

COMMUNIST PARTY POWER IN KAMPUCHEA (CAMBODIA): Documents and Discussion

Compiled and Edited
With an Introduction by

Timothy Michael Carney



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The research and conclusions in this work are solely those of the author. This paper is not an official statement of Department of State policy nor does it necessarily reflect United States government analyses.

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FOREWORD

The events that have occurred in what was Cambodia, and especially since June 1975, now seem to be in the process of transforming that land, in the eyes of the outside world, into another "land of mystery" not unlike that which French explorers claimed to be unshrouding when they "discovered" the ruins of Angkor hidden beneath the jungle. The "mystery" of contemporary Kampuchea, however, is but the product of our own ignorance, which this Data Paper is intended to help dispel.

The Southeast Asia Program has over the years been fortunate in attracting a small stream of U.S. Foreign Service Officers with Southeast Asian expertise and experience who have come for a year's study-leave in order to broaden and deepen their knowledge. Tim Carney is the most recent of these, a veteran of three years' service with the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh who has a high degree of proficiency in the Khmer language, a commitment to scholarly discourse, and a determination to make sense of the momentous events through which he lived. Read against the background of those events, this volume does much to illuminate our understanding of the current leadership of the government of Kampuchea, its policies, and its roots in Cambodia's troubled past.

David K. Wyatt
June 1976

PREFACE

A Department of State assignment to Cornell for a year of Southeast Asian area studies gave me the time to research for this paper. Professor David K. Wyatt's course in modern Southeast Asian history provided the academic structure in which I researched and wrote. Professors Wyatt and Benedict R. O'G. Anderson criticized earlier drafts of the paper. I am also grateful to Mr. Stephen Heder, Dr. David Elliott and Mr. Paul McNellis for suggesting additional sources, comparative examples and helpful comment in general. My colleagues Jack Pavoni of the Department of State and Barry Broman at the American Embassy in Bangkok helped track down and clarify valuable sources. Mr. Im Proum deserves special thanks for reviewing my translations. His calligraphy graces the Glossary.

Khmer terms and proper nouns in the Introduction and in the translations appear in their standard French spellings. For accurate transliterations I have used a system which Professor Franklin Huffman devised based on Sanskrit. An approximately phonetic romanization accompanies most of these often tortuous transliterations.

The first two translations come from the handwritten, mimeographed Khmer Communist Youth Alliance monthly for August 1973. The first article, "Manifesto of the Periodical Revolutionary Young Men and Women," sets forth the aims of the publication. The second article gives the party's view of youth problems and the party's role in awakening youth consciousness. A unit of the Khmer Republic's army seized the periodical in Kompong Chhnang province in late 1973.

Ith Sarin, an Inspector of Primary Education who spent most of 1972 in the bush as a candidate party member, wrote the third and fourth items. One is a translation from the French version of his request to rally to the Khmer Republic; the other is my translation of the last half of his book, *Regrets for the Khmer Soul*, published in Khmer in Phnom Penh in late 1973.

The last translation comes from captured handwritten notes entitled "A Short Guide for Application of Party Statutes." Republican forces seized it in fighting around Phnom Penh in February 1975. I have not examined the Khmer original.

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THE KHMER REPUBLIC (CAMBODIA): ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS

(From Donald P. Whitaker et al., *Area Handbook for the Khmer Republic (Cambodia)*, Washington, D.C., 1973.)

CONTINUITY IN CAMBODIAN COMMUNISM

by Timothy Michael Carney

Introduction

Neither official Cambodian public documents nor Radio Phnom Penh mention the existence much less name the leadership of a communist party in Cambodia. Nevertheless, a varied but limited number of sources confirm the party's existence and Leninist role in the revolution and sketch party ideology and programs. Elements of that ideology have emerged at an accelerating rate in Radio Phnom Penh's post-victory broadcasts. Parts of the ideology and programs have roots in earlier writings of both Khieu Samphan and Hu Nim. Foreign Communist publications since 1970 cast additional light on the party and underscore lists of its leadership provided by defectors.

This paper relies heavily on the report and book Ith Sarin wrote after spending most of 1972 as a candidate party member in the bush.¹ Of the documents used which emanate from the party itself, an article in the party youth alliance monthly,² sets forth class analysis and confirms the party's leading role in the revolution. Recent Phnom Penh radio broadcasts strongly support the accuracy of material from both of these sources. Khieu Samphan's newspaper, *L'Observateur*, his doctoral thesis and that of Hu Nim give evidence for the roots of party ideology and programs and complete the list of major primary sources. I have also, of course, drawn on my tour in Cambodia from 1972 to 1975 with the U.S. Embassy.

Available sources on Khmer radicalism do not match those on the Vietnamese or even the Lao in either quality or quantity, and leave many key questions open. The material on the period of the First Indochina War inadequately approaches the origins of Khmer communism and its ties to the Vietnamese. For the post-Geneva era, untouched topics include the relations among the Khmer who went to North Vietnam for training, those who stayed in the bush, and those who emerged as the leftist legal opposition. The last eventually gave the movement three prominent leaders in the early 1960s: Khieu Samphan, Hou Yuon, and Hu Nim. The period from 1967, when these three men disappeared into the bush, to 1970 also needs serious work, perhaps starting with interviews of surviving Khmer political figures.

¹Ith Sarin, *Sraṅaoh Pralung Khmer [Regrets for the Khmer Soul]* (Phnom Penh, 1973), and "Nine Months with the Maquis" (Translated by U.S. Embassy, Phnom Penh, May 1973). Both book and report draw on Ith Sarin's observations and those of a companion who did not publish. The book's stated purpose is to awaken Khmer Republican leftists to the dangers the Khmer communists pose and cause them to end opposition to the regime. The paper served as Ith Sarin's request to rally and includes some frank suggestions for Republican reform. I will cite the book hereafter as *SPK*.

²"Paks kommunist kampuchea nung panaha yuvachun nungeyuvaneari kampuchea [The Communist Party of Kampuchea and the Problem of Young Men and Women of Kampuchea]," *Yuvachun nung yuvaneari padavat [Revolutionary Young Men and Women]*, 1 (August 1973). This handwritten mimeographed periodical carries the legend, "Informational and Educational Organ of the Alliance of Communist Youth of Kampuchea." Hereafter cited as *Y-YP*.

The Beginnings

Cambodian communism has its roots in the Viet Minh-oriented wing of the anti-French Khmer Issarak independence movement.³ A number of published sources since 1970 point to 1951 as the founding year of a Cambodian party. Wilfred Burchett set 1951 as the year the "Pracheachon" or People's party formed. He called the Pracheachon "in fact the Cambodian Communist Party, formed after the dissolution of the Indochinese Communist Party in 1951 and the constitution of communist parties in each of the three states."⁴ A year after Sihanouk's overthrow the then-clandestine Radio in a May Day broadcast noted that "After World War II and particularly after 1951, the Cambodian working class . . . continued to develop and strengthen."⁵ Ieng Sary subsequently cited 1951 as the year when "we began following the criminal activities of American imperialism and its Cambodian puppets."⁶ Finally, the party itself dates its founding to 1951 as the Pracheachon party which only in September 1966 took the name Communist Party of Kampuchea (PKK--Pak Kommunis Kampuchea).⁷ That 1951 creation had called itself the "Revolutionary Cambodian People's Party"; its statutes copied those of North Vietnam's Lao Dong party, and its Secretary-General, Sieu Heng, had worked closely with the Viet Minh.⁸

Working with the Vietnamese posed certain problems for the Khmer with repercussions that have lasted even until today. In the mid and late 1940s the only going national concerns in mainland Southeast Asia held power in Hanoi and Bangkok. The early Khmer independence leaders had dismissed Sihanouk as a French lackey, a view also congenial to the republican ideals of a small number of the elite. Pridi's Free Thai government in Bangkok gave massive assistance to the Khmer Issarak in 1946 and 1947, partly for ideological reasons and partly to discomfit the French who, by late 1946, had succeeded in wresting back Thai wartime territorial gains in Laos and

³The Khmer Issarak originally started in Bangkok in the early 1940s with Thai sponsorship that reached its height under Pridi's 1946-47 government. The November 1947 Thai rightist coup ended strong support and the Issarak entered an uneasy alliance with the Viet Minh which lasted until January 1949 when Dap Chuon, who figured in the original Issarak exile government announced in Bangkok in 1947, dropped out of the Viet Minh-assisted Committee of Khmer Liberation. Within a year the Viet Minh had turned to Nguyen Thanh Son, Sieu Heng and Son Ngoc Minh, whose made-up name attempted to capitalize on a nonexistent relationship to popular nationalist Son Ngoc Thanh. Son Ngoc Thanh's Thai-supported dissidence from 1952 after his return from exile forms another story. See Khmer Peace Committee, *Khmer Armed Resistance* (October 1959); Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, *Minority Problems in Southeast Asia* (Stanford, 1955), pp. 173-178; David Steinberg et al., *Cambodia* (New Haven, 1959), pp. 106-112; Charles Meyer, *Derriere le sourire khmer* (Paris, 1971), p. 186; and V. M. Reddi, *A History of the Cambodian Independence Movement: 1863-1955* (Tirupati, India, 1970?).

⁴Wilfred G. Burchett, *The Second Indochina War* (New York, 1970), p. 51.

⁵U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report*, No. 86 (March 4, 1971), reporting Agence Khmere d'Information's "1st of May, Glorious International Labor Day." Hereafter cited FBIS.

⁶*Le Monde* (Paris), January 15, 1972, carrying an interview of Ieng Sary by Claude Julien.

⁷Ith Sarin, "Nine Months," p. 5. See also "A Short Guide for Application of Party Statutes" (Translated captured document), Phnom Penh, 1975, for mention of a September 1966 Central Committee decision to change the party's name.

⁸Charles Meyer, *Derriere le sourire khmer*, p. 186. He cites Maurice Laurent, *L'Armée au Cambodge et dans les pays en voie de développement du Sud-Est Asiatique* (Paris, 1968), 43.

Cambodia. The Thai rightist coup of November 1947 ended major Thai aid to the Khmer Issarak, whose Bangkok-based government the Thai had only just formally recognized, and left the Viet Minh as the only support for Khmer who wished to continue the fight for real independence. Khmer memories of the period during the early 19th century when Nguyen Vietnam tried to incorporate and Vietnamize Cambodia and resentment over French use of Vietnamese personnel in the lower colonial service remained strongly alive, however, among both peasants and elite. This hostility emerged when Sihanouk genuinely appeared to be working for real independence. Issarak leaders mistrustful of ultimate Vietnamese intentions actively rallied to the Prince or simply ended dis-sidence. Major Khmer leaders from this period do not figure in today's Cambodian "revolutionary organization" and the Khmer who opted to go to North Vietnam under the terms of the Geneva Accords apparently met with increasing ingratitude after their 1970 return to staff the expanding revolutionary movement.⁹

The rechristened "Democratic Kampuchea" has publicly underscored the new state's symbolic connection with the Issarak period. The 5 January 1976 Constitution specifies that the new national flag shows three yellow towers on a red field. The Viet Minh-oriented segment of the Issarak displayed a flag identical except for showing five rather than three of Angkor Wat's towers.¹⁰

Sihanouk's success in gaining full independence from the French in 1953 and Issarak exclusion from the 1954 Geneva Conference forced a change in tactics. Hou Yuon told party intellectuals that the party had bowed to the pressure of socialist countries at Geneva and ended the fighting.¹¹ The period from 1954 to 1967, therefore, became the "era of political struggle," a time of open and clandestine educational efforts to rouse and develop public awareness of national and class problems.¹² In internal politics, the Pracheachon Group emerged as a party to contest the 1955 and 1958 National Assembly elections. By 1962, however, Sihanouk had forced the Pracheachon underground.¹³ From the latter part of this period, the party repeatedly sent intellectuals to the maquis to form combat cells. From 1967 the party regarded the armed struggle as having resumed and claimed to have prepared the March 1967 peasant uprising at Samlaut, Battambang province (see below), in advance.¹⁴

⁹FBIS, *Daily Report: Asia and Pacific*, IV, No. 3 (April 4, 1974) carries Agence France Presse in English from Hong Kong of 1 April 1974 entitled "Defectors Recount Disaffection with Communists." Two defectors told AFP that they had returned after training in North Vietnam to engage in military training and village organization. Hereafter cited as FBIS-APA.

¹⁰The two-color frontispiece to the pamphlet by the Khmer Peace Committee, *Khmer Armed Resistance* (October 1952), shows the Viet Minh-oriented wing of the Khmer Issarak's national flag.

¹¹Ith Sarin, "Nine Months," p. 6, quoting Hou Yuon during a 26 May 1972 speech.

¹²Y-YP, p. 17.

¹³Mission du Front Uni National du Kampuchea (Paris), *Bulletin d'Information* (August 11, 1972), carries an item from Agence Khmère d'Information translating a statement from the Committee of the Pracheachon Group denouncing the creation of a false Pracheachon party to contest the Khmer Republic's 1972 legislative elections. The statement affirms that the real Pracheachon ended activities in 1962 due to repression which had also involved progressive and patriotic Khmer not affiliated with the Pracheachon.

¹⁴Ith Sarin, "Nine Months," p. 6.

The Party Emerges

In the five years of war after Sihanouk's deposition in 1970, a number of signs pointed to the existence of a communist party in Cambodia and supported Ith Sarin's and other defectors' claims about the party leadership. Wilfred Burchett remarked on the 1963 disappearance of Son Sen, Director of the Normal School in Phnom Penh, and two teachers, Ieng Sary and Salot Sar. Their wives, he incorrectly noted, disappeared a year later.¹⁵ Ieng Sary and his wife, Khieu Thirith, reappeared in Sihanouk's Royal Government of National Union (RGNU) in 1970 as Special Representative from the Interior and Vice-Minister for Education and Youth, respectively. After Sihanouk's brief 1973 foray into Cambodia, *China Pictorial's* photo supplement on the visit depicted Son Sen among the greeters, identified as Chief of the General Staff of the People's Armed Forces of National Liberation of Cambodia (CPNLAF). The magazine also pictured the enigmatic Salot Sar, with no title; and the photo of his wife, Khieu Ponnary, who is Khieu Thirith's sister, carried the caption, "Chairman of the Democratic Women's League."¹⁶

In 1974 the Chinese formally, but not specifically, demonstrated that the Khmer fit into the category of friendly communist parties. In February Khieu Samphan set out on major travels in the Asian communist world, parts of Eastern Europe, and Africa. His Peking reception evidenced a strong Chinese desire to give him international face. On his initial arrival and subsequent comings and goings through Peking, Keng Piao, listed among "responsible persons departments concerned," welcomed him. Keng Piao holds the title "Director of the International Liaison Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China."¹⁷ His presence more prominently marked Ieng Sary's November/December visit as head of a financial delegation. New China News Agency listed Keng Piao as the second-ranking greeter.¹⁸ The next day Keng Piao and his Deputy Director, Sen Chien, attended, with others, talks between the Khmer visitors and Chinese leaders. Both liaison officials enjoyed the banquet following the talks, reinforcing this indication that the Khmer count among "fraternal" parties. Keng Piao's published appearances in 1974 show nine meetings with different communist party delegations or chairmen; two with youth organizations, one from Romania and the other from Syria; and a meeting with a women's delegation from Albania.¹⁹

The Khmer have yet, however, openly to engage in the sort of rhetoric with fraternal parties that characterizes, for example, the public Lao Dong-Pathet Lao relationship.²⁰ Khmer rhetoric on the occasion of Mao's death did imply the existence of a party in Cambodia by noting that the Khmer joined in the mourning with the

¹⁵Burchett, *Second Indochina War*, p. 53 claims the ladies followed their husbands a year after the men disappeared. Mme. Salot Sar, however, actually remained in Phnom Penh until September 1965. She appears on the staff of the English edition of Sihanouk's magazine *Kambuja* for its first two issues in the summer of 1965 which shows she did not suffer for her husband's defection.

¹⁶*China Pictorial*, Supplement to No. 6, 1973.

¹⁷U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, *Reference Aid: Directory of Officials of the People's Republic of China* (Washington, April 1975).

¹⁸FBIS, *Daily Report: People's Republic of China*, I, No. 214 (November 5, 1974).

¹⁹U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, *Reference Aid: Appearance and Activities of Leading Personalities of the People's Republic of China 1 Jan.-31 Dec. 1974* (Washington, March 1975).

²⁰*New York Times*, February 12, 1976 carries an AFP resumé of a Lao Radio report on the visit of Lao government and party leaders to Hanoi noting the aim to "strengthen relations between the two parties and countries."

"fraternal Chinese Communist Party, government and people."²¹ Their usual formula response to greetings from the Chinese party and people is a reply from the Cambodian government and people.

The Lao apparently have not quite got the message: the Secretary-General of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party, who also holds the Prime Ministry, sent a congratulatory telegram to the new Cambodian premier in April 1976 addressed to Pol Pot, "Secretary-General of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea."²² The Lao had earlier broadcast the text of congratulations from the Cambodian Communist Party Central Committee to the Lao People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee on the 30th anniversary of the Lao proclamation of independence.^{22a}

Leadership Role

The party defines its role in Leninist terms. By 1973 the party wrote that it had led "through every phase of the national and popular struggle."²³ A year earlier Ith Sarin attended the twenty-first anniversary of the founding of the party and described a number of banners carrying slogans which highlighted the party's leadership of the revolution: for example, "Only the Communist Party of Kampuchea can lead the revolution to definitive victory."²⁴ More recently, Radio Phnom Penh echoed this slogan in a historical analysis which put the Cambodian nation and people under the "revolutionary organization's correct leadership" even before Sihanouk's overthrow.²⁵

The party uses the term "revolutionary organization" or simply the "Organization (Angkar)" as its cover name to hide the reality of party control over the revolution.²⁶ The earliest broadcast use of the term dates to March 1971.²⁷ Only in September 1976 did the Organization publicly espouse Marxism-Leninism as its ideology.²⁸ A month later, Thai insurgent radio cited a Cambodian newspaper which gave the founding date of the Cambodian Revolutionary Organization as 30 September 1951, exactly the same date Ith Sarin provided for the founding of the Cambodian Communist Party.^{28a}

A May Day 1971 broadcast from the then-clandestine radio publicly proclaimed the vanguard role of the Cambodian working class: "In Cambodia's history of struggle . . . e Cambodian workers and peasants constituted a basic force in which Cambodian

²¹FBIS-APA, IV, No. 177 (September 10, 1976) carrying an order for flags to fly at half-mast.

²²FBIS-APA, IV, No. 76 (April 19, 1976). This message raises some as yet unanswerable questions about Salot Sar. He has been identified as the PKK Secretary-General. The item suggests that Pol Pot is an alias.

^{22a}FBIS-APA, IV, No. 201 (October 16, 1975).

²³Y-YP, p. 7.

²⁴Ith Sarin, *SPK*, p. 69.

²⁵FBIS-APA, IV, No. 63 (March 31, 1976)

²⁶Ith Sarin, *SPK*, p. 56.

²⁷FBIS-APA, IV, No. 54 (March 19, 1971) carries a Voice of the NUFK Khmer-language statement on the anniversary of Sihanouk's deposition. The FBIS translation reads, "All the people are closely united under the leadership of revolutionary organizations." Khmer nouns do not have a plural form, however, and "organization" fits the context.

²⁸FBIS-APA, IV, No. 183 (September 20, 1976). Eulogizing Mao, the Khmer PM says, "The Cambodian Revolutionary Organization and the Chinese Communist Party and our two peoples resolutely adhere to Marxism-Leninism."

^{28a}FBIS-APA, IV, No. 210 (October 29, 1976) carries the translation from the clandestine Voice of the People of Thailand.

workers were always the most advanced, most valiant, and most active vanguard.²⁹ The party views itself as "the party of the workers and representative of the interests of the people and representative of the interests of the nation and youth."³⁰

In Cambodia a limited picture of the people who exercise party leadership can be built up drawing heavily on Ith Sarin's observations and those of his companion, supplemented from time to time by those of other defectors.³¹ Admitting that he did not know the complete membership of the party central committee, Ith Sarin listed the top dozen. Salot Sar aside, most have figured in Phnom Penh radio broadcasts since the April 1975 Khmer Rouge victory with the notable exception of Hou Yuon, whom the radio has not mentioned in over a year. The list, with titles current to the 14 April 1976 announcement of a new government includes:

Salot Sar, Secretary General of the PKK Central Committee;
 Ieng Sary, second-ranking party figure; made Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs in August 1975;
 Khieu Samphan, Chairman of the State Presidium, former Deputy Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the CPNLF;
 Son Sen, Deputy Prime Minister charged with National Defense from August 1975, Chief of Staff of the Cambodian Revolutionary Army;
 Koy Thuon, former minister of National Economy, Finance and Commerce; Chairman of the Northern Region (see below);
 Hu Nim, Minister of Information;
 Tiv Ol, former Deputy Minister of Information and Propaganda;
 Hou Yuon, former Minister of the Interior, Communal Reforms and Cooperatives;
 Mrs. Khieu Ponnary, Vice-President of the Phnom Penh Committee of the National United Front of Kampuchea (NUFK) and Chairman of the Association of Democratic Women;
 Chou Chet, former Minister of Religious and Social Affairs, Chairman of the Southwest Region;
 Sok Thuok, Deputy Minister of National Security, Chairman of the Phnom Penh Special Region;
 Poc Doeuskomar, former Deputy Foreign Minister, not included in the full RGNU cabinet of January 1975 nor featured since.

The party apparently seeks a genuinely faceless leadership. Only four of the above dozen figure in the April 1976 government, unless others do so under aliases. Part of this secrecy probably comes from a desire to avoid a cult of personality and certainly ties in with a stated objective to institute collective leadership. Khieu Samphan's radio analysis of the new Constitution emphasized that the decision to create a three-man State Presidium flowed from the principle of collectivism in all fields, with the additional aim of avoiding mistakes. "A collective leadership is less prone to make mistakes," he said.³² Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary and Son Sen lived in France during the initial period of de-Stalinization and emphasis on collective leadership after the 20th Soviet Communist Party Congress and we might expect that the grudging reception the French Communist Party (PCF) leadership gave to the campaign would have affected these young Cambodians. They most likely saw that this French communist reluctance stemmed from its own cult of the personality of PCF leader Maurice Thorez, and they surely marked the criticism of Thorez by a dissident wing of PCF leadership. Khieu Samphan's explanation subsumes the danger from the evils of one-man rule in the observation that collective leadership can avoid

²⁹FBIS, *Daily Report*, No. 86 (May 4, 1971).

³⁰Y-YP, p. 16.

³¹The defectors whom AFP interviewed in March 1974 confirmed that Salot Sar held the job of party secretary-general.

³²FBIS-APA, IV, No. 3 (January 6, 1976).

'mistakes.' Those who stayed in Cambodia could look to Sihanouk to confirm suspicions about the value of one-man rule.

While the party as an organization has links directly back to the Viet Minh-oriented section of the Khmer Issarak, most of its identifiable present leadership apparently does not. The core of today's leadership studied in France in the late 40s and 50s and was in its 'teens at the time of the First Indochina War, too young for leadership roles.³³ Although several thousand Khmer withdrew to North Vietnam in 1954, none appear on lists of the current leadership. Some personalities who stayed in the bush or joined the legal opposition to Sihanouk fought against the Khmer Republic. The Phnom Penh vernacular press reported that Keav Keo Mony, a former Issarak Minister, commanded troops in the Battambang region in 1972.³⁴ An equally interesting figure, Non Suon, led Sector forces south of Phnom Penh. He served the Issarak as a regional official and negotiator and became spokesman for the Pracheachon Group until jailed for treason. He spent most of the 60s in prison and ran to the bush after Lon Nol released him in 1970. Neither of these two men's names are in lists of officials of Democratic Kampuchea. A secondhand report has it that the new Prime Minister, Pol Pot, "joined the resistance many years ago . . . to fight the Japanese, French and the Americans."³⁵ Other Issarak leaders, including Sieu Heng, lived in retirement under Sihanouk and Lon Nol.

North Vietnam-trained Khmer did not reach high leadership positions after 1970 apparently because they became increasingly suspect as the Khmer Rouge local organization grew. The number of "Hanoi-Khmer" or those who went north in 1954 varies from 2,500 to 4,000 men. The North Vietnamese told Sihanouk that 8,000 Khmer had gone south to support his return.³⁶ This figure may reflect additional men who continually filtered north during Sihanouk's rule. On their return, these troops commanded battalions and undertook political and military training of new recruits. By the end of 1973, however, serious tensions between the Hanoi-trained group and the local organization had developed. Two "Hanoi-Khmer" defectors claimed that the Khmer Rouge "liquidated" some of their colleagues and removed others from their functions. When the Khmer Rouge disarmed the two men they decided to flee.³⁷

Events in 1973 evidently led the Cambodian organization to see the "Hanoi-Khmer" as the thin edge of the Vietnamese wedge. Hou Yuon had told an Intellectuals' meeting even in 1972 that the PKK "has foreseen all in preparing for danger from the

³³Ieng Sary claims that Khieu Samphan participated in the anti-French activities of students beginning in 1946. See *Le Courrier du Viet Nam* (Hanoi), No. 358 (January 31, 1972).

³⁴*Nokor Thom*, November 26, 1972.

³⁵The *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 25, 1976, carries an article by Edith Lenart entitled "Leaders from the Ranks" in which she reports that Thiounn Prasit, brother of Minister of Health Thiounn Thioeunn, told staffers of the Khmer Paris Mission that Pol Pot had fought in the resistance from Japanese times, adding that he was born along the Khmer-VN border and worked on a rubber plantation near Memot. Ms. Lenart also wrote that Nuon Chea, now head of the Standing Committee of the Assembly of Representatives of the People of Kampuchea, also served in the Khmer Issarak. If confirmed, this information will provide elements of a continuity of leadership now lacking in the history of Khmer communism.

³⁶This information comes from Ker Chhieng, a member of Sihanouk's private office who defected to Phnom Penh in January 1973 and described his time in Peking and travels with Sihanouk to Hanoi to a 29 January 1973 press conference which I attended.

³⁷FBIS-APA, IV, No. 3 (April 4, 1974), carrying the AFP interview described above.

VC/NVA (Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army).³⁸ Significant Khmer Rouge-NVA friction marked the entire year 1973. Armed clashes over supplies and North Vietnamese freedom of movement in general reflected growing Khmer Rouge self-confidence with a corollary armed expression of traditional hostility toward all Vietnamese and those associated with them.

Organization and Recruitment

A desperate shortage of trained medium and lower level party workers and the constraints of working within the framework of the heavily pro-Sihanouk Front inhibited and shaped party organization and recruitment. Ieng Sary set out the goal of recruitment in early 1972:

In order for the revolution to triumph, it is indispensable that at each echelon there be a leadership core composed of men who are firm on principles and who know how to apply our political line in concrete national conditions creatively and with precise aims.³⁹

Later in the year Hou Yuon admitted to assembled intellectuals that the party lacked qualified cadre.⁴⁰ Full party membership took two or three years of candidacy, and a long period of education and training preceded the assumption of responsibility.⁴¹ Actually, the demands of their rapidly expanding control caused the party to accelerate stages of membership. Ith Sarin said he and his companion were in accelerated, advanced stages of candidacy.⁴²

The Khmer Rouge instituted collective leadership through committees for their territorial administrative units.⁴³ Party control over these committees took some time to solidify and never reached the lowest levels. Orders flowed from the Kena Mocchim, the party Central Committee, to the Region (Phiek); then the Sector (Damban), the District (Srok); the Khum (township) and finally to the Phum (hamlet, but often translated as village). The committee included a chairman, a deputy chairman, and members for functional tasks: military, economic, security, political, cultural, etc. Members were democratically elected.

Ith Sarin reports that this structure had not fully formed, even in his time, and notes that until mid-1971 Sihanoukists held most of the important jobs in the lower organization of some Phum, Khum, District and Sector committees. The North Vietnamese had picked those members and they "generally lacked political education." Party members at that time exclusively made up the Region committees and some Sector committees. When Ith Sarin made his observations in 1972, some chairmen or committee members at the Phum and Khum level still remained in the framework of the Front; that is, "they still believed they were making the revolution simply to hand authority back to Sihanouk." The party ensured control, Ith Sarin added, by assigning a party political commissar to monitor the activities of the entire committee for the Khum, District and Sector, thus indicating the key role these intermediate units must have

³⁸Ith Sarin, "Nine Months," p. 9.

³⁹*Le Monde* (Paris), January 15, 1972.

⁴⁰Ith Sarin, *SPK*, p. 62.

⁴¹Ith Sarin, *SPK*, pp. 62 and 73.

⁴²My interview with him in Phnom Penh, June 1973.

⁴³Ieng Sary in *Le Monde* (Paris), January 15, 1972, described such committees as NUFK organs. Ith Sarin, *SPK*, pp. 71-74, gives details on party control over them. Both agree on the membership composition of committees. Refugees from northwest Cambodia note that the authorities now use the term "Sangkat" in place of Khum.

played in production, military recruitment and population control. Radio Phnom Penh confirmed the outlines of this description of the administrative structure in a March 1976 broadcast which reported that the "Comrade Committee Chairman of the Siem Reap Oddar Meanchey Sector" received a delegation of foreign diplomats.⁴⁴

The party inadequately controlled the vital military command structure at least as late as the end of 1973.⁴⁵ In theory, the party assigned political commissars to assist commanders from company level through Region level.⁴⁶ Phouk Chhay, for example, held the post in the Southwest Region as well as representing youths, students, and pupils on the Phnom Penh NUFK committee. Insurgent military units in the Northwest, however, sent delegations to the capital and met with opposition Khmer Republican dignitaries and, late in 1973 even, briefly and inconclusively, with Americans.

By 1975, the best troops came from the Northern and the Eastern Regions. They entered Phnom Penh after having first smashed Republican control of the Mekong River. The Northern Region included Preah Vihear, Stung Treng, Mondulkiri, and Ratanakiri provinces under the direct administration of the Central Committee. The Eastern Region united Kratie, Svay Rieng, Prey Veng, and Kompong Cham Provinces.⁴⁷ Both regions abut Vietnam and/or Laos and the party enjoyed the NVA shield during the crucial period of Khmer Rouge expansion from 1970 to 1972. Party discipline and control, accordingly, should have been more complete over troops from these two areas.

Even in 1975, the largest area, the Southwest Region, apparently had not recovered from losses of troops and cadre during the 1973 fighting. That area included Kampot, Koh Kong, Kompong Seila, Takeo, Kompong Chhnang, Kompong Speu, Oudong, and Kandal provinces along with Kompong Som port. Troops from this Region suffered in 1973 when they attacked Phnom Penh in the teeth of tactically employed B-52 and

⁴⁴FBIS-APA, IV, No. 44 (March 4, 1976).

⁴⁵In January 1972 Ieng Sary told *Le Courrier du Viet Nam* that the Cambodian Peoples' Liberation Armed Forces were divided into "guerilleros, regional troops, and regular troops," all under the command of a National Military Committee seconded by a Staff. He also noted that regular troops were organized in regiments and regional troops in battalions. By late 1974 the Khmer Rouge had organized their regular forces into divisions.

In March 1972 Peking's New China News Agency (FBIS-APA, IV, 59, March 24, 1972) reported that, on Khieu Samphan's proposal, the NUFK Politburo drafted a Decree instituting the High Command of the CPNLF with Khieu Samphan as President; Salot Sar as Vice-President and Chief of the Military Directorate of the Army; Nuon Chea as Vice-President and Chief of the Political Directorate of the Army; So Vanna as Vice-President and Deputy Chief of the Army Military Directorate; Thieun Chhith as Member and Chief of the Directorate of Military Materiel, Son Sen as Member and Chief of the General Staff. The NUFK Paris Mission published the text of the Decree in its *Bulletin d'Information* of March 31, 1972 and I have based the titles of High Command officials on the French rather than the FBIS report of Hsinhua's English-language broadcast.

⁴⁶Ith Sarin, "Nine Months," p. 8.

⁴⁷The description of Regions comes from Ith Sarin. By April 1974 seven Military Regions existed, each with a three-digit code number. Only senior cadre officials knew the numbers for Regions and Sectors; others referred to them as Ith Sarin does: the Regions by compass point and the sectors by toponym. The regional representatives in the People's Representative Assembly elected 20 March 1976 come from the Eastern, Southwestern, Northwestern, Northern, Western Regions and from the Siem Reap-Oddar Meanchey, Preah Vihear, Kratie, Ratanakiri-Stung Treng, and Mondolkiri Sectors.

F-111 bombers and finally broke a month before the U.S. bombing halt after taking a key bridge only twelve kilometers south of the capital's airport on Route 3. This effort severely damaged Southwest Region forces and they displayed remarkably bad coordination in the next dry season's offensive against Phnom Penh. A large part of their indifferent success in the 1975 offensive came from the greatly improved calibre of Republican troop commanders facing them.

The party used its youth organization, the Alliance of Communist Youth of Kampuchea (Yuv.K.K.--Sampoan Yuvachun Kommunis Kampuchea) as cutting edge and prime source of recruitment into the party itself. Youth came to be the party's right arm under its direct control; the party "educated, watched, nourished and built youth as the central force in the revolutionary movement of each era and as the central force for future national construction."⁴⁸ In southeastern Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge gave intensive political training to members of the patriotic youth association, a NUFK rather than a party organ. Training took place during two or three weeks at remote centers. Returning youngsters fiercely condemned religion and custom, rejected parental authority and showed a militant attitude with marked confidence in mechanical weapons and a rejection of the mystic. Although the trained youth still lived at home, they ceased working the family plot and instead worked on those fields under direct youth association control.⁴⁹

The Yuv.K.K. itself came to draw heavily from soldiers of all ranks. Recent refugees have commented on the youth of guards in villages for relocated former urban-dwellers. Weekly political meetings in these areas concentrate on production, perhaps reflecting the low level of these youngsters' political education as much as the genuine need for heightened rice yields.⁵⁰

Although security needs must now predominate, Cambodia's present rulers clearly see a continuing political role for youth. A January 1976 broadcast praised Khmer youth for its resolution to continue rejecting such non-revolutionary concepts as "private property, personality, vanity."⁵¹ This despite the new Constitution which shortly before had affirmed that articles of everyday use would remain in private hands.

Ith Sarin gave no details on the other key source of party members: the Association of Democratic Women of Kampuchea. He listed no other party organizations in his book and his paper left the issue somewhat confused. His companion, however, whom I interviewed in Phnom Penh in mid-1973, said that a series of parallel organizations matched each one from the Front with another from the party. Front organizations termed themselves "Patriotic" while party organizations labeled themselves "Democratic." The latter recruited members of the former whose political consciousness had developed. The clandestine radio gave a list of these "Patriotic" organizations for monks, youth, women, workers, farmers and intellectuals in the preface to the report of the NUFK's First National Congress.⁵²

⁴⁸Y-YP, p. 19.

⁴⁹U.S. Department of State, U.S. Consulate Can Tho (Vietnam): Kenneth Quinn "The Khmer Krahom Program to create a Communist Society in Southern Cambodia," February 19, 1974, pp. 17-18. This declassified airgram assembles a wide variety of intelligence reports and refugee comments for a detailed look at PKK programs in Kampot, southern Kandal and Svay Rieng provinces. I will cite it hereafter as Quinn, "The Khmer Krahome"

⁵⁰William Shawcross, "Cambodia under its New Rulers," *New York Review of Books* (March 4, 1976), p. 25.

⁵¹FBIS-APA, IV, Noe 19 (January 28, 1976)

⁵²FBIS, *Daily Report* No. 142 (July 24, 1973), gives the list, translated from Khmer, which minimizes possible confusion in translation from Khmer to French to English.

Ideology and Programs

The continuing use of the term "revolutionary" to describe themselves shows that total victory means more to the leadership than merely defeating the "Lon Nol clique" or "American Imperialism." They demand basic changes in Cambodian society and personality which require inculcating new values under a discipline unknown to modern Cambodia. In contrast to their Vietnamese neighbors, the party rigidly enforces its new values, possibly because not even senior cadre have the experience that generates an institutional self-confidence basic to pragmatic, flexible implementation of principles. Moreover, Cambodia's small population may encourage party leaders to push "proletarianization,"⁵³ arguing that they can control any sharp popular reaction because they control internal communications and each area contains too small a fraction of the population to start a successful revolt.

The Organization's discipline most strongly sets it apart from the rest of Khmer society. Hanging overall, the discipline restricts travel, insists cadre adopt "revolutionary names" to ensure security, and demands punctual, scheduled performance of all tasks according to set procedures. An individual who tries hard but fails despite following instructions still takes the blame because the party does not make mistakes. The discipline demands self-reliance and emphasizes "mastery of the task at hand" and never depending on foreigners.⁵³ Radio Phnom Penh has strongly stressed the ideal of self-reliance during the past year.

Ith Sarin laid out the program for building the kind of cadre which Ieng Sary (above) said the movement needs. All personnel of the "Angkar," including military and ordinary peasants, engage in weekly criticism and self-criticism sessions aimed to root out "individualistic, personal" character traits. Cadre also perform required manual activities such as chopping firewood and helping out during the agricultural cycle, all the while carefully watching each other for non-revolutionary behavior in eating, drinking, talking, late-rising, etc. This combination of criticism/self-criticism for all and manual activities for the cadre aims to build proper socialists and prepares the cadre to endure future hardships.

The party clearly analyzed and condemned the gap which traditional officialdom created between themselves and the people off whom they lived. Cadre-building concentrated on forcing "Angkar" officials to "study from the people to become like the people."⁵⁴ The Organization attacked the chronic diseases of Khmer bureaucrats: officiousness, authoritarianism, and affecting a lifestyle different from that of the peasant. The approach contrasts markedly with the attitude of a middle-level Khmer Republican official who once asked why Americans cared so much for what Khmer peasants thought. In a hint of things to come, however, Ith Sarin also noted that the Organization had a saying about not always letting the people lead them around by the nose.

Khieu Samphan clearly sparked this approach to cadre-building. His own lifestyle on returning to Cambodia in 1959 and during the years when he served as a National Assembly Deputy strongly contrasted with the cognac and concubine circuit of his peers. As a newspaper publisher he seized every occasion to extol the simple life of the ordinary Khmer. A notable exposition of his views on officialdom used Sihanouk's own words, as was customary for government critics, to decry Cambodia's lack of qualified cadre. Khieu Samphan expanded on the idea by emphasizing that civil servants needed practical experience to back up their theory and that their

⁵³See Ith Sarin, *SPK*, pp. 48-60; Ieng Sary, interviewed in *Le Monde* of January 15, 1972, emphasizes the aim of self-reliance.

⁵⁴Ith Sarin, *SPK*, p. 48.

attitude toward the people "plays a great role." Giving lip service to Sihanouk's good example, he observed that most civil servants had abandoned "haughtiness and prideful attitudes." But, even with the correct attitude, civil servants also needed to know the innermost desires of the people. "To learn from the people is to perfect one's knowledge, to verify the theory learned at school by the experiences of life. It is to learn to really love the people." Bribery and corruption fade if the functionary respects the people, he concluded.⁵⁵

In March 1972 Hou Yuon outlined the qualities of cadre in terms which expanded on the ideas of Khieu Samphan and Ieng Sary and which Ith Sarin subsequently repeated. Speaking on the Voice of the NUFK Hou Yuon declared that, having been selected from the people, Front administrative cadre "live like anybody else, work like anybody else and understand the people . . . the administrative cadre are thoroughly indoctrinated in their duties to serve the people by means of mass activities as well as by teaching them about the morality of patriots . . . which are based on love for the people, respect for the people, and loyalty to the people. The people are served wholeheartedly and with utmost sincerity . . . politely and courteously treated and not as if being treated by dictators, officials, or military autocrats. The opinions of the collective groups are respected and the solidarity between the cadre and the people is upheld."⁵⁶

Cadre development and building the peasantry also depended on party education. Political education took place at special political study schools, at work, at conferences and informal lectures. Educational documents emanated from the party central committee.⁵⁷ The Organization tailored education to the political sophistication of the students. Ith Sarin wrote that Front cadre used documents appropriate for Sihanoukism. The more politically-aware studied documents dealing with the division of Khmer society into classes; class struggle; mass view; building proletarian principles; criticism and self-criticism, and others.⁵⁸

The party's own 1973 analysis of class divisions of Khmer society put a "feudal, imperialistic, capitalist, reactionary, and oppressor class" over an oppressed class of "worker-farmers, poor and lower-middle peasants."⁵⁹ Radio Phnom Penh echoed this earlier formulation when an April 1975 Special National Congress acknowledged that the chief winners of the 17 April victory were "the people--especially workers, poor and lower-middle farmers, and other laborers in the rural areas and towns comprising more than 95 per cent of the entire Cambodian population."⁶⁰ Ith Sarin especially remarked on the particular attention cadre performing manual labor gave to poor farmers and said such help gained the party far more support than instruction in political theory did.⁶¹

Further analysis concentrated on land rents and rural indebtedness. "Feudal landowners," according to the party, exploited poor and lower-middle peasants through rents for fields and interest on borrowed money.⁶² Although only this one source cites the problem, apparently the modern party restricts class enemies to the category of landlord. Hu Nim's Sihanouk-era doctoral thesis, as outlined below, clearly

⁵⁵*L'Observateur* (Phnom Penh), November 13, 1959, carries the comment under the headline "The Civil Servant and Social Progress."

⁵⁶FBIS-APA, IV, No. 62 (March 29, 1973) from the Voice of NUFK in Khmer of March 25, 1973.

⁵⁷Ith Sarin, *SPK*, p. 67e

⁵⁸Ith Sarin, *SPK*, p. 65e

⁵⁹*Y-YP*, p. 13.

⁶⁰FBIS-APA, IV, No. 82 (April 28, 1975)

⁶¹Ith Sarin, *SPK*, p. 59.

⁶²*Y-YP*, p. 15

added "rich peasants" to the exploiting class. For comparison, the Vietnamese communists limit class enemies to landlords, i.e., those who live entirely from rents; while the Chinese add "rich peasants," defined as those who can individually farm only part of their large holdings and must hire labor or rent out the rest.⁶³ The Vietnamese still acknowledge the existence of "rich peasants" while Cambodian radio now mentions only "poor and lower-middle peasants."

Khieu Samphan stated his view of the landlord and rural indebtedness problems in his 1959 doctoral dissertation.⁶⁴ Hu Nim tried to document the situation with statistics from the 1962 census in part of his own dissertation in 1965.⁶⁵ Khieu Samphan also used his newspaper, *L'Observateur*, to publish the conclusions he reached in his thesis.⁶⁶ In Khieu Samphan's belief, an unfavorable balance of payments and transfer of the multiplier effect⁶⁷ abroad due to the importation of needed industrial material severely hampered Cambodia's own industrialization. The integration of the Khmer economy into international commodity and capital markets caused the deficit due to a growing Western absolute advantage in industrial products and consequent decline in the value of Cambodia's exports of primary products. Cambodia's "pre-capitalist" production, both agricultural and artisanal, proved unable to compete, and he noted a trend for population density on arable land to increase, exacerbating the already excessive leisure of Khmer farmers.⁶⁸ Landowners sharpened their exploitation of peasants to get more export products for foreign markets. Usurers, whom Khieu Samphan asserts generally include landowners or wholesale commission dealers, profit by a decline in the well-being of artisans and peasants who are unable to compete with foreign goods to lend money at usurious rates. The import/export business also sparks the formation of a whole new field of intermediate-commerce middlemen. The Chinese might have become national bourgeoisie, favoring the development of independent national capitalism, he adds, but international integration causes them to become the middlemen.⁶⁹ The "rich" classes then increase consumption of imported luxury goods and intensify accumulation of wealth in specie and gems causing the balance of payments deficits.⁷⁰

Khieu Samphan proposed structural changes to turn "landowners, middlemen and loan sharks" into a class of "agricultural or industrial capitalist entrepreneurs."

⁶³David P. Elliott, "Revolutionary Re-Integration: A Comparison of the Foundation of Post Liberation Political Systems in North Vietnam and China" (Doctoral Dissertation, Cornell University, 1976). For a more detailed definition of Chinese rural social structure see Theodore Chen (ed.), *The Chinese Communist Regime: Documents and Commentary* (New York, 1967), pp. 204-205.

⁶⁴Khieu Samphan, "The Economy of Cambodia and Its Problems with Industrialization" (Translation by U.S. Dept. of State, Doctoral Dissertation, University of Paris, 1959)e

⁶⁵Hu Nim, "Les Services Publics Economiques au Cambodge" (Doctoral Dissertation, Royal University of Phnom Penh, 1965)e

⁶⁶For example, in a series of articles in *L'Observateur* (Phnom Penh) which began 7 June 1960, entitled "Le Commerce Exterieur du Cambodge."

⁶⁷Khieu Samphan refers here to the effect produced when a given income is consumed and saved. The amount consumed becomes income of others in a repeating pattern which effectively results in a greater total income than the original input. If the income goes to foreigners, the effect occurs abroad with no benefit to Cambodia.

⁶⁸Khieu Samphan, "The Economy," p. 26.

⁶⁹*Ibide*, pp. 46-47.

⁷⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 55-57.

The government would force reductions in land rents and interest rates, inducing landowners to "reorganize holdings and institute more capital-intensive practices and wage labor. Such a profound transformation would demand "a whole system of very severe measures," starting with the tight control of foreign trade.⁷¹ In addition, both large landholders and peasants would be educated to see the need for the reforms.⁷²

In the rural areas, lowering land and interest rates, both essential to restoring peasant morale, needed not only tough government decrees but also government-backed peasant action. Fighting usury, Khieu Samphan continues, required the organization of autonomous peasant credit cooperatives, "managed and run by the peasants themselves."⁷³ In order to increase production, Khieu Samphan saw a need systematically to generalize the traditional Khmer peasant practice of working in teams of several families for mutual aid during transplanting and harvesting. "Mutual aid could be engaged in at first for a specific job, then gradually expanded until it becomes the rule; it could help in the establishment of production cooperatives in the villages . . . [the] production cooperatives could spread centrifugally."⁷⁴ The peasant association, he later elaborated, should unite peasants at the level of their community using the framework of the Khum with the aim that the number of such associations should equal the number of Khum.⁷⁵

Hu Nim, working on a more substantial statistical base, gave a more precise analysis of Cambodia's agrarian structures. He set forth a division of Khmer landowners on the basis of the realities of returns to agriculture in Cambodia. In his schema, "landed proprietors" owned ten or more hectares of land but did not work it themselves, instead living by "exploiting the peasants" through rents or sharecropping. Usurers fit in this group. "Rich peasants" also owned land but exploited part and rented out the rest; they generally used wage labor and lived well on holdings of more than five hectares. "Middle peasants" owned from 2 to 5 hectares which they and their families worked without outside help and had elementary agricultural implements. They sometimes rented additional land to feed their large families. "Poor peasants" who formed "the great majority" may have owned a bit of land but no tools, or tools but no land. They rented or sharecropped to make ends meet. If they owned land, they had less than one hectare of market gardens on the river banks or less than two hectares in the inland rice areas. Finally, a class of "agricultural wage-earners" owned neither land nor tools and sold its labor.⁷⁶ This last group, the "agricultural proletariat," accounted for 6.6 per cent of the active population or 156,700 people, by 1962 census figures.⁷⁷ Hu Nim's categories and definitions basically duplicate the Chinese communist analysis of class structure in the countryside.⁷⁸ His open use of this Chinese model came at a time when Sihanouk's Cambodia and the People's Republic enjoyed very close relations. Indeed, Hu Nim became a vice-president and then president of the Sino-Cambodian Friendship Association until September 1967, when Sihanouk disbanded it in the wake of the Cultural Revolution,

⁷¹Khieu Samphan, "The Economy," p. 69.

⁷²*L'Observateur* (Phnom Penh), August 2, 1960.

⁷³Khieu Samphan, "The Economy," p. 104; and *L'Observateur* (Phnom Penh), February 12, 1960.

⁷⁴Khieu Samphan, "The Economy," pp. 105-106.

⁷⁵*L'Observateur* (Phnom Penh), February 12, 1960.

⁷⁶Hu Nim, "Les Services," pp. 96-97.

⁷⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 97-98.

⁷⁸Theodore Chen (ed.), *The Chinese Communist Regime*, pp. 204-205.

charging Chinese interference in Cambodian internal affairs. Hu Nim then joined Khieu Samphan and Hou Yuon in the bush.

Hu Nim paid close attention to land tenancy and particularly to sharecropping and renting land. He noted that Khmer landholding, despite its fragmentation, tended toward concentration especially over the previous ten years. Although he admitted that the division of land into small parcels dominated both riverbank holdings and paddies in the fertile regions, "nevertheless, the tendency toward a concentration is marked, not only in the new areas of extension, but likewise, in still limited proportion, on the fragmented regions themselves."⁷⁹

Proving a tendency for land to concentrate in large holdings along riverbanks escaped him. He cited census figures for 1962 which showed that 31 per cent of the 836,000 agricultural families owned only 5 per cent of the cultivated land and noted that 86 per cent of all families owned fewer than 5 hectares each. In 1956, 92 per cent of the 727,000 farming families owned less than 5 hectares; accordingly, he argued that "the number [*sic*] of small landowners decreased while that of middle and large landowners increased."⁸⁰ In fact, the population increase meant that the number of small holders actually increased from 669,000 families in 1956 (92 per cent of 727,000) to 718,000 in 1962 (86 per cent of 835,000). The extension of ricelands, incomplete tenure records and major discrepancies between figures for land owned and land actually sowed further complicates the picture.

Hu Nim concluded that the fragmented tenure structure with its tendency toward concentration poses problems. The "feeble development" of capitalism in Cambodia forestalled the production-increasing technological benefits of concentrated holdings in favor of speculation in land including renting and sharecropping.⁸¹ Land rent from sharecropping and the system of rent fixed in specie or, more usually, in paddy before planting, "is the direct exploitation by *landed proprietors* and *rich peasants* of the poorest stratum of the peasants."⁸² Hu Nim argued that the 1962 census figures on renting and sharecropping did not accurately reflect the situation since many of the very small landowners had to rent land or sell their labor in order to subsist. He estimated that 25 per cent of the agricultural families rented or were sharecroppers.⁸³

These two analyses here primarily serve to show a continuity between the ideas and programs of the party in the 1970s and those of two leading leftists of the late 1950s and 1960s. If accurate, however, the analyses could indicate the extent of rural discontent and provide grounds for peasants to support the revolution independent of Sihanouk's popularity. Khieu Samphan, for example, claimed to see a "rural explosion" in the making due to agrarian structural imbalance.⁸⁴ Ith Sarin, on the other hand, described both NVA/VC and Khmer Rouge tactics to mobilize the peasantry by using Sihanouk's great popularity.⁸⁵

Independent study of Khmer agriculture and land tenure both refutes and supports elements of the Khieu Samphan-Hu Nim thesis. On the basis of research during

⁷⁹Hu Nim, "Les Services" p. 85e

⁸⁰*Ibid.*, p. 88.

⁸¹*Ibid.*, p. 89.

⁸²*Ibid.*, p. 95, with my emphasis added.

⁸³*Ibid.*, p. 96.

⁸⁴Khieu Samphan, "The Economy," p. 61e

⁸⁵Ith Sarin, *SPK*, pp. 74-75.

the 1950s, Jean Delvert did not cite landlords among the problems of the Khmer peasant. Rural debt, he noted, mounted as peasants bought on credit against part of their harvest or borrowed money for other needs such as the heavy expenses of cremations. Delvert suggests, however, that peasants "did not find their domination by traders too onerous and could support their victimization by usurers."⁸⁶ He maintained this view in 1970 after numerous field trips to Cambodia since publishing his 1961 classic, *Le Paysan Cambodgien*.⁸⁷

In law, the farmer who tilled land for five consecutive years became its owner, thereby assuring the rights of the man who put the plow to the ground. This basis of land tenure did not change. What did change was the size of peasant holdings as more and more children inherited smaller and smaller parcels, especially in the well-watered areas. In the mid-1960s, for example, a study of a Khum along the Mekong in densely populated Kompong Cham province showed that private owners divided 83 per cent of the farmland into over 6,000 fragmented holdings averaging just over one-quarter hectare apiece.⁸⁸ The Khum included 1,500 houses and total land in private hands reached 1,600 hectares, but, as residents owned land in other Khum and outsiders owned land in the Khum under study, calculation of average landholding proved impossible.

A United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) expert's report based on work in 1967 and 1968 concluded that "direct owner cultivation is the widest spread mode of exploitation."⁸⁹ However, the study noted that "it is impossible to determine the number of exploiters and the area they exploit, either in direct cultivation or by renting and sharecropping. It will be necessary to await the 1970 census to get an idea."⁹⁰ In Svay Rieng province the study examined 111 properties larger than 20 hectares and found that 76 of these "great landed proprietors," in Hu Nim's terms, cultivated all their own land.⁹¹ Where tenancy held, sharecropping prevailed and generally demanded 50 per cent of the harvest, a much heavier rate than that charged to rent the land before planting. Significantly, the calculation of returns to agriculture showed that sharecropping on poor rice fields of Kompong Speu province, a badly watered, infertile area, produces a very heavy monthly deficit. Owner cultivation in Kompong Speu netted a disposable monthly surplus (after subtracting consumption requirements) which equaled that of sharecroppers on rich land in Battambang

⁸⁶Jean Delvert, *Le Paysan Cambodgien* (Paris, 1961), pp. 652-653. The statement is part of his conclusions and in context reads, "The peasant, does he want to [intensify agricultural practices and diversify crops]? Everywhere, in effect, they are the masters of the land. Small holders exploiting directly with the help of their families. A true peasantry therefore. Rural Democracy rare in Asia. Dominated by the trader certainly, but served by him likewise and less burdensome, perhaps, than one might think. Victim of usury certainly, but the usurer here is not the great landowner and he is more easily borne."

⁸⁷Jean Delvert, "Les Paysans Cambodgiens dans la Tourmente," *Le Figaro* (Paris), July 2, 1970.

⁸⁸Milada Kalab, "Study of a Cambodian Village," *Geographical Journal* (London), 134, No. 4 (December 1968), pp. 521-523. The king, kingdom and wats owned the remaining 17 per cent of the land.

⁸⁹Rene Lefebvre, *Rapport sur l'Economie Agricole du Royaume du Cambodge* (Phnom Penh, 1968), p. 97.

⁹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 100.

⁹¹*Ibid.*

province. Owner cultivation in Battambang produced a disposable surplus four times greater than sharecropping.⁹²

By 1968 the lands along the riverbanks had diversified into green beans, sesame, tobacco, maize, and other market garden crops. The shift was well underway even in 1963 at which time the per hectare return from these crops was double to quadruple that of paddy.⁹³ Finally, the FAO expert's study tried to compare rural returns with urban salaries but could only say that 68 per cent of farmers gained less than 1,000 riels/month while only 29 per cent of urban wage-earners made less than that.⁹⁴

In Delvert's time Chinese rural creditors could not take land since it could not be alienated. Instead they took part of the harvest which their urban Chinese connections ideally fixed them to market. By 1966, however, Cambodia's cooperative movement had enrolled a third of the farming families. The cooperatives extended credit, provided storage for paddy to keep supply and hence price smoother over a longer period of time or for eventual purchase by the national export company, and ran reasonably priced stores.⁹⁵ All of these activities sought to undercut the rural trader and moneylender. The FAO study, however, noted very poor reimbursement rates for cooperative loans. Although unable to estimate the scale of recourse to usurious loans, the FAO expert noted that the 12 per cent monthly interest rate during the agricultural season particularly weighed on the regions poorest in soil; he argued that peasants paid the moneylender first, thus explaining the poor rate of cooperative loan repayment. The moneylender supplied year-round needs for consumption as well as loans for production, and the peasant recognized his priority for repayment⁹⁶

Although much more can probably be done with even the poor data available, the independent studies lead to a mixed reception of the Khieu Samphan-HuoNim analysis. Specifically, landlordism does not emerge as a major national problem, although in some areas peasants engaged totally in sharecropping must have felt severe pressure. Peasants on the lower end of rural revenues must also have made invidious comparisons between their lot and that of city dwellers, particularly as they entered the city for seasonal work, for example as cyclo (pedicab) pedaller. A fourfold difference in surplus income from rich riceland in Battambang may also have galled, depending on how the owner cultivator distributed his surplus; that is, whether he in fact spent it on luxury imports or rather on the local wat and/or rites of passage for his children in which his neighbors participated. All in all, the case for a national rural tinderbox remains to be proved.

One area, however, produced significant rural unrest during the Sihanouk era. Putting outlying arable land into production often demanded heavy investment in irrigation and/or large-scale land clearing. These outlying areas developed the Sihanouk era's largest landholdings as Khmer officials and Khmer of Chinese origin began large-scale mechanized riziculture in northern Battambang province in the 1950s. In southwest Battambang province land questions unclearly entered into a March-April 1967 peasant uprising around Samlaut. In recent years, Sihanouk has claimed that then Prime Minister Lon Nol's troops sparked the revolt by trying to evict peasant

⁹²Rene Lefebvre, *Rapport*, pp. 226-227.

⁹³My analysis from figures in the Ministère de l'Agriculture's *Bulletin de la Statistique des Etudes Agricoles* (Phnom Penh, 1963)

⁹⁴Rene Lefebvre, *Rapport*, p. 236.

⁹⁵Remy Prud'homme, *L'Economie du Cambodge* (Paris, 1969), pp. 188-191 and Table 60, p. 278.

⁹⁶Rene Lefebvre, *Rapport*, pp. 72 and 76.

cultivators from lands they had cleared, in favor of high government official deed-holders.⁹⁷ At the time of the outbreak, however, the Prince told the nation that Khmer Rouge were attacking members of his youth league farming on areas which the Viet Minh had held earlier and that the "Reds" had also hit a number of provincial guard posts and burned bridges. Sihanouk gave Lon Nol orders to suppress the outbreak and led the invective against Khieu Samphan and Hou Yuon which caused them to flee to the bush in late April 1967 where Hu Nim, as noted above, joined them later in the year.⁹⁸ The Prince also excoriated the governor of Battambang, promising to transfer him and end corruption in the provincial administration. Whatever the reality, the PKK has seized on the Samlaut revolt as a milestone marking its return to armed struggle and, presumably, as proof of the accuracy of its class analysis.

Since 1970 the party has increasingly pressed for greater collectivization of agriculture. Land reform led the Chinese and Vietnamese efforts to collectivize agriculture and information from Cambodia suggests that the Khmer, too, instituted land reform where applicable. In areas where they regrouped population during the war, the Khmer Rouge, however, apparently skipped directly into more advanced stages of collectivization.

Ieng Sary told a North Vietnamese interviewer in January 1972 that land rent still existed but was much reduced in zones under NUFK control and that usurious interest rates were forbidden.⁹⁹ Moreover, part of the produce of state-farmed lands of landowners forced to be absent from their farms for reasons other than "treason" were put aside against their return. Peasants without land could work lands left idle by those fighting for the NUFK against payment of a small rente. The NUFK, Ieng Sary added, encouraged the creation of production and consumption cooperatives to eliminate middlemen. For agricultural production they developed many mutual aid movements among the peasants, he said, in a possible echo of Khieu Samphan's suggestion to systematize traditional mutual aid groupse

Details of sweeping land reforms in 1972 come from rural Kampot province in southeastern Cambodia.¹⁰⁰ In Kompong Trach district authorities limited individual ricefield holdings to five hectares and market garden fields to one hectaree. The Khmer Rouge confiscated paddies over that limit and gave them to people with fewer than five hectares or to People's Associations in the villagese. Local governments kept control over excess orchards and market garden holdingse. In more heavily populated Kandal province the authorities confiscated all land and then parcelled it out in one-hectare plots per family.

Collectivization operated in two different systemse. The lowest level of government, an "inter-family group" composed of 12-15 families headed by a group chairman whom the hamlet chief picked, implemented the task of agricultural production. In one system, starting in 1972 the individual family kept responsibility for tilling a particular piece of riceland but the entire group harvested together and stored the paddy at a central pointe. The group chairman distributed an equal daily ratione of rice. The village government bought the surplus and the chairman kept the money

⁹⁷Norodom Sihanouk and Wilfred Burchett, *My War with the CIA* (Baltimore, 1973), pp. 62-63.

⁹⁸FBIS, *Daily Report* for April 6, 13 and for May 5, 1967 carry the text of Sihanouk's speeches on the uprising, attacks on the leftist Deputies, and announcement of their disappearance.

⁹⁹*Le Courrier du Viet Nam* (Hanoi) January 31, 1972e

¹⁰⁰Quinn, "The Khmer Krahom," pp. 27-29, 33, provides the material for this and the following paragraph.

for special needs such as medicine or farm equipment. In the other system the group held land in common and all aspects of rice-growing took place in common from plowing to harvesting. Distribution of produce was the same. Areas in which villages had resettled all used the second system.

Elsewhere in Cambodia in late 1972 peasants living northwest of Kompong Speu could and did withdraw from collective experiments. At that time, a collective meant common storehouses and paddy fields; small groups of villagers lived in collectivity with the aim of awakening a socialist consciousness among peasants.¹⁰⁰

Ieng Sary's description points to the institution of lower-level agricultural production cooperatives, a stage of collectivization wherein the division of produce depends to a degree on the capital in land or tools which a peasant initially provides. The actual situation in southeastern Cambodia from 1972 argues for a transition to a higher level stage with equal division of produce and more holdings in common. In 1976 Radio Phnom Penh outlined the function of "peasant production cooperatives," a more inclusive concept than the "solidarity group for increasing production"¹⁰² featured so prominently just after the Khmer Rouge took control of Cambodia. Divided into solidarity groups of about ten families each,¹⁰³ the production cooperative, "now assuming the nature of a Phum (hamlet)," mobilizes basic peasant forces to conduct production work in all fields; handles communication and transport of its products; deals with education, culture, welfare, and sanitation; barter for goods, ensures security, and inculcates in the peasantry the Organization's political, economic, military, social, and cultural lines.¹⁰⁴ The Khmer have apparently moved their basic agricultural decision-making center from the equivalent of the production team (the inter-family or solidarity group) up to the echelon of the hamlet during the year. The evidence, mainly refugee reports, suggests that distribution of production now depends entirely on work rather than capital input which means, if true, that the Khmer have also moved from the lower level to higher level agricultural production cooperatives throughout the country in the astonishing space of one year.

In contrast, the Chinese spent the first half of the 1950s installing qualified rural cadre before they moved to this higher level which preceded their unhappy experience with communes.¹⁰⁵ The North Vietnamese also moved cautiously on cooperativization. From 1958 to 1960 they moved all cooperatives into the lower level stage. By 1965 half the cooperatives should have moved to the higher level. As for size, by mid-1961 three-fourths of Vietnamese cooperatives had reached the point where the hamlet became the headquarters for distribution of work assignments and compensation.

¹⁰¹Ith Sarin, "Nine Months," p. 12.

¹⁰²Since their victory Radio Phnom Penh has claimed that solidarity groups for increasing production formed in 1973. The earliest contemporary reference I have seen dates to September 1974 and describes solidarity groups for increasing production in the Samlaut area. See NUFK Information Office (Peking), "Samleñ vidyu ranasirs ruap ruam jāti kambujā," 152 (September 23, 1974). The term "peasant production cooperative" appeared in early 1976 and has been shortened in recent radio broadcasts to "peasant cooperative." Radio Phnom Penh claimed May 19, 1974 as the founding date of the peasant cooperative. See FBIS, May 21, 1976 report of a May 20 Phnom Penh radio broadcast on the subject.

¹⁰³William Shawcross, "Cambodia," p. 26.

¹⁰⁴FBIS-APA, IV, No. 23 (February 3, 1976). FBIS originally translated the cooperatives as "assuming the nature of a village"; checking their tape resulted in confirmation of the term "Phum (hamlet)" instead.

¹⁰⁵Franz Schurman and Orville Schell, *The China Reader: Communist China* (New York, 1967), p. 175.

The Vietnamese have kept accounting at this level as a matter of best agricultural management. In 1961 the Chinese lowered their level of accounting to the production team, which in China has the same size as the Vietnamese hamlet and may be the most rational basic decision-making element to ensure agricultural efficiency.¹⁰⁶ Khieu Samphan's 1960 contention that cooperatives should function at the level of the Khum hints that the Khmer may try to raise the managerial headquarters to a higher echelon at some point in the future.

That production cooperatives become like hamlets suggests the nature of party-sponsored changes in traditional settlement, religious support and activity patterns. Traditionally residents saw a Phum as a group of houses supporting a particular monastery.¹⁰⁷ The PKK, however, has treated the Sangha with varying degrees of harshness. A refugee with whom I talked in mid-1975 said that in Kompong Cham province older monks could remain at the wat while younger monks were required to rejoin secular life. Other refugees talked of entire monasteries being emptied. The 1976 Constitution ends Buddhism's role as the state religion, declaring that everyone has freedom of worship except of "reactionary" religions, or has freedom not to worship at all. New settlement areas most probably do not devote resources, now collectively owned, to build monasteries, and the production cooperative apparently serves to replace the ritual and ceremonial center of the local wat as the focus for social organization.

In a country as underpopulated as Cambodia, concern should lie with control of manpower, a traditional Southeast Asian aim, rather than the more Western attention to control of territory. Both elements figured in the war as the result of more "Westernized" leadership on both sides. The Khmer Rouge and the Republicans both initially went all-out to gain control of as many people as possible. The Lon Nol government welcomed refugees whom it could not feed without outside help.¹⁰⁸ At the same time, the Republicans refused to give up outlying positions which they could resupply only with the greatest difficulty. In 1972 the Khmer Rouge raided Republican territory after population and would relocate entire villages deep in their zones.¹⁰⁹

The Khmer Rouge changed this pattern in 1973 by emphasizing quality of control rather than sheer numbers. They took advantage of opportunities to gather population which their military activity created for them. But, they less and less specifically aimed military activities at population-gathering and more at meeting Republican troops and cutting lines of supply.¹¹⁰ Ith Sarin, on the basis of experience in

¹⁰⁶David P. Elliott, "Revolutionary Re-Integration," pp. 460-462 and 513-514.

¹⁰⁷Milada Kalab, "Study," pp. 523 and 529.

¹⁰⁸At a 21 November 1974 press conference, Khmer Republican Prime Minister Long Boret reported that 350,000 refugees entered his government's zone in 1974 alone. U.S. bombing had ended in August 1973 and military action centered around Phnom Penh and lower Route 4 to the Gulf of Siam during the 1973-1974 dry season. Refugees took advantage of thinner Khmer Rouge control to flee to Republican zones, aided by aggressive patrolling, particularly from the Kompong Thom enclave. See also Donald Kirk, "Revolution and Political Violence in Cambodia," in Joseph Zasloff (ed.), *Communism in Indochina* (Lexington, Mass., 1975), p. 225.

¹⁰⁹*Nokor Thom* (Phnom Penh), July 11, 1972, discusses kidnapping of villagers in Kandal and Takeo provinces.

¹¹⁰The single greatest increase in population for the Khmer Rouge in 1973 came when they penetrated to within 100 meters of the governor's mansion at Kompong Cham city after a two-week siege. After taking the bulk of the provincial capital, they

1972, wrote of the Khmer Rouge's refined approach toward the people. By late 1973 and early 1974, Khmer refugees into both South Vietnam and the Kompong Thom enclave spoke of harsh rule and frequent killings.^{d11} Sometime in 1973 the party apparently decided to accelerate its program to alter Khmer society and expected its discipline to hold back the peasant migrations which have been the time-honored rural answer to repressive government.

In the absence of party documents, the reasons for the shift, which included more rigorous collectivization and an accelerated denigration of Sihanouk, remain uncertain. But, three momentous events occurred by mid-1973 which probably forced the party's hand. The first, the Paris Accords, created considerable confusion in the Sihanouk-Khmer Rouge alliance. The Prince indicated flexibility just after the signing, citing "friends" who argued against continued bellicosity while others built peace. He returned to public intransigence while in Hanoi for Tet the following week, presumably because the insurgency in Cambodia had slapped him down. The PKK must have feared for the constancy of its Chinese and Vietnamese allies at this point. The second event, Sihanouk's short visit to Khmer Rouge-controlled Cambodia, must have sharpened the party's appreciation of his continuing popularity among the mass.

Finally, the reality of the end of American bombing took hold. The Khmer Rouge, as noted above, attacked Phnom Penh in full force in June and July 1973, despite the imminent halt of American air support for their enemies.^e Fear that the Vietnamese would sell them out in a final solution to the war in Vietnam before the next dry season made conditions suitable for a renewed offensive may have influenced the Khmer Rouge decision to attack the capital. The Vietnamese, however, finally concretely showed their continuing support by furnishing heavy weapons units to assist in the siege of Kompong Cham in August and early September. Their decision to do so must have been made earlier in the summer, perhaps by mid-July when the Khmer Rouge had demonstrated their capability by rolling up FANK garrisons along Route 6 to the vital road junction with Route 7 at Skoun on the way to Kompong Cham. Breathing easier with assured Vietnamese logistical and heavy weapons support, the Khmer Rouge would have had the leisure to gauge their progress, which had included deep penetration of Republican lines and even a brief closing of the Mekong, and realize the corollary poor performance and leadership of most Republican troops. Victory must have seemed as near as the next dry season offensive.

The formal manifestation of a policy shift appeared in July 1973 when the "First National Congress" of several hundred delegates, including monks, noted the increasing success of Khmer Rouge arms, and decided that the U.S. military intervention must end and that the RGNU/NUFK must replace the Republicans as the sole and unique representatives of the Khmer nation and people.^{d12} Subsequent events have shown that such Congresses serve as vehicles for popular ratification of key political decisions. The February 1975 Second National Congress publicly reaffirmed the

led over 15,000 people away before Republican reinforcements arrived and pushed them out. Toward the end of the year the Khmer Rouge cut Route 5 between Phnom Penh and Battambang and kept the road closed until they won. They had also rolled up Republican garrison towns on Routes 6 and 7 from Phnom Penh to Kompong Cham before they hit the town itself.

¹¹¹Donald Kirk, "Revolution," p. 222, and Sheldon Simon, "The Khmer Resistance: External Relations 1973-1974," p. 199 and footnote 4, p. 211. Both are in Zasloff (ed.), *Communism in Indochina*.

¹¹²FBIS, *Daily Report*, No. 142, July 24, 1973 reporting the July 21, 1973 Statement of the National Congress from the Voice of the NUFK.

decision to fight until total victory and privately, I believe, ratified the decision to evacuate the urban population. The immediately post-victory Special National Congress decided to retain Sihanouk and Penn Nouth as formal leaders and promulgated the party analysis of Khmer class society, laying the groundwork for the new Constitution. The December 1975 Third National Congress ratified the Constitution, thus effectively abolishing the monarchy and ending Buddhism's role as the state religion. Before victory, key political decisions would have required secrecy and the unpublished internal decisions of the First Congress likely dealt with the change in attitude toward Sihanouk and an accelerated program of collectivization and rural control in the interest of increased production and peasant political development.¹¹³

Both the Khmer Issarak and Sihanouk himself laid the groundwork for such a use of National Congresses. In order to outflank the National Assembly, in 1957 Sihanouk proposed that the Fourth National Congress of the Sangkum should be the nation's policy-making body. He has written that the Pracheachon immediately supported the idea "for they had once proposed something similar."¹¹⁴ Earlier still, the Khmer Issarak claimed that in April 1950 two hundred representatives of the people and members of the Buddhist clergy met in a "People's Congress" and officially recognized the Viet Minh-oriented wing as "the only national united front."¹¹⁵ The Cambodian People's Representative Assembly elected 20 March 1976 presumably marks an end to the need for such congresses since the Assembly represents both the people and the army.

Conclusions

A communist party exists in Cambodia with the leading role in the revolution. The party sees itself as stemming back to the First Indochina War, with 1951 as the date of its founding. Most of its present leading personalities grew up during and after that war and early party figures have disappeared, perhaps to honored obscurity. A few leaders left from the 1940s may now begin to emerge in more prominent positions. Major leaders spent considerable time in the bush before 1970 and worked closely with the North Vietnamese during the five years of war after Sihanouk's overthrow, but nothing indicates they will compromise Cambodia's independence. They actually maintain a wary attitude toward their eastern neighbors.

Independent analyses of rural Cambodia do not support key elements of party agrarian class analysis. The party analysis and programs show a continuity from the writings of Khieu Samphan and Hu Nim in the late 1950s to mid-1960s. No direct evidence, however, puts these men in the party at the time of their writings. They both emerged as leaders in the party and in the government of wartime and postwar Cambodia.

The rigid implementation of party programs suggests a relative lack of qualified cadre who could be entrusted with a more pragmatic implementation of party policy. The brutal implementation of a forced back-to-the-land program since April

¹¹³Sihanouk felt the shift as evidenced by his intemperate remarks to journalists at the September 1973 Algiers Non-Aligned Conference and especially his remarks to Alain Bouc in *Le Monde* (Paris), October 27, 1973, which cast doubt on his future place under the Khmer Rouge. His earlier interview with Oriana Fallaci in the *New York Times*, August 12, 1973 (Magazine section) produced the memorable phrase, "The Khmer Rouge will spit me out like a cherry stone" when they had done with him. Such comments went far to undermine the RGNU case to replace the Khmer Republic at the 1973 UN General Assembly.

¹¹⁴Sihanouk and Burchett, *My War*, p. 98.

¹¹⁵*Khmer Armed Resistance*, p. 13.

1975 at least partly reflects inadequate control owing to a lack of administrative cadre. More sophisticated party levels probably recognize the hardships but argue that such methods, Cambodia's low population, and its plentiful land can combine to bring agricultural production back into surplus. With surplus restored, discontent and internal security needs should decline and the party will have more leisure to develop the cadre necessary for a genuine revolution of Khmer social values.

Elements of organization and ideology have emerged in domestic radio broadcasts at an accelerating rate. Class analysis appeared in 1975, and Marxism-Leninism in 1976. The new Constitution abolished the monarchy and the role of Buddhism in early 1976. Increasing steps toward collectivization used the model of youth to decry the concept of private property in March 1976. Emphasis on production cooperatives provides the framework for collective ownership of land and factories which the Constitution ordains. Youthful disdain for private property despite Constitutional tolerance of private ownership of "everyday items" suggests that the party envisions further qualitative stages of collectivization. Entering such stages would require some preparation, including in theory a constitutional amendment, and the party will probably first consolidate and geographically expand the present stage of collectivization at the administrative level of the Phum first.

The party still obscures its ties to the government, hiding behind the "revolutionary organization." Ith Sarin believed that "communism is recognized by the masses as a regime both inconceivable and incompatible with the national society."¹¹⁶ The party may indeed fear popular reaction to the impact of the full weight of the word "communism," particularly if people associate it with the harsh living conditions that now prevail. The party may also be subject to the inertia of having operated through a screen as it did in the days of the Pracheachon and through the Organization. Internationally, Democratic Kampuchea's Constitution establishes neutrality among the attributes of the nation, a position difficult to maintain credibly if the party openly announces its control. In all, however, the internal arguments for continued clandestine control seem most convincing. As the internal situation ripens with the education of cadre and the lessening need for tight internal security, the Communist Party of Kampuchea will undoubtedly publicly enter the international circle of fraternal communist parties.

¹¹⁶Ith Sarin, "Nine Months," p. 12.

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MANIFESTO OF THE PERIODICAL

REVOLUTIONARY YOUNG MEN AND WOMEN

(From *Yuvachun Nunq*
Yuvaneari Padevat,
No. 1, August 1973,
pp. 1-7.)

In our revolutionary movement today a great many young men and women have actively sought to join together in both the Alliance of Yuv.K.K. [Communist Youth of Kampuchea] and in patriotic organizations. And these numbers are continually growing in an orderly way. Today, all over the country, the membership of the Alliance of Yuv.K.K. counts by tens of thousands of people. In the offices and departments there are tens of thousands of young men and women. In the armed forces of all three categories (village militia, regional forces, regular forces) there are also a great many young men and women. Therefore, if we add them together all over the country, the number of young men and women in our revolutionary ranks adds to hundreds of thousands of people, whether Yuv.K.K., troops, in offices and departments both at the front lines and the rear ranks.

In sum, all young men and women in our revolutionary ranks have all received continuous constructive education from the party. Therefore, so far, the movement of young men and women has progressed forward both in building each individual and in building a movement of revolutionary struggle. Our many young men and women have joined in revolutionary activities on all battlefields both at the front lines and in rear areas in overflowing numbers.

In order to explode and push the movement of young men and women toward greater strength in accordance with the actual situation, in accordance with our revolutionary movement which is bounding ahead, our Communist Party of Kampuchea, even though pressed by other matters, nevertheless definitely needed to build an organ to educate-construct-nurture the principle of revolutionary political consciousness in our young men and women following the direction and the policy approach of the party in order that [this principle] becomes more clearly defined. That organ is this periodical *Revolutionary Young Men and Women* which appears monthly. This periodical is an organ of revolutionary youth and is under the aegis of the party.

The intentions of this periodical aim to serve revolutionary young men and women, taken together, but also to serve all progressive young men and women in the ranks, too. This periodical has a direction toward building our young men's and women's political consciousness and their implementation of assignments which will serve the movement to fight and strive in the front lines and the rear areas as well as in the offices and departments.

Therefore, this periodical is a periodical to lead, explode and push the movement of young men and women to do the concrete work of building-nurturing the principle of political consciousness of the party into the revolutionary youth organization and to acquire [for the youth movement] and spread experiences both in the matter of political consciousness and regarding the job of implementing various

assignments of the revolutionary youth organization. That is to say, [this periodical]

1. Politically, aims to disseminate, educate, nurture, orient political principles, strategic and tactical; the approach to people's war of the party; the party's economic approach; the party's socio-cultural approach and the party's foreign policy goals through concrete execution and with concrete experience of building the force of revolutionary young men and women.

2. Mentally, aims to disseminate, construct, nurture a revolutionary consciousness such as:

-- class consciousness, class struggle, division into classes so that our youth have a proper class philosophy;

-- righteous revolutionary precepts;

-- national pride, a proper patriotic spirit. Proletarian nationalism and internationalism of our revolutionary movement in order to explode the national principles of the worker class, of the party;

-- precepts of unremitting struggle both with the enemy and with nature and in building oneself in order to fulfill duties, large and small, which the party assigns in order to have maximum victory;

-- a spirit of serving the nation and people, especially the people of the base areas;

-- a revolutionary heroism in the task of fighting the enemy at the front lines, in increasing production in the rear areas, in fulfilling duties well in offices, etc.

-- a high spirit of collectivity, ridding oneself of individual interests in favor of the whole, etc.

3. In implementing assignments, aims to:

At the front lines explode and push young men and women who are combatants, who are messengers, who are medics, who carry ammunition, food, the wounded, etc. to overcome to fight, rushing to fulfill their individual duties to the maximum; to fight and strive as strongly as possible and always firmly.

In the rear areas explode and push the movement to increase production; the problem of solidarity with the people in general; the problem of doing a job with the people of the bases

-- increasing pride in the work of manual activities to become closer to the people of the bases;

-- exploding the spirit of the collectivity; spirit of economizing of collective goods and of time in the offices and departments and worksites and individual jobs.

In all, that is, the aim is of building reflexes of our youth toward the overall good and increasing their understanding and desire for manual activities; that is to say, changing their old worldview progressively and causing the adoption of a new, revolutionary worldview as a replacement.

To summarize, the periodical *Revolutionary Young Men and Women* has a direction toward building a stand of the political consciousness and implementation of assignments of the party and exploding the movement of young men and women so that it becomes increasingly vigorous and strong in the interest of serving the movement to fight and strive onward both at the front lines and in the rear areas. It also builds reserve strength for perpetuating the leadership of the revolutionary movement generally in the future by taking the revolutionary movement concretely, both at the front lines and in the rear areas and offices, and building it by means of the aspects of political consciousness and the task of implementing various assignments.

Therefore, the periodical *Revolutionary Young Men and Women* appeals to our dear readers to provide their personal assistance in news and many articles of various personal experiences to be printed in our periodical.

In conclusion, the periodical *Revolutionary Young Men and Women* wishes success to the brave young men and women of Kampuchea, wishes good health and strength and a quick intelligence as well as a strong principle of revolutionary political consciousness in order to raise the battle standard to fight and strive against the enemy on all fronts to be as strong as possible and continually gain new great victories!

Long Live the brave young men and women of Kampuchea!

Long Live the periodical *Revolutionary Young Men and Women!*

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF KAMPUCHEA
AND THE PROBLEM OF
KHMER YOUNG MEN AND WOMEN

*(From Yuwachun Nung
Yuvaneari Padevat
No. 1, August 1973,
pp. 9-20.)*

We raise this problem in order

-- that our youth might clearly understand the philosophy, principles, and activities of the oppressor classes which are imperialist, feudal, capitalist, and whose beliefs affect our youth;

-- that our youth might clearly understand the philosophy, principles, and activities of our Khmer Communist Party as concerns the youth of Kampuchea (Cambodia).

These desires aim to gather the strength of youth whether revolutionary farmer, worker, student, or intellectual for ever-increasing and closer solidarity with the nation, people, and armed forces for the liberation of the Khmer nation through fighting a peoples' war against American imperialists and their valets; fighting to liquidate the traitorous Lon Nol-Sirik Matak-Son Ngoc Thanh-In Tam and their clique; and struggling to wrest genuine independence, peace, and neutrality to build so that our beloved country becomes happy, bountiful, glorious, and powerful. That is the high ideal of our people, especially our youth who are the guarantors of, who have the responsibility for, the future destiny of the nation and people under the leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea.

* * *

Human society is divided into social classes: there is the oppressor class and the oppressed. In Khmer society, for example, each class has its own different economic and political interests. Therefore, each social class has a philosophy, principles, and activities specific to each problem, large or small, and different from other classes.

The oppressor class is imperialistic, feudal and capitalist in seeking to protect its own interests; it has a philosophy, principles and a mentality [or consciousness] such that [we] see the facts of aggression against other countries and the oppression of the worker-farmer class and the people described as "just" or "proper" etc.

The former French imperialism and the present American imperialism which has invaded and is oppressing our nation, people, and youth, which is bombing and slaughtering our people and youth in the most ferocious, violent way, both have said that they are helping "save" the nation, helping "defend" and promote the "well-being" of Kampuchea, etc.

The traitorous Lon Nol-Sirik Matak-Son Ngoc Thanh-In Tam and their clique is a militarist, fascist representative for the feudal, capitalist, and unparalleled reactionary class that serves as traitorous, country-selling valets of American imperialists. [The clique] opened its arms to American imperialists and to the Saigon/Bangkok traitors, shot and slaughtered the people and youth at will. As for them, they are corrupt fascists who seize youth and take them to be shot at in their place. They usually claim that they are "patriots," "saving the nation," "freedom-loving and democratic" and are "developing the country," etc.

The Khmer nation which is paying by the loss of its soil and independence; the Khmer people and youth, who are paying by the loss of liberty, democracy, their future, and who are oppressed by the American imperialists and the traitorous group, have a clear philosophy and principles that definitely require struggle to wrest independence, democracy, and their own future under the leadership of the Khmer Communist party. A struggle must take place in order to liberate the nation and people and youth; only then will progress be made toward building a plentiful, glorious and powerful nation.

The problem of youth is analogous. The imperialist, feudal, capitalist oppressor class, which has interests glued to aggression and oppression, also has its philosophy, principles, and activities toward youth in accord with its class interest.

The Communist Party of Kampuchea, the party of the working class, represents the interests of the worker-farmer class, of the people, and represents the interests of the nation and youth; [the party] also has a philosophy, principles, and activities which follow those of the nation, people, and classes which it represents.

What are the philosophy, principles, and activities of the imperialist, feudal, capitalist class toward the youth of our Kampuchea?

For a long time the imperialist, feudal, capitalist oppressor class has regarded youth, especially worker-farmer youth, poor and lower-middle peasants, as a source from which they can suck out their interests in the most delicious manner and as a major source of strength to perpetuate their oppression and protect their treasonous state power.

Imperialists, in their aggression against any country, whether in the guise of old or neo-colonialism, must try all methods, of whatever shape or form, to get the youth in hand. They transform youth into important instruments of theirs in executing their colonial policy. During wartime, youth is a source which imperialists first of all seize and force to go to be shot at and die in their place. Manifestly, American imperialists and the traitorous Lon Nol-Sirik Matak-Son Ngoc Thanh-In Tam now are using fascist laws to herd our youth like cattle into taking up arms, fighting and dying in their place.

The feudal, capitalist class is just the same. Youth, whether poor or lower middle peasant are exploited by feudal landowners through rents for fields, interest on money, all of which unite to create sorrow, difficulty, and suffering [for them] along with [their] fathers, mothers, and families. When they no longer have paddies or fields and must go to the cities, then the capitalists heavily oppress the worker forces. Salaries are not commensurate with the heavy work so food is never enough to satisfy hunger. Sometimes the capitalists chase them out of the factories and they can find no work; some youths are forced to fall into evil ways.

As for students and genuine intellectuals, they are not as oppressed as worker-farmers and poor and lower middle peasants and others. However, their education is conducted according to an imperialist, feudal, and capitalist culture to transform

them into young men and women who have lost all patriotic spirit, love of the people, and love of production. Imperialists, feudalists, and capitalists change our student youth and intellectuals to become their instruments to serve them in perpetuating their treasonous state power.

Our young people in their youth are comparable to flowers which are budding and brilliantly blossoming. But, in the society of the oppressor class, our youth of all strata are withered and blighted, stifled and muffled, in difficulty and suffering, because of the oppressors' wickedness and because of the threats and intimidation of the fascist, despotic regime of the oppressors. The future of our youth is black, null.

What is the Communist Party of Kampuchea's philosophy, principles, and activities regarding our youth?

As the party of the workers and the representative of the interests of the worker-farmer class and of the people and representative of the interests of the nation and youth, the Communist Party of Kampuchea regards Khmer youth as a major and important strength of the nation which has the most essential role in the struggle to liberate the nation now and in the future construction of the nation.

A nation which has a youth strong in revolutionary consciousness and revolutionary political principles, and which has been made strong and solid under the leadership of the party of the working class, the nation, and people, will surely win over every enemy aggressor and surely will have a glorious, powerful future in plenty and happiness.

From the earliest times until now, under the leadership, training, and care of the party, Khmer youth of all strata, especially farmer-worker, student youth, have joined together in every era to fight and make a revolution to free the nation and liberate the people.

In the era of struggle to wrest independence from French colonialism, our party caused the movement to explode; youth joined in large scale and became combattants, doctors, supply transporters, producers, etc.

In the political struggle from 1954 to 1967, the party increasingly concentrated on education and building the strength of youth and people in the rural areas and in the cities. Khmer youth, upon receiving this education in the political principles, the revolutionary consciousness of the party, all found rage strongly mounting. [Their rage] manifested itself as a struggle movement to contest American imperialists and the oppressor classes in whatever guise. In the cities, especially in Phnom Penh, the force of youth, that is, worker-producer and student youth, became the nucleus, the wick of the struggle in the movement of demonstrations and meetings to oppose American imperialists and the traitorous power-holders. In rural areas the party also depended on the strength of youth, whether poor or lower middle peasants. The party protected, educated and developed them to awaken and become aware of the national problem, the class problem, and to entrust them with the study as defense forces for the protection of villages (Phum) and districts (Khum) and their officials (Committees); to destroy spies of the ferocious traitors, and to struggle only to change the life of poor farmers.

In the era of political struggle, even though our party had difficulties in educating [propagandizing] youth of all strata, the party tried to use all means whether open or secret. Our party educated youth by word of mouth alone, by legal public newspapers and issued secret [clandestine] periodicals such as the periodical

Yuvachun Chhean Mukh ("Progressive Youth") and the periodical *Kammokar* ("Worker") for workers in general as well as for young workers.

Because of receiving a progressive and revolutionary ideology from the party, the revolutionary struggle movement of youth surged increasingly stronger in both the cities and the rural areas and united with the movements of the people as a whole under the leadership of the party. Which is to say in the combat movement of youth which the party began in 1962, the secret youth organization called the *Sampotn Yuvachun Kampuchea Pracheathibodey* ("Alliance of Democratic Khmer Youth") which later came to be called the *Sampotn Yuvachun Kommunis Kampuchea* ("Alliance of Communist Youth of Kampuchea"), became the right arm of the party under the direct aegis of the party.

In the era of internal armed struggle during the two years since the American imperialists and traitorous Lon Nol-Sirik Matak-Son Ngoc Thanh-In Tam coup to date, tens, hundreds of thousands of brave Khmer youth have responded to the party's appeal and stood forth to make revolutionary war to deal with American imperialists and the traitors. They have unreservedly joined the revolutionary ranks, joined to serve the revolution bravely in all tasks of the party. The revolutionary struggle will end in great victory now.

From the time the movement appeared until now, in every era of the Khmer nation's and people's struggle under the party's leadership, we have clearly seen that the party has educated, watched, nourished, and built youth as the central force in the revolutionary movement of each era and as the central force for future national construction. This is a glorious honor for Khmer youth which must take its turn, make the revolution until final victory under the leadership of the party, and then continue the revolution in the position which youth itself will have as the masters of the future destiny of the nation.

* * *

On the glorious occasion of issuing the periodical *Yuvachun-Yuvaneari Padevat* ("Revolutionary Young Men and Woman"), we all have the deepest appreciation for the important role of the young men and women of Kampuchea in each era of the revolutionary movement. We also wish to pause in reflection as a sign of respect for the valorous sacrifices of brave Khmer youth. They have sacrificed for the end of liberating the nation, people, and class. We will always remember this heroism and these good deeds done for the nation, people, and party.

Ith Sarin

NINE MONTHS WITH THE MAQUIS

*(Translation from the
French by U.S. Embassy,
Phnom Penh, May 1973.)*

En Route

On April 19, 1972, at Tonle Bati, we were received by officers of a Khmer Rouge battalion commanded by a former primary schoolteacher who had disappeared from Phnom Penh in 1970.

On April 20, at Baset (Kg. Speu) we were presented to the President of the Srok Committee (the equivalent of the Aphibalsrok) named HAM (a revolutionary name). He was a former primary teacher at the primary school of Santhor Mok, disappeared from Phnom Penh in 1966. He was about 40 robust, short, stocky, bald and taciturn.

On May 6, at Veal Loveang, in Phong District (Kg. Speu) we received a visit from NONG SUON (called Chamroeun Chey), Political Commissar of the Saang-Koh Thom Region (Damban No. 25). He was about 40, tall, with a sonorous voice, bronze complexion and one broken tooth.

On May 10: a mass meeting in the grounds of the primary school of Kat Phlouk which grouped more than 10 thousand men. Khmer Rouge cadres of the province and the srok were present. Mr. SAING RIM (called On), a former Professor of the Deuxième Cycle was president of the organizing committee. Mr. HOU YON [usually spelled HOU YUON] gave a two-hour speech which was much applauded.

At the Headquarters of the Khmer Rouge Special Region (Tactical Region No. 305). District of Peam Pram Bei Mom (Srok of Kg. Tralach)

On May 14, around 1700, at Taing Khmau, we were received by Mr. SIENG PO SE in person, at the time he was Chief of the Regional Supply and a Finance Service. His Deputy Mr. MEN NITHO (called Dan), a former Electrical Engineer was with him. Mr. Sieng Po Se (called Neak), was about 40, average height, yellow complexion almost Chinese. As for his number two, Men Nitho was about 30, average height, bronze complexion, and purely Khmer.

On May 15 at Sieng Po Se's camp, we were visited by a number of people: CHHUN SOK NGUON (called Som) former engineer of public works, accompanied by SIENG TEK CHHAY (ex-professor of ESPC)¹ and by DIEN PHIKAR (former primary teacher) All were in the regional service of Information and Propaganda.

SOK THUOK (called Vorn) Chief of the Khmer Rouge Special Region and Vice-Minister of Security in GRUNK. Mr. Sok Thuok, known under the revolutionary name of Vorn, was thin, feeble, average height, copper complexion, open utterer of tightly delivered

¹*Enseignement secondaire du premier cycle*, a secondary school teacher.

wordse He was about 40 and was a member of the Central Committee of the Khmer Communist Party [PKK]e Within the Party he held a higher rank than Hou Yuon and Hou Nim.

HOU YUON coming on a tour of inspection in the regione He was named Minister of the Interior, charged with Community Development and Cooperativese Hou Yuon was about 40, robust, solid, tall, copper complected, of a jovial temperament, very open but close and combative, deeply cultured and politicized. A good leader of men, he rejoiced in guerrilla life. His popularity among his comrades and the inhabitants was uncontestede It was to exploit this popularity and his political credit to the maximum that NUFK and the Party Central Committee offered him the honorific portfolio of the Interior. Actually, Hou Yuon has no real authority within the Party. His party comrades tended to accuse him of revisionism because his materialistic revolutionary concepts were less rigid, more supple, and more liberale

THUCH RIN (called Krin), former professor, member of the Party, Director of the regional service of Information and Propaganda for the Nirdey Teuse² Regione He was Director and Editor in Chief of the information newspaper *Pracheachon Padevat* [Revolutionary People]e He is one of the more important political personalities of the Nirdey Teus Regione Aged about 30, round, shorter than average height, with a wide forehead and copper complexion, he was open and affablee

On 21 May, during a dinner organized in honor of Hou Yuon, we met: NGUON ENG (called Ny) Sethakech Pet [a member of the hospital team], former engineer, member of the Party. He was about 40, copper complexion, taciturn, and about the same height as Hou Yuone

Mr. HANG (revolutionary name): small, active, open, eloquent, he was about 30 and about 1.59 meters tall. A member of the Party, he was the Deputy to Sok Thuok and the only person of importance in the region whom we could not identify. His wife was a schoolteacher.

KOY OUM (called T.P. [sic])³ from the Railway Service at Phnom Penh, he rallied to the Khmer Rouge movement in February 1972e He was in the Khmer Rouge supply service for the Red Armies of Nirdey Teuse He was about 40, bald, plump, courteous, affable, and joviale

ROS CHETHO (called Cheat) was about 1.66 or 1.67 meters tall, with round piercing eyes, bulging forehead, receding hairline, and a pensive aire He was a slow and sonorous speaker and was about 38 or 39e He was the third-ranking political personality of the Special Region after Mre Hang.e He was a Party member and Director of the Information and Propaganda Service for the Special Regione

From 26 May to 3 June 1972: A political meeting of intellectuals of the Special Region was held. It was organized by the Phnom Penh NUFK Committee and presided over by Prince Phurissara and Hou Yuon. Some 60 intellectuals attended.

The Phnom Penh Committee is thusly constituted:

Prince PHURISSARA (called Kem)	President
Doctor CHUON CHOEUN (called Pen)	Vice President
ROS CHETHO	Member, Charged with Press and Information

²Southweste

³Koy Oum's revolutionary name is Tip in *Sranaoh Pralung Khmer*, p. 28.

PHOK CHHAY⁴
Mme. KHIEU PONNARY

Member, Charged with Trade Unions
Member, representing the
Association of Patriotic Women⁵

Only Mme. Khieu Ponnary was missing from this meeting.

Besides the members of the Phnom Penh NUFK Committee the following people attended the meeting:

DY PHON (called Thuk), dentist. Nyopic, jovial, and a talker. Yellow complexion, about 40 and plump.

HANG (deputy to Sok Thuok)

CHEY CHUM (High Functionary) recently come from Phnom Penh. He joined the meeting May 27 and probably had left Phnom Penh the 26th May 1972. Thin, sickly, tall, he was almost 50. In his black outfit he looked Vietnamese a PHAN VAN DONG!

SIENG PO SE

MEN NITHO

THUCH RIN

CHHUN SOK NGUON (called Som), a young engineer, aged 32, member of the Party.

CHAN BOPHA (called Khom), holds a *Licence* in law, former magistrate. Responsible for the Office of Sale of Imported Goods. He is about 30, tall and slim.

Miss KUN (revolutionary name), a former professor of the Second Cycle. Age: 28 or 29, petite, modest and discreet. A member of the Party, she will have increasing influence.

KAING KEK IEV (former professor ESPC), small, thin, ill.

KHIEK VANTHA (former Controller of Finance) died of illness toward the end of June.

YOU THAN (called Phal), former professor ESPC, member of the Party.

SIEK TEK CHHAY (called Than)

SREY DAUNG (called Khe), former dam engineer, more than 27 years old, good-looking, intelligent and eloquent.

DIEN PHIKAN (former schoolteacher)

Mrs. CHUON CHOEUEN and her daughter

KHIENG KAON (professor)

⁴*Sranaoh Pralung Khmer*, p. 31, puts Nguon Eng in charge of Trade Unions, and makes Phok Chhay the representative of Students and Intellectuals.

⁵Association of Democratic Women in *Sranaoh Pralung Khmer*, p. 31.

PHOK CHHAY, member of the Party, thin, about 38 or 39 years old. He was in fragile health and of average height, a good orator with a very good memory.

CHUON CHOEUN, About 48 or 49, bald, sparse hair, plump.

Prince PHURISSARA, age about 40, bronze complexion, average height; wide, bulging forehead; modest, simple, and courteous.

On 12 November 1972, we made a furtive visit to newcomers Mr. SO MERAM, naval captain (*capitaine de vaisseau*) and his two Lieutenants. It is to be noted that officers who rally to NUFK such as Messrs SO MERAM, MAING MARINEL and CHENG SAYUMBAUN are viewed with a jaundiced eye.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF KAMPUCHEA

Party veterans pretended that their revolutionary movement was born in 1951, at first under the name of the People's Party (*Kanapak Pracheachon*). It was only later (we forget the date) that the Pracheachon was called the "Communist Party of Kampuchea." In the beginning of 1972, the Central Committee of the Party published the history of 21 years of struggle of their party, a struggle which was fought from 1951 to 1972. Tactically, this struggle went on in three steps:

- (1) From 1951 to 1954 (until the general peace treaty of Geneva), the Cambodian Communists conducted a joint political and armed struggle (according to their words, alas!). They claimed that their Party controlled 2/5 of the land and two million people at that time. But the Treaty of Geneva obliged them to hand in their arms and cede the conquered lands to neutralist forces, to cooperate with the regime in power, and to limit their activities solely to the political struggle. Mr. Hou Yuon, during the 26 May meeting remarked:

"The socialist powers of Europe, bloodied by the Second World War, and the Asian socialists, much weakened by the Chinese and Korean wars, overestimated the strength of the imperialists at that moment and pressured the all-consuming Indochinese revolutionary forces to end the fighting and accept the peace treaty with the imperialist forces." Hou Yuon saw in this a calculated tactical maneuver by the socialists.

- (2) From 1954 to 1967, the political struggle: by means of the press, in Parliament, in the various quasi-governmental institutions. In continuing its political struggle, the PKK launched preparations for another armed struggle. Intellectual cadres were repeatedly sent to the maquis to form combat cells. The clandestine disappearance of young intellectuals explains this tactic of the party.
- (3) From 1967, the Party resumed the armed struggle. The events at Samlaut were prepared in advance and gave new impulse to the struggle.

The Khmer Communist Party, which had disguised itself for long years, showed its true face from 30 September 1972. It proclaimed its existence from 1951 and its rights of leadership through all vicissitudes of the struggle. It took the direction of the struggle in the framework of the NUFK. The open inauguration of the 21st anniversary of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, which took place 30 September 1972, gave the first public view of the party flag which has as emblems a hammer and sickle in the center of a blood-red field.

Mr. SALOTH SAR was Secretary-General of the Party. After came IENG SARY, KHIEU SAMPHAN, SON SEN. We were unable to secure a list of members of the Party Central Committee.⁶ What we know is that Hou Yuon and Hu Nim were second-rank personages in the Central Committee of the Party. All the Chiefs of the five tactical Regions (Nirdey Teus, Special Region, Bopea Teus, Oddor Teus, Central Region)⁷ were both Vice-Ministers and members of the Party Central Committee.

ORGANIZATION** PROGRAM

The former administrative structure has been modified. The administrative hierarchy was as follows: the Phum, the Khum, the Srok, the Damban, the Region, the Central Committee. Each zone is administered by a committee assisted by various associations: Patriotic Youth Association, Association of Young Democrats (molding the cells of the party), Association of Patriotic Women. . e . The number of members of the committee varies with the importance of the zone. The committee is composed of a President, a Vice-President, members charged with supply and the economy, instruction and education, health services, etc. All the Presidents of the NUFK Committees for Sroks, Damban, and Regions are members of the Party and cell-leaders; so are most of the leaders of NUFK Committees for Khums. The Khum Committees which do not have the Party's trust are flanked by one or two representatives of the Party. Such is the case for the Khum Committee of Tbeng Khpos.⁸ As for Phums, the party leaves them to the desires of pro-Sihanouk elements.

The forces are arranged in three categories: village guerrilla (*Kang Chhlop*), the regional army (*Kang Damban*), and the regular army (*Kang Sruoch*)e Regular cadre are picked from Party cells.

From company level, the commander of each unit is helped by a Political Commissar whose authority over combatants is indisputable. The Party seeks to give command over each unit to sons of peasants, sympathizers and faithful to the movemente

The Communist Party of Kampuchea published the political program of the NUFK which it elaborated together with Sihanouk's team in Peking. The major political lines followed by Sihanouk when he was in power remain almost the same. There are some modifications regarding internal policies. As for foreign policy, there is no change: Cambodia is to be neutral, independent, non-aligned, territorial integrity, cooperation internationally on terms of equality with all countries regardless of regime.

One feels Sihanouk's political world in this program; however, the term "monarchy" has passed into silence.

One could say that the political program of the NUFK is far from being advantageous for the PKK. There is only mentioned in detail an enlarged action plan to improve the life of little people, peasants and workers: intensified rural development, more rational agricultural policy, workers' salaries, social insurance, farming policy, war policy, etc. . . .

⁶*Sranaoh Pralung Khmer*, p. 43, adds the following: Koy Thuon, Deputy Finance Minister; Hu Nim, Minister of Information; Tiv Oi, Deputy Minister of Information; Hou Yuon, Minister of Interior; Khieu Ponnary, Deputy Minister of Education, etc.; Chou Chet, Deputy Minister of Health; Sok Thuok, Deputy Minister of Security; Pok Doeuskomar, Deputy Foreign Minister.

⁷*Teus* means "direction" and the word preceding is a compass point.

⁸A *srok* of Oudong Meanchey Province.

This NUFK political program was elaborated in Peking toward the middle of 1970 at the time when the Khmer Communist Party had to cut its fingers to exploit Sihanouk's political credit. This is nothing but a communist trick. Now, in the internal areas, this plan is a dead letter. The Khmer Communist Party, in methodically getting rid of pro-Sihanouk cadres, has *carte blanche* over the direction of the country. Under the veil of NUFK and with the complicity of the Chinese and Vietnamese Communist parties, it has followed and respected only its own program not as yet revealed to the public.

In accelerating the development of its cadres, the Party has undertaken efforts at collectivization at its rear bases: common storehouses, paddies, small groups of villagers living in collectivity. All these actions try to awaken a socialist consciousness among the peasants.

But the peasants remain passive, very attached to their habits and customs. The new collective life being imposed on them frightens them. Most keep secret their attachment to Sihanouk and his regime.

Sihanouk has practically no power. All power is and will be in the hands of the Party. If Sihanouk wishes to cling to power and his former regime, he will be simply eliminated. The Sihanouk-KR⁹ coalition is clearly a fraud. NUFK is nonsense because of its deep and irreconcilable contradictions. Now, the first task of the PKK consists of indoctrinating and assimilating pro-Sihanouk forces. An accelerated formation of cadres so requires.

Vis-à-vis North Vietnam, the PKK is in close cooperation, but less favorable than with Red China. There is also distrust of North Vietnamese unstated intentions. Hou Yuon said that the PKK has foreseen all in preparing for danger from the VC/NVA. Certain Party cadres declare unceasingly that the key to the Vietnamese problem (the victory of Vietnamese socialism, reunification) can be found in Cambodia. It is therefore in the interest of the VC/NVA (interest of all sorts, moreover!) that they support the PKK. Alas! The PKK brags of being up to its mission; it is absolutely not under the guidance of the Vietnamese Communist Party; it is equal to all fraternal Communist parties and independent.

The PKK seems to have control over all activities in its zones. The VC/NVA are far from being the masters.

The PKK tends to sympathize more with Red China. It sees there a constant support, efficacious and disinterested. It has modeled its leadership after the Chinese. It should likewise be noted that most of the higher cadres of the Party are pro-Chinese socialists. The Party also sees in China a counterweight to the Vietnamese danger.

Unlike China, the PKK does not deal gently with the Soviet Communists. Like China, it has accused the USSR of revisionism.

It has kept a mortal hate for the Republican Government of Phnom Penh. It accuses it of being the valet of American imperialists, of being puppets, of being reactionary, of corruption.

It has tried to instill a bloody hate against our regime among the masses (meetings, artistic seances, popular gatherings).

⁹Khmer Rouge.

In my opinion, we have very little chance in appealing for the collaboration of the KR with our regime.

PARTY CADRES, CRITICISM, SELF-CRITICISM, DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM

The development of Party cadres is an almost continuous process (at school, in daily life, in meetings and informal lectures).

At school there are debates and conferences on the contents of various documents recommended by the Party Central Committee, for examplee

- Revolutionary discipline
- The National Revolution
- Social Classes in Cambodian Society
- Class Struggle. Antagonistic Contradictions
- Popular Conception [*"la conception populaire"*]
- The Directing Role of the Working Class in the Revolutionary Struggle
- Revolutionary Hate
- The Proletarianization of Cadres: The Qualities of a Revolutionary Cadre
- How to Fight Individualism, Liberalism, Dogmatism, Opportunism, Sectarianism, etc.
- The Price of a Revolutionary
- Collectivism, Criticism, Self-Criticism, etc.

Practically and in daily life, each member has the duty of checking on his fellow man. This duty is reciprocal. All which is not revolutionary or which is harmful to the revolution (socialist revolution) is condemnable, forbidden (listening to broadcasts of songs from Phnom Penh is forbidden) Each member is required to undergo manual tests like workers or peasants (digging, wood-cutting, vegetable growing, rice-milling, transplanting, etc.). . . . These manual tests are an integral part of the formation of revolutionary cadres. In short, each member should be like the people, with the people, for the people. . . .

Cadres in training must have two meetings each week, the first in a small group of which they are members, the other in the group as a whole. In the closed group, one practices criticism and self-criticism directly. In turn, each member examines himself, his own activities and his errors in the past week before passing under the criticism of his comrades. The criticisms and self-criticisms ought to be done on the five following recommended principles:

- manual activities
- state of morale, feelings
- instructions given by higher-ranking chiefs
- personal position regarding policy and the Party
- revolutionary solidarity

Criticism and self-criticism are practiced at all echelons and social strata.

In the group as a whole, one criticizes the group's collective activities without alluding to individual activities. Afterwards the group develops a program of collective work for the forthcoming week.

The PKK seems faithful to the chief Marxist-Leninist lines. Certain concrete realities of Cambodian society have been voluntarily forgotten. For example, Khmer individualism is solidly rooted in Khmer society and forms the base of the national

personality. Buddhism (combated by the spirit of Khmer Marxist materialism) is similarly inseparable from the social and national life of the Khmer.

The collectivization preached by the KR will be checked when confronted with the instinctive individualism of the Khmer. The proof is that the peasants in the KR rear base at Peam Pram Bei Mom are successively withdrawing from the collective life imposed on them.

Vis-à-vis the movement of international peace, the PKK has kept its intransigent position: no negotiations, no peaceful political settlement. They have fought to the bitter end the possibility of peace negotiations with our government, with our regime. They have unceasingly proclaimed control over 8/10ths of the territory and five million people. Their decisive victories are just in sight. They reject any peaceful political settlement.

As for general elections, they have no ideas.

But, personally, I think that in case of inevitable general elections, imposed by the great powers, including China, the PKK already has its knight: Sihanouk. But this is only an illusion. I think that, even under the pressure of great powers, the PKK will continue the fight, will reject the general election because it will be more advantageous for our regime or for Sihanouk than for them.

CONCLUSION

1. I believe that the people, peasants living under enemy control, do not want the socialist regime, nor the presence of VC/NVA. Loving their land and village, they wish ardently for the return of peace.

The greater part of those attached to Sihanouk have more and more lost hope in his return to power and are turning to our regime. All in continuing the fight against the Communists, we should, in our opinion, expose actively the deep contradictions between Sihanouk and the PKK. We have every chance to attract to our cause the Sihanoukists who tremble before the weight of the red regime.

2. To carry on the war against the Communists, the best tactic consists, I think, in rationalizing and cleaning up our own administration, in resolving the major immediate internal problems (the economy for example), in restoring discipline and the revolutionary ardor of March 18. Because Communism is recognized by the masses as a regime both inconceivable and incompatible with the national society, there is still time for our regime to reexamine frankly, with no suspicious passions, our past errors, errors which cost our regime, however much still applauded and loved, dear.

Done at Phnom Penh, 7 May 1973

Mr. Ith Sarin, ex-Inspector of
Primary Schools

Ith Sarin
LIFE IN THE BUREAUS (OFFICES)
OF THE KHMER ROUGE
(3 JUNE 1972 TO 15 JANUARY 1973)

*(From his Sranaoh Pralung
Khmer [Regrets for the
Khmer Soul], Phnom Penh,
1973, pp. 37-76.)*

On 3 June 1972 the *Angkar* ["Organization"] ordered us to work in the Bureau of Information and Culture of the Special Region. Comrade (*Mit*) Chhun Sok Nguon, a former engineer, was Chairman of the Bureau of Information of the Special Region replacing Mr. Chi Kim An who hanged himself in the beginning of April. He took us to work in Phum Srei Andoung. Our office was built on a high elevation at an old abandoned village 500 meters west of Wat Srei Andoung next to the Kok Kmaoch [of Srei Andoung]e. When we arrived the other members were interested and paid us close attention. Our group (*kruom*) had 13 members, most of whom were engineers and teaching personnel; all were under the command of Mr. Ros Chetthor himself. Mr. Ros Chetthor was the third-ranking personality in the Special Region following after Comrade Sok Thuok and Comrade Hang. The Bureau Chairman explained about the Organization's discipline, about the collective lifestyle, about the duties which we must daily accomplish. The 13 members were divided into three teams (*buak*)e. The Chairman of the Bureau designated those colleagues who were most sincere toward the Organization. They had the strongest political principles and could become chairmen of the teams. Each team must meet weekly to examine each other's principles; they called this the "Lifestyle Meeting" or the meeting for criticism and self-criticism. They decided on Thursday night for "Team meetings" and on Sunday night for the "Group meeting" or the gathering of all the teams.

1. Location and Situation

Each bureau had to be built far from peasant villages; near a source of water, a stream or a well, for example; in a thick wood and close to open fields. They built thatch huts under large trees. One hut was for sleeping, another for dining, and various others for working. The Information Bureau of the Special Region had a printing press, typewriter, mimeograph, stencils, ink, various documents, etc. Near the work area they dug a bunker and many little trenches to take shelter in during bombing attacks. All members, including the old and the young, could recognize various makes of aircraft by their sound. On hearing a distant sound, the 10 year-olds instantly could tell an observation craft from a T-28 bomber.

The bureaus of the important administrative committees (*kammbhipal*) were built in the quiet woods at a distance of 500 to 1,500 meters from small villages which were support villages or their base camps. By observation, their location was often in thick woods near very small rice fields so as to remain concealed from aircraft and so breezes could easily circulate.

The Communist Party of Kampuchea has divided the areas they hold into larger regions as follows:

1) Southwest Region which includes Kampot and Koh Kong provinces; Sihanoukville; Kompong Seila, Takeo, Kompong Chhnang, Kompong Speu, Oudong, and Kandal provinces.

2) Eastern Regions which includes Kratie, Svay Rieng, Prey Veng, and Kompong Cham provinces.

3) Northwest Region has Kompong Thom, Siem Reap, Oddar Meanchey, and Banteay Chhmar provinces.

4) Pursat-Battambang-Pailin provinces.

5) Special Region (newly created at the end of 1971) to control the area around Phnom Penh. Today the Special Region, both headquarters and internal administration, are located in the Southwest Region on the Kompong Speu-Kompong Chhnang border in the Sangkat [a lower administrative division] of Peam Prambei Mom, the southern section of the District (*srok*) of Kompong Tralacho. Some of its administrative personnel are in Kompong Speu province (Srok Baset) and in Kandal province (Srok Kandal Stung and Srok Saang-Koh Thom).

6) Preah Vihear province, Stung Treng, Mondulhiri, and Ratanakiri are under the direct administration of the *Kena Mocchhim* (Central Committee) of the Khmer Communist Party. Geographically and strategically we can understand why their *Kena Mocchhim* itself governs these areas. These provinces are all strong military bases and abut Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand.

Each Region is further divided into [decreasing in size] sectors (*Damban*); then districts (*Srok*); then *Khum* (township or village) and then *Phum* (hamlet). Secretaries or chairmen of each Region have heavy influence in their areas. Which is to say that they have all political, administrative, economic, military, and social responsibility. These "secretaryships" and "chairmanships" are for members of the Central Committee who are also members of the Royal Government of National Union of Kampuchea. They are intellectuals, "Khmer Rouge core (*SnuL*)"--long-time adherents of the "Khmer communist movement." They are "fulfilled candidates" in their party.

In the Southwest Region, important Khmer Rouge dignitaries include Mr. Chou Chet, who is the Chairman and the Deputy Minister of Health; Mr. Phouk Chhay, called Nang, who is political commissar for the Southwest Region troops; Mr. Thuch Rin, called Krin (former high school teacher), who is Chairman of the Bureau of Cultural Affairs and Information; Tā [Grandfather, an honorific] Mok (revolutionary name), who is leader of the Southwest Region troops. The major headquarters is in the Amleang Sector. A printing press there produces the newspaper *Revolutionary People* under the leadership of Mro Thuch Rin himself. The Southwest Region is the biggest, has the greatest troop strength and the most important leadership "cadre."

According to Phouk Chhay's report to a meeting at the end of May 1972, the monthly expenditures in the Southwest Region reach over two million riels for Khmer Rouge military and civilian personnel, who earn 135 riels each per month.¹

The Special Region is under the leadership of Mr. Sok Thuok, called Von, who is the Chairman as well as the Deputy Minister of National Security. In addition there are Mro Hang (revolutionary name) and Comrade Ros Chethor, called Cheat.

¹In mid-1972, 135 riels = US \$1.00.

The important Khmer Rouge dignitaries in the *Kena Mocchhim* are mostly intellectuals who disappeared from Phnom Penh in 1962 [sic] and 1968 [sic], most importantly:

- Mr. Khieu Samphan, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense in the Royal Government of National Unity [RGNU] and Commander-in-Chief of the "People's Liberation Armed Forces of Kampuchea." Mr. Khieu Samphan is the third personality in the Communist Party of Kampuchea.
- Mr. Salot Sar (First Personality) is the Secretary-General of the Communist Party of Kampuchea.
- Mr. Ieng Sary is the second personality in the Khmer Communist Party.
- Mr. Son Sen in the fourth personality.
- Mr. Koy Thuon is the Deputy Minister of Finance.
- Mr. Hu Nim is the Minister of Information.
- Mr. Tiv Ol is the Deputy Minister of Information.
- Mr. Hou Yuon is the Minister of Interior Charged with Rural Affairs and Cooperatives.
- Mrs. Khieu Ponnary, Deputy Minister of National Education, Culture and Youth.²
- Mr. Chou Chet, Deputy Minister of Health.
- Mr. Sok Thuok, Deputy Minister of National Security.
- Mr. Pok Doeuskomar, Deputy Foreign Minister.

Mr. Son Sen and Mr. Pok Doeuskomar really hid quietly in Phnom Penh for the following year after the Phnom Penh authorities said they had disappeared. This is the information which we received from Khmer Rouge personalities in the bush.

As for important Khmer Rouge cadre who died in the bush, Mr. Uch Ven (professor) died of typhoid and Mr. Chi Kim An (engineer) committed suicide in Phum Srei Andoung.

The Information and Culture Bureau of the Special Region was at Srei Andoung until 7 August 1972, then was dismantled and moved to the east of Phum Srei Russei in Dac Srayal Sector. In the beginning of July aircraft heavily bombed Phum Tang Khmau and Phum Srei Andoung.

In the Information Bureau we lived in a circle of comrades who had a socialist revolutionary philosophy that was strict and far to the left. Many of these members were young people who had been associated with the clandestine Yuv.&K. movement (Communist Youth of Kampuchea) in Phnom Penh or were members of the Association of Khmer Students (AGEK) fattened up by Peking.

The Special Region's Bureau of Arts was 600 meters southwest of Phum Srei Russei. The many youngsters and artistic leaders totaled over 70 people. Most were peasants' children; some were children of Khmer Rouge core dignitaries; for example, children of Mr. Ieng Sary and Mr. Sieng Po Se.

²Actually she is Chairman of the Democratic Women's Association and her sister Mrs. Ieng Thirith held the ministerial post.

About three kilometers east of the Information Bureau, or 800 meters west of Phum Hong Tnaot, was the large hospital of the Special Region; it was built on the banks of a creek at the site of an abandoned village. This hospital could handle hundreds of sick and wounded. Drs. Chuon Choeun, Dy Phon, Professor Khhieng Kaon and engineer Nguon Eng worked in the hospital, assisted by a few Khmer Rouge doctors who had just arrived from Hanoi.

The Bureau of Economic Affairs was at Phum Tang Khmau on the banks of a stream northwest of Wat Tang Khmau. Mr. Sieng Po So had responsibility for Regional economic matters, and over the few vehicles used: they included, for example, a Landrover and trucks. On the east and south of the Economic Affairs Bureau many shelters were built to receive "newly arrived guests" who had just run from Phnom Penh and whose political trends agreed with those of the Front cadre (Sihanoukism). The Organization first had to "mature the consciousness" (*Satiqārammī*)³ of these "newly arrived guests" here, so they did not have as much freedom to come and go. Nor did they have important duties in the Organization aside from digging fields, raising crops or a few chickens and ducks to support their own lives. The members of the other bureaus called this place the "Front's Phum." Here we met and talked with a Lt. Commander named So Meram and two of his Ensign colleagues on 12 November 1972.

2. The Organization's Discipline

The Organization's discipline was very tough and strong in nature, which is to say it was communist discipline, as strong as iron. They educated and trained (*Phsāmñi*) (System de dressage) youth and their cadre to become socialists and to become communists by means of a series of increasingly tougher standards. Many documents were compiled by the *Kena Mocchhim* to be used as study guides.

As for the members of the Military Bureau who still love King Sihanouk, they [the Organization] do not yet dare show their true intentions. They hold only to the principle of struggle in the framework of the Front as the lesson to be taught; i.e., the principle of national revolution. They lyingly claim, "We are struggling to make this revolution in order to liberate the nation from the yoke of American imperialism.^é"

Bit by bit they edge into the theory of national democratic revolution and stir up class warfare, class rage, and the life and death class struggle in Kampuchea. They attack feudalists, reactionaries, and compradore capitalists. They do not attack King Sihanouk's name openly nor do they foster and praise it either. Some cadre in Khmer Rouge ranks are openly attacking Sihanouk's "feudal traits." Those Khmer Rouge cadre who dare to praise King Sihanouk are regarded as people opposed to the revolution. They maintain that King Sihanouk is the symbol of feudalism even though he is living in Peking.

With the People. The object of the discipline of the Khmer Rouge *Angkar* which is most important is not to disturb the "ways of the people." Each Khmer Rouge must absolutely take a modest and simple attitude with the people. They must destroy tendencies to seek "authoritarianism" or "officiousness.^é" They frequently recall the words of Mao Tse-tung that "The people are fish; they are the water [*sic*]" Revolutionaries (socialist revolution) must become children of the people and must become like the people in order to study from the people because "the people are the

³The term also means "mentality" or "spirit" according to context; "consciousness" will appear when Ith Sarin uses the word more formally, usually in connection with ideology.

fount of knowledge which study can never dry up." They raise the slogan, "Study from the people in order to be like the people," but they hold to another principle that they "should not let the people lead them by the nose either." In their lifestyle: sleeping, walking, eating, drinking, dressing, they take care not to be openly different from the people. Attitudes and words that reach peasants must definitely be modest and simple. This is why the Khmer Rouge require black dress with the *krāmā*⁴ around the neck. Food is neither more plentiful nor of better quality than that of the people. They often remind themselves of the poverty of the people who support their revolution. Furthermore, pressure against "seeking good food" has become one of their tactics in order to accustom themselves to bear up under all difficulties and educate their bodies and their mentalities to become "proletarian (*kammajīb*)"e" Therefore, in each bureau they rarely have the good fortune of having two dishes of food.

The Khmer Rouge *Angkar* strongly forbids disturbing the produce or goods of the people. Making free with or violating peasants girls is a matter for heavy punishment. According to continuous observation these disciplines are fully and effectively respected and complied with. Another effective point in Khmer Rouge "Psychological Activity" toward peasants is help during trouble. If a peasant in a Phum is sick, the Khmer Rouge will often go to the house to give an injection or leave medicine even at night or during a storm. In ploughing, transplanting, harvesting, or threshing seasons, each bureau must send out its members to help. This being "together with the people" in order to "serve the people," closely associating with the people, is the implementation of one of the Khmer Rouge theories in educating Khmer Rouge cadres.

These kinds of psychological activities were really successful and deeply affected the people more than the instruction in theory did. The farming people of the base areas who knew nothing of socialist revolution quickly began to love and support the *Angkar* because of its sentiments of openness and friendliness.

In the Bureau In all bureaus the Khmer Rouge lived collectively (*Samūhabhāb*), following collective discipline (discipline of the Organization), working according to a schedule which the collective set for each week and month.

All bureau members, whether ordinary members or the chairmen, were required to do the same manual activities (*Balakamm*)e. These manual activities were regarded as of the prime necessity in "building (*kasāñ*)" yourself to become a proletariat, a worker; if one had the habit of keeping up regular manual activities, he could endure the various hardships which the revolution might meet. Performing manual activity renewed the mentality; that is, changed it into a revolutionary consciousness, a proletarian consciousness, a socialist consciousness. Khmer Rouge often reminded each other that "their revolution still had a further difficult, suffering-laden, winding way (La revolution disait Mao tse Toung suit un chemin toujours tortueux; jamais rectiligne [The revolution, said Mao Tse-tung, always follows a tortuous path, never proceeds straight ahead.])e" Each member must not denigrate the manual activities which he makes; all of them (except some very important Khmer Rouge dignitaries) had to grow vegetables, potatoes, carry water, chop firewood, mill rice by themselves, each taking his turn. Besides matters relating to the livelihood of the bureau, each member also has an assigned duty such as in the printing plant, etc. The organization forbade the use of the words, "A" and "Ming."⁵ They took the word

⁴An allepurpose red or blue and white-checked cloth that serves men and women as protection from the sun or as a covering while bathing; otherwise worn around the neck as a scarf.

⁵Impolite forms of address used to show superior to inferior status or contempt.

"Mit" ["friend" or "comrade"] for general use. The words "Bang," "Ming," "Ma," "Om," "Ta," "Yay,"⁶ are also used but "Mit" is more common. They often remind each other to strengthen "political sentiment" more than just "sentiment" by itself.

The Organization continually guides them to try to get rid of "personal traits" individualistic aspects which they denounce as "reactionary traits" that in order to attain the highest, one must hold firm "an overall image" of the principle of "collectivity" and concentrate on the greater rather than on personal interests. If a member easily becomes irritated or is short-tempered, they accuse him of still having "thick individual traits." They often connect this element of individualism together with "traits of liberalism." All these traits are regarded as opposed to the revolution, as traits of the oppressor class, traits of the reactionaries. Once in a while in the lifestyle meetings, they criticize each other back and forth on this matter of "liberalism" in "drinking, sleeping, walking, talking" which means that some comrades eat differently than they are told, or are sluggardly morning risers or talk too much and do not know when to keep quiet, etc. Mutual surveillance is the duty of each member and the judging of the traits listed above is in the interest of educating the members to become "socialists" (*Un socialiste*). This is a step in "taming" a man to become a "machine" (*un robot, un automate*) contrary to natural evolution.

Aspects of delinquency must be conquered under the Organization's guidance; for example, women, liquor, and gambling. As for women and gambling, the Khmer Rouge Organization really seems to have these problems solved along with that of theft. Regarding liquor, there is still some problem left, but the Khmer Rouge Organization has eliminated degrading public drunkenness to a great degree.

In Khmer Rouge society, they have definitely forbidden a man to have two wives.

Peasants in the Phum, like members in each bureau, also have duties such as monitoring each other's activities in their own teams in order to educate each other in the way which communists call "construction." They have one weekly meeting of a team or a group which is called the lifestyle meeting. During the meeting of the team they conduct criticism and self-criticism; that is, they expose deficiencies and improper acts, the qualities and the faults of themselves and those of their team members. To be able to conduct this criticism and self-criticism requires that the Khmer Rouge and villagers check up on one another. Criticism and self-criticism are the most important tools of Marxism-Leninism. The principles which each member must watch for in himself and his comrades are:

- Principle of Manual Activities
- Political Principles
- Principle of Solidarity
- Principle of Consciousness
- Principle of Assigning Work

In the group meeting they examine the principles of the entire group and do not speak of the individual. After examining the various principles of the group, they draw up a schedule for the next week.

In this criticism and self-criticism, the Khmer Rouge Organization's guidance notes that criticism and self-criticism must not be used as a weapon to get revenge or attack each other. They note that criticism and self-criticism are a method of

⁶Kinship terms used among intimates or at the market to distinguish age and sex.

mutual education, a "medicine to counter disease" such as the diseases of "individualism-liberalism, officiousness-authoritarianism-bureaucratism," for example. One who engages in criticism and self-criticism must have "a cool head always" and not be irritable. Performing criticism and self-criticism must always be based on the ways of the Organization and the people.

Another discipline of the Khmer Rouge (the cadre) is keeping secrets. Members of the bureaus must keep confidential their personal information and that of their bureau and the Organization. This is why each person must have a new name and must hide his former name so that no one else knows it except the higher level of the Organization when it officially needs to seek information of the individual. If anyone at all, even in the same rank, or even a peasant wants to know about the situation of the bureau or the former name or "class" or birthplace, they cannot be told. This discipline is reemphasized each week and monitored like various other activities as well.

They have precisely ordained a hierarchy; that is, the lower levels of the Organization respect the higher: the Phum Committee follows the orders of the Khum Committee which in turn takes orders from the District Committee which respects those of the Sector, [then the Region] which listens to the *Kena Mocchhim* (the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea).

Each member must "freely" hand himself over for the Organization "to build." One must trust completely in the *Angkar* because the Organization has as many eyes as a "pineapple" and cannot make mistakes.

This is the dictatorial condition of the party over the individual, an unbounded authority of the party over everything. It is a step directly toward establishing the "Dictatorship of the proletariat (*Dictature proletarienne*)."

Each member must trust the Organization completely; must guard the honor of the Organization; must not stab the Organization in the back. If someone tries to perform [a task] according to the Organization's way but instead has a bad result, they do not accuse the Organization of having wrongly "pointed the way," but put the blame on the individual instead. The individual himself is inept, is deficient. One consequence cannot be avoided: that is, it is always shown that the Khmer Rouge cadre has committed a violation of discipline or taken authority on himself and taken the name of the Organization as a screen [for his deed]. That which is called the Organization is the Communist Party of Kampuchea and the party's large and small branches which include committees of the Phum, Khum, District, Sector, Region up to the level of the Center.

They forbid to and fro movement between bureaus. Not only that, members who do so are "constructively" criticized for the act of "liberalism," for an act contrary to the aspect of secrecy. This is why members of bureaus do not have many contacts and exchanges of opinion with each other. They have done it this way so as to preserve the strength of confidentiality and protect against those who intend to betray the Organization. In daily living in each bureau they often recall the need to maintain "the principle of independence and control over things; self reliance;" that is, each bureau must find its own way of making do by itself. The Organization only supplies money in the amount of 135 riels per member per month. Each bureau must manage to seek food (mostly crabs and snails) and vegetables itself; must "push for production" through its own strength; must raise chickens, ducks, pigs in each individual bureau [being satisfied] with what possibilities they can manage.

3. The Matter of Manual Activities

The Organization regards performing manual activities as the first duty of each member. A communist must definitely forge himself in the work of doing manual activities. The performing of manual activities for cadre intellectuals is the same sort as that of villagers.

In the Bureau Each member, man or woman, whether intellectual or peasant's son absolutely must carry water, seek firewood, cook soup, sweep the yard of the bureau, dig for crabs in the fields, water the vegetables, husk paddy, polish rice; feed chickens, ducks, and pigs. They divide these tasks by turn and do them on precise schedules with no thought to bickering or slacking. Idly looking on, arguing, refusing to work is not common. Each person must clearly show patience toward every other at the time of fulfilling an activity. A member who is lazy and sluggardly in these tasks will be criticized by the other members at the time of the meeting of the team or the group.

The Work of Increasing Production. Each bureau is guided by the higher level of the Organization to solve its own living problems and not to depend too much on the people for nourishment because the people lack much. Each bureau must clear and work fields and vegetable gardens by itself. They grow mustard greens, tomatoes, mint, *trakuan* [the water vine *convolvulus reptans*], gourds and melons, eggplant, pepper, potatoes, maize, and beans, for example. Some Khmer Rouge groups even have cattle and water buffalo to work rice fields. In some bureaus, such as the Art Office of the Special Region, all the youngsters climb palm trees and collect the sap for sugar to use in their own departments.

The bureaus also work very hard to develop the raising of ducks, chickens, and pigs.

Even though the bureaus have chickens, ducks, and pigs, food is still lacking just as much because the Organization induces one to "know how to economize," know how to endure and be without hunger to conquer "wants" and the desire for delicious things. Moreover, the region in which we lived was extremely poor in fish and meat; even frogs were hard to find. Two or three eggs were boiled with mustard greens for 12 people. Sometimes they boiled only mustard greens with no fish or meat. Some Khmer Rouge ate fresh fish only three or four times a year and not enough of it even then.

Serving the People. Each Khmer Rouge had to be absorbed in the "philosophy of the people"; had to join with the people. Helping out in the problems of the people, especially the people of the base areas, is the primary matter the higher levels of the Organization paid attention to. When the people raised a dam or dug a pond or a dike or built a house, the Khmer Rouge teams nearest the Phum took turns together to go help and paid attention to what they were doing, too. At the time of transplanting, harvesting, threshing, they also took turns to give punctual assistance. The Organization helped with the affairs of the poorest farmers most of all.

This is one aspect which interested us.

The Khmer Rouge Organization regarded manual activities as the chief principle with the aim that:

- 1) Their cadre and members at every level ready themselves for various future difficulties; to develop the habit of enjoying this manual work which is an important aim in order to progress in building a socialist nation.

2) So that their members and cadres draw closer to the people, understand the people's desires and their sufferings, and profit by the opportunity to learn from the people. In the practical performance of a task the people are the source of knowledge that can never dry up

3) Reinforce habits of respect of the Organization's team and group discipline following a type of materialist discipline (*Discipline materialiste*) of factory workerse

[4)] So that each member of cadre tries to forge himself in order to slip away from "traits" that are not revolutionary, not proletarian such as the "traits" of most intellectuals, for example. If one does not apply himself to manual activities, he cannot love the people and will maintain a mentality that denigrates the manual activities of others which is the mentality of a reactionary, a feudalist, a capitaliste

According to materialist theory, only the worker-proletariat builds the world, builds each [separate] socialist [system]e In every society, this worker and proletarian class is more numerous than all otherse Therefore, according to the character of democracy, should not state power fall into the hands of this class? This is the philosophy of the Marxists-Leninistse

5) Increase the spirit of materialism-realism-scientism which, according to Marxist-Leninists, will conquer the philosophy of idealism (*Idealisme*) which serves the reactionary class, the oppressor class (this is the philosophy of the Khmer Rouge)e Moreover, this work of manual activities is also a medicine to help conquer a narrow, sluggardly mentality or philosophy (*Etroitesse de Vue*).

[4.] Political Education

The Khmer Rouge are very interested in political education. Political strength is their first strength; military strength is only an instrument of political strength. Khmer Rouge members in all frameworks must receive political education without fail. They study in political schools, at the office, during meetings, at conferences, during the living group gatheringse

Education at Political Study Schools. The Khmer Rouge Organization now greatly lacks administrators (cadre) endowed with high quality and political culture. Mr. Hou Yuon himself admitted this problem at the Intellectuals Conference at the end of May 1972. Each administrator before assuming a responsibility must receive a long education and training over a period of one to three years, at leaste and must have served their movement for a long time in the Yuv.K.K. (Communist Youth of Kampuchea) or in the S.N.K.P. (Association of Democratic Women of Kampuchea)e

Each administrator must have righteous precepts for living and righteous, clean politics; that is:

1) Love, respect and serve the people-workers-peasants with the whole heart and soul; not be dictatorial toward the people, not intimidate the people. Must always be modest and simple toward the people.

2) Along with always protecting the interests of the people, do nothing to disturb the goods of the people, even a single pepper or a can of rice. May not extort goods of the people either by "hot" or "cold" means. May not take bribes from the people.

- 3) If one wrongs the people, he must beg their pardon.
- 4) Speak, sleep, walk, stand, sit, eat, smoke, play, laugh in a refined unobtrusive manner following the traditions of the peopleo
- 5) Do not go beyond the bounds of propriety toward womeno
- 6) Do not drink or eat anything of a bad nature that is non-revolutionary.
- 7) Do not gamble.
- 8) Do not touch money or property of the people or of the Organization.
- 9) Must have burning rage toward the enemy.
- 10) Must do manual activities like the peopleo
- 11) Must always respect other comrades in the collective and in the Organization. Must not work in a dictatorial, individual manner.
- 12) Must constructively conduct criticism and self-criticism; in the Front organization [work] honestly seeking to build strong internal solidarity and unityo Do not fight together outside the Organization nor use slander in order to struggle for influence.
- 13) Must awaken in order to make the revolution by oneself; do not depend on others or foreigners or let anyone replace one. Must clearly understand that this revolution is the revolution of the people of Kampuchea and the people must make it themselves and seize the destiny of the nation themselves; do not sleep waiting for foreigners to do it.
- 14) Must maintain the image of the mastery of the task at hand; know how to solve all problems that relate to living whether in the realm of thought or on the material side of the peopleo
- 15) Must strongly believe that our struggle has real difficulties but will certainly be victorious.

* * *

In the political education schools the Khmer Rouge Organization uses clever tricks, uses various documents to educate according to the lines of each member (they usually say political awareness), which is to say that, for a member who still holds Sihanouk in affection (Cadre of the Front) and fears a socialist regime, they usually use only documents which square with the ideas of the Front for education or they let this category of member simply receive training at his bureauo Sometimes they show the road to red theory by means of various documents; there are seminal documents dealing with:

- The Division of Khmer Society into Classes
- Class Struggle
- Mass View (*dassan mahajan*)
- Building Proletarian Principles
- Criticism and Self-criticism (*critique et auto-critique*)
- Proper and Improper Pride
- Quality of Administrators
- etcq

Regarding full cadre (*krapkħāṅṅ beā lakkħṅ:*) core administrators who are "candidates [*sic*]" of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (*Membre du Parti Communiste Khmer*), their educational limits seek to instill continually deeper socialist habits (*Plī socialist*) aiming for a communist regime. And the education of this category of [members] is secret, not revealed to the category of members of the Front or to the category of ordinary [members]. That is, [it is restricted to] those cadre who are candidates and whom the Khmer Rouge Organization intends to be their core in each region, to be bureau chairman or political commissars for their troops.

In the Khmer Rouge Organization's Special Region, the people who have the duty to teach and educate the potential cadre include Mr. Sieng Po Se, Mr. Ros Chetthor, Mr. Sok Thuok, Mr. Chi Kim An (died at the beginning of April 1972), and Comrade Hang (revolutionary name).

In the Southwest Region, Mr. Chou Chet, Mr. Phouk Chhay, and Mr. Thuch Rin are the instructors.

Education and Study in the Bureaus. In each office, the Chairman and deputy chairman are the study leaders who discuss various goals which are set forth in the documents. All documents used for study emanate from the Central Committee (*Kena Mocchħim*) of the Communist Party. Study in the bureaus cannot be done regularly. Sometimes they do it once a month, sometimes once every two months, depending on available free time.

Besides the study from documents, they regard the living group meetings (meetings for criticism and self-criticism) which are held every Sunday as especially appropriate for political education and monitoring the implementation of political theory and approach. In the criticism and self-criticism meetings they often criticize each other the most for traits of "individualism" and "liberalism." They try to conquer these "traits" with the aim of "taming" men to become instruments to respect and apply the discipline of the Organization without complaining, like a machine on behalf of this socialist regime. They make and strengthen into a habit the idea of respecting the rhythm of discipline, the tempo of work, the rhythm of life according to the worker discipline which they hold up as the model. That is, they implement the theory of proletarianization by taking the weight of the party's authority and applying its full pressure bit by bit. This is the preliminary beginning of the "Dictatorial authority of the proletariat" (*phase primaire de la dictature proleta-rienne*).

Political Education at Meetings. We already know that meetings are an important school of political education for peoples of socialist countries. Khmer Rouge leaders have paid very close attention to the matter of meetings.

In all places, even small Phum, Khmer Rouge leaders always seize on everyday ceremonies and transform them into large or small meetings. At the end of the harvest season they induce the villagers to hold a meeting to profit by politically educating and by encouraging the villagers to try to "push themselves," increasing production, too. At the meetings there are always artistic performances as a means of propagandizing-educating-fomenting "revolutionary violence" so they are enraged against the "enemy" (that is, we Khmer ourselves!). Besides speeches from the core [cadre], they arrange for men and women representatives of the villagers to rise and give their opinions, which statements they call "raising interest" to support their revolution and struggle. Let me note that in each Phum, they have arranged for one of their core to conduct political education once or twice every year. Funerals of Khmer Rouge troops are also diverted into meetings.

On 30 September 1972 they conducted a major meeting at all the Regions to commemorate the founding anniversary of the Communist Party of Kampuchea which they claimed was formed in 1951. They printed the history of their 21-year struggle. Before 30 September 1972 the Khmer Rouge Organization concealed and did not let out the name of the Communist Party of Kampuchea. The year 1972 was the first year in which the Khmer Rouge showed their face publicly as a "name brand."

On many prominent red banners they inscribed various slogans concerning the task of leadership of the "party"; as prime examples

- "Only the Communist Party of Kampuchea can lead the revolution to definitive victory."
- "The Communist Party of Kampuchea holds the task of leading the revolution of Kampuchea."

On 30 September 1972 at seven p.m., north of Phum Tang Khmau, under the falling drops of a light rain, a microphone loudly ordered all comrades to roll down their shirtsleeves, button their collars, take off their caps and be ready to salute the "party flag." The onlookers saluted silently. . . . As the anthem "Salute the party flag" [was playing], the lights came up and, ripping out of its blue sheath, emerged a red sheet of cloth, four square meters in size with the emblem of a hammer and sickle touching in the center of the red sheet. I looked left and right and saw the comrades nearby clenching their fists, silently saluting the flag. I also saluted with clenched fist like them and turned slightly to whisper in French to a friend who had the same political philosophy, "It is like they stabbed me right in the heart with a knife. . . . I have the impression of living in the U.S.S.R." My friend made a sign for me to speak softly so nobody would hear. A little later, taking advantage of a time when other people were paying attention to the speech of the Deputy Chairman of the Special Region, both of us secretly motioned and slowly edged out of there, giddy with a feeling of hopelessness piled on. There was never a time when I despaired of the nation as I did then. . . .

Political Education during Conferences. During conferences such as the Conference of Intellectuals, for example, Khmer Rouge dignitaries or their administrators gathered to discuss difficult problems and various deficiencies with which they had met in implementing the way of the party. These conferences were of a sometimes public, sometimes secret character. In open conferences they would raise problems in the framework of the Front to be discussed. They concealed and did not speak of the "Communist party" or about the political program of the party. In the circle of communist "candidates" the various discussions in the conferences were closed because they discussed the real political program of the party, about the party's tactics and strategy. Aside from candidates or important core [cadre], no members had the right to attend these major conferences.

5. The Manner of Implementing Phum, Khum, District, Sector, and Regional Government

At this time the Khmer Rouge had divided the Phum-Khum-District-Province-Region system into one of Phum, Khum, District, Sector, Region. Forming of Sectors and Regions out of our Provinces and Regions was still not clearly done. In reality each Khmer Rouge Sector had a size equal to one of our Provinces and the Regions were equal to one of our Administrative Regions (*regions administratives*).

Each Phum, Khum, District, Sector, Region was led by a Phum, Khum, District, Sector, Region Committee. They often abbreviated it as the *Kena*-Phum, Khum, Sector. Each committee has the following composition:

- Chairman
- Deputy Chairman
- Members (few or many) charged with economics, social affairs, culture, military, etc.

As for the Khum, District, and Sector, they had a political commissar of the party assigned called the "party-sec" (Secretary of the party). The "party-sec" had the greatest authority because he was the representative of the party assigned to monitor the activities of the entire committee. In the Khum where the chairman did not understand about the revolution, they designated a party political commissar to assist the committee. The political commissar or the "party-sec" were all candidates or full members in the party. As for the other members of the committee (except for Sector and Region Committees) some had not yet become party members, that is, were just sympathizers or were people who had supported their revolution for a long time and had received in-depth political education from them. There were still chairmen or committee members of the Front at some Phum and Khum who remained in the framework of the Front; that is, they still believed that [they] were making the revolution simply to hand authority back to Sihanouk. As for the members of this sort of committee, the Khmer Rouge Organization always monitored them and often gradually gave political education to attract them into skipping toward the socialist revolution in stages.

From the end of 1970 until mid-1971, the composition of the Front committees at the Phum, Khum and District was still highly confused. Sihanoukists had most of the important jobs in the lower organization in some Phum, Khum, District, and Sector committees. All these members were picked and forced [to serve] by the Viet Cong-North Vietnamese; therefore, they lacked deep political education generally. As for the higher organization, some Khmer Rouge Sector committees and Region committees held exclusive domain; that is, the members of all the leadership committees were entirely full members of the party. In order to become a full member of the party, a person had to join the serve their movement at least for two or three years and fulfill all their conditions.

The Khmer Rouge used political tactics in swallowing up the strength of the Sihanouk Front. At first, in 1970 and 1971, when Viet Cong and North Vietnamese communist forces were invading and expanding [into Cambodia], these foreign communist troops used King Sihanouk's stock of popularity as a screen in order to gather strength and support in the strata of the people whom they controlled. At that time, Khmer Rouge strength, military and political, was very weak. Both Viet Cong-North Vietnamese and Khmer communists met to change political tactics so as to gather in the Sihanoukist strength because in most of the rural areas Sihanouk's popularity was still strong. A large number of peasants and merchants still supported King Sihanouk which led the Khmer Rouge leaders to hide themselves behind the screen of the "National United Front of Kampuchea." The Central Committee of the Khmer Communist Party pulled Sihanouk into their trap by means of Peking. Having gotten him in hand, the Khmer Rouge got ready to squeeze him dry.

Now the strength of the Sihanouk Front has changed into political strength of the Khmer Communist Party. Khmer Rouge cadre, whether political or military, have entered and taken over all organizations of the Front, large or small, and have replaced all the Sihanoukists. All the Sihanoukists have been changed into Khmer Rouge. Today, since the Khmer Rouge started to show themselves to the people, Khmer Rouge cadre actively began to teach socialist theory.

* * *

Henceforth in Khmer problems, both the remains of the monarchy and of Sihanoukism will no longer have the power to continue haunting us. The wheel of history spins forward, never retreating. Only two political forces confront each other: the free Khmer Republican regime and the force of the communists.

In the ongoing war to stop the Indochinese Communists, the Khmer nation definitely needs a revised, new national principle which will be the second phase of the revolution of March 18 in order that we have our own possibility to check the engulfing force of the communist revolution in Indochina. So that we avoid a transformation of Khmer destiny into that of Poland, Khmer leftists must rid themselves of risky and nonsensical political notions and come to help organize the national society to seek progress and well-being in a Khmer style in the circle of the Khmer family because only a Khmer regime represents the real will of the Khmer nation and such a Khmer regime will also be a total synthesis of regimes of capitalism and socialism.

A SHORT GUIDE FOR APPLICATION OF PARTY STATUTES

(Translated captured document, Phnom Penh, 1975.)

I. Party Name

Our party is called "The Communist Party of Kampuchea" in accordance with the recommendations passed by the Central Committee in September 1966.

II. Goal of the Party

1. The immediate goal of the party is to lead the people to succeed in the national democratic revolution, to exterminate the imperialists, feudalists, and capitalists, and to form a national revolutionary state in Cambodia.

2. The long range goal of the party is to lead the people in creating a socialist revolution and a Communist Society in Cambodia.

III. Party Membership

1. Requirements for party membership are as follows:

a. Candidates who desire to join the party must be members of the Young Men's Communist League, the Farmers' Association and the Young Women's Democratic Association. These requirements apply to any location where such organizations have been established; they do not apply to a location where such organizations have not yet been formed.

b. Candidates who desire to join the party must have a good revolutionary attitude and must have performed revolutionary activities which have been acknowledged and satisfied by the masses. These activities can take many forms, such as in the political, economic, liaison or military fields.

c. Candidates who desire to join the party must have a good and clean personal history and must be from the lower class, such as poor farmer or middle farmer especially of the lower stratum. We must pay special attention to these important points and ensure that those who do not have a good clean personal history, such as former soldiers, agents, subdistrict chiefs, militia members or those who were in contact with the enemy, do not join the party.

d. Candidates must not have bad morals, must not drink excessively, chase women, fight, rob or have earned their wealth illegally.

e. Candidates who desire to join the party must be at least 18 years of age.

f. Candidates who meet the above requirements, must be selected, taught, and tested for a period of three months to develop knowledge about the way, spirit, politics, and organization of the party.

g. When requirements for party membership are finally met, candidates will be allowed to become a member of the party with the unanimous agreement of the full branch committee and the approval of the full district committee. Candidates will not be admitted by the decision of an individual branch member or cadre as it sometimes occurred in the past.

h. Candidates who apply for party membership must have two party members as sponsors who in turn can guarantee their backgrounds and various requirements for joining the party.

2. The admission of new party members must be performed as follows:

a. The ceremony will include the secretary or deputy secretary of the branch committee, representing the party, who will serve as the chairman of the meeting, the two sponsors of the candidate, and the candidate himself, a total of four persons.

b. The chairman announces the subject and program of the meeting.

c. The chairman leads in the salute to the party flag and pays respects to the fallen party members.

d. The chairman introduces the biography of the candidate and announced the decision of the branch committee and the approval of the district committee to admit the applicant into the party. The chairman will question the applicant to make sure that he is willing to join the party.

e. The applicant reaffirms his intention and reasons for joining the party.

f. The applicant takes an oath in front of the party flag by raising his fist in front of the party flag and reads the following oath: "I,, swear in front of the party flag that I will be loyal and unconditionally serve the national revolutionary party and class workers for my whole life."

g. The chairman recognizes the new member and assigns him activities to perform in a branch organization and sets up a probationary period for the new party member based on his class. The probation period is three months for a poor class farmer and six months for a middle class farmer.

h. The chairman and participants at the meeting will congratulate the new party member and encourage him to work hard and learn in order to become a good party member.

i. The new party member agrees to adhere to the life style of a new Communist party member.

j. The chairman leads the participants in the salute to the flag before closing the meeting. On the occasion of the admission of the new party member, a drink may be arranged during the meeting, however, the meeting will not be longer than one and one-half hours.

3. Duties of party members.

a. Internal duties. Hold criticism and self-criticism sessions once every two weeks or once each month to review work performances, to study past experiences, to seek out good qualities and failures and to plan work for the future.

Hold individual and group sessions to study Marxism-Leninism, the political teachings and aims of the party, discuss ways to participate in the revolutionary activities of the people and revolutionary capabilities, and study means to strengthen the way, spirit, and politics of the revolution. Pay a contribution of one riel each month. Hold criticism and self-criticism meetings to instill correctness among individuals and comrades. Absolutely protect the secrets of the party, absolutely preserve the strength of the party, absolutely respect the discipline and organization of the party, and absolutely preserve the union and internal unity according to the codes of the party. Display examples of the work and activities of the revolution in accordance with the way, spirit, and politics of the party.

b. Duties among the masses. Propagandize and teach the people about the various subjects which serve the civil war in order that the people will increase production according to the decisions and the directives of the party. In this matter we have to serve the people faithfully and learn from them. Organize the people according to different groups in order that their strengths may be concentrated into guerilla units, militia units, the united fighting women's associations, and production associations. Make circulars and finally select good people for admittance into the party.

4. Rights of party members. Party members of all classes have the same rights as follows:

a. All new members may be considered as candidates for party positions and be selected and nominated for leading activities of the party.

b. Party members may discuss and offer opinions of decisions concerning the work of the party in accordance with democratic centralism, regardless of whether it is a small or big problem at any level.

c. A party member has the right to criticize political matters or plans of the organization at any level in accordance with democratic centralism. However, observe that these rights belong to full party members. For provisional members, they have the right to discuss problems with full party members but are not entitled to make decisions. This means they do not have the right to offer opinions or decisions concerning the selection and nomination of new members, nor can they select and nominate themselves to party positions.

5. Party Organizations

b. Branches and Cells

A branch committee is a party organization which is organized at the subdistrict level. A cell is subordinate to a branch and is established at the village level.

Any subdistrict which has three or more party members may organize a branch committee. A subdistrict which has from six to eight party members must nominate a secretary and a deputy secretary for leading the branch committee. Any subdistrict which has ten or more party members must have a committee of from three to five members to lead the branch. One committee member is the secretary, another is the deputy secretary, and the remainder will hold other positions in the committee.

A village which has two or more party members may form a cell with a chairman to lead it. (Note. A branch committee is a formation of cells. This is because the branch is the party's organization in the subdistrict and cells are the party's organization in the village. Usually, a good cell chairman in a village can be

nominated as a member of the branch committee in the subdistrict in accordance with the rule of three to five members to a branch committee.g

b. Duties of Branch Committee and Cell Members

The duties of branch committee and cell members are the same.

Internal duties. Hold criticism and self-criticism sessions once every two weeks or once a month to review work performances, to draw on past experiences, to seek out qualities and failures, and to plan new work to be performed in the future. Organize study groups in order to strengthen our spirits and to increase our capabilities; lead the people politically by holding branch meetings once every three months to examine the previous work and plan new activities. Select and nominate new organization leaders, such as a secretary, deputy secretary, and committee members. Examine our financial accounts and assets, protect the secrets of the party, preserve the revolutionary strength, respect the discipline and organization of the party, and maintain our union and internal unity according to the plans of the party.

Duties among the masses. Propagandize and teach the people about the various subjects which serve the civil war, such as military teachings and agricultural production, in accordance with the decisions and directives of the party. Organize the people according to classes in order to utilize their strength in guerrilla units, militia units, women's associations, production units, the Young Men's Communist League, and the Farmer's Association. Also select and nominate good people for the party.

c. District Committee

The district committee is an organization of the party at the district level. Its duties are to lead and undertake the work of the party in the district. The district committee clearly leads the branches in all subdistricts of the district.

In each district, a district committee will be established when there are three or more branches. The district committee is to be formed at a meeting attended by the representatives of all branches in the district. The district committee has three to five committee members depending on the number of branches in the district. The district committee must have one secretary and one deputy secretary.

Internal duties. The district committee holds a meeting once each month. However, a special meeting may be held if there is an immediate need to examine old work, correct qualities and failures and plan new work for the district committee. Organize duties to increase political capabilities and organize good leadership in the district. Study sessions must be kept short so that they will not interfere with the basic work among the people. Properly lead the branches of the entire district to carry out the decisions and directives of the higher organization on time.

Increase the formation of branches and cells in the subdistricts and villages of the entire district. Organize a district meeting once every six months to be attended by representatives of all branches in the district. Hold criticism and self-criticism sessions to seek out qualities and failures, prepare new plans for the next six-month period, select new district committee members, and examine the financial accounts and assets of the district.

Duties among the masses. Let the branches and cells propagandize and teach the people on military, economic and various other subjects in accordance with the decisions and directives of the party. Let the branches and cells organize the people according to classes in order to attain better quality and more numerous people for the popular revolution. Make the district better and better.

IV. Organizational Statutes of the Party

The organizational statutes of the party are based on democratic centralism and are as follows:

- a. Party leadership at the top echelon of the organization is established by a vote. However, in places where conditions are not suitable, the party will make the decisions and appointments.
- b. Every decision of the party is initially decided by the majority before party members are given an opportunity to express their opinions.
- c. It is the duty of a member to respect the majority (the lower echelon must respect the higher echelon). A party member must respect the committees and organizations, and these organizations at all levels of the party must respect the central leadership.
- d. Party members and committees at all levels must respect and carry out all decisions and directives of the party. If they disagree with a decision or directive of the party, members have the right to request a meeting with a higher echelon through the chain of command. While waiting for a new decision they, however, must respect and execute the old decision.
- e. Leadership and working procedures must respect and follow the directions of the collective leadership and each person will carry out his own responsibility.
- f. Party organizations at all levels have the right to solve and manage their work according to the framework based on the political way and decisions of the party. However, when they encounter important problems or problems which are beyond their capabilities, they must report and ask for a decision from a higher party level. Following each decision, the lower level organ must report to the higher level party echelon the various situations at their respective levels. The leadership organizations must create various guides for lower level organizations based on fixed time periods, existing situations, and work experience.

V. Party Discipline

1. In order to maintain good union and unity in the party, our party has the goal of respecting the discipline of the party organization. The discipline of the party is strict and perfect, and it follows the enlightened way of each member. Each party member must respect and act according to the discipline of the party. To respect the discipline and organization of the party means to respect the spiritual way of the party, the political way and purpose of the party, the various decisions of the party, and the various regulations of the party.

2. Any organization or party member who opposes the spiritual way of the party, the political way and purpose of the party, the various decisions of the party; who causes a break of union or unity in the party; who does not perform his duty; who reveals party secrets causing damage to the party; who embezzles party funds and property; or who creates other serious and minor violations, will be disciplined as follows:

a. For the committees--criticize and warn offenders only within the party. Change some personnel on committees or change the whole committee and form a new one.

b. For personnel--criticize and warn members only within the party. Change a member's job, demote him to a lower position, suspend him for a given period, or expel him from the party.

c. To discipline any committee which has committed an error, proposals for such discipline must be initiated by the next higher level committee and approved by a higher level organization before the action is carried out.

d. In order to criticize and warn a branch committee which is in error, the district committee has the right to execute the discipline. However, to carry out major disciplinary measures, such as a changeover of the branch committee, the district committee must have the prior approval of the province committee.

e. For members who have erred and must be punished by criticism or warning, the committee has the right to execute the discipline. For personnel who have erred and who must have his job changed, be demoted, or expelled from the party, the committee must have the prior approval of a higher level echelon before discipline can be executed. For the expulsion of a member from the party, which is the harshest discipline, the committee which proposes this discipline and the higher echelon which approves the discipline, must consider the benefit and loss to the party before making the decision. At the same time, consequences resulting from the expulsion of the member from the party must be considered so that the decision will not cause any harm to the party.

VI. Party Finances and Assets

1. Finance and assets of the party come from the monthly contributions and the various assistance provided by party members, people of various revolutionary associations, and from trading and production activities of the party.

2. The monthly contribution of party members is fixed at one riel per month.

3. The request for various assistance from the people must be approved by the regional organization.

4. To keep and control the money and assets of the party, there must be an accurate system of accounting for incomes and expenditures which will be examined collectively. The expenditure and use of money and assets of the party will be decided collectively.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES

by

Timothy Michael Carney

SALOT SAR

Secretary-General, Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea

Salot Sar was born 19 May 1928 in Kompong Thom. He studied at the College Technique in Phnom Penh earning a Brevet d'Enseignement Industriel. His specialty was carpentry. He left Phnom Penh for Paris in August 1949 to study radio electronics at the Ecole Française de Radio-electricite. He failed his examinations at three sessions and returned to Phnom Penh in January 1953.

Salot Sar joined the Pracheachon Group after his return and became active in leftist journalist circles. In 1963 Sihanouk included him among 34 leftists, rightists and other subversives invited to form a government. Salot Sar and others evidently believed the public identification foreshadowed repression and left for the maquis at the same time as did Ieng Sary and Son Sen. In 1971 he reappeared as one of the signers of a National United Front of Kampuchea intellectuals' appeal. In March 1972 he was designated one of the three vice-chairmen of the High Command of the Cambodian People's National Liberation Armed Forces. Salot Sar had responsibility for the Military Directorate. *China Pictorial* photographs show him among the greeters during Sihanouk's 1973 trip to Cambodia.

Salot Sar's wife, Khieu Ponnary, is Chairman of the Association of Democratic Women of Kampuchea. Ieng Sary's wife is her sister.

Salot Sar's brother, Salot Chhay, ran the Khmer Republic's official daily newspaper.

IENG SARY

Deputy Prime Minister charged with Foreign Affairs

Actually born in 1930 in Vinh Binh province, South Vietnam, Ieng Sary claimed to have been born in Prey Veng, Cambodia on 1 January 1930. He probably did so in order to take advantage of scholarships for those born in Cambodia proper. He studied at Lycee Sisowath in Phnom Penh, earning a Baccalaureat, Premier Partie and left Phnom Penh in October 1950 for commercial studies in Paris. He changed to the Institut d'Etudes politiques in 1953.

An active and travelled leftist, Ieng Sary became president of the Union of Khmer Students for 1955-56. He returned to Cambodia in 1957 and taught at Lycee Sisowath then Lycee Kampubot. In 1963 he disappeared into the bush after one of Sihanouk's confrontations with the left.

Ieng Sary reemerged in Peking in August 1971 as Special Envoy from the Interior Part of the National United Front and Royal Government of National Union (RGNU) of

Kampuchea. He returned to Cambodia in late 1973 to become Special Advisor to the Office of the RGNU Deputy Prime Minister (Khieu Samphan) and in August 1975 assumed his present title which the April 1976 People's Representative Assembly reaffirmed. He also holds a leading role in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea.

Ieng Sary's wife, Khieu Thirith had also joined in leftist student activities in France. She holds a French degree in English literature. An RGNU official she continues in the government of Democratic Kampuchea as Minister of Social Action. She also represents Phnom Penh factory workers in the People's Representative Assembly. Her sister married Saloth Sar.

SON SEN

Deputy Prime Minister charged with National Defense

An ethnic Khmer, Son Sen was born 12 June 1930 in Tra Vinh province of South Vietnam. He left Phnom Penh for France in September 1950 after studies at the Ecole Normale de Phnom Penh, a pedagogical school. He studied teaching in France until he lost his scholarship for having been a sponsor of the August 1955 Khmer student political meeting in Paris. He returned to Cambodia in May 1956 to teach at Phnom Penh's Lycee Sisowath.

Son Sen joined the Sangkum Reastr Niyum in 1958 and became director of curriculum at the National Pedagogical Institute. He temporarily lost his job in mid-1962 when accused with other teachers of attempting to discredit the monarchy and Sangkum in contacts with students. Then, in February 1963 he was accused of instigating student disturbances in Siem Reap after which he figured on Sihanouk's list of 34 leftists invited to form a government. He ran to the bush in 1963 at the same time as Saloth Sar and Ieng Sary.

A March 1972 decree establishing the High Command of the Cambodian People's Liberation Armed Forces named him as Chief of the General Staff. He received his present title in August 1975. He serves in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea.

Mrse Son Sen, Yun Yat, also formerly taught at Lycee Sisowath. She is a native of Siem Reap and studied at the College des Jeunes Filles in Phnom Penh. She joined her husband in the maquis apparently in 1965. Yun Yat figures in the April 1976 government of Democratic Kampuchea as Minister of Culture and Education and represents Phnom Penh factory workers in the People's Representative Assembly.

KHIEU SAMPHAN

Chairman of the State Presidium

Son of a minor civil servant, Khieu Samphan was born 27 July 1931 in Svay Rieng. He attended Lycee in Cambodia. In 1954 he arrived in France to study law and economics; he received a Doctorate in Sciences Economiques from the University of Paris in 1959. In 1956 he served as Secretary-General of the Khmer student union.

Khieu Samphan returned to Cambodia in 1959 and opened the biweekly French newspaper, *L'Observateur*, which mixed praise of Cuba, China, and the Soviet Union with articles on Khmer customs, lifestyle, and the economy. The Ministry of Security interrogated Khieu Samphan in early 1960, questioning him on his anti-monarchy and pro-communist attitudes. The Minister of Security apparently masterminded a success-

ful attack which saw Khieu Samphan set upon, stripped naked, and photographed in broad daylight on a Phnom Penh street in August 1960.

By 1962, however, he had joined Sihanouk's Sangkum Reastr Niyum and successfully ran for Parliament, a feat he duplicated in 1966. He served as Secretary of State for Commerce from October 1962 to July 1963. The tenor of Sihanouk's invective against Khieu Samphan and Hou Yuon in the wake of the March-April 1967 Samlaut uprising caused them to run for the bush.

After Sihanouk's deposition Khieu Samphan publicly reappeared as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense of the Royal Government of National Union of Kampuchea, then Commander in Chief of the Cambodian People's National Liberation Armed Forces as well. The April 1976 Cambodian Peoples' Representative Assembly elected him to his present position. He is also a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea.

Khieu Samphan remained a bachelor during the Sihanouk era.

HU NIM

Minister of Information

Born 25 July 1932 in the district of Prey Chhor, Kompong Cham province, Hu Nim was educated in Cambodia and France where he earned a Licence in Law during studies from 1955 to 1957. He eventually received a Doctorate in Public Law from Phnom Penh University in 1965. He also holds a diploma in Economic and Customs law. Hu Nim worked as a customs and treasury official.

On 30 December 1957 he joined the Sangkum Reastr Niyum and won a seat in the National Assembly elections in 1958 and again in 1962 and 1966. He represented a district in Kompong Cham province. Hu Nim participated in a number of Sihanouk-era governments first as Undersecretary of State at the Prime Ministry from April to July 1958, then undersecretary of State at the Ministry of the Interior for Parliamentary Relations from July 1958 to February 1959. From February to June 1959 he served as Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Justice charged with "Assainissement General," an anti-corruption post. He rejoined the government from August to October 1962 as Secretary of State for Commerce. While a deputy he wrote for and worked at a number of government and private publications including *Realities* and *Neak Cheat Niyum*.

Hu Nim became an officer of the Sino-Cambodian Friendship Association at its 1964 founding, then replaced its President in 1967 at a time when Sihanouk was moving against the left in the wake of the Samlaut uprising and the overseas activities of the Chinese cultural revolution. He fled to the bush in October 1967 after Sihanouk made him the target of increasingly threatening invective which included strong remarks at a September 1967 speech in Hu Nim's constituency while Hu Nim was on the stage listening.

Hu Nim reemerged after Sihanouk's deposition as Information Minister in the Royal Government of National Union of Kampuchea, a position he continues to hold from the new Assembly of the Representatives of the People of Kampuchea. Hu Nim represents Phnom Penh factory workers in that body. He is also a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea.

Mrs. Hu Nim joined him in the bush and was among the ladies who greeted Monique during Sihanouk's 1973 visit to Cambodia.

KHMER COMMUNIST GLOSSARY

កង	kañ	military unit
កងល្ងាច	kañ jhlap	village guerrilla
កងតំបន់	kañ tampatn	regional forces
កងស្រួច	kañ sruac	regular forces
កងទ័ពបដិវត្តកម្ពុជា	kañ dāb padivatt kambuja	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Kampuchea
កម្មករសហនិពន្ធ	kammakar sahajib	factory workers' union
កម្មសម្បទិក	kammasiddhi ruam	collective property
កម្មាធិការ	kammāhipāl	cadre; administrative committee
កសាង	kasāñ	to construct; to build
កសិករក្រីក្រ កសិករកណ្តាល កសិករក្រោម	kasikar kra kasikar kañtāl thnā'k krom	poor and lower middle peasant
កសិករសហគមន៍	kasikar sahakarn	peasant cooperative
គ្របដណ្តប់	krapkhand	framework; cadre (not current)
ក្រុម	krum	group
ក្រុមសហប្រតិបត្តិការ បង្កើនផល	krum sāmaggī pañka pañgoen phal	solidarity group for increasing production
គណៈប្រតិភូរដ្ឋ	Gaṅ: Pradhān ratṭh	State Presidium

គណៈមជ្ឈមណ្ឌល
របស់ក្រសួងកសិកម្ម
និងកម្មាធិការ

Gaṇ: qacintray nai
sabhā tamṇāñ prajājan
kambujā

Standing Committee
of the Assembly of
the Representatives
of the People of
Kampuchea

គណៈអធិបតី

Gaṇ: qadhibatī

Presiding Committee

ចលនា

calanā

movement (social or
political)

បាត់កាំបែ

jā't tamñ

implementation of
assignments; organi-
zation

បាត់កាំបែត្រូវគ្នាជាគ្រុធម្ម

jā't tamñ ḡnā jā
krum 2

organize themselves
into groups

ដីជាន់

jih jā'n

to oppress; to
exploit

ជំហរ

janhar

stand; principle

ជំហរនៃកម្មវិធីនិង
ការងារនៃស្ថាប័ននីមួយៗ

janhar ekarāj mōā's
kār nañ khluan dī bññ
khluan

principle of inde-
pendence, mastery
of the task and self-
reliance

ដាក់មើល

tān moel

to monitor; to sur-
veil

ទស្សនវិស័យ

dassan mahajan

mass view

ទម្រង់និងសីលធម៌

didian nañ svāy
didian

criticism and self-
criticism

ភាគ

dhātu

traits; elements

ភារកិច្ច

nādī

duty; responsibility;
domain

បក្សកុម្មុយនិស្ត
កម្ពុជា

Paks kummuyanīs
kambujā

Communist Party of
Kampuchea

បំពាក់បំប៉ន	pambā'k paṃ'pan	to nurture
បំផុស	pamphus	to cause to surge upward; to expand explosively
ប្រជាធិបតេយ្យ ប្រមូលផ្តុំ	prajādhīpateyy pramūl phtuṃ	Democratic Centralism
ប្រជុំជីវភាព	prajum jīvabhāb	lifestyle meeting
ជំនឿ	phnat̄t	habit
ជួញដូរដោយ	phsā khluan jā'p	to solder or weld oneself to
ជួញដូរ	phsāṃṇ	to tame an animal; to indoctrinate
ពលកម្ម	balakama	manual activities
ពួក	buak	team
មោឃៈ	marga	policy line; road; way
លក់ស្រួច	la't tam	to temper; to forge
រលាកទស្សនៈ	lok dassan:	worldview
វិណ័យៈ	vapṇ:	social class
សតិសម្បជញ្ញ	satiqāraṃṇ	consciousness; mentality; spirit
សភាតំណាងរដ្ឋសភា ជនកម្ពុជា	Sabhā tamṇāṅ prajājan kambujā	Assembly of the Representatives of the People of Kampuchea

សម្របសម្រួល	samōhabhāb	collective
សម្របសម្រួល កម្មវិធីសកម្មភាព	Sambāndh_yuvajan kummuyanīs kambujā	Alliance of Communist Youth of Kampuchea
សរុប	suán ruam	overall; the whole; the higher interest
ស្រុក	samruk	to strive for
ស្មារតី	smārtī	spirit; moral
ស្នូល	snōl	core; nucleus
ហូប	hōp	to drink; to eat
អង្គការ	qañkār	Organization