

“POR CANTIGAS O POR RIMAS”:
POETRY AND POLITICS AT COURT IN IBERIA, 1000-1300

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My dissertation explores how the Occitan lyric of the troubadours fits into the literary system of medieval Iberia and that of the broader medieval Mediterranean. To that end, I alternate between conceptual and literary-historical interventions, theorizing three concepts — court, agency, and subject — and analyzing three poetic scenes. Each scene stages close readings of the songs of a different “Iberian” troubadour — Guilhem de Peitieu (1071–1126), Guillem de Berguedà (...1138–1192...), and Guiraut Riquier (...1254–1292) — in their courtly contexts. In the first chapter, I theorize the court as a space, working from definitions in Alfonso X’s *Siete Partidas*, and lyric as a practice that helps to produce and regulate that space. Complementing that conceptual analysis, chapter two focuses on the songs of the “first” troubadour, Guilhem de Peitieu. I assess the vocabulary surrounding craft in Guilhem’s songs and its overlap, and disjunction, with that used in the lyric of Iberian *taifa* courts. Turning to the question of what lyric can *do*, chapter three draws from contemporary theory and medieval texts to develop an account of the agency of lyric. My fourth chapter observes this process in action, analyzing the corpus of Guillem de Berguedà, the combative Catalan nobleman and troubadour whose violent songs exemplify the extra-literary force lyric could exert. The fifth chapter explores the treatment of the subject in troubadour lyric, arguing for an understanding of the troubadour subject that is open and multiple rather than unitary and fixed. The “I” in these songs serves as a point of convergence for the complexity of the court: a space whose multiple functions contaminate each other until politics and pleasure become inseparable. This is the context I take up in the last

chapter, focused on the court of Alfonso X and the “last” troubadour, Guiraut Riquier. Guiraut’s moment is one of dramatic change in linguistic technology and his lyric documents the attendant shifts in authority that result, even as he defends the value of his craft in its waning days.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

James Patrick Kozey was born in Washington, D.C. on May 5, 1989. He grew up in Indianapolis, Indiana, and in June of 2012, he graduated with a B.A. in Spanish from Stanford University in Stanford, California. He pursued his graduate studies in Hispanic Literatures and Cultures in the Department of Romance Studies at Cornell University in Ithaca, New York from 2013 to 2019 under the direction of Simone Pinet.

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INTRODUCTION

This project arose out of a desire to understand how the Occitan lyric of the troubadours fits into what, in Claudio Guillen's terms, could be called the *civitas verbi* or "city of the Word" of medieval Iberia, and that of the broader medieval Mediterranean. That question has preoccupied philologists and literary historians since the nineteenth century, beginning with Manuel Milà i Fontanals in *De los trovadores en España* (1861). Ramón Menéndez Pidal addressed it too, beginning in 1924, in a work that would eventually become *Poesía juglaresca y los orígenes de las literaturas románicas* (1957). In the 1970s, Martín de Riquer addressed the question in his edition of Guillem de Berguedà's songs (1971) and his anthology *Los trovadores* (1975). Around the same time, Carlos Alvar published the straightforwardly titled *La poesía trovadoresca en España y Portugal* (1977), and his collection of *Textos trovadorescos sobre España y Portugal*. Vincenç Beltran's *La corte de Babel* (2005) is one of the most recent entries into this lineage, tackling the thirteenth century with a particular eye towards the multiple romance vernacular lyric traditions active at the time.

While this project depends on that tradition of scholarship, reading those works now clarifies a fundamental problem with trying to pursue "Iberian" troubadour studies: how do we know what counts as Iberian? Some of the works listed above can, at times, read like an apology for the songs they cover, many of which are satirical or politically motivated, and therefore difficult to understand. Those songs are also ripe targets for a kind of literary historical "strip-mining" that pulls out the deictic signals pointing towards people, places, and datable events, which might serve as the raw materials for the construction of national literary edifice.

What became clear to me in reading these songs on their own terms is something that seems obvious, but which proved both methodologically and analytically productive: of *course*

the songs that can be counted as “Iberian” are the satirical and political ones. It’s only these songs — filled with the names of people and places — that we can *know* have an Iberian audience. What is now Southern France claims most of the birthplaces of these figures, and what is now Northern Italy was the sight of production for many of the songbooks that preserve this lyric. With the important exception of troubadours born, and documented, in Iberia, these songs are all we have. This is especially true for kingdoms like Castile and León as opposed to Aragón, where some troubadours, and songbooks, are from, as addressed by Riquer and more recently Miriam Cabré. But just as Cabré suggests, this is not necessarily a mark of alterity, but rather something indicating how much wider a network these figures participated in than is immediately obvious. My work also follows others who have taken different angles when approaching the relationship of the troubadours and Iberia, like María Rosa Menocal’s *The Arabic Role in Medieval Literary History* (1987) and Jesús Rodríguez-Velasco’s *Castigos para celosos, consejos para juglares* (1999).

Taking on Occitan troubadour lyric as part of the medieval Iberian literary system calls for tools with which to read this politically motivated, satirical lyric, not as some also-ran genre, but as an integrated part of the troubadour tradition — something it clearly seems to be from looking at the songbooks. My approach defines what this sort of lyric *is* by looking at what it *does* — because in reading it, the fact that it is attempting to *do* something is immediately apparent, both in pragmatic and programmatic terms. This led me to think about how to address the court as a space produced by people through practices like lyric. It also led me to take on the idea of the agency of lyric in order to address how a song “acts” by proxy “on behalf” of its composer. Understanding that “secondary” or “second-class” agency, as Alfred Gell describes it, helped me approach the unavoidable issue of the “troubadour subject.” To acknowledge the role

of human actors involved in the production, reception and circulation of this lyric, I argue for a concept of the “troubadour” subject” that is multiple and open, while still recognizing the *hombres de carne y hueso* that stand behind these songs, to use another of Guillen’s turns of phrase.

Each of the concepts went along with a reading of a troubadour who I felt had an illuminating relationship with Iberia: Guilhem de Peitieu, “the first troubadour,” helps interrogate how to approach the “Arabic role” in the troubadour tradition and its relationship with the Islamicate courts of Iberia; the Catalan nobleman and troubadour Guillem de Berguedà’s vulgar, insulting songs are a clear instance of the agency of lyric in which I’m interested; and Guirat Riquier, the “last troubadour,” by way of his verse-epistles to, and in the voice of, Alfonso X, demonstrates the connection between changes in linguistic technologies — an embrace of the vernacular and the increased role of writing at court — and changes in the practice of both administration and lyric as well. Throughout all of it, I dealt with issues around *mestier* and *mercat*, that is craft / profession / mastery, and exchange — two related, at times overlapping, semantic fields that occurred again and again in the songs that I read.

These issues occur before and after the Occitan lyric of the troubadours, in Iberia and elsewhere. While I don’t take on the question of influence or origins directly here, the case for an important relationship between Occitan lyric and the Arabic lyric in Iberia is a strong one. Hebrew poetry is a useful analogue as well. I also think that a better understanding of the lyric of the troubadours can contribute to readings of later poets like Ausiàs March and the Castilian *cancionero* poets — the title of Enrique de Villena’s *Arte de trovar* comes from somewhere, after all.

By way of an example, take Ana Gómez-Bravo's book *Textual Agency* (2013). In it, she traces the trajectory of the increasing importance of "knowledge" in Castilian courtly life in the fifteenth century, but her account is so focused on Castilian literature that it misses some important precursors. First, for her, is Alfonso X, followed by an increase in the fourteenth century, and an even higher level in her period of study, the fifteenth, when "courtly knowledge and behavior became associated with the opportunity for social mobility and proximity to the monarch" (21). Gómez-Bravo also spends a great deal of time focused on the role of literacy and scribal culture. In all of this, she is interested in what poems as textual objects can *do*, concluding that "[a]gency is communicable and contested. It is also grounded in the material aspect of production. Through these means the text becomes its own agent; it has iterative powers that use but are not wholly dependent on human agents" (216). She also argues that these texts "mov[e] through networks of exchange" (216). Some of this will sound familiar after reading this project, though I think my own work articulates a different view of the agency of lyric. In general, it is consonant with my interest in an approach which acknowledges how different lyric traditions precede, succeed, or overlap with one another.

That approach is an ongoing one, and this project is an opening push, considering the Occitan troubadour tradition as an integrated part of the Iberian literary system. As it is only a beginning, it does not engage with some obvious parallels, like Galician-Portuguese lyric, especially the *cantigas d'escharho e maldizer*. My hope, however, is that this project offers methods that produce work which can be built upon, by myself and others, in the greater project of understanding lyric's role in the literary systems of medieval Iberia and that of the Mediterranean.

CHAPTER ONE

“*Que cosa es Corte...*”: From a productive polysemy, towards a concept of the court

“The court” is three things at once: a room in a palace, the people in that room, and what those people are doing. This productive polysemy — place, people, and practice — functions as a trinity of sorts: the court is all three of these things, but none can be understood except in terms of the other two. Analyzing this polysemous trinity can help to reanimate the court, because the court is best understood as a *space*, or “a produced place” (Certeau 117).¹ Understanding the court as a space — something produced in a place, by a group of people, performing a practice (or set of them) — is a productive approach especially as it relates to lyric. While many practices help constitute the court, lyric is one that also serves as an invaluable index of the very space it produces.

This spatial understanding of the court allows for structural comparisons between connected, but distinct, instantiations of apparently similar phenomena. While lyric’s role as index will be addressed below, this chapter will argue for a concept of the court based on the productive polysemy outlined above: place, people, and practice.² This courtly trinity helps produce an understanding of the court that can provide for structural and systematic comparisons across the diversity of courts in medieval Iberia. This chapter will begin with meditations on what the court is taken from Alfonso X’s *Siete Partidas*, before turning to a song by Peire d’Alvernha from the court of Alfonso VIII, “Cantarai d’aqestz trobadors” [I’ll sing of those troubadours], an example of how lyric can help to produce the space of the court.

¹ This is Michel de Certeau’s formulation, from *Arts de faire* (1980) taken from the Steven Rendall’s translation, *The Practice of Everyday Life* (1984). For his distinction between “space” and “place” see pp. 117-118.

² See chapter three, which addresses “lyric” as a diachronic category, its place in literary systems, and its potential for a secondary kind of agency.

Defining the court has been an issue for readers of the troubadours for some time. Linda Paterson describes the process as “confusing,” but she contends that, in general:

...a court was either an assembly centered on some leading figure, or else a place of residence where such an assembly might take place. In other words, it might be a location, or the people in it, or a special event. Its function might be political, judicial, administrative, or social. (91)

Paterson echoes the trinity referenced above, but she lacks “practice.” When the court is conceived of as a space, a practiced place, this polysemy becomes productive, rather than confusing, pointing towards the constant interplay of the court’s constitutive elements. Reading the troubadours in the context of Iberia provides a rich resource for more contemporary thinking on what “the court” is, as can be found in *Las Siete Partidas* (=> *Partidas*), produced by the workshop of Alfonso X of Castile and León (b. 1221, r. 1252-1284).³ One law provides a similarly tripartite definition:

Corte es llamado el lugar, do es el Rey, e sus vasallos, e sus Oficiales con el, que le han cotidianamente de consejar, e de seruir, e los omes del Reyno, que se llegan y, o por honrra del, o por alcançar derecho, o por fazerlo, o por recabdar las otras cosas que han de ver con el.

[“The Court” is the name of the place where the King, his vassals, his officials (who must daily advise and serve him), and the men of the Kingdom gather, either for his honor, to obtain justice or to dispense it, or to transact other business which has to do with him [the King].] (2.9.27)⁴

³ Alfonso X will be discussed further in chapter six. For a recent brief biography in English see Simon Doubleday’s *The Wise King* (2015). See also H. Salvador Martínez’s *Alfonso X, el Sabio* (2003), translated into English by Odile Cisneros as *Alfonso X, the Learned* (2010).

⁴ Title IX of the second *Partida*, from which this law is taken, is “*Qual deve el Rey ser a sus Oficiales, e a los de su Casa, e de su Corte, e ellos a el.*” [What the King should be to his officers, to his house, his court, and they to him]. Citations from the *Partidas* are from the 1555 edition glossed by Gregorio Lopez, in this case from a nineteenth century printing (1843-1844). Translations are modifications of Samuel Parsons Scott’s (1931), which are the basis of the English edition of the *Partidas* edited by Robert Burns (2001).

The court is described first as a “place” (“el lugar”), then as a set of people (“el Rey...sus vasallos...sus Oficiales...los omes del Reyno”) [the King...his vassals...his officials...the men of the kingdom] and finally by all the practices those people perform in that place. All of it is focused on the presence of the King.

The *Partidas* themselves are a rich text: the laws have a “literary” character which makes them “seem as much essays as laws,” as Robert Burns describes them (ix). First promulgated in 1348, some six decades after the death of Alfonso X, the *Partidas* have been a constant in Spanish law, always taking a “supplementary” role, but always present (Rodríguez-Velasco, “La Urgente Presencia” 99–100).⁵ After dispensing with God in the first *Partida*, Alfonso turns to governance and kingship in the second.⁶ In it, Title IX focuses on the relationship between the king and the people surrounding him, like court officials, the members of his home, and those who come before the court. It lists different offices and describes their function, what type of men ought to fill them, and how they ought to act. Finally, the last four laws in the title lay out a framework for thinking about the court itself. The first of them, 2.9.27, cited above, is “*Que cosa es Corte, e porque ha assi nome, e qual deve ser.*” [What “the Court” is, why it is so named, and what it should be.] Along with the three laws that follow it, the law provides a tripartite concept of what sort of thing “the Court” is, while also making clear this is cannot be understood as just three individual elements — place, people, or practice — but is, rather, the product of all three.

⁵ Jesús Rodríguez-Velasco has written extensively on the *Partidas*. His article “La urgente presencia de *Las Siete Partidas*” (2010) analyzes the “urgent presence” of the *Partidas* during moments of crisis for the Spanish monarchy from the thirteenth century through the twentieth. The article also offers an account of its textual history, as well as on its theoretical implications.

⁶ Use of “Alfonso” in order to describe the work produced by the king’s workshop follows Rodríguez-Velasco, in turn following María Rosa Lida de Malkiel (Rodríguez-Velasco, “Espacio” 424n2).

The law shows a concern with *nomes* [“names”], and explanation via etymology, that is characteristic of the *Partidas* in general. After answering “what” the Court is, the law attempts to explain “why” it has that name (“porque he assi nome”). Here, in an effort to explain the name *corte*, the law twists multiple strands of meaning around one another in an effort to form a single thread. The first two are Latin — *cohors* and *curia* — which relate to the institution as a place and a group of people, while also touching on what sort of business is transacted there. The third is Castilian — *cortar*, or “to cut” — which relates directly to administrative and judicial practice. While each etymological strand accounts for a piece or two of the concept, as individual terms they are incomplete. Together, the three *nomes* offer a fuller understanding, and, as they are spun around one another, the thread they produce leads to a concept of the court as produced space.

First is *cohors*, “en que muestra tanto Ayuntamiento de compañías; ca alli se Allegan todos aquellos que han de honrrar, e de guardar al Rey, e al Reyno” [which means a union of companies for there all those whose duty it is to protect the King and the Kingdom are collected] (2.9.27). *Cohors* (also rendered as *cors*) is itself a dead spatial metaphor, referring first to an enclosed space or yard holding animals, then metonymically to groups of people.⁷ In that sense, it came to mean the retinue of a leader or other important figure (Lewis and Short, “Cohors”). Here, it moves from a place to a group of people, all the while containing an important element of practice — the coming together of the different constituencies that make up the *cohors*.

The second Latin etymon is *curia*, “que quiere tanto dezir, como lugar do es la cura de todos los fechos de la tierra, ca alli se ha de catar lo que cada vno deue auer, segund su derecho, e su estado.” [which means a place where supervision is exercised over all the acts in the land, for there it must be determined to what each one is entitled, according to his rights and station.]

⁷ In English, this sense survives in the word “cohort” (“Court, n.1”).

(2.9.27). The *curia* is an idea as old as the Roman republic — it was the name for the building in which the Senate met. Livy retrojects its origins to the legendary founding of Rome: the *curiae* are the thirty “tribes” into which Romulus divides the people of the city, one for each of the Sabine women (Livy 1.13.6). It was also the name for the group, the council, that advised a ruler in a more formal capacity (Lewis and Short, “Curia”). That dual sense, a place of official council and also an official group of councilors, preserves another collapsed strand of meaning (“Court, n.1”).

Evelyn Procter documents the evolution of the *curia* in Iberia into a kind of parliamentary assembly known as the *Cortes*.⁸ The “*Cortes* in Castile, León and Aragón; *Cortes* in Portugal; and *Corts* in Catalonia,” are comparable with the English Parliament or the French Estates General, but they precede those two chronologically (Procter 1n1). Each of these assemblies differs according to the political concerns and social structures of the time, but each follows a similar pattern of evolution during the thirteenth century, from *curia* to *Cortes*. As Procter explains:

In the eleventh and twelfth centuries the work of government was carried on by the monarch with the aid of an assembly to which various names were given, but which in the twelfth century was generally called the *curia regis*. [...] In its largest form the curia consisted of members of the royal family, the officials of the king’s household and the lay and ecclesiastical magnates of the kingdom. A great assembly of magnates was cumbersome and, for practical reasons, could be summoned only at infrequent intervals. The business of government, however, required daily attention and this routine business was transacted by a much smaller body composed of officials and *familiares* together with those bishops and nobles who might be with the king. These two sorts of assembly were not separate institutions, but two forms of the same institution. It was from the curia in its largest form that the representative assemblies evolved. (1–2)

⁸ See *Curia and Cortes in León and Castile, 1072-1295* (1980).

There is a marked flexibility in what fits under the *curia* label: moving from a group of people, to a metonym for the place where those people met, the term then refers again to a group of people exercising power through their proximity to the ruler, before finally becoming a new form of institutional designation.

The final etymon binds together the Latin words — focused on grouping — with a Castilian verb that represents their semantic opposite: *cortar* [to cut]. As the law puts it, “Otro si es dicho Corte segund lenguaje de España, porque alli es la espada de la justicia” [Furthermore, it is called *corte* in the language of Spain, because the sword of justice is kept there] (2.9.27). The law then offers a discussion of what the “espada de justicia” [sword of justice] is, that “con que se han de cortar todos los malos fechos, tambien de dicho, como de fecho” [with which all evil acts in word or deed are punished] (2.9.27). A more literal translation would be that all these “evil acts” would be “cut” rather than “punished.” The focus here is, once again, on the central role of the king at court. While his very presence concentrates power in one place, bringing different groups together, his strength comes from his ability to do the opposite: to cut down, to separate, and as will be seen in a later law (2.9.30), to exclude and to force out.⁹ The presence of this cutting blade, wielded by the king, is what makes the court a site of such power, and that concentration of power is what makes the different practices performed there — administrative, legal, and lyric — so important.

⁹ In her book *Files: Law and Media Technology*, translated into English by Geoffrey Winthrop-Young, Cornelia Vismann takes note of the power of deletion, of cancellation, especially as it relates to the law. See pp. 25-29 regarding “canceling” and the chancery, and pp. 39-70 on Justinian and the compilation of Roman law in codices that would have played such an important role in the compilation of the *Partidas*. For that history, see Rodríguez-Velasco, “Urgente presencia...” esp. pp. 105-125.

The rest of 2.9.27 is focused on matters of behavior, explaining both what sort of deeds might justify being “cut,” and what sort of improper or arrogant speech might indicate an underlying uncouth nature. Only those who avoid these improper actions and use the correct sort of language, i.e. “las palabras buenas e apuestas” [words which are proper and well-considered], can be called “buenos e enseñados” [good and educated] (2.9.27). They are, in fact, “cortesés, porque las bondades, e los otros fallaron, e los aprisieron en las Cortes” [corteous because the excellent qualities and other beneficial instruction which compose what is called courtesy, are always to be found and learned in the courts] (2.9.27). This helps explain why, according to the text of the law, noble sons are sent to court in Spain, to learn how to be *cortesés* and freed from *villania*. Scott translates “villania” as “wickedness,” but the word also recalls the figure of the *vilan*. In troubadour lyric, the *vilan*, or peasant, is the opposite of courtly, something a lord or lady might reveal him or herself to be through improper conduct or speech.¹⁰

The next three laws continue this meditation on the relationship between space and practice. The final one, 2.9.30, is dedicated precisely to regulating conduct, how the rhetorical practice of *retraer* — which Scott translates as “ridicule” but Rodríguez-Velasco points out is a kind of narration — ought to be used properly at court.¹¹ Laws 2.9.28 and 2.9.29 each describe a

¹⁰ In *Vilain and Courtois*, Kathy Gravdal defines the two terms as they occur in Old French, see pp. 12-15. Through a confusion of Old French homophones, *vilain*, or peasant, is conflated with *vil*, from the Latin *vilem* “‘of little worth,’ ‘of low price’” (12). By the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, *vilain* can mean “(1) a space, that of the rural countryside; (2) a social class, that of the medieval peasantry; (3) a moral sphere, that of the base and vile; (4) a stylistic register, that of vilains mots, gross words and crude self-expression; (5) a literary sphere, or constellation of genres” that includes *fabliaux* and *pastourelle* (14).

¹¹ He does so in “Theorizing the Language of the Law” (2008), which develops his concept of a “space of certainty” at the heart of the Alfonsine legal project, ultimately focused around the body of the king and the notion of Alfonso himself as the sole guarantor of certainty.

space, the sea and the palace respectively.¹² Law 2.9.29 dwells again on the suggestive polysemy of a courtly space, but here it does so expanding on a specific place in which the court itself was often held: *el palacio* [the palace]. This law describes the *palacio* in parallel to 2.9.27's description of the court, but with an even clearer focus on practice. Called "*Que cosa es Palacio, e por que le llaman assi.*" [What a Palace is, and why it is so called] (2.9.29), the law opens with the declaration that "Palacio es dicho cualquier lugar, do es el Rey se ayunta paladinamente, para fablar con los omes" [Any place is called a Palace where a king publicly associates with men to talk to them] (2.9.29). There is a strong parallel with the definition of the court provided earlier.

As Rodríguez-Velasco describes:

...[t]he main difference between 'court' and 'palace' is that the court can receive people from any social space, whereas the palace is the center where the king meets with the nobles and other officials that constitute his group of administrators. ("Theorizing" 72n14)

There is, then, an even more critical set of concerns about the way in which those present in the more private, but critically, still public space of the palace act. The palace is so called because it is a place where the king meets with men to speak "paladinamente," i.e. in both a public and intelligible fashion.¹³

¹² Law 2.9.28 gives an explanation for why "los Sabios antiguos" [the old sages] compared the court to the sea. First, both must be capacious enough to hold all their business. Second, each poses a challenge, a chance for a kind of adventure: the reward for those who go out on a sunny day, and the threat of drowning for those who risk a trip in the stormy season (2.9.28). Finally, the law explains that the king ought to listen to his councilors, again using nautical metaphors. While those around him ought to advise him well, ultimately, the king should "guiar por la justicia" [be guided by justice] in the same way that a sailor navigates by the compass needle, reliable no matter the weather (2.9.28).

¹³ For more on the concepts circling around *palacio*, see Yakov Malkiel's "Old Spanish Paladino [...]". He argues that the adverbial form of *paladino* is mostly found in thirteenth century prose texts, like the *Partidas*, and that *paladinamente* survives longer than most other members of the word family (956). Its two connotations, "'widely known, public," and... 'plain, obvious, readily understandable'" are present in its many uses, and certainly in the *Partidas* (954). Some examples include theft in public (i.e. on the street) as "*ladrón paladino*" versus "*ladrón cubierto*"

Like the etymologies of *cohors* and *curia* in law 2.9.27, *palacio* circles back to a dead spatial metaphor as well. The word goes back to the Latin “palatium,” itself a name for one of the seven hills on which the city of Rome was founded, and on which Imperial residences were built (Lewis and Short, “Palatium”). An analysis of the word’s use in Castilian and Navarrese administrative documents, from the mid-tenth to mid-twelfth centuries, shows how *palatium* moved between, and tied together, a spatial dimension and a symbolic one (Bocos et al. 282). It could range from something as general as the whole income earning estate of a lord, to something as specific as a particular building; but in either case, it was tied to the presence of a figure of power, the *señor*, making it “the place where the Lord is,” to paraphrase law 2.9.30 (Bocos et al. 284).

While court business could take place in buildings other than a palace, they occupy a central place in the discussion in the *Partidas*. The symbolic power of those monuments, however, was matched by their tendency to disappear. This is not evidence of a later architectural program of obliteration, but rather, as Therese Martin describes it, “their susceptibility to reuse with a new function” (Martin, “Chronicling” 134). In describing the difficulty in studying secular palace architecture, Martin points out two key elements of such structures that make this true: they were positioned in centrally important locations, and they were made out of expensive materials to emphasize the importance of their owners, like stone in moments when it was rarely used in urban secular architecture (“Chronicling” 111–12). When a

or “secret theft”; or what Gonzalo de Berceo calls “*roman paladino*” i.e. “commonly understandable vernacular” or “*voz paladina*” as a “plain, simple word” (957). See also Simone Pinet’s “Rumor and noise,” where she synthesizes Malkiel’s definition as “to speak *paladino* is to speak clearly, publicly, as in the sphere of influence of the king” (“Rumor and Noise” 16).

city grew in later centuries, secular palaces provided a ready-to-hand supply of building materials and they occupied valuable land, leading to their infrequent survival.

While the physical structures are seldom still present, an understanding of the legal concept of the palace, and the court in turn, can help provide an understanding of what would have happened in the courtly space produced therein. It comes down to a similar polysemy in the terms designating both spaces.¹⁴ Like the court, the palace is both a physical and a produced space. In its evolution — from an exploitable agrarian unit, to a heritable legal entity, and finally to something more symbolic — a slippage of meaning occurs that makes the concept richer and more complicated. Invoking one meaning recalls the others. While it may be impossible to know in a given case which meaning of *palatium* should be understood, its use always carries a reminder of the source of its power: the presence of the “Señor” (Bocos et al. 285).

That presence, of the king in this case, shapes law 2.9.29, which tries to dictate how one ought to behave *paldinamente* while in the *palacio*. While very specific in certain prescriptions (no signing messages, as monks might do, for instance) the main thrust is simple enough: speech in court must be done in the open, in a measured way, and in a way that is intelligible to all — most critically to the ruler. This effort to depict the palace, and the court, as a space in which the king knows and controls all, is a consistent theme in the *Partidas*. What may seem to be rules of conduct are also an assertion that there is a proper way to speak, that the king is the arbiter of that appropriateness, and that all speech in his presence falls under his authority.

The types of speech appropriate for the court are more explicitly addressed in the final law of the title, 2.9.30, “*Quantas cosas deuen ser catadas en el retraer,*” which Rodríguez-

¹⁴ In other words, “polisemio de la palabra entre edificio y figura jurídica” [polysemy of the word between building and juridical figure] (Bocos et al. 291).

Velasco translates as “What things should be considered in narrating,” with Scott translating the final word as “ridicule” (Rodríguez-Velasco, “Theorizing” 70). A rhetorical term taken from Occitan and Old French poetry, *retraer* means “to narrate,” with examples found in sources ranging from Guillem de Berguedà to the Castilian work of mester de clerecía the *Libro de Alexandre* (“Theorizing” 69).¹⁵ It is a practice which shares important features with lyric, particularly the sort of insulting and/or humorous exchanges that characterize satirical and political songs. At the heart of the law is a concern over how to properly use humorous, ironic speech in relating such a narration, particularly considering that audience members might well be the subject of that which is retold — a fact which helps to explain Scott’s translation of *retraer* as “ridicule.”

The stakes are high, and as such, a speaker should take three things into account: “tiempo, e lugar, e manera” [time, place, and manner] (2.9.30).¹⁶ In all three, the key is appropriateness — one must choose the right occasion, the right audience, and the right manner to relate an anecdote in order to ensure that it is properly received. Indeed, the audience’s reception is a critical element in the success or failure of “el juego” [the game] (2.9.30).¹⁷ A person who plays “the game” well is called a *palanciano*, which Scott leaves untranslated and

¹⁵ Another thirteenth century text, it uses *retraer* in this sense in its programmatic prologue. In the third stanza — after the poet has already described his craft not as “joglaría” but “clerezía” — he says that any who listens to him, “aprenderá buenas gestas que sepa retraer; / averlo han por ello muchos a coñocer” [he will learn great *gestes* in order to tell them himself / for which he will become very well-known] (my trans. modifying Casa Rigall) (3). In his edition of the text, Casas Rigall glosses “retraer” as “referir, contar, recordar” [to relate, to tell/narrate, to recall] (1101).

¹⁶ Rodríguez-Velasco points this out in “Theorizing” as well, given that the punishment for libel in songs and the *infamia* [infamy] which can result from it, are harsh. These are offered in the seventh *Partida*, and will be discussed in chapters three and four.

¹⁷ This recalls Benjamin Liu’s formula for joke telling in *Medieval Joke Poetry* which is discussed in chapter four.

Rodríguez-Velasco renders, “literally, person of the palace” (“Theorizing” 77). The king and the audience render judgement on the game, since “dize el prouerbio antiguo, que non es juego, donde ome non rie.” [the old proverb says it is no joke, at which man does not laugh.] (2.9.30).¹⁸ Those who cannot manage that demonstrate themselves unfit and should be expelled from the court and the palace (2.9.30). The king’s power comes as much from his ability to exclude someone from the space of the court as from his ability to include them in it.

THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS

What sort of space does a reader see when they look into the text of the *Partidas*, and how does that image reflect reality? Reflection is not an accidental metaphor in the context of the *Partidas*. They are a sort of *speculum principum*, “Mirror for Princes,” a key genre for the sort of royal education from which Alfonso benefited, and one that is a critical site for intercultural exchange in, and beyond, Iberia.¹⁹ Mirrors, though, are a complicated symbol, and the genre is made up of complicated texts. Referring to the Islamic tradition, Nequin Yavari explains that “[a]s a genre” mirrors for princes are “encyclopedic in nature, widely distributed in time and location, and

¹⁸ Here, Scott translates *juego* as “joke” rather than “game” to better highlight an audience’s laughter as a condition for success.

¹⁹ These works, popular in Latin as well as in the Arabic *adab* tradition, were often presented to new rulers on the occasion of their succession to the throne (Kéchichian; Bjork). Drawing on a tradition that Aristotle presented Alexander with such a work, the genre was popular in the tenth through thirteenth centuries, and grew more so beyond that time period (Lewis). The range of texts that could fill the role was a broad one. H. Salvador Martínez lists the collection of tales in *Calila e Dimna* as one example from the Arabic tradition, as well as the Castilian original commissioned by Alfonso’s father, Fernando III, the *Libro de los doze sabios* (Martínez 76–77). The latter would be referenced repeatedly in Alfonso’s legal works, particularly the second *Partida*, with its focus on academic and practical education of the ruler. Whether the details reflect Alfonso’s own experience, or that which he attempts to lay out for future heirs, it can be understood as such a mirror (78–80). For more on *Calila e Dimna* as such a text, see María Jesús Lacarra (1979), pp. 33-39.

subject to much tampering by later copyists, often accumulating contradictory accretions in the process” (48). One common trope and its inverse makes these contradictions clear: good advice givers warn against the bad advice of others, and just as frequently, a king ignores good advice and then kills the counselor who gave it to him (48). Neither counselor nor prince wants to see himself in that image.

The prologue from the first *Partida* asks that the work be seen in this light, describing how, “todos los reyes de nuestro señorío...se caten en este libro ansi como en espejo” (1.Prologue). Rodríguez-Velasco describes this passage as creating a “virtual image of a universe of certainties” (“Theorizing” 66). A “Mirror for Princes” also offers a space in which the prince, or king, may see himself, and it also reflects a desire to ensure that what they see in the book does indeed reflect reality. But the space seen by means of a mirror is a peculiar, often misunderstood one. Michel Foucault considers this strangeness in “Des Espaces Autres” [“Of Other Spaces”].²⁰ In it he describes his conception of *utopia* and *heterotopia*, two spaces that reflect society in “perfected” and “inverted” form respectively (24). While a utopia is a “placeless place,” a heterotopia exists in reality, while “represent[ing], contest[ing], and invert[ing]” society (24). In Foucault’s account, the mirror sits between, and shares characteristic with, both a utopia and a heterotopia. It is a kind of “mixed space” that puts spectators into the “unreal, virtual space” behind its surface; in seeing their reflection, they imagine themselves from that alternative perspective, seeing an inverted, heterotopic version of themselves (24).

This, however, is not quite the sort of virtual space that the mirror of the *Partidas* opens up. Mirrors are less intuitively understood than they are often assumed to be.²¹ There are also

²⁰ The text is made up of notes for a talk given in March of 1967, published only after his death, first in French in 1984, then in English in 1986 (22n1).

²¹ Joel Snyder, in his article “‘Las Meninas’ and the Mirror of the Prince,” argues that:

important, productive differences, in both theoretical and material terms between medieval and modern mirrors. First, medieval optical theory proposed two distinct visions of how sight worked, one focused on the viewing subject, the other on the object being viewed. According to the theory of *extramission*, the subject's eye emits a ray that interacts with the object being seen. In the second theory, *intramission*, the object emits a form that is in turn apprehended by the viewer (Akbari, "Sight Lines" 150). A mirror, then, presents a quandary, a case in which the subject might seem to constitute *itself* through the act of seeing ("Sight Lines" 150). This helps explain the critical allegorical importance of the mirror in medieval literature, one which often relates to, or overlaps with, sight (*Seeing* ix-x).²²

In those allegories, the mirror is often a mediating third space between an observer and the truth, often divine, they seek to grasp. Indeed, the symbolism of the mirror becomes tied up with the material out of which it is made. The material nature of the medieval mirror — whether

Mirrors are treacherous things. We all use them and think we understand them "intuitively," but most of us do not understand them at all. Some examples: Do mirrors reverse writing right to left? If a piece of paper with writing in English on it is held up to a mirror, we will see the mirror reverse the words. True? Yes, true, but the mirror has not reversed anything at all. We do the reversing. Take a piece of clear plastic or cellophane and write a sentence on it in waxy crayon. Hold it up to a mirror so that the writing appears, as usual, reversed in it. Now look at the writing on the clear plastic. It is reversed also. When we hold a page to a mirror, we do so with the back of the page to us and with the writing toward the mirror: we reverse the page relative to the way we read it; the mirror passively reflects this. Two more questions: (1) As you move away from a mirror, do you see more or less of the room in which you stand? (2) Imagine that you have a mirror as long and as wide as your face, held at eye level and that you place your face practically against it so that the mirror is filled from top to bottom with its reflection. Walk away from the mirror. How much of the mirror is filled by your face when viewed from a distance of ten feet? From one hundred feet? From infinity? Answers: (1) You can see less and less of the room as you move away from the mirror, more and more as you approach it. It is just like looking through a window into a room. (2) The size of your face relative to the size of the mirror is constant. Your face will not get smaller and smaller as you move away; it will always appear to fill it. (566n8)

²² Akbari's *Seeing through the Veil* (2004) offers a more comprehensive study of the relationship between optical theory and allegory.

polished bronze, silver, or crystal — means it offers a different sort of reflection than the silver-backed glass mirrors made by Venetian artisans from the fourteenth century onwards.²³ This, however, adds to its potential symbolic significance, rather than subtracting from it. Take crystal: while still loaded with associations with transparency and purity from biblical and classical sources, crystal often appears in twelfth and thirteenth century courtly literature at what Marisa Galvez calls “heightened moments of subjectivity” (“Dark Transparencies” 18). In those moments it is seen through intromission rather than extramission, a substance that mediates the corporeality and sensuality of erotic desire which underlie so much courtly literary production (“Dark Transparencies” 16–18).

The *Partidas* sit at an intersection between these two concepts of the mirror. The space they project could be the ideal of the king, and of the court, that rulers could look into, and seek to shape their world to match.²⁴ Even if the text seeks to project a kind of transparent access to

²³ Sabine Melchior-Bonnet’s *The Mirror* (2001) provides a history of the craft’s development, with a particular focus on France.

²⁴ Snyder describes this aspect of the Spanish tradition of *espejos de príncipes* in the Renaissance:

The term “mirror” in the titles of these texts is most usual, but other terms are used in its place. Thus in this genre we also find the “looking glass,” or the “glass,” or the “ideal,” or the “idea” of the prince. All of these terms function in a similar way: they indicate ideal norms of conduct, character, and thought. This old sense of “mirror image” has nearly vanished from our language; it is the notion of a mirror reflection that is exemplary, or ideal, a reflection that can be reached only through art and can be seen only by the inner eye, a reflection whose source is not and cannot be corporeal in origin. It is also the reflection of an artistic ideal, since the figure of the perfect or exemplary prince is the creation of human fashioning. Understood in this way, the mirrored prince is an ideal, integral being whose intellectual, moral, and political virtue—in other words, whose character—is fashioned by art, in accord with divine doctrine and the wisdom of men of arts, letters, and practical affairs. The mirror of the prince is an object as well as the product of imitation; so the character of the creator of the ideal is forever implicated in it. (558)

the nature of ideal rulership, to the seat of power and its operation, it is, itself a mediator.²⁵

Looking into the *Partidas* as this sort of mirror helps square the text's relationship with reality: both reflecting an ideal, and shaping the reader's own perception. The laws are easier to understand when, rather than contemplating how they would have been enacted or enforced, one instead views them as part of a larger cultural project to put all things under the control of the ruler. The court of the *Partidas* is a sort of fantasy, where justice guides every royal choice. When a king reads it, and sees himself in it, he is not looking into the kind of mirror Foucault describes, but he may well be put into a placeless place, or an inversion of the spaces that surrounds him. By seeing himself in the court of the *Partidas*, then tracing his own gaze back to where he stands in reality, the differences between the ideal and the real come into focus. Readers of the text today, trying to triangulate a point of courtly understanding, need a third referent, which raises the question of what sort of evidence might provide that contrasting experience. Lyric can serve as that third referent.

A COMIC GALLERY AT THE COURT OF ALFONSO VIII

“Cantarai d'aqestz trobadors” (=> *Cantarai*) by Peire d'Alvernha (...1149-1168...) reflects, and produces, such a space. In a 1933 article on the song's background, Walter Pattison describes the range of analyses it has occasioned:

No single Provençal poem has been so much discussed...in recent years as Peire d'Averne's satirical review of twelve contemporary troubadours and jongleurs. In this work Peire brings before us a group of his fellows, some of them great figures in Provençal literature, such as Guiraut de Bornelh and Bernart de Ventadorn, others humble entertainers who go begging and singing from town to town. In each case Peire sketches a rapid caricature of his victim, ridiculing especially his appearance and his singing ability. (19)

²⁵ Philip Lorenz considers a later English case where a “Christall Mirror” is held up as a way to “open on to a view of the interiority of sovereignty itself” (102).

Filled with names and references to other troubadours, as well as to place names across present-day France and Spain, the song's deictic signaling invites the kind of scholarly strip-mining to which satirical lyric is vulnerable. The song's series of satirical portraits also recalls the rules laid out in law 2.9.30 of the *Partidas* regarding the "game" or "joke" of *retraer*. This reading will look at how the song documents the court while helping to produce the space of the court. The way it deploys humor points to a specific understanding of how power functions at court, as, above the jovial proceedings the *espada de justicia* hangs.

Cantarai predates Alfonso X's court by a century, occasioning a comparison with another ruler of Castile with the same name, Alfonso VIII (1155, r. 1158-1214). While the court of Alfonso X marks a moment of much wider vernacular production, it is also a period that marks a change in the Occitan troubadour tradition, a transition from orality to writing. Alfonso X's patronage of lyric in Occitan, as well as in other peninsular vernacular registers like Galician-Portuguese, can be seen as a continuation of a courtly model put in place by his great-grandfather (Alvar 53). Alfonso VIII's reign represents the high-water mark of Occitan lyric in the peninsula, according to scholarly consensus; Vincenç Beltran goes so far as to argue that while Alfonso X might have matched Alfonso VIII in quantity of Occitan lyric produced for his court, there was no comparison in terms of quality (38).

Occitan troubadours had received patronage in Iberian courts before Alfonso VIII — Peire mentions Alfonso's father Sancho III, for example — but as the Occitan troubadour tradition grew in stature, demand for their songs grew as well. Carlos Alvar points out that the levels of patronage in Alfonso VIII's era indicate not only an appreciation for Occitan lyric, but also a sufficient number of peninsular courts where those composing in Occitan would find a warm welcome and an understanding audience (53). At least eight Occitan troubadour received

Alfonso's patronage.²⁶ Contemporary nobles also viewed lyric patronage as a sphere in which they could compete with the king, and names like Diego López de Haro and don Fernando and don Alvaro de Lara crop up in songs from the period (53). That competition for prestige also helps explain the rise of Galician-Portuguese lyric — the first song which can be dated with assurance comes from Alfonso VIII's reign.²⁷

Cantarai — a song in fourteen *coblas singulares*, each made up of six octosyllabic lines, and a two-line *tornada* — documents this apex of Occitan lyric production at the court of Alfonso VIII. It is also a song that derives great comedic effect from functioning as a mirror, or series of them, for the figures it depicts in verse, which is mentioned explicitly in the third *cobla*. Each of these fourteen units mocks a specific troubadour by reflecting on the contradiction between their appearance and reality, between semblance and nature:²⁸

<p>Cantarai d'aqestz trobadors que canton de maintas colors e·l pieier cuida dir mout gen; mas a cantar lor er aillors q'entrametre·n vei cen pastors c'us non sap qe·s mont'o·s dissent.</p>	(5)	<p>[I'll sing of those troubadours that sing in different styles [colors] and the worst thinks he sings very well; but they'll have to sing somewhere else because among them I see a hundred shepherds none of which knows if he's going up or down.</p>
<p>D'aisso mer mal Peire Rotgiers, per qe n'er encolpatz primiers, car chanta d'amor a presen; e valgra li mais us sautiers</p>	(10)	<p>Of this, Peire Rogier is guilty, because of which he'll be accused first, since he sings openly of love; and he'd be more use as a psalter</p>

²⁶ In his article, "Catalan and Occitan Troubadours at the Court of Alfonso VIII," (2004) Antonio Jiménez Sánchez summarizes the literature surrounding the number of troubadours with a definite relationship to Alfonso's court. While Manuel Mila i Fontanals, Riquer, Alvar, and Joseph Snow agree to a list of around eighteen, Jiménez Sánchez suggest the total is lower, something like nine (104, 117). Alvar himself, would later (2002) amend the longer list from his earlier work, suggesting there were at least eight (53).

²⁷ According to Alvar, this is Johan Soares de Pavha's "Ora faz ost' o senhor de Navarra," which is from between 1198 and 1200 (57).

²⁸ The following edition is based on Riquer and Goldin, with the translation being my modification of Riquer and Goldin's own in Spanish and English respectively. The song appears in nine manuscripts (*A, C, D^a, I, K, N², R, a, and z*) (Riquer, *Los trovadores* 333). For Riquer's edition, see pp. 332-341; for Goldin's see pp. 170-175.

en la glieis' o us candeliers
tener ab gran candel' arden.

in a church, or holding a candelabra
with a great altar candle burning.

E·l segonz, Girautz de Borneill,
qe sembl'oire sec al soleill
ab son chantar magre dolen,
q'es chans de viella porta-seill;
que si·s mirava en espeill,
no·s prezari'un aiguilen.

(15) The second, Giraut de Bornelh,
who looks like a wineskin dried out in the sun
with his sick, pitiful song,
the song of an old woman water-hawker;
if he looked at himself in the mirror,
he couldn't think less of himself.

E·l tertz, Bernartz de Ventedorn,
q'es menre de Borneill un dorn;
en son paire ac bon sirven
per trair'ab arc manal d'alborn,
e sa mair'escaldava·l forn
et amassava l'issermen.

(20) The third, Bernart de Ventadorn,
is less than Bornelh by a span;
in his father he had a good servant,
good at shooting with a handmade bow of elderberry wood,
and his mother warmed up the oven
and gathered vine shoots.

E·l quartz, de Briva·l lemozis,
us joglars q'es plus qerentis
que sia tro q'en Beniven,
e semblari'us pelegris
malamutes, qan chanta·l mesquis,
c'a pauc pietatz no m'en pren.

(25) The fourth, the Limousin from Briva,
the neediest *juglar*
to be found from here to Benavent,
and he seems like a falcon,
a sick one, when he sings,
(30) so that we almost feel sorry for him.

E·N Guillems de Ribas lo qins,
q'es malvatz defors e dedins,
e ditz totz sos vers raucamen,
per que es avols sos retins,
c'atretan s'en fari'us chins;
e l'uoil semblan de vout d'argen.

And Guilhem de Ribas, the fifth,
is wicked inside and out,
and says all his verses raucously,
for his crooning is so bad
(35) it would make him a dog
and he has eyes like a silver statue.

E·l seises, Grimoartz Gausmars,
q'es cavalliers e fai joglars;
e perda Dieu qui·l o cossen
ni·l dona vestirs vertz ni vars,
que tals er adobatz semprars
qu'enjoglarit s'en seran cen.

The sixth, Grimoart Gausmar,
who is a knight that plays at being a *juglar*
and he who allows him loses God
(40) and gives him green dresses and motley
and for every one armed as a knight
a hundred will act as a *juglar*.

Ab Peire de Monzo so set,
pos lo coms de Tolosa·l det,
chantan, un sonnet avinen,
e cel fon cortes qe·l raubet,
e mal o fes car no·il trenqet
aqel pe que porta penden.

(45) With Peire de Monzo there are seven,
since the count of Toulouse gave him,
singing, an agreeable little tune,
and he was courteous toward he who robbed him
and he proceeded poorly in not cutting off
that little foot that he wears hanging.

E l'oites, Bernatz de Saissac,

And the eighth, Bernart de Saissac,

c'anc un sol bon mestier non ac
mas d'anar menutz dons queren;
et anc puous no'l prezei un brac,
pois a·N Bertran de Cardailiac
ques un vieil mantel suzolen.

(50) who never held good office
other than going to ask for miserly gifts
and I value him less than dirt
since from Bertran de Cardalhac
he asked for an old dirty cloak.

E·l novens es En Raembautz,
qe·s fai de son trobar trob bautz;
mas eu lo torni en nien,
q'el non es alegres ni chautz;
per so pretz aitan los pipautz
que van las almosnas queren.

(55) And the ninth is Raimbaut
whose songs [trobar] make him too boastful
while I reduce them to nothing
because they're neither happy nor fervent
therefore I consider him no better than a bag-piper
(60) who goes begging for hand-outs.

E N'ebles de Saigna·l dezès,
A cui anc d'amor non venc bes,
sitot se chanta de coinden:
us vilanetz enflatz plages,
que dizen que per dos poies
lai se loga e sai se ven.

And Ebles de Sanha, the tenth,
to whom no good love ever came,
although he sings with grace;
he's a pompous, litigious, little boor,
(65) of whom they say that for two coins
he's for rent here and for sale there.

E l'onzes, Gonzalgo Roitz,
qe·s fai de son chant trop formitz,
per q'en cavallaria·s fen;
et anc per lui non fo feritz
bos colps, tant ben non fo garnitz,
si doncs no'l trobet en fugen.

And the eleventh, Gonzalo Ruiz,
he's too satisfied with his singing
which presumes toward knighthood
(70) and never a good hit was dealt by him,
so poorly armed did he go,
that he wasn't found running away.

E·l dotzes us veilletz lombartz,
que calma sos vezins coartz,
et ill eis sent de l'espaven;
pero sonetz fai mout gaillartz
ab motz maribotz e bastartz,
e lui apell'om Cossezen.

The twelfth is a little old Lombard
who calls his neighbors cowards
(75) and it's he himself who is afraid;
but he composes many gallant tunes
with false and illegitimate words
and he's called Kind [Just-Right].

Peire d'Alvernge a tal votz
que chanta con granoill'en potz
e lauza·s mout a tota gen;
pero maistres es de totz,
ab c'un pauc esclarzis sos motz,
c'a pena nuils hom los enten.

Peire d'Alvernha has a voice
(80) That sings like a frog in a well,
and he brags about himself in front of everybody;
be he is master of all,
so long as he lightens up his words a bit
because nobody understands them.

Lo vers fo faitz enflabotz
a Puoich-vert, tot jogan rizen.

(85) This *vers* was made for the revelers [gluttons]
in Puigverd, all playing and laughing.]

The opening *cobla* defines the song's purpose, explaining how Peire will use his song to separate the courtly wheat from the un-courtly chaff. The closing *tornada* insists upon, and inscribes, his success. He calls those unworthy figures "pastors" [shepherds], which, without using the word, evokes the figure of the *vilan*, and the later charge of *villania* in the *Partidas* made against those who should be excluded from the court. In each of the subsequent *coblas*, he attacks a troubadour or joglar for some aspect that would mark them as out of place in court, often focusing on their physical appearance, their background, or the mismatch between the subject of their songs and their own actions. This raises the question of who would have been his audience, how Peire gained this knowledge, and how these remarks would have been received.

Pattison suggest that this song represents a game among courtiers, a song with a tone defined by its "good-natured playfulness" (19). How could it not be, when the song ends with a two-line *tornada* that declares it was made for the "revelers" at Puigverd, "all playing and laughing"? (vv. 85-6). Indeed, Pattison proposes for that, for this to be true, the troubadours being mocked must have been present for the song's original performance.²⁹ This, however, misses the particular power of what Peire does in the song's opening and closing lines. Along with defining the project as one which gives *him* the power to exclude others from the court, he ends by inscribing his own success into the song. As framed in the *Partidas*, "non es juego, donde ome non rie" [it is no joke, at which man does not laugh], and Peire seems to insist that

²⁹ This is part of what drives Pattison, and others, to attempt to date the song to a specific time and place. One option is 1170, at the embassy that brings a new wife to Alfonso VIII (Pattison 23–24). Later scholars have pointed out the ways in which this precise circumstance is unlikely, but they have held onto his notion that the song was likely performed for an audience that understood who was being mocked, and which may well have included the troubadours in question. See Riquer's introduction which question's Pattison's itinerary (*Los trovadores* 332–33). Galvez points out that the individual "satirical portraits depend as much on conventional traditions of burlesque and satires of the troubadours' lyric texts...as on any historical portraits of these poets that one might deduce" (*Songbook* 64).

the inverse is true: if there is laughter, then it must be a joke (2.9.30). This song, in its structure and its deictic specificity, displays an understanding of the power that comes from authorizing exchange, whether of goods, land, or insults at court.

As outlined in the opening *cobla*, *Cantarai* is an exchange of insults. In its final lines, Peire authorizes it himself. What exactly is he signing off on? After the opening *cobla*, the mockery commences, some of it friendly, some of it decidedly less so. The first three troubadours that receive Peire's critical gaze are all known from sources outside his song. The third and fourth *coblas* are also linked to each other, something that does not occur elsewhere in *Cantarai*. Afterwards, a mix of known and unknown figures receive his mockery, ending with the twelfth and harshest comedic portrait. Finally, Peire finishes the song with some self-critique and the *tornada*.

The first troubadour mocked is Peire Rogier, who is thought to have abandoned holy orders to become a troubadour. Peire d'Alvernha suggests he might have been better off in his old job. He also asks whether Peire Rogier is of much use as anything other than a prop, “e valgra li mais us sautiers / en la glieis'o us candeliers / tener ab gran candel'arden.” [...and he'd be more use as a psalter in a church, or holding a candelabra with a great altar candle burning] (vv. 10-12). The second sketch is of Giraut de Bornelh, and for it, Peire adopts a more direct, physical mockery, saying Giraut looks like an old wineskin left out in the sun (“sembl'oire sec al soleil”), and that his singing sounds like an old woman hawking water (“...chans de viella porta-seill”) (vv. 14, 16). Critically, Peire also brings up the idea of a mirror as a space in which to view and understand faults. Here, he suggests that, if Giraut were to look into one, he would see quite a bit of difference between the reflection therein and anything of value (vv. 17-18).

In mocking his third victim, Bernart de Ventadorn, Peire compares him to Giraut, by stating, “...es menre de Borneill un dorn” [[he] is less than Bornelh by a span] (20). Peire may be mocking Bernart for being a palm’s width shorter than Giraut, for having less ability as a troubadour, or both. This is further reinforced by the rest of the *cobla*, which lays out references to Bernart’s mother and father being peasants, raising the importance of genealogy, and undercutting Bernart’s claims to courtliness. The joke would lose its felicity if either stanza were removed. This point of structural continuity is worth noting because it is unique in the song, which has an overall structure built for alteration. As mentioned above, the song is made up of *coblas singulares*, which contributes to the song’s project. *Coblas singulares* are stanzas which change rhyme sounds while maintaining the same scheme in each stanza. In this case there is some continuity, as the *b* rhymes are maintained, but it remains a song structure that points towards mutability rather than stability. After all, the song could have been shackled together with *coblas unisonnans* — stanzas with a rhyme scheme that is consistent across the whole song — but instead, Peire’s song seems built for emendation, interpolation, and replacement. While producing a particular space in a given instance, then, this makes it eminently suited to being redeployed in different contexts.

For a later songbook audience — one that would not have had the same familiarity with the given figures of ridicule — the appeal might well be the references it contains. Galvez considers the power of troubadour names in the second chapter of *Songbook*. In it, she points out that names have “an untranslatable deictic specificity of which we see traces” in Peire’s *Cantarai* (*Songbook* 64). She pushes further to suggest that the names themselves can become a kind of currency when they move into a songbook. Rather than solidifying some particular meaning by being set down in a textual form, a name can add opacity by stacking diverse interpretive

possibilities on top of one another (*Songbook* 64). Galvez also considers the song's mutable structure, particularly in light of an influential 1195 imitation of the song. She points out that it is:

...easy to imagine names of other authors and names within a song as interchangeable, both synchronically in an easily adaptable gallery song, and diachronically through interpolations from now cohesive songs...[O]ne could simply imagine a protean gallery open to variants and attributions. (*Songbook* 65–66)

That idea of the song as a “protean gallery” is particularly striking when contrasted with Peire's reputation as a practitioner of willfully obscure lyric himself. Peire leverages that as part of his own self-mockery in the final stanza, and it may be that by placing himself in that contradictory space, he finds room to maneuver.

That is worth highlighting, because while Pattison and others point towards the playful nature of the satire in the song, some of the insults seem quite a bit more cutting. The eighth stanza, for instance, attacking Peire de Monzo, charges him with having lifted a melody from the Count of Toulouse (vv. 43-5). Peire suggests that, while the Count treated him kindly (“cortes”) he would have done better in “...trenquet / aqel pe que porta penden” [cutting off / that little foot that he wears hanging] (vv. 47-8). It does not take too much imagination to think of the “little foot” Peire d'Alvernha proposes be lopped off to be Peire de Monzo's genitals. That would be a rather stiff punishment for using another troubadour's melody without acknowledgement, a common enough practice. There are also the charges of poverty and begging levied at Bernart de Saissac (vv. 49-54) and Raimbaut d'Arenga (vv. 55-60). He says Ebre de Sanha is a “vilanetz,” the diminutive of *vilan*, willing to sell or rent himself for two coins (“dos poies”) (vv. 61-66). The reference here to being a professional, i.e. not wealthy enough to be truly courtly, shades

into a charge of prostitution. He calls Gonzalo Ruiz a coward too focused on his singing, before turning to his final victim (vv. 67-72).

While the others' treatment may be explained away as bawdy jokes, and the fact that they are named directly takes some of the sting out of the remarks — they are delivered *paladinamente* as it were, not behind their backs — the twelfth troubadour ridiculed by Peire is not treated as politely. Called only a “veilletz lombartz” [little old Lombard], he receives Peire's harshest words. While this man calls his neighbors cowards, he is himself one (“calma sos vezins coartz, / et ill eis sent de l'espaven;” [he claims his neighbors are cowards / and it's he himself who is afraid]) and his poetry belies a similar hypocrisy, (“pero sonetz fai mout gaillartz / ab motz maribotz e bastartz,” [but he composes many gallant songs / with false and bastard words]) (vv. 74-75). This sort of reference is deictic too, but much more difficult for anyone not included in the song's original audience to understand. That could create a pleasurable effect for those “in the know” enough to guess at the “lombartz” identity. It also helps deliver a harsher criticism, suggesting that this figure is in fact so worthy of contempt that they will not be mentioned by name. Their duplicity will stand behind an equally duplicitous code-name — “Cossezen” which Goldin translates as “Just Right” (v. 78).

Further, Peire charges him with using “motz maribotz e bastartz” that its “false and illegitimate words” (v. 77). Each of those adjectives is more loaded, however, and given that the song in general draws equivalencies between the nature of a troubadour's songs and their character, these insults hit harder. *Bastartz* means illegitimate just as “bastard” does, recalling the emphasis in earlier stanzas on a non-courtly lineage making a person suspect. *Maribotz* is even harsher. Riquer says that the word means “marabuto o marrano, o sea converso, tomado en el sentido de ‘desleal, falso’” [*marabuto* or *marrano*, that is *converso* in the sense of ‘disloyal,

false'] (*Los trovadores*, nn.77, 340). *Marabuto* is a kind of Moorish hermit, and *marrano* a more familiar epithet, means filthy and unclean — like the *haram* pigs that the word also describes, from the Andalusī Arabic *muḥarrām*. Of course, it is also a word thrown at *conversos*, i.e. converted Jews, thought to secretly be practicing their religion (“Marabuto”; “Marrano, Na”). As will be detailed in a later chapter, these sorts of insults — being a bastard or a heretic, Jew or Muslim — were not taken lightly.

This harsh note, coming at the end, would seem to sour the song, putting it out of bounds of the kind of courtly game practiced in the space laid out in the later laws of the second *Partida*. There has been critical speech that seems to attack another person’s character, and it has not been done openly. Peire corrects course, however, by closing with an additional thirteenth portrait, one of himself. If the penultimate *cobla* saw the insulting project come to fruition, as a member of the court was called out for truly unworthy behavior, then the final stanza softens the blow. Peire compares his own voice to a croaking frog in a well (vv. 79-80), and points out his own arrogance (v. 81), and the obscurity of his own style of verse (vv. 82-84). Now, rather than sitting in judgment over his fellows as the first *cobla* had suggested he would, he has descended, placing himself among them. He too is receiving a mocking take-down, so it all must be in good fun. Then, in the *tornada*, he seals the deal, declaring that his song has received a positive reception, while it is in fact still being performed. It is a clear example of a piece of lyric that seems to *do* precisely what it *says*.

These final gestures underline the kind of critical evidence about the court that can be drawn from lyric. Peire seems to very clearly understand the potential of a song like this. First, it depicts a kind of horizontally distributed power amongst courtiers, each jockeying for their own bit of leverage over one another. Peire puts himself above those surrounding him, but only by a

degree. As he lobs harsher and harsher critiques, he sets up a final release valve on the pressure that begins to build as the song progresses. Then, at the song's tensest point in the twelfth portrait, he opens that valve by finally introducing his own self-mockery. The relief that comes when Peire declares himself to be the same as his fellow courtiers means that the laughter, presumably, comes too. The *tornada* insists on it.

The way in which Peire critiques himself, however, suggests that he is not quite ready to say he is among equals. While he describes himself in physically unflattering terms, his own reference to his arrogance and the complexity of his poetry is hardly the worst insult he gets in over the course of the song. In fact, his claim could be seen as saying that, if he bothered to lighten his own weighty words, he would be well received by all those around him. Is that not precisely the case in *Cantarai*? When he concludes the song with a declaration of his own success, might not he be saying, indirectly, that he is, in fact “maistres...de totz” [master of all]? Whatever the outcome, Peire has managed to grab the hilt of the *espada de justicia* for a while, if not to “cut” with it himself, at least to point it in the direction of those Peire deems unfit. All the while, he proves his own courtliness by insisting it was all in good fun.

CONCLUSION

Reading *Cantarai* in this way depends on: 1) a concept of the court rooted in the polysemous trinity of place, people, and practice; 2) the court as a produced space; and 3) lyric as a practice that both produces and reflects it. It helps *Cantarai* to reanimate the long-gone moment when a group “a Puoich-vert, tot jogan rizen” — it seems determined to enact what it describes. Reading the song in conjunction with the *Partidas*, displays how even such a “playful” song can have serious implications, which helps emphasize why songs like this are critical sites for analyzing

the power relations at court. If the court as described in the *Siete Partidas* is a mirror for princes, *Cantarai* is a sort of crystal mirror of its own, offering a different facet to each troubadour that sees himself in it. Taking both and looking at the distance between what is reflected in the *Partidas* and in *Cantarai* creates a sense of dislocation which analyzing the different courts of Medieval Iberia will require working through.

This song also underlines the fact that the relationship between the troubadours and Iberia is one of ebb and flow. If the ebb is thought of not as a waning but as a movement out, and flow not as a waxing but as a movement in, then the spread of the courtly culture of *taifa* kingdoms like Zaragoza is an ebb, and the court of Alfonso VIII and his contemporaries represents a flow. First there is a movement outward through figures like Guilhem de Peitieu and his contemporaries, before a rush back into Alfonso's court that spills over elsewhere. As it happens, there is a genealogical link as well. In 1170, Alfonso VIII is betrothed to Leonor Plantagenet³⁰ (1162-1214), though because of her age the actual wedding does not take place until four years later (Weir 64).³¹ Leonor was the daughter of Henry II of England, and Eleanor of Aquitaine, herself a patron of troubadours. The older Eleanor was also the granddaughter of Guilhem de Peitieu, the "first troubadour."

³⁰ As she is called in Spanish — Leonor or Leonor of Castilla — rather than Eleanor of England or Eleanor Plantagenet.

³¹ Pattison posited the trip of the dignitaries seeking Leonor's hand as the setting for the first performance of *Cantarai*.

CHAPTER TWO

Craft Translated: Guilhem de Peitieu, Iberia, and the Troubadours

The first songs of the Occitan troubadour tradition appear in the songbooks under the name *coms de peiteus* [Count of Poitiers]. According to Gerald Bond's edition of the songs, of the twelve that are transmitted under that name, one is likely spurious; the remaining eleven can be found in ten different manuscripts — nine songbooks, and one citation in Matfre Ermengau's *Brevari d'Amor* ("Introduction" lxxvi; 55–56).³² Documentary evidence and critical opinion have identified the *coms de peiteus* behind these songs as Guilhem de Peitieu, or William the VII Count of Poitiers and IX Duke of Aquitaine (1071-1126).³³ One of the most powerful lords of his era, his fame and political power likely helped ensure the preservation of his lyric. His connections to Iberia are well established, too: already in his father's reign in the eleventh century, relationships of both conflict and alliance were common between Romance speaking Christian lords from north of the Pyrenees and Arabic speaking Muslim lords from south of the mountains.³⁴

This chapter is neither an argument about "influence," nor a story of "origins." No matter how strong, a connection dependent on a single link is easily broken: either by the weight of what it is asked to support or by the ease with which attacks can be levied against a single target. Instead, this chapter will analyze the use of "craft" metaphors in Guilhem's songs in conjunction with art historical evidence which posits a broader level of contact and exchange between groups

³² *C, D^a, E, I, K, N, R, V, a^l*, and the citation in the *Brevari d'Amor*; see Bond pp. 55-56. These range in production from the "late thirteenth to the middle of the fourteenth century, in groupings ranging from a single song to a collection of eight" (Bond, "Introduction" lxxvi). The one which Bond rejects as belonging to Guilhem is thought to be by Uc de Sant Circ ("Introduction" lxxvi).

³³ They are the first songs attributed to anyone. For more on the earliest instances of Occitan lyric see Paden (1995).

³⁴ This will be explored further below. See Cynthia Robinson's *In Praise of Song*, pp. 353-370.

north and south of the Pyrenees. The connections documented in these sources weave in and out of one another to create a wider range of bonds — some strong, some weak — which may hold together, even if a single thread is pulled at or a particular connection is undone.

In taking this approach, the chapter relies on readings of three songs alongside art historical evidence drawn from work by the historian George Beech and art historians Cynthia Robinson and María Judith Feliciano. In each case, exchange lies at the heart of things, as well as lyric's role in the production of the space of the court. The first question this chapter asks is what evidence for direct contact and transmission from one tradition to another exists in material or linguistic form. Second, it examines lyric and material evidence that allows for more indirect comparison. Finally, it pursues a metaphorical comparison, relating lyric to the production and circulation of textiles.

The most “direct” case draws on Beech's work on the so-called “Eleanor” vase, tracing it from its origins in Persia, across the Mediterranean and eventually to Zaragoza, and then through Guilhem's hands into the treasury of the Abbey of Saint-Denis. In conjunction with the history of the circulation, transformation, and exchange of this single object, there is also a song of Guilhem's that has long occasioned debate about whether or not the “first troubadour” knew, or could have known, Arabic. The song also poses questions about what the “matter” of language is, especially as it is manipulated in the creation of lyric, and what its exchange, communicative or otherwise, can accomplish.

Robinson pursues a different sort of comparison in approaching the courtly cultures of the *taifa* kingdoms of Iberia and what is now Southern France. In one instance, she analyzes two caskets, one from south and one from the north of the Pyrenees, with similar ornamental programs, looking not only at what the two have in common, but also where they differ. This

chapter will look for those same sorts of overlap and disjunction in metaphors surrounding lyric “craft” in the Arabic lyric of Iberia’s Islamicate courts, as Robinson documents in *In Praise of Song*, and in Guilhem’s songs. While there is notable overlap, there are also striking differences. Robinson argues that the two cultures ought to be understood as having a relationship of “transposition,” and this analysis will argue that in such cases *differences* are more critical than similarities to understanding this process.

Finally, the chapter will close with another comparison between lyric and material culture. The vocabulary of exchange in Guilhem’s songs draws the eye towards another practice where, through skillful assembly, an artisan creates something that acquires new layers of meaning as it makes its way across the Mediterranean, the Pyrenees, and beyond: textiles. To the extent they are similar, both lyric and textiles are vehicles which enable the exchange and circulation of valuable preexisting materials through their skillful manipulation. Thinking of lyric as analogous to textiles points towards a set of questions about lyric itself that function as threads running throughout this project: what sort of thing is lyric? what is it made out of? what does its creation entail? and, perhaps most critically, what can it *do*?

“BABARIOL, BABARIAL, BABARIAN” : GUILHEM AND THE “ELEANOR VASE”

The “Arabic role” in medieval literary culture, since María Rosa Menocal pushed the issue into the critical foreground in the 1980s, has in some ways focused, in others sidelined, arguments about “origins” or “influence.”³⁵ What has become clear in the intervening years is that to engage

³⁵ For the state of the question at that point, see Roger Boase’s *The Origin and Meaning of Courtly Love* (1977), Menocal’s review essay (“Close Encounters”) (1981), and Boase’s later response (“Arab Influences”) (1992). Boase’s list of potential origins includes: “(1) Hispano-Arabic, (2) Chivalric-Matriarchal, (3) Crypto-Cathar, (4) Neoplatonic, (5) Bernardine-Marianist, (6) Spring Folk Ritual, (7) Feudal-Sociological” (*Origin and Meaning* 3). For a more recent

directly with the sort of cross-cultural comparisons that studying Iberian literature necessitates, it is at least helpful, if not necessary, to expand beyond the literary.³⁶ Contact and exchange can be documented through a range of material sources, and one benefit of engaging with such analyses is that a visual similarity can be convincing even when linguistic evidence remains elusive.³⁷ Just as it is unlikely that there will ever be *definitive* manuscript evidence that *the* Guilhem de Peitieu described in contemporary chronicles was the force behind the songs that bear the name *coms de peiteus* (“Count of Poitiers”) that appears in the manuscripts, a simple origin story for the lyric of the troubadours will likely remain elusive as well.³⁸ That is because there were almost certainly multiple sources of influence, and one of those was the Arabic lyric of the *taifa* courts. The

summary of the bibliography surrounding different theories, see Robert Taylor’s *Bibliographical Guide* (2015), whose categories include the “Arabic Theory,” the “Latin Theory,” the “Popular Theory (Indigenous Sources),” and the “Celtic Theory.” Paden (1998) also addresses the questions and pushes for an approach that acknowledges exchange and the possibility of multiple, mutual influences, see pp. 3-7.

³⁶ An obvious, negative, example is the breakdown in attempts to trace a relationship between Arabic and Occitan lyric through metrical or linguistic means. See Federico Corriente (2009) on these problems as they relate to the *kharjas*. J.A. Abu-Haidr’s *Hispano-Arabic Literature and the Early Provençal Lyrics* (2001) critiques these approaches, see for example pp. ix-x, 6-26. When reading his book, however, one is left wondering what, other than evidence of direct translation, *would* satisfy him in proving “influence” in either direction. See esp. “Part III: No Arabic Echoes in the Provençal Lyrics,” pp. 171-257. Robinson’s *In Praise of Song* (2001) is a helpful positive example, as is *Under the Influence* (2004) (coedited with Leyla Rouhi). See Juan Carlos Ruiz Souza’s “Botín de guerra y tesoro sagrado” (2001) for more on the ways in which objects changed hands across confessional and political lines. See also Maribel Fierro’s “Two Castilian political myths and al-Andalus” (2015) which draws out the recasting of some motifs in the thirteenth-century Castilian *Poema de Fernán González* can be traced back to an Islamic context.

³⁷ An example of this from another “origins” debate would be the success of Sarah Morris’s *Daidalos and the Origins of Greek Art* as opposed to the controversy surrounding Martin Bernal’s *Black Athena*. While some of that difference in reception depends on tone and context, the possibility of making the argument for external “influence” — here regarding ancient Greek culture — using art historical materials rather than linguistic ones is striking.

³⁸ This case too is “circumstantial.” For a rundown of what is and is not known about the Count and the composer of the songs, see Robert Taylor (2006).

figure of Guilhem is one connection between those two contexts, made evident not only in those chronicles, but via material sources as well.

The “Eleanor of Aquitaine Vase” is one of the objects that most directly links the Islamicate courts of Iberia to those across the Pyrenees. Currently held in the Louvre, the “Eleanor Vase,” as it is also known, derives its name from an inscription which runs around its base which documents the changes in ownership that led to its final resting place in the treasury of the Abbey of Saint-Denis: “Hoc vas sponsa dedit Aanor regi Ludovico; Mitadolus avo, mihi rex, Sanctisque Sugerus” [This vase, Eleanor gave as a bride to King Louis, Mitadolus to her grandfather, the King to me, and Suger to the Saints] (78–79).³⁹ The identity of three of these figures is immediately clear: “Aanor” is Aliénor [Eleanor] of Aquitaine, the “rei Ludovico” is her first husband King Louis VII of France, and “Sugerus” is the Abbot Suger (Beech, “William IX” 3). Eleanor gave the vase to Louis as a wedding present, he later gave it to Suger, who then housed it in the abbey’s treasury. The inscription, however, also refers to two other figures: Eleanor’s unnamed “avo,” or “grandfather,” and someone called “Mitadolus.” In fact, the identities behind those two names create a link in a chain that stretches across the Pyrenees, connecting the two courtly milieus.

In a pair of articles on the Eleanor Vase, George Beech offers a theory on Mitadolus’s identity which explains how the vase might have found its way into Suger’s hands. The “Vase” actually consists of two pieces: first, the pear-shaped rock crystal vase itself, thought to be from Sassanian Persia;⁴⁰ and, second, the twelfth century gold filigree mount in which it rests, crafted

³⁹ Modification of the translation and edition from Panofsky, quoted in Beech (“William IX” 3n1).

⁴⁰ Beech concludes this based on the locations of workshops producing rock crystal vessels before the tenth century, and the similarity of the honeycomb ornamentation on the vase to surviving Sassanian glass vessels (“Origins and History” 69, 74). The vase itself is unique, as

locally. Beech suggests this was likely produced on the Abbot's orders, with the original crystal cut down to fit the mount; its overall shape matches that of the original vessel but with a longer neck ("Origins and History" 74). The inscription runs around this base.

The oldest transfer listed in the inscription is from Mitadolus to Eleanor's unnamed "avo," whom Beech identifies as Guilhem ("William IX" 4). The fact that he is unnamed leads Beech to conclude that it must be him, and not Eleanor's relatively less well-known maternal grandfather, because Guilhem was "one of the greatest French princes of the day," and would not have needed an introduction for anyone who could read a Latin inscription ("William IX" 4-5). This suggests that Mitadolus would have been an equally important personage. Beech argues that "Mitadolus" is likely a Latin transcription of part of the title of the last Muslim king of Zaragoza: Imad al-dawla abd al-malik ibn Hud (...1110-1130). After losing his capital to the Almoravids in May of 1110, Imad al-dawla was able to maintain his power through an alliance with Alfonso I of Aragon ("William IX" 3).⁴¹ Beech argues that Guilhem and Imad al-dawla knew one another because they would have fought as allies under Alfonso in 1120.⁴² Their service to the same lord, knowledge of which comes from the historian Ibn Idari's thirteenth century *Kitab al Bayan Mugrib*, leads Beech to state with confidence that this explains how an object such as the vase

"no other pear shaped rock crystal vessel appears to have survived for comparison" ("Origins and History" 74). The Louvre's catalog entry on the vase suggests it could be either Sassanid (sixth to seventh century CE) or post-Sassanid (ninth through tenth century CE) (Muriel).

⁴¹ Specifically, he cites other contemporary Latin and Arabic sources to confirm that the suffix "adolus" is likely a Latinization of "al-dawla" which is itself "not a personal name but the second part of a title that meant dynasty, kingdom, rule, or term of office," with the first part varying by time and region; while "in the eleventh century some of the...Taifa...kings of Islamic Spain began to use the title," there was no one other than "the king of Saragossa" using the title in 1120 ("William IX" 6).

⁴² "The two men must have met and known one another if only because, as allies, they commanded factions of the same army under King Alfonso the Battler of Aragon on the same field of battle at Cutanda in southern Aragon on 17 June 1120" ("William IX" 7).

could be *given* by a Muslim lord to a Christian one, rather than being *taken* as a prize (“William IX” 7).

Beech is even more confident in identifying the subsequent transfers: Guilhem would have brought the vase back with him to Poitiers in 1121 before giving it to Eleanor, either right away as a baptismal gift, or, at the latest, on his death in 1137 (“William IX” 8). Even this latter chronology would have enabled Eleanor to give it to Louis on the occasion of their marriage that same year. Beech argues that Suger seems to have acquired it from Louis’s possessions, perhaps seeing it, despite its original exchange as a gift, as having gained a new status, as *spolia* representing Christian dominance, both legendary and real, over Islam; this might explain the “extraordinary lengths” Suger went to “have the vase lavishly mounted in precious metals and gems and then carefully add the inscription” (“William IX” 8).

A gift, though, is a tricky thing to read.⁴³ Beech’s account may say more about how the transformed vase represents Suger’s desired interpretive outcome — a sign of religious triumph — rather than something with a more political and strategic significance in the first instance of exchange documented in the inscription. Cecily Hilsdale takes the Eleanor Vase as a central example of the difficulty of reading “gifts as evidence” (176). Indeed, assuming the gift is a sign of friendship ignores the role that gift giving, and the gift itself as an object, can play in establishing such alliances (176). Suger’s own action transforms the object physically, adding the base with the inscription. It also is done on the occasion of a different sort of exchange, giving it

⁴³ A recent summary can be found in Hilsdale’s essay “Gift” (2012) in the special issue of *Studies in Iconography* called *Medieval Art History Today — Critical Terms*, pp. 171-182. See Olga Bush’s “Poetic Inscription...” (2017) for the specific role of poetic inscriptions in the gift economy of the Islamic world, with a specific focus on medieval Iberia. Ana Rodríguez’s “Narrating the Treasury...” (2019), which documents a similar bridal gift with roots in Iberia brought by Eleanor’s “successor” wife to Louis, Constanza, daughter of Alfonso VII of Castile and León, will be mentioned below.

to the saints, thus making it sacred and closing off its circulation. As Hilsdale puts it, “the vase's earthly transfers terminate in its sacred consecration” (178).

The Eleanor Vase, then, both communicates a great deal, and also removes itself from further conversation when it passes into the treasury. It proves a connection of *some* sort between members of two courtly milieus, but it is not, on its own, proof of more than the fact of that contact. It is certainly not proof of mutual understanding. One of Guilhem’s songs — “Farai un vers, pos mi sonelh” [I shall do a song, since I am dozing] (= > *Sonelh*) — contains another suggestive instance of communicative incommunicability.⁴⁴ *Sonelh* tells the story of a man dressed as a “pilgrim” who meets a pair of women on the road and pretends to be unable to communicate with them in order to have sex.⁴⁵ It exists in three songbooks — *C*, *N*, and *V* — with *V* serving as the base for Bond’s edition.⁴⁶ Along with a different stanzaic structure, the version in *C* has a three-line variant in an otherwise similar stanza to *V*, that is sometimes held up as an indication of Guilhem’s contact with the Islamicate courts of Iberia, and even of his possible knowledge of Arabic. The song itself is a ribald and violent tale interwoven with a meditation on language, communication, and exchange.

⁴⁴ As mentioned above, Bond, argues that, of the twelve songs attributed to the Count that survive, eleven are likely his, and another ought to be attributed to Uc de Saint Circ. Those songs, sometimes appearing alone, at others in groups of as many as eight, are preserved in ten manuscripts, with two — *C* and *E* — seeming to derive from the same source, based on the similar body of texts preserved, and occasional overlaps in their order (“Introduction” lxxvi).

⁴⁵ The idea that this song is composed while dozing, likely on horseback, is common to his song “Farai un vers de dreit nien” [I’ll do a song about nothing at all] as well. In that case, Bond points out that this image “is often used to suggest the unreal aspect of the content of the song” pointing to other examples in songs by Cerveri de Girona (63n5-6). These are also songs that represent moments of something more like *ex nihilo* creation, that is, creation out of, or at least *about*, nothing.

⁴⁶ *C* is of Occitan production dating to the fourteenth century, currently held in Paris; *V* is held in Venice in the Biblioteca Marciana, likely of Catalan production in 1268; and *N*, of Italian production in the fourteenth century, is held in the Morgan library (Gaunt and Kay 304).

The song tells the story of a male narrator — the “pilgrim” — encountering a pair of noblewomen on the road. He pretends to be incapable of speaking in a way that they can understand so that he may accompany them back to where they are staying. To do so, he utters some “nonsense” words (“Babariol, babarial, / Babarian.”) (vv. 29-30), and they take him along. They sleep together, more than once: the description is almost Catullan in its enumeration (“Cen e qatre cint et uit vetz!” [One hundred and eighty-eight times!]) (v. 80). Before that, however, the ladies demand proof that he is really as incapable as he seems of disclosing the secret of their infidelity, so, naturally, they scratch his back viciously with a cat. He stays quiet and reaps a reward — a week in the ladies’ company — for the investment of the “mais de cen” [more than a hundred] wounds he suffers (v. 69).

The scene of their meeting, and the lines he delivers to the women are the critical ones here. *Coblas* three through five document their meeting and the “communicative” exchange between the parties:

- | | |
|--|---|
| <p>En Alvergnhe, part Lemozi,
M'en anei totz sols a tapi;
Trobei la moiller d'en Guari
E d'en Bernart;
Saluderon mi sinplamentz
Per Sant Launart.</p> | <p>(13) [In Auvergne, beyond Limousin,
I went along all alone, in pilgrim's guise</p> <p>(15) I came across Lord Warren's wife
And Lord Bernard's;
They greeted me openly
In the name of St. Leonard.</p> |
| <p>La una·m diz en son latin:
“O, Dieus vos salv, don pelerin;
Mout mi senblatz de belh aizin,
Mon escient,
Mas trop vezem anar pel mond
De folla gent.”</p> | <p>(20) One of them said to me in her language:
“Ah, God save you, Sir Pilgrim.
You seem to come from fine surroundings,
I swear,
Yet we see many fools around
In the world.”</p> |
| <p>Ar auzires c'ai respondutz:
Anc no li diz ni ba ni butz,
Ni fer ni fust no ai mentagutz,
Mas sol aitan:
“Babariol, babarial,
Babarian.”</p> | <p>(25) Now you will hear what I answered:
I never said “bah” or “boo” to her,
And didn't mention “iron” or “wood,”
But only this much:
“Babariol, babarial,
(30) Babarian.”]</p> |

(vv. 13-30, 18-19)

In songbook *C*, however, the song is presented differently, beginning directly with a *cobla* in which the “pilgrim” meets the two women, followed by his immediate reply:

Aujatz ieu que lur respozi:	(7)	[Listen to how I answered them:
Anc fer ni fust no·y mentaugui		I did not mention “wood” or “iron”
Mas que lur dis aital lati:		But only spoke the following words:
“Tarrababart	(10)	“Tarrababart
Marrababelioriben		Marrababelioriben
Saramahart!”	(12)	Saramahart!”]
(48–49, vv. 7–12)		

Three key moments occur in each version: 1) the use of the word “lati” to represent some notion of language; 2) the reference to “iron” and “wood” as contrasted with the song’s “nonsense”; and, finally, 3) the choice of the “nonsense” words themselves.

While the word “lati” is used in both versions, it refers to different sorts of speech, in each case. Christopher Davis, in a study of the term “lati” in Guilhem’s corpus and troubadour lyric more broadly, argues that it:

...primarily means “Latin,” but acquired another valence in Occitan and other Romance vernaculars of language that is obscure or difficult to understand, such as dialect, jargon and, for troubadours in particular, the language of poetry. In this secondary sense, *lati* is uniformly accompanied by a possessive pronoun (*mon*, *son*, *lor*, etc.), which indicates that it is a particularized kind of language, identified with its speaker and with the specific context in which it appears. (3)

In medieval Iberia the word “ladino” is used at certain points to refer to spoken Romance vernacular (López-Morillas 47).⁴⁷ It also came to be the label for the Judeo-Spanish spoken in

⁴⁷ As López-Morillas explains:

...in the first eight centuries AD, written texts (all, of course, in Latin), when read aloud, were pronounced just as the common speech was, in the only pronunciation anyone knew. It is highly unlikely that even the educated considered “Latin” to be a separate language; one spoke *LATINU* (pronounced [*ladino*], but with none of the connotations that the latter term bears today), but one had to write it in an odd and difficult way. (36)

Even after the year 1000, speakers of Romance “would have identified their spoken tongue as *ladino*, certainly not as *leonés*, *navarro*, or any other variety” (47).

the diaspora after the expulsion of the Jews in 1492 (53–54).⁴⁸ In the context of *Sonelh*, “lati” is twice used to refer to speech of questionable intelligibility. First, it refers to the language of the women, which would seem to indicate that “su latino” is their own romance vernacular.⁴⁹ They use that “lati” to ask a question focused on separating semblance from nature: to distinguish between the people who *seem* refined (“senblatz de belh aizin” (v. 21)), and the “folia gent” [“fools”] all around them (v. 24). The “pilgrim” here, understanding an unspoken subtext or sensing an opportunity to perpetuate some duplicity of his own — the misogynist’s fear of active female sexual desire is never far away in these songs — capitalizes on it with his nonsensical response. Indeed, in the version in *C* “lati” refers to the words that the pilgrim speaks *to* the ladies. In each case, a statement is made in someone’s “lati” and the purpose of it is precisely *not* to be understood: the ladies are not *really* asking for a response, they want someone who will keep quiet; and the pilgrim wants precisely not to be understood, to communicate that he is incapable of communication.

This, again, evokes Davis’s observation, that “lati” will be used to denote the language of poetry. This is more noteworthy given how the pilgrim describes his own speech. In both cases, he makes a point of saying he does not mention “fust” [wood] or “mentagutz” [“iron” or “metal”]. He does not speak of the obviously material, but rather, uses his words — a substance of a different sort — to manipulate the world around him. Daniel Heller-Roazen, in an essay titled “The Matter of Language,” argues that this nonsense represents an engagement with Platonic, and Neo-Platonic, ideas about the “third kind.” Presented in the *Timaeus*, the “third kind” is “the ‘molding-stuff of everything’” in which everything ‘sensible’ is...”; it is “the pure

⁴⁸ See Manuel Alvar’s *El ladino: judeo-español calco* (2000).

⁴⁹ Referred to as possessions of their husband’s, presumably for comedic effect as they certainly seem like autonomous actors.

potentiality for sensible apprehension” (Heller-Roazen 857). After explaining the term’s original appearance in the *Timaeus*, Heller-Roazen argues that while modern readers may fail to note that the “aporetic character of the ‘third kind’...follows from the aporia inherent in any attempt to describe the apprehension” of that which is *necessarily* not perceivable, medieval readers would have had no such difficulty (859). This can be traced to Chalcidius, whose partial translation of the *Timaeus*, “renders Plato’s ‘matter’ (*hyle*) by *silua* and explicitly refers the word *silua* to the *hyle* discussed by Aristotle,” which is definitely concerned with potentiality (859).

In *The Forest of Medieval Romance*, Corrine Saunders addresses the results of Chalcidius’s translation more fully. It is through him that “the forest” is linked to “chaos and discussions of primordial matter” (19). For Plato *hyle*, which literally means “forest,” is used to refer “back to an older idea of chaos, *hyle*, as the disorder from which order arose” (19). Aristotle on the other hand, changes its meaning to that out of which “everything is made” (20). The later Neo-Platonic tradition pits *kosmos* (“order”) against *hyle* (“chaos”) which gains a sense of “good” vs. “evil,” a set of associations on which Chalcidius follows up when he becomes the first to use *silva*, primarily meaning “forest,” to translate *hyle*: “...chaos, quam Graeci hylem, nos siluam uocamus...’ (‘the chaos, which the Greeks call *hyle*, we call *silva*’)” (qtd. in Saunders 20). Chalcidius uses “images of tempestuous sea and malleable wax” as metaphors for *silva* rather than forest, but even without direct evocation, Saunders argues that *silva* and *hyle*’s meanings as “forest” come through clearly in post-classical commentators who address the space of the forest in literature like Virgil (20).⁵⁰

Heller-Roazen’s argument in “The Matter of Language” engages extensively with this process, and indeed, suggests that this philosophical progression can be observed in the nonsense

⁵⁰ For Saunders full account, see pp. 19-24 which continues through to the “school of Chartres.”

words here. He even argues for a philosophical education of the Count by scholars from the “School of Chartres.” While that point is debatable, the identification between his songs and the “matter of language” is telling. This is the same troubadour under whose name “Farai un vers de dreit nien” [I’ll do a song about nothing at all] is transmitted. It seems clear that his songs are focused on the rhetorical capacity of language, on what can be accomplished through its skillful manipulation. If “lati” is the language of poetry along with the vernacular, what sort of “matter” is it? To say it is *not* the same as physical material, while linking it to the language of verse itself, points to its mutability. One thread worth tracing here is the reference to “wood” as a kind of matter, something which will come up again in the songs analyzed below.

In the question of Guilhem and his Iberian contacts, the most critical element is the “nonsense” words themselves, and what they seek to “communicate.” In the first case— “Babariol, babarial, / Babarian” (vv. 29-30) — the pilgrim rather clearly speaks “nonsense,” coming close to punning on the idea of a “barbarian” itself.⁵¹ “Barbarian” is, of course, based on an onomatopoeia for incomprehension — *barbaros* being, perhaps, an impression of the speech of a non-Greek speaker for a Greek (Liddell et al.). It comes into Castilian, “bárbaro,” in the second half of the thirteenth century (Coromines 85). The citations before 1300 in the *Corpus diacrónico del español* mostly come from Alfonso X’s court, one from the *Bocados de oro* (c. 1250),⁵² and most of the others come from Alfonso X’s *General Estoria* (c. 1275).⁵³ In each case, the word “bárbaro” refers to a certain kind of foreign language, though the context changes. In the case of the *Bocados*, the citation — “E assí como el bárbaro non puede entender lo que

⁵¹ Heller-Roazen argues this moment should be thought of as an extreme instance of the rhetorical trope of “barbarism” — here a recursive loop in which the term itself (“barbarismus”) is itself “barbarized” (876).

⁵² Itself translated from Arabic, see Fernando Gómez Redondo (1998), p. 455.

⁵³ There is also one instance of “bárbaros” used in the *Vidal Mayor* (Canellas and Tilander 510).

dize el arávigo” [And so as the barbarian cannot understand that which the Arabic says] (Mubashshir ibn Fātik 173) — indicates that the “bárbaro” is he who cannot understand Arabic. In the *General Estoria*, on the other hand the “bárbaro” o “bárbaros” is clearly coming from the Greek and Latin usage for someone “foreign.”

In the version in *C* — “Tarrababart / Marrababelioriben / Saramahart!” (vv. 10-12) — the lines themselves seem closer to a “barbarous” utterance in that sense, to words in a foreign tongue. This has raised the question, are these words Arabic, or are they meant to be?⁵⁴ Bond points to previous attempts at translating the string of syllables as Arabic, but ultimately opts for the notion that it is “pseudo-Arabic, used humorously, as in many (especially dramatic) sources of the thirteenth century” and he suggests that it is likely a later interpolation of a “redactor” with “a sophisticated sense of humor” (84n10-2, 67–72). Of course, mimicry need not necessitate sophistication — it could be something more basic and sinister. For a later copyist, the context would also be different than it was for Guilhem. Either way, Beech argues that reopening of the question is reasonable, as Patrice Uhl (1990) does in arguing that the lines “are in Arabic, thus suggesting that the Duke of Aquitaine knew that language” (“Troubadour Contacts” 15).⁵⁵ Beech is ultimately unsure whether to support the claim or not, but he points to the Eleanor Vase as a reason to take such ideas more seriously than they had been previously.

The interest of this study is not in the literal question of whether or not Guilhem himself knew Arabic.⁵⁶ Such an assertion would be a lot of argumentative weight to hang on one three-

⁵⁴ Something that Bond mentions in a note, and that Beech expands on in a later article.

⁵⁵ Beech also enumerates those who have posited this before: Nykl (1946), Briffault (1945), Lévi-Provençal (1956), the later rejection by Frank, and Uhl’s article as well — all of these offer rather different translations (“Troubadour Contacts” 16). See also the more recent work by Hilty and Corriente (2006).

⁵⁶ Direct evidence is absent, and the question is itself less relevant than it might at first seem. It is unlikely that he would have needed to understand a phenomenon perfectly to find it worthy of

line section of a single song, especially given that song's burlesque, parodic nature. Everyone referenced in the song comes in for ridicule: the women who are duped by the "pilgrim;" their husbands, whose names are given in the song; and the pilgrim himself, who debases and injures himself in exchange for food and sex (though admittedly a great deal of both). But, it is not a matter of what the lines *mean*. Their inclusion helps draw a reader's eye, and a listener's ear, to the critical importance Guilhem's songs placed on the skillful manipulation of form — like his song about "nothing." One avenue for understanding this better is to examine the self-concept held by those making this sort of lyric: how they viewed their "craft." It is a rich metaphoric field, one which yields a great deal of insight into the relationship between courtly contexts both in, and in contact with, Iberia.

CRAFT "TRANSLATED"

In her book *In Praise of Song*, Cynthia Robinson documents the connections between the courtly culture of Iberia and that of Southern France through much more than a single point. The first part of her study — "The Culture of Courtly Love in Al-Andalus, 1005-1134 A.D." — explores the culture of the *taifa* kingdom of Zaragoza, "as a 'courtly' one" through an analysis of the Aljafería, the palace built in the city of Zaragoza in the eleventh century (*In Praise of Song* 2–

imitation, particularly if he was but one part of a series of links in the process of "transposing" a courtly culture from one side of a contact zone to another. See Robinson (2002), pp. 279-281 and Mallette (2005) for more on the idea of how this transmission of Arabic poetry might have worked, and imaginings of the sort of bilingualism, or translation, that might have been likely in these courtly settings. As to the question of language, Beech, Mallette, and others have argued that there are a number of steps between full incomprehension and full bilingualism. See also Robinson (2002), esp. pp. 301-322. If the use of pseudo-Arabic is imitation or mimicry, the question is rather different; however, mockery does not preclude the possibility of emulating a practice like lyric, especially given its place in the courtly system of literary and cultural production.

3).⁵⁷ One of the lenses through which she seeks to understand the palace is the poetry that would have been performed inside it, allowing for a reconstruction of “the manner in which [its interior spaces] were envisioned, used and experienced by their original public” (*In Praise of Song* 7). That poetry is, in the terms of this project, one of the practices that produced the space of the court that existed inside the Aljafería. Robinson puts this into the context of broader shifts in Iberian Islamicate cultural practice through the eleventh and early-twelfth centuries. In the second part of her study — “Courtly Courts as Sites of Cultural Interaction” — she touches directly upon the connections between the courtly culture of the *taifa* kingdom of Zaragoza and that of Poitiers, ultimately arguing that “[t]he entire phenomenon of Provençal courtly culture...reads as a broad-brushstroke rendering, a *transposition*, of the earlier...Andalusī ‘courtly’ phenomenon into another key or register (in this case, into another language)” (*In Praise of Song* 279).

Robinson opens that second part of her book with a pair of exemplary objects that help display this phenomenon of “transposition”: the “Pamplona” casket, an ivory casket of the type made in the Caliphal workshops of Madinat al-Zahara outside of Córdoba, dated 1004/5 by its Kufic inscription; and the “Troubadour” casket, an example of the “Limoges Enamels,” likely made towards the end of the twelfth century (*In Praise of Song* 261–63).⁵⁸ The caskets display striking common elements, while their differences mark key distinctions between the courtly cultures which produced them. Each casket has an ornamental program that similarly displays a combination of vegetal and geometric ornament punctuated by “courtly” scenes; however, along

⁵⁷ The palace’s name is a hispanicisation of the Arabic al-Ja‘farīyya (*In Praise of Song* 2–3).

⁵⁸ For more on the Pamplona casket see Robinson’s “Love in the Time of *Fitna*: Courtliness and the ‘Pamplona’ Casket” (2007).

with the obvious difference in size and materials used, the varieties of courtly scene depicted on each diverge in telling ways (*In Praise of Song* 265–68).⁵⁹

These similarities and disjunctions in material evidence are echoed in lyric as well. One place where this appears is in the set of metaphors each tradition uses around “craft.” In each case, they speak to the state of the lyric tradition, one more developed, one coming into its own, and the desired impact of that practice in their respective courts. In the Arabic poetry and poetics in question, lyric is described as an object of refinement, something valuable, made out of precious materials with great skill. Poets speak about working with materials like gold and silver, and of their poems as pearls on a necklace. Guilhem talks about craft too, but his metaphors have a different color to them. While his songs speak to the process of their own creation and to their good quality, they do not use the refined register of Arabic panegyric. Already in *Solenh*, one sees his focus on exchanging language, even when it is not focused on communication, for rewards, erotic and otherwise. The songs to be read below demonstrate that his lyric is full of a language of exchange, one where his “mestier” [skill] (v. 4) guarantees his ability to earn his bread “en totz mercatz” [at every market] (vv. 41-42).⁶⁰ The distinction between how those crafting lyric in each tradition conceive of their own efforts can help clarify what is at stake in the “translation” or “transposition” of this courtly practice from one context to the other.

The eleventh century, the era of the *taifas*, is a critical moment in Iberia’s political and cultural history, one which bears witness to the “efflorescence of petty courts, extending

⁵⁹ There are no women on the Pamplona casket, for example, while the Troubadour casket “is assertively *hetero-sexual*” (*In Praise of Song* 268). Here, it is worth remembering, as Bill Burgwinkle emphasizes in *Love for Sale*, that representations of heterosexual desire in the lyric of the troubadours need not indicate that their function could not have been homosocial as well, triangulating a message of desire or praise for a male patron through his “Lady.”

⁶⁰ This comes from “Ben vueill que sapchon li pluzor” [I want everyone to know].

patronage to all comers” (Wasserstein 5).⁶¹ That “efflorescence,” however, is the result of the collapse of the Caliphate of Córdoba, something which begins in 1009, and is complete by 1031. The century prior, the Caliphate had reached the height of its power under ‘Abd al-Rahmān III (r. 912-961), the “longest reigning and most powerful Umayyad ruler of al-Andalus” (Collins 166, 179).⁶² He would be succeeded by another able ruler, his son who served as Caliph under the name al-Hakam II (r. 961-976) but whose own son, Hishām II (b. 965, r. 976-1009, 1010-13), would have to take power before his majority, leaving him in need of protection, and open to manipulation; this helped lead to the rise of the man who would come to be known as al-Mansūr, “the Victorious” (174, 188). Born around 937 as Muhammad Ibn Abī Āmir, he helped ensure that Hishām could take power upon his father’s death (185). By 997, when al-Mansūr raided Santiago and stole the bells from its cathedral, he had also assumed de facto control over the Caliphate from Hishām II (191).

Upon al-Mansūr’s death in August of 1002, however, things did not remain stable. His eldest son ‘Abd al-Mālīk was able to effectively rule in as his father had, with Hishām still in nominal control, but upon ‘Abd al-Mālīk’s death in October of 1008 things began to turn (192, 195, 196). His younger half-brother, known as “Sanchuelo” because of his mother’s place in the Navarrese royal line, was able to have Hishām declare Sanchuelo his successor as Caliph (Collins 196). Public opinion turned against him, it did not help that he was rumored to have poisoned ‘Abd al-Mālīk; a coup followed when Sanchuelo was fighting in the North in 1009 and he was later killed (Collins 197–98). Wasserstein describes the period from 1008 to 1031 as marked by a power struggle, and eventually a *fitna*, a civil war or crisis, which led to the

⁶¹ For an account of the *taifa* period see David Wasserstein’s *The Rise and Fall of the Party-Kings* (1985), esp. pp. 115-162.

⁶² This account follows Roger Collins’s *Caliphs and Kings*, pp. 166-204.

“definitive disappearance of the caliphate as an institution in Cordoba” (55). At the height of the dissolution, in 1031, there were as many as thirty eight separate kingdoms, each led by a “Ta’ifa or ‘Party King’” marking a period of relative independence that lasted through the 1090s (Collins 203–04).

As an index of the court whose space it helps to produce, lyric can provide valuable insight into the function of Islamicate courts in such a tumultuous time. Robinson argues that, because Al-Mansūr’s legitimacy was, rightly, suspect, he sought to cover over this defect by cultivating the loyalty of his courtiers through the patronage of their work. One way of doing so was to patronize the sort of “courtly” practices that made a court what it was. In the *taifa* courts, always suffering from a questionable degree of “legitimacy,” this went even further, with the patron often presenting himself as a peer to those verse-makers who surrounded him. Critically, he maintained control by *authorizing* the revels that served as occasion for panegyric and more Bacchic poetic expressions.⁶³ The space of the court was not just one of pleasure, but also one of administration. Many of those composing verse also contributed to the court as scribes and advisers to their ruler and patron (Robinson, *In Praise of Song* 11). In that sort of setting, the political and administrative practices of the court overlap with the pursuit of pleasure to a point where they become difficult to untangle. It should be unsurprising then, that when exposed to such a phenomenon, others seeking to improve their own political situation, or to project their own authority, might emulate those practices.

This may help explain the desire of someone like Guilhem to “transpose” elements of an already extant courtly culture into his own milieu. Places like the Aljafería serve as a reminder of that. As mentioned above, Robinson focuses on the palace, describing how its ornamental

⁶³ See Robinson (2002), esp. pp. 105-140.

program could be read in conjunction with the kind of poetry that would have been recited there, complimenting the cosmological and philosophical writings by many of the same authors. No less intricate than the ornamental program of the palace itself, the poetry in question was clearly thought of not just as a divine gift, but as the product of a skilled practitioner, deserving of respect. As an example, Robinson cites an Andalusī treatise on making verse called *Sirr al-Adab wa-Sabk al-dhahab* [“*The Secret of Adab and Gold-Working*”] (*In Praise of Song* 191). Dating to the mid-eleventh century,⁶⁴ it survives in quoted form in another collection of wisdom literature appearing in a section on *san‘at al-kalām*, i.e. the “making” of a certain kind of knowledge. The root of the word *san‘at* (s-n-‘), according to Robinson:

...has associations with manufacturing, translating as ‘to do, make;’ ‘to produce, build, manufacture, make, design;’ ‘to work, treat, process’ and most of its derived forms are strongly connected with the manual tasks of artistry or craftsmanship. Moreover the specific derived form used here—*san‘at*—translates as ‘work, workmanship, making, manufacture, fabrication; technical skill; artistic skill; craft, trade. (*In Praise of Song* 191)

This helps establish the metaphorical field associating poetry and craft.

Robinson also quotes one of the surviving sections of the treatise in which it describes the process of ordering words in a “most eloquent [fashion], from which are created interwoven clusters (*ta‘qīd*); we melt down verse into little tickling streams, then we mold (rhymed) prose into jewels of mother-of-pearl...” (*In Praise of Song* 192). Words are a kind of matter here as well, but here they are a valuable material. This makes the process of creating poetry akin to the manipulation of other precious materials, and in another contemporary text poetic creation is described in just such terms. In a *risalā* elevating the manipulation of these precious materials to the level of all other courtly activities, the author describes words as “golden inks...as though

⁶⁴ Composed by Ahmad ibn Burd al-Asghar, it was dedicated to Ma‘n ibn Sumādih, ruler of Almería, which allows its dating (Robinson, *In Praise of Song* 190–91).

No soi tan fatz No sapcha triar lo meillor D'entre·ls malvatz.		I'm not so stupid That I wouldn't know how to select the best From among the bad.
Eu conosc be sel que be·m di E sel que·m vol mal autressi, E conosc be celui que·m ri; E s'ill pro s'azauton de mi, Conosc assatz Qu'atressi dei voler lur fi E lur solatz.	(15) (20)	I know well who speaks well of me And likewise who wishes me harm, And I know well who laughs at me; And if the worthy are happy with me, I know well enough That I should likewise want their peace And their solace.
Ben aia celui que·m noiri Que tan bon mester m'escari Que anc a negun non failli: Qu'ieu sai jugar sobre coisi A totz tocatz; Mas ne sai de nuill mon vezi, Qual que·m vejatz.	(25)	May he live well who raised and educated me, For he granted me such a good profession No matter which one of mine you look at. For I know how to play on a cushion At any (game) touched upon; I know more about it than any of my neighbors, No matter which one of mine you look at.
Dieu en laus e Saint Julia: Tanta i apres del joc dousa Que sobre totz n'ai bona ma; Mas ja qui conseil me querra, No l'er vedatz, Ni nuils de mi non tornara Desconseillatz.	(30) (35)	I praise God and Saint Julian That I have learned so much about the sweet game That I have a hand more skilled than all the others; And if someone seeks counsel from me, It will never be refused, And no one will turn away from me Disconsolate.
Qu'ieru ai nom: "maistre serta": Ja m'amigu'a nueg no m'aura Que no·m vueill'aver l'endema; Qu'ieu soi be d'est mestier, so·m va, Tant enenhatz Que ben sai guazanhar mon pa En totz mercatz.	(40)	For I am called: "Perfect Master": Never will my woman-friend have me at night And not want to have me the next day; For I am so trained in this profession— Of this I boast— That I know well how to earn my bread At every market.
Pero no m'auzetz tan gabier Qu'ieu no fos raüsatz l'autrier, Que juguav'a un joc grossier Que·m fo trop bos al cap premier Tro fo taulatz; Quan gardei, no m'ac plus mestier, Si·m fo camjatz.	(45)	But you do not hear me boasting so much As if I were not forced to retreat the other day, When I was playing a big game Which I liked very much at first Until it was set up on the board; When I looked, it no longer served me, It was so changed.
Mas ela·m dis un reprovier: "Don, vostres datz son menudier	(50)	But she said to me in reproach: "My lord, your dice are small,

Ez ieu revit vos a doblier!”
Fis m’ieu: “Qui·m dava Monpeslier
Non er laisatz!”
E levei un pauc son taulier (55)
Ab ams mos bratz.

And I invite you again at doubled (stakes).”
I answered: “Even if someone gave me Montpellier
This wouldn’t be stopped!”
And I raised her board a bit
With both my arms.

E quan l’aic levat lo taulier,
Espeis los datz;
E·ill dui foron cairat, vallier,
E·l tertz plombatz. (60)

And when I had raised her board,
I hurled the dice;
And two of them were well-squared, valid,
But the third was loaded.

E fi·ls ben ferir al taulier
E fon jogatz.

And I made them strike hard against the board,
And (the game) was played.
(pp. 24-28, vv. 1-62)]

The song is made up of four *coblas doblas*, pairs of stanzas with matching rhyme sounds, with a 8a8a8a8a4b8a4b pattern, ending with two *tornadas*, one made up of four lines and the other of two (67–68). Usually labelled a *gap*, or boasting song, it builds towards the moment where Guilhem dubs himself “maistre serto” in the sixth *cobla*. It demonstrates a conflation of “skills” or “professions”: in the first *cobla* the topic is lyric; in the second and third it is the ability to distinguish between good and bad, and to know the intentions of others; in the fourth he names his “mester” explicitly as the business of the court, while taking a turn for the erotic; that erotic sense is made explicit in the same *cobla* where he uses the phrase “maistre serto,” focused on exchange; and in the final two he demonstrates that “skill” through an “exchange” with an unnamed lady. Taking each in more detail can show how the song sets up the linguistic ability Guilhem is using as equivalent with all these subsequent “mestier.”

In the opening *cobla*, Guilhem depicts himself as a craftsman, bringing something out of his “obrador” [workshop] (v. 3). He also describes the song in material ways, which both track with, and diverge from, the metaphors from the Arabic context. For instance, the metaphor of lacing up the song, recalls the notion of a song as a string of pearls — both may be referring to

rhyme as something that holds together a larger work.⁶⁷ But in Guilhem's song it sounds like the vocabulary of a tailor, rather than a jeweler. His mastery over his materials shows his power, yes, but he is not working with pearls or gems. Of course, the erotic is already here as well, as it's easy to conflate lacing up a song and a corset.

There are other explicit signs of "craft" here in this *cobla* as well. Guilhem says his song is of "bona color" [good color] (v. 2), suggesting it is of good quality. While this, along with the reference to the "flor" (v. 4) which can be rendered "prize" rather than "flower," may well refer to rhetoric, that "bona color" could also be a reference to metallurgy or other crafts.⁶⁸ Judith Peraino, looking at the division of the troubadour's process of crafting a song — between composition and performance — describes the two steps as follows:

...the first was "to find" (trobar) the raw material, the second was "to perfect" it (afinar). The troubadour worked "to file" (limar), "to plane" or "smooth" (aplanar), "to polish" (polir), "to refine" or "temper" (refranher) the raw material of the song. This process generated a rich vocabulary of craftsmanship, mostly taken from woodworking, [and] metallurgy. (38)

Here, through metaphors relating to the manipulation of both wood and iron the "craftsman" works on an altogether different, extant, material: language. As Peraino notes, "trobar" means not only to compose a song, but to find the material out of which it would be made. The songs of a troubadour like Guilhem are not so much the *ex nihilo* creation of *poesis*, but rather a skillful assembly of what is already at hand. In *Ben vueill*, the song has already been crafted, and now, taken out of the workshop, it will stand as witness to its craftsman's excellence. The word used for this act of bearing witness here is "auctor" (v. 6), suggesting how lyric might have

⁶⁷ Bond comments on this metaphor at more length, explaining that "'lace, interlace' is used throughout the century as a metaphor for the linking together of words and melody, or message and form, and is found in [Old French] as *laisse*, the basic unit of epic verse." (68n7)

⁶⁸ See Ferrante, p. 595.

simultaneously produced and reinforced the authority of the patron to whom a song was dedicated, as well as that of the person (or persons) who made and performed it. The composition and performance of such songs would, then, inscribe the authority of the patron and the composer in the very production of the space of the court.

This is doubly true in a case like Guilhem's where he is both lord and troubadour. The song, with its tightly linked *coblas doblas*, suggests a weaving together, a lacing up in its own terms, of multiple strands of mastery in order to create an overall unbestable image: the "maistre sarta." He plays on "coisi" [cushions] (v. 25), which Bond points out might be sat upon during the day, and thus depict the goings on at court, but also slept upon at night, a nod to the obvious erotic content of the *gap*'s boasts (69n25). The "game" he is to play in the "exchange" with the unnamed lady — Bond suggests an early version of backgammon called "tables" — works in a similar way (69n45). While he is excited to play at first, when Guilhem notices things do not look good for him, he blanches (vv. 43-49). Here, the song introduces a second voice, the Lady's, who taunts Guilhem, saying his dice are small (v. 51). But Guilhem answers that no stakes, political, monetary, or otherwise — all three referenced via the synecdoche of Montpellier — could deter him (vv. 53-4). The allusion to dice as sex organs is only intensified by another "game" double entendre: when he refers to raising her "taulier" ["board" or "table"]. Bond suggests this would have been a way to cheat at the game which was played on a hinged board, and raising one side would thus scramble the pieces (70n55). When he throws his three dice, the sexual meaning of this is made even clearer, as two are "vallier" [valid] while one is "plombatz" or "loaded." It is at this point that the song ends "E fi·ls ben ferir al taulier / E fon jogatz" [And I made them strike hard against the board / And (the game) was played] (vv. 61-2).

The word “vallier,” which Bond translates as “valid,” is unique in Occitan lyric, and it brings to mind an array of suggestive meanings. The word “val” would mean “value, service” and the related “valer” would mean “to be valid,” which leads Bond to conclude that it “likely means ‘of value, valid, serviceable’” (70n59). This conflation of validity and worth points to the meaning of the word “mercatz,” here, not just the physical space of a market, but instead the act of exchange itself (Raynouard, “Lexique roman” 310). The many sorts of exchange that are conflated here — sexual, political, and material — points to how lyric could, at the same time, function in a culture of gift exchange, and also be traded for something else in the marketplace. Leslie Kurke points to something similar in a much earlier lyric practice, the victory odes of Pindar, in her book *The Traffic in Praise*. She points to how lyric could both be commissioned and paid for in the context of a changing system of coinage, while also serving as a source of, and repository for, “symbolic capital” in Bourdieu’s terms (Kurke 6–7).⁶⁹ Circulation was key to these connected functions. A similar process may help explain the conflation of programmatic statements of mastery, and the boasts about different sorts of exchange in songs like *Ben vueill*.

One of the explanations for the programmatic statements in Guilhem’s songs, and for metaphors that refer to craft more generally, is the state of the Occitan lyric tradition itself in that moment. Joan Ferrante begins an essay on the topic by stating that:

Provençal poetry is the first body of lyric poetry in a romance language. This means that the troubadours who wrote the first lyrics had no native literary traditions to draw on—they had to create their medium as they were working on it. (93)

⁶⁹ See Bourdieu, pp. 171-183. The question of value is a larger one than can be addressed here. Pinet investigates the crossing discourses of rhetoric, economics, and poetry as they pertain to the *mester de clerecía* in the third chapter of *The Task of the Cleric*, “Coins on the Desk.” She lays out theories of value and the intersections of an economic and literary vocabulary, making use of Marcel Mauss’s theory of the gift, and Georges Bataille’s ideas around expenditure and waste, see esp. pp. 95-107. For more on value, literature and economics, see Marc Shell, and more recently Christopher Nealon and Joshua Clover.

This led, in her view, to both the production of conventional material that could be better understood by their audience, and “a pursuit of unusual and distinctive technical devices to mark the individuality of the poets” (93). The troubadours in the first century of the tradition were “quite self-conscious about their role as poets” (93). This is especially true of the “first” troubadour. Despite a variety of moods in his songs, “Guillem rarely lets us forget that he is a poet creating a poem” which he states directly (“*farai un vers*”) in five songs, while boasting of his abilities in three others (96). Ferrante argues that the “mastery” of which he so often boasts, is about his rhetorical skill. Critically, there is another common thread in his songs that she draws out: his depictions of knowledge or understanding as being *worth* something, i.e. that those who follow a given song’s meanings are worth more than those who do not (97).⁷⁰ This underlines the ideas around *mercatz* as exchange mentioned above. Bill Burgwinkle, in a discussion of Guilhem’s songs, goes so far as to argue that:

Words serve as capital in the troubadour ethic. Words are bartered in return for favors which include money. Particularly as they begin to be more consistently fixed in writing, words can establish, and even more easily, destroy a patron’s reputation (Burgwinkle, “Juggling” 15).

Language, especially as manipulated by a skilled “master” can have an external impact, currying favor and cutting down enemies. These songs seem to turn the hilt of the *espada de justicia* that Alfonso will later claim is present in the court.

The language of exchange in *Ben vueill*, is hardly isolated to that song alone. In perhaps his most directly vulgar song — “Companho, tan tai agutz d’avols conres” [“Comrades, I have used so much bad equipment”] (= > *Conres*) — Guilhem employs what Stephen Nichols politely

⁷⁰ Again, this points to how the purposeful miscommunication of all parties in *Sonelh* makes both sides objects of ridicule.

calls “explicit synecdoche as [the song’s] principal generative force, thereby achieving a more thorough reification of the woman as sex object” (27).⁷¹ That is to say, he builds the song around the word *con* [“cunt”]:

Companho, tan tai agutz d’avols conres (1)
Qu’ieu non pusc mudar no·n chan e que no·m pes:
Enpero no vueill c’om sapcha mon afar de maintas res.

E dirai vos m’entendensa, de que es: (5)
No m’azagauta cons gardatz ni gorcs ses peis,
Ni gabars de malvatz homes c’om de lor faitz non agues.

Senher Dieus, quez es del mon capdels e reis,
Qui anc premiers gardet con, com non esteis?
C’anc no fo mestiers ni garda c’a sidons estes sordeis.

Pero dirai vos de con, cals es sa leis, (10)
Com sel hom que mal n’a fait e peitz n’a pres:
Si com outra res en merma, qui·n pana, e cons en creis.

E sels qui volran creire mos casteis
An ho vezer pres lo bosc en un deveis: (15)
Per un albre c’om hi tailla en i naison dos ho treis.

E quan lo bocx es taillatz, naid plus espes,
E·l Senher no·n pert son comte ni sos ses;
A revers plan hom la tala, si·l dampn[atges no·i es ges.]

Tortz es c’om [planha la talla, si negun] dan no·i a g[es] (19)

[Comrades, I have had so much bad equipment
That I cannot keep from being bothered by it and singing about it
But I do not want people to know my feelings about many things.

And I shall tell you my meaning and what it concerns: (5)
I do not like a guarded cunt nor a fishing hole without fish,
Nor the boasting of base men when one has no deeds from them.

Lord God, you who are the leader and king of the world,

⁷¹ This edition and translation are, again, Bond’s. The bracketed text in the Occitan are his reconstructions of damaged portions in *E*, which result from the removal of an initial from the manuscript (61). *E*, an Occitan manuscript from the fourteenth century, has been linked to Northern Italy as well (Burgwinkle, “The Chansonniers as Books” 249n15).

The man who first guarded a cunt, why did he not perish?
For never was there a servant or a guard who was worse to his lord.

But I shall tell you about the cunt, what its nature is, (10)
As a man who has done bad things with it and taken worse from it:
Although any other thing decreases, if someone steals from it, the cunt increases

And those who do not want to heed my admonitions
Should go see it for themselves at a wood in a preserve:
For each tree which is cut down there, two or three grow up (15)

And when the wood is cut down, it grows back even thicker,
And the lord does not lose his revenue or his income from it;
The devastation is lamented wrongly if there is no damage at all.

It is wrong to lament the devastation if there is no harm at all. (19)
(10–11, 61–62)]

The song is made up of six three-line monorhymed *coblas* with a final one-line tornada. The first two lines are hendecasyllabic and the final line is in epic meter, with fourteen syllables and a stress on the seventh syllable before the caesura (60–61).

As Nichols argues, the song is built around the word “con,” [“cunt”] which is used four times, and is punned on through the sound-alike “com,” which occurs three times, along with words that can be read as compounds of it like “conres” (27–28). Nichols also points out that this word, and Guilhem’s interest in it, ties this song together with his other “companho” lyrics,⁷² which focus on a conflation of “courtly” images that surround hunting, with the pursuit of women as a similar sort of prey, which makes each as much an arena for homosocial competition as for the “satisfaction” of their own desire (25). At the same time, *Conres* also exhibits a concern with matter and exchange, meditating on what sort of “thing” *con* is.⁷³

⁷² Those songs which begin with an address to his “companions,” see Newman.

⁷³ Bond cites Nichols as pointing out that “con-res” itself could be read as “cunt-thing” (62n1).

The song opens with a reference to Guilhem's companions and a meditation on his desire to make known a thing that really sticks in his Count-ly craw. His issue is with those who would deny him his "right" to have sex with whomever he wishes. He dislikes a "cons guardatz" [guarded cunt] as much as he dislikes a "gorcs ses peis" [fishing hole without fish] (v. 5). These are an odd pairing, one a guarded object of desire, and the other a deceptive promise of sustenance. Each, however, is alike in that they deny Guilhem his "prerogative" as Lord: access to an apparent resource. The "cons guardatz" is as deceiving, in its denial of erotic satisfaction, as a place that promises fish but does not deliver. It also may indicate that he thinks a "cons guardatz" cannot fulfill its purpose of satisfying him, in the same way a "gorcs ses peis" cannot offer what it should. He goes on to ask God why he did not strike down the first man who prevented a man such "access."

There is also a homosocial dimension to the discourse around *con* here. In the epic line that ends the second *cobla*, Guilhem compares the fish-less fishing hole and the guarded cunt to the boasts of a man "c'om de lor faitz no agues" [when no one has deeds from them] (v. 6). Then, in the next epic line he says that "C'anc no fo mestiers ni garda c'a sidons estes sordeis" [For never was there a servant or a guard who was worse to his lord] than the man who first guarded a cunt (v. 9). The key relationship here is not between men and women — though sexual desire drives the song — but between a man, who does not properly offer what he has, and his lord, to whom that "thing" is denied. This focus on a sense of feudal obligation runs through the whole song, binding it together parodically through the lines that are "epic" in form, but decidedly less so in content.

Finally, the song takes a turn for the “market.” As Burgwinkle notes, the fourth stanza contains what are often called Guilhem’s *leis de con* [laws of cunt]. He points specifically to the conception of economics provided by the that fourth stanza:

In a straightforward gift economy, a treasure is diminished when one takes from it, only to be replenished later through reciprocation. Guilhem’s conflation of sex and economics...indicates that his understanding of exchange is founded on the workings of a market economy. The more a thing is desired and enjoyed...the more its value will grow. And the more this enjoyment is noted, the more prestige that will accrue to that object...once desire is added to the equation: sometimes the more you take the more there is. (*Love for Sale* 45–46)

The more that is taken, the more there is, a notion that Guilhem continues to develop in the penultimate *cobla*, which compares *con* to *bosc* or “wood.” The penultimate stanza invites any who doubt the principle espoused in the *leis de con* to go find a forest to observe how, when a tree is cut down, two or three more come back in its place (vv. 14-15). Guilhem takes this even further in the final *cobla*, where he stretches the “matter” of the forest to stand for its worth to the lord on whose land it grows: because the wood grows back even thicker after it is cut down, the lord does not lose “his revenue or his income” (as Bond translates “son comte ni sos ses”) (v. 17). Here the words “comte” and “ses” refer to specific sorts of feudal income—the former is a “count” and the latter a “tax” (like the archaic English “cense” borrowed from the French *cens*, as in “census”) (“† Cense, n.2”). This sort of reasoning focuses on the need for exchange to ensure that a given type of object increases its worth. It also applies these ideas to things as different, and presumably hard to commodify as sex, language, and authority. In doing so, it conflates them. This same conflation occurs in *Ben vueill* in the *cobla* in which Guilhem declares himself “maistre sarta.” He is claiming that he is so skilled at his craft — whether sex, lyric, or political rule — that he could find satisfaction whenever he wants. He is the master of the *mercatz*.

Understanding the translation, transposition, or adaptation of the Arabic courtly phenomenon to the new linguistic, religious, and cultural context of Guilhem's moment necessitates tracking a number of registers which are constantly blending in and out of one another. A focus on the way in which those producing lyric thought about and described their own craft is a good way to track the differences between the two. Since this lyric practice is so tied into the court and its constitution, those differences reveal much more than just a taste for a different kind of poetry. Guilhem was no professional. He was the largest land-owner in his region, and the chronicles remember him as much for his constant conflict with other secular and religious authorities as for his wit.⁷⁴ Seen through the lens of "craft," of the market, and of exchange, it is easier to understand what the stakes are when Guilhem declares his mastery. While Ferrante is right to suggest that these programmatic statements are traces of a tradition inscribing its own poetics into itself, they are more revealing than that.

As will be seen in later chapters, the presumed status of the lyric "craftsman" can have an impact on the pitch of the vocabulary of exchange used in their songs. As a lord, Guilhem's songs always ensure he is on the winning side of the deals he makes. As these metaphors change with the shifts in Occitan lyric practice over time, their differences can be instructive. These metaphors clarify not only how lyric workers viewed their craft, but how they *wanted it* to be seen. They showcase not just what they thought of their own work, but what sort of work their lyric might have done on its own, and those are insights that can be carried forward into new contexts, times, and places, as the craft of lyric is translated, adapted, and transposed, again and again.

⁷⁴ For these documents, see Bond (1982) pp. 91-163, which collects and translates documents that reference the Count.

CONCLUSIONS: TEXTS AND TEXTILES

There is an obvious relationship between the virtuosic manipulation and combination of language and the idea of weaving. Textile production was a luxury art practiced in al-Andalus, and not unlike the Eleanor Vase, its movements can be traced across the Peninsula, the Pyrenees, and the wider Mediterranean. A difference worth noting, however, is the relative ubiquity of these textiles versus unique objects like caskets or the vase. Textiles survive in many forms: funerary garments uncovered in excavations of the graves of bishops and royalty, wrapped around relics, and covering altar pieces. They are prized objects with long histories that parallel the history of lyric: objects in which already extant matter is assembled into something that can hold and transfer worth through exchange and circulation, taking on new meanings as it moves into new contexts and new uses.

There is an etymological affinity as well, which underscores the analogical relationship between lyric and textile, a relationship this section will develop briefly in order to tie up the threads running through this chapter. Walter Ong points out that the word “[t]ext”, from a root meaning ‘to weave’,” in “[o]ral discourse has commonly been thought of...as weaving or stitching—*rhaps idein*, to ‘rhapsodize’, basically means in Greek ‘to stitch songs together’” (13).⁷⁵ The songs of the troubadours, particularly at their outset, are “oral” in important ways. Just as lyric helps to produce the space of the court, and architectural and spatial metaphors can help in reading them, lyric and textiles also have a striking and productive relationship. In particular, the way something that is woven together persists despite the many changes in its use

⁷⁵ In Latin, *texere* means “to weave” (“Text, n.1”).

and re-articulations of its meaning gets at what is most difficult, and potentially interesting, about reading these songs.

María Judith Feliciano has worked extensively on the topic of textiles in al-Andalus, with a particular focus on the problems of using confessional labels like “Muslim” to describe such objects.⁷⁶ In “Muslim Shrouds for Christian Kings,” she explores this production in the thirteenth century, arguing that:

Andalusi textiles were central to the formative process of the medieval Iberian aesthetic vocabulary and played a highly visible role in the development of identities through their use in ritual and daily life, outside of confrontation, in a rapidly changing environment” (“Muslim Shrouds” 103).

These objects were made out of valuable materials by skilled artisans, which at the very least were viewed as the sum of their parts, but often as more than that. In arguing for their use as garments that signified the authority of a ruler, she offers that:

Andalusi textiles made of silk threads, wrapped in gold, colored in expensive trade dyes and woven by the most skilled hands, of whatever religious creed, were, indeed, the most decorous vestments with which to assert Castilian monarchic grandeur and cultural legitimacy (“Muslim Shrouds” 105)

This helps explain why even an expressly “Christian” figure like the Archbishop of Toledo, Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada, was buried in 1247, in garments made from Andalusi cloth that he had been given by Fernando III. As Feliciano points out, even when excavated in the sixteenth century, the first reaction of commentators was to comment how sumptuous and regal the garments were, not to point out their “Islamic” nature (“Muslim Shrouds” 119–22).

Feliciano has also studied earlier centuries, including those of the *taifa* kingdoms and, crucially, the period of the songs by Guilhem. Even then, she argues, these textiles circulated less

⁷⁶ For more on this topic, both in terms of material analysis and questions of dating and interpretation, see the *Interwoven* project run by Ana Cabrera-Lafuente analyzing the textile collection of the Victoria and Albert Museum. Feliciano is an advisor to the project.

as alien *spolia* and more as a readily intelligible part of everyday life, albeit as vehicles for the preservation, and subsequent transfer, of immense economic and symbolic value (“Medieval Textiles in Iberia” 46–50). The presence of imported Andalusi textiles in a number of French sites, as well as cases like the burial shroud of Pedro de Osma, a bishop who came to Iberia from France and was buried in Andalusi textiles in 1109, represent evidence of what Feliciano calls a “trans-Pyrenean taste” for the fabrics (“Medieval Textiles in Iberia” 52, 54–55).

There are also stories of textiles that might once have hung on walls, as they might have in *taifa* palaces like the Aljafería, finding new uses, and new meanings along the way. Feliciano points to the cloths that were draped over the altar in the Monastery of San Zoilo in Carrión de los Condes, already present in the eleventh century, as likely examples of what would originally have been wall hangings (“Medieval Textiles in Iberia” 56–57). Such objects would be part of the program of ornament of such a space (“Medieval Textiles in Iberia” 62).⁷⁷ That association, and the way in which they help produce the sacredness of such a space, may help explain how textiles could go on to gain new layers of meaning from such associations. Around the sixteenth century, an apocryphal story about Teresa of Carrión, the wife of the monastery’s founder — her donation to the monastery to the Cluniac order in 1076 is documented — becomes associated with a particular blue and white textile (“Medieval Textiles in Iberia” 57–58). She is said to have used it to float across the river Carrión with her newborn twins (giving birth to twins was thought to be a sign of infidelity at the time). In the thirteenth century, “sumptuous textiles projected notions of spiritual nobility, inner beauty, and high moral standing in correspondence with elegance, beauty, and appropriate attire” (“Medieval Textiles in Iberia” 58). As late as the

⁷⁷ While here she is referencing the use of the cloth in the church, in conjunction with wall paintings and vestments, a similar aesthetic conjunction could be imagined in an earlier setting as well (“Medieval Textiles in Iberia” 62).

sixteenth century, Teresa, now the object of devotion of a local cult, has her “alleged purity...projected in quasi-virginal terms by the exquisite blue and white textile that had played a part in religious rites” perhaps even on or at the altar in San Zoilo, some four hundred years before (“Medieval Textiles in Iberia” 58).

Textiles, then, are a “powerful material capable of temporal and geographic evocation,” and they “were fundamental in the process of the visualization of the holy and the mirroring of majesty” (“Sovereign, Saint, and City” 123). Feliciano describes them in this way in the context of another treasury, that of the Collegiate Church of San Isidoro de León. In “Sovereign, Saint, and City” she explores how the textiles in that treasury helped reveal a “commercial map that links the Kingdom of León with woven goods fashioned far beyond the frontiers of al-Andalus and the Mediterranean, expanding into Central Asia” (“Sovereign, Saint, and City” 97). They help make up a collection of objects that enabled “the construction of majesty and sanctity” of the city of León in its efforts to be understood as *civitas regia*, or “royal city,” ranging from the ninth to the thirteenth centuries (“Sovereign, Saint, and City” 97, 97n4).

This description ought to recall the Eleanor Vase and Suger’s efforts to establish the Treasury of the Abbey of Sant-Denis. In an introductory essay to the issue of *Medieval Encounters* dedicated to the treasury of San Isidoro, of which Feliciano’s above-cited essay makes up part, Therese Martin compares the two explicitly, pointing out the relative lack of research on the Iberian cases (Martin, “Caskets” 3). Such a trove, Martin argues, necessitates an interdisciplinary approach, as the contributions by Feliciano and others make clear. In summarizing what possibilities such objects hold, he argues that “[e]ach transfer of a luxury object embodies long distance connection; each object in León indicates that some form of contact existed” showing researchers glimpses of those who were “driving forces” behind the

collection of such objects in the eleventh and twelfth centuries (“Caskets” 38). In this case, it is a range of women, recalling again the crucial role Eleanor played in the transfer of her Vase from her grandfather Guilhem to her husband Louis (“Caskets” 38).

Ana Rodríguez, relying on chronicle evidence, points to another gift exchange, not a textile, but one which does tie together some of the threads of this chapter rather nicely: another gift from Louis VII to Suger, and through him to the treasury of Saint-Denis. This one, however, was from his second wife, Constanza, daughter of Alfonso VII, whom Louis married in 1154 (Rodríguez 54). The gift in question was a large emerald from “Zafadola” which Rodríguez argues is a corruption of “Sayf al-Dawla, ‘Sword of the Dynasty’ — who was to be the last king of the taifa of Zaragoza, vassal of Alfonso VII” and a participant in Alfonso’s imperial coronation in 1135 (51). Zafadola is the son, then, of “‘Imād al-Dawla, ‘Supporter of the Dynasty’” i.e. Mitadolus (53). The vase that Mitadolus gave to Guilhem, who in turn passed it on to Eleanor, was, according to Rodríguez, likely “from the sacking of the Fatimid palaces of Cairo in the 1060s” (53). What all this means is that:

both objects, the gem of Zafadola and the Fatimid rock crystal ewer of Mitadolus ended up in the treasury of the...abbey of Saint Denis...[B]oth had been presented by King Louis VII of France after receiving them from his two wives: the vase from the first, Eleanor; the gem from the second, Constanza (54).

In that treasury, then, two generations of rulers of kingdom that had built the Aljafería demonstrated their connection to lords with ties to the production of troubadour lyric.

Objects like those that wind up in treasuries — vase or gem, casket or textile — have certain things in common. They must be perceived as valuable enough to merit being given, often first to their owner, or chain of them, and then finally to the treasury where they end their circulation. The songbooks that collect the lyric of the troubadours, with or without traces of melody, show how far the analogy between the material and the linguistic can, and cannot, go.

Being placed in a monastery treasury changes an object — the placement of the Eleanor Vase in its setting is obvious enough proof of that. It can also add new layers of meaning that are harder to predict, like the blue and white textile in San Zoilo. These objects, often from distant places, show what Hilsdale calls “progressive accumulated histories” (qtd in Martin, “Caskets” 2). And perhaps they are more similar than they might at first appear: each takes a material and, through skillful manipulation, turns it into something that is better suited for circulation. At the same time, just as that which is stored in a treasury may no longer circulate, there is nothing guaranteeing a song on vellum will fare any better.

What they do have in common, on the analogical level, is clearest when the lyric of a troubadour like Guilhem is compared with textiles like those discussed by Feliciano. They represent a vehicle for the storage and transfer of a certain kind of value. There is the obvious physical sense in which they combine valuable matter — gold, silk, and dyes — through skillful craftsmanship, into an object that is more valuable still, but that second layer of value depends not only on the estimation of the labor involved, but in the symbolic significance of the textiles as well. Whether hung on a wall, cut into garments, even wrapped around the bones of a Saint, an initial symbolic significance could be altered, added to, or erased as their use varied, with all those differing layers of meaning stacking on top of one another.⁷⁸ This layering of meanings points towards what is, perhaps, a better way to understand the lyric of a troubadour like Guilhem and the lyric of Islamicate Iberian courts like the *taifa* kingdom of Zaragoza. Beyond individual songs, lyric circulated as a practice as well, undergoing adaptation, transposition, and gaining its own local meanings and instantiations along the way. If the cloths that draped the

⁷⁸ For more on the use of these textiles in the transfers of saint’s relics, and that process more generally, see Rosser-Owen.

walls of the palaces where these songs were performed could do it, why not the words that echoed among them?

CHAPTER THREE

“[T]estimoni, cavalier e joglar”: Towards a Concept of the Agency of Lyric

At the end of his hybrid-genre “Epic Letter,” the troubadour Raimbaut de Vaqueiras (...1180-1205...) tells his lord, the Marquis of Montferrat, that he deserves triple the compensation given to other men because he has served him in three capacities: “testimoni, cavalier e joglar” [witness, knight, and *joglar*] (v. 118).⁷⁹ With this list, Raimbaut is not only setting out a theory of what a troubadour can accomplish for a patron, but also of what a *song* can accomplish for its *composer*. While most obvious in the satirical and political lyric of the *sirventes*, there is a concern, present throughout the songs of the troubadours, about how songs can, and will, act on behalf of their composers. That “action on behalf of” constitutes a kind of “agency” which this chapter will work to articulate, addressing both “agency” and “lyric” as they relate to the troubadours in Iberia. A comparative approach is needed to understand the place of Occitan lyric in the many courts it helped to produce, both in its performance and in its textual afterlife — something Raimbaut de Vaqueiras and his “Epic Letter” help demonstrate.

This chapters will argue that to understand what lyric *is*, one must understand what lyric *does*. Understanding what it “does” requires an analysis in both “pragmatic” and “programmatic” terms. “Pragmatic,” has a dual resonance, evoking Charles Sanders Peirce’s notion of the “index” as well as the field of linguistics focused on deixis and language that acts.⁸⁰ “Programmatic” is a term often used to refer to refer to a poem that lays out the “program” of the

⁷⁹ These dates are Riquer’s (*Los trovadores* 811).

⁸⁰ For a history of the relationship of both sets of ideas taken to the end of the twentieth century, see Benjamin Lee’s *Talking Heads* (1997). See pp. 1-15 for a brief overview.

work to follow.⁸¹ In this chapter, it will refer also to the metapoetic moments in troubadour songs which direct the attention of their audience, whether seeing or hearing them, to the nature of their creation, and perhaps, to that which they seek to *do*. Moments of deixis and epideixis, for example can fulfill this function, and have important insight to offer readers of the troubadours. Other such elements include performance and performativity, and the relationship of lyric and ritual.

First, however, it is necessary to address the term “lyric.” While the label “lyric” is a useful one, it is worth articulating just what falls under that umbrella, and how it has developed over time. Beginning with Claudio Guillen’s notion of “literature as system,” this chapter will push for a use of the term “lyric” based on a “fuzzy” notion of genre. This approach relies on notions of categorization based on “prototypes,” building off of Wittgenstein’s concept of “family resemblance.” Ultimately, the goal is an understanding of “lyric” which can perform the task that Guillen sets out for literary history — enabling comparison while recognizing historical specificity. It is an approach well suited to the study of Iberian troubadour lyric, and to understanding the notion of the agency of lyric proposed in a work like the “Epic Letter” when it is read programmatically.

THE “LYRIC” AND “LITERATURE AS SYSTEM”

In trying to define the term “lyric,” the tension between historicity and the possibility for comparison is immediate. This tension is on display in Virginia Jackson’s entry on “lyric” in the

⁸¹ It seems more popular among classicists than with specialists in the literature of later periods. See, for example, entries in the *Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetics* on “Alexandrianism” (pp. 34-35) or “Eclogue” (pp. 386-387) which use it in this sense.

Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics.⁸² She opens by pointing out that while, “[i]n Western poetics, almost all poetry is now characterized as lyric [...] this has not always been the case” (826). Jackson distills the “invention” of lyric in its modern sense down into a brief sketch. While Goethe introduces “lyric” alongside “epic, and drama” as one of “the three ‘natural forms of poetry’” used in this sense, the term was novel (826). Examples of poems from antiquity through early modernity that are now called “lyric” might have at first been thought of as “songs” or “short occasional poems” (826). Beginning in the eighteenth century, the term began to be defined as poems that were typified by their “brevity, subjectivity, passion, and sensuality” (826).⁸³

While this may be how the term “lyric” comes into English literary study as an obvious third “natural form,” it occurs earlier, and in response to many of the same traditions, in Iberia. Even confined to the case of the Castilian word “lirica,” the evidence does not match up with Jackson’s historical sketch. In *The Poet’s Art*, Julian Weiss reconstructs a history of literary criticism as it relates to fifteenth century Castilian poetry. Like the troubadour tradition to which

⁸² Jackson is a key figure in what has come to be known as the “New Lyric Studies.” As Stephanie Burt summarizes in a review essay focused on Jackson and Yopie Prins’ *Lyric Theory Reader*, the term “refers to ideas set forth, or at least implied, by Yopie Prins in *Victorian Sappho* (1999); codified by Virginia Jackson in *Dickinson’s Misery* (2005); summarized in a 2008 special issue of PMLA, in Jackson’s long entry for “lyric” in the new *Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics* (2012), and in the forewords and headnotes to the [*Lyric Theory Reader*]” (422). Burt’s essay provides both a summary of and response to what she sees as the positions of the New Lyric Studies. See also Jonathan Culler’s response in the second chapter of *Theory of the Lyric*.

⁸³ Jackson argues that this helps explain why “lyric” is the term used by various poets and thinkers to describe poetry that expresses personal feeling, exhibits a concentration of formal elements, or could be described as overheard speech — ideas belonging to Hegel, Poe and Coleridge, and Wordsworth and Mill respectively (826). This connection to the expression of individual feeling also helps explain how debates about the definition of “lyric” become debates about the definition of the terms “subject” and “person.” This aspect of the debate will be the main focus of chapter five.

they refer, there is still a “self-consciousness that pervades the fifteenth-century court poetry” which results in lyric that often seems to be “a public declaration of artistic principles” (1–2). Weiss responds to critical opinion — that there is no “literary criticism” proper in Castilian until López Pinciano’s *Philosophía antigua poética* (1596) — by arguing that past approaches have looked for the wrong thing (descriptive criticism) in the wrong places (*external* to poetry, prologues, commentaries, and glosses) (5–6).⁸⁴

This critical oversight is understandable, however, because most works that might *seem* to promise critical or theoretical insight — beginning with the Occitan *Razos de trobar* [Reasons/Rules for composition] composed around the turn of the thirteenth century by the Catalan Ramon Vidal de Besalú — appear to fit best in a tradition of grammatical or rhetorical treatises (7). Weiss argues that this is not the same as proof that there was *no* critical judgement of poetry in the middle ages, a practice likely as old as the composition of verse, but instead that such criticism was likely performed privately (7).⁸⁵ Ultimately, this is the value of looking to the “literary text itself” (7) to find moments of self-appraisal, such as can be done through a programmatic reading of something like Raimbaut’s “testimoni, cavalier e joglar” [witness, knight, and *joglar*] (v. 118).

The first citation for the word “lirica” in the *CORDE* is attributed to a figure that also draws Weiss’s attention: Enrique de Villena (c. 1384-1434).⁸⁶ Weiss analyzes Villena’s *Arte de trovar*, the earliest surviving, though fragmentary, poetics in Castilian, a work that “preserves the

⁸⁴ The original statement he responds to is by Karl Kohut, which is followed by many coming afterwards (5).

⁸⁵ Guiraut Riquier, the topic of the sixth chapter, even composes a letter in verse — “Als subtils aprimatx” [To the intelligent and refined] (c. 1280) — which contains evaluative criticism of the song of another troubadour as it pertains to love, see Linskill (1985) pp. 273-330.

⁸⁶ According to Coromines, the word “lira” [lyre] is datable to 1438, and “lirico,” a derivative for that which is related to the lyre, or the playing of the lyre or a lyric poet, appears in 1444 (362).

close association between poetry and rhetoric... established by Provençal and Catalan Schools” (71). The *Arte* is part of an effort to place Castilian on the same level as other vernaculars which had been established as vehicles for the elevated cultural practice of poetic craft. Villena does not use the word “lirica” there, but instead in his “Exposición del soneto de Petrarca,” where he translates and comments on Sonnet 148, which features a programmatic enumeration of rivers.⁸⁷ At the end of his explanation of the metaphor of the river, Villena describes the ability of “poesía” [poetry] to capture things in a manner appropriate to a given feeling: “así en las cosas alegres como en las tristes trágicamente, sátira, comedia e lirica” [thus in the happy things, like in the sad through tragedy, through satire, comedy and lyric] (375).

This use, especially given that it comes in a reading of Petrarch, points back to knowledge of the classical context. Returning to Jackson’s entry on “lyric,” she rightly points out that even there, plenty of things now thought of as lyric were first called by other terms (Sappho’s songs were “melic” for example) (826). She approaches the diversity of terms applied by troubadours to their own work in the same way:

Sometimes the lyric proper is thought to have arrived in troubadour verse, but the elaborate medieval distinctions among the many genres of such verse (e.g., *chanson*, *tenso*, *descort*, *partimen*, *alba*, *pastourelle*, *dansa*, *sirventes*, *cobla*) are lost when we describe troubadour poems as consistently or essentially lyric... (827)

Jackson’s implication here, that these terms represent real variation in the songs of the troubadours, is correct. It would also be correct to argue that there is an interpretive danger in reading all troubadour songs — the debate song of the *tenso*, the dawn song of the *alba*, or the satirical *sirventes* — in exactly the same way. To say that these songs have *no* unity to them, however, pushes too far in the opposite direction, and risks atomizing the troubadour corpus.

⁸⁷ Collected in Pedro M. Cátedra’s *Obras completas de Enrique Villena* (1994).

Instead, more needs to be done to take the songs from all of these diverse genres seriously, to understand the “structure” of their relationships to one another, and how those “structures,” taken together, constitute a “system.”

This is the approach laid out by Claudio Guillén in *Literature as System: Essays toward the Theory of Literary History*. In the introduction, he offers a metaphor for his project, which conceives of literary history as a city of language, or *Civitas verbi*:

It has seemed to me that a cultural whole or a literary system could be visualized, metaphorically speaking, as the verbal and imaginary equivalent of an ancient yet living, persistent yet profoundly changing *city*. The great cities we have all admired, merging stone with flowing water, monuments with gardens, humble streets with spacious plazas, Gothic churches with Baroque palaces, accomplish time and again the integration of a plurality of styles in an existing, growing environment. Who has not paused to feel and recognize this unity—the immediacy of an old building, the manner in which small things are granted a role or mediocre places vindicated, the peculiar atmosphere of the great city? As I remember those I myself have loved best—Seville, Paris, Cologne, Lisbon, Venice, and a few more—I venture to think that their “atmosphere” is like a silent sign of the greatness of the past. The freedom and vitality of the great city are such that they succeed in assembling not only a variety of styles and ways of life but series of historical moments, layers of historical time. (12–13)

This metaphor frames how Guillén’s approach points towards the possibility of comparisons across time, at the same time that it recognizes the importance and necessity of understanding a given moment and historical context on its own terms. It also evokes, on the level of metaphor, how a literary practice like the composition and performance of lyric, could help produce the space of the court. It is of particular help for approaching a topic like courtly lyric from a comparative perspective, inviting an analysis of how something like the agency of lyric might manifest itself across the many different courts of medieval Iberia and the medieval Mediterranean.

Guillén insists that what he means by “system” must be understood “flexibly” and “dynamically”:

What does one mean, in this context, by system? As far as the literary historian is concerned, a system is operative when no single element can be comprehended or evaluated correctly in isolation from the historical whole (or “conjuncture”—in Spanish *conjunto* or *conyuntura*) of which it is a part. I assume that the term is to be used flexibly and dynamically, that it can refer to a stable order but also to a moment in a process of structuration. A system can be relatively open, loose, disjointed. We need have no “fearful symmetry” or other neatly proportioned arrangements in mind, for our model is neither mechanical nor visual. Our subject is a certain type of *mental* order, characterized by the functional importance of the relationships obtaining between its various parts. (In this sense, a system of poetics is like a linguistic code.) A system is more than a combination or a sum of its components. It implies a certain dependence of the parts on the whole, and a substantial impact of the basic interrelationships. Our principal models, then, are linguistic and social. (378)

That “*mental* order” is the verbal city referenced above, with each element only intelligible in relationship to the others around it. This “open, loose, disjointed” system, one which can only be apprehended as it comes into a historical *conjunto* or “conjuncture,” is what a phenomenon like the court amounts to, or forms a part of.

Guillén further develops the terms “system” and “structure” in another essay, “On the Object of Literary Change,” where he explains that “system is the broader term; structure, the more precise one” (487). That is because “structure” refers to the relationships between units, and “system” refers “to the set which is ‘held together’ by these relations or the larger configuration which embraces one set after another in historical time” (487). Guillén offers the example of reading a sonnet by Quevedo, with a preliminary knowledge of its historical context, an experience through which the reader “dwells in an aesthetic presentness” (494). If that same person then reads a sonnet by Góngora, they apprehend the “relationship existing and having existed between the two, i.e. of a *structure*,” and that experience is “to a limited but very characteristic extent, a *historical experience*” (495). It is these “[s]tructured relations, rather than individual events...” which “permit the critic-historian to replace the poem in the past without seeing its artistic substance vanish completely in the distance” (495).

“Lyric” as a term, then, can help provide an understanding of a certain *sort* of poetry in relationship to a particular historical *conjunto* or “conjuncture.” It helps enable comparison of the constituent element in a given system — to apprehend the correct structures — as opposed to the set of structures in a different system. As it pertains to lyric, Guillén proposes that:

the theoretical orders of poetics should be viewed, at any moment in history, as essentially mental codes—with which the practicing writer (the writer as individual, as *hombre de carne y hueso*) comes to term through his writing. (390)

Guillén also identifies the articulation and defense of the “famous division into three genres— ‘narrative’ (or ‘epic’), ‘dramatic,’ ‘lyrical’”: first the Latin work *De poeta* (1559) by Antonio Minturno, then more robustly in Francisco Cascales’s Castilian *Tablas poéticas* (1617) (Guillén 390). At the same time, he looks back to the classical world and finds something that corresponds with Jackson’s argument that what counts as “lyric” is often determined after the fact. There is an important relationship across time between those who anthologize literary works and the theorists that try to systematize it. As Guillén lays out, “the term ‘lyrical’ became most clearly attached to an elite of authors” in the Alexandrian anthologists of the third and second centuries BCE, and again with Horace in the first century BCE (400). The question then becomes, “[i]s it a fact that the selection of classical canons and anthologies played a central role in the rise of the lyrical modes in general?” (402). The point is not to deny the role of selection over time in shaping a term like “lyric” as it is understood in the twenty-first century, nor how it has at times distorted the apprehension of “poetry.” Instead, it is to emphasize that, if understood as a historical process, the use of a term like “lyric” can be helpful.

This line of thinking is taken up by others working to understand genre in general and lyric more specifically. Ralph Cohen’s “process theory of genre” (217), for example, recalls Guillén’s metaphor of the *civitas verbi*. Cohen argues that:

[...] genre concepts in theory and practice arise, change, and decline for historical reasons. And since each genre is composed of texts that accrue, the grouping is a process, not a determinate category. Genres are open categories. Each member alters the genre by adding, contradicting, or changing constituents, especially those of members most closely related to it. (Cohen 204)

Jonathan Culler expands on Cohen's framework with the clarification that:

[...] conceptions of genres are not just accounts of what people of a particular period thought; it is crucial to the notion of genre as model that people might have been wrong about them [...] Genre study cannot be just a matter, for instance, of looking at what Renaissance critics say about genres and using only those categories for thinking about Renaissance literature, though of course one should try them out, while keeping in mind the possibility that more capacious and historically informed categories may be essential to grasping the full import and deepest resources of literary productions. (Culler, "Lyric, History, and Genre" 883)

Cohen's argument, and Culler's reframing of it, both echo Guillén's push to recognize the "structures" or relationships between individual works or types of work, as well as the "system" they make up, in light of their relationship with their particular literary historical *conjunto*.

Because of the diversity of active poetic practices being pursued in and beyond Iberia in the middle ages, "lyric" can serve as a useful way to frame an analysis of what those phenomena do, and do not, have in common. To close this discussion, it is worth returning to the list of troubadour "genres" listed above by Jackson. In that list, there may be something of the shortcoming Culler outlines above, relying too much on the specificity of contemporaneous terminology at the expense of the unity that can be seen with distance. That list comes from an essay by William Paden which directly addresses this problem. Paden articulates a vision more in line with Guillén, Cohen, or Culler when he argues that the study of literary history is necessarily full of anachronisms:

[...] the troubadours lacked our concepts of literature and of lyric poetry. And yet we apply these notions to the study of the troubadours. When we look back onto a distant past, we have no choice but to commit anachronism, [...] by realizing its ahistoricity we may learn to understand better what we do when we read in

genres, and to judge better their usefulness. We need to ask how and why this system came to be built. (“The System of Genres in Troubadour Lyric” 33–34)

Paden, here, is perhaps perceiving the layered accumulations of the literary past that Guillén describes via the metaphor of the *civitas verbi*. In seeking to understand how a term like “lyric” could further this project’s aims, it is worth considering just how such a *category* is conceived of in the first place.

“FUZZY” CATEGORIES: “PROTOTYPES” AND “FAMILY RESEMBLANCE”

One upshot of taking this problem seriously is that it opens up an alternative way of thinking about the sorts of categories that a label like “lyric” can call to mind. Taking on *all* the songs of the troubadours as literary objects with relationships to one another, as part of a system, pushes towards a “fuzzier” idea of genre. Rather than setting out to cut literary corpora at the joints, it invites a consideration of categories defined by “family resemblance” and “prototypes,” not necessary and sufficient conditions. Not all poetry will be lyric, and not all things written in verse may be best understood as poetry. This sort of conceptual practice mirrors the songbooks in which troubadour lyric survives: capacious, sometimes confusing, but provocative when taken together as a whole.⁸⁸

“Family resemblance” is Ludwig Wittgenstein’s term, later built upon by cognitive linguists beginning in the 1970s as they developed “prototype theory” (J. R. Taylor 42–43). Both address problems with concepts of categorization that rely on Aristotelian notions of necessary and sufficient conditions as the sole arbiters for an object’s binary membership or non-membership in a category. In his *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein points to the

⁸⁸ See Galvez’s *Songbook*, pp. 1-16.

difficulty of defining the necessary element that something must have in order to be called a “game.” Instead of one element in common among all things that might be called a game, “we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail” (§66). This lack of a single unifying factor leads Wittgenstein to state:

I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than ‘family resemblances’; for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way.— And I shall say: ‘games’ form a family. (§67)⁸⁹

Concepts like this one, according to Wittgenstein might be thought of as concepts “with blurred edges” (§71).

Klaus Hempfer takes up the implications of applying the theory of prototypes to lyric in “Theory of the Lyric: a Prototypical Approach.” In the early 1970s, William Labov had demonstrated that “many linguistic categories do not exhibit clear boundaries. Instead, they possess a core that combines the typical features of a category and represents them mentally” (Hempfer 53).⁹⁰ Eleanor Rosch further developed the theory, demonstrating, “that not all

⁸⁹ The rest of §67 is also clarifying. In it, Wittgenstein elaborates:

And for instance the kinds of number form a family in the same way. Why do we call something a ‘number’? Well, perhaps because it has a—direct—relationship with several things that have hitherto been called number; and this can be said to give it an indirect relationship to other things we call the same name. And we extend our concept of number as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre. And the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres.

But if someone wished to say: ‘There is something common to all these constructions—namely the disjunction of all their common properties’—I should reply: Now you are only playing with words. One might as well say: ‘Something runs through the whole thread— namely the continuous overlapping of those fibres’. (§67)

⁹⁰ Labov asked participants to distinguish between line drawings of different “household receptacles like cups, mugs, bowls, and vases” and “[c]ontrary to the expectations of classical theory, there was no clear line between CUP and BOWL; rather, one category merged gradually

members of a category represent it in equal measure” (Hempfer 53). To do so, she asked “subjects to judge to what extent certain kinds of entity could be regarded as good examples of a category” (J. R. Taylor 45–46). In the category “furniture,” for example, CHAIR was deemed to be a very good example, while TELEPHONE was a very poor one (J. R. Taylor 46). CHAIR, then was closer to the “prototype,” which Rosch defines as follows: “[b]y prototypes of categories we have generally meant the clearest cases of category membership defined operationally by people’s judgement of goodness of membership in the category” (Rosch 36).⁹¹

What does this mean for lyric? Hempfer points out that while family resemblance and prototype theory share an origin, they have distinct ideas about “resemblance” itself. While in Wittgenstein’s concept, resemblance exists “between different members of a family and therefore of a category,” resemblance in prototype theory “appears decidedly stronger” since the category has a prototype at its center, “which then allows one to determine the relationship of resemblance through different degrees of proximity or distance of the individual elements to this core” (Hempfer 54). This distinction is useful, argues Hempfer, because it helps address some of the difficulties that arise when trying to apply the concept of “prototype” to a category like lyric. Echoing the considerations of Cohen and Culler, Hempfer points to the problems of the “polysemy and historicity” of genre concepts like lyric (55). His solution is to argue that synchronic “modes” (“transhistorical invariants” in his terms) give rise to diachronic “genres” and that “the transhistorical invariants are best viewed as prototypes, while historical genres are best described by the concept of family resemblance” (55).⁹² In Guillén’s terms, the prototype

into the other” (J. R. Taylor 43). Here, Hempfer is citing a summary by John Taylor from his book *Linguistic Categorization*. See especially chapters three and four.

⁹¹ Quoted in Hempfer.

⁹² Hempfer also acknowledges the similarity of his approach to Culler’s, pushing back against those who would say “that a transhistorically valid theory of the lyric was impossible,” but

might apply to a system seen as a sequence of related structures seen over time, while family resemblance would apply to a structure in relation to a particular literary historical *conjunto*.

As seen in both Guillén and Jackson above, the prototype for lyric might be difficult to locate or agree upon, depending as much as it does on differing principles of selection over time. The idea of family resemblance, however, is certainly useful in understanding the work of the troubadours more holistically, and it does lead towards some elements that might be of broader literary historical interest. Adopting such a perspective pushes a reader to understand the songs of the troubadours as both material and linguistic objects. As matter, they necessitate consideration of the process by which a song, with music, becomes words on a page. As language, they display a kind of epideictic discourse that means to have an impact, one of the defining characteristics of certain theories of the lyric, focused around an understanding that lyric is rich in language that seeks to do what it says.

WHAT LYRIC IS

A rather obvious question, but one that is worth answering, is that posed implicitly by Jackson in her *Princeton Encyclopedia* entry: does it make sense to call the texts that have come down in the troubadour songbooks “lyric”? The short answer is: yes. One thing that unifies definitions of “lyric” is a connection to song.⁹³ These were works that were accompanied by melodies, meant for performance before a public, whether by the troubadour or trobaritz that composed them, or

distinguishes his on the basis of his use of prototype theory, something he acknowledges is shared by Werner Wolf’s earlier work (Hempfer 55).

⁹³ This is one of the reasons that critics of more contemporary poetry object to the label of “lyric” for experimental poetic practice in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. For this perspective see Marjorie Perloff and Christopher Nealon. One wonders, however, why the category should be rejected in light of the most recent innovations in the poetic arts, rather than recognizing the many centuries of experimental work for which it is a useful term.

by a *joglar* or performer. The trouble for musicologists, and for literary scholars who ought to take interest in this original moment of performance, is the paucity of musical notation that survives, and the subsequently limited knowledge of performance practice.⁹⁴ What does survive, however, are the texts of the songs themselves (lyric in a different sense). Reviewing them, feature after feature points to this performed reality, their production of a courtly space, and their insistence on the reference to, invocation of, and creation of, a particular kind of present.

The lyric of the troubadours is perhaps best understood in terms of rhetoric. The rhetorical category under which so much of the lyric falls is “epideixis,” that is, speech dedicated to praise and blame, to “demonstrating” something about the speech’s object (Cornilliat 448).⁹⁵ Nested in the term is another term critical to understanding lyric’s capacity to act: “deixis.” The term parallels the idea of an index: that which *points* towards its object, a meaning of the word that goes back to its use in Latin, as “he who (that which) points out” (Lewis and Short, s.v. “Index”, I). Linguists use the term “deixis” to describe the same sort of phenomenon that philosophers refer to as an index (Nunberg 2, n. 1). Deixis, as John Lyons points out, “is merely the Greek word for ‘pointing’ or ‘indicating’” though it has become a technical grammatical term (275). Whether following the Latin route (thing which points) or the Greek one (pointing), the power of textual objects with these features is that traces of their original surroundings — the context of their composition, and performance, their eventual rendering as text, and the

⁹⁴ This is dealt with in chapter five in tandem with Judith Peraino’s *Giving Voice to Love*. For a more general take troubadour lyric as “song,” see the chapters by Hendrik van der Werf and Margaret Switten, appearing in *A Handbook of the Troubadours* and *The Troubadours: an Introduction* respectively.

⁹⁵ See also the *Dictionary of Untranslatables* entry on “Speech Act” which examines epideixis as a measure of rhetorical efficacy, and argues for its translation, in its context referring to Sophistic practice, as “performance” among other options (Cassin et al. 1037)

transmission of those texts — are inscribed within them. This allows readers today a chance to piece together the functioning of those processes.

Lyric is a good source of evidence for understanding the court, and the role of a figure like Raimbaut, because it serves as an *index* of the court. In Peirce's earliest account of his system of signs, he defines the index as one of the three main types — icon, index, and symbol. Peirce views each sign as being made up of three elements, the first of which he also calls a *sign*, then is the *object*, and finally the *interpretant* (Atkin, "Peirce's Theory of Signs"). The sign can be thought of as a signifier, the object as the thing being signified, and the interpretant, as the one mediating the relationship between the two. One example Albert Atkin uses in explaining the concept is a fire. The smoke the fire produces is the sign (the signifier, like a word written on a page), the fire itself is the object (that to which the written word refers), and the person a mile away who sees the billowing smoke is the interpretant (Atkin, "Peirce's Theory of Signs").

If a sign is something that stands, to somebody, for something else, the next three distinctions — icon, index, and symbol — relate to "*how* the sign stands for its object in its creation of an interpretant" (Atkin, "Index" 163). First, "if a sign stands for its object through some *quality*, then the sign is an *icon*," something like the sample book of paint swatches a car dealer uses to indicate the color of a car being purchased — the paint swatch shares a quality (color) with what it represents ("Index" 163). An index "must stand for its object through some existential or physical fact," like smoke for a fire, while a symbol is a sign which "stands for its object through some convention" like a red traffic light indicating a driver must stop ("Index" 163).⁹⁶

⁹⁶ The complication does not end here. There is a five-part schema for understanding what precisely counts as an index. It breaks down as follows, with each numbered item being described as a "feature" with a name ascribed to it by Atkin in:

One common example given for an index is a footprint on a beach. In Peirce's scheme, the footprint has a physical link to the person whose foot caused it, and it directs an observer's attention to that person even in their absence. It has the same characteristics regardless of whether or not there is someone there to observe and interpret it. The footprint also refers solely to the particular individual whose foot made that particular impression, indeed to the particular moment when they did so. While an observer might be able to ascertain some information about who left the footprint from observing it that is not primarily what it does. Primarily, it shows that a particular someone stepped there in a particular moment. Finally, while the footprint shares some things in common with the person who left it — qualities like foot size and shape — that is not what is most important in its interpretation. It is not an icon, nor a symbol, but an index.⁹⁷

Yet, if all these “features” are taken as necessary and sufficient conditions for something to count as an index, that would exclude several sub-types of index in Peirce's own system.⁹⁸

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- 1) “Indices use some physical contiguity with their object to direct attention to that object.” Atkin calls this the *significatory feature*, and singles out its “physical contiguity” (i.e. that smoke physically follows from fire) and “attention directing” (that one's attention is brought to bear on the fire that causes the smoke, even without seeing the fire itself) (164).
 - 2) “Indices have their characteristics independently of interpretation” (163). This is the *independence feature*, i.e. its characteristics do not depend on how it is interpreted (the smoke is connected to the fire that caused it regardless of its observation or lack thereof) (165).
 - 3) “Indices refer to individuals” (164). This is the *singularity feature*, i.e. a *particular* plume of smoke is an index for a *particular* fire, not for all fires (165).
 - 4) “Indices assert nothing” (164). This is the *indicatory feature*, a positive version of which would read “all indices show or indicate their objects rather than describe them” (165).
 - 5) “Indices do not resemble, nor do they share any law-like relation with, their objects” (164). This is called the *phenomenological feature*, emphasizing the “secondness” of the relationship between index and object, rather than having a primarily iconic or symbolic relationship (165-166).


⁹⁷ Atkin uses this example (“Index” 166).

⁹⁸ The are *index*, *sub-index*, and *precept*. The latter two only have features one, three, and four from the list above, while the first has all five (183).

That is what makes it seem possible, taking a “fuzzier” view, to see lyric as an index: a remnant, a sign, of a practice performed by a person in a place which helped to produce the space of the court in a particular moment. It offers a glimpse at the structures that undergirded the system of the court in a particular moment or *conjunto*. There are particular features of lyric, in its use of language and the context of its original production, performance, and circulation, that make even clearer just how it functions as an index. The songs of the troubadours spend a great deal of time and effort pointing towards a specific here and now: to the names of specific individuals and places, to the audience hearing them, to the performer giving them voice, and even to the songs themselves. The focus on deixis and epideixis recurs in arguments that seek to define a transhistorical lyric category. Culler dedicates time in his *Theory of Lyric* to epideixis, and Hempfer names it as an element in his lyric “prototype,” and it also comes up in earlier work by linguists like Roman Jakobson in his work on deixis (“shifters”) and the “poetic function,” as well as philosophers interested in performative speech like J.L. Austin.

In his account of speech events, Jakobson posits that each such event is made up of six different “factors”: an “addresser,” sends a “message” to an “addressee” which happens in reference to a mutually experienced “context” in a mutually intelligible “code,” all of which requires a “contact,” or channel of communication (353). The six different linguistic “functions” he names, describe which of these six factors is the primary “orientation” of the given utterance. The poetic function describes a speech event where the “message” is the primary focus.

Rendered as a diagram:



(353)

If there is one sort of speech which is central to understanding the lyric of the troubadours, it is this language which attempts to *do* what it *says*.

Roland Greene, in *Post-Petrarchism*, brings this up, arguing that lyric, and particularly lyric sequence's like Petrarch's *Canzoniere*, are "defined by the dialectic play of ritual and fictional phenomena" (5).⁹⁹ When fully in its ritual mode, "lyric is an utterance uniquely disposed to be re-uttered" (5). It forms "a performative unity into which readers and auditors may enter at will" (7). The elements that help make this possible are precisely what Jakobson is pointing towards with his "poetic function." Ritual is a kind of speech that seeks to have an impact on the world around it. It seeks not merely to represent, but to *do*, echoing J.L. Austin's distinction between *constative* and *performative* "speech acts."¹⁰⁰ Culler gives a summation of the difference between *constative* utterances "which make true or false statements" and *performative* ones, "which accomplish the action to which they refer" (*Theory of the Lyric* 125). Despite the fact that Austin states explicitly that literary language is not his purview, there is an obvious appeal in Austin's work for those with an interest in the literary:

Austin's account provides an alternative for the active, creative functioning of language: language as act rather than representation. Literary discourse can take its place among performative linguistic practices that bring into being that to which they refer or accomplish that of which they speak— creative and world-changing modes of language. The theory of performative language acknowledges this linguistic mode, so central to literary value. (Culler, *Theory of the Lyric* 126)

⁹⁹ Or, as will be argued in chapter six, Guiraut Riquier's own lyric corpus as preserved in the songbooks.

¹⁰⁰ This is one of the main topics of *How to Do Things With Words*, based on lectures delivered in 1955, and first published posthumously in 1962.

Austin recognizes, though, that the conative vs. performative distinction on its own is too simplistic.¹⁰¹ His finer-grained distinction describes three parts to every individual speech act: the *locutionary*, *illocutionary* and *perlocutionary* acts. Culler summarizes them as:

...the *locutionary* act (of producing a given utterance), the *illocutionary* act (the act I perform in speaking this utterance in particular circumstances), and *perlocutionary* act (acts that I may accomplish as a result of the illocutionary act).
(*Theory of the Lyric* 129)

One of the problems with privileging the performative when analyzing literary discourse is that it draws focus to illocutionary acts and discounts perlocutionary acts, and while the former are mostly just the result of conventions of literary discourse, the latter are potentially much more interesting: “[M]oving readers, provoking reflection, leading them to act differently” are “all perlocutionary consequences that cannot be predicted” and may well be “the most important acts a poem performs” (*Theory of the Lyric* 130). This lets the reader focus, instead of on its felicity — its success or failure in Austin’s terms — on the effects a given poem has. In the end, lyric success is something different, since “lyric, by its formal patterning and mode of address, asks to be learned by heart, even if that seldom happens; its efficacy depends upon its success in making its words memorable, having them remembered” (*Theory of the Lyric* 130). In this light, Culler concludes, “[i]t is far better...to think of the poem as performance, which may or may not be efficacious, rather than performative, which is supposed to bring about, by convention, that of which it speaks” (*Theory of the Lyric* 131). When seeking to understand troubadour lyric, the question is not whether this sort of “active” language — the language of ritual, of performance,

¹⁰¹ There are performative utterances, warnings, for instance, that do not contain any performative verbs, like “There is a bull in this field.” Making a factual utterance, on the other hand, is also performing the act of stating something, for instance one could reframe “The cat is on the mat” as “I hereby state that the cat is on the mat” (Culler, *Theory of the Lyric* 129).

of epideixis — exists, but rather what it is focused on doing, what might be called the “agency of lyric.”

WHAT LYRIC DOES

What is agency? The *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* begins its “Agency” entry with the most general formulation: “an agent is a being with the capacity to act, and ‘agency’ denotes the exercise or manifestation of this capacity” (Schlosser). In their entry on the term in the *Dictionary of Untranslatables*, Etienne Balibar and Sandra Laugier complicate this presentation, pointing out how slippery a term agency is when attempting to render it in another language (French in their case). Balibar and Laugier describe how the term, coming into general English usage in the seventeenth century, and then into philosophical discourse in the eighteenth, went on to gain a few different layers of meaning (17). Ultimately, “in English, ‘agency’ came to sum up the difficulties of defining action and, in the contemporary period, of what makes it possible to act,” though attempts to render it into French as one word missed this complexity (17–18).¹⁰² Balibar and Laugier suggest that “‘agent’ would be more easily translated by *sujet* (and, in turn, ‘agency’ translates *sujet* better than ‘subject’ does)” (18). There is, however, a particularly interesting use of the term in economic and legal discourse, as Balibar and Laugier point out. Agency, in these fields, can “[...] describe modes of action that are in a sense ‘by proxy,’ that is, carried out by someone in place of someone else.[...] [I]t is an action whose subject is not where we think it is, in the agent” (21).¹⁰³

¹⁰² In English, key figures are J.L. Austin, Elizabeth Anscombe, and Donald Davidson, especially as agency comes to relate to different theories of action and intention.

¹⁰³ The specific examples revolve around the “principal” and “agent” relationship in economic theory.

This last sense is where the focus on the agency of lyric comes from for this chapter, and this project more generally. This is a study of lyric in motion, an attempt to reanimate it by understanding the concerns a song's composer might have had about its possible impact in the world. What is its role in the *civitas verbi* of medieval Iberia, or of the medieval Mediterranean? The many moments of self-address in these songs, when a troubadour turns to the *joglar* — the performer — or even to the song itself; all of this implies that these songs do work *on behalf* of their composers. It is the contention of this chapter that understanding this agency, as it relates to and occurs in lyric, can reveal insights that might be otherwise overlooked, and can ultimately enable a sort of reconstruction, not only of the courtly space these songs helped to produce, but of what filled those spaces as well. While the next chapter will showcase an individual whose work typifies the agency of troubadour lyric, this one will address an example that provides both a schema for understanding the agency of lyric, and a further argument for the benefits of categories with “blurred edges.”

This concept of agency shares some features with the account given by the British social anthropologist Alfred Gell. In *Art and Agency* (1998), Gell uses Peirce's notion of the index to formulate what he calls a “folk” notion of agency, i.e. as it is understood by people, in order to take seriously a system that is philosophically “wrong” (17). In Gell's terms, “[a]gency is attributable to those persons (and things...) who/which are seen as initiating causal sequences of a particular type...[a]n agent is one which ‘causes events to happen’ in their vicinity” (16). The events in question, argues Gell, do not have to be the intended ones for an observer to make an attribution of agency (16). That observation uses “abduction,” another term from Peirce, which refers to a “synthetic inference” (Gell 14). The process of abduction is that by which an observer might attribute agency to a cloud of smoke as “the index of fire-setting by human agents” (15).

All told, this theory allows for a notion of “second-class agency” for objects as a result of their becoming “enmeshed in a texture of social relationships” (17). In developing this theory, Gell relies on the fact that people *do* form social relationships with things, and that those objects can then serve as “a mirror, vehicle, or channel of agency” (18, 20). At the same time, he maintains the importance of the distinction between “‘primary’ agents,” i.e. those capable of intention, and “‘secondary’ agents” which could be objects (20). Ultimately for Gell, the object that becomes an index in his terms amounts to “a congealed residue of performance and agency in object-form, through which access to other persons can be attained, and via which their agency can be communicated” (68).

Still, not only is this theory elaborated in the context of art objects, and not literature, it actively rejects the comparison of art objects with language and its interpretation (14). In “Literary Art and Agency?” Warren Boutcher addresses what a version of Gell’s theory that *is* applicable to literature would look like, especially in the case of premodern literature. His observations apply to medieval literature as well. A critical problem is that Gell, in eschewing the linguistic, ends up with a system that lacks terms for anything like “critical discourse” or “paratext”; however, Boutcher argues that Gell’s theory is helpful, especially in a premodern context with differing assumptions about the capacities of language and writing (160–62). It is telling that the object of analysis Boutcher takes up in conjunction with Gell’s theory is the letter, especially of the sort used by figures like Erasmus and other humanists (Boutcher 161). Raimbaut de Vaqueiras’s *Epic Letter* is this sort of index, and it seems to exhibit this kind of “second-class agency.”

THE “EPIC” LIFE OF RAIMBAUT DE VAQUEIRAS

Reading Raimbaut de Vaqueiras (...1180-1205...) in the *conjunto* of medieval Iberia benefits from a “fuzzier” understanding of categories. At first glance, Raimbaut hardly seems to be an “Iberian” troubadour, and the work to be discussed here, the so-called “Epic Letter” (=> *EL*) is hardly typical troubadour lyric. As Peter Linskill, the editor of the only complete edition of Raimbaut’s lyric output, notes, “[h]is career is one of the most brilliant and romantic known to literary history” (3). Linskill goes on to describe Raimbaut as:

A humble minstrel and poet, who in the course of his wanderings experienced all the vicissitudes inseparable from his precarious calling, he rose to be the friend, confidant, and companion in arms of no less a person than the future leader of the Fourth Crusade of 1202, the Marquis Boniface I of Montferrat, whose glories and perils he shared over a long period; and his claim to the latter’s gratitude lay more in the military field than in his poetic talent, outstanding though it was. (3)¹⁰⁴

Linskill compares Raimbaut’s *vida* against the many datable events and named people and places in the *EL* in order to provide a more complete account of the troubadour’s life than is usually possible. He was born in Vacqueyras, in what is now southern France, possibly between 1155 and 1160 (4–5). Raimbaut eventually found his way to the court of Montferrat in what is now northwestern Italy, a “Marquisate” which owed its twelfth century prestige to the ruling Aleramic family’s defense of the crusader kingdom of Jerusalem under the rule of William III (7).¹⁰⁵ It was William’s third son who would rule as Boniface I (c. 1152, r. 1192-1207), and whose patronage would support much of Raimbaut’s output (8).

In the *EL*, Raimbaut recounts some chivalric exploits by Boniface in his youth, in which Raimbaut took part — “romantic expeditions undertaken to afford timely assistance to young

¹⁰⁴ For more on his biography, and for the text of his songs, see Joseph Linskill’s 1964 edition of Raimbaut’s lyric. The texts of his songs in this chapter will draw from his edition and his translations, unless otherwise noted.

¹⁰⁵ The “Marquisate of Montferrat” was nestled in “the foot-hills of the Alps between Savoy...Milan...and Liurgia” (7) centered around the city of Casale. Today, it could be located in between the cities of Turin to the west, Genoa to the south, and Milan to the north-east.

ladies in distress” (8–9) — which Linskill dates as taking place between c. 1177-8 and 1182 (9).

To be clear, these “romantic expeditions” (III vv. 1-79 in the *EL*) are what Linda Paterson describes as accounts of “marriage by abduction”:

Boniface and the troubadour allegedly came to the rescue of Saldina de Mar, who had already been abducted by Albert of Malaspina. The two ‘heroes’ kidnapped her from the fortress of Malaspina at supper time, and donated her to Ponset d’Aguilar who was supposedly in bed dying of love for her. They also allegedly kidnapped Jacobina de Ventimiglia from her uncle, who was trying to marry her off to deprive her of her inheritance. After joyful adventures they donated her to a hospitable host, and Boniface regained for her the whole territory of Ventimiglia [...] Raimbaut implies that the women were happy with their eventual conjugal lot, but it remains obscure whether they had any say in it. (Paterson 239–40)

This, according to Linskill, shows Raimbaut’s abiding “love of action” (9). It certainly showcases his knowledge of tropes of the romances (9).

While Raimbaut’s own movements between 1182 and 1188-9 cannot be determined to Linskill’s satisfaction, 1183 marked the beginning of Boniface’s de facto rule of Montferrat — one of his brother’s, Ranier, had died and his father and other brother Conrad, were in Palestine (9–10). By 1189, Raimbaut himself resurfaces in Provence, composing a *sirventes*¹⁰⁶ in defense of the “lord of Baux” — Linskill suggests Hughes I des Baux, eventual Viscount of Marseille in 1193, who “held an important administrative post under the Count of Provence” (11). The complicated dynastic mess is worth untangling to make clear the continued Iberian involvement in the region’s affairs. The conflict in question, between those allied with Count Raymond V of Toulouse and the “house of Barcelona-Provence,” related to Raymond’s claims to territory in Provence. Raymond was defeated in 1190 with assistance from the Baux family, by forces led by Count Alfonso II of Provence, himself the son of King Alfonso of Aragon (10).

¹⁰⁶ Poem II in Linskill’s edition (89–97). The song is made up of six *coblas unissonans* of seventeen lines each with two three syllable lines followed by six syllable lines throughout the rest of the *cobla*. The melody is from an earlier song by Giraut de Bornelh (94).

Linksill divines all this from a *sirventes*: “Leus sonetz” [Simple melody], in which Raimbaut defends the Baux family, and decries those in their circle that failed to assist them. It ends with a strong condemnation of a specific partisan of Count Raymond:

En Guillems Arnautz jatz,	(100)	[Sir William Arnaud is resting
que n’es tant mal portatz		he has conducted himself so ill
c’om l’en ten per malvatz	(102)	in this affair that men consider him rotten]
(92-93, vv. 100-102)		

These final three lines betray one of the kinds of action a song could take, attacking a figure and their reputation, that could last long past the moment in which the reference itself is understood.

As much untangling of the lyric threads as Linskill is able to do, his note to these lines only identifies the *target* of the attack, not the nature of the underlying sin. As he put it, “[t]he allusion to his reprehensible conduct remains obscure” (97n100). This is one thing that troubadour lyric *does*: an operation carried out by the song’s composer for a patron that has outlived any of the involved parties. All that exists now is the insult, without any of the pieces necessary to decode it. This seems to be evidence of lyric acting “by proxy,” exhibiting agency.

Raimbaut brought these services along with an apparent willingness to take up arms, as is evidenced by his next stay in Italy with Boniface, which Linskill suggests may have been occasioned by Boniface’s assumption of the title Marquis upon the death of his brother Conrad in 1192 (14). Serving at his patron’s side in the campaign of Emperor Henry VI in 1194 to conquer Sicily, Raimbaut was granted knighthood by Boniface for his role in the successful campaign. Along with being mentioned in the *EL* itself (II, vv. 17-25), Raimbaut’s knighthood is also referenced by others, often as an object of mockery; the Marquis Albert Malaspina does so in a *tenso* and the troubadour Perdigon mentions it in a *partimen* (15, 15n52-54).¹⁰⁷ Raimbaut is

¹⁰⁷ In each reference is also made to “Raimbaut’s fondness for eating, which apparently resulted in corpulence” (15n54).

back in Provence in 1195 and 1196, composing love songs, before returning to the court of Montferrat in 1197, where he would stay until 1202, a span of years to which Linskill assigns ten songs, almost a third of Raimbaut's total output. That period's end coincides with a downturn in the fortunes of Montferrat in local political terms, but a personal uptick in Boniface's election as leader of the Fourth Crusade (in the early fall of 1201) (30). At first, Raimbaut does not join his lord, going instead to Provence and the court of Hugues de Baux, now Viscount of Marseille, but by the spring of 1203, he has taken the cross and joins up with the Count en route to Constantinople (31). This assertion is made based on Raimbaut's depiction of the first siege of the city in July of 1203 in the *EL* (II, vv. 26-28), as well as of the second in 1204 during which Raimbaut was wounded (II, 37) (32).

Eventually, Boniface was given control of Salonica (Thessalonica), Macedonia, and Greece, after having not been declared ruler of the new "Latin Empire," and he consolidated his holdings over the next few years until his death in 1207 (32-33, 35-37). His death took place at the hands of Bulgarian forces, returning from the marriage of his daughter Agnes to Henry of Flanders, now the "second Latin emperor" (35-36). The account of his end comes from Geoffrey of Villehardouin's chronicle of the Fourth Crusade, which records his death "[m]ortally wounded...abandoned by all but a few companions, who remained to share his fate" (36). While there is not a list of those who died with Boniface, Linskill thinks that, given the survival of the *EL* and three other songs which he believes were composed in the East, it would be surprising that a living Raimbaut would not have composed a *planh* for his fallen lord as well (36). For this reason, and, admittedly, the poetry of it, Linskill argues that "[t]o have sealed with his blood a lifelong devotion to Boniface would indeed have been a fitting end to the life of this faithful poet-warrior" (37).

The *EL* itself comes from a moment just before this end for Boniface, and perhaps Raimbaut himself. Linskill dates it to 1205, arguing that this was the moment when Boniface “began to distribute the expected rewards to his many faithful followers” (33). It is, then, an effort by Raimbaut to ensure he receives the recognition he believes he deserves. The *EL* is a hybrid work, detailing the exploits of his patron in the manner of a *chanson de geste*, organized in monorhymed decasyllabic sections later called *laissez* for that reason. At the same time, it makes the case for Raimbaut’s own valor, and value to his lord, in a way that recalls the genre of letters on love themes written from the perspective of a troubadour begging a favor from a lady (Linskill 33). Here, clearly, two genres are being combined to *do* something. Despite his time spent across the Mediterranean, in what is now France, Italy, and Greece, Raimbaut’s connection to Iberia might seem tenuous — other than his alliance with a house in Provence that had connections to the county of Barcelona. His work, both in the *EL* and elsewhere, have distinctive connections to Iberian literary history. Critically, the *EL* would go on to feature prominently in manuscripts that mark the intersection of the Occitan and Catalan literary traditions.

Raimbaut’s work shows strong enough connections to Iberia that some critics have argued for his presence there during his life, an assertion Linskill ultimately rejects. There is, for instance, “Eras quan vey verdyar” [Now when I see turn green], his famous multilingual *descort* [discord], so called for its mismatched stanzas, each of which is in a different language, with the final *cobla* integrating them all together. The fifth (vv. 33-40) is in Galician-Portuguese, arguably the first instance of it being used as a literary language.¹⁰⁸ There is also his song “Altas

¹⁰⁸ For more on this song, see Roy Hagman’s “The Multilingual Descort of Raimbaut de Vaqueiras.” Given that, “three of the languages used by Raimbaut, Genoese, Gascon, and Spanish-Portuguese, did not yet exist as literary languages in his time, making this poem the first literary instance of each” (Hagman 16).

undas que venez” [Tall waves coming over] which places a lament for a lost male lover in the voice of a lady, with a refrain ending each stanza “Et oy Deu, d’amor! / Ad hora·m dona joi et ad hora dolor!” [Ah, God, this love! / Sometimes it gives me joy and sometimes pain!] (5-6, 10-11, 17-18). This, clearly, echoes the Galician-Portuguese *cantigas d’amigo* in both theme and structure, which has occasioned speculation about whether Raimbaut knew the Iberian tradition, or whether, indeed, he could be the author at all. Finally, Federico Saviotti describes how Raimbaut uses deictic signaling and toponyms to create a map of the Mediterranean world in which he operated across the body of his songs, with references stretching from Spain to Constantinople (44–45). However, while he was likely present at the sack of Constantinople in 1203 by his lord on the Fourth Crusade, the consensus is that Raimbaut did not visit the Iberian peninsula itself, but rather that he might have interacted with others who had, and his own patrons moved in circles that intersected with the Aragonese and others.¹⁰⁹

Raimbaut de Vaqueiras’s *EL* would not serve as the prototype for an “Iberian troubadour song.” It was not composed in Iberia, it is much more narrative than a typical *canso* or *sirventes*, and its themes of combat and knightly daring differ markedly from other examples in the corpus. All that said, this text has served a critical function in the history of the reception of troubadour lyric in Iberia, particularly in its manuscript form. It is also a text that sets out very clearly to *do* something: argue for the compensation of its composer by the dedicatee of the work, his patron. Raimbaut argues he deserves three times the compensation of other knights because he fills three roles — “testimoni, cavalier e joglar” [witness, knight, and *joglar*]. How did this come to be the case? And what do those three roles have to say to readers today about the expectations of the agency of troubadour lyric in Iberia?

¹⁰⁹ For more on this subject, see Linskill 29-30, and Saviotti.

The *EL* is divided into three sections, each of which opens with an address to Raimbaut's patron, then details some action from their shared history, reflecting well on them both, and then Raimbaut asks for compensation for his service. Each *laisse* consists of a different number of monorhymed decasyllabic lines, and they are non-chronological. The first two, which relate events from more recent military campaigns, are around sixty lines, while the third and final *laisse*, which covers the youthful "valorous exploits" of Boniface mentioned above, is longer, at more than a hundred. There is, however, a unity suggested by some of the structure of the introductory lines of the first *laisse* and the closing lines of the third. At the *EL*'s opening, Raimbaut thanks God that he has found such a great lord in Boniface: "e laus en Dieu quar tan m'a enansat / que bon senhor ai molt en vos trobat" ["and I praise God that He has so advanced me / that I have found in you a most generous lord"] (vv. I.5-6). At the close of the third *laisse*, Raimbaut again asks for compensation for his deeds, which he has just outlined in terms of service and assistance to his patron in the *laisse* preceding it:

E pus, senher, sai tan de vostr' afar, (115)
per tres dels autres mi devetz de be far,
et es razos, qu'en mi podetz trobar
testimoni, cavalier e jocglar
senher marques

[And since, my lord, I know so much of your affairs,
you must reward me as for three others,
and this is just, for in me you may find
a witness, a knight and a poet,
my Lord Marquis.]¹¹⁰ (Linskill 308, 312)

Here, Raimbaut repeats the same procedure with which he has closed the previous two sections: a direct appeal to his patron for a material reward for his service.

¹¹⁰ The translation here is from Joseph Linskill's edition of Raimbaut's lyric, which does not lineate the English. For the text of the *EL* see pp. 299-344.

Just as he was lucky to have “found” (“trobat” from line 6 in the first *laisse*) his lord, he says that Boniface in him can “find” an equally worthy subject (“trobar” in line 117 of *laisse* III). Both words are at the end of the line, and unlikely to be missed.¹¹¹ The word “trobar” means not just “to find,” of course, but also refers to the act of composing verse, and it raises the possibility of reading these lines programmatically. In that sense, Raimbaut is emphasizing the potential for lyric like his to *produce* the positive image of a figure like the Marquis, to *compose* him in song. Likewise, it shows how Raimbaut produces his own image through the production of works like the *EL*. This declaration directly precedes his description of his three-fold worth to his patron.

Raimbaut asks for his reward to be triple what Boniface might give another because he and his service are worth three times as much, because in him, Boniface can find “testimoni, cavalier e joglar.” This trio of terms is, in sum, a statement of the value of a figure like Raimbaut, as he views himself: someone who might bear *witness* to the greatness of his lord; a *knight*, as he has described his valor on the battlefield in previous *laisse*s; and finally, as a “poet” in Linskill’s translation, but more literally as a *joglar* or performer. One way to understand this trinity of terms is that they not only represent Raimbaut as an actual figure, but that they represent the potential his lyric holds. Here, it seems evident that the verse in question “testifies” to the great valor of Boniface.¹¹² It also, in the process, testifies to *Raimbaut’s* valor, and more

¹¹¹ For more on this see Linskill 318n1. He points out that not only is there structural unity here between opening and closing of the whole work, but that “the formula of address with which each of the three *laisse*s begins and ends” is “a usage apparently borrowed from the amorous letters in verse” (318n1).

¹¹² One could also think of “testimoni” as indicating that Raimbaut has himself seen so much of Boniface’s virtue as to be able to back it up. Indeed, Linskill suggests that:

Though no Provençal text offers *testimoni* in this figurative meaning, Raimbaut, for so long closely associated with the events he is recalling, might well consider

specifically, his *value*. The second term, “cavalier,” here is a reminder that Raimbaut has fought on the battle field, but he has also represented his lord in lyric skirmishes. Finally, he calls attention to his craft as a performer and his profession as a “poet.” In an earlier moment a listener or reader might have found self-designation of a *joglar*, rather than a *troubadour*, strange. Linskill suggests that Raimbaut’s use of the word “joclar,” in reference to himself in a positive sense, is proof “that the distinction between the troubadour and *jongleur* was disappearing at this time,” before pointing to Guiraut Riquier’s displeasure with that fact (which will be detailed in chapter six) (344). Of course, on a symbolic level, reminding his patron of his skill as a performer, Raimbaut is also pointing out the ability of his songs to perpetuate themselves, to circulate beyond the scope of their original performance into other courts, and beyond into posterity.

Was the *EL* a success? The text of the *EL* itself is dedicated, along with praising his patron, to building a strong case for compensating Raimbaut for his service. Apparently, he was. As Linskill points out, in the *canso-sirventes* “No m’agrad’ iverns ni pascors” [Neither winter nor spring delights me], Raimbaut states that he has been made rich by his role in the conquests (34, 241–52).¹¹³ The work also provides details of Boniface’s exploits that outstrip the record in chronicles, proof that it certainly served as “testimoni” to his legacy. Just what leads to its subsequent success is a fair question. Linskill and others point to the level of emotion in its depictions of some of the episodes in question, it also contains a great deal of specificity, the sort

his poem to be a document attesting for posterity the noble and chivalrous deeds of the Marquis and himself as an irrefutable witness. (344)

¹¹³ Linskill suggests it was likely composed in Salonika, that is, the Crusader state of Thessalonica, lands surrounding current day Thessaloniki, in 1205, making it his last datable work (34, 241–52).

of deictic signaling that might have been of interest to later compilers. What is perhaps most interesting, is how it kept performing its function past the point at which doing so would benefit its composer. Raimbaut's fate is unknown after the composition of the *EL* (or almost, a year later with that *sirventes*) but through it, he finds himself at the center of a literary scene developing around the works of troubadours like him.

The compiler of the *Sg* manuscript clearly saw something in the work, enough to put it in a key position in Raimbaut's work as represented in the *chansonniér* in question. Raimbaut's work is, itself, in an important position in the songbook as well. *Sg*, dating to the final third of the fourteenth century, was produced in Cataluña, and despite being late for the troubadours, it is one of the first lyric manuscripts of Catalan provenance which survives (Cabré and Martí, "carrefour" 93). Cabré and Martí offer the suggestion that it may have been produced for Count Pere II of Urgell (r. 1347-1408), likely based on a collection that would have belonged to his father, Jaume I of Urgell ("carrefour" 133). The manuscript begins with a large number (104) of songs by Cerverí de Girona, then, the next troubadour included is Raimbaut — there are 23 songs under his name, six are spurious — before other figures like Bertran de Born, Giraut de Bornelh, Arnaut Daniel, and Jaufre Rudel. Then, there is a section of fourteenth century Catalan poets, four songs by Guillem de Berugedà, and finally a fragment of the *Roman de Troie* ("carrefour" 97). Cabré and Martí explain the principle of selection at work in the songbook as being focused on providing corpuses that are as complete as possible, with a focus on figure that are important to the Catalan literary tradition: Cerverí for his association with the royal administration of Jaume I of Aragón and his son Pere III of Aragón; and Raimbaut and Giraut de Bornelh (who has 73 songs in *Sg*) each of whom was influential as well ("carrefour" 99).

The corpus of Raimbaut's songs as they appear in *Sg* is broken into two groups: first, songs of different genres ending with the *EL*, and second, a set of some fifteen *cansos*. The *EL*, effectively, splits the two sections, and *Sg* is, in fact, the only manuscript that transmits Raimbaut's corpus and which places the *EL* in this "central" position (Saviotti 56, 58). It is visually notable for a reader of the manuscript as well, because while every preceding text in *Sg*, more than a hundred of Cerverí's songs, and now half of his own, has been laid out in "long lines," the *EL*, because of its epic meter, is presented in two columns (Cabré and Martí, "carrefour" 101n17).¹¹⁴ A reader would encounter the *EL* as a piece amidst otherwise more obvious examples of troubadour lyric, and would be primed to pay it special attention.

Occitan's role in Catalan literary history is also of interest to Cabré and Martí, which they address in an essay "Poetic Language in the Multilingual Crown of Aragon" in a 2018 issue of *Tenso* on the topic. In it, the authors address the "adoption of a seemingly artificial or foreign poetic language" i.e. Occitan, in the kingdom of Aragon ("Poetic Language" 66). The use of Occitan in a "Catalan" context, after all, occasions the "first treatise on a vernacular language" — Ramon Vidal's *Razos de trobar* — and it has led some to view the phenomenon as "peripheral" or a sign of Occitan's "alterity" for Catalan speakers ("Poetic Language" 70, 74). But, Cabré and Martí argue, the kingdom of Aragón expanded from the eighth century to the fifteenth by incorporating new territories in which the inhabitants spoke other languages, and some of those were Occitan-speaking regions, like Provence (1112) and Montpellier (1208) ("Poetic Language" 66–67). Provence's incorporation, after all, helps explain Raimbaut de Vaqueiras's songs that relate to the king of Aragón as outlined above.

¹¹⁴ The only other such moment comes with the fragment of the *Roman de Troie* on ff. 125r-126v; there is also a song presented in a single column (Cabré and Martí, "carrefour" 101n17).

It is also less clear than was previously thought that there was a stable Occitan *koine* which all troubadours used, and against which the work of the Catalan troubadours can be judged as “other” (“Poetic Language” 70). Indeed, it is not clear that those first treatises on troubadour composition, grammars really, were directed to a “Catalan” audience per se: little is known about the origins of the *Razos*, composed around the turn of the thirteenth century; and the next example, Jofre de Foixà’s *Regles de trobar* (late thirteenth c.) is written in Sicily, then controlled by Aragon, with an audience that is not specifically “catalan” (“Poetic Language” 76–77). The goal of these works seems, instead, to elevate the status of certain vernaculars to a higher level of prestige, and to assign certain languages to different forms or genres of poetry, and Jofre’s text is structured like a Latin grammar (“Poetic Language” 77–78). Villena’s *Arte* does something similar for Castilian in a later moment. By the time such a text is written in Occitania, the *Leys d’amor* from which the poetic terms assigned to troubadour lyric are taken for example, it seems clear that the goal is to “propagate a tradition that is deemed a vehicle of *saber*,” something which the fourteenth century treatises produced in conjunction with the poetic competitions in Toulouse will echo as well (“Poetic Language” 78–79). This, Cabré and Martí explain, important, because, “[t]he perception of Occitan as a prestigious language, coupled with a self-perception of belonging to the troubadour tradition, will determine the course of Catalan medieval poetry” (“Poetic Language” 80).

This becomes especially clear when taking *Sg* into an account of the reception of Occitan troubadour lyric in the kingdom of Aragón. The notion of different forms or genres being associated with different vernaculars is underscored by other Catalan figures who are more contemporary to, but still precede, the production of *Sg*. Cerverí de Girona, whose work makes up so much the manuscript, is clearly aware of other languages, but he studiously avoids their

use except in a few cases for his lyric (“Poetic Language” 80–81). Ramon Llull on the other hand changes his language according to his audience (“Poetic Language” 83). There is another figure, however, who mostly uses Catalan, but whose rare use of Occitan confirms its place in the courtly milieu as a language of poetry: Ramon Muntaner (“Poetic Language” 83–84). Muntaner, “one of the main actors of the Catalan expansion in the Mediterranean” deploys “literary language according to genre” in his *Crònica* (“Poetic Language” 83). Muntaner is thought to have written his Chronicle in Valencia between the years of 1325 and 1328. In the text, largely in Catalan, there is a section in chapter 272 referred to as the *sermó*: 250 alexandrines broken into twelve *laises* of twenty monorhyme lines; the *sermó* is in Occitan and references an Old French epic melody to which it can be sung (“Poetic Language” 83).

Another key instance of the *EL* is in a manuscript that also contains the *Crònica*. In an article on the reception of the *EL*, Paolo Di Luca details another place where the text crops up, and it does so along with Muntaner’s *Crònica*: the manuscript *cv*. Produced in Valencia in the first half of the fifteenth century, the manuscript contains the *Crònica de Muntaner* in its ff. 1-199, though the end is missing due to damage to the manuscript; then, on ff. 203v-205r. Raimbaut’s letter is copied out (54–55). Di Luca argues for its later copying into the manuscript, which he asserts may have belonged to the family of Muntaner, because of the prestige of Raimbaut in the Catalan milieu, the uptick in the circulation of texts between southern France and the Kingdom of Aragón in the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and because there are important parallels in the meter and content of the *EL* and the *sermò* which appears in the *Crònica* (54–57). The thematic resonance of the expansion across the Mediterranean in Muntaner’s text and Raimbaut’s own relation of adventure across a range of similar territory may also help explain it.

As mentioned above, the *EL*, in its final lines, offers a taxonomy of how troubadour songs are meant to work: they could bear witness and testify to something, they can do “combat” after a fashion, and they carry in themselves the instructions for their own performance. As explored above, the *EL*, itself a strange bedfellow for more typical examples of troubadour lyric included in *Sg* and elsewhere, managed to be preserved and disseminated, especially in the Catalan context. In that perpetuation, the *EL* marks out the agency of troubadour lyric in another sense: how it operates not only in the original moment of composition or in performance during the life of the troubadour, but also posthumously in its reduction to textual form and its subsequent circulation in manuscript form. In that state, it is still an index of the different systems in which it played a part, in all the different *conjuntos* across space and time in which it figured. It helps display the complexity of the *civitas verbi* of medieval Iberia, and the place of Occitan troubadour lyric within it. The following chapter will examine the work of another troubadour featured in the *Sg*, included towards the end of the manuscript, whose own work shows very clearly how songs can act “by proxy,” exhibiting “secondary agency,” and how those songs can escape the original intentions of their composer: Guillem de Berguedà.

CHAPTER FOUR

Mining the Necropolis: Guillem de Berguedà and the *Sirventes*

Guillem de Berguedà (...1138–1192...) was a Catalan nobleman and troubadour, thirty-one of whose songs survive in twenty-one songbooks; however, his name is little known outside of experts on the *sirventes* — the genre he wrote in — or students of the history of Catalan literature.¹¹⁵ One of the factors that helps explain Guillem’s limited reception is that he fails to fit troubadour “prototype”: he is not French, and rather than the love lyric of the *canso*, the dawn song of the *alba*, even the technical innovation of the *sestina*, he mostly writes politically motivated satirical songs, filled with a deictic specificity that resists interpretation at every step. His songs are vulgar, too, and they refuse to hide that vulgarity behind a closed or obscure style as moralizing songs often did. To sum it up, Guillem’s lyric is less focused on springtime openings, and more interested in insinuating that he slept with his rivals’ wives.

Guillem’s corpus is, then, an excellent site to better understand the agency of lyric and how it produces the space of the court while serving as its index. It also provides an opportunity to better understand what contemporary concerns were around that agency, about what could be done “por cantigas o por rimas” [by song or by rhyme] as it is phrased in the *Siete Partidas* (7.9.3). This runs into another of the issues that makes the reception of Guillem’s lyric difficult: it is filled with jokes. These jokes take work to understand, and some have weathered the

¹¹⁵ Those are, following Riquer’s edition, *A, C, D, D^a, D^c, F, G, H, I, K, M, O, Q, R, Sg, T, a^l, d, e, ω, and b^c*. *A, D, D^a, I, K, and ω* are from the thirteenth century; *C, D^c, F, G, H, I, K, M, O, Q, R, and Sg* from the fourteenth; *T and b^c* from the fifteenth; *a^l and d* from the sixteenth; and *e* was copied in the eighteenth. Riquer also breaks down the manuscripts by the location of their compilation: *A, D, D^a, D^c, F, G, H, I, K, M, O, Q, T, d, and ω* are Italian; *Sg, e, and b^c* are Catalan; *C, and R* are from Languedoc; and *a^l* in Provence. *A, D, I, and K*, contain the largest body of work, while *C, R, Sg, and T* contain four or more songs, and the others have fewer (Riquer, *Guillem de Berguedà* II: 7-10).

centuries less well than others. Love suggests a universality which makes later readers believe they have access to a given troubadour's intentions or emotional state. Humor runs into a buzz-saw of inevitable obscurity as time "fossilizes" the references that give it mirth, leaving behind detailed caches of facts fit, from a certain perspective, only to fuel historical narratives about the life and times of those who could have gotten the joke.¹¹⁶

This is the sort of work that Guillem de Berguedà's songs have attracted: one more interested in strip-mining his poetic output for historical insight than in looking at the lyric *qua* lyric. Nineteenth century Catalan philologist Manuel Milà i Fontanals, for instance, collects translations of songs and documents of Guillem's history in *De los trovadores en España* (1861). Martín de Riquer continued this pattern in the twentieth century.¹¹⁷ Riquer's edition, still the standard, bears the hallmarks of someone whose interest in Guillem de Berguedà is driven as much by his biography as the lyric itself. This is understandable for a figure like Guillem, his songs being rich with names and references to places, and with Guillem having left enough of a historical trace behind to make following a biographical approach all the more enticing. The trouble is that Riquer's account, while revealing much, can at times read like a better-sourced *vida*. The *vidas* themselves can often read as a kind of flattening of the lyric, a deflated version of the figurative language in the songs themselves.¹¹⁸ This can lead to a circular analytical

¹¹⁶ This formulation is taken from Benjamin Liu, whose argument will be addressed in more detail below. William Burgwinkle also addresses this issue in *Love for Sale*.

¹¹⁷ He first publishes a two-volume study on Guillem in 1971, and, in 1996, eight centuries after the last documented reference to Guillem in 1196, an updated one-volume, Catalan edition of the same work.

¹¹⁸ For an account of *vidas* as literary criticism, see Elizabeth Wilson Poe. For an economic and materialist reading of the *vidas* as well as the *razos*, prose introductions to individual songs, see Burgwinkle.

process: building an account of the life of Guillem, often based on details in his lyric, then using that account to interpret the same lyric.¹¹⁹

It was precisely the potential for building up such an interpretive edifice that attracted Milà i Fontanals to Guillem's work, despite some reservations. In his introduction to Guillem, he describes the troubadour's songs as being:

Tan cínicas como las de Guillermo de Poitiers, más sanguinarias que las de Bertrán de Born, las composiciones de este odioso personaje no deben salir en gran parte de lo más recóndito de la necrópolis científica, al paso que por su no escaso interés histórico y especialmente literario, demanden el más completo examen que su naturaleza permite. Es de notar por otra parte que por la oscuridad de sus alusiones y de alguno de sus pasos, y sobre todo por el silencio de la historia, ofrecen dificultades de interpretación, acaso insuperables (Milà i Fontanals 284–85).

[As cynical as those of Guilhem de Peitieu, more bloody than those of Bertran de Born, the compositions of this odious character should not, in large part, leave the most hidden part of the scientific necropolis, yet their great historical, and especially literary, interest demand the most complete examination that their nature permits. What's more, it is to be noted that, due to the obscurity of their allusions and of some of their expressions, and above all the silence of history, they offer, possibly unsurmountable, difficulties in interpretation.]

Calling Guillem's work as cynical as that of Guilhem de Peitieu and as bloody as that of Bertran de Born, a more celebrated composer of the *sirventes* "commemorated" by Dante in Canto 28 of the *Inferno*, Milà i Fontanals situates Guillem in terms of other, more celebrated figures known for their satirical bite. But, if the work of this "odious character" should not be allowed to leave the most remote part of the cemetery of the science of philology, the information of historical and literary importance present in these songs justifies their examination as fully as "their nature allows." Yet, Milà i Fontanals understands that the same historical allusions and deictic signaling

¹¹⁹ Linskill's biography of Raimbaut de Vaqueiras, cited in the last chapter, certainly has to deal with this problem.

that justify his interest in such otherwise unseemly songs also renders them resistant to the philologist's efforts at interpretation.

Guillem's status, then, is a blessing and a curse for his lyric's preservation. It may have contributed to his ability to express himself so "freely" — i.e. with such rampant vulgarity — but it is also what prevents Milà i Fontanals from embracing his poetry whole-heartedly. A brief, potent example can be found in some of his strongest language, which he uses against the Bishop of Urgell, a figure who we know mostly from Guillem's attacks on him (Riquer, *Guillem de Berguedà* I: 71–78). In "Chansson ai comensada" [I've begun a song]¹²⁰ Guillem describes the bishop as having a curved nose (insinuating, perhaps, that he is a Jew), and claims he has such a large penis that when he forces himself on a woman named "Bernarda" he rips her in half (vv. 27-30). Indeed, so the song goes, if a doctor had not been there to sew her back together again, she surely would have died (vv. 31-36). Or there is another song, "Un sirventes vuoill nou far en rim'estraigna" [I want to make a new *sirventes* in strange rhyme] in which the bishop is again depicted as being bestially sexually violent.¹²¹ This time, a woman testifies that her sister died when her heart was broken (literally) after receiving the attentions of the bishop (vv. 8-14) (Riquer, *Guillem de Berguedà* II: 79–86). These examples are extreme, perhaps from the remarkable insult of casting aspersions of sexual violence at a priest, but they are also evocative of much of Guillem's lyric.

NO LAUGHING MATTER

¹²⁰ VI in Riquer's edition (*Guillem de Berguedà* II: 71–77).

¹²¹ VII in Riquer's edition (*Guillem de Berguedà* II: 79–85).

These songs help demonstrate that it is not just the level of historical detail, however, that limits the ease of studying Guillem's lyric; after all, much of the corpus of many troubadours is filled with such detail. The real difficulty comes with the form that this detail takes: jokes. Benjamin Liu in his book *Medieval Joke Poetry*, opens with a joke about just how unfunny jokes are when you explain them (1).¹²² Jokes are useful for historians and literary scholars because they require a public. As Liu points out, jokes require both an audience, and an object of ridicule, they create an in-group and an out-group (6). When used in certain contexts, the ludic nature of a joke can hide a real intent to harm behind the excuse of humor, or take the place of violent emotion (7, 9). Guillem's lyric certainly relies on that last aspect of humor, as if he is famous for anything it would be that his poetry is often described as cruel, or "diabolical," as Riquer calls it, echoing Milà i Fontanals.¹²³ This is, of course, reminiscent of what Alfonso tries to regulate regarding the courtly practice of *retraer* in the *Partidas*: "dize el prouerbio antiguo, que non es juego, donde ome non rie." [the old proverb says it is no joke, at which man does not laugh.] (2.9.30).

The *sirventes* is a "moralizing or satiric [t]roubadour poem," often one that reuses the melody of an already extant song (Gaunt).¹²⁴ While Guillem also composed in other genres, the vast majority of his corpus is made up of examples of the *sirventes*, some using that word in the songs themselves, and others being designated as such by later critics. Examples of the *sirventes* predate Guillem's poetic activity by some twenty years. Often using the melody of another troubadour's lyric, these songs were dedicated to satirizing a political opponent or moralizing

¹²² The book is dedicated to the Galician-Portuguese courtly lyric tradition's own insulting poetry, the *cantigas d'escarnho e de maldizer*, but the observations apply more broadly.

¹²³ Almost every mention of him, though, says something like this.

¹²⁴ This is, more or less, the formulation that appears repeatedly in introductory texts describing the genre. Catherine Léglu in her chapter in *The Troubadours: An Introduction* uses a similar formulation as well. There are other dimensions to the genre that will be explored below.

against someone the troubadour deemed degenerate. This reuse adds to their parodic or satirical capacity, providing an intertext for the listening audience. Marcabru predates the *sirventes*, but clearly influences it, and Bertran de Born, Guillem's better remembered contemporary, used the form as a political weapon, much as Guillem does. The genre then "served," as its name would indicate, multiple purposes.¹²⁵ Guillem's lyric corpus serves as a site to examine how this genre exemplifies an attempt to create lyric that could act on behalf of the troubadour standing behind it.

In "Defamation in the troubadour *sirventes*: Legislation and lyric poetry," Catherine Léglu argues that the nature of slander and defamation in the middle ages meant that the kind of "jokes" in Guillem's lyric would not have been taken lightly by the objects of his ridicule (31). The insults he offers fit under the rubric of *palabras vedadas*, or "forbidden words" in the *fueros* of Castile and León, including accusations of treachery, sexual promiscuity, homosexuality, and so on (32). Given that similar charges were used as actual grounds for punishment in some of the later cases that Léglu cites, it seems quite likely that these songs, "rather than entertaining invective...could have circulated as conscious *libelli famosi* and have been used to injure their addressees in a quasi-physical sense" (36). Importantly, in the actual cases Léglu mentions, no effort seems to be made to assess the *veracity* of the claims in the songs, instead, as she puts it "the *infamia* and *injuria* [they] inflic[t] are considered sufficient grounds for punishment" (35). It is Léglu's assertion that, "while the *chansonniers* preserve these songs in a frame of aesthetic effect and entertainment, it is probable that in performance, they may have had other, more dangerous implications" (38).

¹²⁵ For more on the genre, see Léglu's chapter "Moral and Satirical Poetry" in *The Troubadours: An Introduction*.

Alfonso X's *Siete Partidas*, carry this effort forward as they seek to punish libelous songs, and in so doing, to regulate humor. In the seventh and final part of the code, in Title IX, focused on *injuria*, the various types of injury one might suffer, Law three is entitled “*De la desonra que faze un ome a otro por cantigas, o por rimas*” [“On the Dishonor that one man does to another through songs and rhymes”] (7.9.3), which is worth quoting in full:

Enfamen et deshonran unos á otros non tan solamente por palabra, mas aun por escriptura haciendo cantigas, ó rimas ó dictados malos de los que han sabor de enfamar. Et esto hacen á las veladas paladinamente et á las veladas encubiertamente, echando aquellas escripturas malas en las casas malas de los grandes señores, ó en las iglesias, ó en las plazas comunales de las cibdades ó de las villas, porque cada uno lo pueda leer: et en esto tenemos que reciben muy grant deshonra aquellos contra quien es fecho: et otrosi hacen muy grant tuerto al rey los han tan grant atrevimiento como este. Et tales escripturas como estas dicen en latin famosos libellos, que quiere tanto decir como libro pequeño que es escripto á enfriamiento dotro. Et por ende defendieron los emperadores et los sabios que hicieron las leyes antiguas, que ninguno no debiese enfamar á otro esta manera: et cualquier que contra esto hiciese, mandaron que si tan grant mal era escripto en aquella carta que si le fuese probado en juicio á aquel contra quien la face, que merece pena por ende de muerte, ó desgarramiento ó otra pena qualquier; que aquella pena misma reciban también el que compuso la mala escriptura como el que la escribió. Et aun tuvieron por bien et mandaron que aquel que primeramente fallare tal escriptura como esta, que la rompa luego et non la muestre á ninguna home: et si contra esto hiciere, debe haber por ende otra tal pena como aquel que la fizo. Otros defendieron que ninguna home non sea osado de cantar cántiga, nin de decir rimas nin dictados que fuesen fechos por deshonra ó por denuesto de otro: et si alguno contra esto dicier, debe seer enfajado por ende; et demas desto debe recibir pena en el cuerpo ó en lo que hobiere á bien vista del judgador del lugar do esto acaesciere. Et esto que decimos en esta ley fue defendido porque ninguno non se atreviese á enfamar á otri á fruto nin de otra manera: mas quien quisiere decir mal de alguno, acúselo del mal o del yerro que ficiere delante del judgador, así como mandan las leyes desde libro; et probándolo non caerá por ende en pena, et fincará enfadado aquel á quien acusó en la manera que debe. Et como quien que diximos en la primera ley este título que que deshonrare á otro por palabra, si probase que aquel denuesto ó mal que dijo dél era verdad, que non cae en pena; con todo eso en la cántigas, o rimas o dictados malos que los homes faces contra otros, et los meten en escripto non es así; ca maguer quiera probar aquel que fizo la cántiga, ó rima ó dictado malo que es verdad aquel mal ó denuesto que dijo aquel contra quien lo hizo non debe seer oido, nin le deben caber la prueba. **Et la razon porque non vela deben caber es esta, porque el mal que los homes dicen unos á otros por escripto, ó por rimas, es peor que aquel que dicen otra guisa por palabra, porque dura la**

remembranza della para siempre si la escriptura non se pierde: mas que lo que es dicho otra guisa por palabra olvidase mas aina.

[Some men render others infamous and dishonor them not only in speech but also in writing, by making songs or rhymes, or evil statements of those whom they desire to defame. They do this sometimes openly, and sometimes secretly, distributing these wicked writings in the houses of great lords, and in churches and in the public squares of cities and towns, in order that every one may read them; and with regard to this we hold that those against whom it is done suffer great dishonor therefrom, and that those who display insolence of this kind, also grievously wrong the king. **A writing of this kind is called, in Latin, *famosus libellus*, which means a little book which contains written defamation of another.** Therefore the emperors and the wise men of the ancients, who made the laws, forbade anyone to defame another in this way; and they ordered that whoever violated this law, if he had made any serious charge in the paper and should be convicted of the offence in court, he, for this reason, deserved the penalty of death, banishment, or any other punishment whatsoever; and that the party who composed the wicked paper should receive the same punishment as the party who wrote it. They also deemed it proper that whoever first found a writing of this kind should at once tear it up, and not show it to any man, and if he violated this law that he should suffer the same penalty as the party who wrote it. They also forbade any man to be so insolent as to sing songs, or repeat rhymes or statements which were intended for the dishonor and insult of another party, and if anyone violated this law that he should be considered infamous on this account; and, in addition to this, that he should receive corporal punishment or be fined, as seemed best to the judge of the district where this took place.

What we stated in this law was forbidden in order to prevent any person from defaming another secretly, or in any other way. Whoever desires to speak ill of anyone should accuse him before a judge of a crime or offense which he has committed, as the laws of this our book direct; and where he proves it he is liable to no penalty on this account, and the party whom he accuses is rendered infamous, as he should be. And although we stated in the first law of this Title, that where one party dishonors another by speech, and he proves that the insult or evil which he uttered concerning him was true, he is not liable to any penalty; nevertheless, this is not the case with respect to songs, rhymes, or wicked statements which men utter against others, or reduce to writing. For although the party who made the song, rhyme, or evil statement may desire to prove that the wicked charge or insult which he stated against the other is true, he shall not be heard, nor shall any evidence to establish the same be received. **The reason why this must not be done is the following, namely: because the evil which men say of one another either in writing, or in rhyme, is worse than that which is spoken in any other way by words, because if not lost the remembrance**

thereof endures forever, but whatever is stated in another way in words is soon forgotten. (7.9.3)]¹²⁶

The law argues that a man can be dishonored or rendered infamous not only by way of statements made *to* him, but also by things said *about* him, and through “cantigas” (songs) and “rimas” (rhymes), whether written or spoken. They can be presented in “las casas de los grandes señores: o en las Iglesias: o en las plaças comunales de la cibdades, & de las viellas” [the houses of great lords, or in churches, or in the plazas of cities and towns] where anyone “los podrie leer” [could read them]. In doing so, the wronged party “reciben gran desonrra” [receives great dishonor], which, as Léglu points out, has a significant consequence.

There is an interesting comingling of the written and oral dimensions here, as laws from different moments — and cultural and linguistic contexts — come together. After all, it is the “Emperadores y sabios” who wrote the laws on these *libelli famosi*. The punishment they deem fit is death or banishment, and it applies to *everyone* involved in the transmission of the *libellus*, the person who composed it, who wrote it down, even someone who saw it and did not immediately destroy it (assuming it takes written form). It seems as though the concern of the *Partidas* is to stop the circulation of insult, *especially* because it does not go through the proper channels: namely, those overseen by the court. An accusation should be made in front of a judge and adjudicated, “como mandan las leyes de aqueste nuestro libro” [as the laws in this here book, our book, command]. There is, also, an interesting role for truth in these proceedings, as signaled above by Léglu. While truth can be a defense for an insult spoken to someone’s face, speaking so duplicitously, behind a person’s back, or in writing or rhyme, is another matter. The accused in those cases (i.e. the person spreading the libel) will not even be dignified with a chance to

¹²⁶ Emphasis is mine.

present themselves before a judge. That is due, again, to the danger posed by songs, rhyme, and written insults, “porque dura la remembrança della para siempre, si la escritura non se pierde; mas lo que es dicho de otra guisa por palabra olvidase mas ayna” [because it [libel] lasts in memory always, if the writing is not lost, but that which is said in other ways in words is soon forgotten]. The law aims to regulate and authorize a type of exchange: insults. Here, in this fantasy of the possibility of regulating language, indeed of the administration of invective, a powerful testament to the agency of lyric is embedded, and the stakes in Guillem’s lyric are made clear.

VIDAS, OLD AND NEW

Guillem’s *vida* displays the impact of his lyric on the compilers of the songbooks in which it is found — *A*, *I*, and *K*, all of which also collect his *sirventeses* against Ponç de Mataplana, which will be explored further below (Berguedà 10–11):

Guillems de Bergedan si fo uns gentils bars de Cataloigna vescoms de Bergedan e seigneur de madrona e de Riechs. Bons cavalliers fo e bons gerriers, et ac gerra ab Raimon Folc de Cardona, q’era plus rics e plus grans que el. Et avenc se q’un jorn el se trobet ab Raimon Folc et aucis lo malamens; e per la mort d’En Raimon Folc el fo deseretatz. Longa sazón lo mantengront totz lo escogosset e de las moillers e de las fillas e de las serors, que anc non fo neguns qe·l mantengues, mas N’Arnautz de Castelbon, q’era uns valens gentils hom d’aquella encontrada. Bons sirventes fetz, on disia mals al suns e bens als alters, e vanava se de totas dompnas que·il sofrion amor. Mout li vengront de grans aventuras d’armas e de dompnas, e de grans desaventuras. E puois l’aucis un peons. Et aissi sont escriut dels sieus sirventes.

[Guillem de Berguedà was a courtly baron from Cataluña, viscount of Berguedà and lord of Madrona and of Puig-reig. A good knight and a good fighter, he made war with Ramon Folc de Cardona, who was more powerful (rich) and greater than he. And it happened that one day he found himself with Ramon Folc and he killed him traitorously; and for the death of Ramon Folc he was disinherited. For a long time he was maintained by his relatives and friends; but later they all abandoned him because he cuckolded them all, either with their wives or with their daughters or with their sisters, until there was no one left to maintain him save N’Arnau de

Castellbò, who was a valiant gentleman of that region. Good *sirventes* he made, where he said bad things to some and good things to others, and he bragged about all the ladies who suffered love for him. He had many great adventures in arms, and many misadventures. And later, a soldier killed him. And here are written his *sirventeses*.]¹²⁷ (Riquer, *Guillem de Berguedà* II: 27-29)

Following Riquer's reconstruction, based on the documentary evidence he compiles, Guillem is first mentioned in 1138 as the son of a father of the same name, viscount of Berguedà. In 1162, Alfonso became count of Barcelona and king of Aragón, a monarch with whom Guillem would first align himself, and later rebel against, during the 1180s and 90s. Guillem's first poetic activity takes place around 1170-1175, the same period in which he murders his rival Ramon Folc, viscount of Cardona. Guillem may have met Bertran de Born in France in 1184, and his last song dates to around 1194, before he is next mentioned, dead, in 1196.¹²⁸

Some of Riquer's reconstruction complements the *vida* well. The additional details seem like reasonable information to draw from the signed wills and other documents that, owing to Guillem's nobility, survive in archives. Other aspects, however, seem like critical evaluations of the lyric itself synthesized by the scribe composing the *vida*.¹²⁹ Guillem's tendency to sleep with every woman around him, for instance, could reflect a reality, or, it could be a naïve reading of the *many* references he makes to his amorous conquests (often of other men's wives, daughters, sisters, etc.). The detail that he was killed by a common soldier, "un peons," does not appear in his lyric, but, in its lack of dignity, it might also be kind of proto-*contrapasso* (Riquer, *Guillem de Berguedà* I: 73-74).¹³⁰ More striking still is the detail about his treacherous murder of Ramon

¹²⁷ Translation mine, modifying Riquer's version of the *vida* in Spanish.

¹²⁸ See Riquer, chapters I-III (*Guillem de Berguedà* I: 11-32)

¹²⁹ It appears in three manuscripts, *AIK*, all of which Riquer indicates were copied out in Italy in the second half of the thirteenth century and each of which contains a number of Guillem's songs (thirteen in *A*, and the same fifteen in *I* and *K*). (Riquer, *Guillem de Berguedà* II: 1-10).

¹³⁰ i.e. a literary critical judgment meted out in the form of just punishment based on the "sin" of the individual in question.

Folc. It is a detail that Riquer does quite a bit with, and it certainly fits Guillem’s *persona* in the lyric. The *vida* mentions that Guillem killed Ramon Folc in a traitorous way, i.e. not on the field of battle. There is documentation that Ramon was killed “irregularly,” in 1175, but there is no documentary evidence that says directly that Guillem de Berguedà was responsible. This takes up chapter six of Riquer’s study of Guillem’s life in the first volume of his study on the troubadour. It is quite the story, and his archival detective work certainly speaks to the pleasure that exists in recovering a past life, in exhuming Guillem from the philological and historical necropolis to get a better look at him. In that exuberance, though, he may overstep the evidence.

Without suggesting that this did *not* happen, it is worth noting how much Riquer’s belief that it *did* slants his reading of Guillem’s lyric. It serves as a key point around which he dates much of Guillem’s output, and it also defines his readings of individual songs, like the *sirventes* “*Joglars no·t desconortz,*” [*Joglar* don’t despair] (=⇒ *Joglars*).¹³¹ A song Léglu reads as judicial parody, Riquer describes as a “*sirventés escrito en prisió*n” [a *sirventes* written *in prison*]

(*Guillem de Berguedà* I, 55):

<p>Joglars, no·t desconortz e vai t’en d’espero —no·i gartz agurs ni sortz— vas lo rei d’Arago, qe·m traga de preiso; que ja, pois serai mortz, no·m tenga dan ni pro. (vv. 1-7)</p>	(5)	<p>[<i>Joglar</i>, don’t despair and go spur on —don’t note signs nor chances— to the King of Aragón, that removes me from prison; since, when I’m dead, It won’t do me harm or good.]</p>
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The song sets itself in a prison, as can be seen from the opening *cobla*, with Guillem sending his satirical plea for a pardon via a *joglar* to Alfonso; however, he proceeds to make a mockery of judicial proceedings and implies that, in fact, Alfonso has no right to judge him, that he ought to

¹³¹ V in Riquer’s edition (*Guillem de Berguedà* II: 55–61)

judge four of Guillem's enemies instead, each of whom he then names and insults. Indeed, in the third stanza, he states that he has done nothing to his enemies, aside from sleeping with their wives:

q'a totz dic ad un fron: [because I say face to face with everyone:
"Reis, anc no fi qe.us pes, (20) "King, I never did [anything] that would weigh on them
mas los maritz aon". but dishonor their husbands."]
(vv. 19-21)¹³²

Riquer's claim that this was literally written in captivity seems overmuch. The prison, after all, in the sense of the prison of love in which a lady might have placed a troubadour, could be a conventional, courtly space, here subverted for humorous effect.¹³³ It could also be an aspect of his effort to parody the legal system, and in that way to undermine the authority of his lord — or both. Part of the power of this kind of satire is its ability to communicate multiple, distinct levels of meaning simultaneously. The polysemy of the courtly prison here means that its different meanings contaminate one another, until it becomes entirely unclear which sense is primary to the other.

PONÇ DE MATAPLANA: *INFAMIA* AND AGENCY

There is evidence for Guillem's awareness of the potential for his lyric to exhibit a "second-class" agency or to act "on behalf" of. One of his targets in *Joglars* is Ponç de Mataplana,

¹³² Verse translations are mine, modifying Riquer's unless otherwise noted.

¹³³ Thanks to Henry Berlin for pointing out that prisons are not "anti-courtly" spaces in quite the way I had previously thought to describe them in a comment in *Kalamazoo* in 2015. In Guillem's own corpus, he uses the trope this way, with a similar wording. Song XXVIII in Riquer's edition, "Lai on hom mellur'e reve" ["Where the men better themselves and prosper"] — which namechecks Castilla, Aragón, and León in the first *cobla* — in its third, states: "Dona, vostr'amor mi rete, / que m'a mes en vostra preyzo / liat pel col ab un cordo." [Lady, your love retains me / which has me locked in your prison / tied by the neck with a cord] (vv. 26-29) (*Guillem de Berguedà II*: 237-244)

<p>c'ab vos tenga meliana meins de brajas de cortves; et anc fills de crestiana pejor costuma non mes. <i>A, Marques, Marques, Marques,</i> <i>d'engan etz farsitz e ples.</i> (Riquer, <i>Guillem de Berguedà</i> II: 98-99).]</p>	<p>(30)</p> <p>(35)</p>	<p>who boasts of having napped with you without Cordoban underpants; and no son of a Christian ever introduced so bad a custom. Oh, Marquis, Marquis, Marquis, of trickery you're full and stuffed!</p>
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In the song, Guillem repeats the refrain five times, once in each of the *coblas* that make it up. In each, the rhyme sounds that match “*Marques*” (the *b*'s in an *aababbb* rhyme scheme), remain constant while the other sounds change. It is a simple, easily adaptable structure, and one that could be repeated, and expanded upon, in performance.

It is also an efficient example of how much praise and blame can make use of the same epideictic structures. The song begins with a pair of physical insults in the first and second *coblas*, before turning to an accusation of sodomy. This is not too dissimilar to a song praising a lady moving from a positive physical description to an expression of erotic desire — the request for a kiss or favor that stands in for sexual consummation. In the *canso* the through line might be extolling the virtues of the Lady; here, it is an insistence on the treachery of Ponç — “*d'engan etz farsitz e ples*” — coming right after his name is announced three times. This is hardly Peire d'Alvernia's *Cantarai* or the “juego” which all present may enjoy: there is no space of laughter offered to the object of ridicule. Instead, the song both brings that object of ridicule into being — invoking him over and over again in both the refrain and the body of the *coblas* — and then cuts him down.

That embodiment is quite clear in the *coblas* attacking Ponç's appearance. In the second (vv. 8-14), Guillem mocks Ponç's big, and missing, teeth, saying that when Ponç lost three of them falling on some rocks, Guillem was surprised the *rocks* did not break. And besides, Guillem says, you cannot tell the difference in Ponç's appearance anyway. Next, Guillem mocks Ponç for

having an injured arm. Apparently, it's stiff like a beam or wooden trunk, and Guillem kindly advises a medicinal tea of nettles as a solution to get it loosened up (vv. 15-21). After having insulted Ponç's semblance — his facial and bodily appearance — Guillem turns to his nature. In the fourth and fifth *coblas*, he ties an accusation of treachery together with one of sodomy, both *palabras vedadas* under the rubric from the *fueros* cited by Léglu above. That survive today in the songbooks also warns of the harm that can be transmitted “por cantigas o por rimas” as well.

First, Guillem warns anyone who might trust Ponç that they will have neither “amor” nor “compania,” (neither “love” nor “company”) as in the fellowship of a friend (v. 23). If they do, they ought to take care going anywhere with Ponç, even during the light of day, and under no circumstances should they go anywhere with him at night (vv. 24-26). If this was not a clear enough “warning,” then the final *cobla* seals it when Guillem says that no one should dare take a *siesta* with Ponç without wearing “brajas de cortves” [Cordoban underpants] (vv. 29-31). Riquer points out that Córdoba was famous for the quality of its leather goods, so Cordoban underwear would, ostensibly, offer someone protection from sexual violence. Since the song presents itself as being directed to a male audience, the accusation is clear: do not turn your back on Ponç, or he will take advantage of you in more ways than one.

While it takes until the final two *coblas* for this accusation to become overt, it is present throughout the song. The refrain ties together treachery and sodomy when it declares over and over to the Marquis that “*d’engan etz farsitz e ples*” [*of trickery you’re full and stuffed*] (35). Here, Ponç is on the *receiving* end of the stuffing, but the association is clear. Ponç is not to be trusted, and if he’s *taking it* from dishonest sources, he’ll *give* as good as he gets. As mentioned above, it should be remembered that both of these charges are *palabras vedadas*, that this song is meant to inflict *injuria*. It was not the only *sirventes* that Guillem composed targeting Ponç.

Riquer counts three others, making Ponç almost as much of a target of ridicule as Ramon Folc, the rival that Guillem's *vida* reports he murdered.

But Guillem also wrote a *planh*, or song of mourning, and that song was also directed at Ponç. In it, he declares in the third *cobla*:

Marques, s'eu dis de vos follor, ni motz vilans ni mal apres, de tot ai mentit e mespres, c'anc, pos Dieu basti Mataplana, no·i ac vassal qe tan valges, ni qe tant fos pros ni valens. ni tan onratz sobre·ls aussors, jas fosso ric vostr'ancesors; et non o dic ges per ufana. (Riquer, <i>Guillem de Berguedà</i> II: 130–31)	(20)	[Marquis, if I said nonsense about you or boorish and ill-mannered words, in all I've lied and erred, since never, since God built Mataplana, has there ever been there a vassal that was so worthy and that was so noble and so valiant. Nor one honored over the most praised, although your ancestors were powerful, and I don't say it to jest.]
	25	

The way in which these songs work at cross-purposes with one another — made explicit in the lines above — makes clear that the public, performative nature of their future dissemination was an obvious factor influencing their composition. Guillem, when it suited him, sought to denigrate, injure, and insult Ponç in a way that, presaging Alfonso's concerns in the seventh *Partida*, seems purposefully calculated to circulate; however, after Ponç's death, most likely fighting against Muslim forces in Spain, the political calculus changed. Guillem needed to alter course, composing his *planh* in order to mitigate the harm that might be done to his own reputation, his own *fama*, by his previous satirical songs. This all points towards Guillem's ultimate lack of control over his own lyric, something driven home even further by the manuscript history of these songs: *Joglars* survives in seven manuscripts, the *cansoneta* survives in four, while the *planh* is only preserved in one (*T*).

FISH IN THE LARDER

Guillem’s insulting songs deploy different techniques to get their points across and while others can be a bit more circumspect, they are no less cutting. Take “Eu non cuidava cantar,” [I did not think to sing], a *sirventes* made up of four *coblas unisonans* and a three line *tornada*, which survives in eight manuscripts (Riquer, *Guillem de Berguedà* I: 31–38):

- | | | |
|---|-------------|--|
| <p>Eu non cuidava cantar,
 car razon non avia,
 mas Arnautz del Vilar
 m’a mes er en la via;
 c’auzi l’autrier clamar
 de Mon Sogra’ab sa carona,¹³⁵
 q’el no·il det l’ora nona¹³⁶
 del peis, e fes l’amagar.</p> | <p>(5)</p> | <p>[I didn’t think of singing,
 there being no reason to,
 but Arnautz del Vilar
 has put me now on the path of it;
 so, the other day I heard him complaining
 of My Lord with his crown,
 because he did not give him, at the Ninth Hour,
 fish, and hid it from him.</p> |
| <p>Baros, e cum o poc far,
 pois en l’alberc l’avia?
 Si n’agues a comprar
 ben tart l’en dera.l dia.
 E car me fetz plorar
 Ma Sogra,¹³⁷ q’es bell’e bona,
 Dampnedieu prec qe.l confona
 o·l lais ad mi encontrar.</p> | <p>(10)</p> | <p>Barons, how could he do it,
 when in the house there was some?
 If he’d had to buy it,
 he hardly would’ve given it to him all day.
 And since he made her cry,
 My Lady, who is beautiful and good,
 I pray to our lord that he confuse him
 or that he lets him meet with me.</p> |
| <p>Mout es cobes de manjar
 e plens de gelosia,
 per que no·l deu amar
 midonz¹³⁸ N’Estefania;
 faria lo menar
 en la cort de Barselona,
 que de Tortoz’a Narbona
 de tracion non a par.</p> | <p>(20)</p> | <p>He’s very eager to eat
 and full of jealousy,
 because of which you must not love him,
 my lady N’Estefania;
 I would take him
 to court in Barcelona,
 since from Tortosa to Narbona
 he has no equal in treachery.</p> |
| <p>E pois ren no.m cal reptar
 qe·il fassa de bausia,
 laiszar m’o ai estar</p> | <p>(25)</p> | <p>And so since it’s worth nothing to me
 That I challenge him for treason,
 I’ll leave him be</p> |

¹³⁵ Riquer translates “Sogra” as “Suegro,” or “Father-in-law” it could also be rendered “Lord,” though the connotation of the relationship is strong, and suggestive of a more provocative accusation.

¹³⁶ In the liturgical calendar this would have been around midday (Riquer, *Guillem de Berguedà* II: 33).

¹³⁷ Again, Riquer translates this as “Suegra” or “Mother-in-law,” but could be “Lady.”

¹³⁸ This is just “lady” rather than “sogra.”

<p>tro un jorn que l'aucia. Sogra, no·us deu pesar si ben gardatz sa persona, qel dia c'om lo repona poiretz cent tans meillurar.</p>	(30)	<p>until one day I kill him. Lady, you should not regret it if you look well at his person, because the day that they bury him you'll do one hundred times better.</p>
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<p>Sogra: Berga e Cardona e Mon Sogr'ab la corona m'an fayt de vos tant luynar. (Riquer, <i>Guillem de Berguedà</i> II: 31–37)</p>	(35)	<p>My Lady: Berga and Cardona and My Lord with the crown has kept me so far away from you.]</p>
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The song is directed at Pere de Berga, another local rival of Guillem's, who is targeted in three songs. In this one, Guillem claims he would not have been moved to sing, "car razon no avia," [there being no reason to] until he heard a complaint from his friend Arnau del Vilar (v. 2). Léglu makes the point that, by using witnesses to address his complaints in *Joglars*, Guillem manages to both ridicule the judicial process, and distance himself from the slanderous nature of his accusations, since he is just "reporting" what he has heard.¹³⁹ In this song he employs the same method (as he did with his attacks on the Bishop of Urgell) and works to obscure the actual direction of his attack by constantly shifting the object of his address, one of the song's more interesting formal characteristics.

The object of ridicule is never directly addressed in the song. Instead, he is obscured, and needled, through the *senhal* assigned to him, "Mon Sogr'ab sa corona," [my Lord with his crown] or just "la corona" [the crown] in the second instance (vv. 6, 34). The "crown" worn by "My Lord" here is not only a sign of his elevated status, but also an insinuation that he is a cuckold, and that Guillem is the one who slept with his wife. That indirect address is heightened as the poem develops. Guillem is addressing a complaint heard from his friend, Arnau del Vilar, about Pere, that he declined to give this friend fish, when Pere had some in his home. The

¹³⁹ Thinking back to law 7.9.3 in the *Partidas*, this would still seem to get him in trouble under those standards, as he is transmitting slanderous speech to a further public.

assertion here is one of greed, and as will be outlined, heresy. In the second stanza, Guillem opens by addressing his complaint about Arnau's treatment at Pere's hands to the "Baros" [barons] listening to his song (v. 9). He then brings in Pere's wife, as "Ma Sogra, que es belle'e bona" [My Lady, who is beautiful and good] (v. 14). It is between these two figures that Guillem will alternate his address for the rest of the song. He is, recalling Liu, both declaring an object of ridicule, and also defining the group that will "get" the joke. It is the prerogative Alfonso X takes upon himself in the *Partidas* as well in law 2.9.30 regarding the "juego" of *retraer*.

In the third stanza, Guillem addresses Estefania, Pere's wife, directly, at the same time that he makes clear his charge that Pere "es cobe de manjar / e plens de gelosia" [he is greedy in eating / and full of jealousy] (vv. 17-18). He does not stop there. The rest of the stanza covers the breadth of Alfonso II's kingdom (from Tortosa to Narbona), saying that in all that space, there is no greater a traitor than Pere de Berga, and that Guillem would like to see him brought before the court in Barcelona. Again, Guillem is using his courtly song to invoke another aspect of the court, its place in the administration of justice. In an earlier *cobla*, the key slight suffered by Arnau that occasions Guillem's poem is the denial of fish. Riquer points out that Guillem may be accusing Pere de Berga of heresy, as there is a strong association between Cathars and dietary restrictions, to which fish was an exception. The "treachery" Pere has committed is never clearly defined, but his greed with regards to food is elaborated upon directly. That greed might also be taken as a pun on Pere's jealous guarding of his wife, while in fact, like the food in his larder, she deserves to be "enjoyed" by his guests, recalling Guilhem de Peitieu's *leis de con*.

If the third *cobla* brings Pere up on charges, so to speak, then the fourth provides a sentence. Guillem in no uncertain terms states that he would like an excuse to kill Pere, licitly, in a duel or in battle, and that his wife will be much better off with Pere in the ground. After all,

Guillem might be able to spend some time with her at that point. The *tornada* seals this, lamenting how far Guillem has been kept from his object of desire, “m’an fayt de vos tant luynar” [[he] has kept me so far away from you], the “vos” here representing Estefania, and, as it so often does, perhaps some territory Guillem might have coveted as well. This is a song, then, that invites itself to be read on multiple levels and in multiple ways. It constructs its own audience deictically: in spatial terms, its references span the kingdom of Aragón; in its address of the barons, it produces an audience; and its address of Estefania, and Pere, who it does not address directly, establishes who is on the inside, and his looking in from the outside.

While the temptation to mine such a song for biographical clues is understandable, taking it on its own terms demands a different approach. The spark here, its “humor,” and what might occasion the reuse of its rhymes — Bertran de Born has a *sirventes* set to the same pattern — is the way in which the song gives the reader access to a world, managing to communicate to multiple audiences simultaneously: to Pere, to Guillem’s own contemporaries, and then to later publics that Guillem could never have anticipated. Guillem does so by playing within already established conventions, but also by crafting a literary object encoded with enough of its own rules to ensure its reception, transmission, and survival. In that way, the song stands on its own, able to act on behalf of its composer, whenever a public might come along willing to engage with it.

AN EMPTY LOVE SONG (CONCLUSIONS)

Guillem composed a pair of songs which directly address the question of his own lyric’s agency, of its capacity to stand on its own as his representative. One is a feigned *tenso* with a swallow

(“arondeta”) standing in for his lyric.¹⁴⁰ The other is a *canso*, or love song, which achieved a large diffusion, evidenced not only by its manuscript history — it survives in thirteen manuscripts, more than any other of Guillem’s songs — but also via its re-use by other troubadours (Riquer 119-120).¹⁴¹ More than anything, it is remarkable for how *little* deictic specificity it contains, an empty vessel compared to the spilling-over *sirventeses*. Instead of named ladies he seeks to conquer, or lords at whom he is hurling insults, here, Guillem presents himself as a courtly lover par excellence. The fact that the lyric container is emptied of all specificity invites a reading of the *canso* as a programmatic statement, a look at what Guillem thinks his lyric can accomplish. The song, “Qan vei lo temps camjar e refrezir” [When I see the weather change and cool] (=> *Qan vei*), is made up of five, eight-line *coblas unisonans*, maintaining the same *ababab* rhyme scheme.¹⁴² There are three moments, each of the odd numbered *coblas*, that drive this metapoetic point home.

In first *cobla*, Guillem borrows and inverts the typical nature opening or *natureingang* in which the song of birds and the song of troubadours are intermingled:

Qan vei lo temps camjar e refrezir,
e non auch chans d’auzels, voutas ni lais
que fassant bosc ni conbas retintir,
ni foulla vertz no·i par ni flors no·i nais,
per q’alz mendics trobadors e savais (5)
camja lor votz per l’invern qe·ls tayna;
mas eu sui cel que no·m volv ni·m biais,
tanta i de joi per freich ni per calina.

¹⁴⁰ This is XXV in Riquer’s edition, “Arondeta, de ton chanter m’azir” [Swallow, your song bothers me] (*Guillem de Berguedà* II: 213–18).

¹⁴¹ Some of these include the use of its metrical scheme by Bertran Carbonel and in a *tenso* between “Bernardo y Tomás [de Saboya]” (Riquer 120). Riquer also makes the claim that the Occitan verses that Dante puts into the mouth of Arnaut Daniel in the *Purgatorio* section of the *Commedia* could be understood as imitating the line “Tan tai de joi per freich ni per calina” depending on how one reads the manuscripts. He also charts out his disagreements with those who would argue the contrary (120-121).

¹⁴² In Riquer’s edition, it is XXVI (*Guillem de Berguedà* II: 219–30)

(vv. 1-8)

[When I see the weather change and cool,
and I do not hear the songs of birds, trills nor chirps
that make the woods and hills resound
and no green leaves appear, nor flowers bloom,
because of which all the miserly and miserable troubadours
change their voice for the winter that worries them;
but I am that which does not turn or stray,
as happy am I for the cold as for the heat.]¹⁴³

There are precedents for an inverted nature opening of this kind — Riquer points to Cercamon’s “Puois nostre temps comens’a brunezir” [So our weather begins to darken] — but it is worth noting that Guillem uses this courtly occasion as a way to signal his poetic superiority by both demeaning his rivals and praising his own skill. He calls his rivals “mendics” and “savais,” two variations on “mean” or “wanting” — in the sense of giving and receiving (v. 5). His claim that he will demonstrate the strength of his love by singing in cold weather just as he would in warm runs parallel to the gesture that Guilhem de Peitieu employs in his *gap* “Farai un vers de dreit nien” [I will make a song about nothing]. There, the “first” troubadour shows mastery over form through negation and subversion. For Guillem, while the birds and troubadours may not be singing — Riquer mentions that “voutas” and “lais,” are a pair of terms often used in tandem to refer to the modulating songs of birds and troubadours alike — he will sing anyway, to demonstrate the depth of his feeling, and the height of his craft (Riquer 221, n. 2).

¹⁴³ The “Natureingang” entry in the *Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetics* states that:

A typical example consists of temporal elements (usually of spring-time), such as descriptions of vegetation or scenery characteristic of the season (foliage, birdsong, water), positively qualified as pleasant or sweet and producing joy. After the description, the speaker adapts these seasonal elements to his or her needs. (Galvez, “Natureingang”) It also points out that the pleasant season could be used as an inversion or point of contrast to the troubadour’s feelings, as in songs by Raimbaut d’Aurenga and Bernart de Ventadorn, and as Guillem is doing here.

The rest of the song does not follow this negating tack as explicitly as “Farai un vers de dreit nien,” but it does engage with convention in interesting ways. The song has two other moments that self-consciously explore the nature of the lyric object. The third *cobla* does so by dwelling on all the words left *unspoken* and the songs left *unsung*, all while meditating on interpretation, which will emerge again in the final *cobla*:

Ab entresseins qe·m fetz, que’eu non aus dir,
mi fetz plus gauch que qi·m dones Roais;
mas non per tant q’ieu no·il aus descubrir,
que mandat m’a que no·m hiesca del cais (20)
mas en chantan, et d’aisso no m’eslais;
que cen chantars n’ai faitz en tremolina,
e tals mil motz q’enqer un non retrais,
ni no·m sove co·is mou ni cum s’afina.

[With the signs that she made to me, which I dare not voice,
she produced in me more joy than if they gave me Edessa;
but not until the point when I dare uncover it,
so commanded I have been that it will not leave my lips (20)
but by singing, and in this I do not overstep myself;
so a hundred songs I have made trembling,
and near a thousand words of which still not one have I divulged,
and I don’t recall how they begin nor how they end.
(vv. 17-24)]

Here, the Lady, given no name, neither openly nor in a hidden *senhal*, has given signs to the troubadour, which produced more joy in him than he would get from taking control of the crusader kingdom of Edessa; yet, he dares not speak this joy (vv. 17-18). He will only reveal his feelings, his love, through song, but the strength of his passion is such that it exceeds him. He has composed a hundred songs, a thousand words, but he has not spoken one, and now, he cannot remember them (vv. 22-24). Here, there is an intermingling of erotic charge and poetic meditation, as the act of *trobar* is considered as a labor-intensive mix of passion and craft.¹⁴⁴ For

¹⁴⁴ And the misogyny should not be forgotten either. The overdetermined reading of the lady’s signs by the male lover, the view of love as a sickness inflicted upon the troubadour by the lady

every song, a hundred others, a thousand words, must be remembered and forgotten, brought near completion and then fail to reach it. Recording his worthy ministrations for love in the song itself, is a show of rhetorical, and erotic, prowess and proficiency.

Rhetorical and erotic sensibilities are impossible to separate here, and they join with the practice of interpretation. The troubadour is in a constant state of excitement, of deferred consummation, that leads him to tremble and to forget where his own melodies begin or end. But the source of that ecstasy is in his interpretation of the “entresseins” [signs] he has received from his lady. The ecstasy of interpretation — the joy in “reading” the unattainable object of affection, uncovering hidden, secret knowledge — is clear here. It sets up the final *cobla* which will address the role of the song as an index, a secondary agent, acting on behalf of its composer, as it also questions the interpretive capacity of its audience.

Perhaps the most striking of the three programmatic instances cited here is the meditation on lyric transmission presented in the final *cobla*, when Guillem turns to address his song directly:

Canssoneta, si·us saupesses former
d'intrar en cort o offrir en palais
et a parlar ab midonz cui desir,
pergera vos, que coita m'es et ais,
a la bella, cui soi fis e verais, (45)
m'anassetz dir, puois tanta gens l'aclina
qe il mieiller es del mon e que val mais:
meraveil me cum mon cor non devina.

[Little song, if you consider yourself able
to enter in court and present yourself in the palace,
and to speak to my lady that I desire,
I would beg of you, since I am unquiet and anxious,
to the beautiful one, to whom I am loyal and true, (45)

who, it is worth remembering could not have consummated that love without betraying her marital vows, all track the strong misogynist currents present in Ovid, Tertullian, and Guillem's contemporary, Andreas Capellanus (or at least his reception).

say on my behalf, since many people revere her,
that she is the best in the world and worth the most:
I am amazed that she does not guess my heart [intention].
(vv. 41-48)]

While Guillem's songs almost always have undeniable objects of address, this song is something else: it plays to everyone and no one, to a lady that does not exist, and through her, to whatever court the song might find itself in. Perhaps that helps explain its transmission, buoyed up by the importance of Guillem's own name, even as it lacks any others (even Edessa is a commonplace for exotic riches). Guillem's song also, in its dedicated and able rehearsal of courtly *topoi*, pitched as they are in negation, might well be taken programmatically. Guillem has first considered what might lead him to sing and expressed that he is moved to do so even without the season matching his mood. Next, he explains the process of composition and revision, of all the *un-sung* songs that make up part of his lyric craft, how he has filed down the song now present before its audience. Finally, he turns directly to the song itself and asks that it go into the court, into the palace, and "parlar ab midonz" [speak with my Lady] and that it "m'anazzetz dir" [speak on my [his] behalf]" (vv. 43, 46). Then, he wonders at the fact that this lady, so revered by so many, might not guess his intentions, or what is in his heart (v. 48). Here, then, the sign is *his* to deliver, and if she is really as great as everyone claims (Guillem included) then how and why has she failed to guess his intentions?

If this were a *sirventes*, one could imagine this song as opening on the problem of the occasion, then celebrating the difficulty of composition, before finally wondering just how "beautiful" are those who fail to grasp what is being communicated. Far from an expression of love, this is critique, a mockery of the dunces, Peire d'Alvernhe's *pastors*, in the audience. But, in the presence of common places and the absence of deictic specificity, Guillem seems most concerned with expressing his own ability, rather than with *using* it. If this is a song of erotic

desire, it is most remarkable for how quickly it checks off the boxes of “courtly love’s” misogyny. It is the Lady’s fault that he feels the way he does, that she fills him with so much passion and refuses to grant him release. It is the Lady who fails to recognize the great suppression of his passions that he undertakes not to utter a word of the “signs” she has (apparently) given him. Finally, it is up to her to interpret the message he has “hidden” in his song. If she does not, *she* is at fault.

Whatever his theme, Guillem’s lyric again and again marks out the capacities of the songs he composes and that he directs be sung. They can deliver messages of love, sure, but they can also marshal political grudges, they can slander and inflict *injuria*, and all the while they can showcase just how good he is at what he does. If this sounds familiar to Guilhem de Peitieu, that is for good reason. While not the same kind of technical innovator, Guillem does capitalize on his own *fama* to deliver a remarkable degree of harm to his rivals. His own lyric’s transmission, its passage from song to page, might well owe something to the fact of his name. In reading his lyric now, in bringing him out of the necropolis, there is more to be gained than just a series of facts about the *conjunto* of the medieval Kingdom of Aragón — though that is there as well — instead, it offers a key to understanding the role this lyric played in the system of cultural production it helped to constitute. Not every song is dedicated to a bird wending its way to a lover, some are knives thrown at a target. And knives can cut both ways.

CHAPTER FIVE

The “Underlying Thing”: the Troubadour Subject in Iberia

Can readers gain access to those people responsible — to the *hombres de carne y hueso* to modify Guillén’s phrase — for the lyric of the troubadours? Chapters one and three of this project articulated concepts of the court and of agency as they relate to troubadour lyric produced in, and in relation to, Iberia. The court can be conceived of as a space produced by a set of people, in a given place, performing a specific set of practices. Lyric, as one of those practices, is of special interest because it indexes the space of the court it simultaneously helps to produce. Its role in the literary system of the court enables songs to act on behalf of their composers in ways both intended and not. This chapter will explore how the programmatic and deictic moments in troubadour lyric, in conjunction with its context, can reveal aspects of the multiple subjects that stand behind, and are produced in, these songs.

While the term “subject” began simply enough as “the underlying thing” — a translation of Aristotle’s term *hupokeimenon* — it has accumulated a wide variety of meanings both over time and across disciplines: from the “subject” of a sentence, to that of a painting, or even of a lord (van Inwagen and Sullivan). It has also been an *implicit* concern of readers of the troubadours since the compilation of the first songbooks. In the past half century, it has become an *explicit* one. The abundant deixis and use of the first person make clear that troubadour lyric is the product of both a literary system, and a historical *conjunto*, deeply interested in the subject. It is hardly the only one. Understanding the “troubadour subject” entails understanding the term’s persistence and instability in specific contexts and across time and space.

This chapter will begin with a brief overview of “the subject” as it has been used over time in different discourses, beginning with definitions by Étienne Balibar and others. Then, it

will address the “troubadour subject” specifically through a summary of its critical treatment over time by readers of the troubadours, aided by Judith Peraino’s work in this area. Making use of concepts developed by critics specializing on troubadour poetry — Sarah Kay’s “autobiographical assumption,” Gerald Bond’s reading of subject against *persona*, and Marisa Galvez’s “hermeneutic opacity” — it will also address underlying issues around the stability of “the subject,” building on a concept of the person developed by Marcel Mauss. Finally, it will conclude with a reading of two variant endings of an “Iberian” song by Marcabru, one of the most recognized troubadours, about whose producing “subject,” paradoxically, the least is known.¹⁴⁵

SUBJECT: *SUBJECTUM* OR *SUBJECTUS*?

For those seeking to define “the subject,” its multiple tangled meanings become immediately apparent. Grammar, law, and philosophy, political and literary theory, all have related, distinct, and often multiple, answers when asked “what is the subject”? It only complicates matters that, as it is often used, the term can easily be conflated with others like “agent,” “self,” or “person.” To begin with, here is a rather muddled attempt to define “the subject” by Jerrold Seigel, the prominent “historian of the self”:

A subject...is an active agent, a thinker of thoughts, doer of deeds, or bearer of properties, identifiable through its relations to its contents and qualities, yet remaining independent of them, so that it persists as they change and fall away.
(14)

¹⁴⁵ Eleven later writers cite him, and *R* erroneously calls him the “first” troubadour (Marcabrun 5).

Seigel goes on to add that a “subject” can also, sometimes, be used to refer to what seems to be its opposite (“object”), i.e. the subject of a painting, which he explains through the etymology of the term:

...subject comes from the Latin *subjectum*, meaning something that lies beneath, underpinning or giving support to some entity. In ancient and medieval usage, it referred to any substance of which qualities could be predicated, so that many objects were “subjects.” [...] In politics, however, the subject “lay beneath” some constituted authority, such as a king or prince, and was therefore at least in some degree passive. (14–15)

This is all true, so far as it goes, and the importance of political sense of “subject” is worth foregrounding, but it misses some key issues. In particular, Seigel does not engage with how, and why, theories of the subject have tangled these meanings up into one another, especially in philosophy after Kant.

One issue may be an incomplete etymology. The philosopher Étienne Balibar argues that the difficulty in knowing how a given writer is using the term “subject” ultimately boils down to:

[...] a pun (intentional or otherwise) on two Latin etymologies: that of the neuter *subjectum* (which, like *suppositum*, has, ever since the scholastics, been regarded by philosophers as a translation of the Greek *hupokeimenon*), and that of the masculine *subjectus* (equated with *subditus* in the Middle Ages). One gives rise to a lineage of logico-grammatical and ontological-transcendental meanings, and the other to a lineage of juridical, political, and theological meanings. Far from remaining independent of one another, they have constantly overdetermined one another... (Balibar 40)¹⁴⁶

While the logical and grammatical senses — that which takes a predicate — are present in medieval philosophical writing in both Latin and Arabic, the ontological and transcendental senses are more recent. The shift to “modern” philosophy is often said to occur with the articulation of what is called (in English) the “thinking subject” by René Descartes. Per the

¹⁴⁶ This appears both in the “subject” entry in the *Dictionary of Untranslatables*, cited extensively below, and in *Citizen Subject* as an essay called “Annex: Subjectus/Subiectum” which is the version cited here.

Oxford English Dictionary, the thinking subject is “a being...that thinks, knows, or perceives” or it is “the conscious mind,” and eventually it is “the person or self considered as a conscious agent” (“Subject, n.”). Balibar argues that it is Immanuel Kant, not Descartes, who establishes this sense of the subject as the basis for philosophy; indeed, Balibar suggests that Kant retrojects this idea onto Descartes in order to make it seem less novel (44).¹⁴⁷ Kant’s move will serve as a productive stumbling block for future thinkers — like Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, Georges Bataille, Louis Althusser, Jacques Lacan, Michel Foucault, and Judith Butler — who will challenge that conception of the subject by bringing the complex relationship of the political and ontological meanings of the word out into the open.

In the entry for “subject” in the *Dictionary of Untranslatables* (=> *DoU*), Balibar is joined by Barbara Cassin and Alain de Libera in identifying three “groups of meaning” for the subject: “subjectness (*subjectité*...), subjectivity (*subjectivité*), and subjection (*sujétion*)” (Balibar et al., “Subject” 1069). The first, “subjectness,” links the logical and physical subjects — “‘in which’ there can be accidents” and “‘of which’ there can be predicates” — which map onto the “logico-grammatical” sense mentioned above (“Subject” 1069).¹⁴⁸ Next is subjectivity, which “makes ‘subject’ the opposite of ‘object’” and opposes mental experience to that which is outside it (i.e. subjectivity vs. objectivity) (“Subject” 1070). Finally, there is “subjection,” which includes the political sense mentioned above, but the way in which it shades *any* use of the term in ways that can be particularly difficult to isolate. This is a key part of the medieval use of the term, but the authors caution that not everything which is “‘sub-mitted’ (*subjectum*) is

¹⁴⁷ In that retrojection, he ascribes to Descartes a “nominalization of the statement *cogito* or ‘I think’ so as to make the name of a self-referential operation whereby thought takes itself as its own object” (46).

¹⁴⁸ The French *subjectité* is a translation of the German *Subjektivität* which is “probably coined by Heidegger” (“Subject” 1069).

‘subjected’ (*subjectus*)” and “‘being placed beneath’ should not be confused with ‘being subjected’” (“Subject” 1070). Ultimately, they suggest, it would be wise to remember that “[s]ubjectivity is not the relative product of subjectness and subjection” (“Subject” 1070).

HISTORY OF THE “TROUBADOUR SUBJECT”

When reading accounts of the subject in the work of literary critics, it becomes clear that as much as the middle ages can be valuable to think *with*, they have more often been used as something to think *against*. Take Jacob Burckhardt’s classic example arguing *against* the existence of the self, and the subject, in the middle ages. Burckhardt declares that in the middle ages “[m]an was conscious of himself only as a member of a race, people, party, family, or corporation” (98). That view of the period does not disappear with the turn of the twentieth century, nor of the twenty-first. Medievalists such as David Aers have argued that when literary critics write developmental histories of the subject they reproduce aspects of arguments like Burckhardt’s all over again (Aers 192).¹⁴⁹ Such is the “cultural myth” of the middle ages that historian and critic Brian Stock describes in *Listening for the Text*: “[t]he Renaissance invented the Middle Ages in order to define itself: the Enlightenment perpetuated them in order to admire itself; and the Romantics revived them in order to escape from themselves” (68). One could add

¹⁴⁹ The essay “A Whisper in the Ear of Early Modernists; or, Reflections on Literary Critics Writing the ‘History of the Subject’” is a critique of what he calls “radical critics” either in their politics, i.e. “Cultural Materialists,” or in their approach to prior literary studies, i.e. “New Historicists” (Aers 178, 192). One work that comes in for criticism here is, of course, Stephen Greenblatt’s *Renaissance Self-Fashioning*. Greenblatt’s opening line explains that “in sixteenth-century England there were both selves and a sense that they could be fashioned” with a nod to Chaucer’s “subtle and wry manipulations of *persona*” to attempt to stave off criticism of a neglect of literature of the centuries prior (Greenblatt 1). Aers also takes Terry Eagleton to task, for, in his own way, creating a “monolith” out of the middle ages (Aers 192).

to that list those writers, theorists, and philosophers who helped make up what Bruce Holsinger calls the “avant garde premodern” in *The Premodern Condition* (4).¹⁵⁰

Aers argues that much of this comes down to ignorance, an effect of which is “the belief that ‘everything suddenly changed’ during the period of one’s own specialization” (196). A priority of this chapter (and this project) is to avoid an argument for the “invention of the subject,” whether explicit like Burckhardt’s or implicit like so many others. To do so, this section will lay out a brief overview of the history of what could be called the “troubadour subject,” that is, the history of the subject as written by literary critics with an interest in the troubadours. Troubadour lyric has a deep, self-reflective interest in the subject, but it is not the only body of work like it. Indeed, taking on the troubadours as they relate to Iberia makes this very apparent, as the peninsula is host to several similar, overlapping moments. It also recasts the troubadours as actors in a different set of literary and cultural systems which can help complicate and enrich the study both of these songs, and the broader networks in which they play a part.

Judith Peraino lays out a useful history in her book *In Giving Voice to Love*. Her focus is on love songs, and she aims “to bring philosophical and theoretical notions about the self and subjectivity to bear on the nuts and bolts of music” (8). Her account begins with Gaston Paris’s nineteenth century coinage of “courtly love” (11, n. 29), the investigation of which drives an “implicit” investigation of the troubadour subject in the first half of the twentieth century. And in this way, Peraino details how it was that in the 1940s, Alexander Denomy and Leo Spitzer looked to Islam and Christianity respectively in order to develop their theories of courtly love as an ennobling process for the lover. Then, in the 1960s, Erich Köhler argued instead that courtly

¹⁵⁰ That list begins with Georges Bataille, who was himself trained as a medievalist, and also includes Jacques Lacan, Jacques Derrida, Roland Barthes, Pierre Bourdieu, and, to a lesser extent, Michel Foucault.

love was best understood in terms of “social structure” and could be seen as representative of class struggle playing out between different strata of the nobility. Finally, in the 1960s and 1970s, Roger Dragonetti and Paul Zumthor focused on a structure of a different sort, arguing that medieval lyric presented “a poetic system rather than sincere self-expression” (Peraino 13–19). All of these approaches foreground the seemingly “universal” love lyric at the expense of other genres. They also make clear on of the interpretive dangers of “lyric” reading as Virginia Jackson might outline it, mentioned above in chapter three.

While this last structuralist poetics obscures the subject, it reemerges, first implicitly, then explicitly.¹⁵¹ Michel Zink’s *The Invention of Literary Subjectivity* (1985, trans. 1999) focuses on what he calls “literary subjectivity,” which he defines as, “not spontaneous display or real expression in a text of an author’s personality, opinions, or feelings, but rather what marks the text as the point of view of a consciousness” (4).¹⁵² It is, then, not a question of apprehending the consciousness of the historical person who wrote the text — Guillén’s *hombre de carne y hueso* — so much as the fact that the text displays the perspective of “a consciousness.” Zink marks the key point at which literary subjectivity emerges as the shift from “sung poetry” like that of the French *trouvères* to the “recited poetry” of genres like *dits* and *romans*; the songs of the Occitan troubadours, for which less music survives, sit somewhere in the middle (38).

A trio of books by Sarah Kay, Gerald Bond, and Peter Haidu, published in the two decades after Zink’s study, mark the reemergence of the troubadour subject proper. First is Kay’s

¹⁵¹ Peraino lists studies by L.T. Topsfield, Linda Paterson, Ruth Harvey, Jörn Gruber, Simon Gaunt, and Rouben Cholakian because each “presumes a historically real, singular, coherent ‘author’ behind each name attached to a particular lyric” (Peraino 18).

¹⁵² Zink contends, in line with Hegel, that Christianity changes the role of art in fundamental ways, and that “[t]he emergence of French literature can thus be seen to coincide with a point when art had to recognize it held no other truth than the subjectivity it embodied. That awareness defines literature” (10–11).

Subjectivity in Troubadour Poetry (1990). For Kay, “subjectivity” is “the elaboration of a first-person (subject) position in the rhetoric of courtly poetry” (*Subjectivity* 1). She lays out her own history of the reception of the troubadour subject, which, “[f]rom the thirteenth to the mid-twentieth century” relied on what she calls “the ‘autobiographical assumption,’” i.e. “assuming that the ‘I’ of an individual text refers in some way or other to its supposed author and the ideas and feelings expressed there are in some sense his or hers” (*Subjectivity* 2). The naïve approach should recall the *vida* writers — medieval and modern — whose biographical understanding ultimately obscures key features of troubadour lyric, like the political capacity of the *sirventes*. The earlier version of the autobiographical assumption has two main flaws, according to Kay: 1) an unfounded “optimism” about the “transparency of meaning” in poetic language, and 2) an “unreflecting” attitude about ideas like “‘personality’ and ‘sincerity’” (*Subjectivity* 3). Her own version takes these critiques onboard, but ultimately insists that, “[a]lthough Occitan lyric poetry is clearly a poetry of ‘convention’, this does not necessarily mean that it thereby excludes all sense of self” (*Subjectivity* 5).

Gerald Bond’s *The Loving Subject* (1995) has a broader aim than Kay’s study, as it seeks to explain the surge of writing that describes a new “private secular self” at the turn of the twelfth century in “Romanesque France.” He argues that cultural production of the period indicates a “wide-spread interest” in this new conception of the self, from which he draws a pair of implications: 1) “personal” cultural production only makes sense in a structure where there is value in “the construct of the ‘person,’” and 2) this production would be of interest to “agents of the dominant institutions as that construct began to affect structures of power.” Bond also argues that the new “images of the self” appearing at the time are not unitary, but that they “represent instead contested positions within an arena of ideological controversy” (*The Loving Subject* 1).

Bond's argument makes theoretical hay out of the difference between the concept of *persona* and the post-1960s understanding of the "subject." *Persona*, according to Bond, traces its roots to classical antiquity, pointing towards "a theory of a public self constructed in language" which amounts to a kind of "self-impersonation" (Bond, *The Loving Subject* 5, 15).¹⁵³ Key among the notions of the "subject" to which Bond turns is Althusser's idea that "ideology interpellates individuals as subjects" (Althusser 170). Bond argues for a version of this model that is less absolute, modifying each of its terms (*The Loving Subject* 12). First, "ideology" cannot be singular, because "in practice one finds competing ideologies whose agents hail... a given individual to subjecthood" (*The Loving Subject* 12). Next, he argues that a notion of interpellation that does not take an individual's *response* to the hailing into account is too simple; the constitution of the subject depends on the addressee as well as on the addresser (*The Loving Subject* 12–13). Finally, he rejects assimilating "subject" with "agent," instead arguing that he will limit his definition to "public presentations of the self, those common, material, and authorized images of individuals which implicitly or explicitly carry out ideological functions within a dominant discourse" (*The Loving Subject* 13).¹⁵⁴

What Bond finds from his comparison of "subject" and *persona* is a "feedback loop" between "subjection and subjectivity" by which certain figures: 1) emerge on the margins; 2) are condemned, but in their condemnation are represented, and thus made more central; and finally, 3) become attractive to people in power due to their centrality (Bond, *The Loving Subject* 158–

¹⁵³ For Bond's full account of *persona* as a term, see pp. 5-10.

¹⁵⁴ See chapter three (p. 91) for a discussion of the cases in which subject and agent *are* equivalent to one another according to Balibar and Laugier. "Discourse" is worth defining in Bond's sense as well. As he puts it, he means it "more or less" as Foucault does, "but without the degree of singularity, concordance, and hegemony that he grants it," (Bond, *The Loving Subject* 208n8) pointing to the section "Towards a Theory of Discursive Practice" in Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rainbow's *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, pp. 44-78.

59). This is what happens to the *persona* of troubadour lyric, which, Bond argues, is made into a subject, thus allowing powerful individuals an opportunity to exploit it by shaping their own self-image (Bond, *The Loving Subject* 161).

Peter Haidu's *The Subject, Medieval/Modern* (2004), is a bigger project, though it does rely on the troubadour subject for parts of its argument.¹⁵⁵ Haidu does make a point that parallels Bond's insistence on the multiplicity of competing ideologies operating in the middle ages. As Peraino posits, summarizing Haidu's view, this competition can open a space for "autonomy and agency," functioning as an "ideological workspace for medieval society" (Peraino 21). The history of the "troubadour subject," then, is no less complicated than any other history of the subject. Peraino's own study, as mentioned above, focuses on an aspect of the troubadour corpus missing from most literary engagements with it: "the actual voice and, by extension, the body" (21). Her contribution is a valuable reminder to literary critics that the elision of melody and text marks a lost opportunity. As Kay notes in an essay on Peraino's book (among others):

...literary scholars are *en masse* fairly uniformly resistant to talking about anything but text. Confrontation with music specialists' attention to verbal texture is humbling. If as scholars of poetry we are willing to talk about line length, rhyme, and verbal repetition, it is hard to see why we should be so reluctant to talk about pitch, interval, and melodic repetition. I would hope that we could learn to do so by drawing on the strengths of our own training: not replicating, that is, the discourse of musicology, but using it to help us find our own, related, and maybe theorized ways of describing the musicality of sung verse. (Kay, "Interdisciplinarity" 310)

This is worth remembering. At the same time, it encourages a similar question about the studies cited above: what sorts of disciplinary "resistance" are on display?

¹⁵⁵ Haidu does not shy away from declaring a beginning for the modern subject. He argues that "[t]he modern subject was invented in the Middle Ages" (1), because "[t]he state's beginnings...are found in France and England in the eleventh and twelfth centuries" (2). In the sweep of his provocative readings, Haidu may himself fall victim to some of the same totalizing impulses that Aers warns about above.

What can be learned by trying to understand the lyric of the troubadours not only in relation to the literary systems of France or Italy, but in relation to those of Iberia and the Mediterranean? Most all of the above-cited studies are focused on love lyric which precludes them from reckoning with the full corpus in all its complication; and they mostly take as a given that troubadour lyric leads to French and Italian poetic traditions. Love lyric is important, as are the *trouvères*, Dante, and Petrarch. They are not, however, the only interested audiences for the lyric of the troubadours, either during or after its “original” moment of production. These histories of the troubadour subject also too often present an account that is at the same time too limited *and* too general. Most claim to address a specific, circumscribed version of the subject, whether by addressing a derivative term (i.e. “literary subjectivity”) or by severing the subject from its conceptual network (i.e. insisting it is separate from “agent”). At the same time, they often stumble into universalizing claims anyway (especially Zink and Haidu). Inevitably, this project may do some of the same, but one avenue to avoid it is to add another dimension to discussions of the troubadours’ role in medieval literary and cultural history — through an engagement both with Iberia’s role in the tradition, and genres of lyric outside the *canso*. In an attempt to address what “underlying thing” might help explain how different literary systems show an interest in the subject, the next two sections will engage with three connected terms that occur in studies of the subject like those examined above, as well as in the songbooks themselves: name, person, and persona.

PERSON AND PERSONA

Something Peraino points out is the prevalence of names in the troubadour tradition. Specifically, she points out the disparity in songs attributed to a specific troubadour or *trouvère*.

460 troubadour names and 264 trouvère names survive in songbooks and other works, but while only one in ten troubadour lyrics *are* anonymous (around 250 out of 2500) only one in five trouvère lyrics *are not* (around 1750 out of 2130 are anonymous) (19). Alongside those named troubadours, the songs of the troubadour corpus have what Peraino describes as “a substantial collection of seemingly ‘lost’ subjects who nevertheless claim subjecthood” (19). This is reminiscent of what a song like Guillem de Berguedà’s *canso* might represent if it were severed from his name: still exhibiting all the same markers of an underlying “subject,” and in its language, doing what is necessary to assert its nature as an index of a subject. What is the “underlying thing” here? Is it consistent across time, culture, and context? Is a name a subject? Answering these questions requires a hermeneutics of “both/and,” because the results will be multiple and shifting rather than unitary and fixed.

Bond argues there are multiple moments — *conjuntos* — in which the subject is a clear and intense topic of interest. In the conclusion to *The Loving Subject*, he suggests that his study helps lend credence to the notion that “the twelfth century [is] a period of intense speculation about and reconstruction of the subject” (*The Loving Subject* 162). He insists, however, that he is *not* claiming “that here one finds at last the beginnings—much less the origins—of western subjectivity” because indeed, “there seems no reason to assume the existence of some unique source” (*The Loving Subject* 162). The twelfth century is, instead, one among many moments that could be found “whenever and wherever changes occur in such areas as writing technology, production modes, social formation, and cultural consciousness that are strong enough to disturb

the equilibrium between subjection and subjectivity” (*The Loving Subject* 162).¹⁵⁶ Indeed, medieval Iberia bears witness to several such moments, some of which overlap with one another.

The notion of *persona* is helpful in understanding this. In a subsection of the “subject” entry of the *DoU* — “6. Subject, thing, person” — Balibar et al. point out that “[e]veryday language tends to assimilate the notion of ‘subject’ to that of ‘person’” which makes understanding “subjectness” in terms of “subjection” difficult (“Box 6” 1084). As Bond is already cited above noting, *persona* has roots in antiquity, and here Balibar et al. trace different threads of the term’s meaning from Roman law to Late Antique and medieval philosophy. To begin with, *persona* means “mask” and then through metonymy the “*personage, character, part, represented by an actor*” wearing such a mask (Lewis and Short, “Persona, Ae”). From actor’s mask, to actor’s role; then, representing a “double metonymy,” it becomes a term for political representation — i.e. Cicero’s magistrate who “assumes the role of the city” (Balibar et al., “Box 6” 1084).¹⁵⁷ This seems to be the source of the dubious second century CE etymology “*per-sono, to sound through*” (Lewis and Short, “Persona, ae”).¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁶ Candidates include “fourteenth-century Italy, sixteenth-century England, eighteenth-century England, or elsewhere” (Bond, *The Loving Subject* 163).

¹⁵⁷ The full citation is “*est proprium munus magistratus intelligere se gerere personam civitas* [It is . . . the particular function of a magistrate to realize that he assumes the role of the city],’ (On Duties, I, 34)” (qtd. in Balibar et al., “Box 6” 1084).

¹⁵⁸ The source here is a reference to the lost *De origine vocabulorum* [On the origin of words] by Gavius Bassus, quoted in the Aulus Gellius’s *Noctes Atticae* [Attic Nights]:

...wittily, in my opinion, does Gavius Bassus explain the derivation of the word *persona*, in the work that he composed *On the Origin of Words*; for he suggests that that word is formed from *personae*. “For,” he says, “the head and the face are shut in on all sides by the covering of the *persona*, or mask, and only one passage is left for the issue of the voice; and since this opening is neither free nor broad, but sends forth the voice after it has been concentrated and forced into one single means of egress, it makes the sound clearer and more resonant. Since then that covering of the face gives clearness and resonance to the voice, it is for that reason called *persona*, the o being lengthened because of the formation of the word.” (Gel. 5.7.1)

By the middle ages the Roman notion of *persona* has already been reformulated and repurposed in different ways. This variability may be what leads developmental histories of the subject to argue explicitly, or implicitly, that the inner life of those human beings alive “then” (whenever that may be) were fundamentally *different* from “now.” This speaks to an assumption that human consciousness differs fundamentally across time and between cultures. In his essay “A category of the human mind: the notion of the person; the notion of the self,” (=> *Notion*) the anthropologist Marcel Mauss draws on ethnographic observations of tribal societies in the Americas and Australia, alongside the Roman notion of *persona*, in order to argue for a notion of the self that, while different from the “modern” one, is endemic to human society.¹⁵⁹ Mauss’s main goal in *Notion* is to argue that the self — a supposedly “innate...categor[y] of the human mind” — in fact “originated and developed slowly over many centuries and through many vicissitudes, so that, even today, it is still imprecise, delicate and fragile” (1). Though he begs off engaging directly with questions of language and psychology, Mauss makes very clear that he believes a notion of self is a given, arguing that “there has never existed a human being who has not been aware, not only of his body, but also at the same time of his individuality, both spiritual and physical” (3).

In an essay putting Mauss’s *Notion* into the context of the rest of his work, N.J. Allen argues that Mauss’s terminology exhibits a kind of slippage particular to the anthropological use of terms like “self” or “person,” which can mean: “(i) what they are ordinarily taken to mean in English, (ii) the nearest equivalent in some alien society or group of societies, or (iii) what is

¹⁵⁹ The essay was first delivered as a lecture in French and was published in 1938. For a summary of the essay’s publication and translations see the preface to *The Category of the Person*, esp. p. viii. The translation presents the French used for key terms in italics within parentheses.

common in both usages” (29). Mauss uses all three, but it is the third “deeper more theoretical concept” which lies at the heart of *Notion* (Allen 29). His ultimate position, according to Allen, is that:

[m]odern society has a concept of the person (usage i), many tribal societies have or had a related concept (usage ii), and it is the concept in usage iii that has evolved from one to the other, and will evolve further. (29)

Keeping that third notion in mind, it is worth reviewing the trajectory that Mauss traces in the essay.

Mauss uses ethnographies of native peoples in the Americas — the Zuñi and several North-Western tribes — and in Australia to argue for a notion of self (the “‘role’ (*personnage*)” that is distant from the “modern” one (12). Mauss argues that “a whole immense group of societies” share the notion of “the role” which a person plays “in sacred dramas, just as he plays a role in family life” (12). He moves from this notion to that of “‘person’ (*personne*) and of ‘self’ (*moi*)” (12).¹⁶⁰ Mauss explores how in Rome *persona* became the legal ‘person’ (*personne*). Then, he looks to Stoic philosophy, Christianity, and philosophy from early modernity on, in order to explain the moral, spiritual, and psychological development of the self. He summarizes the ultimate itinerary as follows:

From a simple masquerade to the mask, from a “role” (*personnage*) to a ‘person’ (*personne*), to a name, to an individual; from the latter to a being possessing metaphysical and moral value; from a moral consciousness to a sacred being; from the latter to a fundamental form of thought and action — the course is accomplished. (22)

¹⁶⁰ He also briefly reviews how the notion of person or self *did* come into being ancient India and China, civilizations that were “among the very great and ancient societies which first became conscious of it [...] invented it, only to allow it to fade away almost irrevocably” (Mauss 13). This is representative of some of the problems in the essay which will be addressed below.

The essay has problems, but the “more theoretical” notion of person developed in it has potential as well.

First, some of the problems. Mauss cites Edward Sapir, which raises questions around linguistic relativity — i.e. the theory that language *shapes* consciousness in strong, observable ways, something that experimental evidence does not support.¹⁶¹ Mauss also exhibits an attitude that Allen describes as “evolutionism” — which the conclusion to the essay certainly makes clear. That viewpoint would hold that societies “develop” and would posit stages of “advancement” in an inevitable march towards “progress.” Mauss’s evolutionism is weaker (and less undermining) than that more simplistic vision just outlined (Allen 27). It is also worth remembering that there is no *telos* to evolution; and further, cultural production is only partially (and often poorly) explained by evolutionary means.¹⁶²

Allen summarizes Mauss’s notion of the self as, “the *concept of the individual presupposed by or expressed in a society’s dominant value system or encompassing ideology*” (Allen 30).¹⁶³ This recalls, rather strongly, Bond’s formulation of the subject, but he rightly pointed to the multiplicity of ideologies in the middle ages. In trying to understand the changing, multiple subjects and selves in medieval Iberian courts — perhaps an even *more* complicated series of contexts — Mauss’s “usage iii” notion of the self is helpful. It can “underlie” the subsequent discussion of how a grammatical subject does or does not correspond to the *hombre*

¹⁶¹ See Caleb Everett’s *Linguistic Relativity* (2013) for an overview of the work done in the last century.

¹⁶² Much of what underlies evolutionary approaches to understanding aesthetic objects relies on the discipline of Evolutionary Psychology which, ultimately, involves a lot of conjecture for something claiming to be probative (e.g. Dennis Dutton’s *The Art Instinct*). For an overview of some of the argumentative problems of this approach, see Stephen Davies *The Artful Species* esp. pp. 41-44.

¹⁶³ Emphasis in the original.

de carne y hueso responsible for a song's composition, along with the many others involved in its initial performance, and subsequent oral and textual circulation. It is a reminder that there is *something* there, even if the something is more complicated than a naïve approach would suggest.

Previous chapters have already argued that deictic and programmatic language in a song, in conjunction with its context and transmission, can render visible a secondary sort of agency: the “by proxy” actions that songs seem intent on performing on behalf of their composers. What such an idea implies is the existence of a network of *human* actors that make such “action” possible. A person or set of persons “underlie” a song, and a set of actors, the audience, must receive and act in response to it. The sort of naïve readings that Kay describes above imagine an easy window into the chain of intentions that underlie a song. Subsequent scholarly work has made clear just how far from the truth this is — a light example would be Riquer's attempts to piece together the life of Guillem de Berguedà and then to use that reconstruction as grounds for his interpretive work. Critics should not, however, conclude as a result that there is *no* trace of intention to be found in these lyric indices. The “theoretical notion” Mauss advances in *Notion* makes clear that there *is* an “underlying thing” common to the diversity of literary and cultural systems which display an interest in “the subject” — one that complements Gell as well.

MARKING THE TROUBADOUR SUBJECT: NAMES AND THE DEMAND FOR THE SUBJECT

A lyric that exists only as words inscribed on parchment or paper is not a stable object, especially when, if it exists in more than one place, those instances almost inevitably differ from one

another.¹⁶⁴ Additionally, of course, a song in its performance is not a stable object either. In both cases, the existence of the work depends on people, in a place, performing a set of practices. As argued in chapter one, it is precisely this set of circumstances that can produce a space like the court, and it is what makes lyric, which indexes the space of the court as it helps produce it, a valuable object of analysis. Deixis — language which points — implies a network of actors necessary to produce the linguistic event in question. Troubadour lyric is full of such language, and this helps classify it as an index, especially as it accumulates layer after layer of new complications and connections in the process of its entextualization. Looking at the language of a song that tries to *do* something provides a view of it in motion. Watching the path(s) it takes can offer a glimpse of the multiple “underlying things” which led to its current instantiation. Some types of language are the flags for such opportunities: deixis is one, programmatic statements are another, and a third is the name.

In *Songbook* (2012), Marisa Galvez explores how proper names in the chansonniers produce a phenomenon she calls “hermeneutic opacity”:

...an interpretive effect of the songbook’s materiality from which we can deduce how names function from various vantage points without attributing agency to any one standpoint, such as poet or scribe, or value to any one situation of reception. (Galvez, *Songbook* 61)

This phenomenon is the result of what happens when troubadours — often content to use a *senhal* or code name — “invoke their proper names” and when those names are, in turn, used by copyists and scribes as rubrics in songbooks (Galvez, *Songbook* 58). In this way, names, “rather than creating stable identities as metonymic headings for lyric corpses” as had so often been

¹⁶⁴ For measures of the variation in troubadour songs — i.e. Paul Zumthor’s *mouvance* — among the different chansonniers, see Amelia Van Vleck’s *Memory and Re-Creation in Troubadour Lyric*, esp. pp. 71-91.

assumed in the past, “reveal a particular troubadour as a multiauthored, fluid assemblage arising from the position of the songbook reader” (Galvez, *Songbook* 58). That is the “troubadour subject” as it is understood in this project, a figure that stands in for multiple, inchoate figures, but that, through the tracing of the agency of their songs, working as indices, there is a chance to understand what is operating “underlying” them. It parallels the lyric as index itself.

In summarizing the scholarly consensus around what troubadour performance might have looked like before the songbook, Galvez suggests that “troubadours probably heard about one another through their songs and through the close networks of people and places in the courtly environment of medieval Occitania” (Galvez, *Songbook* 63). In this context, Galvez offers, a given “troubadour’s name may have included familiarity not only with his or her lyrics but with the troubadour’s theatrical gestures, quality of voice, and stature” (Galvez, *Songbook* 63). By the time it is included in songbooks, the names in the lyric begin to do something else entirely, and as a reader encounters those names, they are always already doing *both*. Parsing these texts requires an embrace of hermeneutic opacity.

The troubadour networks Galvez mentions above overlap with Iberia. The sort of grist to the mill of “national” literary history has been songs with specific references to names, places, and people which can prove those connections. It follows that, for songs that take place in Iberia, this is known only because they are the sort of song — political, satirical, or moralizing — that requires such references. As the above metaphor makes plain, however, not much of aesthetic value or interest survives such “processing.” This chapter will now look at precisely such an instance produced by a song with deictic references to the Iberian peninsula that exists in several versions. While looking at the historical sketch it can help produce, the main issue is what it seems to be aiming to *do*, what type of language it uses to do it, and what is implied by the

changes documented in the song's differing versions. Having two versions means that, by following its "path" as it is "in motion," there is a better chance of locating (and understanding) the "underlying thing."

Marcabru (...1130 – 1149...) is one of the best-known troubadours about whom we "know" the least.¹⁶⁵ Based on allusions in his songs and his *vidas*, he was active in the second quarter of the twelfth century in what is now South-Western France and Northern Spain — and he was in or on the way to Castile, possibly with the court of Alfonso VII, in 1137. That last date and location come from a specific set of deictic signals — references to Castile, Portugal, and Barcelona — in "Al prim comenz de l'invernailh" [At the very beginning of winter] (= > *Comenz*), a song that exists in two different versions. Those signals "shift" between the two versions in order to target a different audience, while maintaining the overall shape and content of the song. Here, I am interested in exploring a process by which observation of lyric's indexicality can help readers gain some access to the "troubadour subject" — i.e. the "underlying thing" of the song — while also reckoning with the impossibility of its recovery, and the necessity of engaging with multiple, contradictory, layers of meaning present in a text found in a manuscript.

The other aspect that brings *Comenz* to the fore is the self-invocation it contains. Among the types of naming that occur in the songbooks, Galvez explains that self-invocation can be used for a variety of performative effects, and it takes on additional ones in its material existence in the songbook (*Songbook* 74). Marcabru's self-naming is "a lyrical gesture and an authorizing

¹⁶⁵ These are Riquer's dates (Riquer, *Los trovadores* 170). The editors of the most recent critical edition — Simon Gaunt, Ruth Harvey, and Linda Paterson — confirm that his earliest datable song dates to 1130, and his last to 1149, but they indicate that he likely composed into the 1150s (Gaunt et al. 2–3).

mark” (*Songbook* 74). For troubadours like him, the name is “a synecdoche for the experience of [his] songs” while in the songbooks, a “proper name” is “metonymically deployed in a manner that builds upon” that prior synecdoche (*Songbook* 75). Galvez describes Marcabru’s “identity as a preacher and moralist,” and his style as “polemical” and “cryptic” — so it is fitting that his uses of his own name often appear as “quasi-auctorial citations” (Galvez, *Songbook* 75).

Marcabru’s name itself “literally means ‘making a brown mark’ or, alternatively, is an abbreviated form of ‘Marcus Brunus’ (‘Mark Brown,’ ‘the brown one’)” and it described the way in which he “audibly brands — brown marks” his audience through his creative use of courtly language to simultaneously vulgar and moralizing ends (*Songbook* 80).

Marcabru’s name and his deictic signaling play a key role at the end of *Comenz*. The song appears in the critical edition edited by Simon Gaunt, Ruth Harvey, and Linda Paterson, in two versions which they label *IV* and *IVb*. This is because the song, which appears in even more varied form in six manuscripts (*A, I, K, N, a¹, and d*), seems to be aimed at different audiences based on two distinctive endings — but the changes between versions amount to more than a mere swapped *tornada* (Marcabrun 65–67; Gaunt and Harvey 71–72).¹⁶⁶ The details, taken together, suggest that Marcabru first composes the song in, or on the way to, Castile after April of 1137, and the second version is likely composed subsequently in Gascony before 1147 (Marcabrun 68–69). The critical details about *how* this difference is determined depend on a set of deictic signals to place and patron (Marcabrun 69).

¹⁶⁶ Simon Gaunt and Ruth Harvey develop the question in detail in their earlier joint essay on the topic (“Text and Context in a Poem by Marcabru...” in *The Troubadours and the Epic* (1987), pp. 59-101) and those views are synthesized in the introductory notes in the critical edition of Marcabru’s songs. In the essay, Gaunt writes “Text” explaining the difference between the two main versions of the song (as he had edited them at that point), while Harvey writes “Contexts” which explains the complications of any sure narrative around who the song is meant for.

In “Text and Context...” Gaunt describes the song as a “show-piece” designed to attract patrons, but the audience in each case is different (Gaunt and Harvey 71–72). This is because it is marked by Marcabru’s moralizing *persona* and makes heavy use of irony in conjunction with “construct[ing] his poem on a series of oppositions,” i.e. the rhetorical figure of *contentio* (72–73). Those contrasts — winter/summer, morning/night, work/sloth — enable Marcabru’s criticism of those who fail to work hard in a series of inventive, and eventually vulgar, ways (73–78). He also critiques men and women for their adulterous behavior. Finally, he pitches himself as a troubadour, indicating that those with the good sense *not* to behave like those he’s just mocked will surely be wise enough to provide him with patronage (78).

The song’s two versions conclude in different ways which mark out the difference in their audience. First is *IVb*, thought to be the earlier version, which ends as follows:¹⁶⁷

Poissas non es poestatz pros qan non sap garir dels sanglutz ni d’una tos, cum fai c’ainz regardara nos? Don a ssi Marcabrus o ditz, Desama[n]t li gran los menutz.	(50)	[Since a ruler is no hero, when he cannot recover from retching and coughing, how can he manage to pay attention to us first? This is why Marcabru says this to himself: great men no longer love the small-fry.
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En Castella e vas Portegau on anc non fo trames – e Dieus sau – e vas Barcelona atretau, puois lo Peitavis m’es faillatz, serai mai cum Artus perdutoz. (Marcabrun 84–85, vv. 49–60) ¹⁶⁸	(55) (60)	In Castile and towards Portugal, where greetings have never been sent before – and may God save them – and towards Barcelona too, since the Poitevin has failed me, I will ever more be lost like Arthur.]
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Contrast that with the second version, *IV*, which ends as follows:¹⁶⁹

Pozesatz non pot esser pros	(55)	[A powerful man cannot be worthy
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¹⁶⁷ Based on the text in thirteenth century Italian chansonnier *A* (Marcabrun 6, 81).

¹⁶⁸ Text and translation (modified for lineation) from Gaunt et al., see pp. 70-87. This version, *IVb* is pp. 81-87, and *VI* is pp. 70-81.

¹⁶⁹ This version is based on *a*¹, which is a sixteenth century copy of a lost thirteenth century chansonnier (Gaunt and Harvey 8, 69).

<p>si non sap guerir d'un sanglot o d'una tos: li orfanel can guaran nos segon zo qe Marchabrus ditz, trian los granz mest los menutz.</p>	<p>(60)</p>	<p>if he does not know how to cure a sob or a cough: the orphans are looking at us – according to what Marcabru says – as he distinguishes the powerful from the small-fry</p>
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<p>En Castella e·n Portegal voil trametre aquestas salutz – mas Dieus los sal – et en Barselona atretal e neis la valor son perdutoz,</p>	<p>(65)</p>	<p>To Castile and Portugal, I wish to send these greetings – provided God save them – and to Barcelona too [...] and even valor are lost.</p>
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<p>En Gascognha sai, vas Orsal me dizon q'enceis uns petitz on trob azesc se soi perdutoz. (Marcabrun 72–73, vv. 55–69)</p>	<p>(65)</p>	<p>Here in Gascony, towards Ossau, I am told that a little one is growing up where I may find food if I am lost.]</p>
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It is clearly the same base song: the sentiment of the stanza in which Marcabru uses his own name is largely consistent between the two versions (vv. 49-55 in *IVb* and vv. 55-60 in *IV*), and the same three places — Castile, Portugal, and Barcelona — are named in the last stanza. The differences are clear as well, however: a critical set of allusions are dropped from *IVb* in *IV*, the context and formulation of the deixis changes, and there is the addition of the *tornada* in *IV*.

In *IVb*, there is a reference to “lo Peitavis” [the Poitevien], who has “failed” Marcabru (v. 59). This is the allusion scholars have used to date the song, identifying “lo Peitavis” as Guilhem X Duke of Aquitaine, VIII Count of Poitou (Gaunt and Harvey 86). Guilhem X — son of the “first troubadour” Guilhem IX — died on Good Friday, the ninth of April, 1137 while on Pilgrimage to Santiago de Compostela (Gaunt and Harvey 86). The “failure” here, is glossed then as his inability to provide further patronage for Marcabru (v. 59). When Marcabru declares he is “cum Artus perdutoz” [lost like Arthur] (v. 60), the “Arthur” in question is taken to be the figure of King Arthur as he appears in romances (Gaunt and Harvey 86). The question is, lost in relation to where? The critical elements for discerning this are in the prepositions used to refer to

the places named in the song, and the syntax surrounding them. As the editors point out, in *IVb* Marcabru is “lost *en* Castile, but *ves* Portugal and Barcelona,” while in *IV* all three greetings are sent “*en*” — and the sentence structure suggest he is not *there*, but rather “*en* Gascony, ‘here’ (v. 67)” as he makes clear in the *tornada* (69). This is why Harvey argues that when, in *IVb*, Marcabru declares he will be “lost,” it is in reference to the court in Poitou, not Castile (86).

All this suggests that the audience of the early version of *Comenz* is new potential patrons in Iberia, while Marcabru is either in or on the way to Castile after his patron’s death. Harvey’s analysis of the song’s context lays out a full complement of Iberian monarchs and their relatives that could have served as potential patrons (three out of four are named Alfonso): Castile here refers to the recently crowned “emperor” Alfonso VII; Portugal is a metonym for Alfonso Enriquez; and Barcelona stands in for Ramon Berenguer IV (88). In other songs, Marcabru has already made references to Alfonso VII’s cousin Alfonso Jordan, the Count of Toulouse, which may play a role in understanding the context here as well (90).¹⁷⁰

IV is a different matter. Here, the references to “lo Peitavis” and “Artus” are both dropped, and while Castile, Portugal, and Barcelona are still mentioned, the altered syntax adjusts the location of Marcabru’s enunciation. The line “En Gascogha sai, vas Orsa!” [Here in Gascony, towards Ossau] (v. 67) makes clear that in this song Marcabru is now elsewhere (in Gascony), but it leaves the question: who is the “petitz” [little one] (v. 68)? Here, the argument is more circuitous, and the dating is less specific than with *IVb*. The suggestion is that the “petitz” is Peir de Gabaret (r. 1134-1153) who succeeded his uncle as the Viscount of Béarn in 1134 while still a child, with his mother Guiscard serving as regent (Gaunt and Harvey 89). This puts

¹⁷⁰ While the present aim is not a full documentation of Marcabru’s Iberian activity, Harvey lays out a useful overview of the competing theories see “Text and Context,” pp. 89-95.

the song's date of composition after 1134 (presumably after 1137) but before 1147, at which point documents suggest that Peire's minority had come to an end (Marcabrun 69).

At stake here is not so much the historical sketch, but *how* it is possible to produce one. What can be learned about the "troubadour subject" underlying this lyric from the variation in the two versions of *Comenz* presented as *IVb* and *IV*? Harvey and Gaunt label the song a "failure" in the sense that it does not lead to a long period of Iberian patronage. It is precisely that failure, however, that helps reveal something of the subject(s) standing behind (or beneath) it. In "Texts and Contexts..." Gaunt argues that the variation here allows for a look at "authorial intervention" (81). Instead, one could argue, there is the possibility for a method.

Keeping in mind the hermeneutic opacity that names produce in a songbook, lyric's programmatic and deictic moments, in conjunction with its context, provides tools to grapple with the interpretive difficulties that phenomenon implies. Songs only *do* anything because people *make* them, in two senses: people are responsible for their production and performance, and people receive and act upon them. Troubadour lyric *demand*s a subject, or so the practice of its readers over time would suggest, but that subject is shifting and multiple, not fixed and unitary. Grappling with it, then, requires a hermeneutics of "both/and," one that recognizes that in dealing with troubadour lyric is like turning over something with facets in our hands. While looking at each new surface reveals something different, smashing it to pieces will not reveal its "true nature." The next chapter will explore how these conflicts come into even starker view when accounting for the role of changing linguistic technologies and their relation to the subject.

From the concepts of the philosophers to the work of literary critics, the problem of the "troubadour subject" does not find a neat resolution. That, however, is in keeping with the lyric itself. Beginning with Kay's re-articulation of the autobiographical assumption; adding Bond's

account of *persona*; Mauss's "theoretical" sense of the thing underlying role, persons, person and self; and finally Galvez's concept of the "hermeneutic opacity" of names; all of these theories point towards a complex, multiple "troubadour subject." Lyric, as an index, ultimately acts "on behalf" of *many* people. In reading it now, it is necessary to keep that in mind, while seeking out those moments that can provide glimpses of the "underlying thing."

CHAPTER SIX

“...de trobar mercat”: Guiraut Riquier at the court of Alfonso X

Guiraut Riquier (...1254-1292) spent the decade of the 1270s at the court of Alfonso X of Castile and León (1252-1284) (Riquer, *Los trovadores* 1609), negotiating his *mestier* [craft] and his search for *mercat* [exchange] within the structure of a “linguistic technology” developed in the court of Alfonso “el Sabio” [the Wise].¹⁷¹ Both *mestier* and *mercat* cover much wider semantic fields than “craft” and “exchange,” words which point towards a pair of key concerns for Guiraut: what his craft *is*, and what it can *do*. While works from Alfonso’s court like the *Siete Partidas* provide one vision of musical and poetic practice at court, Guiraut’s own lyric, and his *letras*, or “verse-epistles,” provide a productive counterpoint for the complex environment that term “linguistic technology” seeks to get at, referring both to the mode of recording language and that which is recorded. The first sense is the relationship between literacy and orality, as well as administrative practices that relate to them. The second includes not only the idea of different registers, i.e. the classical versus the vernacular, but also of different vernacular languages in use at Alfonso’s court.¹⁷² These different linguistic technologies have an impact on the literary system at court, a space where literary systems cannot be separated from administrative and legal practice.

¹⁷¹ The fullest account of Guiraut’s patrons and activity among different courts is still Joseph Anglade’s *Le troubadour Guiraut Riquier* (1905). In the context of Iberia, and his time spent at the court of Alfonso X, each of the major literary historians of the troubadours in Iberia has dealt with him. Riquer includes him in his anthology (see pp. 1609-1646), and he features prominently in works by other literary historians focused on the poetic activity at the court of Alfonso X: see Milà i Fontanals (pp. 196-240); Ramón Menéndez Pidal (pp. 8-17, 167-182); Carlos Alvar (181-258); and Vinçes Beltran (pp. 123-301).

¹⁷² Here, that will mean Castilian, Occitan, and Galician-Portuguese.

This chapter will examine this situation through the relationship between Guiraut’s concern over *mestier* and *mercat*, that is, with his craft and what he receives for it. First, it will provide some context for Guiraut’s production in Alfonso’s court. Next, it will work to define “linguistic technology.” Then, it will take up the different depictions of performance in the *Siete Partidas* and Guiraut’s *letras*. Finally, it will examine the sixth and last of Guiraut’s *pastorelas* which bring together concerns about craft and exchange.

ALFONSO’S COURT AND GUIRAUT RIQUIER

The court of Alfonso X witnesses an explosion in vernacular literary production, including competing courtly registers for the production of verse and music, both in Occitan and Galician-Portuguese.¹⁷³ This is, of course, alongside Castilian’s use in legal and historical discourse.¹⁷⁴ Work on the context of Alfonso’s court has already shown interaction between “troubadours” employing each linguistic register.¹⁷⁵ The *Cantigas de Santa María*, collecting more than four hundred songs many with accompanying musical notation and illuminations, are a rich source for the Galician-Portuguese craft of *trobar*.¹⁷⁶ But, while in the preface to the *Cantigas* Alfonso

¹⁷³ This chapter will be primarily concerned with Guiraut Riquier’s work, but for more on the Alfonsine cultural context, see Francisco Márquez Villanueva’s *El concepto cultural alfonsí* (2004), as well as Robert Burn’s edited collection *Emperor of Culture* (1990). For a biography of the King and his context, see H. Salvador Martínez’s *Alfonso X el Sabio* (2003) and more generally, Simon Doubleday’s *The Wise King* (2015).

¹⁷⁴ For the important activity of translation that proceeds Alfonso’s reign by more than a century, beginning with the conquest of Toledo in 1085, see Charles Burnett’s *Arabic into Latin in the Middle Ages* (2009). The subsequent use of Castilian marks a changing situation re: vernacular literacy and the use of Latin, which Burnett explores as well.

¹⁷⁵ Among the many instances of work on this topic, Beltran’s chapters on the court of Alfonso X in *Corte de Babel* are an excellent introduction. See n. 171.

¹⁷⁶

quero seer oy mais seu trovador,
e rogo-lle que me queira por seu
Trobador e que queira meu trobar

[I want to be no more than her troubadour,
and I beg of her that she want me for her
troubadour and that she desires my songs

declares his desire to be the troubadour for the virgin, the *Partidas* are full of instances that attack or seek to limit the kind of musical and poetic performance that is licit at court.¹⁷⁷ This makes the response to the courtly environment in “Espanha” that Guiraut Riquier articulates all the more interesting, especially in the verse letter, the *Supplicatio* (1274) which he addresses to Alfonso asking for a clear definition of the term *joglar*, and the response that he pens himself in Alfonso’s voice, the *Declaratio* (1275). Its context in the rest of his corpus will be explored below. Given Alfonso’s concern with “nomes” in the *Partidas*, Guiraut seems to have found himself an ideal target and mouthpiece.

Aside from those letters, and his cycle of six *pastorelas*, Guiraut is perhaps best-known for the fact that he is prolific (second only to Cerverí de Girona), and that he likely had a role in the ordering of his own work for its compilation as a textual object.¹⁷⁸ He is also, as will be seen below, easily slotted into the “system” of Italian vernacular lyric, in which Guiraut fits into a constellation of author-ordered verse collections along with Dante, his near contemporary, and Petrarch. But, his collection of verse is just as much a part of the system that includes verse compilations with an autobiographical bent that includes *El libro de buen amor*.¹⁷⁹ Reading his work for the narrative arc that proceeds from its sequencing also obscures some of its most

reçeber, ca per el quer’ eu mostrar
dos miragres que ela fez...
(Mettman, I, 55)

to receive, because through them I want to show
the miracles that she does...]

This is taken from the edition of the *Cantigas* edited by Walter Mettmann. The translation is mine. For more on the question of Alfonso’s role in the composition of the *Cantigas*, see Joseph Snow’s work on the subject: e.g. “Alfonso as Troubadour: The Fact and the Fiction” in *Emperor of Culture* (pp. 124-140), or “The Central Rôle...” (1979).

¹⁷⁷ Jesús Rodríguez Velasco details these instances in *Castigos para celosos* (1999), see pp. 275-277.

¹⁷⁸ See Riquier, pp. 1610 and Michel-André Bossy’s “Cyclical Composition...”.

¹⁷⁹ Bossy argues for this, as well as Villon’s *Le grand testament* (“Cyclical” 290).

strikingly programmatic features. It also obscures moments that involve administrative structure directly, such as in the *letras* which use formulas from the chancery.

In both cases, reading his lyric only for the narrative aspects of its sequencing also draws attention away from moments in Guiraut's corpus that showcase his concerns around craft and compensation, and the role of linguistic technologies in both. The defense of "craft" embedded in Guiraut's lyric is consistent with an understanding of *mestier* in line with its Castilian cognate *mester*, a broader semantic field which links craft with commercial concerns. As Simone Pinet conceives of it, *mester*:

can be translated not only as 'mastery' or 'craft' but also as 'task' or 'technique,' including the ancient sense of *technè*. Such *technè* as *mimesis* is intimately related to the new regime of the vernacular – an effect in the thirteenth century of the Latin renaissance of the twelfth – and to the transition from a gift economy that had profound effects on all levels of medieval culture. (*The Task of the Cleric* 11)

This is the context in which Guiraut finds himself in the 1270s in the court of Alfonso X, and as will be seen below, it intersects with his concern around *mercat* as well.

THE *LIBRE* OF GUIRAUT RIQUIER

Guiraut's work survives in two songbooks, *C* and *R*.¹⁸⁰ In *C*, a songbook with more than 1200 troubadour songs, Guiraut's work appears about three quarters of the way through (Bossy, "Cyclical" 278). It is preceded by a striking piece of text which reads as follows, based on Olivia Holmes's transcription and translation:

Aissi comensan lo cans den: Guiraut riquier de narbona en aissi cum es de cansos. e de verses. e de pastorellas. e de retroenchas. e de descortz. e dalbas. e dautras diversas obras en aissi ad ordenadamens cum era ad ordenat en lo sieu libre. del qual libre escrig per la sua man fon aissi tot translatat. e ditz enaissi cum de sus se conten.

¹⁸⁰ *C* is fr. 856, copied in Narbonne, *R* is fr. 22543 made in Languedoc, both copied in the fourteenth century, and both currently held in Paris at the BnF (Riquer, *Los trovadores* 12–13).

[Here begin[s] the song of Mr. Guiraut Riquier of Narbonne, made up as it is of *cansos*, *verses*, *pastorellas*, *retroenchas*, *descortz*, *albas*, and various other works, in the same order as it was ordered in his book, from which book, written by his own hand, it was all copied here, and it says the same [there] as is contained here below] (Holmes 101)

Holmes points out the specific choices she makes in her translation which have implications for understanding the text. First, there is a tension between the plural form of the verb “comensan” and the singular form of the noun “lo cans.” Michel-André Bossy, in his own translation, renders “lo cans” as “singing,” something which Holmes rejects in order to draw attention to this grammatical wrinkle because:

The grammatical inconsistency points to the underlying tension in the poems (or poem?) that follow(s) between unity and multiplicity, between the poet’s efforts to make his texts cohere into an organic whole, a “libre,” and the fragmentary, non-narrative nature of both the individual lyrics and the entire multiauthored manuscript. (Holmes 101)

That *libre* is, for Holmes, the whole of the poetic output contained in *C*, sixty-eight works that follow this opening text. In both *C* and *R*, however, there is a distinctive organizational structure that has a main body of *cansos* and *vers*, after which appear the works in other genres.

Bossy provides an overall structure for the *canso-vers* section contained in *C* and *R* (though the latter does not execute the program in precisely the same way). He posits, based on the numbering in *C*, a twelfth *vers* in the middle of the fifty-four song cycle which is missing.¹⁸¹ In this section, the songs are preceded by rubrics which identify if the song is a *canso* or a *vers*, the date of its composition, and which number it is of the genre in question (Bossy, “Cyclical” 280). This scheme in the rubrics helps support Bossy’s theory that there is a missing twelfth *vers*

¹⁸¹ See pp. 291-293 of his “Cyclical Composition in Guiraut Riquier’s Book of Poems”. For the specific differences between the two manuscripts, see p. 279, n. 11. Also, as mentioned above, see Bertolucci’s “Il canzoniere” as Bossy points out.

which would occupy the thirty-fourth spot. Following this assumption, the overall work is made up of fifty-four songs that can be split into two halves of twenty-seven songs each, or into three thirds of eighteen songs each. There are nineteen *cansos* and eight *vers* in the first half, and the number is reversed (eight *cansos* and nineteen *vers*) in the second half. When broken into thirds, the design is even more intricate: the first third has fourteen *cansos* and four *vers*; the middle third has nine of each genre; and the final third flips the numbers of the first with four *cansos* and fourteen *vers* (Bossy, “Cyclical” 291–93).

Both *C* and *R* preserve further works after this body of songs, and they are ordered first by genre and then chronologically (Bossy, “Cyclical” 279). It is here that the *pastorelas* and the *letras* are found, though only in *R* in the case of the *letras*. Bossy lays out concepts of what the *canso* and the *vers* mean for Guiraut according to the works that are labeled under these distinctions. Leaving aside the history of the two terms, Bossy argues that in Guiraut’s corpus, the *canso* is mostly love lyric, often aimed towards *Belh Deport*, the *senhal* or “secret name” of his object of desire, which Bossy translates as either “‘Fair Pleasure’ or perhaps ‘Fair Pastime’” (“Cyclical” 280–81). The *senhal* and the content of these love songs offer an avenue to link erotic and programmatic desires. Bossy describes Guiraut’s category of *vers*, on the other hand, in a way that is reminiscent of the definitions of lyric given in chapter three of this project: “Guiraut’s concept of *vers* is roomy and perhaps hazy on the periphery. One suspects that he cobbled together the category to suit the grand design” of his overall project (“Cyclical” 281). More broadly, the category of *vers* here, might well be thought of as equivalent to *sirventes* for earlier troubadours (“Cyclical” 281). One can see, then, the principle of selection described above (see chapter three) in operation. Crucially, however, *vers* is not subordinated. Instead, it occupies a place of equal importance with the more obviously “lyric” *canso*.

Holmes argues that the rubric which mentions Guiraut's *libre*, along with the close similarity in presentation of Guiraut's corpus in *C* and *R*, amounts to, "direct evidence that such a book once existed, although there is no particular reason to believe that the scribe of the manuscript ever laid his or her hands on it" (102). For her, however, Guiraut's *libre* is best understood as part of an author-ordered lyric sequence, a phenomenon that overlaps with Dante's *Vita Nuova* and comes into its own with Petrarch's *Canzonere*. Rather than arguing for influence between Guiraut's chronological Italian precursors or successors, Holmes argues that the emergence of multiple author-ordered compilations at the same time in different places "suggests the influence of common cultural factors such as the recent advent of vernacular literacy and the widespread diffusion of systems of written record keeping" (103). This argument invites the comparative analysis of different literary systems, especially as they relate to the development of linguistic technologies which enable and influence legal and administrative practice as much as they do musico-poetic ones.

Holmes's own approach, however, limits what she finds in Guiraut's *libre* in two key ways, both of which are revealed in her book's subtitle: ...*Authorship from Troubadour Song to Italian Poetry Book*. First, as has already been mentioned above, this connects Guiraut solely to the Italian tradition, which links his work into only one of the several chains of which could form a part. In doing so, Holmes argues for an almost teleological progression towards the separation of "lyric" from musical performance — something which follows from Italian lyric but is hardly universal. For instance, she argues that:

The passage...from a fixed sequence of stanzas within the written *canzone* to a fixed sequence of poems in the *canzonere* thus seems to be the natural, almost inevitable, outcome of the divorce that writing provoked between words and music. In giving up song, Italian poets devised a new vernacular genre that was able to recount a series of events in confessional format. (Holmes 12)

Guiraut's songs do have music preserved with them however (in *chansonnier R*), and this is a striking difference between the Italian lyric tradition and the Iberian one. After all, Holmes herself points out just before the above quote that a likely model for Guiraut's *libre* is Alfonso X's *Cantigas de Santa María*, which also include musical notation (11).

Holmes's argument also relies on a set of underlying claims about the relationship between the "self" and language; specifically, that changes in modes of thinking can be observed in correspondence with changing relationships between linguistic technologies, like the classical and the vernacular, the written and the oral. Especially as her argument relates to literacy, she relies on work by Walter Ong and Eric Havelock that has come in for criticism, as will be outlined below, based on the failure of experimental work to bear it out. Ultimately, she comes close to claiming that the "self" depends on, and is a product of writing, though she backs off. First, Holmes insists that her interest is not the "advent of 'bourgeois subjectivity,' but the emergence of an author who was necessarily an 'implied author,' an aggregate of inferences based on the text" (4). Her limitations are that she does not, "intend to trace not the 'real' advent of an autonomous subject, but the partial creation of conditions of possibility in which the Romantic concept of transparent authorship could eventually arise" (4). Still, the theoretical basis of even these more limited claims posits a strong connection between writing and the mind that, upon further examination, is only borne out in a much weaker form as this chapter will now explore.

LINGUISTIC TECHNOLOGIES

This chapter depends on an understanding of linguistic technologies that includes not only writing, but also different languages or registers. It is related to the idea of *mestier*, but can be

examined at a more basic level by asking: 1) what is a “technology” in this sense? and 2) can language be conceived of as one? There has been plenty of work on literacy and writing that considers written language from this perspective, but viewing language itself as a technology is a more recent development.¹⁸² In both cases, the relationship between language and thought is at issue.

Salikoko S. Mufwene advances the argument that language itself can be usefully understood as a technology. He begins with W. Brian Arthur’s definition of technology as “a means to fulfill a purpose: a device, or method, or process” (Arthur 29). Mufwene, in advancing his position, expands on that definition, clarifying that a technology in this sense:¹⁸³

...need not be material, it need not have a complex structure (though languages do), it need not be monolithic, it need not have been planned, it need not be a conscious invention, it may have acquired this status in an ad-hoc fashion, it need not work perfectly and can be improved several times on different occasions, and it can be adapted to new uses. (330)

This understanding of technology is helpful in considering the literary system of the court of Alfonso X and its relationship with administrative practice.¹⁸⁴ This chapter will argue that

¹⁸² Jack Goody and Ian Watt’s “The consequences of literacy” (1963) and Eric Havelock’s *Preface to Plato* (1963) provide a starting point. In medieval studies more specifically, see Thomas Clanchy’s *From Memory to Written Record* (1980) and Brian Stock’s *The Implications of Literacy* (1983), which both concern the topic of literacy very directly. See also Mary Carruthers’s *The Book of Memory* (1990), which argues that medieval culture was “memorial” rather than “documentary” (Carruthers 9).

¹⁸³ He argues that:

...language is a natural collective technology that evolved primarily to facilitate efficient communication in populations whose social structures were becoming increasingly more complex. It emerged through hominine’s exaptation of their own anatomy, thanks to the same mind that was enabling the complex cultures they were producing. (Mufwene 327)

¹⁸⁴ For the “pre-history” of Castilian administrative practice and its relationship to the monarchy see Amaia Arizaleta’s *Les clerics au palais* which covers the period from 1157-1230. For the general intellectual work of the court of Alfonso X, which will only be discussed briefly below, see Francisco Márquez Villanueva’s *El concepto cultural Alfonsí* (1994).

considering language itself as a technology enables a clearer understanding of the different registers used in the court — the classical, but also the various and competing vernaculars — along with increasing ubiquity of literacy and writing. These two movements are related but their relationship should not be viewed as a directly causal one.¹⁸⁵

The idea of writing as a technology, as stated above, has been at issue for much of the twentieth century in and beyond the bounds of literary studies. In *Orality and Literacy* (1982) Walter Ong provides an account of what he calls the “technologizing of the word.” Literacy here is viewed as a technology which fundamentally changes the nature of the relationship between human beings and language.¹⁸⁶ Ong draws on Jack Goody and Eric Havelock to advance an argument that the advent of writing fundamentally changes the nature of the human mind.¹⁸⁷ Havelock, in *The Preface to Plato*, advanced the idea the invention and relatively widespread adoption of the alphabet are necessary for the abstract thought displayed in the work of philosophers like Plato and Aristotle.¹⁸⁸ This is something that Ong takes on board completely, and in his conception “literate human beings” are those “whose thought processes do not grow out of simply natural powers but out of these powers as structured, directly or indirectly, by the

¹⁸⁵ For a review of the linguistic situation in Iberia approaching and through this period, see Consuelo López-Morillas’s “Language” chapter in *The Literature of Al-Andalus*. As mentioned above, Burnett also documents the changing programs of translation under Alfonso and his father Fernando III, first into Latin and then, speaking to the changing linguistic situation in the peninsula, into Castilian.

¹⁸⁶ For more on writing as technology, see Clanchy pp. 88-115.

¹⁸⁷ In Ong’s framework, he offers nine characteristics of “thought and expression in a primary oral culture”:

“(i) Additive rather than subordinate...(ii) Aggregative rather than analytic...(iii) Redundant or ‘copious’...(iv) Conservative or traditionalist...(v) Close to the human lifeworld...(vi) Agonistically toned...(vii) Empathetic and participatory rather than objectively distanced...(viii) Homeostatic...(ix) Situational rather than abstract” (37–48).

¹⁸⁸ As he explains in the preface, there is a connection between “the transition from the oral to the written and from the concrete to the abstract” (Havelock xi).

technology of writing” (Ong 77). This is perhaps Ong’s boldest claim, though he makes plenty.¹⁸⁹

To make these arguments, Ong relies on the work of others who advance this thesis from different disciplinary perspectives — Havelock is a classicist, Goody a social anthropologist — but scholars in and outside those fields have subsequently challenged those findings as John Halverson outlines in his article “Goody and the Implosion of the Literacy Thesis.” The “literacy thesis” as Halverson designates it, makes the “principle claim...that the development of logical thought (‘syllogistic reasoning’, ‘formal operations’, ‘higher psychological processes’) is dependent on writing, both in theory and in historical fact” (301). Goody’s *The Domestication of the Savage Mind* (1977) for example, came out while work was already underway on the studies that underlie Sylvia Scribner and Michael Cole’s *The Psychology of Literacy* (1981). Scribner and Cole combined an ethnographic and psychological approach to the study of literacy in the Vai community in Liberia in an effort to understand the relationship between thought and literacy, as well as schooling.¹⁹⁰ Scribner and Cole approach the question of psychology’s

¹⁸⁹ Like:

Without writing, the literate mind would not and could not think as it does, not only when engaged in writing but normally even when it is composing thoughts even in oral form. More than any other single invention, writing has transformed human consciousness. (78)

And:

Writing and print and the computer are all ways of technologizing the word. Once the word is technologized, there is no effective way to criticize what technology has done with it without the aid of the highest technology available. (79)

¹⁹⁰ The Vai developed their own script — a syllabary — sometime in the nineteenth century. See Cole and Scribner, esp. pp. 23-34 and 263-270. Men in the Vai community have preserved a practice of literacy in Vai script that takes place outside a schooling context and exists alongside literacy in Arabic that is fostered in Qur’anic education. There is also English language schooling. This complicated picture allows the researchers to design experiments which try to isolate the effects of schooling from the effects of literacy, and offer different types of literacy in order to see if there is a literacy effect *per se*. Part I of the book frames the question, and the subsequent parts explore their work and its results.

relationship with literacy, especially the claim that “mastery of a written language affects not only the content of thought but also the processes of thinking” (5). They are interested in this because, in their words, “scholars who offer these claims for specific effects in psychological processes present no direct evidence that individuals in literate societies do, in fact, process information about the world differently from those in societies without literacy” (7). Scribner and Cole ultimately find that “literacy makes some differences in some skills in some contexts” (234) and they present what they term “a practice account of literacy” with a practice defined as something combining “technology, knowledge, and skills” (235–36).¹⁹¹ Literacy, understood in this way, consists of “not simply knowing how to read or write a particular script, but applying this knowledge for specific purposes in specific contexts of use” (236). This particular sense of literacy is a helpful way to conceive of it, because it focuses on the importance of use.

Halverson takes on Goody’s articulation of the literacy thesis, as opposed to Ong’s or Havelock’s, because Goody developed the thesis over time in response to criticism (Halverson 301).¹⁹² Over two decades, Goody’s claims grow weaker and weaker, to the point that, by the time Halverson is writing in 1991, not much is left.¹⁹³ Halverson’s method consists of recasting Goody’s own evidence in order to demonstrate that “many of the things deemed ‘impossible’ in oral culture are in fact not only possible but also achieved in reality” (312). Syllogistic reasoning,

¹⁹¹ It recalls those more recent studies on the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis that yield slight results mentioned in chapter three.

¹⁹² Goody also worked with Scribner and Cole on an earlier project published in 1977 (Scribner and Cole 34).

¹⁹³ Halverson takes on, in turn, Goody and Watt’s “The consequences of literacy” (1963) which examines ancient Greece; *The Domestication of the Savage Mind* (1977), which analyzes the “effects of writing on ‘modes of thought’ (or cognitive processes)” (Goody ix); and *The Interface Between the Written and the Oral* (1987) which addresses Scribner and Cole (Halverson 302–05, 305–08, 308–14). For a more recent, and more sympathetic, take on Goody’s research on literacy, see Michael Cole and Jennifer Cole’s “Rethinking the Goody Myth” (2006).

for example, is *possible* for an oral culture, but it is closely tied to schooling. List-making is also certainly present in oral cultures, even if the lists have different formal characteristics.

Ultimately, he emphasizes the fact that “the consequences of literacy depend entirely on the uses to which literacy is put and that both the uses and the consequences are extremely variable”

(314). What it is ultimately left of the “literacy thesis” is, then, “the preservative potentiality of writing” which Halverson describes as:

to the extent that texts *are* preserved, disseminated, accumulated and *read* (an obvious but important proviso), the amount of available information can increase far beyond the carrying capacity of human memory, individual or collective; it means that each generation of thinkers can therefore build on the work of its forebears without starting all over again, thus making possible a much more rapid advancement of knowledge than is possible under oral conditions; it means that thought can be communicated more easily and accurately over space as well as time; that it can provide intellectual stimulation beyond the possibilities of isolated oral societies; that it can, in short, expand the mind and sharpen intelligence. (315)

This, then, is what Halverson calls the “solid and important residue of the implosion of the literacy thesis” (316).

It is rather different, and a more circumscribed claim, to argue that the linguistic technologies available have an impact on what is communicated, or recorded, via those technologies. Indeed, taken on a more limited basis — changes in linguistic technologies have an impact of what is communicated — it seems as obvious as it does important. Versions of it have been argued elsewhere: in *Archive Fever*, Jacques Derrida argues that the structure of the archive “determines...what is *archivable*” (16–17); and Cornelia Vismann, in *Files*, suggests that changes in the technologies for recording something will change what is recorded (xii–xiii).¹⁹⁴ It

¹⁹⁴ See also Roger Chartier’s *Inscription and Erasure*, esp. pp. vii–45, for a consideration of these issues in the middle ages and as they relate to Spain in the early modern period. I discuss these issues further elsewhere (see Kozey pp. 262–65).

is worth keeping in mind how sweeping the claims should be that are made on this basis, however, with Halverson's analysis serving as a caution against too expansive a version of the "literacy hypothesis." Readers of the troubadours have not been immune to these temptations — as seen with Holmes above. Figures like Guiraut Riquier, with his apparent awareness of writing, and contexts like Alfonso's court, where vernaculars were being newly pressed into service as vehicles for the transfer of knowledge, the temptation to claim a fundamental epistemic shift is both tempting and understandable. Instead, it may be more productive to focus on precisely what can be observed in texts like Guiraut's lyric, in order to make claims that stand up better to scrutiny, and avoid making unintended implications as much as possible.

THE *SIETE PARTIDAS* AND GUIRAUT RIQUIER'S REFLECTION ON THE COURT OF ALFONSO X

As mentioned above, Holmes assigns Guiraut Riquier an important place in the history of the development of vernacular lyric. Holmes is interested in tracing "the emergence of an author who was necessarily an 'implied author,' an aggregate of inferences based on the text" (4), and in her schema, a line can be drawn from the prose commentaries of the *vidas* and *razos* in the *chansonniers* to Dante's *Vita nuova* and then Petrarch's *Canzoniere*. This sort of "author" is also a proxy for a more "modern" sort of subject, one which would allow readers to adopt more typical notions of agency and intention. Of course, if one does *not* have Italian lyric sequence in mind as the *telos* of vernacular poetry in the Mediterranean, a figure like Guiraut Riquier is interesting for a different set of reasons. One might consider him a forerunner to the fourteenth century *Libro de buen amor* in Iberia, or François Villon's *Le grand testament* (Bossy, "Cyclical" 290). Perhaps even more critically for this project, Guiraut's author-ordered *libre* is a

clear indication of the impact of linguistic technologies on poetic *mestier* as much as on the administrative *mestier* of the clerks.

One valuable point of comparison is between the vision that Guiraut will lay out in his *letras* and in his songs, and that which is depicted in other sources from Alfonso's court, like the *Siete Partidas*. Guiraut's lyric has more in common with the courtly vision outlined in the *Cantigas de Santa María* which is worth exploring briefly. Guiraut's own lyric cycle closes with a third dedicated to a conversion narrative, changing out his object of earthly desire, *Belh Deport*, for a heavenly one, the Virgin Mary. This final third, from song thirty-six to song fifty-four, marks *Belh Deport*'s death in the *tornadas* of songs thirty-seven and thirty-eight, then, in song forty, Guiraut explicitly shifts his focus to the Virgin (Bossy, "Cyclical" 284–85). Bossy points out that song forty, a number which is itself associated with "trial and temptation," is dated to February 1284, and he suggests that perhaps it is meant to be imagined taking place on Candlemas, February 2nd, which is Mary's feast day ("Cyclical" 285). This is reminiscent, of course, of what Alfonso himself does in the *Cantigas de Santa María*, including his stated desire to serve as the troubadour of the virgin.

The Alfonso of the *Siete Partidas*, on the other hand, seems much less inclined to encourage the practice of the troubadours, whether in Occitan or in Galician-Portuguese. While the *Cantigas* celebrate some and condemn others, the *Partidas* repeatedly caution against the infamy caused by certain types of performance. In his *letras* — especially the *Supplicatio* and *Declaratio* — Guiraut demonstrates yet a further perspective, from an Occitan troubadour in a court with competing and varied performance practices, which may help further triangulate the courtly reality. His concerns over who can and should be called a *joglar* versus a *trobador*, are of use less as a direct reflection of reality than, as with examples taken from the *Partidas*, in a

negative sense: Guiraut's *letras* reflect what he fears will take away, his ability to find a *mercat* for his *mestier*.

While the legal texts sit outside the lyric milieu, they comment on it in several places. Two instances in particular, one in the first *Partida* and one in the seventh, offer specific condemnation for at least some *juglares*, a more general term for performers. The first is in 1.20.12, which discusses the paying of tithes when the money in question is earned illicitly: "*De quáles ganancias son tenudos los homes de dar el diezmo maguer las ganen maliciosamente.*" [Out of What Profits Men Are Required to Pay Tithes, Although They Obtain Them in An Evil Way.] (1.20.12). While tithes must be paid out of legitimate earnings, what about that which is *not* earned legitimately, or is earned in a way that is in and of itself sinful? Would that not implicate the church itself in those illicit, sinful actions? Along the way towards answering this question (sometimes yes, sometimes no), the law provides lists of the sorts of people, and activities, which raise doubts about whether or not money is owed to the church from those earnings. That class includes that which is earned by:

[...] guerra non derecha, ó de caza defendida, ó de robo, ó de furto, ó de simonia, ó de renuevo, ó de los que ganan los judgadores dando malos juicios, ó los abogados ó los personeros razonando pleitos tortilleros á sabiendas, ó los testigos firmando falso testimonio, ó los oficiales que son en las casas de los reyes ó de los otros señores que ganan ó toman algunas cosas de ls homes contra defendimiento de sus señores, ó lo que ganan **los juglares ó los remedadores**, ó los que juegan á tablas ó á dados, ó los adevinos, ó los sorteros, quier sean varones ó mugeres, ó lo que ganan las malas mugeres haciendo su pecado, et lo que llevan los homes poderosos de aquellos sobre quien han poder amenazándolos de manera que les han algo á dar por miedo que han dellos ó de qual manera otra quier semeiante destas que ganan los homes alguna cosa con pecado [...]

[...from unjust war; or from hunting which is forbidden; or from robbery, theft, simony, and waste; or where judges receive rewards for rendering wicked decisions, and advocates and attorneys obtain fees for knowingly conducting unjust lawsuits, or witnesses profit by giving false testimony; or where officers of the king's household, or of those of other lords, acquire or receive property from men contrary to the orders of their masters; or where money is obtained by the

devices of gamblers, counterfeiters, players of dice, or of draughts, diviners and fortune tellers, whether men or women; or where women of evil life gain by their sin; or where powerful men take from those over whom they have authority, by threatening them so that they have to give them something through the fear which they have of them, or in any other way whatever similar to these, by means of which men acquire property through sin...] (emphasis mine)

Critically, included in the Castilian is the class of “los juglares ó los remedadores” [the performers or imitators] which Scott’s English translation drops out. That is ultimately unsurprising, because as will be demonstrated below, the difficulty in understanding precisely what these terms means is precisely the concern for Guiraut that occasions his *letra* to Alfonso.

After listing these illicit ways to earn something of value, ranging from unjust war to gambling and prostitution, with performing somewhere in between, the law clarifies that if any of the above persons “fuese cristiano, ó judío, ó moro, ó herege,” [whether he be Christian, Jew, Moor, or heretic] gain *land* from such a practice, they *do* have to pay tithes on any earnings from that land. This is because the Church’s claim is not on the person or the sinful practice, but on the land itself. Then, there is a further complication that the law addresses: what about property that is not land (“otras cosas que non fuesen heredades” [other property, not immovable])? Here there are two types, one on which the previous holder of the property no longer has any claim and the other on which the previous owner *does* have a claim (i.e. something stolen); the first sort of property can have tithes paid on it, while the second cannot.¹⁹⁵

¹⁹⁵ That first it the, “cosa que pasa el señorío della al que la gana de guisa que aquel que ante la haber no finca demanda derecha contra él porque la pueda cobrar” [something whose ownership passes to him who acquires it, so that he who formerly owned it has no claim or right against the other by means of which he can recover it]. The secons is the “cosa que non pase el señorío della al que la gana si como de furto ó de robo” [something, the ownership of which does not pass to him who gains it, as, for instance, a theft or a robbery].

The first sort of property is that earned by performers and prostitutes, and the church *chooses* not to accept it lest it seem to approve of the activity in question. After all, they can wait until the person in question has moved beyond their sinful action to collect:

...et esto cae en **los juglares et en los remedadores** de las ganancias que facen por **sus joglerias et remedamientos**, et en las malas mugeres de lo que ganan con sus cuerpos. Ca maguer que tales mugeres como estas malamente lo ganan, pueedenlo recibir; pero la iglesia tovo por bien de non tomar el diezmo dellas sin de los desuso dichos en esta ley, porque non semeie que consiente en su maldat: et esto se entiende de mientras que vevieren en aquel pecado: ca despues se partieren dél, bien lo pueden tomar sin mala estancia.

[...This applies also to that which **gamblers and swindlers** obtain through **their gambling and swindling**; and likewise to what bad women gain by their bodies, for although women of this kind obtain money in an evil way, it may be accepted. The Church, however, deemed it proper not to receive tithes from them, nor from the others above mentioned in this law, in order that it may not appear that she consents to their wickedness. This is understood to be the case during the time they live in this sin, for after they abandon it tithes can be received from them without reproach.] (emphasis mine)

First, it is worth noting that “juglar” does not mean “gambler” and “remedador” does not mean “swindler.” The former is a performer, more generally, and the latter is someone who imitates. These categories will be explored further below as they relate to Iberian performance practice. Second, it is worth remembering that those who perform are equated with prostitutes who earn money illicitly by bodily means. This is an area of concern for Guiraut as well.

The same class of sinful action occurs again in the 7.6.4: “*Por quáles razones es el home enfamado por derecho, haciendo alguna cosa que non debe.*” [Concerning Infamous Conditions Caused by Law.] (7.6.4). It covers a much wider category of performers, and again, prostitutes:

Leno en latin tanto quiere decir den romance como alcahuete, et tal home como este quier tenga sus siervas ó otras mugeres libres en su casa mandádoles facer maldat de sus cuerpos por dineros, quier ande en otra manera por trujamania alcahoteando ó sosacando las mugeres para otro por algo que le den, es enfamado por ende. Otrosi son enfemados **los juglares, et los remedadores et los facedores de los zaharrones que públicamente antel pueblo cantan, ó baylan ó facen juegos por precio que les den: et esto es porque se envilecen ante**

todos por aquello que les dan. Mas los que tanxiesen estrumentos ó cantasen por solazar á sí mismos, ó por facer placer á sus amigos, ó dar alegría á los reyes ó á los otros señores, non serien por ende enfadamos. ...ca por qualquier destas razones sobredichas es el home enfamado tan solamente por el fecho, maguer non sea dada sentencia contra él, porque la ley et el derecho los enfama.

[*Lena*, in Latin, means, in Castilian, a procuress, and a woman of this kind who keeps slaves or free women in her house inducing them to commit wickedness with their bodies for the sake of money; or who goes about in some other way, acting as a broker and soliciting or enticing women for other persons in consideration of receiving something from them, becomes infamous for this reason. **Buffoons, mimics, and merry-andrews who wander around publicly among the people, and sing or make jests for a reward, are also infamous, and this is the case because they degrade themselves in the presence of all persons for a price which is paid them; but those who play upon instruments, or sing so as to com fort themselves, or give pleasure to their friends, or contribute to the entertainment of kings or other lords, shall not be considered infamous on this account.** ... On account of any of the reasons aforesaid a man becomes infamous solely by reason of his act, although no sentence may have been pronounced against him, because the law and justice render him so.]

The common factor here, and with most of the other categories listed, is the acceptance of money for a service performed with the body. As with so many of the laws in the *Partidas*, there are classes described, and then immediate exceptions. For instance: men who fight “wild beasts” or one another for money are made infamous because it indicates a lack of character; however, if a man fights someone to defend themselves or a friend, or they fight an animal to prove their strength, he will “ganarse prez de home valiente” [gain distinction as one who is brave and powerful].¹⁹⁶ Similarly there are distinctions in the “worth” of the sort of work done by performers (prostitutes have no such luck).

The key issue in the distinction between types of performers is the goal of the activity, those that do it “por precio que les den” [a price which is paid them] are infamous, while those

¹⁹⁶ I am thinking about issues around economic language in the *Partidas*, and beyond it in the Occitan, in conjunction with chapter three of Simone Pinet’s *The Task of the Cleric*, see esp. pp. 97-107.

that do so “por solazar á sí mismos, ó por facer placer á sus amigos, ó dar alegría á los reyes ó á los otros señores” [to comfort themselves, or give pleasure to their friends, or contribute to the entertainment of kings or other lords] are not. The list of such performers is also different. Among the infamous are “los juglares, et los remedadores et los facedores de los zaharrones” [[b]uffoons, mimics, and merry-andrews] who in public, in front of the people “cantan, ó baylan ó facen juegos” [sing or make jests]. Here, it is between the classes of people based on their professions and the specific actions they take in front of an audience. Scott sees three types of antiquated clowns or fools who “sing or make jests,” but the Castilian gives three specific terms that will be followed up on below in Guiraut’s *letras*: “juglares,” “remedadores,” and “facedores de los zaharrones.” If the next clause follows on the first, these classes: sing (“cantan”), dance (“baylan”) and, perhaps, make jests (“facen juegos”). But these, by virtue of taking what they can get from a crowd, “se envilecen ante todos” [degrade themselves in the presence of all persons]. Or, perhaps the degradation is what they *do* for the money, not unlike prostitution. Those, on the other hand who play instruments or sing in order to comfort themselves, please their friends, or bring happiness to the king or other lords, do *not* run the risk of infamy. What is the difference between these two groups of people and corresponding activities? Is it their audiences? The explicit need for remuneration? Here, Guiraut’s *letras* are telling.

THE *SUPPLICATIO* AND *DECLARATIO*

The texts now known best as the *Supplicatio* and *Declaratio* are representative of a group of works by Guiraut preserved in *chansonnier R*. It preserves what, in Joseph Linskill’s 1985 critical edition, are presented as fifteen works, ordered by Pillet and Carstens in alphabetical order (Riquier i, xvii). They are dated in their rubrics across a twenty year period, from around

1260 to 1280 (Cholakian 130). The letters, as Carlos Clavería outlines in an article on the subject, do not deviate much from the form of the epistle in classical Latin literature, like Cicero's or Horace's (125). Most importantly, the epistle was not only a method to communicate with someone somewhere else, it was an opportunity to give an opinion and to display one's rhetorical skill regarding a philosophical, scientific, or literary question (125).¹⁹⁷ In the verse epistle, then, just as in the compilatory work of the *Partidas*, there is room to pursue topics of interest and importance to those who stand behind the work in question. In both the *letras* and the *Partidas* alike, one of the striking elements is the combination of classical authorities and Iberian particulars. In the instances from the *Partidas* cited above, as well as in chapter four regarding *injuria* and Guillem de Berguedà, there is also a shared concern around the possible harm that can be done through linguistic means. In the laws just cited, the question is how one becomes “infamous” through the performance of certain practices, some of which are artistic or poetic performance. In the *letras* in general, both in and beyond those cited below, Guiraut displays a similar concern for the concept of *vergonha* — that is, in French “vergonne, honte, puduer” [shame, disgrace, modesty], or *verguenza* — as the *Partidas* do for the sort of *injuria* to one's *fama* that can be suffered through action or word (Raynouard, “vergonia” 508).

¹⁹⁷ As Clavería puts it:

No puede decirse que las epístolas de Guiraut Riquier se aparten en esencia de lo que la epístola llevaba en sí de la tradición clásica. En la carta Latina había más posibilidades que la de la simple narración o comunicación de cosas sucedidas a ausentes, algo que ultrapasaba lo meramente personal. La sistemática ciceroniana de comunicarse en suerte o en desgracia, de dar noticias y consuelo y consejos, y lo que la epístola de Horacio había conseguido, no son cosas diferentes de lo que Riquier se propone. La epístola fue también en la literatura clásica forma de expresión de temas filosóficos y de discusión de cuestiones científicas y literarias. Las epístolas poéticas de Riquier se conforman en forma y contenido a ese espíritu y a esas posibilidades. (125)

Perhaps most strikingly, the *letras* are markedly mercantile, concerned with the sort of compensation that could be earned for the kind of linguistic product of “craft” of which Guiraut possesses knowledge. They showcase a simultaneous disdain for certain kinds of profit seeking, while being very much concerned with, and engaged in, overtly market-centered thinking. Market, here, in the sense of the Occitan *mercat*, mentioned in this chapter’s title: first and foremost above the action of exchange, before it becomes the name of a place where such actions take place. As will be seen in the *letras* and the songs read after them, Guiraut uses the word, and its forms, in *both* ways. The concern around securing one’s material safety and livelihood is seldom far from his mind and is often evoked programmatically. In a corpus that seems much more cognizant of its own status as, potentially, a written object, this has interesting implications, especially around the changing linguistic technologies — and the knowledge of their use — at court at the time. In particular, the *letras* which are addressed to Alfonso, especially the *Supplicatio* and the *Declaratio*, which Guiraut composes in Alfonso’s voice, display a concern with the words used to describe the specific poetic practice that Guiraut is undertaking. He seeks to define it and to defend its particular value at the top of a hierarchy he constructs in relationship to it.

The *letras* do have a close relationship with the time Guiraut’s spent in Alfonso’s court. Over their span, a reader sees how Guiraut seeks. out, becomes a part of, and then abandons Alfonso’s court. Of the fifteen, seven have a more or less direct audience in Alfonso’s court, even before Guiraut is thought to have been a member of it. *Letras* II, VI, and VII are all addressed to Aimeric, the son of Amalric IV viscount of Narbonne.¹⁹⁸ The first, *letra* II (1265),

¹⁹⁸ It is worth noting that Amalric is an altered form of Manrique, because the counts of Narbonne are a branch of the Lara family — this relationship with the Castilian monarchy, along

indicates that it is to be sent to the court of Alfonso X, which he praises by noting that he knows of no other earthly king so worth service as Alfonso (vv. 30-40). In *letra* VI (1268) he again works praise of Alfonso (vv. 250-255) into a *letra* which is, otherwise, dedicated to extolling the virtues young prince Aimeric ought to be pursuing (Riquier 78). VII, called “novas” in the rubric which dates it to 1269, is a didactic work which details six specific kinds of *vergonha* [shame] (vv. 92-93), directed this time to Amalric IV, but it seems equally interested in addressing Alfonso, whom he calls “le paire de saber” [lord of knowledge] (v. 49). By *letra* IX, (1272), Linskill puts the troubadour in Alfonso’s court, and he argues it may represent an effort by Guiraut to formulate a short, verse version of a “mirror for princes” (Riquier 140). *Letra* X is dated to 1274, the same year as XI, the *Supplicatio* and *Declaratio*. These letters clearly exhibit the sort of agency outlined by Gell and Boutcher in chapter three.

The *Supplicatio* begins with the rubric “Aiso es suplicatio que fe Guiraut Riquier al rey de Castela per lo nom d[e] joglars l’an [MCC]LXXIII” [This is the supplication that Guiraut Riquier made of the king of Castile regarding the name of the *joglars* in the year of 1274], and runs to 863 lines, each of which aims for six syllables in rhymed couplets. As Jesús Rodríguez Velasco describes the *Supplicatio* and the response to it “representan la insatisfacción de un trovador ante la inexactitud del término de juglar” [they represent the dissatisfaction of a troubadour before the inexactitude of the term “joglar”] (43). The form of the *Supplicatio*, made up of twelve subsections, is split into an *exordium* (vv.1-107), *narratio* (108-673), *petitio* (vv. 674-799), and *conclusio* (800-863). In the *narratio*, as Linskill summarizes, Guiraut gives a long account of the six classes of man, until, around v. 528, he begins to turn towards his main

with Alfonso’s general reputation, may help explain the exact way in which he first travels to Alfonso’s court (Rodríguez Velasco 271).

concern: the confusion around just what practices ought to be referred to with the word “joglar,” arguing that this same classificatory principle ought to be applied to them as well.¹⁹⁹ The *petitio* argues that Alfonso is just the man for the job and that harm is done by lumping together such a diverse group of practitioners under one inadequate label. Finally, he recapitulates the argument again in the conclusion.

The *Declaratio*, dated to 1275, is almost certainly *not* written by Alfonso though it is put in his voice by Guiraut. It opens with the rubric “Declaratio que·l senher rei n’Afonso de Castela fe per la suplicatio que Guiraut Riqu(i)er fe per lo nom de joglar l’an MCCLXXV.” [*Declaratio* that the lord, King Alfonso of Castile made to the *Supplicatio* made for the name of the *joglar* in the year of 1275] (Riquier 221). It is split into six subsections that fit into three larger sections, running to only 393 lines. First the *exordium* (vv. 1-69) opens it; the *narratio* (vv. 70-197) recapitulates the argument of the *Supplicatio* before tackling the terminological situation as it stands in “Espanha”; the *dispositio* (vv. 198-322) proposes a new set of terms — *bufos*, then *joglars*, then *trobadors*, then finally *doctors de trobador*; and finally it finishes with a further recapitulation in the *conclusio* (vv. 323-393).

The easiest means of understanding these almost twelve hundred lines of verse is as an exercise in justifying the place of someone with Guiraut’s *mestier* at court, and his right to receive remuneration as such. It is also one of the clearest examples in Guiraut’s corpus of his efforts to portray his *knowledge*, which he is using as justification for compensation, rather than the bodily action of performance. His concern with names also echoes the *Partidas*, and Alfonso is an ideal audience (and mouthpiece) for such a rhetorical performance. All told, they certainly

¹⁹⁹ Linskill’s edition summarizes the contents of the *letra* and then a French translation after providing notes to the text. See pp. 167-220 for the *Supplicatio* and pp. 221-245 for the *Declaratio*.

speak to the “troubadour subject” that underlies and is produced by Guiraut’s corpus. But, in working through each text, there are many moments at which the strange, apparently contradictory relationship that exists between *mestier* and *mercat* is thrown into stark relief. The best place to begin is with Guiraut’s breakdown of the importance of names in general, and those of the classes of humanity in the *Supplicatio*. Indeed, as Cholakian points out in an overview of the *letras* in general, all of them are “(1) pleas for financial support and (2) involuted, if not ambiguous efforts to prove that the poet-correspondent deserves it” (Cholakian 130). As such, they deploy a particular *persona*, and construct a certain kind of troubadour subject, as was outlined in the previous chapter. It is also the case that, in casting the *Declaratio* in Alfonso’s voice, Guiraut crafts an Occitan lyric *persona* for the Wise King, to complement his Galician-Portuguese one in the *Cantigas*. After an overview of the different parts of the *Supplicatio* and then the *Declaratio*, the task here will be to examine: 1) the theory of naming that Guiraut is advancing, 2) its relationship to exchange or payment, and finally 3) the relationship of the theory advanced here and what it says about the reality of linguistic technology in Alfonso’s court in the decade of the 1270s. For both Alfonso and Guiraut, the author as one who oversees a *program* is clearly important, a figure that “authorizes” the actions performed by others. In adopting Alfonso’s voice, Guiraut is also showcasing the way his craft can “perform” that sort of “authority” as well.

Guiraut begins with a breakdown of the different classes of society, and the fact that each have particular “noms” [names].²⁰⁰ Among the diversity of men in society — women are not mentioned here — Guiraut names six types: “clergues e cavaliers, / borzes e mercadiers, /

²⁰⁰ Clavería points to a Latin poem collected in *Poésies populaires latines du Moyen âge* (1847) titled “Des diverses classes d’hommes” for a parallel to this project (10, n. 3).

menestrals e pages,” [clerics and knights, / townsfolk²⁰¹ and merchants, / craftsman and peasant]

(vv. 127-129). He then explains that:

A cascu establitz	(132)	[To each is established,
es, segon esser, noms		following their way of being, names
e diverses cognoms		and different special names
c’om enten e’n respon,	(135)	which they understand and (to which they) respond
per benessers que’y son		and that they relate to
o per diversitatz;		different classes or types to which they belong
et es de totz vertatz		and it is undeniable
que’ls volun possezir.	(139)	that all value having them.]

What is meant by “noms / e diverses cognoms” [names / and different special names] is made clear when he begins his analysis of a particular class, the first of which is the “clergues” [clergy]. While the pope and a parish priest could both be called “clerc,” Guiraut argues that there is a useful distinction between the two (vv. 172-243). The same is true for the “cavayers” (v. 244), which he covers in the next section (vv. 244-321). It is worth pausing over some of those lines establishing what amounts to the first tenant of this “theory” of names: “et es de totz vertatz / que’ls volun possezir” [and it is undeniable / that all value having them] (vv. 138-139). This notion of the value in possessing a name, and the idea of a name as proper to, and property of, a person or thing, is used throughout the rest of the *Supplicatio* and *Declaratio*.

The next pair of classes — “borzes e mercadiers” — are treated rather differently. The townspeople or middle-class, are not recognized as having specialized names, but rather as all belonging to one class, that is:

mas que son apelatz	(324)	[that they are not called
borzes tant solamen,		anything other than “bourgeois,”
que nulh avansamen		for the reason that no hierarchy
de noms entr’els non an.	(326)	of names exists among them]

²⁰¹ The French translation Linskill uses is “bourgeois,” and perhaps an English equivalent like “burgher” would work as well.

Their pair in the scholastic couplet, “mercadiers” have a clearer reason for their name:

Mercadiers per mercat es nomnatz enaisi, per qu’ es semblans a mi que tug son mercadier silh que no fan mestier mas sol comprar e vendre.	(378)	[Merchants for “market” are so called, because, it seems to me, that they are all mercenary and that they have not trade but only buying and selling]
	(383)	

He does distinguish between types, though not with a special name, between those merchants who stay in one place versus those who:

...fan viatje otra mar o en Fransa e van per esperansa de guzanh per lo mon, compran venden lai on meilhs podon lur pro far.	(392)	[...they travel overseas or in France and though go for the hope of profit through the world, they buy they sell that which can make them the most profit.]
	(397)	

Guiraut also uses the word *mercat* here in a way that will bear remembering below, when he explains, again, that merchants are those who live via selling and nothing else: “e venden en mercat, / c’ outras obras no fan” [and they sell at market / other works they do not] (vv. 419-420).

It is here that commerce, then, enters the picture for the first, but not last, time in the two sections of the *letra*. While the *borzes* are an undistinguished mass without hierarchy, the *mercadiers* are defined by the action they take that gives them their name: *mercat*. More specifically, they live to buy and sell, whether staying in one place or traveling overseas, to France (placing Guiraut in Castile), wherever the greatest profit can be made. It is hard not to read this take, programmatically, as describing a great deal of what it is that Guiraut himself is doing in his lyric, and in this *letra* in particular. This becomes even clearer when he addresses the performing crafts and class below. First, he addresses another pair of classes.

Artisans (“menestiers” (v. 452) and peasants (“pages” (v. 494)) come out much better overall than do middle-class townspeople and merchants. Artisans have multiple names that

match their specializations (“cascus per sel que fa” [each for that which they do] (v. 457)), but each understand the overall name (vv. 452-493). Peasants also have a range of responsibilities, but they all focus on their work:

per tot laboradors	(511)	[but all workers
boviers e fortjadors,		cowherds and excavators,
podadors, ortolas;		wine-growers, fruit-growers;
tug de cors e de mas		all by body and by hand
laboran per vertat.	(515)	they work truly.]

Here, however, Guiraut begins the next phase of this argument: while all these classes may contain various subcategories, the overall name still matches each member of a subcategory.

This is *not* the case, he will go on to argue for the name *joglar*.

In particular, the problem is that several different sorts of performers are referred to with the word *joglar*, and the reputation of each is dramatically different, according to Guiraut. This is also in accordance with the framework laid out in the laws from the *Partidas* cited above, where 1.20.12 cites the money earned by “los juglares ó los remedadores” as problematic for tithing. In Guiraut’s telling, the problem begins with the different sorts of practitioners who all get called “joglar” despite their differences. Some of those are the sort who barely know how to play an instrument, and, still worse, go about and demand money for their songs (vv. 562-569). The even *worse* practice, however, recalls law 7.6.4 from the *Partidas* even more directly:

o autre, ses razo,	(570)	[or others, without reason,
cantara per las plassas		will sing in the plazas
vilmen, et en gens bassas		vilely, and of base people
metra, queren, sa ponha,		will charge, demand, stress alms
en totas, ses vergonha,		of all, without shame,
privadas et estranhas,	(575)	known and unknown,
pueys ira·s n’en tavernas,		then they’ll go to a tavern
ab sol qu’en puesc’ aver;		then quickly give them all the coin they have;
e non auzan parer		and they won’t present themselves
en deguna cort bona.	(579)	to any good court.]

This sort of shameless commercial debasement — indiscriminate performance for money that is then spent to satisfy bodily urges — is the worst sort of person with whom a *joglar* who pursues noble ends could be confused. It is also very close to the problematic sort of performance covered in law 7.6.4, which specifically addresses the public nature of the performative debasement for money, which pushes on the fact that “se envilecen ante todos por aquello que les dan.” The issue, then, is twofold: 1) the different subcategories of *joglar* collapse into that single name, like the “borgues” (v. 652); and 2) that collapse reflects poorly on the whole class, because some who lack the appropriate skill and motivation — i.e. perform for money — end up tainting the whole pool.

The *Supplicatio* closes out with a summary of the case and a request for a response from Alfonso himself. In the process of doing so, Guiraut outlines his own theory of what it means to pursue his mestier correctly, that is, what it means to *trobar* in a way that is worthwhile and merits consideration from patrons:

Mas dels sabens ab sen	(740)	[But those who with knowledge and sense
que fan los bos trobars		make the beautiful compositions [<i>trobars</i>]
rete hom lurs cantars		men remember their songs
e als de ben que fan;		and the other good ones they do;
e val pueis atertan		and they're worth as much
per solatz e per sen	(745)	for their solace and sense
co se·i eran prezen,		as if they were present
ab tot que sian mort.	(747)	even after they are dead.]

The lasting strength of a song is its ability to persist in the memory beyond the death of the composer responsible for it. There is a directly stated goal for lyric's action on behalf of its composure, and presumably its patron as well. This is the same trait the Alfonso cites as a danger

of “cantigas” and “rimas” — especially when they are committed to writing — in law 7.9.3.²⁰²

Here, however, it functions in inverse fashion, as a positive attribute. Through the song’s persistence in the memory of other men, the results they cause — “solatz” and “sen” [“solace” (or “comfort”) and “sense”]. This is a far cry from the public debasement of the practice of the infamous *joglar* in the *Partidas* or decried above in the *Supplicatio*, but it points towards the harmful potential of this sort of linguistic object: it is, when well-wrought, a powerful tool for good, and when performed or crafted by the wrong sort, for the wrong ends, it can do harm.

But if the main crime of those called *joglars* despite their baseness is that they debase themselves for a financial reward for their work, even debasing themselves for it, Guiraut’s final conclusion makes a reader pull up short. The end of the *Supplicatio* declares that, if this epistle goes unanswered, Guiraut will have no choice but to make his living another way:

Car si no·s fai, jamai	(852)	[Because if it does not happen, never
no cug esser joglars,		I don’t think I’ll be able to continue being a <i>joglar</i>
tan m’es le mon amars		the world is bitter to me
car y cap aitals gens	(855)	because it includes people
que lunhs avansamens		that this recognition
no·i es datz a saber		is not given to those with knowledge
de trobar sert e ver		of <i>trobar</i> sure and true
de nom, don ai pezansa,		under this name, I have given thought,
e·n sofri malenansa	(890)	I have suffered malady,
tal que d’onor m’esquiva:		Such that I’ve given up honor:
donc pessarai co viva		I will therefore advise to live
estiers en calque guiza.	(893)	in another way of being.]

Here, he ties himself to his poetic practice, and begs a special designation that recognizes the value of his craft and makes up for the maladies he has suffered. It should be no surprise that, in crafting the response in the *persona* of Alfonso, Guiraut provides himself with just such a reply.

²⁰² See chapter four, esp. pp 114-17, which discusses the law entitled “De la desonra que faze un ome a otro por cantigas, o por rimas” [On the dishonor that one man does to another by song or by rhyme] (7.9.3).

In the *Declaratio*, Guiraut takes on the voice of Alfonso X, deploying a highly recognizable *persona* that is perfectly suited to the task he has set for the king: judging the value of the musical and poetic practice of *joglar* and *trobar*. The date is later, the year 1275 is in the *letra* itself (vv. 27-28), and its specific references to Iberian performance practice, especially the specific “noms” he gives, has led some²⁰³ to think the *letra* might have been based on conversations between the troubadour and the troubadour-king. The way in which “Alfonso” introduces himself, however, recalls the formula of the chancery at the time, as Linksill points out, summarizing the scholarly consensus on the point (Riquier 232). It is, then, the *persona* of the king rather than the king himself speaking — a different sort of “troubadour subject” — and Guiraut clearly stands behind him:

per gracia de Dieu	(33)	[by grace of God
e per lo plazer sieu		and by his pleasure am I
reys regnans de Castela,	(35)	reigning King of Castile
e reys per que·s capdela		and the King by whom are ruled
Toleta e Leos,		Toledo and Leon,
Gallisia e·l bos		Galicia and the noble
regne de Cibilia		Kingdom of Sevilla
de Cordoba, de Murcia,	(40)	of Córdoba, of Murcia,
d’Algarbi, de Geyan:		of the Algarve and of Jaén:
per so que soplecan		for this which was requested
nos mes denan l’autrier		not long ago by
temens, Guiraut Riquier		humbly, Guiraut Riquier
per lo noms de joglars,	(45)	on the name of <i>joglars</i>]

This formula does a few things. First, it recalls the sort of territorial claims that a troubadour like Guillem de Berguedà makes by producing a kind of space with the lyric, recalling specific places the delimit one’s holdings. Second, with the space of his kingdom brought to mind, it conjures up a version of “Alfonso X” as *persona* that exists externally to the king himself — this chancery

²⁰³ Ramón Menéndez Pidal points to Mila i Fontanals as an example, though he himself thinks it is purely Guiraut’s work. See pp. 10-12 of *Poesía juglaresca*.

formula is not unlike a seal on the *letra* itself, which, in attempting to guarantee its “authenticity” in fact reveals its artifice. Then, finally, it links Guiraut with all that came before it, with the breadth of the kingdom that stands behind Alfonso who is, following the logic of the incident that the *letra* sets up, taking up the topic of Guiraut’s *Supplicatio*. It is a doubly legitimating gesture.

The response of the *Declaratio* itself, which runs to only about half the length of the *Supplicatio*, is straightforward, ultimately providing a hierarchy of lyric craft and performance at which, surprising no one, Guiraut’s vision comes out on top. But before that, the voice of the *Declaratio* runs through a series of explanations of the diversity of names that are used in Castile to describe lyric and related performance practices, explaining both what those names are, what they describe, and sometimes where they came from. Some of the etymologies are creative, but the resulting list of terms has been a topic of interest to most every scholar of the troubadours in Iberia, as well as those with an interest in verse practices in the peninsula in general, because of the particularity of the language used. He starts with a false etymology for the word *joglar*, then details those words used in Spain, along with a couple of names used elsewhere (France and Italy):

<p>car tug li esturmen <i>instrumenta</i> dig so; e donc qui·l nom espo de joglars d’estruments, d’aqui es dissendens, e son <i>istriones</i>: e son <i>inventores</i> dig tug li trobador.</p>	<p>(130)</p> <p>(137)</p>	<p>[because all the instruments are called <i>instrumenta</i>; and so that the name I expect of <i>joglars</i> of instruments is from here descended, and they are called <i>istriones</i> and <i>inventores</i> they are all called <i>trobador</i>. ... Other names they have here according to romance so the men, great or small, they believe it right to refer to everything with <i>joglar</i>:</p>
<p>[...] D’autres noms a prezen n’i a segon romans, que·ls homes, paucx o grans, los sabon dreg nomnar, ab tot son dig joglar:</p>		

so son tragitador e contrafazedor e d'autres atressi. [...]	(157)	those that are illusionists and mimics [counterfeiters/imitators] and others like them.
Pero adhordenat es pro ben en Espanha, e no volem que·s franha, mas diga·s com se ditz, c'assatz es ben partitz per cognoms lurs afars: hom apela <i>joglars</i> totz cels dels esturmens, et als contrafazens ditz hom <i>remendadors</i> , e ditz als trobadors <i>segriers</i> per totas cortz, et homes secx e sortz endreg de captenh bo, que dizon ses razo o fan lur vil saber vilmen ses tot dever per vias e per plassas e que menon vils rassas a dishonor viven, ditz hom per vilzimen <i>cazueros</i> ab vertat Aisi es acorsat per Espanha de dir, per que pot hom chاوزir als noms, que sabon far. Pero tug son joglar apelat en Proensa,	(162)	... But ordered well are things in Spain and we don't want it to change but express ourselves as now, because they are well distinguished by special names the activities men call <i>joglars</i> all those with instruments and the mimics they call <i>remedadores</i> , ²⁰⁴ and they call <i>trobadors</i> <i>segriers</i> in all the courts and the men that are blind and deaf when it comes to propriety and declaim without reason or use their vile knowledge ignobly in front of everyone on the roads or in plazas and who frequent base groups and in dishonor live they are called dishonorably, and correctly, <i>cazueros</i> . So currently it is said in Spain and so men are able to discern through their names, what men do. But all are <i>joglar</i> called in Provence, (vv.162-189)]
	(183)	

The etymology of *joglar* is not from the Latin “histrion” [actor] as is suggested in the *letra*, but rather the term “iocularis” [jocular, laughable] (Lewis and Short, “Histrion, onis”; Lewis and Short, “Jocularis”; “Joglar”). Framing it that way, however, linking performance with an

²⁰⁴ While the Occitan “remendadors” suggests the idea of fixing or restoring something (from the Castilian “remendar”) Menéndez Pidal renders it as “remedadores” and compares it to the use of “remedillo” in the *Cantigas* (Menéndez Pidal 22).

instrument to the idea of performance in general, rather than the invention or creation of the troubadour proper, represents a loaded perspective.

The move from Latin to the vernacular lays out rather plainly the conflicting linguistic registers at work in the context of Iberia in the thirteenth century, much as happens in the *Partidas*. The court was no exception to this, and indeed, these different registers — the classical Latin that begins the response, and the vernacular that ends up occupying the majority of the body of the *letra* — are each linguistic technologies of the sort defined above, here being marshalled here for overlapping, but distinct purposes. It begins with Latin, a language of learned authority, and then it will continue with the *problems* caused by the use of “romans” which do not have the clarity of distinction that Latin does.²⁰⁵

The key section here, then, breaks down several names from “Espanha” that have been of subsequent interest to plenty of scholars making an effort to better understand the variety of lyric and performative practice in the peninsula in the middle ages. Those words are *remedador*, which occurred in the *Partidas* as well, along with *segrier* and *cazuro* — along, of course with *joglar* and *trobador*. The first, *remedador*, is a performer who practices a kind of imitation — “imitar o contrahacer” [imitate or counterfeit] as Menéndez Pidal puts it (22) — and is separated from the category of *joglar*. The *segrier* is described as a kind of itinerant troubadour, which Menéndez Pidal argues is actually a reference to a kind of intermediate figure between *joglar* and *trobador* in the Galician-Portuguese tradition (there called a “*segrer*” or “*segrel*”) (16). The final term, *cazuro*, refers to those who do tricks, physical performers of sort, whether with animals, puppets, or on their own, and Riquier wishes to avoid confusing troubadours with them

²⁰⁵ It should be noted again, however, that the given Latin etymologies are spurious, while the *letra* is written in one Romance vernacular, and takes as its subject the use of names in yet another two (Castilian and possibly Galician-Portuguese as well, as will be documented below).

via the term *joglar*. In Spanish, they would be called *zaharrones* or *zamarrones*, as Menéndez Pidal summarizes the varied uses of the term, and its likely Hispanoarabic etymological origins.²⁰⁶ *Caçurro*, as Menéndez Pidal renders it, “designa a un juglar de ínfama clase” [designates a *juglar* of infamous class] and may have an Arabic origin as well (“qadzur ‘sucio,’ ‘indecente’” [qadzur ‘dirty,’ ‘indecent’]) (230). He also points to a mention of the practice in the *Libro de Buen Amor*.²⁰⁷

After detailing all the sorts of bad actions that get labeled, improperly, as *joglaria*, Guiraut moves on to what the classifications *ought* to be, ultimately outlining a schema that has four levels: *bufos*, *joglar*, *trobador*, and finally *doctor de trobar*. He begins by invoking the Italian word “bufos” before moving on to define the other categories:

hom los apel <i>bufos</i> ,	(220)	men they call <i>bufos</i> (clowns)
co fa en Lombardia		like they do in Lombardy (Italy).
E silh c’ap cortezia		and those who have the trait of courtliness
et ab azaut saber		and the adequate knowledge
se sabon captener		and know to comport themselves
entre las ricas gens,	(225)	among the good people, (<i>ricas gens</i>)
per tocar extrumens,		whether playing instruments,
o per novas comtar		or reciting <i>novas</i>
d’autri, o per cantar		composed by others, or by singing
autrus vers e cansos,		others’ <i>vers</i> and <i>cansos</i> ,
o per d’autres faitz bos	(230)	or other compositions that
e plazens per auzir,		are pleasant to listen to,
podon ben possezir		they are able to possess
aquel nom de joglar.	(233)	the name <i>joglar</i> .
[...]		...
sian <i>joglar</i> nomnat	(238)	they are called <i>joglar</i>
aquist, car per dever		those, because they must rightly
devon en cort caber	(240)	stand in court and find a place
et esser benanan;		and they live well;
car mot gran mestier an		because there is a great task (<i>mestier</i>)
en las cortz aitals gens,		in the court for these people,
car motz recreamens		because much leisure

²⁰⁶ See pp. 18-21.

²⁰⁷ In “coplas 114-120,” see Menéndez Pidal, pp. 231-233 specifically, and pp. 230-239 more generally regarding the category.

aportan e plazers.	(245)	they bring, and pleasure.
E sels on es sabers		And that is their knowledge
de trobar motz e sos,		of composing (<i>trobar</i>) words and melody,
d'aquels mostra razos		of those that show reason
com los deu hom nomnar:		so such men should be called:
car qui sap dansas far	(250)	because they know how to do/perform <i>dansas</i>
e coblas e baladas		and <i>coblas</i> and <i>baladas</i>
d'auzaut maistreiadas,		and they practice other arts,
albas e sirventes,		<i>albas</i> and <i>sirventes</i> ,
gen e be razos es		it is right and reasonable
c'om l'apel <i>trobador</i> ;	(255)	that one calls them <i>trobador</i> ;
e de aver honor		and he must be honored
per dreg mais de joglar,		more so than the <i>joglar</i>
c'us autres se pot far		because another can make himself
joglars ab so saber.	(259)	<i>joglar</i> with their compositions (<i>saber</i>)
[...]		...
E dizem que·ls melhors,	(296)	And we declare that the best ones
que sabon essengar		who know how to teach
com se deu capdelar		as we have said above
corts e faitz cabalos		lessons and noble actions
en vers et en cansos	(300)	in <i>vers</i> and in <i>cansos</i>
et en autres dictatz		and in other compositions (<i>dictatz</i>)
c'avem deus nomnatz		they must be named accordingly
deu hom per dreg dever		these men by right
nomnar, e per saber,		they are called, for their knowledge
don <i>doctor de trobar</i> .	(305)	gentlemen <i>doctor de trobar</i> .

Guiraut, here, slots the low sort of performance practice that some of the Iberian names might map onto, to the “bufons” from Lombardy. Then, he establishes an ordered hierarchy of the performers and/or composers, of different sorts of verse that are worthy of the time, attention, and compensation, of those noble sorts — “ricas gens” (v. 225). First are the *joglars*, then the *trobadors*, and finally a seemingly new category, the *doctor de trobar*. As one climbs each rung of Guiraut’s proposed socio-poetic ladder, the difference is in the “saber” of the person in question. First, there are the *joglars*, of the right sort now that the previous thousand lines of the *Supplicatio* and now *Declaratio* have explained, who have three characteristics: 1) “cortezia” or courtliness, 2) the “auzautz saber” [adequate knowledge] of their craft, and 3) that “sabon captener” [know how to comport themselves] in the setting (vv. 223-225). All of this is before

the question of what they actually do is laid out: they play instruments and tell *novas*, or they sing *vers* and *cansos*; but crucially, these are the *novas* “d’autri” [of others] and “autrus” *cansos* and *vers* [others’]. This is to say, their *mestier* is not composition: they do not stand behind their own work.

This relationship between worthy *mestier* and the ability to fully master the craft in question, is underscored in the descriptions that “Alfonso” then gives. First, the *trobador*: “E sels on es sabers / de trobar motz e sos” [And that is their knowledge / of composing (*trobar*) words and melody] (vv. 246-247). They are able to find and assemble those words and sounds across a range of forms: *dansas*, *coblas*, *baladas*, *albas*, and *sirventes* (vv. 250-253). But, as “Alfonso” then lays out, they ought to be held in higher esteem than the *joglar*, not only because of the range of types of song they can perform, but because those songs are the product of *their* craft. They deserve more honor than the *joglar* “c’us autres se pot far / joglars ab so saber” [because another can make himself / *joglar* with their compositions (*saber*)] (vv. 258-259). One can perform the actions necessary to earn the name *joglar*, on the basis of the knowledge and body of work (*saber*) of another.

If that knowledge and craft are what deserve the recognition, then those that can instruct others in the way of doing such things, what “Alfonso” calls “don *doctor de trobar*” [gentleman doctors of *trobar*] (v. 305), deserve the highest status of all. Here, it is because these practitioners not only have the requisite *saber*, but they “sabons essenhar” [they know how to teach] (v. 297). But what do they teach exactly? “Alfonso” describes it as “corts e faitz cabalos” [lessons and noble actions] (v. 300) in *vers*, *cansos*, and *dictatz*, the last of which is a more general term for compositions (vv. 301-302). The most common interpretation for commentators had been that these doctors are teaching composition, but it seems as plausible that they are also putting moral

or ethical lessons and noble deeds into verse. Their special gift, then, is that they know how to use the craft of musical and poetic composition to its best ends: to improve their audiences.

It seems obvious, however, that the framework that Guiraut presents here in Alfonso's voice should be taken as evidence of the concerns of the "last" troubadour, and as a "mirror" of courtly reality only in the way a "mirror for princes" might be. Even leaving aside the infamous performance practices, the body of lyric produced in Iberia in the latter half of the thirteenth century is too broad and diverse to fit under such a carefully wrought system of names. Here, an attempt to neatly categorize meets a too messy reality. *Mestier* is a key concern for Guiraut. Since Guiraut invokes the administrative formula of the chancery in the *Declaratio*, it shows how, as the exercise of authority comes to be more and more frequently mediated by a range of new, competing, linguistic technologies, those with the *mestier* to make use of those mediating technologies gain new authority of their own. At least, so they hope.

In the *Supplicatio*, Guiraut reserves his highest scorn for those performers who debase themselves in public indiscriminately for money, for the *borzes*, and to a lesser but still present degree for the merchants. In each case, what he deems improper in their behavior is an unhealthy focus on material reward at the expense of all else. The *Declaratio* outlines an ordered courtly musico-poetic universe in which those with the skill of highest valued are accorded the most honor. But as is already apparent in the *Supplicatio*, that honor has material dimensions as well. If he receives no answer from Alfonso, Guiraut claims, he will have to find another way of living (vv. 892-893). Even with this "answer" in hand, and his status "guaranteed," Guiraut eventually left Alfonso's court anyway. In that move away, back across the Pyrenees, he would go on to compose songs that continue his focus on *mercat* as an area of concern. Even when done for

humorous effect, it underlines the serious nature of the concern of the troubadour for the possibility, or lack thereof, of finding a market for their craft.

GUIRAUT'S LAST *PASTORELA*

Bossy sums up the critical opinion of Guiraut's *pastorelas* with the claim that "Guiraut Riquier's six *pastorelas* are his best appreciated works" ("Twin Flocks" 149). Bossy, however, pushes back against the critical consensus which has tended to approach the songs, regardless of theoretical approach, as "a complete, self-contained cycle of lyrics" and additionally as a lyric unit "quite distinct and independent from the rest of Riquier's corpus of works" ("Twin Flocks" 149). It is evident that the "*pastorela* cycle" displays a close degree of continuity, both "narrative and thematic" ("Twin Flocks" 149); however, when read as an integrated part of Guiraut's lyric, a different view emerges, one that is simultaneously erotic and programmatic. The *pastorelas*, which span from 1260 to 1282, show the troubadour, named Guiraut Riquier in the songs, meeting the same shepherdess, and eventually her daughter as well, through the phases of their lives (Riquier, *Los trovadores* 1611–12). In each song, he makes advances towards her, and in each case, she mocks him for it, recalling Marcabru's first instance of the genre more than a century before. But by the time of the last *pastorela*'s composition, dated to 1282, with Guiraut having left the court of Alfonso sometime around the end of 1279, he finds the shepherdess and her daughter in a new situation: they are "ostaleyras" [inkeepers] (v. 4).

As with all the *pastorelas*, and his work more generally, Guiraut is pursuing two ends at once: one erotic and the other programmatic. As Bossy summarizes it, he projects the erotic desire of the "poet-lover...onto the figure of the witty, elusive shepherdess" at the same time that he reflects "the poet-craftsman's longing to master an ideal poetic form" ("Twin Flocks" 150). It

is clear from the first of the six, where Guiraut declares: “Toza, mot m’agrada / quar vos ay trobada, / si·us puesc azautar” [Young girl, I’m so glad / to have [*trobar*] you, / especially if I can please you” (vv. 21-23).²⁰⁸ Here, as Bossy points out, *trobar* functions in two ways at once: it means that Guiraut is glad to have “found” the girl, at the same time, he is glad to have “composed” her, referencing his own poetic activity (“Twin Flocks” 151).²⁰⁹ This recalls the reading of Raimbaut’s *EL* in chapter three as well.

This sixth *pastorela* begins by stating where it takes place “A Sant pos de Tomerais” [At Saint-Pons-de-Thomières] (= > *A Sant Pos*) and describing an encounter between the troubadour and two women he does not know. As the last in the sequence, it has been some twenty-two years since the date of the first encounter between the troubadour and the shepherdess. Here, he meets here with her daughter, now mostly grown, but, as mentioned above, he finds that she is a shepherdess no longer:

<p>A Sant pos de Tomeiras vengui l’autre dia de plueja totz mullatz, en poder d’ostaleyra, qu’ieu no conoyssia; ans fuy meravelhatz per que·l viella rizia qu’a la jove dizia auau calque solatz; mas quasqua·m fazia los plazers que sabia</p>	<p>(1)</p> <p>(5)</p> <p>(10)</p>	<p>At Saint-Pons-de-Thomières the other day, soaked from the rain, I came to a place two landladies owned, whom I didn’t recognize; but I was puzzled because the old one laughed and to the young one said something that amused her; but each made me comfortable, as she knew how,</p>
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²⁰⁸ Based on Bossy, translation modified (Bossy, “Twin Flocks” 150–51).

²⁰⁹ Overall, the *pastorelas* serve an important supplementary role to the *canso-vers* sequence they follow in the manuscript. Bossy argues that the main sequence has a design that “is almost architectural,” and the six song sequence of the *pastorelas* continues the multiples of three that underlie the whole of Guiraut’s corpus (Bossy, “Twin Flocks” 152–53). Bossy uses a simile to describe the *libre* as being like “a Gothic nave for a cathedral” where “descending vault ribs meet and are bound together to form a sequence of pillars” (Bossy, “Twin Flocks” 153). Following this metaphor, he argues, the *pastorelas* form “a Gothic transept or aisle which closely matches the major proportions and rhythms of the cathedral nave” and indeed, helps clarify that overall structure (“Twin Flocks” 171).

- tro fuy gent albergatz,
que agui sovinensa
del temps que n'es passatz
e cobrey conoyssensa
de·l vielha, de que·m platz. (15)
- E dissi·l “Voz etz selha
que ja for bergeira,
e m'avetz tant trufat.”
Elha·m dis, non pas felha,
“Senher, mais guerreira
no·us serai per mon grat.”
“Pro femna, de maneira
tal vos vey segon teyra
qu'esser deu chastitat.”
“Senher, s'ieu fos leugeira
non a trop qu'en carreira
fuy de trobar mercat.”
“Pro femna, per aizina
fon dich d'ome cochat.”
“Senher, ans suy vezina
d'est amic non amat.” (20)
- “Pros femna, d'aital toza
cum vos deu amaire
fort esser dezirans.”
“Senher Dieus! Per espoza
Mi vol, mas del faire
no suy ges acordans.”
“Pros femna, de maltraire
vos es ben temps d'estraire,
si es hom benanans.”
“Senher, assatz ad aire
pogram viure; mas paire
lo sai de ·VII· efans.”
“Pros femna, gent servida
seretz per sos filhs grans.”
“Senher, ja·n suy marida
q'un no n'a de ·X· ans.” (25)
- “Na Femna descenda,
de mal etz estorta,
e peitz anatz sercan.”
“Senher, ans suy membrada,
que·l cor no m'i porta
si que·n fassa mon dan.” (30)
- so I had quite good lodgings.
Then I began to remember
back to an earlier time,
and I recalled that
old lady, with pleasure.
- And I said to her, “You're the one
that used to be a shepherdess
and made fun of me all the time.”
And she said, without spite,
“Lord, I won't be your enemy
anymore, not willingly.”
“My good woman, the way
you always are when I see you
you deserve to be told a thing or two.”
“Lord, I may have been carefree once,
but it's not been long since
I was on the point of making a deal.”
“Good woman, you said that to comfort
some tormented man.”
“Lord, I'm his neighbor
of this friend I don't love.” (35)
- “Good woman, for a young girl
like you a lover
must be full of desire.”
“Lord God, he wants me
for his wife. But for that marriage
business, my heart isn't in it.”
“Good woman, you've had a hard life
this is your chance to get out of it,
if he's well-to-do.”
“Lord, we could live quite
comfortably, but the fact is,
he's got seven kids.”
“Good woman, the older ones
will help you.”
“Lord, I'm sorry to say,
he doesn't even have one ten years old.” (40)
- “My mad woman,
you get pulled out of one mess,
and you go looking for a worse one.”
“Lord, no, I'm just using my head
so that I don't get carried
away by my feelings and get hurt.” (45)

- “Pros femna, via torta
 querez, don seretz morta,
 so·m pes, enans d’un an.”
 “Senher, ve·us qui·m coforta,
 quar de mon gauge s porta,
 selha que·ns es denan.”
 “Pros femna, vostra filha
 es, segon mon semblan.”
 “Senher, pres de Ilha
 no stobes vos antan.”
- (55) “Good woman, your taking
 the wrong road, it’ll kill you
 in a year, and that makes me sad.”
 “Well, my lord, here is my comfort,
 the gate to my joy,
 this girl before you.”
 “Good woman, your daughter,
 I presume.”
 “Lord, you found us once,
 near l’Isle Jourdain.”
- (60)
- “Pros femna, doncx emenda
 convenra que·m fassa
 per vos de motz pezars.”
 “Senher, tant o atenda
 qu’a sso marit plassa,
 pueys faitz vostres afars.”
 “Pros femna, no·us espassa
 enquers, e dura·us massa
 maishuey vostre trufars.”
 “En Guiraut Riquier, lassa
 suy quart ant seguetz trassa
 d’aquestz leugiers chantars.”
 “Pros femna, quar vilheza
 vos a faitz chans amars.”
 “Senher, de vos se deza
 tant qu’als vielhs non etz pars!”
- (65) “My good woman, in that case
 it is only right that *she* make
 amends for many griefs you’ve given me.”
 “Lord, let her just wait
 till her husband consents,
 then go right ahead.”
 “Good woman, you haven’t stopped it
 yet, to go right on
 laughing at me.”
 “En Guiraut Riquier, I’m sad
 because you follow the path
 of those foolish songs.”
 “Good woman, you say that because old age
 has sung some bitter songs to you.”
 “Lord, it keeps away from you so well,
 you don’t look at all like the other old men.”
- (70)
- (75)
- (80)
- “Pros femna, de mal dire
 no·m feratz temensa,
 mas aisso solatz par.”
 “Senher, ges no m’albire
 que ma malsabensa
 vos saubessetz pessar.”
 “Pus e vostra tenensa
 suy, ben devetz sufrensa
 de tot ab mi trobar.”
 “Senher, ges no m’agensa
 qu’ie·us diga ren per tensa,
 ni·us fassa malestar.”
 “Dona, ja no poiariatz,
 quar no us puesc desamar.”
 “Senher, quant o faraitz,
 ye·us vuelh totz temps honrar.”
- (85) “Good woman, none of your harsh words
 could make me afraid
 but now you are jesting.”
 “Lord, I really don’t think
 you could have the slightest
 idea how displeased I am.”
 “I’m a guest in your
 house, you have to take
 whatever I say.”
 “Lord, I don’t get any pleasure
 out of picking a quarrel with you,
 or making you uncomfortable.”
 “Madame, you couldn’t do either,
 because I cannot fall out of love with you.”
- (90)
- (95) “Lord, when you do just that,
 I want to honor you always.”
- “Al pro Comte agensa
- “The noble count of Astarac,

<p>d'Astrac nostra tensa, Dona, qu'om deu lauzar." "Senher, sa grans valensa lo fai ab bevolensa a totas gens nomnar." "Dona si'l sa veritatz, saubessetz l'amparar?" "Senher, ben auziriatz que n'ay en cor a far." (Goldin 318–25)</p>	<p>(100)</p> <p>(105)</p>	<p>whom everyone should praise, Madame, will be amused by our little quarrel." "Lord, because of his great worth people say his name with much love." "Madame, if you saw him right here, would you know how to welcome him?" "Lord, you'd find out what it's in my heart to do for him."</p>
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This encounter should be read, as Bossy suggests, in two ways simultaneously: it is a humorous song about the maladies of *fin'amor*, and it is a clear comment on Guiraut's own *mestier* and his ability to "close a deal."

To give the song a purely narrative reading, it unfolds as follows: Guiraut Riquier (v. 74), encounters two women at an inn where he is staying. At first, he does not recognize them, but then realizes that they are the woman he has been sparring with for twenty years, and her daughter, now grown. They are, "oysteleras" [innkeepers] at Saint-Pons-de-Thomières, a town near Narbonne. The setting of the song is the inn itself. In the second *cobla*, Guiraut, tells the former shepherdess that, despite her protests, she has to listen to what he has to say. Then, she says that she was, in fact, recently on the point of agreeing to a proposal of marriage — "fuy de trobar mercat" [I was on the point of making a deal] (v. 27) Guiraut encourages this, continuing now in the third *cobla*, but she says that, not only does she not love her suitor, he is also inadequate: he has seven children. When Guiraut says that at least some of the older ones will be able to help her care for the others, she reveals that they are all under ten years old.

In the fourth *cobla*, Guiraut changes terms of address — from "Pros femna" [Good woman] to "Na Femna descenda" [My mad woman] (v.33, v. 49) — cautioning that she's gotten herself into a tough spot (vv. 49-51). When she responds she's just avoiding the damage that following her heart could cause, Guiraut says she'll be dead within the year (vv. 52-57). Her

response is that she is comforted by the presence of her daughter, whom Guiraut has met before, referencing the location of one of their past meetings (vv. 58-64). Guiraut then, in the fifth *cobla*, turns his amorous attention to the daughter, before the “pros femna” responds with a joke: let’s wait to see what her (the daughter’s) husband says (vv. 65-71). While Guiraut protests that she hasn’t stopped mocking him as she’d promised to, the former shepherdess responds, naming him directly, and decrying the fact that he has continued to “sequetz trassa / d’asquetz leugiers chantars” [follow the path / of those foolish songs] (vv. 75-76). They then trade some barbs about age and the passage of time (vv. 76-80). In the next *cobla*, the sixth of seven, Guiraut makes a demand of his hostess: no matter her dislike for him, he is her guest, and she must put up with whatever it is he has to say, and he can’t help but love her. The song ends with a final *cobla* that lets the woman shut down Guiraut one last time while praising a new patron the “Comte...d’Astrac” [Count of Astarac] (vv. 97-98).

What this reading misses is the rich programmatic dimension of the song, and the way in which it showcases Guiraut’s lasting concern around the link between *mestier* and *mercat*. Read programmatically, the song begins with an expression of Guiraut’s inability to find an adequate patron. As established by Bossy in reference to the first of Guiraut’s *pastorelas*, the “domna” here can be seen as a stand in for the troubadour’s song at times. In the second *cobla*, when she claims she was about to “make a deal” (“de trobar mercat”) this becomes clearer. Guiraut encourages this, but ultimately when Guiraut realizes the inadequacy of this suitor/patron, his response is anger and despair, and in doing so he expresses concern for his current ability to find support, as well as for his work’s quality and longevity. He not only calls her “Na Femna descenda” [My mad woman] (v. 49) as mentioned above, but says she won’t live another year. If this is to be taken as a bit of self-judgment of his own craft, it’s a grim one. But here the woman

responds in a way that suggests something hopeful, reminiscent of the highest purpose of *trobar* that Guiraut mentions in the *Supplicatio*: “ve·us qui·m coforta, / quar de mon gauge s porta, / selha que·ns es denan.” [here is my comfort, / the gate to my joy, / this girl before you.] (vv. 58-60). Guiraut’s highest praise for a troubadour is that they had the ability to, with their songs, to make it seem as though “co se·i eran prezen, / ab tot que sian mort.” [as if they were present / even after they are dead] (vv. 58-60). Here, the “good woman” looks to her own daughter as a guarantee that she will live on past death.

Is this simply an endorsement of the quality of Guiraut’s own lyric? An implication that his songs will beget others — a new kind of agency? Ultimately, the next *cobla* undercuts the message at the same time that it brings the cycle of *pastorelas* to a close, all while promising more. Instead of taking note of the woman’s wise observation, Guiraut uses this as a chance to make advances towards her daughter, only to be shut down again by the former shepherdess who notes that he is still being led astray by the foolishness of love lyric (vv. 75-76). Then, Guiraut doubles down, and in doing so, he hammers home the understanding of this song as one that is equally focused on the reception he believes he deserves in exchange for his craft. Guiraut demands that the woman put up with him because he is her guest: “Pus e vostra tenensa / suy, ben devetz sufrensa / de tot ab mi trobar.” [I’m a guest in your / house, you have to take / whatever I say.] (vv. 87-89). This suggests an interesting relationship between the *tenensa* and the obligation to receive whatever the guest *trobar*. The suggestion seems to be that a host must accept that which is given to them, and the guest ought to receive some satisfaction for it in exchange. After all, that act, *trobar*, is meant to be a powerful one.

CONCLUSION

This ought to be kept in mind whenever Guiraut’s lyric is presented too straightforwardly. It is a corpus in which the “troubadour subject” standing behind it *seems* closer to the reader, but is still shrouded in layers of mediation that make it difficult to access with any certainty. As much as Guiraut is concerned with love, or politics, or the Virgin, he seems to be equally interested in guaranteeing for himself the possibility of receiving something in exchange for exercising his craft.

This is one of the reasons Guiraut’s works — and Guiraut as a “troubadour subject” — have been described as “late” or defined by their “lateness,” reflecting a position that he stakes out for himself. One song that looks directly at that theme comes at the end of his main lyric sequence in *C* after he leaves Alfonso’s court: *Be·m degra de chanter tener* [I should abstain from singing] (=> *Be·m degra*) (1292). Rather than sing to a lady, he instead expresses his sadness at the state of his art’s audience: the past was better, and the future seems bleak. He ends the second *cobla* with the declaration that “mas trop suy vengutz als derriers.” [But I have come too late.] (v. 16) Then he describes what he means in the third:

<p>Qu’er non es grazitz lunsh mestiers menhs en cort que de belh saber de trobar; qu’auzir e vezer hi vol hom mais captenhs leugiers e critz mesclatz ab dezonor; quar tot, quan sol donar lauzor es al pus del tot oblidat, que·l mons es guays totz en barat. (Goldin 324–27)</p>	<p>(17) For now no craft is less esteemed at court than the beautiful mastery of <i>trobar</i>, because they notice (20) nothing there but their shrieks of dishonor. The things the court would once applaud are all forgotten now, (24) for all the world exults in fraud.</p>
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This song is often taken as a sign that Riquier understands his place as one witnessing the sad decline of a once great artistic tradition, but he is hardly the first to make that rhetorical move. What’s more, after this stanza, he takes a religious turn, addressing God, the peril of Muslims overrunning Christian forces, before finally turning to the Virgin for “pietat” [pity] and to Christ for “gracia, perdon et amor” [grace, forgiveness, love]. This religious tone paired with the song’s

final placement in his main lyric sequence is telling. The world is a fallen place, things end, and salvation waits beyond. But, strikingly, even here Guiraut manages to programmatically demonstrate his own skill. For example, the enjambment between it and the next “...mestiers / menhs en cort...” and the second and third “...del belh saber / de trobar;” suggests a rupture in the courtly paradigm, while showing off his artistic capacity, using the words set off by the enjambment to do so: his *mestier* or craft, and its lack of appreciation in court, and the beautiful mastery or knowledge (belh saber, also recalling the *senhal* for his beloved *Belh Deport*) with the craft of *trobar* itself.

This sort of manipulation is seen in the *letras* as well. Just as “Alfonso” responds to one of Guiraut’s *letras*, there is a second instance of what Holmes calls “pseudolegal documentation” in *letra* XIII (118). The letter is a response to a call by Enric de Rodes for the best interpretation of an earlier song by the troubadour Giraut de Calanso, what Holmes describes as a “‘close reading’ in rhymed couplets” (118). At the end of the *letra*, there is a *Testimoni*, not unlike the *Declaratio*, in the voice of Enric himself. Following Holmes’s edition, it contains the following praise of Guiraut’s interpretation:

E nos entendem pro quel cors
 Del entendemen a tocat.
 E prestam li auctoritat
 E per so quel crezut en sia.
 Volem lin portar guerentia.
 E mandamz quey sia pauzatz
 Nostre sagel so es vertatz.
 (Holmes 119)²¹⁰

And we well understand that
 he grasped the manner of understanding,
 and we grant him authority.
 And so that he will be believed,
 we want to give him a guarantee of it,
 and we order that affixed on it
 our seal be, this is the truth.

²¹⁰ For Linksill’s edition, see pp. 299-300. The translation is my modification of Holmes’s.

Directly after this statement, as though to put into language the seal which is not present, the manuscript contains the phrase: “Aiso fon trag veramen de la carta sagelada” [This was faithfully copied from the sealed document] (Holmes 119).

What does Guiraut accomplish with this direct invocation of an authority granting administrative practice? Holmes argues it marks his “desire to achieve stability and ‘auctoritat’ in the vernacular” and that this evidence of this desire indicates:

a consciousness of the possibilities for textual stability and macrotextual complexity gained in the passage from oral performance to written document, he also seems to have been aware of what is lost: time itself, the fleetingness of the spoken or sung word, and the individual texts’ participation in the actual events of history (Holmes 119).

On the contrary, it seems like this moment, and the *Declaratio*, even the sixth *pastorela*, are doing more than seeking a lost, purer oral past. The troubadour subject in those moments was a complicated one as well, and trying to excavate Guiraut’s *libre* and resurrect it as single-authored anthology seems to miss this point: it is glancing at Tuscany while forgetting to look back across the Pyrenees to the courts of Castile and León. When opposed not to Dante or Petrarch, but instead to the monumental projects of Alfonso X’s workshop, attempting to harness the power and dynamism of new linguistic technologies, Guiraut’s lyric looks different. Here, the reader of the *C* and *R* can see across Guiraut’s corpus a keen awareness of the possibilities of the linguistic technologies at his disposal, yes, but believing that he is bemoaning what has been lost is, perhaps, too take his lyric persona a bit too seriously. He is engaged directly in the manipulation of the trappings that seem to grant authority to the linguistic technology that is Occitan lyric. He does not mark the “end” of the tradition, only the beginning of a new phase, one marked by changing articulations of craft, and continued focus on, and hope “de trobar mercat.” His lyric is perhaps, a new nave on the cathedral in the *civitas verbi* of medieval Iberia.

CONCLUSION

This project's principal aim has been to see how the Occitan lyric of the troubadours fits into the literary system of medieval Iberia and the broader network of the medieval Mediterranean. To that end, it paired conceptual accounts of three concepts — the court, the agency of lyric, and the troubadour subject — with the investigation of three poetic scenes focusing on three troubadours who I've argued can be usefully described as “Iberian” — Guilhem de Peitieu, Guillem de Berguedà, and Guiraut Riquier. These chapters function in pairs, with the conceptual accounts helping to illuminate aspects of what emerges in the staging of the poetic scenes.

In the first chapter, I argued that the court can be thought of as a produced space, the product of people, in a place, performing a set of practices — lyric principle among them, pairing a discussion of the court as described in Alfonso X's *Siete Partidas* with a reading of Peire d'Alvernhe's *Cantarai*. The discussion of Guilhem de Peitieu in the second chapter was focused on making different sorts of arguments for the relationship of the Occitan lyric tradition and Iberia through the figure of the first troubadour. To that end, it made use of different pieces of material cultural evidence in combination with the songs discussed to argue for different possible approaches to crafting a broader, more complex picture of contact and, especially, exchange. Without a conception of the court as a produced space, something which a practice like lyric helps bring into being, arguing for such a set of connections would be difficult to separate from the search for direct connection, and I hope the pairing of those two chapters makes clear how a more structural view can be useful.

In the third chapter, I developed an account of the agency of lyric which argued that what lyric *is* can be best understood by looking at what lyric *does*, that is, studying it in motion —

focusing on the programmatic and the pragmatic. That chapter also introduced the notion of lyric acting on behalf of its composer, or by proxy — Gell’s “second-class” agency — along with my first direct reliance on Guillén’s notion of literary systems. This led to a discussion of Raimbaut de Vaqueiras in the context of Iberia, focused on his *EL*. In it, Raimbaut outlines one vision for the agency of lyric in his call for compensation for having served as “testimoni, cavalier e joglar.” The chapter also examined the *EL*’s marked Iberian afterlife. The fourth chapter, taking up the insulting, vulgar songs of the Catalan nobleman and troubadour Guillem de Berguedà, examines the most direct instance of the agency of lyric to that point in the project, exploring how Guillem’s lyric works “on behalf” of its composer, both in accordance with, and against, his apparent wishes.

In the fifth chapter, I addressed the “troubadour subject,” a recurrent issue in the study of the Occitan lyric tradition. My goal was to establish the stakes for the debate while also making clear that successful approaches will necessarily engage in a reading that is multiple and open rather than closed and unitary — something emblemized by the reading of the two versions of Marcabru’s *Comenz*. In the final chapter, many of the threads from the earlier chapters come together in a discussion of Guiraut Riquier’s time in the court of Alfonso X. The chapter comments on Guiraut’s concern with, and exploration of, two terms that come up again and again in the songs analyzed in previous chapters: *mercat* and *mestier*. In particular chapter six examined his *letras* to and “from” Alfonso X, and the last of his *pastorelas*.

This project does not pretend to provide the final word on any of these topics. It is, rather, to borrow and modify a metaphor from the second chapter, like a textile still on the loom. Looking at it, one can see how different threads begin to weave together, but much remains to be done before the piece is finished. Following Guillén’s notion of the *civitas verbi*, the “city of the

word” brought to mind by the literary system of medieval Iberia is too large to be “mapped” completely in any one project. Instead, I aimed to provide a brief tour of a neighborhood I thought had been overlooked, despite being near some rather well-known landmarks. I hope that it can also serve as an invitation to return, to map out more routes for further wandering.

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