

COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM
LOCALLY

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COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM LOCALLY

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In 2011, the Obama administration announced a national countering violent extremism (CVE) strategy, which tasked local communities to work together to design and implement their own CVE programs to help prevent the threat of violent extremism. Seven years later, the majority of Americans do not know what “CVE” is and few programs exist at the local level. This project examines the U.S. approach to CVE and the challenges local stakeholders faced while attempting to design and implement “community-led” CVE programming. In examining these challenges, I explore why only some communities have responded to the federal government’s call for action to design and implement CVE programming and created what I term *CVE governance networks*. I find that three factors—community stakeholder interest in CVE, capacity to mobilize and facilitation—explain the variation in mobilization at the local level in the United States.

However, the creation of a CVE governance network does not necessarily mean that the network will develop and implement CVE programs. Local community stakeholders face numerous challenges throughout the policymaking process, which ultimately hinders implementation efforts. Often, governance networks succumb to internal political conflicts that are fueled by stakeholder disagreements over how CVE programming should be implemented within their communities. Given this, I find that networks with a local leader who is able to both facilitate coordination and make final implementation decisions tend to be more successful in implementing collaborative programming. Evidence from interviews and surveys of stakeholders involved in the CVE policymaking process lends support for my theory of local level collaborative policymaking and reveals the intricacies of the CVE policymaking process.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Caitlin Ambrozik was born in Johnson City, New York where she grew up and attended Johnson City High School. After graduating, she stayed close to home and attended Binghamton University, where she majored in Political Science and History and competed for Binghamton's Women's Track and Field Team and Women's Tennis Team. She became fascinated with studying terrorism and counterterrorism while studying abroad at Murdoch University in Australia. Caitlin further explored her interests in both topics during her five years of studies at Cornell and as an intern for the Department of Defense. This dissertation is the end product of her studies.

To Stephen

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CHAPTER 1
COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

1.1 Introduction

In 2014, Ahmed¹ ran into one of his friends from grade school. Ahmed explained to me that this friend was best described as a party animal. When Ahmed returned from a trip abroad, he was surprised to see his friend made some changes—changes that Ahmed thought signaled that his friend had started to become a responsible adult. As noted by Ahmed, “I came back and I saw him and I was like all right, he was dressed in traditional clothes and looked like he might have started to attend mosque again. So, I thought, oh good, this guy has turned himself around... then I started talking to him.” However, his friend started to empathize with an emerging group based in Iraq and Syria, a group we now know formerly as ISIS. Alarmed, Ahmed wanted to take swift action to help his friend. He turned to a community leader—someone he trusted—for guidance on how he could help his friend from going down the wrong path and as Ahmed put it, “from doing something stupid.”

The community leader agreed to meet with Ahmed. As explained by Ahmed, “I went to his office and I went there and said look, this is what is going on and my friend had written me a list on pen and paper of videos [ISIS videos] to watch.” Much to Ahmed’s dismay, the response of the community leader was disappointing, “he said there is nothing we can do, he is already probably being watched by the FBI and we just have to sit back.” Ahmed’s response? “I sat back and said, like really? I look up to you and you are one of the few individuals in the Muslim community that can do something and you are telling me that there is nothing you can do.”

¹ A pseudonym was chosen to allow for the anonymity of the interviewee.

Unfortunately, cases such as Ahmed's friend do arise. In addition to domestic terrorist groups including far-right groups, international terrorist groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda pose a threat, albeit a limited one, to communities in the United States. Although these international groups are based abroad, recruitment of Americans can occur over the internet and through other means. Cases such as Jaelyn Young and Muhammad Dakhalla, the two college-aged lovers who tried to join ISIS, and Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik, the husband and wife duo responsible for the San Bernardino terrorist attack, have proven that it is possible that an American citizen can either take up arms abroad to fight or conduct a violent attack domestically. This is a policymaker's worst nightmare: a "wicked problem."

1.2 Community-led Network Approaches to Counter Violent Extremism

"Wicked problems" refer to complex policy problems that are unpredictable, arduous to define, and may not have definitive solutions (Head and Alford 2015; Rittel and Webber 1973). Fitting this description, terrorism is a classic example of a 'wicked problem' (Hayden 2006). The exact timing and location of a future terrorist attack are unknown, yet, policymakers and practitioners still attempt to prevent terrorist attacks from happening. Given that terrorism is an unpredictable problem, a definitive and simple solution to counter terrorism does not exist. Instead, governments use a variety of different counterterrorism approaches to attempt to minimize the threat of terrorism.

In countering international terrorism, the United States is a global leader. The United States is not only an innovator in military capabilities (Brooks and Wohlforth 2015), but the U.S. military often leads coalition operations against terrorism in places such as Iraq (Pauly 2017).

Moreover, the U.S. serves as a key influencer in shaping counterterrorism policy including anti-terrorism legislation (Alvarez 2003). Historically, the U.S. approach to counterterrorism has largely been reactive and dominated by the military and intelligence community. Yet, when it comes to domestic counterterrorism initiatives, the federal government has opted to take a different approach.

Following the September 11th, 2001 attacks, terrorism became a top policy concern amongst the public. Public concerns of terrorism produced a window of opportunity for policy entrepreneurs to find and promote new innovative solutions to the problem of terrorism. Rather than solely relying on the military and law enforcement to counter terrorism, policymakers developed the concept of *countering violent extremism* or “CVE.” I define CVE as a collection of non-punitive policies and programs that aim to either prevent violent extremism and/or disrupt an individual or group’s reliance on violent extremism by attempting to address the root causes of violent extremism. The concept first appeared in the United Kingdom and slowly spread to other countries including the United States. Starting under the Bush administration, policymakers began considering bringing CVE-type programming to the United States.² However, it was not until the Obama administration when the concept left the closed-door beltway policy discussions and entered into the public sphere.

As a set of tools, CVE can be developed and implemented by individuals, organizations, governments, or by networks, what I term as *CVE governance networks*. A CVE governance network is a network consisting of two or more local public and private stakeholders, and wherein the purpose of stakeholder involvement in the network is to help develop and potentially

² Anonymous US Government Official, personal communication, Washington D.C., July 2015.

implement a CVE strategy for their community. Since strategies are contingent on community preferences, strategies and participants in the network can vary by locality.

The Obama administration not only sought to incorporate the concept of CVE within its counterterrorism strategy but also departed from the traditional government-led counterterrorism terrorism approach to one that was community-led. This meant that rather than the federal government designing and implementing CVE programming, the Obama administration preferred for local communities to take the lead and develop a “whole-of-society” network approach to build resilient communities. With the release of a national CVE strategy in 2011, the Obama administration attempted to empower communities to mobilize around CVE and take action largely on their own.

There are many potential benefits associated with a community-led network approach to CVE. As argued by past scholars, solving wicked problems requires the involvement of a multitude of stakeholders with diverging ideas (Churchman 1967). Similar to other traditional governance networks seen in public policy, CVE networks can pool the knowledge of multiple experts and use joint problem solving to increase the chances that a solution is found to a wicked problem (Chrislip and Larson 1994). A community-led initiative can also potentially increase community buy-in of an initiative by granting community stakeholders the ability to shape policy that affects them (Eversole 2011). This is why scholars have also called for the establishment of a network approach to develop multifaceted collaborative solutions to terrorism (e.g. Beutel and Weinberger 2016; Dalgaard-Nielsen 2016; Ellis and Abdi 2017; Michaels 2008; Pollard 2007; Weine and Cohen 2015). However, attempts to promote a community-led governance network approach to public policy often fail (Head and Ryan 2004).

1.3 Where are the Programs?

Governments have increasingly used a governance network approach to public policy to address new governing problems (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004). This approach challenges traditional hierarchical models of policy development and implementation by delegating responsibilities to the local level. However, a host of problems usually arise when implementing federal initiatives at the local level. Consequently, as Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) argue, it should be no surprise that implementation often fails.

Unsurprisingly, the U.S. approach to CVE also suffers from what I term the *decentralization deficit problem*. Since CVE policymaking in the U.S. is decentralized and community-led, the implementation of CVE is difficult and subsequently programming at the local level is rare. I find that up until 2016, CVE governance networks existed in only approximately eleven communities, and only four of those communities actually implemented their CVE plans.

Despite the challenges associated with implementation, this dissertation examines why some communities have CVE governance networks and why some even implement their CVE plans. The questions that this dissertation seeks to understand arise from the differing experiences of local governance networks with CVE. Why do governance networks exist in some communities? Why do some local governance networks implement CVE plans while others do not? How do the programs that are implemented function on the ground? And, can CVE serve as a viable non-punitive supplement to traditional, more militaristic or police-intensive counterterrorism policies? To some, the answers to these questions may be obvious. However, I find that the answers are more nuanced than initially expected.

1.4 The CVE Policymaking Process

The CVE policymaking process is a multi-stage process that begins with mobilization. Throughout the dissertation, I use the term *governance network mobilization* to refer to the process of securing the willingness of community stakeholders to participate and form a governance network. Ideally, the process does not stop after mobilization. Next, a CVE governance network decides on a CVE plan for their communities. During this planning stage, the stakeholders decide what types of CVE programs best fit the needs of their local communities. After these decisions are made, a governance network ideally implements the strategy. However, as a multi-stage process, a community-led network approach to CVE can fail at any point during this process.

First, as a resource-consuming activity (Huxham and Vangen 2005), stakeholders may not always be willing to participate in CVE networks (Cherney et al. 2017). Although this may be true in some cases, surprisingly, I find communities with stakeholders who are interested in CVE and have the capacity to develop a governance network but still do not have a CVE governance network. In these cases, I argue that a lack of facilitation explains why some communities do not mobilize and create a CVE governance network.

For those communities that do create a network, the network then ideally attempts to develop and implement a CVE strategy. I show that some governance networks developed comprehensive CVE plans to implement within their communities. However, for other networks, stakeholders were unable to decide on a strategy or created a strategy with few details. Subsequently, some communities implemented the full strategy while in other communities,

community stakeholders only implemented either part of the strategy or did not implement the strategy at all. In analyzing local level implementation efforts, I find that coordination problems arise within CVE governance networks. These coordination problems are fueled by local political conflicts that often lead to decision stalemates amongst stakeholders. I show that CVE governance networks with a leader who is able to act as a functional equivalent to a centralized policymaking model are more successful. By doing so, my argument illuminates the micro-political explanations of community-level decision-making and mobilization.

1.5 Key Concepts and Assumptions

To develop a theory to explain why some community stakeholders mobilized and formed a CVE governance network and why only some networks implement CVE programming, I use insights from a macro-level comparative case analysis of the United States and the United Kingdom, a country with a plethora of CVE programs.³ I find differences between the strategies and implementation of CVE in both countries that help explain why the United Kingdom has an abundance of CVE programs, whereas the United States has few. Unlike the United States, CVE programming in the United Kingdom is centralized under the U.K. government, well-funded, and targets all forms of extremism, both violent and non-violent extremism. In the United States, however, CVE is decentralized and community-led, poorly funded, and targets only violent extremism. Responding to the call for more precise theoretical models in the study of governance networks (Bryson, Crosby, and Stone 2015; O’Leary and Vij 2012), I use the information from the national level comparative analysis, together with insights from the public

³ I focus the analysis in the United Kingdom on programs implemented within England and Wales due to availability of data.

administration literature, to form a new theory on the mobilization of collaborative governance networks. I show that mobilization is contingent on three factors – interest in CVE, capacity to mobilize, and facilitation. I also show that implementation is contingent on local level leadership embedded within CVE governance networks.

1.5.1 Scope

Throughout the dissertation, I use the term "community" to refer to the areas where local governance networks seek to develop and implement CVE plans. The U.S. federal government uses this terminology to promote CVE efforts as a “community-led” initiative. In reality, the conceptualization of community varies by locality. In some areas, "community" simply refers to the Muslim community within a particular city, whereas in other areas community can refer to an inter-faith community residing in a larger region. For this dissertation, the community component is embedded within a local governance network composed of actors such as nongovernment organizations and local government officials who are members of a particular concentrated geographical area.

I also use the term *CVE plan* throughout the dissertation. CVE plan refers to either a formal or informal plan that a local governance network develops. These plans can include one program or multiple programs. Subsequently, I refer to the term "CVE program" as the programs that are associated with a CVE plan. In this dissertation, I analyze the emergence of local governance networks and the development and implementation of CVE plans either within a geographical area surrounding a major city, referred to as a region or an administrative county.

The theory presented in this dissertation broadly applies to the policymaking process regarding security-related public policy within communities at this scale. Though, in the dissertation, I empirically test the validity of my theory only on CVE programming. At the macro-strategic level, I examine the national CVE strategies of the United States and the United Kingdom. However, since local governance networks implement CVE efforts at the local level, this dissertation also examines implementation at the micro-level within communities primarily in the United States. In the U.S., I analyze why governance networks emerge in some communities and not others by examining mobilization efforts in two regions, the Greater Columbus, Ohio Region and the Greater Houston, Texas Region. Furthermore, I analyze the development and implementation of CVE programming in three regions, the Greater Boston Region, the Greater Los Angeles Region, and Montgomery County, Maryland. Despite the dissertation's focus on five communities, the theory proposed in this dissertation is intended to be applied more broadly.

1.5.2 Assumptions

The theory proposed in this dissertation rests on several assumptions about the security-related public policymaking process. The theory assumes that security itself is an uncertain public good, meaning that the optimal level of security is unknown. Although states engage in efforts to maximize security, state actors cannot know for certain if their actions will indeed maximize their level of security relative to the threats that they face and the costs of providing security.

Assuming that security policy decisions are made in a purposive way, I also assume that community stakeholders, besides state actors, must make assumptions about their expectations of

security and measures to promote security. Since the optimal level of security is unknown, community stakeholders can only assume that their actions will increase security. This assumption is critical for the development and implementation of security-related public policy, including CVE. The assumption implies that community stakeholders that choose to develop and implement CVE programs view the benefits of implementation to be greater than the costs.

Reaching the conclusion that the benefits of implementation outweigh the costs is not guaranteed. Delivering any public good is costly, and the implementation of CVE programs is no different. Implementation requires time and financial resources. Moreover, the effectiveness of CVE programs is largely unknown, which adds to the difficulty in determining that the benefits of CVE programs outweigh the costs of implementation. Thus, this dissertation shows that community stakeholders must first mobilize around the concept of CVE.

1.5.3 Principal-Multi-Agent Problems

I conceptualize the CVE policymaking process as a principal-agent relationship with multiple agents, which I term as a “principal-multiple-agent” relationship. In the U.S., the principal, referring to the federal government, delegates a varying degree of responsibility for the development and implementation of CVE programs to local governance networks. The networks are typically composed of community stakeholders such as local organizations and actors from the local government. I find two problems that exist given this principal-multi-agent relationship. First, the creation of a governance network is not guaranteed. Second, the formation of a governance network does not guarantee that the implementation of a CVE plan will occur.

1.6 Theory

Since there are multiple stages associated with the CVE policymaking process, there are multiple components to my theoretical model that seek to understand and explain the outcomes of each stage. The three stages each present a series of challenges for stakeholders to overcome before moving on to the next stage of the process. To understand why the implementation of CVE plans is rare in the United States, one must first understand each stage. While the theory presented in the dissertation provides an explanation for the lack of CVE programming in the United States, the theoretical model also provides policymakers a roadmap for the promotion of future CVE efforts.

1.6.1 Mobilization

A governance network will not emerge within a community unless some community stakeholders believe that the benefits of CVE outweigh the costs of implementation. To mobilize stakeholders, the government may choose amongst three options. First, the government may decide not to take any actions to mobilize agents and rather allow governance networks to emerge organically. Second, the government may choose to promote mobilization by using external incentives, either positive or negative. The government may use positive incentives such as financial compensation or negative incentives such as sanctions to motivate stakeholders to mobilize. Third, the government may choose to encourage mobilization by motivating stakeholders to voluntarily participate. Rather than using sanctions or positive incentives to sway

stakeholders to comply, the government can attempt to mobilize agents by increasing the appeal of CVE to community stakeholders.

In the U.S., the federal government primarily relies on the first and third strategy. Nevertheless, mobilization depends on the interaction between multiple factors, both behavioral and facilitative; thus, to understand mobilization, a more dynamic and inclusive theory is needed. I concentrate my analysis on three factors: interest, capacity, and facilitation. I argue that all three factors determine the prospects for mobilization given the uncertainty around the concept of CVE, the lack of CVE expertise, and the costs associated with mobilization. However, not all communities are the same and my theory accounts for these differences.

Some communities may have stakeholders who have an interest in CVE or at least an openness to CVE and the capacity to mobilize.⁴ Although ideal for the prospects of mobilizing, I argue that in these communities, facilitation is still needed to first increase the appeal of CVE to stakeholders in order to, first, motivate them to join the network and, second, to guide stakeholders through the mobilization process. In this case, facilitation does not involve the use of external incentives to motivate stakeholders to mobilize.

While the above scenario is an ideal scenario for CVE practitioners, in reality, most communities may not have stakeholders with the capacity to mobilize or interest in CVE. But this does not necessarily mean mobilization can never occur in these communities. To foster mobilization in communities with stakeholders who do not have the capacity to mobilize, a different type of facilitation is needed. Here, facilitation in the form of positive incentives can increase the appeal of CVE to stakeholders by offsetting the costs of mobilization. Other communities may simply not have any stakeholders who are interested in CVE. This possibility

⁴ The capacity to mobilize refers to the knowledge of CVE, and the capabilities and resources required for a stakeholder to participate and contribute to CVE programming.

is not improbable given that the concept of CVE is controversial and many organizations actively oppose CVE programming. In these situations, mobilization is highly unlikely unless a facilitator uses negative incentives to increase the costs of non-participation for stakeholders and essentially force a community mobilize.

1.6.2 Development and Implementation

Even if a governance network initially mobilizes around the concept of CVE, I find that this does not necessarily mean that the network will ultimately *implement* a CVE plan. As with all principal-agent relationships, CVE is prone to agency loss. Several factors may minimize this loss, including both actions by the government and by the local governance network. Although the government can select stakeholders that are more likely to implement CVE programming or monitor the process to decrease agency loss, coordination problems fueled by local political conflicts hinder implementation efforts. After the mobilization stage, stakeholders need to determine what the actual programs will encompass and what service providers will implement these programs. These decisions require stakeholders to coordinate their actions and agree upon a CVE plan. Given the multitude of stakeholders involved in the planning of CVE programs and a general lack of knowledge regarding which CVE programs are effective, the development of a CVE plan by stakeholders is a difficult task. Stakeholders may disagree not only on the types of programs to implement, but also about deciding where to obtain funding from, deciding what organizations or individuals to include in the implementation of the plan, deciding when and where to implement the plan, and deciding how to allocate tasks.

Certain governance networks are more likely to overcome this coordination problem given the presence of a local level CVE leader. Some form of centralization is critical for the development and implementation of CVE policymaking because of the variety of stakeholders involved in the process, the lack of administrative rules in place for implementation, and the uncertainty and stigmatization surrounding CVE initiatives. A leader can act as the functional equivalent of a centralized public policy initiative by making policy decisions when the collective group is unable to do so. Otherwise, local governance networks will be unable to overcome coordination problems and at best create an incomplete plan that lacks the details needed for community stakeholders to implement programs. When this is the case, community stakeholders will either partially implement the plan or forgo implementation.

Overall, the theory predicts that implementation of CVE plans should occur in areas where stakeholders are mobilized and where a local leader is embedded within the network. The table below summarizes the predictions.

Table 1.1: Implementation Predictions

	<i>Leadership</i>	<i>Leaderless</i>
<i>Mobilization</i>	<i>Implementation</i>	<i>Partial or No Implementation</i>
<i>No Mobilization</i>	<i>No Implementation</i>	<i>No Implementation</i>

1.7 Data and Methods

Using evidence from the United States and the United Kingdom, I illustrate how my argument explains the details of my cases while drawing generalizable implications for not just CVE

initiatives, but other security-related programming. Because policy implementation is a well-researched subject, I assess my argument in comparison to other arguments concerning policy implementation. To evaluate the explanatory capacity of my argument, I rely on a variety of analytical methods to gain additional leverage over the central research questions of this dissertation.

First, to develop my theory, I analyze the national CVE strategies of the United States and the United Kingdom using a most-similar systems design to inductively identify macro-level explanations for why governance networks emerge and why only some governance networks in the U.S. implement CVE programs. Both countries have a national strategy for countering violent extremism, called *CVE* in the United States and *Prevent* in the United Kingdom. Despite being named different things, the two strategies share many similarities including similar policy objectives. However, unlike the U.S. case, CVE governance networks have implemented hundreds of CVE plans in the United Kingdom. An in-depth analysis of the strategies and their applications in both countries reveals other clear differences, which include differences in the structure of CVE policymaking and the process of implementation. I then use these insights to help inform my theoretical expectations to explain mobilization and implementation at the micro-level.

To then test my theory of mobilization and implementation, I also use a most similar systems design to analyze the local level implementation of CVE within the United States. I analyze the mobilization process in two regions, and the implementation of CVE plans in three regions. I chose these cases because they share similarities in regard to factors that may explain the creation of governance networks and the implementation of CVE plans that are not accounted for in my theoretical model. Yet, these cases differ in terms of my main explanatory and outcome

variables of interest. I rely on traditional comparative methods to analyze the plausibility of my explanatory variables and alternative explanations. I use process tracing to uncover the policymaking process in each case, and I find observable implications of my explanatory variables of interest that lend support to my theory.

Studying the CVE policymaking process requires detailed case study knowledge. To acquire this knowledge, I relied on interviews, public opinion surveys, local newspapers, primary source documentation from the case communities, and a variety of secondary sources. The variety of sources consulted for this part of the dissertation paints a detailed account of the CVE policymaking process in my case communities and fills in existing knowledge gaps about what has happened in these communities. Using a snowball sampling method, interviewees included key actors involved in the policymaking process including individuals at all levels of government, non-governmental actors, religious organizations, academics, and activists working on this issue. In total, I conducted over 50 interviews with various stakeholders including senior policymakers and public officials including mayors and U.S. Attorneys. The information obtained from the interviews provided the needed community level details about the policymaking process.

CVE is a very controversial topic especially within Muslim communities. Opponents of CVE argue that CVE focuses too much on the Muslim community and ignores other forms of violent extremism such as far-right extremism in other non-Muslim communities. For these reasons, in recent years, governments, especially the United Kingdom, have become tight-lipped on some details of CVE initiatives. Because of this, many of my interviewees within the U.K. government were encouraged to limit the detailed information about CVE programs to the public. For these and other reasons, many of my interviewees requested to stay anonymous.

Likewise, in the U.S., many stakeholders who have been involved with CVE have been ostracized within their communities. Subsequently, I refer to these cases in general terms and withhold names from those that requested to be anonymous. While anonymity makes it difficult for readers to verify the information I obtained, I have tried to supplement and corroborate the information from the interview with publically available information whenever possible. Moreover, when interviewees provided consent, I include as much information as granted by the interviewee.

Additionally, an increase in research on CVE in combination with the limited number of cases of CVE programming in countries such as the United States leads to researchers focusing on the same cases for multiple studies. As a result, some of my case communities have suffered from research fatigue, in which myself and others have found it difficult to convince respondents to take part in another study (Southers and Hienz 2015). This leaves the primary documents and secondary sources as valuable sources of information, especially for those communities where I was only able to secure a limited number of interviews.

1.8 Contributions

In examining a community-led CVE network approach, I expose factors that are overlooked as potential pitfalls to the future of CVE. I focus my attention on the consequences of the lack of guidance on CVE and the local political conflicts that emerge within communities on efforts to develop and implement CVE programming. Scholars in this field, instead, focus on the potential negative consequences of the CVE terminology (Schanzer et al. 2016), lack of resources for CVE programs (Vidino and Hughes 2015), the prioritization of Islamic violent extremism, and

the perceived lack of effectiveness of the programs (Challgren et al. 2016). Although I do not deny that many of these factors are indeed stumbling blocks for the future of CVE, I turn my analytical focus toward the underlying factors that inhibit the development and implementation of CVE programs. I also provide solutions to these problems by highlighting the importance of facilitation and leadership embedded within governance networks at the local level.

My contribution also provides a new understanding on how CVE programming is developed and implemented at the local level. I contribute new empirical evidence of CVE programming to the current literature on CVE, which lacks a solid empirical understanding of how CVE programs operate and how they are developed. To date, most studies on CVE have either focused on the structure of CVE policies, community attitudes towards it, and the effectiveness of CVE programming. Critical policy studies highlight the potential negative consequences of CVE policy such as the lack of transparency on CVE (Skoczylis 2015), the link between CVE and intelligence-gathering (Kundnani 2009), and the stigmatization of Muslim communities (Heath-Kelly 2013). Additionally, research on CVE focuses primarily on the *effectiveness* of CVE programs (Weine and Eisenman 2015; Williams, Horgan and Evans 2016). Although needed, research on the effectiveness of CVE runs into a problem: CVE programs are rare. As best stated by one local community leader in Boston, "What are they going to evaluate, the air?"⁵ Surprisingly, the actual implementation of CVE initiatives has largely gone understudied in the field (Innes, Roberts, and Lowe 2017). Consequently, a deeper understanding of the different programs and why only some governance networks implement these programs supplemented with on the ground research with CVE programs is required before the field prioritizes examining other topics such as the effectiveness of CVE programs. I contribute a

⁵ Anonymous Muslim Community Leader, personal communication, Boston, MA, December, 2016.

nuanced understanding of CVE supplemented with empirical data on how communities and CVE programming actually operate.

1.9 Dissertation Outline

In Chapter 2, I explain in more detail the concept of CVE and the different programs that are typically associated with CVE. In this chapter, I also address the potential benefits and consequences of CVE programming to illustrate why CVE can be controversial and why the mobilization of communities around CVE is not guaranteed. In Chapter 3, I then conduct a comparative macro-level analysis of CVE strategies in the United States and the United Kingdom. I use this analysis to inductively identify differences between the two strategies that may account for the differing outcomes of implementation. I also use this chapter to explain in more detail the CVE policymaking process in both countries. In Chapter 4, I then use these findings in addition to insights from public administration to link the macro-level outcomes to explain micro-level differences in implementation in the United States. Chapter 4 outlines my theory on mobilization and implementation, which includes both an explanation for why some communities mobilize and others do not and an explanation for why only some communities that mobilize around CVE end up implementing CVE plans.

The next two chapters then test the explanatory value of my theoretical expectations for mobilization and implementation. Chapter 5 outlines the mobilization process in two regions, the Greater Columbus Region and the Greater Houston Region. Both regions were chosen using a statistical method that matches cases that are similar in terms of potential explanations for mobilization and differ regarding the outcome variable of interest, mobilization. The Houston

region successfully mobilized around CVE and created an informal CVE governance network, whereas the Columbus region fell short. To determine the explanatory value of my theory, I trace the mobilization process in both communities using an analysis of interviews and primary and secondary source material. I supplement this analysis with two public opinion surveys that analyze the micro-behavioral reasons why individuals chose to mobilize or not within the community. The analysis of the two cases demonstrates how my theory helps explain mobilization more completely than alternative models of mobilization.

After examining the mobilization process, Chapter 6 examines the development and implementation of CVE programming in three regions. For this chapter, I primarily use interviews and primary and secondary source material to trace the implementation process in Boston, Los Angeles, and Montgomery County, MD. Similar to Chapter 5, these regions share similarities on a number of variables that may explain implementation but differ in regard to the status of implementation. While Montgomery County, MD has a fully operational CVE model, Los Angeles, and Boston lag behind. The analysis reveals how the presence of local CVE leadership helps explain the differing outcomes in implementation.

Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation. In this chapter, I discuss the main findings of my research and the implications of my argument for both social science and the policy community. I also discuss the future of CVE under the Trump administration and the challenges that lie ahead. I conclude the chapter with recommendations for future research.

CHAPTER 2

THE FUNDAMENTALS OF CVE

2.1 Introduction

In his State of the Union address to Congress following the September 11th attacks, President Bush famously declared a ‘war on terror.’ President Bush further explained how the U.S. planned to fight and win this war on terror,

“we will direct every resource at our command- every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war- to disrupt and defeat the global terror network.”⁶

It turns out that all of these “weapons of war” do not solve the problem of terrorism. And as some have argued, these military-type tactics are not only expensive but may do more harm than good (Forest 2007). Even the extensive use of drone warfare and the expansion of the intelligence apparatus in the United States cannot solve the problem of terrorism. Although this type of warfare may diminish the operational capacities of one group in the short-term, groups can reemerge later on. Moreover, terrorism scholar Lorenzo Vidino echoed what law enforcement and prosecutors have been increasingly suggesting, “we cannot arrest our way out of this problem” either.⁷

After 9/11 came the Madrid bombings in March 2004, the murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in November 2004, and the July 2005 London bombings. The attacks produced a shift in counterterrorism strategy. This shift emerged due to a realization that many of the attackers were not foreigners but rather “homegrown terrorists” (Coolsaet and Struye de

⁶ The Guardian. “Text of George Bush’s Speech.”
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/21/september11.usa13>

⁷Lorenzo Vidino, ISIS in America: From Retweets to Raqqa. Lecture presented at Panel Discussion on ISIS in America: From Retweets to Raqqa at George Washington School of Media and Public Affairs, Washington, D.C., 2015. Also, Michael Downing, Former Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department, personal communication, Washington D.C., December 14, 2015.

Swielande 2008). The traditional military-type tactics used to counter terrorism abroad seemed ill-equipped to fight terrorism at home.

Within policy circles and academic circles alike, terrorism began to be viewed as not just an isolated phenomenon, but rather as one option among a range of options from which individuals and groups could choose from to achieve their objectives. Terrorism is tactic of violence, and similar to all types of violence, it emerges in the context of a broader social, political, and cultural context (Bosi, Dochartaigh and PISOIU 2016). Individuals choose a strategy to pursue among alternative violent and non-violent options (Crenshaw 1995).

In addition to this new way of conceptualizing terrorism, came another realization that, as Sagemen (2008) notes, no one is born a terrorist. If no one is born a terrorist, and there is a process by which one becomes a terrorist, then this suggests that the process can be both reversible and preventable. With this realization, a shift in counterterrorism strategy began to take shape. No longer were politicians, particularly in Europe, keen on using phrases such as the “war on terror” to depict the problem of terrorism. The “war on terror” quickly became the “war of ideas” (Rosenau 2006). States began to incorporate “soft approaches”⁸ into counterterrorism strategies in order to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of vulnerable populations (El-Said 2015). What emerged was a series of policies and programs known broadly as countering violent extremism, or CVE as U.S. policymakers call it. These policies and programs aimed to augment traditional

⁸ As outlined by Nasser et al. (2011), states can pursue either ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ power counterterrorism strategies. Taking these terms from Nye (2008), ‘hard’ power is when states coerce individuals by use of force to obtain certain objectives. Usually, ‘hard’ power is conceptualized as military or economic power (Wilson III 2008). Search and destroy strategies are examples of ‘hard’ power. These strategies seek to disrupt and subsequently destroy terrorist networks through military tactics that can take place both domestically or abroad (Brimley 2006). On the other hand, ‘soft’ power is defined as “intangible assets such as an attractive personality, culture, political values and institutions, and policies that are seen as legitimate or having moral authority” (Nye 2008:95). ‘Hearts and minds’ strategies are typically associated with ‘soft’ power. The ‘hearts and minds’ strategy dates back to a counter-insurgent model that emphasized strategies that sought to win the hearts and minds of individuals to support counter-insurgent operations (Berman et al. 2008). These strategies included political and economic development efforts to increase support for government forces over insurgencies.

counterterrorism tactics to provide policymakers and practitioners additional tools to fight terrorism by addressing the root causes of violent extremism.

2.2 Addressing the Root Causes of Violent Extremism

Since no one is born a terrorist, an individual must somehow become a terrorist or supportive of the concept of terrorism.⁹ The most common way scholars explain the process by which an individual becomes a terrorist is by using the terminology of *radicalization*. Although the term is problematic given its subjectivity and false implication that ideological beliefs are a necessary precursor to violence, the term is widely used.¹⁰ Most commonly, radicalization refers to “the process of developing extremist ideologies and beliefs” (Borum 2011, 9).¹¹ As a means to prevent terrorism by understanding why some individuals become involved in terrorism, the radicalization process is often scrutinized in an attempt to identify the drivers of this process and an individual’s pathway to terrorism. However, scholars are quick to point out that there is no single pathway towards violent action, nor a single driver that explains why individuals

⁹ Involvement in terrorism does not necessarily only refer to engagement in violent activity; rather involvement can range from aiding and abetting an event to providing funds for terrorism. Please see, Horgan, 2008.

¹⁰ For an overview of the problems associated with this term, please see, Borum, 2011. Other arguments concerning the problematic nature of the radicalization discourse are most commonly found in the critical terrorism literature. For an overview of some of the concerns associated with radicalization, please see, Heath-Kelly, 2013. For an overview of the discipline, please see, Heath-Kelly, Jarvis, and Baker-Beall, 2014.

¹¹ This definition acknowledges the distinction between extremist ideology and extremist violence. Since not all individuals who hold extremist views engage in violence or support violence, this is an important distinction to make. However, it is also important to note the difference between non-violent and violent extremism, since CVE programming in the United States focuses on the latter. Other definitions of radicalization also exist within the literature. According to El-Said and Harrigan (2012), radicalization refers to the “change in views and behavior of groups and individuals towards embracing more uncompromising political and ideological positions and ideas, with a willingness to take unusual and concert actions to seem them implemented” (5). Another definition defines radicalization as “the process whereby groups or individuals undergo a psychological transformation that leads them to depart from tradition and increase their advocacy to an extreme political, social or religious ideology” (El-Said 2015:9). For a discussion of the various definitions of radicalization, please see Neumann (2013).

radicalize through a certain pathway. Instead, individuals radicalize for different reasons and at different paces, and only a subset engage in actual violence (Borum 2011).

Through analysis of biographies and court documents of known convicted terrorists, scholars have identified a variety of potential drivers of terrorism. These drivers include the presence of political grievances, socioeconomic factors, socio-psychological factors, culture and identity issues, trauma, and religious/ideological factors (Hafez and Mullins 2015). Some individuals may be drawn to join terrorist groups to be part of a network (Abrahms 2008). Others may be pulled into a group with the assistance of close associates, as research continues to show the importance of the role of friends and family during the radicalization process (Harris-Hogan 2014; Sageman 2004).¹² Scholars most commonly categorize these different factors using the push and pull terminology.¹³ Push factors are those factors that may make an individual susceptible to radicalization while pull factors are the factors that attract individuals to terrorism.

The same push and pull factors can also determine which individuals disengage from terrorism. In reference to disengagement, push factors refer to the factors that drive an individual away from terrorism and can include burnout, loss of faith, or disagreements with the group. Pull factors, on the other hand, are factors external to the group that encourage an individual to disengage such as the promise of amnesty or another incentive to disengage or even the desire to live a normal lifestyle. Much more work on this area of study is needed, but from an analysis of

¹² The case of Zulfi Hoxha, or Abu Hamza al-Amriki, an American from New Jersey and suspected senior commander of the Islamic State is a more recent example. Hoxha reportedly used the internet to stay in contact with his friends, who orchestrated his travel from the United States to the Islamic State in April 2015. For Hoxha's case, his social network directly facilitated his jihadist activity (Hughes, Meleagrou-Hitches and Clifford 2018). Hoxha is not the only case of this. In Gill, Horgan, and Deckert's (2014) analysis of 119 lone-actor terrorists within the United States and Europe, approximately a third of their sample had family or close associates who were previously involved in either political violence or criminality.

¹³ Alternative categorizations of radicalization factors exist. For example, Kleinmann (2012) offers an alternative way to categorize these factors by distinguishing between individual-level (cognitive and internal factors), group-level (external social forces such as recruitment), and mass-level factors (societal factors such as economic factors).

87 autobiographical accounts of terrorists, Altier et al. (2017) find that push factors play a larger role in explaining the disengagement of individuals.

Countering violent extremism programming focuses on the drivers of violent extremism. However, given the variety of different pathways to violent extremism and the numerous potential drivers, CVE programs can be tailored to address any of the drivers mentioned previously. How this decision is made and who makes this decision varies across countries and in some cases, sub-nationally.

2.3 Defining CVE

Similar to the lack of consensus around terms such as ‘terrorism’ and ‘violent extremism,’ there is no common definition of CVE. Despite multiple calls for a clear definition of the term (McCants and Watts 2012), many academic studies fail to even provide a definition (Nasser-Eddine et al. 2011). Although a few definitions exist, these academic definitions vary. Government definitions of CVE also vary and many countries do not even use the CVE terminology. Even in the U.S., government agencies lack a common definition of CVE.¹⁴

Khan (2015) provides the most comprehensive definition. She defines CVE as “the use of non-coercive means to dissuade individuals or groups from mobilizing towards violence and to mitigate recruitment, support, facilitation or engagement in ideologically motivated terrorism by non-state actors in furtherance of political objectives.” Other definitions vary based on the purpose and targets of CVE programs. Some definitions favor the prevention component of

¹⁴ For an outline of the various U.S. government definitions of CVE see, Challgren et al. 2016.

CVE,¹⁵ and others emphasize CVE's focus on terrorist groups.¹⁶ A common thread amongst some definitions is the non-coercive element of CVE programming as demonstrated in this definition by Selim (2016) who defines CVE as "a collection of noncoercive, nonkinetic, and, most importantly, voluntary activities to prevent and intervene in the process of radicalization to violence."

A lack of a clear definition of CVE contributes to the blurred distinction between CVE and other fields such as development, democratization (Heydemann 2014), and social cohesion efforts (Lindekilde 2014; Harris-Hogan, Barrelle and Zammit 2016). One way that scholars have attempted to distinguish CVE from other fields is by referring to CVE-relevant versus CVE-specific programming. Romaniuk (2015) argues that CVE-specific measures are "measures that prevent or suppress violent extremism in a direct, targeted fashion," and CVE-relevant measures are broader in scope and attempt to indirectly reduce vulnerability to extremism (Romaniuk 2015, 9). However, in practice, a consensus around a common set of measures to prevent or suppress violent extremism does not exist, which complicates any attempts to differentiate CVE-relevant from CVE-specific programming.

Given the lack of a consensus around the term CVE, I put forth my own definition of CVE. I define CVE as a collection of non-punitive policies and programs that aim to either prevent violent extremism and disrupt an individual or group's reliance on violent extremism by attempting to address the root causes of violent extremism. This definition encompasses the

¹⁵ See, for example Williams, Horgan, and Evans (2015) who use the White House's definition to define CVE as a "preventative approach to counterterrorism: an approach intended to preclude individuals from engaging in, or materially supporting, ideologically motivated violence."

¹⁶ For example, McCants and Watts (2012) define CVE as an effort to reduce the number of terrorist group supporters through non-coercive means.

variety of CVE programs that exist and emphasizes the non-punitive element of CVE, which is what differentiates CVE from ‘hard approaches’ to counterterrorism.

In practice, there are four main components that practitioners and scholars typically associate with CVE: prevention, intervention, deradicalization, and disengagement. Each component can include a variety of different programs that operate in the non-criminal or criminal spaces of public policy.

2.3.1 Four Components

Treating radicalization as a process requires a different toolkit from the standard military-type tactics used to counter terrorism. Unlike traditional counterterrorism tactics, the CVE toolkit includes tools to respond to both individuals who have committed a crime and those who have not. For counterterrorism, the relationship between an individual and the law determines what tools are used, when and against whom. Legislation creates and defines four spheres of operation based on four types of individuals: law followers, law fence-sitters, lawbreakers, and former lawbreakers. Law followers refer to everyday citizens who abide by the law. Law fence-sitters are individuals who have not yet committed a crime but may be considering doing so. Lawbreakers are the individuals who have crossed the legal line and have committed a crime. Finally, former lawbreakers are individuals who have previously committed a crime and are not interested in committing future crimes.

Traditional counterterrorism tools are designed to address and respond to lawbreakers, but CVE can operate and is designed to operate, in all four spheres. Prevention and intervention policies operate within the non-criminal space, meaning these policies target individuals who

have not yet carried out a crime. Prevention programming aims to ensure that law followers remain law followers and intervention programming is designed to prevent law fence-sitters from becoming lawbreakers. Once individuals cross the legal threshold and commit a crime, deradicalization and disengagement programming are designed to assist the transition of lawbreakers into former lawbreakers. The table below categorizes these four components based on the space that they operate in, either the non-criminal or criminal space, and whether or not program recipients are typically individuals or groups.

Table 2.1: Different Categories of CVE Programming

Program Recipients	Legal Sphere of Operation	
	Non-criminal space	Criminal space
Individuals	<i>Intervention</i>	<i>Deradicalization, Disengagement</i>
Groups	<i>Intervention, Prevention</i>	<i>Deradicalization, Disengagement</i>

Prevention programs focus on preventing violent extremism by attempting to address the possible root causes of violent extremism (El-Said and Harrigan 2012). These types of programs are broad in scope and subsequently target a community¹⁷ or a large segment of the population, such as the youth, rather than a single individual (Vidino and Brandon 2012). Since these initiatives target the possible root causes of violent extremism, and as the current literature has identified that there are many different possible root causes,¹⁸ these initiatives can include a variety of different programs. Social and economic welfare programs, afterschool activities, inter-faith dialogue sessions, community outreach and engagement activities can all theoretically be used to prevent violent extremism. The content of the programs is consequently dependent on

¹⁷ For a discussion on the use of the term community within the CVE field, please see Spalek, McDonald and El Awa, 2011.

¹⁸ See, for example, Borum (2011).

the preferences of the designer. For example, the Active Change Foundation is a non-profit organization located in East London that includes a youth community center. Based on his personal experience of being recruited to join Al Qaeda, the center's founder, Hanif Qadir, believes that the youth are particularly susceptible to the recruitment efforts of groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS. Aware of recruitment efforts in his neighborhood, Qadir believes that the youth need a space to talk about their grievances and a safe place to go after school to hang out with their friends. For these reasons, the purpose of the center is to prevent violent extremism by offering youth alternatives through after-school activities, mentoring, and sports.¹⁹

Intervention programs, on the other hand, can target both individuals and groups. However, similar to prevention policies, interventions also operate within the non-criminal space. Interventions assist law fence-sitters by offering these individuals an off-ramp. Unlike prevention programs, interventions can be customized to meet the needs of individual clients. Intervention programs often offer mental health services or social services, depending on the case, to an at-risk individual or a collective group. Although these programs are more common in Europe, intervention programming is slowly starting to gain momentum in the United States. For example, in Florida, Nezar Hamze, a Broward County Sheriff and director at the Florida chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations, helped develop an intervention crisis program. As explained by Hamze, the team is composed of volunteer professionals who are mental health professionals, social workers, legal representatives and law enforcement. The team is activated if a community member or professional recognizes and refers an individual to the program who may be going down the wrong path. The team acts as a mobile intervention unit. Currently, there are three active teams operating in south Florida, central Florida, and north central Florida. If the

¹⁹ Hanif Qadir, Director and Founder of the Active Change Foundation, personal communication, London, UK, January 16, 2016.

referred individual agrees to participate in the program, the team meets and determines what services, if any, the referred individual may need access to in an effort to help provide that individual an off-ramp.²⁰

Instead of operating within the non-criminal space, deradicalization and disengagement programs work within the criminal space. Although scholars often conflate the two terms, the terms refer to different processes. Individuals can disengage from violent extremist groups for a variety of reasons (Bjørgero and Horgan 2009). Disengagement initiatives attempt to convince individuals to leave terrorist groups or stop supporting terrorism. Deradicalization initiatives, on the other hand, go a step further and aim to “deradicalize” an individual or to convince an individual to change his or her “extremist” views. Typically, programs that operate within the criminal space include both components, but this may not always be the case. Disengagement programs also often include a rehabilitation component that can include counseling, family involvement, vocational training and assistance with reintegrating into society (Rubin, Gunaratna and Jerard 2011). For example, Life After Hate, a U.S. based program, assists individuals with disengaging from far-right extremist groups by providing their clients with counseling, mentoring, and other services.²¹ Outside of the U.S., Saudi Arabia’s CVE programming is most known for its prison-based deradicalization program that subjects inmates to ideological counseling to help individuals deradicalize (Boucek 2008).

²⁰ Nezar Hamze, Director of Florida chapter of Council on American-Islamic Relations, personal communication, August 11, 2016.

²¹ Angela King, co-founder of Life After Hate, personal communication, Washington, D.C., December 14, 2015.

2.4 Different Approaches to CVE

As with all public policies, there are different approaches policymakers can take to reach policy objectives, and CVE is no different. Two approaches that are gaining traction amongst practitioners and policymakers include a community-led and a public health approach to CVE. Other approaches include driver-specific approaches to CVE. Since there are a variety of reasons why an individual may join or support a terrorist group, some practitioners develop programs to address only one potential driver rather than developing programs that attempt to address multiple drivers of violent extremism. Below I explain the variety of different approaches to CVE.

2.4.1 Community-led Approach

Although law enforcement and federal agencies are normally the most likely to respond to the terrorist-threat, communities can also be a valued asset. As argued by Spalek and Weeks (2017), communities often have the credibility and capacity to monitor and respond to high-risk individuals. Huq (2017) further outlines two possible mechanisms through which communities can respond to the terrorist threat. First, communities can compete with terrorist organizations by offering substitute forms of social solidarity which can decrease the appeal of joining an organization. Second, communities can also reinforce ethical norms through persuasion or social sanction to increase the social costs associated with joining a terrorist organization. Besides these two mechanisms, communities also know how to allocate resources more effectively and efficiently than external actors since community stakeholders operate within their communities

and are aware of community needs (Harris-Hogan, Barrelle and Zammit 2016). Finally, communities may also be the best equipped to see the signs of radicalization (Grossman 2015; Mirahmadi 2016; Spalek and Weeks 2017; Williams, Horgan and Evans 2016) since family and friends are often aware of the intentions of violent actors (Gill, Horgan and Deckert 2014).

With this in mind, rather than the government taking the lead on CVE efforts, some countries have opted for communities to design and implement their own CVE programs. As part of a community-led approach, communities choose what community stakeholders are involved and what programs to implement, meaning that communities design their own CVE policies and programs. Countries such as the United States have promoted a community-led CVE approach, which will be the focus of this dissertation.

Although a community-led approach allows community stakeholders to take ownership of their programming that responds to local needs, there are costs to the strategy. As this dissertation will show, few stakeholders at the community level actually know how to develop and implement CVE programs. Moreover, stakeholders may not even be aware of CVE, which creates a challenge for an approach that requires stakeholder participation. Schanzer et al. (2016) surveyed U.S. law enforcement's degree of knowledge of CVE and found that only 57.6% of police agencies were familiar with the federal government's CVE national strategy. The public is even more unaware of CVE programming. In an April 2016 survey of 477 U.S. citizens 18 years of age and older on Amazon's Mechanical Turk,²² only 32.91% of the respondents had previously heard about CVE efforts.²³ To complicate matters, the public is split on whether community organizations should even be involved in efforts to curb violent extremism. In

²² Demographic statistics of this survey can be found in Appendix A.

²³ Of those that have heard of CVE before, respondents indicated that they heard of CVE through news stations and radio stations such as the National Public Radio. One individual, a police officer, heard of CVE from a commanding officer. No one had direct experience with CVE programs.

another survey of 68 respondents in Anaheim, CA,²⁴ when asked how CVE programs should be implemented, approximately 39.92% of respondents stated that government and law enforcement should address the issue alone, 9.23% stated that community organizations and the public should address the issue alone, and 38.46% of respondents felt that a public-community partnership is the best way to address the problem of violent extremism.

2.4.2 Public Health “Approach”

Derived from the public health classification system of disease prevention, another approach to CVE is the “public health approach.” The public health classification system outlines three levels of practice in disease prevention: primary, secondary, and tertiary (Simeonsson 1991). Primary prevention attempts to reduce the number of new cases of a disease, secondary intervention seeks to decrease the prevalence of the disease amongst those at risk, and tertiary intervention seeks to decrease the effects associated with an existing disease (Mrazek and Haggerty 1994). Together, these three areas of practice provide the basis for the CVE public health framework.

Existing CVE programs can clearly map onto the public health framework. Prevention programs, which are designed to target a large group of people, are most closely associated with primary prevention. Intervention programs fall under secondary intervention, and disengagement and deradicalization programming fall under tertiary interventions. As such, the public health approach to CVE is a form of categorization that adds additional terminology to the study of CVE, rather than an entirely “new” approach.

²⁴ Demographic statistics of this survey can be found in Appendix A.

Similar to a community-led approach, there are both possible costs and benefits associated with a public health approach to CVE. On the one hand, framing CVE in terms of the public health approach can potentially expand the opportunity for funding for CVE programming by providing access to funding within the medical field. The public health approach also helps justify the need for a holistic approach to CVE and the involvement of medical practitioners in the CVE realm. Weine et al. (2017) even argue that the public health approach will decrease public criticism, however, it is unclear that this is the case and whether this approach helps direct the field in a new direction. On the other hand, the approach is also risky. Intentionally or not, the public health framework securitizes the public health sector and can jeopardize ethical and legal guidelines that are put into place in the medical field to protect the confidentiality of treatment (Speckhard 2016). The approach also risks giving the false impression that mental health is always related to terrorism when we know from research that this is not the case (Gill and Corner 2017). Nonetheless, practitioners and scholars, especially within psychology, are increasingly using this terminology and promoting such an “approach” in the United States (e.g., Challgren et al. 2016; Weine et al. 2009; Weine and Eisenman 2016) and other countries as well (Bjørge 2013; Harris-Hogan, Barrelle, and Zammit 2016).

2.4.3 Single Driver Approaches and Ad Hoc Programming

Since individuals may radicalize for different reasons, practitioners can adjust the content of CVE programs to address different possible drivers of violent extremism. For example, Saudi Arabia’s CVE Counseling program is based on a socioeconomic approach and it is designed to address the basic needs of a client by providing clients with employment, housing, and

transportation (Boucek 2008). Other models prioritize different perceived drivers for radicalization. In Yemen, the Religious Dialogue Committee is a religious-led approach where religious leaders offer counseling services and promote dialogue with inmates regarding religion (El-Said and Harrigan 2013). The risk associated with a single-driver approach is that the content of the programming may not help everyone since individuals radicalize for different reasons. Although single driver approaches exist, the field is moving towards more individualized CVE programming that alters the content of CVE programs based on the needs of the client rather than a pre-determined perceived driver.


Similar to single-driver approaches to CVE, often only one type of CVE program will exist within a community. Take Alameda, California for instance. The Alameda County Sheriff's Office is currently developing a rehabilitation program, Operation E Pluribus Unum, for inmates in Alameda County jails who are at risk for returning to violent extremism. The purpose of the program is to decrease the risks of recidivism and radicalization amongst this sub-set of the population.²⁵ However, Alameda lacks a holistic approach to CVE. While this ad hoc program has the ability to decrease recidivism, Alameda does not have other types of CVE programming to help individuals from entering the justice system as a result of violent extremism. That said, there are benefits to ad hoc programming. As this dissertation will show, single programs that do not require collaboration are easier to develop and implement compared to holistic CVE strategies. Additionally, the public can prefer certain types of programs over others. For example, in the Amazon Mechanical Turk survey of 477 respondents mentioned previously, respondents were asked their degree of approval of different types of CVE programs.²⁶ As the

²⁵ Source: Alameda County Sheriff's Office Application for the Fiscal Year 2016 Countering Violent Extremism Grants.

²⁶ The main activities that are typically associated with CVE are as follows: community policing; community engagement activities; after-school youth activities; religious training by religious scholars; interventions; CVE

results in Chart 2.1 show, approval of CVE varies by type of activity. While the majority of respondents approve of CVE to some degree for most of the activities, respondents were less supportive of religious training by religious leaders and intervention programs. Programs such as after-school activities for the youth were approved of to some degree by around 81% of respondents. These results are followed close behind by respondents' approval to some degree of community engagement activities at around 80%. Given the public's preferences for certain types of CVE programs, a single ad hoc program may make more sense in certain communities.

Chart 2.1 Public Support of CVE by Activity



efforts online; and disengagement programs. All of these activities were included in the survey question. To give respondents more information about CVE efforts and to understand approval rates by type, respondents were asked to indicate whether they approved or disapproved of these efforts individually.

2.5 Targets of CVE Programming

An assumption amongst critical studies of CVE and opponents of CVE is that CVE programming is developed for and only targets Islamic violent extremism, and therefore only operates within Muslim communities. Indeed, there are good reasons for such suspicion of CVE programs. In the early days of CVE following the 9/11 attacks and attacks in Europe, Western governments openly prioritized countering the threat from Islamic violent extremism. In the U.S., this was seen in the national counterterrorism strategies under both the Bush and Obama administrations. In an extreme case, the U.K. government openly allocated CVE funding based on the population densities of Muslim communities.²⁷ Because of this prioritization, outreach activities tended to target Muslim communities, which reflected the prioritization of Islamic violent extremism, but also created the misperception that CVE is only for Muslim communities.

However, the prioritization of countering Islamic violent extremism does not mean that CVE programming can, should, and does only attempt to prevent Islamic violent extremism. There is nothing inherent to the concept of CVE to imply that CVE will only be effective against Islamic violent extremism versus other forms of violent extremism. As will be discussed in the next chapter, CVE strategies and programs have evolved to counter all forms of violent extremism. Moreover, the latest trend in CVE, as is the case in the United States, is for communities to develop and implement CVE programming. The use of the term ‘community’ in official CVE communications is always intentionally left undefined. Although an assumption is that the term refers to Muslim communities, in the U.S., it is left up to local actors to define the community. As will be shown in forthcoming chapters, in some areas, local actors have defined

²⁷ Anonymous Home Office employee, personal communication, London, UK, January 2016

community as a reference to the local Muslim community, as the case in Houston, Texas, while in other areas, community is broadly defined and is more closely associated with a geographic region as the case in the Greater Los Angeles, California Region. Thus, the targets of CVE programming vary tremendously not just across countries, but also sub-nationally.

2.6 Who is Involved?

Altogether, there are four types of actors who can potentially develop and implement CVE programs: individuals, organizations, governments, and joint collaborations, which I refer to as CVE governance networks. In some cases, individual citizens take the initiative to counter violent extremism. An example is the story of Abdirizak Bihi. Bihi is a Minneapolis resident nicknamed "Super Somali." In the past three years, at least 25 people have joined Al-Shabab from Minneapolis, one of whom was Bihi's nephew. In an effort to counter the recruitment efforts of Al-Shabab, Bihi created the Somali Education and Special Advocacy Center that works to prevent individuals from joining extremist groups like Al-Shabaab (Saslow 2011).

Organizations can also implement CVE programs. There are many different organizations worldwide that conduct CVE-related work, including for-profit, non-profit, and religious-based organizations. *Unite 4 Justice* located in Victoria, Australia is one such organization. The organization created a multicultural youth center where staff members educate the youth about other cultures in an effort to prevent stigmatization, a possible root-cause of violent extremism. For-profit technology companies such as Google's Jigsaw are also increasingly involved in CVE efforts to curb online radicalization. Jigsaw recently created a program called the Redirect Method, which places advertising alongside any keyword searches

that Jigsaw has determined to be associated with common keyword searches conducted by ISIS supporters (Greenberg 2016). Religious-based organizations are also involved, such as the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC) in the United States who created a CVE initiative titled Safe Spaces to curb violent extremism.²⁸

The most well-known actor that participates in CVE efforts is the government. Whether at the local, state, federal or central government level, the government can play a significant role in the CVE realm. On January 15, 2016, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon acknowledged the critical role of the state in countering violent extremism by calling on the Member States to develop multidisciplinary national action plans that counter violent extremism by addressing the local drivers of violent extremism.²⁹ As of 2017, at least 27 states have established a national CVE action plan. Even without a national action plan, national CVE programs exist in other countries as well, as is the case in countries such as Panama and Egypt.³⁰

In light of this, states have increasingly realized that due to the magnitude and complexity of the problem of radicalization, states cannot counter the threat alone. Government officials and CVE practitioners believe that tasking communities to play a role in organizing and implementing CVE plans will increase the chances that these efforts will successfully prevent radicalization (Briggs 2010). This has led to the emergence of the fourth type of actor, CVE governance networks. I define a CVE governance network as a network consisting of two or

²⁸ For more information, see, <https://www.mpac.org/safespaces/>

²⁹ See, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) Plan of Action, Available at: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/674

³⁰ The following states have a national CVE action plan: Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, Australia, Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Kosovo, The Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Serbia, Spain, the United Kingdom, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Canada, and the United States. Information regarding the presence of a national action plan within a country was culled from the State Department's Annual Reports on Terrorism available at: <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2016/272234.htm>

more local public and private stakeholders in which the purpose of stakeholder involvement in the network is to help develop and potentially implement a CVE plan.

CVE networks vary in terms of size, composition, formality, and structure. Some networks are large consisting of stakeholders from a variety of agencies and community-based organizations and other networks are much smaller. CVE networks can also be either formal or informal, and centralized or a decentralized. A centralized network is one where a local stakeholder serves as the center of expertise and manages the policymaking process. Although centralized, as a network, other network members are still able to help develop and implement the CVE programming. A decentralized network is one where decision-making and the management of the policymaking are dispersed equally amongst all members. My focus in this dissertation is on CVE governance networks.

2.7 Why CVE?

Counterterrorism is commonly associated with the investigation, prosecution, and imprisonment of individuals who have either acted or intended to act using terrorism. However, arresting and prosecuting individuals for terrorism does not prevent other individuals from radicalizing (Selim 2016). As Innes, Roberts and Lowe (2017) have found, it is also difficult for law enforcement to secure a sufficient amount of evidence to warrant and support a legal prosecution related to terrorism. In an arrest-based model insufficient evidence can prevent law enforcement from taking action, which is the reason why law enforcement did not prosecute Omar Mateen prior to the Orlando nightclub massacre in 2016 when Mateen shot and killed 49 people. The case of Mateen shows that law enforcements' inability to secure a sufficient amount of evidence can sometimes be deadly (Goldman, Zapotosky and Berman 2016). In this regard, governments and

frontline stakeholders began to view traditional measures to counter terrorism such as the use of military and intelligence as necessary but insufficient to effectively counter terrorism (Cohen 2016; Crelinsten 2014). Since there is a high threshold for prosecution, CVE programming is an attractive alternative to the justice model that can potentially save lives by enabling stakeholders to take non-punitive action to intervene without relying solely on prosecution. Subsequently, scholars and policymakers identified the need for a holistic counterterrorism strategy with multifaceted programming to address the root causes of violent extremism. The concept of CVE offers policymakers the needed tools to establish such a strategy.

CVE programming also provides communities with different options to counter violent extremism. CVE programming in some cases allows practitioners to use their personal knowledge of their clients to create tailored programming. Individuals radicalize for a variety of different reasons (Borum 2011). One individual may do so because a close friend joined a group, while another individual may join a terrorist group for ideological reasons. However, practitioners can tailor CVE programs to address the specific needs of an individual to either prevent the individual from ever joining a group or assisting an individual from disengaging from a terrorist group. The individualized programming is a benefit unique to CVE compared to alternative counterterrorism approaches.

Finally, CVE programming can be used to educate the community about the dangers of violent extremism and options available for community members to use for assistance. According to an FBI report, family members see signs of radicalization in more than 50% of terrorist cases, but few family members report these cases.³¹ Educational outreach CVE programs can provide information to community members on the programs available in their

³¹ Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Subcommittee. "Interim Report and Recommendations." June 2016. Accessed March 31, 2018 available at: <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/August%202017.pdf>

communities that are designed to assist individuals who may be radicalizing. Education and the availability of alternative programs to assist radicalized individuals may increase the likelihood that community members will alert authorities and prevent the use of violence.

2.8 Why Not CVE?

Despite the potential benefits of CVE programming, concerns regarding CVE also exist. Several legitimate concerns have emerged globally amongst academics, policymakers, practitioners, and leading civil rights and civil liberties organizations regarding CVE programming. One of the main concerns with CVE is that these programs target, either directly or indirectly, Muslim communities. Scholars argue that the targeting of Muslims creates what is termed, ‘suspect communities’ (Vermedulen 2014). Scholars also argue that this can lead to discrimination (Mythen, Walklate and Khan 2009) and the stigmatization of Muslim communities (Kundnani 2009).

Others view CVE as a means for the government to gather intelligence on certain communities (Thomas 2010). In the United States, this is a sensitive topic given the federal law enforcement’s history of targeting Muslim communities and the use of informants to convict individuals on terrorism charges (Nguyen 2005). Scholars and leading civil rights and civil liberties organizations such as the Brennan Center for Justice have subsequently raised concerns that CVE programming has the potential to mix community outreach initiatives with intelligence-gathering efforts (Price 2015).

As found in countries such as Australia, intelligence-gathering has fueled distrust amongst the Muslim communities and law enforcement, which has complicated partnership efforts (Cherney and Hartley 2017). However, amongst those who do partner with the

government, scholars argue that these organizations can experience a loss of credibility. For instance, Chowdhury and Krebs (2009) found that in India and Spain, moderate Muslims lost credibility within their communities when the government attempted to promote their causes. The potential loss of credibility has also led organizations in the United States to reject government CVE funds under the Trump administration (Wang 2017).³²

Others argue that CVE programming is simply not needed since terrorism is not a widespread problem. Scholars argue that the terrorism threat is often exaggerated by the government, which can lead to unnecessary counterterrorism measures (Brooks 2012). Some evidence suggests that community members also agree. As found by Weine (2015) in Los Angeles amongst 100 Muslim community members, violent extremism is often not in the top tier of problems identified by Muslim community members. I found a similar situation in Anaheim, CA. In the survey of 68 respondents mentioned previously, 26.67% of respondents thought that violent extremism was a major problem while 35% thought it was a minor problem and 21.67% thought that violent extremism was not a problem at all within their community. As demonstrated in Table 2.2, respondents were more concerned with other problems such as homelessness and crime.

Table 2.2 Percentage of Respondents by Topic Area

	Major Problem	Minor Problem	Not a Problem	Don't Know
Violent Extremism	26.67	35	21.67	16.67
Crime	49.18	39.34	3.28	8.20
Racial Profiling	55	26.67	13.33	5
Homelessness	88.52	9.84	0	1.64
Unemployment	34.43	44.26	9.84	11.48

³² Thus far, four organizations have rejected funds upwards of \$500,000 to implement CVE programs. These organizations include: Ka Joog, Claremont School of Theology, Unity Productions Foundation, and Leaders Advancing and Helping Communities.

There is also a lack of evidence that CVE programming is effective. In a review of the CVE literature, Mastroe and Szmania (2016) found that the majority of the current CVE literature does not include program evaluation data. Moreover, the program evaluations that do exist do not include rigorous empirical designs to establish causality. This lack of evidence has prevented scholars from justifying the use of CVE programming from an empirical standpoint. The lack of empirical evaluation studies on CVE is fueled by a multitude of factors including lack of funding, difficulty in identifying outcome measures to study, and the lack of transparency regarding CVE programming. For instance, in a letter from academics to the U.K. government with more than 140 signatures, academics also expressed concerns regarding the lack of transparency regarding the U.K. CVE strategy, known as *Prevent*, which has barred scholars from properly evaluating the strategy (Ross 2016).

CVE programming largely depends on the actions of community members, which can lead to two additional issues. First, community members need to be willing to speak up and say something if they notice signs that an individual may be heading down the wrong path. Intervention programs offer community members an alternative to reporting an individual to law enforcement. However, it is unclear whether or not community members will use this resource. For instance, in a recent study in the United Kingdom of 66 individuals from both Muslim and white British communities, respondents reported that they would prefer to report individuals to police rather than counterterrorist specialists. Moreover, these respondents stated that they did not understand how the reporting system worked and what choices are available (Thomas et al. 2017). Second, if a CVE program attempts to prevent an individual from committing a violent act and fails, CVE practitioners are concerned that they can then potentially be blamed for the

attack. CVE programming then places a large amount of responsibility on CVE practitioners, a responsibility that some practitioners may not want to have.

Finally, some argue that CVE does not go far enough to counter terrorism. In a letter to Jeh Johnson the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Representative for Texas's 10th congressional district, Michael McCaul complained that CVE programming was a "politically-correct approach to the threat." McCaul criticized CVE programs that attempt to target all forms of violent extremism as "dangerously broad."³³ Altogether, there are many concerns and a great deal of uncertainty regarding CVE programming, which complicates the CVE policymaking process. These concerns should be taken seriously since public opinion has traditionally played a significant role in the passage of domestic counterterrorism policies within the United States (Domke et al. 2006; Grandy 2003; Mueller 2009).

2.9 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have outlined the fundamentals of CVE programming to begin to fill the gaps in the literature on what programs and policies are associated with the term CVE. Since the concept is rarely defined within the literature, I started with providing a basic definition of the concept. I define CVE as a collection of non-punitive policies and programs that aim to either prevent violent extremism and/or disrupt an individual or group's reliance on violent extremism by attempting to address the root causes of violent extremism. As discussed, CVE programming is most often associated with four types of programming, including prevention, intervention,

³³ Source: Letter to Secretary Jeh Johnson from Michael McCaul, July 7, 2016. Accessed March 26, 2018 from <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/August%202017.pdf>

deradicalization, and disengagement programming. While a variety of actors implement CVE programs including the government, organizations, and everyday citizens, the focus of this dissertation is on the implementation of CVE programs by governance networks.

This chapter also shows how CVE initiatives are unique from other types of policy initiatives. Although CVE programming offers practitioners flexible, multifaceted options beyond the traditional counterterrorism toolkit, many concerns about CVE remain including CVE's impact on Muslim communities. Despite government efforts to promote CVE as an initiative that can target all forms of violent extremism, the history of the concept in the United States and Europe and the past focus on Muslim communities has made CVE controversial. Moreover, there is a lack of research on CVE programming and consequently it is unknown whether CVE programming is effective in reducing violent extremism or if CVE actually does more harm than good. The uncertainty around the effectiveness of CVE programming, the controversial nature of the concept of CVE and the involvement of stakeholders from a variety of disciplines and job sectors makes CVE unique from other policy initiatives. Because of this, the mobilization of organizations and communities around CVE and the development and implementation of CVE programming are not guaranteed. As the U.S. government has learned, CVE is challenging to implement, yet, the expectations for the potential benefits of CVE remain high. The remaining chapters closely examine the CVE policymaking process at the national and local levels to provide a deeper understanding and explanation of the varying responses to CVE.

CHAPTER 3

CVE IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

3.1 Introduction

The undiscussed Achilles heel of CVE in the United States is that CVE programs are *rare*. But why are CVE programs in the United States rare? Are other countries facing similar problems with implementation? Moreover, why are some communities able to form networks and implement CVE plans while others choose not to or attempt to, but fail? To answer these questions, in this chapter, I compare the U.S. experience to the United Kingdom, a first mover in CVE programming. The United Kingdom has had greater success in terms of implementing what I call CVE plans, so I conduct a comparative analysis of the national strategies to theorize why this is the case.

These two countries share important similarities. Both countries face similar terrorist threats and in their response to these threats, both countries share similar policy objectives, targets of the policy, and types of programs that are implemented by governance networks. Moreover, both countries also face public opposition to CVE efforts. Yet, in-depth analysis of both CVE strategies reveals clear differences in approaches that may explain the divergent experiences with CVE. To identify the differences in approaches that may explain the variation in implementation, I use information gathered from interviews with government officials in both countries, practitioners, academics, and community leaders. I then triangulate this information with information collected from Freedom of Information Requests, declassified government documents, and other secondary sources to provide an overview of each country's national

strategy, the history of CVE, and any unique details in how each country implements its CVE strategy. I find that the political structures of the two countries contributed to differences in the CVE policymaking structures. I also find that the scope of CVE efforts, the availability of funding and the process of implementation also differ between the two cases.

3.2 Uncovering Implementation Results

In both countries, the governments have tasked local communities to develop what I term *CVE plans* to address the underlying causes of violent extremism. The plans are created by CVE governance networks, a conglomeration of multiple community stakeholders. Since CVE is an umbrella term that can refer to a multitude of non-punitive programs, CVE plans can include a variety of different programs. Some plans can include just one CVE program for practitioners to develop, while other plans may be more complex and include multiple programs. The content associated with the plans, thus, varies by locality.

In the U.S., local CVE governance networks develop and implement CVE plans. The networks are composed of stakeholders from the public, private, and non-profit sectors. Public stakeholders are primarily from the city-level government, although, some public stakeholders include locally designated federal employees from agencies such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or the Department of Justice (DOJ) U.S. Attorney. Stakeholders from the private and non-profit sectors commonly come from the Muslim communities located within the city or on the outskirts of a major city, depending on where the local Muslim populations reside. The local governance network develops a plan to be implemented primarily within a particular

jurisdiction, usually at the city or regional levels. However, only a few local governance networks have fully implemented the CVE plans that they developed.

Since the release of the national CVE strategy in the U.S. in 2011 until 2016, four cities or regions with CVE governance networks have implemented CVE plans. These are the Greater Los Angeles, CA Region; the Greater Minneapolis, MN and St. Paul, MN Region; Montgomery County, MD; and three related cases in Florida.³⁴ There are also additional cases of ad hoc CVE programs in the U.S.; although, these programs are also rare. Appendix B includes the methodology used to identify these cases and a list.

Contrary to the U.S. case, governance networks *embedded within* local authorities have widely implemented CVE efforts in the United Kingdom, known as *Prevent* projects.³⁵ As will be discussed later in the chapter, *Prevent* governance networks are structured differently than governance networks in the United States. In the U.K., the networks are composed primarily of public sector stakeholders from the local authority. Thus, CVE in the United Kingdom is centralized across England and Wales under the central government. Governance networks then create *Prevent* plans to be implemented within the local authority's jurisdiction, often by community-based organizations. Although data on CVE plans are difficult to obtain from the U.K. government,³⁶ I am able to approximate the number of plans that have been implemented by local CVE governance networks based on interviews and unclassified government documents. From 2011 to 2015, local authorities in England alone have implemented between 62 and 103 CVE plans. A description of the methodologies used to identify the approximate number of CVE plans in each country are included in Appendix B.

³⁴ As previously outlined in Chapter 2, three active intervention teams operate in south Florida, central Florida, and north central Florida.

³⁵ There are 353 local authorities in England and Wales.

³⁶ Due to national security concerns, the U.K. government generally keeps this information classified.

3.3 The United States and the United Kingdom as Comparative Cases

Why have governance networks in the United Kingdom been more successful than networks in the U.S. at implementing CVE plans? There are many possible reasonable explanations for the variation in implementation. Perhaps terrorism is not a problem in the United States. It could also be the case that governance networks in the U.S. develop overly ambitious CVE programs. Or maybe the public in the U.S. is more opposed to CVE programming. All of these factors may explain why the U.K. has been more successful. In what follows, I address these concerns by explaining the similarities among these potential explanatory factors.

3.3.1 Terrorist Threat

The most well-known terrorist threat that the United Kingdom faced during the twentieth century was from the Irish Republican Army (IRA). More recently, however, the United Kingdom has faced similar threats as the U.S. from groups such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS. Notable terrorist events include the deadly bombing campaign by the IRA in British pubs between October and November 1974 and the 2005 London Bombings. According to the *Global Terrorism Database*,³⁷ since 2001, the U.K. has experienced 765 terrorist events resulting in 83 fatalities and wounding 1044 individuals.

British citizens are also traveling from the United Kingdom to fight for terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq. Approximately 850 people have left the U.K. for these conflict zones, including

³⁷ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2017). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd>

200 Britons who have died overseas.³⁸ These individuals range in age and come from various parts of the United Kingdom. Potential fighters are recruited both virtually and in-person by recruiters. As of early 2017, the U.K. government has convicted 75 individuals for offenses relating to the conflicts in either Syria or Iraq.


The U.K. does face a real threat from terrorism, however so does the United States. Terrorism in the United States is highlighted by key events such as the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, September 11, 2001, attacks, and the Boston Marathon bombings. Perpetrators of plotted, failed, and successful attacks span the spectrum of violent extremism, from far-right extremism to radical Jihadist extremism. According to the *Global Terrorism Database*, since 2001, there have been approximately 308 terrorist incidents in the United States resulting in 3125 fatalities and at least 704 individuals wounded.³⁹ Using data from START's Terrorism and Extremist Violence in the United States (TEVUS) dataset,⁴⁰ the map below displays the locations of terrorism and violent extremism events in the U.S. since 2001.

³⁸ "Who are Britain's jihadists?" BBC News, 12 October 2017. Available at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-32026985>

³⁹ This statistic excludes the 9/11 attacks.

⁴⁰ The Terrorism and Extremist Violence in the United States (TEVUS) Database. Retrieved from <http://www.start.umd.edu/research-projects/terrorism-and-extremist-violence-united-states-tevus-database>

Figure 3.1: Terrorist Attacks in the United States since 2001



The U.S. experience with terrorism does not just include failed and successful attacks. Hundreds of foreign fighters have also left the U.S. to join foreign terrorist groups. Approximately 250 known Americans are known to have joined the conflicts in Syria and Iraq (Temple-Raston 2015). Besides fleeing the U.S. to support groups like ISIS, Americans have also joined other groups including Al-Shabaab, a terrorist group based in Somalia. Americans join the conflicts for various reasons after either “self-radicalizing” or radicalizing with the help of a recruiter—either virtually, through social media, or in person. Terrorist groups are known to recruit within the U.S., including groups such as Al-Shabaab that use face-to-face recruitment in cities such as Minneapolis (Southers and Hienz 2015).

3.3.2 Policy Objectives

Both countries also share similar policy objectives. In the U.S., the central policy objective of the CVE strategy is “to prevent violent extremists and their supporters from inspiring, radicalizing, financing, or recruiting individuals or groups in the United States to commit acts of violence.”⁴¹ In doing so, the strategy aims to create resilient communities.⁴² The U.K.’s policy objectives are uncannily similar. *Prevent* has five primary objectives:

to challenge the ideology behind violent extremism and support mainstream voices; disrupt those who promote violent extremism and support the places where they operate; support individuals who are vulnerable to recruitment or who have already been recruited by violent extremists; increase the resilience of communities to violent extremism; and address the grievances which ideologues are exploiting (Home Office 2009, 6).

Thus, both countries, at a strategic level, are attempting to do similar things. It is not the case that the policy objectives of one country are easier to implement than the other. Instead, both countries are trying to prevent violent extremism by addressing the root causes of violent extremism and promoting resilient communities.

⁴¹ “Empowering local partners to prevent violent extremism in the United States.” White House, US Government, August 2011, p. 3. Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/empowering_local_partners.pdf

⁴² Resilient communities are “those where violent extremists routinely meet disinterest and opposition and where recruitment attempt regularly fail. Such communities know what tools and support are available to assist individuals that may be on a path towards violence.” Strategic Implementation Plan, pgs: 1-2. Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2016_strategic_implementation_plan_empowering_local_partners_prev.pdf

3.3.3 Programs

Similar to the policy objectives, both countries aim to achieve those objectives using similar methods. As mentioned in a previous chapter, CVE initiatives include four main areas: prevention, intervention, deradicalization and disengagement efforts. In both the U.S. and the U.K., CVE programs implemented by local governance networks primarily include prevention and intervention programs.

In the U.K., *Prevent* projects include both prevention and intervention efforts. The prevention efforts attempt to prevent individuals from either engaging in terrorism or supporting terrorism. For example, the 261 projects from the Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund, a government fund dedicated to *Prevent* and dispersed to local governments, ranged from a focus on sports (34 projects) to projects that involved debate, discussion or forum (141 projects).⁴³ Projects involving children services and community safety initiatives each made up around a fifth of the total projects, and community engagement initiatives made up around a quarter of projects. The projects themselves ranged from one-day events to 12 months or more. Around 41% of the projects were between six and eleven months in duration (Department for Communities and Local Government 2008).

In addition to prevention work, the U.K. also has an intervention program, titled Channel. This program, which was first piloted in 2007 and still exists today, is a multi-agency intervention program that offers potential at-risk individuals a tailored support system within the non-criminal space (HM Government 2015). Community members, statutory agencies, or other

⁴³ Other projects included a focus on: general education (85), leadership (70), training (non-accredited) (68); arts/cultural (49); training (accredited) (30); other (34).

actors can make referrals of individuals deemed to be vulnerable to terrorism (Home Office 2009). Once referred to Channel, the case goes directly to the police to determine whether the individual is involved in a current investigation. Because Channel operates within the non-criminal space, if the individual is under investigation, the process stops, but if the person is not, the process continues. From there, a Channel panel⁴⁴ assesses the case to determine the suitability of the case for the Channel program based on a vulnerability assessment framework focused on engagement, intent, and capability. After the panel conducts an initial assessment and the case is deemed to be suitable for the panel, the referred individual can either accept or decline the offer of assistance. If accepted, a multi-agency panel develops a support system that normally includes services such as mentoring and counseling, theological guidance, educational guidance, and efforts to encourage civic engagement (HM Government 2015).

CVE plans⁴⁵ developed in the U.S. mimic programs in the United Kingdom. For example, the Los Angeles CVE action plan includes both prevention and intervention components. On the prevention side, the prevention programs aim to expand community engagement through community policing, inter-faith events, workshops, young-adult engagement and leadership programs. The LA plan also included a proposed intervention model, although, the local governance network left out the specifics of the model.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ A Channel Panel is required to be chaired by the responsible local authority. The panel can consist of a variety of different actors depending on the case. These actors may include the NHS, schools, social workers, youth offending services, local statutory agencies for children and adult services, and other statutory agencies (HM Government 2015).

⁴⁵ The details of these plans will be reviewed in later chapters.

⁴⁶ Source: Los Angeles Interagency Coordination Group in Collaboration with Community Stakeholders, “The Los Angeles Framework for Countering Violent Extremism” February 2015. Available at: <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Los%20Angeles%20Framework%20for%20CVE-Full%20Report.pdf>

3.3.4 Target Communities

Both countries also have experienced a similar shift in regard to the target communities for CVE efforts. In the early years of CVE, both countries primarily focused on Muslim communities. Since then, both countries have expanded their reach for CVE programs to include programs that address threats from a variety of groups across the ideological spectrum, including far-right extremism.

Starting under the Bush administration, CVE efforts in the U.S. primarily targeted Muslim communities. In the early days of CVE in the U.S., Secretary Chertoff of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) met with American Muslims to discuss ways to promote civic engagement and prevent violent radicalization. At the same time, U.S. government officials (USGO) from the DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties consulted with Muslim American community leaders and experts on what terminology to use when referring to groups such as Al-Qaeda and methods to counter these groups. USGO expressed concern that certain terminology could potentially isolate Muslim Americans. As such, USGO sought recommendations from community leaders and scholars.⁴⁷

U.S. policymakers first adopted the term ‘Countering Violent Islamist Extremism’ (CVIE) to refer to the efforts to address the root causes of terrorism.⁴⁸ At the time, other terms were considered, including the U.K.’s term ‘Prevent.’ USGO chose the term CVIE because it

⁴⁷ “Terminology to Define the Terrorists: Recommendations from American Muslims,” *Department of Homeland Security, Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties*, January 2008.

⁴⁸ The author can trace the term back as early as 2008. Please see, U.S. Congress, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs United States Senate, *The Roots of Violent Islamist Extremism and Efforts to Counter It*, 110th Cong., 2d sess., 2008, Committee Print 110-942.

accurately portrayed what the programs aimed to accomplish, to prevent violent Islamic extremism. However, once President Obama entered office, the “I” was dropped, and these efforts became known as CVE.⁴⁹

Even though the Obama administration dropped the “I” from CVIE, Muslim communities remained the priority target for CVE programs in the early years of CVE efforts. Although the 2011 U.S. national CVE strategy, entitled *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*, outlined the need to prevent all forms of extremism, the threat from Islamic violent extremism was the primary concern for the administration. This was reflected in the early years of CVE in which community outreach efforts primarily targeted Muslim communities (Selim 2016). That said, since then, some local communities have expanded their programs to address a variety of forms of violent extremism. For instance, in the Greater Boston Region—a region that developed a CVE plan—the plan specifically outlined that it applied to all forms of violent extremism (Boston Regional Collaborative 2015).

Similar to the U.S. case, CVE efforts in the United Kingdom began with a sole focus on Muslim communities but expanded afterward. In the early years of *Prevent*, the initiative prioritized efforts against groups such as Al Qaeda. For example, local authorities were previously given funding from the U.K. government for *Prevent* initiatives based on population statistics of Muslims living in the United Kingdom. The areas with a more significant percentage of Muslims received more substantial sums of funding for the implementation of *Prevent* (Kundnani 2009). Since then, the allocation of funding has been changed to reflect terrorist risk rather than population statistics. Moreover, local authorities have incorporated *Prevent* projects within their plans to target other forms of extremism, such as far-right extremism.

⁴⁹ Correspondence with U.S. government official, November 2016.

3.3.5 Opposition to CVE Efforts

Both countries also face public opposition to CVE programming. Interviews with vocal opponents of the CVE programs revealed similar concerns amongst CVE opponents. Interviews with Muslim community leaders in both countries and an analysis of previous studies revealed that the focus on Muslim communities is a source of public backlash toward CVE efforts in both countries. Interviewees from both countries also expressed concern that the government uses CVE programs for intelligence-gathering purposes.

One vocal opponent of CVE in the U.S. is the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), specifically the CAIR-Los Angeles Chapter. In an interview with CAIR's previous Public Affairs Coordinator, several concerns about CVE were mentioned. CAIR opposes the focus and targeting on Muslim-American communities. Terrorism is a low incidence event, and although a concern, the organization feels that with limited resources, there are other important issues such as gun violence that the government overlooks. The organization is also concerned about the unintended consequences of CVE programming on community dynamics. Individuals may report each other to local officials for political reasons, or because some hold different interpretations of Islam, which can put one community member at odds with another. Finally, the organization opposes government and law-enforcement intervention within the "gray zone." The gray zone refers to a situation where an individual has not conducted any crimes but may hold extremist or problematic views. CAIR believes that this situation should first be dealt with within the Mosque. Haroon Manjlai, the former Public Affairs Coordinator for CAIR-LA, stated,

If an individual, say a 14-year-old, is saying problematic statements, that individual needs counseling and needs to talk to a religious scholar... Those interactions can only take place when there is complete

confidence that the conversation is kept confidential. If parents of young people are worried that a particular Imam is partnering with law enforcement to figure out who the potential terrorists are, those conversations will not happen.⁵⁰

CAIR-LA is not alone in holding these concerns about CVE. After the announcement of the CVE pilot regions in the U.S., several groups voiced concerns about the programs within their cities. CAIR-LA along with the Asian Americans Advancing Justice, American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California, Sikh American Legal Defense and Education Fund-Los Angeles, and the Islamic Shura Council of Southern California all voiced their concerns about CVE efforts in Los Angeles. Specifically, the groups were concerned that the programs were ineffective, stigmatizing for American Muslims, and were simply a means to gather intelligence on the Muslim community.⁵¹ Similar concerns arose in Boston and Minneapolis. Along with the announcement of Boston's CVE Plan came a dissenting view by the Islamic Society of Boston Cultural Center (ISBCC) attached as an attachment to the plan. The ISBCC also stated its concern that CVE is stigmatizing for American Muslims.⁵² In Minneapolis, stakeholders who attempted to implement Minneapolis' CVE plan faced intense criticism from some members of the local Somali community. As one member of the CVE governance network explained, "they [opponents of CVE] would put up our pictures all over the mosques in the community like we were fugitives."⁵³

⁵⁰ Interview with Haroon Manjlai, Public Affairs Coordinator, Council on American-Islamic Relations, Anaheim, CA, 17 November 2016.

⁵¹ Source: Asian Americans Advancing Justice- Los Angeles, "Los Angeles Based Groups Serving American Muslim Communities Question Federal Government's Countering Violent Extremism Programs as Ill-conceived, Ineffective, and Stigmatizing," 13 November 2014, Available at: <http://www.advancingjustice-la.org/sites/default/files/20141113%20-%20MR%20-%20CVE%20Statement.pdf>

⁵² Source: Islamic Society of Boston Cultural Center, "A dissenting view- Islamic Society of Boston Cultural Center," In "A Framework for Prevention and Intervention Strategies: Incorporating Violent Extremism into Violence Prevention Efforts," Boston Regional Collaborative, February 2015. Available at: <https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-ma/pages/attachments/2015/02/18/framework.pdf>

⁵³ Anonymous member of the Somali American Task Force, personal communication, April 3, 2018.

Similar concerns by the public and non-governmental organizations have emerged in the United Kingdom concerning *Prevent* efforts. Moreover, the same criticisms have arisen over time despite changes to the strategy. For instance, in 2009, the Communities and Local Government Committee of the House of Commons called for an inquiry concerning the effectiveness of the *Prevent* program. As part of the inquiry, the Committee held five oral evidence sessions and met with front-line *Prevent* workers. The Committee stated that a statement by the Institute for Community Cohesion summed up the majority of the views of interviewees in stating that

The real problem with the *Prevent* agenda is simply that it is presently situated within a counter-terrorism strategy and implemented by a team dedicated to counter-terrorism and is therefore viewed through this lens with suspicion and apprehension; there is a strong belief that the community [Muslim] will be spied upon, wrongly accused and treated unfairly; or simply that the community is made guilty by association with terrorism (House of Commons, 2010, 8).

Muslim community leaders raised similar concerns about *Prevent* in interviews I conducted in 2016. Dr. Omer El-Hamdoon, the President of the Muslim Association of Britain, stated that "even though the Government tries to convince us that it [*Prevent*] is targeting all forms of extremism, in reality, it is targeting Muslims."⁵⁴ He felt the programs were stigmatizing and were used by the Government as a means to "police ideas."

Overall, interviews with vocal opponents of CVE and previous studies on the topic reveal shared concerns. In both countries, opponents of the programs view them as stigmatizing for Muslims and as a means for intelligence-gathering. Thus, the networks implementing CVE plans

⁵⁴ Dr. Omer El-Hamdoon, President of the Muslim Association of Britain, personal communication, London, UK, 4 January 2016.

in both countries face not just opposition from the public, but also similar concerns from the public.

Although I can hold these similarities constant across both cases, in what follows, an analysis of primary and secondary sources and interviews with government officials in both countries reveals substantial differences in the structure of CVE policymaking, policy details, and the implementation process. The next section provides an overview of these factors in both countries.

3.4 Uncovering the Details of CVE Efforts in the United States

Given these similarities, why then has the U.K. been more successful? In what follows, I uncover the details of CVE efforts in both the U.S. and U.K. to identify the reasons for the U.K.'s success. I begin with the U.S. case.

3.4.1 CVE Strategy

In 2010, the Obama administration began reevaluating its domestic counterterrorism efforts. In February 2010, the Secretary of Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano, tasked the Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC)⁵⁵ to work with state and local law enforcement and community groups to develop and provide recommendations to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Before the release of a national level CVE strategy, the HSAC established a Countering Violent Extremism Working Group to provide Secretary Janet Napolitano with

⁵⁵ The HSAC provided recommendations to the Secretary of Homeland Security on a matter related to homeland security.

recommendations on how best to work with the American Muslim community to stop violent crime.⁵⁶

At a meeting in April 2010, Secretary Napolitano tasked the CVE working group with answering four main questions: (1) what are "best examples of how police/community partnership can lead to significant reductions in violent crime?"; (2) "does this approach lend itself to preventing violent crime that is motivated by extreme ideological beliefs and how this effort impacts the police-community partnership?"; (3) "if state and local law enforcement need/want to have CVE in their efforts how do they make it successful?"; (4) "what type of training would frontline officers, investigators, and management personnel require?"⁵⁷

As suggested by the questions, the early days of CVE in the U.S. under the Obama administration revolved primarily around community policing efforts and targeting violent crime more generally. This is further illustrated by the discussion at the working group meeting, where the focus of the discussion was around determining means by which law enforcement could establish trust with the local Muslim American communities. During these meetings, key concerns emerged from participants which parallel the concerns still brought up today by opponents of CVE. For example, a representative from the Austin Police Department highlighted the potentially damaging consequences for trust-building from the use of informants and the consequences of singling out specific Muslim communities instead of working with all religious and/or immigrant communities.

⁵⁶ The working group was composed of both HSAC and non-HSAC members including law enforcement officials, community leaders, homeland security experts, and former local, state, and federal government officials. Martin O'Malley, Governor of Maryland and HSAC member, chaired the group. Although the working group was tasked to give recommendations to DHS for outreach activities, the department was already implementing engagement activities through its Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) since 2003. Please see CRCL, "Engagement with Key Communities Team," August 14, 2009.

⁵⁷ Source: Homeland Security Advisory Council Countering Violent Extremism Working Group. "Meeting Notes." April 22, 2010. Available at: <https://www.muckrock.com/foi/austin-139/homeland-security-advisory-councils-cve-working-group-austin-police-department-25411/#file-87127>

At the same time that Secretary Napolitano tasked the HSAC to provide recommendations for CVE, the administration began drafting a national strategy for CVE. Led by the National Security Staff (NSS), the administration created an Interagency Policy Committee (IPC)⁵⁸ on countering and preventing violent extremism in the United States to draft this strategy. Composed of representatives from across the government at the levels of Assistant and Deputy Assistant Secretary, the IPC developed the strategy, which was later signed by the President.⁵⁹

In August 2011, the U.S. government released its national CVE strategy, *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States*. Although the administration had previous strategies for counterterrorism, this was the first U.S. strategy specifically for CVE efforts. The national strategy called for a three-pronged approach: to counter violent extremist messaging, promote community engagement, and build expertise to prevent violent extremism.⁶⁰

Shortly thereafter, in December 2011 the Obama administration released the *Strategic Implementation Plan* (SIP) as a guide for the implementation of CVE in the U.S. The SIP targets all forms of violent extremism, but countering violent extremism inspired by al-Qaeda and its affiliates is a priority. According to the SIP, CVE in the U.S. is a community-led effort to build resilience against violent extremism, while the federal government only plays a supportive role.

One of the primary objectives of the SIP is to build the CVE knowledge base of the federal government and its local partners. To achieve this objective, various agencies in the

⁵⁸ The agencies involved in the drafting process were as follows: the Department of State, the Department of Treasury, the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, the Department of Commerce, Department of Labor, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Education, Department of Veteran Affairs, the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the National Counterterrorism Center. *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States: Strategic Implementation Plan*, December 2011. Available at: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/sip-final.pdf>

⁵⁹ Source: *Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States: Strategic Implementation Plan*, December 2011. Available at: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/sip-final.pdf>

⁶⁰ Ibid.

federal government take the lead to build programs to understand violent extremism and to train the relevant actors on the best practices to CVE. For instance, DHS and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) both have analytic groups that research violent extremism. The federal government then disseminates this information to local partners and facilitates the exchange of best practices with foreign partners. The 2015 CVE Summit is an example of a key exchange of information that took place amongst foreign and local partners.

The second main objective of the SIP is for the federal government to counter violent extremist propaganda. Under this objective, the federal government aims to increase the capabilities of its local partners to challenge violent extremist ideologies that are found in propaganda. To do so, the federal government seeks to inform local partners on the threat of violent extremism and ways that violent extremist groups recruit members to ensure that local partners can effectively respond to current recruitment trends.

The last key objective of the SIP is to enhance the federal government's outreach efforts to American Muslim communities. Under this objective, federal engagement efforts include efforts to discuss issues such as civil rights and counterterrorism measures and other areas of concern with Muslim communities, raise awareness regarding the threat of violent extremism, and facilitate key partnerships with Muslim community actors to prevent violent extremism.

3.4.2 Structure of CVE in the U.S.: A Decentralized Model

Overall, the U.S. model, as outlined in the 2011 SIP, is rooted in a community-led model where the federal government takes a facilitating role rather than a leading role in the development and implementation of CVE programs at the local level. For this reason, we may characterize the

U.S. model as a decentralized model, without a single agency or institution that takes the lead during the planning and implementation processes. Instead, the SIP separates duties amongst the agencies found within the entire federal government into either a leadership or partnership role.

According to the SIP, a Lead is a “department or agency responsible for convening pertinent partners to identify, address, and report on steps that are being taken, or should be taken, to ensure activities are effectively executed.”⁶¹ On the other hand, a Partner is a department or agency that is responsible for collaborating with either a Lead or other Partners to accomplish key tasks. For instance, U.S. Attorney’s Offices are Partner agencies and the SIP tasks U.S. Attorneys to coordinate local partners to enhance outreach activities.⁶² However, another agency, the FBI, is considered a Lead agency and the agency is responsible for establishing and coordinating CVE-related education and awareness modules.

Although the Obama administration tasked the federal government with increasing community engagement activities, this does not mean the federal government is directly responsible for CVE programs. The government’s role is to serve as a “facilitator, convener, and source of information to support local networks and partnerships at the grassroots level” to foster “nuanced and locally rooted counter-radicalization programs and initiatives.”⁶³ The long-term objective of the government’s community engagement efforts is to help communities institutionalize locally-focused approaches to CVE.

Decisions on programming are the responsibility of the local community rather than the federal government. Although the federal government assists in facilitating partnerships and

⁶¹ SIP, 2011, 6.

⁶² The administration chose U.S. Attorneys to coordinate efforts based on their knowledge of their home districts and ability to make determinations of which communities within their districts the federal government should engage. Interview, US Government Official, October 2016.

⁶³ SIP, 2011, 10.

sharing information at the local level, communities themselves must take ownership of the initiative and develop and implement CVE programming at the local level. Local governance networks then make these decisions. The networks, composed of both public and private stakeholders, vary in composition across cities in the U.S. For example, in Boston, the CVE governance network includes academics, whereas the governance network in Montgomery County, MD does not. Governance networks also vary in regard to how the networks make decisions. Some networks, as the case in Montgomery County, MD use a centralized decision-making structure whereby one agent or organization makes final decisions, whereas other networks, such as the one in Los Angeles, use a consensus-based structure.

3.4.3 2016 Update to the SIP

In January 2016, after an internal review of the status of the 2011 SIP in the summer of 2015, the DHS and DOJ announced the creation of a Countering Violent Extremism Interagency Task Force. The Task Force helps implement and updates the SIP based on feedback from government and private stakeholders.⁶⁴ Hosted by DHS, the Task Force seeks to “bring together the best resources and personnel from across the executive branch to ensure that we face the challenge of violent extremism in a unified and coordinated way.”⁶⁵ Both the DHS and DOJ provide the overall leadership of the Task Force, and the FBI, NCTC and other agencies provide the staffing requirements for the force. Within the Task Force, federal efforts are organized into the

⁶⁴ Source: Email Correspondence from Heath Fong (Assistant Secretary of State and Local Law Enforcement, DHS) to Tom Manger and Darrel Stephens. March 8, 2016. Available at: <https://www.muckrock.com/foi/austin-139/homeland-security-advisory-councils-cve-working-group-austin-police-department-25411/#file-87127>

⁶⁵ Source: Department of Homeland Security. “Countering Violent Extremism Task Force.” January 8, 2016. Available at: <https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/01/08/countering-violent-extremism-task-force>

following categories: research and analysis; engagement and technical assistance; communications; and interventions.⁶⁶

In October 2016, the Obama administration released an updated SIP. Although the strategic goals of the 2011 CVE Strategy remain the same, the 2016 update includes new information on the current environment of violent extremism and a reflection on the experiences of the administration during the past five years. The SIP further explains the establishment of the interagency CVE Task Force and outlines the objectives of the Task Force as follows: “(1) to synchronize and integrate whole-of-government CVE programs and activities; (2) conduct ongoing strategic planning; and (3) assess and evaluate CVE efforts.”⁶⁷

Federal efforts at the national and local levels remain the same. At the national level, federal efforts remain focused on advancing the CVE initiatives by disseminating best practices, issuing grants, and building partnerships. The federal government’s role at the local level remains focused on empowering communities to develop and implement community-led partnership programs with state and local authorities. The strategy also makes a clear distinction between CVE efforts and intelligence-gathering investigations by reaffirming the federal government’s commitment to protecting civil rights and civil liberties.

The strategy does outline a few changes in regard to community engagement. The strategy outlines the need for an increase in the depth, breadth, and frequency of engagement with local communities. At the same time, the SIP designated DHS and DOJ to increase efforts to support the design and implementation of local CVE frameworks by identifying promising practices and relevant subject matter experts to assist local Muslim communities. While the

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ SIP, 2011, 2.

updated SIP outlined CVE efforts under the Obama administration, the Trump administration as of May 2018 has yet to release its CVE strategy.

3.4.4 Funding

Up until 2016, there was no federal funding specifically for CVE initiatives in the United States. However, this changed in 2016 when Congress passed the *Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act 2016* that provided \$50 million for countering terrorist attacks. Congress approved of this funding for the 2016 fiscal year in response to the San Bernardino and Paris attacks. The funding applies to programs that attempt to "prepare, prevent, and respond" to a terrorist attack. According to the Appropriations Committee, not more than \$10 million is designated for CVE initiatives to help states and local communities with their programs, not less than \$39 million is designated for states and local governments to prepare, prevent, and respond to coordinated terrorist attacks, and not less than \$1 million is designated for expanding the Joint Counterterrorism Awareness Workshop Series.^{68,69}

Regarding the funds designated for CVE initiatives, the funding is available based on a competitive basis and distributed by DHS. Stakeholders from the government, nonprofit organizations, or higher education institutions were eligible to apply for the funding. Accordingly, stakeholders could apply for funds for the following reasons: "planning, developing, implementing, or expanding educational outreach, community engagement, social service programs, training, and exercises, as well as other activities as the Secretary of Homeland

⁶⁸ This series brings together actors from the federal, state, and local governments and the private sector in order to assist local areas in improving their counterterrorism preparedness capabilities.

⁶⁹ Source: Email Correspondence from Chuck DeWitt to Michael Ferrence; Laura Cooper; Jonathan Thompson. Monday, April 25, 2016.

Security determines appropriate." ⁷⁰ Within the \$10 million, the funds are distributed as follows: "developing resilience (\$3 million); challenging the narrative (\$2 million); training and engagement (\$2 million); managing intervention activities (\$2 million); and building capacity (\$1 million)." ⁷¹

Besides federal funding specifically designated for CVE, there are other grants and sources of financing that CVE practitioners can use for CVE programming. There are also different types of federal funding that community groups can apply for including categorical, block, blended (pooled), or braided funding. ⁷² For instance, agencies such as the DOJ have provided grant money to assist local CVE efforts (Marcelo 2016). The Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), a component of the DOJ, provides funding opportunities for CVE programming that involves community engagement activities. Outside of federal funding, practitioners have sought funding opportunities from private sources and donations from the public.

3.4.5 Implementation

The CVE policymaking process is best described as a three-stage process consisting of mobilization, planning, and implementation stages. Currently, localities in the U.S. are not required to develop or implement CVE programs, which means community stakeholders must

⁷⁰ Source: Email Correspondence from Chuck DeWitt to Michael Ferrence; Laura Cooper; Jonathan Thompson. Monday, April 25, 2016., p.2.

⁷¹ Source: Department of Homeland Security. "Fact Sheet: FY 2016 Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Grants." July 6, 2016, Available at <https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/07/06/fy-2016-countering-violent-extremism-cve-grants>

⁷² Categorical funding is funding earmarked for specific activities and given by government entities. Block funding is funding given as a sum of money for local actors to achieve their CVE goals. Blended funding is when federal entities and private foundations pool funds to support CVE efforts. Finally, braided funding is when a local government can apply from multiple government agencies for funding. Please see National Counterterrorism Center. "Countering Violent Extremism: A Guide for Practitioners and Analysts." 2014.

first agree to mobilize around CVE and form a CVE governance network. In some select cities, the federal government attempted to jumpstart local CVE efforts by way of community outreach events. As I will show later in the dissertation, in combination with additional local-level facilitation efforts, in a few cities these efforts were successful and community stakeholders mobilized. In these cases, once the stakeholders agreed to form a governance network, the network began the planning process. During the planning phase, the network determines the specific components of the plans and how these plans are to be implemented. The components of the plans may vary based on the network, but overall, plans in the U.S. focus primarily on prevention and intervention CVE programming. Ideally, after a governance network develops a plan, community stakeholders then implement it within a target area.

3.4.6 Government Efforts to Promote CVE

The U.S. government conducts several outreach events to increase awareness and expertise in regard to CVE. The first of these events is called the Community Awareness Briefing (CAB). The CAB is an outreach event that attempts to increase community awareness of the radicalization process and recruitment activities that take place within their communities. Local government stakeholders invite NCTC briefers and staffers from the DHS Office of Civil Liberties and Civil Rights (CRCL) into a community to give a presentation to the public and law enforcement on the radicalization process and terrorist group recruitment tactics. This program serves as a chance for the federal government to engage with the community and for the public to ask any questions or raise any concerns that they may have. As of 2016, the NCTC has conducted the CAB in thirteen cities: Austin, TX; Boston, MA; Chicago, IL; Columbus, OH;

Dover, DE; Houston, TX; Los Angeles, CA; Minneapolis, MN; Ocean City, NJ; Orlando/Tampa, FL; Pittsburgh, PA; and Seattle, WA (National Counterterrorism Center 2016).

As another means to increase community interest in CVE, the federal government conducts what is called a Community Resilience Exercise (CREX). The CREX is a half-day exercise that is designed to improve communication between law enforcement and communities and to share ideas amongst participants on how to build community resilience. Similar to the CAB, both NCTC and DHS CRCL employees conduct the CREX. To date, the CREX has been given to the following cities: Washington, D.C; Seattle, WA; Chicago, IL; Durham, NC; Houston, TX; Nashville, TN; New York City, NY; Sacramento, CA; Minneapolis, MN; Columbus, OH; and Fresno, CA.⁷³

The CREX is modeled after a program that was first introduced in the United Kingdom. The U.S. government contracted Dr. Gwen Griffith-Dickson of the Lokahi Foundation to assist in developing the CREX and CAB programs in the U.S. The basis of the briefing is to provide a venue for local law enforcement, local government actors, the private sector, and the public to attend and discuss CVE and issues related to CVE.⁷⁴

There are two components to the CREX. The first part of the exercise involves scenarios of possible violent extremist activities. Each scenario is hypothetical but modeled on behaviors exhibited by prior violent extremists. Attached to each scenario are two questions. The first asks what law enforcement should do in the situation, and the second asks what the community should do. There are several components attached to each scenario that the moderator reveals in different stages. After the moderator reveals a stage, the participants break into small groups and

⁷³ Seamus Hughes, former National Counterterrorism Center employee, personal communication, Washington D.C., February 2016.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

discuss potential responses and how they can work together (National Counterterrorism Center 2015).

For example, one scenario given to participants takes place in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area. The scenario features a 16-year-old named Ahmed. The scenario includes a list of personal characteristics and other tidbits of information about Ahmed. Participants learn about Ahmed's close relationships with his older brother and a few teachers at his school. As the activity progresses, participants also learn that Ahmed is struggling with the situation in Syria and his friends have started to notice a difference in his personality. Each stage of the scenario reveals new clues regarding Ahmed's situation and the reaction of Ahmed's parents. The scenario ends with the last scene that reveals Ahmed is missing.⁷⁵

After the first activity and discussions about the scenarios conclude, CREX facilitators assist participants in creating a local action plan. The facilitator asks the following questions to participants: "how will communities and law enforcement work together to build trust and to protect their communities from violent extremism? What are the problems we face? What is our end state? Goals/Objectives? What programs can we do?"⁷⁶ Through this guided discussion, participants create a local action plan that focuses on prevention and intervention efforts. However, it is up to the governance network to further develop the plan and implement it.

Besides community outreach events, the federal government also administers training sessions in an attempt to increase domestic and international expertise on CVE. In August 2014, the U.S. government hosted the 2014 National Summit on Empowering Communities to Prevent Violent Extremism and invited CVE experts and country representatives from across the world. The purpose of the summit was to share best practices amongst participants to increase

⁷⁵ Source: "Scenario- Minneapolis/St.Paul, MN." National Counterterrorism Center.

⁷⁶ Source: "Scenario- Minneapolis/St.Paul, MN." National Counterterrorism Center, p. 7.

knowledge of CVE efforts. The federal government also transmits information about CVE through training exercises of local partners conducted by agencies such as NCTC and the DHS.⁷⁷ Moreover, the CVE Task Force under the Obama administration even developed a guide for communities to follow to help communities develop comprehensive CVE frameworks.⁷⁸

3.4.7 Three- Region Pilots

As a means to increase the number of community-led responses to violent extremism in cities across the U.S., the Obama administration's National Security Council (NSC) designated the three CVE pilot regions in September 2014. The purpose of these pilot regions was to set an example for other cities to implement similar CVE plans. The pilot regions were chosen based on two criteria: their history of community engagement and the presence of a local government partner interested in collaborating with the federal government on this issue. From these criteria, the NSC created a list of regions from which three regions were selected: Boston, the site of the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings; Los Angeles, a region with a history of community policing and community engagement initiatives that started under the auspices of action against crime and

⁷⁷ Source: The White House. "Fact Sheet: The White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism." February 18, 2015. Available at: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/18/fact-sheet-white-house-summit-countering-violent-extremism>

⁷⁸ Source: "Guide to Developing a Local Framework to Prevent and Counter Violent Extremism and Promote Community Resilience." Countering Violent Extremism Task Force, undated. In the guide, the Task Force advises community stakeholders to follow a six-step implementation process. The Task Force first recommends that community stakeholders should analyze local threats and decide on the scope of the framework. Next, according to the guide, local stakeholders should identify and build relationships with diverse stakeholders to bring all relevant parties to the table followed by the development of a needs assessment and an inventory of existing programs. Once complete, the Task Force suggests that the stakeholders should design the framework and develop metrics to assess outcomes. After implementing the framework, the Task Force then recommends stakeholders to evaluate their programs.

gangs; and Minneapolis, the site of recruitment efforts by Al-Shabaab, a Somali terrorist organization, which recruits from the Somali community in Minneapolis.⁷⁹

The National Security Council tasked each region to create a CVE plan to implement within their jurisdiction. On February 18, 2014, the NSC tasked the Preventing Violent Extremism Interagency Policy Committee (IPC) to develop a process for the pilot regions to use to establish comprehensive CVE frameworks.⁸⁰ The IPC's proposed process recommended that local stakeholders should take the lead to develop and implement the CVE framework. As outlined in the work plan, the IPC recommended that the federal partner agencies, namely the DOJ, FBI, and DHS, should first meet to review existing partnerships and programs in the three geographic areas. Next, the IPC recommended that federal partners should initiate a dialogue with local stakeholders to share inventories of local resources and networks and to identify gaps. The IPC then recommended that together, the federal partners with local leaders should meet to develop a framework which was then recommended to be shared with the broader community to receive community input. Following community input, the IPC recommended that local stakeholders should implement the proposed framework.

In line with the IPC's suggestions, from the time of designation to the 2015 White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism, various stakeholders within the three cities met to create their own CVE plans. Members from each of the local governance networks then revealed the plans at the Summit on Countering Violent Extremism. Each plan outlined its key focus areas and programs that the region planned to implement to accomplish the listed objectives. Boston's

⁷⁹ Seamus Hughes, former National Counterterrorism Center employee, personal communication, Washington D.C., July 2015.

⁸⁰ Source: "A Comprehensive Approach for Countering Violent Extremism at the Local Level." Released to the public on April 13, 2017. Available at: <https://www.aclu.org/foia-document/comprehensive-approach-countering-violent-extremism-local-level-0>

plan focused on radicalized individuals; Los Angeles focused on community engagement and intervention; and Minneapolis-St. Paul focused on the drivers of radicalization and societal level concerns (Hughes and Vidino 2015).⁸¹ However, not all of these frameworks were fully implemented. As this dissertation will show, stakeholders in Los Angeles and Minneapolis-St. Paul only partially implemented their plan while stakeholders in Boston did not implement any components of their plan.

3.4.8 Discussion

Since the Obama administration released the first CVE strategy in 2011, the U.S. government has continued to promote the concept of CVE, albeit more recently under the Trump administration under a different name: preventing terrorism. CVE efforts in the U.S. are primarily community-driven, meaning that CVE policymaking is decentralized. Local community governance networks, rather than the federal government, design and implement CVE programs to meet local needs. In fact, the civic nature of the U.S. model makes the model unique compared to more centralized models commonly found within centralized political systems as seen in the U.K. That said, the federal government does take part in CVE efforts, often engaging in efforts to counter violent extremism online and promoting CVE to local communities. These outreach efforts are needed to mobilize communities, especially since the implementation of CVE programs is voluntary. Despite these outreach efforts by the federal government to empower local governance networks to implement CVE, only some have done so. In the next section, I provide the history and structure of CVE in the United Kingdom in an

⁸¹ Each plan will be extensively outlined in the empirical section.

attempt to identify the differences that may explain the different experiences with implementation.

3.5 Uncovering the Details of CVE Efforts in the United Kingdom

Even though there are some similarities between the CVE approaches of the U.S. and U.K., an analysis of CVE efforts in the U.K. reveals important differences between the two countries. To identify these differences, I first analyze *Prevent* legislation and the various changes that have occurred to this legislation since 2009. The section concludes with a discussion of the various components of *Prevent* and the process of implementation.

3.5.1 *Prevent* Strategy

The United Kingdom's national counterterrorism strategy as part of the United Kingdom's overall counterterrorism strategy is known as CONTEST. The strategy dates back to 2003, although it was first publically released in 2006 (Home Office 2006). Since then, the strategy has undergone several changes, the first by the Brown Government in 2009 (Home Office 2009), followed by subsequent changes in 2011 (Home Office 2011) and 2015 (United Kingdom Parliament 2015).

A series of factors contributed to the creation of CONTEST. The September 11, 2001, attacks in the U.S. demonstrated to other countries that terrorism knew no boundaries. Around the same time in the spring and early summer of 2001, local authorities of Oldham, Burnley, and Bradford in the United Kingdom experienced violent riots with property damage and members

from a variety of marginalized communities attacked the police. After the attacks, the U.K. government assembled a team, the Community Cohesion Review Team (CCRT), to investigate the causes of these riots and to make recommendations for the government's response. The team partially attributed the emergence of the riots to the polarization of the inner-city areas (Cantle 2001). In addition to the riots and 9/11 attacks, intelligence reports indicated that British Muslims had been training in terrorist camps in Afghanistan starting in the late 1990s (Leapman 2007). These three factors convinced the government that action by state authorities was needed to counter these threats (Thomas 2010).

CONTEST encompasses four policy areas, otherwise known as the four Ps: *Pursue*, *Prevent*, *Protect*, and *Prepare* (Home Office 2011). *Pursue* aims to stop terrorist attacks through efforts to detect and investigate potential threats in the earliest stages. *Protect* involves policies to strengthen the U.K.'s defenses to help protect against a terrorist attack, which includes actions to strengthen the U.K.'s infrastructure and secure its border. *Prepare* focuses on mitigating the impact of an attack if one occurs by enhancing emergency preparedness efforts and emergency response services. Finally, *Prevent*, the focus of this dissertation, attempts to stop individuals from either becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism (Home Office 2011).

3.5.2 Changes to *Prevent*

The U.K. government has changed the *Prevent* strategy a total of three times thus far, in 2009, 2011, and 2015. Following the 2005 London Bombings, in March 2009 the government released a revised version of CONTEST. The revisions were the result of 64 recommendations provided to the government by community-led working groups referred to as 'Preventing Extremism

Together' or the PET initiative. Of the 64 recommendations, 27 recommendations consisted of things that the government could do to improve *Prevent* initiatives.⁸²

Few changes were made in 2009 to *Prevent* itself. The U.K. government allocated additional funding for *Prevent* programming within the revised version of CONTEST. Funding increased for both community programming and the Channel program. The focus of *Prevent* remained on Muslim communities, but the strategy claimed to apply equally to other communities.

The main change to CONTEST as a whole, which included *Prevent*, was the introduction of a Public Service Agreement (PSA) and the removal of ring-fencing from an Area Based Grant, a source of funding. A PSA was a performance management framework for government departments. The purpose of a PSA was to outline the aims and objectives of service delivery government departments in an effort to hold government departments accountable for achieving objectives and delivering public services. In total, there were 30 PSA Delivery Agreements that applied to a variety of service delivery sectors from education to healthcare. The U.K. government introduced a PSA for CONTEST that applied to the various government departments that were responsible for implementing CONTEST, including the Home Office. The aim of the PSA was the same as the aim outlined in the strategy, namely to reduce the risk of terrorism to the United Kingdom. The PSA also included the outcomes of interest associated with the four main components of CONTEST. The CONTEST Board oversaw the delivery and monitoring of CONTEST through the PSA.⁸³ However, this change was short-lived since the Coalition government abolished the PSA system in 2010.

⁸² Source: "Countering International Terrorism: The UK'S strategy." HM Government. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/272320/6888.pdf

⁸³The Director-General of OSCT chairs the CONTEST Board. The Board is composed of representatives from key Government Departments.

Besides the introduction of a PSA, the U.K. government changed the way that local authorities could spend government funding. As the main sources of funding for *Prevent* programming, the Home Office gave Area Based Grants to local authorities for *Prevent* projects. Prior to these changes, Area Based Grants included ring-fencing, which meant that local authorities were required to spend the funds according to the objectives outlined by the grant funders. The removal of ring-fencing meant that local authorities could spend the funding on local priorities, which may not necessarily correspond to the objectives of the grant.⁸⁴ This change gave local authorities more flexibility in determining how to use the funds.

The British government conducted a formal evaluation of *Prevent* prior to the 2010 transition from the Labour government to the Coalition government. Political disagreement within the Labour government over the relationship between *Prevent* and community cohesion played out within the 2010 evaluation of *Prevent*. The evaluators raised concerns that the strategy stigmatized Muslim communities and the strategy contributed to the perception that *Prevent*, particularly the Channel program, was being used for intelligence gathering purposes. Consequently, the evaluation team recommended that community cohesion work should not be associated with a counterterrorism agenda (House of Commons 2010).

As a result of the 2010 evaluation of *Prevent* and the change in government, the new Coalition government made several changes to its strategy. First, the new Coalition government expanded the definition of extremism and began to target both non-violent and violent forms of extremism (O'Toole et al. 2015). This controversial move—also a key difference between CVE in the U.S. and the United Kingdom—expanded the scope of *Prevent* and as many argue,

⁸⁴ Source: Freedom of Information Request, Croydon.
https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/prevent_programme_in_croydon#incoming-444602

increased opposition to the strategy.⁸⁵ As a result of this move, *Prevent* efforts now target extremism that promotes both violence and non-violence, whereas, in the U.S., there remains only a focus on violent extremism.

Unsurprisingly given the recommendations of the evaluation team, the government also *attempted* to separate community cohesion initiatives from *Prevent*. In previous versions of *Prevent*, the government allocated funding to community cohesion initiatives under the auspices of the *Prevent* initiative. However, the 2010 evaluation of *Prevent* noted that the overlap between the two contributed to public concerns that the government was focusing only on Muslim communities to reduce the threat of terrorism (House of Commons 2010). Even though the government attempted to separate *Prevent* initiatives from community cohesion initiatives, as some will argue, in practice, the government was unsuccessful. (O’Toole et al. 2015).

More recently, *Prevent* underwent another major change in 2015 with the passage of the Counterterrorism and Security Act.⁸⁶ The Act places a statutory duty, or legal obligation, on all 353 local authorities in Great Britain and Wales to practice “due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism.”⁸⁷ Besides local authorities, the Act also applies to a variety of public institutions including educational institutions, childcare and health services, prisons and probation and the police (United Kingdom Parliament 2015).

Prior to the passage of this act, local authorities were not required to assess the risk of radicalization within their area, nor to take appropriate action. However, in accordance with the

⁸⁵ Therese O’Toole, personal communication, Bristol, UK, January 2016.

⁸⁶ Excerpts in this section appear from Caitlin Mastroe, "Evaluating CVE: Understanding the recent changes to the United Kingdom’s implementation of *Prevent*." *Perspectives on Terrorism* 10, no. 2 (2016).

⁸⁷ According to the *Prevent Guidance* issued for England and Wales, the term “having due regard” means “that the authorities should place an appropriate amount of weight on the need to prevent people being drawn into terrorism when they consider all the other factors relevant to how they carry out their usual functions.” (p. 21). Home Office (2015). *Revised Prevent Duty Guidance for England and Wales: Guidance for specified authorities in England and Wales on the duty in the Counterterrorism and Security Act 2015 to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism*. London: TSO.

Act, authorities are now required to either establish or use a preexisting local multi-agency group to coordinate *Prevent* activity. Local authorities are also required to assess the risk of individuals being drawn into terrorism, work with *Prevent* coordinators and other authorities as part of the risk assessment procedures, mainstream *Prevent* into the policies and procedures of the authority, train staff to understand *Prevent* and recognize potential vulnerabilities, and—if a risk is determined—then develop a *Prevent* action plan (Home Office 2015; Mastroe 2016). Local authorities are also required to construct and chair a joint local authority/ police panel, commonly referred to as the Channel program, to assess vulnerable individuals and provide an individualized plan for those individuals who voluntarily participate in the program.

In April 2015, the Home Office made additional changes to the implementation and evaluation of *Prevent*. Based on previous evaluations of *Prevent* projects, the Home Office created a catalog of the successful projects from the previous 2 or 3 years. Rather than developing their own projects to implement, local authorities now bid for funding to implement one of the projects from the government's catalogue.⁸⁸ Prior to this, local authorities developed their own projects and then bid for funding. Based on interviews with Home Office employees, in some rare cases there still is an opportunity for local authorities to make adjustments to the pre-set project to cater to the needs of the local community. But for the most part, local authorities are unable to adjust projects to meet local needs.

⁸⁸ Anonymous Home Office Employee #1, #2, #5, personal communication, London, UK, January 2016.

3.5.3 Structure of *Prevent* in the United Kingdom: A centralized model


Unlike the United States, the overall policymaking structure in the United Kingdom is centralized under the Home Office. The Home Office makes key decisions about funding, assigns employees to coordinate *Prevent* programming in local authorities, and approves *Prevent* plans for local authorities. However, there are three general structures of decision-making that affect *Prevent*: national, local and police.

At the national level, the Home Office presides over the entire *CONTEST* strategy, even though multiple agencies are involved. At the top of the decision-making pyramid sits the Home Office Secretary, Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) Secretary, and Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. Ministers receive information regarding progress reports and strategic advice from a national *Prevent* Board. This Board is composed of members from all the government departments and agencies that are involved with *Prevent*. The Home Secretary and Communities Secretary also receives information from the Local Delivery Advisory Group, which is composed of national, regional, and local organizations (Home Office 2009).

Key decisions that the central government makes include funding decisions. Before changes to *Prevent* in 2011, the government identified the areas that were to receive funding for *Prevent* measures, named priority areas, based on population statistics of Muslims living in the United Kingdom. However, this changed after 2011 when the government instead identified priority areas based on the threat of extremism faced by that local authority. A process largely shrouded in mystery, intelligence services use measures to evaluate the threat level within an area. After this evaluation, the Home Office labels local authorities as either priority, supported, or non-priority areas. Although both priority and supported areas are eligible to receive funding

for *Prevent* projects, the Home Office only gives priority areas a *Prevent* coordinator. Unlike priority and supported areas, non-priority areas do not receive any *Prevent* funding.⁸⁹ Typically, a priority area will implement 3 to 5 projects per year with variation across authorities. In 2015, there were 30 *Prevent* “priority” areas and an additional 14 “supported areas.”⁹⁰ The graphic below displays the breakdown of local authority areas in England and Wales for 2015.

Figure 3.2: 2015 Prevent Funding by Local Authority



⁸⁹ Anonymous Home Office Employee #2, personal communication, London, UK, January 2016.

⁹⁰ The Guardian obtained the names of the priority areas and supported areas in 2015 under the Freedom of Information Act. The priority areas in the Greater London area include Brent, Camden, Ealing, Enfield, Greenwich, Hackney, Hammersmith and Fulham, Haringey, Islington, Kensington, and Chelsea, Lambeth, Lewisham, Luton, Newham, Redbridge, Tower Hamlets, Waltham Forest, Wandsworth, and Westminster. The supported areas in the Greater London area include Barking and Dagenham, Hounslow, Slough, and Southwark. Priority areas outside the Greater London area include Birmingham, Blackburn with Darwen, Bradford, Cardiff, Derby, High Wycombe, Leeds, Leicester, Liverpool, Manchester, and Stoke-on-Trent. Finally, supported areas outside the Greater London area include Brighton and Hove, Burnley, Calderdale, Coventry, Crawley, Dudley, Kirklees, Portsmouth, Sandwell, and Walsall (as cited in Mastroe 2016) Data retrieved from: <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/feb/13/prevent-counter-terrorism-support>

In addition to funding, each priority area receives a coordinator. The coordinator, known as a *Prevent* coordinator, is formally employed under the jurisdiction of the Home Office. The purpose of *Prevent* coordinators is to “assist” and support the local authorities in developing a plan. By doing so, these coordinators act as the lead for local *Prevent* projects. There are two types of *Prevent* coordinators (Mastroe 2016). The first type assists the local authority in formulating an action plan for an area and implementing that plan according to the risks within the area. As one such coordinator explained,

I am the conduit between the Home Office and the local authority concerning *Prevent*. I am tasked with understanding the risk in the local area, so I have a full understanding of that risk. I bring together relevant partners, communicate risk to them, and develop a plan to mitigate that risk.⁹¹

The second type of coordinator assists higher education institutions. These individuals are “responsible for engaging universities and further education providers on *Prevent* and helping them implement policies as well as doing direct training of staff and doing engagement work with students.”⁹²

In priority areas, the local authority then develops a CVE Action Plan with the assistance of the *Prevent* coordinator. The Home Office monitors the process and then approves the plan for implementation (Home Office 2015).

Local level structures vary based on the local authority, but ultimately, elected council officials are responsible for *Prevent* at the local level. According to the 2008 *Prevent* Delivery Plan, the central government instructed local authorities to develop multi-agency arrangements to deliver *Prevent*. Some local authorities set up a group specifically for *Prevent*; others used a

⁹¹ Anonymous Home Office employee #2, personal communication, London, UK, January 2016.

⁹² Anonymous Home Office employee #3, personal communication, London, UK, January 2016.

Local Strategic Partnership (LSP),⁹³ or a previous decision-making body such as the Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership (CDRP).⁹⁴ The membership of these decision-making bodies also varies by the local authority, but members generally come from a variety of statutory agencies. For instance, the Richmond Upon Thames Local Authority's *Prevent* Steering Group consists of social care representatives, police representatives, and others from the local authority.⁹⁵ This Steering Group then meets with the LSP on a quarterly basis to update the LSP on the implementation process.⁹⁶

The police also have a separate decision-making authority structure. Local police forces who deliver *Prevent* related projects are accountable to their local police authorities. Additionally, the National *Prevent* Delivery Unit, a sub-component of the Association of Chief Police Officers, also supports local police in delivering the Police *Prevent* Strategy. The Regional Police *Prevent* Coordinators oversee the delivery of *Prevent* and then report back to the *Prevent* Board (Home Office 2009).

⁹³ An LSP is a single decision-making body composed of local level actors from the public, private, business, community and voluntary sectors.

⁹⁴ A CDRP is a local statutory partnership directed under the Crime and Disorder Act of 1998 to coordinate action on crime and disorder.

⁹⁵ The Steering Group is composed of the following types of individuals: "Senior Manager from the Local Authority, Local Authority representative from Community Safety, Adults Social Care, AfC Achieving for Children, MPS area *Prevent* Coordinator, Local MPS Counter Terrorism Intelligence Officer, MPS SO15 Channel officer, Richmond and Kingston Probation Trust, London Community Rehabilitation Company (CRC), Health representatives." Richmond Borough *Prevent* Steering Group. Terms of Reference and Membership. Available at: <https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/354915/response/870772/attach/5/19558%203.pdf>, p. 2.

⁹⁶ Source: Richmond Borough *Prevent* Steering Group. Terms of Reference and Membership. Available at: <https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/354915/response/870772/attach/5/19558%203.pdf>

3.5.4 Funding

Funding for *Prevent* initiatives primarily comes from the central government. Unlike the U.S. where private funding for CVE-specific programs is common, private funding in the United Kingdom is rare. As mentioned previously, the government allocates funding to a local authority after designating the local authority as a priority area.

Various sub-components of the Home Office grant the funding to local authorities. The government either allocates funding to a specific project within a local authority or to the local authority to allocate itself. In the beginning years of *Prevent*, the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) provided priority local authorities with funding under the Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund. Hazel Blear, the Secretary of State for the DCLG, announced the allocation of £45 million dedicated to *Prevent* initiatives for the period of April 2008 to March 2011, which was one such funding source.⁹⁷ Overall, the DCLG allocated an estimated £80 million in funds for *Prevent* between April 2007 and 2011 (Kundnani 2009).

The Office of Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT) is also the main source of funding for *Prevent* initiatives. Under one such funding scheme that reaches recipients outside of priority local authorities, the OSCT invested up to £1.5 million for *Prevent* related projects for the 2016 fiscal year. Under the Innovate U.K. initiative, the OSCT provides these funds based on the results from a competition to encourage civil society applicants to find innovative ways to prevent individuals from either radicalizing or supporting terrorism.⁹⁸ Subsequently, even for

⁹⁷ Please see: “The Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners in England/stopping people becoming or supporting terrorists and violent extremists.” UK Home Office. Available at: <https://www.counterextremism.org/resources/details/id/45/the-prevent-strategy-a-guide-for-local-partners-in-england-stopping-people-becoming-or-supporting-terrorists-and-violent-extremists>

⁹⁸ Source: HM Government. “Radicalization and terrorism prevention: apply for funding.” 30 August 2016. Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/radicalisation-and-terrorism-prevention-apply-for-funding>


local authorities who are non-priority areas, there are sources of funding available for *Prevent*-specific projects.

3.5.5 Implementation

Similar to the U.S., implementation in the United Kingdom is a multi-stage process, but the process differs. The mobilization process in the U.K. begins when the Home Office identifies priority areas for CVE-related activity within the country. Once identified, local authorities can either accept or decline the Home Office's offer. Up until 2009, the OSCT and DCLG, two offices within the Home Office, distributed the actual funds.⁹⁹ A decision-making body within the local authority makes the actual decision to either accept or deny the funds. Depending on the local authority, this body can be a LSP, a *Prevent* Board, or CDRP. The figure below illustrates the process.

⁹⁹ The DCLG only administered *Prevent* funding from 2008 to 2011. The amount of funding was as follows: 2008/2009 £17,825,043, 2009/2010 £27,358,559 and 2010/2011 £21,575,904. For additional information, please see: Freedom of Information Request Relating to *Prevent* Funding Ref F0007987, 8 August 2014. Available at: https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/prevent_programme_32#incoming-557466

Figure 3.3: Prevent Implementation Process in the United Kingdom



In the early years of *Prevent*, once a local authority “bought in” to *Prevent*, the Home Office gave priority local authorities the funding. Afterwards, the local authority in coordination with the *Prevent* coordinate would develop a *Prevent* Action Plan. At the same time, the local police developed a counterterrorism local profile (CTLP)¹⁰⁰ to inform strategic planning. Once developed, the local governance network chose community partners to implement the action plan.

¹⁰⁰ A CTLP identifies threats and vulnerability from terrorism and extremism in local areas to assist local partners in developing mechanisms to minimize local threats (Home Office 2009).

However, after 2011, this process changed slightly. Instead of allocating funds directly to local authorities to spend accordingly, local authorities were required to develop an action plan and then bid for funding for the projects. Local authorities would submit a proposal to the Home Office's *Prevent* Panel, which then would make an assessment. If the panel approved the initial proposal, it would then go to the Ministers for approval or rejection.¹⁰¹ If approved by the Ministers, local partners would then implement the action plan.

3.5.6 Discussion

The United Kingdom has a well-developed and implemented CVE strategy. Since *Prevent*'s inception in 2003, *Prevent* has undergone several changes over time. The strategy has evolved from one in which local communities were able to design their own programs to one where the central government chooses the programs to develop at the local level.¹⁰² Moreover, the strategy has evolved from an initiative that relied on voluntary participation by local authorities to one that requires all local authorities to have 'due regard for the threat of extremism.'

In terms of implementation, although the U.K. has more CVE-specific programs than the U.S., it is worth noting that prior to the 2015 changes to *Prevent*, not all local authorities had *Prevent* plans in place. Non-priority areas did not normally implement *Prevent* projects, whereas most priority local authorities decided to implement *Prevent* projects.

¹⁰¹ Anonymous Home Office employee #4, personal communication, London, UK, January 2016.

¹⁰² For a discussion of why this change took place in the United Kingdom please see Mastroe (2016) where I argue that the government transitioned to a catalogue-based system for evaluation purposes.

3.6 Identifying the Differences

Based on the previous overview of the CVE efforts in the U.S. and the U.K., several macro-level factors could explain differences in CVE program implementation across countries. The structure of policymaking and scope of CVE efforts, the levels of funding, and the process of implementation all differ between the two cases. These factors could each potentially explain why local governance networks in the U.K. have implemented more CVE plans compared to the governance networks in the United States.

First, the decision-making structures used to make decisions regarding CVE differs between countries. CVE in the United Kingdom is centralized reflecting the U.K.'s centralized political system. Decisions regarding which local authorities receive funding are made by central government departments, mainly the Home Office. Centralization has also increased over time. After the 2015 changes, local authorities have less opportunity to design their own *Prevent* plans, since governance networks are forced to choose from a list of projects distributed by the Home Office. This is not the case in the United States.

In the U.S., similar to other policy initiatives, CVE policymaking is decentralized and civic organizations play a more meaningful role, meaning that local governance networks are able to design and implement programming on their own accords. Within the American political system, the federal government's delegation of lawmaking power to other actors such as state, non-profit grantees, for-profit contractors and networks has become commonplace (Dilulio 2014). In the past, the federal government has outsourced lawmaking responsibilities for large initiatives including the implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of

2010 (ACA) (Allison 2013),¹⁰³ Medicaid (Thompson and Dilulio 1998),¹⁰⁴ and the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act (Dee and Brian 2011; Hanushek and Raymond 2005).¹⁰⁵ In fact, the rise of decentralization and push towards network approaches to governance was a reaction to the notion of the inefficiencies, lack of flexibility and corruption associated with “big government” (Fukuyama 2015). However, decentralized policymaking often complicates the policymaking process leading to inefficient outcomes (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973). This could, as I argue in the next chapter, explain why the United Kingdom has been more successful at implementing CVE programs. Centralized decision-making can increase the likelihood the programs are implemented.

Although both countries share similar policy objectives and implement similar types of CVE programs, the scope of CVE efforts differ. In the United Kingdom, CVE efforts are not just called something different, but also target all forms of extremism, meaning both nonviolent and violent extremism. The underlying basis of the U.K.’s approach is that extreme ideas, even if nonviolent, can potentially contribute to radicalization and lead to terrorism. This is not the basis of CVE in the United States. CVE efforts in the U.S. only target violent extremism, especially since nonviolent extremist views are protected under the first amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The United Kingdom's differing approach towards CVE may contribute to the larger number of programs given the broader scope of CVE.

¹⁰³ The implementation of the ACA uses contractors who are paid by the federal government, either the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services or the U.S. Department of the Treasury, to implement tasks such as building information systems (Allison 2013).

¹⁰⁴ Medicaid has been implemented by state agencies and state contractors (Thompson and Dilulio 1998).

¹⁰⁵ In January 2002, President Bush signed the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act which directed states to design school accountability systems for all public K-12 schools. In doing so, the federal government delegated the responsibility to create education standards and to link annual student assessments to those standards to the states rather than creating federal standards. This allowed states to create accountability systems according to state preferences which led states to implement a diverse set of accountability systems (Dee and Brian 2011; Hanushek and Raymond 2005).

The two countries also differ in terms of the levels of funding available for CVE programs. The U.K. government, since the early years of *Prevent*, has allocated funding specifically for the implementation of the *Prevent* strategy. Priority and supported areas receive large sums of money every year to implement various Prevent projects. This is unheard of in the United States. Up until 2016, the only cities that received funding from the federal government were the pilot cities. Even in these cities, the government allocated more funding for the evaluation of the programs rather than the actual programs. In 2016, Congress finally designated funds specifically for CVE efforts in the U.S. Since programs need funds to function, the differences in funding between the two countries could also explain the variations in implementation.

Finally, CVE plans are implemented in different ways in the United States and United Kingdom. In the U.K., the local government decides to accept or decline *Prevent* funding and then a local governance network, composed mostly of public sector actors, design a CVE plan in consultation with a *Prevent* coordinator from the Home Office. In the U.S., the decision to mobilize around CVE is not decided on by the local government, but rather a governance network composed of actors within the public, private, and voluntary sectors who voluntarily decide to participate. Although U.S. Attorney's Offices can offer assistance in coordinating local actors, local governance networks typically do not receive guidance from the U.S. federal government. The presence of the *Prevent* coordinator and the composition of the local governance network can potentially make implementation easier. Receiving advice from a person knowledgeable about CVE, and working primarily with individuals from one sector, may make it easier for local governance networks to decide on what programs to implement and how.

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter outlined the details of the CVE strategies in the United States and the United Kingdom. Despite the similarities between the two strategies, local governance networks have implemented more CVE plans in the United Kingdom compared to the United States. In an effort to understand why this is the case, I analyzed both strategies at the macro-level to inductively identify potential differences. The analysis of the CVE strategies revealed that there are clear differences in the structure of CVE policymaking. There are also differences in the scope of CVE efforts, the availability of funding for CVE efforts, and differences in the implementation process. All four differences could potentially explain why more programs exist in the U.K. compared to the United States. In the next chapter, I use these insights along with insights from previous research on policy implementation to provide a theoretical expectation of why only some communities in the U.S. implement CVE programs.

CHAPTER 4

A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR EXPLAINING THE CVE POLICYMAKING PROCESS: LINKING THE MACRO WITH THE MICRO

4.1 Introduction

A macro-level analysis of the CVE strategies of the United States and the United Kingdom in Chapter 3 revealed clear differences that may explain differing levels of program implementation. I found that the strategies differed in regard to the policymaking structure and scope of CVE efforts, the process of implementation, and the availability of funding. Using this information and insights from public administration literature, in this chapter, I develop a theoretical explanation for why only some stakeholders mobilize and develop a governance network within a community and why even fewer develop and implement a CVE plan.

Stakeholders first need to mobilize around the concept of CVE for a governance network to emerge. This rarely happens without facilitation. Even when communities have stakeholders who have an interest in CVE and the capacity to mobilize, facilitation is still needed to convince stakeholders to mobilize and form a governance network. I argue that community stakeholder interest, capacity, and facilitation all contribute to the prospects for mobilization given the uncertainty around the concept of CVE, the lack of CVE expertise at the local level, and the costs associated with mobilization.

Although community stakeholders may mobilize around CVE, this does not mean that the network will then implement CVE programs. The decentralized nature of CVE policymaking in the U.S. creates a series of implementation roadblocks for stakeholders. One major roadblock

is the presence of coordination problems that emerge as a result of internal political conflicts amongst stakeholders involved in the governance network. Given the multitude of actors involved in CVE, a governance network must also develop a means to effectively coordinate actions between stakeholders to develop and implement CVE plans. In this case, my argument holds that mobilization is *necessary but not sufficient* for the implementation of CVE programming.

However, drawing on insights from the previous chapter about the United Kingdom's CVE policymaking structure, I argue that governance networks with a local CVE leader who has the authority to coordinate action, mediate conflict and make final policy decisions are more likely to overcome these implementation roadblocks and implement CVE programming. From the previous macro-level analysis, the degree of centralization is an important difference between the CVE strategies of the U.S. and the U.K. In the United Kingdom, the Home Office makes critical decisions for local authorities regarding CVE. Although in the U.S., the federal government does not officially make these decisions, I argue that some governance networks rely on local leaders to fill this role and this helps explain why some governance networks are successful. A governance network that has a local CVE leader is more likely to overcome coordination problems and decision stalemates that may arise during the planning and implementation process.

4.2 Assumptions

My theoretical model is based on a series of assumptions about the nature of security, security policy decisions, and subsequently CVE policy decisions, and stakeholder motivations for action.

These pose challenges and problems that ultimately, as I argue, complicate the CVE policymaking process.

4.2.1 Security: Costly, Public and Uncertain

In this dissertation, I first assume that a state's security is costly, a public good, and uncertain. To maintain security, some type of protective service is needed, such as a military to protect from external threats or law enforcement to enforce the internal rule of law. Protection is also costly. Moreover, when the state provides security for all of its citizenry, security is not excludable, meaning that everyone benefits from the protection. Consequently, the delivery of security becomes a collective action problem (Olson 1965). Since everyone benefits and due to the costs, citizens would rather free-ride off the protective actions of others rather than provide security themselves. Given this preference, governments typically provide security for their citizenry as a form of public service.

A state's degree of security is also uncertain. Although states are aware of threats posed by groups such as ISIS, not all threats are known. The world is composed of a series of known and unknown facts. Some things are known (known, knowns), such as the fact that Al-Qaeda planned and carried out the September 11 terrorist attacks. There are also things that states know that they do not know (known, unknowns), such as when and where the next terrorist attack might happen. There are things states do not know that they do not know (unknown, unknowns). Finally, there are even things that states do not know, but could be known (unknown, knowns), such as situations where the state does not dedicate resources to determine something that could be known (Daase and Kessler 2007).

In this dissertation, I assume that security is a *known unknown*. States do not and cannot determine what the optimal level of security is. Although states attempt to maximize their security, they cannot know if their actions will indeed maximize their level of security relative to the threats that they face and the costs of providing security.

Consider a state (A) and a non-state security threat (B). State A faces legitimate known security threats from both external state and non-state actors. However, A also faces a known, unknown threat from entity B. In this situation, A cannot determine its level of security. It may be able to determine that its current environment is less safe or safer than the past given an assessment of known past and present threats, but still, this evaluation cannot weigh the likelihood or cost of unknown threats. As a result, A cannot assess the utility gained from counter-threat efforts. Entity A can only make assumptions that counter-threat efforts increase security, but these are *assumptions* rather than objectively knowable facts.

4.2.2 Security Policy Decisions

Another key assumption of this dissertation is how decision-makers make security policy decisions. I assume that when making security decisions, decision-makers attempt to act rationally. This means that, given resource constraints, actors try to weigh the benefits and costs associated with a particular decision while taking into consideration feasible alternative options.

Three conditions must be met for an actor to make a rational decision. First, a feasible set of all possible courses of action to take must exist. From this set, there must be a causal structure of action that determines the outcomes for each of the courses of action. Finally, an actor must be able to subjectively rank the alternatives. An actor then chooses which course of action to take

based on the ranking. When faced with risk, an actor will choose the option that maximizes expected utility (Elster 1986).

However, the nature of security complicates the rational decision-making model. Under the assumption that security itself is uncertain and the optimal level of security is unknown, a rational decision regarding security is hard to make. Since decision-makers do not know all the threats that exist and do not know for certain whether their actions to deter these threats will do so, it is impossible to conduct a reliable cost-benefit analysis while weighing potential alternative options. With this in mind, I assume that actors are purposive in their attempt to maximize their security.

I suggest that actors within the security realm make decisions as if they operated in a world of risk rather than uncertainty. Given the uncertainty associated with security, actors make assumptions about their expectations regarding security and measures to promote security. Doing so allows actors to rearrange uncertain outcomes into risk-related outcomes.¹⁰⁶ This rearrangement of reality is similar to Beckert's (2016) reasoning of how economic actors are able to make decisions regarding the market given the uncertainty. According to Beckert, economic actors create fictional expectations about the market to minimize uncertainty in order to make economic decisions. I conceptualize security in analogous ways: security actors are no different from economic actors in this regard.

An example of this "rearrangement of reality" is the government's use of external threat assessment models for decision-making purposes (Daase and Kesler 2007). Risk assessment models are based on the full spectrum of known and possible threats an entity could face.

¹⁰⁶ Uncertainty refers to a situation where actors cannot know all the information needed to determine an accurate probability of gains versus losses. Risk, on the other hand, refers to a situation where actors do not know the outcome of a decision, but can still accurately measure the probability of gains versus losses, and thus the expected utility of various actions (Knight 1921).

Illustrating this point is 'The Risk Management Process for Federal Agencies,' a management program released by the U.S. federal government. Under this framework, facility managers are required to assess current threats that a facility may face ranging from environmental to terrorist threats. In doing so, facility managers must evaluate the relative likelihood of occurrence of each potential threat by relying on historical data and the contents of the facility itself to determine the probability of occurrence. Next, facility managers conduct a vulnerability assessment, which requires an assessment of the potential consequences of a threat. Risk is then determined based on an analysis of the likelihood of occurrence and potential impact or vulnerability of a facility. As a result of this assessment, facility managers make a decision regarding which risk is acceptable or unacceptable in order to develop countermeasures to address the unacceptable risks (Renfroe and Smith 2014). By assessing risk regarding only known potential threats, facility managers can make what they conclude to be "rational" decisions, even though security at its basic level is uncertain given the presence of unknown threats.

Within the security realm, actors use a similar kind of risk assessment model to make decisions. However, security sector actors cannot make accurate predictions about security given the degree of uncertainty associated with it, so they make assumptions about their expectations of security to allow them to rationalize their decisions. The most important assumption that these actors make is that security can be maximized. As discussed earlier, given the nature of known and unknown threats, it is impossible to accurately predict whether or not security is being provided at an optimal level. Not only do security sector actors not know all the threats that they face, but states also do not know the consequences of their efforts to counter these threats. Nevertheless, I suggest that security sector actors *assume* that security can be maximized, which allows these actors to associate a value with gains.

A statement by former President Bush illustrates this point. In his 2002 address to the nation on the Department of Homeland Security, President Bush said, "Yet every day brings new information, a tip or arrest, another step, or two, or three in a relentless march to bring security to our nation and justice to our enemies."¹⁰⁷ In his discussion of the War on Terror, President Bush noted that the resources devoted to the war provided the U.S. with necessary information that increased security. However, Bush, like other leaders, only assumed that his actions were increasing state security. At that moment in time, Bush did not know for certain if the resources that he devoted to the war were, in fact, increasing security, because he could not assess the unknown threats and whether or not his efforts would result in valuable intelligence. Yet, he was still able to decide on resource allocation, because he *assumed* that these actions would increase security relative to the previous status quo.

4.2.3 Stakeholder Motivations for Action

Finally, I also assume that stakeholders are motivated to take action on security-related topics for different reasons. According to Deci and Ryan (2000, 2008), human motivation ranges from nonself-determined or extrinsic motivation to self-determined or intrinsic motivation. Some individuals are extrinsically motivated meaning that an individual's motivation is contingent upon external incentives such as compensation. However, other individuals may be intrinsically motivated meaning that an individual is motivated by internal reasons such as believing in the

¹⁰⁷ Source: George W. Bush. June 6, 2002, Address to the Nation on the Department of Homeland Security. Available at <http://millercenter.org/president/gwbush/speeches/address-to-the-nation-on-the-department-of-homeland-security>

tasks themselves (Pelletier and Sharp 2008). I use these insights to inform my theory on mobilization.

4.3 CVE Decisions, Uncertainty, and A Public Good

Similar to other security decisions, the U.S. government makes decisions regarding CVE initiatives according to the aforementioned assumptions. First, the government assumes that CVE efforts can increase security, even without knowing the effectiveness of these programs. As illustrated in a statement at the White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism in February 2015, National Security Advisor to the United States Susan Rice stated,

...Effective interventions often begin and grow within local communities. Government partnerships are critical, but the best solutions are often bottom up, not top down. So we'll work more closely with civil society and tap the talents of communities which might otherwise be left on the sidelines.¹⁰⁸

Thus far, there has been limited empirical research conducted on the effectiveness of CVE efforts (Mastroe and Szmania 2016). Although research has found that a few programs have achieved their stated objectives (Williams, Horgan and Evans 2016), at least in direct reference to the statement above, there is no empirical comparison of top-down versus bottom-up solutions. Despite this uncertainty, as illustrated in the statement above, the U.S. government assumes that bottom-up solutions for CVE can be effective. This assumption justifies the government's allocation of resources for CVE efforts and delegation of tasks to the local level.

¹⁰⁸ Source: Remarks by National Security Advisor Susan Rice at the White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism. February 19, 2015. White House, Office of the Press Secretary. Available at: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/19/remarks-national-security-advisor-susan-e-rice-white-house-summit-counte>

Assuming CVE efforts are an effective way to increase security is potentially problematic given the costs associated with CVE efforts. Local governance networks must acquire resources and devote time to develop and implement CVE programming. Take, for instance, an intervention program where CVE organizers attempt to assemble counselors, social service providers, the local police, and teachers to create a tailored program for at-risk youth. These stakeholders have other primary jobs, but for an intervention program to work, the participation of these stakeholders is crucial. To give a sense of the monetary costs associated with CVE programming, the estimated costs for only a small portion of the Montgomery County CVE Model totaled \$25,000 in the 2015 fiscal year.¹⁰⁹

Although scholars typically associate opportunity costs with the costs related to the production of a task, for CVE, the result may also engender costs. Scholars and practitioners alike do not know if CVE is effective, in fact, CVE may even be detrimental to a community. Rather than increasing security, CVE has the potential to do more harm than good if implemented incorrectly. Even the targeting of CVE programming towards certain communities can lead to negative consequences. CVE programming that openly targets Muslim communities can lead to the isolation of these communities and create a public backlash against those that implement the programming. Consequently, the implementation of CVE programming can be costly and in different ways.

Finally, I assume that the outcomes of CVE programs can, *in principle*, result in a public good: security. The goal for CVE programs is to increase security for all citizens by reducing the threat of violent extremism. Since the good is not excludable, those that receive the good would

¹⁰⁹ Source: Fiscal Year 2015, Office of Community Partnerships, WORDE Contract. Available at: <https://www.muckrock.com/foi/montgomery-county-338/montgomery-county-model-grants-office-of-community-partnerships-25534/#file-92160>

rather free-ride than provide the good. However, CVE in the U.S. calls for a “whole-of-society” approach and the use of public-private partnerships to design and implement CVE programs. The unintended consequence of this takes the form of a classic collective action problem.

4.4 Principal-Multi-Agent Problems

Taking into consideration these key assumptions, I conceptualize the delegation of tasks associated with the planning and implementation of CVE programming as a principal-agent relationship with multiple agents. A principal-agent relationship begins when an authority or principal delegates to an agent the responsibility for taking action on behalf of the principal. If a principal delegates tasks to agents who have the training and inclination to carry out those tasks, then the principal may benefit from specialization (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). Accordingly, principals often delegate tasks to overcome problems associated with collective action, namely coordination problems (Farrell and Saloner 1985),¹¹⁰ free-riding problems,¹¹¹ and social choice instability problems.¹¹²

¹¹⁰ A coordination problem occurs when members of a group are uncertain about the strategies that other members of the group will pursue. This is especially the case when there are a variety of alternative options to take in response to a task, but the different alternatives benefit each group member differently.

¹¹¹ As explained earlier, the classic example of free-riding stems from the example of public goods in which the good cannot be excludable to all group members. Thus, group members have an incentive to free-ride off the provision of the good by others. See, Olson, 1965.

¹¹² Social choice instability refers to a problem that arises when a group engages in collective action that varies from one choice to another. A group may decide to devote resources to CVE initiatives and then quickly decide to allocate those resources to gang prevention. As such, the group never accomplishes its objectives, because of the instability in choice selection. See, Arrow 1951.

4.4.1 The Principal

For the CVE case, the principal is the U.S. federal government. The principal's objective is to increase security and attempts to do so through CVE. At the same time, the U.S. government, as indicated by the national strategy, believes that governance networks should design and implement multifaceted CVE programs in coordination with a variety of community stakeholders. Thus, the principal believes that (1) CVE programming is needed; (2) implementation should take place in a coordinated way at a local level, and as purposive actors attempting to act rationally, (3) the expected benefits of CVE implementation outweigh the expected costs.

4.4.2 The Agents

The agents in my account are participants of local CVE governance networks. I define a local governance network as follows:

A governing arrangement composed of public and non-state stakeholders whereby collective decision-making is used to make or implement public policy.¹¹³

Local governance networks can include stakeholders from the local government, non-governmental sector, religious organizations, or even the public. The composition of the networks may vary between locations given stakeholder interest in CVE and targeted outreach efforts. In some cases, governance networks can be large and include non-government,

¹¹³ I derived this definition from a similar definition proposed by Ansell and Gash (2008). However, unlike their definition, I do not require the condition that the local governance network relies on a consensus-based decision-making process. This modification allows for the possibility that a collective body may not reach a consensus, yet the process moves forward for other reasons.

government, and academic stakeholders as is the case for the 51-member CVE governance network in Boston called the Boston Regional Collaborative. In other cases, the governance network is smaller, as seen in Minneapolis where the CVE governance network is composed of 15 stakeholders from the Somali American community.

4.5 Beyond the Moral Hazard Problem

Principal-agent (PA) scholars usually focus on the difficulty of getting agents to expend effort on behalf of the principal, the result of a form of moral hazard. Even though agents and principals may share a common goal, agents have personal incentives to act in ways that benefit their own self-interests. These incentives can lead to tension between the goals of the principal and the execution of the task by the agents (Miller 2005). Agents may prefer to shirk, and consequently, the principal will suffer.

Under the standard principal-agent framework, implementation varies because of variation in agent effort or diversion of effort towards ends valued more by the agent. Given this, the presence or absence of solutions to increase agent effort in accordance with the principal's expectations may explain implementation. Solutions often discussed within the literature include creating contracts with agents, screening and selecting agents, monitoring and evaluating agents, and institutional checks.

Miller (2005) argues that there is no one solution to the principal-agent problem, while I argue that there is no one principal-agent problem that explains variation in implementation of CVE programs. I focus on two distinct problems that arise from a principal- multi-agent relationship. First, principals need to convince agents to accept the principal-multi-agent

relationship, because agents initially may not be willing to participate in the relationship. Second, given the multiple agents involved, a coordination problem also occurs once a governance network is formed, which can also hinder implementation.

4.5.1 Problem 1: Governance Network Mobilization

Why do CVE governance networks emerge? The majority of principal-agent models take the PA relationship as given—I do not. Community stakeholders may not always be willing to even participate in the relationship in the first place. Even though the government assumes that CVE is needed and that governance networks should implement CVE programming, stakeholders may not agree. In fact, the rarity of CVE governance networks in the United States suggests that this is the case.

Not only is implementation costly, but, given the level of uncertainty associated with CVE, stakeholders may not be able to weigh the potential benefits over the costs associated with implementation. When faced with uncertainty, stakeholders are unable to properly rank alternative courses of action. Although I argue that stakeholders operating within the security realm can form expected beliefs regarding security, this may not always be the case for other stakeholders. Previous research suggests that an individual's inability to weigh expected preferences may be due to a lack of experience or unfamiliarity with the options. Security sector stakeholders have more experience with security-related measures, whereas other stakeholders do not. For these reasons, it cannot be assumed that the government and community stakeholders share a common goal. As demonstrated in psychology and other fields, individuals are more likely to accept the status quo when faced with uncertainty (Loomes, Orr and Sugden 2009; Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1998). Without stakeholders who are willing to participate,

implementation is not possible. I use the term *governance network mobilization* to refer to the process of securing the willingness of community stakeholders to participate in the relationship and form a governance network.

4.5.2 Drivers of Collaborative Governance

As a resource-consuming activity, it can be difficult to establish collaborative governance (Huxham and Vangen 2005). To explain why governance networks emerge, public administration scholars have identified various drivers of collaborative governance. While few theoretical models exist that explain the emergence of governance networks, I use insights from these previous studies to develop a theoretical model to explain the emergence of CVE governance networks.

Most fundamentally, a need for collaborative action is required for stakeholders to agree to collaborate. Collaborative action is likely when individual stakeholders face a problem and are unable to find a solution to the problem or achieve their goals on their own or through alternative means (Thomson and Perry 2006). Prior failures to address an issue through other means can also drive stakeholders to establish a collaborative governance network (Bryson and Crosby 2008). Other scholars have argued that collaborative action is more likely under conditions of uncertainty. If stakeholders are unsure how to manage a problem, stakeholders may use collaborative action to reduce risk (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004).

A need for collaborative action may not be enough to establish a collaborative network. As others have argued, stakeholders must also be interested in collaborative action. Often, stakeholders determine what counts as a problem (Kingdon 2007). Stakeholders must express an

interest to participate and have some type of incentive to participate. Incentives to participate are partly contingent upon stakeholder expectations about the intended results from collaborative action (Ansell and Gash 2008). Since participation in collaborative governance networks is often voluntary, the chances for collaborative action increase when stakeholders view their participation to be necessary to achieve a policy outcome (Brown 2002).

Scholars have also argued that the capacity for joint action is an important driver of collaborative action. Capacity can include stakeholder knowledge, experience, and resources that are needed to participate. Some stakeholders simply do not have the skill or expertise to participate in a collaborative governance network (Warner 2006). Others, may not have the time or energy to engage in a time-consuming activity (Yaffee and Wondolleck 2003). Preexisting social capital is also thought to increase the prospects for collaborative action (Oh and Bush 2016). Prior cooperation between stakeholders may increase the prospects for collaborative action, while prior antagonism between stakeholders can hinder mobilization efforts (Margerum 2002). Although, as others have argued, conflict amongst stakeholders may also drive collaborative action, especially after a deadlock that imposes costs for all stakeholders involved (Ansell and Gash 2008).

Facilitative leadership is another driver of collaborative governance identified by various scholars. As argued by Susskind and Cruikshank (1987), facilitative leadership is needed to bring stakeholders to the table and to guide stakeholders through the collaborative process. Facilitation can empower and mobilize stakeholders around an issue to promote collaborative action (Ansell and Gash 2008; Vangen and Huxham 2003). A network may use one or multiple leaders, either formally or informally, to promote collaboration.¹¹⁴ Distinguishing between stewards, mediators,

¹¹⁴ Facilitative leaders can come from either the public or private sector. Crosby and Bryson (2005) argue that there are two types of facilitators: sponsors and champions. Sponsors are the facilitators that act behind the scene while

and catalysts, Ansell and Gash 2012 argue that leaders may also play different roles during the policymaking process. Some act as stewards to bring legitimacy to the collaborative network. When distrust amongst stakeholders is high, a leader can act as a mediator and intervene to help resolve conflicts amongst stakeholders (Ansell and Gash 2012; Lasker and Weiss 2003). Finally, a facilitative leader can also act as a catalyst of collaborative governance by identifying ways to produce constructive collaboration (Ansell and Gash 2012). Thus, facilitative leadership is a potentially critical driver of collaborative governance.

Besides identifying the potential drivers of collaborative governance, a few studies propose a model for mobilization within the public administration literature that addresses the complexity of the process. These models vary in complexity and explanatory value. For example, Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh (2012) simply argue that one or more drivers, such as incentives, leadership, interdependence, and uncertainty, must be present for a collaborative network to emerge.¹¹⁵ Ansell and Gash (2008) propose another model that includes a variety of drivers that help foster the mobilization of governance networks, including levels of trust and shared understanding between members, interpersonal connections between members, and methods that can help facilitate mobilization. Although these drivers correspond to previously identified drivers of collaborative action, it is unclear the ways that these drivers interact and how these drivers foster or hinder the prospects of mobilization. Finally, Bakker et al. (2012) propose a model that seeks to explain the mobilization of citizen initiatives¹¹⁶ and distinguishes between

champions are facilitators that lead during the day-by-day activities. Ansell and Gash (2012) further untangle the different types of champions and propose that there are two types, professional and organic facilitators. Professional facilitators are professionally trained and neutral actors while organic facilitators often hold a vested interest in collaboration.

¹¹⁵ Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) provide an update to this theory by suggesting that these four factors can be interdependent.

¹¹⁶ A citizen initiative is one in which citizens, independent of the government, develop their own projects to implement within their communities.

network structuration and process management.¹¹⁷ However, these scholars also fall short in determining the conditions under which certain types of facilitation are likely to be more effective than others in fostering collaboration.

The public administration literature identifies several drivers of collaborative governance and proposes some models to explain collaborative governance. However, mobilization is often the result of a complex interaction between multiple drivers, both behavioral and facilitative; thus, to understand mobilization, a more dynamic and inclusive model is needed. Existing mobilization models often lack parsimony and include a myriad of explanatory factors without unpacking how these factors interact. I draw on these pre-existing models as a foundation to develop a theory of mobilization for CVE governance networks. The next section presents the theory and identifies the scenarios when mobilization is most likely depending on the interactions between three factors: interest, capacity, and facilitation.

4.5.3 Expectations

Since I assume that the creation of a CVE governance network that will develop and implement CVE programs results in a collective action problem, a community must then agree to participate and overcome the collective action problem to mobilize. The literature outlined previously emphasizes three categories of factors —interest, capacity, and facilitation— that can all foster mobilization. I argue that these three categories of factors interact in unique ways to create environments that are conducive to mobilization under certain circumstances.

¹¹⁷ Facilitation by process management refers to activities, similar to those proposed by Ansell and Gash (2008) that help citizens in achieving goals, whereas facilitation by network structuration refers to regulatory actions that can promote mobilization (Bakker et al., 2012).

Communities can have different levels of exposure to these three factors. Some communities may have public and private stakeholders who are interested in working with others to develop CVE programming, while other communities may not. A community may also have specific capabilities or resources that can be used to help mobilize community stakeholders around CVE, whereas other communities may not have such a capacity. For instance, some communities may have a history of collaborative programming, making it easier for these community stakeholders to agree to work collaboratively, while other communities do not. Likewise, some communities may have community stakeholders with actual expertise in CVE-relevant work and knowledge of CVE, making it easier for community stakeholders to mobilize around a cause.¹¹⁸ Finally, facilitative leadership may exist in some communities and not in others.

Facilitation can also take different forms. First, since some individuals are extrinsically motivated, facilitation may include the use of external incentives, either positive or negative, to motivate stakeholders to form collaborative governance networks. Positive incentives refer to the use of compensation or another reward to encourage participation (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). Since stakeholders, as rational actors, will not agree to participate if participation yields more expected costs than benefits, a facilitator can offer a stakeholder compensation that is at least as great as the expected opportunity costs associated with task completion. When the expected benefits outweigh the costs of participation, stakeholders are more likely to mobilize.

Facilitators can also issue negative incentives or sanction stakeholders for inaction. Sanctions raise the costs for stakeholders not to comply and participate. For instance, in a principal-agent relationship where the principal is a governing authority, the principal can

¹¹⁸ For instance, anti-gang and crime prevention programs can be reformulated to address the needs of CVE efforts.

require by law that an agent complies with the demands of the principal. With punishments set in place for noncompliance, stakeholders will be more likely to comply with the demands of the principal.

Besides incentivized facilitation, since some individuals are intrinsically motivated, a facilitator can also use non-incentivized facilitation techniques to motivate stakeholders to work collaboratively. To promote intrinsic motivations amongst community stakeholders, a facilitator can rely on traditional network management techniques to achieve compliance at a highly internalized level. Rather than using sanctions or positive incentives to sway stakeholders to comply, a facilitator can attempt to mobilize stakeholders by actively recruiting individuals to mobilize. A facilitator can do so by leveraging existing social capital or by strategically framing mobilization to make participation appealing to a stakeholder (Gray 1989; Page 2010). Either way, potential participants must believe that the cause is just and important enough to act on (Snow and Benford 1992).

4.5.4 Conditions Conducive to Mobilization

Although decentralized policymaking often fails and not all community stakeholders will be interested in creating a governance network, governance networks can still emerge within a community. There are four possible conditions where a governance network is most likely to emerge. First, a governance network is likely in a community with a facilitator and stakeholders who are interested in CVE and have the capacity to mobilize.¹¹⁹ Although interest in collaborative action is important (Thomson and Perry 2006), mere interest in CVE programming

¹¹⁹ The need for facilitation follows previous studies that also assert that facilitation makes participation more likely by making the process easier for participants. See, for example, Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993.

does not guarantee that mobilization will occur because of the collective action problem. For example, research in Australia has found that stakeholders were interested in participating in collaborative action on CVE but faced a range of risks and challenges, which often prevented stakeholders from participating. Besides funding constraints, respondents expressed reputational concerns about being associated with the delivery of CVE services (Cherney et al. 2017). Moreover, the rarity of expertise in CVE and the lack of direction from the federal government regarding CVE programming warrants the need for some guidance and reassurance during the mobilization process. Facilitation can even foster community stakeholder interest in CVE if needed, since stakeholders may not initially be interested in CVE. That said, facilitation does not require the use of external incentives if community stakeholders have either prior interest in CVE or develop an interest in CVE and the capacity to mobilize. In this scenario, the threshold to overcome the collective action problem is low.

Second, a network is likely to emerge in communities with stakeholders who have acquired an interest in CVE either prior to facilitation or due to non-incentivized facilitation efforts but do not have the capacity to mobilize, when a facilitator uses positive incentives to motivate stakeholders. Without positive incentives, stakeholders are unlikely to mobilize around CVE given the lack of capacity. Positive incentives will reduce the costs associated with mobilization, which will simultaneously increase the prospects for mobilization. Since collaborative action is a resource-dependent and time-consuming activity (Yaffee and Wondolleck 2003), community stakeholders need to have the knowledge, expertise, and resources to participate. Positive incentives, such as financial compensation, can reduce the costs of participation and convince community stakeholders to participate, which may not have happened otherwise.

The last two scenarios involve communities without stakeholders who have an interest in CVE. In these communities, regardless of whether the stakeholder have the capacity to mobilize, mobilization is only likely if a facilitator uses negative incentives. Without interest in CVE, positive incentives and non-incentivized facilitation are unlikely to mobilize stakeholders. Stakeholders who have no interest in CVE are unlikely to view CVE programming as beneficial or needed within their communities. Subsequently, these stakeholders will likely continue to weigh the costs of participation and implementation as greater than the expected benefits of mobilization. The table below outlines the theory’s predictions for mobilization by outlining the conditions under which mobilization is likely to occur within a community.

Table 4.1: Conditions Conducive to Mobilization

		<i>Capacity</i>	
		<i>High</i>	<i>Low</i>
<i>Interest in CVE</i>	<i>High</i>	Non-incentivized facilitation	Positive incentives
	<i>Low</i>	Negative incentives	Negative incentives

4.5.5 Conventional Explanations for Implementation Outcomes

Even if stakeholders mobilize around CVE and form a governance network, implementation of a CVE plan still may not occur. There are a variety of potential explanations for the variation in implementation outcomes. I categorize these explanations into two broad categories:

metagovernance/structural and policy specific. Different forms of metagovernance¹²⁰ can be used as a means to regulate the governance network and resolve coordination problems (Jessop 2002; Sorensen and Torfing 2007). Metagovernance can include a series of “hands-on” and “hands-off” approaches¹²¹ to regulate the efficiency of governance networks (Sorensen and Torfing 2007).¹²² Scholars have identified numerous metagovernance “tools” that principals can use to help minimize agency loss. Principals can pre-screen and select agents, monitor and evaluate the work of agents, and offer agents incentives or sanction agents for not completing tasks. Policy-specific explanations refer to the complexity of the programs, the resources available for agents to implement programs, and the prior experience of agents working together as sources for agency loss.

In reference to metagovernance, scholars have identified various techniques that principals can use to minimize agency loss within the policy implementation process. The three most common techniques include the screening and selection of agents, the use of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) mechanisms, and the use of sanctions and/or incentives. Past studies have argued that one way for principals to ensure that tasks are completed is for principals to select agents that hold the same preferences as the principal through a pre-selection process (Bendor, Glazer, and Hammond 2001). M&E mechanisms also have the ability to increase agent

¹²⁰ The term metagovernance is derived from the public administration literature. Other scholars also use the term network management to refer to the regulation of governance networks (Kickert et al. 1997).

¹²¹ “Hands-on” approaches are forms of metagovernance that bring a metagovernor in direct interaction with the governance network either through the form of process management or network participation. “Hands-off” approaches are forms of metagovernance where a metagovernor seeks to regulate the network through indirect methods such as institutional design (Sorensen and Torfing 2007).

¹²² The literature identifies four main tools of metagovernance. The first tool involves the use of political, discursive, and financial framing, which requires a metagovernor to define the overall objectives of a network or encourage a network to pursue a certain strategy through the allocation of financial resources. The second tool, network facilitation, requires a metagovernor to use process management techniques to lower the transaction costs of interacting and as a means to resolve conflicts. The third tool, network participation, requires a metagovernor to participate in the governance network and align the goals of all actors involved. Finally, the last tool, institutional design, requires a metagovernor to define the of rules of engagement within a network (Sorensen and Torfing 2017).

accountability by increasing the costs of noncompliance for agents (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973). Contracts are one of the most common tools principals use to achieve policy objectives (Kelman 2002). Principals can embed M&E mechanisms within contracts to both reduce the costs associated with implementation and improve agent performance (Brown, Potoski and Van Slyke 2009). If an agent is required to submit performance results in exchange for reimbursement, the agent may be more likely to comply with the principal's demands (Weingast 1984). Finally, principals can enforce penalties or grant awards to agents to motivate agents to complete the tasks. The threat of sanctions provides agents with the motivation not to shirk (Goldsmith and Eggers 2004).

Factors associated with the policy may also impact implementation. As argued by Provan and Kenis (2008), the nature of a task can have a significant impact on the success of a network. Namely, the content of the programs, access to funding and prior stakeholder experience with collaborative policymaking and implementation can also make the implementation process easier for some stakeholders. Since complex policies can complicate the implementation process (Larson 1980), some CVE programs may be simply easier to implement than others, which may explain the different outcomes in implementation. Policy implementation also requires financial resources (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973). A lack of appropriate funding and staffing needed to implement programs could then itself explain the lack of implementation in some communities. Prior institutional ties between the public and private stakeholders implementing the policy may also make implementation easier for local governance networks. The presence of prior partnerships may make it easier for some local governance networks to use these prior partnerships to foster coordination and subsequently implement collaborative programs (Caruson and MacManus 2007; Chenoweth and Clark 2010).

4.5.6 Problem 2: Coordination

Although there may be many reasons for the lack of implementation in the United States, in this dissertation, I emphasize the impact of coordination problems on implementation efforts. After the mobilization stage, stakeholders need to coordinate their efforts and determine what the actual programs will encompass and what service providers will implement them. In general, coordination is difficult amongst multiple stakeholders, not only because stakeholders disagree with each other, but also because coordination requires both time and effort. Coordination requires stakeholders to set aside time to work together as a collective to develop and implement programs. Since stakeholders often volunteer their time to the CVE cause, organizing meetings around different schedules can be a challenge in and of itself. For CVE, coordination problems are amplified because of the variety of actors with differing interests involved, the uncertainty and stigmatization associated with CVE programming and the lack of administrative rules for CVE policy implementation.

The involvement of a variety of stakeholders with different interests in the policymaking process can impede coordination for three reasons. First, a stakeholder's self-interest may conflict with either the interests of other stakeholders involved in the process or what is best for the entire community (Ansell and Gash 2012). For instance, in the government, conflicts of interest can often create in-fighting between different agencies (Bardach 1998). Stakeholders are less likely to coordinate their actions with others if their interests do not align.

Second, in addition to the realization that CVE initiatives are stigmatizing, there is a general lack of knowledge regarding "what works" best for CVE and how to implement CVE

programming (Mastroe and Szmania 2016). A lack of information concerning CVE in combination with the number of stakeholders involved in a controversial initiative can lead to differences in opinion and local political conflict. This is what makes CVE unique from other similar collaborative governance policymaking initiatives. Even if we assume that all stakeholders have a common interest in either reducing the threat of violent extremism or implementing CVE programming, these stakeholders may have different interpretations of how to do so. Stakeholders may disagree not only on the types of programs to implement, but also about deciding where to obtain funding from, deciding what organizations/individuals to include in the implementation of the plan, deciding when and where to implement the plan, and deciding how to allocate tasks. Subsequently, local political conflicts that emerge within a governance network can hinder development and implementation progress.

Finally, stakeholders involved in the process may not have previously worked together. Without prior collaboration, stakeholders do not have experience working and coordinating with the other stakeholders. Consequently, stakeholders are less likely to correctly assess the preferences and working styles of others within the network, which can make coordination more difficult. Altogether, when decision-makers are unable to coordinate their actions, implementation is unlikely. Thus, in this dissertation, I emphasize the influence of local political dynamics that fuel coordination problems and ultimately negatively impact the development and implementation process.

4.5.7 Resolving Coordination Problems

To resolve these coordination problems, I follow conventional arguments within the policymaking literature¹²³ and argue that hierarchy can resolve coordination problems. Although there are benefits of decentralization and horizontal decision-making,¹²⁴ decentralization invites the potential for agency loss (Treisman 2007). A more decentralized system with egalitarian decision-making that encompasses a variety of actors leads to less coordination between actors and a lower level of outputs (Clark 1968; Crosby 1996; Sabatier 1986). For these reasons, some scholars argue that hierarchy matters for the prospects of policy change (Clark 1968; Crain and Rosenthal 1966; McLanahan 1980). These scholars argue that a centralized structure with a clear ranking of units and delegation of tasks is ideal for policy change. That said, I argue that a local CVE leader can act as a de facto centralization mechanism.

4.5.8 Role of Local CVE Leaders

Given these insights and my findings from the United Kingdom that emphasize the importance of centralization, I argue that a local CVE leader is needed within a governance network.

Although there are benefits gleaned from decentralization, given the uniqueness of CVE

¹²³ Policy implementation research has undergone three generations. The first generation of studies viewed policy implementation in terms of cost-benefit analysis and viewed implementation as a function of flawed or imperfect primary legislation. The result of the first generation was a multitude of case studies with little theoretical implications. The second generation focused more on theory particularly related to top-down theories of command and control as a contributing factor to explain implementation. Although an alternative to the second generation of research emerged that focused more on bottom-up explanations of implementation. The focus of the third generation of research was to be more scientific while putting forth a contingency theory to suggest that there is not a one size fits all approach to understanding implementation across issue-areas. See, for example, DeLeon and DeLeon (2002).

¹²⁴ Proponents of decentralization argue that decentralization leads to better governance, while others suggest that decentralization brings government “closer to the people” (Ostrom 2008).

policymaking, some form of centralization is needed. A key feature of CVE governance networks is that network members are able to help develop and implement CVE programming in some way. However, when stakeholders fail to agree on the specific details or an aspect of a policy, a local CVE leader is needed to step-in to move the process forward. A leader can act as a “shadow hierarchy” and can be used by a network as a “fall-back” option when conflict threatens to derail the policymaking process (Scharpf 1994).

I am not the first to emphasize the importance of leadership for the policymaking process (e.g. Ansell and Gash 2012; Crosby and Bryson 2005; Kettl 2009; Wondolleck and Ryan 1998). Other scholars have argued that consensus-based policymaking is prone to a leadership deficit problem which negatively impacts the policymaking process (Stephens 2014). By advocating for the importance of leadership, scholars have identified the different types and forms of leaders that are commonly found. Leaders can be professionally trained, independent actors or organic actors who hold a vested interest in the community (Ansell and Gash 2012). These leaders can be embedded within a governance network or lead “at a distance” as a sponsor or funder (Wondolleck and Ryan 1998). Important for the CVE policymaking process, there are also three forms of leadership: leadership for the process to handle administrative and logistical tasks, leadership for issues to set the policy agenda, and leadership for the decisions to be made (Ibid). I argue, for CVE, the presence of a leader or set of leaders within the governance network with the ability to execute all three tasks is critical for the successful implementation of CVE programming.¹²⁵ By executing these tasks, a leader can mimic a top-down hierarchical policymaking structure within a decentralization collaborative environment.

¹²⁵ It is important to note the key distinction between facilitation in the mobilization stage and leadership in the development and implementation stage. Facilitation does not require a stakeholder to make policy decisions or set an agenda. However, I argue, a leader is required to do just that. Thus, although a leader is a facilitator, a facilitator is not necessarily a leader.

Consequently, the tradeoffs of decentralization versus centralization are not zero-sum. Mechanisms of centralization are still possible when policymaking is decentralized, granting stakeholders the benefits of decentralization coupled with the safeguards associated with centralization. This option retains the community-based nature of policymaking. Even though a local CVE leader embedded within the governance network facilitates action at the local level by managing the process and making key decisions regarding the model, “lower level” stakeholders are still involved in the planning and implementation of the CVE model and have the ability to shape the content of the model. In theory, when coordination problems are not resolved through collective decision-making, a leader who is trusted by other network members can mediate conflict to help resolve those problems. Subsequently, I expect that governance networks with a local CVE leader who can facilitate coordination, set the agenda, and make final decisions will be more likely to create more detailed and comprehensive CVE action plans and fully implement those plans.

Although some scholars argue that hierarchy is not the only solution to coordination problems pointing to self-organizing approaches,¹²⁶ I predict that no or partial implementation of CVE plans will occur in communities where there is not a local CVE leader acting as a functional equivalent for centralization. The lack of administrative rules associated with CVE policymaking, the heterogeneity amongst stakeholders and the degree of uncertainty and stigmatization related to CVE make coordination difficult without a leader helping guide the process. Under these circumstances, it is unlikely that the governance network will develop a

¹²⁶ Other mechanisms that can potentially produce policy coordination include framing, the use of networks, and the use of boundary spanners. For a detailed discussion, please see Peters, 2013.

comprehensive CVE action plan with the details needed to implement all aspects of the plan. Partial implementation, then, is the best-case scenario for any watered-down action plans. The table below summarizes the predictions from both stages.

Table 4.2: Implementation Predictions

		<i>Presence of a Local CVE Leader</i>	
		<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>
<i>Mobilization</i>	<i>Yes</i>	Implementation	Partial or No Implementation
	<i>No</i>	No Implementation	No Implementation

4.6 Conclusion

My argument explains why the implementation of CVE plans in the United States is rare. After discussing key assumptions about security policy and how I conceptualize the policymaking process, I outlined my central argument. Broadly speaking, I argue that implementation is best explained by understanding the various problems and challenges that arise during the policymaking process.

The remainder of this dissertation will show that facilitation promotes mobilization and a local level leader can resolve coordination problems that arise during the policymaking process. In reference to mobilization, I show that facilitators can use a variety of mobilization techniques to either raise the expected benefits of compliance or raise the expected costs of noncompliance relative to the expected costs associated with participation and implementation. These techniques include methods such as the use of sanctions, positive incentives, and self-determination

techniques. I will also show how interest in CVE and the capacity to mobilize dictate what facilitation technique is needed to foster mobilization.

Given the uniqueness of CVE policymaking, the existence of a CVE governance network does not mean that a network will ultimately implement its CVE plan. I will show that CVE governance networks often succumb to conflicts between stakeholders and decision stalemates which hinders implementation. However, networks with a local CVE leader who can act as an informal centralization mechanism are more likely to overcome conflict and create and fully implement comprehensive CVE action plans versus leaderless governance networks. These key factors, together, help explain why and how some local CVE governance networks can implement security-related policy while others fall short.

In the next several chapters I use parts of my theory to help explain the lack of CVE plans in the United States. In the next chapter, I analyze the mobilization process in two communities, Houston and Chicago, and show how facilitation led to the mobilization of stakeholders in Houston. Following this chapter, I explore the development and implementation processes in three communities, Boston, Los Angeles, and Montgomery County, and I illustrate how the actions of a local CVE leader in Montgomery County contributed to the successful implementation of the collaborative Montgomery County CVE Model.

CHAPTER 5

COMMUNITY STAKEHOLDER MOBILIZATION RESPONSES¹²⁷

5.1 Introduction

In the 2011 national CVE strategy, the Obama administration delegated the responsibility to design and implement CVE programs to local communities. The strategy also came with a catch. At the time, federal funding delegated specifically for the implementation of this CVE strategy did not exist. This meant that community stakeholders would need to volunteer their time and resources to creating and implementing CVE programs within their communities. Despite the odds, between 2011 and 2016, approximately¹²⁸ eleven communities have responded to the federal government's call to action and formed a local governance network¹²⁹ with the intention to design and implement multi-sector CVE programs.¹³⁰ This chapter examines the differing community stakeholder responses to the federal government's CVE strategies at the community level.¹³¹

¹²⁷ This chapter is adapted from Caitlin Ambrozik, "Community Stakeholder Responses to Countering Violent Extremism Locally." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* just-accepted (2018): 1-23.

¹²⁸ This number is only an approximate number for the following reasons. First, a comprehensive list of current CVE programs in the US did not exist for the author to consult. Subsequently, and not surprisingly, a list of communities that have created a governance network with the intention to design and implement a CVE plan also did not exist. The author learned of the communities working on CVE through interviews with US Government officials (USGO) and CVE practitioners. Since the implementation of CVE is bottom-up in the United States, it is possible that some communities are working on this issue without the knowledge of USGO. Subsequently, the quoted number is only an estimated approximate number.

¹²⁹ A governance network is a form of 'blended social action' (Sampson et al., 2005). I use the term governance network to refer to the public-private partnerships that emerge with the intention to design and implement CVE initiatives at the local level.

¹³⁰ The local governance networks are found in the following areas: Atlanta, GA; Boston, MA; Chicago, IL; Dearborn, MI; Denver, CO; Houston, TX; Los Angeles, CA; Minneapolis/St. Paul, MN; Montgomery County, MD; New York City, NY; Tampa, FL.

¹³¹ I use the term 'community' to refer to the areas where local governance networks implement their CVE plans. The U.S. Federal Government uses this terminology to promote CVE efforts as a 'community-led' initiative. The conceptualization of community varies by locality. In some areas, 'community' simply refers to the Muslim community within a particular city, whereas in other areas community can refer to an inter-faith community living in

To explain why CVE governance networks emerge within some communities and not others, in chapter four I outlined four scenarios under which mobilization is most likely to occur. For mobilization to occur in three of the four scenarios, I argued that facilitation would be needed in the form of either positive or negative incentives. However, in the United States, up until 2016, positive incentives in the form of compensation did not exist. Moreover, the federal government does not use negative incentives to promote mobilization. Given this, according to my theory, mobilization occurred in these eleven communities because there were stakeholders who were interested in CVE and had the capacity to mobilize, and a facilitator used non-incentivized facilitation methods to recruit stakeholders to participate. All three factors should then explain the existence of mobilization given the uncertainty around the concept of CVE, the lack of CVE expertise, and the costs associated with mobilization.

A comparison of two communities, Houston and Columbus, that expressed an initial interest in CVE and are statistically matched on a number of potential determinants of mobilization, highlights the importance of each of the three factors for mobilization. Both communities had the capacity to mobilize and form CVE governance networks and had community stakeholders who were interested in CVE, but facilitation only occurred in Houston. Based on interviews with stakeholders involved in the local CVE efforts and primary source information, I find that facilitation, specifically non-incentivized facilitation, was key to the successful mobilization of a collaborative CVE governance network in Houston.

I also extend my theoretical expectation from the community level to the micro-level by examining the decisions of individual community stakeholders. Similar to the community writ

a larger region. For this chapter, the community component is embedded within a local governance network composed of actors such as nongovernment organizations and local government officials who are members of a particular concentrated geographical area.

large, I predict that stakeholders who express an interest in CVE and have the capacity to mobilize are more likely to mobilize after being guided through the mobilization process. Survey data of those stakeholder in Houston who mobilized and stakeholder in Columbus who did not lends further support to this argument.

5.2 Community Case Selection and Methodology

Given the lack of positive and negative incentives in the U.S., I concentrate the empirical analysis in communities with community stakeholders who are interested in CVE and have the capacity to mobilize. As a result, in this chapter I focus my attention on the scenarios that are most likely to occur in the United States. In doing so, these cases provide a hard test for the need of facilitative action, since CVE governance networks are most likely to emerge in these cases given the low threshold to overcome the collective action problem. To examine the explanatory value of my theory, I conduct a comparative analysis of two communities, one with a CVE governance network and one without a network.

To find two similar communities with different experiences with mobilization, I chose the most similar cases amongst communities who have stakeholders who were interested in CVE. I use a Community Resilience Exercise (CREX) and the general receptiveness of CVE amongst the community stakeholders who attended the exercise to determine whether or not a community has members who are interested in CVE. As explained previously, the Community Resilience Exercise (CREX), consisted of a half-day exercise designed to improve communication between law enforcement and communities and to share ideas amongst participants on how to build community resilience through CVE programming. Employees of both the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and the Department of Homeland Security's

(DHS) Civil Rights and Civil Liberties division (CRCL) are invited into communities by community members interested in CVE to give the briefing (National Counterterrorism Center 2015). To date, federal employees have given the CREX to the following cities: Seattle, WA; Chicago, IL; Durham, NC; Houston, TX; Nashville, TN; New York City, NY; Sacramento, CA; Minneapolis, MN; Columbus, OH; and Fresno, CA.¹³² According to Seamus Hughes, who facilitated many of these exercises, generally all of the community members who attended the exercise were receptive to the idea of CVE except for community members in New York City.¹³³

From this set of communities, I determined whether or not the community mobilized. I operationalize mobilization within a community by the presence of community stakeholders within a community who form a governance network with the intention to plan and possibly implement a CVE plan. I define a CVE governance network as a network consisting of two or more local public and private stakeholders whereby the purpose of stakeholder involvement in the network is to help develop and potentially implement a CVE plan. A governance network can either be a formal network in which stakeholders are bonded together by contracts or an informal network in which stakeholders are bonded together simply by trust. In the U.S., CVE governance networks are primarily informal networks. Based on this definition, out of the eleven communities that expressed an interest in CVE, community stakeholders in only three communities, Chicago,¹³⁴ Houston, and Minneapolis,¹³⁵ mobilized and created a governance network to develop a CVE action plan.

¹³²The CREX was also given in Washington, D.C., but this briefing was a pilot activity where leaders from across the country were invited to Washington, D.C. to participate. Given that this CREX was not tied to a particular city, I have not included this case in my analysis.

¹³³ Seamus Hughes, former National Counterterrorism Center employee, personal communication, Washington, D.C., February 23, 2016

¹³⁴ Please, see the Appendix C for a brief description of CVE efforts in Chicago.

¹³⁵ Although community stakeholders in Minneapolis mobilized around CVE, for the comparative case selection, I exclude Minneapolis from the analysis because Minneapolis was chosen by the White House as a CVE Pilot City. With this designation came an added pressure to mobilize, which non-pilot communities did not have.

Besides an interest in CVE, as found in the public administration literature, there are many potential drivers of collaborative governance. To account for these other explanations for the emergence of CVE governance networks, I include these other drivers in my case selection process. To measure these other drivers of collaborative governance, I use the county unit of analysis rather than the central city itself. I do this because even though the CREX took place in a specific city, stakeholders operating in areas beyond the central city often participated in the CREX. For the comparative analysis, community should then be interpreted as a geographical county.

My theory on mobilization also identifies the importance of stakeholder capacity for mobilization. To compare cases on this driver, I use a series of proxy variables to capture different types of capacity. The first variable is the existence of prior domain-specific collaborative networks within a community. In communities with a pre-existing collaborative network, community stakeholders may be accustomed to working together, and the presence of such networks illustrates that collaborative governance is possible within that community. Moreover, prior working partnerships may make it easier for a facilitator to mobilize community stakeholders around CVE. Although there were no prior CVE collaborative networks in place within the communities, there were other security networks. To account for this possibility, I include two measures: the presence of a Fusion Center and the presence of a DHS Community Roundtable. Fusion Centers operate as a collaborative information-sharing hub for federal, state, and local law enforcement and security partners to share information critical for enhancing homeland security. In total, there are around 70 Fusion Centers in the United States.¹³⁶ Whereas

¹³⁶ For additional information, please see: <https://www.dhs.gov/fusion-center-locations-and-contact-information>

the presence of a Fusion Center captures government and law enforcement collaboration, the presence of a DHS Community Roundtable captures government and civil society collaboration. DHS's Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) branch holds regular roundtable meetings to bring together community members and government representatives. Currently, 15 cities hold quarterly roundtables to discuss issues that are of concern to community members.¹³⁷

Community capacity can also include the resources available to the community that may make mobilization easier. As proxy measures for the presence of resources that can be used for mobilization, I include measures for the overall population and percentage of citizens that are foreign-born using data from the 2010 U.S. Census.¹³⁸ I also include a measure of the estimated percentage of citizens within the county that are Muslim using data from the Association of Religion Data Archives (2010).¹³⁹ Larger counties may have more resources to mobilize community stakeholders, while counties with larger numbers of immigrants and Muslims are more likely to have civil society services in place to cater to these minority groups. Since CVE programs often cater to Muslim and immigrant communities, the presence of community stakeholders already mobilized and offering services to these communities may make the mobilization of a CVE governance network more likely.

I also include other variables besides interest in CVE and a community's capacity to mobilize that may influence prospects for mobilization. Certain communities may be more likely to mobilize around CVE if community stakeholders perceive that there is a problem of violent extremism within the community. To account for this possibility, I include three measures to

¹³⁷ For additional information, please see: Department of Homeland Security, "Community Engagement Section." Available at: <https://www.dhs.gov/community-engagement>

¹³⁸ Retrieved from: <https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/>

¹³⁹ Association of Religion Data Archives. (2010). Muslim Estimate Counties (2010). Retrieved from: http://www.thearda.com/q12010/QL_C_2010_1_28c.asp

capture this perceived threat: the number of terrorist incidents since 2001, the number of foreign fighters from the community, and whether or not an area was a recipient of the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI). My source for the number of terrorist incidents from 2001 is from the Global Terrorism Database,¹⁴⁰ while I use data from a report produced for the DHS by the Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute that gathered data on American foreign fighters from 2011 to 2015 to obtain the number of foreign fighters from a community.¹⁴¹ I include recipients of the UASI as a proxy for the overall threat of terrorism. DHS selects recipients of the UASI based on a risk methodology. DHS chooses regions by estimating the relative risk¹⁴² for terrorism in the 100 most populous metro statistical areas.

The geographical locations of potential community stakeholders to mobilize around CVE may also impact the prospects for mobilization. Of particular interest is the locations of the Muslim population surrounding the major city, since Muslims are actively involved in developing community-led CVE programs. If a Muslim community is centrally located, it may be easier for these community stakeholders to mobilize compared to a community that is geographically dispersed. To distinguish between communities with a centrally located Muslim population and communities with a Muslim population that is dispersed, I calculate the average distance between Mosques within a 25-mile radius of the central city.¹⁴³

¹⁴⁰ Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2017). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd>

¹⁴¹ Source: Homeland Security Studies and Analysis Institute. (2015). American Foreign Fighters: Implications for Homeland Security. Retrieved from:

https://www.anser.org/docs/reports/American_Foreign_Fighters_Implications_for_Homeland_Security_Final_Report_Task_14-01.03.11_508.pdf

¹⁴² Relative risk is determined based on three factors: 1.) the likelihood of a future attack; 2.) the likelihood that an attack will be successful; 3.) the predicted effect of an attack. Retrieved from: <http://bparati.com/Urban-Area-Security-Initiative-Program>

¹⁴³ To do so, I geo-located data on Mosques within a 25-mile radius of the central city using ArcGIS software. I then calculated the average distance, in miles, between each Mosque within the 25-mile radius. A buffer zone of 25 miles was chosen to more accurately capture the community actors typically invited by government actors to partake in CVE planning and implementation.

Finally, I select cases based on the political lean of a county and the year the CREX was conducted. I include a measure of the political lean of a county because the national CVE strategy was an Obama administration initiative. Thus, counties that lean towards the left may be more likely to mobilize around a Democratic initiative. I determine whether a county leans Democratic or Republican based on the majority of votes at the county level for the 2008 and 2012 Presidential elections using data from the Guardian (Rogers and Cage 2012). Finally, I include the year the CREX occurred. Mobilization takes time, and CREX briefings were conducted by DHS and NCTC at different points in time starting in 2014. Therefore, regions that have had a CREX briefing more recently have had less time to mobilize compared to counties that had CREX briefings in 2014. I gathered information regarding the dates of the CREX briefings culled from the DHS CRCL monthly activity reports.¹⁴⁴

Following Nielsen's (2016) call for the use of statistical matching techniques in "most similar" research designs, to find the most similar cases, I use Gower's General Similarity Coefficient as a metric to gauge the comparability of cases. The estimation involves calculating the distance between cases based on various potential determinants of mobilization to determine the degree of similarity between cases. Based on this calculation, I am able to match the cases that are most similar on various potential determinants of mobilization but differ in terms of the type of facilitation and the outcome variable of interest, mobilization. This matching technique ensures that the case selection is systematic, credible, transparent, and replicable (Nielsen 2016).

The results of the matching are displayed in Table 5.1 below. Gower's General Similarity Coefficient calculates how similar or dissimilar the cases are to each other in terms of the potential determinants of mobilization. The distance coefficient ranges from a scale of 0,

¹⁴⁴ As an example, please see: https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/crcl-newsletter-june-2011_0.pdf

indicating complete similarity between two cases, to 1, indicating complete dissimilarity between two cases. I select on the outcome variable whereby Houston and Chicago are positive cases. Subsequently, to find the two most similar cases that differ in terms of mobilization, I find a case that is most similar to either Houston or Chicago. The two most similar cases are Houston (Harris County) and Columbus (Franklin County) with a coefficient of 0.273. Both communities share many similarities yet differ in the type of facilitation the community received and the outcome variable of interest, mobilization.

Table 5.1 Gower Similarity Coefficient Results:

Gower Similarity Coefficient Results								
	Houston	Columbus	Chicago	Seattle	Durham	Sacramento	Nashville	Fresno
Houston	0							
Columbus	0.273	0						
Chicago	0.214	0.351	0					
Seattle	0.343	0.364	0.481	0				
Durham	0.503	0.378	0.607	0.411	0			
Sacramento	0.301	0.339	0.456	0.352	0.363	0		
Nashville	0.483	0.352	0.647	0.512	0.238	0.191	0	
Fresno	0.562	0.511	0.729	0.404	0.232	0.282	0.198	0

5.3 Houston and Columbus as Comparison Cases

Houston and Columbus are prime candidates for a comparative analysis since both communities have stakeholders who share similar interests in CVE and both had the capacity to mobilize, based on my metrics. Community stakeholders and law enforcement in both areas expressed an

openness to the concept of CVE when employees of DHS and NCTC conducted a CREX in both communities in 2014. As argued previously, a common interest in CVE is critical because communities in which community stakeholders express an interest in CVE lowers the threshold for overcoming the collective action problem.

Both communities also had the capacity to mobilize around a collaborative multi-sector endeavor. As a historically Democratic region, Houston, similar to the Columbus region, has a history of both conducting community engagement initiatives and creating multi-disciplinary solutions to community problems. Community collaboration in Houston expands beyond the presence of a Fusion center and DHS Roundtables. One of the key stakeholders in initiating CVE efforts in Houston, Sheriff Adrian Garcia, was also instrumental in ensuring local law enforcement actively engaged community members, specifically from ethnic communities. One initiative started by Sheriff Garcia in 2010, titled the Incident Response Forum, brought community members together to ensure the community had a plan in place if a community emergency occurred.¹⁴⁵ The Harris County Sheriff's Office (HCSO) relied on existing social capital to create a network of community leaders who could quickly respond to an emergency and disseminate information to their communities. The City of Houston Mayor's Office also developed an Anti-Gang Model in response to local gang activities. This model also utilized a collaborative structure which relied on community stakeholders to develop and implement programs.¹⁴⁶ The connections and experience gained from these initiatives provided the basis for CVE efforts in Houston.

¹⁴⁵ Source: Email from Outreach Strategists to HCSO, August 17, 2010

¹⁴⁶ Houston's model was based on the national gang center's comprehensive gang model. The model is available at: <https://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/Comprehensive-Gang-Model/About>

A long history of community collaboration could have also provided the Columbus area with a solid network to utilize for CVE efforts. In addition to the Fusion Center and DHS Roundtables, other community engagement initiatives and types of multi-sector programming are common in the area, partly due to the ethnic and religious diversity of the region. Columbus is home to a world-recognized interfaith coalition, named the Safe Alliance of Interfaith Leaders (S.A.I.L). Created as a Christian-Muslim initiative, the group has evolved into an interfaith collaboration comprised of community leaders from Christian, Muslim, Jewish, and Hindu faiths. The coalition promotes interfaith dialogue and peace through education and community-oriented events. As explained by Imran Malik, the co-founder of S.A.I.L, the interfaith collaborative work serves as an example for other communities.¹⁴⁷

Besides community interest and capacity to mobilize, the communities also faced a threat from violent extremism. The travel of American citizens to fight abroad for terrorist organizations has been a concern in both communities, since individuals from both the Houston and Columbus areas became foreign fighters.¹⁴⁸ The federal government also acknowledged the potential threat of violent extremism in its designation of both areas as UASI recipient awardees. Even though a terrorist event occurred in Columbus and not in Houston, which suggests that the threat of violent extremism may be greater in Columbus than Houston, Houston mobilized while Columbus did not.

¹⁴⁷ Imran Malik, personal communication, March 12, 2016

¹⁴⁸ In Columbus, in 2013, Abdifatah Aden left Columbus for Syria to fight with al-Nusra Front. Following his half-brother to Syria, Abdirahman Mohamud, also left Columbus and traveled to Syria in 2014 to fight for al-Nusra Front. In Houston, Michael Todd Wolfe attempted to join ISIS in 2014. Source: United States v. Abdirahman Sheik Mohamud, Criminal Indictment, United States District Court, Southern District of Ohio, April 2015; United States v. Michael Todd Wolfe, Criminal Complaint, United States District Court, Western District of Texas, June 2014.

Although both communities have prior collaborative social networks in place, it is also possible that Houston had other resources, such as funding, that Columbus did not have to mobilize around CVE. This does not appear to be the case. Despite the designation of both communities as UASI recipients, neither community received funding specifically allocated for CVE initiatives. Because funding is critical for mobilization efforts, the lack of CVE funding in both communities levels the playing field for comparison purposes.

Beyond the similarities between the two cases, the communities differ in various ways. Both cases are large urban areas with a higher percentage of Muslims and foreign-born citizens than the national average, although Harris County is larger and has a higher percentage of Muslims and foreign-born citizens.¹⁴⁹ Consequently, civil society may simply be more developed in Harris County than Franklin County, which may have made it easier for Harris County to mobilize community stakeholders and leverage existing social capital. Additionally, the estimated geographic dispersion of the Muslim population differs between the two cases. In Houston, the Muslim population is not centrally located compared to the Muslim community surrounding Columbus, which should make it more difficult, logistically speaking, for the Houston area Muslim community to mobilize.¹⁵⁰ However, community stakeholders within Houston mobilized around CVE whereas community stakeholders in Columbus did not. Nonetheless, the differences amongst the two cases raise an inferential problem for my argument. Since the communities are not exact matches, other factors such as Houston's well developed civil society could also explain mobilization in Houston. Consequently, a

¹⁴⁹ The population of Harris County is 4,092,459 with 2.86% of the population being Muslim and 25.4% of the population is foreign-born. The population of Franklin County is 1,163,414 with a 1.34% Muslim population and a 9.8% foreign-born population.

¹⁵⁰ The average distance between Mosques in Houston is 12.31 miles, while the average distance between Mosques in Columbus is 5.93 miles.

deterministic argument is not plausible and the role of facilitation conditioned on a community’s members’ interest and capacity to mobilize should instead be interpreted in probabilistic terms.

The table below outlines the main similarities and differences between the two cases.

Table 5.2: Houston and Columbus as Comparative Cases

	Houston	Columbus
Mobilization	Yes	No
Year of CREX	2014	2014
Fusion Center	Yes	Yes
DHS Community	Yes	Yes
Roundtable	0	1
# of terrorist incidents	1	2
# of foreign fighters	Yes	Yes
UASI recipient	4,092,459	1,163,414
Population	2.86%	1.34%
% Muslim	25.4%	9.8%
% Foreign born	12.31 miles	5.94 miles
Average distance between Mosques	Democratic	Democratic
Political lean	Non-incentivized	None
Facilitation		

The next sections examine the process of mobilization in both communities using insights gleaned from semi-structured interviews and primary source material. Based on a snowball-sample, I conducted eight interviews on the mobilization process in Houston and ten interviews on CVE efforts in Columbus. Interviewees included the two Houston facilitators and individuals from the federal government, law enforcement, non-government organizations, and religious institutions. I supplement the interviews with primary source material, which includes email correspondence between practitioners regarding CVE efforts.

5.4 Community Level Reasons for Mobilization

Despite different mobilization outcomes, community stakeholders in Columbus and Houston each had a similar first exposure to the concept of CVE. For both, the CREX served as the first time many of the participants had even heard of the concept, let alone sat down and discussed the concept in a collaborative setting. It is the events that happened afterward that explain the divergence. This section explains CVE efforts in both communities and identifies the importance of interest, capacity, and facilitation in explaining the divergent outcomes in mobilization at the community level. The following section expands the analysis to explain individual-level decisions to mobilize or not.

5.4.1 CVE Efforts in Houston

Shortly after the release of the 2011 CVE strategy, in August 2011, Mustafa Tameez, a community leader, passed along the CVE strategy to the Harris County Sheriff's Office (HCSO).¹⁵¹ Interested in the concept, the Sheriff's office and Tameez took steps to increase the larger community's interest in CVE, the first being inviting NCTC and DHS to the Houston region to conduct a CREX. After being personally invited to the event by Tameez and the HCSO, about 40 community leaders came to the CREX on June 14, 2014, and learned about the concept of CVE and different methods to build community resilience against violent extremism. According to Mustafa Tameez and federal government employees who helped conduct the CREX, community stakeholders were very receptive to the exercise and expressed an interest in

¹⁵¹ Source: Email correspondence from M. Tameez to A. Bernstein (HCSO), August 19, 2011

developing CVE-related programs.¹⁵² In a survey conducted by NCTC and DHS CRCL at the conclusion of the exercise, 96% of participants viewed the exercise as a constructive use of their time, and 89% stated that they would use the information from the exercise to promote future work.¹⁵³

Following the CREX, the HCSO decided to act on developing CVE programs within Harris County. Since there were community stakeholders interested in CVE within Harris County, the HCSO hired Mustafa Tameez, an employee of Outreach Strategists,¹⁵⁴ to provide consulting and training for the HCSO for CVE through public engagement.¹⁵⁵ As part of the contract, Tameez was to develop a strategic plan to CVE with an emphasis on working with at-risk youth within Harris County. To do so, Tameez acted as a facilitator and decided to mobilize the broader community to help develop the plan. Although Tameez was under contract with the HCSO, community members who responded to his call for assistance were not.

After enlisting Wardah Khalid, a Houston native and activist for the American Muslim community, to co-facilitate the mobilization of community members, Tameez organized a CVE plan kickoff meeting to start the planning process. To convince community stakeholders to participate, Tameez leveraged existing social capital within the Harris County Muslim community to recruit individuals and tell them about CVE. Since most community stakeholders hold professions outside of the security sector, the notion of CVE was foreign to them. For this reason, Tameez and Khalid actively facilitated mobilization by approaching key community

¹⁵² Mustafa Tameez, Houston CVE consultant, personal communication, March 1, 2017; Seamus Hughes, former National Counterterrorism Center employee, personal communication, Washington D.C., February 23, 2016; anonymous US Government employee, personal communication, Washington D.C., June 2016

¹⁵³ Source: Community Resilience Exercise Proposal (2015). Freedom of Information Request #DF-2015-00054. Approved for release by ODNI on April 28, 2016.

¹⁵⁴ Outreach Strategists is a consulting firm based in Houston that assists clients with implementing strategic communications solutions. For additional information, please see: <http://www.outreachstrategists.com/what-we-do/>

¹⁵⁵ Source: Harris County Production PO Reference Report, Report Number, R418126. June 24, 2014.

leaders and asking these individuals to be a part of the planning process. Given his previous experience with developing community engagement initiatives, including initiatives for the HCSO, Tameez already had the connections with key community leaders who could contribute to the development of the plan. Moreover, prior to recruiting members of the Muslim community to participate in this endeavor, Tameez obtained the support of Houston’s mayor at the time, Annise Parker, although, the city government was not directly involved in the development of the framework.¹⁵⁶

When asked how he convinced individuals to mobilize behind CVE, Tameez stated that framing was crucial. Tameez explained his approach, ‘if you have a conversation with someone about the gaps in our community and indicate that you think that person is the best situated to fill that gap then there is no push back....it is important to state that if they don’t do it, then who will?’¹⁵⁷ Khalid followed the same approach when asking community members to participate in focus groups and provide insights into the CVE plan. As explained by Khalid, ‘we told them we were taking a different approach than normal CVE...a “whole of society approach” to build community resilience.’¹⁵⁸ Both facilitators used their prior community contacts to reach out to community stakeholders to more clearly explain their intended approach to CVE in an attempt to motivate community stakeholders to mobilize around CVE efforts.

Muslim community members responded positively to Tameez and Khalid’s mobilization efforts. Twenty-five community members helped to develop Harris County’s CVE plan. After the initial meeting, Tameez and Khalid held additional focus group sessions and conducted individual interviews with community stakeholders who agreed to help with developing the plan.

¹⁵⁶ Annise Parker, former mayor of Houston, personal communication, April 6, 2018.

¹⁵⁷ Mustafa Tameez, personal communication, March 1, 2017

¹⁵⁸ Wardah Khalid, personal communication, August 23, 2017.

Through these meetings, Tameez and Khalid received input from community stakeholders on what should be included in the CVE plan and what the community's needs and concerns were. Using these suggestions, the facilitators wrote the formal plan and presented it in a group setting to around 50 community leaders.

Catered towards assisting at-risk youth, the plan consists of a series of recommendations for the Harris County community to follow with the purpose of building community resilience. The plan, titled *Building a Resilient Community to Counter Violent Extremism*, aims to counter violent extremism by strengthening and expanding existing community programs. Programs mentioned in the plan include mental health programs, leadership and civic engagement programs, interfaith dialogue programs, counter-narrative programming, among others. Participants assessed that these particular areas were gaps within the Muslim community in which continued and further action was needed (Tameez and Khalid 2014).

5.4.2 CVE Efforts in Columbus

Whereas community stakeholders in Houston responded to the call for mobilization and in a collaborative setting even created a CVE plan for the Greater Houston area, community stakeholders in Columbus did not. Prior to 2014, religious leaders in the suburban Columbus formed S.A.I.L to promote interfaith dialogue. The group's efforts received national attention during 2012-2013 when the Obama administration expressed an interest in promoting interfaith work in Columbus. According to Imran Malik, one of the co-founders of S.A.I.L., the diversity work of the organization sparked the interest of DHS.¹⁵⁹ In September 2014, Abdirizak Farah, a

¹⁵⁹ Imran Malik, personal communication, March 12, 2016

Columbus native and DHS employee, helped organize a CREX for Columbus. Hosted at a local mosque, Noor Islamic Center, Secretary Johnson of DHS and other employees of DHS and NCTC attended the event to talk to community leaders. At the local level, members from across the interfaith community in addition to local law enforcement and government officials attended the event. As was the case in Houston, the exercise was well attended, and according to Farah, community stakeholders were supportive of the concept of CVE.¹⁶⁰ Yet, stakeholders did not create a CVE governance network.

The objective of the event was to build momentum within the community around CVE; however, the momentum subsided because of the lack of facilitation. According to several community stakeholders, there were additional follow up sessions amongst interfaith leaders regarding diversity initiatives and communication continued between the interfaith community and local law enforcement regarding community concerns. Collaborative action, primarily in the form of discussion forums,¹⁶¹ happened on a variety of topics¹⁶² – except on CVE. Community leaders were supposed to be directed to government officials that could help the community plan CVE programming specifically in response to ISIS, but as noted by Imran Malik, ‘it kind of fell apart.’¹⁶³ There was no one to facilitate policymaking and guide the community through mobilization and ultimately, the implementation process. Without guidance, community stakeholders were unaware what the next steps in the process were and subsequently, the momentum from the CREX disappeared. Employees of the federal government also

¹⁶⁰ Abdirizak Farah, Department of Homeland Security employee, personal communication, March 13, 2017

¹⁶¹ There were some exceptions to this. For example, in a suburb of Columbus, Hilliard, the Hilliard Police Department, Hilliard School District and S.A.I.L worked together to adjust the curriculum within schools in an effort to promote diversity and understanding of multiple faiths (Imran Malik, personal communication, Columbus, OH, April 19, 2016).

¹⁶² For instance, members of the Noor Islamic Center partnered with local law enforcement to create a security plan for Noor’s campus to protect members from harm.

¹⁶³ Imran Malik, personal communication, Columbus, OH, April 19, 2016

acknowledged the lack of facilitation as a contributing reason for the lack of programming as one employee stated, ‘there was simply no follow-up.’ USGOs stated that part of the reason for the lack of follow-up in communities was due to the limited staff dedicated to CVE outreach.¹⁶⁴ Federal government staffing limitations and the lack of non-government individuals at the local level with the appropriate training and knowledge to lead a CVE effort explains the lack of facilitation in Columbus.

Columbus’ CVE experience is a missed opportunity for the development and implementation of a CVE plan. Instead of working collaboratively across public and private sectors, community stakeholders interested in CVE and with the capacity to mobilize either did not explicitly attempt to counter violent extremism or did so on an individual basis. For example, at the Masjid Abubakar Assidiq Islamic Center, the youth community organizer, Horsed Nooh, acknowledged the need for such programming and proceeded to create his own CVE-related programming. To combat radicalization, Nooh created events to educate parents on the dangers of radicalization and engaged in counter-messaging in response to online radicalization.¹⁶⁵ Although ad hoc CVE programming can serve as an alternative to collaborative initiatives, the Columbus case illustrates the complexities of mobilization and why only some communities mobilize around collaborative initiatives.

The comparison of CVE efforts at the community level in Houston and Columbus reveals that CVE governance networks emerge within communities when community stakeholders are interested in such an effort, hold the capacity to mobilize, and when community stakeholders are exposed to facilitation. Non-incentivized facilitation helped launch mobilization in Houston,

¹⁶⁴ Anonymous US government official, personal communication, Washington D.C., July 2015.

¹⁶⁵ Outside of the Islamic Center, Horsed Nooh intervenes whenever he sees early signs of radicalization, although his intervention efforts are done with individuals online who are not associated with the Islamic Center. Horsed Nooh, personal communication, Columbus, OH, April 19, 2016.

while community stakeholders in Columbus, who did not have a facilitator, did not mobilize around the creation of a CVE governance network. Thus, even if a community exhibits the capacity and interest in CVE, mobilization may fail to materialize. Interest in CVE, capacity to mobilize, and the exposure to facilitation are all equally important for mobilization to occur when external incentives are not used for mobilization purposes. While the comparative case analysis explains the emergence of governance networks at the community level, to further verify these findings at the micro-level, the next section introduces a survey I disseminated to community stakeholders who mobilized in Houston and those that did not mobilize in Columbus to understand the divergence in individual actions.

5.5 Micro-level Reasons for Mobilization

My theory posits that mobilization is likely in communities where community stakeholders express an interest in CVE and capacity to mobilize when a facilitator assists community stakeholders during the mobilization process. At the same time, the theory also yields predictions for explaining individual decisions to mobilize or not. To help examine the plausibility of the micro-level implications of the theory, I created two online surveys to understand why community stakeholders located in the Houston and Columbus areas decided to either mobilize or not around CVE. The first survey, distributed in Houston, targeted members of the CVE governance network that formed, while the second survey, distributed in Columbus, targeted community stakeholders most likely to mobilize around CVE. If my theory is correct, community stakeholders who mobilized in Houston did so because they were interested in CVE, had the capacity to mobilize, and were exposed to the actions of the facilitator. In Columbus, my

theory predicts that community stakeholders with an interest in CVE and the capacity to mobilize fail to mobilize due to a lack of facilitation. Finally, my theory also predicts that individuals with no interest in CVE will choose not to mobilize even if offered positive incentives.

5.5.1 Survey Design

A survey of the organizations most likely to mobilize and participate in a CVE governance network requires a unique survey sample. To create the survey sample of the second survey of community stakeholders in the Columbus area who are most likely to mobilize, I collected information on the general employment backgrounds of community stakeholders in existing CVE governance networks in other cities for which data was available.¹⁶⁶ Based on other CVE governance networks, the majority of community stakeholders who are participants of CVE governance networks are affiliated with an organization or agency. These organizations include government agencies, law enforcement agencies, non-government social service organizations, and religious institutions active within the interfaith community. I then used this information to create a list of potential community stakeholders in Columbus with similar backgrounds to CVE community stakeholders in other areas.

Although major community organizations have offices across the U.S., such as the YMCA and ACLU, and government agencies are generally the same across cities, smaller organizations such as religious organizations and non-profit organizations tend to vary based on location. Subsequently, to identify relevant non-profit organizations, I obtained information on all the operating non-profits in the Greater Columbus Region and identified the organizations

¹⁶⁶ This information is provided in Appendix C.

working with immigrant communities and engaging in violence prevention work.¹⁶⁷ To identify the religious institutions most likely to mobilize around CVE, I chose religious institutions that were previously active in the interfaith community in the Columbus area. With the prior experience of working with others to promote interfaith collaboration, these institutions are more likely to mobilize around a collaborative effort versus institutions that are not as active. Thus, I directed the survey to members of the S.A.I.L. community. A partial list of the target survey respondents in the Columbus area is provided in Appendix C.

Respondents were asked a variety of questions to gauge their interest, capacity, and exposure to facilitation. The Houston survey consisted of 22 multiple choice questions and nine open-ended questions. The questions addressed respondents prior interest and knowledge of CVE before the respondents participated in the governance network. The survey also included two questions to understand how respondents heard about efforts to develop the plan in the Greater Houston Area and why the participants decided to help develop the CVE plan. Questions regarding respondents' experience in helping develop the plan and post-plan experience, including whether or not collaboration and communication amongst the participants increased, decreased or stayed the same, also appeared on the survey. The Columbus survey included 15 multiple choice questions and four open-ended questions. The questions addressed respondents' knowledge of CVE, interest of CVE, capacity to mobilize, and likeliness to mobilize under different circumstances. The full questions of the two surveys are found in Appendix B.

I disseminated both surveys in the summer of 2017. I disseminated the Houston survey to 23 individuals¹⁶⁸ who mobilized around CVE and participated in drafting the 2014 Community Resilience Plan. The survey resulted in a 44% response rate. Based on CVE governance

¹⁶⁷ I obtained this information from www.greatnonprofits.org

¹⁶⁸ I was only able to retrieve the contact information for 23 of the 25 participants.

networks in other areas, individuals representing non-government organizations and religious organizations are typically associated with an organization's leadership, while individuals from government and law enforcement agencies can include executives or lower level employees. Since lower level employees receive orders from above, I directed the survey in Columbus to individuals with leadership positions. I disseminated the Columbus survey to individuals representing 27 organizations, which included six government agencies, two law enforcement agencies, 14 non-government organizations, and five religious organizations. The survey resulted in a 59% response rate. Amongst those who indicated their job titles, the results include responses from two managers, one Lieutenant, three religious leaders, three executive directors, one CEO, one chief strategy officer, and two directors. The response rates are consistent with other studies of community organizations and studies on CVE.¹⁶⁹ However, given the small number of responses, the results are best interpreted as a plausibility probe. The results are discussed below.

5.5.2 Results

The discussion above illustrates how non-incentivized facilitation promoted mobilization in the Greater Houston Region and explained why a CVE governance network did not emerge in the Greater Columbus Region. The survey results are also broadly consistent with my argument. I argued above that although a community actor's interest in the concept of CVE increases the

¹⁶⁹ See for example, Gazley and Brudney (2007). Based on an analysis of 1607 studies published in the years 2000 and 2005, the average response rate for studies that used data collected from organizations was 35.7 percent. See, also, Baruch, and Holtom. 2008. Directly related to CVE, Cherney et al. (2017) also found a low response rate amongst CVE stakeholders. The authors noted that this is likely due to the potential community backlash a stakeholder may face once they are associated with CVE efforts.

likelihood of mobilization, interest alone is not sufficient for mobilization to occur. The survey results lend further support to this. Unsurprisingly, when asked whether or not both non-government and government stakeholders in the Greater Houston Region should work together to develop CVE programming, the majority of respondents in Houston agreed that community stakeholders should work together to develop such programs. However, respondents in Columbus also expressed an interest in CVE. Approximately 75% of Columbus respondents strongly approved of CVE and 81% of respondents agreed that both government and non-government organizations in the Greater Columbus Area should develop CVE programs.

Somewhat surprisingly, the results also revealed that not all respondents who mobilized and helped create the Community Resilience Plan in Houston agreed that Houston should develop CVE programming. Moreover, when asked whether the respondents had a positive, negative, or no opinion of the concept of CVE before helping develop the CVE plan, 50% stated that they had a positive opinion, 30% had neither positive nor negative opinion, and 20% had a somewhat negative opinion of CVE. These results suggest that support for CVE is neither necessary nor sufficient for mobilization at the micro-level. I attribute this finding to two factors based on the responses to two open-ended questions. First, as discussed above, the facilitators in Houston framed the initiative more broadly as a community resilience initiative rather than solely relying on a 'CVE' frame. Given the use of the community resilience frame, at least one respondent was confused about the plan's association with the term CVE. In response to the question that asked respondents why they decided to participate and help develop the CVE plan, one respondent stated, "I was unaware that this was a CVE program." This response provides evidence that the term 'CVE' is highly controversial in the United States. CVE is often associated with the perception that such programming targets the Muslim community and is used

for intelligence-gathering purposes. Thus, the ‘CVE’ label can dissuade some individuals from supporting CVE-type initiatives. Second, some individuals participate in the policymaking process not because they support a certain policy, but rather, some participate due to their desire to protect their communities. An open-ended question that asked why the respondent decided to participate revealed that at least one individual did so in order to, “assure that this wasn’t aimed at solely Muslims being vilified.”

The surveys also provide evidence that a community actor’s capacity to mobilize does not guarantee that community actor will mobilize. One factor that reduces the costs of mobilization is whether or not community actor has previous experience working collaboratively. In Houston, all of the respondents previously collaborated with at least one other organization on a project or problem while in Columbus, all but two respondents did so. Community stakeholders in Columbus even had the prior experience working in this policy realm on an individual basis. Many community stakeholders, especially in the non-government sector, created their own programs to combat extremism. As indicated by one respondent, “we already work in this manner and we are willing to further our engagement with the community.” Therefore, in support of my argument, the capacity to mobilize—although important for the prospects of mobilization—is not sufficient for the mobilization of a CVE governance network.

The results illustrate how facilitation benefited Houston and the lack of facilitation led to a missed opportunity in Columbus. Community stakeholders in Houston revealed that they mobilized after being approached by either Tameez or Khalid, while only one agent preemptively asked to help develop the CVE plan. By contrast, community stakeholders in Columbus were not exposed to facilitation, which resulted in many being largely unaware of the term CVE. Approximately 50% of respondents in Columbus were not familiar at all with the

term prior to taking the survey, while only 12% were extremely familiar. However, the lack of prior knowledge of the term does not necessarily mean that community stakeholders in Columbus were unwilling to participate if given a chance. Rather, when asked how likely or unlikely it is for their organization to help develop CVE programming if given the opportunity, 37% of respondents indicated that they were extremely likely and 31% indicated that they were somewhat likely.

Columbus respondents provided a variety of reasons for why they were likely or unlikely to help develop CVE programming. Many of these responses alluded to the challenges associated with working collaboratively in influencing their decisions. For example, one respondent stated, “there is a history in Columbus of developing “collaborative” approaches that often lead to little more than information sharing and little outcome driven action. Voluntary involvement would involve a careful assessment of the potential of the effort to achieve actual outcomes and willingness of collaborative partners to minimize organizational self-interest.” In these situations, non-incentivized facilitation can assist in bringing community stakeholders together and guiding community stakeholders through the process to ensure that the efforts result in an outcome-driven action in the form of CVE programming rather than just ‘cheap talk.’

Despite the benefits of facilitation for the prospects of mobilization, as previously argued, facilitation is not likely to work in all situations. In Columbus, respondents who stated that they were not likely to develop CVE programs were also the same respondents who were not interested in CVE programming. Uninterested respondents cited concerns that CVE programming is biased towards Islamic extremism and stated that countering violent extremism is not a high priority. In these cases, even external incentives are unlikely to sway respondents to mobilize around CVE. When asked how likely or unlikely their organization was to develop

CVE programming when given the opportunity and provided compensation to do so, out of five respondents, only one changed their answer and indicated that they were somewhat likely to participate.

The included additional questions to understand other possible reasons why some individuals mobilized and others did not. Amongst Houston respondents, 9% of respondents thought that violent extremism was a major problem, 63% thought it was a minor problem, and 27% thought it was not a problem at all. Columbus respondents also indicated that they thought violent extremism posed some problem with 11% of respondents reporting that they thought violent extremism was a major problem, 58% a minor problem, 11% as no problem, and 17% who did not know. Although one may argue that an individual's perception of a problem drives interest in a policy, amongst Columbus respondents, this does not appear to be the case. Respondents who reported that violent extremism posed no problem in the Greater Columbus area still approved of CVE efforts. Likewise, respondents who stated that violent extremism was a minor problem in Columbus both approved and disapproved of CVE efforts. Consequently, an individual's perception of violent extremism as a problem within their community does not fully explain why an individual decides to mobilize.

Respondents were also asked their level of trust in different stakeholders. Interestingly, in general, the average level of trust was lower amongst Houston respondents than Columbus respondents. On a scale of 1 to 10 with 1 being no trust and 10 being fully trusting, Houston respondents indicated an average trust level of 4.5 (range from 2 to 10) for government stakeholders, 5.67 for non-government stakeholders (range from 4 to 10), 5.78 for local law enforcement stakeholders (range from 2 to 10), 5 for federal law enforcement stakeholders (range from 2 to 10), and 7.22 for religious institutions (range from 2 to 10). In Columbus, on a

scale of 0 to 5 with 0 being no trust and 5 being fully trusting, Columbus respondents indicated an average trust level of 4 (range 2 to 5) for local law enforcement stakeholders, 3.62 (range 1 to 5) for federal law enforcement stakeholders, 3.62 (range 2 to 5) for government stakeholders, 3.4 (range 1 to 5) for religious organizations, and 4.3 (range 2 to 5) for non-profit stakeholders. This indicates that trust in other participants of a governance network alone does not explain an individual's decision to join a governance network.

In sum, the mobilization of CVE governance is best explained by a community actor's interest in the concept of CVE, capacity to mobilize, and exposure to facilitation. Rather than one factor solely driving an individual's decision to mobilize, all three factors are important drivers for mobilization. In Houston, the majority of respondents mobilized due to their interest in CVE, prior experience collaborating with other community stakeholders and working on similar issues and their exposure to facilitation efforts by Tameez and Khalid. The survey results provide evidence that community stakeholders in Columbus were also interested in CVE and had the capacity to mobilize, yet did not. In comparative terms, facilitation proved to be the key distinction between Houston's success compared to Columbus.

5.6 Conclusion

The concept of CVE is a promising avenue for counterterrorism initiatives, especially when local communities can tailor programs to address local problems. However, this type of strategy comes at a cost. Without federal programming and mandates requiring CVE programming, in general, communities are less likely to develop CVE programs. As found in this chapter, this does not mean that CVE governance networks will never emerge within communities under certain conditions. Rather, as I have agreed throughout this dissertation, mobilization depends on

three factors: community stakeholders' interest in CVE, capacity to mobilize, and exposure to facilitation. Applied to the cases of Houston and Columbus, the theory provides an explanation for why mobilization occurred in Houston but not in Columbus. The comparative analysis elucidates that mobilization is most likely in communities with community stakeholders who have an interest in CVE, capacity to mobilize, and where community members were motivated and guided through the mobilization process by a facilitator.

These findings yield important policy implications for the future of CVE efforts in the United States and elsewhere. One implication of the argument is that facilitation at the local level is an important component that has largely been missing from CVE efforts within the United States. The CREX and DHS Roundtables set the foundation for mobilization, but continued mobilization is needed. A one-off event is simply not sufficient to create an environment that is conducive to mobilization. The analysis showed that for Houston, even though the area had the capacity and interest in CVE, mobilization would not have happened without the continued facilitation efforts of Mustafa Tameez. As best summarized by Tameez, 'the only way it does work [CVE mobilization] is if there is a professional involved that knows how to run the process and gives consulting time working with people to help figure out how to do it.'¹⁷⁰

The survey analysis also revealed the importance of an organization's interest in CVE. Even if the federal government provides funding for mobilization and implementation of CVE initiatives, organizations are unlikely to mobilize unless they express an interest in CVE programming that is independent of the economic incentives. Thus, funding, such as the 2016 CVE Grant that the DHS allocated to 26 agencies and organizations, does not necessarily mean that organizations will remain mobilized and implement CVE programs. As demonstrated by the

¹⁷⁰ Mustafa Tameez, personal communication, March 1, 2017

four organizations that have already rejected the CVE funding, interest in the cause is also important (Wang 2016). Subsequently, a concerted effort at the national level is needed to ensure the CVE concept remains desirable by local stakeholders to secure the future of domestic CVE efforts.

Finally, the analysis revealed that communities need additional guidance on CVE. The survey results exposed that amongst the organizations who are most capable of developing CVE programs, previous knowledge of CVE is minimal. Most organizations in Columbus had not previously heard of the concept of CVE, despite their organizations' ability to play a critical role in reducing the threat of violent extremism. Additional public outreach is needed to raise awareness of CVE and what CVE programs seek to achieve.

5.6.1 Limitations

This chapter's concentration on the variation amongst the eight communities that expressed an initial interest in CVE, based on my metrics, limits the verified theoretical claims I can make in this dissertation. By limiting my analysis to these eight cases, I was able to control for factors that could potentially explain the mobilization outcomes, but I could not feasibly nor reliably empirically identify a full sample of communities in the United States. Since my theoretical model rests on the importance of stakeholder interest in CVE, I would have needed to conduct survey research at the local level in all communities in the United States to create a complete sample of cases. Financial and time limitations were the primary barriers to conducting this task. While the chapter's focus on the eight cases provides a 'hard test' for the need of facilitation at the local level in the United States, these cases are unfortunately not representative of the full

sample of communities in the United States. In some ways, these eight communities are unique in that a CREX was administered in only these cases and the community seemed receptive to the idea of CVE. This uniqueness begs the question as to what distinguishes these eight communities from others in the United States. Below, I touch on two potential differences: community need for CVE due to preexisting problems with violent extremism, and knowledgeable local social entrepreneurs.

It may be the case that communities that held a CREX faced a perceived violent extremism problem and actually needed CVE programming whereas other communities did not need CVE services. One can imagine that because terrorism is rare, only communities that have experienced a terrorist incident or had foreign fighters take the first steps towards supporting the concept of CVE. Indeed, Table 5.3 below that displays the eight cases featured in this chapter and the reported terrorist attacks since 2001 and foreign fighters from those communities suggest this may be the case.

Table 5.3 Number of Terrorist Attacks and Foreign Fighters

City	Number of Terrorist Attacks	Number of Foreign Fighters
Chicago	1	3
Columbus	1	2
Durham	0	2
Fresno	0	0
Houston	0	1
Nashville	0	0
Sacramento	0	0
Seattle	7	0

Amongst the eight, there are only three communities, Fresno, Nashville, and Sacramento, that have not experienced a terrorist attack since 2001 nor had any foreign fighters. However, this

does not necessarily mean there was not a prioritized need for CVE in these communities. Both Sacramento and Nashville had other experiences with terrorism. In 2009, Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad, born Carlos Bledsoe, opened fire on a military recruiting center in Little Rock, Arkansas. Prior to the attack, Carlos traveled to Yemen and claimed to be a member of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Carlos briefly attended Tennessee State University in Nashville. He converted to Sunni Islam in his freshman year of college and soon dropped out of school and traveled to Yemen (Dao 2010). In his statement to the House of Representatives' Committee on Homeland Security, Carlos's father, Melvin Bledsoe, claimed that Carlos began to radicalize while he was in Nashville. His father claimed that some Muslim leaders in Nashville had taken advantage of his son (Bledsoe 2011). Sacramento has experienced at least one terrorist threat as demonstrated by the sentencing of Eric Taylor McDavid, a radical environmental activist who was convicted in 2007 on the ground of conspiring to bomb the Nimbus Dam and cell phone towers in Sacramento (Krichner 2015). In Nashville and Sacramento, this potential perceived threat of terrorism was enough for these cities to house a Fusion Center.

Fresno appears to be an outlier. In Fresno, prior to the 2015 CREX, there were no known terrorist attacks or recruitment efforts for foreign fighters. Although there have not been any documented experiences with terrorism or terrorist threats in Fresno before the CREX, this does not necessarily mean that there was no perceived community need for CVE. Interestingly, in a poll conducted by Gallup in 2014, Fresno residents reportedly were the least likely to feel safe and secure among the 100 most populous U.S. metropolitan areas (McCarthy 2015).

Terrorist attacks are rare and only a few hundred Americans have left the states to become foreign fighters. However, other communities outside of these eight also have experienced terrorism in some form. As demonstrated by the various cities that have

experienced a terrorist attack before as shown previously in figure 3.1 in chapter three, other communities outside of these eight have a terrorism problem. Moreover, according to the Southern Poverty Law Center, 917 hate groups were operating in the United States across 48 states in 2017.¹⁷¹ Since CVE has the potential to prevent other forms of violent extremism beyond the narrow scope of terrorism, other communities beyond these eight could have also potentially benefited from CVE programming, if interested. A second factor, the presence of knowledgeable social entrepreneurs, may instead explain the differences between these cases.

I suspect what distinguishes these eight communities from communities that did not take the initial first step is the presence of local social entrepreneurs who were previously knowledgeable about CVE and wanted to promote the concept within their communities. For Chicago, the social entrepreneur was Stevan Weine, a Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Illinois at Chicago who studies CVE. Houston had Sheriff Adrian Garcia who helped kick-off Houston's experience with CVE. Even Durham had CVE social entrepreneurs, a Duke University Chaplain and former U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of North Carolina, Thomas Walker, who both helped NCTC employees set-up the CREX.¹⁷² These social entrepreneurs planted the seed for the concept of CVE within their community. Given the small size of the community of CVE scholars and practitioners, I do not expect all communities to have an individual with the knowledge and social capital to initiate CVE efforts within their community. This is precisely why the Obama administration administered the coordination role at the community level to the U.S. Attorney's Offices.¹⁷³ Even though this move is controversial amongst both supporters and opponents of CVE programming because of the U.S. Attorney's

¹⁷¹ Please see "Hate Map," Available at: <https://www.splcenter.org/hate-map>

¹⁷² Seamus Hughes, former National Counterterrorism Center employee, personal communication, Washington D.C., February 23, 2016

¹⁷³ Ibid.

role in prosecutions, it is unclear what other stakeholder is in a position to act as an effective catalyst. As explained by former U.S. Attorney Andrew Luger, this social entrepreneur needs to be able “to gauge the level of risk and understand how recruiting is taking place to help guide stakeholders through the development process.”¹⁷⁴ That said, despite the importance of CVE social entrepreneurs, this distinguishing factor does not pose a problem for my theoretical model, since this factor already appears in my model as a form of facilitation.

In sum, this chapter’s focus on a subset of cases limits the verified theoretical claims I can make about my theory on mobilization. Although I suspect that the presence of knowledgeable CVE social entrepreneurs within these eight cases distinguishes these eight cases from other communities in the United States, this difference is already incorporated into my theoretical model.

5.6.2 Generalizability

The chapter’s focus on a subset of cases within the United States calls into question the generalizability of my theory on mobilization. Although this paper only empirically analyzes two communities in the United States, the theory proposed in this dissertation can potentially explain other cases as well. While future research can test the actual generalizability of the findings of my research, the United Kingdom’s evolving experience with *Prevent* lends some support for the chapter’s broader theoretical claims on the importance of different types of facilitation for certain community stakeholders.

¹⁷⁴ Andrew Luger, former US Attorney of Minnesota, personal communication, March 2, 2018.

As discussed in chapter three, the United Kingdom's initial success in establishing *Prevent* governance networks, within local authorities can be explained by some local authorities' initial interest in *Prevent*, capacity to form a network and the facilitation efforts of *Prevent* coordinators. The Home Office tasked *Prevent* coordinators to coordinate and promote collaborative action within local authorities amongst relevant community stakeholders (Mastroe 2016). While this tactic worked in some cases, facilitation efforts and even positive incentives in the form of *Prevent* funding was simply not enough to convince some local authorities who were opposed to *Prevent* to participate. It took negative incentives, in the form of the Counterterrorism and Security Act of 2015 to convince some local authorities to participate. The Act places a statutory responsibility on all local authorities to assess the risk of radicalization within their area and to take appropriate action.¹⁷⁵ As explained by one *Prevent* coordinator of why the statutory duty was passed, "I think there were some cases of some local authorities being less cooperative. Some of this was to bring uniformity to *Prevent*, the major part was to reach all these areas [local authorities] that were previously not doing *Prevent* at all."¹⁷⁶

5.6.3 Next Steps in the CVE Policymaking Process

Since this chapter focused only on the formation of CVE governance networks, it must be noted that the emergence of a network may not ultimately lead to the successful implementation CVE programming. Houston is an example of this. Despite developing a CVE plan, the network did not implement the plan afterward. One reason for this is the lack of facilitation and leadership

¹⁷⁵ Source: Counterterrorism and Security Act 2015. United Kingdom Parliament, c.6, schedule 6, February. London: TSO.

¹⁷⁶ Anonymous Home Office employee, personal communication, London, UK, January 5, 2016.

following the development of the plan. The HCSO only hired Tameez to develop a CVE plan. Stakeholders involved in the development of Houston's plan were also aware of this. In the Houston's CVE governance network survey, one stakeholder explained that when being recruited to join the network, "Mustafa reached out saying that he wanted to assemble a team of different types of community leaders and workers to identify what this process could look like in Houston, what resources were in place and what the relationship was between law enforcement and the Muslim community." Others also acknowledged the lack of communication following the development of the plan. As one stakeholder stated, "there was not much communication or contact regarding how to implement the plan once the main parts were approved and submitted. I don't recall being asked to do anything specific in order for the plan to be executed in our community." Houston's former Mayor, Annise Parker, also noted that she did not receive any follow-up after the plan was released.¹⁷⁷

Stakeholders also acknowledged other factors that prevented the further development of the plan. Four stakeholders explained that they needed additional time and resources to work out the details for implementation to occur. Another stakeholder explained how not all stakeholders were in agreement on the best way forward, "sometimes all the pieces in the community aren't always working together or in agreement about things. There would need to be more buy-in and persuasion to the community at large to support the plan for implementation to occur." Consequently, despite all of the survey respondents stating that the plan should be implemented to some degree both collectively and individually, implementation did not occur.

Houston is not a unique case of a CVE governance network failing to implement a developed plan. As the experiences of the CVE pilot regions in the United States demonstrate,

¹⁷⁷ Annise Parker, former mayor of Houston, personal communication, April 6, 2018.

the development and implementation of CVE programming are not guaranteed. In the next chapter, I explore in more detail the development and implementation stages of the policymaking process in three additional communities: Boston, Los Angeles, and Montgomery County. I find that two of these communities faced similar “roadblocks” to implementation as found in Houston. Thus, together, this chapter and the next provide a complete analysis of the CVE policymaking process.

CHAPTER 6

IMPLEMENTING CVE: THE CASE FOR LOCAL CVE LEADERSHIP

6.1 Introduction

In the last chapter, I explained why only some communities mobilize and form local CVE governance networks to design and implement CVE plans. However, even though a governance network may exist, implementation of CVE programming still may not occur. Between 2011 and 2016, of the eleven communities that mobilized in response to the federal government's call for action, only two local governance networks, one in Montgomery County, MD and another in Tampa, FL have created and fully implemented new CVE-specific multi-sector programming in response to the national strategy. An additional two networks, one in Los Angeles and another in Minneapolis-St. Paul, partially implemented a CVE plan.

This chapter explains the variation in the implementation of CVE programs in the United States. As explained in chapter 4, I emphasize the influence of local political dynamics on the development and implementation process. Subsequently, I argue that governance networks that have a local CVE leader are more likely to implement CVE programming. Despite my concentration on the role of leadership during the implementation process, other factors can also influence the process. To verify the explanatory value of my theory on policy implementation, I use a comparative case study approach. I compare the development and implementation efforts in three communities, Boston, Los Angeles and Montgomery County, Maryland to understand *how* and *if* centralization matters for policy implementation. All three case communities set out in 2014 to develop a CVE model to implement within their region, yet after the first policy process cycle, only Montgomery County was able to fully implement its CVE model.

A comparison of the development and implementation efforts in the three communities that have all developed plans for CVE programs highlights the importance of local leadership for the implementation of CVE programs. Semi-structured interviews with individuals involved in the policymaking process and an analysis of primary and secondary source material lend support to this argument. I find that networks with a local CVE leader who is able to facilitate coordination, set the agenda, and make final policy decisions create more comprehensive CVE action plans, making the implementation process easier. In my comparison of the implementation efforts, I also identify other factors that also help explain variation in implementation including the role of local opposition to CVE efforts.

6.2 Community Case Selection and Methodology

In general, policy implementation research suffers from a problem of ‘too many variables.’ Multiple factors are often at play that can all influence the prospects of implementation (Goggin 1986; Hill and Hupe 2009). In response, Johansson (2010) recommends that scholars conduct an in-depth analysis of the policy and attempt to understand the implementation context. Following Johansson’s recommendations, in this chapter, I use a comparative case study approach to systematically evaluate the role of my main explanatory variable of interest and provide in-depth details of the CVE programs and the policymaking context in each case. To do so, I compare the development and implementation efforts in three communities, Boston, Los Angeles and Montgomery County, Maryland.

The three case communities shared many similarities but had different degrees of success in terms of developing and implementing CVE plans. Despite the mobilization of a CVE

governance network in all three cases, the networks designed their own CVE plans to varying degrees. Networks in both Los Angeles and Montgomery County created a formal plan in which they set out to implement. Although the CVE governance network in Boston, known as the Boston Regional Collaborative, originally planned to develop a CVE action plan composed of CVE programming, the network ended up only creating a loose framework composed of various recommendations that other stakeholders within the Boston region could follow. Some local community organizations in Boston did implement CVE programs, but these programs were independent of the Collaborative.

Even though Boston failed to implement a CVE plan, the other two networks had more success. In Los Angeles, the network implemented some of the programming outlined in its CVE model, but the network also had difficulty implementing other components of the model. This was not the case in Montgomery County, where stakeholders implemented the entirety of its CVE model, known as the Montgomery County Model. Below, I explain how the presence of local leadership helps explain both the varied content of the action plans and the corresponding implementation success. While the Montgomery County network was led by two CVE leaders, in the other two cases, although the USAO helped with administrative aspects regarding developing the programs, the planning and implementation process was neither coordinated nor centralized.

The purpose of the comparative case studies is to illustrate the mechanisms by which local leaders helped agents in one community and the lack of leadership negatively impacted agents in the other two cases. I use process-tracing methods to determine *why* some communities implemented CVE plans, while others did not and *if* and *how* the administrative structures played a role in the process.

To gain a complete picture of the policy implementation process in all three cases, I conducted interviews using a semi-structured format with government officials, NGOs, academics, religious leaders, and community members within the case communities. I relied on the snowball sampling method to acquire interviewees within each case community. The semi-structured format provided the flexibility for follow-up questions and an opportunity for me to ask additional questions that arose during the conversation with the interviewee to understand more completely interviewee responses. I was able to explore the meaning behind the responses to answers, which would not have been as easy to accomplish through other interview methods.

I supplemented these interviews with an analysis of primary and secondary sources. I acquired these documents through Freedom of Information Act requests, newspapers, declassified government documents, and the existing literature. The documents provided me the ability to triangulate data I acquired through interviews and provided additional context for the implementation process within the community. Before I present the main findings of this analysis, I further justify the comparison between Boston, Los Angeles, and Montgomery County below.

6.3 Boston, Los Angeles, and Montgomery County as Comparison Cases

To be useful as comparison cases for illustrating the effects of centralization on the prospects of implementation, the three cases should be as similar as possible on as many plausible determinants of implementation as possible. Thus, I chose these three cases because of their

similarities on many of these factors.¹⁷⁸ Table 6.1 contains a list of some plausible explanations for implementation and compares the three case communities.

Table 6.1: Explanations for Implementation

EXPLANATION	BOSTON	LOS ANGELES	MONTGOMERY COUNTY
INCENTIVES/SANCTIONS	None	None	None
SELECTION OF AGENTS	Yes	Yes	Yes
MONITORING AND EVALUATION	Yes	Yes	Yes
POLICY COMPLEXITY	Intervention & Prevention	Intervention & Prevention & Interdiction	Intervention & Prevention
PRIOR INSTITUTIONAL LINKAGES	Yes	Yes	Yes
ACCESS TO RESOURCES	Yes	Yes	Yes

All three communities share many “structural” similarities. First, all three communities benefited from a pre-selection of agents for the implementation process. Since CVE efforts are decentralized in the U.S., stakeholders within the local community were able to select other stakeholders to collaborate with. Because the NSC tasked U.S. Attorney’s Offices (USAO) with coordinating CVE efforts under the SIP, the decision of who to collaborate with often fell into the hands of the local USAO. In Boston, the USAO took several months to choose which agents to include in the implementation process. Utilizing pre-existing relationships, the USAO invited participants to be included in the Boston Regional Collaborative.¹⁷⁹ In Los Angeles, the USAO in collaboration with the Interagency Coordination Group worked on CVE efforts in

¹⁷⁸ Table 1 in Appendix D includes a comparison of the 11 cases of mobilization on the various indicators. In comparing the 11 cases, Boston, Los Angeles, Minneapolis, and Montgomery County were the most similar. Research fatigue amongst the Somalian-American population in Minneapolis prevented me from gaining the needed contacts in Minneapolis to conduct an in-depth analysis of the case.

¹⁷⁹ Anonymous employee of US Attorney’s Office in Boston, personal communication, February 10, 2017.

coordination with pre-selected community stakeholders.¹⁸⁰ In Montgomery County, a community organization, the World Organization for Resource Development and Education (WORDE), rather than the USAO, chose to coordinate their efforts with the County Executive, Law Enforcement, and the Faith Community Working Group (FCWG).¹⁸¹

In comparing the capabilities of the stakeholders involved in each community, the stakeholders across all cases share similar backgrounds. Each local governance network included members from the police, local government, religious organizations, and non-government organizations. Community leaders were also represented in the networks across all three cases. With representation from the key sectors of local government present in all three cases, all three communities had stakeholders who were capable of planning and implementing CVE programs. However, this does not mean that all the stakeholders who were involved in the process supported CVE programming. As will be discussed later, some stakeholders supported CVE and others opposed of CVE. Appendix D includes a list of the stakeholders involved in each of the networks and those that provided input during the implementation process.

Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) features can increase the costs of noncompliance (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973). If an agent is required to submit performance results in exchange for reimbursement, the agent may be more likely to comply with the principal's demands (Weingast 1984). All three cases were monitored and evaluated by academics funded by the federal government. The National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, and the U.S. Department of Justice awarded funding to researchers to evaluate the CVE programs in all three cases. In fact, in Boston, evaluators competed for \$400,000 in funding earmarked for

¹⁸⁰ Sgt. Mike Abdeen, Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, personal communication, Los Angeles, CA, November 17, 2015.

¹⁸¹ Isiah Leggett, Montgomery County Executive, personal communication, Rockville, MD, March 7, 2016.

evaluations, an amount far greater than the funding allocated for the actual implementation of programs.¹⁸² Moreover, communities were not required to submit performance results in exchange for reimbursement. Given this and that all community programs were under evaluation, M&E features do not seem to explain the variation in implementation.

For all three communities, the federal government did not offer incentives to local stakeholders to encourage implementation or sanction local communities for not implementing CVE programs. According to the U.S. national CVE strategy, the implementation of CVE programs is completely voluntary. Although the federal government seeks to empower communities to design and implement CVE programs, no incentives are offered to communities to do so. Likewise, communities are not punished for failing to implement CVE programs. Therefore, the possibility that the federal government attempted to incentivize implementation through incentives or sanctions for only some communities and not others does not explain the variation in implementation.

The three case communities also share similarities regarding policy complexity. Since local communities have the discretion to develop and implement their own CVE plans, some CVE plans may be more complex and harder to implement than others. However, in all three cases, the communities outlined plans that incorporated prevention and intervention components.¹⁸³ Although Los Angeles' plan also included an interdiction component, this was nothing new for the region since law enforcement was already engaged in interdiction activities. Subsequently, differences in the complexity of the plans do not seem to explain the variation in implementation.

¹⁸² Anonymous Muslim Community Member in Boston, personal communication, Boston, MA, December 2016.

¹⁸³ The sections below will detail the plans in each case community.

Without resources, policy implementation is nearly impossible. A lack of funding and staffing needed to implement programs could then explain the lack of implementation in some communities. CVE scholars have also identified the lack of funding for CVE programs as a major weakness in U.S. CVE policy (Vidino and Hughes 2015). However, although limited, each case community had access to funding for implementation purposes. As CVE pilot regions, Los Angeles received \$100,000, and Boston received \$216,667 for the implementation of CVE programs.¹⁸⁴ Montgomery County also received funding for the implementation of CVE programs through the County Executive and the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program.¹⁸⁵

All three governance networks also had experience with collaborative policymaking based on a history of prior collaborative action. In Montgomery County, WORDE collaborated with the County Executive on community engagement efforts before the roll-out of their CVE programs. A similar situation arose in Los Angeles. In Los Angeles, the Interagency Coordination Group had prior experience working together with community members on crime prevention. Moreover, Boston also had prior institutional linkages between stakeholders and the USAO chose agents based on those prior linkages.¹⁸⁶ Given that in all three cases, the agents working together on CVE had prior experience working with others involved, prior institutional linkage do not explain variation in implementation.

Since coordination problems and conflicts can arise within CVE governance networks, I emphasize the importance of a local CVE leader embedded within a governance network for implementation efforts. Subsequently, I chose networks both with and without a leader to

¹⁸⁴ Anonymous employee of US Attorney's Office in Boston, personal communication, February 10, 2017.

¹⁸⁵ Mehreen Farooq, WORDE Senior Fellow, personal communication, March 25, 2016.

¹⁸⁶ Anonymous employee of US Attorney's Office in Boston, personal communication, February 10, 2017.

analyze the effects of leadership on implementation. A local CVE leader is a stakeholder or subset of stakeholders within a governance network who can facilitate action by making key decisions, guiding the policymaking process, and serving as the center of expertise for others to defer to when needed. In Montgomery County a local NGO, WORDE, and the Montgomery County Executive's Office of Community Partnerships served as the model's leaders who coordinated efforts and stepped in to lead the other network participants when necessary. Although other network participants often helped design programs and subsequently shaped the content of the CVE model, WORDE and the Montgomery County Executive's Office of Community Partnerships guided the others. In Boston and Los Angeles, decision-making was much more decentralized and lacked leadership. Although in both cases the USAO facilitated mobilization and helped coordinate stakeholders in the early stages of CVE planning, afterward, no single stakeholder led the process and coordinated efforts.

The cases do differ in at least four important ways which complicate any argument that the three cases are similar across all extraneous variables. First, the National Security Council designated both Boston and Los Angeles as CVE pilot regions while Montgomery County was not listed as a pilot region. Second, although the public expressed concerns about CVE across all three cases, Los Angeles experienced the most opposition. Third, the number of stakeholders involved in the planning and implementation stages varied by community. By far, the Boston Regional Collaborative consisted of the most stakeholders¹⁸⁷ with 51 stakeholders as members of the Collaborative representing 31 agencies and organizations. The Los Angeles Collaborative consisted of five government and law enforcement agencies and only a few community

¹⁸⁷ The comparison of the number of stakeholders is made at the organizational level. For instance, in Boston, some agencies had more than one representative on the Collaborative. Since an agency's representatives are acting on behalf of the agency, I only count the agency, rather than the number of representatives, as a stakeholder.

stakeholders.¹⁸⁸ In Montgomery County, six government agencies, one government body composed of religious leaders and one non-government agency were the primary agents involved in implementing the Montgomery County Model. Finally, although all three communities received funding for CVE programming, Montgomery County received the most. The Montgomery County Model has received upwards of one million dollars for programming within Montgomery County and the expansion of its model in two other cities.¹⁸⁹

Given these differences, I cannot make a deterministic argument about the central role of leadership during the implementation process. Rather, my argument concerning the role of a local CVE leader should be interpreted as a probabilistic one. The policymaking process is complex and multiple factors are often at play that can influence the prospects for implementation. The purpose of this study is to analyze the local political dynamics during the policymaking process and bring to light the role played by local CVE leaders in explaining the variation in implementation.

In the section above, I outlined various potential explanations for the variations in implementation and showed the similarities amongst the three cases. In what follows, I use the comparative case studies to illustrate the mechanisms through which leadership assisted agents in Montgomery County during the policymaking process and the lack of leadership created roadblocks for implementers during the policymaking process in Boston and Los Angeles. Through an in-depth analysis of the policymaking process in each case, I also address the other differences amongst the three cases and evaluate the influence these factors had on the prospects for implementation. In what follows, I provide an overview of the policymaking process in all

¹⁸⁸ The exact number was not disclosed by the Collaborative.

¹⁸⁹ Source: World Organization for Resource Development and Education (WORDE). (2016). "A Collective Impact Initiative that Increases Public Safety and Social Cohesion: Strategic Plan 2016-2019." Available at: http://www.worde.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Strategic-Plan_final_v3_090616.pdf

three cases and determine the role played by local CVE leaders in explaining the variation in implementation.

6.4 Implementing a CVE Plan in Los Angeles

The Greater Los Angeles Region is diverse. Approximately 33.8% of the population in the Greater Los Angeles Region is foreign-born.¹⁹⁰ Moreover, as Brie Loskoto, Executive Director of the Center for Religion and Civic Culture at the University of Southern California in Los Angeles, explained, Los Angeles' diversity is one of the reasons why LA is home to more non-profits per capita than any county in the country.¹⁹¹

For these reasons and the fact that Los Angeles has conducted CVE-related community outreach work since 2008, the National Security Council, under the Obama administration, approached the U.S. Attorney for the Los Angeles Area about designating Los Angeles as a pilot CVE region.¹⁹² Despite other community officials not knowing about the designation until after it went public, local officials were supportive and agreed to participate given Los Angeles' prior history of conducting community engagement activities. Moreover, the region wanted to lead the country in this effort, as Sgt. Mike Abdeen of the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department who was involved in the planning process stated, "we wanted to be ahead of the curve."¹⁹³

¹⁹⁰ Source: ACS 2015, "Los Angeles- Long Beach-Anaheim, CA Metro Area." Census Reporter. Available at: <https://censusreporter.org/profiles/31000US31080-los-angeles-long-beach-anaheim-ca-metro-area/>

¹⁹¹ Brie Loskoto, Executive Director of the Center for Religion and Civic Culture at the University of Southern California in Los Angeles, personal communication, March 6, 2017.

¹⁹² Joumana Silyan-Saba, Senior Policy Analyst, City of Los Angeles Human Relations Commission, personal communication, Los Angeles, CA, November 17, 2015.

¹⁹³ Sgt. Mike Abdeen, Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, personal communication, Los Angeles, CA, November 17, 2015.

Stakeholders within the Los Angeles Region voluntarily mobilized and formed a CVE governance network using the Interagency Coordination Working Group (ICG) as the foundation for the network. The ICG is a network composed of government officials in the Greater Los Angeles Area. Members include officials from six main agencies: the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), Los Angeles Sheriff's Department (LASD), Los Angeles Human Rights Commission (LAHRC), and the U.S. Attorney.¹⁹⁴

The NSC's designation of Los Angeles as a CVE pilot region forced the local community stakeholders to codify the efforts the region was already engaged in and encouraged the region to create new programs.¹⁹⁵ In charge of coordinating the efforts, the USAO decided the best way to develop a CVE plan was to receive community feedback and develop the plan based on that feedback. Community members gave feedback during town halls and focus groups sessions, while the ICG and a few selected community leaders drafted the plan based on the feedback.

Before 2011, the ICG's focus was broad, and it was mostly used by members to coordinate community events. The ICG served as a mechanism to share information, keep other local partners in check and make sure all local government partners had access to the most up-to-date information regarding activities and situations in the area. However, when DHS detailed

¹⁹⁴ The network meets once a month to discuss a variety of public safety issues and every member can give input on the topics discussed. To run the meetings, the ICG has a chair of the committee who is elected by the members of the network. The chair's role is administrative, meaning that the chair is responsible for organizing events like town halls and setting the agenda for the group. During the time when the CVE Framework was being planned and implemented, Sgt. Mike Abdeen was chair followed by Joumana Silyan-Saba representing the Los Angeles Human Rights Commission. Members of the ICG in addition to a select group of local community stakeholders helped develop the Los Angeles CVE Framework (Ibid).

¹⁹⁵ Haroon Azar, Regional Director of Strategic Involvement, Department of Homeland Security, personal communication, Los Angeles, CA, November 17, 2015.

Haroon Azar to the area in 2011 in a non-investigative role,¹⁹⁶ Azar encouraged the group to focus on risk mitigation rather than just coordinating events. The partners then used this platform to develop the CVE framework based on community feedback. The partners also used the group to further develop and implement LA's CVE Framework.¹⁹⁷

Once the community provided feedback regarding the Framework through town halls and community meetings, the ICG took over. The ICG gathered the feedback and then drafted the plan over the course of a year. Importantly, the Framework was developed under a time constraint. After the NSC had designated Los Angeles as a pilot region, the partners working on the Framework were invited to the White House for a national CVE Summit in February 2015 to present on CVE efforts in Los Angeles. Thus, the Framework had to be completed by the time of the CVE Summit. The members of the ICG invited other community members to join them as part of an envoy to the CVE Summit. Once the ICG drafted the Framework, the community members invited to go to D.C. also gave input. One community member, Ahmed Younis, explained how he did not agree with the content of the first draft. Subsequently, Younis, in partnership with Haroon Azar and Joumana Silyan-Saba, worked through the final revisions before the White House Summit.¹⁹⁸ The Framework was then made public in February 2015 and introduced at the CVE Summit.

Based on interviews with the individuals involved in developing the Framework, it is clear that the approaching deadline of the Summit and the pilot region designation was the reason why Los Angeles developed the formal Framework. Again, prior to the designation of LA

¹⁹⁶ DHS partnered with the City of Los Angeles to establish the post, known as the DHS Office of Strategic Engagement. The post was developed due to requests by local government and community members to DHS to bring subject matter expertise to the region.

¹⁹⁷ Haroon Azar, Regional Director of Strategic Involvement, Department of Homeland Security, personal communication, Los Angeles, CA, November 17, 2015.

¹⁹⁸ Ahmed Younis, Former Principal Deputy Secretary of State, US Department of State and contributor to LA's CVE plan, personal communication, Huntington Beach, CA, November 18, 2015.

as a pilot region, the community was already engaged in CVE-related work and did so without developing a formalized plan for the community. Although community members expressed support for the pilot project and its ambitions, without the Summit and the designation, it is unclear that the partners would have formally mobilized around CVE. Nonetheless, the Framework was a consensus-based document.

6.4.1 Los Angeles CVE Framework

The Los Angeles Countering Violent Extremism Framework applies to the Greater Los Angeles Area. The Framework is designed to reduce the threat posed by violent extremist groups while ensuring that individual liberties remain protected. The Framework applies to a broad spectrum of violent extremist ideologies. However, some of the projects proposed in the Framework apply to the Muslim-American communities, because these communities are the ones leading the CVE efforts in LA.

The Framework consists of three components: prevention, intervention, and interdiction. The prevention component focuses on expanding community engagement efforts and promoting resilient communities through community-led programs. Interventions target individuals at-risk for radicalization. Finally, the interdiction component attempts to disrupt impending criminal threats.

The prevention component is a collective effort to address the root causes of violent extremism. To do so, the LA Framework sets out to build partnerships between the community and law enforcement, expand community engagement and invest in community-led programs. The Framework outlines various ways the community plans to increase engagement efforts such

as generating awareness of community activities through public forums and workshops and ensuring that events are inclusive. Programs such as women leadership programs and youth engagement programs are also included in the Framework. Besides proposed activities, the Framework also includes community-led programs that already existed in the area including NewGround, a Muslim-Jewish collaboration that brings young Jewish and Muslim professionals together to find common ground through dialogue.

The purpose of the intervention component is to provide vulnerable individuals on the path towards radicalization an “off-ramp.” The concept behind the model is that rehabilitative care will be provided to vulnerable individuals before any criminal act is conducted. However, the Framework is sparse on details of the model including how individuals will be identified, which service providers will be involved, and what role law enforcement will play in the process.

The final component of the Framework is interdiction. Indirection efforts, meaning investigation and arrest efforts, seek to stop individuals who are intent on committing violence. Although the Framework notes the importance of seeking alternatives to the arrest-based model when appropriate, the ICG still included the interdiction component in the Framework.

6.4.2 Implementation

Three years after the announcement of the Los Angeles CVE Framework, the implementation of the framework is still a work in progress. That said, the community has made progress implementing the prevention and interdiction components of the framework. As Sgt. Mike Abdeen stated, "we continue to do interdiction, but what we are good at is prevention and

community engagement which has been going on for years." However, the network struggled to further develop the intervention component, which is the only new component of the plan.

After the envoy returned from the CVE Summit, the ICG continued to work on further developing the framework, especially regarding the intervention program. In the original framework, the ICG was unable to solve some problems that LA faced and hammer out the details of the programming needed for implementation. For instance, one challenge was figuring out the stakeholders who would play an active role in the intervention program. As Joumana Silyan-Saba explained, "the idea is that we need to build a network of agencies who can be used as a network for the referral processes so that individuals who are struggling can either self-refer or can be referred by family members, friends or clergy. The challenge for us in LA is that, because of the diversity and because we are geographically spread out, it is very difficult to create those networks in a cohesive way."¹⁹⁹

To further complicate matters, when the envoy returned from D.C., as Ahmed Younis explained, "the intervention part blew up in our face." Segments of the public, primarily within the Muslim communities, expressed their opposition to the framework, particularly concerning the intervention component. One vocal opposition group, the Council on American-Islamic Relations- LA Chapter, expressed concern that the CVE efforts were stigmatizing to the Muslim community and could potentially be used for intelligence-gathering purposes.²⁰⁰ Similar concerns were expressed early on in the process in a letter sent to Deputy National Security Advisor Lisa Monaco in December 2014 and signed by a coalition of 27 civil rights and

¹⁹⁹ Joumana Silyan-Saba, Senior Policy Analyst, City of Los Angeles Human Relations Commission, personal communication, Los Angeles, CA, November 17, 2015.

²⁰⁰ Haroon Manjlai, Public Affairs Coordinator, Council on American-Islamic Relations, personal communication, Anaheim, CA, November 18, 2017.

community groups from LA.²⁰¹ As Haroon Azar explained, “so that [the opposition] did slow us down a bit, I mean I had to participate at all these different events and clarify, because there was so much backlash and misinformation about what we were doing.”²⁰² Although the opposition to the framework slowed the process, other members of the ICG suggested that the opposition also contributed to a healthy discussion around community concerns.²⁰³ The community had the ability to give additional input, which allowed the ICG to respond to some of the opposition and address community concerns.

As the public expressed concerns about the framework, internal debates concerning the details of the intervention component emerged within the ICG and resulted in a decision stalemate. Not only did the ICG have difficulty in creating the needed networks for a referral-based intervention program, but FBI Headquarters allegedly proposed an intervention model that the members of the ICG did not agree on. As Sgt. Mike Abdeen stated, “we [ICG] talked to the Assistant Director in Charge of LA's FBI division, and he viewed the model as an FBI HQ initiative and stated that the LA division of the FBI was not involved. However, other community members did not buy in. At this time, we are trying to come up with an alternative and incorporate the community, because the community should determine this, not the government.”²⁰⁴ In public presentations about the Los Angeles Framework as late as May 2015, the network admitted that a formal intervention model did not exist and the network was trying to resolve outstanding issues by developing: “(1) a reliable analysis and assessment of legal liabilities for interveners; (2) a more robust inventory of available resources; (3) strategies to

²⁰¹ Source: Letter to the Hon. Lisa O. Monaco, Dec. 18, 2014, accessible at <http://goo.gl/WTKpjW>.

²⁰² Haroon Azar, Regional Director of Strategic Involvement, Department of Homeland Security, personal communication, Los Angeles, CA, November 17, 2015.

²⁰³ Joumana Silyan-Saba, Senior Policy Analyst, City of Los Angeles Human Relations Commission, personal communication, Los Angeles, CA, November 17, 2015.

²⁰⁴ Sgt. Mike Abdeen, Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, personal communication, Los Angeles, CA, November 17, 2015.

ensure that concerns about civil rights, civil liberties, and data privacy protection are adequately addressed; (4) credible research-based baselines for indicators of violent extremism; and (5) a mechanism for providing collaborative input into the intervention process that avoids securitizing the process, while recognizing potential risks to the community and ensuring appropriate mitigation responses are utilized.”²⁰⁵

However, the ICG never agreed on an alternative model. Others also expressed the difficulty in further developing the intervention component of the framework. Haroon Azar mentioned that one point of contention was over when to involve law enforcement. Azar explained the dilemma, “if the intention is to create a community-led framework, which the LA framework is, then at which point should we involve law enforcement in understanding that to the benefit of everyone there needs to be some dotted line with law enforcement and I think that is the biggest disagreement at all levels.”²⁰⁶

Community members also expressed concern about the FBI’s involvement. On October 16, 2015, the FBI convened a community focus group for community-based groups and faith organizations in Los Angeles “to review FBI products regarding the community’s involvement in deterring violent extremism and to provide constructive feedback on this endeavor.”²⁰⁷ At the meeting, the FBI introduced the community group to their proposed intervention model, referred to as the “Shared Responsibility Committee” (SRC). The purpose of the SRC was to rehabilitate individuals who had been previously identified by the FBI as “at-risk.” However, groups such as

²⁰⁵ “The Los Angeles Framework for Countering Violent Extremism.” Los Angeles Interagency Coordination Group, May 2015, pp. 7-8.

²⁰⁶ Haroon Azar, Regional Director of Strategic Involvement, Department of Homeland Security, personal communication, Los Angeles, CA, November 17, 2015.

²⁰⁷ Source: Muslim Public Affairs Council Memorandum to Participants of the Muslim, Sikh, Arab and South Asian Communities Interagency Meeting at the Department of Justice- Civil Rights Division. October 10, 2015. Available at: <https://www.aclu.org/foia-document/memorandum-muslim-public-affairs-council>

the Muslim Public Affairs Council²⁰⁸ opposed the FBI's involvement in CVE and its efforts to take the lead on CVE programs because of the FBI's role in criminal investigations and prosecutions.

ICG members also indicated other points of contention that arose during the process. In a survey I constructed²⁰⁹ to allow ICG members to speak freely about the implementation process anonymously, members indicated that disagreements arose over the future direction of CVE in LA, conflicting missions amongst individual agencies that prevented the group from reaching a consensus, and disagreements over how to name and brand the CVE efforts. Members also highlighted the lack of leadership around the implementation of the CVE framework. Although the USAO assisted with the drafting of the CVE framework, the USAO opted to no longer participate in the process.

As my theory predicted, coordination problems due to conflicting opinions and difficulties in organizing the actions of various local stakeholders hindered implementation efforts. Disagreements arose amongst the stakeholders involved in the policymaking process regarding key components of the CVE model. Unfortunately, no one was able to take the lead and move the process forward; thus, the lack of leadership contributed to the lack of implementation. Although the LA network was able to implement the prevention and interdiction components of the framework, these components were efforts the stakeholders were already engaged in. When a disjuncture between the federal and local visions of CVE arose regarding intervention, the partners reached a stalemate. For nearly two years, no actor had the authority,

²⁰⁸ The Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC) disapproval of the SRC foreshadowed the difficulty the FBI would have trying to promote the concept. MPAC has previously been very supportive of the concept of CVE and applied and received funding to implement its own CVE programming. Thus, the organization's disapproval of the FBI's program suggested that the implementation of this specific CVE program would be difficult if not possible. Soon after the FBI announced the SRC program, the agency pulled the program with little explanation.

²⁰⁹ Three out of the five members of the ICG responded to the survey.

either formally or informally, to coordinate actions and lead the group through the policymaking process. The LA CVE process was also riddled with in-fighting between agencies attempting to take the lead, as one community member involved in the planning process explained that because every agency wanted to be in the limelight, organizations involved in the process were competing with each other and this infighting prevented collaboration from happening. The community member stated, “I would go to community events and either DHS was putting it on or the LAPD and I had to ask them, what is happening, is no one working together anymore?”²¹⁰ The infighting also prevented the ICG from obtaining additional funds needed for implementation. As Sgt. Mike Abdeen explained, “the problem is that we don’t have a solid intervention program to offer it to funding organizations to get the funding.”²¹¹

6.4.3 CVE Policymaking Post-2016

Los Angeles’s struggles with the further development of the intervention program changed after a split within the governance network that resulted in two new approaches to CVE with separate CVE leaders.²¹² The split emerged around the time of the 2016 call for applications for the 2016 CVE Grant in the summer of 2016. According to one community member, stakeholders within the original CVE network wanted to take different approaches.²¹³ The first set of stakeholders pursued a law-enforcement centric approach to CVE. The network was composed the Los Angeles Police Department, Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, the Los Angeles Joint Terrorism

²¹⁰ Anonymous Muslim community leader, personal communication, February 2017.

²¹¹ Sgt. Mike Abdeen, Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, personal communication, Los Angeles, CA, November 17, 2015.

²¹² Although a split emerged within the ICG, the ICG still formally exists and meets to discuss community events and activities.

²¹³ Anonymous Muslim community leader, February 2017.

Task Force which includes the FBI, and the Los Angeles Department of Mental Health. Led by the Los Angeles Police Department, the network created an intervention program titled “Recognizing Extremist Network Early Warnings” or RENEW.²¹⁴

The second set of stakeholders pursued a community-led approach to CVE. Under the leadership of Mayor Eric Garcetti of the City of Los Angeles²¹⁵ the second network is taking a public health approach to CVE in its program titled Building Healthy Communities in Los Angeles. The network is composed of a multidisciplinary steering committee with three main advisory sub-committees: a community advisory group,²¹⁶ an operational development committee,²¹⁷ and the ICG.²¹⁸ The operational development committee defines protocols for the model and the community advisory committee informs the operational designs of the prevention and intervention programs and coordinates all community-based organizations. The ICG’s involvement in the approach is solely for the regional law enforcement coordination of community outreach and engagement. As part of the network’s application for CVE funding, the Mayor’s Office is set to manage an intervention program developed by community-based organizations and to “convene and facilitate regular meetings of the community advisory group, organize conference-workshops to facilitate information-sharing, and monitor and identify gaps

²¹⁴ Source: The RENEW Program: A New Approach to Identifying Early Warnings of Potential Violent Behavior, Chief Michael Downing, Los Angeles Police Department.

²¹⁵ The Mayor’s Office hired Joumana Silyan-Saba formally of the HRC as a director of Strategies Against Violent Extremism (SAVE) to develop and implement strategies against violent extremism.

²¹⁶ The community advisory group is composed of MPAC, King Fahad Mosque, Homeboy Industries, Not in our Town (NIOT), ILM Foundation, Violence Prevention Coalition and GRYD Foundation, Professional Community Intervention Training Institute, LA Emergency Preparedness Foundation Access Services, Tiyya Foundation, California Sikh Council, USC Center for Religion and Civic Culture, and the City of Los Angeles Human Relations Commission.

²¹⁷ The operational development committee is composed of the Mayor’s Office of Public Safety (convener and facilitator), City of Los Angeles Emergency Management Department, County of Los Angeles Emergency Management, County Department of Mental Health, County 211 Referral System, City of Los Angeles 311 ITA, Los Angeles Unified School District, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, and Bayan Claremont University.

²¹⁸ Source: Los Angeles CVE 2016 Grant Funding Application. “Building Healthy Communities in Los Angeles.” Application submitted by the City of Los Angeles Office of Mayor Eric Garcetti, Mayor’s Office of Public Safety.’

in the services.”²¹⁹ At the time of writing, the further development and implementation of the model is on hold until the Los Angeles City Council votes to approve the acceptance of the 2016 CVE Grant. Thus, it is unknown how successful this new strategy will be. However, if my theory is correct, the new leadership of the Mayor’s Office amongst the one set of stakeholders and the LAPD amongst the other set of stakeholders should improve implementation efforts.

In conclusion, the LA case study lends support to my theory about the importance of local CVE leadership for the policymaking process. Because of the lack of leadership during the first CVE policy cycle, the CVE network was unable to overcome internal disagreements. Internal conflict was not, however, the only reason why the ICG struggled with implementing its model. Public opposition to CVE put pressure on the ICG and hindered implementation efforts. That said, LA was able to continue its prevention work through community engagement initiatives mainly because many of these programs were already in place and did not require additional coordination. Unsurprisingly, Boston, another pilot region, had similar difficulties during the policymaking process.

6.5 Implementing a CVE Plan in Boston

The NSC also designated Boston as a CVE pilot region. The NSC designated Boston as a pilot region largely because of the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings conducted by the Tsarnaev brothers. However, the Marathon bombings were not Boston’s only experience with terrorism. Boston served as a previous recruitment hub for Chechen jihadists during the 1980s and 1990s

²¹⁹ Source: Los Angeles CVE 2016 Grant Funding Application. “Building Healthy Communities in Los Angeles.” Application submitted by the City of Los Angeles Office of Mayor Eric Garcetti, Mayor’s Office of Public Safety.’ p.3

(Berger 2013). The region also had at least two recent incidents of radicalization, one in 2008 where the individual plotted an attack against civilians and another in 2009 where an individual plotted an attack against the government and civilians.²²⁰ Additionally, the Boston area is very diverse with, as of 2010, 27% of the population is foreign-born and 53% of the population as people of color.²²¹ For these reasons, the NSC approached the U.S. Attorney's Office in Boston in March 2014 to ask if they would be willing to help coordinate CVE efforts in the Greater Boston Region.

After agreeing to help coordinate local CVE efforts in Boston, the USAO spent the first several months, from March to June, determining what CVE was. As a representative from the USAO stated, "It [CVE] was a beltway term and from our perception came from the UK. We didn't have a real understanding of what it was or what it wasn't so we spent a good portion of this time doing research."²²²

Around August 2014, the USAO began planning which partners to bring to the table to help develop a CVE plan. In an attempt to build a CVE governance network, referred to as the Boston Regional Collaborative, composed of partners from both the non-government and government sectors, the USAO chose to invite partners that had preexisting partnerships with either the USAO or local law enforcement. Additionally, the USAO ensured that they invited partners with diverse views about CVE to the table. Out of a total of 54 individuals invited, 51 individuals agreed to participate. Two individuals declined the offer citing lack of time to devote to the Collaborative and one individual did not respond to the invitation.²²³ The Collaborative

²²⁰ Source: Subject ID Numbers 2001 and 1111, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2017). Profiles of Individual Radicalization in the United States (PIRUS) [Data file]. Retrieved from (<http://www.start.umd.edu/pirus>)

²²¹ Source: The Boston Indicators Project. "Race/Ethnicity." Available at: <http://www.bostonindicators.org/indicators/boston-neighborhoods>

²²² Anonymous employee of the US Attorney's Office in Boston, personal communication, February 10, 2017.

²²³ Ibid.

included partners from both the non-government and government sectors. Partners from around the Boston Region took part including partners from suburbs such as Cambridge, Greater Lowell, Jamaica Plain, Roxbury, and Wilmington (Boston Regional Collaborative 2015). Based on interviews with Collaborative members, similar to the Houston case, the members decided to participate only after being recruited by either the USAO or by other organizations participating which reiterates the importance of facilitation for mobilization efforts.

Given the number of individuals invited to the Collaborative, the USAO decided to separate the Collaborative into two different groups, the threat assessment and care group and the civic engagement group. The assessment working group was primarily composed of partners who already interacted with services that supported and engaged in some type of threat assessment. The civic engagement working group was composed primarily of community-based organizations. Each working group met separately in October and December; then the entire group met in January 2015 before the CVE Summit in February.²²⁴

During the planning process, and similar to the LA network, each member of the Collaborative held an equal seat at the table. The meetings were spent discussing what to include in the framework. After the sub-group meetings, the USAO put together draft versions of the framework for the sub-groups to review. Through the formal meetings and informal discussions on conference calls and emails, the Collaborative created a final version of the framework. The final framework, a consensus-based document, was publically released in February 2015.²²⁵

Similar to the Los Angeles network, many disagreements arose amongst participants developing the framework. Based on interviews with several individuals involved in the planning

²²⁴ Ibid.

²²⁵ Abdirahman Yusuf, Executive Director, Somali Development Center and Boston Regional Collaborative member, personal communication, Roxbury, MA, December 14, 2016.

process, individuals involved in the Collaborative disagreed over the concept of CVE and how CVE should be branded within the Greater Boston Area. For example, as one stakeholder explained, “we struggled over how to make this [the framework] not just about Muslims and many people disagreed over how to do this.”²²⁶ Moreover, similar to the Los Angeles network, the Collaborative struggled over the concept of interventions and the role of law enforcement in interventions.

The Boston framework initially was not supposed to be a framework, but rather an action plan. The USAO thought the plan would include a full strategy with goals, objectives, tasks, and an implementation component. However, once the Collaborative started to discuss these issues and realized the complexity and disagreements amongst participants, the USAO determined “that wasn’t something that we were going to be able to do.”²²⁷ Thus, the Collaborative ended up developing a framework rather than an action plan, and as illustrated below, the framework lacked key implementation details such as who was to implement the proposed programs. As one member of the Collaborative stated, “the framework was just too general.”²²⁸

6.5.1 Boston CVE Framework

Similar to Los Angeles’ Plan, Boston’s CVE Framework applies to all forms of violent extremism. The Framework lists problem areas the Collaborative identified with CVE in addition to goals and solutions that communities within Massachusetts can use as a guide for the

²²⁶ Anonymous interview with Boston Regional Collaborative member, personal communication, Boston, MA, December 15, 2016.

²²⁷ Anonymous employee of the US Attorney's Office in Boston, personal communication, February 10, 2017.

²²⁸ Anonymous interview with Boston Regional Collaborative member, personal communication, Boston, MA, December 15, 2016.

implementation of CVE-specific programs. However, unlike LA and MCM, the Collaborative's framework serves solely as a guide for communities rather than an action plan.²²⁹

The framework identifies seven problem areas related to the challenges of preventing violent extremism. The problems can be bracketed in terms of problems that contribute to the radicalization of individuals to violent extremism and problems associated with the implementation of CVE programs. The Collaborative felt that individuals can be lured toward radicalization through social media or other platforms that recruiters use to attempt to convince individuals to join terrorist groups. Moreover, U.S. foreign policies can often facilitate grievances amongst individuals contributing to the prospects for radicalization. The Collaborative identified that young people, in particular, are at greater risk of being vulnerable to recruitment.

The Collaborative also identified issues with developing solutions to these problems. The Collaborative noted that providing resources to those in need is difficult when there is a lack of understanding regarding violent extremism, distrust between government and non-government actors, and lack of cultural awareness. Moreover, the Collaborative thought that individuals convicted of violent crimes are in need of support before and after release from prison.²³⁰

The Collaborative offered solutions to each of the seven problem areas defined earlier in the Framework. In response to the vulnerability of youth, the Collaborative recommended that youth programs could be developed such as programs that promote conflict resolution skills or develop a sense of belonging amongst students. The Collaborative also recommended cross-cultural engagement activities and peer mentoring programs. In response to the recruitment

²²⁹ Boston Regional Collaborative. "Fact Sheet: A Framework for Prevention and Intervention Strategies," February 2015.

²³⁰ Boston Regional Collaborative. "A Framework for Prevention and Intervention Strategies," February 2015.

tactics used by extremist groups, the Collaborative recommended developing relationships between non-government and communications experts to develop counter-narratives. Since U.S. foreign policy may create additional grievances, the Collaborative recommended providing workshops for the public to increase awareness and non-violent methods that individuals can use to change policy.

The Collaborative also made recommendations in response to the challenges regarding the further development and implementation of CVE programs. To address the lack of understanding regarding violent extremism, the Collaborative suggested additional training and dialogues on violent extremism with the assistance of public health and mental health providers. Other suggestions included creating a statewide multidisciplinary team to enhance communication and a resource guide with information regarding mental health services. A lack of trust between the public and government may also complicate efforts to develop solutions. Thus, the Collaborative emphasized the need for additional dialogue between these groups either formally or informally. To create a more culturally aware society, the Collaborative encouraged training and public debates on this issue. Finally, since the Collaborative believed the those convicted of crimes are in need of a multitude of services, members recommended the development of programs where subject matter experts could provide specialized training to these individuals to assist in the disengagement process.²³¹

²³¹ Ibid.

6.5.2 Implementation

After the envoy returned from D.C., the Collaborative did not formally meet again until six months after the Summit, in September. At that time, the purpose of the meeting was to receive an update from the members regarding implementation efforts. However, no one had implemented any components of the framework. To jumpstart efforts, after the September meeting, the USAO called for a smaller group discussion to work out the details of the intervention component of the plan.²³² However, the Collaborative has not further developed an intervention model and has since collapsed following the decision by the USAO to pass off the CVE problem-set.

As part of the pilot initiative, Boston received \$216,667 for the implementation of the framework. Following the large group meeting in September and the smaller group discussion, the USAO signed a cooperative agreement with Executive Office of Health and Human Services (EOHHS) to take the lead on CVE efforts in Boston and allocate the funds.²³³ As part of the agreement, the funds were to be dispersed in the form of mini-grants to: "non-government to provide services and support for intervention specific to ideologically-motivated violence; counter-messaging activities that challenge violent extremists propaganda; and universal prevention activities."²³⁴ The collaborative component of CVE programs disappeared.

After the change in project managers, in March 2016, the EOHHS called for a request for information (RFI) regarding the status of implementation efforts in Boston. EOHHS sought

²³² Source: Email from Brandy Donini-Melanson to Robyn Kennedy. "Multi-Disciplinary Intervention Follow-up," Wednesday, September 9, 2015

²³³ Source: "Cooperative Agreement" between US Attorney's Office and the Executive Office of Health and Human Services, September 30, 2015.

²³⁴ Source: Email from Brandy Donini-Melanson to Robyn Kennedy. "Tomorrow's meeting." Wednesday, August 19, 2015.

feedback from community members related to program design, communities to be served, recommended strategies, and resource requirements. Researchers from Harvard's T.H Chan School of Public Health²³⁵ interviewed community members to receive their input on the Framework and the future of CVE efforts in Boston. The researchers conducted interviews with individuals from community-based organizations, government agencies, health care, and academia. The researchers interviewed around 20 individuals involved in the Collaborative and 32 individuals who were not involved in the Collaborative. Based on the interviews, the researchers found that respondents did not agree with the term 'CVE' and did not support violence prevention initiatives that are narrow in scope (Savoia 2016). Based on this input, EOHHS changed the name of Boston's efforts from CVE to Promoting Engagement, Acceptance, and Community Empowerment (PEACE).

Following the name change, EOHHS ran a call for proposals in August 2016 to disperse the funding. However, EOHHS only received four applications.²³⁶ One of the applications did not qualify to receive funding; thus, the EOHHS allocated \$216,667 amongst the three remaining organizations, the Somali Development Center, United Somali Youth (which operates out of the Islamic Society of Boston Cultural Center), and Empower Peace (Marcelo 2016). Although the programs funded are CVE-specific programs, none of the programs are collaborative or directly derived from Boston's framework. The push for multi-sector collaborative CVE programming in the Greater Boston Area failed to transpire.

The lack of leadership within the Collaborative made it difficult to resolve disagreements between members of the Collaborative and promote coordination for two reasons. Although the

²³⁵ DHS awarded the Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health funding to evaluate the Boston model.

²³⁶ Elena Savoia, Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health Professor and Lead Evaluator for the Boston CVE Pilot Program, personal communication, The Hague, The Netherlands, November 7, 2016.

USAO facilitated action, the USAO did not have the expertise on CVE or authority to make key decisions. Moreover, in interviews with Collaborative members, many stakeholders expressed their apprehension with the USAO's involvement in a supposed non-punitive initiative due to the USAO's role as a prosecuting authority. Thus, with no one to intervene and mediate conflicts, when disagreements arose between Collaborative members, the outcome was a watered-down framework that lacked a clear direction and the details needed for implementation. The requirements of implementation stretched beyond the capabilities of the members involved in the Collaborative given the number of details that were left to be developed and the broad scope of the framework. Given the structure of the Collaborative, no agency or organization was able to step-in and steer the Collaborative in a direction favorable to implementation. The network in Boston also lacked a coordinating body to implement the framework. Once the Collaborative developed the framework, it dissolved and the EOHHS took over with the purpose of only dispersing the funds. Without an organization or agency facilitating coordination amongst the Collaborative participants, collaboration failed to occur.

Although the lack of a local CVE leader hindered implementation efforts, Boston also faced other difficulties. Similar to LA, Boston faced external opposition to CVE efforts. For instance, in April 2016, civil rights organizations in the Boston area delivered a petition signed by over one thousand Massachusetts residents calling for the EOHHS to end its collaboration with federal law enforcement on CVE efforts.²³⁷ The organized opposition against CVE forced some members of the Collaborative to distance themselves from the CVE efforts to avoid community backlash. Subsequently, the preservation of self-interests outweighed the needs of the Collaborative.

²³⁷ Source: Muslim Justice League. "Press Advisory: 1000 Massachusetts Residents call on Health and Human Services to Reject Federal Prosecutors' "Violent Extremism" Campaign," April 4, 2016.

The Boston case lends further support for the need of a local CVE leader to act as a functional equivalent of a centralized policymaking structure. Despite the Collaborative's initial interest in CVE, prior partnerships in place to implement CVE programs, and available resources for implementation, the Collaborative did not implement its CVE plan. A leader was missing.

6.6 Implementing a CVE Plan in Montgomery County

Located just north of Washington D.C., Montgomery County, Maryland is home to a diverse population and a progressive county government which has historically leaned Democratic. As of 2010, approximately 30% of the County's population is foreign-born.²³⁸ Although not selected as a pilot region, stakeholders also mobilized around CVE after facilitation. This time, however, a local NGO, known as WORDE, and the County Executive's Office of Community Partnerships' Interfaith Liaison helped facilitate the mobilization process. Reverend Kasey Kaseman, the Interfaith Liaison, and WORDE utilized their social networks to convince other stakeholders in Montgomery County to mobilize around the concept of CVE. In contrast to the cases in Boston and Los Angeles, the governance network in place in Montgomery County designed and fully implemented a CVE plan, known as the Montgomery County Model (MCM).

The World Organization for Resource Development and Education (WORDE), established in 2002, is a nonprofit, educational organization committed to mitigating social and political conflict. Originally based in Washington, D.C., the organization moved to Montgomery County in 2011 to establish the International Culture Center (ICC). The purpose of the ICC is to

²³⁸ Source: "Characteristics of Foreign-Born and African American Residents of Montgomery County." Available at: https://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/partnerships/resources/files/Montgomery_County_Foreign_Born_Data.pdf

promote social cohesion amongst Montgomery County residents through various community programming. Around this time, WORDE organized informal community programs in the U.S. and researched counterterrorism. WORDE also began to call for public-private partnerships to develop community-based responses to radicalization (Mirahmadi and Farooq 2010).

Executive Director, Dr. Hedieh Mirahmadi founded WORDE and helped develop Montgomery County's CVE model, previously known as the Montgomery County Model (MCM).²³⁹ Mirahmadi previously worked and lived in Los Angeles and served on a citizens' advisory board, which had a strong partnership with the Los Angeles Police Department. Mirahmadi wanted to build a similar relationship with law enforcement in Montgomery County. Moreover, WORDE wanted to "practice what it preached" in regard to fulfilling the need for community-based responses to radicalization.²⁴⁰

After the Boston bombings in April of 2013, Rev. Kaseman introduced WORDE staff to the County Executive, Isiah "Ike" Leggett and Chief Thomas Manger of the Montgomery County Police and pitched the idea of a collaborative effort to prevent violent extremism. Both agreed to form a partnership to mobilize around CVE. WORDE, the County Executive, the County Executive's Office for Community Partnerships, and the Montgomery County Police worked together to form Montgomery County's CVE model.

When WORDE approached the County Executive and County Police about the idea for an inter-faith based collaborative violence prevention program, both the County Executive and Chief Manger of the County Police were supportive of the idea. Ike Leggett, the County Executive, recognized the need for programming and knew that Montgomery County could

²³⁹ Since its inception, WORDE renamed the MCM to the Building Resilience Against Violent Extremism (BRAVE). The name change allows for more general applicability.

²⁴⁰ Mehreen Farooq, WORDE Senior Fellow, personal communication, March 25, 2016.

benefit from the programming. Being right next to D.C., Montgomery County is sensitive to the issue of public safety and the County is a diverse community. Since Leggett took office in 2006, the County has engaged in community outreach efforts to make the County more inclusive; thus, Leggett felt the idea pitched by WORDE was a natural fit for the community.²⁴¹ Similarly, the police department was supportive of the idea. The department also has a long history of community engagement. It began using community policing in 1988 in the Lincoln Park area of Rockville, MD in response to drug and crime problems. The department institutionalized the practice in other parts of the County in the 1990s. Moreover, the department felt the programs were needed. In reference to the idea of interventions, one officer expressed his support, "what if the 15-year-old crack seller who was killed, if given the opportunity and mentorship, had the ability to cure cancer? Then, we are the ones losing."²⁴²

The MCM is inclusive, meaning that it targets the full spectrum of public safety threats, not just focusing attention on one particular community. The MCM seeks to, "generate awareness of risk factors of violent extremism and empower the appropriate figures to intervene with vulnerable individuals before they choose a path of violence."²⁴³ The model is based on an early-warning system that increases the number of people who could intervene and prevent violence. For the warning system to work, the MCM is based on four core components: engagement, building connections, education, and targeted interventions. The MCM achieves its objectives through community policing and working through two bodies, the Faith Community Working Group (FCWG) and the Crossroads program. Behind both non-policing components of

²⁴¹ Isiah Leggett, Montgomery County Executive, personal communication, Rockville, MD, March 7, 2016.

²⁴² Montgomery County Commanding Police Officer, personal communication, Rockville, MD, February 2016.

²⁴³ Source: World Organization for the Resource Development and Education (WORDE), "Developing a Community-led Approach to Countering Violent Extremism (CVE): An Instructor's Manual," June 2016, p. 73.

the model lays local CVE leaders under the direction of WORDE and the County Executive's Office of Community Partnerships.

WORDE and the Interfaith Community Liaison created the FCWG as a sub-component of the County Executive's Faith Community Advisory Council, which is part of the Montgomery County Executive's Office of Community Partnerships. Although non-government sector leaders set the agenda for FCWG with guidance from the County's Interfaith Liaison, Rev. Kasey Kaseman, WORDE manages and helps with the administrative aspects of the FCWG and its programming. Common responsibilities of WORDE include but are not limited to: "maintaining email databases and communication amongst thousands of stakeholders, convening stakeholders to address urgent issues affecting the county, identifying subject matter expertise for events, providing the ICC as a facility to host meetings and events, and providing logistical support for events."²⁴⁴

WORDE is also involved in the other main component of the MCM, the Crossroads program. WORDE designed and implemented the Crossroads program; it's intervention program. While FCWG works on the community-engagement side of things and the Montgomery County Police conducts community policing, Crossroads offers vulnerable individuals services such as mentoring, counseling and access to social services to prevent these individuals from engaging in violence. In addition to WORDE's Crossroads program, WORDE can recommend clients to other service providers within Montgomery County that can provide assistance to vulnerable individuals, including social service agencies such as the Family Services Inc., the Lutheran Social Services, and the Collaboration Council.²⁴⁵

²⁴⁴Ibid, p. 75

²⁴⁵ Source: World Organization for Resource Development and Education (WORDE). (2016). "A Collective Impact Initiative that Increases Public Safety and Social Cohesion: Strategic Plan 2016-2019." Available at: http://www.worde.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Strategic-Plan_final_v3_090616.pdf

The MCM launched in April 2013 with a town hall on April 25, 2013. WORDE hosted the town hall forum which was led by the Interfaith Community Liaison. The FCWG signed a joint statement calling for unity and partnership to prevent violence amongst people of all faiths. Doing so, the FCWG and 70 others, committed themselves to: “creating opportunities for people of different faiths to become better acquainted and able to celebrate our essential unity; forging partnerships with first responders and trained leaders from all faith traditions to serve our fellow residents in crisis situations; and, planning long-term intervention techniques designed to prevent violence.”²⁴⁶

6.6.1 The Montgomery County Model

The MCM is the first evidence-based CVE model in the United States.²⁴⁷ In its three years of operation, the MCM has served more than 4274 county residents, and more than 300 faith-based institutions have participated in the MCM.²⁴⁸ To operate the programming, the MCM has received almost one million dollars in private and public funds to grow and enhance the program. The model is also currently being replicated in two areas, Prince George’s County in Maryland and Denver, Colorado.

As mentioned, the MCM’s four main components are to engage, educate, connect and intervene. The premise is that if community members are well informed about the risk factors of

²⁴⁶ Source: Faith Community Working Group (FCWG) of Montgomery County Calling for Unity and Partnership to Prevent Violence.” April 25, 2013. Accessible at: <http://www.theicc.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/FINAL-solidarity-statement-050713.pdf>

²⁴⁷ The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) funded a formal evaluation of WORDE programming in an attempt to understand its effectiveness. The results of the evaluation can be found in Williams, Horgan and Evans (2016). At the time, the NIJ also funded evaluations of the pilot programs. However, the lack of actual implemented programming in the pilot cities prevented the formal evaluations of the effectiveness of the programs.

²⁴⁸ Source: World Organization for the Resource Development and Education (WORDE), “Developing a Community-led Approach to Countering Violent Extremism (CVE): An Instructor’s Manual,” June 2016.

radicalization, then they can help identify vulnerable individuals and refer these individuals to the intervention program. The FCWG conducts community outreach events, the Montgomery County Police conducts community policing and training, and WORDE offers training regarding radicalization and mentoring and counseling to vulnerable individuals through its Crossroads program.²⁴⁹

The purpose of the Faith Community Working Group (FCWG) is to promote interfaith collaboration within Montgomery County. The FCWG is headed by Co-Chairs who steer the agenda for the FCWG and help make decisions such as the creation of sub-committees. The Co-Chairs are appointed by the Interfaith Community Liaison, a County Executive position, and can serve two-year terms with eligibility to serve a second term. In the first years of operation, Rev. Kasey Kaseman appointed Dr. Hedieh Mirahmadi of WORDE and Rabbi Batya Steinlauf as the Co-Chairs.²⁵⁰

The FCWG is composed of various community members from Montgomery County. Initial members of the FCWG consisted of individuals who participated in the inaugural event of the FCWG in 2013. However, the group is inclusive and any individual who is a resident of Montgomery County or works in a faith-based community organization headquartered in Montgomery County is qualified to join.²⁵¹ As part of the qualifications for membership, members must serve on at least one FCWG sub-committee. The Co-Chairs task each sub-committee with a topic relevant to the objectives of the FCWG.

²⁴⁹ Source: World Organization for the Resource Development and Education (WORDE). “A Collective Impact Initiative that Increases Public Safety and Social Cohesion- Strategic Plan 2016-2019,” 2016.

²⁵⁰ In addition to chairing the FCWG, the Co-Chairs serve on the Executive Committee of the Interfaith Advisory Council for the County Executive.

²⁵¹ Source: Faith Community Work Group, “Statement of Purpose.” August 2013.

The FCWG is currently composed of three sub-committees: the community building, faith leaders response team (FLRT), and the emotional and spiritual care volunteers (ESCV) sub-committees. The community building sub-group is in charge of facilitating interfaith relations and creating programming, while the FLRT is composed of members prepared to respond to any community crisis. The ESCV consists of individuals who are trained to provide emotional and spiritual assistance after a crisis. Past committees included committees on healthcare, hunger relief, solidarity programming, education, and refugees. In the first year of operation, there was also an intervention and prevention of violence subcommittee. Members of the intervention and prevention of violence committee helped develop awareness of these issues and helped build expertise to prevent violence.²⁵²

Besides conducting community engagement through FCWG events, the Montgomery County Police Department also conducted community engagement through community policing. The Montgomery County Police engage the community from a variety of angles. The principle method is through specialized units called district community action teams. The purpose of these specialized teams is to have officers assigned specifically for engagement purposes. Typical patrol officers normally do not have the time for engagement activities. Patrol officers are dispatched to calls for services and are constantly going from one call to another, so they do not have time to get to know their communities and the people within them. The specialized units operate by geographic regions, rather than targeting communities by ethnicity. However, MCPD also has an African American liaison committee, an Asian American liaison committee, and a LGBTQ liaison committee that meet monthly and discuss issues related to these specific communities. Thus, the MCPD engages the public in as many ways possible. Moreover, the

²⁵² Ibid.

department continues to improve its community relations. As Lieutenant Michael Ward explained, “community engagement requires constant attention and constant work, but the payoff is great.”²⁵³

WORDE developed the Crossroads Program to provide individuals with low to moderate incomes, particularly women and teens, who are vulnerable to radicalization with mentoring and access to social services. The program targets individuals from underserved communities within Montgomery County including individuals from the South Asian, Middle Eastern, and African communities. Individuals that can benefit from this program include individuals suffering from trauma, emotional disorder, anger management, or individuals having acculturation difficulties.²⁵⁴

The purpose of the intervention program is to connect vulnerable individuals to service providers in an attempt to reduce their vulnerability to engaging in violence. The program operates within the pre-criminal space, meaning that individuals referred to the program have not yet committed any crimes. Under the MCM, anyone from the community can refer an individual to WORDE. The NGO, when appropriate, then refers the individual to the relevant community services that can provide individual assistance. In addition, WORDE also provides counseling and mentoring when appropriate. The referral-based system works bi-directionally, meaning that cases can be escalated or de-escalated based on the individual’s needs.²⁵⁵

²⁵³ Lieutenant Michael Ward, Montgomery County Police Department, personal communication, April 21, 2017.

²⁵⁴ Source: World Organization for the Resource Development and Education (WORDE), “Developing a Community-led Approach to Countering Violent Extremism (CVE): An Instructor’s Manual,” June 2016.

²⁵⁵ Source: World Organization for the Resource Development and Education (WORDE). “A Collective Impact Initiative that Increases Public Safety and Social Cohesion- Strategic Plan 2016-2019,” 2016.

6.6.2 Implementation

At its foundation, the MCM is a bottom-up CVE model with top-down support grounded by local CVE leaders. WORDE, the first leader, serves as the primary backburner organization that steers the agenda and makes sure the model runs smoothly. However, the Interfaith Community Liaison as a component of the County Executive's Office of Community Partnerships, the second leader, also facilitates coordination primarily amongst grassroots organizations within the interfaith community and the county government. At the same time, the community, meaning the interfaith community, can offer input on the content of the programs associated with the FCWG. The County Executive serves as a source of funding and support for the initiatives (Mirahmadi 2016).

As mentioned, WORDE initiated the planning and implementation process of the MCM. Mirahmadi developed the idea of the MCM and pitched it to the other stakeholders with help from Rev. Kasey Kaseman. As Lieutenant Michael Ward explained, "Mirahmadi was the architect, visionary and builder for the MCM."²⁵⁶ Unlike the networks in Boston and Los Angeles which struggled over the details of the CVE programming, under this structure, FCWG members provided input for the model and WORDE provided additional insight and guidance when needed for implementation. With WORDE as a lead organization, it partnered with the County Executive and Montgomery County Police to implement the model. While the partners launched the FCWG as a body of the County Executive's Office of Community Partnerships, WORDE implemented the Crossroads programs through its organization. The County Executive

²⁵⁶ Lieutenant Michael Ward, Montgomery County Police Department, personal communication, April 21, 2017.

then provided funding for the MCM. For instance, in 2015, the County Executive provided \$85,000 for programming.²⁵⁷

Unlike the other two cases, the implementation process was straightforward for the MCM. As mentioned by Leggett, he thought the implementation process went smoothly with little difficulties.²⁵⁸ For the engagement part of the model, the partners used the FCWG to develop programs and obtain volunteers. For example, the FCWG used the town hall on April 25, 2013, to plan a Solidarity Walk and volunteers were able to sign up for the event. The FCWG also used the town hall to develop a clergy response sub-committee.²⁵⁹ Since its inception in 2013, the FCWG has held various additional events ranging from an annual interfaith picnic to educational events about topics such as public safety and extremism. Again, the purposes of these events are to promote interfaith collaboration and in reference to CVE, raise community awareness regarding violent extremism.

Interviewees believed that one reason for a smooth implementation process was due to WORDE's efforts. From the early days of the MCM, WORDE has served as a central organizing force of the model and center for expertise regarding radicalization and violent extremism. WORDE not only developed the Crossroads program and helped develop the framework of the MCM, but it also centralized all administrative and managerial aspects of the MCM around the organization. As Michael Williams, an academic who evaluated the MCM, stated, "WORDE orchestrates the spider web that connects everybody."²⁶⁰ As the backburner organization, if something goes array, WORDE steps in and ensures the model remains operational. For instance,

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ Isiah Leggett, Montgomery County Executive, personal communication, Rockville, MD, March 7, 2016.

²⁵⁹ Faith Community Working Group. "Agenda," April 25, 2013.

²⁶⁰ Michael Williams, Social Psychologist, Georgia State University and evaluator of the Montgomery County Model, personal communication, Washington, D.C., February 2016.

the MCM incorporates education workshops within its model which requires training materials. However, there is a lack of educational material on CVE and the radicalization process. As the center for expertise for this topic, WORDE was able to intervene and develop in-house educational material to incorporate into its programming.²⁶¹ WORDE's actions prevented the delay of implementation because of the centralization component of the MCM that grants WORDE the flexibility to intervene and guide the process. WORDE provided the MCM with the expertise and staffing needed to ensure that communication and coordination amongst partners ensued.

Even though WORDE was important, other stakeholders also contributed to the successful development and implementation of the model. First, stakeholders noted that the MCM would not have been possible without the resource support from the County Executive. Second, established social networks due to prior collaboration were also key to the success of the MCM. The MCM benefited from Rev. Kaseman who had years of experience working with the interfaith community in Montgomery County and establishing connections between the government and local grassroots organizations. As explained by Rev. Kaseman, he did not have to make cold calls and work with people he did not know, instead, he was calling people he had known for many years and had a credible working relationship with. This made it easier to forge connections and collaboration between multiple agents.²⁶²

In addition to factors such as resources and the prior history of collaboration, stakeholders pointed to the role played by the police to explain Montgomery County's success. The police were not at the forefront of the MCM; rather the MCPD served as a partner in its execution. Lieutenant Michael Ward partially attributes the success of the MCM to the

²⁶¹ Mehreen Farooq, WORDE Senior Fellow, personal communication, March 25, 2016.

²⁶² Rev. Kasey Kaseman, Interfaith Community Liaison, personal communication, April 28, 2017.

community-led aspect of the model because the public tends to support a community-led initiative more than a police-led model.²⁶³ Indeed, this was one of the reasons why the White House promoted community-led CVE initiatives in the first place. Community members had the ability to shape the content of the model and offer ideas to the executive partners.

Although the implementation process went relatively smoothly, the partners have encountered some problems, particularly in regard to the opposition. In the early years of the MCM, the partners have had difficulty distinguishing between the MCM community-led efforts from the perceived U.S. federal government approach to CVE. Thus, the MCM has received some criticism primarily from advocacy groups such as CAIR and the Brennan Center rather than community members.²⁶⁴ Thus, unlike Boston and Los Angeles where the opposition is localized, the opposition did not hinder implementation efforts in Montgomery County in the early years. That said, even though interviewees agreed, the local community has remained largely receptive and supportive of the CVE efforts within Montgomery County, more recently, the opposition to CVE has grown. As explained by Rev. Kasey Kaseman, “there has been growing criticism now that I have been addressing...local community members have been coming to me and criticizing the model.”²⁶⁵ Rev. Kaseman attributes this growing criticism to the growing perception that the model is more police-centric than it actually is. Nonetheless, the MCM is operational and has reached thousands of individuals within Montgomery County.²⁶⁶

The MCM lends support to the argument that leadership increases the likeliness of the implementation of CVE programs. WORDE’s and the County Executive’s Office of Community Partnership’s ability to facilitate the implementation process, coordinate efforts amongst

²⁶³ Lieutenant Michael Ward, Montgomery County Police Department, personal communication, April 21, 2017.

²⁶⁴ Mehreen Farooq, WORDE Senior Fellow, personal communication, March 25, 2016.

²⁶⁵ Rev. Kasey Kaseman, Interfaith Community Liaison, personal communication, April 28, 2017.

²⁶⁶ Ibid.

participants, and step-in when issues arose contributed to the successful implementation of the model.

6.7 Conclusion

The implementation of CVE initiatives by local governance networks is a complex process shrouded in uncertainty and confusion over what CVE is and what CVE programs should entail. Focusing on a network that had local CVE leaders in Montgomery County and two networks that were leaderless in Los Angeles and Boston, I have argued that leadership increases the prospects for implementation by increasing coordination amongst multiple agents. In the pilot regions in Los Angeles and Boston, despite the facilitative actions of the USAO during the planning stages, the CVE plans that the local governance networks developed were vague and lacked key details regarding the content of CVE programs. I argued that leaderless networks were prone to decision stalemates, which helps explain both the vagueness of the plans developed and the lack of implementation. By contrast, in Montgomery County, WORDE and the County Executive's Office of Community Partnerships served as anchors for the planning and implementation phases and helped ensure that the implementation process ran smoothly.

The importance of leadership is not the only factor that explains why CVE governance networks struggle to implement a CVE plan. Reflected in the interviews with participants of the local governance networks and as others have argued, the availability of resources is just as important for the implementation process. Moreover, the external opposition to CVE from some community members, especially from civil rights and liberties organizations, slowed the implementation process. Local governance network participants took time to address the concerns of opposing community voices with little success in appeasing the opposition.

The implications of this argument have several policy recommendations for the future of CVE efforts in the United States. The research findings lend support for the need of leadership during the early stages of the policymaking process. However, leadership does not mean that the principal, the U.S. federal government should control the process, nor does it mean that the community should not be involved in the policymaking process. In Montgomery County, while WORDE handled administrative tasks such as scheduling meetings, community members were still able to give feedback into the types of programs and events implemented within the County and WORDE only intervened when needed. Besides the need for leadership, the research findings also suggest that communities need more training regarding CVE. Community stakeholders consider CVE a ‘beltway’ phenomena and stakeholders are often unaware of how to create CVE programs and what CVE entails. Additional training and empirically-based CVE research can potentially close these knowledge gaps, address misconceptions about CVE, and improve the prospects for future CVE initiatives in the United States.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

7.1 Introduction

Decentralized policymaking with community participation yields several costs and benefits to the policymaking process. Decentralization allows communities to design policies that directly impact them to better suit community needs (Ostrom 2008). At the same time, decentralization often fails due to various challenges that arise during the policymaking process (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973; Treisman 2007). In this dissertation, I have argued that these challenges are magnified for the CVE policymaking process given the variety of stakeholders involved in the process, lack of administrative rules for the implementation of CVE programming, the uncertainty around CVE, and the stigmatization attached to CVE programming.

Consequently, this dissertation has studied why few communities create a CVE governance network and even fewer develop and implement a CVE plan in the United States. Disaggregating the CVE policymaking process into three stages – mobilization, development, and implementation– I have advanced a novel argument for why CVE governance networks and subsequent CVE plans only emerge in some communities under certain conditions. I first study why some stakeholders agree to participate and create a CVE governance network at the local level focusing on stakeholder interest in CVE, stakeholder capacity of mobilize, and facilitation. Even when stakeholders are interested in CVE and have the capabilities to mobilize, facilitation increases the prospects of mobilization. Through interviews and surveys in both Houston and Columbus, I show the importance of facilitation, which secured mobilization efforts in Houston and explained the lack of mobilization in Columbus.

The dissertation also finds that although mobilization is the first step in the process, mobilization does not guarantee that a governance network will implement a CVE plan within a community. I also have shown that networks with local CVE leaders are more likely to implement a CVE plan compared to those that are leaderless. Evidence from Boston, Los Angeles, and Montgomery County show WORDE and the Montgomery County Executive of Community Partnerships ensured that the implementation process moved forward whereas disagreements amongst stakeholders that emerged in the other two cases were not resolved given the lack of a central actor with authority to step-in and resolve the issues.

Altogether, the dissertation sheds new light on the complexities and challenges associated with CVE efforts. However, there is more to be understood. Following a discussion of the implications of the research findings, by way of conclusion I discuss the future of CVE. I address the recent changes to CVE under the Trump administration, the challenges that lie ahead, and provide suggestions for future research on the topic.

7.2 Implications

My argument and findings have implications for both social science and policymakers. For social science research, my argument has implications for two literatures: the implementation of countering violent extremism and theories of the emergence of collaborative governance and policy implementation. My findings also provide policymakers the needed information to understand what happened at the local level. I address these implications below.

7.2.1 Implications for Social Science

Where are the CVE programs? For CVE specialists, I provide a theory for the lack of CVE programming at the local level. My theory highlights the implications of local politics that are often at play at the local level during the CVE policymaking process. By its nature, CVE policymaking involves a variety of different actors with different interests and perceptions working in an environment that may be foreign to them. One consequence, as I show, is that CVE policymaking often falls victim to local political disagreements that ultimately impede the policymaking process. However, I show how facilitation and leadership can overcome many of these challenges that emerge within the policymaking process.

My research also addresses policy implementation, a topic that has gone understudied within the CVE field. Thus far, CVE research has primarily concentrated on evaluating the effectiveness of CVE programming at the expense of understanding the complexities associated with the CVE policymaking process. This dissertation addresses this gap in knowledge by providing empirically-based research using mixed-methods to provide a more nuanced understanding of the CVE policymaking process.

Why do governance networks emerge? For public administration specialists, my dissertation provides a theory for the emergence of governance networks. Unlike other studies that examine principal-agent relationships, I do not take the agent's acceptance of the relationship as given. My theory outlines the scenarios under which governance networks should and should not emerge. I show that stakeholder interest in the topic, capacity to mobilize, and facilitation, together, increase the prospects for mobilization.

Why so some governance networks fail? My dissertation also provides public administration specialists additional evidence for the need of leadership embedded within governance networks for the development and implementation of security policy strategies. I outline the reasons why leadership is critical for security-related governance networks and show that networks that have a local CVE leader are more likely to develop comprehensive policy plans and to implement those plans.

7.2.2 Policy Implications

As found in chapter 3, one difference between the CVE efforts in the United States and the United Kingdom is U.K.'s reliance on public institutions versus the United States' reliance on community-based programming. I find that the U.K.'s centralized model and the use of facilitators in the form of *Prevent* coordinators helps explain the numerous CVE programs in the United Kingdom versus the lack of programming in the United States. However, I find and later show in chapters 5 and 6 that centralization and facilitation are important not just for state-centric, top-down approaches, but also for civic, bottom-up approaches.

In chapter 5, I show how a local police department's decision to hire Mustafa Tameez to facilitate action was key to the mobilization of stakeholders within the Muslim community in the Greater Houston area. This finding has two policy implications. First, although a lack of CVE programming may be a sign of a lack of interest in CVE, the Columbus case study shows that some stakeholders are actually interested, but lack the knowledge, resources, and assistance to move the process forward. Second, although the findings in Houston may imply that state-initiated efforts are needed for mobilization, the Montgomery County Model in chapter 6 shows

that state initiative is not a prerequisite for mobilization or implementation. This means that non-state-initiated efforts also need resources, including funding sources, to implement CVE programming.

Relatedly, chapter 6 shows that centralization can come in different forms. A local CVE leader as found in the Montgomery County Model, can act as a functional equivalent of centralization to provide the best of both worlds. A CVE governance network led by a trusted stakeholder provides the flexibility, inclusiveness, and innovativeness found in community-based programming while providing the security and stability found in top-down policymaking. Although the federal government attempted to encourage U.S. Attorney's Offices to mimic this structure, these efforts fell short. As found in Los Angeles, some U.S. Attorneys chose not to participate, whereas others, as in Boston, lacked decision-making authority. Policymakers seeking to learn from these experiences should encourage communities to pursue this model with the caveat of allowing communities to choose the leader versus a state-picked federal government stakeholder. Although more research is needed, my findings suggest that the centralizing figures should be a trusted stakeholder with the social capital and knowledge needed to design and implement CVE programming.²⁶⁷

Finally, I find that public opposition to CVE exists and is growing, which threatens the future of CVE programming. In chapter 6, all three CVE initiatives in the three case studies faced public opposition to CVE. Opponents of CVE are primarily concerned with law enforcement's involvement, specifically the FBI's involvement, and the targeting of Muslim American communities. This means that future CVE efforts should remain inclusive and *target all forms of violent extremism*, not just Islamic violent extremism. Additionally, law

²⁶⁷ Numerous field guides on leadership exist for the role of leadership in collaborative governance. For instance, please see, Chrislip (2002).

enforcement's involvement in CVE should be a community decision, not a forced decision.

Although these policy recommendations may seem common sense, recent changes to CVE under the Trump administration has proven otherwise.

7.3 CVE Going Forward Under the Trump Administration

Beginning with funding allocation, we have seen many changes to CVE programming under the Trump administration, which together threaten the prospects for CVE in the United States.

Towards the end of the Obama administration, in 2016, Congress approved a \$10 million Countering Violent Extremism Grant Program. The grant was to be administered by the Department of Homeland Security, Office for Community Partnerships. Eligible applicants had the opportunity to apply for funding to address one of five areas of operation: developing resilience; challenging the narrative; training and engagement; managing intervention activities; and building capacity.²⁶⁸ Over 200 applicants responded to the call. The week before the change in administration, DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson announced the recipients of the grant: the original list included a wide range of recipients from organizations that focus on Islamic violent extremism to those that focus their efforts on countering white supremacy. These organizations proposed a variety of programs from counter-messaging media campaigns to intervention programs designed to offer individuals on a path towards radicalization an off-ramp. Despite the range in programming, under the Obama administration, all of these programs fell under the umbrella of CVE.

²⁶⁸ Source: Department of Homeland Security, "Notice of Funding Opportunity: Fiscal Year 2016 Countering Violent Extremism Grant Program." 2016.

Following the Trump administration's brief CVE funding freeze (Duncan and Strickler 2017), on June 23, 2017, the Department of Homeland Security released an updated list of the recipients of the CVE grants. Aside from the organizations that rejected the funding shortly after President Trump took office, the new list also excluded a couple of notable organizations, namely organizations that sought to counter far-right extremism. The excluded organizations included Life After Hate, a program that targets rightwing extremism,²⁶⁹ and Project Help Nevada,²⁷⁰ an organization that proposed a CVE media campaign in the Northern Nevada area to target "the act of mass murder, killing sprees, and suicide associated with multiple homicides."²⁷¹ The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill's media campaign proposal to target both jihadists and recruitment by white supremacists was also excluded from the list (Price 2017). In an email from a DHS spokeswoman to NPR, DHS claimed that organizations were cut from the list based on new criteria applied to the grants, rather than because of an organization's focus on white extremist violence (ibid.). The table below lists the organizations that either received funds, had funding revoked, or rejected funding.

²⁶⁹ Source: <https://lifeafterhate.org>

²⁷⁰ Source: Project Help Nevada, <http://www.projecthelpnevada.org/unitedagainstviolence>

²⁷¹ Source: https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/9b7204_9be42b9658794e049c498b1b2f915b27.pdf

Table 7.1 CVE Grantees Under the Trump Administration²⁷²

Received Funding	Funding Revoked	Declined Funding
Alameda County Sheriff’s Office America Abroad Media City of Arlington Police City of Dearborn Police City of Houston City of Los Angeles Crisis Intervention of Houston Denver Police Global Peace Foundation Heartland Democracy Center Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department Masjid Muhammad, Inc. Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety and Security Nashville International Center for Empowerment National Consortium for Advanced Policing National Governors Association Nebraska Emergency Management Agency Peace Catalyst International Police Foundation Rochester Institute of Technology Seattle Police Department The Counter Extremist Project Tuesday’s Children University of San Diego	Coptic Orthodox Charities Council Foundation Life After Hate Inc. Music in Common Muslim American Leadership Alliance Muslim Public Affairs Project Help Nevada, Inc. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill	Claremont School of Theology Ka Joog Leaders Advancing and Helping Communities Unity Productions Foundation

Based on responses received by one organizations that was denied funding, this new criterion allegedly includes a need for organizations to work in coordination with law enforcement. The Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC), an organization that did focus on Islamic violent extremism, also had funding pulled. In a statement sent from DHS to MPAC, it was told that “it

²⁷² Source: DHS Countering Violent Extremism Grants, available at: <https://www.dhs.gov/cvegrants>

did not meet the criteria of working with law enforcement to counter violent extremism” (Hansler 2017). An analysis of the original grant proposals reveals that 11 recipients out of the 26 recipients of funding are either a law enforcement agency or proposed a program that works with law enforcement.²⁷³

These moves are evidence of a change in government strategy, one that counteracts previous attempts to ensure that CVE efforts were inclusive and distinct from law enforcement operations and consequently less objectionable. The result will likely be an unnecessary roadblock for CVE practitioners in securing the local support needed to operate successful programs.

Under the Obama administration, just the *belief* that the federal government prioritized countering groups such as ISIS and Al Qaeda led to a public backlash against CVE. Amongst the Muslim American community, misperceptions emerged that any program that was labeled as “CVE” implied that the program was used for intelligence-gathering purposes on the Muslim community. As seen in chapter 6, communities that were attempting to develop their own programming, such as the Greater Boston and Los Angeles regions, felt the repercussions. A backlash occurred despite community CVE plans that proposed CVE programming that targeted all forms of violent extremism. Practitioners consequently struggled with attaining local support for the programming, especially amongst Muslim American communities. For Los Angeles, this meant spending several years holding town halls and conducting public outreach campaigns to communicate the true intentions of Los Angeles’ CVE model.

²⁷³ The grant recipients working with law enforcement are as follows: City of Arlington Police Department, City of Dearborn Police Department, Denver Police Department, Hennepin County Sheriff’s Office, Seattle Police Department, National Consortium for Advanced Policing, Nebraska Emergency Management Agency, Police Foundation, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, Alameda County Sheriff’s Office, Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety and Security.

Besides changes to the recipients of the 2016 CVE Grant, other changes to U.S. CVE efforts also raise questions about the future of CVE programming. Amidst rumors that the Trump administration is forgoing the CVE terminology for “Countering Radical Islamic Extremism,” according to an anonymous USGO, the administration is instead favoring the term “preventing terrorism partnerships.”²⁷⁴ Reflecting this change, a section of the DHS website that was previously named “Countering Violent Extremism” has been changed to “Preventing Terrorism Partnerships.”²⁷⁵ Moreover, on November 30, 2017, DHS’s Office for Community Partnerships, the office that housed the CVE Task Force, transitioned to the Office of Terrorism Prevention Partnerships (OTPP). In addition to the name change, key CVE policymakers resigned from CVE government positions following the transition including George Selim, a DHS official from the Bush era and former director of the Office of Community Partnerships in DHS and leader of the federal CVE Task Force under the Obama administration (Beinart 2017). As former CVE policymakers transitioned out, these individuals were replaced by controversial personnel such as Katharine Gorka, wife of Sebastian Gorka, a former contributor to Breitbart known for her anti-Muslim rhetoric and now a senior advisor to DHS on matters related to terrorism prevention (Schulberg 2017). The Trump administration has also deprioritized CVE efforts as reflected by a substantial budget cut to the OTTP for Fiscal Year 2019. Under the new budget, OTTP’s budget total is approximately \$2.6 million compared to a \$4 million budget in Fiscal Year 2017.²⁷⁶

²⁷⁴ Email correspondence with author, anonymous U.S. government official, September 2017.

²⁷⁵ See: <https://www.dhs.gov/preventing-terrorism>

²⁷⁶ Source: Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Secretary and Executive Management Budget Overview, Fiscal Year 2019 Congressional Justification. Available at: <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/OSEM%20FY19%20CJ.pdf>, p.66. See also, DHS Appropriations FY2017: Departmental Management and Operations. Congressional Research Service, August 24, 2017.

7.4 Future Challenges for CVE

The changes to CVE under the Trump administration highlight a number of future challenges for the future of U.S. CVE efforts. Below, I discuss three of these challenges: (1) determining where CVE ‘fits’ into counterterrorism; (2) determining who should be involved with CVE; (3) overcoming the challenges of evaluation.

7.4.1 Where Does CVE Fit?

Where does CVE fit into a broader grand strategy against terrorism? Moreover, should CVE be subordinate to other counterterrorism (CT) tools or vice versa? The government and CVE field has yet to decide where CVE fits and its relation to CT (Braniff 2017). Generally speaking, CT consists of a conglomeration of different tools to mitigate the risk of terrorism. Traditional counterterrorism tools include military force, both kinetic and non-kinetic; prosecution; and intelligence collection. Historically, the government has prioritized military and law enforcement counterterrorism efforts over others. Although CVE exists, the government under both the Obama and Trump administrations has treated CVE merely as an afterthought and separate from traditional CT.

This decision has two consequences. First, by sidelining CVE and trying to separate CVE from CT, we lack a complete CT grand strategy and one that can adequately respond to the terrorist threat. The prioritization of traditional CT tools means that our approach to CT is built to primarily only respond to individuals who break the law and commit acts of terror. However, to prevent terrorism from happening, CT must also be able to prevent individuals, or fence-sitters, who have not yet committed a crime but may be considering doing so from committing a

crime. Unlike other CT tools, CVE can and is designed to respond to fence-sitters. Second, by prioritizing traditional CT tools over CVE, CVE lacks the legitimacy needed to secure public support and convince stakeholders that CVE programming is a worthwhile approach to pursue at the local level. Moreover, as shown in interviews with individuals who oppose CVE, the failure for the government to properly outline and define where CVE fits into CT contributes to public confusion about CVE's relation to other CT tools such as intelligence-gathering.

What is needed then, is a redefinition and broadening of counterterrorism strategies to include the concept of CVE to create a holistic CT approach. Since this has yet to happen, CVE, as a set of tools, lacks a clear definition and legitimacy, which threatens the future of CVE in the United States.

7.4.2 Who Does What and How?

A continuing question for the future of CVE programming remains, who should be involved in CVE efforts and how? Policymakers in Boston, for instance, struggled with this question, especially as it related to law enforcement's role in CVE. In one draft memo, policymakers asked questions such as, "In what cases/scenarios are professionals required to report information to law enforcement?;" "What types of communication is privileged or exempt from legal proceedings;" and "What is the role of law enforcement? (member/ nonmember/ referral source/ optional member with the consent of family?"²⁷⁷ As further discussed by Speckhard (2016), the cooperation between mental-health professionals, psychologists and social workers with law enforcement calls into question existing legal and ethical protections in medical care. Proper

²⁷⁷ Source: CVE Grant Brainstorming, Executive Office of Health and Human Services. <https://www.muckrock.com/foi/massachusetts-1/countering-violent-extremism-27692/#files>

diagnoses are contingent upon communication between healthcare officials and clients. However, the possibility that healthcare officials may need to disclose the progress of their clients to law enforcement, even when there is no imminent danger, threatens to disrupt the communication and trust that these practitioners rely on for a proper diagnosis. Even from a law enforcement perspective, law enforcement's involvement in CVE can be complicated. Detective Stuart Frisch of the Memphis Police Department who has 27 years of experience in counterterrorism admitted that "not every community has a law enforcement person that they can go to with any degree of trust and not see a SWAT team on their door in an hour." However, Det. Frisch emphasized the critical need for law enforcement to work with the community in a partnership built on trust.²⁷⁸ For CVE practitioners, there are no clear answers to these questions, which as I show in my dissertation, leads to politically-charged disagreements. Nonetheless, policymakers need to decide the boundaries of practitioner involvement in CVE and ensure that certain safeguards are in place to uphold legal and ethical protections of civil rights and civil liberties.

The Trump administration's refocus on law enforcement's participation in CVE, perhaps, attempts to answer the who question, but with costs. As shown in this dissertation, the public is wary about law enforcement's participation and law enforcement themselves are also wary. For example, in Montgomery County, Lt. Michael Ward stated that he believed the Montgomery County Model was successful because law enforcement was not at the forefront of the model.²⁷⁹ The Montgomery County Model shows that community organizations can implement CVE programming with little help from law enforcement and still be successful in achieving program objectives. Moreover, the latest criteria added to the CVE grant that prioritizes funding

²⁷⁸ Detective Stuart Frisch, Memphis Police Department, personal communication, March 30, 2018.

²⁷⁹ Lieutenant Michael Ward, Montgomery County Police Department, personal communication, April 21, 2017.

organizations that partner with law enforcement has reignited the CVE opposition movement in Los Angeles.²⁸⁰ Subsequently, this fundamental component of CVE programming—who is involved in CVE programming—remains a challenge for future CVE efforts.

7.4.3 Evaluation

Another key challenge, not directly addressed in this dissertation, is the challenge of evaluating the effectiveness of CVE programming. I am not the first to identify the challenge of evaluation for the prospects of CVE (e.g. Borum and Hogan 2012; Romaniuk and Chowdhury Fink 2012). Currently, there is no consensus on evaluation standards for the field (Romaniuk and Chowdhury Fink 2012). Prevention programs are amongst the hardest CVE programs to evaluate in terms of understanding their direct benefits for counterterrorism because they are typically all-encompassing (Harris-Hogan, Barrelle, and Zammit 2016).

However, CVE practitioners face a number of other challenges as well. For instance, even though CVE is a long-term strategy, researchers often evaluate programming using short-term measures due to funding and resource limitations. Moreover, scholars often have limited access to data to evaluate programming due to privacy and national security concerns.

Altogether, the field writ large lacks a solid understanding of the effectiveness of CVE (Mastroe and Szmania 2016).

That said, the Obama administration attempted to encourage organizations to incorporate evaluation studies in CVE programming by requiring DHS's CVE grant recipients to provide

²⁸⁰ In February 2018 weeks before LA's city council was due to vote on the city's acceptance or rejection of the 2016 CVE Grant funding, organizations including CAIR, the Muslim Justice League, and Advancing Justice-LA launched a CVE opposition campaign through a Muslim grassroots movement, the MPower Change, to protest the CVE funding. For more information see: <https://mpowerchange.org/act>. Ishraq Ali, Organizing Director of MPower Change, personal communication, February 12, 2018.

performance data on a quarterly basis to DHS. However, a survey I administered in fall 2017 to the 26 recipients of the CVE grant reveals that practitioners continue to struggle with the evaluation component. Out of the nine programs that responded to the survey, only one program was previously evaluated. The majority of the other organizations included in the survey have not yet implemented programs, but all, plan to conduct future evaluations. The challenge rests in the reliance, amongst CVE practitioners and researchers, on the use of research designs that preclude the ability to draw causal inferences. Only one organization planned to use a quasi-experimental research design to evaluate their programming, while the remainder of the survey respondents chose to use either pre and post-program analysis designs or to only record output metrics. Thus, evaluating CVE will likely remain a large challenge for CVE practitioners to overcome.

7.5 Future Research

These challenges for CVE efforts open numerous doors for future research on this topic. My dissertation research also raises a number of questions. For example, in chapter 5, I focused the analysis on understanding the relationship between community stakeholders' interest in CVE, capacity to participate, and non-incentivized facilitation. However, my theory on mobilization also predicts when governance networks will emerge under situations with different variations in the three factors. Although positive and negative incentives are not used in the United States to foster the creation of these networks, other countries, especially European countries, use these techniques. Future research can subsequently apply this theory to cases outside the U.S.'s CVE experience.

In chapter 5, even though I showed how facilitation is critical for the mobilization of CVE governance network. due to limited CVE governance networks, I was unable to analyze the effects of a facilitator's characteristics on CVE mobilization. It may be the case that certain individuals, such as an individual who is well-known and trusted within a community, have more success in mobilizing stakeholders than other facilitators. For example, in Houston, the facilitators were individuals who were well known and respected within the Muslim community. Moreover, Tameez, although hired by the Harris County Sheriff's Office, and Khalid were not affiliated with the government. This may have made it easier for Tameez and Khalid to gain the trust of community members and convince community stakeholders to participate in CVE efforts. There may be a different result if the facilitator is directly associated with the government or law enforcement. Community members may be less likely to respond to the facilitation efforts by federal employees due to potential trust issues. Future research can capitalize on the increasing variation between communities to examine this factor and the more fine-tuned differences in approaches to facilitate collective action.

Chapter 2 provides some insights into public responses to CVE, but more research on this topic is needed. Specifically, future research can study how certain CVE frames may sway public opinion or increase public interest in CVE. In separate research (Ambrozik 2017), I have studied the effect of CVE terminology on public opinion, but I did not find a significant effect. In national telephone and online surveys, I tested whether individuals were more likely to support CVE if framed as "community resilience initiatives" versus "countering violent extremism initiatives." Future research can analyze alternative frames.

Future research can also analyze the consequences of different types of programs on implementation efforts. As explained in chapter 2, CVE incorporates a variety of different

programs ranging from prevention programming to disengagement programs. Early CVE efforts in the U.S. tended to focus on the same types of programs, and in chapter 6, I held constant the type of programming across cases. Because of this, this dissertation did not analyze how the type of programming impacts implementation efforts.

Finally, as discussed above, the Trump administration's recent changes to CVE programming in the United States creates potential significant challenges for CVE practitioners on the local level. Future research is needed to analyze both the direct and indirect consequences of the recent changes. That said, based on my research thus far, the future of CVE in the United States is at risk.

APPENDIX A

CHAPTER 2 METHODOLOGY

A.1 Demographic Statistics for National CVE Survey

Although MTurk respondents are typically more representative of the general American population than other convenience samples such as students (Behren et al. 2011; Berinsky, Huber and Lenz 2012; Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling, 2011; Paolacci, Chandler and Ipeirotis 2010; Ross et al. 2010). the representativeness of MTurk surveys is still a concern. Previous research has indicated that MTurk respondents are typically younger, more educated, wealthier, and more democratic on average (Berinsky, Huber and Lenz 2012; Ross et al. 2010). When attempting to estimate public knowledge of public policy, these differences could potentially impact the results.

Based on a sample composed of 477 respondents, the demographic information corresponded to a certain extent with the findings from the previous literature. First, when comparing MTurk respondents to the 2010 census on race, age, and gender, the gender distribution and age distribution was relatively the same. However, African Americans and Hispanics/Latinos were underrepresented in the MTurk survey. Table A.1 provides the percentages of these factors for both the MTurk survey and census data.

Table A.1: Survey Demographic Statistics in Comparison to the Census

	MTurk	Census ²⁸¹
Female	49.69	50.8
Age (mean)	37.14	37.2
Race		
African American	9.01	12.6
Arab	0.21	--
Asian/Pacific Islander	4.82	5.0 ²⁸²
Hispanic/Latino	6.71	16.3
Native American	1.26	0.9
White	76.52	72.4
Other	1.26	6.2
Don't Know	0.26	--

Lewis et al. (2015) found that MTurk respondents were on average less religious than the general population. Religious backgrounds of participants may be an important indicator of support for CVE. Opposition to CVE made by groups such as the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) and the Brennan Center has centered on the point that CVE is discriminatory towards Muslims. Therefore, it is critical to ensure that Muslims are represented in this survey since CVE impacts this religion the most. Table A.2 outlines the religious composition of the survey in comparison to a PEW survey. Although Agnostic and Atheist respondents are overrepresented in the MTurk survey which is in further support of Lewis et al.'s (2015) findings, Muslims are adequately represented. I have no reason to believe that religion, other than Islam, is related to a respondent's degree of support for CVE.

²⁸¹ 2010 Census data was used for gender, age, and race, while data from the 2015 Current Population Survey was used for educational attainment, please see, Camille Ryan and Kurt Bauman. "Educational Attainment in the United States: 2015." United States Census Bureau (2016) Retrieved from: <https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2016/demo/p20-578.pdf> and United States Census Bureau. "Profile of General Population and Housing Characteristics: 2010." US Census Bureau (2010). Retrieved from http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=DEC_10_DP_DPDP1&src=pt

²⁸² This category was separated in the Census as Asian (4.8) and Pacific Islander as (.2).

Table A.2: Survey Demographic Statistics in Comparison to PEW

	MTurk	PEW
Religion		
Agnostic	17.82	4.0
Atheist	15.72	3.1
Buddhist	2.10	0.7
Christian	51.78	70.6
Jewish	2.10	1.9
Muslim	1.89	0.9
Other	6.50	1.5
Don't Know	2.10	0.6

Besides the previous demographic information, I also asked respondents about their political views and family history in regard to immigration. I asked respondents whether they were an immigrant (5.24), a first-generation immigrant²⁸³ (11.32), a second-generation immigrant²⁸⁴ (11.53), none apply (70.44), don't know (1.47). Unfortunately, terrorist organizations often target second-generation immigrants for recruitment purposes (Lyons-Padilla et al. 2015). Due to this, many CVE programs target this subsection of the population; thus, it is important to understand the perspectives of these individuals.

The political views of respondents were also recorded within the survey. I asked respondents whether they were very liberal (18.66), somewhat liberal (32.91), neither liberal or conservative (18.45), somewhat conservative (20.75), very conservative (9.01) and don't know (0.21). Similar to previous studies (Berinsky, Huber and Lenz 2012), respondents in the MTurk survey were slightly more liberal.

²⁸³ Respondents were told that a first-generation immigrant refers to an individual whose parent(s) were born outside the U.S.

²⁸⁴ Respondents were told that a second-generation immigrant refers to an individual whose grandparent(s) were born outside the U.S.

A.2 Baseline Demographics for Anaheim Survey

The survey captured demographic statistics on the respondents' ages, political views, gender, employment, race/ethnicity, religious views, and education. Of note, the sample population consisted of registered voters in Anaheim, CA. There are 139,313 registered voters in Anaheim out of a total population of 358,546.²⁸⁵ Although demographic statistics are not available amongst registered voters in Anaheim, Table A.3 provides comparison statistics on the race/ethnicity amongst respondents in comparison with the larger Anaheim population. Although whites are overrepresented and Hispanics are underrepresented in the local survey, this is unsurprising given that previous studies have found that non-Hispanic whites make up 61% of California's voters.²⁸⁶

Table A.3 Comparison Demographic Statistics

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Percentage of Respondents</i>	<i>Anaheim Demographics²⁸⁷</i>
Race/Ethnicity		
White	42.19%	26.0%
Black	1.56%	2.1%
Hispanic	31.25%	53.6%
Asian	20.31%	15.8%
Arab	1.56%	--
Other	1.56%	0.1%
	N=68	

²⁸⁵ City of Anaheim. "Anaheim, By the Numbers." Winter 2017. Available at: <http://www.anaheim.net/DocumentCenter/View/13910>

²⁸⁶ Mark Baldassare, Dean Bonner, David Kordus, Lunna Lopes. "Race and Voting in California," Public Policy Institute of California, August 2017. Available at: <http://www.ppic.org/publication/race-and-voting-in-california/>

²⁸⁷ U.S. Census Bureau, 2012-2016 American Community Survey Five-Year Estimates. Available at: http://www.dof.ca.gov/Reports/Demographic_Reports/American_Community_Survey/index.html#ACS2016x5

As mentioned above, religious backgrounds of participants may be an important indicator of support for CVE. Especially in the Greater Los Angeles Area where the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) is mobilized against CVE primarily due to the concern that CVE is discriminatory towards Muslims, adequate representation from Muslims in the survey is critical. Table A.4 outlines the religious composition of the survey. Although comparison statistics were not found for the larger Anaheim population, Muslims are adequately represented in the survey.

Table A.4 Local Survey Religion Demographics

Religion	
Agnostic	12.5%
Atheist	4.69%
Buddhist	6.25%
Christian	39.06%
Jewish	0%
Muslim	10.94%
Other	17.19%
Don't know	9.88%
N=68	

I also asked respondents their political views and employment status. Regarding political views, I asked respondents whether they were liberal (34.92), moderate (50.79), or conservative (14.29). I also asked respondents whether they were employed (71.43), unemployed (17.46) and retired (11.11).

APPENDIX B

CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY

B.1 Methodology for U.S. CVE Programs

The identification of known or planned CVE programs in the U.S. was difficult. A list of active CVE programs in the United States does not publically exist, meaning that I had to create my own dataset of CVE programs. To be included in the dataset, a program must meet two conditions. First, a program needs to publically identify as being associated with CVE work, and the program's mission must conform to the objectives of CVE efforts. A program can identify as being associated with CVE in two main ways. First, a program's mission statement or other forms of communication associated with the program can state a program's association with CVE efforts. A program can also be identified as being associated with CVE efforts by its acceptance of funding specifically designated for CVE-specific work. Even if a program identifies as being associated with CVE, the program's mission must also confirm the association. A CVE oriented mission is one that seeks to reduce the threat of violent extremism by addressing the root causes of violent extremism. This definition is broad given the variety of programs typically attributed to CVE-specific work. For instance, the definition includes programs that attempt to prevent individuals from engaging in violent extremism, joining violent extremist groups, countering violent extremism initiatives, assisting individuals in disengaging from violent extremism, among other possibilities. The second condition for inclusion in the dataset is that the program must be operational. There are several proposed CVE programs in the United States, including proposed programs in the CVE pilot cities. However, this chapter only focuses on existing programs.

To find existing CVE programs that met these criteria, I relied on two methods. First, I conducted internet searches for key terms such as ‘CVE’ and ‘Countering Violent Extremism.’ After reading through websites of potential programs and consulting the existing CVE literature, I identified the programs that met the criteria. Even though I conducted extensive research on existing CVE programs, it is possible that I missed programs. The most well-known cases, the three-region pilots, were easily identifiable, but the other cases required much more research and creativity to identify. To supplement my initial research efforts, I created a crowd-sourced global database of CVE programs.²⁸⁸ I released the database through social media and within CVE policy circles in the U.S. with data on CVE programs I gathered from the existing CVE literature and news accounts of CVE programs. As a crowd-sourced platform, this allowed practitioners working within the CVE realm to contact me about their program that I may have missed through my own research. The CVE program in Florida was added to this list as a result of the database.

The table below lists the operational CVE programs in the United States. The table includes the city or region where the CVE program is located, whether or not the CVE program is a result of a collaboration or not, the type of CVE programming, and the name of the program. The only cases where specific names were not mentioned are the CVE pilot cities of Minneapolis and Los Angeles. In these cities, a community-wide CVE plan exists that includes various programs.

²⁸⁸ <http://arcg.is/1OI5kUB>

Table B.1: List of Implemented CVE Programs in the United States

City/ Region	Collaboration	Type of CVE Programming	Name of Programming
Greater Minneapolis/St. Paul Region	Yes	Community Policing, Prevention, Intervention	CVE pilot city
Greater Los Angeles Region	Yes	Community Policing, Prevention	CVE Pilot city
Los Angeles, CA	No	Intervention	MPAC Safe Spaces
Boston, MA	No	Prevention	Somali Development Center
Boston, MA	No	Prevention	United Somali Youth
Boston, MA	No	Prevention	Empower Peace
Chicago, IL	No	Prevention/ Intervention	Life After Hate
Florida	Yes	Intervention	CAIR-FL
Montgomery County, MD	Yes	Prevention/ Intervention	BRAVE Model
Brooklyn, NY	No	Counter-narratives	?TakeOnHate
Denver, CO	No	Community Policing	Denver Police Department
Reno, NV	No	Prevention	Project Help Nevada, Inc
Dearborn, MI	No	Community Policing	Dearborn Police Department

B.2: Methodology for the U.K. CVE Programs

As mentioned previously, in the United Kingdom, the local authority creates a *Prevent* plan to be implemented within its jurisdiction. Plans include approximately 3 to 5 projects per year.²⁸⁹

Based on this information, I was able to determine the approximate number of CVE plans implemented over time. The U.K. government does not publically release how many local authorities developed a *Prevent* project plan, but information regarding the number of projects across the U.K. is released for some years. The government released data on the first year *Prevent* was rolled out in 2007. Starting in July of 2011, the Coalition government agreed to release an annual report on *Prevent* and within this report data on the number of projects that were implemented. From here, I was able to calculate, with the assumption that plans typically include 3 to 5 projects per year, the approximate number of CVE plans implemented.

Since the early years of *Prevent*, local authorities that received funding from the central government have implemented *Prevent* projects or related projects within their jurisdictions. *Prevent* projects implemented as part of the Pathfinder program, a term that refers to *Prevent* during its early stages prior to 2009, included many different types of programming. Overall, for the 2007-2008 fiscal year, a total of 261 PVE projects were funded across 56 local authorities.²⁹⁰ The table below reports the number of projects implemented within England for which data is available. The table also includes the number of local authorities that received funding for

²⁸⁹ Anonymous Home Office employee, personal communication, London, UK, January 2016.

²⁹⁰ Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund: Mapping of project activities 2007/2008. December 2008. The Department for Communities and Local Government. Available at: <http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120919132719/http://www.communities.gov.uk/documents/communities/pdf/1092863.pdf>

Prevent and the approximate number of *Prevent* plans, based on the assumption that plans usually include 3-5 projects.

Table B.2: U.K. Prevent Plans

Fiscal Year	# of Local Authorities with Prevent funding	# of Projects	Low End of Approximate # of Plans	High End of Approximate # of Plans
2007/2008	70	261	52	87
2011/2012	25 ^{*291}	80 ²⁹²	16	27
2012/2013	-- ²⁹³	40 ²⁹⁴	8	13
2013/2014	37 ²⁹⁵	60 ²⁹⁶	12	20
2014/2015	44 ²⁹⁷	130 ²⁹⁸	26	43
<i>Total</i>	<i>176</i>	<i>571</i>	<i>114</i>	<i>190</i>

²⁹¹ Please note, this number is incomplete. This number is only one type of local authority, a priority area, that received funding. The number excludes the number of local authorities that are not priority areas, but received funding, known as supported areas. Data retrieved from:

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf

²⁹²https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/170644/28307_Cm_8583_v0_20.pdf

²⁹³ Data for this year has not been released by the Home Office.

²⁹⁴https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/415708/contest_annual_report_for_2014.pdf

²⁹⁵ <https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/218908/response/560113/attach/3/attachment.pdf>

²⁹⁶https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/415708/contest_annual_report_for_2014.pdf

²⁹⁷ <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/feb/13/prevent-counter-terrorism-support>

²⁹⁸https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/539683/55469_Cm_9310_Web_Accessible_v0.11.pdf

APPENDIX C CHAPTER 5 METHODOLOGY

C.1 Chicago CVE Efforts

Chicago is the second example of mobilization amongst the communities where there was a CREX. After the CREX, in September 2015, the Cook County Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management in collaboration with Rutgers Institute for Emergency Preparedness and Homeland Security and the University of Illinois at Chicago College of Medicine Department of Psychiatry, held a Targeted Violence Intervention Best Practice Summit in Chicago. More than 40 members of federal, state, and local government agencies in addition to stakeholders from academia, non-profit organizations and the private sector attended the workshop. The purpose of the workshop was to develop a targeted violence intervention model for Cook County.²⁹⁹ Following the meeting, the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority created the Targeted Violence Prevention Program (TVPP). The TVPP works with interested communities and helps these communities build community-level programs to prevent individuals from being recruited to use ideologically inspired violence and to assist individuals already on the path towards using violence. The director, Junaid Afeef, travels to local communities across Illinois to provide information on targeted violence and ways that local communities can form networks to build community resilience.³⁰⁰

²⁹⁹ Stevan Weine, Michael Masters, and Linda Tartaglia. Targeted Violence Intervention Best Practice Summit: After Action Report, November 05, 2015.

³⁰⁰ Junaid Afeef, Director of Targeted Violence Prevention Program, personal communication, Chicago, IL, January 12, 2017.

Table C.1: Stakeholders in Other CVE Governance Networks

	Boston	Houston	Los Angeles	Montgomery County
Government	DHS, Massachusetts Department of Corrections, FBI, Department of Mental Health, U.S. District Attorney, city government, state human rights and relations commission, National Counterterrorism Center, Executive Office of Public Safety and Security, Department of Education, state emergency management agency	City of Houston	DHS, city of Los Angeles, U.S. District Attorney	County executive, office of community partnerships
Law enforcement	FBI, city law enforcement, county law enforcement, state police	County law enforcement, city law enforcement	FBI, city law enforcement, county law enforcement	County law enforcement
Academic Advisors	Academic Advisors	None	Academic Advisors	Academic Advisors
Non-Government	Refugee Trauma Center at Children’s Hospital, Baptist clergy, Islamic clergy, Anti-Defamation League, Somali community organizations, Pakistani Association	Islamic clergy, Refugee organizations, youth organizations	Muslim community leaders	Muslim community organizations

Table C.2: Columbus Survey Target Respondents³⁰¹

Government	City of Columbus
Government	Community Refugee and Immigration Services
Government	Franklin County Domestic Violence
Government	Ohio Department of Mental Health- Violence and Injury Prevention Program
Government	Ohio Emergency Management Agency
Government	U.S. District Attorney’s Office
Law enforcement	Columbus Police
Law enforcement	Franklin County Sheriffs
Non-government	ACLU
Non-government	Al-Noor Islamic Cultural Center
Non-government	Anti-Defamation League
Non-government	Boys and Girls Club
Non-government	Congregation Beth Tikvah
Non-government	Dublin Community Church
Non-government	First Community Church
Non-government	Goodwill of Central Ohio
Non-government	Islamic Foundation of Central Ohio
Non-government	Muslim Family Services of Ohio
Non-government	MY Project USA
Non-government	New American Initiative
Non-government	North Lewisburg United Methodist Church
Non-government	Progressive Peace Coalition
Non-government	Somali Community Access Network
Non-government	United Way of Central Ohio
Non-government	US Together
Non-government	YMCA

³⁰¹ This table presents a partial list of the targeted survey respondents. One organization requested to stay completely anonymous and to be excluded from this list.

C.2 Survey Questions

C.2.1 Houston Survey Questions

Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) efforts attempt to minimize the threat of violent extremism. Do you think violent extremism is a major problem, minor problem, or not a problem within the Greater Houston Area?

- Major problem (1)
- Minor problem (2)
- Not a problem (3)

Prior to your participation in developing the plan, were you unfamiliar, somewhat familiar or very familiar with the concept of countering violent extremism (CVE)?

- Unfamiliar (1)
- Somewhat familiar (2)
- Very familiar (3)

Display This Question: If Prior to your participation in the Collaborative, were you unfamiliar, somewhat familiar or very... Somewhat familiar Is Selected Or Prior to your participation in the Collaborative, were you unfamiliar, somewhat familiar or very... Very familiar Is Selected If you can recall, how did you learn about CVE?

Prior to your participation in developing the plan, did you have a positive, negative, or no opinion of the concept of CVE?

- Extremely positive (1)
- Somewhat positive (2)
- Neither positive nor negative (3)
- Somewhat negative (4)
- Extremely negative (5)

How did you first hear about efforts to develop a CVE plan in the Greater Houston Area?

Why did you decide to participate and help develop the CVE plan for the Greater Houston Area?

How frequently does your local government involve your organization when making decisions about what actions to take to address the threat of terrorism in your community?

- Rarely (1)
- Sometimes (2)
- Frequently (4)

How frequently does your local government involve your organization when making decisions about issues not related to the threat of violent extremism?

- Rarely (1)
- Sometimes (2)
- Frequently (3)

Please select all that apply. Before you helped develop the plan, did you previously work on a project/problem in collaboration with any of the following stakeholder groups?

- Community-based organizations (1)
- Local government officials (2)
- Local law enforcement (3)
- Federal law enforcement (4)
- Religious organizations (5)
- None (6)

Do you think both non-government and government actors in the Greater Houston Area should or should not work together to develop CVE programs to counter the threat posed by violent extremism?

- Should (1)
- Should not (2)
- Unsure (3)

On a scale from 1 to 10 with 1 being unwilling and 10 being very willing, how willing are you to collaborate with the following stakeholder groups on issues related to CVE?

- _____ Government stakeholders (1)
- _____ Non-government stakeholders (2)
- _____ Local law enforcement stakeholders (3)
- _____ Federal law enforcement stakeholder (4)
- _____ Religious institutions (5)

Next, I am going to ask you some questions about your time developing the plan.

Overall, how would you describe your experience helping develop the plan for the Greater Houston Area?

- Very positive (1)
- Somewhat positive (2)
- Neither positive or negative (3)
- Somewhat negative (4)
- Very negative (5)

Did you attend scheduled meetings regarding the development of the CVE plan rarely, occasionally, or frequently?

- Rarely (1)
- Occasionally (2)
- Frequently (3)

On a scale of 1 to 10 with 1 being no trust and 10 being fully trusting, in general, please indicate your overall degree of trust of members from the following stakeholder categories:

- _____ Government stakeholders (1)
- _____ Non-government Stakeholders (2)
- _____ Local law enforcement stakeholders (3)
- _____ Federal law enforcement stakeholders (4)
- _____ Religious institutions (5)

Did your overall degree of trust of members from the following stakeholder categories, increase, decrease or stay the same over the course of your participation in developing the plan?

	Options		
	Increased (1)	Decreased (2)	Stayed the same (3)
Government stakeholders (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Non-government stakeholders (2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Local law enforcement stakeholders (3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Federal law enforcement stakeholders (4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Religious institutions (5)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Next, I am going to ask you some questions about your opinion of the Building a Resilient Community to Counter Violent Extremism plan.

Overall, to what extent do you support or do not support the plan?

- Strongly support (1)
- Somewhat support (2)
- Neither support nor do not support (3)
- Somewhat do not support (4)
- Strongly do not support (5)

Display This Question: If Overall, to what extent do you support or do not support the Boston CVE Framework? Somewhat do not support Is Selected Or Overall, to what extent do you support or do not support the Boston CVE Framework? Strongly do not support Is Selected Or Overall, to what extent do you support or do not support the Boston CVE Framework? Somewhat support Is Selected

Are there any particular areas of the plan that you do not support?

In your opinion, are there aspects of the plan that need further development?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)
- Don't know (3)

Display This Question: If Yes Is Selected
 What aspects do you believe need further development?

Display This Question: If Yes Is Selected
 In your opinion, were there factors that prevented the further development of the plan?

In your opinion, should the plan be implemented collectively, by individual stakeholders, or both collectively and individually?

- Collectively (1)
- Individually (2)
- Both collectively and individually (3)

Now, I am going to ask you some final questions about your experience after you developed the plan.

Since the plan was developed, how often are you in contact with the other participants that helped develop the plan?

- No longer in contact (1)
- Occasionally in contact (2)
- Frequently in contact (3)

Since the plan was developed, has your collaboration with members from the following stakeholder categories increased, decreased, or stayed the same in regards to CVE?

	Collaboration on CVE		
	Increased (1)	Decreased (2)	Stayed the same (3)
Government stakeholders (6)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Non-government stakeholders (7)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Local law enforcement stakeholders (8)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Federal law enforcement stakeholders (9)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Religious institutions (10)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Since the plan was developed, has your collaboration with members from the following stakeholder categories increased, decreased, or stayed the same in regards to issue areas besides CVE?

	Collaboration on issues other than CVE		
	Increased (1)	Decreased (2)	Stayed the same (3)
Government stakeholders (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Non-government stakeholders (2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Local law enforcement stakeholders (3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Federal law enforcement stakeholders (4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Religious institutions (5)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

To date, have you personally implemented or helped implement any part of the plan?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

Display This Question: If To date, have you personally implemented or helped implement any part of the Framework? Yes Is Selected

Can you explain what part of the plan you implemented or helped implement?

Display This Question: If to date, have you personally implemented or helped implement any part of the Framework? Yes Is Selected

What challenges, if any, have you come across while implementing the plan or part of the plan?

Display This Question: If To date, have you personally implemented or helped implement any part of the Framework? No Is Selected

Can you explain why you have not implemented or helped implement part of the plan?

On a scale from 1 to 10 with 1 being no interest and 10 being very interested, in the future, how interested are you in implementing the plan collaboratively? individually?

_____ Collaboratively (1)

_____ Individually (2)

What job sector are you affiliated with?

- Government (1)
- Law Enforcement (2)
- Religious institution (3)
- Non-government organization (4)
- other (5) _____

Finally, is there anything else you would like to mention about your experience working on the plan or the future of CVE efforts in the Greater Houston Area?

[END SURVEY]

C.2.2 Columbus Survey Questions

How familiar are you with the term Countering Violent Extremism, otherwise known as CVE?

- Extremely familiar (1)
- Very familiar (2)
- Moderately familiar (3)
- Slightly familiar (4)
- Not familiar at all (5)

Display This Question: If How familiar are you with the term Countering Violent Extremism, otherwise known as CVE? Extremely familiar Is Selected Or How familiar are you with the term Countering Violent Extremism, otherwise known as CVE? Very familiar Is Selected Or How familiar are you with the term Countering Violent Extremism, otherwise known as CVE? Moderately familiar Is Selected Or How familiar are you with the term Countering Violent Extremism, otherwise known as CVE? Slightly familiar Is Selected
What do you know about programs that attempt to counter violent extremism and how did you become familiar with this term?

Display This Question: If How familiar are you with the term Countering Violent Extremism, otherwise known as CVE? Extremely familiar Is Selected Or How familiar are you with the term Countering Violent Extremism, otherwise known as CVE? Very familiar Is Selected Or How familiar are you with the term Countering Violent Extremism, otherwise known as CVE? Moderately familiar Is Selected Or How familiar are you with the term Countering Violent Extremism, otherwise known as CVE? Slightly familiar Is Selected

As a representative of your organization or agency and based on what you know about Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programs, do you have a positive, negative, or no opinion of these programs?

- Extremely positive (1)
- Somewhat positive (2)
- Neither positive nor negative (3)
- Somewhat negative (4)
- Extremely negative (5)

Violent Extremism refers to any actions that encourage, condone, justify, or support the commission of a violent act to achieve political, ideological, religious, social, or economic goals. As a representative of your organization or agency, do you think violent extremism is a major, minor or no problem within the Greater Columbus Area?

- Major Problem (1)
- Minor Problem (2)
- No Problem (3)
- Don't Know (4)

Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programs refer to programs that address the root causes of violent extremism. These programs are non-punitive preventive programs that are developed to

help reduce the threat of violent extremism. In the U.S., with guidance from the federal government, local community members and organizations partner with local government officials and law enforcement to create CVE programs for their local communities. As a representative of your organization or agency, please indicate how much you approve or disapprove of efforts that attempt to counter violent extremism through non-punitive preventive programs?

- Strongly approve (1)
- Somewhat approve (2)
- Neither approve nor disapprove (3)
- Somewhat disapprove (4)
- Strongly disapprove (5)
- Don't know (6)

I am going to list a series of programs that are often associated with counter violent extremism initiatives. As a representative of your organization or agency, please indicate how much you approve or disapprove of each activity. If you do not know what these activities are, please hover your mouse over the word for additional information.

	Strongly approve (1)	Somewhat approve (2)	Neither approve or disapprove (3)	Somewhat disapprove (4)	Strongly disapprove (5)	Don't know (6)
community policing (1)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
community engagement activities (2)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
after school youth programs (3)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
religious counseling conducted by religious scholars (4)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
intervention model (5)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
countering violent extremism online (6)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
disengagement initiatives (7)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

As a representative of your organization or agency, do you think both non-government and government actors in the Greater Columbus Area should or should not work together to develop collaborative CVE programs to counter the threat posed by violent extremism?

- Should develop programs (1)
- Should not develop programs (2)
- Unsure (3)

If given the opportunity, how likely or unlikely is your organization or agency to voluntarily help develop collaborative CVE programs with both local government and non-government stakeholders to implement within the Greater Columbus Area?

- Extremely likely (1)
- Somewhat likely (2)
- Neither likely nor unlikely (3)
- Somewhat unlikely (4)
- Extremely unlikely (5)

Please explain why your organization or agency is either likely or unlikely to voluntarily help develop collaborative CVE programs to implement within the Greater Columbus Area?

If given the opportunity and provided compensation, how likely or unlikely is your organization or agency to help develop collaborative CVE programs with both local government and non-government stakeholders to implement within the Greater Columbus Area?

- Extremely likely (1)
- Somewhat likely (2)
- Neither likely nor unlikely (3)
- Somewhat unlikely (4)
- Extremely unlikely (5)

If given the opportunity and resources, how likely or unlikely is your organization or agency to help implement collaborative CVE programs developed by both local non-government individuals/organizations and government officials of the Greater Columbus Area?

- Extremely likely (1)
- Somewhat likely (2)
- Neither likely nor unlikely (3)
- Somewhat unlikely (4)
- Extremely unlikely (5)

If given the opportunity and resources, how likely or unlikely is your organization or agency to help implement CVE programs developed by only local government officials of the Greater Columbus Area?

- Extremely likely (1)
- Somewhat likely (2)
- Neither likely nor unlikely (3)
- Somewhat unlikely (4)
- Extremely unlikely (5)

If given the opportunity, how likely or unlikely is your organization or agency to recommend individuals, who may benefit from the programs, to collaborative CVE programs that are developed by both local non-government individuals/organizations and government officials in the Greater Columbus Area?

- Extremely likely (1)
- Somewhat likely (2)
- Neither likely nor unlikely (3)
- Somewhat unlikely (4)
- Extremely unlikely (5)

If given the opportunity, how likely or unlikely is your organization or agency to recommend individuals, who may benefit from the programs, to CVE programs that are developed by only local government officials in the Greater Columbus Area?

- Extremely likely (1)
- Somewhat likely (2)
- Neither likely nor unlikely (3)
- Somewhat unlikely (4)
- Extremely unlikely (5)

What job sector is your organization or agency affiliated with?

- Government (1)
- Law Enforcement (2)
- Religious Institution (3)
- Non-government service provider (4)
- Other (5) _____

Display This Question: If What job sector is your organization or agency affiliated with?

Religious Institution Is Selected

What religion is your religious institution affiliated with?

Does your organization or agency hold a physical location in the Greater Columbus Area?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

Display This Question: If What job sector is your organization or agency affiliated with?

Government Is Selected

Please select all that apply. Which of the following groups has your organization or agency previously collaborated with on a project/problem in the Greater Columbus Area?

- Local law enforcement (1)
- Federal law enforcement (2)
- Religious organizations (3)
- non-government service providers (4)
- None (5)

Display This Question: If What job sector is your organization or agency affiliated with?

Government Is Selected

On a scale from 0 to 5 with 0 being unwilling and 5 very willing, how willing is your organization or agency to collaborate with the following groups on issues related to CVE in the Greater Columbus Area?

- _____ Local law enforcement (1)
- _____ Federal law enforcement (2)
- _____ Religious organizations (3)
- _____ Non-government service providers (4)

Display This Question: If What job sector is your organization or agency affiliated with?

Government Is Selected

On a scale from 0 to 5 with 0 being no trust and 5 being very trusting, to what degree does your organization or agency trust members from the following categories in the Greater Columbus Area?

- _____ Local law enforcement (1)
- _____ Federal law enforcement (2)
- _____ Religious organizations (3)
- _____ Non-government service providers (4)

Display This Question: If What job sector is your organization or agency affiliated with? Law Enforcement Is Selected

Please select all that apply. Which of the following groups has your organization or agency previously collaborated with on a project/problem in the Greater Columbus Area?

- Government (1)
- Religious Organizations (2)
- Non-government service providers (3)
- None of the above (4)

Display This Question: If What job sector is your organization or agency affiliated with? Law Enforcement Is Selected

On a scale from 0 to 5 with 0 being unwilling and 5 very willing, how willing is your organization or agency to collaborate with the following groups on issues related to CVE in the Greater Columbus Area?

- _____ Government (1)
- _____ Religious Organizations (2)
- _____ Non-government service providers (3)

Display This Question: If What job sector is your organization or agency affiliated with? Law Enforcement Is Selected

On a scale from 0 to 5 with 0 being no trust and 5 being very trusting, to what degree does your organization or agency trust members from the following categories in the Greater Columbus Area?

- _____ Government (1)
- _____ Religious institutions (2)
- _____ Non-government service providers (3)

Display This Question: If What job sector is your organization or agency affiliated with? Religious Institution Is Selected

Please select all that apply. Which of the following groups has your organization or agency previously collaborated with on a project/problem in the Greater Columbus Area?

- Local law enforcement (1)
- Federal law enforcement (2)
- Government (3)
- Non-government service providers (4)
- None of the above (5)

Display This Question: If What job sector is your organization or agency affiliated with? Religious Institution Is Selected

On a scale from 0 to 5 with 0 being unwilling and 5 very willing, how willing is your organization or agency to collaborate with the following groups on issues related to CVE in the Greater Columbus Area?

- _____ Local law enforcement (1)
- _____ Federal law enforcement (2)
- _____ Government (3)
- _____ Non-government service providers (4)

Display This Question: If What job sector is your organization or agency affiliated with? Religious Institution Is Selected

On a scale from 0 to 5 with 0 being no trust and 5 being very trusting, to what degree does your organization or agency trust members from the following categories in the Greater Columbus Area?

- _____ Local law enforcement (1)
- _____ Federal law enforcement (2)
- _____ Government (3)
- _____ Non-government service providers (4)

Display This Question: If What job sector is your organization or agency affiliated with? Non-government service provider Is Selected

Please select all that apply. Which of the following groups has your organization or agency previously collaborated with on a project/problem in the Greater Columbus Area?

- Local law enforcement (1)
- Federal law enforcement (2)
- Government (3)
- Religious institutions (4)
- None of the above (5)

Display This Question: If What job sector is your organization or agency affiliated with? Non-government service provider Is Selected

On a scale from 0 to 5 with 0 being unwilling and 5 very willing, how willing is your organization or agency to collaborate with the following groups on issues related to CVE in the Greater Columbus Area?

- _____ Local law enforcement (1)
- _____ Federal law enforcement (2)
- _____ Government (3)
- _____ Religious Institutions (4)

Display This Question: If What job sector is your organization or agency affiliated with? Non-government service provider Is Selected

On a scale from 0 to 5 with 0 being no trust and 5 being very trusting, to what degree does your organization or agency trust members from the following categories in the Greater Columbus Area?

- _____ Local law enforcement (1)
- _____ Federal law enforcement (2)
- _____ Government (3)
- _____ Religious Institutions (4)

Display This Question: If What job sector is your organization or agency affiliated with? Other Is Selected

Please select all that apply. Which of the following groups has your organization or agency previously collaborated with on a project/problem in the Greater Columbus Area?

- Local law enforcement (1)
- Federal law enforcement (2)
- Government (3)
- Religious Institutions (4)
- Non-government service providers (5)
- None of the above (6)

Display This Question: If What job sector is your organization or agency affiliated with? Other Is Selected

On a scale from 0 to 5 with 0 being unwilling and 5 very willing, how willing is your organization or agency to collaborate with the following groups on issues related to CVE in the Greater Columbus Area?

- _____ Local law enforcement (1)
- _____ Federal law enforcement (2)
- _____ Government (3)
- _____ Religious Organizations (4)
- _____ Non-government service providers (5)

Display This Question: If What job sector is your organization or agency affiliated with? Other Is Selected

On a scale from 0 to 5 with 0 being no trust and 5 being very trusting, to what degree does your organization or agency trust members from the following categories in the Greater Columbus Area?

- _____ Local law enforcement (1)
- _____ Federal law enforcement (2)
- _____ Government (3)
- _____ Religious Institutions (4)
- _____ Non-government service providers (5)

Display This Question: If What job sector is your organization or agency affiliated with? Religious Institution Is Selected

How frequently does the local government involve your community when making decisions about what actions to take to address the threat of terrorism in your community?

- Frequently (1)
- Sometimes (2)
- Never (3)

Display This Question: If What job sector is your organization or agency affiliated with? Religious Institution Is Selected

How frequently does the local government involve your community when making decisions about issues not related to the threat of terrorism?

- Frequently (1)
- Sometimes (2)
- Never (3)

What is your job title?

[END SURVEY]

APPENDIX D

CHAPTER 6 METHODOLOGY

Table D.1: Case Comparisons

Case	Incentives/Sanctions	Selection of Agents	Monitoring and Evaluation	Policy Complexity	Prior Institutional Linkages	Access to Resources
Atlanta	None	Yes	No	Undetermined	Yes	No
Boston	None	Yes	Yes	Intervention and Prevention	Yes	Yes
Chicago	None	yes	No	Undetermined	Yes	No
Dearborn	None	yes	No	Prevention	Yes	No
Denver	None	yes	No	Prevention	Yes	No
Houston	None	yes	No	Prevention	Yes	No
Los Angeles	None	yes	Yes	Intervention, Prevention, Interdiction	Yes	Yes
Minneapolis	None	yes	Yes	Intervention, Prevention	Yes	Yes
Montgomery County	None	yes	Yes	Intervention and Prevention	Yes	Yes
NYC	None	yes	No	Undetermined	Yes	No
Tampa	None	No	No	Intervention	Yes	yes

Table D.2: Collaborative Governance Members

	Boston ³⁰²	Los Angeles	Montgomery County
Police/ Security	FBI, DHS, local police departments, Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency, Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety and Security, Massachusetts Department of Education, Massachusetts State Police, Boston Public Safety, Massachusetts Chiefs of Police Association	Los Angeles Police Department, Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, FBI, DHS Office for Strategic Engagement, Orange County Sheriff's Department, City of Los Angeles's Office of Homeland Security and Public Safety	Montgomery County Police, Maryland Emergency Management Agency, Montgomery County Office of Emergency Management and Homeland Security
Government Agencies	US Attorney, Massachusetts	Los Angeles Mayor's Office, Los Angeles	Montgomery County Executive, Office of

³⁰² For a full list of the individuals involved in the Boston Regional Collaborative please see, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Boston%20Framework_1.pdf

	Department of Mental Health, Massachusetts Association of Human Rights and Relations Commission, Mayor's Office, New Bostonians, Boston Public Schools	Human Relations Commission, US Attorney, Department of Mental Health, California Department of justice, United states Citizenship and Immigration Service, Transportation Security Administration	Community Partnerships; Department of Health and Human Services; Montgomery County Mental Health Association: Voices VS Violence
Religious organizations	Islamic Council of New England, Twelfth Baptist Church, Islamic Society of Greater Lowell	Council on American Islamic Relations- LA Chapter, Muslim Public Affairs Council	Faith Community Working Group
Non-government	Somalia Development Center, Anti-Defamation League, Pakistani Association, Somalia Community and Cultural Association, Boston Emergency Services Team, Refugee Trauma and Resilience Center at Boston's Children's Hospital	Undisclosed	WORDE
Community leaders/members	Undisclosed	Undisclosed	Undisclosed

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