

ORIGINS OF THE  
PHILIPPINE REPUBLIC

Extracts from the Diaries and Records  
of Francis Burton Harrison

by Francis Burton Harrison



Edited and Annotated  
by  
Michael P. Onorato

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## FOREWORD

Francis Burton Harrison is an enigmatic, relatively neglected and frequently maligned figure in the succession of American Governors General in the Philippines. He was a Democrat in an almost unrelieved succession of Republic administrators. He presided over the transfer to Filipinos of legislative power and increased executive responsibility, the rapid Filipinization of the Philippine civil service, and the unfortunate debacle in the financial affairs of the Philippine government precipitated by the sudden end of the First World War, the consequences of which, his critics exaggerated out of all proportion in their efforts to discredit him and his administration in the Islands.

The Cornell Southeast Asia Program is proud to be able to republish Harrison's diary of his service as adviser to President Manuel L. Quezon during the first years of the Philippine Commonwealth and later during the war-time government-in-exile. Harrison's publication of his diary must represent his mature reflections when he was no longer a participant in public affairs and relatively free, therefore, to record his assessments of events and participants in those events.

Scholars of the American period in the Philippines must be grateful to Professor Michael P. Onorato who recognized the unique value of Harrison's diary to which he was guided by Professor John A. Larkin. Dr. Onorato has annotated the diary for publication at this time.

Essays embodying Professor Onorato's contributions, which have clarified and expanded our understanding of the impact of American colonial policies, particularly those of the Wood regime on the Philippines, have been collected in his volume, *A Brief Review of American Interest in Philippine Development and other essays* (Manila, 1973). The specialist working on the Philippines under American rule values the thorough research and insightful annotations provided in his work, *Leonard Wood as Governor General: A Calendar of Selected Correspondence* (Manila, 1969). More recently, the promise of his continued interest in Harrison and his administration to which the present volume is indebted, was confirmed by Professor Onorato's articles: "Governor General Francis Burton Harrison and His Administration: A Re-appraisal" and "Five Statements" which appeared in *Philippine Studies* in the winter of 1969-1970.

Frank H. Golay  
Professor of Economics and Asian Studies  
Director, Cornell Southeast Asia Program

March 1974







## EDITOR'S NOTE

My original intention was to write a long essay about Francis Burton's Harrison's work in the Philippines and his unique and salutary contribution to Philippine-American relations, the development of Filipino nationalism, and anti-colonialism in Southeast Asia. On reflection, it seems best that any discussion of these topics await another occasion.

The most recent studies of Harrison's career in the Philippines are Napoleon J. Casambre's doctoral dissertation on Harrison's administration prepared under the supervision of Professor Claude A. Buss then at Stanford University, Peter A. Stanley's *A Nation in the Making: The Philippines and the United States, 1899-1921* which examines the Harrison regime in detail, and my own articles which are referenced in the footnotes. Two recent biographies by Carlos Quirino and Vicente Albano Pacis about Manuel L. Quezon and Sergio Osmena respectively, discuss the American governor general's efforts on behalf of Filipino self-government.

Francis Burton Harrison resigned as governor general the last day of President Woodrow Wilson's second term. He left Manila after virtually eight years as the sole architect of a unique relationship between the representative of the metropolitan power and the Filipino political leaders. His departure from Manila and his high office was personally heart-wrenching for Harrison. As governor of nearly eleven million people, he had possessed both the office and duties that enabled him to make his life, as he saw it, meaningful. As the ranking Democrat in line to succeed to the chairmanship of the House Ways and Means Committee in 1914, he sacrificed, in the view of many of his colleagues in the Congress, much to go out to the Philippine Islands. Even General Leonard Wood, then Chief of Staff, advised him not to waste a promising career in public service upon an alien people when his government had neither policy nor plans for their future relationship with the United States. We know now, however, that Harrison was restless for the challenge of more arduous and demanding work in the service of his country. The post of governor general was considered by many at that time to be the second highest public office that any American could hold.

Harrison's eight years in Manila were personally fulfilling, as well as tragic. He was vilified by Manila Americans even before he left for his post. Republicans at home and in the Philippines made his work unnecessarily difficult. His second marriage floundered under the stress of life in Manila; and his third marriage to the just-turned eighteen year old daughter of an American professor teaching in the Philippines did not enhance the prospect of returning home in March 1921. Rather than return to publicly defend his regime which had suffered serious social and economic setbacks after 1918, and to be drawn into the interminable partisan wrangling over the then important "Philippine question," Harrison went to Scotland with his young wife and infant son where the presence of his cousin, Lord Fairfax, enabled him to enter into the gracious life of a country squire.

Although he returned to the United States to complete his only known *apologia* of his work in Manila, *The Cornerstone of Philippine Independence*, Harrison spent most of the fourteen years before returning to the Philippines in Europe. His private life was marred by two further divorces, financial concerns, and the absence of substantive and creative work. He was possessed of an abiding sense of *noblesse oblige*, so often found among high-born persons. He was a Fairfax of Virginia, a kinsman of Thomas Jefferson.

Manuel L. Quezon's invitation to return to Manila in 1935 must have come as a welcome relief from the tedium of Biarritz and Tangiers in the winter and Scotland during the rest of the year. Perhaps, Harrison saw the possibility of renewing his efforts on behalf of Philippine independence. Unfortunately, there are no documents available--nor does his diary help us--to understand why he returned to Manila and what he hoped to gain by doing so. The diary does suggest that he wanted to help Quezon and that he and his fifth wife, an Englishwoman, intended to remain in Manila for a year or so.

The reader should not be surprised that Harrison, after an absence of fourteen years, slipped easily into Manila's social, political, economic, and military circles.

He had maintained a steady correspondence with Rafael Palma, Isauro Gabaldon, Eulogio Rodriguez and Colin Hoskins, as well as with many other Filipinos and Americans in the islands. His files at the Library of Congress are rather slim for the early thirties and there is no way now to estimate the extent of his familiarity with Philippine problems then current. However, it is obvious that he must have kept himself sufficiently abreast of Philippine affairs that to pick up the tangled and byzantine-like threads of Filipino politics and Philippine-American relations was not difficult.

This short statement about Harrison is an occasion to recognize the intense feelings he held for the Philippines and its people. After all, he had a large, personal stake in seeing the Philippines become a sovereign state. If he was less than enthusiastic about the Muslim (Moros) Filipinos, and the Mountain Tribes, as scornful of the Chinese, Harrison was no better or worse than white men of his time who disliked the so-called sloth and filth of the "natives" and found the money-grubbing of the overseas Chinese distasteful.

The importance of this diary to Philippine historiography lies in the fact that it dispels once for all the idea that Harrison was subservient to Manuel L. Quezon, part fool and part sycophant. The diary substantiates the view of Quezon, while president of the Philippine Commonwealth that we have from other sources--weak, unsure of himself, sometimes petty and vindictive, occasionally the wise statesman, and much of the time a consummate politician. We are given portraits of Manila Americans and leading Filipinos, as well as of life in Manila and provided with Harrison's view of the political, economic and social scene during his service with the Commonwealth government. Moreover, Harrison gives us an insider's look of the Institute of Pacific Relations conference of 1943 and insight into Quezon's decision to stand by the United States during the Battle of Bataan, his struggle to find meaning as an exiled leader, and the sharp clash with Sergio Osmena over the presidential succession in November 1943. Lastly, the diary serves as a vehicle for Quezon's vignettes recalling associations with American presidents and governors-general and Filipino political leaders.

My sole concern for the diary is its authenticity; is it a reproduction of Harrison's notes or was it fabricated from the whole cloth, i.e., written long after the events reported therein. There is no way that this concern can be resolved. However I am convinced that we do have a genuine and unique document that was written by Harrison.

What I have done is reproduce the diary as it was published, except for gross grammatical errors, obvious typographical mistakes, and the placement in their proper sequence of several paragraphs which were listed as errata. If the errors were allowed to stand in this edition of the diary, every page would have its *sic* and some pages would have had an eye-distracting number of such *sics*. Harrison was seventy-eight and with failing eyesight when the book was in galleyproof. He had neither the time nor the energy to devote to recasting the book. Instead, he urged the reader to be his own proofreader. Other than a dozen word changes, about two dozen commas supplied, and a date or two given, as well as sticking to uniform spelling of names of persons, places, things, this edition of the diary is *faithful* to the original text. Nothing has been deleted.

If the reader finds the English spelling or turn of a phrase grating, it must be remembered that Harrison spent nearly two decades in Scotland. If his style is excessively formal, e.g., calling someone Governor General several times on one page, instead of using his last name after giving his rank and title, it must be recalled that Harrison learned his language, grammar and style of writing in the decade before the Spanish-American war. Quezon, for instance, is never called Manuel, although Harrison undoubtedly so addressed him on occasion, he is either the President or simply Quezon. Harrison himself insisted on being addressed as "Governor" even at the end of his life.

As for the annotations, every effort has been made to keep them to the bare minimum to save the reader annoyance which would result from a deluge of comments by the editor upon the text. Naturally, any criticism of the annotations must be borne by me.

A most interesting feature of the copy used in preparing this edition is the marginalia. I am convinced after comparison of examples of Harrison's handwriting, that they were made by him. If this is the case, the William Lockwood Memorial Library at State University of New York at Buffalo possess not only the only extant copy which I have been able to locate in any public or private institution, but the author's own copy. The diary has not been registered for copyright protection



despite the assertion on the title page. Professor John A. Larkin of SUNY Buffalo must be thanked for mentioning its existence to me.

Thanks must be given to all those in this country, the United Kingdom, and the Philippines who have helped me over the years. I acknowledge with gratitude the three grants given by the American Philosophical Society of Philadelphia that enabled me to examine the regimes of Leonard Wood and Francis Burton Harrison. Special thanks must go to Professor Frank H. Golay and his colleagues in the Cornell Southeast Asia Program for making this edition of the Harrison diary possible.

Finally, I exercise my prerogative to express a very personal opinion concerning Wood and Harrison whose service in the Philippines I have studied for over a decade. Both individuals were very much the right men in the right place at the right time during their tenures as governors general. If the Filipino people should remember no other Americans from the colonial period but them, they will not have made a mistake. It is my sincerest wish that this data paper will serve the purposes for which Harrison kept his record of Philippine Commonwealth.

It is my greatest hope that I may become an instrument in the further spread of democratic self-government.

We do not believe that we can endow you with the capacity for self-government. That you must acquire for yourselves.

You are now on trial before the international tribunal that is as wide as the world. . . . We shall eagerly await convincing proof that you are capable of establishing a stable government of your own. Such a government may not necessarily denote an entire reproduction of our own institutions but one which guarantees to its citizens complete security of life, of liberty, and of property.

People of the Philippine Islands! A new era is dawning! We place within your reach the instruments of your redemption. The door of opportunity stands open and, under Divine Providence, the event is in your hands.

Inaugural Address, October 6, 1913  
FRANCIS BURTON HARRISON



ORIGINS  
OF THE  
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EXTRACTS FROM THE DIARIES AND RECORDS OF

FRANCIS BURTON HARRISON

By

FRANCIS BURTON HARRISON

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## INTRODUCTORY NOTE

The pages which follow are taken from a diary recording experiences and conversations with the late Manuel L. Quezon when he was President of the Philippine Commonwealth, and with many others: Filipinos, Americans, as well as foreigners in the Philippines; their views as reported herein may fairly be said to represent public opinion there and later in Washington on the progress of the Philippine people toward the creation of a free and independent republic.

The writer served as Governor General of the Philippines under President Woodrow Wilson from the autumn of 1913 to the spring of 1921, and has subsequently been adviser to all four of the Philippine Presidents.<sup>1</sup> But the events recorded in this diary are chiefly confined to two periods of Philippine history, from the autumn of 1935 for nearly a year, and again for the period of the life of the Philippine Government-in-Exile during its existence in Washington, D.C., under President Quezon, from May 30, 1942, to the death of Quezon in August, 1944.

If occasional passages reporting the doings and sayings of the late President Quezon appear indiscreet, it may be stated most positively that this brilliant leader and statesman knew throughout these conversations that his expressed opinions were being recorded from day to day and that they would eventually be printed by the present writer. Since the author of this diary is unfortunately quite ignorant of shorthand, the record had to be kept, often late in the night after the events of each day, in longhand. This old-fashioned method of reporting has, most unfortunately, failed to capture all the fire and originality of expression peculiar to the gifted leader of the Filipinos. He sometimes urged my collaborating with him in the writing of a book on the preceding forty years of Philippine history, but such cooperation would merely have resulted in an experience for the present writer such as Jonah had with the whale.

Quezon was dynamic, restless and volatile by disposition, and the knowledge that he was "talking for the record" was ever present in all his conversations with the present writer during the periods covered by this diary. This, no doubt, stimulated his brilliant histrionic talents, which he usually found agreeable, as indeed, it was to the one who kept the record.

Ordinarily, the experiences of an adviser to a chief executive are shrouded in some mystery. But President Quezon was a singularly open and frank man--even of history he had no fear.

A genuine attempt has been made in the pages which follow to write down all events entirely objectively and impartially, and to avoid the expression of the writer's own ideas and opinions, but no doubt this "consummation devoutly to be wished" has occasionally proved to be beyond the writer's own powers of self-control.

This book is intended primarily for the author's family and friends, but it is possible (particularly in view of the destruction of most of the relevant Philippine archives at the time of the Japanese invasion), that it may serve some purpose as source material for students engaged in research into the great American experiment of extending to a race of far-away people the original American ideas of political liberty to be gained through self-government leading ultimately to complete independence.

This latter the American people on July 4th, 1946, gave in full measure to the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands, with resulting impact upon the lives and purposes of other nations in the Far East.

My grateful thanks are due to Mr. William Bird, now of Tangier, who helped so greatly in the preparation of the manuscript for the printer and in friendly advice as to the format of the book; and to Mr. David Bernstein of Washington who first read the manuscript and encouraged me to have it printed.

Tangier, June 1st, 1949  
Francis Burton Harrison

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<sup>1</sup>Harrison served Presidents Quezon, Osmena, Roxas and Quirino. After July 4, 1946, he served as sometime adviser to the Philippine Foreign Office until 1951.

July 6, 1935. Shanghai. Went down on Harry Payne's boat to meet Quezon on the *Coolidge*. Philippine Flag made for me by Mrs. Vicente Madrigal on the occasion of the repeal of the Flag Law (1916?)<sup>2</sup> at mast head. Quezon in fine form on his way back from the United States where the new Commonwealth Constitution had been signed by President Roosevelt. Took him to H. Payne's where he talked very frankly before us all of the future of the Commonwealth. Said if he was elected he would secure General MacArthur to prepare for the defense of the Philippines!

As for Japan, he thought that country would never try to take the Philippines if they had a strong, well-trained army; that! Japs might think it worthwhile only if the Philippines were defenseless. Phil Buencamino was with us; he had come up from Manila to see that the Shanghai police took proper steps for the protection of Quezon whose life had been threatened in the Philippines. (N.B. I supposed this was the result of recent *Sakdalista*<sup>3</sup> disorders, but back in my mind was a suspicion of the! followers of Aguinaldo.) Quezon asked me to come on with him to Manila but told him we would wait until after he was elected. He said, "If I am elected, I shall want you to do some work on the Philippines." He introduced me to Governor General Murphy who was also on the *Coolidge*. Great cordiality from Murphy who is a fine looking, simple-mannered and upright man. Saw also Quintin Paredes (Speaker) and Miguel Cuaderno, now in the Philippine National Bank, formerly my stenographer.

September 27, 1935. Arrived at Peninsula Hotel, Hong Kong, ill. Newspaper man told us that Quezon was in the hotel incognito, having arrived from Manila without its being known beforehand that he was leaving the Islands. Saw Quezon that evening in my room for 40 minutes and had a good talk about the elections. Said his majority was greater than the combined votes! of his two opponents, that Aguinaldo had beaten him in Cavite and Aglipay had led in Ilocos Norte. Said that Aguinaldo was taking his defeat *very badly* and that there were murmurs of revolution and assassination. I recalled that I had told him sixteen years before that Aguinaldo was "a dangerous man!" Quezon said passionately "I will -----." I said deportation, but he replied the Philippine Government has no such power except in case of foreigners. Quezon told me he wanted to have me on his staff in the Philippines as an economic or financial adviser. He looked worn and said he had slipped away from Manila for a rest. I asked if he was worn out by office seekers, and he replied "No --by friends who wished to congratulate me." His blood pressure had gone up from 140 to 180, but was now down again. Suggested I should go on a trip to Peking with him but I soft pedalled. Then said he was returning to Manila that night and asked me to wait 6 days in Hong Kong and he would return--which he was, however, unable to do. He left the hotel (as described to me by a pressman who was waiting downstairs) with a body guard like a football wedge, Quezon flourishing a riding crop and refusing to be interviewed. Quezon told me later in Manila that a newspaperman had forced his way into his cabin on the steamer and Quezon had ordered him out. Result: rather disagreeable item in paper next morning. People in Manila and Hong Kong thought Quezon had come over to see me, but our meeting was entirely due to chance. He expressed indignation over Malcolm's book and had refused to write a foreword for it; told me top hats were to be worn at his Inauguration--turning the tables on those who made such a joke of our arrival together in top hats in 1913.<sup>4</sup>

October 12, 1935. Arrived in Manila on *Empress of Russia*. Fleet of a dozen launches with flags, music, etc., accompanied the steamer to quarantine with terrific screeching of whistles. My first return since I left on March 5, 1921. At quarantine, a reception committee came on board. Rafael Palma, Chairman of this group was just as he had been in 1913. Quezon headed the party--the first time in years, I am told, he has come aboard a steamer to greet a guest. All old friends were there, including the surviving members of my former cabinets: Barretto, Apacible, De Veyra, Paredes, etc., etc.! Only Illustre, Mapa and Jakosalem are dead! Copious photos by newspapers.

Week of October 12-19, 1935. Full of newspaper interviews, photos and publicity. Dinner of fifty old friends, mostly Filipino, on the 12th. Quezon introduced

<sup>2</sup>The Flag Law was repealed on October 22, 1919.

<sup>3</sup>In 1935, the followers of exiled radical leader, Benigno Ramos, tried to instigate their own version of Philippine independence from the United States. Although the revolt was short-lived, it left a bitter taste for Quezon who was then striving to prove Filipino competence for! full self-government.

<sup>4</sup>Harrison is recalling the uproar caused by his alleged insistence upon formal morning attire for his inaugural address as governor general on the occasion of his arrival in the Philippine Islands on October 6, 1913.



me, in very friendly and cordial tones. He told me again of his displeasure with Malcolm, and said the latter had been undignified in coming to beg him to retain him on the Supreme Court bench. He said also that Barretto was out of favor with him for having sided with Osmena in the struggles of recent years. In discussing newspapers, Quezon remarked that he had always fought them and had won even when they were all against him; he added that each of them only expressed the views of one man--the editor or proprietor. Afterwards, we danced in the Manila Hotel where Doria (my wife)<sup>5</sup> and other ladies joined us. Doria handles people and the press with great success.

October 13, 1935. Dined informally at Malacanan. Governor General Murphy and his sister very cordial and kind. The Palace much the same as when I left it but is largely refurnished. It is indeed a very romantic old house. Murphy was particularly enthusiastic about the Executive Building which was finished in my time (1920). We talked of Aguinaldo's feud against Quezon and he told me he rebuked Aguinaldo for giving him so many stories against Quezon; he said he did not believe it all--that anyway Quezon would make no concealment of anything in his past--mentioned the trip of Quezon to Russia in 1911(?)<sup>6</sup>. He added that Don Manuel always spoke worse of himself than did any of his critics. Murphy offered us his car, and we used N° 1 with Ambrosio (my old driver) for several days.

Tea party at the *Tiro al Blanco* on October 16. All old friends and very delightful. Doria was enchanted with the Filipina ladies and with the dancing. Dinner at Quezon's fine house in Pasay, on October 17--about thirty guests, all old cabinet, etc. Mrs. Quezon was very sweet and cordial. Saw young Aurora (baby) Quezon; they call me her "honorary god-father" because at her christening in the Cathedral in 1920 the Archbishop refused to accept me as god-father because I was a Mason. Quezon was rather tired of dinners and was nervous at having to sit still so long, but was very cordial; told me had fought in turn all of the Philippine political leaders. I replied that he dearly loved a fight, like an Irishman, and that Congressman Tim Ansberry had not nicknamed him "Casey" for nothing. Pleased to find Osmena also friendly; but Phil Buencamino warns me that "the old gang" headed by Osmena would turn on Quezon again at the first opportunity.

On October 19 played bridge with Quezon, Palma and Guevara at the latter's house --a good game. Quezon held no cards but was amiable about it. Several young men and ladies were sitting or standing around in the old Filipino fashion, ready to serve. Guevara has been thirteen years as Resident Commissioner in Washington and wants to go back there. Will Quezon reappoint him? He has been advocating to Congress an American Protectorate here as a permanency. I was told of Guevara's dramatic defense of me before the Committee on Insular Affairs when Ben Wright the then Insular Auditor, attacked me. Guevara fell senseless at the end of his speech.

The Archbishop of Manila, Msgr. O'Doherty called on me October 17; friendly as ever; he has cooperated with the government during his 19 (?) years here, and says he is ready to leave if the Filipinos want their own Archbishop--possibly Bishop Reyes of Iloilo aged 42 and a nephew of Mrs. Sophie de Veyra; that the Islands are now divided by the Church into a northern and southern section. Quezon told me later that Msgr. O'Doherty has been very satisfactory and that they would probably wish to keep him for a couple of years. I understand that most of the Bishops under him are now Filipinos.

October 16, 1935. Visit to the new offices of *Vanguardia*. Alejandro Rocas, Sr. and his son were very friendly--I was introduced to the staff--Rocas is very proud of his new photogravures. We then visited his new *Ideal* Cinema--very fine--and is air conditioned. Visit to Shaw's new Wak-Wak Golf Club--as good as may be found in any country. Visit from Basilio Valdes, Chief of the Constabulary, who is a new man in public life since my day, and has had a rapid rise; he was formerly the successor as Chief Medical Officer to Francisco Oñate, then was made a General. He asked me to let him know when I went to the Provinces. Talk with General Nathorst, retired, who is very Swedish in appearance, and indeed looks very much like their King; he says

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<sup>5</sup>Harrison's fifth wife.

<sup>6</sup>Quezon went to St. Petersburg in 1908 as the Philippine delegate to the International Congress of Navigation. He went by way of the Trans-Siberian Railroad. By the time he arrived in the Russian capital the congress had been adjourned for two weeks. This did not deter him from enjoying himself as he completed a journey around the world in the company of Teodoro M. Kalaw. See T. M. Kalaw, *Aide-de-Camp to Freedom* (Manila: T. M. Kalaw Society, Inc., 1965), p. 64f.

very few American officers are left in the Constabulary Force which is now to be increased to 8,000; said there is no danger of revolution or assassination from Aguinaldo, that he (Aguinaldo) has no organization and is being pushed politically by Agoncillo and another. Talk with Felipe Buencamino who says Aglipay became a candidate for the Presidency at the instigation of Aguinaldo because the latter could not get votes in the Ilocos country on account of the murder during the Philippine Insurrection of General Luna (for which Aguinaldo was believed responsible). N.B. Rafael Palma tells me that [Luna was killed at the suggestion of P. Buencamino],<sup>7</sup> Sr., a member of Aguinaldo's cabinet. That Aguinaldo sent word to Luna to come to Malolos to see him but was absent when he arrived. Luna was killed by his own guard. The Government of Aguinaldo at once began to disintegrate.

Palma told me that he resigned his Presidency of the Univ. of the Philippines in 1933 to take part in advocating the Hare-Hawes-Cutting bill in the American Congress, against which Quezon was fighting. Quezon has expressed to me privately the fact that he does not want to "lose" Palma. Palma tells me that I am "more radical" than "many Filipinos"--i.e., on the subject of independence.<sup>8</sup> I called on Weldon Jones, the auditor here appointed by President F. Roosevelt. He is a fine type of young Texas college professor; he is on excellent terms with his staff, and is to be Economic Adviser to High Commissioner Murphy after November 15th.

October 19, 1935. Trip around environs of Manila with Ramon Fernandez, formerly the *Alcalde*. He showed us the improvements and growth of city, and was especially interested in New Manila and San Juan Heights. I took pleasure in riding over the new road which in my time I had tried in vain to push through the Chinese Cemetery!

Visit to Teodoro Kalaw, E. B. Rodriguez and Montilla at the Philippine Library in the Legislative Building. Wonderful collection of Filipiniana--they purchased the library of the old Tabacalera Company for 200,000 pesos. It contains many historic documents, including a photostat of an agreement signed by Salisbury, Hanotaux, Sec'y of War Alger of the United States, &c. which arranges for the Independence of the Philippines in 1900. It is said to have been obtained by Vicente Illustre (now dead)<sup>9</sup> from "a Spaniard" for 20,000 pesos. Probably a forgery.

October 20, 1935. Trip with Felipe Buencamino to Montalban--new bridge at Mariquina with toll of 15 centavos--at this rate, bridges pay for themselves in ten to fifteen years and are then free of tolls.

Visit from ex-Governor Ramoso of Nueva Ecija and his wife--he now lives in Guimba and works in his garden--he recalled our *Cimarron* (wild carabao) hunts back! in 1913, etc. Later visited a cock-pit with Doria and Felipe Buencamino--was greeted with cheers by the audience (probably staged by Felipe).<sup>10</sup> Very animated scene during the fights.

October 21, 1935. Played golf with Chief Justice Avanceña. He was very complimentary about my work here, said they understood my feelings in sacrificing the support of all fellow Americans here to carry out my mission, and appreciated it--that I am "part of Philippine history" &c. The conversation was in Spanish in which tongue I am very rusty. He has the cultural charm of old Spanish-Filipino days.

Dined with Vice-Governor Hayden--Quezon was there and he talked of General MacArthur, who had refused the High Commissionership here. Quezon said that we three would be working closely together, and told how MacArthur had praised the Filipino soldier in highest terms. Quezon also mentioned the foreign trade situation as between the Philippines, the United States and Japan. I spoke up for the poor "consumer" and he replied in an animated way how he had advocated the rights of the consumer in conversation with President F. Roosevelt. (But there is a snarl in all this--I have not yet got ahold of the thread.)

<sup>7</sup> Brackets found in the copy used for this edition. A question mark was placed at the end of the line in the right hand margin.

<sup>8</sup> See Gerald E. Wheeler, "Manuel Quezon and Independence for the Philippines: Some Qualifications," *The U.P. Research Digest*, II (July, 1963), 13.

<sup>9</sup> A question mark appears in the left hand margin of the copy used for this edition.

<sup>10</sup> This is very typical in the Philippines. Harrison was under no illusion concerning his popularity among the people.

October 22, 1935. Played golf with Don Rafael Palma. He said he had finished his half hour speech for Thursday's banquet, and would send it to me so I could prepare a reply. I told him that a part of his value had always been his straightforwardness; that he told the truth and was no flatterer.

Conversations with Isauro Gabaldon in this hotel. He says Tirona & Sotto are back of Aguinaldo--not Agoncillo, who did not support Aguinaldo during the election; he thinks disturbances are possible in Cavite and also in Nueva Ecija--but believes Quezon to be well informed and able to handle everything. *Sakdalistas* are still a problem. Rice is scarce because it is being withheld by those in the conspiracy who are helping this movement. When he was Resident Commissioner to Congress, the Filipinos of the "Missions" sent there who had clamored so loudly here about "Immediate Independence," had worked more the other way<sup>11</sup> in Washington; that Pedro Guevara's move in the American Congress for a permanent Protectorate for the Philippines was his own idea; that the idea might grow stronger here, but Gabaldon agreed with me that United States were unlikely to consent; also agreed that Japan had no policy of aggression here except for markets. Restrictions on P.I. products in U.S. might be modified but, in his opinion, this is uncertain. Gabaldon never learned English well--his speeches while in U.S. Congress were put in shape by Tavenner. For some years past, he had had no political relations with Quezon and Osmena. He could never support Phil Buencamino; and criticized his methods; was cold on the subject of Paredes--and only mild about Manuel Roxas whose abilities, however, he admires. He thoroughly agreed with me on the subject of immediate independence but considered, as I do, that this issue is now settled, and there is nothing more to say; adds they should accept and make the best of it.

He described the development of the Province of Nueva Ecija and the settling up of regions where he and I used to shoot *cimarrones*. He said that Bishop Aglipay received a large vote for President from Ilocanos in Nueva Ecija. (Conversation was in Spanish.)

Went out with Quezon at three o'clock to see his *casita* at Mariquina--he suggests that I buy the adjoining *terreno*--most wonderful view in Western Rizal. He raises American turkey--Rhode Island red poultry--has a Berkshire boar--and grows Indian corn. He told me he would keep on in his new Government those Americans who had been loyal--like Bewley;<sup>12</sup> that the legislature had appropriated 6 million pesos for retirement gratuities for Americans now to leave the service. He is bringing out General McIntyre and Dr. Heiser--the latter "for one or two years" to forestall attacks by the American Army here and the "Old Guard" on health conditions here--exclaimed how they would "savage" him (Quezon) if cholera broke out again!<sup>13</sup> He expressed genuine surprise to see that racial hatred still existed; and added that Vice-Governor Hayden is one of those "Nordics" who look down on colored races, as does Governor Forbes; said that they believed they "loved" the Filipinos but in the same way the former Southern slave owners loved their negro slaves; he added that he had told Governor Murphy that he would not stand for racial discrimination. Said Governor General Murphy would have nothing to do as High Commissioner and was going to live at Baguio. He disclosed the fact that General MacArthur had refused the job of High Commissioner. He intends to make some position for ex-Resident Commissioner Guevara which would not cost the Government too much, but that Guevara had lived in Washington so long he had become lazy--because, "as you know, they do very little work in Congress." He said Rafael Palma had written him an insulting letter when he (Quezon) opposed the Hare-Hawes-Cutting bill; Palma wrote that: "I would drive you out of public life unless you (Quezon) admitted you are wrong!" So Quezon wrote Palma that it would disrupt the University of the Philippines if he (Quezon) answered him in kind unless Palma resigned the Presidency--which he promptly did! Then Quezon beat Palma for the Senatorship with Sumulong. Said he now had thirty million pesos to spend and would begin on public works which had been suspended for the last two years.

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<sup>11</sup>Gabaldon broke with Quezon in 1928 over the Filipino leader's refusal to advocate immediate, complete and absolute independence. See Michael P. Onorato, *Leonard Wood as Governor General: A Calendar of Selected Correspondence* (Manila: M. C. S. Enterprises, Inc., 1969), p. 102, fn. 186.

<sup>12</sup>Luther B. Bewley served as Director of Education (1919-1935) and adviser on Philippine education until his death in 1950's.

<sup>13</sup>A reference to the cholera epidemic that occurred in the latter part of the Harrison administration. The epidemic was played up as proof of Filipino incapacity for self-government. See Dean C. Worcester, *The Philippines Past and Present*, new edition in one volume by Ralston Hayden (New York: Macmillan, 1930), p. 339, fn. 1.



We played bridge at Jim Rockwell's with Quezon. The latter told Doria that he would go to the United States in March to attend the Trade Relation Congress (doubt this).

Dined with Colin Hoskins--Arsenio Luz there; said he had gone into partnership in the insurance business with Trinidad and Miguel Unson; that this business was in its infancy in the Philippines.

October 23, 1935. Snipe shooting at Arayat with Judge Jaronilla and Pedro Tan; very few birds and we got into the big swamp which took an hour to cross. Total bag of only 23 for 3 guns, as contrasted with bag of over 500 to 5 guns in 1920. Evidently the immense increase of sport among the Filipinos has knocked out the snipe shooting in the Philippines.

Jaronilla was Department Attorney of Mindanao under Carpenter when I was here; he says he and Guingona are in favor of re-establishing the Department of Mindanao. Says the *Sakdal* movement is not over yet.

October 24, 1935. Played bridge in afternoon with Doria, Quezon and Mrs. Howell.

Banquet for me at night of at least 1000 in the Manila Hotel. Real, genuine kind welcome. Far more personal cordiality than I ever experienced here as Governor General. Left out the political remarks I had prepared, since it seemed ungracious to intrude offerings of advice in a gathering so purely personal! Received from the President of Pasay! a very complimentary resolution of the Municipal Board there. Osmena was really gracious in his short speech of welcome at this banquet. Mrs! Quezon sat next to me and jumped every time the flashlights went off. I suppose she is under a nervous strain for Quezon's safety. Miguel Unson told me it had been the largest *spontaneous* application for tickets to the banquet they had ever received.

So end the celebrations planned by the Reception Committee and we can now relax. It has been a wonderful experience and far surpassed all my expectations. Americans are evidently far more popular here than formerly! Colin Hoskins told me that Forbes in his visit to the Provinces in 1921 commented, even then--on the fact that formerly he had been received courteously in his provincial visits, but now cordially, and he attributed that change to his successor's work here!<sup>14</sup> This surprised me!

October 25, 1935i Dr. Kneedler questioned me about the probable security of American investment here--I expressed optimism!<sup>15</sup>

Alejandro Roces, whom I met said Osmena was "too much of an oriental; Quezon had the advantage of being partly occidental!"

Eleven a.m. I called on Governor General Murphy, and had a very friendly though brief chat. He expressed enthusiasm over his cabinet group--said he found them "more patriotic and with more integrity" than his former colleagues on the Detroit City Council; he asked me to help to entertain Vice-President Garner and his companions; said Garner was a much bigger man than usually given credit for in the United States. Murphy and I are to have a chance to get to know one another better in Baguio. Magnificent office building at Malacanan; I saw Charlie Franks and lots of my old assistants there.

October 25, 1935, 9 p.m. --October 29, 8 a.m. My wife and I are on a trip to the Bicol Provinces as guests of Sr. A. Roces. Sr. Paez, head of the Manila Railroad Co., accompanied us, also Ramon Roces and his wife (Manuelita Barretto), on a private train. Fishing in Ragay Gulf (Doria caught 2, I one); shooting snipe and duck at Pili--at the home of Prieto in Camarines Sur; trip to rest house in Albay on Mt. Mayon driving up through hemp plantations, on the new Paez road. We were given an attractive tea dance at the Mayon pavilion by Governor Imperial of Albay! Spent a comfortable night there. Sensational scenery, views of the Pacific Ocean; future health resort at altitude of 2500 feet, with a temperature of about 70f. Numerous conversations with Roces, Paez, etc.

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<sup>14</sup>Former Governor General William Cameron Forbes was willing to concede that Harrison had broken down much of the tension that existed between the Filipino leaders and the senior American colonial authorities. See W. C. Forbes, *The Philippine Islands* (2 vols.; Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1928), II, 298, fn. 1.

<sup>15</sup>Dr. Harold Kneedler owned extensive properties in Manila, including the Bayview Hotel. His concern over American investments typified the perennial anxieties of American and foreign businessmen in the Philippines.

A. Roces, Sr. is the proprietor of *Vanguardia*, *Tribune* and *Tagalog Daily* and of the *Ideal Cinema*. He is a very generous, warm-hearted man, full of ideals, and rather puritanic--zeal for the welfare of the poor people; is really an ardent patriot--not a politician, and is thoroughly stubborn and fearless. He wishes well for Commonwealth and is willing to give Quezon full support if a decent honest Government is set up--but is rather anti-capitalist. Has always been devoted friend of mine and a supporter of my work here. Would be glad to see me Economic Adviser--and favors low tariffs on the necessaries of life. He advocates also a 25 years period before full independence but accepts the new law. Roces believes it is a waste of time to work for the permanent continuance of the old free trade with the United States, but believes the American people are "sentimental" and can be appealed to for a modification of the present restrictions. I agreed. He advises me to consult with Manuel Roxas about the economic future--thinks him safe in judgment--and considers him sane and studious--believes him to be the coming man, and says that Quezon takes his advice.

Here are some of Alejandro Roces' opinions on people:

Quezon is impetuous--changes quickly--is not personally concerned over money--has great opportunity now to give a decent government. Roces advised him to go in for a reputation as a good President and not to care about financial benefits; better leave a good name to your children rather than a fortune. He commented that Jim Ross and Jacob Rosenthal are Quezon's best friends among Americans.

Osmena, in the opinion of Roces, is too lacking in firmness of character--is always 50-50!

Aguinaldo is entirely ignorant--has no organization and is pitiful.

Wood was a tragedy--was dotty when he came out here; Wood said of Quezon that when surrounded by angels he was an angel--and vice versa.

Davis was nothing.

Governor Cailles is a "100% liar"--that he (Roces) did not believe Cailles' story of the killing of seven *Sakdalistas*. He laughed over a photo of Cailles smoking a cigar and pointing a revolver at three dead men.

Don Isauro Gabaldon is an honest man.

Governor Murphy is lacking in firmness--*vide* the award of Government printing.

Yulo represents capitalists.

Does not advise Roxas to accept the post of Secretary of Finance, nor Paez to accept that of Secretary of Communications.

Sison is the best of the present cabinet--and is absolutely honest.

He then denounced by name several prominent Filipinos whom he believed to have accepted or demanded large sums of money for their influence in public life.

Roces says Quezon is afraid of assassination--that the President had told him that this eventuality was "inherent in his job!" I said that assassination was "not in the Filipino character"; he replied he used to believe that--but not now.

Says Barretto is too old; that Singson is not a reliable man; Sumulong is a good man, he believes, but he cannot understand him at times. Tirona is of no real account.

Agrees with me that there is too much higher education in the Philippines--it makes only for discontent.

Roces, Sr. advocates a National Transportation Corporation to take over all the motor bus lines--capital required now is about three million pesos but they would take shares or instalment payments; they can be run as feeders to the Railroad. Paez agrees with him. Roces advocates moving Bilibid prison out of town and making the site a central market and the hub of motor busses--thus cutting out the middleman. This has been tried in Spain--and is a success.

Doria reports a conversation with Mrs. Roces, Jr. and the provincial officials of Albay in which she told them the Philippines was being exploited by American

salesmen--with which they rather shamefacedly agreed. Mrs. Roces said to her, "I know why I like you so much because you are *English*--the Americans treat us like niggers." Mrs. Roces said where possible she bought only Jap goods. Doria said the Wolfsons and the American hairdressers in the beauty shops talk of Filipinos as if they were imbeciles.

At Pili Prieto talked of his starch factory there--he employs about 100 men--their starch is 80% for the laundry because, it is "more viscose"--20% for food (tapioca). They failed at first because they used camotes--now they make \$200,000 gross per annum using cassava plants which he smuggled out of Java in 1933--they are nearly double the size of the native Philippine cassava.

Talked October 27 with Gov. Imperial of Albay about hemp central and hemp-stripping machines--the latter are made by Inti Harvester Co. and cost about six thousand dollars; too expensive for the small farmer with a plantation averaging forty hectares. It would take two to three generations to teach cultivators to cooperate on a central. Said Albay has a 6000-horsepower waterfall--which had been abandoned by Meralcoi

At the tea dance in Mayon pavilion there was a good orchestra from Tabajo--people danced like Americans. Mrs. Imperial said her chief ambition was to go to Hollywood.

Duck and snipe shooting at Pili--duck were teal and mallard--very novel method of screened *bankas*--men went into water like retrievers after a wounded duck.

Mayon Rest House "the beauty spot of the Philippines." Volcano erupted last year for the first time in a century, as is still smoking--comfort and modern conveniences at the rest house

Clouds of locusts in Camarines Sur.

October 28, 1935. Long talk on the train with Paez with maps of railway system and roads in Luzon--extensions have built out of income. I praised him for having a corporation with non-political directors to manage it; evidently he is that unusual man who has "learned to say no." He studied two years in a preparatory school in Switzerland and then 4 years at the Polytechnikon in Zurich, said to be the best engineering school in Europe. His original ambition was to be a Military Engineer. He says it will cost two million pesos to complete the gap of 25 kilometers in the Railroad between Camarines and Tayabas. He added that the Philippine Railway in the Visayas is practically bankrupt. Iloilo branch pays--the bonds mature in 1937, and the bondholders have agreed to surrender them if the interest is guaranteed. Their best reason for government buying that system is to prevent another power (Japan) from making such purchase. Paez is in favour of a National Transportation Corporation as is Roces. He explained the views of Vicente Madrigal on the competition of Government cement plant with his own at Binalongan on Laguna de Bay, which he purchased for a song from Inchaustis and which now turns out 10,000 barrels a day--largely for use of the mines in Baguio. Paez thinks the gold mines in Camarines Norte (Paracale etc.) are probably as good as those in Benguet. He says all earnings from the Government cement plant go to the National Development Co. which, as yet, has spent practically nothing. (N.B. Osmena, on October 19th, confirmed this and said the National Development Co. is now in position to function properly under the new Commonwealth.) The Sabani ranch is not as yet successfully developed by the National Development Co.--(but it was purchased to prevent another nation from getting it, and in response to protests on above score from United States Senators).

Paez (Oct 28) advocates economy of self-sufficiency for the Philippines. I objected to carrying this idea too far, and thought foreign commerce essential.

Paez also said the choice of Wood for Governor General over Forbes was in accordance with Quezon's personal preference.<sup>16</sup> (N.B. I recall Quezon's remark to me in Paris about Wood.)

Paez stated that there is bituminous coal in Polillo; that iron mines in Camarines Norte are now exporting directly to Japan; and that an oil well is working in the Bondoc Peninsula in Tayabas.

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<sup>16</sup>See Michael P. Onorato, *A Brief Review of American Interest in Philippine Development and Other Essays* (Manila: M.C.S. Enterprises, Inc., 1973), pp. 30-31. This edition revised the edition published by McCutchan in 1967, as well as contracting two articles into one, and adding a previously unpublished article.



October 29, 1935. Osmena gave me a luncheon of 30 at Wak-Wak Club--mostly old friends and members of the Government in my time. The host told me that he had persuaded Aguinaldo to be good and not to make any incident at the inauguration. Said to the General that government is strong enough to coerce him by force, but we don't want that. Osmena gave a toast to me as "Friend, Statesman and Nation Builder." Santos, Ruiz and others were there who seldom come to banquets. Palma was jolly and Paredes still-born. Zulueta, Arranz, Vera, Varona, Avelino, Posadas, La Fuente, Torres, Singson, de Veyra, Montilla, Enaje, Corpus, Apacible, Guingona, Costas, Reyes, Sison and Rosa were among those present.

Played golf with Gaches: he thinks we have accomplished nothing here; that the house of cards will fall in two years; that Franklin Roosevelt is "loco"--"as you might expect from a cripple." Denounced the "forgotten man." Gaches' principal interest seems to be to keep the united States market open for Philippine goods and to have Filipinos buy only American products.

At Wak-Wak I met Uchiyama, the Japanese Consul-General who was very polite, and said he had studied up in the Consulate all the records of my administration, especially those of Consul General Kurusu, and wanted to call on me to express "appreciation of all I had done for them."

October 30, 1935. Golf at Wak-Wak with Chief Justice, Rafael Palma and Jaronilla. Visits from de Leon, (son of Dr. Felix), Lara and Oñate.

October 31, 1935. Visits from Guingona, Lope K. Santos, Hadji Butu and Pedro Aunario, former appointed members of the Legislature from Non-Christian regions.

Telephone from Mrs. Quezon--she reports that her husband shows positive traces of ulcers of stomach--he is to go to Philippine General Hospital at 10 o'clock to be X-rayed. She is to spare him all public social affairs, in order to keep him in shape for the inauguration.

Golf with Sam Gaches at Caloocan; his comment on Quezon's illness was: "Then there is something important coming on--he is always ill when he can avoid a difficult situation." Claims to like and admire Quezon but evidently Gaches is but a hopelessly poisoned member of the Old Guard.

Banquet given to Governor General Murphy by the Council of State. Quezon was absent and his speech was well read by Speaker Paredes who presided. The Speaker made graceful references to me--as also did the Governor General, who speaks more like an Irishman than an American; he has reserve, good English and in well balanced sentences. He seems uneasy in company--apparently is bored or else, perhaps, he is wishing himself elsewhere. I sat next to General MacArthur whom I met for the first time--a brilliant man with profile of vigour and determination. I told him he and I were the best friends Quezon had among the Americans out here--he replied that Quezon really "loved" me. MacArthur is keen for the continuance of free trade between the United States and the Philippines. Believes the United States will grant it at the end of the 10 year period, but will do nothing thereafter in a military sense to protect the Philippines and they must take care of themselves. Am forcibly impressed by his personality.

Osmena told me the X-ray of Quezon was negative!

Met the Chinese Consul General--he is just like all the Chinese. I smiled to myself when reflecting that I had my last Chinese Consul General here recalled in 1920 for opium smuggling. Met also the Consuls from England, Denmark and Switzerland.

November 1, 1935. Went to Quezon's house in Pasay; he is in bed and was being interviewed by the Acting President of the Senate, Avellino, and another legislator. Quezon has had blood emissions from the mouth; X-rays are said to be positive for ulcers of the stomach. He seemed surprised when I told him he should spend 6 weeks in bed on a milk diet--what are his doctors doing? Mrs. de Veyra, who was in the house, said it was impossible to "keep him down."<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>17</sup>One of the major difficulties that Quezon's doctors faced was that of keeping him quiet and obedient to their instructions. The only time that he was fully under their control was when he was totally incapacitated or scared by his own excesses. His bout with TB in 1927-28 left him dependent on but not cowed by his doctors.

Quezon showed me a letter he had drafted to Governor General Murphy who evidently had arranged with Secretary of War Dern to draw up a list of instructions for the American High Commissioner! Quezon's letter in response was extremely vigorous and was a positive rejection of the idea that the High Commissioner should exercise any more powers here than those granted him by the Tydings-McDuffie law. In reality, he was only an "Ambassador." It is of the utmost importance, he believes, to avoid at the very beginning precedents which may serve as a pretext for future interference!<sup>18</sup> I told him how the British High Commissioner to Egypt had interfered in the Government there. He remarked that "General Parker<sup>19</sup> has been at Murphy!" He commented that, when separated from the Council of State, which Murphy admires and upon which he relies, he would be accessible to very adverse influences--cited the example of "sturdy" Yeater, who as my last Vice-Governor, lived at the Army & Navy Club--Yeater finally wished to close the National Bank &c., &c. Quezon then gave me a draft of his proposed inaugural address to read--very fine--it meets the situation perfectly.

Met Dr. Fabella at Quezon's--he told me how public health had improved--that babies average 1/2 kilo more in weight than formerly.

Talk with Alberto Barretto, who told me how the Americans here had, after my departure, grown accustomed to talk of my extravagances at public expense while! Governor General. He as Secretary of Finance at that time knew I had spent of my own money 75 thousand pesos<sup>20</sup> a year more than my salary<sup>21</sup>--I had no allowances--while how the Governor General gets his servants paid for at Malacanan Palace and at the Mansion House at Baguio; has six motor cars free, and 250,000 pesos allowance for entertainments and 250,000 pesos (since this practice was initiated by Stimson) for "staff" i.e., military (or civil) advisers. None of these allowances were available to me when I was Governor General from 1913 to 1921!

Another thing which strikes me as strange is how even my friends forget that almost all the existing "improvements" to which they invite attention were either made or initiated under my government!<sup>22</sup>

P.M. Golf at Wak-Wak--Doria & I with Chief Justice and Mrs. Avanceña!

November 2, 1935. An hour and one-half's conversation with Quezon in Pasay--he is still in bed but is better. Had him to myself as the others were at the pier greeting the arrival at 9:30 a.m. of Secretary of War Dern. Quezon again expressed a thrill at my recent reception by the public here--said it was genuine and not manufactured--he had nothing to do with preparing it. He added that they would have "murdered me" with kindness if it had not been for the preparations for the inauguration. Described many incidents of the Wood and Stimson administrations--Said! he might have -- if he had not himself as Resident Commissioner learned to know the

<sup>18</sup>The role and position was left vague at Filipino insistence. This would lead to problems for High Commissioners Paul V. McNutt and Francis B. Sayre when they attempted to interest themselves in Philippine internal affairs. Quezon was extremely jealous of his prerogatives and resisted any attempt at American interference in domestic policy! The Fairfield Bill (1924) upon which the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act and the subsequent Tydings-McDuffie Act which provided for Philippine independence on July 4, 1946 gave the High Commissioner very definite watch-dog authority over governmental expenditures. The failure of the Filipino leaders to accept the Fairfield measure had nothing to do with any fault in the proposed legislation. See Michael P. Onorato, "Independence Rejected: The Philippines, 1924" in his *A Brief Review of American Interest*.

<sup>19</sup>General F. LeJeune Parker.

<sup>20</sup>The pesos was pegged at two to one U.S. dollar.

<sup>21</sup>Under the Jones Act (1916) the Governor General received 36,000 pesos. The Organic Act of 1902 was slightly over generous in that he received compensation for serving as President of the Philippine Commission. His total salary then was 42,000 pesos!

<sup>22</sup>Harrison suffered from the old straw: "Out of sight, out of mind." He was correct in his comment however in that few improvements were initiated after his administration. Governor General Wood served more as a brake to the exuberance of Harrison's regime. Governors General Stimson, Dwight Davis, Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., and Murphy were more caretakers than initiators of policy.

real sentiments of American people. He added that Stimson was rough and direct and pounded the table. Said he (Q) loved<sup>23</sup> Stimson--he always kept his word and told the truth.

Stimson, said Quezon, offended the Americans here by refusing to consult their opinions--he told them that he represented the United States and what he wanted to learn was Filipino opinion. He described the successful fight Stimson made here to put the foreign banks under the bank examiner. He had told Jim Ross and the Manager of the National City Bank of New York that they were obstructing his Government. Had Manager of the National City Bank transferred out of this country and told them that if the bank did not remove him, it would not have the backing of the Department of State, when he took up his post of Secretary in Washington. Quezon remarked with a laugh that when Stimson left here, the local Americans would elect me (the writer) President if Stimson had run against me. When I offered to leave "unless he had something more to say to me," he hesitated and then opened up as follows:

He told me that I was to be a guest of the Government for one month; and after the inauguration, he would make me one of his advisers--the work to be defined later --I was to fix my own salary--he wanted me with him, and thought it would make a favorable impression on the people but did not seem positive of that. (I suppose he feels that my welcome here is a sentiment which might be diminished if I took any work here.)

Then he talked of the Governor General and remarked that it was an outrage that Nick Kamisky, the old caretaker of the Palace, was being taken away from Malacanan but that he wanted my servant Ah King as his butler. Then talked again of plans he said were being made by Murphy for future work of the High Commissioner here.

November 2, 1935, P.M. Doria & I went with Judge and Mrs Jaronilla to Pila, Laguna--to shoot snipe there--tea with Judge Agra--another tea with Governor Cailles at his fine new house at Dayap. I am struck with the modernization of Filipino women --in the provinces formerly they spoke little or no English, and took no part in the conversation--now they are very jolly and are extremely pleasant hostesses. Governor Cailles insisted on taking the dishes from the *muchachos* and serving me himself in the old Spanish style. He showed me the horns of the *cimarron* he had killed when he went with me to Baler long ago. He was extremely affable and kind.

Judge Jaronilla, who comes from Iloilo discussed with me the chilly reception I had in Iloilo in 1916--I told him it was so cool, especially on the part of the foreigners there, that I had never gone back--he replied that this was because the foreigners were opposed to independence and the Filipinos were mostly Progressistas--that I would find it very different now. He and his wife lamented the early death of Jalandoni of Iloilo, the brilliant Nacionalista leader there.

November 3, 1935. At Quezon's house in Pasay--Judge (former Senator) Vera from Sorsogon; Governor Cailles; and deputies from Rizal--Governor Murphy was there for three quarters of an hour. He came out dressed in riding clothes--smiling and happy. Quezon told me that Murphy has decided not to proceed with the "definition" of the High Commissioner's duties--(I never believed that any answer could be made to Quezon's memorandum of protest).

Met Justice Malcolm; he spoke of the "gracious" act of my attending his taking the oath of office in the Supreme Court. He says he is still the youngest of the American Justices but is the longest in service of the whole court. (I remember how great was the opposition to my appointment of him.) Quezon tells me Malcolm allots "only two pages" to my administration in his new book<sup>24</sup>--most of his praise being given to Worcester *et al.* He records the fun made of my top hat and cutaway coat etc. during my arrival in Manila in 1913.

November 4, 1935. Visit from Rafael Palma--I asked him if Osmena was friendly to me now--he said "yes"--that Osmena had forgotten the slight resentments of 1918-

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<sup>23</sup>A much over-worked term which meant that Quezon found the American susceptible to his charms.

<sup>24</sup>Although it would seem that Quezon could not be referring to George Malcolm's *The Commonwealth of the Philippines* which was published after the inauguration of the Commonwealth government in which Harrison is mentioned on pages 77 to 81, it is possible that Quezon saw an advance draft of the book in early 1935.



20.<sup>25</sup> Said Quezon doubted the loyalty of Speaker Paredes during the recent electoral campaign; that the latter was not really a coalitionist--and that Paredes would not be reelected speaker--probably it would be Manuel Roxas.

I called on Quezon but found he was closeted with members of the Assembly--probably trying to settle the speakership fight--so I did not wait. Palma says Paredes will be offered either the Resident Commissionership in Washington, or else a position here as counsel to the Government Corporations!

Called at Sternberg (Military) Hospital to enquire about General Hull & Colonel Mason.

Bridge with the Howells at Fort McKinley.

Reception and ball at Malacanan given by the Governor General for the Secretary of War and Mrs Dern. The large room was practically cut in two by the orchestra; tables on balcony; and dancing on the riverside half of the big room,--but all lights out in dance room making it very gloomy. There was no gaiety perceptible and banks of thirsty men were looking in vain for a drink. The grounds, on the other hand, were too brilliantly illuminated so that all one could see outdoors were lights--no trees or shrubbery were visible!

Secretary of War Dern was affable. General MacArthur whispered in my ear "This place must be full of ghosts for you."

November 5, 1935. Played bridge in p.m. with Palma, Marquardt, Trainor and Hendry--had a conversation with W. F. Lapointe who is just as erratic, but more amusing than formerly; he exudes oceans of gossip about various personages. He has secured control of the old abandoned "Spanish mine" in Cavite and wishes to float it in London or New York, and is very proud of the prominence of his subscribers. He told me he had been appointed by Governor Wood as head of a welfare commission to clean up prostitution in Manila, and had deported the undesirable characters among the Japanese women. Saw Tommy Wolff who has a large collection of Filipiniana which he intends to give to the New York Public Library.

November 6, 1935. Saw Quezon for a moment--he was busy writing his reply to Paredes' letter on the speakership tangle.

Later I went with Palma to visit the University, and called on President Bocobo. In his ten years as president of this university, Rafael Palma had put through a very large building program, and there are now more than 6,000 students! Got Professor Otley Beyer to show us his collection of recent archaeological finds--extremely interesting and in good preservation. He says that several land bridges to Asia used to exist. I asked him then, why the fauna existing now on the mainland is absent here? He replied that those animals were here formerly but are now mostly extinct--he is finding the bones of elephants in the Philippines now. Tamarao used to exist on Luzon--he finds their teeth here.

We watched the military practice of the students, and inspected a "mountain battery"--shot at the pistol range--girls as well as the young men are excellent shots. They gave a folk dance in the gym: the "bird dance" from Leyte, footing it between two bamboo poles which are clapped together--it is very graceful, and contains the elements of modern dance steps. Tea at the Manila Club with Peters; dinner & bridge at the Wolfsons.

November 7, 1935. Interview with Borres of the *Herald*. Then had a talk with G. Johann Vogel, a young New York Jew who has been here only two months and has already accumulated a most amazing amount of information about industry and commerce in the Philippines! He submitted a plan for National Industrialization. Then had a visit from Ventura Yumol, our old snipe-shooting "boy" from Macabebe--he asked me to shoot there again!

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<sup>25</sup> It is evident from this diary, as well as other sources, that Harrison leaned heavily upon Quezon for help during the latter years of his regime. This was only natural since both men served in the United States Congress together, both were *bon vivants*, and the Filipino leader was tolerant of the American's marital difficulties. It was Quezon who urged President Wilson to do nothing concerning Harrison after his marriage to the eighteen year old Beth Wrentmore until receiving further word from him. See Joseph Tumulty to Woodrow Wilson, June 5, 1919, cable, *Joseph Tumulty Papers* (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress), Box 7.

Bridge with T. Wolff, Babbitt & Anderson. Tea with the Feldsteins at Army & Navy Club; dinner with the Rockwells.

November 8, 1935. Golf with Doria & the Bocobos.

Arrival of the big Congressional party; the hotel full of noise and excitement. Of them all, only Vice-President Garner, Senator Robinson and Speaker Byrnes were in the House of Representatives when I left there 22 years ago.

Saw Quezon, who was tired but happy--says he does not think he convinced the Governor General as to the limited powers of the new office of High Commissioner but that the Governor General had dropped his plan of defining those powers and had not shown Quezon's letter to the Secretary of War. Quezon added that he now had up another issue with the Governor General, and that he was too busy to feel the emotional excitement of the approaching inauguration. He said "If I fail it will be my own fault." I complimented him on his answer to Paredes on the speakership question. He scoffed at McLellan, Weeks and the other "reactionaries" cited by Paredes as authorities on the powers of a Speaker. After inauguration, Quezon will go to Malacanang Palace for one hour only (and the Governor General moves out)--but will return to sleep there that night.

Saw Resident Commissioner Delgado,<sup>26</sup> who came over with the Congressional party. He reports that Senator King<sup>27</sup> felt hurt because in the speech of welcome (by Roxas) the name of Hawes was lauded and he (King) was not mentioned.

Saw *Alcalde* Posadas and Assemblyman Romero from Oriental Negros, and called on Secretary Geo. Vargas about tickets for the inauguration.

Doria reported a conversation with the very British Topsy Sinclair, who ridiculed Filipino self-government. He said it was only given because the United States considered it dangerous to hold the Philippines; that in a few years England would force the United States to take the Philippines back because they formed part of the British defense from Singapore to Hong Kong! Doria laughed heartily and said this conversation was just like that book by Macdonnell--"England their England."

Met Senator King, author of several resolutions in Congress for immediate independence of the Philippines. Told him how much his coming was appreciated. He said that in 1920 President Wilson, on his sick bed, had sent for him and told him to go to the Democratic National Convention and get adopted a resolution for independence of the Philippines "and get it quickly."

Met Senators Joe Robinson of Arkansas & James Byrnes of South Carolina both old friends who were in the House of Representatives with me. Very cordial.

James J. Rafferty came to lunch with us. He is very vigorous and outspoken in spite of his 71 years. We had many laughs over old times in Manila. He told my wife a good deal about my work here in former times, and said that before I made the Filipinos feel the very liberal intentions of the American Government towards them, they had suffered from somewhat of an "inferiority complex."

Tea at Ramon Rocesh house--Alberto Barretto there; also ex-Speaker Roxas, the most brilliant of the younger Filipinos. Roxas said the Osrox Commission to Congress in Washington had to spend fourteen months there, because it was so difficult to interest Americans in the Philippines; that it would have been easier to get immediate independence than a transition period of ten years. He told Doria that the United States, having "taken on the job" would not undo all their good work by insisting on the retention of punitive economic clauses. Doria told him that she did not see that the United States had done much for the Philippines--he smiled knowingly.

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<sup>26</sup>The Organic Act (or Jones Act) provided for two resident commissioners from the Philippine Islands. The Tydings-McDuffie Act provided for one resident commissioner from the Commonwealth.

<sup>27</sup>Senator William King (Utah) was someone the Filipino leaders could count on to support any measure they wanted passed or oppose anything they objected to. He proposed more independence bills than any other American legislator. There were several American congressmen and senators who were friendly to Filipino aspirations--some were not moved by altruism.

Saw Walter Robb,<sup>28</sup> who said he hoped I had nothing to do with the Secretary of War having to call on Quezon before he visited Murphy. I told him I had never heard of it.

Saw Secretary Alas.

Did not go to the ball at Malacanan tonight--too terrible a crush.

November 9, 1935. One hour at Quezon's house, but had no chance to see him. Talked with Razon about the Trade Commission to the United States; and with Enaje--he showed me the wounds he had received in Leyte in 1900 in the battle in which he (Enaje) shot Tommy Wolff in the stomach. I was told by an Assemblyman present that Enaje had been Quezon's choice for Speaker of the Assembly but while Enaje supported Quezon's plans for a coalition in the Assembly, he openly opposed at the caucus the reduction in the powers of the speaker, whereupon Quezon immediately said: "Then you are no longer my candidate for speaker!"

Saw John Robb who told me that all the plans for introducing greyhound racing here seemed satisfactory.

Called at Malacanan on the Secretary of War. Not in.

Called on Smith<sup>29</sup> of the *Bulletin*. He described a recent trip through the Southern Islands with Governor General Murphy, whom he describes as: "more like Billy Sunday than a high dignitary." He said that Murphy cannot bear any injustices --that he invited complaints both in Cebu and Jolo after the elections, and was nearly overwhelmed by the rival (and armed) mobs. He stood them off by his personality. Murphy interested himself in a sick baby and kept writing to enquire about it. Smith said he had told Murphy that his work in the Philippines was "written in sand" (tho he pronounced it "riding in Seine!"). Murphy is evidently an evangelist.

Had General Frank McIntyre<sup>30</sup> and Mr & Mrs Harry Payne to dinner; McIntyre said he had come out for only two weeks (but Quezon tells me he wants to keep him for three months). McIntyre expresses doubt about the wisdom of trying to get rid of the American (processing?) tax on copra and oil--says the Philippine Government will get at least ten million dollars out of it, and described how Cuba was selling its surplus sugar in England at half-price; complained that the Philippines did not produce enough--cited \$20,000,000 of pineapples exported from Hawaii to the United States, while the Philippines exported only \$100,000 worth.

McIntyre is as fine a gentleman as ever, and does not look much older than he did fifteen years ago, when I last saw him. He said the Hare-Hawes-Cutting act could have been passed without the provisions for trade between the United States and the Philippines--but that the Filipinos themselves wanted that matter settled in the bill.

November 10, 1935. Saw Quezon, who was being urged by the Rector of San Juan Lateran to attend the graduating exercises today (Quezon's old school); instead, Mrs Quezon agreed to be present to represent him. He will be able to attend his reception tonight for only one hour--and that only with an effort. Says he is going to Malacanan Palace for a few minutes only, after the inauguration and then simply to take possession--he moves in finally on the 21st. He detailed Col. Paulino Santos to act as his A.D.C. during inauguration. Santos thanked me for what I wrote of him as Governor of Lanao, in the *Cornerstone*.<sup>31</sup>

Bridge with Doria, Harry Payne & Jim Rockwell.

<sup>28</sup>The late Walter Robb was an American journalist and publicist in Manila during the twenties and thirties. He sometimes supported the Filipinos although most of his writings reflected an anti-independence bias.

<sup>29</sup>Robert Aura Smith (sometimes called Ora Smith) later wrote *Philippine Freedom, 1946-1958* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958).

<sup>30</sup>McIntyre was the long-time chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs. After his retirement from the Army, he was rewarded by Quezon with a position as official lobbyist for Philippine sugar.

<sup>31</sup>The full title of Harrison's book was *The Cornerstone of Philippine Independence: A Narrative of Seven Years* (New York: Century, 1922).



Dinner with Paynes at Army & Navy Club. General Hull very courteous.

Reception at Quezon's at Pasay--the house and gardens are very attractive. Quezon was unable to stand in the receiving line. Met Speaker Brynes and other Congressmen.

November 11, 1935. Saw Jim Ross--full of vigour and life and apparently he has recovered from his dreadful accident of last January in New York. He told me that the Army-Forbes forces were fighting against me as hard as ever--that Bowditch, Ermin and Weinzheimer were at it. That Ermin had said General MacArthur would quit if I stayed on here. I told him he had better repeat that to Quezon. Jim was full of fight--said I must stay on--that Quezon would never allow the American Army to run his administration--that I had friends here who would stand up for me &c. &c.

Saw former Senator Hawes who is ill with a bad heart--he is managing the Congressional party's trip, and said that in his studies of Philippine history one of the things which made him angry was my opponents making me out as a Tammany rough neck<sup>32</sup> destroying things out here, instead of my being what he called a "Virginia gentleman." Said his own bill was changed by the Tydings-McDuffie Act in only two particulars (i) the word "absolute"; (ii) withdrawing the United States Army at the end of ten years. Senator Hawes looks physically very feeble. He says that these people (Filipinos) cannot live with the present economic restrictions, which the United States must modify.

Saw Resident Commissioner Delgado and his wife; they came from America (leaving their children there) at his own expense, in order to accompany the Congressional delegation. A fearful row now on between him and ex-Senator Hawes--he says Hawes directs the Resident Commissioners in Washington, as he is an adviser to the Philippine Government at a "nominal" salary of \$5,000 in addition to his \$25,000 a year from the Philippine Sugar Growers Association. Delgado says that Hawes bosses the whole Congressional Mission, that he makes it seem part of the sugar lobby; that he (Delgado) is all that prevents the press men from spreading this idea; that the *Philippine "Free Press"* has just published an article attacking him (Delgado). He threatens that, if he is not sent back as Resident Commissioner, he will expose all this and show up Hawes. Hawes tried to prevent his coming out here. (I used all my best efforts to keep him quiet so as not to cast any discredit on the visitors nor on the government.) I told him finally, that I thought the appointment of the new Resident Commissioner was already settled.

Annual meeting of the Philippine National Guard Association; luncheon at Plaza Hotel, at which I was the speaker.

Tea at Jaronilla's. Mrs Harry Hawes and Colonel Van Schaick were there. Met Rev. Dr. Lyons, who first suggested to me at Malacanan in 1920 the building of the Balete-pass road into Nueva Viscaya and he was later the first man to make the trip over the pass by motor. Mrs Jaronilla told Doria that the argument against woman's suffrage in the Philippines, was the great influence that such a measure would give to the Church. (N.B. Roxas says the same)

Went at 7 p.m. to the Manila Club to observe the "two minutes Armistice silence." Of those who had been present when I attended there with the American Admiral on Nov. 11, 1918, I saw now only Stevenson and Gordon. Jim Ross and Colin Hoskins spent the evening with me while Doria went to the Armistice Day dinner dance at the Manila Club. Our conversation was chiefly about arrangements for a reception to be given to the visitors by the American (Democrats) of the Philippines. Also we had much talk about MacArthur and Quezon.

In Senator Hawes' room I met McDaniels, agent for the American Cordage Trust.

November 12, 1935. Saw Joe Cooley who is still living at Zamboanga--told me of his success down there with dessicated coconuts.

Called at Malacanan on Vice-President Garner, but missed him. Talk with Senator Brynes of South Carolina--mostly about fishing.

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<sup>32</sup>Harrison was anything but a Tammany Hall man. Despite the pleadings of dozens of prominent Democrats for jobs for friends in his administration, he made two (possibly three) such appointments: one for McIntyre and another for William J. Byran.

In P.M. "Carabao Wallow" at Camp Nichols Club House--excellent show of jumping horses--aviation display of six small pursuit planes--very impressive. Met General Alfred T. Smith who was very cordial and polite.

Went with the Paynes to Satterfield's house (Colonel Livingston's) on Pasay Beach--met Mr Hargis (now of Cebu) who is interested in Mindanao mines. I asked him about the future of the sugar mills, he expressed confidence in spite of the calamity howlers!

Cocktail party at Mrs Stowes--all the "Old Guard" were there--i.e., the former "Polo Club (Forbes) set."

Dined with the Paynes on the lawn of the Army & Navy Club, then went to Malacanan Palace to the last reception to be given there by an American Governor General. The palace was dark enough for the last scene in *Götterdämmerung*.

Quezon was there in full evening dress. The Governor General was very cordial and seemed happy. Colonel Garfinkel, a.d.c. as a special privilege, got some drinks for our group. Played bridge with Selma Payne, Julian Wolfson and Marguerite his sister--one of the staff came up and commented on the "first bridge game he had seen in two years at Malacanan"! It was a very small party. Talk with Nick Kamisky, the old palace superintendent.

November 13, 1935. Called at Pasay. Quezon was closeted with General McIntyre, General Creed Cox (Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs), Osmena, Roxas, Paez and Carmona--I believe they were discussing the subject of the bonds of the Manila Railroad. Later, had fifteen minutes talk with Quezon, who told of his learning that the Governor General and Secretary of War were going ahead after all with defining the High Commissioner's prerogatives. Quezon says he got out of bed and drove to Malacanan; the Secretary of War offered to leave the room, but Quezon asked him to stay so that he could hear what he said to the Governor General! Then Quezon went for the Governor General who, in reply, spoke of the army and navy. Quezon replied that while some of his best friends were in the army, that body as an institution seemed unable to think rationally on some subjects. The Governor General offered to resign as High Commissioner, if he had forfeited Quezon's confidence, but the latter replied that this was *not* necessary. Then Quezon told the Secretary of War that the army had even "betrayed!"<sup>33</sup> an American Governor General (me)! That if they tried on anything now he would ask the President to withdraw the United States Army, and he would take over the defense of the Philippines himself. He then told the Secretary of War that if he would treat him frankly and "without mental reservation" he would find that he was always ready to come half way to meet American views, but that if he conducted plans behind his back, he would get no co-operation from him, and then all that would be left for the Secretary of War to do would be to order his soldiers to shoot him. Quezon thinks this has definitely settled the relations between the Philippine Government and the army; says he reminded the Secretary of War how he had gone to Washington to get the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act amended just so as to cut out a provision for retaining the army here after independence. Quezon thinks he had now nothing adverse to expect from the office of the High Commissioner.

Another subject discussed at this animated meeting just before the inauguration of Quezon as President of the Philippine Commonwealth, where Secretary of War Dern and Governor General Frank Murphy "went to the carpet" with President-elect Quezon was the question of the number of guns to be fired by the American Army to salute the new government! This salute had already been fixed by the Secretary of War, before his arrival at Manila, at 21 guns. Later, after his first few days in the Philippines, Secretary Dern changed his mind, yielding under American "Old Timer" influence in Manila (Quezon thought through Murphy, on the instigation of the *Bulletin*), so it was decided to make the salute only 19 guns. Quezon heard of this by chance, so he hurried to the meeting at Malacanan Palace, where Dern and Murphy were in conference! Quezon told them both that he did not like this being done behind his back; that he would take his oath of office in his house in Pasay, and would not attend the inauguration; that he was only a farmer's son (and a poor farmer) and all his life had found ceremonies irksome, but this matter of the salute was one affecting

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<sup>33</sup>Quezon was referring to the so-called Christmas eve revolt of 1914 in which elements of the American Army acted as *agents provocateur*. See Harrison, *The Cornerstone*, pp. 151-152. There is no question that most senior American officers in the armed services were uneasy about Harrison's Philippine policies. However many of them found him interested in the military and a charming host! A few had a genuine respect for his abilities as governor general!

the new Commonwealth. Quezon stated that Murphy turned blue and Dern pink. He told them they had selected the wrong man to trample on--that no Secretary of War had any authority over him--not even the President could remove him unless he used his Army to do it and he intended the United States Government to understand this right at the beginning. That if, by the Tydings-McDuffie Act the United States intended to give sham self-government to the Filipinos, as the English had to the Egyptians and to the Indian Princes, he would not be a party to it. Dern very decently said he appreciated the way Quezon was talking. Thereupon, President Roosevelt was brought in by cable, and he sent a personal appeal to Quezon to go through with it, which the latter accepted, rather than embarrass Roosevelt and make the Congressional delegation appear ridiculous. Quezon adds that after this "brush," his stomach ulcer cleared up, and he got well again.

November 14, 1935. Conversation with Senator King; he said that after talking with many people he was worried over the situation here because of two considerations: (a) Japan, of which he spoke at length and (b) the Filipino people as he saw them: he said there was a sense of unreality about it all, the people seemed to be superficial; and not really fit for democratic rule; of weak physique and by no means all well satisfied with Quezon. He asked me whether I was confident of the future and I told him positively yes; that it was difficult to know these people--they do not give their real sentiments away easily; that their progress in recent years, in health, modernity and political democracy had been wonderful; that the ten year period would make it all right, which was all that reconciled me (partially) to the ten years. I think King had been to the Elks Club!

Senator King is very much opposed to all of Roosevelt's socialism; told me that he and Senator Carter Glass were very unhappy over it. He is an old-fashioned Democrat, and a genuine Anti-Imperialist.

November 15, 1935. Inauguration of Manuel L. Quezon as President of the Philippine Commonwealth. His inaugural address was his best speech. The Secretary of War also made an admirable address. The ceremonies were perfectly carried out. The crowd was immense, but there was not much shouting. The old walls of Spanish Manila made a picturesque historical background for the memorable transfer of executive authority from the United States to the Philippine Government. Military parade was blocked by mobs. Osmena looked very serious, and very much the gentleman. Altogether, it was a moment of wonderful sentiment for me.

Governor General Murphy now becomes the first American High Commissioner--he left the ceremonies when his own part was finished, and went to his rooms in the Manila Hotel to receive the official call of the Admiral and of the Commanding General there. He told me that a few weeks ago it looked as if there might be no inauguration: Aguinaldo was proposing to raise 60,000 men to march on Manila in demonstration of his opposition. He remarked that bloodshed would have been inevitable. I congratulated him on having put his hand to the plough, and then having finished the furrow. The Governor General seemed very tired.

One of the interesting features of the inauguration was the presence there of Quezon's little son, in uniform with a.d.c. aiguillettes on his right shoulder--an honor paid only to a President or to a Field Marshal. General MacArthur sat next to Doria during the ceremonies.

Dinner for the Secretary of War at President Quezon's house in Pasay; very well done indeed. Quezon was tired but happy--General McIntyre, General Cox and Admiral Murfin--Doria sat next to General MacArthur at the table--there was an air of satisfaction among the guests. After dinner, we went to the Inaugural Ball which was opened by President and Mrs Quezon. The auditorium was not overcrowded--people, especially among the Congressional party were pretty well tired out. Colin Hoskins told me that since this was the most weighty Congressional party ever gathered officially out of Washington, its visit had not only given great weight to the new government among Filipinos but had deeply impressed the "Old Guard" Americans here. The auditorium was beautifully lit and the whole affair in very good taste. Colin hopes that the new High Commissioner will assert American prestige here, and not be merely an "Ambassador." General MacArthur told Doria that the position of High Commissioner at present was very "nebulous";<sup>34</sup> that he himself might take it if offered him--combining the duties of that and of military adviser. The Secretary of War told Doria how he and the Governor General had visited Aguinaldo in Cavite giving

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<sup>34</sup>The very fact that the role and position of High Commissioner was nebulous acted as deterrent to MacArthur's pursuit of the post.



only one hour's notice of their coming, so that a crowd (of demonstrators) could be avoided--Nevertheless when they arrived at Kawit, there were two thousand people there"!

November 16, 1935e Saw ex-Senator Altavas from Capiz--he invited us to stop with him; his son is just graduating from the Philippine University Law School and is about to take the examination for one of the six positions in the proposed new diplomatic service.e

Saw Jim Ross who told me that the purchase by the government of the Philippine Railway was under consideration, and that Mr Pardee was out here for that purpose.

Luncheon at *Tiro al Blanco* given by Resident Commissioner Delgado for the Congressional party--Vice-President Garner was there, Senator Minton of Indiana had been to visit "The General"--(Aguinaldo), and had asked him why he did not attend the inauguration whereupon Aguinaldo "bristled up."

Sandwiches with Jim Ross at 6 p.m. Rosenthal, young Ehrman, Rumley and Beveridge were there. Then to the Polo Club for the "Gridiron Dinner"--I was one of the *lechones* and was introduced as "the only Democratic Governor General who failed to be appointed High Commissioner." Sat near Roy Howard who explained why Manchukuo had not been actually annexed to Japan, as recently told him by the Japanese: "because it was not merely an affair of a treaty, but a promise given on behalf of the Army by Imperial Rescript" (i.e., the word of their Emperor who is a "God").

I sat next to Manuel Roxas who explained to me their purpose in dealing with Japan vis-a-vis the Philippines and with the United States, on Philippine trade relations. He agreed with me that denial of their fair share of the trade with the Philippines was dangerous--a cause of offense; but added that the Filipinos were set on retaining as much of the American market as they could--that the United States bought their goods and Japan did not; that in, say, five years, he hoped the American Congress could be persuaded to modify existing law on future trade relations with the Philippines, and stated that if they did, they should *defend* the Philippines.

Ball at the Araneta's in Manila Heights; rain and too many guests (800)e Garden party spoiled. Terrific motor block. It is a beautiful new house by architect Arellano in the Spanish style. We then moved on to the Wak-Wak Club for the dance. Quezon and his wife were there. Brilliant ball.

November 17, 1935. Edge of typhoon. Cancelled trip for picnic at Calamba Sugar Estate.e Saw Nick Kamisky; the old caretaker of the palace and talked over the situation at Malacanan with him.

Saw Quezon at 4 p.m. He is on a milk diet but is not losing strength. He had left the ball at two o'clock this morning. Spoke of the inaugural ceremony as being so beautiful, but said he was too busy to get a thrill out of it. He remarked that the "head-chopping" was about to begin; that he would take Cotterman's place as railway director tomorrow; adding that he had determined to give no posts for reasons of favoritism or friendship: that Tommy Earnshaw to whom he was indebted for his first "leg up" in making money many years ago had asked him yesterday for a post for his son, and he had told him "no"--that the Civil Service governed these posts--that young Earnshaw was not fit for a place anyhow, and would do no work. Tommy replied sadly that this was his mother's fault.

Quezon said that the "masses" were already responding to his ideas of good government--that he was absolutely determined to give the Philippines the finest administration they ever had. I said that something was necessary to win the good opinion of the "masses" in these nearby provinces; he replied that the present hard situation hereabouts was the fault of Governor General Murphy's administration: that the stoppage of public works had given the retiring government a fine financial position to turn over but that it was like a tenant letting a house go into disrepair--Quezon said that if it had gone on much longer, he would not have accepted the Presidency; he added that he had already given the judges a "talking toe"

The President then said he had told Vice-President Garner, the Secretary of War and Senator Robinson how the people here had recently welcomed me--also how I spent my own money out here and had taken nothing from the Philippine Treasury. He was interested in my suggestion that my "Advisorship" should be connected with either Foreign Affairs (which subject he has already taken up with the Secretary of State and wants to start now) or transportation. Replied he was in favor of a National Transportation Co. and would put Paez in touch with me tomorrow about the bonds of

the Philippine Railway Company. Said he would go South in about ten days and wanted me to go with him.

Bridge with the A. D. Williams. 7 p.m. dinner of the Manila Press Assn. Run by the reporters and a better show than the "Gridiron" of the night before. Young Teodoro Valencia of the *Bulletin* made an excellent chairman. I sat next to William Allen White, and had with him a most enjoyable conversation about the Americans of our time. He thought well of Grant, admired Cleveland extremely; said McKinley was not a man--only a public character--had no home life with an invalid wife and was a tissue of inhibitions. Luckily, before we could get to Theodore Roosevelt, the speeches began! White & Roy Howard were good--they are no orators but have a nice wit. High Commissioner Murphy made a really eloquent plea to the American pressmen present to give the Philippines a square deal in the United States and not to pick on minor incidents.

Big ball given by Filipino "Bachelors" in Manila Hotel. Really beautifully staged and the ladies magnificently dressed. The American Vice-President and Speaker &c sat in a sort of box as a "Court of Honor." The social aspect of Filipino society must have impressed them very well.

November 18, 1935. Not feeling well--stayed in room a.m.h Visit from Serrano, ex-presidente of Calumpit. He says (contrary to what I had been told) that my old friend Don Serafin Linsangan is still alive, and at Pantabangan!

Visit from Claude Russell who told me the difficulties the Manila Rock Asphalt Co. (Leyte mines) had in selling their asphalt to the Bureau of Public Works.

November 19, 1935. 4-5 p.m. University of the Philippines military review of students; folk dances with sixty five couples, all students; the men were in *camisas de Chino* and the girls in lovely *traje de mestiza*. This was the first time I had seen these dances. In my day they would all have dressed in European costume and danced the turkey trot. This shows their new self-confidence or pride of nationalism. They are not ashamed of being themselves. All notions of their being *Indios* have been thrown in the dust-bin. It was very lovely and a big success. The American Vice-President & Speaker Brynes went after the first dance--(most of us are quite exhausted by these festivities). The visitors leave tomorrow, thank God! Myriads of autograph seekers.

Cocktail party at Le Jeunes (National City Bank). Big crush with the usual traffic jam &c &c--N.B. when entertaining in Manila, look after the traffic problem first; give far more light on stairway & in house, and less glaring lights in the garden. Confusion existed as the original request for "full dress" at Malacanan tonight. Sam Gaches sent his motor to Baguio to fetch his dress clothes--then flew up there himself--now is marooned there by washouts caused by the typhoon!

This morning the newspapers carried a very gracious statement by Quezon that he was trying to persuade me to remain as adviser to the Government. He is always such a gentleman! (This was answered the next morning by an editorial attack on my qualifications in the *Bulletin*, and much criticism there of Quezon for making a "political" appointment.)

(This was the first anniversary of my wedding with Doria. Nov. 19, 1934 at Alexandria, Egypt.)

First Ball at Malacanan given by President and Mrs Quezon. Big crush, and a really brilliant affair, with sufficient light in the ball-room. Doria danced with Phil Buencamino in the *Rigadon de Honor*; she was dressed in a green *Mestiza* costume with silver flowers. Well done. Home early and to bed.

November 20, 1935. Last day of the Congressional visit. The hotel is in confusion and turmoil. Quezon came to say goodbye to the Vice-President and the Speaker &c. The President was very well and was quite active. Brief chat with Senators Ashurst and Gibson and Representative Treadway.

Bridge with Marquardt, Wright & Ely.

The *Herald* gave an editorial replying to the criticism of the *Bulletin* on my proposed appointment as Adviser to the new Government.

Saw films of the Inaugural. Quiet evening.

November 21, 1935. Legislative Building. Saw Osmena who was waiting for a caucus to consolidate the new party. I said that since there was no further reason for "pros" and "antis" there was need of new political parties. Osmena explained that the purpose was now to divide into supporters or opponents of the new government. Quezon came in attended by Paredes and numbers of the legislators. I asked him whether he was going on the Southern Islands trip on Tuesday? He replied he was not decided. (I think this trip is most unlikely, since the Legislature is about to convene in special session!) Quezon looked preoccupied and worried.

Saw John Robb on the Greyhound racing proposition. His Syndicate has become snarled up in a legal tangle with the Attorney General's Office.

Visited Otley Beyer at the University. One hour's talk over his archaeological work in the Philippines. Among many interesting facts, he told me that the identity of the Easter Island block "script" with the inscriptions recently discovered on the Indus had been established by a Frenchman. (This is a most powerful argument in support of G. Elliot Smith & Perry. It revived my old spirit of protest against Alfred Maudslay's ideas on the Mayas.)

Interview with a Colonel of the Constabulary, commanding the District of Albay &c. Told me of the disarming of the Bocobos in my time; they had killed 50 Japanese in Davao because the latter took their lands under a Government title, and the Bocobos didn't even know what a title was. This land question in Davao, *re* the Japanese, is a very live issue at the present moment.

Saw A. D. Williams at lunch. We are all trying to get away to Baguio for the week end, but Williams says Quezon calls him every day--even when only political matters are being considered. (N.B. I think Quezon wishes to keep as an office for the President his former office in the Legislative Building which he occupied as President of the Senate). Williams says Roxas is Quezon's real choice for the speakership.

Bridge at Manila Club with Jolly, Gordon and Peters. Saw Blunt (British Consul General) who had been playing tennis.

Captain & Mrs Howell to dinner and bridge.

November 22, 1935. Saw Paterno, cashier of the Philippine National Bank who told me of the disasters to the bank in 1920 under Miller in their Shanghai branch; of the good outcome of their old loans to the sugar mills etc.

Saw Foley, manager of the New York branch of the Philippine National Bank ever since my day, who says that all his investments in bonds for the Bank have stood up--an unequalled record in America!

Golf in p.m. with Doria at Wak-Wak; saw Justice & Mrs Vickers there--talk about Cebu and books on Filipiniana--he has some good Filipiniana.

Bridge with Mr & Mrs Shaw after dinner.

November 23, 1935. Saw Nick--everything at Malacanan in great confusion--additional offices are being made from bed rooms in the Executive Building.

Saw Colin Hoskins--very interesting talk on program of "Nationalization of Industry" in the Philippines. He is full of progressive ideas, and is a keen student of economics; his training in the Internal Revenue Bureau gave him a thoro' grasp of taxation problems.

P.M. at Wak-Wak: reunion of Harvard & Yale Graduates--spoke at dinner. Resident Commissioner Delgado advocated the closest possible relations with the U.S. and said "If we fall into the hands of Japan, it would be just too bad." This rather contradicts his views expressed to me privately a few days ago, when he seemed to think there was no danger from Japan.

Golf with Doria on Municipal Links. Called at Malacanan--Quezon was engaged. Called on the Hamilton Lawrences--he expressed the gloomiest views on the future of sugar in the Philippines. Also said the Filipinos would have to lower their standard of living (just what former Governor General Forbes said yesterday in the American press!).

Gave a dinner and bridge for the Harry Paynes at the Polo Club--Julian & Margot Wolfson and Jim & Mrs Rockwell.



November 24, 1935. General McIntyre called to say good-bye. I asked him whether I should stay on here, and he expressed approval. Said they had gotten started so well it would be a pity if they made a mistake, and I might be able to advise. He announced that he would retire as Trade Commissioner in Washington, after a few months, but did not wish to stay on here, and was leaving on the *Empress* this p.m. Remarked that trade relations between the United States and the Philippines might be improved over the provisions of the present Tydings-McDuffie Act, but only if prosperity returned to the United States. Said at present there is always somebody about in Congress to be nasty. Lobbyists are everywhere in evidence. The Farmer's Union is rather like Trade Unions--Chester Gray, their lobbyist is consulted by Congress in everything they do concerning agriculture. Recalled how Woodrow Wilson had driven out all the lobbyists--"it was funny how they all fled for cover." Said he was going to lunch with Quezon to say good-bye.

11 a.m. Saw Quezon make his official call on High Commissioner Murphy at the Manila Hotel. Four skeleton companies of the 31st Infantry U.S.A. (only American regiment left in the Philippines) paraded. Quezon's car was accompanied by three motor cycle cops--19 guns fired.

November 26, 1935. Long talk with Rafferty in the morning re industrialization in the Philippines.

Golf at Wak-Wak with Jim Rockwell in the afternoon.

Appointment at 7 o'clock at Malacanan with Quezon. He has a *sala* (or office) next to his bedroom over the front door (where my bedroom used to be, but now reconstructed). He was cheerful and in good form; very friendly. He said he was off tomorrow for a couple of days in Laguna to look into this Encallado banditry. I told him it sounded just like the days of Rizal's books; he said the Constabulary had slipped back in the last few years--thought it a defect in Governor General Murphy's administration. (Later Osmena and I expressed to one another a wish that Quezon might not be known to take the matter too seriously.)

Quezon again voiced his irritation with Major General Parker. I said I was so sorry to see General McIntyre leave; he said that he, too, was sorry, but that McIntyre was determined to leave and retire as Trade Commissioner. He had been quite knocked out by the recent death of his wife. Quezon plans to manage so that McIntyre remains in the service.

We then discussed my appointment as Adviser on Communications and he asked me also to help him in the reorganization of the government. He is to put me in touch with Quirino and Paez on the purchase of the Manila RR. bonds from the English.

9:30 p.m. ball at Malacanan--about fifty extremely nice people--the only Americans there besides ourselves were Roy Howard, his wife and son and the High Commissioner and family. The dance was given for Judge Murphy who returns home tomorrow.

Had many interesting conversations--with General Valdes, Miguel Unson and Colonel Paulino Santos. The latter is opposed to the appointment of Moros to govern Moros; said it is better to give positions to bright Moros such as fiscal etc. to serve up here in Manila.

Teahan was amusing about the boredom of Baguio. Osmena danced every dance; Quezon only one tango. Drinks were served on the balcony; Garfinkel, a.m.c., says that no drinks were offered at big parties following the custom initiated by Governor General Wood. I arranged, at wish of Quezon, to have Nick Kamisky stay on as superintendent at Malacanan. Ah King whom I brought from Shanghai as my servant was installed again at the Palace as number one "boy."

November 27, 1935. Talk with Rafferty and McCreery, who is auditor and acting manager of the Philippine Railway. He said that the Iloilo line, is practically self-sustaining. Cebu is not suited to a railway. Is pessimistic over the situation of the sugar mills.

Bridge in p.m. with Mrs Lussier, Mrs Howell & Doria.

Dinner dance at the Manila Hotel. 25th anniversary of the marriage of Mr & Mrs Benito Razon--about 300 guests there. Well done and very pleasant.

November 28, 1935. Received from Secretary Quirino and Paez papers on the proposed purchase from the English of the 4% bonds of the Manila RR. Co. Two and one-half hours study of these.

Before dinner, went out to Sunset Beach near Cavite to swim with Geo. Logan (Lapointe, Trapp & Arnold). Lapointe says the rebellious *Sakdalista* movement will subside on the payment of higher wages and provision for more employment. That communist movement is more serious.

November 29, 1935. Visit with City Engineer Artiaga to the new "South Cemetery" originally initiated by him with my co-operation; it was formerly a large tract of the Zobel estate; is now filling up rapidly--then what?

Artiaga suggests that in the reorganization of the government, the office of *Alcalde* be made elective but with reduced powers, and a board combining a City Manager and commission form of government be appointive; adds that the inclusion of parts of the city now in Rizal Province is blocked by politicians. If done, it would give Manila another Assemblyman (and these are generally in opposition to the government) and take away one of the two members for Rizal Province.

Says Meralco want to take up most of their street railway tracks in Manila and to operate bus lines under the same franchise; he is in favor of this; but the present *Alcalde* and the Board oppose the plan, because Meralco insists they would then be relieved of the necessity of sharing in street repairing. Artiaga adds that the repair of streets would be cheaper anyway.

The Manila water front and Pasig River region is now rat proofed; no case of bubonic plague has occurred since 1914.

Workmen's barrios are authorized but not yet started.

Storm drains are badly needed in the City; the filling of low-lying parts is unsatisfactory says Artiaga because of the lack of drains.

Conference 9-10 a.m. with Paez over the proposed purchase of the Manila RR Southern 4's from the Southern Syndicate. He is much in favor of accepting the British offer, and says that if the plan is carried thru the RR. can meet its indebtedness for interest even in bad times.

Called on Don Elpidio Quirino, Secretary of Finance, who occupies my old office in the Ayuntamiento; did not find him. Director de la Rosa of the Art Museum conducted me around the Marble Hall where the House of Representatives used to sit in my time. Pretty bad collection of paintings, except those by Luna; troops of school children were going thru.

Hour with Maj. W. H. Anderson, who says Quezon is not as friendly to him as formerly; Ehrman and the sugar men are too close to the President says Anderson. He thinks much else may be sacrificed to the sugar campaign. Says the hemp & cordage men have gone back to America disgruntled because no attention was paid to them here. They now say they have secured the seed and will grow hemp in Panama and thru' the United Fruit Company. Anderson states that business and industrial morality has "gone to hell" in the United States since the war. He believes that Japan has the most wonderful industrial organization in the world. Anderson wishes to sell his radio plant in Manila Heights to the government.

Long talk with Colin Hoskins about the proposed reorganization of the government.

Arrival at 3:30 p.m. of the China Clipper--the first commercial airplane on the United States-China service. Like a great silver bird. Tremendous excitement--women rather hysterical. Perfect landing of the big plane in the harbor. Simultaneous arrival of the French Admiral on his ship. Everyone mistook the salutes for the Admiral as being a tribute to the plane.

Sinukuan Lodge social entertainment; speeches sandwiched in between musical items. The masonic speakers referred to my reception in 1917 at Malacanan for the Masonic Bodies--in the palace where former Governors General in Spanish days had signed decrees of death for members of Masonic lodges. This entertainment was in my honor--Rafael Palma spoke.

November 30, 1935. Long talk with Rafferty about my relation to the new Government and further concerning industrialization. He also said that the "cumshaw" habit in dealing with government employees; so prevalent in Spanish days was now again in full swing here. Said he was coming around to my ideas of the Chinese--has been reading *For Ways That Are Dark*.

Long talk with Jim Ross, who said he and Jake Rosenthal, the two Americans resident here who are considered to be Quezon's closest friends, had both noticed a "hold-off" in the President's attitude since the inauguration. We talked over palace politics as regarded my appointment as adviser--he said he had been told that there is opposition both from Spanish (Elizalde) sources and Filipino--apparently a contest to gain control of the influence at Malacanan. Said he did not believe that MacArthur is opposing me. Commented on MacArthur's "natty" costumes. Also said Quezon had dyed his hair.

5 p.m. reception for the French Admiral given by French Consul at the Army & Navy Club.

Dinner and bridge at C. W. Frank's home--with Dick Elys and Marquardts.

December 1, 1935h Sunday a.m. Malacanan Palace was thrown open to the public by the President's orders--crowds of *tao* sightseers--Quezon's about to leave on *Banahao* for Zamboanga with Roy Howard and his family as guests. He had originally invited Jim Ross and me on this trip but did not renew the invitation, for which, at the moment, I am relieved. I asked him to fix definitely my status, and he cordially agreed to make my appointment as one of his "technical advisers" valid tomorrow--salary 15,000 pesos which he said was the same as that of the Vice-President and next to his own, the largest under this government. Read to me two editorials in the *Tribune* of that date unfriendly to his government and asked me to see Alejandro Roces, as his friend, and call his attention to his promise to support the administration. Also listened to my opinion on the proposed purchase of the Manila RR. bonds. Said it was much the same as Foley's--whom he asked me to see. I expressed a desire to begin a study of papers on propositions to reform the Government now on file at Malacanan. He asked me to do so, and said I was to have an office at Malacanan. He looked well, and is still on a milk diet. Said he would be back from the Southern Islands by Saturday next.

At 6 p.m. Doria gave a party at the Polo Club for Mrs Stevenson, Mrs Walford, Mr & Mrs Peters, Count Churruga, Correa, Lea, and Mr & Mrs Satterfield.

December 2, 1935. An hour and a half with Foley (New York manager of the Philippine National Bank) over the Manila RR. bond purchase--his ideas and mine are very similar but he looks on it chiefly from the point of view of a banker, while I can, perhaps, see better the government policies involved. He predicts a change in the management of Philippine National Bank here and says Miguel Cuaderno, and perhaps Corpus, must go.

Foley advocates the issue of 5 million pesos of Philippine Commonwealth 5% bonds, to establish the government's credit; says the whole issue can be supported by the Philippine National Bank in New York. Would like to go home via Europe and feel out the situation in Switzerland, France and England on this bond issue, and says also that while in London he can drop a few hints to Scott and Priestly that they should make a better offer on Manila RR. bonds.

One hour with A. Roces, Sr. in *Vanguardia* offices; he seemed glad to have me act as intermediary between him and Quezon. Appeared surprised when I showed him the two offending articles; said he had not seen them, and would correct the misstatement; he is about to become "dictator" of all his editorial policies--re-news his intention "without reservation" to support Quezon. Dis-approved of Quezon's visit to the bandit country but had not commented on it. He was very cordial and friendly, and expressed pleasure at my appointment as adviser--but said it should not have been confined to communications, but have been general. Said he would make an appointment for me to talk with Manuel Roxas tomorrow.

December 3, 1935. 7 a.m. with Colin Hoskins to look at McDonough's house in Parañaque--the best for us of all those we have seen. Later went to Rosario to see Wing's house--it has a sense of peace and country life but Doria objects to the furniture and to the fact that there is only one bath-room.

Went to Malacanan, took the oath of office as the President's Adviser before Secretary George Vargas--he then showed me my new office and said Mrs Burfield would be assigned to me as stenographer. Called on the Vice-President, and on Secretary Yulo who are my neighbors. Discussed with Lara my legal residence and the transportation question, i.e., use of motor cars. Actually, I never had a Stenographer, and always used my own car.

4 p.m. speech at University convocation--not very satisfied with my effort, but urged them to be themselves--congratulated them on Folk Dances and other evidences



of their appreciation of their native culture. I cited the newest nationalism in Germany and in Japan and the insistence in those two countries on their ancient traditions. Also boomed the work of Otley Beyer. Told Rizal's story of King Bernardo. Urged that they discard all inferiority complex as Filipinos.

Dinner at Stevensons in Pasay!

December 4, 1935!. Moved into my office in Malacanan Executive Building. It is very cool, quiet and delightful! Put in my first morning at writing Christmas letters to go by air mail to my children--beginning with Kiko<sup>35</sup> who was born in the Palace just beside here, nearly 15 years ago!

Apparently no announcement of my appointment was made by Quezon so it will just leak out in the press.

In the afternoon, we joined the Gaches at the Carabao Wallow Club to watch a jumping contest in the ring there--we were then told that when the bugle blew we were all to go out and form a "horse-shoe" to greet the High Commissioner and the Commanding General on their arrival!. After our waiting 15 minutes in the dark, the two dignitaries arrived. General Parker having come down from Baguio, but having had to stop at the hospital first; his arm was still in a sling and evidently he is not well. Usual press photos and flash lights. Then the High Commissioner spoke for about, twenty minutes in eulogy of General Parker, and bid farewell to him on behalf of the members of the Club of which he is the Patron Saint. Murphy used excellent English and has a good vocabulary but was too long, too solemn and too eulogistic. Give him a cloak and cowl and he would make an excellent monk of the Savanarola type.

General Parker was visibly affected, and was spurred to a reply also lasting at least twenty minutes. He displayed the army mind of the "Days of the Empire" by showing that he believed that he and the Governor General together had governed this country for the past two and a half years!

Dinner at the Walter Stevensons, where garden and trees were most artistically lit.

December 5, 1935. My office is beginning to fill up with people who want jobs or money, and with newspapermen!. One young reporter wanted to know what my salary is. I told him to ask the President.

Golf with Doria and bridge later at the Manila Club.

December 6, 1935. John H. Pardee spent one hour in my office; told me he had been one of the originators of the idea of an elected Filipino head of a "Protectorate"--in the Philippines--that he had persuaded Secretary of War Weeks, and he finally induced President Harding to agree, but as Manuel Roxas was at that time the only one of the Filipino leaders in Washington, Roxas had to cable the suggestion to Quezon and Osmena who were in Japan on their way back to Manila and they wired back refusing.<sup>36</sup> Pardee wants to know whether the Philippine Railway Co., should pay its Dutch bond holders on a gold basis, or whether the Manila RR. had decided that under American law they could pay only 4%. If so, the Philippine Railway Co., would pay only 4%, because the gold clause was not in their bonds and upon "instructions" from the Secretary of War in the time of Taft this had not been followed by a vote of their board. No written word of this exists in the War Department today.

Saw Colonel Paulino Santos, who was on his way to see General Valdes, wishing to criticize the campaign against the seventy bandits in Laguna Province. Said the constabulary had not sufficient men or enough experience for the task; and that rewards for capture of the outlaws should not be offered, which would humiliate the Government.

December 7, 1935. Motored with Doria and Rafael Palma to Los Baños to inspect the College of Agriculture. Excellent plant!, interesting animal industry of cattle

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<sup>35</sup>Harrison's son by his third wife, Beth Wrentmore Harrison.

<sup>36</sup>Manuel Roxas never met President Harding but he did meet President Coolidge. The sequence of events described by Pardee is too confused to sort out here. Suffice to say that the aftermath of the second Parliamentary Mission (1922) was the proposal of a Philippine commonwealth. See Michael P. Onorato, "The Philippine Independence Mission of 1922" in his *A Brief Review of American Interest*.

and pigs. Also good Forestry School. Dean Gonzales and his staff of young professors, had each a Ph.D. degree from an American university. They came from all the different provinces. Palma and I addressed them. The Dean said that, at first, the graduates were all absorbed in the Government service, but that now an increasing number go back to their own lands to apply their scientific training. He added that ten per cent of the students come from abroad--Siam, China, Java etc. He believes it is the best college of tropical agriculture to be found in the tropics. All animals, he said, which are brought in from cooler climates degenerate here from anemia. The school has a quinine grove now twenty years old, planted in Bukidnon, and they want machinery to make enough quinine to supply the whole Philippines. Rafael Palma thinks that with the irrigation systems now installed or on the way, the Philippines can eventually be self-supporting in rice.

Palma told me of his ten years service as President of the University. He visited one hundred universities in Europe and forty in America. Very interesting and very able man. He is now in favor of economic planning and opposed a standing army. Says the Filipinos have not yet recovered from their inferiority complex.

Saw ex-Speaker Roxas at the Manila Hotel--he asked me about the purchase of RR bonds. I said I thought better terms could be had, but that was a "penny wise pound foolish" policy. He assented.

Ball at Malacanan for the Assembly. Had a talk with the new Speaker--Montilla--he has a refined face and a good social manner--met a group of Japanese and talked with them. Quezon was in very good form. I left after the *Rigodon*. Met High Commissioner in the gardens; he was just putting Ambassador Grew in his motor.

Colin Hoskins tells me of a conversation between the editor of the *Herald* and "Mike" Elizalde, who is the head of the National Development Co.; Elizalde denounced my appointment as adviser and damned Quezon!

Doria tells me that Ora Smith says he likes me personally so much that he will have "tears in his eyes" when his articles in the *Bulletin* "paste me on the wall"

December 8, 1935. Quiet morning in the office; in p.m. went out to inspect McDonough's house in Parañaque--very fine guest rooms but his own quarters are most inconvenient--typical bachelor's house. Call at Tommy Wolff's. He agrees with me that the Tydings-McDuffie Act settles the question and independence will certainly come in ten years.

Doria went out to the French Admiral's party on his flagship.

I went to the military tournament in the Stadium with General and Mrs Smith--was very much impressed by the performance of anti-aircraft guns. Smith tells me they register 20% hits, because the explosion of shrapnel near a plane dislocates the machinery &c. Quezon was there with his son, but, not feeling well, went home.

December 9, 1935. Quiet day--talk with Garfinkel, a.d.c. at office: he says Quezon is ill again from eating too much; that the President does not like to come to his office at Malacanan and prefers to do his work in pyjamas at his home in Pasay. Nor does Mrs Quezon wish to move into the Palace--she also prefers Pasay.

Bridge and dinner with Mr & Mrs Fox, Peters, and Espinos (Spanish Consul General). Last named told me that Colonel Lim was to leave Scouts and become a general in the new Philippine Army. Good selection.

December 10, 1935. Long Talk with A. D. Williams at Malacanan about the reorganization of the government. He gave me a chart showing a reduction in the number of the provinces, based on topography & roads--which would save nearly half of the expenditures on provincial governments. We discussed many bureaus and buildings for the same. He said that the retirement of surplus officials as proposed by the law of two years ago was not carried out. I asked him if he would serve on a committee to work out a plan, if I could get Palma also? He consented.

Saw Quezon for one hour at Pasay--says he has had frightful pains in his stomach, and thinks that milk does not agree with him; therefore, he ate a dinner of oysters, fish, chicken, four vegetables, and a sweet! An awful diet for stomach ulcers! Then he became very natural and lively. Said his 1st pardon had been for adultery, and that he would not allow a man to remain in prison for an offense he had so often committed himself. I told him he must cast responsibility for administration on his cabinet--said he proposed to do so, and that is why he has just announced the rule

of only two cabinet meetings a week, because they had fallen into the habit of not giving an increase of salary to an employe without cabinet consent.<sup>37</sup> I told him there was much corruption in the government. He agreed and said that was why he had jumped so hard on the Director of Commerce, in connection with the importation of rice--as a warning to all minor employes. We arranged a program for a committee to reorganize the government. Then I asked him about nationalization of industries. He said they must do it; but should begin by an economic review, and then inform the public. If capital was not forthcoming to start the necessary industries, the government would undertake them, and later offer them at public auction to private business.

Quezon then said he had told Roy Howard that, except Taft, I had been the only Governor General who had done anything permanent for the islands. That his break with Osmena had started with his objection to the latter's "pussyfooting" and support of Wood. That Wood tried to sell the Philippine National Bank and the Manila Railroad; that if he had done so, it would have lost 100,000,000 pesos for the Philippines; that his fight with Wood killed Wood, and nearly killed him (Quezon). (Doria had had a conversation this same day with Roy Howard's son, Jack, who on this trip south spoke of the extreme loyalty of Quezon to me--[adding that Ora Smith would weep copious tears and at the next instant knife a man in the back].)<sup>38</sup>

President Quezon spoke well of Foley of the Philippine National Bank and of Yulo. Said he (Q) was informed of a lot which goes on, because he has three agents in Tom's Dixie Kitchen;<sup>39</sup> that he knows all the racketeers in his Government, and will outwit them. He added that he was going to direct only the policies of the government, but I wonder?

December 11, 1935. Talk with Oñate who asked me to secure his reinstatement as colonel of Constabulary so that he could draw his retirement pay. Talk with Suria, who is afraid that if amendments to the Tydings-McDuffie Act are sought by Filipinos, the American Federation of Labor and the Farm Lobby will retaliate with immediate independence. He wishes that henceforth the Japanese & Chinese could be refused licenses to do business here.

December 12, 1935. Long talk with Rafferty; he said he told Hausserman, who was making so much money out of Benguet Consolidated gold mine (4-5 millions a year?) that he was a shining mark to bring increased taxation on mining. We discussed Roy Howard's article stating that the independence movement had collapsed. Rafferty says Quezon and Osmena<sup>40</sup> have never been in favor of independence (I differed as to former).

Talk with "Deacon" A. W. Prautch, retired head of the Rural Credit Board. He says he administered himself out of a job because he opposed local caciques who were absorbing a fund which was intended for the poor man. Says also that he "ordained" Aglipay as the first bishop of the Independent Church. That Aglipay had been excommunicated as a priest for serving as a Colonel in Aguinaldo's army; that on Prautch's advice, Aglipay excommunicated Archbishop Harty, then appointed three bishops for the Independent Church, who elected him Archbishop.

December 13, 1935. Interview with Charles Franks on reorganization. Talk with Colonel Garfinkel who pointed out how unused Quezon was to executive work. Said that today is the first time the President has been in his Malacanan office for ten days, and that, as a.d.c., he was not allowed to make appointments for him because Quezon wanted to be free. I saw the President who told me he was to appoint the three ex-Secretaries of Finance as a Committee on Reorganization of the Government (Barretto, Singson & Unson), and that he wished me to work with them. He then took me over the

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<sup>37</sup>By the time Harrison left Manila the Council of State was approving the salaries, raises, promotions and demotions of every civil servant. This was the result of the ambitions of Quezon and Osmena who saw the Council of State as vehicle for self-aggrandizement.

<sup>38</sup>Brackets found in the copy used for this edition. A question mark was placed at the end of the line in the right hand margin.

<sup>39</sup>A popular cafe for many American men in Manila.

<sup>40</sup>See Michael P. Onorato, "The United States and the Philippine Independence Movement," *Solidarity*, 5 (September, 1970), pp. 2-15. See also his "Independence Rejected."



Palace, pointing out how his library was to be formed by throwing the small office and bedroom into one. We discussed putting the Spanish paintings back in Malacanan. He looked ill and worn out.

Golf with Doria at Wak-Wak, and a cocktail party at Hoskins where we met several of the Marsman group.

December 14, 1935. Saturday--Quezon away at Canlubang, presumably staying with the Ehrmans. Garfinkel, Vargas and Nick are all dashing about trying to meet the President's sudden decision to change his office to that formerly occupied by Secretary Franks; they are also pushing work on a new office to be called the library in Malacanan Palace.

Bridge with Zeitlin and Colonel Lim at Pedro Guevara's house. Pedro told me that if a vote were taken in the Philippines on the proposal he made as Resident Commissioner for a permanent Protectorate by the United States, he would win. Thinks it will come about anyway.

December 15, 1935. Speech at 9 o'clock at the Columbian Institute before the Professional's League. Intelligent addresses before mine by two young Filipinos--Ernesto D. Bohol, the organizer was one of them; he is very sincere and straightforward.

Polo match in p.m.h-fast & first rate. A. D. Williams told me of Quezon's discharge some years ago of Ernest Westerhouse as head of the Manila Railroad. Said it was a rough deal.<sup>h1</sup> Williams thinks permanent retention of the Philippines by the United States is probable--otherwise there would be disaster! He will retire in three years, and wishes to farm on his place in Virginia.

"At home" at Justice Vickers in Santa Ana--he showed me his "first edition" of *La Gironiere*--which turns out to be a 2d. edition (1857). Talk with Justice Recto,<sup>h</sup> who expressed pleasure in the discharge of Cotterman from the Bank Board. Said Cotterman owned the building in which the Philippine National Bank is situated, and used his influence against the construction of a new building for the bank--[unethical!]<sup>h2</sup>

A. D. Williams said the High Commissioner was very much upset because the first China Clipper did not show him the first deference, for the pilot went straight to Malacanan Palace to report to the President. Murphy said his entourage are evidently feeling like flat tires since he ceased to be Governor General and gave up the great executive powers of that office.

A. D. Williams further says that the Elizaldes are possibly opposed to me because they think I might be an impediment in their transportation business--i.e., shipping. He added that the Elizaldes have just resigned, from the directorate of the Polo Club because they fear pressure there from Quezon. He reported that it is now rumoured that I came out here this time to advance the interests of the English in the Manila RR. bond redemption. (Exactly contrary to facts--as usual). Says Paez insisted on resigning if the bonds are not redeemed. I feel certain we could have made a better bargain with the English; that I could have done it; and that it is legally possible to avoid paying them receipts from the "gold clause"<sup>h</sup>in the bonds, and that the English know it. (N.B. Quezon asked me to prepare "advise" on this subject and then never asked for my opinion.)

December 16-19, 1935. Dull mornings in office--have not seen Quezon. Some hitch is apparent in the plan to purchase the Manila RR. bonds; the subject is hung up in the Committee.

The national defense scheme is published in full, and will gain strength as the public understands it.

Quezon appeared before the National Assembly and read a message favouring a National Economic Planning (conservatively conducted). Excellent effect.

The 18th is my 62 birthday--not much in that fact. Feel quite serene and contented except that in my office I do not have anything to do of any importance. Hope

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<sup>41</sup>See Onorato, *A Brief Review of American Interest*, p. 38.

<sup>42</sup>Brackets found in the copy used for this edition. A question mark was placed at the end of the line in the right hand margin.

to get busy when the committee on reorganization is started. Have put in two weeks in a study of the files and reports of recent years to get the background for reorganization.

Saw poor Gilhauser at Wak-Wak; he has just lost his daughter in a motor accident in California.

Series of cocktail parties in afternoons leading up to Christmas

December 20, 1935. 7 p.m. in Malacanan with the President who was in good health and spirit. I complimented him on his message on economic planning--he enquired where it has been well received in the foreign community. I gave him Colin Hoskins' plan or organization for the economic council &c. Then I asked him what was the matter with the Manila RR. bond purchase? He said it has been held up to enquire of the United States Government as to whether they considered that the Philippine Government was responsible for the principal of these bonds; they had replied thru the High Commissioner in the affirmative--so Quezon said the bill would go through because this meant that the United States would act on the maturity of the bonds and seize the Custom House. He said that if the American Government had decided this Government was *not* responsible for the principal, he was going to say to the English that he had been in favour of purchase but the Legislature demands better terms. I told him that this Government was *not* responsible for principal of these bonds--that just as we had bought the railroad we could sell it. Then he said Confesor (Assemblyman) had told him of F. e. Theo Roger's (of *Free Press*) story that I had come out here to get what I could for the English! He said he had authorized Confesor to state the true facts in the Legislature--that this impugned his honor as well as my own--that he would put Rogers in prison if he printed such a gross libel. He asked me to bring him the memorandum on these bonds which I had prepared for him on December 6, which I did. We then talked a lot about England and the English--I told him to consult me if he had any questions up with the English, since I understood them better than most Americans who were misled by their bland manner and assumed innocence. That what they understood and respected was force and power. Quezon admires the English character. He asked me if I thought the Empire was essential to the continued existence of England as a great power and I said yes!

We then discussed colonization and land problems in the Philippines. He advocates spending money on roads to open up new sections of Mindanao, so that settlers will move in of their own accord. He does not advise spending money on settling people in a wild country; said he would provide transportation for volunteer settlers.

The President also said that instead of continuing the former custom of purchase of the Friar Lands in the provinces around Manila, he wanted to get fair treatment for the tenants; that previous purchases of these lands had not helped because outside speculators had intervened, and had secured the lands; he asked me to acquire a copy of Gladstone's "F.F.F." law for Ireland of about sixty years ago, when he settled the Irish agrarian problem. (Fixed Tenure, Fixed Rent and Freedom of Transfer). He told him I would go to ask Blunt, the English Consul General. He also asked me to get Blunt's reaction to the interview he had given the London *Times* representative who came with Blunt a few days ago--not for publication--he told the *Times* man he would have to deny the interview if published.

We also talked over plans for the reorganization of the government. We agreed that this time it must be a real reorganization, and radical. He said he had only been in charge for a month and was already sure the present government was most inefficiently organized. He announced that he wanted me to sit with his three commissioners. He asked me which of two alternatives he should choose--(1) to have investigation & report by his three commissioners or (2) to just call in Department Secretaries and tell them they could only have so much appropriation, and must reorganize their Department. I told him (1) was more scientific, and advised him to proceed with (1) and afterwards apply (2). I asked him how radical the reorganization was to be?--did he, for example, approve the plan of reducing the number of provinces to 28? He said "no"--that the saving of a couple of millions would not compensate for the diminution of energy and progress which would result. I then asked him whether he would approve of abolishing the elective city council of Manila and substituting a Board of appointed managers with the *Alcalde* as its chairman--latter to be elected? He said "yes."

As I was leaving, he asked me if I would keep notes and write up an account of these months afterwards. I replied that I was already doing so. I also told that if at any time my presence became embarrassing to him on account of the attacks on

me by the old imperialists, just to send me on a mission abroad and I would not come back. He replied that he and I would continue to work here together until we had accomplished something substantial.

I then went to home of A. P. Blunt, British Consul General--he did not get there until 8 o'clock, having been at work in his office, getting off in the mail all his reports on governmental development here. Promised to write the Foreign Office for "F.F.F" law on Irish lands. When asked what his reactions were to the President's interview with the London *Times*, Blunt said Quezon was very broad minded, and amazingly frank. I denied that I knew what Quezon had said in the interview--Blunt said he had been embarrassed by the President's raising the question of Roy Howard's statement that if the United States abandoned the Philippines, the Filipinos would get under England's wing.<sup>43</sup> He said Quezon had stated he could run a better government here than anybody else had done--I agreed. As I left, Blunt asked me in a casual voice what had happened about the purchase of the Manila RR. bonds--I said there had been "a hitch." He eagerly enquired "what hitch"? I said it had been caused by Vicente Villamin's speech--"Ah!" he said "they fear the wily English bankers, whereas our fellows would rather get this agreement now than perhaps lose everything later." I replied that there was much to be said on each side, but I really thought the deal would go through--(it passed the Legislature just about that time).

While I was at Malacanan, Quezon talked at length about his letting out the American Justices of the Philippine Supreme Court--under the Constitution he has the power not to accept their resignations until July 1st next, and he was considering assenting to Chief Justice Avanceña's request to retain them that long, when the *Bulletin* published an editorial attacking him for thinking of letting the Justices out. Thereupon he sent to Avanceña to enquire whether the six month's retention of those Justices was essential to the Court--Chief Justice Avanceña replied he could not really say so--thus the resignations are to be accepted as of January 1st. He wrote a letter for the press explaining that he is thus conforming to the spirit of the Constitution. He says Malcolm is behind the drive--he dislikes him as unreliable. Quezon then spoke of the unparalleled generosity of the retirement gratuities given by the Filipinos to those Justices: Malcolm was to receive 60,000 pesos!

Wrote an address for the banquet tonight of the Political Science Club of the University of the Philippines. Got home to find Doria greatly upset over a scurrilous attack on me in a letter pretended to be from a Filipino to the *Bulletin*. I hope this campaign does not discourage both Doria & Quezon! I have never answered (nor read, if possible to avoid) any newspaper attacks!<sup>44</sup>

Reception this p.m. at James Ross'. Dinner of Political Science Club of U.P. at the Cosmos Club--sat between Bocobo, President of the University and ex-Judge de Joya--speech.

December 21, 1935. Contribution to the *Tribune* by Pedro Abad Santos commenting on Roy Howard's article. A very shrewd analysis of the present situation. So far as Quezon is concerned, I do not really know his views of the future--I discard that part of Santos' article which deals with the working classes, for while now suffering from economic depression, they are certainly on a much higher standard of living than any others in tropical Asia.

Conversation at his office with J. Ross. He supplied the key to the puzzle--everything clicks now and falls into place:

- (a) Quezon's reticence with me
- (b) The Roy Howard interview
- (c) The good impression wished to be created by the purchase of Manila RR. bonds from the English Company

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<sup>43</sup>There was no article published in the London *Times* concerning Quezon's interest in the possibilities of a British protectorate. Roy Howard's caused little stir in the United States. With Christmas approaching it was buried in the *New York Times* on page 17 for December 11 and page 14 of the following day's issue.

<sup>44</sup>While Governor, Harrison was raked over the coals by the American-owned Manila papers and the wire services subscribed to by stateside Republican newspapers. After several months of relentless abuse, he developed an overly thin skin which caused some Filipino leaders to wonder about his suitability as governor general. He later hardened himself and survived the assaults.



- (d) The unwillingness of Blunt to accept Quezon's house in Pasay at a very reduced rental
- (e) The embarrassment of Blunt over the interview the London *Times* man (Stevens) had with Quezon etc. etc.
- (f) The anxious enquiries Quezon made of me as to the utter dependence of England upon holding her Empire together etc. etc.

This is *haute politique* indeed.<sup>45</sup> J. Ross told me that Quezon is in favour of independence if that is safe (so is J. Ross); that at the moment he is badly scared over Japan; that England appears to be an "anchor to windward" (words mine); that three years ago Quezon told him that the United States was going to "kick us out" and Quezon was then in favour of going to London to talk with the Foreign Office; J. Ross told him that the Foreign Office would not talk with him. That Colonel Frank Hodson told J. Ross that he (Hodson) had been asked by Quezon to talk to the British Ambassador in Washington and had done so.<sup>46</sup>

J. Ross and I agreed on the reasons for the attacks on me here--that I was believed to be in favor of quick independence<sup>47</sup> and that they believed my own Government here had damaged business (Wood-Forbes Report); J. Ross thought it would die down soon. Elizalde's opposition to me was due to his jealous wish to have a controlling influence over Quezon.

The most surprising symptom I have found out here this time is the utter lack of self-confidence among the Filipinos!<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>45</sup>Harrison had always argued that British imperial interests in the Far East worked to the disadvantage of Philippine independence efforts. It must have come as some surprise to learn that Quezon was willing to look towards British protection if he could not get the United States to guarantee the independence of the Philippines after July 4, 1946.

<sup>46</sup>On January 20, 1935, Colonel Hodson wrote to C. W. Orde of the British Board of Trade offering to keep the British Embassy in Washington apprised of anything that Quezon might say to him that would have any bearing on the future of Philippine-American relations as they might affect British interests. Quezon had cabled him at St. Moritz asking his attendance in Washington. The Foreign Office was somewhat reluctant to have Hodson listening to Quezon, perhaps advising him, and then going over to the British Embassy to make reports and get advice. But as the Foreign Office minutes relate: "Colonel Hodson's offer represents the only chance we shall have to get a hearing in any United States-Philippine arrangements in the near future. Not only that, but Senor Quezon is the one person in the Philippine Islands who really matters, and a private word in time to him in regards to questions which concern us will doubtless be worth more than may [*sic*] belated official protests. And, further, if we turned down Colonel Hodson's offer, he might assume that we were not interested and, although he doubtless would not let us down, his consequent advice to Senor Quezon would no doubt not be as helpful as might otherwise have been the case." See F.O. file 371/18762, Public Record Office, London. For some reason, Hodson had ingratiated himself with Quezon. During the war, he was in contact with Quezon while in Washington. On the basis of those contacts, he continued to keep London informed on Philippine matters.

<sup>47</sup>One of the canards that many Manila Americans perpetuated was that Harrison wanted immediate and precipitate independence. It is apparent from the diary, as well as other sources, that Harrison wanted independence only after the Filipinos had received the best possible terms conducive to their remaining a free and independent people. He was not in favor of the United States just walking out of the Philippines or the Filipinos accepting just anything to get a promise of independence. However, he did believe that an equitable arrangement could be accomplished in much less time than most Americans would accept as possible. As governor general, Leonard Wood also accepted the reality that some solution could be worked out sooner than most people believed if the Filipino leadership wanted a resolution of the Philippine question.

<sup>48</sup>This was an obvious over-reaction to his discovery that Quezon was thinking in terms other than complete independence after July 4, 1946. However, it is true that many members of the Filipino business community, as well as political leaders, were uneasy about the headlong race towards severing American ties to the Philippines.

J. Ross asked me if I did not think Quezon could lead his people into a Protectorate--I said he could lead some of them, but that denial of independence was a cartload of dynamite.

Doria left at noon en route for the Mt Data Christmas party of Heine Schradieck of the Standard Oil. Amusingly enough, I remembered how I had interned Schradieck together with the other Germans in the Philippines when we entered the World War in 1917.

Saw Secretary of Agriculture Rodriguez, former Governor of the Province of Rizal, concerning the dispute between Binangonan and Cadorno municipalities.

Saw the President at Malacanan at 6 p.m.; he was about to start for the National Assembly which was ready to adjourn. He was in the barber chair now established in the Palace and he received my account of my interview with Blunt with alert interest. His mind was taken up, however, with a pending dispute between the Jesuit Friars and their tenants on some unspecified *hacienda*. He said he wanted me to help him on it, but what he really desired was a sympathetic audience before which to express his own views. Secretary Yulo was waiting in the next room and joined in the conversation. Quezon said he had sent today for Araneta, the lawyer for the Jesuit Corporation, to prepare the ground before he should see the Administrator of the Corporation tomorrow; that agrarian troubles on this *hacienda* might result in bloodshed; that he (Quezon) was in favour of justice rather than the law; that these families of tenants had cleared the land and had lived on it for generations--that they practically owned it and had more moral right there than the Friar owners who had not paid originally for the land and had not spent any money in its development (I interjected the view that as the Friar orders had then been the government they had practically given these lands to themselves, as was customary in *Frailandia*--that the situation was like a chapter out of *Noli Me Tangereh*--"yes," Quezon said, "except that now there is no Spanish Governor General to order out the troops.") Quezon said he told Araneta he would not evict the tenants who had not paid rents and that he would not send the Constabulary to defend the Administrator; that, pending the purchase by the Government of these Friar lands (or alternative measures) he considered the tenants had more moral rights than the Friars--that if these people were dispossessed more "communism" would result; that he did not care to make any public statement of his views, because in this case there might be outbreaks instigated by demagogues.

During the morning, Quezon had signed the National Defense Act in the presence of Osmena and MacArthur--movie taken of same.

Jim Ross told me he understood "Mike" Elizalde was out as head of the National Development Co.

December 22, 1935. Talk at the lunch table with Foley of Philippine National Bank; said he had seen the President the afternoon before; Quezon was much preoccupied with the Friar Land crisis. I asked Foley whether the Philippines could raise money on a bond issue to purchase these lands; he said it would be very difficult and that the Philippine National Bank would have to stand ready to take up the issue--he added that the rich men like A. Soriano and the Elizaldes would have to take part of the issue "and they won't like it."

December 23, 1935. Ramon Fernandez and Assemblyman Rodriguez of Cebu wished to take up with me a question of steamer coal in Cebu, but I told them I was not appointed "Adviser on Transportation," but simply Adviser, and had no authority to take up matters unless they were especially designated by the President. Fernandez told me he was going up to Baguio with Quezon and would ask him about it.

December 24, 1935. Talk with Colonel Paulino Santos, director of Prisons, who assured me he believed Bilibid would be moved to the country at last--he would make his 3,000 prisoners work there and make money for the government. Touching on another subject, he strongly advocated a big river-control work for the Agno and Rio Grande Rivers, especially on the Candaba swamp project. Said they must be undertaken even if it takes one hundred years to complete--to assure the people they will not lose their crops by floods as has so often happened. Santos also advocated a coconut products industry here. Said the site of Bilibid is worth two million pesos, but should be made a park.

Big typhoon today.

December 25, 1935. Talk with Rafael Corpus, former director of Agriculture and now President of the Philippine National Bank. He told how Wood had tried to liquidate the bank; how eventually all the money supposed by Wood to be lost in sugar

mills had been made good--even Philippine Vegetable Oil paid back 50%. Said he discovered more and more how the economic basis for the country was laid during my administration.

*Sugar*--said it was O.K. for seven years.

*Hemp*--said Sumatra's attempt to rival the Philippines had failed.

*Rice*--said next! year would be worse than this; that the floods in Pangasinan etc., had ruined the crop; that sugar had absorbed much of the rice land.

*Iron*--said Economic Council must establish a steel industry here--Japan was now taking 300,000 tons of iron ore yearly from Paracale in the Philippines--that our coal in Mindanao was just right for iron, but was too hard for ships. We had all the materials at hand, and even if it would compete with the United States we must insist on it. It was also a matter of national defense. We need a mineral survey, particularly of the vast and untouched iron fields of Surigao, reserved for the government.

*Government of Quezon*--said it had taken well so far.

*Roy Howard article*--said the fear of Japan was very real and the commercial classes would like an anchor--either the United States or England. Said fear of Japan did not penetrate to the common people in the provinces.

*Sakdal & Communism*--a very real problem--said some Filipinos had gone to the International in Russia and had come back with money. General Valdes told him one of these leaders had 50,000 pesos. Valdes confirmed this to Corpus.

*Japanese*--said they were very bold; that they were watching the development of the Davao matter; that they had been allowed by connivance or by supineness of Filipino officials to get these lands illegally and should not be blamed. Corpus says it was the Filipinos' own fault.

Christmas dinner (lunch) with the Headquarters Commander of the 31st Infantry, the only regiment of American soldiers left in the Philippines. Excellent home food and a far better entertainment than last Christmas at Luxor in Egypt. Captain & Mrs Lussier and Captain & Mrs Howell.

Dinner with Mr & Mrs Samuel Gaches. Talk with old Colonel J. N. Wolfson who told me that McKinley's secret instructions to Taft when he sent him out here to the Philippines as the first Civil Governor were to prepare the Filipinos as rapidly as possible for self-government--hence the "little brown brother" (and Taft's fight for power against the United States army). Colonel Wolfson also told me of being retained recently (he is over 80 years of age) by 81 inhabitants from Tarlac who had been ousted from their lands by a local *cacique* under claim of a prior Spanish title, even tho some of them had Torrens titles. The judge of first instance in Tarlac had decided in favour of the *cacique*--Wolfson got this reversed in the Philippine Supreme Court.

December 26, 1935. Left at 7:15 a.m. alone in the motor for Baguio--arrived at 12:15 without hurry--263 kilometers. Roads as far as Tarlac excellent with a fine new bridge on entering the province of Pangasinan. Roads in Tarlac are chiefly surfaced with gravel, and are very dusty, as is the approach to the entrance gate of Benguet (Kennon) Cañon road. Benguet road itself is badly worn on surface, tho' each motor pays at least two pesos for entrance. Country through all the "rice provinces" is one continuous cultivation in rice and sugar, until nearing Camp One. Lots of motor busses of Pampanga and Pangasinan Transportation Companies. Signs are in English everywhere in place of the former Spanish. Baguio itself is like a "boom town" in Dakota or Colorado; architecture in the town is not harmonious but rather glaring with discordant red roofs. Igorrotes are no longer much in evidence. Stores are run by slippery Chinese and equally slick lowland Filipinos--prices much higher than in Manila, andoBaguio has every evidence of being a mining boom town. Saw Pascual Pacis and refused a reception in the town hall.

Doria arrived at 7:30 p.m. "all in" after a twelve hours motor trip from Mt. Data via Cervantes!. Dangerous driving these cliff roads. They saw one motor bus which had fallen off a cliff and had caught on a pine tree--the nine passengers in it were uninjured tho the bus was suspended upside-down.

December 27, 1935. Golf in a.m. with Doria. Bridge in p.m. with Ed. Harrison, Houghton & Thompson at the Pines Hotel. Called on the Quezons who were out and left



my memorandum of the digest of Gladstone's Irish Land Laws. Called at the Mansion House which is double the size it was in my days. Instead of a wooden second story with *sawali* walls between the bedrooms as formerly, it is now a really modern mansion reconstructed by Governor General Davis. Grounds and gardens are greatly extended and really well done. Saw the High Commissioner in his bedroom apparently at work in his dressing gown. He asked Doria to ride tomorrow. After dinner in Pines Hotel, an evening talk with Rafferty--my loyal friend.

December 28, 1935. Golf alone in a.m. Doria rode with the High Commissioner and Teahan--enjoyed it immensely, but said the High Commissioner was so "mooney and difficult to talk with"--Doria refused to enter the Mansion House because Mrs Ora Smith whose husband directs the *Bulletin* was there.

(Baguio). In p.m. at Quezon's house; bridge; Quezon, Peters, Ed. Harrison & myself. Quezon is undoubtedly a brilliant bridge player tho unacquainted with many of the Culbertson calls. He listen attentively to the bids, then takes a long time to bid and places the cards with skill. As my partner he bid three no trump, was doubled and he redoubled making 3 extra tricks, all of which depended on one successful finesse--thus netting 2100 points (game & rubber). He had Jake Rosenthal staying with him, who is a really devoted personal friend of his. House was full of children playing with Christmas toys.

December 28-31, 1935. With Doria in Baguio--golf every day on Country Club or municipal links and those at Camp John Hay. Called on Colonel Dosser, Governor of the Mountain Province. He has a nice house, an Igorot *mestiza* wife and lots of children. Mrs Dosser is attractive and runs a successful beauty parlor. Dosser and I talked over old times and how near we came to a casualty in our wild carabao hunt in Ifugao in 1915.

Big party on New Year's Eve at the Country Club, where Hausserman and Marsman were entertaining their American mining managers and engineers. We went with Peters, Mrs Fox, Macaulay of Sun Life--etc. In the afternoon Doria and I drove around Trinidad valley and down to overlook the Benguet mining settlement.

January 1, 1936. Eleven a.m. went to the Mansion House for High Commissioner's New Year's reception on the lawn as per custom. We had been invited to dinner there the night before but could not accept (3d time). Mr & Mrs Charles Hoover (Consul General at Hong Kong) had already left but we met Chief Keith of the Baguio police with an assorted family of *mestizas*--I asked after the pony he used to ride when he weighed 300 lbs. and he said it was "resting easily!" Also met Colonel Kimberly and his second wife (a Viennese). He is back again at Corregidor--they had been making a really perilous motor trip thru the Mountain Province to Lubuagan and down to the Cagayan valley in a big Cadillac. Mrs Kimberly said she had lost seven pounds in weight thru fright.

The High Commissioner looked very sun-burned and rather wildeyes. He told me the plans for a residence for the High Commissioner to be built in Manila next to the Army & Navy Club were already drawn by architect Arellano and been sent off to the Secretary of War; that the dredging was going on. He believed the building would be completed in nine months.

Motored down from Baguio--lovely drive until we ran into heavy rain near Manila. Doria and I had "New Year's talk" and agreed that I was not really welcomed out here, and my services in the Government were not actually needed--that Quezon was exceedingly kind and loyal to me, but that my presence was likely enough a source of embarrassment to him. That we (D & I) would stop living in a dream world, that we would slow up social efforts and really try to enjoy ourselves and make the most we could out of our year here!<sup>49</sup>

Arrived at 5:30 in the rain at McDonough's house in Parañaque which I have rented for one year at 500 pesos a month; a staggering rent. Servants in confusion--nothing ready--Doria almost in tears--McDonough told us his "night watchman" had just been caught making off with some of his silver and linen! I must try to get a Sikh (Indian) in his place. No food--no soap--no conveniences, so Doria & I dined alone in the Polo Club much depressed.

January 2, 1936. At office. Quezon's bureau filled with candidates for the Court of Appeals. Visit from Judge Jaronilla who explained his own position: he

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<sup>49</sup>This was a very perceptive self-analysis of his position in the Philippines.

had been Attorney General when he gave a decision that the "Board of Control" was unconstitutional--which opinion was sustained by the Philippine Supreme Court and by the United States Supreme Court. He was afterwards nominated for the Philippine Supreme Court on Wood's recommendation. Nomination was sent to the United States Senate and not acted upon (Jaronilla says due to Queson)--since then he has been uniformly loyal to Quezon--voted for him this year. Says he has been "punished" enough, and now should go on the Court of Appeals instead of being passed over in favour of Judges whom he himself as Attorney General had promoted to the bench. Was trying to see Quezon. I told him how very strongly Quezon felt on the issue of the Board of Control, and told him there was little hope! Tried to get Garfinkel to push him in to Quezon.

At night, reception at Casino Español for Quezon. He looked very smart in full dress with a Spanish decoration. He said he had put out a statement in the press assuring Americans that in general they were not to lose their positions in the new government; repeated how the *Bulletin* editorial in behalf of retaining American Supreme Court Justices had induced him to accept their resignations at once! Complimented Colin Hoskins on his paper on the organization of National Economic planning and said "We can use him" (Hoskins). Said he had been sick all the afternoon but was very cordial and pleasant.

January 3, 1936. Nothing doing at office; Quezon sick in Malacanan--should return to Baguio. Garfinkel said Quezon had a "heavy night" at the Casino Español --but Quezon does not drink. Food causes his upsets. Saw Vamenta formerly Attorney of Department of Mindanao and Sulu; he told me Osmena was anxious to do something for Governor Frank Carpenter who is now in a soldiers home in Massachusetts! Said when the Sultan of Sulu signed the treaty with us renouncing his rights of sovereignty (in my time) Carpenter had told him (Vamenta) that if they were Englishmen their future would be assured, but that "republics were ungrateful" &c.

P.M. Golf at Caloocan with Doria. Talked with Consul General Blunt who commented on Quezon's quickness of thought and decision--said Quezon was so reasonable --he could even take another's opinion.

January 4, 1936. Watched pelota in p.m. at Casino Español, a really good fast game. Dined later with Captain & Mrs Lussier; all there were "army" except Doria and myself. Later, I joined Quezon, Ross, Whittall, Roces and Karadag on *Arayat* and sailed at 11 p.m. for Lubang where we arrived early in the morning.

January 5, 1936. Others went fishing and I had a talk with Quezon. He is deeply interested in the Friar Land question. He had told Sinclair (manager), Araneta (lawyer) and the father-superior of the Jesuits who own the estate that if they evicted their tenants and disorder resulted they would not have his (Quezon's) support--he would *not* send the constabulary to protect them--they would have to appeal to the United States army. Later he told the five leaders of the agitation among the tenants that he would not protect them! Each side agreed to hold off and let him try to settle the dispute. He asked Sinclair whether the failure of the tenants to pay rents was due to wilfulness, or whether they really could not pay because the market for the cane they planted was lost. Sinclair replied "the latter." Quezon then told them they must proceed to mill all the cane the tenants had planted.

Quezon outlined his general idea of how to value the Friar Lands when he purchases them for resale to the tenants--on the basis of equity rather than law: first, ascertain, if possible how the lands had been acquired, and whether the religious corporations had ever really paid anything for them--then to evaluate not including improvements made by the tenants or due to government activities (such as roads and bridges)--the basis he things, should be the value of the land when acquired, plus interest, and not the present value, I commented that this was not the "due compensation" required by the Constitution, and he replied that *this* Supreme Court would decide it to be "due compensation!"

Quezon told us at lunch about how "F.D.R." had shoved Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. (Governor General) out of office and let Halliday act as Governor until he appointed Murphy. Quezon himself had advised Governor Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. not to make a radio speech in behalf of Hoover during the election campaign, saying no Governor General had ever taken part in an electoral fight in the United States. Governor Roosevelt persisted, and he actually believed his speech would turn the election (!!!). Quezon begged him to let him see the speech before delivery and persuaded him not to use several offensive paragraphs--but unfortunately Governor General Roosevelt had sent his speech a month earlier to the American press which published the paragraphs Quezon had persuaded him to omit from the speech itself. Franklin Roosevelt replied thanking him and declining to let him "sacrifice" himself.

Jim Ross commented on the unsatisfactory condition of the Public Utilities Commission, saying that he told Quezon the same thing. The President, in reply, had asked him to submit a list of judges for a new bench. I tried to get J. Ross to include Rafael Palma.

Quezon invited Doria and me to go to the Southern Islands with him in the Spring. Said he wanted to take his eldest daughter, and that Mrs Quezon would not go to sea if she could avoid it.

After lunch, Quezon and Alejandro Roces had one and a half hour's animated conversation. We watched to see that there were not too many sparks flying, but all seemed to go off well.

Got the opinions of A. Roces and Whittall on the rotten condition of the game law. Told Quezon, and advised Roces to get up a sportsman's association to force the issue--he said he would do so.

J. Ross told me that Malcolm had had ambitions to become Governor General.

January 6, 1936. At the office in the morning Hoskins was discussing the landlord and tenant situation. He said that with rice (palay) selling at 3 pesos a *ganta* the peasant who gets one-half share from his landlord can just manage to make both ends meet--but with palay at its present price of 1.50 pesos they cannot make a living; that often a man borrows at the rate of 80 centavos a *ganta* in the planting season and has to deliver the palay six months later to his creditor (*Chino* or *Cacique*) when it is worth 3 pesos. He explained the slow growth of the country banks and the country branches of the Philippine National Bank of which he is a director. Also discussed the currency situation and advocated the purchase of silver at the present price of 45 cents and the issue of silver certificates against the same.

In the afternoon at Malacanan from 4-7. Quezon was rather tired and appeared absorbed in refitting the Palace; he is making a new entrance on the street side and all quarters on that side, including the dining room are to be for the use of his wife and children; the old ball room is to be made into a banquet sala; the bedroom where Kiko (my son F.B.H. Jr.) was born in 1921 is now Quezon's library and office; the downstairs floor-space by the river is to be made into a "club" with bridge tables, dance floor and bar; land on opposite side of the Pasig River is to be bought and made into a park; a new building is to be erected on the opposite bank of the river with guest rooms on the top floor, and the President's office and that of the Council of State on the ground floor. Thus he hopes to make the (old) Palace "habitable for his family"! He received Ed. Harrison and Baroness Von Hagen who are to be married soon; she had just arrived in Manila preceded by a newspaper blast announcing her as a "criminologist."

The President said he was quizzing Supreme Court Justices daily to find out whether they placed "human" rights on an equality with "property" rights; that he was going to have on that bench only justices who would interpret the Constitution in the spirit of the age in which it was written; that Recto thought as he (Quezon) did; that he might have to get rid of one or two of those old Justices.

Quezon also said he was about to "explode a bomb" tomorrow or the day after, because he was going to suspend the leases obtained over 1,300,000 acres of land in the Philippine oil fields by a syndicate composed (incidentally!) of four or five of his best friends (Buencamino, Luz, &c) that the son of Osmena was one of them and had been selling some worthless stock in his company; that he would force them to go to the courts over their leases--that he would fight the monopoly. I told him that the heads of both the Asiatic Petroleum and Socony had told me in recent months that they did not believe there was any paying oil in the district.

He also told me he had changed his plans for the reorganization of the government--that he was going to make Manuel Roxas Secretary of Finance and turn the reorganization over to him. (This lets me out of this complicated task.)

The President asked me to make a *thorough* study of the Landlord & Tenant situation. To go about the provinces and examine. That he wanted me to do it because any Filipino whom he might delegate would belong to one class or the other (i.e., landlord or tenant) or be influenced by it. That I could have what assistance I needed, and could choose either to be associated openly with Secretary of Labor Torres (the nominal head) or go at it without being known to be employed on that research. When I asked him whether he would be willing to tax the large estates (Friar &c) out of existence, he said he positively intended to--I advised him that he must get a law first fixing rents and the tenure of holdings for the tenants.



He asked me to go up to Cabuyao tomorrow with him to see the farm there which he owns, and on which he intends to build a *nipa* house, and to farm.

Also said that if his health lasted, he would in three years have a "model government" here.

Quezon was interested in Whittall's suggestion (via me) to have a visitors book in Malacanan similar to those in English "Government Houses."

He talked of moving Bilibid prison immediately; stating that the law authorized him to sell it but that to buy the new site he would have to use the funds of the National Development Co. and then face the Legislature on this. Is going to make a park out of Bilibid grounds, for he felt that it was a crime not to have more parks in a tropical city like Manila; and if the municipal board did not agree to this, he would "get rid" of them. He not only wants several more parks in Manila but said also he was going to transform Harrison Park.

Afterwards played bridge with Quezon, Guevara, Zamora and Karadag.

Quezon left for twenty minutes treatment by his doctor; he is always worried by a draft or by any cool air, and wears more clothes than anyone else in the tropics.

January 7, 1936. Played golf in a.m. at Fort McKinley with Doria; afterwards, we swam in the bay in front of our house. Colin Hoskins to lunch and we talked over landlord & tenant situation, and land taxes; and planned trips to see the big haciendas.

Left at 3 p.m. with Babbitt & Anderson for Cabuyao. Babbitt said his sugar companies were going to make all they could in the next five years, hoping to repay the capital in that time, and thereafter what assets were left were in the nature of a dividend. Said sugar machinery was of no use for anything else. After independence, a differential even as good as that given Cuba would not save the Philippine mills because the cost of production and haulage are so much lower in Cuba. Andy Anderson (manager of the Manila Hotel) said that tourist traffic here could never be much because the Filipinos had suppressed everything which might really interest American visitors--such as the Igorrotes and their naked women--hence these Americans made a bee line for Bali where there were plenty of naked women; otherwise Bali was nothing but the Philippines all over again.

Anderson predicted more trouble in the future for the Philippines from internal disturbances, especially when they had their own army with ambitious generals. Said he was not particularly apprehensive about Japan. Trouble here was that there is only "one Quezon"--Roxas, he thinks, is the next coming man.

When we arrived at Cabuyao, Phil Buencamino and his wife greeted us. Quezon was there with Nieto--they had been inspecting his farm just the other side of the river where Quezon is going to build a *nipa* house and to go there every Friday. He complained of being very tired. We were just sitting down to the bridge table when I had a long distance call from Geo Vargus to say that Doria had been thrown from a horse in Manila and was in St. Paul's Hospital. I left at once. Poor Doria was suffering great pain. Fool polo pony of Angel Elizalde bolted with her and ran her into the stable where she was smashed off. Very brave and already feeling better. Narrow escape from death!!

Anderson said Quezon's troubles will come from his own followers, because he will not give them all they want and they will "double-cross" him later. He also commented on the fact that many wealthy white women here kept Filipina women; that it was more expensive than a white woman because the whole family has to be kept!

January 8, 1936. Poor Doria suffering a great deal from her various sprains and bruises, but very plucky.

January 9, 1936. Quezon in Malacanan in very good humour and is exercising his strong creative spirit in reorganizing and improving the Palace. Brief chat on landlord and tenant. Mrs Quezon was there leading a squad of laborers carrying furniture. Jose Laurel there, who was formerly in the Executive Bureau, and later Secretary of the Interior; Quezon told me in his presence that Laurel was to be one of the new Justices. Spoke very highly of his qualifications; and added that Laurel was the greatest jurist among the Filipinos.

Wrote a memorandum on the reorganization of the Government and handed it to the a.d.c. in the afternoon.

Tea at Conrado Benitez's house near the *deposito* in San Juan del Monte. Large party given for the United States Trade Commissioners. Arranged there with Miguel Cuaderno to visit his home town of Dinalupian in Bataan as a tourist but really to see the church landholding there of nearly 4,000 hectares, and composing an entire municipality. The agent of the Archbishop is a Spaniard; he raises rents every six months and dispossesses non-payers.

Talk with Bewley, director of Education; he says Osmena is the best Secretary of Public Instruction they ever had.

Saw Osmena and told him that the reason I saw so little of him nowadays is because it is the closed season on dancing!

Long talk with Dr Dorfman, United States Trade Commissioner (expert). He sails for home on Saturday. We had a confidential discussion on the Philippine situation. He said the Commonwealth Government's chief danger was their new army; that military men usually got their way in increased appropriations. That an unpaid army was a menace. Concerning trade relations with the United States, he agreed with me that it might be unwise for the Filipinos to raise the question of amending the Tydings-McDuffie Act just now; that they might get more if they waited. He said political independence was impossible without economic independence, and the latter could not be obtained unless the present laws were amended. That the Filipinos were unwilling to "cut the umbilical cord"; that they would probably ask Congress to postpone independence. He added that the present "prosperity" was confined to a small class (the upper crust), and that he had looked into dinner pails and entered houses, and the bulk of the population here had not shared in the "prosperity"; that when, for example, gold went from twenty to thirty-five dollars, the miners wages were actually reduced from one peso to 90 centavos; that when (five years hence) the export taxes were imposed, they would wipe out the sugar industry which cannot compete with Cuba, and also would destroy the cigar export trade to the United States. He said, further, that they must begin to limit imports here. Suggested a very heavy excise tax on cigarettes of "blended tobacco"--i.e., Americans; emphasized that they must begin to limit imports from the United States and increase those from other countries (Japan). He further said that the Filipinos were trying to think out schemes for additional advantages to United States business--and were even considered applying the United States Coastwise Trade laws, which he thought a bad thing for the Philippines. I replied that we in the Philippines had, in my time, always strenuously opposed that. He stated that the United States sold 47 million dollars worth of goods annually to the Philippines, but gave up 18 million dollars for a premium on Philippine sugar, so the trade was probably not really worth anything to United States. I said that economic laws could not be violated without paying for it--he replied that they were paying now and would pay much more heavily later. About textiles he entirely agreed with me that we could not stop Japan; that the only factory here had no machinery newer than 1900; that only a Japanese textile mill could succeed here. I told him that on trade relations I had not been consulted at all--that my views on independence were too well known--that perhaps I was too old-fashioned in economics. He said that Cordell Hull's new reciprocity treaties were really reciprocal, while the Filipinos wanted only one-sided advantages for themselves.

January 11, 1936. Having failed yesterday through lack of organization of his staff to get an interview with Quezon, he asked me to lunch today. Advised him to have a written list of visitors who have been granted interviews, and if possible, limit them to 10 minutes each, when an a.d.c. should be hovering in the door.

He was talking with Colonel Santos about the removal of Bilibid--he had just seen the municipal board and in a few minutes persuaded them to sell to the government a 1200 acre tract near Alabang, and Santos was instructed to begin to move the prisoners immediately. This is a speed record! Quezon told me that it was a remark of mine a few days ago which started this quick action, for I had commented "Oh! moving Bilibid--we have been talking about that for 25 years!" Quezon also said he preferred Executive to Legislative work because you could "get things done." He and Santos and Vargas were then talking of the appointment of Generals in the new Philippine Army, and several additional names were mentioned--Quezon said impatiently "Oh! no--we will have more Generals than soldiers!" He and I then had lunch alone on the veranda, where I struggled with the ankle mosquitoes. Quezon said he was inviting the Supreme Court Justices in relays to luncheon to investigate their views on human as against property rights, without their knowing his purpose; that if they were already fixed on the bench he would not feel authorized to enquire into their views, but that it was his duty to appoint (or reappoint) within a year the whole lot of them, and he did not intend to do so unless they satisfied his views on "liberalism.!" He said that, so far, he had no cause for dissatisfaction.

We then opened up the discussion of the Friar Lands etc., which was the main purpose of our meeting. I said Colin Moskins would want 1000 pesos a month for half-time work and he replied that was all right. I told him we were ready to start our secret investigation of the estates at once, and that the recent *Herald* article stating that I was studying the road system (the exact opposite of what I had told the reporter) was a good "smoke screen." I asked him if he really intended to buy all the estates, and he said he did not know. I suggested that he get the "three F's" act passed first and authorize a Board of Land Commissioners to handle the whole subject--to buy or not, as seemed best, but to fix rentals and tenure wherever they could--not to try to abolish all tenancy. Some of these tenants were not fit to be freeholders, and that was probably why in the disposal of the former Friar Lands in Cavite the real occupiers of the farms had in many cases been ousted or suspended by outsiders. He agreed that we should not try to upset too violently the whole system. So he said if I would prepare the subject, he would call the Assembly in special session in February for 3 days to pass the law--adding with a smile that the Assemblymen would enjoy the Carnival.

The President said he was going to throw open his "bridge or poker club" underneath Malacanan three afternoons a week to the Assemblymen so that they could drink and play there, and keep out of the gambling houses. That this would also give them a feeling of part ownership of the Palace. He asked me how to raise the money for the proposed Board of Land Commissioners to operate and I suggested that he buy silver at present low price and issue silver certificates, which he could buy the law do on a much higher capital figure. This would be a moderate inflation, but I was in favour of a little inflation if we could get the money in circulation and not let it accumulate in the banks. I told him of Dorfman's remark that there had been no real prosperity whatever among the bulk of the country people in Philippines, and he thoroughly agreed. I said if really hard times come here it would be principally among the present small class of rich people--that the country people were able to live as they do, almost from hand to mouth.<sup>50</sup> He asked me to see Roxaso

He mentioned Secretary of Labor Torres, and said he bored him--was too theoretical--always reading what they were doing in Germany and wishing to apply it here without knowing whether it is applicable or not. Wanted to get rid of him: "he reads too mucho"

I told him his (Quezon's) personality was stimulating--that he had his staff scared but that was a good thing--nevertheless his agents carried out his wishes. He said he knew that was how he got things done. Told him his strongest characteristic was the "will to create," which explains his love of buildings--that when a building was finished he lost interest in it.

Quezon then asked me why I had requested him to see Jaronilla which he had agreed to do. I replied "to save his face; he is a candidate for the Court of Appeals, but I know you will not appoint him." He then said he would explain the situation to me, that he did not wish to be unjust, and I would agree with him. Jaronilla was Attorney General under Governor General Wood, and when the Board of Control case came up, Wood cabled to Washington for the opinion of the Judge Advocate General of the Army, which when secured [he handed to Jaronilla to use as *his* opinion; Jaronilla, instead of balking because *his* opinion had not been asked as the law requires, accepted that handed him.]<sup>51</sup> This was in the middle of the fight which as Quezon says "landed General Wood in the cemetery and me in a sanitorium." I had to agree that Quezon's decision was right. "Besides," he added, "he is a rotten Judge--he can't write a good opinion either in English or Spanish--his wife has to help him. If I had a post to offer as snipe-shooter for the Government I would give it to him." (N.B. Jim Ross also told me that Jaronilla was not a good judge). Quezon then said the Wood-Forbes Report was full of lies,<sup>52</sup> and insulted the Filipinos, who were at least equally responsible with me for my government. He also said there had been Filipinos who had given up everything to oppose Wood, and cited

<sup>50</sup>This situation annoyed Harrison very much. See his remarks to the members of Malcampo Preceptory N° 2 (Manila) on October 10, 1919 found in Michael P. Onorato, "Five Statements," *Philippine Studies*, 17 (October, 1969), pp. 773-778.

<sup>51</sup>Brackets found in the copy used for this edition. A question mark was placed at the end of the line in the right hand margin.

<sup>52</sup>See Onorato, *A Brief Review of American Interest*, p. 41; see also Onorato, *Leonard Wood as Governor General*, C. W. Franks to Harrison, January 14, Franks to Harrison, February 3, 1922, p. 21f.



*Laurel and Santos*.<sup>53</sup> He said that when Jaronilla's name had been sent to the United States Senate for the Philippine Supreme Court, he (Quezon) had blocked it. He said he did not hate a single Filipino who had opposed him in all innumerable fights, but did hate three Americans: Gibbs, Cotterman and W. H. Anderson.

January 12, 1936. (Sunday) bridge at 10 a.m. in Mariquina in Lord's house (as partner of Babbitt). Players: Rogers, Andy Anderson, Babbitt, Quezon & myself. At lunch, Quezon was in good form, though he had to get up and wander around as he can never stand sitting through a long banquet. Spoke of his campaign against Encallado and the other bandits, and of his method of handling a bandit campaign when he was Governor of Tayabas 30 years ago, which was to suspend the *Presidente* and *Consejales* of Casiguran (his kinfolk) and threaten to put them in prison for 20 years, if they did not turn over the bandit--who had been living quietly in Casiguran all the time. He told them to get him dead or alive, and shortly his body was delivered in two pieces with the head cut off.

Anderson asked the President if he could pay a bonus to the "boys" of the Manila Hotel who had so cheerfully accepted a reduction in their wages--Quezon said no! that a similar request had been referred to him by Corpus, President of the Philippine National Bank, for his employes, on the allegation that it would keep them honest(!!). Quezon remarked to Corpus that he would like to put some of them in prison, as he needed prisoner workmen for building the new prison at Alabang. A lot of chaff about Anderson & Rogers, each of whom had put 6,000 pesos in the stock of the new oil companies. Quezon said he had discovered that the Standard Oil Company's lease was illegal.

I spoke of Vamenta's article on the Japanese leases in Davao. He said that the illegality had been committed by Filipinos who had sub-let to the Japanese; that these Filipinos were getting 15% of the profits and that he was going to seize that 15% for the Government--even if he did not disturb the Japanese until their leases expired. That it really dated back to Governor Carpenter who had encouraged every development of Mindanao, "a thing which any one of us in his position would have had at heart" (Vamenta was one of Carpenter's young men). Mention was made of some American for years in the service of the Japanese (supposed, erroneously I believe, to have been Geo. Bronson Rea) who had announced that he was going to retire and live in Zamboanga. Quezon commented that he would hang him if he could!<sup>54</sup>

Babbitt told me later that it always made him furious to have Americans denounce Quezon for his "hair-trigger" opinions, and that Quezon had told him recently how different it was being an Executive--that causes he had championed in the Senate now appeared impracticable to him (such as Sec'y. Torres' opinions on labour). Babbitt also said that he usually knew to a centavo how much money the President had --and that Quezon had said not long ago, that he had not saved up anything for his wife and children--he spends every cent he gets, in keeping up his position and! the fight.

Quezon said Murphy was so very "good" it made him uncomfortable.

Doria said Mrs Gaches had stated that all the Filipinos (*Mestizos*??) she had met, had expressed a great fear of the new army--that they expected to be unbearably taxed to support it. Babbitt told me the new army was the only thing which could keep down future civil disorders.

At lunch, during the discussion about the outlaws, I said that in former times there were some very good people among the *remontados*, hoping that Quezon would tell the story of his own youth at Baler, when he struck a *guardia civil* with a club and knocked him out (in a quarrel over some girl) and fled to the mountains with the wild men--but he did not rise to the bait.

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<sup>53</sup>This was hardly a fair representation of Jose P. Laurel's or Jose Abad Santos' feelings concerning their service in Leonard Wood's administration. See Onorato, *A Brief Review of American Interest*, pp. 74-79, *passim*; see also Onorato, *Leonard Wood as Governor General*, Laurel to W. H. Taft, June 10, 1923, p. 78.

<sup>54</sup>Several times in this diary, Quezon will talk tough about executing someone. It was bluff. It would appear that he was nagged by the image of Rizal's mother begging the Spanish Governor General to spare her son, as well as the knowledge that General Noriel was swept to his execution in January, 1915 when there was reasonable doubt as to the necessity for taking his life.

January 13, 1936. Left with Quezon, Colonel Santoso and Mayor Posados for the new site of Bilibid Prison at Montinlupa, near Alabang, Laguna. We travelled in a motor which never went over 30 miles an hour, with motorcycle cops in front and behind. When we got there, we shifted to Quezon's Ford armored car with bullet-proof (apparently glass) windows. He says that when he goes incognito to the provinces he always travels in this Ford alone with Colonel Nieto who has a machine gun with him--Quezon carries a revolver on those trips. He said Encallado, the dead bandit, reported that he saw this car pass in the mountains and could have shot Quezon. Quezon comments he wished he had tried.

I asked him about the Ayuntamiento--he stated that the Marble Hall was to be given to the Supreme Court.

He began to talk about Rodriguez, Secretary of Agriculture. Said he had talked too much in the press--had quoted Quezon concerning the Japanese hemp leases in Davao, which caused the Japanese Ambassador in Washington to enquire of the Secretary of State if it was true that Quezon had consulted him about it. Hull truthfully replied "no." But the worst was, after Quezon had rebuked Rodriguez for talking to the press and had announced his own policy concerning the leases of hemp lands in Davao, Rodriguez had published in the press his own defense as Secretary of Agriculture, instead of giving the paper to the President. Quezon said he would have to remove him, unless he crawled--that he was particularly sorry to do so because Rodriguez was an energetic worthy man, and had done more for his (Quezon's) election than any other individual. He is moreover a man who has made good in his own business life. He thought Rodriguez would be better as Secretary of Labour.

Quezon said he had talked so much while he was in the Senate--he was now going in for action.

He also said he had already adopted my suggestion and was abolishing all "law" divisions in the bureaus and obliging the Bureau Chiefs to consult the Attorney General or the Secretary of Justice.

The President stated further that the Japanese question resolved itself into a dilemma--either to avoid showing them that the Filipinos were antagonistic to the Japanese, or else to let them occupy the islands industrially; that one of the leading Japanese had passed en route from a ceremonious visit to Australia (a pretext) and that he (Q) had been ill (also a pretext) and postponed seeing him until the last minute. That this Japanese had dismissed the Japanese Consul General from the room during the interview. That Quezon had told him very frankly how the Filipinos felt about their lands, but had put off trade discussions. We talked of the purchase by the Government in my time of the Sabani ranch on the remote east coast of Luzon. [Quezon remarked that this was "blackmail" by an American who had acquired it when he was a Judge of the Philippine Land Court.]<sup>55</sup> That the United States Senators who had raised a fuss about the possible purchase of it by Japanese had been inspired by that man.

Said also that the Filipinos had blocked the use of this man's ranch to the north of Sabani (now W. H. Anderson's), by closing the land access to this property.

Quezon said Harding had been very fond of him and liked his opposition to Governor General Wood--that if Harding had lived longer, Quezon would have gotten rid of Wood sooner.<sup>56</sup>

I asked him about the vast iron fields in Surigao which I had reserved by Executive order for the Government. He said he had already had nibbles from the Japanese and one of them was coming here soon about that, but ostensibly on another errand.

P.M. Becker from Aparri appeared with his two sons asking to have them put in the Philippine army. Saw General Reyes and think it is fixed.

<sup>55</sup> Brackets found in the copy used for this edition. A question mark was placed at the end of the line in the right hand margin. Quezon was referring to Daniel R. Williams who bore a deep-seated grudge against the Filipino leaders. His book, *The United States and the Philippines* (1926), shows his animus toward Quezon.

<sup>56</sup> There is no evidence to suggest that President Harding had he lived would have done anything more than his successor. See Onorato, *Leonard Wood as Governor General*, p. 94, fn. 104. See also Robert K. Murray, *The Harding Era: Warren G. Harding and His Administration* (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1969), pp. 347f.

At my request, former Speaker Manuel Roxas came to see me. Said he was going to his province tomorrow to consult his people as to whether he should accept the post of Secretary of Finance. I told him I had been requested by Quezon to ask his opinion of the plan to use part of the Government currency reserve and exchange standard funds (which are 4 times larger, together, than required by law) to purchase silver at the present low rate, and by issuing silver certificates at a "pegged" rate to make a vast sum for the Treasury--he objected first because the price of silver might go lower on account of the very artificial market for silver in United States, and secondly because they might lose (part of) the 2 million pesos of interest at 2% now obtained in the United States.

He next asked me what I was doing in relation to the Friars *haciendas*--I told him and he seemed satisfied except as to the constitutionality of my proposed Land Commissioner's decisions fixing tenure and rents. He observed that the English constitution was not written as was that in the Philippines. I replied that the Philippine constitution gave to the Government the right to expropriate Friar Lands--"yes" he said "and the right to adjudicate relations between landlord and tenant." Well, he said, "we might do it by establishing a Landlord & Tenant Court."

Roxas then speculated on the result of the next presidential elections in the United States. Said that if a conservative Republican were elected, he might listen to Stimson, Davis & Hurley on Philippine policies, but not if a man like Borah were elected. I said, yes, the West is for getting rid of the Philippines, but that I thought F. D. Roosevelt was going to buy his reelection by the expenditure of public money and that my grand-children were going to be burdened 50 years hence in repaying the debts incurred by F. D. Roosevelt's joy ride.

Talk with Reyes, new Chief of Staff of the Philippine army--tired and old, and unaggressive, hardly able to cope with new problems.

I asked Quezon whether there was any plan afoot to recreate the Government of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu--he said that he was not sure, but feared it would be considered as a "step backward"--he intends to accomplish the same object by designating some one member of the Government to act for him--that nobody realized how great under the constitution was the power in the hands of the President of the Philippines.<sup>57</sup>

I wonder why Osmena is laying so low nowadays?

January 14, 1936. Made a short memorandum on proposed silver purchase and annexed Colin Hoskins' opinion. Could not see Quezon as he was too busy.

State banquet in the old ball room of Malacanan so used for the first time. Very magnificent--over 100 guests in honor of the High Commissioner. Two Admirals, three Generals, Cabinet, Supreme Court, Consular Corps etc. Nearly half an hour's delay in going to the table. The High Commissioner and President Quezon came in twenty minutes late, but that was not their fault--they were waiting for guests to assemble, as is done in British Government Houses--a custom introduced here by T. Roosevelt, Jr. That particular ceremony only works effectively when the guests are sufficiently self-disciplined to get there first--many of the Filipinos stroll in at any old time--some accept an invitation and never even show up.

Quezon was looking very dignified and as proper head of a State--made an excellent address--which he read--(caution of an executive rather than of a legislator)! He touched on the coming trade conference and hoped that when President Roosevelt calls it together some of the inequalities of the situation may be smoothed out; he stressed the importance of having a High Commissioner like Murphy who will cooperate. The High Commissioner spoke well and without notes. He is dignified and has admirable use of English; he is, perhaps, a little too sentimental, but that is genuine and kindly. I sat next to the Japanese Consul General who pumped me for all he was worth on trade questions. He especially wanted to know when the Trade Conference would be called, but I, of course, had no idea, and only told him I hardly saw it coming this year.

January 15, 1936. Doria's birthday, which she celebrated by beginning to walk again. At work all day on abstracting Irish Land Laws. In the evening we had Mr &

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<sup>57</sup>See John H. Romani, *The Philippine Presidency* (Manila: Institute of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1956). The whole thrust of Professor Romani's study is that the 1934 constitution was a Filipino instrument which conferred large powers upon the Philippine Presidency. See pages 213-227 especially.



Mrs Hubert Fox, Mr & Mrs Peters, Sinclair & Rockwell to dinner and bridge--our first party in our new "home.!" Doria managed to get to the table.

Doria says many people believe that Quezon still has tuberculosis, but she maintains that he has been cured.

January 16, 1936. Finished abstract of Irish Land Laws and gave it to Quezon with advice to secure at same time as the passage of these laws an act enabling him at his discretion to impose progressive rates of taxation on all estates over 1,024 hectares. I said I would like to help in the drafting of the law, and he replied he wouldn't dare to draft it himself--that he would send it to the Secretary of Justice for preparation. He absolutely assured me however that the powers needed in the act now existed in the constitution, in provisions expressly included by him at the time it was adopted.

Luncheon alone with Quezon. I told him how surprised I was at the lateness of some of his guests at the banquet on Tuesday--he said it was the a.d.c.'s fault--the system had been running down--I replied that there was a general lowering of American social manners in the last twenty years. He said he was going to raise the standard of manners and clothes at Malacanan--"you know" he remarked "how familiar I am with my own friends in private, but in official matters I am going to insist on form." He was annoyed because Murphy had not brought a full dress coat down from Baguio, so he (Quezon) also had to wear white. Said that recently when guests were late at dinner he had threatened to close the doors and not admit them. That in the future he would accept no excuses except illness and absence from Manila; that he had recently sent Nieto to "Mike" Elizalde who had pleaded a "previous engagement," and Mr & Mrs Elizalde came to his dinner. He said Stimson and I were the two American Governors General who observed proper form at Malacanan. Said he was having prepared for Malacanan enlarged photographs of the three Governors General who had been identified with significant progress in Philippine history: Taft, myself and Murphy. We went over the old paintings which had just been brought back from the Museum to Malacanan--I advised him to get the Arellanos to hang and light them. His favourite is the picture of Dasmariñas (the Governor General in 1592) when being persuaded by the head of the Dominican Order to lead Filipino troops to assist the King of Cambodia (an expedition in which Dasmariñas lost his life). This was painted by the Filipino artist Hidalgo (in Paris?) I advised him to change the position of the *Pacto de Sangre* which is wasted where it hangs. This led us to talk of Dr Pardo de Tavera who had posed for Luna in Paris for the portrait of Legaspi signing the *Pacto*. We both wished he were still with us with his nice wit and culture. Quezon said Tavera was an inveterate enemy of Osmena and always referred to him as "That Chinese.!" Quezon added that Osmena never forgave anyone and never forgot! I said how sorry I was to have angered Tavera by pardoning the *Pajaro Verde*.

At luncheon he was waited on by my Ah King and a new Chinese number two boy--I commented upon how wise it was to have foreign servants who did not understand his conversation any too well, and who would probably neither understand nor repeat what was said at his table--he said that was the point. I understand he has just added five American policemen to the Malacanan staff--one of them I had recommended to him previously as the man who had arrested an armed murderer--"that's just the kind of man I want" he replied.

I asked him whether he wanted me to talk public business at luncheon, and he replied that he enjoyed it with people he liked. Told him I had just been with Paez and had written for him (Quezon) an opinion on the Manila RR. I advised him to instruct the public utilities commission to stop for the present issuing any more "certificates" or licences for the bus lines. Said he would do so. Told him it was fortunate he could put the railroad and the busses under one control--other countries could not now do so but he was catching the situation nearly as it began.

I also expressed the hope that he would be able to get the Legislature to agree to permit the Manila Railroad to abandon those branches which were (dead) unprofitable. He replied that if the Assembly would not grant such permission, he would just abandon those branches!

Then I raised the question of the five years plan for road building in Mindanao, of which he had sent me the papers this morning. I remarked how wise he was to push development of this great and almost uninhabited Empire--many schemes having been advanced in the past to separate that part of the Philippines from the rest on the pretext that it should be done because that territory was "Mohammedan.!" He then said we would go down there together in the Spring; that he was determined to open up those regions; that he considered nationalism only a "means to an end" and that

the rights of the human race to land and to existence were superior to the rights of nationalism. I cited the case of the Australians and said the equities were against them--that if he did not develop Mindanao, some other nation would take it and occupy it. Advised him to persuade some of the more turbulent of the dissatisfied people in the Tagalog Provinces to move down there. He said he was already planning that--they were exactly the sort of men needed in pioneering. I suggested that in the end he would probably emerge as the leader of the masses (in the provinces) after being double-crossed and betrayed by his "friends" in Manila. He said he already was the leader of the masses, and that his votes came from them. I observed that he was the only Chief Executive I had known except Woodrow Wilson who was a political philosopher--that most executives were interested only in force and guile--that is what Mussolini believed (Machiavelli)--who had no principles of any sort except opportunism.

He cited the case of the Chinese in the northern provinces of China and Manchuria--they did not develop their own lands and, of necessity, another nation stepped in.

Said he too had heard that W. H. Anderson had given an option for the purchase of his big ranch at the border of Sabani ranch! Asked him if he knew that an iron mine had been discovered and was being developed in Samar--he did not know about that and I was unable to give him the names of the promoters except the engineer--Milton Sutherland. They are believed to have made a contract for the ore with the Japanese.

Quezon stated he had this morning cancelled some of the oil leases including that of the Asiatic Petroleum. I asked him who had been the lawyer who had secured illegal leases for Asiatic Petroleum--he replied "our friend Jimmie Ross."

Showed me the magnificent cabinet of maroon and gold presented to him on Monday by the Tabacalera Company in which to keep the Constitution--he is to have it in his office in the Palace.

The President then said that after his banquet on Tuesday he wanted to ask me to join him and Murphy at a dance (which lasted until 3 a.m.) on the *Arayat* but that he thought it would be embarrassing for me without Doria.

Doria says an army woman told her Quezon is a very "fast worker" with women and that he does not confine himself to those of his own race--this rather surprises me--it was one thing when he was in the United States but is a quite different proposition in the Philippines!

January 18 & 19, 1936. Quezon away on a tour of inspection of Forts Camp Stotsenburg, Olongapo and Corregidor.

Florence Edwards arrived to visit Doria who is now up and about and will soon be out. Colin Hoskins and I working on an additional memorandum on the agrarian laws.

January 20, 1936. Asedillo, the old Tayabas bandit, has surrendered and been brought here in the presidential car, to see Quezon personally; was taken back and released in the hills on promising to return in three days with his sons and chief followers. All of this is quite picturesque--no promise of pardon has been given; he will have to stand trial. Entirely in line with the *costumbre del pais*.

I submitted a memorandum on the Manila Railroad plans for the next few years; also Colin Hoskins' proposed bill on the agrarian situation.

Saw Justice of the Peace Abra from Pila, Laguna, and asked him a lot of questions about the *Sakdañistas* who are said to be disappointed that Ramos, their leader in Japan had not brought this country immediate independence by December 31. They were still sending him money, however, and continued to believe that Japan would get freedom for them. I asked him how large a percentage of his province were in favour of independence. He replied nearly all of them, tho in 1931 he had told Governor General Davis that only 30% were in favor. He added: "if you bluff these people (i.e., advocate independence) they will believe you, but if you tell them the truth (i.e., the difficulties) they refuse to believe; they think they will get everything out of independence."

January 21, 1936. Nothing doing at the office--finished my study of Colonel Francisco Oñate's petition to reopen his Court Martial of 1925. I read all the records taking several days, and advised him there was no possible use of reopening the case.

In p.m. golf with Jim Rockwell at Wak-Wak. Am feeling pretty seedy.

January 22, 1936. Only a short time at office. Played bridge in p.m. with Pedro Guevara, Tuason, Nicasio and Reyes. I have laryngitis, and can hardly speak! Home and to bed, where I stayed until January 26 with a severe attack of "tonsillitis" or perhaps "dengue"--had no doctor.

The papers are attacking Quezon freely for receiving the bandit Asedillo and allowing him to be taken back to his province by the Governor of Tayabas in N° 1 car--thus making a hero of him!<sup>58</sup> However, Quezon is extremely wise in showing such energetic determination to put down banditry in the provinces and graft in the government. Both have increased in recent times out of all measure, and much more so than is publicly understood. Whether that is due to (a) the prospective change to a Commonwealth Government, or (b) the dreamy mentality of Murphy plus his absorption in his own career as a promoter of Christian ethics, or (c) to the "get rich quick" mood of the times in the Philippines (hard times following a great sugar boom) is hard to say--possibly all three. But Quezon is placing emphasis upon public order, and he knows how to secure it--his method of "getting" the bandit leaders out here is, in the end, always the successful one in the Philippines.

January 25, 1936. Quezon off to Pangasinan with his a.i.d.c. Colonel Garfinkel--to meet General Smith's army on its practice march to Dagupan. He is probably also picking up first hand information concerning Friar Land estates on his week-end trips.

Excellent article by Vicente Albano Pacis in the *Herald*, calling on Filipinos to show more faith in themselves, and greater resolution in meeting the coming independence.

January 27, 1936. Back again at the office after first illness I have ever had in the Philippines. Garfinkel told of Quezon's visit to Tarlac and Pangasinan; what intelligent interest he showed in military manoeuvres and in the equipment of General Smith. Garfinkel expressed his pleasure in the present great change of heart of the American military towards Quezon--how they were beginning to understand his intelligence and powerful grasp of affairs "and" he added "you know Quezon doesn't like the army"!! Also said the American "Old Timers" were letting up on their incessant grumbling against Quezon--"as they had always grumbled against every Governor General!"! He said the army (and "Old Timers"?) had not believed up to the very day of inauguration that the Commonwealth Government would ever come into being. This, of course, was wishful thinking. Said Quezon had accomplished more in one month than Governor General had ever done in one year.

January 28, 1936. Ex-Federal Judge Milton Purdy from Shanghai arrives.

Funeral service in the afternoon in the Episcopal Cathedral for the late King George V. A very representative turnout. Murphy and Quezon both there--tho I think Quezon was rather unwilling to appear before his own people to take second place. Service was all about God and very little about the late King! Too many hymns and too much choir. Speech by Consul Blunt well phrased, and not so sloppy as if given by an American.

Mrs Quezon's absence with Mrs Phil Buencamino en route for Java is odd. What does it mean? Is it her dislike of Malacanan and of public office? or has it political significance?

January 29, 1936. Call from Blunt to return mine--complimented him on his address yesterday especially his rejection of unnecessary adjectives. He enquired what use we were making of his Irish Land Laws.

Call from Pedro Tan, who said Quezon's supporters were grumbling at his favouring his opponents instead of his own party--i.e., Roxas for Secretary of Finance.! He agreed, however, that Roxas was by all odds the best man for the post--he added "perhaps Quezon is training him to fight against Osmeña in the next election"!!

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<sup>58</sup>This is nothing unusual in the Philippines. President Quirino allowed Luis Taruc to see him with the understanding that the Huk Supremo would reconcile his differences with the government. President Ferdinand E. Marcos continued in the same vein when he allowed two hijackers to obtain amnesty after taking a PAL plane to Hong Kong. More recently, he has brought Muslim Filipino dissident leaders to Malacanang in order to win them over to his side.



January 30-31 & February 1-2, 1936. h Dull, uninteresting days, in spite of the tropical beauties of which Conrad and Maugham write. Quezon busy all the time selecting the judges for appointment to the new Court of Appeals. He is evidently bent on cleaning up the old government of which the moral fibre has softened in recent year. My having secured an interview with him for Jaronilla was not a success (tho I knew he was not going to appoint him on account of Jaronilla's weakness before Wood when he was his Attorney General) h Quezon announces that the two judges (unnamed) who sought promotion from him personally had thereby disqualified themselves!! Quezon's list of "clean-ups" since inauguration are on

- (a) Rice imports
- (b) Graft in sale of clipper stamps
- (c) Oil leases
- (d) Sevilla in United States punished as an oil share pusher
- (e) Baguio cadets caught hazing dismissed--including Quezon's own nephew
- (f) Bandit suppression
- (g) Attack on jueting gambling and
- (h) Dismissal of Judge Paredes--this universally popular.

Jim Ross says that Quezon is being much more careful about women nowadays.

Trip with Doria and Florence Edwards February 1st to Tagaytay ridge--sensational view down on Lake Taal & the volcano--ideal site for bungalows for week-end.

February 3, 1936. Dinner at Malacanan for Cabinet--Doria wore her new black dress which was a great success, and Quezon asked her chaffingly if she was in mourning for King George? Corpus, President of the Philippine National Bank, sat on one side of me, and spoke *con amore* of how I supported him as Director of the Bureau of Lands against American attacks. He said Secretary Denison only supported him when, as Governor General, I ordered it. I urged Corpus to write his memoirs--he said he had been a newspaper reporter for five years before I appointed him as Director of Lands, but that his own style was only anecdotal.

Talked with Under-Secretary Albert, who remembers not only the Philippine Revolution against Spain, but later on an interview he had with President Wilson; he came back here sharing a cabin with Quezon when I arrived in the *Manchuria* in Oct. 1913. He said that Quezon was much excited when he secured my appointment as Governor General through Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan in 1913--he then said: "now we are sure to get independence." Albert gave Doria some complimentary accounts of me as a public speaker.

After dinner, I talked for a half hour with the President. He told me of his difficulties in appointing Judges, and said that Osmena had urged on him the nomination of Rafael Palma to the Supreme Court. That he (Quezon) had wanted to appoint him, and had consulted Chief Justice Avanceña and other Justices--that they had been rather non-committal, but when Quezon returned from Baguio, and asked them again about Palma, the Supreme Court Justices had meanwhile heard Don Rafael Palma argue a case before them and were now certain that he was not qualified to be a Justice. Quezon said that Osmena had asked for an appointment with him every day for a week, and that he had given every excuse, especially that he was tired, until it was too late for Osmena to interfere again. Osmena then told Quezon that they were better able to select the judges than was the bench. I called his attention to how Osmena had nearly wrecked by administration by his insistent recommendation of Venancio Concepcion as President of the Philippine National Bank.<sup>59</sup> We agreed that Osmena was a bad judge of men. I called his attention to the efforts I made for five years to induce him (Quezon) to break with Osmena. He replied: "It took me twenty years."

Osmena had also persistently tried to get an appointment with Quezon to argue in favour of Aldanese. Quezon and I agreed that the Collector of Customs was personally straight, but Quezon said he had been put in an awkward position by Governor Wood. I complained that the Philippine Government was full of graft, and asked whether it was not because Governor Murphy has had his head in the clouds. Quezon said, "no, you must not think that of Murphy"--that the original fault was with Governor General Wood--that corruption was rife under him.<sup>60</sup> That his successor, [*sic*]

<sup>59</sup>See Peter W. Stanley, *A Nation in the Making: The Philippines and the United States, 1899-1921* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 240-247, *passim*. See also Onorato, *A Brief Review of American Interest*, p. 38f.

<sup>60</sup>This charge of Quezon concerning corruption during the Wood administration

Governor General Davis had announced in a speech in Honolulu that he was going out to the Philippines to clean up graft in this country. That while Davis was here, he never knew anything at all about the country.

The announcement of the Government's decision to cancel the lease of the *arrastre* to Simme & Gilke had subjected Quezon to a perfect bombardment of letters of protest from Americans. They state that the lease of the *arrastre* to the Manila Terminal Co. under Governor Wood had greatly improved the freight service at the Manila docks. Quezon said that perhaps it had not been done any too well before but that he was going to turn it over to the Manila Railroad Co. and have Paez manage it; that the Manila Terminal Co. had been making 500,000 pesos a year out of it. That they had offered Aldanese a large salary for extra service with the Manila Terminal Co.; that Governor Wood had permitted him to accept; [that it was "unethical" for the Collector of Customs to have another salary from a business firm.]<sup>61</sup> This practice had been stopped November 15 under the new constitution.

Quezon next talked about the (Baguio) Constabulary Academy case, where he had just dismissed eight of the cadets, including his own nephew, for hazing and had transferred Colonel Johnson, the Commandant. The cadets whom he had examined personally concerning this case, had replied that they thought the regulation against hazing was a dead letter. I told him how President Thomas Jefferson in the last year of his life had ridden down from Monticello to the new University of Virginia and had dismissed his own two nephews (my great uncle Cary and his cousin Carr) for a student prank. He said he wished he had known of this, for he would have cited it as a precedent in this Constabulary case.

February 4, 1936. Talk with A. D. Williams over the immense chromium fields in Zambales and prospects for a market not yet available. Also about the Leyte asphalt fields and the possible building of a plant to refine and manufacture the products.

In the afternoon, we gave our tea dance. About 100 hand-picked people came--three quarters of them were Americans or English--it went with a bang from the beginning and Doria was a charming hostess. The party kept up until midnight. Doria very happy over her success. I had a conversation there with Don Isauro Gabaldon who expressed unfeigned enthusiasm over the success of Quezon's Government. He said the President was daily gaining ground in the provinces. He recalled that many years ago I had told him that when Quezon matured, he would be a great statesman, and that I had made a good prophecy.

Quezon enjoyed himself at our party and later he and I with Felicia Howell and Mrs. Gardiner played bridge. Quezon and I won two rubbers against two of the best women players in Manila!

February 5, 1936. At the office I had a long talk with Rafael Palma who is writing a history of the Philippines. We discussed old days in the Philippine Commission. He expressed great admiration for the success of Quezon's administration, commenting upon how the President had matured, and now showed a conservative caution in place of his former instability. Palma remarked upon the slowness of Quezon's decision in his appoints to office--said he probably consulted too many people; he added that I had been more decisive in my actions towards appointments and removals. Remarked also how the opposition to Quezon was not quieting down--even from Aquinaldo and Sotto. Thinks Quezon is going to appoint him to the Board of Education. Expressed his great interest in my landlord and tenant plans.

February 6, 1936. The President names all but one of the Judges of the Court of Appeals--good selections, made in accordance with recommendations of the Supreme Court, and various Bar Associations. It now appears that the undue deliberation in the selection was owing to Quezon's desire to make the public understand that there would be no "politics" in his courts. Even so, I think he overplayed his hand. I saw Francisco Delgado and congratulated him--he replied that his acceptance was at a considerable financial sacrifice--I said "of course"--he replied that when, years ago, I offered to appoint him a Judge, he could decline but now every citizen must do what he was able to help their own new Government.

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does not square with any known facts relevant to his regime. Cf. Teodoro A. Agonzillo and Oscar M. Alfonso, *History of the Filipino People* (Quezon City: Malaya Books, 1967), p. 370f.

<sup>61</sup> Brackets found in the copy used for this edition. A question mark was placed at the end of the line in the right hand margin.

In the afternoon, I had a bridge party--Rafael Palma, Pedro Guevara, Colonel Lim, Angel Tuason, Jose Reyes, Zamora and Nazario--they play really expert Culbertson bridgeh

February 7, 1936. An hour in the morning at the office with Manuel Concepcion, in my time Secretary of the Philippine National Bank. He told me of his father's conviction by the Courts (as President of that bank) and his own sentence by a divided, and perhaps influenced court; [Johnson and Malcolm seem to have railroaded him]<sup>62</sup>--aided by bed-ridden Chief Justice Araullo, who should not have written the opinion. Manuel is now engaged in placer mining in Abra, and says he takes out enough gold for his living expenses every year and added: "I don't need a Government position." Interesting talk on the currency situation. He advocates fixing the ratio between gold and silver, and proposes dissociating the Philippines from the American dollar. Says inflation, and further devaluation of the dollar in the United States is imminent. Believes they mean to raise the price of gold to 45. Says Warner, Barnes & Co. are instructed to invest their cash in Benguet Consolidated for a big rise. Thinks Philippine currency should be based on silver, and sufficient gold dollars held only for all foreign exchange.

He commented how Quezon is rising rapidly through good government.

Had an appointment with Quezon in the afternoon, but he did not return until very late from his official visit to the English Admiral and went straight to bed--exhausted. Garfinkel said Quezon had ordered a launch the duplicate of the Admiral's, for official visits; that he went aboard the yacht *Yolanda* and at once wished to have a ship like that; he enquired of the Captain who told him of Lady Yuill's which was for sale at Glasgow. Wishes to take it up through the British Consulate. Florence Edwards has seen this yacht and says it is "wonderful."

Osmena is broke, and is worried about the behavior of his sons by his first marriageh Osmena's present wife, however, is a rich woman (Limjap).

February 8, 1936e Golf at Caloocan with Hubert Fox, G. Sinclair and P. Jollye. Went to San Juan to buy a dog for Mrs Ross and took it to their househ Colette Guest and Kuka Guest came to our house to call.

Jollye says that Dr Mitchell, now on the *Yolanda*, is the man whom Senator Joe Robinson assaulted at the Chevy Chase Club, and for which Robinson was expelled from the Club.

Hubert Fox stated that the price of gold is much more likely to go up than down in the next ten years, and that for the next five years, at least, the Philippines is about the safest place in the world for an investment--and what country can be guaranteed for a longer period than that?

Papers report the arrival of Quintin Paredes in San Francisco and his statement that he was confident of the present for the Commonwealth, but was dubious of the future; saying: "we are not unmindful of the difficulties ahead particularly in the matter of graduated export taxes which begin within the next few years. We are sure that in your sense of generosity and responsibility *you will not case us loose.*" This statement looks bad--probably he added some words which were unreported in the cable such as adding: "without fairer provisions for our future"--but as it stands it undermines Quezon's position with the *independistas* here.

Sunday, February 9, 1936. To lunch with the Satterfields and to tea on the yacht *Yolanda*. My school days friend, Edith Bishop, now the widow of Moses Taylorh is the owner of this beautiful vessel.

February 10, 1936. Jim Ross consults me as to his course of conduct as Chairman of the Philippine Democratic Committee (as for the past 25 years) in view of an approaching committee meeting to decide on the delegates to the National Convention. He cannot support F. D. Roosevelt because of the unconstitutionality of his administration and the financial chaos of the United States. Asked me which of three courses he whould adopt:

- (a) insincere endorsement
- (b) violent attack or
- (c) his (Jim Ross's) resignation as Chairman.

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<sup>62</sup>Brackets found in the copy used for this editionh A question mark was placed at the end of the line in the right hand margin.



I advised him to resign--which he wants to do

Luncheon at Malacanan for Edith Taylor Bishop, Miss Tiffany, Drury and Dr Mitchell etc. Doria enjoyed herself very much and arranged with Quezon all about the proposed trip to the Southern Islands in April, asking him also to invite Felicia Howell, which pleased Quezon. The President talked to Doria mostly about his old poker playing days--and said of himself that he was a natural born gambler; called across the table to me to tell how he took 600 pesos from John Switzer on a busted flush some twenty years ago. He had us all start his new visitors' book by signing our names.

5-7 bridge: Doria, Judge Pardy, Ely and myself. The evening newspaper brought news of the appointment of de las Alas as Secretary of Finance. So Roxas has refused!! This will make something of a political sensation, and I would dearly like to know the reason for Roxas having coquetted and now finally refusing. Am rather glad that so booklearned an advocate of "economic planning" as Roxas is not to have the Philippine treasury to work upon.

February 11, 1936. Morning paper discussed whether Roxas' refusal indicated a split in the coalition; also announced the resignation of "Mike" Elizalde as head of the National Development Co.

Off at 8 a.m. with Doria and Professor H. Otley Beyer for an all-day trip around Laguna de Bay, thru Rizal and Laguna Provinces. Beyer showed us various sites of his archaeological excavations. Bagas is the oldest continuously inhabited village in the Philippines, dating from neolithic times. He showed us various old Spanish churches on the eastern shores of the Laguna, of which the most interesting is at Morong. The priest who built that in 1640 had evidently come from Acapulco in the galleons--the facade of the tower was designed by him--an odd mixture of Renaissance and Rococo, and with designs of windows and cornices of *Maya* patterns.

The road around the eastern side of Laguna de Bay has been opened only two years. In my time, this region was a mere backwater gone to decay. But the immense old semi-ruled churches in every *poblacion* show how rich the church was there in the seventeenth & eighteenth centuries. Beyer pointed out to us underground caves still inhabited today and first used as homes in the iron age. Modern history began there in the twelfth century with the invasion of foreign (Javanese, later Moro) conquerors, who drove the lake-dwellers up into the hills behind. Those whom they dispossessed were of the Indonesian type we know today as Ifugaos, and all the surrounding hills are still marked by the ruins of stone-dyked rice terraces, many of which we examined. We saw in Tanay the old ceremonial tree with a surrounding stone platform, just as is found among the Ifugaos today. The platform had been kept up by the villagers without any thought of their animist ancestors. To the east of us--perhaps 50 miles to the Pacific was "unexplored" country, the home of negritos and *remon-tados*--this belt stretches about 400 miles to the north. We passed the country where the recent bandit campaign was conducted. Then to Pagsanan--the rich coconut country and so to Lillo on the slopes of Banahao. San Pablo with its crater lake--country with bamboo like those, so Beyer says, in Celebes.

Beyer remarked that the *Sakdalista* movement is only marking time. That during the recent depression, the people in these provinces were lucky if they made twenty-five pesos in cash a year--that a peseta was big money to them; that they were worked upon by agitators, who asked them whether their conditions had improved in the thirty years of American occupation--then they dwelt on the faults of provincial officials, and told them the two peso cedula tax each man paid went to the rich politicians in Manila for their entertainments and automobiles. The bright spot of it all was that the price of copra had risen again now, and even at the very worst, these people never starved--they could live off the country.

We had passed over the high hills on the peninsula of Jala-Jala made famous by La Gironiere; the hinterland is still uninhabited, and the jungle comes right down to the new mountain road.

When, in 1913, I first met Beyer he was stationed among the Ifugaos and has, I am told, an Ifugao wife--so, I asked him questions about what "modern" civilization had done for them in a quarter century. He said that the situation was delicate--that they had three grievances: (1) government interference with their tribal customs; (2) sanitation and (3) schools!

That having a sense of humour, they laughed at themselves over the new sanitary regulations, but that the school question was difficult. The first barrio schools were introduced there by Secretary Denison in my time, say 1915 or 16--then the

elders of the villages were begging for schools--they promised to build the house for the teacher and to feed him. About two years later, they began to balk and to withdraw their children--these formerly had learned at home to play at building rice terraces and Ifugao houses--something useful for every Ifugao to know, but now they were learning to play baseball, or basket ball--things useless for an Ifugao. Besides, they were taught in school to despise some of the immemorial customs of their parents. Finally the only children who were allowed by their parents to go to school were those rounded up by the policeman and marched there. Then came the burning of the teachers' houses and reprisals of a burnt village by Governor Dosser.

At Morong (or was it at Pillia?) the young parish priest, namely Prince Troubetskoy who recently succeeded the Baron de Steuer, came down from the *convento* and begged us to enter and "have a whisky" because he had no beer. Then he asked Beyer to give him the dates of his church, and Beyer replied--foundation in 1585, church really started in 1640--fortifications around it in 1696.

Beyer said that in San Pablo there had been 15 couples, rich Filipinos who had married American wives, who made up a society of their own. Only two of these marriages had been conspicuously successful. He and I agreed that a mixture of races produced the greatest social and mental movement--that a pure race tended to become mentally stagnant.

To diversify the diet and elevate the morale of the mountain peoples, Beyer advocates goats and sheep--the only animals which could live in those mountains--there are no beasts of prey in the Philippines.

Said the problem in Nueva Viscaya was the two thousand square miles inhabited by the Ilongots--among whom no Christians cared to settle, and the one thousand square miles now densely inhabited by Christians.

Apparently, Beyer is now writing busily, a task to which I have often nagged him.

Further observations by Beyer were:

Roxas is very ambitious and is unwilling to risk being Secretary of Finance with the prospect of an unbalanced budget--also, the political situation in the United States may influence him.

The Spanish priests under Legaspi (1560-90) brought the *remontados*, (Ifugao type) down from the mountains on the Pacific coast to settle again in their former homes on the lake-side whence the Moro pirates had driven them out a century or two earlier.

Dean C. Worcester and David P. Barrows fell out in 1904, and the Department of Ethnology was tossed about for years like a baseball.

J. D. Rockefeller, Jr. was taken out for a ride from Pasig towards Montalban in 1922 by the advice of Dr Heiser--the road was always 6 in. deep in dust, and there was lots of tuberculosis--Rockefeller offered to pay the cost of a new road; Governor Wood declined the offer, but the road was built by the government.

Governor General Stimson took the funds set aside for the new bridge we had planned across the Pasig above Malacanan for some other public works project in which he was interested--hence the traffic jam and dangerous situation of Ayala bridge which is being now, since a year, incompetently and wastefully doubled in width.

When we passed Montinlupa, where the new "Bilibid" is being established, I told Beyer how Santos had already planted one hundred and fifty prisoners who are picked men, to labor there, without guards. Doria expressed surprise, but Beyer joined me in explaining that the "criminal classes" in the Philippines contained very few of our type of jail birds--that many of them were there for offences artificially created by Spain or American taboos and entirely at variance with their own traditional standards. That in consequence, in most cases no great stigma attached among them to a prison sentence.

Beyer also said that Paredes was an Indonesian type, not unlike the Hawaiians--which is frequently in Ilocos; that Bocobo was probably a negrito type--rather snappy for the President of the University of the Philippines!

February 12, 1936. At office, Hartendorp, who has been appointed Adviser to the President on press matters, came in to see me--he has the next room. He

suggested that Roxas had tried to drive a sharp bargain with Quezon and had been repulsed.

He told also the story of Quezon's visit of a few days ago to the Lian Friar estate. The President asked an old man there why the tenants had burned the residence of the manager for the Friars. The old man replied that this had not been done by the tenants, but by the estate managers in order to get up a case against the tenants. Quezon replied "I am not an American Governor General--don't tell me such nonsense. As a matter of fact, I am a Filipino, and not from Manila--I was born and brought up in a small place just like this."

Hartendorp also told me of last Friday's Press Conference: how somebody asked whether Judge Paredes' petition for a rehearing of his sentence of dismissal would be entertained by the President, and Quezon had replied that since he had read a whole column editorial in the *Bulletin* commending his act of dismissal, this being the first time in his life he (Quezon) had not been attacked by the *Bulletin*, he would not forfeit this new found favor by rehearing the sentence. Then Hartendorp later advised Quezon that Robert Aura Smith had been very much flattered, and three other newspapers were jealous. Would it not be well for Quezon to compliment the other editors? (Quezon told me later he had replied: "You ass! I was sarcastically running the knife into Robt. Aura Smith--not flattering him!!!")

Quezon came back and asked me to go for a ride with him--the usual ceremonies took place which he has established for leaving Malacanan--motorcycle cops etc. Quezon went to see the High Commissioner, who was very cordial to me. Do not know the purport of their half hour talk. I chatted with Franks, Ely, Teahan, the a.d.c.'s and others of the High Commissioner's office until Quezon and I started back to Malacanan for lunch--alone together, and about as pleasant a time as I have ever had with him; we had at least twenty hearty laughs.

He explained the whole Roxas business: he had arranged with Don Manuel to accept the post of Secretary of Finance and on February 8 wrote him a former offer of this plus power to vote Quezon's powers of control in the Manila Railroad and the National Development Co. To his intense surprise, on his return from taking his children out for a drive at 5 p.m. (which drive he didn't want to take) he received an answer from Roxas, which he read to me, in which Roxas thanked him but stated that in as much as he had been elected, in accordance with his own wish, a member of the Assembly from Capiz, he could not leave his constituency unless called on to do so by "unavoidable duty of the Government." This was a shock and surprise to Quezon who at once sent him a letter saying that he (Quezon) had believed that Roxas could be more useful as Secretary of Finance than as a member of the National Assembly; that Roxas was entitled to his own opinion on the matter, and since he (Roxas) had decided against it, Quezon would accept his decision not to be a member of the Cabinet, but with regret. Thereupon Roxas hurried around and tried to chip in--said he would withdraw his letter and would serve as Secretary of Finance, but Quezon replied it was "too late" as he had already appointed de las Alase. Then Osmena came to see Quezon and Quezon says that if he (Osmena) had then offered to resign as Secretary of Public Instruction, he (Quezon) would have interrupted the opening of his first sentence with "I accept"; but Osmena had no idea of resigning. Quezon says Osmena is an "old snake, but a non-poisonous snake." He said "I licked those fellows only a year and a half ago, but they won't stay licked." I told him he had enough loyal men around him to run any government, and it was unwise to count upon loyalty from his opponents. He said that the night after he got rid of Roxas he was so happy he could not sleep--he wanted to call up an old friend (me) to come and talk to him; that after staying awake until 3 a.m. he got up and worked at his desk until 6.

Next I asked him about his acceptance of "Mike" Elizalde's resignation of the presidency of the National Development Co. He replied that "Mike" had been the largest contributor to Quezon's campaign fund in the election for the Presidency; that "like the Republicans in the United States, he had expected in return to run my administration, and so I dropped him."

Next Quezon described his recent interview with Hausserman, Marsman and Andres Soriano, the three leaders in gold mining here. He told them he was in favour of developing the natural resources of the Islands; that he was also in favour of a fair return to investors. That all three of them had contributed to his campaign fund but if they believed that gave them a right to do as they pleased under his administration they were in for a rude awakening. That if they found existing laws unfair or unworkable, they should come to him and they would find a "sympathetic" listener when they were proposing amendments, but that if they or their clever lawyers tried to evade the law, they would go to jail. He said from the after-effects of this conversation, they seemed to be very well pleased with the outlook.



Next, I took up with him the question of his attitude to the newspapers--a point on which he and I seem to be entirely congenial. He said he had agreed to the Friday interviews, and enjoyed them. That when he had been questioned and had answered, and another question was put he had "refused to be cross-examined" which produced a sympathetic laugh. I urged him to bend a little to avoid the nibbling of squirrels which might impair the confidence he was gradually inspiring in his own people. But he continues to scorn the press. I said I was just like him and had never crooked the knee to the newspapers.

Then we reverted to Hartendorp, and Quezon said he had received news from him a day or two ago that *Scandal* was going to publish an article about him and Miss. "That sweet girl" Quezon added. He told Hartendorp to let it be published, and I recalled the Duke of Wellington's answer: "Publish and be damned." Quezon replied that he never objected to this sort of scandal "because they always get the wrong woman or the wrong place."

Then Quezon told me that the law permitting him to reorganize the Government had been drafted by Roxas who was to have undertaken the job. That he regretted he had allowed this to happen, because Singson told him it had taken six months of the hardest work of his life to reorganize only the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources--and even then his doorstep was always crowded with weeping wives and children. So, Quezon asks me to draft a "superficial reorganization," so as to have something to show to the Assembly when it convenes in June; he will give me the appropriation and personnel. "We" he added, "will really reorganize the government two or three years hence."

His mind is set on our vacation trip in April to Moroland when he "will be through establishing his Government firmly and can relax."

Golf at McKinley later with Doria and call on Felicia Howell.

February 13, 1936. Evening papers carry an account of the suicide of my old friend Manuel Earnshaw in his family mausoleum at the *Cementerio del Norte*. This is the second suicide in our old *Tiro al Blanco* group--the first was Antonio Roxas. Poor Manuel with whom I had talked several times lately, was in the depths of depression from loss of all his money &c. He was born in 1862; thus was 74 years old.

Dinner at Judge Ross'.

February 14, 1936. Quezon appoints the National Economic Council and Government Survey Board; both have been held up for more than two months while Roxas was coyly weighing the advantages to himself in accepting or declining this work. Quezon told me only two days ago that he had abandoned the idea of the government survey board for lack of time to complete its work before the Assembly meets in June; that he wanted me to do the work superficially of course, but to give him something to show the Assembly. Yesterday when talking with Unson and Trinidad I suggested to them that they ask for a budgetary bureau to be set up within the framework provided by law for the Survey Board, and to be allowed to run on for a couple of years until they could finish the standardization, and all other technical reforms. Meanwhile, we could offer plans of consolidation and co-ordination of the different bureaus. Immediately after, they saw Quezon and I surmise the plan suggested by me went through, as they, with Paez are appointed as the new members of the Survey Board.

Talked with Hartendorp, publicity adviser; he has three plans:

- (1) To condense news of local papers for Quezon, under separate columns of approval and criticism
- (2) To post a one sheet Government "Gazette" with caricatures etc., selected from local papers, in every municipality and school in the Islands
- (3) To send one sheet of selected articles in local papers out to a list of American papers.

Talked with Lapointe about his recent trip to San Fernando, Union, to see the carnival there. He travelled 3d class in the railroad and is amusing but bitter in his criticism of the dirt and delays. Also says most of the passengers carry a revolver in the hip pocket. He mimics General Wood very well--also Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. whom he calls the "Play Boy" of the "Far East."

Golf in p.m. at McKinley with Doria.

Talk with Palting, mail clerk in Malacanan; he lived eight years in New York, joined Tammany Hall and voted without being a citizen. Came back here at Quezon's suggestion. Has valuable suggestions as to reorganization in the Post Office here.

General Holbrook arrives vice General Kilbourne.

February 15, 1936. Carnival starts. City full *provincianos*. Traffic jams on Ayala bridge simply intolerable. Certainly *calesas* should not be allowed to cross there at such a time.

Visit from my old acquaintance E. J. Haberer writer. German-American Jew. How much cleverer the Jews are than all the others! He will not call on Quezon because he is a devoted friend of Isauro Gabaldon. Wished to talk over the agrarian question which he considers the most important of all Philippine issues! (so do I). Says there are no friar land questions--it is all a racket on the part of the church to sell dear lands at a high price and buy more land elsewhere much cheaper; also on the part of the tenants to get something for nothing. Says the days when the friar stood in the fields with a whip are gone forever. Advocates repression of the agitators, of the agents provocateurs and of the land speculators. Intensely admired Quezon's statement to the tenants who want to work but forty days a year; that all should be obliged to raise two crops--even tho' one is dry (maize etc.). That the food crops of the Philippines such as coconut oil should be shipped to the underfed people of Central Europe. Admires the practical achievements of the Bolsheviks, and their handling of the land question.<sup>63</sup> Says "small holdings" cannot succeed because they are uneconomic; he added that homesteading is the practical solution of the land question in the Philippines. He expressed the view that the worst disaster which can overtake a man in the Philippines is to become rich--such is the bloodthirsty horde of parasites and *parientes* which immediately settles on him.

Bridge in p.m. with Doria, Mrs Peters and Babbitt.

February 16, 1936. Rumour heard by Doria from army officers that a group of American businessmen, of whom Julian Wolfson is said to be one--are trying to buy a yacht for Quezon to give it to him for eight months of the year. Doria replied that she did not know whether Quezon would accept it, but if he did, the businessmen need not expect in return any special favours from the government, for Quezon stood up so straight he leaned over backward; that as they first President, he was trying to establish precedents for absolutely clean and honest Government. Doria and friends went to Billikin Ball at the Carnival--only "pale faces" present--Doria comments on how sadly (decorously?) the Filipinos take their social pleasures. I replied that everything among them seemed on a minor key, but that might only be their social manner.

P.M. Doria, Mrs Swift and I to Montalban for tea, and we saw the bats issue at 5:45 from the limestone caves in the cliff far above--long twisting columns which came tumbling out in hugh detachments--must have been a million of them. Two small kites appeared about 10 minutes before them, and when the bats dashed out, each bird secured his supper.

February 17, 1936. Call from General Sandiko whom I last saw as a speaker at my farewell banquet March 5, 1921. He had been recently with Quezon to the United States on a mission presenting the Constitution to President Roosevelt, and had been "modernized." Is now employed on the investigation of Friar Land disputes for Quezon. His points are to try to ascertain:

(a) Who will obtain the lands when the government buys the lot and sells in parcels; and (b) how accurate the books of the Friar's agents are; whether the rents from *aparceros* are all entered as income; and he would also verify the sale of mangoes. The *aparcerero* system is that the one who clears the land pays no rent for the first three years and then six pesos annually for five years. They often sublet for a share of the crop.

Call from Zosimo Fabella who was a boy when he accompanied us in 1921 on the *Eastern Exporter* to Colombo. Had since been many years in the United States studying at colleges there. Comes from Pagsanan--and says coconuts are now 13 pesos a thou-

<sup>63</sup>It is evident from this diary and other sources that Harrison was concerned about landlords, tenantry and farms for the people who wanted to own their own land. He was willing to discuss the subject with anyone who might contribute to his better understanding of the situation in the Philippines.

sand--were up to 19 a few weeks ago--9 pesos at this time last year; that they raise only one drop of rice a year, in spite of irrigation, because the soil is so poor (thru flooding)--as compared to that in Tarlac where they get 60 cavans of palay per hectare per crop while in Laguna around Pagsanan they get only 30. Said that the people are now much better pleased with Quezon, especially because of such action as the dismissal of Judge Paredes and the resignation of his second a.d.c. Major Martinez of the Constabulary. He comes from Negros and is without promotion because he had begged to remain on leave longer with his family. The politicians sought to bring pressure on Quezon on his behalf, but in vain.

Fabella told me he had been president of the election board in Pagsanan during the presidential election last year, and that they had returned all except 20 of the 350 electors of his town as having voted (for Quezon mostly), whereas only about half of them really cast their votes. Said his justification was that they feared the election of Aguinaldo, "who would not make as good a President as the average high school boy."

Pagsanan had been the headquarters of the Constabulary all through the bandit campaign; Fabella thinks that the bandits would have taken eight months more to round up, if it had not been for their surrender. [That Cailles had not really helped at all--it was merely artful advertising on his part. That Cailles' wife and a partner of hers owned the gambling business of Laguna province--bribed the police and stood off the constabulary]<sup>64</sup>--that during the recent anti-jueting campaign by Quezon a few of the very many joints had been raided and closed, but would soon reopen. That Cailles' wife had an income of 6,000 pesos a month from that source, and that jueting built their fine house in Dayap in which Cailles entertained us in the Autumn. Said jueting was conducted crookedly. It is a simple game with 37 numbers in a bottle. The players bet on a combination of any two numbers as they are shaken out of the bottle.

Says the *Sakdalistas* talk independence because it is the only real issue they have.

February 18, 1936. When I saw the Cabinet today waiting patiently for the President to finish a talk in the Palace, I did not much envy them--especially when remembering that Quezon's intention is not to share anything confidential with them (on account of Osmena?) but to have an "inside cabinet" of his own--like the War Cabinet in England.

Roxas has been appointed head of the "Rice Commission" which relatively unimportant post he accepts with every show of pleasure after his recent encounter with Quezon's will and a thorough drubbing.

Enaje has been appointed Adviser to the President on matters concerning judicial reorganization--an excellent choice, but small potatoes after his disappointments over the Speakership and Presidency of the Court of Appeals.

Doria tells me that the tradesmen try on her a regular racket of overcharging--to wit those who supplied conveniences for our tea dance--electrician, chair man and orchestra. She says it really frightens her, and she must get everything down in writing before hand. If, as Major Anderson told me, commercial morality had been enormously lowered in the United States since the war evidently similar influences are at work here.

Saw Osmena for a few moments, handsome and smiling as of yore.

Professor Africa of the University of the Philippines, the head of the Department of Students of Foreign Relations, called on me to enquire whether the "supervision and control" of the United States over the foreign affairs of the Philippines prevented the establishment of separate Philippine Consulates. Told him I would get Quezon's opinion, but my own opinion was that it could be done if Philippine Consuls were to deal only with Philippine ships, matters of citizenship and of commerce. I then told him of the question which the American judge at Shanghai recently asked me: "what am I to do if Filipinos now claim extraterritorial rights here?"

A. D. Williams came in to enquire whether there was any basis for Quezon's newspaper statement that it was being considered whether to build main roads in Mindanao,

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<sup>64</sup> Brackets found in the copy used for this edition. A question mark was placed at the end of the sentence in the right hand margin.



or railroads, which would cost ten times as much and probably be a heavy loss. We agreed that roads were the modern solution, and that a railroad was only justified if leading to a mine or other heavy industry. He had told Quezon of the failure of the Bureau of Science to get a 6,000 peso machine to manufacture quinine for the Bukidnon plantation. Quezon took up the phone and ordered this done at once. Williams is greatly relieved that Quezon has now abandoned his plan of constructing another building opposite Malacanan--he has compromised on a chalet for tea parties constructed of Philippine woods; after the fashion of the Forestry Exhibit at the Carnival.

Visit from Lacson, Iloilo lawyer, whom I asked what the Negros sugar planters were doing to prepare for the "sanctions" of the Tydings-McDuffie law? He replied, as they all do, "nothing, except to wait for a modification of that law--no effort is being made to lower costs of production and transportation--except talk of a harbour and wharf in Negros." He said he had never been in favour of immediate, absolute independence; that the Visayans are all "Progresistas," and the Tagalogs are for immediate independence. I asked him just what he meant--he replied "I am an Idealist--I want independence, but it is like wanting a beautiful woman--you want her all right, but if you have any sense, you count the cost."

Dr Piguiging of Tanay called. He is going to work with the Bureau of Plant Industry and Bureau of Commerce on the Friar Lands question. Evidently Quezon is getting all the information he can on this subject.

Pedro Tan of Arayat and Major Santos, Assistant Chief of the Constabulary in Central Luzon called; both keen sportsmen. I asked them why the law against trapping and selling snipe was not enforced and Santos said because it added fuel to the flames of socialism--the peasants said the rich could shoot snipe and the poor couldn't catch them. We agreed to try to get the snipe shooting season extended for next Autumn and Winter.

Santos told me of the rarity of the monkey-eating eagle of the Philippines. The British Museum had finally secured two specimens from a missionary priest in northern Luzon. Santos has one specimen, Jaronilla one and the University of Santo Tomas one. Santos also said he could prove that the "painted snipe" bred all the year around in the Philippines like the wild chicken. He believes that Balabac and Palawan had been part of Borneo at one time, as is shown by the existence of the peacock and mouse deer in those islands. Said he disapproved of "deer-sticking" in Jolo, because usually only the females and young were speared.

February 19, 1936. Colin Hoskins called with Biggars, manager of the Chase Bank at Hong Kong to discuss the possibility of the Philippines buying silver, with a large seignorage profit, and putting the currency on a silver basis, with gold credits for foreign trade accounts. Biggars advocates this and says he thinks the United States would approve; and he would be glad to see a solvent nation going on silver. Said the United States had driven a very hard bargain with England on silver.

In p.m. at work at office on a speech for tonight. Saw Quezon for half an hour --in his pyjamas after siesta, and looking tired, but in his usual vitally active mood. I told him I had suggested to Unson before the latter saw him the setting up of a budgetary bureau within the framework of the Act creating the Survey Board on the reorganization of the Government--let the Survey Board serve for 2-3 years or until they had finished a scientific standardization &c. Let the members of the board plan the consolidations etc.; for immediate use. He said "Oh! I thought that was Unson's own idea." The President wants me to work with the board.

Then I took up the subject of Landlord & Tenant and he said no special session was to be called. Told him the more I went into it, the more suspicious I was of the existence of a racket on part of both landlords and tenants--he agreed, and said he must have some plan by which the small man would get his lands--and to beat the speculators. I told him two of the Friar Estates were on 60-90 year lease to outsiders; and that these lessees were demanding 1-2 million pesos for their interests--we must put penalty taxation on all estates larger than 1000 hectares, to squeeze them.

Then I told him of my morning's talk with Biggars and he at once wrote me notes to Roxas, Weldon Jones and Vicente Singson Encarnacion to consult them on this subject.

Then he arranged on the telephone a trip to Masbate with Andres Soriano for March 25-30, to see the mines; he invited Doria and me to come and some lady to

accompany Doria. His conversation with Soriano was gay and courteous. Soriano is chartering the *Negros* for the trip, and Quezon begged him to go light on the food, so as not to threaten "*mi ulcera de estomago.*" Quezon also fixed up with the Japanese consul dates for the trip to Davao, April 1-10, inviting Doria and me to accompany him on the *Arayat*.

Quezon said he was tired and needed recreation, so we arranged for two bridge games.

He told me of his speech to the executive chiefs at Malacanan that morning; telling then how he had been getting all the credit for their work, and while this satisfied his vanity it hurt his sense of justice, and if anything went wrong he would get all the blame!

I spoke that evening before the Foreign Relations Club of the University of Manila--good audience and it went off well. Constitution Day. The Dean (Gallego) in introducing me referred to Quezon as the "Father of the Constitution" and to me as its "Grandfather" which pleased the students and brought a big laugh. Usual anemic musical program.

February 20, 1936. Just as we were starting for the Stevenson's party Quezon called me up asking me to explain to Betty how sorry he was he couldn't come as he was giving a dinner at Malacanan. (It seems he had personally promised her to come.) She would not receive my explanations when we arrived. Had a later chance and told her how Quezon had planned to go to her party with me, and was quite unconscious that this was the evening he was giving a dinner for Romulo. She was still angry and said "Well just let him ask *me* to dinner!" I asked "You wouldn't accept?" "I'll be damned if I would." There really is considerable disarray in Quezon's social engagements. An a.d.c. who was not afraid of him could keep him straightened out, but this seems impossible. Certainly there was no mention of his own dinner party on his calendar when I was with him yesterday. Doria tells me she likes Quezon so much personally, but feels he is rude to her about engagements.

Saw Colonel Hodson at Stevenson's--he was invited to Malacanan and refused because of Stevenson's party--that will jolt Quezon. The real fault is psychological, Quezon cannot endure to be pinned down--he wants to be free and get away if he feels like it.

February 21, 1936. Discussions on currency question in the Philippines with Hoskins, Lagdomeo and Weldon Jones. Lagdomeo says that their monetary policy must follow the economic, and the latter must follow their political leaders. Thinks as I do that the Philippines should already be making plans to expand their foreign markets, and that eventually they must have their own currency instead of being tied at 2 to 1 to the rubber dollar. Weldon Jones is afraid of the effect on business if we buy silver here, but is interested in the subject and appears eager to study the point I put. He agrees with me that so far as silver is concerned, the United States has no policy. He says Roosevelt adopted plans for going off gold and buying silver to appease elements determined on a far more dangerous course of inflation.

February 21, 1936. P.M. bridge party at Babbitts, which Quezon accepted thru me. As I arrived, Babbitt said Quezon had just telephoned him he was ill in bed and couldn't come. He was seen at the Carnival later that evening! The resurrection from bed was probably due to the fact that his recent girl friends had been candidates for election as Queen of the Carnival, and probably begged him to come. Don't blame him. Our bridge went ahead, Jim Rockwell, Anderson, Babbitt, Mrs Dodge and myself. Doria went to Carr's cocktail party where she said the guests were mostly English and very agreeable.

February 22, 1936. Holiday. An hour with Sam Gaches in his office where he told me at my request the whole story of the Mineral Resources Mining properties. Excellent and vivid 40 minutes talk by him on rediscovery of the ancient Chinese mines of 500-1,000 years ago in Camarines Norte. Gave all the difficulties of mining in that region (Labo) and said it might be a "flop" "but"--with a gesture--"it drives you crazy it looks so good." Said all mines in the Philippines except those in actual operation, like Benguet Consolidated, were "hooy," meaning, a speculation only as yet--but added he believed the Paracale--San Mauricio--Labo district was destined to become the great gold fields of the Islands.

Had a talk yesterday with Palting, who has made a survey of the executive offices at Malacanan since inauguration, and he reports four times the volume of business compared with the days of the Governors General--but, he added, this was mostly due to the different boards engaged in reorganizing the Government.

Saw also Colonel Antonio Torres, Municipal Councillor, candidate for appointment as first Filipino Chief of Police of the City of Manila. He seemed downcast and said to me "My career is ended"--I replied "No! it is just beginning"--that afternoon's papers carried the announcement of his nomination to head the Police Department.

Saw also Dr Calderon, Director of the Philippine General Hospital--he is old and failing--walks with a stick. He is the senior surviving appointee to office made by me as Governor General.

Long talk with Colin Hoskins on currency problems in the Philippines. He had two hours with Weldon Jones this morning on the silver purchase. We also went into constitutional questions; the United States under Roosevelt; and the administration. Colin asked why Jim Ross and I could not support Roosevelt.

Doria's dinner here tonight. Colette Guest, Kuka Guest, Mr & Mrs "Shiny" White, Andres Soriano, Jim Rockwell, Paco Oleaga, Evelyn Burkhart who is to marry Paco in a few days, Tony McLeod, Young Hoover, Florence Edwards and Commander MacDowell. Dinner not well cooked. Orchestra dismissed by Doria as no good, so we went on to the Polo Club dance and had a gay evening. Mr & Mrs Gaches had a large dinner party there on the lawn--with the Rectos and Buencaminos. Doria said the Army crowd mournfully regretted that the last stronghold of the Palefaces was now invaded. Mrs Gaches told Doria how difficult her social-political work on the committees was, because the Filipinos with whom she served were so casual--not to say rude!

February 23, 1936. Gold share market booming here with some sensational advances. Bridge at Manila Club with Jollye, Humphreys and Jameson.

February 24, 1936. Bridge at Columbian Club with Vicente Lim, Reyes and Nazario on Tuesday p.m.

Large dinner for us at Ramon Fernandez's home. Osmena and Roxas were there, and everybody was very polite--the dinner was well cooked and well served. Later Doria and I went to a buffet dinner at Jim Rockwell's--usual back-slapping-hello-old-man American crowd.

February 25, 1936. Mrs Quezon returned from a month's absence in Java etc. Press photos of attentive loving couple, Quezon in yachting cap. The next day Quezon left with Nieto and his aides for an eight day trip through Balete pass and the Cagayan valley!

Talk with Colonel Vicente Lim, senior Filipino officer in the United States Army and a graduate of the American War College. He said: "Quezon is a very hard man to work with." I commented on how the President's calendar was congested, because gave too much time talking with each visitor. He replied, "He understands the psychology of his people!" He stated Quezon "is giving us the best Government we ever had, but God help us if he dies and we get a weak-kneed President!" Lim also said: "even Quezon is only human and can't be 100% perfect--as evidenced by the appointment of Antonio Torres." As Lim himself had wished to be Chief of Police of Manila, he may be prejudiced, but he seemed to be trying to be fair in the following estimate of Torres: "integrity unquestioned; has ideas, but is childish and can't write English, and is a coward." Lim said that his "thesis" at the Army War College in 1929 was that Japan within five years would take Manchuria; that they would wait until the United States got into great financial difficulties; that England is now also waiting, but to see if the United States will put itself together; otherwise England is prepared to fall back on Singapore. That Japan is planning a canal thru the neck of the Malay peninsula in Siam, and for this purpose is making friends with the Siamese rulers. That this canal would present no more difficulties than had the Panama Isthmus. Lim also said in his thesis (and still believes) that the Philippines is bound to fall under the economic domination of Japan, but the latter will not pay the cost of physical domination. Said the Americans could never defend the Philippines against Japan, but the Filipinos could make the invasion of their country too difficult to make it worthwhile. Lim is a brother-in-law of Vicente Villamin, and thinks highly of him, tho' Quezon does not like Villamin.<sup>65</sup> Lim told Quezon that he is ready to give up his rank in the United States Army to serve in the Philippines Army *if really needed*--otherwise not.

<sup>65</sup> Vicente Villamin was something of a thorn in Quezon's side. He had a way of bursting Quezon's rhetoric concerning the ability of the Philippines to become economically independent of the United States.



Dinner with Jollye--excellent food and civilized service--later to Carnival--poor show, and the loudspeaker has added new resources of horror to the barkers!

February 26, 1936h Talk with Rafferty who is being done in by his partners in the manganese mineh Rafferty told me of repeated lies and evasions which are characteristically the world's 11th wonder!

Talk with Simmie about the *arrastre* plant and the Government's attitude toward sameh Simmie says he, Gaches and Hausserman would become Philippine citizens in a moment if they could get out of the United States income tax by so doing. Said he was selling out his California property as quickly as he could.

Jollye told me last night that he once crossed the Atlantic on the same ship with ex-Governor General Stimson and ex-Governor General Davis--they spoke to one another but were not friendlyh

Sinclair mentioned that the Tabacalera had spent several hundred thousand pesos here trying to raise Sumatra tobacco wrappers--it would not grow--either due to the soil or the climateh At the Carnival, he and I had inspected his (Smith-Bell's) hemp stripping machine--noisy, slow and almost as much physical exercise as if done by hand!

February 27, 1936. All day drive with Doria and Professor H. Otley Beyer through Laguna, Batangas and Cavite provinces. At Ft. McKinley we turned down to the river and took the new road thru Pateros and Taguig to Alabang. Pateros is, of course, the centre of the duck raising industry and Beyer says the people there spread the story of how their men hatched their ducks--the fact was they had a primitive (and perhaps very ancient) incubator of layers of sand on bamboo slats; the top is covered, and the men sit on that and talk and smoke, hence this lurid tale!

The new road to Alabang passes *Alcalde* Posada's *hadienda*--hence the road, according to Beyer! The shores of Lake Laguna are occasionally almost uninhabitable because of the smell of decaying algae, which sometimes even invade Manila via the Pasig River. Beyer said the decaying masses are due to the blackade created by water lilies--that A. D. Williams had installed a fine wire mesh at the outlet into the Pasig River which seems to cure that; there are so few boats on the Pasig River nowadays that this is possibleh

We discussed the possibility of help for the Philippines health service from the Rockefeller Institute now that Dr Victor Heiser was separated from that institution. I told how Quezon had recently thought of bringing Heiser out as Adviser on Health, so that if any epidemic broke out here, the Filipinos would not get all the blame--i.e., to make Heiser the goat. Heiser, who is a shrewd intriguer, "ducked."h

Passed one of Beyer's archaeological sites on a ridge beyond Taguigh

Beyer mentioned how busy he is nowadays with Dr Geo. Pinkley of the American Museum of Natural History and his companions. Mnbien of Peking, Chinese archaeologisth They had spent 4 months together in Peking, studying the "Peking man"--they had a theory that the "drift" of continents had separated the Philippines and Celebes from the mainland, and that these islands had been the original "rim" of the continent; so that, perhaps the skulls or teeth of the "original" man could be found in the Philippines which they believed to have been formerly the seashoreh He had persuaded these two scientists to stay on here to examine with him the brokel lime-stone areas near to and north of Montalban gorge--to search for "filled caves."

I asked Beyer why the Filipinos used the reverse gestures in beckoning to come, and in nodding (also in using the saw); he said these matters were much disputed, but *he* believed they came from very early times; said there was a Basque village near Santander where the people also gestured in the reverse wayh

He went on speaking of the mountain people of Luzon, stating that the solution of the problem was their absorption by the *Cristianos*; said this would improve the Filipino stock and quoted Rizal to sustain his theory. Cited Paredes and Villamor as examples. The former half Tinguian and half Indonesian; the latter pure Tinguian.

Entering the province of Batangas, he said the residents were the most sturdy and independent race of Luzon, and were great fighters. Their horses and cattle are also the best in the Philippines. Their food is maize, dry rice, and poi. All the slopes of Mount Makalut (chief volcano)--5000 feet high, near Lake Taal, were densely inhabited in the neolithic age--a large proportion of his archaeological finds came

from there. But there is a gap in their history of nearly 1000 years--positively no iron age relics. He supposes that an eruption of the Taal volcanoes drove out or destroyed all these early settlements--perhaps the survivors migrated to the site of the present Rizal Province. In 1911, the year of the last explosion, Father Algue of the Weather Bureau three days before the eruption came, had begged the Philippine Government to remove all people on the island of Taal. Some 2600 people who were there, and in the surrounding neighborhood, were killed in that explosion. The name of the mountain: Makalut, means "curly-headed" since it was inhabited until within 200 years of now by Negritos. Taal Lake is the crater of the great volcano of former times. Now only four or five small craters are left above the water, and also Mount Makalut of which the whole gigantic cliff to the west is the remaining wall. The volcanic ash makes wonderful soil when decayed--hence the better specimens of man and beast. The lake was connected with the sea by a river navigable to former ships, until the 1911 explosion which blocked the former outlet and raised the level of the lake. The water of Lake Taal is still brackish, and the fish are of marine types. The soil cuttings hereabouts show various levels of volcanic ash, marking the periodic eruptions.

Passed thru a barrio which had voted against de las Alas four years ago, so to punish them, he would not complete the 1½ kilometers of road connecting their barrio with the main road for three years!

Visited the town of Taal on the sea--it was moved from the original site on Lake Taal 200 years ago, after being twice destroyed by the volcano. Nice old church, and another well-known church and stairway constructed by Christian Chinese after a massacre of their people by Filipinos. In answer to my question *why* the Filipinos periodically massacred the Chinese--he replied "various reasons"--the massacre of 1603 was permitted by the Spanish because they thought the Chinese were getting too rich; the attempted massacre of 1922 was due to the arrogance of the Chinese after their own revolution in China.

Mabini came from Batangas--his brother still lives there; so do Conrado and Francisco Benitez, Teodoro and Maximo Kalaw (note how shrewd they are in keeping out of high political office)--Galicano Apacible, de las Alas and the Tironas, and the Lopez family. The Zobel and Roxas families have large *haciendas* in the southwest of this province.

I asked Beyer why in his "ancestral chart" of Filipinos, he did not mention the Japanese; he replied that the Japanese had only lately begun to settle in the Philippines. The similarity of appearance of many Filipinos to the Japanese is due to Malay ancestry which is in nearly half the Filipinos and in most of the Japanese. Those Malays now here invaded from Java and Celebes, and partly from the mainland. Those Malays who went to Japan, entered partly from the mainland, and others, during the Stone Age, from islands east of Java, via Guam, Marianas, Marshall and Bonin Islands--not via Celebes and the Philippines. This is proved by the oval stone axes of a type found in Japan and in the Pacific Islands mentioned, but never found in Celebes, Borneo, nor the Philippines. (Note: the Japanese are just becoming aware of this kinsmanship and are modifying their former arrogant attitude towards the "Southern Barbarians.")

Today's newspapers give an account of a military revolt in Japan led by the army, and the murder of five leading statesmen by the soldiers. Beyer! said this is in the Japanese tradition. The samurai were so arrogant and such bullies that the Japanese 80 years ago got rid of them and re-instated their Emperor. In his opinion, the domination of the military caste today in Japan is dangerous, but the Japanese will eventually throw them out as they did the samurai.

Other remarks of Beyer were:

Searchers are finding the teeth of elephant and rhinoceros in the Philippines, but none of the tiger, as yet. Plenty of tamarao teeth, all other Luzon. This central region has been agricultural for so long that the dangerous animals were killed off in prehistoric times.

He is not sure the carabao is not indigenous here; the appearance of the Ifugao *cimarron* is quite different from the domestic type. I could corroborate that statement.

Chinese carp had been introduced here by the Bureau of Science in the fine fish lake in Camarines. Result: the newcomers had devoured the superior type of fish already there, and the people would not eat the carp. So the Bureau of Science is now trying to eliminate the Chinese carp by some disease fungus.

Coming from Batangas through the western part of Cavite towards Tagaytay ridge, Beyer said this country was not settled as is the adjacent southern Batangas, because it was and always had been a paradise for gangsters now operating as cattle thieves. Some of them were rich men who were playing cattle rustler where formerly they would have been pirates--for sport. They had "fixed" the municipal officers and the Constabulary. I commented on the great decline in morale of the Constabulary under the amiable General (Dr) Valdes. He said part of it was due to the building of so many roads--the Constabulary had given up "hiking" patrols, and now seldom got out of their motors. He added that my execution of General Noriel--public enemy N° 1 in Cavite, had put a stop to the gangster business in that province for nearly 20 years. Now it was springing up again.

Beyer said that as a geologist, he believed the gold reef in the Philippines extended straight along the Cordilleras. That the Benguet Igorootes were "gold conscious" and knew all the surface gold places in their provinces; that he did not believe there would be any new gold "strikes" there except at deep levels; that the Bontocs were opposed to gold prospecting, and that the country to the east--Ifugao--was not geologically suitable. That Abra and Kalinga offered a good field for prospecting, especially since Abra, like Benguet, was not heavily wooded.

He expressed worry over the change of the governorship of the Mt. Province now that Colonel Dosser has resigned. Said Bontocs and Ifugaos were resistant to changes in their social and economic system. They were large, organized and proud nations. But, he added, the Filipino officials generally started with great enthusiasm for "reform" in the Mt. Province and then cautiously let the people alone and went in for personal petty graft. Said the Ifugaos were afraid of *Cristianos* getting all the public offices in their country and taxing, and changing their customs. Said during Governor General Murphy's vacation in United States, Vice Governor Hayden had appointed some twenty of the Ifugaos as minor officials in their own country.

I asked him what had become of the Igorrote girls educated in Mrs Kelly's school --he said some of them had married Americans--some lived with them without marriage--most of them had gone back to their filthy ancestral huts and had become Igorrote wives, forgetting their education.

He said the Kalingas the handsomest and most warlike of the northern nations had nevertheless proved less resistant to modern "progress" than any of the others.

When in the barrio of Makalut, town of Cuenca, we visited the home of the local *cacique* Caves. I asked Beyer to explain his odd face; Beyer said it was mostly Moro--the Moro pirates governed here when the Spanish first came here 350 years ago.

Later that evening we gave a dinner to Consul General Blunt and Mrs Blunt, Carr, Sinclair, Mrs Swift and Miss Masters--the latter was half an hour late, for which there was no excuse, for she is hardly a "mere chit of a thing." Manners in post-war times are certainly "shot to hell."

February 28, 1936. Visit to office of the usual series of men wanting me to get them jobs. Great relief when Rafferty arrived--he has forced his partners in the Manganese Mine, to "do him right." Told me Sy Cip's brother took a Chinese "dumb head" to the United States to campaign against our attempt to make the Chinese keep their books in English, Spanish or Tagalog so that the Government could collect taxes. The Chinese won.

We discussed the "customary law" of the Philippines which underlies the laws imposed by the Spanish and by ourselves. This explains many apparently incomprehensible events here. I told of the magnificent lands in the Cavite foot hills which were unoccupied because of the *bandidose*. He said he was the first of the Americans in Cebu to move out to a section on the outskirts of the City--no Filipinos would then live there because of the *Pulijanese*. Said Osmena told him apropos of the recent surrender of Encallado, that this was the customary method of putting an end to brigandage: inviting the leader to one's house and treating with him. "I was afraid" said Osmena "when the criticism was running so high here over the princely way Encallado was treated by Quezon, that the papers would recall that this was the method I used myself when Provincial Governor to put an end to the *Pulijan* movement in Cebu."

Long talk with Rafferty about Pershing and the "Moro question"; he was collector of customs in Cebu and Zamboanga at the time General Pershing was military governor there. Rafferty believes there was no Moro question there; only a "question" created by the United States Army! Said the reason why Pershing did not oppose my plan to remove the Army from Moroland and install Civil Government under Carpenter was that



Pershing wished the credit for having made this possible. (As a matter of fact we would never have had peace down there unless we had withdrawn the United States Army!) Rafferty says Pershing was utterly selfish and extremely unpopular in Zamboanga. His "illness" when he left for home as the last military governor of Mindanao was only an excuse.

Golf in p.m. at McKinley with Doria.

Memo: Beyer said yesterday that Governor General Murphy had been so afraid of provoking "labor" hostility in the United States that he had declined to take action against two or three labour leaders here when they deserved it. (That seems to have been his fault as an administrator: every question to be decided here! was considered with one eye on his political future at home.)

Quezon is making speeches in the Cagayan valley denouncing people who will not pay their (cedula) taxes, and those governments in the provinces which fail to collect it. (Perhaps the land tax is involved.) It seems probable that the situation is due both to "hard times" and to a general relaxation of government in recent years.

Quezon has announced that the June drawing in the Charity Sweepstakes will be the last; no doubt the affair has given rise to some scandal but I think it wiser for an administration to regularize and make use of gambling rather than vainly trying to eliminate it.

February 29, 1936. Air of repose in the Executive Building--when Quezon is in Malacanan the whole place is like a beehive.

Visit from Sandiko. An interesting type, apparently of mixed ancestry: Chino and Moro. He reported on his investigation into Friar Land questions in Bulacan: says the purchase by the Government would benefit chiefly the *hacendros*; somewhat also the tenants who had added from two to four hundred pesos value per hectare to the land--the *aparceros* also would gain some slight benefit. They now pay 24-40 pesos rent per hectare which goes eventually to the *hacendros* but is not entered on the estate books; if they can raise 70-80 gantas of palay per hectare, the *aparceros* now get only about 20-30 of it for themselves--not enough on which to raise a family. He says usury in one way or another is universal, and that a system like the "Raffeyen" must be introduced here! Says all wealthy Filipinos invest their money in land, not in industries or mines, for they know how to get much more for it thereby. He wants to break the power of landlords and to free the small man who is now a sort of slave under a feudal system. Says our Rural Credit Association under Prautch broke down because the *caciques* borrowed all the money intended for the *aparceros*. Sandiko says they may have him killed, but he is not afraid.

Visit from Don Vicente Singson, who came at Quezon's request, to talk with me over the suggested purchase of silver at 45 cents with part of the "gold" (i.e., United States dollar) credits in the United States. Singson is opposed to this because silver is so uncertain, being now a by-product of other mining. Is in favour of a gold standard for this government. Is also strong for the Philippines having its own currency standard--free from the United States dollar, being suspicious of the latter. Two years ago, when he was Secretary of Finance, Singson went with the mission to the United States, and finally persuaded the War Department to agree to separate the currency system here, but was not informed of their decision for six months and meanwhile had left the post of Finance for private business. Says the change of system must be made while the Philippines are still under American sovereignty, so as not to alarm the public. He wishes to have a central bank here, such as has been introduced in "succession states" in Central Europe--thus making the government able to regulate and prevent raids on the gold supply! Has heretofore been opposed by other bankers here, but they have now come around to his view. Thinks Quezon does not understand these questions, and he admits it. Laughed at the Chinese irony over Kammerer's regulations. I told him my story of Yuan Shih Kai in 1915. Singson says he is convinced the United States will give the Philippine independence "whether the Filipinos want it or not!" and that they must prepare for it now.

Golf in p.m. at Caloocan with Fox, Jollye and Sinclair. Bridge 7-2:30 a.m. here with Guevara, Dr Bangui and the younger Palma. Good game--they are better performers at the Culbertson system than are the English or Americans here. At supper, Guevara launched forth on his favourite subject--the absorption of the Philippines by Japan. Says that altho' the two races are related they really have nothing much in common--"but our grandchildren will!" Cited a recent statement by Vice-Admiral Kenkiki Takahashi, Commander in Chief of Japanese combined fleets as follows: "It is likely

that Japan's economic advance in Manchukuo, soon will reach its limits, and, therefore, the Empire's future commercial expansion must be directed to Southern Seas, with Formosa or the mandated islands of the Equatorial Pacific as bases. In such event, the cruising radius of the Japanese Navy must quickly be expanded so as to reach New Guinea, Borneo and Celebes. H'

March 1-2, 1936. Traffic congestion during Carnival intolerable now over, thank God! Besides, cracks are reported in the north pier of the Ayala bridge, so heavy trucks are banned from there--other people, possibly, are scared away--a great blessing.

The biggest external changes in Manila during my fifteen years of absence are: (1) the sanitation--both Americans and Filipinos are much more healthy--the water is safe to drink now, and food is safe almost everywhere. Only tropic anemia now threatens us; and (2) the lovely flowers now on sale at all the markets. I believed Governor General Davis turned Manila into the garden it now is.

Mrs Gaches told me at our dinner that her butler had put his high wages into supporting his two brothers through college--signs of a topsy-turvy world--or perhaps rather of the Filipino determination to be *ilustrado*. As only a small proportion of these "educated" men can be employed in the Government or in clerical positions elsewhere, this accumulation of young people who won't work with their hands only increases dangerously the general discontent.

March 3, 1936. Reception at Japan Club. Saw Mrs Quezon who is just back from Java, and is much thinner. Talk with Speaker Montilla, a refined type of man. Asked him why his group was buying up rival sugar centrals in times like this? He said, first to get Spanish capital into Filipino hands, and also because they expected to make money out of the by-products of sugar, such as molasses, glass from bagasse ashes, fibres and paper, wine, alcohol etc. Also spoke of industries to be established from coir--or coconut husk fibre.

Congratulated the Japanese Consul General on the escape of my old acquaintance Viscount Makino in last week's massacre of Cabinet officers in Japan.

March 4, 1936. Talk in the office with Dr Schay, a Jewish refugee who escaped from the Nazis; he was the editor of the second largest newspaper in Germany--was sitting with a friend playing chess in a cafe in Berlin, when he heard of the burning of the Reichstag. He telephoned at once to his wife to bring his suitcase to the station, reached Aachen, and walked across the border to Belgium. I asked him: "The Nazis burned the Reichstag, didn't they?" "Of course," he replied and added that there was a "will to war" among the Nazis as soon as they could arm; they were then lacking in fortresses, and in heavy artillery; their aviation was now the largest in Europe. They mean to get the Danzig corridor back; Poland was to be "compensated" by annexing the northern part of the Ukraine--war would be made by Germany and Poland on Russia in the Spring of 1937--but things could change before that. Schay means to open a school for Filipinos in Manila.

March 5, 1936. Reporters who accompanied Quezon on his northern trip said that at the dedication of the Bayambang bridge and in three other speeches, Quezon stated that the opening up of Nueva Viscaya and Isabella was due to my hunting trips there of twenty years ago.

San Juan Lateran "commencement" of the military class and presentation of a gold sword to Colonel Vicente Lim, Professor of Military Science there. Marquee on the lawn in front of the old walls of city. Father Rector spoke in English--complimenting the cadets; he said that most of the leading soldiers in the revolt against Spain had been trained in this Corps "and though I am a Spaniard, I recognize the right of a people to fight for their independence." This address was made just forty years after the day when the prisons behind those walls had been crammed with Filipinos supposed by the priest-ridden Spanish Government to sympathize with the *Insurrectos*! I sat next to the Father Rector of Santo Tomas University whom I knew of old. He said he approved of military training in the schools, and disapproved of college athletics because of their semi-professionalism. Bocobo, the President of the University of the Philippines, delivered the address in favour of military training; he commended it as a cure for Filipino slackness, tardiness, and lack of discipline in business as well as in social life. I said to Father Rector (who is Spanish), "He is telling the Filipinos some home truths which neither you nor I could express. H' The Father Rector approves greatly of Quezon's Government and he added: "he understandsh his own people. H'

Saw Unson! who, on my enquiry, told me Quezon had said nothing to him as Chairman of the Government Survey Board as to my working with him. I told him Quezon had contemplated turning the whole thing over to me, and when he created! the Board instead, he had wanted me to work with them.

March 6, 1936. Palting, who is an Ilocano, says of his people that they are never satisfied without some sum of money in the bank, while the Tagalogs spent! everything they had "for tomorrow we die." (Fable of the ant and the grasshopper!) He is insistent on a thorough reform of the Post Office bureau here; and also demands that something be done to prepare for the reception here of the Filipinos about to be repatriated by the United States.

Doria called at Malacanan on Mrs Quezon by appointment but Mrs Rodriguez who speaks only Spanish seems to have gummed the conversatibn. Mrs Quezon said she had cut out half of her trip to the East Indies because Junior was not well. She came back from Singapore on an uncomfortable freighter; and now complains about the inconvenience of accommodations for her at Malacanan Palace. Commended the social custom at Government House in Singapore, where all guests left immediately luncheon was finished.

March 7, 1936. Photographed by Arellano for Malacanan. Quezon wishes to hang up photos of Taft, myself and Murphy as the three Americans most closely connected with significant chapters of the American occupation. Arellano told me that everywhere confidence in Quezon was growing--that he was a real leader.

Papers contain notices about two matters showing the results of slowness in the administration. 1st, the rice regulation by the Government. The dealers claim that Quezon! had acted too slowly to benefit them as intended. 2d, Quezon has suspended the Governor of Albay because he would not come to Manila to answer as to why the Provincial Board had reduced the cedula tax from two pesos to one. But it seems that the resolution of the Board had been before Quezon for so long without action that it became effective without approval!

Long talk with Manuel Concepcion on the currency; we agree that Paredes had lost his fight in Washington against the repeal of the law authorizing the payment of \$23,000,000 to the Philippines for the gold devaluation, because he argued on sentimental grounds instead of giving exchange and commodity prices, the best he can do now is to get action by Congress suspended until proper arguments can be presented later on.

American republicans of the Philippines had their political convention to select delegates to their National Convention. Selph and Marguerite Wolfson were the! spokesmen. They have learned very little in 36 years of progressive defeat on the Philippine question. They still hope to turn back the hands of the clock. They did not come out against "independence after ten years" but denounced the economic provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie Act.

Doria describes the hopelessness of trying to shop in establishments where Filipinos serve. They are obstinate, disobliging and arrogant!. Always answer to any enquiry that "we haven't any of that"--will never compete successfully in the retail trade with Chinese, Spanish and Japanese.

Attended dinner of Yale graduates of Philippines in honor of Yale men promoted recently: Justice Jose Laurel, Judge Delgado, Secretary of Finance de las Alas, Assemblyman from Marinduque and Celeste, the Secretary of the National Economic Council. A lot of real fun and a very pleasant evening.

Bridge earlier with Colonel Lim, Tan and Nazario at the Philippine Columbian Club--good game.

Did not attend Tommy Wolff's gigantic reunion of "Old Timers.!"

March 8-9, 1936. Trip with Doria to Atimonan; stopped en route to see Lukban, where we were greeted by Tolentino who was *Presidente* there on my last visit (with Quezon) in 1913. Fine old church uninjured during the Revolution. Old stones artistically discoloured by the damp climate. The houses of this region are of bamboo, like those at Lillo on the other side of Banahao. Flowers and running water are everywhere!. Unique scenery with rice fields inset among coconut groves. The unrivalled approach to the town was ruined by a large bill-board advertising Chesterfield cigarettes.



Over Quezon hill zig-zig to Atimonan. Unique scenery. Bath in the tumultuous Pacific. Good hotel, former residence of Governor (now Under Secretary) Guinto. Electric light and modern plumbing and a pure water supply. This and the hotel at Pagsanan are the first attempts at modern hotel keeping by Filipinos, and Reyes, the manager here, is doing well. Atimonan township now has 16,000 inhabitants with six million coconut trees. After the trees begin to bear, they need little attention, except to clear away the undergrowth; on some trees the nuts ripen every three months. Locals have no capital nor enterprise to start a desiccated coconut factory, nor to manufacture the by-products.

We stopped on the way back at San Pablo to call on the Stoffords.

March 11, 1936. At office. Hartendorp uneasy because his appointment is as "technical assistant," and not as "adviser"; fears he will be reduced to mere routine work, and is upset because he can't see Quezon. Told him I had been unable to see Quezon myself for three weeks. Appointments are out for the Boards of Directors of the Philippine National Bank and of the National Development Co. They are completely Filipinized: even Colin Hoskins is ousted! Bank directors henceforth are to consist only of Government officials, thus freeing the bank from business interests of a private nature. Sorry about Colin who is one of the best directors the bank has had.

Saw Rafael Palma coming to take the oath of office as President of the National Board of Education. He seems pleased, and I am really glad Quezon took care of him--rare magnanimity on the President's part!

At Manila Club for bridge, but Peters, entering the card room slipped and fell cutting his head badly and fracturing his wrist--took him to doctor's. Only a few days ago called on General and Mrs Holbrook and found her with a broken wrist from a fall on a slippery floor. This is a common accident here.

Admitted by affiliation as a member of Bagumbayan Lodge No. 4; I heard that our former efforts to make Americans fraternize with Filipinos had now been replaced by the necessity of persuading the poor Filipinos (Plaridel Temple) to fraternize with the "aristocratic" lodges which contain Americans--a schism is threatened--trouble seems to have been created by Masterson, an ex-soldier who is ambitious and speaks a few words of Tagalog.

Soriano told Doria that he finds it more profitable to sell his copra (Laguna) in the open market than to send it to the nearby (San Pablo) desiccated coconut factory.

March 12, 1936. Long talk with Prautch on credit for poor people in provinces. Quezon off to Baguio.

Anderson and Clyde Dewitt at the hotel. Dewitt says Colin Hoskins is the only Democrat in Manila in favour of F. D. Roosevelt. Much talk about mines and mining and litigations depending thereon.

Our dinner for General and Mrs Smith, Commander and Mrs Millet, Mr and Mrs Le Jeune and Mr and Mrs Oleaga.

March 13, 1936. Bridge tea for us at the Bocobo's--five tables--Palma and Roxas there. Much interest in Franco-German crisis but no excitement.

March 15, 1936. Visit from Colin Hoskins--who said he was rather hurt that Quezon did not let him know before accepting his resignation as a director of the Philippine National Bank, but that he thought Quezon was right in Filipinizing it, and in excluding business men from the board, because "the more successful they had been, the more predatory the type." I asked him about the sugar mill shares--he said all bank's holdings were being bought up by Filipino interests--that the Jones-Costigan law was apt to continue, and under that, all the companies could liquidate their capital in five years, or even four. He thought very well of de las Alas, who is vigorous and yet prudent.

Luncheon at Malacanan in honor of Isauro Gabaldon who is sailing in *Vittoria* for six months in Spain and in Germany, where he is going to take the waters for diabetes. I was glad to see him and Quezon reconciled. Spoke of this and of Palma, to Quezon who said he was pleased to "recognize" them after giving them such a licking. Had a nice letter from Palma. He added that Gabaldon was one of the finest characters they have in the Philippines.

There were about thirty guests in the old dining room at Malacanan--the first time I had been there under the Filipino Government. I was the only American present. Former Residents Commissioner Gabaldon, Guevara, Delgado and Osias were there--also Alunan, Nieto, Gill, Montilla, Lacson etc. I sat between Mrs Quezon and "Baby." Mrs Quezon told me that she had not been entertained by the Governor General in Java, and had refused to put herself forward as she was traveling incognito. It is evident that the Dutch are uneasy about the effects that Philippine independence will have on the Javanese.

Mrs Quezon and I made many arrangements for our trips in April. Quezon and his wife showed great affection for one another.

The President said he wished to attend the coronation of Edward VIII in London,<sup>66</sup> and I said I would like to go with him. Said he would have arrangements made through our State Department for his accommodation in London.

I asked him whether now that he had organized his government it would operate with vigour? He was positive it will.

Asked him when he was going to inaugurate his bridge and poker club for the members of the Assembly in the new basement at Malacanan. He replied that it was not quite finished. I told him the Assemblymen were in a mood when it would be a good gesture--he answered: "Not until I have given them a licking!" I laughed, so he had to join in.

March 17, 1936. Long talk at the office with Hartendorp, who is wearing down under his inability to see Quezon, or to do anything except routine matters. Fears he is being blocked by Vargas, whom he has several times criticized in his periodical, the *Philippine Magazine*. Says an attempt is being made to make us Advisers look useless to the Government. Told him to keep quiet and maintain a stiff upper lip.<sup>67</sup>

Visit from Consul General Blunt who is going on leave--introducing Consul Foulds.<sup>68</sup> Said Quezon had told him he wanted to attend the coronation in May, 1937.

After lunch Vargas called me on phone and said Quezon was off to Zamboanga, and if Doria and I and Mrs Howell wished to go, the *Arayat* would leave at 3 p.m. Fierce rush and we all made it, to find Quezon had gone ahead in the *Mayon* to stop over at Iloilo, and we were to join him at Zamboanga on Tuesday a.m. On the *Arayat*, we found only Governor Guingona and Perez, the municipal treasurer of some town in Tarlac, off on an inspection trip for Quezon. Perez and I had a talk about the landlord and tenant situation, and he agreed with me in all particulars. He said the Chinos had a complete grip on the marketing of rice. I asked him if the report of the Rice Commission which has just been adopted was not a fight against the Chinos and he assented. He said that labor in the Philippines was now faced with a reduction of wages--these had already fallen from eighty centavos in my time to sixty centavos. Naturally, a good deal of social unrest results. Even so, our sugar could not compete with that of Java, where wages were only about twenty centavos.

Asked him to play bridge, but he said the regulations forbid Treasurers playing any game of cards and that this executive order had been signed by me!

Guingona is in favour of constructing roads rather than railroads in Mindanao.

Amazing what a lot of apparently waste land there is in the Philippine Islands--in contrast with Japan, for example. The lower coasts of Cavite and Batangas and the coast of Negros, appear uninhabited, though here and there one sees the fires and smoke of *caigñins*.

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<sup>66</sup>The question of Quezon's attendance at the coronation of Edward VIII was a nettlesome one for the British Foreign Office. It was resolved when Quezon lost interest in pressing the matter of the protocol that would attend his visit to London for the royal event.

<sup>67</sup>It was obvious that Harrison was concerned that any in-fighting among the American advisers to Quezon would give Manila Americans an opportunity to destroy the effectiveness of the Filipino leader's ability to lead his people.

<sup>68</sup>L. H. Foulds was later to become the first British Minister to the Philippine Republic.

March 18, 1936. Lazy day at sea--rather rough in spots and no vessels sighted. Both girls seasick.

March 19, 1936. Arrived at Zamboanga one hour before the *Mayon* which brought Quezon, his daughter "Baby" and a considerable suite. Walk up to market place where Assemblyman Alano introduced Quezon who spoke in Spanish. His address was on the duties of citizenship and the relations of the provinces with the Commonwealth Government; said also that whereas in the past elective officials who were guilty of misdeeds were more leniently treated than appointed officials would be--now the new government would treat them all severely since it was their own administration. Just afterwards, he proceeded to a hearing on charges of petty graft against Provincial Governor Ramos (mulcting ten pesos from policeman etc.). He gave no decision, though during the hearing, Quezon suspended a stenographer and the Secretary of the Provincial Board for having falsified the record in favour of Ramos. Afterwards, Quezon told me he thought Ramos was guilty but did not know whom to appoint in his place. He gave a hearing to a Moro Datu who was opposed to military conscription. Quezon told the Datu, to the latter's surprise, "I don't give a damn whether you enroll or not. You will have time to study the question, and later on, if you don't enroll something will happen." This is in accordance with his idea that Moros are great bluffers, and will never agree with what you seem to want unless they can put you under an obligation.

Drive to San Ramon--a wonderful penal colony. Talk with Joe Cooley, who started it. He was unwise enough to go into business with an associate whom he describes as thoroughly unreliable--and with Joe Harriman the New York banker who is now in prison.

Visits to quarters of the Huntsberry, and the Tiltons--both are Lieutenants in the army.

Tea dance at the Zamboanga Club--met many old acquaintances; the most torrid heat I have ever felt. There was a big thunderstorm at night which delayed the departure of *Arayat*. Instead of leaving at 8 p.m. we did not get off until 2 a.m., so would be unable to keep our appointment at the mouth of the Cotobato River on the morning of March 20th--docked instead at Parang and we drove 28 kilometers over the hills on the new road across this part of Cotobato and arrived at the latter place at 12 noon. Meanwhile, the water parade which had been waiting for us at the mouth of the river had returned, much disgruntled.

From numerous conversations, I gather that the famous "Moro problem" has been "solved"--though it is still possible to have local disturbances in Jolo and Lanao. Roads are being pushed everywhere. Cotobato Moros are dirty, unkempt and doped looking--poor specimens physically. *Cristianos*, especially Ilocanos, are settling everywhere in this wonderful valley. Cotobato is the most hideously ugly, galvanized iron town I have ever seen. Cattle, coconuts and palay. The Provincial Engineer said that by next year we would be able to motor from Cotobato to Lanao. Rains--reception at Provincial Treasurer Palillo's, who was outspokenly furious at the failure of Quezon to come to his *merienda*. I tried to pacify him. Provincial Governor Gutierrez (Major in the Constabulary) had been tried on charges of using prison labour for his own purposes, but when it turned out that the labour made the magnificent flying field which he has leased to the government for one peso a year for five years, Governor Gutierrez was acquitted and reinstated.

Secretary Quirino says he will transfer the offices of the Department of the Interior for three months of every year to Zamboanga to show the Southern Islands that they are really part of the Philippines.

I congratulated Assemblyman Tomas Confesor on his independence speech answering Pedro Guevara.

Bridge with Quezon, Doria and Felicia Howell.

The President said he wanted to stay on in the Southern Islands, but he had two military reviews near Manila. I consoled him by saying that all the hard work he had put in by cultivating the American Army officers was bearing most excellent results.

Quirino said that as Secretary of the Interior, he really occupies the former position of the Governor General, having authority over all the Provincial Governors. He also reported that when Quezon came down from Baguio recently he asked him: "Why did you suspend my Major" (Gutierrez, Major of the Constabulary is the appointed Governor of Cotobato), he (Quirino) replied: "Why shouldn't I suspend my Governor?" Secretary Quirino started life as a school teacher at the age of fifteen--and his



mother then took all his salary. Some years later, he said, Isabelo de los Reyes beat him as a candidate for Senator, and at the next election retired, saying he wanted to give Quirino a chance!

Quirino said to me that my silver purchase suggestion was "gaining ground!" He also remarked that I had helped in the purchase of the Manila Railroad bonds, because I knew the "psychological background" of the English bondholders.

Talk with Alano, the Assemblyman from Zamboanga. He is the manager of the United States Rubber Company's plantation on Basilan Island. Lawyer. Used to be stenographer for Quezon in the American Congress in 1911. He was born in province of Bulacan. He recently accepted a nomination for the Assembly simply as a matter of "civic duty," as he is a successful lawyer and plantation manager. Said Yulo had persuaded to such effect, that he replied he was willing to serve just as a stenographer as he did twenty-five years ago in Washington. He said the Assembly would be "all right" when it met in Manila in June. They were not going to make a fight for silly privileges.

Twelve thousand crocodiles were killed last year in the Cotobato River--the hides were sent to Manila for sale.

One merchant in Cotobato claims to have exported 1½ million pesos worth of palay (rice) last year.

Bridge with Quezon, Doria and Felicia Howell--Quezon is way ahead. He plays and bids excellently.

Left Parang at 6 o'clock bound for Zamboanga or Basilan. *Quien sabe?*

Guingona was aboard and in lively discourse with a group of Assemblymen about the very advantageous flying fields they had mapped out and were preparing in Mindanao.

Major Hutter of the United States Army Medical Corps says General MacArthur states that my administration was the best the Americans had in the Philippines. This is something of a pleasant surprise!

March 21, 1936. Back in Zamboanga. About 11 o'clock off for Basilan, which was "non-Christian territory" in my time! Rough crossing to Isabela. I had visited there 20 years ago when the only plantation was that of Menzi (Behn, Meyer & Co.)--the pioneer rubber plantation in the Philippines. Then we went only 300 yards from the harbour to see the old Spanish fort and the Spanish naval hospital built on stilts over the sea. Today we motored on a first-class road 9 kilometers to the United States Rubber Co. plantation managed by Dr Strong. Magnificent coconut groves and miles of splendid rubber trees. The market for their rubber is entirely in the Philippines--in Japanese owned factories for making rubber-soled shoes etc. The plantations are now cramped by the lumber concession of Künzle and Streiff. Arthur Fischer, Director of Forestry, will not allow more plantation land to be taken from the forest. Clearings that have been made were done by raising a platform twenty feet from the ground and then sawing off the tree; gigantic trunks were left standing and then burned, which is a frightful waste of good lumber!

Strong and Menken have 400 laborers--from a Yaktan tribe of Moros, who are now mostly Christians. They are of pure Malay type wearing picturesque costumes. Strong says he has never carried a weapon in his thirty years there. Both men love their present way of life and would hate to have spent their years indoors in an office. A Yaktan dance was given for us--derived from the Siamese-Bali etc.; the movement is all hands and wrists--hardly any body rhythm--syncopated time is beaten by the feet. They chanted: "Maida--lingaling da'ling!" No instrumental music. The dancers sang.

Doria asked if there were no "beach-combers" on this enchanted isle--none; "well then, where is Robinson Crusoe?" Sure enough, there is such a person on Basilan; a Doctor, retired from the United States Navy who is rich, and goes once a year to the United States to buy four or five boxes of books and then returns to live in the jungle, sans clothes, sans shoes and eating camotes. As is to be expected, alcohol is said to be his recreation in idle moments.

Mangrove swamps--probably alive with crocodiles; astounding groves of coconuts. Alano's plantation is on the smaller island opposite.

A launch chartered by Dr Strong came down to meet the *Arayat*, but the sea was too rough to board the vessel so our steamer went straight up the river. The launch followed flying a big flag with an Arabic inscription--Strong hoped Quezon would not notice this flag: "I told the Moros to decorate the launch and the lousy fellows put up that flag!" Evidently this was the end of an era for them, and they didn't know it!

Miss Karagdag, with her father and mother, were on this trip.

Back to Zamboanga where more festivities are planned which I hope to duck.

Visit from Admiral Yarnell and return visit of Quezon dressed in riding clothes and flourishing a crop to the American cruiser *Augusta*--salutes etc. Buffer supper on *Augusta* given by the wardroom. Admiral very affable; he is a brilliant man. I had a long talk with him about Rosshire and Inverness where the Admiral was stationed during part of the War. Also had a talk with the Chief Signal Officer about fishing. Later there was a dance at the Overseas Club which I managed to escape.

Colonel Stevens of the Zamboanga Constabulary is a fine type of frontiersman, was a Lieutenant in my time, and says that after we removed the Military Government from Mindanao and Sulu, there were for a time, just as many excitements as before, but there was no publicity about it such as the army had always given. Now, all is absolutely tame and settled.

There are few young men among the civilian whites in Zamboanga; mostly these are "Old Timers," now in business.

I note the predominance of Southerners in our army and navy--this should produce a fine fighting type.

We did not get away from Zamboanga until 4 a.m.

Sunday, March 22, 1936. All day at sea and very rough--all hands more or less under the weather. Bridge in p.m. Quezon has, so far, won all the rubbers and we three are all losers.

Talk with Quezon off Panay. I asked him about Philippine sugar shares; he said they were good for dividends for ten years--even after the "sanctions" levied five years hence. He told me that the planters are counting on the continuance of free trade with the United States. I remarked that I had bought some gold shares--he commented "They are good!" I said I was thinking of buying Shaw's Philippine Iron Company's shares--he said if you wait, you may be able to buy shares in a government-owned Company in Surigao--"you reserved them for the government twenty-one years ago!" I asked him if they had been recently surveyed and were as rich as we had believed? "Yes," he replied.

I then asked about the possibility of setting up separate Filipino consulates--said he had taken it up with Secretary Hull before inauguration, and he had referred it to William Phillips. Had received no answer as yet.

Next I reported a conversation with Simmie concerning the *arrastre* plant. He replied that Simmie is a good man: "if I leave that business in private hands, his company will have the preference--but I want more money from it."

Said Rodriguez would not remain as head of the National Development Co. He would send him around the world for a year to study industry and commerce, adding: "he talks too much!"

He asked me if I had talked with the High Commissioner about silver--I said certainly not; that I would not go to the High Commissioner about anything official without his instructions. I had asked Weldon Jones about it as he (Quezon) had requested and was waiting his report before making up my own opinion. Quezon said that the High Commissioner had talked with him about it.

We laughed a little over "experts" and he said he was getting one to come out here with only his travel paid.

I asked him if the United States would not give the Philippines the equivalent in silver even if they had refused to pay the losses on devaluation in gold. Quezon said that Morgan had formerly been ready to do this, but businessmen in Manila were carrying on with capital borrowed abroad and they are now afraid their loans would

be called if silver in large quantities were introduced into the Philippines currency. He also remarked that the Philippine loss on devaluation was already more than thirty million pesos--especially when computed in terms of trade competition with Japan; he added that the present was the moment to get any benefits or concessions from the United States, before the Republicans get in.

I remarked that the *Manila Bulletin* was still fighting hard, against us and he replied: "They are the damndest die-hards and reactionaries I have ever seen."

Next he commented upon Dr Victor Clark, the financial expert of the American Congress, who had come for a few months to the Philippines as an adviser. Quezon said Clark was able to review all things dispassionately because he wasn't even prejudiced about the Soviets, and that was the supreme test for an American.

Then he spoke of lawyers, and remarked that Clyde Dewitt was the best American jurist in the Philippines, and Jose Laurel was the best Filipino jurist.

At luncheon, on the steamer I told the President, of his daughter "Baby's" witty reply to my comment on his speech in Zamboanga, and he sprang up and kissed her, saying: "She is a true daughter of mine!"

March 23, 1936. We arrived at Marinduque at 9 a.m. on *Arayat* worn out by the voyage. We went off first and after fiddling about to get a chauffer, drove up to Boac to get photographic films for Doria. Chatted in the shop for half an hour until Quezon arrived--fire-crackers!--constabulary--police--local officials of Marinduque. Secretary Quirino went on across the island to investigate some case. In the President's stead he spoke at a town on the other side of Marinduque. Quezon went to the town plaza of Boac and addressed a large crowd. He seemed very happy to be among his own people in Tagalog for about forty minutes. He had not been there for twenty years. He used many homely witticisms, which took well with the crowd. Made polite reference to my having signed in 1920 the law which made a separate province of Marinduque, until then a part of Tayabas (Quezon's own province)--very evident was his relief at getting away from the Moros whom he distrusts and dislikes.

Various inspections--visit to a home, where I asked questions about the local gold deposits (apparently "a dud") and about their copra, coffee etc. Then to luncheon where I sat beside Quezon. The next move was to drive across the island, but the President said his stomach ulcer was giving him another hemorrhage, so I advised him to go back to the *Arayat*, which he agreed to do. We talked again about the Moros; he said he had instructed Colonel Stevens to act first and report later; that those Moros who wished to become civilized members of the Commonwealth would be welcomed, and the others would gradually disappear (like the American Indians). He added that there were 160,000 Moros in Cotobato who could be made useful citizens--they could be taught agriculture. He must have noticed that when we entered the town of Cotobato, some Moros standing by the sign: "We want a Civilian Governor" (local politics) had spat as we passed by in the motor!

The President was enthusiastic over Lt. Johnson, one of his submachine gun bodyguard on the Cotobato trip and said that he was going to promote him. Same as to the big American policeman from Malacanan who accompanied us on the journey and hung on the step of the motor car. (N.B. what a big grip those employes have who get into personal contact with N° 1.) He said Johnson was the only one of General Wood's appointees as young Constabulary officers who had made good. Quezon had noticed him in the anti-bandit campaign last October.

So we left Boac and crossed the channel to the beach opposite Lucena, where Doria, Felicia, "Baby" Quezon, Miss Labrador, Nieto and I disembarked in a launch; from that to a *banca*, thence to a chair. A big crowd of provincial officials waited on the beach to meet Quezon who, however, did not land. We went off in our own motor at 5:30 and arrived at home at 8 p.m. having done 159 kilometers in two and a half hours through romantic scenery, over fine roads.

On this trip it was painfully evident that the *Arayat* was too small, the sea was very rough, (as usual) the boat was crowded; the servants from Malacanan were insolent and lazy; the whole thing lacked direction and management, and was about as badly done as is conceivable. This extraordinary inefficiency could easily be corrected by Quezon giving an a.d.c. authority over the servants--but he himself, prefers to be free from regulations of any kind.

March 24, 1936. At the office. Miguel Unson, to whom I reported that Quezon told me he had instructed him (Unson) that I was to sit with the Government Survey



Board replied: "It must be so because he said so, but I never heard it." Said he would try again to see Quezon tomorrow.

Usual crowd of office seekers and others needing help, in my office.

Visit from Hartendorp, Dutch-born American citizen; editor of the *Philippine Magazine* who has just received from Vargas his dismissal as Adviser on Press matters. Says Quezon had sent for him before inauguration and had asked him to be Press Adviser at a salary of five hundred pesos monthly. He was flattered and pleased. He has a Filipina wife and children and was proud to be called in by the President. He asked Quezon from whom he should take orders, and the President replied: "only from me"; thereupon Quezon called in his a.d.c. and gave instructions for the immediate admission of Hartendorp whenever the latter wished. However, Hartendorp soon found that he could not obtain "audience." He thinks Vargas has "gypped" him, because he had criticized him severely in his magazine.

Hartendorp had rented a house in Uli-Uli, had taken his children out of boarding school, and was about to celebrate his reunion with them in a home when he received his dismissal. When first appointed, he had asked Quezon how long the work was to continue, and Quezon replied "two or three years--or as long as my administration lasts." Hartendorp lasted three months!!

Talk with A. D. Williams, who suggested buying for the National Development Co. a yacht like *Yodanda* of 1000 tons for Quezon's use. Thoroughly good idea!

Williams has just been made a director of the Cebu-Portland Cement Co. which had inherited the Cebu coal field, once the property of our defunct National Coal Co. He says they have just found 350,000 tons of excellent coal there which will lower the cost of cement. (Even our Coal Company was not without some merit!)

Elizalde presided over his last meeting of the National Development Co. this morning. Usual glowing accounts of his management given in *Herald* which he owns. It seems he thinks the Elizaldes have lost "face" since his resignation as President of the National Development Co. was accepted, so during this week while the President was away the Elizaldes forced an issue in the Polo Club by proposing and seconding Manuel Nieto for membership.<sup>69</sup> (The Polo Club and the Army and Navy Club are the last stand of the "Old Timer" Americans.) [Nieto was rejected on the ground that he was only Quezon's "gun-man" (which is very unjust!).]<sup>70</sup> All four Elizaldes thereupon resigned from the club and took their polo team to the practice field in Camp Claudio. they are now seeking to lead the army polo players away from the Polo Club--but in vain.

The late General Tinio's son (nephew of Don Isauro Gabaldon) came in to see me with the request that he be appointed technical assistant to me. It seems that Assemblyman Angara of Tayabas had asked his uncle (Quezon) to make this appointment without consulting me, and Vargas had told him in reply that if "Governor Harrison had need of a technical assistant, it might become possible later on"!!!!

March 25, 1936. Busy morning at office. Miguel Unson has seen Quezon and has received instructions that I shall work with the Government Survey Board. He came in and outlined their work. The office is at the Heacock Building, and he spends most of his time there. Is worried by the belief that insufficient revenue is obtained from the customs, and is trying to work out a scheme for improvement; he says that every time the customs bureau is investigated the revenue receipts leap up!

We talked over the issue of railway vs. roads in Mindanao: he says the plan is to take down there that useless railroad outfit in Cebu, and perhaps in Iloilo as well, and to build roads as feeders. I also saw Osmena for a moment before the Cabinet meeting and he talked on the same subject. says the time has come to decide either for railroad or roads, and not to make the same mistake as in Luzon, where they run parallel.

Hartendorp came in, and reported that he had recently called on General MacArthur, who has an office in Santa Lucia barracks. The General told Hartendorp that he was the first editor who had called on him, and expressed surprise; he also voiced

<sup>69</sup>A question mark appeared in the right hand margin of the copy used for this edition. The reference was Nieto's membership in the Polo Club.

<sup>70</sup>Brackets are found in the copy used for this edition.

regret that Quezon's address on National Defense at the University had not been better received, and that the press does not support the plan. He said that his plans are extremely well forward, and that the Philippine army is going to get munitions and equipment at one-quarter cost from the United States Army. In ten years, the Philippines, he believes, will have a force making it necessary for another country, if attacking, to lose a great number of men, and to spend perhaps a billion dollars, which will make them hesitate to attack. This would be very different from the picnic the Japanese had in walking into Manchuria. Hartendorp asked whether the Philippines were not rich enough to make this "worth while," and whether these islands are not a prize because "strategically located"? The General replied that the strategic situation would bring in other allies--especially the United States. Seemed positive of that. He also remarked that Quezon was one of the five great statesmen of the world.

Hartendorp reported that Quezon had cut his Friday press audiences four times running--"doesn't seem to care a damn about the press," and, of course, is being criticized by the newspaper men." Hartendorp observed that in the opinion of people with whom he talked, there were too many United States military reviews and parades going on (n.b. Quezon is reviewing troops at Fort McKinley this p.m.).<sup>71</sup>

8 p.m.--*Negros* left Manila with a large party as guests of Don Andres Soriano headed for Masbate, to inspect his mines there: Masbate Consolidated and IXL Quezon, Roxas, Sabido, Confesor, Babbitt, Belden, Correa, Dewitt, Spanish Consul, Fairchild, Fernandez (Ramon), Fox, Hodson, Ingersoll, Kerk, Le Jeune, Peters, Selph, Whittall, Wolf and many others. Fine ship of 1900 tons and everything aboard *de luxe*. Bridge with Quezon, Babbitt, Ingersoll, Peters, Wolff etc. at all hours. Conversations with many aboard on mines, sugar, etc. The general impression as to the latter is no basis for the buoyancy and optimism as to the present prices of sugar shares and their future prospects. No one can answer the question: why this optimism? Not only are Filipinos buying up sugar mills but *haciendas* also in the sugar districts are changing hands at prices much higher than before. Ramon Fernandez says they have just found that they can produce sugar at four and a half pesos a *picul*, whereas five and a half has been the cheapest heretofore. But the real reason for the situation is probably that the Filipinos know the sugar game (some have already made fortunes out of it) and they would rather stick to something they do so well than venture into new fields. Many of the gold mines are in an experimental stage still, and the general public is waiting to see what happens.

Duggleby states that up to date, no proof exists that the Paracale district is as rich as the gold vinds in Baguio. However it was formerly the chief seat of Spanish mining. Says that under American rule no new mines have been discovered in the Philippines--yet every creek in the islands has traces of gold. He doubts whether sufficient gold will ever be produced to satisfy the world, since production is not increasing, in spite of very high present price of gold as a commodity.

The general opinion is that very little foreign capital has as yet come into Philippine gold shares.

Talked with Fairchild, Fernandez and Alunan on sugar: the latter sold his own sugar shares in *Negros*. Babbitt is bewildered by the high prices of sugar shares, including those of his own company.

I asked Quezon if he couldn't do something to ease off the dismissal of Hartendorp. He replied "we are going to make him a Professor of English." Quezon was tired out when he came aboard, and the next morning he was as fresh as a daisy, and very gay. I heard him dictating in his cabin--next to mine, at 6:30 a.m.

March 26, 1936. Off the coast of Masbate. Fishing was tried by Kerk etc, but the water was too rough. Arrived in the little harbour about 4 p.m. and the whole party went ashore and visited the mill of Masbate Consolidated,--which crushes 800 tons a day and is now being enlarged to 2000 tons--said to be the largest in the Oriente. Apparently it is very efficient and up to date, and seems very impressive indeed.

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<sup>71</sup>Quezon's seemingly endless reviews of American and Philippine troops caused some concern among Filipinos and Americans. Quezon, however, was not so much interested in the pomp and ceremony as he was in showing the military that he was not antagonistic toward them. One of the major differences between the Hare-Hawes-Cutting bill and the Tydings-McDuffie Act was the provision for the withdrawal of the American military after July 4, 1946.

Coming back in the dark, some of us in a small launch were stuck on the bar for 40 minutes in a driving rain. Very glad to get back to the ship--and a bath and dinner! More bridge.

March 27, 1936. Most of the party went off for the day to drive fifteen miles to IXL mineh. There was a heavy rain and the weather is most unpromising. Bridge on the ship.

Quezon went ashore in Masbate town to see the officials and to make a speech. The band greeted him on the pier with "Here comes the bride" and Quezon's comment afterwards was that "he is a g-d fool"! This is the port where my brother Archy and I boarded the *Sealandia* in December 1918 bound for New York on my one and only vacation home.

Reception and dance in the afternoon; good dancing and lots of fun at the house of ex-Governor Bayot. Excellent dinner and then back to the steamer to start for Manila. At bridge, after dinner Quezon remarked on the frequent disasters which were overtaking everybody who played a hand "I don't like these damned things which are happening here." Loud laughter. This has been the most steady bad luck I have had in bridge for a year.

Amusing conversation with Whittall, Wolff and Selph on parrots and psittacosis (quite in the Macdonnel strain).

Before dinner, Marsman and Culbertson joined the party by plane from Manila.

March 28, 1936. At sea, bound for Manila. Quezon is trying to persuade Roxas and Alunan to go to Washington on the trade commission--they are holding back, probably for two reasons:

(a) apprehension of failure

(b) danger of appearing to interfere with Don Quintin Paredes, the Resident Commissioner.

I asked Secretary Quirino jokingly whether he had suspended any more provincial officials. He said "no"--I said why not suspend me? He replied "I should lose my job if I did."

Back in Manila at 2:30 p.m. Very successful trip--excellent selection of guests, and comfortable steamer.

5:30-8:30 p.m. "Commencement" at Santo Tomas University in front of their new building on North Side. Founded in 1612, (?) this school has graduated almost all the leading Filipino patriots of the past. The 450 graduates of this year wore gowns with hoods of different vivid colours, thus making an extremely picturesque scene. Diplomas were given by the High Commissioner and by the Archbishop. Father Rector Tamasio had been Quezon's professor in 1898. Only five Americans were there.

Quezon's address was of academic merit and on a high level of civic service. He set forth the care necessary in appointing judges, and described how the success of a democracy must depend on the character of the judiciary. Quezon received the degree of LL.D. Mrs Quezon putting on his hood--much applause.

[March 29, 1936]h Doria in Baguio--quiet day at my desk at home.

March 30, 1936. Made the commencement address at the School of Surveying of the University of the Philippines, talking on the subjects of the Friar Land Estates in Luzon and the development of Mindanao. Largest commencement the school has ever had.

Later, I interviewed H. C. Anderson at the Manila Hotel on the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs. He said that Collector Aldanese is o.k., and what is needed is to raise the salaries of the appraisers and also to send a Filipino appraiser to be on the staff of the United States Commercial attaches in Kobe, Shanghai and Hong Kong to check invoices; also we need a Customs Judge here.

At Malacanan, I learned that Quezon goes off tomorrow on his trip to the Bicol and to his birthplace: Baler. Hope I don't have to go up the Pacific coast in the little *Arayat* in this gale of wind. Expect not, as he has said nothing further to me about the trip.



We attended the "Commencement" of the University of the Philippines' Conservatory of Music--Bocobo, Mrs Quezon and Roxas were there. About 15 graduating students performed and a like number of the Philippine Army band handled the "heavies." This was a classical concert which began with Handel and tapered down to Puccini. The orchestral pieces were all right; and they had one good woman pianist.

March 31, 1936! Quezon telephoned asking us to the Commencement of the University of the Philippines at 8:15! a.m. I put on gown and hood for the first time since receiving from this University an LL.D. eighteen years ago. The ceremonies were very well run and seemed impressive. Quezon rose and congratulated the *cum laude* students as they advanced to receive their degrees. I was glad to see the large graduating class of the College of Agriculture!<sup>72</sup> The law school students received most of the applause from the audience, which shows again how little perception people *en masse* have for real values. For the first time, the graduates in medicine outnumbered the law--65-64! When honorary degrees were given to Dr Singian and to High Commissioner Murphy, Quezon was asked by Bocobo to make an impromptu speech, which he did, rather haltingly and with an effort--in praise of those two; he also made a handsome reference to myself. The error in the American school of oratory is that it is too fulsome. Evidently Billy Sunday was a typical rouser of pure American vintage. There is now a very strong campaign of flattery by the Filipino orators and press to keep Murphy here. They really like him and can get on with him as High Commissioner. A most difficult post to fill!

Talk with Don Rafael Palma, who said the plans of the new Education Council were to stress primary education so as to make it universal; but, he added, this was chiefly a question of funds. He asked me if I had noticed that at Santo Tomas University Commencement, Quezon was the only one of the recipients of degrees who did not kneel before the Father Rector--thus denying the subordination of State to Church--this explains his having Mrs Quezon to pin on his cape for him instead of the Archbishop.

Conversation with Father Tamayo who marvelled at Quezon's remarkable memory of his student days--"he was all alone in Manila when he came from Baler, and I tried to help him!" Later I told this to Quezon and he said: "Father Tamayo saved my life--I was starving and had nowhere to go--he took me in and gave me room and board free!"

Talk with General Reyes over the resistance by the Moros in Lanao against registration for military service. He regretted that the law had not contained a provision permitting the President to suspend it in certain provinces, commenting that: "we don't want these Moros and Ifugaos anyway!" He added that the drawing by lot for conscription was a revival of Spanish days. He himself in the old era had not been drawn for the Spanish Army because his family was influential!

An article in a morning paper showed the alleged attitude of Lanao Moros against conscription:

"MORO PRINCESS BACK FOR VISIT--Princess reveals determination of her people to reject soldiering.

"Corregidor, March 27, 1936. Moro Princess Juliana, Malawani, niece of Datu Cali of Lanao, a visitor to the island, revealed in an interview with the *Tribune* correspondent here that if the government forces the Lanao Moros to register for military training, they will fight to the last, according to a letter to her of another uncle, Datu Ganooki."

I told Reyes I thought it was a mistake, anyway to arm these Moros--they might desert *en masse* with their arms.

Talks later with Unson, Garfinkel and Santos on this subject. General impression is that the Moros oppose everything--cedula, abolition of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes and conscription. No use dallying with them. My impression is that the Filipinos are aching to get at them. They have been especial pets of the Government and are spoiled! Wood was largely responsible for this. The situation resembles that of the Apaches under Geronimo!

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<sup>72</sup>For Harrison's interest in Philippine agriculture, see Napoleon J. Casambre, "Francis Burton Harrison: His Administration in the Philippines, 1913-1921" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University, Stanford, 1968), Chapter IV, 8-15.

The speech of Roxas at the Commencement of the University of the Philippines was far above my expectation--he displayed perfect use of English and great mental powers. His voice is unfortunately too high, although through an amplifier perhaps, this is not so apparent. He uses no gestures except emphatic nods. If only he had a little of the English reticence and hesitation, I should say he is (mentally) the most convincing orator I have heard. Quezon expressed himself as thinking that Roxas should not have asked a question in his address--i.e., "what can the future of the Philippines be?" without answering the question himself; but as a matter of fact Roxas did answer this by discarding for the Philippines all permanent protection from other powers, and urging the Filipinos to prepare to defend themselves.

In the afternoon with the Government Survey Board. Unson, Trinidad and Paez--am rather embarrassed by Quezon having attached me to their board. Unson was discursive, with almost unintelligible use of English; Paez was completely silent; Trinidad was skeptical and coldly incisive. A good deal of laughter at *La Comedie Humaine* as exemplified by Department Secretaries and Bureau Chiefs. The board was evidently rather discouraged as to the outlook. A questionnaire had been sent out to all Bureau Chiefs and the only Bureau which has answered was that of the Weather! Trinidad has found out that 8,000,000 pesos is owing to the government from landowners on the Cadastral Survey, and 5,000,000 pesos in irrigation works. The latter had probably better be written off. Similar experience was had, I believe, in Siam, South Africa and the United States. At the end of the session, Unson said most kindly to me: "This makes us rather home-sick--because it reminds us of your days!"

April 1, 1936. Message from Quezon asking Babbitt, Andy Anderson and me to join him on *Arayata*. I accepted, Babbitt and Anderson declined--rather a job to get substitutes--Peters and Wolff were proposed.

News in the morning papers that Lanao Moros had fortified a cotta--it was stormed by the Constabulary and 5 Moros are reported killed (more likely 50!).

What an intolerable bore it is being in an office where three out of four visitors come to ask something of me!

A. D. Williams says Quezon has approved plans for the appraisal of a yacht in Los Angeles--1000 tons--sister ship of *Yolanda* (Mrs Moses Taylor's).

April 2, 1936. Saleeby's buffet supper at the Polo Club; then to *Arayat* with Peters and Wolff--leaving at 10 p.m. with Enaje and Avelino.

April 3, 1936. Absolutely quiet day at sea--on a painted ocean; arrived at sunset at the harbour of Sorsogon with the volcanoes Mayon and Buluyan on either side. Tortuous entrance to the bay and poor harbour; anchored out in the stream, one hour and a half from the shore by launch. Quezon came aboard about midnight after a strenuous tour of the Bicol Provinces.

April 4, 1936. Breakfast with Quezon. He is in great form. Had dismissed a school teacher and a J.P. in Bicolandia. Said the school master who was a married man with two children had seduced a fifteen year old pupil and she was with child. Her parents had whipped her for two days to ascertain the name of the man. The school teacher denied the story, so Quezon cross-examined both the girl and man. He said "I am no hypocrite, but seduction of a girl pupil in the school house is too much--besides the man denied it and lied about it, so I fired him!"

The Justice of the Peace had let off two of three cattle rustlers brought before him by the Captain of Constabulary because they were *parientes* of his. The judge's argument was that the law permitted arrests by the Constabulary--but now they were officers of the Philippine Army!! Quezon said "well you let them go, and I shall let you go to join them" and dismissed him.

I thanked the President for his kind reference to me in his recent address at the University of the Philippines commencement. He said he wanted "those young people to know what you had done for our country." He rather feared Murphy might be displeased at my receiving mention during his ceremony but Murphy had told Quezon how much this pleased him. Quezon said "I love Murphy as I do you, but he would never have done what you did--he is too sensitive to newspaper criticism."

Quezon spoke of going for a vacation up to Shanghai on April 27th--and asked me to come for a two weeks trip.

Arrival at 8 a.m. at Catbalogan, Samar. The crowd attending the reception committee on the wharf bore several signs showing the dissension and accusations of

oppression in the provincial and municipal governments. The Governor of Samar in his introduction of Quezon mentioned that no men from this province had been given high posts in the Commonwealth Government; and that the province had been neglected in road appropriations. This gave Quezon a fine opening and he went for the governor hammer and tongs--one of his best addresses this season. The crowd understood English, so Quezon dismissed the local interpreter; he then attacked the whole idea of provincialism and "tribal" sentiment--reminded them that they were Filipinos rather than Samar people--that the government was their own--that it was the duty of the government to treat all provinces alike in road appropriations; that he had never favored unfairly his own province of Tayabas. Advised them to pay their taxes, so as to show their patriotism.

Left Catbalogan at noon--through the straits of San Juanico, between Samar and Leyte. Five or six hours of the loveliest tropical scenery. Narrowest place was only just deep enough for a small steamer. We arrived at Tacloban, Leyte, at 4 p.m. --Quezon's speech on the wharf to a big crowd was as excellent as that of the morning but somehow the crowd seemed duller than at Catbalogan. He went to inspect the new hospital and later to confer with provincial and municipal officials. He then shut off any more speeches. We drove to the United States Military Reservation, the finest Constabulary station I have yet seen. Went to Enaje's house, and waited for an hour making laborious conversation in Spanish with his brother. Much enlivened by discussing Tommy Wolff's wounding, capture and tortures by local Filipinos during the United States-Philippine war. I felt ill and wished to walk back to the steamer to pull myself together, but was defeated by our host--there is something of the jailer in a provincial host in this country--he must have his own way, and you must take all his hospitality whether you will or no. The idea of our walking down to the pier, I suppose, made them fear to lose face--they resist you like steel. Quezon then arrived and we went to the Paye Club for a banquet and a little dance. I managed to sit at the table, but couldn't eat. Quezon talked of his speeches, and I said he should have them taken down by a stenographer, to protect himself against misquotation. He said he was not afraid of that, since under the constitution he had one term only--that it was very difficult to get his friends in the Convention to accept the one term provision, because they wanted him to serve longer--he insisted and "it is one of the best things I have ever done."i

Left at 8 p.m. for Lanao.

April 5, 1936. Arrived at 1 p.m. at Iligan, but such a heavy sea was running we could not land at the pier. All were greatly disappointed not to go up to Dansalan, being anxious to be on the scene of last week's fighting. Quezon talked a little of the Morosi. He has given the Constabulary an absolutely free hand in dealing with them--they are to be petted no longer. He will not listen to their interminable and childish speeches, and does not receive their delegations which come to Manila; says he is going to stop the pension paid the Sultan of Sulu (tho fixed by treaty) because he will not recognize his claim to sovereignty. Says he will make the husband (now Assemblyman) of the Princess Dayang--Dayang Governor of Jolo, since he knows that she will govern the island well. The general disposition is to cease pampering the Moros. Quezon will stop the annual subsidy paid to bring important Moros to Manila.<sup>73</sup>

We lay off Kolumbugan (lumber) settlement for some hours, but there is no road from there to Iligan, so we went back at 10 p.m. to see if we could land--no luck--so off to Zamboanga and Jolo.

April 6, 1936. At sea, with wind abating. Talk over gambling and sporting shows in the Philippines. Greyhound racing has a definite black eye because of the crookedness of a promoter who first tried to introduce it here. I advocated establishing here professional *pelota*. The San Lazaro race track is a rotten show, and plans are on foot to have a new and decent one. I also advocated a Spanish lottery system, and said that "missionary" interference from the United States was now, under the Commonwealth a mere impertinence.

Quezon said that a new hotel should be built at Baguio, and some rooms set aside for roulette etc., to be run by a club--he would tell the Chief of Police to keep away.

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<sup>73</sup>It is ironic that a generation later President Marcos is bringing no-longer-prominent Muslim Filipinos to Manila but also deserving young men and women to complete their studies there.



Put into oil wharf near Zamboanga and refuelled--a swarm of mosquitoes came aboard. On to Zamboanga where I did not go ashore.

April 7, 1936h At sea nearing Jolo. At breakfast I had a talk with Quezon over the Government Survey Board. He said the government had become a mere bureaucracy. I told him the Survey Board was puzzled to know how to decrease the expenses of government in accord with his wishes--was it by lowering salaries? He said no--but by abolishing useless places and duplications.

The President then told me how, long ago, he had agreed with Governor General Wood to sign the contract for the sale of the government's Portland Cement Co. in Cebu for 200,000 pesos; though he never intended to do so, but wanted Wood to keep quiet during his (Quezon's) current political campaign then under way. The day after the election, Wood sent for him and presented him with the contract which he (Wood) had already signed, and then Quezon refused. Wood went purple in the face and rose as if to strike him. Quezon told him he had changed his mind, and that he took that privilege because Governor General Wood did it so often himself! The government cement co. now has a surplus of two million pesos, and is worth about four! Wood wanted to give the Manila Railroad away to J. G. White and Co.; also to sell all the government-controlled sugar centrals for a song. Quezon says Wood would have lost one hundred million pesos for the Philippines in his rage to "get the government out of business."<sup>74</sup> (I was the one who had originally put them in!)

Quezon is going later to Davao with three members of his cabinet: Rodriguez, Yulo and Quirino, to settle the ticklish international situation there; wish I could be there, but am going back to Manila.

Arrival at Jolo. Visits to provincial and municipal buildings. Quezon made a fine speech to the Constabulary at their quarters. He told them that the primary duty of soldiers was to ensure peace and order for their fellow men, and this should be sufficient reward for them. He said that the duty of the soldier in time of peace was to be courteous and just, but in time of war it was to kill; their rifles were not given to them as ornaments, but to kill when ordered to do so. Since several of the leading Moros were present, this firm attitude will be understood all over Jolo in forty-eight hours. The Constabulary can handle the situation of allowed to do so, and now they have been assured of the proper backing by the highest authority. The Moros are bullies, and understand only force.

Quezon told me he was going to break the power of the Datus (there are 6 or 7 of them in Jolo) and to stop the "babying" of them by the Government.

He received telegraphic news that the registration for the new Philippine Army had been 100% successful, and very happy he was over this--showing again how much better he understands his own people than do so many of the Filipinos.

A terrific rainstorm arose which prevented our trip across the island of Jolo by motor.

[Mrs Rogers, the Moro wife of the former Governor of Jolo (and an old sweetheart of Quezon)]<sup>75</sup> came to lunch. I asked her, before the President, how long it had been since the last disorder occurred here? She replied that order had been more disturbed during the past three years than for a long time past. She told the story of the killing last night of a boy of twelve who ran away from a provincial policeman--i.e., one of the "police" attached to the Deputy Governor, the Datu of Indanan. Quezon rose at once--sent for the municipal President, the Chief of Constabulary (Major Gallardo) and Governor James Fugate. I advised Quezon to abolish the "deputy governors" and their gangsters. I also advised him never to make a Moro the Governor of Jolo--he said he never intended to do so, but would appoint a Christian Filipino (Major Gallardo) as Governor in the place of Fugate, who was originally a "missionary" and "should have remained so."

Quezon, when he had inspected the jail, reported that there was one young man in there who claimed to have killed his man in a fight. Quezon said he did not always

<sup>74</sup>Cf. Onorato, *A Brief Review of American Interest*, p. 50f. See also Michael P. Onorato, "Leonard Wood and the Philippine Cabinet Crisis of 1923," *The University of Manila Journal of East Asiatic Studies*, XI (March, 1967), p. 61f. This was my doctoral dissertation at Georgetown University (Washington) in 1960.

<sup>75</sup>Brackets are found in the copy used for this edition. A question mark was placed at the end of the line in the left hand margin.

object to that sort of killing, and would look into the case. He said there were also two Moro women in jail on the charge of adultery; he told Judge Labrador to try the two cases this morning, and if convicted, he would pardon the women, "since it is absurd to allow a man to have thirty wives and to put a woman in jail for adultery."

Graft and tyranny are rampant among the Joloanos, and Quezon is glad he came down here to learn the situation.

Opium smuggling, which used to be rife here, is uncommon now, and this must mean that the British Government at Sandakan is at last helping to stop it. I couldn't get them to do so in my day and this was the subject of an acrimonious exchange of views between myself and Lord Curzon when he was British Foreign Secretary.<sup>76</sup> [Met Hadji Butu, former Prime Minister of the Sultan here, whom I made Senator, and later discharged as such for taking part in the opium traffic. I asked Mrs Rogers what he lives on now--she replied: "graft--mostly religious."]<sup>77</sup>

Quezon is a most erratic bridge player--always doubling and bidding slams. He plays his hands wonderfully, and if he makes an original bid, it is sure to be very sound. I am losing heavily here, as I did on the Negros trip.

The President has apparently been completely cured of his stomach ulcer by a series of injections--he now eats copiously, and even drinks beer and cocktails. I must go to see his doctor as soon as I can get back to Manila.

The contrast here between the neat homes of the Christian Filipinos and the reeking quarters of Chinese and Moros is striking.

Mrs Rogers told me that none of the teak forests of Jolo, the only ones in the Philippines--are being cut and sold. Main exports are copra and hempo. They grow some upland rice, but the Moro diet consists chiefly of tapioca and fish. They are marvellous sailors.

Quezon gave me to read "The Secret War for Oil" after I had gone through it. I told him he ought to go down on his knees and thank God that oil had not been discovered in paying quantities in the Philippines. He said he had been first told that twenty years ago by Representative William Atkinson Jones of Virginia. If oil is found here, it should be in the hands of one company only--either American or English, and not divided up between various rival oil companies.

In the afternoon, trip around the island of Jolo on the new roads, and saw the sites of various battles fought by Generals Wood and Pershing. We visited all the Constabulary posts. I had been to Camp Romandier in 1915 when we had that thrilling deer hunt with spears, and on horseback. The agricultural development of the island is now simply wonderful--they are, perhaps, the best farmers in the Philippines; also they have fine stock; horses, cattle and carabaos. I told Quezon that this had changed my whole opinion of the Jolo Moros. It is an eye-opener; and he said it had had the same effect on him. That he was going to bring some money here, and help break the power of those who are exploiting the poor farmers of this paradise on earth--whether they are Vinta Moros, Chinos or the Datus. If necessary, he would have the National Development Company undertake the marketing of the crops, so as to cut out the extortioners. He repeated what Governor Fugate had told him: there are three kinds of Moros--the aristocrats, the farmers and the Vinta Moros, who own no land and live at sea.

The President is now receiving on the *Arayat* a delegation of the Datus who are not officially favoured by Governor Fugate. "Probably they are full of complaints."

Quezon says he will provide appropriations for more water for Jolo. He is very enthusiastic over what he has seen. I told him he must be prepared for explosions

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<sup>76</sup>The British Foreign Office tried to put some heat on the North Borneo government to stop the smuggling. The reaction of the British governor of North Borneo was that he had too much coastline to patrol; and if the Philippine authorities were so concerned about opium smuggling then they should chase the smugglers instead of bothering him. It was quite a putdown for the British Foreign Office and Manila. See the F.O. document F898/898/100

<sup>77</sup> Brackets are found in the copy used for this edition. A question mark was placed at the end of the line in the right hand margin.

if he broke the power of the exploiters--resistance on some feigned issue--he said he was prepared to handle that.

Altogether, I think this afternoon will have an important bearing on a fair settlement of the "Moro problem," at least so far as Jolo is concerned.

The teak forests are very badly managed--but crops of hemp, maize, tapioca, coconuts and upland rice are excellently farmed; so are papayas, mangoes, kapok and other useful trees.

The President received a telegram stating that the Japanese had landed on Turtle Island, taken all the eggs and the female turtles and killed all the males--an incident full of disagreeable possibilities.

We received a statement in the town of Jolo from a local resident (Mrs De Leon) that the magnificent farms we saw were the work of Scout and Constabulary soldiers who had settled there--the more backward farms were the work of the stay-at-home Moros.

Arrived in Siasi at 11 p.m.; a small crowd of local officials had gathered on the pier. Quezon is the first chief executive, I believe, to visit this island except General Wood. We stumbled about in the moonlight, visiting the old Spanish fort and the barracks built by the American soldiers in 1901. The main street was faintly lighted by electric light owned by a Chinese--there are one hundred Chinese here in a total population on the island of only some four thousand--one road has been built, four kilometers long, half way across the island. The racial stock here is Samal (the sea gypsies--there are three types of them, those who live entirely on their vintas with no house on land, those who live entirely on land and those who use both. Industries are pearls and copra. Evidently the Chinese get all the profits.

Quezon asked the locals whether they had any questions or complaints--one leader stepped up and advocated the retention of Governor Fugate (Siasi is a part of the province of Jolo). Quezon asked him: "are you the agent of the Governor?" and he replied "Yes, Sir," and probably didn't find out until the next morning the irony of it.

On our return to the steamer, Quezon talked for an hour with Peters, Wolff and myself. I lamented that the courts had overthrown our attempt to force by law the keeping of books by the Chinese businessmen in either English, Spanish or a native dialect of the Philippines. Quezon said the adverse decision in the Philippine Supreme Court, had been written by Justice Johnson, and that in the United States Supreme Court by Chief Justice Taft--but it was purely a political decision. Said that the new constitution of the Commonwealth had provided for that; that the rice marketing of the Philippines was entirely in Chinese hands, and they could, if they wished, starve the islands--"an intolerable situation," he added.

Talking of the necessity of the Constabulary being supported by the head of the state, Quezon described the recent *Sakdalista* uprising in Laguna Province. The local chief of Constabulary received some rumours of a gathering and sent a patrol of one officer and ten men in the jitney to make a survey. Approaching Cabuyao (near Biñan) they found the town in the possession of a large party of *Sakdalistas* who had seized the *Presidencia*, on nearing which they were fired on and the officer and five men were wounded. The officer leapt from the jitney and cried out "come on and fight them, men"--they began firing and killed fifty of the *Sakdalistas*, after which the rest fled; but instead of commendation, the Constabulary were given repeated investigations! (Quezon was in Washington at the time.)

The President then passed to the subject of communism, and said that the Filipinos were easily drawn to these theories. Governor General Murphy he felt made a mistake when he released the communists from Bilibid prison--even though he was himself opposed to keeping men in prison for their political opinions. He made it as a condition to their release that they be exiled from Manila to various points such as Ifugao and Batangas. When Quezon assumed the presidency of the Commonwealth, he found that the people of the localities to which those men had been deported had built them houses and were supporting them! In Spanish days, all the Filipino patriots had been similarly deported! Quezon pardoned these exiles from home immediately in order to destroy their influence in politics. He then had an interview with [Evangelista, one of them who is an educated man and is a convinced believer in communism, and had been one of Quezon's former leaders.]<sup>78</sup> The President told Evange-

<sup>78</sup> Brackets are found in the copy used for this edition. A questionmark was placed at the end of the line in the right hand margin.



lista that it was folly to think the Philippines could be converted to communism. Evangelista replied that the communist leaders were building for the future; they were working for their grandchildren and were willing to die for their belief. Quezon retorted: "it's no more use talking to you--you look out you don't get into the clutches of the law again. There is one difference between you and me--you are willing to die for it and I am willing to kill you for it!"<sup>79</sup>

Then we talked about health. Quezon said he thought my trouble was nervous indigestion and that I could be cured by having some work to do which really interested me: that as soon as I was through with the Government Survey Board he wanted me to work with him on a history of the Philippines during the fifteen years since my administration. The accepted belief in the United States, he said, was that I had wrecked the Philippines and Wood had restored it;<sup>80</sup> while the exact contrary was the truth. We would get the figures, and he would give me the incidents from his own recollections. Told me how he was flat on his back in Baguio a few years ago when Osmena opened his attack on him in connection with his opposition to the Hare-Hawes-Cutting law, saying Quezon should be driven from the Philippines. Quezon was at once carried from his bed to the train, and at Tondo station was carried from the train to a platform which had been erected there for him. Thousands of his followers were present. He spoke for an hour, and walked down from the platform and was ill in bed no more.

April 8, 1936. At sea, playing bridge en route to Zamboanga, where on arrival went that evening to dinner with Mr and Mrs Joe Cooley. Very pleasant. Quezon had a little dinner dance on board the *Arayat* for the Karagdags and Alanos. At 1:30 that night I was driven out of bed by mosquitoes and met Quezon walking restlessly around the deck. We talked for an hour or so; and discussed his advantages as Chief Executive over all of his predecessors, because he is the only one of us who has really known his own people. He laughed and said he always prefaced his interviews with Filipinos by saying "Now, I'm not an American Governor General--I'm a Filipino so tell me the truth!" He said he was not indispensable as many told him; that he knew at least four Filipinos who were capable of carrying on.

He then gave his impressions of American Presidents he had known in the past; T. Roosevelt impressed him by his vigour and likeableness; Taft by his sympathy and amiability;<sup>81</sup> Coolidge was a small and dull man, and even his questions about the Philippines were foolish. As soon as Quezon read of the Lincolnian scene of Coolidge taking the oath of office before his father in the simple home under the lamp, he saw the beginning of a great and probably successful press campaign by "the interests"; Governor Forbes told him then that Coolidge would be a second Lincoln; "but (said Quezon) I never did think much of Forbes' brains!" Told me more of Stimson and remarked how rough he was, but honest; they quarreled nearly every day, but never let the public know of it!<sup>82</sup> Quezon felt respect and affection for him.

April 9, 1936. In Zamboanga. The *Mayon* arrived with Yulo, Quirino and Rodriguez, Santos, Fellers and many others, and Peters, Wolff and I shifted to the *Mayon* for Manila.

Interview with Johnson who has been here since '99 and was an agent for Governor Frank Carpenter whom we discussed--he said Carpenter was a public servant thru and thru and perfectly coldblooded; knew everything that was going on from his agents and especially from Filipina women! Said the only way for a white man to succeed down here was by keeping active every day. Most of the fifty Americans who had settled in Zamboanga Province had gone in for loafing and booze, and lived on their Filipina wives. He was broke when in 1932 copra went down and he was left with nothing but debts--subsequently, he paid them all off and last year was assessed for the largest income tax in the Province, on an income of 50,400 pesos. It came from dealing in

<sup>79</sup>One sometimes wonders how Quezon would have handled the Huk problem if he had been President at the time.

<sup>80</sup>Cf. Onorato, *A Brief Review of American Interest*, pp. 39-40, 104-105.

<sup>81</sup>See the Taft letters during the twenties concerning his feelings about the Philippines under the leadership of Harrison, Quezon and Osmena that are abstracted and annotated in Onorato, *Leonard Wood as Governor General*, pp. 79-81, 115, fn. 328.

<sup>82</sup>Quezon felt himself compelled to maintain smooth relations with Governor General Stimson so that it might be possible to continue the canard concerning Wood's temperamental behavior as being the cause of the break between himself and the Filipinos.

cutch and copra, and from stevedoring and automobile agencies. He remarked that the Chinese down here come as coolies, get a little *tienda* at some cross-roads and in ten years own all the property around--they plant nothing and create nothing--send to China for their "sons" (made by parcel post)! The Japanese on the other hand created plantations and improved and developed the country, and lived like highly civilized beings with all the modern conveniences. He greatly preferred the latter.

April 10, 1936. Ingersolls, Walkers, McCreers on board, also Karagdags and Sabido.

Ship stopped for a minute at 7 a.m. in respect for the death of Harold Dollar.

What a treat to be on a first class well-run ship after a week of "barrio yachting." Quezon frankly admits the conditions on the *Arayat* and is expecting to get a new yacht.

This morning, nothing in sight except miles and miles of barren sea coast and the stony hills of Cebu--a good example of how mankind can destroy a rich country--all the trees are gone and the soil has washed out to sea as in China. The city of Cebu is quite unlike the cities of Luzon. There is an old Spanish fort and the houses are more monotonous and solidly built; it has an immense wharf frontage, and several ocean-going steamers which take freight to foreign lands straight from Cebu. What a joy for the first time to visit this province without having reviews, parades, speeches, handshaking and stiff receptions. Was met by Colonel Gilhauser of the Standard Oil Co. He says sugar is the best investment in the Philippines today; there is gold in Mindanao; oil may be discovered in Cebu; he spoke of Mindanao, where he had been an excellent governor of three Moro provinces; he said they need care in handling--to kill Moros is the easiest way, but not the wisest.

Spent the day at the Golf Club where the Iloilo team had just arrived to play their annual match with Cebu. Carter Johnston, ex-judge, was there.

April 11, 1936. In Iloilo, where we saw a great extension of the filled lands and a long river wharfage. It is a solid and well-kept city with fine environs such as Jaro etc; old Spanish churches. Little parklets are everywhere. Both this and Cebu are good-sized cities. Iloilo has been the centre for shipping the sugar from Negros and Panay. Now that the new port of Pulupandan has been opened, part of this traffic will be diverted there as soon as *bodegas* can be built, and Iloilo will suffer as Zamboanga did when the port of Davao was opened. Visit to the Santa Barbara Golf Club and to the Iloilo Club; luncheon at Greenbaums, with Wolff, Peters, the McCreers and the Powells.

Both in Iloilo and in Cebu, the Philippine Railway representatives complained bitterly about the Public Service Commission--said they fixed unfair rates, and two men in Iloilo told me [that the other judge was as undesirable as Judge Paredes who was fired.]<sup>83</sup>

2 p.m. off for Manila and home.

Quezon is in Davao with three members of his Cabinet and the Japanese Consul General, trying to settle the land embroglio there.

April 12, 1936. Arrived back in Manila, and was much pleased to be met by Doria at the pier. Quiet day at home. In p.m. to Montalban to see the bats--joined a picnic supper of the Oleagas; Rosales, Ducasse and the Pimleys.

April 13, 1936. Busy day at the office and shopping--with the Government Survey Board discussing the transfer of accounting divisions and property sections of the bureaus to the Budget Director. Dinner with Colonel Moller at Polo Club.

April 14, 1936. With Survey Board at the Bureau of Science. Very interesting. Lunch with Judge Purdy, Doria and Judge Ingersoll at the Manila Hotel. Dinner at home for Miss Buchan and Rosales and to a dance at the Casino Español for the 5th anniversary of the founding of the Spanish "Republic"--there must have been few of those Spanish present who really wished to celebrate that event!

April 15-21, 1936. Trip with Doria to Ifugao to hunt on Colonel William E. Dosser's ranch. Interesting, strenuous with terrific heat and a very long ride on

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<sup>83</sup> Brackets are found in the copy used for this edition. A question mark was placed at the end of the line in the left hand margin.

ponies from Marasat, Isabela to the ranch house. Doria and I motored to Balete pass rest house the first afternoon--3000 ft altitude--cold at night. Last time I went thru here was on horseback in 1920, with Beth,<sup>84</sup> Virginia,<sup>85</sup> General McIntyre and Don Serafin Linsangan--hence arose the impulse to build this road; a difficult bit of engineering which has since tripled the population of Nueva Viscaya and Isabela through immigration. Even today, there are numerous families with all their household goods in bull or carabao carts moving in, chiefly over the high mountains from the Ilocos country. Some also enter via the old Villaverde trail from Tayug--which was almost impossible by horse in my day. The road leading up to Balete passes thru a wild and beautiful camping country with clear streams rather like northern California--now settling up. The equal of a train load of goods for or from the valley of the Cagayan passes over this mountain road every day by truck. The second range of mountains--between Nueva Viscaya and Isabela--has only a one way road, with terrific zig-zags and much delay. There are numerous tolls for the permanent or temporary bridges, which makes the passage quite expensive.

At noon, on the 16th we reached the army post at Echague, where Lt. Dionisio is in command. Echague is still in a backwater in spite of the thru road. It appears to be dull, stale, flat and weary, and is still in the grip of Chino store keepers. There; Dosser and Lieutenant Beulan met us, and at Marasat after ten miles of hellish rough and dusty barrio road we met Lt. Baccay with his four soldiers from Miayaoyao. Were told we could not make camp that afternoon, and had to spend a typical barrio night in Marasat, surrounded by dust, noises, smells and filth--pigs, dogs, chickens and carabao--garlic etc. This finally put Doria and me off eating for the trip, and the rest of the time I subsisted on tinned milk--being ill anyway. The *barrio teniente* brought in a wounded eagle which he carried peacefully under his arm--with a cord on its leg. This bird stood with superb disdain and pride while the barrio folk inspected it--Dosser let it go later.

April 17, 1936. Six hours on pony-back, over flat country and Magat river--which may be forded only at this time of year--then over low rolling country to a ranch leased from the Government by Dosser and Beulan; they have about one thousand head of cross-bred Hereford and Indian stock, which are the finest cattle I have seen in the Philippines. The altitude was only some one thousand feet; there is plenty of water and the whole country is ideal for grazing, resembling California in the old days. Hunting from the 17th-20th April 1936. We were posted on hills with "draws"--i.e., wooded valleys above streams which were beaten by Ifugao and Filipino hunters: very picturesque they were, with lots of their jackal-like dogs. The deer came out running at a distance of 150-200 yards--and were hard shots. We got 8 in all, and one sizeable boar was bayed by dogs and speared by the Ifugaos. We saw parrots, jungle fowl, monkeys and orioles, in the most beautiful imaginable scenery. The men caught a fifteen day old fawn (which we have brought down to Manila and are keeping in the yard). At the bathing creek near the ranch house, where the average depth of water is six inches, there is a hole about fifteen feet deep dug by the crocodiles which come thirty kilometers up in the mountains by the small streams discharging into the Magat River. They take occasional calves from the ranch. We saw no wild carabao, tho always expecting them. One crowd (!) (Batangas Transport) was near there the week before and had killed two *cimarrones*. The administration of the game laws by the Bureau of Science is ridiculous--it should be transferred to the Constabulary and have some teeth put in it.

There is a great scarcity of game since my day 20 years ago altho it is now supposed to be a closed season for 3 years, except for those who hold special licenses in the Mountain Province. We spent three golden days perched on hill tops watching the beaters and their dogs in the draws below--with the shouting, calling and fusillade from above when a deer appeared. Doria stood the "roughing it" and the physical strain magnificently--thirst was the worst feature of all--the temperature must have risen to 130° in the sun, and we had no effective method of keeping water cool in the canteens. The ponies did prodigies in carrying us up high hills over rough cattle trails--one of these little stallions does twice as much work as a stable-fed horse at home. I was ill with indigestion all the time, and made the grade with difficulty. Pleased by the abundance of song birds--(unusual in the Philippines) and by the hoarse shouts of the *kalaw* (hornbill).

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<sup>84</sup>Beth Wrentmore Harrison was the oldest daughter of Professor Clarence Wrentmore of the University of the Philippines. Harrison later divorced her in order to marry her sister, Margaret, who was the mother of his son, Norvell.

<sup>85</sup>His eldest daughter by his deceased first wife, Mary Crocker of the famed banking family of California.



Terrific heat, dust and hours of real thirst on the drive back to Balete.

April 21, 1936. Returned to Manila, stiff, tired and dirty.

April 22, 1936. Bridge--dinner at Murad Saleebys.

April 22-23, 1936. At Malacanan and with the Survey Board. Quezon is to return from the Visayas tonight.

Dosser told me that there were 210,000 mountain people--of whom 100,000 were Ifugaosi. He said that when the census of 1918 was taken and only 60,000 Ifugaos were reported, actually there were about 40,000 more of them hiding in the mountains on account of the great influenza epidemic. He believes that the Ifugao nation is diminishing in numbers thru the effects of malaria--they are very prolific but only bring up from two to three children to a family; they have rice to eat only half the year--(my own impression is that the destruction of the forests has diminished the water for irrigation and they cannot grow food enough).

April 22, 1936. Quezon returned on *Visayas* having left the *Arayat* on account of a small typhoon in the Bicol. Unson met him at the steamer and said he was in excellent health and spirits. He gave the President the result of the work of the Survey Board and Quezon at once appointed Assemblyman Marabut of Leyte as Under Secretary of Finance vice Carmona now President of the Philippine National Bank. The President accepted the Survey Board's resolution creating a Budget Office directly under the President, consisting of Under Secretary Marabut, Auditor General Hernandez and Director of Civil Service Gil--transferring to this Board all accounting divisions of the Bureaus. Unson and Hernandez wanted property divisions also transferred to the Budget Office; but Trinidad, Paez and Dizon thought this would make too much friction--however, it is "now or never"!

Quezon spent 7 p.m. to 9 p.m. at Malacanan signing papers etc--then went off to Baguio for some days where he is busy with such Government officials as are now up there on "summer" vacation.

Babbitt and Rockwell have left the Philippines for a long vacation--"everybody" is supposed to be gone from Manila, but gaieties still keep up. Doria is preparing to depart on the 27th on *Empress of Japan* en route to Peking.

A San Francisco (Cal.) judge writes to Paredes concerning the "repatriation" scheme for Filipinos in the United States that: "the Filipino community in his city, in proportion to its numbers, affords the courts more criminal business than any other, and most of this is due to the fact that nearly all of them have white mistresses of a type not likely to do them much good--but still they are happy." (This is all the more notable because such relations have always been very rare in the Philippines itself--and incidents arising therefrom are most unusual out here.)

April 24-25, 1936. Long talks with Unson about the Philippine Government. He remarked that General Wood had a sense of humour<sup>86</sup> and was a strong character--in some respects was a great man. Does not know why Wood vetoed the act to create a Budget Office.

Unson and I discussed the Bureau of Science. He thinks it is attempting too many diverse duties; that it is overlapping the work of other bureaus. Unson is in favour of turning it into an Industrial Research Bureau; when it has perfected an industrial method it should quit that and investigate another. Discussed also appointive provincial governors and a national police as authorized in the constitution, in order to stop political maneuvers; favouritism and improper use of the police. Various members of the Assembly seem to be receptive to these ideas.

We reviewed consideration of the Bureau of Posts and of a possible consolidation of the Bureau of Lands with the Land Registration Office. Unson says it has been a mistake always to have appointed a lawyer as Director of the Bureau of Lands (Undoubtedly this is one of the most unsatisfactory Bureaus of the Government.) More discussions as to Aldanese and the Bureau of Customs. All agree that Aldanese is himself perfectly honest but has not enough firmness or "ferocity" (Unson).

Dinner with Mr and Mrs Oleaga at Casino Español. Doria tells me that Marguerite Wolfson and Mrs Gaches tried to take care of Quezon at Topside, Baguio, two or three

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<sup>86</sup>Cf. Kalaw, p. 146f.

years ago when he was so ill he could not walk. They were trying to get him away from his host of followers, but Quezon stayed only thirty-six hours at Topside, and was so strenuous a personality that she and Mrs Gaches had to "go to bed for a week" after he left. She says he is as exhausting as a "vampire.!"

April 27, 1936. Doria sailed away on the *Empress of Japan* for a six weeks vacation in China. This is our first long separation.

April 28, 1936. At Malacanan. A. D. Williams had just come from a conference with Quezon, Paez and Ramon Fernandez; says the President is set on building railways in Mindanao, and "A.D.!" and, Fernandez tried to convince him they would not pay. "A.D." said he thought he had offended Quezon still more by replying to his (Quezon's) complaints that the roads offered too unfair competition to the Manila Railroad, that the competition from trucks was unfair and when they had finally managed by January 1, 1936 to get the tax on trucks raised from one peso to two pesos per 100 kilos, the rate had at once been reduced again. This was Quezon's own doing on the advice of Geo. Vargas, and they both looked pretty glum. (This is the first instance I know since his inauguration where private interests had influenced the President contrary to the public interest.)

"A.D." also inveighed against the taking of the accounting division out of the Bureau of Public Works and putting it with the others in the new budget office.

He also admitted it was a mistake to have put the Bagagab-Echague road over the mountains--it should have followed the Magat River down stream.

3 to 5 p.m. with the Survey Board quizzing the Directors of the Bureau of Lands and of the Land Registration Office. They sat side by side rather like naughty school boys, each covertly watching the other.

Bridge at the Polo Club, Peters, Satterfield and Ale. Went for a short time to Oleagas "cock-tail supper.!"

April 29, 1936. Dr Sison came to see me at Malacanan. He had advised Quezon not to leave on the *Corregidor* without taking a doctor along because of his infected gums which had to be lanced. The President went off with Osmena--*muchedumbre* in Iloilo and in Cebu. I went to the Japan Club for the "Emperor's birthday party.!"

April 30, 1936. Called at Dr Sison's. I must go completely on the waterwagon. Went to the Bureau of Science--then to Malacanan where I talked for half an hour with Dawson (from Shanghai) of the United States Department of Agriculture. He has been here for some weeks studying the agricultural situation: says the Filipinos are the most "agriculturally minded" people he has ever known, and that many alert minds are busy on the problem of diversification of crops. Dawson reports the tobacco drops in the Cagayan valley are almost a failure from drought.

Saw Hartendorp and had a telephone from Dosser in Baguio. Tried to help out troubles for both.

Paulino Santos has been appointed Chief of Staff of the Army and a Major General--best man possible, and he will still be allowed to carry on as Director of Prisons--this will take him from Malacanan. Reyes also is made a Major General and Provost Marshal, Dr Valdes a Major General, Vicente Lim also a General--all good selections.

Talked with Lapointe who has just come up from Antimonan where he is building a nipa shack in his coconut grove.

Went to the Aquarium which seems rather neglected. Called on Jim Ross to get his opinion concerning Americans becoming Philippine citizens. He agreed with Dewitt that this act does not impair American citizenship.

May 1, 1936. (Labor Day). Manila quiet; but there are pictures in the press of policemen trying on gas masks, which would naturally work for quiet! I saw a group of police with riot guns in front of the Post Office. Malacanan is deserted; Quezon manages to spend only one day at a time there sandwiched in between his voyages.

Out with Lapointe to visit Geo. Logan in the Spanish Hospital at San Pedro Makati. This is the most modern (3 years old) and apparently the best managed hospital in Manila, and it is run by the Spanish community. Then went to the Manila Hotel to say good-bye to "Andy" Anderson who is going (reluctantly) home on leave.

Then to Tommy Wolff's house where his 28th annual picnic for employes of the Sanitary Steam Laundry Co. was held on the lawn. Julius Rees back from United States, says conditions are improving there--he believes Roosevelt is sure of re-election. Rees approves the adoption of a new United States tax on the undivided profits of corporations. Talked with the United States Shipping Board man: in my day there were 30,000 tons a month shipped out of the Philippines--now nearly 10 times as much. Hence the great show of ships. He said that when independence comes, only the hemp industry could survive--sugar cannot compete with Java. Rees is however, also very pessimistic as to the future of the United States.

Lapointe tells me that in all the years he has spent in the Philippines, he has never known a Filipino to repay money borrowed!

Should have gone this noon to the German Club for their National Day--and was even anxious to do so, though no doubt, some of their older members were among those whom I deported to the United States detention camps during the war--but I could not stomach the thought of drinking Hitler's health! Believe I should have vomited!

May 2, 1936. Visit to the Museum of the Bureau of Science: good collection of birds and fishes. It is amazing how few species of wild mammals there are in the Philippines. The ethnological and insect collections are defective. Then to the Botanical Gardens--a sad "petering out" of this little zoo since my time. They have one small elephant, two bears (one mangy), a few wild boars and some wretched monkeys, and one deer. Most of the cages are vacant. Then to the Philippine Library to see E. B. Rodriguez. He wishes to restrain their library to its present scope of historical works and their museum to history and art. Very canny fellows: Teodoro Kalaw and Rodriguez! They know exactly what they want and just what they cannot get out of the legislature. Rodriguez believes the other bureaus of the Government should keep their own small museum collections as at present for their studies; also that the Bureau of Science should keep its own library.

May 3, 1936. Quiet Sunday. Many letters to write, arranging for my sons Kiko and Norvell<sup>87</sup> to come out in August. Saw a polo game in p.m. with Stevenson and Morgan.

May 4, 1936h Quezon back for 48 hours Malacanan humming again as per schedule. Visited the Ice Plant with E. B. Rodriguez, Assistant Chief of the Philippine Library to see the old archives of the government which were moved two months ago to the top floor because this building is supposed to be fire proof. Quarters for archives are commodious enough, but are as hot as the hinges of hell since they have no ventilation--95 degrees Fahrenheit at 8:30 a.m.--it rises later to 108 degrees. Need of twenty-five cataloguers, and money for binding and repair of old Spanish documents which are written on fine old paper and in beautiful handwriting. A horrible smell of fish arising from Army cold stores below! Rodriguez says Governor General Murphy's economies are partly responsible for *Sakdaista* uprising in Laguna a year ago.

Later in the morning, I visited Otley Beyer at the University of the Philippines, and asked his opinion of the Bureau of Science. He says it was originally started as a government laboratory; Worcester put Freer there and made the staff do research work. In my time, Denison made it more "practical." Later, Dr Brown came in and realizing the difficulty of getting from the legislature funds for research began to boom and advertise the practical, or routine, productions of the bureau (glass, paper, pottery etc.) and raised the annual appropriation to nearly one million pesos, but disorganized the Bureau and left it in a mess. He attempted too much. Beyer says Arguelles is a good chemist but has not backbone enough for political life. He added that the Filipinos treat the Government like a family (*pariente*) affair, and when a high salaried post is abolished, the salary is divided up among half a dozen small men who are of no earthly use. Says research and routine should not be combined--with the Dutch in the Indies they are kept entirely separate. He believes that Secretary Rodriguez is one of the worst *pariente* job seekers of the lot. Am to see him later.

In p.m. to cinema with Petersh

Saw Paulino Santos, just made a Major General and Chief of Staff of the new Army. He appears happy and thrilled. Sworn in today and asked me to attend.

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<sup>87</sup>His son by his fourth wife, Margaret Wrentmore Harrison; he died in 1941 in a school bus accident.



May 5, 1936. Two very nice letters from Doria written at Hong Kong.<sup>88</sup>

From 8:30-10:30 with Arthur Fischer at the excellent office of the Bureau of Forestry. He is now the senior Bureau Chief. I appointed him in 1917. Twenty years is too long, and Fischer is thin, neurotic and passionately excitable. He grows livid when he tells of how Governor General Murphy let him down on appropriations for his quinine forest in Bukidnon. He got the seeds in Java from Consul General Hoover, and tried first in Baguio but moved the plants to Bukidnon where they have made a startling success, and have nearly double in quinine content of the original. There is scope here for development.

Fischer is a true type of the devoted public servant--high minded--energetic--and inspires his men. Wishes to retire and has been offered excellent posts in Siam and China. Has not a cent saved up. He started the catch industry in Zamboanga.

May 6, 1936. Visited Director Camus of the Bureau of Plant Industry. He is a relative of Judge Camus who was present. This director is a fine example of the energetic, clean, highly educated public servant. The poor chap was zealous to show me his whole industrial plant in the short time at our disposal, which was interesting but exhausting. My seeking him was to ascertain whether there is any "overlapping" with the Bureau of Science; as, indeed, there turned out to be in the work of soil analysis, and probably in other botanical and agricultural enterprises. He said Quezon and Murphy had been there. The latter allowed him 10,000 pesos for a house to install his looms, and he put it up in twenty-five days to get the whole appropriation before the end of the year. He also makes cotton yarns of Philippine cotton, with old second-hand machinery. His purpose is to show the people that their cotton will find a market. He asserts that he could also make of hemp all the sugar and copra bags needed in the Philippines, and better than those made from imported Indian jute. He is also perfecting a process of manufacturing coire.

In p.m. bridge here for Guevara, Banqui and Nazario. I asked Pedro Guevara about his successor Resident Commissioner Paredes. Guevara replied that Paredes didn't understand American Congressional psychology; said he (Guevara), without any speeches, got thru the authorization for the payment of the \$23,000,000 "depreciation of gold" deposits of the Philippines at the end of a session of Congress, and even Senator Adams stood by him. Now Paredes is getting nowhere with all his speeches and public statements. Guevara also predicted the election of Landon (if nominated) over F. D. Roosevelt. Said organized business would defeat the latter. If elected, he thought, Landon and the Republicans would come out for a permanent dominion status for the Philippines and that there would never be complete independence here. Although this is exactly what Guevara himself has been working for he said he was in favour of F. D. Roosevelt because the latter was "good for the Philippines." Also he had advocated selecting me as High Commissioner. Said when I was here it was all "like one happy family, and none of that anti-American feeling which is now growing up."

May 7, 1936. Earthquake lasting fifteen seconds at 5:13 a.m., which did not even wake me.

The morning papers published Rafael Palma's report on a proposed reorganization of the educational system here. This is the promptest and most intelligent report of any board so far appointed under the Commonwealth Government. Emphasis is laid on five years of elementary education which should be free and compulsory; secondary education to be confined to agriculture and industry, and people are to pay for the usual high school education, which would better be left to the non-government schools. I wrote to congratulate him. If accepted, I wonder whether this report can be put through the legislature? (The Bureau of Education is the strongest political organization in the Philippines.)

Went to the British Consulate at the request of Foulds, acting British Consul General, who wanted some information from Quezon but did not desire to make it "official" by asking questions himself, as follows:

1. Did the Japanese threaten Quezon with "grave consequences" over the Davao land question, and did Quezon reply: "you can't bluff me"? Foulds himself expressed skepticism over the accuracy of this newspaper report.

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<sup>88</sup>It seems that Harrison followed the tradition of the colonial tropics--that of sending the white women and children to the temperate zones during the hot, dry season.

2. Could High Commissioner Murphy when going to the States, appoint an "Acting" or merely "delegate" his powers? These involve questions of official calls if a British warship comes here to visit.

3. Would the High Commissioner return here?

Then Foulds and I had a general and on the whole, very congenial conversation on Great Britain, the Japanese, and the question of complete independence here.

Went to the Survey Board and made my report on the Bureau of Science. This is the first time in 15 years I have tried dictating to a Filipino stenographer and I found it more work than to write in long hand. I seem to have a larger vocabulary in English than that to which they are accustomed out here. I told Miguel Unson that Geo. Vargas had expressed himself as impatient to get the Government Survey Board's report--Unson replied: "I am a slow worker, I know, and Vargas is a fast one, but I do not trust those quick decisions of Vargas."

Talk with ex-deputy Varona. I asked him what the National Economic Council, of which he is a member, was doing? He replied: "nothing much until the question of "national self-sufficiency" was decided. (The Filipinos are getting ready to trade the Philippine markets for continued free trade with the United States.) In that case, they will do nothing at all in the Economic Council, and it will be a regular gas chamber, instead of actually going to work, as the public expects, to prepare the economic life of the Philippines for complete independence. The attitude of Rocesh papers here on Senator Walsh's ridiculous objection to competition in the United States market by Filipino made rubber shoes is a good example of the paralysis here! Varona said that in Negros there was a new patriotism--viz: "Buy American"--"Entirely disinterested!" I commented. He said the "N.E.P.A." was anathema in Negros (sugar)

Quezon is due back today from his family trip to Baler, the birthplace of himself and of his wife as well. He is to stay here until he goes on May 13th as far as Shanghai with High Commissioner Murphy.

May 8, 1936. Saw Dr Sison who accompanied Mrs Quezon over the mountains on horseback from Bongabong to Baler: two days of riding. Coming back down the coast in the *Arayat* it was very rough when they emerged from the shelter of Polillo--Mrs Quezon was sea sick and Quezon ordered the steamer in to Mauban instead of carrying on to Hondagua. Sison says Quezon is talking of building a pier at Baler to exploit the big stand of timber there (too expensive!).

Saw General Sandiko at the office: he says the purchase of the remaining Friar Lands is the only solution of the agrarian troubles; says twenty per cent of the agitation is due to the activity of troublemakers. Also told me that in Pambusco men work eighteen hours a day thru a trickery in interpreting the eight hour law, which permits only twelve hours of service, and that only under certain agreements. He is strongly in favour of organizing the powerful labour unions, and so are Torres and Varona.

This morning, Quezon gave a press interview to both "foreign" and "local" reporters. Evidently, he had important things to give out. The newspapers published:

(a) A statement that Davao land "leases" would go to the courts.

(b) The President contemplates the construction of a 150 kilometer (300!) electric railway between Davao and Cagayan de Misamis, and also would complete the Aloneros-Pasacao gap in the southern lines of the Manila Railroad. The Maria Cristina Falls in Lanao are to be used for part of the power for the first project.

(c) That the Philippines would sooner ask for immediate independence than wait for the end of the ten years period if there are no prospects of improving the provisions of the economic clauses of the Tydings-McDuffie law. The Philippines, as stated, "would prefer to break away from the American economic apron strings and blaze a new economic and political trail from itself." "I am not exactly in favour of eliminating the export tax," he said "if Congress would remove the tax I would ask for authority sufficiently elastic so that this power can be lodged in the hands of Philippine authorities to impose a tax on sugar exports from the Philippines." "This would be a good test of the patriotism of the sugar barons" he declared, and: "If we cannot export our sugar duty free to the United States, that is, if we should lose our American market for sugar and tobacco, for example, I would ask for immediate independence. I would not wait for the expiration of the transition period. There would be no use marking time."

Newspapers also quoted Judge Hausserman, head of the Benguet Mines and now in the United States (usually in recent years very tactfully) as saying that the withdrawal of the United States from the Philippines would be "tragic" because it would mark the end of American interest in the Orient. This remark was resented by seven or eight Assemblymen, who understood that Hausserman meant it would be tragic for the Philippines. They replied that the "tragedy" might be for Hausserman's many mining millions.

*Alcalde* Posadas vetoes the "Hyde Park" (i.e., speeches) ordinance of the Municipal Board, stating that the Luneta should not be used for the propagation of subversive doctrines.

May 9, 1936. Talk with A. D. Williams who says Quezon now wants a much bigger yacht than that he (Williams) had selected for him; wishes the *Southern Cross*, now in Cuba, twice the size of the *Yolanda*; price asked: half a million dollars.

He told me again of a talk with Quezon concerning transportation. It arose out of a project to build a wharf for the Cebu Portland Cement Co. Williams pointed out that this would reduce the revenues of the Cebu Railway. Quezon replied: "our guarantee of interest on the bonds expires next year. We will have to buy the road and move it." Williams agreed and suggested moving it to Negros. Quezon remained silent. What he wants is to move it to Mindanao which Williams opposes since he believes that a railroad would be so much more expensive to maintain and operate than roads. Williams says a wharf at Baler would be too expensive to build. That wharf at Iligan is O.K. and we should have landed there on our recent trip.

Papers today carry a statement from Pardee, calling on bondholders of the Philippine Railway to deposit their bonds with him for purposes of negotiation with Philippine Government; says the company cannot pay the \$8,000,000 principal of bonds due next year, and proposes to sell bonds (\$1000) at \$350 apiece to the Philippine Government; (price now in New York \$300 and the stock sells for \$1 a share).

May 10, 1936. Sunday. Awakened at 5 a.m. by a ferocious brass band in the nearby barrio "playing" for some church festival. At 10 a.m. it is still at it, and worse than ever. What with dogs, roosters and church bells, this adds new horrors to residence in the Philippines. (The fiesta, with band complete went on steadily until 11 p.m.)

In the afternoon, I went out to McKinley and golfed alone. In the evening six toughs threatened Oleaga and his cook and frightened the family. Oleaga sent his chauffeur to the police station at Parañaque, but the police were all away at the fiesta!

May 11, 1936. At Malacanan where I saw Sandiko. He came to enquire how he could get some of his followers placed as waiters at the Manila Hotel. He had with him a child of 4 whom he called his baby. My next visitor was Major Mendes, aged 64, who was looking for a job. His appeal was chiefly based upon the number of children he had. It was very much like the line of talk of Mussolini who prods the Italians into frenzied reproduction, and then complains that there is no room in Italy for its people, and they must have colonies for expansion! Odd how all these Filipinos in the sixties have a brood of little children!

Afternoon bridge here with Mrs Oleaga, Mrs Hill and Peters. I gave a dinner for Geo. White, ex-governor of Ohio and my old friend in Congress and his bride, whom he married in Columbus, Ohio just thirty days ago. Captain and Mrs Sellers also were here. Geo. White is 64--likewise, ex-Governor General General Davis was married again this week.

May 12, 1936. Survey Board meeting, called to co-ordinate the work of the University of the Philippines with various bureaus. Present: Bocobo, Bewley, Kasilag, acting Director of the Bureau of Public Works, and Camus, Director of the Bureau of Plant Industry. Very interesting meeting in which they all seemed ready for cooperation. Bocobo suggested a means by which this may be done. Also, he and Bewley, Director of the Bureau of Education, talked of overproduction of vocational graduates, especially in agriculture, who could find no jobs afterwards. Public opinion is outraged if any attempt is made to close or limit schools. New type "A" curriculum is to be 60% academic and 40% vocational. They are going to try to give primary education to every child, and gradually to reduce the secondary. In Java and other Dutch East Indies there are only four trade schools and four agricultural schools for a population of over 50,000,000. The Muñoz Agricultural School in Nueva Ecija costs the Government nearly five times as much as do other schools.



Bocobo said the plan to have the legislature fix the salaries of Professors in the University of the Philippines would take away academic freedom. (I agree.) Unson made mild fun of this statement. Bocobo is strongly for increased funds for research--he suggested getting the several industries of the Philippines to contribute. We talked of the National Economic Council, and I called attention to its paralysis because no general economic policy has been adopted by the government; all its energies are now bent towards getting a relaxation of the sanctions of the Tydings-McDuffie act. Unson told me confidentially that the membership of the National Economic Council was not well received by the public. He said Elizalde and Trinidad were well thought of--but Madrigal's business methods were prehistoric.

Bridge in p.m. with Satterfield, Peters and Saleeby.

May 13, 1936h Intense heat these days--97°-100° indoors. In the afternoon Trinidad (who is the manager of the Pampanga Sugar Co.), of whom I asked why no sugar shares were for sale, said this was the time to sell out, not buy, but shareholders expected to get all their capital back in three or four years and a profit also. However, present prices offered for the shares were too low to tempt holders into the market.

In shopping in Manila, especially on the Escolta, American "salesmanship" is used to the Nth power, with the result that some of us are offended (as I was in Heacock's today) and leave without a purchase.

Five prisoners escape from Montinlupa--one is recaptured; the "trusty" system seems to have its limits.

At 3:30 p.m. went down to the *Cooledge* to say good-bye to High Commissioner Murphy and Quezon. The former looked preoccupied and tired. I said to Quezon: "you will see Doria in Peking." He answered: "Oh! I'm only going to Hong Kong--to be back Tuesday (18th)--wish you were coming with me." I told him I was staying here under Dr Sison's care. The next day, Vargas received a telegram stating that Quezon was not returning until the 28th so probably he will get as far as Shanghai. On the steamer, I chaffed Osmena about being my "boss" now, and he said "I'm not to be acting President"--Quezon apparently acts on precedents of recent American presidents.

Talk with A. D. Williams. He said Quezon was angry with Bewley, whom he had previously always supported, because the teachers in the Bureau of Education had opposed giving up Teacher's Camp in Baguio for the National Army as Quezon and MacArthur desire. This worried Bewley greatly, so he apparently saw Quezon and disowned all opposition.

May 14, 1936. Short chat at Malacanan with Francisco Benitez, in which I expressed pleasure in the new plans for education. I asked him about building school houses--he said that in future they were going to stop building, in expensive and ugly concrete, and construct in "native materials." After all these years of folly, I am glad to see common sense at last prevail.

Long talk with Dr Manuel Roxas about the Council of National Research and the importance of research work in general to promote diversification of the products of the country. We seemed to agree about the deplorable paralysis in all economic plans, due principally to the influence of sugar interests and their lobby in Washington. Nevertheless, he wishes to speed up research work to be ready for the time when the National Development Co. does get to work (if ever).

In p.m., went with A. D. Williams, Consulting Engineer of the Metropolitan Water System to inspect their plant. Lovely drive to Ipo--on a road new to me. Otley Beyer, who came along with us, pointed out many of his best archaeological sites in Rizal and Bulacan, where he made the first discoveries in 1926. He was very interesting about the neolithic and Iron Age people. The latter era in the Philippines was from 200 B.C. - 700 A.D. He also showed us the streaks of red earth where the "tektites" are found, which he named "Rizalites." These are, he said, the only meteoric stones of a silicate nature, and also the only ones which contain mineral elements not yet known on this earth. The valley of the Novaliches River is rich in ancient remains--a region now largely unoccupied by man. Beyer says this is probably due to two reasons: (a) malaria (still there) and (b) gold digging and panning by the ancients, which then petered out, so far as their methods went. The earth here is honeycombed with old worm-like tunnels, with ventilation holes every 30 feet. Beyer says this was the mining method of the Chinese who flocked to California, after the '48, and began working over the sites abandoned by Americans. We saw the spot where gold signs were discovered when the Bureau of Public Works constructed the road to Ipo--which led to the Ipo and Salacot mining industries today.

Old women still pan about 50 centavoes a day worth of gold out of the Santa Maria River near there--just as their ancestors did 2000 years ago.

At Ipo, we saw the coffer-dam being constructed on the Angat River which is to be completed in 1938, thus making a deep and narrow lake ten kilometers back into mountains. The river varies fifty feet in height between lowest and highest levels, and is always swift. The six kilometer tunnel, which took six years to complete, gives a six foot (in diameter) opening down towards the filter plant near Novaliches. When finished, this project will ensure Manila for the next century at least a fine water supply. Visited the new reservoir at Novaliches, and also the recently opened filter plant a few miles below there. All very wonderful engineering.

May 16, 1936. Abolition of the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes is announced pending a commission which is to be substituted. It is alleged that the Moros (and Pagans?) object to the designation!!

Two articles in the Press show the difficulty of running a government on Quezon's method of never consulting newspapers!:

(a) Memo. by General MacArthur, in answer to Press criticisms, explaining that the selection of Generals for the new Philippine Army was made without any influence from Quezon.

(b) Vargas' explanation of a suggested new yacht for the government, was not merely for Quezon but to replace the *Bustamente*, the old cable ship, which became more expensive to repair than to substitute a new ship. An editorial in the *Bulletin* showing that "if a frank statement of intent had been made in the first place etc."--and concluding: "no apologies are needed!" Quezon gives himself most reluctantly to the press--tho he is not nearly as neglectful of it as I used to be!

Ambrosio--for the past twenty-five years N° 1 chauffeur at Malacanan Palace, came to see me; he says Murphy will not return--(he is now High Commissioner Murphy's chauffeur); this may be "servant's gossip" but Ambrosio is in a position to hear a lot!

One hour and a half with Dr Roxas and Unson at the Survey Board; Roxas expounding the necessity for a fixed and sufficient income for research work--says we must prepare for the "diversification" of industries. He and Unson ridicule the idea that the Philippine Government cannot exist without the fat sugar industry.

After Roxas left, Unson told me confidentially that "something very important" was pending in top circles, and that Quezon would have to return from Hong Kong by the 18th. It is a discussion of the relations of the Philippines with the United States and Japan. If Japan will not undermine the sovereignty of the Philippines, but merely wants trade here, it might be a good idea, according to Unson, to make some arrangement with Japan, in view of the "wobbling" of the United States' attitude towards the Philippine problem. "We are here in the Orient, and here we stay!" This all-important question was possibly brought to the front by the Davao land muddle. Unson says that he and Vicente Singson wrote recently withdrawing from a dinner group at Wak-Wak because they found at the first dinner held that it was intended for them all to be committed to using their best efforts at whatever cost to secure retention of the United States' market. Unson says there are plenty of other leading Filipinos who are restive under "too much sugar" in politics. They want to prepare for independence by planning the economic future. (Dr Roxas is apparently of the same view.)

May 16, 1936. Asked A. D. Williams about hydro-electric power: he said the Meralco expended double its estimates on the Pagsanan site. He explained that under the constitution all water power is the property of the Government and can only be leased; not sold; that the only good sites left in the Philippines are:

- (a) Maria Cristina Falls in Lanao
- (b) Angat River ten miles above the new water works dam
- (c) possibly the Agno River!

There seems to be no opportunity in the circumstances for outside capital. He also said, speaking of the gold mines in the Paracale district, that because of mining; Paracale in 1840 was a town of 84,000 people; now it has only 2-3000.

In p.m. golf alone at McKinley.

May 17, 1936. Sunday. Quiet day at home--golf alone at McKinley at 5 o'clock.

May 18, 1936. Long talk with Unson about the reorganization of the government. Query: how to get funds from the Legislature for research scientific work? We finally decided the only way by which we could avoid alarming the legislature is to strengthen the Bureau of Science, instead of turning over its researchers to the University, or trying to secure a large appropriation for the Council of National Research (Dr Roxas); Unson says Governor General Murphy considered Dr Roxas something of a spendthrift. We talked of the American attitude of growing indifference and severity towards the Philippines. He commented that it was American psychology for a father to cut loose entirely from a grown-up son! Unson expressed doubt of the Philippine Army.

Quezon returned from Hong Kong and after a day at Malacanan left for Baguio. His office work is greatly in arrears and is in confusion. Vargas handed me a memorandum prepared by Quezon dated April 14 in Iloilo, addressed to me, (and unsigned) asking me to prepare papers to carry out the recommendations of the annual report of the Manila Railroad Co. This I received May 18!! Vargas says he found it "on the boat" (Arayat?). I hardly think it was meant for me, anyway, but probably for Paez who is away inspecting the line for the proposed railroad in Mindanao. Quezon cannot stand the racket at Malacanan Palace--when he finally does receive his visitors he gives three times the time necessary for each interview. He is too restless for office work anyway, and while there feels like a bird in a cage. He gives himself so thoroughly to each visitor that this kind of work wears him out. He cannot, however, let his underlings run their offices, so all of them are simply terrified of him, and the administration becomes paralyzed.

I asked Unson why the United States Army officers thrust themselves to the fore continually in the press, giving "full military honors" and exchanging so many visits of ceremony, so that the public must have an engorged idea of militarism in the Philippines. He said this was not so from Taft to me, but dated from General Wood as Governor General.<sup>89</sup>

Unson is anxious to have the Bureau of Printing print all textbooks for Philippine schools; but is opposed by the Bureau of Education. I advised him to include this recommendation in the Survey Board's report on the Bureau of Printing, thus advocating giving more employment to Filipino printers.

Golf alone at McKinley at 5 p.m.

May 19, 1936. Three nice letters from Doria at Peking. She is thrilled by sight-seeing, but bored by all the "Main Street" personalities she meets.

Papers carry a statement by Quezon that he has arranged with the High Commissioner for a preliminary trade conference after the election in Washington. Papers guess that (Speaker) Roxas and Alunan will be sent (??).

3-5 p.m. with Survey Board--officials of the Bureau of Science there. I questioned them as to the failure of administration of the fish and game law.

Dinner at Colin Hoskins for Weldon Jones and Major General Santos; Jim Ross, Carlos Romulo, Dr Valdes, Victor Buencamino there--all in *barong tagalog*. Conversation after dinner chiefly about General MacArthur and later about Japanese relations with the Philippines. Jim Ross said MacArthur was a brilliant soldier but had Napoleonic ambitions. Hoskins added he was sorry to see him here, as something always happened when MacArthur was present, and that the general only wanted or organize the Philippines Army to help the United States.<sup>90</sup> Santos thinks Japan's expansion is to continue on the mainland, and that she doesn't want political sovereignty here.

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<sup>89</sup> During the first year of Wood's regime, Quezon complained that the Army was disrespectful to the dignity of his office, Senate President, whenever he visited an American military post. Wood then ordered all American military and naval establishments to render full and appropriate honors whenever Filipino civil officers and legislators visited such posts. Wood also demanded that the American armed services look to the training of the Filipino in order that he might defend his country when it became independent. On every occasion, he urged Filipino youth to prepare themselves for the defence of their nation. However, the first effort to instill a martial spirit among Filipinos was under Harrison during the First World War when the Philippine National Guard was established.

<sup>90</sup> MacArthur served as commanding general, Philippine Department during the mid-twenties.



May 20, 1936. Quezon issues a statement that passage by the United States Senate of a bill repealing the authorization to pay the Philippines \$23 millions for gold devaluation of Philippine Government deposits in the United States banks was a "great injustice to the Filipino people," and that the "loss of the money to the Philippines was directly due to the refusal of an American Secretary of War to convert Philippine Government deposits in the United States into bullion, despite the urgent requests of Philippine representatives"; and that: "The said funds were in the keeping of the government of the United States and held in trust by its officials and America has profited by it as much as we have lost."

General Santos said, quoting MacArthur, that judging from the registration for military enrollment, the present population of the Philippines is 18,000,000. This is 4 million more than is usually given, but seems probable. It is 18 years since we took a census.

Victor Buencamino told us there is a daughter of Governor Frank Carpenter employed in the Philippine Education Co. I asked him about *mestizos*. He said those part Spanish and American blood exhibited all the worst traits of both races--that the Chino-Filipino was the best--(n.b. he is one himself)!--the real reason (in my opinion) is that the half-blood of one of the dominating races tries to "belong" to the social caste above him and is rebuffed and embittered by his partial failure. The Chinese, on the other hand, have never dominated politically nor socially here!

At the Survey Board, Unson who had proposed abolishing the "home economic division" of the Bureau of Science, had today been interviewed by Miss Oloro, head of that division. He was all of a twitter, and couldn't keep off the subject of what a great work she was doing.

May 21, 1936. Called on Dr Victor Clark at the Manila Hotel; he is the new economic adviser to this government. He is employed by the Library of Congress of the United States. A great traveler and observer! He is well-balanced, but perhaps a little timid. Has been here before for several visits. He now advises the Filipinos to be cautious is asking for amendments to the Tydings-McDuffie law, and adds that they may get amendments in Congress they do not want. He asked me particularly about the Rice and Corn Corporation--whether all the sales could not be taken over by one organization; I called attention to the fact that most of the rice mills and sales agencies were in the hands of the Chinos!. He also told me that formerly he had been disinclined to pay any attention to "chatter politics," but he had seen them come true in Manchukuo and in Abyssinia. He added that if the Filipinos did not develop Mindanao, some cub reporter today might suggest that that island is just what the Japanese need, and in the end they might get it. I told him of Quezon's extreme preoccupation with this problem.

Acting High Commissioner Weldon Jones called me to his office to present his report (which I asked for on January 27th!) concerning Colin Hoskin's proposition that the Philippine Government should purchase silver at 45 cents with some of their dollar deposits in the United States and thus make millions by seignorage. Jones had come to a definite conclusion in opposition. He said the world was too unsettled for such a move, and that any tampering with the currency in the Philippines would alarm businessmen here. He declared the Philippines must not be put on a "silver basis," since silver is too fluctuating in value as a commodity, and the world is "moving away from it." He added that China has just gone off silver and has joined the dollar exchange. We then discussed the possible effects of this latter move upon the Japanese. I expressed regret that England's strenuous attempt to bring China into sterling exchange had failed. The Chinese are sticking like leeches to us, hoping to embroil us with Japan, and England is now willing to have America pull the chestnuts out of the fire; our trade with China is not worth it; Japan has already started a counter-block by setting up local customs houses in the North China block--charging only one-fourth of the standard Chinese duties, and thus intending to flood China with Japanese goods, and so threaten the stability of all loans to China held by foreigners.

Bridge in the p.m. with Nazario, Tobanguí and La O.

Big dinner at the Manila Hotel given by Mr and Mrs Tommy Wolff as a *despedida* for Don Andres Soriano who is off on a visit to St Jean de Luz. Both Soriano and Colonel Hodsoll told of telephone conversations by wireless in the last few days with Juan Figueras in Biarritz!

Talk with Benito Razon just back from the United States. He had been recently with a group of Americans who expressed disapproval of the apparent change of heart

in the Philippines over independence since the passage of the Tydings-McDuffie law; that this change was no doubt due to the same influence which was causing America to withdraw from activities in the Orient--i.e. the power of Japan; that the demand for free markets for the Philippines in America was based on unfairness of the sanctions in the Tydings-McDuffie law by which America keeps her free market here for ten years, and Filipinos get a free market in the United States for only five years. He agreed with me that the new series of kicks by Americans against the Philippines is based on general indifference ("we never had any good reason for being there anyway") plus an irritation that Filipinos should have preferred independence to retaining American protection.

May 22, 1936. Newspaper blast purporting to come from Secretary of Labour Torres to the effect that the Department of Labour could not get funds for its expansion from the Survey Board, nor from the Budget Commissioner--that "Miguel Unson was not interested in the poor man"! This was followed later by a contradiction from Unson and a disavowal by Torres; nevertheless I believe Torres was quoted correctly. A few days later they printed rumours of a "general strike" with an editorial in the *Bulletin* questioning whether this complaint did not come from the Department of Labour because they couldn't get all the funds they wanted. Next this was denied by Torres, who went so far in his denial that the labour leaders became balky. It is evident that the Department of Labour under Torres considers itself the political leader of the discontented.

May 23, 1936. Trip to San Pablo with Colonel Craig, Mrs White and Miss Wolfson. The manager of the dessicated coconut factory there (Stofford) told of periodic visits from four or five agents of the Department of Labour, enquiring of workmen whether they had "any complaints." As a matter of fact there were none, since the eight hundred employes receive one peso a day and good treatment. This is the wrong way about for these agents: they should be schooled now to make proper enquiries, like life insurance agents. There was also a complaint by Stofford of the administration of justice in San Pablo.

Marguerite Wolfson told how, before Murphy's arrival, they all had been prejudiced because what she called a "Mick" had been appointed, but at her very first meeting with him, he won immediately her support and championship by his modesty and simplicity. He said to her: "My sister and I are very simple people, and have never been used to all this social life. We didn't appreciate the complexity of this position." So she turned in and helped all she could. She said T. Roosevelt was a disaster because as Governor he was too undignified in his relations with the Filipinos.

Conversation at luncheon at San Pablo about Japan. Stofford and Mrs White very friendly to Japan and full of admiration for its accomplishments.

May 24, 1936. Conflict between Don Vicente Singson, head of the Rice and Corn Corporation, and Collector of Customs Aldanese who insists on duty being paid on imports of rice from Saigon. Singson refuses to pay. Aldanese says that the Corporation makes a profit and must pay duty. (No doubt this is on the side of Chinese dealers who control the rice market here.) Later, Quezon, after consulting Secretary of Justice Yulo, ruled that the Corporation need not pay customs duty. (The *Herald* on May 27 gave a front page leader on this as "a menace to constitutional Government" because Quezon decided this point himself instead of letting it go to the courts.) It is evident that all signs of dictatorship will be resisted here.

May 25, 1936. At the Survey Board and office, discussing the Bureau of Science etc. Bridge in the p.m. at the Manila Club.

May 26, 1936. Conference at the office of Paez, who had just returned from an air trip (his first) to survey transport possibilities in Mindanao. He showed me all plans for his suggested legislation in the coming session. I made an approving report thereon to Quezon. Paez told me was proceeding slowly and unit by unit to buy bus lines competing with the Manila Railroad, instead of announcing a general plan therefor. He said that the road which replaced the Tay-Tayh-Antipolo branch of the Manila Railroad (taken out in my time) was now the most profitable section of the bus company--they carried 18,000 people to the shrine at Antipolo the other day--this being a month of pilgrimages. The railroad company will replace Cavite and other unprofitable railroad lines in the same way.

May 27, 1936. Luncheon alone with Quezon at Malacanan. He appeared in very good spirits; is swimming daily in his tank, and played golf at Wak-Wak at 5 o'clock. This morning he spoke with pleasure of my appearance of good health and asked me to go with him on the *Negros* trip to the Southern Islands June 3-15, with the members

of the Assembly. I accepted. He spoke also of the speed with which he had acted at once on Miguel Unson's recommendation for the creation of a budget commission and had appointed Marabut at the head. I said the Governor of Leyte would think this was the result of his public complaint when we were in Catbalogan in April because no Leyte men were high in government office--a complaint which the President had denounced blisteringly before the crowd (advocating a national, not a local outlook). Quezon said this was so, and as he had so many sound reasons for doing so, he would suspend that Governor for one month, to avoid his increasing his undesirable influence over his province thru the appointment of his friend Marabut.

I spoke to the President of the good time we had had at the dance at Masbate--he invited me to a small dance at Malacanan Friday night--said he had sent for Corpus from Masbate to come to Manila on government business, but the latter had not had the sense to bring those charmers with him!

I asked him (for Unson) what his attitude would be on the question of the transfer of the Provincial Treasurers from the Department of the Interior to the Department of Finance (Quirino?). He said that was a subject as to which as much might be said on one side as the other--that he would accept the recommendation of the Survey Board. (Later I told this to Unson, thinking he would act at once as I advised, but Unson began to deliberate!) I enquired of Quezon about the repeated kicks emanating from the United States Congress towards the Philippines nowadays, and whether they could not later be reasonably straightened out. He seemed doubtful, but evidently is not ready to talk about it. (Nazario tells me that at the last press conference he said it was "up to the American businessmen," and hinted at reprisals by the Filipinos.) I told him the simile of American psychology--when a son grows up the father does nothing more for him; Quezon liked that. I said that some Americans appeared to be peevish now because after all that had been done for them the Filipinos had insisted on separation. He replied: "Well! then why did they give us independence?"

I called Quezon's attention to the controversy over appropriations for the Department of Labour between Secretary Torres and Miguel Unson, in which Torres called Unson "not interested in the poor man"--Quezon at once said Unson was extremely interested in the welfare of the poor. He added that he had one Cabinet minister who was "useless" and "worthless," namely Torres; that he had nearly fired Torres several months ago; that Torres kept calling up (3 times) in a recent Cabinet meeting the proposal to build four story concrete tenement houses for labourers. Quezon finally snubbed him, and explained that tenements to house 100 families would only make the other 900 families wild; that a four story building was "too much work" for a labourer to climb; that concrete as a material in this climate was too hot--"why not leave them in their *nipa* houses?"

An article in the *Bulletin*, May 29, described a quarrel between officials of the Department of Labour and some labour leaders as to which group should get the credit for the "higher wage" movement. Apparently, government officials claim the labour leaders are "trying to steal the show." "There is no reason for this sudden antagonism" a high labour official stated, "as in the past we have always sided with the labour element." This displays an utter lack of public responsibility, similar to the debates in the Municipal Council of Manila over the *cochero* registration ordinance--these speeches are only cadging for the *cochero* vote.

Quezon spoke highly of Sandiko--as did I--I told him Sandiko wishes to go to America to study the labour question there. He was interested.

A. D. Williams was brought in by Vargas, to receive instructions about air-conditioning the President's room at Malacanan Palace. Was asked to have the work finished in two weeks--Quezon adding: "I don't want to do it for my successor."

We talked of Geo. White's visit and of our old friends in Congress--Quezon said he had liked the Ohio delegation of that day, except R. J. Buckeley who had voted against independence for the Philippines offered in the Clarke Amendment (1916).<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>91</sup>The Clarke Amendment which would have provided for independence in 1920-21 was killed by a combination of Filipino foot-dragging and Democratic Representatives in the U.S. Congress crossing party lines to oppose its inclusion with the Jones Bill. The fact that Quezon was unable to support that measure fully because of lack of instructions from Osmena to get that amendment passed (albeit Quezon made a show of support for the amendment) hung like an albatross around his neck. The Clarke amendment will be mentioned several more times in this diary. It was something that Quezon was unable to get out of his system.



Quezon agreed with me about the type required for "Public Defender."

May 28, 1936<sup>e</sup> Survey Board. I gave Unson a message from Quezon about the Provincial Treasurers. Advised him to bring up at once for Executive Order the transfer of these officials and also that of Engineers Island and the lighthouse service to the Bureau of Customs--in fact all the reorganization they have already decided upon. I think he is afraid he may prematurely make decisions which might have to be changed later in a more general reorganization.

Talked with Unson about nationalizing the Municipal police. He said a comment by Posadas was that if they were nationalized, the President would be blamed for all mistakes. In fact, Unson wishes to take away all administrative responsibility from Quezon--for example, he wants to put the Philippine Army under the Secretary of the Interior!

In Unson's office I met General Alejandrino--he is no longer an "Adviser to the President"--left some weeks ago, apparently, from what he says, because he could never get to see Quezon!

Luncheon at Wak-Wak--*despedida* for Andres Soriano. Colonel Hodson asked me whether he should advise his friends to accept the government's offer of \$350 for their Philippine Ry. bonds--or go to foreclosure? I told him they would not get that much out of a foreclosure.

Sat between Dr Tuason and Shultz, manager of the great Roxas estate at Calauan in Laguna. He has from three to four thousand employees--and in twenty-five years has had no labour troubles--never a case in court--there is now no indebtedness from his tenants to the plantation; has no bother from the Department of Labour officials. Says copra is a better price than the dessicated coconut factory pays--thinks the Philippines should stick to exporting raw materials, as they are not prepared for industrialization

May 29, 1936. A. D. Williams at my office. A few days ago, he was called before the Cabinet to advise on new taxation. Quezon wants a transportation tax on all forms of travel. Cabinet members wish to devote the cedula tax to school purposes only<sup>h</sup> thus making it more popular.

The President went today to Cabuyao, Nueva Ecija to see a new church dedicated. A. D. Williams is to take him on Monday to Silang to see the route of a new road to Tagaytay thus cutting thirteen kilometers off the run. Quezon stopped this road construction several years ago (not to favour the wishes of Aguinaldo?). Now he wants to see it go through, but says he apprehends a "kick-back" because he (Quezon) is interested in the land syndicate at Tagaytay!

Luncheon with William Shaw at Wak-Wak for Andres Soriano--about 150 men--terrific din of talking and later of noisy jazz music. One's voice is strained trying to converse. Say with Clyde Dewitt, and had a very interesting talk over the Archbishop and his business interests here. His Grace appears to be losing all along the line.

Hoskins greeted Secretary Rodriguez as "Governor" (he was formerly so in Rizal) and remarked that a governor of a province had more power than a Secretary of Department. "Yes" said Rodriguez "especially nowadays"! He has just been replaced by Secretary Alas as President of the National Development Co.

Small dance in the new downstairs cabaret at Malacanan. The heavy rain from 5-8 p.m. had flooded parts of the Palace, which we entered on planksh. Quezon appeared late. He asked me if I noticed the speed with which he signed the Executive Order proposed by Unson for transferring Engineer Island and the lighthouse service to the Bureau of Customs. This is the second time lately he has emphasized his rapid executive action--Why?<sup>92</sup>

May 30, 1936<sup>e</sup> Many telephones out of action due to yesterday's small flood.

Talked, however, with Quezon on the telephone.

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<sup>92</sup> It seems that Quezon had someone whispering in his ear that Harrison was talking about his indecisiveness. Any one of the people Harrison talked with about the subject was sufficiently beholden to Quezon to "turn" him in.

Press carries a statement that the President opposes the transfer of Provincial Treasurers to the Department of Finance, but will submit the question to his Cabinet on Monday.

Received the May 1st copy of the *Japan Times* from the Japanese Consulate here, containing a special issue on Japan-Philippines relations with a very frank article by Debuchi, former Japanese Ambassador to the United States analyzing commercial and political difficulties of the Commonwealth. Also an article by Marquis Tokugawa expressing friendship and desire for more intimate relations with the Philippines. Also a plea by a Japanese businessman for tariff revision in the Philippines. Likewise, two very sensible articles putting forward Japan's side of the Davao case, and estimating the investment there by Japanese variously from 50 million to 100 million yen. Also an article and speech by Manuel A. Alzate, chairman of the committee on Foreign Affairs of the Philippine Assembly. He begins by acknowledging their cultural debt to Spain and to United States and their economic and political debt to latter, but "This state of things, nevertheless is not bound to continue. Several forces are now at work tending to bring the Philippines into closer communion with the other countries of the Far East!"<sup>93</sup> He analyses trade as it now exists between Japan and the Philippines and shows how one-sided it is, and insists Japan must buy more Philippine products: "Your country by reason of her geographical proximity and her present industrial development is an ideal market for Philippine products."

The local papers here, print increasing accounts of "good-will" visits of Filipinos to Japan; also visits there of other prominent Filipinos in consequence of the "T.V.T.!" newspaper contests here for "popularity" etc. All this movement and activity has sprung from the general belief outside the government circles here that the Philippines are a part of the Orient and had better make the best of the situation!<sup>94</sup> The recent coldly hostile attitude of the United States Congress etc., is having its effect, and underlying government influence here is no doubt stressing the necessity for an earnest study of their relations with Japan. The Japanese are making an evident attempt to show courtesy and consideration for the visiting Filipinos. All of the above shows that the Filipinos are making a real attempt (rather under cover) to face their fears and meet the dragon with out-stretched hand.

Received a wire that Doria is back in Shanghai; I hope the increasing troubles and public disturbances in China due to Japanese activity in the North will remain comparatively innocuous while she is there!

May 31, 1936. Sunday. Day reserved for bridge with Quezon but early in the morning a message came through from Nueva Ecija, that he would not return. Went to a tea dance at Bay View Hotel given in honour of ex-Senator Torralba, now an adviser at Malacanan.

June 1, 1936. At office and Survey Board. Tension growing between spokesmen for United States (Congressmen etc.) and the Philippines. Article in *Herald* by columnist Lopez<sup>95</sup> concludes: "There may be strings to Japan's proffer of friendship. We should be fools not to suspect that, but if American policy continues to be what it is, it were best perhaps to take the proffer, strings and all, rather than hang ultimately from the tightening rope of American selfishness."

Address of President Bocobo of the University of the Philippines advocating intensification of Filipino culture, saying industrialism in the Philippines is a poor substitute for independence. "If this new Philippines is going simply to duplicate or reproduce what America or Europe has done for the culture of the world, its role in history will be vain and meaningless. Despite the softening effects of Western culture on Filipino life, the Filipino character still retains enough of the grit and sand and iron of the Malay ancestors. We must neutralize the deadening influence of Western customs which we have initiated without having adopted Western organization and industry!"

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<sup>93</sup>See J. L. Vellut, *The Asian Policy of the Philippines 1954-61* (Canberra: Department of International Relations, The Australian National University, 1965).! See also Teodoro A. Agoncillo, *A Short History of the Philippines* (New York: Mentor Book, 1969), pp. 285-300, *passim*.

<sup>94</sup>For Quezon and Japan, see Grant K. Goodman, *Davao: A Case Study in Japanese-Philippine Relations* (Lawrence: Center for East Asian Studies, The University of Kansas, 1967); see also his *Four Aspects of Philippine-Japanese Relations, 1930-1940* (New Haven: Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University, 1967).

<sup>95</sup>Salvador P. Lopez.

Bridge in the evening with A. D. Williams, Saleeby and Peters. Quezon did not return this morning to make his trip to Silang with Williams. The latter says that the President expressed himself to him as being sore at the attitude of the United States Congress in withholding funds from the Philippines. I suppose Quezon is preparing for the Rotary Club a speech with a big sting in it.

It seems to me possible that Secretary Yulo, who went recently as far as Shanghai with the High Commissioner, was entrusted with some powers of negotiation with the Japanese.

The papers here are full of the wrangling and the childish arguments in the Municipal Board--particularly over the regulation of the *cocheros*--it is a pitiful exhibition of incompetence of city councillors and their failure to understand their civic duty, but after all, infinitely straighter and more decent than the government of some American cities!

June 3, 1936. Moreno, the lawyer, President of the Yale Club here has secured the consent of the President of Yale University to confer the degree of LL.D. on Quezon if he can attend commencement at New Haven in June 1937. I am to ask Quezon whether he will accept.

Conference with Unson at the office--he, while waiting to see Quezon, went over the ground of the Survey Board; also the following questions he wishes to lay before the President:

(1) Are Department Secretaries to continue to run the bureaus, or shall they revert to the old way of leaving it to the Bureau Chiefs--Department Secretaries being only supervisory?

(2) Could the Bureau of Commerce be put under the Department of Labour, as in the United States? At present the amount of work in Departments is unbalanced. Now the Secretary of Labour gets only the viewpoint of the labourers. Query: whether the proposed move would alarm labouring men who are afraid of capitalism?

(3) If Provincial Treasurers are moved to the Department of Finance, should this Department control disbursements in the provinces as well as collections? If so, how? Provincial Treasurers would lose caste by the change--how avoid this? Formerly, Frank Carpenter as the right-hand man of the Governor General and as Executive Secretary,--trained the Provincial Treasurers, and thus lent prestige to them. Now, politics has entered in; and the standards are lower.

(4) Our plan of concentrating laboratories in the Bureau of Science is impracticable; we find that there are too many in different bureaus. The largest number are in the School of Hygiene, Bureau of Animal Industry at Pandacan and at Alabang where the animal sera are manufactured.

(5) The Bureau of Lands is badly administered: there are appalling delays--(also graft, I think). They thought that the Friar Lands Division had broken even; but the Auditor shows us that the government has lost four and one-half millions in this agency.

(6) Unson is opposed to creating a Department of Health, at greatly increased expense. Says a Commissioner of Health and Welfare might be made an Undersecretary of Department; or else a big bureau of Health & Welfare might be created with four divisions:

- (I) Health or Sanitation
- (II) Quarantine
- (III) Hospitals
- (IV) Welfare.

June 4, 1936. Unson was with the President this morning and reports that Quezon is in favour of having the Bureaus run the Government but insists that the Department Secretaries should do all the talking (as in England). He is opposed to a combination of the Bureau of Commerce with the Department of Labour (saying to Unson: "I am not going to change any of my Secretaries"!!); is for four [sic] divisions as stated above; he is definitely opposed to consolidating any provinces.

I suggested to Unson that the National Police prescribed by the constitution should be a *Guardia Civil*--always loyal, and not part of the army; hence never in politics.



On board *Negros* for the President's trip given for the members of the National Assembly. Ship was two hours late in starting because Quezon was making an address before the Rotary Club in the Manila Hotel. Forty-five Assemblymen are in the party, almost a quorum; also Osmena and Major Speth and T. Wolff--the latter two, with myself being the only "palefaces" in the party. Those of us already on board heard Quezon's speech on the radio. His delivery was excellent--slow and distinct. He first said chaffingly that the Cabinet had just decided to put a tax on lip-stick; then he paid a tribute to Murphy, but complained that the High Commissioner was always after them to balance the budget, under the conviction, apparently, that what was good for the Filipinos was not good for America! Asked for support from all elements, said that the task of government was very difficult. He referred to ex-Judge Malcolm's book on the Philippine Commonwealth which had just been published and in answer to some of the criticisms in it, he described the book as an: "Autobiography of Justice Malcolm--by himself." Next he went for T.V.T. and *Herald* for their criticisms--especially the editorial of Romero (*Herald*) on his (Quezon's) decision that the Rice and Corn Corporation need not pay customs duties, on the ground that it was: "Government transferring money from one pocket to the other." Stated he was trying to run the government on business lines, like a corporation executive; he proposed to try new plans, but nothing very radical. His speech hit hard, but was very good-humoured and was well received. He told the "secret" of the inauguration where the Secretary of War had ordered 21 guns to be fired and then had it reduced to 19. Quezon reported that thereupon he told Secretary of War Dern he would take the oath of office in his Pasay home, but relented. Said that the United States should do all it could to build up the power of his government, for it was better for the United States, and for all Americans (and foreigners) to have this "experiment" succeed.<sup>96</sup>

When the steamer started, went to bridge with Quezon, Wolff and Roxas, until 3:45 a.m.

June 5, 1936. Bridge with the President, Roxas and Speaker Montilla. Quezon went for the last named for not knowing anything about bridge. Praise for Governor Carpenter, Marabut and for Rafael Palma's education report. Quezon said he found the Department of the Interior the most unpopular branch of the administration. Told Roxas that his memorable address at the University Commencement had been criticized for not being more specific, but that he (Quezon) commended it for that very reason.<sup>97</sup> The conversation then went on about the Binalbagan sugar shares held by the Philippine National Bank and then passed to the subject of Venancio Concepcion. Quezon said General Concepcion wanted "vindication"; that the answer of the planters showing why they should be allowed to buy the bank shares was very modest, but would show plainly, if published, why Concepcion should be prosecuted again. The President commented that Concepcion had gained control of the National Bank in a way no one else had attained; that thereby he forced Whittaker to apply for the loan to Binalbagan, and to make him (Concepcion) President of the company; this provided an exit for him (Concepcion) if he should be finally forced out of the bank; that Osmena had already told Concepcion how difficult a fight it was to keep him as head of the bank; that the Vice-President still believed that Concepcion was innocent. I told Quezon how Osmena had burst into tears when I first showed reluctance to the appointment of Venancio Concepcion, as Vice-President of the bank; and that I had finally yielded the point rather than break with Osmena. Quezon said Osmena often used tears; so that it no longer made any impression on him; he added that Osmena had lately tried it again when he (Quezon) refused to put Palma on the Supreme Court.

The President is looking fine, and exclaimed how well he felt. I commented on Commanding General Parker, and how the American Army still felt and claimed that they are part governors of the Philippines. He then told the story of Commanding General Holbrook who had sent him a curt official letter stating that his a.d.c. Captain Fellers was to return to duty at Corregidor. Quezon was very angry and sent Holbrook an equally curt reply that Fellers and any other army officers who worked for the Commonwealth Government were appointed by him in consultation with the President of the United States. Holbrook climbed down at once!

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<sup>96</sup>It is ironic that Quezon should have reacted as he did. Of all the Filipino leaders, he (more than anyone else) knew that most Americans did not know or care about the so-called experiment in the Philippines. He was asking the impossible of the American government when he called for it to step out in front of its own people and lead the way in Philippine-American relations. See Onorato, *A Brief Review of American Interest*, pp. 1-12.

<sup>97</sup>See Quezon's comment as expressed on page 74 of this diary.

I mentioned to Quezon the invitation of the President of Yale University to him (via Moreno, President of the Yale Club of the Philippines) to receive an LL.D. next year, if he could be present in person. Quezon was much pleased, and accepts.

Talk with Speaker Montilla and ex-Speaker Roxas on what use could be made in the future of sugar mills if they become no longer profitable. Montilla suggested the manufacture of bottles made of bagasse, alcohol for motors etc., and paper. He further said he was going to crush bamboo with the Bataan Sugar Co.'s mill in the off season for Soriano's brewery. Hodsoll was to put up a new paper mill in the same vicinity.

Bridge with Quezon, Sabido and Roxas. Quezon and I lost; the game lasted till nearly 4 a.m. Sabido is a brilliant player.

June 6, 1936. Arrived at Iligan, route having been changed by Quezon in accord with news from the Manila Weather Bureau. The visit to Culion is now to be at the end of trip.

Before making wharf at Iligan, Quezon addressed the Assemblymen, asking for funds for the development of Mindanao. He used maps, and said that an electric railway was to be built from Misamis, via Bukidnon to Davao, the water power for this project coming from the falls in Lanao. Only four or five of the Assemblymen had ever been in Mindanao before. The gathering seemed to be willing to vote the money, but wanted to know how they were to get the colonists? Quezon replied "Open roads, and they will come of themselves."

Sabido is opposed to agricultural colonies, when established with government money.

I told Quezon, Osmena and Roxas that economic plans for the Philippines were blanketed until either they decided, or circumstances decided for them, on their future economic relations with the United States. (I find many here agree with this feature of the difficulty of the sugar situation.)

Quezon talked of Elizalde and the Polo Club incident; he insisted that the refusal to elect Nieto a member had been due to its race discrimination against Filipinos; he added that Saleeby is an Assyrian Jew; that the Assyrians had for centuries allowed the Turks to trample them; that people of that type could not insult the Filipinos.

Osmena is subdued and *triste*. He has, I am told, money and family troubles, as well as political.

There is no drinking whatever aboard the ship; the steward complains that he had stocked up, and nobody uses it! Sharp contrast indeed to the last voyage on Negros when Don Andres Soriano was host to the American mining magnates.

Drive from Iligan to Dansalan (Lake Lanao)--surely one of the most beautiful bits of scenery in the Philippines. Through Maranao Botanical Gardens, where there is a waterfall; past the fine fields at Momungan, where in 1914 we established an agricultural colony for "down and out" Americans, of whom there were originally about fifty but now there are only eleven left; all the other colonists today being Filipinos. Then Lake Lanao with mountains in the background which is as fine a scene as any in Switzerland. The buildings, however, have run down since American army days here. The Constabulary who now compose the garrison are splendid picked troops: big, athletic men.

The President's speech of the day was made at Camp Keithley, where most of the Lanao Moro Datus were present. This made a brilliant scene with their vivid costumes. Quezon, instead of flattering them, as his predecessors had done, talked straight from the shoulder of what his government proposed to do to develop their country; and stated that now they would be required to expect no further consideration as Moros; that they must remember that they were all Filipinos, and that this is their own government. He stated very positively that he wanted no more disorders, adding that: "Life is precious everywhere, but in such beautiful surroundings as Lake Lanao, life is doubly valuable," and then finally cautioned them that: "thus it would be wise of them to be good"!!

This was new talk for the Moros, and one of them remarked to a friend: "he is hard on us." All this will do inestimable good. Quezon spoke very carefully, selecting each word. It was badly translated by a native into the bastard Arabic which the Lanao Moros are supposed to use.

Luncheon was served at the post club. It suddenly became dark and began to rain. The meal had been laid for one hundred and twenty, but many more were there, and the food disappeared in ten minutes--as in a visitation of locusts!

After lunch, Wolff and [I went to the house of Lt. Ormai, of the Artillery. He is a small man and a killer.]<sup>98</sup> He said he had two stokes mortars, two mountain guns (3.2) and a sub-machine gun; that the last time he took a cotta (about two months ago) he found their bolt holes, and described how he shelled the Moros there. He said the Lanao Moros are cowards (Cooley says ditto)!. They oppose everything proposed by the government, but are divided into numbers of petty sultanates. These "Sultans" are selected, if of the blood of the former sultan, for their personal bravery. They get a share of the religious receipts. The older Moros present today had, no doubt, been leaders of the Priate Empire existing from ancient times which fell after the American occupation; until that, they used to raid the northern islands of the Philippines for slaves and plunder. Their reign is at an end.

Visit to Reina Cristina falls; a magnificent site, and the best hydro-electric proposition in the Philippines. This will certainly suffice to run an electric railway. Quezon has ordered the Bureau of Public Works to give no more franchises for water power in the Philippines; all are to be reserved for the government.

Camp Overton, near Iligan has been entirely abandoned. I first came there with General Pershing in December 1913.

Left Iligan for Zamboanga. At dinner with Quezon, Santos, Roxas and Sabido. Roxas and I pressed hard for reforestation and a campaign against forest destruction for clearings (*caigñins*)h. Quezon heartily agreed with our arguments. Someone remarked that Cebu had been so ruined by destruction of its forests, that in a century from now it would have hardly any population. I mentioned what the Government of Japan was doing for reforestation; how Germany, France, Switzerland managed it by communes. Quezon said he was confident he could make the people understand why they should not burn the forests for homesteads (*caigñins*).

The President added that this was the first visit to Lanao he had ever enjoyed, because he didn't have to listen to Datu Amanabilang; that the last time this old Moro had spoken in his presence he had argued that they did not want to be governed by Filipinos but wanted the Americans there; but today a Datu had protested against the American Superintendent of Schools, and wanted a Filipino. He, (Quezon), thereupon "went for him"; and told him his threat of closing the schools by withholding children would not be listened to by the government; that if the schools here were closed, the money would go elsewhere, where people were clamoring for schools. Quezon further admonished this man that the Datus were no better before the law than the poor man--that even he as Chief Executive was not above the laws. That the Moros, though in a minority, had equal rights with the Christian Filipinos; that if the Moros developed a great leader, as he hoped they would, this man would be available for election as President. Quezon also denounced their petition for Moro Governors of provinces and *Presidentes* of villages, and said the best citizens would be selected where he was a Moro or a *Cristiano*.

Later, the President told me he now thinks the Lanao Moros will gradually "come into camp," when they see that the government is in earnest; that they are good farmers!, and he was going to build a fine road right around Lake Lanao, to help to civilize them, "instead of killing"; and if they won't be "good" they will eventually meet the same fate that the American Indians did.

The President was rather sharp with his a.d.c., Major Natividad, for trying to get him to read a paper at dinner, when he wanted to talk.

In the absence of the Governor, Quezon called up the Colonel commanding the Constabulary here, and ordered him to remove the squatters from around the reservation at Reina Cristina falls. He also told Roxas that he would wire the President of the United States asking that the remaining Army reservations near Camp Keithley be turned over to the Commonwealth Government, so that henceforth settlers on these lands would not be evicted.

I had a talk with Assemblyman Luna of Mindoro about his bill to protect tamaros!, a unique small buffalo, found on his island and nowhere else today. He told me

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<sup>98</sup> Brackets are found in the copy used for this edition. A question mark was placed at the end of the line in the left hand margin.



that the game reserve I had created by Executive Order on Mt. Calavite, Mindoro, was of no use because no game wardens had been appointed. He said the peculiarly malignant malaria found on this island had been eliminated at least from around San Jose. He added that he himself, has never been in the interior of the island, and it is almost uninhabited. Naturally, he wants this great province, just opposite Batangas, developed. I told him I thought the malaria in the past had practically ruined the island, since there had been a large population there in ancient times, to judge from old Chinese records.

A geologist named Belts, a great traveler and good observer, said a special brand of English was being developed here in the Philippines. The teachers had a bad accent and the pupils worse. (This is why I now find it more difficult to understand my servants,--and indeed all Filipinos, especially over the telephone.)

Talk with General Paulino Santos, the head of the Philippine Army, who is my cabin mate. More than twenty years ago I appointed him to be the first Filipino Governor of Lanao, and now he comes back as Chief of Staff, naturally, very proud he is of his rise in life. He is very conscientious and is fiery tempered about his work; he has no patience with political or personal promotion seekers. He is quick on the trigger about resigning if he meets a serious obstacle in administration--as he did with General Wood. He finds General MacArthur to be the cleverest American he has met, and very broad-minded. Santos intends to have all supplies for the new army made if possible in the Philippines. He will tolerate no interference with his official authority, and recently "sat on" General Valdes and Major Ord, MacArthur's assistant. He does not get on well with Osmena, but has a fine relationship with Quezon, who he says, was very cold with him at first. Santos is utterly and completely devoted to the service of his country,--and is not afraid of anyone nor of any nation. He remarked: "I honestly believe that next after the Japanese, the Filipinos are the greatest of the Asiatic peoples."

Comments I have heard upon the Lanao Moros by my companions are: vacant expression, open boob mouth, stained with betel nut--(Malay type). These Moros do not bathe, and one is glad to avoid shaking hands with them. Their poor physical appearance is variously ascribed to inbreeding, hook-worm, and opium.

A passenger on the *Negros* who is a much-traveled geologist said that in the Dutch East Indies the third generation of Mohammedan Malay were quite tractable, and he thought these Moros would develop in the same way.

Talk for one hour with Vice-President Osmena:--recollections of old times when he was the undisputed leader of his people, and we had worked so closely together. I asked him about Palma's report on education; he said he hoped it could be put into effect but was not sure. I next asked him about the high price of sugar shares in the Philippines. He thought the market level far too high, but said the sugar people had so much money they put it into more shares and high-priced *haciendas*. Next I recalled how with backing he had founded the National Development Company, eighteen years ago and it had accomplished nothing. Asked if all economic plans were not paralyzed by the sugar question, and he agreed.

Then I enquired about the reforestation of Cebu and he expressed himself as enthusiastic over the idea but at once diverted the conversation into a eulogy of planting fruit trees, and increasing the export of fruits. Said it was almost impossible to induce the Chinese to eat more sugar but in fruit: "can do." He eloquently pictured millions of Chinese eating Philippine bananas which he thinks far superior to those from Formosa. I called attention to the recent exclusion of mangoes from importation into the United States on the old dodge of thus preventing the introduction of the "fruit fly"! (Recalled my speech in Congress on this subject, and the cynical smile of Speaker Cannon.)

I asked Osmena about the future of their free trade market in the United States. He agrees with me this cannot be held. (So does Tommy Wolff, who comments: "none so blind as those who will not see.")

Next I asked Osmena about Nationalism in the Philippines. He said it was growing greatly, but that "it is wise to preserve some local sentiment or culture."

Osmena commented on the political strength of agricultural organizations in the United States, and said Secretary of State Hull told him: "These people are very powerful." I asked him why United States spokesmen are now "delivering so many kicks against the Philippines." He replied: "because of (a) the economic situation in America and (b) they have lost interest in the Philippines; the old generation, many of whom had altruistic feelings towards Filipinos, are gone."

He agreed that the period before complete independence would be shortened by the United States if the Filipinos asked for it.

Osmena then expressed feelings against the taking of teachers camp in Baguio for the army; said the teachers made the best soldiers anyway since they were so conscientious, and had such a sense of responsibility towards their country.

I reminded him of how we carried through the plan for civil government in Mindanao and Sulu in 1914, to which the War Department agreed because Pershing joined in the recommendation; Pershing's motive being support for his own record--he wanted to rank as the last Military Governor of the Moroland and to show that his administration had pacified those regions in order that the army could be withdrawn etc. Osmena then told a story of Pershing on a visit with him to Cotobato just before I came to the Philippines in 1913, when the proposal to establish a colony of *Cristianos* there was under investigation. Osmena added that Bryant (?) was taking photographs of Pershing, explaining that he wanted a record of the one who would be "responsible" for the project, and Pershing at once said he would have the plates broken. Quezon said they have by now spent a million pesos on this plan, but agrees that it was worth it, since, right where there is the largest Moro population, the purpose has been accomplished in Cotobato of "settling the Moro question."

Osmena also talked of the Japanese: thought them very clever, and thoroughly disciplined. He expressed surprise that though the Japanese did not talk good English their government statements in the English language were always so perfectly expressed. (I think former Consul General Kurusu is this "foreign office spokesman.")

Short speech by Quezon to the Assemblymen as we approached Zamboanga. He believes that the town is ended (commercially) because of its geographical position. He asked the respective committeemen to visit the schools and leprosarium; but the great object of interest is of course, San Ramon prison colony (founded by Don Ramon Blanco in 1870 for political prisoners, and developed by us into an agricultural and industrial penal colony). He stated that the time had now come for the Assembly to decide (a) whether to sell this *hacienda* to private parties, or (b) to sell part of it and keep part (piggery) or (c) to keep it as training school for the Davao penal settlement. There are 1300 hectares at San Ramon, and 27,000 at Davao.

Tommy Wolff told us how, during one of his earlier political campaigns Quezon had been savagely attacked as a *mestizo*--especially in the provinces of Tarlac or Zambales. Quezon at once went to a meeting there and stated in his speech that his mother was a Filipina, he was born in the Philippines, and that he is a Filipino--he "didn't know what mestizo meant!"

In Zamboanga, Osmena made the address at the Plaza Pershing. It was said to have been extremely eloquent. He spoke *con amore* of the development of the former "Moro Province" and made polite allusions to my work there. The President and I played truant and went out to San Ramon with Speth and swam on the beach there. All the rest of the party joined us there at tea-time. Quezon persuaded me to eat for the first time *balut*, i.e., eggs containing chickens about to hatch! It is really quite a delicacy. The President at once noticed the prettiest girl there and danced with her; there was a lot of amusing chaff over his writing in her autograph book. Quezon then told us a lipstick story of a Hollywood girl he once met on the steamer crossing the Pacific--he was giving her a cocktail and remarked: "I wonder why girls use that hateful lipstick?"! She instantly replied: "Don't be afraid, I'm not! coming near you." (But she did.)

Talk of the bad English accent of the young Filipinos of today; Quezon said he was going to try to have English instruction eliminated from the primary grades, and get Americans to teach in higher grades. I asked: why not get teachers who really speak English--namely, the English themselves?

Then had a talk with Quezon about Secretary of War Newton Baker. Listening to my account of my own slightly strained relations with him, he said "I thought the atmosphere of the army in the War Department was affecting him!"

Quezon told me of High Commissioner's insistent dwelling on the necessity of balancing the budget. Quezon had heard that Murphy stated the Philippine Army was unbalancing the budget, "and that was one of the reasons I accompanied him on the boat as far as Hong Kong but we never had a chance to discuss it." When Quezon returned to Manila, he sent for Weldon Jones to talk this over, and said to him: "before we begin to talk, let's agree on the term 'balanced Budget!'" This was then

defined as: "the ordinary expenses of the Government falling within the ordinary revenues." Agreed. Then he told Jones that the recent income of the Philippine Government was not "ordinary," because "we have had a row of Governors General here who didn't collect the taxes." He added that he would collect five million pesos a year more than his predecessors had done from the present taxes, and "in the first quarter of this year I have already collected two millions more than were received last year; moreover, I am going to impose new taxes: an inheritance tax (where there are no children) to confiscate all estates over a half million pesos, and heavy income taxes on all those having over 100,000 pesos income which is "enough money for any human being." Weldon Jones expressed himself as delighted with this form of taxation, and, added Quezon "Murphy himself would be delighted but had not the nerve to risk public disapproval here; he will be glad to be absent while this is done!"

I commented to the President on his advantage with the legislature in being a Filipino himself, and, unlike his predecessors, he was thus able to deal directly with them, and not thru an intermediary. He replied: "I know the (*sotto voce*) God-damn psychology well enough."

Quezon asked Colonel Stevens commander of the local Constabulary (Army) at Zamboanga whether he would like to be transferred to Manila. Stevens, who was driving the motor said slowly: "Well, Mr. President, I would really rather stay in Zamboanga." Quezon replied: "Well, next year you will have to come to Manila anyway for six months, you can't get to be a General without doing that. I will attach you to Malacanan and then you can get a per diem." Stevens said "Very good, Sir." He has about the nicest house in Zamboanga. We went there to play bridge later. Quezon explained to Stevens that he wanted the Non-Christians to "get accustomed" to Filipino officers and had moved Dosser from the Mountain Province, and Fort from Lanao accordingly.

Interesting talk with Quezon over my landlord and tenant propositions. He told me of the bill introduced to lay progressive taxes on large landed estates, as I had recommended in January. He said that Assemblymen had been in touch with him on this; that the savage attack in the *Bulletin* against this bill convinced him of its merit, if before that he had had any doubt that the idea was sound. I then talked about the Irish Land Laws with him, and asked him if Roxas would oppose, after lamenting in his University of the Philippines commencement speech that "the land in the Philippines was passing from the peasantry to large land-owners." Quezon said "Yes, he will object, on account of his wife (a De Leon from Bulacan) but we shall beat him." Told him I wanted to consult with members of the Labour Committee now on board about the bill, and he said "Yes--you'd better."

After dinner I stayed on board writing up these notes, while all the rest went to the dance at the Zamboanga Club and returned at 11 p.m. in high spirits, but with no signs of alcohol.

Bridge with Quezon, Roxas and Sabido, from 11:30 to 4 a.m. Then sat talking with Quezon and Sabido until 5. For the first time, with Quezon, I raised the Japanese question. He said his first preference would be for the Philippines to stick to the United States, if possible; if not, to England. If those alternatives are not available, he would come to an arrangement with the Japanese, and "I can do it--I know how." Sabido said that the Japanese individuals who he knows are all afraid of Quezon--that the President was the only man who could handle that question. Quezon said that a few years ago, in Shanghai he brought Chinese and Japanese leaders together, and the success of those negotiations was temporarily such that the Japanese people at home were for a time annoyed with their army for treating the Chinese so harshly. Like every one else, Quezon has grown tired of trying to help the Chinese "nation," but now says it would be the best thing for China to recreate her country with the aid of the Japanese. "The Japanese despise the Chinese" he said "but admire the Filipinos for setting up their own nation." He then told some of the recent history of North Asia with a sympathetic understanding of Japanese problems; described how, at first, all they wanted in Manchuria was to protect the interests of their railroad there. The Chinese had agreed to Japan's building this railroad, thinking it would be a dead loss but when, instead, it became profitable, "They threw stones at the Japanese." He recounted the extreme aggressions of the Chinese which had harassed the Japanese so sorely--how the Chinese propaganda had brought the European powers to her side as had also the missionary propaganda in the United States. He added that the successful war of Japan against Russia had been brought by them as a purely defensive campaign, if ever there was one."

Quezon believes in the good-will of Japan towards the new Filipino nation. He remarked: "I have acquaintance with a large number of Japanese, but have hardly ever



been able to make friends of them"--an exception is Marquis Tokugawa--the grandson of the Shogun. Another friend is the present Japanese Consul General in Manila, who replaced an arrogant and trying man, and is more like Kurusu. The President said he is getting constantly closer to the Japanese Consul at Manila; that the latter is now learning to trust him, and actually gave him more information about the strained Davao situation than "any of my own fellows"--"I telephoned him recently and told him that the question which caused real irritation against Japan among the Filipinos was not Davao, a question the people at large really do not understand, but that of their invasion of our fisheries, a matter the Filipinos do understand, since it affects their own food supply." The Consul replied that he saw the point clearly, and would ask his government to draw off the invading fishermen. President Quezon admitted that the reported "incident" on his recent visit to Davao was true: namely, that the Japanese Consul had suggested that there might be "grave consequences" in the outcome, and Quezon had replied: "You can't bluff me." We then talked of our old friend Ambassador Hanihara of long ago in our congressional days in Washington--Quezon said the incident which caused his recall as Ambassador, was very unjust: "Hanni," (as we used to call him), showed the "offending" letter to Secretary of State Hughes before he sent it and Hughes said "fine":e-then, the fierce public reaction in the United States frightened Hughes, and Ambassador Hanihara was recalled by the Japanese Government and Hughes permitted this injustice in silence.

I asked Quezon what he proposed doing to stop the Moros from smuggling in Chinese coolies and opium? (A matter apparently entirely neglected nowadays) and inquired why he didn't get a fast gunboat. He replied that in a couple of months he would have five of Mussolini's fast "torpedo type" boats capable of going fifty miles an hour.

To bed at 5 a.m. after a more interesting day and night.

June 8, 1936e Slept until 11 a.m. The party went up to Cotobato and Quezon, Speth and I swam at the mouth of the river. Formerly, General Wood's favourite army post in Mindanao was near here but is now abandoned and fifty squatters are on the reservation. Quezon says he will put them off, as he wants to make this the principal Philippine army post--just half way between Zamboanga and Davao.

Argument over airplanes,--posts and travel. The President complains they are very expensive. Discussion of the relative merits of land and sea planes for use in the Philippines. (Asked Capt Bradford in Davao--he rather favours land planes--says that amphibious planes are too heavy to carry pay loads.)

Talk at lunch over exercise of the pardon power. Quezon quoted Chief Justice Taft as ruling that this power extended to one even before the judgment of the court, which surprised me. He spoke of pardons for those sentenced for adultery, and told of a case of long ago decided by Judge Borja in Tayabas, in which he (Quezon) was wrongly accused of using influence for a pardon. The accused were the father of Don Miguel Unson and another man's wife. Unson was then 70 years old, and the facts were clear. The woman pleaded guilty, and was sentenced, while Unson was tried and acquitted! Quezon stated his views of pardons (which are the same ideas as those which actuated me when I exercised this power)--crimes of cheating and stealing and meanness deserve no pardon, while crimes of violence, if unpremeditated, deserved sympathetic consideration.

Off for Davao. Bridge and early to bed.

June 9, 1936. Chat with ex-Speaker Roxas: he said that there is a copper mine in Capiz which has contracted to sell the whole of its output for one year to the Japanese; he further stated that the vast iron fields which I set aside by Executive Order in 1915 as a government reservation had aroused the interest of Marsman who was now contesting the validity of this action; in Roxas's opinion, Marsman will not put up a real struggle against the government. I suggested to him that it might be better for the government to lease this iron field to Marsman on a royalty basis. Roxas says he asked the High Commissioner before he left to get the consent of the President of the United States for the Philippine Government to (a) give Quezon flexible tariff rights to raise or lower 100% on any item of the custom's tariff; and (b) to negotiate commercial treaties (under supervision of the American State Department) with foreign powers.

Quezon made an excellent talk to the Assemblymen just before our arrival at Davao: he spoke in Spanish and first called attention to their visit to Cotobato, and said that the former army post at Parang should be the capital not only of Cotobato but of all Mindanao. That it was equidistant from Zamboanga, Lanao and Davao.

He then turned to the Davao question giving a very carefully worded exposition of the burning question of the day: he said "there is no Davao question," and that the press had been guilty of irritating public opinion both in Japan and the Philippines. "It shows how the newspapers can embroil nations, even to the point of war," he said, "but there is nothing in Davao which threatens Filipino rights nor the economic position of the country. If there is no Davao question there is a Davao situation, which is not to be sneezed at. By their handling of this matter, the Filipinos will be judged as to their ability and sense of justice in dealing with foreign nationals." He went on to say that: "The Executive branch of this Philippine Government has examined the situation very carefully, with a determination to solve this matter with the Assembly. It is not desirable, nor is it necessary for the legislators to examine into this matter today."

When the *Negros* docked, Quezon again put Osmena to the fore, and the latter received the plaudits of the crowd and the Constabulary honors. Osmena was to be in the front all day. (Very wise!) Quezon knows Osmena would like it very much.

Wolff, Major Speth and I went with the procession to the end of the (plank) motor road, but there was not sufficient railway transportation for all the party, so we slipped back to lunch and to shop at Davaoh

Swim with Quezon and Speth--water muddy and warm, but Quezon enjoyed himself with great zest. He went over his reasons for taking Assemblymen into his confidence:--to make them more nationally conscious and give them "a sense of responsibility to their country." "These young men will be the statesmen of the future--but I am making it very hard for my successor."

I asked Quezon whether the absence of Japanese on the streets etc., today in Davao was not on their part an act of policy (so this would not look like a Japanese colony) and he whispered that this had been staged by the Japanese Consul General.

June 10, 1936. All day at sea. Quezon talked of the newspaper press, and said they had always (except of the *Herald*--"which was founded by me (Quezon) with the money of my friends") attacked him and supported Osmena. He added: "Murphy had daily press conferences and one a week for foreign correspondents, while I agreed to one general press conference a week, and only kept three of those!"

Quezon said of Davao that he intended to persuade ten rich families from Negros, Bulacan and Pangasinan to take up a thousand hectares each, and establish modern hemp *haciendas* there to show the Filipinos that they can cultivate better than the Japanese. The advantages of the latter in hemp had been in organization and modern science--qualities quite lacking in the hemp culture of the Bicol regions of the Philippines. The last "individual" method surviving there "insured the least profit at the most cost," as contrasted with organized, "planned" industry.

Bridge the whole afternoon. At supper with Quezon, Roxas, and Sabido, the last named called attention to Assemblyman Rafols of Cebu who had Nile green embroidered pyjamas (at the next table)--like a woman's beach pyjamas. Lots of laughter and chaff and Rafols was called "Cleopatra."

Sabido then told of Assembly roll having been called to: "Datu Umbra" (husband of Princess Dayang-Dayang), and Rafols had objected to the use of the title saying: "why shouldn't my name be called as 'lawyer Rafols.'" Umbra happened to be absent, but at the next session he appeared and said he understood he had been "attacked" (some mischief maker probably an "anti," said Quezon), and was prepared to "meet" the gentleman from Cebu anywhere outside the Chamber in a closed room or in the open. Rafols at once apologized and asked to have his previous remarks expunged from the record. (He had "heard of these Moros" said Quezon.)

Quezon tells me he is going to establish a general pension system for all government employes.

The President is provoked by the ruling of the State Department of the United States as to Americans being unable to divest themselves of their citizenship on becoming Philippine citizens; said that the law firm of Ross Lawrence and Selph had acted like damned fools in presenting the question as they did; that the State Department had taken this chance of serving the United States Treasury (income tax); that these opinions of Ross, Lawrence & c and of Clyde Dewitt had shown their imperialist frame of mind. Roxas said this left the situation as really ridiculous. Sabido asked Quezon what would be the position of Americans who had meanwhile become Philippine citizens, when the ten year period expired--Quezon replied very positively: "They will be Filipino citizens."

The President said he would station 1000 soldiers at Parang. He has evidently been depressed over the situation for he remarked to me confidentially: "I am beginning to believe I shall make a success of this government but you have no idea how deep petty jealousies are!" (It is unusual, to say the least, to find so buoyant a character at all discouraged.)

N.B. At my conference on the *Aparceros* bill with Magalona yesterday, I was embarrassed by his bringing with him as "interpreter" a reporter of the *Bulletin*, the very paper which had savagely attacked Perfecto's bill recently, and had denounced its proposal to put a progressive income tax on large landed estates--the policy I had suggested to Quezon in January.

June 11, 1936. Arrived early in Jolo. The party went off to tour the island, while Quezon took me swimming to a beach half an hour by motor from Jolo, an ideal strand and cool crystal water. This is the only proper swimming place we have yet found. We were followed by Major Gallardo and six soldiers, who were posted at sharpest attention facing back from the beach on to the jungle. There have been three killings this week in Jolo--one of a soldier by a *juramentado*. Quezon found the water rather too cold, but was exhilarated by the spur of it. We were taken there by a Spanish *mestizo* formerly in government service in Manila who now owns the electric light plant in Jolo. The President introduced him as the "Rockefeller of Jolo" and said to him: "you have made millions out of the Moros"--to which he replied: "no Sir! out of the *crisianos*, because the Moros go to bed immediately after dinner!" Quezon roared, and said: "Now this man is a friend of mine!"

We talked of General Wood, and Quezon said: "When I write my history of his administration<sup>99</sup> here people will say I was prejudiced, but Wood wished to sell the whole Philippines. He was also so anxious to make friends with the Moros that he told the Constabulary not to shoot at them"--"the result was that a few years ago the Moros massacred nearly a whole company of Constabulary here in Jolo, and killed all the officers; the only survivors were those who were the fastest runners"--"I do not feel any rancour against General Wood, only pity!"

The Sultan of Sulu has just died, and the question of the perpetuation of the "Sultanate" is raised. His brother is the claimant tho his niece Dayang-Dayang wishes to be Sultan. Quezon says she is, by far, the ablest of the Moros, and is married to Datu Umbra. (I remember her telling me 20 years ago how she had fought against the American army in the trenches at the battle of Bud Daho.) The Moham-medan law, so far as I know, does not permit of a woman being Sultan, but anyhow the late Sultan surrendered a large part of his political sovereignty to General Bliss in 1903 (?) and finally to Carpenter in 1915. "Much greater surrender of rights to Carpenter" said Quezon. He told me Governor Fort of Jolo wished the government to select the Sultan, but Guingona stopped his making this blunder before it was too late. There is to be a conference at 10 a.m. today to settle this question; Quezon said he would recognize the Sultan<sup>100</sup> only as the religious head. I asked him whether it would not be easier to do as the English and Dutch do? "No! not at the expense of good government. My first thought is always of that!" (An excellent and characteristic bit of philosophy).

He is now talking confidentially with Mrs Rogers (a German *mestiza* who is the wife of a former Governor of Jolo, and is the source of much of his information here). I heard him say: "If you were a man, I would make you Governor of Jolo!" I asked Mrs Rogers if there were any dances at Jolo? "No! only killings!"

Quezon told me that Osmena made a speech during the late political campaign denouncing him for his fight against Governor General Wood, and stating that he (Osmena) had only taken part "as a matter of discipline."<sup>101</sup> Quezon remarked: "I was very glad to learn this--they were scared." To my question, he said "I forced the Cabinet to resign!"<sup>102</sup>

<sup>99</sup>The closest Quezon came to writing his history of the American! governors general was *The Good Fight* in which he mentioned nothing controversial about Leonard Wood. The whole struggle between him and Wood was reduced to a few lines.

<sup>100</sup>The British North Borneo Company through the Foreign Office expressed interest in the succession because of the stipend paid by the Company to the Sultan.

<sup>101</sup>It would appear from the study of Osmena by Vicente Albano Pacis that Osmena supported Quezon most reluctantly. See *President Sergio Osmena: A Fully Documented Biography* (2 vols.; Quezon City: Phoenix Press, Inc., 1971), I, 323, 335, 343f.

<sup>102</sup>See Onorato, *A Brief Review of American Interest*, pp. 76-83.



I told Quezon that the closest parallel to his constructive work was that of Mustapha Kemal in Turkey, who has given perhaps the best example today of government work in modernizing and organizing an Asiatic race. He replied: "Yes! he is more like me than anybody else." He has evidently been studying Kemal's career. Quezon added: "the chief difference between us is the religious one--he is a Mohammedan and I a Christian!" I remarked that Kemal had separated Church and State. "Yes, but the religious difference between us, however superficial the religion of each of us, permits him a different behaviour. We both love to gamble, but I refrain from doing so--Kemal seeks his excitement, when government affairs are quiet, in the underworld, drinking with the lowest men and frequenting the coarsest women!" I remarked: "Well, Kemal is not a gentleman." Quezon replied "Neither am I,--I come from the common people." He went on to say that Kemal, like himself had an "unbalanced nervous character," but while Kemal satisfied his tendencies in abovementioned ways, Quezon restrained himself. He agreed with my remark that he (Quezon) would not be so well if he did not have all these troubles and excitements of political life with which to contend.

The President then talked of the Philippine Army. I said that if they had not taken away from us the National Guard which he and I organized in 1917-18 (Air Corps and submarine also) we would be better off here now. "Yes,!" he replied, "our work would now be partly accomplished!" We spoke of the parade on the Luneta in which I led the National Guard division in review before him.<sup>103</sup> Quezon said "Wasn't that splendid! I want you and myself to review at least one hundred thousand Filipino soldiers before the end of my administration; many of our rich people here don't want to pay for protection! But this will cure the inferiority complex of the Filipinos." He spoke of the fine soldiers now here on the wharf, and we agreed that these fellows were "killers.!"

There has been only one typhoon in Jolo in 80 years--that of 1932, which took off most of the roofs in the town.

I asked him (Quezon) again about the 5 torpedo boat vessels he has ordered from Italy, and he said they were exceedingly fast and quite cheap, adding: "these are the boats with which Mussolini scared the British Navy out of the Mediterranean."

Bridge in p.m.; at night a ball in the Park pavilion in Zamboanga. I went with Osmena. Major General Holbrook was there, having brought three planes down from Manila. The steamer sailed early in the morning for Manila direct, cutting out the Culion (leper colony) part of the program because many of the Assemblymen are prone to seasickness.

June 12, 1936. All day at sea. Worked in the morning on Landlord & Tenant bill. Bridge with Quezon, Roxas and Sabido. At Dumaguete from 4-5 p.m. to allow four Visayan Assemblymen to disembark. Quezon again put Osmena forward to receive the honors. The President took Speth, Assemblyman Villanueva and me by motor out to see the hot springs. Many attractions in this neighbourhood. They have a "Baguio" at 3000 feet on the extinct volcano--very rich soil, and 70,000 people in or near the town; Quezon agreed that there is sufficient population here to make a chartered city with a decent hotel, this could be developed into a tourist resort. There is a crater lake, also limestone caves which are a great site for archaeology--evidences of iron, gold and sulphur exist hereabouts. They have a successful Methodist university, the Silliman. Quezon asked me many questions about Dr Otley Beyer--evidently wants to be informed of the ancient history of the Philippines. Said he himself had Ilongot blood through his mother. There are many *mestizas* in Dumaguete--it appears that when the Spanish liberals were exiled to Mexico, some of them drifted out here and to Zamboanga. Quezon remarked that they did a good job!

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<sup>103</sup>There is no question that the United States Army both in Manila and Washington were not very anxious to see Harrison and Quezon succeed in developing the Philippine National Guard. After much foot dragging the American military authorities helped the Filipinos but it took all the pressure that Harrison could put upon the War Department to get the Guard federalized just before the war ended on November 11, 1918. From start to finish the National Guard was an attempt to show loyalty and solidarity with the United States fighting against European autocracy. As such, it was resented by most Americans in Manila. Nevertheless the Guard represented the first concrete effort to establish a posture of defense on the part of the Filipino leaders. The refusal of the U.S. Army to offer any help until prodded was the source of rancor and suspicion. It may be that Quezon's lament was right: the Philippines would have been better off in 1935 had the National Guard been taken seriously by all concerned.

Quezon talked of the Public Service Commission which as he recalled was one of the progressive acts of my Administration, intended to protect the public, but had turned out exactly the opposite; said the Supreme Court under Johnson had entirely rewritten our law; remarked that he ought to have been on the Supreme Court himself. Has now put Vera as Public Service Commissioner to try to get things more decently run. I told him there was general dissatisfaction with this commission.

At dinner, the President talked with me confidentially about Osmena & Roxas. He had been very reluctant to oust Osmena as the leader in the days when I was here (as I was then urging him to do) for it would have been said that he had gained the leadership thru the support of the American Governor General. He added that he had lost Roxas to Osmena when those two were on the "Osrox" mission to Washington--that they then believed he, Quezon, was dying. That he was reluctant even then to go to issue with Osmena, but his Senators were "sick of O" and forced him into it. He said Osmena is now less powerful mentally, and was not at all the man I used to know--no brilliant ideas--always coming to him for appointments, in which he (Quezon) skillfully outmaneuvers him, taking a leaf from Osmena's own book. I asked him why Osmena looked so *triste*; whether it was his troubled family affairs (his sons)? "No" he replied--indicating that it was Osmena's loss of power. Said he had been ready to break with the whole lot of them over Teacher's Camp in Baguio, even to the point of accepting the resignation of Osmena as a Cabinet member! He thinks Roxas is the one with brains, but that he would have to break him if he went on organizing "his fellows." Quezon said he could not let down his own supporters,<sup>104</sup> who had "made him President."

I suggested a method of his writing as he wished his account of the administrations from Wood to Murphy in collaboration with me by having a stenographer present and letting me ask him questions. I told him this would be the way to get his vivid personality into print. He seemed pleased to agree. I made some mention of when I "left here" and he enquired anxiously whether I was going--told him that was only to spare him any embarrassment that I really wanted to stay here! Quezon said that is what I should do--get a home; invest here; that I had more friends here than anywhere else; that my life's work had been done out here, and that Filipino historians would agree that they would still be struggling for their independence if it had not been for me!<sup>105</sup>

We discussed the missionaries out here, with whom I never had any trouble. He stated they caused him embarrassment! only recently by complaining about the Philippine Army and by saying to President Roosevelt that its spirit was anti-Christian. The High Commissioner had brought him an enquiry on this matter and he remarked: "The answer was easy,--President Roosevelt signed our constitution, and we are only carrying out what is permitted in that."

Talked of present population of the Philippines. He now agrees that there are probably 16,000,000 (I think 18) and may be 25 in ten years. Makes him jubilant over the possible size of the army.

Memo: In Zamboanga I commented to Colonel Stevens on the fact that there had been three killings in Jolo that week. His reply was "they are at least 3 behind schedule--they average one a day." When asked why? he said: "Because they like it."

June 13, 1936. At sea--caucus between Quezon and members of the Legislature. Most convincing evidence of good will and cooperation of the executive and legislature upon a high level of intelligence. The President's method of address to the Assembly was perfect!--extreme seriousness in presenting his plans, and terminating many a subject with a pretty wit which brought roars from his audience. I believe he will get his whole program through, and very progressive it is! increased income tax and inheritance tax; increased taxes upon the mining industry (where not still in the exploration stage); change of cedula into "school tax"; progressive land tax on large estates to solve agrarian problems without the necessity of government purchase of all the Church *haciendas* (my contribution); regulation of transport by omnibus so as not to lose government investment in the railroad; trebling of sales tax, but to be imposed only once--and at the source. He said that without these taxes

<sup>104</sup>On specific issues of importance to him, Quezon was quite capable of disappointing his followers. However, he was quick to make up with them. On minor issues he invariably threw his support to them or else remained neutral.

<sup>105</sup>See Michael P. Onorato, "Governor General Francis Burton Harrison and His Administration: A Re-appraisal," *Philippine Studies*, 18 (January, 1970), pp. 178-186.

there would be only one million pesos surplus in the budget--which left nothing extra for the "pork barrel," i.e., public works. If passed, he would see that the Assembly had at least three millions more to spend on public works. He also recommended Boards of Arbitration for fixing minimum wages, etc. i-said they had been going slow heretofore in labour legislation being recommendations from the Department of Labour are "too theoretical" and might possibly cause damage greater than their good. Time, he thinks, has now come to make a beginning "for we have done nothing as yet for the labourer and small farmer." (To my surprise, when Quezon broached his "somewhat radical" plan for a progressive land tax, Roxas who sat next me turned and said "splendid").

Quezon told the Assembly that he would recommend nothing bearing on the tariff laws, until after a trade conference with the United States; and nothing changing the currency laws as at present.

Then Osmena spoke, gracefully and eloquently. It was a very passionate and convincing address. The first part was about the development of Mindanao, in which he made references to work in the past of Quezon, Carpenter and me. Then turned to leprosy problem (Culion) i-Quezon is anxious to abandon Culion and have separate leprosia in different provinces, so as not to separate and isolate the lepers so horribly. Osmena (and Dr. Cañizares) believe leprosy is contagious and especially so in childhood. Roxas says the annual increase of lepers in the Philippines is one thousand; all they can do is to take care of them. He adds that the Philippine Government has, so far, spent twenty million pesos on Culion--chiefly in subsistence and transportation.

Quezon finished by saying that hereafter, bills for legislation would not be transmitted to the Legislature by the Executive but even if prepared in the Executive branch would be handed to Chairmen of Committees. He concluded by saying that there is no reason for calling this a junketing trip, due to the serious and productive conferences aboard. At the same time, he did not deny that there had been recreation on the journey, adding: "For my own part, when I became a candidate for the Presidency, I did not become a candidate as *Obispo*"

Visit to the Culion Leper Colony: Quezon was very *emotionne* and quoted Dante's inscription over *Inferno*—Osmena once more did the honours, and made the speech. Cured lepers, who are discharged, are not wanted any longer at home especially if they bear traces of their former disease, and after 6 months or so they usually write asking permission to come back here and settle in the "Negative Barrio." Private capital is doing good business in this town of 7000, with a cinema, electric light plant and Chinese *tiendas*. After a drive around by motor, in which many facts were discussed in relation to the disease, back to the *Negros*--and off on our last leg towards Manila.

At lunch there was an interesting discussion between Quezon, Roxas and Sabido over labour. Roxas says there are no labour problems in the Philippines except in two or three large towns. They all condemned the attitude of the Bureau of Labour (now a Department) in trying to stir up trouble. Murphy's creations of Parole Courts and Public Defenders were attacked; i-evidently Secretary Torres is going to have a rough ride in this National Assembly.

Quezon said "someone" (F.B.H.) had told him how agents of the Department of Labour went around asking labourers if "there were any complaints" and he had given Torres a severe dressing down. He added that the right man for Secretary of Labour is Varona, whose attitude is always reasonable--he has common sense and a great hold over labour audiences. Quezon also remarked that the labour leaders in the Philippines are generally "crooks."

An interesting constitutional question arose between Quezon and Roxas as to impeachment--Quezon is opposed to the unicameral system; he says *esprit de corps* will cause the Assembly to impeach the Executive and so long as the Commonwealth endures, ultimate safety lies in the President of the United States having the last say. After complete independence the situation would be dangerous i-he says a vigorous Executive would send General Santos with soldiers to close the Assembly! This may be prophetic.<sup>106</sup>

At dinner with Quezon and Roxas alone, I commented on how little things change

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<sup>106</sup> It happened when President Marcos sent the Army to close the Congress building down after the proclamation of the 1973 constitution.



in the Philippines--here were the two of us together again twenty-three years later! Quezon answered: "Isn't it beautiful."

Long talk later with Floor Leader Romero of Dumaguete.

June 14, 1936. Arrival at five a.m. at Manila. Quezon left the steamer before I could say good bye. Major Speth came in to see me and told me of the break between Quezon and Jake Rosenthal who is one of those who are being prosecuted for the sale of oil shares contrary to the "Blue Sky Law" (Henderson Martin in 1915 proposed this legislation on the Kansas model). Quezon told Jake to go to see Secretary Yulo to show his innocence of intent etc. Jake waited an hour on a bench outside Yulo's door, and then an underling came out and told him "the prosecution must proceed as it had been ordered by Malacanan!" This broke Rosenthal. Later, Quezon went to call on him at his home,<sup>107</sup> but Rosenthal refused to come down; Quezon invited him to Cabuyao for the week-end, and Rosenthal declined; Quezon then asked him to accompany him to Baguio and again met with a refusal! This was probably what made Quezon despondent and caused his earlier mentioned remark at the Rotary Club that his post "is the most difficult job on earth today" and "my friends sometimes have expected me to save them from certain trouble into which they themselves have voluntarily gone," and "if I were a quitter, I would quit now. At least for a man of my temperament it is the worst job, because I like my friends and I love to be happy. Disagreeable things cut me through etc."

Arrival home. Space, quiet, comfort, good food and peace. Three lovely letters from Doria who is due home in exactly a week.

Day spent in catching up on newspapers, letters and financial affairs.

June 15, 1936. Working on a draft of the Landlord & Tenant Bill based on the Irish Land Laws. Called on Jim Ross both at his office and his home.

June 16, 1936. Called on T. Wolff at his office to discuss his memorandum on the new cedula tax law. Finished the draft of Landlord & Tenant Bill.

In the p.m., the Survey Board had its weekly meeting; they are framing a plan for the standardization of salaries in the Government. One of the marked characteristics of round-table conferences of Filipinos is their sense of humour. Unson, Trinidad, Paez, Rustia and Occuña were there.

Went to the Legislative Building to hear the message of the President to the Assembly. Gratings were locked on the doors. I pushed through the crowd, got a policeman to open the door and was met by Chief of Police Antonio Torres who said the city had been "under arms" since the night before; the only people in the galleries were his secret service men. Communists were supposed to have threatened a bomb.

Sat with the *Alcalde* and the Chief of Police. Quezon read a forty minute message of "progressive conservatism"--really an excellent program for the development and relief of the country. Acoustics of the hall are so bad, I could hardly catch his words. Torres says this building was designed for the National Library and 3000 pesos have just been spent to improve the acoustics of the hall, but with no success;--he said it must be air-conditioned and hung with tapestries. Quezon's voice is too strong and oratorical for the loud speaker. If he proposes to broadcast, I have advised him to study the matter of his voice.

Bridge with Gordon, Jollye and Sinclair at the Manila Club. When I was home at dinner Quezon called me on the telephone to ask if I had read his message. He said he was very tired--had only begun it yesterday morning and had been up all last night! over it. Quezon called attention to his reference to the Irish Land Laws.

Will analyse his message after reading it in the morning papers.

June 17, 1936. The message was excellent, and contained the following reference to agrarian reform:

"In the meantime, I recommend the adoption of measures similar to those which were adopted in Ireland to solve agrarian problems! there existing from time immemo-

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<sup>107</sup>This was very typical of Quezon! In fact, there are stories of him literally waiting at table in order to woo back a prominent supporter whose *amor proprio* he wounded. He usually won with such tactics.

rial. I also recommend the immediate passage of a law authorizing the expropriation of those portions of the large *haciendas* which are urban in character and occupied by the houses of the tenants."

Saw the President on the balcony at Malacanan, and congratulated him on his message, though his somewhat impromptu speeches and papers are usually his best, because they give more of the ardor and passion of his personality. He called me over and kept Secretary Yulo and Justice Recto &c waiting in order to give me the following letter he had written (in long hand) in reply to mine of thanks for the trip on the *Negros*:

"Malacanan Palace, June 17, 36.

Dear Governor:

Your note of the fifteenth is very much appreciated.

In asking you to join me in my trips I am only seeking my own pleasure and profit. Your company brings back to memory those happy days of our former association and offers me the opportunity--which I can seldom have in Manila--to get your views and encouragement on the plans I have which may be a little too advanced for some of my associates. It is a source of great satisfaction that you feel as much pleased with the trip as I am.

Yours

Manuel."

I expressed myself as very happy to have this letter. Then I took up with him his very frank and bold renouncing of the purchase of the remaining Friar Estates, and congratulated him on recanting his former views. (This is one thing I have been trying since last Autumn to spare his government.) I told him that his "Board of Arbitration" in my bill on Landlord and Tenant, as taken from the Irish Land Acts, was the Land Commission, and I had given them the power to purchase (with his approval and action by the Assembly) all or part of any of these estates; that it was better for him to have the power to use in an emergency, even if he didn't exercise it. He agreed. I also told him that after his message a lot of the agitation and trouble would die down--he agreed. Hoped he could now induce the more turbulent tenants to move to Mindanao.

Talked with Colin Hoskins on phone about the landlord and tenant bill--he said "the failure to purchase the Friar Estates would disappoint some important churchmen!"

I took the bill down to Diokno's office for remoulding.

N.B. on the *Negros* Quezon had remarked that before the arrival of the Americans in the Philippines, venereal diseases were almost unknown here. I told him with what reluctance in May 1917 I had closed the "Red Light" district of Manila, when the Commanding General of Fort McKinley brought me President Wilson's Executive Order thereon, referring to eliminating such districts within a certain number of miles of an army post. This General was equally reluctant to act, saying: "I founded it myself in 1901 when I was Provost Marshal here"--Quezon said this closing had spread prostitution and venereal disease greatly here.

Talk with Secretary of Finance Alas on the standardization of salaries; he emphasized the view that this *must* be undertaken, and it was better to get it over with now, however disagreeable this may be. He admitted however that the higher salaries of the City of Manila and of Provincial Governors must also be readjusted.

June 18, 1936. Wrote a memorandum for Quezon on the extension of the season for shooting snipe.

Saw Quezon from twelve to one o'clock in his office with Secretary Torres, *Alcalde* Posadas &c. He asked me about the Landlord and Tenant Bill--I told him I had left it the day before in Diokno's office for revision--he said "It is loaded with dynamite--better telephone Diokno how confidential it is; not to let it leak out prematurely; and I want to see it before it is sent to the Assembly!" Something or somebody has been at him--this warning from him is alarming!

Beyer and Belts, two geologists to lunch. Ross and Hoskins to dinner.

Sunday June 21, 1936. Return of Doria on *Empress of Japan* and day spent in rejoicing over having her back.

June 22, 1936. At office; visit from Becker from Aparri, who has always been a sort of confidential agent of the Government on affairs in the far north. Says he cannot persuade his two handsome *mestizo* sons to go to the Military Academy to become army officers. He came down to Manila to try to induce the President to visit the Northern Islands--as to which I talked later with Quezon and he agreed to go to see the Batanes, Camaguin etc "in between two typhoons," tho he spoke rather ruefully of a typhoon getting him and me! Becker also asked to have one of Quezon's confidential advisers sent up to Aparri for a while.

Becker says the Japanese are settling in isolated places on that coast, getting sea weed (for iodine)--they pay 5 centavos a kilo for the sea weed and sell it for 22. They also take *camagon* wood from the forests and load it in Japanese ships returning from the South. The island of Camaguin is heavily wooded with fine timber, and is peopled by those of Aguinaldo's small force who escaped northwards when he was captured in Palanan by Funston. Becker says the Japanese fish these waters with ice-supplied boats which are periodically visited by a mother ship.

The country of the northern coast is a fine source of supply of rattan, and there are thousands of hectares lying idle in the interior. Ilocano emigrants are slowly trickling into Cagayan province. Many Negritos are in the *cordillera* east of Lake Cagayan, which, by the way, is not nearly so large as is shown on the maps. There was, he added, no danger of attack from the Negritos unless one goes armed. The Apayaos and Kalingas no longer disturb travelers from Ilocos immigrating via Abra across their country. The Aparri breakwater is not yet finished. Once a month a subsidized Tabacalera steamer calls at Batanes with supplies but gets practically no cargo there.

Later from 10:30 to 1:40 on the balcony at Malacanan Palace with Unson, Yulo and Marabut checking up on Quezon's message on the budget--later we were joined by Quezon, Osmena and Vargas--(Osmena came on other business but took part in this discussion).

After having his office in Malacanan air-conditioned, Quezon turned the "conditioning" off and sits outside on the balcony to do his office work. (Those of whom I enquire here seem to be of two minds concerning the advantages of air-conditioning--a process new here, tho I first experienced it in Buenos Aires six or seven years ago!)

Visit from Ramon Diokno and Eulogio Benitez with the former's draft of my landlord & tenant bill; he has amplified it by including amended portions of the Civil Code, rice tenancy law and sugar tenants law--a remarkable bit of legislative drafting. If this bill is adopted it will free the "serfs" on the land and provide in the Philippines an exit from the feudal system.

Talk with Unson concerning the plan to make the Governors of Provinces appointive instead of elective (*qua* France). It will have support in the Assembly since this measure would enhance the prestige of Assemblymen, who will then be the chief elective officials in the provinces. Even if he favours this centralization of power, Quezon will hardly come forward to advocate it, since it appears superficially to be a step back from democracy!

Unson reports that the disappearance of fish from their former haunts in the Philippine waters is due chiefly to dynamiting. He said further that agents from the Department of Labour foment "safe" strikes in order to have the credit for settling them. His last bit of official gossip was that the Philippine Army is to buy old type Enfield rifles and 45 caliber revolvers--a size Unson thinks unsuitable for Filipinos.

When Quezon joined our group, his budget was gone through, and he was particularly concerned to change the last paragraph which as originally drafted, sternly admonished the Assembly not to touch the surplus of the government--(thirty-one million pesos nominally--nine millions real unencumbered surplus)--Quezon asked us what we thought of appropriating the government's surplus. Unson spoke up at once, pointing out that the system had been different here than elsewhere. In England and France they budgeted only for expected actual expenditures. Quezon and he agreed that the real riches of a nation were to be found in the pockets of the people and not in the Government vaults. I told of the first United States surplus under President Andrew Jackson, which was divided up by the government among the states. Quezon then modified his budget message so as to leave a door open to use the nine million



surplus later if needed; said he wanted to get his tax laws through first, then take five millions of the surplus as a revolving fund for the development of Mindanao. He went on to say that the trouble in using a surplus would not be with the Assembly, but with the United States Government which under the Tydings-McDuffie law has powers to intervene here in financial matters--that the High Commissioner was always at him to keep a surplus and to balance the budget--principles which, however, Murphy did not himself observe when Mayor of Detroit, and which are certainly not followed by his chief, President Roosevelt. "I could manage Weldon Jones" he said, "but it is hardly worth while for he will not be Deputy High Commissioner for long; from what I read in this morning's paper, Murphy will be back in a few months; in reference to a proposed nomination for Governor of Michigan, he now states that his work in the Philippines is not yet finished."

The President then invited me to lunch with him after all the others left, and told me how he had left Manila dead beat on Friday but as soon as he got to Atimonan and had a swim he wanted my company and thought of wiring for me to join him on an excursion to Alabat Island where the sea bathing is so wonderful. He had talked to the school teacher at Alabat and found that in the schools practically no Filipino patriotism is taught. Said he had gone in swimming again at Sunset Beach, Cavite, "but if I had not been enough of a man to go through with it, I would have refused on account of the jelly-fish."

I handed him the Landlord & Tenant bill. He said Secretary Torres had come to him a day or two after his message to the Assembly last Tuesday, and had told him that his passages referring to the land system had killed all danger of disturbances; especially now that he has reversed his former position and has come out against purchase by the government of the great estates. I asked him if the church was not disappointed. He said "Yes, for they expected to sell their lands to the government at a terribly high price."

He had been reading a Spanish work of the early conquest of the Philippines and expressed regret that the high reputation of the Filipinos for commercial honesty in their early dealings with the foreigners was no longer maintained today. He also said he was sorry that the Spanish expeditions of long ago against the Moluccas and Borneo had failed--for by now they would be the center of a great empire. I remarked that this would come to pass anyway in the future. Quezon agreed.

I enquired whether he wished the Survey Board to proceed with their attempt to consolidate scientific laboratories or to wait, since, against the wish of his own expert adviser, Dr Manuel Roxas, he had wired to ask for some expert from the Mellon Institute, to come out here to help us to reorganize. He said: "Yes, go ahead." The President is determined, if possible, to prevent "overlapping" and we dealt with the extreme difficulty of getting at the real facts from the bureaus concerned here!

I asked him to request Washington to prolong the service of Consul General Hoover at Hong Kong for one year (to the time of Hoover's retirement). He at once drew up a cable to the High Commissioner to that effect, which was very complimentary to Hoover.

Told him that Doria and I wanted to go to Bali for a couple of weeks--he replied that he did not understand the interest in Bali, adding: "We have plenty of Balis here."

Quezon then said he was celebrating a great event today telling me that a month ago, spots had been discovered again on his lungs. He had been dreadfully worried, and told nobody, not even his wife, but today another examination had been made and he is now absolutely clean of tuberculosis. Meanwhile, he had taken exercise and had avoided the sun. This dread of tuberculosis hangs over all the truly brilliant prospects of his remarkable career.

Asked him for the pardon of Evangelista in San Ramon and he said he would attend to it.

He had asked Unson about amending the sales tax law so as to collect it at a higher percentage but with a single incidence, and thus to stop tax evasions. Unson said it was impossible to stop Chinese evasions, and that collection at the source would penalize manufacturers instead of falling on the merchants.

In the afternoon, tea dance at Bilibid for the birthday of General Santos. Quezon was there, but did not seem to enjoy himself much.

June 23, 1936. Speaker Montilla invites me to accompany the Assembly trip to Cebu, but I did not accept because of the recent return of Doria.

Sent Quezon memos. on (a) silver coinage and seignorage profits on silver by the Cuban Government; (b) regulations of sign-board advertising in England and Belgium; and (c) upon the Evangelista petition for pardon at San Ramon.

June 24, 1936. Brief chat with Osmena at Malacanan.

June 25, 1936. Interesting interview with mining engineer Milton Sutherland, who has spent three years mostly in the field throughout the islands. He says new mining developments in some base metals are being contracted by Japanese at ridiculously low prices; that they are exploring all over the Philippines and are trying to skim all the best in metals; attempting for example to take out the 60% iron ore at rock-bottom prices; that the new Capiz Copper Co. has agreed to sell 50,000 tons to Japan at an absurdly low price; that the Philippine Iron Mines get from Japan not much more than half the United States price. Sutherland says there is no coking coal in the Philippines; and two tones of coke are required for one ton of pig iron. (Could we start heavy industries in the Philippines?) He states there is a new English plant in China, near coking coal, which might be useful. Believes it possible that there will be a great future for chromite, for which new uses are constantly being discovered; he added that use of chrome with steel requires only 75% of the present weight of steel. Interesting (superficial) discussion of gold mining districts--Camarines, Abra etc.

June 27, 1936. Saturday; in a.m. at Survey Board. Unson says June 30 is the dead-line for presenting their recommendations to Quezon--after that the President must act in reorganization of the government only thru the Legislature. I dictated a hurried memorandum on separating the routine functions of the Bureau of Science from those of research, and transferring most of the Bureau of Science from those of research, and transferring most of the former to the School of Hygiene, Bureau of Plant Industry and Bureau of Health.<sup>108</sup>

In the afternoon, long meeting of Survey Board in which they voted as to their conclusions on many vexatious points, especially as to Provincial and Municipal Governments. They are firm for appointive governors. (This will meet with support in the Assembly, but I fail to see how Quezon can recommend it to them as his own proposition!); election of provincial board of five members; transfer of Provincial Treasurers to the Department of Finance; designation of Cabinet members as "Ministers" with discussion of Presidential Governments and Parliamentary Governments elsewhere. Discussion of the phrase "by and with the advice and consent" of the Assembly and of the sound reasons for the recent rejection of the word "advice" by the Constitutional Convention in the Philippines; discussion of "National Police" and "Guardia Civil"; creation of a Department of National Defense (asked for by the President); creation of the Department of "Interior and Labour" by consolidation (also probably asked for by Quezon!). I had to leave at 6:15 p.m. before the end of the session. Miguel Unson is easily the leader out here in the science of government and has mature, sound and kindly judgment, and a saving sense of humour. Paez is cautious, silent and extremely watchful--evidently is convinced that "shoemakers should stick to their lasts," and that he should not get entangled in government snarls; Paez has a broad forehead and intelligent sympathetic eyes. Trinidad (an Indonesian type) is solemn, cautious and conservative, with positive, thundery opinions--but it is often difficult to get an expression of his ideas out of him. Very sound men, all three. As secretary, Rustia, is efficient, respectful, silent--the typical portfolio man; I suspect he is boiling with ideas.

June 28, 1936. Sunday morning visit from Colin Hoskins. We agreed in disapproval of "nuisance taxes." There was talk of warehouses and rural credit facilities. I asked him: "what is the use of doing these things for people with whom it is a cardinal principle never to pay back.!" Very good talk in reply. Colin says sharp distinction must be drawn between debts owed to the government (taxes, credits &c.) and those to private concerns. People here do not feel a moral obligation to pay the government; in Spanish times here any broken-down *Peninsular* with family pull could get appointed a tax collector in the Philippines. (N.B. "tax farmer"). The Chinese, here for their part, had been brought up at home under a system of tax "squeeze"; American (Army and Navy officers &c. in spite of their oaths of office) would occasionally smuggle in goods from China. Why, then, blame the Filipinos?

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<sup>108</sup>The intent of the author cannot be ascertained from this sentence. There was no way that it could be restructured so that its meaning can be made clear.

His chauffeur who had previously been out of employment for six months, now has 500 pesos in the savings bank. Houseboys &c carried not a centavo with them because they didn't want to be drawn into crap games. When he was agent for the "Book of Knowledge" he sold (mostly in the Provinces) a half million pesos worth;--the 5% loss expected on payments was not reached. In selling lots for homes in Tondo etc., he finds 90% of the installment payers responsible. He had said to the *Asociacion de Propietarios* a few days ago that the 5% of non-payers were well-known irresponsible drifters!--and they assented. He concludes that the Rice and Corn Corporation will eventually come to building credit warehouses in the Provinces, and that generally speaking, taxes could be collected through an education of confidence in the government, so there is no real need of new taxes. (N.B. Quezon's campaigns in the Provinces on this subject).

We agreed that the Filipinos are really a martial people, could pay for an army and wanted one. That MacArthur's recent statement (tho belated) would have an excellent and permanent effect.

June 30, 1936. A. D. Williams, back from a trip to Cebu with the President, says that Quezon never left the *Mayon* on which he had a severe attack of "flu," and the doctors were afraid of pneumonia. He is now back at work, weak but much better. The rumours as to his illness which were published Saturday last in the *Bulletin* were utterly unfounded and mischievous. Williams states that the campaign against "graft" by Vicente Sotto, as published in *La Union* concerning the location of the proposed Cebu Capitol is entirely untrue; this land belongs to Osmena but he has always "offered to donate it to the government.!" For many years the plan has been approved by all concerned.

A. D. Williams is exercised over Quezon's sending to the United States for architect William Parsons (Yale '95) for town planning here without consulting him (Williams); thinks Parsons should not come during the rainy season. Quezon says Arellano's municipal buildings etc. are too much like churches or theaters--(Arellano says ecclesiastical architecture suits and Philippines, and I rather agree with him).

The Government Survey Board is being mildly criticized in the Press: "the net result, thus far, has been an increase, rather than a decrease in the already top heavy government personnel" (editorial in *Bulletin*)h If the Board is to be credited with an increase in the Bureau of Justice and in the Civil Service, there would be some appearance of reason in this criticism. So far as I know the Board had nothing to do with either! Yulo "put one over" in the Bureau of Justice matter (thinks Unson)!! I personally do not disapprove of either increase, but it makes things more difficult when the Board comes to recommend *reductions* elsewhere!

Issue of Vicente Sotto's paper *La Union* of July 1, 1936 contains the following alleged interview with Quezon: "*Confio en que la independencia vendra dentro de quatro anos y debemos estar preparados: ?quien debe sustituirme?--dijo Manuel L. Quezon en el curso de una entrevista con un representante de Union.*" (Is this the same idea expressed publicly by Quezon some weeks ago: that he would rather have early independence than the economic sanctions of the Tydings-McDuffie Act?)

July 1, 1936. At the very last moment before his authority to act under the reorganization act lapsed, and without further action by the Assembly, Quezon signed the recommendations of the Government Survey Board dealing with the transfer of Provincial and Municipal Treasurers from the Department of the Interior to the Department of Finance; also that transferring the collection of the radio fees from the Post Office to Treasurers; moreover, practically all of our recommendations removing routine functions from the Bureau of Science and transferring same to the School of Hygiene, Bureau of Health and Bureau of Plant Industry were approved. This leaves the Bureau of Science with little else than research work (which was our main objective) and the Division of Mines. The way is now open for organizing it as a Bureau of Industrial Science as we wished. There will be "wailing and gnashing of teeth" in the Bureau of Science. I wrote Quezon a note congratulating him on his decision in this matter, and advising him to make a layman--administrator as head of the Bureau of Science. It would have been difficult, if not impossible, to get this through the legislature--the scientists confuse them so, and have such a network of friendship and influence. No howl in the newspapers yet. I suppose the Bureau of Science people are stunned.

July 3-7, 1936. Politically, a dull period; I did not see Quezon and talked with him only once on the telephone when I invited him to come to our dance at Parañaque. Doria and I have spent the time at bridge, golf, dancing, dining out and



the cinema. The newspapers have been uninspiring, containing chiefly flaring headlines about Murphy in the United States,--asking whether he is to be a candidate for Governor of Michigan, or will come back here instead as High Commissioner. His attitude appears to be that of "Richard Yea and Nay."

July 8, 1936. Forty minutes with Quezon in his office in the Executive Building. I think he is bothered by the air-conditioning in the Palace. Had not seen him for 18 days, during part of which he had the flu--he looks rather worn and tired, and seemed under somewhat of a nervous strain. Showed me the eight enlarged photographs which he has hung on the walls of this office--Taft, Murphy and I are the three Americans. I then approached the subject of appointive governors; told him the Survey Board was anxious to recommend this to him, but did not wish to embarrass him;--that I thought there would be considerable support for it in the Assembly. Also, I advanced Miguel Unson's project for a Provincial Council (of the administrative officials) and an elected provincial board of four. I asked whether it would not be better to combine both into one body? He replied that the whole Cabinet (except Osmena) was in favour of appointive Governors; when the Americans wished to appear to be bringing self-government to the Filipinos, they gave them elective governors, but gave the latter no power, retaining all authority in the hands of the Governor General and that this move had been a sham.<sup>109</sup> He said he would transmit the Survey Board's recommendation to the Assembly with the frank comment that he did not need the power of appointment, since he has complete control now, and if the Assembly wanted to introduce more self-government they should take part of it away from him and give it to the governors. However, he stated that only the United States and Mexico and a few other countries had elected Governors (n.b. there are special historical reasons for this in the United States); that all the other countries had appointive governors--that it was much better administration, and would be no real infringement on democracy.

Quezon next said that when Weldon Jones had lunch with him recently, the latter suggested that the High Commissioner would be pleased to know that the President had recommended the abolition of the Belo fund--that Murphy had wanted this done. Quezon appears to have flared up at this and asked: "Why did Murphy use the Belo fund for two and one-half years as Governor General and then want it taken away from his successor?" Quezon then added: "Murphy is an Irishman." He explained that the Belo fund had been first given to Governor General Stimson, who took over when Wood had completely disorganized this government with his "Cavalry Cabinet."<sup>110</sup> The Governor General's office was then out of touch with the natural channels of administration. But the Belo fund had served its purpose long ago, and Quezon wished to regularize appropriation laws by abolishing the fund after he had completely organized his government structure. Weldon Jones answered that Murphy had told him he had taken up this matter with Quezon en route to Hong Kong, but the President replied that Murphy had never mentioned it. It appears that Murphy had suggested it to Secretary Yulo, but Yulo says nobody would dare to take it up with Quezon!

The President then told me that if Murphy does not come back he will advise the appointment of Jones as High Commissioner. He thinks Jones has plenty of brains and good judgment. (N.B. it appears from this involved story that Quezon is intensely resentful of anything being carried on behind his back which affects his powers or privileges).

As I was leaving, I asked the President whether he had struck a snag in the Landlord and Tenant act? He said: "yes, I had been intending to talk to you about that--it is a bad law." I supposed I looked very blank for he went on to say there are no teeth in the law "and what we need in this country is teeth!" I asked him whether he had read my original bill which, upon his instructions, I took to Diokno for advice as counsel to the government corporations. He said "No"! I told him it was attached to Diokno's version of the bill when I handed it to him, and that it contained all the teeth of Gladstone's Irish Land Laws, and that Diokno had modified it by including some of the provisions of the existing Civil Code--which, instead,

<sup>109</sup> Although it is true that the Americans said one thing and did another about preparing the Filipinos for self-government at the grass roots level, it is equally true that the Filipino leaders did nothing to rectify situation after the Jones Act was passed. The *Bayanihan* barrio councils as established by President Marcos may be the first effort to foster a national self-consciousness at the local level.

<sup>110</sup> Concerning the "Cavalry Cabinet," see Michael P. Onorato, "Leonard Wood and His Khaki Cabinet, 1921-1927," found in *A Brief Review of American Interest*, pp. 98-106.

might well have been amended this was intended to meet the objections of both Diokno and Yulo that we could not "impair the obligation of contracts." "That," said the President, "is what spoiled the bill." He then left me and, carrying the bill, went into the adjoining room, where the Cabinet was in session behind closed doors. After some ten minutes he came back, closing the door again, and stood before me with his shoulders thrown back in the characteristic stance of an Ilongot warrior (a nation in the Luzon mountains from which his own mother had sprung). Waving the bill again he said: "Governor, this is a bad bill." I replied, "No! Mr. President, that is a good bill, but it has one all-important defect in the eyes of those to whom you may just now have shown it--there are too many representatives of the *Caciques* among them--nearly all those who have been called on to pass upon it, except you and myself, are members of, or representatives of the great landowning caste." Quezon seemed somewhat impatient and high-strung, so I excused myself and left him.

So ended a chapter, so far as I was concerned, and the pity of it is that our ardent wish to cut out of the life of this country the cancer which is eating at the provinces has gone glimmering!<sup>111</sup> There was not even a suggestion from the President of having the bill amended again, or reframed, as so many of the bills are before passage into law. I see that my hopes of evolving a yeoman stock of small landowners in place of the existing feudal system in the country districts is dashed. When I reflect that Quezon himself, a few short months ago, had first suggested to me the Irish Land Laws<sup>112</sup> as a model for the Philippines, and how ardently he himself had wished for that reform, I wish I knew what influences had meanwhile so powerfully turned him to the "right about"! Later that day, A. D. Williams, the American he constantly on all of his manifold building and construction enterprises, and who is probably more frequently at his side than any other of my fellow countrymen, told me that "a prominent Nueva Ecija landowner,"<sup>113</sup> whom we all know well, probably killed the bill. If that is correct, Quezon's attitude before me this morning was a simply superb display of his histrionic talents!

At all events, I now feel that my usefulness to him has been impaired, and I shall await a suitable opportunity to resign my post.<sup>114</sup>

July 9, 1936h One hour with Miguel Unson at the Survey Board, where we went over the ground of my recent conversation with the President concerning the policy of having appointive governors in the Provinces.

Unson next asked my advice as to how he should go about reporting to the President three resolutions of the Survey Board on matters in which Quezon has already acted or formed an intention of doing so, over the heads of Unson and of his other colleagues on the Board, and against Unson's deepest convictions:

(a) Salaries in the Bureau of Justice recently fixed by Quezon (a "hot one" just put over by Secretary of Justice Yulo) which deranges the other scales of salaries under the standardization plan;

(b) Quezon's reported plan to put the Bureau of Prisons under the Philippine Army (another "hot one"--this time by General Paulino Santos);

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<sup>111</sup>Harrison's interest in the agricultural reform was long-term and real. Perhaps it found its roots in his ancestry--a Fairfax of Virginia and a close relative of Thomas Jefferson.

<sup>112</sup>See pages 29, 30, 36 of the diary.

<sup>113</sup>It is very difficult at this point to know exactly who was meant. My own impression is that Isauro Gabaldon's reconciliation with Quezon meant more than the passage of the new Land Law. It is entirely possible however, that Quezon did not believe that he could live with that law and decided to kill it before being embarrassed in the press and National Assembly. Perhaps both reasons prompted Quezon's actions in attacking the measure.

<sup>114</sup>While another man might have resigned immediately or pouted for months, Harrison was motivated by a sincere desire to spare Quezon any embarrassment. Nevertheless the relations between Harrison and Quezon will never again be as deep and warm as Harrison imagined them to be until that morning of July 8, 1936. Although Harrison will serve the government-in-exile between 1942-1944, there is the slight hint that the relationship was strained partly because of Quezon's discomfitures and partly because of past episodes being recalled whenever both men were together.

(c) Creation of new machinery for the Moro Province. This is Guingona's influence, and when Unson had him before the Survey Board, Guingona refused to answer our questions, alleging that he had already taken up the matter with the President and considered it confidential! Unson had then read to Guingona the law requiring all government officials to answer questions of the board, but the latter still refused to reply and stuck to his guns!

Inasmuch as both Quezon and Unson, separately, have previously expressed to me the same ideas as to how to deal with the Moros, viz.: to stop "babying" them and to block their drive for "separation" from the rest of the population of the Philippines, it appears to me that this breach is only one of form, or procedure and not of principle. However, the way of the reformer (Unson) is no path of roses, especially when an equally determined "reformer" (Quezon) is his superior officer, and has already decided things!

Rafferty came in to my office and said he had recently talked with Osmena, who commented on how much my past and present services were appreciated here, and how well the Assemblymen thought of me. Celestino Rodriguez, (who has never been very pro-American) told Rafferty the same story. These comments came as rather an anticlimax to my scene with Quezon yesterday over the Landlord and Tenant bill.

Rafael Palma next came to see me, happy over an interview held just previously with Quezon, concerning an attempt to introduce religious instruction in the government schools. To Palma's great delight, the President had told him that, as a leading Mason, he should keep in the background, and must leave to him, Quezon, the duty of putting a stop to the Church's attempted intrusion into the schools. Palma looks younger, more serene and happier than he has appeared since my return here last Autumn. This man is through and through an ardent patriot and always an upright public servant. He has entirely recovered his former serenity now that he is doing really useful public service, as head of the National Council of Education.

I commented to Palma that I could barely understand the English spoken by the young Filipinos of today. He admitted that their accent is getting worse and worse, and hopes that this may be corrected by the use of gramophones in the schools. He added that it was superhumanly difficult to get a new idea through what he called "The Junta!"

My last caller was "Deacon" Prautch, who wished to talk "Credit Unions." He has a peculiarity I have never observed in another man:--he not only evades an answer to any direct question, but doesn't even trouble to reply.

July 8-18, 1936. Ten days of "innocuous desuetude!" There is nothing whatever on my desk, except one paper on a real property assessment in Manila which George Vargas sent me--probably out of kindness!

Since the collapse of the ardent plans Quezon and I shared on his earlier proposed plan for a reform of the agrarian problem, his manner, on the few occasions when I have seen him, has appeared somewhat constrained. Am trying meanwhile through Unson and Benitez to learn what really happened to my Landlord and Tenant bill.

July 24, 1936. Breakfast at Malacanan Palace with the President, Secretary Yulo, Carmona and architect Arellano.

Before the others arrived, I told Quezon how much I approved his appointment of Hermangildo Cruz as Director of the Bureau of Labour, and the President replied that under the preceding administration Cruz had been "framed," but that he (Quezon) had then advised him to resign because he had lost the confidence of Governor Murphy.

At the table, the President remarked that he was reading Professor Kirk's new book<sup>115</sup> on the Philippines, and enjoyed the first chapter so much because of the cynicism with which the author exposes the "cant" of McKinley's government in pious profession of the "White Man's Burden!" He added that Governor Forbes had really believed in that *cliche*. Quezon and I both admitted to one another that we had tried to read Governor Forbes' book on the Philippines, and had been quite unable to do so.

After lunch, we all went down to Binondo to look at three sites for the proposed new building of the Philippine National Bank. In the business district, the

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<sup>115</sup> Grayson L. Kirk, *Philippine Independence, Motives, Problems and Prospects* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1936).



crowds stared at Quezon as if he were royalty!

I enquired as to Quezon's opinion of the present disorders in Spain. He replied that the Spanish people are not fit for self-government, and have lost the ability to carry on under a constitutional monarchy. "What they need," he remarked "is five years of a dictatorship.<sup>1</sup>"

To dinner with Colonel Hodsoll at the Manila Club; the first entertainment given by the English since the death of King George V.

July 25-August 2, 1936. In Baguio July 25-30, house hunting for next winter. Saw for the first time the interior of several houses there. These Americans may have known how to make money out here, but certainly not how to spend it. Stevenot's is a really decent little cottage; as also are Stevenson's and Kingcome's (two Englishmen). On the whole, there is probably no nation except possibly the Norwegians so totally devoid of taste and comfort in their homes as the Baguio Americans. Perhaps this is due to the "temporary" psychology of those who are making fortunes out of shoes, lumber etc., and are investing nothing in the country, always ready for instant flight when the daily dire prophecies of the *Bulletin* come true. They have been poised on tiptoe for a dash home every moment for the past 30 years!

Typhoon for two days--temperature 62<sup>o</sup>. It is more agreeable in Baguio when it is empty. Drive back down the Benquet Cañon with six landslides temporarily blocking the road; enormous boulders had fallen from the cliffs above. This road should never have been built, since a fraction of the money spent on bridges in the lowlands, and on the old Spanish trail via Naguilian would have served the purpose far better. We built the Naguilian road in 1914 to have an alternative access to Baguio if Benquet road washed out again.

During the week, the Ship of State has lain in the doldrums with sails flapping in idleness. Lots of talk. An effort is being made by Quezon to get his taxation measures through the Assembly. Bombardment of the City Council of Manila by all the papers.<sup>i</sup> The usual suspension and punishment of provincial and municipal officials here and there is going on. Constant press criticism of the number of "advisers" and "technicians" at Malacanan. I must get out of it as gracefully as possible--certainly when my year is up.

Vacation visit of two delegations from Japan have arrived, including eight members of their House of Peers.

Reception at the Swiss Club August 1st on their national holiday; lots of generals present--American and Filipino.

August 3-9, 1936. On August 3rd the *Bulletin* carried an article stating that the High Commissioner's office had turned "thumbs down" on the proposed new bond issue for public works pending in the Assembly. The *Herald* that afternoon published a very aggressive and powerful statement by Quezon that the High Commissioner's office had absolutely no legal authority to interfere in the matter of the bond issue, and denouncing the *Bulletin* etc. I telephoned him that night to congratulate him on his statement. He was pleased, but said he was in bed with a temperature of 102<sup>o</sup> (probably the result of yesterday's *lechon* at the picnic he gave in Laguna Province for the Assembly!); he added: "I was somewhat provoked by the *Bulletin's* article.<sup>1</sup>" Subsequently, he told me how the idea had been given to the Assembly thru Cuenco--that the policy of the *Bulletin* was to be always "throwing bricks" at the Administration; that it was also that paper's fixed principle to try to make out that the High Commissioners governed the Philippines, (contrary to the provisions of the Tydings-McDuffie Act). His vigorous counter-attack threw the *Bulletin* office into confusion, and Taylor sent Ora Smith to Malacanan to apologize,<sup>16</sup> but he couldn't see the President because of his illness. Quezon told me "every pain I had in my stomach I laid on the *Bulletin*." Weldon Jones came to see him the next day and said "This may cost me my job," so Quezon sent a letter by Clipper to Murphy stating that Jones was not responsible for the "thumbs down" article; that he was very satisfactory here, and would be the best man for High Commissioner if Murphy did not come back.

On the same day (August 3rd) the *Herald* printed an article by MacArthur on the defense of the Philippines. It was an extremely able and brilliant analysis of the

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<sup>116</sup>This was very typical of Quezon. His use of his own organ, *Philippines Herald*, together with a hard-hitting statement from him, usually demolished his opponents and the opposition press.

military problems of this country, and made very convincing reading. Quezon was so much pleased that he proposes to give a banquet in favour of General MacArthur.

Quezon was in Baguio August 5-8, 1936. Jim Ross had dinner with him recently, and the President said that Mrs Quezon was going away for a year. Jim told him to be careful and to remember "the fierce light which beats upon the throne"!

August 10, 1936. I asked de Jesus to get me an interview with Quezon.

August 11, 1936. Saw Quezon coming out at 9:30 with A. D. Williams, Arellano the architect and Assemblyman Magalona. He called out to me asking me to lunch with him, and a moment later sent a messenger to ask me to join his party. We went down to the Port Area to see the land which Magalona wants to lease for a hotel. Quezon told me it would not compete with the Manila Hotel, since it would be of a different class, and would not be a success anyway--the group of Negros sugar planters represented by Magalona "had so much money they didn't know what to do with it"; they hoped to construct the hotel in four months to be ready for the coming Eucharist Congress. Quezon approved the plan "because the Government might as well get the income from the rental." Somebody added that "the Government would probably get the hotel in the end--to use for offices."

Quezon talked of getting rid of the San Miguel Brewery as a neighbour of Malacanan Palace, and making government offices there, so that he could house all the bureaus under the control of the President in one group around him: Civil Service, Auditor, Budget Office &c. Apparently, he contemplates exchanging the Government Ice Plant (now leased for 120,000 pesos a year to San Miguel Brewery and assessed as worth 1,200,000) for the brewery buildings next to Malacanan.

Quezon also told us that Cuenco had been to see him asking his aid in getting the Assembly to modify the new inheritance tax law so as to exempt bequests for religious and educational purposes. Maximo Kalaw, the Chairman of the Ways & Means Committee had then come to ask him to oppose this change. Quezon is opposed anyway--says the Government is spending a very great deal of money anyway on educational and charitable programs. The papers carry an item of another decision backed by Quezon to insist on the payment of certain taxes by the Church. It is possible that he feels restless now over his re-conversion to the Church made when he was so ill in California several years ago. He is, I think, irked both by that and by the partial restriction of his mental liberty. If so, the Church has won a Pyrrhic victory in restoring him to its bosom! I remember how at the time of my appointment as Governor General, the question was "why not send a Catholic<sup>117</sup> to a Catholic country?"<sup>118</sup> and the reply was "The Church doesn't want a Catholic as Governor General--they had one in Governor General Smith, and he was so impartial in his relation to the Church that he leaned over backward!"

On our return to Malacanan, the President and I went into his office and I told him I wished to ask him about three points he had suggested to me as to my future relations out here!

(1) He had said I had better stay on out here for the rest of my life (giving complimentary reasons)--"not of course always in the Government--but as an investor"--I now was asked to become a director of a company about to be launched. He properly replied it would not be suitable "so long as I was at Malacanan"--of course he "had no objection to my making investments here." (I passed up for the moment the plan I am forming to get out of the government service)!. Then Quezon asked me what was the second question?

(2) I raised again his suggestion that I should collaborate with him in a history of the Governors General since my time. His face lit up with this. I said we should not wait, but "strike while the iron's hot!" He agreed, and advocated my seeing him three times a week, either while driving around or in Malacanan, adding "I like your company, and I think you like mine." "The way not to write a biography is

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<sup>117</sup>Harrison's last wife, a Basque, brought about his conversion to Roman Catholicism.

<sup>118</sup>At the time of Harrison's appointment, Taft, then a Yale law professor, stated that someone whose wife's divorce was accomplished under strange circumstances ought not to be sent to the Philippines where divorce was forbidden. The idea being that the sensibilities of Catholic Filipinos might be affronted. In a country where the "double standard" for men was still widely held such concerns were unimportant.

to sit down to it, because then one often misses the important points." My third questionh

(3) Was whether he had consulted Secretary Yulo as to Americans taking up Philippine citizenship. He jumped and said: "By Jove, I had forgotten that" and sent for Yulo immediately.

Then he went into the matter of his relations with Murphy, saying "Murphy is a man who avoids facing a difficult situation--especially with a determined man like myself. If he ever comes back here he will not dare to try to run the government. I would rather have Weldon Jones here--he is clever, wise and modest. I consulted him about that part of my message to the Assembly denouncing the withholding of the excise taxes in the United States--and he was very helpful."

Quezon then gave me a copy of his letter of November 2, '35 to Murphy opposing a "definition by the Secretary of War of the duties and privileges of the High Commissioner" and stating forcibly the constitutional rights of the new Commonwealth. Murphy never replied to this. The President went on to discuss the powers of inspection of the High Commissioner into the offices of the government, which are very broad. Said he had drawn up an authorization for all bureaus and offices to give information upon request by the High Commissioner, but on advice of Yulo he had withheld this. However, the only two matters on which information has *not* been furnished are: (a) the Philippine National Bank, which refused "in spite of my orders" to furnish a copy of their minutes to the High Commissioner and I did not press them further" and (b) as to the Belo Fund. Murphy came to see him with a demand for the list of payments in the Belo Fund, and Quezon told him he could see it himself, but he would not turn it over to the High Commissioner's office. He told Murphy: "The powers of inspection of your office are based on the responsibility of the United States to make sure that Philippine finances are kept sound. How could the authorized expenditure of my 250,000 Belo Fund affect the general financial position? If this, however, is mere curiosity, or is an attempt to show I have not administered the fund honestly and legally,--I resent it." Murphy returned to the enquiry later, but got no further. Quezon went on the steamer as far as Hong Kong with Murphy who then never raised the question, but en route to Shanghai he gave Yulo a letter on the point, saying he need not put it on the record if it was thought unwise. Yulo never gave this letter to Quezon. Then, the President continued: "I would rather deal with a man who came out in the open like Stimson--who was a savage,<sup>119</sup> but not one who fought from ambush--he was out on the open road always ready for a scrap. He was brutal--I never knew a man so well brought up who was so rough.<sup>120</sup> Once during Stimson's administration as Governor General, Don Miguel Unson came to me and said he would have to resign as acting Secretary of Finance. I persuaded him not to resign and then told Stimson, who replied: 'I have tried to be careful with the Filipinos and especially with Unson--I didn't know I was rough!'"

Later, at luncheon with Quezon and Aldanese, I opened the conversation by saying I had seen in the papers that he is interested in the Leyte Rock Asphalt dispute with the Bureau of Public Works. That this was not my business, but I had the papers on my desk and here they were--the latest statements from A. D. Williams and Claude Russell. He said at once "I am in favour of A.D."--(so sounds the death-knell of an infant Philippine industry!). He went on to say that Claude Russell had lost the government a lot of money as head of the defunct coal company (no doubt he did, but this valuable coal is now about to "come home to roost"). He added that General Wood came out here breathing fire and promising to "take the Government out of business,"<sup>121</sup> but the only business they should properly have relinquished was that of coal, and: "Wood kept hold of this company for two years after we had tried to close it up, because Russell kept flattering him." He then went on about Wood. I told of the day in November 1920 when the news of Harding's election as President had been received here. At the moment, I was driving up to Malacanan with Quezon and Osmena and one of them said: "This means either Wood or Forbes." "How did you come to prophecy Wood?" I asked. Quezon replied: "We didn't select Wood; he was chosen because he

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<sup>119</sup>Professor Claude A. Buss, on January 21, 1974, in a long distance telephone call, told me that Quezon liked Stimson very much and did not think much of Harrison. He wasn't surprised when he learned that Quezon told him basically the same story about Stimson that he told Harrison.

<sup>120</sup>Although Stimson was a cultivated, corporation lawyer with wide government service in the administrations of Taft and Coolidge (and later Hoover and Roosevelt), he had a strong sense of what was right and wrong and a powerful determination to see his way through.



was a defeated candidate for the Presidency and Harding didn't want him around. I had first known Harding when he was a Senator, and asked him later in the White House why he had sent Wood to the Philippines.<sup>121</sup> Harding replied: "Because the people of the Philippines asked for him." "Why, Mr. President, no reputable Filipino would ask for a man who had insulted them as the Wood-Forbes Report did." (Quezon found there a telegram prepared by Fairchild and Cotterman! I asked if any Filipino had signed it and he said "perhaps Aguinaldo.") "But," added President Harding, "Wood will stay there only a year, for the University of Pennsylvania has elected him Chancellor, and will hold it open for a year." Quezon thereafter started back to Manila and meanwhile the Legislature had passed a resolution offering co-operation to Wood. Quezon was angry about this. He told Osmena they ought to fight, but Osmena was for compromise. During the first year, the Legislature passed every bill requested by Wood. At the end of the year, Harding wired Wood that he was unwilling to impose upon his sacrifice any longer, but Wood replied that his work here was unfinished. "No gentleman," remarked Quezon, "would reply in that way to the President's suggestion."<sup>122</sup> The Chancellorship of the University of Pennsylvania was then given to another, and Wood remained as Governor General for some six more years<sup>123</sup> until his death. Both men present at this lunch said that Wood had employed every effort to investigate them. Aldanese added that he was not aware that for two months, four army secret service men had been raking everywhere for his "graft" because he wore a diamond ring and was building a house. They examined all the banks in Manila for proof of his supposed wrongdoing. Then Wood congratulated him (Aldanese) "because there was nothing against him." Quezon said they had made a search for his "five millions" which were, they concluded "probably in Spain"!! George Fairchild, who was a traitor to Quezon (and to me)<sup>124</sup> in every other respect, said at that time in a conference with Wood, that Quezon never had been a grafter. Fairchild ought to know, because when my administration had helped him to start his sugar central at San Jose, Mindoro, George had offered him 600,000 pesos of the stock which Quezon refused. Fairchild then gave some of this stock to his lawyers: Jim Ross, who kept his (and lost) and his partner Ham Lawrence, who sold his (and gained).

Quezon then told of the special election for Senator of Ramon Fernandez over Sumulong. He said that one day at lunch at Malacanan he told Wood that the contest was not between those two candidates, but it was Wood vs. Quezon, and that he (Quezon) would beat him in every precinct.<sup>125</sup> Wood (who had a sense of humour, as Quezon remarked) smiled and replied that he was afraid that was so. And so it was. Quezon and Aldanese agreed that Wood's mind had begun to fail when he was here as Governor General.<sup>126</sup>

The President had invited Collector of Customs Aldanese, to luncheon order to discuss measures for increasing the safety at sea on Philippine ships. He said that on a recent trip to Cebu with Osmena, he had put "Baby" Quezon (his eldest daughter) with a party in one of the ship's boats, which leaked, and it required two men to keep bailing it out;--then, one after another two oars broke! Aldanese was told that a committee of naval officers would visit him at Quezon's request to discuss plans for greater safety. Aldanese said regulations were not observed in ships because the owners pushed the captain to carry more passengers than the law allows to ports where there are no customs officers; he added that the law should be amended to provide for power of suspension of the right to navigate a vessel, so the owners would have to back up the ship's officers in enforcing regulations. Quezon agreed. They also said that far too many officers are employed on these ships. The President remarked that he would furnish Aldanese with twelve secret service men to travel about and investigate the shipping situation.

<sup>121</sup> See Pacis, pp. 319-320. See also Onorato, *A Brief Review of American Interest*, pp. 29-33, 41-42, 49-50.

<sup>122</sup> See Onorato, *ibid.*, pp. 56, 69f.

<sup>123</sup> Wood had planned to return to the United States in the autumn of 1923 with the intention of resigning. The Cabinet Crisis of July, 1923 precluded any return as long as he was under fire. He was able to leave in 1927 because he had just won a victory in the courts against the Board of Control which he abolished in November, 1926.

<sup>124</sup> It is hard to believe that Harrison accepted at face-value every bit of back-biting gossip that Quezon told him.

<sup>125</sup> See Onorato, *A Brief Review of American Interest*, pp. 79-82.

<sup>126</sup> It is difficult to believe that Quezon and Aldanese accepted what they told Harrison, whose ego they wished to inflate, about Wood's mind failing.

August 12, 1936. Talk with A. D. Williams over the building activities of Quezon. Malacanan Palace is never quiet; always, there is hammering and moving of walls etc. It appears that while the President is acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications, Under Secretary Cruz has not a jot of authority, and every single decision of his has to be O.K.'s by Presidential Secretary George Vargas. Thus it is very hard to get things moving. Quezon asked Williams about making Vargas Secretary of this Department and putting Anonas in as Presidential Private Secretary. Williams replied to him that Quezon could not spare Vargas as his own Secretary, and it would be better to make Anonas Secretary of the Department of Public Works.

Williams and I talked of the coal mines at Cebu; the iron fields of Surigao; of the possibility of starting a heavy iron and steel industry here; of smelters for the chromium ore, etc. How wonderful it would be if the National Development Company could at last get started--but fear has always been an anaesthetic to them.

August 13-17, 1936. August 15 at Rafferty's dinner (Grawfus). I sat between Alfonso Sy Cip and Romulo, head of the *Herald*. Romulo told me of his dramatic defiance of General Wood,<sup>127</sup> when the latter called him on the carpet for the attitude of his paper--(all of which was published in the *Herald* at the time) of the magnificent impromptu speech by Quezon in defense of my administration at a banker's dinner in San Francisco. Romulo also said Manuel Roxas is "laying low"; that Quezon was mentioning my name to be first for inscription on the gold plate to be put up at Malacanan (on the first anniversary of the Commonwealth) to commemorate those Americans &c &c--Romulo also remarked: "it would be terrible if the Republicans won the election in the United States."

Reception at Malacanan this night. As we had dined first at Colonel Garfinkel's at Fort McKinley, we arrived after the reception line had dissolved and after the *Rigodon* had been danced. Quezon was in very good form and was pleased to show various improvements he had made in the Palace which is now lighted by the great chandeliers from the old Ayuntamiento and was cheerfully bright for the first time since the Cimmerian darkness of the Murphy regime. The cabaret downstairs was dreadfully overcrowded. No whiskey was served at the bar. Dancers were streaming with sweat. Traffic, however, was better managed than I have ever seen it, for three different parking places were provided with a telephone to each. The refusal of Quezon to have whiskey and soda served surprised me more than anything I have ever known him to do. It can hardly have been the monastic influence of his predecessor! Anyway it made most of the guests leave early to dash for the Manila Hotel. However, Quezon himself, went to bed at 10:30 so he can't have cared how early the guests left. Mrs Quezon appeared, and was very agreeable.

August 16, 1936. Quiet Sunday. The A. D. Williams to bridge and dinner. Williams thinks Vargas may be the one who makes it so difficult for the few surviving "palefaces" at Malacanan. He added that they won't ever use the documents he writes in English, but rewrite them with all the peculiar Filipino phraseology. Williams also said that everything proposed by the Bureau of Public Works was at once resisted by the city government.

August 17, 1936. The August 15 edition of *La Union* reports an intelligent speech by Diputada Dolores Ibarra in the Cortes in Spain, which makes clear the Civil War in Spain is largely based upon landlord and tenant disputes.

Visited the Survey Board; interesting conference with Don Miguel Unson, who was in one of his more confidential moods. We agreed in sympathizing with Quezon's rather futile effort to escape from a life-long habit as a partisan politician. He is caught on flypaper, also, with his almost hopeless task of coping with the bureaucracy and with inter-departmental jealousies. His one big mistake was in taking over the Cabinet of his predecessor. If he had chosen as his Cabinet fresh men, imbued with the new spirit of the Commonwealth, he might have been able to carry out his plans. "The people think he is strong!" said Unson. He then began on the subject of MacArthur and referred to Quezon's unshakable confidence in the Marshal: "MacArthur has great prestige to maintain and he would not do anything to lower it, but people are already laughing at his defense plans--what could we do to prevent Japan from taking Mindanao? A country is not supposed to be conquered until its capital is taken; but the Japanese could say "we don't want Manila, we only want

<sup>127</sup> See Carlos P. Romulo, *I Walked with Heroes* (New York: Avon Book Division, 1961) pp. 122-123. Cf. Onorato, *A Brief Review of American Interest*, p. 54. The flaw in Romulo's version was that Governor General Wood was not in Manila when the cartoon was published nor did he return until several days later.

Mindanao"--as indeed they have done in Manchuria. What we really need here, I think Unson, is a strong National Police force which could protect the rights of foreigners and avoid international incidents." (N.B. It does appear that MacArthur's defense plans refer principally to Luzon.) Unson then told the story of General Alejandro's resignation as adviser to the President. He had been studying defense plans since 1914, and was a member of the Council of National Defense when he became an adviser in January last. He prepared a plan for the National Police and had reached a certain point which needed a decision by the President, but his request for an interview was ignored. So he resigned. Now Quezon has asked him to become once more a member of the Council of National Defense, and he told Unson he was reluctant to accept "because he wished to preserve his independence of thought."

About the creation of a National Police force, Unson says my suggestion of a Guardia Civil is impracticable (I suppose because of opposition from the Army--plus! the matter of cost). Quezon cannot consent to disentangle the Constabulary from the Army but expects to be able to retain direct control of the Constabulary branch of the army himself. His idea is now to put the Municipal police directly under the Constabulary with power to move them from one town to the other etc. This, Unson confesses is a direct invasion of municipal autonomy--"just when we are talking of giving greater autonomy to the municipalities"--I told him that this, after all, is the English method of government--like "Alice through the Looking Glass"--he laughed and replied "well, we are doing some of it here already." We then discussed the apparent impossibility of a solution of the problem of the government of the City of Manila. He says an elective Mayor would make it only worse. We agreed upon the hopelessness of the street and traffic problems--he cited what the Chinese have done in Canton and Amoy.

Unson then mentioned Guevara's opinion that the United States had wanted the creation of an army here. He himself had referred this question to Governor General Murphy, who said "no," then bit his lips and changed the subject.

August 18, 1936. I read of a petition by part of the Native officials of the Dutch East Indies to the Volksrad for an autonomous government after ten years! This is one reason why, in my time, I always found the Dutch there (except for Governor General Limburg von Stirum himself) so worried about our plans for Philippine independence.

A. D. Williams came in to consult me about the task just given him by Quezon in a Cabinet meeting, to draft an Executive Order fixing a minimum wage 25% higher than the present average wages paid by the Bureau of Public Works in the different provinces. This order is to apply, of course, only to employees of the government. Quezon said this move was a "matter of conscience" with him. Williams had replied to him that the wages now paid them ranged from 40 centavos a day, in Ilocos to 90 centavos in Davao. He called Quezon's attention to the fact that many clerical employees of the government received only 20 pesos a month. The President was for raising at once this minimum to 30 pesos, and proposed including the two propositions in one order. Difficulties of Civil Service rules appeared etc.

August 19, 1936. Quezon's 58th birthday--great animation at Malacanan. The President was in very good form, and enthusiastic in his greeting. Had a talk with Yulo about Philippine citizenship, and he did not seem to have been instructed by Quezon to find a test case. He said Doria would become a Philippine citizen if I did, but would still retain her status as an English subject.

August 21, 1936. Brought home to lunch, Dr Victor Clark, the economic expert from Washington, who has been here for four months. As we both have been "advisers" of Quezon we chaffed one another about the small amount of "work" given us. I mentioned how I had passed the morning, and he said: "dilute your morning's work down! to 10% and you'll get mine!" I told him how safe Quezon was on questions of currency and government finance, and that the President was determined to avoid the slightest excise for interference by the High Commissioner. He said he was perfectly satisfied with the financial situation here--except for the stock market boom which he thinks is bound to collapse, and he considers it a menace. He sailed for home the next day.

August 24, 1936. Quezon's banquet for General MacArthur of 144 guests at one table in the central hall in Malacanan. Army, Navy, Consular Corps, Committees of Assembly, Church pundits, etc., etc. Probably the most brilliant and dramatic dinner party ever given in the Palace. The purpose of the evening's ceremony was to confer an appointment as Field Marshal on MacArthur with the presentation of a gold baton. Quezon's address opened with an account of his first visit to Malacanan in 1900 as a prisoner of war, he having been sent through the lines by General Mascardo of the



Filipino insurrectionary forces from Zambales to ascertain whether General Aguinaldo was really a prisoner of war. The story was well and dramatically told--thus furnishing an excellent introduction to the son--MacArthur's address was carefully prepared and was eloquently delivered. He was covered with orders and decorations. His speech was all about preparedness. When he had finished, the Japanese Consul General who sat next to me whispered: "it is the same speech the Japanese Generals make before the Diet when they want more money for the Army!" He (Uchiyama) talked that evening more openly and frankly about Japan than one expects from one of their officials. Told me of recent nationalization of all water power in Japan; also of the new rule requiring old men to vacate the public service and in business as well;--in the latter they must now retire at the age of 55 unless they are Directors, when they can go on to 60. Youth insists on taking control. Pensioners get one third of their former salary.

Uchiyama had originally set up the first Japanese Legation in Havana;h-he commented that Cuba under the Platt Amendment was much like the Philippine Commonwealth now.

Later, Quezon invited MacArthur and his staff, Cavender, Jim Ross and myself to stay on in his office, and we talked until one o'clock. MacArthur and I were urging Quezon to influence the *Bulletin* to stop its campaign in the United States in derogation of the Philippines. MacArthur says that news from the Philippines, manufactured by the *Bulletin* and by Walter Robb is published as facts by the Associated Press and the United Press etch, without verification--the only place in the world where this is possible! MacArthur also discussed the influence of Stanley Hornbeck in the State Department, who for fifteen years has directed "Far Eastern Affairs," and is strong for America's withdrawal from the Pacific.

August 25, 1936. As Quezon was about to start for Iloilo I asked his secretary, Vargas, to secure me an interview with the President as I wished to present my resignation as Adviser, to enter into business. I knew that with this, (to Vargas), delightful reason, I should (for the first time) get an immediate appointment. Quezon was very cordial, and asked me what I wished. I told him that ever since he had hinted to me in the South that I should settle down in the Philippines for good and go into investments, I had been opening lines of enquiry and that it was "like pulling the string of a shower-bath." He then remarked that he had expected to keep me as an adviser all through his presidency, and I remarked that I had supposed my appointment had been for only one year. He replied that if I really wished it, he would accept it, provided my resignation was not for dissatisfaction. I said that if things had sometimes not gone as I might have wished, it was too small a matter for comment. I told him of my admiration and friendship for him, and we parted the best of friends. In response to my subsequent letter of resignation, he later wrote as followsh

Malacanan Palace  
Manila

August 27, 1936

Dear Governor Harrisonh

In reply to your letter of August 25, 1936, submitting your resignation as Adviser to the President, as you are desirous of entering the Board of Directors of several of the newly forming business Corporations in the Philippines, I beg to advise you that I accept, with great regret, your resignation effective at the close of business, August 31, 1936.

Your wealth of experience in Government administration and your enthusiasm and faith in our efforts have enabled you to assist most effectively in the delicate and important tasks given you which included Government reorganization, and having finished your major assignments, to return you longer in the service would be at too great a sacrifice on your part, and I feel it would not be fair.

I wish to take advantage of this opportunity to state that when I asked you to serve in the capacity of Adviser for the Government of the Commonwealth, it was not only my object to secure the services of a man whose knowledge and experience in government would be of immense value to my administration, but also to give public recognition of the unexcelled contribution you have rendered to the cause of good government in general and Filipino self-government in particular. I dare

say that the existence of the Government of the Commonwealth today and the certainty of the establishment of the Philippine Republic nine years hence have both been made possible because of what you have done as Governor General of the Philippines. Despite what your detractors have written and said of your administration, I confidently believe that History will yet do you justice.

I wish you success in your new ventures and I hope this means that you have decided to cast in your lot with us.

Need I say that our last association has given me a lot of pleasure?

Always your friend and admirer,

Manuel L. Quezon

Nothing could have been handsomer, nor more characteristically generous than this.

September 4, 1936. After luncheon at Malacanan, Quezon took Ross and me into his office and read us a long letter from a young Filipina girl who had been one of the *summa cum laude* students whom he had congratulated at the recent University of the Philippines commencement. He had met her again on the steamer on his last trip to Iloilo and since then has been conducting a sentimental, (tho innocent!) correspondence with her. He seemed struck with amazement at her independence of view, lack of respect for his position, distrust of politicians and freedom of thought. She even used that phrase "corrupting the youth" (for which Socrates was condemned) about one of her University Professors who had been discharged from the faculty for teaching the students to think for themselves. Quezon exclaimed many times how the Filipina had changed since he was young. I told him my own daughter<sup>28</sup> made me understand this, and he was lucky to find out by chance what the young people of his country are thinking. I have never seen him more absorbed.

A few days later I sat next but one to him at the funeral ceremonies for poor Trinidad. In middle-age, the sudden death of one of the group sobers up all the rest of us. Quezon looked very shocked. He came in *barong tagalog*, while all the rest of us were formally dressed. At the coffin afterwards, Quezon was quite noticeably jostled--for once, he was not the first person in the room.

Visit to Osmena's home on his birthday--talk with Rafael Palma &c.

September 15, 1936. Quezon asks the Assembly to permit the recall of the "Chinese book-keeping" bill, as he will not veto it if passed, but asks that the Chinese be given a term (2-3 years?) to prepare!! This is a bill already mentioned in the preceding pages of this diary, which requires Chinese in the Philippines to keep their accounts for tax inspection in English, Spanish or a native dialect. The *Herald*, *Tribune* and *Bulletin* commend his action editorially. As this is the law for which he and I fought so hard nearly twenty years ago, and the unconstitutionality of which as declared by the United States Supreme Court caused Quezon to denounce savagely to me only three months ago the legal decisions of both Chief Justice Taft and Justice Johnson,--that is, to say the least, a most extraordinary reversal on Quezon's part. The power to make this law is now said to be existent under the new Commonwealth constitution. It is very sad for me to see him jettison one of the principles which he held most ardently. He now gives somewhat the appearance of a man riding a bucking broncho--not of a leader.

September 21, 1936. Return to Manila of Quintine Paredes, Resident Commissioner to the United States, who is reported as wishing to resign. He states the difficulties he has encountered in America, and still hopes for the payment of the Philippine Government of the excise tax and the gold devaluation fund. He says there is very little understanding in the United States as to the Philippine situation. False reports, he states, are sent by "some journalists" in Manila and printed by the United States press without verification. (Aimed at the *Bulletin* assassins). No reference to this statement was printed on September 22, in the *Bulletin* nor in the *Tribune*. This corroborates what General MacArthur told Quezon in our recent meeting. Paredes says: "Information now current in the United States is that the Commonwealth Government is very extravagant in its expenses, and that our system of education has been

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<sup>28</sup>Virginia and Barbara--daughters of his first wife.

wrecked. Some correspondents here in the Islands have sent this misinformation to the United States with the apparent purpose of discrediting the new government." (This is the same campaign which was daily directed for years from here against my administration. The Filipinos of twenty years ago paid no attention to it when aimed at me;--indeed seemed to believe it, if not to enjoy it!)<sup>129</sup>

The exodus of government officials to enter business continues--some of their best men are leaving office.

Flare-up in Baguio recently where Quezon went to attend the commencement exercises of the Officers Training Corps. The members of the Assembly present at this commencement left the reception because their Speaker was not "recognized." (A great deal of antagonism against the new Army and its officers exists in the Legislature.) It is hard work for Quezon to keep the boat from rocking. He is staking all on the new army.

September 24, 1936. Arrival of my son Kiko who was born here in Malacanan Palace on February 7, 1921, and left with me when he was five weeks old. Now he comes alone from England.

September 26, 1936. Record of yesterday's (Friday) one hour press conference--(not intended to be published verbatim, because the President answers all questions like a "good fellow" without having to consider the effects on the public)i He is, however, quoted as being in favour of woman's suffrage, adding: "my friends might say that the President changes his mind, but when I change my mind I have a reason for it." This reminds me of my attempt last winter to persuade him to have a regular series of office appointments, not more than fifteen minutes each, and not to spend so interminably long a time listening to certain talkative men, by which process he dislocates his whole program. His reply to me then was: "When I give a long interview it is because it is important." What he meant, I think, is that it was politically important to him to give up his time to that individual.

Another, and certainly important part of the Friday press conference dealt with the length of time for the existence of the Commonwealth. He said (without quotation marks)i That his program of government presupposes the execution of the Tydings-McDuffie independence plan and that public affairs here were being so run that if Congress should decide to give independence tomorrow or say within five years from today, the Islands would be prepared to assume full control and responsibility for the government without any hitch. Then he was quoted as follows: "I have no doubt that many Filipinos want the Commonwealth to continue. Professor Kirk in a recent book answers the question intelligently. I do not believe that the average Filipino is for the continuation of the Commonwealth after the transition period has elapsed. The majority of the people are for terminating the Commonwealth. The protectorate plan is entirely out of the question because it is not understood and accepted in the United States. We are ready for independence in five years, even tomorrow, if Congress should decide to give it. I am preparing this government for that."

September 28, 1936. Quezon telephoned me himself asking me to bring my son Kiko out to luncheon.

September 29, 1936. At Malacanan, Kiko was introduced to the President in his office--which was formerly the bedroom where Kiko was born--Quezon was very cordial to him and had delightful manners with the boy; showed him about the Palace, and I myself was intrigued by all the recent improvements. The fill is completed on the riverside--to be made into lawn only, with no buildings; the water front opposite is to be a private golf course for Malacanan with a little ferry across the river.

At luncheon, Quezon talked of his recent stiff remarks to the Assembly on their proposal to abolish the salary of Ruiz, Director of Posts,--which, he believes, was really an invasion of the constitutional privileges of the Executive.

The President reported that he had just been talking on the radio-phone with Hausserman, in the United States, who predicted Roosevelt's re-election, though the *Digest* polls were favourable to Landon. I asked him about the change of sentiment in America as to the Philippines. He replied that he was like a man in charge of ai

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<sup>129</sup>It is difficult to know now what Harrison meant by his remark. It might be that he was saying that the Filipinos were amused by the intensity of the attacks upon him because most of them were either exaggerated or partially untrue or outright lies. However, I cannot be certain as to the import of his remark.



vessel during a typhoon!-he had nothing to do but to stick to the helm and be prepared for every emergency, and he didn't want to be caught "snoring.!" He agreed that the ten year term for the Commonwealth before independence was just as likely to be shortened as to be lengthened.

He told me he had arranged for Hartendorp's paper a subsidy of 300 pesos a month, and was ready to go to 500 pesos; remarked that Hartendorp had behaved so much like a man when he was "fired" at Malacanan.

He then went back to the Wood administration, and said that General Frank McCoy was the only able man around Wood. He had been put there by the Forbes crowd to outwit him, (Quezon) but he had won most of the deals. McCoy wanted later to be commanding General of the Philippines, and he (Quezon) had blocked it. I laughed and remarked that he must have selected all the recent commanding generals here himself;--none of them were too bright. Quezon actually looked slightly confused for a moment, then broke out in a story of the selection of T. Roosevelt as Governor General. Hurley (the Secretary of War) told Quezon that Hoover wanted to placate the Progressive element in the Republican party, so wished to make "T.R. Jr." Governor General here. Hurley asked Quezon to meet "T.R. Jr.!"--which he did, then went to see Hurley who enquired what Quezon thought. "You told me, Mr Secretary that the people of Puerto Rico all liked 'T.R. Jr.'""--"yes"--"Well then they must be very far behind the people of the Philippines in modern thought.!" Hurley laughed and Quezon told him to give him one month in the Philippines before "T.R." came, and he would make it all right for him. But he warned Hurley that the members of the Cabinet would size up a Governor General in fifteen minutes. When he arrived at Manila, "T.R. Jr.!" was only a *Mabuhay* man. How mistaken "T.R. Jr.!" was in writing that letter of advice to his son, (remarked Quezon)--in which he cautioned him against accepting a commission in the army as that career was only suited to the less intelligent mind! Quezon said Governor General Davis had really made no impression out here; he had previously been Secretary of War and really didn't want to come here--had wished instead to be Ambassador to France or to England.

Quezon told me he would revise the terms of the close season for snipe shooting whenever I wished,!--adding: "I never pay much attention to what those Ph.D. men in the Bureau of Science say.!"

I remarked that Kiko, having been born here, could, upon reaching the age of 21, choose whether he wished to be an American or a Philippine citizen--in which respect he had a wider choice than myself. Quezon at once said he would put a resolution thru the Assembly conferring citizenship on me; he had looked up the power in the constitution and found it there.

We had many laughs together and a really happy luncheon. He was pleased with Foster's recent interview, especially his remark; "Up to this point! President Quezon didn't seem to think there was anything he couldn't!do.!"

October 4, 1936. Doria and I attended the dance given for the President by the Assembly at the Manila Hotel. Quezon was in full evening dress and was looking very well.

October 5-8, 1936. The morning papers carried a handsome message from Quezon to the Assembly in the following words: the President's message says:

"Former Governor General Francis Burton Harrison has expressed to me his desire to become a Filipino Citizen. It appears, however, that under the present Naturalization Law he lacks the required residence to acquire Filipino citizenship.

It is not necessary for me to state that no American has contributed more to the cause of Philippine self-government and independence than the Honorable Francis Burton Harrison and that he deserves the eternal gratitude of our people. I feel that it would be a very gracious act on the part of the National Assembly if it would confer upon former Governor General Harrison Filipino citizenship by a special Act, and I hereby beg to recommend that you present this matter to the Assembly.!"

October 8, 1936. Called up Quezon on the telephone to thank him for his message; he was evidently tired and coughing a good deal; he said the law naturalizing me would pass unanimously as it had passed the caucus--he would not have submitted it otherwise. I told him I took it very seriously--he said he knew that.

October 9, 1936. The law passed; meanwhile I heard from the British Consul General in answer to our enquiry that the Foreign Office had replied to him: "You may still regard Mrs Harrison as a British subject, though lawyers may differ as to this.!" (About as direct an answer as the Foreign Office could give!!!)

October 17, 1936. Went with Don Vicente Singson to Malacanan to see Quezon in order to urge a modification of the sales tax law in order to impose only one incidence if the goods are sold in the proposed new produce exchange;--this referred to agricultural products only. Singson did the talking--an excellent statement for about ten minutes. Quezon then called a meeting of the National Economic Council for the next day, at which, eventually, the proposition was adopted. So it passed the Assembly, but was followed by another law organizing a *government* produce exchange; which was, perhaps, either a trick or bad faith of some sort (Yulo?).

During our interview, Quezon had spoken of the devastations in Nueva Ecija which he had just visited:--he said the stench of decomposition was still in his nostrils. Due to his visit he had been able to stop the survivors from rebuilding in exactly the same exposed spots.

October 18, 1936. Saw Arthur Fischer, Director of Forestry, who described his visit with Quezon yesterday to the Bureau of Science to inaugurate the new totaquina (quinine) factory for the Philippines. Said he had been obliged to fight like a demon to make Director Arguelles co-operate. He also said Quezon's administration was "patch-work"--i.e., empirical--that the President seemed to be taking up enthusiastically chiefly those matters which came before him and had caught his fancy.

October 19, 1936. State banquet at Malacanan for Lord Rothermere--I doubt whether Quezon understands how to appraise correctly Lord Rothermere's position in England. The old man made a good show and a witty speech. In his address of welcome, the President made me nervous. He was skating on thin ice, but with his usual skill managed to avoid making a break. The British Consul General Foulds, who sat next to General MacArthur, and hence next but one to Rothermere, told me later that MacArthur had not been taken in for a moment by the guest of honor. Quezon was ill at ease with a "Lord,!" and had not been properly coached as to the proper mode of address &c &c. He came up to me when we were all on the balcony after dinner, and whispered: "For God's sake go and talk to him.!" Rothermere was cordial to me because of my long residence at Alness which is near his shoot at Dornoch in Scotland.

October 20, 1936. Talk with Dr Otley Beyer. In response to my question as to what it was that the rebellious *Sakdalistas* really sought, he replied: "to get rid of the whole *cacique* system.!"

October 21, 1936. Dinner dance at Malacanan for the passengers of the first Pan American Clipper--including Cornelius Vanderbilt Whitney, the son of a father and mother who had been my childhood friends. The evening was excessively dull.

At his office with the President I told him that one very important feature of the Commonwealth had been the improvement in his health. Pointed to the picture of one year ago showing, Quezon and Murphy, with Secretary of War Dern and Speaker Byrnes--the two latter were now dead. Quezon replied that he was far too busy to<sup>130</sup> die, or to think of death.

Asked him about his new yacht, which is due here at the end of this month. Advised him to anchor out in the bay in her, and he said he would have a 25 knot launch. He must get away; was restless and remarked that he was tired out. He was not going to Baguio, and wanted to take my son Kiko on a provincial trip.

He then called in Osmena and some sixty members of the Assembly (who were waiting *en masse* for the appointments of justices of the peace), and the President then administered to me before them the oath as a Philippine citizen. Cordial and good feelings on all sides, and it was a very pleasant and dignified ceremony, befitting the significance of the act. Judge Agra is preparing for me a seat in the Assembly in the next elections!!

November 24, 1936. Saw Quezon on behalf of Agra, Justice of the Peace of Pila, at the instance of General Cailles. Ten a.m. and Quezon was still in his pyjamas, for which he apologized. He was apparently about to breakfast, after a golf game.

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<sup>130</sup>A question mark and words--"by me"--was placed at the end of the sentence in the right hand margin.

He opened the question immediately, instead of the usual preliminary moves, by asking me what my mission was. Seemed very much perplexed by the problem of the Justice of the Peace of Pila, and said it was involved in that of San Pablo. After a pause and a search for the proper words, he indicated that Agra might be appointed after all. Sent for Yulo (who had just left) but couldn't get him. Said his five days of concentration upon the complete slate for Justices of the Peace for the whole country had been about the most disagreeable and exhausting bit of work of his life. That for some days afterwards, he had forbidden anyone to mention the subject to him. That Agra had prejudiced his own cause by hanging around Malacanan all the time "as if he had no confidence in himself."

Then told him I would like to see the gold plate dedicated on November 15, the first anniversary of the founding of the Commonwealth, on which the names of those who had been most responsible for the creation of a Commonwealth, Americans and Filipinos were inscribed. I said I had not attended because my name (one of the three Governors General) was on the plaque, and I would have felt like a statue, loose from its pedestal. That, however, I had regretted the omission of the name of the man who was chiefly entitled to record on the plaque! He said he had opposed the inclusion of his own name because the committee had consulted him; "but," he added "the surprising thing is that my wife and daughter advised me against having my name included." Next I asked him why the name of Theodore Roosevelt was included with that of McKinley, Wilson & Franklin Roosevelt. He answered: "Because he signed the first organic act of the new Philippines." "Nevertheless" I replied "he was more opposed to this sort of thing than any of them--remember when he advised the English in Egypt to 'govern or get out'?" "Yes," he answered "and how impertinent that was; and was characteristic also of his attitude towards the Philippines under the Jones Act." He then went on to denounce the committee which had originally prepared the list of names to be inscribed even including that of Governor General Wood!--a name which he (Quezon) had indignantly struck off.

As I left, he started to say something about two beautiful girls, and I called from the door-way: "Glad to see, Mr President that you do not neglect the artistic side of public life"--he replied "When I neglect art I shall be taken to the cemetery."

December 1, 1936. Glad November is over--somehow or other this is nearly always a worrisome month;--this year it was even worse than usual both because of Doria's illness, and by reason of the lack of discretion, not to say greediness of some of my associates in business.

At Malacanan at 9:30. Quezon was in the barber chair, just finishing an interview with Cuenco, former Assemblyman from Cebu whom he introduced to me as the new Secretary of Public Works and Communications. Three days ago, Cuenco had been announced as the new Mayor of Cebu; but it appears that Osmena as the Boss of Cebu was obliged to offer some opposition, to the appointment of one of the opposing party. Vargas was present with Quezon and handed him Cuenco's appointment as a Cabinet member, explaining that Osmena had intimated his acquiescence in that rather than having to consent to Cuenco's being Mayor of his city--never believing Quezon would agree. It looks as if Osmena had been out-jockeyed!! The President told Vargas to get this appointment right into Cuenco's hands; so that nothing could happen to interrupt it. When, a half hour later I reported this appointment to Claro Recto and Rafael Corpus, they both said: "This will break up the coalition!" but when I replied that Osmena had already agreed, Corpus remarked "That's the trouble--Osmena is too easy."

I then reported to the President my recent conversation with Foulds, British Consul General, in which I gained the information that the heads of foreign states such as Kings and Presidents were not invited to the Coronation. To this Quezon made no comment--he had probably learned this himself from Foulds; but he was obviously disappointed. My last point for Quezon that morning was a report of a conversation with Tommy Wolff last Friday night in which he stated that by accepting Filipino citizenship I had "not a friend left"--"except you, Tommy" I interrupted, at which he began to stammer. Quezon told me "not to let these fellows get under my skin." I went on to say that Wolff was getting in the frame of mind of the late Paul Reinsch, American Minister of China, who had come to believe that the inhabitants of the country wished him harm (and went mad). Quezon at once said that Wolff's mind was weakening from too much conviviality. He then observed that he "could not stand seeing any of his friends under the influence of liquor."

I told Quezon about the troubles caused to newly forming mining companies by the excessive zeal of the promoters--that I had joined the Central Exchange under the urging of Speaker Montilla believing he was back of it--that I never heard of



Prats until then--that I had induced Don Ramon Fernandez to join with me and we had gone to work to secure a Produce Exchange as something of real value for the future, and thanks to Quezon's assistance had obtained it. Shortly after this conversation Corpus reported to me that the President had vetoed the bill on exempting Produce Exchanges from more than one sales tax--thus making them impossible except when run by the government. (This I doubt).

January 20, 1937. My optimistic note on December 1st was soon shown to be a fallacy--after calling his economic council, taking their opinion and sending to the Assembly a bill freeing a Produce Exchange from more than one sales tax, and after the Legislature had adopted his recommendation and passed the bill--Quezon vetoed it and signed instead a bill creating a Government Produce Exchange--the exact opposite of what he had promised Don Ramon Fernandez! This action was pretty hard for us to swallow. Shortly after this Quezon went to China for a fortnight and I had moved to Baguio before he returned. I did not see him at Xmas time. Sympathized with an editorial in his paper (Quezon's) signed by Carlos Romulo on January 16. "Farewell to Government by Irresolution"--pretty sharp attack--Quezon must have let down Romulo as well! Most of the press written by Filipinos is chaffing Quezon for his frequent changes of mind. There must be a pretty bundle of disappointed hopes by this time--the real trouble seems to be that Yulo puts the pressure on him at the last moment and wins his way.

Quezon's trip to China, especially his conference there with the Cantonese leaders, is said to have influenced him greatly. For example, on his return he announced that he had changed his plans for a standing army, and now was going to set up only 10,000 men, instead of 20,000. Guevara has talked with him, and says "our Army will be a danger in the Philippines as soon as the American Army leaves." Guevara also told me that Quezon had "come around to my (Guevara) views," i.e., in favour of a continued American protectorate. (This I rather doubt). Quezon asked Pedro Guevara to accompany him to Washington when he leaves in a few days on the "Trade Mission preliminary conversations." (N.B. Quezon has been adroit enough thru all these past 25 years to avoid putting himself publicly in opposition to "immediate").<sup>131</sup>

After various conflicting announcements in the press, Quezon has finally decided to leave for the United States on January 23, in spite of the fact (or because of it??) that the Eucharistic Congress is to gather in Manila February 1st, led by Cardinal Doherty, formerly Bishop of Iloilo. It is said Quezon has turned over Malacanang to the Cardinal for his visit.

January 20, 1937. Jim Ross and I secured an appointment with Quezon and went to Malacanang at 10 o'clock. Were held there half an hour while Vicente Aldanese, (the last survivor in office of my Bureau Chiefs), was pressing upon Quezon acceptance of his resignation as Collector of Customs. Aldanese came out beaming and announced his success after many previous attempts. He exclaimed: "Now, I am free!"

The President was in his office in the Executive Building in perhaps the happiest mood in which I have seen him in recent years. He said his friends asked him if he was not reluctant to go away for six months from the Philippines. He replied that "he could hardly wait for Saturday to come." Next he was on the telephone to Carlos Romulo, his eyebrows twitching vigorously during the conversation--was keen to ask how his big address of Monday on the Philippine Army plans etc., at the Convocation of the University of the Philippines had "taken" among the students. From Quezon's expression, Romulo's answer was evidently favourable. Then he turned to Ross (whom he calls "Jaime") and to me, full of this recent address. He said he had made it not to reply to recent criticisms by Aguinaldo and Sumulong--whose attacks were trivial--but to answer statements of the "American Foreign Relations Committee" (an unofficial body) and of "professor" Fey as to "sabotaging the schools." That he had, however, wished to ridicule Sumulong, by calling him the self-constituted mentor of the Philippines, "who descended from above the clouds to deliver his criticisms from Mount Sinai." He added that he knew the psychology of his people, and the way to answer Sumulong was to make him ridiculous. (N.B. Sumulong made a sturdy and effective answer).<sup>132</sup> Quezon said he had taken seriously the argument of the American

<sup>131</sup>See Onorato, "Philippine Independence Movement," *passim*; see also "The Philippine Independence Mission of 1922" and "Independence Rejected: The Philippines, 1924" found in *A Brief Review of American Interests*

<sup>132</sup>This was part of Quezon's way of handling someone whose arguments were stronger and better than his own. It usually worked. When it did not, Quezon would posture for a while and then let the issue die a natural death. He did not like being shown up by anyone.

Foreign Relations Committee that the Philippine Army was created by the United States to face Japan, because he feared that in consequence the War Department might be investigated by Congress. That he had cabled his University address in full to the American War and State Departments, that the local representatives of the Associated Press and of the United Press had cabled their selections from theispeech and he (Quezon) had paid for the full transmission. (The Japanese Consul General is said to have wired it home.)

I then told him I was sorry he was going to the United States to open the Trade Conference, because always up to this moment he had "brought home the bacon" from Washington, and that he couldn't do it now. He replied that his Trade Conference business in Washington would consist of only one hour's conversation with President Roosevelt, of which nobody would know the purport. He then said he was really off on a vacation, since, through some friends, he had recently made \$25,000, "and I am going to stay away until I have spent it all on having a really good time." Ross and I said we would try to meet him in London or Paris next May, and we shook hands on that.

Quezon then turned to me and said: "We are about to go ahead with the Malangas Coal Mines again. This was the only one of your economic projects which Governor Wood did not try to close. Every year in the Board of Control I begged him to close it because we were losing 5 million pesos, but Claude Russel was drawing 30,000 pesos as manager, and always said that 'next year' he would need no more government appropriations. What the Philippines needs is just a good coal man--Jim Rockwell tells me that Meralco can use this coal--so can the steamship companies--it is also useful for domestic purposes--we have from 5 to 10 million tons there" (n.b. this is anthracite of the same quality as "Pocahontas"). Jim Rockwell has offered to send me out his coal mine manager from the Associated Gas & Electric Company's mines near Philadelphia.<sup>1</sup>

The President then remarked: "I am taking with me to the United States the data to show that instead of Governor General Wood having 'saved the Philippines from economic ruin' we prevented him from ruining the Philippines." He then added: "The fight with Wood sent me to Monrovia--but think where it sent Wood!"

Next I asked him why he had vetoed our bill for a Product Exchange and signed one authorizing a Government Produce Exchange which hadn't the capital nor ability to run one--both of which we had, and that we were entitled in the Philippines to emulate the Produce Exchange which had done so much for Japan; and, I added "we would have broken up the system of Chino *compradores* in the Philippines." He nodded, and expressed the utmost astonishment at my saying he had vetoed the (unofficial) Produce Exchange bill, and signed the act creating a Government Exchange. He said he had taken the advice of his Economic Council, and had over-ridden the objections of his Secretaries of Justice and Finance (Yulo and Alas) in helping us to give private business the power to operate a Produce Exchange. He added: "---" "must have slipped one over on me" (referring to having given him the wrong bill to sign). He then sent for his Private Secretary again, and George Vargas came in as usual, moon-faced, with startled eyes--to explain if he could (which he couldn't). I rather think he (Quezon) may have been sincere in the whole matter, though it is always possible that it was a piece of magnificent acting. (The Government Produce Exchange was never established, and the Chinese *compradores* still rule the provinces)

January 21, 1937. Called on Consul General Blunt, fresh from the English Foreign Office. He had just passed through the United States and was emphatic in the belief that anti-Filipino sentiment was strong there--but still he did not believe that independence would ever come here: "These people don't want it." I pointed out that the rich *ilustrado* class of Filipinos with whom he had come in contact might not desire it--but the United States did want it. This he admitted.<sup>133</sup> I

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<sup>133</sup>The British Foreign Office was skeptical at first that the United States would offer a fixed date for independence. The feeling was that the Americans were over-reacting to Filipino pressure--that the Philippines were Washington's Ireland. The Foreign Office tried to console itself that the Americans would come to their senses ultimately and stop short of granting sovereign independence to the Filipinos. When it became very obvious that the clock was not going to be turned back, the British then put the best face on what they considered to be an American mistake. During the Second World War, they were chagrined to see the Philippine "experiment" constantly surface as the model for their relations with India and the Empire.

then told him that Quezon had always been adroit enough to leave himself in a position where he could again lead the independence movement--and any political leader in the Philippines who opposed independence would be "smeared on the wall."

The remainder of the winter of 1936-37, Doria and I spent as tenants of the Stevenson house in Baguio. There we were when, on March 12, 1937 our little daughter Ursula Fairfax Harrison was born!

Some five weeks later, we sailed on the M.V. *Vittoria* for Genoa, and I did not return to the Philippines until October, 1938.



## MANILA REVISITED

December 1938

### A Dash of Dictatorship

During the autumn of 1938, my wife and I, with our little daughter Ursula, who had been born in Baguio some nineteen months earlier, were waiting in France the outcome of the Meeting of the Chiefs of State of England, France and Germany at Munich. When the shameful pact of Munich was signed, it became evident that the European War was, for the moment, postponed.

So we separated on our respective journeys--Doria and Ursula to visit the United States, and I to revisit Manila.

In the afternoon of October 27, 1938, I arrived at Manila on *Conte Rosso*, twenty-one days out of Trieste. It was just over twenty-five years since, with Resident Commissioner Quezon, I had first landed here with a message to the Filipino people from President Woodrow Wilson in my pocket.

This time, I had come to the Philippines largely on my own affairs, so I had notified nobody except Andy Anderson, the manager of the Manila Hotel. He, poor fellow, had died while I was en route, but had left directions for me to have exactly the room I requested. I had avoided troubling any other of my friends in order to spare them the customary arrangements for meeting the ship.

Quezon is away, it seems, in Baguio; Osmena is on the way to the United States, and elections for the Presidency are impending next month, which will probably take up most of the President's attention.<sup>134</sup>

Manuel Roxas has left the Assembly to become head of the National Economic Council.

In the lobby of the hotel, I saw Miguel Unson and Paez and several "Old Timer" Americans.

October 28, 1938. Called on High Commissioner Paul McNutt who was looking vigorous and well. Pleasant meeting him again.

At noon I was glad to have a telephone from the President at Malacanan--he had just arrived from Baguio and is going to his own province of Tayabas tonight. He invited me to the banquet he is giving at the Palace in honour of General and Mrs Burnett, the Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs from Washington, but I begged

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<sup>134</sup>Harrison was in error. The elections he was referring to were for the National Assembly.

off and asked him instead, if I might come to lunch with him alone. He said he would do so as soon as he returned to Manila and remarked: "Oh! well, I will make you honorary a.d.c., so we can go around." He added that he thought I had deserted them when I stayed away so long (18 months). Hoped the customs had treated me all right, &c.

Old friend Rafferty came to lunch with me at the hotel. He reported unfair treatment in regard to his real property in the City of Cebu. This sort of sentiment appears to be on the increase in the Philippines.

Am told that Roxas is to become Secretary of Finance in place of Antonio de las Alas, resigned. This, to me, marks Roxas as an eventual successor to Quezon. Tactically, he will be in a stronger position than will Yulo, as Speaker--and is a more formidable man.

October 31, 1938. In my visit to the National Library on Saturday, I told Teodoro Kalaw the story of the execution of Dr Rizal as given me on the *Conte Rosso* by Sendres (a Spaniard) formerly head of the *Banco de las Islas Filipinas*. Sendres had been present at the execution. At that time Sendres roomed with a Captain of Artillery, who was on the military court which tried Rizal. Sendres says Rizal was sentenced to death, because, although he had stated before the Court that he had never done anything against Spain, he was in favour of the complete independence of the Philippines. Sendres added that the execution of Rizal was a great political error; he thinks America's treatment of Aguinaldo was the right way--"look at Aguinaldo now, a poor man."

Saw Colin Hoskins, and asked him about the attacks here on foreign (American) business. He said Quezon's program was to filipinize commerce and industry. He added that corruption in the civil service is on the increase, i.e., "greasing the palm of a government employe to get one's business off the desk." "Quezon does not know it, and wouldn't believe it, if told" he added.

Professor H. Otley Beyer to lunch; he looks well and stands the climate better than the others. At the "prehistoric" conference at Singapore this year, he obtained more evidence of ancient migrations here from the coast of China south of Swatow. He also saw evidence on bronze drums, date 200-300 B.C., recently excavated in Indo-China, of the "diffusion of cultures." On these drums were engraved designs exactly like those on the Maya buildings in Yucatan. During the last eighteen months, he had greatly extended his archaeological discoveries in Batangas.

As to politics, Beyer says that Quezon has skillfully drawn into his own hands all the strings of dictatorship.

He tells me that the agrarian question is the source of most political trouble in the Philippines; that after I left, Quezon got Howe from the United States to propose solutions--all were rejected went home in high dudgeon.

8 p.m. Dinner at Malacanan. The President was standing at the head of the big stairway and I was greatly pleased at the prospect of dining with him alone--but found Ehrman and Weinzheimer, the Calamba sugar people, already there. Not only have these two always opposed me, but their presence put the lid on the table conversation so far as I was concerned and a dull evening was assured, though the talk winged from one topic to another, as is always the case when Quezon is present. He was as cordial and friendly as ever, but was very tired indeed--all sparkle was gone and I got from his presence none of that stimulus as in nine cases out of ten in the past.

Ehrman made some excuse for not starting for twenty days on some trip with the President by saying he had to leave soon for San Francisco. "Nobody can leave the islands unless I permit!" replied Quezon.

The President said he was going to change his entire Cabinet, and that he was sailing the next day for the south, largely to see if he could get Alano re-elected to the Assembly in Zamboanga; he invited me to go with him, but I asked if I might be invited later when his yacht came out of dry-dock.

He praised very highly the expert service of Dr Bain, a mining expert he had brought from the United States, who examined and reported on the vast fields in East Surigao, and on the National Coal Company's seams.

Then he told the story of a recent conversation with Datu Umbra, the first Moro Governor of Jolo, and a modern educated man. Umbra had taken Quezon out alone into

the interior of Jolo, so the President asked him: "Have you got your revolver?" Umbra said: "No!--but why?" "Well," replied Quezon, "You always carry one in the Assembly in Manila!" "Yes," retorted Umbra, "I need one in Manila, but not in Jolo."

Mrs Quezon, looking very well, and smart, came in to speak to us before being ferried across the river, to sleep in the nipa house she has had built there--says it is much cooler, and she has never really liked Malacanan Palace.

November 2, 1938. Miguel Unson to lunch. He says it is generally rumoured that Osmena has gone to the United States to persuade President Roosevelt to agree to an amendment to the Philippine Constitution, permitting the re-election of Quezon. Unson thinks the President is training Yulo as his successor, and that Manuel Roxas has not yet been forgiven by Quezon, who once wanted to "annihilate" him. Unson also thinks Quezon is in a position to lead the people either towards or away from independence.

November 3, 1938. Called on Don Rafael Palma who is confined to his house by some mysterious malady which was at first diagnosed as a brain tumor. He says he has no incentive to live--can taste nothing, can hardly see and hears with difficulty. His tongue is thick, but his mind is clear. This noble man was one of the patriots during the revolution--and is utterly unselfish. He says he has now made it up with Quezon and wishes he could serve him.

I asked Palma about Japan. "We are not afraid of Japan" he said. "She will be tied up with her aggressions in Asia for some years, and we should be able to take care of ourselves if we are sincere in our preparations for defense."

He does not like McNutt's present idea for this country and is afraid of the "Dominion status" movement.<sup>135</sup>

He urges me to write a book on Quezon and to get it out as soon as possible.

Finally he remarked that Quezon is satisfying the Moros with roads and self-government but that the Japanese problem in Davao should be settled by the United States before they leave the Philippines.

November 5, 1938. Dinner with Mr & Mrs Hubert Fox, I sat next to the British Consul General, Wyatt-Smith, who has served thirty years in China. I asked about the complaint of the white merchants in China that England is abandoning its trade there. He replied that the export trade from England to China is now in heavy industries and that the textile trade has become hopeless. He added that England does not need her own merchants in China, since their government can deal with Asiatics directly--they got on very well in the beginning in that way, and can do so again.

November 6, 1938. With High Commissioner and Mrs McNutt at the Fairchild residence which they have rented. He says he made notes of all his conversations with Quezon and filed them in the records of his office.

McNutt thinks Manuel Roxas the best brain of the Filipinos to follow Quezon. His opinion of Quezon: "instability and impulsiveness; colorful and is a wonderful man." Likes him and likes to be with him. Says Quezon has created a situation of great instability here by speeches in the United States for independence *earlier* than 1946.

McNutt said he thought Osmena was about finished politically; that Yulo would be Speaker, but lacked exactly what a speaker needs: a knowledge of how to deal with men.

That afternoon, Mr and Mrs Walter Robb to tea with me and we talked of Professor Otley Beyer. He says that the American Academy of Science had sent a Dutchman out here to search Beyer's notes who had collected thirteen volumes of excerpts from his records. That much at least, will survive Beyer, who seems to have no disposition himself to write for publication.

Saw Arthur Fisher, former director of the Bureau of Forestry. He says McNutt's "realistic re-examination" really means postponement of independence and a dominion form of government out here. He thinks it is too late for that plan. Fischer likes McNutt and says he is equally popular here with both Americans and Filipinos.

<sup>135</sup> See Wheeler, "Independence for the Philippines," *passim*.



Dinner with the Marquardt's--poor "Mark" has gone practically blind at the age of 60. Talk mostly about the English, tho "Mark's" son says he fears a clash between Japan and United States over the nine power treaty!. Best food I have had in Manila.

November 9, 1938. Clean sweep for Quezon and the *Nacionalistas* in the election --so one-sided that it looks almost like a Hitler plebiscite!.

Poor Quezon is still laid up in bed with a severe attack of "shingles."

Visit from Rafael Corpus--next to Quezon, he and Claro M. Recto are the most interesting conversationalists out here. Both are frank, salty and full of information. Corpus who was president of the Philippine National Bank knows the ins and outs of most occurrences in the Philippines!!

Saw Colonel Hutter, of MacArthur's staff at lunch--he is incessantly traveling with Quezon as his physician. Has been away four times with him in the last few months. Says the President nearly died of appendicitis this year, and that his "shingles" are still bad.

Called at 6 p.m. at Malacanan. Quezon on account of the "shingles" is unable to wear any clothes, except pyjama trousers and cannot sleep without morphine, poor fellow! Our conversation was simple and friendly and indeed for nearly thirty years now we have been close friends.

He told me that I must spend three weeks with him on the yacht and in his nipa house on the Pasig!. He also talked of his friendship for Bob Rogers, who, he said "wore so well because he was quiet!."

November 17, 1938. Had an hour with Quezon, who is evidently better. Jake Rosenthal was there reading to him. Quezon had paid a visit to Japan last August and greatly admired the "honesty, industry and loyalty" of those people. He then said very earnestly: "If the Filipinos ever have trouble with Japan it will be their own fault!. I do not believe Japan will ever attack the Philippines if we treat them decently!."

The President said he was going to speak on December 17th on the subject of Nationalism--he has always, he said, been a nationalist, but it can go too far. Rosenthal told him he was "only 83% American"<sup>136</sup> and Quezon approved the quip.

Met Manuel Roxas at the front door of Malacanan and I expressed pleasure that he is now Secretary of Finance. I added he ought to have taken that post in the beginning, and he replied: "There was then no opportunity!."

November 18, 1938. Conversation at the Philippine National Library with the Director E. B. Rodriguez. He gave me his recent article in *La Vanguardia* on "Baler 60 years ago"--about Quezon's childhood. Says the "father" Lucio Kesson was father of the half-brother of Quezon whom I used to know at Baler. Quezon's real father is supposed to have been a Spanish priest!. He observed that the scenery at Baler was "serene and beautiful" and "then came violent tempests and thundering on all sides" --like Quezon.

November 20, 1938. Luncheon given by General Douglas MacArthur in his pent house on the roof of the Manila Hotel; finest suite of rooms in town. I sat next to Yulo. It was all a bit stiff at first and then came excellent general conversation. MacArthur restated his plan of defense for the Philippines arranging to make it too expensive for any power to tackle them. Said that no nation could hold the Filipinos for long against their will; that when they fought against the United States, the guns only began to slacken when our policy of developing the Filipinos for eventual independence became known.<sup>137</sup> He added that neither Japan nor Germany could ever exploit these people--the Filipinos simply wouldn't work for them.

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<sup>136</sup> An obvious reference to the amount of U.S. involvement in Philippine trade.

<sup>137</sup> The guns were put down when it became clear that the United States was prepared for a long war if necessary to break the back of Filipino resistance. The decision to lay down arms was sweetened by America's willingness to allow the Filipinos to share power, especially at the local and provincial level, with the Americans. The U.S. Army began the process of filipinization to co-opt the elite and make American sovereignty attractive to them.

Then MacArthur proceeded to develop his idea that for the past four hundred years, culturally and historically the Filipinos have really been part of Latin America. It actually started as a dependency of Mexico, when the Spanish first occupied these islands. He wished a good-will commission to be sent from Manila to develop relations with the twenty American nations, and make the Philippines a part of our Pan American system.

MacArthur said the Department of State considers the Philippines a foreign country already--and even, perhaps, an unfriendly country! The defense plans of the United States arrange for that possibility. That if Philippine affairs had remained in the Bureau of Insular Affairs in the War Department, the Filipinos would thus have been able to keep an attorney in Court. Says that Philippine affairs are now managed in the State Department by Francis Sayre, who regards the Philippines as completely foreign. When MacArthur gave his "Latin American" thesis to Sayre last summer, the latter nearly blew up and stated: "You must not say that." MacArthur also gave a similar argument to President F. D. Roosevelt, who made an evasive reply to the effect that the idea was interesting, but entirely new.

MacArthur has a gift for fine phraseology and when in argument has a piercing, steady, rather hypnotic gaze--is intensely in earnest and his whole heart is in his statements.

November 21, 1938. When I got back to the Manila Hotel last night, the *Kahirup* society ball was going on in the new ballroom. This is a Filipino dancing club, apparently based on sugar money. The ladies were laden with brilliant jewels, and acres of beautiful new cars were parked outside the hotels. Such a display of wealth is a dangerous sign of the times here. It is all photographed for Sunday newspapers which circulate in the nearly poverty-stricken provinces.

November 22, 1938. "Old reunion party" for me at the Manila Hotel--39 old associates and friends of much earlier years were at the dinner, which was gotten up by Don Miguel Unson. Three members of my Cabinet of long ago were present--Alberto Barretto, Jaime C. de Veyra and Vicente Singson Encarnacion. Poor Rafael Palma is too ill to attend.

November 23, 1938. Good talk with Dr. Ralph Rock, paleontologist and botanist from Yunnanfu, China. He is a friend and correspondent of my daughter Virginia. He thinks war must soon come in Europe.

December 1, 1938. Report of the Joint Preparatory Commission rendered in Washington. Great commotion in his community. Osmena announces in Washington that McNutt's proposal for "realistic reexamination" of the Philippine question has been abandoned and that political independence<sup>138</sup> in 1946 will be adhered to. Rotary Club and other "Old Timers" are thrown into confusion.

December 2, 1938. Went aboard the new government yacht *Casiana* at 6:30 p.m. with Don Alejandro Roces, Colonel Eisenhower, Colonel Hutter, Major Speth, Jake Rosenthal, Bob Rogers and A. D. Williams--all close friends of Quezon, who brought with him also his elder daughter Maria Aurora and his son Manuel Jr.

Very luxurious vessel and admired by all.

Bridge took up most of our waking hours on this brief trip. I had only one conversation with Quezon produced a story to record. He says that on his last visit to the United States in March, 1937, he told President Roosevelt that he was in favour of independence for the Philippines in 1938 or 1939, because the existing situation was impossible since: (a) the relations of the High Commissioner to the Philippine Government were not defined and (b) trade relations under the Tydings-McDuffie Act were so disadvantageous. So far as President Roosevelt was concerned, he was then willing to grant immediate independence.

Quezon reports a scene at the reception then given him in Washington by the Secretary of War. Dr. Stanley Hornbeck, adviser on Far Eastern Affairs in the Department of State, whom he describes as "one of those imperialists" came up to him and sneered at the plight in which the Filipinos would find themselves if they got immediate independence. Quezon roared at him: "We Filipinos can live on rice and fish, and to hell with your sugar and oil."

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<sup>138</sup>See Wheeler, "Independence for the Philippines," *passim*.

Quezon also commented that if Murphy really did not wish to return as High Commissioner when McNutt withdrew, he was in favour of Francis Sayre. He says Sayre is a fine fellow, and a son-in-law of the late President Wilson. He learned as Adviser to the King of Siam how to get on with Orientals. "But," he added, "Sayre is opposed to commercial concessions by the United States to the Philippines."

Manuel Roxas joined us for the last day of the trip, and I saw him win seven straight rubbers of bridge. He is singularly well up in American political history. He seems to me *facile princeps* after Quezon. He is shrewd enough, I think to steer his way through all the shoals around him as he enters the present Administration. Very agreeable and interesting man.

December 7, 1938. Visit from Don Quintin Paredes who is very glad to get back to Manila after resigning as Resident Commissioner in Washington, because he had not enough money to run properly his office there. He says he has not retired from ambitions and that Quezon can elect anybody he chooses as his successor.<sup>139</sup> "If he doesn't take it himself."

December 10, 1938. Spoke at the annual debate of the Manila Law College. A really entertaining evening, and I was very graciously introduced by Judge Manuel Camus (the Dean) and by Dr Victoria Yamzon.

December 11, 1938. Visit from Guillermo Gomez, Under Secretary of Finance, age 58--nearly pure blooded Spaniard, who speaks English well. Was Collector of Customs in Iloilo from 1899 to 1929 and has since held his present position here. Very interesting talk about the customs tariff.

December 12, 1938. Agrarian troubles in Bulacan and in Nueva Ecija.

December 15, 1938. Celebration of commencement at the University of the Philippines, to which I was invited as an "alumnus" i.e., (hon L.L.D.). The fact that it is a state university is too much in evidence. According to the programme: the first number is to be the unveiling of an oil portrait of Quezon in a cap and gown; second a chorus by students entitled "Bathala, Bless our President" and then comes an address by Quezon's secretary, George Vargas. Too much incense may become a trifle stifling!

December 16, 1938. Poor James Fugate, an American, formerly Governor of Jolo, who was in the Episcopal Mission in Cotobato, has been murdered, his head cut off by Moros (?) there.

December 18, 1938. My birthday (65). Dined with the Rockwells, together with General Creed Cox, former Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs now adviser to Quezon and a sound, sensible fellow. After dinner he talked a little--said there will be no change in the date 1946 for independence. He stated that the only thing which could bring on a war between the United States and Japan would be an attack by Japan on the Philippines, that the United States will not withdraw in face of a threat by Japan.

December 23, 1938. Staying with the President alone at the Guest House across the Pasig River from Malacanan Palace.

At luncheon we had Don Alejandro Rocas, proprietor of the T.V.T. newspapers and Paez, manager of the Manila Railroad Company. Paez told of the success of the new branch of the railroad in the Bicol Provinces--at last, they have through connection with Manila and it is no longer necessary to cross Ragay Gulf by steamer. Quezon mentioned that he had refused the request of residents of those provinces for a highway parallel with the railroad.

Rocas came in excited by the press dispatches giving the exceedingly strong reply of Assistant Secretary of State Sumner Welles to the German *Charge d'Affaires* in which he refused to apologize for the very strong denunciations of Germany by Secretary Ickes. Parallel and even more aggressive statements had been made by Ickes himself, and by Key Pitman, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, which contained the language: "We do not like the Government of Germany and we do not like the Government of Japan." Rocas is expecting serious consequences--perhaps war. Quezon remarked: "The way to keep the peace nowadays is to use insults."

<sup>139</sup> According to the 1934 constitution (until it was amended in 1940), the Philippine president served one six-year term.



Later Roces told me of his conversation about me with the late Governor General Leonard Wood, who had asked him what he thought of me. Roces replied enthusiastically about me, stating that before my coming here, the Filipinos had felt they were "nobodies." Wood replied: "What wonderful friendship!!" Roces answered him: "That is not merely friendship--it's justice!"<sup>140</sup>

Roces then went on to relate a conversation he had just after the defeat by the United States of the Philippine insurrection. He said tartly to a friar: "You gave us Heaven and Hell, but kept the earth for yourselves--now we want our earth, and you can take back your Heaven and Hell!"

This started the President talking about the present troubles on the Buenavista estate in Bulacan, belonging to the Church. These difficulties had come to a head this week. Quezon said: "The Archbishop is my friend, or used to be." The Buenavista through its revenues supports the "San Juan de Dios" hospital in Manila. At the moment, the estate is in the hands of a receiver, who had ordered the new crop to be left untouched while the financial troubles were adjusted; the *aparceros* (or tenants) are to receive their share--there have been disorders, threats and danger of bloodshed. Secretary of Justice Santos recently called this serious situation to Quezon attention in a recent Cabinet meeting, and the President became indignant that he had not been earlier informed. He telephoned at once to Orense, the lawyer for the Church, to the Governor of the Province, to the Constabulary &c. to hold up everything for a week, until he can get the situation straightened out. Quezon even threatened Orense with violent resistance from the Constabulary if his agents proceeded. States that he will not be like General Weyler who sent a company of Spanish artillery to the Calamba estate to shoot down the tenants there (*vide* Rizal). He then sent for the Archbishop and recalled to him the reason for the Filipino insurrection against Spain. The "Friar Estates." He then offered to lease the estate for the government for an average rental equal to that which the Church had received from this estate for the past five years, plus ten per cent, which would make 115,000 pesos as an annual return for an estate assessed at four million pesos. Quezon said the Government would buy the estate for three million pesos. The Archbishop withdrew to consider, and the matter is still pending.

I remarked that when Governor Taft had negotiated the famous Friar Lands purchase, it was a pity he did not buy all the Church estates for the government. Quezon explained that Taft bought only the Friar Estates because he thought that those belonging to the Archbishop would be protected by the Filipinos who are all Catholics.

Quezon then mentioned his last summer's veto of the bill for religious instruction in the state schools--he said that over two thirds of the Assembly favoured this bill.

Finally, he talked of the commencement exercises this year at San Juan Letran, the college he had attended when he was a boy. They had played during these exercises, not only the Filipino National Anthem, but that of Spain also--then everybody else present gave the Fascist salute but at that point, Quezon sat down. When he made his address, a little later, he slapped them severely for this incident, stressed the need for neutrality in the Spanish Civil War, and commended the attitude of High Commissioner McNutt in avoiding partisanship. Then in order to temper off the severity of his rebuke, he remarked to them: "I am glad to get even with the faculty, for these padres did just what they wanted with me for eleven years!"

A little later, when he went to mass in some parish church, the friar organist started the old (Franco) Spanish anthem and immediately switched to the Philippine anthem, and he realized how directly the Filipinos had derived their anthem from the old Spanish one.

At dinner that night, the President developed a theory in favour of representative democracy instead of "mob democratic rule." "The people care more for good government than they do for self-government," he asserted, adding that "the fear is that the Head of State may either exceed his powers, or abuse them by improprieties. To keep order is his main purpose."

<sup>140</sup> Wood had a good idea what Harrison was like. Before Harrison went out to Manila, both men used to ride together. Harrison liked the military and enjoyed their company. When he was appointed governor general he tried to take Frank R. McCoy, then attached to Wood in the War Department, as his aide-de-camp. One wonders what Harrison's regime might have been if McCoy had gone out with him in 1913.

As I felt there was more than a dash of unorthodoxy in his present philosophy, I then led him to a discussion of the qualities of those who are candidates to succeed him.

His present choice is Yulo, of whom he thinks so highly as a lawyer, and added that it was most important for an executive not to exceed his powers. He has consulted Yulo at every turn of his own administration. Now he will make him speaker to "give him his chance." At the same time he is bringing Manuel Roxas close to him as Secretary of Finance, to study him as well. I put several questions as to Yulo's qualifications in handling other men, and in getting the best out of them. Quezon replied that if Yulo succeeded him he could sustain him and put him over. He admitted, however that the frequent appearances of Yulo at the glittering social events of the sugar barons did not help him with "the people" adding the view that Joe's (Yulo's) only weakness is that his wife runs him; she is very extravagant. The President added that Yulo has no control whatever over Mrs Yulo's exhibitions of wealth; she used, moreover, to come to a banquet up to an hour late. He, Quezon, finally gave instructions to his staff at the Palace, that his dinners were to be kept waiting only ten minutes for Mrs Yulo, and no longer. Shortly after this, she came to a dinner party half an hour late and was told at the door that the dinner was going on, and empty places at the table had been removed. This put a stop to her tardiness.

Roxas, he says, will certainly be President of the Philippines some day--"nothing can stop it" though he does not know whether Roxas will actually succeed him. Roxas has built up a great reputation throughout the Philippines; has matured and improved tremendously in the last three years.

I asked him what would be the position of Roxas if his new tax measures were rejected by the Assembly? He replied: "I will put them over." Roxas has planned his new taxes on the mines in consultation with the principal representatives of the mining companies, and they have already agreed that the proposed taxes are fair.

Paredes, he says, is a very strong man and is the leader of all the Ilocanos; he has Tinguian blood, but not as much as had the late Ignacio Villamor, whom I had nominated as the first Filipino President of the University.

Paredes, he continued, is a very able man, but violent. Quezon greatly appreciates his support of Yulo for the speakership, and he spoke very highly of the former--but he knows, of course, how warmly I am attached to Paredes. I told Don Quintin the next day that Quezon had spoken so well of him, and he expressed the utmost skepticism, then added: "if he wants to extricate me from my difficulties here, why does he not 'deport' me on one of those missions to the United States or Europe?" He added that he had no career in the Assembly, and that unless he keeps quiet for the next three years, it will just bring on a row with the administration; that if he does keep quiet, he will lose his political influence.

This conversation was so confidential that I did not report it to Quezon, and the President made only one further comment at this period upon Quintin Paredes, which was to the effect that Paredes had a big personal following in the Assembly of which he was Speaker--while Roxas, as Speaker had only a dozen personal followers there, and had to be helped by Quezon and Osmena.

My conversation with the President that night at the "Guest House" concluded early because he was so tired, and as we said "good night" he dwelt for a few minutes upon the subject of the book he wishes to write in collaboration with me. He suggests that I work up my own notes first and he will supply a thread of narrative for the administrations which came between mine and his! It is difficult to see how this would work out--I have no talent as a Boswell and not even an ambition to fill so exacting a role!

December 24, 1938. Breakfast at seven o'clock. The President and I still alone together, and both rather sleepy. He woke up, however, when I began to talk of the great iron deposits in eastern Surigao, reserved since 1915 by Executive Order for the disposition of the government. Quezon said that Marsman would not press his challenge as to the constitutionality of the Executive Order. Geologist Bain believes that the only way to work these iron fields is in conjunction with the South Manchuria Railway--he has just come back from there. I asked Quezon whether this would mean heavy industries in the Philippines, and that the Filipinos were going to make their own steel? He said "Yes." This led to an exposition by him of the extreme awkwardness of the geographical position of the Philippine Islands, lying more or less between Japan and the United States. He had advised Mr Bain that nothing could be done in this respect at this moment of great strain; he had also sent Bain's

report on this subject to High Commissioner McNutt, so that the American Government would not think that he was dealing directly with Japan, adding: "They already think in Washington that this was the purpose of my visit to Japan last summer. If we go on, however, opposing every single thing that the Japanese want, as the Chinese so foolishly did, we may meet the fate of China."

Thereupon, I raised once more the thorny question as to whether the Filipinos were considering the raising of their tariff laws as to the importation of textiles, which would be possibly construed as being aimed at Japan. Quezon replied that he had taken up this question personally with President Roosevelt, telling him that on certain higher qualities of cotton goods it might be possible for them to favour the United States, but positively not on common cotton cloth, affecting every inhabitant of the Philippines. He could not stand for that, and Roosevelt remarked that he himself wondered why all the Filipinos should pay tribute to American textile companies; he added, however, that the Filipinos could start their own textile manufactures and protect them, and that, he said, would be "all right.!" This was a thoroughly satanic suggestion as it seems to me, for the American mills under free trade with the Philippines, will get all the protection ostensibly proposed for native industry in the Philippines, and the cost of clothing for every inhabitant in these islands will rise.

Quezon then turned again to the rather acute situation arising as regards Japanese holdings of hemp plantations in Davao. The province is so large that the fifteen thousand hectares held by the Japanese are, so the President explained, a mere "drop in the bucket" (?). A lot of their hemp land was obtained by them through dummy Filipino owners. Instead of cancelling leases and raising a direct issue with Japan, he proposes to wait for the expiration of these leases and then refuse to renew them.

One hundred and twenty guests assembled in the lower reception hall by the river, at Malacanan, for a luncheon given in my honor. The entertainment went off with a bang and real cordiality was shown me by both the Americans and the Filipinos present. In his address, Quezon was very effective in making the points of which a resume was later published in the press. All of the pleasant and very personal humour of the President's remarks about me as well as my comments about him in return was omitted by the press.

At the little table with Quezon and myself, sat General MacArthur and High Commissioner McNutt. I concluded my own remarks on a serious note with the statement that I was sailing away from them tomorrow to the uncharted seas of a European war. As I sat down, MacArthur asked me what I meant by a European war? I replied to him that I had just recently come from France and was returning there, and that I was as certain as I could ever be of anything in the future that a war was coming very soon in Europe. General MacArthur replied: "They cannot afford a war, but if there were a war, Germany would go through Russia like a knife through cheese.!"

5 p.m. Don Alejandro Roces, the proprietor of the influential chain of newspapers known as "T.V.T." invited me by telephone to take a "cup of chocolate" with him at his residence this evening--"no butter," he added. It turned out, of course, to be a four course banquet with Philippine delicacies. The guests were: President Quezon, Secretaries Manuel Roxas and Jose Abad Santos, Alberto Barretto, Miguel Unson, Paez and Jake Rosenthal. Quezon acted as Santa Claus in presenting me with a handsome gold wrist-watch as a joint Christmas gift from all those present.

After the sumptuous meal, they took me out doors a few yards to the corner of the park and the boulevard, both of which had been named in 1921. There they pointed out to me the site upon which they were going to erect a statue to me! Up to that moment, I had believed that our host, Alejandro Roces was making a *broma* but all of a sudden, I realized they were in earnest. I was really extremely embarrassed and could find nothing sensible to say. At first I pointed out that statues were not raised to living men, but they countered by referring to the statue of Lord Curzon in Calcutta. I refrained from answering with the statement: "Yes, and look at the pedestal of that statue, all covered with betel-nut saliva from the Indians.!" I merely remarked feebly that the fashion in statues changed so rapidly and after a while, parents could hardly tell their children, "who that old guy was up there?" This made no impression, so I had to think rapidly, and came out with the reflection that in the passage of a few years, the only beings which made real use of statues in the parks were the pigeons and the sparrows. This brought a general laugh, and the situation was saved.

Miguel Unson then told me that the young people in the Philippines knew nothing about my administration of some twenty years earlier. I replied that this, perhaps,



was the natural course of events but he said "no"--that it was largely the result of the vigorous campaign made by my successor, Governor General Leonard Wood and his "Cavalry Cabinet" to discredit me.<sup>141</sup> He added that they had even cut down the tree which I had planted, explaining that this was done so they might practice polo there, but Unson said it was intentional.

Young Roces then told me that his father often said that he made his successful start as a newspaper man by backing my administration throughout--and this was the only newspaper support I ever had either in the Philippines or in the United States.

December 25, 1938. Sailed from Manila on *Conte Biancamano*, and among those who came down to say good-bye were Miguel Unson, Manuel Roxas and Rafferty.

December 27, 1938. Dr Elliott, President of Purdue University, Indiana, on board returning from advising on the proposed reorganization of the University of the Philippines. Says that before leaving he submitted his report which took 40 minutes to read. Gil told him it was the only time Quezon was ever known to have kept quiet that long!

Elliott says he saw students informally and "off the record," and learned a lot that way. That the University is now disorganized, though Quezon is deeply interested in its success and asked Dr Elliott whether he should take over the portfolio of Public Instruction *ad interim*, and Elliott replied: "I am sorry to say--no!! Mr President!" He remarked that Quezon though claiming to be an oriental, had more of the occidental outlook than any of the rest of them. Thinks him "like all dictators, rather ruthless." He believes Quezon is running down physically, and that Roxas is training himself for the presidency--the latter is very abstemious and "the only Filipino who goes in for physical exercise."

He (Elliott) came out to Manila at the instance of Manuel Roxas the man whom he places highest of the Filipinos today. He said Roxas should not serve as Chairman of the Board of Regents of the University because he fills too many political posts, and there should be no politicians on the board.

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The diary is suspended here, and not resumed until May 1942. War conditions made it impossible for me to see Quezon meanwhile. The war began on September 1st, 1939 while I was again in France.

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<sup>141</sup>After having studied both governors general and their administrations, as well as the men who served them, it seems that Unson was following a typical Filipino cultural pattern when he made his remarks to Harrison. They have no basis in fact.

## PART II

### THE PHILIPPINE COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE

Shoreham Hotel, Washington, D.C. May 30th 1942

A few days ago, Quezon had wired me at Charlottesville, Virginia, inviting me to join him as his guest at the Ambassador Hotel in New York and just as I was about to start for there another wire came stating that he was coming down to Washington, so I joined him here this morning at nine o'clock--our first meeting since his *despedida* party for me at Malacanan Palace on Christmas day of 1938 in Manila--two and a half years during which the constitution of the Philippine Commonwealth had been amended so as to permit his re-election as President last November. Within thirty days thereafter, the Japanese had struck, and Quezon's inauguration for a new term was held after Christmas of 1941 in the beleaguered fortress of Corregidor, without the presence of the Legislature and under the Japanese bombs.

The President was not yet up when I arrived at the hotel but welcomed me very warmly, clad in his pyjamas. He was in good spirits, as animated as ever, but he had a very bad cough which he ascribed to the continual dust of the bomb shelters on Corregidor Island.

He told me of his escape with his family from that fortress by submarine, and his exciting and hazardous journey by boat and plane down to Melbourne, Australia; all of which is to be told in the book he wishes to write.

They had left Manuel Roxas, by then a Colonel in the army, in Mindanao, and had designated him as President-elect or "Designate" in case Quezon and Vice-President Osmena failed to survive the hazardous journey before them. Roxas had refused to accompany them out of the Philippines, since he insisted on staying behind to continue the fight. The last they saw of him was at the Del Monte plantation in Mindanao, from which their two planes took off for Australia. Chief Justice Jose Abad Santos had already left the fleeing presidential party, and had gone to Cebu, where subsequently the Japanese found him and later killed him because he refused to cooperate with them in any way. Thus perished a dear and greatly esteemed friend of mine, whose lofty character and ardent patriotism should entitle him to an especial shrine in the memory of the people of the Philippines.

In the City of Melbourne, Quezon fretted greatly, in spite of the many courtesies paid him there by General MacArthur, and the gratifying statement made to him by the Governor General of Australia, who said to the exiled President that the delaying actions on Bataan and Corregidor had saved Australia.

Quezon felt, however, that while his country was being occupied by the Japanese, he was, at that moment doing nothing useful to help them and he became exceedingly restless in Melbourne living idly in comfort while his fellow countrymen at home were in the "Clutch of Circumstance!" So he decided to go to Washington.

President Roosevelt sent a cruiser to escort the *President Coolidge* from Australia to San Francisco; gave Quezon and his family and their suite the presidential

train across the American continent, and, together with his Cabinet officials, met Quezon at the train at the Union Station in Washington. Quezon and his family stayed overnight at the White House and to the guests at a Cabinet dinner, he told that evening his story of the invasion of the Philippines and of his own daring escape from the hazards of Corregidor. He found himself a hero of the Administration and of the American public.

I found him very reluctant to be considered a hero since he had really wanted with all his heart to stay behind in the Philippines with his own people in their supreme test. His health was shattered by his experiences but his spirit was that of a lion.

Osmena, who joined us at breakfast in Quezon's rooms at the Shoreham was cordial, and told me that his own plan had been to escape from Corregidor and join Manuel Roxas and Guingona as *remontados* in the mountains of Mindanao.

Quezon reverted again to the fame which had come to him as a "hero"--he said that in fact he had been dreadfully scared by the bombing on Corregidor. He had been greatly impressed by the cool courage there of his eldest daughter, "Baby," who whenever the bombing began, refused to run for the shelter of Malinta tunnel. She explained to her worried mother that when all those big men were running for the tunnel, she preferred "not to get trampled upon at the entrance."

While they were at first on Corregidor, the Japanese had sent Quezon word that if he would come back to Malacanan Palace they would give the Filipinos their independence "with honor." Quezon was at that time in real doubt whether, for the sake of his people, he should not accept--he was greatly bothered by the responsibility of his decision, knowing that no early relief or reinforcements would be sent to the Philippines, so he cabled to President Roosevelt a summary of his perplexities. On December 28th, 1941, the President replied to him stating that the United States would give the Filipinos back their country and an independence which the United States would *secure and protect*.<sup>142</sup>

He thinks the Americans and Filipinos in Manila were at first well treated by the Japanese forces, but was not fully informed as to conditions there until he arrived in Panay, where he met several governors of Provinces in Luzon, who had managed to slip through the lines.

I enquired about several of my friends--Quezon said that Alejandro Roces was publishing Japanese stuff in his papers, but that he did not blame him for that, because the enemy had probably taken possession of his publishing plant.

He said that he did not leave Manila and go to Corregidor until strongly urged to do so by General MacArthur and American High Commissioner Sayre went with him to the island fortress. There was incessant bombing around them while they were in the tender at the little wharf by the Manila Hotel for an hour and a half. When General MacArthur followed that night, he was not bombed in the darkness.

Quezon left nobody in Malacanan Palace because the superintendent, Nick Kamisky was in Baguio; all his papers were left behind there, but he is told that the Palace had not been damaged. The beautiful old Treasury building near the mouth of the Pasig River was destroyed because there were some inter-island boats moored there at which the Japanese bombers were aiming. He said the first lot of the enemy bombers were remarkable shots.

Quezon then went on to describe the army in defense of the Philippines at the time. As mobilized, it consisted of 7,000 American soldiers and 8,000 Philippine

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<sup>142</sup>On eight other occasions in this diary, Quezon refers to President Roosevelt's promise to "secure and protect" the Philippines. It would seem that he sought to assuage his feelings of guilt for having left the Philippines (or at least his fears of having allowed Roxas and other powerful Filipinos to remain behind) by constantly assuring himself that he had extracted something very important from the United States. Had the promise not been made at an hour of national tragedy but made after cool rational discussion, Quezon would indeed have achieved the ambition of a lifetime--the promise of American protection and guarantee of the sovereign Philippine Republic. But having been issued when it was, the promise was only as good as the maker's willingness to live up to the commitments promised. Quezon understood this. That is why he kept the heat on Roosevelt. And, as suggested, he probably needed the psychological boost.



Scouts (American Army troops who are Filipinos), and 120,000 Philippine Army soldiers and officers; 75-80,000 of the Filipino Army were on Luzon. There were heavy casualties in the field before they got to Bataan; once there, there were not very many killed, but a considerable number of officers, both American and Filipino were later picked off by the Japanese sharp-shooters. Quezon's own nephew was wounded.

He remarked that Aguinaldo was no "Quisling"--that he only wanted independence. George Vargas, the presidential secretary was left in charge of the City Administration.

On Corregidor, Quezon said, General MacArthur was utterly fearless; refused to take shelter while the bombing went on, and declined to wear a steel helmet. Others ran for shelter.

He also commented that in his opinion this war was a direct result of the American policy towards China to which the United States had so consistently adhered.

Quezon declared that before leaving Manila for Corregidor, he had laid his perplexities as to the policy best for the welfare of the Philippines before his Council of State as also before General MacArthur. The General told him he must not falter now because he had become a "world hero." He replied to MacArthur that he and the general had worked together for eight years, but the general did not really know him yet, adding: "I never took any decision in my career merely to gain the esteem of others but only to retain my own--I am still your President." MacArthur replied by rising and stating: "You are still my President."

Quezon seemed very sore about England; especially as to their handling of the Singapore campaign, and even more than that over Great Britain's pulling away all the American navy for use in the Atlantic. He is sure the United States Navy could have defeated Japan at the beginning if they had then sent their whole navy against the Japanese fleet. He was also angry when he spoke of the American troops being sent to Ireland. This was what the American and British official propaganda cynically called "global strategy," meaning the abandonment of the Philippines until Germany should be defeated.

Since his arrival in Washington, Quezon said Secretary of the Navy Knox has asked him whether General Hurley had not sent the Philippines abundant supplies from New Zealand since the attack, and Quezon had replied that Hurley had sent practically nothing--"only a basketful."

The rest of this morning was spent by us in driving about and looking at big houses with a view to acquiring a presidential residence for the Quezons: I observed that since my own time in Washington, residences had dropped to less than half their former capital values although rents are as high or higher than they were long ago. This is due to the recent heavy taxation on luxury homes; the Philippine Government might have to pay these taxes. Osmena and Soriano were with us--the usual hurry and scurry went on as always on one of Quezon's outings.

Then back to the Resident Commissioner's residence where an informal Cabinet meeting was held to hear an accounting from the Philippine Purchasing Agent Harry L. Hershey, who is stationed in New York. Quezon evidently thought that Hershey had been getting commissions on his purchases, and questioned him as to that more than once. Hershey, of course, replying that his only recompense had been his salary. "How much do you get?" asked Quezon. "Six thousand dollars a year," replied Hershey. Quezon expressed surprise and asked: "How do you live on that?" Hershey replied very modestly and simply. "Why, I have never had more than that to live on--it's all we need." That won Quezon, who told me later that he had sent for Hershey to fire him. I heard Hershey from across the big room say he had been my secretary in Malacanan, and had been appointed Purchasing Agent by me--so I put in: "Yes, he was the best Secretary to the Governor General I ever had, and the most reliable." Quezon told me later he was going to raise Hershey's salary.

We next went to a luncheon party given at the Cosmos Club in Washington by former Representative Keating of Colorado, now, I believe, the publisher of a labour newspaper in Washington. The twelve men present, with one or two exceptions had been in the House of Representatives when Quezon was Resident Commissioner from the Philippines and I was a member of the House from New York. There were with us now Senators Norris, La Follette, MacKellar, Gerry and Hayden and old Sabath of Illinois from the House; also Sumner and Crosser, Woodbury of Michigan and ex-Representative Timothy Ansberry of Ohio, now a lawyer in Washington, and an old friend of Quezon.

In reply to a toast to him, Quezon made a short speech and then for two hours they fired a barrage of questions at him in very sympathetic terms, showing that the fight put up by the Filipinos had raised them to a "new high" level in American esteem. It was all very gratifying to Quezon, who answered all their questions in his customary frank and quick way--except when they came to investigate preparations made for the initial defense of the Philippines, where he did not allow a single criticism against the American Command out there. To escape questions on American preparedness in the Philippines he answered by saying he did not know--had not even wished to enquire.

The timing of the Japanese attack in relation to that on Pearl Harbor was the subject of many questionsh

Quezon's story of his own personal experiences and observations during those first few days of the invasion of his country were listened to by those present with absorbed interest.<sup>143</sup> He said he was first awakened in Baguio at five-thirty in the morning by a telephone call from Manila from George Vargas his secretary, to say that the Japanese had attacked Pearl Harbor. Quezon stated: "I had foreseen events pretty much as they actually happened, but I never had believed that they would assault Pearl Harbor. I thought that perhaps, Vargas was still half asleep at that early hour, and was imagining things, so I told him to call up General MacArthur and verify the rumour. I don't know whether he actually did so, but a few minutes later he called me again and said the report was true. At seven-thirty, I was talking with Major Speth, an American who was Vice-Mayor of Baguio, when we saw some thirty or forty planes over the town. We ran out to watch them, and Speth said: 'American bombers'--but then they began to drop bombs on nearby Camp John Hay, the American military reservation nearby, and my house shook. Their bombing, as I afterwards learned, was extremely accurate; they had come, not from carriers, but from the islands of Formosa, just to the north of Luzon.'<sup>144</sup>

Quezon was then asked by the American statesmen present what the American defense was doind at that time? He replied that some of their planes had been ordered up at once but were recalled from the air for instructions, and it was while they were grounded again at Camp Clark, near Stotenburg, that the Japanese bombs fell on them about half past ten in the morning, and destroyed most of these planesh

At this point in the conversation, Ansberry, who sat next to me whispered: "Casey is skating on pretty thin ice, but has crossed it very well." Since Quezon up to that point in his narrative, had had no responsibility for the defense, he did not let himself be put in the position of criticizing it. The only point--at which he let go some criticism against the policies of the U.S. Army; was later on describing the Filipino division which he and I had raised in the First World War. He said: "Some of the American generals in 1917 were afraid of us (i.e., of their loyalty) and delayed the formation of our division until it was too late,<sup>144</sup> but Filipinos would have fought just as bravely for the Americans then as they did lately when their own lands were invaded."

I was referred to by Quezon and put in that they held us up so long that it took us eighteen months to get our division to the point where it could be mustered into the federal service. That was just before the armistice in November 1918.

Quezon pointed out to those present that the Philippines had been invaded because the American flag was there--that the Japanese had not wanted to attack the Filipinos. That he had always tried to make friends with the Japanese, as he had with the Chinese; that every time he had been to Japan, even on vacation, each Japanese Foreign Minister had made a big fuss over him, and added that he had been invited to luncheon with the Emperor. But he added the American Government had always been suspicious of all this, and had interfered with him.

He told them how on December 28th, when he arrived at Corregidor he was uncertain whether or not it was his duty to his people to continue the resistance and had wired President Roosevelt to that effect and Roosevelt replied pledging to free the Philippines of the Japanese, give the Filipinos their independence as previously

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<sup>143</sup>See Manuel L. Quezon, *The Good Fight* (New York: D. Appleton-Century, 1946), pp. 181-207. See also Carlos P. Romulo, *I Saw the Fall of the Philippines* (Garden City, N.Yh: Doubleday, Doran & Co., 1942), pp. 28-55.

<sup>144</sup>See note 103. It is obvious the 1917-1918 putdown by the U.S. Army rankled Quezon.

promised, and to *secure and protect it*. This Quezon added was a great gain over the previous pre-war position where the United States had proposed to say "Good-bye boys, we've been good friends, but now you must look out for yourselves." With this great advantage in the future now promised by President Roosevelt, Quezon decided to continue the resistance. "Of course," he added, "I know that the President has not the authority to bind the American people, for I have been in legislatures myself."! But he added that he had relied upon the nature of this promise and the circumstances in which it was made, to consider it binding for the future.

The Senators quizzed him about the number of troops engaged in the Philippines, how many planes, etc., but most of all as to whether the stubborn resistance of the Filipinos was not based upon the treatment which the United States had given them. He gave to this an emphatic affirmative.<sup>145</sup> La Follette insisted that similar treatment must be secured for all the rest of the subject peoples in the world. Norris dwelt upon the kind of disarmament which should not be imposed upon the aggressors--Germany and Japan--to overcome their belief in their own superiority in which this generation had been brought up: "We must see that they have not a gun, not a tank, no means of war for fifty years if that is necessary."

Quezon continued on the subject of Japanese-Philippine relations before the war by saying that he had never believed the former would attack them: that this aggression was because of the presence of the American Army there.

Note the wisdom of Quezon's successful campaign in Congress in 1935 to get the Hare-Hawes-Cutting law amended by the existing Tydings-McDuffie law!

Now, he remarked, the situation was entirely changed; the Japanese and the Filipinos were no longer friends but enemies--the Philippines could never be safe as an independent nation after this war, without a new international system.

About the Filipino Army, he said the soldiers were not mere *taos*, for all the best families in the islands had sent their sons. His nephew had been wounded. General Francisco had told him in the weeks of war that they could win if properly supported, since "We can kill ten Japs for every Filipino we lose.!" That at Singapore the British army had suffered greatly by "infiltration.!" When the Japanese penetrated their lines and shot them from behind. On Bataan however every single Japanese soldier who got through was killed or taken captive. At one time, 500 of them got through and almost all were destroyed or captured; some of them threw themselves over the cliffs rather than surrender.

They asked him whether Japanese bravery was not due to their religion, that if they were killed in battle, they would go to Heaven. Quezon replied that religion had very little to do with Japanese character--that it was their training from boyhood--their devotion to their Emperor. He admitted that this was a "sort of religion.!" Now, he added, the Japanese learned that the Filipinos could and would fight.

Quezon said he went to Corregidor on MacArthur's urgent persuasion the day after Manila was declared an open city. That from that day on he really knew very little of what was going on in Manila and the surrounding provinces except from messengers who got through the Japanese lines both by sea and land. When he got away and arrived at the Visayas he met there the governors of several of the Luzon provinces who had escaped; and thus he learned more about the actual situation!

The losses among the Filipino soldiers had been very considerable in the open warfare on Luzon before the battle of Bataan; afterwards, on Bataan there had been important losses of both American and Filipino officers from snipers, but not so many among the enlisted men. He did not believe that in the whole Philippine war, the United States had had as many of their officers and men killed and wounded as at Pearl Harbor.

Later in the day, at the Shoreham Hotel with Quezon and Osmena, I remarked that Secretary of War Stimson was one of the best members of Mr Roosevelt's administration,

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<sup>145</sup>After the First World War, the Filipino leaders liked to argue that their loyalty during that war to the United States warranted special considerations being given them by Washington. They also liked to point out that their loyalty was stimulated by the good treatment they received at Harrison's hands. What they did not tell was that Harrison and Quezon worked very hard to create the illusion of Filipino support for the American war effort in order to establish the climate of goodwill in Washington.



and we could be sure he would provide the Philippines all the support in this war which was possible. Quezon was thus led to tell of how they had secured Stimson's appointment some thirteen years ago as Governor General of the Philippines on the death of Governor Leonard Wood. Quezon and Osmena were in Washington<sup>146</sup> and were determined not to have again so terrible a time in the Philippines as they had experienced under General Wood. They went to Chief Justice Taft and told him they wanted Stimson to succeed Wood.<sup>147</sup> Stimson was then Secretary of War,<sup>148</sup> and he refused their urgent appeal to come out to the Philippines, though he remarked to them that the post of Governor General was one of the most important in the American Government. Then Quezon went to him again and promised to support him as Governor General, and if he came to the point where he differed from him, he would keep silent--but if it came to some issue which he is conscience could not put up with he would resign. After Stimson became Governor General, finally such an issue arose in Manila. He served notice that he was going to veto a bill passed by the legislature which they regarded as absolutely essential; so Quezon went to the Palace and was escorted upstairs by Colonel Winship (afterwards Governor of Puerto Rico). As they entered his office, Stimson said: "Get out Winship," believing that Quezon had won him over. Winship vanished like smoke. Then Stimson, slapping his desk, said it was no use talking to him because he had made up his mind. Quezon then went to work and repeated the exact words he had first used in persuading Stimson to take the office, and added that the precise situation had now arisen, and that he would resign as President of the Senate. After hearing Quezon's argument and his statement that the whole legislative body would be roused against him by a veto, Stimson reversed his position and told Quezon he had "saved him from himself"; a phrase he again used in his final report as Governor General.

Another incident with Governor General Stimson was when Don Miguel Unson, Secretary of Finance, and Fileomon Perez, also then in the Cabinet, came to Quezon and insisted they must resign because Stimson had insulted them. Quezon went to Stimson and told him he did not know how to treat the Filipinos; that as Quezon knew, Stimson never had intended to insult any of them, that with Quezon, he could tell him to "go to hell," and Quezon could answer back in the same terms and neither would be insulted, but with the rest of them, Stimson could not use that brusque manner. Stimson replied: "Why, I consider Don Miguel Unson the best man I have in my Cabinet." He really appreciated Quezon's advice and the whole issue was successfully ironed out.

May 31, 1942. Quezon came into my room at the Shoreham for a two hours talk. Yesterday he had offered me an official position to go around with him and help him with his English in preparing his speeches. I told him I thought his command of English was excellent, and that I had not come to him to get a job. "But that was the reason why I asked you to come," he replied. So here I am back again as adviser to the President, as I had been in 1935 and 1936. I hope I may be of some use to him in his very trying situation as head of a government-in-exile.

I then asked him whether he had foreseen the coming of war between the United States and Japan. He replied that during those last few weeks before the Japanese struck he had been sure of it. I enquired what he had thought of the note handed by Secretary of State Hull on November 26, 1941 to the two Japanese Ambassadors. He replied: "What did you think of it?" "I thought it," I said, "the equivalent of a declaration of war upon Japan." "So did I," he put in; "with such a people as the Japanese,--no government could possibly accept such a proposal as to get out of China and give up Manchuria; the government which did that could not survive. So immediately I asked Admiral Hart urgently to call on me, and told him: 'Admiral, this is the same as a declaration of war by the United States upon Japan. What will happen if our communications with the Mainland (i.e., the U.S.) are cut?' The Admiral replied: 'Oh, it will only be a matter of three weeks.'" Quezon continued by saying that a few days before Pearl Harbor in his speech on "Heroes' day" (on December 2nd, 1941) at the University of the Philippines in Manila, he told the students how heavy

<sup>146</sup> Neither Quezon nor Osmena just happened to be in Washington in the autumn of 1927. They went there quite hurriedly when it became apparent to them that President Coolidge could not decide upon Wood's successor. Possible choices were: Acting Governor General Eugene A. Gilmore, General Frank McIntyre, Henry L. Stimson, General Frank R. McCoy, Dwight Davis, General Douglas MacArthur, and several lesser known individuals.

<sup>147</sup> See Onorato, *Leonard Wood as Governor General*, p. 114, fn. 315, p. 115, fn. 328.

<sup>148</sup> Stimson was then in private law practice.

his heart was, because many of those magnificent young men who had just passed in parade before him were soon to lay down their lives for their country.

Quezon then went on to describe to me the meeting of the American-Japan Society in Tokyo which was attended by Ambassador Grew, on the occasion of the appointment of Nomura as Ambassador to the United States. At this meeting, Foreign Minister Matsuoka had told them of his efforts to get Nomura, a retired admiral, to go to United States as Ambassador, because Nomura was known to be a personal friend of President Roosevelt. At first Nomura had been unwilling to accept the post, but Matsuoka went to his house and persuaded him to take on the serious and difficult talk of reaching a working agreement with the United States Government. Matsuoka then emphasis his opinion that it was the duty of the United States and of Japan to avoid war--if not, it would be a terrible conflict, and would destroy civilization. Matsuoka then sent a letter to Quezon enclosing a copy of this speech and wrote at the bottom of the letter as follows: "To his Excellency President Quezon: Dear Mr President, I hope you will agree with my views.!" The envelope was addressed in Matsuoka's own handwriting, and was handed to Quezon by the Japanese Consul General at Manila--so every precaution had been taken to conceal the identity of the person to whom the letter was to be delivered--even the stenographer was not to know. Quezon said that at the time, he thought this was a very "suspicious circumstance," and that Matsuoka was in deadly earnest. "But," Quezon added, "I did not then know anything about the real strength of Japan, and I simply wondered how they dared even to consider a war against the United States, since he assumed that America would immediately send their whole fleet against Japan and completely destroy the Japanese navy.!"

He did not believe that the second Japanese envoy Kurusu was sent to the United States to join with Nomura in order to "gain time." Indeed, he thought that it was the United States that needed "time"--not Japan, and he added: "The seriousness of the situation was apaprent when the attack was made on Pearl Harbor, because the Japanese never go to war unless they are thoroughly prepared.!"

On the question as to why the Japanese aviation had bombed President Quezon's birth place, Baler, Quezon did not believe at any time that this was done in reprim<sup>149</sup> because he had called upon his people to support the American side; "If it was aimed at me," he asked, "why did they respect my houses at Baguio, at Mariquina and Malacanan Palace itself? Those buildings have not been damaged nor looted.!"<sup>150</sup> (N.B. It transpired later that the bombing at Baler had been aimed at the small wireless station there.)

Quezon then reported a conversation he had had a few days ago with the Chinese Ambassador who had told him Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had recently gone to India *not*, as reported, to try to persuade the Indians to join the English in resistance against Japan, but to try to persuade the British Government to give independence to India!

I then asked the President to elucidate the phrase he had used: "doubts as to my duty to the people of the Philippines" which beset him when he arrived at Corregidor and of which he at once had informed President Roosevelt by cable. Of course, I could understand his perplexity as to whether it would be best to insist upon further resistance when he was already convinced that the United States neither could nor would send reinforcements nor supplies to them while concentrating on the German War, but I asked him to explain further his state of mind then on that momentous question. Thereupon, he replied that he might have considered advising his countrymen to join an association of Asiatic nations which were to be partners in the real meaning of the word but that he had no confidence in the Japanese offer to them of self-government. He added: "Those fellows would not really leave us alone to govern ourselves ----it would take them three hundred years longer to learn how to do so."

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<sup>149</sup>Whenever Quezon is drawn into any discussion of possible Japanese atrocities he seems to either cut the conversation short or else skirt the issue by speaking in generalities. It seems that he did not want any atrocity stories attributed to him lest the Japanese occupation authorities make life miserable for his associates. It is remotely possible that he thought that by avoiding untoward comments about the Japanese he might either during the war or after its conclusion establish some working relationship with them.

<sup>150</sup>For some reason the Japanese High Command spared both Malacanan and Quezon's effects therein, especially his correspondence files which are now housed at the National Library (Manila).

Asked about the internal situation in the Philippines just before the war, Quezon began his reply by stating that he himself was a sincere democrat and really believed in the rule of the people, but that in dealing with the application of this theory, especially in times of strain, there were too many people going around advocating democracy for everybody without any real sense of responsibility towards the people themselves or knowledge of the struggle and fight necessary to protect democracy.<sup>151</sup> He believed it was especially necessary to know the background of a people, and to understand what their history meant. This, of course, recalled my effort in 1936 to prepare for him at his suggestion, and when first acting as his adviser, a bill to reform the system of landholding in the Philippines, so as to protect the millions of small farmers (*taos*) in their tenant holdings and really to begin the dividing up of the many great *haciendas*. The bill was modelled upon Gladstone's "three F's" land bill of the 1880's for Ireland, as had been suggested to me by Quezon himself. But, as related in the first part of this "diary," the members of his Cabinet all balked at it and the President had handed it back to me with the remark that it was "loaded with dynamite." I replied that I had, at the time, been greatly distressed by the failure of this effort at reform, but that I know a little of the background in Philippine history: how, always until the Spanish liberals had begun in their own country for reforms, with repercussions upon the Filipinos, the state of society in the Philippines as in other Malay communities elsewhere had been entirely aristocratic. "Why," I said, "Your own Cabinet then, and most of the members of the legislature--those gentlemen were almost all aristocrats." "Except me" he interrupted, "I wasn't one."

Then I got him to tell part, at least, of the story of the constant friction existing between High Commissioner Sayre and himself during the year before this war. He started by saying that Sayre is, personally, a very nice fellow, but unlike his late father-in-law, Woodrow Wilson, he does not understand government. He is one of those lovers of liberty who goes around trying to apply liberty as a solution to problems which arise without much consideration of the results to follow; that he started all his arguments with him (Quezon) with the statement: "I am a Christian gentleman," which is no doubt perfectly true, but in itself does not solve by its application all political problems. The serious disagreement between Quezon and Sayre which had some bearings on inadequate civilian preparedness in the Philippines just before this war broke out, arose through what the United States would call the "Office of Civilian Defense," and had nothing to do, as I had previously presumed, with any attempt by President Quezon to spend part of the \$50,000,000 then held in the United States for the Philippines. Nor did Quezon try to get the United States to pay for his Office of Civilian Defense.

The trouble between the President of the Philippines and the High Commissioner started in 1940 when the legislature passed an act delegating to Quezon powers to regulate the civilian defense corps and otherwise prepare for a supply of food and for making air-raid shelters for the protection of the civilian population of the Philippines. The Philippine constitution placed his power in the legislature only "in a national emergency," with restrictions on the power to be exercised by the President. They had studied the history of difficulties which had arisen in the United States over the "delegated powers" which are forbidden by the American constitution.

In 1941, during the growing tension throughout the Far East, Quezon issued the necessary executive orders based upon this grant to him of limited delegated powers. At once, a group of young Filipinos called the "Civil Liberties Union" passed a resolution of protest. High Commissioner Sayre was aroused, and is believed to have notified President Roosevelt who cabled Quezon warning him that adverse sentiment was aroused in the United States since the American "Civil Liberties Union" had joined in the fray. Quezon at once cabled back to Roosevelt that he would not exercise any of the powers so delegated to him without a direct application to him from High Commissioner Sayre.

A few months later, Major General Grunert then in command of the Philippine Department of the American Army, asked Quezon to attend a meeting with him, High Commissioner Sayre and the American Admiral. The general wanted to know what plans there were for the protection of the civilian population in the event of war and complained that so far as he could see, nothing had been done; what was Quezon going to do about it? The President replied: "Ask High Commissioner Sayre" who sat absolutely silent. Finally, at this conference, it was agreed that a committee should be appointed as an Office of Civilian Defense, consisting of General Douglas MacArthur,

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<sup>151</sup>A rare philosophical moment on Quezon's part.



then a retired Lieutenant General of the American Army, but engaged as Quezon's Adviser on Military Affairs and occupied in organizing the Philippine Army, and Quezon's secretary George Vargas, and A. D. Williams, adviser to the President on public works. This committee was to cooperate with the American General and Admiral. At the meeting, General MacArthur asked Major General Grunert if he would state to him first of all, as Department Commander, whether the American Army was going to protect the Philippines and what plans he had for getting the equipment necessary for such protection? The Department Commander replied that he was only a soldier, and knew nothing of politics; that he intended to fight for the protection of the Philippines but could not state what equipment would come to him for that purpose. General MacArthur then expressed himself as dissatisfied with the latter part of the Department Commander's reply, and refused to serve on this committee until he had a satisfactory answer. So MacArthur retired from this committee and A. D. Williams and Vargas went ahead with their plans for air-raid shelters, etc.

Shortly after this, A. D. Williams returned to the United States after forty years of service in the Philippines on public works and construction, and by this time General MacArthur had been put in command of all American and Philippine forces in the islands.

At the public meeting on "Heroes' day," December 2, 1941, to which reference has already been made in these pages, President Quezon said in his public address that he had not been able to discharge his full duty and prepare adequately for the civilian population a sufficient food supply nor adequate air-raid shelters because he had been prevented from doing so by the President of the United States, and this statement was reported in garbled and misleading form in some newspapers in the United States. Further, Quezon stated that the protest against due preparation in the Philippines had been started by the local Civil Liberties Union, and that if they were thus responsible for any evil results, they merited condign punishment.

At dinner that evening, Quezon told me had rented the house of General Hurley, "Belmont," near Leesburg, Loudon County, Virginia from next Sunday for the summer, so he will be only two days at Hot Springs--another of those sudden and unexpected changes of his plans to which his entourage are thoroughly well accustomed. This means, however, that I am not to have him to myself to get on with the manuscript.<sup>152</sup>

Bridge in my room at the Shoreham, nine p.m. to two a.m. Very lively bidding and the playing was animated. The other players were Quezon, Dr Trepp, his devoted physician from Manila and the attractive and modest young a.d.c., Lieutenant-Colonel Velasquez from the Province of Bulacan, a West Pointer, a West Pointer who has been through the battle of Bataan. When the Governor General of Australia met Quezon a few months ago, Quezon told the Governor General that Veasquez was one of the Filipinos who had been doing the fighting. The Governor General talked with him for five minutes and turned and thanked Quezon for the delaying battle in the Philippines which had helped to save Australia. Quezon, however, agrees with me in doubting whether the Japanese plans included the conquest of Australia.<sup>153</sup>

June 1, 1942. At ten a.m. in Quezon's rooms at the Shoreham with Don Andres Soriano and Resident Commissioner "Mike" Elizalde helping us to correct the typed draft of the twenty minutes address Quezon is to deliver before the House of Representatives tomorrow. Dr Clark, formerly one of his advisers in the Philippines was sent off to get the text of Quezon's first speech in the American House of Representatives in 1911 in which he had promised the United States the very support of the Filipinos in time of need which they had now rendered them thirty-two years later.

At luncheon at the Shoreham with Quezon and Osmena. Talk of the good effect created by Quezon's quiz by the Senators and members of the House last Saturday at luncheon at the Cosmos Club. Quezon commented that the most disturbing element of that occasion was the statement of Senator La Follette at the conclusion of the Senators' remarks upon how we should disarm our opponents after we had won the war. La Follette had remarked: "We expect those five or six million men who will make up our armed forces, when they come home to *tell us what we shall do with the peace.*" This, according to Quezon, was "rubber-stamp" statesmanship, and he added: "We might as well have pure democracy!" He believes that the representative form of

<sup>152</sup>Quezon had been pestered by Morgan Shuster (of the Century Co.) for nearly twenty years to write an autobiography or else his story of the struggle for independence.

<sup>153</sup>Cf. John Toland, *The Rising Sun* (New York: Bantam Books, 1971), p. 345.

government means that the representatives are chosen to make the final decisions for their constituents; La Follette's theory would mean a complete abdication of power by representatives elected by the people.

While we were at luncheon in the restaurant of the Shoreham, two priests came up with a tall refined looking young man whom they presented as the Archduke Otto.

Seeing that I was not to have the projected fortnight of quiet with Quezon at the Hot Springs, with a stenographer present, I seized this opportunity to tell him about the plans of our friend Morgan Shuster in New York for publication of his book. Shuster's suggestion is that Quezon should write now chiefly about the war, and insists that it be ready for printing in September; he suggests that Quezon should prepare another and more complete biography later.

Quezon asked me how long it took me to write my *Cornerstone of Philippine Independence*, published by Shuster in 1922. I told him five weeks, and he expressed surprise that it had been written in long-hand.

I began, then, by asking Quezon to tell me of his birth and early life. This is a difficult way of working out a book because the text will lack the originality of expression and the animated style of narrative characteristic of Quezon's own diction, and will have to be made up on the basis of my daily memoranda of his conversations. But I see no other way, at present, than to catch his ideas on the rebound every time I am with him, and we are so seldom alone together. At all events I had better make hay while the sun shines.

So I said to him that Shuster wants the story of the poor boy who became President of his country, as a means of reaching popular opinion in the United States, but that I myself had always found him *muy señor*, and supposed he had sprung from the class of *principales*. He laughed, and said his parents owned two acres of land at Baler when he was born. Then I said that since Shuster wanted, this time, only a war book, he should present first a short account of his early life and upbringing and then pass to a good story of his participation in the Philippine insurrection against the United States, and balance that later with a careful account of his recent notable and gallant services in this war as an ally of our country. He seemed to accept that idea, and I hope he will find time from now on to develop his own way of carrying out this literary undertaking.<sup>54</sup>

June 2, 1942. At noon to Capitol with General Valdes and Colonel Andres Soriano. Valdes says he is going back to service in Australia next week.

I felt much like a stray cat on the floor of the House of Representatives--had not entered the Chamber since in August 1913 I left after nine years of service there to go to the Philippines. I recognized only two of the old members who were there in my time. The representatives looked rather depressed. Elizalde tells me that they know they have their authority and power to the Executive; and feel very much the bitter and frequent attacks on them by the "smear" press.

When Quezon mounted the Speaker's dais he made a striking figure outlined against the huge American flag--shoulders squared and head thrown back. His eyes sparkled and his person gave out a spirit of animation and vitality, quite in contrast to the rather weary, not to say depressed looking figures of the members of the House.

He received an ovation, and prolonged applause punctuated his address. He read the cablegram to him at Corregidor from President Roosevelt promising the re-occup-

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<sup>154</sup>It has become apparent from reading this diary that Harrison played a large but unsung role in pulling together Quezon's book after the Filipino leader's death. I have read nearly everything Quezon ever wrote for publication and most of his major drafts of state papers. His book, *The Good Fight*, reads too much like the work of someone skilled in the use of language. In fact, its tone is too much like this diary and Harrison's earlier work, *The Cornerstone*. No doubt, Quezon fleshed out what he wanted in his book. But it is very doubtful--at least from this diary--that he went beyond that point and left a major manuscript *ready for publication* at the time of his death. Harrison is acknowledged as the contributor of Chapter XIV. Colonel Manuel Nieto of the Philippine Army was acknowledged as the author of Chapter XV. Why? It was probably easier to do so than attempt to assert that Quezon had written the book from cover to cover. If I am correct in asserting that Harrison (or Shuster) pulled the book together after Quezon's death, then how much of what was published represented Quezon's ideas or the editor's.

tion of the Philippines, the giving of independence and, most important, the *protection* of it. Gave the impression that it was these promises which inspired the Filipinos to their gallant stand at Bataano Altogether an impressive and useful speech. The occasion was one of real drama. He lived up to it.

Afterwards, we spent an hour "revising" or correcting the official stenographic report of his speech, as is customary before an address in the House of Representatives goes to the government printing office for the Congressional Record.

"Baby" Quezon to whom, in an aside, I confided my fear at the time that Quezon's voice would give out in the middle of his address, replied: "Oh, Father's voice never gives out unless he finds it expedient."

Driving back from the Capitol alone with Quezon, I found him too tired for conversation, until I mentioned by chance the subject of the Philippine Moros. I commented upon the sad end of former Governor Fort of Jolo, who had been an appointee of Governor General Wood. After resigning his post in 1937 he became a Protestant Episcopal missionary in Cotabato--another unruly Moro section. One morning on a path near there, his body was found on the path with the head severed by the blow of a bolo.<sup>d<sup>55</sup></sup>

Quezon remarked that the Moros really like nobody whatever but themselves, except when they can get something out of it. "That," he said, "was a fact which no Americans had discovered"; in Australia this Spring even General MacArthur had told him of the great use we were going to make against the Japanese of the enthusiasm of the Philippine Moros for the American cause. Quezon told him, however, that he hoped the American Army was not going to give arms to the Moros on Jolo, who are reported to have joined the Japanese, but added that the Japs will have plenty of trouble with them. "Jolo," Quezon added, "is divided into two factions each claiming a Sultan." (As I think this split was brought about by Quezon himself, in order to weaken the power of the Joloano Sultanate, I made no comment.) Quezon further remarked that when he reached Mindanao on his journey of escape from Corregidor, the American Army officers there were boasting of the great help the Moros were about to give them. Quezon laughed.

He then turned to the subject of the war against Japan: He said it could not be won without "the complete destruction of their army and navy--that with such a government and such a people, a negotiated peace would be utterly impossible.

In the Shoreham grill-room I met Harry T. Edwards, one of my former Bureau Chiefs as Director of Agriculture. He is now and for years has been fibre expert in the United States Department of Agriculture. He first came to the Philippines shortly after the Insurrection was over, but says many Filipinos in the provinces kept on fighting until about 1904. Even then, there was a raid by them on Cavite when he was visiting his brother there. He told me that General MacArthur, the father of our General, who was the last Military Governor of the Philippines was very "stuffy" about turning over the reins of power to the first Civil Governor, William Howard Taft, and kept the latter waiting at the door of his office in Fort Santiago for an hour before admitting him to take over. Taft never forgave MacArthur. So ended the "Days of the Empire," except in Mindanao and Sulu where the army officers still refer to the Philippine administration in Manila as the "Civil Government." The singing by Army Officers at their annual "Carabao Wallow" of the song "Damn, damn, damn the Filipinos" continued until 1913, when after my arrival in the Philippines, President Woodrow Wilson ordered that to cease.

Had a conversation with Resident Commissioner "Mike" Elizalde at his office this afternoon. He has great and sincere admiration for President Quezon. Thinks Osmena would be of no use except to hand out the offices, and that he could not run a government himself. (This in my opinion is a gross underestimation of Osmena's abilities.) Elizalde says the Filipinos were all right under American Governors General, but queries how they will make out by themselves when solving such problems as government finance. He esteems Quezon highly because when he is "not up" on a subject himself he is willing to take advice; says he was called in with Yulo and others to give opinion as to whether Quezon should accept a second term as President of the Commonwealth. He was the only one consulted who answered "no," because he is such a confirmed democrat and believes the other system leads to dictatorship. Thinks well of Manuel Roxas as an eventual successor to Quezon.

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<sup>155</sup>Harrison meant James Fugateo



June 3, 1942. Shoreham Hotel. Helping Quezon with the preparation of his address to be made before the United States Senate tomorrow. I suggested to him that if he used the phrase that "he did not come to ask that they send troops to drive the invader from his beloved land," (in preference to their putting their American effort into another theater of war)--he might be called into account later by his own people. He replied: "I have an answer to that: I do not want the Philippines to be utterly wrecked by becoming again the theater of war--I hope the United States will strike directly at Japan. God forbid that our country should be treated like France today--that is simply awful."

Osmena came to see Quezon, but the latter was closeted with Supreme Court Justice Frankfurter, so Don Sergio came to my room for a talk. His purpose was to suggest the introduction in the speech tomorrow of a strong statement Quezon had made in October 1941 in Manila in which he stressed the absolute necessity for the Filipinos to join with the United States if they were drawn into the war. I think Quezon will use it.

I asked Osmena about the early days of American government in the Philippines. He said that General Franklin Bell as Provost Marshal of Manila was considered by them as a liberal. Frank McIntyre was the first American he ever met. Osmena was then editing a newspaper in Cebu and McIntyre was the Military Censor there. General MacArthur (the father) was Military Governor of the Philippines for only a short time --then he had a row with Mr Taft over turning over the government to the latter.

Osmena and Quezon were then governors of their respective provinces and together founded the *Nacionalista* party, but advocated co-operation with the Americans--which produced a storm of protest. The opposition to the Americans, however, came rather from the Spanish and Spanish mestizos than from the bulk of the Filipinos; Quezon was an exception. Dr Pardo Tavera was active in opposition to America.

Don Sergio said that another time they would not fortify the region around Manila, which is indefensible; it is better for them to have their capital in the mountains of Pampanga or Tarlac--says at Fort Stotsenburg, which can be defended. He thinks that with the help of the United States the damage now done to the Philippines can be repaired in a comparatively short time.

Dinner with Quezon. He is very much disturbed by the evening news of the bombing by the Japanese of Dutch Harbor, Alaska. I told him that if they effected a foothold on the mainland of Alaska, they could bomb Chicago and Detroit. He said: "then somebody ought to be impeached."

Our talk was then mostly about Japan. He said he had first met Matsuoka when the latter was head of the South Manchuria Railway; at that time, Matsuoka talked very frankly against the Chinese policy of his own government and ridiculed the idea that an indemnity should be exacted by them from China. "Why," he asked "should we make them pay when we ourselves have invaded and devastated their country?" Quezon believes that he himself might have been asked to be a referee between China and Japan except for the complete control of Philippine foreign policy by the United States.

I expressed again to Quezon my regret that Professor Africa's plea in 1936 for the training of young Filipinos in American consulates which I had at that time favorably recommended to him, had not been allowed by the United States. He replied that Secretary of State Hull had, at the time, agreed to the proposition and he supposes it had been blocked by some clerk in the State Department, or possibly a chief of bureau.

Quezon then turned to the subject of his luncheon with the Emperor of Japan. The presentation and wait before lunch were very formal. Then the Minister of the Household disappeared and they sat down at the table. Quezon was to the left of the Emperor, whose brother was on his right and on the other side of him sat American Ambassador Grew. Grew's deaf ear was turned towards the rest of them, and the Emperor's brother talked very loudly into it. This enabled the Emperor to have a quiet conversation with Quezon. His Majesty spoke English, but an interpreter stood behind his chair; he asked a good many questions of Quezon, and Quezon of him. Afterwards, Grew asked Quezon what they had talked about, especially when the Emperor and Quezon were, along in the "study." Quezon refused to tell what the Emperor had said to him, and also what he, himself had said in reply; stating that it would be insulting if Grew suggested that he, Quezon, had said anything disloyal to the United States.

This was in February, 1937.<sup>156</sup>

He then turned again to a discussion of Francis Sayre, the High Commissioner to the Philippines. He touched on a discussion which had occurred between them as to the future trade relations between the United States and the Philippines which had taken place while Sayre was still in the Department of State. It was then suggested that this most important subject be referred to a Joint Committee, and Sayre proposed as Chairman former Vice Governor Hayden, recommending him because he was a professor. Quezon made a grimace. "Why," said Sayre, "I have been a professor myself." Later, when Sayre was appointed High Commissioner, and Quezon gave him a banquet, he introduced him as a "professor," and everybody laughed. Quezon added that he entirely agrees with the opinion once expressed by Professor Becker, head of the Agricultural College at Los Baños, who stated before the Board of Visitors of the University of the Philippines (Governor General Wood, Quezon and Osmena), that: "A Doctor of Philosophy cannot run anything."

Turning to another subject, Quezon lamented that the United States Government had not backed up Morgan Shuster on his mission as treasurer of Persia, but had let him be run out of office by Sir Edward Grey, then the English Foreign Secretary. He added the remark to me that: "Shuster and you certainly started something thirty years ago--he in Persia, and you in the Philippines."

Turning back to the subject of Japan once more, Quezon said he was sure Prince Konoye tried to prevent war between Japan and the United States. He sent Nomura over here as Ambassador to this country. When he saw he was going to fall, Prince Konoye resigned as Premier.

Finally, Quezon observed that Siam had made a mistake in joining even nominally with Japan; that France and England are no longer able to parcel off pieces of Siam for their own Empires, and would never be so again. *Sic transit gloria mundi.*

June 4, 1942. 12:30 p.m. at Senate Chamber to hear Quezon's address. Excellent and effective. He seemed a little nervous at the beginning, and no wonder: that is the most critical audience in the world. They were all very friendly to him. Quezon told me that never in his wildest dreams had he expected to address the United States Senate, though he had always counted on being the President of his own country. Senator Barkley of Kentucky, the floor leader, sat on his right and led the applause, while Senator Tydings sat on his left. As the Senate was technically in recess to receive him, applause was not "out of order" and some of the Senators kept it up even longer than the crowded galleries. They had interrupted their voting on a declaration of war against Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary to receive him! The ex-Mrs Douglas MacArthur went up in the motor with the Quezons.

Quezon was in high spirits after it was all so well over, and had A. D. Williams and myself, with Quezon's two daughters to lunch at the Shoreham. His daughters were chaffing him because he had made one slip--referring to the V.P. as "Vice President Marshall." It was, of course, Henry Wallace.

At lunch, there was a lively conversation between Quezon and A. D. Williams, who in recent years had been closest to the President of any American in the Philippines, being his adviser in the construction of public works in which Quezon's keen creative energies were always fully employed. Williams, who had at last, after so many years of service in the tropics incurred the disease known as "sprue" had finally, in July 1941, been obliged to resign his most confidential post with the President in Manila and retire for good to his farm near Culpepper, Virginia. One of his last bits of construction work in the Philippines had been the creation of an air-raid shelter at Quezon's country home at Mariquina, near Manila. The Quezon girls, who were present at this luncheon commented enthusiastically over this and said that, during the invasion they had spent most of their time in that shelter; it had a toilet and two entrances, and had been cut out of the tufa rock which is excellent material for insulating shocks.

Quezon and Williams told of some differences of opinion between the President and General MacArthur during these months of anxiety and strain before the war broke, but it would be quite superfluous to recount such matters now after the close friend-

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<sup>156</sup> Professor Grant K. Goodman (University of Kansas) is preparing a paper on Quezon's meeting with the Japanese Emperor based on Japanese archival materials for the 1974 meeting of the Association for Asian Studies on the Pacific Coast.

ship and heroic co-operation of those important personages during the dramatic war scenes which followed.

They also chatted about General Eisenhower the present Chief of the War Plans Board in Washington. MacArthur had brought with him on his mission to the Philippines two Majors in the United States Army, Ord and Eisenhower. When poor Ord was killed in an airplane accident at Baguio, Eisenhower became MacArthur's "number two." Eisenhower was very popular with both races in Manila--Americans and Filipinos, and seemed to enjoy the many occasions on which Quezon entertained him at Malacanan and on the yacht *Casiana*. Finally, Mrs Eisenhower began to claim the Major's time for her social engagements and Quezon had chaffed him about this in the presence of his wife at the farewell luncheon he gave them at Malacanan Palace some months before the war broke, when they were returning to the United States.

At this same luncheon, Quezon and A. D. Williams made quite different computations as to the number of American war planes in the Philippines at the time of the invasion. When Williams then ill, finally left the islands to retire home, he had been a member of the board appointed by Quezon to advise on new air fields. He calculated that the United States then had some three hundred plane in or en route to the Philippines, actually on hand or about to arrive. Quezon said there had been, at the time of the Japanese assault thirty-eight four engine bombers and about one hundred and thirty war planes of various types. Many of these were destroyed on the ground at Nichols Field, Clark Field and Cavite on the eighth of December, 1941. I asked whether this destruction caused any panic among the Filipinos and he replied that they knew nothing about it. Williams told again of his having, as representative of the Philippine Government gone around in June or July 1941 with the American officer-in-charge to inspect ground for new air landing space near Manila and how he personally had begged the Commanding General not to extend existing fields, but to build a dozen new landing grounds among the bamboo fields to either side of the South Road. No attention had been paid to his advice. He also remonstrated with the navy for spending five or six million dollars in dredging and in filling in an extension of the existing air field at Cavite which, as he said, "stuck out like a sore thumb" in Manila Bay, and was visible from the air for a great distance.

Quezon then said how indignant he had been with Admiral Hart for withdrawing his fleet from the Philippines at nearly the last moment. "If he was going to lose his fleet, why not to so in defense of the Philippines instead of Java?" He admitted, however, that Hart's fleet was destroyed after he, himself, had been relieved of command at the insistence of the Dutch, who took over the American ships before the disastrous naval battle of the Java Sea. But Quezon still insisted that his submarines, based on Cavite for refuelling, should have been used to sink the Japanese transports and thus interrupt the invasion of the Philippines. There were twenty-eight submarines in this command of which some twenty-two were of the new type.

Quezon then turned to some remarks on the pressing reasons which had induced him to attempt towards the end of February 1942 the escape by submarine from the beleaguered fortress of Corregidor. This will not be repeated here, because it has been described in his book *The Good Fight* published by D. Appleton-Century in New York in 1944, after the President's death.

This account of that day's conversation at the luncheon table at the Shoreham would be incomplete without recording the writer's recollection of another subject discussed by Quezon, which has, however, a very remote bearing if any on the invasion of the Philippines.

June 5, 1942. At night at the Shoreham Hotel.

Quezon told me the story of his visit to Corregidor in 1935 after he had been inaugurated as the first President of the Philippine Commonwealth. He was invited by General Kilbourne, the American officer then in command of the fortress, who was the man who had done so much to develop its defenses. Quezon said: "As I went ashore on Corregidor I saw there a whole regiment of Americans--not Philippine Scouts, drawn up as a guard of honor to salute me. I was quite overcome with emotion--just two miles away across the water was the little town of Mariveles, where thirty-four years earlier I had surrendered myself as an officer of Aguinaldo's army to an American Lieutenant of artillery. If ever since that surrender I had felt any bitterness against America, it vanished when I looked upon that regiment of American soldiers drawn up to salute a Filipino President of the Commonwealth. This regiment seemed to me to epitomize the whole history of the United States in the Philippines. They had come there in the beginning with their soldiers to overcome us by force--and now the symbol of that force was drawn up to salute the Filipino head of a



government of Filipinos which had been set up by the United States. The three most thrilling events of my life all occurred within a radius of two miles of that spot where I then stood:

- (1) My surrender at Mariveles to the American officer
- (2) An American regiment drawn up on Corregidor to do honor, and
- (3) Besieged in the fortress of Corregidor by the Japanese."

June 6, 1942, a.m. Having himself dictated a letter to President Roosevelt requesting that he be given a seat on the Pacific War Council, which was sitting in Washington, Quezon gave me his proposed draft to read and advise him as to its form. I read it with dismay. He had been watching my face and asked me: "What's wrong with it?" I told him that his strong reference to the contrast of the gallant resistance of the Filipinos to the aggression of Japan with the "supine surrender" of the English at Singapore, and the "inefficient battle" put up by the Dutch in the Netherlands East Indies somewhat jolted me. I asked him to consider that he was asking for the honour of a seat on the United Nations Pacific War Council, although his own country was already represented there by President Roosevelt. I suggested to him to omit all such criticisms of allied nations the representatives of which already sat on this Council; that those phrases might actually block his own admission, especially since Harry Hopkins was "one thousand per cent pro-English!" I urged him to send no letter to President Roosevelt on this subject, but merely to call up Harry Hopkins on the telephone and make his request, and I believed it would be accepted. His was a perfectly reasonable request and was similar to proposals understood to have been already made by Australia and India to the British Government--both of which propositions were backed by American public opinion. I also said that if his request was granted, this would be considered by the outside world as another step towards independence of the Philippines.<sup>157</sup>

In a few days, he was invited to become a member of the Council and subsequently played an active and useful part in discussions there over the whole Pacific scene.

June 7, 1942. Quezon thinks this is a *business war*, caused by slavish imitation by Japanese of the Western powers' methods of monopoly. If the Japanese had not closed the open door in China, there would have been no war. It was totally needless, in any case, for the Japanese could have undersold all commercial rivals with all of her own products in China and she had already regained for China Control over her own customs administration. If the "open door" had been maintained, the United States could then have held their Chinese market only on petroleum and tobacco.

In Japan in 1937, Quezon met members of the House of Peers and of the Diet who were opposed to the militarists--not so now. One of the Peers who was speaking of the recent Coronation said it was the *last*, as a religious ceremony with all the "Son of Heaven" cult. Quezon says he is never entirely at his ease in conversations with Japs--they have been until recently, for too many centuries isolated from the rest of the world.

Thinks it is a mistake to assume that the Japanese are naturally an Empire and the Chinese not; on the contrary, the Chinese have always been imperialists when they were strong enough, and the Japanese only recently so. China in the past tried to conquer Japan. If the Chinese now argue that the aid promised by the United States to China has not been satisfactorily supplied, he would reply, if he was an American, that the Chinese got us into this way anyway.

Quezon is absolutely opposed to the plan to let the Chinese remain armed after this war, and the Japanese entirely disarmed. "The Japanese could teach us civic virtues, but the Chinese only 'trickery and corruption.'" Would prefer to have the Indians armed.

I asked him whether, in the peace settlement, the Dutch East Indies would be given back to the Netherlands? He replied: "That would be an outrage. The Malays should be allowed to unite. For years the Javanese have been looking to the Filipinos to lead them to freedom. The movement started when General Wood was Governor General; we smuggled their leaders<sup>158</sup> into the Philippines with the connivance of the Collector of Customs (Aldanese); Ramon Fernandez helped them and gave them money.

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<sup>157</sup>The British Foreign Office acceded to the request rather than get dragged into a diplomatic squabble over the status of the Philippine Commonwealth.

<sup>158</sup>See Tan Malaka's Manila memoirs in *Solidarity*, I (January-March, 1966), 15-22.

I must soon begin to work on this with the English, the Australians and the New Zealanders. At the Peace Conference, I intend to make a loud noise. If we were to be united politically, I would be willing to have the capital in Java. It is not mere numbers that count, but intelligence.<sup>M</sup>

He thinks we could make a satisfactory peace with Japan at any time, but Roosevelt would not consider it for a moment. Believes the Japs would consent to leave the Philippines outside their "Co-prosperity sphere."

"The great political danger to Don Sergio and me now is that the Japanese may declare the independence of the Philippines themselves." "If so" he added "I would not stand in the way for one moment, but would resign and not spend one more penny of the money of the Philippines in the United States, even though it would reduce my family and myself to starvation." He said that if he were President of the Philippine Republic, and the Japanese sent for him now to return to be head of an independent country, he might consider it. But he is only president of the Commonwealth which owes allegiance to the United States, and he is irrevocably tied up with that. If the proposition of independence were put to the Filipinos now by Japan they would vote overwhelmingly for it--there would be no need of Japanese soldiers to carry out the election.

Roosevelt did not insist that the Filipinos should continue the war against the invading Japanese. On the contrary, on January 3rd, 1942 in response to his cable of the day before from Corregidor, in which Quezon had questioned the right of the United States to make the Filipinos carry on a war for a power which could not protect them, Roosevelt had wired MacArthur to permit the highest ranking Filipino officer to surrender the Philippine Army, and then ordering MacArthur to carry on the fight to his last man<sup>h</sup>

Quezon then told of some Indians who were on the steamer with him when he was crossing the Pacific in 1916 with the Jones Law in his pocket. Two or three of them came up to congratulate him on his great achievement and ask his help for Indian independence.<sup>H<sup>59</sup></sup> "This," he replied, "I am not in a position to give." They were taken aback and asked: "Aren't you in favour of our independence?" "Yes, I'm in favour of it, but with your 350 million people, all you would have to do is to have every Indian sneeze at the same moment. Give me one half your population and I would have the English begging me for *their* independence." They retired angry and confused.

He thinks that, physically, the Siamese most resemble the Filipinos. They went over to the Japanese before the war began because their former territories in Indochina which had been seized by the French, had been given back to them by the Japanese<sup>h</sup>

Discussing the two photos in the *Manila Tribune* of Jan (?) 1942 showing first George Vargas reading to the Japanese officers his acceptance of the post as head of the Executive Commission set up by them, and the second showing the group of Philippine representative citizens who had been summoned, or chosen to accept this new form of temporary government, I commented on the presence there of former Chief Justice Avanceña. Quezon remarked that it was a damned shame that the group insisted on the presence on that occasion of that old man.<sup>H<sup>60</sup></sup>

He thinks Kihara, former Vice Consul at Davao, whom he likes, is the go-between between the Japanese High Command and the Executive Commission of Filipinos.

June 12, 1942. At Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York. I saw Quezon and Osmena at 9 a.m.

They both seemed depressed, and the latter was absent-minded. I learned the reason for this depression while Morgan Shuster and I were questioning Quezon about his war book. He said he had had one of the most discouraging interviews of his

<sup>159</sup>The Indian nationalists were well-informed about the Philippine independence movement. See V. S. Ram, *Comparative Colonial Policy with Special Reference to the American Colonial Policy* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1926)<sup>a</sup> See also Gary R. Hess, *America Encounters India, 1941-1947* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1972).

<sup>160</sup>For two views of the occupied Philippines, see Armando J. Malay, *Occupied Philippines: The Role of Jorge B. Vargas during the Japanese Occupation* (Manila: Filipiniana Book Guild, 1967) and David Joel Steinberg, *Philippine Collaboration in World War II* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1967)<sup>h</sup>

life last night with two owners of publishing businesses--not merely editors, (Henry Luce and Roy Howard). And he was not satisfied that the future relations between the United States and the Philippines were not even yet settled, in spite of President Roosevelt's cable to him on Corregidor that the islands were to be "taken back, independence granted and secured and protected"--a promise upon which he had staked so very much. Now, he began to believe that all the United States would do for them would be to "put them back in the same place they were in the beginning." When I asked him exactly what he meant, he did not clarify the situation, but Shuster and I afterwards presumed these words to mean a sort of "phony" independence was to be theirs, and without being "secured and protected," and, even possibly under the hegemony of Japan.<sup>161</sup>

Shuster then remarked that there was a large number of persons in the United States today who were at heart pacifists and would be ready for an arranged peace.

When we were alone together once more, I asked Quezon why, when he was on Corregidor and refused the Japanese offer of "independence with honor," he had been so sure in staking the whole future on confidence in a positive victory over Japan. He replied: "It is the intelligence of the average American and the limitless resources of your country which decided me. The Americans are, of course, good soldiers, as they showed in Europe during the last war, but as for courage, all men are equally courageous if equally well led. Merely brave men certainly know how to die--but the world is not run by dead men." He cited the case of the Spartans and the Athenians. "What became of the Spartans?" And then he added that in making on Corregidor that momentous decision, he "wasn't sure."<sup>162</sup>

It later appeared that one of Luce's publications--*Fortune* in its August number was to publish an excellent analysis of Far Eastern affairs by Buell. They sent Quezon a preview copy of this article which however carried an absurd suggestion that independence be postponed in the Philippines until 1960, the islands to be garrisoned meanwhile by the United Nations. "What" cried Quezon, "they propose to garrison us with Chinese and Russian soldiers? The moment that article comes out, the Japanese radio will use it. The people of my country will turn at once to the Japanese side, and I shall be completely discredited. You propose to return Formosa to China? How foolish. Better garrison *Formosa* by the United Nations armies, and thereby protect the Philippines and insure peace in the Far East!"

Quezon says he finally converted Luce and Howard to this view, and Luce is going to advocate Philippine independence immediately after the war. Quezon is quite worn out by the strain of these arguments, conducted until 1:30 last night and for an hour this morning. He remains still greatly depressed by the views of Howard and Luce on the Philippines' status after this war is over. He now sees that the final success of his life's work really depends upon Roosevelt's party remaining in power in Washington.<sup>163</sup>

While we were somewhat gloomily surveying this episode of the inside working of New York editorial minds, an American press agent came in and told Quezon that at two-thirty p.m. on Sunday, the Flag Day of the United Nations, President Roosevelt will announce the recognition of the Philippines as one of the United Nations. This is the prompt result of the negotiations conducted by Quezon through Hopkins, and is surely a swift remedy for the enervating doctrines of Luce and Howard.

Quezon, in the midst of serious distractions and worries about the future of his country, has been stirred up by Shuster to make another effort to concentrate on his book. He has just wired General MacArthur inviting him to write and cable a foreword to his proposed book. I reported to Quezon that Shuster expected to sell 25,000 copies of the book, if gotten out promptly, which figure at 15% royalty on a \$3.00 book would net him (Quezon) \$10,000. The President's comment in reply was that he

<sup>161</sup>A very prescient viewpoint on Quezon's part. There is no question that the Philippines remained under the American shadow until very recently. And while the mutual defense pacts did secure and protect the Philippines, one nevertheless has the gnawing belief that unless American interests were directly and immediately involved the Philippines would have to proceed alone. See also note 142 of this diary.

<sup>162</sup>See Theodore W. Friend, *Between Two Empires: The Ordeal of the Philippines, 1929-1946* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 199-210.

<sup>163</sup>Quezon had friends in both American political parties. He was comfortable in both camps.



had an offer of that sum for ten lectures in the United States which would be much easier for him than writing a book. However he believes that with his experiences and observations of the Japanese attack on the Philippines, such a book by him would serve a useful purpose. He asked me to get from Colonel Andres Soriano and from General Valdes the facts for the period between the invasion of the Philippines and the entry, unopposed of the Japanese into Manila. This I am proceeding to do, since both officers are here in this hotel with us.

(Note by the writer. The following pages are now, seven years later, inserted in this diary upon its preparation for the press, because, although the information was obtained by President Quezon's direction for his own use in his book, it was never so used by him, and it now seems worth while to preserve for future students testimony as to the effect of the Japanese invasion of the Philippines from two highly competent witnesses of the scenes described and especially as coming from key men in the situation.)

Having been in France myself during the German invasion of that country in 1940, I had in my mind a picture of the kind of observations by members of Quezon's entourage which should, in my opinion be included in a description of the fall of the Philippines.

Beginning with a question to Don Sergio Osmena, I asked him how the municipal officials of Luzon had stood up to the invasion, remarking that in France I had been told they all had run away except for one mayor in the north, who had stood his ground.

Osmena replied that they all stood firm in the path of the Japanese invasion in Luzon, and mentioned one mayor in the Province of Albay, who, when the head of the Japanese column entered his town, climbed on the step of the leading automobile and emptied his revolver into it, then fell back dead. Further questions to Osmena were not possible because he was off to Boston to speak there in substitution for Quezon, who had been invited to luncheon tomorrow in the White House by President Roosevelt.

Quezon himself contributed only the following brief statements: that one of the lessons they learned during the invasion was that the Philippines *could* be defended--with one thousand planes, one hundred submarines and one hundred mosquito boats. The mosquito boats which he himself had ordered in Great Britain for the defense of the Philippines had never been delivered to him; they had been diverted to help Finland in the first of her two recent wars with Russia. England promised to replace them but was prevented by the war from doing so. Anyway, he remarked, at the banquet given him today by the Chase National Bank, he had told them: "This is not our war." He also added that General Aguinaldo had most certainly not been a Quisling during the invasion; indeed, he observed, in recent years the General had been in favour of immediate independence for the Philippines because he believed that his country was in deadly danger under the American flag. The next morning I secured from Basilio Valdes the following statements on the subject of the invasion. He had been Commanding General of the Philippine Army until it was mustered into the American service, then he became Quezon's Chief of Staff for the Filipino units in the army, and Minister of National Defense in Quezon's Cabinet.

The following are the statements from Valdes as I understood his account:

Valdes reports that Americans made up only 20% of the army of defense, but the American newspapers overstressed the American participation in the whole war; that it is very difficult indeed to make any exact figures for the casualties.

He said that in the organization of the Philippine Army, for the first two years, 1936 and 1937, they drafted the prescribed 40,000 men a year. For the succeeding years, having found the financial burden too great, they drafted but 25,000 men a year. (Get copy of Valdes' last annual report as Chief of Staff to President Quezon; a copy must be in the War Dept.)

Valdes says that when the invasion occurred, there was some panic at first in Manila, but none in the provinces. They had studied the disaster in the downfall of France, and military maneuvers were not hampered by crowds on the roads; certain roads were immediately closed to the public. They held the enemy above San Fernando Pampanga until the troops which had been engaged on the Lucena front were moved around Manila to the Bataan lines--a brilliant military move.

Valdes states that Quezon was in a wheel chair all the time he was on Corregidor; that he discarded it on entering the submarine; 24 hours after reaching Panay he was able to go up two flights of stairs.

*Fifth Columnists and Trickery* Valdes: "After the battle of Morong (in Bataan), General Segundo said, we had to withdraw and with us were cavalry from Stotsenburg who had lost their horses in the battle. The next day we retook Morong; so we searched the forest for those horses. We met a man in Filipino uniform who spoke perfect English; he said he knew where the horses were and led us up a trail. But he led our two officers, a major and a lieutenant up to a machine gun nest--thereupon the guide (Jap) threw himself on the ground. Our lieut. was killed, the officer in command of the machine gun, and the others fled. Then the major killed the false guide. The Japanese were always after Filipino uniforms."

When asked *who* the fifth columnists were, Valdes said: "First of all, those opposed to Quezon's administration such as the *Sakdalistas* in Laguna and Bulacan and Tayabas, tho their leader Ramos, in prison for sedition, had been moved from the Philippines to an American prison.<sup>164</sup> (For Ramos and *Sakdalistas* see Hayden's book). The new name for *Sakdalista* is *Ganap*, which also means "I protest!" The Japanese had made much of Ramos and sent him back to the Philippines.

*Second:* The Japanese-Filipino mestizos, of whom there were not many in the Philippines.

*Third:* General Artemio Ricarte, *el Vibora* (Viper) of the old Filipino insurrectionary army. He is now riding around Manila<sup>165</sup> with an a.d.c. and Japanese soldiers beside him. (He caused me a great deal of trouble when I was Governor General and I sent Clyde Dewitt to Shanghai on a small coast guard cutter to arrest him with a warrant from the American Judge there--Dewitt was sea sick for the eleven day trip by sea--Ricarte escaped with the aid of an English clergyman.) Shuster, who was with us in this New York hotel while General Valdes was talking, related an experience of his own with Ricarte about 1903, when Shuster was Collector of Customs in Manila: Ricarte came over from Hong Kong to Manila, and Shuster went out to meet the steamer personally, to hand the oath of allegiance to the United States for Ricarte to sign. Ricarte replied that he was insulted by being asked to take such an oath and that he had breathed enough of the air of his native land, now that it was so polluted. So back he went to Hong Kong, crying out that he would live to see the day when every American was driven out of the Islands. Now he comes back with Japanese to see his curse fulfilled!<sup>166</sup>

*Fourth:* In Angeles, Pampanga, 8 kilometers from Fort Stotsenburg, a Filipino furniture maker named [Timio kept a shop, at the back of which he had a speakeasy.]<sup>167</sup> When the officers from Stotsenburg used the W.C. by his speakeasy, they would sometimes talk together, and Timio had a stenographer in the adjoining room, and furnished news to the Japs. This man was awarded a contract for making dummy airplanes of bamboo and cloth for the army camouflage, and when the bombardment of Camp Clark air field took place, not a single dummy plane was hit.

*Fifth:* In the second week of the war, telephone messages went all over Manila saying the watersupply had been poisoned. Three *sakdalistas* in a car were caught driving around Manila and shouting this news. Valdes had them arrested; lots of people came to his office to know if the rumours were true and in order to convince them he had to draw a glass of water and drink it in their presence.

*Sixth:* Story of Claro M. Recto, former Justice of the Supreme Court. After the bombing of Baguio, there was a stream of cars which started south for Manila; when they arrived at the "Forks" in Pampanga, "a man in uniform" directed them off to the right in the direction of Stotsenburg, so the line of automobiles served as a "pointer" to aircraft above, and the bombing at Stotsenburg began just before the motors got there.

*Seventh:* Cutting of wires to detectors on Clark Field (see below).

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<sup>164</sup>If General Valdes was referring to Benigno Ramos, he was in error. Ramos returned with the Japanese occupiers.

<sup>165</sup>A question mark was placed at the end of the line in the right hand margin.

<sup>166</sup>Quezon was attached sentimentally to Ricarte. Whenever he passed through Japan, he would send the General some money--more a token of his esteem than a contribution toward his cause. In the Quezon Papers there is a rather large size file of correspondence between them over the course of two decades.

<sup>167</sup>Brackets are found in the copy used for this edition. A question mark was placed at the end of the line in the left hand margin.

June 13, 1942. At Waldorf-Astoria.

Story of Lt. Colonel Andres Soriano:

Soriano said that it did a great injustice to Aguinaldo to call him a fifth columnist. The General was perfectly loyal.

*Bombing of air fields:*

"The bombing of Baguio was at 7:30 a.m. on December 8th; these enemy planes then turned northwards and bombed the Cagayan valley--Aparri, Tuguegarao and Iligan.

"At about the same hour, Davao was bombed.

"Next they came over Clark Field--not a fighter up to oppose them. Many of the officers were at luncheon when the Japanese struck. They said: 'We don't know how it happened.' At that time, 17 B-40s were destroyed on the ground at Clark Field. Explanation: the wires to detectors had been cut by enemy agents."

Soriano, when I asked about the American planes which, according to Quezon had taken the air when news came of the bombing of Baguio at 7:30, said they were probably some planes which were en route for Mindanao at that time, and were recalled.

By the 10th & 11th of December, almost all our planes (80%) were destroyed--"it was worse than Pearl Harbor."

"Three-quarters of an hour after they struck at Clark Field they were over Iba Field--all the officers were having luncheon.

"MacArthur took command of all the armies on July 20 (?). He did not have five months in which to pull them together. General Lewis Brereton arrived early in November, a very amiable man--he found a Brigadier General in command of the air force, an officer of the old *laissez faire* school. They put him in command of the fighter planes, when they should have shipped him off home." Those fighter planes were ready to start for Formosa, and actually started, "I don't know why they were recalled to the ground--some of them may have been included in the squadron which started for Davao that morning and had been recalled.

"After December 10th or 11th, the Japanese were entirely masters of the air, unopposed. I understand that the Americans had 38 four engine bombers, and about 170 other planes in the Philippines before the invasion.

*"Supplies for besieged armies on Corregidor & Bataan:* An officer told me: 'All through the battle of Bataan we expected relief and reinforcements, though we knew the American Pacific Squadron had been temporarily put out of action at Pearl Harbor. On my first trip back from the front at Bataan to see General Sutherland on Corregidor the boys in the trenches had asked me to bring them food, tobacco and whiskey. This was on February 3rd; on February 18th I was again sent from the front on an errand to Corregidor, and this time all that the boys asked me to bring back was only "good news"--i.e., of relief coming. We all expected help until we heard President Roosevelt's address on February 22nd. The truth about the sending of supplies is as follows: three convoys started from Australia. The first was diverted to Singapore; the second to the Dutch East Indies, and the third, consisting of three cargo boats started at last for the Philippines. Two of the vessels turned back and went to the west coast of Australia--to Brisbane. One boat, the Moro vessel Doñañate (?) got through to Cebu; it carried 1000 tons of sugar and 1000 tons of rice, both commodities we already had in the Visayas, so it was like carrying coals to Newcastle. Very little of this got through to Corregidor and Bataan, because of the blockade. Another vessel went aground near Leyte but the cargo was salvaged. We understood that after Pearl Harbor, the American Navy could not convoy supplies to us. Nor, of course, could they strike directly at the Japanese Navy as had always been the plan.'

"On Dec. 1st, Quezon sent for Admiral Hart, and questioned him. Hart seemed very confident. He thought that if the Japanese ever cut the communications between the mainland (U.S.) and the Philippines, it would, at the most, be 18 days before it was re-established.

"Of the airplanes sent from the United States via Australia in the months just preceding Pearl Harbor, the bombers, which could fly all the way, got through to the Philippines. A shipment of 200 fighters intended for the Philippines, had inexperienced young boys as pilots and crews, and they smashed up 180 of these 200 planes in Australia."



Soriano's account of important *visitors* to the Philippines just before, based on which, Quezon had believed that there was a well prepared plan worked out for the *defense of the Far East*. Quezon was not really consulted, or informed in detail, but he had every reason to think that the defenses of the Philippines were.

"Quezon saw Duff Cooper and was not at all impressed by him. General Sir Brooke Popham was in Manila several times from the end of 1940 to April 1941. He conferred only with Sayre, Grunert and Hart.

The Dutch Chief of Staff who after visiting the United States from Batavia, became Commander-in-Chief for the Netherlands East Indies when his chief was killed in an air accident. He visited the Philippines.

"Litvinoff came to Manila about November 1st or a little later. Quezon was ill, and Litvinoff was only there for two days, but the President saw him and was very much impressed by him!"

Then Kurusu, whom they all knew in Manila because he had been Consul General there in my time, came through on his mission to the United States about the middle of November.

In October 1941, the Secretary of the Colonies and the Secretary of Finance of the Netherlands East Indies made a trip across the Philippines.

Soriano had had reservations for the September Clipper from the United States to the Philippines but became so uneasy over international relations that he left America on July 29th instead.

After MacArthur had been given Supreme Command there was real co-operation established with the American Army, which had been rather sore theretofore with General MacArthur because he had accepted service with the Filipinos. Soriano thinks, however, that MacArthur was glad to take Filipino Command, otherwise he would lose rank as Lieutenant General at the end of his extended term (five years) as Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, and would have had to step down and become a young Major General. (As a matter of fact, he became the Field Marshal of the Philippine Army.) General Grunert was coming to the end of his term as Department Commander of the Philippines; he had been offish with MacArthur because he worked with the Filipinos, and the Department Commander had been an "ally" of Sayre. Now Grunert is very friendly with Quezon.

The Americans in Manila, after Soriano arrived back there were still "alseep at the switch"; only a small percentage of them were awake to the seriousness of the situation. Right up to the 1st of December many people thought that nothing was going to happen. Quezon was one of the few who seemed aware of the danger, tho he was not informed as to the real strength of Japan. He kept cool-headed. He realized the situation after Secretary Knox's *ballon d'essai* statement of November 11th and Secretary Hull's comprehensive and sweeping statement of November 26th to the two Japanese Ambassadors in Washington.

In Manila during those last weeks some of the Americans feared that the Filipinos would not support them--these were the "Old Timers" who had always looked down on the Filipinos. In Soriano's opinion there was absolutely no justification for this fear among the "Old Timers." He did feel some uncertainty as to the real though concealed sentiments of some of the members of the Legislature. Possibly some of the Filipino lawyers who had as clients the more important Japanese financial interests in the Philippines were luke-warm, or followed the line of least resistance. He also suspected the real feelings of some of the professional Filipinos who had taken their degrees in Japan. The only pro-Japanese Filipinos of whose sentiments he was sure were two Filipino businessmen he named.

"In September, military supplies from the United States began to trickle in; there was a very noticeable increase of them by November, when bomber squadrons arrived. Nearly everybody thought that the crisis would not come before Spring and this would have given MacArthur a real chance of success. Even with the small air force we had there at the moment of invasion we could have gone far to stop the Japanese landings at Lingayen Bay and Guman Bay (e. coast Bicol), if we had learned the lesson of the battle of Crete. We might also, with our limited air force intact, have been able to keep the Asiatic fleet in our waters and thus impede the invasion. This would have served to stop the Japanese on their way to Singapore.

"We could have preserved the bulk of our air force if we had dug shelters for them in the hills around the air fields. There was a perfect opportunity for this

at Stotsenburg, for example. This was what MacArthur did with the few rickety planes he had left, on the air fields he constructed on Mariveles Bay during the siege of Bataan. With the immense amount of mining machinery we already had in the Philippines we could easily have dug out shelters of our air defenses and airplanes.M'

I asked Soriano whether the Spaniards in the Philippines had to be watched. He replied: "Perhaps I am partial, but in my opinion the great bulk of the Spaniards then in the Philippines were entirely loyal. They are, of course, extremely influential in the Islands.M'

About the disastrous campaign on Malaya, Soriano said that the acid criticisms of the Australian General Gordon Bennet were probably correct. Soriano, who was educated in England, said that the Englishmen of the colonies are probably of a somewhat lower social stratum--it was their arrogance and that of their women which led to disaster. The especial harshness of the Japanese towards the English was due to championship of the Asiatic races. They humiliated the English because of their political and personal bossiness towards Asiatics. They are leading a race movement for their fellow Asiatics. (N.B. "Old Timers" and the policy of "Prestige in the Philippines.M' F.B.H.)

"The Filipino Scouts were the back-bone of our armies--I consider them the equals of any crack regiment in any army in the world.

"The Philippine Army were mostly draftees--some divisions were fairly trained--most of them were just barely trained. The young Filipino officers, the first class to graduate from their Military Academy at Baguio, were excellent; many of them were killed.

"When I was commissioned, I reported to General Jones at Fort McKinley; he was the commander of the Southern Luzon forces. An officer of the Philippine forces was not considered the equal of an American officer. We managed to secure the same pay for the Filipinos.

"On Bataan, relations became excellent between American and Filipino officers; no distinction was made; promotions and citations were equal.

"Vicente Lim, and Generals Capinpin and Francisco, in the front line were really fine soldiers. General Secundo, tho he had been at the best military schools in the U.S.h was always uncertain--he should not have fallen back at the first day's battle at Morong. Quezon had previously disciplined him by sending him for a year to Mindanao and then called him up to command the Military Academy at Baguio. He lost all his batteries and equipment at Morong. Lim, Capinpin and Francisco are all three prisoners of the Japanese now. Homma's Chief of Staff really did commit hara-kiri.

"Colonel Juan Moran, a brother of the Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, who was Chief of Staff of the 11th Division, did an excellent job.

"The 26th Cavalry, the 45th and 57th Infantry and 24th Field Artillery were Scouts.

"A Philippine division contains only 7,500 men.

"We could have licked the Japs at the beginning, if we had been properly equipped. After the battle of Malaya, no. If we had had an adequate air force, we would have thrown out the Japanese, they cannot stand up against air attack--not even the Manchurian veterans. What enabled us to stand so long on Bataan against such odds, was our artillery. The Japanese simply *will not stand artillery fire*.

"The Japanese soldier with his bushido and fanaticism is individually better than the German; the Jap is more of a savage, while the German is, in comparison, more civilized.

"The technique and minute preparation of the German and Japanese armies are about equal.M'

The Americans in Manila behaved with dignity, and the civilian population conducted themselves well, noticeably so when, after the first two or three days, the enemy had complete control of the air.

In the battles in the Philippines the draftees had to be steadied by the Scouts when infiltration occurred--almost all troops are shaken when fired on from the

flanks and from the rear, and think themselves cut off from their base. (Soriano suggests we do not praise the draftees too highly since that they might provoke answers from Americans.)

"A French-American pigeon keeper or trainer (Soriano called him *pigeonnier*) at Fort McKinley, whom they called 'Frenchy,' (named Saulnier), made so good on Bataan, calling out the range for the soldiers that he was finally put in command of a battalion--much to the surprise of the commanding officer, who, however, acquiesced when told what this boy had done!

"The Filipinos had shown great ability in *jungle fighting* when they were drawn from the frontier type, but not so much so the *ilusarados* or "white collar" men. Once on the Tuol River in W. Bataan about 3 kilometers from Bagao, a Filipino 2d Lieut. (later Captain), in command of a company, found that they were surrounded by a larger force of Japanese. He had only two platoons, and recognized his inferiority in numbers and equipment. He lay in ambush for 24 hours without food. Knowing the Japanese tactics of reopening their attack just after sunset, he took the initiative and succeeded in making contact on both flanks. They killed a great part of the Japanese platoons around them; 25 or 30 Japanese corpses were found, and he lost only 6. (n.b.) This happened on the 8-9th of February.

"*Negritosa*-(they often saw them); Negritos have learned to speak Tagalog. Used them sometimes as guides, but found them so unreliable that we quit. They served the Japanese just as willingly. Many of them were killed. We came across a former constabulary soldier from the lowlands named Mariano Daiit, who was living among the *Negritosa*-he had a patch of camotes and some papaya trees. He was a very loyal guide for my commanding officer, General Jones. Once when General Jones and I and two young officers, with only 67 men were surrounded, Mariano, as always, found a way out for us. When we withdrew to Matic, we were no longer able to find Mariano and fear he fell into the hands of the Japanese and suffered the fate they often meted out to civilian assistants.

"When the Japanese High Command got behind in their program, their army became much more brutal. They changed their propaganda by leaflets, and began to call on the Filipino troops to kill the 'real enemy,' their American officers. They also changed their treatment of their Filipino prisoners--at first they used to strip off their uniforms, kicked them in the ass and told them to 'get out!'. Many of them came back to us. As a rule they treated their military captives well, tho they perpetrated savagery upon civilians caught with the troops. When their program fell behind, they changed noticeably; they still took the uniforms, but used the soldiers as *cargadores*; sometimes they bayoneted their military captives, acting with complete savagery.

"We took very few *prisoners* for two principal but very different reasons. *First*, many of them killed themselves rather than become prisoners. *Second*, our men often found that a Japanese offer of surrender was only a *ruse* or bait, to lead us up to machine gun nests. After several of those experiences, we could not control our boys!."

At one time, the Japanese effected a landing at three places on the S.W. coast of Bataan peninsula, but they were driven off or destroyed.

By the end of the war, the town of Mariveles had been completely destroyed. A vast "all-weather" airport had been established at Mariveles; this was finished just before the surrender of Bataan. It had caves into which the planes could be pushed.

Soriano further suggested that, for the purposes of Quezon's book the question of stressing atrocities by the Japanese be carefully considered. Will the American public demand the gruesome? He mentioned the weight of other considerations in this matter. He, personally, saw corpses of Filipino men and women mutilated by the Japanese and thrown by them into the Abo-Abo River in Bataan. He told also how one Vicente Logarta (?), a newspaper man from Cebu, left Manila on February 25th and went to the province of Bulacan, where he found that out of 176 cases of rape of girls aged from eleven to sixteen years, 110 had died! There was, as yet, very little information as to what took place in the provinces; it is not believed, however, that such savagery had been shown there as took place in Hong Kong. (Query: had the abundant supply of liquor in Hong Kong something to do with that?)

June 13, 1942. At the Waldorf-Astoria in New York.

Quezon back from the big parade, said he had been so tired that he wanted to back out. However he only had to shake hands with Mayor La Guardia, King George of



Greece, Governor Herbert Lehman and the foreign minister of Venezuela. He rode in an open car with Colonel Manuel Nieto, his aide-de-camp, and had never in his life had such an ovation--even in Manila.

He was greatly disturbed by the lodgement of the Japanese on the island of Attu, in the Aleutians, and remarked: "That's no way to win a war--to lose all the battles!"

June 14, 1942. At the Shoreham in Washington.

Quezon came in greatly exhilarated, having just signed the United Nations pact together with the Mexican Ambassador--with whom he left the White House, arm-in-arm, saying to the press: "This is not put on--this is the way our two countries really feel towards one another."

Quezon remarked to me: "I believe absolutely in the sincerity of President Roosevelt," and added: "This signing of the United Nations pact is a recognition of us as a separate nation!" He broadcast at 10:15 p.m., and told me: "This will be known all over the Philippines if there is one short-wave receiver left to them!"

The next day he was still in high spirits, and was pleased with the pictures taken of him with President Roosevelt.

June 14th and 15th 1942. Conferences at the Shoreham with Major General Basilio Valdes, Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army and Minister of National Defense in the War Cabinet of Quezon. He gave me exact information as to the air fields, muster of the army, and in particular concerning his gallant exploit during the days from December 28th to 31st, 1941, when on orders from General MacArthur, he returned from Corregidor to Manila and successfully evacuated some four hundred wounded personnel from Sternberg Hospital in Manila on board a hastily devised hospital ship bound for Australia.

Modesty as to his own achievements is an outstanding feature of the character of General Valdes. His simple narrative, written at the time, is full of the breathless suspense of a great city just on the point of being occupied by the enemy.

June 15-16, 1942. Quezon tells me that when he went to Corregidor on December 24 last, part of the "doubts" about the policy he should adopt were based upon the possibility of a declaration by the Japanese of Philippine independence. This thought was, for him, a "nightmare." We would have been left in an impossible situation, for if he accepted, the United States would have turned against him, and if he refused, his own people might have repudiated him. He thought that if, after the Burma campaign, the Japanese had proclaimed the independence of India, it would have started a revolution there.

It was not until he got to the Visayas after February 20th and had talked to people down there, and especially with those who at the risk of their lives, had escaped from Luzon, that he was able to gauge the real sentiments of his people. Among these was Tomas Confesor, who had escaped from Bauang in a boat provided by the "Quisling" Mayor of the town, who had been selected by the Japanese to replace the constitutionally appointed mayor, since the latter had been killing all the Japs he could get at. "Incidentally," said Quezon, "these Filipino 'Quislings' were like those Filipino officials appointed by the American Army during the Philippine insurrection--they would do everything in their power to aid their own fellow countrymen."<sup>168</sup>

At my request, Quezon told me of his conversation in Malacanan with Litvinoff, the Russian diplomat, just before the war. The Russian warned him very seriously:

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<sup>168</sup>Quezon is making a very subtle distinction between those who were "forced" to serve the American Army and those who willingly served the American authorities because they saw no other alternative. The problem that confronts the scholar is that of motivation when discussing the collaboration issue during the Philippine-American war or the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. Steinberg in his book *Philippine Collaboration in World War II* argues quite strongly that the Philippine elite saw themselves as the keepers of Filipino culture and preservers of the nation. As such it was incumbent upon them to survive even if it meant collaborating. Whatever the merits of his argument, it is apparent from this diary that the issue weighed heavily upon Quezon. And the distinction he was making, while seen in the diary, would have served in his mind, at least, as an extenuating factor when reviewing the collaboration issue after the end of the war.

"Be on your guard"--the same advice he then gave to General MacArthur and to Admiral Hart. Quezon thought highly of Litvinoff and says he believes the Russians knew more about Japan than the Japanese knew of Russia.

To turn back to a description of public sentiment in the Philippines, Quezon said he had known of course that he could get the Filipinos to raise an army, and he did. He also had been positive that he could bring the Filipinos into the war against Japan if their country were invaded--and he did so. But further than that, he could not tell, without full consultation with them, whether they would take any part in the "rising tide of color," which is a movement sponsored by Japan as "Asia for the Asiatics." But when he got out of Corregidor he learned how profound and widespread among the people was the spirit of resistance to the Japanese, and how deep was the hatred of the Filipinos for them. They had even threatened to kill Vargas, though they well knew that he, Quezon, had asked Vargas to stay there and care for Filipino interests as acting Mayor of Greater Manila. That if the Japanese now withdrew most of their forces from the Philippines for use elsewhere, leaving only a small garrison in the Islands, the Filipinos would kill every one of them. "For the first time I realized that we are really foreigners in the Orient." He attributes this largely to their Christian religion. He stressed how deep was now the devotion to the United States of the Filipinos altho they were very angry at the "Old Timers.!"

He still thinks that if the independence of the Philippines had been declared by Japan; that would have caused a revolution in India.

Quezon is seriously considering a plan for declaration of independence of the Philippines now. (N.B. that is what Quezon and MacArthur advised President Roosevelt to do in their Christmas cablegrams from Corregidor).

Quezon repeated his talk with Roosevelt at the signing of the United Nations pact in the White House yesterday by Quezon and by Mexico. This, he thinks is conclusive recognition of the Philippines as a "separate nation." He thereupon asked Roosevelt if he was going to be admitted as a member of the Pacific War Council. Roosevelt replied that "Halifax wants India to have a seat there.!" Quezon instantly answered that there would be a meeting of the Pacific War Council on Wednesday. (Quezon remarked to me that an appointment by the British Government of an Indian to sit on this council would be that of a sort of Quisling.)

So on Tuesday morning Quezon went to see Sumner Welles who spent an hour and ten minutes telling him in perfect Spanish how the Philippines deserved a seat on the Pacific War Council. He said he would find out what Roosevelt had meant, and would let Quezon know by telephone; which he did.

The Philippine President then turned, as he often did, to reflections on the very close co-operation he had enjoyed with General Douglas MacArthur during critical days in the Philippines. He recalled that in all circumstances, and at all times, the general had the most perfect manners and offered him every proper official deference; even later, when they were in Australia, he would never ride on the right of the seat in the motor car. In Melbourne, "where I was nothing, MacArthur would always come to my house to see me. If I visited his office, he would come down the ten stories from his office and stand until I was seated in the motor. He would never give promotions nor send orders to any of my people without first referring the matter to me. This was different from the methods of General Wainwright, who had succeeded to the command on Corregidor when MacArthur was ordered to Australia; he had promoted Manuel Roxas from the rank of Colonel to that of Brigadier General after I left Corregidor. I had deputized Roxas to act for me, but was not consulted as to his promotion, and I objected. The promotion was then not effected. I was the only authority who could fix the ranks in the Philippine Army. Unfortunately, I never had a chance to explain this to Roxas since I then lost all communication with him while he was in the mountains of Mindanao.

"Among my closest advisers during the invasion all, Santos, Osmena, Yulo, Roxas, etc. played a man's part. Roxas and Osmena were the strongest among them for our sticking to the United States.

"As for General Lim, I found that a meeting during that time of strain was necessary with MacArthur, Lim and General Valdes, to curb Lim's proposals, and to show them that they must not take their important orders from MacArthur while he was only my adviser without consulting me. During that brief period before MacArthur was given full command of the armies, I kept the sole authority to decide important questions.!"

June 22, 1942. Shoreham Hotel.

Quezon returned from a conference with Secretary Ickes, whom he greatly likes.

He is getting more interested every day in composing ideas for his book, which I am glad to see. Today, he expressed his wish not to have any controversial subjects in this war story, but will save them for the biography he wishes to write later. He may insert Japanese atrocity stories of their invasion of the Philippines, but only "as told to him"--not as being of his knowledge true. This settles neatly a ticklish question of policy.

Quezon observed that Assistant Secretary of State Sumner Welles is more "effective" than our old friend Hull, and believes it best to sound him out first on any plans for the future of the Philippines.

Stated that he had told ex-Vice Governor Hayden that in his book he had been so kind about him that he felt he could say in criticism only that Hayden appeared to be an adherent of Governor General Wood--"You are still a Republican"--Hayden reddened. Quezon told him that the theory that Leonard Wood had "saved" Philippine finances was ridiculous. "If I had not stopped him, he would have thrown away assets worth three hundred million pesos in the Philippines." Hayden replied "I suppose you mean the railroad, bank, etc."

Lord Halifax had given Quezon a luncheon. This was the day after Quezon's first appearance upon the Pacific War Council. Halifax said to Quezon at luncheon: "I liked your remark to the press!" Quezon said he liked Lady Halifax better than he did her husband. She had told Halifax after luncheon: "You'd better have a talk with President Quezon--You may learn something!"

Mrs Quezon who was then present with us, had just attended a luncheon given for her by Mrs Sayre. Sayre is about to resign as High Commissioner. She told Mrs Quezon that there had been a broadcast from Manila in May arranged by the Japanese. In it an American lady told how the American civilian prisoners at Santo Tomas in Manila were allowed to establish their own form of government; had their own entertainments and their own schools for their children. Exercise was allowed daily in Santo Tomas grounds etc. She then added that their chief concern was that they had no milk for their children--at this point a Japanese spokesman interrupted and said: "That is the fault of the Americans for destroying all supplies before we arrived!" I asked Mrs Quezon if it was true that they had destroyed all the food supplies before going to Corregidor, and she replied "Of course."

I then asked Quezon further about his famous luncheon with the Japanese Emperor in 1937--whether the Emperor had offered him any "special treaties" (n.b. this was one of the questions recently submitted to Quezon by the *Cosmopolitan*). He said "no!" I asked him whether Ambassador Grew's annoyance with this whole affair had not changed the United States Government's attitude toward Quezon for a time. He said not; that President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull were all right, but that he might have had some enemies, like Stanley Hornbeck, the "Far Eastern expert" in the State Department. Denied that the State Department had interfered to spoil his subsequent trip to Mexico; that the Mexican President had sent him his gorgeous \$500,000 train, --"like a hotel" to convey him to Mexico City.

Told the story of his shift in plans during his escape to Australia in going from Dumaguete by speed boat with Lieutenant Bulkeley across to Mindanao. Wainwright had wired him that there were five Japanese destroyers in the straits, and it was inadvisable to go now--better to postpone. But Colonel Soriano together with Major Fernando of the Philippine Army Air Corps had just spent several hours in one of those old planes off Negros waters. They had sighted only one Japanese destroyer, which at 6 p.m. had gone off towards the Sulu Sea. So, after midnight, when he and his family, having received Wainwright's warning message, had gotten nearly all the way back from Dumaguete to Bais (20 miles), Soriano caught up with them in the dark, and he and Bulkeley advised Quezon to turn around again and take the chance of getting across that night to Mindanao. Quezon accepted!.

To an enquiry as to whether Mrs Quezon ever expressed her opinions about such decisions on this dangerous voyage; he replied: "Never; she always did just what I decided." I then enquired how he had felt about the possibility of his capture by the Japanese? He said he did his best to avoid capture, but he always felt that if taken by them, they would treat him with every consideration, and probably put him right back in Malacanan.



He added that he thought Chief Justice Jose Abad Santos had gotten caught by the Japanese in Cabu. (N.B. they shot him there).

Exchange of cables between Quezon in Corregidor and Roosevelt: Quezon advised him that he was in grave doubts as to whether he should encourage his people to further resistance since he was satisfied that the United States could not relieve them; that he did not see why a nation which could not protect them should expect further demonstrations of loyalty from them. Roosevelt in reply, said he understood Quezon's feelings and expressed his regret that he could not do much at the moment. He said: "go ahead and join them if you feel you must." This scared MacArthur. Quezon says: "If he had refused, I would have gone back to Manila." Roosevelt also promised to retake the Philippines and give them their independence and protect it. This was more than the Filipinos had ever had offered them before: a pledge that all the resources and man power of United States were back of this promise of protected independence. So Quezon replied: "I abide by your decision."

I asked him why he supposed Roosevelt had refused the joint recommendation of himself and MacArthur. He replied that he did not know the President's reasons. Osmena and Roxas had said at the time that he would reject it. Roosevelt was not moved by imperialism nor by vested interests, nor by anything of that sort. Probably he was actuated by unwillingness to *recognize* anything Japan had done by force (*vide* Manchuria). Quezon thinks that in Washington only the Chief of Staff (General Marshall) who received the message from MacArthur in private code, and Roosevelt himself, knew about this request for immediate independence.

When Quezon finally got to the White House, Roosevelt was chiefly concerned about Quezon's health. Roosevelt never made any reference to their exchange of cables.

Quezon added that, so far as he was aware, the Japanese had never made a direct offer to the United States Government to guarantee the neutrality of the Philippines, but many times they made such an offer to him personally.

"It was not that I apprehended personally ill treatment from the Japanese" said Quezon; "What made me stand was because I had raised the Philippine Army--a citizen army--I had mobilized them in this war. The question for me was whether having called them, I should go with this army, or stay behind in Manila with my people. I was between the Devil and the deep sea. So I decided that I should go where the army did. That was my hardest decision--my greatest moral torture. I proposed by cable to President Roosevelt that the United States Government should advise the Japanese that they had granted independence to the Philippines. This should have been done before the invasion and immediately after the first Japanese attack by air. The Japanese had repeatedly offered to guarantee the neutrality of an independent Philippines. This was what *they* thought should be done!" Quezon is going to propose the passage by Congress of a Joint Resolution, as they did in the case of Cuba, that "the Philippines are and of right out to be independent" and that "the United States would use their *armed forces to protect them.*"

When asked by Shuster to try to describe his *own* frame of mind when he was told at 5:30 a.m. Dec. 8 of the attack on Pearl Harbor, Quezon said he had never believed that the Japanese would dare to do it; but since they had done so, it was at once evident that they were infinitely more powerful than had been supposed--therefore he immediately perceived that the Philippines were probably doomed.

In Washington the other day, he asked the Chinese Ambassador whether the Japanese had not fooled all the rest of the world by pretending to be weak. The ambassador just laughed. Quezon says that if consulted, he would have advised the Chinese to take a leaf from the Japanese book on cunning. The Japanese had been checked in their expansion plans three times, (after each of their three successful wars), by the concert of Great Powers--each time they "bowed their head" and submitted. Finally, after waiting nearly half a century, their chance had come, and they took it. So, if the Chinese, at the time the "China Incident" broke had pretended to submit, then allowed themselves to be armed and trained by the Japanese, they would only have had to wait *their* chance.

June 30-July 3, 1942. *Martial Law* High Commissioner Sayre had recommended to President Roosevelt early in the summer that if war broke out, he should declare martial law in the Philippines. This the President had a right to do, in case of invasion. Quezon also had that right to be exercised in concurrence of the National Assembly. Sayre when questioned on this subject by Quezon gave an "evasive" answer. When MacArthur became Supreme Commander in July he found Sayre's despatches to President Roosevelt with such a recommendation. MacArthur said to Quezon that *he* would

make no such recommendation to over-ride the Commonwealth Government; said he (MacArthur) was not in favor of setting aside the civil government in time of war. Quezon had told Sayre that if this were done, he would resign as President and then could not answer for the consequences. Martial law was thus never proclaimed in the Philippines during this war. "When I was in that agony of indecision, I thought the responsibility too great, and discussed with MacArthur, whether martial law should not be proclaimed, but he would not hear of it. When we got to Corregidor, MacArthur joined with me in my recommendation to Roosevelt that the independence of the Philippines be recognized immediately by the United States." However, General Chenoweth had set up a sort of martial law in the Visayas. Quezon learned of this from a polite letter from the Governor of Capiz. When Quezon got down to the Visayas himself, he found that the army had overridden the civil government, the police and the courts. "I was so angry that I abused General Chenoweth, poor fellow, for an hour and a half." MacArthur revoked this imposition of martial law as soon as Quezon reported it to him by radio.

June 25, 1942 [*sic*]. Quezon is very much exercised because he found that the *Army Intelligence Service* had discovered that Colonel Andres Soriano, his Secretary of Finance, had been one of Franco's fascists. And now they were investigating the loyalty of Soriano and of Quezon himself. Quezon busy dictating a strong letter of protest to Secretary of War Stimson. The letter was sent by hand. Quezon called the Secretary of War personally on the telephone, and Stimson replied: "Don't take them seriously." Quezon: "But I do--very." Stimson: "Well, then, let me tell you a story: when I entered the Army in 1917 they at once put me in the intelligence division. The first afternoon I was there, I read that every second man I knew was a 'spy.' I'll call in General Strong and give him hell." Quezon added that the Army Intelligence is also investigating a foreign ambassador in Washington.

*Pacific War Council that day.*

Roosevelt said that the reason the Atlantic Charter had omitted all reference to freedom of religion was because neither Churchill, (who was present at the meeting) nor he, had thought enough about religion to remember to put it in. (N.B. this was disingenuous in view of the photograph published at the time showing Churchill and Roosevelt sitting side-by-side on the deck of the *Prince of Wales* singing each from a hymn book.) Roosevelt added: "Churchill and I forgot it--that is the fact, but I couldn't very *well* admit that."

Roosevelt remarked that King Peter of Yugoslavia was interested only in the Hollywood girls. "I'll have to send for a couple of them."

Quezon says that at the Pacific War Council Churchill looked across the table in a puzzled way at him, but when he heard Roosevelt refer to him by name, he a look of interest and after the meeting, came around the table and shook hands saying: "I've never had a chance to meet you before and I am very glad of the present opportunity to congratulate you on the gallant fight put up by your people. We consider it to have been a very great contribution to the war effort."

Harry Hopkins said to Quezon: "I see you are the best dressed man on the Council." The Minister from New Zealand expressed doubt. Quezon replied: "I heard a radio speech in English from a Japanese saying that the Filipinos had lost all their virtues as Oriental people due to the influence of Spain and the United States. All that they care about now is to be well-dressed, so that people will look at them." Hopkins got quite red--he has no sense of humour, which Roosevelt, on the other hand, has in such abundance.

Roosevelt minimized the taking of the two outermost of the Aleutian Islands by the Japanese, but added: "I don't know what my friend Mackenzie King thinks of it--he lives nearer than I do." Mackenzie King did not seem to be so unconcerned over it as was Roosevelt.

Roosevelt was asked if he was sure of the victory of his party in the coming Congressional elections--he said "Well--no. But I was Governor of New York with a Republican Senate, a Republican House; and I think I can kid them along."

*National Defense Act of the Philippines.* Quezon said: "As soon as I had agreed with the President and Congressional leaders on a new independence law (Tydings-McDuffie Act) which eliminated the provision for keeping the United States Army in the Philippines after independence should be attained, I realized the responsibility we had assumed for the defense of the Philippines. During the last world war, we had organized a Philippine National Guard, but American Army leaders had never encouraged

the maintenance of this.<sup>169</sup> So, this time, I realized that my first task would be to prepare the Philippines when free to assume the responsibility for its own defense. I went at once to see General Douglas MacArthur in Washington; he was the best informed--the one man to advise me. The following conversation ensued:

"Q.: 'General, I wish to ask you some questions and I hope you will answer them fully or not at all--be very frank. Do you think the Philippines if independent can be effectively defended against a first class power?'

"MacA.: 'I not only think so, but I know so!'

"Q.: 'Would you be willing to assume the responsibility of preparing the Philippines to defend itself?'

"MacA.: 'Yes, if the President will allow me.'

"Q.: 'How much do you think it would cost?'

"MacA.: 'How much are you now spending on the Constabulary?'

"Q.: 'About 6,000,000 pesos annually!'

"MacA.: 'Add to that 10,000,000 pesos each year for ten years--it can be done.'

"Q.: 'Yes. If I am elected president, that very day I will wire inviting you to come to the Philippines at once.'

"We next agreed that an American law then in force authorizing the President to send, on request, military missions to the South American countries should be amended to extend also to the Philippines."

Quezon added to me: "I saw Roosevelt again and asked him to let me have MacArthur, and to have this law amended; that was done before I left Washington.

"I was then very much encouraged as to our national defense problem. I believed every word MacArthur said, and felt very confident. But I suspected that the War Department was not very enthusiastic over our plan; I felt this still more so when my friend General Harbord came to Manila a couple of years later; he said nothing about the Philippine Army--either for or against.

"Back in the Philippines, I went for everybody who criticized our National Defense Act. But when in 1939, I saw Czecho-Slovakia and Poland fall--saw Germany defeat them so easily though they had far more by way of defense than we could acquire even at the end of ten years, I began to weaken. I then told the Cabinet that I feared I was spending more money on the National Defense than was justified. If nations like Poland and Czecho-Slovakia can be overwhelmed so quickly, it is possible they would also do it to us. Better, perhaps for us not to waste so much money!

"So, I began to hesitate; I told MacArthur and Sayre. Upon one occasion I made a statement to newspaper men that I was not as confident as I had been before of the ability of an independent Philippines to defend itself against a first class power. MacArthur did not contradict my newspaper statement, but he never lost faith in his work. I called him before the Cabinet and told him my doubts as to the effectiveness of our plans. He replied that he had always taken it for granted that our own defense would be implemented by the United States Navy.

"Of course, my concern was not over the situation of the Philippines so long as we remained under the flag of the United States. I felt first, that no other nation would dare to attack the United States, and, second, that in case of attack, we would not have to rely upon ourselves alone, that the prime responsibility for the Philippines would rest on the United States. Whatever we might have would be just that much help.

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<sup>169</sup> According to Agoncillo and Alfonso, Leonard Wood "was the only one among high American or Filipino officials who called attention before 1934 to the necessity of taking steps for the national defense of the Philippines. This, he urged, should be part of the Filipinos' preparation for self-government. Under the political atmosphere then prevailing, however, the formation of a Philippine Army could not be undertaken." See Agoncillo and Alfonso, p. 371. See also notes 89, 103, and 144 of this diary.



"At the beginning of November 1940, I gave notice to all Americans in the service of the Commonwealth that I could not commit myself to them beyond my own term of Office--so they all had a year's notice before the election of November 10, 1941. I added: 'I am not a candidate for re-election.' I had no disagreement whatever with MacArthur; I intended to keep him but would not commit myself or tell him so. He asked me 'What will you do if you are re-elected?' I refused to explain and said to him, 'If you find something you find more satisfactory, take it.'

"The result of the election of November 1941 was much bigger than before. Only Sumulong ran against me. He died later when I was in Corregidor.'

July 1, 1942. Quezon's description of his *visit to the island of Mactan* (off Cebu) with Secretary of Public Works Cuenco and the Governor of the Province: they took him over the magnificent new road to the *barrio* where they had erected a statue to Lapu-Lapu the local datu who had killed Magellan. Quezon turned to them and remarked that Lapu-Lapu was not the first *independista* but was really no better than a local "head-hunter," that the inscription on the statue was not based on historical truth; the fight in which Magellan lost his life was merely a struggle between two local chieftains.<sup>170</sup> As for this fine road, it was just part of Osmeña's program of spending the Commonwealth's money down here to get all the votes in the *barrio*.

He then turned to a description of his relations with Osmeña in the latter years of my (F.B.H.'s) administration. In 1916 Quezon came back to the Philippines with the Jones Law in his pocket and was at once elected President of the Senate; not only did I (F.B.H.) try to push him forward towards the leadership, but his Senators from the very beginning bucked against the old protocol by which the Speaker of the House (Assembly) had been established as N° 1 Filipino and N° 2 in the Islands after the Governor General. Quezon says that he had originally had himself elected as Osmeña's lieutenant against the latter's wishes. When he came back in 1916 with the Jones Law, he knew he could beat Osmeña but he really felt that Osmeña was the better man to head the nation; Quezon felt himself inferior to Osmeña especially in the realm of government finance.<sup>171</sup>

*Council of State.* This was a maneuver of Osmeña to perpetuate himself in power. When he first showed the original draft of the proposed Executive Order creating Council of State, it was so drawn that the Council was to sit under Osmeña's<sup>172</sup> presidency without the Governor General being present. Quezon told Osmeña at once I would never agree to this. They came with the proposed order to Malacanan together. Osmeña made the suggestion that the Council sit without the Governor General. Quezon says: my face grew fiery red, and I stated "Not over my dead body." Then there was a pause which to Quezon seemed to last an hour, so finally he remarked: "It's a fine day, Governor." Quezon had often told this story to "old timers" when they maintained that I had been "run" by Osmeña and Quezon. He always said that I was the most independent<sup>173</sup> of all the American Governors General with the possible exception of Stimson.

Quezon then went on to talk of the *entertainment fund* which I had asked the legislature to set up for my successors just before I left the Philippines. Quezon re-

<sup>170</sup>Quezon's deep sense of history is attested to by his decision to leave his papers to the Philippine nation without reservations in their use.

<sup>171</sup>While Quezon may have felt himself unsure of his political position in Manila after being away almost continuously for nearly seven years, it is very doubtful that he felt himself inferior to Osmeña in any capacity. Quezon was indulging in some rationalization for not taking on Osmeña in 1916.

<sup>172</sup>See Pacis, pp. 231-234.

<sup>173</sup>Harrison was not a wealthy man *per se*. As the trustee for his minor daughters by his first wife, he enjoyed some modest income over and beyond his salary as governor general. Moreover his brother, Fairfax, as president of the Southern Railway Co. and the occupant of Belvoir House, was substantially wealthy. The illusion was created therefore that Harrison was independent. His greatest assertion of that "independence" came when he cabled his resignation effective upon receipt in Washington if President Wilson ordered him to stay the execution of General Noriel. Wilson cabled back at once that Harrison was free to do what he thought best concerning the Filipino General. This action on the part of Harrison worried Osmeña and Quezon. Nevertheless they agreed that he was worth more to them in Manila than forcing the issue between Washington and the Governor General over staying the execution of Noriel. See also note 54 in this diary.

marked that I had paid for all my entertainments; Taft's brother paid for his; Smith gave one fiesta and then got himself appointed a Federal Judge. Quezon said Wood profited from the fund--I remarked "poor man, he surely needed it," but Quezon replied "It was terrible because it made Wood stay on so long in the Philippines."<sup>174</sup> His Vice Governor Gilmore charged the government 3 pesos for every private guest whom he entertained.<sup>175</sup>

Governor General Smith was described by Quezon as a "simple, openhearted man," who was closest to the Filipinos of any of them before I came. He had been selected as Governor General by Cardinal Gibbons, and was so devout a Catholic that he used to confess to the Jesuits in Manila, who thought they could run him. But a year and a half after Smith's appointment, Cardinal Gibbons said he would never ask for a Catholic again. Smith stood up so straight against pressure that he leaned over backwards.

July 3rd, 1942. Met *Lt. Col. Carlos Romulo*, editor of Quezon's paper the *Herald* in Manila--noted orator--a.d.c. to MacArthur, i.e., "press agent"--still very shaky, said he was wounded once on Bataan (?). He corrected the newspaper interview ascribed to him on landing at San Francisco. He did not correct the statements to the effect that he was in the United States "on a mission for General MacArthur," nor that he was the "last man to escape from Bataan"; but did give a correct rendering of the Domei agency announcement concerning the burning of Cebu--that it was to show the Filipinos that all further resistance should cease--not that it was punishment for sniping, in which even women were said to have taken part from upper windows of houses when the army of occupation entered Cebu.

"Further resistance" probably refers to the guerrilla bands, or remnants of the army still active in the high mountains of Cebu, and perhaps also in Luzon and Mindanao.

Quezon tells me that a "high official" of the Red Cross reported to him that the Japanese are *treating their prisoners* in the Philippines well.

Reports come from Australia that the danger from the Japanese has not lessened--only that their present interest is turned elsewhere. Some think the enemy could take Australia and New Zealand whenever they wished.

"No nong" (Manuel Quezon, Jr.) celebrates his sixteenth birthday. He tells me that "Calle F. B. Harrison" in Pasay has had its name changed by the Japanese.

*Chat with Osmena.* He says that there were 5,000 troops in Negros; 5,000 in Cebu; 5,000 in Panay and 30,000 in Mindanao--all units of the Philippine Army, with high officers who were all Americans. Believes General Sharp, tho unwilling to surrender, probably did so when Lieutenant General Wainwright expressed his desire that he should do so.

Osmena has always been interested in pushing the settlement of Mindanao by Christian Filipinos, but believes that in all these years they have only persuaded some 50,000 of them to go down there.

Osmena was the founder of the *Nacionalista* party and its first president. Since 1907 they were permitted by the American Governors General to agitate for independence.

At the convention of Governors of Provinces in 1906, Osmena, from Cebu, Quezon from Tayabas, Veyra from Leyte, Luna from La Union, and Gabaldon from Nueva Ecija were the only *Nacionalistas* but ran the convention in spite of the fact that all the rest were *Progresistas*. Governor General Smith was in charge during these years. The *principales* of negros proposed establishing a "Republic of Negros," and Smith

<sup>174</sup>Harrison was referring to the financial embarrassments caused Wood by his two sons, Leonard Wood, Jr. and his stock deals, and Osborne Wood and his illnesses. But it is ridiculous to believe that Wood stayed on in the Philippines in order to profit from the entertainment fund.

<sup>175</sup>Quezon had very little liking for Professor Eugene Gilmore, who served Governors General Wood, Stimson and Davis. Although he did not accept every one of Wood's tactics in handling the Filipino leaders, he nevertheless accepted the basic premise that Wood's understanding of the Jones Act was correct and that he was right when he urged the leaders to run their government in accordance with its provisions and the advances gained under the Harrison regime.

did not object so long as they stayed under the American flag. Tells the story of Smith's first attempt to speak Spanish. It was at this banquet in Negros, and after the customary large number of courses, a lady beside him asked: "*Quiere Su Exceñencia tomar una siesta ahora?*" He replied: "*Si Senora, con usted,*" thinking the *siesta* was a name for ice cream.

Quezon on the subject of protocol: "I have never been much interested in it. I prefer the theory of Don Quixote, who when he appointed Sancho Panza Governor of Baratari, was given a dinner by the latter. Sancho invited him to sit at the head of the table, but Don Quixote replied: 'Wherever I sit will be the head of the table.'"

The subject, however, is of great importance to Osmena. Taft has fixed Osmena's status as Speaker of the Assembly when opening the first Philippine Assembly, by declaring that, after the Governor General, the Speaker of the Assembly was the second man in the Philippines.

Leonard Wood, when Department Commander in the Army had raised the question with Governor General Forbes--Wood was unwilling to allow precedence over the Department to a Filipino. Osmena cabled Quezon then the Resident Commissioner in Washington and Quezon went to see the Secretary of War adding that "Tho I considered my mission a silly one, yet the duty was imposed on me by my leaders." He reported to the Secretary of War that Osmena believed Wood was trying to undo the fiat of Taft, and that he (Osmena) would consider such action a humiliation to him and to his people. "Personally," said Quezon, "I never consider it important where they place me." The War Department ducked the issue, ruling that when the Speaker was invited, the Commanding General should not be present and vice versa. This was in 1910-11. Quezon added: "Wood could not stand the idea of a Filipino being put ahead of him. I never regard such matters as important unless done with the purpose of humiliating me or my race."<sup>76</sup>

Quezon continued: "When McNutt was first sent in 1936 [*sic*] as High Commissioner to the Philippines, I was in Europe. The Japanese Consul gave a fiesta at which he toasted the President of the Philippines before proposing a toast to the High Commissioner (McNutt)." This Quezon considered as of no importance and it was certainly not an official attempt of the Japanese to play politics in the Philippines. "The Americans in Manila had been pushing McNutt to assert himself, and got him crazy." So, he sent circulars to all the Consuls in the Philippines calling their attention to the correct order of precedence, and instructing them to route all official correspondence with the Commonwealth Government through his office."<sup>77</sup>

"In Washington, they had a Cabinet meeting to discuss the press furore over this matter, for they feared it would give trouble. Vice President Garner said: 'I'm afraid we've sent a trouble maker there.' President Roosevelt replied: 'I wouldn't say that, but he seems to be indiscreet.'"

"I was in Paris at this time, but refused to be quoted as being mixed up in this damned nonsense. When I arrived in New York all the newspaper men were on to me on this question. I told them: 'Gentlemen, all I wish to tell you is this: if there is a toast and I am given the opportunity of drinking it, all I care about is that there should be enough to drink.'

"The President was relieved when he learned of this reply. But I feared that with McNutt I might have another Wood-Quezon fight on my hands in Manila. Before arriving home, I carefully wrote out my speech. The banquet of welcome, attended by

<sup>176</sup> It is hard to pinpoint the post that Wood held at the time of the incident described by Quezon. If he meant when Wood was commanding general, Philippine Department, then his chronology is wrong: since General Wood did not serve while Forbes was Governor General nor was he in Manila in 1910-1911. If he meant that Wood was Chief of Staff when he received a query from Manila, then he must be wrong again. General Wood had the highest respect for Speaker Osmena and his position. Moreover, it seems improbable that any American General Officer would make an issue of precedence in the Philippines after nearly four or five years since Taft's fiat that the Speaker was second only to the Governor General.

<sup>177</sup> The British Foreign Office found this disconcerting. The British consul general found a way out from the dilemma by asking McNutt's office if the most routine and nonpolitical correspondence had to go through the High Commissioner. The furor soon died down after Quezon's return to Manila.



some 1,500-2,000 people was dramatic enough for we had an earthquake during it. I told them: 'In order that there may be no misunderstanding among the people, I consider it important on this occasion to state what I consider to be the rights of the President of the Commonwealth in relation to those of the American High Commissioner. The latter, as the representative of the President, occupies the highest place. But all the power and responsibility of this government, except in the matter of foreign affairs, rests in the President of the Philippines. In these matters, I am the boss. I will welcome any suggestions from the High Commissioner and no doubt his suggestions will exercise great influence on our decisions.' (Wm. H. Anderson's book<sup>178</sup> contains 20-30 pp. on this.)

Quezon next described his first lesson as a young member of the first Philippine Assembly in 1908 on how to act when attacked by the press. A local newspaper in Manila had attacked him in its morning issue and a friend rushed into his bedroom and awakened him with the article. He leapt out of bed, rushed through his dressing and ran to the office of the paper, asking to see Salazar, the editor. He shoved the paper before him and asked him if he had written it. "Yes," so he pushed it into Salazar's mouth who went over backward with his chair. Alemany rushed in to protest, and Quezon raging, asked him if he had anything to do with it, so Alemany fled. Then Salazar challenged Quezon to a duel and Quezon replied: "To hell with you and your fuel!" He then went into the composing and printing room and told the workmen in Tagalog that they ought to quit working for such scoundrels.

The next morning, *all* the press attacked Quezon. He began to be ashamed and to think that after all he was disgraced. He went down to attend the session of the Assembly in the marble hall of the Ayuntamiento, and at the door met Governor General Smith, who "was himself a fighting Irishman"--Smith said to him: "Well, young man, you had quite a good time yesterday. Let me offer you a piece of advice--there is nothing worse than being ignored by the press; if they won't praise you, pay them to attack you!" Osmena said nothing to Quezon about the incident!

*Visit to President Coolidge.* Former Governor General Forbes told Quezon that in due time, Coolidge would be recognized as the greatest President next to Lincoln. Quezon remarked to me that he thought he was the *worst!* "not even except Harding." He described a visit with Osmena to Coolidge in the White House. It was Osmena's first President;<sup>179</sup> he bought a suit for the occasion and bowed low when entering the presence. Quezon continued: "After 10 minutes I saw that Sergio was beginning to revise his estimate. This was not one of Coolidge's best days! He drawled and gulped and nobody could make sense out of anything he said. When we left the White House, Sergio said '*Chico! Caramba!* so that's a President of the United States!'"

*Quezon's revision of Hare-Hawes-Cutting Bill:* The provision of the indefinite retention of the American Army in the Philippines after independence was granted seemed to Quezon to make "independence" (a) *futile*--for had not the Army "betrayed" an American Governor General? What would they do when a Filipino became the head of state? "Suppose Don Sergio for example were the first President of an independent Philippines, what would happen? Directly after his inauguration he would perhaps wish to rest after the ceremonies and take a drive. He would go to Fort McKinley, outside Manila, and perhaps be halted by a sentry and turned back!"

The provision was moreover (b) *dangerous*--and would be liable to create incidents between the United States and the Philippines. Moreover, though at the time they naturally did not make this statement, there was the challenge to Japan in the continued presence of the U.S. Army in the Philippines. He thinks this requirement was a product of American imperialism.

So, he wired Osmena and Roxas in Washington to await his arrival there and added that if they could convince him that the bill was wise, he would support it. This they failed to do. Senator Harry Hawes, one of the joint authors of the act, gave a luncheon for the Philippine delegation at which Joe Robinson, the floor leader of the Senate was present. Having listened to the discussion at the table, Robinson finally said with some show of anger--and he was a man of sudden anger and violence: "I've had enough of all this--you can take the law as it is, or leave it." Quezon rose and said: "Then I'm through, we won't accept the law." He left and returned at once to the Philippines. Before Robinson's death, a little later, the senator paid a handsome tribute to Quezon.

<sup>178</sup>See William F. Anderson, *The Philippines* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1939), pp. 163-178.

<sup>179</sup>Quezon was wrong. Osmena's first president was Warren G. Harding (1922).

Upon his return to Manila, Quezon got the legislature to reject the law by more than a two-thirds vote. He told the caucus that they would have to "get rid" of Osmena (the Vice President) as head of the senate [*sic*] and of Roxas as Speaker. There was much hesitation among them since the people were so anxious for independence that there was general support for the law. So Quezon told them: "You leave it to me--the popular support here for Osmena and Roxas will not last thirty days." Then Quezon offered his own resignation as President of Senate, which was refused by a large majority. Roxas, that evening, did not wait for the vote; he resigned as Speaker of the House of his own accord. He was "chaired" by the students at the University and said later that "he had fallen from the speakership into the arms of the people." Quezon commented publicly that when Roxas had fallen into the arms of the students, he had picked out those of a pretty girl in the crowd--Quezon added that he wouldn't mind that kind of a fall, himself. During the controversy, Quezon made no personal attacks nor reflections on either Osmena or Roxas. The Hare-Hawes-Cutting law was overwhelmingly rejected by the legislature.

*Religious Instruction in the Public Schools:* Taft as the first Civil Governor had passed a law permitting this, but it was very ambiguous in its terms, and never put into effect. (N.B. this, and Taft's visit to the Vatican, plus the "Friar Land Purchases" had a great deal to do with the re-election of Theodore Roosevelt in 1904. I was campaigning on the state ticket in New York in that election and knew of the immense activity--undercover--of the Catholic priests against our ticket headed by Alton B. Parker. F.B.H.)

Quezon says that when Laurel, Roxas and Recto were framing the constitution of the Philippine Commonwealth, Taft's "religious instruction" proposition was inserted in the articles. The first session of the National Assembly, in the early winter of 1935-6, passed by 90 votes a law to this effect. Quezon vetoed the act on the ground that it was unconstitutional. Chief Justice Avanceña, whose advice he took privately, backed him up, but the act was never re-passed over Quezon's veto, so never came before the courts. Avanceña went down to his home province of Iloilo to explain this matter to his sisters, who had brought him up and educated him. They had kept a school there since Spanish days, and were intensely religious. Avanceña did not broach the subject to his sisters but went to the priests who were those who "confessed" them, and explained to them the constitutional point. Then, after satisfying them, he arranged with them to come to dinner and to have one of them raise the question quite casually at the table.

Quezon was dictating to Canceran the chapter of his book on his birth and childhood. Great was my surprise at the primitive conditions at Baler 60 years ago: no market--everybody raised, or shot or caught their own food or exchanged their crops for venison and pork. Few shotguns; most of the people were armed only with spears or bow and arrows, etc. He replied: "Inferiority complex of the Filipinos never has permitted them to tell the truth about their primitive conditions in Spanish days. I shall be the first." (Vivid contrast here with the profusion, extravagance and disregard of expenditure in which he has lived during the Commonwealth; instead of resenting this, the Filipino are probably proud of all this reckless display--I've never heard him express the view that *anything* he wanted was too expensive. F.B.H.)

July 14, 1942. Shoreham Hotel. I found Quezon in high spirits; he had an overhaul yesterday at the Walter Reed Hospital, where they found his heart, arteries, kidneys, etc., quite sound, and ascribe his blood pressure only to nervousness.

He is now all enthusiasm for writing his book, and is at work six or eight hours a day in his room, dictating to Canceran, and writing his revisions of the manuscript. He has Morgan Shuster in New York on the telephone every day to talk over the batches of ms. he sends him. Shuster is encouraging him up to the limit.

I questioned him about the willingness of the Filipinos to agree to the retention of naval bases in their islands after independence and for which he had included a provision in the Tydings-McDuffie Act; the retention or establishment of which is to be subject to negotiation between the United States and the future Philippine Republic. He rejected the idea that the Navy should then continue to occupy the old base at Cavite, or, indeed, any place on Manila Bay, whereby the seat of government would be under naval gunship but would consent to their occupying such bases as Olongapo, Pollilo, etc., and he has already set up weather observatories at such stations. The idea of the Filipinos was that the American Navy would not interfere with the internal affairs of the Republic, but that its presence in the Philippines would deter other powers from aggressions.<sup>180</sup>

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<sup>180</sup> At that point in time, it seems hard to believe that Quezon thought that the U.S. Navy was immune from power politics.

With the Army, however, the situation was quite different--ever since the last military governor of the Philippines, General Arthur MacArthur, had shown such reluctance to turning over the government to Mr William H. Taft, the first civilian governor; the Army in their different posts throughout the Philippine Islands had shown a very active interest in the working of the new government of the islands. Thus, they seemed to sense that they represented the idea of the use of force against the Filipinos.

This opinion Quezon had expressed in November 1935 to Secretary of War Dern and to Senate floor leader Joe Robinson in Washington some months earlier, citing in a discussion of this question what he called the "betrayal" of a Governor General by the Army. He had reference, of course, to the ludicrous and abortive "uprising" of the Filipinos in the Botanical Garden in Manila at Christmas time of 1913 when I was the Governor. This affair had consisted of the gathering of some dozens of Filipinos, mostly of the cook or *muchacho* type, who tried to start a noisy demonstration, but were at once discouraged by a few of the city police. We later found that this abortive affair had been "staged" by *agents provocateurs* of the Philippine Scouts, a part of the American Army; and an American colonel of the Manila garrison had meanwhile paraded his regiment. The secret service agents of the army were at that time too much involved in local politics--possibly in order to justify their own continued employment!

Quezon on phone with Morgan Shuster over the first proofs of title page and foreword of his book. Insists on having the italics changed in Roosevelt's pledge, taken from under "I pledge" and inserted instead: "*the full resources and man power of U.S. are back of this pledge.*" "That" he added to me "was what influenced our people to resist!"

I told him of the campaign being conducted in the United States by Pearl Buck for what she calls "economic equality, etc." for Negroes in our country. Her argument is based on the Japanese propaganda in Asia which, she maintains, weakens America with the Chinese. I asked him if such an argument had any effect on the Chinese and he just laughed. He never had heard of Pearl Buck. He said that American Negroes were well liked in the Philippines citing the example of Major Loving, leader of the Constabulary band.

Quezon gets every day here in Washington from the State Department a precis of Japanese propaganda over the radio in the Philippines. He says: "the Japs are doing too d-d well"; that they had released General Vicente Lim; had rebuilt the damaged railways, and had restored inter-island passage to the central and southern islands. I asked him about the sugar plantations; he thought the Japanese would keep them going, take all the sugar and not pay for it, adding "it makes no difference to me."

Spoke of his troubles caused by the corruption by the Chinese in the Philippines. When a delegation from Chiang Kai-shek visited him he told them he sympathized with their desire of independence and hoped they would throw the Japanese out, but he did wish they would help him to curb Chinese corruption in the Philippines. The last Consul General they had in Manila was one of the "new young men" and he helped Quezon to clean up the immigration mess; and to put in jail the violators of that act. Quezon reorganized the Bureau of Immigration. He added that if he lives to attend the Peace Conference, he will work to see that China and Russia do not remain armed while Japan is disarmed. Hopes to line up Canada, Australia and the Latin American countries to that end.

Quezon thinks that when he asked Roosevelt for independence for the Philippines in 1938 or on 4th of July, 1939, Roosevelt was quite in conformity but was curbed by those "Experts" in the Department of State.

Quezon then remarked that he bought Rafael Palma's new "history" for the government and then refused to have it printed, adding that Don Rafael seemed to favor Wood's administration quite as much as mine. I told him that Palma had said to me in 1936 that I was much more "radical" than some of the Filipino leaders then were--meaning, of course, that my views on independence were more aggressive.<sup>181</sup>

On Corregidor, Quezon said, he became so dissatisfied with *Carlos Romulo's* broadcasts that he asked MacArthur (on whose "staff" Romulo served) to put him under the censorship of a committee composed of Osmena, Roxas and Santos. Romulo came to him and said that would humiliate him, but "I had decided to fire him if he did not

<sup>181</sup> See Onorato, "Governor General Francis Burton Harrison," pp. 182-183, 185.



submit. I told him I never put out anything myself without submitting it to them.' I then read to Quezon Romulo's interview in today's New York papers stating that the Japanese had burned all the books in the library of the University of the Philippines dealing with "Democracy, the United States and England" etc. . . Quezon stated he had heard this rumoured but did not know whether it was true or not. The part of Romulo's interview dealing with the *Bello incident* was true. Bello had a school of his own at Vigan, and when the Japanese first got there they ordered him to haul down the American flag, but said he could leave the Philippine flag over his school flying. He replied that the law obliged him to have both flags, that they could haul down the flags themselves, but he refused to do so. They shot him down.

I then tried to read to Quezon from *Collier's* recent article on *atrocities by Japanese when entering Manila*. He didn't want to listen to it; said he had never even read Marsman's article on atrocities in Hong Kong; said he did not believe all this stuff, and would not take part in the abuse of the Japanese.

I subsequently asked three members of Quezon's staff about *atrocities in Manila*; they seemed somewhat surprised by the question, calling attention to the fact that Manila had been declared an open city and was not defended. One of them said he had heard that the niece of Major Stevenot, a young American woman, had been abused by the Japanese because she would not tell them where Stevenot was. (He was on Corregidor.) Stevenot was the head of the long distance telephone company, and of the radio company. Another indignity was offered to a Filipina girl who had no pass for crossing a bridge--or else did not understand the sentry's questions. There were many atrocities of rape in the provinces.

Quezon said he had sent Colonel Andres Soriano to see Norman Davis to ask about treatment of prisoners by the Japanese. Davis is head of the American Red Cross. Quezon is trying to have supplies forwarded to the Philippines. Davis stated that he was already in touch with ex-prisoners returning from Shanghai and they reported they had been well treated.

The British recognized the Japanese occupation of Kong, Shanghai and Singapore, and can thus communicate with their nations there through channels. The United States has not recognized Japanese occupation of the Philippines.

*American School System in the Philippines* Quezon described his quarrel with Vice Governor and Secretary of Public Instruction Gilmore (under Wood). It was in a car going down to lunch with Gilmore at the Army and Navy Club. Quezon told him the American system was destroying the old civic virtues of the Filipinos--respect for the family, the church and authority--the discussion became so heated that Quezon refused to lunch with Gilmore.

The following story was told me recently by Frank L. Crone, former Director of Education in the Philippines and in Peru:

Quezon and Osmena were sent for during Wood's time to come to Malacanan Palace and were occasionally kept waiting for three quarters of an hour before being received by the Governor General. Wood's a.d.c. told Crone that on one such occasion Quezon appeared clad in a *camisa de chino*, *chinelas* (slippers) and a *salacot* (big country hat). When surprise was expressed at his costume, he replied: "Well, if I am to be treated like a *tao* when I come to Malacanan, I'm going to dress like one."

Crone said also that the ancient local, democratic self-government still prevailed in every *barrío* in the Philippines. The *cabeza de barangay* was not a government position, but was the head of the local group named *barangay* after the original muster of the *vinta* or long boat in which their ancestors had first landed in the Philippines.

Also, he added, family affairs, such as domestic matters like Marriage, are usually settled by a big family council.

July 15, 1942. Shoreham.

During the Spanish regime, the *cabeza de barangay* was the collector of the *cedula personal* tax; he was handed a list of all inhabitants over 18 and had to produce revenue called for by the list, whether he had been able to collect it or not; as a result he was usually ruined. See references in Rizal's novels, which are, however poorly translated into English.

Rizal, said Quezon, had never been one of his heroes--he was persevering, but never a man of decision--he refused, when an exile in Dapitan, to join Bonifacio in

the revolution; this fact was counted on by the defense at his trial--but his execution was foreordained. The uncertainty in the mind of the reader of Rizal's famous books *Noli me Tangere* and *El Filibusterismo* as to whether it is Elias or Ibarra who is really the hero of his novels indicated either Rizal's own habitual indecision, or a wish to cover up his belief against a subsequent inquisition by the Spanish authorities.

*Mabini* (the "divine paralytic") is more nearly Quezon's hero. His ms. was unknown until his death; is now in Philippine National Library--and has never been printed. It denounces Aguinaldo severely, on account of his narrowness and selfishness. Mabini was captured and held as a prisoner by the Americans, and never could be forced to recant. After the insurrection, he took the oath of allegiance to the United States! While on Corregidor, Quezon wanted to go back to Manila and, like Mabini before him, have nothing to do with the captors (Japanese) even if necessary to go to prison.

At the Malolos Congress, Buencamino and Paterno urged Aguinaldo to quit the hopeless fight and negotiate with Schurman, President of McKinley's Philippine Mission.

Quezon next turned to an account of the debates among his government associates on Corregidor upon the question of *Surrender of the Philippine Army to the Japanese*: They, none of them, believed in any permanence in the independence then offered by the Japanese. Osmena and Roxas, as well as Quezon thought that if this offer was accepted by them, the Japanese Army could be persuaded to withdraw within a reasonable time, and that they might allow the American Army to be evacuated to the United States. Quezon and his advisers believed that the war would eventually be decided by an attack on Tokyo, and nowhere else in the Far East. Meanwhile, they felt it better to put up with Japanese interference in their affairs--thus sparing the Philippines all that it otherwise might go through. As for permanent independence granted them by the Japanese, it would mean very little for the Japanese Consul General would be the real Chief Executive of the Philippines. He would come to Malacanan with all "due courtesy" but the first time a serious one of his "requests" was refused, it would mean war.

Quezon called my attention to what I had told the Americans in Manila in my time namely that Quezon was the "best friend they had in the Philippines."<sup>182</sup> As a choice between the Americans and Japanese he would take the former every time; he could put up with even such absurdities as those of Governor General Wood, because he was an American--he could talk and drink with him. When he was Resident Commissioner in Washington he had lots of American friends who treated him exactly like one of themselves. With the Japanese, he could never be at ease--never could really understand them. The Japanese policy in Asiatic countries is utterly selfish; they had been so long isolated that they still thought only of themselves.

Ever since the *fracaso* of the League of Nations, Quezon has believed that if America withdrew from the Philippines the Japanese would absorb the Islands. The Filipinos, he thinks, could not have "made terms" with them. "We would have been in the present position of the Siamese; they have the form but not the substance of self-government--that generally satisfies the Orientals but not the Filipinos."

The following account by Quezon of the beginning of the *political fight between himself and Osmena* was dictated by him to Cancaran in my presence on June 7th, for use in his book *The Good Fight* but was omitted from the book when printed, so it is reproduced here.

"I was elected to the Assembly as *Nacionalista* in 1907. I was the floor leader and Osmena the Speaker. In 1909 I was appointed Resident Commissioner and occupied the position until 1916. I secured from Congress the passage of the Jones Law and was elected Senator and then made the President of the Senate!

"The great fight between Osmena and me started when General Wood was there. The remote cause of my fight with Osmena was the jealousy of the Senate of its prerogatives and the Senators never admitted that.<sup>183</sup> They thought that the recognition of

<sup>182</sup> Wood said the same thing. Of the two Filipino leaders, most Americans believed that Quezon was genuinely fond of the United States and would do all in his power to preserve that relationship. Cf. Anderson, pp. 129-130.

<sup>183</sup> See Onorato, *A Brief Review of American Interest*, pp. 52f. See also Pacis, pp. 271-300.

the Speaker of the House as the number one man was a denial of the seniority of the Senate over the House. It was a mistake of Osmena. I swear before God that I never intended to replace him as the leader of the party. I had so much love for this fellow. As a matter of fact I thought he was better prepared than me. I had no doubt that at that time he was better prepared. And this idea was so sincere with me that even when the fight on the Hare-Hawes-Cutting bill came I decided that I was not going to fight it. I was only going to explain my opinion for I thought it was my duty to tell the people. I even told Governor General Murphy that Osmena and Roxas were the men best prepared to run the government, and that even after my election as President. But with the acts of these two men they convinced me that I could do that better than they. I will tell you how I discovered this.

"After my election as President of the Philippines, I did not want to give Osmena a portfolio in my Cabinet. I wanted him to be my senior adviser and have all papers of the different departments go to his office before they were acted upon. But he is so interested in the appearance of things that he insisted that I appoint him Secretary of Public Instruction and he thought that his men would believe that I had disregarded him if I did not give him that portfolio and that would make him lose prestige with the 'Pros.' He insisted and I appointed him. I told him 'I am going to appoint you but you must understand that in these circumstances you will not be my adviser any longer. You will have a seat in the Cabinet; will have a voice and no more. And you will understand that I cannot offend the other members of the Cabinet by having their views submitted to another secretary of department.' So I dealt with the secretaries of department without taking his views first.

"However, I still thought of meeting his views on general policies and gave instructions to my aides and Secretary that the Vice President could see me any time without previous engagement, and I set aside a time for him every day. But instead of talking to me about public policies he brought petitions of men who stood by him, as well as gossip. I tolerated this for three weeks, but later on I revoked my instructions to my Secretary and aides about seeing the Vice President because I got sick about the things he brought to me. So he ceased to be what I wanted him to be--my adviser. The immediate effect was for me to go through all the departments of the government. That is why when you were there I was practically handling everything.

"Now, there is one department of the government in which I was convinced of my utter ignorance--the department of finance. I had an understanding with Osmena and Roxas that I would make Roxas Secretary of Finance. I did not appoint him right away because I wanted his services in the House. He was a minority leader and I wanted him to work in conjunction with the majority leader so there would not be any trouble in the House. When the House was about to adjourn, I sent for him and told him about his appointment to the secretaryship, but he said that he wanted to go to Capiz and consult with his followers. He came back and said: 'Mr President, I am ready.'

"I had talked with Quirino, the Secretary of Finance then, and had prepared him for the change a long time ago. I sent for Quirino and told him that I would appoint Roxas Secretary of Finance and him as Secretary of the Interior. I called Roxas over the phone and asked him: 'Are you ready?' He said 'yes.' Then I told him that I was going to write him a letter offering him the position. I wrote the letter, sent it to him; but I was so tired that day, I told my aides that I would not see anybody and went to bed. I fell asleep and did not wake up until five in the afternoon. During that time the reply of Roxas was delivered in which he said: 'I have received your letter and I felt that I should remain in the House unless you think that my services are absolutely essential in the Executive Department.' That made me so mad. I thought it was an act of treachery; that he wanted me to write another letter begging and tell him: 'you are so essential that I cannot run the government without you.' I was so angry that I called my children and took them for a ride with my launch in the Pasig River.

"At seven the following morning I sent for Antonio de las Alas. He came and I said: 'Alas you are the Secretary of Finance.' I almost killed him with the news and after telling him about his appointment I left the Palace and told the people in the Palace that I did not want to see anybody. I answered Roxas' letter and simply told him: 'I understand your position and I therefore shall not appoint you Secretary of Finance.' That is all I told him, and he has been trying [*sic*] to see me, but I never saw him. After giving out to the press the appointment of Alas I sent word to Roxas that I would see him. He came and said: 'Mr President, I have received your letter and I have come to tell you that I withdraw my letter.' 'Well, it is just a little too late,' I said. 'And I want to tell you something so that there may be this clear understanding between us. Manoling, I have told you time and again that I could not run this government without you as Secretary of Finance



and I never changed my mind about it, but when I wrote you the letter it was the President of the Philippines offering you that position. The President will not admit that he cannot run the government without you or anyone. I am going to run this government without the "Pros" and you can all go to hell.<sup>i</sup>

"The Vice President wanted to see me. I thought he was going to intervene and I was determined to tell him that I wanted his resignation as Secretary of Public Instruction. So I told my aides that I would see him right away. But to my disappointment, he did not say a word about the case. Later on I discovered why. That fellow Sabido went to see the Vice President and told him not to mention anything about the case of Roxas to me sayingi 'The President, I am afraid, will have us all out.'

"That is the reason why I say that these people forced me and gave me the chance to discover whether I could run this government or not. You know that in a banquet in the Palace I said that I have always thought that the Vice President was much better qualified than I was to run the government. But it was he himself who convinced me that I can run it better than anybody.

"Way back in 1916, upon the passage of the Jones Law, Osmena telegraphed me asking what position he could occupy--what I thought should be done--where do you think I should go? I told him that I wanted him to continue being the leader of the party and that therefore he should go to the Senate and be its president. He telegraphed me again that in consultation with the leaders of the party he had decided that he should continue as Speaker and that they would elect me senator. I told them that I wanted to practice my law profession.

"So from the beginning I feared that there would be this conflict and he himself saw it.

"You know the report that the Wood-Forbes Mission madei That report made me mad like hell. I arrived in the Philippines sick with fever and before my arrival Wood had been appointed Governor General. I learned that the legislature had approved, upon the appointment and assumption of office on the part of General Wood, the same joint resolution which was approved when you were appointed Governor General. I sent for Senator Sison and told him: 'How is it possible that you people have approved his resolution?' He said: 'Well, it was presented by Palma. You left Palma as your representative and we assumed that they<sup>184</sup> have consulted with you.'

"That was the most humiliating thing for the legislature to do. So from that time on I realized that Osmena was not the man to lead the country under those circumstances. I did not immediately start the trouble; but I began to show him that I was not pleased. I criticized him for that and from that time on I started letting him know that there was trouble coming. So we did not have trouble until I was ready for it, and the fight for leadership started. The elections came and I defeated him."<sup>185</sup>

August 24, 1942. Quezon, whom I had not seen for nearly a month, looks well but complains that he cannot make any great effort; and that his blood pressure is still very high. He spends most of the day in a silk dressing wrapper. He was closeted in his room for some time with Carlos Romulo, whom he afterwards characterized to me as politically "foolish" but adds that Romulo is a man who carries out everything entrusted to him.

He was very much aroused because of the proposed showing of an old film depicting the Philippine Constabulary in process of being cut to pieces by Moros until rescued by an American Army officer. Protested to J.i.Davies who is head of one of these propaganda organizations. Davies said he would at once look into it. But Quezon sat down and wrote a hot letter to the film director. Quezon denounced this attempt to show the Filipinos as cowards, (after this war in the Philippines)i and added that he understood the director is a man "of Jewish race," and that he, Quezon, considered this a poor return for his having opened the shores of the Philippines to the Jewish refugees, and for having himself given several acres of his own land to the Jews to help them to make a living. The movie director replied saying that he had withdrawn the film.

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<sup>184</sup> Senator Palma and Speaker Osmena.

<sup>185i</sup> See Onorato, "The Democrata Party," found in *A Brief Review of American Interestq* pp. 64-68.

Then I had a long talk with him about his book. He stopped writing when he was in New York some two weeks ago, and retired to Leesburg to rest because he was tired. Canceran had told me that in New York he would begin dictating at 4:30 a.m. and they would not get breakfast until eleven. Quezon blamed Shuster and me for having allowed him to write so much of his personal biography and made him appear boastful incidents of his youthful success as a runner, prizes at school, etc. He has been busy recently striking out all these passages from the galley proofs of his book which Shuster is setting up as he gets the ms. I pointed out to him that in June of this year I had worked ten hours a day for thirty days to get his book ready, under pressure from him and Shuster. Then when I submitted it to him for revision he had found a couple of mistakes I had made in putting his story on paper. That I had secured from him some account of his childhood and youth to introduce him personally to the American public, and to give a pungent background to his remarkably successful career. That he had so greatly enjoyed reviving memories of his youth that he had gone ahead with this quite independently of me. We had been talking all the time of a second book later on, in which he could really let himself go. That for nothing in the world would I stop him from recording his reminiscences, even tho they were not to go in *this* book. He admitted the truth of all this, but said he had decided never to write his own biography, that these things made him look ridiculous. That *somebody else* could write his biography (apparently not I), and he does not give me the long passages he had written or dictated about his personal life. I replied that I had been telling him for years that I was collecting materials for a biography of him, and he replied that I had better let him see what I was to write. I told him that there had been only three or four great autobiographies in the whole history of literature, and that to be really great at it a man must discard all concern as to what anybody would think of his character, and simply try to tell the truth. That I considered it fortunate that he had discovered mistakes in my ms. of this book, because that prompted him to write it all himself, which he could do a thousand times better than I could.

As for Shuster, I said that an editor learned from experience that when he persuades a man to write his first book, if he snubbed his excursions into matter not necessarily suitable, the author might throw up the whole job.

Quezon is a hard man to convince, but I think he was persuaded by this argument. He began dictating a third and fourth letter to Shuster telling him what to strike out but advising him to keep the surplus parts of personal biography for use at some future time. Then he set to work for some hours, striking out a good part of the galley proofs--much of which, I think, was quite unsuitable for the purposes of this topical war book. He called me in from time to time to read me the political parts he had written since I last saw him.

With this, I think his flagging interest in the book began to revive. It will be all the better if he now continues, though he will find it much harder to write of the serious events of the war and of his preparations for defense, than he did with the scenes of his early life which served an escapist purpose for his mind in these extremely troubled times.

He was particularly interested in reading me what he had written in favour of a "Dominion status" for the Philippines. Said he had often been accused by Americans of being secretly against independence but he had in 1916 supported the Clarke amendment in Congress for independence tho Osmena had not. (Osmena came to me in the Ayuntamiento one day in 1916 and was in the greatest distress and excitement--trembling--told me of the introduction of the Clarke amendment, and proposed to do all he could to defeat it. I told him: 'D. Sergio, you have been going up and down the Philippines for years advocating independence. Now that it is offered to you, if you oppose it, the Filipino people will smear you on the wall.' Quezon says nevertheless that Osmena cabled him to oppose it.)<sup>186</sup> In support of the principles of the Clarke amendment, Quezon says now that this would have given them independence in 1918 or 1920. That there was then, as yet, no great sugar industry in the Philippines so there would have been no powerful opposition to free trade in the United States; that the Americans would have wished to keep open their free market for shoes and machinery in the Philippines. The Jones bill, to which the Clarke amendment was added in the Senate made no provision for trade restriction in America for Philippine commerce. So the Filipinos, if made independent in 1918 would not have suffered any economic earthquake, and could have gone to work to prepare themselves for military self-protection.

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<sup>186</sup>See Stanley, pp. 221-225. See also Onorato, "Philippine Independence Movement," pp. 9-10.

In his plans for a Dominion status, he still would not have had a single American in uniform in the parts of the Islands which is government administered, but he would be willing to give the United States such small islands as they needed for their air bases, etc. He seemed anxious to have my views of what he had written on Dominion status, adding that this was the first time he had made a public statement to that effect. He wanted to know whether I thought it was all right him to make such a statement. I replied that in present conditions in the world, it was all right, and that for some years before the war, I had never given any weight to this proposition because I did not then for a moment believe that the United States would accept responsibility without power. Nor did he. But the invasion and occupation of the Islands by the Japanese had changed the whole political situation. For him now to advocate Dominion status would be merely the logical result of the choice of the United States which he made during those days of extreme anxiety, first at Mariquina and then on Corregidor, when he considered if new leaders were now arising in the Philippines. He replied that he was old (just 64) and could not answer for such a development. I asked him if the Filipinos would be in favour of his policy of Dominion status and he said "No."

He got busy on the telephone talking in Spanish to Under Secretary of State Welles, offering to make a radio address to the Latin American States now that Brazil has joined the war. The suggestion was accepted. He also received an invitation to dine at the White House tomorrow evening.

He later sent a letter to Shuster explaining that he was not interested in any profits which might come to him from the book, altho he left the Philippines practically penniless. He wanted Shuster to be trustee for any such profits and to devote them to public purposes after the war, but if he were to die meanwhile, and his family were in want, that fact should be taken into consideration.

He then returned to the subject of his reminiscences. Told of his first "fighting speech" in the Washington House of Representatives which was in opposition to President Taft's "Friar Land Purchase Bill"--in the middle of his speech, Crumpacker interrupted him to enquire what his colleague thought of it. Quezon replied: "I don't know. Ask him. He is present"--but old Benito Legarda had slipped out. Quezon added "my colleague was a patriot, but he did not forget what was convenient." When he got to their lodgings after his speech, Legarda embraced him and said "You were magnificent. Because you are so brilliant, I wish to save you. Don't do it--don't run your head against a stone wall. They will ruin you." Quezon replied: "There will be other presidents after Taft." "Yes," said Legarda "but they'll all be the same." Quezon answered: "Well, I thank you very much Don Benito but remember: there is nothing so sad as a man's not being able to return to his own country." Legarda was not re-elected by the Philippine Assembly, went to Paris and died there, and never saw his native land again.

Quezon contrasted my action (immediately after the defeat of our party in 1920) in sending to President Wilson my resignation effective on his last day of office, with that of Governor Forbes, who was in the United States when Wilson was first elected, and went back to Manila, to be later ousted by President Wilson.<sup>187</sup> Also Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. who as Governor General made a campaign speech practically accusing his cousin the President of being a crook. Then after F.D.R. was elected, T.R. Jr. offered to stay on in his post. F.D.R. replied thanking him for his devotion to his public office, but relieving him and making the Vice Governor acting. I observed that T.R. Jr. was very foolish. Quezon replied: "He's worse than that--he's stupid."

In p.m. August 24th had a conversation with Mrs Quezon and Mrs Marcos Rocas, widow of the captain who was my a.d.c. in the Philippine National Guard in 1917. Her brother-in-law Don Alejandro Rocas has been in recent years the most intimate friend of the Quezon family in the Philippines--at all their fiestas, or on the yacht *Casiana* or at Baguio with them. In the past, Rocas had fought Quezon savagely with his newspapers. The first mission confided to me by Quezon when I became his Adviser in 1935 was to go as "ambassador" to Don Alejandro in his newspaper office and negotiate a treaty of peace between two doughty opponents. (See my diary for Nov. '35.)

Mrs Quezon does not believe the Japanese have done general damage in the Philippines since the occupation of Manila. The Japanese who acts as "G.G." is occupying the Quezon house in Pasay, which was undamaged in the bombing.

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<sup>187</sup>Wilson did not oust Forbes from his post. In fact, Wilson was quite willing to retain him until his administration could work out its own Philippine policy.



She feels quite lost at having nothing to do nowadays. Had not only a busy life looking out for Malacanan Palace, but also for their houses in Baguio, Pasay, Marikina, Quezon City, Cabuyao and Tagaytay.

But, when her children were fairly grown up or at school, Mrs Quezon asked her husband to allow her to see what she could do as a farmer of her 600 hectare farm near Mount Arayat in Cabuyao. The first thing was to get irrigation water from the system in the Candaba swamp adjoining the farm; but Quezon refused to authorize the extension of the government irrigation system in order to irrigate his wife's farm. However she persuaded him to have a survey made, so that it was shown that such extension would benefit many thousands of hectares belonging to other persons in that vicinity.

Sugar farming had been abandoned there by Felipe Buencamino, so Mrs Quezon started with 200 hectares of rice paddy. Then she got a Japanese manager and planted 25 hectares in *ramie*, a Chinese plant which can furnish rubber and also a fibre from which both "linen" and "silk" fabric can be made. The Japanese in the Ohta Development Company in Mindanao had made a great success of this fibre. It is stronger than abaca and cuts one's hand when trying to break it. The fibre is about three feet long and makes stronger parachutes than does silk. The Japanese send to London the linen they make of it--the most beautiful sold in England.

The *ramie* plant is about 5 feet high, and the suckers must be cut four times a year. The leaf is heart-shaped and is silvery underneath. The fibre sells for 40-50 pesos per picul and the income is sixteen times as great as that from sugar cane. The cost of production is 20% of the gross revenue. From her 25 hectares, Mrs Quezon was getting 32,000 pesos net profit a year. It gives continuous employment to labourers throughout the year. Her ambition was to have 50 hectares of *ramie*. The Japanese have a special knack in this cultivation; it requires dry land, but must have irrigation.

Mrs Quezon has had in recent years a very active and profitable life as business woman; was on one or two boards of mining companies, with, for two or three years an income of 1,200 pesos a month from Acoje mine (she helped to discover this chromium mine herself). In Quezon City she owned a grocery store and a drugstore; just before the invasion she had paid 20,000 pesos for beginning construction of the first cinema there; she owned also apartments and two houses in Quezon City.

She likewise owns three *pescañas* or fish ponds, in Guagua, Pampanga, which yield two nettings a year; the fry are put in when the size of mosquito wigglers and in six months are foot long; 3-4,000 fish at a haul, which go fresh to market in baskets. The ponds are salt water, but are kept brackish. It is really curious how superior in business matters the Filipinas are to the average Filipino men.

She feels very deeply the interruption of her business life.

Major (Dr) Cruz, who was present, is superintendent of the hospital she built near her farm in Pampanga. He told us that there was now news that the "communists" there had gone over to co-operation with the Japanese, as the *Sakdalistas* around Laguna also had, from the beginning, already done. Mrs Quezon remarked: "A good thing, then they will no longer be communists." Cruz observed they had never really been communists but merely followers of Pedro Abad Santos who is himself somewhat inclined that way. They followed him because of their grievances against the landlords. They had killed two or three of the leading landlords in recent years. There are, thinks Cruz, about 15,000 of them, including their families, in Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Tarlac and Pangasinan.

Quezon says that Americans owned the *sugar in Cuba* and they brought on the war against Spain.

He remarked that Osmena had perfect physical courage; is quite imperturbable; but has no "moral courage."<sup>188</sup>

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<sup>188</sup>Quezon was referring to Osmena's unwillingness to fight him at the expense of national unity. Above all else, Osmena prized highly the appearance of unanimity in the presence of the Americans. He could have worked all manner of difficulties for Quezon in 1922, 1923-25, 1927-29, 1933-34. Each time he stopped short of unleashing the terrible forces of Philippine partisan politics. This cost him the presidency in 1946.

While playing two bridge hands tonight he made mistakes--quite unusual for him--he was abstracted, and admitted he was thinking of Romulo.

Once more we agreed that the American school system in the Islands had been in some respects a failure, especially in the teaching of English, which gets worse and worse. Quezon said that while he was lying ill of TB in his house in Baguio, with a Filipina as trained nurse, she told him one morning that the "Press" was there to see him. He said: "Tell them to go to Hell"--the man at the door, who overheard, was Father Tamayo, the head of the Dominicans, where Quezon had been educated. The nurse had said "priest" as if it was "press.!" Quezon easily explained this later to Tamayo.

August 26, 1942. At lunch.

Quezon opened by declaring that he was the happiest man in the world today. He had received the best news since leaving the Philippines. Reported a telephone conversation with "Chick" Parsons, who had just arrived on the *Gripsholm* from the Far East. Parsons is an American whom the Filipinos receive as one of themselves. He is Panamanian Vice Consul at Manila and because of this is believed not to have been "confined to quarters" by the Japanese. He telephoned Quezon this morning that he had frequently seen Vargas and Alunan and the rest and they are still absolutely loyal to Quezon. Quezon had received on Corregidor a letter from Vargas written just as the Japanese were entering Manila, in which Vargas stated that wherever he might be, whether (as Quezon's arrangement had been), in Malacanan--the Japanese permitting--or in his own house, "you will always have a loyal servant in me." Parsons is coming down to Washington tomorrow to report, as Quezon didn't wish to continue the conversation over the telephone.

Quezon then began to talk again about the history of the American regime in the Philippines. He said that there were three Governors General who left the Islands with the hatred of most of the Americans there. Taft "because of his brave fight against the Generals while the swords everywhere were still rattling in the scabbards"; Stimson "because he put the foreign (and American) banks under the control of the government for the first time"; and myself, "for giving self-government to the Filipinos.!"

Governor General Wright was an easy-going man--a southerner Republican--adding "you know what that means." He was Forbes' ideal. Did not go over well with the Filipinos!

Quezon then told the story of the "Bank Control" incident. He said Stimson and I were the bravest of the American Governors General because neither of us really cared whether we held on to our "job" or not.<sup>189</sup> Stimson hadn't wanted to accept the post, and returned to the United States within eighteen months to become Secretary of State.

The bank incident arose as follows: I (the present writer) had tried to put the foreign banks under Philippine Government control in my time, but had been stopped by a cable from "that imperialist Secretary of War whom Mr Wilson had to relieve later--Lindley M. Garrison.!" In Stimson's time, Lagdomeo was still Insular Treasurer, and was also Inspector of banks; he was one of the most honest and hard working of the government officials, and was sadly underpaid. When hardup he once borrowed 200 pesos from an American, formerly Insular Treasurer and a good friend, who was by then an officer in the *Banco de las Islas Filipinas*, (Spanish bank). This man<sup>190</sup> entered the loan on the bank's books not as from himself, as Lagdomeo supposed, but as from the bank. So Stimson called Quezon in and told him the story and said he would have to fire Lagdomeo. Quezon said he was inclined to agree with him but would like to talk with Unson, the Secretary of Finance. Unson told Quezon that Lagdomeo was a man of perfect honesty--"if it had been 20,000 pesos, instead of 200 pesos. I might not think so--the smallness of the sum, in my eyes, confirms his honesty. If he is dismissed from the service, I shall resign as Secretary of Finance." Quezon reported

<sup>189</sup>Harrison wanted to leave Manila very badly at the end of Wilson's first term. In fact, he wrote his brother, Fairfax, begging him to get him out with honor: an ambassadorial post to some prestigious government. His brother replied: "I would rather see you die at your post than return from it without the respect of the American people--but fortunately it does not seem necessary to make a sacrifice of life." See Fairfax Harrison to F.B.H., January 12, 1915, Francis Burton Harrison Papers (Washington: Library of Congress).

<sup>190</sup>William T. Nolting.

this back to Stimson who at once saw the seriousness of the situation. Quezon said it would be disastrous to his administration, such was the complete confidence of the public in Unson. "But," he said, "I can show you a way out of it--put the banks under government inspection, appoint an American as inspector and leave Lagdomeo, who has too much work anyway as Insular Treasurer. Stimson agreed, but Quezon told him of the political danger of a move so violently opposed by the banks as was government control. Stimson was quite indifferent to that--hadn't even known that these banks were not subject to government inspection, and insisted that they ought to be. So Quezon had the law passed after giving hearings to protests from the bank lawyers. Then Stimson agreed to hold hearings before signing the bill, whereupon Quezon rushed around to know whether this meant he was not going to sign the act. Stimson smiled and said: "These people have the right to be heard, and I have the right to disregard their advice!"

Stimson staged a big public meeting in Malacanan Palace with lots of chairs, and sat there on a sort of throne, listening very seriously. Jim Ross, Dewitt *et al.* as lawyers made arguments. Roxas (Speaker) made a serious statement on the subject which he had studied. Stimson allowed two or three days to pass, and then signed the bill.

"Tiny" Williams of the National City Bank of New York had from the beginning, led the campaign against the bill and was organizing powerful interests in the United States!<sup>191</sup> by cable. Stimson sent for him and said: "I am leaving the Philippines in fifteen days and shall be Secretary of State when I land in the United States. If you do not withdraw your effort to coerce me, I shall as Secretary of State be disinclined to show any favours to the National City Banks abroad, and not much support." Williams broke all records in getting to the cable office.

When Stimson left, Quezon in bidding him good-bye and congratulating him on a successful administration added that he had *bad* as well as good things to tell him--that the Americans in the Islands hated him worse than they did Harrison. Stimson replied: "My God, is it as bad as that?"

Quezon said that Stimson believed that I had tried to replace American officials too fast. Quezon added that, if I had not done so, my administration would have been a failure,<sup>192</sup> for I would have lost the confidence of the Filipinos.

Stimson was a non-social man, who saw few people outside his official duties.

Taft's speech to his opponents in the Philippines (sometimes credited to me--F.B.H.) was to the "Lions of the Press"; to them he said the waters on both sides of Corregidor are wide enough to allow them all to go home in one day.

*Archbishop of Manila*, Msgr. O'Doherty was formerly a close friend of Quezon, who had given up his friendship for the Archbishop after a series of cold-blooded abandonments by the latter of those who had served him loyally; beginning with General Thos. L. Hartigan who would have been penniless in his last years if Quezon had not helped him. Hartigan as lawyer for the Church had made 15,000,000 pesos for the archepiscopal see. Then came the Archbishop's abandonment of Whitaker (son of an Oxford Don) who had made himself responsible for some of the Church's debts (Visayan Refining Co.). Then the Archbishop went back upon O'Malley and Father Fletcher. Quezon sent for the Archbishop and told him he had lost faith in him; listened to O'Doherty's explanations of each of the four cases and then replied that he was no longer his friend; that he would continue to show him every official and personal courtesy--but "he was through."

*High Commissioner Sayre*, who got back from Corregidor to the United States before Quezon, wrote a report to the State Department thru Secretary Ickes, pointing out those whom he believed to be the "Fifth Columnists" in the Philippines, and suggesting that Quezon was one. Learning of this on his arrival, Quezon spoke at the Press Club (no publicity) referring to High Commissioner Sayre who was present, and to the latter's suspicions. This led Sayre to go to Secretary Ickes, who had held up Sayre's letter, and to demand that it be forwarded. Ickes still did not act, until Sayre sent a written request which Ickes could not ignore. So he forwarded Sayre's letter with the endorsement: "President Quezon, a Filipino, does not yield

<sup>191</sup>The object for causing a fuss in the United States was due to the fact that Congress could disallow any act of the Philippine legislature.

<sup>192</sup>See Onorato, "Governor General Francis Burton Harrison," p. 181.



in loyalty to F.B.S., an American--his value to this country is one thousand times greater!" In fifteen days Sayre was out of office.

August 28, 1942. Quezon gave a luncheon in his rooms for "Chick" Parsons,<sup>193</sup> the first person to leave the Philippines and return to the United States whom we have seen since the Quezon party arrived here in May. What confidential messages he brought to Quezon have not yet been told me.

All Quezon's family and staff were clustered around Parsons, each one anxious for news of home and friends! General Kilbourne, Superintendent of V.M.I., who long ago used to command on Corregidor, was also present.

Parsons gave his news succinctly and had a ready response to all questions.

The general impression he gives is that Japanese rule in the Philippines is fairly lenient. All American men and women over military age are free from internment and living in their own homes. The chief difficulty is in lack of money, due to freezing of American and foreign banks. Jake Rosenthal is busy getting checks from Americans and selling them (without commission) for what they will bring--80% or even 50%. This, Parsons thought to be very kind because the checks are on the frozen banks "which will probably never be opened again!"

Americans of military age are interned in the new buildings of Santo Tomas University in Manila.<sup>194</sup>

72,000 soldiers are interned, the Filipinos (including Scouts) at Stotsenburg, and the Americans at Fort McKinley.

Those Filipinos, such as Manuel Roxas, and Chief Justice Jose Abad Santos, who accompanied Quezon to Corregidor have been shot. (Quezon told me this in an aside--"not executed but shot"). Parsons said that there have been others "executed." (N.B. Most fortunately, the news of the shooting of Manuel Roxas was false).!

I asked Quezon what part Aguinaldo was playing, and he said "I don't really care to talk about that!"

Bennet of the *Bulletin* and Dick of the *Free Press* are in prison in the dungeons of Fort Santiago.

The Quezon girls asked Parsons how the people felt about their leaving for Corregidor, and he replied that all were in favour of it because otherwise they would have been used as hostages to exert pressure on their father!

General Vicente Lim has *not* been released, as reported, and is not likely to be.

Quezon questioned Parsons as to the loyalty of the Filipinos--he replied that Quezon never had the people so united behind him as at present.

He next asked about Major Speth, the Vice Mayor of Baguio, an American of German descent and one of his closest friends. Parsons said "he is practically governor of the (Mountain) Province now!" Then Quezon told the experiences of Speth during the invasion. He was having coffee with Quezon when Camp John Hay was bombed. On leaving that night for the south, Quezon took Speth with him, but sent him back to see the Commander of the Japanese troops in the north, to ask that Baguio not be damaged, since it was undefended. This Speth tried to do but was arrested by the American general in command there and thrown into prison as a fifth columnist. On learning of this Quezon telephoned the general asking that Speth be released, but the general replied: "He talked himself into this, let him talk himself out." So Quezon telephoned

<sup>193</sup>Parsons would later send a report (September 27, 1943) to Quezon describing what he had seen and heard about Quezon's popularity and the question of independence from the United States. Quezon bitterly denounced (February 15, 1944) Parsons as an imperialist. But, according to Carlos Quirino, Quezon later apologized for calling Parsons an imperialist. Quirino goes on to state that Parsons was reflecting hearsay in his report, plus he was told what the Filipinos thought he wanted to hear. See Carlos Quirino, *Quezon: Paladin of Philippine Freedom* (Manila: Filipiniana Book Guild, 1971), pp. 365-366.

<sup>194</sup>For the story of the Santo Tomas internment, see A. V. H. Hartendorp, *The Santo Tomas Story* (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1964).

MacArthur, saying that Speth had merely done for Baguio what MacArthur had done for Manila, in declaring it an open city--so Speth was released.

I asked Parsons if any Filipino troops were still resisting, and he replied: "I hope not."

Cebu has been burned as far up as the church by the Filipinos.

Inter-island traffic is by *vinta*; there are no steamers.

The Calumpit bridge has not yet been repaired; the Manila Railroad Co. is still being run by Paez.

Imported food is no longer available; plenty of native food.

Japanese are keen about iron mines; are not interested in gold mines, of which only the lower levels have been flooded; the mills are intact. They want chromium, but the mine at Acoje cannot be used because the wharf has been destroyed.

Quezon was thrilled to learn that his radio addresses are heard in the Philippines. Parsons says the Japanese did not seize radios--only took antennae--so the Filipinos have installed new antennae buried in the ground.

Public schools are open, but the use of English is abolished; teaching is in Tagalog; at least one year of Japanese is required. Universities are closed.

Parsons told us no atrocity stories at luncheon; I had no means of seeing him alone.

November 5, 1942. At Shoreham Hotel with Quezon whom I had not seen for at least two months--he looked pale and weaker. Told me he had been in bed for a long time, that for a while he could not walk, and I saw a wheel chair in Canceran's office. As the conversation developed, he showed his usual animation and the colour came back to his cheeks.

I asked him again about the killing of Manuel Roxas and Jose Abad Santos by the Japanese. He said Manuel Roxas had not been killed but was still fighting in the mountains (of Mindanao?). Jose Abad Santos who had (deliberately) missed the last plane from Cebu had been caught there by the Japanese and had been shot. I asked him why? He could not explain but remarked "He left Corregidor in my party!" Said he would have been a really great Chief Justice, but could never have been President because he had no executive ability.

He said he doubted whether the Japanese would ever have been inclined to attack the Philippines if it had not been for the presence of the United States there. Doubts now whether the Japanese would even allow moderate self-government to the Filipinos. Thinks however that the war is already as good as won, since the crushing defeat which Rommel suffered in Africa this week. As soon as Germany cracks, England and the United States can defeat the Japanese. Then he said to me: "We shall be back in the Philippines in 1944."

Meanwhile, he said, it would make no difference if the Japanese won the battle of the Solomons, occupied Australia--or even India. Added they will have to be completely knocked out--will never give up. I pointed out how *prudent the Japanese Government* had been in giving up their spoils after three previously successful wars, when called on to do so by the Concert of Powers. He stated that this was because of their long-range planning, and that now they had attained their real objective, they would never back down. They must be smashed.

He then launched into a half-hour's panegyric of the English. He had always been very anti-English before,<sup>195</sup> and had denounced them savagely on his arrival in Washington for their collapse in Singapore. He now says that when it comes to their own real interests, such as the defense of England or of Egypt, nobody can fight more stubbornly than the English--he praised particularly their stand in front of Alexandria when they had already lost all their new material to Rommel. Previously he had always hated Churchill as an "arrogant imperialist" but now admits that he is a typical John Bull and is the man of the day. Continued with a vivid tribute to Queen Elizabeth in overthrowing the Spanish and French powers.

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<sup>195</sup>This is strange in view of Quezon's earlier attempts (see pages 29-31 of this diary) to seek some grounds for support from the British.

Was not much inclined to discuss last week's overwhelming Republic gain in the elections in the United States. Remarked that his friend Justice Frankfurter<sup>196</sup> had been "very silly--he is so ardently pro-English"--but did not explain what he meant.

Afternoon game of bridge during which he coughed frequently. Was due to entertain Justice Frank Murphy alone at dinner--explaining to me that there were certain subjects he wished Murphy to discuss with President Roosevelt. But just as Murphy arrived, Quezon was taken by a very severe fit of asthma, and doctors scurried in to attend him. He went to bed after an injection! Murphy was much worried, as indeed we all were.

Murphy and I talked together for 3/4 hour. Extremely interesting conversation about the election, and causes thereof.

November 14, 1942. P.M. at the Shoreham.

Quezon pale and tired and talking as little as possible. He was dictating a letter to Mrs Woodrow Wilson thanking her for some courtesy and expressing to her how much the Filipinos loved the late President Wilson for fighting for their independence and for protecting their rights.

He gave an amusing explanation of the reason why the mass tomorrow is not to be at the Cathedral, as he had directed his chaplain, Father Pacifico Ortiz--instead, it is to be held at the Jesuit Church to which order the chaplain belongs, though there are more steps there than Quezon wishes to climb! "He wants to get more people at the mass than we had at the broadcast! But I told him" said the President, "'to invite only the Roman Catholics on the list of those whom we had invited to my broadcast.'"

He then talked of his veto of the bill for "religious instruction" in the schools of the Philippines--adding however, that if beforehand, High Commissioner McNutt had expressed to him disapproval of that measure, "I would have signed it. I'll tell you a secret: I let the Assemblymen think I might sign it--it was, however, so long I couldn't read it, but would consider it if passed. They offered a conference with me on the terms of the bill, but I refused. When Mrs Quezon heard that it might fail to pass the Assembly she was greatly upset. She was ill at the time, but I had a talk with her. I asked her 'Do you trust me?' She looked at me and said that question was almost an offense--of course she trusted me. I then asked her if she realized that in pursuit of my duty I would sacrifice even herself, our children and myself? She said: 'Yes, do your duty!' Then, when the time came to veto the bill, the Bishops whom I defied could not get at me!" Quezon remarked: "Many a ruler has been ruined by priests, especially by his wife's confessors!"

Quezon then showed me the script of his proposed broadcast which will, as we now know, be heard in the Philippines, where the Filipinos are able to conceal their short-wave radios because, as the President remarked their shift their short-waves every day, and you know how far they can walk in the mountains in one day.

I made one suggestion to add four words to his address, which he adopted. It referred to the guerrilla warfare in the mountains, in which the Japanese take fearful punishment. Their experiences in Formosa have taught them to dread the mountain tribes. Quezon had recently received a short-wave message from Colonel Peralta in Panay which stated that he had just killed two thousand Japanese in mountain warfare there.

Sunday, November 29, 1942. Shoreham Hotel.

Quezon is looking in better health and spirits than I have observed this year. He told me that I am to go with Resident Commissioner Elizalde to represent the Philippines at the international meeting soon to be held in Canada, under the Institute of Pacific Relations.

He added that hereafter, he will really have some work for me to do, for he is setting up an office of "public relations," i.e., propaganda, and wants someone there who really knows the Philippines, since he is dissatisfied with the present organization.

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<sup>196</sup>Justice Felix Frankfurter was a young law officer in the War Department who worked out some of the details of Wilson's early Philippine policy.



As to the coming gathering in Canada, I raised at once the question of the future of India, in order to know his own present attitude.

He then gave me at length an account of the most interesting debate he recently had with the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, in the United Nations Pacific War Council on the subject of India. He began by telling me that after the first four or five meetings of the Council which he had so far attended, at which he had sat silent, he began to believe that the Council was largely a farce; but that it was at least desirable to have the Philippines represented on it to show the world that they had equality with other nations of the Pacific.

One day at the Council, Mr Nash of New Zealand was holding forth, as he usually does, at great length "laying down the law" about strategy, and expressing dissatisfaction with the present situation. Then Quezon took up the debate and said: "I think there is nobody at this table who is more interested in the war in the Pacific than myself, since my country, is already under the heel of the Japanese. But, in view of the 'global strategy' of the day, I am constrained to be reconciled. I feel that there are some countries today which are of more importance than others in that aspect. I refer particularly to India." He then asked President Roosevelt to tell them about India. Roosevelt said he knew little more than the British censors allowed him to learn, so he turned to Halifax who replied that the situation was all right--that the Indians had refused to accept responsibility;<sup>197</sup> Hindus and Moslems could not agree.

Then Quezon resumed, stating: "I know nothing myself about India; I have been there twice only--as a tourist. I do not know the Viceroy, I do not know Gandhi, I do not know Nehru. I believe that if I were there now, I could find out. Let me tell you a story, and you shall draw your own conclusions; for I shall draw none. Prior to the year 1896, some young Filipinos who had been educated in Europe began to press the Spanish Government in Manila for liberal concessions to the Philippines. The leader of these was Dr Jose Rizal. The Spanish in the Philippines said to themselves: 'If we execute Dr Rizal, the ignorant, uneducated masses in the Philippines will cease to be interested in this movement.' So, on December 30, 1896, they executed Rizal. Within three months; the whole of the Philippines was in a blaze of insurrection. The Spanish finally paid Aguinaldo and his leaders 400,000 pesos to remove to Hong Kong. Dewey, after his naval victory, brought Aguinaldo back to help him take Manila. But when McKinley decided to assert American sovereignty over the Islands, Aguinaldo led an insurrection against the Americans. The Americans said: 'It is only the Tagalogs--if we suppress them, the rest of these ignorant, uneducated people will settle down.' But it took them four years, an army of 180,000 men and more than \$600,000,000 to accomplish this. And then what really reconciled the Filipinos was the school system set up by the American Army officers. Even when in 1916 the Jones Law was passed, they were not entirely convinced. It took the agreement between President Roosevelt and myself in 1934, and the setting up of the Commonwealth to do that. When President Coolidge had told the Filipino delegation to Washington that the matter had been settled for two or three generations, they paid no attention to that, and kept right on with their political campaign.

"Meanwhile, almost every American in the Islands had constantly maintained that the Christian and Mohammedan Filipinos could never get on together; that as soon as American rule ceased, the Moros would cut off the heads of all the Christian Filipinos--but since the inauguration of Filipino self-government there has been far less war between them and the Moros than under the Americans.

"I have said that personally I know nothing of India, but if, when I left the Philippines I had not been so ill, I would have liked to go there, even if President Roosevelt forbade it, and I think I could have found out what is the matter supposing the English had not seized me and executed me!"

When Quezon ended, Lord Halifax replied: "Nobody around this table can admire more than I do the character, the courage and the ability of the Philippine President. I believe, however, that if he had gone there, as he says; he would have found on closer inspection that the problem is far more complicated than he thinks;--even if the authorities had not 'executed him.'"

Quezon replied: "The Ambassador seems to misunderstand me. I said I knew nothing about India but that I believed that I could find out. And why? Because as a

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<sup>197</sup> Lord Halifax was referring to the refusal of Indians to form ministries in British India. Under the India Act of 1937, each British province had its own responsible government.

Filipino, the leaders of Indian life would have *had faith* in me, and told me frankly their ideas and purposes. The Indians, however, do not have faith in the English as the Filipinos had faith in the Americans! and thus they cannot unite to solve their problems as we did.<sup>198</sup> I refuse to believe that the Indians are so unpatriotic as simply to decline to share the responsibility. I believe that there must be very many patriotic men among them, and we should know what it is they mean. The situation has been misrepresented to us by the official reports of the Government of India--not intentionally, of course, but certainly so. And I venture to assert that I could have found out what the real trouble was if I had gone there!"

Then Roosevelt pacified the situation by telling a story of Al Smith's ability to handle human relations!-how he addressed a labour crowd which was expressing great discontent. Smith said that he was their friend and hoped they were his friend. That he really wanted to find out what the trouble was, and he believed that as men of good will, they could settle it all if the men would select a few representatives to join him around a table where they could smoke some really good cigars, have a drink, and talk it all over as friends.

And then Roosevelt adjourned the meeting of the Pacific War Council.

Next Quezon told me of a recent correspondence with Lord Halifax. When Quezon was last in New York, he read a telegram he proposed to send to Gandhi and Nehru over the telephone to the President's lady secretary and asked her to enquire of Roosevelt whether he had any objection to Quezon's sending it. Quezon did not disclose to me the contents of the telegram. Immediately Roosevelt telegraphed Quezon heartily approving of his sending the message. So it was sent. No answer.

Shortly afterwards, a letter came to Quezon from Halifax, saying that he had been instructed by the Secretary for Foreign Affairs to express the regret of the Government of India that they had been unable to deliver the message, since both Gandhi and Nehru were in jail, and communication with them was not permitted. All very courteous and correct in Halifax's letter.

I asked Quezon how he got on with his Dutch colleague on the Pacific War Council. He said he had nothing much to do with him. Asked whether he thought the Dutch would have their empire restored after the war, he said he didn't know--but if it were, it would only be a matter of thirty years at most.

He then added that what he believed the Indians wanted was a greater share in their government--that they did not wish for direction of India's military effort. He added that the present situation was much more likely to turn India over to the Japanese.

December 1, 1942. Quezon thinks Admiral Leahy arranged for the occupation of North Africa, and when he was "recalled" from Vichy he was really getting out before the Nazis could seize him and treat him as a spy.

I was invited to attend the Cabinet meeting yesterday to hear Bernstein explain his plan and program for the new office of "Special Service" (propaganda) which he is organizing for Quezon. It was a one man show. Quezon made a long and rather astute statement to let Bernstein understand that he had changed his mind as to the scope of the undertaking. Bernstein was told to read his plan of organization and was stopped after the opening paragraphs. It was a scheme for a Malay Federation to include the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, Siam and French Indo-China. Quezon explained that if such a scheme were ever proposed, it would have to come from the Javanese, or others of the countries concerned--otherwise it would look as if the Filipinos were reaching out after an empire. Quezon said he would not mind if Java were the seat of government, of such a federated state--but that it was no time to mix in such questions now! Such a move would only provoke ill feelings among allies. Elizalde says that Quezon watches the faces and studies the expressions of everybody in a group which he is addressing and added that Quezon must have noted the strained and worried countenances around him during this very interesting and, perhaps, momentous conversation.<sup>199</sup>

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<sup>198</sup>The Foreign Office was annoyed in the extreme by the constant references to Filipino-American solidarity based upon the Tydings-McDuffie Act (which promised independence on a date certain). They came to believe that the Americans were deliberately waving a red flag in front of Indian nationalists' eyes.

<sup>199</sup>The issue of federation runs throughout the early and mid-1940s. Romulo was

Luncheon with the two United States Army captains, who escaped with extreme hardship from the Philippines in August and made their way to Australia. Splendid chaps: they are longing to get back to fight the Japanese and don't wish to be sent anywhere else, even to North Africa! One had been in Batangas and one in Mindoro, and tho every Filipino in each of those provinces knew where they were, nobody gave them away to the Japanese. Instead, they sheltered and fed them and gave them the small boat in which they finally got away together. They reported that there are believed to be only 20,000 Japanese in the Philippines now. They stick to their garrisons, or to the big cities, or to the *caminos reales*. The Filipino protector of the captain who was in Batangas came and went to Manila whenever he wished. He repeated a conversation with a Japanese colonel who spoke Spanish well: this colonel confessed that the Japanese knew from the beginning that they could not win this war. The two officers agreed that there were many Americans--soldiers and civilians, at large and in hiding in the Philippines. They said the Filipinos had remained perfectly loyal, but one of them added that he was not sure they would all continue so if the situation were prolonged indefinitely without relief.

Quezon was much gratified to have them say that the Filipinos were perfectly loyal to him, and had not blamed him for his escape from the Islands--that they understood the necessity for this. He stated again that when MacArthur pressed him to go to Corregidor, he had resisted and then finally been persuaded. He had sent for General Francisco, who told him that with 1,500 of the Constabulary soldiers he could keep Quezon perfectly safe indefinitely in the mountains of Rizal; he knew every foot of those wild mountains; that if they gave him enough machine guns he could continually harry the Japanese and inflict great damage on them. MacArthur vetoed this suggestion. Quezon said no Filipino would ever have given his hiding place away. I remarked that they did do so in the case of Aguinaldo and he replied that Aguinaldo had been guilty of great crimes and misdemeanors.

He also remarked that like Governor General Murphy, he had never allowed the death sentence to be inflicted--he hated the idea of putting a man to death in "cold blood"!

December 3, 1942. I was sent by President Quezon from Washington as a member of the Philippine delegation to the Eighth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations at Mont Tremblant Lodge, Mont Tremblant, Province of Quebec.

On the train, I shared a compartment with Resident Commissioner J.h.M. Elizalde and was vastly entertained by his account of "palace politics" in the entourage of President Quezon. "Mike" and I talked so late that we overslept in our compartment and were carried on to the wrong station in Montreal; without any breakfast we had to take a taxi in the frozen slush for four miles to catch the little one-horse single-track train northwards. On the train, crammed in like "sardines in a tin," we went through an endurance test for five hours at ten miles an hour, up snowy hills.

These physical discomforts are mentioned to show how thoroughly the management of the Institute of Pacific Relations carried out their agreement with the governments represented at the conference that absolutely no newspaper reporters should attend. I believe this understanding was rigorously carried out.

My account of the proceedings which follows is exactly as it was written in pencil upon yellow paper at the time. This is mentioned to excuse the informal and perhaps indiscreet nature of the communication.

On the little train, a relic, I suppose of the seventies, I sat next to an Indian, whom I later found to be head of their delegation, Sir A. Ramaswami Mudaliar. Told him he was the first Indian gentleman I had ever met--when I was in his country the Government of India had taken jolly good care that I should meet no Indians. He smiled. Told me he had lunched recently with King George; was frequently in England --member of British War Cabinet etc.; but always delighted to get over to France where there was no colour line and he could have a nice long talk with anybody he chanced to run across. I asked him whether the trouble in India was not largely social? He assented. Whether it had not been much worse since the English had brought their ladies over with them? Answered "yes.H" To my question whether Churchill would last after the war, he replied: "Not one day!"

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one of the articulate spokesmen for it. Philippine participation in Maphilindo, ASA, and ASEAN stems from the ideas put forward by Quezon and others concerning federation.



At Mont Tremblant Station, we got into a sleigh with a mixed bag of foreigners. Driving up to the Lodge I observed that when I was younger I used to come to this region at this same season to hunt caribou. The man opposite asked me if the caribou were still here? "Yes," I replied "some of those I shot at certainly are."

On arrival at the Lodge, found ourselves parcelled out in various little chalets --bare walls--typical skiing resort--one bathroom per chalet--standing in line to shave and to get to W.C. Picturesque but d-d uncomfortable.

Dr Jessup (Philip C.), the Chairman of the Pacific Council sent for me and told me that rules of the Institute did not allow one not native-born to be part of a delegation--asked me if I would not be willing to sit as a member of the United States delegation. I replied: "No--because I haven't been invited." He said: "I invite you." So I said I should be equally happy on either delegation. That left the Philippine delegation to consist of Resident Commissioner J.M. Elizalde, Arturo B. Rotor, Secretary to the President of the Philippines, Urbano A. Zafra, Commercial Adviser to Resident Commissioner of the Philippines, and Sebastian Ugarte, a Basque mestizo, Legal Adviser to the Resident Commissioner--who was secretary of the delegation. We all sat together at the table for meals, and were usually joined by Chinese; a Siamese, Indians, a Korean, etc.; and Dr Ralph Bunche, an intelligent and agreeable American Negro.

English was the tongue of all the meetings; I only had to talk French with the delegate from France, Professor Paul Rivet, formerly head of the *Musee de l'homme* in Paris--now head of the Ethnological Institute of Columbia in Bogota, whence he had come by plane. He is noted for his ability to distinguish racial traits by studying one's head and face. I asked him to diagnose me--he took one look and said "*purement anglais.*" (I have often read his article on ethnology).

There were more than one hundred delegates present from 13 different countries, *vizt.a* Australia, Canada, China, Fighting France, India, Korea, Netherlands, Netherlands Indies, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, United Kingdom and United States. To these must be added an international secretariat of at least fifty more--many of whom sat as delegates at the round tables.

The Institute meets every three years. Heretofore, government officials have been banned. This time, nearly all those present were connected in some way or other with governments *in esse* or *in exile*. This added a grim note of reality to the discussions which, I believe, are usually conducted by professors of one sort or another. Instead of a research committee of philanthropists, it had become a political meeting, pure if not simple. In fact, the round tables and even the plenary sessions sometimes broke out into all-out verbal wrestling matches, with no holds barred.

The main theme of the conference was whether the "Atlantic Charter" applied to all the world, or whether it was meant only for Europe. Roosevelt and Willkie had maintained recently that those principles of self-determination must apply to all the world. Winston Churchill, on the other hand, had not long ago announced in a speech at Mansion House that "what we have we hold," and "I did not become Prime Minister of the British Empire to preside over the liquidation of that Empire." On no occasion in any of the numerous meetings did anybody, even on the U.K. delegation defend Churchill's speech. In fact, it caused them acute embarrassment. Some even made futile attempts to explain it didn't mean what it clearly did mean. The Canadians, Australians, New Zealanders and many of the Americans barked like the seals on the Golden Gate ledges outside San Francisco. Walter Nash, the vice premier of New Zealand, barked loudest and angriest of all. In vain did such delegates as Arthur Creech Jones,<sup>200</sup> Labour member of Parliament, (and parliamentary secretary to Ernest Bevin, Minister of Labour) and Captain D. Gammans, Conservative member of the British Parliament; protest that nobody in Parliament would dream of interpreting the Atlantic Charter as inapplicable to any part of the world--especially Asia!

There stood the vision of the robust figure of Winston Churchill, their Prime Minister, and he was not to be pushed behind the curtain any more than was the Statue of Liberty--rather less so, if anything. So at the end of ten days the English delegation looked like a lot of hens after a raid on the coop--feathers ruffled and the picture of dejection. Sir John Pratt almost in tears.

In this chorus of barking seals I was impressed by the conviction that the assemblage was making the English pay for many generations of arrogance and condescension

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<sup>200</sup> Later Secretary of State for the Colonies in the Atlee Government

towards colonials. The Canadians in all this were clearly without any sense of responsibility. All that they were determined to accomplish was to be able to go before their voters and be free from the reproach of "fighting to save the British Empire.1'

The Australians did not enjoy quite such supreme self-confidence. For them to help drive the European powers out of Asia was to let down the barricades between themselves and the Asiatics. Neither the Australians nor the New Zealanders really understand that they are Asiatic powers--they are still thinking in terms of the British homeland.

The Dutchmen present were obviously under the wing of the English--one thought of the Royal Dutch-Shell oil alliance. They had come there with two puppet Javanese who were utterly unable to express themselves--one was head of their delegation. They supported the English in everything. Meant to keep as inconspicuous as possible, but we smoked them out from under their leaf. They were forced to produce in the middle of the conference a statement by Queen Wilhelmina promising after the war to give the Netherlands Indies equal partnership with Holland. Her statement was wreathed in Royal Phraseology as to be practically unintelligible to the rest of us. It appears the Dutch Viceroy may be obliged to have his powers somewhat curtailed. No racial discrimination henceforth. Vague references to general elections which are evidently expected to take some time to organize. It appears that Queen Wilhelmina made practically the same commitments in her address before the United States Senate several months ago. When Lord Hailey, who was the chairman of our round table at which such topics were discussed on the second day of the conference, came to the subject of the Netherlands Indies, he was for slipping the subject along the table until perhaps it might fall into a convenient scrap basket. When challenged, some Dutch member present ventured some vague reference to an important announcement about to be made on the matter--I kept insisting that some disclosure as to the nature of this announcement be made during the conference and that we be given the privilege of debating it.<sup>201</sup> At a later round table, my next-door neighbour, Mr G. H. C. Hart, Chairman of the Board of Commissioners for the Netherlands Indies, Curacao and Surinam showed me a long rather obscure telegram from his Government-in-Exile, explaining (?) the scheme; he also had included in the mimeographed reports to the conference a further statement. He seemed convinced that "language is given us to conceal our thoughts." The Dutch Prime Minister had sent this to him, and it consisted of long passages of "double talk"--in the midst of this jungle of words I detected a statement that "The Queen thinks that perhaps the powers of the Governor General may have to be reduced"!

On my return to Washington, I made an especial (verbal) report to President Quezon on this situation. It is a subject in which he is most particularly interested. For some years; underground conferences between him and "leaders" of the Javanese (who are erroneously supposed to be completely docile--like the two hand-picked specimens the Dutch brought with them to Mont Tremblant). They seem to have some sort of a vague ambition to recreate the old Malay Empire of long ago--to include the Netherlands Indies and the Philippines and parts of British North Borneo.

Quezon did not seem much impressed by the determination of the Dutch to hold on to their rich empire. His comment was that the last time he talked to the Javanese leaders a few years ago; they were *all pro-Japanese*. He told them this was a very great mistake; for while they could get rid of the Dutch any time they tried, they would *never* of their own efforts, get rid of the Japanese, once the latter were established in the East Indies.

Except for the brilliant Professor Rivet, who spoke like a brave and vigorous man, the other three "Fighting French" delegates had absolutely nothing to say. They were like three white rabbits; if cornered, they pretended not to "speak English.1' They gave the impression of knowing absolutely nothing whatever about the topics under discussion. As a matter of fact I think they were struck dumb by all this talk of giving any power back to any "natives"--they had never heard of such a thing--much less done it. If too much was demanded in their colonies, their custom has been just to shoot a few hundred of them, and not write home about it. They consider that the abolishing of the colour line socially, which is their specialty, is all the "natives" want.

When Indo-China was reached in the geographical review which occupied our first round table, there was a spattering of talk about the border dispute between Thailand

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<sup>201</sup>Harrison must have enjoyed seeing the representatives of the imperial powers squirm over the issue of extending self-rule to the colonies.

and Cambodia. The chairman was about to pass on to fresh fields and pastures new, but I insisted on pointing out that there was a very great deal more to Indo-China than what had been said. The Annamites covered the larger part of Annam and Tonkin and they had a long history of self-government behind them until very recently. The Free French delegate present preserved his mask of immobility. In answer to a question he stated that the French Government General was still functioning in Indo-China, but was very restricted in its powers by the Japanese. M. Baudet was being either unnecessarily secretive, or else was too depressed to care much anyway.

At a later round table, one of the French present admitted that he understood the implications of the Atlantic Charter and that they were ready to apply them. I wonder? There was no use in badgering these poor fellows--they will probably have been forgotten long before one of the multi-coloured French parties emerges as a stable leader. Anyway, were we Americans not bound by our government's reiterated promises that the French Empire would be restored intact to France? It was only the British Empire that some of our delegates, together with all the Canadians and some of the Australians, were out to disrupt. Walter Nash, the vice premier of New Zealand, was the loudest and easily the most offensive leader of these battling reformers. So far as one could think amidst this shouting and tumult, the principal war aim of the "Allied Nations" was to strip our principal ally of its empire.

The American delegation, some 36 strong, held but two caucuses. The first was opened by a voice on my right, coming so far as I could judge from Mr Len de Caux, the publicity director of the C.I.O. and editor of the *C.I.O. News*. He is an educated man of considerable refinement. He started the proceedings by announcing in a clear voice: "We are going to fight to preserve the British Empire!" To my surprise, the chairman, Dr Jessup, asked for a show of hands on that point, and nearly half of those present voted for the proposition. Then we adjourned!

The most ardent American abolitionist of colonies, however, seems to have been Edwin R. Embree, President of the Justice Rosenwald Fund of Chicago and Vice President of the Division of Human Biology, Rockefeller Foundation. He was reported to have opened the ball at his round table with the "all-out" statement: "I'm for doing away with all colonial governments." This clear but all-too-sweeping statement exposed him to so much good-natured chaff that he calmed down into a useful and intelligent member of the conference.

The second caucus of our delegation was held to discuss the dilemma in which the United States delegates found themselves. Having somewhat over strained themselves in dismembering the British Empire the Americans were asked by the English what contribution their country was prepared to make to the post-war world? That was a question no American cared to answer after the Republican triumph at the polls the month before. The tables were thus neatly turned. Now we were on the spot. It took us three or four days to regain our customary complacency and to recover some of the ground lost by this counter attack. At our caucus, the chairman asked old Senator Elbert D. Thomas, as the most expert political analyst present to say whether he thought the United States would accept post-war international responsibilities. The old Buddha, after consideration, gave birth to the following important formula: "My state would do so, but I do not think that the states around us would!" Since his state is Utah, with the smallest electoral vote in the Union, the oracle had not completely solved our troubles for us. If he was no more persuasive as a young Mormon missionary to Japan, one is not surprised that the Latter-Day Saints failed to convert the Japanese. We retired in some confusion to our icy bedrooms to sleep over the situation--but *la nuit* did not *porte conseil*, and perforce on the succeeding days our ferocity against the English colonial system somewhat abated. Nobody mentioned the name of on Franklin D. Roosevelt, either at our caucus, nor on any later occasion. The November election had wrought wonders. Even Mr Michael Straight, editor of the *New Republic*, Mr de Caux, the C.I.O. representative, and Mr Edgar A. Mowrer, who were members of our delegation laid aside their harps, took off their long white robes and dismounted their wings for several succeeding days. There was thus some crumb of comfort, however negative, to be derived from the doldrums in which we Americans found ourselves.

With the odds so heavily against them, nevertheless the British delegation was easily the best there. Headed by old Lord Hailey, forty years in the Indian Civil

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202 Post-war reconstruction concerned the Foreign Office so much that they established a separate file to handle the volume of correspondence and state papers dealing with the subject. They were quite anxious to have some definite understanding from the United States on the matter.



Service, former Governor of the Punjab and of the United Provinces, in his old age he had shown much liberality in his book *African Survey* and was filled with genuine concern for undeveloped minorities. It is perhaps this very concern for the minority which has kept the English parliamentary system alive during the centuries.

Hailey enjoyed the undeniable advantage of being the only "Lord" there, but he owed his success at the meeting chiefly to his Irish wit, not to mention a polished parliamentary manner. Add to this his old-world air of authority. His bald head and aquiline features resembled a bust of Julius Caesar. The Old Romans of Queen Victoria's day governed a large part of the world--and looked it. He confided to me that he hadn't a bean in the world, except his pension, and was in a hurry to retire so that he could spend the rest of his days sea-trout fishing on the west coast of Scotland.

Hailey opened the first plenary meeting of the conference with a prepared address stating that England was ready to speed-up the progress of all her colonies towards self-government, adding that their policy had never been one of exploitation --but of trusteeship. He said the new watchword was to be *partnership* with their colonial subjects. He and his colleagues on their delegation were absolutely sincere in this, and were shocked at the lack of appreciation from the "have-not" members present. He described the progress towards self-government as a ladder: some of their colonial peoples had climbed already higher than others up the ladder; Ceylon and Burma were at the top, and were now ready. To the Indians, he turned and said in most decisive tones: "We are ready to accept *any* constitution for India of whatever form, upon which you can agree."

He was followed by Dr Sao-ke Alfred Sze, former Chinese Ambassador in Washington and London. He too, read from a prepared address. He is an amiable and popular man, and the method by which he has gained his popularity was apparent in his speech. He talked for some time and said nothing. He has some nervous disorder which caused his hands to shake so he could hardly follow the paper. The other fourteen Chinese present were gloomy and recalcitrant. They felt they were being neglected--they had moreover positive complaints, to wit: four lend-lease shipments of armaments which had been ear-marked for China had been diverted en route to others of their "allies." (India?) They wanted all of their territory back--especially the three eastern provinces which make up Manchuria, and Formosa which they had ceded to Japan in 1895. They did not ask for Korea--they wanted to stick the United States with a mandate for that!<sup>203</sup> Especially on the subject of emigration of Chinese they were insistent. This is a really live issue in all near-by parts of the eastern world, and causes the utmost and genuine concern to their neighbours. The spectre of Chinese penetration and economic imperialism haunted us all throughout the conference. Their ardent nationalism of the present day alarms all of their neighbours. They demanded the return of Formosa without any concession as to an international police post--said that could be discussed later. Their delegation showed little teamwork; they seemed to me to be afraid of the two or three delegates who had come by bomber plane from Chungking, and were alarmed at what *they* might report on their return there. One of them, at a plenary session made a fiery speech, demanding: "Is America fighting for China?"

The most attractive, refined-looking woman present was the lady pilot, Mrs Hilda Yen, who had flown her plane from Chungking via India and Africa. She had been as a child to school in the United States and could speak English perfectly, free from those humming, explosive noises indulged in by most Chinese when they are said to be talking in English.

Taking it all in all throughout the conference, the English got the roughest ride, but the Chinese caused the greatest uneasiness to others.

After Dr Sze had finished his address, the chairman called on the only Korean present, Younghill Kang, who came from the Board of Economic Warfare in Washington. He was formerly Professor of English Literature at New York University. He started off well enough telling how a Presbyterian missionary had helped him to escape from Korea and reach the United States. Then he recited the names of all the masters of English literature to whose works he was addicted. Finally he turned on the tap of self-pity and told us what a hard time he had in getting started. He had worked up from seven dollars a week to fourteen when I went down for the third time. I did not listen to his last ten minutes. My mind went back to my visit to Seoul, the capital of Korea, in 1915. The Japanese Resident Commissioner had done the honors

<sup>203</sup> See Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR), *War and Peace in the Pacific* (New York: International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1943), p. 86.

and shown me around, then offered me a drink. He thereupon told me he had been to school in Bridgeport, Conn., and not only spoke American but *thought* like an American. He had accepted his mission to Korea with exalted notions of how he would up-lift them, but, he added bitterly, "I had not been here a month before I wanted to hit these God-damned boobs of Koreans with a club." No! Delegate Younghill Kang did not sharpen the zest of anybody present for a Korean mandate!

To turn now to the working of the round tables. Each was given a special subject, to be discussed by the twenty to twenty-five delegates present. No votes were to be taken--no decisions to be made--only discussion. Ordinary statements to be confined to three minutes. All proceedings deemed confidential except the summary of opinions written up by a *rapporteur* who was present! Since about half of the delegates sat silent most of the time, the report of the *rapporteur* could not be taken as a correct summing up of what all members thought.

When a round table had finished its discussions, the *rapporteur* looking worried, disappeared for a day or so, to write up the report which he was to read to a plenary session.

The best of the *rapporteurs* we heard were:

1. Professor Ralph J. Bunche from Howard University in Washington. He is a Negro (mulatto), member of the American delegation, and one of the most popular and useful members of the conference.

2. Miss ----- (?), an American girl, who came there as a member of the secretariat.

The most important round table at which I sat was that on India. We had six sessions of two hours each. The result was a personal, parliamentary triumph for Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar, with whom I had chatted in the train. The Indian delegation was hand-picked and perfectly drilled. No voice was allowed to be raised for Gandhi, Nehru and the Congress party.

There were seven Americans and five Canadians at this round table, and they started off baying in a chorus of discontent with the failure of the Cripps Mission. They all regarded it as of supreme strategic importance to get some kind of settlement of the India question. The complexities of the question finally brought our round table to a peace of exhaustion or perhaps one should say numbness not unaccompanied by headache.

Sir Frederick Whyte started off as the ringleader for his trained Indian performers. For five years he has been President of the Indian Legislative Assembly. Large, bland and parliamentary, he seemed too reasonable to be entirely true. He had intended, I think, to hold the hoop through which the Indians were to jump. After the first session, pale and almost unnerved, with disordered hair and his parliamentary manner shattered, he subsided into innocuous desuetude.

The Indians took charge. Their teamwork was perfect; their manners imperturbable, their modesty and good humour beyond reproach. They ranged in importance all the way from the highest officials down to Mr N. Sivaraj, a representative of the "Depressed Classes" i.e., the untouchables. His manner was as humble as that of the Mad Hatter at Alice's tea party; his countenance was so black you would have collided with him on a dark night. But like all the rest of them, he had brains and wit. He rather attached himself to me socially, and more than repaid my attentions by his one witticism to me--he called our Philippine experiment, "a policy of inexpediency," which made me laugh.

The Begum Shah Nawaz, parliamentary Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, was the light forward of the Indian team. It is said that our soldiers now in North Africa have been instructed never to speak to a Mohammedan lady--such orders would be quite superfluous in dealing with the Begum. No man I have ever met could have gotten one word in edgewise with her. She was gifted with a perfect cataract of English speech and possessed the added advantage that we could not understand a word she spoke. Moreover she brought with her an ammunition dump of stupefying statistics.

I think she gained more yards for her team than any of the others. Her star play, however, seemed to pass unnoticed by all but myself. Among the hand-picked Indians who made up their delegation were two partisans of the Indian Congress party--but with sealed lips. One of them was a bearded, rotund jolly lawyer named K. M.

Panikkar, whose continual high spirits were infectious--except at the breakfast table. He was the kind of social Indian who stays at the Savoy Annex and dances at the Kit-Kat Club. He had whispered in my ear that he was pro-Congress but pledged me to secrecy.

Having been called before our round table to testify about how easy it would be for the Indian Princes to fit into an independent and federated India--he being the foreign minister of the native state of Bikaner, and thus qualified as an expert--he was uninterrupted during his ten minute statement. When he finished, our chairman, Mr Edgar J. Tarr, Director of the Bank of Canada, asked Panikkar mildly what he thought of the Congress party--at once a brilliant diversion was created by the Begum: she poured forth a torrent of words to which Mr Tarr listened most courteously. When the Begum paused for breath, it was noticed that Panikkar had disappeared. This was as neat as any forward pass I ever witnessed. When after the meeting I charged Panikkar with this maneuver, he denied it vehemently, but I noticed that his face twitched slightly.

Another Indian who contributed to the gaiety of nations was Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, Judge of the Federal Court of India. I had supposed he did not speak English, so silent and judge-like was his demeanor for several days. Finally we reached a point where Lord Hailey was betraying his usual anxiety over the minorities. He was asking what would become of the aboriginal inhabitants of Formosa if it were given back to China. There was a pause and then the Indian Judge said in deep and solemn tones: "Minorities are more interested in self-indulgence than in self-government!"

To return now to the discussions at the India round table, Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar, who was their spokesman, opened by stating that the Cripps Mission had failed because Sir Stafford dealt only with Gandhi and Nehru. That Gandhi would not negotiate with England because he believed the United Nations were already licked. That "Mahatma" Gandhi, (in slightly sarcastic tones) had tremendous influence on the Congress party, but that many of his followers could not swallow his non-violent resistance. There was little to be done while Gandhi and Nehru lived, but each had now reached their allotted "three score and ten!" He insisted they were not now "in jail" but only under detention. Meanwhile voluntary enlistment of Indian soldiers was going ahead at a greatly increased rate. Most Indians wanted to fight--and certainly did not want the Japanese. If the Western powers believed they could bring about a mediation, they would be most welcome to try. The Committee of Mediation should have the power to settle the dispute or else the Indians would not accept it. He wished for an independent dominion form of government for India, but within the framework of the British Empire.

Sir Frederick Whyte, who had been sadly jolted by the sand-papering he had undergone from the Canadian-American bloc at the table broke in to say that the Americans had disqualified themselves from sitting on such a mediation board because they were so soaked in Gandhi propaganda.<sup>204</sup> Explosive denials by several Americans. Then someone suggested "Let the Chinese do it!" Thereupon the Begum was understood to reply "China has been as much exposed to Gandhi propaganda as America!"

Then the subject of Pakistan, or Mohammedan separation was introduced, and quite a lively wrangle ensued between Hindus and Moslems. There were few, if any, dull moments in the conference.

A mild and scholarly American, W. Norman Brown, Professor of Sanskrit at what they are pleased to call the University of Pennsylvania, had a constructive proposal to make. He has served in India for years as a Professor of English, but neither his voice nor his manner were sufficiently aggressive to dominate the tumult--which sounded like the zoo at meal time. Brown's blond head sank back quite disconsolately. What he proposed was that the Government of India should give "responsible government" to the Viceroy's Executive Council. I managed to get the floor to support his proposal, citing how President Wilson had sent me to the Philippines in 1913 to break the governmental deadlock there. My predecessor had failed to get the budget passed by the Filipino Assembly. I did. Instead of repressive measures, we gave the Filipinos more concessions, beginning with a majority in the Commission, or Upper House. Shortly afterwards, I added, the First World War broke out. The prelude was the United States withdrawing its army and navy from the Philippines for more needed

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<sup>204</sup> Foreign Office records show that the British were concerned, if not frustrated, over American propaganda efforts that were beamed to the Indian fighting forces in the China-Burma front.



use elsewhere. The Filipinos were left to take care of American interests in the Islands. The last act of this drama was the recent battle of Bataan where 20,000 young Filipinos laid down their lives to protect not only their own liberties, but also the American flag.

Towards the end of our long session on India, Mr Len de Caux, the C.I.O. representative, wanted to bring in a discussion of the American poll tax!

As the only representative of a poll tax state (Virginia) present, I stated that if given an opportunity I would vote to amend the constitution of Virginia to abolish the poll tax, but that I differed from my colleague both as to the nature and implications of the poll tax. Mr Tarr, the chairman, intervened to rule the poll tax out of order. Mr de Caux, in the next plenary session, complained he had been "shut up" on the poll tax question.

It may thus be seen that the machinery at the India round table was running down --whirring and knocking noises were, by now, quite audible. Injured combatants were quietly licking their wounds. Sir Rasmuswami was allowed the last half hour almost without interruption. He acquitted himself with dignity and composure. Altogether a notable parliamentary triumph for him. No votes were taken and no decisions reached. Nevertheless, those of us who had for the first time debated with Indian leaders left the Council chamber with vastly increased respect for their race, and with much greater hopes for the future of India. Later I asked Panikkar whether the Indians would believe the word of an Englishman. "Absolutely," he replied "but it's damned hard to get them to give their word!!"

During almost the whole course of this "round table" four representatives of the American State Department had sat side by side with a dyspeptic expression. They were not wearing striped pants due I suppose to the deep snow through which they had to walk to the meeting. All four looked as if they had had their faces lifted.

My next round table was the "Political-Military"--a review of the political situation in the Far East, with consideration of the strategic implications involved. In the room next to us sat the "Military-Political" round table, where questions, similar to ours, but with the stress laid on the military features were debated. All the Generals, Admirals and Air Chief Marshals present sat, of course, at the latter table. Judging from their typical style of debate, as observed in other meetings, we could easily picture what was going on at this adjoining round table. Major General V. W. Odium, recently Commander 2nd Division Canadian Army in England, barked out his words by two and threes, apparently ordering us all to go over the top. Our own more suave Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, U.S.N., adopted the quiet technique appropriate to the quarter-deck. His was the "You may fire ready, Gridley" style. Major General Frank McCoy, resting after his recent arduous duties of condemning a lot of German spies to death, was suave and reticent. Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Longmore had plenty of time during the discussions to think over the more congenial days he had lived through in the distant past before this war. Judging from private conversations I had with him at meal times, his mind dwelt often on grouse-shooting, tho one of his most pleasant memories was of a night long ago at St. Tropez, where they bought the dance band, and didn't get home until the next afternoon.

We were credibly informed that the Military-Political table dismissed our own deliberations in the next room as freshman-sophomoric; saying that we spent all our time up in the stratosphere, without sufficient oxygen.

In the Political-Military round table I sat between Lord Hailey and Mr G. H. C. Hart, the brains of the Netherlands' delegation. This was enjoyable. While the Chinese were indulging in some big talk about the unreasonableness of asking for an "international security post" on Formosa after the war--explaining that it could only be intended against Japan--who would be disarmed anyway--Hailey and I were whispering together about the siege of our legations in Peking by the Boxers! While Dr Sze, the leading Chinese delegation, was denouncing the opium traffic, I told Hailey that I had demanded and received the recall of the Chinese Consul General at Manila [because he was personally involved in the opium smuggling ring].<sup>205</sup> I think Hailey enjoyed it, too, for he invited me to join him in sea-trout fishing on the west coast of Scotland; meanwhile, as a first installment, he invited me to lunch with him.

The chairman of our Political-Military debate was Mr H. B. Butler, C.B., LL.D., Minister and Director General of British Information Service, British Embassy,

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<sup>205</sup> Brackets are found in the copy used for this edition. A question mark was placed at the end of the line in the left hand margin.

Washington. He was a fair and discreet presiding officer, but gave out very little light and heat.

Lord Hailey was, as usual, the central figure of the discussions. He exhibited his usual concern over untutored minorities. Mentioned more than once the head-hunters of Borneo. Was told that after a head-hunter had completed his collection of heads he wasn't such a bad sort of chap at all, and much like other people. Being considerably badgered by several Americans at the round table Hailey showed what a sting he had in his tail. He remarked in a dreamy voice that he had said somewhere recently--thought it was in the House of Lords--that he was sometimes thankful he was not an American--look at Puerto Rico--when the people there asked for bread, the United States gave them the vote! I joined in the loud laugh, but happened to glance at the faces of my fellow Americans present--they looked like graven stone images.

We Americans were being pushed about as usual at this conference because we criticized others and had nothing constructive to offer. Finally, Dr Stanley K. Hornbeck of the State Department expressed the opinion that the United States would join the International Police after the war. I added my opinion to the same end. Embree and Tyler Dennett, former President of Williams College, said ditto. Our views were well received. Old Senator Thomas had gone home, anyway! The only persons present who did not look particularly gratified were, as it seemed to me, the Chinese. But perhaps I did them an injustice. They have the shape of countenance which cannot express pleasure without grinning--and they were certainly not grinning at the moment.

I improved the occasion to drive the point home by announcing that before the battle of Bataan, President Roosevelt had wired President Quezon, that all the man power of the United States and all their resources would be back of his promise to regain the independence, and to *secure* it. "To that extent at least," I added, "the United States is determined to stay in the Far East after the war."<sup>206</sup> I listened carefully for three rousing cheers from the Chinese, but do not now recollect to have heard even one cheer. Still, one never knows, they may have their own quaint way of expressing a delirium of pleasure.

The most serious issue of immediate post-war concern was, of course, Hong Kong. Did the Chinese insist upon its return after a century as a British colony? Was not the matter also of great importance to the trade of all the nations in the Western Pacific? Could we afford to lose this great free trade post? One of the English delegates put the matter very objectively and with much restraint. There was no answer from the Chinese. They sat silent, with poker faces. The foreign concessions at Shanghai present an almost equally thorny problem. A great imperial city has grown up on the mud flats so contemptuously given the European merchants long ago. In recent years, the Chinese have shown a decided intention to get them back, with all the fabulous riches which have been built up there.

Two of the fears in the back of the minds of many Asiatic delegates were Chinese imperialism and American imperialism! One delegate let slip the statement that the people of the United States were imperialists and didn't know it themselves. Perhaps he referred to our "Good Neighbour" policy towards South America which is compounded of an equal mixture of self-defense and exploitation. However, there is no need at present to worry about that since everyone knows that people seldom stay bought. There were no delegates present from any of the South American States which front on the Pacific!

Of the four *delegates from the Philippines*, it can be said that they won good opinions on all sides because of their modesty and excellent manners. They knew that after the battle of the Philippines their race had won universal good will from the United Nations. They were, indeed, "sitting pretty," and unlikely to mar the picture by any demands or aggressiveness. Commissioner Elizalde went home on the third day; Rotor and Ugarte three days later. The latter two had never attended an international conference before. Dr Zafra stayed to the end and came back with me. He had been at the "sugar conference" in London several years before, and is thoroughly grounded in economic facts and figures concerning the Philippines.

Zafra was at the Economic round table and reported that it had degenerated into a cross fire of arguments between half a dozen of the so-called economists present. Their terminology was so obscure that it was not certain that they even understood one another. The rest of those present had little idea what the debate was about.

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<sup>206</sup>See IPR, p. 87.

The *rapporteur*, Mr J. B. Condliffe, Professor of Economics at the University of California, and of several English institutions, made what seemed to me a comic report of the proceedings to the plenary session. It thus becomes apparent, as I had always suspected, that economics is not an exact science--or else its high priests have not yet agreed upon a common prayer book.

The last plenary session ended on a note of bitter wrangling between the delegates from the British Dominions and those from Great Britain. The ghost of Winston Churchill's Mansion House speech had not been laid. Walter Nash, New Zealand Minister to the United States, and a member of the Pacific War Council made a rousing stump speech taking great patches of skin off the English delegation. It was a thoroughly embittered and masterly address. Various of the English present answered him, maintaining the complete sincerity of their offers, and the good faith of the English Government and especially of the House of Commons on the question of gradual freedom for the component parts of their empire. Mr Arthur Creech Jones, M.P., parliamentary secretary to Hon. Ernest Bevin, Minister of Labour, made an answer of passionate sincerity and deep feeling to Nash's attack. Poor old Sir John Pratt, Chairman of the Central Chinese Railways--a slender, tall mestizo of some ancestry hard to analyze--almost broke into tears. He acknowledged that he had come to this conference to aid in offering most substantial concessions to present world opinion on the subject of colonial imperialism, but that he would leave with a miserable feeling of defeat and utter failure. Then there was some more sandpapering of the American delegation because of our failure to promise more substantial post-war co-operation. Mr Michael Straight, the youngest American delegate, finally presented a resolution offering such co-operation as the rest of us could not now dare to propose. This won goodwill, and considerably raised Straight's batting average. His chief impediment throughout was his delivery--he talks as if he had a hot potato in his mouth.

The closing ceremonies that night were given to amiable discourses from delegates selected by the management. The storm had blown itself out.

Dr Zafra made a modest and humorous little address which was well received. Dr Stanley K. Hornbeck, (representing the Department of State) closed for the Americans. He tried to offer post-war co-operation without committing himself to anything definite. The mountain groaned in labour, and "*mus ridiculus exiit*"--in other words, he is not proficient in the art of walking on egg shells.

As for myself, having been the first proponent thirty years ago of the gift of self-government to a "native race,"<sup>207</sup> I had to rub my eyes and look around to make sure it was not all a dream. Where were all of these fiery apostles of freedom a quarter century ago? Which one of these Americans had approved my policy in the Philippines and had backed me up when I most needed it? Not one. I remembered the visit of Clyde Tavenner to the Philippines when I was in my eighth year as Governor General. He had been a former colleague of mine in Congress and was on my side of these problems. When he came to say good-bye at Malacanan, he told me that in his tour of the Philippines he had met only one American who believed in Philippine independence. "Who's that?" I eagerly inquired. "Yourself" he replied.<sup>208</sup>

Whatever may be the satisfaction one may feel in seeing in his own time a large part of world opinion swing around to the thesis on which he wrecked his own political career, nevertheless it is a sad fate to be a whole generation ahead of the times.<sup>209</sup>

December 15, 1942. On my own return from the two weeks session of the Institute of Pacific Relations at Mont Tremblant, Quebec, I reported to Quezon at the Shoreham. He was deeply interested. Said the terms of the proposed settlement by Holland of the Indonesian<sup>210</sup> question didn't really matter--the Indonesians could get rid of the Dutch any time they wanted. Remarked that there was a percentage of truth in the

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<sup>207</sup> Harrison was the first colonial authority in Southeast Asia to seriously work for and demand consideration of self-government for the people he was sent to govern.

<sup>208</sup> Cf. Clyde H. Tavenner to Harrison, Personal and Confidential, October 5, 1928, *Harrison Papers*

<sup>209</sup> This, in my opinion, was the *raison d'être* of Harrison's diary.

<sup>210</sup> It is not out of historical context for Quezon to use Indonesian to describe the Netherlands Indies. By the late 1930s, the term had gained currency in Southeast Asia.



English claims that they always had a policy of preparing their colonies for self-government. He thought that a Dominion Status for the Philippines might be the outcome of this world situation. Expressed apprehension over the Chinese attitude on emigration and their general aggressiveness.

January 7-8, 1943. Shoreham Hotel.

Arrived in answer to a telegram asking me to come as soon as I could. Quezon was looking very well and in good spirits. Told me he was going down to Arizona in about two weeks and "if he hadn't finished his by that time he wanted me to accompany him for ten days or so." No signs here of any work on his book. Dr Trepp insists he had not worked on it "for months." Elizalde told me en route to Canada that Bernstein was writing Quezon's book for him; that he heard Quezon direct Cancaran to turn over the ms. to Bernstein. Trepp thinks not.<sup>211</sup> I asked Trepp why Quezon had so entirely neglected my draft of his book; Trepp did not know--thought possibly it had not been sufficiently eulogistic!

Quezon had seen Panikkar, the Indian, whom I met at Mont Tremblant. Had been very deeply interested. Panikkar told him the Indians want independence--not Dominion Status; that the Moslems also want it, though they demand safeguards as a minority. Quezon suggested to him the federal system like the United States, with a lower house representation based on population, and the upper house giving equality to states. Panikkar replied that is what they propose to do. That they must retain all of Occidental influence they now have and not just lapse into their former Oriental luxury and magnificence. England is afraid to let go just now--the Indian army is chiefly one of professional soldiers, and could easily turn against England if things went badly.

But Quezon told me he had abandoned all idea of taking any hand in the freeing of India and of Indonesia and in the forming of an Indonesian Empire, made up of a union of the Philippines and the Netherlands Indies. He had decided to concentrate entirely on the problems of his own people; though he would be "the happiest man in the world" if the other projects became a reality. Said it would take fifty years for an Indonesian Empire to become strong enough to withstand China or Japan. He had told President Roosevelt of his decision to concentrate on the problems of his own country and not take part in the other schemes, and that this statement "made Roosevelt jump." He added that the good will or support of Great Britain as well as of the United States would be needed in either eventuality. Thought Hong Kong should not be given back to China, but that the English should pay China the value of the barren island as it was when ceded to them, because of the disgraceful circumstances in which they got it.

Panikkar told Quezon that the Burmese were going to fight on the side of Japan!

Quezon is now going to try to get through Congress a joint resolution that the Philippines are and of right should be independent, etc.

I spoke of my distaste for the masochism of Gandhi and Nehru--always in prison and seeming to glory in it; Quezon said: "It's that Hindu philosophy."

He recognizes that the English are essentially a manly race, but they have "that racial superiority which I hate. I am a member of a race which has been looked down upon for centuries, and I can't stand that theory of racial inferiority. But their feeling of superiority is not vanity--they really believe it--hence their feeling of responsibility which is so marked not only in officials; but in businessmen and bankers as well."

I also had a talk with Dr Trepp, his Swiss doctor. Says Quezon does not really need him now; his TB is so well under control, he can live anywhere he likes. Says he feels like a mere lackey of Quezon; there is no real work for him to do. Would like to get a job on the staff of a sanatorium. Has come to the conclusion that Switzerland is the only real democracy he knows. There is not an ounce of democracy in the Philippines--even a businessman there has no chance unless he is a Quezon man.

I also had a short chat with Quezon on past events in the Philippines. He said Governor General Luke Wright was all right; but his influence was impaired by the very anti-Filipino attitude of his wife.

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<sup>211</sup> See note 154 of this diary.

Told me how he had taken Sumulong, Rodriguez, etc., away from General Wood, and then the latter threw up his hands. Quezon organized a Supreme Council of the Philippines and gave the pro-Wood Filipinos an equal representation on it with his own partisans. He, Quezon, presided but had no vote--still they all followed him obediently and without a question.<sup>212</sup>

Dr Pardo Tavera, a distinguished member of the first Philippine Commission, was patriotically against independence; he wanted the United States to remain there for the sake of the Philippines. Still, he was so independent-minded himself that he continually opposed the Governor General and really forced himself out of the Philippine Commission.<sup>213</sup>

January 9-10, 1943. Shoreham Hotel.

Quezon very friendly and gracious--perhaps making up for the incident of the week before, when, knowing that I was coming from Charlottesville on his request, he let me make the journey without sending me word that he was going to New York! Dr Trepp says this is characteristic--that he often shows no consideration whatever, especially when he changes his own plans! Trepp does not know whether Quezon will really go to Arizona--his health would do equally well in Washington. Was under the weather in New York. His family spent the time in shopping, theatres and the opera; Quezon stayed only in his apartments in the Waldorf-Astoria. Had one visit each from Roy Howard and Morgan Shuster.

Quezon has on his desk a bound notebook containing the proof sheets of his (unfinished) book. Took it up for 15 minutes with me, and got me to write an additional page concerning his childhood at Baler, and then started our bridge game which lasted the rest of the afternoon and until one o'clock in the morning--"wild cat" bridge, in the Filipino fashion, with precious little of partnership in it.

The next day I was with him to receive David Bernstein, his new "Special Services" (i.e., advertising) man. Bernstein is full of clever schemes for publicity over the radio and movies. Quezon conveyed to him his decision to drop the "free India" and "free Indonesia" issues for the present. Said he had been with Harry Hopkins this morning communicating to him the same decision. (Harry Hopkins probably let Lord Halifax know this at once--thus removing a cause of irritation if not worse!) Told Hopkins he must concentrate on the affairs of his own people, and was beginning to prepare his plans for the Joint Resolution for Independence! Bernstein commented that this would be a very powerful weapon of psychological warfare; also conveyed a request of *Time* for a reply to an article from Buenos Aires--German sponsored propaganda purporting to come via Japan from the Philippines, in which eulogistic descriptions were given of the present peace and contentment in the Philippines. Quezon dictated a brief response quoting General Tanaka's recent report on his tour of the Philippines, in which the situation of public order was described as "not very satisfactory." Quezon added that naturally it was not satisfactory to the Japanese since the Filipinos were still fighting vigorously. They had tasted freedom such as the Japanese themselves had never known at home and did not mean to give it up.

Bernstein then presented the question of a movie drama in Hollywood, now in course of preparation, showing an American nurse and an American officer's adventures on Bataan. A Filipino doctor had been proposed, and Romulo considered it, and insisted that *he* should appear as *himself*! Quezon said quietly that Romulo did not look sufficiently like a Filipino--was more like a Chinese. Proposed Dr Diño, his personal physician instead--said he was a real Malay type and also had had previous experience of acting.

Knowing as I did, from another source, of the terrific row Romulo and Quezon had recently had over Romulo's book *I saw the Fall of the Philippines*, I was somewhat diverted by this calm discussion. Quezon had been so angry with Romulo that he had told him, "to get the hell out of here, and never come back" and had deprived him of his uniform as a Lieutenant Colonel of the Philippine Army when he was on the lecture platform.<sup>214</sup>

Quezon takes an especial pleasure in spending money, due, no doubt, to his cramped childhood in Baler. He remarked that he had paid the Shoreham Hotel \$20,000

<sup>212</sup>See Onorato, *A Brief Review of American Interest*, pp. 67-68!

<sup>213</sup>The Governor General mentioned! was James F. Smith.

<sup>214</sup>See Quirino, pp. 359-361. See also Romulo, *I Walked with Heroes*, pp. 171-173.

(Trepp says it was \$60,000--he had seen the bills) this year for redecorating the suite he and his family occupy! This sort of thing, in my opinion, constitutes a political danger of considerable menace. Then Bernstein took up with him the idea that Quezon's own life should be the story of a Hollywood film. Some tentative discussion on this. If he had published his book, the film could be based on that. Personally, I dread the vulgarizing of this whole chapter of Philippine history by those fellows in Hollywood.

Long discussion between Quezon, Secretary of Finance Andres Soriano, Foley, head of New York branch of Philippine National Bank, and the Auditor General Jaime Hernandez. The National City Bank of New York asks payment of 200,000 pesos turned over December 27, 1941, while Manila was being bombed, to the Insular Treasurer for transmission by telegraphic transfer to New York. The National City Bank holds a microfilm of the Insular Treasurer's receipt, but nobody knows what happened to the original since the destruction of part of the Intendencia building by Japanese bombs. Auditor Hernandez opposed the payment now, in view of the uncertainty as to the facts. Quezon upheld him and seemed justly proud of the character and independence of his Filipino auditor.

Quezon gave me several stories from the inside talk of the United States Supreme Court, which he gets from Justice Murphy and Justice Frankfurter; incidents illustrating the very high esteem in which the Filipinos are now held in America.

January 18, 1943. Shoreham Hotel.

Morning at Elizalde's office, discussing with him, Ugarte and Zafra preparation of our official report on the recent international conference at Mont Tremblant.

Also talk with Elizalde on the subject of Bernstein--he was very much upset because they already had a budget for that office of \$150,000--and no Filipinos were on the staff, except a recently appointed librarian. Says that Quezon has had no publicity since Bernstein took over two months ago. Cited his Saturday night speech in Baltimore which did not appear in the papers. The fact was, however, as Quezon told me, that he did not deliver his speech as prepared because he looked over the audience of the Maryland Bar Association, and listened to their dull chairman, and decided they needed a stronger and more personal address than he had prepared. He added that it was the "toughest looking" audience he ever faced, so he started off "on his own" and gave it to them "hot from the griddle." I am told he had them applauding wildly and won rather an ovation.

At lunch with Quezon, Mr and Mrs Andres Soriano, and two important Pacific Coast magnates with their wives decked out in valuable furs and new gowns. Quezon began by looking very tired, speaking slowly and reaching for his words in English. As he warmed up, he showed at his very best. Described the lunch of the day before at which he had entertained Mr and Mrs Henry Luce. Mrs Luce is not enjoying her first days in Congress--the new member is usually treated with little consideration by the House. She could not get on the Committee on Foreign Affairs, etc. Quezon was much relieved to find that Mrs Luce, who had been so very active in the propaganda for China, was now not in favour of entirely overthrowing the balance of power in Asia and of leaving Japan (as well as the rest of her neighbours) at the mercy of China.

Quezon had told her his plans for a joint resolution of Congress declaring the independence of the Philippines when a plebiscite of the Filipinos should accept it. When she asked whether an independent Philippines would grant commercial airports to the United States, he said "not only commercial, but military" she professed herself delighted and said she was entirely in favour of the resolution. (N.B. This morning Elizalde had expressed serious doubts whether Congress will pass such a resolution, and said it would meet opposition in the State Department until the general situation in the Far East becomes clearer.)

Then Quezon talked of his respect and regard for Congress, and denounced last summer's smear campaign against it. "If a member of the House was a fool" he said "that only means that his constituents likewise were fools."

He told again, and told well, the story of his last address to the students of the University of the Philippines one week before the Japanese struck.

One of the guests present today was a California contractor who had been employed by the Navy a year before Pearl Harbor to extend Cavite airport and other posts in the Pacific islands. Quezon told him how A. D. Williams disputed with the Navy over the extension of Cavite airfield and urged that extra fields, well camou-



flaged, should be constructed instead. But both Navy and Army authorities refused to listen to him.

I spent Monday morning and all day Tuesday in Elizalde's office, working with him, Rotor, Ugarte and Zafra on the preparation of our formal report as delegates to the Institute of Pacific Relations last month at Mont Tremblant, Quebec. Very interesting discussions and really entertaining.

When we were alone, I asked Elizalde, whether he had read Romulo's book, *I saw the Fall of the Philippines*. He said: "Yes, I read it twice--it is bunk!" I inquired what it was that Quezon had objected to--he replied: "First because he put MacArthur ahead of Quezon all the time, and then because he had put in a full list of the persons whom Quezon took with him to safety from Corregidor; such people as Valdes, Major (Dr) Cruz, Ah Dong, his personal servant, etc.!" Elizalde says he left more important persons behind--should have ordered Manuel Roxas to come to Australia with him instead of consenting to his staying behind; that Romulo was obliged to have the book recast and to pay \$1,800 to the publishers for resetting, renumbering the pages etc. This came out of his first payment of \$2,500. That the blackouts in the book were really at the instance of the War Department; they were left in the book to add importance to it. Romulo has sold already 25,000 copies--will probably get \$20,000 out of the book.

In the Philippine Government circles I find general anxiety over probably future aggressions by Russia and China. Many stories of Russian plundering of the *elite* in the part of Poland which they annexed.

Quezon is still planning to go in about two weeks to Phoenix, Arizona, and invites me to accompany him for a couple of weeks. Intends to stay there a month or six weeks. I wonder?

January 20, 1943. Shoreham Hotel!

Quezon and Nieto back from an hour with J. Edgar Hoover, Chief of the Federal Bureau of Investigation ever since Coolidge's day. He has a small office at the end of a long narrow room like a corridor--visitors are visible for a long while as they approach him--rather like Mussolini's arrangements for those whom he receives. Hoover, he says, is a very fine man and intensely patriotic--is against all forms of "isms," but more especially is opposed to communism, which he detests.

At luncheon, we met Mr Sinclair, newspaper publisher from Oregon and on the staff of an office which apportions for the government the newsprint to the newspapers. Says this paper is useful also for explosives (nitrates) and for containers. Present shortage will increase. They do not advise the papers to cut down on advertising, but leave them to arrange their own space. Advertising however is bound soon to diminish, since motors, radios, etc., no longer are being made for the public.

At lunch Sinclair questioned President Quezon on two main subjects:

(a) Were they always aware of their danger from Japan? Quezon said: "No! Only aware during a year or so before the Japanese struck!"

(b) Could an independent Philippines survive economically? Quezon said: "Yes, the loss or partial loss of the American market would affect the Philippine Government only temporarily or until readjustments were made. The great mass of the people would not be much affected in any case. The United States would need 600,000 tons of sugar from the Philippines even after absorbing their own sugar production and that of Cuba and Hawaii; in other respects, Philippine trade might increase in new channels. Trade modifications under an American law of independence for the Philippines was to be expected!"

The Philippines are necessary to the United States as a foothold, or outpost, especially in aviation, etc.

January 26-27, 1943. Shoreham Hotel.

Quezon is offered \$1,000 a lecture for ten meetings by Getts, a lecture promoter, who came to lunch with his wife, the former Osa Johnson, widow of Martin Johnson the big game photographer.

Quezon expressed himself as in favour of a balance of power in the Far East--that Japan should not be so crushed that China may arise in her place as the would-be dictator of the Orient.

He said that Churchill and Roosevelt could not get Stalin to come to Casablanca --he did not wish to be tied up to them as he is playing his own game and intends to go to Berlin alone and then arrange his own empire; that Churchill and Roosevelt did not want Chiang Kai-shek at Casablanca.

Quezon maintained that the Ilongots in his youth were free-for-all head-hunters. I remarked that they had killed very few Americans--only two whom I remembered, while the Spanish in their day simply didn't dare to go into their country. Quezon replied that during the first revolution against Spain, the Filipinos got hold of a lot of firearms, and they tamed the Ilongots who could not stand up to a shotgun when armed themselves with only their spears and arrows. Like most of the Filipinos who lived in Baler, his native village, Quezon has Ilongot blood through his mother.

January 29, 1943. Shoreham Hotel.

The newspapers this morning gave Premier Hideki Tojo's speech of yesterday to the Diet in Tokyo in which he promised independence to Burma. He also said: "The people of the Philippines deserve independence; because they understand Japan's real aims and are ready to collaborate. . . . It is encouraging to observe an ever increasing movement among Filipinos for collaboration with Nippon.

I called this to Quezon's attention and he was much disturbed. His own letter to President Roosevelt on the subject of "independence now" was dated January 25, but has not yet been sent; it is understood that the Executive branch of the government, except the Department of State, is in favour of a joint resolution by Congress stating that the "Philippines are and of right ought to be independent." The Secretary of State (Hull) is also in favour of this, but he has little or no influence in his Department. The "permanent officials" headed by Dr Stanley K. Hornbeck are disposed to have no step taken in that direction until after the war and after it can be seen what the situation really is in the Far East.

After reading Tojo's statement to the Diet, and a subsequent declaration by George Vargas expressing his readiness to accept "independence with honour" as already twice promised by the Japanese, Quezon was galvanized into immediate activity. I told him he should see Roosevelt at once and press the matter for all he is worth. Vargas' statement as interpreted by Quezon shows that Tojo's "independence" will not become a reality "for three months yet" and he, Quezon, must go into action in order to get the United States grant of independence first.

He said that the masses of the Filipino people would accept Tojo's independence eagerly; that the leaders would know that this sort of "independence" would not be worth having, but would fall in line all the same. "This would be a very serious matter to my people and to myself" he honestly added. After a pause Quezon continued: "When the United States gets back to the Philippines they will then have to fight not only the Japanese, but the Filipinos, as well, and I would be more likely to fall to a Filipino bullet than I was likely to be shot by the Japanese during the battle of Bataan."

He had told us yesterday at Commissioner Elizalde's luncheon, at which we gave him our official Mont Tremblant report, that the Japanese in the Philippines had already given to the small farmers of the Philippines land on which they lived and worked "a measure we will have to allow to stand when we regain our country, even if we have to recompense the landed proprietors."

Altogether it looks to me as if the Japanese were "outsmarting" us in political warfare. It reminds me of what I told Professor Robert Gooch, in Charlottesville, 13 months ago when Churchill came to Washington and the "global" war was decided on, which meant simply "go for Hitler and abandon the Pacific until later." I then said to him that if they are completely abandoned now, you may later have the Filipinos as well as the Japanese against you in the end.

Quezon's draft of a letter to Roosevelt stresses three points:

- (1) the proclamation of Philippine independence and the recognition of the Philippine Republic by the Japanese.
- (2) the rehabilitation and development of the Philippine economy.
- (3) the guarantee of the future military security, political integrity and economic progress of the Philippines.

"It would be both wise and proper to proclaim Philippine independence now!, rather than wait until 1946.!"

He recommends the passage of a joint resolution by Congress advancing the date for independence to April 9th (the anniversary of the fall of Bataan) or the 4th of July, 1943.

This would be a "shot heard round the world" he urges--the most telling psychological blow that could now be delivered in opening the "Battle for the Far East."

"A further and very important consideration is the possibility that Japan may, at any time, proclaim Philippine independence and establish a puppet state there. If this should happen" he urged, "before America recognizes Philippine independence, Japan will have gone far toward making the United States! a laughing stock or a mere opportunist in the Far East." (He should modify this language . . . in the recent abrogation of the extraterritoriality treaties, Axis propaganda hammered at the theme that this was "a plagiarism of the magnificent gesture of the Japanese").

. . . In exchange for a guarantee of military security the Philippines will offer to the United States!

"The use under a generous lease of strategic air and naval bases which will act as the center of America's power for peace in the Far East" and . . . "all the trained and proven Filipino man power needed to man these bases."

. . . The assistance of the Filipino armed forces, etc.<sup>215</sup>

February 21-23, 1943. Shoreham Hotel.

Summary of events here during my two weeks of absence!

The letter Quezon was drafting when I left, in which he asked the President's support for a joint resolution of Congress declaring the Philippines "are and of right ought to be free and independent" was never sent. Instead he saw the President just back from his trip to the Casablanca Conference. Result was that the State Department sent him a memorandum that the appointment of Quezon to the Pacific War Council and his being asked to sign the United Nations Declaration was the equivalent of recognition by the American President of the Philippines as an independent nation. Obviously, they decided that the proposed Congressional joint resolution would be ridiculed by the Japanese when they were in occupation of the Islands. Legally the President has no power to free the Islands while they are still--nominally, at least, --a possession of the United States. But Quezon seems to be satisfied with the decision. (At least, it is a suspension of the constitution of the Commonwealth, and as such, leaves Quezon in command as head of that State until further constitutional action is taken, and thus averts the succession of Osmena to the Presidency of the Commonwealth on November 15th next. This, I believe, the President of the United States has a legal right to do).

Quezon's radio address given out by the Office of War Information on February 20th, dealing with the announcement of this decision, was really excellent.

In part he said:

"Assuming that tomorrow Japan was to declare the Philippines an independent nation, what would that mean? It would merely mean that the Philippines would be another 'Manchukuo'--a government without rights, without powers, without authority. A government charged only with the duty to obey the dictates of the Japanese rulers. After the tragic end of Korea's independence, in utter disregard of a solemn pledge to respect it, it would be worse than folly to rely on any promise by the Japanese Government. . . . President Roosevelt has, in effect, already given the Philippines recognition as an independent nation. On my arrival in Washington, he rendered me honours due only to the heads of independent governments. . . . He has recognized our right to take part in the Pacific War Council, with Great Britain, China, the Netherlands and the self-governing Dominions of Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The President of the United States himself presides over the Council table. . . . In the name of the Philippines, I am a signatory to the Atlantic Charter. We are one of the United Nations. Our independence is already a reality. . . .!"

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<sup>215</sup>The preceding three lines were Harrison's suggested changes.



This was broadcast using short wave facilities of the Office of War Information for the Philippines and other parts of the world.

Quezon asked me to read over the papers in the proposed contract to film his book, which Warner Bros' offer--Morgan Shuster advises him to get a "radio lawyer" to protect his interests, and points out that the form of contract only guarantees that the "basic story" shall be under his control; that it would thus be possible for the movie company to present Quezon's personality and his life story in a manner derogatory to his dignity. Probably Shuster's anxiety is well founded; no doubt he welcomes a prospect of getting Quezon to finish his book, but his first concern is to protect him.

Quezon's comment to me was: "How could I sign the contract when I haven't finished my book?" I told him Shuster could finish the small remaining part for him. He said: "No--I'll do it myself."

Quezon had accepted an invitation to speak on March 19th before the National Republican Club of New York. Now he proposes to go away to "California" for the purpose of "protecting his health"--he would thus break the engagement. I try to persuade him at all costs to keep this date--in view of the growing power of the Republican party, he could not afford for the sake of his country and of himself to break it. He should go there and try to capture the good will of those important men as he did that of the Maryland Bar Association. He seems firmly of the opinion that he can go away on a vacation--is this a result of, or possibly influenced by, his recent conversation with President Roosevelt?

Quezon showed me a letter he was drafting to MacArthur about the management of the guerrilla campaign in the Philippines which is charge of Lt. Col. Peralta. Quezon resented the General's trying to appoint civilian, as well as military officials--such as Confesor as Governor of Iloilo. Tells MacArthur that the young flying hero Villamor is on his way out there, and should be entrusted with such affairs. That we must be careful not to treat those Filipinos who are co-operating with the Japanese as if they were traitors--that attitude might really make them so. Says that some of those who had entered the enemy's service helped these two young American officers to get through the Japanese lines and escape in August. The guerrilla depredations on Filipinos living in the towns in the north must be stopped. Many of those who have accepted military service with the Japanese will later use the rifles given them now *against* the Japanese when we return. Laments the fate of Manuel Roxas in falling into the hands of the Japanese. If they have murdered him for refusal to accept from the Presidency (he refused three times) he adds "I do not know how many generations it will take for our race to produce another Manuel Roxas.!" Recommends that Roxas be made a Major General by MacArthur. Says that "Chick" Parsons is the best man to keep the Filipinos in line--he is now on his way back there.

At luncheon Quezon told us he had just received a call from M. Willoquet, French Consul to Manila, who left there last June. He said the Japanese were trying to marry George Vargas' daughter to one of their army officers.

More about Manuel Roxas. Quezon forbids Bernstein to make public the fact that Roxas is in the hands of the Japanese. If still alive he is being pressed by the Japanese to accept the presidency. To stir up news about him might only result in his death. If he had accepted their invitation to become President of an "independent" Philippines (under the Japanese) this might even now be an accomplished fact. If he persists in his refusal, "he has only done what I wanted him to do--show the Japanese we would have none of them.!" Roxas was taken out in an airplane from Mindanao in November; nobody knows where he is now--probably in Fort Santiago. The Japanese have been rounding up schoolteachers who were not *conforme* and putting them in Fort Santiago, just as the Spanish did--they probably shoot them there.

Quezon announced that Isauro Gabaldon has just died, 74 years of age, and "ten years older than he ever let Sergio and me know--we never understood how his wife (a Tinio) could be so much older than he was." Upon the death of Tinio, Gabaldon became the "boss" of Nueva Ecija--he ruled by popularity, but Tinio had governed by fear. "He (Gabaldon) split with me on making further terms with the Americans, short of independence, which he thought was guaranteed by the Jones Bill. I had to defeat him first for the Senate and then for the Assembly, but I never attacked him personally, and when I became President of the Commonwealth I went to him and made friends again." The Japanese broadcast his obituary as "one of the most distinguished of the Filipinos.!"

Consul Willoquet, who was French Consul at Manila, and was put in prison by the Japanese for being a Gaulliste, was released on threats by de Gaulle of reprisals on

the 4,000 Japanese, who are prisoners in North Africa. He says that whereas Vargas could get no favours from the Japanese such as release of a prisoner, it is evident that Aguinaldo is really "sold" to them.

Vargas' recent speech of February, advising all guerrillas to surrender and come into camp, since they were only delaying the granting of independence, reminds Quezon and Osmena of similar appeals made by Pardo de Tavera to the *insurrectos* in 1900, "when I was one of them."

Willoquet, who saw de Gaulle in London, says the Free French are planning independence for Indo-China.

Office of War Information reports a Japanese broadcast from Manila calling a convention there of all provincial and municipal officials to be addressed first by Vargas and next by the Japanese spokesman. A three point programme: (1) Independence at earliest possible moment. (2) Economic rehabilitation. (3) "Cultural Questions"--such as cutting off completely from the previous regime.

Long discussion on India with Quezon, (Osmena and Bernstein present). Quezon is considered an authority on this subject. P.M.<sup>216</sup> says he is the man to send there to settle it all. Quezon thinks the Cripps Mission brought about some sort of an agreement with the Indian nationalists, but the Viceroy (Linlithgow) and General! Wavell took no part in the discussions. "If Gandhi dies, we may expect a wide-scale revolt!" Quezon thinks the loss of India would finish off for good the whites! in the Far East and destroy hope of restitution of the Philippines. That China will then be forced to submit to Japan, since she will be shut off for good. The question is: will the Indian army stand by the English?

It is understood that Roosevelt reads only the *New York Times* in the morning and P.M. in the afternoon.

February 25, 1943. Shoreham Hotel.

Quezon says that when he first came to Washington as Resident Commissioner he, like most Filipinos, believed that when they saw an American man and woman out driving together, whom they knew not to be married to one another, they were sexually intimate. This was the old Spanish idea. But when he got to Washington and made friends with American girls, he soon found out the truth as to our views on the sexes --he was delighted, and when he went back to the Philippines, he convinced them as to the real American situation in these matters.

This conversation arose from an amusing incident--he was at his desk writing a letter to a well-known Washington hostess--a widow, but still young. She had recently entertained him in her house at a *diner a deux*. This was the first and only time they had met, and she terrified him by stories of the spying of the various secret services which, apparently, has always gone on in Washington. She told! how, during the last war, she had warned Bernard Baruch, then a most important official, that she knew there were six police dictaphones in "his" house. He thought the statement ridiculous, but went home, made a search and found six of them--two under his bed! He was so furious that he went at once to President Wilson and resigned his office. The President finally calmed him down. Well, this lady, in return for some orchids which Quezon had sent her after the dinner, wrote him a rather *empresse* letter--a little coy and pleasantly familiar. He was struggling with his English vocabulary in writing his reply and asked me to help him. I read his letter and told him that it wouldn't do at all--his phrase: "I was to find that, as the Spanish say, you carry your heart in your hand"--I protested that it was dangerous for a statesman to write such a letter--if a third party found it, use might be made of it. He jumped as if he had been shot--he was only trying to be polite. He explained that the phrase above quoted meant in Spanish only "sincere" or "virtuous" but I again objected that in English "virtue" meant not the old Latin sense of the word, but only referred to sex! He was horrified, entirely rewrote the letter in uncompromising phrases and thanked me rather effusively for saving him. He made a great story for his family out of this!

Quezon, Andres Soriano, Secretary of Finance and myself in conversation. More talk on news from the Philippines, which comes from Colonel Peralta, chief of guerrillas in Panay, through MacArthur in Australia, from time to time, and also, in bits, from returned travelers like Consul Willoquet, etc.

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<sup>216</sup> Abbreviation for *Picture Magazine* which was a daily newspaper with a left-of-center bias.

George Vargas, altho head of the government commission under the Japanese is not trusted by them. He is always attended by Japanese "aide-de-camp" when he goes out; Japanese officers live in his house. His wife confessed to Willoquet who saw her alone, that they are not free agents.

Quezon thinks the Japanese have disposed of Manuel Roxas by a feigned airplane accident. Soriano thinks that they have taken him to Japan to hold as a hostage. When Quezon was in the tunnel at Corregidor, he thought he was dying, and wanted to go back to Malacanan. Roxas begged him not to do so. Later when the time came for Quezon to leave Corregidor to join to MacArthur in Australia (an event which was not then anticipated); Manuel Roxas begged him in tears in his eyes not to go from Corregidor. He exhorted him to "think of your fame." Roxas followed Quezon to Dumaguete, and went with him to Mindanao, though he did not wish to leave Wainwright at Corregidor. Refused to leave Mindanao and joined General Sharp's forces there.<sup>217</sup> Sharp was ordered by Wainwright from Corregidor, when the latter fell, to surrender explaining that the Japanese would not give any terms to those on Corregidor unless all the military forces in the Islands also surrendered themselves. So, to save the men and women on Corregidor, Sharp and Roxas came in and gave themselves up to the nearest Japanese command. (NOTE--later--Roxas and Commander Worcester, U.S.N.R. fled to the mountains of Bukidnon). General Paulino Santos and Guingonaj [who were not in the army, are in Mindanao. They have "gone over" to the Japanese.]<sup>218</sup> Quezon says that Guingona was with him when Vargas' co-operation with the Japanese was mentioned in Quezon's presence, and, as Quezon says, when he heard no adverse comment upon Vargas' action, being a "bright fellow" (Q.), Guingona followed suit. Quezon expressed a desire to know what Guingona had done with the four million pesos of Philippine currency he took to Mindanao to pay the army there--"if he kept it for himself. . ." I protested vigorously that nobody who knew Guingona could believe such a thing possible. Quezon agreed. "But," I said "I have now heard you say twice that--if he kept it for himself." Finally we agreed that he had probably burned the money, as his instructions required.

Soriano asked if he could bring the Spanish Cabinet Minister of War (Bergdorfer?), who is now in Washington, to call on Quezon tomorrow morning? Soriano said B. was an anti-Nazi, and had remarked that Quezon's fame was now great in Spain. Quezon replied that he could squeeze in a half-hour for the call from B. "which should be long enough if I don't start making speeches--which I always do!"

It appears that Justice Frank Murphy presented to Roosevelt the plan for the recent announcement that Roosevelt has already recognized the Philippines as possessing the attributes of an independent nation by putting Quezon on the Pacific War Council and asking him to sign the United Nations declaration. Murphy then told Roosevelt quite heatedly that he disapproved the decision to make Hitler the No. 1 enemy, and concentrate on him to the disadvantage of the Pacific area. Roosevelt took Murphy's objections in good temper and told Murphy to "cool off."

Somehow, the conversation turned back to Dr Dominador Gomez. Quezon described him as a pure Malay type, but very big and a tremendous orator in the Spanish style, who swayed his audiences as he pleased. He had been a colonel in the Spanish Army. Was elected in 1907 as a delegate to the First Philippine Assembly. The election was declared void by the Assembly because there was no proof that Gomez was a Philippine citizen. Another election, and Gomez was returned by an even larger majority amid tumults and mob fighting. So they let him in!

When Quezon was Resident Commissioner in Washington he had occasion to make some uncomplimentary remark about Gomez. Quezon, traveling homewards, got to Shanghai on the steamer where he received a letter from Gomez challenging him to a duel. On arrival in Manila Quezon received a visit from the famous Colonel Blanco, also formerly a colonel in the Spanish Army in the Philippines and founder of the Macabebe Scouts, who appeared as Gomez's second to challenge Quezon and asking who his second would be. Quezon replied: "I shall appoint no second. I do not wish to fight a duel with Dr Gomez. But you may tell him this: 'I give him leave to shoot me any time he sees me. Also tell him that any time he comes within one metre of me, I shall immediately shoot him.'"

Shortly afterwards, Quezon attended a burial in Manila. With him were

<sup>217</sup>For the Roxas story, see Marcial P. Lichauco, *Roxas; the Story of a Great Filipino and of the Political Era in Which He Lived* (Manila: Kiko Printing Press, 1952).

<sup>218</sup>Brackets are found in the copy used for this edition. A question mark was placed at the end of the line in the right hand margin.



his cousin Miss Aurora Aragon--now Mrs Quezon and! Mary Buencamino. They knew about the challenge and were horrified to see Dominador Gomez standing near Quezon and all the more so since Gomez had his hand in his side pocket! Mrs Buencamino slipped right behind Gomez and stood there to grab his arm, but Quezon pushed right in front of him to look down into the grave. Gomez drew out his hand from his pocket, but produced only a pocket handkerchief to mop his face!!

Quezon then told of his marriage to Miss Aragon in Hong Kong in 1919. I (the present writer) was on the Ocean (Pacific) en route for New York when I received a radio from Quezon. "Married Hong Kong!!" I went down to Dr Oñate's cabin to wake! him, and demanded that he should tell me who Quezon had married. He was afraid to commit himself and it was a half-hour before I could get out of him the guess that it was Quezon's cousin, Miss Aurora Aragon.

The marriage was secretly decided on when Quezon and Miss Aragon were in Hong Kong.<sup>219</sup> Quezon sent his a.d.c. to the American Consul and requested that he should ask the Governor to waive the required 10 days residence, which was done. When the guests and the principals had met in rickshaws at the civil marriage bureau, Quezon turned to Luis Yancko and said: "Do you know why we are gathered here? I am going to be married right now!" Yancko's mouth fell open with surprise and he stammered "but to whom?" Quezon replied: "To this young lady who stands beside me." "But, but that's impossible" said Yancko (meaning because they were within the degrees of relationship prohibited by the Church). "Impossible--how do you mean?" "Well" said Yancko "not impossible but improbable!"

Yancko gave them a beautiful wedding breakfast at the leading Hong Kong hotel.

At lunch today Mrs Quezon and General Valdes were describing the discomforts of life in the tunnel at Corregidor. Mrs Quezon got tired of waiting in line before support to get her shower, so she would wait until 2 a.m. and bathe then. Soon others discovered the way, and they began standing in line in the middle of the night. No curtain hung on the alcove which contained the shower. After the heavy bombings, the water main was broken, and for two weeks they had not only to bathe in salt water, but also to cook their rice and make their coffee in salt water, which entirely upset their stomachs.

Colonel Velasquez, a West Pointer, who was in the front lines at Bataan and Corregidor, was recently at the military school at Fort Benning, Georgia, where he says he made himself rather unpopular when the meals were discussed by saying: "Sometimes we may have to go hungry for a long time." Velasquez told me he thought a campaign like that in Tunisia was necessary to harden the American troops, who were now overfed and thinking and talking all the time about their three big meals a day. He said he thought our American troops were pampered.

Quezon has started work again on his book. Has rewritten the foreword. Warner Bros have offered to make a film of it. Much talk with Bernstein about terms and arrangements. Quezon does not think that Morgan! Shuster has been careful enough in editing the English of his ms. He evidently wishes to be thought letter-perfect in English. He says he now wants to finish the book--can't do it in Washington--too many interruptions. Requests me to go off with him for 20-30 days and work with him on the book.

March 5, 1943. Shoreham.

Quezon wired for me to come here for ten days or so to help him finish his book, which he is determined to do, because, no doubt, of Warner Bros' offer for the cinema rights.

Congratulated him on his Opera House (New York) address last Saturday, which he said had brought him many compliments.

Asked him about political conditions here--whether Roosevelt would seek a fourth term? He said, yes--if he thinks he can be elected, otherwise he will sacrifice Wallace or McNutt. That nobody could make a success of the first post-war presidency. The Republicans had no man in sight who could do it--the United States would be in for very hard times--whoever got in would be a one-term president. Then Roosevelt would try to get in again in 1948 when he would be only 68 years old. He thought the present trend in America was towards post-war isolationism, which would be disaster.

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<sup>219</sup>See Quirino, pp. 127-131.

The only two leading candidates who were surely not isolationist, are Roosevelt and Wilkie, and the latter was talking himself out of the nomination.

He then turned to the story of my nomination to the Philippines in 1913. He, as Resident Commissioner, had had an understanding that no nomination of a Governor General would be made without letting him know. But one day he read in a Washington evening paper that the nomination of Oscar T. Crosby, a West Pointer and an engineer for the New Jersey traction companies, was being considered. He went right to Tumulty and said he must see President Wilson. T. let him in with the agreement that he would take only three minutes. He asked Wilson if it was proper for him to express himself on a nomination of a Governor General? Wilson said "Yes." "Mr President, I have just read in an evening paper that Mr Oscar T. Crosby is being considered, is that a fact?" Wilson replied that it was. Then Quezon said: "The people of the Philippines will not feel that this is what they had expected of you." "Why not?" "Because it says here that Mr Crosby is a West Pointer, and that would mean to them that you were sending out a soldier to govern them with an iron hand; then it says that he is an engineer for the great traction interests--that would mean to the Filipinos that he was coming out there to advance American financial interests." Mr Wilson replied: "That is interesting." So Quezon went out and straight to the War Department where he told General Frank McIntyre that they had not kept their understanding with him, and that now he could tell them that they would not get their man nominated.

(It must have been shortly after this that I went to see the President at the request of my brother Fairfax, to advocate the nomination of Crosby. Wilson told me that he esteemed Mr Crosby very much personally but that Crosby was connected with traction interests against which he had been fighting when Governor of New Jersey.)

Quezon then continued by stating that a few days after he had seen the President I came into his office at the request of my brother, to ask whether there was any hope for Crosby. He told me his objections and then said: "Why shouldn't you get the nomination yourself?" I was somewhat taken aback and asked: "What makes you think I could get it?" He replied: "I don't know, but I can try." I asked him to wait a little for me to consider the matter and that anyway I did not want Crosby to believe that instead of advancing his cause, I had only been working for myself.

A few days later, I returned and said that if he found the idea acceptable he might go ahead.<sup>220</sup> He went at once to Representative William A. Jones of Virginia, the Chairman of the House Committee on Insular Affairs and told him he had found the right man for Governor General.<sup>221</sup> Jones expressed himself as much pleased with the idea so Quezon went on to Secretary of State Bryan's office. He was diffident and rather uncertain in approaching the great man, but was at once admitted to his office. Bryan replied "why he's the man who has been helping me to fight the reactionaries in the Ways and Means Committee in the tariff revision. I'll go right into the President and put the matter before him."<sup>222</sup>

A day or two later my nomination went to the Senate and was confirmed the same day. Meanwhile Quezon had seen Senator Gilbert Hitchcock, Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Philippines, who was believed to be rather a "reactionary" but he agreed at once. Hitchcock, however, was believed to be opposed to Philippine independence.<sup>223</sup>

Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison, a leading conservative, was fortunately absent on a speaking tour in the West at this time, or else, with the backing of the

<sup>220</sup>What Harrison did was consult his family on the appointment. On August 21, 1913, Fairfax Harrison wrote in part: "And if you can find means to expedite the time when the United States will abandon his unhappy sovereignty of those islands--even if it is necessary to continue a protectorate like that we exercise over Cuba, you will write your name large in the history of our country." See *Harrison Papers*

<sup>221</sup>If Quezon found the "right man" for Manila, he certainly did not communicate that fact to Osmena until after Harrison's nomination was announced.

<sup>222</sup>For Harrison's appointment see Harrison, pp. 3-4; Quezon, pp. 125-127; Pacis, pp. 208-221; Onorato, "Leonard Wood and the Philippine Cabinet Crisis of 1923," pp. 4, 6-7; Quirino, pp. 103-104.

<sup>223</sup>Hitchcock was very friendly to Harrison throughout his term as chairman of the Senate Committee on the Philippines.

War Department he might have blocked the nomination. He, like most of the Army officers, was opposed to the independence of the Philippines.<sup>224</sup>

Next we talked over the strong anti-English sentiment in the United States today. I told him of my arguments with Gwathmey and Finley of the University of Virginia two days ago; that I was convinced that the heart of the so-called "democratic" movement in the world today was *social* that it was rather a revolutionary struggle, not so much for political rights, as formerly, but a demand for social equality. He agreed, and said that it was rather dangerous to be pronouncedly in favour of the English in the United States today. That Roosevelt was aware of this and had told Lord Halifax so, but was sticking firmly by England. Quezon said that a large part of the dislike of England in the United States today arose from dislike of the Jews who were all-out to help England. Justice Felix Frankfurter had lost his commanding influence in Administration circles because of being so excessively pro-English. I recalled Colonel Lindberg's Chicago address of August 1941 in which he stated that the principal influences which were pushing the United States into this war were: 1. The Roosevelt Administration; 2. The English; and 3. The Jews. For this, Lindberg was violently attacked in the press.

Quezon told of his own long-standing dislike of the English because of their arrogance in Asia; of how he had cursed them in Corregidor for their failures in Singapore and Hong Kong; how he had come to admire them as men, after Dunkirk and the battle of Egypt, and how the alliance between the United States and England now was the salvation of the whole world. He, himself, had given up for the present, all his own interests and plans for a Malay Federation, etc., and was concentrating only upon the interests of his own country. (This was the advice I so strongly urged upon him when I first joined him ten months ago on May 30, 1942.)

The recently (March, 1943) announced convention of the United Nations soon to be held to debate the world food problems, was originally the suggestion of Mr Nash, the Minister of New Zealand, in the Pacific War Council. But, after a debate lasting two hours over the subject of wheat, in which the difference of viewpoint between those nations which produced wheat and those which bought it was apparently so sharp, the Council was going to abandon the idea of a convention of the United Nations as likely to serve only to show up the lack of unity among these "allies." Then Quezon spoke in the War Council in favour of calling such a convention--he said it was quite right that the nations (U.S. and Gt. Britain) which were making the greatest effort in the war, and were spending their money should be the ones to direct the affairs of the United Nations. However it would be wise to allow the smaller countries an opportunity to present their own views. That would make them all feel that they were taking their share of decisions. It is potentially a strong movement to which attention must be paid. "Have the conference," he said "not in Washington or New York, but in some quiet place like the Warm Springs, Virginia, where the delegates would be thrown into intimate association with one another and could discuss everything in private conversation. Roosevelt could address the conference on the subject of food, select a chairman and let the latter send everything placed before the Conference to Committees, to hear and consider and report later. Let there be no real debates before the conference to disclose or develop sharp differences of opinion, but let anyone discuss what he pleased, even though the ostensible purpose was only the food question."<sup>225</sup> Finally, these ideas were accepted by the whole Pacific War Council, and the project of a Conference of the United Nations was later announced by the President.

I commented on the loyalty of Roosevelt to his friends and supporters--how he immediately appointed to new posts those of his circle who had been defeated in the elections. Quezon commented: "I never did that."

Excerpt from Quezon's letter of March 4, 1943 to General MacArthur in Australia.

I gather from the reports to which I have referred above that some of our guerrillas are committing the same mistakes or abuses

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<sup>224</sup>It is very doubtful that Garrison would have opposed the Harrison nomination. If so, I doubt that he would have secured War Department support. General McIntyre, who was chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, was friendly enough with Quezon to support anyone the Filipinos wanted. And General Wood, Chief of Staff, was friendly enough with Harrison to give him advice not to go to Manila. No one, except Manila Americans and Republicans, would have opposed the nomination.

<sup>225</sup>Quezon's suggestion is in accord with his cultural pattern and his political life-style.



that were committed by our guerrillas during the fight against the Spaniards and later against the Americans. They are looting and maltreating, and, in some cases, killing Filipinos whom they suspect to be pro-Japanese. From every point of view that is wrong, moreover, it may be of serious consequences.

In the case of Peralta, he has even gone to the extent of criticizing me for not denouncing Vargas and his colleagues. The insolence of this man in attempting to give me a lecture regarding the history of the revolution in which I took part while he was still unborn or a baby, and on the psychology of the Filipino people, would be laughable if it did not betray his utter unfitness for the role that he is aspiring to play in the Philippines.

Not as an answer to Peralta, but only to make crystal clear my stand in this respect, I wish to remind you that even while we were in Corregidor, at a time when a policy of threat or condemnation might have had more effect than now, I studiously avoided saying anything that might give Vargas and the rest of the Filipinos who have now accepted positions under the Japanese Military Administration, the impression I have lost faith in them. The reason for my attitude is that I knew, and have not changed my opinion, that the Filipino can best be won by showing him confidence rather than distrust. Indeed, if threat and punishment would make a Filipino loyal, the whole country would now be pro-Japanese. In other words I am of the opinion that if we want to keep the Filipinos on our side the commanders of the guerrillas must refrain from persecuting those who seem to be cooperating with the Japanese, unless they help the Japanese to discover the places where our guerrillas are hiding, or kill our men. Prager's report shows that even our Constabulary and Philippine Army soldiers who are now serving in the Japanese organized police force are, in fact, loyal to us.

Long discourse today by Quezon illustrating his advantage in politics in the Philippines because he knew how to appeal directly to the *tao* instead of relying like most of the other *politicos* upon securing the support of the "leaders." He illustrated this method by referring to General Sandiko's successful appeal to the people in his province of Bulacan (during Governor Forbes's administration) against an extra-legal Executive Order of the Governor General which Speaker Osmena had obligingly ratified by passage through the Assembly.

His best story was of the campaign made by him against the all-powerful Godofredo Reyes of Sariaya, Tayabas, when Quezon was President of the Senate and in control of the Nacionalista party. He put up Primitivo San Augustin and, to the astonishment of all the leaders in Tayabas, San Augustin beat Reyes. Quezon had gone himself to open the campaign and had addressed crowds of *taos* appealing to them in speeches 1 hour to 1½ hours long not to let their *caciques* vote for them, but to exercise the right of suffrage like free men. This method won that election.

Discussion of the Church and of Masonry. Quezon thinks neither of them count much in Philippine politics--bishops always have been easy to beat, but less so since Filipinos have been ordained as bishops, and the parish priests are now almost exclusively native citizens.

Quezon always states that he became a Catholic again after his "daughters were grown," but it really was in 1928 when "Baby" was about 7 and "Nine" was, say, 5. Quezon scorns the idea that this move benefited him politically. He explains he did it so that his daughters should not be "ashamed" of him. One can understand how Mrs Quezon brought pressure on him upon this subject in the home life. In order to be readmitted to the Church, he had to renounce Masonry, since the Church will not tolerate any secret society and is especially violent against Masonry. Quezon argued with his father confessor against the prejudice in the Church against Masonry. The priest said: "Ah! you do not know--they don't let you know what the real secret purpose of those in control of it cherish--they spit on the cross!" Quezon protested. "Do you know who I am--I am the Cardinal of the Masons--I almost might say their Pope! I am the Grand Master of the Blue Lodge." But it was all to no effect--he had to give in.

Conversation with Mrs Quezon on her voyage with Mrs Buencamino to Java in 1936. The Dutch Government would pay her no direct courtesies because she came unofficially. The American Consul General in Batavia told her of all the precautions the Dutch

Government had taken to prevent the Javanese leaders from meeting her. Two of the Javanese leaders, ladies who had been educated in Europe came to Mrs Quezon's hotel room after midnight and asked that the door be locked. Mrs Quezon had already refused the room prepared for her so as to avoid the possibility of dictaphones. These two ladies begged her to help them towards independence. She said in reply that the Filipinos had succeeded because they were united under her husband (!). But the Javanese replied that they could do nothing to that end because they could not assemble to unite--the Government would not even allow more than two of them to meet together after dark.

The Japanese, she said, through their cheap and excellent shops in Java as well as through the excellent manners of their shopkeepers were making great headway with the Javanese.

The Dutch system of rotation of crops included also rotation of agriculturalists --so the native farmers never felt they owned any of the fields!

March 11, 1943. Shoreham Hotel. Conversation with Major (Dr) Trepp. Disillusionment of a doctor.

Dr Trepp, aged 56, short, stocky with thick shoulders and a round skull--a typical "alpine." Comes from a Swiss village on the Italian side of the Alps, lying at an altitude of 1,500 meters. This used to be a 40 horse post-road station run by his grandfather before the St Gothard Tunnel was opened. Has a son in the American army in Tunisia; says that if his son dies, he will kill himself. Anyway, he is really more seriously ill himself than Quezon is.

For ten years was head of the Quezon Sanitorium outside Manila--is a specialist in TB.

His round, pale blue eyes, express a sort of childish innocence which he conceals with a brusque manner. At bridge, his "dooble" comes forth with a crack like that from the long rifle of a Swiss sharpshooter.

When Quezon left Manila for Corregidor on December 28, 1941, he took Trepp with him as a "personal physician." Trepp says: "I believed he was a god." During the weeks on Corregidor, Quezon had a sharp attack of bronchitis and perhaps a touch of pneumonia. "The food for all of us was rationed to two scanty meals a day--but Quezon had mutton chops and beefsteak." Trepp added: "I lost forty pounds there." I asked if Quezon had been brave during the bombardment. Trepp answered: "Quite the contrary." He added: "I once, afterwards, asked Colonel Nieto, his a.d.c., about all the exploits told by Quezon in his book, of his *insurrecto* life--how he had fought in this and that engagement and Nieto answered. 'Yes! behind a tree.' When we got to Negros," continued Trepp, "Quezon had bought two automobiles, which he left behind him there. When we boarded the planes in Mindanao for the journey to Australia, all the rest of us were obliged to leave our clothes behind, so that the seven chests of valuables belonging to Quezon and his family could be carried. Once he was in Melbourne, he bought two more automobiles and rented a house at \$500 a month for six months. A few weeks later, we were on the *Coolidge* en route for the United States."

Then with some indignation Trepp added:

"On April 9th, 1942, in Melbourne, Australia, we received word of the fall of Bataan. Nieto and I went up to the President's apartment and told him the news of the disaster. He was seated in a chair with the family gathered about him looking over the silver and jewelry and personal possessions they had been able to bring from Malacanan Palace on their flight. It had been taken out of the bank in Melbourne that day and a little later was sent back there. Nieto and I went downstairs and cried." This simple Swiss was evidently unaccustomed to the life of those who sit in the seats of the mighty, nor did he allow for the fact that Quezon had known from day to day, through General MacArthur of the approaching and certain disaster to the armies on Bataan and Corregidor.

I asked Trepp why Quezon had spent \$20,000 of the Government's funds in redecorating and refurnishing the suite in the Shoreham Hotel in Washington? "\$20,000!" he cried: "it was \$60,000--I saw the bills." Trepp, with his Swiss conscience did not understand the tremendous inner urge in Quezon to be always building and recreating Malacanan and all of his surroundings as President of the Philippines. It not only compensated Quezon's own soul for his starved surroundings as a *barrio* boy in Baler during his childhood, but it truly expressed, as Quezon believed, the desire

of a people approaching nationhood to "put their best foot forward." However brilliant the Swiss may be in interpreting the psychology of foreigners who come there to have themselves analyzed by their doughty psycho-analysts, the rest of the world will always be a puzzle to these fierce democrats of Switzerland.

Quezon had told me that the offer of "independence with honour" was made him by the Japanese before he took his final decision to fight alongside the Americans. Trepp now tells me that Quezon did not learn of this offer until he was in Melbourne, some months later, and that then his first comment was: "If I had only known!"<sup>226</sup>

Poor lonely, defeated man! He had been ousted from "the seats of the mighty" and plunged into the depth of "some divine despair."

One's comment on Trepp's perhaps quite natural feeling is that "any man may be a hero--except to his valet."

March 12, 1943. Shoreham Hotel. Lunch with Mr Cancera, private secretary to Quezon. Cancera much bothered by the President's frequent changes of plan for his trip to Florida causing the utmost possible inconvenience to everybody around him. This is the usual performance, but none of them get really used to it, and all grumble as much as they dare. I asked Cancera how the President got that way? He replied: "It was his life in Malacanan--absolute authority; all opposition crushed--complete selfishness--thinks about nobody but himself."<sup>227</sup>

Cancera is a young man, son of a farmer in the Cagayan valley. He is tall, lithe and graceful. His chin is up, his shoulders thrown back. He would look equally as well in a G-string and necklace of cowrie shells, and with a spear in his hand instead of a pen. As it is, he contents himself with a suit of "Kollege-Kut Klassy Klothes," and flirts with all the waitresses. As this is the only possible way to get served in an American restaurant, it must be admitted that he shows a good deal of practical sense. He possesses a measure of native dignity and good taste in his pride of country. He is not impressed by American movies.

I told Quezon about the School of Military Government at Charlottesville. He replied: "Not one of those--fellows will get to the Philippines. The President has assured me that the first man to land there will be President Quezon, arriving in an American battleship."

Discussion of the Moro problem: Quezon pointed out the mistake of Americans in not letting the Sultan govern Jolo--that they would thereby have avoided all those disorders and little wars. The Americans whom he left last Spring in Mindanao made another mistake: the American Army officers have always believed that the Moros loved them and hated and despised the Filipinos. General Sharp (in command there) and his staff were making plans for the great aid the Moros would render in repelling the Japanese in Mindanao. Quezon said to Sharp: "That's all very well, but for God's sake don't give them any guns." The other day he was laughing over a report from MacArthur of questions put by one of his staff to an officer who had escaped from Mindanao--the staff officer was trying to bring forth an answer showing how the Moros loved the American Army, and asked what kind of people the Moros were killing now? "Oh! every kind--Americans, Filipinos and Japanese" was the answer. As a matter of fact they had recently assassinated three American Army officers.

I suspect that Quezon's own policy toward the Moros is that of the American of past days in our own country. "The best Indian is a dead Indian."

When Quezon, before the war, granted permission to 10,000 Jews to settle in the Philippines at the rate of 1,000 a year, the Jewish Committee picked out, as the best farming land--Lanao! Quezon says he refused this, since they wouldn't be alive at the end of a year. Quezon tells me that Lanao has as many rich and wonderful Moro farms as has Jolo nowadays.

Quezon settled the question of the recent succession to the Sultanate of Jolo, by refusing to make the choice. The Government of North Borneo, a territory most of which is part of the Jolo Sultanate, wrote to him to enquire whom he now recognized as Sultan. He replied: "The Sultan is, for us, only the head of his Church--he will

<sup>226</sup> See Quirino, pp. 340-341.

<sup>227</sup> Cancera overlooks Quezon's handling of Osmena and the Democrata party in the '20s. Quezon began thinking of himself long before entering Malacanan.



not meddle in the choice." So the North Borneo Administration sent for the two candidates to come to Sandakan and present their claims--which they did. Datu Umbra, himself of the late Sultan, the royal blood, the husband of Princess Dayang-Dayang, niece of the late Sultan, was elected over the other claimant--a brother of the late Sultan.

This decision aroused two factions in Jolo, and greatly weakened their subsequent claim to the North Borneo lands. Some years later, the Chartered Company of North Borneo transferred "their" land, to Great Britain--but they had waited for this momentous action until six days after the inauguration of the Philippine Republic! Thus the Jolo Moros were dispossessed of their great inheritance in North Borneo!<sup>228</sup>

The question of Quezon's health is always to the fore, every day of his life. Even his American friends in the Philippines used to say that he used his illness as a means of avoiding unnecessary engagements or contingencies. Dr Trepp tells me that so far as Quezon's TB is concerned, that is perfectly in hand, and there is no reason why he should not live for years. As for his blood pressure, Trepp himself, who, not long ago had a heart attack, has a much higher blood pressure! Recently the President was urged to cut down on his food, and especially to avoid heavy meats. That regime lasted a few days, and then he claimed to be fading away so rapidly, and had become so feeble, he could hardly speak. At once, the family set up a terrible clamor that the doctors were killing him, and the regime was relaxed. It must have been a superb piece of acting. As it is now, he and his family, at least once a day, eat a Filipino dish reeking with fat, and with great lumps of pork, ham and sausage.

Every now and then, Trepp persuades Quezon to go out for a walk, which consists of creeping along the hotel corridors, doctor on one side and a.d.c. on the other, to his luxurious motor. They drive out to the suburbs and Quezon walks slowly for three or four hundred yards. Back home again, Quezon goes to work, or to receiving visitors to whom he talks for hours and hours--rounding off with four or five hours of concentration on bridge, until well after midnight.

Truly a remarkable "invalid"--he wears out all of his associates!

April 29-May 1, 1943. Shoreham Hotel.

Quezon back from three weeks rest at Miami as guest of the military intelligence service. Originally he had planned to have me spend a fortnight with him to "finish his book" but on arrival there with his family he wired me there was no room available for me in the house which was provided for him. The real reason, however, as Trepp tells me, is that he was absolutely tired out, and spent the whole three weeks sleeping, resting and playing two-handed bridge. Dr Trepp says that Quezon is in "good physical condition" but he, Trepp, does not know whether the President will live to get back to the Philippines if that is delayed four or five years longer. Quezon is already homesick, and much depressed by this "global strategy" which has postponed the prosecution of the Pacific War in favour of the European theatre. Trepp says Quezon is "wearing down." He admits it is chiefly a question of spirit, and on this count, Quezon is getting gradually to realize how the cards are stacked against him and his country. Also he is deeply worried as to whether the Filipino leaders will continue to stand by him or whether they are provoked because Quezon and his family are safe in Washington while *they* are suffering under the Japanese occupation.

I had only two sizeable conversations with Quezon in these three days. A good deal of our talk was over the attempt he is about to make, after an hour's conversation he had April 27th with Sumner Welles to get the Administration to pledge itself to two or three principles essential to the future security of the Philippines after the Japanese are expelled. The first of this is the acceptance by the United States after the Philippine Republic is set up, of naval and air bases in the Islands; the ground forces of the air bases to be supplied by the Filipinos. Second, an appropriation of \$600,000,000 by the United States to rehabilitate the Philippines, which Quezon thinks would repair all essential damage done by the Japanese and also allow the Filipinos to industrialize the Islands. Third, support by the United States Government of quota laws on immigration into the Philippines in order "to maintain our occidental, Christian civilization." (This last, of course, refers to Chinese immigration.)

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<sup>228</sup>The loss of the North Borneo (Sabah) lands of the Sultan of Sulu annoyed Harrison. See Harrison, pp. 109-110.

Quezon expressed his present determination to retire at the end of the two years term of his second presidency which will expire November 15, 1943. He gave very sound reasons why he is determined to observe the constitutional provision under which he was elected for a second term of two years, but I told him I did not believe the "United States Government" would allow him to do this. Roosevelt has the power to suspend the Philippine constitution and after his message to Quezon on Corregidor of December 28, 1941, promising "to redeem and protect the independence of the Philippines" had done little since to carry out this promise.

Quezon says MacArthur states that, if, after Pearl Harbor, the United States had delivered an all-out attack on the Japanese with the two task forces in the Pacific, which survived the Pearl Harbor disaster, plus sufficient naval forces then on duty in the Atlantic, Japan could have been defeated at that time.

Roosevelt had agreed, however, to all the propositions of Churchill, when the latter came to Washington about New Year of 1942, to concentrate the first efforts of America and Great Britain on Hitler. Hence the present "global strategy!"

While I was present with him, Quezon received visits from Generals Stilwell and Chennault and also from the Foreign Minister of Australia, Dr Herbert V. Evatt. They all had received an unsatisfactory answer from Roosevelt as to sufficient aid to MacArthur.

All of this weighs with increasing depression upon the bright hopes with which Quezon came to the United States in May of 1942. It is breaking his spirit.

He is intensely interested in the pro-MacArthur wave of sentiment now flooding the United States. Says MacArthur will never consider his own candidacy for the presidency if he is given the weapons and men with which to attack Japan. MacArthur has demanded 500 bombers and 450,000 men; he proposes to skip over the Netherlands Indies and get to Mindanao with air-troop transports. If refused sufficient support, he might become a candidate for the presidency--especially if he has been made to appear a martyr.

Quezon had dinner three nights ago with J. Edgar Hoover and Senator Chandler of Kentucky, the leader of the "pro-Pacific War" group in the Senate. Quezon says J. Edgar Hoover is much of the same opinion as Chandler. During this account of his dinner with them, Quezon cheered up as talked of the wonder Kentucky ham they had eaten--far superior he thought to any so-called "Virginia ham"!

Quezon says that Roosevelt is absolutely "sold" on the Chinese, but adds that he (Q.) would rather live under Japanese rule than under the Chinese, but detests the thought of either.

The speech for which Quezon had been preparing on "Bataan Day" (April 9, 1943) was stopped by Roosevelt who thought it undesirable to commemorate an American defeat. The ceremony was to have been under the auspices of the Treasury Department as a rally to sell war bonds. So, instead of this, Quezon went a week later to Hartford, Connecticut, and spoke at the meeting in honour of General Wainwright, now a prisoner of the Japanese. Wainwright is a Connecticut man.

I tendered Quezon two invitations to come to Charlottesville to speak, but he merely shook his head. One bid was from General Wickersham to address the School of Military Government and the other was from Dabney Welford, President of the Raven Society--Welford had told me he thought that 800 students would attend for such an occasion.

It seems doubtful whether Quezon will finish his book; I turned back to him some fifty typed pages of his account of his experiences on Corregidor with my pencilled notes on it. He expressed no desire to see it. I asked Trepp why Quezon had not wanted to complete his book at Miami and Trepp replied: "He has no mental discipline!"

Quezon said that when he came to Washington in the early summer of 1937 and asked the President for independence in 1938 or 1939, he told Roosevelt how the Japanese had approached him on various occasions asking for "neutralization" of the Philippines, which would have meant withdrawal of the United States forces in case of independence. Roosevelt refused to entertain this idea though expressing himself as in general favour of "neutralization!"

When Quezon first arrived with MacArthur on Christmas eve, 1941, at Corregidor, Quezon wired Roosevelt stating that it was already evident that the Philippines could

not be successfully defended, and equally evident that no immediate relief from the United States was to be expected, therefore he requested Roosevelt to authorize him to approach both Roosevelt and the Japanese, asking that the armed forces of both be withdrawn from the Islands. It was in connection with that request that Roosevelt wired authorizing MacArthur to disband the Filipino Army if Quezon requested it, and at the same time wired Quezon that he pledged the entire resources in men and materials of the United States, so that the freedom of the Filipinos should be redeemed and their independence established and protected. This was the first time that the United States had ever agreed (tho only by presidential announcement) to *protect* their independence. It was on this basis that the battle of Bataan was fought--at least, so far as the important participation of the Philippine Army was concerned.

During all these years of political struggle for the independence of the Philippines neither Quezon nor I had ever considered a protectorate possible--nor that the United States would consent to it. Quezon says: "Nobody fought the American imperialists more constantly and vigorously than I did--but now I would prefer to have them there--so long as they let us have back what we had already gained, and allow us to make our own laws.<sup>229</sup> They will never send another Governor General nor High Commissioner to the Philippines!"

Quezon said that in his visit to him the day before, Dr Evatt, the Foreign Minister of Australia, was in a cold rage against the English. Evatt reacted to the coining of the tricky phrase "*global strategy*" just as I (F.B.H.) had done. Evatt said that when Australia was threatened with invasion by the Japanese, the English would not send back the Australian troops until after the battle of El Alemein, and then returned them with only the clothing in which they stood--not one item of equipment. Evatt was going directly to England to tell Churchill exactly how the Australian troops felt about it. From my own acquaintance with Evatt I have no doubt that he did just that.

Quezon did not believe the English will make much of an effort in the Far East after Hitler is beaten; he quoted Churchill's recent address in which he stated that after victory over the Germans, England would partially demobilize. But, all the same, even if the English leave the job in the Pacific chiefly to the Americans, Quezon is, for the first time in his life, friendly to the English and would be willing to co-operate with them and with the United States in the projects for future security in the Pacific. This is something very new for Quezon, who has always detested the English imperialists.<sup>230</sup> He has heard from me many times how the United States originally took over the Philippines at the instigation of England, and against President McKinley's wishes, but as part of the balance of power, and to avoid a war in 1899 with Germany. Also how the English have always exerted secret pressure on the United States to hold the Philippines as a means of maintaining the balance of power.<sup>231</sup>

Quezon told me at great length of his conversation on April 27, 1943, with Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, which took a full hour, and in which they apparently reached complete agreement. Quezon began by reading to Welles a quotation from a recent address in which Welles had said: "It can never be made too clear nor reiterated too often, that the foreign policy of the people of the United States exactly like their domestic policies, should only be determined from the standpoint of what the American people believe is their real, their practical, self-interest. Our foreign policy must not be based upon emotional altruism or sentimental aspirations!"

Quezon then proceeded to show Welles what the practical self-interest of the United States in the Far East would be, Pearl Harbor has proven to be ineffective to protect United States strategy. The United States, he advises, should take all the mandated islands and make the Philippines their outpost in any plan of defense in the Pacific. Of course he (Q.) knew that he spoke only as a layman, and the General Staffs would have to decide all these plans. Welles interrupted to say that the United States could not take the mandated islands, since that would be contrary to their public professions. That the mandated islands would have to be under international ownership, but the Americans should administer them. With this Quezon agreed, remarking that from the point of view of what he had come to say, it would amount to the same thing.

<sup>229</sup>In my opinion, this was the essence of Quezon's desired relationship with the United States. Cf. Anderson, pp. 129-130.

<sup>230</sup>See pages 29-31, and note 195 of this diary.

<sup>231</sup>See Onorato, *Leonard Wood as Governor General*, p. 93, fn. 98 and 99.!



Quezon then went on to develop his ideas to Welles, stating that a condition precedent to all further agreements should be that the Philippine Republic be recognized by the United States as soon as the Japanese were expelled from the Islands.

He then quoted Roosevelt's cablegram to him in Corregidor that freedom would be regained and protected, etc.

Quezon finally stated that this was his own last year of office as President, that he had yielded last time to the demand for re-election, but only on the basis of two years more, when Osmena could succeed him. He would not stultify the position he had then so publicly assumed, that Osmena had been included on the ticket on his (Quezon's) own insistence, for Osmena was only leader of a minority of the Nacionalista party. He was determined to retire on December 31, 1943. He now asked that the United States come to an agreement on future plans for the Philippines and now wait for the end of the war, so that Quezon could retire in the knowledge that he had completed his program for the Philippines.

What he asked was:

(1) That the United States accept airfields and naval bases in his country (Welles stated that the Army and Navy were in favour of that); that the Filipinos furnish the ground forces for the airfields, and pay their men insofar as they were able.

(2) That the United States contribute \$600,000,000 for the rehabilitation of the Philippines.

(3) That the Philippine Republic be supported by the United States in maintaining the quota systems established for immigration by the Philippine Commonwealth, so that they could sustain and preserve their own form of civilization.

Welles said he was in agreement with all of these propositions, and if Quezon would write him a letter to that effect, he would present the matter to the President within a week.

Quezon commented to me that the sum he asked for rehabilitation would be sufficient, and would also allow them to industrialize, and that fifty years hence there would be 50,000,000 Filipinos, able to defend themselves.

May 15, 1943. Shoreham Hotel.

Dr Trepp tells me that Quezon is in very much better condition; that his blood pressure is down to 160--about right for his age; that the past week has been largely given up to interviews with Supreme Court Justices Murphy and Frankfurter, and when I saw Quezon he told me the "legal" position as to the Philippine Government-in-Exile (probably worked out by the two justices) viz. that only authority since the Japanese occupied the Islands is President Roosevelt, and he will decide about any change in the person to head the Philippine Government-in-Exile. This assures Quezon of continuance in office until the Islands are re-occupied by the United States and a new election is held. This, however, is not the sole cause of Quezon's good spirits and improved health; the allied victory in Tunisia has sent the barometer up again.

Quezon says he has decided to give up his pressure of work as much as possible; no more evening work, and no more bridge. He is alone with his family in the evenings now; during the day he sees only those visitors absolutely necessary. Stays in bed as late as he can in the morning; has indefinitely postponed work on his book.

Called Bernstein and me into conference about the future of the "Office of Special Services" at 1617 Massachusetts Avenue. Will not ask for deferment of draft of the Americans now in that office, since he says he does not feel that he has the right to do so. Bernstein, himself, is not asking for deferment (tells me of the example of what happened to several of the new-style "planners" in the Federal Government); he has evidently been made nervous by the strength of feeling in Congress. Bernstein will be drafted July 1st, and his assistant, Dr Cherin, will probably get a commission this Summer.

Bernstein had submitted to Quezon a memorandum on the future of the "Office of Special Services"--proposing that the head of it hereafter be given cabinet rank, proposing Dr Rotor, the President's Secretary, as head of this office. Quezon refused to consider this, said he could not give up any of Rotor's time and duties as fixed at present. Quezon complimented Bernstein on his work and said that since he

was leaving, he (Q.) had considered abolishing the rest of the office. But now he wished to put me in there to supervise this office--I spending half my time in Washington.

It looks to me if Elizalde had been right in the very beginning (when Q. first made this suggestion to me early in December last) that I was to be a *banana peel* for Bernstein! Since then Bernstein has made very good, and it looks as if the transfer of Bernstein and of his second in command to the army would leave me as the banana peel for the rest of the office!

Some talk in the antechamber of my going on Monday to the Hot Springs Conference with the Philippine delegation, but shortly afterwards they managed to get in touch with General Basilio Valdes, so he came East at once by plane to join the delegation --thus making it all-Filipino, as it ought to be.

Later: Valdes appeared, having come by plane from Fort Leavenworth, where he was studying at the Army Staff College. He was loth to give up his studies, but off he goes tomorrow with Elizalde, Rotor and Zafra to Hot Springs. The American press much vexed because it is not allowed to attend the sessions of the "Food Congress." Newspapers are indulging in all sorts of bitterness and "smear stuff."

May 16, 1943. Shoreham Hotel.

Quezon busy writing a letter in his own hand to Osmena in answer to a brief submitted to him by the latter. This is the opening gun in the contest between the two for the presidency of the Commonwealth after November 15, 1943. Quezon read me the salient points of Osmena's brief, all of which were citations as to the constitutionality of a government-in-exile. Quezon now points out that all of Osmena's authorities refer to formerly *independent* states now (or formerly) in enemy occupation; these examples are irrelevant, since the Philippine Commonwealth has never been an independent government and the issue now lies between the United States and Japan--so the whole subject is in the hands of President Roosevelt, and he alone can decide what part of the Commonwealth Government and of its constitution are in force today. This leaves little doubt that Quezon will remain as President of the Philippines even after his present term of two years, expiring December 31, 1943, has run out. This would bar Osmena from enjoying the two years as President to which he was elected by the Philippine people, just before the invasion by the Japanese. Since Quezon is being privately advised by Justices Murphy and Frankfurter, there can be little doubt of the outcome. Opinion around headquarters is that Osmena will not offer serious resistance.

The part of Osmena's offer to Quezon which aroused the latter's indignation was the proposition that Quezon should continue to live in the magnificent suite in the Shoreham when Osmena assumed the presidency, and that Quezon should become President of the Council of State, which as he points out was the same old suggestion made to me as Governor General in 1919, [*sic*] when Osmena tried to persuade me to disassociate myself from the new Council of State under his own presidency--a proposal which I then rejected.

At all events, Quezon feels that Osmena's offer to him now is "insulting." I have no idea of the contents of Quezon's letter of reply and probably never shall know but I consider it now practically certain that Quezon will remain as President until at least the Philippines are reoccupied. I had previously told him I did not believe that Roosevelt would tolerate any other plan.

Whether this is politically wise for Quezon is another matter. As Trepp says he weakened his political future when he left Corregidor, and the present project that he shall hold the presidency of the Commonwealth for the two years for which Osmena had been elected president by the Filipinos, while practically unavoidable, will weaken him still further with the people at home. *Quien sabe?*

Meanwhile the Japanese radio announcements of statements by leading Filipinos continue to unsettle Philippine headquarters in Washington--however, these are now considered either as downright Japanese lies, or else as statements made under duress. *Collier's*, May 22, 1943, publishes a recent statement by George Vargas: "It becomes our pleasant duty to share the joy of liberated millions . . . victory for Japan is victory for the Philippines." At the same time, the Japanese radio announced that Vargas' son had been sent to Tokyo to the University--ostensibly for study, but we assume, as a hostage for his father's "good behaviour." Manuel Roxas is in his own home in Manila, under "protective custody." Generals Lim and Capinpin have apparently issued statements that the Americans let them down in the Philippine

war and they are in favour of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Both of these Generals are now at liberty.

There is evidently still a great deal of ill-feeling among those who surround Quezon (but not in his own mind) because of the failure of the United States to make any effort to relieve Corregidor, after all the abundant promises made to that end in the early stages of the invasion. Mrs. Bewley, who brought her daughter out just before the fall of Corregidor in an American Navy plane to Freemantle, Australia, is still bitter about the lack of effort made by the United States in the theatre of the Philippines. Her husband is a prisoner in Manila--or at Los Baños. Her plane was the only one of the three that got through. One was shot down over Corregidor and all on board lost; one fell in Lake Lanao and all were drowned. This was the end of what had frankly been considered a "suicide mission."

Quezon took me out for a long drive. I tried to get his mind fixed on pleasant thoughts--got him to tell me of the making of Tagaytay ridge into a resort now by the new road only 40 minutes from Manila--the resort is at 2,500 feet altitude--plenty of water (and wind!).

At Malacanan he has cleaned out the slaughter house and dog pound across the Pasig River and all other "smelly things" on the swampy land opposite the Palace and has turned it all into a park--where I used to shoot snipe! He fears the Japanese will destroy Malacanan if they have to evacuate the Islands. So far they have done no damage there and have not even occupied the Palace.

Secretary Knox told him the Japanese could have taken Dutch Harbor if they had tried; now their occupation of Kiska and Attu really made no difference--we could get them out whenever we cared to try.

Quezon thinks Roosevelt tried to get us into the war immediately after the fall of France but that the American "isolationists" prevented this at that time; it was Pearl Harbor that was the immediate cause of our fighting.

May 24, 1943. Shoreham Hotel.

Osmena was operated upon hurriedly on Saturday last for appendicitis. Quezon goes down to Doctors' Hospital every day to call on him.

The President told me of a recent meeting of the Pacific War Council. Mr Roosevelt had opened with a talk of Attu, of which he had a large map. Evidently, he intended this to be the end of the meeting, but Mr Churchill took the floor. Quezon remarked that if he had not heard his statement, he would have had quite an erroneous idea of the situation in the Pacific merely from hearing Churchill's previous recent address to the American Congress.

The Prime Minister now explained to the Council quite frankly that England could not undertake the prosecution of a campaign in Burma--they could, he said, use only a certain sized force there, and added: "The Japanese are better than we at jungle fighting!" Now, he could not supply the men to put the Burma road into proper condition and to maintain it. "This," remarked Quezon to me "left me in some doubt as to whether the British Government really wanted to help China!" Thereupon, H. H. Kung made a "silly speech" and begged Churchill to open up the Burma road for them, adding that it was probably a choice of generals! Churchill interrupted to say, tartly: "I hope the time will never come when England cannot select its own generals!"

Churchill continued and stated that he heartily backed the present Australian demand, presented by Dr Evatt, for more planes than the 400 he had requested. Roosevelt replied that both Australia and General Chennault were to get more planes than those for which they had originally asked.

In some unexplained way, Quezon seemed to think that the big attack on Japan was to come from Siberia! He also felt that the Philippines would be reclaimed from the enemy by direct attack which would be ruinous to his country.

Quezon added that from listening to these debates on the War Council he is inclined to believe that Churchill will not enter upon any more military or naval enterprises unless he is seventy per cent sure of success. For his own part, Quezon added while attending the meeting of the Pacific War Council, he was confining his part strictly to the interests of the Philippines. These seemed to fit in with the English plans. He recalled such Englishmen as he had liked personally in the Philippines, such as Horace Whittall and Pat Jollye--then he added reflectively: "Who



could ever have expected the time to come when I should appear to be backing English imperialism?" He does indeed, at the present juncture, seem to be inclined towards English strategy. For years I have been cautioning Quezon not to neglect the importance for his country of the sympathetic backing of Great Britain.

Quezon next turned to political history as he had seen it unfold. He believed that Woodrow Wilson was the greatest American of this half century. Of Roosevelt, he commented: "He stands the criticism against him throughout the United States admirably," adding: "I should be bursting out all the time." He thinks Churchill is a greater man than Roosevelt.

Then Quezon turned to recollections of his service in the American Congress as Resident Commissioner from the Philippines, and dwelt on the failure to get the Clarke Amendment to the Jones Bill in 1916 through the House of Representatives. Senator Clarke introduced his bill for independence of the Philippines effective within two years. He was a solitary man who did his own thinking, and never went to the White House. So President Wilson went to Clarke's apartment and asked him to change the period before full independence from two to *four* years because the first World War was then in full swing. Clarke was flattered and accepted the suggestion. The Philippine bill including this "Clarke Amendment" passed the Senate by the deciding vote of Vice President Marshall. In the House, however, Fitzgerald and his large bloc of Roman Catholic Democrats bolted the Democratic leadership and killed the Clarke Amendment. The only Catholics in the House to vote for the amendment were Ansberry of Ohio and Broussard of Louisiana. It appears that Osmena had cabled Quezon from Manila not exactly expressing his own opposition to the Clarke Amendment but quoting adverse opinions of his followers--Rafael Palma, etc.<sup>232</sup>

Independence for the Philippines in 1918 or 1920 would among other favourable results, have prevented the growth there of the "sugar barons" and might even, later on, have staved off the Japanese invasion. Their economy would have stood up to the test at that time better than in the subsequent period when sugar dominated the market.<sup>233</sup>

May 25, 1943. This day stands out in my memory because it was the last time when the President looked like the robust Quezon of a much earlier day. He was exceedingly well dressed and once more entirely gracious as of yore. He welcomed me with one-time cordiality and opened by saying: "Guess where I have been," then went on to state that he had just returned from the funeral of Mrs William Howard Taft, the widow of the former President. He said there had been only about fifty persons in the church, few government officials--none of the Cabinet; only six motors went to the cemetery. Quezon said he had to be "almost carried" up the hill by Lt. Madrigal, his a.d.c. Senator Taft whom he had never before thanked him most earnestly for his presence. Quezon replied to the Senator that Mrs Taft had been so much liked by the Filipinos--she visited the Filipina ladies in their homes and danced the rigodon with Filipinos. In reporting this incident to me Quezon added: "Not so Mrs Wright. Governor General Wright was a much abler man than Taft, but his wife did him no good." Taft as Secretary of War removed Wright. Quezon remarked that "after all the two most significant names in the history of American Government of the Filipinos were Taft and your own. It took just as much courage for Taft to stand up to the Army officers as it did for you to fight the bureau chiefs and imperialists a decade later." That afternoon my wife and I enjoyed an excellent game of bridge with Quezon.

May 26, 1943. Doria and I sat in a taxi today with Mrs Paul McNutt who had not seen our small daughter Ursula since she was a baby of three weeks at Baguio, six years ago. Mrs McNutt was looking lovely and very smartly dressed. She commented on the regal style in which the Quezons lived at the Shoreham; and said that sometimes when she entered the hotel with her arms full of bundles; as one was obliged to do nowadays; she met Mrs Quezon flanked by two a.d.c.'s! Said that she herself had once been a refugee (from Mexico); but that was not the way people expected refugees to look! It was good-natured but ironic.

The Japanese radio (Domei) states that Vargas announced that all Filipinos should celebrate Japanese Navy Day (May 17) since the freedom of East Asia had been assured by the shattering by the Japanese of the Anglo-American and Dutch navies!

<sup>232</sup>See Stanley, pp. 221-225. See also note 91 of this diary.

<sup>233</sup>This is difficult to know. Sugar gave the Philippines a surplus which allowed for trade deficits with the rest of the world.

Arnaldo in charge of the library in the Commonwealth Building (1617 Mass. Ave.) says that it is not believed that the Japanese have destroyed any libraries in the Philippines, except possibly a part of the University Library. That the Philippine National Library was untouched, except that probably they took the old documents for their own great collection of Filipiniana in Tokyo--as, also possibly all the priceless collections of Professor Otley Beyer.

Sitting in the lobby of the Shoreham that evening with Dr Trepp, we saw Quezon and his daughter Baby going toward the front door for a drive. Quezon went up the three or four steps nimbly almost waving his rubber-tipped cane. Trepp observed that if he had seen us, he would have been leaning feebly on Baby's arm. Trepp told me that the President was a "used-up" man, physically; that there was nothing organical serious about his condition, and that he should live for from 5 to 10 years more--but was gradually wearing down. Says he (Trepp) saved Quezon's life in 1932 and at first Quezon was grateful to him and put him in charge of the Sanitorium later replacing him there by Dr. Cañizares and making Trepp the latter's "adviser."h As soon as Trepp had taught the Filipino doctors his methods, they shoved him aside.h Quezon has not been generous to him in later years, but Trepp had built up a five private practice in Manila, and had put his savings into successful gold mines.

Trepp said he "simply adored" Quezon until they went to Corregidor--but thought his leaving Manila a terrible mistake (of course, Trepp did not know of the pressure and specious promises of help from Roosevelt).

May 27, 1943. Lunch with Mrs Luther Bewley, the wife of my old director of education in the Philippines, who is now a prisoner of the Japanese at Santo Tomash She and her sweet daughter were the last to escape from Corregidor by plane.

She admires MacArthur and particularly so Wainwright and says the latter became very bitter against the Administration for breach of promise as to the relief of Bataan and Corregidor. She added that the Commander of the Philippine Department several years before the war went home and pleaded to have Corregidor supplied with sufficient food and ammunition to withstand a six years's siege--actually they had only three months' supply! Says Chief Justice Jose Abad Santos was present in the deliberations of the Cabinet with Quezon before they went to Corregidor: they framed four questions and cabled them to Roosevelt and got categorical and favourable replies as to help to be sent immediately, and how much and when! Then nothing was done. Santos became bitter and refused to leave the Philippines with Quezon, was caught by the Japanese and shot.

Mrs Bewley said she saw Manuel Roxas at Dansalan in Mindanao. The Japanese were then only 20 miles away; Roxas refused to come with them, largely on Wainwright's advice. Filipinos are exceedingly bitter against Quezon for leaving. Mrs Bewley added that before Pearl Harbor, all Army and Navy officers in the Philippines thought war with Japan could be won in three weeks. Roosevelt knew perfectly of the ill-feeling between the Army and Navy commanders at Pearl Harbor, and did nothing about it.

Finally, Mrs Bewley expressed the opinion that Quezon could win back his people upon his return to the Philippines.

This is the last entry in my diary for almost thirteen weeks. President Quezon nearly demonstrated the old saying that "a funeral breeds funerals." He fell seriously ill a few days after going to the cemetery to attend the funeral of the late Mrs Taft.

September 6-9, 1943. Saranac Lake, N.Y.

This is the first entry in this diary for more than three months. Early in June, Quezon was attacked by bronchitis and soon developed a serious attack of tuberculosis. Dr Trepp was frankly alarmed--he told me that Quezon was a worn-out man, and expressed himself as uncertain whether he could pull Quezon through this time. I suggested Saranac Lake, of which Trepp had never heard, but he understood at once when I mentioned the name of the famous Dr Trudeau. So, after a couple of weeks in Washington and an equal period at Doctors' Hospital in New York, Quezon was taken to Saranac.

Before leaving Washington, Quezon was not allowed to speak above a whisper, and the Cabinet met in his bedroom, where the President designated Osmena to act for him, and in case the latter was incapacitated (as he then was!), Elizalde was to act as and for the President. This selection, inevitable as it was, created vast confusion among high officials--Quezon's secretary, Dr Rotor, and Bernstein, head of the Office

of Special Services, were frankly uncertain whether they could (or would) get on with Elizalde!

Meanwhile, Osmena, who, as already noted, has been suddenly operated on for appendicitis, came through safely, and then developed an infection and a high temperature. The first two occasions when I visited him in his bed in Doctors' Hospital in Washington, he could not speak--only moved his eyelids. I then thought he might die in my presence. My third visit, a fortnight later found him sitting up in a wheel chair and conversing agreeably; I told him he would soon be dancing again, and to clinch the matter he stood up and did a couple of fox-trot steps. He has been more or less acting as President ever since, somewhat to the surprise of Elizalde, who had expected Osmena to be out of business for a year.

Quezon's 65th birthday was at Saranac on August 19, 1943; shortly after that I heard that he was going to send for me; a telegram on September 4, from Rotor asked me to go up to Saranac for a week.

On arrival, I found all the customary "court circle" at MacMartin camp--Mrs Quezon, the three children and all their usual suite. Osmena and Bernstein were there, and Valdes and young Madrigal soon arrived. They were all gayer and in better spirits than I have seen them since their arrival in the United States in May, 1942. Quezon was said to have gained five pounds, and was contemplating an early return to Washington to escape the cold weather at Saranac. Trepp seemed resigned to the move, although he was enjoying himself in surroundings which reminded him of his native Switzerland. Quezon had the steam heat on in the house all summer, and part of his "outdoor" porch enclosed!

I found Quezon still on his back in bed, he was obliged to talk in an unaccustomed low voice, and easily became tired. Osmena, Bernstein and I were at once employed on several alternative forms for a joint resolution of Congress declaring that the Philippines were and of right ought to be free and independent, that independence was to be granted as soon as the invader was driven out of the Islands and was to be secured, and the United States was to make good the ravages of war.

Quezon had received at Saranac a visit from Secretary of War Stimson on the latter's journey to the Quebec conference. Stimson had been deeply disturbed by the Japanese political maneuvers in the Philippines (as, indeed I have been myself). They feared that the Japanese grant of independence might rally a certain number of Filipinos to aid the Japanese army to resist the coming American attack on them in the Philippines. Stimson told Quezon that if this occurred, he (S.) would feel like committing suicide. Millard Tydings, the Senator from Maryland, Chairman of the Committee on Territories etc., had been staying nearby with his father-in-law, ex-Ambassador Joseph E. Davies, and the two of them had come over to visit Quezon. Tydings then told Quezon that he would "father" "any damn thing" to which the President would agree in order to meet this situation.

So, together with Osmena and Bernstein, I worked for the first day on the various forms offered for the proposed joint resolution. We could see Quezon for only an hour in the morning and the same length of time in the afternoon. That night Osmena and Bernstein returned south.

Talk with Colonel Manuel Nieto, Quezon's loyal friend and chief a.d.c. He told me that they had recently seen a colonel (American) who had escaped from the Philippines in July last. He reported that the Filipinos still have 10,000 troops in Mindanao; that there the Japanese held only Davao, Zamboanga, Misamis and the country up as far as Lake Lanao. The Filipinos can operate elsewhere in Mindanao as they wish. Tomas Confesor has a sort of government in existence in parts of Panay and adjoining islands; Samar and Leyte are for the most part unoccupied by the Japanese. Parts of Cebu are still in the hands of Filipino commandos; Luzon is pretty thoroughly occupied by the enemy.

In conversation at lunch I condoled with Mrs Marcos Roces over the death of her brother-in-law, my good friend Don Alejandro Roces. It seems that the news had been kept from her--I don't know why! In talking over this with Quezon later he remarked "Roces was better dead than left alive to explain later his attitude in his newspapers (*La Vanguardia*, *Taliba*, etc.) which had been pro-Japanese from the moment the enemy occupied Manila!" Quezon added that he would not himself hang any of the pro-Japanese Filipinos upon his return, though he added that "some of them may be killed before we can take control." The general impression is that the Filipino people can distinguish accurately between those who are really pro-Japanese and those who are merely co-operating formally to preserve what they can of their country. Quezon



quoted again the cable he sent to Roosevelt before leaving for Corregidor, that "if a government cannot afford protection to its citizens it cannot claim their allegiance." It seems that thereupon Roosevelt cabled MacArthur to release the Filipino Army if Quezon demanded it, but also cabled Quezon his famous message "promising to redeem and protect the Philippines and give them their independence." Quezon added that he had changed the word "redeemed" when he issued to the Filipino people the proclamation publishing Roosevelt's message, on the basis of which the Filipinos fought the battle of Bataan. Roosevelt did not know that MacArthur had showed Quezon the message allowing him to disband the Philippine Army if Quezon insisted. Quezon praised Roosevelt's attitude very highly.

He told me that Stimson's recent visit to London was to insist that a more vigorous war be waged at once. Hence the pronouncements to that effect at the subsequent Quebec Conference.

About the so-called "independence" offered by the Japanese to the Filipinos, Quezon said: "As soon as I heard that the voting was to be done only by members of the *Kalibapi*, all my anxieties were ended. If it had been a vote of the Filipino people I would never have gone against it--I would have resigned." (As a matter of opinion, the Filipinos are said to have "adopted" the new constitution by the vote of 181 hand-picked members of the *Kalibapi*!) This attitude of Quezon toward his retention of the presidency is uncertain in my mind. When Osmena and Bernstein left after handing him the various forms proposed for a joint resolution of Congress, Quezon in bidding good-bye to Osmena said "If this resolution passes Congress before November 15th, I shall resign because I am ill." Mrs Quezon also told me that when they go back to Manila, it would not be to reside in Malacanan Palace, but in their own house! On the other hand, Trepp says that he knows Quezon is going to retain the presidency, since he has overheard the negotiations on that subject!

After Osmena and Bernstein had left, I worked for two more days with Quezon on the joint resolution and the various alternative forms were whittled down to one, declaring the Philippines independent, etc., as soon as invader was ejected and reciting Roosevelt's famous message of promises to "redeem, secure, etc. and to repair."

Just as I was leaving to return home, well satisfied with the draft of the joint resolution and Quezon's proposed letter to President Roosevelt, a telephone conversation between Mrs Quezon and ex-Governor General Frank Murphy in Michigan introduced another uncertainty into Quezon's mind! Murphy was then quoted as having said that "he did not want the Philippines to be treated like India, and the resolution must grant immediate independence and he was going to Washington to get it!"

Canceran, the President's private secretary, who had been busy all day for three days typing and retyping forms of the resolution as Quezon thought of new improvements, sadly said to me: "That is the trouble with the President, he always changes his mind at the last moment, upon new advice."

Well, we shall see, what we shall see.

Roosevelt and Stimson are already committed to the earlier proposition--i.e., independence as soon as the Japanese invader is thrown out. (The other form might look as if the United States were evading their obligations).

It seems that Quezon has had Dr Cherin, an assistant of Bernstein, working on the re-writing of Quezon's book this summer, though Quezon told me nothing of that. The real hitch in publication is that Quezon cannot yet tell the full story of the all-important interchange of cablegrams between himself and Roosevelt before the battle of Bataan.

September 29, 1943. Shoreham Hotel.

Quezon back from Saranac in his apartment in the Shoreham; still on his back and confined to his bedroom; full of fight over the joint resolution introduced in the Senate by Mr Tydings for immediate independence of the Philippines. No fever and yet not much strength--but the spirit burning fiercely. Tries not to speak and writes his remarks on a pad, but occasionally breaks in with a muffled voice.

The story of the joint resolution since I left Quezon in Saranac nearly three weeks ago, is the substitution for our form for independence (as soon as the Japanese are driven out of the P.I.) of a straight-out declaration for immediate independence, as suggested later by Frank Murphy. When Murphy got back to Washington he telephoned the White House that he did not want the Philippines "treated like India."

Quezon has sent the two forms of resolution down to Tydings who had gone to see Roosevelt (for the first time in years) and, while he seems not to have actually shown the resolution he had selected (and enlarged) for immediate independence, he came out and announced that Mr Roosevelt and Secretary Hull were in favour of it, and introduced it in the Senate on September 24th with a brief statement stressing the importance of preventing the Japanese grant of "independence" from influencing any Filipinos to fight alongside the Japanese army when our forces re-entered the Philippines.

Then the opposition got to work in the press. Mr Walter Lippman attacked the new resolution introduced by Senator Tydings in two newspaper articles on September 28th and 30th, and Quezon replied to the first in very vigorous terms on September 29th, being ably supported by the veteran journalist, Mr William Philip Simms. Editorials in the *Washington Star* and *Washington Post* opposed the Tydings' resolution.

Quezon as is usual in one of his political fights, is alternately in high spirits and in the trough of depression.

I saw him at 6 p.m., September 29th, and he opened up by writing his views to me, in answer to my remarks. He said he had been willing to accept independence when the Japanese were expelled, but now it was too late to yield on immediate independence--the Filipinos could not be made to understand. He added "rather than yield, I'll go Jap.H" Stimson and the Interior Department (Ickes) were opposed to it, according to Quezon; Roosevelt was writing his message to Congress on the subject, and was to send it first to Quezon on Monday, October 4th. Quezon had sent General Valdes before the Senate Committee to read his (Q's) views in support of the resolution "word by word" and could not now retract.

I told him this move should have been made last February (1943) when we first took it up--but Quezon said that Osmena was then opposed. (Quezon was also then uncertain of Roosevelt's position on the question.)

The President then reached under his pillow and showed me two telegrams from MacArthur of September 25th, and 27th, 1943. The first congratulated Quezon upon Tydings' resolution, and said he knew of no people who would better adorn independence than the Filipinos. That early in August he (MacArthur) had become deeply concerned over the possible effects of the Japanese declaration of "independence" for the Philippines and had cabled the Chief of Staff that it was necessary for the United States to grant independence before the Japanese did so, and had asked the Chief of Staff to show his cable to the Secretary of War and to the President. MacArthur added that probably Quezon had not been apprised of his cable!

MacArthur's second cable was to ask Quezon, in the event of the passage of Tydings' resolution, to give MacArthur command without salary of the Philippine Army to use with the American Army to reconquer the Philippines, a task to which he had dedicated the rest of his life.

At this point Andres Soriano came in and joined us; he is trying to get released from his post as Secretary of Finance; but Quezon told him (in Spanish) that he must wait until next May.

Later I dined with Soriano; he told me he had been trying ever since last Spring to get out of the Cabinet; he wanted to join the Philippine Army in Mindanao and be a general officer there. Also wishes to launch his preparations for the rehabilitation of the Philippines. Wants to make it an industrial and shipping nation to take over part of the business in the Islands of the class of enterprise which had made Japan so strong in the past. Quezon kept telling him to wait.

September 30, 1943. Did not see Quezon this day; he had a Cabinet meeting for half an hour at 11:30 a.m. and then "slept" the rest of the day.

Talked with Dr Rotor and Bernstein. The latter says Quezon is emotionally very much upset by the editorials in *Washington Post* and *Washington Star*; and very angry with Lippman. Rotor says Quezon is always pessimistic towards the end of a political fight; he walks right up to an issue, fights every step with all his might and then becomes pessimistic over probable results.<sup>234</sup> Bernstein added that since that con-

<sup>234</sup>This was a characteristic of Quezon's make-up. During a "fight" with an opponent he was super-charged by the dynamics of the conflict. Then, after sober second-thoughts, Quezon would plunge into concern, almost despair, that he had

versation in Saranac at which we were present when Quezon told Osmena that if the resolution passed by November 15th he (Q.) would resign because he is ill, Bernstein had heard nothing more on the subject. He says that at the time Quezon was sincere, but he (B.) never believed that Quezon would quit.

Talk with Resident Commissioner Elizalde who was more cordial than usual; he had helped Tydings to draw up the resolution as finally introduced. Thinks the idea inspiring and beautiful.

Discussed with him the Mountbatten appointment; he said it was not done in order to interfere with MacArthur, but so as to have British forces reconquer their lost Asiatic colonies; thus they can hold them. Otherwise if done by Americans or under American Command the United States might insist on independence for these colonies. At least the United States would be embarrassed by the matter! Elizalde said also that General Marshall, Chief of Staff, did have a "run-in" with Churchill at Quebec-- Marshall is no "yes man." Elizalde insists that old General Pershing is in an army combination with Marshall, Admiral King and General MacArthur.

Friday, October 1, 1943. Saw Quezon at 10:30 a.m. He was writing a letter to Judge Samuel Rosenman the newly appointed counsel for President Roosevelt stating that he (Q.) understood that the draft of Roosevelt's message to Congress which Rosenman was to show him (Q.) on Monday next, was now ready. Quezon now asked to see it before Monday; also a copy of any joint resolution which had been before the President. "So that we may know exactly what we are agreeing or disagreeing upon."

He paused to say: "It's all that damned Stimson" (to whom, by the way, he is deeply attached). He went on to say Tydings had telephoned him to stand firm; that "they will get the Tydings resolution or they will get none." The Monday meeting was to consist of Stimson, Tydings, Rosenman and Quezon in his bedroom.

Having finished his letter and given it to Canceran to type and to send to the White House, Quezon indulged in some hearty cussing of the Jews (Lippman and Rosenman). He expressed his wonder that the Jews, a small nation of only some ten million were able to run the United States.

October 6, 1943. Shoreham Hotel.

Went to the Commonwealth Building and talked with Osmena, Bernstein and Rotor. The meeting to discuss the joint resolution for Philippine independence had been held on Monday at 2 p.m. in the drawing room of Quezon's suite at the Shoreham--Quezon being pushed in on a wheel-bed. Others present were Secretary of War Stimson, Secretary of the Interior Ickes, Under Secretary Abe Fortas, Senator Tydings, Vice President Osmena and Judge Rosenman. Bernstein and Canceran were, on Quezon's invitation, in the adjoining dining room and heard it all.

Quezon opened the proceedings with a well-measured statement in perfect good humour. Then Stimson, who appeared much vexed, stated his case--he said he had understood he had made an agreement with Quezon at Saranac which included a joint resolution for independence *after* the Japanese were driven out, and this had been broken by the introduction of the Tydings resolution for *immediate* independence. He (Stimson) had previously taken up the matter with Roosevelt and an agreement had been reached. It had since been broken.

Thereupon, the President's message to Congress on the proposed resolution was read and approved by those present. This message stated that Roosevelt was "sure the American people believe that the Filipino people have earned the right juridically to be free and independent" and that "the date of July 4th, 1946 for their independence had already been fixed by Congress and approved by the Filipino people" and that "it

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allowed himself to be swept along. One example might suffice: when the Filipino members of Governor Wood's cabinet resigned at Quezon's insistence, he was exhilarated by the power he had exercised over his compatriots and the embarrassment that he caused Wood. Shortly thereafter, the Philippine legislators, sitting as the Commission on Independence, voted to demand the immediate recall of Leonard Wood. Stunned by the sudden unexpected turn of events, Quezon hastened to Malacanan Palace to assure Wood that he had not instigated the demand--as he had not. Then to show his good faith, the recall resolution was quietly pigeon-holed. There are numerous other instances where Quezon was whip-sawed by his emotions. He was possessed of monumental ambition to become the first Filipino head (or chief) of government. Anything he did that might jeopardize that dream caused him untold anguish.



is possible, however, that the fortunes of war will permit an earlier consummation of this joint will by the American and Filipino peoples!" Therefore he asked Congress for power, in consultation with the President of the Philippine Commonwealth to advance the date. He also asked for power to adjust with the Philippine President provisions for their security and that Congress provide for future security for the Philippines and for reparations for the ravages of war.

I learned later from Vice President Osmena that the question of the insertion in the message of President Roosevelt of a request for a provision by the Filipinos of airfields, naval stations and garrisons for American needs, also came up at this conference. Quezon requested that all mention of these subjects be left out of the joint resolution of Congress--to be arranged later. This was agreed to.

It seems that Secretary Ickes had taken little part in the discussion, only expressing politely to Senator Tydings his own support of Secretary Stimson's views.

Rosenman, likewise, kept discreetly silent, except for a suggestion of a phrase needed; finally he asked if he could now report to President Roosevelt that they were all in agreement--which was granted.

Rotor, Bernstein and Canceran consider that the outcome of the conference was a great triumph for Quezon, and report that as a result the President was in the highest spirits. I could not see him myself because Dr Trepp reported that Quezon was completely tired out but that he wished me to wait over in Washington until he could receive me.

Osmena informed me that the Departments of State, War, Navy and Interior had been opposed to the resolution drafted by Senator Tydings declaring for immediate independence of the Philippines. He, Osmena, was very well satisfied with the outcome of the conference.

I met in the Shoreham a Lieut. Col. Manning, who as a young officer had been one of Governor General Wood's satellites. He expressed himself as being still completely opposed to Philippine independence but the same time was in favour of freeing all the English colonies!

October 7, 1943. Shoreham. Cabinet meeting at 11:30 a.m. in drawing room of Quezon's suite. The President in a wheel-bed. Vice President Osmena on his right--Andres Soriano, Auditor Hernandez; Commissioner Elizalde, Major General Valdes, Col. Romulo, Presidential Secretary Dr Rotor and Canceran. After they were all seated, Quezon invited me in.

He opened up with a statement explaining all the events which finally resulted in the President's message. He began in a very low and solemn voice, in a perfect hush; I did not know what was coming, and for a moment thought that he was leading up to an announcement of his resignation as President of the Commonwealth. Dr Rotor and Canceran were at his side taking down the statement in shorthand. Quezon's voice grew firmer and more animated as he proceeded. I hope to have a copy of that statement. The most interesting part to me was his account of the attitude of Stimson; the latter had believed an agreement had been reached at Saranac, and when Tydings introduced the resolution (Frank Murphy's idea) for immediate independence, Stimson called Quezon on the phone and told him that their agreement had been broken and he could not support the Tydings resolution. Quezon replied: "Governor, for God's sake don't oppose it before the Senate Committee!" Stimson replied: "Very well, I won't go, but I won't support it!" At the Monday meeting with the others at Quezon's rooms, Stimson was still peeved about the breach of agreement, but after listening to Tydings' explanation and hearing Roosevelt's proposed message read, Stimson said he was satisfied, and got up to go saying: "Everything that has been done here is perfectly all right!"

The position of Tydings was equally difficult. He had previously telephoned Quezon to stand firm for immediate independence, and added: "If they don't take this resolution, they won't get any!" Quezon added to his Cabinet: "I knew this was embarrassing because Senator Tydings had the power: on his committee are Bennett Clark, Burton Wheeler, Vanderhof, Nye--in fact all the *Cimarrones* in the Senate!" On Saturday last, Tydings had broadcast his views and Quezon and his family all listened in. Immediately Quezon sent a wire of appreciation to Tydings and Mrs Quezon sent one to Mrs Tydings. He thinks this had a calming effect on Tydings.

Tydings admitted he had not read the resolution to Roosevelt but had discussed immediate independence and then went out and made a public statement that Roosevelt,

Hull and Quezon were in favour of his resolution. It now appears that Hull was not in favour; but Roosevelt was in an awkward situation vis-a-vis the Senate Committee. He was grateful to Quezon for having been the cause of Tydings' visit to the White House--the first time in years, and he didn't want another break with Tydings. So Rosenman wrote the message as Roosevelt finally sent it.

Quezon told his Cabinet that if Laurel declares war on the United States (as was done by the Burmese--Jap.--Government) he (Q.) will attack him--"not physically of course" (with a rueful smile) "and after my attack on Laurel, our guerrillas will probably kill him. I have, as you all know, refrained from attacking those Filipinos who have supported Japan, but in the event of a declaration of war--I will!"

Quezon also explained that this matter is a little late! He wished to put it through last February, when it would have been far more effective, but was at that time uncertain whether Roosevelt would support him--and unwilling to make any move to bring himself at loggerheads with the President.

During this meeting of the Cabinet, Osmena has kept his head slightly on one side (deafish in one ear?) and his eyes intently fixed on Quezon's face, with an expression of absolute devotion.

After Cabinet, Quezon invited me to his room to have a cocktail. He was sitting up in bed, quite wreathed in smiles; his face was fuller and he seemed happier than he had been for months--evidently delighted that he had won this triumph, and gratified that he had been able to help President Roosevelt out of a tangle.

I asked him curiously about Judge Rosenman and he replied: "He is a very good lawyer, but he is a politician," meaning that he was very smooth and perhaps not frank.

No sooner had this tangled situation been smoothed out than another very embarrassing issue, which will confront Quezon by November 15th next, raised its head. A precis of this will now be given, but I may add that Quezon's joy was already tempered by the announcement from Tokyo that the Japanese grant of independence for the Philippines is set for next week--October 14th. These are the dregs in Quezon's cup of happiness. There is never a dull moment nowadays!

I now quote from an editorial in the *Washington Post* of October 8, 1943:

"Meanwhile the Philippine Government-in-Exile is being subjected to a severe moral test. The Philippine Constitution, designed to serve the forthcoming republic as well as the Commonwealth, provides that no President shall hold office more than eight years. President Quezon's eight years will be up on November 15. Under the Constitution, he must yield his office on that date to Vice President Osmena, who is also in this country. Some Filipinos fear that their Constitution may be put on ice for the sake of keeping the politically skilled Mr Quezon at the head of the government-in-exile. We do not know whether any such proposal has been seriously entertained, but we are of the opinion that to disregard so vital a provision of the Constitution would be a severe blow to the Philippine Government on the eve of complete independence. It would probably go a long way in the minds of Filipinos in offsetting the advantages of a new independence resolution."

This excerpt from a Washington newspaper ushers in a crisis in Philippine political history. It heralded the opening of a last chapter in the stormy and combative life of Manuel L. Quezon.

On October 14, 1943, the Japanese radio in Tokyo announced the creation of a Philippine Republic by them, and the next day President Quezon in Washington commented upon this event himself in a radio message in which (in part) he said:

"The terms of the alliance as announced by Tokyo clearly show the real purpose behind the granting by Japan of a so-called Philippine independence, namely, to use the Philippines politically, economically and militarily for the successful prosecution of the war of Greater East Asia!"

He reminded his people that "we are bound to America by the ties of gratitude and loyalty."

This radio address of Quezon concluded: "I will return with General MacArthur; and I hope and expect that the Filipino people, when that day comes, will fight on the side of the liberating forces and not allow themselves to be used by Japan who is responsible for the thousands of lives lost, the hardships and suffering of our people and the devastation of our country.

"Filipinos, my beloved countrymen, keep your faith in America. Let us be with her in victory as we have with her in defeat!"

The day of this radio address I saw Quezon again at the Shoreham. He was sitting up in bed and his voice was noticeably stronger than last week--he looked altogether better in health and spirits. Asked me to look over a letter he was drafting to Roosevelt requesting a decision upon the presidency of the Commonwealth, which must be made before November 15th next--the date upon which, under the constitution of the Philippines Quezon's "second term" ends and Osmena is to become President.

Quezon advises Roosevelt that only *he* can decide the matter; that the American press was already taking it up and evidently did not understand the subject; that when on December 30, 1941, on Corregidor in consultation with General MacArthur they two decided to hold inaugural ceremonies and that Quezon should take the oath as President and Osmena as Vice President although the Assembly had not yet been able to meet together to count the votes and announce the election results, as, under the constitution, they were required to do. They had not met because they were unable to do so on account of the invasion. That he had come to the United States on the insistence of Roosevelt to conduct a government-in-exile here, where he (Quezon) was to serve as the symbol of the redemption of the Philippines. That he had come against his own wishes, since he had preferred to remain in the Philippines and share the "bitter lot" of his people. The letter also advises Roosevelt that it was true that Osmena did not agree with Quezon as to the situation and that a copy of this letter was being sent to Osmena, and he asked that Osmena be given a hearing before Roosevelt made his decision.

In discussing the letter, which stressed the fact that it was Quezon who had formed the Philippine Army, which was still fighting in the mountains and in the forests against the Japanese military regime which had dispossessed his government Quezon told me that he had refused "twenty times" Osmena's offer to agree to a clause in a second joint resolution soon to be voted on in Congress, declaring that Quezon should continue as President and himself as Vice President. Evidently he did not think it proper that the American Congress should "elect" them. As soon as they got back to the Philippines, Quezon would favour another election, adding: "No matter what happens, I will be President if I live--I can run the other (Osmena) out completely." His letter to Roosevelt excluded all reference to the "puppet" government selected by the Japanese.

He had wired MacArthur congratulating him on his great air victory at Rabaul, and stating that he hoped to be at MacArthur's side when he re-entered the Philippines. Showed me MacArthur's cabled reply that "he had always envisioned that."

Quezon seemed to have warmed up his anger against Laurel since our last conversation. This, of course, was due to Laurel's acceptance of the presidency from the Japanese. Said he would have an execution of Laurel and Aquino in a public square when he returned.

Said his splendid message of even date to the Filipino people would get to them on short wave radio from MacArthur to the guerrillas. I said I wished to go back to the Philippines with him and he replied: "If I live."

I told him I would like to be on the Commission to settle future relations with the Philippines. He replied that he did not know whether he would be President and so have the power to nominate the nine Commissioners for the Philippines provided for in Tydings' joint resolution. Showed me the resolution as at present drafted, and seemed very happy over the broad and complete provisions for American responsibility for all losses by individuals of whatever nationality who had been damaged in their property by the war.

(Before I had gone in to talk with Quezon, Dr Trepp and Colonel Nieto, perhaps the two persons most in Quezon's confidence, assured me that Quezon had no idea of surrendering the presidency in the middle of this war, and said that the matter was "already cooked"--in Spanish.)

I warned Quezon once more against American Army Occupation of the Philippines--or by the School of Military Government. The old liners of the regular army were



still dreaming of the return of the "days of the empire." He replied: "MacArthur will prevent that--he is not that kind."

He thought that he had won over Tydings completely by his letter to the Senate Committee endorsing Tydings's first joint resolution "word by word" (providing for immediate independence). I reminded him that I had advised him in Saranac only in favour of independence "when the Japanese were expelled" and, if consulted would not have approved the alternative form of resolution for immediate independence, since as soon as I heard of the latter I said (to Canceran)--this will look as if we Americans were giving up our responsibility towards the Filipinos. I had wanted a form of resolution which would get through Congress without friction. He replied that he might not have been able to get the present form of resolution without advancing the other first! He remarked again that Roosevelt was grateful to him for bringing Tydings into relations again with the President. Finally he added that Supreme Court Justice Frank Murphy had advised him that the Philippine Constitution had all been "shot to hell" by the Japanese.

October 27, 1943. Shoreham Hotel, 6:30 p.m.

Quezon invited me to his room for cocktails: Andres Soriano was there with the Tabacalera Spaniard from Bayonne, also Colonel Romulo, Colonel Nieto, Foley and myself. Mrs Quezon also was present. Quezon looked much better; has gained weight and was sitting up in bed. Dr Diño says, however, the blood pressure was still high.

The purpose of the assemblage was evidently to castigate the Franco Government of Spain--hence the strong dash of Spanish blood among those invited and present. The Japanese radio had been playing up the message of *felicitation* of Jordana, Foreign Minister of Spain, to Laurel's new "President" of the "Philippine Republic." Domei had stated this was "the equivalent of de facto recognition of the new Philippine Republic by Spain."<sup>235</sup>

Quezon had prepared a statement for the press which he had submitted to the Department of State. He had no copy, but he and Romulo between them pieced it together by memory. In this Quezon had recited the fact that he had Spanish blood and how proud he had always been of the gift by Spain of Occidental religion and culture to the Philippines from the days of Legaspi and Urdaneta down. He now saw that the Government of Spain was felicitating a Government in the Philippines dedicated to a return of the Filipinos to Oriental culture and the ways of their forefathers of the days of Legaspi. Even the Spanish language which had been recognized and had greatly spread during the forty years of American sovereignty was no longer to be permitted. Approval of this by the present Spanish Government would be a great disappointment to the Spanish in the Islands and would eventually be "very bad for Spanish business there."

Andres Soriano was badly rattled: two years ago he had been an influential supporter of Franco and he now said that this message had been sent by Jordana under German pressure but added that for the past two years Franco had hit the wrong nail on the head every time.

I suggested to Quezon that this had not been "a recognition" of Laurel's Government, such, for example, as would permit the sending of an Ambassador from the Philippines to Spain. He replied that it was the equivalent of a recognition and that the Department of State could regard it as such (Yes! I replied "if they wish to do so").<sup>236</sup> Quezon stated that any Government which recognized the Philippine Government under Laurel was guilty of a declaration of war against the United States.

As we went off, Mrs Quezon and Foley remarked to me that they were sorry the President took it so hard, and excited himself so much over it.

I had half an hour during the afternoon with Dr Rotor, Quezon's secretary, who showed signs of great strain during the uncertainty, as to the "succession." He

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<sup>235</sup>The British Foreign Office wanted to make trouble for the Franco regime because of Spanish willingness to harbor German sympathies during the war. It tried to induce Washington to use Spain's felicitations to the Laurel government as a weapon against the Axis powers and their sympathizers.

<sup>236</sup>Washington was more anxious to preserve relations with Spain than make a diplomatic fuss over the incident. Quezon must have been aware that the State Department did not intend to "attack" Laurel through Spain on his behalf.

finally remarked that if Quezon loses, perhaps it might benefit him in the end to have had a period of rest during which he could build up his strength for the electoral campaign he would go through when he returned to the Philippines. This however did not seem to lessen the strain under which Rotor was suffering.

Osmena came in to see Quezon at 6 p.m. Both were said to be in good humour and were entirely friendly together.

October 28, 1943. Telephone conversation in the morning with ex-Senator Harry B. Hawes, counsel in Washington to the Philippine Government. He said people were about 50 per cent on each side of the succession question. Nobody knew. The joint resolution was not certain to pass because it was not true that Senator Tydings was satisfied with the compromise resolution. Tydings was busy already on his own re-election campaign.

There is to be another "meeting" on Friday of the same officials who attended the previous one--i.e., Quezon and Osmena, Tydings, Stimson, Ickes, Rosenman.

November 3, 1943. Shoreham Hotel.

The issue of the succession to the presidency when Quezon's term, according to the constitution of the Philippines is to expire, now blankets all other considerations at these government headquarters, even the form of the joint resolutions for Philippine independence before 1946; and the rehabilitation of the Islands is not mentioned.

For two hours yesterday afternoon the Philippine Cabinet sat to listen to Quezon's exposition of the succession issue, and broke up in a wrangle.<sup>237</sup> Then Quezon's time was taken up by a lengthy visit from Mrs Ogden Reid of the *New York Herald Tribune*; early this morning, Roy Howard of the *New York World Telegram* took up two more hours of Quezon's time. On the whole, the press of the United States led by W. Lippman and Eugene Meyer (*Washington Post*) have given Quezon a very rough ride on the subject of the succession. It has all apparently been very badly handled. The best (and only) argument for continuing Quezon in office is the *war effort*. MacArthur and Stimson are in accord that Quezon's leadership is a great asset in the proposed reconquest of the Philippines. That consideration should, in my opinion, override all other arguments at this moment. Roosevelt, to whom Quezon appealed to settle the question in his favour, has washed his hands of it, expressing through Rosenman to Quezon his preference that Quezon should remain as President. Roosevelt's excuse is that he has practically recognized Quezon's Government-in-Exile as an independent government. The weakness of this argument is that Congress is only just beginning to consider a joint resolution to advance the date of independence.

On the constitutional question, the Attorney General of the United States has ruled (confidentially) in favour of Osmena's succession on November 15. The only argument against this, as I see it, would be that the Japanese invasion prevented the second term of Quezon as President and of Osmena as Vice President from coming legally into being and thus postponed their second elected term from starting constitutionally until they are restored by the American Army to their proper offices. The consideration of this matter is now to be referred (if at all) to *Congress* in connection with the second i.e., the independence resolution!

This is exactly the solution of the difficulty which has been proposed constantly during this past year by Osmena to Quezon, and latter has refused it point blank "twenty times" as he informed me.

Osmena is pressing his views with quiet persistence and Quezon's objection seems to be based upon an unwillingness to submit the proposal of an extension of his presidency to the action of the American Congress tho willing to have it by dictum of President Roosevelt!

Today (November 3) I went in at 12 o'clock with Dr Arturo Rotor, who is secretary to the President and also a member of the Cabinet. Quezon was sitting up in bed and was looking robust and well as I have seen him in recent years. His TB has entirely healed, and his blood pressure is not causing anxiety now.

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<sup>237</sup>See Gerald E. Wheeler, "Manuel L. Quezon and the Philippine Constitution," *Philippine Historical Bulletin*, 8 (March, 1964), pp. 34-36; Quirino, pp. 368-378; Friend, pp. 235-237; Pacis, pp. 178-203.

Quezon greeted me with the statement: "I shall soon be *Juan de la Cruz*" which suggestion I repudiated. He told me, briefly, the present situation as to the succession and has taken a stand for retirement. "But" he added, "I shall win out in the end" (referring to the elections to be held in the Philippines after re-occupation)!

He then caused Rotor to read aloud the minutes of the Cabinet meeting of the day before. The proceedings had consisted chiefly of a statement by Quezon on the succession. He had begun by reciting that the limitation on the length of service of the presidency of the Philippines had been of his own doing--he was then firmly of the belief that this was desirable. He told them that up to the last moment he had not been sure that Osmena would be his running mate; that the caucus was in favour of either Yulo or Paredes for the vice presidency, and that Manuel Roxas had told him he would be a candidate for the presidency if Quezon did not run! He added that they were besieged in Corregidor at the time of their second inauguration, the constitutional provisions for "counting the votes" not having been observed by the legislature by reason of the Japanese invasion.

Quezon next referred to the extreme reluctance he had felt and expressed at the time to leaving the Philippines upon the insistence of President Roosevelt--he would much rather have stayed with his people and shared their sufferings, or death! He described the journey to Australia, where they found nothing to do, and so to Washington. He even referred to the written statement of Roosevelt, at the foot of the photograph he had given Quezon upon his arrival in Washington in May of 1942, which stands by his bedside. In this, Roosevelt greets "the gallant President of the Philippines" and expressed his belief in the "triumphant return to the Philippines" of Quezon.

Then Quezon proceeded to emphasize the opinion of MacArthur and of Secretary of War Stimson as to his being how an indispensable leader of the Filipinos for the campaign of reoccupation of the Islands; and referred to the report brought him from the Philippines this last summer by Dr Cruz, whom Quezon had sent over there on a secret service mission: Cruz reported on his return that the overwhelming sentiment existing now among the Filipinos was that Quezon should return as President!

Finally Quezon began to discuss the letter proposed to be signed by Quezon and Osmena and the Cabinet asking Congress to "review the whole situation and take such action as will best serve the interests of the Filipino people.!" Apparently neither he nor Osmena were willing to sign the same form of letter to the Congressional leaders, though both were not convinced of the necessity of submitting the issue to Congress!

Next there ensued a long argument in Cabinet between Quezon and Osmena on the form this letter should take. A fair idea of Vice President Osmena's position in this whole matter is presented by a letter he wrote to President Quezon on October 18, 1943, and of which Osmena gave me a copy on November 3, 1943. I quote several of the salient sentences from this letter:

"As I have already indicated to you, I am willing to support whatever plan may be finally decided upon by the proper authorities to be in the best interest of the Filipino people, provided it meets the requirements of law. Whatever the decision may be, it is my hope and desire that we shall continue to work together in the future as we have done in the past! And if it should be determined that the present set-up of our Government ought to be maintained for the duration in the interest of our people's unity, and to better assure the effective prosecution of the war, you may be certain of my continued loyal support and whole-hearted co-operation. . . ! .

"Throughout the struggle for freedom in the Philippines, we have always considered the unity of our people to be essential. If it is held that the Constitution has ceased to be operative in view of the occupation of the Philippines by the enemy, then the question of presidential succession does not arise! If on the other hand it is ruled that the Constitution is still operative, enemy occupation notwithstanding, then the prohibition contained in Article VII, Section 4, of the Constitution that no person may hold the presidency for more than eight consecutive years applies and should be given full force and effect. . . .

"Manifestly, if it were not for its effects on the Constitution and the possibility of misunderstanding, the solidarity of our people and the continuity of our participation in the war program would be aided and promoted by keeping you at the helm of our government. On the other hand, the maintenance of the status quo in the direction of government requires the suspension of one of the fundamental provisions



of the Constitution. This is a very serious step. . . . Moreover, the suspension of the Constitution will establish a bad precedent for the future. . . . Since both of us are personally involved in this question, may I suggest that the matter be brought before the attention of the President of the United States for advice?"

I do not know whether at the meeting of the Philippine Cabinet on November 2, 1943, Vice President Osmena presented these same arguments, but at all events he remained calm and self-assured throughout these stormy proceedings, in sharp contrast to Quezon's irritable and nervous condition.

Finally Quezon tried to bring the whole issue to a vote in the Cabinet. He called upon Don Jaime Hernandez to express the first opinion, because, as Auditor of the Government he had been appointed by the President of the United States, and was not subject to removal by Quezon. In reply, Hernandez asked if they could see the letter of General MacArthur recommending the retention of Quezon as President. This was refused, and the meeting then broke up in a regular wrangle. Quezon finally dismissed them with the statement that he was quitting on November 15th, and would leave Washington on November 14th for California.

This afternoon, November 3rd, Quezon is to see ex-Senator Harry B. Hawes, counsel for the Philippine Government in Washington, to be shown the forms of the two joint resolutions to be submitted to Congress. (The one on independence, the other on the succession).

On November 9, 1943, Senator Millard Tydings secured the passage through the United States Senate of Joint Resolution number 59 for "The Continuation of Philippine Government in Status Quo," without opposition and with very little debate.

On November 10, 1943, Representative Bell of Missouri called up the Senate Joint Resolution in the House of Representatives and ran into stormy weather. It is probable that the brief letter from Secretary of War Stimson which, among others, was read in the House, was the strongest argument for the passage of the resolution. Stimson wrote: "In my opinion the passage of this resolution will greatly assist in a continuous and effective prosecution of the war effort to liberate the Philippines from the Japanese. I hope it may be adopted by both houses promptly."

Never was there a clearer demonstration in American Congressional history that *Silent inter arma leges*.

A touch of home politics was introduced early in the House debate by Representative Cole of New York. He asked Chairman Bell: "In these days of dictators and one-man rule throughout the world, does the gentleman think the adoption of this resolution by the Congress and retaining the two Filipino officials can be taken as any criterion or precedent which the American people might follow in 1944?"

Serious opposition soon developed in the House: doubts were expressed on constitutional grounds by Mr Michener of Michigan, who said, however, that he would support the resolution "to aid the war effort." Mr Gross of Pennsylvania was very caustic. He said: "My information is that this President of the Philippines came over here and brought about twenty aides and servants along with him and left his Cabinet there. . . . I believe had he brought his Cabinet with him, that Cabinet would be here today in support of the Government-in-Exile instead of being the Cabinet of the puppet Government of the Philippines set up by the Japanese. . . . I cannot understand why we should take action like this to keep an old man who is too ill to attend to business, in office, etc.!"

Mr Wadsworth of New York, the spokesman for Secretary Stimson in the House, came to rescue of the resolution, saying: "My support of it springs from my conviction that it will bring a distinct military advantage to us in the conduct of the war in the Far East, and especially in helping us to recover the Philippine Archipelago," etc. He was seconded by Mr McCormick, the floor leader, who referred to Quezon as the "George Washington of the Philippines." Resident Commissioner Elizalde also spoke several times in favour.

Mr Judd of Minnesota stated that "there is quite a section of Filipino opinion in this country which is definitely opposed to this action,<sup>238</sup> and has been warning us for weeks that some such bill would probably be pulled out of the hat at the last moment and rushed through Congress, just as is being attempted here today."

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<sup>238</sup>See Quirino, p. 374.

Finally, there being so much opposition, the resolution was put over for an hour's more debate the next day.

On November 11, 1943, the resolution was taken up again by the House of Representatives. Attention was called by Mr Murphy of Pennsylvania that this same problem for a Government-in-Exile had arisen in the case of Belgium, Iceland, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. Mr Eaton of New Jersey said that "argument about the constitution is simply shadow boxing. . . There is no constitution to bother with. The Japanese have it in the ditch where they have our flag." Mr Lemke of North Dakota said "We are showing that we have as little respect for the Constitutions of other people as Hitler, Mussolini and Hirohito. . . . If this resolution is passed, then we are guilty of the same thing that Japan was guilty of when it set up a puppet Chinese king in Manchukuo." Mr Stefan of Nebraska said: "If we are breaking promises and doing them (the Filipinos) harm by tearing up any part of their sacred Constitution, that should not be done."

Mr Elizalde, the Resident Commissioner, said he "was only supporting this resolution as a war measure. . . . The President of the Philippines authorized me this morning to speak in his behalf and say that he is perfectly in accord with this resolution. In view of what has been said about his (Quezon's) health, that in fact his sickness was caused by hardships in the tunnels of Corregidor."

Mr Curtis of Nebraska said: "I do not like the idea of this Congress passing a resolution to keep anybody in office, to extend their term, to create a perpetuity in office because somebody says it is necessary. The State Department and the War Department say that this resolution is necessary. . . . If we upset that (the Philippine Constitution) and extend the term of the present President the Filipino people are not represented, but the individual who holds office is an agent of the Government of the United States."

Mr Coffee of Washington made a long address in opposition, and characterized the resolution suspending the Philippine constitution as "a dangerous quasi-fascistic piece of legislation that has come before Congress at this time when we are fighting a war to crush fascism. . . . If we pass this resolution we shall be justly criticized the world over for being a wrecker of a country's constitution and sponsor of personal Government."

Mr Hoffman of Michigan and Mr Voorhis of California spoke against the resolution, and Mr Wright of Pennsylvania in favour because General MacArthur "thinks there is nobody who can so mobilize the Philippine spirit behind a fight for independence and a fight against the aggression of the Japanese as their patriot, the man who has led them to independence, Manuel Quezon."

This lively debate ran on for some time longer, and the majority party brought in their biggest gun, the popular Speaker of the House, Mr Rayburn of Texas, in support of the resolution.

The debate was closed by Mr Judd of Minnesota, in opposition. Since his speech aroused President Quezon more than any of the others, I quote a few of Mr Judd's remarks. "There has been a good deal of agitation by persons who had certain reasons for keeping the present President of the Philippines in office. . . . There are 125,000 Filipinos in this country and we have not had a chance to hear a single one of them testify." About Commissioner Elizalde, he said: "He is as he told us yesterday an appointed official, appointed by the man whom it is proposed that we keep in office after his term expires and after it is unconstitutional for him to remain in office. . . . It seems to me we must recognize frankly that if we pass this bill today we will not be choosing a President for the Philippine Islands. Only its people can do that. We will rather be setting aside the man they chose to be their President beginning November 15, in order for us to establish in his place a personal agent of the United States Government. Let us be clear about this. He will not be their president, he will be our *gauleiter*, much as I dislike the word."

Mr Judd then moved to recommit the resolution (i.e., to defeat it) and on that motion, the yeas were 119 and the nays were 169. Then the resolution passed the House by 181 votes to 107.

November 12, 1943. Shoreham Hotel.

The question of the Philippine Presidential succession has been settled in Quezon's favour, but not without a sting in the tail of the transaction.

I saw Osmena first--he had gracefully stepped aside in Quezon's favour, but had reaped all the glory of patriotism and of self-sacrifice. The method of appeal to Congress by a letter "submitting to the President and the Congress the whole question of the Presidential succession in the Philippines" was Osmena's original idea which Quezon fought as hard as he could for many months while he still hoped that Roosevelt would do it for him by executive decision. But Roosevelt was too smart--he refused to act, and Attorney General Biddle gave a decision to his Chief that it was clearly unconstitutional. This let Roosevelt out and Quezon was obliged to accept Osmena's proposition of a joint letter to Congress. Quezon would even then not sign this letter until Osmena had signed before him! Tydings told Osmena that he would not touch the matter unless Osmena was in favour of putting Quezon ahead of his as President to serve until their rule was re-established in the Philippines. Osmena also told me that he had gone to Stimson and asked him frankly to state whether Quezon or he would best serve the war effort as President, and Stimson replied: "Quezon!"

After the battle in the House of Representatives was all over I went to see Jimmy Wadsworth, who had spoken well in favour of the resolution and he told me he acted for Stimson in preparing the way in both houses of Congress. But there were two snags in the House, he said: (1) The House leaders had sent around a written notice to members that there would be "nothing important" raised in the House that week, and the sudden introduction of this resolution looked like an attempt to "put something over!" At least 100 members had gone away for the week-end, and many of these scurried back to make a full house when the matter came to a vote on the second day. (I understand that over 400 members were present, tho the final vote was only approximately 70-110.) (2) Many members thought this was an attempt by Roosevelt to create a precedent of the "irreplaceable man" which he could use for himself next year.

As I entered Quezon's office at the Shoreham that morning after the Congressional debate, Mr Canceran handed me a typewritten letter some four or five pages long, which had been dictated by Quezon, and told me the President wished me to go over it and make any suggestions as to the form and content. I read it through and was quite startled by the vehemence, not to say violence of what Quezon had to say. It was a letter to the Chairmen of the House and Senate Committees, expressing gratitude to them for their getting the joint resolution passed, but for several pages it was full of answers to the criticisms which had been made in the House on Quezon's attempt to perpetuate himself in power. I tried as best I could for an hour or two to modify or readjust his language but finally gave it up and went in to see Quezon who was lying in bed, looking depressed and worried, and physically feeble. I told him that he could not send the letter in that form. With unexpected meekness he asked: "Why not?" I then suggested that in his letter thanking the two Chairmen, he should leave out all those angry replies to what had been said in criticism of him in the House; that the two Chairmen, Tydings and Bell, were his friends and had put the resolution in his favour through Congress--that they were not responsible for what had been said in the House--that on the contrary they had both put the best side on his case forward. He then asked me what he should put in his letter and to my surprise he at once accepted my statement that the first paragraph of the letter would be all right if he accepted my pencilled sentence at the end of it showing modesty and gratitude. I added that if we wished to reply to statements of Dr Judd, and of the publicist, Mr Vicente Villamin, he should do it in letters addressed to them personally. "But," I added, "the fight is all over--you have won, and are to remain as President, so let it all drop!"

Here is the letter as Quezon then sent it and as it appeared in the *Congressional Record*:

Washington, D.C., November 13, 1943.

The Honorable C. Jasper Bell,  
Chairman, Committee on Insular Affairs,  
House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

My Dear Congressman Bell: The joint resolution "to provide for the continuation of the Government of the Philippine Islands" which was unanimously passed by the Senate and by a big majority in the House, has touched me deeply and has been a source of pride and gratification. I take it as a public recognition on the part of the representatives of the American people of my service to my country and to the United States in this hour so tragic for both peoples, and of my continued usefulness in the military struggle which lies before us. Very sincerely yours, MANUEL L. QUEZON.



Poor man, he is really ill--has had a temperature for some days, and looks badly. The sweets of victory have turned bitter in his mouth. He feels this set-back in his commanding popularity very greatly, and yet it is largely his own fault. He had been too combative, even arrogant both in the matter of independence resolution, which is still pending and in the question of the Presidential succession. But, on the other side of the scale, he has won out in the latter, and if he lives, will return to the Philippines as its President. But the savour of the whole thing is gone --he is furious at being called a *gauleiter* by Representative Judd.<sup>239</sup>

Quezon, moreover, is convinced that all of the opposition to him in the press and in Congress had been prompted by Osmena. That is not my own opinion. But it is true that Don Sergio, though vanquished in the contest, is perfectly bland and self-possessed, and is satisfied that his work had arranged the whole matter in exactly the form he had always wished. There is little doubt moreover that in the United States Quezon's position has been considerably weakened, while Osmena's conduct is the subject of general approval.

December 1943-May 31, 1944. Towards the middle of December 1943, Quezon moved with his family to Miami, Florida. He craved the sunshine and warmth of a climate more nearly resembling that of his own country, over which during his life in exile he constantly brooded. Reports of the state of his health were not encouraging, and the right over his succession to the presidency had worn him out completely. He no longer had the vitality which had given him such astonishing recuperative powers in his previous illnesses. His country was still under the brutal heel of the invader.

In February, I proposed to go down to see him, but he returned a polite negative.

At the end of March I wrote him that I had to undergo a serious surgical operation, and he wired me that they were all praying for a successful recovery.

As he was not doing well at Miami, he was moved to Asheville, North Carolina, a climate favourable to tuberculosis patients. Quezon was in the Hathaway Cottage at the Grove Park Hotel, and as I entered, I heard low voices in conversation from his bedroom. He and his nurse were talking. Colonel Manuel Nieto and Dr Trepp were in the sitting room, and they told me that Quezon had not been doing at all well at Asheville, and that the next morning they were going to move him back at Saranac in the Adirondack Mountains, in northern New York. I asked, of course, if I might see him, and Dr Trepp replied that Quezon had had a relapse at Miami, and that while, of course, he could not forbid me to go in to see him, nevertheless he earnestly wished that I should not enter Quezon's bedroom. Of course I acquiesced in his decision. I spent an hour talking with Nieto and Trepp.

Those who saw Quezon put aboard the train in a stretcher the next morning told me he was exceedingly feeble. I never saw him again until on August 3rd I looked on his dead face as his body lay in its coffin in St Matthew's Cathedral in Washington.

August 4 and 5, 1944. Long talk with Dr Trepp the day after the funeral. What an extraordinary career was Quezon's!--born a village boy in Baler in 1878, of mixed Spanish and Ilongot blood, he spent his childhood in one of the most remote and inaccessible little villages of the southwest Pacific. He died as the President in exile of the conquered Philippines, and was given the most impressive funeral which I ever attended. The cathedral was full and many dignitaries were there. He was buried in Arlington Cemetery--a great military display headed by General Marshall and Admiral King. His body is left there until it can be sent back to the Philippines on an American battleship.

Trepp described to me Quezon's last illness: Asheville was the "low point" and Quezon began to improve again at Saranac Lake. He was kept in touch with the progress of the war by daily readings from newspapers, and attended now and then to a little executive business by letter and telegram. He wrote to MacArthur two days before his death. He was, however, not unaware of the seriousness of his condition. He told Nieto just a day or two before the end to look out for all his affairs and he had a long and satisfactory talk with his wife. At ten o'clock on the morning of August 1st, 1944, he suddenly had a hemorrhage--about a liter of blood which practically choked him--sank rapidly and died peacefully.

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<sup>239</sup>Quezon knew that many Filipinos and Americans considered him a petty dictator. Even Harrison must have thought so--otherwise why the chapter of his diary entitled: "A Dash of Dictatorship." In 1940, Teddy de Nolasco wrote *The Filipino Case for American Retention or Debunking Manuel L. Quezon, First Fuehrer under the U.S. Flag* (New York: Verne Dyson, 1940).

Trepp says that Quezon wore himself out completely by his quarrel with Osmena over the presidency in November 1943, and never recovered. He was often found in tears in his bed at that time.<sup>240</sup> This, Trepp names as the proximate cause of his death.

Mr Serapio Canceran, the private secretary of the late President expresses deep concern over the possible killing of General Roxas by the Japanese because he is believed to be the "undercover" head of the guerrillas. He says that two days before he died, Quezon sent a cable to General MacArthur asking him to rescue Roxas and get him away from the Japanese. "This," replied MacArthur "would be very difficult to do." Dr Trepp believes that Roxas will be elected first president of the Philippine Republic.

A few months later, Trepp himself died in Doctors' Hospital in Washington of cancer of the stomach. I saw him several times in his last days, and this simple and honourable man suffered greatly towards his end.

THE END

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<sup>240</sup>See Friend, p. 237; Quirino, pp. 380-385.

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\* This is the original index (with all its inadequacies, errors and omissions) keyed to this edition of the diary. Two individuals who did not make the index are Francis B. Sayre and Leonard Wood. I regret that it was impossible to correct all the oversights or even rework the entire index. The original index leaves much to be desired.



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