MEASURING ISLAMISATION IN INDONESIA: THE PRACTICE OF ISLAM IN CENTRAL JAVA AND WEST SUMATRA DURING REFORMASI

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Kim Chwee Chia

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Abstract

This thesis explores a proposed method for measuring the degree of Islamisation within a community, where Islamisation is defined as the extent to which Islam and religious concepts and rationale are used to organise and decide within the community at the political, social, cultural and personal levels. This proposed method involves the aggregation and analysis of measurements from different aspects by which a community could be Islamised, in order to obtain an assessment of the general state of Islamisation within that community. To assess the method's feasibility, this thesis deploys it in two case studies of the Indonesian provinces of Central Java and West Sumatra during the *Reformasi* era. These case studies demonstrate that this method can be used to derive substantiated broad assessments about Islamisation. These assessments suggest West Sumatra is more Islamised than Central Java, although both provinces have experienced Islamisation during *Reformasi*.

Biographical Sketch

Chia Kim Chwee was born and raised in Singapore. He obtained a BSocSci (Hons) from the National University of Singapore in 2009. Before arriving at Cornell University for further studies in 2018, he was a civil servant with the Singapore Government where he held various appointments within the Ministry of Defence and the Prime Minister's Office. He specialises in the study of Southeast Asia, particularly in the fields of politics, security and terrorism.

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List of Abbreviations

BPRS	*Bank Pembiayaan Rakyat Syariah*
DPR	*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*
DPRD	*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah*
Golkar	*Partai Golongan Karya*
MA	*Madrasah Aliyah*
MAK	*Madrasah Aliyah Kejuruan*
MI	*Madrasah Ibtidaiyah*
MPR	*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*
MT	*Madrasah Tsanwiyah*
OJK	*Otoritas Jasa Keuangan*
PAN	*Partai Amanat Nasional*
PBB	*Partai Bulan Bintang*
PD	*Partai Demokrat*
PDI-P	*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan*
PKB	*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa*
PKS	*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*
PPP	*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*
SD	*Sekolah Dasar*
SMA	*Sekolah Menengah Atas*
SMK	*Sekolah Menengah Kejuruan*
SMP	*Sekolah Menengah Pertama*

Glossary

Dakwah	The proselytising of Islam and Islam-related concepts.
Hajj	The annual Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca.
Jilbab	A long and loose-fitting outer garment worn by some Muslim women that covers the entire body.
Kabupaten	Regency; a territorial administrative unit used in Indonesia.
Kota	City; a territorial administrative unit used in Indonesia.
Madrasah	Islamic schools.
Musholla	An area for the convenient performance of the daily Islamic canonical prayers, but not for congregational worship.
Pancasila	The foundational philosophy of the Republic of Indonesia.
Perda Syariah	Religious laws or regulations passed by local governments in Indonesia. "*Perda*" is an abbreviation for "*Peraturan Daerah*", which means regional regulations.
Pesantren	Islamic boarding schools.
Orde Baru	President Suharto's New Order regime (1966-1998).
Qurban	An Islamic holiday, also known as *Eid al-Adha* in Arabic.
Reformasi	Term used to describe the current era in Indonesia following President Suharto's 1998 resignation.
Salat	The five daily canonical prayers required of Muslims in Islam.
Syariah	Religious laws, rules, and lifestyle decisions according to Islamic tenets.
Zakat	A form of alms-giving practiced in Islam.

Chapter 1

Introduction

The role of Islam in the lives of Indonesia's Muslims is as diverse as the multi-ethnic archipelago they inhabit. While there are Indonesian Muslims who regard Islam primarily as a set of religious rituals and teachings for their spiritual needs, there are also Indonesian Muslims who infuse Islam into multiple aspects of their lives, such as using religious rationale to guide their political beliefs and actions and to select goods and services for consumption. Yet these categories are not dualistic; the variations and permutations of beliefs and practices over such issues among Indonesian Muslims are as diverse as the population itself.

There are benefits in attempting to synthesise this complex tally of beliefs and practices into assessments that provide a holistic depiction of the role and importance of Islam within a community, and which can also be compared against similarly derived assessments of other communities. This would supplement existing scholarly studies of Islam in Indonesia that are typically focused on entities that are explicitly Islamic, such as Islamic political parties and Islamic associations, at the expense of other entities within society that are less explicit about how they have been influenced by Islam (Van Dijk 2013, 15). This would also augment existing thematic studies of Indonesian Islam that are focused on discussing specific aspects and issues such as the role of Islam vis-à-vis *Pancasila* in Indonesian society, or the extent of Arab influence in Indonesian Islam (Burhani 2013, 25-34).

But a detailed and comprehensive study of the role of Islam in the lives of Indonesia’s 230 million Muslims would be a grandiose undertaking. Even when limited to a fraction of Indonesia’s Muslim population, the detailed nature of a thorough investigative study will remain a daunting challenge, given the multitude of ways Islam could potentially manifest in the lives of its adherents.

I propose the application of a heuristic method to make this task manageable yet capable of producing analytically useful results. This method involves analysing selected religion-related parameters of sub-communities within Indonesia to obtain meaningful *prima facie* assessments about the role of Islam in these communities. This method will also endeavour to use a consistent and transparent criterion when distilling information and detailing the rationalisations behind the final assessments reached, so that the results obtained by this method can be improved upon in subsequent research efforts or used as a basis to identify and rationalise subsequent in-depth research into specific areas of interest.

In the remainder of this first chapter, I will explain the steps involved in this proposed method. In the next chapter, I detail the results obtained from applying this method to two case studies of the Indonesian provinces of Central Java and West Sumatra. My analysis of the results of these case studies is in the third chapter. The last chapter concludes this thesis with a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of this proposed method.

Defining Islamisation

The method proposed by this thesis for measuring the role of Islam in a community involves using clearly defined parameters to measure, assess and characterise the degree to which Islam plays a significant role in various aspects of life within the community being studied.

As there are multiple ways where Islam can manifest itself in daily life, I will standardise the unit of analysis for this method as "Islamisation". My definition of Islamisation is adapted from the versions used by Merle Calvin Ricklefs and Bernhard Platzdasch. Platzdasch defines Islamisation as the increase in the number of Indonesian Muslims practising religious behaviour, including praying, fasting, and adopting Islamic fashions in their attire (Platzdasch 2009, 333). While Ricklefs does not explicitly define Islamisation in his trilogy of books about the Islamisation of Java, Ricklefs did state that his books were focused on the connection between what people believed and what they consequently did (Ricklefs 2012, xviii-xix). Thus by using Ricklefs' idea as a guiding principle to expand on Platzdasch's definition, I define Islamisation as the identifiable extent to which Islam-related concepts and rationale have been employed as a primary principle around which decisions are made in all aspects of life including politics, cultural practices, and personal behaviour.

Measuring Islamisation

The first step in this proposed method for measuring Islamisation involves listing out the parameters within each aspect of life to be measured and explaining how these parameters could indicate the presence of Islamisation. For example, a

parameter about politics would be the number of votes obtained by Islamic political parties compared to the number of votes obtained by non-Islamic political parties during elections. In this case, I would be attempting to identify the extent to which election results demonstrate people's preference for politicians who are highly associated with Islam or Islam-related issues.

The next step is to detail the measurements for each parameter. These measurements can be either quantitative or qualitative. The aforementioned example of number of votes obtained by Islamic political parties versus non-Islamic political parties is an example of a quantitative measurement, although the subsequent assessment about the degree of Islamisation demonstrated by this measurement is necessarily qualitative in nature. It is also possible to use qualitative measurements in instances where quantification is not possible, not available, or not meaningful.

The last step is to analyse these measurements to deduce the general state of Islamisation in the community. The method used in arriving at this overall assessment is primarily qualitative, as imposing standardised weightages or processes for evaluating the various parameters used will likely fail to satisfactorily account for contextual and substantive differences between and within communities across time and space. The analysis will also focus on identifying the presence of Islamisation in trends over time, as opposed to attempting to identify Islamisation from specific data points.

Chapter 2

Case Studies: Central Java and West Sumatra

This thesis seeks to assess the feasibility of the proposed method outlined in the previous chapter by using it to conduct two case studies in the Indonesian provinces of Central Java and West Sumatra. This chapter details the basis and objectives of these case studies, the time period, the parameters used and the specific aspects of Islamisation of which their measurements are indicative, and details of the measurements obtained. The assessments derived from analysing these measurements are detailed in the next chapter, while the final chapter provides an assessment of the feasibility of this method.

Basis and Objective for Case Studies

This section discusses my reasons and objectives for choosing Central Java and West Sumatra for the case studies. The objectives of these case studies are to demonstrate the proposed method's ability to generate measurements of Islamisation, compare these measurements across cases, and use them to better understand the societies being studied. The case studies have been specifically scoped to better achieve these objectives. These scoping decisions include limiting the number of case studies to two, both at the province-level, so that these objectives are manageable and achievable. Also, I chose Central Java and West Sumatra for the case studies since their demographic similarities reduces complexity when measuring Islamisation, while their political and cultural differences provide opportunities to use Islamisation as an

explanatory tool to better understand their societies. I will now proceed to explain these scoping decisions in detail.

I decided to have multiple case studies instead of a single case study as using multiple case studies allows me to juxtapose the results from one case study against another. As case studies are inherently weak at ensuring the external validity of their conclusions (Gerring 2009, 101-102), this will allow me to better ascertain how well this method fares at facilitating comparative analyses of Islamisation.

My decision to limit these case studies to two was borne out of practical considerations. While there is no theoretical limit on the number of case studies one could run in a study utilising this method, limiting the number of case studies to two makes this thesis manageable and allows it to focus on demonstrating the application of this method so that the method's strengths and weaknesses can be better evaluated.

Practical considerations also underpinned my decision to peg these case studies at the province level, instead of conducting lower-level studies at the *kota* and *kabupaten* levels, or even at the district and village levels. As the largest official administrative unit of Indonesia, province-level statistics and data are generally more abundant and easily accessible than similar statistics for the smaller administrative units.

The decision to select the provinces of Central Java and West Sumatra for the case studies was premised on two reasons. The first was to select provinces that were relatively homogenous in terms of their religious and ethnic demographics. This was to reduce complexity in the findings by making it less likely that Islamisation had taken place along religious or ethnic lines within the province. Both Central Java and

West Sumatra are inhabited largely by Muslims. As of 2017, 96.8% of Central Java's 34.2 million inhabitants and 98.1% of West Sumatra's 5.32 million inhabitants were Muslims (BPS Provinsi Jawa Tengah 2018, 56, 125; BPS Provinsi Sumatera Barat 2018, 173, 298). Similarly, both Central Java and West Sumatra are largely inhabited by one ethnic group. 97% of Central Java's inhabitants are Javanese, while most of the remainder are Sundanese (1.4%) or Chinese (0.4%) (Na'im and Syaputra 2011, 36-41). 87% of West Sumatra's inhabitants are Minangkabau, and most of the remainder are Batak (4.6%) or Javanese (4.5%) (Na'im and Syaputra 2011, 36-41).

However, a significant demographic-related drawback of selecting Central Java and West Sumatra would be the disparity between the sizes of their respective populations, which leaves open the possibility that the findings from comparing Islamisation in both provinces could be explained by their disparity in size. According to the 2010 census, Central Java's population of 32.4 million is more than six times larger than West Sumatra's 4.85 million population (Indiyanto 2013, 16). To mitigate this potential drawback, I will use the appropriate units of analysis where relevant during cross-province comparisons, such as intra-province changes over time that are measured in proportional rather than absolute values.

Another reason for selecting Central Java and West Sumatra was to use the findings on Islamisation in these provinces to obtain greater insights on pre-existing political and cultural differences between these two provinces. This thesis will focus on two such areas of difference. The first would be how both provinces had voted in a

consistently different manner in their last two gubernatorial elections.[1] The incumbent governors of both provinces are currently serving their second term, but Central Java's governor Ganjar Pranowo is from the non-Islamic political party *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan* (PDI-P), while West Sumatra's governor Irwan Prayitno is from the Islamic political party *Partai Kedilan Sejahtera* (PKS). The second area of difference would be how scholars have generally identified the Minangkabau in West Sumatra to be more Islamic than most other Indonesians (Keddie 1987, 1-2; Simon 2012, 238-242).

Time-period

For this thesis, I will measure Islamisation in these two provinces from the beginning of the *Reformasi* period in 1998 to the current day. In doing so, I seek to continue earlier research by scholars about the increased role of Islam in the politics and society of a post-*Orde Baru* Indonesia. One example of such research is the increased popularity of Islam-themed commercial products ranging from fashion to literature, entertainment, and financial services (Utama 2015, 121-124; Rinaldo 2013, 51). Prior research has also suggested that Indonesian Muslims have generally become more pious in recent years, as demonstrated through changes in their lifestyle choices such as more female Muslims opting to don the veil and more Muslim parents desiring an Islamic education for their children (Utama 2015, 121).

[1] 2013 and 2018 for Central Java, and 2010 and 2015 for West Sumatra.

Scholars have previously documented how this increased piety has led to changes in public life in Indonesia. Religious political issues were observed to have become more salient during *Reformasi* as both Islamic and non-Islamic political parties adapted their rhetoric and policy positions to compete for the support of an increasingly pious electorate (Tanuwidjaja 2010, 44-45). At the same time, the phenomenon of public moralism justified through religious rationale had visibly become more prevalent, such as in the form of self-styled Islamic vigilantes committing thuggery and extortion against vice-related activities and religious minorities (Wilson 2008, 199-203).

Parameters Used

I have taken into consideration these earlier research efforts when deciding on the parameters of Islamisation to be measured in the case studies of Central Java and West Sumatra. There are nine such parameters, and they are:

1) votes cast during elections for Islamic political parties and politicians versus non-Islamic political parties and politicians;
2) the quantity and enforcement of local religious laws and regulations;
3) enrolment in Islamic schools versus non-Islamic schools;
4) the quantity of Muslim places of worship;
5) the prevalence of religion-related intolerance;
6) the quantity of Muslims performing the *hajj* pilgrimage;
7) the quantity of Muslims involved in *Qurban* rituals;
8) the popularity of Islamic banking services;

9) the popularity of Arabic names.

The following sub-sections are organised according to these nine parameters. Each sub-section begins by explaining what the parameter is and how it is relevant to Islamisation, before detailing the results for the two case studies and a brief analysis of the significance of these results for Islamisation.

Islamic versus Non-Islamic Political Parties and Politicians

Background and relevance

The onset of *Reformasi* had resulted in a multitude of Islamic political parties sprouting onto the political scene. 12 of the 48 political parties that took part in the first *Reformasi*-era elections in 1999 were acknowledged by the electoral commission as Islamic, a stark contrast to the *Orde Baru* regime that allowed only the *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (PPP) to function as the sole Islamic political party for most of the *Orde Baru* (KPU 1999, 35-37).

But the results of the 1999 elections made it clear that the supply of political parties, both Islamic and non-Islamic, had far exceeded the electorate's demand for political diversity. Only 21 of the 48 political parties competing in the 1999 elections managed to win seats at the national parliament (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* – DPR) and of these, nine were Islamic political parties (KPU 2008). Most of the unsuccessful smaller political parties would eventually depart the political scene. By the time of the 2014 elections, only five significant Islamic political parties remained: the *Partai Amanat Nasional* (PAN), the *Partai Bulan Bintang* (PBB), the *Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa* (PKB), the PKS, and the PPP.

Some prior scholarly research had suggested that these Islamic political parties may not have differed much from the non-Islamic political parties in terms of both policy and actions. For example, in their effort to attract a broader base of voters, Islamic political parties were found to have generally downplayed in their rhetoric religious issues such as instituting *syariah*, and instead focused on general tropes of good governance such as tackling corruption and promoting economic growth (Platzdasch 2009, 323-324). At the same time, individual Islamic politicians on the ground were observed to have employed vote-buying and other forms of patronage politics so as to be able to compete on an equal footing with other politicians who were utilising such strategies (Ismanto and Thaha 2016, 141-145).

In addition, some non-Islamic political parties, particularly *Partai Golongan Karya* (Golkar) and *Partai Demokrat* (PD), had at times adopted positions that were as pro-Islam as the Islamic political parties. For example, Golkar and PD politicians had sided with Islamic political parties on controversial religion-related issues such as the passing of the 2003 education law that required students to receive religious lessons according to their professed faith and from teachers professing the same religion[2], and the 2008 anti-pornography law that was advocated on religious and moral grounds against concerns of a potential threat to civil liberties (Tanuwidjaja 2010, 41). Apart from political opportunism, this might also be partly due to the presence of some Golkar members who were former Islamic politicians who had suppressed their

[2] This requirement was controversial as it was perceived as a deliberate attempt to effectively outlaw attempts to teach Muslim students about Christianity in Christian schools, where a significant number of Muslim students were enrolled (Baswedan 2004, 677).

Islamic identity and Islamist aspirations to join Golkar during the *Orde Baru* (Platzdasch 2009, 56).

But I would argue that Indonesia's Islamic political parties remain significantly different from their non-Islamic counterparts in two aspects. Firstly, unlike non-Islamic political parties as a general whole, these Islamic political parties have in common their belief that Islamic concepts and teachings should be used to govern Indonesia, even if they do not share a common approach and level of enthusiasm in pursing their belief (Platzdasch 2009, 322-329; Ismanto and Thaha 2016, 141-145). For example, scholarly research has shown that the PKS has a relatively clear intent and plan to acquire state power for the purpose of enforcing a moral life onto Muslims via *syariah*, as compared to the PPP which has not been keen to intellectually reconcile its catch-all rhetoric in which it espouses to be pro-*syariah* and pro-pluralism at the same time (Platzdasch 2009, 193-205).

More importantly, surveys have shown that where the public is concerned, the Islamic political parties are still regarded as a distinct category separate from the non-Islamic political parties, regardless of the latter's occasional support for pro-Islam causes. A 2009 survey by the survey firm *Lingkaran Survei Indonesia* revealed that the public perceived the PKS, PKB, PAN, PPP and PBB as Islamic political parties, while Golkar, PD and PDI-P were perceived as secular, *Pancasila*-based or nationalist political parties (Tanuwidjaja 2010, 40).

Taking all these factors into consideration, I will attempt to measure Islamisation in this parameter as defined by support for Islamic political parties and politicians versus support for non-Islamic political parties and politicians during

elections via two measurements. The first measurement analyses the candidates and outcomes of the gubernatorial elections in Central Java and West Sumatra, while the second measurement looks at the number of seats Islamic political parties have been able to secure in the DPR and the provincial parliaments (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah* – DPRD) from these two provinces. The results of these two measurements will be interpreted to ascertain the extent of Islamisation defined by the degree to which voters are supportive of political parties and politicians who are closely identified with Islam, be it through their party identity or campaign promises.

Measurements: Central Java

The gubernatorial elections in Central Java for 2008, 2013 and 2018 suggest that Islamic political parties and religious political platforms have limited support from Central Java's voters. The winners of these three gubernatorial elections have all been from the non-Islamic political party, PDI-P. The incumbent governor, PDI-P's Ganjar Pranowo, won in 2013 and 2018, and the PDI-P candidate Bibit Waluyo won in 2008 (Utami 2013b; Utami 2013c). There are no indications that religious issues had played a significant role in Ganjar and Bibit's electoral campaigns, which were largely centred around promises of further economic development for Central Java (Kompas 2018; Suara Pembaruan 2013).

This was also largely the case for one of their opponents, a PKS candidate named Hadi Prabowo who stood for the 2013 gubernatorial election. Hadi's campaign also largely revolved around economic issues, although one of Hadi's electoral promises appeared to be explicitly religion-related. This promise concerned Hadi's

plan to improve society by upholding the values of "faith, piety and local wisdom" (*keimanan, ketakwaan, dan kearifan local*), which can be reasonably interpreted as a promise to uphold Islamic values along with other local religious and spiritual practices in a predominantly Muslim province (Utami 2013a; Suara Pembaruan 2013). Hadi did not fare well in the 2013 election, finishing a distant third with only about 21% of the vote compared to Ganjar's 49% and Bibit's 30% (Utami 2013c).

Election results for Central Java's DPR and provincial DPRD legislators during *Reformasi* also suggest that there has been limited support for candidates from Islamic political parties. During *Reformasi*, Islamic political parties only managed to obtain 35% to 42% of seats in Central Java's 100-seat provincial DPRD (see Table 1). Similarly, only 36% to 42% of Central Java's DPR legislators during *Reformasi* were from Islamic political parties (see Table 2).

Table 1. Provincial *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah* legislators from Islamic and non-Islamic political parties for Central Java from 1999 to 2019

	Islamic political parties	Non-Islamic political parties	Total
2015-2019	39	61	100
2009-2014	37	63	100
2004-2009	42	58	100
1999-2004	35	65[3]	100

Sources: Pemilu.asia, n.d.d; Pemilu.asia, n.d.c; Apriyanto 2007, 281; Hadi 2004, 54.

[3] This figure includes 10 legislators from the police and the military.

Table 2. Proportion of *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* legislators from Islamic and non-Islamic political parties for Central Java from 1999 to 2019

	Islamic political parties	Non-Islamic political parties
2014-2019	37%	63%
2009-2014	36%	64%
2004-2009	42%	58%
1999-2004	38%	62%

Sources: Pemilu.asia, n.d.b; Pemilu.asia, n.d.a; Apriyanto 2007, 273; KPU 1999, 97.

These details suggest that support for Islamic political parties in Central Java has been consistently limited to a minority of the population during *Reformasi* thus far. This limited support may explain why candidates in Central Java's gubernatorial elections, even those backed by Islamic political parties, have shown little interest in having more religious issues among their campaign promises. Thus it can be surmised that Islamisation in Central Java in the form of popular support for political parties and candidates closely identified with Islam was both not substantial and did not appear to increase during *Reformasi*.

Measurements: West Sumatra

The results of West Sumatra's gubernatorial elections in 2005, 2010 and 2015 show that the province's voters have consistently demonstrated their support for politicians hailing from Islamic political parties or politicians who had significantly utilised religion in their electoral campaigns to win votes. The current West Sumatran governor, PKS' Irwan Prayitno, had won the 2010 and 2015 gubernatorial elections with 32% and 59% of the vote respectively (Pemilu.asia, n.d.i; Detik 2010). Although Irwan only obtained 32% of the votes in 2010, about 16% of voters chose PAN's

Fauzi Bahar, the other Islamic candidate, which allows for the conclusion that around half of the voters in both the 2010 and 2015 elections had voted for an Islamic candidate (Detik 2010).

Similarly, although the 2005 election was won by PDI-P's Gamawan Fauzi with 44% of the vote, it can be argued that Gamawan's victory was enabled by the splitting of the pro-Islamic candidate vote among three losing candidates: PKS' Prayitno who received 25% of the vote, PAN's Jeffrie Geovanie with 15%, and PPP's Kapitra Ampera with about 7% (Detik 2005a; Detik 2005b). The combined votes of this Islamic trio adds up to be about 47%, which is similar to the abovementioned share of votes obtained by Islamic candidates in 2010 (49% from two candidates) and 2015 (59% by one candidate).

More importantly, it is possible to suggest that electoral support for Prayitno could be interpreted as support for an electoral campaign that heavily features Islam. Religious issues were prominent in Prayitno's campaign platform for the 2010 elections, alongside other ostensibly campaign promises unrelated to Islam. Prayitno promised in 2010 that if he were elected, he would turn West Sumatra into an "Islam-oriented" centre of education and improve the standards of religious education; allow for personal piety to develop such as by making it easier for people to worship; build more mosques and *mushollas*; increase the role and functions of religious institutions; promote Islamic banking; improve the professionalism of religious groups; and promote the religious sciences (Irwan-MK Cagub 2010).

This heavy focus on Islam in Prayitno's election agenda is likely in part attributable to Prayitno's background as a leading PKS Islamist ideologue. Prayitno is

a senior PKS official who had previously authored articles exhorting Muslims to defend themselves against the ill-intentioned infidels (*kafir*), such as the Christians and the Jews who purportedly sought to destroy the Muslim community (*menghancurkan umat Islam*) by distancing Muslims from the aspiration of establishing a caliphate and promoting "nationalism… separation of religion and state, orientalism, Christianization, and the women's liberation movement" (Platzdasch 2009, 194-195, 350). Prayitno had also authored guidelines for PKS cadres exhorting them on the importance of carrying out *dakwah* in a temperate and "non-controversial" manner so that *dakwah* would be more successful (Platzdasch 2009, 230).

On the other hand, Islamic political parties have experienced a slight decline in their ability to have their politicians elected to the DPR and provincial DPRD in West Sumatra during *Reformasi*. Although Islamic political parties commanded a majority of seats in the provincial DPRD legislature from 1999 to 2009, this majority was subsequently lost (see Table 3). Similarly, the proportion of DPR legislators elected from West Sumatra from Islamic political parties also declined over time during *Reformasi* (see Table 4).

Table 3. Provincial *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah* legislators from Islamic and non-Islamic political parties for West Sumatra from 1999 to 2019

	Islamic political parties	Non-Islamic political parties	Total
2015-2019	25	40	65
2009-2014	20	35	55
2004-2009	32	23	55
1999-2004	31	24[4]	55

Sources: Pemilu.asia, n.d.g; Pemilu.asia, n.d.h; Apriyanto 2007, 71; BPS Sumatera Barat 2002, 24.

Table 4. Proportion of *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* legislators from Islamic and non-Islamic political parties for West Sumatra from 1999 to 2019

	Islamic political parties	Non-Islamic political parties
2014-2019	36%	64%
2009-2014	43%	57%
2004-2009	64%	36%
1999-2004	57%	43%

Sources: Pemilu.asia, n.d.e; Pemilu.asia, n.d.f; Apriyanto 2007, 69; KPU 1999, 89.

In summary, it is possible to surmise from these details that to a certain degree during *Reformasi*, a significant portion of West Sumatra's voters was willing to support a politician associated with an Islamic political party and a significantly Islam-related electoral campaign, as shown by the results of West Sumatra's gubernatorial elections. But at the same time, this support for Islamic politicians is neither on the rise nor is it immutable, as shown through the declining fortunes of Islamic political parties in West Sumatra during elections for the DPR and the provincial DPRD. Thus, with regards to Islamisation in the form of support for political parties and politicians

[4] This figure includes six legislators from the police and the military.

closely identified with Islam, it is possible to suggest that for West Sumatra while a significant number of the province's voters are Islamised in such a manner to begin with, such Islamisation does not appear to have become more widespread during *Reformasi*.

Local Religious Laws and Regulations

Background and relevance

The introduction of religious content in Indonesia's constitutions, laws and regulations has been a long-standing goal for a significant number of Indonesia's Islamic political parties and Islamic groups. The most prominent of such attempts was their repeated efforts to insert the Jakarta Charter into Indonesia's constitution. The Jakarta Charter is a seven-word long clause - "*dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam bagi pemeluknya*" - that if inserted, would have constitutionally obliged Muslims to adhere to *syariah* law in Indonesia (Hosen 2005, 419). Although the Jakarta Charter was excluded from the final draft of the Indonesian constitution ratified in August 1945, Islamic politicians have tried multiple times since then to insert the Jakarta Charter, most recently during the period of constitutional reform in the early *Reformasi* years of 1999-2002 (Hosen 2005, 419).

However, multiple scholars have assessed that the 1999-2002 attempts by Islamic politicians to insert the Jakarta Charter or other *syariah* and religion-related clauses into the constitution was actually a non-starter, as the Islamic politicians backing these moves (primarily from PPP and PBB) lacked the numbers within the *Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat* (MPR) to have a realistic chance at having these

proposed amendments approved (Platzdasch 2009, 176-177; Elson 2013, 420). These Islamic politicians were opposed by non-Islamic politicians and some Islamic politicians such as PAN leader Amien Rais (Elson 2013, 414-417). There was also little public support in favour of these proposed constitutional amendments, which was opposed by Nahdlatul Ulama, Muhammadiyah, and prominent Muslim intellectuals such as Nurcholish Majid among other parties (Elson 2013, 405, 420).

Some of these Islamic elements who were less keen on these proposed constitutional amendments were not against having *syariah*, but felt that these attempts were detrimental to the pro-*syariah* cause in different ways. For example, some pro-*syariah* politicians were cognisant that Indonesia lacked the legal infrastructure and human resources to properly implement *syariah* law, and that the pro-*syariah* politicians lobbying for constitutional amendments had not thought through how to translate Islamic principles into enforceable codes of law (Platzdasch 2009, 191-192). Separately, PKS ideologues disagreed with these attempts at amending the constitution as they believed that such attempts were bound to fail due to insufficient public support for *syariah*, and furthermore backfire by engendering more public resentment against *syariah* (Platzdasch 2009, 203). Instead, these PKS ideologues argued in favour of *dakwah* programmes to educate the public in favour of *syariah*, while at the same time introducing religious laws into the current legal system at a gradual pace, so as to eventually mould society into supporting the imposition of an Islamic state ruled by *syariah* law (Platzdasch 2009, 202-204).

While it is unclear how many Islamic politicians agreed with the PKS ideologues' slow-boil approach to Islamise Indonesia, the piecemeal introduction of

religious laws into Indonesia has taken place in Indonesia during *Reformasi*. There have been successful attempts at legislating religious laws at both the national and sub-national levels. At the national level, religious laws concerning marriage, education, Islamic banking, the governance of *zakat*, against insults to religion, and the 2008 anti-pornography law which was supported by Islamic parties on a morality and anti-vice basis, have been legislated (Salim 2015, 167).

At the sub-national level, there has been a burgeoning of religious laws and regulations during the *Reformasi* era. Mainly issued at the provincial, *kota*, and *kabupaten* levels, these laws and regulations are commonly referred to as *Syariah* regional regulations (*perda Syariah*) and can be categorised as anti-vice *perda Syariah* (examples of vice are gambling, alcohol consumption, prostitution) and *perda Syariah* in favour of Islam-related activities such as reading the Quran, paying *zakat*, or donning clothing deemed suitable for Muslims (Bush 2008, 174-176).

These *perda Syariah* have aroused concern from multiple quarters, such as from non-Muslim minorities who fear discrimination, and from women who are concerned that their activities are being overly restricted (Bush 2008, 175). Keeping track of *perda Syariah* across Indonesia has been a challenge, resulting in inconsistent tallies across the years. Melissa Crouch's 2009 article on *perda Syariah* noted that there were at least 160 such laws and regulations created between 1999 and 2006 (Crouch 2009, 54), while a 2010 Human Rights Watch report claimed that there were 200 *perda Syariah* in effect at that point in time (HRW 2010). Most recently, Michael Buehler's 2016 book suggested that there were 443 *perda Syariah* created across Indonesia between 1998 and 2013 (Buehler 2016, 174).

As such, this parameter seeks to ascertain the number of *perda Syariah* that are currently in effect in Central Java and West Sumatra, the specific areas of behaviour that these *perda Syariah* seek to control, and the authorities' ability and consistency in enforcing these *perda Syariah*. This would enable the assessment of the extent of Islamisation that has taken place during *Reformasi* through the usage of *perda Syariah* to rationalise, shape and govern the behaviour of people.

Measurements: Central Java

There appears to be relatively few *perda Syariah* currently in effect in Central Java. A November 2018 *Tempo* article on *perda Syariah* across Indonesia listed only one example from Central Java, which was a Semarang mayoral regulation that sought to regulate the hours of operations for entertainment venues such as pubs, public baths, billiard parlours, karaoke joints, discotheques, massage parlours, nightclubs, and cafes (Siddiq 2018). However, Buehler suggests that there are 17 *perda Syariah* in Central Java, 12 of which were enacted at the district level (*kecamatan*), and five at the municipality level (*kabupaten* or *kota*) (Buehler 2016, 215). It is unclear how these *perda Syariah* have been enforced in Central Java, if at all.

It is possible that the relative absence of *perda Syariah* in Central Java is a result of both local ambivalence and political opposition against *perda Syariah*. In November 2018, when responding to media queries about a survey that suggested a significant portion of Central Java's population were indifferent towards the implementation of *perda Syariah* in their province, Central Java's governor Ganjar Pranowo told the media that he was against implementing Islam-related laws and

regulations in Central Java (JoSS 2018). While it might be tempting to attribute Ganjar's stance to his position as a PDI-P politician, party affiliation with a non-Islamic party is not a reliable indicator of non-support for *perda Syariah*. Earlier research by the Wahid Foundation had indicated that the *perda Syariah* issued in Indonesia before 2008 was done by politicians from both Islamic and non-Islamic political parties, particularly politicians from PKB, Golkar and PDI-P (Bush 2008, 181).

Thus in terms of Islamisation, it would be plausible to suggest that little Islamisation has taken place in Central Java during *Reformasi* in terms of *perda Syariah* as there are probably too few *perda Syariah* that have been implemented in the province to substantially affect the behaviour of its inhabitants.

Measurements: West Sumatra

On the other hand, it is clear from prior scholarly accounts that a sizeable number of *perda Syariah* have been both legislated and implemented in West Sumatra during the *Reformasi* era. According to Michael Buehler, 54 *perda Syariah* were created in West Sumatra between 1998 and 2013, which made West Sumatra the province with the second-highest number of *perda Syariah* in Indonesia after West Java, which has 103 (Buehler 2016, 174). According to Delmus Puneri Salim, West Sumatra's *perda Syariah* have primarily dwelt on issues such as regulating behaviour, preventing vice and immoral acts, ensuring Quranic literacy including specifically for students and couples intending to get married, adopting attire suitable for Muslims, and managing *zakat* (Salim 2015, 167-168).

There are several indicators, mostly from Delmus Puneri Salim's research, that these *perda Syariah* appear to have been actively implemented by the relevant West Sumatran authorities. A religious official from Solok regency told *Tempo* in 2018 that couples who were attempting to get married but were unable to read the Quran would have their marriages postponed until they were able to do so (Putri 2018). This penalty is in line with the contents of the relevant *perda Syariah* (Crouch 2009, 74), which in this case would be *Perda No. 10/2001 Kabupaten dan Kota Solok No. 10/2001 Tentang Wajib Baca Al-Qur'an untuk Siswa dan Pengantin* (Salim 2015, 167). Similar *perda Syariah* exist in the regencies of Sijunjung, Lima Puluh Kota, Pasaman, Pesisir Selatan, and Payakumbuh city, but it is unclear how strictly these particular *perda Syariah* have been enforced in these locations (Salim 2015, 167-168).

West Sumatra's *perda Syariah* requiring Quranic literacy for students have been implemented in various ways. In Solok regency, primary school students have been required to be able to recite the Quran (Salim 2015, 119). Pesisir Selatan regency's *perda Syariah* on this issue requires students to perform the *salat* prayers, in addition to possessing Quranic literacy (Salim 2015, 120). For Padang city, public secondary school students were required to attend a *pengajian* at a mosque twice a month, and public primary school students had additional Quranic classes every Sunday at five a.m. (Salim 2015, 121). In addition, students in Padang were required to memorise the 99 names of Allah (Salim 2015, 121).

The *perda Syariah* on *zakat* were crafted and implemented to strengthen the local government's control over the collection and disbursement of *zakat*. According to Salim, all of West Sumatra's *perda Syariah* on *zakat* stated that the relevant *Badan*

Amil Zakat Daerah officials were responsible for collecting and distributing *zakat*, as opposed to allowing other private institutions to also do so (Salim 2015, 98). In addition, Padang city's *zakat* law made *zakat* compulsory for individual Muslims and Muslim-owned businesses that could afford it (Salim 2015, 97). The law also specified specific assets liable for *zakat* (gold, silver, cash, business profits, agricultural, plantation and fishery products, mining, livestock, income and artefacts) and the specific recipients of *zakat* (the poor, homeless, *zakat* collectors, those newly converted to Islam, slaves, debtors, those engaged in the way of Allah, and wayfarers) (Salim 2015, 97-98).

The *perda Syariah* on regulating behaviour and eradicating vice have also been enforced, although each locality's *perda Syariah* has defined improper behaviour and vice differently. The provincial-level anti-vice *perda Syariah* has specifically prohibited adultery, extra-marital sex, gambling, and the consumption of alcohol and narcotics (Salim 2015, 149). On the other hand, Padang Panjang city and Padang Pariman regency defined vice as "any behaviour displeasing to the community because it contravened religious or customary norms", and Sijunjung regency also outlawed any acts that disturbed religious observances (Salim 2015, 149). But there are indications that the enforcement of these anti-vice *perda Syariah* may have been sub-optimal. According to bureaucrats and Islamic figures interviewed by Michael Buehler, these anti-vice *perda Syariah* have been ineffectual as their targets have been able to bribe governmental officials and local thugs who were tasked by officials to enforce these anti-vice *perda Syariah* (Buehler 2016, 177).

The enforcement of the *perda Syariah* on adopting Muslim attire appears to have led to a visible change in the dressing habits of West Sumatrans. In addition to affecting Muslims, non-Muslim women are now generally discouraged from wearing clothes that reveal their navel, thighs, or cleavage, even though they are not required to wear a *jilbab* (Salim 2015, 150-151). Some *perda Syariah* have also gone further in specifying what constitutes acceptable dressing, such as Solok regency's *perda Syariah* which specified the exact type and style of clothing for Muslim men and women to wear. Men were obliged to wear trousers and tops with short or long sleeves, whereas women were obliged to wear clothes that covered their torso and all four limbs, and in addition a *jilbab* that covered their chest, neck, and head apart from the face (Salim 2015, 149).

In summary, it is thus plausible to suggest that a significant degree of Islamisation has taken place in West Sumatra via *perda Syariah* during the *Reformasi* era. Apart from the sheer quantity of *perda Syariah* instituted in the province, it appears that these *perda Syariah* have been enforced sufficiently to substantially amend the lifestyle and habits of West Sumatrans to entail a bigger and more prominent role of Islam and Islam-related concepts in their daily lives, although this assessment should also be caveated as most of the information cited here is derived solely from Salim's study on this issue.

Enrolment in Islamic and Non-Islamic Schools

Background and relevance

Indonesia's Islamic education sector is well-developed and extensive. It is possible for an Indonesian child to obtain his or her education entirely from Islamic schools from pre-school to tertiary education, without having to travel beyond his or her home province for the most part (Kemenag RI, n.d.). The majority of Islamic schools in Indonesia consist of *madrasahs* and *pesantrens*. As of 2007, there were an estimated 37,000 *madrasahs* and 10,000 *pesantrens* in Indonesia educating at least 5.7 million students (Azra, Afrianty, and Hefner 2007, 173).

Pesantrens (generally known as Islamic boarding schools) emerged in Indonesia centuries ago to provide a religious education for Indonesia's Muslims so that the latter could perform the duties and rituals that were expected of Muslims (Dhofier 1999, 2-4, 13-14). Over time, the focus of *pesantrens* shifted to training would-be traditionalist religious scholars on the Islamic sciences, such as study of the *Quran* and *hadith*, jurisprudence (*fiqh*), Arabic grammar, mysticism (*tasawwuf*), rhetoric (*balaghah*), syntax and morphology (*ilmu alat*), so that upon returning home after graduation, these *pesantren* graduates could lead and guide their communities on religious rituals and religious problems (Azra, Afrianty, and Hefner 2007, 175; Dhofier 1999, 30-32).

Madrasahs were introduced in Indonesia in the early 20th century by modernist Muslims that sought to provide a similar education as *pesantrens* in the Islamic sciences, but by using methods of instruction adapted from Dutch government schools and Christian missionary schools (Azra, Afrianty, and Hefner 2007, 176). For

example, early *madrasahs* were novel in the local Islamic education scene for introducing the modern classroom and blackboard, textbooks, and annual examinations, which was a stark contrast to the *pesantrens'* relatively loose and informal mode of instruction that revolved around the personalised study of the classical religious commentaries (*kitab kuning*) with the resident teacher (*kyai*) (Azra, Afrianty, and Hefner 2007, 176).

Government-led reforms in the 1970s would play a significant role in bringing both *pesantrens* and *madrasahs* closer to the current system today. In the 1970s, the religion ministry standardised *madrasahs* into three separate levels of graded instruction that were aligned with similar categories of non-Islamic schools at the same level: the *Madrasah Ibtidaiyah* (MI) and the non-Islamic *Sekolah Dasar* (SD) at the primary school level, the *Madrasah Tsanwiyah* (MT) and its counterpart *Sekolah Menengah Pertama* (SMP) at the lower secondary level, and *Madrasah Aliyah* (MA) and its counterpart *Sekolah Menengah Atas* (SMA) at the upper secondary level (Azra, Afrianty, and Hefner 2007, 177).

As for *pesantrens*, a 1975 government regulation made it compulsory for *pesantren* students to complete a general elementary education of at least six years in addition to their religious studies, although scholars have noted that many *pesantrens* were by the 1950s offering non-religious subjects such as English and mathematics to attract students interested in working in secular occupations after graduation (Azra, Afrianty, and Hefner 2007, 176; Hefner 2009, 65; Dhofier 1999, 22). Nevertheless, *pesantrens* remain distinct from both non-Islamic schools and *madrasahs* in some aspects. Unlike *madrasahs* and non-Islamic schools, *pesantrens* do not follow the

standardised Indonesian academic year, and *pesantren* curriculums are also not standardised in any manner (OECD and ADB 2015, 70).

Recent scholarship suggests that many graduates of *madrasahs* and *pesantrens* are still commonly found in local communities as mosque leaders (*imam*), religious teachers (*ustadz*), or even as religious scholars (*ulama*) if the graduate pursues additional studies elsewhere (Hefner 2009, 60-61; Asadullah and Maliki 2018, 98).

This thesis is primarily concerned with ascertaining the popularity of Islamic education in Central Java and West Sumatra during *Reformasi*, as I define this aspect of Islamisation as the extent to which an Islamic education is deemed desirable and worth obtaining. Thus I will attempt to measure this aspect of Islamisation by examining enrolment figures for *madrasahs* and *pesantrens* in Central Java and West Sumatra during *Reformasi* vis-à-vis enrolment figures for their public school counterparts.

However, I am aware that religion-related reasons are unlikely to be the sole factor behind a decision to enrol into an Islamic school. As highlighted by Karen Bryner's 2009 fieldwork in Yogyakarta, both students and parents expressed a variety of reasons for wanting to enrol in an Islamic school, both religious (improving one's Arabic, understanding Islam better, acquiring morals) and non-religious (joining a sibling already enrolled there) (Bryner 2009, 142-149).

Money-related factors are also an important criterion behind the choice of schools. According to a 2018 study by Niaz Asadullah and Maliki, parents that opted to send their children to non-Islamic schools were found to be generally more literate, urban, richer and better educated, thus allowing Asadullah and Maliki to hypothesise

that the lower fees in Islamic schools was an important factor that convinced some parents to enrol their children there (Asadullah and Maliki 2018, 106). The soundness of Asadullah and Maliki's hypothesis arises from the general fact that cost-related considerations are a major factor influencing enrolment rates, or the lack thereof in the Indonesian education system (ASEAN 2014, 51). For example, *pesantrens* are known to be popular as a low-cost means for children from poorer backgrounds to obtain an education (ASEAN 2014, 49). In general, during *Reformasi,* while almost all children attended primary school, around a quarter of school-age children did not enrol at the lower secondary level, and only around half of school-age children enrolled in upper secondary school (ASEAN 2014, 45). These decreased enrolment rates at higher levels of education are likely due to a combination of increased fees and costs at the junior secondary and upper secondary level in the form of textbooks, consumables, school uniforms, transportation, school registration and meals, and also the potential opportunity cost in the form of the potential earnings these teenagers could obtain if they were to enter the workforce earlier (OECD and ADB 2015, 70).

At the same time, there is also the possibility that individuals may seek an Islamic education to qualify for specific lucrative job opportunities. A senior Islamic educator in East Java told Robert Hefner in 2005 that job opportunities as preachers were flourishing for those trained in religious knowledge and Arabic, and that a gifted preacher could earn more in one night than an Islamic judge or teacher could in a month (Hefner 2009, 69).

Thus in acknowledgment of the multitude of possible reasons that constitute an individual's choice for an Islamic or non-Islamic education, I will exercise caution

when characterising the degree of assessed Islamisation from the enrolment figures of Central Java and West Sumatra.

Measurements: Central Java

There appears to be a statistically significant increase in the number of students enrolled in Islamic schools at the primary level, known as *Madrasah Ibtidaiyah* (MI), during *Reformasi* as demonstrated by the trendline in Figure 1. From 2002-2017, the yearly enrolment figures for MI had steadily increased from around 531,000 students in 2002 to 611,000 students in 2017, an increase of around 15% (see Figure 1). It is plausible that this increase may in part have come at the expense of enrolment at its non-Islamic counterpart, *Sekolah Dasar* (SD). As demonstrated by the negative trendline in Figure 2, the yearly enrolment figures for SD had steadily declined from 3.57 million in 2002 to 2.98 million in 2017, a decrease of around 17%.



Figure 1. Enrolment in *Madrasah Ibtidiyah* for Central Java from 2002 to 2017 ('000). Sources: BPS Jawa Tengah 2018, 88; BPS Jawa Tengah 2017, 86; BPS Jawa Tengah

2016, 77; BPS Jawa Tengah 2015, 95; BPS Jawa Tengah 2010, 109; BPS Jawa Tengah 2006, 109.



Figure 2. Enrolment in *Sekolah Dasar* for Central Java from 2002 to 2017 (‘000). Sources: BPS Jawa Tengah 2018, 87; BPS Jawa Tengah 2017, 85; BPS Jawa Tengah 2016, 76; BPS Jawa Tengah 2015, 92; BPS Jawa Tengah 2010, 106; BPS Jawa Tengah 2006, 106.

At the lower secondary level, there has also been a similar statistically significant increase in the number of students attending Islamic schools, known as *Madrasah Tsanwiyah* (MT). From 2000 to 2017, the yearly enrolment figures for MT had substantially increased from around 314,000 students in 2000 to 426,000 students in 2017, an increase of around 35% (see Figure 3). This also may have come at the expense of enrolment figures at its non-Islamic counterpart, *Sekolah Menengah Pertama* (SMP), whose enrolment appears to have increased at a slightly slower rate compared to MT, as shown by the SMP trendline in Figure 3.



Figure 3. Enrolment in *Madrasah Tsanwiyah* and *Sekolah Menengah Pertama* for Central Java from 2000 to 2017 ('000). Sources: BPS Jawa Tengah 2018, 89-90; BPS Jawa Tengah 2017, 87-88; BPS Jawa Tengah 2016, 78-79; BPS Jawa Tengah 2015, 96, 99; BPS Jawa Tengah 2010, 110, 113; BPS Jawa Tengah 2006, 110, 113; BPS Jawa Tengah 2001, 143, 146.

Enrolment at the Islamic schools for the upper secondary level, *Madrasah Aliyah* (MA) also increased during *Reformasi*, as demonstrated by the trendline in Figure 4. From 2000 to 2015, yearly enrolment in MA had steadily increased from 80,000 in 2000 to 147,000 in 2015, an increase of around 83%. However, this increase did not appear to have come at the expense of enrolment in the non-Islamic schools at the same level, the *Sekolah Menengah Atas* (SMA) and *Sekolah Menengah Kejuruan* (SMK).[5] In fact, enrolment at SMA and SMK increased more significantly than enrolment at MA during the 2000-2015 period. Enrolment at SMA and SMK

[5] Apart from choosing between MA and SMA, students can also choose to attend SMK, which provides a vocational education. There is an Islamic version of SMK known as *Madrasah Aliyah Kejuruan* (MAK). But there are no separate enrolment statistics for MAK as it appears that MAK students attend MA institutions where they study a vocational curriculum (IES, n.d.).

increased from 762,000 in 2000 to 1.01 million in 2015 (see Figure 4), an increase of about 248,000 students enrolled compared to a 67,000 increase for MA.



Figure 4. Enrolment in *Madrasah Aliyah, Sekolah Menengah Atas*, and *Sekolah Menengah Kejuruan* for Central Java from 2000 to 2015 (‘000). It is unclear why enrolment in 2008 drastically dipped, though the 2007-2008 global financial crisis might be one possible explanation. Sources: BPS Jawa Tengah 2015, 100, 103; BPS Jawa Tengah 2010, 114, 117; BPS Jawa Tengah 2006, 114, 117; BPS Jawa Tengah 2001, 147, 150.

There was also a significant statistical increase in the yearly enrolment figures in Central Java’s pesantrens during *Reformasi*. The yearly enrolment figure in 2016 was 657,000, which was almost three times as large as the enrolment figure of 223,000 in 1998 (see Figure 5).



Figure 5. Enrolment in *pesantrens* for Central Java from 1998 to 2016 (‘000). Sources: Kemenag RI 2017, 163; BPS Jawa Tengah 2015, 118; BPS Jawa Tengah 2014, 148; BPS Jawa Tengah 2013, 148; BPS Jawa Tengah 2010, 150; BPS Jawa Tengah 2005, 152; BPS Jawa Tengah 2001, 182.

In summary, the statistics for Central Java appear to tentatively suggest the presence of Islamisation during *Reformasi* in the form of a more receptive attitude towards Islamic education in Central Java. Across all levels of education measured, there was a statistically significant increase in preference for Islamic education that took place alongside relatively lower increases or even a decrease in preferences for non-Islamic schools, except in the case of upper secondary education. But this hypothesis of possible Islamisation should be caveated by the possibility that these increases in enrolment could also have been partly induced by other non-religious factors as discussed earlier. In addition, for Central Java’s case, the increase in upper secondary enrolment for both SMA and MA can also be partly explained by the provision of financial assistance from both the national and provincial governments

(Suwardi 2018, “SMK Gratis”). Thus while still plausibly valid, the Islamisation-related conclusions drawn from these observations should not be overstated.

Measurements: West Sumatra

There was a statistically significant increase in enrolment in *Madrasah Ibtidiyah* (MI) at the primary school level during *Reformasi*. The yearly enrolment in MI in 2017 was 21,000, almost double of the 1998 figure of around 11,000 (see Figure 6). However, the significance of this increase in MI enrolment is diminished given that the majority of relevant school-age children continue to be enrolled in *Sekolah Dasar* (SD), with yearly enrolment ratios between SD and MI ranging from 30:1 to 55:1 during this 1998-2018 period (see Figures 6 and 7). In addition, enrolment in SD also generally increased during this time period, as shown by the trendline in Figure 7.



Figure 6. Enrolment in *Madrasah Ibtidiyah* for West Sumatra from 1998 to 2017 (‘000). Sources: BPS Sumatera Barat 2018, 238; BPS Sumatera Barat 2013, 144; BPS Sumatera Barat 2008, 106; BPS Sumatera Barat 2002, 80.



Figure 7. Enrolment in *Sekolah Dasar* for West Sumatra from 1998 to 2017 (‘000). Source: BPS Sumatera Barat 2018, 234; BPS Sumatera Barat 2013, 129; BPS Sumatera Barat 2008, 92; BPS Sumatera Barat 2002, 68.

At the lower secondary level, statistically significant increases in enrolment for both *Madrasah Tsanwiyah* (MT) and *Sekolah Menengah Pertama* (SMP) between 1998 to 2007 can be discerned. For example, the yearly enrolment at MT for 2017 was around 85,000, compared to around 54,000 in 1998 (see Figure 8). Similar gross increases in enrolment took place for SMP, where the yearly enrolment in 2017 was 218,000, compared to around 188,000 in 1998 (see Figure 8).



Figure 8. Enrolment in *Madrasah Tsanwiyah and Sekolah Menengah Pertama* for West Sumatra from 1998 to 2017 ('000). Sources: BPS Sumatera Barat 2018, 242, 246; BPS Sumatera Barat 2013, 132, 147; BPS Sumatera Barat 2008, 95, 108; BPS Sumatera Barat 2002, 70, 82.

There was also a statistically significant increase in enrolment at *Madrasah Aliyah* (MA) between 1998 and 2017, as suggested by the trendline in Figure 9. The yearly enrolment for MA in 2017 was around 30,000, compared to around 17,000 in 1998 (see Figure 9). However, this increase in MA enrolment was dwarfed by the increase in enrolment in *Sekolah Menengah Atas* (SMA) and *Sekolah Menengah Kejuruan* (SMK) during the same time period in terms of gross increases. The yearly enrolment in SMA and SMK in 2017 was around 231,000, compared to 146,000 in 1998 (see Figure 9).



Figure 9. Enrolment in *Madrasah Aliyah, Sekolah Menengah Atas,* and *Sekolah Menengah Kejuruan* for West Sumatra from 1998 to 2017 (‘000). Source: BPS Sumatera Barat 2018, 254, 262; BPS Sumatera Barat 2013, 141, 150; BPS Sumatera Barat 2008, 98, 110; BPS Sumatera Barat 2002, 73, 84.

As for *pesantrens*, the trendline in Figure 10 suggests a slight statistically significant increase in yearly enrolment between 2008 to 2017. At the same time, these yearly enrolment figures fluctuated significantly between 2008 and 2017 (see Figure 10). While enrolment figures dipped to a low of 19,000 in 2012 and peaked at 39,000 in 2015, these figures started and ended the time period without much difference at 32,000 for 2008 and 30,000 in 2017 (see Figure 10).



Figure 10. Enrolment in *pesantrens* for West Sumatra from 2008 to 2017 (‘000).
Source: BPS Sumatera Barat 2018, 310; BPS Sumatera Barat 2013, 195.

In summary, it is possible to suggest that Islamisation might have manifested in West Sumatra during *Reformasi* in the form of an increased preference for an Islamic education, although such an assessment would have to be heavily qualified. There were statistically significant increases in the yearly enrolment figures at all levels of Islamic schools, but yearly enrolment figures in non-Islamic schools at the same level during the same time period were either equally or more significant than the increases for Islamic schools. It is possible that the proliferation of *perda Syariah* in West Sumatra requiring Quranic literacy for all students in the province may have relatively lowered the demand for Islamic schools, as it would be possible for students to obtain some religious education without having to enrol in an Islamic school.

Muslim Places of Worship

Background and relevance

Scholars have suggested that the construction of Muslim places of worship could be used to measure religiosity in communities. Some studies have documented instances where mosque construction was perceived as attempts to proliferate the physical symbols of Islam within the community, presumably out of a sense of piety (Gutiérrez 2015, 1-2; Kuppinger 2014, 794-795). A 2017 article by Nick Kuipers suggested that the act of constructing mosques and *mushollas* in Indonesia was an indicator of religiosity as these construction efforts were usually organised by the local community for their own needs (Kuipers 2017). This was because since 2006, permits for constructing places of worship in Indonesia have been granted by lower-level local officials, whereas previously such permits were granted by the regent (*bupati*) or mayor (*walikota*) (Kuipers 2017).

Most of the mosques and *mushollas* in Indonesia constructed during *Reformasi* are likely to be funded by local sources. Kuipers noted that while communities had previously received funding from the national government during the *Orde Baru* to build mosques, such funding had largely dried up during *Reformasi* due to fiscal decentralisation (Kuipers 2017). Moreover, sources of external funding for building mosques, including from Saudi Arabia, are likely to be limited. As of 2017, only an estimated 150 out of Indonesia's 800,000 mosques and *mushollas* were Saudi-funded (Varagur 2017; Kuipers 2017).

I seek to build on this existing research by ascertaining the extent of Islamisation that has taken place during *Reformasi* in the form of mosque and *musholla*-building.

Assuming that the religiosity of local communities was a key reason for building mosques or *mushollas*, I will do so by collating Indonesian government statistics on the yearly recorded number of mosques and *mushollas* in Central Java and West Sumatra. I will also ascertain whether population increases may have been a reason for building more mosques and *mushollas*.

Measurements: Central Java

There was a steady increase in the number of mosques in Central Java between 2003 to 2017 as demonstrated by the trendline in Figure 11.[6] During this time period, the number of mosques had increased from 36,000 in 2003 to 47,000 in 2017 (see Figure 11). There was only a slight increase in the number of *mushollas* during the same time period, from 94,342 in 2003 to 95,662 in 2017 (BPS Jawa Tengah 2018, 126; BPS Jawa Tengah 2004, 153).

[6] The fluctuations in Figures 11 to 14 for mosque numbers are likely due to inadequate attempts by officials to keep track of these places of worship. This anecdote from Kuipers illustrates the difficulty of doing so. In recent years, Indonesia's religious affairs ministry had solicited its mosques and *mushollas* to fill out a form for the ministry's national database, but only 423,000 out of the country's 800,000 mosques and *mushollas* had done so thus far (Kuipers 2017).



Figure 11. Number of mosques in Central Java from 2003 to 2017. Sources: BPS Jawa Tengah 2018, 126; BPS Jawa Tengah 2017, 124; BPS Jawa Tengah 2016, 97; BPS Jawa Tengah 2015, 117; BPS Jawa Tengah 2010, 149; BPS Jawa Tengah 2007, 149; BPS Jawa Tengah 2006, 149; BPS Jawa Tengah 2005, 151; BPS Jawa Tengah 2004, 153.

This increase in mosques appears to have outpaced the population growth of Muslims in the province. The ratio of Muslims to mosques in Central Java has generally decreased between 2003 to 2017, as depicted by the trendline in Figure 12. This trend is also borne out by census data, which indicated that the Muslim population in Central Java had only increased by about 5% between 2000 and 2010 (Indiyanto 2013, 25), when the number of mosques had increased by about 14% during the same time period.[7]

[7] In view of the implausible fluctuation in the number of mosques recorded for 2010, I have used the average number of mosques between 2008 to 2012 (which is 40140.8) to derive this 14% figure.



Figure 12. Number of Muslims per mosques for Central Java from 2003 to 2017. Population statistics before 2015 are interpolated using census data from 2000 and 2010. Sources: BPS Jawa Tengah 2018, 53, 125-126; BPS Jawa Tengah 2017, 123-124; BPS Jawa Tengah 2016, 96-97; BPS Jawa Tengah 2015, 116-117; BPS Jawa Tengah 2010, 148-149; BPS Jawa Tengah 2007, 149; BPS Jawa Tengah 2006, 149; BPS Jawa Tengah 2005, 151; BPS Jawa Tengah 2004, 153.

In summary, the higher number of mosques in Central Java seems to indicate a higher degree of Islamisation during *Reformasi* in the form of increased building of mosques, especially since it is likely that more mosques were built than what was necessary to cater for the increase in population. It is also peculiar that there was no equivalent increase in the number of *mushollas* similar to that of mosques, which would have been necessary if the new mosques were built to service a growing population. Thus there are grounds to surface the hypothesis that this increased mosque-building in Central Java may reflect various forms of increased religiosity among its Muslims, be it via visiting the mosque more often, or wanting to build more

mosques, or to have separate mosques for a specific sub-denomination of Islam, such as Salafism.

Measurements: West Sumatra

There was also a steady increase in the number of mosques in West Sumatra during *Reformasi* as demonstrated by the trendline in Figure 13. During this time period, the number of mosques had increased from about 4,000 in 1998 to 5,000 in 2017 (see Figure 13). There was no significant change in the number of *mushollas* in West Sumatra between 1998 and 2007, which averaged around 11,000 to 12,000 during this time (BPS Sumatera Barat 2018, 299; BPS Sumatera Barat 2002, 130).



Figure 13. Number of mosques in West Sumatra from 1998 to 2017. Sources: BPS Sumatera Barat 2018, 299; BPS Sumatera Barat 2013, 187; BPS Sumatera Barat 2008, 158; BPS Sumatera Barat 2002, 130.

However, this increase in the number of mosques did not outpace the population growth of Muslims in West Sumatra. As shown by the trendline in Figure

14, the number of Muslims per mosque for West Sumatra has generally increased between 2003 to 2017, as depicted by the trendline in Figure 14.



Figure 14. Number of Muslims per mosque for West Sumatra from 1998 to 2017. Population statistics for 1998, 1999, 2001 to 2003, and 2006 are interpolated using census data and statistics from *Badan Pusat Statistik*. Sources: BPS Sumatera Barat 2018, 173, 298-299; BPS Sumatera Barat 2015, 199; BPS Sumatera Barat 2013, 187; BPS Sumatera Barat 2010, 61, 158; BPS Sumatera Barat 2009, 61, 155; BPS Sumatera Barat 2008, 65, 158-159; BPS Sumatera Barat 2006, 57, 147; BPS Sumatera Barat 2005, 147; BPS Sumatera Barat 2002, 130; Indiyanto 2013, 25.

It is possible that Islamisation might have taken place in West Sumatra in the form of mosque-building efforts during *Reformasi*. The main factor in favour of Islamisation would be the substantial 25% increase in the number of mosques during *Reformasi.* As with the analysis for Central Java, it is also peculiar that in West Sumatra, there was no equivalent increase in the number of *mushollas* similar to that of mosques, which would have been necessary if the new mosques were built to service a growing population. While the increased ratio of Muslims to mosques during *Reformasi* appears to suggest that insufficient mosques were built to cater for

population increases, such a conclusion would require measurements of mosque capacity and accessibility across West Sumatra, an effort that is beyond the scope of this thesis. Thus as with the case in Central Java, it remains tentatively plausible that the increased mosque-building in West Sumatra is reflective of a possible increase in religiosity among its Muslims.

Religion-related intolerance

Background and relevance

Much has been written by scholars about an apparent rise in religion-related intolerance by Muslims in Indonesia during the *Reformasi* era. Kikue Hamayotsu has argued that the lack of social mobility for many Muslims during the New Order regime had resulted in some of these Muslims believing that this was due to discrimination by non-Muslims within the government (particularly by the Chinese), and such beliefs had helped instigate the religion-based communal violence during the early years of *Reformasi* (Hamayotsu 2002, 371-372). This communal violence during the early *Reformasi* years mainly took place in the forms of numerous attacks against non-Muslim minorities in Java and Sumatra (Sidel 2006, 135-137), widespread Muslim-Christian clashes in Central Sulawesi, Maluku and North Maluku (Sidel 2006, 153-187), and the emergence of Islamic vigilante groups, most notably the *Front Pembela Islam* (FPI) (Sidel 2006, 137-140).

While the large-scale clashes in Sulawesi and the Malukus had ceased by late 2001, small-scale violence has persisted in an intermittent fashion across Indonesia. According to Marcus Mietzner, since 2005, local militias have been responsible for

small-scale but increasingly violent attacks on religious minorities and Islamic sects deemed unorthodox by their attackers (Mietzner 2014, 53).

Some scholars have identified how Indonesian bureaucrats have been complicit in encouraging religious intolerance during *Reformasi*. Officials from the *Majelis Ulama Indonesia* (MUI), Indonesia's top clerical body, were said to have encouraged violence from religious intolerance by engaging in public discourse that allows these perpetrators of communal violence to frame their actions as being in defence of Indonesia and Islam (Woodward et al. 2014, 155). There have also been instances of MUI officials and other local officials directly engaging in persecution of religious minorities deemed as residing outside the five state-permitted religions in Indonesia (Hicks 2013, 10-13).

One frequent area of dispute has been over the establishment and operation of non-Muslim places of worship. Some Muslim groups including the FPI have forcibly closed multiple churches across Indonesia in recent decades and pressured local officials to reject applications to build new churches (USCIRF 2013, 1). In 2017, Muslims protesting the erection of a 30-meter-tall statue of Guan Yu (a general in third century China that is a figure of worship for various Chinese religions) outside a Confucian temple in Tuban, East Java argued that the statue was an insult to Islam and the "natives" of the region (Goldman 2017).

Another common target for violence and discrimination are Muslim minorities deemed unorthodox by Indonesia's Sunni majority, such as Indonesia's Shia and Ahmadiyah communities. Scholars have observed an upsurge of anti-Shia and anti-Ahmadiyah violence during *Reformasi*, such as forcing Shia residents to leave the

community unless they converted to Sunnism (Suryana 2018, 148, 151-152), and mob violence against Ahmadiyah practitioners including instances where local police officers were present but had refused to intervene (Woodward et al. 2014, 167-168).

These acts of anti-Shia and anti-Ahmadiyah violence have been in part legitimised and encouraged by religious authorities, including MUI. In 2005, MUI had re-issued its 1980 *fatwa* declaring Ahmadiyah teachings as heretical for suggesting that its founder was a prophet (Woodward et al. 2014, 158). Both local MUI officials and the police were involved in the successful persecution of a Shia preacher in East Java between 2011 to 2012, that culminated in East Java's governor issuing a decree against religious deviancy that included Shia Islam as a target (Formichi 2014, 22-23). In 2013, local religious leaders in East Java had rejected President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's request to allow evicted Shia families to return without being forced to convert to Sunni Islam (Suryana 2018, 151-152).

There are grounds to suspect that such sentiments may not necessarily be isolated within a noisy fringe. A 2018 article by Marcus Mietzner and Burhanuddin Muhtadi suggested that the FPI and other like-minded Muslim groups were supported by a like-minded and significant segment of Indonesian Muslims who were conservative, pro-Islamist and politically neglected, and this enabled the FPI and these Muslim groups to mobilise 200,000 to half a million Indonesians to protest in Jakarta in late 2016 against the alleged insults against Islam committed by the then Jakarta governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Mietzner and Muhtadi 2018, 479, 493-495).

This thesis considers all religiously-motivated intolerance by Muslims against non-Muslims or other Muslims as another aspect of Islamisation and seeks to measure

its prevalence during *Reformasi* in Central Java and West Sumatra through statistics of instances of religiously-motivated intolerance, and the number of non-Muslim places of worship in the province over time. Through the measurements obtained, an assessment can be derived on the state of Islamisation in these two provinces, as defined by the suspected prevalence and influence of intolerant Muslims who are willing and able to act on their beliefs.

Measurements: Central Java

According to the Wahid Foundation's records, the number of incidents of religiously-motivated intolerance[8] per year in Central Java had fluctuated between 2008 to 2017. These incidents had steadily risen from four incidents in 2008 to peak at 45 incidents in 2012, before subsiding back to around 11 incidents per year between 2014 to 2017 (see Table 5).

Table 5. Incidents of intolerance in Central Java from 2008 to 2017

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Number of incidents	2	16	4	19	45	30	10	7	14	15

Sources: Wahid Foundation 2018, 16; Wahid Foundation n.d., 8; Wahid Foundation 2015, 27; Wahid Foundation 2014b, 25-26; Wahid Foundation 2014a, 23-24; Wahid Foundation 2012, 29, 33-34; Wahid Foundation 2011, 4-5; Wahid Foundation 2010, 38, 50, 62, 71; Wahid Foundation 2009, 4; Wahid Foundation 2008, 84, 89.

This suggestion of increased religious tolerance in Central Java in recent years appears to be echoed in part by the Setara Institute's findings. According to the Setara

[8] These incidents of religiously-motivated intolerance would include both violent and non-violent acts that violate religious freedom, ranging from hate speech and physical harassment, to systematic exclusion and violent repression (Wahid Foundation 2015, 17-24).

Institute's annual evaluation and ranking of Indonesian cities in terms of assessed tolerance[9], the Central Java city of Salatiga was among the top 10 most tolerant cities for both the 2017 and the 2018 rankings, while no Central Java cities were in the bottom ten (Setara Institute 2017; Setara Institute 2018, 5-8).

At the same time, governmental statistics suggest that there has been a discernible increase in the number of non-Muslim places of worship in Central Java from 2001 to 2017, from around 3,000 in 2001 to around 4,000 in 2017, a substantial increase given the extremely low proportion of non-Muslims in Central Java (BPS Jawa Tengah 2018, 126; BPS Jawa Tengah 2004, 153).

In summary, these measurements appear to suggest that despite the occasional presence of religiously-motivated intolerance in Central Java, it is possible to consider the province as relatively religiously tolerant, thus in turn the level of Islamisation in Central Java in this regard can be regarded as relatively low.

Measurements: West Sumatra

According to the Wahid Foundation's records, there were few incidents of religious intolerance in West Sumatra between 2008 and 2017 (see Table 6). But more recent reporting by the Setara Institute suggests that intolerance might be prevalent within parts of West Sumatra, particularly Padang city. The Setara Institute had listed

[9] Each city was scored on four aspects: 1) the presence of local governmental policies promoting or discouraging tolerance; 2) statements and actions by local officials regarding tolerance; 3) instances and dynamics of religious intolerance in local communities; and 4) the diversity and inclusivity of local communities. These cities were then ranked against each other based on their total score, from which the annual ranking was derived (Setara Institute 2018, 3-5).

Padang city as one of the top 10 most intolerant Indonesian cities for both 2017 and 2018 (Setara Institute 2017; Setara Institute 2018, 6-7). In view of the methodology used by the Setara Institute for calculating its rankings, this would suggest that there might have been substantial incidences of religious-related intolerance taking place in Padang in recent years and that Padang's officials did not act to clamp down against such incidents (Setara Institute 2018, 3-5).

Table 6. Incidents of intolerance in West Sumatra from 2008 to 2017

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Number of incidents	0	3	0	3	4	1	1	1	8	0

Sources: Wahid Foundation 2018, 16; Wahid Foundation n.d., 8; Wahid Foundation 2015, 27; Wahid Foundation 2014b, 25-26; Wahid Foundation 2014a, 23-24; Wahid Foundation 2012, 29, 33-34; Wahid Foundation 2011, 4-5; Wahid Foundation 2010, 38, 50, 62, 71; Wahid Foundation 2009, 4; Wahid Foundation 2008, 84, 89.

Governmental statistics also suggest that the number of non-Muslim places of worship in West Sumatra during *Reformasi* have remained consistent at around 400, with little growth if any (BPS Sumatera Barat 2018, 299; BPS Sumatera Barat 2002, 130).

While incidents of intolerance do not appear to be common in West Sumatra, these findings do suggest possible areas of concern that warrant further investigation. For example, it is possible to hypothesise that there might have been underreporting of incidents of intolerance, when attempting to reconcile the low number of such incidents recorded by the Wahid Foundation with the Setara Institute's assessment of Padang city as an intolerant city. It is also peculiar that the number of non-Muslim places of worship in West Sumatra has remained stagnant over a period of 20 years,

especially when considering that there was an increase in non-Muslim places of worship in Central Java, a province that also has a very low number of non-Muslims. Thus this suggests there might have been obstruction of attempts to construct or obtain official permits for non-Muslim places of worship in West Sumatra. As such, there are grounds for this thesis to suggest that Islamisation might have occurred in West Sumatra in the form of religiously-motivated intolerance.

***Hajj* Pilgrimage and Qurban**

Background and relevance

This thesis considers personal piety as an important aspect of Islamisation, as it is possible to theoretically regard individual piety as a primary motive that compels the individual to perform other visible acts of Islamisation. Earlier scholarly attempts at measuring piety had identified the performance of religious rituals that were expected from adherents of the religion as acts of piety. For example, a recent study by Thomas Pepinsky, William Liddle and Saiful Mujani sought to measure piety by surveying Indonesian Muslims on whether they performed the obligatory daily prayers, fasted during *Ramadan*, attended Friday prayers, and paid *zakat* after *Ramadan* among other religious acts (Pepinksy, Liddle, and Mujani 2018, 33-36).

Building upon such studies, I will use statistics on participation in the *hajj* pilgrimage for both Central Java and West Sumatra, and participation in religious rituals during *Qurban* (the Indonesian name for the *Eid al-Adha* holiday) for West

Sumatra[10] to assess the general levels of piety within these two provinces as an aspect of Islamisation.

Measurements: Central Java

In Central Java, the number of Muslims performing the *hajj* pilgrimage each year had increased significantly during *Reformasi*, both in absolute terms and as a proportion of the Muslim population. Yearly pilgrim numbers had increased steadily from 18,000 pilgrims in 1998, to 32,000 pilgrims in 2017 (see Figure 15). This significant increase in pilgrim numbers remained after population growth during this period was accounted for, as indicated by the trendline in Figure 16. The steep drop in pilgrim numbers in 1999 is possibly attributable to the combination of the financial crisis and political transition that Indonesia was undergoing at that time.



Figure 15. Number of pilgrims from Central Java for 1998 to 2017. Sources: BPS Jawa Tengah 2018, 127; BPS Jawa Tengah 2015, 117-119; BPS Jawa Tengah 2010,

[10] The relevant *Qurban*-related statistics are unavailable for Central Java.

149, 151; BPS Jawa Tengah 2007, 149; BPS Jawa Tengah 2005, 153; BPS Jawa Tengah 2002, 172; Kemenag RI 2017, 73.



Figure 16. Number of pilgrims relative to Muslim population for Central Java from 1998 to 2017. Population statistics before 2015 are interpolated using census data from 2000 and 2010. Sources: BPS Jawa Tengah 2018, 53, 125, 127; BPS Jawa Tengah 2017, 123; BPS Jawa Tengah 2016, 96; BPS Jawa Tengah 2015, 116-117, 119; BPS Jawa Tengah 2010, 148-151; BPS Jawa Tengah 2007, 149; BPS Jawa Tengah 2005, 151-153; BPS Jawa Tengah 2004, 153; BPS Jawa Tengah 2002, 172; Kemenag RI 2017, 73.

These pilgrims had probably waited for a long time for their turn to perform the *hajj*. A senior religious affairs official in Central Java in charge of *hajj*-related issues told the media in July 2018 that *hajj* applicants from Central Java were on a waiting list that could take as long as 21 years (The Jakarta Post 2018). In addition, it appears that Central Java's *hajj* waiting list had only lengthened in recent years.[11] An earlier 2015 media report claimed that the waiting list across Indonesia only ranged

[11] It is unclear how Indonesia's *hajj* authorities allocate Indonesia's yearly national *hajj* quota among the different waiting lists at the local level.

from 12 to 17 years (Soloway 2015). In addition, these aspiring pilgrims had paid at least US$2,000 to join the waiting list (Soloway 2015). It is thus plausible that the lengthened waiting list is indicative of increased piety among Muslims in the province, given that *hajj* applicants there are paying a significant sum of money for an event that they could only attend two decades later.

In summary, it is plausible to suggest that there was an increase in Islamisation in Central Java during *Reformasi*, in terms of piety demonstrated by what appears to be increased enthusiasm for performing the *hajj*.

Measurements: West Sumatra

In West Sumatra, the number of Muslims performing the *hajj* pilgrimage each year remained largely similar during the *Reformasi* period. Apart from a steep decrease in pilgrim numbers in 1999 that was likely attributable to the political and economic instability in Indonesia then (similar to what happened in Central Java), pilgrim numbers from West Sumatra generally fluctuated between around 3,600 to 4,600 between 1998 to 2017 (see Figure 17). Thus after accounting for population growth during *Reformasi*, this resulted in a small decline in the yearly proportion of Muslims performing the *hajj*, as shown by the trendline in Figure 18.

Like Central Java, West Sumatra's pilgrims had also waited for a long time for their turn to perform the *hajj*. In July 2018, West Sumatra's governor told the media that West Sumatra's *hajj* applicants may have to wait for 17 years before they could perform the *hajj* (Cahyono 2018).



Figure 17. Number of pilgrims from West Sumatra for 1998 to 2017. Sources: BPS Sumatera Barat 2018, 300; BPS Sumatera Barat 2013, 189; BPS Sumatera Barat 2008, 161; BPS Sumatera Barat 2002, 133.



Figure 18. Number of pilgrims relative to Muslim population for West Sumatra from 1998 to 2017. Population statistics for 1998, 1999, 2001 to 2003, and 2006 are interpolated using census data and statistics from *Badan Pusat Statistik*. Sources: BPS Sumatera Barat 2018, 173, 298, 300; BPS Sumatera Barat 2015, 199; BPS Sumatera Barat 2013, 189; BPS Sumatera Barat 2010, 61, 158; BPS Sumatera Barat 2009, 61, 155; BPS Sumatera Barat 2008, 65, 159, 161; BPS Sumatera Barat 2006, 57, 147; BPS Sumatera Barat 2005, 147; BPS Sumatera Barat 2002, 133; Indiyanto 2013, 25.

For West Sumatra, statistics of religious rituals performed during *Qurban* are also available in the form of the quantity of livestock sacrificed during these rituals and the number of donors of these livestock. During *Reformasi*, the number of livestock sacrificed each year had come close to doubling between 1998 to 2017, increasing from 20,000 in 1998 to 38,000 in 2017 (see Figure 19). It can also be suggested that generally more Muslims in West Sumatra have participated in this ritual especially after 2004, with peak participation in 2013 with around 345,000 participants, which is also around 7% of West Sumatra's Muslim population (see Figure 19). (This also assumes that most participants in West Sumatra's *Qurban* rituals were native to the province.) This significant increase in participation in *Qurban* ceremonies remains even after accounting for population growth during *Reformasi*, as indicated by the trendline in Figure 20.



Figure 19. *Qurban*-related statistics for West Sumatra from 1998 to 2017.
Sources: BPS Sumatera Barat 2018, 306; BPS Sumatera Barat 2013, 193; BPS Sumatera Barat 2008, 165; BPS Sumatera Barat 2002, 137.



Figure 20. *Qurban* participants relative to Muslim population for West Sumatra from 1998 to 2017. Population statistics for 1998, 1999, 2001 to 2003, and 2006 are interpolated using census data and statistics from *Badan Pusat Statistik*. Sources: BPS Sumatera Barat 2018, 173, 298, 306; BPS Sumatera Barat 2015, 199; BPS Sumatera Barat 2013, 193; BPS Sumatera Barat 2010, 61, 158; BPS Sumatera Barat 2009, 61, 155; BPS Sumatera Barat 2008, 65, 159, 165; BPS Sumatera Barat 2006, 57, 147; BPS Sumatera Barat 2005, 147; BPS Sumatera Barat 2002, 137; Indiyanto 2013, 25.

It is thus plausible to tentatively suggest that there might have been an increase in Islamisation in West Sumatra during *Reformasi*, in the aspect of personal piety demonstrated through performance of significant Islamic rituals. As such, this increase in piety would have been arguably demonstrated through the increased participation in *Qurban*, in terms of both human and animal participation. At the same time, it is plausible that this increased piety did not result in any significant increases in *hajj* pilgrim numbers, given the long waiting list and high cost of going on *hajj*, thus pious but disappointed *hajj* aspirants in West Sumatra might have found *Qurban* an easier ritual to fulfil instead. But the ability to confirm or debunk such a hypothesis is beyond the scope of this thesis.

Islamic Banking Services

Background and relevance

It is possible to characterise the growth of Islamic banking in Indonesia as almost a purely *Reformasi*-era event. Although Indonesia's first Islamic commercial bank, Bank Muamalat Indonesia, was founded in 1991, the growth of the industry only took off after the 1997-1998 economic crisis, when more Islamic banks began to emerge onto the scene (Juoro 2008, 229). Some scholars have suggested that this slow start was probably due to the *Orde Baru* regime's concerns about potential political challenges from religious issues and actors, even as the regime became more accommodating of Islamic groups within society during this time (Sari, Bahari, and Hamat 2016, 180). This post-*Orde Baru* growth in Islamic banking was also facilitated by the 1998 Banking Law that allowed conventional banks to provide Islamic banking services and defined the Islamic banking services available in Indonesia (Juoro 2008, 229). By 2007, there were a total of 142 Islamic banks in Indonesia, the majority (114) of which were *Bank Pembiayaan Rakyat Syariah* (BPRS) which were Islamic rural banks that had smaller capital investment requirements and offered only limited saving and financing services (Juoro 2008, 231-233). The remainder consisted of Islamic commercial banks and Islamic banking units owned by conventional banks (Juoro 2008, 233). As of June 2018, the number of Islamic banks in Indonesia had increased to 202, the majority (168) of which were BPRS (OJK 2018, 2).

Some Islamic banks in Indonesia appear to have assumed that personal religiosity was a key motivating reason for Muslims to utilise Islamic banking services, given their significant usage of Islamic symbols such as Quranic verses,

imagery of religious sites, hijab-wearing women, and Islamic terms in their advertisements to attract customers (Arham 2013, 215-219).

But personal religiosity is more likely to be one of many reasons, rather than the key reason, in motivating Muslims to consume Islamic banking products. Prior research by Thomas Pepinsky had suggested religiosity may not be a primary consideration for an individual to consume Islamic banking services (Pepinsky 2013, 162-163). At the same time, other research efforts have found that religiosity-related considerations such the bank's profit-sharing and loss-sharing practices (Setiawan, Panduwangi, and Sumintono 2018, 1657), and Islamic banks' non-usage of interest remain part of the reasons why consumers chose Islamic banking products (Abduh and Omar 2010, 9).

As it remains plausible that the popularity of Islamic banking in a locale is to some degree related to the personal religiosity of the locale's inhabitants, I will attempt to measure Islamisation in Central Java and West Sumatra by assessing the popularity of Islamic banking in these two provinces during *Reformasi*.

Measurements: Central Java

Statistics from Indonesia's central bank appear to suggest the popularity of Islamic banking in Central Java has increased during *Reformasi*. Between 2009 to 2015, the total yearly value of loans issued by Central Java's Islamic banks increased by four-fold for Islamic commercial banks and Islamic banking units, and five-fold for BPRS (see Tables 7 and 8). Similarly, both categories of Islamic banks experienced a

four-fold increase in the yearly total amount of funds deposited by its customers between 2009 and 2015 (see Tables 7 and 8).

Table 7. Activity of Islamic commercial banks and Islamic banking units in Central Java from 2009 to 2015 (billion rupiah)

Year	2009	2010	2011	2015
Loans issued by Islamic banks	2,611	4,170	5,759	11,172
As percentage of loans issued by non-Islamic commercial banks	2.9%	4.2%	4.7%	5.2%
Funds deposited into Islamic banks	2,241	3,391	4,232	10,576
As percentage of funds deposited into non-Islamic commercial banks	2.3%	3.2%	3.4%	4.9%

Sources: Bank Indonesia n.d.c, 40; Bank Indonesia n.d.b, 43; Bank Indonesia n.d.a, 43; OJK 2015, 43; Bank Indonesia 2010a, 45; Bank Indonesia 2011a, 37; Bank Indonesia 2012a, 31; Bank Indonesia 2016a, xii.

Table 8. Activity of *Bank Pembiayaan Rakyat Syariah* in Central Java from 2009 to 2015 (million rupiah)

Year	2009	2010	2011	2015
Loans issued	104,775	159,991	223,000	545,123
Funds deposited	107,152	137,560	179,000	466,908

Sources: Bank Indonesia n.d.c, 41; Bank Indonesia n.d.b, 44; Bank Indonesia n.d.a, 44; OJK 2015, 44.

Data from Indonesia's financial services authority (Otoritas Jasa Keuangan – OJK) indicated that the total value of loans issued by Islamic banks in Central Java continued to grow by around 14% per year for both 2017 and 2018, while the total value of funds deposited into Islamic banks in Central Java also grew by 20% in 2017 and 15% in 2018 (OJK 2017, 5; OJK 2018, 5). The OJK also ranked Central Java in both 2017 and 2018 as fifth among all Indonesian provinces in terms of total asset value for Islamic banks (OJK 2017, 4; OJK 2018, 4).

When compared against loans issued by and funds deposited with non-Islamic commercial banks, the data appears to suggest that an increased number of customers in Central Java are doing business with Islamic banks as compared to non-Islamic commercial banks between 2009 to 2016, although it should be noted that most of such financial services transactions are still performed with non-Islamic banks (see Table 7).

As such, it is possible that Islamisation may have taken place in Central Java in terms of the steady growth of popularity of Islamic banking within the province, although this conclusion should not be overstated given the lack of clarity on the growth in customer base, and the rationale of these new customers for using Islamic banking services.

Measurements: West Sumatra

It appears that the popularity of Islamic banking in West Sumatra experienced a similar increase, but perhaps on a slightly smaller scale. Between 2009 to 2015, the yearly total value of loans issued by West Sumatra's Islamic banks increased by four-fold for Islamic commercial banks and Islamic banking units, and two-fold for BPRS (see Tables 9 and 10). As for the yearly total amount of funds deposited between 2009 and 2015, the amount grew three-fold for Islamic commercial banks and Islamic banking units, and two-fold for BPRS (see Tables 9 and 10).

Table 9. Activity of Islamic commercial banks and Islamic banking units in West Sumatra from 2009 to 2015 (billion rupiah)

Year	2009	2010	2011	2015
Loans issued by Islamic banks	833	1,469	2,386	3,599
As percentage of loans issued by non-Islamic commercial banks	4.9%	7.2%	8.3%	7.5%
Funds deposited into Islamic banks	839	1,288	1,578	2,598
As percentage of funds deposited into non-Islamic commercial banks	5.2%	6.8%	6.9%	7.9%

Sources: Bank Indonesia n.d.c, 40; Bank Indonesia n.d.b, 43; Bank Indonesia n.d.a, 43; OJK 2015, 43; Bank Indonesia 2010b, 23; Bank Indonesia 2011b, 37; Bank Indonesia 2012b, 46; Bank Indonesia 2016b, 43.

Table 10. Activity of *Bank Pembiayaan Rakyat Syariah* in West Sumatra from 2009 to 2015 (million rupiah)

Year	2009	2010	2011	2015
Loans issued	56,656	72,258	91,000	138,525
Funds deposited	49,529	66,365	75,000	120,790

Sources: Bank Indonesia n.d.c, 41; Bank Indonesia n.d.b, 44; Bank Indonesia n.d.a, 44; OJK 2015, 44.

Data from OJK indicated that growth in total value of funds deposited for Islamic banks in West Sumatra continued apace in 2017 and 2018 with around 11% growth each year, while the total value of loans issued decreased by around 1% for both years (OJK 2017, 5; OJK 2018, 5).

When compared against loans issued by and funds deposited with non-Islamic commercial banks, the data appears to suggest that generally an increasing number of customers in West Sumatra are doing business with Islamic banks as compared to non-Islamic commercial banks between 2009 to 2016, although it should be noted that

most of such financial services transactions are still performed with non-Islamic banks (see Table 9).

Although West Sumatra's growth rates for Islamic banking were relatively less impressive than those witnessed in Central Java over the same time period, there is arguably enough growth in Islamic banking in West Sumatra during *Reformasi* to suggest that some Islamisation in the form of increased popularity of Islamic banking had also taken place in the province. But the caveats against overstating this conclusion for Central Java would also apply to West Sumatra, as there is also a lack of clarity on the growth in customer base, and the rationale of these new customers for using Islamic banking services in the case for West Sumatra.

Arabic Names

Background and relevance

In recent decades, there has been a discernible increase in the adoption of cultural and social behaviour from Arabia into Indonesia, often done under the impression that the Arabic behaviour in question is worth adopting as it is more Islamic. Examples include the adoption of dressing styles associated with the Arab Middle East and eschewing dressing styles associated with Indonesia or the West, and the usage of Arabic phrases in everyday conversations instead of their Indonesian equivalents, such as using the Arabic greeting "*as-salam alaykum*" (which is also deemed to be more Islamic) instead of an Indonesian equivalent such as "*selamat pagi*" (Bruinessen 2018, 2-3). This preference for adopting Arabic cultural markers has extended into naming practices.

Measurements: Central Java

A 2016 study conducted in three villages of different socio-economic status within Central Java's Klaten regency revealed that about 17.5% of the inhabitants of these three villages possessed Arabic names (Aribowo and Herawati 2016, 118). Upon further analysis, around 80% of these Arabic-named inhabitants were children, which is indicative of a recent *Reformasi*-era increase in interest by parents in giving their children Arabic names (Aribowo and Herawati 2016, 118-119). A separate 2014 study into naming conventions used by the inhabitants of Central Java's Kudus regency also found that one common type of names that Kudus' inhabitants were likely to have were names utilising Arabic words denoting beauty, piety or greatness (Widodo 2014, 159).

In the absence of comprehensive data about naming conventions for the rest of Central Java, it can be deduced that these preferences for Arabic names are not confined to these specific villages and regencies in Central Java, as other studies have found similar trends in regions neighbouring Central Java. A 2017 study of Yogyakarta's Bantul regency and East Java's Lamongan regency and Lumajang regency had revealed a general increase since the 1990s in the bestowal of both Arabic names and hybrid names involving Arabic elements in these regions (Kuipers and Askuri 2017, 36-45).

Thus it can be presumed that some level of Islamisation had taken place in Central Java during the *Reformasi* time period, in the form of more of Central Java's inhabitants bestowing Arabic names to their children in what is likely to be their effort to assume an identity that they perceive to be more Islamic. Unfortunately, I am

unable to conduct a similar analysis for West Sumatra due to the lack of similar prior studies into naming practices in that province.

Chapter 3

Analysis

At this stage, I will aggregate and discuss my findings regarding the assessed extent of Islamisation in Central Java and West Sumatra, before comparing these findings against each other for further insights.

Central Java

It is possible to tentatively conclude from my findings that Islamisation took place in Central Java during *Reformasi*, and that this Islamisation was primarily manifested in the personal and private domains in the form of an increased tendency to associate with Islam during decision-making for personal issues. This ranged from the relatively mundane, such as an increased preference for Islamic banking services, and possibly also going to the mosque more often or supporting mosque-building projects, or for relatively major life decisions such as deciding to have one's children obtain an Islamic education, giving these children Arabic names, and setting aside a significant sum of money to perform the *hajj* pilgrimage.

But this Islamisation does not appear to extend to the public sphere. Support for Islamic political parties has not grown in Central Java despite Islamisation. One possible explanation, derived from Merle Calvin Ricklefs' study of Islamisation in Java is that as non-Islamic political parties had during *Reformasi* begun to routinely use Islamic symbols as part of their electoral campaigns, (Ricklefs 2012, 276-277), there might have been little reason for Islamised voters to switch their votes in favour

of an Islamic political party. Central Java's politicians have generally avoided implementing *perda syariah*, probably in part due to the limited support for Islamic political parties in the province. There also appears to be little appetite among intolerant Muslims in the province to publicly display their intolerant beliefs.

But more research would be needed to pinpoint exactly which segments of Central Java's population has been Islamised, as this would better explain the presence or absence of Islamisation-related phenomena. For example, if Islamisation was taking place primarily among those who usually voted for Islamic political parties, one would not expect Islamisation in Central Java to lead to substantial gains for Islamic political parties in the immediate future. Nevertheless, it remains possible that continued Islamisation in the long-term may result in the emergence of more Islamisation-related phenomena across society in its various aspects.

West Sumatra

It is also possible to tentatively conclude from these findings that Islamisation has also taken place in West Sumatra during *Reformasi*. Utilising the same public-private dichotomy, it can be assessed that Islamisation had also manifested in the form of an increased tendency by Muslims to associate with Islam during their decision-making for personal and private issues. For example, generally more Muslims in West Sumatra during *Reformasi* can be said to be using Islamic banking services, possibly going to the mosque more often or supporting mosque-building projects, participating in *Qurban* rituals, and perhaps also deciding on an Islamic education for their children.

Unlike Central Java, Islamisation in West Sumatra has manifested in the public sphere. A significant portion of West Sumatra's almost wholly-Muslim electorate has demonstrated a propensity to vote for Islamic political parties and candidates, including for Islamist politicians running on an Islam-heavy platform such as West Sumatra's current governor, Irwan Prayitno. Possibly partly encouraged by this pro-Islam vote-bank, West Sumatra's politicians have introduced a significant amount of *perda Syariah* in the province.

Given the presence of Islamisation in both public and private spheres, questions about the presence of causality between the two spheres naturally follows. I would suggest that it is more likely that private and personal beliefs are influencing public and political behaviour, rather than vice-versa. Prior research in recent decades has indicated that the Minangkabau, who form the majority of West Sumatra's inhabitants, were significantly Islamised in their personal beliefs and behaviour to begin with (Keddie 1987, 1-2; Simon 2012, 238-242), thus making it more likely that the policies and platforms adopted by *Reformasi*-era politicians in West Sumatra were their attempts to appeal to an electorate believed to be already pious.

Thus it is also possible to similarly perceive the widespread implementation of *perda Syariah* in West Sumatra as attempts at winning support from a generally pious electorate. For example, given that prior research has suggested that a significant number of Minangkabau families and schools require adolescent females to adhere to *adat* (customary traditions) and Islamic teachings on female modesty (Parker 2009, 67-68, 88-90), the implementation of *perda Syariah* requiring Muslim females to dress modestly in West Sumatra may be better perceived as the public and official

acknowledgement of pre-existing personal and private beliefs that are widely held within society, rather as a top-down Islamist attempt at shaping and controlling private behaviour.

Nevertheless, detailed research beyond the scope of this thesis would be required to pinpoint with greater clarity the nature of such public-private causations within these different aspects of Islamisation. In the meantime, these trends of Islamisation, both public and private, are likely to continue apace in West Sumatra.

Comparing Central Java and West Sumatra

It is also possible to compare the findings for Central Java against those for West Sumatra to characterise their state of Islamisation relative to each other. Within the realm of politics and governance, there is little doubt that West Sumatra is more Islamised in its ways than Central Java in view of West Sumatra's greater tendency to elect Islamic politicians, and the substantially greater number of *perda Syariah* in place in West Sumatra.

But despite this difference, the findings on private and personal choices made by individual Muslims suggest that the Muslim populations of both provinces have been Islamised to a similar degree during *Reformasi*. Regarding the degree of preference for an Islamic education for their children, both provinces have experienced largely similar substantial increases at both primary, lower secondary and upper secondary levels, with the only substantial difference being found in *pesantren* enrolment rates, where Central Java experienced a three-fold increase while there was no significant change for West Sumatra. A similar case can be made for mosque-

building efforts and the popularity of Islamic banking services in both provinces, where both provinces experienced roughly similar increases in mosques built and the degree of increase in the popularity of Islamic banking services.

The only parameter where a substantial difference between the two provinces is apparent would be the number of pilgrims who embarked on the *hajj* pilgrimage during *Reformasi*. In this parameter, the overall 77% increase in Central Java's yearly pilgrim rate from 1998-2017 clearly dwarfed the figures from West Sumatra, which essentially fluctuated and remained similar during this 20-year period. But it is not conclusive that this difference is indicative of lower piety levels in West Sumatra, given the hefty financial costs and long waiting time involved in performing the *hajj*, and findings that suggest increased piety among West Sumatran Muslims manifested through increased participation in religious rituals during *Qurban*.

Thus while my findings suggest that both provinces can be characterised as experiencing Islamisation during *Reformasi*, they also allow a depiction of West Sumatra as an area that has experienced more Islamisation as compared to Central Java, particularly in the public sphere of politics and governance. These findings are generally in line with earlier studies and observations about the increased role and influence of Islam in Indonesian politics and society during *Reformasi*.

At the same time, these findings also surface the hypothesis that contrary to existing perceptions, the Minangkabau may not necessarily be significantly more

pious or religiously observant than other Indonesians.[12] This is because, as was mentioned earlier, the findings suggest that regarding personal and private issues, Muslims in both West Sumatra and Central Java have experienced Islamisation in several similar aspects of their lives. Thus there are grounds to suspect that apart from the Javanese Muslims from Central Java, other Muslims in Indonesia may also have become more Islamised in recent decades, thus rendering Minangkabau religiosity less exceptional in today's Indonesia. Further research beyond the scope of this thesis would be required to investigate this hypothesis.

Separately, the findings also suggest that increased Islamisation in the private and personal spheres may not necessarily result in changes in voting behaviour that favours Islamic political parties and candidates. This argument is most evident in the case of West Sumatra, where the vote-share of Islamic political parties in the provincial DPRD and the number of Islamic politicians from the province elected as DPR legislators decreased during *Reformasi* even as the almost wholly Muslim electorate was arguably becoming more Islamised at the same time. Similarly, the increased Islamisation of the population in Central Java did not appear to lead to any substantial gains for Islamic political parties and their candidates. Further research would be required to confirm and understand this phenomenon.

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[12] According to the 2010 census, 65% of Indonesia's Minangkabau reside in West Sumatra. Riau is a distant second with 10%, followed by North Sumatra (5%), Jakarta (4%) and West Java (4%) (Na'im and Syaputra 2011, 36).

Chapter 4

Evaluation

I will now conclude this thesis with a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the methodology used to measure Islamisation in this thesis. To recap, the primary objective of this methodology was to facilitate the formation of meaningful *prima facie* assessments and observations about the state of Islamisation within a community, which can then be deployed to identify specific issues of concern and rationalise further research into these issues. This methodology was then tested out via two case studies where said methodology was applied to the Indonesian provinces of Central Java and West Sumatra.

The case study had successfully demonstrated the methodology's ability to aggregate and synthesise measurements about Islamisation in a heuristical manner across a variety of fields and subjects over a broad timespan, to produce broad yet meaningful and useful assessments regarding Islamisation. For example, this methodology has allowed me to assess that while both the Muslim populations in Central Java and West Sumatra have experienced Islamisation in their personal and private lives during *Reformasi*, West Sumatra appears to be slightly more Islamised than West Java as Islamisation has also taken place in West Sumatra's politics and governance. My findings from the case studies have also identified areas of potential further research, namely that the Minangkabau today may not be significantly more pious or religiously observant than other Indonesians, and that the Islamisation of

culture and society might not necessarily lead to better electoral performances for Islamic political parties and politicians.

The case studies have also identified a key weakness of this method, which is that the measurements obtained from the parameters used may not necessarily be indicative of Islamisation. For example, a Muslim individual's decision to enrol their children in an Islamic school need not necessarily stem from religious reasons, as non-religious reasons such as proximity and the local reputation of a specific school are equally plausible. While this methodology has attempted to solve this problem by aggregating results at the provincial level, so as to capitalise on the working assumption that religious motivations are more likely to be represented in a larger sample size, this then leads to the possibility that the actual degree of Islamisation denoted by each measurement may vary from what the figures from each measurement appear to profess.

Nevertheless, this weakness can be regarded as an inevitability given that the methodology is focused on producing a broad trend-based analysis, as opposed to a detailed investigative approach that would entail the careful exploration of the multiple possibilities of causality behind each specific data point.

To conclude with a maddening aphorism, I would suggest that despite these drawbacks, this proposed methodology for measuring Islamisation is usable and has utility, so long as the methodology is deployed correctly, and its results interpreted appropriately.

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