ESSAYS ON IMMIGRATION, RELIGION & ASSIMILATION IN WESTERN EUROPE

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ESSAYS ON IMMIGRATION, RELIGION & ASSIMILATION IN WESTERN

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The dissertation investigates the role of religion and religious difference in the process of assimilation between immigrants and native populations in Western Europe. To do so, it asks a set of interrelated research questions: how does cultural difference affect assimilation? How do Muslims immigrant population culturally adapt to the secular context of Western European nation-states? How does upward mobility impact the acculturation patterns and experiences of religious stigma among the rising immigrant elite? Three separate studies provide answers to these questions. The first study is a large, theoretically-driven review of the last decade of immigrant incorporation scholarship in America and Western Europe. Through a comparative lens, it identifies large empirical trends toward assimilation, but also the unique role played by religious and cultural difference in the European context - a role not foreseen in assimilation theory. The second study uses large-scale survey data from France to investigate assimilation between Muslim immigrants and natives in terms of religiosity. Using a unique research design, it uncovers the role of parental socialization and perceived discrimination in shaping a religiosity surplus among Muslims compared to the reference population. The third article, a qualitative analyses of the subjective experience of upwardly mobile immigrants in France, uses thirty-eight in-depth interviews to provide a first empirical look at the rising immigrant elite. It shows that non-Muslim immigrants typically feel they have achieved status and respect in the French community, while Muslim immigrants generally still feel like cultural outsiders despite high levels of socioeconomic attainment.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lucas Drouhot was born and raised in Dijon, France. Prior to beginning his doctoral work at Cornell University, he obtained a *Licence* in Political Science from the University of Lyon and a Bachelor of Arts in Sociology from McGill University. His research interests are in the study of international migration and immigrant incorporation, with a focus on social stratification and social networks. In Fall 2018, he will begin an appointment as a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity in Göttingen, Germany.

Pour ma mère, Pascale Cantoni (1957-2013), et Lorène, my life companion

extraordinaire

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Dominant theoretical models of immigrant incorporation, from the early Chicago school to the theoretical synthesis operated by Milton Gordon (1965), and to contemporary theories of segmented (Portes and Zhou 1993) and neo- (Alba and Nee 2003) assimilation, never seriously considered religion and religious difference to be critical dimensions of the assimilation process. In Gordon's canonical theory of assimilation, the acquisition of the host society's symbols, codes and norms represented a necessary first step, but the bulk of assimilation revolved around "structural assimilation" - the interpenetration of immigrants' and natives' social circles. More recently, segmented assimilation theory has emphasized skin color and ethnic resources as a structural factors shaping the opportunities and trajectories of the children of immigrants due to racial stratification in the United States, while neoassimilation theory has focused on the role of the law in favoring equal opportunity for success and social mobility in the post-Civil Rights United States .

A lack of engagement with religion as a critical dimension of assimilation reflects the particular purview of immigration scholars thinking and writing about assimilation in America - a settler society celebrating cultural diversity, hyphenated identities and freedom of religion, and where to believe is, by and large, to belong. Yet such defining aspect of the American mainstream can hardly be assumed to be the same in the older nation-states of Western Europe - a regional context where, by contrast, centuries of intense military rivalry have resulted in a tighter integration of state, territory, culture and the imagined community of belonging. In particular, a legacy of religious wars has led to the progressive secularization of European nation-states, and uniformly low levels of religious participation and identification among their native populations.

Seen in such broad historical light, contemporary debates about multiculturalism and the accommodation of ethnic and religious diversity, figuring so prominently in contemporary European politics, should not be surprising. These national conversations, following the rhythm of election cycles, reveal the stronger links between cultural homogeneity and social cohesion in Western Europe compared to settler societies like the United States. The bulk of these tensions has progressively evolved to focus on religious difference rather than any other cultural dimension, such as language and ethnicity (Brubaker 2015). In this process, the guest workers of yesteryear who participated in the postwar reconstruction of Europe became, along with their children, European Muslims - a large immigrant minority standing out in the European context not due to racial, ethnic, or class difference but through the religious norms and symbolic systems associated with Islam. The recurring controversies generated by the legal qua societal accommodation of Islam across Europe (Joppke and Torpey 2013, Koopmans 2005) sheds light on the absence of a policy blueprint for the successful incorporation of cultural difference. This, too, is a legacy of the history, and the mode of entry of Muslim populations in Europe, one that was not planned or anticipated by European states as the First Oil Shock in 1973, and the recession that followed, put an abrupt end to the rotating migration flows of guest workers (Laurence 2016). Many of them, along with their families, chose to stay in Europe out of fear that they would not be able to come back after returning to their countries of origin, thus finding themselves permanent immigrants without having really elected to do so.

In this dissertation, I focus on the incorporation trajectories of Muslim immigrants and their children in Western Europe, with a particular empirical focus on the French case. In doing so, I adopt and adapt the theoretical tools developed by American immigration scholars to study cultural and religious adaptation in the European context, and ask a set of interrelated research questions: how does cultural difference affect assimila-

tion? How do Muslims immigrant population culturally adapt to the secular context of Western European nation-states? How does upward mobility impact the acculturation patterns and experiences of religious stigma among the rising immigrant elite?

Three separate studies provide answers to these questions. The first study is a large, theoretically-driven review of the last decade of immigrant incorporation scholarship in America and Western Europe. Through a comparative lens, it identifies large empirical trends toward assimilation in both context. Specifically, the review shows that the children of immigrants in contemporary Europe overwhelmingly experiences trajectories of assimilation - that is, slow progress in educational and socioeconomic attainment net of the modest social origins of their parents. This absence of a strong ethnic penalty on life chances, however, belies the increasingly salient influence of religious affiliation and religious difference on economic, relational and cultural outcomes of immigrant incorporation. We identify a circular, segregating dynamic in which religion and religious affiliation are heavily transmitted by first-generation parents, on one hand, and uniquely stigmatized and constructed as culturally alien by European natives. This scenario, in which initial class inequality and religious difference interact to endogenously reproduce and reinforce cultural difference in the context of reception, suggest a revision of neo-assimilation theory to include a formal theoretical proposition on the co-evolution of cultural difference and social closure.

The second study uses large-scale survey data from France to investigate assimilation between Muslim immigrants and natives in terms of religiosity. In this chapter, I formulate and implement a unique research design allowing me to put to work influential propositions on population heterogeneity found both in segmented and neoassimilation theories - namely, that the native mainstream is composite and cannot be reduced to a single, homogeneous core (Alba and Nee 2003), and that immigrant incorporation tra-

jectories are diverse (Portes and Zhou 1993). Using large-scale survey data from the French census bureau and the French Demographic Institute, I find that French natives are made of four, major subgroups at the intersection of age and social class. Among these subgroups, religiosity varies but remains very low. I then match a large sample of self-identified Muslim respondents to the subgroup in the French reference population they are socially closer to. While I find that Muslim themselves are a diverse social group, I document the existence of a sizable and consistent religiosity surplus. I show the religiosity surplus to be closely related to parental socialization, the perception of various forms of discrimination and the maintenance of transnational ties. Through an original, theoretically-driven research design, this chapter documents an essential social fact - the existence of a sizable cultural difference between immigrants and natives that, in turn, helps explain other important results in the literature. Very low rates of intermarriage and national identification, as well as the difference in societal attitudes documented among Muslim families - typically much more conservative than natives - documented in past work in Europe all relate, in part or in whole, to the higher levels of religiosity found among Muslim immigrants and their children compared to the native populations in the host society.

The third study is a qualitative analyses of the subjective experience of upwardly mobile immigrants in France. Using thirty-eight in-depth interviews with immigrant professionals of North and Sub-Saharan African origin, I find that individuals who perceive or experience racial stigma mobilize cultural elitism - a characteristic feature of the culture of the French upper-middle class as documented by Bourdieu (1979) and Lamont (1992) - to deflect racism, and present it as a quintessentially un-French manifestation of social backwardness. This result, which sheds light on the important role of cultural scripts, symbols and narratives to claim belonging, do not extend to Muslim respondents. Rather, I find that Muslims face a type of religious stigma that is more in-

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tense than racism insofar as it is socially legitimate - e.g., involving progressive concerns for gender equality and security among natives in post-terror France. Rather than countering stigma by mobilizing cultural elitism, Muslim respondents in this study try to fit in by managing everyday interactions to appear as "integrated" Muslims in the eyes of French natives. In other words, I find that Muslim respondents to have considerable difficulty converting high levels of socioeconomic attainment into cultural membership in French society - i.e., being valued, honorable members of the national community. The particular predicament faced by Muslim respondents in this study, and the sharp contrast presented by non-Muslim interviewees, suggests a rethinking of the links between social mobility and belonging assumed to be non-problematic in assimilation theory. It suggests, in particular, attending to the independent role of cultural repertoires in enabling and disabling claims to belonging among immigrants, and thus considering institutionalized legal equality as a necessary but insufficient condition for assimilation and the full inclusion of immigrant newcomers and their children.

CHAPTER 2

**ASSIMILATION AND THE SECOND GENERATION IN EUROPE AND
AMERICA: BLENDING AND SEGREGATING SOCIAL DYNAMICS
BETWEEN IMMIGRANTS AND NATIVES**

Introduction

Over the last decades, international migration has led to unprecedented ethnic, racial
and religious diversity within Western liberal societies[1]. Comparative figures from na-
tional census bureaus and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) suggest that, as of the early 2010s, the proportion of foreign-born hov-
ers between 10% - France, Spain - and 20%, as in Belgium (Alba and Foner 2015,
OECD/European Union 2015) (Alba and Foner 2015, OECD/European Union 2015).
Including native-born children with at least one immigrant parent, immigrant groups
constitute 16% of the population in Spain, 19% in the UK, 20% in the Netherlands,
20% in Germany, 21% in Norway, 24% in the United States, 26% in France, 28% in
Sweden, and 30% in Belgium (OECD/European Union 2015, 17). Whether or not these
new immigrants and their children are achieving full membership in their country of
settlement, however, remains an open empirical question. Is there or isn't there a trend
of increasing social similarity over time and generations leading to the erosion of social
boundaries distinguishing immigrants from natives? In this article, we review recent
empirical work on immigrant incorporation on both sides of the Atlantic-specifically the
United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway,
Spain and Belgium. Our aim is to synthesize research findings published within the last
decade detailing blending and segregating processes in the incorporation of immigrants

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[1]This chapter was co-authored with Victor Nee.

and the second generation across these national contexts.

The United States' origin as an immigrant nation is reflected in its Constitution, empowering Congress "to establish an uniform rule of naturalization" for citizenship. In Western Europe by contrast, conceptions of the national community have historically been more cultural in character, and their populations more homogenous. But there too, large-scale immigration has led to accommodative efforts to extend citizenship rights to immigrants and their children. Our review of the literature shows that the overall observed pattern in both the United States and Western Europe is one of assimilation: a process of social convergence leading to a gradual erosion of ethnic, racial, religious and other differences as determinants of life chances for immigrants and their children (Alba and Nee 2003).

Comparing and contrasting immigrant trajectories in Western Europe and North America, however, we find the assimilation process to be contingent upon path-dependent and culturally specific factors. Regarding the United States, numerous studies point to legal status as a key causal factor channeling immigrants and their children in specific incorporation pathways. For Western Europe, by contrast, a new literature has emerged identifying religion-and specifically the Muslim/non-Muslim distinction-as a potent symbolic divide affecting assimilation.

Assimilation is a complex and multidimensional convergence process occurring at socioeconomic (resource distributions and socioeconomic attainment), relational (preference in marriage and friendship, extent of intergroup contact and trust) and cultural (subjective feeling of belonging, being considered "one of us" by the majority group, engaging in cultural practices identified with immigrant community at little or no social costs at all) levels. These dimensions are, of course, causally linked. Regardless of such interrelation, each dimension can be examined separately as a distinct signal of the

incorporation process, involving a varying degree of blending or segregating dynamics.

Our definition of assimilation considers the agency of both immigrants and natives in the maintenance or the erosion of the distinctions between them. It designates a mutual process of convergence: immigrants come to resemble natives over time and vice versa. Cumulatively, the intermixing of people and cultures contributes to a self-reinforcing, evolutionary remaking of mainstream society with respect to the social groups that encompass the imagined communities of the nation state (Anderson 1991). Assimilation does not imply homogenization of immigrant identity and culture towards a specific core as a necessary endpoint, although such homogenization may occur. We rather conceive of assimilation as the declining significance of context-specific markers of difference-like race, ethnicity or religion-in the lives of immigrants and their children.

We view assimilation as a possible outcome of the generic process of incorporation and prefer this term to the more one-sided and race-related (at least in the US) concept of integration. The extent of intergenerational change in specific empirical measures between the first and the second generation remains a crucial yardstick to evaluate assimilation, and the one we focus on in our review.

2.1 Diverse assimilation trajectories in America

The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 has, in a fifty-year period, progressively reshaped the American demographic landscape with new immigration flows from Asia, Central and Latin America, and to a lesser extent Africa and the West Indies.

2.1.1 Intergenerational progress in socioeconomic attainment

General and large-scale studies relying on survey data, such as White and Glick (2009) and Waters and Pineau (2015), describe an overall trend of assimilation in socioeconomic outcomes like educational attainment, earnings and occupations among contemporary immigrants in the US. Echoing findings from an earlier study (Kasinitz et al. 2008) of the second generation in New York City, Waters and Pineau (2015) and Duncan and Trejo (2015) find that second generation members of most immigrant groups reach or exceed the educational attainment of third plus generation White natives. Feliciano and Lanuza (2017) show that the "second generation advantage" of children of immigrants typically reflects the class background of their parents, who transmit aspirations for high relative status in the country of destination based on their social position-measured in terms of relative educational attainment-in the country of origin. The most recent representative data from Census-sponsored surveys unambiguously confirms this overall trend of substantial intergenerational progress in educational attainment across all immigrant groups (Duncan and Trejo 2018, Tran 2018).

Beyond this general picture portraying the overall trend, there is of course a heterogeneous social reality. Hsin and Xie (2014) use nationally representative longitudinal survey data to document a persistent academic advantage of Asian Americans over Whites, which they and others (Lee and Zhou 2015) attribute to family-level human capital and norms of academic achievement prevalent among selective immigrant groups from East and South Asia. Importantly, even the children of less well-educated working class parents appear to benefit from spill-over effects of high academic achievement of middle-class Chinese immigrant and second generation children (Kasinitz et al. 2008). By contrast, immigrants from Central America and Mexico tend to have much lower educational attainment levels and appear to lack organizational resources

enabling information sharing and strategies for getting ahead in the public school system[2]. Notwithstanding this, the second generation makes notable progress, completing on average three to four more years of education than their parents (Waters and Pineau 2015: 249-255, Bean et al. 2015 chapter 4, Duncan and Trejo 2018) and massively enrolling in American colleges (Pew Hispanic Center 2013).

High average rates of educational attainment translate into white-collar occupations for a sizable proportion of the second generation. This is obviously the case among the children of Asian immigrants, whose widespread progress into benchmark occupations of socioeconomic success such as engineering, science, medicine and law has been well documented (Lee and Zhou 2015, Sakamoto et al. 2009). Importantly, it can also be observed among the children of immigrant parents who arrived in the United States with relatively low educational and occupational attainments. At 28% and 32.5% respectively, second generation Mexicans and Central Americans-the descendants of the most socially disadvantaged groups-are approximately three times more likely to be in managerial and professional positions compared to their foreign-born peers (Waters and Pineau, chapter 6). More generally, there is little evidence for Mexican or Latino stagnation or decline across generations. Although later generation Mexicans are typically thought to be at a high risk of downward mobility, Luthra and Waldinger (2010) instead report that they are actually much less likely than their parents to cluster in low-paying and unstable jobs. Tran and Valdez (2015) report important progress in occupational attainment from the immigrant to the second generation for all Latino groups.

This general pattern of upward social mobility is reflected in declining rates of spatial segregation across generations for most immigrant groups (Iceland 2009) and also

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[2]Nee and Hilbrow (2013) suggest that the high academic achievement of immigrant and second-generation groups from Asia not only can be attributed to selectivity, but to lower relative numbers of undocumented immigrants in these immigrant steams. The higher relative numbers of undocumented Mexican and Central American immigrants is not surprising given the greater distance between East and South Asia and the United States

in the emergence of middle-class residential neighborhoods inhabited by high-achieving immigrant minorities-the so-called ethnoburbs (Li 2009, Logan and Zheng 2010). This dynamic of spatial attainment is not limited to Asian immigrants. Using data from Los Angeles, Bean et al. (2015, chapter 6) show that the Mexican second generation's typical neighborhoods have higher levels of education and a lower percentage of co-ethnics and of poverty, and that this trend continues in the third generation. Recent work on the wealth accumulation of Mexican Americans and other Latinos similarly point to a cumulative pattern of upward mobility over the life course despite significant economic hurdles among the first generation (Keister, Vallejo and Borelli 2015).

2.1.2 Blending dynamics induced by social mobility

Continuous large-scale migration may complicate the second generation's attempts to craft symbolic or optional forms of ethnic identity, as it may give rise to issues of cultural authenticity within the immigrant community (Jiménez 2010). Nonetheless, socially successful Mexican Americans commonly integrate middle-class and Mexican identities, experiencing upward mobility while also maintaining ethnic solidarity with less fortunate members of the community (Vallejo 2012). This produces a type of social capital based on ethnic organizations and middle-class role models reminiscent of the collective culture of achievement and mobility found in many Asian American communities (Lee and Zhou 2015). Although social mobility leads some to identify as White (Emeka and Vallejo 2011), middle-class members of immigrant groups often maintain hyphenated identities in which ethnic belonging and socioeconomic success are not mutually exclusive (Vallejo 2012, Jiménez and Horowitz 2013). The ethnic culture of Korean and Indian professionals, in particular, portends a broader patterns of assimilation wherein ethnic identity becomes largely unproblematic (Dhingra 2007).

Research on intermarriage similarly points to a blurring of ethnic and racial boundaries. Despite replenishment of the pool of marriageable co-ethnics through continued migration (Lichter, Carmalt and Qian 2011), intermarriage rates have been rising steadily since the 1980s (Alba and Foner 2015 chapter 9). A majority of native-born Asian Americans now intermarry, most often with Whites-a pattern reflecting their high socioeconomic attainment, which leads to opportunities to marry with the native majority group (Min and Kim 2010). Meanwhile, research on dating preferences among Latinos suggests inclusive attitudes rather than strong tastes for same-race partners, despite persistent exclusionary attitudes among Whites (Feliciano, Lee and Robnett 2011). Consequentially, there is an increasing number of children from mixed unions and individuals identifying as biracial (Alba, Beck and Sahin 2017).

2.1.3 The explanatory power of class rather than race in the post-Civil Rights era

To a significant extent, human and cultural capital and family economic resources explain differences in socioeconomic mobility of the second generation across immigrant groups. In the present era, class has more explanatory power than does race. Taking such relative socioeconomic position into account, the contemporary, post-Civil Rights American immigrant story thus appears to be, overall, one of assimilation moderated by the selective power of formal immigration law and general dynamics of social reproduction. Most Asian immigrant groups, whose demographic composition has been drastically shaped by 1965 Hart-Celler Act, are thus assimilating into the American mainstream (Nee and Holbrow 2013, Lee and Zhou 2015; see Sakamoto et al. 2009 for a review), while the trajectories of Hispanic immigrants shows slow if significant

progress (Morgan and Gelbgiser 2014, Luthra and Waldinger 2010, Tran and Valdez 2015, Bean et al. 2015, Tran 2018).

We find very little evidence in the recent literature for the pattern of "downward assimilation" that Portes and Zhou's (1993) segmented assimilation theory predicted for immigrant minorities in America's central cities. Of special importance here is the incorporation of West Indian and African immigrants. Rather than a dominant trend of downward assimilation towards a racialized underclass, empirical research describes an overall pattern of schooling success among the US born children of black immigrant families, especially compared to their native counterparts (Thomas 2009). This pattern is driven by class selectivity among Black (especially African) migrant families, resulting in high status aspirations and achievement norms in the United States (Imoagene 2017).

More generally, we observe heterogeneous incorporation trajectories shaped by family economic resources and family structure (Elo et al. 2015, Thomas 2009, Kasinitz et al. 2008, Sakamoto et al. 2009). This is not to say, of course, that race does not affect the subjective experience of belonging among non-White members of the second generation in the US, as recent studies on Latino (e.g. Frank et al. 2010, Vallejo 2012) and Black (e.g. Clerge 2014, Imoagene 2017) show it does. Likewise, the Black/White boundary remains important for intermarriage (Alba and Foner 2015 chapter 9). Yet, there is no recent study systematically demonstrating that the life chances and incorporation trajectories of non-White members of the second generation are structurally shaped by race[3]. Rather, within-group differences in such trajectories (see Alba, Jiménez and

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[3]Three prominent studies published in the last ten years warrant closer discussion. In their impressive longitudinal study of Mexican Americans in Los Angeles and San Antonio, Telles and Ortiz (2008) argue that slow educational progress of Mexican immigrants beyond the second generation reflects a dynamic of racialization. Yet, their own analysis shows that skin tone has no effect. More importantly, variation is their respondents' occupational attainment reflects their endowment in human capital, while one would expect racialization to nullify the effect of human capital on occupational attainment. The second study, by Haller, Portes and Lynch (2011) uses survey data from Florida and California and argue that the Mexican and Black Caribbean second generations are experiencing downward assimilation due to their race. Yet, their analysis shows ethnic and racial penalties for educational and occupational attainments

Marrow 2014, Elo et al. 2015) suggest that racialization and its associated socioeconomic straits are neither inevitable nor uniform for non-White immigrant groups in America.

2.2 The coming of age of the second generation in Western Europe

The contemporary de facto multiculturalism in Western Europe is, in great part, the legacy of yesteryear's guest worker programs launched during the economic boom of the postwar period, particularly the 1960s. France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands relied on their ties to their ex-colonies while Germany, Belgium, Sweden and Norway relied on bilateral treaties for supplies of labor. A system of temporary contracts thus brought large numbers of workers from Southern Europe, North Africa, Turkey, Pakistan, and to a lesser extent Southeast Asia and the Caribbean to Europe. After the 1973 oil shock crisis, this recruitment of guest workers abruptly stopped. However, many of these migrants stayed on in the destination countries, and migration flows shifted, at once, to family reunification. Migrant workers and their families thus became permanent migrants. Asylum seekers from Chile, Vietnam, Yugoslavia and the Middle East also fed migration flows in the late 20th century. The historical narrative for Spain is somewhat different: The immigrant population in Spain, while substantial, primarily dates back to the early 21st century; it has been fueled by immigrants from other European member states and from South America.

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largely vanish once school level factors and educational aspirations are controlled for. Both studies provide relatively weak empirical evidence for a strong effect of ethnic or racial background on incorporation outcomes net of class and other characteristics. Finally, Pager et al. (2009) use experimental evidence and convincingly show that discrimination in hiring and job channeling affects Latinos as much as Blacks in the low-wage market, but the study is not focused on immigrant groups. More evidence of this type focusing explicitly on the incorporation of immigrants - rather than racial groups - in labor markets and other institutional domains is needed to ascertain the effect of systematic ethnoracial discrimination on progress towards assimilation.

2.2.1 Intergenerational progress in socioeconomic attainment

As in the United States, review of the recent literature regarding the status of immigrants in Western Europe points to socioeconomic assimilation across generations as the overall pattern. A crucial part of this story is intergenerational progress in educational attainment: recent comparative studies report that the second generation is much more educated than their immigrant parents, who often came from countries with little compulsory schooling (Crul et al. 2012). In spite of this noteworthy progress, however, the children of immigrants in Europe typically lag behind their native peers in predictable ways. Turks and North Africans are surpassed by European-origin migrants, with Asian-origin students outperforming both and sometimes natives as well (Alba and Foner 2015, chapter 9). Does this indicate an immigrant-specific penalty representing systematic ethnic inequality? It does not seem so, as scholars have established that the gap in educational attainment is best accounted for as a gap in parental socioeconomic resources-especially parents' education-rather than an "ethnic" gap per se (Heath and Brinbaum 2014). A large array of new studies in Germany (Luthra 2010, Song 2011), France (Brinbaum and Kieffer 2009, Ichou 2013) Sweden (Jonsson and Rudolphi 2011), Norway (Støren and Helland 2010), Spain (Portes et al. 2016, Schnell and Azzolini 2015), and the United Kingdom (Wilson, Burgess and Briggs 2011, Ichou 2015) report that much of the gap stems from class rather than ethnic inequality. Some residual differences do remain for some groups, like African youths from the Sahel region and Turks in France, possibly stemming from their low parental educational attainment within their country of origin (Ichou 2014). Nevertheless, few studies report large differences once social background is controlled for (but see Borgna and Contini 2014). Some studies report an immigrant advantage compared to similar natives in terms of aspirations and achievement (Wilson, Burgess and Briggs 2011, Jackson et al. 2012, Salikutluk 2016, Fernàndez-Reino 2016), as well as an attenuated effect of parental social background

(Luthra 2010, Brinbaum and Kieffer 2009, Tucci et al. 2013). There exists variation in educational outcomes within groups: Turks, for example, do better in some educational systems (such as in France and Sweden) than others (such as in Germany), despite their general disadvantage (Crul et al. 2012). Immigrant children appear to benefit from comprehensive systems with early schooling encouraging language acquisition and with a range of options kept open in later stages of secondary education (no early tracking), thus allowing their higher aspirations to blossom (Alba and Foner 2015 chapter 8, Jackson et al. 2012, Crul et al. 2012, Tucci et al. 2013, Crul 2013, Borgna and Contini 2014).

The overall trends in the second generation's labor market outcomes are social reproduction in existing structures of inequality and relative social mobility given prior family socioeconomic status, which is generally low due to the social origins of many immigrant families who first came through the guest worker programs. In France, the descendants of immigrants are overrepresented in the working class but show rates of upward mobility comparable to that of natives; thus occupying labor market positions, on average, more desirable than their parents' but less so than natives' (Meurs et al. 2009). In Norway, using registry data, Hermansen (2016) documents an overall convergence in socioeconomic status among the children of immigrants and natives. In Spain, Aparicio (2007) documents large increases in occupational attainments-away from non-qualified labor-among second-generation Moroccan and South American youths compared to their parents. In Britain, using longitudinal household surveys, Li and Heath (2016) find that the substantial disadvantage of the first generation in terms of occupational attainment vanishes in the second generation. Crucially, they find that the patterns of social reproduction in occupational attainment across generations among natives are mirrored among immigrants. Class origins, in other words, trump ethnic origins for the life chances of the second generation. This important point is echoed in comparative

work. Lessard-Phillips, Fibbi and Wanner (2012) show that the Turkish second generation experience relatively high social mobility in European cities, and that the bulk of the gap in labor market outcomes with natives can be accounted for by human capital differentials. Pichler (2011) shows that the second generation as a whole reaches high occupational levels at roughly the same rate as the native majority in European countries, with similar or slightly better returns to education in the case of men. Other recent work (Crul et al. 2017) has studied the emergence of a new, highly educated elite among the children of immigrants, as would be predicted by this general dynamic of upward mobility.

Qualifying this picture, however, several studies report gaps in employment rates between natives and immigrants. In Norway, Hermansen (2013) finds that ethnic minorities do not suffer a penalty in terms of promotion once employed, but does find an unexplained residual in terms of access to employment. Echoing earlier work (Heath et al. 2008), an ethnic penalty in access to employment for some immigrant groups has been documented in other contexts (see Luthra 2013 for Turks in Germany, Tucci et al. 2013 for North Africans in France, Algan 2009 for comparative evidence of a gap in the UK, Germany and France). This gap can be the effect of several processes, including labor market institutions, lack of information about jobs among immigrant families, or discrimination. We shall revisit this point later on.

2.2.2 Social networks and assimilation

In addition to socioeconomic outcomes, European scholars have been at the forefront of the study of network structures as they relate to immigrant incorporation, producing a dynamic new literature on immigrant social capital and relational integration with

native populations. Representing a shift from the focus on intermarriage and residential segregation of American scholars of incorporation, this research suggests that contacts with natives like friendship and acquaintanceship are associated with better economic outcomes such as higher income and chances of employment (Lancee 2010, Kanas et al. 2012), higher levels of acculturation in terms of identification with the host society and host language use among immigrants (de Vroome et al. 2011, Schulz and Leszczensky 2015, Ali and Fokkema 2016) and increased tolerance among natives (Savelkoul et al. 2011, Janmaat 2014).

Much recent research has logically sought to understand the predictors of such contact. Studies done in Germany, England and the Netherlands suggest that the main predictors of contacts with the native majority among immigrants are generational status (second, third, etc.) and educational attainment (Martinovic et al. 2009, Martinovic 2013, Platt 2014,Van Tubergen 2015, Damstra and Tillie 2015). While Turks appear to exhibit both lower levels of contact and weaker advantages from contact with natives (Martinovic et al. 2009, Schulz and Leszczensky 2015), a blending dynamic of increasing social amalgamation across generation nevertheless appears to be at work. Research on preference in friendship among immigrant adolescents in Sweden, Germany, England and the Netherlands shows that while sharing a similar ethnic identity is an important factor for some subgroups, it is trumped in magnitude by general principles of tie formation such as gender homophily and network effects like reciprocity (Smith et al. 2014a). Meanwhile, research on generalized trust-the feeling that most people can be trusted, which signals social cohesion-shows that second-generation immigrants are adopting the trust patterns of native populations (Dinesen and Hooghe 2010) and that generalized trust does not vary by ethnic group as much as it does by education and material circumstances (de Vroome et al. 2013). The general picture emerging from this new work is thus one of increasing social processes of blending between natives and immigrants.

The probability of such intergroup contacts does not appear to be determined by ethnic differences as much as class differences.

2.2.3   Acculturation patterns

The final dimension of assimilation that European scholars have heavily scrutinized in the last decade relates to culture, conceived in terms of identity, cultural practices such as language and religion, and values. The trend here is broadly similar to the socioeconomic and relational aspects of incorporation. There is, on one hand, an important shift in the feeling of belonging to the national community between first- and second-generation individuals. In the United Kingdom, Platt (2014) finds that the overwhelming majority express a feeling of belonging in Britain. Portes et al. (2011) obtain substantively similar results when studying the second generation in Spain. In France, Maxwell and Bleich (2014) focus on Muslim immigrants and document lower levels of identification compared to other groups, but find that most of this difference vanishes among those who were born in France and speak French. In terms of language more generally, the relative absence of studies concerning the lack of fluency of the second generation in the destination country language suggests it to be a nonexistent problem. Meanwhile, studies in retention of the home language suggest rapid rates of decay unless parents explicitly emphasize it in the household context (see Soehl 2016a for France; Van Tubergen and Mentjox 2014 for Germany, England, Sweden and the Netherlands). Isolated studies on specific aspects of acculturation, such as name-giving (Gerhards and Hans 2009) and attitudes towards homosexuality (Soehl 2016b), suggest similar strides towards native reference points relative to the initial cultural distance between the destination and home country.

The overall picture emerging from a comparative review of the literature in the United States and Western Europe is one of assimilation as a path-dependent process of social reproduction and relative upward mobility. Despite differences within and between immigrant groups as well as variations in institutional and cultural contexts of reception, the fate of the second generation in Western liberal societies appears to be determined, first and foremost, by their initial stock in various forms of capital at the family level. As proposed by Nee and Alba (2013), "*If perceived opportunities are more extensive and plentiful in the mainstream than in ethnic enclaves, the purposive action of immigrants and their children will be aimed at optimizing returns to investment in human and cultural capital in the mainstream society, even in the face of opposition to their assimilation by individual members of the majority and minority groups*" (p.363). This proposition builds on Merton's (1968) theory of unintended consequences of purposive action in its assumption that people striving for success often do not see themselves as assimilating per se. "Yet unintended consequences of practical strategies and actions undertaken in pursuit of the familiar goals-a good education, a good job, a nice place to live, interesting friends and acquaintances, economic security-often result in specific forms of assimilation" (p. 362). Reviewing the recent literature, we,see sizable intergenerational progress toward majority group levels on most outcomes and generally do not find the life chances of the children of immigrants to be considerably impacted by ethnic differences or immigrant status per se.

2.3 Segregating dynamics for the second generation

Nonetheless, there remain significant barriers to assimilation. In the United States, undocumented status is a source of multiple forms of disadvantage for Mexican and Central American immigrant families. In Europe, meanwhile, the influence of religion affects

the assimilation trajectories of Muslim immigrants and their children. Additionally, class inequality interacts with parental immigrant culture in maintaining or recreating ethnic and religious identities among the second generation, thus preserving the symbolic boundaries separating them from natives.

2.3.1 The challenges of undocumented status in the United States

Undocumented status-not having legal rights that benefit legal immigrants–has a deleterious effect on socioeconomic outcomes[4] (Massey and Bartley 2006). Studies comparing documented and undocumented immigrants from Mexico and Central America suggests a seven and four percent net wage penalty for undocumented men and women, respectively, as well as lower returns to education (Hall et al. 2010, Bean et al. 2015 chapter 4); a higher probability of working physically demanding and repetitive jobs and generally worse work conditions (Massey and Sanchez 2010, Hall and Greenman 2015); a lower likelihood of owning a home and higher probability of living in a low quality neighborhood (Cort 2011, Greenman and Hall 2013). These empirical studies underscore and help to explain a broader pattern of declining wages and resilient poverty rates among Mexican migrants, over half of whom are undocumented in the US, largely unable to return to Mexico due to border enforcement and thus at the risk of descent into a new underclass (Massey and Gelatt 2010, Massey and Pren 2012, Massey et al. 2016, Pew Hispanic Center 2011)[5].

Undocumented status is consequential as regards other aspects of incorporation. There is evidence linking the share of undocumented Mexican migrants to higher rates

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[4]In general, undocumented immigrants come with the lowest level of formal education, while legal immigrants include a high representation of college educated, especially from Asia, who change their immigration status after completing their formal education in the United States.

[5]Older work, however, shows that labor market earnings of undocumented immigrants improve as they acquire specific skills through work experience in the United States (Tienda and Singer 1995).

of segregation from native Whites (Hall and Stringfield 2014). Menjívar and Abrego (2012)'s ethnographic study reveals the perpetual fear of deportation among undocumented Central American migrants in California and Arizona-fear that translates into an avoidance of mainstream institutions like social services or even schools. Such qualitative approaches are particularly well suited to studying the cultural impact of the absence of legal status on identity and self-understanding. Massey and Sanchez (2010), for example, document the emergence of a panethnic Latina identity and a rejection of American culture among undocumented immigrants enduring the struggles associated with lacking papers and being barred from the American dream. In another ethnographic study, Menjívar and Lakhani (2016) vividly describe the transformative effects of immigration law on immigrants' personal lives. For these individuals, this struggle dictates work, marriage and childbearing decisions, civic engagement, and, ultimately, their self-understanding as deserving individuals striving to become 'legal'. Meanwhile, recent experimental evidence from Schachter (2016) convincingly shows that White natives consider undocumented status to be an unacceptable trait of potential neighbors or friends, and one structuring a symbolic divide between insiders and outsiders in their mind. At a socioeconomic, relational and cultural levels, the absence of legal status thus operates to channel undocumented immigrants away from assimilation.

What does this imply for young children who immigrated with their parents-the so-called 1.5 generation-and the native-born second generation? Undocumented students are less likely to finish high school and go to college (Hall and Greenman (2013), and those in community colleges are more likely to drop out due to their ineligibility for financial aid (Terriquez 2015). More generally, Gonzales (2011) describes the process of "learning to be illegal" after high school for those who immigrated as children with their parents and were protected from deportation while in school thanks to the 1982 Plyler v. Doe Supreme Court ruling. The lives of the high school dropouts and

those who managed to go to college converge towards precariousness and work in the low-wage sector due to the lack of a Social Security number. For those born in the US to undocumented families, there is a pattern of intergenerational transmission of social disadvantage. At age three, these infants tend to exhibit a lower cognitive development, as their parents' working conditions leave little time and energy to stimulate their children and scant resources to pay for child care (Yoshikawa 2011). Survey data from Los Angeles to show that children growing up in families with both undocumented parents have, all else equal, a one to 1.7 year deficit in terms of years of school completed compared to similar children in families with one or no undocumented parent (Bean et al. 2015, chapter 4). Crucially, children-especially females-whose parents entered without papers and later regularized their status appear to catch up completely with those growing up in legally stable families (ibid 87). This implies a causal effect of legalization on the second generation's educational attainment.

2.3.2   The challenges of religion and cultural difference in Western Europe

Within the sociology of immigration in the last ten years, a large literature on the incorporation of Muslim groups has rapidly emerged. This literature broadly documents the crystallization of social differences between immigrants and natives around religion, and the Muslim vs. non-Muslim divide in particular. A secondary, related literature sheds light on the endogenous role of social inequality in reinforcing pre-existing symbolic differences between immigrants and natives.

The persistence of a strong religious culture among Muslim immigrants long after having migrated and among the second generation is remarkable given the normative

pressure towards secularism and lower religiosity levels in the European context. In Britain, Muslims' religious identity is demonstrably as salient among individuals who migrated fifty years ago as among those who were born in the UK (Bisin et al. 2008, Lewis and Kashyap 2013). In the Netherlands, Maliepaard et al. (2012) describe a religious revival among the Muslim second generation. In France, Drouhot (2017) shows that Muslims are, regardless of generation, substantially more religious than socially comparable natives. Substantively similar findings have been reported in comparative research across Europe (Fleischmann and Phalet 2012, Torrekens and Jacob 2016, de Hoon and Tubergen 2014). A recurrent finding in this literature is that parental socialization and control among Muslim families play a key role in the transmission of religiosity (Drouhot 2017, Soehl 2016c, de Hoon and Tubergen 2014, Maliepaard and Lubbers 2013, Fleischmann and Phalet 2012, Diehl et al. 2009).

Native populations react to the vitality of Muslims' religious culture with increasing suspicion if not hostility, as reflected in the evolution of public opinion in Britain and France (Bleich 2009). Recently, Adida et al. (2016) use a series of audit studies and experimental games in France to precisely measure the potential bias in hiring, association and allocation preferences of natives, and convincingly show that a unique religious discrimination exists against Muslims, net of their regional, ethnic or racial origins. The authors argue that part of this bias can be attributed to statistical discrimination, and to the belief among natives that Muslims have gender and religious norms that are incompatible with theirs. This study is especially important insofar as a host of prior experimental studies[6] that did not properly control for religion reported an ethnic bias against groups (e.g., Pakistanis or Turks) that are overwhelmingly Muslim. Using survey data, Heath and Martin (2013) similarly find that ethnic penalties on British labor markets are largely religious in nature.

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[6]E.g., Van der Bracht et al's (2015) study of the housing market in Belgium, Kaas and Manger's (2012) study of the labor market in Germany and Midtbøen's (2014) study of the labor market in Norway.

The recent literature on Muslim incorporation thus broadly depicts the social reproduction of religious culture in immigrant families, on one hand, and the stigmatization of this culture by natives, on the other. The literature points to multiple consequences from this dual dynamic of cultural polarization reinforcing attitudes of societal hostility towards Muslims. First, there is a significant employment gap between Muslims and non-Muslims, the exact origins of which are debated. Some point to the role of discrimination in hiring (Lessard-Phillips et al. 2012, Connor and Koenig 2015) while others emphasize the role of high religiosity in moderating labor force participation, particularly among women (Khoudja and Fleischmann 2015, Koopmans 2016, Cheung 2014). It is likely that the employment gap is a product of both sides of the divide between Muslims and non-Muslims.

Second, recent work on intermarriage and friendship structures suggests that religion has also become a key relational divide in Western Europe, contributing to segregating dynamics. Using data from Belgium, Great Britain, and Germany, Carol (2016) describes low rates of religious intermarriage among second-generation Muslims, whose behavior does not significantly depart from their foreign-born counterparts. Through an emphasis on cultural maintenance, Muslim parents exert strong influence on intermarriage rates (Carol 2016) as well as friendship and romantic involvement with non-Muslim peers (Munniksma et al. 2012, Smith et al. 2014b) among their native-born children. Meanwhile, using data on friendship patterns in German schools, Leszczensky and Pink (2017) show that Christian students discriminate against Muslims as potential friends. Previous studies reporting a strong influence of ethnic background on homophily patterns in friendship among immigrant adolescents and natives (Smith et al. 2014a, Smith et al. 2016) did not properly control for religion and religiosity. In light of Leszczensky and Pink (2017)'s study, it is likely that religious homophily explains a large portion of ethnic homophily in friendship networks involving Muslim-origin

youths.

In the case of Muslim immigrants in Europe, it thus appears that the causal arrow follows a Weberian trajectory from culture and religious affiliation to relational and socioeconomic outcomes. Parental influences aiming at cultural maintenance and discrimination from natives are the two sides of the predicament faced by the second-generation Muslim youths.

Besides religion as an exogenous source of cultural difference imported from the country of origin, there is evidence for cultural decoupling from natives produced by high levels of inequality experienced by the second generation. Wimmer and Soehl (2014) use large-scale survey data across Europe to demonstrate that social and legal disadvantage leads to the maintenance of parental culture (measured as values) from the country of origin. Thus, inequality blocks acculturation-and does so with a substantial magnitude, as experiencing disadvantage has the same effect on acculturation as having 8.5 fewer years of schooling. Ethnographic research in Belgium by Van Kerckem et al. (2013) shows that low socioeconomic resources and limited opportunities for social mobility result in stronger involvement in the local immigrant communities among Belgian-born Turks. In turn, the preservation of parental cultural traits, such as traditional gender norms, is enforced through gossip and social control in dense and homogeneous networks making up the ethnoreligious community.

Other ethnographic accounts show that socioeconomic marginality encourages cultural decoupling from parental as well as mainstream culture in response to relative deprivation. In Germany, Bucerius (2014) describes the lives of second-generation male migrants from Turkey who are legal and symbolic foreigners due to their lack of German citizenship. Perceiving their treatment as unfair, they reject what they perceive to be mainstream German culture in favor of the drug trade, which allows them

to attain material signs of success. A critical aspect of the social trajectories of poor, second-generation Turkish men is the influence of early tracking in school towards vocational careers with lower prospect for social mobility-an outcome largely explained by parental background (Luthra 2010) but often thought by Bucerius's subjects to reflect anti-immigrant bias. Ethnographic research in France has documented analogous perception of unequal treatment by public institutions like schools and the police (Marlière 2008) and analogous cultural responses to perceived exclusion in the form of petty criminal enterprises regulated by autonomous and localized economies of honor (Sauvadet 2006).

Ethnographic accounts of the marginalized second generation in Germany and France describe a sharp symbolic divide between an emergent âĂŸus'-oppressed, poor, isolated, powerless, non-White, Muslim-and âĂŸthem': the powerful, well-off, well-connected, non-Muslim natives. In turn, the subjective experience of economic, spatial and cultural marginalization provides fertile ground for oppositional worldviews and for illicit, alternative economic options such as the drug trade (Sauvadet 2006, Lapeyronnie 2008, Bucerius 2014). While such high levels of social exclusion characterize only a small minority among the second generation, these dysfunctional scenarios are widely publicized and tend to contribute to a nativist sentiment in the host populations by depicting certain immigrant groups as problematic-e.g., being more prone to crime and harboring norms and values that are incompatible with the mainstream. This is, in turn, a social condition for further stigmatization and for more segregating dynamics of social closure affecting the children of immigrants as a whole.

2.4 Conclusion: Blending & Segregating Dynamics in Europe and America

Overall, recent research on immigrant incorporation in the United States and in Western Europe tends to support the proposition of neo-assimilation theory cited earlier:

- Proposition 1: **Purposive action**

If perceived opportunities are more extensive and plentiful in the mainstream than in ethnic enclaves, the purposive action of immigrants and their children will be aimed at optimizing returns to investment in human and cultural capital in the mainstream society, even in the face of opposition to their assimilation by individual members of the majority and minority groups (Nee and Alba 2013: 367).

As the recent and rapidly increasing literature on the deleterious effect of undocumented legal status in the US makes clear, however, constitutional rules extending formal equality of rights to legal citizens are a crucial and enabling scope condition. Thus:

- Proposition 2: **Formal institutions**

If society's constitutional rules and their enforcement by the state extend formal equality of rights to all citizens and if political actors signal credible commitment to reinforcing cultural beliefs and formal rules of equality of rights, then immigrants and their children entitled to full citizenship are likely to choose a course of social action that increases their likelihood of assimilation (ibid, 367).

The institutional apparatus of modern polities such as the United States can out-law racial discrimination and increase its social and economic costs in non-trivial ways (Alba and Nee 2003: 54-56). In reviewing the recent literature, we do not find the incorporation trajectories of immigrant groups to be structurally shaped by their racial difference from the native majority in the contemporary, post-Civil Rights era. We do find, however, a profound influence of their legal status and mode of entry into the U.S. Both the central role of legal status, on one hand, and the relatively marginal place of race, on the other, constitute a testimony to the influence of the law-the formal rules of the game shaping incentives and defining legitimate social action among natives and immigrants-in the incorporation process.

While the most emphatic sources of segregating dynamics in the United States in-volve immigration law, in Western Europe the primary sources of segregating dynamics involve cultural - specifically religious - differences. Put differently, hurdles to assim-ilation involve the state and belonging in a political community, in one case; in the other, they involve the nation and belonging in a cultural community. Our comparative review of recent European research prompts us to consider the analytic importance of initial cultural difference in triggering blending or segregating social dynamics between immigrants and natives. We therefore propose:

- Proposition 3: **Cultural difference**

If certain cultural diacritics are integral to community cohesion among immigrants but generally stigmatized among natives, cultural difference and social closure between im-migrants and natives are likely to co-evolve. In such cases, assimilation occurs through individualistic patterns of social mobility.

When immigrants face strong legal or cultural barriers, how does assimilation occur? Reliance on ethnic collective action is a standard response to societal hostility, but commonly works to reinforce segregating dynamics of the majority group, as Bonacich and Model (1980) discuss in their study of the Japanese enclave economy in California of the early 20th century. However, ethnic collective action can also be linked to blending dynamics, as in the Chinese community effort to gain entry of the second generation in white public schools in the same period in Mississippi (Loewen 1988). Such mobilization of ethnic collective action has become more common following Civil Rights era legislation that outlawed racial discrimination and extended equal legal rights to immigrant minorities. Neo-assimilation theory thus maintains:

- Proposition 4: **Collective action**

In general, when discriminatory barriers block an individualistic pattern of social mobility, assimilation when it occurs, depends on ethnic collective action mobilized (Nee and Alba 2013: 364).

Our review of the burgeoning literature on incorporation of immigrants in the United States and Europe points to promising directions for future research. As already mentioned, there is presently a relative scarcity of systematic studies on ethnoracial discrimination and its effect on immigrant incorporation. Yet experimental evidence convincingly shows that discrimination in hiring and job channeling affects Latinos as much as Blacks in the low-wage market (Pager et al. 2009). More evidence of this type focusing explicitly on the incorporation of immigrants-rather than racial groups-in labor markets and other institutional domains is needed to ascertain the effect of systematic ethnoracial discrimination on progress towards assimilation.

What triggers blending or segregating social dynamics in intergroup relations? Exploring this question in greater depth is key to future research. Nee and Alba (2013) argue that a blurring of ethnic boundaries facilitates gradual assimilation by larger numbers of second generation immigrant minorities, contingent on periods of "non-zero-sum mobility" of sustained economic growth. Inter-group competition for resources, on the other hand, triggers segregating social dynamics (Olzak 1994; 2006). In addition, recent work suggests that exogenous shocks such as terror attacks (Legewie 2013) or economic crises (Rugh 2010, (Mooi-Reci and MuÃśoz-Comet 2016) can significantly impact incorporation, by exacerbating economic strain among immigrants and triggering cultural and social anxiety among natives. A latent nativism is manifest in populist politics in both the United States and Europe, and the spillover effects of nativism on electoral politics in late 19th century and early 20th century United States show that restrictive immigration laws follow social movements channeled by populist politicians. Nativist social movements of the early 20th century culminated in the passing of the Immigration Act of 1924, which set quota on the number of Southern and Eastern European immigrants, and of Arabs and Jews, and provided funding to enforce the long-standing ban on non-white immigration. In the United States and Europe, populist politicians once again are mobilizing anti-immigrant sentiment to win votes in contested electoral campaigns, ushering in a new era of restrictive policy and legal changes curtailing immigration. As the third generation comes of age, furthering our understanding of the consequences of nativism for assimilation and immigrant incorporation in Western liberal societies represents a crucial task for future work.

CHAPTER 3

CRACKS IN THE MELTING POT? RELIGIOSITY & ASSIMILATION AMONG THE DIVERSE MUSLIM POPULATION IN FRANCE

3.1   Introduction

Longstanding policy and scholarly debates surrounding the integration of Muslim immigrants and their children have firmly established religion - rather than race, language, or ethnicity - as the primary ground for difference and cultural accommodation in Western Europe (Zolberg and Loon 1999, Brubaker 2015). An impressive array of recent studies has documented the legal and institutional aspects of the integration of Islam (Laurence 2012, Carol and Koopmans 2013, Joppke and Torpey 2013); the various forms of prejudice Muslims face (Franz 2007, Safi and Simon 2013, Adida, Laitin and Valfort 2016); and their subjective belonging as postcolonial minorities (Kapko 2007, Bleich 2009, Maxwell and Bleich 2014, Beaman 2015b).

At the very heart of the controversies and debates generating this new body of scholarship lies a simple and well-documented social fact: Muslim immigrants and their children stand out in the secular European context by the intensity of their religious beliefs and practices (Bisin et al. 2007, Malieppard, Lubbers and Giesbert 2012, Kashyap and Lewis 2013, Lagrange 2014). Yet despite the rise in scholarly publications on the integration of Islam in Europe in recent years, such religious vitality - including among the native born 2nd generation - remains to be explained. In this article, we focus on shedding light on the factors and processes contributing to Muslims' departure from native levels of religiosity in France - the European country with the highest relative share of self-identified Muslims. We use a novel approach to studying the assimilation process, by inductively identifying different segments of the French native population

corresponding to different baseline religiosity levels. This allows us to compare Muslim immigrants to socially similar members of the native population and to account for social heterogeneity in both groups - thus avoiding essentializing either of them as bounded and homogeneous (Alba and Nee 2003, Brubaker 2004). We then test several hypotheses and argue that three main factors contribute, among Muslim immigrants, to a net religiosity differential compared to their native, non-Muslim counterparts: parental religious socialization, the maintenance of different transnational relationships with the country of origin, and the experience of discrimination in France. In particular, we show that these three factors explain approximately 60% of the "surplus" of religiosity of Muslims in France. Importantly, however, the analyses show that the explanatory power of particular variables varies across subgroups, illustrating how different, parallel processes are at work in producing a religiosity surplus for different segments of the Muslim population.

The rest of the article is organized as follows. We first define assimilation as a process of cultural embeddedness in the country of destination, and one implying secularization in the European context and the French context in particular. We then discuss recent evidence of delayed religious assimilation among Muslim immigrants and their children. Drawing on the literature on immigration, ethnicity and race, we outline six possible mechanisms to account for this phenomenon: material deprivation, alienation, family socialization, transnationalism, replenished religiosity, and contextual effects at the neighborhood level. Shifting to empirical analysis, we identify cohesive subgroups in a representative sample of the French native population in order to systematically match a sample of first- and second-generation Muslims living in France to a reference category against which we compare their religiosity level. We then estimate a regression model of the distance in religiosity from the native level of reference within each matched segment of the Muslim population. The final section of the article discusses

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the significance of the results for immigrant assimilation theory as well as the analytical and theoretical payoffs to an inductive identification of the relevant subgroups when studying the assimilation process, without necessarily taking immigrant generation or religious groups to be the natural units of analysis.

3.2 Assimilation: definition, theory & practice

3.2.1 Religiosity and assimilation: what to expect for 1st & 2nd generation Muslims?

Assimilation can be conveniently defined as a process of increasing social similarity between native and immigrant populations taking place over one or more generations. This corresponds to the erosion of cultural (language, religion), relational (ties and patterns of associations), and cognitive (identity) differences between host societies and newcomers as they bear on the life chances of immigrants and their children, and their progressive circumscription to "symbolic" and "optional" forms such as foods, dress, names, etc (Gordon 1964, Gans 1979, Waters 1990, Alba and Nee 2003, Wimmer 2013).

For foreign-born newcomers - the so-called 1st generation - this process takes place over the life course, after having migrated. In the US for example, studies of the 1st generation show that immigrants' command of English increases while their health decreases towards native levels (Enspenshade and Fu 1997, Antecol and Bedard 2006). Existing studies of 1st generation migrants to Europe show a similarly strong influence of the context of reception in shaping assimilation processes (Heath et al. 2008).

The largest stride towards assimilation with natives occurs among the 2nd gen-

eration grown and socialized in the destination country, with variations across groups and time periods regarding progress or stagnation in the third generation (Gans 1962, Gordon 1964, Alba and Nee 2003, Kasinitz et al. 2008, Jiménez 2010). Assimilation is not necessarily a smooth process, however. It can be conducive to tensions among families, as parents often lose out in influence on their children to social forces in the context of reception (Rumbaut 1994). Gans (1962) for example, in his classic study of Italian-American working-class families in Boston's West End, shows that parents heavily compete with the "peer group" for the socialization of their children (Gans 1962 chapter 3-4). More recently, Mario Small (2002) has shown how cultural frames about community, ethnic solidarity and the neighborhood can drastically change within a single generation despite parents' best efforts to sustain a sense of neighborhood pride and involvement in Villa Victoria, a Latino/a immigrant enclave in Boston. More generally, major theoretical perspectives on the assimilation process, such as neoassimilation (Alba and Nee 2003) and segmented assimilation (Portes and Zhou 1993), emphasize a change between the first and the second generation as a result of socialization in the destination country.

In the American context, where levels of religious practice and identification have historically been high, one aspect of assimilation is the crystallization of religion as an important aspect of identity and community. As Kasinitz et al. (2008) remark in their study of the second generation in New York City, the US-born children of West Indian, Chinese, Russian, Indian or South American origins are generally more religious than their parents (Kasinitz et al. 2008, 264-272) - something to be expected in a country where atheists have historically been seen as the true "cultural others" (Edgell, Gerteis and Hartman 2006). In the U.S. in sum, to believe is, by and large, to belong.

In Europe, by contrast, increasing social similarity with natives has historically

meant secularization. Research in France shows that the religious practice and identification of Christian immigrants from Poland and Armenia and Jews from Russia collapsed in the 2nd generation (Noiriel 1996, chapter 4). More broadly, research on immigrant adaptation has shown that immigrants's religiosity is affected by the context of reception. Immigrants settling in religious countries become more religious themselves, and vice versa (Van Tubergen 2007, Van Tubergen and Sindradottír 2011). In other words, religious assimilation occurs in several possible directions as a form of social and cultural embeddedness in the destination country. In the European context in general and the French context in particular where secularization has been most powerful (Bowen 2007), the expectation is unambiguous: we should observe an intergenerational decay in religiosity as second-generation immigrants become less religious, and thus more similar to their native counterparts.

3.2.2 Recent evidence of delayed religious assimilation in France and beyond

The available qualitative and quantitative evidence, however, does not corroborate the assimilation-as-secularization hypothesis outlined above. The qualitative scholarship has depicted French-born Muslims' subjective religious experience as a mix of underclass-like cultural adaptation to poverty and social exclusion, and a rediscovery and reinvention of their parents' cultural heritage[1] (Lepoutre 1997, Kapko 2007, Kepel 2012a, 2012b). Kepel (2012b) emphasizes religious change among the young members of the 2nd and 3rd generation who practice an Islam based on public displays of identity - by fasting and following Islamic dietary restrictions - rather than spirituality and regular attendance of religious service. Such change notwithstanding, existing quanti-

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[1]Appendix A offers a brief primer on the history of Muslim migration in France and Europe.

tative studies show that the 2nd generation's religiosity is surprisingly strong, often as strong as that of their parents (Brouard and Tiberj 2011, Lagrange 2014, Soehl 2016). Brouard and Tiberj (2011) show that the intensity of religious identity and the following of strict behavioral rules stemming from religious texts is much higher among Muslims, regardless of nativity. Lagrange (2014) reaches similar conclusions and talks about a maintenance of religious sentiment in the French-born 2nd generation (Lagrange 2014: 224-230; see also Soehl 2016). This picture differs considerably from the assimilation-as-secularization process documented for earlier waves of Catholic and Jewish immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe (Noiriel 1996 chapter 4).

Beyond the French case, a new scholarship on assimilation and religiosity has firmly documented a similar phenomenon of religious vitality among Muslims in Europe. Despite modest evidence of assimilation (Maliepaard, Lubbers and Giesbert 2010, De Hoon and van Tubergen 2014, Maliepaard and Alba 2015), Muslims immigrants and their children's levels of religiosity largely appear as impervious to the secularizing influence of the context of reception, in such diverse national settings as the UK, Belgium, the Netherlands, or Sweden (Bisin et al. 2007, Connor 2010, Güveli and Platt 2011, Fleischmann and Phalet 2012, Maliepaard, Lubbers and Giesbert 2012, Lewis and Kashyap 2013, Torrekens and Jacobs 2016; see Voas and Fleischmann 2012 for a review).

3.3 Possible mechanisms at work: 6 hypotheses

The phenomenon of delayed religious assimilation thus constitutes a historical surprise and a sociological puzzle in need of an explanation. We now survey the immigration literature in search of possible mechanisms at work in producing delayed religious as-

similation. We propose a series of six testable hypotheses.

3.3.1 Material insecurity

One possibility to explain the religious resilience of Muslims in France is to view religiosity as a response to widespread material insecurity. The "insecurity hypothesis" proposes that certain social conditions such as low income and unemployment are conducive to high stress and high uncertainty, and thus foster the need for structuring narratives and other cognitive outlets provided by the religious experience (Norris and Inglehart 2004). Spiritual life thus compensates for material hardship. The insecurity hypothesis has received empirical support in past studies (Van Tubergen 2007, Immerzeel and Van Tubergen 2013). The economic plight of many Muslim communities in France and their spatial relegation to the impoverished *banlieues* at the outskirts of the country's major cities is well-known, making the insecurity hypothesis credible (Lepoutre 1997, Kepel 2012a).

H1: *The experience of material insecurity promotes higher religiosity compared to French natives.*

3.3.2 Reactive religiosity

A second hypothesis considers the effect of feeling alienated as a result of perceiving or experiencing unfair treatment, leading to an increased identification with the stereotyped minority group to maintain self-esteem (Branscombe, Schmitt and Harvey 1999). This hypothesis has been formulated as "reactive ethnicity" within the segmented assimilation framework in sociology (Portes and Zhou 1993, Rumbaut 2008). It has recently

been adapted to religion and reformulated to interpret the observed increase in religious identification associated with perceived or experienced hostility from the majority outgroup (Connor 2010, Maliepaard and Alba 2015). Qualitative work on the 2nd generation in France has described the resentment of young Muslims feeling rejected by the rest of the population (Kapko 2007, Kepel 2012a, 2012b). In addition, recent experimental evidence from Adida, Laitin and Valfort (2016) has established that there is a distinct and substantial anti-Muslim discrimination on the French labor market. This literature does not differentiate between perception and experience of discrimination; we are therefore including both in the reactive religiosity hypothesis.

H2: *The perception or experience of discrimination promotes higher religiosity compared to French natives.*

3.3.3 Parental socialization

Another mechanism potentially explaining religiosity in the 2nd generation is the influence of parental efforts to transmit their beliefs to their children, producing a phenomenon of inter-generational faith transfer (Hunsberger and Brown 1984). The power of parental religious socialization among Muslim families have been particularly well established in past research (Scourfield et al. 2012, Jacob and Kalter 2013, de Hoon and van Tubergen 2014, van de Pool and van Tubergen 2014, Soehl 2016).

H3: *Parental religious socialization promotes higher religiosity compared to French natives.*

3.3.4 Transnational ties

The maintenance of transnational ties among 2nd generation can lead to a cultural exposure to the country of origin, which can manifest itself in a stronger religious commitment if religion is salient there. The hybridization of migrant identities between "here" and "there" has been well-theorized, albeit somewhat in parallel with the literature on assimilation (Basch, Glick-Schiller and Blanc-Szanton 1994, Faist 2000). In terms of religion, there is an elective affinity between the maintenance of transnational ties and the universal dimension of Islamic society - the "Ummah" (Bowen 2012). As such, transnational ties between Muslim communities in the old and new country can act as prisms for the transmission of cultural beliefs and norms contributing to a maintenance of the home country's religious culture.

H4: *Transnational ties to the country of origin promotes higher religiosity compared to French natives.*

3.3.5 Replenished religiosity

Recent insights on the importance of continuing waves of migration for the assimilation process constitute a fifth hypothesis for the puzzle of delayed religious assimilation. Mainly associated with the work of Tomas Jiménez (2010) on Mexican immigration in the US, the replenishment hypothesis stipulates that a continuous wave of immigrant complicates the adaptation process for later-generation migrants, because it increases their interaction with foreign-born who act as ethnically "authentic" ambassadors for the country of origin - in particular by de-legitimizing the optional or symbolic ethnicity of later generation migrants (Jiménez 2010). A continuous influx of migrants from Muslim-majority countries provides extensive opportunities for exchange between re-

cently arrived Muslim immigrants and more established migrants - including the French-born 2nd generation - on the "true" practice of Islam and the most authentic way to be a Muslim, one presumably involving a high degree of religiosity imported from the context of origin and transmitted through social influence. Such a "replenished Islam" could stall opportunities to craft a hybrid, possibly less intense religious practice borrowing elements from both the context of origin and the context of reception.

H5: *Continuous interaction with recent immigrants from Muslim-majority countries promotes higher religiosity compared to French natives.*

3.3.6 Neighborhood disadvantage

Finally, it is also possible to think of delayed religious assimilation as a collective response to social disorganization in religiously segregated neighborhoods. Ethnographic work inspired by the ecological tradition of the Chicago school has described, in much detail, the cultural adaptation of migrant and minority groups to social disadvantage in the city (Gans 1962, Suttles 1970, Anderson 1999). Anderson (1999), for instance, vividly depicts the localized system of meanings and moral norms governing behavior and interactions in a poor, crime-ridden Philadelphia neighborhood which, while being at odds with "mainstream" middle-class culture, is locally rational and internally consistent. In these studies, a specific neighborhood culture and morality produced by dense networks of poor and spatially immobile neighbors arise to organize interactions and community. The existing ethnographic evidence on culture and community life in French urban ghettos - home to a large share of the country's Muslim population - is consistent with a scenario of diffusion and adoption of Islam as a collective adaptation to social exclusion (Lepoutre 1997, Lapeyronnie 2008, Bronner 2010, Kepel 2012a,

2012b).

H6: *Neighborhood disadvantage promotes higher religiosity compared to French natives.*

3.4   Analytical strategy

Earlier work has often envisioned assimilation as a unilinear process of incorporation into a culturally white middle-class core (Gordon 1964). A key theoretical insight of newer perspectives on the assimilation process, however, is the internal diversity of both immigrant and native groups (Portes and Zhou 1993, Alba and Nee 2003). Immigrants groups arrive with different endowments in various forms of capital, from different contexts of origin. Conversely, destination countries are not homogeneous societies. They are, rather, divided along multiple lines of differentiation such as space, age, class or race. The "mainstream" is often diverse and complex, especially in countries with a long immigration history such as France and the US (*ibid*).

Unfortunately, much, if not all existing work on the adaptation of Muslim immigrants and their children in Europe implicitly conceives of bounded, homogeneous Muslim groups amidst a national, similarly bounded and homogeneous mainstream. This constitutes a normative concern: taking for granted social categories like "natives" or "Muslims" risks reifying groups whose boundaries are in fact highly contested or fluctuating - making scholarly work on the topic potentially, and unwittingly participate in the construction of essentialist, deeply political categories of practice rather than carefully reflected upon categories of analysis (Brubaker 2004, 2013). This is related to two empirical concerns: simply comparing "Muslims" to "natives" risks pathologizing Muslim populations by comparing them to a "grand" mean corresponding, in real terms, to a

modal middle class. This would be a poor yardstick for assessing Muslim religious as-similation as the literature suggests that only a small minority of Muslims have attained middle class status in France (Institut Montaigne 2016). Additionally, such a "garbage can" approach to studying assimilation can indulge in inaccuracy and oversimplification: it is possible for different processes to be at work for different segments of the Muslim population - in which case the immigrant or religious category would not be the proper unit of analysis. These concerns call for a sharper, more data-driven analytical approach (Garip 2012).

This paper therefore develops in two distinct analytical moments. First, we inductively determine categories of reference within the French population, by finding cohesive subgroups in a representative sample of natives. We then match each respondent among a large, representative sample of Muslims living in France to a reference category in the native French population based on social proximity. In the second part of the analysis, we model Muslims' distance to the mean religiosity of their native subgroup of reference. In line with the relational nature of the assimilation process, our modeling approach thus does not predict religiosity per se, but rather the net distance from the expected level of religiosity as found in a comparable segment of French natives.

3.5 Data, methods & measures

3.5.1 Data

We use data from the complete module of the *Trajectoires et Origines* survey (Teo), a high quality, representative survey of immigrant populations with a large native, reference sample aged between 18 and 60 in France, and carried out by the French census

bureau in cooperation with the National Demographic Institute (INED). Its comprehensive sets of covariates allows for a simulatenous testing of the hypotheses just proposed. The TeO survey was designed to fill a historical gap in France, where the gathering and use of ethnic and religious statistics has been illegal in the past (Simon 2008). The data gathering process occurred in 2008-2009, and the data was released in 2011 (Beauchemin, Hamel, Simon 2016). The response rate for the survey was 58%, yielding a sample of 21,137 respondents. The sample features 5,706 respondents identifying as Muslims, 99.6% of whom are either 1st or 2nd generation immigrants. The sample also features 4,179 coded as "natives", i.e. born in France of French-born parents, out of which approximately 59% declare having a religion[23].

3.5.2 Methods & measures

Clustering and matching procedure

In this study, we use cluster analysis on a large sample of French natives to determine cohesive subgroups to serve as baselines to measure Muslims' religiosity surplus. Cluster analysis refers to a large family of techniques designed to find coherent groupings and structure in observational data (Kaufman and Rousseeuw 2005). For our analytical purpose, clustering and then modeling within each cluster represents a more appropriate strategy compared to a matching approach, such as the popular propensity score stratification approach (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1984) [4].

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[2]We thus only use parts of the TeO survey data: only those respondents that are either Muslim immigrants or natives - the rest are non-Muslim, 1st and 2nd generation immigrants.

[3]The regression models presented below report lower "n"'s due to missing data on some covariates. We correct for missingness with probability weights (see more below).

[4]This matching approach would model the probability of being Muslim and then create strata by propensity scores in order to compare Muslims' and natives' religiosity within each. First, this requires an exhaustive knowledge of the predictors of Muslim religious identification to get reliable estimates, which would constitute a leap of faith in our case as sociological scholarship on the topic is only in its early

Similarly, clustering is a more appropriate than simply accounting for group heterogeneity by dividing them in segments along dimensions that *a priori* matter. We could decide to compare low income Muslim immigrants to low income natives, for example. But we do not know if income is the right dimension to organize our comparisons. Additionally, it is possible for several dimensions (income, gender, age, urban location...) to consolidate into subgroups (Blau 1977). In other words, what matters for group heterogeneity may well be specific configurations of variables rather than specific variables.

In this paper, we thus use the popular *k-means* clustering algorithm to identify major categories in a sample of French natives to inductively determine reference groups against which Muslims' religiosity levels are to be measured. Compared to popular alternatives such as hierarchical clustering which work best with nested structure such as evolutionary trees, *K-means* clustering does not make any assumption about the structure of the data at hand and is much more efficient in terms of time and computer resources when working on large datasets such as the *TeO* data. Following Garip's approach (2012, 2016), we choose variables that both fundamentally structure French society and are known to be associated with religiosity from past research: gender (Miller and Hoffman 1995), age (Argue, Johnson and White 1999), education (Albrecht and Heaton 1995), family income (Immerzeel and van Tubergen 2013), whether or not the respondent lives in an urban setting (Finke and Stark 1988), and professional status (working a job or not)(Chadwick and Garrett 1995, Immerzeel and van Tubergen 2013). We transform continuous variables in dummies (coded as 0 for values below the median and 1 for values above) to avoid an arbitrary weighting of attributes due to different

stage. Second, the unidimensional nature of the obtained propensity scores makes it hard to test different hypotheses as the predictors associated with them are all used to compute the logit model from which the propensity scores are obtained. More generally, while propensity score matching can potentially be an efficient way to achieve a sharper comparison between immigrants and natives, it will remain silent on the internal heterogeneity of both groups, which is a crucial theoretical point in immigration theory (Portes and Zhou 1993, Alba and Nee 2003) and one which we seek to empirically engage here.

scales, which would affect the clustering results in undesirable ways. *K-means* cluster-ing uses distance (in this particular case, Euclidean distance) to compute measures of similarity and creates cluster of minimally dissimilar observations. It aims at obtaining as sharply differentiated clusters as possible among numerous possible solutions, differ-ing on the number of possible clusters. We test the different clustering results with 10 diagnostic tests from the *NbClust* and the *clValid* packages in the *R* software to deter-mine the most appropriate number of clusters (Brock et al. 2008, Charrad et al. 2014). We then implement the clustering algorithm and carry out the rest of the analyses in the *Stata* statistical package.

The second step is to match each 1st and 2nd generation Muslim immigrant in the TeO survey to the cluster in the native sample he or she is most similar to on the variables used in the original clustering, based on the smallest Euclidean distance.

Dependent variable: Distance in religiosity from the subgroup of reference in the native population

After each Muslim respondent has been assigned to a native subgroup of reference based on social proximity, we can calculate his or her distance to the a reference level on four dimensions of religiosity: the subjective importance of religion in the respondent's life (not, somewhat, quite or very important), the frequency at which the respondent follows his or her religion's dietary constraints and guidelines (never because there is none, never, sometimes, and always), the frequency of religious service attendance (never, only for important family events or holidays, once or twice a month, or at least once a week) and whether or not the respondent wears a visible religious sign (never, some-times, or always). We coded those responses following an incremental scheme and

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added them together to obtain a general religiosity score ranging from 0 to 12[5].

The outcome variable of interest in this study is thus the distance between the value given by the self-identified Muslim respondents and the mean value for the subset of French natives in their respective subgroup of reference - i.e. the subgroup within the native population he or she is most comparable to[6]. We then model the distance in religiosity to the mean religiosity of reference using ordinary least square regression, within each cluster.

Predictors of interest

H1: Material insecurity: We measure material insecurity with four independent variables: family income standardized by the number of consumption units (1 for the the first adult, 0.5 for each additional adult and 0.3 for each other person younger than 14), the number of persons per room in the household, the subjective evaluation of standard of living by the respondent's him or herself, and the subjective evaluation of the degree of hardship when growing up.

H2: Discrimination: We measure the perception of discrimination through a question on the opinion about the frequency of discrimination in France yielding a variable on the perception of discrimination (low, medium and high). Second, we exploit the rich module of discrimination in the TeO survey to construct variables regarding the

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[5]The subjective importance of religion and religious attendance both runs from 0 to 3 while wearing a religious sign and following dietary restrictions run from 0 to 3 with "Never" being coded as 0 and "sometimes" being coded as "2" in order to give the same weights to similarly worded responses across items

[6]Only respondents who declared having a religion answered questions on religious practices on which our religiosity measure is based. In this paper, we include French native who do not have a religion (around 42% of the native sample) as "0" scores. we re-ran the analyses presented below including only French natives declaring to have a religion and obtained substantively similar results. We choose to include areligious respondents since they represent a large fraction of the population and ignoring them would make for a less meaningful comparison.

lived experience of discrimination. Each respondent declaring having been discriminated against had to identify specific ground on which he or she thought he or she had been treated unfairly. We coded these as a series a dummy variable reporting discrimination based on one's religion, one's name, one's accent, one's race, or one's physical appearance, as well as in specific situations on the housing market, by mainstream public institutions (such as by the police, in a public administration or at the post office), and at work.

H3: Parental religious socialization: To measure the influence of parental socialization on current religious identity and practices, we use the respondent's answer to a question about the importance of religion in the education received from parents ("not at all" "somewhat" "quite" or "very" important).

H4: Transnational ties: We include three different types of transnational ties with the country of origin, all coded as dummies: whether or not the respondent maintains friendship or family ties, whether or not the respondent sends remittances, and whether or not he owns property in the country of origin.

H5: Replenished religiosity: We measure opportunities for interaction with recently arrived migrants from Muslim countries with two dummy variables on neighborhood context. These dummy variables indicate if the respondent lives in a neighborhood located in the top decile at the national level for percentage of 1st generation migrants from North Africa (corresponding to 40% or more) and Sub-Saharan Africa (19% or more) living in the respondent's neighborhood. The neighborhood composition comes from census data included in the TeO survey. French neighborhoods as defined by the French census are much smaller than American census tracts, comprising around 2,000 people on average and constitute good proxies for neighborhoods. As for using immigrants as a measure of Muslim religious presence, North Africa has historically been

almost entirely Muslim, and Sub-Saharan African immigration in France comes mostly from the Sahel region, comprising countries such as Senegal and Mali which feature large Muslim majorities among their populations (Lagrange 2013).

H6: Neighborhood disadvantage: Finally, we use 4 census measures done at the tract level to account for neighborhood disadvantage: percentage of neighborhood inhabitants with only a primary school education, percentage of long-term unemployed among the unemployed, percentage of social housing, and percentage of large families (i.e. 5 persons or more per household). Like variables measuring H5, we binarized each measure and coded those contextual variables as "1" if they were part of the top decile at the national level, and "0" otherwise[7].

Other controls: In addition to the hypothesized predictors of interest, we control for nativity status (foreign VS French born) as well as age, squared age, sex, professional status (e.g. working, student, retired, etc) educational attainment (measured as one of eight categories in the French education system, such as *baccalauréat général* - general track in high school - or *licence* - bachelor's degree), and parents' educational attainment (Scheepers, Te Grotenhuis and Van Der Silk 2002, van Tubergen and Sindradottír 2011). We also control for respondents born of mixed religious couples and region of origin, as anthropological research has shown that Islam can be different across geographic and cultural contexts (Bowen 2012). Finally, we control for the quality of the interview as reported by the interviewer for each respondent.

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[7]The incentive for binarizing the measures is to simplify the presentation of the results while providing a more conservative tests for the replenishment hypothesis. Additionally, sensitivity tests with alternative specifications are performed in section 6.3 on robustness checks. The results obtained are substantively identical.

3.6 Results

3.6.1 Cluster analysis

Social & religious heterogeneity in the French native population

Table 1 below reports results from a 4-cluster solution found to best fit the sample of French native respondents[8]. We select the 4-cluster solution after a series of 10 diagnostic tests (reported in detail in Appendix B) suggesting it to be substantially better than a 3-cluster one and as well-delineated as the less parsimonious 5- and 6-cluster ones. Importantly, the clusters are meaningful - forming easily identifiable segments of the French population with a top value emerging as significantly higher than the next closest one on all variables except one (Grimmer and King 2010).

These results reveal that native French are segmented into meaningful subgroups, readily identifiable in terms of social class. Cluster 1 encompasses younger, poorer natives who are not integrated on labor markets. A closer look at its occupational structure reveals that it features the homemakers and the unemployed respondents of the sample [9]. We label this group "socially dependent". Cluster 2 features individuals who are also earning less and have low educational attainment, but are nevertheless employed - forming a clear "working class" cluster. Cluster 3 is made up of older individuals, for the most part working, with a low education and higher income than the two preceding group. The occupational structure of this group - which we label "lower middle class" - encompasses low ranking employees and civil servants who are more senior that those

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[8]Continuous values were binarized during the clustering process but are reported in real terms here for purposes of clarity.

[9]Tables showing the occupational structure of the obtained clusters are not shown here but are available upon request.

Table 3.1: Native French sample characteristics by cluster membership

	Cluster 1	Cluster 2	Cluster 3	Cluster 4
∝ female	0.40	0.53	0.50	0.43
	(0.49)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)
Age	30.94	36.92	**46.26**	36.71
	(12.34)	(10.39)	(9.25)	(10.39)
∝ with at least a *baccalauréat général*	0.24	0.12	0.00	**1.00**
	(0.43)	(0.33)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Family income in k	11.66	14.83	21.73	**26.56**
	(6.16)	(5.10)	(8.70)	(10.93)
∝ living in a city that is 100k+	0.55	0.18	**0.70**	0.66
	(0.50)	(0.38)	(0.46)	(0.47)
∝ working a job	0.00	**1.00**	0.97	0.88
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.16)	(0.32)
Observations	787	1058	1040	1294

Note: The table reports mean proportions ("∝") and values for variables within each cluster, as well as their standard deviation within parentheses. The highest value across clusters is in bold if it is significantly different from the next closest value in other clusters (two-tailed test, $p<0.05$).

of cluster 2, as well as retirees. Finally, cluster 4 concentrates socially advantaged individuals with higher human and economic capital - the solid middle class and beyond, which we label "middle class +".

Does the internal social differentiation of the native French population translate into diverse religiosity levels, however? Figure 1 below reports the mean religiosity score for the 4 subgroups making up the native population.

Figure 3.1: Religiosity by cluster for native French sample (bars are 95% confidence intervals).

The uncovered subgroups differ in religiosity. There are three distinct groups: the working, lower middle and middle class and beyond clusters are distinct from each other, while the socially dependent and middle class and beyond subgroups overlap. The diversity of the natives in terms of religiosity is consequential to study the process of assimilation between Muslims and the rest of the French population: if most Muslims are, for example, socially similar to lower middle class natives, then their high religiosity does not constitute as much of a puzzle, since members of this subgroup are more religious than other groups in France in general. More generally, such internal diversity evidently calls for a more careful approach to assimilation.

Cluster affiliation for 1st and 2nd generation Muslims in France.

Figure 3.2: Cluster of reference for Muslims in France, by generation.

Figure 2 presents the results of matching Muslims respondents in the TeO survey to their socially most proximate subgroup within the native population. Muslims in France are socially much more diverse than depicted in the literature. The "socially dependent" category comprises the largest group, with the rest of Muslims in France being more evenly spread in their cluster of affiliation. The social similarity between foreign and French born Muslims suggests that immigrant generation is not the best unit of analysis. In turn, such internal heterogeneity confirms the value of our analytical strategy

designed to provide more meaningful benchmarks to understand the religiosity gap between Muslims and their socially closest equivalent in the native population. The next section describes this gap in detail.

The "religiosity surplus" of Muslims in France

Figure 3 describes the mean deviation in religiosity for Muslims and how they vary depending on their cluster of reference. As expected given the diversity in religiosity of the French native sample of reference, Muslims' level of departure from the mainstream is not uniform across cluster. It is, however, consistently well above 0. Muslims in the socially dependent, working class, and middle class and beyond subgroups are particularly heterodox compared to socially similar natives.

Figure 3.3: Average surplus in religiosity from native subgroup of reference for Muslim respondents (bars are 95% confidence intervals).

To put Muslims' religiosity surplus in perspective, figure 4 reports average scores measuring the religiosity differential of immigrant respondents from other self-identified religious groups, across immigrant generations.

Figure 3.4: Average surplus in religiosity from native subgroup of reference, by denomination and immigrant generation (bars are 95% confidence intervals)

A dynamic of assimilation is clearly visible for respondents identifying as Christian, Catholic and Protestant, with a strong inter-generational decay in religiosity down to levels statistically closer to their cluster of reference. In comparison, Muslims have a surplus of religiosity from their native subgroups of reference at magnitudes that are several times larger than other groups.

Where does the "religiosity surplus" come from? To summarize the results so far, we have shown that Muslims significantly depart from the levels of religiosity of socially similar French respondents. What social and economic factors could explain such de-

parture from native French? We now test the series of hypotheses we outlined earlier.

Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for variables of interest.

Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics for variables of interest (standard deviation in parentheses and variable range in parentheses on left column) in the sample of Muslim respondents, by cluster affiliation

	(Cluster 1)	(Cluster 2)	(Cluster 3)	(Cluster 4)
	Socially dependent	Working class	Lower middle class	Middle class +
∝ 2nd generation (i.e. French born)	0.47	0.45	0.28	0.39
	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.45)	(0.49)
Net religiosity differential (-.2.32-10.41)	4.79	4.65	3.48	3.98
	(2.37)	(2.28)	(2.32)	(2.40)
∝ female	0.35	0.61	0.57	0.53
	(0.48)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.50)
Age (18-60)	31.97	32.90	44.05	35.37
	(11.47)	(8.63)	(9.18)	(8.47)
Education (1-8)	3.73	3.39	2.68	7.28
	(2.31)	(1.96)	(1.46)	(0.79)
Father's education (1-8)	2.40	2.06	1.74	3.04

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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics for variables of interest (standard deviation in parentheses and variable range in parentheses on left column) in the sample of Muslim respondents, by cluster affiliation

	(Cluster 1)	(Cluster 2)	(Cluster 3)	(Cluster 4)
	Socially dependent	*Working class*	*Lower middle class*	*Middle class +*
	(1.90)	(1.51)	(1.34)	(2.42)
Mother's education (1-8)	1.99	1.67	1.39	2.38
	(1.61)	(1.17)	(0.87)	(2.00)
Family income in k(0-96)	9.18	12.29	15.31	20.48
	(4.74)	(4.99)	(7.87)	(10.84)
N persons per room (.14-6)	1.16	1.09	1.09	1.01
	(0.49)	(0.47)	(0.46)	(0.46)
∝ reporting: Financial hardship	0.42	0.30	0.29	0.18
	(0.49)	(0.46)	(0.45)	(0.39)
∝ reporting: Financial hardship when growing up	0.29	0.30	0.29	0.25
	(0.45)	(0.46)	(0.45)	(0.43)
∝ reporting: Lived discrimination: religion	0.11	0.10	0.08	0.12

Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics for variables of interest (standard deviation in parentheses and variable range in parentheses on left column) in the sample of Muslim respondents, by cluster affiliation

	(Cluster 1)	(Cluster 2)	(Cluster 3)	(Cluster 4)
	Socially dependent	Working class	Lower middle class	Middle class +
	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.27)	(0.33)
∝ reporting: Lived discrimination: name	0.10 (0.29)	0.13 (0.33)	0.10 (0.30)	0.16 (0.36)
∝ reporting: Lived discrimination: accent	0.05 (0.21)	0.06 (0.23)	0.08 (0.27)	0.06 (0.23)
∝ reporting: Lived discrimination: nationality	0.30 (0.46)	0.31 (0.46)	0.28 (0.45)	0.42 (0.49)
∝ reporting: Lived discrimination: race	0.18 (0.39)	0.20 (0.40)	0.18 (0.39)	0.28 (0.45)
∝ reporting: Lived discrimination: appearance	0.14 (0.35)	0.14 (0.34)	0.14 (0.35)	0.19 (0.39)

Continued on next page

Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics for variables of interest (standard deviation in parentheses and variable range in parentheses on left column) in the sample of Muslim respondents, by cluster affiliation

	(Cluster 1) Socially dependent	(Cluster 2) Working class	(Cluster 3) Lower middle class	(Cluster 4) Middle class +
∝ reporting: Lived discrimination: housing	0.05	0.07	0.06	0.10
	(0.22)	(0.26)	(0.24)	(0.31)
∝ reporting: Lived discrimination: institutions	0.27	0.28	0.25	0.30
	(0.45)	(0.45)	(0.43)	(0.46)
∝ reporting: Lived discrimination: workplace	0.19	0.18	0.12	0.22
	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.33)	(0.42)
Importance of religion	3.29	3.28	3.14	3.14
in parental education (1-4)	(0.88)	(0.90)	(0.97)	(0.92)
∝ reporting: Transnational ties: family	friends	0.77	0.78	0.80
0.78	(0.42)	(0.42)	(0.40)	(0.42)

Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics for variables of interest (standard deviation in parentheses and variable range in parentheses on left column) in the sample of Muslim respondents, by cluster affiliation

	(Cluster 1)	(Cluster 2)	(Cluster 3)	(Cluster 4)
	Socially dependent	*Working class*	*Lower middle class*	*Middle class +*
∝ reporting: Transnational ties: remittances	0.07	0.15	0.20	0.22
	(0.26)	(0.36)	(0.40)	(0.41)
∝ reporting: Transnational ties: investments	0.15	0.14	0.24	0.18
	(0.36)	(0.35)	(0.43)	(0.39)
Neighborhood context: ∝ in top decile	0.48	0.39	0.45	0.31
% immigrants from Maghreb	(0.50)	(0.49)	(0.50)	(0.46)
Neighborhood context: ∝ in top decile	0.25	0.19	0.29	0.28
% immigrants from SS Africa	(0.43)	(0.39)	(0.45)	(0.45)
Neighborhood context: ∝ in top decile	0.21	0.19	0.14	0.09
% with only a primary education	(0.41)	(0.39)	(0.35)	(0.29)

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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics for variables of interest (standard deviation in parentheses and variable range in parentheses on left column) in the sample of Muslim respondents, by cluster affiliation

	(Cluster 1)	(Cluster 2)	(Cluster 3)	(Cluster 4)
	Socially dependent	*Working class*	*Lower middle class*	*Middle class +*
Neighborhood context: $\propto$ in top decile	0.07	0.04	0.04	0.05
% long term unemployed	(0.25)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.22)
Neighborhood context: $\propto$ in top decile	0.61	0.52	0.56	0.47
% social housing	(0.49)	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)
Neighborhood context: $\propto$ in top decile	0.39	0.32	0.38	0.27
% large families	(0.49)	(0.47)	(0.49)	(0.44)
Observations	1817	1082	659	773

3.6.2 Results from OLS regression models

Predicting the religiosity surplus by cluster membership

Table 3 presents results from OLS regression models predicting variation in the distance to the mean religiosity of the respondent's subgroup of reference in the native population. These coefficients were obtained using weights accounting for sampling design as well as probability of being present in the analytic samples due to missing data, and robust standard errors. The left column presents a pooled model for all Muslim respondents while the other 4 models present within-cluster regression results.

Table 3.3: Results for OLS regression models predicting religiosity differential for Muslims in France, by cluster membership

	All Muslim respondents	(Cluster 1) Socially dependent	(Cluster 2) Working class	(Cluster 3) Lower middle class	(Cluster 4) Middle class +
Nativity status:					
1st generation (i.e. foreign born)	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
2nd generation (i.e. French born)	0.0864	0.313	0.0819	0.450	0.549
	(0.167)	(0.344)	(0.347)	(0.336)	(0.395)
H1: Material insecurity					
Family income income in k	-0.0272***	-0.0213	-0.0462**	-0.0122	-0.0164*
	(0.00620)	(0.0128)	(0.0147)	(0.0141)	(0.00806)
N persons per room	0.147	0.0217	0.101	0.127	0.343*
	(0.0901)	(0.136)	(0.156)	(0.269)	(0.162)
Experiencing financial hardship	-0.208*	-0.150	-0.398*	0.0490	0.0147
	(0.0967)	(0.134)	(0.184)	(0.212)	(0.229)

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Table 3.3: Results for OLS regression models predicting religiosity differential for Muslims in France, by cluster membership

	All Muslim respondents	(Cluster 1) Socially dependent	(Cluster 2) Working class	(Cluster 3) Lower middle class	(Cluster 4) Middle class +
Experienced financial hardship when growing up	-0.128	-0.202	-0.157	0.0175	-0.0637
	(0.0856)	(0.141)	(0.174)	(0.192)	(0.173)
H2: Reactive Religiosity					
Perception of discrimination:					
Low	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Medium	0.0200	-0.0372	-0.276	0.192	0.116
	(0.124)	(0.172)	(0.261)	(0.233)	(0.296)
High	0.117	0.0859	0.0995	0.00179	0.104
	(0.116)	(0.174)	(0.235)	(0.255)	(0.285)
Experience of discrimination:					
Religion	0.830***	1.010***	0.440	0.652	0.813**

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Table 3.3: Results for OLS regression models predicting religiosity differential for Muslims in France, by cluster membership

	All Muslim respondents	(Cluster 1) Socially dependent	(Cluster 2) Working class	(Cluster 3) Lower middle class	(Cluster 4) Middle class +
	(0.137)	(0.197)	(0.259)	(0.413)	(0.274)
Name	-0.115	-0.0950	-0.0172	-0.601	-0.165
	(0.133)	(0.223)	(0.243)	(0.362)	(0.246)
Accent	-0.467*	-0.460	0.134	-0.584	-0.436
	(0.185)	(0.298)	(0.332)	(0.478)	(0.347)
Nationality	-0.0315	-0.304	-0.332	0.302	0.498*
	(0.114)	(0.193)	(0.202)	(0.257)	(0.220)
Race	0.0224	0.0878	-0.179	0.0551	-0.0670
	(0.133)	(0.255)	(0.229)	(0.280)	(0.243)
Physical appearance	0.367**	0.318	0.796**	0.266	0.0381
	(0.128)	(0.203)	(0.254)	(0.316)	(0.253)
Housing	-0.0296	0.594*	-0.682	-0.174	0.198

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Table 3.3: Results for OLS regression models predicting religiosity differential for Muslims in France, by cluster membership

	All Muslim respondents	(Cluster 1) Socially dependent	(Cluster 2) Working class	(Cluster 3) Lower middle class	(Cluster 4) Middle class +
	(0.206)	(0.278)	(0.490)	(0.349)	(0.240)
Institutions	0.0646	0.255	0.0336	-0.0521	0.326
	(0.0977)	(0.141)	(0.193)	(0.213)	(0.194)
Workplace	0.143	-0.0542	0.482*	0.419	-0.184
	(0.103)	(0.157)	(0.206)	(0.285)	(0.221)
H3: Parental socialization					
Religion in parental education:					
Not important	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Somewhat important	0.508*	-0.358	0.947*	0.317	1.501***
	(0.246)	(0.461)	(0.480)	(0.415)	(0.386)
Quite important	1.554***	0.682	2.137***	1.032*	2.544***

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Table 3.3: Results for OLS regression models predicting religiosity differential for Muslims in France, by cluster membership

	All Muslim respondents	(Cluster 1) Socially dependent	(Cluster 2) Working class	(Cluster 3) Lower middle class	(Cluster 4) Middle class +
	(0.239)	(0.442)	(0.443)	(0.404)	(0.366)
Very important	2.879***	1.912***	3.304***	2.537***	3.786***
	(0.234)	(0.436)	(0.433)	(0.384)	(0.349)
H4: Transnational ties:					
Family & friendship ties	0.441***	0.597***	0.272	0.558**	0.0988
	(0.0885)	(0.138)	(0.181)	(0.215)	(0.176)
Sending remittances	0.248*	0.261	0.111	0.0258	0.545**
	(0.115)	(0.191)	(0.267)	(0.222)	(0.202)
Investments	0.283*	0.264	0.430*	0.560**	-0.225
	(0.112)	(0.211)	(0.207)	(0.212)	(0.220)

H5: Replenished Religiosity:

Continued on next page

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Table 3.3: Results for OLS regression models predicting religiosity differential for Muslims in France, by cluster member-
ship

	All Muslim respondents	(Cluster 1) Socially dependent	(Cluster 2) Working class	(Cluster 3) Lower middle class	(Cluster 4) Middle class +
Neighborhood context: top decile	-0.142	-0.185	0.110	-0.0814	-0.0167
% immigrants from Maghreb	(0.0925)	(0.142)	(0.178)	(0.196)	(0.187)
Neighborhood context: top decile	0.0140	-0.0409	-0.207	-0.0936	0.196
% immigrants from SS Africa	(0.0964)	(0.163)	(0.206)	(0.193)	(0.176)
H6: Neighborhood Disadvantage					
Neighborhood context: top decile	0.229	0.319	0.148	-0.308	0.584
% with only a primary education	(0.117)	(0.169)	(0.224)	(0.260)	(0.312)
Neighborhood context: top decile	0.0412	-0.136	-0.00679	0.652	0.683*
% long-term unemployed	(0.141)	(0.193)	(0.311)	(0.406)	(0.311)
Neighborhood context: top decile	0.165	0.172	-0.0224	0.199	0.195
% social housing	(0.0888)	(0.133)	(0.176)	(0.214)	(0.172)

Continued on next page

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Table 3.3: Results for OLS regression models predicting religiosity differential for Muslims in France, by cluster membership

	All Muslim respondents	(Cluster 1) Socially dependent	(Cluster 2) Working class	(Cluster 3) Lower middle class	(Cluster 4) Middle class +
Neighborhood context: top decile	0.386***	0.281*	0.394	0.599**	0.265
% large families	(0.0926)	(0.125)	(0.212)	(0.211)	(0.202)
Constant	5.497***	5.561***	4.709***	3.236	7.313***
	(0.675)	(0.841)	(1.387)	(2.141)	(2.021)
Observations	4331	1817	1082	659	773
R^2	0.338	0.286	0.336	0.351	0.576

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Unreported controls also included in the models: sex, age, age squared, education, father's education, mother's education, regional origin, occupational status and interview quality.

When all Muslim respondents are pooled together, the model explains 33.8% of the variation in Muslims' religiosity surplus in France. Individual models run by cluster affiliation explain between 28.6% and 57.6% of this variation. Variance inflation factors run for each model indicate that the results presented here do not suffer from multicollinearity despite the number of predictors included[10].

First, it is important to note that nativity - i.e. being 1st or 2nd generation - is unrelated to Muslims' difference from French natives. What, then, explain this surplus[11]?

We find modest evidence for the effect of material deprivation. Family income has the expected effect across all Muslims, but the within-cluster regression models reveal that the effect is entirely carried by the working class subgroup, in which the estimates is almost 70% larger in magnitude than in the pooled model. Conversely, the number of persons per room in the household, a measure of material comfort, only has the expected effect in the middle class cluster. The subjective evaluation of one's situation and the level of hardship when growing have effects running either in the opposite direction to what was hypothesized or no effect at all. Overall, the material insecurity hypothesis is not particularly well-suited to explain Muslims' religiosity surplus. This result is surprising given the widespread assumption of a strong link between poverty and religiosity among Muslims often made in the literature (Franz 2007, Lapeyronnie 2008, Kepel 2012a, 2012b)

The rich set of co-variates in the discrimination module of the TeO survey allows a clear view on the impact of perception as opposed to different types of lived discrimination. First of all, perception per se of discrimination in France is unrelated to the outcome variable of interest. The experience of discrimination on various grounds,

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[10]We do not include the details of these analyses on variance inflation factors here due to space limitation. They are available upon request.

[11]We only discuss results relevant to the tests of our hypotheses in the main text. Table 4 in the Appendix C reports coefficients for control variables, separately from coefficients discussed here.

however, provide support to the reactive religiosity hypothesis. The effect of having experienced explicitly religious discrimination is strong and significant for socially dependent and middle class Muslims, while discrimination on physical appearances matters for those who are working class. In terms of specific places where discrimination has been experienced, we observe a similar diversity of experience: the socially dependent are sensitive to discrimination on the housing market while the working class subgroup reports experiencing discrimination, quite logically, on the workplace. These subtle differences by social experiences would have been lost or heavily distorted in a general model, as indicated by results for the model pooling all Muslims together on the left column. Overall, these results indicate support for the reactive religiosity hypothesis.

The impact of parental socialization, as indicated by the importance of religion in the education received from parents, has a consistent and large effect across subgroups. In the pooled model, the difference between "not important" and "very important" in the importance of religion in the education imparted by parents to the respondent corresponds to a 2.88 increase in the distance to the expected level of religiosity - a 55% increase from the intercept. Looking at the within-cluster models, however, one can see that this coefficient varies a lot in magnitude. Parents of respondents in the working and middle class + subgroups are better at transmitting their religiosity to their children than parents in the other two clusters. Overall, those results provide strong support to hypothesis 3 regarding the effect of parental socialization.

The hypothesis regarding the effect of transnationalism also finds support in the data, with different types of ties at work for different subgroups. Once again, it is important to note that the pooled model would have been a rather blunt instrument: it picked up on these effects but with a much more moderate effect size than in the subgroups where they actually come from.

The replenished religiosity hypothesis regarding the effect of living in neighbor-hoods with a large share of recently arrived migrants from Muslim-majority countries is not supported. This result is surprisingly given the perpetual suspicion on the segregated *banlieue* neighborhoods, often depicted as enclaves of religious radicalism at odds with the norms of the French Republic (Bronner 2010, Kepel 2012a).

Finally, we find mixed support for the neighborhood disadvantage hypothesis through the consistent and strong effect of living in a neighborhood with a higher per-centage of large families. Other indicators of neighborhood disadvantage, however, are unrelated to our dependent variable. This is puzzling, as interpreting the independent effect of large families is not straightforward. We therefore abstain from elaborating on the neighborhood disadvantage hypothesis as it receives mixed support from the models presented here.

Summing up, we find support for the predictors associated with the reactive reli-giosity, parental socialization, and transnationalism hypotheses (H2, H3, and H4 respec-tively). Paternoster tests for the equality of coefficients (Paternoster, Brame, Mazerolle and Piquero 1998) confirms that the coefficients for parental socialization, and different types of discrimination and transnational ties significantly vary across subgroups (table 5 reporting z-scores for the test is available in Appendix D).

In order to put the magnitude of those three sets of variables in perspective, we computed the predicted change in the respondent's distance in religiosity from the native subgroup of reference between two profiles. A respondent in profile 1 grew up with parents who consider religion to be "very" important, has experienced discrimination and maintains ties in his country of origin. Profile 2, by contrast, received a parental education in which religion was only "somewhat" important, has never experienced any discrimination, and does not maintain any tie with his or her country of origin. Profile

1 and 2 are otherwise equal on all other variables, which are set at their respective means. For the discrimination and transnational ties variables, we only manipulate those variables which were significant in each cluster (e.g. religious discrimination in cluster 1 and 4 only, sending remittances in cluster 4 only, etc). We report the predicted values of the religiosity surplus for both profiles and for each cluster in table 4 below.

Table 3.4: Estimated values (standard errors in parentheses) and % decrease in religiosity surplus between Profile 1 - high parental emphasis on religion, experiencing discrimination and maintaining transitional ties and Profile 2 - moderate parental emphasis on religion, no experience of discrimination and no transnational ties. Predicted values for Profile 1 and 2 are significantly different across all clusters (two-tailed test, p<0.05).

	Profile 1	Profile 2	$\Delta P1 - P2$
C1: Socially dependent	7.03	2.56	**-63.58%**
	(0.32)	(0.19)	
C2: Working class	6.86	2.80	**-59.18**%
	(0.40)	(0.33)	
C3: Lower middle class	5.04	1.71	**-66.07%**
	(0.20)	(0.24)	
C4: Middle class +	6.68	2.54	**-61.98%**
	(0.31)	(0.21)	

The parental emphasis on religion, the experience of discrimination and the maintenance of transnational ties with the country of origin contribute between 59 and 66% of the religiosity surplus of Muslims in France compared to French natives. A parsimonious set of variables thus explain the majority of Muslim immigrants' distance in religiosity to comparable French natives.

3.6.3 Supplementary analyses and robustness checks

In light of its strong effect, we explored potential interactions between parental religious socialization and our other significant set of predictors, namely discrimination and transnational ties. It is plausible that higher emphasis on religion in the education received from parents could plausibly result in an increased reaction to discrimination, as well as a more acute awareness of the importance of maintaining ties with the "old country". We thus ran separate analyses by cluster membership and levels of parental emphasis on religion. No clear pattern emerges, and discrimination and transnational processes appear to be independent from parental religious socialization. We also checked for possible interactions of transnational ties and discrimination with generation, as the ethnographic literature suggests that 2nd generation Muslims experience these processes differently (Lepoutre 1997, Kepel 2012a, Kapko 2007, Lagrange 2013 chapter 8), but found no difference across generations within each cluster[12].

We checked our regression results by testing them with alternative specifications for certain predictors or sets of predictors. We tested the material deprivation hypothesis with only one predictor (just family income or just number of persons per room in the household) instead of the high number included in the main models. We tested the replenishment and neighborhood hypotheses with ordered categorical as well as linear specification by decile rather than the dummies for top decile used in the main models. These alternative specifications produced results which were substantively identical from those presented here[13].

Another series of robustness checks attempted to gauge the effect of selection in our estimation of the effect of discrimination. More religious Muslims might be,

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[12]We choose not to include these results here due to space limitations and the already heavy number of tables and figures. They are available upon request.

[13]*idem.*

for various reasons, more likely to be discriminated against in the first place and this could confound the effect of discrimination. We thus ran separate models for individuals who "never" wore a religious sign and others who "sometimes" or "always" wore one - with the assumption that those with a visible sign are more likely to be discriminated against[14]. The results show that the effect of religious discrimination is substantially reduced - but still significant - for those who "never" wear a religious sign. This suggests either a selection process or a stronger reaction or perception to discrimination among those wearing a religious sign. Additional models run for each dimension of religiosity for those who "never" wear a sign still show a widespread association of several types of discrimination with higher departure from expected levels of religiosity. Experiencing institutional discrimination is associated with a higher deviation from expected levels of religious attendance and subjective importance of religion in one's personal life, while discrimination on religious and national grounds is related to higher respect of dietary constraints[15].

More generally, it is likely that both selection and reactive religiosity processes are simultaneously active. Recent experimental work in France has shown specifically religious discrimination against Muslims to be at work, thus reinforcing Muslims' cultural affiliation with their country of origin and creating a self-reinforcing dynamic of distrust and polarization (Adida, Valfort and Laitin 2016). This deeply endogenous relationship between discrimination and cultural "otherness" - high religiosity in this particular study - is discussed in detail in the next section.

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[14]We attempted to obtain estimates for the "net" effect of discrimination using propensity score matching but unfortunately the common support region to carry out the analyses was too small between the treated and untreated groups.

[15]Since both the main text and the appendix already feature a heavy number of tables and figure, those additional models are not included here and are available upon request.

3.7 Discussion

3.7.1 Taking social heterogeneity seriously: uncovering subgroups and parallel social processes

Theoretical work on immigration and social boundaries has repeatedly called for a careful analysis of the internal diversity inherent to both native and immigrant groups (Alba and Nee 2003, Portes and Zhou 1993). This concern is especially prominent in the work of scholars warning against "groupist" thinking in sociology and emphasizing the need for a reflexive use of social categories like ethnicity and religion so as to avoid essentialist accounts of bounded, homogenous and solidary groups (Brubaker 2004, 2013, Wimmer 2013). This call for reflexivity is the analytical counterpart to more political concerns about essentialist representations of the "other" in postcolonial theorizing (Said 1979) and the emerging scholarship on contemporary Islamophobia (Taras 2013). While qualitative inquiries on Islam in Europe have been attentive to these questions and careful not to assume Muslims form a bounded and homogeneous group (Bowen 2007, 2012, Kapko 2007, Kepel 2012, Beaman 2015a), quantitative scholars have methodologically assumed Muslims and Islam as relatively fixed entities, often adding religion as a dummy variable in a multivariate regression, or taking for granted religious groups to be the natural unit of analysis (for recent critiques of this approach in the scholarship on race and ethnicity, see Brubaker 2004, Wimmer 2013). The analytical strategy we have proposed and implemented here seeks to actively engage with these theoretical calls for reflexivity and attention to within-group heterogeneity. Given the growing politicization and suspicion Muslims are the object of as an often essentialized minority group, we consider this effort to be particularly timely and important.

Besides concern about essentialism, this strategy led to important analytical pay-offs. An analysis taking for granted religious affiliation or immigrant generation as the proper unit of analysis would have yielded blunt and inaccurate results - as indicated by the results of the pooled model compared to subgroup specific models in table 3. We interpret coefficient differences between subgroups as reflecting a diversity of social experiences which existing research can help us contextualize further.

The first subgroup has been the subject of past ethnographic work focusing on the experience of marginalized Muslims - economically vulnerable individuals living in segregated neighborhoods and keenly aware of the religious and spatial stigma affecting them (Lepoutre 1997, Franz 2007, Kepel 2012a, Lagrange 2013). The coefficients for religious and housing discrimination - the latter reflecting the prevalence of stigmatized social housing (so called *HLM*) in immigrant neighborhoods - suggest just that. One also notices that the effect of parental socialization is weaker compared to other groups - something reminiscent of the qualitative observations on young, Muslim men who are in conflict with their parents on religious matters (Kepel 2012b, Lagrange 2013 chapter 8). Crucially, nascent work on Islamic radicalization in France suggests that, if it mostly occur among Muslim families, it does so outside of the parental purview - either in the neighborhood, in prison or on the Internet (Thomson 2016). Existing portraits of young jihadists further suggest that a feeling of alienation, discrimination and a lack of integration on labor markets - key characteristics of cluster 1 - play an important role in the radicalization process (Khosrokhavar 2014, Thomson 2016; see also Institut Montaigne 2016).

At the opposite end of the social spectrum, recent research on the Muslim middle class in France can help us further understand the results for cluster 4 (Beaman 2015a, Institut Montaigne 2016). Muslims raised in middle class homes are able to appropri-

ate their parents' heritage on their own term rather than being coerced into it (Beaman 2015a: 12-15). This contrasts with other studies of Islam in the *banlieues*, where the control of parents and elder brothers is notorious (Lapeyeronnie 2008, Kepel 2012a, 2012b). A less forceful religious socialization can lead to a more voluntary embrace of Islam as a form of self-actualization, and thus explain the tremendous effect of parental socialization for middle class Muslims. Additionally, a higher level of education bringing expectations of social mobility, fair treatment and a belief in the national Republican ideology can help explain this subgroup's particular sensitivity to discrimination on religious and national grounds (Beaman 2015b).

It is harder to contextualize the results of clusters 2 and 3 due to the lack of existing research. The importance of transnational ties along with the absence of reported discrimination is a defining aspect of the lower middle class' religious trajectory and one deserving of further scholarly attention. Cluster 2 appears slightly more familiar. The strong effect of parental socialization and the experience of discrimination at work are reminiscent of ethnographic work on 1st generation migrants from Muslim countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (Lagrange 2013). Lagrange describes the religiosity of industrial workers and their families from rural Sénégal and Mali who remain attached to Islam in part to cope with harsh social conditions in France - including deindustrialization and the lack of jobs. This perspective is that of 1st generation migrants, however, and cluster 2 features an even mix of native and foreign born. More work on working class Muslims is needed to understand their particular religious trajectory in France.

More generally, those results suggest that it is necessary to empirically deconstruct labels such as "Muslim" (Brubaker 2013), "immigrant" (Garip 2012), or "mainstream" (Alba and Nee 2003). The diversity of social processes at work among different subgroups existing under the umbrella of one religious category suggests that a more induc-

tive, data-driven approach to determine the relevant units of analysis in the assimilation process is necessary. The approach we used can be adapted for the analysis of other questions relating to immigrant incorporation and implying a comparison with natives while retaining the heterogeneity of both populations.

3.7.2 Immigrant mode of entry and the making of a negative cultural equilibrium

We showed that a parsimonious set of variables - family socialization, transnational ties and the experience of discrimination - explains approximately 60% of the religiosity surplus of Muslim immigrants in France. What do these findings suggest for assimilation theory and what do they contribute to immigration research in general?

A proper interpretation of these findings requires historicizing the Muslim presence in France, and Europe in general. Today's Muslim minorities are yesterday's guest workers and their children. Those workers came to Europe in the late 1950s and 1960s in search of better salaries in the postwar economic boom, without intending, or being provided with institutional pathways to stay permanently (Laurence 2012). The 1973 Oil Crisis resulted in an economic recession and rising unemployment, leading Western European governments to freeze all guest worker programs. Workers who were already in Europe wanted to preserve their professional future and thus started to bring their family members while hoping that guest worker programs would resume (Moch 2003: 187-188). In the late 1970s, the French government encouraged return migration by offering cash incentives - the "million Stoléru" equivalent to around 1500 - and discouraged new migration by increasing penalties on undocumented migrants. Those policy initiatives were largely unsuccessful, however, and by 1981 around 1.5 million migrants

from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey were present in France. The politicization of immigration and immigrant integration then rose in the 1980s as it became clear that those guest workers were in fact becoming permanent minorities (Castles 1986, Noiriel 1996, Moch 2003, Laurence 2012).

The exogenous shock at the origin of the sudden halt of worker programs - the 1973 Oil Crisis - and the following ambiguities regarding the future and status of ex-guest workers and their families produced a specific mode of entry of migrants from Muslim societies in France, one that was not fully voluntary like earlier migration waves from nearby European countries (Moch 2003). Guest workers and their families who, by and large, did not plan on permanently migrating found themselves as involuntary minorities (Ogbu and Simons 1998) in a culturally threatening context, i.e. one charac-terized by secularism. They thus had an incentive to maintain and transmit their religious belief systems to their children as well as links to the country of origin. Meanwhile, their unexpected presence generated widespread cultural anxiety once the economic boom came to a halt in the mid-1970s. Controversies regarding the accommodation of Mus-lim practices and religiosity emerged a decade later, such as the first "veil affair" in 1989.

In light of their mode of entry as guest workers accidentally becoming permanent minorities, we can think of the process generating and maintaining a high religiosity surplus among Muslim immigrants and their children in France as a negative cultural equilibrium. Immigrants from Muslim countries imported high religiosity levels that they successfully transmitted to their children, while maintaining ties with the country of origin. This high level of religiosity made them suspicious and liable to stigma and discrimination in the French secular context (Bowen 2007) - thus reinforcing an initial cultural difference through reactive religiosity, in a circular motion. This narrative is

consistent with recent experimental work on the "negative discriminatory equilibrium" affecting Muslims in France (Adida, Valfort and Laitin 2016). Using experimental methods, Adida, Valfort and Laitin show that there exists a specific type of discrimination against Muslims in France, above and beyond race, and that this discrimination feeds off native perceptions of Muslims' religious and gender norms (*ibid* chapter 6). Muslim immigrants perceive and react to this discrimination by maintaining a high attachment to their culture of origin and a low level of identification with France.

Theoretically, our findings thus point the lasting effects of immigrants' mode of entry for assimilation. While recent research on migration in Europe suggests that migrants' cultural heterodoxy develops endogenously as a response to inequality (Wimmer and Soehl 2014), our work shows that Muslims' religiosity surplus compared to socially similar segments of the French native population is both exogenous (the importance of parental socialization in transmitting high religiosity levels inherited from the country of origin, as well as transnational ties) and endogenous (the experience of discrimination from French natives) to the context of reception. More generally, the strong explanatory power of this set of variables suggests that Muslims living in France experience a lasting status of involuntary minority spanning differences across subgroups and generations.

3.8   Conclusion

This paper has documented a phenomenon of delayed religious assimilation among Muslims - 99.6% of whom are immigrants - in France. Using a new analytical strategy accounting for the heterogeneity of both the immigrant and the native reference group, we found that parental socialization, transnational ties and the experience of discriminations explain approximately 60% of Muslims' religiosity surplus compared to

socially similar French natives. While we documented different trajectories across sub-groups within the Muslim population, we interpret the consistent effect of these three sets of variables as reflecting a negative cultural equilibrium stemming from the accidental mode of entry of Muslims as involuntary minorities who were originally not supposed to permanently settle in France.

In closing, a few remarks about the limitations and potential prospects opened by our study are in order. Despite its large sample and unusually high number of covariates, the data used here are only cross-sectionnal. This undoubtedly constitutes a strong limitation, as assimilation is an inherently dynamic and temporal process. Certain mechanisms hypothesized to be at work here, such as reactive religiosity, are hard to observe without confounders in observational data despite their strong theoretical foundations. Experimental and longitudinal data are needed to further study the processes at work among Muslims in France (see Adida, Valfort and Laitin 2016 for a recent experimental example on discrimination).

Finally, let us restate an important theoretical point: heterogeneity matters. Scholars of migration and intergroup relations can and should be wary of taking evident social categories of the migration process, such as immigrants or Muslims, as their natural units of analysis. The "Muslim" label covers a diversity of social trajectories. Our empirical approach consisting in decomposing Muslims and natives in cohesive subgroups, as well as our documenting of parallel social processes at work among them, has made clear that a careful deconstruction of bounded groups to avoid their reification is not a fashionable intellectual posture but a strong analytical imperative.

3.9 Appendix A: Background on the Muslim presence in Europe

Contemporary Muslim immigration dates back to the migration flows of foreign male workers brought in to help rebuild Europe after World War Two. Stimulated by the Marshall Plan, European economies were in full swing during the 1950s and 1960s and relied on bilateral treaties to temporarily import a much needed extra-manpower from countries with which they had close ties inherited from colonialism or historical alliances. Britain thus relied on Pakistani and Indian workers, Germany on Turkish ones, and France on Moroccan, Tunisian and Algerian ones. Those male workers sought employment abroad because the better pay allowed them to send remittances to their home country; in turn, national governments were happy not to worry about their integration since it was a straightforward guest worker arrangement in which workers would voluntarily return to their home countries (Laurence 2012). Workers rotated freely between countries and their presence or culture did not generate widespread hostility in Europe at the time. It was in fact quite the opposite: upwardly mobile European workers happily gave away their manufacturing and construction jobs as they entered the middle class en masse (Noiriel 1996, Laurence 2012).

This political and social arrangement came to a brutal halt in 1974 when Western economies fell into recession as a result of the first oil shock. Unemployment sharply rose and European governments stopped all flows of foreign workers. Those who were in Europe at the time stayed, and migration flows virtually changed overnight, from male workers to the family members those workers had left behind. The Muslim presence in Europe has since then been deeply contentious and coincided with the rise of identity, immigration and immigrant integration as objects of political debates (Noiriel 1996. In Germany, these tensions took the form of important debates on the reform of nationality law and the public funding of Islamic religious institutions (Joppke and

Torpey 2013) while debates revolved around mutliculturalism in Great Britain and the Netherlands. In France, policy and scholarly debates revolved around the integration of Muslim practices and claims in the existing church-state institutional framework of "la¨é" (secularism), promoting a strict relegation of religion to the private sphere (Bowen 2007). Several "veil affairs" and requests for dietary accommodation in public schools have, in particular, generated much controversy.

Muslims are now the largest and fastest growing religious minority in Europe, making up 3.5% of the national population on average in Western European countries (Laurence 2012, Pew Research Center 2015). Muslims in France, however, represent 7 to 8% of the national population, accounting for around 4.5 million people forming the largest Muslim minority relative to the national population in Europe (*ibid*).

3.10 Appendix B: Cluster validation measures to determine the best number of clusters in the sample of French natives

Figure 3.5: Cluster validation measures across number of clusters for French native sample

This study uses ten validation measures to choose the number of clusters used to break down the native French reference sample in several reference categories. They were computed using the *NbClust* and *ClValid* packages in the *R* environment. We briefly explain how to interpret each measure below. For more detail on each measure, see Kaufman and Rousseeauw 2005, Brock et al. 2008, Liu et al. 2010 Charrad et al. 2014.

- The Connectivity measure indicates the degree of connectedness of the clusters. It should be *minimized*.

- The Silhouette Width index is a measure of cluster compactness and separation. It should be *maximized*.

- The Dunn index is a measure of cluster compactness and separation. It should be *maximized*.

- The Figure of Merit is a measure of cluster stability and should be *minimized*.

- The SDBW index is a measure of cluster separation and density. The SDBW index should be *minimized*.

- The Krzanowski and Lai index is a measure of cluster separation and should be *maximized*.

- The average distance between cluster means is a measure of cluster stability and should be *minimized*.

- The average proportion of non-overlap is a measure of cluster stability and should be *minimized*.

- The average within-cluster distance indicates cluster stability and should be *minimized*.

- The within-groups sum of squares is a measure of cluster compactness and should be *minimized*.

The results indicate that a 4-cluster solution yields the best compromise between producing well-defined clusters and parsimony. Additionally, we evaluated cluster quality on how differentiated the defined clusters were on the variables included when running the *kmeans* algorithm. As reported in table 1, the top proportion in each cluster is statistically significant from the next lowest value for all variables but one (gender). This is superior to the 3-, 5-cluster and 6-cluster solution, in which 2 or 3 variables have ties for top values, indicating lower cluster definition. Finally, and importantly, we used the human perception criterion (Grimmer & King 2010) to determine if the proposed solutions formed meaningful - i.e. interpretable - clusters, in which the 4- and 5-cluster solution emerged as forming the most easily recognizable subgroups.

3.11 Appendix C: Controls included in the OLS regression models but not presented in the main table

Table 3.5: OLS results for control variables included in the main model but not presented in Table 3

	All Muslim respondents	C1: *Socially dependent*	C2: *Working class*	C3: *Lower middle class*	C4: *Middle class +*
Demographic predictors					
Male	-0.294***	-0.376**	-0.358*	-0.253	0.126
	(0.0841)	(0.139)	(0.165)	(0.172)	(0.157)
Age	-0.166***	-0.112**	-0.103	-0.132	-0.272**
	(0.0306)	(0.0415)	(0.0603)	(0.0805)	(0.0858)
Age squared	0.00171***	0.00113*	0.00106	0.00166	0.00311**
	(0.000374)	(0.000549)	(0.000755)	(0.000885)	(0.00104)
Education	0.0131	-0.0527	0.00583	-0.0312	-0.209
	(0.0198)	(0.0284)	(0.0443)	(0.0650)	(0.108)
Father's education	-0.0380	-0.0114	-0.0354	0.126	-0.0373

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Table 3.5: OLS results for control variables included in the main model but not presented in Table 3

	All Muslim respondents	C1: *Socially dependent*	C2: *Working class*	C3: *Lower middle class*	C4: *Middle class +*
	(0.0251)	(0.0350)	(0.0499)	(0.0708)	(0.0433)
Mother's education	0.0169	-0.0510	-0.0281	0.0802	-0.0201
	(0.0379)	(0.0447)	(0.0669)	(0.126)	(0.0552)
Regional origin:					
Maghreb	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.	Ref.
Sahel	-0.368**	-0.566*	0.0369	-0.0448	-0.286
	(0.141)	(0.225)	(0.276)	(0.303)	(0.283)
Turkey	0.0617	0.122	0.276	-0.369	-0.697
	(0.132)	(0.181)	(0.234)	(0.371)	(0.369)
Other in Subsaharan Africa	-0.0745	-0.301	-0.565	0.0417	0.727

Continued on next page

Table 3.5: OLS results for control variables included in the main model but not presented in Table 3

	All Muslim respondents	C1: Socially dependent	C2: Working class	C3: Lower middle class	C4: Middle class +
Asia	-0.114	-0.320	-0.542	0.931*	0.152
	(0.204)	(0.299)	(0.412)	(0.405)	(0.523)
Other	-1.063***	-0.743	-0.923*	-1.980**	-0.784
	(0.273)	(0.431)	(0.460)	(0.683)	(0.476)
Mixed	0.257	0.137	0.573	-0.369	0.730
	(0.171)	(0.231)	(0.347)	(0.578)	(0.407)
Occupational status:					
Working	Ref.		Ref.	Ref.	Ref.

Continued on next page

Table 3.5: OLS results for control variables included in the main model but not presented in Table 3

	All Muslim respondents	C1: Socially dependent	C2: Working class	C3: Lower middle class	C4: Middle class +
Student	-0.587***				-0.718
	(0.166)				(0.569)
Homemaker	0.582***	0.591**		1.462	0.281
	(0.140)	(0.217)		(1.303)	(0.656)
Other (handicapped, etc)	0.758	0.136		-2.107**	3.217**
	(0.430)	(0.278)		(0.648)	(1.005)
Retired	0.204		-0.486	0.398	
	(0.510)		(1.474)	(0.566)	
[1em] Unemployed	-0.105	0.0745		-0.625	0.522
	(0.118)	(0.171)		(0.812)	(0.568)
Quality of the interview	1.069*	0.195	0.628	0.723	1.014

Continued on next page

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Table 3.5: OLS results for control variables included in the main model but not presented in Table 3

	All Muslim respondents	C1: *Socially dependent*	C2: *Working class*	C3: *Lower middle class*	C4: *Middle class +*
	(0.437)	(0.359)	(0.390)	(0.611)	(0.777)
Constant	5.497***	5.561***	4.709***	3.236	7.313***
	(0.675)	(0.841)	(1.387)	(2.141)	(2.021)
Observations	4331	1817	1082	659	773

Standard errors in parentheses

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

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3.12 Appendix D: Z-scores from Paternoster tests for coefficients equality

Z-score testing for coefficient equality adapted from Paternoster et al. (1998), in which the z-score for the difference between two coefficients *b1* and *b2* is given by:

$$Z = \frac{(b_1 - b_2)}{\sqrt{SEb_1^2 + SEb_2^2}} \tag{3.1}$$

The table below gives the z-scores for all 6 pairs of clusters being tested for equality of coefficients:

Table 3.6: Z-scores for pairwise Paternoster tests for regression coefficients equality, for all 6 possible pairs of clusters. Note: Bolded and italicized z-scores indicates a rejection of the null hypothesis of equality of coefficients (two-tailed test, $p<0.05$ and $p<0.10$ respectively).

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
	1-2	1-3	1-4	2-3	2-4	3-4
Level of parental emphasis on religion	**-2.26**	-1.08	**-3.36**	*1.33*	-0.87	**-2.41**
Transnational ties:						
Ties with family & friends	*1.42*	0.15	**2.23**	-1.02	0.69	**1.65**
Transnational remittances	0.45	0.80	-1.02	0.25	*-1.30*	**-1.73**
Transnational investment	-0.56	-0.99	**1.60**	-0.44	**2.17**	**2.57**
Discrimination:						
Religious discrimination	**1.75**	0.79	0.58	-0.43	0.99	-0.33
Discrimination on physical appearance	**-1.47**	0.14	0.86	*1.31*	**2.11**	0.56
Housing discrimination	**2.26**	**1.72**	1.08	-0.84	**-1.61**	-0.88
Institutional discrimination	0.93	1.20	-0.30	0.30	-1.07	*-1.31*
Workplace discrimination	**-2.07**	**-1.45**	-0.88	0.18	0.99	0.65

CHAPTER 4

STIGMA AND BELONGING AMONG THE RISING IMMIGRANT ELITE IN

FRANCE

Introduction

Postwar migration flows have reshaped the demographic composition of Western liberal societies towards unprecedented diversity, remaking the ethnic and religious makeup of urban areas where immigrants predominantly settle. Despite low levels of human capital and modest social origins on average, many members of North African, Turkish and South Asian migrant groups to Europe - including the native-born second generation - have experienced upward mobility towards the upper-middle class, while others have come as skilled migrants and successfully converted their human capital into desirable labor market positions.

Individual success stories in the realms of sports, business and politics have accompanied this slow but real incursion in the European spotlight. Yet, remarkably little is known about the lives of upwardly mobile individuals of immigrant origins, and scholars have only recently taken an interest in the new immigrant elites (e.g. Crul, Keskiner and Lelie 2017). Yet, the experience of the immigrant upper-middle class is relevant insofar as it involves articulating belonging in starkly different groups: the immigrant community on one hand - often poor and stigmatized as culturally different - and occupational groups commanding large amounts of honor and prestige among natives on the other (Bourdieu 1984, Lamont 1992). Of particular interest are upwardly mobile immigrants' interactional tactics, ways of presenting oneself, fitting in and managing stigma in spaces dominated by members of the native majority. Such "minority cultures of mobility" (Neckerman, Carter and Lee 1999) reflect efforts to attain cultural mem-

bership - being viewed as valued and respected members of their society of settlement (Lamont and Molnár 2002: 188-189). As such, they can afford researchers a sharper look at the relationship between social mobility and assimilation - one often assumed in assimilation theory (Alba and Nee 2003, Waters and Jiménez 2005, Gans 2007) but rarely studied empirically.

In this paper, I examine the subjective experience of ethnoracial and religious stigma among upper-middle class immigrants in France. How do successful immigrants respond to lived and perceived challenges regarding their belonging to French society? How do they articulate class, ethnicity, and religion to handle stigma and claim membership in the imagined French community? Using qualitative data from thirty eight in-depth interviews with immigrant professionals, I show that upwardly mobile immigrants use the symbolic resources afforded by their upper-middle class status to deflect stigmatization and disempower the use of ethnic and racial categories against them by, in return, stigmatizing racism as culturally inferior, backwards and illegitimate. I argue that this is enabled by the French repertoire of cultural elitism (Lamont 1992) as well as the lack of currency of ethnoracial categories in formal and informal institutions like laws and cultural norms, which results in upper-middle class immigrants adopting the cultural codes and scripts of the native white, upper-middle class without much tension or contradiction. Conversely, the qualitative data shows that Muslim respondents experience a more intense and peculiar form of religious stigma casting them as cultural outsiders despite high levels of socioeconomic integration. Unlike their non-Muslim counterparts, I find that Muslim respondents have difficulty reversing stigma and instead try to differentiate themselves from undesirable, self-identified Muslims giving their religion a bad name - such as perpetrators of terror attacks. The situation faced by Muslim respondents reflects the absence of cultural repertoires making religion a plausible way to claim belonging in France - especially in a time period when suspicion

against Muslims have become generalized. By emphasizing the role of cultural reper-
toires in enabling and disabling claims for belonging, the study sheds light on symbolic
aspects of immigrant incorporation often neglected in past work. It suggests that, con-
trary to the implicit assumptions of assimilation theory (Alba and Nee 2003, Waters and
Jiménez 2005), socioeconomic mobility does not necessary leads to inclusion as "one
of us" by the native majority. Symbolic inclusion among immigrants remains, instead,
actively negotiated and struggled upon after upward mobility has been achieved.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. It first assesses the emerging empir-
ical literature on the immigrant elite and the subjective social experience of upwardly
mobile immigrants in the United States and Europe. It then develops a theoretical back-
ground to understand the challenges and symbolic struggles associated with social mo-
bility among recent immigrants. It then introduces the research question, qualitative
design, and main results of the study, contrasting the subjective experience of Muslim
and non-Muslim respondents. The final section discusses the relevance of the results for
assimilation and revisits the links between social mobility, assimilation and belonging
among upwardly mobile immigrants.

4.1 Empirical background: the rise of an immigrant elite in West-
ern countries of immigration

The postwar period coincided, in many Western countries, with substantial demographic
change brought about by new, extra-European migration flows. In the United States, the
1965 Hart-Celler act ended past policies based on nationality quotas and significantly
increased migration from Asia, as well as Central and South America. In Europe, recon-
struction efforts relied heavily on immigrant guest workers from countries with whom

Western governments had bilateral agreements - e.g. Turkey with Germany, Maghribi countries with France, and India and Pakistan in the United Kingdom. After the First Oil Shock in 1973, many guest workers chose to stay in Europe after rotating work programs ended and brought their immediate relatives through family reunification. These migration flows have remained relatively constant in size over time and the proportion of foreign born has kept increasing to attain unprecedented highs on both sides of the Atlantic (Pew Research Center 2015, OECD 2018).

Upwardly mobile immigrant groups in the United States: between racialization and hyphenated identities

In the United States, an empirical consensus exists on a general dynamic of upward mobility in the post-1965 immigration - often taken as a sign of assimilation (Alba and Nee 2003, Waterns and Jiménez 2005, White and Glick 2009). As such, a new literature has started to document the emergence of an immigrant middle and upper middle class. Among Asian immigrant groups, extraordinarily high educational and occupational attainment has led to the image of a "model minority" (Hsin and Xie 2014, Lee and Zhou 2015) and change in the meaning of educational success in areas where Asian upper-middle class families settle (Jiménez and Horowitz 2013). Yet, qualitative work has documented the residual salience of race in the subjective experience of upper-middle class Asian professionals (Dhingra 2007) as well as that of the emerging Mexican middle class (Vasquez 2011, Vallejo 2012). This has prompted some to talk of "racialized assimilation" (Lee and Kye 2016) or "assimilation in spite of racialization" (Vasquez 2011) to describe the trajectory of the successful second generation. This literature echoes some findings from scholars on the Black middle class evolving and negotiating the color line in elite social milieus dominated by Whites (e.g. Lacy 2007).

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While social mobility translates into identifying as White among some segments of upwardly mobile immigrants in the US (Emeka and Vallejo 2011), immigration scholars have also documented the salience of hyphenated identities in which ethnicity and socioeconomic success are not mutually exclusive (Vallejo 2012, Dhingra 2007, Jiménez and Horowitz 2013). In her study of the Mexican American middle class, Vallejo (2012) describes a variety of ethnic identifications across individuals - from White identification away from the Mexican community, to those joining ethnic association, with others in-between engaging in optional (Waters 1990) forms of Mexican ethnicity (e.g. food, occasional festivities, etc). Despite dynamics of racialization, the social legitimacy of hyphenated identities provide flexibility in articulating ethnic and class belonging among socially successful immigrants in the United States, where claiming membership in particular ethnic groups is considered part and parcel of the mainstream (Alba and Nee 2003).

The emerging immigrant middle class in Western Europe

By contrast, the European literature on the immigrant middle, let alone upper middle class, is in its infancy. This should not be surprising in light of the overwhelmingly working-class origins of postwar migration in Europe, which has made social ascendancy to higher class status a long, multi-generational endeavor due to dynamics of social reproduction (Heath, Rothon and Kilpi 2008). Yet a new generation of immigrant elites is emerging, as seen most visibly in the realm of politics (Alba and Foner 2015 chapter 7).

While scholars have recently sought a better understanding of the structural determinants of pathways of upward mobility among the second generation (Crul et al. 2012, Crul, Keskiner and Lelie 2017), research on the subjective experience of up-

wardly mobile immigrants remains rare. Beaman's (2015) work on the religious identity of the Muslim middle class and Shahrokni (2015)'s research on the culture of mobility among upwardly mobile North Africans student in France, however, provide vivid illustrations of the contradictions induced by a double status of socioeconomic insiders and ethnoreligious outsiders. Beaman's respondents consciously adopt the official cultural repertoires regarding *laïcité* and secularism to frame their religious practices as compatible with cultural tenets of the French Republic. Shahkroni's respondents tended throughout their studies in elite schools to congregate with individuals of similar class and ethnoracial backgrounds to maintain a sense of community, yet found that this very solidarity stereotyped them as unable or unwilling to integrate in the eyes of their native peers, furthering a sense of pre-existing isolation. The difficulties in articulating multiple identities arise in a context where the official ideology of Republicanism has long discouraged the expression of ethnic and religious particularisms, focusing instead on citizenship (Brubaker 1992, Bowen 2012).

4.2 Theoretical background: Symbolic boundaries, immigrant upward mobility and assimilation

The qualitative literature on the immigrant elites thus documents important residual barriers to the full inclusion of immigrants from middle and upper-middle class backgrounds. In this section, I mobilize the literature on social and symbolic boundaries as well as assimilation to re-examine the theoretical links between social mobility and belonging among upwardly mobile immigrants.

Struggling over belonging: the boundary making perspective

Sociologists of inequality have long recognized the cultural dimensions of social closure (e.g. Weber (1978 [1922]: 305-307, Bourdieu 1984) and more recently advanced the concept of symbolic boundary (Lamont and Molnár 2002). This effort is part of a growing literature building on the concept of boundary and boundary making (Barth 1968) to shed light on the relational nature of class (Lamont 1992) and ethnic (Wimmer 2013) inequality and group making. Symbolic boundaries are conceptual distinctions drawn to categorize people and informing a sense "us" and "them". As cultural producers of social stratification, symbolic boundaries are the object of power struggles, and "groups compete in the production, diffusion, and institutionalization of alternative systems and principles of classification" (Lamont and Molnár 2002, 168). When symbolic boundaries are widely agreed upon however, they result in large macro-level outcome such as legally enforced segregation or stable peace among nation-states - so called social boundaries (*ibid*). Symbolic boundaries can be regarded as a necessary but insufficient cause for social boundaries.

Struggles upon symbolic boundaries are enacted in everyday life through stigmatization and discrimination events[1]. The constitutive categories of insiders and outsiders are contextual, and comparative work shows that symbolic boundaries do not always coalesce along ethnic and racial lines (Wimmer 2013). Rather, the production, perception and interpretation of stigma are informed by available cultural frames, scripts and narratives - i.e. cultural repertoires - which are themselves located in larger, path-dependent historical processes (Lamont et al. 2016). In the context of immigrant incorporation,

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[1] Following Lamont, Silva, Welburn, Guetzkow, Mizrachi, Herzog and Reis 2016, I define discrimination as the withdrawing of certain opportunities and resources solely in virtue of one's national, ethnic and racial background. By contrast, I define stigmatization as subjectively felt challenges to one's belonging and self-worth in virtue of one's national, ethnic or racial background unfolding in the course of everyday interactions.

stigmatization from natives is likely to occur towards immigrants they perceive to be irrevocably different and outside the imagined community (Bail 2008, Schachter 2016). Conversely, immigrants have to actively handle and respond to stigma in order to claim inclusion and parity with natives. In the United States for instance, historical case studies suggest that the imagined community has long been shaped by the Black-White distinction - a widely agreed upon symbolic boundaries until well into the twentieth century (Fox and Guglielmo 2012). As such, various immigrant groups have striven to "become White" or at least avoid being seen as Black - as in the case of the Irish (Ignatiev 1995), Italians (Orsi 1992) or the Chinese of the Mississippi delta (Loewen 1971).

Assimilation beyond immigrant social mobility

Following massive institutional change outlawing racial discrimination within Western liberal societies after World War II, immigration scholars have typically considered immigrant social mobility to be a sufficient cause for boundary shifting and assimilation with natives (Alba and Nee 2003, Waters and Jiménez 2005, White and Glick 2009; See Shachter 2016 and Gans 2007 for more detail). This derives from a structural theorization of the mainstream, defined as the social spaces wherein ethnic and related differences cease to influence life chances and opportunities (Alba and Nee 2003:12).

Yet, recent research strongly suggests that today's native communities of "us" are still constituted by a subjective dimension - one that is independent of socioeconomic status and formal equality of opportunity between naturalized immigrants and natives under the rule of law. As such, the extent to which upward mobility leads particular categories of "otherness" (such as race or religion) to naturally recede towards irrelevance, and thus inclusion by the native majority, remains unclear. In the United States, experimental research suggests that White Americans continue to perceive non-White

immigrants as substantially different from themselves regardless of said immigrants' legal status or occupational attainment (Schachter 2016). In European nation-states whose polities have historically been more predicated upon cultural homogeneity than North American settler societies (Brubaker 1992, Alba and Foner 2015), native populations hold context-specific, yet clear preferences for cultural similarity among new immigrants (Bail 2008). While causality remains ambiguous, recent comparative evidence suggests strong links between immigrants' well-being, acculturation levels, and perceptions of discrimination (Angellini et al. 2015, Beier and Kroeneberg 2013, Safi 2010). Stigmatization on grounds of religious difference appears, in particular, to impact the social experience of Muslim minorities regardless of their level of socioeconomic attainment (Simon and Safi 2013, Adida et al. 2016).

In short, recent evidence in the United States and Europe suggests that structural attainment does not equate full inclusion among upwardly mobile immigrants. More generally, the rise to prominence of far right populist movements campaigning on nativist or civilizationist themes (Brubaker 2017) bears witness to the resilience of the cultural dimension of belonging, and highlights the influence of native majority in negotiating the boundary movement at the heart of the assimilation process. In formal theoretical terms, immigrant's location in a specific web of affiliations (Simmel 1955) - simultaneous membership in social categories like gender, ethnicity, religion, occupation or nation - offers natives ways of excluding and classifying as outsiders those members of the ingroup that are also members of contested or undesirable outgroups. In Goffman's words, the upwardly mobile immigrant's dilemma is thus that of "possessing an attribute that makes him different from others in the category of persons available for him to be, and of a less desirable kind [...], a trait [...] breaking the claim that his other attributes have on us. He possesses a stigma, an undesired differentedness from what we had anticipated" (Goffman 1963: 2-5). The layering of "desirable" and "undesirable"

attributes complicates the study of assimilation of upwardly mobile immigrants. Which attribute is sufficient for inclusion as "one of us"? More importantly, which attributes (dis)qualifies for cultural membership?

4.3   Research question, analytic strategy and data

The boundary strategies and specific "minority culture of mobility" (Neckerman, Carter and Lee 1999) deployed by the new immigrant elite to claim membership in the mainstream offer a critical approach to study the cultural dimensions of assimilation beyond a structural focus on social mobility. In this study, I focus on upper-middle class immigrants in France and ask: how do socially successful members of otherwise stigmatized minorities negotiate their belonging in France? How do they face and respond to stigma from natives to assert membership in the national community?

I use in-depth interviewing with thirty-eight immigrant professionals to tackle this question. Focusing on their experience of discrimination and stigmatization, I exploit the phenomenological potential of the in-depth interviewing method - i.e. its capacity to uncover respondents' subjective view of the world - to study the "boundary work" individuals engage in to negotiate their belonging in France when such belonging is challenged. By boundary work (Lamont 1992, 2000), I mean the conceptual, discursive distinctions people use to differentiate among, and locate oneself in specific social groups.

In the absence of detailed ethnic statistics (Simon 2008), sampling interviewees for such a rare and hard-to-reach population poses substantial logistic challenges, and I therefore resorted to snowball sampling to recruit participants. I used occupation and educational attainment to identify class background. None of the individuals interviewed

came from a long lineage of elites in their respective country of origin, and I therefore regard upward mobility and upper-middle class status as synonymous in the context of this study. I used skin color, national origin and immigrant status to identify ethnoracial difference. This recruitment strategy led to a group of highly educated professionals of North and Sub-Saharan African background. All but one held French citizenship. Sixteen interviewees were female, and twenty-three were French born (conversely, fifteen were first generation immigrants). Appendix B provides further demographic detail on the respondents in this study.

Interviews were carried out in the Paris area as well as mid-sized cities in Eastern France, and took place in public places or in the respondent's office or home. They lasted 75 minutes on average with a minimum of 42 and a maximum of 128 minutes. All interviews featured the same set of open questions probing for the participants' subjective sense of membership in the national cultural community as well as experience of stigmatization and discrimination. Substantial time was devoted to eliciting definitions and normative views (i.e. boundary work) on what it means to be French, race, racism and other core topics related to belonging. There was variation in the later parts of the interviews as probing and follow-up questions depended on answers to earlier questions. A copy of the interview guide is featured in Appendix A. The Muslim-non Muslim divide appeared to be salient early on in the project. I thus focused on interviewing Muslim respondents for the later stages of fieldwork, yielding seventeen self-identified Muslims out of thirty interviewees.

Complete transcription, first stage coding and interviewing occurred simultaneously as part of fieldwork. Analytic coding, partial transcription and additional interviews characterized the later stages of the research process (Charmaz and Belgrave 2002).

4.4 A qualitative view of belonging among upper-middle class immigrants

4.4.1 Proud members of the Republic: mapping the national community and claiming membership

The vast majority of respondents reported a strong attachment with the national cultural community and had positive feelings toward mainstream French institutions (e.g. schools, criminal justice, etc). When asked to define what they meant by being French, they typically mobilized the repertoires of the Enlightenment and French Republicanism - a national ideology born out of the 1789 Revolution which regards belonging to the nation as a matter of individual will rather than ascriptive criteria such as ethnicity (Brubaker 1992). In doing so, they framed their personal success stories of occupational mobility as part of a longer tradition of colorblind and civic inclusion. This narrative, derived from official public culture, was used to cast nativism and ethnic exclusion as un-French. A West African born medical professional explains:

"*I think I am a fine French citizen and that I am able to talk about French culture just as well as those who claim only they really belong. Sometimes, I encounter people who are a little rigid about all of this and I tell them "this is not what French culture is all about".*

Q: *You mean, racism?*

Yes, among people who are racist. And even historically, France has always been a welcoming place. France is the country of Human Rights, the country of opening up to others, and the country of assimilation of various immigrant flows, since the Antiquity until now and in recent times...The Italians, the "ritals" [slang] as we used to call them,

the Spaniards with Franco, the Portuguese, the Polish in the mines of the North, and
their descendants are culturally French, so I don't really see how someone can claim to
belong just because he has deep roots here."

Older, foreign born respondents generally reported having experience a general decrease in interpersonal occurrences of overt racism in the last several decades. In the realm of work, for example, no respondents reported having recently faced overt remarks or behavior indicative of strong dislike or tension on ground of ethnic difference. In fact, many respondents were wary of the "trap" - as an East African respondent put it - of interpreting personal rejection and failure as reflecting racial injustice, as they considered that systematically thinking in terms of racial groups led to "communitarianism" (*communautarisme*) and the breaking down of the civic community - another hallmark of official culture revolving around the "indivisible" French Republic.

Yet, the uncertainty of ethnoracial stigma in daily life was a recurrent theme, as the respondent's colleagues and extended family members never abruptly expressed such views - often considered crass and ridiculed in highly educated, professional milieus. As such, respondents often described themselves to be "protected" from racism in their immediate environments, and narratives of confronting hostile individuals were relatively rare in the qualitative data - while many interviewees reported isolated incidents, only one reported a recent, strong confrontation in which he contemplated resorting to the law to establish a wrongdoing on racial grounds. Instead, interviewees gave ambiguous interactions and events the benefit of the doubt, especially among interviewees who were in traditionally elites social milieus - e.g. legal and medical fields - where class stigmatization was likely to be confounded with race. A general behavioral response to stigma was thus to show professional competence (see Lamont and Fleming 2005 for an analogous result among successful African Americans), even though some re-

spondents reported feeling as if they sometimes had to do more than their White, native counterparts to gain and maintain respect.

Away from the polite and educated social milieux in which respondents evolved, the hostility of certain natives manifested more clearly in electoral periods. The ever high-scoring National Front served as an important reminder that France as a whole might not be as inclusive as their immediate social environment. Yet, a typical Republican rhetoric also informed the cultural response they put forward, in which the National Front defended a misguided idea of France. In the words of a Moroccan-born elected official:

A: "*As far as I am concerned the* Front National *is not part of the Republic. I am sorry, but no way* [...]. *France has benefited from waves of immigration that made it what it is today, one of the most respected nations in the world. And foreign populations have been necessary in order to feed this virtuous circle. It is not just about the Gallic village* [village gaulois] *The FN defends this notion of a Gallic village, but it does not exist. For me, fighting racism is also a pillar of France. And it is what honors it abroad and why it can be seen as an example. It is the cradle of Human Rights, and of the Enlightenment, let's not forget it, French history is also about that.*

Q: *You think people who vote for the FN forget this aspect of history?*

A: *No, it's not that, they simply don't know it. They definitely don't know it."*

In that particular excerpt, the respondent used the themes of ignorance and social progress to locate nativism and hostility towards immigrants - both strongly associated with the National Front - outside the realm of Frenchness. This respondent's reliance on the themes of knowledge and culture reflect a broader response to perceived stigma - one structured by a reliance on upper-middle class culture, to which I know turn.

4.4.2 Framing racism: a kind of backwardness

When discussing how they perceived discrimination and stigmatization in France, some interviewees began with personal anecdotes recounting experiences of overt racism in public space - name calling, insults, and threats of violence. By and large, instances of such explicit manifestations of hostility from the native population were rare, but figured prominently in the symbolic boundaries respondents drew towards behaviors they perceived as being primal and deeply uncultured.

An African born doctor, working at a major hospital in Eastern France, reminisced of two occasions of abruptly xenophobic attitudes in public transportation, once as a medical student in the subway and once as a junior high school student in a bus:

"One day a bus driver told me: "So you've come here to screw our wives, snow white?". I was 12, and I did not understand what he meant....I mean, I had learnt a rather literary French back in [African capital]...and my friends later told me what it actually meant."

"Once I took the subway, I sat down and an older person got up, spat on the ground and said "you nigger!". Whatever..."

An elected official in a mid-sized city also recalled of similar interactions and commented:

"This is a primal form of racism. Primal because it is really the reaction of an animal in a jungle...I mean it just makes no sense. Someone who is just insulting, I mean, I don't see him as an animal but almost, because it is a violent behavior. I just find it primeval..."

Both respondents oppose such direct expressions of hostility to a sense of civilization

they were endowed with at the time of those interactions.One's contrast of his mastery of a rich, formal French actually *preventing* him at first from understanding a grossly racist remark is analogous to the other's qualification of outwardly discriminatory behaviors or remarks as primitive. Similar accounts of managing public interactions with hostile, white natives depicted the ideal-type of the *beauf* - the French equivalent to a philistine. In these accounts, a subtle stigmatization of typically "vulgar" ways of talking and acting served to invalidate symbolic ethnic boundaries from natives without intellectually engaging with it, at the time of the interaction or when recounting the story during the interview. Nonchalant reactions ("whatever") typically served to mark such aggressive verbal and bodily expressions as unfit to contest the respondents' place in society. Strong engagement of body and words in public interaction, valued as virility and honesty in working-class culture, is typically stigmatized as impolite and uncivilized in middle and upper-middle class culture (Pinto 1984).

The interviews material shows that stigmatization of manners and speech as inferior is inseparable from a stigmatization of racism as an intellectual defect. A reliance on the repertoire of cultural elitism (Bourdieu 1984, Lamont 1992) to characterize racism as culturally backwards cut across the majority of interviews. In one instance when a waiter assumed he was fasting and would thus just drink a coffee, a non-Muslim, Tunisian-born music teacher was denied service at a restaurant. He explains that his intellectual background empowered him and helped him get over his initial frustration:

Q: "*What made you get over it so easily?*

A: *It is because I think I know where it is coming from. I know it is a preconceived belief, I know the person who reacts like this doesn't think at all, so why bother* [...]. *I was raised this way. As I told you, my father is a very cultivated individual, he really is a thinker.*"

Q: *What is it that he taught you that was useful for you when facing racism?*

A: *To think. Yes. To think...When you face something, you have to try to understand it, where it comes from and so on. It is much more satisfying than just reacting. Can you imagine, about what I just told you at [name of the bar], here I come, I am not even seated yet, I haven't ordered anything and the waitress comes and tells me "sorry, no coffee served on the terrace", I could have reacted pretty badly. And it would have been somewhat legitimate...But no. No way."*

In this interview excerpt, the dichotomy between reaction and reflection proposed by the respondent parallels the boundary work of other interviewees contrasting a sense of civilization with the "crass" behaviors and attitudes of discriminating natives discussed above. He frames racist attitudes as being inherently irrational and lacking in intellectual content - a type of knee-jerk reaction opposed to his own sense of intellectual sophistication. He elaborates on his sense of superiority:

"No, I doesn't bother me...That stuff does not affect me. There are times it arouses pity, you know? I am someone who is really open-minded, and you know, there are times [those reactions] are just appalling. It arouses pity because if I could talk to the person, I could show her that I am much more open-minded, much more cultivated, you know. And if she sought to know how I came here, what I am doing, and so on, I am sure she would change her mind, you know?"

Interviewees' boundary work coalesced around intellectualism and being intellectually sophisticated. The theme of culture and being "cultivated" (an imperfect translation for "*cultivé*" in French), in particular, operated as a powerful discursive device. Being *cultivé* refers primarily to having in-depth knowledge in diverse areas and being intellectually accomplished - often beyond one's professional sphere. This emphasis on

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gratuitous knowledge and "legitimate didacticism" (Bourdieu 1984: 24-5) is a key element of social distinction in the French context, and a key component of the response to stigma among the individuals I interviewed.

Corollary to the cultivated character of the respondents was a sheer "ignorance" and "*inculture*" among the native stigmatizers - an intellectual defect identified as the backbone of prejudice and discrimination. Respondents stigmatized *inculte* individuals' ignorance of fields of knowledge as diverse as biology, history or the law - fields that they, by contrast, claimed a strong command of in virtue of their work, or through leisure reading. In doing so, respondents implicitly but powerfully claimed superior ways of knowing - by punctuating their discourses with references to historical cases, well-known experts, statistics in contrast to anti-immigrant discourses presented as folk knowledge. This discursive sophistication, a hallmark of legitimate culture valuing abstract and deductive knowledge compared to working-class modes of knowing valuing experience (Bourdieu 1984, Pinto 1984), emphasizes a clear hierarchy in which "culture" and knowledge operate as corrosive agents against bigotry and racism. In other words, "someone who is cultivated, who is open-minded towards the world, who reads a lot, can't be racist", as an Algerian born official put it.

Interviewees were more forgiving towards the regrettable attitudes of uneducated and ignorant people compared to colleagues in professional positions for whom they held higher intellectual standards. A French-born lawyer of Algerian ancestry said she could understand how someone "who has less education, who is less cultivated, who is not as smart" could be prejudiced - she, herself, could think this way "if she was a little dumber than she actually is". When asked about what to think of prejudiced colleagues, she elaborates:

"*It is less acceptable insofar as lawyers are educated, smart people. I have a*

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friend, his grandmother has never seen an Arab person in her whole life...She watches T.V. and she hears about urban riots, by blacks and Maghribi people who burn cars. I can understand why she would be racist and afraid. It is silly, because she is ignorant[...] Even though I don't approve, I can understand...But a lawyer who has been exposed to a lot of people, who knows full well that an Arab is not any less worthy than a yellow or a white person, indulging in racism, no I can't accept it. Then I can actually judge that person, and say "he is just a dummy" ".

By juxtaposing ignorance and "culture", interviewees also opposed a sense of narrow-mindedness and lack of diversity - not knowing anyone different from oneself - to an idea of cosmopolitanism and modernity they were part and parcel of. When prompted to elaborate on what caused defiance vis-à -vis certain migrants groups, a public official born in France of Algerian immigrants explained:

"*Culture plays a role which is, in my view, paramount. That is, someone who is isolated, without a culturally rich outlook on the world, without contact with others, and I mean this for either whites, immigrants, or later generation immigrants. I think that culture is important for bridging [differences].*"

Culture - and being "cultured", i.e. *cultivé* in French - thus conveys a sense of refinement - as in English - as well as knowledge, intellectual sophistication, and cosmopolitanism. The final mark of this cultured stance on discrimination and stigmatization is a refusal to engage in gut reaction, and to be "above race". Most interviewees adopted passive or "zen" responses when experiencing or perceiving anti-immigrant stigma. Mixing both an intellectual and emotional reflexivity, a senior executive born in France of Moroccan parents, explains his own approach to dealing with occasional stigmatization:

"*You can either react by thinking that all those people are dumb as a rock, or you*

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can work at understanding this further...as a kind of deconstruction of the bias those people have...I have chosen the second option."

4.4.3 Religious stigma and symbolic exclusion among Muslim respondents

While such cultural elitism emerged as the overarching theme and a predominant way to manage ethnoracial stigma, religious affiliation appeared to shape the experience of Muslim interviewees. While this study did not set out to focus on religious stigma, the Muslim-non Muslim divide vividly emerged during fieldwork. I therefore focused on interviewing Muslim respondents in the last stages of fieldwork.

When comparing the reports on the perceived evolution of stigma and discrimination in everyday life, Muslim respondents typically told a very different story. While they concurred with other respondents who said that blunt racism and purely ethnoracial stigma was fading away, they perceived anti-Muslim acts and discourses in everyday life to have generally been increasing. Depending on their age and personal story, some Muslim respondents identified various tipping points after which they felt things had changed: for some, it was 9/11, while for others it was during Nicolas Sarkozy's presidency - whose campaign openly competed with that of the National Front, and perhaps contributed to legitimize such discourse. For yet others, it was most clearly related to the wave of Islamist terror attacks in the 2010s.

Importantly, no self-identified Muslim respondent reported that she perceived the national cultural community to have grown more accepting of Islam and Muslims over time, regardless of how these categories were defined across interviews. This was especially salient among religiously observant individuals, i.e. those who prayed, fasted

or wore a religious sign. Such individuals - who made up the majority of the Muslim respondents - generally reported growing difficulties in articulating their religious practices with daily life, particularly at work, where they perceived any visible manifestation of religious practice as a potential liability. A corporate manager illustrated this point by explaining why she chose to break her fast to have an important lunch with her boss during Ramadan - something she would have never done a few years back. She did it because she felt she had to show decency and dedication to the job (*Montrer patte blanche*) to deal with generalized suspicion against Muslims:

"In that case, I did it. It really sucks...But I did it. Simply because I don't want others to think «Oh she is Muslim, she is doing Ramadan, she does not want to integrate ». It would mean than I bring my religion at work [...].I don't want, by doing that, to say to everyone at work that I am Muslim."

For Muslim interviewees, avoiding the image of someone "who does not want to integrate" (*qui ne veut pas s'intégrer*) appeared as an important aspect of the presentation of the self - one to be reckoned during interactions with non-Muslims in the course of daily life. The meaning of appearing as "integrated" varied across interviewees and contexts : for some - especially women - it meant managing and responding to expectations of gender traditionalism, and thus appearing as "modern" Muslims. Others like the respondent above felt pressure at work, in public space or in social settings to be "discrete" Muslims - i.e. not showing or expressing their religion, in accordance with the public culture of secularism. For yet others, it meant strongly condemning and dissociating themselves from self-identified Muslims who perpetrated terror attacks. Such interpersonal interactions with non-Muslim colleagues, family members and friends did not amount to stigma per se in the mind of respondents - although for some it did, of course. Across situations and interviews however, it contributed to reify religion as a

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master status among individuals who, in line with the expectations of the French cultural context, saw it as a private matter. This contradiction, which resulted in being seen first and foremost as a Muslim, was particularly frustrating for respondents who were were born in France. One female respondent, a senior executive at a major transportation company, explained:

"*For a while I have felt that secularism* [laïé] *has been something aggressive, and still is today. I am all for secularism the way it was defined in the 1905 law because it allows for the cohabitation of different religions. But I am not for a fundamentalist and dogmatique secularism* [laïntégriste, dogmatique].

Q: *It is something you have personally felt? This weight?*

Yes, sometimes I have this impression. Staying positive and benevolent in that context is hard. For a while I have had the feeling that I am forced to just be a Muslim. But I am not just Muslim. I am French, I am a women, I am a worker, I am a mother. We just see my Arabness [on me renvoie à mon arabité], *which is a part of me as well, as well as my religion. And I am aware that for some, I am not fully French. For me, I am, and I am at peace with that. I know some people in my situation are not at peace with that. But I am. I think in French, I dream in French. I was schooled in France. And I take part in the national French effort.*"

Muslim respondents generally reported that they perceived the brunt of anti-Muslim discourses as occurring in the realm of politics and the mass media rather than at the interpersonal level. Criticizing the way many politicians and pundits portrayed Islam and Muslims was thus a theme that unambiguously cut across all interviews. When asked an open question about how the atmosphere in France vis-à -vis Islam had changed, a French born Muslim of Moroccan parents and medical doctor spontaneously

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referred to a change in terms of public discourse:

"It's very subjective...But my impression, like that of many other Muslims, is that on television, in the media and especially in politics, we are constantly criticized as Muslims specifically. And this has been like this for a while [...]. I would say this has been like this since 2004 and the law on the veil in public schools. And I feel that they are always trying to cast us in a same mold.

Q: *Who is "they", here?*

It is mainly right wing politicians, but also left wing ones now, relayed by certain journals and pundits [...]. It's not that we are not integrated, it's that certain such persons do not want to integrate us.

Q: *: And this has been since 2004?*

Yes. I feel like I was insulted then. And that I have often been insulted since."

Respondents fustigated both the quality - focusing on select cases reflecting badly on Muslims - and the quantity of political and news coverage on the topic. They had come to expect the same reporting or articles on halal slaughtering, illegal mosque building and other similar topic as they generally coincided with the celebrations of the Muslim calendar. About a third of respondents reported that they simply stopped watching television in the last few years as a result of this excessive coverage. Several, in particular, regretted the fact that many public conversations on Islam occurred without the voice of Muslims themselves - instead inviting pundits or theological scholars respondents did not see as legitimate. This led to the impression of a constant conversation "about us but without us", as an interviewee put it. Yet, many were pleasantly surprised at recent electoral results, including the 2012 and, for interviews to took place after it, the 2017

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presidential elections. They realized, in the process, that media and political framings of Islam were not necessarily shared in the public at large, as a female respondent puts it about the election of moderate left president Hollande in 2012:

"*I was very angry some time ago, and I was telling myself «I am going to leave France». That was four or five years ago. I had discussed this with one of my old bosses. And finally I decided against it. I thought I would stay, I would fight.*

Q: *When was this exactly?*

This was after the terror attacks by Mohammed Merah. The climate was really, really tough. I really thought about it [leaving]. *But I did not do it. What reconciled me, is that there had been the 2012 elections afterwards, and I told myself «the media is trying to have us believe that the whole of France is against Muslims, but in fact it's not the case ».*"

In the excerpt above, the interviewee reported realizing during elections that the situation was not as bad as she had thought. Importantly, this situation of Muslim respondents represents a inversion to that of non-Muslim upper-middle class immigrants, for whom daily life was rather incident free, and who only occasionally realized that hostility was "out there" during electoral periods when the anti-immigrant National Front scored high even if it did not win. More generally, it is abundantly clear from the interview material that the general "climate" respondents perceived as hostile to Muslims took a big toll on their ability to project their future in France. Past and present plans to leave, such as that expressed by the respondent above, were explicitly mentioned by three other interviewees. Some planned to go back to the lands of their parents (e.g. Morocco or Algeria) to be able to practice and live their faiths as they pleased, without the shackles they felt in France. Others thought of emigrating and often compared the

negative French context to England or the United States, places they perceived as more welcoming.

4.4.4 "This is not what Islam is about": boundary work around religious authenticity

A crucial difference between Muslim and non-Muslim respondents emerged at the level of boundary work respondents employed to position themselves within the national community and claim membership. Contrary to non-Muslim respondents, their boundary work did not draw distinctions vis-à -vis hostile or "Islamophobic" natives, but rather vis-à -vis other self-identified Muslims who tarnished Islam, and against whom they had to compete for the legitimate definition of what their religion was and was not. Muslim respondents generally did not challenge anti-Muslim attitudes; in fact, several reported they understood why public opinion was hostile. Rather, they positioned themselves to be better representatives of Islam than those who, in their opinion, gave it a bad name.

Respondents' presentation of their faith and practices followed three major themes organized around implicit dichotomies: they presented Islam as being *personal* (as opposed to communitarian), *complex* and *nuanced* (as opposed to dogmatic) and *universalist* (as opposed to particularist). As such, they typically framed their practices and views as that of "liberal Muslims". In doing so, they revealed the long shadow of cultural tropes and ongoing debates regarding the nature of Islam, its purported incompatibility with secularism and Western liberal democratic norms, its inherent social conservatism and the nature of its links with religiously motivated acts of terrorism - a set of question framing Islam as a "cultural problem" respondents had to take a stand on when discussing their own views.

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When discussing their approach to Islam, respondents were often very individual-istic - and consistently referred to "their" vision of their religion, both acknowledging its internal diversity and the legitimacy of their personal interpretations. This meant, for many, the separation of strict religious rituals from faith and personal religious values as criteria to belong within the Muslim community. One male respondent explained why his lack of rigorous practice did not make him any less Muslim:

"Just because I don't do all those things does not mean I am not Muslim. This is my view, and it might be wrong, but when I talk to a Muslim at a mosque, the pious kind who tells me I am going to go to hell, I just feel like telling them to shut up. This is ridiculous, and I am amazed to see people live by three lines in a book telling them how to lead their lives, what they have to do from morning to evening. The Coran is a manual for society [...], *but I hate what the 21st century is doing with it. I would like to go back to the time of the Ottoman empire. That was the real Islam, it did not prevent you from living your life here on Earth, to be close to God.*

Q: *Can you explain a bit more what "amazes you", as you said?*

It amazes me to see some people acting like dummies, especially judging others if they do not do it the way they want it [...]. *It amazes me to see them judging others, killing others in the name of God. Commit such crimes and murders...While what they say is so not true! I am talking about radical Islam today. As we often talk about and see it in France today. It amazes me that they tarnish the image of Islam because this is not what Islam is about. If everyone were like me, to be the way you want to be, to just respect others. One can be an atheist and be a good person. It is about the beauty of the heart, the beauty of the soul that religion is about.*

Q: *Is this what being Muslim is about for you?*

Yes, exactly, this is my personal definition of it. As long as I don't hurt people around me. I try to do good when I can, not everyday but whenever I can. And for me, this is enough, and I don't need an asshole to come tell me I am going to burn in hell.

In this interview excerpt, the respondent focuses on morality and "doing good" as a trait making him a good Muslim, and naturally established a continuum between strict practice, community control, religious fundamentalism, and religious violence. This continuum was not present in all interviews, as many respondents were eager to simply and strongly state that Islam had nothing to do with terrorism. More generally, many made a case that Islam, at its core, was not about blindly following scriptures but about diffuse, moral values - such as generosity for the poor, tolerance, empathy, respect for the elderly, faithfulness, integrity and honesty. This focus on values empirically reflects the process of religious incorporation in the French context, which implies a process of individualization and privatization away from collective and organized forms of religious expression. At the level of meaning-making, it allowed respondents to abstract Islam away from specific rituals to focus on what it shared with other religions, such as Christianity or Buddhism, and atheists with moral decency. As such, a focus on religious value was a way to establish equality and frame Islam as an ordinary religion with a universal reach. One of my interviewees felt uneasy identifying what differentiated "good" and "bad" Muslims. She was, however, keen to describe the essence of "her" conception of Islam and said:

"*What is most important in my conception of Islam, and in any case, what I would like for us all [Muslims] to share as much as possible, are shared values [...]. There are so many universal values in Islam, I would like for this to be most important to people. The rest are just personal arrangements* [cuisine interne]. *The rest, who gives a damn, really? If we could get together around values of generosity, sharing, respect,*

humanism. And curiosity, which I think is also an Islamic value, to want to be educated rather than to be passive and to just get swallowed in. I mean, to determine the type of life you want to lead, which is a common aspect in a lot of religions and philosophies. This, I would like us to have more emphasis on. Conversely, what I sometimes regret is this more obscurantist approach, a bit less educated and learned, which uses this [religion] and could use something else. A lot of these people are just thugs, for me [...]. Typically, terrorists, I mean little pricks, really, sorry for me they are just little thugs. They could have done anything, they could have gone into the mob or criminal networks. It's just the same thing, except it has this Islamic "hat" on it. It is so unfortunate for others that it is this hat in particular.

While respondents did not rely on the repertoire of cultural elitism and knowledge to disqualify and deflect anti-Muslim attitudes, they often used it to criticize radical interpretations of Islam. In this respect, Muslim respondents drew on similar tools and themes as non-Muslim ones, but they directed it at other, undesirable Muslims rather than native, non-Muslim French harboring hostility towards Islam. The themes of culture and knowledge were typically framed in a narrative of religious self-actualization in which the respondents came to "their" vision of Islam through autonomous reading and questioning - thus generally presenting their religious trajectory as a personal quest. As for the respondent above, the figure of the radical Muslim - uneducated and uncritical in her approach to scriptures and prescriptions - served as a backdrop to depict the respondent's more enlightened approach as authentic and trustworthy. The figure of the undesirable, radical Muslim was not consistent across interviews. For some, it was that of religiously motivated terrorists. Others stigmatized gender traditionalism and homophobia. Older respondents were more broadly critical of the second generation's intense but ill-informed new forms of religious practices, which they did not see as authentic and part of their traditions.

4.5 Discussion & conclusions

To sum up, this paper documents the subjective experience of belonging and stigmatization among upwardly mobile immigrants in France. It shows that non-Muslim respondents faced moderate levels of stigma and deal with it with the toolkit of upper-middle class culture and its emphasis on cultural elitism to frame racism as a backwards phenomenon. By contrast, it shows that Muslim respondents face higher levels of stigma - casting them as outsiders despite high level of socioeconomic attainment - and lack a readily available cultural toolkit to make sense of their belonging in French society. As such, this study suggests that upward mobility might be a necessary but insufficient cause for symbolic belonging - being included as "one of us" by the natives (Schachter 2016). It thus underscores the cultural aspects of assimilation, i.e. the analytic importance of publicly available scripts, narratives and symbols for meaning-making and claiming one's place in society when such place is challenged. It suggests that a cultural perspective emphasizing the relevance of meaning, symbolic and scripts in the assimilation process can complement dominant and structurally minded approaches focusing on the relationship between ethnoracial differences and life chances (Alba and Nee 2003, Heath et al. 2008, Alba and Foner 2015).

4.5.1 How cultural repertoires enable and disable claims to belonging among structurally integrated immigrants

On one hand, I find that non-Muslim respondents of various ethnic origins rely on upper-middle class culture and its emphasis on knowledge and cultural refinement (Bourdieu 1984) to cast racism as ignorant, crass and hence invalid. This echoes findings from Lamont's (1992) landmark comparative study of the American and French upper-middle

class. She found that Americans were more likely to use money and morality vis-à -vis others they felt superior to, whilst their French counterpart used snobbism and high culture to a much greater extent - a finding explained by a long tradition of court society and intellectualism in the Enlightenment period that contributed to legitimize cultural elitism as a toolkit for social distinction among the elites (Lamont 1992, chapter 5). As such, the boundary-making strategies of non-Muslims respondents documented in this study represents a continuity with past work, and suggests that the national cultural repertoire of cultural elitism in France helps the symbolic inclusion of immigrant newcomers.

Conversely, the predicament faced by Muslim respondents underscores the absence of a religious repertoire for belonging among French elites. In France, a tradition of anti-clericalism inherited from the Revolution and the influence of socialism has long discredited religion among the upper-middle class. Rather, the Enlightenment tradition motivating French Republicanism has produced a rationalist and individualistic (rather than ethnic or religious) conception of the political community - and one in which religious minorities have been seen as potential threats to social cohesion (Brubaker 1992: 104-110, Kastoryano 2002: 49-51). The French tradition of citizenship therefore does not provide readily available cultural repertoires to reconcile religious and national belonging, and tends to marginalize morality as a ground for boundary making - a point made vivid by Lamont's (1992) comparison with the United States.

This study highlights how cultural repertoires provide templates to classify and deal with stigmatization in everyday life among upwardly mobile immigrants. It adds to recent effort aimed at uncovering the role of cultural repertoires in shaping perceptions of, and responses to stigma (Lamont et al. 2016). Conversely, it suggests that, for upwardly mobile Muslim respondents, traditional markers of assimilation and social success do not necessarily translate into a strong sense of belonging. Without easily

available repertoires for meaning-making - such as national myths and narratives derived from widely shared, legitimate, public political culture - Muslim respondents showed far less ease in deflecting religious stigma and presenting themselves as valuable members of the national community.

4.5.2 The resilience of religious stigmatization in spite of social mobility

This study complements recent work identifying unique barriers to assimilation among Muslim minorities above and beyond race (Adida et al. 2016, Heath and Martin 2012, Bleich 2009, Alba and Foner 2015 chapter 6). In this study, I show that such symbolic barrier remains for those who experience high structural attainment in French society. Why is this the case?

On one hand, discrimination and stigmatization on ground of race and ethnic difference have lost legitimacy - they are both illegal and informally sanctioned through reverse stigmatization - e.g. most people strongly seek to avoid appearing as racist. The same, however cannot be said about the widespread suspicion directed at Islam in contemporary Europe, which often appears under the guise of progressivism. Contemporary controversies about the inclusion of Islam, Islamic practices and the limits of multiculturalism often bring to the fore progressive position on women's rights, gay rights, and even animal right's - in the case of halal slaughter - that construe Islam as a vector of cultural backwardness (Scott 2007, Bowen 2007). Such a civilizationist view, now widespread in new populist rhetoric and the European public at large (Brubaker 2017), makes it effectively much harder for Muslim individuals to dismiss anti-Muslim attitudes. Rather, it puts the onus on Muslim individuals, themselves, to show that they are not backwards by differentiating themselves from undesirable Muslims.

More generally, the resilience of a religious stigma in spite of mobility among Muslim respondents reflects the contested and politicized nature of Islam in a period of "unsettled times" (Swidler 1986) brought about by heightened security concerns and rising cultural diversity. In such a period, competing definitions and views on Islam are proliferating in public space, and contributing to reifying religion as the dominant way to handle and discuss such cultural diversity (Brubaker 2013). Because of their high degree of politicization, Muslim practices are all but "optional" (Waters 1990); rather, they carry social costs which manifest themselves in everyday life and must be reckoned with - as in the case of the respondent above carefully weighting if she should break her fast to attend lunch with her boss. While many respondents in this study voiced their desire to be considered like any other ordinary French citizen (Beaman 2015), their experience suggests that their Muslim identity remains particularly salient in daily interactions with non-Muslim others. In other words, religious stigma in the lives of upwardly mobile Muslim immigrants does not only consist in a diffuse hostility toward Islam, but also in religious affiliation superseding other social identities due to the politicization of religion.

4.6   Appendix A: Core questions of the interview guide

1 - Where were you born? How and when did you arrive in France?

2 - Now tell me a little bit about your background, what you studied at school as well as your professional history.

3 - As of today, do you feel French? Why?

4 - What is your definition of racism? What are examples?

5 - Have you ever felt that you had been discriminated because of your, name, skin color, religion, etc? — In what circumstances? — Other anecdotes. —At what frequency?

6 - Beyond these anecdotes, what is your general experience with discrimination? —in public spaces? —At work? —Elsewhere?

7 - People react really differently when facing adverse circumstances like this. What was your reaction?

8 - What is you relationship with your country of origins? —As of today, do you have any sentiment of belonging to a community other than France?

9 - According to you, how has racism changed in the course of the last 3 decades? How will it change in the future?

10 - How do you feel toward the political discourse of the National Front? —Why would some people vote for the National Front?

11 - How any of your experience of racism affected your feeling of belonging to

France? Why?

12 - How do you treat the question of racism with your children (how would you treat it if you do not have children yet?) - if so, how did you handle the issue?

4.7 Appendix B: Demographic characteristics of respondents

Table 4.1: Demographic characteristics of interviewees

Age	Occupation	Gender	Immigrant origin
52	Doctor	M	West African
54	Lawyer	M	Maghreb
52	Professor	M	West African
41	Corporate executive	F	Maghreb
26	Ph.D student in social science	M	Maghreb
41	Regional state official	F	East African
27	Corporate executive	F	Maghreb
31	Central government official	F	Maghreb
44	Corporate executive	M	Maghreb
25	Music teacher	M	Maghreb
57	Veterinary physician	M	East Africa
36	Corporate executive	F	Maghreb
28	Central state official	F	Maghreb
25	Urban planner	M	Maghreb
30	Lawyer	F	Maghreb
50	School principal	M	Maghreb
29	Community organizer	M	West Africa
28	Tech entrepreneur	F	Maghreb
28	Ph.D student in social science	F	Maghreb
34	Schoolteacher	F	West African
42	Engineer	M	Maghreb
30	Local state official	M	Maghreb

32	Accountant	F	Maghreb
33	Ph.D student in physics & high school teacher	M	West African
45	Central state official	F	Maghreb
58	Doctor	F	Maghreb
26	Lawyer	F	Maghreb
43	Schoolteacher	F	Maghreb
22	Special education teacher	F	Maghreb
39	Journalist	M	Maghreb
24	Business student	M	Maghreb
29	Schoolteacher	M	Maghreb
30	Doctor	M	East Africa
52	Professor	M	Maghreb
33	Research scientist	M	West Africa
45	Corporate executive	M	Maghreb
30	Corporate executive	M	Maghreb
28	Engineer	M	Maghreb

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