

THE INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION OF
AUTHORITARIAN RULE IN ISLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1969-1977

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Mattias Emerson Fibiger

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THE INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION OF
AUTHORITARIAN RULE IN ISLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1969-1977

Mattias Emerson Fibiger, Ph. D.

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This dissertation examines the making of authoritarian rule in Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore from 1969-1977. American President Richard Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger funneled vast sums of U.S. military and economic aid to island Southeast Asia via the anticommunist policy of the Nixon Doctrine. Facing no meaningful communist threats, national leaders in the region then used American largesse to construct and consolidate newly authoritarian regimes. Indonesia played a leading role in this process, disseminating its authoritarian state-building doctrine of national resilience and encouraging a “New Orderization” of island Southeast Asia. The transformation of the region’s political systems then reverberated on both sides of the Pacific. In the United States, diasporic communities and human rights groups lobbied against the provision of American aid to authoritarian regimes and contributed to a broad left-right coalition that undermined the Nixon and Ford administration’s core foreign policy projects. In island Southeast Asia, the narrowing of legitimate channels of political contestation produced an efflorescence of disloyal opposition movements, including communist, Islamist, and separatist insurgencies. The narrative emphasizes several themes, including the international and transnational construction of authoritarian rule, the importance of regional history, and the agency of American and Southeast Asian leaders and publics.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Born in Vancouver, Canada, Mattias Fibiger emigrated to the United States with his family as an adolescent. He graduated high school in California and continued on to pursue undergraduate studies in history at the University of California at Santa Barbara, where he graduated with high honors and distinction. He entered the doctoral program in history at Cornell University in August 2012. In July 2018, he will become Assistant Professor in the Business, Government, and International Economy unit at Harvard Business School.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

In the Text:

AAS: Association of Asian Scholars

ABRI: Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia*)

ADB: Asian Development Bank

AFP: Armed Forces of the Philippines

AMSRP: Association of Major Religious Superiors in the Philippines

ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations

ASPAC: Asian and Pacific Council

Aspri: Personal Assistants (*Asisten Pribadi*)

Bakin: State Intelligence Coordinating Agency (*Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara*)

Bappenas: National Development Planning Agency (*Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional*)

BCC: Basic Christian Community

BDSU: Barrio Self-Defense Unit

BN: Barisan Nasional (National Front)

CBCP: Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines

CCAS: Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars

CEP: Congress Education Project

CFAH: Concerned Filipinos and Americans in Hawaii

CGP: Consultative Group for the Philippines

CNL: Christians for National Liberation

CPM: Communist Party of Malaya

CPP: Communist Party of the Philippines

CSIS: Centre for Strategic and International Studies

DAP: Democratic Action Party

Depnankam: Department of Defense and Security (*Departemen Pertahanan dan Keamanan*)

DI: Darul Islam

DNU: Department of National Unity

EPU: Economic Planning Unit

FELCA: Federal Land Consolidation and Rehabilitation Authority

FELDA: Federal Land Development Authority

FFP: Friends of the Filipino People

FMS: Foreign Military Sales

FPDA: Five Power Defense Arrangement

FUEMSSO: Federation of United Kingdom and Eire Malaysian and Singaporean Student Organisations

GAM: Free Aceh Movement (*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka*)

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

Gerakan: Malaysian People's Movement Party (*Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia*)

Golkar: Functional Groups (*Golongan Karya*)

GPI: Islamic Youth Movement (*Gerakan Pemuda Islam*)

Hankamrata: Total People's Defense and Security (*Pertahanan Keamanan Rakyat Semesta*)

HDB: Housing and Development Board

HMI: Islamic Student Association (*Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam*)

ICHDF: Integrated Civilian Home Defense Forces

IGGI: Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia

IMF: International Monetary Fund

ISA: Internal Security Act

Jl: Jema'ah Islamiyah

KAMI: Indonesian Student Action Front (*Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia*)

KAPPI: Indonesian Highschool Student Action Front (*Kesatuan Aksi Pelajar Pemuda Indonesia*)

KBL: New Society Movement (*Kilusan Bagong Lipunan*)

KDP: Union of Democratic Filipinos (*Katipunan ng mga Demokratikong Pilipino*)

Kesban: Security and Development (*Keselamatan dan Pembangunan*)

KM: Patriotic Youth (*Kabataang Makabayan*)

KNPI: National Indonesian Youth Committee (*Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia*)

Kopkamtib: Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (*Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban*)

Lemhannas: National Defense Institute (*Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional*)

MAF: Malaysian Armed Forces

MAN: Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism

MAP: Military Assistance Program

MCA: Malaysian Chinese Association

Metrocom: Metropolitan Command

MFP: Movement for a Free Philippines

MIC: Malaysian Indian Congress

MNLA: Malayan National Liberation Army

MNLF: Moro National Liberation Front

NAFUS: National Association of Filipinos in the United States

NCC: National Consultative Council

NCRCLP: National Committee for the Restoration of Civil Liberties in the Philippines

NEDA: National Economic Development Authority

NEP: New Economic Policy

NIEO: New International Economic Order

NPA: New People's Army

NPPA: Newspaper and Printing Presses Act

NOC: National Operations Council

NSC: National Security Council

NU: Nahdlatul Ulama

NUSP: National Union of Students of the Philippines

OPEC: Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

Opsus: Special Operations (*Operasi Khusus*)

PAP: People's Action Party

PAS: Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (*Parti Islam Se-Malaysia*)

Parmusi: Indonesian Muslim Party (*Partai Muslimin Indonesia*)

Pertamina: State Oil and Gas Mining Company (*Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak dan Gas Bumi Negara*)

PDI: Indonesian Democratic Party (*Partai Demokrat Indonesia*)

PHILCAG: Philippine Civic Action Group

PKI: Indonesian Communist Party (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*)

PKP: Communist Party of the Philippines (*Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas*)

PLO: Palestine Liberation Organization

PNI: Indonesian National Party (*Partai Nasional Indonesia*)

PPP: Development Unity Party (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*)

Repelita: Five-Year Economic Development Plan (*Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun*)

RISDA: Rural Industry and Smallholders' Development Authority

SA: Societies Act

SAF: Singapore Armed Forces

SDK: Union of Democratic Youth (*Samahang Demokratiko ng Kabataan*)

SRM: Voice of the Malayan Revolution (*Suara Revolusi Malaya*)

UMNO: United Malays National Organization

UN: United Nations

UP: University of the Philippines

USSU: University of Singapore Student Union

Wanhankamnas: National Defense and Security Council (*Dewan Pertahanan Keamanan Nasional*)

ZOPFAN: Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality

In the Notes:

ACDA: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

ANM: National Archives of Malaysia (*Arkib Negara Malaysia*)

ANRI: National Archives of the Republic of Indonesia (*Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia*)

ASSUS: State Ministry for Special Affairs, 1968-1976 (*Asisten Sekretaris Negara Urusan Khusus, 1968-1976*)

CFPF: Central Foreign Policy Files, 1967-1969

CUML: Columbia University Rare Book and Manuscript Library

EKUIN: Ministry of Economics, Finance, and Industry, 1966-1973 (*Menteri Negara Bidang Ekonomi, Keuangan, dan Industri, 1966-1973*)

EOB: Executive Office Building

FRUS: *Foreign Relations of the United States*, with year and volume number

GFPL: Gerald Ford Presidential Library

H Files: NSC Institutional (“H”) Files

HAK: Henry A. Kissinger Office Files

HAK Telcons: Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts (Telcons)

HB IX: Secretariat of Vice Presiden Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, 1973-1978 (*Sekretariat Wakil Presiden Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, 1973-1978*)

IMS: Subject Files of the Office of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore Affairs, 1965-1974

Lemhannas: National Defense Institute (*Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional*)

MemCon: Memorandum of Conversation

NAA: National Archives of Australia

NARA: National Archives and Records Administration

NSC: National Security Council

NSC-EA Presidential: National Security Adviser - Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific

NSC-EA Staff: National Security Adviser - NSC East Asian and Pacific Affairs Staff Files.

PPS: Speeches of President Suharto, 1966-1998 (*Pidato Presiden Soeharto, 1966-1998*)

Polkam: Minutes of the President’s Instructions and Decisions at a Session of the Council on

Political Stabilization and National Security (Risalah petunjuk-petunjuk dan putusan-putusan Presiden pada sidang Dewan Stabilisasi Politik dan Keamanan Nasional)

PRP: Philippine Radical Papers

RG: Record Group

RNPL: Richard Nixon Presidential Library

Sekcab: Cabinet Secretariat, 1966-1971 (*Sekretariat Kabinet Periode 1966-1971*)

SNF: Subject Numeric File, 1970-1973

Telcons: Telephone Conversations

INTRODUCTION

Asia's Cold War ended in the 1970s. Or at least it should have. The People's Republic of China forged a tacit alliance with the United States and steadily embraced capitalist economic governance. Chinese aid to revolutionary movements in Burma, Malaysia, Thailand, and elsewhere in Southeast Asia—what Beijing once regarded as the “cradle of revolutions”—dwindled as Chinese leaders worked to establish diplomatic relationships with Asia's noncommunist states.¹ The Soviet Union mounted a revolutionary thrust in the Third World in the 1970s. But Moscow restrained its ambitions in Asia, where Soviet leaders instead worked to deepen détente with the United States and proposed a conservative collective security arrangement designed to contain Chinese influence.² Domestic communist movements throughout the region—possible partners in Chinese or Soviet campaigns of aggression or subversion—were decimated, defunct, and delegitimized.

Meanwhile Asia's noncommunist states had grown considerably more united, more prosperous, and more powerful. The leaders of noncommunist Southeast Asia resolved their internecine disputes over territory and ideology and banded together to form the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967. An alphabet soup of other international institutions including the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), both founded in 1966, knit the wider region together. Political interconnection went hand-in-hand with economic growth. In the quarter-century after 1965, the economies of East and Southeast Asia expanded at more than double the rate of other world regions. Most

¹ Chen Jian, “China's Changing Policies toward the Third World and the End of the Global Cold War,” in Artemy M. Kalinovsky and Sergey Radchenko, eds., *The End of the Cold War and the Third World: New Perspectives on Regional Conflict* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 110.

² For more on the Soviet offensive in the Third World see Jeremy Friedman, *Shadow Cold War: The Sino-Soviet Competition for the Third World* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015); Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

of that growth owed to the remarkable—“miraculous,” it came to be called—performance of eight economies: Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the “Four Asian Tigers,” referring to South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. East and Southeast Asian economies grew not only more prosperous, but also more equal. Such rapid, shared growth resulted in significant improvements in almost all quantifiable indicators of human welfare, from life expectancy to poverty to the number of people living without basic necessities like food, water, and shelter. Aggressive population control programs drove birth rates down more quickly in East and Southeast Asia than in other world regions, ensuring higher levels of saving and investment and preventing rapidly expanding education systems from becoming overburdened.³ And trade further interwove the region’s growing economies. Intra-ASEAN trade accounted for only 6.3 percent of the total trade of the organization’s member states in 1967. By 1979, that figure had expanded to 14.9 percent.⁴ Economic and demographic change combined to lift huge numbers of Asians out of poverty and diminish the appeal of revolutionary movements. The political and economic uncertainty that propelled American involvement in the region following World War II had evaporated.

The Vietnam War masked the Asian Cold War’s ebb. At the close of the 1960s, China and the Soviet Union continued to furnish their Vietnamese clients with vast quantities of military and economic aid, fueling the war against the American-backed regime in Saigon. Those aid figures, however, masked a deeper reality. China and the Soviet Union did not seek to foment revolution for its own sake. Each communist giant sought primarily to check the other’s influence in Indochina and establish a dominant position within the international

³ World Bank, *The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 1-26.

⁴ See the data in International Monetary Fund, *Directions of Trade: Yearbook* (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1967-1979).

communist movement, for which the Vietnam War harbored profound symbolic importance.⁵ Thus, in Cambodia, China cultivated the vehemently anti-Vietnamese Khmer Rouge while the Soviet Union maintained diplomatic relations with Lon Nol's rightist dictatorship. And thus both Moscow and Beijing, anxious to nurture their improving relations with Washington, paired fraternal aid to Hanoi with appeals to accept a negotiated settlement that fell short of the Vietnamese communists' maximalist objectives, including the removal from office of Nguyen Van Thieu, the American-sponsored president of South Vietnam.⁶

Washington also acknowledged the necessity of a negotiated peace. Budgetary constraints and a surge of Congressional and public activism made the withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam an electoral and financial necessity. Upon entering the White House in 1969, Richard Nixon paired Vietnamization—the gradual withdrawal of American troops and the corresponding buildup of the South Vietnamese military—with a go-for-broke military offensive, including aggressive bombing campaigns over South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. After recognizing in late 1969 that this renewed offensive was unlikely to wring concessions from Hanoi, the president settled on a “decent interval” approach, which envisioned a negotiated settlement that would leave Thieu in power for a period long enough to secure Nixon's reelection at home and preserve American credibility abroad.⁷ To maintain pressure on the North Vietnamese, Nixon bombed communist-controlled areas of Indochina

⁵ Qiang Zhai, *China and the Vietnam War, 1950-1975* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Ilya Gaiduk, *The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996).

⁶ Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, *Hanoi's War: An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013), 232, 246-247; Odd Arne Westad, Chen Jian, Stein Tonnesson, Nguyen Vu Tung, and James Hershberg, eds., “77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964-1977,” *Cold War International History Project Working Paper Series*, no. 22 (May 1998): 132, 182-183.

⁷ For Nixon's Vietnam War strategies the seminal text remains Jeffrey Kimball, *Nixon's Vietnam War* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998); see also Larry Berman, *No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam* (New York: The Free Press, 2001); and David Schmitz, *Richard Nixon and the Vietnam War: The End of the American Century* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014).

almost continuously, punctuating that violent equilibrium with periodic escalations, such as the ferocious bombardment of Hanoi and Haiphong that finally secured the Vietnamese negotiator Le Duc Tho's signature on the Paris Peace Accords in January 1973. Nixon claimed the accords would bring "peace with honor" to Vietnam.⁸

Honor, maybe, but not peace. The American withdrawal left only two dramatically weakened combatants. The map of South Vietnam was pockmarked by competing sovereignties, which the American ambassador in Saigon likened to "cancerous growths."⁹ The flow of American aid—the lifeblood of the South Vietnamese economy—thinned from more than \$3 billion in 1973 to \$1 billion in 1974 to \$750 million in 1975.¹⁰ Inflation and unemployment consequently soared in South Vietnam, prompting a reverse migration of the labor force from city to countryside.¹¹ Amidst economic stagnation and political uncertainty, Catholic and Buddhist groups began challenging Thieu's authority, staging protests in cities across South Vietnam. When North Vietnam mounted a probing attack in the Central Highlands region in early 1975, South Vietnamese forces retreated. But the retreat quickly turned into a rout, and resistance to the communist onslaught seemingly melted away. North Vietnamese forces lifted the red flag with the yellow star over the presidential palace in Saigon on April 30, 1975. Around the same time, communist movements assumed control in Cambodia and Laos.

⁸ Richard Nixon, "Address to the Nation Announcing Conclusion of an Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam," January 23, 1973, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3808> (accessed March 8, 2018).

⁹ *Conference Transcript: The Paris Agreement on Vietnam: Twenty-Five Years Later* (Washington, D.C.: The Nixon Center, 1998), 18.

¹⁰ Greenbook, "U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants," *United States Agency for International Development*, <http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/> (accessed December 18, 2017).

¹¹ Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, *The South Vietnamese Economy and US Aid*, January 7, 1975, CIA Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/LOC-HAK-59-2-2-2.pdf> (accessed December 4, 2017).

But no specter haunted Asia after the communist takeovers in Indochina. Apart from Laos and Cambodia, the dominoes did not fall. The dual imperatives of reconstruction and reunification militated against Vietnam's adoption of a revolutionary foreign policy. A decade of aerial bombardment had destroyed much of North Vietnam's military and productive capacities.¹² And South Vietnam had won the unenviable distinction of most heavily bombed country in history: its infrastructure was in tatters, its agricultural and industrial outputs lagged behind government targets, and its economy remained hobbled by unemployment and inflation. And other problems loomed, most notably the extension of Hanoi's political authority over the southern population. Thousands of northern cadres traveled southward to assume administrative posts below the seventeenth parallel. The influx caused political and cultural tensions to flare, and some northerners denounced their southern counterparts for "regional chauvinism."¹³ Expanding northern power brooked no compromise. Hundreds of thousands of former South Vietnamese officials, soldiers, landlords, laborers, worshipers, artists, and even revolutionaries were labeled politically unreliable and sent to re-education camps, where many were subjected to brutal treatment.¹⁴ While judging the intention of Vietnamese leaders is difficult, Vietnam possessed little capability of sowing instability beyond Indochina. Some scholars have pointed out that Vietnam did in fact offer token revolutionary assistance to left-wing movements across Latin America, Asia, and Africa in the years after reunification. But what stands out about these efforts is not so much their breadth, but their modesty. Except for a token dispatch of about two dozen advisors to train

¹² Memorandum, Odeen to Kissinger, July 26, 1972, CIA Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/LOC-HAK-451-5-22-1.pdf> (accessed December 5, 2017).

¹³ Quoted in Ngo Vinh Long, "The Socialization of South Vietnam," in Odd Arne Westad and Sophie Quinn-Judge eds., *The Third Indochina War: Conflict between China, Vietnam and Cambodia, 1972-79* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 127.

¹⁴ See Mark Philip Bradley, *Vietnam at War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 174-177.

Nicaraguan *contras* in the early 1980s, Vietnam mostly denied the appeals of Third World revolutionary movements for material aid in the decade after 1975.¹⁵ The war's end also unleashed centrifugal forces within the wider international communist movement, deepening the Sino-Soviet split and revealing Vietnam's chauvinistic ambitions for hegemony over its Indochinese neighbors.¹⁶ By decade's end, Asia's communist states went to war with one another rather than with their capitalist neighbors. Vietnam invaded Cambodia in December 1978, and China invaded Vietnam in February 1979.

Outside of Indochina, the Vietnam War served as an engine of economic growth and a vehicle of regional integration. American military and economic aid programs injected enormous sums of capital into the region. Over the eight years in which American combat troops served in Vietnam, for example, U.S. aid to neighboring Thailand totaled almost \$1 billion; aid to Indonesia, the Philippines, and South Korea reached similar heights. But the war also brought indirect benefits. The Johnson and Nixon administrations pursued guns-and-butter economic policies, heating up the American economy and driving up demand for Asian imports. Taiwan's exports to the United States, for example, grew from \$97 million in 1965 to \$1.7 billion in 1973.¹⁷ Japan earned roughly \$1 billion per year as a direct result of American intervention in Vietnam, and war-related U.S. spending elsewhere in Asia created larger markets for Japanese goods, enabling the country to solidify its post-World War II recovery

¹⁵ Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, "The Vietnam Decade: The Global Shock of the War," in Naill Ferguson, Charles Maier, Erez Manela, and Daniel Sargent, eds., *The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2010), 168-171.

¹⁶ See Christopher Goscha, "Vietnam, the Third Indochina War, and the Meltdown of Asian Internationalism," in Odd Arne Westad and Sophie Quinn-Judge eds., *The Third Indochina War: Conflict between China, Vietnam and Cambodia, 1972-79* (New York: Routledge, 2006), 152-186.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

and penetrate smaller, less developed Asian economies.¹⁸ Other countries, too, benefitted from American military spending. Already in 1967, the CIA estimated that 15 percent of Singapore's gross national income derived from American military procurements related to the war in Vietnam.¹⁹ South Korean, Thai, and Filipino soldiers whose salaries came from American coffers—and who were thus dubbed “mercenaries” by an American senator—remitted large sums of money to their homelands.²⁰ The war also promoted tourist industries in major metropolitan areas across the region, especially in Hong Kong, Bangkok, and Taipei, the most popular destinations for American soldiers on rest and recuperation leave, but also in Tokyo, Manila, and Seoul. And even in countries where Vietnam War dollars made no significant inroads, such as Malaysia, war-fueled prosperity in the wider region proved beneficial, enabling the expansion of raw material exports and overseas worker programs.²¹ The fighting in Vietnam thus overshadowed two more important trends: the consolidation of capitalist, American-friendly regimes in Asia, and the weakening and fracturing of the region's communist movements.

But the Cold War was more than just a geopolitical and geoeconomic competition that saw the United States and its capitalist clients square off against the Soviet Union and its communist clients. It was also an ideological competition that suffused the globe, polarizing

¹⁸ Richard Stubbs, *Rethinking Asia's Economic Miracle: The Political Economy of War, Prosperity and Crisis* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 125-152.

¹⁹ Central Intelligence Agency, Weekly Summary Special Report: Singapore on the eve of Lee Kuan Yew's Visit to the US, October 6, 1967, CIA Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79-00927A006000070008-3.pdf> (accessed December 17, 2017).

²⁰ See Robert M. Blackburn, *Mercenaries and Lyndon Johnson's "More Flags": The Hiring of Korean, Filipino, and Thai Soldiers in the Vietnam War* (Jefferson: McFarland, 1994).

²¹ “Malaysia: The Three Year Recovery” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 6, 1972.

and militarizing societies, communities, and even families across the world.²² Contestants for power from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe framed their domestic struggles—over modernity, independence, development, and identity—in terms of the Cold War and appealed to the superpowers for aid. Unwilling to cede the initiative lest their access to markets or resources be constrained, their ideology or credibility be undermined, or their careers or reputations be tarnished, American and Soviet leaders responded favorably to many of these appeals. Superpower aid in the Third World built institutions, alleviated suffering, and promoted economic growth; but so too did it instill antagonisms, equip militaries, and suppress dissent. Said one Indonesian who killed hundreds of his fellow citizens during the pogroms of 1965-66, “We did this because America taught us to hate communists.”²³ The words reveal a dichotomy at the heart of the Cold War: Although the superpowers and much of the developed world experienced the Cold War as what John Lewis Gaddis has termed “long peace,” large parts of the Global South experienced the Cold War as what Odd Arne Westad has called a “semipermanent civil war.”²⁴

Asia had also escaped this sinister effect of the Cold War by the 1970s. That was certainly true for island Southeast Asia—the subject of this dissertation. Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore ranked as stable, Western-oriented, capitalist states. The revolutionary upsurge that swept the region in the 15 years following the Second World War had subsided, the result of internationally aided counterinsurgency campaigns and missteps by leftist groups. Relatively inclusive political arrangements led most citizens to identify, if not

²² Odd Arne Westad, *The Cold War: A Global History* (New York: Basic Books, 2017); Heonik Kwon, *The Other Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).

²³ Quoted in *The Look of Silence*, directed by Joshua Oppenheimer (New York: Drafthouse Films, 2014).

²⁴ John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987); Westad, *Global Cold War*, 398.

with their government, then at least with their system of government. Admittedly, the region was not a democratic utopia. The military-dominated Suharto regime in Indonesia had in 1965-66 presided over a politicide that killed of hundreds of thousands of Indonesians, mostly suspected leftists and ethnic Chinese, and the leaders of the New Order had no intention of allowing a return to the freewheeling politics of the early 1950s.²⁵ In the Philippines, oligarchic domination and the persistence of patron-client ties rendered the constitutional government unaccountable to popular demands, and President Ferdinand Marcos considered declaring martial law as early as January 1970, only two months after winning reelection in a deeply flawed contest.²⁶ In Malaysia, Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman headed the Alliance, a multiracial elite coalition dominated by the ruling United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and generally hostile to mass mobilization. And in Singapore, the road to independence decimated the island's political left and culminated in a sovereign city-state controlled by a single-party regime led by Lee Kuan Yew. None of the region's political systems could thus be called a liberal democracy. But each state possessed at least some hallmarks of democratic rule, among them relatively free and fair elections, vibrant presses and social movements, the rights to expression and association, and the rule of law. Alternatives to economic and political integration with the West found few individual

²⁵ For the Indonesian killings see Geoffrey Robinson, *The Killing Season: A History of the Indonesian Massacres, 1965-66* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018); Jess Melvin, *The Army and the Indonesian Genocide: The Mechanics of Mass Murder* (New York: Routledge, 2018); John Roosa, *Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto's Coup D'Etat in Indonesia* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006); Vanessa Hearman, "Dismantling the 'Fortress': East Java and the Transition to Suharto's New Order Regime (1965-1968), Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Melbourne, 2012; Geoffrey Robinson, *The Dark Side of Paradise: Political Violence in Bali* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995); Robert Cribb, ed., *The Indonesian Killings of 1965-1966: Studies from Java and Bali* (Clayton: Monash University Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, 1990).

²⁶ Ferdinand Marcos, Diary Entry, January 8, 1970, *Philippine Diary Project*, <https://philippinediaryproject.wordpress.com/1970/01/08/thursday-january-8-1970/> (accessed March 4, 2018).

adherents and little organized support. No longer did the Cold War define island Southeast Asia's political, economic, social, or cultural life.

But perceptions lagged behind reality. President Richard Nixon and his chief foreign policy aide, National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger remained wedded to the Cold War as an organizing framework for American policy. Possessed of none of the modernization theory idealism that shaped the Kennedy and Johnson administrations' engagement with the Global South, Nixon and Kissinger believed non-Western peoples were ill-suited to democratic self-governance and considered authoritarianism the best inoculant against instability.²⁷

Accordingly, the two men funneled vast amounts of American military and economic aid to repressive regimes that they hoped could serve as guarantors of national and regional stability, fashioning the emergent Nixon Doctrine into a vehicle of authoritarian entrenchment. Among the most important recipients of Nixon Doctrine aid were Iran under the leadership of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Brazil under the leadership of a military junta, and Indonesia under the leadership of Suharto.²⁸ For his part, the Indonesian strongman shared many of Nixon and Kissinger's anxieties about the vulnerability of Southeast Asia to communist subversion.

Eager to adopt a leadership role in preserving regional stability, he too worked to promote authoritarian governance in island Southeast Asia. In particular, he promulgated the authoritarian state-building doctrine of *ketahanan nasional* (national resilience) throughout

²⁷ The literature on modernization theory is vast and growing. For some representative texts see Michael Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003); Nick Cullather, *The Hungry World: America's Cold War Battle Against Poverty in Asia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010); David Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); Daniel Immerwahr, *Thinking Small: The United States and the Lure of Community Development* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015).

²⁸ See Roham Alvandi, *Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); Matias Spektor, "Equivocal Engagement: Kissinger, Silveira and the Politics of U.S.-Brazil Relations (1968-1983)," Ph.D. Dissertation, Oxford University, 2006.

the region. Suharto and the region's other would-be autocrats also mobilized the rhetoric of the Cold War to extract the maximum possible amount of aid from the United States and the international institutions it dominated, among them the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The result was an international and transnational campaign of "authoritarianization"—a term less teleological, if also less elegant, than popular phrases like democratic backsliding, democratic erosion, or democratic breakdown.

Authoritarianization reshaped the region's politics over the following decade. Facing no meaningful communist threats, newly empowered authoritarian regimes wielded coercive institutions against all manner of opposition—not only leftists but also liberals, Islamists, separatists, students, and minorities. The Indonesian military consolidated its domination of the archipelago's political system and sidelined the political parties, Muslim organizations, and student and youth groups upon which Suharto's ascent to power had depended. In the Philippines, Marcos declared martial law in 1972. His newly authoritarian regime brought the oligarchy to heel, centralized control over the instruments of power and patronage, and arrested, tortured, and murdered huge numbers of dissidents. In Malaysia, race riots in the capital of Kuala Lumpur in May 1969 prompted the Tunku to dissolve parliament and create a new authoritarian governing body called the National Operations Council (NOC). After a two-year interregnum, Razak presided over the restoration of parliamentary democracy, but only after sweeping constitutional change and an enlarged military and police apparatus guaranteed the enduring dominance of a successor to the Alliance called the *Barisan Nasional* (BN). And in Singapore, Lee's People's Action Party, always inimical to political contention, cemented its control over the city-state's massive bureaucracy and modest territory. Throughout the region, supranational flows of power, capital, and ideas enabled national

leaders to narrow or eliminate legitimate channels of political contestation, to flatten media landscapes and suppress civil societies, and to empower coercive institutions.

Such profound changes reverberated in unanticipated and enduring ways. In the United States, diasporic and human rights organizations lobbied against American support for newly authoritarian regimes in island Southeast Asia. These activists won converts among some members of Congress, who used their positions of power to demand American foreign policy pay greater heed to human rights. Representatives and representations of island Southeast Asia contributed to a broader left-right coalition founded upon a moralistic opposition to the *Realpolitik* of the Nixon and Ford administrations, which eroded public support for détente and left Nixon and Kissinger to construct their architecture of peace on a foundation of sand.²⁹ Meanwhile in island Southeast Asia, opponents of authoritarian regimes found their opportunities for exerting political voice limited, and many then turned to exit. Communist, Islamist, and separatist insurgencies returned to once again menace the region's stability. The efflorescence of political activism in the United States and disloyal opposition in island Southeast Asia confirmed that the authoritarianization ignited by the Nixon Doctrine—a project, like détente, intended to stabilize the international system—brought only new forms of instability.

This dissertation begins as Asia's Cold War ends. It explains why, over the following decade, island Southeast Asia experienced a relatively contemporaneous shift from

²⁹ Jeremi Suri, "Détente and its Discontents," in Bruce Schulman and Julian Zelizer, eds., *Rightward Bound: Making America Conservative in the 1970s* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008); Jussi Hanhimäki, *The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); Julian Zelizer, *Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security—from World War II to the War on Terrorism* (New York: Basic Books, 2010).

consensual to coercive modes of governance. And it traces the consequences of that shift for the region's domestic and international politics. In the following narrative, three themes emerge.

The first theme is the international and transnational construction of authoritarian rule. Due in no small measure to archival and linguistic challenges, most scholarship on the genesis of authoritarian regimes in island Southeast Asia has been produced by scholars of comparative politics. Most of this literature focuses on a single state or regime.³⁰ But some authors take an explicitly comparative approach.³¹ Among the best is Dan Slater, whose magnificent *Ordering Power* argues that authoritarian governments in Southeast Asia arose when national elites surrendered their resources to the state, banding together to form “protection pacts” against urban, class-based contentious politics that they perceived as endemic and unmanageable under more pluralistic institutional arrangements.³² Slater is right to characterize authoritarianism as dependent upon a state's ability to extract and marshal scarce resources, but he neglects what was among the most important revenue bases of island Southeast Asia's authoritarian regimes: foreign aid. Suharto, Marcos, and Razak used internationally derived sources of capital to finance economic development programs, which could legitimize their rule in the absence of democratic elections; to fund the expansion of militaries and other coercive institutions, which could suppress dissent; and to pursue corrupt

³⁰ Benedict Anderson, “Old State, New Society: Indonesia's New Order in Comparative Historical Perspective,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 42, no. 3 (May 1983): 477-496; David Wurfel, *Filipino Politics: Development and Decay* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); Edmund Terence Gomez and Jomo K.S., *Malaysia's Political Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

³¹ See Thomas Pepinsky, *Economic Crises and the Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes: Indonesia and Malaysia in Comparative Perspective* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); Lee Morgenbesser, *Behind the Façade: Elections under Authoritarianism in Southeast Asia* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2016); Sheena Greitens, *Dictators and Their Secret Police: Coercive Institutions and State Violence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

³² Dan Slater, *Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

accumulation, which could enrich themselves and buy off elite competitors. Chronicling the purposes to which Southeast Asian autocrats applied foreign aid, this dissertation argues that protection pacts were international—dependent upon the cooperation of foreign financiers of authoritarian rule in addition to the collective action of domestic elites. International capital enabled national leaders to reinforce their authoritarian political structures and shrink the domestic constituencies upon which state power depended. In other words, it allowed authoritarian leaders to build states from the outside-in, and it obviated the compromise, cooptation, and bargaining that Charles Tilly has shown was inherent to inside-out state-building in Europe.³³ Authoritarianism was thus an international construct.

And so too was it a transnational construct. This dissertation, the first piece of scholarship written in English to draw upon the central archival records of the Suharto regime, unearths an Indonesian campaign to implant authoritarian governance across the region by evangelizing the state-building doctrine of “national resilience.” After the leaders of Malaysia and the Philippines faced endogenous political shocks that challenged their democratically elected governments, they adopted the Indonesian model to construct and consolidate newly authoritarian regimes. Marcos and Razak overcame path dependencies in national politics and created novel institutional and ideological formations that, taken together, revealed nothing less than the partial “New Orderization” of island Southeast Asia: a convergence toward Suharto regime-style authoritarianism. Other scholars have paid attention to the roles of cooperation, emulation, and inspiration in the promotion of left-wing national liberation movements during the Cold War. Jeffrey James Byrne has chronicled the manifold ways in which Ahmed Ben Bella’s Algeria became a beacon for national liberation movements in

³³ Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1990), 99-103.

across the colonized and developing world—from Angola to Vietnam to Palestine. If Algiers became a “Mecca of revolution,” as Byrne puts it, a site to which pilgrims traveled to deepen their understanding of and engagement with revolutionary theologies, then Jakarta became a Medina of counterrevolution, a slightly less popular destination, but one that nevertheless inspired authoritarian reaction across island Southeast Asia, and occasionally on the mainland.³⁴ But it was not only the force of the Indonesian example that inspired mimicry. The Suharto regime acted as a vanguard, actively promoting its strategies of authoritarian state-building through an array of channels, including diplomatic and military exchanges, widely read publications like the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, and international institutions like ASEAN. These meetings, publications, and institutions—contrary to the claims of some scholars that they were ineffectual—became critical nodes for the transmission of authoritarianism throughout island Southeast Asia.³⁵

The second theme is regional history. Relatively few works of international history adopt a regional outlook. Most instead embrace what might be called a spokes-on-a-wheel approach, which emphasizes bilateral relations between the United States and one or more other states. Such a lens blinds historians to processes and connections outside the American field of vision.³⁶ Others take a global approach, which emphasizes developments and entanglements that are planetary in scale. Such a lens risks eliding local, national, and regional idiosyncrasies or implying an ahistorical uniformity to complex phenomena.³⁷ The

³⁴ Jeffrey James Byrne, *Mecca of Revolution: Algeria, Decolonization, and the Third World Order* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016).

³⁵ See the discussion in Alice Ba (Re)Negotiating *East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 17–41.

³⁶ See, for example, Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

³⁷ See, for example, Jeremi Suri, *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2003).

changes that swept island Southeast Asia in the 1960s and 1970s spanned beyond national borders but did not encompass the globe. For however globalized the world became in the 1970s, spatial, linguistic, cultural, and political barriers remained. What James Scott has called the “friction of distance” limited the international and transnational circulation of people, capital, and ideas, and an authoritarian development strategy originating in Jakarta could move more easily to Manila than Managua.³⁸ This dissertation therefore makes the case for writing the international history of Southeast Asia in a regional register. Other scholars of recent international history have suggested the merit of such an approach.³⁹ But all existing accounts sound a common refrain: the inaccessibility of indigenous documents necessitates the reliance on American, British, Canadian, and Australian government documents, as well as English-language publications. Those documents offer invaluable insights, certainly more than the current zeitgeist of international history acknowledges, but theirs is nevertheless an outsider’s perspective. Based on primary sources from Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore—written in Indonesian, Tagalog, Malay, and English—as well as government documents and publications from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, this dissertation excavates the insider’s perspective of the international history of island Southeast Asia.

³⁸ James Scott, *The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 8.

³⁹ See, for example, Robert McMahon, *The Limits of Empire: The United States and Southeast Asia Since World War II* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999); Michael Hunt and Steven Levine, *Arc of Empire: America’s Wars in Asia from the Philippines to Vietnam* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012); Ang Cheng Guan, *The Cold War in Southeast Asia: An Interpretive History* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2018); Christopher Goscha and Christian Ostermann, ed., *Connecting Histories: Decolonization and the Cold War in Southeast Asia, 1945-1962* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2009); Malcolm Murfett, ed., *Cold War Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 2012); Bradley Simpson, “The Cold War in Southeast Asia,” in Robert McMahon, ed., *The Cold War in the Third World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); and see also Salim Yaquub, *Imperfect Strangers: Americans and Arabs in the 1970s* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016).

It also argues for an attendant reconceptualization of the Cold War. Since the publication of Odd Arne Westad's field-defining *The Global Cold War*, historians have increasingly conceptualized the Cold War as a singular global conflict, one that played out along axes both east-west and north-south.⁴⁰ As Robert McMahon puts it, recent scholarship on the Cold War has "forged a rare scholarly consensus"—"that the Cold War constituted a truly global contest, in which the Third World served as a critical theater."⁴¹ By stressing the unique dimensions of and trajectories of the Cold War in Asia, and in island Southeast Asia in particular, this dissertation suggests that, while scholars ought to be mindful of the Cold War's global dimensions, so too should they regard the Cold War as an agglomeration of relatively distinct yet interdependent regional systems. Consider the timelines: By the time the Cold War arrived in Latin America, it had largely been settled in Europe; as the Cold War heated up in Africa, it ended in Asia.⁴² Or scrutinize the themes: In the Middle East, conflicts between Arab states and Israel, and between conservative and radical Arab regimes, to say nothing of the region's vast hydrocarbon reserves, inflected Cold War competition; in Asia, the role of overseas Chinese communities, the crest of popular nationalism, and the economic development of the world's two most populous states defined the superpower conflict; while in Latin America, already independent a century before the advent of Soviet-American rivalry, economic inequality and the contest between populisms of left and right produced Cold War polarization, but the hegemony of the United States made the period after 1945 particularly inhospitable for socialists. A disaggregation of the Cold War allows historians to

⁴⁰ Westad, *Global Cold War*, 1-7.

⁴¹ Robert McMahon, "Introduction," McMahon, ed., *The Cold War in the Third World*, 4.

⁴² Hal Brands, *Latin America's Cold War* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010); Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Piero Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003).

question old assumptions and temporalities, to see broader continuities between the colonial, Cold War, and post-Cold War worlds. It also enables them to excavate other important themes like decolonization and state-building.⁴³

Which is not to say that Asia, or even island Southeast Asia, were themselves entirely homogenous. This dissertation makes the case for Singaporean exceptionalism. The city-state was exceptional in its geographic size, demographic composition, and economic prosperity, as other authors have argued. But so too was it exceptional in its international posture and its political stability. Unlike the other states in the region, and in spite of the fact that it received little in the way of international aid, Singapore served as a vocal and reliable supporter of Western policies in the 1970s. Some authors have attributed this unusual stance to Singapore's reliance on Western security guarantees and private capital investment.⁴⁴ But that does little to differentiate it from other states in the region. This dissertation argues instead that Lee Kuan Yew's regime inhabited a strong state—one capable of projecting power throughout Singapore's modest territory—and maintained pristine nationalist credentials, and that Lee therefore had little reason to fear anti-American protest. And unlike the other states in the region, Singapore experienced no comparable eruption of domestic insurgency in the 1970s. Other authors have ascribed the city-state's relative tranquility to good governance and rapid economic growth. This dissertation argues instead that Singapore's largely precise,

⁴³ For early moves in this direction see Lorenz Lüthi, ed., *The Regional Cold Wars in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East: Crucial Periods and Turning Points* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015).

⁴⁴ See Daniel Wei Boon Chua, *US-Singapore Relations, 1965-1975: Strategic Non-Alignment in the Cold War* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2017).

nonviolent coercive infrastructure and Lee's effective monopoly on credible claims of nationalism prevented the emergence of disloyal opposition.⁴⁵

The third theme is agency. Over the past two decades, international historians working in far-flung archives have uncovered the agency of historical actors long regarded as weak. Much of this scholarship has examined how, during the Cold War, supposed client states like South Vietnam and North Korea exercised influence over the United States and Soviet Union. But the historical literature on the international relations of island Southeast Asia is slim. Much of it still characterizes Suharto, Marcos, Razak, and Lee as pliant instruments of imperial power. Some historians have suggested that these leaders' reliance on international aid rendered them pliant. The title of one historical-journalistic account of U.S. engagement with the Marcos regime—*Waltzing with a Dictator*—evokes a sense of frictionless obeisance.⁴⁶ Other historians in this school have emphasized a powerful yet indirect American influence channeled through modernization theory.⁴⁷ Another strand of the literature characterizes these autocrats in somewhat Orientalizing terms. Some historians, for instance, have suggested that Suharto was a peculiarly Javanese figure, arguing that his approach to politics was largely determined by his ethnicity.⁴⁸ Cracks in this historiographic consensus have emerged only recently. In particular, Edward Miller and Jessica Chapman have argued

⁴⁵ T.N. Harper, "Lim Chin Siong and the 'Singapore Story,'" in Tan Jing Quee and Jomo K.S., *Comet In Our Sky: Lim Chin Siong in History* (Selangor, Malaysia: INSAN, 2001), 3-55; Michael D. Barr and Carl A. Trocki, eds.,

Paths Not Taken: Political Pluralism in Post-War Singapore (Singapore: NUS Press, 2008); Natasha Hamilton-Hart, "The Singapore State Revisited," *The Pacific Review* 13, no. 2 (2000): 195-216.

⁴⁶ Raymond Bonner, *Waltzing with a Dictator: The Marcoses and the Making of American Policy* (New York: Times Books, 1987).

⁴⁷ Bradley Simpson, *Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S.-Indonesian Relations, 1960-1968* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008).

⁴⁸ Damien Kingsbury, *The Politics of Indonesia* (London: Oxford University Press, 1998); Margot Lyon, "Mystical Biography: Suharto and Kejawen in the Political Domain," in Angus McIntyre, ed., *Indonesian Political Biography: In Search of Cross-Cultural Understanding* (Clayton: Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1993).

that the authoritarian South Vietnamese leader Ngo Dinh Diem was neither mandarin nor puppet but rather a nation-builder possessed of agency and vision.⁴⁹ This dissertation follows on their work to brand Suharto, Marcos, and Razak “independent dependents”: dependent upon international aid to maintain the durability of their narrowly-based regimes, yet strikingly independent in their policies and rhetoric. Authoritarian leaders in island Southeast Asia frequently adopted positions of aloofness from, or even opposition to, the geopolitical concerns of their international patrons, including the Vietnam War, the Arab oil embargo, and the New International Economic Order. Authoritarian leaders in island Southeast Asia were the architects of their own destinies.

But so too did they require American military and economic aid. This curious mixture of autonomy and reliance casts new light on a contentious methodological and conceptual debate among historians of the Cold War. Some scholars cheer efforts to uncover novel sources in far-flung archives, which have broadened and enriched our understanding of agency and causality in the Cold War and furthered a historiographical project aiming to “de-center” the United States and “privilege the foreign.”⁵⁰ Other scholars grate against this trend, advocating instead a return to research in American archives, American periodicals, and other American sources, and a renewed attention on themes like domestic politics, economic competition, and ideology. Pointing out that the United States was never one power among many but was always predominant, Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall argue that the international turn “runs the risk of assigning greater agency to these other actors than they

⁴⁹ Edward Miller, *Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of South Vietnam* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013); Jessica M. Chapman, *Cauldron of Resistance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and 1950s Southern Vietnam* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013).

⁵⁰ Thomas Zeiler, “The Diplomatic History Bandwagon: A State of the Field,” *Journal of American History* 95, no. 4 (March 2009): 1061.

deserve, with the result that the analysis becomes ahistorical.”⁵¹ This dissertation, reliant upon sources both American and foreign, and attendant to dynamics both domestic and international, reveals that agency was never as zero-sum as the debates among historians suggest. In island Southeast Asia, the objectives of superpowers and their allies aligned as often than they clashed, and both patron and client states exerted agency *through* rather than *against* each other. It was because of Nixon and Kissinger’s mistaken sense that communism posed a serious threat to Asia that Suharto, Marcos, and Razak were able to draw upon American resources to construct and consolidate newly authoritarian regimes, and it was because these Southeast Asian autocrats trafficked in the rhetoric of anticommunism and the policies of the Cold War that Nixon and Kissinger leaders could claim to be upholding regional stability as they withdrew American forces from Vietnam.

This history is still with us today. The policies of American retrenchment following the Vietnam War left poisonous legacies for Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore. Each suffers today from authoritarianism, economic inequality, official corruption, politicized militaries, and atrophied civil societies—problems exacerbated if not caused by external intervention. Now American leaders are seeking once again to extricate the United States from a series of disastrous wars in a far-flung portion of the globe. And policymakers have again seized upon authoritarian strongmen as potential guarantors of national and regional stability in the wake of American withdrawal, among them Egypt’s Abdel Fatah al-Sisi, Saudi Arabia’s royal dynasty, Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and more. The history unearthed in this dissertation warns that autocrats are likely not to overcome disorder but to nurture it, precisely because they deny opportunities for peaceful political change. And it

⁵¹ Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, *America’s Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2009), 5.

warns, too, that the victims of Western-sponsored authoritarian regimes are likely to associate their suffering with the United States. The study of the past offers no hard-and-fast lessons for policymaking in the present. But absent serious redirection of American policy, something very much like the story in the following pages could happen again.

CHAPTER 1

ORIGINS

President Richard Nixon arrived on the Pacific island of Guam in the late afternoon of July 25, 1969. Twelve hours after witnessing the splashdown of the Apollo XI spacecraft and enthusing that the moon landing capped “the greatest week in the history of the world since the Creation,” Nixon wanted to stir up news coverage of his forthcoming tour through Asia. He spoke at length to reporters on a background basis and articulated what would come to be called the Nixon Doctrine.⁵²

Nixon focused his remarks on the need for a post-Vietnam War framework for American involvement in Asia. Geography and history, the president stressed, had fashioned the United States into a Pacific power, one possessed of interests and responsibilities that stretched far beyond its western shores. And a Pacific power it would remain. What else but American might could deter and repulse aggression by communist states like China, North Korea, and North Vietnam? Yet in the same breath, Nixon qualified the scope of American involvement in the region, implying that the United States could no longer afford, in the words of his favorite *bête noire*, to “pay any price, bear any burden” for the defense of freedom in Asia.⁵³ The president saw promise in economic development, in the growth of nationalism, and in the fact that “Asians do not want to be dictated to from the outside.” The United States, he said, required a long-range policy suited to these new circumstances: “We should assist, but we should not dictate. . . . We, of course, will keep the treaty commitments

⁵² Richard Nixon, “Remarks to Apollo 11 Astronauts Aboard the U.S.S. Hornet,” July 24, 1969, *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2138> (accessed March 2, 2018).

⁵³ John F. Kennedy, “Inaugural Address,” January 20, 1961, *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=8032> (accessed March 2, 2018).

that we have. But as far as our role is concerned, we must avoid the kind of policy that will make countries in Asia so dependent on us that we are dragged into conflicts such as the one that we have in Vietnam.”⁵⁴

Central to Nixon’s remarks was a simplistic distinction between aggression and subversion. The president explained that the United States would maintain its nuclear umbrella over “Free Asia” and insisted that American forces would repel any large-scale acts of aggression by major powers. But, he said, the United States would now expect the tasks of maintaining domestic security and combatting indigenous insurgencies to be “handled by . . . the Asian nations themselves.” This principle he related to Pakistani leader Ayub Khan’s admonition that, when internal subversion threatened countries friendly to the United States, the American role was to “help them fight the war but not fight the war for them.” The Nixon administration would henceforward furnish its Asian allies with the military and economic aid—but no longer the manpower—necessary to subdue threats that arose within their national borders.⁵⁵

Four days later, after stopovers in the Philippines and Indonesia, Nixon arrived in Thailand. Having piqued allies’ anxieties by expressing his desire to shrink the American military presence in Southeast Asia, Nixon chose in his official statements to affirm the U.S. “determination to honor our commitments” and to “stand proudly with Thailand against those who might threaten it from abroad or from within.”⁵⁶ Journalists covering the president’s trip

⁵⁴ Richard Nixon, “Informal Remarks in Guam With Newsmen,” July 25, 1969, *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2140> (accessed March 2, 2018).

⁵⁵ Richard Nixon, “Informal Remarks in Guam With Newsmen,” July 25, 1969, *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2140> (accessed March 2, 2018).

⁵⁶ Richard Nixon, “Remarks at a Welcoming Ceremony in Bangkok, Thailand,” July 28, 1969, *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2151> (accessed March 2, 2018); Richard Nixon, “Statement on the President’s Visit to Thailand,” July 28, 1969, *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2153> (accessed March 2, 2018).

questioned why he had contradicted his previous focus on burden-sharing.⁵⁷ While the president and his press secretary denied any shift in emphasis, the minor public relations kerfuffle revealed that Nixon wrestled with contradictory policy imperatives as he attempted to define the future of American involvement in Asia. Precisely what the Nixon Doctrine meant remained murky.

Nixon aide Patrick Buchanan quickly surmised as much. In a report he put together shortly after the president's return to Washington, Buchanan relayed that "most editorial writers and columnists are taking what they want out of the Guam and Bangkok statements—depending on which way they want us to go."⁵⁸ He described "a great air of confusion" regarding Nixon's policy in Asia and "general disagreement about what the 'Nixon Doctrine' will mean when push comes to shove."⁵⁹ Where liberals saw a formula for curtailing American meddling abroad, conservatives saw a scheme to reassert American support for embattled allies and friends. And Americans on both sides of the political spectrum embraced the Nixon Doctrine as an articulation of a broad public sentiment of "No More Vietnams." The nebulous character of the Nixon Doctrine gives credence to the historian Jeffrey Kimball's conclusion that Nixon was deliberately ambiguous on Guam. Kimball regards Nixon as a savvy politician seeking to project an image of competence by persuading "voters and European leaders that he intended to withdraw from Vietnam and avoid future 'Vietnams'

⁵⁷ "U.S. to Stand By Thailand, Nixon Tells Viet Ally," *Boston Globe*, July 29, 1969; "Nixon Pledges U.S. to Defense of Thailand: Policy Shift Denied," *Los Angeles Times*, July 29, 1969; "Nixon Helps Ease Thailand's Fears of Postwar Peril: Same Policy Transition Period," *Washington Post*, August 1, 1969; "A Little Touch of Dickie in the Night," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, August 7, 1969.

⁵⁸ Memorandum, Kissinger to Nixon, August 29, 1969, Press Reaction to "Nixon Doctrine" [Aug 1969-Mar 1970] [1 of 1], NSC Files, Box 378, RNPL.

⁵⁹ Patrick Buchanan, General Appraisal of the Asian Trip & the Nixon Doctrine, Press Reaction to "Nixon Doctrine" [Aug 1969-Mar 1970] [1 of 1], NSC Files, Box 378, RNPL.

while also assuring Asian and other allies and clients in the capitalist-leaning developing world that he was not abandoning U.S. commitments.”⁶⁰

Surprisingly given the wealth of scholarship on the Nixon administration and the international history of the 1970s, the Nixon Doctrine has received relatively little scholarly scrutiny.⁶¹ Most scholars see the doctrine as emerging out of a contradiction between encroaching limits and enduring obligations—as a way to preserve anticommunist stability in the Third World while adapting to new political and economic constraints on the exercise of American power. Historians have also characterized the Nixon Doctrine as a simple abstraction of Vietnamization, or as a blueprint for preserving American credibility as Nixon reconciled himself to an eventual communist takeover of South Vietnam. There is an air of inevitability to these accounts, a sense that the Nixon Doctrine marked the only possible strategic response to structural change. This seeming inevitability notwithstanding, historians disagree on whether the Nixon Doctrine marked continuity or change in the broader arc of American foreign policy during the Cold War. Daniel Sargent sees continuity, depicting the Nixon Doctrine as a “strategic reaction to adverse circumstances” related to the Vietnam War, including a resurgent isolationism and a balance-of-payments crisis. But he characterizes Nixon as aiming to “sustain, not shed, the international commitments that the United States had assumed since the 1940s.”⁶² John Lewis Gaddis sees change, describing the Nixon Doctrine as an indication of “shifts in long-term global strategy.” He portrays Nixon as recognizing that “the United States could not afford indefinitely to proliferate foreign

⁶⁰ Jeffrey Kimball, “The Nixon Doctrine: A Saga of Misunderstanding,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 1 (March 2006): 65

⁶¹ Indeed the only monographic study of the Nixon Doctrine to date is Robert S. Litwak, *Détente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, 1969-1976* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

⁶² Daniel Sargent, *A Superpower Transformed: The Remaking of American Foreign Policy in the 1970s* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 42.

commitments, and then undertake to honor them on a timetable and in a manner set by its adversaries.” In Gaddis’s view, the Nixon Doctrine aimed to regain the United States’ initiative in the Cold War by differentiating between core and peripheral interests, and by husbanding American resources to address threats to the former.⁶³

In their focus on the what the Nixon Doctrine meant in *theory*, scholars have largely neglected what it accomplished in *practice*. The United States provided military and economic aid to states that could preserve domestic order and act as guarantors of regional stability. That aid would flow overwhelmingly to countries ruled by non-democratic governments. While nothing in Nixon’s July 1969 remarks to journalists or his administration’s subsequent explanations of the Nixon Doctrine in annual reports to Congress specified that American largesse would be dispensed primarily to autocrats, the Nixon Doctrine became in practice an instrument by which the United States reinforced authoritarian regimes. Why? The virtually unanimous opinion of the foreign policy establishment held that the United States ought to avoid making large-scale financial commitments to authoritarian regimes. Career officials in the National Security Council, the State Department, the Pentagon, and the Central Intelligence Agency argued that such commitments would render dictatorial leaders insensitive to the demands of their populations, and that increasingly dissatisfied citizens would in ever greater numbers call for revolutionary rather than evolutionary change. But Nixon held the foreign policy establishment in contempt, and his chief foreign policy aide Henry Kissinger was always eager to indulge the uglier sides of his boss’s personality. What’s more, both men believed that authoritarian, military-dominated states could better maintain national and regional stability in the Third World, and that such

⁶³ John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War*, revised and expanded edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 296.

states better served American interests than their democratic counterparts. Nixon and Kissinger's idiosyncratic personalities and biases thus overrode countervailing opinions and fashioned the Nixon Doctrine into a vehicle of authoritarian entrenchment.

The Vietnam War had by Nixon's inauguration in January 1969 sundered American society. More than thirty-five thousand American troops had lost their lives in the conflict up to that point, and an average of two hundred more flag-draped coffins made their way home from Southeast Asia each week. The war fueled social protest, cultural upheaval, political discord, and economic deterioration—conditions that imposed a broad set of limits on the exercise of American power.

Most easily measurable was the financial burden imposed by the war, which exhausted nearly a quarter of the nation's defense budget in 1968.⁶⁴ President Lyndon B. Johnson had long been reluctant to seek a tax hike to pay for the costs of the war even as he presided over a massive increase in federal budgetary outlays on domestic programs through the Great Society and War on Poverty. Government spending fueled aggregate demand, which outpaced aggregate supply and produced inflation topping five percent in early 1969. Upward inflationary pressure coexisted with downward budgetary pressure, as Congress began pressing for reductions in spending on national defense. Left with less money to secure manpower and materiel that had become more expensive, the Nixon administration announced two major shifts in American military policy: a move from a "two-and-a-half war" to a "one-and-a-half war" military posture, and a move from a nuclear posture of "strategic superiority" to one of "strategic sufficiency." Together these changes promised to shave more

⁶⁴ Stephen Daggett, "Costs of Major U.S. Wars," *Congressional Research Service Report*, June 29, 2010.

than \$5 billion from the defense budget.⁶⁵ The Nixon Doctrine represented a further effort to tailor American national security policy to suit new economic realities. By substituting relatively cheap foreign manpower for more expensive American manpower, as Brigadier General Robert Pursley explained to Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, the “maintenance of U.S. ‘interests’ could theoretically be accomplished with *lower total U.S. financial outlays*.”⁶⁶ The Nixon administration simply needed to obtain Congressional support for the increased levels of foreign military and economic assistance that would be required to build up indigenous defenses against communism.

There was no guarantee that such support would be forthcoming. As American casualties in Vietnam mounted, support for the war waned. No less a bellwether of public opinion than newsman Walter Cronkite famously responded to the Tet Offensive in early 1968 by asking “What the hell is going on? I thought we were winning the war!”⁶⁷ That August, the Gallup poll revealed that for the first time a majority of Americans believed sending troops to fight in Vietnam had been a mistake.⁶⁸ Though the antiwar movement remained unpopular—always more so than the war itself—it had by the time of Nixon’s inauguration become an impediment to policymaking. In 1969, Congress passed an amendment to the defense budget prohibiting the involvement of American ground forces in Thailand and Laos. The amendment’s principal author, Senator Frank Church, an Idaho Democrat, called it a “reassertion of Congressional prerogatives” in foreign policy.⁶⁹ It was to

⁶⁵ Paper Prepared by the NSSM 3 Interagency Steering Group, in *FRUS 1969-1976:34*, 174-193.

⁶⁶ Memorandum, Pursley to Laird, February 20, 1970, Nixon Doctrine, 1969-1971 (1), Box A82, Melvin Laird Papers, GFPL. Emphasis in original.

⁶⁷ Quoted in Chester Pach, “The Way It Wasn’t: Walter Cronkite and Vietnam,” *History News Network*, <http://hnn.us/article/104635> (accessed December 2, 2013).

⁶⁸ “Nixon Viewed Best to End Vietnam War: Gallup Poll,” *Boston Globe*, August 25, 1968.

⁶⁹ John W. Finney, “President Backs Senators on Laos,” *New York Times*, December 17, 1969; LeRoy Ashby, *Fighting the Odds: The Life of Senator Frank Church* (Pullman: Washington State University Press, 1994).

be the first of many Congressional attempts to use the power of the purse to curb the war in Indochina. Nixon and Kissinger responded to these Congressional pressures. Implicit in the Nixon Doctrine was the promise that American lives would no longer be sacrificed for the cause of containment in Asia—a promise designed to shore up support for American foreign policy among a war-weary public, a skeptical media, and a tightfisted Congress.

These newfound limits on the exercise of American power notwithstanding, Nixon and Kissinger believed in the necessity of what they called an “honorable” end to the Vietnam War. They saw the survival of a noncommunist South Vietnam—at least for a decent interval following an American withdrawal—as vital to maintaining the United States’ international credibility. Kissinger put it thusly in a January 1969 article in *Foreign Affairs*: “However fashionable it is to ridicule the terms ‘credibility’ or ‘prestige,’ they are not empty phrases; other nations can gear their actions to ours only if they can count on our steadiness.”⁷⁰ If the international commitments of the United States were thrown into doubt, Nixon and Kissinger believed, adversaries of the United States would be emboldened and allies disillusioned. But Nixon and Kissinger also considered domestic audiences, for credibility determined not only how allies and adversaries engaged with the United States but also whether the American public judged an internationalist foreign policy to be a worthwhile endeavor. Meeting with a group of American ambassadors in Thailand, the president argued that “the way we end [the] Vietnam war will determine whether we can have a viable policy in Asia,” because a communist takeover of South Vietnam would lead the American people to “throw up their hands on further active Asian involvement.”⁷¹ A White House notetaker has Nixon casting the

⁷⁰ Henry Kissinger, “The Viet Nam Negotiations,” *Foreign Affairs* 47, no. 2 (January 1969): 219.

⁷¹ MemCon, Nixon and Ambassadors, July 29, 1969, MemCons - The President's Asian and European Trip July - August 1969, NSC Files, Box 1023, RNPL.

situation in different terms in a meeting with Australian Prime Minister John Gorton, resuscitating the metaphor of falling dominoes that American policymakers first used to justify U.S. intervention in Vietnam: “Once a great nation starts down this path of withdrawal, giving way to disillusion, said the President, the process is very difficult to reverse. The resulting ‘domino effect,’ should the U.S. take this road, could affect not only Southeast Asia but our entire global posture.”⁷²

Which is not to say that Nixon and Kissinger discounted the more traditional domino theory, holding that a communist victory Vietnam would mechanistically and inevitably lead to communist takeovers throughout Southeast Asia. That much was made clear in a conversation between Nixon and Deputy National Security Adviser Alexander Haig, captured on a secret White House taping system:

Haig: You know, they [unclear] about the dominoes. But Thailand would be gone in six months to a year. Cambodia, Laos—

Nixon: —Indonesia.

Haig: Indonesia would be next.

Nixon: Yeah, no question. And Singapore, Malaysia, the Straits. You’re goddamn right it would go.⁷³

A conclusion to the war that preserved the honor—the credibility—of the United States was therefore essential.

To secure their “honorable” peace, Nixon and Kissinger broadened the war. American aircraft had bombed Cambodia intermittently beginning as early as 1965. But in March 1969, Nixon ordered a massive B-52 bombing campaign, which struck deeper into Cambodian territory, ostensibly in an effort to prevent communists from using its territory as a sanctuary and transit point for men and materiel making their way into South Vietnam. But as Colonel

⁷² MemCon, Prime Minister Gorton’s Meeting with the President, May 6, 1969, Australia Prime Minister Gorton May 6 & 7, 1969, Vol 2 of 2 [1 of 2], NSC Files, Box 910, RNPL.

⁷³ OVAL 717-20, May 2, 1972, White House Tapes, RNPL.

Ray B. Sitton remembered, Nixon and Kissinger ordered the bombing, dubbed Operation Menu, to prove to the North Vietnamese that “we were serious about possible escalation.”⁷⁴ The president hoped that the threat of excessive force would compel Hanoi to accept American terms for a settlement, an outgrowth of what he called the “madman theory.”⁷⁵ In yet another effort to bring the war to an expeditious end, Nixon and Kissinger attempted to induce the Soviet Union into wringing concessions out of the North Vietnamese. In backchannel negotiations with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin opened in February 1969, Nixon and Kissinger insisted upon “linkage”—the idea, in Nixon’s words, that “progress in one area must logically be linked to progress in other areas.”⁷⁶ The Soviets sought an arms control agreement, and the Americans implied that Moscow’s help in reining in Hanoi would lead them to look favorably upon the proposition. To that carrot Nixon and Kissinger added a stick: the specter of American rapprochement with China, by then the Soviet Union’s chief global adversary. But these stratagems accomplished little, and the war dragged on.

Even as Nixon pursued military escalation and triangular diplomacy, he acknowledged the need to appease American public opinion. Laird, who had spent 16 years in Congress before being tapped for the top job at the Pentagon and possessed keen political instincts, became the administration’s foremost advocate for troop withdrawals. He remembered that, upon being sworn in as secretary of defense, “I had a time bomb ticking—it was public

⁷⁴ Quoted in Jeffrey Kimball, *Nixon’s Vietnam War* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 125.

⁷⁵ H.R. Haldeman, *The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House* (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1994), 82-83.

⁷⁶ MemCon Nixon, Kissinger, Toon, and Dobrynin, February 17, 1969, USSR Memcons Dobrynin/President, NSC Files, Box 340, RNPL.

opinion in this country.”⁷⁷ If the current pace of U.S. war deaths in Vietnam continued unabated, Laird feared, the public’s willingness to sustain more vital American commitments, like the defense of Europe, would gradually erode. The secretary of defense therefore waged bureaucratic warfare against opponents of troop withdrawals, not least among them Kissinger, and he lobbied Nixon to authorize a program of what Laird called “Vietnamization.”

Vietnamization referred to the gradual withdrawal of American ground forces from Vietnam and to the concurrent buildup of the capacity of the South Vietnamese state to maintain its political and territorial integrity. In other words, the United States would provide the money necessary for the defense of South Vietnam, but the burden of blood would increasingly rest with the South Vietnamese themselves. In April 1969, Nixon ordered Laird to prepare a “specific timetable for Vietnamizing the war.”⁷⁸ The first withdrawals of American troops began three months later, when 25,000 American soldiers returned home. Nixon for most of his first year in office leaned toward more militant approaches for ending the war, and Vietnamization was not a central component of his strategy. But Vietnamization did amount to a recognition that large-scale American involvement in Vietnam could no longer be sustained. And it doubtless inspired the more general principle of relying on foreign rather than American manpower to combat communist insurgencies—a central component of the Nixon Doctrine.

Asian allies of the United States regarded these developments with alarm. Kissinger recalls that “these threatened countries saw our withdrawal from Vietnam as irreversible. They feared that in the process the United States might shed *all* its responsibilities and turn its

⁷⁷ Interview of Melvin Laird, September 2, 1986, Laird - Oral History Interviews (1), Box D8, Melvin Laird Papers, GFPL; see also Dale Van Atta, *With Honor: Melvin Laird in War, Peace, and Politics* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2008).

⁷⁸ National Security Decision Memorandum 9, April 1, 1969, NSDM 9, H Files, Box H-208, RNPL.

back on *all* its interests in the region.” If, he worried, “the United States was perceived to be abdicating its role in Asia, dramatic changes in the foreign policies and perhaps even the domestic evolution of key countries would be probable.”⁷⁹ Asian leaders routinely expressed to representatives of the Nixon administration their anxiety regarding a rapid American withdrawal from Asia. Emblematic was a letter Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos wrote to Nixon in which he stressed the “need to allay the apprehension, which is general throughout free Asia, of a precipitate American pullout from Southeast Asia after Vietnam.”⁸⁰ Kissinger relayed these concerns to Nixon in a series of memoranda penned in advance of his July 1969 junket through Asia, during which the president announced the Nixon Doctrine.⁸¹ In this sense, the Nixon Doctrine was pulled from the periphery rather than pushed from the core, inspired by the need to allay Asian leaders’ unease. The president frequently explained to his Asian counterparts that the Nixon Doctrine was not a formula for abandoning Asia, but rather a formula for maintaining the domestic support necessary to remain involved in the region.⁸²

The post-Vietnam War context did not make inevitable Nixon’s strategy of cultivating authoritarian clients. The newfound limits on American power, the conceptual stepping-stone of Vietnamization, and the desire to maintain American credibility were important to the articulation of the Nixon Doctrine. But as causes go, these were necessary but not sufficient.

Other strategies were open to the Nixon administration in 1969. Members of the foreign

⁷⁹ Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), 222.

⁸⁰ Letter, Marcos to Nixon, January 25, 1969, Presidential Correspondence [With Heads of State] Prior to 22 Jul-3 Aug Trip [Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, India, Pakistan, Romania], NSC Files, Box 461, RNPL.

⁸¹ Memorandum, Kissinger to Nixon, July 18, 1969, President Nixon's Trip July-Aug 1969 Country Briefing Book Indonesia, NSC Files, Box 453, RNPL; Talking Points, July 11, 1969, President Nixon's Trip July-Aug 1969 Country Briefing Book the Philippines, NSC Files, Box 454, RNPL.

⁸² Memorandum, Holdridge and Saunders to Kissinger, December 20, 1969, VP Trip East Asia - Jan 70 [Part 2], NSC Files, Box 450, RNPL. This memorandum recounts that Nixon told Indonesian President Suharto that what was then being called the Guam Doctrine was “a way to keep the U.S. in Asia, not to get us out.”

policy bureaucracy offered trenchant critiques of the administration's decision to rely on authoritarian clients as bulwarks against communism, and they discussed alternative strategies in both piecemeal and holistic terms.

The Nixon administration began formulating a "Post-Vietnam Asia Policy" even before American troop levels in Vietnam reached their peak in May 1969.⁸³ Early administration records reveal substantial disagreements on future U.S. involvement in the region. Proponents of what would come to be called a "high" strategy believed that communist governments and insurgencies represented serious threats to the United States and its allies, and that American setbacks in Southeast Asia would bring "cumulative repercussions that threaten our strategic and economic interests, our credibility, and peace elsewhere in the world." They therefore favored the "deployment of substantial US forces and expenditures" to maintain order in Southeast Asia. Advocates of a "low" strategy evaluated the situation differently. They considered the possibility of overt communist aggression remote given China's relative weakness, and they believed covert communist subversion would run aground on a host of obstacles, including "the military and paramilitary capabilities of the nations themselves; cooperation between certain Asian countries; anti-Chinese feelings in many quarters; the force of nationalism; modernization and the improvement of general living conditions; religious resistance to communism, etc." Because they regarded Southeast Asia as of only marginal importance to American interests, supporters of the low strategy endorsed a reduction of U.S. involvement in the region.⁸⁴ Kissinger glibly advised Nixon that

⁸³ National Security Study Memorandum 38, April 10, 1969, NSSM-38, H Files, Box H-143, RNPL.

⁸⁴ Interim Analysis of United States Interests and Objectives in Southeast Asia, Review Group – Asian Trade Problems – 5/2/69, H Files, Box H-036, RNPL.

he should “probably not discuss these differences” with representatives of foreign governments.⁸⁵

Ultimately the administration’s attempts to articulate an explicit post-Vietnam War strategy for the whole of Southeast Asia foundered on what Marshall Green called “critical unknowns in the near future” regarding the war’s trajectory.⁸⁶ As the effort to craft a holistic strategy for the future of American involvement in Southeast Asia subsided, the administration began strategic planning for Southeast Asia on a country-by-country basis. Most inputs into the policymaking process supported the assumptions of the low strategy.

Indonesia, which Nixon often referred to as “the greatest prize in the Southeast Asian area,” became a critical point of contention.⁸⁷ The country constituted nearly half of Southeast Asia in both geographic and demographic terms, and it housed a bounty of natural resources. It controlled the choke point between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, critical because it served as a passageway through which Middle Eastern oil traveled to Japan. Under its first post-independence leader, Sukarno, Indonesia had experienced endemic political and economic instability and transformed from a democratic, non-aligned country into a vaguely authoritarian, communist-leaning one. But a military takeover in 1965-66 reversed Indonesia’s leftward momentum. The self-proclaimed New Order presided over the slaughter of some half a million Indonesians accused of holding communist sympathies—a political genocide—and reoriented Indonesia’s economy toward the West. Since then, the United States had pursued what the NSC staff dubbed a “restrained political approach” toward Indonesia: emphasizing economic aid provided within a multilateral context, welcoming

⁸⁵ Talking Paper for the Gorton Visit: The US View of Southeast Asia, Review Group – Asian Trade Problems – 5/2/69, H Files, Box H-036, RNPL.

⁸⁶ Memorandum, Green to Kissinger, November 22, 1969, NSSM-38, H Files, Box H-143, RNPL.

⁸⁷ Richard Nixon, “Asia After Viet-Nam,” *Foreign Affairs* 46, no. 1 (October 1967).

Indonesia's adoption of a greater role in Asian regional organizations, and restricting military aid to low-level civic action projects. Within Nixon's NSC staff there existed "general consensus" that this restrained approach ought to be continued.⁸⁸ But that cut against the wishes of Indonesian President Suharto, who sought American military assistance in order to consolidate his authority and offset the decline of Soviet aid and the degradation of old, Soviet-acquired equipment.⁸⁹ The NSC staff therefore penned memoranda advising Nixon not to bring up the subject of military assistance with Suharto during his travels through Southeast Asia.⁹⁰ "We believe," they wrote, "that Indonesia possesses adequate arms to handle all foreseeable threats to its internal security, and we do not wish to embark on the immense task of re-equipping the Indonesian Armed Forces."⁹¹

Shortly after announcing the Nixon Doctrine on Guam, the president and his entourage landed in Jakarta for meetings with representatives of the Suharto regime. American archivists have been unable to locate records of the discussions between Nixon and Suharto, and the available Indonesian archives do not contain minutes or summaries of any meetings between the two men. But the Indonesian president later informed American Secretary of State William Rogers that he asked Nixon to furnish the Indonesian military with weapons, equipment, and training.⁹² In concurrent conversations between Kissinger and a group of Indonesian military officials led by General Sumitro, the American national security advisor

⁸⁸ Memorandum, Richard Sneider and Morton Halperin to Henry Kissinger, June 19, 1969, NSSM-61 [1 of 2], H Files, Box H-154, RNPL.

⁸⁹ Airgram, AmEmbassy Jakarta to State, January 29, 1969, POL 1 INDON 1/1/67, Box 2205B, CFPF, RG 59, NARA.

⁹⁰ Indonesia – Talking Points, President Nixon's Trip July-Aug 1969 Country Briefing Book Indonesia, Box 453, NSC Files, RNPL.

⁹¹ Indonesia - Background - The Indonesian Armed Forces and US Military Assistance, July 10, 1969, President Nixon's Trip July-Aug 1969 Country Briefing Book Indonesia, NSC Files, Box 453, RNPL.

⁹² Telegram, SecState Bali to RUEHC/SecState WashDC, August 5, 1969, Tony Lake Chron File [6 of 6] [June 1969-May 1970], Box 1048, NSC Files, RNPL.

promised that the Nixon administration would bestow the Suharto regime with increased levels of military aid. Kissinger and Sumitro also began the process of setting up a backchannel that bypassed civilian officials in the U.S. Department of State and the Indonesian Foreign Ministry.⁹³ The Javanese generals mistrusted their foreign minister, Adam Malik, for his Sumatran heritage and his history of involvement with the left-wing Murba Party. They also suspected the American foreign policy bureaucracy as holding a “bias” against an Indonesian regime (correctly) perceived as military-dominated.⁹⁴ In any case, the generals’ wishes coincided with Nixon and Kissinger’s own penchant for secret diplomacy. Shortly after returning to the United States, Nixon told Kissinger that he regarded “our discussions with Indonesian Generals on military assistance” as “personal Presidential commitments,” and he wanted American officials to “follow through without fail.”⁹⁵

The NSC staff and members of the State Department’s East Asian and Pacific Affairs Bureau worked to reverse, or at least moderate, Nixon’s decision. They saw existing American policy toward Indonesia as “already consistent with the Guam Doctrine,” and they cautioned that the pursuit of a close bilateral relationship with Indonesia would make the country less, not more, secure.⁹⁶ According to an in-depth U.S. government study, the Suharto regime faced “no serious external or internal threats.”⁹⁷ The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) had been decimated, separatist groups in the outer islands had been defeated, and other opposition groups had been either coopted or contained. Nor did China or Vietnam pose a

⁹³ Memorandum for the Record, July 27, 1969, Tony Lake Chron File [6 of 6] [June 1969-May 1970], Box 1048, NSC Files, RNPL.

⁹⁴ Memorandum, Lake to Kissinger, July 27, 1969, Indonesian Generals, HAK, Box 101, RNPL.

⁹⁵ Memorandum, Nixon to Kissinger, August 7, 1969, President/Kissinger Memos, Box 341, NSC Files, RNPL.

⁹⁶ Review Group Meeting, December 18, 1969, Review Group Meeting - Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore 12/22/69, H Files, Box H-041, RNPL.

⁹⁷ NSSM-61 Indonesia, Review Group Meeting - Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore 12/22/69, H Files, Box H-041, RNPL.

meaningful threat. The PRC had turned inward during the Cultural Revolution, reducing the likelihood of a Chinese invasion of Southeast Asia. Indonesia's ethnic Chinese minority, meanwhile, was relatively small and wealthy, rendering them improbable vectors of communist subversion. And even if Vietnam were to be reunified under communist leadership, the Suharto regime saw the country as likely to be "too concerned with its own internal problems of economic reconstruction and political reconciliation to pose a threat to its neighbors."⁹⁸ Absent threats, the NSC concluded, any increase in aid to the Indonesian military, corrupt and already "far larger than is required," risked undermining the position of fiscally conservative, pro-Western technocrats and leading the Indonesian government to ignore the vital tasks of fostering "a popular base for the regime" and "institutional channels for the expression of discontent." Closer ties with the United States could also inflame Indonesian nationalist sentiment and "provide fuel to the regime's domestic enemies," because it would entail a departure from the country's traditional nonaligned status.⁹⁹

The issue came to a head during a review group meeting in December 1969. Most members of the NSC and State Department favored acquiescing to Nixon's order to expand military aid to Indonesia by supplying the Suharto regime with slightly higher levels of non-combat equipment. Kissinger, though, wanted to furnish the Indonesians with some combat equipment derived from surplus stocks in Vietnam. One staffer wrote that the rest of the NSC hoped to "be able to weaken still further movement towards" the provision of combat

⁹⁸ Airgram, AmEmbassy Jakarta to SecState WashDC, January 29, 1969, POL 1 INDON 1/1/67, CFPF, Box 2205B, RG 59, NARA.

⁹⁹ NSSM-61 Indonesia, Review Group Meeting - Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore 12/22/69, H Files, Box H-041, RNPL.

equipment.¹⁰⁰ That effort proved unsuccessful. The following month, Kissinger reported to Laird and Rogers that the president “believes that his conversations with President Suharto oblige him to proceed with a combat/civil action mix.”¹⁰¹ Nixon ordered a threefold increase in American military assistance to Indonesia, and he directed that a large share of that be dedicated to combat equipment.¹⁰² Any and all of the NSC and State Department staff’s reservations about reinforcing Indonesia’s authoritarian government had been swept aside.

A similar process played out in the Philippines. The United States possessed longstanding interests in the archipelago, a former American colony that became independent only in 1946. Successive American presidents had regarded the Philippines as of immense symbolic importance—a beacon of democracy and capitalism, and a light for the rest of Asia. As one U.S. official stationed in Manila concluded near the end of 1968, precisely because Filipinos had to such a great extent adopted American political, economic, and cultural values, “our credibility, our prestige, and our influence are tied with Philippine success or failure.”¹⁰³ But American policymakers’ concern for the fate of democracy in the Philippines led them, paradoxically, to indulge and even abet strikingly antidemocratic practices. In working to promote economic development and defeat a leftist insurgency, Washington

¹⁰⁰ NSSM-61 Indonesia, Review Group Meeting - Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore 12/22/69, H Files, Box H-041, RNPL; Memorandum to Masters, Def 19-1a MAP Funding Levels 1970, IMS, Box 7, RG 59, NARA.

¹⁰¹ Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers and Secretary of Defense Laird, January 21, 1970, in *FRUS 1969-1976:20*, 611.

¹⁰² Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers and Secretary of Defense Laird, March 11, 1970, in *FRUS 1969-1976:20*, 614-615.

¹⁰³ Telegram, AmEmbassy Manila to SecState WashDC, December 13, 1968, POL PHIL-US 1/1/68, CFPF, Box 2430, RG 59, NARA.

fortified a venal Filipino oligarchy and hamstrung efforts to address structural problems like the maldistribution of land and wealth.¹⁰⁴

Lofty exaltations about the importance of democracy in the Philippines all but disappeared from American policy planning documents during the Nixon administration. American officials focused instead on the more material facets of the U.S.-Philippine relationship: the U.S. military installations scattered throughout the archipelago, which afforded the United States power projection capabilities throughout the Asia-Pacific and played vital roles in American plans to defend the region against Chinese and Soviet aggression; the token but entirely U.S.-subsidized contingent of 2,300 Filipino engineers deployed in Vietnam called the Philippine Civic Action Group (PHILCAG), which buttressed shaky American claims that the war was the product of a broad, multinational consensus; and the trade agreements that knit together the Philippine and American economies and extended the “special relationship” beyond the colonial period. Most consequential among the latter was the Laurel-Langley Agreement, set to expire in 1974. It provided for the relatively unhindered exchange of goods between the two countries, a generous quota for Philippine sugar imports into the United States, and parity rights that guaranteed Americans equal rights with Filipinos in the development and ownership of the archipelago’s natural resources and public utilities. These favorable—some said exploitative—conditions led American private investment to flow into the Philippines. Though the U.S. share of the Philippine import market had declined markedly during the 1960s, from 50 percent to 30 percent, American

¹⁰⁴ See Nick Cullather, *Illusions of Influence: The Political Economy of U.S.-Philippine Relations, 1942-1960* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996); H.W. Brands, *Bound to Empire: The United States and the Philippines* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Stanley Karnow, *In Our Image: America’s Empire in the Philippines* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1989).

private investment in the country still totaled nearly \$1 billion in 1969.¹⁰⁵ The Nixon administration regarded safeguarding American access to military bases and markets as its overriding interests in the Philippines.

Communism did not threaten these interests, and American officials knew as much. The Hukbalahap guerrilla movement that imperiled national stability in the 1950s had by the late 1960s devolved into a Mafia-style organization—one more concerned with using prostitution and gambling rackets to extract revenue from its base area in central Luzon than with propagating its ideology and subverting the authority of the Philippine state.¹⁰⁶ (A then-miniscule Maoist splinter group, too, derided the old Huks as “purely a crime gang,” “completely isolated from the masses.”)¹⁰⁷ Left-wing groups more broadly, the State Department reported near the end of 1969, “have been unable to garner any significant popular support.”¹⁰⁸ Nor were they likely to receive succor from the outside world. President Ferdinand Marcos wrote in his diary that Philippine communists were not receiving aid from the People’s Republic of China or other foreign sources, and that it was “our unanimous assessment” that leftist guerrillas could harass or sabotage Philippine forces but could not mount a threat to the stability of the Philippine state.¹⁰⁹ The American Embassy in Manila also diligently relayed Marcos’s proclamation in his 1969 state of the nation address that

¹⁰⁵ Robert E. Baldwin, Robert S. Ingersoll, and Woo-choong Kim, “U.S. and Foreign Competition in the Developing Countries of the Asian Pacific Rim,” in Martin Feldstein, ed., *The United States in the World Economy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 105.

¹⁰⁶ Airgram, AmEmbassy Manila to Secretary of State, January 14, 1969, POL 23 PHIL 1/1/67, CFPF, Box 2429, RG 59, NARA.

¹⁰⁷ “Statement of the New People’s Army,” *Ang Bayan: Pahayagan ng Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas Pinapatnubayan ng Kaisipan Mao Tsetung*, July 1, 1969.

¹⁰⁸ U.S. Department of State Director of Intelligence and Research, “The Philippines: Will President Marcos be Re-Elected?” November 7, 1969, POL 15-1 PHIL 1/1/69, CFPF, Box 2428, RG 59, NARA.

¹⁰⁹ Quoted in William C. Rempel, *Delusions of a Dictator: The Mind of Marcos as Revealed in His Secret Diaries* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1993), 57-58, 61.

“external communist aggression represents a minimal threat.”¹¹⁰ But as early as 1967, U.S. intelligence officials had begun warning of a different danger to American interests in the Philippines—corruption and mismanagement. “Unless the peasant farmer and the urban slum dweller are persuaded that the present system can respond to their needs,” read one CIA report, “their growing apathy could in time turn into rebellion.”¹¹¹

Nineteen-sixty-nine was an election year in the Philippines, one that saw Marcos, hoping to become the first Filipino president to win reelection, square off against Senator Sergio Osmeña Jr. The campaign hewed close to precedent, revolving around personality and patronage rather than policy. But the two candidates occasionally traded barbs over who better embodied Filipinos’ nationalist aspirations. On the stump, Marcos vowed to renegotiate all treaties with the United States and to open economic relations with communist countries, dubbing Osmeña an American lackey. As Kissinger put it in a memorandum to Nixon, “President Marcos is trying to convince the Manila sophisticates that he is not your puppet, but that he can get more from the US than anybody else.”¹¹² Osmeña adopted a more openly pro-American stance, deriding Marcos as a round-heeled naïf who would surrender the Philippines to communism. Playing on President Johnson’s praise of Marcos as his “right-hand man in Asia,” which for the incumbent had become something of a political liability, Osmeña said Marcos now wanted to become the “left-hand man of Mao Tse-tung.”¹¹³

¹¹⁰ Telegram, AmEmbassy Manila to SecState WashDC, January 28, 1969, POL 15-2 PHIL 1/1/67, CFPF Box 2428, RG 59, NARA.

¹¹¹ Quoted in H.W. Brands, *Bound to Empire: The United States and the Philippines* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 287.

¹¹² Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, July 17, 1969, in *FRUS 1969-1976:20*, 405.

¹¹³ Airgram, AmEmbassy Manila to Secretary of State, April 17, 1969, POL 15 PHIL 1/1/67, CFPF Box 2428, RG 59, NARA.

Marcos traveled to Washington in April 1969, ostensibly to attend Eisenhower's funeral but in reality to request increased levels of American aid while also seeking the Nixon administration's understanding for his sometimes anti-American rhetoric on the stump. The State Department concluded that "the visit had about it an unreal air for all the discussions were focused on what the Philippines wants from us."¹¹⁴ It was no anomaly. Before Nixon arrived in the Philippines in July 1969, the Filipino ambassador in Washington presented the White House with a "shopping list" that included more military and economic aid, renegotiation of American military basing rights, and a non-reciprocal extension of Philippine trade preferences.¹¹⁵ Marcos reiterated his requests in a private meeting with Nixon, passing the American six typed memoranda detailing specific requests for additional assistance.¹¹⁶ Nixon expressed a willingness to discuss increases in military aid, but he hedged on the Marcos administration's other requests, reminding his Filipino counterpart that "the United States had a few financial problems itself."¹¹⁷ As it happened, Marcos accelerated the exhaustion of his government's foreign exchange reserves through lavish campaign spending, including by distributing checks for several thousand pesos to every barrio captain in the country.¹¹⁸ Toward the end of the campaign, he withdrew PHILCAG forces from Vietnam, citing economic difficulties.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁴ Telegram, State to AmEmbassy Manila, April 5, 1969, POL 7 PHIL 1/1/69, CFPF, Box 2427, RG 59, NARA.

¹¹⁵ Memorandum, Lox to Brown, July 15, 1969, President's Trip Reactions - Communications - Jul 22 - Aug 3, 1969 [1 of 1], NSC Files, Box 462, RNPL.

¹¹⁶ Philippines – Background – Presidential Requests, December 8, 1969, VP Agnew's Trip Philippines December 1969 - January 1970 [1 of 3], HAK, Box 82, RNPL.

¹¹⁷ Telegram, AmEmbassy Manila to SecState WashDC, August 4, 1969, Tony Lake Chron File [6 of 6] [June 1969-May 1970], NSC Files, Box 1048, RNPL.

¹¹⁸ Airgram, AmEmbassy Manila to State, May 20, 1969, POL 14 PHIL 1/1/68, CFPF, Box 2427, RG 59, NARA; Albert F. Celozza, *Ferdinand Marcos and the Philippines: The Political Economy of Authoritarianism* (Westport: Praeger, 1997), 25-27.

¹¹⁹ Philippines – Background – Status of PHILCAG Withdrawal, December 8, 1969, VP Agnew's Trip Philippines December 1969 - January 1970 [1 of 3], HAK, Box 82, RNPL.

Nixon and Kissinger took a dim view of the Philippine political system, regarding it as hopelessly dysfunctional, and they did not consider the Philippines as likely a guarantor of regional stability as Indonesia. The Nixon administration therefore followed well-worn patterns in U.S.-Philippine relations: the United States funneled vast sums of military and economic aid to the nation, which Filipino elites used to fund pork barrel projects and siphoned off to enrich themselves; in exchange, Filipino elites acquiesced to the presence of American bases and businesses on Philippine soil, and occasionally offered rhetorical and material support to American foreign policy. The Nixon Doctrine overlaid rather than replaced these patterns. It removed the importance of preserving Philippine democracy from the American foreign policy calculus while bolstering an increasingly corrupt and centralized regime that catered only to the minimum demands of the Filipino people.

The administration initially chose to handle Singapore and Malaysia together. These territories occupied a strategic position adjacent Indonesia along the Straits of Malacca—the principal avenue of trade for goods making their way between Asia and Europe. Also important were their productive and military capacities: Malaysia produced some 40 percent of the world's rubber and tin, and Singapore possessed one of the globe's largest naval bases. Since the end of the Second World War, British policymakers and indigenous elites had molded these colonies into conservative, pro-Western independent states ruled by ethnically-constituted governments. Aware that local authorities lacked sufficient military capabilities to defend themselves, Britain had opted to maintain a custodial responsibility for the region's security. But financial difficulties had forced London to announce in January 1968 that it would remove its military forces from Malaysia and Singapore by the end of 1971 as part of

its “East of Suez” policy: the broader withdrawal of British military forces from former imperial possessions east of the Suez Canal.¹²⁰ Since then, the United States had encouraged the development of a consultative but non-binding security arrangement among the region’s five Commonwealth powers: Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore. The NSC staff recommended that the Nixon administration continue the policy of adopting a “very limited role” in Malaysia and Singapore, “leaving the initiative to the Commonwealth both for military security and economic assistance.”¹²¹ That Malaysia and Singapore were small countries existing within the Commonwealth rather than American orbit did much to keep U.S. policy on a restrained track. But a slight differentiation in American policy toward the two states nevertheless emerged.

Malaysia’s government faltered in May 1969. Elections held that month resulted in unexpected setbacks for the ruling Alliance government, a consociational regime composed of three political parties: the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC). This coalition, dominated by UMNO, had long preserved a racial stratification of power in Malaysia, allowing ethnic Malays to control the country’s political system and ethnic Chinese to control its economy. But other political parties made electoral inroads by denouncing the status quo and demanding greater rights and privileges for their constituents. The Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) seized on the degradation of Malay cultural and educational institutions, as well as pervasive Malay unemployment, to claim that UMNO had shirked its duty to preserve the perquisites for Malays enshrined in the country’s constitution. Non-Malay opposition parties,

¹²⁰ Background Paper – UK Withdrawal from Malaysia/Singapore, March 16, 1968, British Withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia (1 of 2), IMS, Box 2, RG 59, NARA.

¹²¹ Review Group Meeting, December 18, 1969, Review Group Meeting - Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore 12/22/69, H Files, Box H-041, RNPL.

among them the Democratic Action Party (DAP) and Malaysian People's Movement Party (Gerakan), campaigned for a "Malaysian Malaysia." These parties attracted votes mostly from non-Malays who felt that special Malay privileges denied the rest of the population access to adequate schooling, fulfilling employment, and meaningful political participation. In particular, they feared that a "Malayanization" of the country's educational infrastructure (meaning the imposition of mandatory Malay-language instruction for all pupils) would sever the linguistic bonds that afforded young Chinese and Indians access to their ancestral cultures.¹²² The election results shocked observers: the Alliance received only 48 percent of the popular vote. Gerrymandering and a disunited opposition left it with an enduring parliamentary majority, but the regime had clearly lost much of its legitimacy.

Opposition parties staged raucous post-election "victory" celebrations. DAP and Gerakan partisans made clear their intent to bring sweeping political change to Malaysia, with many parading through the streets while waving brooms to illustrate the point. Some of these rallies, later reports averred, saw Chinese supporters of the opposition hurl racial epithets at Malay bystanders.¹²³ Threatened by growing Chinese assertiveness in the political realm, Malay youths, with UMNO's imprimatur, formed gangs to march against the pullulating opposition. The largest march was set for dusk on May 13. As Malays staged at the residence of a prominent UMNO politician, fisticuffs broke out between Malay marchers and Chinese onlookers. Stones and bottles were lobbed between the increasingly agitated groups. One American stationed in Kuala Lumpur remembered that "We then had a first class example of that old Malay word *amok*, and its meaning"—evoking the persistence colonial era

¹²² Airgram, AmEmbassy Kuala Lumpur to SecState WashDC, June 30, 1969, POL 14 MALAYSIA 5/1/69, CFPF, Box 2324, RG 59, NARA.

¹²³ National Operations Council, *The May 13 Tragedy* (Kuala Lumpur: Government of Malaysia, 1969), 29-35.

stereotypes about allegedly languid Malays who could be worked into a frenzy by real or imagined slights.¹²⁴ Groups of Malays broke off from the marchers and charged through Chinese neighborhoods, killing many unfortunate citizens with *parang* and *kris* (ceremonial machetes and knives). Chinese and Indians organized local self-defense forces to repel the attackers. The Malaysian army was called in to restore order, but many soldiers joined in on the violence and shot indiscriminately at ethnic Chinese people, homes, and businesses.¹²⁵ By the time order was restored nearly three days later, the riots and ethnic violence had claimed hundreds of lives.

The leaders of UMNO responded swiftly. They blamed “communist terrorist” saboteurs for the eruption of racial strife—in Malaysia’s political lexicon, a clear reference to ethnic Chinese. (A twelve-year “Emergency” between 1948-1960 had seen British and Malayan forces combat a virulent communist insurgency whose members were overwhelmingly of Chinese extraction.) UMNO suspended parliamentary democracy and imposed authoritarian controls on Malaysian political life. Tunku Abdul Rahman, the longtime prime minister, announced the formation of an all-powerful, all-Malay National Operations Council (NOC) headed by his deputy, Tun Abdul Razak. Said one government official, “There is no doubt now that democracy is dead in this country.”¹²⁶ The NOC arrested opposition leaders, banned political speech, censored the press, and announced a ten-battalion expansion of the army and police. Such harsh measures alarmed U.S. observers, who roundly rejected the Malaysian government’s use of the communist bogey to justify their repressive

¹²⁴ Interview with John Helble, *Frontline Diplomacy: The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training*, <https://memory.loc.gov/service/mss/mfdip/2004/2004hel01/2004hel01.pdf> (accessed April 7, 2016).

¹²⁵ “Some Teaparty,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 12, 1969.

¹²⁶ “Emergency Panel Rules in Malaysia,” *New York Times*, May 17, 1969.

measures. No information available to American officials suggested that communists had played any role in instigating the riots, given that the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) had long been holed up near the Thai border with fewer than 1,000 adherents.

These Americans saw the Malaysian government's increasingly authoritarian policies as likely to be counterproductive. One official likened them to "lighting a long fuse connected to the keg of powder on which Malaysia is balanced."¹²⁷ The country's profound racial animosities could not be resolved by an authoritarian regime in which power belonged exclusively to ethnic Malays, who constituted less than 50 percent of the country's population. State Department intelligence analysts summarized the risks of this approach as "economic recession, a rise in Chinese militancy, increased Chinese support for the Communists, and the alienation of East Malaysia."¹²⁸ Toward the end of the year, the NSC staff produced a study analyzing American policy toward Malaysia and Singapore. Its conclusions were damning: Malaysia faced no communist threat, and ethnic communalism and economic underdevelopment posed the greatest dangers to the country's stability. The construction of a repressive state apparatus represented not a last-ditch effort to combat communist subversion but rather a ploy "to prevent the opposition from developing real power"—the effect of which would only exacerbate the "sense of frustration on the part of minority groups."¹²⁹

Yet the Nixon administration moved to support the antidemocratic measures taken by the Malaysian government. Most likely Malaysia was seldom if ever discussed in the Oval

¹²⁷ Telegram, AmEmbassy Kuala Lumpur to SecState WashDC, May 21, 1969, POL 23-8 MALAYSIA 4/1/69, CFPF, Box 2326, RG 59, NARA.

¹²⁸ INR Intelligence Note, "Malaysia: Malay-Dominated Government Gambles with Nation's Stability," June 10, 1969, POL 23-8 MALAYSIA 6/1/69, CFPF, Box 2326, RG 59, NARA.

¹²⁹ U.S. Policy Toward Malaysia and Singapore, Review Group Meeting - Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore 12/22/69, H Files, Box H-041, RNPL.

Office or on the seventh floor of the State Department, and mid-level officials took their cues from American policy toward the rest of the region. The newly arrived American ambassador in Kuala Lumpur, Jack Lydman, remembered that “We wanted the support, the psychological support, if not active support, of the Malaysian government for our role in Southeast Asia, particularly Vietnam. Also, we wanted Malaysia as much as possible to be part of a free world shadow defense system regionally which would include Indonesia and probably the Philippines and Thailand.”¹³⁰ And like their counterparts in the rest of Southeast Asia, American officials stationed in Malaysia did not challenge their host government’s authoritarianism. As the American chargé d’affaires acknowledged months after the rioting, embassy officials would “not engage, at this time, in pressuring the GOM [Government of Malaysia] to hasten back to an open political system.”¹³¹ (Here the United States was an outlier; both Australia and Britain had early on urged the Malaysian government to restore democracy.)¹³² Washington’s support for Malaysian authoritarianism did not only take the form of inaction. The Nixon administration responded positively to the Tunku’s request for aid in developing the intelligence capabilities of a new government bureau in charge of suppressing dissent, in particular the efforts of what the prime minister described as communists and other “extremists” to criticize the government through “character assassinations and poison-pen letters.”¹³³ To be sure, the Nixon administration did not

¹³⁰ Interview with Jack Lydman, *Frontline Diplomacy: The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training*.

<https://memory.loc.gov/service/mss/mfdip/2004/2004lyd01/2004lyd01.pdf> (accessed April 7, 2016).

¹³¹ Letter, Lindquist to Green, September 5, 1969, Defense Affairs 1969 - DEF 19 Military Assistance, IMS, Box 3, RG 59, NARA.

¹³² Airgram, AmEmbassy Kuala Lumpur to SecState WashDC, June 18, 1969, POL MALAYSIA 1/1/67, CFPF, Box 2321, RG 59, NARA.

¹³³ Memorandum of Conversation, Tunku and Green, October 13, 1969, POL MALAYSIA-US 1/1/67, CFPF, Box 2330, RG 59, NARA; Review Group Meeting, December 18, 1969, Review Group Meeting - Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore 12/22/69, H Files, Box H-041, RNPL.

immediately preside over a massive increase in American military and economic aid to Malaysia. Nixon and Kissinger believed that neither Malaysia nor Singapore possessed the capability to assume a leadership role in Southeast Asia.¹³⁴ But Malaysia nevertheless became something of a Nixon Doctrine client: American aid helped to establish anticommunist stability under authoritarian governance.

The same could not be said of Singapore. Nixon and Kissinger held its leader, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, in tremendous esteem. Kissinger would claim that the man's "talents are greater than his country."¹³⁵ That reverence stemmed in part from Lee's perspicacity and from the public support he lent to American foreign policy. But it also owed to the fact that Lee did not seek or require American aid to maintain his authoritarian regime. Briefing Nixon for an informal meeting with his Singaporean counterpart in May 1969, Kissinger wrote that Lee "is an unusual visitor, *in that he will not be seeking anything* from you."¹³⁶ Indeed, for the entirety of Nixon's term in office, the only significant expenditure of American resources for Singapore's security came from a presidential commitment to provide Singapore with \$1-2 million annually in order to finance the upkeep of the naval base being vacated by Britain, of which the United States made extensive use for Vietnam War-related operations.¹³⁷ Singapore did not become a Nixon Doctrine client, making it an outlier among the noncommunist states of Southeast Asia.

¹³⁴ Review Group Meeting – Indonesia – Malaysia/Singapore – December 18, 1969 – HAK Talking Points, Review Group Meeting - Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore 12/22/69, H Files, Box H-041, RNPL.

¹³⁵ Memorandum of Conversation, President Ford's Meeting with Prime Minister Rowling, May 7, 1975, May 7, 1975 - Ford, Kissinger, New Zealand Prime Minister W. E. Rowling, National Security Adviser - Memoranda of Conversations, Box 11, GFPL.

¹³⁶ Memorandum, Kissinger to Nixon, Undated, Singapore Lee Kuan Yew Informal Visit 5-13-69 [1 of 1], NSC Files, Box 938, RNPL. Emphasis in original.

¹³⁷ Memorandum, Kissinger to Laird, January 8, 1970, NSSM-31, H Files, Box H-141, RNPL; Background Paper – Singapore Naval Base, Ibid.

What made Singapore exceptional? Where other Southeast Asian states had to manage vast and sometimes archipelagic territories riven by cultural and ethnic divisions, the Singaporean state had only to control an island of less than 300 square miles whose population numbered almost 80 percent ethnic Chinese. To project state power within such a miniscule and homogenous territorial enclave was relatively easy. Singapore also emerged from colonial rule comparatively prosperous. The legatee of a peculiarly beneficent form of British imperial governance, which developed in the city-state an enviable educational and economic infrastructure, Singapore at the moment of its independence in 1965 ranked as the wealthiest country in Southeast Asia measured in terms of GDP per capita. It would grow even more prosperous in the years following. Lacking natural resources and a hinterland, the Singaporean government achieved further economic development by emphasizing export-oriented industrialization and the country's position as a global trading entrepôt. (Already in 1969 Singapore was the world's fourth-busiest port, measured in terms of the volume of goods passing through it.)¹³⁸ GDP grew at an impressive clip, on average more than 12 percent per annum, in the five years after independence. And such economic success, combined with Singapore's uniquely competent and incorruptible civil service, did much to inoculate the population against political agitation.¹³⁹ What some scholars have called the "Singapore puzzle"—the depoliticization of public life amidst vibrant economic growth and a particularly effective form of authoritarian governance—is really not so puzzling at all.¹⁴⁰

But democratic institutions in Singapore did not wither on their own. Lee rose to political prominence as a member of the inaugural class of Singapore's parliament,

¹³⁸ "Singapore Planning an Expanded Role in World Shipping," *New York Times*, July 21, 1969.

¹³⁹ Natasha Hamilton-Hart, "The Singapore State Revisited," *Pacific Review* 13, no. 2 (2000): 195-216.

¹⁴⁰ Michael Haas, ed., *The Singapore Puzzle* (Westport: Praeger, 1999).

established by the British in 1955. In often eloquent oratorical performances, he defended democracy, social justice, the free press, and the rule of law. In years following, though, it became clear that his veneration of democratic principles did not extend beyond words to deeds. He was elected prime minister in 1959, when Britain transferred internal authority to the fledgling Singaporean government. Two years later, Lee assented when London decided to divest itself of Singapore and its remaining colonial possessions in Southeast Asia by incorporating them into already-independent Malaya. (The agglomeration of Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, and Sarawak would be rechristened as Malaysia upon the merger's completion in 1963.) But the support Lee lent to the Malaysia plan weakened his political standing within Singapore. Dissidents within his People's Action Party (PAP) rejected the merger with Malaya; a full 80 percent of its members defected, with most joining a new left-wing party called Barisan Sosialis. As a prerequisite for his further cooperation with the Malaysia plan, Lee demanded that Singapore's British-dominated Internal Security Council implement a program of mass arrests of his political opponents. Operation Cold Store, launched in early 1963, saw the arrest of over 100 of Lee's opponents—Barisan Sosialis parliamentarians, trade union leaders, leftist professors, and more—on the pretext that they served as agents of communist subversion. Lee was thus ensconced in power.¹⁴¹ After exiting Malaysia two years hence, he continued to build his apparatus of authoritarian control. In the elections of 1968, the remnants of the opposition put forth candidates for only seven of Singapore's 58 parliamentary seats. None prevailed.

¹⁴¹ Matthew Jones, "Creating Malaysia: Singapore Security, the Borneo Territories, and the Contours of British Policy, 1961-63," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 28, no. 2 (May 2000): 85-109; Matthew Jones, *Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia: Britain, the United States, and the Creation of Malaysia* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

If Lee did not require American aid to retain power, neither did he want it. A Cambridge-trained barrister, he possessed a certain nostalgia for British power. (The British foreign secretary once called him “the best bloody Englishman east of Suez.”)¹⁴² He responded to the impending withdrawal of British forces from Malaysia and Singapore not by seeking security guarantees from the United States, but rather by flying to London and imploring the prime minister, members of Parliament, and national television audiences to reverse their decision. An Indonesian diplomat stationed in London described his protestations as unsuccessful and embarrassing, characterizing the Singaporean as behaving “as if he was drunk.”¹⁴³ Even after being rebuffed in London, Lee did not request aid from Washington. Instead, he established a covert partnership with the Israeli army in order to develop Singapore’s military capabilities.¹⁴⁴ The prime minister recognized that his was a particularly durable authoritarian regime. All he asked of American leaders was that the United States hold the line in Vietnam in order to avoid upsetting the balance of power in Southeast Asia—an exhortation echoed by the region’s other noncommunist leaders.¹⁴⁵ The Singaporean regime had, like many other governments in Southeast Asia, culled and oppressed its political opposition. But unlike the other states in the region, Singapore could claim that the internal stability of its political system owed nothing to American assistance.

Why did Nixon and Kissinger ignore other options and fashion the Nixon Doctrine into a vehicle of authoritarian entrenchment? The answer lies in each man’s background and

¹⁴² “Traveler’s Tales,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 7, 1991.

¹⁴³ Surat dari Duta Besar R.I. di London kepada Menteri Luar Negeri mengenai likuidasi pertahanan militer Inggris di Malaysia, Singapura dan teluk Persia, January 22, 1968, SEKKAB, 150, ANRI.

¹⁴⁴ Lee Kuan Yew, *The Singapore Story: The Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew* (Upper Saddle River: Prentice-Hall, 1998).

¹⁴⁵ Memorandum for the Record, Informal Visit of Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, May 10-14, 1969, June 4, 1969, POL 7 Prime Minister Lee's Visit 1969, IMS, Box 3, RG 59, NARA.

personality. Nixon and Kissinger came to share a myopic focus on communism as the overriding threat to American interests in Asia, a skepticism about the fitness of non-Western peoples for democratic self-governance, and a loathing of the traditional foreign policy establishment. A brief survey of each man's biography confirms as much.

Richard Nixon's was an unhappy childhood, the kind that tantalizes biographers. Born in a small California town to an abusive father and a distant mother, he nursed insecurities, resentments, and ambitions. He pined for the attentions of his often-absent mother, Hannah, whom he idealized as a "saint." That he saw more of himself in his father Frank—in Nixon's mind driven but unsuccessful, intelligent but short-tempered—was likely no small source of anguish.¹⁴⁶ Nixon was determined to transcend the anonymity of his circumstances, but he would carry a lifelong sense of social exclusion that owed to his modest background. This angst provided him with both purpose and political gift, which he realized after enrolling at Whittier College. The school's social life was dominated by a club of well-to-do students called the Franklin Society. Knowing he didn't belong in that circle, young Nixon established the rival Orthogonian Society for the student body's less illustrious members. The historian Richard Perlstein calls it "an eminently Nixonian insight: that on every sports team there are only a couple of stars, and that if you want to win the loyalty of the team for yourself, the surest, if least glamorous, strategy is to concentrate on the nonspectacular—silent—majority."¹⁴⁷

For a time, it appeared Nixon was destined to join that nonspectacular majority: he studied law at Duke, practiced at a firm in California, worked at the Office of Price

¹⁴⁶ Richard Nixon, *RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), 8, 12-13.

¹⁴⁷ Rick Perlstein, *Nixonland: The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America* (New York: Scribner, 2008), 22. See also Tim Weiner, *One Man Against the World: The Tragedy of Richard Nixon* (New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 2016); Evan Thomas, *Being Nixon: A Man Divided* (New York: Random House, 2016).

Administration in Washington, and served in the Navy in the Pacific. It was not until 1946 that he found his vehicle of ascent (an unusual one for such a misanthrope) in politics. Nixon rested his early political career on red-baiting, which he fused with the resentful cast of populism innate to his personality. That his foils—first Jerry Voorhis, a Yale Phi Beta Kappa; then Alger Hiss, a debonair member of the foreign policy establishment; and finally Helen Gahagan Douglas, a Hollywood-dwelling bleeding heart—were of elite stock no doubt reinforced Nixon’s determination to best them, if necessary by relying on unsavory tactics. Even then he was a polarizing figure. His supporters admired his role in the House Committee on Un-American Activities’ investigation of Hiss, who was accused of being a communist saboteur. The televised hearings were high drama, and Nixon’s dogged pursuit of the allegations against Hiss, eventually convicted of perjury, rocketed the freshman legislator to national prominence. His detractors would grumble instead about his 1950 senatorial campaign against Douglas, which revealed a proclivity for low politics. Nixon branded her the “pink lady,” deriding her as “pink down to her underwear.” Members of his camp went so far as to send out postcards from the fictional “Communist League of Negro Women Voters” imploring Californians to cast their ballots for Douglas. Those dirty tricks helped Nixon win the election, but they also won him the moniker that would haunt the rest of his career: “Tricky Dick.” While partisans would continue to quibble about the merits and sins of his campaigns, there is no gainsaying that Nixon ascended on the rising tide of what historians would come to call the Second Red Scare.¹⁴⁸ He would remain enamored of the political utility of anticommunism

¹⁴⁸ The best account of Nixon’s early political career is Roger Morris, *Richard Milhous Nixon: The Rise of an American Politician* (New York: Henry Holt, 1990). See also Irwin F. Gellman, *The Contender: Richard Nixon: The Congress Years 1946-1952* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999).

The Republican brass took notice of his success. Nixon was drafted as Dwight D. Eisenhower's vice presidential nominee in 1952, a recognition that the internationalist general whose base of support was on the Eastern seaboard needed a running mate who could bring ideological and geographic diversity to the ticket. Nixon took to national campaigning with gusto, deriding Democratic candidate Adlai Stevenson as "Adlai the Appeaser" who held "a Ph.D. degree from Acheson's College of Cowardly Communist Containment." Such smears already being de rigueur for Nixon, the race is more notable for an episode that heightened his status anxiety and sense of political victimization. In mid-September, newspapers began reporting that wealthy California businessmen had been paying for Nixon's campaign expenses—an ethically questionable but at the time relatively common arrangement among politicians. The press carped on the "slush fund" and suggested that the Nixons had used it to bankroll an extravagant lifestyle. A public furor erupted, bringing with it demands that Nixon be dropped from the Republican ticket. Eisenhower directed Nixon to appear on television to explain himself, and the resulting speech was a masterpiece of political theater. Nixon declared in mawkish tones that the only gift he had ever received was a black-and-white cocker spaniel that his daughter had named Checkers, and "regardless of what they say about it, we're gonna keep it."¹⁴⁹ The speech vindicated Nixon and would rank among the most famous of his long career. But the broader episode convinced him that the media, that exemplar of the establishment, would never tolerate the success of low-born Nixon.

Eisenhower prevailed in the election, and Nixon embarked upon a peripatetic vice presidency. Fact-finding and goodwill tours took him to Asia and the Pacific, Europe and the Soviet Union, and Africa and Latin America. The notes that Nixon scrawled during and after

¹⁴⁹ Richard Nixon, "Address of Senator Nixon to the American People," September 23, 1952, *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=24485> (accessed March 2, 2018).

these trips betray a myopic focus on communism—a focus that belies some scholars’ claims that Nixon’s red-baiting was a rhetorical flourish that masked a deeper foreign policy pragmatism even during his vice presidential years.¹⁵⁰ Rather, Nixon’s impressions reveal that his embrace of anticommunism extended beyond politics to policy. His first junket sent him mostly through the Asia-Pacific in 1953, where he surveyed the detritus of European empires and witnessed the struggles of a new generation of indigenous leaders to construct viable postcolonial nations. American policymakers had reason to be worried about the region’s prospects. The People’s Republic of China had asserted itself in international affairs and fought the United States to a standstill in Korea, and local communist movements had achieved a degree of national credibility due to their outsized roles in anti-Japanese resistance movements during the Second World War. But during his tour Nixon was presented with evidence that an allegedly monolithic communism in fact posed little threat to the stability of Southeast Asia. Communist rebellions for the most part claimed only a small number of adherents. And the overseas Chinese populations suspected to be vectors of communist subversion occupied tenuous positions in most of the region’s emerging nation-states, being regarded skeptically as a result of their ethnic difference and relative economic prosperity.¹⁵¹ Still, when Nixon returned stateside to brief Eisenhower’s National Security Council on his travels, he planned to highlight first the “Commie danger” faced by each country and to stress

¹⁵⁰ For an argument that Nixon’s pragmatism was evident in his vice presidential years see Irwin F. Gellman, *The President and the Apprentice: Eisenhower and Nixon, 1952-1961* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015).

¹⁵¹ See Handwritten Notes, RN [Trip File Far East] Notes By Country Malaya, Pre-Presidential Series 325, Pre-Presidential Papers, Richard Nixon Presidential Library; Handwritten Notes, RN [Trip File: Far East] Notes By Country: Indonesia, Pre-Presidential Series 325, Pre-Presidential Papers, Richard Nixon Presidential Library; Handwritten Notes, RN [Trip File: Far East] Notes By Country: Philippines, Pre-Presidential Series 325, Pre-Presidential Papers, RNPL.

the need for military rather than political solutions to communist insurgencies.¹⁵² He came away from Asia aware that its people demanded democracy but unsure that they were prepared for it.¹⁵³

Nixon's fealty to the Republican cause won him the party's presidential nomination in 1960. His opponent was Democratic Senator John F. Kennedy, scion of a wealthy political clan and just the type of adversary Nixon loathed. But Kennedy proved a surprisingly nimble campaigner. Though he satisfied the basic qualifications for membership in America's anticommunist civil religion, he and Nixon represented distinct denominations. Nixon had made his career by suggesting that his opponents were, if not disloyal, handmaidens of communist perfidy. Kennedy oriented his anticommunism toward new themes like science, technology, and the Third World. In waging a campaign that spoke to Americans' yearning for progress at the onset of a new decade, the Massachusetts senator projected an aura of youth and boldness.

Nixon lost the election by a thin margin. Parsing his defeat, he embraced familiar tropes. He believed that he was treated unfairly by a hostile news media, and that Kennedy during the country's first televised presidential debates "conveyed the image—to 60 million people—that he was tougher on Castro and communism than I was."¹⁵⁴ Thus began what Nixon would come to call his "wilderness years." It was an apt metaphor, not only because Nixon for the first time in fifteen years did not hold elective office. The zeitgeist of the sixties, that decade of ferment, led many Americans to regard the crass anticommunism that fueled Nixon's political ascent as antiquated and irrelevant.

¹⁵² Handwritten Notes, RN [Trip File 1953 Far East] Reports [Notes]: NSC?, Series 325, Pre-Presidential Papers, RNPL.

¹⁵³ Richard Nixon, *RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), 134-136.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 221.

Two men could hardly have different backgrounds, but Nixon and Kissinger developed similar outlooks. Heinz Kissinger was born to a Jewish family in Germany amidst the tumult of the interwar period. More than three quarters of a century later, Kissinger claimed that his experiences in Germany had little impact on him—concerned as he was with soccer rather than statesmanship.¹⁵⁵ But biographers have (wisely) been reluctant to take him at his word. At ten years old Kissinger witnessed the collapse of the Weimar Republic and the coming to power of the Nazis. One historian argues that seeing his father humiliated and stripped of his possessions by the Hitler regime’s anti-Semitic policies made Kissinger insecure about his outsider status and anxious to acquire power and prestige.¹⁵⁶ Kissinger would remain an outsider. Even after his immediate family escaped Germany and began building a new life as refugees on the far shores of the Atlantic, where Heinz morphed into Henry, the boy’s insular Orthodox Jewish community existed decidedly outside the mainstream of American life. Kissinger’s politics were as likely a casualty as his personality. The Nazis subverted Weimar Germany’s democratic institutions from within, and Kissinger then watched as fascist Germany ran roughshod over Europe in the face of ineffectual Western resistance. As another historian puts it, “Kissinger could only conclude that democracies were weak and ineffective.”¹⁵⁷ Though causal pathways between the traumas he endured as a youth and the decisions he made as a steward of American foreign policy remain tenuous, there can be little doubt that Kissinger’s experiences in Europe influenced his later conceptions of international affairs.

¹⁵⁵ Niall Ferguson, *Kissinger, 1923-1968: The Idealist* (New York: Penguin Press, 2015), 36.

¹⁵⁶ Robert Dallek, *Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power* (New York: HarperCollins, 2007).

¹⁵⁷ Jeremi Suri, *Henry Kissinger and the American Century* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2009), 8.

Having escaped as a child, he returned as a man. Kissinger was drafted into the American military in 1943 and naturalized as an American citizen. Dispatched to Germany the following year, his linguistic skills and knowledge of the culture, to say nothing of his intellect, helped him to ascend the ranks. Indeed, the army would reveal Kissinger as a skilled inhabitant of bureaucracies—able to amass favor and turf by attaching himself to influential personages, and by performing his duties with savvy and surety. He saw combat, but as a counterintelligence officer his principal charge was purging occupied territories of committed Nazis. Kissinger’s resolve in that task was doubtless enhanced by the role he played in liberating the Ahlem concentration camp, the sight of which he described as “one of the most horrifying experiences of my life.”¹⁵⁸ That some members of his family, too, were swallowed by the Holocaust does much to explain Kissinger’s industriousness. After Germany’s surrender, denazification gave way to reconstruction as the Western powers sought to forestall the growth of communism. The compromises inherent in such an approach led Kissinger to tire of the “moribund & bureaucratic” nature of military life.¹⁵⁹ He stayed in Germany, but through a mentor secured civilian employment as an instructor in the European Command Intelligence School. His lectures prepared students for the tasks of denazification and instilled in them a sense that communist subversion imperiled the American project in postwar Germany.

Kissinger returned stateside and enrolled at Harvard in September 1947. In the course of obtaining his bachelor’s and doctorate, he earned a reputation as a brilliant student of history and political science (and, as the sobriquet Henry Ass-Kissinger implies, as a sycophant). Most intriguing about this period in Kissinger’s life is the extent to which his

¹⁵⁸ Quoted in Ferguson, *Kissinger*, 164.

¹⁵⁹ Quoted in *Ibid.*, 191.

academic pursuits seemed to meld with the foreign policy concerns of the American government. In 1951 he established the Harvard International Seminar. The program brought young leaders from across the globe to Cambridge, where they spent a summer discussing the problems of peace and development. Kissinger wrote at the time that the seminar sought to combat neutralism and “swing the spiritual balance in favor of the U.S.” in the Cold War by cultivating “spiritual resistance to Communism.”¹⁶⁰ It was in Kissinger’s estimation a vital effort, one necessary not only in Europe and Asia but also in the United States. For while he loathed McCarthy’s—and, by implication, Nixon’s—vulgar political theater, he believed that the government needed to address the problem of “Communist penetration in the United States”¹⁶¹ Even his scholarship spoke, albeit indirectly, to the United States’ international predicament. In the introduction to his dissertation on the restoration of European order after the Napoleonic Wars, Kissinger wrote that he chose his topic “partly, I am frank to say, because its [the era’s] problems seem to me analogous to those of our day.”¹⁶² Conspiratorial accounts that suggest Kissinger wrote and networked in the single-minded pursuit of power surely miss the mark. But Kissinger was a man of ambition. He was attracted to power and tended to echo the views of those who held it.

In the 1950s and early 1960s Kissinger existed in that liminal space between government and higher education: he became a professional think-tanker. At the Council on Foreign Relations, he hobnobbed with luminaries from government and academia, business and civil society, and the military. These networks introduced him to the man who would become his patron, Nelson Rockefeller. In his new guise Kissinger also began publishing in

¹⁶⁰ Letter, Kissinger to Elliott, August 22, 1951, Box 2, William Yandell Elliott Papers, Hoover Institution Archives.

¹⁶¹ Quoted in Ferguson, *Kissinger*, 284.

¹⁶² Quoted in Suri, *Henry Kissinger*, 129.

more prominent venues and writing about problems more obviously germane to American national security—the Geneva Conference in *Foreign Affairs* rather than the Concert of Europe in a Harvard dissertation. His most notable work, and the one that would for the first time bring his name into newspaper columns, was a trenchant critique of the Eisenhower administration’s policy of massive retaliation. Kissinger argued that Eisenhower’s policy lacked credibility and that the United States ought to be willing to employ low-grade nuclear weapons in localized conflicts. In other publications, he began formulating his argument that the American bureaucracy represented an impediment to effective policymaking. Kissinger’s scholarship in this period is also striking for an omission: Asia. Though it became a focal point of American foreign policy as the 1950s turned to the 1960s, Kissinger thought of the region as little more than a backwater, relevant only in the context of the Soviet-American rivalry. “Nothing of importance can come from the South,” Kissinger said in 1969. “History has never been produced in the South. The axis of history starts in Moscow, goes to Bonn, crosses over to Washington, and then goes to Tokyo. What happens in the South is of no importance.”¹⁶³ Given the importance of anticommunist stability for Kissinger, Southeast Asians’ desires for political and social liberation never entered the equation.

The characteristics that Nixon and Kissinger evinced in their early careers came to the fore after they reached the White House. To an unprecedented extent, the two men centralized authority over American foreign policy. Kissinger believed the traditional foreign policy apparatus could not formulate the cohesive, proactive, and imaginative foreign policy that he

¹⁶³ Quoted in Seymour Hirsh, *The Price of Power: Kissinger in the White House* (New York: Summit Books, 1983), 263.

and Nixon hoped to implement. The State Department, Kissinger later wrote, displays “a strong bias in favor of making policy in response to cables and in the form of cables”—he believed its policymaking to be regimented and reactive, even hackneyed.¹⁶⁴ Nixon shared Kissinger’s skepticism about the effectiveness of the government’s foreign policy bureaucracies. “If the Department of State has had a new idea in the last twenty-five years,” he once said, “it is not known to me.”¹⁶⁵ As if to punctuate his determination to conduct foreign policy out of the Oval Office, Nixon selected as his secretary of state the attorney William Rogers, an ally from the Eisenhower administration who possessed little experience in foreign affairs. Nixon told Kissinger that he “considered Rogers’s unfamiliarity with the subject an asset because it guaranteed that policy direction would remain in the White House.”¹⁶⁶

To doubts about the competence of bureaucracies, Nixon added a soupçon of paranoia about the loyalty of bureaucrats. Before his inauguration, Nixon ordered one-third cuts in the staff of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the United States Information Agency (USIA), the CIA, and military personnel stationed everywhere except Korea and Vietnam. “Stir up the bureaucracy,” came the order to H.R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman, Nixon’s deputies in charge of domestic matters.¹⁶⁷ The president would often attribute foreign policy setbacks to “the lower echelons of the bureaucracy at State and Defense,” rife as they were with “people who are deliberately trying to sabotage not only our

¹⁶⁴ Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), 27.

¹⁶⁵ Quoted in Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, *America’s Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2012), 256.

¹⁶⁶ Quoted in Dallek, *Nixon and Kissinger*, 83.

¹⁶⁷ Memorandum, Nixon to Haldeman, June 16, 1969, Memos – June 1969, President’s Personal File, Box 1, RNPL; Memorandum, Nixon to Haldeman and Ehrlichman, June 16, 1969, Ibid.

policy but particularly the presidency itself.”¹⁶⁸ These were members of what he called the “Ivy League and Georgetown set,” snobbish blue-bloods who would at every opportunity undermine the administration and its policies.¹⁶⁹ Little wonder that Nixon would ignore warnings emanating from the State Department and CIA about the wrongheadedness of his foreign policy.

Nixon came into office convinced that communism still represented the overriding threat to American interests in Asia. His predecessors in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations had attempted to inoculate the region against communism by promoting economic development. Aligning himself with disciples of development theory as articulated by Walt Rostow, which held that material prosperity would produce political stability, LBJ dreamed of a Tennessee Valley Authority for the Mekong Delta.¹⁷⁰ Nixon considered such an approach ineffectual. He was fond of deriding “the softheads who think that you can solve every problem with another bowl of rice.”¹⁷¹ He and Kissinger believed that political stability represented a necessary precursor to economic growth, and that military or authoritarian rule served as the most effective vehicles of political stabilization. They therefore worked to fashion the Nixon Doctrine into an instrument of authoritarian entrenchment. Part of that effort included an attempt to revamp the nation’s foreign aid program. Nixon and Kissinger wanted to tie American largesse to American interests, to gear foreign aid toward promoting

¹⁶⁸ Memorandum, Nixon to Staff, February 8, 1971, Memos – February 1971, President’s Personal File, Box 3, RNPL.

¹⁶⁹ RN Tape Transcript, May 18, 1972, Memos – May 1972, President’s Personal File, Box 4, Richard Nixon Presidential Library. See also Gregg Herken, *The Georgetown Set: Friends and Rivals in Cold War Washington* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014).

¹⁷⁰ See Patrick Cohrs, “Towards a New Deal for the World? Lyndon Johnson’s Aspirations to Renew the Twentieth Century’s *Pax Americana*,” in Francis J. Gavin and Mark Atwood Lawrence, eds., *Beyond the Cold War: Lyndon Johnson and the New Global Challenges of the 1960s* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).

¹⁷¹ Memorandum of Conversation, Nixon and Thanom, July 29, 1969, Tony Lake Chron File [6 of 6] [June 1969-May 1970], NSC Files, Box 1048, RNPL.

stability rather than prosperity or democracy. At an early meeting with Rudolph Peterson, the chairman of his newly appointed task force on foreign aid, Nixon argued that “State/AID is wrong not to want to help Indonesia militarily; they must have sufficient military assistance to maintain internal security. More broadly, the military may be the most stable force in most countries.” He ordered Peterson to abandon any preconceptions “that the military or rightist leaders are villains.”¹⁷²

That his approach sacrificed Asians’ right to self-determination did not concern the president. Nixon had not shed his civilizational worldview, nor his belief that non-Anglo Saxon peoples were ill-suited to democratic governance. He told Senator William Saxbe that it was “self-defeating to try to apply U.S. standards to developing states.” “Strong leadership was essential,” he said, “even though the kind of leadership required did not fit the mold for American conceptions for the Democratic process.”¹⁷³ To Vice President Spiro Agnew he griped that “We have enough problems with democracy in this country.” In a “less sophisticated land,” he added, “democracy would blast them right out of the water.”¹⁷⁴ The president always insisted that realism impelled him to support authoritarian governments. “Our concern is foreign policy except for something like genocide,” he explained to his ambassador to the United Nations. “We will aid dictators if it is in our interest.”¹⁷⁵

Nixon and Kissinger conceived of and presented themselves as steely eyed realists who thought only of the American national interest. But that understates the extent to which

¹⁷² Memorandum of Conversation, President’s Task Force on Foreign Aid, September 2, 1969, MemCons - Presidential/HAK June-December 1969 [1 of 2], NSC Files, Box 1026, RNPL.

¹⁷³ Memorandum of Conversation, Nixon and Saxbe, May 11, 1971, Subject Files Congressional Vol II Jan-Jul 1971, NSC Files, Box 314, RNPL.

¹⁷⁴ Memorandum of Conversation, Nixon and Agnew, February 10, 1973, MemCons - Presidential/HAK January-March 1973, NSC Files, Box 1026, RNPL.

¹⁷⁵ Memorandum of Conversation, Nixon, Scali, and Scowcroft, February 13, 1973, MemCons – Presidential/HAK January-March 1973, NSC Files, Box 1026, RNPL.

the calculations of even the arch-realist will be influenced—and, indeed, constituted—by experiences, emotions, careerism, and the pursuit of personal advantage.¹⁷⁶ Members of the NSC, State Department, and CIA presented Nixon and Kissinger with numerous, thoroughly realistic appraisals of the administration's policy of cultivating authoritarian clients in Southeast Asia. These critics evaluated the Nixon Doctrine in terms of the national interest, and they found it wanting. But Nixon and Kissinger did not change course, pushed forward by their own personal biases as much as by any grand strategic calculations. They considered communism the principal threat to American interests in Asia, believed that authoritarian rule represented the best inoculant against instability, thought that Asians were ill-suited to democratic governance, and suspected that critiques of their policies coming from within the American government were products of incompetence if not duplicity. As we will see in the subsequent chapter, Southeast Asian leaders were aware of these biases and exploited them to further their own parochial interests.

¹⁷⁶ Barbara Keys, "Henry Kissinger: The Emotional Statesman," *Diplomatic History* 35, no. 4 (September 2011): 587-609; Logevall and Craig, *America's Cold War*.

CHAPTER 2

AUTHORITARIANIZATION I

Tan Sri Ong Yoke Lin, the long-serving Malaysian ambassador to the United States, attended the festivities accompanying Richard Nixon's inauguration as president on January 20, 1969. Remembered as a "master at cultivating the power centres in Washington," Ong wanted to rub shoulders with one man in particular: Henry Kissinger, recently named as Nixon's chief foreign policy aide.¹⁷⁷ Sensing an opportunity, he pulled Kissinger away from the revelry for a brief conversation. Ong impressed upon Kissinger the severity of the communist threat to Southeast Asia. Not one to be brushed off, he followed up the following day with a letter in which he included two copies of his government's recently released white paper, *The Path of Violence to Absolute Power*.¹⁷⁸ Decidedly alarmist in both substance and style, the paper warned that the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), derelict since the late 1950s, had renewed its militancy and embarked upon a "path for an ultimate seizure of power by violence and bloodshed" that posed "grave threats to the security of this country."¹⁷⁹

Over the next decade, Malaysian officials frequently sounded similar themes in discussions with their American counterparts. The propaganda broadside, officials in the Nixon administration assumed, marked the beginning of a Malaysian effort to court the United States for additional military and economic support. Observers in Washington believed policymakers in Kuala Lumpur, anxious about the impending withdrawal of British and American forces from Southeast Asia, sought American aid to reinforce their country's

¹⁷⁷ Quoted in Chandran Jeshurun, *Malaysia: Fifty Years of Diplomacy, 1957-2007* (Kuala Lumpur: The Other Press, 2007), 94.

¹⁷⁸ Letter, Ong to Kissinger, January 21, 1969, Malaysia, Box 2, HAK, RNPL.

¹⁷⁹ Government of Malaysia, *The Path of Violence to Absolute Power* (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Chetak Kerajaan, 1968), 1.

woeful defensive capabilities.¹⁸⁰ There was a measure of truth to these views. But these observers missed a more salient source of the Malaysian government's desire for American aid: authoritarian state-building. The government of Tunku Abdul Rahman, responding to race riots that convulsed the capital of Kuala Lumpur on May 13, 1969, suspended parliamentary democracy and invested authority in an unelected National Operations Council (NOC) under the leadership of Tun Abdul Razak. The newly authoritarian government dramatically expanded the power of the Malaysian state through increased tax collection and other revenue generating enterprises, including profits from state-owned enterprises and government-linked corporations as well as growing rents from natural resource concessions.¹⁸¹ Yet the government's fiscal appetites consistently exceeded its extractive capabilities. In that context international aid became critical.

National leaders elsewhere in island Southeast Asia also sought to extract the maximum possible amount of aid from the United States and the international institutions it dominated. Particularly after moments of democratic rupture, newly authoritarian leaders turned to economic development programs, coercive institutions, and corrupt ventures to legitimize, preserve, and profit from their positions of power. To build and implement these programs required substantial capital inputs, and saddling the domestic population with too large of a fiscal burden might engender political instability. International aid would enable national leaders to bankroll their programs of authoritarian state-building without provoking popular protest. In other words, international capital enabled authoritarian leaders to build

¹⁸⁰ Airgram, AmEmbassy Kuala Lumpur to Department of State, August 4, 1969, POL 1 MALAYSIA 1/1/67, Box 2321, CFPF, RG 59, NARA.

¹⁸¹ Mukul Asher, *Revenue Systems of ASEAN Countries: An Overview* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1980), 16; see also Gomez and Jomo, *Malaysia's Political Economy*; Edmund Terence Gomez, *Minister of Finance Incorporated: Ownership and Control of Corporate Malaysia* (Singapore: Institute for Democracy and Economic Affairs, 2018), 19-37.

states from the outside-in. It obviated the compromise, cooptation, and bargaining that Charles Tilly has shown was inherent to inside-out state-building in Europe. Indeed, where Tilly shows that in Europe an external threat spurred domestic negotiations to marshal resources against international enemies, in Southeast Asia an external opportunity spurred international negotiations to marshal resources against domestic rivals.¹⁸²

In spite of their reliance on international capital to sustain their regimes, Southeast Asian autocrats proved remarkably resistant to international influence. Tunku Abdul Rahman, for instance, offered occasional statements of rhetorical support for the Vietnam War. Yet the Tunku's crusading anticommunist rhetoric and desire for American military and economic aid did not translate into material support for the Vietnam War. Malaysia contributed only token amounts of arms, ammunition, and training to the military and police force of South Vietnam. Not only did Malaysia refuse to send its own troops to fight in Vietnam, it also prohibited American soldiers from visiting Malaysia on rest and recuperation leave after 1967. Authoritarian leaders in island Southeast Asia were thus "independent dependents": dependent upon international aid to maintain the durability of their regimes, yet strikingly independent in their policies and rhetoric. Suharto of Indonesia, Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, and Tun Abdul Razak of Malaysia presided over nationalist, even anti-American publics emboldened by legacies of activism under earlier periods of democratic rule. To placate their restive populations, authoritarian leaders in island Southeast Asia routinely adopted public stances of aloofness from, or even opposition to, the geopolitical concerns of their international patrons, particularly the United States. In private, they often stressed to their American interlocutors that a more forthcoming support for the Vietnam War would

¹⁸² Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States*, 99-103.

imperil the broader anticommunist project in Southeast Asia by inciting domestic protest.

Understanding Suharto, Marcos, and Razak as independent dependents helps explain why the United States failed to internationalize the Vietnam War, in contrast to the Vietnamese communists' successful efforts to win sustained international backing for their anticolonial struggle. It also explains why national leaders in island Southeast Asia so readily acted against American interests in other policy areas, such as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil price hikes or the establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO).

To win the aid necessary to reinforce their authoritarian political structures, national leaders in island Southeast Asia practiced a deliberate threat inflation, exaggerating the danger posed by domestic communist movements and their putative international sponsors—China, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam. They also played on American concerns about credibility, suggesting that a failure to furnish additional military and economic aid would deliver a psychological blow from which it would be difficult to recover, as anticommunist governments would be demoralized and communist insurgencies emboldened. Yet however much Nixon and Kissinger harbored anxieties about American credibility, there are few indications that national leaders in island Southeast Asia harbored genuine worries about American abandonment or communist aggression. As Ong explained in a speech before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council only a week after his meeting with Kissinger, “there will not be another Vietnam in Southeast Asia, because the other countries in the region have strong governments and economies.”¹⁸³

¹⁸³ “Ta’ akan ada lagi ‘Vietnam di-Asia Tenggara,’” *Berita Harian*, January 26, 1969.

Suharto's New Order regime was a keen observer of American politics. Suharto, Foreign Minister Adam Malik, and the Jogjakarta Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, who served as minister for economic affairs before becoming vice president in 1973, regularly received intelligence reports detailing developments in the United States.¹⁸⁴ The available Indonesian archival record, though by no means exhaustive, suggests that leading figures in the Indonesian government were deeply informed on American politics, to a degree that dwarfed their engagement with other key countries, such as the Soviet Union, People's Republic of China, Japan, either of the Vietnams, or even their neighbors in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Indeed, Hamengkubuwono for the duration of his vice presidency received weekly reports from the Indonesian ambassador in Washington.¹⁸⁵ And every quarter, the ambassador sent Hamengkubuwono a compilation of all notable mentions of Indonesia in influential American media outlets.¹⁸⁶ These reports afforded senior Indonesian policymakers with an awareness of Nixon and Kissinger's biases in the realm of foreign policy. As early as 1967, the Suharto regime's intelligence services reported on the future president's beliefs about authoritarianism and stability in the Third world. Detailing Nixon's comments on South America, the State Intelligence Coordinating Agency (Bakin) wrote that Nixon believed that South American countries needed "De Gaulle-style democracy with a strong leader at the top." Though he was "concerned about the survival of representative democracy in the region," Nixon was equally mindful of "the rate of economic development."

¹⁸⁴ Letter, Soedjatmoko to Suharto, December 9, 1970, Surat-surat mengenai persetujuan kerjasama antara Indonesia dan Amerika di bidang perekonomian, 1798, EKUIN, ANRI; Letter, Soekamto Sajidiman to Adam Malik, September 25, 1970, Surat dari Konsul Jenderal RI kepada Menlu di Jakarta mengenai secret hearing Symington, 1894, Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ See Duta Besar RI di Washington DC: Laporan Fakta Mingguan tanggal 24 Desember 1973 – 7 Maret 1978, 424, HB IX, ANRI.

¹⁸⁶ See Kedubes RI di Washington DC: Kumpulan guntingan tulisan-tulisan dalam surat kabar Amerika Serikat mengenai Indonesia dari tanggal 31 Januari 1976-Januari 1978, 432, HB IX, ANRI.

Moreover, the American “wants South America’s major countries—Brazil and Argentina—to take over the police role which the US has traditionally undertaken in the area.”¹⁸⁷

The parallels with Indonesia were not difficult to discern. Like Brazil and Argentina, Indonesia was an authoritarian state draped with only the barest trappings of democracy. Like Brazil and Argentina, Indonesia was ruled by a military strongman whose legitimacy rested upon a discourse of economic development. And like Brazil and Argentina, Indonesia occupied a part of the globe from which American leaders wanted to disengage after lengthy periods of direct military intervention, but in which they worried about the possibility of instability. After Nixon’s inauguration, Suharto sensed an opportunity to extract additional aid out of the United States and the international institutions it dominated. Reports from Indonesia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and intelligence services continued to emphasize Nixon’s biases: a “hard-line” anticommunism in both domestic and international politics; a desire to manage foreign policy from the White House, to the exclusion of the wider bureaucracy and even Secretary of State William Rogers; a favorable outlook toward authoritarian, developmentalist regimes in the Third World; and an obsession with credibility, or “face” as the Indonesians termed it, as American forces withdrew from Vietnam. These observations emerged from a careful reading of Nixon’s speeches and writings in the years leading up to and immediately following his election, especially his 1967 *Foreign Affairs* article entitled “Asia After Viet-Nam.”¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁷ Badan Koordinasi Intelidjen Negara, Laporan Intelidjen Berkala – Minggu Ke-III & IV bulan “Mei – 1967,” July 8, 1967, Laporan-laporan mengenai situasi politik dalam dan luar negeri, 122, Sekkab, ANRI.

¹⁸⁸ Apa dan siapa Richard Milhous Nixon, Berkas mengenai kunjungan Presiden Amerika Serikat, Richard M. Nixon, tanggal 27-28 Juli 1969, 389, Sekkab, ANRI; Amerika Serikat dan masalah-2 utama jang dihadapinja, Ibid.

Suharto wasted little time in lobbying the Nixon administration for heightened levels of aid. In a March 1969 discussion with Marshall Green, the outgoing U.S. ambassador in Jakarta newly promoted to the top job at the State Department's Asia desk, Suharto said he said he wanted to "explore [the] means by which the Indonesian armed forces can be brought to an acceptable state of readiness." American assistance, Suharto explained, would allow the Indonesian military to counter the internal threat posed by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and the external threats posed by China and Vietnam. Moreover, a modernized Indonesian military could dispatch troops to fend off communist threats elsewhere in Southeast Asia, such as Malaysia.¹⁸⁹ These were talking points designed to appeal directly to the American president. And they struck a chord with Nixon, who perused Green's report of the conversation with interest, making several marginal notations as he read. He ordered Kissinger to schedule a Suharto visit to the United States "as soon as possible."¹⁹⁰

Not all Indonesian policymakers favored the expansion of military aid that Suharto requested. Two days after his discussion with Suharto, Green met with Malik. The foreign minister put far less emphasis on Indonesia's need for military assistance. Indeed, according to Green's report of the conversation, Malik "remarked that such outside military aid should be limited in scope so as to avoid disproportionately large military establishments. He added wryly: What [the] military needs more than weapons and tools is greater political sophistication."¹⁹¹ Yet Malik was a savvy bureaucratic operator. As Suharto continued to

¹⁸⁹ Telegram, AmEmbassy Djakarta to SecState WashDC, March 23, 1969, POLITICAL AFF. & REL. INDON-US 1967, Box 2212, CFPF, RG 59, NARA.

¹⁹⁰ Memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, March 26, 1969, in *FRUS 1969-1976:20*, 566ff.

¹⁹¹ Telegram, AmEmbassy Djakarta to SecState WashDC, March 25, 1969, POLITICAL AFF. & REL. INDON-US 1967, Box 2212, CFPF, RG 59, NARA.

press for heightened levels of aid from the United States, Malik moderated his views or at least expressed them less often.¹⁹²

Air Force One touched down in Jakarta in July 1969. Nixon's visit—the first time an American president had traveled to Indonesia—marked Suharto's first opportunity to speak directly with his American counterpart and patron. Inexperienced in international affairs, the Indonesian strongman prepared for the meeting by digesting briefing books on the litany of projects on which he sought American assistance: expanding the Indonesian military, bankrolling his five-year economic development plan, stabilizing the prices of export commodities like rubber and tin, increasing Indonesian oil exports to the United States, securing international recognition of Indonesia's takeover of West Papua, and obtaining international agreement to the rescheduling of Indonesia's sovereign debt.¹⁹³ The briefing books informed Suharto that the United States still regarded Indonesia with a combination of "hope and anxiety." And they coached Suharto to play on both emotions as he lobbied for heightened levels of aid. The New Order's five-year economic development plan, for instance, required "very large quantities of American assistance." Its success would make Indonesia "more resistant to the communist threat," while its failure would mean "an Indonesia that is continuously economically weak that can easily become a communist target." Or take the Indonesian military, which required "sufficient arms aid and military equipment." A reinvigorated military could combat communist threats across Asia, whether caused by Chinese or Soviet meddling or by the end of the Vietnam War. Nixon himself, the briefing books noted, harbored a "special interest in forms of regional cooperation" that

¹⁹² On Malik's chameleonlike political qualities see Ruth McVey, "In Memoriam: Adam Malik (1917-1984)," *Indonesia* 39 (April 1985): 144-148.

¹⁹³ Ichtisar masalah-2, Berkas mengenai kunjungan Presiden Amerika Serikat, Richard M. Nixon, tanggal 27-28 Juli 1969, 389, Sekkab, ANRI.

would allow “Asian countries to defend themselves (and defend American interests).” The books therefore instructed Suharto to emphasize Indonesia’s leading role within ASEAN as “the most concrete proof of Indonesia’s cooperative efforts with other Southeast Asian countries.”¹⁹⁴ In a later conversation with Rogers, Suharto indicated he raised all these subjects.¹⁹⁵

Nixon responded enthusiastically to Suharto’s overtures. So favorable was the American president’s response, in fact, that the Indonesian ambassador in Washington, Soedjatmoko, whose views mirrored Malik’s, expressed concern about the “inflation of Indonesian expectation, developed since President Nixon’s departure, for additional U.S. assistance.”¹⁹⁶ Soon thereafter, the Nixon administration received a barrage of aid requests. Widjojo Nitisastro, the Berkeley-trained economist who presided over the National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas), reported to the Ministry of Finance in September 1969 that “Washington is planning a total amount of aid that is very small for next year.” This, he explained, “must be avoided because it will cause a result in a negative influence toward loan markets and aid from other countries.”¹⁹⁷ Malik met with Nixon at the United Nations in November, and he urged the United States to extend additional aid to fund the Suharto regime’s five-year economic development plan.¹⁹⁸ The following month, Nixon endorsed a \$100 million increase in multilateral aid to Indonesia, of which more than one-

¹⁹⁴ Amerika Serikat dan masalah-2 jang dihadapinja, Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ Telegram, SecState Bali to RUEHC/SecState WashDC, August 5, 1969, Tony Lake Chron File [6 of 6] [June 1969-May 1970], Box 1048, NSC Files, RNPL.

¹⁹⁶ Telegram, SecState Bali to RUEHC/SecState WashDC, August 5, 1969, Tony Lake Chron File [6 of 6] [June 1969-May 1970], Box 1048, NSC Files, RNPL.

¹⁹⁷ Radiogram, Widjojo Nitisastro to Menteri Keuangan di Djakarta, September 17, 1969, Berkas mengenai bantuan/kredit dari negara-negara Inter Government Group on Indonesia (IGGI), 78A, Sekkab, ANRI.

¹⁹⁸ Memorandum of Conversation, Nixon and Malik, November 17, 1969, POL 7 INDON 1/1/68, Box 2207, CFPF, RG 59, NARA.

third would come from American coffers.¹⁹⁹ Meanwhile, Indonesian military officers approached the White House through backchannels established by Kissinger during Nixon's July 1969 visit to Jakarta to appeal for additional training and materiel.²⁰⁰ Nixon himself intervened in the National Security Council's (NSC) policy planning process to order a tripling of American military assistance to Indonesia, including higher levels of combat equipment than most U.S. officials believed wise.²⁰¹ Soedjatmoko's worries about inflated expectations were evidently ill-placed.

As Indonesian officials lobbied the Nixon administration for heightened levels of military and economic aid, they also began pressing for relief on Indonesian debt repayment. Sukarno, the country's founding father, had mismanaged the economy and left Indonesia with a foreign debt burden of \$2.2 billion. In 1966, the country's balance of payments deficit left it unable to cover the more than \$500 million in debt repayment coming due that year.²⁰² That year, the Paris Club, a group of Western creditor countries, offered Indonesia a three-year grace period, after which it would have to repay the balance of its sovereign debt over eight years. The creditor countries also banded together to form the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), which would handle all future debt negotiations with Indonesia on a collective, multilateral basis.²⁰³

¹⁹⁹ Memorandum from the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, December 22, 1969, in *FRUS 1969-1976:20*, 603-605.

²⁰⁰ Memorandum from John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), October 30, 1969, in *FRUS 1969-1976:20*, 593.

²⁰¹ Memorandum, Kissinger to Laird and Rogers, March 11, 1970, Backchannel - Indonesia HAK/Sumitro 1970 [2 of 2], Box 101, HAK, RNPL.

²⁰² Radius Prawiro, *Indonesia's Struggle for Economic Development: Pragmatism in Action* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 58-64; see also Anwar Nasution, *Financial Institutions and Policies in Indonesia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1983), 26-28.

²⁰³ G.A. Posthumus, *The Inter Governmental Group on Indonesia* (Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1971).

At the end of the three-year grace period, which coincided with Nixon's inauguration as president, Indonesia's current account deficit was \$500 million, and the country's economic outlook still precluded it from repaying its sovereign debt.²⁰⁴ The IGGI tasked the former chair of Deutsche Bank, Dr. Hermann Abs, with drafting a plan for restructuring the country's debt burden. Abs proposed in August 1969 a plan whereby Indonesia's creditors would forgive the interest on all the country's debts, lowering the total burden from \$2.2 billion to \$1.7 billion. Indonesia would then repay the principal over 30 years in equal installments with payments beginning immediately. The Abs plan became the basis for negotiations between Indonesia and its creditors at the October 1969 meeting of the IGGI. At this meeting several Western European governments signaled their opposition to the plan, while the United States and Japan suggested they may not win legislative approval for their participation.²⁰⁵ The Soviet Union, which was not an IGGI member but held large quantities of Indonesian debt, rejected the Abs Plan because "a workers country could not be philanthropic and reduce interest to zero."²⁰⁶ With considerable American help, Indonesian negotiators over the following six months overcame the objections of other IGGI members and won agreement to a rescheduling of Indonesian debt in April 1970. The plan amortized Indonesian debt over 30 years, with equal payments beginning immediately, and allowed Indonesia to pay only 4 percent interest with payments beginning in 1985.²⁰⁷ Though the Soviet Union declined to participate in the negotiations, the agreement also covered the half

²⁰⁴ Government of Indonesia, *Nota keuangan dan rantjangan anggaran pendapatan dan belandja negara tahun 1969/1970* (Jakarta: Departemen Keuangan, 1970), 38-39.

²⁰⁵ Telegram, Dep. Luar Negeri Dinas Sandi to Suharto no. 292/hag/I/69, November 1, 1969, Berkas mengenai bantuan/kredit dari negara-negara Inter Government Group on Indonesia (IGGI), 78A, Sekkab, ANRI.

²⁰⁶ Telegram, SecState Bali to RUEHC/SecState WashDC, August 5, 1969, Tony Lake Chron File [6 of 6] [June 1969-May 1970], Box 1048, NSC Files, RNPL.

²⁰⁷ Telegram, Dep. Luar Negeri Dinas Sandi to Suharto no. 35/ris/4/70, April 26, 1970, Berkas mengenai bantuan/kredit dari negara-negara Inter Government Group on Indonesia (IGGI), 78A, Sekkab, ANRI; "Jakarta to Repay Debts Over a 30-Year Period," *New York Times*, April 28, 1970.

of Indonesia's Sukarno-era sovereign debt owed to Soviet Bloc countries. In August 1970, the Soviets agreed to abide by the terms of the modified Abs plan. By helping to dramatically reduce the New Order's debt burden, the Nixon administration made its aid payments to Indonesia all the more valuable.²⁰⁸

The Suharto regime continued to press for additional aid in the years following. Economic aid flowed mostly through the IGGI. Though it had been established to oversee only Indonesia's debt rescheduling agreements, the IGGI, both Indonesia and its creditors agreed, would serve as a useful forum for disbursing international aid to promote Indonesia's economic development. The IGGI's roster included the United States, Japan, several western European countries, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, as well as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), each of which established offices in Jakarta. Between 1967-1969, the IGGI delivered approximately \$500 million in economic aid to Indonesia, of which the United States and Japan each contributed about one-third. Beginning in 1969, the IGGI split food and non-food aid, and the Nixon administration committed to supplying one-third of non-food aid and an undefined "fair share," in practice more than one-half, of food aid. The Nixon administration also promoted a massive increase in overall IGGI aid, agreeing to a figure of \$600 million for 1970, more than the previous three years' worth of aid combined. Year after year, the Suharto regime lobbied for further aid increases. When Indonesian officials caught wind in 1971 that the United States might not meet its one-third pledge for non-food aid, General Sumitro sent a backchannel message to Kissinger urging that

²⁰⁸ Widjojo Nitisastro, *Pengalaman pembangunan Indonesia: kumpulan tulisan dan uraian* (Jakarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2010), 389-416.

Nixon “be made personally aware of our concern.”²⁰⁹ Suharto himself wrote a letter to Nixon explaining that “if a reduction in the United States’ aid pledge for 1972/1973 is announced, it will strongly add to the arguments used by certain groups in our society, skeptical of United States policies, to doubt even more the present Indonesian government’s domestic and foreign policies.”²¹⁰ While the American’s response has been lost, Suharto’s appeal evidently succeeded, and Nixon overruled State Department officials who had pressed for a reduction in aid.²¹¹ A similar drama played out the following year, when Kissinger insisted that the United States once again pledge one-third of non-food aid over the objections of the State Department.²¹² By 1974, total annual IGGI aid to Indonesia reached \$750 million.²¹³ And between 1969-1974, after which point ballooning oil revenues made Indonesia less dependent upon international assistance, the IGGI delivered a full \$3.5 billion of aid to Indonesia.

If economic aid was a multilateral endeavor, coordinated through the IGGI, military aid was a bilateral phenomenon, flowing mostly from the United States. Suharto made his case for heightened levels of military aid early and often, usually by playing on Nixon and Kissinger’s fixations on communism and credibility. In May 1970, he traveled to the United States for meetings with Nixon and other senior American officials, his first presidential trip outside Asia. Shortly before his departure, Suharto received a report from Yoga Sugama, chief of the intelligence division of the Department of Defense and Security (Dephankam).

²⁰⁹ Letter, Sumitro to Kissinger, December 5, 1971, Backchannel - Indonesia HAK/Sumitro 1970 [1 of 2], Box 101, HAK, RNPL.

²¹⁰ Letter, Suharto to Nixon, December 3, 1971, INDONESIA Suharto, corres. [1970-1974] [1 of 1], Box 755, NSC Files, RNPL.

²¹¹ Memorandum, Rogers to Nixon, December 1, 1971, INDONESIA Suharto, corres. [1970-1974] [1 of 1], Box 755, NSC Files, RNPL; Letter, Suharto to Nixon, December 12, 1971, INDONESIA Suharto, corres. [1970-1974] [1 of 1], Box 755, NSC Files, RNPL.

²¹² Memorandum, Kissinger to Nixon, October 7, 1972, INDONESIA Suharto, corres. [1970-1974] [1 of 1], Box 755, NSC Files, RNPL.

²¹³ Memorandum to Hamengkubuwono, Laporan-laporan sidang IGGI ke-XIV Mei 1973 dan sidang ke-XVI Mei 1974 tanggal 14 Mei 1973, 9 Mei 1974, 171, HB IX, ANRI.

Yoga wrote approvingly that “the Nixon administration has outlined a non-discriminatory policy toward other countries, whatever their form (dictatorship or democracy) and whichever group rules (military or civilian).” But he also warned that “within the American people there is a tendency not to sympathize with governments led by the military,” and that several New Left and West Papuan “anti-Indonesia” groups, along with allegedly unfriendly media outlets like the *New York Times* and NBC News, sought to undermine American support for the New Order. Meanwhile in the U.S. Congress, Yoga explained, there existed a movement to “make cuts to the budget not directly related to the people’s welfare (defense and foreign aid).” To navigate these cross-cutting trends, Yoga advised Suharto to emphasize both American credibility and communist aggression: The Nixon Doctrine now faced a “test case” brought about by the accelerating withdrawal of American soldiers from Vietnam, and that the United States needed “give the countries of Southeast Asia a reasonable ability to defend themselves against the communist threat.”²¹⁴ An American embassy official in Jakarta confirmed, based on a pre-departure meeting, that “Suharto will want to talk mainly about enlarged and accelerated flow of military equipment from U.S.”²¹⁵

On the eve of Suharto’s visit to the United States, the American press reported enthusiastically on his reorientation of Indonesia toward the West, and on his reputation as a quiet, unassuming family man, in contrast to the bombastic, womanizing Sukarno.²¹⁶ Suharto traveled first to Washington for talks with Nixon and Kissinger, and for individual meetings with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Immediately upon sitting down in

²¹⁴ Departemen Pertahanan-Keamanaan G-I/Intel, Laporan Khusus Nomor: R/G-I/LC/008/IV/1970 tentang: Amerika Serikat, April 29, 1970, Laporan khusus dari Ketua G-I/Intel Hankam mengenai Amerika Serikat, disertai surat pengantar dari Panglima Tinggi Angkatan Udara, 161, Sekkab, ANRI.

²¹⁵ Telegram, AmEmbassy Djakarta to SecState WashDC, May 21, 1970, POL 15-1 INDON 1/1/70, Box 2374, SNF, RG 59, NARA.

²¹⁶ “Suharto Will Thank Nixon, Not Beg,” *Baltimore Sun*, May 24, 1970; “Jakarta and the West: Strong Internal Forces Seem to Push Indonesia into More Anti-Red Stance,” *New York Times*, May 20, 1970.

the Oval Office, Suharto raised the communist bogey to argue for expanded economic aid, saying it was necessary to accelerate his five-year economic development plan lest “issues such as the revival of Communism . . . become more critical.” Only minutes later, he added that, though he had emphasized economic development in his first years in office, “now Indonesia must give attention to military strength as well. Assistance is especially needed for the navy and air force. Given Communist strength we cannot neglect defense,” especially considering what Suharto characterized as escalating Chinese and Soviet threats. Nixon promised to give Suharto’s requests “very sympathetic consideration.”²¹⁷ The following day, General Alamsjah followed up with Kissinger on Indonesia’s specific military aid requirements. For a decade, Alamsjah explained, all Indonesian military equipment came from the Soviet Union, and the current state of Soviet-Indonesian relations was so poor that obtaining spare parts for this equipment had become impossible, leaving “a Navy without gunboats” and “pilots without aircraft.” Alamsjah suggested that an American program to re-equip the Indonesian military was necessary to preserve stability in Southeast Asia, because “Indonesia was being depended upon” by other countries in the region. Yet he hinted at a second rationale behind Suharto’s requests, suggesting the American military aid package should be delivered before Indonesia’s elections scheduled for July 1971.²¹⁸ As Suharto departed Washington the following day, Nixon once again assured his Indonesian counterpart that he would “work out an arrangement to fulfill the needs of Indonesia.”²¹⁹

²¹⁷ MemCon, Nixon, Suharto, and Kissinger, May 26, 1970, MemCon - The President/Pres. Suharto/Kissinger May 26, 1970, Box 1024, NSC Files, RNPL.

²¹⁸ MemCon, Kissinger, Alamsjah, and Holdridge, May 27, 1970, MemCon - The President/Pres. Suharto/Kissinger May 26, 1970, Box 1024, NSC Files, RNPL.

²¹⁹ MemCon, Suharto, Nixon, and Kissinger, May 28, 1970, MemCon - The President/Pres. Suharto/Kissinger May 26, 1970, Box 1024, NSC Files, RNPL.

Suharto continued on to New York to visit the United Nations. Occurring shortly after the UN's November 1969 legitimization of the "Act of Free Choice" that secured West Papua's integration into Indonesia, Suharto's visit reflected Indonesia's reentry into the international community after years of turbulence under Sukarno. His task was a delicate one. Ruslan Abdulgani, Indonesia's ambassador to the UN, prepared Suharto for the visit by stressing his objective was to "reinforce the 'image' of a New Indonesia" and "accelerate multilateral socio-economic aid" to the archipelago.²²⁰ Yet Suharto also needed to preserve Indonesia's reputation as a non-aligned, independent state even as it became increasingly dependent upon the West. In a speech before the UN's Afro-Asian Bloc, Suharto attempted to resolve that apparent contradiction by emphasizing both non-alignment and regional stability: "Indonesia's free and active, non-aligned foreign policy continues to be implemented." Those very principles, he went on to explain, mandated that Indonesia "cannot but play a role as a catalyst to ensure the victory of integration over disintegration, by way of regional cooperation in the social, economic, cultural, and political fields, in accordance with the UN Charter, so that each country attains national resilience." To those familiar with Indonesia's political lexicon, national resilience clearly referred to Indonesia's effort to promote anticommunist stability by proliferating authoritarian institutional and ideological structures.²²¹

By all accounts Suharto's tour through the United States was a success. He had reinforced Indonesia's non-aligned image in New York and won a commitment for

²²⁰ Memo, Ruslan Abdulgani to Suharto, January 6, 1970, Berkas mengenai kunjungan Presiden Suharto ke Amerika Serikat tanggal 24 Mei - 2 Juni 1970, 397, Sekkab, ANRI.

²²¹ Pidato pada kunjungan ke Amerika Serikat, di depan Kelompok Asia Afrika di PBB, pada Mei 1970 di Amerika Serikat, 723, PPS, ANRI; for the Bandung Conference see George McTurnan Kahin, *The Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956); See Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya, eds., *Bandung Revisited: The Legacy of the 1955 Asian-African Conference for International Order* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2008).

heightened military aid in Washington. Upon his return to Indonesia, he tasked General Sumitro, a professional soldier who served as deputy commander of the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (Kopkamtib), the security core of the New Order, with managing the U.S. military assistance program for Indonesia. Sumitro sometimes grated against the personalism and corruption that characterized the New Order, but he traveled to the United States in June 1970 and took to his directives with gusto. Aware of the centralization of foreign policy in the White House and the skeptical outlook of many State Department hands toward expanded military aid to Indonesia, Sumitro wanted to meet first with Kissinger and only then with Pentagon officials, bypassing the State Department altogether. When he met with Kissinger on July 1, the general stuck to the familiar Indonesian script, emphasizing communism, credibility, and regional stability.²²² Sumitro also met with Admiral Thomas Moorer, the recently installed chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and suggested that the United States ought to replace all Soviet equipment in Indonesia, valued at nearly \$1 billion, and to furnish the Indonesian military with additional airlift and amphibious capabilities. “Extremely ambitious and unrealistic,” one Kissinger aide called the proposal, which included B-52 bombers and intermediate-range ballistic missiles: “It goes well beyond the type of fairly uncomplicated conventional equipment which they can maintain and which we would be best able to provide.”²²³ To reiterate the importance of expanded military aid, Sumitro sent Kissinger a telegram in September insisting that “We Indonesians may be able to play [a] leading role in catalyzing SEA [Southeast Asian] nations into regional organization . . . which can have [a] unified approach to subversive threat of red Chinese,” especially since

²²² MemCon, Sumitro, Latif, Kissinger, and Holdridge, July 1, 1970, Backchannel - Indonesia HAK/Sumitro 1970 [2 of 2], Box 101, HAK, RNPL.

²²³ Memorandum, Holdridge to Kissinger, July 7, 1970, Backchannel - Indonesia HAK/Sumitro 1970 [2 of 2], Box 101, HAK, RNPL; Memorandum, Lynn to Kissinger, July 7, 1970, Ibid.

the communist powers would seek to “move into [the] vacuum created by [the] British East of Suez policy and [the] Nixon Doctrine.”²²⁴

Partly because the aid skeptics at the Pentagon and Foggy Bottom intervened, the Suharto regime’s appeals for heightened levels of military aid bore few concrete results in 1970. Among the career officials at State and Defense, a consensus had emerged that, even if the Nixon administration could pry additional aid from a stingy Congress and an already overstretched Military Assistance Plan (MAP) budget, Indonesia possessed little capacity to absorb sophisticated military equipment without diverting precious resources away from economic development. In the opinion of Francis Galbraith, the American ambassador in Jakarta, an expanded military aid package “would put a strain on Indonesia’s non-alignment; would arouse exaggerated Indonesian expectations; [would] alarm Indonesia’s neighbors; [and would] imply U.S. support of the Army vs. civilians at the time of heated and likely crooked elections.”²²⁵ To break the bureaucratic logjam in Washington, the Indonesians raised the specter of a tilt toward Moscow. In November 1970, Air Force Chief of Staff Suwoto met with Galbraith in Jakarta and suggested that, if additional American aid was not forthcoming, Indonesia would be forced to turn toward the Soviet Union. As Galbraith relayed the conversation, “Suwoto said he does not want his air force split into two sections, one supplied by Soviet and one by U.S. (implying he is not in favor of accepting Soviet assistance) but he also implied that unless U.S. moves faster with its assistance for close air and other support for Indonesian air force he may be forced to take Soviet assistance.” Although most American analysts discounted the notion of an Indonesian realignment as impractical, a thinly veiled

²²⁴ Telegram, Sumitro to Kissinger, September 25, 1970, Backchannel - Indonesia HAK/Sumitro 1970 [2 of 2], Box 101, HAK, RNPL.

²²⁵ Letter, Masters to Galbraith, April 17, 1970, DEF 19-1 Combat Equipment, Box 5, IMS, RG 59, NARA.

negotiating ploy, the conversation appears to have alarmed Kissinger, who wrote on the telegram that “We can’t rest or they will buy Soviet arms.”²²⁶ The following month, the Nixon administration and the Suharto regime inked an informal, five-year agreement for American military aid to Indonesia totaling at least \$20 million per year.

Actual American military aid figures often exceeded that informal commitment. Between July 1970 and June 1971—fiscal year 1971—the United States furnished Indonesia with more than \$35 million in military aid. And in September 1971, Nixon signed a presidential directive ordering a military aid package of at least \$25 million for fiscal year 1972.²²⁷ Such a massive military aid program owed primarily to Suharto’s manipulation of Nixon and Kissinger’s idiosyncratic biases. That much became clear in a September 1971 meeting between Nixon and Galbraith, a military aid skeptic. According to a White House notetaker, “The President noted that there were those high[-]level policy makers in the U.S. Government who felt quite strongly that U.S. assistance to Indonesia and, in fact, other developing nations such as those in Latin America should be channeled primarily through economic assistance and that military assistance tended to retard progress.” The president said “he did not accept this view. He asserted that it was essential that all understand that [in] a developing country such as Indonesia, with thousands of miles of coastline, a strong military influence and an essentially military leadership had to have a substantial military capability if political stability was to be assured.”²²⁸ He continued to seethe at Galbraith and other like-minded officials in the State Department, including Marshall Green and Edward Masters, who

²²⁶ Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, November 24, 1970, in in *FRUS 1969-1976:20*, 683-685.

²²⁷ Presidential Directive 72-3, September 7, 1971, 71-11 – 72-09/71, Presidential Determinations, Box 370, Subject Files, RNPL.

²²⁸ Memorandum for the President’s File, September 14, 1971, in *FRUS 1969-1976:20*, 694-696.

fought against escalating military aid. “I, we, have had a constant battle with Marshall Green,” Nixon fumed in a November 1971 meeting with Kissinger and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird. “Marshall Green is wrong about this. You can’t have a thousand miles of islands with no damn equipment to defend those damn islands. . . . We have to keep Suharto in power too. Let’s face it. Otherwise, you get another goddamn Sukarno in there.”²²⁹ The following fiscal year, from July 1972 to June 1973, a full \$30 million in U.S. military aid flowed to Indonesia.

American domestic politics threatened to derail the U.S.-Indonesia partnership in the years following. The withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam in January 1973 and the subsequent communist takeovers of Cambodia and South Vietnam in April 1975 left the American body politic eager to turn its back on the war and with little appetite for further involvement in Southeast Asia. Renewed Congressional skepticism toward foreign aid in general—and toward military aid to authoritarian regimes and economic aid to oil-exporting countries in particular—made it difficult to sustain the massive American aid relationship to authoritarian, oil-rich Indonesia. And the Watergate scandal, together with the cumulative effects of the Vietnam War, weakened both Nixon and the office he inhabited, further hindering the president’s ability to meet his personal aid pledge to Suharto. The White House struggled, mightily but successfully, to meet the \$20 million per year benchmark in military aid between 1973-1975. But it shed its commitment to supply one-third of Indonesia’s non-food aid and a fair share of its food aid through the IGGI. Instead, it agreed to supply one-third of total IGGI aid to Indonesia and even then found it difficult to meet that pared down

²²⁹ EOB 299-19, November 10, 1971, White House Tapes, RNPL.

pledge. American economic aid to Indonesia dipped to around \$90 million per year beginning in 1974, about 40 percent of the 1973 figure. Though considerable, these cuts paled in comparison to those toward other countries, and the U.S. commitment to Indonesia remained the largest American development assistance program.²³⁰

Oil revenues left the Suharto regime less dependent upon international aid after 1973-1974. But New Order officials continued to lobby against any reduction in military and economic aid. After the Paris Peace Accords brought an end to the Vietnam War in January 1973, Nixon dispatched Vice President Spiro Agnew to Asia to reassure American friends and allies that the United States had no intention of abandoning them. Agnew arrived in Jakarta in early February for discussions with Suharto, Malik, Berkeley Mafia technocrats, and military leaders. All stressed the necessity of expanded military and economic aid, and the danger posed by communist aggression and subversion spearheaded by a Vietnam no longer tangling with American power.²³¹ Summing up his visit to Nixon, Agnew reported that “President Suharto was apprehensive about the future of Indochina and is anxious to be reassured concerning our continued presence and support.”²³² Nixon’s resignation in August 1974 afforded New Order leaders with an additional opportunity to leverage American officials’ fascination with credibility into heightened military and economic aid. As the American embassy in Jakarta reported, the “Watergate challenge to President Nixon caused considerable worry in GOI [Government of Indonesia] leadership circles because of adiration [*sic*] for

²³⁰ Telegram 47882 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia, March 9, 1974, in *FRUS 1969-1976:E-12*, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve12> (accessed February 17, 2018).

²³¹ Telegram, AmEmbassy Kuala Lumpur to SecState WashDC, February 8, 1973, Vice President's SEA Visit Jan 28 - 10 Feb 73 [2 of 3], Box 952, NSC Files, RNPL; three other telegrams sent from Kuala Lumpur on the same date—numbers 0494, 0495, and 0496—report Agnew’s conversations with other senior Indonesian officials.

²³² Memorandum, Agnew to Nixon, February 9, 1973, Vice President's SEA Visit Jan 28 - 10 Feb 73 [2 of 3], Box 952, NSC Files, RNPL.

Nixon's foreign policies and belief that personal link between Suharto and Nixon was important element in US support for Indonesia."²³³ The new American president, Gerald Ford, tutored by the credibility-obsessed Kissinger, made every effort to reassure Indonesian observers that continuity would be the watchword of American foreign policy, sending letters to that effect to both Suharto and Malik. When Malik met Ford for the first time at a United Nations meeting in September 1974, he made clear the most important facet of that continuity for Indonesians: "President Suharto," Malik reported, "asks that you will consider continuing U.S. aid to Indonesia."²³⁴

The Indonesians' efforts to link aid, credibility, and communism continued to pay dividends. Suharto lieutenants once again raised the possibility that, if more aid were not forthcoming, Indonesia might shift away from its pro-Western posture, toward neutralism or even the communist bloc. In March 1975, Benny Murdani, who held deputy positions in Dephankam, Bakin, and Kopkamtib, complained to the American ambassador, David Newsom, that Indonesia "gets less than \$15 million from U.S. in comparison with vast sums put into Indochina. How can Indonesia face up to communist Southeast Asia fi [*sic*] Saigon with a million and a half men and millions in aid cannot do it?" If Indonesia did not "have [the] strength to oppose," Murdani warned, "it must accommodate."²³⁵ Far-fetched as they were, these threats always affected Kissinger, who worked to expand American military and economic aid to Indonesia even as budgetary constraints forced steep reductions in overall foreign aid disbursements. In May 1975, only weeks after the communist takeovers of

²³³ Telegram, AmEmbassy Jakarta to SecState WashDC, August 22, 1974, Electronic Telegrams, 1974, RG 59, NARA.

²³⁴ MemCon, Malik, Ford, Kissinger, September 24, 1974, President Ford MemCons (1), Box 16, NSC-EA Staff, GFPL.

²³⁵ Telegram, AmEmbassy Jakarta to SecState WashDC, March 31, 1975, Indonesia - State Department Telegrams To SECSTATE - EXDIS, Box 6, NSC-EA Presidential, GFPL.

Vietnam and Cambodia, he proposed that \$20 million in economic aid earmarked for India be reallocated to Indonesia to “enhance our credibility with the Suharto Government.” As Kissinger lamented, aid cuts combined with the fall of Saigon to fuel “Indonesian pessimism over the reliability of U.S. intentions toward Indonesia.”²³⁶ These fears continued to grip Kissinger as he prepared for Suharto’s impending July 1975 state visit to the United States. Preparing the novice Ford for the meeting, Kissinger emphasized that the Indonesians “are pathological about the Chinese, and worried about Vietnam and the Soviet Union.” Implying that the United States ought to expand its aid to Indonesia, Kissinger told Ford that “We tend to take things for granted. Remember they used to get all their military equipment from the Soviet Union.”²³⁷

Ford proved just as vulnerable as his predecessor to manipulation by Suharto. When the two men first met in July 1975, Suharto predicted the communist victories in Indochina would immediately encourage communist insurgencies elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Then, “when they have built up the Communist movements, the Vietnamese will be able to supply the military equipment necessary for them to undertake military activities.” The expanded communist threat Suharto said, demanded expanded levels of American military and economic aid. Ford was convinced. While he gestured toward Congressional pressures for further reductions in aid, he also agreed to establish a joint U.S.-Indonesian consultative commission to coordinate additional military and economic aid.²³⁸ The two men met again in December, when Ford touched down in Jakarta and Manila on his return from a five-day

²³⁶ Memorandum, Kissinger to Ford, May 7, 1975, Indonesia (2), Box 6, NSC-EA Presidential, GFPL.

²³⁷ MemCon, Ford and Kissinger, July 5, 1975, July 5, 1975 - Ford, Kissinger, Box 13, National Security Adviser - Memoranda of Conversations, GFPL.

²³⁸ MemCon, Ford, Kissinger, and Suharto, July 5, 1975, July 5, 1975 - Ford, Kissinger, Indonesian President Suharto, Box 13, National Security Adviser - Memoranda of Conversations, GFPL.

junket in Beijing. Suharto again emphasized the danger posed by a communist-dominated Indochina and the support, both material and ideational, they were likely to give to local communist insurgencies. And Ford again committed to seeking Congressional authorization for “the maximum amount” of American aid to Indonesia.²³⁹

Suharto had already begun work to improve Indonesia’s reputation in Congress. In June 1975, he remarked to his Council on Political Stabilization and National Security that the “balance of power between the executive and legislative” branches of the American government now tilted toward Congress. He ordered a delegation dispatched to Washington to curry favor on Capitol Hill.²⁴⁰ Led by Suharto’s aide-de-camp Ali Murtopo, who also headed the extraconstitutional military intelligence Special Operations (Opsus) unit, the team traveled in October 1975 to Los Angeles, Minneapolis, Washington, New York, and Ithaca, where they met with legislators, administration officials, entrepreneurs, and scholars. Freshman Congressman Jim Jeffords lauded the visit—whose express purpose he described as “establishing a dialog with the Congress on the future of American-Indonesian relations”—as “a mark of the new era of congressional dynamism.”²⁴¹ In a private memorandum to Suharto, the Indonesian ambassador in Washington, Roesmin Nurjadin, reported the delegation persuaded influential lawmakers that Indonesia represented “a guardian of stability in Southeast Asia” deserving of American support. Congressman William Broomfield, previously an outspoken opponent of expansive military aid to Indonesia, had “changed his view and will make every effort to ensure the aid that Indonesia genuinely needs will be

²³⁹ Telegram, AmEmbassy Jakarta to SecState WashDC, December 6, 1975, Indonesia - State Department Telegrams To SECSTATE - NODIS (3), Box 6, NSC-EA Presidential, GFPL.

²⁴⁰ Polkam, June 10, 1975, Sekretaris Negara RI: Risalah petunjuk dan putusan presiden dalam sidang dewan stabilisasi polkam tanggal 12 Maret 1974-16 Nopember 1976, disertai surat pengantar, 567, HB IX, ANRI.

²⁴¹ Ali Murtopo, “Future Indonesian-American Relations,” *Congressional Record*, October 20, 1975, 10096-10097.

granted by Congress.” And Congressman Donald Fraser, a harsh critic of Indonesia’s detention of tens of thousands of political prisoners, had moderated his opinion.²⁴² Suharto also invited Congressional delegations to visit Indonesia. The members of one such delegation, which traveled to the archipelago in August 1975, announced at the end of their visit that they supported continued U.S. military and economic aid for Indonesia.²⁴³

As a result of their discussions with Ford and members of Congress, senior Indonesian officials anticipated American aid levels would revert to early Nixon era levels.²⁴⁴ An Indonesian military delegation arrived in the United States in the summer of 1975 and presented what journalists called a “shopping list” of military equipment whose total value reached as high as \$150 million. Ford, who in his first meeting with Suharto had promised to furnish Indonesia with additional transport aircraft, countered with a proposed \$42.5 million military aid package for 1976, still more than double the previous year’s military aid figure. And where as late as April 1975 the Ford administration had envisioned a complete elimination of economic aid to Indonesia, it now proposed a substantial increase, to \$90 million.²⁴⁵ Even after the disastrous Indonesian invasion of the former Portuguese colony of East Timor in December 1975, which imperiled the further flow of U.S. military aid to Indonesia because it relied on American-provided weapons, the Ford administration worked to forestall any Congressional pressure for an aid cutoff. Kissinger ordered a temporary,

²⁴² Memorandum, Roesmin Nurjadin to Suharto, October 30, 1975, Dubes RI di Washington DC Roesmin Nurjadin kepada Presiden: Laporan tanggal 30 Oktober 1975 tentang kunjungan delegasi CSIS ke Amerika Serikat, disertai lampiran, 203, HB IX, ANRI.

²⁴³ Telegram, AmEmbassy Jakarta to USInfo WashDC, August 8, 1975, Electronic Telegrams, 1975, RG 59, NARA.

²⁴⁴ “Jakarta Draws Shopping List for Stepped-Up U.S. Arms Aid,” *Washington Post*, July 24, 1975.

²⁴⁵ “Jakarta Strives to Keep Foreign Aid: More U.S. Arms and Other Help Due,” *New York Times*, November 26, 1975.

informal suspension in the delivery of military aid in January 1976, and then quietly ordered the resumption of military aid flows in May.²⁴⁶

The arguments Suharto and other senior New Order officials mobilized to win American and international aid were disingenuous. Internal Indonesian documents—intelligence reports, records of cabinet discussions, and government-commissioned studies—confirm as much. New Order leaders believed China and the Soviet Union posed no meaningful threat to Indonesia. Nor did they anticipate a Vietnam reunified under communist rule would embark upon an aggressive, expansionist foreign policy. And the Indonesian communist movement, they admitted among themselves, had been completely and irrevocably dismantled. It would go too far to say that New Order officials *invented* their anxieties about communism, inasmuch as they remained vehemently anticommunist and feared the return of left-wing political agitation. But these fears were *exaggerated* and *instrumentalized* to extract the maximum possible amount of aid from the United States and other international financiers of authoritarian rule.

Anticommunism was the rhetorical and ideological glue that held the New Order together. Suharto peppered his public speeches and his conversations with American officials with references to the “latent danger” posed by the “extreme left.”²⁴⁷ Yet he routinely received reports from military, intelligence, and police agencies that characterized the Indonesian communist movement as decimated and unable to recover. In June 1970, for instance, a Bakin daily report alleged that a group of Indonesian communists, with foreign support, “were instructed to join the power of the masses with the legality of political

²⁴⁶ Memorandum, Barnes to Scowcroft, May 17, 1976, Indonesia (7), Box 6, NSC-EA Presidential, GFPL.

²⁴⁷ “Presiden jelaskan kekuatan2 sopol OTB yang merupakan bahaya laten,” *Sinar Harapan*, February 2, 1974.

parties/mass organizations other than the PKI.” The report characterized these communists as “extremely dangerous,” yet it also admitted that they numbered less than thirty and had no weaponry.²⁴⁸ Several other intelligence reports from the period 1970-1973 also describe similar efforts by alleged communists to rebuild the PKI. What impresses about these reports, however, is not that they were so ubiquitous, but that they were so trivial. For example, a March 12, 1973 daily intelligence report devoted considerable space to a Jakarta man seen burning documents outside his house on the night of the September 30 more than seven years earlier.²⁴⁹ By 1973, Suharto would complain to his cabinet that “both in society and in certain government circles there is a presumption that the problem of the September 30th Movement/PKI is finished and that the government is using the September 30th Movement/PKI as a reason (scapegoat) to cover up government deficiencies and failures in various fields.” As the political salience of anticommunism waned, the New Order resorted to fanciful theories about the Indonesian communist movement: the “iceberg theory” suggesting that huge numbers of communists remained below the surface, or the idea that communists had discarded the PKI and now inhabited an “organization without form.”²⁵⁰

Nor did senior figure sin the New Order consider the Soviet Union a threat to Indonesia. A secret March 1972 study on superpower relations in the era of détente prepared by the National Defense and Security Council (Wanhankamnas) characterized the Soviet Union as a power in decline. Reformist and revisionist movements had risen up against Soviet

²⁴⁸ Badan Koordinasi Intelidjen Negara, Laporan Harian R-065/LAPHAR/BAKIN/6/1970, June 1, 1970, Berkas mengenai Laporan Intelijen, 1269, EKUIN, ANRI.

²⁴⁹ Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara, Laporan Harian R-059/LAPHAR/BAKIN/3/1973, March 12, 1973, Berkas mengenai laporan harian BAKIN (Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara) Tahun 1970-1973, 1283, EKUIN, ANRI.

²⁵⁰ Risalah putusan-putusan dan petunjuk-petunjuk Presiden dalam sidang Kabinet Paripurna pada tanggal 27 Nopember 1973, Sekretaris Kabinet RI: Risalah petunjuk-petunjuk dan putusan-putusan Presiden pada sidang Dewan Stabilisasi Ekonomi Nasional tanggal 20 Februari 1973 - 7 Desember 1976, 225, HB IX, ANRI.

authority across Eastern Europe, dealing “shocks that endanger the integrity” of the Warsaw Pact. Moscow now faced a dilemma “between the requirement to maintain hegemony in Eastern Europe and the requirement to give channels for the aspirations growing in socialist countries.” In the economic realm, the Soviet command economy had shown itself unable to keep pace with technological progress in the West, and it now required massive infusions of foreign capital to meet the rising demands of the population. The Wanhankamnas study predicted that Moscow, weakened though it was, would attempt to fill whatever power vacuum emerged in Asia following the American withdrawal from Vietnam and the British withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore. But because the Soviet Union’s “primary strategic objective” was the containment of China, it would “put ideological interests aside” and seek to build diplomatic relationships rather than foment insurgencies.²⁵¹

This relatively sanguine view of the Soviet Union was by no means universal at the highest echelons of the New Order. A top secret May 1972 Kopkamtib report evaluated Soviet cultural and economic diplomacy in Indonesia—holding industrial exhibitions, offering Russian language courses, screening films about Soviet life, and the like—as a “threat that, if left unchecked, will at some point increase to become a national danger.”²⁵² But such views, representing the paranoid anticommunism that gripped segments of the Indonesian military, resonated less and less as the decade progressed. Suharto told his cabinet in November 1973 that, while taking into account the possibility of subversion and

²⁵¹ Dewan Pertahanan Keamanan Nasional, Lembaran Kerdja No. 006/1972: Apresiasi tentang pola hubungan super power dan usaha Indonesia mengamankan kepentingan nasionalnya, Surat dari Sekretaris Jenderal Dewan Pertahanan dan Keamanan Nasional kepada Presiden/Ketua Dewan Pertahanan Keamanan Nasional mengenai pola hubungan dua superpower dan usaha Indonesia serta penilaian tentang joing communique RRT-USA, beserta lampiran, 1284, EKUIN, ANRI.

²⁵² Memorandum, Sumitro to Cabinet Ministers, May 12, 1972, Surat dari Panglima Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban Wapang kepada Menteri Kabinet Pembangunan mengenai kegiatan offensif Rusia dalam Bidang Ekonomi dan Kebudayaan, 1904, EKUIN, ANRI.

infiltration, the signing of trade agreements with socialist countries was “a good political step.”²⁵³ Soviet-Indonesian relations accordingly witnessed substantial improvements through the 1970s. The two countries signed an agreement on economic and cultural cooperation in 1974, and in 1976 Moscow offered Jakarta financial and technological assistance for mining and hydroelectric projects. Such dramatic improvements in Soviet-Indonesian relations allowed Suharto to maintain the appearance of Indonesia’s nonaligned foreign policy and to dangle the possibility of an Indonesian realignment toward the Soviet bloc before his American benefactors. But New Order leaders did not consider the Soviet Union capable of providing the military and economic aid upon which Indonesian state-building depended. If the Soviet Union was not a threat, neither was it a potential benefactor.

China was altogether more threatening. New Order leaders saw Chinese hands behind the September 30th Movement. And they grated against what they regarded as continuing Chinese interference in Indonesian affairs: broadcasts of Indonesian-language radio programming that incited antigovernment activities, and offers of political sanctuary for exiled Indonesian communists.²⁵⁴ The Suharto regime froze official diplomatic relations with China in October 1967. Yet top Indonesian officials did not unanimously regard China as a threat. Malik’s Foreign Ministry had opposed the freezing of relations with Beijing. As early as 1969, Malik began a public campaign to restore diplomatic ties, telling Henry Kissinger and other American officials in July that China’s process of economic development would

²⁵³ Risalah petunjuk-petunjuk dan putusan-putusan Presiden pada sidang Dewan Stabilisasi Ekonomi Nasional, November 27, 1973, Sekretaris Kabinet RI: Risalah petunjuk-petunjuk dan putusan-putusan Presiden pada sidang Dewan Stabilisasi Ekonomi Nasional tanggal 20 Februari 1973 - 7 Desember 1976, 225, HB IX, ANRI.

²⁵⁴ “RRT melalui Radio Peking: RRT terus lantjarkan fitnah ala ‘Gestapu/PKI,’” *Angkatan Bersendjata*, April 23, 1966; “Menurut Presiden Soeharto masih ada 220.000 anggota PKI jg berkeliaran,” *Kompas*, August 29, 1968; Rizal Sukma, *Indonesia and China: The Politics of a Troubled Relationship* (New York: Routledge, 1999), 44-69; Taomo Zhou, “Ambivalent Alliance: Chinese Policy Toward Indonesia, 1960-1965,” *China Quarterly* 221 (March 2015): 208-228.

inevitably endow it with a stake in the preservation of the international status quo.²⁵⁵

Soedjatmoko offered a different rationale, writing in 1969 that “China’s capacity to project her military strength outside her boundaries is for a long time going to be quite limited.”²⁵⁶ By the time Nixon visited China in early 1972, segments of the Indonesian military had shed their alarmist views of the People’s Republic. A provisional analysis prepared in October 1971 by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a military-linked think tank associated with Ali Murtopo, described China’s international objectives not as promoting revolution in Asia but as recovering traditional Chinese territory and winning the loyalty of the developing world.²⁵⁷ The Wanhankamnas report on superpower relations characterized China’s grand strategy as only slightly more ambitious. It suggested Chinese leaders would attempt to carve out a sphere of influence covering both Pakistan and Indochina as buffers against India and the Soviet Union and would seek to extend Chinese influence farther afield in Southeast Asia by mobilizing overseas Chinese communities.²⁵⁸

Suspicion of China, and of Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent, remained a central theme of the New Order. After anti-Chinese riots erupted in Bandung in August 1973, ignited by a roadway accident involving three ethnic Chinese driving a Volkswagen and a Javanese in a horse-drawn wagon, Suharto told his Council on Economic Stabilization that the PKI was

²⁵⁵ Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, July 29, 1969, in *FRUS 1969-1976:20*, 577.

²⁵⁶ Soedjatmoko, “South-East Asia and Security,” *Survival* (October 1969): 302, 304.

²⁵⁷ Jajasan Proklamasi Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Analisa previsional mengenai Asia pada umumnja, Asia Tenggara pada-chususnja, January 1972, 2326, EKUIN, ANRI.

²⁵⁸ Dewan Pertahanan Keamanan Nasional, Lembaran Kerdja No. 006/1972: Apresiasi tentang pola hubungan super power dan usaha Indonesia mengamankan kepentingan nasionalnya, Surat dari Sekretaris Jenderal Dewan Pertahanan dan Keamanan Nasional kepada Presiden/Ketua Dewan Pertahanan Keamanan Nasional mengenai pola hubungan dua superpower dan usaha Indonesia serta penilaian tentang joing communique RRT-USA, beserta lampiran, 1284, EKUIN, ANRI.

behind the disturbances.²⁵⁹ He added that “repressive measures are needed” so that “Indonesians of Chinese descent can adjust themselves, so that they do not only ‘assert their rights,’ but must also fulfill their obligations as good and responsible citizens.”²⁶⁰ In May 1974, citing the Bandung riots, Suharto ordered his Council on Political Stabilization and National Security to aggressively enforce the ban Chinese-language newspapers—a follow-on step to the New Order’s demands that ethnic Chinese Indonesians abandon their Chinese names, their Chinese-language schools, and their Chinese religious and cultural practices. Though his fixation on ethnic Chinese Indonesians as a potential fifth column suggested that some of Suharto’s worries about China were genuinely held, he believed that efforts to accelerate overseas Chinese into Indonesian society could reduce the danger they posed and allow for a resumption of diplomatic ties with China. He described his anti-Chinese policies as “a preparation for the normalization of Indonesia-PRC relations,” which he called “only a matter of time.”²⁶¹ Some hawkish segments of the New Order’s national security apparatus, such as Bakin, remained opposed to any thaw in relations between Indonesia and China. But Suharto nevertheless continued to order steps be taken to pave the way for renewed diplomatic relations—particularly as Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand established ties with China in 1974-1975.²⁶²

Suharto’s belief that China continued to interfere in Indonesia’s internal affairs meant he ultimately refused to open diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic until 1990.

²⁵⁹ “Demonstrasi: Impala udin versus VW,” *Tempo*, August 11, 1973.

²⁶⁰ Risalah petunjuk-petunjuk dan putusan-putusan Presiden pada sidang Dewan Stabilisasi Ekonomi Nasional, August 7, 1973, Sekretaris Kabinet RI: Risalah petunjuk-petunjuk dan putusan-putusan Presiden pada sidang Dewan Stabilisasi Ekonomi Nasional tanggal 20 Februari 1973 - 7 Desember 1976, 225, HB IX, ANRI.

²⁶¹ Polkam, September 10, 1974, Sekretaris Negara RI: Risalah petunjuk dan putusan presiden dalam sidang dewan stabilisasi polkam tanggal 12 Maret 1974-16 Nopember 1976, disertai surat pengantar, 567, HB IX, ANRI.

²⁶² Polkam, May 14, 1974, Sekretaris Negara RI: Risalah petunjuk dan putusan presiden dalam sidang dewan stabilisasi polkam tanggal 12 Maret 1974-16 Nopember 1976, disertai surat pengantar, 567, HB IX, ANRI.

When the Chinese government issued a congratulatory message to the PKI on its anniversary in 1975, Suharto ordered an increase in “vigilance” against potential subversion.²⁶³ Never again until at least November 1976, when the available archival trail ends, did the Council on Political Stabilization and National Security discuss preparations to normalize relations with China. What emerges from these records is a decidedly more moderate conception of the threat posed by China than the one New Order leaders put forth in their discussions with American policymakers. That divergence is strong evidence that Indonesian leaders exaggerated the danger posed by China to win additional aid from the United States.

The communist takeovers of Cambodia, South Vietnam, and Laos did not surprise Suharto or other New Order leaders. As early as September 1974, Suharto explained to Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore and Tun Abdul Razak of Malaysia that, without massive American aid, “sooner or later—maybe in the two or three coming years—all of Vietnam and Cambodia will become ‘red.’”²⁶⁴ In the weeks after the fall of Saigon, Suharto and Malik spoke with a range of other Southeast Asian leaders. Except for Lee Kuan Yew, none expected that a reunified Vietnam would not embark upon an aggressive or expansionist foreign policy, and none believed the communist victory in Indochina would threaten the political stability of noncommunist countries in Southeast Asia.²⁶⁵ New Order leaders agreed only with the first point. The idea of an “open communist invasion from the North to the South,” Ali Murtopo explained at a CSIS conference in May 1976, “clearly ignores the existing realities within the Indochinese countries, which are still in a state of flux even to this day, as well as outside

²⁶³ Polkam, June 10, 1975, Sekretaris Negara RI: Risalah petunjuk dan putusan presiden dalam sidang dewan stabilisasi polkam tanggal 12 Maret 1974-16 Nopember 1976, disertai surat pengantar, 567, HB IX, ANRI.

²⁶⁴ Polkam, September 10, 1974, Sekretaris Negara RI: Risalah petunjuk dan putusan presiden dalam sidang dewan stabilisasi polkam tanggal 12 Maret 1974-16 Nopember 1976, disertai surat pengantar, 567, HB IX, ANRI.

²⁶⁵ Departemen Luar Negeri, Laporan Mingguan, n.d., Seri laporan mingguan menteri Luar Negeri, no 01-52 thn 1975, 94, ASSUS, ANRI.

factors such as the interests of the great powers.”²⁶⁶ In a meeting of the Council on Political Stabilization and National Security, Suharto explained that he anticipated the communist triumph would lead not to direct communist aggression but instead to indirect communist subversion. “The communist victory,” he asserted, “will have an effect on communist elements in Southeast Asia via ideological solidarity,” and will cause indigenous communist movements to “increase their opposition to or resistance against the government.”²⁶⁷ The idea of a reunified Vietnam offering material support for insurgencies across island Southeast Asia, the specter of which Suharto used to pry additional aid out of the Ford administration, does not appear in the available archival records of the New Order’s national security bodies. That suggests it was less a genuine Indonesian worry than a negotiating tactic for use with the Americans.

New Order leaders believed they could manipulate American policy to serve their own purposes. The Wenhankamnas report on superpower relations explained that Indonesia could exert tremendous influence over American policy. Because “an Indonesia under the influence of Moscow or Beijing” would threaten the overall American strategic posture in Asia, the report argued, “Indonesia’s bargaining position toward the United States is sufficiently strong and big. In other words, without having to actively involve ourselves in American strategy, the United States needs to keep our economic position stable.”²⁶⁸ This was an extraordinary assertion for a country as dependent upon American aid as Indonesia.

²⁶⁶ Ali Murtopo, “Peace and Security in Asia and the Pacific,” May 1976, Ketut Dewan Director Centre for Strategic and International Studies Daoud Joesoef: Laporan konperensi ke-III Indonesia-Jepang tanggal 3-6 Mei 1976 di Jakarta dan Yogyakarta, disertai lampiran, 211, HB IX, ANRI.

²⁶⁷ Polkam, April 8, 1975, Sekretaris Negara RI: Risalah petunjuk dan putusan presiden dalam sidang dewan stabilisasi polkam tanggal 12 Maret 1974-16 Nopember 1976, disertai surat pengantar, 567, HB IX, ANRI.

²⁶⁸ Dewan Pertahanan Keamanan Nasional, Lembaran Kerdja No. 006/1972: Apresiasi tentang pola hubungan super power dan usaha Indonesia mengamankan kepentingan nasionalnya, Surat dari Sekretaris Jenderal Dewan Pertahanan dan Keamanan Nasional kepada Presiden/Ketua Dewan Pertahanan Keamanan Nasional mengenai

Suharto thus obtained American military and economic aid under false, or at least exaggerated and misleading, pretenses. And the aid furnished by the United States and the international institutions it dominated enabled Suharto to consolidate his authoritarian regime.

The New Order arose following a mysterious attempt to purge the Indonesian military leadership called the September 30th Movement, and a subsequent countercoup and anticommunist pogrom orchestrated by the military in 1965-66. The United States had encouraged the political polarization that preceded the military takeover and supported the bloody campaign against the Indonesian communist movement.²⁶⁹ But to the dismay of Suharto and his associates, the administration of Lyndon Baines Johnson kept Indonesia at something of an arm's reach in the years following. Between 1965-1968, American and international aid figures remained relatively low. Meanwhile in Indonesia, capital flight, tepid economic growth, persistent inflation, and considerable hikes in the prices of food, water, and fuel limited the nascent Suharto regime's ability to extract resources from Indonesian society. Though total tax revenues increased dramatically, rising more than 850 percent from 11.7 billion rupiah in 1965 to 111.8 billion rupiah in 1968, most of that growth owed to indirect taxation on imports, suggesting Suharto and other New Order leaders saw the broad masses of already impoverished Indonesians as unwilling to cede additional resources to the state.²⁷⁰ Suharto's limited resource base forced him to stage his coup d'état in slow motion. He cooperated with student and youth groups, Muslim organizations, and even political parties,

pola hubungan dua superpower dan usaha Indonesia serta penilaian tentang joint communique RRT-USA, beserta lampiran, 1284, EKUIN, ANRI.

²⁶⁹ See Simpson, *Economists with Guns*, 171-206.

²⁷⁰ Government of Indonesia, *Nota keuangan dan rantjangan anggaran pendapatan dan belandja negara tahun 1971/72* (Jakarta: Departemen Keuangan, 1972), 97-108; see also Government of Indonesia, *Buku saku statistic Indonesia, 1964-1967* (Jakarta: Biro Pusat Statistik, 1967), 326.

all of which he regarded as potential threats to his authority. He coexisted with Sukarno rather than ousting him from the presidency immediately. And he ordered the still fractious Indonesian military to infiltrate rather than replace existing civilian institutions. In short, during the early years of the New Order, Suharto did not possess the capital necessary to entrench his dominance of the Indonesian state.

The floodgates of international aid opened in 1969. American military aid to Indonesia totaled more than \$200 million over the course of the Nixon and Ford administrations. But that was only the on-the-books figure, which underestimates the total value of American aid. The Pentagon valued the weapons, equipment, and training it provided to Indonesia at bottom-barrel prices; offered used military equipment deemed “excess stock” from the Indochina theater at depreciated prices; and accepted token payment for Foreign Military Sales (FMS) items in Indonesian rupiah rather than American dollars. Establishing a more accurate estimate of American military aid to Indonesia is a gargantuan task. Suffice it to say that such vast quantities of equipment revitalized the Indonesian armed forces and did much to replace the hundreds of millions of dollars—up to \$1.1 billion, one estimate puts it—in Soviet equipment delivered to Indonesia under Sukarno.²⁷¹ By the night of September 30, 1965, some 90 percent of Indonesia’s air force equipment and 80 percent of its navy equipment was Soviet in origin. Fifteen years later, approximately 90 percent of all Indonesian military equipment came from the United States.²⁷²

Economic aid dwarfed military aid. Between 1969-1976, the United States alone delivered no less than \$1.4 billion in economic aid to Indonesia, and the IGGI delivered at

²⁷¹ Taomo Zhou, “China and the September 30th Movement,” *Indonesia* 98 (October 2014): 41.

²⁷² Bradley Simpson, “Embracing the New Order: The Nixon Administration and Indonesia, 1969-1974,” paper presented at the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations annual conference, June 2007.

least \$2 billion more. Most of that aid went to financing the New Order's five-year economic development plans (Repelita). The first, unveiled in 1969, depended upon international aid for 60 percent of its expenditures. The plan sought to overcome inflation, jumpstart rice production, increase exports, and rehabilitate infrastructure, particularly in rural areas.²⁷³ Given that only about 20 percent of the archipelago's roads and 40 percent of its port facilities were in good repair in 1969, huge sums of money would be required to promote the country's economic recovery.²⁷⁴ Even after the explosion of oil revenues in 1973-1974, the Suharto regime still counted upon international aid for its domestic economic development programs. The second five-year economic development plan (Repelita II), active from 1974-1979, envisioned international aid accounting for 30 percent of its expenditures.²⁷⁵ Far more ambitious than its predecessor, Repelita II proposed an expansive program to meet the educational, housing, employment, and health needs of ordinary Indonesians, as well as a significant expansion of the Indonesian military. These economic development programs helped the Suharto regime to maintain GDP per capita growth rates of above four percent every year except one during the 1970s. Though economic growth did not inoculate the population against political contention, it did serve as one of the most important sources of the New Order's legitimacy. All told, the Suharto regime was profoundly dependent upon international aid in the early 1970s. As a percentage of total government revenue, international aid to Indonesia climbed from 25 percent in 1968 to almost 40 percent in 1970 before settling near 15 percent through the rest of the decade as oil revenues grew in

²⁷³ Government of Indonesia, *Rentjana pembangunan lima tahun 1969/70 – 1973/74* (Jakarta: Departemen Penerangan, 1969), 36.

²⁷⁴ John M. Allison, "Indonesia: The End of the Beginning?" *Asian Survey* 10, no. 2 (February 1970): 150.

²⁷⁵ Government of Indonesia, *Rencana pembangunan lima tahun kedua 1974/75 – 1978/79* (Jakarta: Republik Indonesia, 1974), 6-15.

importance.²⁷⁶



Figure 1: International Aid as a Percentage of Total Government Revenue in Indonesia. Data taken from Government of Indonesia, *Nota keuangan dan rancangan anggaran pendapatan dan belanja negara* (Jakarta: Departemen Keuangan, 1969-1980).

International military and economic aid introduced a great many distortions into Indonesian political life. The most important was enabling Suharto to finance a bloated military establishment, whose manned strength hovered around 300,000 in the 1970s, a figure that Indonesian and international observers alike considered far greater than necessary to meet the country's defensive needs. According to the annual budgets prepared by the Indonesian government, the military's share of total government spending hovered between 25 and 50 percent in the 1970s.²⁷⁷ Outside the Warsaw Pact, only Israel, Jordan, Syria, the Yemens, Oman, Pakistan, Taiwan, Singapore, and the United States reached similar levels of military

²⁷⁶ See the issues of Government of Indonesia, *Nota keuangan dan rancangan anggaran pendapatan dan belanja negara* (Jakarta: Departemen Keuangan, 1969-1980).

²⁷⁷ Ibid.

spending as a percentage of government expenditures over the same time period.²⁷⁸ If anything, the publicly available Indonesian budgets likely *understate* the military's monopolization of the state's resources, insofar as off-books sources of financing, such as revenues diverted from military-owned or military-dominated businesses regularly accounted for half of total government spending in the early years of the New Order, according to the most reliable estimates.²⁷⁹ A March 1970 editorial in the armed forces newspaper *Angkatan Bersendjata* confirmed that the official budget covered only half of the Indonesian military's needs.²⁸⁰ The foundation of Suharto's authority, such a massive military would have been unsustainable without international aid. And it was not only military aid that was critical, because economic aid allowed Suharto to offset other costs and divert additional resources toward the military that would have otherwise been necessary to maintain the loyalty of the Indonesian population.

²⁷⁸ Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Worldwide Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1970-1979* (Washington, DC: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1982).

²⁷⁹ Lex Rieffel and Jaleswari Pramodhawardani, *Out of Business and On Budget: The Challenge of Military Financing in Indonesia* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), 32; R.E. Elson, *Suharto: A Political Biography* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 151.

²⁸⁰ *Angkatan Bersendjata*, March 4, 1970.




Figure 2: Total U.S. Aid and Indonesia's Military Budget. Data taken from U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Worldwide Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers* (Washington, DC: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, various years); and U.S. Agency for International Development, *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, 1945-2013* (Washington, DC: USAID, 2015).

As international aid figures reached their peak as a percentage of Indonesian government revenue, Suharto moved against the institutions and organizations upon which his ascent had depended. He moved first to secure the loyalty of the military. The September 30th Movement had decimated the army's top brass, and Suharto's decisive action to turn back the putsch left him with the influence necessary to determine the shape of the reconstituted general staff in Jakarta. But resistance to his authority remained in the army's various regional commands, whose powerful leaders had enjoyed considerable autonomy under Sukarno and continued to prize their personal fiefdoms. The officer corps of the air force and navy, consisting mostly of Sukarnoists, also grated against the extension of Suharto's authority, not least because their branches relied overwhelmingly on Soviet-supplied equipment. Suharto first worked to establish total dominance within the army. It was painstaking work, but by 1969 he had reassigned all potential rivals to areas of the country where they had no political cachet or kicked them upstairs to ambassadorships or other symbolic posts. Then it came time

to consolidate his authority over the other branches of the armed forces. By then, much of the equipment of the air force and navy was derelict, and Moscow was less than eager to supply the new, right-wing Indonesian government with spare parts at a discounted price. The decrepit state of the air force and navy rendered them vulnerable to Suharto's threats and blandishments. In October and November 1969, Suharto reorganized the Indonesian military to eliminate all operational independence between services and bring them under the central control of Dephankam.²⁸¹ By the end of the year, Suharto's control over the military was uncontested.²⁸² International aid helped him to win the loyalty of the air force and navy. When Suharto met with Nixon and Kissinger in May 1970, he made a special appeal for aircraft and watercraft.²⁸³ And most of the military equipment that the United States provided Indonesia over the next five years went to the air force and navy, ensuring that no challenges to Suharto's authority would arise from within the military for want of equipment.

Student and youth organizations represented another potential challenge. The Islamic Student Association (HMI), Indonesian Student Action Front (KAMI), and Indonesian Highschool Student Action Front (KAPPI) staged raucous protests in the months after September 30, 1965. Seeing themselves as "shock troops" for the military, they supported Suharto in his war of attrition against Sukarno by making public demands that the PKI be banned, that the government be reformed, and that prices be lowered.²⁸⁴ Students and youth (*pemuda*) had a reputation as the revolutionary vanguard of political change in Indonesia, and their agitation in the early months of the New Order proved helpful to Suharto. But their

²⁸¹ "Reorganisasi ABRI," *Indonesia Raya*, October 11, 1969.

²⁸² Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, revised edition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 228-241.

²⁸³ MemCon, Nixon, Kissinger, and Suharto, May 26, 1970, MemCon - The President/Pres. Suharto/Kissinger May 26, 1970, Box 1024, NSC Files, RNPL.

²⁸⁴ Jusuf Wanandi, *Shades of Grey: A Political Memoir of Modern Indonesia, 1965-1998* (Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2012), Kindle locations 652 and 719.

continued activism posed a threat to Suharto's vision of a depoliticized Indonesian society.²⁸⁵ Some agitators, dissatisfied with the corruption, inequality, and authoritarianism of the New Order, began staging protests against Suharto. In March 1969, they demanded a purge of blatantly corrupt officials, which Suharto rejected.²⁸⁶ In 1971, they mounted a demonstration against the pet project of Suharto's wife, Ibu Tien—a 250-acre, \$26 million theme park dedicated to showcasing Indonesia's cultural diversity, which was financed mostly with ill-gotten money.²⁸⁷ "How much of Pertamina's [the Indonesian state oil company] money was used to fund the *Taman Mini Indonesia Indah* project?" asked one disgruntled letter writer a few years later, echoing the students' sentiment.²⁸⁸ The protest against the theme park turned violent when, at Ibu Tien's behest, armed gangs attacked the student and youth demonstrators with fists, machetes, and pistols. The brazen activism of Indonesia's youth frightened the country's military rulers, who responded by ordering the dissolution of youth gangs and ordering that all student and youth organizations be subsumed the umbrella of a new, government-controlled body: the National Indonesian Youth Committee (KNPI).²⁸⁹

Student and youth unrest continued to escalate in late 1973 and early 1974. In Jakarta, the HMI led protests on an almost weekly basis.²⁹⁰ Simmering youth discontent exploded in mid-January, when Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka visited Jakarta. Protests against

²⁸⁵ See Benedict Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972).

²⁸⁶ "KAMI KAPUT?" *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 6, 1969.

²⁸⁷ For the cost see Yulia Nurliani Lukito, *Exhibiting Modernity and Indonesian Vernacular Architecture: Hybrid Architecture at Pasar Gambir of Batavia, the 1931 Paris International Colonial Exhibition and Taman Mini Indonesia Indah* (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2016), 129.

²⁸⁸ Letter, Martono to Hamengkubuwono, January 25, 1976, Martono: Surat tanggal 25 Januari 1976 tentang pendapat masyarakat terhadap tulisan di Harian Suara Merdeka tanggal 2 January 1976 berjudul "Peningkatan Orde Baru Dunia," 121, HB IX, ANRI.

²⁸⁹ Loren Rytter, "Pemuda Pancasila," in Benedict Anderson, ed., *Violence and the State in Suharto's Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001), 137-141; Government of Indonesia, *14 tahun Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia, 23 Juli 1973-1987* (Jakarta: Departemen Penerangan, 1987), 39-63.

²⁹⁰ "Mahasiswa: Katakanlah dengan senyum," *Tempo*, January 19, 1974.

corruption and inequality, in which young Indonesian demonstrators believed Japan was implicated, erupted into riots that left almost a dozen dead, hundreds more injured, and millions of dollars in property damage. The January 15th Disaster (*Malapetaka Lima Belas Januari*), as the riots came to be known, shook the foundations of the New Order and led Suharto to accelerate his efforts to bring Indonesian *pemuda* to heel. In March 1974, at a session of the Council on Political Stabilization and National Security, Suharto explained that “The formation of the National Indonesian Youth Committee is intended to develop Indonesian youth so that they cannot easily be divided and are not fragmented in the narrowness of group politics and ideology.”²⁹¹ At almost every subsequent council meeting over the following six months, the KNPI was the first issue discussed, illustrating the importance Suharto put on depoliticizing Indonesian youth. “Do not hesitate in giving the right direction to the activities” of students, Suharto explained in November 1974. “Although it seems small, if left to drag on this experience can have substantial consequences in the future.”²⁹² The Indonesian military surveilled and suppressed hostile student and youth organizations and channeled funds to groups friendly toward the New Order, effectively incorporating *pemuda* into the state by hook and by crook. Because so much of the military and state budgets depended upon international aid, the neutralization of Indonesian students and youth depended, albeit indirectly, on those same external sources of capital.

Endowed with less ideological influence than students and youth but more institutional strength, political parties represented a third potential challenge to the Suharto regime. The

²⁹¹ Polkam, March 12, 1974, Sekretaris Negara RI: Risalah petunjuk dan putusan presiden dalam sidang dewan stabilisasi polkam tanggal 12 Maret 1974-16 Nopember 1976, disertai surat pengantar, 567, HB IX, ANRI.

²⁹² Polkam, November 14, 1974, Sekretaris Negara RI: Risalah petunjuk dan putusan presiden dalam sidang dewan stabilisasi polkam tanggal 12 Maret 1974-16 Nopember 1976, disertai surat pengantar, 567, HB IX, ANRI.

military men who dominated the New Order held Indonesia's political parties in contempt, viewing them as vehicles of conflict that stirred up parochial rivalries among the population and thereby impeded economic development. But Suharto nevertheless allowed a circumscribed role for political parties in the early years of the New Order. After decimating the left wing of Sukarno's Indonesian National Party (PNI), Suharto allowed the party to resume political activities beginning in 1967. The following year, he assented to the creation of a new Islamic party. Why? Parties retained a massive political infrastructure across the archipelago, and Suharto worried that banning them outright would ignite a popular rebellion.²⁹³ But he also tasked Ali Murtopo with covertly intervening in the parties' internal affairs to ensure they selected leaders amenable to the New Order's constrained conception of politics.²⁹⁴ Only as international aid skyrocketed in the late 1960s and early 1970s did the Suharto regime's manipulation and domination of the political parties become more overt. Money from the New Order's coffers flowed to political parties that acceded to Suharto's directions, and military commanders openly pressured party delegates to choose leaders friendly to the regime.

Yet Suharto still resented the kaleidoscope of Indonesian parliamentary politics. "If the road is already there, the one and only," he wondered in his memoirs, "why must we have so many cars, as many as nine? Why must we have speeding and collisions?"²⁹⁵ Suharto therefore implemented a "simplification" of Indonesia's political system in 1973, agglomerating the archipelago's Islamic parties into the Development Unity Party (PPP) and its nationalist parties into the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). The New Order exerted

²⁹³ Hamish McDonald, *Suharto's Indonesia* (Blackburn: Dominion Press, 1981), 96-97.

²⁹⁴ Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, 245-264.

²⁹⁵ Soeharto, *Pikiran, Ucapan, dan Tindakan Saya: Otobiografi Seperti Dipaparkan kepada G. Dwipayana dan Ramadhan K.H.* (Jakarta: Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1989), 266.

almost total control over these reconstituted political parties. Suharto ordered his Council on Political Stabilization and National Security to provide the PPP and PDI, as well as the government Golkar party, with a monthly subsidy of 2.5 million rupiah.²⁹⁶ The following month, he told the council to prohibit the publication of an official PDI newspaper, saying the decision was necessary to “safeguard political stability.”²⁹⁷ As the PDI struggled against external constraints, it was paralyzed by internal conflict, since it housed an unruly combination of hostile parties. After two years of bitter factional struggle, Suharto hand-picked new leadership for the PDI, which he anticipated would stabilize the party and make it friendlier to the regime.²⁹⁸

More cohesive than the PDI, the PPP won gentler treatment from the Suharto regime. In June 1976, Kopkamtib asked PPP leaders not to use as their logo an image of the Ka’bah, the holiest site in Islam toward which all Muslims pray. In a country where illiteracy rates reached almost 40 percent, and where more than 90 percent of the population espoused Islam, New Order leaders believed the Ka’bah logo, which like all party logos appeared on electoral ballots, would afford the PPP a disproportionate advantage in the forthcoming 1977 elections.²⁹⁹ PPP leaders refused the regime’s appeal, and not until five years later was the party finally forced to change its logo. But the PPP was nevertheless plagued by internal

²⁹⁶ Polkam, March 12, 1974, Sekretaris Negara RI: Risalah petunjuk dan putusan presiden dalam sidang dewan stabilisasi polkam tanggal 12 Maret 1974-16 Nopember 1976, disertai surat pengantar, 567, HB IX, ANRI.

²⁹⁷ Polkam, May 14, 1974, Sekretaris Negara RI: Risalah petunjuk dan putusan presiden dalam sidang dewan stabilisasi polkam tanggal 12 Maret 1974-16 Nopember 1976, disertai surat pengantar, 567, HB IX, ANRI.

²⁹⁸ Polkam, April 13, 1976, Sekretaris Negara RI: Risalah petunjuk dan putusan presiden dalam sidang dewan stabilisasi polkam tanggal 12 Maret 1974-16 Nopember 1976, disertai surat pengantar, 567, HB IX, ANRI; see also Edward Aspinall, *Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance, and Regime Change in Indonesia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 147-150.

²⁹⁹ Polkam, June 22, 1976, Sekretaris Negara RI: Risalah petunjuk dan putusan presiden dalam sidang dewan stabilisasi polkam tanggal 12 Maret 1974-16 Nopember 1976, disertai surat pengantar, 567, HB IX, ANRI; for illiteracy rates see Government of Indonesia, *Ringkasan penduduk Indonesia menurut propinsi dan pulau 1976* (Jakarta: Biro Pusat Statistik, 1976), 34.

factionalism, which rendered it vulnerable to the Suharto regime's interference and made the party largely ineffectual as a voice for Indonesian Muslims.³⁰⁰ Both the PPP and the PDI were, moreover, prohibited from operating at the village and subdistrict levels, which prevented them from cultivating the ties with the population that had made political parties so powerful under Sukarno. Suharto's establishment of control over Indonesia's political parties depended upon international aid. Without external sources of capital, Suharto would have been required to extract greater resources out of the Indonesian population, and the infrastructural and institutional strength of political parties would have been vital in that extractive effort. In other words, international aid enabled Suharto to pursue subjugation rather than negotiation with Indonesia's political parties.

In spite of his reliance on international aid to maintain the durability of his regime, Suharto routinely adopted positions of aloofness from, or even opposition to, the geopolitical concerns of his international patrons. These included the Vietnam War, the oil crisis, and the New International Economic Order.

The Suharto regime never wavered from its public opposition to the Vietnam War. Foreign Minister Adam Malik, in a 1966 speech before parliament in which he first explained the international outlook of the New Order, insisted that Indonesia "continues to stand firmly in support the Vietnamese people in opposition to the United States military intervention." He urged "the United States to withdraw its military forces from Vietnam and hand over the

³⁰⁰ Umaid Radi, *Strategi PPP 1973-1982: Suatu studi tentang kekuatan politik Islam tingkat nasional* (Jakarta: Integrita Press, 1984).

solution of the Vietnam issue to the Vietnamese people themselves.”³⁰¹ Even after the Nixon administration opened the floodgates of military and economic aid beginning in 1969, Suharto and other senior Indonesian officials continued to criticize the American prosecution of the war in public, particularly its expansion into Cambodia. When Suharto traveled to Washington to appeal for heightened levels of aid in May 1970, he gave an unusually harsh toast at a dinner with Nixon in which he urged that all efforts “be taken to prevent the war from widening and to insure the preservation of Cambodia’s right to sovereignty and neutrality, among other things, by effecting the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Cambodian territory.”³⁰² In private, Indonesian officials urged the Nixon administration to remain in Indochina as long as it took to preserve the region’s noncommunist governments.³⁰³ But even as the Nixon administration sought to portray the war as necessary to preserve the security of Southeast Asia and supported by noncommunist Asian leaders, Suharto refused to make any public statements to that effect.

Why did the Suharto regime refuse to offer any rhetorical or material support for the Vietnam War? The answer lies in Indonesia’s domestic politics. Since 1948, *bebas aktif*, or free and active, had served as the watchwords of Indonesian foreign policy.³⁰⁴ Perceived transgressions of Indonesia’s neutralist line caused public outcries and toppled governments: In 1952, after Foreign Minister Subardjo concluded a mutual security agreement with the United States and pledged Indonesia would contribute to the defense of the “free world,” a

³⁰¹ Adam Malik, *Politik luar negeri Indonesia dipimpin oleh falsafah Pantja-Sila: Pidato Waperdam/menlu Adam Malik dimuka sidang DPR-GR pada tanggal 5 Mei 1966* (Jakarta: Kementerian Peneranan, 1966), 27-28.

³⁰² “Suharto Says Red Troop Intervention in Asia Must Be Prevented,” *New York Times*, May 28, 1970.

³⁰³ Memorandum of Conversation, Kissinger and Indonesian Leaders, July 28, 1969, MemCons - The President's Asian and European Trip July - August 1969, Box 1023, NSC Files, RNPL.

³⁰⁴ Riwayat Salamun, *Politik bebas aktif Indonesia dan pengembangan ketahanan nasional serta ketahanan regional Asia Tenggara* (Jakarta: Markas Besar Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional, 1991).

spate of public protests, some of which turned violent, forced the entire cabinet to resign. Even after Suharto's takeover, the free and active principle remained popular among the Indonesian population. The country's parliament reaffirmed *bebas aktif* as the "foundation" of Indonesian foreign policy in 1966, and Suharto affirmed the principle in his annual State Speech the following year.³⁰⁵ A political scientist who visited the archipelago in the early 1970s and surveyed the country's foreign policy elite found that two-thirds of respondents believed that the free and active principle mandated "maximum efforts to maintain a balance in Indonesia's relations with the contending power blocs" in the Cold War.³⁰⁶ Too close an association with the United States would risk provoking the kind of popular and elite discontent that had undermined previous Indonesian governments.

Beyond a broad devotion to *bebas aktif*, anti-Americanism remained a potent force in Indonesian politics in the 1970s. The Vietnam War was deeply unpopular among a public inculcated with the values of anticolonialism and Third World solidarity, which held particular sway among the Indonesian left. By the mid-1970s, religious figures ill-disposed toward sympathy for communism had also begun opposing American foreign policy. The Islamic Youth Movement (GPI), a Muhammadiyah-associated youth organization within the KNPI, published a statement criticizing American involvement in the Middle East as a colonial effort to secure control over the region's natural resources and aid Israeli aggression. The statement urged Muslims the world over to "prepare to wage holy war against countries

³⁰⁵ Suharto, *Pidato kenegaraan didepan sidang DPR-GR, 16 Agustus 1967* (Jakarta: Departemen Penerangan, 1967).

³⁰⁶ Franklin Weinstein, *Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence: From Sukarno to Suharto* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976), 179-180.

that undertake military expansion in Arab countries.”³⁰⁷ Suharto’s domestic political imperatives therefore prevented him from offering public support for the Vietnam War.

Which is not to say that Suharto never worked to further American interests in Indochina. After Lon Nol’s March 1970 coup d’etat in Cambodia, the Suharto regime organized an international conference to preserve Cambodia’s sovereignty and neutrality, and to confer a degree of international legitimacy on the country’s new military government. Within two weeks of the coup, Malik told the Indonesian press that “What is happening in Cambodia at present is a change of government and that Indonesia recognizes the government currently in power in that country.” The American ambassador in Jakarta, Francis Galbraith, soon received instructions to meet with Malik and urge Asian countries to speak “with a common voice” and register their concern for Vietnamese interference in Cambodia. (No mention was made of the five-year old U.S. bombing campaign in the country, nor the impending American-South Vietnamese invasion.)³⁰⁸ Whether at American behest or his own initiative is difficult to discern, but Malik spent the next six weeks organizing a conference of Asian states to discuss the situation in Cambodia. The conference, to be held in Jakarta, would demonstrate Indonesia’s ability to play a leading role in Southeast Asia, bolster Malik’s prestige within the New Order, and forestall pressure from Indonesian generals for more direct intervention in Cambodia.

³⁰⁷ Gerakan Pemuda Islam: Seruan tanggal 27 Januari 1975 tentang rencana ekspansi militer Amerika Serikat ke Timur Tengah, 588, HB IX, ANRI.

³⁰⁸ Telegram, Department of State to AmEmbassy Djakarta, March 31, 1970, POL CAMB-INDON, SNF, RG 59, NARA.

Malik implored, cajoled, and browbeat representatives of more than twenty Asian countries to attend.³⁰⁹ Most noncommunist states accepted his invitation, although some did so reluctantly, while communist countries like North Vietnam, North Korea, and China declined to participate, as did the more strictly non-aligned states like Burma and, to Malik's dismay, India. That the conference offered a role to Lon Nol but not to the deposed Sihanouk suggested its aim was to legitimize Cambodia's new, American-backed government and decry North Vietnamese interference in the country. Still, the Indonesian organizers worked to keep up appearances. At the conference's opening ceremonies, Suharto explained that "We gather here not to discuss a strategy for interfering in Cambodia's internal affairs; on the contrary, we are trying to help Cambodia maintain its legitimate rights."³¹⁰ In closed-door sessions over the following two days, the assembled delegates hashed out a communique urging the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Cambodia.³¹¹ Though the conference met with denunciations from China, and though the ongoing American invasion of Cambodia gave the proceedings what one journalist called an "air of futility," American policymakers exulted.³¹² They celebrated the Indonesian-led conference as a manifestation of the Nixon Doctrine principle of Asian solutions to Asian problems.³¹³

Meanwhile Suharto, apparently without Malik's knowledge, offered to serve as a conduit for American military aid to the Lon Nol regime, effectively undermining the publicly

³⁰⁹ Director of Intelligence and Research, Intelligence Brief: The Asian Meeting on Cambodia, May 12, 1970, POL 7 INDON 5/1/70, Box 2372, SNF, RG 59, ANRI; for a more detailed summary of these efforts see Ang Cheng Guan, *Southeast Asia and the Vietnam War* (New York: Routledge, 2010), 79-86.

³¹⁰ Amanat pada upacara pembukaan Konferensi para Menteri Luar Negeri Asia di Djakarta, pada tanggal 16 Mei 1970, 337, PPS, ANRI.

³¹¹ Telegram, AmEmbassy Djakarta to SecState WashDC, May 17, 1970, POL 7 INDON 5/16/70, Box 2372, SNF, RG 59, NARA.

³¹² "Whispers from the Sideline," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 4, 1970.

³¹³ Telegram, AmEmbassy Djakarta to SecState WashDC, May 18, 1970, POL 7 INDON 5/16/70, Box 2372, SNF, RG 59, NARA.

stated objectives of the Jakarta Conference. Within weeks of Lon Nol's coup, the Nixon administration hatched a scheme for the Suharto regime to furnish the new Cambodian government with Indonesian-made AK-47s and ammunition.³¹⁴ Suharto agreed to the plan in early April, provided the Indonesian AK-47s would be replenished by American-made M-16s. An Opsus team traveled to Cambodia in mid-April to lay the groundwork for Indonesian military assistance to the Lon Nol regime.³¹⁵ Around the same time, the State Secretariat, run by General Sudharmono, tasked the Legal and Analysis Bureau with preparing a memorandum on how the New Order could square aid to Cambodia with Indonesia's *bebas aktif* foreign policy. The bureau reported back that the provision of aid to Cambodia—while technically justifiable as an effort to combat Vietnamese imperialism, preserve Cambodian independence, and secure Indonesian interests—“should be a special case, an exception imposed by circumstance.” It envisioned an aid package anywhere between a minimal program of small arms and training and a maximal program that included heavy equipment like trucks, tanks, helicopters, and aircraft.³¹⁶

Malik found out about the plan in mid-April, and he worked with sympathetic American officials to derail it. He told Francis Galbraith, the U.S. ambassador in Jakarta, that the Nixon administration should “continue to drag our feet on responding to Suharto on proposal that U.S. replenish Indonesian arms supply to Cambodia.”³¹⁷ He also opposed the

³¹⁴ Telegram, Department of State to AmEmbassy Djakarta, April 10, 1970, POL 7 INDON 1/1/70, Box 2372, SNF, RG 59, NARA; Minutes of WSAG Meeting, April 14, 1970, Originals, 1969 and 1970, WSAG Minutes, H-114, H Files, RNPL.

³¹⁵ Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, April 2, 1970, in *FRUS 1969-1976:20*, 616-617; Telegram, AmEmbassy Djakarta to SecState WashDC, April 26, 1970, POL 7 INDON, Box 2372, SNF, RG 59, NARA.

³¹⁶ Biro Analisa dan Perundang-undangan, Memorandum tentang bantuan militer kepada Kambodja dan politik bebas aktif R.I., June 18, 1970, Laporan-laporan mengenai situasi politik dalam dan luar negeri, 122, Sekkab, ANRI.

³¹⁷ See *FRUS, 1969-1976:20*, 624fn2.

idea publicly, telling the press that Indonesia would offer Cambodia prayers, but not arms.³¹⁸ With both the Indonesian and American governments riven by internal conflict, the arms replenishment scheme stalled for more than a month. Only when Suharto visited Washington in May did preparations resume. Meeting with Nixon in the Oval Office, the Indonesian strongman complained that Galbraith had slow-walked the idea that the United States could replenish any Indonesian military equipment to Cambodia. Nixon was furious, calling Kissinger to complain that Galbraith's attitude was "troubling" and giving the order: "They [the Indonesians] should provide assistance and we will replace it. Let's get going on that subject."³¹⁹ Kissinger met twice with Suharto's military emissary, General Sumitro, in early July. The meetings were devoted to ironing out an expanded Military Assistance Program (MAP) package for Indonesia, as we have already seen, but Sumitro and Kissinger also finalized an arrangement whereby Indonesia would furnish Cambodia with 25,000 AK-47 rifles and the United States would in exchange provide Indonesia with 30,000 M-16s.³²⁰ The effort won Indonesia an additional \$3 million in American military aid in 1970. In the years following, Indonesia continued to supply Cambodia with military aid.³²¹ The Cambodia arms scheme served both American and Indonesian interests, inasmuch as it furnished the Lon Nol regime with military aid without provoking a hostile American Congress and deepened Indonesia's own aid relationship with the United States. But it also revealed the limits of the New Order's willingness to support American geopolitical interests. An effort to modernize

³¹⁸ "Adam's Prayer," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 7, 1970.

³¹⁹ Telcon, Kissinger and Nixon, May 26, 1970, May 21-31, 1970, Box 5, HAK Telcons, RNPL.

³²⁰ MemCon, Kissinger and Sumitro, July 8, 1970, Backchannel - Indonesia HAK/Sumitro 1970 [2 of 2], Box 101, NSC Files, RNPL.

³²¹ Minta Bantuan Indonesia, Menlu Kamboja Temui Presiden Soeharto, 13 Januari 1971, in G. Dwipayana and Nazarudin Sjamsuddin, eds., *Jejak Langkah Pak Harto: 28 Maret 1968 – 23 Maret 1973* (Jakarta: Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1991), 226.

the Indonesian military had to be kept secret lest it inflame public opinion, and even then it still had to overcome significant opposition within the New Order regime.

The New Order was similarly reluctant to support American geoeconomic interests. That much became clear in 1973-1974, when Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) leaders responded to American support for Israel during the Jewish state's war with its Arab neighbors by embargoing the sale of oil to the United States, slashing production, and marking up prices. A barrel of oil that had sold for only \$3 in September 1973 sold for \$12 in January 1974. Kissinger and other senior American policymakers hoped that Indonesia would exert a moderating influence within OPEC and pressure other oil exporting countries to increase production and lower prices. After all, Indonesia had declined to participate in the embargo levied by Arab OPEC member states against Israel's international patrons. Yet consular officials stationed in Jakarta doubted that the Suharto regime would cooperate, for the simple reason that doing so was not in Indonesia's economic interest. New Order officials, they said, harbored "concern, in part for domestic political purposes, that Indonesia do no less well than OPEC countries in obtaining [the] best return for its oil exports."³²² Their conclusions were accurate.

Indonesia's hydrocarbon sector boomed in the 1970s, which one senior New Order economist called the archipelago's "oil decade."³²³ Huge numbers of new oil fields came online as multinational conglomerates like Caltex, Shell, and Stanvac, along with more than forty other oil smaller companies, flooded into the archipelago in joint ventures with

³²² Telegram, AmEmbassy Jakarta to SecState WashDC, January 26, 1974, in *FRUS 1969-1976:E-12*, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve12> (accessed February 17, 2018).

³²³ Radius, *Indonesia's Struggle for Economic Development*, 101.

Indonesia's state oil company, Pertamina.³²⁴ Oil became increasingly vital to the New Order: As a share of the government's budget, oil revenues first eclipsed tax revenues in 1970-71 and doubled them beginning in 1974-75.³²⁵ And Pertamina's profits fueled industries far beyond the hydrocarbon sector—including agriculture, tourism, shipping, and insurance—and even funded white elephant projects like the Krakatau steel mill. As Ibnu Sutowo, the ostentatious Pertamina chief put it in September 1973, "Pertamina is more than just an oil company. We are a development company for Indonesia."³²⁶ Most important for Suharto, Pertamina's profits and debts became an important off-the-books source of financing for the Indonesian military.

New Order leaders refused to sacrifice Indonesia's economic interests at the altar of cheap oil for the United States. Bakin suggested in April 1974 that Indonesia "must maintain the price of oil and, if possible, raise it again." It would therefore be critical to maintain the unity of OPEC countries and overcome any Saudi or Egyptian inclinations to lower prices.³²⁷ The reason, as spelled out in a memo to Hamengkubuwono two months later, was simple: in Indonesia's 1973-74 fiscal year, oil accounted for 47 percent of Indonesia's foreign exchange earnings and 39 percent of its domestic revenues, and Suharto's second five-year development plan anticipated that the value of Indonesia's oil exports would rise an additional 33 percent

³²⁴ Robert Fabrikant, "Production Sharing Contracts in the Indonesian Petroleum Industry," *Harvard International Law Journal* 16, no. 303 (1975): 303.

³²⁵ See Government of Indonesia, *Nota keuangan, 1971-1975*.

³²⁶ Pertamina Public Relations, *Pertamina for a closer Indonesian relationship with the developed countries in its second five-year development plan: Speech by Lieutenant-General Dr. Ibnu Sutowo* (Jakarta: Pertamina, 1973), 2.

³²⁷ Memo, Asisten Wakil Presiden Urusan Pemerintahan kepada Hamengkubuwono, April 9, 1974, Asisten urusan pemerintah: Memo tanggal 9 April 1974 tentang pokok-pokok memo Bakin mengenai sikap Indonesia menjelang sidang istimewa Majelis Umum PBB yaitu masalah bahan bakar dan pembangunan, 321, HB IX, ANRI.

every year between 1974-1979.³²⁸ In meetings of OPEC ministers over the course of 1974, Indonesian negotiators consistently worked to overcome Saudi objections to further hikes in the price of oil.³²⁹ Indonesia did not follow other OPEC countries and adopt an additional 10 percent increase in the price of oil in September 1975, and it instead raised prices only four percent. But as a Ford administration NSC staffer reported, “Indonesian crude was overpriced to begin with, and thus the resultant per barrel figure approximates that of the other OPEC countries.”³³⁰

Indonesia’s efforts to promote a New International Economic Order (NIEO) were of a piece with its efforts to obtain additional oil revenues. The OPEC example inspired Third World leaders to renew their calls for a more equitable distribution of global resources. Algerian leader Houari Boumedienne organized a special session of the United Nations, where in April 1974 he called for a New International Economic Order. His demands joined economic nationalism (the rights of states to control their own natural resources and regulate multinational corporations) and dependency theory (nonreciprocal trade preferences for developing countries and technology transfers from north to south). “The raw material-producing-countries insist on being masters in their own houses,” Boumedienne proclaimed.³³¹ Kissinger’s response to the NIEO sought to unite the West and divide the Third World between oil producers and consumers.³³² “Obviously we can’t accept the new economic order,” he explained in a meeting with senior Ford administration policymakers,

³²⁸ Memorandum, Asisten Wakil Presiden Urusan Pemerintahan kepada Hamengkubuwono, June 26, 1974, Asisten urusan pemerintah: Memo tanggal 9 April 1974 tentang pokok-pokok memo Bakin mengenai sikap Indonesia menjelang sidang istimewa Majelis Umum PBB yaitu masalah bahan bakar dan pembangunan, 321, HB IX, ANRI.

³²⁹ Memorandum, Asisten Presiden Urusan Pemerintahan kepada Hamengkubuwono, September 3, 1974, Ibid.; Memorandum, Asisten Presiden Urusan Pemerintahan kepada Hamengkubuwono, September 25, 1974, Ibid.

³³⁰ Memorandum, Barnes to Scowcroft, October 23, 1975, Indonesia (3), Box 6, NSC-EA Presidential, GFPL.

³³¹ “Poor Lands Urged to Control Goods,” *New York Times*, April 11, 1974.

³³² Sargent, *A Superpower Transformed*, 175-179.

“but I would like to pull its teeth and divide these countries up, not solidify them.”³³³ The centerpiece of these divisive efforts was a North-South dialogue through which the United States agreed to cooperate with developing countries to stabilize their export revenues on an individual basis. Indonesia, as a Western-aligned country that exported raw materials like palm oil and rubber in addition to petroleum, ought to have been susceptible to American leverage on the NIEO. Yet Suharto’s New Order did everything it could to further Boumedienne’s New International Economic Order and undercut Kissinger’s divisive efforts.³³⁴ At a follow-up special session of the United Nations in September 1975, Malik derided Kissinger’s efforts to separate OPEC member states from other developing countries as “neither a correct nor a helpful approach to our deliberations.”³³⁵ Indonesia accordingly ramped up its advocacy of the New International Economic Order in various international fora. In spite of its dependence on international aid, Indonesia remained strikingly independent in its foreign policy.

The same pattern played out in Malaysia and the Philippines. Razak and Marcos used threat inflation to extract the maximum possible amount of aid out of the United States and the international community, wielded internationally obtained resources to construct and consolidate newly authoritarian political structures, and yet refused to toe the American line on issues of geopolitical import to the United States. Singapore remained exceptional. Far less dependent upon American resources than its neighbors in island Southeast Asia, Singapore

³³³ MemCon, Ford, Kissinger, et. al., May 26, 1975, in *FRUS 1969-1976:31*, 1012.

³³⁴ Adam Malik, *Mengabdikan republik, Jilid III: Angkatan pembangunan* (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1979), 96-108.

³³⁵ Statement by His Excellency Mr. Adam Malik, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Indonesia, Head of the Indonesian Delegation to the 7th Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, September 2, 1975, Menteri Luar Negeri Adam Malik kepada Presiden: Laporan delegasi RI ke sidang khusus ke-VII Majelis Umum PBB di New York tanggal 1-16 September 1975, disertai pengantar, 202, HB IX, ANRI.

under Lee nevertheless served as the most vocal and reliable American partner in the region. While archival limitations make it impossible to present as detailed a picture as Indonesia, a brief sketch of developments in each country reveals similar themes.

As a former British colony, Malaysia looked to the United Kingdom for security assistance in the early years of its independence. And even after Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced in 1968 that British forces would be withdrawn from positions east of Suez by 1971, Malaysia continued to position itself within the Commonwealth rather than the American orbit. Together with their counterparts in London, Singapore, Canberra, and Wellington, policymakers in Kuala Lumpur signed on to the Five Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA), which pledged each of the five Commonwealth countries to immediate consultations, though not necessarily military intervention, in the event of an attack on any other. But Malaysia continued to harbor doubts about the willingness of Commonwealth countries to come to its assistance in the event of an attack, and British aid to Malaysia declined steadily as the 1970s wore on.³³⁶

The Razak regime therefore began looking to the United States for aid. In December 1971, an attaché at the American embassy in Kuala Lumpur sent a note to Thong Yaw Hong, the deputy secretary of the Economic Planning Unit (EPU), a powerful government agency in the prime minister's office, informing him of surplus equipment from Vietnam that could be used to further Malaysian development programs, including land reclamation and port construction schemes.³³⁷ Total American aid to Malaysia remained relatively low in absolute terms, but the Razak regime made a concerted effort to win heightened levels of American

³³⁶ Airgram, AmEmbassy Kuala Lumpur to Department of State, August 4, 1969, POL 1 MALAYSIA 1/1/67, Box 2321, CFPPF, RG 59, NARA.

³³⁷ Letter, Crawford to Thong, December 16, 1971, Surplus Equipment in Vietnam - 1987/0029239 - W/E/06/B/28/d/2, ANM.

military aid as the Vietnam War came to an end. In November 1972, the Malaysian deputy minister of defense met with the U.S. ambassador in Kuala Lumpur to explain his government's anxiety at the prospect of weapons from Indochina "falling into enemy hands." "One way to reduce our enemy's chances of obtaining these weapons," the Malaysian said, "is for these weapons to be owned by anti-communist powers," such as his own government.³³⁸ When Phnom Penh and Saigon fell to advancing communist forces in April 1975, Razak told his military leadership that "We should take advantage of this golden opportunity" to secure surplus weapons and equipment from the Indochina theater—hardly the words of a man fearful of an impending communist offensive.³³⁹ Razak died suddenly before he could make his case, but his successor, Datuk Hussein Onn, appealed for heightened military aid when Ford's vice president, Nelson Rockefeller, traveled to Malaysia and Singapore in March 1976 to reassure regional leaders of the continuity of American power and purpose in Asia. Onn planned to ask for an enlarged aid and credit relationship to meet what he characterized as an expanded communist threat from the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) and the communist states of Indochina.³⁴⁰ In spite of American intelligence officials' belief that the communist insurgency "remains well below the threshold at which it in any way threatens the government's control of the country," Onn's gambit proved successful and won Malaysia \$65 million in military credits between 1976-1979.³⁴¹

³³⁸ Surat Peringatan, Catatan perbincangan mengenai baki alat-alat tentera Amerika Syarikat di Vietnam Selatan, November 6, 1972, American Aid and Credit Sales - KP/Laut/1275 Vol. 2 - W/E/04/B/06/b/2, ANM.

³³⁹ Minit mesyuarat membeli senjata dan alat kelengkapan perang Amerika yang berlebih dari peperangan Vietnam dan Khmer, May 9, 1975, American Aid and Credit Sales - KP/Laut/1275 Vol. 2 - W/E/04/B/06/b/2, ANM.

³⁴⁰ Wisma Putra, Talking Points for the Visit of the Vice-President of America to Malaysia, March 19, 1976, Visit of Ministers and Senior Officials from U.S.A. - 2005/0019401 - W/E/04/A/02/d/1, ANM.

³⁴¹ Memorandum, Scowcroft to Rockefeller, March 1976, Vice President's Trip to East Asia, March-April 1976 (3), Box 20, NSC-EA Staff, GFPL; Cheah Kong Lee, Pembelian Kelengkapan melalui Tunai/Pinjaman, December 21, 1976, American Aid and Credit Sales - KP/Laut/1275 Vol. 2 - W/E/04/B/06/b/2, ANM.

Total U.S. aid to Malaysia increased consistently throughout the 1970s. And the military percentage of American aid to Malaysia spiked from less than 10 percent in 1970 to more than 80 percent in 1976. As the decade wore on, American aid became an important source of financing for the Razak and Onn regimes' development and military expansion programs. In 1971, Razak unveiled the Second Malaysia Plan as the country resumed a circumscribed form of parliamentary governance—one that, for example, did away with the requirement that parliamentary districts house populations of similar size, allowing blatant gerrymandering to secure the regime's authority in relatively free but very unfair elections. The Second Malaysia Plan relied primarily on domestic sources of financing. Only 15 percent of its expenditures depended upon foreign aid or borrowing.³⁴² By the Third Malaysia Plan, active from 1976-1980, the government's development programs had become far more reliant upon internationally derived sources of capital. Where the Second Malaysia Plan anticipated using \$1.4 billion in foreign financing and ended up requiring \$2.3 billion, the Third Malaysia Plan anticipated relying on \$5.8 billion in foreign financing to achieve its goals. That the Ford administration had agreed to furnish the Malaysian military with undervalued equipment from the Indochina theater and additional military credits also enabled the government's proposal to "expand and strengthen its security forces considerably" during the Third Malaysia Plan.³⁴³

Marcos proved far more effective at extracting aid out of the United States and the international community, and far more dependent upon that aid to maintain the durability of his regime. In September 1970, for instance, Imelda Marcos, the garish Filipina first lady, visited the United States and requested a \$300 million stabilization fund for the Philippines.

³⁴² Government of Malaysia, *Ranchangan Malaysia Kedua, 1971-1975* (Kuala Lumpur: Percetakan Negara Kerajaan Malaysia, 1971), 86-91

³⁴³ Government of Malaysia, *The Third Malaysia Plan, 1976-1980* (Kuala Lumpur: Percetakan Negara Kerajaan Malaysia, 1976), 101-303, 244, 256.

She told Nixon and Kissinger that, without the fund, Marcos would lose the forthcoming 1972 elections and that, as a result, “we would lose everything,” including “our bases”—a not-so-subtle threat that the Marcos government would abrogate American access to Subic Bay Naval Station and Clark Air Field. “The Philippines has been branded as the American baby,” she continued, raising the specter of both American credibility and communist aggression, and “we don’t want to become another Chile.”³⁴⁴ Yet the available evidence suggests that Marcos did not fear the possibility of communist aggression or subversion. In his personal diary, Marcos raged far more often against elite competitors like Benigno Aquino and Fernando and Eugenio Lopez than communist agitators like José María Sison and Kumander Dante. Indeed, he believed that the communist insurgency was a manifestation of elite opposition to his government, and perhaps elite plots to assassinate him, rather than genuine popular discontent. “The escalating demonstrations, mobs and riots, all supported by the Lopezes,” he fumed in April 1972.³⁴⁵ One scholar who has studied Marcos’s diary entries, including many still inaccessible to the public, concludes that Marcos “seemed to discover anti-communism as the antidote for his ailing political fortunes,” in order to marshal domestic and international support against the recalcitrant Philippine oligarchy.³⁴⁶

American aid proved essential in enabling Marcos to construct a newly authoritarian regime after declaring martial law in September 1972. American aid to the Philippines doubled in the year following the declaration, and in the years to come it would regularly account for between 20-50 percent of the Philippines’ military budget. The dramatic

³⁴⁴ Mrs. Marcos to RMW, September 24, 1970, Philippines Pres. Marcos Visit Aug 70 [1 of 1], Box 935, NSC Files, RNPL.

³⁴⁵ Ferdinand Marcos, Diary Entry, April 17, 1972, *Philippine Diary Project*, <https://philippinediaryproject.wordpress.com/1972/04/17/april-17-1972/> (accessed March 2, 2018).

³⁴⁶ William Rempel, *Delusions of a Dictator: The Mind of Marcos as Revealed in His Secret Diaries* (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1993), 52.

expansion of U.S. aid allowed Marcos to double the manpower of the Philippine military—and to double the military’s share of total government expenditures—in the four years after declaring martial law.³⁴⁷ Not only that, but Marcos doubled salaries across the military over the same period.³⁴⁸ Its loyalty to Marcos thus secured, the military became the regime’s enforcer, and it imprisoned, tortured, and killed those who dared to resist Marcos’s authority. Several scholars have suggested that the Marcos regime’s authoritarian state-building efforts in the early years of martial law depended upon domestic rather than international resources. Tax collection statistics partially support this claim. In the years prior to Marcos’s declaration of martial law, the Philippine state was anemic compared to its neighbors in island Southeast Asia: Tax revenues as a percentage of national income hovered at about 10 percent, and most of the state’s revenues owed far more to indirect rather than direct taxation. In the four years following Marcos’s declaration of martial law, absolute tax revenues increased threefold, partly due fear of punishment on behalf of taxpayers and partly due to offers of tax amnesty on behalf of the government.³⁴⁹ But the state’s very capacity to make credible demands of the Philippine population, particularly the oligarchy, for tax payments owed to an enlarged military utterly dependent upon American support. Absent such huge quantities of American aid, Marcos would not have been able to marshal the resources necessary to secure the loyalty of the military, and the military would not have possessed the capacity and to subjugate the oligarchy, the judiciary, the press, the church, and civil society.

³⁴⁷ ACDA, *Worldwide Military Expenditures*, 41; U.S. Agency for International Development, *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, 1945-2013* (Washington, DC: USAID, 2015).

³⁴⁸ Wurfel, *Filipino Politics*, 148.

³⁴⁹ National Economic and Development Authority, *Five-Year Philippine Development Plan, 1978-1982: Including the Ten-Year Development Plan, 1978-1987* (Manila: NEDA Production Unit, 1987), 355-356; Asher, *Revenue Systems of ASEAN Countries*, 56-57.

Singapore was exceptional. Lee's authoritarian regime proved far less dependent upon international aid than its counterparts in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia. After peaking in the period between 1969-1973, when it totaled almost \$70 million, British aid slowed to a trickle. And American aid to the city-state, after an infusion of \$20 million in 1968-1969, was all but eliminated in the early 1970s. While the region's other authoritarian regimes would have starved for resources and been forced to broaden their political bases, Lee's authoritarian regime was able to extract huge quantities of capital out of Singapore's domestic population. Consider government tax revenues. Over the course of the 1970s, the Singaporean state's tax revenues clocked in at about 35 percent of the Malaysian state's tax revenues, in spite of the fact that the Singaporean government controlled only 0.2 percent of the territory and 20 percent of the population of the Malaysian government. That domestically derived capital financed robust authoritarian institutions. Consider military expenditures. Over the same decade, the Singaporean state's military expenditures reached about half of Indonesia's, in spite of the fact that the Singaporean military defended only 1/75th of the population and 1/2650th of the territory as the Indonesian military.³⁵⁰ Singapore's authoritarian regime was thus stronger and more domestically based than his counterparts elsewhere in the region. That it was so meant Lee had little need for American or international aid.

Over the past three decades, political scientists have internationalized their understanding of democratization. Samuel Huntington described the policies of external actors as one factor among many in the "third wave" of democratization that swept the world after 1974. Policy changes in Brussels, Washington, Moscow, and the Vatican promoted

³⁵⁰ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "SIPRI Military Expenditure Database," <https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex> (accessed March 2, 2018).

democratic change across the globe.³⁵¹ More recently Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way have argued that an authoritarian state's "linkage" to the West determined whether or not that state would democratize in the post-Cold War era.³⁵² No such deep, theoretically informed international perspective exists for democratization's obverse—what might clumsily, but less teleologically than terms like "democratic backsliding" or "de-democratization," be called authoritarianization. Instead, political scientists tend to explain the rise of authoritarian governments by pointing to the balance of political forces *within* a given state or society. The presence of contentious (domestic) politics revolving around class, religion, or ethnicity is regarded as an especially important precursor to the rise of authoritarian governments. Polarization and violence along those axes in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia did indeed represent critical antecedents to the rise of the Suharto, Marcos, and Razak regimes. But those would-be autocrats relied on American and international aid to construct and consolidate their authoritarian regimes. Their linkages with the West represented vital channels for the military and economic aid that flowed in generous amounts to these autocrats and allowed them to finance their authoritarian state-building projects. Absent such international aid, the regimes that emerged would have looked far different, likely incorporating more consensual rather than coercive modes of governance, because leaders would have needed to extract greater quantities of resources out of the domestic population. So if the West has been a source of democratization in faraway societies, so too has it been an impediment to it—indeed it has been a source of authoritarianization. Authoritarianism in

³⁵¹ Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 85-100.

³⁵² Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 43-54.

island Southeast Asia was thus made internationally. And as the following chapter will make clear, so too was it made transnationally.

CHAPTER 3

AUTHORITARIANIZATION II

Hours before Ferdinand Marcos signed Proclamation 1081 declaring martial law in the Philippines, he met with the U.S. ambassador in Manila, Henry Byroade. The American, Marcos exulted in his diary that evening, “agreed that there seemed to be no other solution” to the Philippines’ woes other than martial law.³⁵³ Scholars agree that the Nixon administration’s imprimatur was important to Marcos, even if “smoking gun” evidence of the American president’s own direct, ex ante approval of martial law remains elusive. Marcos therefore framed his decision in ways meant to appeal to his American benefactors, whose moral and material support he required to secure his rule. Proclamation 1081 focused on mounting levels of violence in the Philippines and the need to fashion what Marcos called a “New Society.” In his first address to the nation after issuing the declaration of martial law, Marcos insisted that “we must now reform the social, political, and economic institutions in our country,” adding that, “if you offend the New Society, you shall be punished.”³⁵⁴ Byroade and other American officials, whose laments about the sorry state of Philippine public life were well known, responded with resignation, if not with outright enthusiasm. The Nixon administration refrained from public comment on the end of democratic rule in the Philippines after concluding that the United States had no alternative but to aid Marcos’s attempt to remake both state and society.³⁵⁵

³⁵³ Ferdinand Marcos, Diary Entry, September 22, 1972, <http://philippinediaryproject.com/1972/09/22/sept-21-1972-thursday-sept-22nd-at-145-am/> (accessed June 12, 2017).

³⁵⁴ “First Address to the Nation under Martial Law,” in Ferdinand E. Marcos, *Presidential Speeches: Volume IV* (s.l: Ferdinand Marcos, 1978), 139, 136.

³⁵⁵ Memorandum, Kissinger to Nixon, September 23, 1972, in *FRUS 1969-1976:20*, 556-558; Telegram from the American Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State, October 2, 1972, in *Ibid.*, 562-564.

In their focus on cooperation between Marcos and elements of the Nixon administration, scholars have ignored other international connections that shaped Marcos's authoritarian regime. In 1973, the Filipino dictator published *Notes on the New Society of the Philippines*, a meandering book that offered a personal account of his decision to implement martial law. Rife with amateurish political theory, the book offers a clue to one of martial law's neglected origins. Martial law, Marcos wrote, emanated from the "September 21 Movement." By this he meant not any particular event or movement, but rather his own recognition that the "remaking of society was not just an imperative of national development but of national survival."³⁵⁶ His authoritarian lexicon—"New Society," "September 21 Movement"—betrayed Marcos's emulation of Suharto's New Order regime in Indonesia, which arose after the September 30th Movement in 1965.³⁵⁷ Marcos chose his monikers carefully, aware of the positive reception Suharto's regime received on the global stage, particularly among international financiers of authoritarian rule. "Has there been any outraged cry over the martial law in Indonesia?" he asked in the early pages of *Notes*.³⁵⁸ And Suharto did not merely inspire Marcos: the Indonesian aided his Filipino counterpart. Although there are no extant transcripts of their conversations, the two men met often and all but certainly discussed strategies of authoritarian state-building. Juan Ponce Enrile, Marcos's defense minister, remembered Suharto as one of "the two Asian leaders whom President Marcos respected and highly regarded."³⁵⁹ The cooperative relationship between authoritarian elements in Indonesia and the Philippines spanned beyond Marcos and Suharto. In the months

³⁵⁶ Ferdinand Marcos, *Notes on the New Society of the Philippines* (Manila: Marcos Foundation, 1973), 30-31.

³⁵⁷ Roosa, *Pretext for Mass Murder*.

³⁵⁸ Marcos, *Notes on the New Society of the Philippines*, 12.

³⁵⁹ Juan Ponce Enrile, *A Memoir*, ed. Nelson Navarro (Quezon City: ABS-CBN Publishing, 2012), Kindle location 13424.

leading up to the declaration of martial law, Philippine military and intelligence officials repeatedly solicited advice from their Indonesian counterparts.³⁶⁰ Favorable views of the Suharto regime percolated into the Philippines through other channels as well. Among them were the burgeoning Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which sponsored cultural exchanges and academic conferences; and periodicals like the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, which served as required reading for elites throughout the region.³⁶¹ Transnational exchanges such as these enabled Marcos to overcome path dependencies in national politics and create novel institutional and ideological formations that, taken together, revealed a convergence in styles of authoritarian governance between Indonesia and the Philippines. Authoritarianism was a transnational construct.

Existing optics are insufficient to reveal the transnational construction of authoritarian rule in island Southeast Asia. The framework of the solitary nation-state that still animates most histories of the modern world cannot capture the manifold ways in which the application of power across national borders has defined human life; likewise, scholars of comparative politics, who have penned the most textured studies of modern Southeast Asian political development, systematically ignore the role of supranational causes in the genesis of the region's authoritarian governments. U.S. and the World history is uniquely suited to uncovering and analyzing these international and transnational flows of power. According to one recent state-of-the-field essay, "It is now unusual to find a historian of U.S. foreign relations who does *not* champion multinational, multiarchival research to understand

³⁶⁰ Bonner, *Waltzing with a Dictator*, 95-96.

³⁶¹ The periodical's letters to the editor page offers ample support for this contention. Influential policymakers from across the region, likely aware of the publication's outsized role in shaping Western views of Asia, routinely wrote to contest what they perceived as mischaracterizations, omissions, and errors in articles.

America's influence from beyond its shores."³⁶² Yet even the most internationally-minded historians of American engagement with the wider world have missed the role of cooperation and emulation among Southeast Asia's authoritarian governments, often because they narrow the scope of their analysis to focus only on bilateral relations between the U.S. and one other state or widen it to span the entire globe. A regional perspective is essential. Newly discovered documents from the central archives of the Suharto regime, as well as documents from the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and the United States, reveal that intraregional cooperation and emulation shaped the institutions and ideologies that undergirded authoritarian governance in island Southeast Asia.

Suharto promoted a vision of authoritarian nation-, state-, and regime-building that he encapsulated under the ideology of "national resilience." Drawing upon earlier Indonesian experiences and ideas, Suharto and other New Order thinkers theorized that a country's resilience against threats both internal and external arose from a combination of economic prosperity, sociopolitical cohesion, and military strength. These conditions, according to the first primer on national resilience drafted by the National Defense Institute (Lemhannas) in 1968, created the "tenacity and endurance to face all threats coming from without or within, that directly or indirectly endanger the survival the state and nation of Indonesia."³⁶³ Three years later, in his annual Commander's Call address to senior Indonesian military officials, Suharto said that "national resilience is the only force capable of confronting subversion and infiltration."³⁶⁴ Finally, in 1973, the Suharto regime consecrated national resilience as the

³⁶² Thomas Zeiler, "The Diplomatic History Bandwagon: A State of the Field," *Journal of American History* 95, no. 4 (March 2009): 1060.

³⁶³ Lemhannas, *Ketahanan nasional* (Jakarta: Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional, 1968), 2.

³⁶⁴ "Presiden Soeharto: Hadapi Subversi dan Infiltrasi dengan Ketahanan Nasional," *Jejak Langkah Pak Harto 1968-1973*, 401.

lodestar of Indonesian foreign policy, and made explicit the regime's intention to promote the adoption of its national resilience ideology elsewhere in Southeast Asia.³⁶⁵

The Suharto regime's pursuit of national resilience gave rise to an array of novel ideological and institutional formations in Indonesia, including a developmentalist government party, a military role in the preservation of domestic stability and the promotion of economic development, an official state ideology that delegitimized political opposition, a stepwise development program drafted by technocrats, and a defense doctrine that emphasized mobilization of the citizenry. Suharto nursed concerns about the ability of other states in island Southeast Asia to defend themselves against communist aggression and subversion. He therefore traveled throughout the region and evangelized his conception of national resilience, encouraging other leaders to adopt the methods that secured his authority in Indonesia. And his campaign proved remarkably successful. National leaders elsewhere in island Southeast Asia drew upon the Indonesian model as they worked to construct and consolidate newly authoritarian regimes after moments of democratic rupture. While institutional and ideological stickiness meant that national particularities remained, the result of Suharto's campaign was nothing less than the partial "New Orderization" of island Southeast Asia.

This authoritarian convergence relied on the United States. The Nixon and Ford administrations regarded the Suharto regime as their most important partner in Southeast Asia, and the Nixon Doctrine encouraged Indonesia to adopt a leadership role in the region. The Suharto regime's efforts to promote national resilience in island Southeast Asia would demonstrate Indonesia's ability to act as a guarantor of regional stability and its value as a

³⁶⁵ Ketetapan Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia nomor: IV/MPR/1973 tentang Garis Besar Haluan Negara, <http://www.tatanusa.co.id/tapmpr/73TAPMPRS-IV.pdf> (accessed August 16, 2017).

continuing recipient of vast sums of American aid. Absent the resources supplied by the United States and the incentive to win additional resources in the future, Suharto's campaign to promote national resilience would likely not have been so ambitious. Nor would it have been as effective. The Suharto regime worked to channel American aid in Southeast Asia toward other countries that adopted its national resilience framework.³⁶⁶ Had national leaders in these countries not themselves been desirous of American aid, they would have possessed little incentive to remake the institutions and ideologies that structured their political systems.

Ideology was for Suharto the pivotal font of national resilience. At the dawn of the postwar era, Indonesia, riven by gulfs of geography, ethnicity, language, religion, class, and politics, seemed more likely to disintegrate than cohere.³⁶⁷ To unify the colony's some 17,000 islands stretching over 3,000 miles of ocean, the nationalist leader Sukarno proclaimed Pancasila as the philosophical foundation of the Indonesian state. Derived from the Sanskrit for "five principles," Pancasila enumerated the beliefs upon which Sukarno contended the Indonesian revolution would be built: belief in one God, a just and civilized humanity, Indonesian unity, democracy guided by the wisdom and unanimity arising from representative deliberation, and social justice for all Indonesian people. Suharto was a devotee of Pancasila during his military career, and it was to safeguard these principles from an alleged coup plotted by the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), to his mind atheistic, antidemocratic, and anti-Pancasila, that he intervened in national politics in 1965 and gradually undermined

³⁶⁶ Telegram, AmEmbassy Jakarta to SecState WashDC, July 9, 1975, Indonesia - State Department Telegrams From SECSTATE – NODIS, Box 6, NSC-EA Presidential, GFPL.

³⁶⁷ R.E. Elson, *The Idea of Indonesia: A History* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 98-148.

Sukarno's government.³⁶⁸ After ascending to the pinnacle of Indonesian politics, Suharto promulgated a far more stifling interpretation of Pancasila, one that stressed unanimity and harmony rather than democracy and revolutionary contention. "The primary source of National Resilience is Pancasila," read the 1968 Lemhannas primer on the subject, because it animated the actions of all Indonesians and led them to "prioritize the national interest over individual and group interests." According to Lemhannas, Pancasila united the citizenry and mobilized the population toward the achievement of national goals, while at the same time discouraging political contention and ideological strife.³⁶⁹ As Suharto explained in his 1969 National Day speech, "For the umpteenth time we feel grateful that we have an ideology rooted in our personality. An ideology that fits with the personality of the nation, this is the primary requirement for national resilience."³⁷⁰

In addition to ideology, the Lemhannas report declared, national resilience arose from the political, economic, sociocultural, and military fields. The primary requirements for political resilience included strong leadership and an inert public, a system that Suharto dubbed Pancasila Democracy. In April 1967, he characterized the New Order "an order of Pancasila Democracy which puts the people's interest first and not group or private interests."³⁷¹ He elaborated on his conception of Pancasila Democracy in a speech delivered in front of the People's Representative Council four months later. The substance of a democratic order—fair and regular elections, a free and independent press, and programmatic political parties—had no place in Pancasila Democracy: Suharto insisted that elections must

³⁶⁸ Elson, *Suharto*, 100-104.

³⁶⁹ Lemhannas, *Ketahanan nasional*, 3.

³⁷⁰ Pidato Kenegaraan Presiden Republik Indonesia di hadapan Sidang DPR-GR pada tanggal 16 Agustus 1969 di Jakarta, 452-1, PPS, ANRI.

³⁷¹ "HUT Persit, Jenderal Soeharto: Orde Baru Adalah Orde Demokrasi Pancasila," in G. Dwipayana and Nazarudin Sjamsuddin, eds., *Jejak Langkah Pak Harto: 1 Oktober 1965 – 27 Maret 1968* (Jakarta: Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1991), 171.

“guarantee the success of the New Order’s struggle,” the press must “reflect the orthodoxy of the New Order,” and Pancasila must serve as “the ideology of each political party and all other organizations.” There would be no promulgating ideas that could serve as “sources of conflict and mutual suspicion.”³⁷² According to the Lemhannas primer on national resilience, atop this stultified system of Pancasila Democracy would sit a strong leader who “arouses the dignity and obedience of the people.” Changes in leadership ought to be avoided, it said, because they represent opportunities “for the proliferation of infiltration and subversion” or could “result in the congestion of the implementation of governance.” Of Indonesia’s experiments with democracy in the 1950s, the Lemhannas document explained, “The various types of political systems practiced in the past only brought the result of weakening resilience in the political field.”³⁷³ All told, the Suharto regime’s conception of national resilience entailed a remarkably authoritarian vision of Indonesian political life. Ali Murtopo, a leading architect of the New Order institutions and author of its ideologies, was more blunt: he decried liberal democracy as a “disease.”³⁷⁴ In a widely discussed 1972 book, he wrote that the Indonesian people should form a “floating mass” freed from political thinking and partisan allegiance so that “the people in the villages will not spend their valuable time and energy in the political struggles of parties and groups, but will be occupied wholly with development efforts.”³⁷⁵

If Suharto harbored contempt for democracy’s substance, he nevertheless sought to maintain democracy’s procedures. Such formalities, he believed, played an important

³⁷² *Presiden RI Ke II Jenderal Besar HM Soeharto dalam berita*, buku I (1965-1967) (Jakarta: Antara Pustaka Utama, 2008), 594; see also *Jejak Langkah 1965-1968*, 201-202.

³⁷³ Lemhannas, *Kethanan nasional*, 10-12.

³⁷⁴ Ali Moertopo, *Politik nasional: Strategi, taktik dan teknik implementasinya* (Jakarta: Staf Pembinaan Karyawan, Departemen Pertahanan Keamanan, 1970), 18.

³⁷⁵ Ali Moertopo, *Dasar-dasar pemikiran tentang akselerasi modernisasi pembangunan 25 tahun* (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1972), 83.

legitimizing role both at home, among an Indonesian public accustomed to some form of democratic rule, and abroad, among the New Order's Western backers. In 1967, Suharto overrode objections from some conservative generals and allowed a circumscribed role in politics for existing parties, and the following year he assented to a three-year postponement of elections scheduled for 1968.³⁷⁶ But the Indonesian strongman had no intention of relinquishing his authority, and he needed an institutional vehicle to secure his electoral legitimation. He ordered Murtopo to reinvigorate Sekber Golkar (Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups)—a civil structure founded by the military as a counterweight to the power of the PKI—and fashion it into a party-machine through which Suharto could win the presidency in 1971 and perpetuate the military domination of Indonesian politics. But Murtopo's early efforts to refurbish the organization found little success. Golkar wielded almost no influence outside Jakarta, and what little reputation its leaders possessed in the capital came from corruption and womanizing. In November 1969, the plugged-in *Far Eastern Economic Review* Indonesia correspondent O.G. Roeder, who also served as Suharto's authorized biographer and enjoyed a measure of access in the *Istana Negara* and *Bina Graha* unusual even for a sympathetic journalist, reported that the Indonesian autocrat "has not yet established a party base from which to make his bid for a second term."³⁷⁷ Just one month earlier, Murtopo's Special Operations command (Opsus), a shadowy military intelligence outfit, had penned a series of internal memoranda arguing for a further postponement of the elections, warning that the party system still needed to be "reorganized" and that holding elections could undermine Indonesia's political and economic

³⁷⁶ Elson, *Suharto*, 163-165.

³⁷⁷ "Pemilu Pemalu," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, November 6, 1969; O.G. Roeder, *The Smiling General*.

stabilization.³⁷⁸ Word of the possibility of an additional delay percolated through Jakarta, inspiring strongly worded letters from the chairman of the Indonesian National Party (PNI), discontented speeches from the leaders of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), and alarmed editorials in several newspapers.³⁷⁹ Furious, Suharto called Murtopo and his aides to a meeting. “If the people hang me, you all will clap your hands and laugh at me,” he said, insisting that Golkar be revitalized in advance of the elections, which he affirmed would be held on time.³⁸⁰

Murtopo then accelerated his efforts to transform Golkar into an army-dominated political machine that could secure electoral victory in 1971. He induced or coerced industrial conglomerates, labor unions, professional associations, religious groups, and women’s and student communities into the Golkar fold, quadrupling the number of “functional groups” associated with the organization at the dawn of the Suharto era.³⁸¹ Golkar’s program was vague, emphasizing service to the New Order’s causes of development and stability, and opposition to the ideologically oriented political parties of the Sukarno era.³⁸² Yet its most important function was not as a vector of ideological mobilization but rather as a vehicle of electoral legitimation, vote winning, and patronage dispensation. To grow Golkar’s membership, Minister of Home Affairs Amirmachmud in February 1970 introduced regulations barring civil servants and armed forces (ABRI) employees, military or civilian, from joining “political organizations”—effectively making Golkar, framed as a functional

³⁷⁸ Memorandum dari OPSUS, Pemilu dan Strategi Nasional, October 1969, 114, Sekkab, ANRI.

³⁷⁹ Letter, Osa Maliki and Usep Ranawidjaja to Suharto, July 1, 1969, 144, Sekkab, ANRI; *Antara*, October 2, 1969; “Tegaknja kedaulatan rakjat melalui pemilu,” *Sinar Harapan*, September 4, 1969.

³⁸⁰ Wanandi, *Shades of Grey*, Kindle location 1539.

³⁸¹ Masashi Nishihara, *Golkar and the Indonesian Elections of 1971* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1972), 18fn40.

³⁸² Golongan Karya, *Beberapa tanja djawab tentang pemilu* (s.l.: Golongan Karya, 1971), 1.

rather than political grouping, the only party to which state employees could belong.³⁸³ As the elections approached, civil servants were required to sign declarations of “monoloyalty” to Golkar, and were encouraged in myriad ways to cast ballots and mobilize additional voters for Suharto’s electoral machine.³⁸⁴ Some Golkar functionaries controlled by the military traveled around villages and told residents “If you choose another party it could be misinterpreted as being anti-military and maybe even pro-PKI,” a not-so-subtle threat of violence only five years after the massacre of at least 500,000 Indonesians suspected of harboring leftist sympathies.³⁸⁵ For these heavy-handed tactics Amirmachmud earned the nickname “Bulldozer.”

A creation of the central state, Golkar crept down the hierarchies of the military and civil service, its tendrils penetrating deep into Indonesian society even at the local level, where other political parties were prohibited from operating. The party’s funding came from rents paid to the Suharto regime by businessmen in exchange for lucrative government contracts, monopoly agreements, and protection from violence; and by military men in charge of state-owned enterprises, charitable foundations, and all manner of minor businesses. Patronage arrangements such as these helped Golkar recruit competent and energetic government functionaries in spite of the relatively flat salary structure of the civil service compared to the private sector, and to win loyalty from erstwhile nationalist or Muslim party voters by funding things like development subsidies for village heads and *haji* voyages for

³⁸³ Peraturan Pemerintah 6/1970, Pengaturan kehidupan politik pejabat-pejabat negeri dalam rangka pembinaan sistem kepegawaian negeri Republik Indonesia.

³⁸⁴ Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, 267-270.

³⁸⁵ Wanandi, *Shades of Grey*, Kindle location 1563.

Muslim constituents.³⁸⁶ As an institution, Golkar in its early years remained hollow, a vehicle of vote-getting layered over existing networks of patronage and corruption. But it proved effective, winning 62.8 percent of the vote in 1971 and securing a second term in office for Suharto.³⁸⁷

Sociocultural resilience served as an underdeveloped corollary to political and ideological resilience. The Lemhannas primer emphasized that Indonesia's social resilience arose from the traditions of village life, which instilled in the population an "awareness that, with mutual cooperation, deliberative consensus, and unity, social problems can always be minimized, so that the tranquility of national life can be preserved." Meanwhile Indonesia's cultural resilience, the report explained, owed to the traditions of tolerance and independence among the population—reflected in the state motto of *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*, meaning unity in diversity—which prevented the "colonization of the mind" by outside forces.³⁸⁸ Suharto thus appealed to an invented Indonesian tradition as a source of his authority. He and a cadre of New Order theorists appealed to a mythic version of village tradition to cast individualism, liberalism, and dissent as alien to Indonesian society and culture. Instead, they argued, Indonesian *adat* (custom) prized hierarchy, unity, and order.³⁸⁹ A key proponent of this school of thought was the legal scholar Soediman Kartohadiprojjo, who taught at the Military Law Academy until his death in 1970. By proffering a vision of Indonesian society and culture as monolithic, Soediman characterized an array of concepts including democracy, individualism, social justice, popular sovereignty, and indeed the very idea of politics as a competition of

³⁸⁶ Ross McLeod, "Soeharto's Indonesia: A Better Class of Corruption," *Agenda* 7, no. 2 (2000): 103-105; Crouch, *Army and Politics*, 268-270.

³⁸⁷ Ken Ward, *The 1971 Election in Indonesia: An East Java Case Study* (Clayton: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1974), 22.

³⁸⁸ Lemhannas, *Ketahanan nasional*, 7.

³⁸⁹ See David Bourchier, *Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia: The Ideology of the Family-State* (New York: Routledge, 2015).

interests, as Western imports which “go against our souls.”³⁹⁰ Properly interpreted for the sake of national resilience, Indonesian sociocultural norms became another check against political contention in the New Order.

The cause for which Suharto promoted political stability was economic development—the former, he said, was an “absolute requirement” for the latter.³⁹¹ And economic development was itself a vital aspect of national resilience. “The problem of national prosperity can no longer be separated or detached from the problem of national security,” read the 1968 Lemhannas report on national resilience, “because the two problems have a reciprocal relationship.”³⁹² The whole range of crises that affected Indonesia before 1966 Suharto attributed to “the neglect of economic development.”³⁹³ To orchestrate Indonesia’s economic recovery—which included reining in hyperinflation, rebuilding the banking system, repairing crumbling infrastructure, and managing foreign debt—Suharto relied on a group of economists called the Berkeley Mafia, a collection of young faculty members at the University of Indonesia so dubbed because most had received their doctorates at the University of California’s Bay Area campus. At the behest of these technocrats, Suharto in 1967 shepherded through parliament the Foreign Investment Law, which opened the floodgates of foreign investment in Indonesia’s natural resource sector.³⁹⁴ Grateful Western governments showered the New Order with generous loans and debt rescheduling agreements, coordinated through the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI) after its establishment in 1967. At the same time as the Berkeley Mafia reoriented Indonesia’s

³⁹⁰ Soediman Kartohadiprodjo, *Beberapa pikiran sekitar Pantja-Sila* (Bandung: Alumni, 1970), 68.

³⁹¹ “Presiden Soeharto Rapat Umum di Tanjung Karang, 15 Juli, 1968,” in *Jejak Langkah 1968-1973*, 28-29.

³⁹² Lemhannas, *Ketahanan nasional*, 16.

³⁹³ Soeharto, *Pikiran*, 232.

³⁹⁴ Undang-undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 1 Tahun 1967 tentang Penanaman Modal Asing, http://www.dpr.go.id/dokjdi/document/uu/UU_1967_1.pdf (accessed September 1, 2017).

economy along neoliberal lines, Suharto presided over the construction of a system of corruption and patronage that funneled rents into the New Order's coffers.³⁹⁵ The dual infusion of capital from foreign and corrupt sources enabled Suharto to launch the first of his five-year economic development plans, which depended upon international capital for sixty percent of its expenditures and was unveiled in April 1969.³⁹⁶ "We are today giving high priority to economic development," Suharto said in his 1969 National Day address, "precisely to improve our national resilience, which in the economic field is very severe."³⁹⁷ Suharto's reliance on technocrats who crafted a stepwise development program to refigure the Indonesian economy, undergirded by an army-focused web of corruption and buoyed by petrodollars, resulted in an impressive economic recovery that saw dramatically reduced inflation and impressive growth rates by the 1970s.

Military resilience represented the last element of national resilience. This did not refer exclusively to Indonesia's ability to repulse external threats. Lemhannas described military resilience as the "consciousness that the entire people has the right and responsibility to defend the State and the Nation . . . against threats from wherever they arrive and whatever their shape and manifestation."³⁹⁸ Suharto and other New Order generals drew two lessons from recent Indonesian history: that most threats to the continuity of the republic emerged from within the archipelago, and that the mobilization of the masses by the armed forces represented the key to overcoming those threats.³⁹⁹ Inspired by those lessons, Suharto

³⁹⁵ Pepinsky, *Economic Crises and the Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes*, 42-61.

³⁹⁶ Government of Indonesia, *Rentjana pembangunan lima tahun, 1969/1970 – 1973/74*.

³⁹⁷ Pidato Kenegaraan Presiden Republik Indonesia di hadapan Sidang DPR-GR pada tanggal 16 Agustus 1969 di Jakarta, 452-1, PPS, ANRI.

³⁹⁸ Lemhannas, *Ketahanan nasional*, 7.

³⁹⁹ See Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia's Strategic Culture: Ketahanan Nasional, Wawasan Nusantara, and Hankamrata* (Queensland: Griffith University Centre for the Study of Australian Asian Relations, 1996).

developed or deepened three military doctrines that legitimized a leading sociopolitical role for the armed forces throughout the Indonesian archipelago.

During the revolutionary period of 1945-1949, in which the ragtag Indonesian military fought Dutch efforts at recolonization, General Abdul Haris Nasution developed a system of “Total People’s Defense and Security.” Abbreviated Hankamrata, the system envisioned a small, underequipped, and poorly trained military overcoming its deficiencies by mobilizing the population against powerful invaders or internal enemies. In his seminal text on guerrilla warfare, Nasution wrote that the armed forces, if recognized as the guarantor of the nation’s ideology, could rely on the people for food, shelter, medical care, camouflage, and assistance in overcoming enemies both internal and external.⁴⁰⁰ Hankamrata became an integral part of military resilience. As the Lemhannas primer concluded, “National defense and security are not only ABRI’s problem but the problem of the whole nation and must be cultivated by and with all national powers, with ABRI at its core.”⁴⁰¹ A related doctrine of “Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management” emerged under Sukarno’s leadership, when Indonesia experienced a spate of separatist rebellions and religious insurgencies. At one point in 1958 internal strife denied the central government control over about one sixth of the archipelago’s territory. The armed forces, still under Nasution’s leadership, became convinced of the need to station its units throughout the archipelago, where they would adopt roles ensuring political stability, promoting economic development, and promulgating Pancasila parallel to the local-

⁴⁰⁰ Abdul Haris Nasution, *Pokok-pokok Gerilya dan Pertahanan Republik Indonesia dimasa jang Lalu dan jang Akan Datang* (Jakarta: Pembimbing, 1954).

⁴⁰¹ Lemhannas, *Ketahanan Nasional*, 15-16.

level civilian administration.⁴⁰² After Suharto began assuming executive power, he centralized control over the armed forces' territorial commands and helped the military further permeate the everyday life of most Indonesians. Some 20,000 officers were assigned to administrative posts across the archipelago. The portion of military men who served as town and district heads rose from 24 percent in 1965 to 54 percent in 1969, and governors from 40 percent to 100 percent over the same period.⁴⁰³ Civilians were soon required to obtain military permission for all manner of everyday activities, such as traveling, organizing meetings, delivering sermons, or issuing publications.⁴⁰⁴ Hankamrata and Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management, as military doctrines, ensured ABRI a significant presence throughout the archipelago.

The armed forces also adopted a decisive role in national politics. Nasution beginning in 1957 popularized the idea that the military would take a "Middle Way," participating actively in but not dominating Indonesian politics. The military also took on an enlarged national economic role around the same time, managing some of the Dutch enterprises expropriated in 1958 and forming its own business ventures. By 1966, the Second Army Seminar held at the Army Staff and Command School in Bandung declared that "The army, which was born in the cauldron of the Revolution, has never been a dead instrument of government concerned exclusively with security matters. The army, as a fighter for freedom, cannot remain neutral toward the course of state policy, the quality of government, and the safety of the state based on Pancasila. The army does not have an exclusively military duty

⁴⁰² "The Doctrine of Territorial Warfare: Translation of Document No. NS1124-01, Indonesian Army Staff and Command School, March 1962," in Guy Pauker, *The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1963).

⁴⁰³ Bouchier, *Illiberal Democracy in Indonesia*, 158.

⁴⁰⁴ David Jenkins, *Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1984), 42.

but is concerned with all fields of social life.”⁴⁰⁵ The seminar sanctified the military’s assumption of a sociopolitical role as *dwifungsi*, or dual function. This role increasingly veered toward leadership, as generals moved to displace Sukarno and other political figures, whom they blamed for the endemic crises that plagued Indonesian life, particularly the growing power of the PKI. The Lemhannas primer recounted that, since the republic’s founding, “Decadence . . . in the political, economic, and social fields gave rise to various obstacles and difficulties,” and, as a result, the military “became the dynamist and stabilizer for the current national condition.”⁴⁰⁶ The Indonesian military came to dominate the New Order’s political system. ABRI was disproportionately represented in Suharto’s cabinet and was guaranteed one quarter of the seats in the Indonesian legislature. And these military men, members of a security-obsessed bureaucracy suffused by an almost paranoid anticommunism, quickly turned their attentions toward the wider Southeast Asian region. This was an imperative of national security. As a secret report from the military-linked Centre for Strategic and International Studies put it, if “a disturbance that occurs in one country in this region, its tremors will immediately be felt in the other countries,” including Indonesia.⁴⁰⁷

Suharto and other architects of the New Order saw other countries in Southeast Asia as suffering an ideological deficit, which rendered them vulnerable to communist subversion. This was a lesson of both Indonesia’s historical experience and the Vietnam War. “From experience in the past thirty years of national independence, it can clearly be seen that the

⁴⁰⁵ Crouch, *Army and Politics*, 342-352, quotation on page 345.

⁴⁰⁶ Lemhannas, *Ketahanan nasional*, 16.

⁴⁰⁷ Centre for Strategic and International Studies, “Analisa previsionil: Mengenai Asia pada umumnya, Asia Tenggara pada khususnya,” January 1972, Yayasan Proklamasi (Centre for Strategic and International Studies): laporan mengenai analisa previsionil mengenai Asia pada umumnya, Asia Tenggara pada khususnya, 2326, EKUIN, ANRI.

threats to the security and integrity of the Nation and State of Indonesia, as well as to the security and integrity of the rest of this region of Southeast Asia have mainly been ideological in character or ideologically motivated even though their manifestations may have been physical and their operation has penetrated into the social, political, economic, and cultural fields,” Suharto’s aide-de-camp Ali Murtopo explained. “And because such threats have been motivated by a certain ideological concept or outlook of life, we must also face them with a definite conception or outlook, for despite their frequently physical manifestations, physical force alone, no matter how strong, would not suffice to deal with them. The Vietnam experience is a case in point.”⁴⁰⁸ Indeed, Suharto would routinely criticize American policymakers for aiding the South Vietnamese with money, materiel, and manpower but without an overarching moral framework—they were given things to fight *with*, but nothing to fight *for*, in the Indonesian strongman’s mind.⁴⁰⁹ He and other senior New Order officials worked to ensure other countries in Southeast Asia developed national ideologies akin to Pancasila and adopted the New Order’s national resilience framework more broadly. As late as the 1980s, Suharto considered it important to station military representatives as ambassadors in Southeast Asia “so that ASEAN members will really be able to adapt themselves to the effort of increasing their national resilience.”⁴¹⁰

The New Order’s efforts to promote authoritarianism in island Southeast Asia were designed to preserve, protect, and promote Indonesian interests. But so too were they designed to win additional military and economic aid from the United States. In September 1970, as General Sumitro sought to obtain the Nixon administration’s imprimatur for

⁴⁰⁸ Ali Murtopo, *National Resilience and Indonesia’s Foreign Policy* (s.l.: s.p., 1974), 4.

⁴⁰⁹ MemCon, Ford and Suharto, July 5, 1975, President Ford’s Trip to the Philippines and Indonesia, December 1975 (13), Box 19, NSC-EA Staff, GFPL.

⁴¹⁰ Soeharto, *Pikiran*, 488-489.

expanded aid, he sent a telegram to Kissinger emphasizing the ways in which Indonesia was prepared to adopt a leadership role in Southeast Asia. Sumitro's telegram emphasized the importance of "building 'national resilience' in SEA [Southeast Asia]," suggesting that in that way "Indonesia can make [a] contribution to [the] maintenance of security in SEA without repeat without formal 'military pact.'" He added that "we must strive to create [a] uniform regional security system thru [*sic*] application of Indonesia's concept of Total People's Defence and Security." To achieve these objective Sumitro suggested Indonesia, with American financial assistance, would establish close diplomatic, military, and intelligence cooperation with other Southeast Asian states.⁴¹¹

Suharto's efforts bore fruit. After race riots convulsed Kuala Lumpur on May 13, 1969, the government suspended parliamentary democracy, and a new authoritarian body called the National Operations Council (NOC) took control. Led by Tun Abdul Razak, the NOC sought to restore national stability and ethnic harmony to Malaysian society. It did so by reordering Malaysian politics along Indonesian lines. Razak tapped Tan Sri Ghazali bin Shafie to head a new Department of National Unity (DNU). In a July 1969 speech broadcast on radio and television, Ghazali explained his task as the "systematic formulation of the National Ideology" that could transcend "the affiliations of race, religion, cultural [*sic*], class and political parties."⁴¹² Razak also announced the creation of the National Consultative Council (NCC), a forum where representatives of most political parties and various religious, social, and professional groups could "establish positive and practical guidelines for inter-

⁴¹¹ Telegram, Sumitro to Kissinger, September 25, 1970, Backchannel - Indonesia HAK/Sumitro 1970 [2 of 2], Box 101, HAK, RNPL.

⁴¹² Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie, "The task of restoring national unity," *Straits Times*, July 18, 1969.

racial co-operation and social integration for the growth of a Malaysian national identity.”⁴¹³ The composition of the DNU and NCC reflected a vision of politics as the cooperation of functional groups under a unifying ideology, one all but certainly inflected by the Indonesian example. Still nominally head of state, though increasingly overshadowed by Razak, Tunku Abdul Rahman urged the NCC at its first meeting in January 1970 “think afresh” and create a novel political and economic framework for Malaysian life that might allow the restoration of parliamentary governance.⁴¹⁴ In secret sessions over the following months, the NCC debated the establishment of strictures on public discussion of sensitive political questions, such as the special rights and privileges accorded to ethnic Malays; the promotion of government efforts to redress the economic imbalance between ethnic Chinese, on the one hand, and ethnic Malays and Indians, on the other; and the creation of an overarching national ideology that could unite Malaysians of all colors and creeds.⁴¹⁵ The DNU took the first stab at devising a national ideology, which Ghazali called *Rukun Negara*, meaning National Principles, often rendered as Rukunegara. The ideology was then debated and refined by the NCC until it was adopted by the NOC and announced to the public on August 31, 1970. In its final form, Rukunegara committed Malaysia to “achieving greater unity, to maintaining a democratic way of life, to creating a just society in which the wealth of the nation shall be equitably shared, to ensuring a liberal approach to Malaysia’s rich and diverse cultural traditions and to building a progressive society.”⁴¹⁶ In pursuit of those ends, Rukunegara enumerated five principles to guide the Malaysian people: belief in God, loyalty to king and country,

⁴¹³ Quoted in Barbara Andaya and Leonard Andaya, *A History of Malaysia*, second ed. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001), 299.

⁴¹⁴ “‘Think afresh’ plea to the NCC,” *Straits Times*, January 28, 1970

⁴¹⁵ “Continuing role for the NCC,” *Straits Times*, March 12, 1970.

⁴¹⁶ “Rukunegara,” *Straits Times*, September 1, 1970.

upholding the constitution, rule of law, and good behavior and morality.⁴¹⁷ Razak worked to implant Rukunegara in all aspects of Malaysian life, making its recitation compulsory in schools and featuring it prominently in national speeches.

Though its creation was driven by internal dynamics, Rukunegara, contemporary observers hastened to remark, owed a clear debt of inspiration to Pancasila. But the extent to which Razak modeled Malaysia's national ideology on Indonesian example has not been fully realized. In March 1970, Suharto traveled to Malaysia at Razak's invitation. The two men planned to discuss the communist threat in Borneo and the development of ASEAN economies, as well as bilateral cultural and scientific cooperation.⁴¹⁸ But Suharto, as he so often did, steered the conversation toward his conception of national resilience. According to his official chroniclers, Suharto, over meals with Razak insisted "that the concept of national resilience is the only answer to the challenges faced by Southeast Asia," and that ideology represented the cornerstone of national resilience.⁴¹⁹ Knowledge about the role of ideology in ensuring political stability in Indonesia filtered into Malaysia in other ways as well. The *Far Eastern Economic Review* regularly featured sympathetic updates from Roeder on the Suharto regime's efforts to use Pancasila to tamp down on political contention.⁴²⁰ And ASEAN regularly coordinated conferences and diplomatic exchanges focusing on the importance of national ideologies. Yet, upon its publication in August 1970, Rukunegara failed to impress Indonesian officials. Suharto invited Razak to Indonesia for an official state visit a few months thereafter. Before Razak's arrival, the Indonesian ambassador in Kuala Lumpur, U.A.

⁴¹⁷ Government of Malaysia, *Rukunegara* (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Chetak Kerajaan, 1970).

⁴¹⁸ "Perjanjian baru Indonesia, Malaysia di-meterai," *Berita Harian*, March 18, 1970.

⁴¹⁹ "Kampong Pak Harto di Tanjong Nalia Malaysia (Ketahanan Nasional Merupakan Prasyarat Stabilitas Asia Tenggara)," in *Jejak Langkah 1968-1973*, 210.

⁴²⁰ "Reprieve for Politics," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 20, 1969; "The Lady Grows Up," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, August 28, 1969.

Thalib, sent a secret binder to Suharto to prepare him for the discussions. “At a glance, Rukunegara is a kind of Pancasila,” the ambassador reported, and “this was indeed the purpose of the Malaysian leaders.” But Thalib saw Rukunegara as different from Pancasila insofar as the former represented a “set of guidelines controlled to achieve national goals” that are “shallow and short-term” while the latter served as “a perennial source that animates all thinking including national goals.”⁴²¹ The Indonesians’ disappointment with the Malaysians’ formulation of a national ideology did not, however, stop them from finding other ways to assist Razak’s authoritarian government.

The Suharto and Razak regimes cooperated in combatting communist guerrillas that operated along the Borneo borderlands between Indonesia and Malaysia. The two governments signed agreements that allowed troops from each country to venture across their shared border in hot pursuit of communist guerrillas, and that permitted aircraft from each country to overfly the airspace and occasionally land in the territory of the other. Coming only four years after the cessation of hostilities between Indonesia and Malaysia, the deepening of military cooperation surprised even rapprochement-minded government officials. As one secret Malaysian government report summarized, “Ever since the termination of Indonesian confrontation against Malaysia and the subsequent commencement of the Communist Terrorist upsurge [*sic*] in Sarawak, the Indonesian Armed Forces have been most cooperative in the operations against the CTs, particularly along the Sarawak/Kalimantan border areas.”⁴²² In exchange, the Malaysian military provided the Indonesian military with

⁴²¹ Letter, Thalib to Suharto, December 8, 1970, Surat dari Duta Besar R.I. untuk Malaysia kepada presiden mengenai masalah yang akan dibicarakan oleh P.M. Malaysia dan Presiden Suharto, dalam rangka kunjungan P.M. Malaysia tersebut, 394, Sekkab, ANRI.

⁴²² Memorandum, Mengeluarkan Minyak Kapal ka Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Logistics Assistance to Tentera Nasional Indonesia - 1982/0000859 - W/E/05/B/15/c/2, ANM.

rations, aviation fuel, and medical assistance that rough terrain and poor infrastructure made it difficult for Jakarta to deliver to troops on Borneo. Occasionally, the Malaysian military also offered the furnish the Indonesian military with equipment that was no longer being used, such as in 1971, when Malaysia offered Indonesia 12 Twin Pioneer light transport aircraft that, the Indonesian ambassador in Kuala Lumpur reported, would be “very useful in the interior areas of Kalimantan and West Irian.” The only hiccups in anticommunist cooperation between Indonesia and Malaysia owed to domestic politics. After a reconfiguration of Malaysian politics in mid-1970 led to the participation in a coalition government of the Sarawak United People’s Party (SUPP), dominated by ethnic Chinese and historically sympathetic to leftist causes, Razak suspended the Indonesian military’s hot pursuit rights, which Thalib suspected owed to the Malaysian government’s attempt to placate moderates in SUPP worried about the treatment of their coethnics.⁴²³

Military cooperation between Indonesia and Malaysia soon resumed. Suharto urged Razak to adopt Indonesia’s Hankamrata system. Such a strategic posture would, Thalib reported to Suharto in December 1970, serve the Malaysian military well during the period 1971-1972, which he anticipated would be “years of crisis” in Southeast Asia. The British intended to withdraw from Malaysia and Singapore by 1971, leaving behind indigenous militaries that Indonesian observers considered ill-equipped to provide for national defense. In the same period, the American presence in Vietnam would in the same period reach its lowest point in four years. Thalib therefore recommended that Suharto “convince Malaysia that the

⁴²³ Singapore International Chamber of Commerce, *Economic Bulletin*, February 1971, 46; Letter, Thalib to Suharto, December 8, 1970, 394, Surat dari Duta Besar R.I. untuk Malaysia kepada presiden mengenai masalah yang akan dibicarakan oleh P.M. Malaysia dan Presiden Suharto, dalam rangka kunjungan P.M. Malaysia tersebut, Sekkab, ANRI; Government of Malaysia, *The Threat of Armed Communism in Sarawak* (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Cetak Kerajaan, 1972).

Hankamrata Doctrine is the most appropriate for a developing country.”⁴²⁴ Shortly before Razak’s arrival in Indonesia, Thalib’s office sent a note to the Malaysian Ministry of Foreign Affairs requesting permission for a 70-member delegation from Lemhannas to visit Malaysia to “study and understand the problems in countries neighboring Indonesia and exchange ideas about the problems faced together by Southeast Asian countries.”⁴²⁵ And while any extant records of the discussions between Suharto and Razak, or between Lemhannas and Malaysian military officials, remain inaccessible, there are considerable indications of close military cooperation between Indonesia and Malaysia in the period immediately following the May 13, 1969 riots. Malaysian officers were guaranteed seats in the Indonesian armed forces’ staff and command and military intelligence schools.⁴²⁶ And Razak in a speech on December 17 “thanked ABRI . . . for the training given to the Malaysian Royal Army.”⁴²⁷

The Suharto regime’s effort to evangelize Hankamrata represented a driving force behind the Malaysian government’s announcement of its Security and Development (Kesban) program. Though not formally adopted by the National Security Council until 1980 as “the sum total of all efforts undertaken by the MAF [Malaysian Armed Forces] and other government agencies to strengthen and protect society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency,” the ideas and programs behind Kesban in fact dated to the early 1970s. At the dawn of that decade, Razak explained that the “primary task of the Armed Forces is to fight the communists. But at the same time, they must also help implement the Government’s

⁴²⁴ Letter, Thalib to Suharto, December 8, 1970, 394, Surat dari Duta Besar R.I. untuk Malaysia kepada presiden mengenai masalah yang akan dibicarakan oleh P.M. Malaysia dan Presiden Suharto, dalam rangka kunjungan P.M. Malaysia tersebut, Sekkab, ANRI.

⁴²⁵ Letter, Kedutaan Besar Republik Indonesia Kuala Lumpur to Kementerian Luar Negeri Malaysia, December 16, 1970, Indonesia - 1970 - 1982/0005484 - W/A/06/A/31/c/3, ANM.

⁴²⁶ Telegram, AmEmbassy Djakarta to SecState WashDC, August 8, 1969, POLITICAL AFF. & REL. INDON-US 1967, Box 2212, CFPF, RG 59, NARA.

⁴²⁷ “Jamu PM Malaysia, Presiden Soeharto: Stabilitas Asia Tenggara Tanggung-Jawab Negara Negara Asia Tenggara,” in *Jejak Langkah 1968-1973*, 278.

development plan—this is part of the fight against the communists. Defence and development go hand-in-hand.”⁴²⁸ In short, Razak believed that economic development and social cohesion would inoculate the Malaysian population against radicalism, and that the military had a prominent role to play in shepherding the country’s economic development. The Malaysian military dramatically increased its presence in areas where the government implemented development schemes through the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA), which converted jungle to cultivable land settled and farmed by smallholders; the Federal Land Consolidation and Rehabilitation Authority (FELCA), which aimed to introduce new technologies and build modern infrastructure; and the Rural Industry Smallholders’ Development Authority (RISDA), which promoted the construction of rubber plantations. Other scholars have ably demonstrated that the Kesban doctrine had distinctly Malaysian precursors, such as the Briggs Plan and General Gerald Templer’s “Hearts and Minds” campaign during the Malayan Emergency, both of which emphasized the links between economic development and counterinsurgency.⁴²⁹ But the KESBAN doctrine possessed some novel aspects that most likely owed to Indonesian inspiration. For instance, in 1975, Razak introduced a Neighborhood Watch (*Rukun Tetangga*) program as part of Kesban, which required all able-bodied males between the ages of 18 and 55 to receive training from military development officers and subsequently patrol their neighborhoods. “The idea,” said Razak, “is to make everyone responsible for their own security and that of their neighbours by taking

⁴²⁸ Quoted in Hishammuddin Tun Hussein, “Managing Complex Security Challenges: Historical Perspectives, Traditional Sovereignty, Nation Building and Collective Approaches,” *The Journal of Defence and Security* 4, no. 2 (2013): 113.

⁴²⁹ Ong Weichong, “Securing the Population from Insurgency and Subversion in the Second Emergency (1968-1981), Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Exeter, 2010, 132-150.

turns guard their areas.”⁴³⁰ The strengthening of civil-military ties and the mobilization of the masses in the name of national security owed a clear debt of inspiration to the Suharto regime’s Hankamrata doctrine.

Representatives of the Suharto regime also suggested that the Malaysian military might adopt a broader role in ensuring political stability akin to the Indonesian military’s role under *dwifungsi*. In 1969, *Angkatan Bersendjata*, the newspaper of the Indonesian armed forces, began publishing a series of articles suggesting that Malaysian officials had asked about the role of the Indonesian military in maintaining domestic order and in spearheading economic development. The principal lesson of the Indonesian experience for Malaysia, the articles recounted, was the role of the military in safeguarding the national ideology from internal threats, and thereby preserving national resilience: “Because the ideology of ABRI is the ideology of the State, namely Pancasila, ABRI automatically becomes a stabilizing force. It is a force that remains the backbone of the Pancasila State if there occurs instability due to the tendency of politicians (read: parties) to replace or at least modify the foundation—philosophy—of the state, whether from the extreme left or the extreme right. Or because of the presence of conflict between groups.”⁴³¹ But the Malaysian military remained explicitly apolitical, never developing a doctrine akin to *dwifungsi*. It maintained domestic security and safeguarded the government’s political and economic development programs, but it never formulated and implemented those programs like Indonesian military. This is because Malaysia’s national leadership emerged from strong political parties rather than, as in the case

⁴³⁰ “New Bid to Curb Red Terror,” *Straits Times*, April 22, 1975; “Kerahan tenaga di Malaysia,” *Berita Harian*, July 25, 1975; “Malaysia Calls Up Vigilantes,” *Straits Times*, July 25, 1975.

⁴³¹ “Antara Indonesia dan Malaysia: ABRI Menjadi Kekuatan Stabilisasi,” *Angkatan Bersendjata*, October 5, 1969; “Antara Indonesia dan Malaysia: Perkembangan Peranan Angkatan Bersendjata,” *Angkatan Bersendjata*, July 5, 1969; “Antara Indonesia dan Malaysia: Dwi Fungsi Angkatan Bersendjata Kita,” *Angkatan Bersendjata*, March 5, 1969.

of Indonesia's national leadership, from the military. Regional connections could shape the nature of the programs launched by the Razak regime, but they could not alter the regime's fundamental character.

A similar process played out in the Philippines. Marcos first met Suharto when he traveled to Jakarta in 1968. Impressed by the New Order's efforts to ensure political stability and promote economic development, Marcos enthused at a press conference that "under the leadership of President Suharto, Indonesia is making progress and Indonesia will become the largest nation in Southeast Asia."⁴³² The two leaders met often in the years to come, and Suharto impressed upon Marcos the wisdom of his vision of authoritarian political and economic development. When Suharto visited the Philippines in February 1972, he spoke about the importance of strong leadership and stability for nation-building. The lessons of Indonesia's experience were clear: "In facing earlier challenges we have found an answer, which we have dug from our own experiences, which is our conception of national resilience. We must strengthen our national ideology which is rooted in our personality, we must reinforce political stability by developing a democratic life that recognizes responsibilities, we must implement economic development which is just in assuming the burden and enjoying the results of development, we must preserve a sense of shared destiny and social harmony, and we must have adequate security and defense forces that become the responsibility of the entire nation with military forces as its vanguard."⁴³³ Not without reason did the print organ of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), *Ang Bayan*, suggest that a primary purpose of the

⁴³² "Presiden Marcos: Dibawah Jenderal Soeharto Indonesia Menjadi Terbesar di Asia Tenggara," in *Jejak Langkah 1965-1968*, 242.

⁴³³ Pidato balasan pada djamuan makan malam kenegaraan yang diselenggarakan oleh paduka jang mulia Presiden Marcos, February 13, 1972, 107, PPS, ANRI.

visit was “to teach each other how to suppress the people and preserve a brutal and corrupt regime subservient to U.S. imperialism.”⁴³⁴ And indeed, after Marcos declared martial law in September 1972, he consciously modeled parts of his regime on Suharto’s.

Marcos was convinced of the need for a new national ideology akin to Pancasila that could promote a spirit of public interest and wield together the Philippines’ disparate clans, classes, ethnolinguistic groups, and religious movements. “The new covenant—the political bond—must take the form of a national ideology,” he wrote in his 1972 *Notes on the New Society*. It was the old ideology, Marcos explained, which “viewed politics as essentially a competition for public power and privilege among individuals, political parties, and pressure groups, and only secondarily as a means of promoting the general welfare and the public interest,” that accounted for the failures of Philippine politics and “led to the martial necessity.”⁴³⁵ Complaints about the venality of Filipino politicians were nothing new, but this distinctly functionalist and anti-democratic view of politics all but certainly reflected Indonesian inspiration. Marcos succeeded in establishing the infrastructure through which a new national ideology might be promulgated such as a pliant national media that served as a government mouthpiece, a primary and secondary education system that could indoctrinate pupils, and a single national political party that could serve as an umbrella for political disputes. But he never articulated an ideology in anything but the vaguest possible terms. Marcos’s rhetoric brimmed with phrases like “national discipline,” “revolution from the center,” “new society,” and “new Filipinism,” which revealed aspirations rather than any shared beliefs upon which Philippine unity, stability, and prosperity could be based. As late as

⁴³⁴ “Suharto: Ang Kasuklam-suklam na Larawan ng Isang Pasistang Halimaw,” *Ang Bayan: Pahayagan ng Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas Pinapatnubayan ng Kaisipan Mao Tsetung* 4, no. 2 (March 1972): 8.

⁴³⁵ Marcos, *Notes on the New Society*, 70-71.

1982 he still characterized the national Philippine ideology as “emergent.”⁴³⁶ He did, however, repeatedly justify his authoritarian rule as the only route to prosperity, a rhetorical strategy that Suharto had employed to great effect in Indonesia.

Marcos also emulated Suharto’s efforts to promote economic development. The extent of direct cooperation between the Marcos and Suharto regimes in establishing their economic development planning bodies is unclear. A number of international bodies provided institutional pathways for the transnational exchange of authoritarian development strategies. In 1971, for instance, the Joint Philippine-Indonesian Economic Commission met for three days in Manila and, according to Malacañang’s *Official Gazette*, agreed on “specific measures for the effective implementation of projects geared to the realization of the common objectives of the two countries.” Marcos spoke to the commission and praised “the efforts exerted by the Philippines and Indonesia to help one another in attaining their mutual goal of industrial and economic development.”⁴³⁷ When Suharto visited the Philippines in February 1972, Marcos and his economic team spent nearly two hours meeting with their Indonesian counterparts to discuss the two countries’ economic development programs.⁴³⁸ National leaders and technocrats also gathered several times a year at ASEAN meetings and inevitably discussed pathways toward economic growth. But the most compelling evidence for Marcos’s adoption of Suharto’s economic development programs is circumstantial—evident in the results rather than the planning of Indonesian and Philippine economic development. A kind of technocratic corruption enabled each leader to promote his nation’s development and bolster his personal security.

⁴³⁶ Ferdinand Marcos, “The True Filipino Ideology,” *Official Gazette*, May 12, 1982.

⁴³⁷ “Official Week in Review: July 23-29, 1971,” *Official Gazette*, August 2, 1971.

⁴³⁸ “Official Week in Review: February 11-17, 1972,” *Official Gazette*, February 21, 1972.

Like the Berkeley Mafia in Indonesia, Filipino technocrats crafted stepwise development plans that emphasized self-sufficiency in rice production, the boosting of export revenues, and the management of population increases.⁴³⁹ The first of these plans was released in 1966, predating Suharto's first five-year plan.⁴⁴⁰ It won plaudits from international creditors, whose subsequent short-term loans to the Philippines financed dramatically increased government expenditures, which rose 43 percent between 1964-1968 and jumped another 25 percent in 1969, as Marcos dished out pork to secure his reelection. By 1970, however, the Philippines' sovereign debt burden had again become unsustainable, and its major creditors formed the Consultative Group for the Philippines (CGP), an analogue to the IGGI. The CGP demanded the implementation of a neoliberal stabilization package and the devaluation of the peso in exchange for debt restructuring agreements. These reforms, together with additional loans, produced economic growth rates that hovered around 6 percent throughout the first half of the 1970s but did not result in improvements in the lot of ordinary Filipinos, as real wages dropped by about 25 percent between 1969-1973.⁴⁴¹ After issuing Proclamation 1081, Marcos once again moved toward an activist governmental role in the economy. He created the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), which centralized control over the planning and execution of development programs.⁴⁴² NEDA oversaw a quadrupling of state investment as a share of GDP in the four years after 1972, financed by an expanded tax base, once-again profligate commercial and multilateral lenders

⁴³⁹ Amando Doronila, *The State, Economic Transformation, and Political Change in the Philippines, 1946-1972* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 133-138.

⁴⁴⁰ Government of the Philippines, *Four-Year Economic Program for the Philippines: Fiscal Years 1967-1970* (Manila: Office of the President, 1966).

⁴⁴¹ Robert S. Dohner and Ponciano Intal Jr., "The Marcos Legacy: Economic Policy and Foreign Debt in the Philippines," in Jeffrey D. Sachs, ed., *Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance, Volume III: Country Studies – Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Turkey* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 382-384.

⁴⁴² Republic of the Philippines, *The National Economic and Development Authority* (s.l.: National Economic and Development Authority, 1975).

grateful for the removal of impediments to international investment, and off-books spending by newly created state-owned enterprises such as the Philippine National Oil Company, the National Power Corporation, the National Fertilizer Corporation, the National Development Corporation, and the Metro-Manila Transport Corporation.⁴⁴³ These institutions and strategies for promoting economic development mirrored closely those employed by the New Order.

Marcos also siphoned much of this newfound public wealth into his personal accounts, sums so vast, in fact, that by the time of his ouster in 1986 he ranked as the second-most corrupt dictator in modern history—behind only Suharto.⁴⁴⁴ And just like Suharto, Marcos's corruption was integral, not incidental, to his regime's coalitional logic. The Filipino despot constructed a mechanism of rent collection and patronage dispensation that enabled him to bypass the authority of the traditional oligarchy and secure his own position in office. In the month after issuing Proclamation 1081, Marcos signed two decrees designating the entire archipelago as a "land reform area" and decreeing "the emancipation of all tenants from the bondage of the soil."⁴⁴⁵ In practice, however, land reform was a project not of humanitarian uplift but of authoritarian coalition-building. Marcos expropriated only the estates of his political opponents, most notably the Lopez clan.⁴⁴⁶ He also exempted export crop-producing haciendas from land reform and, within a year of unveiling his program, revised the land retention limit upward to avoid alienating the mid-sized military landholders upon whom the

⁴⁴³ National Economic and Development Authority, *In the New Society, Where Does Your Tax Money Go? It Goes Back to You in the Form of Essential Services* (s.l.: Bureau of Internal Revenue, 1973).

⁴⁴⁴ Robin Hodess, "Introduction," in *Transparency International Global Corruption Report 2004* (Sterling: Pluto Press, 2004), 13.

⁴⁴⁵ Presidential Decree No. 2, Proclaiming the Entire Country as a Land Reform Area, September 26, 1972, in *Pres. Ferdinand E. Marcos Executive Issuances, 1972-1986* [hereafter *Marcos Executive Issuances*] (Manila: Marcos Presidential Center, 2006); Presidential Decree No. 27, Decreeing the Emancipation of Tenants from the Bondage of the Soil, October 21, 1972, in *Ibid.*

⁴⁴⁶ Wurfel, *Filipino Politics*, 122-123.

stability of his regime depended.⁴⁴⁷ Marcos also granted, through a variety of mechanisms, effective monopolies in the sugar and coconut industries to personal cronies. In 1973, Marcos issued a presidential decree creating the Philippine Coconut Authority, controlled by his crony Eduardo Cojuangco, was given the authority to levy a tax on coconut sales.⁴⁴⁸ The following year, he bestowed by decree a monopoly on the sugar trade to organizations controlled by his fraternity brother Roberto Benedicto.⁴⁴⁹ The rents from these and other quasi-monopolies accrued upward, padding Marcos's pockets and filling the New Society's coffers.⁴⁵⁰ And much like in Indonesia, if the technocrats attempted to undermine these patronage arrangements, they were quickly sidelined.

The institutional mechanism through which Marcos distributed his ill-gotten gains also bears a resemblance to its Indonesian counterpart, Golkar. By the mid-1970s, international donors to the Philippines had made clear their discontent with the archipelago's antidemocratic political situation. Marcos had also concluded that party formations had reinforced the authority of Suharto, Razak, and Lee Kuan Yew. In 1977-78, he fashioned a new political body halfway between party and machine dubbed the New Society Movement (KBL). KBL represented little more than a formal structure—a vehicle of vote-getting—applied to the vast informal networks of patronage, corruption, and bossism that Marcos had established around Malacañang. Local government officials and members of the national

⁴⁴⁷ Benedict Kerkvliet, "Land Reform in the Philippines Since the Marcos Coup," *Pacific Affairs* 47, no. 3 (Autumn 1974): 292.

⁴⁴⁸ Presidential Decree No. 232, Creating a Philippine Coconut Authority, June 30, 1973, in *Marcos Executive Issuances*; Presidential Decree No. 276, Establishing a Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund, August 20, 1973, in *Ibid.*

⁴⁴⁹ Presidential Decree No. 388, Creating the Philippine Sugar Commission, February 2, 1974, in *Ibid.*; Presidential Decree No. 579, Rationalizing and Stabilizing the Export of Sugar and for Other Purposes, November 12, 1974, in *Ibid.*

⁴⁵⁰ See Gary Hawes, *The Philippine State and the Marcos Regime: The Politics of Export* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).

bureaucracy, whom Marcos could sack at whim, flocked to the organization; urban capitalists and landed elites joined, too, no doubt because Marcos could expropriate their assets with the stroke of a pen; and so too did members of the military, since Marcos had become their patron and partner. As one former KBL member explained, “It’s nice. Like any political grouping you want to bring something home. You don’t want to go home empty-handed. And at that time all funds were controlled by Malacañang. . . . Now if you are in the opposition, you don’t get anything.”⁴⁵¹

To safeguard the political and economic gains made under martial law, Marcos bolstered the role of the Philippine military (AFP). Whether he was aided or merely inspired by the Indonesian example is difficult to discern. Representatives of the New Order traveled to Manila often. Only three weeks before declaring martial law, Marcos received Indonesian Defense Minister Maraden Panggabean and bestowed upon him the Ancient Order of Sikatuna, in honor of his efforts to strengthen ties between the two countries. The Filipino president expressed “hope that the close understanding now existing between the Philippines and Indonesia shall continue to be further strengthened by frequent exchange of visits,” and affirmed that the two countries “are joined by geographical propinquity, common ideology, common origin and common destiny.”⁴⁵² Over the next five years, Indonesian military delegations repeatedly visited the Philippines, where they pressed for the Marcos regime’s adoption of national resilience and ASEAN’s development of an indigenous defense capacity.⁴⁵³ These visits likely made the AFP’s assumption of a political role attractive to both Marcos and Filipino military leaders, who had seen the symbiotic relationship between

⁴⁵¹ Quoted in Terence Lee, *Defect or Defend: Military Responses to Popular Protests in Authoritarian Asia* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015), 80.

⁴⁵² “Week in Review, September 1-7, 1972,” *Official Gazette*, September 11, 1972.

⁴⁵³ “Official Week in Review,” December 7-13, 1973, *Official Gazette*, December 17, 1973.

Suharto and ABRI. Given archival limitations, the best evidence of military emulation between Marcos and Suharto is again indirect and circumstantial—the similar institutional and ideological formations that the Philippine military unveiled in the years after the declaration of martial law.

Marcos insisted in 1972 that “Our martial law is unique in that it is based on the supremacy of the civilian authority over the military.”⁴⁵⁴ In fact, Marcos quickly used the military to subjugate all strongholds of civilian authority save his own, and military officials adopted civilian functions in vastly greater numbers. “The people’s regard for our soldiers has justified my faith in you,” Marcos told a military audience at Camp Aguinaldo in December 1972, “and this is the reason I have given you greater responsibilities, indeed a major role in nation-building.”⁴⁵⁵ The AFP thus adopted a doctrine akin to ABRI’s *dwifungsi*. This built on a tradition of increasing military involvement in politics that predated martial law. Under President Ramon Magsaysay in the 1950s, the AFP engaged in “civic action” projects such as the construction of national infrastructure, and more than 100 military officers served in civilian positions, including several cabinet posts.⁴⁵⁶ But Magsaysay’s successors, Carlos Garcia and Diosdado Macapagal, had few connections to the military, and scarce was the military official appointed to key posts during their terms in office. That changed with Marcos’s election in 1965. The new president kept the defense portfolio for himself during the first year of his rule, and his 1966 Four-Year Economic Development Program specified the

⁴⁵⁴ Marcos, *Notes on the New Society*, 99.

⁴⁵⁵ “The Need for Vigilance,” in Ferdinand Marcos, *Presidential Speeches Volume IV* (Manila: Ferdinand E. Marcos, 1978), 218.

⁴⁵⁶ Rommel Banlaoi, *Philippine Security Age of Terror: National, Regional, and Global Challenges in the Post-9/11 World* (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 2010), 102.

military as one of the key state organs involved in socioeconomic programs, including education, agriculture, and industry.⁴⁵⁷

But the military's role underwent a fundamental shift after the declaration of martial law. Where before it had acted as a tool of civilian authority animated by a professional, apolitical ethos and only occasionally involved in domestic programs, it became a coequal partner of the civilian administration deeply enmeshed in political competition, the exercise of patronage, and the preservation of domestic security.⁴⁵⁸ In the four years after the declaration of martial law, the military's budget quadrupled in concrete terms and, measured as a share of GDP, more than doubled. Over the same period, the military's total manpower ballooned from about 60,000 to more than 140,000 men. These increases dwarfed military growth in other Southeast Asian countries, which did not possess the dual protections of an oceanic barrier and American troops and were therefore far more vulnerable than the Philippines to communist aggression as the United States withdrew from Vietnam.⁴⁵⁹ The enlarged military took part in huge numbers of civic action projects across the archipelago, constructing roads, bridges, and schools; assuming responsibility for managing public utilities, media outlets, and certain industries; and exercising influence over the education, justice, and diplomatic systems. It also began suppressing political opposition to Marcos, in large part because Marcos monopolized control over military promotions and allowed loyal subordinates to stay behind the mandatory retirement age. The autocrat packed the senior ranks of the military with loyalists—relatives, fellow Ilocanos, and classmates from the University of the Philippines cadet corps. To secure the loyalty of lower-level commanders, Marcos

⁴⁵⁷ See Government of the Philippines, *Four-Year Economic Program, 1967-1970*.

⁴⁵⁸ Alfred McCoy, *Closer than Brothers: Manhood at the Philippine Military Academy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999).

⁴⁵⁹ ACDA, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1972-1982*.

immediately after the declaration of martial law gave them a pay bump, increased their benefits, and established a retirement pension system.

So too did Marcos work to militarize society, adopting a counterinsurgency program that resembled Suharto's Hankamrata doctrine. Civilian militias had long been a facet of the Philippines' decentralized political system. Landed oligarchs often fielded militias, which they employed to enforce their authority and occasionally to help the central government suppress rebellions, as in the case of the Huks in the 1950s.⁴⁶⁰ In 1970, Marcos worked to circumvent the armed power of other political elites by launching the Barrio Self-Defense Unit (BSDU) program. Representatives of the AFP trained, armed, and supervised men from each barrio, the official rationale, in the words of Marcos's secretary of defense, being that "arming the people themselves against the dissidents was the best and most effective way to dislodge the Huks [communist rebels] in Central and Southern Luzon."⁴⁶¹ But the BSDU program represented a precursor to Marcos's efforts to centralize control over Philippine society and undermine the traditional ties of patronage and loyalty that accounted for much of the political power of oligarchs. It therefore attracted stiff resistance from other powerful political clans, including that of Marcos's chief rival, Liberal Senator Benigno Aquino. He delivered a speech on the Senate floor accusing the Marcos administration of sending poorly armed BSDU farmers into battle against highly trained Marxist guerrillas, and demanding the program be dismantled.⁴⁶² Around 1973, Marcos rebranded the BSDU as the Integrated Civilian Home Defense Forces (ICHDF). Though not formalized until 1976 through Presidential Decree 1016, the ICHDF quickly grew to include some 25,000 paramilitaries,

⁴⁶⁰ See Kerkvliet, *The Huk Rebellion*.

⁴⁶¹ Enrile, *Autobiography*, Kindle location 6631.

⁴⁶² Benigno Aquino, *A Garrison State in the Make and Other Speeches*, ed. Nick Joaquin (Manila: Benigno S. Aquino Jr. Foundation, 1985), June 25, 1970.

who won a reputation for brutality and wanton human rights abuses.⁴⁶³ The ICHDF, which paid farmers and laborers for paramilitary service from national rather than local coffers, allowed Marcos to sever the patron-client ties that welded poor Filipinos to landed oligarchs. Meanwhile Marcos ended local elections and arrogated to himself the right to dismiss any local or provincial official, preventing the traditional elite from exercising its historic leverage over the central state.

Though most governments in island Southeast Asia moved toward New Order-style institutions and ideologies, emulation was not unidirectional. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, who went on to assume several important positions in the Suharto regime, fled Indonesia after taking part in unsuccessful separatist rebellions in the 1950s. He wrote a book on economic development in Malaysia and Singapore, in which he called the Malaysian government's FELDA program a "key element in the solid foundation of social and economic overhead capital formation by which the rural economy can substantially contribute to and share in the country's future growth."⁴⁶⁴ That program doubtless inspired some of the Indonesian government's rural resettlement schemes during the New Order.

The Suharto regime also appeared impressed by the Marcos regime's use of Philippine cultural exhibits to promote national unity. In the late 1960s, Imelda Marcos presided over the creation of Nayong Pilipino. A theme park comprising large dioramas of seven culturally distinct Philippine villages and miniature replicas of some of the archipelago's top tourist

⁴⁶³ "The Final Report of the Fact-Finding Commission: II: Political Change and Military Transmission in the Philippines, 1966-1989: From the Barracks to the Corridors of Power," *Official Gazette*, October 3, 1990.

⁴⁶⁴ Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, *Trade and Aid in Southeast Asia—Malaysia and Singapore* (Melbourne: F.W. Cheshire, 1968), 38.

attractions, Nayong Pilipino opened to the public in June 1970.⁴⁶⁵ Situated around a large man-made lagoon near the Manila airport, it served as a popular destination for foreign delegations en route to Malacañang Palace. In February 1972, on a state visit to the Philippines, Suharto and his wife Ibu Tien toured Nayong Pilipino with the Marcoses and lunched on the grounds.⁴⁶⁶ By that time, Imelda's project had already convinced Ibu Tien to construct a similar monument to Indonesia's cultural diversity.⁴⁶⁷ In March 1970, she founded *Yayasan Harapan Kita* (Our Hope Foundation), to which she indelicately suggested business leaders donate should they wish to retain Suharto's favor. The foundation's flagship project was *Taman Mini Indonesia Indah* (Beautiful Indonesia-in-Miniature Park). Plans for the park, which would sit on one hundred hectares of land in southern Jakarta, included life-size dioramas of traditional homes from each of Indonesia's 26 provinces. In the middle of these dioramas would sit a large lagoon whose surface would be dotted by man-made islands, which from a birds-eye view would depict the Indonesian archipelago. Ibu Tien insisted the project would serve as a modern-day Borobudur, and Suharto affirmed it would raise national consciousness and make Jakarta a tourist destination.⁴⁶⁸ But Ibu Tien's ham-fisted fundraising tactics, to say nothing of the extravagant cost of the project for a nation still mired in poverty, inspired protests. Suharto stood by his wife's side, declaring in a rare impromptu speech that he and the Indonesian military would "pummel" those who sought to oppose or disrupt the project.⁴⁶⁹ Taman Mini opened to the public in 1975. Though intended to showcase

⁴⁶⁵ Gerard Lico, *Edifice Complex: Power, Myth, and Marcos State Architecture* (Manila: Ateneo University Press, 2003), 57-60.

⁴⁶⁶ "Official Week in Review: February 11-17, 1972," *Official Gazette*, February 21, 1972.

⁴⁶⁷ Wanandi, *Shades of Grey*, Kindle location 1291.

⁴⁶⁸ Benedict Anderson, *Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 176-177; "Beautiful Authority," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, January 15, 1972.

⁴⁶⁹ "Resmikan RSP Pertamina, Presiden Soeharto: Akan Saya Hantam Pelanggar Konstitusi," in *Jejak Langkah, 1968-1973*, 401.

Indonesia's unity in diversity and depict Suharto as the progenitor of a glorious past, the park instead became a symbol of the Suharto regime's corruption. In that, too, it had much in common with Nayong Pilipino. Each park helped win its progenitor a similar nickname: Marcos became known as "Mister Ten Percent," while Ibu Tien acquired the moniker "Ibu Tien Percent."

In an essay that defined a generation of scholarship on the Philippines, Benedict Anderson characterized the archipelago's political structure as "cacique democracy," referring to a decentralized system dominated by landed elites whose base of political power rested in the provinces. Anderson's was a strikingly teleological account, noting that "cacique democracy contained within itself the seeds of its own decay" and "it was only a matter of time before someone break the rules and try to set himself up as Supreme Cacique for Life."⁴⁷⁰ But internal dynamics did not alone determine the shape of the Marcos regime. Marcos and other leaders in island Southeast Asia responded to a similar set of imperatives: ensuring political stability, promoting economic development, securing national defense, and winning Western support. Suharto offered a blueprint for the achievement of those objectives—one with which other regional leaders were intimately familiar. Marcos and Razak subsequently emulated his fixation on ideology, which had no real precursors in either the Philippines or Malaysia. So too did Suharto's vision of military modernization, social militarization, and technocratic corruption inflect the course of authoritarian political development across the region. The New Orderization of island Southeast Asia did not eradicate all national particularities, but it did produce a striking institutional and ideological convergence.

⁴⁷⁰ Benedict Anderson, "Cacique Democracy in the Philippines: Origins and Dreams," in *The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the World* (New York: Verso, 1998), 192-226.

The extent to which Suharto's conceptions of an ideologically-founded, economically-driven, and militarily-secured conception of national resilience percolated throughout island Southeast Asia became clear at the landmark February 1976 meeting of ASEAN. Held in Bali, the summit resulted in the establishment of a permanent ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta. But it is most notable for the formal adoption of Indonesia's national resilience framework by all other member states. The first article of the ASEAN Concord stated that "Each member state resolves to eliminate threats posed by subversion to its stability, thus strengthening national and ASEAN resilience."⁴⁷¹ The adoption of the national and regional resilience framework, and the growth of ASEAN as an institution, was the result of a decade-long campaign led by the Suharto regime. The regional institution, though nominally restricted to social, cultural, and economic cooperation, became the most important forum for the exchange of ideas about authoritarian political and economic development as well as a seedbed of anticommunist security cooperation. As the chief of the military-linked Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta remembered, "ASEAN had been established in 1967 to withstand the dominoes likely to fall to communism after Vietnam. The socio-economic 'front' of ASEAN was just a cover for the strategic build-up of a force that could withstand communist pressure in the region."⁴⁷² And, because the leaders of most ASEAN states believed that authoritarianism was necessary to combat communism, the regional organization became critical in the transnational construction of authoritarian rule in island Southeast Asia.

⁴⁷¹ "The Declaration of ASEAN Concord, Bali, Indonesia, 24 February 1976, http://asean.org/?static_post=declaration-of-asean-concord-indonesia-24-february-1976 (accessed September 4, 2017).

⁴⁷² Wanandi, *Shades of Grey*, Kindle locations 2879-2885.

ASEAN was founded to low expectations in 1967. Territorial and ideological conflicts had caused two earlier attempts at regional agglomeration to sputter to quick demises in the early 1960s. While the ascent of Marcos in the Philippines and Suharto in Indonesia had quelled some of these intraregional disputes, such as Sukarno's *Konfrontasi* campaign against Malaysia, few contemporary observers believed any emergent Southeast Asian identity could overcome the jealous nationalisms that animated the region's politics. Yet a shared fear of regional instability spurred the leaders of Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand to make one further attempt at erecting a regional umbrella organization.⁴⁷³ ASEAN's early years were marked more by conflict than cooperation. Were it not for the persistence of anxieties about abandonment—stoked by Britain's accelerated withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore and the United States' disengagement from Vietnam—ASEAN may well have run aground on the same shoals as its predecessors.⁴⁷⁴ But those anxieties only grew. As Philippine Foreign Minister Carlos Romulo remarked in 1969, "Events are beginning to show the diminishing value of reliance on one's friends." The leaders of the five ASEAN states therefore worked to further institutionalize their collaboration.⁴⁷⁵ In that process Indonesia assumed a leading role.

The Bangkok Declaration, ASEAN's founding document, limited cooperation among the organization's five member states to the social, economic, and cultural realms.⁴⁷⁶ Those limitations meant that, for the first several years of its existence, the ASEAN represented little more than empty shell. As the influential Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik lamented

⁴⁷³ See Ba, *(Re)Negotiating East and Southeast Asia*, 42-65.

⁴⁷⁴ Kei Koga, "Institutional Transformation of ASEAN: ZOPFAN, TAC, and the Bali Concord in 1968-1976," *The Pacific Review* 27, no. 5 (2014): 733-735.

⁴⁷⁵ Ross Terrill, "Bangkok-Manila," *The Atlantic Monthly*, July 1969, 26.

⁴⁷⁶ The ASEAN Declaration, August 8, 1967, in Foreign Information Directorate, *A.S.E.A.N. (Association of South-East Asian Nations)* (Jakarta: Department of Information Republic of Indonesia, s.n.), 1-6

privately to Suharto in July 1968, “there is not or is not yet common ground on the functions and goals of ASEAN,” so that the organization served as “an ‘extension’ or continuation of national programs” rather than a truly regional body.⁴⁷⁷ The Suharto regime made the first attempt to deepen ASEAN by recommending military cooperation. But other member states, who nursed anxieties about Indonesian expansionism held over from the era of *Konfrontasi*, swiftly rebuffed the Indonesian proposal.⁴⁷⁸ If ASEAN was unlikely to evolve into a formal military pact, it did become a site of informal political and diplomatic cooperation.⁴⁷⁹ What Tun Abdul Razak called “sport shirt diplomacy” helped resolve tensions between Malaysia and the Philippines over Sabah, and between Singapore and Indonesia over the execution of two Indonesian marines captured during *Konfrontasi*. The Suharto regime also made efforts to use ASEAN to promulgate its authoritarian development strategies. In 1970, Lemhannas urged the deepening of ASEAN cooperation in the economic, sociocultural, political, and security fields, which it claimed would promote a convergence in policies and identities and thereby enhance the national resilience of each member state.⁴⁸⁰ Toward the end of 1970, the Indonesian Human Resources Development Foundation (*Yayasan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia*) sponsored an ASEAN regional workshop on “The Role of Leadership in Development.” The attendees were treated to papers by the likes of Agus Salim denigrating democracy as “bring[ing] with it certain problems,” such as disenchantment and instability. “And stability,”

⁴⁷⁷ Memorandum, Malik to Suharto, July 29, 1968, 71, Berkas mengenai kerja sama negara-negara ASEAN dalam bidang ekonomi, Sekkab, ANRI.

⁴⁷⁸ *Antara*, March 6, 1968; Boni Ray Siagian, *Eighth Year Cycle of ASEAN: With Forewords/Messages of ASEAN Foreign Ministers* (s.l.: ASEAN National Secretariat, 1976), 103-118; Adam Malik, *Mengabdikan Republik*, 83.

⁴⁷⁹ Dewi Fortuna Anwar, *Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), 167-174.

⁴⁸⁰ Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional, “Memorandum diskusi problema XV: Perkembangan ASEAN dalam rangka peningkatan ketahanan nasional,” September 24, 1970, Lemhanas: Tentang perkembangan ASEAN dalam rangka peningkatan ketahanan nasional, 590, Lambertus Nicodemus Palar, ANRI.

he added, “particularly political stability and law and order, is to my mind a precondition to growth [*sic*] and development.” Summing up the conference, the steering committee wrote that “Although democratic means of leadership are preferred, with respect to certain types of problems, authoritative means of leadership have inevitable [*sic*] to be resorted to.”⁴⁸¹ The workshop promoted the Suharto regime’s conception of national resilience, which emphasized the importance of strong leadership.

In 1970, Razak gave further impetus to ASEAN’s political cooperation by proposing the neutralization of Southeast Asia, which his deputy Tun Dr. Ismail envisioned as being guaranteed by the great powers.⁴⁸² After a series of contentious debates, the members of ASEAN in 1971 signed a declaration that Southeast Asia should become a “Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality.” Suharto disagreed with the reliance on great powers to secure Southeast Asia’s neutrality. But Indonesia signed onto ZOPFAN because he saw the declaration as a first step toward the construction of an indigenous Southeast Asian security architecture.⁴⁸³ Although ASEAN had become a forum for member states to discuss security relationships, a confidential CSIS study remarked in January 1972, “what until now has not or cannot be produced by ASEAN is a determination on behalf of member states to defend the region together.”⁴⁸⁴ By this senior New Order officials meant not a mutual defense pact but rather broad cooperation on security matters. In an attempt to move ASEAN toward a more cooperative security posture, Suharto and Malik introduced the concept of regional resilience.

⁴⁸¹ *ASEAN Regional Workshop on: “The Role of Leadership in Development,” Yogyakarta, 13-19 Dec. 1970* (s.l.: Yayasan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia, s.d.), 23, 2.

⁴⁸² “Tun: The Only Way to Peace,” *Singapore Herald*, December 16, 1970.

⁴⁸³ Adam Malik, “Towards an Asian Asia,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, September 25, 1971.

⁴⁸⁴ Centre for Strategic and International Studies, “Analisa Previsionil: Mengenai Asia pada Umumnya, Asia Tenggara pada Khususnya,” January 1972, Yayasan Proklamasi (Centre for Strategic and International Studies): laporan mengenai analisa previsionil mengenai Asia pada umumnya, Asia Tenggara pada khususnya, 2326, EKUIN, ANRI.

At an April 1972 ASEAN ministerial meeting, Malik likened ASEAN to a chain, only as strong as its weakest link: If one member state lacked national resilience and proved vulnerable to subversion or infiltration, the other member states would have to divert precious resources away from development and toward defense, which would diminish their own national resilience. On the other hand, Malik explained, the realization of regional resilience would “enhance the capabilities and abilities of each member country and its people in all fields of national endeavour, in order to withstand and overcome all kinds of outside interference and adverse influences, harmful to its sound and harmonious development.”⁴⁸⁵ Just as New Order officials believed national resilience referred not only to a country’s military capabilities but also its ideological, political, economic, and sociocultural strength, they considered regional resilience not only the sum total of each country’s national resilience but also a broader cohesion of institutions, ideologies, and identities among ASEAN’s member states. Malik’s speech was well received, earning plaudits from the Malaysian and Thai delegations. When the meeting adjourned, the ministers’ joint communique included the point that “It was necessary for member countries to develop national resilience which would enable them to face the present changes and challenges of the future with greater confidence.”⁴⁸⁶

Changes in the balance of power in Southeast Asia made other ASEAN member states receptive to Indonesia’s proposals. In particular, the accelerated British withdrawal from its bases in Singapore and Malaysia and the American agreement to the Paris Peace Accords led

⁴⁸⁵ Quoted in Dewi Fortuna Anwar, “National Versus Regional Resilience: An Indonesian Perspective,” in Derek da Cunha, ed., *Southeast Asian Perspectives on Security* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000), 88.

⁴⁸⁶ Joint Communique of the Fifth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting Singapore, 13-14 April 1972, http://asean.org/?static_post=joint-communique-of-the-fifth-asean-ministerial-meeting-singapore-13-14-april-1972 (accessed August 16, 2017).

many of the region's leaders to fear a steep drop-off in external assistance for national and regional defense. The slashing of American military and economic aid to ASEAN countries by 55 percent in the year after January 1973 seemed to give credence to these anxieties. In the face of declining international support, regional cooperation in the security field became more attractive.⁴⁸⁷ ASEAN ministers met in Kuala Lumpur in February 1973 to consider the implications of the final American withdrawal from Vietnam. There they offered a first, tepid endorsement of the idea of regional resilience, concluding that “the developing [of] national and regional resilience could be the foundation on which Southeast Asian countries could assume this responsibility” for “the peace and security of the area.”⁴⁸⁸ Other ASEAN member states increasingly recognized Indonesian leadership as essential in this effort. As Marcos put it in July 1973, Indonesia served as “the base and anchor of Southeast Asia.”⁴⁸⁹

The Suharto regime used that leadership role to promote national resilience, which it consecrated as the lodestar of Indonesian foreign policy in the Official Guidelines of State Policy in 1973. “Take steps,” the guidelines instructed Indonesian officialdom, “to consolidate the stability of the Southeast Asian region and the Southwest Pacific, thus enabling the countries in the region to manage their own futures through the development of national resilience, and strengthen the consociation and cooperation among member states of

⁴⁸⁷ United States Agency for International Development, “U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, 1945-2013,” <https://explorer.usaid.gov/reports-greenbook.html> (accessed September 1, 2017).

⁴⁸⁸ Joint Press Statement of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting to Assess the Agreement on Ending the War And Restoring Peace in Vietnam and to Consider Its Implications for Southeast Asia Kuala Lumpur, 15 February 1973, http://asean.org/?static_post=joint-press-statement-the-asean-foreign-ministers-meeting-to-assess-the-agreement-on-ending-the-war-and-restoring-peace-in-vietnam-and-to-consider-its-implications-for-southeast-asia-kuala-lumpur-15-f (accessed August 16, 2017).

⁴⁸⁹ “Official Week in Review, July 27 – August 2, 1973,” *Official Gazette*, August 6, 1973.

the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.”⁴⁹⁰ Lemhannas and CSIS spearheaded this effort. In January 1974, Lemhannas organized a seminar to study the role of economic development in national resilience and regional cooperation. Starting from the premise that all ASEAN countries suffered from internal political, economic, sociocultural, and institutional weaknesses, the Lemhannas seminar affirmed that a principal goal of ASEAN should be the development of national and regional resilience. ASEAN could serve as a “vehicle and catalyst for accelerating the realization of Regional Resilience” by helping foster a common Southeast Asian identity, which could induce member states to alter their economic structures to become more complementary, their foreign policies to become more harmonious, and their security postures to become more cooperative.⁴⁹¹ Later that year, Professor Fuad Hassan gave a lecture at Lemhannas calling this process a “collectivisation of interests.”⁴⁹² In other words, the adoption of regional resilience entailed a move away from ASEAN’s posture of absolute noninterference in internal affairs and toward a broad convergence toward New Order-style political, economic, military, and ideological structures. The effectiveness of Suharto’s efforts to evangelize its political and security doctrines became clear during an October 1974 CSIS conference in Jakarta. There, Malaysian Minister of Home Affairs Tan Sri M. Ghazali bin Shafie endorsed the concepts of national and regional resilience. He affirmed the desirability of a “correlated response on the part of ASEAN member states” toward “largely uniform internal security requirements.” ASEAN could help a given country develop “a national ethos to which dissimilar components of the state can relate, as well as socio-economic

⁴⁹⁰ Ketetapan Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia nomor: IV/MPR/1973 tentang Garis Besar Haluan Negara, <http://www.tatanusa.co.id/tapmpr/73TAPMPRS-IV.pdf> (accessed August 16, 2017).

⁴⁹¹ Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional, *Pelita II sebagai Usaha Peningkatan Ketahanan Nasional Indonesia dan Pemantapan ASEAN dalam Rangka Kerjasama Regional* (s.l.: Departemen Pertahanan Keamanan, 1974), 4, 27-32.

⁴⁹² Fuad Hassan, “ASEAN and Its Prospect for Development,” November 1974 (s.l.: Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional, 1974), 1.

reconstruction to provide them with tangible evidence of the benefits to be accrued from participation in the national system.”⁴⁹³ These points were echoed by Alejandro Melchor Jr., Marcos’s executive secretary who played a critical role in establishing the institutions of martial law in the Philippines.⁴⁹⁴ Other countries in island Southeast Asia had begun adopting Indonesia’s national resilience framework.

At the introductory ceremony for ASEAN’s 1976 meeting, Suharto explained the organization’s mission as “establish[ing] an orderly, peaceful and stable condition within each individual territory, free from any subversive elements and infiltrations.”⁴⁹⁵ There the assembled heads of ASEAN government signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, which pledged the member states to mutual cooperation and non-interference; the Declaration of ASEAN Concord, which affirmed national and regional resilience as ASEAN’s formal security framework; and the Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Secretariat, which provided for the creation of a central ASEAN hub in Jakarta.⁴⁹⁶ The regional organization, according to Adam Malik, was founded as a result of a “convergence in political outlook of the five prospective member-nations” regarding the need for a “coordinated approach among the nations of Southeast Asia toward the problems of peace, stability and development.”⁴⁹⁷ As a result of the Suharto regime’s promotion of its

⁴⁹³ *ASEAN’s Response to Security Issues in Southeast Asia* (s.l.: Percetakan PKS PJ, s.n.), 11.

⁴⁹⁴ Alejandro Melchor Jr., “Security Issues in Southeast Asia,” in *Regionalism in Southeast Asia: Papers Presented at the First Conference of ASEAN Students of Regional Affairs (ASEAN I): Jakarta, October 22-25, 1974* (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1975), 39-54.

⁴⁹⁵ *Statement by the President of the Republic of Indonesia His Excellency General Soeharto at the Opening of the Meeting of ASEAN Heads of Government on February 23, 1976, at Denpasar, Bali* (s.l.: Republic of Indonesia, s.n.), 7.

⁴⁹⁶ Directorate of Foreign Information Service, *The First ASEAN Summit* (Jakarta: Department of Information, s.n.).

⁴⁹⁷ Quoted in Yuen Foong Khong, “ASEAN and the Southeast Asian Security Complex”, in David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, eds.) *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 327.

doctrine of national resilience, the ASEAN states increasingly converged toward authoritarianism as the solution to political uncertainty.

Singapore remained exceptional. Lee Kuan Yew held his Indonesian, Filipino, and Malaysian counterparts in relatively low esteem, viewing Suharto with uncertainty, Razak with suspicion, and Marcos with contempt. He did not make his first visit to Malaysia until 1972, and he waited until 1973 to visit Indonesia and 1974 to visit the Philippines. Lee therefore possessed neither the opportunity nor the inclination to adopt the New Order-style institutions and ideologies that percolated through the rest island Southeast Asia in the 1970s. That did not stop Suharto from promoting his conception of national resilience to Lee. According to a joint communique, when Lee finally visited Indonesia in May 1973, Suharto “explained to the Prime Minister of Singapore the Indonesian efforts to develop its own as well as regional resilience,” emphasizing the importance of “the concept of national resilience, particularly in order to maintain national unity and cohesion, political stability, economic progress, and national security.” Lee’s response merely indicated he “was sympathetic to, and expressed his support for, the Indonesian efforts to strengthen its own national resilience as well as regional cohesiveness.” He then explained Singapore’s own “effort of nation building,” which diverged from the Indonesian model.⁴⁹⁸

Why such a lukewarm response? Like Suharto, Lee believed authoritarianism was necessary for political stability and economic development. In a 1977 interview with the *London Times*, he was paraphrased as saying, “in a developing nation certain freedoms have

⁴⁹⁸ Joint Communique Issued on the Occasion of the Official Visit of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Singapore to the Republic of Indonesia, May 27, 1973, <http://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/data/pdfdoc/lky19730527.pdf> (accessed September 5, 2017).

to be sacrificed for the sake of economic growth and security and to withstand communist infiltration.”⁴⁹⁹ But his authoritarian vision diverged significantly from Suharto’s. Lee eyed all ideologies save pragmatism with disdain. “I am not fixated on a particular theory of the world or of society,” Lee reminisced near the end of his life. “I am pragmatic. I am prepared to look at the problem and say, all right, what is the best way to solve it that will produce the maximum happiness and well-being for the maximum number of people?”⁵⁰⁰ In Singapore’s early years of independence, Lee called this stance an “ideology of survival,” which Singapore’s first Minister of Foreign Affairs Sinnathamby Rajaratnam would later dub “moneytheism.”⁵⁰¹ Meanwhile the institutions Lee built and led, though occasionally bearing a functional resemblance to those elsewhere in island Southeast Asia, proved exceptional in their origins and often in their operations. His ruling People’s Action Party (PAP), founded in 1954, relied on oppression to win power and served as an electoral vehicle to renew the government’s mandate. But it inspired the loyalty of Singaporeans through performance as much as patronage or persecution.⁵⁰² Economic growth rates averaged above 11 percent per annum in the first decade after the city-state separated from Malaysia in 1965, and the PAP developed a reputation for competence and incorruptibility. The party thus won upward of 70 percent of the popular vote in the four Singaporean elections held between 1968-1980.

Lee did construct a powerful military and militarize Singaporean society, but his model was not Indonesia but Israel—another small state surrounded by potentially hostile,

⁴⁹⁹ “Singapore Detentions Defended,” *Times of London*, May 25, 1977.

⁵⁰⁰ Graham Allison and Robert D. Blackwill, eds., *Lee Kuan Yew: The Grand Master’s Insights on China, the United States, and the World* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2012), 131.

⁵⁰¹ “Speech by Mr S Rajaratnam, Second Deputy Prime Minister (Foreign Affairs), at the Official Opening of the Regional Workshop on ‘The Roles and Functions of the Senior Citizens’ Clubs of the Community Centres,’ at the People’s Association Headquarters,” July 22, 1984,

<http://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/data/pdfdoc/SR19840722s.pdf> (accessed September 5, 2017).

⁵⁰² Morgenbesser, *Behind the Façade*, 137-180.

ethnically distinct neighbors. Dr. Goh Kweng See, Singapore's first Minister of the Interior and Defense, determined that foreign aid would be integral in building upstart Singapore Armed Forces (SAF). After being rebuffed by Switzerland, India, and Egypt, he secured an agreement with Israel to dispatch a military mission to Singapore. The Israeli trainers arrived in 1965 and, over the next decade, transformed the SAF from a small force of regular soldiers supplemented by volunteer reservists into a mass force undergirded by conscription and mandatory reservist service. Unlike the other militaries in island Southeast Asia, the SAF steadily shed its role in the preservation of internal security to nonmilitary organizations, namely the Internal Security Department and the Singaporean Police Force, and focused on building an offensive conventional warfare capability.⁵⁰³ Indeed, Lee considered unwise the reliance on militaries for the preservation of political stability and the promotion of economic development. In June 1969, he made a speech lamenting the growing political roles of militaries across the underdeveloped world.⁵⁰⁴

Nor did Lee support the Indonesian efforts to promote security cooperation within ASEAN or the neutralization of Southeast Asia. In the same 1977 interview with the *London Times*, he argued "Asean should remain an organization primarily for economic, political, and social cooperation."⁵⁰⁵ Lee remained aloof from Southeast Asia. Instead, he took on a globetrotting role that led many to speculate he had set his sights on succeeding U Thant as secretary general of the United Nations.⁵⁰⁶ That speculation was misplaced—a man as imperious as Lee would have chafed in such a delicate position. The Singaporean leader

⁵⁰³ Tim Huxley, *Defending the Lion City: The Armed Forces of Singapore* (St Leonards NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2000), Kindle locations 516-614.

⁵⁰⁴ "Hot Cross Lines," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 12, 1969.

⁵⁰⁵ "Singapore: The Case for Putting Strings on Liberty," *The Times*, May 25, 1977.

⁵⁰⁶ "Lee Kuan Yew's Terse Retort," *Times of London*, April 18, 1969.

merely believed that “your best friends are never your immediate neighbors.”⁵⁰⁷ At first, he sought British and American guarantees for Singapore’s security, but he changed his view after the United Kingdom retreated from “east of Suez” and the United States withdrew from Vietnam. He then came to believe that that Southeast Asia’s security—and Singapore’s prosperity—would best be secured by encouraging all the world’s great powers to involve themselves in the region more deeply, not simply by guaranteeing its neutrality but by actively competing with and checking the influence of one another. While on a tour of the United States in April 1973, he insisted that any new regional equilibrium in Southeast Asia “must allow the four major world powers (the United States, Japan, Russia, and China) equal access and fair competition for political and economic interests.”⁵⁰⁸ That meant he adopted a skeptical outlook toward the neutralization and noninterference proposals advanced by the leaders of ASEAN states. He signed onto the ZOPFAN declaration, but only because he recognized that it was so vague and aspirational as to be all but meaningless, and he also insisted that ZOPFAN did not imply the neutralization of Southeast Asia.⁵⁰⁹ The ambivalence with which Lee participated in ASEAN minimized the organization’s role as a vector of authoritarianization in Singapore.

The evolutionary biologist Jonathan Losos, summing up twenty-five years of new experimental and observational data, argues that evolution is not as contingent a process as scientists long believed. A common set of environmental conditions, Losos shows, can drive unrelated organisms to develop similar characteristics. Thus dolphins and sharks, who share

⁵⁰⁷ Quoted in Charles E. Morrison and Astri Suhrke, *Strategies of Survival: The Foreign Policy Dilemmas of Smaller Asian States* (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 1978), 187.

⁵⁰⁸ “Southeast Asia’s Concern: A New Balance of Power,” in *Singapore Bulletin* 1, no. 9 (1973): 41.

⁵⁰⁹ Amitav Acharya, *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*, second ed. (New York: Routledge, 2009), 68-69.

no common ancestor and evolved independently, possess similar bodies.⁵¹⁰ This kind of “convergent evolution” occurred among the governments of island Southeast Asia. At the close of the 1960s, only Indonesia was a hard authoritarian regime; the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore possessed, if not ideal systems of self-rule, many hallmarks of democracy, including free and fair elections, rights to expression and association, and the rule of law. That changed by the mid-1970s, as authoritarianism took hold across the region. Like the ocean in which sharks and dolphins swim, a single structural condition animated this convergence: the existence of Western supporters of dictatorial rule. Suharto, Marcos, and Razak could thus draw upon critical reservoirs of support, both material and ideational, as they constructed and consolidated their authoritarian regimes. But these structures alone cannot explain the nature of the authoritarian regimes that took hold across island Southeast Asia. Leaders possessed agency, and they engaged in cooperation and emulation. As Suharto traversed the region in the late 1960s and early 1970s, acting as a vanguard and promoting his conception of national resilience, Marcos and Razak adopted institutions and ideologies that owed a clear debt of inspiration to the Indonesian example. What occurred was nothing less than the “New Orderization” of island Southeast Asia. This process, as we will see in the following chapter, reverberated in the United States.

⁵¹⁰ Jonathan Losos, *Improbable Destinies: Fate, Chance, and the Future of Evolution* (New York: Penguin, 2017).

CHAPTER 4

DISSENT

In January 1971, a Filipino American theater troupe called *Ating Tao* (Our People) staged a production called “Coconut” at San Francisco State University’s Little Theater. The title referenced a derisive term for Filipinos who, like a coconut, were “brown on the outside but pale white inside,” having internalized American values and adopted a scornful outlook toward the history, culture, and inhabitants of the Philippines. Over the course of the evening, dancers performed numbers that evoked the country’s indigenous communities and Spanish colonial heritage, and actors presented skits that poked fun at the “*bahala na*” (come what may) and “Filipino time” attitudes common in the archipelago. A local Filipino American journalist wrote that the entertainment impressed upon the audience “a lingering sense of nostalgia for the old country and a profound pride in a heritage so easily forgotten in America.”⁵¹¹

The performance marked a confluence of two structural changes in American life: immigration reform and the rise of nonwhite identity politics. Since the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 abolished the quota system in favor of occupational and family preference, Filipino immigration to the United States had increased tenfold. By 1970, Filipinos ranked as the second-fastest growing immigrant group in the country, measured in terms of annual arrivals. New arrivals came predominantly from the professional classes, particularly in the medical field, and most settled near Los Angeles, San Francisco, Honolulu, and New York. The majority eschewed politics in favor of pursuing assimilation and

⁵¹¹ “Filipino Guerrilla Theatre Emerges to Scrape the ‘Coconut’ Mentality,” *Kalayaan International*, June 1971.

economic gain, rendered attainable by their white collar backgrounds, their fluency in English, and their familiarity with American culture—products of the half-century Filipinos spent under American colonial tutelage. But a mostly younger and poorer minority of Filipino immigrants embraced the brand of identity politics pioneered by African Americans and adopted by an array of other social groups in the 1960s. Filipino American activists worked to politicize their communities by holding youth fairs and student retreats, organizing demonstrations and strikes, and founding mutual aid societies and newspapers.⁵¹² The favorable review of “Coconut” aired in the inaugural issue of one of these newspapers, *Kalayaan International*. Founded in 1971, the San Francisco-based “movement newspaper” dedicated itself to “committed journalism” and contrasted its emphasis on politics with more longstanding Filipino American media outlets’ focus on cultural events like beauty pageants and comedy shows, which the publishers of *Kalayaan International* derided as trivial.⁵¹³

Filipino American activists represented threads in the broader patchwork of movement culture knit together by youthful organizing and opposition to the Vietnam War. But *Kalayaan International* and other radical Filipino American publications also fostered a transnational, diasporic political consciousness. The paper’s founder, Cynthia Maglaya, emigrated from the Philippines in mid-1970. Having taken part in the First Quarter Storm, a series of raucous protests that rocked Manila between January and March 1970, she was tasked by Patriotic Youth (KM), a communist-aligned opposition group, with building

⁵¹² “Filipinos: A Fast-Growing U.S. Minority,” *New York Times*, March 5, 1971; James Allen, “Recent Immigration from the Philippines and Filipino Communities in the United States,” *Geographic Review* 67, no. 2 (April 1977): 195-208.

⁵¹³ “An Emerging Alternative,” *Kalayaan International*, June 1971.

support for the Philippine revolution in the United States.⁵¹⁴ She and about a dozen other Filipino expatriates and Filipino Americans formed the Kalayaan Collective, and they published *Kalayaan International* out of San Francisco's International Hotel, a longtime hotbed of Filipino American activism.⁵¹⁵ The paper immersed readers in Philippine leftist currents. Updates on the accomplishments of opposition groups in the Philippines accompanied glossaries of revolutionary Pilipino terms, the better for unfamiliar readers to become acquainted with the archipelago's politics and language.⁵¹⁶ Sophisticated long-form essays by the likes of Nilo Tayag, the imprisoned KM chairman, and Renato Constantino, the nationalist historian, offered Marxist and Maoist critiques of Philippine society.⁵¹⁷ But the paper did not cast its gaze only across the Pacific, and the pages of *Kalayaan International* also promoted the ethnic and political awakening of Filipino Americans. Article after article celebrated their achievements in combatting racism in hiring practices, worker compensation, educational curricula, and housing policy in the United States. A consistent theme sounded throughout: Though separated by a vast ocean, the struggles of Filipinos and Filipino Americans were linked, since American imperialism represented the principal impediment to democracy in the Philippines and equality in the United States.

⁵¹⁴ Helen C. Toribio, "We Are Revolution: A Reflective History of the Union of Democratic Filipinos (KDP)," *Amerasia Journal* 24, no. 2 (1988): 160-161.

⁵¹⁵ Abraham Flores Ignacio, Jr., "Makibaka Huwag Matakot! A History of the Katipunan ng mga Demokratikong Pilipino," *Maganda Magazine*, <http://www.nameless.org.ph/sites/default/files/KDP-Ignacio.pdf> (accessed February 21, 2017); Estella Habal, *San Francisco's International Hotel: Mobilizing the Filipino American Community in the Anti-Eviction Movement* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2007), 9-32.

⁵¹⁶ "Increasing Your Word Power in Pilipino," *Kalayaan International*, July 1971; "A Nation Indignant," *Kalayaan International*, July 1971.

⁵¹⁷ See Renato Constantino, "The Miseducation of the Filipino," in *The Filipinos in the Philippines and Other Essays* (Quezon City: Malaya Books, 1966), 39-65; Renato Constantino, "The American Conquest of the Philippines," *Kalayaan International*, July 1971; "Nilo Tayag: Interview," *Kalayaan International*, August-September 1971; Nilo Tayag, "On Commitment: Students and the Revolution," *Kalayaan International*, October-November 1971.

If its ambitions were grandiose, *Kalayaan International*'s reach remained small. The paper circulated among leftist Filipino communities in Los Angeles, Seattle, Chicago, New York, and even Manila, but there is little evidence to suggest it penetrated the mainstream of Filipino American thought.⁵¹⁸ More widely read Filipino American publications, among them *Philippine News* on the west coast and *Filipino Reporter* on the east coast, evinced a decidedly assimilationist, moderate outlook. Other radical Filipino American organizations, consisting mostly of young firebrands whose doctrinaire rhetoric alienated their coethnics, remained similarly ineffective in converting their friends, neighbors, and families to their cause.⁵¹⁹ Kalayaan Collective delegates to the 1971 Filipino People's Far West Convention held in Seattle, which brought together hundreds of progressive Filipino Americans, lamented that "identity movements are not always a direct path to political consciousness," because efforts at cultural veneration could elide the economic deprivation and neocolonial oppression that plagued Filipinos and Filipino Americans alike. Most attendees at the conference, an editorial in *Kalayaan International* surmised, failed to appreciate that "our movement for self-determination cannot be separated from the broader struggle against the social-political forces" of capitalism and imperialism.⁵²⁰

Marcos's declaration of martial law in September 1972 changed the character of Filipino American activism. It attracted many moderate Filipino Americans to the anti-Marcos cause. But it also led left-wing Filipino American organizations to reduce their engagement with issues other than American support for the Marcos regime, such as racism,

⁵¹⁸ "Letters to the Collective," *Kalayaan International*, July 1971.

⁵¹⁹ Joemar Nillo Clemente, "The Emergence of a Filipino American Anti-Martial Law Movement, 1972-1974," M.A. Thesis, San Francisco State University, 2015, 51-52. Other radical Filipino American papers included *Ang Masa* and *Ningas-Cogon*, both published in New York, and *Panahon Na*, published in San Diego.

⁵²⁰ "Beyond Nationalism and Identity," *Kalayaan International*, October-November 1971; see also "Filipinos Come Together: F.Y.A. Convention Seattle, August/71," *Kalayaan International*, October-November 1971.

inequality, and imperialism, and to shift the focus of their activism away from Honolulu, San Francisco, Chicago, and New York and toward Washington. In early 1972, the Kalayaan Collective proposed that radical Filipino expatriate and Filipino American groups coordinate their activities within a formal national structure—“Brothers and Sisters: Let’s Get Organized!” blared their editorial headline.⁵²¹ Those efforts persisted through symposia in San Diego and Los Angeles, and culminated in a Kalayaan Collective-organized conference in San Francisco. News of the declaration of martial law reached the United States soon after the conference began.⁵²² The attendees banded together to form the National Committee for the Restoration of Civil Liberties in the Philippines (NCRCLP), an umbrella group whose guiding principles were opposition to martial law, the restoration of civil liberties in the Philippines, the release of all political prisoners in the archipelago, and an end to American support for the Marcos regime.⁵²³ The NCRCLP staged protests in cities throughout the United States. Calling for a protest in front of the Philippine Consulate in New York in October 1972, it urged “our Third World brothers and sisters and our Filipino compatriots and all those who are on the side of justice, freedom and basic human rights to join us in protesting the suppression of civil liberties and the perpetuation of an unpopular, repressive regime.”⁵²⁴ The NCRCLP also launched an array of other campaigns, including creating anti-Marcos media programs, lobbying American lawmakers to oppose military and economic aid to the Philippines, urging Filipinos in the United States not to pay Philippine taxes, and even

⁵²¹ “Brothers and Sisters: Let’s Get Organized!” *Kalayaan International*, February-March 1972.

⁵²² Habal, *International Hotel*, 70; Madge Bello and Vincent Reyes, “Filipino Americans and the Marcos Overthrow: The Transformation of Political Consciousness,” *Amerasia Journal* 13, no. 1 (1986): 77.

⁵²³ “Oppose the U.S.-Marcos Fascist Dictatorship!” *Kalayaan International*, October-November 1972.

⁵²⁴ National Committee for the Restoration of Civil Liberties in the Philippines, “Is the Philippines the Next Vietnam?” October 1972, Box 12, Philippine Radical Papers, Aklatan ng Unibersidad ng Pilipinas, Diliman.

demanding that Princeton rescind the admission of Marcos's daughter.⁵²⁵ Though controlled by radicals, the NCRCLP's campaigns soon attracted the support of more moderate Filipino expatriates and Filipino Americans, including Alex Esclamado, the publisher of the influential mainstream weekly *Philippine News*, and Ruperto Baliao, the Philippine consul general in Los Angeles.⁵²⁶

The NCRCLP worked to coopt other anti-martial law groups in the United States. Among the most influential was Concerned Filipinos and Americans in Hawaii (CFAH). Founded in the autumn of 1972 by a coterie of Filipino activists and American professors associated with the University of Hawaii, CFAH in short order organized a significant public outreach effort that included public symposia, protest marches, and letter-writing campaigns.⁵²⁷ The organization even published a newsletter, *Pahayag*, which urged readers in Hawaii to make common cause with the mainland anti-Marcos diaspora and with human rights advocacy groups like Amnesty International.⁵²⁸ CFAH also lobbied the White House and Congress to alter American policy. In early April 1973, members of the organization met with Representative Patsy Mink and handed her a petition signed by 500 residents of Hawaii urging a cutoff in American military aid to the Philippines.⁵²⁹ That month, CFAH received a letter from a national NCRCLP coordinator congratulating the organization on its work

⁵²⁵ "National Committee for the Restoration of Civil Liberties in the Philippines Organize in 7 U.S. Cities Picket Local Philippine Consulates," *Kalayaan International*, October-November 1972; "Demonstrators vs. Martial Law," *Philippine News*, October 12-18, 1972; "Marcos Agents Harass KTVU for NCRCLP TV Show," *Kalayaan International*, December 1972-January 1973; "Why Pay Philippine Taxes??" *Kalayaan International*, May 1973; Alan Cranston, "Repression in the Philippines," April 12, 1973, *Congressional Record* 119, no. 58, 570302-570312; "Students Protest Admission of Dictator's Daughter," *Kalayaan International*, May 1973.

⁵²⁶ "NCRCLP Pledges Its Support for Defecting Diplomat," May 24-30, 1973; "Philippines Consul Asks U.S. Asylum," *Los Angeles Times*, May 19, 1973.

⁵²⁷ "Concerned Filipinos and Americans in Hawaii Actively Opposes Martial Law," *Pahayag*, December 1972; "Perspectives on the Philippines," *Honolulu Star Bulletin*, October 11, 1972.

⁵²⁸ "Amnesty International Needs Your Help," *Pahayag*, December 1972; "Filipino Organizations in the Mainland," *Pahayag*, December 1972.

⁵²⁹ "Petition to the U.S. Congress to Cut Off American Aid to the Philippines," *Pahayag*, April 1973.

lobbying Mink and other legislators and urging it to become an official NCRCLP chapter.⁵³⁰ While CFAH remained independent, it joined the NCRCLP's letter-writing campaign and implored its readers to "support this effort now with strong letters to Senators and Representatives against aid to the Marcos regime."⁵³¹ The campaign evidently had some effect. On April 13, 1973, California Senator Alan Cranston lamented that "foreign dictators seem to feel that all they have to do is proclaim their anticommunism and we will rush to their side with dollars and arms." He praised "the conscientious and energetic efforts of a group called the National Committee for the Restoration of Civil Liberties in the Philippines" to halt American military aid to the Marcos regime.⁵³²

Diasporic and transnational opposition to American support for authoritarian regimes became increasingly prominent in the 1970s. Human rights groups flourished, attracting increasing numbers of members and dispatching missions to countries across the globe to report on conditions abroad. Meanwhile immigrant groups comprising longstanding residents of the United States and more recent refugees from political repression organized themselves to lobby against the dictators who now held power in their homelands. Between these diasporic and human rights lobbies sat a smaller coalition of scholars, whose ethnic backgrounds rendered them out of place in diasporic communities but whose affective ties to, and long experience in, particular regions rendered them unique in human rights lobbies. Historians have already situated the 1970s as a pivotal decade in the birth of human rights consciousness.⁵³³ Overlooked in that grand narrative, which often eyes Chile, Greece, Vietnam, and Biafra as loci of American concern for human rights, are representatives and

⁵³⁰ "Letter to the Editor," *Pahayag*, April 1973.

⁵³¹ "Opposed to Martial Law? Write Your Senators and Representatives," *Pahayag*, May 1973.

⁵³² Alan Cranston, "Repression in the Philippines," *Congressional Record*, April 12, 1973, 12135-12137.

⁵³³ See Samuel Moyn, *The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2012).

representations of island Southeast Asia, which together played a minor but meaningful role in the proliferation of human rights consciousness in the 1970s. By the mid-1970s, they had transformed island Southeast Asia into one of the most prominent discursive terrains upon which battles over the human rights were fought.⁵³⁴

Through public activism, media campaigns, and congressional lobbying, groups like Amnesty International and the National Committee for the Restoration of Civil Liberties in the Philippines drove debates over American sponsorship of right-wing authoritarian regimes into the mainstream of American political discourse. Like defenders of U.S. engagement with such regimes before and since, the Nixon and Ford administrations argued that “quiet” diplomacy was the best means of achieving greater respect for human rights abroad. Absent generous aid packages, the argument went, the United States would have no voice with which to advocate progressive reforms, no leverage over the policies of allied governments; more forceful demands for human rights protections, possibly accompanied by threats of aid cutoffs, would prove counterproductive because they would inspire a nationalist backlash against foreign pressure. The transnational and diasporic campaigns against authoritarian regimes in Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore cast these arguments as hollow. The Suharto, Marcos, Razak, and Lee regimes were avid observers of American politics especially attuned to human rights campaigns. Officials in each government worked to deflect pressure from human rights groups by wooing their leaders and by offering competing discourses that cast human rights as alien to Asian cultures and historical

⁵³⁴ Patrick William Kelly, “The 1973 Chilean Coup and the Origins of Transnational Human Rights Activism,” *Journal of Global History* 8, no. 1 (March 2013): 165-186; Sargent, *A Superpower Transformed*, 68-100; Barbara Keys, *Reclaiming American Virtue: The Human Rights Revolution of the 1970s* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014); Jan Eckel and Samuel Moyn, eds., *The Breakthrough: Human Rights in the 1970s* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014).

experiences. What changes in the human rights situations in island Southeast Asia came not as a result of American policymakers' halfhearted prodding, but instead as a result of bold nongovernmental campaigns that threatened to upend "quiet" American diplomacy.

Congressional concern over the Philippines spiked in 1969, after Senator Stuart Symington began hearings on American security commitments abroad. A reformed hawk, the Missouri senator had by the time of the Tet Offensive come to doubt the ability of the United States to sustain the political, economic, and human costs of the Vietnam War—and the mantle of global leadership more generally.⁵³⁵ In February 1969, he was tapped by J. William Fulbright, the Arkansas arch-dove who chaired the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to preside over a subcommittee investigating the proliferation of American bases and treaty commitments abroad. In particular, Symington focused on whether these tendrils of American imperium risked involving the United States in another counterinsurgency war like the one raging in Vietnam, and whether they abetted military usurpation of Congressional control and oversight over foreign policy.⁵³⁶ Composed entirely of antiwar senators, the subcommittee's conclusions were never in doubt. But the hearings, which commenced in November 1969 with four days of closed-door testimony on U.S. involvement in the Philippines, brought to light some disturbing tales of American duplicity and ineptitude.

The splashiest headline concerned the Philippine Civic Action Group (PHILCAG), a 2,300-man engineering force dispatched to South Vietnam because, in Marcos's words, "there

⁵³⁵ "Stu Symington: The Path of a High-Level 'Defector,'" *Washington Post*, April 7, 1969; James C. Olson, *Stuart Symington: A Life* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2003), 377-397.

⁵³⁶ "Senate Probes U.S. Military Ties," *Washington Post*, March 14, 1969.

is no price too high to pay for freedom.”⁵³⁷ Symington’s hearings revealed the Philippine president’s words as harboring an unintended double meaning. The Johnson administration, which trumpeted the Philippine commitment to Vietnam as evidence of a broad international consensus behind the war, had at Marcos’s behest paid the Philippine government approximately \$36 million to field PHILCAG—and had also promised to furnish the Philippine military with additional assistance in the form of funds and materiel.⁵³⁸ The hearings also afforded Symington and his colleagues opportunity to voice a broader critique of U.S. involvement in the Philippines, which argued that American military and economic aid served to ensconce Marcos in power and diminish opportunities for peaceful political change, and which presaged the perspective that would often appear on the pages of *Kalayaan International*. That much was made clear in a revealing exchange between Symington and Air Force Lieutenant General Robert Warren, who presided over the Pentagon’s military assistance program:

Senator SYMINGTON: Yesterday we heard testimony that the external threat to the Philippines was very little. Today we have testimony that the United States support of counterinsurgency is minimum. What, therefore, is the real purpose of this military assistance? Doesn’t it come down to a quid pro quo for the bases and a means of contributing to the Filipino Government. . . .

General WARREN: In my opinion, to a degree, yes, sir. But it is also to help the Filipino forces to physically protect U.S. Forces in the Philippines.

Senator SYMINGTON: From whom?

General WARREN: Internally, sir. To maintain internal security and stability and, thereby, make our own activities over there more secure.

Senator SYMINGTON: In other words, we are paying the Philippine Government to protect us from the Philippine people who do not agree with the policies of the Government or who do not like Americans.

General WARREN: To a degree, yes, sir.⁵³⁹

⁵³⁷ “Manila War Role Is Issue in Capital,” *New York Times*, October 13, 1969.

⁵³⁸ “U.S. Paid 39-Million to the Philippines for a Vietnam Unit,” *New York Times*, November 19, 1969.

⁵³⁹ “Testimony of Lt. Gen. Robert H. Warren, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Assistance and Sales; Accompanied by Maj. Gen. George B. Pickett, Jr., Chief, Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Philippines,” in *Hearings Before the Subcommittee on United States Security Commitments Abroad of the*

Symington intended to make public this exchange and almost 400 pages of additional testimony from his hearings on the Philippines.

Alarmed by the possible repercussions of disclosure, three of Nixon's most trusted advisors—domestic affairs advisor John Ehrlichman, legislative affairs guru Bryce Harlow, and national security aide Henry Kissinger—penned a memorandum alerting the president that “Symington and Fulbright are well on their way to achieving their purpose in holding the hearings—i.e., to disrupt and dismantle our defense and diplomatic activities in selected countries.”⁵⁴⁰ The White House demanded substantial redactions in the published account of the hearings. It also requested a delay to avoid injecting an issue that could prove damaging to Marcos into the ongoing Philippine presidential campaign, scheduled to conclude on November 11. Symington agreed to the delay, and to some light redaction that fell far short of the Nixon administration's wishes.⁵⁴¹ The first volume of his subcommittee's hearings hit shelves on November 18, and it ignited a minor scandal. Charles Vanik, the Ohio congressman, decried the revelations contained in the testimony as “utterly shocking and disgusting.”⁵⁴² *New York Times* columnist Tom Wicker denounced “Folly in the Philippines” and asked, “Will someone please save us from ourselves?”⁵⁴³ Soon thereafter, Symington publicized a Government Accounting Office report that indicated the Marcos government had likely diverted American funds intended for Philippine soldiers in South Vietnam, part of the

Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-First Congress, First Session, Part 1: September 30, October 1, 2, and 3, 1969 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), 244-245.

⁵⁴⁰ Memorandum, Ehrlichman, Harlow, and Kissinger to Nixon, n.d., LIG Meeting CHRON File 04/71-12/71, Box 3, National Security Adviser - Legislative Interdepartmental Group Files, 1971-1974 (1976), GFPL.

⁵⁴¹ “U.S. Censors Testimony on Filipino Bases,” *Los Angeles Times*, November 11, 1969.

⁵⁴² Charles Vanik, “The Illusion of Philippine Support in Vietnam,” *Congressional Record*, November 19, 1969, 34881.

⁵⁴³ “In the Nation: Folly in the Philippines,” *New York Times*, November 25, 1969.

vast web of corruption that scaffolded the archipelago's politics.⁵⁴⁴ The revelations surrounding PHILCAG were followed by reports that similar arrangements had been negotiated with the Thai and South Korean governments, which eventually prompted the Senate to vote to restrict U.S. financing for foreign "mercenaries" in Vietnam.⁵⁴⁵ But the outcry over "mercenaries" served to blunt the Symington hearings' broader impact, crowding out more substantive analyses of the illiberal effects of American entanglements in the Philippines.

The mercenaries scandal roiled in late 1969 and early 1970, just as the Nixon administration was shepherding its defense and foreign aid budgets through Congress. The first since the unveiling of the Nixon Doctrine, these budgets reflected the administration's determination to bolster Asian militaries that could serve as shepherds of national development and guarantors of regional stability. Accordingly, 1971 would be the first year since the end of the Korean War that American expenditures for military aid outweighed those for economic aid.⁵⁴⁶ As Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird explained in early 1970, the Military Assistance Program (MAP), in addition to the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credit scheme, was critical "to the success of the Nixon Doctrine"—"the essential ingredient of our policy if we are to honor our obligations, support our allies, and yet reduce the likelihood of having to commit American ground combat units."⁵⁴⁷ Concern over military assistance to the Philippines barely registered during Congressional debates over aid budgets, which were

⁵⁴⁴ "Manila Troop Aid by U.S. Is Verified," *New York Times*, March 26, 1970.

⁵⁴⁵ "Senate Votes Curb on Pay to Viet Allies," *Washington Post*, August 21, 1970.

⁵⁴⁶ United States Agency for International Development, "U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945 – September 30, 2015," http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PBAAF100.pdf (accessed March 29, 2017).

⁵⁴⁷ Melvin Laird, *Fiscal Year 1971 Defense Program and Budget: Before a Joint Session of the Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, February 20, 1970* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), 57.

dominated by legislative quarrels over the war in Indochina and the provision of additional aid to Taiwan, South Korea, and Greece.⁵⁴⁸ When Vice President Spiro Agnew traveled to Manila in late December 1969, he could assure Marcos that the thrust of American foreign policy ought not “be judged by the remarks of Senators Symington and Fulbright.”⁵⁴⁹

But a revolution was brewing in Congress, and Symington and Fulbright’s perspective would soon wield significant influence. Disillusioned by the Vietnam War, a number of influential senators, particularly dovish members of the Foreign Relations Committee, began wielding the power of the purse to demand a great role in the conduct of the nation’s foreign affairs. The numbers reveal an astonishing shift: In the decade before 1968, Senate roll-call votes on defense bills numbered one every two years; in the three years after 1968, more than twenty such votes occurred every single year.⁵⁵⁰ These liberals became increasingly unwilling to funnel aid to authoritarian regimes, some because they feared it amounted to a slippery slope down which the United States would slide into another Vietnam, and others because they lamented the human rights abuses perpetrated by American allies.⁵⁵¹ Emblematic was an often-discussed speech given by Senator Frank Church, a longtime proponent of foreign aid, in October 1971. “While experience has shown that our aid programs have little if any relevance either to the deterrence of communism or the encouragement of democracy,” the Idaho Democrat opined, “they have been effective in certain instances in keeping unpopular regimes in power. . . . A government may torture and terrorize its own population but—from the standpoint of our policymakers—as long as it remains anti-Communist, provides

⁵⁴⁸ “Foreign Aid Program Slowly Loses Support,” *Los Angeles Times*, January 15, 1970; “Military Aid Limits Fought by Pentagon,” *Hartford Courant*, February 9, 1970.

⁵⁴⁹ Philippines – Talking Points, December 15, 1969, VP Agnew’s Trip Philippines December 1969 - January 1970 [1 of 3], Box 82, HAK, RNPL.

⁵⁵⁰ Robert David Johnson, *Congress and the Cold War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 179.

⁵⁵¹ “Mansfield’s Life with Foreign Aid,” *The Sun*, November 14, 1971.

‘stability,’ generally supports American foreign policy, and is hospitable to American foreign investment, it qualifies, for the purposes of aid, as a ‘free country.’”⁵⁵² Shortly thereafter, the Senate voted to kill foreign aid entirely, and the program was restored only after considerable legislative surgery that separated foreign and military aid into two separate bills and imposed considerable limits on each.⁵⁵³ The Senate’s unprecedented hostility to foreign aid reflected an alliance of convenience between conservatives long hostile to overseas spending, like Arizona’s Barry Goldwater and Kansas’s Bob Dole, and liberals increasingly skeptical of military aid and determined to channel economic aid through multilateral institutions.⁵⁵⁴ As one Senate staffer put it, “There has been a strong trend, especially on the part of liberals, to regard military assistance more and more as an imperial device.”⁵⁵⁵

The House, for its part, remained more supportive of American foreign policy, in large part due to institutional quirks and political constraints. As Michael Harrington, a young antiwar congressman from Massachusetts, complained in 1971, “seniority combined with secrecy and manipulation lend magnified power to committee chairmen,” who “attain their positions of power almost exclusively through longevity” and then “make national policy in almost total obscurity.”⁵⁵⁶ These men, such as Texas’s George H. Mahon, chair of the Appropriations Committee, and Pennsylvania’s Thomas “Doc” Morgan, chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, proved unwilling to challenge executive authority in the realm of foreign

⁵⁵² Frank Church, “Farewell to Foreign Aid: A Liberal Takes Leave,” *Congressional Record*, October 29, 1971, 38255.

⁵⁵³ “Senate Kills Foreign Aid Bill: Program Defeated 41 to 27,” *Washington Post*, October 30, 1971; “Interim Foreign Aid Bills Approved by Senate Panel,” *New York Times*, November 5, 1971; “Senate, 65 to 24, Votes \$1.5-Billion for Military Aid,” *New York Times*, November 12, 1971.

⁵⁵⁴ “Funds Run Out as Foreign Aid Fight Continues,” *Washington Post*, February 21, 1972.

⁵⁵⁵ “Guns and Diplomacy,” *Washington Post*, May 7, 1972.

⁵⁵⁶ Michael Harrington, “Cracking the Seniority Wall,” *New York Times*, January 18, 1971.

affairs. As Morgan once put it, “The President is solely responsible for foreign policy.”⁵⁵⁷ Many of these powerful committee chairs hailed from southern states, where politics tilted conservative and livelihoods depended on Pentagon largesse.⁵⁵⁸ Relatively elderly, these legislators also had their international outlooks molded by the Second World War and the early Cold War, which inclined them toward bipartisanship and consensus in foreign policy.⁵⁵⁹ Under their sway, the House consistently thwarted Senate efforts to curb the Vietnam War, held few hearings on other pressing international issues, and regularly appropriated more money than the Senate for foreign and military aid. But as younger politicians began winning seats in Congress—fully half of the members of the 93rd Congress, which opened in 1973, assumed their seats after 1966—they challenged the seniority system and won reforms that limited the number of subcommittee chairmanships that senior legislators could hold.⁵⁶⁰ Most notably, four young members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee—Minnesota’s Donald Fraser, Iowa’s John Culver, Indiana’s Lee Hamilton, and New York’s Benjamin Rosenthal—eked out positions of influence by assuming chairmanships of subcommittees through which legislation was now required to pass before coming to a full House vote. They hired young, idealistic staffers and held public hearings on a range of controversial issues, among them American military aid to the military junta that had ruled Greece since 1967 and the American withdrawal from UN sanctions regime against the white supremacist government of Rhodesia.⁵⁶¹

⁵⁵⁷ “Foreign Affairs Panel Turning Activist,” *Wall Street Journal*, May 31, 1972.

⁵⁵⁸ See Joseph A. Fry, *The American South and the Vietnam War: Belligerence, Protest, and Agony in Dixie* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2015).

⁵⁵⁹ “In the House, Portents of a Change,” *New York Times*, July 27, 1972.

⁵⁶⁰ Carl Albert, *Little Giant: The Life and Times of Speaker Carl Albert* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990), 317.

⁵⁶¹ See Keys, *Reclaiming American Virtue*, 140-148.

By the time Marcos declared martial law in September 1972, Democrats in Congress had become increasingly opposed to American support for right-wing authoritarian regimes. The Democratic Party's 1972 platform, written largely by idealistic supporters of Senator George McGovern, advocated an overall "curtailment of military aid" and immediate cutoffs in support for the autocratic governments of South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Greece, and Portugal.⁵⁶² And in 1973, Congress amended Section 32 of the Foreign Assistance Act to make it the "sense of Congress that the President should deny any economic or military assistance to the government of any foreign country which practices the internment or imprisonment of that country's citizens for political purposes."⁵⁶³ Though this "sense of Congress" language was not legally binding, it reflected a resurgent legislative branch's efforts to curtail aid to right-wing dictatorships. And those efforts alarmed authoritarian clients of the United States. Already in 1970, the Indonesian government had received consular reports indicating that the "opposing viewpoints" between the Nixon administration and Senator Fulbright on view at the Symington hearings risked undermining American military and economic aid programs.⁵⁶⁴ Left unsaid was the extent to which those efforts also reflected the burgeoning influence of transnational human rights lobbies like Amnesty International.

Founded in 1961 by the London barrister Peter Benenson to aid prisoners of conscience, Amnesty International quickly became the world's most visible human rights

⁵⁶² "1972 Democratic Party Platform," July 10, 1972, *American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29605> (accessed April 4, 2017).

⁵⁶³ Public Law 93-189, Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, December 17, 1973, 20.

⁵⁶⁴ Memorandum, Konsulat Djenderal Republik Indonesia di Seoul kepada Bapak Menteri Luar Negeri di Djakarta, September 25, 1970, Surat dari Konsul Jenderal RI kepada Menlu di Jakarta mengenai secret hearing Symington, 1894, EKUIN, ANRI.

organization. Its first annual report noted that the “spread of dictatorship, the tensions that have resulted from the Cold War, and the increasing cleavages between races of different colour, have combined to make state persecution of the individual the gravest social problem of the 1960’s.” The organization’s goal was, therefore, to “mobilise public opinion in defence of those men and women who are imprisoned because their ideas are unacceptable to their governments.”⁵⁶⁵ By the mid-1960s, Amnesty offices latticed Europe and had also sprouted in North America, Asia, and the Middle East, and the organization’s bailiwick grew to encompass torture as well as political imprisonment. Local chapters “adopted” political prisoners and mounted appeals on their behalf, writing postcards to government ministers demanding the adoptees’ release and sending money to the adoptees’ families. (To maintain a strictly nonaligned appearance, each group took responsibility for three prisoners, one from the West, one from a communist state, and one from a Third World country. The most active campaigns focused on Rhodesia, Greece, Iran, and Eastern Europe.)⁵⁶⁶ But Amnesty International’s path to prominence in the United States was more winding. Its early American adoptees were imprisoned conscientious objectors, which combined with the organization’s name to suggest an exclusive focus on the controversial issue of amnesty for draft dodgers.⁵⁶⁷ More broadly, Amnesty International found its opportunities to lobby on behalf of human rights limited by a political discourse already crowded by the Vietnam War and the civil rights movement.⁵⁶⁸

⁵⁶⁵ Amnesty International Movement for Freedom of Opinion and Religion, *First Annual Report, 1961-1962* (London: Amnesty International, 1962), 1.

⁵⁶⁶ Amnesty International Movement for Freedom of Opinion and Religion, *Annual Report, June 1, 1965 – May 31, 1966* (London: Amnesty International, 1966).

⁵⁶⁷ Amnesty International, *Annual Report, 1st June, 1966/31st May, 1967* (London: Amnesty International, 1967), 12.

⁵⁶⁸ “Amnesty Urged for Americans Who Refuse to Serve in War,” *Washington Post*, November 11, 1969; Keys, *Reclaiming American Virtue*, 88-89.

The American chapters of Amnesty International first won public attention in the late 1960s and early 1970s for lobbying on behalf of individuals imprisoned and tortured by regimes that received substantial amounts of U.S. military and economic aid. Most often discussed were Amnesty's reports on Greece, which made headlines in the press and were repeatedly entered into the *Congressional Record*. By November 1969, Rita Hauser, the Nixon administration's representative to the United Nations Human Rights Council, could call Amnesty "that singular organization," already associated in the American political imagination with the blossoming of human rights consciousness.⁵⁶⁹ Controversy as well as praise figured prominently in the group's ascent. Its reporting on Greece won the ire of establishment figures like C.L. Sulzberger and conservatives like William F. Buckley, who belonged to Amnesty's board of directors.⁵⁷⁰ And in 1970, a brouhaha over a report published by Amnesty's headquarters in Britain, which alleged the Israeli military engaged in widespread torture of Arab prisoners, led the American chapters of the organization to distance themselves from the London umbrella.⁵⁷¹ Although Amnesty never entered the policy debate by calling for an end to American support for regimes that abused their citizens, the thrust of its reporting made that conclusion implicit.

Amnesty International's British origins meant the organization was drawn toward Malaysia and Singapore—both commonwealth countries—rather than Indonesia and the Philippines. In the 1960s, Amnesty publications occasionally featured updates on the overall human rights situation in Malaysia and Singapore, and its Postcards for Prisoners campaign

⁵⁶⁹ "Statement by Mrs. Rita E. Hauser, U.S. Representative, in Committee III, on the Violation of Human Rights of Prisoners of War," *Congressional Record*, November 11, 1969, 34878.

⁵⁷⁰ William F. Buckley, Jr., "'Victim of Greek Torture' Says None of Tale Is True," *Los Angeles Times*, February 18, 1970; William F. Buckley, Jr., "The Work of Amnesty," *Los Angeles Times*, April 10, 1970; C.L. Sulzberger, "Greece Under the Colonels," *Foreign Affairs*, 48, no. 2 (January 1970): 300-311.

⁵⁷¹ "The Odd Affair of the Report by Amnesty on Israeli Torture," *Washington Post*, April 4, 1970; "Charge of Torture Splits Amnesty's British, U.S. Units," *New York Times*, April 4, 1970.

highlighted the ordeals of specific Malaysian or Singaporean political prisoners about once a year.⁵⁷² The organization also made periodic appeals for the human treatment of prisoners of war in Vietnam. As late as 1969, however, Amnesty recognized admitted that its “resources are limited and that its main efforts should be concentrated in regions where it can be most effective. South East Asia has hitherto been relatively neglected.”⁵⁷³ That began to change at the dawn of the 1970s, as the international community became increasingly concerned about the massive number of political prisoners held without charges by the Suharto regime in Indonesia. In February 1969, Amnesty’s newsletter shone a spotlight on the story of Pramodya Ananta Toer, the left-wing nationalist writer jailed by Suharto since 1965 and soon to be moved to the infamous prison colony on the island of Buru.⁵⁷⁴ Later that year, the Australian jurist Julius Stone, together with the Amnesty staffer Stephanie Grant, traveled to Jakarta to evaluate the detention of political dissidents, of whom the government estimated there were 116,000. Amnesty reported that the delegation was “extremely well received, and was able to have full discussions with Cabinet Ministers and senior officials.”⁵⁷⁵ Indeed, shortly after Stone and Grant’s departure, the Indonesian government announced the planned release of 26,000 prisoners. Amnesty called the move a “tangible declaration of intent,” but added that the government must be “encouraged to extend its policy of releasing prisoners.”⁵⁷⁶

⁵⁷² See, for example, Amnesty International, *Newsletter for Groups*, no. 16 (March 1967): 1.

⁵⁷³ *Amnesty International Review* no. 27 (May 1969): 4.

⁵⁷⁴ Amnesty International, *Monthly Newsletter from Amnesty International Postcards for Prisoners Campaign*, October 1969, 1.

⁵⁷⁵ Amnesty International, *Annual Report, 1969-70* (London: Amnesty International, 1970), 8.

⁵⁷⁶ “Indonesia,” *Amnesty International Review: A Quarterly Review of News and Comment on International Human Rights*, no. 29 (November 1969): 4-5.

In 1970, Amnesty hired its first full-time researcher focused on Asia, and the organization's central council determined that Amnesty would "give the highest priority to Indonesia."⁵⁷⁷

Amnesty first attempted quiet lobbying. Given the "delicate Indonesian political situation," the organization's International Secretariat reported, "pressure from abroad (of the sort mounted on Greece) could well have an opposite effect to what we want."⁵⁷⁸ In September 1970, Suharto traveled to the Netherlands and West Germany to appeal for continued international assistance for Indonesian economic development and to combat the perception that he was, in the words of his official chroniclers, a "military dictator."⁵⁷⁹ Though he had productive conversations with his Dutch and German counterparts, Suharto faced tough questions from opposition politicians, journalists, and protestors about the status of political prisoners in Indonesia.⁵⁸⁰ Sensing an opportunity, an Amnesty International representative in Germany approached State Secretary Sudharmono and inquired whether the organization's chairman, Sean MacBride, could together with Grant visit Indonesia in October.⁵⁸¹ The delegates hoped to advocate on behalf of political prisoners and ease suspicions of Amnesty among Indonesian officialdom.⁵⁸² Indonesian officials granted visas to MacBride and Grant and, upon meeting the two delegates in Jakarta, sought to impress upon them that continued imprisonment of suspected communists was vital not only for national

⁵⁷⁷ Memorandum, Secretary General to All Sections, January 30, 1970, Folder 4, Box II.5 7, Amnesty International U.S.A. National Office Records, CUML.

⁵⁷⁸ Memorandum, Secretary General to All Sections, January 30, 1970, Folder 4, Box II.5 7, Amnesty International U.S.A. National Office Records, CUML.

⁵⁷⁹ Dwipayana and Syamsudin, *Jejak Langkah 1968-1973*, 254-255.

⁵⁸⁰ Telegram, AmEmbassy The Hague to SecState WashDC, September 4, 1970, POL 7 INDON 7/1/70, Box 2372, Subject Numeric Files, 1970-1973, Record Group 59, National Archives and Records Administration; Telegram, AmEmbassy Bonn to SecState WashDC, September 9, 1970, POL 7 INDON 7/1/70, Box 2372, SNF, RG 59, NARA.

⁵⁸¹ Memorandum, Sudharmono to Pangkopkamtib, Djaksa Agung, and Kepala Bakin, October 13, 1970, Surat dari Sekkab mengenai kunjungan Ketua Organisasi Amnesti Internasional, beserta lampiran-lampiran, 392, Sekkab, ANRI.

⁵⁸² Francis Muecke, "Defending Life: Amnesty International and Indonesia," *Inside Indonesia* no. 8 (October 1986): 9-10.

stability, but also for the safety of the imprisoned. In February 1971, Amnesty sent a private memorandum to Suharto based on the observations of its two delegations. While “appreciating the extremely difficult and dangerous situation which faced the Indonesian Government in 1965 and 1966,” the memo read, “the continued detention of vast numbers of persons who are uncharged and untried clearly contravenes the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human rights and the norms of the Rule of Law” and “is obviously highly damaging to the image of Indonesia in the outside world.” It recommended an expeditious review and release of those prisoners against whom there was no evidence and whose crimes had already been punished by five years of detention.⁵⁸³ But internal Amnesty documents still insisted that the group’s activities should occur “*without any publicity*,” lest they alienate Amnesty’s interlocutors in the Suharto regime or endanger individuals who received Amnesty’s assistance.⁵⁸⁴

Amnesty later praised the Indonesian government for “the unusual frankness with which it discussed its policies.”⁵⁸⁵ And indeed, the Suharto regime, cognizant that its detention of political prisoners damaged its international reputation, worked to redress the problem. A Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (Kopkamtib) seminar held in the spring of 1971 sought to develop ways that political prisoners could be “socialized to become Pancasilaist citizens.”⁵⁸⁶ In May, however, Kopkamtib canceled a follow-up seminar out of concern that “the discussion of political prisoners could be exploited

⁵⁸³ Extracts from Memorandum to President Suharto and the Government of Indonesia Submitted by the Chairman of Amnesty International, February 1971, in Amnesty International, *Indonesia: An Amnesty International Report* (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1977), 141-143.

⁵⁸⁴ Memorandum, Ennals to Members of the Board, n.d., Folder 4, Box II.5 7, Amnesty International U.S.A. National Office Records, CUML. Emphasis in original.

⁵⁸⁵ Amnesty International, *Indonesia Special*, March 1973, 4.

⁵⁸⁶ Komando Operasi Memulihkan Keamanan dan Ketertiban Team Penjelesaian Tahanan Pusat, Pokok-pokok Pengarahan Ketua Teptapu pada Pembukaan Seminar pada Tanggal 29 Maret 1971, Berkas mengenai seminar Pertahanan Keamanan, Tahanan Politik dan HANKAM, 1273, EKUIN, ANRI.

by international organizations that want to discredit the Indonesian government, like Amnesty International, the Cornell group, and the Wertheim group.”⁵⁸⁷ But Amnesty saw little change in the number and conditions of political prisoners. In August 1971, the organization publicized its February memorandum to Suharto, hoping to draw “attention to continuing detention of at least 70,000 political prisoners.”⁵⁸⁸ The publication marked a shift in Amnesty’s strategy toward Indonesia, as the organization embraced adversarial public agitation as a means of pressuring the Suharto regime. In 1973, Amnesty International’s Dutch section published *Indonesia Special*, a glossy 32-page magazine illustrating the history of political imprisonment under the New Order, the ordeals of specific political prisoners and their families, and the Amnesty campaigns to secure justice for the imprisoned.⁵⁸⁹ The magazine made its way into the hands of several senior Indonesian officials, among them Hamengkubuwono, the sultan of Jogjakarta recently installed as Suharto’s vice president.⁵⁹⁰ The organization likewise helped publicize articles from *The Guardian* and *Asia Magazine* on the condition of prisoners on Buru.⁵⁹¹ Amnesty also lobbied members of the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), the international consortium responsible for rescheduling Indonesia’s sovereign debt and coordinating the flow of foreign aid to the archipelago, to protest the Suharto regime’s detention and treatment of political prisoners. A memorandum from the group’s secretary general suggested “the possibility of making *some*

⁵⁸⁷ Djamal Marsudi, “Masalah Tahanan Politik G.30.S/PKI dan Laporan dari Pulau Buru, Konsep Naskah tulisan Djamal Marsudi mengenai “Masalah Tahanan Politik G30S/PKI dan Laporan dari Pulau Buru,” 76, Djamal Marsudi, 1947-1979, ANRI.

⁵⁸⁸ Press Statement from Amnesty International, “Political Imprisonment in Indonesia,” August 11, 1971, Folder 4, Box II.5 7, Amnesty International U.S.A. National Office Records, CUML.

⁵⁸⁹ Amnesty International, *Indonesia Special*.

⁵⁹⁰ See Rakyat: Surat-surat tanggal 22 Agustus 1973-20 Desember 1977 tentang tanggapan Amnesty Internasional terhadap tahanan politik di Indonesia, dalam bahasa Inggris, Belanda, dan Perancis, 539, HB IX, ANRI.

⁵⁹¹ Letter, Ennals to Moller, March 6, 1973, Folder 5, Box II.5 7, Amnesty International U.S.A. National Office Records, CUML; Dom Moraes, “The Prisoners of Buru,” *Asia Magazine*, March 5, 1972, 3-17.

further publicity about the Indonesian political prisoner situation at the time of the IGGI meeting,” because “the Indonesian authorities are increasingly concerned about public opinion in those countries on which they depend for aid.”⁵⁹² Though Suharto announced shortly before the December 1973 meeting that restrictions on 10,000 political prisoners on Buru would be loosened, the Dutch IGGI chair Jan Pronk still criticized Indonesia’s detention of political prisoners in front of the consortium.⁵⁹³

For its part, the Indonesian government ultimately despaired at convincing Amnesty representatives that the indefinite detention of suspected leftists was necessary, and it too adopted a more adversarial posture. In May 1972, the military newspaper *Angkatan Bersenjata* declared Amnesty a “front organization of the New Left” that “defends political detainees, especially the communists who are imprisoned in various countries outside the communist bloc . . . but ‘remains silent in a thousand languages’ about the political detainees in communist lands.”⁵⁹⁴ One civilian minister who normally served as a reliable conduit between Amnesty and the Suharto regime stopped replying to Amnesty’s letters after he was formally censured in a cabinet meeting for “corresponding with communists.”⁵⁹⁵ (Indonesian communists living in exile in China often used Amnesty reportage in propaganda castigating the Suharto regime—a situation with which the organization was intimately familiar since, in

⁵⁹² Memorandum, Secretary General to National Sections, November 20, 1973, Folder 5, Box II.5 7, Amnesty International U.S.A. National Office Records, CUML. Emphasis in original.

⁵⁹³ “Indonesia Loosens Chains on 10,000 Political Prisoners,” *Boston Globe*, December 9, 1973; Appendix 1, Indonesian Coordination Group in Holland, May 1, 1974, Folder 7, Box II.5 7, Amnesty International U.S.A. National Office Records, Columbia University Rare Book & Manuscript Library; Brad Simpson, “‘Human Rights Are Like Coca-Cola’: Contested Human Rights Discourses in Suharto’s Indonesia,” in Eckel and Moyn, eds., *The Breakthrough*, 195.

⁵⁹⁴ *Angkatan Bersenjata*, May 29, 1972.

⁵⁹⁵ Amnesty International, *Indonesia Special*, 31.

the words of Amnesty USA chair Mark Benenson, “we give everyone ammunition.”)⁵⁹⁶ Indonesian officials also began denying visas to members of Amnesty delegations and prevented foreign journalists and advocates from visiting Indonesian prisons for several years.⁵⁹⁷

By 1973, Amnesty had dramatically increased its engagement with Southeast Asia. In addition to its campaign to free Indonesian political prisoners, it had begun lobbying on behalf of victims of Marcos’s martial law regime in the Philippines. MacBride wrote to Marcos shortly after the issuance of Proclamation 1081 to stress the Philippine government’s obligations under international law to provide for the proper treatment of prisoners. Amnesty groups also began adopting Filipino political prisoners and making connections with Filipino American groups in the United States.⁵⁹⁸ Even so, the organization’s capacity to conduct research, mobilize public opinion, and effect political change in Southeast Asia remained limited. Its annual report issued in 1972 acknowledged that, of the thousands of political prisoners adopted by Amnesty chapters, fewer than 100 hailed from Southeast Asia; moreover, it admitted “comparatively little work” had been done on Malaysia and Singapore as the Indonesia program ramped up.⁵⁹⁹ But as the 1970s wore on, Amnesty International and other international human rights lobbies would further expand their Southeast Asia-focused programs.

⁵⁹⁶ Letter, Mark Benenson to William F. Buckley, August 26, 1971, Folder 4, Box II.5 7, Amnesty International U.S.A. National Office Records, CUML.

⁵⁹⁷ “Statement of David Hinkley, Coordinator for Indonesia, Amnesty International, U.S.A., and Member of Board of Directors, U.S. Section,” in *Human Rights in Indonesia: A Review of the Situation with Respect to Long-Term Political Detainees: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations: House of Representatives, Ninety-Fifth Congress, First Session, October 18, 1977* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1977), 9.

⁵⁹⁸ Amnesty International, *Annual Report 1972-73* (London: Amnesty International, 1973),

⁵⁹⁹ Amnesty International, *Annual Report, 1971 – 1972* (London: Amnesty International, 1972), 34.

Meanwhile in the United States, anti-martial law protests attracted support from anti-imperialist disciples of the New Left with little connection to the Filipino American community. Among the first allies sought out by the NCRCLP was Daniel Boone Schirmer, an activist and scholar whose 1971 doctoral dissertation, “Massachusetts Anti-Imperialism, 1885-1904,” examined the Anti-Imperialist League’s campaign against U.S. colonial expansion in the Philippines.⁶⁰⁰ Schirmer had spent decades working to promote communism in the United States, and he was forced to go underground during the McCarthy era before eventually denouncing the excesses of the Soviet system.⁶⁰¹ Though he abandoned his party membership, he shed neither his socialist sympathies nor his activist inclinations. He entered graduate school at Boston University and chose his dissertation topic out of a belief that “the anti-imperialists of that earlier time, and their thought and experience[,] now take on a contemporary relevance in the face of problems that seem much the same, though more virulent”—namely, the American war in Vietnam.⁶⁰² Shortly after Marcos’s declaration of martial law, the Kalayaan Collective invited the newly minted Ph.D. to join the NCRCLP, and Schirmer began publishing on contemporary U.S.-Philippines relations. By 1973, he and a group of other New Left activists had taken over the publication of *Philippines Information Bulletin*, a monthly magazine whose purpose was, in the words of Schirmer’s collaborator Barbara Gaerlan, “to educate non-Filipinos in the U.S. about the dictatorship.” It did not advocate for a political alternative to Marcos as did the NCRCLP, Gaerlan remembered, but followed two guiding principles: “opposition to U.S. governmental support for dictatorship in

⁶⁰⁰ Daniel Boone Schirmer, “Massachusetts Anti-Imperialism, 1885-1904,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Boston University, 1971.

⁶⁰¹ “Liberal Club Elects Dryer New President,” *Harvard Crimson*, May 2, 1935; “Boston Communist Secretary Talks on N.Y. Red Trial Tonight,” *Harvard Crimson*, October 20, 1949; “Bill Banning Red Party Provokes Noisy Hearing,” *Harvard Crimson*, March 15, 1951.

⁶⁰² Schirmer, “Massachusetts Anti-Imperialism,” 8.

the Philippines, and opposition to the U.S. military bases in the Philippines which effectively propped up the dictatorship.”⁶⁰³ By October 1973, Schirmer, Gaerlan, and the small group of writers behind *Philippines Information Bulletin* had formed the Friends of the Filipino People (FFP) in Philadelphia. The FFP focused exclusively on international issues and did not address the plight of Filipino Americans, which together with its publishing base in Boston limited its cooperation with the west coast-based NCRCLP. Its propaganda harped on the “increasing threat of another Vietnam in the Philippines,” which was designed to win adherents in the domestic antiwar movement.⁶⁰⁴

Moderates among the Filipino expatriate and Filipino American communities also began protesting martial law. Foremost among this group was Raul Manglapus, formerly Philippine secretary of foreign affairs and since the early 1960s a progressive senator and leader of the reformist Christian Social Movement. Manglapus was en route to California for a speaking engagement when Marcos declared martial law. During a layover in Tokyo, he received a call from his wife informing him that soldiers had come to their Manila home to arrest him, and that other prominent opposition senators like Benigno Aquino had already been detained. Return to the Philippines meant indefinite detention, so Manglapus continued to the United States. Help from a powerful network of political figures and diplomats secured him a fellowship at Cornell University, but he maintained a low profile knowing that he was “hunted” and his family were “hostages.” After six months of uncertainty, his wife and children escaped the Philippines, their perilous seventeen-day journey taking them from Mindanao to Sabah, then onward to Singapore, Cairo, and Athens, and finally to New York.

⁶⁰³ Barbara Gaerlan, “Boone Schirmer and the Early Days of the *Philippines Information Bulletin*, Friends of the Filipino People, and the Philippines Program and Goddard-Cambridge,” <http://escholarship.org/uc/item/2mf4v5p5>.pdf (accessed March 1, 2017).

⁶⁰⁴ “Friends of the Filipino People Organization Founded,” *Ang Katipunan*, October 16-31, 1973.

In April 1973, no longer afraid that his political activities in the United States would imperil his family's safety, Manglapus began a campaign of letter-writing, speech-making, and testimony-giving against the newly authoritarian Marcos regime.⁶⁰⁵ His first public letter, published in the *New York Times* in May, excoriated Marcos for having "killed . . . Philippine democracy," while also taking care to advocate peaceful political change and denounce extremism of both left and right.⁶⁰⁶ He urged the Philippine military to oust Marcos in favor of a placeholder government, release all political prisoners, and organize a new constitutional convention.⁶⁰⁷ Around the same time, Manglapus helped establish the Movement for a Free Philippines (MFP), of which he was elected president. Schirmer remembered the organization "appealed to the more conservative and well-to-do elements of the Philippine community in the United States."⁶⁰⁸ Its fundraising targeted wealthy Filipino Americans, its publications emphasized anticommunism, and its lobbying focused on Washington lawmakers.⁶⁰⁹ While Manglapus occasionally mentioned the NCRCLP in his speeches, his determination to avoid even the whiff of radicalism made him reluctant to work too closely with the organization.

Tensions over ideology, geography, and personality strained the anti-martial law movement. In July 1973, the NCRCLP published the lone issue of its magazine, *Silayan*, which featured articles either written by or focusing on activists from the Kalayaan Collective, FFP, and MFP.⁶¹⁰ That same month, the leaders of the Kalayaan Collective

⁶⁰⁵ Raul Manglapus, *A Pen for Democracy: A Decade of Articles, Speeches, Letters, Interviews, and Committee Testimony Published in the International Press and the U.S. Congressional Record in the Tradition of the Filipino Democrats a Century Ago* (Washington, D.C.: Movement for a Free Philippines, 1983), xvii-xxiii.

⁶⁰⁶ Raul Manglapus, "The 'Mess' in the Philippines, *New York Times*, May 19, 1973.

⁶⁰⁷ "Manglapus Exhorts Filipinos in the US to Ignore FM Threats," *Philippine News*, May 24-30, 1973.

⁶⁰⁸ Daniel Boone Schirmer, "The Movement Against U.S. Intervention in the Philippines: A Sketch," https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/anti_gma/conversations/topics/1293 (accessed March 1, 2017).

⁶⁰⁹ Jose Fuentecilla, *Fighting from a Distance: How Filipino Exiles Helped Topple a Dictator* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2013), 42.

⁶¹⁰ *Silayan*, July 15, 1973.

founded the *Katipunan ng mga Demokratikong Pilipino* (Union of Democratic Filipinos or KDP), which pledged to mobilize “the broadest number of Pilipino people in the United States” in favor of “national democracy in the Philippines” and “socialism in the United States.”⁶¹¹ On December 30, the day that Marcos’s second term as president of the Philippines was set to end, the KDP, FFP, MFP, NCRCLP, as well as the National Association of Filipinos in the United States (NAFUS) staged a “unity meeting” in New York and issued a statement “demanding that Mr. Marcos fulfill his contract with the Filipino people and step down from office.” But the groups’ divergent priorities nevertheless shone through, as the statement alluded to the junta in Greece, war in Vietnam, and the plight of Filipinos in the United States.⁶¹² Most likely at the order of its overseers in the Philippines, KDP dissolved the national NCRCLP umbrella in early 1974, though some chapters such as the ones in Los Angeles and Chicago remained active for years thereafter.⁶¹³

Public protest represented the Filipino diaspora’s most prominent tactic. Every year on the anniversary of Proclamation 1081, Marcos’s declaration of martial law, radical Filipino Americans staged demonstrations in front of Philippine consular outposts throughout the United States.⁶¹⁴ Each leg of the anti-martial law coalition ministered to its own constituents, with the KDP leading marches of Berkeley radicals and the MFP courting wealthy businessmen.⁶¹⁵ Meanwhile the FFP worked with the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars (CCAS), a group of young scholars whose antiwar stances led them to criticize the

⁶¹¹ Nation-wide Organization Formed: Founding Congress of the *Katipunan ng mga Demokratikong Pilipino*,” *Kalayaan International*, July 1973.

⁶¹² “Unity Meeting in New York: Marcos Denounced by Filipino Groups,” *Ang Katipunan*, January 15, 1974.

⁶¹³ Barbara Gaerlan, telephone interview with author, March 14, 2017; the Chicago NCRCLP chapter, called Filipinos for National Democracy, published a newsletter called *Tambuli* until 1976. For more on the Chicago anti-martial law movement see James Zarsadiaz, “Raising Hell in the Heartland: Filipino Chicago and the Anti-Martial Law Movement, 1972-1986,” *American Studies* 55, no. 4 (2017): 141-162.

⁶¹⁴ “Thousands Join Protests in U.S.,” *Ang Katipunan*, October 1-15, 1973.

⁶¹⁵ “MFP National Convention,” *Ang Katipunan*, October 1-15, 1973.

“complicity and silence of our profession,” particularly the Association of Asian Scholars (AAS), regarding “the brutal aggression of the United States in Vietnam.”⁶¹⁶ The two groups attracted the same constituents, such as Benedict Kerkvliet, a young assistant professor at the University of Hawaii who belonged to CFAH and published regularly in the CCAS’s *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* and the FFP’s *Philippines Information Bulletin* on contemporary land issues in the Philippines. Kerkvliet had been active in the antiwar movement as an undergraduate student, which propelled him to graduate school to study Southeast Asia. He spent eighteen months in 1969-1970 in the Philippines conducting research on the Hukbalahap rebellion of the 1950s, and he married a Filipina named Melinda. After Marcos declared martial law, Kerkvliet and his wife took part in regular demonstrations at the Philippine consulate in Honolulu; when the two moved to Washington for a yearlong fellowship at the Woodrow Wilson Center, they met Schirmer and other members of FFP at protests at the State Department and Philippine embassy.⁶¹⁷ In 1974, FFP and CCAS organized a protest at the April 1974 AAS conference, at which the ambassadors of the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia were scheduled to speak on multilateral diplomacy in Southeast Asia. During the panel discussion, Gaerlan denounced American military spending in the region. “We feel,” she said on behalf of FFP and CCAS, “that peace and security in Asia can never be achieved while U.S. military aid can be used to prop up corrupt and dictatorial governments.” Another questioner raised the issue of political prisoners in Indonesia and the Philippines.⁶¹⁸

⁶¹⁶ “CCAS Statement of Purpose,” *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 1, no. 1 (May 1968); inserted in back issue available online at <http://criticalasianstudies.org/assets/files/bcas/v01n01.pdf> (accessed May 3, 2017).

⁶¹⁷ Benedict Kerkvliet, telephone interview with author, May 18, 2017.

⁶¹⁸ “Boston Protestors Picket Romualdez,” *Ang Katipunan*, April 30, 1974.

Marcos sought to blunt left-wing protest, both in the Philippines and across the Pacific. In October 1973, the CIA reported that Philippine intelligence services “had begun sending intelligence officers to the United States beginning in May 1973 for the purpose of infiltrating, monitoring and possibly counteracting the threat of anti-Marcos propaganda groups headed by Raul Manglapus” and others.⁶¹⁹ Philippine officials in the United States maintained a blacklist of anti-Marcos activists who were denied access to consular services, rendering some Filipinos effectively stateless and some Americans unable to visit the Philippines. Such intimidation came alongside awkward attempts at winning over left-wing activists. For instance, Marcos dispatched Luis Taruc, a former Huk leader who had embraced the martial law government, to the United States to admonish anti-Marcos activists and laud the martial law government as “different from that of other countries,” saying it was his duty as a “revolutionary” to support it.⁶²⁰ But these efforts to establish an astroturf opposition to the grassroots Filipino American movement were in vain, and the anti-martial law movement in the United States grew in prominence year after year.

The most effective of all anti-martial law activities in the United States was the FFP’s Congress Education Project (CEP). Spearheaded by the Washington lawyer Severina Rivera, the CEP’s goal was tilting legislative opinion against the Marcos regime. In May 1974, FFP sent Kerkvliet to testify before the Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, where he urged “the United States to end all military and military-related assistance to the Marcos regime, the newest dictatorship in Southeast Asia.” He argued that Marcos, wholly dependent

⁶¹⁹ “Foreign Agencies in US Cause Concern,” *Boston Globe*, January 5, 1986

⁶²⁰ “Taruc Exposed at Forums,” *Ang Katipunan*, June 15, 1974.

upon American aid, had trapped the Philippines in a cycle of repression and resistance.⁶²¹ While he received a somewhat skeptical response from Senator Daniel Inouye, Kerkvliet's testimony was endorsed by Senator James Abourezk, who called it "a strong argument for the termination of U.S. military assistance" to the Philippines. "Without that support," Abourezk said in front of the entire Senate, "there can be little question that the present Philippine Government would fall. It simply cannot stand on the support of its own people."⁶²² Kerkvliet's testimony evidently worried the executive branch, and it prompted the State Department to issue a ten-page rejoinder. The statement defended American policy as operating "within the framework of the Nixon Doctrine" and, while gesturing toward the "controversial nature" of Marcos's martial law regime, suggested that the United States government could "not comment on or characterize internal developments in the Philippines." It was a disappointing response for legislators opposed to foreign aid, since American largesse shaped the very developments upon which the State Department was loath to comment.

Coming only a month before Congress began debating the 1975 Foreign Assistance Act, Kerkvliet's testimony was entered into the record of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. At the committee's hearings, Minnesota Congressman Donald Fraser asked Robert Ingersoll, chief of the State Department's Asia desk, the extent to which the Nixon administration had implemented Section 32's recommendation that no aid be provided to regimes that practiced political imprisonment. "I know of none," came Ingersoll's response. He later expanded upon his testimony in a letter expressing a belief that "quiet diplomacy" proved more effective than aid cutoffs as a means of fostering greater international respect for

⁶²¹ *Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1975: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, Ninety-Third Congress, Second Session* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1974), 437-498.

⁶²² James Abourezk, "Problems of the Philippines," *Congressional Record—Senate*, June 4, 1974, 17449.

human rights.⁶²³ But Ingersoll's impolitic reply became further fodder the anti-foreign aid cannonade. At concurrent hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Abourezk denounced the State Department's "half-hearted effort" to implement Section 32 and the fact that Ingersoll openly admitted that human rights did not guide American foreign policy. "In Korea, in Indonesia, in the Philippines, in Uruguay, in Brazil, and in scores of other countries whose governments are our friends, the United States sits idly by while grave acts of torture and murder continue to be committed," Abourezk said. He proposed amendments to the foreign aid bill would have prohibited American aid to foreign police forces, mandated that the State Department report annually on the implementation of Section 32, and barred American military aid to countries that did not allow the International Red Cross, the International Commission of Jurists, Amnesty International, or the International Commission on Human Rights free access to prisons in order to determine whether inmates' human rights were being violated. Cranston, the California senator, agreed, lamenting that \$5.1 billion, or some 80 percent of the American foreign aid budget, was disbursed to 57 authoritarian regimes. He called for the United States to "stop fi[n]ancing dictatorships abroad." Even Hubert Humphrey, that quintessential establishment figure, conceded that "the United States should not be in the business of supplying military assistance of a kind that only serves to support internal political repression by authoritarian regimes."⁶²⁴ In all, 104 members of Congress signed a public letter sent by Fraser to Kissinger arguing that, except for in "extraordinary circumstances, we do not believe that long-term U.S. foreign policy

⁶²³ *Fiscal Year 1975 Foreign Assistance Request: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-Third Congress, Second Session* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1974), 280, 285.

⁶²⁴ *Foreign Assistance Authorization: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-Third Congress, Second Session* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1974), 267-285.

interests are served by maintaining supportive relationships with oppressive governments, especially in the military field.”⁶²⁵

Such Congressional activism had legislative consequences. In 1974, Abourezk and Fraser succeeded shepherded another amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, Section 502B, through Congress. It stated, again in nonbinding “sense of Congress” language, that “except in extraordinary circumstances, the President shall substantially reduce or terminate security assistance to any government which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.” If the president chose to override the recommended prohibition on aid to such countries, he was required to provide his rationale and a report on the status of human rights in such countries to Congress.⁶²⁶ The following year, Iowa Congressman Tom Harkin brought forth an amendment to the International Food and Development Assistance Act of 1975 that added Section 116, which dispensed with “sense of Congress” equivocation and banned outright the provision of economic aid to regimes that violated the human rights of their citizens, except in cases that such aid benefited needy people.⁶²⁷ Like other successful amendments that pegged American assistance to human rights standards, Sections 502B and 116 depended upon an uneasy alliance between human rights liberals and conservative aid skeptics.

Manglapus’s MFP also had some effect on Congressional attitudes. The former foreign minister’s letters appeared often in the *New York Times* and other prominent media outlets. He planned to team up with Stanley Karnow, the eminent American chronicler of Asian affairs, to draft a public letter to appear in the *Times* to “appeal for civil liberties in the

⁶²⁵ *Congressional Record*, September 25, 1974, 32653.

⁶²⁶ Public Law 93-559, December 30, 1974, 1815.

⁶²⁷ *Congressional Record*, September 10, 1975, 28306.

Philippines, this time to be signed mostly by prominent Americans.”⁶²⁸ Their plans for the letter made it to the desk of James Wilson, an experienced State Department Asia hand then serving as chief of the Office of Micronesian Status Negotiations, who wrote that “one can only sympathize with all like him who are concerned about the future of civil liberties in the Philippines.” But Wilson insisted that the human rights situation in the Philippines was not “all that bad” and added, “I’m not sure that public decrying of the situation by a lot of us here will help the situation much and might lead to the opposite of what Raul would like to see, namely, further repression.”⁶²⁹ The planned letter did not appear, possibly owing to a lack of signatories. But Manglapus kept up his advocacy. At first, he appealed to Americans’ devotion to democracy, lamenting that the Nixon administration had condoned the “rape” of Philippine democracy.⁶³⁰ By the mid-1970s, though, Manglapus had reframed his advocacy in terms of human rights and avoiding another Vietnam. In a speech in Chicago in June 1974, he suggested that “if pent-up popular resentment should erupt,” in the Philippines, “there could be a vacuum of leadership and chaos, sucking the American presence into another convulsive and protracted Vietnam.”⁶³¹ Shortly thereafter, he characterized Marcos’s martial law government as denying the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.⁶³² In June 1975, Manglapus was invited to testify before Fraser’s House subcommittee, which was holding hearings on the human rights situation in the Philippines and South Korea. He made practical and ideological cases for cutting American ties with Marcos, suggesting that

⁶²⁸ Letter, Manglapus to Williams, October 24, 1973, Correspondence 1973, Box 3, James M. Wilson Papers, Gerald R. Ford Library.

⁶²⁹ Letter, Wilson to Williams, December 26, 1973

⁶³⁰ Raul Manglapus, “Manila and Democracy,” *New York Times*, October 4, 1973; see also Gerald Henderson and Raul Manglapus, “Interview with an Exile,” *America* 129, no. 22 (December 29, 1973).

⁶³¹ Manglapus, *A Pen for Democracy*, 23.

⁶³² Raul Manglapus, “Philippine Archipelago: A Proud ‘Experiment in Democracy’ Aborted,” *Worldview*, September 1974.

“it is the stability that comes with popular government that stops communism and saves American blood and money,” and reminding his interlocutors that “America gave us a framework for our democracy but the will to democracy has always been our own.”⁶³³

Transnational and diasporic human rights lobbies did not alone cause Congress to turn against American sponsorship for authoritarian regimes. Many lawmakers embraced the idea of human rights, whether due to altruism and genuine concern for the fate of peoples abroad, or due to self-interest and a desire to use human rights as a political cudgel. Some even traveled to countries where American military and economic aid underwrote political repression, such as Fraser’s visit to the Philippines in the spring of 1975, where he saw firsthand that “martial law has brought with it serious restrictions on human rights.”⁶³⁴ But nor were transnational and diasporic activists mere puppets trotted out for public consumption. Their testimony and advocacy affected the outlooks of influential lawmakers and encouraged them to escalate pressure on the Nixon and Ford administrations. In short, the visibility of transnational and diasporic lobbies in Congress was both cause and consequence of shifting Congressional attitudes toward American support for authoritarian regimes.

Filipinos, who constituted a much higher proportion of the American population than other Southeast Asian immigrant communities, represented the dominant strands of the diasporic movement against the Nixon Doctrine. But Indonesian, Malaysian, and even Singaporean diasporic communities across the globe made known their opposition to

⁶³³ *Human Rights in South Korea and the Philippines: Implications for U.S. Policy: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Ninety-Fourth Congress, First Session* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1975), 107-112.

⁶³⁴ *Ibid.*, 105.

international support for the authoritarian regimes that held sway in their homelands. And these diasporas made common cause with the human rights lobby in the United States.

One of these diasporic movements was launched by Carmel Budiardjo. Born in London in 1925, she emigrated to Indonesia in 1952 after marrying an Indonesian government employee named Suwondo “Bud” Budiardjo. Bud eventually rose to a senior position in the Indonesian government, and Carmel worked as an economics researcher at the Foreign Ministry. After Suharto’s takeover, Bud, a card-carrying member of the PKI, was arrested and imprisoned. Carmel remained free—she never joined the PKI, though she associated with and performed research and translation for party leaders—until she too was arrested in 1968. For the next three years she was a political prisoner, shuttled between various detention centers around Jakarta. Her plight inspired activism in Britain, and a London chapter of Amnesty International “adopted” Carmel. Stephanie Grant, the Amnesty employee, then intervened and brought the case to the attention of an Amnesty-associated lawyer, who filed a lawsuit on Carmel’s behalf. The case hinged on whether Carmel’s renunciation of British citizenship in the 1950s was legally valid, since her marriage to Bud and concomitant assumption of Indonesian citizenship had never been properly registered. The British government eventually conceded that Carmel remained a British national, and its representatives in Jakarta then pressed the Suharto regime to release her. She was freed in 1971, but only after being forced to sign a statement renouncing her Indonesian citizenship, pledging never to return to the archipelago, and vowing never to engage in political activities hostile to the Suharto regime. When she landed in London in November, Bud remained in prison.⁶³⁵

⁶³⁵ Carmel Budiardjo, *Surviving Indonesia’s Gulag: A Western Woman Tells Her Story* (London: Cassell, 1996).

At first, Carmel maintained a low profile. She penned letters to Indonesian officials urging Bud's release, but her ministrations were never acknowledged. Carmel soon began working with Amnesty International, offering insights on the identities, numbers, and conditions of political prisoners in Indonesia, and also speaking to Amnesty chapters around the United Kingdom. In 1973, feeling that "the work of Amnesty was not enough, that we needed an organization devoted specifically to Indonesia," she started TAPOL, the British Campaign for the Release of Indonesian Political Prisoners.⁶³⁶ The organization's name derived from an Indonesian portmanteau for *tahanan politik*, or political prisoner. *Tapol Bulletin*, the organization's bimonthly publication that first appeared in August 1973, embraced the idea that no change in the situation of Indonesian political prisoners would take place "unless more attention is paid to the problem internationally, especially in those countries where it hurts most, including Great Britain"—referring to "those countries whose governments aid Indonesia over the flagrant violation of human rights in that country."⁶³⁷ TAPOL quickly won the support of influential members of Parliament, such as Lord Avebury, the former Liberal whip and a ferocious advocate of human rights, and Peter Archer, the future Labour solicitor general and a founding member of Amnesty International. In August 1973, Avebury and Archer visited the Indonesian embassy in London to "express the deep concern felt by themselves and many Members of Parliament in both Houses over the plight of Indonesia's *tapols*."⁶³⁸ TAPOL also made explicit contrasts between British policy toward the Pinochet regime in Chile, to which the Labour government halted aid disbursements and denied debt rescheduling because of human rights abuses, and British policy toward the

⁶³⁶ *Ibid.*, 208-209.

⁶³⁷ "General Sumitro: 'Juridically We're Weak, From a Humanitarian Point of View, We're Even Weaker,'" *TAPOL Bulletin* 1, no. 1 (August 1973): 1.

⁶³⁸ "M.P.s Visit Indonesian Embassy in London," *TAPOL Bulletin* 1, no. 2 (November 1973): 3.

Suharto regime in Indonesia, to which the Labour government seemed to be growing ever cozier.⁶³⁹

TAPOL's public agitation had little discernible effect on Britain's relationship with Indonesia. After the Dutch and American governments announced cuts in aid to Indonesia, which they attributed to rising oil prices and Indonesia's human rights situation, the British government announced that it too would make no commitment in aid to Indonesia at the May 1975 IGGI meeting. But several members of the cabinet objected, and the government made a last-minute commitment of \$23.2 million.⁶⁴⁰ Even so, TAPOL's public agitation alarmed the Suharto regime. In 1974, Admiral Sudomo announced that the word *tapol* could no longer be used, insisting that "it is incorrect to call them political prisoners" because "they have all committed crimes."⁶⁴¹ The Jakarta daily *Kompas* reported that "the change in expression is probably intended primarily to clarify misunderstandings which arise abroad."⁶⁴²

TAPOL gradually expanded its reach into the United States. In 1974, Budiardjo published a brief on political imprisonment in Indonesia in the *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, focusing on the prevalence of arbitrary arrest and torture. She recognized that opportunities for Indonesians themselves to protest the Suharto regime's repressive policies were limited, so she advocated "pressure from abroad." The regime, she wrote, "relies heavily on foreign aid and investment" and "has shown itself to be extremely sensitive to criticism that comes from any of those countries" which furnish large amounts of aid.⁶⁴³ The following year, she made two speaking tours in the United States, visiting more than twenty cities and

⁶³⁹ "Britain's Aid to Indonesia," *Tapol Bulletin* 1, no. 4 (April 1974): 2; "Economic and Human Rights," *Tapol Bulletin* 9 (May 1975): 1-3.

⁶⁴⁰ "1975 IGGI Meeting," *Tapol Bulletin* 10 (June 1975): 2.

⁶⁴¹ *Kompas*, December 9, 1974; *Suara Karya*, October 1, 1974.

⁶⁴² *Kompas*, January 8, 1975.

⁶⁴³ Carmel Budiardjo, "Political Imprisonment in Indonesia," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 6, no. 2 (April-August 1974): 23.

making appeals to media, student, and church groups, as well as to legislators and officials of the State Department's Asia desk.⁶⁴⁴ While on her second tour in December 1975, Budiardjo was invited to testify before Fraser's subcommittee, which was preparing to hold hearings on human rights abuses in Indonesia and the Philippines. Fraser called the hearings to order by lamenting that President Ford had requested a fourfold increase in American military aid to Indonesia, which he claimed signaled that the human rights provisions of Section 502B "did not have much impact, if any, in the decisionmaking process." Budiardjo, his star witness, told the story of her imprisonment and her work to secure the release of Indonesia's political prisoners, concluding with a recommendation that Indonesia be deemed "a country that is grossly and persistently violating human rights" and that, accordingly, "no aid should be allowed to flow until these violations end." But in the midst of her testimony, Budiardjo was interrupted and subjected to badgering questions from California Representative Leo Ryan and Ohio Representative Wayne Hays. Hays made clear that he "resent[s] the fact that you are a British communist sitting here in front of this committee," and Ryan told Budiardjo to "go back to Britain and talk about it over there and leave this country out of it."⁶⁴⁵ When Budiardjo defended herself as an earnest advocate of the imprisoned, including her husband, Ryan, trafficking in the casual misogyny of the day, sarcastically responded "You are just a simple housewife, right?" The two hostile legislators had in fact come armed with information provided by Indonesian and American intelligence officials designed to discredit Budiardjo's testimony—the next best option after the Indonesian government made considerable efforts to

⁶⁴⁴ Carmel Budiardjo, "A Speaking Tour for TAPOL in the U.S.A.," *TAPOL Bulletin* 10 (June 1975): 4.

⁶⁴⁵ *Human Rights in Indonesia and the Philippines: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Ninety-Fourth Congress* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1975).

prevent her from testifying in the first place.⁶⁴⁶ Though defenders of close U.S. ties with Indonesia were unsuccessful in that respect, Budiardjo was informed shortly after giving her testimony that her multiple-entry visa had been revoked, making it difficult for her to continue her human rights advocacy in the United States.⁶⁴⁷

In the Netherlands, W.F. Wertheim's Indonesia Committee served as one of the most vocal opponents of the provision of aid to the Suharto regime. Wertheim was a pioneering scholar of Indonesia. A newly minted lawyer, he arrived in the colonial capital of Batavia in the early 1930s and worked at the Department of Justice and subsequently taught at the Law School. His increasingly close interactions with educated Indonesians convinced him of the rectitude of the nationalist cause, and he was made a staunch anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist during three years of imprisonment under the Japanese occupation. He returned to the Netherlands in 1946 and, sacked from his professorship at the University of Leiden because of his anticolonial views, began teaching non-Western sociology at the Municipal University of Amsterdam. Over the following twenty years, his scholarship and political views veered in more radical directions, and Wertheim became an abiding Maoist. He became something of a pariah in Dutch academe, though he continued to participate in scholarly debates over the nature of the September 30th Movement. The Indonesian strongman called the September 30th Movement a communist coup attempt and used it as a pretext for his anticommunist purge that resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Indonesians. Wertheim vocally opposed this interpretation, arguing instead that the September 30th

⁶⁴⁶ Letter, Ali Murtopo to Donald Fraser, November 14, 1976, G9, Subject Committee Files 1976, Donald Fraser Papers, Minnesota State Historical Society.

⁶⁴⁷ "Congressional Hearing on Indonesia," *Tapol Bulletin* 14 (February 1976): 3.

Movement was in fact an internal army affair.⁶⁴⁸ Wertheim also became increasingly involved in politics. He helped found the Indonesia Committee in the late 1960s. He protested Suharto's visit to the Netherlands in 1970 and regularly met with refugees and exiles, who kept him abreast of the latest developments in Indonesia and found in Wertheim an impassioned advocate who could say what they themselves could not.⁶⁴⁹ The Indonesia Committee published a regular bulletin called *Indonesia: Facts and Views* beginning in 1974, and in 1976 Wertheim published his own polemic called *Ten Years of Injustice in Indonesia: Military Dictatorship and International Support*. These publications argued for a cutoff in aid to the Suharto regime.⁶⁵⁰ The perspective of the Indonesia Committee was at first endorsed only by radical left-wing parties in the Netherlands, but it gradually won adherents within the more mainstream Labour Party. One of these adherents was Jan Pronk, who became minister of development cooperation beginning in 1973. Pronk, as we have already seen, criticized Indonesia at the December 1973 IGGI meeting, and he also successfully pushed for a reduction in Dutch aid to Indonesia in 1975. By 1977, the Wertheim perspective had become so dominant that the Labour Party campaigned on abolishing all Dutch aid to Indonesia.⁶⁵¹ So significant was Wertheim's agitation on behalf of Indonesian political prisoners that, when Pramodya was released from the Buru prison colony in 1989, a visitor to the writer's home noticed that two portraits hung above his desk. One of them showed Wertheim.

⁶⁴⁸ W.F. Wertheim, "Indonesia Before and After the Untung Coup," *Pacific Affairs* 39 (Spring-Summer 1966);

⁶⁴⁹ Jan Breman, "W.F. Wertheim: A Sociological Chronicler of Revolutionary Change," *Development and Change* (August 2017).

⁶⁵⁰ *Indonesië: feiten en meningen* 1, no. 1 (March 1974); W.F. Wertheim, *Tien jaar onrecht in Indonesië: militaire dictatuur en internationale steun* (Amsterdam: Van Gennep, 1976).

⁶⁵¹ Maarten Kuitenbrouwer, *Dutch Scholarship in the Age of Empire and Beyond: The Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies, 1851-2011*, trans. Lorri Granger (Boston: Brill, 2014), 179-181.

The other depicted Benedict Anderson. A Cambridge-educated student with leftist predilections, Anderson emigrated to the United States in the 1950s to study Indonesia at Cornell University under the direction of George Kahin. He spent the years 1961-1964 conducting dissertation research and remembered that he “fell in love” with Java in particular and with Indonesia more broadly: “My time in Indonesia attached me to the people in a direct and emotional way.”⁶⁵² By the time Anderson returned to the United States, Kahin had become an impassioned critic of the war in Vietnam, and Anderson began delving into contemporary politics. He and two collaborators penned a confidential analysis of the September 30th Movement, which they argued was an internal army affair, contradicting the official explanation offered by the Suharto regime.⁶⁵³ The “Cornell Paper,” as it became known, achieved a level of notoriety far beyond what its authors hoped or intended—both in the United States and in Indonesia—and it won Anderson a reputation as an inveterate opponent of the Suharto regime. After completing his dissertation, Anderson took up a professorship in government and Asian studies at Cornell and also helped run the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project. He returned to Indonesia briefly in 1967 and again in 1972, but two weeks into his second visit he was expelled from the country and banned from returning. Though he was unable to visit the archipelago for another quarter-century, Anderson’s political involvement on behalf of the country he loved continued. In 1975, he testified before the same Fraser subcommittee at which Budiardjo was subjected to hostile questioning. He lamented that Indonesia had not, as he and “many individuals in this country who have been to Indonesia and share my feeling of affection and admiration for the Indonesian people”

⁶⁵² Benedict Anderson, *A Life Beyond Boundaries* (New York: Verso, 2016), 68-71.

⁶⁵³ Benedict Anderson, Ruth McVey, Frederick Bunnell, *A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965 Coup in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1971).

hoped, made progress toward liberty and prosperity. He advocated a cutoff in American military aid to Indonesia because of its likely political, as distinct from economic, effects; unsure whether a cutoff would promote liberalization, he certainly believed that “the gentle kinds of pressure that have been generated over a number of years haven’t been very successful so far.”⁶⁵⁴ Meanwhile Anderson built a network of doctoral students at Cornell who conducted research on Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries, and who often themselves adopted activist postures. Joel Rocamora, a Filipino who became one of Anderson’s first doctoral students, traveled to Indonesia in the late 1960s to conduct dissertation research Sukarno-era Indonesian politics. During his time in Jakarta, he became frequent visitor to the Likdam prison that housed Budiardjo for a time, and the two spoke on occasion.⁶⁵⁵ After finishing his dissertation in 1974, Rocamora, unwilling to return to the martial law Philippines, became a political exile and took up a post in Amsterdam with the Transnational Institute, a think tank that worked to isolate the dictatorships of Chile and the Philippines and to promote a New International Economic Order.

Rocamora was hardly the only Filipino exile whose experience in the academy led them to activism. Walden Bello, who arrived at Princeton to study for his doctorate in sociology in 1969, remembered that it was not revolutionary agitation in the Philippines but the contemporaneous “American student struggle against the war in Vietnam that really politicized me.”⁶⁵⁶ He became involved in the antiwar movement through the Third World United Front Against Imperialism at Princeton, and he worked to obstruct the work of the

⁶⁵⁴ *Human Rights in Indonesia and the Philippines: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, Ninety-Fourth Congress* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1975), 90.

⁶⁵⁵ Budiardjo, *Surviving Indonesia’s Gulag*, 123-124.

⁶⁵⁶ Walden Bello, “Pacific Panopticon,” *New Left Review* 16 (July-August 2002): 69-70.

university's Institute for Defense Analysis and led an occupation of the Woodrow Wilson School.⁶⁵⁷ After finishing his coursework in 1972, he embarked upon what he intended as a study of political mobilization in the shanty-towns of Allende's Chile, another focus of leftist agitation among romantic American students. But upon his arrival he found counterrevolutionary forces ascendant, which forced him to reframe his dissertation as a comparative study of reactionary counterrevolution in Chile, Italy, and Germany.⁶⁵⁸ By the time Bello returned to the United States, Marcos had declared martial law in the Philippines. He thrust himself into anti-Marcos organizing, joining both FFP and KDP, and he pursued activism full-time after defending his dissertation in 1975. He moved to San Francisco, where he deepened his work with KDP and joined the Communist Party of the Philippines. All this caught the eye of Marcos's considerable intelligence network in the United States: When Bello attempted to renew his passport in the mid-1970s, Philippine consular employees confiscated it without explanation, rendering Bello an effectively stateless political exile. In 1977, Bello and Severina Rivera of FFP published *The Logistics of Repression*, a collection of essays that sought to uncover the manifold ways in which the Marcos dictatorship was utterly dependent upon American support. Schirmer's foreword introduced the book as a "tool for mobilizing . . . popular support" for "cutting off aid to foreign dictators." Marcos, he argued, was an archetypal case. Ending American support for his repressive regime would serve as a "first step toward a more democratic foreign policy."⁶⁵⁹ Indeed, Schirmer and Bello had already presented the key findings of "Logistics of Repression" to the Senate Committee on

⁶⁵⁷ "Protesters Occupy Woodrow Wilson School," *Daily Princetonian*, April 24, 1972; "Speakers Charge 'Complicity': War Hearing Attacks University," *Daily Princetonian*, May 5, 1972

⁶⁵⁸ Walden Bello, "Roots and Dynamics of Revolution and Counterrevolution in Chile," Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, 1975.

⁶⁵⁹ Walden Bello and Severina Rivera, eds., *The Logistics of Repression and Other Essays: The Role of U.S. Assistance in Consolidating the Martial Law Regime in the Philippines* (Washington, DC: Friends of the Filipino People, 1977), 5.

Appropriations in June 1975, where they once again called for an end to American military and economic assistance to the Philippines.⁶⁶⁰

Singaporean and Malaysian political exiles flocked not to Washington but to London, the former imperial metropole, and often engaged in political activities. But given the relatively sparse attention paid to Singapore and Malaysia in the United States, by both policymakers and public opinion, their agitation had little effect on American policy. Tan Wah Piow, for instance, was an activist and president of the Student Union at the National University of Singapore charged by the Lee regime with inciting riots in 1974. After a lengthy 47-day trial that received incessant media attention, Tan was sentenced to a year's imprisonment; upon his release in October 1975, he was instructed to report immediately for mandatory national service. Instead, he fled the country on falsified travel documents and sought political asylum in Britain.⁶⁶¹ There he joined the Federation of United Kingdom and Eire Malaysian and Singaporean Student Organisations (FUEMSSO). He remembered later that "my writings, letters to friends and public speeches in the United Kingdom, that I sought to bring about political change in Singapore solely through the ballot box."⁶⁶² Lee Kuan Yew, the Singaporean prime minister, was evidently worried enough by FUEMSSO's activities that he penned letters to the Socialist International warning of the group's efforts, "working via Marxists and Liberal intellectuals," to "mount pressure on the PAP to get the release of some

⁶⁶⁰ *Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1976: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, Ninety-Fourth Congress, First Session* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1975), 1071-1084.

⁶⁶¹ "Judge Explains Submission and Warns USSU Student President," *Straits Times*, February 19, 1975; "Student Leader Jailed," *Straits Times*, February 23, 1975; "Wah Piow Dipenjara Setahun Kerana Merusuh," *Berita Harian*, February 23, 1975; "Wah Piow Seeks Asylum in Britain," *Straits Times*, October 20, 1976.

⁶⁶² Tan Wah Piow, *Let the People Judge: Confessions of the Most Wanted Person in Singapore* (Kuala Lumpur: Institut Analisa Sosial, 1987).

top, tough communist political detainees” who are “out to re-create an atmosphere of turmoil and tension conducive to communist agitation, chaos and terrorism.”⁶⁶³

FUEMSSO also attracted Malaysians the likes of Yunus Lebai Ali and Maria Abdullah Chin. Yunus was a student activist involved in the Kuala Lumpur protest movement that flared up in 1974, and in that capacity he had become acquainted with Tan Wah Piow.⁶⁶⁴ As his fellow protestors were ensnared by Malaysia’s anti-dissidence dragnet and imprisoned under the Internal Security Act, Yunus sought refuge with a friend whose husband had served as a representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Kuala Lumpur. These connections helped Yunus escape to Lebanon. There he joined the PLO and eventually became one of Yasser Arafat’s personal bodyguards. The brewing civil war in Lebanon eventually forced Yunus to flee to London in the 1970s, where he took up a post studying sociology at North East London Polytechnic. He rekindled his connection with Tan Wah Piow, with whom he would soon visit China, and joined FUEMSSO.⁶⁶⁵ Through FUEMSSO Yunus met Maria Chin, an ethnic Chinese born in London to Malaysian parents. Chin grew up in Malaysia before returning to London for university, and she became active in the radical Malaysian student movement. Eventually Yunus and Chin returned to Malaysia and married, and they would go on to lead some of the country’s most visible protest movements.⁶⁶⁶ But FUEMSSO remained a thorn in the side of the Malaysian and Singaporean governments, churning out dissident publications including a bulletin called *FUEMSSO News Service* and pamphlets like the British Marxist and Pol Pot apologist Malcolm Caldwell’s *Lee Kuan Yew:*

⁶⁶³ Letter, Lee Kuan Yew to Bruno Pittermann, April 27, 1976, <http://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/data/pdfdoc/lky19760427.pdf> (accessed May 26, 2017).

⁶⁶⁴ Singapore Government Press Release, May 13, 1988, Annex B: Tan Wah Piow’s Links with the CPM: Information from the Malaysian Government, <http://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/data/pdfdoc/827-1988-04-21.pdf> (accessed May 30, 2017).

⁶⁶⁵ “Govt Elaborates on Wah Piow-CPM Link,” *Straits Times*, April 22, 1988.

⁶⁶⁶ “Who Is the Woman at the Heart of Malaysia’s Anti-Corruption Protests?” *Time*, November 22, 2016.

The Man, His Mayoralty and His Mafia. Caldwell had lived for two years in Singapore in the early 1970s until he was expelled from the country and banned from returning. His book characterized Lee as a stooge of capitalism and imperialism who sustained his authority through “crushing genuine nationalist and socialist forces while persuading a portion of the people to accept neo-colonial status as true independence and a paternalism akin to fascism as ‘social democracy.’”⁶⁶⁷

True, Budiardjo, Wertheim, Anderson, and Chin were not members of a diaspora, inasmuch as they hailed from countries far from island Southeast Asia. But neither were they the same as the human rights activists who populated organizations like Amnesty International. These Western scholars, aid workers, and travelers had spent long periods of time in Southeast Asian countries and developed affective ties to Southeast Asian peoples, which distinguished them from advocates of a more decontextualized human rights program. They also represented some of the most effective advocates of cutting off aid to the authoritarian regimes of Southeast Asia—not because their stories were more powerful or evocative than those of the thousands of refugees from repression, but rather because they made their cases in societies that remained deeply stratified along racial lines. In other words, these white scholars and activists found it easier to have their voices heard.

By the mid-1970s, transnational and diasporic opposition groups had remade island Southeast Asia in American political consciousness. From a site of communist aggression, it became a locus of American oppression. That change affected not only public perception but also Congressional attitudes. In September 1975, Winston Lord reported to Henry Kissinger

⁶⁶⁷ Malcolm Caldwell, *Lee Kuan Yew: The Man, His Mayoralty and His Mafia* (London: FUEMSSO, 1979), 3.

that, of the four countries whose human rights records had come under significant Congressional scrutiny and were in danger of being sanctioned, two were in island Southeast Asia: Indonesia and the Philippines.⁶⁶⁸ Indeed, Fraser's subcommittee had held hearings on the Philippines as often as it had on Chile and South Korea combined, the other countries highlighted in Lord's memorandum.

Kissinger, however, remained averse to human rights diplomacy and prevented the State Department from issuing anything but the vaguest, most anodyne reports on the human rights situation abroad. After State Department officials in the newly created Bureau of Humanitarian Affairs determined that, in order to comply with Section 502B, they had to issue country-specific reports for the four countries Lord identified, Kissinger vetoed the idea and instructed his team to draft a more general report. Delivered to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House International Relations Committee, the redrafted report characterized human rights abuses abroad as the norm rather than the exception. Since there was "no adequate objective way" to determine which countries engaged in "gross violations" of human rights, specific reports would only result in "public obloquy and impaired relations with security-assistance recipient countries." It concluded by asserting the value of "quiet but forceful diplomacy" to improve the human rights situation abroad.⁶⁶⁹ But the conditions in island Southeast Asia revealed that American-allied governments made substantive efforts to ensure the human rights of their citizens not as a result of Kissinger's "quiet" human rights diplomacy but instead as a result of bold public and Congressional activism. The Suharto regime in Indonesia began making efforts to release political prisoners only after complaints

⁶⁶⁸ Memorandum, Lord to Kissinger, September 20, 1975, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Files, Box 5, RG 59, NARA.

⁶⁶⁹ "U.S. Blocks Rights Data on Nations Getting Arms," *New York Times*, November 19, 1975.

were lodged by Amnesty International, TAPOL, and sympathetic members of the IGGI. Like other authoritarian regimes in the region, the New Order maintained a considerable intelligence-gathering apparatus in the United States that tracked the activities of diasporic and transnational human rights activists and occasionally worked to discredit them.

The Nixon Doctrine-fueled authoritarianism in island Southeast Asia mobilized diasporic and human rights activists who protested the provision of American military and economic aid to repressive regimes. These flourishing dissident groups represented part of a broader shift in American public attitudes in the era, forming a wing of a left-right coalition founded upon a moralistic opposition to the *Realpolitik* of the Nixon and Ford administrations. Ultimately, representatives and representations of island Southeast Asia helped this coalition undermine public and Congressional support for the White House's chief foreign policy projects: détente, triangular diplomacy, the Nixon Doctrine, and the Vietnam War. And if the authoritarianization in island Southeast Asia destabilized politics in the United States, so too did it destabilize politics across the Pacific, as the following chapter will demonstrate.

CHAPTER 5

REVOLUTIONS

They gathered in secret, their task a delicate one. José María Sison and ten associates met at a Pantranco station in the Manila suburb of Quezon City. They boarded rickety buses headed for Alaminos, a backwater town in Pangasinan province on the Lingayen Gulf, from whence they began a day-long trek to the nearby barangay of Dulacac. In this faraway locale, removed from the prying eyes of the capital, they set to work at their project: revivifying the communist movement in the Philippines through the infusion of Maoist ideology.⁶⁷⁰ Huddled in a wood hut at the dawn of 1969, they rechristened the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).⁶⁷¹

If their whereabouts were remote, so too were their odds of success. At the outset, the CPP could claim only about 75 adherents. Its leader, Sison, was a lecturer at the University of the Philippines (UP) and the scion of a prominent landowning family from Ilocos Sur. Though long active in Manila's radical circles, he came off as bookish and decidedly uncharismatic—hardly a Ho, a Castro, or a Mao. His comrades, mostly students at UP and other Manila universities, possessed no military experience. These would-be people's warriors had neither access to weapons nor command of an army, peasant or otherwise. And they needed to compete with the original *Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas* (PKP), a longstanding though moribund organization that still claimed the mantle of vanguard party in the archipelago. Several men present at the creation remembered that, among the CPP's founders, Sison alone

⁶⁷⁰ Gabriel Cardinoza, "39th Anniversary: Joma Sison Recalls Birth of CPP in Alaminos," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, December 26, 2007.

⁶⁷¹ Communist Party of the Philippines, *Rectify Errors and Rebuild the Party* (London: Filipino Support Group, n.d.).

exuded optimism, while the rest “silently nursed a sense of futility.”⁶⁷² The CPP seemed a sterile seed implanted in barren terrain.

And yet it grew, fertilized by an improbable meeting between Sison and a young Huk rebel named Bernabe Buscayno, known by the nom de guerre Kumander Dante. Raised in poverty amidst the turmoil of the Hukbalahap rebellion in the 1950s, Dante joined the Huk rebels as a youth and quickly ascended the ranks. But the rebellion soon withered, and senior Huks settled into running prostitution and gambling rackets in the areas surrounding American military bases, living lives of luxury while the peasants for whom they fought toiled in deepening poverty. This grated against Dante’s idealistic sensibilities, and he defected with as many men and weapons as he could muster. He met Sison in Manila in January 1969, and each found in the other a kindred spirit—the revolutionary without an army, the insurgent without an ideology. The two men formed the New People’s Army (NPA), a guerrilla force that would serve as the armed wing of the CPP. NPA units quickly fanned out across the archipelago, dispatched to areas judged ripe for upheaval. In accordance with Maoist dictum, they were tasked with carrying out an agrarian revolution and establishing rural base areas from which the communist movement would encircle and overwhelm the cities.⁶⁷³

Tarlac province in Central Luzon, renowned for its concentration of haciendas and its history of rebellion, was an early locus of NPA activity. There NPA leaders forged a cooperative relationship with elements of the powerful Cojuangco-Aquino clan, which owned the massive Hacienda Luisita sugar plantation, then operated by opposition Senator Benigno Aquino. NPA cadres drilled on hacienda grounds and organized the local peasantry, an

⁶⁷² Quoted in William Chapman, *Inside the Philippine Revolution* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1987), 78.

⁶⁷³ “Statement of the New People’s Army,” *Ang Bayan: Pahayagan ng Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas Pinapatnubayan ng Marxismo-Leninismo-Kaisipan Mao Tsetung*, July 1, 1969.

arrangement that offered personal and political benefit to opposition Aquino—personal because it strengthened Aquino’s grip on the hacienda as relatives like Eduardo “Danding” Cojuangco sought to wrest control of the property, and political because the NPA could corral peasants to the polls to cast ballots for Aquino in senatorial and, perhaps eventually, presidential elections.⁶⁷⁴ Communist operations went undetected until June 1969, when Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) units on routine patrol in the area captured a trove of CPP documents. The Philippine government immediately dispatched soldiers and right-wing paramilitaries to stamp out the brewing rebellion. By year’s end, the government offensive had become too much for the small rebel group to bear, and guerrillas scattered to communist bases elsewhere in the archipelago. Many went to Isabela province in Northern Luzon, where favorable terrain and a weak state presence enabled the NPA to grow to number some 500 fighters. Other ventures proved less successful. A small NPA team sent to the island of Negros was immediately killed in a firefight with police.⁶⁷⁵ Modest growth but frequent setbacks thus marked the CPP and NPA’s first year of existence.

Then came the storm. On January 26, 1970, President Ferdinand Marcos delivered his annual state of the nation address—his first since becoming the only Filipino president to win reelection. The hectoring speech sounded the theme of “national discipline” but only agitated the tens of thousands of young demonstrators gathered outside the Philippine Congress on Manila’s Padre Burgos Avenue. They belonged to a diverse array of organizations, including

⁶⁷⁴ Lisandro Claudio, “Ninoy Networked with Everyone, Reds Included,” in *Basagan ng Trip: Complaints about Filipino Culture and Politics* (Mandaluyong City: Anvil Press, 2016); for the history of Hacienda Luisita see James Putzel, *A Captive Land: The Politics of Agrarian Reform in the Philippines* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1992), 93-95, 185-186.

⁶⁷⁵ “Long Live the New People’s Army, Onward to Total Victory!” *Ang Bayan: Pahayagan ng Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas Pinapatnubayan ng Marxismo-Leninismo-Kaisipan Mao Tsetung*, March 29, 1989; Gregg R. Jones, *Red Revolution: Inside the Philippine Guerrilla Movement* (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1989), 32-38.

the National Union of Students of the Philippines (NUSP), a moderate opposition group; Patriotic Youth (KM), a communist front organization founded by Sison in 1964 to bring together young students, workers, and peasants; the Democratic Union of Youth (SDK), a KM offshoot whose leaders grated against Sison's imperious leadership; and the Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism (MAN), a broad coalition that opposed the American military and economic presence in the Philippines. The crowd's restiveness stemmed in part from barriers on youth political participation: Philippine law prohibited citizens under the age of 21, at least 70 percent of the population, from casting ballots in national elections.⁶⁷⁶ But speakers at the demonstration seized upon more particularistic grievances, railing against Marcos's alleged manipulation of the upcoming constitutional convention, his "overkill" in ensuring victory at the polls the year before, and his failure to redress dwindling goods and rising prices in the country's markets. The protest grew so riotous that Marcos and listeners were trapped inside the halls of Congress, as chants of "*Rebolusyon!*" "*Marcos puppet!*" and "*Makibaka, huwag matakot!*" echoed from the raucous crowd outside.⁶⁷⁷ When the police escorted the president and his family to the front door and hustled them to a waiting limousine, demonstrators tossed sticks, stones, and bottles at the first family and pelted the president in the back with a cardboard coffin, apparently intended to symbolize his "dead promises."⁶⁷⁸ The authorities responded with a show of force that Aquino later excoriated as a

⁶⁷⁶ "If You Can't Beat Them..." *Far Eastern Economic Review*, February 20, 1969.

⁶⁷⁷ Jose F. Lacaba, *Days of Disquiet, Nights of Rage: The First Quarter Storm and Related Events* (Quezon City: Asphodel Book, 1982), 68-70. The meaning of the first two chants is obvious enough. The latter chant means "Struggle, don't be afraid!"

⁶⁷⁸ "But the Cupboard is Bare," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, February 5, 1970.

police riot. Hundreds of protesters suffered injuries. “Go on, demonstrate!” shouted one officer as he bludgeoned a pair of fallen students with his rattan nightstick.⁶⁷⁹

Four nights later, on January 30, tens of thousands of young people gathered in front of Malacañang Palace to demonstrate against police violence. This protest, too, quickly grew chaotic. A group of agitators commandeered a firetruck and smashed it through the metal gates surrounding the seat of Philippine sovereignty. Hundreds of angry students stormed the compound, lobbing Molotov cocktails into pillboxes and parked automobiles. “This is no longer a riot,” said one police officer. “This is an insurrection.”⁶⁸⁰ Marcos called in AFP, Philippine Constabulary, and Metropolitan Command (Metrocom) forces to reinforce the beleaguered police units and help restore order. Secretary of Justice Juan Ponce Enrile remembered that the authorities turned the area surrounding the palace into a “war zone,” killing four young protesters, one still a high school student, and injuring hundreds more.⁶⁸¹ The demonstrations of January 26 and 30 kicked off what came to be called the First Quarter Storm, a series of protests and police skirmishes that convulsed Manila and outlying provincial capitals between January and March and politicized huge numbers of urban Filipino youth.

The First Quarter Storm produced two mutually reinforcing effects: radicalization and authoritarianization. Members of leftist organizations worked to mold amorphous political ferment into coordinated communist agitation. They distributed propaganda that emphasized broad themes of nationalism and anti-Americanism, harping on American soldiers’ abuse of

⁶⁷⁹ Benigno Aquino, “When Law and Order Went Amok,” January 27, 1970 in Benigno Aquino, ed., *A Garrison State in the Making: And Other Speeches* (Manila: Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. Foundation, 1985), 231-242.

⁶⁸⁰ Lacaba, *Days of Disquiet*, 81.

⁶⁸¹ Juan Ponce Enrile, *A Memoir*, ed. Nelson A Navarro (Quezon City: ABS-CBN Publishing Inc., 2012), Kindle location 6288.

Filipino civilians and American businesses' control of the Philippine economy. "All the lies of Marcos will not cover up the fact that he is a running dog of U.S. imperialism," read one KM leaflet published in February.⁶⁸² Urban revolutionaries also cemented links with agrarian rebels, something unprecedented in the history of Philippine leftism. Chants of "Dante for President" echoed through street demonstrations, and a new verb entered Manila's radical lexicon—*mamundok*, which literally means "to go to the mountains" but was almost always used to connote joining the NPA's guerrilla war.⁶⁸³ The commingling of urban and rural strains of revolution invigorated the radical opposition—the former endowing the movement with ideological and organizational coherence, the latter providing a reservoir of manpower and inspiration. Marcos responded to the swell of radical protest by shifting toward authoritarianism. He summoned Enrile, soon to be named minister of defense, to his office and instructed him to prepare orders for the declaration of martial law.⁶⁸⁴ "I secretly hoped the demonstrators would attack the palace [again] so that we could employ the total solution," Marcos wrote in his diary around the same time. "But it would be bloody."⁶⁸⁵

Sison and Dante were unafraid of blood. To the contrary, they yearned for it. Writing under the pseudonym Amado Guerrero, Sison argued in a 1970 text entitled *Lipunan at Rebolusyong Pilipino* (Philippine Society and Revolution) that the Marcos government's repressive behavior would alienate moderate Filipinos and contribute to the development of a broad anti-Marcos front: "By resorting to more counterrevolutionary violence, the Marcos

⁶⁸² Kabataang Makabayan, Be Resolute! Unite and Oppose the Murder, Maiming and Mass Arrest of Fellow Students and Countrymen!, February 2, 1970, Philippine Radical Papers, Box 8, Aklatan ng Unibersidad ng Pilipinas Diliman.

⁶⁸³ "Marcos at Bay," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, February 12, 1970.

⁶⁸⁴ Enrile, *A Memoir*, 276.

⁶⁸⁵ Quoted in Rempel, *Delusions of a Dictator*, 35.

puppet regime is enraging the people and hastening the collapse” of the Philippine state.⁶⁸⁶ That logic led the CPP and NPA to work to goad Marcos into declaring martial law. In August 1971, unknown assailants tossed fragmentation grenades onto a stage at Manila’s Plaza Miranda, where Liberal Party candidates were speechifying in advance of upcoming legislative elections. At least nine people died, and more than one hundred more, including several leading Liberal senators, suffered injuries. Although Sison denied involvement and branded the attack a Marcos black flag operation, the most compelling evidence suggests CPP responsibility.⁶⁸⁷ Marcos responded to the Plaza Miranda bombing by suspending the writ of habeas corpus, saying “I am asserting the power of government over disorder, over rebellion, over subversion.”⁶⁸⁸ Perhaps inspired by the CPP’s propaganda of the deed, Marcos over the following year orchestrated additional attacks that served as pretexts for further repressive measures. During the summer of 1972, AFP crews detonated bombs around Manila, which Marcos blamed on communist saboteurs.⁶⁸⁹ In September, the military staged an attack on Enrile’s limousine, peppering it with bullets as the defense minister rode safely in an escort car.⁶⁹⁰ Marcos and Sison thus worked in parallel, their shared goal the creation of an environment so chaotic and violent that it would justify a declaration of martial law. That declaration came on September 23, 1972.

⁶⁸⁶ Amado Guerrero, *Lipunan at Rebolusyong Pilipino* [Philippine Society and Revolution] (Manila: Lathalaang Pulang Tala, 1971) 65.

⁶⁸⁷ “We Unite with All Patriotic and Progressive Forces Against the Tyranny of Marcos Terrorism,” *Ang Bayan: Pahayagan ng Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas Pinapatnubayan ng Marxismo-Leninismo-Kaisipan Mao Tsetung*, August 1, 1971; Jones, *Red Revolution*, 59-69.

⁶⁸⁸ Ferdinand Marcos, “To Fight Alone, If Necessary,” August 27, 1971, in Ferdinand Marcos, *Presidential Speeches, Volume III* (Manila: Marcos Foundation, 1978), 429.

⁶⁸⁹ Primitivo Mijares, *The Conjugal Dictatorship of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos* (San Francisco: Union Square Publications, 1976), 137-138; Alfred W. McCoy, *Policing America’s Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), 395-396.

⁶⁹⁰ “Enrile—Ambush Fake,” *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, February 23, 1986. Enrile later recanted, claiming not to have faked the ambush after all. See Enrile, *A Memoir*, Kinde location 8529.

Scholars generally understand the growth of the communist insurgency in the Philippines as a function of large-scale structural processes: the deepening of poverty and insecurity amidst the pressures of population growth, land scarcity, agricultural modernization, and ineffectual governance. The population of the Philippines grew at an annual rate of approximately 3 percent throughout the 1960s and 1970s, quickly enough to double every 25 years. Economic growth proved more elusive, and upward of 40 percent of Filipinos remained locked in poverty. Meanwhile the archipelago's land frontier had been exhausted, necessitating a shift from extensive to intensive agricultural production in order to keep pace with the needs of the ballooning population. Wealthy landowners began consolidating their holdings by means both legal and illegal, and they farmed their enlarged haciendas with mechanical equipment that required less human labor input. Inequality yawned as rates of sharecropping and tenant farming rose to unseen levels, about 50 percent throughout the country and up to 85 percent in Central Luzon—the archipelago's rice granary and the locus of export crop production. The Philippine government did little to alleviate these baleful trends. Marcos's agricultural policies enriched his wealthy cronies at the expense of tenants and small landholders, and his vaunted land reform program had by 1971 given deeds of ownership to only a few thousand sharecroppers.⁶⁹¹ Unable to find work, many peasants fled to cities, where they congregated in disease-ridden cardboard slums like Manila's Tondo.

⁶⁹¹ The Land Reform Act provided that only riceland could be designed as a land reform area, which excluded most of Central Luzon.

In the capital they met graduates of the Philippines' exploding tertiary education system, who fared little better searching for employment.⁶⁹²

But grievance does not always produce rebellion.⁶⁹³ A RAND report published in 1970 concluded that the Philippines was “politically stable,” and that crime, communism, and poverty posed little threat to that stability. The authors found that the “crisis” in the Philippines was a product of elite perception rather than reality. Deep socioeconomic problems notwithstanding, one in two Filipinos considered the national government a positive force in their lives, and fewer than one in ten believed they would be better off without it.⁶⁹⁴ While not discounting the considerable problems facing Philippine society, the political counselor at the American embassy, Francis Underhill, offered a similarly upbeat assessment. He suggested in a January 1971 cable that Philippine society possessed several “safety valves” that released revolutionary pressures: regular elections and peaceful turnovers of power, a tradition of civic mindedness, a scandal-hungry if rumor-mongering press, and a relatively open economic system.⁶⁹⁵ Indeed, Marcos's September 1972 declaration of martial law announced that the NPA had only about one thousand regular soldiers, hardly sufficient to pose an existential threat to the Philippine state.⁶⁹⁶

⁶⁹² Chapman, *Inside the Philippine Revolution*; Jones, *Red Revolution*; Joel Rocamora, *Breaking Through: The Struggle Within the Communist Party of the Philippines* (Manila: Anvil Publishing, 1994); for a countervailing take see Government of the Philippines, *Development for the New Society: The Philippine Economy in the Mid-Seventies* (Manila: Bureau of National and Foreign Information, 1974); Peter Warr, “Poverty and Growth in Southeast Asia,” *ASEAN Economic Bulletin* 23, no. 3 (December 2006): 279-302.

⁶⁹³ James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), 4-5.

⁶⁹⁴ H.A. Averch, F.H. Denton, and J.E. Koehler, *A Crisis of Ambiguity: Political and Economic Development in the Philippines* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1970), xviii, 1-8.

⁶⁹⁵ Airgram, AmEmbassy Manila to State, January 27, 1971, POL PHIL, SNF, RG 59, NARA.

⁶⁹⁶ Proclamation 1081, September 1972, <http://www.gov.ph/1972/09/21/proclamation-no-1081/> (accessed September 30, 2016).

Only after the installation of martial law did the Philippine communist movement experience rapid and sustained growth. The newly authoritarian Marcos regime imprisoned opposition politicians, shuttered unfriendly media outlets, pilfered massive sums from public coffers, and clamped down on dissent—closing many of the safety valves Underhill had identified and enabling organizations like the CPP to achieve oppositional primacy. Toward the end of 1971, the CPP’s newsletter had announced the party’s intention, “in view of the fascist policy of the U.S.-Marcos clique,” to “further develop the underground.”⁶⁹⁷ The CPP and NPA established subterranean political networks in many areas of Luzon *before* Marcos’s declaration of martial law, and they were therefore better prepared than other opposition groups to take advantage of the conditions imposed by authoritarian rule.⁶⁹⁸ The repressive policies of the Marcos regime also made opponents of dictatorial rule, including the liberals and nationalists who far outnumbered communists, susceptible to radicalization. Many found themselves driven underground by the Marcos regime’s overzealous and violent campaign against dissidence. Faced with the threat of imprisonment and torture, one activist remembered, many noncommunist oppositionists threw in their lot with the CPP because they “had no place else to go. They were all threatened with arrests. Their names were on the military lists and their families had been visited by people from the military who instructed the parents to turn them in. The colleges had been ordered to blacklist them. That was their situation.”⁶⁹⁹

⁶⁹⁷ “The Party Enters Its Fourth Year Since Its Reestablishment: Third Anniversary Statement of the Communist Party of the Philippines,” *Ang Bayan: Pahayagan ng Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas Pinapatnubayan ng Marxismo-Leninismo-Kaisipan Mao Tsetung*, December 26, 1971.

⁶⁹⁸ Rocamora, *Breaking Through*, 17.

⁶⁹⁹ Quoted in Chapman, *Inside the Philippine Revolution*, 101.

To be sure, Filipinos did not join the communist movement only because they were repulsed by the Marcos regime's authoritarianism. The CPP offered a compelling analysis of the ills facing Philippine society and prescribed convincing remedies to those ills. By emphasizing the United States' responsibility for the Philippines' woes, CPP and NPA leaders made their cause palatable to the broad majority of Filipinos likely to be inspired by nationalism rather than communism. The NPA also worked to win the loyalty of the masses by differentiating communist from capitalist rule. All party cadres were required to act in accordance with Mao's three rules of discipline and eight points of attention, which prohibited the ill-treatment of peasants or the appropriation of their property.⁷⁰⁰ The NPA implemented land reform that, according to the party's guidebook, had "as its minimum goal the drastic reduction of land rent and the elimination of usury; and as its maximum goal the free distribution of land to the tillers who have no land or who do not have enough land."⁷⁰¹ Finally, the NPA proved adept at establishing law and order in the countryside, organizing small economic projects, and punishing recalcitrant landowners and traitors to the communist cause through the application of red terror.

Marcos was not alone in constructing an authoritarian government. He and other Southeast Asian leaders used American aid and Indonesian inspiration to undermine democratic institutions and establish newly exclusionary, extractive regimes, often justifying their repressive measures as necessary to combat communism. But these changes in the

⁷⁰⁰ Communist Party of the Philippines, "Saligang Batas ng Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas" [Constitution of the Communist Party of the Philippines], December 26, 1968, <http://www.philippinerevolution.net/documents/saligang-batas-ng-partido-komunista-ng-pilipinas> (accessed August 26, 2016).

⁷⁰¹ Bagong Hukbong Bayan [New People's Army], "Rebolusyonaryong Gabay sa Reporma ng Lupa" [Revolutionary Guide to Land Reform], Philippine Radical Papers, Box 9, Aklatan ng Unibersidad ng Pilipinas Diliman.

institutional and ideological structures of the region's states generated only more instability. Facing limited opportunities to advance revolutionary change, many oppositionists came to promote revolutionary change. Disloyal opposition grew in direct relation with Southeast Asian authoritarianism.

Scholars at first emulated policymakers and blamed Chinese meddling for the swell of communist movements in the region.⁷⁰² More recently, though, they have attributed the resurgence of communism in Southeast Asia in the mid-1970s to what Odd Arne Westad calls the “indirect inspiration” of the Vietnamese revolution. “Hanoi’s military and political success against the US, especially after the 1968 Tet Offensive,” Westad writes, “created a revolutionary resurgence in Southeast Asia.” Insurgents across the region, believing in a fit of “creative misunderstanding” that peasant guerrillas would alone dislodge the United States from Vietnam, adapted the National Liberation Front’s revolutionary tactics to their homelands.⁷⁰³ Lien-Hang T. Nguyen takes the argument a step farther, placing “the Vietnamese national liberation struggle at the epicenter of the global revolutionary community.”⁷⁰⁴ Doing so, however, elides the profound domestic determinants of revolution. If the Vietnam War convinced Southeast Asians that revolution was *possible*, conditions of domestic repression convinced them that revolution was *necessary*.

Indeed, the 1970s witnessed a gravitational shift in Southeast Asian leftisms. In the years after the Second World War, the promise of socialist modernity attracted Southeast Asians to revolutionary movements. That appeal had waned by the late 1960s. As Marshall

⁷⁰² See Robert Pringle, *The Philippines and Indonesia: American Interests in Island Southeast Asia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980).

⁷⁰³ Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 190-192.

⁷⁰⁴ Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, “Revolutionary Circuits: Toward Internationalizing America in the World,” *Diplomatic History* 39, no. 3 (2015): 422.

Green wrote in 1969, reporting on a tour of ten Asian countries undertaken after departing his post as U.S. ambassador to Indonesia and en route to becoming chief of the State Department's Asia desk, "At one time Communism held forth some attraction, especially to Asian youth, but it has now been on display so long that whatever attractions it once held have almost vanished."⁷⁰⁵ Green missed the extent to which many young Southeast Asians remained gripped by the examples of the Chinese, Vietnamese, and Cuban revolutions. (Mao's little red book was a common sight at protest marches throughout the region.) But the American captured a broader truth: nationalism rather than communism represented the animating political force in Southeast Asia in the late 1960s. When leftism reemerged in the mid-1970s, it won adherents not because of the pull toward the ideal of socialism but rather a push away from the reality of authoritarianism.

All this is not to say that the growth of radicalism was an exclusively domestic phenomenon. Southeast Asian leftists conceived of themselves as existing within an international current. They exchanged ideas, including Marxist analyses of postcolonial societies and Maoist programs for guerrilla warfare. Their publications regularly featured articles on communist movements elsewhere in Southeast Asia, cheering their successes and lamenting their setbacks. And they often operated on border areas, receiving succor from fraternal parties and traversing national boundaries to elude the power of authoritarian states. International connections such as these shaped and nurtured Southeast Asia's revolutionary movements, but they did not represent necessary precursors to the resurgence of communism.

Authoritarian regimes did not wield coercive institutions only against communists. They targeted all manner of political opposition, nursing forms of disloyal opposition other

⁷⁰⁵ Marshall Green, "A View of East Asia," April 21, 1969, POL - POLITICAL AFF. & REL. 1-1-67, Box 1850, CFPF, RG 59, NARA.

than communism. Of these the most consequential was Islamism. Islam had long been a fixture of political life in island Southeast Asia, claiming demographic majorities in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the southern Philippines. Among the most strident opponents of colonial rule, Southeast Asian Muslims generally adopted moderate political and religious outlooks in the post-World War II period. In Indonesia and Malaysia, they occupied positions of leadership in national governments and catered to the interests of their coreligionists; and in the Philippines, they enjoyed a measure of self-governance under a national policy of salutary neglect. The onset of authoritarian governance imposed newfound strictures on Islamic political participation and made discontented Muslims more frequent targets of the state's coercive institutions. Amidst such conditions, militant and anti-state strains of Islamism flourished. While some scholars attribute the emergence of Southeast Asian Islamist movements in the 1970s to external factors—especially the assertion of Muslim political power in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the oil embargo, and the Iranian revolution—here again domestic variables offer more explanatory power.⁷⁰⁶ Much as communist movements arose where right-wing authoritarian regimes suppressed moderate left-wing opposition, Islamist movements arose where secular authoritarian regimes suppressed moderate political Islam.

⁷⁰⁶ See, for example, Daniel Pipes, *In the Path of God: Islam and Political Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1983); Moshe Yegar, *Between Integration and Secession: The Muslim Communities of the Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand, and Western Burma/Myanmar* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2002).




Figure 3: Insurgent Groups in the Philippines. Data taken from Office of the Minister of National Defense, *OSND Statistical Data* (Quezon City: Department of National Defense, 1987).

The varieties of authoritarianism in Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore differed. These differences harbored consequences for the trajectories of disloyal opposition movements, which flourished amidst three conditions. The first of these two conditions resemble the grievance and opportunity models of insurgency pioneered by political scientists: first, when an authoritarian regime relied on violent and imprecise institutions of coercion to quell dissent, likely to inspire alienation among broad segments of the population; and second, when an authoritarian regime inhabited a weak state, one incapable of preventing extralegal political mobilization in areas where state power was rarely felt—dense jungles, urban slums, isolated regions, university campuses, and houses of worship.⁷⁰⁷ But to those conditions a third must be added, one that historians, by dint of their

⁷⁰⁷ For grievance see Matthew Adam Kosher, Thomas Pepinsky, and Stathis Kalyvas, “Aerial Bombing and Counterinsurgency in the Vietnam War,” *American Journal of Political Science* 55, no. 2 (April 2011): 201-218; Melissa Dell and Pablo Querubin, “Nation-Building Through Foreign Intervention: Evidence from Discontinuities in Military Strategies,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* (2017): 1-64; for opportunity see Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1978); James Fearon, David Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (February 2003): 75-90.

methodological predilections, remain more inclined to detect: when an authoritarian regime proved unable to establish and maintain a monopoly on nationalism.

The second issue of the CPP's official print organ *Ang Bayan*, published in July 1969, featured an article on the communist movement in Malaysia. It observed that the Malaysian government's increasing authoritarianism was "compelling the Malayan people to wage armed struggle" under the leadership of the newly militant Communist Party of Malaya (CPM).⁷⁰⁸

The CPM had long been absent from the scene. During the twelve-year "Emergency" beginning in 1948, British colonial forces waged what became known as a model counterinsurgency campaign against the Malayan communist movement. So effective were British operations that communist leader Chin Peng in 1959 called a halt to communist activity. He ordered the tattered remnants of the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA) to retreat to base areas along the country's northern border with Thailand. CPM cadres received instructions to reintegrate into Malayan society and construct an underground political organization while pursuing "open and legal struggle."⁷⁰⁹ To himself Chin assigned responsibility for international fundraising. He settled in Beijing and traveled across Southeast Asia, meeting with and appealing for aid from such leftist luminaries as Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Ho Chi Minh, and Le Duan. After a decade of lobbying, the CPM leader's Chinese and Vietnamese patrons agreed to furnish the organization with the staff and equipment

⁷⁰⁸ "Crisis for U.S. and British Imperialism Sharpens in Malaya," *Ang Bayan: Pahayagan ng Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas Pinapatnubayan ng Marxismo-Leninismo-Kaisipang Mao Tsetung*, July 1, 1969.

⁷⁰⁹ Chin Peng, *My Side of History* (Singapore: Media Masters, 2003), 406-407; Government of Malaysia, White Paper: The Incipient Threat of Armed Communism in West Malaysia, Armed Communism in West Malaysia - 2000/0026004 - W/E/04/B/20/c/4, ANM.

necessary to establish a clandestine radio station in Hunan province and the financial assistance necessary to reignite the CPM-MNLA insurgency.⁷¹⁰ These connections have done much to convince scholars that international actors midwived the rebirth of Malaysian communism.⁷¹¹

Not without reason. Had it not been for the assistance rendered by fraternal parties across Asia, the CPM likely would not have survived the lean years of the 1960s. And the CPM's announcement of a return to insurgency came in June 1968, well before the inauguration of authoritarian rule in Malaysia. Early that month, the CPM issued a directive entitled "Hold High the Great Red Banner of Armed Struggle and March Valiantly Forward!" Two weeks later, MNLA guerrillas punctuated the announcement with an ambush on Malaysian security forces near the Thai border that killed 17 police officers. But the CPM experienced little growth in the first year of renewed militancy. American officials stationed in Washington and Kuala Lumpur scoffed at a white paper released by the Malaysian government in November 1968 that claimed communism posed "a serious threat to the security of the country."⁷¹² Remarked one State Department intelligence analyst that December, "We do not believe that the capabilities of the communists for action have increased recently either in terms of numbers of supporters or in terms of stepped up training, larger supplies of arms, etc."⁷¹³ Only after the inauguration of authoritarian rule following the May 13, 1969 riots did the CPM experience sustained growth. Like the CPP, the CPM worked to exploit the environment imposed by authoritarianism and radicalize those alienated by

⁷¹⁰ Chin Peng, *My Side of History*, 440-449.

⁷¹¹ Ong Weichong, *Malaysia's Defeat of Armed Communism: The Second Emergency, 1968-1989* (New York: Routledge, 2015), 8-9; Bilveer Singh, *Quest for Political Power: Communist Subversion and Militancy in Singapore* (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Editions, 2015), 163-165.

⁷¹² Government of Malaysia, *The Path of Violence to Absolute Power* (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Cetak Kerajaan, 1968), 31.

⁷¹³ Memorandum, Colbert to Green, December 2, 1968, Untitled Folder, Box 3, IMS, RG 59, NARA.

dictatorial rule. Domestic rather than international variables best explain the resurgence of Malaysian communism.

As early as 1967, CPM cadres received instructions to “intensify the illegal struggle and consolidate the underground fortress in order to ensure . . . that we will not be without resources in the face of white terror.”⁷¹⁴ The communist movement’s subterranean networks put the party and its army in an advantageous position following the installation of authoritarian rule. As other opposition groups struggled to navigate a political system rendered perilous by new strictures on speech and assembly, the CPM underground worked to fashion a united front of Malaysians averse to authoritarianism. Ethnic Chinese communities represented a primary target for radicalization—not only because they had historically served as the backbone of the Malaysian communist movement, but also because they endured disproportionate loss of life and property during the May 13 riots and stood to suffer as a result of the government’s redistributionist economic policies. Underground activists launched a successful word-of-mouth campaign that brought about 500 ethnic Chinese recruits into the CPM fold.⁷¹⁵ Meanwhile communist propaganda castigated the Malaysian government for its antidemocratic—and allegedly anti-ethnic Chinese—measures: “The Rahman-Razak clique, having torn off the badly worn-out mask of ‘democracy’, has ruthlessly carried out a massive sanguinary massacre of the people of Malaya, mainly the Chinese masses, and is openly imposing fascist military rule in the country.” Party publications routinely characterized the Malaysian government as “Malay chauvinist,” urging

⁷¹⁴ White Paper, *The Incipient Threat of Armed Communism in West Malaysia*, Armed Communism in West Malaysia, 2000/0026004 - W/E/04/B/20/c/4, ANM.

⁷¹⁵ Chin Peng, *My Side of History*, 463; National Operations Council, *The May 13 Tragedy* (Kuala Lumpur: Government of Malaysia, 1969), 71.

ethnic Chinese to repay their “blood debt” and oppose the newly authoritarian regime.⁷¹⁶ By June, university and secondary school students across Malaysia engaged in romantic talk about fleeing to the jungle.⁷¹⁷

The CPM did not limit its appeals to Malaysians of Chinese ancestry, cognizant as it was that the communist movement’s racial homogeneity proved a source of its undoing during the Emergency. Voice of the Malayan Revolution (SRM), the Hunan-based CPM radio station, broadcasted not only in Chinese but also in Malay, Tamil, and English. To attract ethnic Malays disaffected by dictatorship but for religious or other reasons ill-disposed toward communism, party propaganda harped on patriotic themes. Communist radio broadcasts painted the Malaysian government as lacking nationalist credentials, a “mere puppet of British imperialists” that served the interests of “feudal landlords, capitalists, bureaucrats and ministers” rather than the masses.⁷¹⁸ SRM broadcasted reports of young Malays killed at the hands of government security forces for trespassing in British tin mines and aired editorials that attributed persistent Malay poverty to the government’s pandering to Japanese monopoly capital.⁷¹⁹ To diminish the Malaysian government’s nationalist credentials, CPM propaganda argued that the regime’s policies served to “give concessions to foreign imperialists” and “further suppress the toiling masses so as to strengthen the position of the Malay bureaucratic capitalists.”⁷²⁰

While CPM operatives constructed an underground political movement, MNLA cadres prepared to reignite the insurgency. They had since 1960 built four base camps in

⁷¹⁶ Government of Malaysia, White Paper: The Incipient Threat of Armed Communism in West Malaysia, Armed Communism in West Malaysia, 2000/0026004 - W/E/04/B/20/c/4, ANM; *Mimbar Rakyat*, November 15, 1969.

⁷¹⁷ “The Parting of the Ways?” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 19, 1969.

⁷¹⁸ *Suara Revolusi Malaya*, November 22, 1969

⁷¹⁹ *Suara Revolusi Malaya*, August 8, 1970; *Suara Revolusi Malaya*, July 8, 1970.

⁷²⁰ *Suara Revolusi Malaya*, November 26, 1969.

northern Malaysia and southern Thailand replete with vast underground tunnel networks and printing facilities. (The Thai government largely tolerated the MNLA's presence, focused instead on the threat posed by the Vietnam War and Thai communists in the country's north and west.)⁷²¹ Around the same time that the MNLA returned to militancy, Malaysian security services captured a CPM document outlining an ambitious agenda for expanding the guerrilla war in northern Malaysia. But MNLA insurgents still numbered relatively few, by most estimates no more than 500, and the tempo of the group's military operations lulled after its June 1968 ambush on Malaysian security forces—perhaps owing to a lack of men and materiel, or perhaps reflecting the guerillas' need to reacquaint themselves with the region's topography (much altered by government land development schemes since the end of the Emergency) and forge a durable infrastructure of mass support.⁷²² The inauguration of authoritarian rule following the May 13, 1969 riots provided the MNLA with an opportunity to engage in a sustained recruitment drive, which doubled the group's armed strength in southern Thailand by mid-1970. Communist guerrillas divided into seven assault teams and intensified their infiltration into and operations within the northern provinces of Kedah, Perak, and Kelantan, and they soon began staging bolder and more destructive attacks on Malaysian government targets.⁷²³

The CPM and MNLA did not, however, achieve the level of success of their Filipino counterparts, the CPP and NPA. The Malaysian communist movement fractured in the early

⁷²¹ "Leap-Frog Fears," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, January 23, 1969.

⁷²² "How strong are the Chin Peng remnants in Betong?" *Straits Times*, February 3, 1969.

⁷²³ Government of Malaysia, White Paper: The Incipient Threat of Armed Communism in West Malaysia, Armed Communism in West Malaysia, 2000/0026004 - W/E/04/B/20/c/4, ANM; The threat to Malaysia, Brunei, and Singapore up to the end of 1970 (Jul 1970 – Jun 1972), AWM 122/68/2018, NAA; Military situation Malaysia/Thailand border area (Oct-Nov 1971), AWM 122/71/2014, NAA.

1970s, and it proved unable to expand its appeal beyond a relatively narrow subset of the population. For its failures the CPM deserves blame. But the Malaysian government made the party's task considerably more difficult. The nature of authoritarianism in Malaysia differed from that of the Philippines. Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman and his deputy-cum-successor Tun Abdul Razak possessed pristine nationalist credentials and presided over a more inclusive authoritarian regime that distributed power and patronage among a relatively broad array of the country's elites. They could therefore draw upon a significant domestic resource base, as well as considerable international aid flows, to expand the capacity of the Malaysian state to combat disloyal opposition. Moreover, the Tunku and Razak wielded nonviolent coercive institutions to prevent the emergence of organized disloyal opposition in urban areas, and they applied violent coercive institutions with a high degree of precision against rural disloyal opposition movements. Malaysian authoritarianism was therefore at once less generative of revolutionary sentiment and more eradicated of armed resistance.

The Tunku and Razak's newly authoritarian regime first sought to shore up support among ethnic Malays, who suffered persistent and disproportionate poverty and who increasingly regarded the government as an inadequate guarantor of their interests. Through the New Economic Policy (NEP), unveiled in 1969 and implemented in 1971, the Malaysian government worked to redress the traditional dichotomy between Malay political power and Chinese economic power. The NEP expanded economic perquisites for Malays and aimed to expand their control of the economy (measured in terms of overall ownership) from less than two percent in 1971 to 30 percent in 1990.⁷²⁴ The government also reinforced what came to be called *ketuanan Melayu*, or Malay supremacy in the social realm. Islam had long been

⁷²⁴ *Rancangan Malaysia kedua, 1971-1975* [Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-1975] (Kuala Lumpur: Percetakan Negara Kerajaan Malaysia, 1971), 41.

recognized as the country's official religion and Malay as its official language, even though substantial numbers of Malaysians practiced a religion other than Islam and spoke a language other than Malay. In the early 1970s, the Malaysian government introduced new Malay-targeted social blandishments—among them the gradual imposition of Malay-language education and Islam-focused coursework on all pupils in national schools—and criminalized criticism of the special rights and privileges afforded to ethnic Malays.⁷²⁵ The CPM thus found it difficult to make inroads among ethnic Malays. Communist operatives established front organizations such as the Islamic Fraternal Party, which sought to convince Malays that Islam and communism were compatible.⁷²⁶ But these organizations found little traction. As late as 1976, Malaysian officials estimated that Malaysian-born ethnic Malays constituted no more than five percent of the CPM's membership. Indeed, that the vast majority of the CPM's ethnic Malay members hailed from Thailand underscores the effectiveness of the Malaysian government's efforts to woo its Malay citizenry.⁷²⁷

If the Malaysian government lavished attention and resources on Malays, it did not ignore the country's Chinese or Indian communities. Since independence Malaysia had been ruled by the Alliance, a consociational political conglomerate led by the Tunku and composed of three ethnically based organizations: the dominant United Malays National Organization (UMNO), and the subservient Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC). The May 1969 elections and the subsequent rioting threatened the multiracial character of the Malaysian government. Though the Alliance retained a

⁷²⁵ Government of Malaysia, *Towards National Harmony* (Kuala Lumpur: Jabatan Cetak Kerajaan, 1971).

⁷²⁶ Abdullah CD, *Memoir Abdullah CD, bahagian III: Perjuangan di Sempadan dan penamatan terhormat* [The Memoirs of Abdullah CD, Part III: The Struggle at the Border and the Honorable Peace] (Petaling Jaya: Strategic Information Research Development, 2009).

⁷²⁷ National Intelligence Estimate 54-1-76, The Outlook for Malaysia, April 1, 1976, in *FRUS 1969-1976:E-12*, 302.

parliamentary majority, the MCA fared especially poorly at the polls—its supporters deserting the Alliance for opposition parties such as the Democratic Action Party (DAP) and Malaysian People’s Movement Party (Gerakan), which campaigned for greater non-Malay rights. Considerable division existed within the MCA leadership over post-election strategy. Some officials favored accepting positions in the new government to preserve their access to power and patronage, while others advocated disassociating from UMNO to regain the support of the restive Chinese masses.⁷²⁸ Tan Siew Sin, the MCA president, at first leaned toward the latter camp. At noon on May 13, he pushed a resolution through the organization’s central committee stating that the MCA would remain in the Alliance but stipulating that its leaders would neither participate in the government nor accept cabinet portfolios.⁷²⁹ The riots that began that evening and the suspension of parliamentary democracy that followed altered Tan’s political calculus. He quickly accepted a position on the all-powerful National Operations Council (NOC) and indicated his intent to cooperate with the regime.⁷³⁰

Tan’s change of heart came in response to pressure from the Chinese business community, organized in local Chinese chambers of commerce whose members feared the economic consequences of opposition.⁷³¹ But it also owed to the Tunku and Razak’s efforts to preserve consociationalism. UMNO leaders faced unprecedented demands to announce a Malay-only government that would cater primarily, if not exclusively, to Malay interests. Malay reactionaries (called “ultras”) denounced the Tunku’s allegedly indulgent posture toward ethnic minorities, blaming it for persistent poverty among *bumiputra* communities

⁷²⁸ Airgram, AmEmbassy Kuala Lumpur to State, July 30, 1969, POL 12 MALAYSIA 1/1/69, Box 2322, CFPF, RG 59, NARA.

⁷²⁹ Telegram, AmEmbassy Kuala Lumpur to State, May 13, 1969, POL 12 MALAYSIA 1/1/69, Box 2322, CFPF, RG 59, NARA.

⁷³⁰ “Requiem for Democracy?” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 22, 1969.

⁷³¹ “Bid by Chinese chambers to get Tun Tan to change mind,” *Straits Times*, May 30, 1969; “The Parting of the Ways?” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 19, 1969.

(literally “sons of the of the soil,” but used to connote Malays and indigenous tribal groups). Among the most prominent ultras was Mahathir Mohamad, a backbench UMNO parliamentarian who lost his seat in the May 1969 elections by a margin of fewer than 1,000 votes and blamed his defeat on ethnic Chinese voters who defected from the Alliance.⁷³² In June 1969, Mahathir penned a letter to the Tunku excoriating the Malaysian leader as a “‘sell out’—giving the Chinese what they demand” and suggesting that “it is past time for you to be pensioned off from your position as Prime Minister and head of UMNO.”⁷³³ The following month, the discontented ultra broached the subject of a military coup with an American diplomat stationed in Kuala Lumpur.⁷³⁴ Neither the Tunku nor Razak yielded to exclusivist Malay pressures. They succeeded in removing Mahathir from UMNO’s Central Executive Committee and shortly thereafter expelled him from UMNO entirely. After Malay youths rioted again in the northern area of Kuala Lumpur on June 28 and killed 15 ethnic Indians, Minister of Home Affairs Ismail bin Abdul Rahman issued a warning: “If the anti-Tengku campaigns or activities are carried out in such a manner . . . as to cause undue fear and alarm among members of any community[,] . . . I will not hesitate to exercise my powers under the law against those responsible.”⁷³⁵ Aired in the Jawi-script daily *Utusan Melayu*, Ismail’s remarks were clearly aimed at recalcitrant Malays. By disavowing Malay chauvinists and communal violence, the Tunku and Razak demonstrated their intent to continue working with non-Malay parties and to preserve the consociational government as a vehicle of patronage

⁷³² Goh Cheeng Teik, *The May Thirteenth Incident and Democracy in Malaysia* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1971), 29-30.

⁷³³ Letter, Mahathir to Tunku, June 1969, enclosed in Airgram, AmEmbassy Kuala Lumpur to State, July 16, 1969, POL 12 MALAYSIA 1/1/69, Box 2322, CFPF, RG 59, NARA.

⁷³⁴ Telegram, AmEmbassy Kuala Lumpur to SecState WashDC, July 14, 1969, POL 12 MALAYSIA 1/1/69, Box 2322, CFPF, RG 59, NARA.

⁷³⁵ Quoted in Gordon P. Means, *Malaysian Politics: The Second Generation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 10.

and power-sharing. Most well-heeled ethnic Chinese thus refused to abandon the battered Alliance ship.

Wealthy MCA powerbrokers were in any case unlikely to support the CPM. Communist propaganda instead targeted the predominantly urban ethnic Chinese who occupied lower rungs of the economic ladder and had become increasingly disillusioned by Alliance rule.⁷³⁶ Razak worked to blunt the CPM's appeals to discontented ethnic Chinese by either coopting or containing the opposition parties for which they voted. After announcing a return to a highly circumscribed form of parliamentary democracy in 1971, Razak incorporated Gerakan and several other opposition parties into an enlarged regime called the Barisan Nasional, which replaced the Alliance. The BN won the loyalty of some opposition partisans by offering them unprecedented access to voice and patronage.⁷³⁷ Many ethnic Chinese voters who remained immune to such enticements flocked instead to the DAP, a loyal opposition party possessed of genuine socialist credentials. Razak tolerated the DAP as an alternative to the CPM as long as it heeded the newly imposed barriers on politicking. DAP leaders and publications could promote their multiracial ideology, but they were not permitted to spell out the obvious policy implication of that ideology—an end to special *bumiputra* privileges.⁷³⁸ That Malaysian authoritarianism was relatively inclusive and largely nonviolent explains why the CPM proved unable to recruit significant numbers of disaffected ethnic Chinese.

⁷³⁶ The MCA retained a stranglehold on rural ethnic Chinese politics. See Judith Strauch, "Tactical Success and Failure in Grassroots Politics: The MCA and DAP in Rural Malaysia," *Asian Survey* 18, no. 12 (December 1976): 1280-1294.

⁷³⁷ Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985), 422-424.

⁷³⁸ Harold Crouch, *Government and Society in Malaysia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 83-85.

Razak reserved the most violent of the Malaysian state's coercive instruments for the disloyal opposition. To combat the renewed communist insurgency in Perak, for example, the government in 1971 launched *Operasi Setia* (Operation Loyalty). Malaysian security forces attempted to cut off guerrillas from their support networks by fencing off villages, imposing a 24-hour curfew, exerting control over the food supply, registering households and tenants, demolishing illegal squatter homes, and providing residents with increased access to government services.⁷³⁹ Soldiers also circulated questionnaires asking for information on the location of communist camps and inquiring how and from whom the guerrillas obtained food and medicine.⁷⁴⁰ How effectively these and other counterinsurgency measures disrupted CPM/MNLA operations is difficult to determine. But the specter of Malaysia's strong state evidently sowed paranoia inside the communist movement. In early 1970, the CPM leadership surmised that some 90 percent of the party's recruits from Thailand were spies implanted by Malaysian and Thai security services, and that these operatives were plotting a coup at the group's headquarters. As jungle tribunals handed down sentences of summary execution for accused traitors, two communist camps rebelled and set up their own central committees. Rebranding themselves the Communist Party of Malaya (Revolutionary Faction) and the Communist Party of Malaya (Marxist-Leninist), the two splinter groups soon grew to command some 500 guerrillas. Chin Peng later rued the fracturing of the CPM, suspecting that he and other party leaders had failed to realize that the allegations swirling inside the communist camps were a "devastating ploy" hatched by government security services.⁷⁴¹

⁷³⁹ Savingram, Australian High Commission, Kuala Lumpur to Foreign Affairs, December 7, 1971, Malaysia – Insurgency internal security, A1838/696/6/7/1 PART 1, NAA.

⁷⁴⁰ Inward Cablegram, Australian High Commission, Kuala Lumpur to Foreign Affairs, September 28, 1971, Ibid.

⁷⁴¹ Chin Peng, *My Side of History*, 465-468.

CPP and CPM propaganda foregrounded Maoist ideas. But their ideological programs in fact owed much to D.N. Aidit, an Indonesian communist leader who in 1957 penned an influential text entitled *Masyarakat Indonesia dan revolusi Indonesia* (Indonesian Society and the Indonesian Revolution). Explaining why Indonesia's national revolution had produced no accompanying social revolution, Aidit pointed to foreign businesses' and indigenous landlords' enduring control over the archipelago's economy. Indonesia was thus "semi-colonial and semi-feudal."⁷⁴² The analysis impressed a young Filipino who spent six months in the early 1960s in Jakarta as the head of a cultural organization dedicated to broadening ties between Indonesia and the Philippines. That Filipino, José María Sison, would go on to use Aidit's work as a template for his own 1970 text, *Lipunan at Rebolusyong Pilipino*, which became the intellectual bible of the CPP. So similar are the two works that Sison has repeatedly been accused of plagiarism.⁷⁴³ Only in their prescriptions do the two revolutionaries differ. Where Aidit emphasized legal, parliamentary struggle, Sison favored illegal, armed struggle.

Sison had learned from the Indonesian example. In 1965-66, the Indonesian government presided over the slaughter of some half-a-million communists and fellow-travelers, and the imprisonment of hundreds of thousands more—all but destroying what, until that point, had been the world's largest non-bloc communist party.⁷⁴⁴ In the years following the bloodletting, various attempts at resuscitating the Communist Party of Indonesia

⁷⁴² D.N. Aidit, *Masyarakat Indonesia dan Revolusi Indonesia* (Jakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 1964), 32.

⁷⁴³ Few of these accusations note that Aidit's pamphlet is also modeled on Mao's own writings. See Mao Zedong, "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party," December 1939, https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-2/mswv2_23.htm (accessed September 12, 2016).

⁷⁴⁴ John Roosa, "The State of Knowledge about an Open Secret: Indonesia's Mass Disappearances of 1965-66," *Asian Studies* 75, no. 2 (May 2016): 281-297.

(PKI) collapsed under the weight of Indonesia's strong state and the Indonesian communist movement's own weakened foundations.

The first attempt took place in 1966. Sudisman, who had been the fourth-ranking leader of the PKI until October 1965, issued a statement whose focus on self-criticism hinted at an emergent Maoism: "The fact that the counter-revolutionary forces could, in a brief space of time, strike at and inflict enormous damage on the PKI obliges us, who can still continue this revolutionary struggle, to carry out criticism and self-criticism."⁷⁴⁵ (Though the PKI had tilted toward Beijing in the Sino-Soviet dispute and denounced Moscow for its promotion of peaceful roads to socialism, the party's pre-1965 embrace of parliamentary struggle suggested at least a partial resistance to Maoist ideas.)⁷⁴⁶ Shortly thereafter, Sudisman released a detailed self-criticism explaining that the Aidit-led PKI had undergone "bourgeoisification," which led it to collaborate with the national leadership under Sukarno, to emphasize the international struggle at the expense of the domestic struggle, and to refrain from waging agrarian revolution.⁷⁴⁷ The Sudisman faction of the PKI attempted to win supporters by characterizing the Suharto regime as a handmaiden of American hegemony. It denounced the regime for abandoning Indonesia's "free and active" foreign policy, a third rail of the country's politics, and accused Suharto of transforming the archipelago into a "new-type colony of the U.S. imperialists."⁷⁴⁸ But such appeals to nationalism accomplished little in the face of Indonesia's pervasive coercive institutions. Betrayed by one of his comrades in December 1966,

⁷⁴⁵ "Hold Aloft the Reputation and Honour of the Communist!" May 23, 1966, in *Build the PKI Along the Marxist-Leninist Line to Lead the People's Democratic Revolution in Indonesia: Five Important Documents of the Political Bureau of the CC PKI* (The Delegation of the CC PKI, 1971), 19-20.

⁷⁴⁶ Bern Shaefer, "Indonesia and the World in 1965," in Bern Shaefer and Baskara Wardaya, eds., *1965: Indonesia and the World = 1965: Indonesia dan Dunia* (Jakarta: PT Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2013).

⁷⁴⁷ "Build the PKI Along the Marxist-Leninist Line to Lead the People's Democratic Revolution of Indonesia (Self-Criticism of the Political Bureau of the CC PKI, September 1966," in *Ibid.*, 85-208.

⁷⁴⁸ "Hold Aloft the Banner of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tsetung Thought: March Forward Along the Road of Revolution!" May 23, 1967, in *Ibid.*, 218.

Sudisman surrendered to a squad of Indonesian soldiers during a raid on a waterlogged *kampung* on the outskirts of Jakarta.⁷⁴⁹

By then another group of PKI operatives had begun implementing Sudisman's ideas in Blitar, a rural area in East Java that had long been a communist stronghold. Rewang and Oloan Hutapea, both Politburo members, organized the local peasantry and trained it in guerrilla tactics. By mid-1968, the communist-led peasantry in Blitar had killed some sixty local religious leaders, extracting revenge for the anticommunist pogroms of 1965-66 in which Muslim organizations played a bloody role. The violence quickly attracted the attention of the Indonesian military, which dispatched 5,000 soldiers to Blitar in June. The arriving troops conscripted locals and forced them to take part in a "fence-of-legs" campaign, in which they linked civilians in a human chain and walked them through the forests to flush out any PKI remnants taking refuge there. Villagers suspected of harboring leftist sympathies were made to take part in the killing of communists, sometimes using nothing more than rocks and sharpened sticks. By the following month, the PKI in Blitar was no more, and eight of the ten members of the organization's reconstituted Politburo had been killed.⁷⁵⁰ Around the same time, Indonesian security services destroyed some other remnants of the PKI among the ethnic Chinese communities of West Kalimantan, where they had been working in concert with dissidents in neighboring Malaysian Sarawak. Never again would the PKI mount even a minor threat to Indonesia's stability.

⁷⁴⁹ Sudisman, "Uraian Tanggung-Jawab" [Analysis of Responsibility], July 21, 1967, <https://www.marxists.org/indonesia/indones/1967-SudismanUraianTanggungJawab.htm> (accessed September 13, 2016).

⁷⁵⁰ Semdam VIII Brawidjaja, *Operasi Trisula Kodam VIII Brawidjaja* [Operation Trident of Brawijaya Regional Command VIII] (Surabaya: Jajasan Taman Tjandrawilwatika, 1969); "Reds Renew Campaign in Indonesia," *New York Times*, August 11, 1968; Ruth McVey, "PKI Fortunes at Low Tide," *Problems of Communism* 20 (January 1971): 25-36; Vanessa Hearman, "Hunted Communists," *Inside Indonesia* 99 (January-March 2010); "Moscow's Djakarta Dilemma," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 12, 1969

Not for lack of sympathy. Even after the anticommunist purges, millions of citizens likely harbored sympathies for the PKI, having belonged either to the party or to one of the mass organizations associated with it.⁷⁵¹ But the Indonesian state's overweening military and intelligence bureaucracies waged particularly effective countersubversion campaigns, as outlined in a top secret 1971 report compiled by the chief of the State Intelligence Coordinating Agency (Bakin). The report defined subversion as "any activity that aims to amend or replace the national philosophy of Pancasila, whether done legally, or through democratic-parliamentary means, or illegally"—a definition so capacious, given Suharto's interpretation of Pancasila democracy as signifying the harmonious unity of a developmental state and a depoliticized society, that it classified New Left-type activism on university campuses as treason. Accordingly, the New Order state implemented both "preventive and repressive" measures to combat subversion. In addition to "investigating, arresting, combatting, and eradicating" subversive elements, the regime would utilize "educational institutions, the mass media, i.e. the press, radio, television, film, *wayang kulit* [puppet] shows," and other instruments of communication to "raise Pancasila consciousness . . . so it becomes ingrained in all facets of the life of the people."⁷⁵² More broadly, the New Order stationed armed forces (ABRI) units throughout the archipelago, where they served in civilian administrative posts, partnered with ethnic Chinese businesses, and otherwise made felt the coercive presence of the Indonesian state. The combination of a weak PKI and a strong Indonesian state meant would-be leftists had little incentive to associate themselves with any

⁷⁵¹ Crouch, *Army and Politics*, 224-228; "A Stony Road," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, February 13, 1969

⁷⁵² Naskah Induk tentang Subversi dan Penanggulangannya [Basic Text on Subversion and How to Overcome It], Menhankam/Panglima ABRI: Surat Keputusan Nomor: SKEP/B/1310/XII/1973 tanggal 10 Desember 1973 tentang pengesahan buku "Subversi dan penanggulangannya," disertai lampiran, 551, HB IX, ANRI; for Suharto's thoughts on Pancasila democracy see Soeharto, *Pikiran*, 227-228.

underground remnants of the communist party, effectively precluding a resurgence of organized leftist opposition.

The success of the Suharto regime's campaign against the PKI became clear during the Malari incident of January 15, 1974. In mid-January, Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Tanaka traveled to Indonesia for an honorific state visit, his reception reflecting Japan's growing economic clout in the archipelago and its influential role in the international consortium responsible for rescheduling Indonesia's sovereign debt. The visit took place at a time of growing civil unrest. Indonesian students gathered in downtown Jakarta on the day of Tanaka's arrival to protest the graft, mismanagement, and foreign domination they saw strangling the Indonesian economy—burning effigies of the Japanese leader to underscore their discontent. By the end of January 15, throngs of Jakarta's urban poor had joined the students and, urged on by government provocateurs, turned the protest into a riot. They burned cars (mostly of Japanese make) and ransacked businesses (mostly of Japanese ownership); others targeted Indonesians of Chinese ancestry, whom they regarded as relatively prosperous and thus symbolic of *pribumi* (indigenous) poverty. The riots killed nearly a dozen people and injured hundreds more, ending only after security forces began firing on the rioters with live ammunition.⁷⁵³ The Indonesians who participated in the protests and subsequent riots were motivated by communist bread-and-butter issues, including inequality and corruption. But they framed their demands in something less than explicitly ideological terms. That no remnants of the Indonesian communist movement could seize upon this ferment suggests the extent to which the Indonesian state's repressive measures had utterly marginalized the PKI as a political force.

⁷⁵³ Elson, *Suharto*, 203-207; Aspinall, *Opposing Suharto*, 24-27.

High-level Indonesian elites had already surmised as much. In the months leading up to Tanaka's visit, the reformist General Sumitro of Kopkamtib (Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order, established in 1965 as the military core of the New Order) had begun feuding with the loyalist General Ali Murtopo of Aspri (Personal Assistants, a small kitchen cabinet of longtime Suharto confidantes who wielded substantial though informal influence). Sumitro became something of a fixture on Indonesia's university campuses, where he lectured on the need for greater government responsiveness and transparency. Though Sumitro channeled the students' anger toward Murtopo, his advocacy of dissent posed a fundamental challenge to Suharto's Pancasila democracy—effectively endorsing the student agitation that crested in the Malari incident. In spite of the government's ubiquitous efforts to convince the population that the “extreme left” represented a “latent danger,” the communist menace had by the mid-1970s receded into memory.⁷⁵⁴ The anticommunist glue that held the New Order together lost some of its adhesive power, and factional disputes over the distribution of power and patronage began to emerge.⁷⁵⁵

The politicide that decimated the Indonesian communist movement made the PKI an unlikely vector of organized opposition to Suharto's authoritarianism. Opposition to the New Order emerged instead from the religious right, especially from Islamic parties and organizations. These groups retained large followings among the Indonesian population, but

⁷⁵⁴ Suharto, Naskah amanat pada para peserta rapat pimpinan ABRI 1974 [Script of remarks to participants in the 1974 Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia leadership meeting], March 8, 1974, 148.1, PPS, ANRI.

⁷⁵⁵ Benedict Anderson, “Last Days of Indonesia's Suharto?” *Southeast Asia Chronicle* 63 (July-August 1978): 2-17.

they were denied meaningful political participation and increasingly became targets of the Indonesian state's apparatus of repression.⁷⁵⁶

Indonesia's two largest Islamic parties welcomed the inauguration of the New Order. Masyumi and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) had each won approximately 20 percent of the vote in Indonesia's first—and, until the 1970s, only—national elections, held in 1955. Ranking only behind Sukarno's Indonesian National Party in popularity, the Islamic parties saw their political clout wane in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Sukarno banned Masyumi for its support of regional rebellions, while NU accommodated itself to the authoritarianism of Guided Democracy in exchange for de facto control over the Ministry of Religious Affairs. As Sukarno cultivated the PKI to counterbalance the power of the Indonesian military, a shared antipathy toward communism nurtured links between anticommunist military officers and disaffected Muslim leaders. When Suharto began purging Indonesian society of communism, NU-associated youth organizations participated in the army-directed mass killings of PKI members. This quasi-partnership led NU leaders to anticipate a prominent voice in the New Order; Masyumi leaders, among the most vocal opponents of Sukarno, hoped for the same.⁷⁵⁷

Those hopes were soon vanquished. Suharto expected the Islamic parties to adopt a legitimating rather than leadership role in the New Order. He and other *abangan* (syncretic Muslims influenced by Javanese mysticism) and nationalist military leaders mistrusted Masyumi for supporting antigovernment rebellions, and they feared that *santri* (orthodox)

⁷⁵⁶ See John Sidel, *Riots, Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006); Mohammad Kamal Hassan, *Muslim Intellectual Responses to "New Order" Modernization in Indonesia* (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka Kementerian Pelajaran Malaysia, 1980); Bachtiar Effendy, *Islam and the State in Indonesia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003).

⁷⁵⁷ Marcus Mietzner, *Military Politics, Islam and the State in Indonesia: From Turbulent Transition to Democratic Consolidation* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), 75-81.

Muslim leaders would attempt to fashion Indonesia into an Islamic state.⁷⁵⁸ Suharto therefore asserted that “the armed forces cannot accept the rehabilitation of the former political party, Masyumi.”⁷⁵⁹ To integrate Masyumi’s supporters into the New Order, Suharto assented to the creation of the Indonesian Muslim Party (Parmusi), based upon the Masyumi stream of modernist Islam. But he blocked former Masyumi officials from assuming positions of leadership in Parmusi and prevented them from standing as candidates in the national elections scheduled for July 1971. Instead, Suharto stocked Parmusi’s leadership with pliant figures and regularly interfered in the group’s internal politics to prevent the emergence of genuine opposition.⁷⁶⁰ Opsus, an extraconstitutional military-intelligence unit headed by Ali Murtopo, spelled out the rationale behind the government’s skullduggery in a report on national elections and party politics. The document declared that all political competition must be a product of “consensus,” must “pronounce the New Order victorious,” and must “safeguard political and economic stabilization.”⁷⁶¹

Suharto evidently regarded NU, which had under Sukarno acquired a reputation for political opportunism, as better suited than Parmusi to his strikingly undemocratic conception of democracy. The military did not intervene in NU’s internal affairs during the early years of the New Order. But NU became more critical of the Suharto regime under the influence of Subchan Z.E., a young firebrand elected as second-in-command of the organization’s political

⁷⁵⁸ The *abangan-santri* dichotomy comes from Clifford Geertz and has become a fixture in scholarship on Islam in Indonesia. See Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960); for the military’s mistrust of *santri* Muslims see Ruth McVey, “The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army (Part I),” *Indonesia* 11 (April 1971): 138-139.

⁷⁵⁹ Quoted in Harold Crouch, *Army and Politics*, 260.

⁷⁶⁰ Elson, *Suharto*, 184-185; Masashi Nishihara, *Golkar and the Indonesian Elections of 1971* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1972), 4-11; Ken Ward, *The Formation of the Partai Muslimin Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1970).

⁷⁶¹ Opsus, *Pemilu dalam strategi nasional [The Election in the National Strategy]*, October 8, 1969, *Berkas mengenai Pemilihan Umum (Pemilu)*, 114, Sekkab, ANRI.

committee in 1967 and reelected in 1971 over the objections of the more accommodationist elites who controlled the party's central institutions. In speeches leading up to Indonesia's highly controlled 1971 elections, Subchan peppered his remarks with harsh attacks on Suharto, Murtopo, and their Golkar party.⁷⁶² Attendees at NU rallies brandished posters with audacious slogans including "The people want to be free" and "The Republic of Indonesia is the possession of all the people, not the possession of one group."⁷⁶³ Consistent harassment and intimidation by the Indonesian military did little to blunt NU's popularity. Where Parmusi's role as a tool of the New Order discredited the party in the eyes of its constituents and led to a dismal 5.4 percent showing at the polls, NU's role as a genuine opposition party did nothing to alienate (and perhaps even inspired) its rural Javanese supporters and resulted in an impressive electoral haul of 18.7 percent. By then the central organs of the New Order had begun targeting NU. Suharto in late 1971 appointed as minister of religious affairs a scholar unaffiliated with NU, severing the party's control over the fiefdom from which it had exerted influence and dispensed patronage. The following year, Murtopo orchestrated Subchan's ouster from NU's leadership. The new party leader called for NU to "return to the guidelines of '26," signifying a rejection of political activism in favor of social engagement.⁷⁶⁴

The next step in the New Order's efforts to establish control over political Islam came in January 1973, when Suharto announced that NU, Parmusi, and two smaller Islamic parties

⁷⁶² Arief Mudatsir Mandan, *Subchan Z.E., sang maestro politisi-intelektual dari kalangan N.U. modern* [Subchan Z.E., the Political-Intellectual Maestro from the Modern N.U. Circle] (Jakarta: Pustaka Indonesia Satu, 2001).

⁷⁶³ Quoted in Ken Ward, *The 1971 Elections in Indonesia: An East Java Case Study* (Melbourne: Monash University Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1974), 106.

⁷⁶⁴ Robin Bush, *Nahdlatul Ulama and the Struggle for Power within Islam and Politics in Indonesia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), 66-68; Crouch, *Army and Politics*, 263-264, 269-271; Ward, *1971 Elections*, 90-113.

would be consolidated into the United Development Party (PPP) under the leadership of pliant figures associated with Parmusi.⁷⁶⁵ Accommodationist officials within the PPP gradually worked to sideline their oppositionist colleagues associated with NU, so that by the mid-1970s NU figures no longer occupied meaningful government posts. A weakened Islamic bloc found its opportunities for exerting political influence limited. The PPP's few achievements in the 1970s included first a successful campaign against draft laws that would have recognized *kebatinan* (mysticism) as a religion and thereby reduced the number of Indonesians who identified as Muslim, and second a campaign against proposed regulations that would have removed marriage and divorce from the purview of Islamic authorities. But Suharto never wavered in his determination to neuter political Islam, which he called "our common enemy" in a 1977 meeting with former leaders of the Catholic Party.⁷⁶⁶

The political suppression of moderate Islam contributed to the growth of radical Islam. Suharto denied Masyumi, NU, and their *santri* coreligionists a meaningful voice in the New Order. But he did not wield the full force of the Indonesian state's coercive institutions against political Islam for fear of alienating the country's 90 percent Muslim population; instead, Suharto attempted to coopt political Islam through the PPP and periodic concessions to religious interests. Inadequate representation combined with incomplete repression to provide space for radical Islamist organizing outside the realm of electoral politics. And much like the CPP and CPM, Indonesian Islamists often eschewed explicitly ideological messaging in favor of a broader nationalism and anti-Americanism.

⁷⁶⁵ Memo, Staf Kesra to Wakil Presiden, December 17, 1974, Staf Kesra: Memo tanggal 17 Desember 1974 tentang rancangan undang-undang mengenai partai politik dan golongan karya, disertai lampiran, 468, HB IX, ANRI.

⁷⁶⁶ Quoted in Jenkins, *Suharto and His Generals*, 29.

Indonesia was no stranger to radical Islam. From the 1920s through the late 1940s, considerable divisions existed within the nationalist movement over whether an independent Indonesia would be organized along secular or Islamic lines. When the secular nationalists under Sukarno prevailed, a West Java-based group called Darul Islam (DI) rebelled against the central government. By the mid-1950s, DI could marshal more than 10,000 guerrillas in West Java and had inspired similar rebellions in South Sulawesi, Aceh, and South Kalimantan. (These were less religious revolts than political ones, expressing particularistic dissatisfaction with the national state under the unifying cloth of Islam.) Sukarno's Guided Democracy government quelled the antigovernment rebellions by the mid-1960s through promises of local autonomy and campaigns of military encirclement. But the rebels did not abandon their cause entirely. As he was being captured near Bandung in 1962, the DI leader Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo told his subordinates that "This is our *Hudaibiyah*"—referring to the temporary ceasefire between followers of the Prophet Muhammad and members of a rival tribe and auguring the rebirth of Indonesian Islamism.⁷⁶⁷

Indonesian Islamism was indeed reborn, midwived by the New Order. Ali Murtopo visited imprisoned DI rebels within weeks of the beginning of the Indonesian military's campaign against the PKI. Shortly thereafter, he ordered the Islamists released so they could participate in the mass killings of Indonesian communists. (Murtopo reportedly did so over the objections of his associates in Bakin, going so far as to intervene with Suharto to prevent the execution of several former DI leaders.) Most of the freed rebels were careful not to run afoul of the New Order. By the late 1960s, however, several had begun working surreptitiously to resuscitate DI. The Islamists devoted their first few years of renewed

⁷⁶⁷ Solahudin, *The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jema'ah Islamiyah*, trans. Dave McRae (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), 23-45.

political activism to networking, propagandizing, and strategizing—taking heed not to antagonize the Suharto regime. For instance, one former DI leader in 1971 convinced Bakin to furnish the organization with 250,000 Rupiah to finance the reunion of some 3,000 former rebels, reasoning that representatives of the New Order could use the occasion to drum up support for the government’s Golkar party in Java in advance of that year’s elections. On the sidelines of the reunion, the attendees renewed old ties and discussed how to revive their moribund organization. By 1976, the group had begun committing armed robberies and staging terrorist attacks to foment social unrest. The renewed *jihad* had commenced.⁷⁶⁸

Thousands of new recruits filled DI’s ranks in the 1970s, spurred on by the Suharto regime’s repression. Read one captured DI document: “The Suharto regime’s tyranny against the Islamic community in reality has been to the advantage of progressive Islamic leaders, religious scholars, youths and the community. . . . The people, particularly the Islamic community, are now against the Suharto regime. . . . As a result at present we do not have too difficult a task to attract [new members].”⁷⁶⁹ Among DI’s new recruits was a young man named Abdullah Sungkar. The Solo native belonged to several Muslim youth organizations, and through these networks he became friendly with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. Both men admired Mohammad Natsir, the former Masyumi leader banned by Suharto from involvement in national politics. In 1967, Sungkar and Ba’asyir set up a radio station from which they broadcasted speeches harshly critical of the New Order. One of Sungkar’s broadsides suggested that “We Indonesians live as if we are riding on an air-conditioned bus. It’s all cool

⁷⁶⁸ International Crisis Group, “Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam And the Australian Embassy Bombing,” Asia Report No. 92, February 22, 2005, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/422311ec4.html> (accessed September 22, 2016), 3 fn7; Solahudin, *The Roots of Terrorism*, 46-63; Ken Conboy, *The Second Front: Inside Asia’s Most Dangerous Terrorist Network* (Singapore: Equinox Publishing, 2006), chapter 3.

⁷⁶⁹ Quoted in Solahudin, *The Roots of Terrorism*, 80-81.

and comfortable but we are actually heading towards Hell. And the driver is . . . Suharto!”⁷⁷⁰

Several years later, this time at Natsir’s urging, Sungkar and Ba’asyir established a *pesantrèn* (religious boarding school) that instilled in its students a harsh strain of Islam. By 1976 the two men had flirted with the idea of founding their own group Islamist group but instead opted to join Darul Islam. Only later would they establish Jema’ah Islamiyah (JI), which in the decades to come would develop a reputation as one of Southeast Asia’s most fearsome terrorist networks.

The Suharto regime tolerated DI’s escalating militancy until early 1977, when it implemented a program of mass arrests and dismantled the organization. This policy of tolerance was the brainchild of Murtopo, intent on discrediting the PPP (whose leaders had publicly courted prominent DI figures) in advance of the country’s 1977 elections.⁷⁷¹ The anti-DI dragnet ensnared Sungkar, who was arrested not for acts of violence but instead for urging his followers to spoil their ballots. Arrested again in 1978 and imprisoned for several years, Sungkar used his defense plea to excoriate the New Order’s cooptation and suppression of political Islam. He grated against the government’s blacklisting of 2,500 former members of Masyumi, its surveillance on Islamic organizations, and its interference in the internal politics of Parmusi and other Muslim parties. He likewise denounced the New Order’s efforts to control youth, journalist, farmer, and worker organizations; its demands that state officials exhibit “monoloyalty” toward the regime’s Golkar party; and the run-rampant activities of Kopkamtib and Opsus, two large security bureaucracies. Such activities, Sungkar said, “only occur in fascist countries like Germany in the era of Hitler and Italy in the era of

⁷⁷⁰ Quoted in Conboy, *Second Front*, Kindle location 444; see *Tempo*, November 4, 2002.

⁷⁷¹ Heru Cahyono, *Pangkopkamtib Jenderal Soemitro dan Peristiwa 15 Januari '74, sebagaimana dituturkan kepada Heru Cahyono* [Kopkamtib Commander General Sumitro and The January 15 '74 Incident, as told to Heru Cahyono] (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1998), 92-93.

Mussolini.”⁷⁷² One scholar has concluded that “It is questionable whether a man like Abdullah Sungkar, JI’s founder, would have made common cause with DI if the New Order government had allowed a party like Masyumi, . . . or any party headed by Mohammad Natsir, to function freely.”⁷⁷³

If DI and JI remained thorns in Suharto’s side, the source of periodic irritation, the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) became something entirely more painful. Aceh, at the northwest tip of Indonesia, was Islam’s point of entry into the archipelago, and its inhabitants developed a reputation as particularly pious Muslims. An Acehnese chapter of DI arose in the early 1950s but subsided in the early 1960s, when Jakarta recognized Aceh as a special region and allowed it to implement *shari’ a* law. As early as 1974, though, the Indonesian government whiffed the emergence of a new rebellion in Aceh. Bakin received intelligence indicating that Hasan de Tiro, scion of a famous Acehnese clan and formerly the self-proclaimed foreign minister of Darul Islam, planned to represent at the United Nations “separatist movements that aim to split Aceh from Indonesia by way of launching total uprisings against the central government and proclaiming an Islamic state.”⁷⁷⁴ De Tiro returned to Aceh in early 1976 and proclaimed Acehnese independence from “all political control of the foreign regime of Jakarta and the alien people of the island of Java.”⁷⁷⁵

⁷⁷² Berita Acara Persidangan Abu Bakar Ba’asyir dan Abdullah Sungkar [Minutes of the Hearing of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Abdullah Sungkar], No.1/Pid.Subv/1982/P.N. Smh, CD 1: Ba’asyir-1 – From Trial 1982 – 1st of Bap 2003, Indonesian Terrorism Documents, Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University Rare and Manuscript Library.

⁷⁷³ Sidney Jones, “New Order Repression and the Birth of Jemaah Islamiyah,” in Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy, eds., *Soeharto’s New Order and Its Legacy: Essays in Honour of Harold Crouch* (Canberra: ANU Press, 2010), 40.

⁷⁷⁴ Memo, Staf Kesra to Sekretaris Wakil Presiden, November 28, 1974, Staf asisten Wakil Presiden urusan Kesra: Memo tanggal 28 Nopember 1974 tentang timbulnya usaha-usaha separatis di daerah Aceh, 585, HB IX, ANRI.

⁷⁷⁵ Hasan de Tiro, *The Price of Freedom: The Unfinished Diary of Tengku Hasan de Tiro* (Banda Aceh: National Liberation Front of Aceh Sumatra, 1984), 15.

Articulating grievance through nationalism rather than Islam, de Tiro seized upon a conceptual architecture of opposition that proved both popular and durable.⁷⁷⁶ GAM won the allegiance of Acehnese much more effectively than DI or JI won the allegiance of Indonesian Muslims.

Indonesia was not the only Southeast Asian country to see opposition to authoritarianism emerge among religious communities. In May 1973, Kopkamtib reported on its efforts to prevent the building of transnational solidarity between Indonesians and Muslim rebels in the south of the Philippines.⁷⁷⁷ The year prior, the imposition of martial law had ignited an insurgency under the aegis of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). Like GAM, the MNLF framed its opposition to authoritarian rule in nationalist rather than religious terms, demanding a homeland for the Bangsamoro people rather than concessions to Muslim interests.

Tension between the Philippines' Catholic majority and its Muslim minority had long been a fixture of the country's politics. Muslims mostly inhabited the southern island of Mindanao and the adjoining Sulu archipelago, which snaked toward the East Malaysian state of Sabah. American colonial authorities had encouraged Christian migration to Mindanao, hoping that Filipino Catholics who had been friendly with Spanish colonial authorities would exert a civilizing influence on—"Filipinize," in the era's parlance—their allegedly barbaric

⁷⁷⁶ Edward Aspinall, *Islam and Nation: Separatist Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 49-83.

⁷⁷⁷ News Form, Pangkopkamtib to Wakil Presiden et al., 1973, Pangkopkamtib kepada para lokes pangkopkamtib wilayah: Telegram tanpa tanggal Mei 1973 tentang adanya kegiatan dari suatu golongan tertentu yang mengumpulkan Al-quran dan mengadakan dakwah yang dihubung-hubungkan dengan pergolakan di Philipina Selatan, disertai lampiran, 532, HB IX, ANRI.

Muslim countrymen.⁷⁷⁸ After the Second World War, the sovereign Philippine government ratcheted up the pace of Christian in-migration to resource-rich Mindanao by providing settlers with easy access to financial assistance and land titles. Dispossessed, impoverished, and politically marginalized, some Philippine Muslims formed secessionist movements. But these movements found little purchase. Although the central state represented for many Philippine Muslims a source of their immiseration, it was an indirect source whose presence was still rarely felt. *Datus* (princes) had ensconced themselves as intermediaries between the central state and local communities, funneling patronage downward and ballots upward and maintaining political order on the Philippines' southern frontier. That remained true until Ferdinand Marcos's declaration of martial law.⁷⁷⁹

The shifts brought on by martial law converged in the career of Nur Misuari. Born in the Sulu archipelago in 1939, he moved to Manila at age 19 after winning a Commission on National Integration scholarship to attend the University of the Philippines. There he obtained bachelor's and master's degrees in political science and eventually became an instructor at the university's Asian Center. He also immersed himself in Manila's student politics. Misuari co-founded KM with Sison 1964, but his was an inchoate radicalism rather than the CCP founder's unambiguous communism. Toward the end of the 1960s, Misuari began concentrating his activism on Muslim issues, crediting his newfound focus to the Marcos government's alleged execution of Muslim AFP trainees on Corregidor Island in 1968.⁷⁸⁰

⁷⁷⁸ Paul Kramer, *The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 208-214.

⁷⁷⁹ Thomas M. McKenna, *Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998), 114-119, 138-149; Patricio Abinales, *Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the Formation of the Philippine Nation-State* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2000), 134-155.

⁷⁸⁰ Benigno Aquino, "Jabidah! Special Forces of Evil?" March 28, 1968 in Benigno Aquino, ed., *A Garrison State in the Make: And Other Speeches* (Manila: Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. Foundation, 1985), 43-60.

Precisely what transpired has never been satisfactorily adjudicated, but most Filipinos surmised that the executed Muslims had been part of a secret military unit called Jabidah, tasked with infiltrating Sabah and reclaiming the contested territory for the Philippines as part of an operation dubbed Project Merdeka. The massacre of his Tausug kin crystallized Misuari's concept of Philippine imperialism, which he saw as ruling unjustly over the Muslim-majority people of Mindanao and Sulu and attempting to expand its domain over the inhabitants of Sabah.

The increasingly militant Misuari departed for Malaysia in 1969 to undergo a year of military training, which the Tunku offered to Filipino Muslims in retaliation for the Marcos government's predations on Sabah. Misuari returned to Sulu during the lead-up to the local elections planned for 1971, which cast in stark relief the demographic changes brought on by Christian in-migration to the Philippine south. Sectarian violence crested as Christian and Muslim elites each sought to establish themselves as representatives of the state, organizing militias to press their claims. *Datus* lost much of their authority as Filipino Muslim students returning from Manila (where they studied at UP) and Cairo (where they studied at Al-Azhar) challenged their chieftains' accommodationist attitudes, and as Marcos centralized the Philippine state and assumed direct control over the government's instruments of patronage in Mindanao and Sulu. It was in this dynamic political context that Misuari established the MNLF. Reappropriating the pejorative Spanish colonial-era label for Philippine Muslims and relying on organizational tactics and ideological proclivities he absorbed during his time in Manila, Misuari appealed to an anti-imperialist Bangsamoro nationalism rather than an explicitly Muslim identity. "We, the five-million Bangsa Moro people," Misuari wrote, "are engaged in a revolutionary struggle for national-freedom from the stranglehold of Filipino

colonialism.”⁷⁸¹ The MNLF remained dormant for the first several years of its existence, focused not on armed struggle but on consciousness-raising and military training. Then came Marcos’s declaration of martial law. The newly authoritarian Marcos regime banned aboveground Muslim political organizations and dispatched a division of AFP soldiers to the Philippine south to establish direct control over the region’s inhabitants and confiscate their weapons. Misuari’s MNLF rebels began clashing with Philippine security forces almost immediately thereafter.⁷⁸²

The Philippine government expended considerable resources combatting the MNLF rebellion. Equipped with American-supplied weapons, AFP soldiers waged a brutal counterinsurgency campaign that killed tens of thousands of civilians and displaced hundreds of thousands more. But the Marcos regime inhabited a weak state hamstrung by inadequate middle class and elite backing, rampant corruption and tax avoidance, and the need to quell two separate insurgencies. Marcos often implored American policymakers for heightened levels of military aid, claiming his government did not possess adequate resources to fight the communist insurgency in the north at the same time as the Muslim insurgency in the south.⁷⁸³ Meanwhile the MNLF’s appeals to a broad Bangsamoro identity won broad and deep support among the thirteen ethnolinguistic groups that populated Mindanao and Sulu, the majority of which had suffered at the hands of Philippine security forces. By 1973, the MNLF claimed it

⁷⁸¹ Nur Misuari, “Statement of the Chairman of the Central Committee of the MNLF to the Muslim Brothers of the World,” June 25, 1973, in International Studies Institute of the Philippines, *Conference on the “Tripoli Agreement: Problems and Prospects, September 12-13, 1985”* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1985), 1.

⁷⁸² Tom Stern, *Nur Misuari: An Authorized Biography* (Manila: Anvil Publishing, 2012); Lela Garner Noble, “The Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines,” *Pacific Affairs* 49, no. 3 (Autumn 1976): 405-424.

⁷⁸³ NSSM-180: U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia in Light of the Southern Philippines Muslim Insurrection, July 26, 1973, NSSM 180, Box H-199, H Files, RNPL.

could mobilize nearly 20,000 fighting men.⁷⁸⁴ The rebels benefitted from international assistance from the likes of Tun Mustapha, the ruler of Malaysian Sabah, and Mu'ammad Qaddafi, the Libyan leader, but the MNLF insurgency flourished primarily because the Marcos regime inhabited a weak state, could not maintain its monopoly on nationalism, and applied violent institutions of coercion in an imprecise manner. Although three-fourths of the Philippine Army was deployed in Mindanao and Sulu by 1975, the government failed extend its control beyond the region's large cities and suffered persistent attacks against AFP encampments.

The Marcos regime ultimately recognized the necessity of a negotiated solution to the insurgency in Mindanao and Sulu. The Organization of the Islamic Conference took notice of the conflict as early as 1973 and organized negotiations between the MNLF and the Philippine government beginning in 1974.⁷⁸⁵ The earliest talks in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia bogged down over MNLF demands for political and military control over an autonomous territorial unit comprising the islands of Mindanao, Palawan, Sulu, and Basilan within the framework of Philippine sovereignty—a formula whereby the MNLF would enjoy the benefits of sovereignty (including control over resource wealth) but not the responsibilities (such as providing for external defense). Unwilling to meet these demands, Marcos expanded his government's "policy of attraction" designed to win the loyalty of Philippine Muslims. The Presidential Task Force for the Reconstruction and Development of Mindanao funneled at least \$100 million per year into social and economic development projects in the Philippine

⁷⁸⁴ Fustico Mendez, "The Muslim Rebellion," Philippine Radical Papers, Box 11, Aklatan ng Unibersidad ng Pilipinas.

⁷⁸⁵ Laporan Delegasi Indonesia ke Konperensi Tingkat Tinggi Islam kedua di Lahore, Pakistan, 18-24 Pebruari 1974 [Report of the Indonesian Delegation to the Second High Level Islamic Conference in Lahore, Pakistan, February 18-24, 1974], Berkas Delegasi Indonesia ke Konperensi Tingkat Tinggi Islam ke-II di Lahore Pakistan tanggal 18-24 Februari 1974, 178, HB IX, ANRI.

south. Marcos repeatedly offered amnesty and positions of authority to Muslim rebels who would come to the government's side, and he worked to foment divisions within the Bangsamoro community by holding peace negotiations that excluded the MNLF.⁷⁸⁶ Finally, Marcos dispatched emissaries to countries across the Middle East, North Africa, and Southeast Asia to sever the international ties that nourished the MNLF insurgency. Together these efforts resulted in the Tripoli Accords, signed in late 1976, which provided for autonomy for the thirteen provinces of the Philippine south and a ceasefire between government and MNLF forces.⁷⁸⁷ The violence ebbed, but the disloyal opposition engendered by authoritarianism did not completely recede. Remnants of the MNLF would go on to found the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and Abu Sayyaf terrorist networks, which would menace the Philippines for decades to come.

Opposition to the Marcos regime emerged from churches as well as mosques. Especially after Marcos declared martial law and wielded the coercive instruments of the Philippine state against traditional sources of political opposition, the Catholic Church was left as one of the lone institutions with the capacity to challenge the government. The clergy at first maintained an apolitical stance and accommodated themselves to authoritarianism. But amidst changes in the demographic and doctrinal composition of the church, religious officials who ministered to the victims of martial law—and sometimes became victims themselves—began to adopt postures of overt political opposition. Despite ideological

⁷⁸⁶ Airgram, AmEmbassy Manila to State, March 14, 1975, President Ford's Trip to the Philippines and Indonesia, December 1975 (7), Box 19, NSC-EA Staff, GFPL.

⁷⁸⁷ The Tripoli Agreement, December 23, 1976, <http://www.opapp.gov.ph/sites/default/files/The%201976%20Tripoli%20Agreement.pdf> (accessed September 28, 2016); Cesar Adib Mujal, *The Contemporary Muslim Movement in the Philippines* (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1985), chapter 6.

antagonisms between the CPP and the church, by the mid-1970s communists and radical Christians were marching and organizing together.

The Catholic Church rivaled the Philippine state in institutional breadth and depth. Its network of parishes spanned almost the entire inhabited territory of the Philippine archipelago, and it commanded the spiritual devotion of some 90 percent of the Filipino population. Since the colonial era, church and state had occupied a symbiotic relationship: the state promoted the religious authority of the church, and the church legitimated the political authority of the state. But a series of structural changes in the 1960s and 1970s led parts of the Philippine church away from its cooperative role. The Second Vatican Council concluded with efforts to “indigenize” churches in the postcolonial world, which led to an influx of Filipino religious officials, and successive popes issued encyclicals ordaining clergy to devote their attention to matters of social justice in addition to spiritual salvation. Around the same time, Latin American Catholics popularized liberation theology, whose message of redressing such collective sins as poverty and social and political injustice proved influential among some Filipino religious leaders.⁷⁸⁸ Many young priests and nuns thrust themselves into social, political, and economic organizing on behalf of the disadvantaged.⁷⁸⁹

A major institutional fault line existed between the Association of Major Religious Superiors in the Philippines (AMRSP), which represented approximately 10,000 priests and nuns, and the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP), which represented about 100 higher placed members of the church hierarchy. Both groups at first accepted

⁷⁸⁸ Gustavo Gutiérrez, *A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics, and Salvation* (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1973).

⁷⁸⁹ “Filipinos Beneath the Cross,” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 19, 1969; Robert L. Youngblood, *Marcos Against the Church: Economic Development and Political Repression in the Philippines* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 65-66, 76-83.

Marcos's rationale for instituting authoritarian rule. But their perspectives on martial law gradually diverged. Bishops and other high-level clergy tended to hail from elite socioeconomic backgrounds, and they occupied positions of privilege that made them reluctant to oppose the Marcos regime. They also reported to a Vatican leadership that, in spite of its mandates to redress social injustice, remained wedded to a conception of the church as above politics. Under the leadership of Jaime Sin, the moderate archbishop of Manila soon to be elevated to the College of Cardinals, the CBCP enunciated a policy of "critical collaboration": the church would cooperate with the Marcos regime but also reserved the right to criticize specific abuses and infringements on church prerogatives. Some more conservative bishops believed even that moderately critical policy went too far. "The occasion is propitious to remind ourselves as citizens of the Republic," Archbishop Teopisto Iberto admonished in a January 1975 address at Malacañang, "of our duty to uphold her sovereignty, respect her constitution, and obey her lawful ordinances. It is assumed, even in the moral order, that the present political administration is a legitimate constitutional government to which every citizen is bound to render respectful allegiance."⁷⁹⁰

Less highly placed members of the clergy saw martial law from a different vantage point. They ministered to and helped organize smallholders and minority tribespeople forcibly evicted from their farms to make way for industrialized haciendas, to urban poor whose informal housing arrangements were demolished in the name of metropolitan beautification, and to striking workers subjected to violence for allegedly imperiling national security. They bore witness to military raids on churches accused of harboring subversive elements and to the deportation of missionaries involved in political activities. More and more, they found

⁷⁹⁰ Archbishop Teopisto Iberto, Speech, January 21, 1975, Philippine Radical Papers, Box 1, Aklatan ng Unibersidad ng Pilipinas Diliman.

themselves the victims of violence perpetrated by the coercive institutions of the Philippine state. Such abuses galvanized opposition to the Marcos regime, which remained unwilling to unleash the full force of the state's power against religiously inspired dissent for fear of alienating the heavily Catholic population and undercutting the goodwill of the church leadership. Priests and nuns focused their attentions on the extralegal detention, torture, and murder of political dissidents, of whom approximately 70,000 had been ensnared by the Marcos regime's dragnet by 1977. The AMRSP formed the Task Force on Detainees of the Philippines in 1973 and began publishing annual reports entitled *Political Detainees in the Philippines* in 1976. The inaugural report charted the group's shifting positions, from a tacit endorsement of martial law to outspoken opposition: "At first most socially concerned Churchmen reacted to martial law with confusion, as did the larger society. . . . Gradually, however, as more and more Church people got arrested and detained (to date more than 50 in all, including at least three still in detention) appeals turned into protests and actions for justice and the respect of human rights."⁷⁹¹ The authoritarianism of the Marcos regime thus radicalized segments of the Philippine church.

As they protested martial law, clergy commingled with communists. Cooperation between the CPP and the church remained uneven, the product of localized initiatives undertaken by individual clergy and CPP efforts to radicalize and coopt Christian oppositionists. In the early 1970s, for instance, some clergy influenced by liberation theology established Basic Christian Communities (BCCs) in the Philippine countryside. BCCs served as small prayer groups, intended to promote the "total liberation" of the poor through consciousness-raising and social action. CPP and NPA cadres infiltrated some BCCs and

⁷⁹¹ Association of Major Religious Superiors in the Philippines, *Political Detainees in the Philippines*, March 31, 1976, Philippine Radical Papers, Box 2, Aklatan ng Unibersidad ng Pilipinas Diliman.

steered them toward violence; by contrast, other BCCs erected bulwarks against communist penetration and focused on nonviolent action. Though Marxists and Christians established no unified rural front against the Marcos regime, some radicalized clergy took it upon themselves to link up with the communist movement. Christians for National Liberation (CNL), established by leftist clergy in 1972, was tasked by the CPP with waging a “national democratic cultural revolution particularly in the areas of liturgy and religious life.” The CNL worked to convince clergy and laity alike that nonviolent reform was impossible and violent revolution was necessary, and they used church resources to provide financial and logistical assistance to NPA rebels.⁷⁹² Still other clergy decided to join the NPA themselves, abandoning their religious posts to take up arms against the Marcos government. The authoritarianism of the Marcos regime steadily radicalized even members of the CBCP. By 1976, Cardinal Sin said in an interview with the *Far East Economic Review* that “I am afraid for the future” because Marcos had made efforts to “control the Constitution.”⁷⁹³

Singapore experienced no comparable upsurge of domestic radicalism or insurgency in the 1970s. Scholars generally ascribe the city-state’s relative political tranquility to good governance, rapid economic growth, and missteps by leftist groups.⁷⁹⁴ These explanations are not wrong, but they are incomplete. Lee Kuan Yew’s authoritarian regime inhabited a strong state and presided over a small territory, and it and regularly wielded the state’s precise and usually nonviolent coercive institutions to combat dissent. And Lee established impeccable

⁷⁹² Quoted in Mario Bolasco, “Marxism and Christianity in the Philippines, 1930-1983,” in Third World Studies Center, ed., *Marxism in the Philippines* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1988), 120.

⁷⁹³ *Far Eastern Economic Review*, December 1976.

⁷⁹⁴ T.N. Harper, “Lim Chin Siong and the ‘Singapore Story,’” in Tan Jing Quee and Jomo K.S., *Comet In Our Sky:*

Lim Chin Siong in History (Selangor: INSAN, 2001), 3-55; Michael D. Barr and Carl A. Trocki, eds., *Paths Not Taken: Political Pluralism in Post-War Singapore* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2008).

nationalist credentials that made his regime immune to nationalist and anti-American agitation—the form of protest that proved most effective against autocrats elsewhere in island Southeast Asia.

Lee's regime relied on laws, sometimes holdovers from the colonial era, to silence dissent. Foremost among these statutes were the Internal Security Act (ISA), which gives the government authority to detain individuals for up to two years without charges; the Societies Act (SA), which requires all political organizations to register with and be sanctioned by the state; and the Newspaper and Printing Presses Act (NPPA), which gives the government control over the ownership, management, and funding of newspapers. In the early-to-mid 1970s, as other countries in island Southeast Asia experienced swells of radicalism and insurgency, Lee used these and other legalistic institutions of coercion to target and intimidate potential sources of dissent and disloyal opposition.

The press represented an obvious target. In 1970, the Chinese-language newspaper *Nanyang Siang Pau* began publishing articles harshly critical of the Singaporean government, accusing the Lee regime of marginalizing Chinese culture by refusing to fund Chinese-medium education. Coming only a year after the deadly race riots that convulsed Kuala Lumpur, the articles alarmed the Singaporean prime minister. At a seminar on communism on democracy organized by secondary students, Lee castigated *Nanyang* for inciting racial hatred. He also denounced an English-language paper, the *Singapore Herald*, as a foreign-funded “black operation” advocating social licentiousness, and a Malay-language paper, *Berita Harian*, for promoting pro-*bumiputra* redistributionist policies that he claimed would incite racial strife. Shortly thereafter, the Singaporean government detained four senior *Nanyang* executives and editorial staffers under the ISA. Lee also pressured foreign banks to

foreclose on loans that funded the *Herald* and another English-language paper, the *Eastern Sun*. To support his claims that the outlets were foreign front organizations working to destabilize Singapore, Lee cited *Herald* editorials critical of his government and, bizarrely, the absence of such editorials in the *Sun*—evidence only of the *Sun*'s deviousness, Lee said, for the paper was establishing a reputation as moderate and reliable to more effectively undermine Singapore later.⁷⁹⁵ Both papers were quickly shuttered and their foreign staffers expelled from the country, though not before the *Sun*'s editors issued a statement denying Lee's accusations and affirming that the paper was strictly anticommunist.⁷⁹⁶

Lee defended his government's harassment of the media in a speech in Helsinki. Arguing that Singapore was susceptible to racial, religious, and communist agitation, he claimed that "freedom of the press, freedom of the news media, must be subordinated to the overriding needs of the integrity of Singapore, and to the primacy of purpose of an elected government."⁷⁹⁷ In 1974, Lee's regime introduced the NPPA, which through regulatory maneuvering established de facto state control over all print media outlets. The law mandated that all newspaper companies be publicly listed, and it created a special type of "management" share that wielded 200 times the voting power of ordinary shares and could only be owned by individuals approved by the government. These nonviolent efforts at

⁷⁹⁵ Lee alleged that the United States was behind the *Herald*. See Memorandum, Kissinger to Agnew, June 22, 1971, Briefing Book Visit of Spiro T. Agnew Singapore, Box 83, HAK, RNPL.

⁷⁹⁶ Francis T. Seow, *The Media Enthralled: Singapore Revisited* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 38-106.

⁷⁹⁷ Lee Kuan Yew, "The Mass Media and New Countries: Address to the General Assembly of the International Press Institute at Helsinki," June 9, 1971, <http://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/data/pdfdoc/lky19710609a.pdf> (accessed October 4, 2016); see also Lee Kuan Yew, *From Third World to First: The Singapore Story* (New York: HarperCollins, 2000), 218.

coercion proved effective, and in years following the boundaries of political discourse in Singapore shrank considerably.⁷⁹⁸

As Lee established limits on the free press, he also worked to neuter students and intellectuals—among the most prominent dissidents in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Student groups had already proved their potency in Singapore. In the 1950s and early 1960s, pupils in the colony’s Chinese-language schools mobilized against government policies they regarded as discriminatory and engaged in several violent clashes with police.⁷⁹⁹ British security services responded harshly, deregistering student groups and imprisoning radical student leaders. Since then, Singaporean pupils in both Chinese- and English-language schools had studiously avoided involving themselves in politics, limiting their activism to issues directly related to student welfare. Even then Lee could brag to pupils at the University of Singapore that he knew exactly what was going on both inside and outside the country’s lecture halls.⁸⁰⁰ But student activism reemerged in the 1970s under University of Singapore Student Union (USSU) leaders Juliet Chin and Tan Wah Piow. They demonstrated against a ten-cent hike in bus fares, launched a flood relief campaign for Bangladesh, and worked on behalf of impoverished dockworkers. When USSU members took part in a labor demonstration, Lee’s regime jailed the Singaporean citizens among them and expelled the foreigners from the country, but it did not mount a violent crackdown on the broader student population.⁸⁰¹ The following year, the government introduced a bill requiring the USSU to

⁷⁹⁸ Jothie Rajah, *Authoritarian Rule of Law: Legislation, Discourse and Legitimacy in Singapore* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 117.

⁷⁹⁹ Hong Liu and Sin-Kiong Wong, *Singapore Chinese Society in Transition: Business, Politics, and Socio-economic Change* (New York: Peter Lang, 2004), 141-163.

⁸⁰⁰ “How Much Leeway?” *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 26, 1969.

⁸⁰¹ Tan Wah Piow, *Let the People Judge: Confessions of the Most Wanted Person in Singapore* (Kuala Lumpur: Institute for Social Analysis, 1987); “6 Foreign Students Expelled,” *Straits Times*, December 12, 1974.

register under the SA.⁸⁰² University employees felt similarly circumscribed in their political activities. As the Singaporean academic (and later ambassador to the United States) Chan Heng Chee wrote in 1976, “In Singapore today, the views of independent intellectuals receive no favour and[,] if his views are critical of governmental power, this function is not recognised as legitimate. Such an intellectual is vilified on the grounds that his claim to the right of criticism is an alien tradition borne of Western liberal thought.”⁸⁰³

Dissent could emerge from spaces as well as social groups. Singapore possessed no faraway regions or impenetrable jungles the likes of which sheltered disloyal opposition movements elsewhere in island Southeast Asia, so Lee recognized that the most likely locus of political radicalization was the urban slum. Tenements, squatter colonies, and shanty towns mushroomed in the postwar period—a 1947 British report called the overcrowded and unsanitary dwellings a “disgrace to a civilised community”—and still housed about 20 percent of the population in the mid-1960s.⁸⁰⁴ In 1960, Lee’s People’s Action Party (PAP) government formed the Housing and Development Board (HDB), tasked with the construction of public housing. Lee wrote in his memoirs that he had “seen how voters in capital cities tended to vote against the government of the day.” By providing low-cost access to homeownership, he hoped, the HDB would “give every citizen a stake in the country and its future” and thereby ensure “political stability.”⁸⁰⁵ His lofty rhetoric masked one of the HDB’s more nefarious purposes. It demolished Singapore’s labyrinthine slums, forcibly resettling their residents in easily surveilled concrete housing blocks. In the process, the HDB

⁸⁰² Josef Silverstein, “Students in Southeast Asian Politics,” *Pacific Affairs* 49, no. 2 (Summer 1976): 203-205.

⁸⁰³ Chan Heng Chee, “The Role of Intellectuals in Singapore Politics,” *Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science* 3, no. 2 (1975): 64.

⁸⁰⁴ Colony of Singapore, *Report of Singapore Housing Committee* (Singapore: Government Printing Office, 1948), 16; Housing and Development Board, *50,000 Up: Homes for the People* (Singapore: Straits Times Press, 1966), 28-30.

⁸⁰⁵ Lee, *From Third World to First*, 116-117.

fragmented poor communities bonded together by kinship, dialect, religion, and shared experiences—communities that represented the most likely targets of leftist mobilization.⁸⁰⁶ The HDB succeeded both in increasing homeownership and combatting disloyal opposition. As a 1970 HDB report concluded, “The final measure of Singapore’s low-cost housing success is the total failure of Communist and communalist appeals to people in the Board’s estates.”⁸⁰⁷

Singapore’s precise and largely nonviolent instruments of social control prevented the emergence of an armed, organized disloyal opposition. What little revolutionary militancy surfaced tended to come from outside the city-state’s borders. Beginning in 1974, the semi-official *Straits Times* occasionally published articles on CPM and MNLA efforts to expand their operations across the Causeway and carry out subversion, bombing, and assassination plots in Singapore—all of which were foiled by the city-state’s robust security services.⁸⁰⁸ That all attempts at revolutionary agitation were spearheaded by a foreign entity—no indigenous communist movement developed in Singapore after its expulsion from Malaysia in 1965—suggests the effectiveness with which Lee’s regime wielded Singapore’s coercive institutions to deter and disrupt disloyal opposition movements.

Singapore experienced no upsurge of revolutionary sentiment not only because Lee’s authoritarian regime wielded a strong state, but also because it established a monopoly on nationalism. Almost as soon as Singapore became independent, Lee worked to style himself

⁸⁰⁶ Christopher Tremewan, *The Political Economy of Social Control in Singapore* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 45-53; see also James Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

⁸⁰⁷ Housing and Development Board Singapore, *First Decade in Public Housing, 1960-1969* (Singapore: Housing and Development Board, 1970), 9.

⁸⁰⁸ See, for example, P.M Raman, “30 Detained in Security Raids,” *Straits Times*, June 22, 1974; Ahmad Osman, “Police Seize 298 Hand Grenades,” *Straits Times*, August 5, 1975; “Communist Threat,” *Straits Times*, October 6, 1975; R. Chandran, “Red Plot Against the PAP,” *Straits Times*, April 29, 1976; K.S. Sidhu, “The Red Plot,” *Straits Times*, May 28, 1976.

as the embodiment of the fledgling nation. In the 1960s and 1970s, he granted his friend and press secretary Alex Josey privileged access to publish a series of hagiographies that lauded the Singaporean strongman as the city-state's "natural nationalist leader" whom "not even the communists sought to displace."⁸⁰⁹ Lee also cultivated a discourse of what in decades following would come to be called "Asian values," which signified a communitarian ethos and a respect for hierarchy allegedly inherent to Asians.⁸¹⁰ By characterizing individualism and democracy as Western concepts alien to Asian cultural systems and historical experiences, Lee cast his authoritarianism as a nationalistic stand against cultural imperialism.⁸¹¹ Western countries, he said in an interview years later, ought not "foist their system indiscriminately on societies in which it will not work."⁸¹² Lee's Asian values discourse also branded dissent as unpatriotic, even dangerous, capable of unraveling Singapore's social fabric. He averred that the West's veneration of individualism promoted cultural licentiousness, evident in the counterculture of the sixties, and thereby threatened the social discipline, economic productivity, and political stability necessary for progress.⁸¹³

Other Southeast Asian autocrats attempted to bolster their nationalist standing by denigrating critiques of their undemocratic practices as cultural imperialism. But Lee's nationalist credentials owed to policy as much as propaganda. His regime refused to accept grant military aid from the United States and objected to the presence of large numbers of

⁸⁰⁹ Alex Josey, *Lee Kuan Yew* (Singapore: Donald Moore Press, Ltd., 1968), 8. For a countervailing take that argues Lee's efforts to establish himself as the embodiment of nationalism were of more recent vintage and that the Josey volumes were "not part of a concerted campaign," see Michael Barr, "The Lees of Singapore: A Quality Brand," *South East Asia Research* 24, no. 3 (September 2016): 344-346.

⁸¹⁰ Clark Neher, "Asian Style Democracy," *Asian Survey* 34, no. 11 (November 1994): 949-961.

⁸¹¹ Michael Barr, "Lee Kuan Yew and the 'Asian Values' Debate," *Asian Studies Review* 24, no. 3 (September 2000): 309-334.

⁸¹² Fareed Zakaria, "Culture Is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew," *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 2 (March-April 1994): 110.

⁸¹³ Lee, "The Mass Media and the New Countries," June 9, 1971.

U.S. troops on Singaporean soil, even on the naval base where American ships docked for routine maintenance.⁸¹⁴ (So effectively did the Singaporean government work to mask the growing American presence that one journalist estimated the best indicator was the proliferation of Budweiser, bourbon, and beef on the city-state's supermarket shelves.)⁸¹⁵ Lee also encouraged Soviet, Chinese, British, and Japanese involvement in Southeast Asia, motivated by a belief that the region's security was best ensured by the involvement of several great powers.⁸¹⁶ Finally, Lee cultivated ties with Israel and partially embraced the state's idiosyncratic go-it-alone approach to national defense.⁸¹⁷ His foreign policy positions prevented Lee's opponents from characterizing him as a neocolonialist stooge and further inhibited the growth of communist and other disloyal opposition movements.

Disloyal opposition movements posed no threat to the stability and security of island Southeast Asia by the late 1960s. The region seemed to have escaped the Cold War, with all its polarizing and militarizing effects. That changed by the mid-1970s. As Suharto, Marcos, and Razak used Nixon Doctrine aid to construct and consolidate their authoritarian regimes, moderates across the region found their opportunities for exerting political voice limited. Many then turned to exit, flocking to the Maoist, Islamist, and separatist insurgencies that flourished in the 1970s.⁸¹⁸ The growth of armed disloyal opposition movements, even when they did not break down along strictly capitalist-communist lines, marked a resurgence of Cold War tensions. For as the cultural anthropologist Heonik Kwon explains, the Cold War

⁸¹⁴ Background Paper, "Singapore Naval Base," NSSM-31, Box H-141, H Files, RNPL.

⁸¹⁵ "Muted Presence," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 2, 1970.

⁸¹⁶ Background, Singapore PM Lee Kuan Yew April 10, 1973, Box 938, NSC Files, RNPL.

⁸¹⁷ "Apart but 'Indivisible,'" *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 19, 1969.

⁸¹⁸ The structure of this argument derives from Albert R. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).

was “globally staged but locally diverse,” fracturing societies, communities, and even families in complex and multifarious ways.⁸¹⁹ True, the countries of island Southeast Asia would have been beset by internal differences even without the international structure of the Cold War. But it is unlikely that their conflicts over ideology, race, religion, and geography would have been so militarized absent the intervention of the United States. The international and transnational construction of authoritarian rule emblemized by the Nixon Doctrine thus created exactly what it was meant to prevent: destabilizing insurgencies that imperiled American interests and Southeast Asian stability. If the Nixon Doctrine’s support for authoritarian regimes in island Southeast Asia was immoral, as many opponents alleged, so too was it counterproductive.

⁸¹⁹ Heonik Kwon, *The Other Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 32.

CODA

SELLING TIME

The mid-to-late 1960s witnessed the rise of a curious but enduring argument about the Vietnam War. As early as January 1965, a full two months *before* the Americanization of the war, the indefatigable *New York Times* columnist C.L. Sulzberger argued that “We have lost most of the space in South Vietnam; but we can still buy time—time to reinforce the anti-Communist position in Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines.”⁸²⁰ Others soon began to echo Sulzberger’s argument. Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew claimed as early as July 1966 that the war was “buying time” for the rest of the countries of Southeast Asia to build up their political, military, economic, and psychological defenses against communist encroachment and subversion.⁸²¹ “Had there been no U.S. intervention” in Vietnam, Lee argued decades later, “Southeast Asia would most likely have gone communist,” because “the will of these countries to resist . . . would have melted.”⁸²² Other Southeast Asian leaders also implored American policymakers—most often in private—to continue holding the line against communist aggression in Indochina. In July 1969, Indonesian President Suharto claimed that the American presence in Vietnam would remain necessary for a minimum of three years. He considered such a time span essential for Indonesia and the other countries of Southeast Asia to “create [the] conditions of economic and political stability which are

⁸²⁰ “The Loss of Options in Vietnam,” *New York Times*, January 11, 1965.

⁸²¹ “Asian’s Thanks Show Fulbright Owes Apology,” *Boston Globe*, July 27, 1966; see also “Lee Kuan Yew,” *Harvard Crimson*, October 23, 1967.

⁸²² Lee Kuan Yew, *From Third World to First: The Singapore Story: 1965-2000* (New York: HarperCollins, 2000), 467.

prerequisites of [an] independent Asian defense.”⁸²³ That same year, the Malaysian leader Tun Abdul Razak told U.S. officials that too hasty an American withdrawal from Vietnam would “have [the] effect of dangerously increasing [the] threat to Thailand and Malaysia.”⁸²⁴

The “buying time thesis,” as this argument became known, proved remarkably durable. Its influence owed in large part to its ability to rhetorically transmute the American failure in Indochina into triumph, not to mention the fact that it was theoretically impossible to refute. Not only was the war a “noble cause,” in Ronald Reagan’s words, but it was also a successful one.⁸²⁵ Walt W. Rostow encapsulated the revisionist utility of the buying time thesis in a self-serving review of Robert McNamara’s only slightly less self-serving memoir, *In Retrospect*: “In short, we certainly lost the battle—the test of will—in Vietnam; but we won the war in Southeast Asia because South Vietnam and its allies for ten years were ‘holding aggression at bay’—the phrase used on 12 July 1966 by President Johnson speaking to the Alumni Council. And that was what it was all about.”⁸²⁶ Of course that was *not* what it was all about.⁸²⁷ But the buying time thesis has continued to fascinate historians and political scientists, much more so than its less sophisticated cousin, the domino theory.⁸²⁸ The metaphor of toppling dominoes implied that the “fall” of Vietnam would mechanistically and inevitably lead to the “fall” of the rest of the countries of Southeast Asia. The buying time thesis added to the domino theory elements of temporality and contingency—in short, a sense

⁸²³ Telegram, AmEmbassy Jakarta to SecState WashDC, July 12, 1969, Moonglow - Vol II [Part 1], Box 456, NSC Files, RNPL.

⁸²⁴ Telegram, AmEmbassy Kuala Lumpur to SecState WashDC, October 9, 1969, POL 15-1 MALAYSIA 1/1/69, Box 2323, CFPF, RG 59, NARA.

⁸²⁵ Ronald Reagan, “Peace: Restoring the Margin of Safety,” August 18, 1980, *Ronald Reagan Presidential Library*, <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/reference/8.18.80.html> (accessed April 8, 2016).

⁸²⁶ W. W. Rostow, “Vietnam and Asia,” *Diplomatic History* 20, no. 3 (June 1996): 469-470.

⁸²⁷ See, among others, Fredrik Logevall, *Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999).

⁸²⁸ Robert Jervis, “The Politics of Troop Withdrawal: Salted Peanuts, the Commitment Trap, and ‘Buying Time,’” *Diplomatic History* 34, no. 3 (June 2010): 507-516.

of history. Dominoes farther down the line could, over time, be made sturdier, better able to withstand the weight of other dominoes collapsing upon them. Depending on when it occurred, the communist takeover of Vietnam would not necessarily cause the communist takeover of all of Southeast Asia.

A cursory comparison of Southeast Asia in 1965 and 1975 might suggest that the buying time thesis holds some truth. When the Johnson administration Americanized the war in Vietnam, the region was mired in poverty, beset by bitter antagonisms, and home to powerful communist movements. Ten years hence, the situation had changed markedly. The Suharto regime had presided over a political genocide that killed some half a million Indonesians and decimated the PKI—until then the world’s largest non-ruling communist party. The communist movements that held power in Indochina ruled over economically destitute and physically demolished territories, and none could reliably project power beyond their national borders. Maoist insurgencies continued to smolder in the Philippines, Thailand, and Malaysia but did not immediately threaten national political stability. Meanwhile the region’s noncommunist states had resolved their disputes over territory and ideology and banded together to form ASEAN, which became a vehicle for renewed diplomatic interconnectivity and a hub for increased economic cooperation. Among the five ASEAN countries, GDP per capita measured in constant dollars increased on average 63 percent in decade after 1965.⁸²⁹

If the effect is certain, the cause is less so. Evidence for the claims that American steadfastness in Vietnam led directly to the destruction of the PKI, the formation of ASEAN,

⁸²⁹ The Maddison Project, <http://www.ggd.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm> (accessed March 22, 2016).

or Southeast Asia's remarkable economic growth is slim.⁸³⁰ Even granting such dubious links, as the historian Robert McMahon points out, the buying time thesis is guilty of conflating intentions and outcomes.⁸³¹

Evaluating the veracity of the buying time thesis is a difficult task. To answer definitively what would have transpired in Southeast Asia had the United States not intervened in Vietnam is an impossible counterfactual: the variables are too numerous, the time period too protracted. But as the arguments in this dissertation make clear, alternative narratives are possible. When one widens the aperture of the buying time thesis to focus not only on the Vietnam War but also on the entire spectrum of American policies and initiatives to secure anticommunist stability in Southeast Asia between 1965-1975, it becomes clear that American involvement made the region more, not less, vulnerable to communist insurgencies. Time was not bought. It was sold.

Communism posed little threat to Southeast Asia in 1969. A November 1968 National Intelligence Estimate on "Southeast Asia After Vietnam" found that communist movements throughout the region lacked national legitimacy and material potency. The communist parties of Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines had ensconced themselves in remote locales populated by tribal minorities, claiming adherents that numbered only in the hundreds. The situation in the non-Vietnamese countries of Indochina differed in degree rather than in kind. Vietnamese-allied communists operated in Cambodia's northeast along the Ho Chi

⁸³⁰ John Roosa, *Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto's Coup d'Etat in Indonesia* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006); Alice Ba, *(Re)Negotiating East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009); Jomo K.S., ed., *Southeast Asian Paper Tigers? From Miracle to Debacle and Beyond* (New York: Routledge, 2003).

⁸³¹ Robert McMahon, "What Difference Did It Make? Assessing the Vietnam War's Impact on Southeast Asia," in Lloyd Gardner and Ted Gittinger, eds., *International Perspectives on Vietnam* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1999).

Minh Trail, while some independent Khmer Rouge cells had established pockets of control in the country's sparsely populated southwest. The Pathet Lao controlled roughly half of Laos's territory and a third of its people—primarily the mountainous eastern half of the country bordering Vietnam. Communists generally found refuge only in what the political scientist James Scott calls *Zomia*, the upland portion of the Southeast Asian massif whose rugged terrain has historically rendered it impenetrable to the states that arose in the region's lowlands. And the same principle applies to Southeast Asia's maritime world: only in the most inhospitable environments, including remote islands and dense jungles, did communist movements find sanctuary.⁸³² The Central Intelligence Agency concluded in 1968 that the relative weakness of communist insurgencies meant that even a rapid communist victory in Vietnam would not augur disaster for the rest of Southeast Asia: "None of the countries in the region, with the possible exception of Laos, is so weak that communist movements are likely to increase their strength greatly over the next several years without major and direct foreign assistance."⁸³³

Such foreign assistance was, American observers knew, unlikely to be forthcoming. Vietnam's territorial ambitions extended to Cambodia and Laos. But the postwar tasks of political consolidation and economic reconstruction would, together with the risk of provoking renewed American intervention, moderate Hanoi's efforts to establish control over all of Indochina. Nor would the self-styled leaders of the international communist movement funnel massive amounts of aid to their ideological brethren in Southeast Asia. The turmoil of the Cultural Revolution had almost entirely immobilized Chinese foreign policy, and what

⁸³² James C. Scott, *The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009).

⁸³³ National Intelligence Estimate, "Southeast Asia After Vietnam," November 14, 1968, in *FRUS 1964-1968:7*, Document 220.

remained consisted mostly of efforts to improve China's position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Aid to self-styled national liberation movements in Southeast Asia increasingly took a back seat to the objective of rapprochement with the United States. Soviet foreign policy likewise sought to counter Chinese influence rather than promote communist insurgencies. The focus of the Soviet Union's strategy in Southeast Asia shifted away from fomenting revolution and toward establishing meaningful diplomatic and economic relationships with the region's noncommunist states. Vietnam was the exception that proved the rule. Both Moscow and Beijing continued to compete for Hanoi's favor by providing high levels of military and economic assistance. But the communist superpowers leavened their aid with appeals for the Vietnamese to conclude a ceasefire that fell short of Hanoi's objective of immediate reunification.⁸³⁴ American officials believed that the Soviet Union and China were likely to react to a communist victory in Vietnam with relief, as an opportunity to moderate rather than accelerate their revolutionary agendas in Southeast Asia.⁸³⁵

A series of papers prepared by the incoming Nixon administration's National Security Council, State Department, and Department of Defense, confirmed the CIA's analysis: communist movements posed little danger to Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. Indeed, the NSC generally argued that creeping authoritarianism rather than communist subversion represented the greatest threat to American interests in most of

⁸³⁴ Shen Zhihua and Li Danhui, *After Leaning to One Side: China and Its Allies in the Cold War* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2011); Chen Jian, "China, the Vietnam War, and the Sino-American Rapprochement, 1968-1973," in Sophie Quinn-Judge and Odd Arne Westad, eds., *The Third Indochina War: Conflict Between China, Vietnam, and Cambodia, 1972-79* (New York: Routledge, 2006); Ilya Gaiduk, *The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996); Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, *Hanoi's War: An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012); Friedman, *Shadow Cold War*.

⁸³⁵ National Intelligence Estimate, "Southeast Asia After Vietnam," November 14, 1968, in *FRUS 1964-1968:7*, Document 220.

Southeast Asia.⁸³⁶ But Nixon nevertheless opened the floodgates of U.S. military and economic aid to the region's autocracies. Under the Nixon Doctrine, announced in July 1969, the administration promised to furnish friendly states in Asia with the money and materiel (if not the manpower) necessary to subdue threats that arose within their national borders.⁸³⁷ Over objections from career officials who argued American policy in the region was already consistent with the Nixon Doctrine, Nixon and Kissinger ordered dramatic expansions in American military and economic aid to Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia. This because Nixon possessed, and Kissinger alternately shared and indulged, a myopic focus on communism as the overriding threat to American interests in Asia, a skepticism about the fitness of non-Western peoples for democratic self-governance, a belief that authoritarianism served as the best inoculant against instability, and a loathing of the traditional foreign policy establishment.⁸³⁸

Noncommunist leaders in Southeast Asia knew of Nixon and Kissinger's political idiosyncrasies, and they practiced a deliberate threat inflation in order to extract the maximum possible amount of aid from the United States and the international institutions it dominated. They then used that international aid to reinforce their authoritarian political structures by financing economic development programs, expanding coercive institutions, and pursuing corrupt accumulation. This happened in distinct ways—each country possessed a unique political trajectory, and the nature of American involvement in each country differed. In Indonesia, Suharto used American aid to consolidate his control of the military and to sideline

⁸³⁶ For broad examples see Interim Analysis of United States Interests and Objectives in Southeast Asia, Review Group – Asian Trade Problems – 5/2/69, H-036, H-Files, RNPL; Review Group Meeting, December 18, 1969, Review Group Meeting - Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore 12/22/69, H-041, H Files, RNPL.

⁸³⁷ Richard Nixon, "Informal Remarks in Guam With Newsmen," July 25, 1969, *The American Presidency Project*.

⁸³⁸ Robert Dallek, *Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2007).

the student organizations, Muslim groups, and political parties upon which his ascent to power had depended. In the Philippines, President Ferdinand Marcos employed American aid (which regularly accounted for 25-50 percent of the country's military budget) to outfit the armed forces, which he then used to establish control over his rivals in the oligarchy, the church, and civil society.⁸³⁹ In Malaysia, Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak sought American aid to build the military and intelligence capacities of the state and, as the decade wore on, to finance his government's economic development programs. And all the region's leaders came to depend on American military power to guarantee regional stability, lest they be forced to divert precious resources from internal authoritarian consolidation to external military defense.

The political scientist Dan Slater argues that authoritarian governments in Southeast Asia arose when elites surrendered their resources to the state and banded together to form "protection pacts" against urban, class-based contentious politics that they perceived as endemic and unmanageable under more pluralistic institutional arrangements.⁸⁴⁰ These protection pacts were, in fact, international. Autocratic regimes in Southeast Asia depended upon the cooperation of foreign financiers of authoritarian rule in addition to the collective action of domestic elites. Authoritarianism was made internationally.

And authoritarianism was also made transnationally. In island Southeast Asia, Suharto pioneered the use of American and international aid to construct and consolidate an authoritarian regime. Possessed of concerns about the vulnerability of Indonesia's neighbors

⁸³⁹ United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1970-1979," <http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/wmeat/c50834.htm> (accessed March 22, 2016); United States Agency for International Development, "U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, 1945-2013," <https://explorer.usaid.gov/reports-greenbook.html> (accessed March 22, 2016).

⁸⁴⁰ Dan Slater, *Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

to communist aggression and subversion, he then proselytized his authoritarian “national resilience” doctrine, encouraging his counterparts elsewhere in Southeast Asia to adopt the methods that secured his authority in Indonesia. In diplomatic and military exchanges, international fora, and regional publications, Suharto and other senior New Order officials promoted the institutional and ideological mechanisms prescribed by the national resilience doctrine: a national ideology that could bind the population together, a government party that could serve as a vehicle of electoral legitimation and patronage dispensation, a stepwise development program that could win international support and produce economic growth, and a military that could adopt a sociopolitical role and mobilize the citizenry. When Razak and Marcos faced political shocks that challenged their democratically elected governments, they drew upon the Indonesian model to establish newly authoritarian regimes. The result was the partial “New Orderization” of island Southeast Asia.

American aid and Indonesian inspiration enabled Southeast Asian autocrats to either narrow or eliminate legitimate channels of political contestation. But that contributed to a radicalization of opponents of dictatorial rule and brought only new and more vexing forms of insecurity. Communist movements, which had been all but wiped out by 1969, returned to once again menace the region’s security, particularly in Malaysia and the Philippines. And armed resistance to dictatorial rule did not emerge only from the left. The Indonesian communist movement had been all but completely destroyed in the bloodletting of 1965-66, and it would not recover for decades. What antigovernment activism did crop up in the mid-1970s comprised students who protested government mismanagement and corruption in something less than explicitly ideological terms and Islamists and separatists who rebelled

against the New Order's rigid secularism.⁸⁴¹ Islamist and separatist insurgencies also began flaring in the Philippines, especially on the southern island of Mindanao. These disloyal opposition movements found most success when they framed their arguments in terms of nationalism and anti-Americanism, casting themselves as the exemplars of the nation against brutal and venal authoritarian regimes.

As internal disorder deepened in island Southeast Asia, external sources of order eroded. The Vietnam War and the Nixon Doctrine made it difficult for the Nixon and Ford administrations to sustain the domestic support necessary to continue to expend American blood and treasure in Southeast Asia. In ever greater numbers across the United States, activists from youth and student organizations, minority and diasporic communities, human rights and religious lobbies, and myriad other social groups protested the war in Indochina and the provision of American military aid to repressive regimes elsewhere in the region. These activists won converts on Capitol Hill, who used their legislative powers to limit the efforts of policymakers in the White House to preserve anticommunist stability in Southeast Asia. Where President Lyndon Johnson could push his open-ended Gulf of Tonkin Resolution through Congress with only two dissenting votes in 1964, by 1975 Congress refused to appropriate money for the defense of South Vietnam and instructed President Gerald Ford to reduce or eliminate American military and economic aid to regimes that routinely violated internationally recognized human rights. Public and Congressional activism helped bring an end to a hopeless war and curb American support for violent regimes. Yet it also made it

⁸⁴¹ Edward Aspinall, *Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance, and Regime Change in Indonesia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005); Marcus Mietzner, *Military Politics, Islam and the State in Indonesia: From Turbulent Transition to Democratic Consolidation* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008); Edward Aspinall, *Islam and Nation: Separatist Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009).

unlikely that the United States could help manage the new forms of insecurity in Southeast Asia ignited by increasing authoritarianism. If a crisis struck the region, an American response was by 1975 anything but guaranteed.

It is worth noting that most of the noncommunist states in Southeast Asia did *not* collapse. That simple, incontrovertible fact became the cornerstone of the buying time thesis. But it does not follow that the Vietnam War and the other American initiatives to contain communism in the region *caused* those states not to collapse. Causality concerns the relationship between events, not non-events, and it therefore makes more sense to examine what American policies *did* accomplish. Southeast Asian leaders obtained American aid under the pretext of containing communism but employed it to secure themselves in power and undermine democratic institutions. Facing foreshortened opportunities for peaceful political contestation within existing national institutions and ideological frameworks, opposition groups increasingly turned toward revolutionary discourses and armed resistance. Noncommunist Southeast Asian countries thus became less secure over the short term. And so too did they become less stable over the long term. American aid abetted and encouraged authoritarianism, militarism, corruption, inequality, and instability.

These are poisonous legacies that persist to this day. National trajectories in island Southeast Asia diverged after the 1960s and 1970s. But the institutional and ideological patterns laid down in the era of authoritarianization proved remarkably durable. The period thus resembles what the economists Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson call a “critical juncture”—a contingent moment in which existing orders are disrupted and new arrangements

established, with effects that reverberate far into the future.⁸⁴² Consider the colonial period in island Southeast Asia: Imperial powers reshaped the region's political institutions, economic patterns, and social arrangements, giving Malaysia its multiethnic polity, the Philippines its oligarchy and Catholic faith, Indonesia its strong and bureaucratic state, and Singapore its entrepôt status.⁸⁴³ Such structuralist arguments underplay the importance of agency and contingency, but they illuminate the deep historical roots of contemporary life. And as a brief survey of the region demonstrates, the authoritarianization of the 1960s and 1970s continues to shape island Southeast Asia today.

In October 2015, Indonesian Defense Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu launched a program called *Bela Negara* (Defend the Nation). The program initially aimed, over the course of 10 years, to recruit 100 million cadres and establish 900 education and training centers in districts across the archipelago.⁸⁴⁴ The first participants donned blue camouflage fatigues, listened to lectures and sang songs meant to stir national pride, marched in military formation, and learned to assemble and use weapons. According to Indonesia's 2015 Defense White Paper, the program had mostly positive objectives, including promoting the values of "patriotism, national awareness, belief in Pancasila as the country's ideology, willingness to sacrifice for the nation, and having the basic capability to defend the nation."⁸⁴⁵ But the implementation of the program revealed more sinister undertones. One *Bela Negara* drill

⁸⁴² Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty* (New York: Crown Business, 2012), 96-123.

⁸⁴³ For a characteristic argument about the colonial period see John Sidel, "Social Origins of Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited: Colonial State and Chinese Immigrant in the Making of Modern Southeast Asia," *Comparative Politics* 40, no. 2 (January 2008): 127-147.

⁸⁴⁴ Kementerian Pertahanan Republik Indonesia, Kebijakan Pertahanan Negara Tahun 2018, <https://www.kemhan.go.id/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/LAMPIRAN-JAKHANNEG-2018-FINAL.pdf> (accessed April 15, 2018).

⁸⁴⁵ Kementerian Pertahanan Republik Indonesia, *Buku Putih Pertahanan Indonesia 2015* (Jakarta: Kementerian Pertahanan, 2015), 95

sergeant told cadres that their “enemies” were “communism, drugs, and homosexuality.” To that list the defense minister himself added foreign cultures and values: “They enter slowly at first, and then spread,” he explained, arguing that alien influences seek “to destroy the nation or at least weaken it.”⁸⁴⁶

Ryamizard justified the *Bela Negara* program as consistent with Indonesia’s Hankamrata defense doctrine, which grew out of the country’s revolutionary experience and emphasized the unity of the military and the citizenry in matters of national defense. But the program more closely resembled the Suharto regime’s efforts to indoctrinate Indonesian citizens in the New Order’s antidemocratic worldview. The Directive for the Realization and Implementation of Pancasila (P4) initiative, unveiled in 1978, eventually required all Indonesian citizens to undergo mind-numbing training courses on Pancasila, Indonesia’s national ideology.⁸⁴⁷ The P4 program’s curriculum, crafted by the armed forces, justified the Suharto regime’s policies for achieving economic development and national resilience. It also defended the military as “arising from the people and joining with the people to uphold and give meaning to independence.”⁸⁴⁸ Ali Murtopo described the P4 program as nothing less than an effort to “Indonesianize Indonesians,” so that it is “impossible for them to be penetrated by communist ideology, or by any other ideology.”⁸⁴⁹ The fall of the New Order in 1998 and the subsequent process of *Reformasi* ended the P4 program and the broader military doctrine of *dwifungsi*, which claimed a political and social role for the armed forces. Even if the military

⁸⁴⁶ “Delapan ancaman negara nirmiliter menurut Menteri Pertahanan,” *Antara*, October 12, 2015.

⁸⁴⁷ Michael Morfit, “Pancasila: The Indonesian State Ideology According to the New Order Government,” *Asian Survey* 21, no. 8 (August 1991): 838-851; Ginandjar Kartasasmita, *Managing Indonesia’s Transformation: An Oral History* (London: World Scientific Publishing, 2013), 104-106.

⁸⁴⁸ See Government of Indonesia, *Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila (Ekaprasetya Pancakarsa) & Garis Besar Haluan Negara (GHBN)* (s.l.: Departemen Penerangan, 1978), 48.

⁸⁴⁹ Government of Indonesia, *Peningkatan penerangan yang berwibawa: himpunan pidato Menteri Penerangan RI, 1978-1982* (Jakarta: Departemen Penerangan, 1983), 209-210.

did not return to the barracks entirely, it adopted a more circumscribed role and withdrew from “practical politics.”⁸⁵⁰ Many observers saw *Bela Negara* as a “thinly veiled militarization” of Indonesian society—an effort by the military to reclaim the political and ideological influence it wielded under the New Order.⁸⁵¹

And it was not only creeping militarism that inspired memories of Suharto. In 1985, the Indonesian strongman, over protests from nongovernmental organizations and religious groups, pushed a law on social organizations through Indonesia’s rubber-stamp parliament. The law mandated that Pancasila be the “sole foundation” of all Indonesian political parties and mass organizations. It also gave the state the authority to dissolve groups that threatened Pancasila or national unity.⁸⁵² Suharto described the law in his autobiography as one of his most significant accomplishments, claiming it preserved national unity and prevented the emergence of “conflicts, rifts, and divisions in social, national, and state life.”⁸⁵³ *Reformasi* removed the “sole foundation” requirement and allowed Indonesian political parties to adopt different ideologies and programs, except for communism. But the political thinking fostered by the New Order persisted. In a 2006 speech, former president Megawati Sukarnoputri, who was cozy with the military and reinstalled several New Order stalwarts in important government posts, lamented that democracy depended too much on voting rather than consensus.⁸⁵⁴ Years later, in the period surrounding the creation of the *Bela Negara* program, the Indonesian government criminalized the criticism of public officials, banned organizations

⁸⁵⁰ Mietzner, *Military Politics*, 211-266.

⁸⁵¹ Bhatara Ibnu Reza, “Bela Negara: Thinly Veiled Militarisation of the Civilian Population,” *Indonesia at Melbourne*, <http://www.law.unsw.edu.au/news/2016/07/bela-negara-thinlyveiled-militarisation-civilian-population> (accessed April 15, 2018).

⁸⁵² Undang-undang nomor 8 tahun 1985 tentang organisasi kemasyarakatan, <http://jabar.kemenag.go.id/file/file/ProdukHukum/ejqa1395037205.pdf> (accessed April 20, 2018).

⁸⁵³ Soeharto, *Pikiran*, 408-410.

⁸⁵⁴ Ken Ward, “Suharto’s Javanese Pancasila,” in Aspinall and Fealy, eds., *Soeharto’s New Order*, 37.

deemed hostile to Pancasila, curbed the activities of nongovernmental organizations, and cracked down on online speech—all raising the specter of a return to an authoritarian political climate.⁸⁵⁵ The legacies of authoritarianization thus stretched far beyond the end of authoritarian rule in Indonesia.

The same was true for the Philippines. In May 2017, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte issued Proclamation 216 declaring martial law in Mindanao.⁸⁵⁶ For almost two years Duterte had mused publicly about the possibility of declaring martial law. “It’s going to be a dictatorship,” the then-longshot candidate told a journalist about his presidential aspirations in October 2015, adding that “it’s the police and the military who will be the backbone.”⁸⁵⁷ He was true to his word: Upon entering office, Duterte launched a murderous war on drugs. Police statistics estimated the drug war killed some 4,500 Filipinos the first eighteen months of Duterte’s presidency, but human rights groups alleged extrajudicial killings, some at the hands of off-duty police officers, numbered twice that figure.⁸⁵⁸ Duterte further broadcast his support for authoritarianism by ordering Marcos be buried with military honors at the *Libingan ng mga Bayani* (National Heroes’ Cemetery), something long sought by the late dictator’s relatives but denied by successive presidents since the People Power Revolution

⁸⁵⁵ “UU Ormas Dinilai sebagai Kemunduran Demokrasi Indonesia,” *Kompas*, September 11, 2013; “Newly revised ITE law still draconian,” *Jakarta Post*, November 29, 2016; “Perppu Ormas Disahkan, Pemerintah Kini Bisa Bubarkan Ormas,” *Kompas*, October 24, 2017; “Tak Diteken Jokowi, Berikut Pasal Kontroversial UU MD3,” *Tempo*, March 16, 2018;

⁸⁵⁶ President of the Philippines, Proclamation No. 216, May 23, 2017, <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/downloads/2017/05may/20170523-PROC-216-RRD.pdf> (accessed April 15, 2018).

⁸⁵⁷ “Duterte: His six contradictions and planned dictatorship,” *Rappler*, October 26, 2015, <https://www.rappler.com/nation/politics/elections/2016/110679-duterte-contradictions-dictatorship> (accessed April 15, 2018).

⁸⁵⁸ “PNP admits 4,251 killed in drug war,” *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, May 8, 2018; Human Rights Watch, *World Report 2018* (s.l.: Human Rights Watch, 2018), 429-435; Amnesty International, “Killings Continue Under President Duterte,” September 20, 2016, <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ASA3548572016ENGLISH.pdf> (accessed April 15, 2018).

toppled the Marcos regime in 1986.⁸⁵⁹ And finally, responding to the seizure of the city of Marawi in Mindanao by rebels loyal to the Islamic State, Duterte issued Proclamation 216. The following day, he told the press that, “If I think the ISIS has taken a foothold in Luzon and terrorism is not really far behind, I might declare martial law throughout the country to protect the people.”⁸⁶⁰ Martial law remained confined to Mindanao, but it persisted well beyond the recapture of Marawi by the Philippine military in October 2017. Two months after the armed forces declared “total victory” over the Islamic State fighters in Marawi, Duterte extracted from a pliant Congress a yearlong extension of Proclamation 216, citing new threats from “communist terrorists and their coddlers, supporters, and financiers.”⁸⁶¹ The human rights abuses, the fearmongering about leftists and Islamists, the nationalist law-and-order mobilization of the middle classes, the empowering of coercive institutions, and the weakening of a flawed but democratic order—small wonder observers saw parallels between Duterte’s government and the Marcos regime.⁸⁶²

Which is not to say the two mirrored each other exactly. Duterte appointed scores of military officials to senior government posts, but he did not—or at least has not yet—empowered the military to quell the oligarchy, to crush his opposition, and to undermine democratic institutions.⁸⁶³ The son of an anti-Marcos activist, he claims to abhor the atrocities of the martial law era and to have little use for ill-gotten wealth.⁸⁶⁴ Intentions aside, Duterte

⁸⁵⁹ “Duterte: Marcos deserves to be buried at heroes’ cemetery,” *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, August 7, 2016.

⁸⁶⁰ “Duterte: There is a war going on,” *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, May 24, 2017.

⁸⁶¹ “Duterte formally asks Congress to extend martial law in Mindanao ‘til end of 2018,” *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, December 11, 2017; “Senate, House allow 1-year martial law extension in Mindanao,” *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, December 13, 2017.

⁸⁶² See, for instance, the essays in Nicole Curato, ed., *The Duterte Reader: Critical Essays on Rodrigo Duterte’s Early Presidency* (Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program Publications, 2018); Thomas Pepinsky, “Southeast Asia: Voting Against Disorder,” *Journal of Democracy* 28, no. 2 (April 2017): 120-131.

⁸⁶³ “Duterte hires 59 former AFP, PNP men to Cabinet, agencies,” *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, June 27, 2018.

⁸⁶⁴ “Rody: Stop comparing me to Marcos,” *Philippine Star*, July 22, 2017.

knows the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) lack the capabilities to reassume their Marcos era roles. The AFP's manpower and inflation-adjusted budget totaled the same in 2015 as they did in 1975, even as the country's population doubled and its GDP increased by a factor of 20. The military also continues to rely on decades-old American-supplied equipment, much of it acquired under the Marcos regime.⁸⁶⁵ Sapped of men and materiel, the AFP ranked as one of the weakest militaries in the region when Duterte entered office. Senior military and police officials therefore opposed the extension of martial law beyond Mindanao. Ronald dela Rosa, the PNP chief, told journalists that Duterte's suggestion of a nationwide declaration of martial law was "uncalled for."⁸⁶⁶ Aware of the relative weakness of the Philippine state's coercive institutions, Duterte proposed a significant increase in military spending from 1 to 2.5 percent of GDP, which would approach the levels of the high authoritarian period of the 1970s.⁸⁶⁷ Given the skepticism of civilian rule engrained in the military and police during the period of authoritarianization, and the enthusiasm for authoritarianism innate to Duterte's personality, such a generous budget risks undermining the consolidation of democratic institutions in the Philippines underway since 1986.

Malaysia, too, remains a product of authoritarianization. In April 2018, Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak announced that an anti-fake news bill had been enacted into

⁸⁶⁵ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Arms Transfers Database*, <https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers> (accessed April 20, 2018); and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *SIPRI Military Expenditure Database*, <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/SIPRI-Milex-data-1949-2017.xlsx> (accessed April 20, 2018).

⁸⁶⁶ "No reason for nationwide martial law – Bato dela Rosa," *Philippine Star*, December 18, 2017.

⁸⁶⁷ "How Much Can the Philippines Boost Its Military Budget Under Duterte," *The Diplomat*, January 21, 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/how-much-can-the-philippines-boost-its-military-budget-under-duterte/> (accessed April 20, 2018).

law.⁸⁶⁸ The law imposed stiff penalties, including sentences of up to six years in prison and fines up to \$125,000, for the malicious spreading of fake news—all without adjudicating the thorny epistemological questions surrounding how a particular piece of news would be deemed “fake.” The law marked the ruling Barisan Nasional regime’s latest attempt to respond to the scandal over 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB), a sovereign wealth fund alleged to have been used as a \$4.5 billion personal piggy bank by Najib and his cronies.⁸⁶⁹ Though the U.S. Department of Justice found the allegations credible, and though Najib himself admitted to receiving a deposit of almost \$700 million into his personal bank account, the Malaysian attorney general quickly ended the investigation into 1MDB after concluding that “no crime has been committed.”⁸⁷⁰ Any public intimation that Najib was engaged in corruption could therefore be labeled as spreading fake news, with all the legal ramifications that designation would bring. Najib also sought to clamp down on the efflorescence of dissent generated by the 1MDB scandal by expelling challengers from his ruling UMNO party, by wielding the country’s existing laws to detain opposition figures like the organizer Maria Abdullah Chin and the cartoonist Zunar, by passing a draconian National Security Act that allowed the government to declare virtual martial law in areas it deemed to contain security threats, and by further gerrymandering parliamentary districts to render the BN all but electorally invincible.

The tactics Najib used to contain the 1MDB crisis resembled those Tun Abdul Razak used to contain political opposition following the establishment of the BN regime. The

⁸⁶⁸ “Controversial fake-news law comes into force in Malaysia,” *Straits Times*, April 12, 2018.

⁸⁶⁹ Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, “U.S. Seeks to Recover Approximately \$540 Million Obtained from Corruption Involving Malaysian Sovereign Wealth Fund,” June 15, 2017, <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-seeks-recover-approximately-540-million-obtained-corruption-involving-malaysian-sovereign> (accessed April 15, 2018).

⁸⁷⁰ “1MDB probe found no crime; Malaysia will cooperate with any lawful investigation, says Najib’s press secretary,” *Straits Times*, July 21, 2016.

similarity spoke to familial connection—Najib is Razak’s eldest child—and also to the inner logic of the BN regime. At moments of crisis, both father and son expelled challengers from UMNO, arrested opposition figures, extended control over the media, threatened to impose military rule, and redrew legislative boundaries. But it was not only the *response* to the 1MDB scandal illustrated the durability of Malaysia’s authoritarian system. 1MDB *itself* revealed the nature of the regime. Since its founding by Razak in 1971, the BN has rested upon a redistributionist bargain between UMNO elites and the country’s ethnic Malay majority: UMNO powerbrokers use the instruments of state to raise the socioeconomic status of ethnic Malays, who then rally behind UMNO in state and national elections. Among the constellation of institutions and policies designed to further this bargain are government-linked investment corporations like 1MDB. These state-affiliated corporations came to control vast reservoirs of public wealth and became nodes of corruption and patronage dispensation within UMNO, as powerful politicians siphoned resources to entrepreneurs who offered them political and financial support.⁸⁷¹ 1MDB thus represents not an exception but the rule—the latest of many financial scandals laced into the genetics of the Barisan Nasional regime during the period of authoritarianization.⁸⁷²

Occurring from the inside-out rather than outside-in, authoritarianization unfolded differently in Singapore. But it continues to shape the city-state today. The People’s Action Party, now led by Lee Kuan Yew’s son Lee Hsien Loong, remains firmly entrenched in power. As in the past, the PAP guards its reputation as the vanguard of the nation and

⁸⁷¹ See Gomez and Jomo, *Malaysia’s Political Economy*, 24-53.

⁸⁷² See Tom Pepinsky, “Malaysia’s Long History of Financial Scandals,” *New Mandala*, August 6, 2015, <http://www.newmandala.org/malaysia-long-history-financial-scandal/> (accessed April 20, 2018); for a divergent assessment see Dan Slater, “Malaysia’s Mess is Mahathir-Made,” *East Asia Forum*, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/07/29/malysias-mess-is-mahathir-made/> (accessed April 20, 2018).

mobilizes largely nonviolent state institutions against all manner of opposition. In February 2018, the Cambridge-trained historian Thum Ping Tjin submitted a paper to the Select Committee on Deliberate Online Falsehoods, a parliamentary body designed to investigate the problem of “fake news” in Singapore. Thum’s paper contended that the most influential purveyor of fake news in Singapore was none other than the PAP: Beginning with Operation Cold Store in 1963, the PAP routinely lodged false charges against its opponents, alleging that they belonged to a communist conspiracy in order to justify their arrest and imprisonment.⁸⁷³ K. Shanmugam, a senior PAP parliamentarian serving as minister for law and home affairs, summoned Thum for questioning. Over nearly six hours of hostile back-and-forth, Shanmugam sought to undermine Thum’s argument that there was no communist conspiracy to seize power in Singapore in the early 1960s, claiming he had willfully ignored or misrepresented evidence and was “not an objective historian.”⁸⁷⁴ Two weeks later, Singapore’s Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority refused to register Thum’s *New Naratif* organization, which promotes independent journalism in Southeast Asia, on the grounds that its “being used by foreigners to pursue a political activity in Singapore.” The refusal imposed a number of obstacles on *New Naratif*’s operations in Singapore, for instance by raising the risk that its meetings could be judged unlawful assemblies.⁸⁷⁵ That the PAP regime so aggressively went after an academic of modest stature suggests that Singapore’s peculiarly durable form of authoritarianism shows no signs of abating.

⁸⁷³ Thum Ping Tjin, “Submission to the Select Committee on Deliberate Online Falsehoods, Parliament of Singapore, February 26, 2018, <https://www.parliament.gov.sg/docs/default-source/sconlinefalsehoods/written-representation-83.pdf> (accessed April 25, 2018).

⁸⁷⁴ “Minister K. Shanmugam grills research fellow Thum Ping Tjin and says he is not an objective historian,” *Straits Times*, March 29, 2018.

⁸⁷⁵ “New Naratif funded by a number of foreigners and clearly has a political agenda: Acra,” *Straits Times*, April 12, 2018.

International and transnational exchanges midwifed authoritarianism in island Southeast Asia during the 1960s and 1970s. To be sure, no political system at the dawn of the era of authoritarianization could be called a liberal democracy. But modes of governance across the region were generally consensual rather than coercive, and state power rested upon relatively wide social bases. Over the following decade, supranational flows of capital and ideas enabled would-be autocrats to shrink the domestic constituencies upon which state power depended and create far more repressive, exclusionary regimes than would have otherwise been possible. And despite divergences in political and economic outcomes since then, enduring authoritarian tendencies continue to hinder the development of just societies in island Southeast Asia. There was nothing inevitable about that outcome. The international and transnational sponsors of authoritarian rule could have channeled their resources elsewhere—toward inclusive rather than extractive institutions, toward liberty and equality rather than oppression and injustice. They can do the same today. Overcoming island Southeast Asia's democratic deficit will require brave Indonesians, Malaysians, Filipinos, and Singaporeans to mobilize against authoritarian regimes. The success of their struggle will demand international and transnational assistance.

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