

MAGINDANAO, 1860-1888: THE CAREER OF DATU UTO OF BUAYAN

THE CORNELL UNIVERSITY SOUTHEAST ASIA PROGRAM

The Southeast Asia Program was organized at Cornell University in the Department of Far Eastern Studies in 1950. It is a teaching and research program of interdisciplinary studies in the humanities, social sciences, and some natural sciences. It deals with Southeast Asia as a region, and with the individual countries of the area: Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.

The activities of the Program are carried on both at Cornell and in Southeast Asia. They include an undergraduate and graduate curriculum at Cornell which provides instruction by specialists in Southeast Asian cultural history and present-day affairs and offers intensive training in each of the major languages of the area. The Program sponsors group research projects on Thailand, on Indonesia, on the Philippines, and on the area's Chinese minorities. At the same time, individual staff and students of the Program have done field research in every Southeast Asian country.

A list of publications relating to Southeast Asia which may be obtained on prepaid order directly from the Program is given at the end of this volume. Information on Program staff, fellowships, requirements for degrees, and current course offerings will be found in an *Announcement of the Department of Asian Studies*, obtainable from the Director, Southeast Asia Program, Franklin Hall, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14850.

MAGINDANAO, 1860-1888: THE CAREER OF DATU UTO OF BUAYAN

by

Reynaldo Clemeña Ilete

Data Paper: Number 82
Southeast Asia Program
Department of Asian Studies
Cornell University, Ithaca, New York
October 1971

Price: \$3.50

© 1971 CORNELL UNIVERSITY SOUTHEAST ASIA PROGRAM

PREFACE

The situation in which the "hero" of history finds himself is as important as his personality and his actions. The leader neither behaves in a vacuum, nor is he an entirely free individual. He acts in a milieu which has been shaped by the past, and the success or failure of his career must, to some extent, depend upon his individual response to historical and cultural forces which he encounters. The man around whom this study is built is Sultan Anwarud-din Uto, known in Spanish records and by his people as Datu Uto, a Magindanao prince who first appears in Spanish accounts in the year 1860. To understand him requires an examination of Magindanao society, whose political, economic and social structures, values, and sentiments find expression in a nineteenth-century situation dominated by this man. Furthermore, we must consider not only the times in which he lived, but also a span of the Magindanao past from as early as the sixteenth century. By uncovering the roots of conflict in his society and by understanding continuities with the past, we can get beyond the less imaginative Spanish viewpoint that Datu Uto's career was an eccentric episode in a glorious era of Spanish conquest in the Muslim areas of Mindanao and Sulu. The Spaniards could grudgingly acknowledge Rizal and Aguinaldo as expressions of a budding Filipino national sentiment; Datu Uto, however, was to the bulk of Spanish writers and policy makers a stubborn, half-civilized "Moro," a descendant of dreaded pirate chiefs who brought terror to the Christian settlements, whose cunning and cruelty made him the leader of a rebellion against Spain. If we attempt to see Uto in the context of Magindanao history and society, a different picture emerges. He is seen to exhibit the attributes of an exemplary Magindanao datu. The conflict of which he was a part ceases to be merely an isolated rebellion against Spain. It takes on a wider significance as part of a complex situation involving tensions between various segments of the Magindanao world, between personal loyalties and Islam, and includes within its scope the external world with which Magindanao was linked.

For this type of study, the traditional narrative approach in historical writing is inadequate, although it still plays an important role in giving life and substance to the treatment which follows. We must always bear in mind that the documentary materials used here are all European, mainly Spanish, and they do not reflect the Magindanao viewpoint, which is our primary interest in this study. Rather than shying away from such sources, however, we can avoid writing "Europocentric" or colonial history by making use of ethnographic accounts and by borrowing some analytical tools from related social science disciplines.

Unfortunately, the study of Magindanao history and society has not progressed much since Najeeb Saleeby published his *Studies in Moro History, Law and Religion* in 1905. Jose Maceda's full-scale study of Magindanao music, a landmark in Philippine ethnomusicology, is probably the only in-depth study of some aspect of Magindanao society that has appeared in recent years. Some scholars have preferred to delve into the sociological aspects of mission work and may sometimes have been influenced by their own "Christian" biases and therefore unable to view Philippine Muslim society in its own terms. Several Filipino scholars have recently shown an interest in "Moro" history for its own sake, but so far they have hardly begun to tap the vast amount of documentary materials in archives and libraries both in the Philippines and abroad.

-
1. "The Music of the Magindanao in the Philippines" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California in Los Angeles, 2 vols. q 1962).
 2. E.g., Francis Madigan, S.J. and Nicholas Cushner, S.J., "Tamontaka: a sociological experiment," *American Catholic Sociological Review*, XIX, 4 (1958), pp. 322-336; also, by the same authors, "Tamontaka reduction: a community approach to Mission work," *Neue Zeitschrift fur Missions-wissenschaft*, XVII, 2 (1961), pp. 81-94. Other works which show the "Christian" bias are: Rev. T. O'Shaughnessy, "Philippine Islam and the Society of Jesus," *PS*, IV, 2 (1956), pp. 214-245; Peter Gowing, *Mosque and Moro; a Study of Muslims in the Philippines* (Manila, 1964). An example of a study of colonial policy is Clifford Smith, "A History of the Moros" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Chicago, 1948).
 3. F. Delor Angeles, *Mindanao; the Story of an Island* (Davao City, 1964); Mamitua Saber, "Four papers on Mindanao-Sulu," undated mimeographed copy in Olin Library, Cornell University.

Horacio de la Costa's accounts⁴ have contributed a great deal towards bringing the Magindanao into the light of modern historical knowledge, but this Jesuit historian has only dealt with the Muslim peoples in a peripheral sense except for a notable article on an eighteenth-century Sulu Sultan. Cesar Majul's pioneering studies⁵ have rightly stressed the need for looking at the Muslim Filipinos through less biased spectacles; Majul, however, has focused on Sulu rather than on Mindanao. A young scholar who, like Majul, has used a sociological orientation in viewing Sulu history is Anne L. Reber.⁶ In the introduction to her work, she has acknowledged the influence of Melvin Mednick, an anthropologist who has written a seminal article on "Moro" history and society and also a thorough study of the Maranao social system in which valuable references to the Magindanaos are made.⁷ Miss Reber also mentions John Gullick, whose study of indigenous Malay political systems⁸ has influenced a number of Southeast Asian specialists, including the present author. In a way, most of the studies we have mentioned, while dealing only marginally with Magindanao, have contributed to the present work. But they by no means represent the entire list of modern studies of Southeast Asian history and anthropology which have greatly stimulated the author's thinking about that tiny segment of the region which is Magindanao.

The reader must bear in mind the limited scope of this study. What follows is an attempt to explore a largely uncharted realm of Philippine history.⁹ We do not claim to have exhausted the store of materials in American archives and libraries, not to mention those in the Philippines, Spain, the Netherlands and Great Britain which we have not even seen. The Newberry Library at Chicago, which is the most important source of materials for this study, contains an impressive collection of manuscripts and published works awaiting the perusal of the researcher;¹⁰ only a fraction of these materials have been used by the present author. The most serious limitation, however, is the fact that the author lacks first-hand knowledge about the land and people of the Pulangi valley. This becomes particularly evident in the chapter on Islam. The available Spanish materials can give a limited and external perspective. A more accurate description can be had only when indigenous texts have been analyzed and when actual fieldwork has been carried out. Furthermore, the subject of Islam is a very complex one, the study of which necessitates familiarity with Arabic texts and with the extensive scholarship on Islam, particularly when it deals with the forms in which the religion has manifested itself in Southeast Asia. The author lacks these qualifications.

A significant step can, however, be made toward a fuller knowledge of Magindanao if the available Spanish sources are properly handled by the historian. Within the whole range of sources at hand, one finds a gradation in degree of reliability and usefulness. Manuscripts, for example, tend to be more valuable than published materials for the simple reason that they probably have not been edited to suit the perspectives of the reading public or prevailing government policies. And among the published sources, the more reliable ones are, naturally, those written by actual participants in the events them-

-
4. *The Jesuits in the Philippines, 1581-1768* (Cambridge, 1961); "A Spanish Jesuit among the Maguindanaos," *Comment*, XII, 1 (1961), pp. 19-41. His best study on the Muslims has been "Muhammad Alimuddin I, Sultan of Sulu, 1735-1773," *JRASMB*, XXXVIII (July, 1965), pp. 43-76.
 5. "The role of Islam in the History of the Filipino People," *AS*, IV (Aug. 9, 1966), pp. 303-315; "Chinese relationship with the Sultanate of Sulu," in Alfonso Felix, Jr. (ed.), *The Chinese in the Philippines, 1570-1770* (Manila, 1966), vol. I, pp. 143-159; "Political and historical notes on the old Sulu Sultanate," *JRASMB*, XXXVIII (July, 1965), pp. 23-42.
 6. "The Sulu world in the 18th and early 19th centuries: A historiographical problem in British writings on Malay piracy" (unpublished M.A. thesis, Cornell University, 1966).
 7. *Encampment of the Lake; The Social Organization of a Moslem-Philippine (Moro) People* (Research Series, No. 5, Philippine Studies Program, University of Chicago, 1965); "Some Problems of Moro history and political organization," *PSR*, V, 1 (1957), pp. 39-52.
 8. *Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya* (London, 1965).
 9. The only "direct" predecessor of this study is the short survey by Paul Lietz, "Mindanao in the nineteenth century," *Conference on Mindanao, Papers* (Chicago, 1955).
 10. A good example of a study based almost entirely on Newberry Library materials is Eliodoro Robles' *The Philippines in the Nineteenth Century* (Quezon City, 1969). Robles' emphasis is on institutions, organizational structures, bureaucracy, and mechanisms of action and control.

selves. In the course of this study, certain "informants" will be seen to stand out. Almost without exception, these are individuals who had been "on the scene," so to speak, such as the Jesuit missionary Pablo Pæstells, the public servant and "Magindanaophile" Ladislao Nieto, the forestry engineer Sebastian Vidal y Soler, the soldier Alfonso Perinat, and the French explorer Joseph Montano. The missionaries, government officials, explorers and others who had occasion to write about the Magindanaos certainly brought with them their own biases and perspectives, ranging from extreme sympathy to outright prejudice. It is in the assessment of a variety of perspectives, often contradictory, that the historian's judgment comes into play. One would certainly not want merely to parrot the statements of the Spanish historian Jose Montero y Vidal, no matter how significant his nineteenth-century work on the Muslim "pirates" has been. For Montero y Vidal is often mistaken, and generally unsympathetic. Fortunately, among the number of foreigners who wrote about the Muslims there have been the Nietos and the Vidal y Solers who sought to understand, in however limited a manner, a strange people's view of things.

The present monograph is based on an M.A. thesis submitted to Cornell University in September, 1970. Thanks are due to the various staff members of the Olin Library in Cornell, the Newberry Library and the Library of Congress who patiently helped the author in securing materials; to the Southeast Asia Program for financing research at the Library of Congress; to Prof. James Siegel, Bruce Fenner, Edilberto de Jesus and Aurora Roxas-Lim for their helpful comments; and to the author's wife, Maria, who has helped him in countless ways and to whom this work is dedicated.


TABLE OF CONTENTS


	Page
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	x
MAPS	xiii
Chapter	
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND-- <i>SA-ILUD</i> AND <i>SA-RAYA</i>	1
II. THE SPANISH ADVANCE AND THE RISE OF DATU UTO (1861-1878)	12
III. THE WORLD OF DATU UTO (ca. 1864-1885)	22
IV. UNITY AND THE ALLIANCE SYSTEM (ca. 1872-1888)	34
V. MUSLIM ASPECTS OF DATU UTO'S SOCIETY	41
VI. "ATTRACTION" AND CONQUEST (ca. 1878-1887)	46
VII. UTO'S DOWNFALL AND ITS AFTERMATH (1887-ca. 1892)	58
GLOSSARY	66
BIBLIOGRAPHY	67

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS


<i>AS</i>	<i>Asian Studies</i> (Department of Asian Studies, University of the Philippines)
<i>BRPI</i>	Blair and Robertson, <i>The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898</i>
<i>BSGM</i>	<i>Boletín de la Sociedad Geográfica de Madrid</i>
<i>CMSJ</i>	Cartas de los Padres de la Compañía de Jesús de la Misión de Filipinas (Jesuit letters, Philippine Mission)
<i>JRASMB</i>	<i>Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Malayan Branch</i>
<i>JSEAH</i>	<i>Journal of Southeast Asian History</i>
<i>PS</i>	<i>Philippine Studies</i> (Ateneo de Manila University)
<i>PSR</i>	<i>Philippine Sociological Review</i>

MAP I






MAP II



MAP III



MAP IV

CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND--SA-ILUD AND SA-RAYA

The homeland of the Magindanao people is the basin of the Pulangi river, "Rio Grande" in Spanish accounts, which spills down the southern slopes of the Bukidnon massif in north-central Mindanao, snaking south and west across a low-lying marshy plain to Illana bay. The word "magindanao," which means "to be inundated," comes from the propensity of the Pulangi to overflow its banks periodically, flooding the whole countryside and giving the impression that the Magindanao heartland is one vast lake, or *danao*. The whole length of the Pulangi from its mouth to Matincuan in the northeast is inhabited by the Muslim Magindanao people who live in *rancherías* or settlements, characterized by strongly knit kinship associations presided over by a datu who is the head of the dominant lineage. During the course of its history, there have evolved in the Pulangi three major centers of population. Twenty miles from the coast the river splits into two branches at a point which is associated with the settlement of Tumbao. Twelve miles above the fork stands the town of Dulawan, or Datu-Piang. Near the mouth of the north branch of the Pulangi stands the city of Cotabato.

Fundamental to this study is the notion that Dulawan in the interior and Cotabato in the delta were once rival centers of power with which specific territories were associated. Dulawan was once the approximate site of Buayan, capital of a sultanate by that name. Its influence was felt above Tumbao, in the upper reaches of the river and in the region of the two lakes--Liguasan and Buluan--which feed it. To the Magindanaos this territory is known as *sa-raya*, or "in the upper valley." The better and sometimes only known center of power was Cotabato, capital of the sultanate of Mindanao. The sultanate of Mindanao, which we shall call the Cotabato Sultanate, was essentially a coastal state. Backed by a powerful navy, her influence was once felt as far west as the Zamboanga peninsula and as far south as the Sangir islands. In Magindanao itself, its sphere of influence was associated with the delta formed by the twin branches of the Pulangi. This territory is known to the Magindanaos as *sa-ilud*, which means "in the lower valley."

The identification of Cotabato and Buayan as coastal and inland states has its dangers, the most obvious of which is the exaggeration of contrasts between the two. As will become increasingly evident later, Cotabato also had an agricultural base in the delta, which became more prominent as trade languished, and Buayan had other exits to the sea besides the outlets of the Pulangi which enabled her to reap the benefits of commerce and piracy. Some framework, however, is needed to explain the significance of the scanty historical records we have at our disposal. The division into *sa-ilud* and *sa-raya*, Cotabato and Buayan, in which not only geographic factors but also political and economic ones influenced the separate development of the two regions of Magindanao, enables us to detect a pattern in the historical record which helps in explaining why the Magindanaos themselves may see a more than geographic distinction between the two territories. More-

1. Najeeb Saleeby, *Studies in Moro History, Law and Religion* (Manila, 1905), pp. 41 and *passim*. The notion is stated more succinctly by the same author in "The Moros (a general account)" (Manila, 1906), p. 15. The article is part of Otley Beyer's collection on Philippine customary law, vol. V, no. 161.
2. The word "Cotabato," which is derived from the Magindanao *kuta watu*, or the Malay *kota batu* ("stone fort"), is a relatively modern name for the city, most probably coming into common usage only after the Spanish occupation of the city in 1861. In old maps and early accounts "Mindanao," "Magindanao" or "Magindano" are used. [Cf. C. A. Gibson-Hill, "Magindano," *JRASMB*, XXIX, 1 (1956), p. 184.] This, however, is confusing since "Mindanao" and "Magindanao" are now the names of the island and the ethnic group which traditionally inhabits the pulangi valley, respectively. Using the name "Magindanao" for the capital of the sultanate would tend to obscure the existence of another Magindanao power in the interior. "Cotabato" is therefore used throughout this study to refer to the capital of the sultanate of Mindanao even in its pre-nineteenth century days.
3. Saleeby, *loc. cit.*

giving of a daughter in marriage is an implicit acknowledgment of the greater prestige of the recipient's line.¹⁰ The early Muslim rulers of Cotabato may very well have appeased, and in the process converted, certain powerful datus in the interior by giving away a daughter in marriage. In any case, there is nothing besides the claims of the Cotabato Sultanate itself to support Saleeby's contention that Sarip Kabungsuwan conquered Buayan by force.¹¹ It seems more likely that, by the acceptance of Islam, the ancient datus of Buayan reaped the benefits of superior political organization and contacts with the many Islamic kingdoms that blossomed in the archipelago in the wake of Majapahit's decline.

Early Spanish accounts give sufficient evidence of Buayan's paramouncy in the Magindanao world. An expedition led by Captain Rodriguez de Figueroa in 1596 met with crushing defeat in Buayan. Figueroa himself was slain by a "Buhahayen" named Ubal. Anticipating a second invasion, Rajah Sirongan and the other Buayans sent a chieftain named Buisan to Ternate to ask for help,

. . . whereupon the king of Ternate sent to Mindanao a fleet of many *caracoas* or rowing-barges and other vessels commanded by *cachils* with selected soldiers numbering over one thousand warriors and a number of light artillery pieces with which to compel the Spaniards to break their camp [near the mouth of the Pulangi] and go away. . . .¹²

In spite of the Buayan-Ternate alliance, the Spaniards were victorious, but problems of logistics forced them to withdraw to La Caldera, at the southern tip of the Zamboanga peninsula, leaving the prestige of Buayan intact. When, by 1599, the Spanish contingent had to withdraw from the area altogether owing to lack of funds and supplies, it was with Buayan that Sulu joined in a confederacy which fitted out a fleet of fifty *vintas* bearing over three thousand well-armed warriors. Under the leadership of the "pilots of the Mindanao River," Sali and Sirongan, the joint fleet headed north to ravage Oton and Panay islands.³

In spite of the clarity of Morga's account, Saleeby finds it impossible to believe that Buayan was an important kingdom in its own right. Criticizing Morga, he says: "A careful review of the Spanish reports referring to these early campaigns in Mindanao indicates that Buayan has been erroneously used in place of Magindanao [Cotabato], the ancient capital of the Sultanate of Magindanao."¹⁴ The fact is that, at the turn of the century, Cotabato was merely an important seaport and a staging area for Magindanao pirate fleets. Its ruler was a descendant of Sarip Kabungsuwan, Datu Kapitan Laut Buisan, who led a powerful Magindanao fleet and so distinguished himself that he was regarded by Saleeby as "the most powerful enemy Spain encountered in her first effort to reduce Moro land."¹⁵ But in spite of such fame, Buisan was for many years subordinate to Rajah Sirongan of Buayan. For example, after a celebrated raid in which a Spanish Jesuit was captured, Buisan had to present his prize to Sirongan and the Buayan court. All the datus of the Pulangi were at Buayan, and there were also present ambassadors from the Sultan of Brunei and the heir of the Rajah of Sulu. Also, in a letter of June 1606 sent by the Magindanao princes to Manila, Capitan Laut Buisan's name is listed after Raja Mura (Mudah?) and the Lord of Buayan, Sirongan, suggesting that Buisan had a rank similar to *laksamana* (admiral).⁶

The Spanish Jesuits perceived the superiority of Sirongan in the Magindanao hier-

-
10. During the "eclipse" of Buayan in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, several Cotabato sultans married Buayan princesses, while the reverse does not seem to be true of the Buayan rulers. Much later, Datu Uto of Buayan regarded his marriage to a Cotabato princess as a sign of his superiority.
 11. Saleeby, *Studies*, p. 56. All of the subsequent writers who have commented on Mindanao's early history seem to have followed Saleeby in equating Kabungsuwan (signifying Islam) and Cotabato with the birth of Magindanao history.
 12. Morga, p. 57.
 13. *Ibid.*, pp. 132-133. Detailed accounts of the early Spanish assaults on Magindanao and of the raids on the Visayas can be found in de la Costa, *The Jesuits*, particularly chapter 12.
 14. Saleeby, *The History of Sulu* (Manila, 1963, reprint of 1905 ed.), p.
 15. Saleeby, *Studies*, p. 57.
 16. de la Costa, "A Spanish Jesuit," pp. 29, 36 and *passim*.

archy, and they managed to persuade him to sign a peace treaty in 1605 by dangling before him the prospect of being recognized and supported by Spain as the paramount lord of Magindanao.¹⁷ Sirongan's desire to be recognized and supported by Spain, however, is symptomatic of the internal strains in the Magindanao polity, the ever-present centrifugal forces which make any political unification a tenuous affair. Some months before the signing of the treaty Kapitan Laut Buisan had made an angry speech at the Buayan court which brought to light his jealousy of the special treatment given by the Spaniards to Sirongan.¹⁸

The treaty with Sirongan was never ratified by Spain. In 1606 a Spanish fleet captured Ternate and brought the defeated sultan to Manila. This was the prelude to an alliance between the rulers of Magindanao, Sulu and Ternate against Spain. This was also the prelude to the rise of the Cotabato kingdom.

De la Costa notes that the period from about 1607 to 1635, in which large-scale Magindanao raids were generally absent, was a transition point in Magindanao history. He suspects that, because by 1634 the confederacy headed by Sirongan of Buayan had disappeared and a unified sultanate had appeared in its wake at Cotabato, during this period "the communities of the Great River were passing through a period of internal reorganization."¹⁹ Indeed, a 1638 account says that Buisan had come to rule all the coast, while Sirongan was the petty-king (reyezuelo) of the river valley region.²⁰ By the 1630's, at least, Cotabato had become a coastal power in its own right. It had eclipsed Buayan, though an alliance was still maintained between them.²¹ How does one explain this sudden development?

Majul, who dates the eclipse of Buayan at around 1619, sees a synchronism between the coming of the Portuguese to the East Indies and the rise of Magindanao-Cotabato. Specifically, he says that military alliances and religious contacts were made between Cotabato and the Macassar and Moluccas kingdoms.²² This explanation is substantially correct, but perhaps the matter can be pursued further. The mysterious 1607-1635 period, mentioned by de la Costa, saw the height of Anglo-Dutch rivalry in the East Indies and Dutch attempts to enforce a commercial monopoly in the Moluccas. Ternate came under Dutch protection in 1607. The Banda islands, including Amboina which was a dependency of Ternate, were completely subdued by 1623. Dutch control over the Moluccas destroyed the indigenous system of cultivation and trade. The inhabitants were compelled to grow products suitable for export, whether it was profitable for the growers or not; at times production would be limited or certain crops would be forbidden in response to the vagaries of the European market. The production of the more valuable commodities, such as cloves and nutmegs, was confined to areas directly controlled by the Dutch; force was used to prevent their cultivation elsewhere. Islanders who violated the monopoly by selling to the English or the Portuguese were severely punished.²³

Some effects of the Dutch methods were a serious lowering of the standard of living of the inhabitants and a disruption of the established patterns of trade. Malay seamen and sea nomads, whose sole livelihood was commerce, found that the Dutch had destroyed the export trade from some islands and in the case of other islands had monopolized it for themselves. The period in discussion was one of great flux, with sea-faring peoples set adrift by external circumstances and forced to seek other trading centers and other rulers to whom they might offer their services. Chinese and Arab traders, too, were on the lookout for free ports. The shifts in population and trade patterns in response to the European intrusion brought about the rise and flourishing of such Muslim kingdoms as Aceh, Makassar and Sulu in the first half of the seventeenth century.²⁴ Recent

17. *Ibid.*, p. 34.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 33.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 40.

20. "Relación de la Gran Isla de Mindanao y de su conquista por los Españoles," *BSGM*, XXII (1887), p. 112. The article is a reprint of a fragment of a book published in Mexico in 1638.

21. *Ibid.*

22. "The role of Islam," p. 311; "Islamic and Arab cultural influences in the south of the Philippines," *JSEAH*, VII, 2 (1966), pp. 62, 68.

23. For one of the many available accounts cf. D. G. E. Hall, *A History of South-East Asia* (London, 1968), chapters 15 and 16.

24. Cf. A. K. DasGupta, "Aceh in Indonesian trade and politics: 1600-41" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1962), chapter I; B. Schrieke, *Indonesian Sociological Studies* (The Hague, 1957), vol. I, chapter III.

historians do not seem, however, to have noticed that the sudden rise of the Magindanao kingdom of Cotabato is part of the same pattern.

The seventeenth-century Jesuit historian, Francisco Combés, attributes the rise of Cotabato to the aggregation in that kingdom of a sea-faring people called Lutao,

. . . the meaning of which is well explained by their occupation, for Lutao signifies in these tongues he who swims or bounds over water. Such is the nature of these people, and they know no house save the boat. . . .²⁵

Combés, who lived in Mindanao from 1645 to 1657, states that the Lutaos were of recent arrival and that they were the "most foreign" of the peoples of the southern Philippines. Because of their "Moorist dress of turban and marlota (i.e., a Moorish robe), their arms and worship," Combés suspects that they were of Arab or Indian origin, but elsewhere he points out their links with the king of Ternate. The Ternate influence in Mindanao, Jolo, Bohol and a part of Cebu was strong at this time. Not only trade but also religious ties linked these areas together in spite of the consolidation of Spanish rule. Ternate was the Muslim center for the Moluccas and the southern Philippines,⁶ and this may have been due to its own links with the Islamic center of Giri in northern Java.⁷ The Ternate-Moluccas origin of the Lutaos which is suggested by Combés is disputed by David Sopher,⁸ but what is known of the situation in the Moluccas at this time, where Dutch tactics there were causing migrations of the original inhabitants to other places, lends more weight to Combés' theory.

The Lutaos distinguished themselves as pirates and traders, and they had extensive communications with all of the kingdoms in the area. They lived together with the kings of Magindanao and Sulu and with the minor chiefs inhabiting the coasts. They were acknowledged as the most knowledgeable and versatile people in the islands, and their services were much sought after in wars, shipbuilding, navigation and commerce. No wonder then, says Combés, that the king who had the most Lutao followers was considered the most powerful and the most feared, for "[the Lutaos] have power to invest the seas and coasts, making captives and pillaging, and making themselves masters of the crossings and passages necessary for communication with the other islands."⁹ It was precisely because the Cotabato king commanded such a large Lutao following that his kingdom flourished at the expense of Buayan in the interior:

. . . the Mindanao [Cotabato] king has become so feared in these latter years that although he of Buhayen is the true and legitimate king, he is coming to be less esteemed; for since the Mindanao king has many Lutaos, he has also the power to make war. And although the king of Buhayen has twenty-fold more vassals, he can make no one uneasy because he has no subjects of this [Lutao] nation; consequently he has no weight in these islands.¹⁰

Combés' statement above clearly underlines the foundation of Cotabato's power: the ability to attract maritime peoples who served under the ruler and gave him the naval strength with which to extract tribute from coastal towns¹¹ and channel trade to the

-
25. *Historia de las Islas de Mindanao, Iolo, y sus Adyacentes* (1667, edited by W. Retana in 1887) Book I, chapters 9-13 are translated in *BRPI*, XL, pp. 99-182. Also translated by J. H. Sutherland in *Mindanao Herald*, VI, Feb. 3, 1909, pp. 8-16. Certain differences in translation were checked against the originale. The present quotation is from the Sutherland translation, p. 12.
 26. Francisco Colín, *Labor Evangélica*, ed. Pablo Pastells (Barcelona, 1900-1902) Book I, p. 17. Colín's work was first published in 1666.
 27. Soemarsaid Moertono, *State and Statecraft in Old Java* (Ithaca, Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project, Monograph series, 1968) p. 31.
 28. The real identity of the Lutao (Orang laut, Samal laut, Ilanos or Badjaus?) is discussed in *BRPI*, XL, p. 100; David Sopher, *The Sea Nomads*, 1965, pp. 307-314. Sopher seems to have confused Combés' account with that of an earlier migration from Johore mentioned in the *tarsilas* and dated by Saleeby as fourteenth century. Sopher moreover located Buayan in Sarangani bay, not in the Pulangi valley, thus placing Combés' account in the wrong context.
 29. Combés, in *BRPI*, XL, p. 108.
 30. *Ibid.*
 31. *Ibid.* The special relationship that exists today between the Cotabato royal family and the Lutangans, allegedly a former sea-nomad people, in the Zamboanga peninsula,

flourishing coastal city. Buayan, on the other hand, while it could boast of "twenty-fold more vassals," was "locked in" by the Cotabato kingdom and thus received less of the benefits of trade and piracy.

Being a maritime power was not without its attendant problems. Cotabato had to define its relations with the rival center of power in the interior, which was the source of foodstuffs for consumption and export and of minerals and forest products which were the staples of the China trade. Buayan, on the other hand, was dependent on Cotabato for salt, metals and Chinese goods. This interdependence, combined with their rivalry for prestige in the Magindanao world, helps to explain the alternation of conflicts and alliances which is the pattern of their internal relations as late as the nineteenth century. In the seventeenth century, however, there is no question of Cotabato's superiority on account of its navy and its revenue from trade. The more pressing problem it faced during its initial flourishing was that of keeping the sea lanes open for the free movement of shipping. It was typical, for example, for the Badjaus to bring their products to Cotabato and for Chinese junks to pick them up there.³² Magindanao traders were themselves busily carrying their produce in their own vessels to Batavia, Malacca, Manila and even Siam.³³ De la Costa's observation that large-scale slave raids were conspicuously absent during the period from 1614 to 1634 can perhaps be explained by the flourishing of the China trade in Cotabato. It was in the best interests of the ruler to control piracy rather than encourage it.³⁴

The Spaniards sought a foothold in southern Mindanao precisely in order to curtail the flourishing of the China trade in Cotabato. By the end of the sixteenth century they had singled out the tip of the Zamboanga peninsula as the site of a naval station and fort, the first in a series of strategic points designed to impede navigation and to carry the sword and cross into the heart of the unsubjected peoples of the south. Two specific reasons are given by Morga for Zamboanga's establishment; these must be borne in mind because they were still operative in the nineteenth century. The first reason was "so that the friendly Tampacans and Lumaguans be maintained in enmity to the Buhahayens."³⁵ The Tampacans and Lumaguans were people of the delta's south branch, distinct from those of Cotabato in the north branch. They were enemies of Buayan; when Figueroa's expedition encountered them in 1596, they contributed their resources to the Spanish cause.³⁶ The Spaniards realized, at this early stage, the efficacy of sowing animosities among the Magindanaos and simultaneously cultivating allies among them. Zamboanga's proximity meant that friendships could be maintained; opportunities for intervention could be exploited.³⁷ The second reason for the establishment of Zamboanga was to impede navigation and trade. La Caldera, as the fort was called, commanded the channel between the peninsula and the island of Basilan. This channel was the normal route of Magindanao piratical and trading vessels communicating with the rest of the

may be a reflection of past conditions. The Lutangans claim to have been the dispatch bearers and freight carriers of the Sultanness of Mindanao. E. B. Christie, "The non-Christians of the northern half of the Zamboanga peninsula," *Customary Law Papers*, VI, p. 162.

32. J. Hunt, "Some particulars relating to Sulo . . .," in Moor, *Notices of the Indian Archipelago and Adjacent Countries*, 1837, p. 50.
33. Excerpts from F. Valentijn, *Oud en Nieuw Oost Indien* (1724-6) in Forrest, p. 309.
34. This idea is developed by O. W. Wolters, "China irredenta: the south," *The World Today* (Dec., 1963). Referring particularly to Srivijaya and Malacca, Wolters states: "It would not be surprising, therefore, if the [Chinese] emperors came to realize the value to them of a strong maritime kingdom not far from the Straits of Malacca, whose rulers could absorb in their fleets the Malay pirate potential and maintain well-stocked entrepôts and good harbour facilities, and whose general stability ensured it a dominating position in the network of Asian maritime communications converging on China" (pp. 543-544). In her thesis, Reber uses this perspective in re-examining the writings of Raffles and other Britishers, and thus demolishes many false notions about Sulu "piracy."
35. Morga, p. 56.
36. *Ibid.*, pp. 50-51.
37. Jose Rizal notes (in Morga, p. 56, footnote 3): "Because with the continuance of the enmity [between the Lumaguans-Tampacans and Buayan] it was easier to subdue them afterward than when they are united, as it happened later [under Cotabato], doing great damage to the disarmed islands subject to the crown of Castille. For this reason we have said that the word "pacify," which the author [Morga] uses so often, seems to be synonymous with "make war" or "sow animosities."

archipelago, the east coast of Mindanao being "next to impossible" for navigation by sailing vessels.³⁸ It was also in the itinerary of Chinese junks making for Cotabato.³⁹ Patrol boats based at La Caldera could give warning of approaching Magindanao ships and re-route Chinese junks to Sulu.

Such was Zamboanga's importance that, when the temporary Spanish garrison was abandoned in 1599 owing to intelligence reports that English ships were heading for the Visayas, it was like "removing the stopper from the bottle."⁴⁰ Toward the end of the year a Magindanao expedition fell "with fury long repressed" upon the Visayas.⁴¹ It is significant that the rise of Cotabato in the first half of the seventeenth century took place at a time when Zamboanga was abandoned and Spanish activity in the area was almost nil. While pressure was being exerted in the Moluccas by the Dutch, Cotabato was an open port. It attracted traders whose usual range of operations was farther south. No wonder, then, that this was the "golden age" of Magindanao commerce which saw the rise of Magindanao's most famous historical figure, Yang Dipertuan Kudrat.

Unfortunately for the Magindanaos, the Jesuits had long analyzed the situation correctly. In 1635, the central government implemented a Jesuit plan for the permanent establishment of a base at Zamboanga.⁴² This development had repercussions in Magindanao shortly afterwards. Sultan Kudrat suffered a military defeat at the hands of a Zamboanga-based force, in spite of the fact that he had a formidable array of allies, who included Sulus, Ternateans, Borneans, Javanese and Dutch.⁴³ Not unexpectedly Cachil Moncay, then ruler of Buayan, offered to help the Spaniards capture his rival Kudrat. In return the Spanish government recognized the Rajah of Buayan as the paramount ruler of Mindanao.⁴⁴ Kudrat, however, soon recovered his prestige and, in fact, became more powerful than ever owing to his skillful use of diplomacy in dealing with Spain. He signed a treaty in 1645 which was in the nature of an alliance with Spain for mutual aid and protection. The situation became stabilized; Spain once again recognized the paramouncy of Cotabato over Buayan.⁴⁵

The general outlines, so far, are clear enough. Dislocations caused by the intrusion of the colonial powers, specially the Dutch, into the Moluccas brought a considerable number of sea nomads and traders to alternative centers, notably Macassar, Sulu and

-
38. de la Costa, *The Jesuits*, p. 281.
 39. Sei Wada, "The Philippine Islands as known to the Chinese before the Ming period," *Toyo Bunko, Memoirs*, IV, 1929, p. 159.
 40. de la Costa, *The Jesuits*, pp. 281-282.
 41. *Ibid.*; p. 325; Claudio Montero y Gay, "Los moros malayo-mahometanos de Mindanao y Jolo," *Conferencia sobre las Islas Filipinas, BSGM*, I, 1876, p. 328; John L. Phelan (*The Hispanization of the Philippines* [Madison, 1967], p. 138) says that Zamboanga was strategic because "leadership among the Moros had passed from the Magindanaos to the Sulus. . . . In order to combat the Sulu menace, the Spaniards chose Zamboanga as their principal offensive and defensive base in that region." I would agree more with de la Costa's version, according to which Zamboanga was established with the Magindanaos, rather than the Sulus, in mind.
 42. On the role of the Javanese and Ternateans see Carta de P. Francisco Lopez, 1636 y 1637, in Vicente Barrantes, *Guerras Piráticas de Filipinas* (Madrid, 1878), appendix I, pp. 298, 302; "Relación de la Gran Isla de Mindanao," p. 113; Delor-Angeles, p. 27; de la Costa, *The Jesuits*; pp. 384-386.
 43. Carta de P. Marcelo Francisco Mastrillo á P. Salazar, *BSGM*, XXII, 1887, pp. 115-116. Moncay is regarded as the legitimate ruler of Mindanao, which, indeed, is justifiable in view of Buayan's previous supremacy. Delor-Angeles thinks, however, that Moncay was "obviously a puppet of the Spaniards" (p. 33). The implication is that Moncay has absolutely no claim to the title "Sultan of Mindanao" because this naturally resides in the Cotabato ruling family. But is this really so? While Cotabato was powerful it certainly could justify its prerogatives to the title. As it declined, the title no longer coincided with reality. When title and reality became so divorced in the late nineteenth century, the Spanish government solved the dilemma by recognizing, *de facto*, two Sultans of Mindanao. (Ferdinand Blumentritt, "Los maguindanaos, estudio etnográfico," *BSGM*, XXXV, 1893, p. 277.) The Moncay incident must be seen as part of a rivalry for control of the Sultanate. (Cf. Gullick, pp. 120-121.)
 44. de la Costa, *The Jesuits*, p. 442; Saleeby, *Studies*, p. 57.

Cotabato. Their aggregation in Cotabato gave the ruler a powerful navy and attracted trade, thereby causing the eclipse of once-dominant Buayan and heightening tensions between the two distinct centers of power in the Pulangi valley. The establishment of Zamboanga brought another source of tensions into the Magindanao scene. A coercive influence began to be exercised upon Cotabato as Magindanao navigation was impeded and Chinese junks kept out. Moreover, Spain took advantage of internal rivalries to maintain some influence in Magindanao, pitting Cotabato and Buayan, both of which aspired to leadership of the Magindanao world, against each other.

According to de la Costa, when Zamboanga was abandoned from 1663 to 1718, the intervening fifty years saw a considerable development in the socio-political structures of Magindanao and Sulu. The "semi-feudal" confederacies of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries "were now full-fledged sultanates with a fiscal administration, courts of justice, and a bureaucracy of a rudimentary kind.⁴⁵ The Cotabato and Sulu sultans began to see themselves as "heads of state,⁴⁶ no longer petty datus holding roughly equal power with a multitude of others.⁴⁵ While it is true that Cotabato trade and communications with the Muslim world reached its peak in the 1660's, a decline seems to have set in by the end of the century. When Dampier visited Cotabato in 1686, he found the sultan most anxious for the East India Company to establish a factory there; the Sultan needed trade to recapture the glory which his city had known under Kudrat.

The Sultan is absolute in his power over all his subjects. He is but a poor prince; for as I mentioned before, they have but little trade and therefore cannot be rich.⁴⁶

The Magindanaos openly expressed their praise and friendship for the British. Their attitude toward the Dutch was more reserved. But for the Spaniards they had nothing but resentment and fear.⁴⁷ Was it because of the damage Zamboanga's presence had inflicted upon their trade? Majul states that the Cotabato Sultanate's prestige reached its peak under the rule of Kudrat, the first to arrogate to himself the title "Sultan,⁴⁸ and that his death in 1671 marked the beginning of the sultanate's fragmentation into smaller units.⁴⁸ In fact, by the eighteenth century it is hardly accurate to speak of a unified Magindanao world under the Sultan of Mindanao at Cotabato.

In 1701, mutual jealousy and distrust between the sultans of Cotabato and Sulu during a visit of the latter to Cotabato erupted into bloody hand-to-hand combat between the two, in which both combatants are said to have been killed. The result was a declaration of war between the two sultanates.⁴⁹ At this point the new Cotabato Sultan embarked upon a course of action which betrayed his weakness and set the precedent for similar actions by his successors for the next century and a half; he demanded, by virtue of the 1645 Lopez-Kudrat treaty, that the Spanish government aid him in destroying his enemy, Sulu.⁵⁰ The Spanish government thought it unpolitic at this time to interfere in such internal matters. But when Zamboanga's garrison was re-established in 1718, the road was open for Spanish intervention. In 1719, a fresh treaty was drawn up between the Cotabato Sultan and the governor of Zamboanga.⁵¹ Twelve years later, a Spanish naval force entered Magindanao waters in response to a plea from the Sultan, who was threatened with internal strife.

The Magindanao civil war of the 1730's is a watershed in Mindanao history, for it exposes the fragility of Cotabato's control over the interior and also marks the beginning of the Sultan's mounting reliance on Spain for the maintenance of his prestige. Historians who have dealt with this period have not rendered a satisfactory assessment of it. The account which has been accepted by Saleeby, Blair and Robertson, and

45. de la Costa, *The Jesuits* p. 541.

46. *Ibid.* pp. 341-342.

47. *Ibid.*, p. 363.

48. "The role of Islam," p. 311. Referring, it seems, to Zamboanga Majul states: "Spanish presence in Mindanao frustrated the natural course of events for the gradual integration of various minor Moslem principalities under one centralized authority" (*ibid.*).

49. *BRPI*, XL, p. 316.

50. Emilio Bernaldez, *Reseña Histórica de la Guerra al Sur de Filipinas* (Madrid, 1857), p. 119.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 138.

others⁵² is that which the Cotabato Sultan's elder brother narrated to Thomas Forrest in 1776.⁵³ In this version, the civil war is reduced to the proportions of a succession dispute. The rightful sultan's uncle usurps the throne, which is then passed on to the usurper's son and grandson. The Sulus side with one or the other contender in order to keep the sultanate in turmoil. In the end the rightful heir, Pakir Mawlana, drives the usurper Malinog to Buayan and restores peace to the land. It is a petty dispute, no more.

We hear a different story, however, from four Spanish historians.⁵⁴ Instead of being just another ambitious member of the royal family, the usurper Malinog is said to be "a prominent chief of Mindanao" who rebelled against the Sultan, having secured the support of more than thirty of the principal villages of the Pulangi. The Forrest, or Cotabato, account seems to deny Malinog external support, and also completely ignores the Spanish role in the civil war. According to the Spanish version, Malinog's rebellion was caused by his refusal to obey the Sultan's demand that he restore to the Spaniards the captives and spoils which he, together with the Sulus, had plundered from the Visayas from 1722 to 1723. The Sultan, powerless to stem the tide of revolt, sought the help of his allies at Zamboanga who, when they learned that Malinog, in turn, was being aided by the Dutch⁵⁵ decided in 1731 to send a fleet to Tamontaka⁵⁶ where the deposed Sultan was residing. Malinog's fort, built by a Dutch engineer, was destroyed after a long battle; his heavily defended principal *kota* farther upriver was devastated. In 1733, however, Malinog suddenly descended on Tamontaka and slew the Sultan. The Rajah Mudah refused to be crowned successor until Manila sent help; he complained that it was his friendship with Spain that had brought upon him the hatred of both Malinog and the Sultan of Sulu. The Spanish government finally bowed to his demands, raised a sum of nine thousand pesos, and dispatched a fleet of forty-eight vessels to the Pulangi.

An excellent gauge of the "legitimate" Cotabato Sultan's prestige is the isolation in which the Rajah Mudah found himself, forcing him to cry to the Spaniards for help. The rebel and usurper Malinog⁵⁷ on the other hand, was backed by a considerable number of Magindanao chiefs, and was allied with the king of the Illanuns, the Sultan of Tawi-tawi, the Sultan of Sulu, and the Dutch. The Rajah Mudah was saved when the Spanish fleet from Manila arrived. A Dutch vessel was captured near Malinog's stronghold, and, although the Sulu-Balanini-Illanun relief contingent was not defeated, it had to turn back for some reason or other. Malinog was pushed back to his stronghold upriver near Buayan. In April 1734, the Rajah Mudah was crowned Sultan by the Spaniards.⁵⁸

What role, if any, did Buayan play in the civil war? Evidently the version which Forrest took down conceals the existence of a rival power in the interior. On the contrary, there is strong evidence to suggest that Malinog had links with the Buayan kingdom. A Spanish writer, Campos Tomás, claims that Malinog was "a prince reigning in Buayan."⁵⁹ The *tarsilas* place Malinog within the Cotabato royal family, but, given the relations between the Cotabato and Buayan ruling families, he may well have had affinal ties with the latter. This possibility is strongly hinted at in the fact that Malinog's three half-brothers (he was an only son) are all linked with Buayan: one was named Raja Bwayan Manuk, and may well have been Buayan's ruler at the time of the revolt; the other two were born of a Buayan princess.⁶⁰ It must also be noted that Malinog's power base was located just below the apex of the delta, a region which, says Saleeby, was in the "middle zone" between *sa-ilus* and *sa-raya* and looked either to Cotabato or Buayan, whichever was more powerful.⁶¹ This evidence, including the fact that in all the sources

-
52. Saleeby, *Studies*, p. 58; *BRPI*; XLVI, pp. 45-48, footnote 6; a more recent example is Reber, p. 185.
53. See Forrest, pp. 201-206. Saleeby and Blair and Robertson were aware of other, conflicting versions but, for some reason or other, rejected them in favor of Forrest's.
54. Joseph Torrubia⁶² *Dissertación Histórico-política* (1753), pp. 68-90, trans. in *BRPI*, XLVI, pp. 38-43; Jose Montero y Vidal, *Historia de Filipinas* (1889-95), I, pp. 438-452, trans. in *BRPI*, XLVI, pp. 44-51 (this account is based on Juan de la Concepción, *Historia de Filipinas* [1788-92], X, pp. 198-238, 337-375); "Capítulo de carta escrita por el Provincial de la Compañía de Jesus de Filipinas al Comisario de su orden en Madrid," in Barrantes, app. III, pp. 311-342; Mariano Campos Tomás, "Estudio del Pulangi (Mindanao)," *La Política de España en Filipinas*, VIII, no. 184 (1898), pp. 165-167. The account we give is a composite of all four.
55. *Ibid.* 56. p. 165. 57. Cf. *tarsila* in Saleeby, *Studies*, p. 38.
58. The Sultan of Tumbao, at the delta's apex, had close kinship, economic and political ties with both Cotabato and Buayan. ". . . The Intermediate position between Saylud and Saraya have been very prominent factors in the history-making events of the valley." (Saleeby, *Studies*, p. 47.)

Malinog is said to have been driven upriver and prevented from ever descending, indicates that this Magindanao rebel prince was a protégé of the Buayan ruler who perceived his rival's weakness and *de facto* dependence upon Spain.

The main accomplishment of the Spanish relief expedition was the closure of the Pulangi passages to the upriver Magindanaos, who were thus "shut in from [their] allies the Joloans and Camucones."⁵⁹ At best, the rebellion was contained by exploiting the geographic factor which had always placed Cotabato in a favored position vis-à-vis Buayan. Meanwhile, the Sultan fell more and more into the net of Spanish influence:

. . . he agreed to allow the entrance of Christian missionaries; the building of churches, and the establishment of Spanish forts and garrisons, in his territories; also to acknowledge his vassalage to Spain by furnishing a quantity of wax, cacao and other products of his country.⁶⁰

Thus, the civil war had increased the polarization of the Magindanao world into *sa-ilud* and *sa-raya*. Cotabato began to look more and more to Zamboanga and Spain for the maintenance of its power. Buayan in the interior was locked in, harboring the rebels who had attempted to take over Cotabato. But if Malinog, now in Buayan, was forcibly cut off from his Sulu and Illanun allies, this measure, undertaken by the Cotabato Sultan with the help of the Spanish navy, could at best be temporary.

One major account of Magindanao remains to be reviewed before we move on to the nineteenth century, and this is Thomas Forrest's, who visited the area from 1775-1776. From 1718 to the time of his visit, Zamboanga had been evacuated for only a few years during the British occupation of Manila (1762-1764).^r The perceptive Forrest concludes that Zamboanga was the cause of the Sultan's poverty and weakness. Spanish patrol boats prevented Chinese junks from calling at Cotabato. Thus, Chinese goods had to enter via Sulu; the little trade that was carried on by the Chinese was confined to that of a few country traders called "Orang Sangley."^{f1} Some sixty years later another Britisher, J. Hunt, attributed the Sultanate's decline to the departure from the area of the Badjaus, who, he said, were the original *orang Solok* of the east of Subanos and Lutas:

. . . The prohibition of the junk trade at Magindanao . . . by which they [the Badjaus] were prevented from selling their produce, compelled them to resort to Macassar and to make that the center of their annual operations.^{f2}

Forrest has little to say regarding the general internal situation, i.e., the conditions in *sa-raya*, because he was caught up in the world of Cotabator. Because of friendly relations between the Cotabato royal family and some Illanun rajahs, he was able to visit some of the dreaded pirate areas.^r Forrest's inability to visit the upper Pulangi may have been owing to the Sultan's lack of control over it and inability to guarantee his safety. But what Forrest heard about Buayan is interesting, confirming the existence of that inland power-center:

Many of the countries above Boyan are subject to the Rajah of Boyan. He is a Mahometan, and his subjects, called by the Magindanao people Oran Selam de Oolo (inland Musselmen), may be about twenty-thousand males.^{f3}

Buayan, then, controlled a considerable territory and population which the Magindanaos of the delta regarded as distinct and inland-dwelling. Forrest's mention of the great number of his subjects recalls Combès's comment that the Buayan ruler had "twenty-fold more vassals" than the Cotabato Sultan. But in the matter of status or rank the ruler of Buayan, being a mere *rajah*, was theoretically inferior to the Cotabato Sultan. Forrest adds that the Rajah of Buayan was obliged to supply the sultanate with a certain number of men in times of war, the implication being that the former was in some sort of vassalage status relative to Cotabato.^{f4}

59. Torrubia, in *BRPI*, XLVI, p. 43.

60. *Ibid.*

61. p. 280.

62. "Some particulars," p. 50r

63. pp. 188-189. The population figure of 20,000 males is reasonable. Figures in the 1870's place at 35,267 the total population under Buayan's control. The comparative figure for the area controlled by Cotabato (then under Spanish rule) is 29,115. Antonio Martel de Gayangos, "La Ysla de Mindanao" (undated, ca. 1878), MS, Newberry Library, cf. chart in appendix.

64. p. 189.

Differences in rank notwithstanding, by the end of the eighteenth century the Sultan of Mindanao at Cotabato was undoubtedly suffering an erosion in the basis of his power, a powerful navy and control of trade, as a result of the presence of Spanish Zamboanga, while the Rajah of Buayan, although locked up in the interior, preserved the basis of his power, which was a sizeable population and vast natural resources. Forrest himself points out that the Cotabato Sultan's greatest asset was his superior geographical situation:

. . . The Rajah of Boyan can have no connection with any body of water out of the river, without leave of Magindanao. As all egress must be by water, the Sultan has him in a manner locked up; unless he go by the lake Buluan, and the harbor of Sugud Boyan (Sarangani bay), between which there is a communication by land over flat country. . . .⁶⁵

We can assume that a great portion of the Sultan's wealth was in fact derived from the collection of tolls from vessels coming to and from the interior,⁶⁶ implying that Cotabato was beginning to rely on the upriver people for income as well as foodstuffs. The stable situation which Forrest witnessed, in contrast to the turmoil of the civil war years, is perhaps due to the interdependence of *sa-ilud* and *sa-raya*, not to the Sultan's control over the interior. But the Spaniards were to alter the situation in the nineteenth century. The sudden outburst of energy from Buayan, at a time when the Magindanao interior was threatened with Spanish conquest, should be seen in the light of the preceding summary and re-interpretation of Magindanao's early history. By looking at Magindanao history not merely in terms of the Sultanate of Mindanao at Cotabato but also taking into account the existence of a rival power center in the interior, we need no longer see the rise of Datu Uto of Buayan as an "accidental occurrence"; his rise becomes another expression of the tension that exists in the Magindanao world between its two territories, *sa-ilud* and *sa-raya*.

65. *Ibid.* The significance of Sarangani bay is dealt with in Chapter III.

66. See Chapter III, p. 23.

CHAPTER II

THE SPANISH ADVANCE AND THE RISE OF DATU UTO (1861-1878)

The rise of Buayan under Datu Uto in the second half of the nineteenth century was largely a response to the situation created by the Spaniards in their attempt to subdue the Philippine Muslims by force or diplomacy. The renewed vigor in Spanish policy toward the Muslims in the nineteenth century was influenced by several factors. The most pressing, perhaps, was the search for a solution to the problem of piracy and slave-raiding in the Christian territories. Although the bulk of these deeds was known to be perpetrated by Illanun and Samal (i.e., Balanini) pirates, blame was heaped upon the Sulus and Magindanaos for their acquiescence and even outright participation in such acts. Solutions to this problem tended to oscillate between what can be termed the "military" and the "diplomatic" solutions. The former was, generally, speaking, a revival of governor-general Corcuera's successful tactic in the later sixteenth century, which was:

To watch the departure of Moro fleets; to be in full observation of their movements, and to try to attack them before they arrive at the ports which they intend to assault with the intention of pillage and slave-raiding.¹

The policy which can be loosely termed "diplomatic" or "liberal" involved the setting up of treaties with the major sultans with the purpose of, among other things, using their influence upon their subjects to suppress piratical activity. This policy tended to be applied when Spanish military weakness precluded armed intervention, although the genuine liberal outlooks of some governors-general must not be underestimated. In any case, the "diplomatic" approach tended to be ineffective owing to the nature of the sultans' political control; suppression of piracy was generally a dead letter in the treaties as a result of the sultans' lack of authority, as distinguished from influence, over their subjects.

Toward the middle of the nineteenth century, when the Spanish military capability was considerably enhanced by the introduction of steamships, shifts in policy along the lines mentioned above tended to reflect the varying outlooks of the Manila government. We must bear in mind that throughout the nineteenth century Spain was involved in a struggle between liberalism and constitutionalism, on the one hand, and conservatism and absolutism on the other. As one side gained power momentarily, a new governor-general would be sent to the Philippines. Thus, a policy of armed conquest might be initiated by a conservative governor-general, only to be superseded a few years later by a liberal policy of coexistence.² Such vacillations in Manila had repercussions in the Magindanao scene.

The desire to control the independent territories of Sulu and Magindanao, whether by peaceful or armed means, was also a response to the changing nature of the Philippine foreign trade. The galleon trade monopoly, which had confined the Philippine trade to a few Spaniards resident in Manila and their backers in Mexico who regarded Manila only as a depot of exchange for Chinese and other exotic oriental goods, was finally dissolved when Mexican insurgents occupied Acapulco in 1815. Attention began to be paid to direct commercial links between the Philippines and Spain and to the exportation of crude products of the archipelago. Agricultural development was stimulated. Manila-based foreigners were encouraged to develop the export trade. Eventually, ports in the Visayas, such as Cebu and Iloilo, were opened and foreigners were allowed to trade and traffic in the provinces.³ With the hope of deriving revenue from trade Spaniards were beginning to think of the fertile plains and forests of Mindanao, where cacao and tobacco might be cultivated and where such traditional exports as beeswax, resins and rice were plentiful. Jolo, too, the *entrepôt par excellence* and center of the slave trade, had to be brought into the Spanish sphere of influence. The Spaniards had to face the fact that the trade

1. Bernaldez, p. 145.

2. For a good survey of the Liberal-Conservative dispute see Horacio de la Costa, *Readings in Philippine History* (Manila, 1965), chapter X, pp. 168-182.

3. James A. Leroy, "The Philippines, 1860-1898--some comment and bibliographical notes," *BRPI*, LII, p. 113.

of these areas was directed to Batavia and Singapore. Moreover, the British and French were already knocking at the doors of Sulu and Basilan respectively. Thus, for Manila it was a race to secure the southern boundaries of the colony.

The first significant development was the signing of treaties with the Sulu and Cotabato sultans in 1836 and 1837. The dual motives of restraining piracy and opening up trade were clearly involved here; moreover, the Spaniards seem to have been unable to use force because of the sorry state of their navy at this time.⁴ Bernaldez says that governor-general Salazar, who originated the idea of the treaties, was fascinated by the idea of encouraging commercial traffic with the Muslim areas in order to give the sultans and datus other incentives, besides piracy, to acquire wealth.⁵ With regard to Sulu, agreements were made to regulate the licensing of shipping and duties to be paid by Sulu boats in Manila and Zamboanga and Spanish vessels in Jolo. An alliance was declared for guaranteeing peace and safety in both Philippine and Sulu waters.⁶ Such "concessions" made by the Sulu Sultan were relatively minor compared with those of the Cotabato Sultan. Besides *de facto* control of Cotabato trade by Zamboanga, the Sultan had to accept the title "Feudatory King of Tamontaka" from the Spanish government, which also chose his successor.⁷ A big step was now made towards the incorporation of Cotabato into the Spanish colonial domain.⁸ As J. Hunt observed in 1837, the English might still have a free hand at Sulu and its possessions, but Magindanao was considered a part of the Philippines, "and although restored to the Sultan, it was under an express stipulation that his majesty should not cede or permit the introduction of any European without the express consent and license of the Spanish government."⁹

Manila was delighted that the Cotabato Sultan should have easily and perhaps willingly come under its wing, for the Sultan was believed to be the key to the eventual domination of the whole Pulangi valley. Only gradually did the Spanish government accept the fact that the "Sultan of Mindanao," as they believed their protégé to be, really controlled only the delta. Former tributaries were quick to repudiate their relationship with Cotabato when they recognized that the Sultan was being used to further Spain's imperialist ambitions. This was done by the Muslims of Davao gulf, on the east side of Mindanao.⁸ In 1844, the Cotabato Sultan ceded Davao to Spain; it was to be colonized sometime later by Jose Oyanguren. Around the year 1847, the vessel *San Rufo*, captained by a Spaniard, came to Davao to trade. It carried a letter of recommendation from the Cotabato Sultan, charging the datus of Davao to receive those of the *San Rufo* as friends. The Davao Muslims pretended to respect the Sultan's letter, and engaged in trade. But when the majority of the ship's crew were at some distance away from the vessel, they were attacked by the inhabitants. Only two of the *San Rufo*'s crew escaped to tell the tale. The Manila government angrily demanded satisfaction from the Cotabato Sultan. But what could the latter do except to admit that the inhabitants of Davao were no longer his subjects, since they had disobeyed his orders, and that the Spanish government had to deal with the Davao datus directly?¹⁰

In 1848, a powerful Spanish force led by the colonizer Oyanguren invaded Davao. To the aid of the Davao datus came hundreds of Magindanaos from the upper Pulangi, or *sa-raya*; after all, the harassed Davao Sultan was the father-in-law of the sultan of Cabakan, a *rancheria* near the upper limit of *sa-raya* which was under the influence of Buayan. In spite of the assistance from Magindanao, the Spanish conquest was inevitable owing to superior weaponry. The top-ranking Davao datus retreated to Cabakan with their followers.

-
4. In 1835, Captain general Enrile made a regulation, the most salient feature of which was that no naval encounter was to be accepted or offered to the Moros because of the certainty of defeat. Agustin Santayana, *La Isla de Mindanao* (Madrid, 1862), p. 41e.
 5. p. 147.
 6. Saleeby, *History of Sulu*, pp. 194-199.
 7. Delor-Angeles, p. 50e. Unfortunately, I do not have a copy of the treaty itself. Other writers who refer to some of its provisions are Santayana (p. 41) and Saleeby, (*Studies*, p. 60).
 8. p. 53.
 9. According to Blumentritt, the Muslim inhabitants of Davao gulf were ethnically Magindanao ("Los maguindanaos," p. 267)e. Evidently, they had the greatest renown as pirates in the seventeenth century. (See Combès in *BRPI*, XL, pp. 102-103.
 10. Quirico Moré to Father Superior, Jan. 20, 1885, *BRPI*, XL, pp. 194-196. The letter also appears in *CMSJ*, VIIe.

Others withdrew southwest to the Liguasan-Buluan areas and Sarangani bay.¹¹ These territories became foci of strong anti-Spanish and anti-Cotabato sentiments; they were a potential source of support for future resistance movements.¹²

When the use of steam vessels in 1846 finally established the Spanish Navy's superiority over native *vintas* and *praus*, there was no stopping the Spanish advance through forceful means. The destruction of the Balanini pirate haunts in 1848 brought a distinct lull in piratical activities, which was used to advantage by the establishment of factories and the dispatch of trading vessels to Mindanao.¹³ In 1851, Jolo was razed by a Spanish force in reaction to alleged violations of the 1836 treaty and to attempts by Sir James Brooke to draw Sulu into the British sphere of influence.¹⁴ After another victory over the Calamianes pirates, the Spanish government took the first step toward the actual occupation of Magindanao by implanting a fort and naval base at Pollok, north of Cotabato, in 1851. This measure was welcomed by the Sultan, who felt the need for Spanish support in order to bolster his prestige. Ironically, however, the Cotabato-Spain alliance only resulted in a further loss of the Sultan's subjects and allies. The revolt of the inhabitants of Sugut in 1852, for example, was prompted not only by enmity toward the Spaniards at Pollok but also by enmity toward the Sultan, who was now regarded a puppet of Spain.¹⁵

The exploration teams which set out from Pollok in 1854 and 1855 to look into conditions in the Pulangi valley finally put an end to illusions the government had of the Magindanao political and social situation. As Romualdo Crespo, one of the explorers, puts it: "The government's lack of knowledge, up to this day, of the social organization of the Mindanao Moros has been the sole cause of the great importance we have given to the Cotabato Sultan in the treaty of 1837."¹⁶ Indeed, for the first time since the seventeenth century we are provided with a succinct account of internal relations in the whole of Magindanao, knowledge which was beyond the capability of Forrest, who had not dared to venture inland.

In the 1770's Forrest could still sense that the Cotabato Sultanate had prestige and maintained its hold over the symbols of power even if it lacked authority over its "subjects." By the 1850's however, radical changes in the internal situation seem to have taken place. There were no less than thirteen sultans in the river valley living in mutual rivalry. The absence of a strong central power had induced many princelings to assert their independence, styling themselves "sultan," whether or not they had the prestige and genealogy to bear such assertions. As Montero y Gay puts it:

-
11. Claudio Montero y Gay, "Exploración en Mindanao," *BSGM*, XV (1883), p. 122; Santayana, p. 111; Joaquin Rajal y Larre, *Exploración del territorio de Davao* (Madrid, 1891), p. 16 (based on explorations made in 1859 and 1882). Santayana adds that the datus of Davao all fled because under Spanish rule they would not have been able to maintain their aristocratic status based on piracy and slavery. Only 6,000 *sakops* (vassal or client class) remained in the towns (*ibid.*).
 12. In June 1861, the governor of Davao received reports that more than 600 Moros from the lake Buluan region were setting out to attack Davao. The threat was averted with the help of pro-Spanish pagan tribes, but Buluan was not occupied and later came under Buayan's control; Montero y Vidal, *Historia*, III, pp. 335-336e
 13. Bernaldez, pp. 171-172. On Feb. 25, 1849, the Governor-general of the Dutch East Indies sent a congratulatory letter to the Count of Manila.
 - 14e Cf. Saleeby, *History of Sulu*, pp. 93-106, 237-250.
 15. Bernaldez, p. 219.
 16. Romaldo Crespo y Guerra to the Gov. and Captain-general, Manila, June 31 [*sic*], 1885, MS, Newberry Library, p. 90. The first expedition was undertaken in August 1854 by Juan de Cordoba, Captain of Engineers stationed at Pollok. The second, from February to March, 1855, was led by Staff Colonel Ramon Mascaro, and included Infantry Commander Romaldo Crespo, Naval Lieutenant Claudio Montero y Gay, Lt. Col. of Artillery Fernando Fernandez de Cordova, and Jose Oyanguren, conqueror and Mayor of Davao. Individual manuscript reports of the above-mentioned are collected in a single volume: Jose Cruz de Oyanguren, "Primer reconocimiento de gran rio Mindanao," July 7, 1855, MSS, Newberry Library. Montero's account, which has been cited (above, note 11), is reprinted in *BSGM*, XV. Oyanguren's account is in Benito Francia and Julian Parrado, *La Islas Filipinas: Mindanao* (Havana, 1898), vol. II, appendix.

I believe that a chief who is known for his valor, who has led a prescribed number of individuals on an expedition, who possesses some *lantakas* and slaves, has a valid claim to proclaim himself Sultan of his *pueblo*.¹⁷

The Spanish observers could still perceive the figments of a past situation: a *sa-ilud* dominated by Cotabato, a *sa-raya* dominated by Buayan. But they had to admit that even in the delta, the Cotabato Sultan's vassals only paid him nominal respect, ignoring his commands and contributing the barest minimum for his support. The Sultan was, in Montero's harsh terms, "a fake, a ridiculous figure whom no one obeys but his slaves; a king without soldiers or slaves, whose palace is a miserable hovel."¹⁸ His principal sources of support were Cotabato itself; Paiguan, residence of the traditional commander of the Magindanao fleet, the Datu Amirol (formerly Raja Laut); and Supangan, whose datu had both the military title of *maramaya* and the religious title of *pandita*. Some years later even Supangan was to rise against the Sultan and his Spanish friends. Other localities that looked nominally to Cotabato were Simuay to the north, and those on the Pulangi's south branch, Limapalay and Taviran. These were settlements which maintained friendly relations with Zamboanga,¹⁹ but it did not mean that they would continue to respect the Sultan. Finally, Tumbao, the strategic settlement at the apex of the delta, was in open revolt against Cotabato.

Sa-raya, too, was in a fragmented state. The Buayan Sultanate's control was confined to the *kotas* of Buayan, Pinyaman and Kabalungan. Montero y Gay, however, stresses the fact that Buayan was the most important and prestigious sultanate in the upper Pulangi. Its ruler was called "Grand Sultan" in order to distinguish him from the more recent upstarts. Gone was his vassal relationship with the Cotabato Sultan. Even the latter's assertion that a confederation still existed between them was seriously doubted by Montero. The one thing that, at this time, clearly stood in the way of conflict between them was the tie of kinship between the two ruling families.²⁰

The general internal situation can be summarized as follows: The Cotabato Sultan had undoubtedly lost the respect of the Magindanaos in the interior. Whether this was true as early as the eighteenth century cannot be ascertained owing to lack of information at the author's disposal. But we can be sure that this was the outcome of the process described in the last chapter. Setbacks in trade had deprived the Sultan of the greater part of his wealth; his increasingly close relationship with the Spaniards in an effort to maintain his precarious situation had only resulted in heightened resentment from the interior. But the sentiment was not necessarily anti-Spanish. In 1854 the Sultan of Buayan appeared to be friendly toward Spain; his irritation was rather directed at the Cotabato Sultan's practice of blocking the mouth of the river in order to prevent the *sa-raya* Magindanaos from communicating with the Spaniards at Pollok. The Buayan Sultan believed that his rival wished to be the sole beneficiary of whatever might accrue from friendship with Spain.²¹ That this was a correct appraisal of the situation can be seen from other details. Why was the Cotabato Sultan, unlike his counterpart at Sulu, willing to cede his domains to a colonial power? There is no doubt that the domestic motive was paramount. The Sultan wanted to use his alliance with Spain as a counterforce to threats emanating from Buayan.²² In 1855 he requested the establishment of a Spanish garrison in Cotabato.²³ Furthermore, it was reported on February 1861, the eve of the Spanish occupation, that fortifications were being built in Cotabato not as a defense

17. "Exploración," p. 117.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 119.

19. These seem to be the sites where the Lumaguans and Tampacans, with whom the Spaniards at Zamboanga maintained contact since the seventeenth century, had their settlements (see Chapter I, p. 8).

20. Montero y gayo "Exploración," pp. 119-120.

21. Juan Cordoba, "Gran Rio de Mindanao," MS, Newberry Library, entry of Aug. 19, 1854, p. 32.

22. In the series of treaties made between Spain and Cotabato from 1827 to 1872, it is clear that the Magindanaos from Libungan and Taviran down (i.e. *sa-raya*) would be granted certain benefits such as the use of the Spanish flag (!) and the provision of arms. Enemies of the Sultan (i.e. generally the *sa-ilud* people) would be considered enemies of Spain; Ladislao Nieto, "Mindanao: paginas sueltas, 1885-1887," MS, Newberry Library, pp. 64-66.

23. Ramon Mascaro to the Gov. and Captain-general, Manila, June 21, 1855, MS, Newberry Library, p. 85.

against the Spaniards but as a protection against the Buayan Sultan's threat to place by force one of his sons (possibly the young Datu Uto) on the Cotabato throne.²⁴

If, on one hand, the *sa-raya* chiefs were resentful of some of the Cotabato Sultan's practices, on the other hand their attitude toward the Spanish visitors was ambivalent. The threat of a Spanish invasion of the Pulangi not being imminent at the time, how else could the foreign explorers be regarded by the petty sultans, each vying to gain the upper hand over the other, except as representatives of a powerful kingdom with whom alliance would be profitable? To the delight of the Spaniards some chiefs sought to outdo each other in honoring them and seeking their friendship.²⁵ Not all acted this way, however. There were those who remembered the bloody conquest of Davao seven years earlier. The Sultanate of Cabakan, where the principal datus of Davao had found refuge, was particularly hostile and twice attempted, unsuccessfully, to engineer ambushes against the Spanish flotilla. The majority of the chiefs were simply apathetic. But it is significant that on one occasion where a datu was slighted by the Spaniards, who preferred to deal with his rival, the former was quick to join the hostile camp.²⁶ This is a sign that beneath all the apathy and divisiveness was a potential for unity and action.

What impressed the Spanish explorers was the fragmentation of authority in Magindanao, from which it was concluded that the situation was ripe for a Spanish occupation. Montero y Gay suggested that, by occupying Cotabato and adopting a policy of attraction, most of the little sultanates could be won over to their side; these in turn could be set off against the few recalcitrant ones. Infantry Commander Crespo felt confident that control could be established simply by taking over Cotabato and Matincauan, at both ends of the Magindanao settlement in the Pulangi river, and having a steamship shuttle back and forth between the two points. Oyanguren and Mascaro stressed economic development and the opening up of trade. This would bring wealth to the inhabitants as well as to Spain. How, then, could a conflict develop? Such confidence on the part of the Spaniards was not an outcome of ignorance. Crespo's advice that the Muslim sherifs and panditas ought to be carefully watched or even expelled, and Mascaro's recommendation that the hill tribes, the source of manpower, be neutralized by missionaries, show an awareness of the roots of political power.²⁷ But the Spanish observers were so impressed by the conditions of relative peace and equilibrium they witnessed that they could not imagine that the Magindanaos could be unified under a leader other than the Cotabato Sultan, their ally; they underestimated the reaction to their projected establishment of control. What actually happened was beyond their expectations. The Spanish advance served as the catalyst for the impending restructuring of the Magindanao internal polity.

On April 30, 1861, a flotilla led by the commanding general of Pollok naval base advanced toward the mouth of the Pulangi river. With the corvette *Narvaez* stationed at the headwaters, the contingent moved into Paiguan, residence of Datu Amirol, father of the Sultan. There the Spanish flag was raised in the datu's *kota* without the slightest resistance. At Cotabato, the Sultan of Mindanao likewise raised the Spanish flag to the roar of a twenty-one gun salute. Aboard the flagship a grand *bichara* was held, whereupon "with the presence and approval of the Sultan and a large number of datus" the Spanish camp was designated, and the government promised to respect the Muslim religion and the customs of the Magindanaos.²⁸

But before the colonial government was able to consolidate its gains, hostilities flared up as a group of Cotabato Magindanaos, about half of the population, signified their opposition to their Sultan, whom they thought to have submitted to Spain all too willingly. The flag of revolt was raised at Pagalungan near the apex of the delta, the middle zone between *sa-ilud* and *sa-raya* where Malinog had had his base more than a

24. Francia and Parrado, I, p. 319.

25. Cordoba MS, pp. 28-29; Montero y Gay, "Exploración," pp. 120-121.

26. Montero, *ibid.*

27. A good summary of the 1854-1855 documents can be found in Paul Lietz, *Calendar of Philippine Documents* in the Ayer collection of the Newberry Library (Chicago, 1956), items no. 294-298. For a preliminary synthesis see his article "Mindanao in the nineteenth century."

28. Montero y Vidal, *Historia de la Piratería Malayo-Mahometana en Mindanao. Jolo y Borneo* (Madrid, 1888), p. 487; Francia and Parrado, I, p. 324. In view of the latter's criticism of Montero's mistakes in the rendering of dates, places, names, etc., their version is accepted whenever discrepancies arise. See Francia and Parrado, II, p. 190 for their comments on Montero.

hundred years earlier. In November 1861, a Spanish land-sea expedition was sent out to punish the Pagalungan rebels.

The Magindanao forces were led by Datu Maghuda, the eldest son of the Sultan of Tumbao. But the influence of the Sultan of Buayan could be felt in spite of his absence from the scene of battle itself. For, on the fifteenth of November, Maghuda sent a commission to notify the Spanish commander that a peace treaty could be concluded only if the Buayan Sultan were consulted first.²⁹ The invaders ignored this veiled peace overture. They had come "to castigate the insolence of the Sultan of Tumbao," and they were not to be set off their track.³⁰ They repeatedly assaulted the *kota* by land, but it was a futile task owing to the natural barriers of marsh and tall grass. Finally, on the seventeenth the *kota* was rammed by the galley commanded by Frigate Captain Mendez Nuñez. The Spanish-Filipino forces stormed into the walls, overwhelming the defenders who were forced to make a hasty retreat.³¹

The Pagalungan massacre seems to have been a great shock to the Magindanaos. Long accustomed to live in continual dissensions among themselves, their petty wars were nevertheless quite bloodless. For example, Vidal y Soler notes that there were only four casualties in half a year among the armies of two sultanates at war with each other. At Pagalungan no less than two hundred Magindanaos were killed. The encounter came to be deeply imbedded in their memories, and the story was transformed into an epic poem which was recited during their councils of war.³²

Another uprising at Taviran was suppressed. But the resistance, far from being eradicated, continued farther upriver. A group of survivors from Pagalungan headed south to Talayan, where they were welcomed. The rest marched to Buayan, which was to become the focus of the anti-Spanish movement. In accordance with Manila's orders to secure the whole of the Pulangi, the colonial forces advanced through Buayan unopposed and pushed on to Matincauan, at the upper limit of Magindanao settlement, which was occupied in February 1863. This was the turning point in their fortunes. In an attempt to establish communications with Davao to the east, the Spanish forces overstretched themselves, failing to maintain vital communications with the delta. Supplies were running low, and the morale of the troops was flagging, when the decision to strike out for Davao was made. For such a daring and foolhardy attempt they paid a high price. According to Perinat, fever, heat, hunger and other calamities left the dead scattered all along the route.³³

All this was being watched closely by the Magindanaos, who were in complete control of riverine communications above Tumbao. Montero y Vidal comments that the Spanish disaster at Matincauan made the Magindanaos realize that their best weapon was the topography of their homeland.³⁴ Encouraged by the retreat from Matincauan, "fugitives" from the delta swelled the ranks of the Talayan Sultanate in what came to be a massive movement of population from *sa-ilud* to *sa-raya*.

In 1864, the governor of Cotabato, Lieutenant Colonel La Hoz, thought it imperative to punish Talayan, the center of operations against Spanish positions in the delta's south. The Sultan of Buayan, who had come to terms with the Spanish establishment presumably after the Pagalungan massacre, provided La Hoz with four guides and some warriors captained by his young son Datu Uto. As the column crossed a reed-grass field (*cogonal*) in single file, small groups of Talayan Magindanaos, kris in hand, suddenly fell upon the center of the column. At this critical moment the Buayan guides and auxiliaries switched sides and joined their Talayan brothers in the attack. In spite of his force of five hundred soldiers, two pieces of artillery, and a great number of Cotabato Magindanao

29. Antonio Vazquez de Aldaña and Valentin G. Serrano, *España en la Oceanía* (Páginas de la guerra de Jolo) (Manila, 1876), p. 88. This account is taken from a letter by a famous participant, Mendez Nuñez. Other correspondences reproduced in the above volume.

30. Pablo Pastells, *Misión de la Compañía de Jesus de Filipinas en Siglo XIX* (Barcelona, 1916-1917), vol. I, p. 28.

31. Cf. accounts in Aldaña, *op. cit.*; Pastells, *ibid.*; Alfonso Perinat, *Operaciones Militares en el Rio Grande de Mindanao* (Manila 1888), part I (historical summary), p. 22; Francia and Parrado, I, pp. 327-328.

32. Sebastian Vidal y Soler, *Memoria sobre el Ramo de Montes en las Islas Filipinas* (Madrid, 1874), p. 193.

33. I, p. 22; also Montero y Vidal, *Piraterías* pp. 653-654.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 654.

auxiliaries, La Hoz was overwhelmed and chased up to the Spanish fort at Taviran. For the first time, the Magindanaos in the interior were victorious in battle. Their hero was Datu Uto, who from this time on is the leading figure of independent Magindanao.³⁵

In the above incident, we saw how Datu Uto disobeyed his father, the Sultan of Buayan, by turning against La Hoz and his contingent. Up to 1872 we are not informed about the datu's position in the hierarchy of Buayan. The old Sultan seems to have maintained friendly relations with Spanish Cotabato, and the latter pressed this to their advantage.³⁶ But the young Uto was already a figure to be reckoned with. In 1865, the Commandant General of Mindanao negotiated a treaty with him. It appears that he signed in the name of the Sultan of Buayan.³⁷ Was Datu Uto merely negotiating on behalf of his father, or is this a sign that power was beginning to shift into his hands? Surely Uto must have been a powerful chief by the late 1860s. He probably could boast of a large following and wealth, even though in terms of rank he was subordinate to the Sultan.

The period from 1865 to 1872 was one of relative stability, punctuated by skirmishes and reprisals, threats and counterthreats between the Spanish forces and those of Datu Uto. This was a period of entrenchment, particularly for the Spanish side. Forts had been constructed in strategic points in *sa-ilud* during the early 1860's, and now efforts were made to win over the chiefs of the delta in order to offset the isolation of these forts.³⁸ The Jesuits, who had established themselves in Tamontaka following the occupation, went to work spreading the Gospel among the hill people and, more important, attempting to subvert their relations with the Magindanaos.³⁹ Such pacification programs were to bear fruit much later.

One thing the Spaniards could boast of: Cotabato was theirs. This commanding position at the mouth of the Pulangi was now an extension of Zamboanga. This was the culmination of a long process which began when Zamboanga was established in the seventeenth century to maintain a coercive influence upon the Magindanao states. This was also the culmination of another process--the decline of the Cotabato Sultan's prestige. He no longer stood as the symbol of the integrity of the Magindanao world.

The Magindanaos consider Sultan Kudrat II, who was responsible for the incorporation of Magindanao territory into the Spanish empire, as the last one of any worth who ruled in Cotabato. The reason they give is that he was the last Sultan to perform the ancestral rite of "stepping on the white earth," which is a guarantee of the Sultan's power and the prosperity of the land.⁴⁰ The Sultan was, in effect, relegated to the position of a paid official in the colonial administration. During his visits to the Pollok naval station, for example, he was given the honors of *Teniente General* in actual service, and was saluted with a volley of seven cannonades.⁴¹ The Cotabato Sultans were awarded various titles by Spain, among which was the *Caballero Gran Cruz* (Knight of the Great Cross). They were "Hispanized" like the early chiefs of the now-Christian territories; soon they would act like cultivated *hidalgos*.⁴² Ironically, the Sultans and a few important Magindanao datus were shown more respect by Spanish officials than were the most illustrious

35. *Ibid.*; Perinat, I, pp. 22-23.

36. Cf. Gayangos MS, p. 26.

37. Pio A. de Pazos, *Jolo; Relato Histórico-Militar* (Burgos; 1879); p. 197; Montero y Vidal, *Piratería*, p. 505.

38. For the general situation in 1866 (described as a stalemate); see Ferdinand d'Alençon [*duc*]; "Lucon et Mindanao, recits et souvenirs d'un voyage dans l'extreme Orient," *Revue des Deux Mondes*; 191 (May 15, 1870), pp. 341-374. Some datus, although enemies of the Cotabato Sultan, were willing to cooperate with the Spaniards; Pastells, *Misión*, I, pp. 30-31, 68.

39. Grace L. Wood, "The Tiruray," *PSR*, V, 2 (April 1957); p. 13. The material on mission work is abundant. Cf. Madigan and Cushner; Pastells, *Misión*; *CMSJ*. The topic will be dealt with later in Chapter VI.

40. Saleeby, *Studies*, pp. 29, 60.

41. Jose Cuevas, "Relación de un viaje de exploración á Mindanao, 1860," in *CMSJ*, VIII, p. 36.

42. Vidal y Soler, p. 192. The Sultan was an accomplished chess player and showed "a cultivated intelligence." Mixing freely with the Spanish elite, he and other datus of Cotabato were fascinated by things European and were willing to accept aspects of Spanish culture (*ibid.*).

Christian natives in other parts of the colony.⁴³

But, in the eyes of the majority of Magindanaos, the Cotabato Sultans were no longer worthy of respect. In May 1863, the Sultan and his son were granted yearly pensions of 1,000 pesos and 800 pesos respectively, for they had come to such a state of penury that . . . they had not eaten substantially for several days, being abandoned by the majority of their subjects."⁴⁴

. . . Ever since he ceded these lands to the Spaniards, his influence has greatly diminished, and although most of the sultans obey him "morally," in material terms it is not much, and he sees himself reduced greatly in the tribute they ought to pay him, and in resources. . . . The pension is most just, since it is due to the Spaniards that he has been deprived of his former prestige.⁴⁵

In return for the pension, Cotabato was ceded to Spain, although the Sultan retained the right to use the title "Sultan of Cotabato," which was in itself a far cry from the illustrious title of "Sultan of Mindanao" by which he used to be called.⁴⁶ Meanwhile, he "ruled" on the opposite side of the river in a "sordid-looking" house described in unflattering terms by the Frenchman Montano in 1880.⁴⁷

Some attention has been given to the fortunes of the Cotabato Sultanate because of the place it occupies in the memory of the Magindanao people. Cotabato was the door to the Pulangi valley, linking the Magindanaos to the greater world beyond. The Sultanate stood as a symbol of the integrity of the Magindanao world as a Islamic community in spite of political rivalries within its segments. The incorporation of Cotabato and its environs *sa-ilud*, in short--into the Spanish empire must have come as a shock to many. If in 1855 most of the sultans and datus in the interior were already "anti-Cotabato," as we have seen, in the 1860's the "anti-Spanish" element came into the forefront. The issue now was one of opposing not only an internal rival but also a foreign and Christian power which had ridden on the back of that rival. The merging of Spain and Cotabato meant that Islamic sentiments could be invoked from among the fragmented principalities of *sa-raya* in order to unite them against the common threat, under the leadership of the new symbol of integrity--Buayan.

In 1872, Datu Uto's father died. One suspects, from the relative inattention paid Uto by Spanish writers prior to 1872, that the old Sultan had the power to restrain his son. Increased mention of Uto after this date indicates a new phase in his career. He had a strong claim to the title "Sultan of Buayan,"⁴⁸ but apparently he allowed his uncle to assume the title. Perinat's opinion is that this was a calculated move by Uto in order that he might carry out his plans "without presenting his face."⁴⁸ As we shall see later, he was the real ruler of Buayan because he controlled its wealth, including that of his uncle. By using his uncle, the Sultan, as a front, Datu Uto was able to consolidate his power and carry on "illicit" trade and communications with other independent regions, without provoking immediate reprisals by the Spaniards.⁴⁹

In the beginning of 1874 Datu Uto, according to Perinat, "accelerated his rebellion," establishing close relations with Sulu, which at this time was being threatened with occupation by Spain. He embarked upon a program of intimidating the remaining datus who refused to support him. His principal *kota* at Marandag (Bakat) was strongly fortified, becoming a veritable nest of heavy cannon and *lantakas* encircled by a network of trenches.⁵⁰ Apparently he had gained such a large following and a network of family alliances that he sent in 1874 a taunting letter to the governor of Cotabato, hinting that with the power he had come to possess he would dare come down to Cotabato to defy the Spaniards and to prove that he was the most powerful in the Pulangi.⁵¹

43. Blumentritt, "Los maguindanaos," p. 279.

44. Francia and Parrado, I, p. 329.

45. Juan Burriel, "Ytinerario de la excursión hecha á Mindanao y Jolo," 1862e1863, MS, Newberry Library, p. 138.

46. Alençon, p. 363.

47. *Voyage aux Philippines et Malaises* (May 1879-June 1881) (Paris, 1886), p. 205.

48. I, p. 23.

49. This is dealt with fully in Chapter III.

50. *Loc. cit.*

51. Francia and Parrado, I, pp. 344-345. For the complete text of the letter and an analysis of Uto's alliance system see Chapter IV of this Data Paper.

Shortly after Uto's letter was received, the governor of Mindanao himself, Colonel Ramon de Careaga, led an expedition in order to capture the "renegade" datu.⁵² Bakat was occupied, but the wily datu was nowhere to be found. Meanwhile, his forces were in complete control of the countryside. Owing to difficulty in maintaining communications with Cotabato (a problem, it seems, of every Spanish force that ventured beyond the delta), and harassed by the guerrilla tactics of the Magindanaos, the Spanish foothold had to be given up within the same month. Ships and men retreated to Cotabato; the advance-fort at Bonga, a few miles above Tumbao, was abandoned. Somewhat as a compensation devised by Uto, Careaga brought back with him a handful of vague declarations of obedience from some Magindanaos who declared themselves representatives of Uto. This was the only compensation he could get for Uto's alleged "crimes and acts of violence."⁵³ Worthless though these declarations were, the governor of Mindanao was saved from the specter of utter humiliation.

Shortly thereafter, the Spanish government decided that the best course of action to follow was to abandon attempts to capture Bakat and to enter into friendly relations with Datu Uto. In May 1875, the acting governor of Mindanao, Anastasio Marques, boarded a gunboat for Buayan, docking right in front of Uto's old house. Somewhat taken aback, the Datu refused to come aboard as Marques suggested. Instead he dispatched two sultans and his chief pandita, who, on seeing that the Spaniards sincerely wanted peace, took great pains to welcome their enemies of yesterday. As the delegation stepped ashore unarmed, someone, possibly Uto, cried out "pagari, pagari, amigos, amigos!" ("friends, friends . . . a !"), whereupon the five hundred or so warriors who had threateningly gathered laid down their arms to echo the cry of friendship. Then took place a most successful *bichara*, attended by all the sultans, datos and religious dignitaries of the area. Datu Uto was in a particularly happy mood, for a daughter had recently been born to him. As the party, returning from the conference site, was passing by a gaily decorated raft on which Uto's daughter lay surrounded by her retinue, the Datu, obviously in a highly elated state, threw his arm around the collar of the Jesuit Fr. Juanmarti, and then of governor Marques, repeating the words "pagari, sagune pagari; amigos, ahora amigos" ("friends today we are friends . . ."). Both Spaniards and Magindanaos were very satisfied with the established peace.⁵⁴

But could there be real peace so long as the Spanish threat remained? In 1876, Jolo was occupied by Spanish troops, and the sense of bitterness and humiliation suffered by the Muslims of Sulu could not fail to reach the Magindanao interior.⁵⁵ Moreover, the Spaniards at Cotabato, together with their Jesuit allies at Tamontaka, still held to their policy of attraction, which meant fomenting dissensions among the sultans and datos upriver. By 1877, after several visits by officials and missionaries, the Sultan of Tumbao (Talakuku) could be counted on to side with Cotabato against his rival Uto.⁵⁶ Only direct orders from the governor-general prevented the use of military solutions.⁵⁷ In spite of the treaty, then, basic differences and tensions remained unresolved. Uto himself carried on with his program of uniting the *sa-raya* Magindanaos under his banner. In 1878, he appeared at Cotabato at the head of an armada of eighty to a hundred *vintas* loaded with armed warriors. The Spaniards "could only endure in silence."⁵⁸ His visit was a dashing show of strength, representing the height of his career. He had gained the alliance of all the sultans and datos of the Pulangi, except Datu Ayunan and others on the south branch of the delta. As the Spaniard Perinat puts it, Uto had truly become "Sultan of the River."⁵⁹

52. *Ibid.*, p. 345. An apparent misprint in Montero y Vidal's account gives the date of the Careaga expedition as October 1864.

53. Perinat, I, p. 24; Montero y Vidal, *Piratería*, p. 655.

54. Letter of Fr. H. Ignacio Larrañaga, May 21, 1875, quoted in Pastells, *Misión*, I, pp. 137-138.

55. Vidal y Soler, p. 194. This is examined in Chapter V of this study.

56. Pastells, *Misión*, I, p. 261.

57. On June 3, 1878, a decree was sent out by Moriones prohibiting wartime operations and all kinds of hostilities against the Moros, except in case Spanish forts were attacked. According to Montero y Vidal, this decree bolstered Datu Uto's prestige; *Piratería*, p. 655.

58. Perinat, I, p. 24; see also Montero y Vidal, *Piratería*, p. 656.

From what has been said so far, should we continue to maintain the Spanish view that Uto was a mere rebel? Or is the notion of "revolt" only relevant in the sense that the Datu was a source of resistance to every attempt of Spain to extend her rule upriver? Datu Uto, descendant of the ancient ruling family of Buayan, can be better viewed as a legitimate Muslim prince, aware of *sa-raya's* tradition of independence, who responded positively to the Spanish threat. There was no constant warfare during the period from 1861-1878 but only petty raids conducted by government forces against independent *kotas*. The only significant encounters were the Talayan massacre of 1861, the defeat of La Hoz in 1864, and the short-lived occupation of Uto's capital in 1875. In all these incidents, it was the Spanish side which took the initiative. Complementing these military adventures were various diplomatic initiatives such as we have seen in 1865 and 1875. Insofar as these initiatives always came from the Spanish establishment, this is a dramatic comment on the scale of the problems which Datu Uto, in fourteen years of influence in the Pulangi valley, had created for the Spaniards.

CHAPTER III

THE WORLD OF DATU UTO (ca. 1864-1885)

Datu Uto belonged to the old ruling family of Buayan, the most prestigious in *sa-rayn*. According to Saleeby, at some unspecified time in the recent past there had been a split in the Buayan Sultanate after the death of Sultan Maytum. Bayaw, the younger son of Maytum, succeeded to Kudarangan and all the northern half of Buayan, and he was known as the Sultan of Kudarangan. Marajanum, Uto's father, succeeded to the capital itself and all the country lying on the left bank of the Pulangi and Sapakan (Dansalan) rivers, including the vital areas extending to lakes Liguasan and Buluan.^d The split in the Sultanate accounts for the fact that Uto's power base is usually named Bakat, rather than Buayan, to distinguish it from the original Sultanate's northern half, Kudarangan.

The territory directly controlled by Datu Uto was Bakat. This was his district, where his ancestors had resided. But his renown rests mainly on his success in subordinating to himself all the sultans and datus in the upper valley up to Matincauan in the northeast, which was the upper limit of Magindanao settlement, and down to Sarangani bay at the southern tip of Mindanao. Moreover, Uto had ties with several Muslim principalities in the vicinity: there were the Illanuns to the northeast and the Sulus (Taosugs) farther beyond. Each of the areas in and out of Magindanao where Uto's influence was felt had a part to play in the waxing and waning of his power. The relationships between these areas will be examined in this chapter.

Bakat, Uto's district, was an asset to him in terms of agricultural productivity and its strategic location in the Pulangi valley. According to Nieto, "the exuberant vegetation of the domains of Utto [had] no equal in the banks of the Rio Grande."² The greater part of it was planted with sugar cane, rice paddy, coffee, cacao, corn, cotton, coconut and various fruits.³ In 1878, an anonymous commentator refuted the common but unfounded belief that the Magindanaos were degenerate and in worse condition than the rest of the Philippine Muslims, in particular the Taosugs of Sulu, by emphasizing how well cultivated the fields were in the delta, in Buayan, and in the Liguasan-Buluan areas. He pointed out how commerce was stimulating agricultural productivity.⁴ The person who most readily responded to such commercial incentives was Datu Uto himself.

What the succession of Spanish treaties with Uto in the 1860's and 1870's did was to open up trade between Spanish-controlled *sa-ilud* and independent *sa-rayn*. The Spaniards and their Magindanao wards needed food, for the supply of which they were willing to postpone bitter enmities.⁵ Rice, fowl, fish, vegetables, fruits, cacao and tobacco were the "necessary goods" which all the Spanish garrisons stood to forego in the event of their complete isolation from the enemy. For such items, says Burriel, the Spaniards were "completely dependent upon . . . [the Magindanaos], and exposed to a desperate situation."⁶ For the Spanish advance had caused a great part of the delta's population to migrate upriver, leaving the lands surrounding the garrisons uncultivated.⁶ Datu Uto used the food-supply issue to increase his bargaining power during the negotiations with Spain.

1. Saleeby, *Studies*, p. 23.

2. Nieto MS, p. 124.

3. "Algunas reflexiones sobre el 58 Distrito de Mindanao llamado del Centro, publicada el año pasado en la 'Oceania,' CMSJ, II, 1879, p. 232; Adolfo Horguín, "Comunicación," March 30, 1888, in Juan Salcedo (ed.), *Proyectos de Dominación y Colonización de Mindanao y Joló* (Gerona, 1891), p. 97; Nieto MS, p. 124.

4. "Algunas reflexiones," p. 236.

5. ? *Española*, Num. 89, 1886 (newsclipping attached to Nieto MS).

6. Burriel MS, p. 125. Burriel was writing during the early years of the Spanish occupation. Presumably as the situation stabilized in *sa-ilud* in the late 1860's some of the population moved back to the delta.

The relative peace that existed for some twenty years (ca. 1864-1884) between Uto and the Spaniards was, to a great extent, due to the commercial *rapport* between them. Perinat says that the great quantity of gold, silver and copper-cash in Uto's vaults was the revenue he got from the sale of foodstuffs and forest products to Cotabato.⁷ Many of the products from Buayan were re-exported from Cotabato to Sulu and Manila. The rice yield was more than enough for subsistence, and so rice was "one of the more important articles of trade of the Moros with the Chinese, who export it to other parts."⁸ The cacao of Buayan was said to be of "superior quality" and was "very much sought after."⁹

There were other productive areas in *sa-raya* beyond Uto's own domains. In Perinat's opinion, in fact, the most cultivated and fertile strength of land was that from Santa Isabel to Cabacan, along the edge of Liguasan marsh.¹⁰ The borders of Liguasan marsh and lake Buluan were well populated and cultivated. Since the sultans and datus of these areas were all subordinate to Uto, he must have obtained a measure of the produce as tax-payments.¹¹ Even if this were not so, however, Uto was certainly able to derive revenue from the traffic in foodstuffs between *sa-ilud* and *sa-raya* by exploiting the superior position of Bakat.

A very common practice in the Malay world was the collection of tolls from vessels passing through control points set up along riverine highways. Those who controlled rivermouths were specially favored since they also sat athwart trade routes. The Sultan of Cotabato, for example, collected tolls from *vintas* leaving the interior laden with produce. Spanish policy, however, sought to eliminate such exactions and to create a situation of "free trade" along the river.¹² When the Spanish occupation forces landed in Cotabato in 1861, panic swept many of the datus who saw the end of their profitable exactions.¹³ The string of forts erected in strategic points along the deltaic riverways deprived the *sa-ilud* chiefs of income from tolls.

But Datu Uto stood beyond the pale of Spanish control. His capital, Bakat, was located in such a way that all vessels coming down from the upper Pulangi and the twin lakes had to pass through it. In 1872, according to Vidal y Soler, all the *sa-ilud* Magindanaos were saying that Uto imposed a stiff toll in Bakat. He denied this charge when questioned, for he was treaty-bound not to interfere with the riverine trade.¹⁴ But by 1875 the Spanish authorities were certain that a toll station at Bakat exacted a large fee from each *vinta* bringing foodstuffs to Cotabato. The short-lived occupation of Bakat by governor Careaga in 1875 is a possible reaction to the toll problem, although the matter is not made explicit in the sources.¹⁵ The amount collected by Uto is not known, though we are given a hint by Nieto, who says that it was "neither more nor less than that which we consent to in the ports of Melilla in Africa."¹⁶

A great deal of Uto's economic activities was directed toward Cotabato; communications between *sa-ilud* and *sa-raya* were not at all frozen during the greater part of the Datu Uto period. But Uto's activities must be seen not only in relation to Cotabato and the Spaniards. In economic terms Cotabato could provide the interior with salt, cloth, metals, porcelain and other important staples, but firearms and other armaments, which Uto needed to sustain his prestige and prepare for the inevitable confrontation with Spain, were items that could not enter Buayan via the deltaic riverways. Parallel to the *sa-ilud sa-raya* trade pattern was another one which, in Spanish eyes, fell under the category of "smuggling."¹⁷

7. Perinat, II, p. 125.

8. "Algunas reflexiones," p. 232. One might speculate on Buayan's role in the often mentioned export of Magindanao rice to Sulu. See Forrest, p. 299; Hunt, p. 43; Reber, p. 198.

9. "Algunas reflexiones," p. 232.

10. Introductory note to Perinat, *Operaciones Militares*.

11. Cf. Cordoba MS, p. 16.

12. This was unanimously propounded by the members of the 1855 expedition.

13. Francis and Parrado, I, p. 322.

14. Vidal y Soler, p. 200.

15. ? Española, Num. 89, 1886, newsclipping attached to Nieto MS.

16. Nieto MS, p. 122.

The Magindanaos of *sa-raya* had something else to export besides rice, bees-wax and the like. They possessed slaves, captives taken from the hills surrounding the Pulangi valley. The slave-trade was a continuation of centuries of raids on Christian settlements. The Spaniards had, by Uto's time, put an end to such threats on their territories, but the Mindanao interior provided fair game. The commerce in slaves undertaken by the *sa-raya* Magindanaos forms an important basis for the "illicit" system of trade and communications linking them to the outside world.

One of the advantages of Bakat was its strategic location vis-à-vis the mountain ranges of Mindanao, inhabited by pagan tribes. The Tirurays, in particular, were dominated by Datu Uto.¹⁷ Many of the *rancherías* allied to him were also strategically located. The Talayan Sultanate, whose sultan was highly trusted by Uto, was situated west of Bakat and straddled the Tiruray mountains. Matincauan, at the upper limit of *sa-raya*, periodically raided Manobos and other hill tribes to its north and east. We know that in the 1880's Matincauan and the surrounding areas were controlled by Datu Enga or Watamama, also called Uto, who was a brother or close relative of Datu Uto.¹⁸ Finally, there was Buluan, commanding the outlet of lake Buluan on the east bank of which stood the important slave-raiding center of Tukanabagu.¹⁹ Buluan was one of the allied *rancherías* mentioned by Uto in his letter of 1874.²⁰

One hill group, the Tirurays, merits special attention because of its proximity to Uto's power base at one end, and to the Jesuit mission at Tamontaka at the other end, resulting in its becoming a bone of contention between the two poles. An examination of the Tirurays also enables us to understand the relationship between the Magindanaos and their hill neighbors and, in particular, the reason for the exploitation of the latter.

According to an anthropologist, Grace L. Wood,²¹ the history of the Tirurays begins with a legend, shared by the Magindanaos, that the two peoples had "the same father and the same mother"; in other words, there were originally two brothers. When Sarip Kabungsuwan came and introduced Islam, the elder brother Mamalu, who refused to be converted, made an agreement with his younger brother Tabunawai whereby the former would go to the mountains and they would carry on trade. From the elder brother came forth the Tirurays; from the younger came the Magindanaos.

A special system of trade existed between the Magindanaos and the Tirurays. On the basis of the legend mentioned by Wood the trade pacts, couched in terms of "sharing mother's milk," may have originated from the ties of the first hill refugees with their lowland kin. Eventually, the relationship seems to have become purely exploitative. A Magindanao chief selected the leaders of the Tirurays within an area he could control and gave them titles, making them responsible for their followers who were to bring to him a share of their agricultural and forest products. In return, the Magindanao chief provided manufactured goods, coastal products and, perhaps most important, protection from raids of other chiefs. Seeds and goods were also loaned, captives being seized if the debt were not paid.²²

Before the Spanish forward-movement in the nineteenth century, some sort of stabilized relationship must have existed between the Tirurays and the Magindanaos, a situation which would have owed not a little to their acknowledgement of a common pre-Islamic ancestry. The notion of a trade pact between the two peoples is corroborated by Forrest, who talks about the forced sale of paddy by hill peoples. The latter, says Forrest, ". . . possess great estates. They may be sold with the lands, *but not off the lands*. They pay yearly taxes not expected from Mohammedan vassals--a *bois* or land tax.²³ What Forrest took to be slaves were not captured hill people but Bisayan Christians, the prize of Illanun or Magindanao raids in the north. The association of slaves with such captives is reflected in the fact that in Sulu and Lanao the word *bisaya* is synonymous with "slave."

17. Gayangos MS, p. 27.

18. Juanmartí to Provincial, June 1, 1890, *CMSJ*, IX, p. 101.

19. Montero y Gay, "Exploración," p. 123.

20. See Chapter IV, pp. 34-35 for text of the letter.

21. pp. 12-13. For ethnographic material on the Tiruray in the nineteenth century, see Pastells, *Misión*, I, pp. 30-41. This is a compilation of data found in the Jesuit letters.

22. Wood, pp. 12-13.

23. p. 278.

The extensive raiding of Mindanao hill tribes, particularly the Tirurays, for the purpose of enslaving them seems to have been a comparatively recent phenomenon, occasioned by greater Spanish vigilance and naval strength in the nineteenth century which effectively cut off the Christian (i.e. Visayas and Luzon) source of slaves. One result of this concerted action against piracy, in which the British and the Dutch took part in their respective spheres, was the final downfall of the Sultan of Cotabato; he was described in 1855 as "a king without soldiers nor slaves,"²⁴ a far cry, indeed, from Forrest's description of him flanked by his Basayan bodyguards. The Magindanaos of *sa-raya*, however, were able to respond to the situation by undertaking to fill the demand for slaves that had arisen. Cordova noted in 1854 that Matincauan had become powerful because it had easy access to slaves who were sold downriver.²⁵ In 1860, the Spaniards first became acquainted with Batu Uto as the captain of two boatloads of slaves bound for Sulu.²⁶ Finally, Sarangani bay, which became Buayan's "outlet," as we shall see, was used by ships from all over the archipelago which unloaded firearms in exchange for slaves.

Starting from the notion expressed in legend that the Magindanaos and Tirurays were brothers, and that their relationship was principally one of trade, we have suggested an explanation for the trend towards outright exploitation of the Tirurays in the nineteenth century, culminating in the Datu Uto period, by relating such a trend to the closure of the main slave sources due to the vigilance of the colonial forces in the subject territories. Soon, however, Spanish vigilance extended to Illana bay itself. The mouth of the Pulangi river, Buayan's usual exit to the outside world, became Spanish territory in 1861; Cotabato could no longer be a channel for the slave trade. The only explanation for the continued success of the slave trade up to the 1880's is that the *sa-raya* Magindanaos had another outlet, which was Sarangani bay, at the southern tip of Mindanao.

The importance of Sarangani bay, also called Sugud Boyan (Harbor of Buayan), was noted in 1775 by Forrest, who saw it as the Rajah of Buayan's only other access to the sea besides the Pulangi rivermouth controlled by the Cotabato Sultan.²⁷ Geographic considerations made this possible. From *sa-raya* one can navigate south past Liguasan marsh to just beyond lake Buluan, from which there is a flat stretch of land--a veritable highway--to the towns of Makar and Buayan on the shores of Sarangani bay.²⁸ The members of the Spanish expedition of 1855 do not seem to have been aware of this fact. They believed that, if Cotabato were occupied, the Magindanaos in the interior would be truly locked in. Only in 1862 was Burriel able to point out the facility of communications between the Magindanao interior and Sarangani bay. Burriel, in fact, met many Magindanaos who talked of having been to the bay and who added that many of their tribe lived there.²⁹

Because of its situation at the southern tip of the island, Sarangani bay played an important role as a haven for ships plying the route to Ternate and Menado. The antiquity of this role is shown by the report of a sixteenth-century shipwrecked expedition, which states that in a fortified settlement of Sarangani island (off the bay) were "porcelain, musk, amber and oils, in which the Mindanaos and the other islands carry on internal commerce: some signs of gold were found. . . ."³⁰ Recent archeological findings confirm the observation that Sarangani was visited by Chinese junks which unloaded, among other things, porcelain ware.³¹ According to the journal of a Magindanao piratical (*mangaio*) prau mentioned by Forrest, Sarangani was the first stop-over on the island-hopping route to Celebes.³² For the most part of the seventeenth century the Sarangani

24. Montero y Gay, "Exploración," p. 119

25. Cordoba MS, p. 30.

26. Cuevas, "Relación," p. 44.

27. p. 189.

28. A British explorer, A. Henry Savage Landor, confirmed this in 1903. See *Gems of the East* (New York, 1904), II. According to Pastells, the journey from Sarangani to Buluan took only fourteen hours on horseback, "passing through good roads"; "Informe sobre la Isla de Mindanao," August 15, 1888, reprinted in *Misión*, III. p. 487.

29. Burriel MS, p. 160.

30. Santayana, p. 12; the original source is Juan de la Concepción.

31. Leandro Locsin and Cecilia Locsin, *Oriental Ceramics Discovered in the Philippines* (Rutland, Vt., 1967), map facing p. 3 (distribution of T'ang, Sung, Ming, Annamese and Sawankhalok wares with principal sites . . .).

32. Forrest, p. 303.

region was tributary to the Sultanate of Mindanao at Cotabato.³³ In the eighteenth century, however, the decline of Cotabato is evidenced by the series of treaties made by a "king of Saringani" with the Dutch.³⁴ The latter apparently realized the importance of the Saranganis. By the 1740's they had staked their claim on Saringani isle by implanting there a stone tablet bearing the initials V.O.C. and claiming the island as part of Ternate. The Spanish government viewed this with much alarm.³⁵

As long as the outlets of the Pulangi were open, Saringani bar remained of secondary importance to the *sa-raya* Magindanaos because of the long duration of the journey and the difficulty of transporting goods by land. This must have been the state of affairs up to the early nineteenth century. Despite sporadic enmities between Cotabato and Buayan, the former could not close off the river for any length of time because it had come to depend on the collection of tolls from vessels descending from Buayan.

Increasing Spanish pressure towards the middle of the nineteenth century altered the situation somewhat. Strong efforts to control navigation at the mouth of the Pulangi through the treaty with the Cotabato Sultan in 1837, the establishment of a naval base at Pollok in 1851, and ultimately the occupation of Cotabato and other key points in the delta made it virtually impossible for the *sa-raya* Magindanaos to use the Pulangi outlets for their traffic in slaves and firearms. Consequently, Saringani bay's importance was enhanced. Moreover, the Spanish conquest of Davao in 1848 had made the principal datus of that area transfer their residence and base of operations to the bay.

Owen Rutter, writing about nineteenth-century Malay piracy, notes that "the island of Saringani, off the coast of Mindanao, was a recognised center of the slave traffic, traders coming from all parts to barter with them."³⁶ In 1862, Burriel observed that Saringani bay was "the principal market for slaves."³⁷ This observation fits in with the pattern of events described earlier: owing to the closure of the slave sources in the Visayas and Luzon, the exploitation of the pagan tribes increased greatly in the interior of Mindanao itself. Cotabato and Davao having fallen into Spanish hands, Saringani bay was the natural outlet left. Burriel goes on to say that the slave center was attracting ships from Illana Bay, Sulu and other places.³⁸ As late as 1888, Pastells branded the bay an "immoral focus of commerce in slaves."³⁹

Various reports concerning the persistence of piracy and smuggling in the southern Philippines make references to Saringani bay and its adjoining islands. In 1869 the governor of Mindanao, having been aroused by "crimes" committed in Saringani waters, called for a vigorous program of espionage to identify piratical centers and destroy them. Suspected areas were Tawi-tawi, haunt of the Balanini pirates and apparent center of operations, Jolo, Calamianes, Balabac, Siassi, and the Saringani islands. The range of piratical operations was from the Visayas south to the Sangirs, indicating that the Spanish assertion that piracy was completely stamped out with the use of steam vessels in the 1850's must be somewhat modified.⁴⁰ In May 1871, the Spanish Navy revealed key information on the timetable of Balanini expeditions. The Saringani islands, according to Balanini informantse, were a rendezvous for the pirate fleet operating off the north and northeast coast of Mindanao.⁴¹

Among the inhabitants of Saringani bay, the people who came in ships from all over the archipelago were obviously regarded as traders or, as Rajal y Larre puts it, "commercial friends." Ships came not only from Illana bay and Sulu, but also from Borneo, Sangir, Celebes, and the Moluccas.⁴² Pastells specifically mentions the Borneans who

33. "Relación de la *Gran Isla de Mindanao* . . . ," p. 112.

34. M. P. H. Roessingh, "Dutch relations with the Philippines: a survey of sources in the General State Archives, the Hague, Netherlands," *AS*, V, 2 (1967), p. 402.

35. "Capítulos de la carta escrita . . . ," in Barrantes, p. 329.

36. *The Pirate Wind* (London, 1930), p. 45.

37. Burriel MS, p. 160.

38. *Ibid.*

39. "Informe," p. 487.

40. "Unas comunicaciones del Coronel D. Ramon Blanco . . . y una propuesta sobre represión de piratas del gobernador de Zamboanga," Zamboanga, Jan. 15, 1869, document in Francia and Parrado, II, pp. 283-287.

41. Aldaña and Serrano, p. 107.

42. *Exploración*, p. 180; "Conferencia acerca de la isla de Mindanao," *BSGM*, XVII, 1885, p. 185.

came in *pancos* to exchange firearms for slaves.⁴³ Sometime in 1870 or 1871, a Dutch brig, the *Jocsevin*, was apprehended in Sarangani bay while engaged in "illegal trade," meaning that gunrunning was involved. The *Jocsevin* had come from the Moluccas and was heading for Jolo and Java. Two or three months earlier it had been seen unloading cacao and firearms in Jolo.⁴⁴ Writing in 1882, Fr. Mateo Gisbert expressed his conviction that the British and Dutch were selling firearms at Sarangani bay and the Culaman coast (southwest of Davao), for even the Manobo hill people in the area appeared to be well-equipped with rifles.⁴⁵ Rajal y Larre, as governor of Davao, reported the frequency of appearance of *pancos* in the bay. Most of them carried foreign traders; Dutchmen, in particular, were mentioned.⁴⁶ As further evidence of the Sarangani bay trade, one can mention the response of various other merchant communities nearby. An Indian trader representing some commercial firms in Davao was reported, in 1885, to have settled together with some one hundred Sangir Moro families opposite the Sarangani islands.⁴⁷ Many Chinese and Christians moved from Davao and Cotabato to the towns of Glan and Buayan in Sarangani bay in order to take advantage of the commerce there.⁴⁸

To Rajal y Larre, the Spanish occupation of Jolo in 1876 seemed to accentuate the importance of Sarangani bay. Perhaps the dislocations resulting from the conquest, aggravated by Spanish attempts to regulate trade, caused traders to call directly at the bay for Mindanao products. Saleeby says that the fall of Jolo completely terminated slave-raids in the Christian communities.⁴⁹ This being so, the importance of the Sarangani bay slave center must have been enhanced.

The flourishing of the bay was made possible by the absence of Spanish control over the area up to around 1885. Burriel, in 1862, was only concerned with the commerce in slaves taking place in the bay. He looked forward to the day when a naval station would be set up there, but he did not express any sense of urgency about it.⁵⁰ The governor of Mindanao called for the establishment of a naval unit there in 1869, but there is no evidence of a response from the central government.⁵¹ From 1870 to 1876 Spanish control over the area was represented by a mestizo and an *indio*, named Saavedra and Panay respectively, who lived in Balut, one of the Sarangani islands, and engaged in agriculture and a little commerce. In 1873 the two were assigned by the Davao government to collect tribute from the islanders. Shortly thereafter, with the help of some pagan inhabitants they fought and defeated two *pancos* of Moro pirates who raided their island. Saavedra killed, in hand-to-hand combat, one of the more famous *datus* of Sarangani bay, a feat which earned him great respect and prestige from the inhabitants of the islands and the bay. However, at the end of 1876 (the year of the conquest of Jolo) Saavedra and Panay were forced by misfortunes and mysterious causes to abandon their land and leave the area. A Spaniard, agent of one of the Davao commercial houses, was installed in Saavedra's place but during the two years of his tenure he not only absented himself from the Sarangani area, but also from the district itself. And so for many years after 1876 only a few Christians remained in the islands, living in virtual poverty, depending solely upon the prestige of the military forces of Davao.⁵² Jesuit missionaries occasionally visited the area in search of prospective missions. Generally they were treated with distrust and suspicion by the *datus* and *panditas* of Sarangani bay.⁵³

It was *Datu Uto*, not the Spaniards, who was in control. When Fr. Juanmartí visited the bay in 1879, he found the inhabitants fearful of the Magindanaos of Buluan and farther north. They admitted that it was *Datu Uto* who dominated them "from yonder above,"

43. "Informe," p. 487.

44. Aldaña and Serrano, p. 108.

45. Gisbert to Moré, Sept. 27, 1882, *CMSJ*, V, p. 251.

46. "Conferencia," p. 185.

47. Moré to Father Superior, 1885, *BPRI*, XLIII, p. 198.

48. Moré to Father Superior, June 27, 1885, *BPRI*, VII, pp. 97, 103.

49. *History of Sulu*, p. 248.

50. Burriel MS, p. 160.

51. "Unas comunicaciones," in Francia and Parrado, II, p. 287.

52. Moré to Father Superior, June 27, 1885, *CMSJ*, VII, pp. 95-97.

53. Juanmartí to Father Superior, April 20, 1879, *CMSJ*, III, p. 12.

and that his will was always obeyed.⁵⁴ Sarangani's link with *sa-raya* helps explain its attractiveness to traders. The diversity of those who called at the bay indicates that they wanted not only slaves but also products such as rice, coffee, cacao, beeswax and other exports of *sa-raya*. In return, Datu Uto received the supplies needed to arm an ever-growing number of followers and bolster the defenses of his capital. Rajal, who explored southern Mindanao in 1882, saw clearly the connection between Sarangani and Uto:

. . . The bay of Sarangani [is] the only one much visited, where with impunity they commit their outrages, bringing in those contrabands of firearms which are provided to the Moros of Mindanao who cannot pass through Cotabato because of our establishment, such contraband being transported through communications with the lake of Buluan.⁵⁵

During all those years when Datu Uto wielded almost supreme power in the Pulangi, Sarangani bay was free from Spanish interference. While the Cotabato Sultan was deprived of his prerogatives as patron of trade, Datu Uto was free to profit from trade with all parties--Sulus, Illanuns, Boreans, Chinese, Europeans--in the tradition of Cotabato during its flourishing years. While Buayan maintained trade relations with Spanish Cotabato and ultimately with Spanish Philippines, it was also able, thanks to its Sarangani outlet, to look to the Malay and Indonesian world of commerce of which Singapore, not Manila, was the center.

The situation in Magindanao was such that Cotabato and Buayan, *sa-ilud* and *sa-raya*, stood in opposition to each other. The former was now a part of the Spanish colonial world looking to Manila as the center, the latter clung to its independence and looked to the Muslim Malay world for support. This situation was reflected in the neighboring Muslim territories of Lanao and Sulu. The active Spanish presence in the Philippine south during the second half of the nineteenth century tended to polarize the leaderships of these territories into pro-Spanish and anti-Spanish segments. The success of Datu Uto's resistance owed not a little to the support which the Datu found among his independent Muslim neighbors. Working in cooperation, they constituted a system of trade and communications which operated parallel to that dominated by Spain.

Datu Uto's relations with the Illanuns inhabiting the coast of Illana bay and their Maranao brothers of lake Lanao cannot be clearly established because the Spaniards themselves were ignorant of what was happening in these areas. The lake Lanao area was for the most part independent until the American conquest at the turn of the century. There is no doubt, however, of Uto's links with the Illanuns. On November 1886, the gunboat *Gardoqui* undertook to inspect the *rancherías* of the Illanun coast which were suspected of being in communication with Uto's forces and providing the latter with war supplies. The first datu interviewed, Kailadan of Balabagan, informed the Spaniards that a henchman of Uto was residing at Lalabuan, one of the larger Illanun principalities. When the gunboat arrived at Lalabuan, the inhabitants, fearing Spanish reprisals, had all fled to the interior.⁵⁶

In order to understand the significance of the above-mentioned incident, it is useful to examine the developments that led up to it. In the first place, precedents existed for Magindanao-Illanun alliances and commercial ties. The earliest Spanish positions around lake Lanao had to be abandoned in 1640 owing to repeated attacks from contingents sent by Sultan Kudrat of Cotabato.⁵⁷ It is interesting to note that the Maranaos and the Illanuns actively aided Malinog in his revolt against the Cotabato Sultan in the eighteenth century. Some sources even state intriguingly that Malinog was called "king of Malanao."⁵⁸ If Malinog was a protégé of Buayan, the Illanun involvement

54. *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14. Juanmartí was of the opinion that the "reduction" of the inhabitants, particularly the pagan tribes, around the bay could only be effected if Buayan itself were first conquered.

55. *Exploración*, pp. 179-180.

56. Manuel Maria Rincón, *Cinco Meses en Mindanao; Operaciones en 1886-1887*; Cartas al "Diario de Manila" (Manila, 1894), entry of Nov. 27, 1886, pp. 52-53. The volume is a collection of dispatches to the newspaper *Diario de Manila*.

57. Montero y Gay, "Los Moros Malayo-Mahometanos," p. 332; for Kudrat's involvement in northern Mindanao see Francis Madigan, "The early history of Cagayan de Oro," *PS*, II, 1 (Jan. 1963), pp. 76-130.

58. "Capítulos de carta escrita," in Barrantes, p. 329; Francia and Parrado, II, p. 207.

in the Magindanao civil war may be early evidence of Illanun-Buayan relations.

The evidence, however, points to the fact that the Illanuns were more closely linked to Cotabato than to Buayan before the Datu Uto period. The name "Illanun" is a contraction of "I-lanaw-en" which means "people of the lake." This was the name given by the Magindanaos to those Maranaos who, owing to various causes in the past, had come to settle around Illana bay and in the Pulangi basin. Illanuns follow Maranao speech but, according to Kuder⁵⁹ have adopted the sober Magindanao dress and quiet manner and are recognized as a *pengampong* or genealogical clan.⁵⁹ Mednick has pointed out that the overlap between the Maranao and Magindanao genealogies occurs particularly with those genealogies derived from the *sa-ilud*, or downriver, branch of Magindanao; there is very little overlap with the *sa-raya* branch.

. . . The implication is therefore that the Maranao are sociologically derived from the down-river branch, and further that the system first took root in the Butig area which lies between the lake and the down-river Magindanao.⁶⁰

The Illanuns have always acknowledged a certain superiority of the Magindanaos over them, rooted in the fact that Islam was brought to them by Sarip Kabungsuwan, the founder of the Cotabato Sultanate.⁶¹

Such close ties of origin are entirely consistent with the historical relationship between the famed Illanun pirates and Cotabato. According to Kuder, Illanun piratical praus of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were actually captained by Magindanao datus or, in some cases, Sulus.⁶² Although Sulu was the principal market for the products of Lanao and the booty of pirates, the city of Cotabato remained a safe haven for pirates until the middle of the nineteenth century. Belcher's description of 1845 is strikingly reminiscent of the earlier days of Cotabato when Lutaos congregated at the flourishing port-city and gave their support to the Sultan:

The Illanons . . . are a distinct race, inhabiting the great Bay of Illanon, on the southern part of Mageendanao, or Mindanao, having for its capital the city of Mindanao (Cotabato), where the Sultan resides, and where, even in the pirates' nest, Europeans and other traders meet with hospitable reception and protection.

It is this Lagoon which is the stronghold of the Lanoon pirates, . . . where, it is highly probable, they submit to their own pirate Chief, and who, acknowledging the supremacy of the Sultan of Mindanao, shields the latter from blame by this semblance of independence; it is well known, however, that any matters referred to the Sultan of Mindanao, respecting the acts of the Lanoons, especially upon questions of ransom, are speedily and effectively arranged by the Sultan.⁶³

The survival of the Cotabato Sultanate's prestige into the nineteenth century may have been due to the Illanuns' acknowledgment of the Sultan's supremacy. Their relationship was concealed, as Belcher tells us, and this may explain why Spanish sources say nothing about an alliance between their ally--the Sultan--and the dreaded Illanuns. But all the treaties between the Sultan and Spain in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries contain a clause making the Sultan responsible for acts of piracy committed by Mindanaoans, including the Illanuns. Is this a hint that the Spaniards acknowledged that the Sultan had some influence over the Illanuns? The material benefits which the Sultan derived from this relationship can be inferred from the first clause in a treaty of 1805: sacred vessels and jewels of the Church, allegedly bought by the Sultan's mother from the Illanuns, were to be turned over to the Spaniards in exchange for 15,000 pesos.⁶⁴

The increasing Spanish domination over the Cotabato Sultan, culminating in the occupation of Cotabato in 1861, was bound to have its effect on Magindanao-Illanun/Maranao

59. Edward M. Kuder, "The Moros in the Philippines," *Far Eastern Quarterly*, IV, 2 (1945), p. 123.

60. "Encampment," p. 102.

61. Kuder, p. 123.

62. Kuder, p. 123; Reber, p. 190.

63. *Narrative of a Voyage of H.M.S. Samarang*, during the years 1843-46 (London, 1848), pp. 263-264.

64. Barrantes, p. 281o

relations. When the naval station of Pollok was being constructed in 1851, the inhabitants of Sugut, a major *rancheria* near the Magindanao-Illanun border, rose in revolt. Bernaldez gives two causes of this uprising: first, the instigation of the Maranaos; second, Sugut's enmity with the Cotabato Sultan who was ostensibly under the protection of the Spanish garrison at Pollok.⁵ Obviously the Illanuns and Maranaos were not witnessing the events at Magindanao with disinterest. The adverse reaction to the Sultan's submission to Spain was not unique to the Davao and *sa-raya* datus. On the other hand, there were Illanun and Maranao datus who remained friendly with the Cotabato Sultan.

In 1879, the Maranao datu Ilian, who belonged to the ruling family of Ganasí, on the shores of lake Lanao, and Malabang on the Illanun coast, was elected by the *rumah bichara* of Cotabato to the post of Datu Amirol. This was a prestigious title, equivalent to *Rajah Laut*, and it evoked memories of Cotabato's past glories as a maritime empire. The Cotabato Sultan was anxious to publicize the new appointment. Letters were sent to the lesser sultans and datus of Lanao. The Sultan also sent his decorated *vinta*, towed by a Spanish gunboat, with a contingent of Magindanao datus to fetch Ilian, who was residing temporarily near Malabang. Ilian brought with him to Cotabato one of his wives, some waiting maids, and thirty principals of Ganasí.⁶

The significance of Datu Ilian's election to a Magindanao post is twofold. First, it was a gesture made by the Sultan on behalf of Spain. The Spaniards had been wanting to gain a foothold in Lanao, for they had heard of the tremendous wealth it held. In 1879 Martel de Gayangos reported a brisk traffic in rice and coffee from lake Lanao to the Illanun coast. The Maranao heartland, he said, produced more than 15,000 picos (1 picoe = 137½ lbs.) of rice and 11,000 of coffee annually *for export*.⁷ The Cotabato Sultan was willing to exert every effort to divert Illanun exports to Zamboanga and Manila. He declared to Jose Urbano, governor of the District, that he had influenced the election of Ilian on behalf of Spain. Now, he said, his friends would be able to partake of the benefits of the Lanao trade. Gayangos' account ends with a strong recommendation that a commission be assembled to explore the hidden trade routes between Illana bay and lake Lanao, which he considered to be "the richest of all in the Filipino archipelago."⁸

Ilian's election can also be seen in the context of internal power struggles. It will be remembered that a year before this Datu Uto and his allies had appeared in Cotabato in a show of strength; the Cotabato Sultan must have looked petty beside his upriver rival. Most significant of all, Uto was one of the aspirants to the rank of Datu Amirol. Gayangos states that Uto could have easily won owing to his massive following were it not for the intervention of the Sultan and the Spaniards.⁹ That the Sultan had to appoint a wealthy and powerful Maranao datu to an important Magindanao post must be seen as an indication of the Sultan's almost total loss of prestige in Magindanao itself. This, perhaps, is a reflection of the nature of the concealed Cotabato-Illanun relationship mentioned earlier. As the Magindanao heartland came under the domination of Buayan, the Cotabato Sultan was forced to look outward for support. This he found from the Spaniards at Zamboanga and from some of the Illanun and Maranao chiefs.

The Cotabato Sultan's alliance with the principal Maranao datu did not meet Spanish expectations. The Maranaos and the Illanuns have never been unified politically. According to Gainza, some geographers had talked about the existence of an Illanun Confederacy, but in actual fact this was not a body-politic but a vague mutual-defense agreement in case of external attack.¹⁰ In Forrest's time there were, on the shores of

65. Bernaldez, p. 219.

66. Antonio Martel de Gayangos, "Laguna de Lanao en la isla de Mindanao," *BSGM*, XIV, 1883, pp. 377-379.

67. *Ibid.*, p. 379; Montero y Gay, "Los Moros," p. 333.

68. Gayangos, "Laguna de Lanao," pp. 377, 379. It is possible that at this time there was an alternative route for Maranao agricultural exports. A 1902 Gazetteer states that the products of the areas east of lake Lanao found an outlet to the sea via the Pulangi river and its tributaries, which extend upwards to the Maranao region (U.S. Bureau of Insular Affairs; *A Pronouncing Gazetteer and Geographical Dictionary of the Philippines*; 1902, p. 579). The significance of this is that Datu Uto may have benefited from tolls collected from this apparent traffic.

69. Gayangos MS, p. 9.

70. *Juicio Crítico*, quoted in Bernaldez, pp. 46-47. Gainza says that there were a great number of Illanun datus, all equal, and that they undertook slave raids in order to increase their power vis-à-vis their rivals.

lake Lanao, no fewer than seventeen self-styled rajahs and sixteen with the title of sultan.⁷¹ The Spanish scheme of diverting Illanun trade to their ports was thus only minimally realized. For example, Illanun coffee was exported in great quantity to Dutch and British as well as Spanish ports.⁷² The commercial entrepôt was Sulu. When the Spaniards occupied Jolo in 1876, the greater part of Lanao's products found their way to Maibun, the alternate, independent capital of Sulu and the center of the "smuggling" activities. Parallel, then, to any special trading relationship between Illanuns and Spaniards which may have resulted from the election of Ilian, was a pattern of Illanun and Maranao trade that was oriented to the Malay and Indonesian world. The evidence for this in Spanish eyes was the flow of firearms and armaments to Lanao and the Illanun coast, a phenomenon which was to make the subjugation of these peoples a difficult task even for the American forces later. The dual system of trade in these areas somewhat resembles the situation in the Pulangi valley. Because of their wealth, says Blumentritt, the Illanuns and Maranaos were able to obtain more and better weapons than their Magindanao counterparts.⁷³

Gayangos notes that the Maranaos had a good number of Tiruray slaves who were set to work in plantations or in cloth printing industries. These Tiruray slaves were bought regularly from the Magindanaos.⁷⁴ It will be remembered that Buayan was the foremost supplier of slaves, and thus we are given a strong hint of the economic relationship between Lanao and Buayan. The principal market on the Illanun coast for such illicit merchandise as slaves and firearms was the town of Lalabuan. There a great market was held every Saturday which attracted Chinese and Muslim traders from all over the area, including Buayan. Coffee, rice, beeswax, Tiruray and Subanun slaves, were brought there to be bartered.⁷⁵ The striking thing about this description of the Lalabuan market by Gayangos is the fact that the main commodities brought there are all known exports of Buayan.

The Spanish government soon discovered that firearms were entering the interior of Magindanao through Lalabuan. That is why, in 1884, governor-general Jovellar strongly recommended that Lalabuan be occupied, for the latter, together with Sarangani bay, was linked to the maintenance of Uto's military strength.⁷⁶ We can picture the datu of Lalabuan as the converse of Datu Ilian of Ganasí and Malabang who opted for Cotabato and Spain. The datu of Lalabuan was one of Uto's hidden allies, a link to the non-Spanish world of trade and communications. It is not surprising that a henchman of Uto should, as we noted at the beginning of this chapter, be resident at Alalbuan and that the inhabitants of this place should prefer to flee inland rather than be questioned about their links with the Magindanao datu.

Datu Uto must have communicated with the Illanuns via a northwest land route.⁷⁷ This seems to have been a more difficult route than the one to Sarangani bay described earlier, and its use must be seen in relation to the Spanish interruption of Sarangani trade in the mid-1880's. The role of both Lalabuan and Sarangani bay was to provide channels through which firearms and war supplies from Sulu could enter the Magindanao interior. Sulu was the focal point of trade and communications in the southern Philippines.

Nieto Aguilar states that, at least prior to the Spanish occupation of Jolo in 1876, the latter city was the point from where the inhabitants of Mindanao were receiving arms, munitions and other things necessary to sustain their resistance to Spanish designs against their independence.⁷⁸ That this was the case is not surprising in view of Jolo's historical role as trade entrepôt of the region. Since the decline of Cotabato in the

71. p. 301. Forrest says that this multiplicity of independent chiefs was the reason that the Cotabato Sultan found it impossible to restrain the Illanuns from piracy.

72. Blumentritt, "Los maguindanaos," p. 273.

73. *Ibid.*, p. 272

74. Gayangos MS, p. 11.

75. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

76. Juan Parrado, *Memoria acerca de Mindanao* (Manila, 1893), pp. 15-16; Montero y Vidal, *Piraterías* p. 643. Barás, another town on the coast, is also often mentioned as a secondary smuggling base. This was after a Sultan friendly to the Spaniards was killed, resulting in complications which prompted the governor of Zamboanga to call for the establishment of a fort at Barás in 1871; Synopsis of Blanco's memorial, July 26, 1871, in Lietz, *Calendar*, p. 165.

77. Pastells implies that the establishment of a fort at Parang-Parang, which is present-day maps lies midway along the road from the Pulangi valley to Lalabuan, was one of the factors which caused Uto to drop his plans of recovering his former supremacy; *Misión*, III, p. 276.

78. *Mindanao, su Historia y Geografía* (Madrid, 1894), p. 42.

late seventeenth century, Sulu, especially its capital Jolo, was "the great commercial mart of all the surrounding ports in Magindanao and the Celebes. . . ." ⁷⁹ Because of the Spanish interruption of the junk trade with Cotabato, Chinese goods had to filter in by way of Sulu, thus making Magindanao dependent on the latter for such vital items as metals and cloth. Sulu, on the other hand, never grew enough rice for consumption and so relied on Magindanao for this commodity. ⁸⁰ Forrest also mentions that the Sulus bought whole cargoes of captives seized by Illanun and Magindanao raiders; this was still the case in the 1830's, according to Hunt. ⁸¹ Long before the Datu Uto period the pattern of trade had already been established: it was to Sulu that Chinese, Arab, Malay and European traders generally went in order to obtain the products of Mindanao; it was from Sulu that the inhabitants of Mindanao obtained imports of iron, cloth and firearms.

The Spanish forward-movement in the nineteenth century had, as one of its goals, the control of the Muslim Mindanao and Sulu trade. After the Spanish destruction of Jolo in 1851, attempts were made to license native shipping, as in Cotabato, and to impose a tariff on foreign shipping. The idea was to divert trade to Spanish ports. Since Jolo was not actually occupied until 1876, however, the former pattern of trade persisted. ⁸² The significant changes took place in Magindanao. As early as 1836, a plan was put forth to diminish or cut off Sulu trade with Mindanao "in order to confine the commerce to our [Spanish] channels." ⁸³ By 1837, says Hunt, large quantities of paddy were transported from Magindanao to Sulu *in Spanish ships*. ⁸⁴ After the Spanish occupation of Cotabato, the latter's trade was directed to Zamboanga and Manila, thus ending a centuries-old pattern.

One of the reasons for Buayan's success in maintaining its integrity was its ability to maintain extensive contacts with Sulu while its rival, Cotabato, was drawn into the Spanish net. In 1860, Datu Uto was seen passing through Cotabato at the head of two Sulu ships, bearing a passport signed by the Sulu Sultan, exporting slaves to Sulu in exchange for firearms and cloth. Says Fr. Cuevas, a Jesuit missionary: "This is the principal commerce of Jolo with the river. . . ." ⁸⁵ Indeed, Sulu's role as buyer of captives seized by Mindanao pirates was not undermined by the series of punitive expeditions and treaties undertaken by the Spaniards. The difference was that by the second half of the nineteenth century the interior of Mindanaoq dominated by Buayan, had become almost the sole source of slaves.

Unfortunately we lack data concerning Sulu's trading relationship with *sa-raya* Magindanao. We know, however, that Sulu ships were said to frequent Sarangani bay and Lalabuan, bringing in firearms which ultimately found their way to Buayan. Wickberg notes that Sulu was the prime outlet for a number of important Mindanao goods whose ultimate destination was Singapore. This leads him to conclude that "in a larger context . . . the Spanish-Moro struggle in Mindanao was part of a contest between Manila (assisted by Cebu and Iloilo) and Sulu to include Mindanao in their respective spheres of economic influence." ⁸⁶ In the context of Wickberg's hypothesis, Buayan was Sulu's partner in an economic tug-o-war with Cotabato and Manila. A good part of the "important Mindanao goods" of which Sulu was the outlet must have come from the Mindanao interior.

Some Spanish writers feel that the death knell of the Magindanao resistance was sounded by the Spanish occupation of Jolo in 1876. The supply of war materials being cut off, the whole basis of the resistance would be undermined. ⁸⁷ The reasoning is sound, but it rests on the mistaken assumption that Sulu trade was controlled by Spain after

79. Hunt, p. 51. The Cotabato Sultanate may have overshadowed Sulu in the seventeenth century or earlier. The Sultan and nobles of Cotabato boasted to both Forrest and Hunt that the rulers of Sulu prior to Baktial (1650's-1660's) had only been *pangerans* (princes or nobles) and tributaries of the Mindanao Sultanate; Reber, p. 97.

80. Forrest, p. 299; Reber, p. 198; Hunt, p. 43.

81. Forrest, p. 330; Hunt, p. 50; see discussion in Reber, p. 172 f.

82. See Majul, "Chinese relationship," in Felix (ed.), p. 156.

83. "Royal directions relative to a general policy and the regulation of commerce with Sulu, and the advisability of making Zamboanga a free port," June 23, 1837, in Saleeby, *History of Sulu*, p. 218.

84. p. 43 (italics mine).

85. "Relación," p. 44.

86. *The Chinese in Philippine Life, 1850-1898* (New Haven, 1965), p. 92.

87. Nieto Aguilar, pp. 42-43; Rajal, "Conferencia," p. 185.

1876. Jolo itself was made subject to a multiplicity of regulations against the importation of firearms, especially by the Chinese, but apparently the breach of such regulations was not uncommon.⁸⁸ More significantly, the impact of the fall of Jolo was neutralized by the rise of an alternative center on the south side of the island. Called Maibun, it became the *de facto* capital of Sulu and the site of the Sultan's residence after 1876. Just as in Magindanao Buayan came to stand for resistance against the Spanish presence at Cotabato, in Sulu it was Maibun that stood against occupied Jolo. The lines of trade tended to reflect such oppositions. Following careful observations made in 1880, the Spanish investigator Garin reported in a memorial that warehouses could be found both in Jolo and Maibun. The merchants of Jolo tended to trade with Zamboanga and Manila, while those of Maibun traded with Labuan and Singapore. In Maibun Garin discovered a huge stockpile of firearms, ammunition and cannons which had arrived from Singapore via Labuan. These were smuggled to Mindanao and retailed there "at a somewhat swollen price."⁸⁹

In another of his general observations resulting from a study of the Chinese in the Philippine south, Wickberg states that "the line between Spanish and non-Spanish territory in Mindanao also marked the line between an area that felt the pull in the direction of Hongkong and one that was oriented toward Singapore."⁹⁰ The preceding sections have shown this to be essentially the case, though we must add that Wickberg's "line" should be extended to Sulu itself after 1876. In Magindanao, the line between Spanish and non-Spanish territory was roughly that which determined the territories of *sa-ilud* and *sa-raya*. Cotabato, the center of *sa-ilud*, came to be a part of the Spanish lines of trade and communications that linked together Malabang, Davao, Zamboanga, Jolo, Cebu, Manila and Hongkong. Buayan, the center of *sa-raya*, while trading with Cotabato really belonged to another pattern which linked together Lalabuan, Sarangani bay, Maibun, Labuan, Singapore and other areas of the Malay and Indonesian world. It was Datu Uto's skillful participation in both systems of trade and communications that enabled him to reap much wealth, the uses of which, as we shall see, were instrumental in elevating him to a position of leadership in the Magindanao world.

88. Majul, "Chinese relationship," p. 156; Vicente Barrantes, "Peligro de Mindanao," *La Política de España en Filipinas*, IV, 1894, p. 102. Barrantes blames this on the free-port status of Jolo as of November 1876, a situation which encouraged the smuggling of firearms. This contrabanding, he says, is clearly reflected in the "almost permanent state of the insurrection in Mindanao."

89. "Memoria sobre el Archipiélago de Jolo," *BSGM*, X, 1881, p. 2060 The price range of such items can be determined from Garin's estimates:

"Piston" type rifles:	carbines	- 20	<i>duros</i> *	apiece
	Smiths	- 32	"	"
	Spencers	- 60	"	"
	Each 100 rounds of ammunition	- 4	"	"
	A <i>pico</i> (63.25 kg.) of gunpowder	- 24	"	"
	<i>Lantaka</i> shells (acc. to weight)	- 26	"	a <i>pico</i>

* *duro* = five peseta piece, a "crown"

90. p. 93.

CHAPTER IV

UNITY AND THE ALLIANCE SYSTEM (ca. 1872-1888)

The Spanish expedition that explored the Pulangi Valley in 1855 found a fragmented political situation. There were almost a dozen little sultanates that had sprouted in the river valley, claiming equal status with Cotabato, Tumbao and Buayan and vying for prestige among their neighbors. The Spaniards were confident that their control over the valley would be accomplished with ease, since the potential for unity among the various political groupings did not seem to exist. But when the colonial forces tried to extend their domination beyond *sa-ilud* barely six years later in 1861, they were met with concerted resistance by the Magindanaos, and their advance was checked. Less than a decade later, the *sa-raya* Magindanaos were politically unified under Datu Uto, and the 1855 image of fragmentation was shattered. How was this unification accomplished, and what were its foundations?

One way this was done was through the build-up of a system of dyadic or person-to-person alliances with Uto at the apex. Pastells says that Uto's ability to capture the friendship of most of the datus was extraordinary, such friendships usually being sealed through his marriage with their daughters.¹ Alliances were also made by arranging marriages between his daughters (by royal wives or concubines, depending on the recipient's status) and other datus. In this way, Uto extended to the political realm the cohesion characteristic of a closely-knit kin group.

An illustration of the importance of marriage ties is Uto's union with Rajah Putri ("Royal Princess"), the only legitimate daughter left behind by the last noteworthy Sultan of Cotabato, Kudrat II. Unfortunately, the date is unknown to us. According to a Manila newspaper, the marriage increased Uto's importance because Kudrat's family was still considered the most important in the valley.² It was as if Kudrat, the last independent Sultan, had, through his daughter, transferred the symbol of Magindanao's integrity to rival Buayan. Rajah Putri and her mother, Paya Sabi, were respected by everyone in the valley, Spaniards included.³ The Princess' banner and insignia were venerated by all the Magindanaos. This banner, which used to be displayed in the Sultan of Cotabato's palace, was seen in 1887 to fly proudly above the *kota* of Datu Uto's Minister of War.⁴ The Uto-Rajah Putri marriage also brought the former into relationship with the Princess' brother, Datu (later Rajah Mudah) Mamakú, who lived in the vicinity of Cotabato and was Uto's protegé in several succession disputes for the Cotabato throne.

Perhaps the period of Datu Uto's greatest power coincided with the time when his network of dyadic alliances, sealed by marriages, was at its fullest development. He himself boasted of this fact in a letter to the governor of Cotabato sent in 1874:

Praised is he who can manage everything. . . . I consider it substantial, indeed, that to which one can aspire from marriage. I am making it known to the commanding general that I will come down [to Cotabato] during the coming Lent. I dare to give this information because we will come in a large group, very large indeed: including my uncle the sultan, my uncle the sultan of Limontangan, the sultan of Punul, Talayan, Ladehilayan, Luna-igned, the rajah mudah of Baluguis, of Baguigued, Cadiguilan, Cayuque, Martincahuanan, Buluan, Badeha-Buayan of that same place, the sultan of Dupilas, of Salugay, and my brother Tambilauan; *we brothers and relatives* will all come down this Lent. . e . Also with us will be the sultan of Buayan, of Malasila, of Mamlag, Malada and Ladasihina. It will be good for

1. "Memoria del R. P. Pablo Pastells," March 15, 1892, *CMSJ*, IX, p. 615.
2. News article from the *Diario de Manila* quoted in Montero y Vidal, *Piratería*, p. 654 (note)e
3. *Ibid.*
4. Perinat, "Diario" (part II of *Operaciones Militares*), Feb. 20, 1887, p. 117.

us to come down in order to join with you in friendship. Give warning to Tumbao; we will not be intimidated.⁵

How does one explain this extraordinary ability to form personal alliances? Why were the datu attracted to Datu Uto in the first place? In answering this question Pastells put forth this view in a memorial of 1892:

In effect his natural talent, his prestige, his riches, his supporters and above all his fiery despotism had created around him a certain air of glory which made him like a feared idol or the compelled leader of whatever action took place in the basin of the Rio-grande.⁶

The above description can be roughly broken down into three components: wealth, a strong personal following, and personal qualities. By examining each of these aspects in detail, perhaps a fuller understanding may be had of the basis of the dyadic ties created by Uto.

Much of Datu Uto's prestige and power was derived from his wealth. This explains how he, a datu, could have gained the respect of all the sultans in Magindanao.⁷ In the first place, the hierarchies of Magindanao, in comparison with Sulu, are not very well delineated. The title *datu*, for example, is much more significant and dignified in Sulu than in Magindanao. In the former the title is hereditary, while in the latter a wealthy freeman might easily acquire the title through influence.⁸ In other words, there is no automatic correspondence between one's actual power and one's title or position in a formal hierarchy, although it is usually desirable to legitimize one's position of power through the acquisition of some formal status. In Datu Uto's case, wealth bridged the fine distinctions of rank. Everywhere in the Pulangi people knew him as *The Datu*,⁹ but none doubted his superiority over the sultans.

The most important index of prestige and power in traditional Magindanao was the number of slaves a sultan or datu owned. Santayana goes to the extent of saying that the aspirant to the throne who possessed the largest number of slaves and *sakops* (free subjects) automatically became Sultan.¹⁰ The Spaniards realized how important slaves were to the Cotabato Sultan when, after the city's occupation, they tried to make the Sultan free his slaves. The Sultan replied to an insistent Spanish official that he would rather give up his wife and children than his slaves, for lacking the latter he simply would cease to be Sultan.¹¹ But eventually he had to bow to the laws of Spain, and surely enough the Sultanate ceased to exist except in name.

Things were different further upriver. In the Pulangi, according to Nieto, practically anybody who had slaves, or had the means to buy them, made himself a datu and established his own *rancheria*. But the number of slaves owned by any of these petty datu rarely exceeded a hundred. At the time of Nieto's writing, there were two potentates who towered above the rest because they had three to four thousand slaves apiece. These were Datu Uto and the Sultan of Tumbao, who was himself a vassal of Uto.¹² Gayangos, writing during the height of Uto's power in the 1870's, attributes to him four to

-
5. Quoted in Francia and Parrado, I, pp. 344-345. Some parts of the Spanish are vague, and the place names are not easily identifiable. See Map 3 for the locations of identified places.
 6. "Memoria," p. 615. "Action" in line 4 is a loose translation of the Spanish "algarada."
 7. Saleeby (*Studies*, p. 23) is the only writer who gives the title "Sultan" to Uto. In his description of the man, however, he uses the conventional title "datu" ascribed to Uto.
 8. Charles Livingston, "Constabulary monographs of the Province of Sulu," 1915 (extracts), in *Customary Law Papers*, 160, vol. V, p. 1; Melvin Mednick, "Some problems," p. 47.
 9. ". . . when a moro of whatever rancheria talks about Uto, he says *The Datto*, and everyone knows to whom the reference is"; Rincón, p. 160.
 10. p. 106.
 11. "Memoria de la Portilla," Manila, Oct. 7, 1867, published in Francia and Parrado, II, p. 129.
 12. Nieto MS, p. 62.

five thousand slaves.^d³ Clearly, the superior number of his slaves is a manifestation of his power; it also explains his superiority over all the sultans.

The Spanish sources available are not too clear about the composition and the role of Uto's slaves. Having determined to stamp out slavery not only in accordance with the demands of the Catholic laws of Spain but also as a means of undermining the political power of the datus, the Spaniards, especially the Jesuit missionaries, tended to condemn the institution without really understanding it in terms of Magindanao society. In the first place, Spanish sources usually fail to distinguish between debt bondsmen and captives of war or slave-raids. Secondly, they often equate Magindanao slavery with its counterparts in America and Africa, thus failing to note the debt relationships and the opportunities for social advancement which, in the case of Magindanao as well as other Malay-type societies, counterbalance the evil aspects of the institution.

According to Mednick, among the Magindanaos as well as most other Philippine lowland groups the generic term for slave is *olipon*. As a group *olipon* were bond rather than chattel slaves and they possessed recognized rights and property. But there was another category of dependents called *baniaga*. These were persons seized from Spanish territories or from the hill tribes to whom the Magindanaos were hostile.^d⁴ Among the thousands of slaves attached to Datu Uto, there must have been both *olipon* and *baniaga*.

It is understandable that when the Spanish sources talk about slaves they actually refer to the *baniagar*. For the Spaniards never forget that they had been their subjects or that they had belonged to the hill tribes whose care had been entrusted to the missionaries. Since slave-raiding in the Visayas had practically ceased by Datu Uto's time, the *baniaga* he owned were taken from the Mindanao hill tribes. Uto must have obtained them as tribute, or *pagdato*, from his *sakops* and other datus who acknowledged his overlordship. As Cordoba points out, a powerful personage had very little authority over other datus apart from his right to exact tribute. The latter could be in the form of slaves, military service or agricultural produce. The datus, including Uto in his own district, obtained slaves from the freemen attached to them. The latter were the ones who raided the hills periodically, generally capturing women and children too weak to flee.^d⁵

As Cordoba points out, the *baniaga* had a very good chance of bettering their lot in succeeding generations:

The captives are first put to hard labor. They hunt when they come of competent age. Their children, although slaves, are in better condition, and from them are taken the concubines of the free classes who often come to be mothers of datus or freemen; and there have even been cited principal datus and a certain sultan born of slave mothers. . . . Because of the relations between slaves and masters, the Moros have become a mixed race.^d⁶

Compared to the situations in other cultures, the distance between master and *baniaga* was not total or unbridgeable. Santayana states that, although slaves could not abandon their owner or change their affiliations, a mutual relationship existed between them and their masters. "Their master is their 'sole deity,^d but there seem to be favors they also receive.^d⁷" Vidal y Soler and Blumentritt, who were among the most reliable observers of the Magindanao scene, state that slaves were not maltreated "except in most rare conditions,^d and that they frequently passed on to become free subjects of their datu.^d⁸ There were even captives from the Spanish territories who found more freedom as slaves of a datu rather than exploited subjects of the Spanish Crown. For example, a report from Sulu states: ". . . by becoming used to a life of freedom and license those people (slaves) also become inured to captivity, from which they could sometimes escape but do not, many preferring to turn to piracy.^d⁹" In Magindanao, it was only after the Jesuits were able to offer generous material incentives that slaves were induced to escape from their masters.

Bearing in mind that the lot of the *baniaga* was not abysmal, that in fact they were not much less fortunate than the *olipin* who had rights and property of their own, we can now turn to the role they played in Datu Uto's career. In the first place, slaves,

13. Gayangos MS, p. 27.

14. "Encampment,^d p. 61.

15. Cordoba MS, pp. 16-17.

16. *Ibid.*

17. pp. 107-108.

18. Vidal, p. 191; Blumentritt, "Los maguindanaos," p. 281.

19. "Royal directions relative to a general policy . . .," June 23, 1837, in Saleeby, *History of Sulu*, appendix III, pp. 217-218.

especially those recently acquired, were made to cultivate Uto's extensive landsa. This enabled Uto to generate wealth through the export of surplus crops, and, perhaps more important, made it possible for Uto and the other datu to be a leisure class. As Mednick puts it, the datu were "free to devote themselves completely to military and political affairs as well as to engage in symbolic behaviour for which their position called."²⁰ Slave labor gave Uto a strong economic foundation for the cultivation of dyadic alliances which, as we shall see, consisted of a redistribution of his material wealth.

In the second place, slaves were important to Datu Uto as personal bodyguards and emissaries. A distinction has to be made between freemen and, perhaps, *olipon* who formed a datu's standing army, and *baniaga* who were entrusted with the more delicate missions requiring unswerving loyalty.²¹ Whenever he traveled, Uto was always accompanied by what appeared, to the news correspondent Rincón, to be an infinity of armed warriors, front and back of him, their *kampilans* unsheathed, ready to act on a signal from their master.²² These were his slaves, some of them his own sons by slave mothers. Not only were they, under the Magindanao code of laws, totally bound to him as well as dependent upon him for their livelihood; they had come to give their complete loyalty to Uto and were thus placed in a position of trust. "Paid assassins," Montero y Vidal sarcastically calls them. Uto's chief bodyguard, who shared with Pandita Ali the honor of ever being by the datu's side, was himself an ex-slave named Yamut, nicknamed "The Executioner."²³

There were other indications of Uto's wealth, besides his slaves. His house was quite substantial, as Nieto puts it, "an indication of the height of success of a lord."²⁴ On each side, strongly lashed to the main posts, were five *lantakas*; at the entrance was an array of these bronze cannons, too numerous to be counted. They were there not only for defensive purposes, but also to symbolize the status and power of the owner of the house.

The interior was divided into rooms, the walls of which were made of choice and finely carved wooden screens. Within these halls lived his concubines and female slaves, more than thirty of them, his only companions. In the main chamber there was a huge cache of precious objects and weapons. According to accounts of slave defectors and to rumor, there were large earthen jars, classified according to color, and huge chests made of wood and copper, filled with gold and silver coins of all mints and denominations, a great quantity of Chinese copper cash, jewelry of all ages, and a thousand objects of ivory and tortoise-shell. Along one side of the room were three heaps: one of *krises*, another of *bolos*, another of spears. Leaning against the walls were a great number of *kampilans*, shields and shotguns.²⁵ Here were jewelry for his women, gold and weapons for his allies and followers. By giving to others, Uto made himself possessor of a debt of gratitude. By lending to the *sakops* in his district, he could turn them into *olipin*, debt-bondsmen, in case they failed to repay him.

Mention of the weapons and armaments Uto owned brings us to a function of his wealth: the monopoly over military power. According to Mednick, the Moro datu as a class had more or less a monopoly over military force and action. Moro weapons of the nineteenth century were fairly complex, and were certainly beyond the means of the ordinary person. The latter had to subordinate himself to those who had access to arms and could provide protection.²⁶ If Uto was to mobilize the Magindanaos against the Spanish threat, he had to have the resources for it. To hold off the colonial army he had to respond with comparable force.

We have seen how armaments were imported from Sulu, directly or through the Illanun coast, although some *lantakas* were manufactured in Magindanao itself, albeit crudely. The high cost of these armaments precluded their purchase by sultans and datu of mean resources. But Datu Uto's control of trade gave him both the purchasing power and the

20. "Some problems," p. 48.

21. Cf. Nieto MS, p. 123.

22. Feb. 10, 1887, p. 160a

23. Rincón, *ibid.*; Montero y Vidal, *Piratería*, p. 654 (note)a

24. Nieto MS, p. 124a. Uto originally employed a Manila architect to design his house, but, being dissatisfied with the plans, he dismissed him and proceeded to have the house built in the traditional manner; Perinat, II, p. 124.

25. Nieto MS, p. 124; Perinat, II, p. 125. Perinat's information comes from a former slave of Uto named Atek.

26. "Some problems," p. 49.

access to these items. This is another explanation of his paramourcy. When the brother of Datu Amirol was asked to comment on why Uto seemed to be more respected and powerful than any of the sultans, he said that this was because more warriors could be armed by Datu Uto alone than five sultans put together.²⁷ Gayangos attributes the respect given Uto by all the sultans and datus of the Pulangi to his ability to arm his people with rifles of modern design.²⁸ Perinat, a military man who participated in the 1887 campaign against the datu, did not fail to emphasize, in the scattered descriptions in his diary, that there was no lack of *lantakas* and carbines among the Magindanao forces.²⁹

Datu Uto's wealth--his slaves, gold, and stockpile of arms--undoubtedly brought him much prestige, served to attract followers, and bound them to him through some form of debt. But wealth alone does not explain why, as Pastells puts it, Uto had a certain air of glory about him which made him "a feared idol." The attractiveness of the datu to others must also have been due to his personal qualities, his possession of powers recognized by others.

One quality of Uto which serves to explain his rise in prestige and power was his personal valor, combined with a certain amount of physical prowess. There is evidence that he was known for his fighting ability at least in the early days of his career. Several Spanish historians have compared him to the seventeenth century Sultan of Cotabato, Kudrat, who became a legendary hero to the Magindanaos owing to his exploits against Spain.³⁰ According to Francia and Parrado, Datu Uto represented "resistance." He stood at the head of a group of datus hostile to Spain, who gave battle against the advancing Spanish-Filipino forces in Pagalungan, Talayan, Bakat, Buayan and Kudarangan, where the datus had concentrated for more effectiveness.³¹ It was in the defense of Pagalungan in 1861 that Uto lost his right eye, thus gaining the nickname "one-eyed man."³² He was in the grand tradition of the great datus of Magindanao who captained piratical praus and displayed their valor at every opportunity in order not to fall into disrespect from the vassals and slaves who obeyed them.³³

However, Spanish accounts of the 1880's, when Uto was already "Sultan of the River" and the Spaniards were devising all sorts of ways to break his power, contradict the dynamic and forceful picture above. Nieto says that Uto was timid; Rincón, that he was cowardly; Montero y Vidal, that he lacked personal valor.³⁴ There seem to be two ways of explaining this apparent change in Uto. First, the unflattering descriptions of him can be placed in historical context: they actually refer to the time when his dyadic alliance system was breaking down as a result of external pressures. Second, personal prowess and valor may be meaningless in the context of Islam and the Sultanate which he, though still known as datu, had, as we shall see, come to represent.

Nieto describes Uto as "a king with many tyrannical rivals."³⁵ Not every datu willingly acknowledged his supremacy. His reign as "Sultan of the River" was marked by instances of terrorism and assassination undertaken by his slave army against recalcitrant datus who either refused to pay tribute or were seeking the alliance of Spain in order to further their own interests. Thus, beneath the semblance of unity in *sa-raya* were ever-present centrifugal forces, the control of which depended largely upon Datu Uto's personal interventions. The situation was aggravated by the lack of effective mechanisms to insure peaceful succession along, say, family lines and primogeniture, as was the case in Sulu, which was more subject to orthodox Islamic influences.³⁶ Thus, anyone with a sizable amount of wealth, a strong following, and firearms was a potential rival who might even assassinate in order to create a power vacuum which would facilitate his own rise.

Uto's fears were very real and inescapable, and it is in this context that Spanish descriptions of him must be seen. His fears explain the numerous precautions he took, some verging on absurdity, in order to insure his safety and well-being. His palatial

27. Vidal y Soler, p. 191.

28. Gayangos MS, p. 27.

29. II, *passim*.

30. Francia and Parrado, I, p. 347; Wenceslao Retana, "Prologue" to Combés, 1897 edition.

31. Francia and Parrado, I, p. 346r

32. *Ibid.*; Vidal y Soler, p. 191.

33. Cf. Santayana, p. 108r

34. Nieto MS, p. 123; Rincón, p. 160; Montero y Vidal, *Piratería*, pp. 654-655 (note)r

35. Nieto MS, p. 122.

36. Majul, "Sulu Sultanate," pp. 26-27.

home was inhabited solely by women who kept a watchful eye on the datu during his relaxed moments.³⁷ Only women were allowed to ride with him in his *vintarr*³⁸. The person in charge of all his gunpowder and munitions was a woman.³⁹ His food had to be prepared before his own eyes by his wives and served first to the other people dining with him, so that what he ate were practically the left-overs.⁴⁰ Such was his fear of being poisoned that whenever he was away from home he drank the milk of coconuts which he himself had split open. During his travels the datu were forewarned to make security preparations. When on land he was perpetually surrounded by his bodyguards. When he used the riverways, warriors would line the banks.⁴¹

Because of his delicate position at the apex of a political system based upon shifting dyadic alliances, what was more important to Datu Uto than personal valor was shrewdness and tact in dealing with men. Montero y Vidal is, at least, willing to acknowledge this fact:

Uto does not have physical prowess or personal valor; but his character traits, on the other hand, make him truly superior to all the Moros of the river, over whom he rules through his intelligence and audacity.⁴²

Pastells talks about Uto's "natural talent."⁴³ Nieto describes the man as "cunning, extremely bad in morals and personally considerate (or prudent)."⁴⁴ Francia and Parrado mention his "sanguinary and cruel instincts . . . augmented by his lively ingenuity."⁴⁵ Rincón says that Uto was "suspicious and astute," and that he had a supine pride which he knew how to conceal with great ease.⁴⁶ In other words, Uto's personality was hardly rigid; in spite of the cruelty and decadence which Spanish writers invariably ascribe to their enemy, there is also an acknowledgment of his ingenuity and prudence, qualities which are necessary ingredients in any successful Magindanao leader. As Santayana points out: "each datu, to prevent absorption by other datu, had to *cultivate* his clientele and have many slaves."⁴⁷ A datu always feared that his free subjects might refrain from sustaining him, such as through the payment of taxes, and that they might abandon him and transfer their allegiance to another datu. What the Spaniards noticed about Uto was his ingenuity in manipulating friendships and debt relationships to suit his ends.

Datu Uto's flexibility, prudence, and wisdom influenced to a great extent his relations with the Spanish officials at Cotabato. If we ignore for the moment the role of Muslim Hajis and panditas, we can say with some confidence that Uto's hostility toward Spain was determined by questions of survival in nature; Spain was not hated in itself and Spaniards were not regarded as the archetypal enemy. The series of *bicharas* between Uto and the Spaniards, where the datu would greet the enemy of yesterday with open arms and profuse declarations of friendship (to the utter amazement and even disbelief of the "enemy"), is only one instance of his flexibility in dealing with others. If the Spaniards had not been conquerors who were hoping eventually to occupy Uto's lands, genuinely friendly relations could have existed between Spaniards and Magindanaos. Datu Uto, like many of his contemporaries in other parts of Southeast Asia, was no bigot who rejected foreign ways and things simply because they were foreign. How does one, for example, account for his wish to have his son Magindara go and study in Spain?⁴⁸

Datu Uto's wealth brought him prestige. It enabled him to build up a following bound to him through some form of debt. He had the natural talent, ingenuity, and prudence to maintain a system of dyadic alliances. This is essentially what the Spanish sources say. But is it the complete picture? Was Uto merely a rich datu who knew how to "play the game," to manipulate people and objects in order to further his self-interest? When Pastells talks about Uto's compelling attractiveness, does it not imply that something more than factional politics was involved? Vidal y Soler says that the Magindanao political system had a "patriarchal" character, that the datu considered his

37. Perinat, II, p. 125; Nieto MS, p. 123.

38. Nieto MS, p. 123.

39. Perinat, II, p. 125;

40. Rincón, Feb. 10, 1887, p. 160; Nieto MS, p. 123.

41. Nieto MS, p. 123.

42. *Piratería*, p. 654 (note).

43. "Memoria," p. 615.

44. Nieto MS, p. 123.

45. I, p. 347.

46. *Loc. cit.*

47. pp. 105-106, 108.

48. Ramon Béa to Jose Guerrico, Oct. 26, 1880, *CMSJ*, IV, p. 131.

vassals to be members of his own family.⁴⁹ This statement suggests that something more than self-interest was involved in Uto's relationships with others. Perhaps there was love as a quality permeating such relationships, but we lack the indigenous sources to show it. The most that can be said is that Uto's real name was *Nua*, which means "good," "affable," "kind."⁵⁰

Perhaps it was not so much that Uto could bribe and manipulate people and thus unify them than that there was power in him which the Magindanaos recognized, power of which wealth and personal qualities were but reflections; power which made personal valor and prowess irrelevant. The Sultan of Cotabato was said to be the only one who could perform the ritual of "stepping on the white earth" which symbolized his union with the powers of the earth, thus assuring the prosperity and fertility of the land.⁵¹ Energy, power, flowed from the Sultan who sat in his throne at the top of Tantayan hill in Cotabato. With the disappearance of the Sultanate, Datu Uto came to represent this power, and this explains, in one sense, his overpowering attractiveness.

The nature of source materials does not permit us to elaborate upon Magindanao perceptions of leadership. But by looking at the subject of religion, we can go beyond a description of the alliance system and broach questions of brotherhood and spiritual fulfillment which inspire human behavior.

49. p. 191.

50. Rincón, p. 160e Rincón calls this "a true sarcasm of the Moro world [morisma]."

51. Saleeby, *Studies*, pp. 29, 60. This ritual was pre-Islamic in origin.

CHAPTER V

MUSLIM ASPECTS OF DATU UTO'S SOCIETY

When in 1855 Romaldo Crespo strongly recommended the expulsion or, at least, the suppression of the activities of Muslim religious officials in Magindanao, he correctly spotted the ideological roots of resistance to the forthcoming Spanish inroads. Watch the sarips and panditas closely, he said, and be prepared to deal with them as the Dutch had done to the Muslim hierarchy at Batavia.¹ Actually, however, we do not hear of any serious attempts on the part of the Spanish authorities to suppress Muslim missionary activity in the Pulangi, in spite of warnings voiced by some Spanish Jesuits. In the first place, the treaties made with the Cotabato and Sulu Sultans all contained provisions against Spanish interference in matters of religion and culture.² In the second place, the assumption seems to have been that, by controlling communications in the delta, links with the greater Muslim world would be progressively severed.

The Spaniards were certainly aware of what was happening to the remaining Muslim communities in Davao in the wake of heavy Spanish colonization since 1848. They were isolated from Muslim communities elsewhere,³ with the result that the panditas lost the prestige they enjoyed among the people. They had difficulty in reading and writing, skills which they traditionally monopolized. Ancient religious practices were displacing orthodox Islam.⁴ Some Jesuit missionaries concluded that the isolation and decadence of Islam made the rate of Muslim conversions to Christianity unusually high in Davao. There is the celebrated case of a sherif who, having come from Singapore only three years earlier, was converted to Christianity, his "congregation" following suit.⁵

The situation in the Pulangi valley was entirely different. When the Duc d'Alençon visited Cotabato in 1866, he was clearly impressed by the great number of hajis he encountered there. One of them, the adviser to the Sultan, is described by the Frenchman as having been to Mecca and adopted the large turban and long robe of the Western Muslims. According to Alençon, "One is surprised to see these barbaric tribes conserve their relations with their religious metropolis three thousand leagues away."⁶ Thus, even in Cotabato, the center of Spanish activity in Magindanao, Islam retained much of its vitality through links with the greater Muslim world.

We can be sure that the resistance of the Magindanaos to the colonial advance in the 1860's had a religious dimension. Alençon, who accompanied a Spanish contingent in a raid on a rebel *kota* in Supangan, noticed several books in Arabic lying in the abandoned *kota*. Furthermore several Arabic characters were inscribed above the door to the command post in the center of the fort, and Alençon believed that they were a Koranic text.⁷ Although these details are inconclusive, they hint at the involvement of the panditas in the actual fighting. This becomes very evident in the 1880's, when the panditas were reported to be fighting side by side with the warriors, rousing them to give their lives for the cause of Allah and the Prophet.⁸ Datu Uto's rise to power in the

1. Mascaro MS, pp. 95, 98.

2. Referring to the Spanish drive against the Muslims in the second half of the nineteenth century, Phelan says: "The Spanish were beginning to distinguish between the adoption of Catholicism and the acceptance of political control. Manila was willing to tolerate non-Christian beliefs in order to win the political allegiance of the newly conquered" (p. 144).

3. Pío Pí to J. Ricart, Superior, Nov. 20, 1894, *CMSJ*, X, p. 83.

4. Blumentritt, "Los maguindanaos," pp. 282-283; Saturnino Urios to Father Superior, Aug. 16, 1894, *CMSJ*, X, p. 237.

5. Pí to Superior, Nov. 20, 1894, *CMSJ*, X, p. 83; Urios to Superior, Aug. 16, 1894, *CMSJ*, X, p. 237.

6. p. 365.

7. p. 368.

8. One of the *kotas* used in defense against the Spaniards was made by the panditas; Perinat, II, p. 74. In Talayan it is said that "Panditas and Sherifs continued at

1860's may have been facilitated by his appeal to the Islamic consciousness of the Magindanaos in the face of the Christian threat of conquest.

In 1872, the Spanish Navy initiated hostilities against Sulu by attacking the capital and setting up a blockade. Vidal y Soler, who was in the Magindanao interior in late 1872, observes that:

During the war with Jolo the sultans and datos [of the Magindanao interior] were very much informed about what was happening, and they sympathized clearly with the Joloanos. There should be no illusions about it; they are, without exception, enemies of Spain.⁹

One can picture the independent Muslim sultans and datos of *sa-raya* nervously awaiting news from Sulu, knowing well enough that their own fortunes depended to a great extent on the outcome of the Sulu-Spanish war. What a far cry this is from the Cotabato Sultan's reaction to the destruction of Jolo in 1851: he actually applauded his Spanish friends for having trounced his rival.¹⁰ Perhaps it is not a mere coincidence that in 1874 Datu Uto "accelerated his rebellion,¹¹ to cite Perinat, by establishing close relations with Sulu when the latter was in deep trouble.¹² The synchronism of events suggests that Uto could see his actions in Magindanao in a wider context which included Islam.

Jolo fell to Spanish hands in 1876 after a bloody struggle. This was the signal for a distinct Islamic revival which spread out from Sulu and reached the Magindanao interior. The majority of the Sulu datos refused to obey the Sultan, who was controlled and given a pension by the Spanish government. In this posture of dissent the datos were supported by the Muslim religious officials who saw themselves menaced by the proximity of Spain and her Catholic missionaries.¹³ As we have seen, the reaction was expressed in one form through the build-up of Maibun as an alternative to the port of Jolo. In the religious sphere one finds a marked increase in the haji traffic after 1876,¹⁴ and the impact of this phenomenon upon the religious life of Sulu.

Although Spanish sources attest to the fact that the hajis came by way of Singapore, nothing is said about their activities there or in the Holy City, or about the contacts they made and the ideas that influenced them. But recent studies about the Indonesians and Malays in Singapore and Mecca cast some light on our topic, since the situation in which Achehnese, Malay or Javanese Muslims found themselves was not entirely different from that in Sulu or Magindanao.¹⁵ In Mecca, certainly the Sulu pilgrims would have come in touch with foreign ideas and, like the Indonesian community there, "share the international and distinctly anti-colonial outlook of the holy city.¹⁶ Singaporeq which was a base for anti-Dutch activities, had commercial ties with Maibun and Buayan, and it would be strange indeed if the mood of the city had not made an imprint on the hajis returning to their Spanish-threatened homelands.

In spite of our ignorance about the precise happenings in Singapore and Mecca, we know that a qualitative change in the religious life of Sulu as a result of the haji

work, making them believe that the Koran would be consumed by fire . . . if the Spaniards came to plant themselves in Talayan"; Horguín, "Comunicación," 1888, in Salcedo, p. 99.

9. p. 194.
10. Bernaldez, pp. 211-212.
11. I, p. 23. Interestingly enough, the long, drawn-out Dutch-Achehnese War, in which Muslim priests, or imams, played a leading role, began in 1873.
12. Montano, pp. 140-141. The Sultan himself could not be reconciled to the new situation until 1878. Early in 1877, he encouraged hostilities of all sorts against the Spaniards; see Saleeby, *History of Sulu*, Ch. V.
13. Barrantes ("Peligro de Mindanao," p. 103) says that this was a consequence of Jolo being made a free port in 1876. The facility of communications and the increase in monetary circulation permitted the Muslims of Sulu and Mindanao to finance the trip to Mecca via Singapore. Barrantes, however, seems to place undue importance on Jolo and ignores the fact of Maibun's flourishing at this time.
14. Cf. Anthony Reid, "Nineteenth century pan-Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia," *Journal of Asian Studies*, XXVI, 2 (1967), pp. 267-283; William Roff, *The Origins of Malay Nationalism* (New Haven, 1967), Ch. II.
15. Reid, p. 269.

influx was perceived by the Spanish Jesuits at Jolo. Fr. Juan Quintana reported that "the difficulty and the repugnance of the Joloanos in embracing our civilization are due to the strong and powerful influence which the *Hajis* or moros come from Mecca have always exercised in order to spread the message of the Koran.¹⁶ Fr. March was more precise; he sought to bring to the attention of the Manila government the great number of panditas, imams and sherifs who in a short time had come to Sulu from Singapore and were obstructing Spanish attempts at conversion and political control. They were responsible for the great increase in the number of *juramentados*, as the Spaniards called those individuals who had made the Muslim oath to give one's own life in the process of slaying Christians.¹⁷ They had even built an imposing mosque conspicuously adjacent to the gates of the Spanish garrison.

Islam, or more accurately its clergy . . . used to be pretty nearly extinct. Whenever there were [Muslim priests] hereabouts, they were guided by ancient customs, and their number had greatly diminished. But today they are experiencing great progress and an increase in numbers.¹⁸

Such a height of Islamic fervor in Sulu had direct repercussions in Magindanao. According to Pastells in a letter of July 1887, the Jolo panditas saw Magindanao as another segment of Dar-ul-Islam threatened by Spanish political and religious expansionism:

. . . Many of [the Jolo panditas] travel to Mindanao with the sinister goal of uniting among themselves the Moros, whose disunity had been up to then the greatest advantage the Spaniards had perceived. . . .¹⁹

Similarly, Blumentritt in 1893 mentions the great number of panditas in the Pulangi valley who had come from Sulu and

. . . who distinguish themselves by their great fanaticism and superior religious knowledge. These joloano panditas are those who preach war against Spain and keep up the relations of the Magindanaos with the foreign centers of the Islamic world.²⁰

The hajis and religious dignitaries who showed up in Mindanao were not necessarily natives of the area. Many of those who came to Sulu from Singapore were Malays.²¹ The chief pandita and adviser of Datu Piang (an ex-follower of Uto who rose to prominence in the 1890's) was a certain Sherif Abdul from Bokhara, who conversed with the British explorer Landon in the Pahari (Hindustani) tongue.²² Landon, who visited the Pulangi valley in 1903, was impressed by the sizable contingent of hajis which he found scattered all over the country--"mostly men who have drifted here from Arabia, Bokhara and Afghanistan . . . a cross between missionary and a trader, at best unscrupulous scoundrels.²³ Unscrupulous or not, one cannot doubt the value of their services to the local sultans and datus. Landon describes the role they played in the Maranao areas then under attack by American occupation forces:

The Lanao region is overrun with Panditas, wise men, and medicine men, officials, and *sayids* or priests, who are the chief instigators of trouble. A *pandapatan* is a military genius who lays out forts and places for defense; a *sangupan* is the head or chief adviser of a tribe.²⁴

What Landon saw at the Pulangi valley and Lanao in 1903 could not have appeared overnight. Even prior to 1876, hajis and panditas must have trickled into the Pulangi with the aim of strengthening Islamic orthodoxy in the scattered *rancherías* and above all unifying the Magindanaos, who were faced with the Spanish threat. No evidence has been found of the existence of Muslim religious schools or monasteries in Mindanao; the influx of religious figures from abroad to ensure the continuity of Islam must have had a long historical precedent.

There is sufficient evidence to indicate the part played by Islam in the Pulangi valley itself. Writing in 1874, Vidal y Soler states that in each *ranchería* in the

16. Juan Quintana to Juan Ricart, Jan. 12, 1887, *CMSJ*, VIII, p. 63.

17. See pp. 44-45 for a fuller explanation of *juramentado*.

18. Estanislao March to Father Superior, June 16, 1887, *CMSJ*, VIII, p. 82.

19. *Misión*, II, p. 109.

20. "Los Maguindanaos," p. 283.

21. March to Superior, *CMSJ*, VIII, p. 82.

22. Landon, II, p. 136.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 56.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 103.

valley lived a pandita, who generally had made the pilgrimage to Meccar. One of his tasks was to recite from the Koran, copies of which were guarded with great care since they dated from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and were heavily written in with commentaries. Panditas had a monopoly of reading and writing skills. Blumentritt compliments the panditas of the Pulangi, in particular, for being "consummate calligraphers." Because of their wisdom, panditas were called upon to give advice on all serious matters. The highest ranking among them, called Pandita Kali, had the sole authority to interpret and revise the *luwaran*, or Magindanao code of laws.²⁵

We can draw out two important roles of the pandita during the Datu Uto period. First, he sought to uphold a political order structure along Islamic lines. Second, his preachings gave an added dimension of meaning to the acts of those individuals who committed themselves to warfare against the Spaniards and their allies.

A pandita was attached to a *rancheria* and yet in a way he transcended it. He belonged to the complex system of dyadic relationships, and yet he also saw himself as part of a larger community of men under the Muslim religion. In calling for Islamic unity, he also meant political unity under a Sultan who was both the guardian of the *shari'a* and, nominally at least, the head of state. Nieto, the most penetrating of the Spanish observers, was able to trace such Islamic roots of Datu Uto's power. Simply by entering Uto's domains, one saw the contrast (with the rest of Magindanao) in the way the religion was practiced. The clergy was organized and, most important, unified in spirit--from the Arab pandita who had arrived from Mecca, to the more recently initiated.

They show their eagerness to maintain their religion in its purity and to demonstrate that it is the only good one, and that Uto is the head of that reunion of men. They show that the best prince is he who observes the precepts of the Koran. . . .²⁶

Although Uto was known to all as *The Datto*, for all purposes he was the sultan of Buayan and the symbol of unity for the Magindanaos of *sa-raya*. But to be Sultan, and not merely a powerful chief, may have entailed a very different role for him, more passive than active, for he was also the mediator between the people and supernatural powers. This is one possible explanation of the disparity in Spanish descriptions of Datu Uto, from a valorous, active man in the 1860's to a timid and passive one in the 1880's.

According to Nieto, a corollary of Islamic unity in Datu Uto's domains was the creation of a relatively sophisticated organizational apparatus in the capital. He claims that this was one contribution of the foreign or foreign-trained panditas and hajjis, who would have been exposed to the advanced political structures of the Middle Eastern sultanates, not to mention Sulu. Nieto, unfortunately, does not go into details. At most he says that Uto had some sort of a "Council of Ministers," of which the most prominent was the Minister of War, Datu Kabalo. There was also a Collector of Customs who manned the toll station at Bakat, and a Grand Judge who also exercised the role of executioner.²⁷ Datu Piang, a Chinese-Magindanao, was Minister of Lands, or administrator of Uto's extensive holdings.²⁸ In sum, says Nieto, Islam provided the framework for military, administrative and other kinds of organization. One can be sure that the hajjis and panditas were responsible for fostering some sort of organizational unity in Uto's capital.

Mention is often made of the pandita's role in "fanaticizing" individuals, turning them into *juramentados*. In the accounts of skirmishes between Datu Uto's forces and the Spaniards, mention of the *juramentados* is almost invariably made. For example, a band of forty of them fell upon the Spanish expeditionary force that invaded Bakat in 1874. Another *juramentado* had defended the mausoleums of the Buayan ruling family when the Spaniards threatened to raze them in 1886. Again, contingents of *juramentados* swooped down on Cotabato and Tamontaka in 1886, burning barracks and Jesuit establishments. In fact, wherever fighting occurred, the *juramentados* were sure to appear, inflicting the greatest damage upon the enemy, each one of them being slain in the process. They were probably Datu Uto's greatest asset militarily. But what inspired them to give up their lives in such a way?

The usual descriptions of *juramentados* by Europeans gives one the impression that they were a maladjusted and desperate lot, given to fanaticism in order to relieve their anxiety. Generally they are said to be insolvent debtors, as in the following typical description by Wingfield:

25. Vidal y Soler, p. 192; Blumentritt, "Los Maguindanaos," pp. 282-283; Saleeby, *Studies*.

26. Nieto MS, p. 121.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 122.

28. *Misión*, III, p. 215.

An insolvent debtor and his family become the slaves of his creditor, and carelessness as to the future is an item in the character of the Malay. It is easy to lure him into debt, for he is a born gambler--cockfighting his supremest joy. Threatened with the sale and dispersion of his family, he is offered an alternative. Wife and children may be ransomed at the price of his own life. He must swear to slay as many Christians as possible ere he falls himself, his after-fate being, of course, Mohammedan beatitude. He swears, and is henceforth known as *juramentado*.²⁹

While not disputing the validity of the above description, one nevertheless finds difficulty in believing that the hundreds of *juramentados* who were killed during the later Datu Uto period were merely insolvent debtors, subtly coerced by society to commit ritual suicide. If whole contingents of Magindanaos could be "fanaticized" by the panditas into becoming *juramentados*, then we must go beyond the question of psychological motivation and look into the vision that fired them.

. . . they are brought together and summoned by the expert panditas to undergo a well-regulated training period. Then they begin the fastings, the wandering courses in deserted forests, the prayers over the tombs of deceased *juramentados*; and, beneath the glimmering light of the moon, the lengthy sermons which expatiate in vibrant terms the joys of the paradise of Mahomet; when the subjects have arrived at a sufficient degree of excitation, but only then, they are set loose upon the Spanish city.³⁰

To those *juramentados* who sallied forth from Uto's *kota* throwing themselves against phalanx after phalanx of well-armed Spaniards, or those who slashed their way into groups of Christians at the Cotabato market, their acts were an extension of religious experience. Their movements toward their sure death were movements in the direction of Paradise; the more Christians they killed, the closer they came to fulfillment. After their death they believed that they would mount a flying horse that would bring them to Heaven, where forty houris were waiting to be their wives. There, too, were the most delectable dishes one could imagine, all for the asking. There one need not do any work; the surroundings were of the greatest possible beauty.³¹

"In the name of God"--this was the cry of the *juramentado* when his first victim fell,³² and one should not miss its implications for the movement which Datu Uto led. The Magindanaos who fought on the side of Uto found their actions meaningful because they were brought closer to the ultimate happiness, the ultimate form of existence. Perhaps this view of the *juramentado* can supplement that of Majul, who explains the system in terms of the failure of the Sultan to prevent a non-Muslim power from controlling a land asserted to have been part of Dar-ul-Islam. In such a case, says Majul, the responsibility for the defense of such a territory shifts to the individual, the *juramentado*.³³

The unification of most of the Magindanao world demanded an ideology that could transcend the notion of personal alliances. Such an ideology was provided by Islam. The impetus for its revival in Magindanao came from Sulu and the Muslim world beyond. Its effect was to impress upon the Magindanaos the existence of a brotherhood of men transcending the *rancheria*. The image of Datu Uto became transformed from merely that of a powerful chief to the symbol of Magindanaos integrity as a segment of Dar-ul-Islam. The organization of the Sultanate of Buayan was strengthened. To those who joined and fought in battle, religion brought a vision of Heaven, the attainment of which was linked to the struggle against foreign, Christian domination.

But in spite of the importance we have assigned to religion as a unifying force, the fundamental, deeply ingrained notion of the dyadic or personal tie as the basis for unification cannot be underestimated. Datu Uto's height of power probably came at that point where Islamic unity and the alliance system merged in the consciousness of his followers. If the Spaniards at Cotabato and Tamontaka could make no headway against Islam, there was something they could and, as we shall see, did do, which was to subvert the alliance system.

29. Lewis Wingfield, *Wanderings of a Globe-trotter in the Far East* (London, 1889), vol. I, p. 300; also Montano, p. 141.

30. Montano, p. 142.

31. J. Franklin Ewing, S.J., "Juramentado: institutionalized suicide among the Moros of the Philippines," *Anthropological Quarterly*, III (N.S.) (Oct. 1955), pp. 149-150.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 51.

33. "The role of Islam," pp. 313-314.

CHAPTER VI

"ATTRACTION" AND CONQUEST (ca. 1878-1887)

The period from 1878 to 1884 is notable for the absence of armed conflicts between Uto's forces and the Spaniards. Perhaps this was due to the weakness of the colonial military establishment; thoughts of conquest were set aside for the moment. As one commentator put it in 1878, the extent of Spanish control was limited to isolated detachments guarding various strategic points in the delta. Not a single home or cultivated field would generally be found in the vicinity of these stockades. The latter were manned mostly by deportees from the Christian areas in the northern islands, who spent the day idly longing for their families elsewhere.¹

Presumably, too, the stipulations of the 1875 treaty were in effect, whereby the independence of Uto's domains were recognized by Spain in return for non-harassment of established Spanish positions and trade between *sa-ilud* and *sa-raya*. In 1880, friendly visits were exchanged between Cotabato governor Carbonnel and Datu Utor. Writing in January 1881, Fr. Juanmartí gives the prevailing Spanish feeling then: the Moros were "pacified" and quiet in the whole of the Pulangi basin; no "misbehavior" took place in any of the occupied points. Credit for this, of course, is given to the governor, a tactful and affable man. And Uto? Unfortunately he is not credited with a genuine desire for peace. A few days before Juanmartí's writing, several high-ranking Spanish officers had journeyed to Buayan in the gunboat *Manileño*, penetrating farther upriver than Carbonnel had done the previous year. Although Datu Uto received the Spaniards with much hospitality and demonstrations of friendship, he could not hide his concern that the *Manileño* had penetrated to the very heart of his domains. Fr. Juanmartí writes with deep suspicion that things unseen by Spanish eyes were going on in *sa-raya*. His experience and contacts among the Magindanao population had probably given him hints of the firearms and slave trade being carried on by Uto. His views most likely represented those of the Spanish officials at that time, since he was a frequent adviser to the governor. There was peace, indeed, but distrust pervaded the atmosphere.²

The fact is that neither side was willing to accept a state of permanent coexistence. The panditas, sherifs and hajjis who came in increasing numbers to Magindanao could not but have brought with them the spirit of *jihad*, the Holy War. As long as a viable resistance movement could be maintained, the goal was the reconquest of those parts of Magindanao that had fallen into Spanish hands. On the Spanish side, the ultimate goal was still the destruction of the power of the sultans and datos, and the extension of colonial rule upriver. The British, Dutch and French were fast consolidating their influence in other areas, and *sa-raya* Magindanao was bound to become a source of irritation to officials in Manila with an expansionist bent. Such lulls in military activity as the period under discussion were due to power struggles between liberals and conservatives in the colonial administration.

But the period from 1878 to 1884 appears to be one of inactivity only in a superficial sense. Through non-military means, the Spanish establishment was busy attempting to subvert the datu-slave and alliance relationships. This is sometimes called a policy of "attraction" to distinguish it from the policy of armed conquest. If Fr. Juanmartí was suspicious of Datu Uto's motives, the latter in turn would have had grounds for distrusting the Jesuit. For the missionaries were at the forefront of the drive to win the population over to the Spanish side, paving the way for more direct intervention in the future.

A policy of attraction had been outlined in 1855 by several members of the expedition that toured the Pulangi valley. Ramon Mascaro, the most perceptive and articulate proponent of this type of policy, emphasized that Spaniards should always act in good faith, with justice and patience. There should be no demonstrations of superiority, no unjustified snobbery, no bad treatment or obstructionism toward the Muslims. The latter should be left in the belief of their own sovereignty; it must not be insisted upon that

1. "Algunas reflexiones," p. 231r

2. Juanmartí to Father Superior, Jan. 25, 1881, *CMSJ*, IV, pp. 141-142.

they are subjects of Spain. Rather, the "necessary conditions" should be imposed almost without the inhabitants being conscious of the process.

The "necessary conditions" for peaceful conquest, as Mascaro saw it, involved the destruction of the traditional power basis--ownership of slaves--and substituting for it wealth gained through cooperating with the Spanish establishment (i.e., work and trade). The hill people, source of slaves, were to be mobilized and converted to Christianity by the Jesuits; they would be grouped together in towns, their chiefs given Spanish titles, and provided with protection against the Magindanaos. As for the latter, individuals who wished to submit would be gathered into towns sheltered by Spanish garrisons. Sultans and datus, submitting, would retain their titles and authority over their subjects. The important thing was that they be made to realize the benefits of cooperating with the colonial authorities. The Cotabato Sultan should be set up as a model for all to follow. The model, however, contained an unpalatable feature: pacified areas would be made subject to Spanish laws regarding slavery.³

Mascaro's advice seems to have been followed after the Spanish conquest of *sa-ilud* in the 1860's. For example, in 1863 the Tamontaka officials appointed Datu Bandara, a Tiruray chief, as *Presidente* of the Municipality of Awang, as the district was then known, and tried to fan resentment against subordination to the Magindanaos. They supplied the Tirurays with goods, and were successful in breaking down trade pacts between these hill people and the lowlanders.⁴ The Jesuit letters make scattered references to attempts to gather hill people into towns within hearing distance of churchbells, a technique reminiscent of sixteenth and seventeenth-century Luzon and the Visayas. In the delta itself various Magindanao datus, such as Vansil and Ayunan, came to terms with Spain and were confirmed in their positions.⁵

Such attempts, however, were largely unsuccessful. Wood says that the Spaniards were simply not strong enough to protect the Tirurays from the Magindanaos.⁶ The tug-o-war between Uto and the Jesuits seems to have been won by the former. As for the chiefs in the delta, excepting Cotabato and its environs, very little headway was made in gaining their genuine support. Spanish garrisons had to bear with their precarious isolation. The most that was achieved was persuading a couple of datus to supply the forts with foodstuffs. As for Mascaro's belief that the datus would naturally aspire to the benefits accruing to the Cotabato Sultan for his submission, this prospect was belied by the Sultan's own lapse into obscurity, his utter dependence on a Spanish pension for his subsistence. The Sultan would not do as a model; something more was needed to convince the datus to submit at heart.

The answer was provided by the Jesuit fathers at Tamontaka who, in the 1870's, embarked upon a program called the *rescate* (ransom)⁷ which paved the way for the success of the policy of attraction in the 1880's. The *rescate* involved the purchase of Magindanao slaves and children, and their resettlement in a new environment where, it was hoped, a community would arise along Hispanic-Christian lines, spreading out to confront the existing Muslim society. The movement originated during a serious epidemic of smallpox in July 1872 which temporarily halted agricultural enterprise in the Pulangi valley. The result was a great scarcity of rice, a disaster which forced the Magindanaos to sell slave children at a very low price. Mindanao governor Luis Golfín, while in conversation with Fr. Venancio Legarra, picked up the idea which had been suggested in 1861 by Fr. Cuevas of forming a small model agricultural community with pagan children and ransomed slaves. Upon reaching a reasonable age the latter would be granted their own parcels of land; as Christian families they would be the nucleus of a town. Golfín thought that the effects of the famine offered an opportunity to start such a project.

Golfín rushed his plans to the Father Superior at Tamontaka, suggesting that, after the ransomed slaves were educated by the Jesuits, they could serve as powerful agents for the development (presumably economic and religious) of the area. The Padre was enthusiastic. The next step was to present the plans to the Captain-general and the Archbishop, primarily in order to devise means to raise funds. A *Junta Superior*, headed by the Archbishop himself, was formed in Manila, while a subordinate commission was set up in Cotabato to implement decisions made by the higher council. By the end of the first year, the first donations totaling 4,500 Pesos enabled the Jesuits to start work immediately. On February 2, 1873, a great fiesta was held in Tamontaka to celebrate the baptism of

3. Mascaro MS, *passim*.

4. Wood, p. 13.

5. Pastells, *Misión*, I, pp. 30-31, 68 and *passim*.

6. Wood, p. 13.

7. See articles by Madigan/Cushner, O'Shaughnessy for a more detailed account of the mission effort.

the first thirty *libertos* (freed-men) of the Mission.⁸

What started out as a cautious experiment became, within a decade, a key but subtle tool to spread Spanish influence deeper in the Pulangi valley. The Tamontaka community presented to hill people, slaves and Muslims alike a model of life in another system. Mascaro's 1855 suggestion that the benefits of cooperating with the Spanish establishment be made known to all was realized not by setting up the Sultan and datus of Cotabato as models but by creating from scratch a community that appeared to provide multiple benefits to its members, who happened to be ex-slaves. The first outsiders to be affected were other slaves, who saw in the Tamontaka idea a means of much swifter transition to free status and livelihood than they could expect otherwise. Gradually, members of the higher classes came to recognize Tamontaka for its educational aspects. As we have seen, in Magindanao the art of reading and writing had always been reserved to the politico-religious hierarchy, particularly the panditas. The attainment of such faculties brought great prestige to the individuals. But to come under the wing of the Jesuits was precisely to be made subject to educational techniques which had been tested in other mission frontiers of the archipelago. A typical day in the Tamontaka community allowed for more than three hours of instruction in reading and writing, plus equal time learning basic agriculture or some trades.⁹ The first batch of *libertos* in 1873 were given a systematic education. By the early 1880's, the respect of the neighboring datus and panditas for the Jesuits and their wards was considerably enhanced.

In an essay written in 1876 or 1877 by an anonymous Jesuit,¹⁰ it was reported that there had been a significant increase in the number of slaves defecting to Spanish-occupied areas. It was suggested that the sultans and datus be made to understand that the Spanish government would protect slaves taking refuge under the Spanish flag. As a compromise, the loss on their former masters' part would be indemnified in cash. It was, in effect, suggested that the concept of the *rescate* be broadened to accommodate defecting slaves.¹¹ About two years later, the institution at Tamontaka was expanded to accommodate the ever-increasing number of such defectors.¹² It is clear that by the late 1870's the Tamontaka experiment was bearing fruit among the lower levels of society.

The greatest feeling of jubilation came when the datus and panditas themselves began to respond to the Jesuit efforts. Writing in May, 1882, Fr. Juanmartí applauded the change in attitude of the native hierarchy in the vicinity of the Missions in Cotabato, Pollok and especially Tamontaka. Datus and panditas were even calling on the Mission houses; they now allowed Jesuit padres to enter their homes. Confidence was built up as the Spanish Jesuits gladly gave their advice on all sorts of problems and provided medical help *gratis*. Many who belonged to the *marayao* (free) class even asked to be baptized.¹³ In addition to the respect which the Magindanaos had had for the Jesuits as religious personages, as Christian counterparts to their panditas,¹⁴ there was a recognition of the practical knowledge (i.e. in medicine, agriculture, reading and writing) they could offer. This recognition, which belongs to a general Southeast Asian ethos of respect for civility and education even in a foreigner, came from viewing the results of the Jesuit efforts at Tamontaka.

As Fr. Ignacio Durán reported to his Superior in 1883, the former slave children, many of whom were reaching the adult stage, had acquired a certain "discipline" in work habits, had assimilated some Spanish customs, could speak haltingly in Castilian, and could even play the reed organ and sing a whole Mass in three or four voices. More important, perhaps, was their ability to read and write well.¹⁵ The Jesuits report that such a display of talent and learning could not fail to attract the attention of the other inhabitants, who compared the *libertos* with their own children raised in the traditional manner. As Fr. Pastells puts it, "they were left amazed by the change wrought in

8. Pastells, *Misión*, I, pp. 132-133 and *passim*.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 133.

10. "Mejoras, que a nuestro juicio convendrían en el 5° Distrito de Mindanao," *CMSJ*, II (1876, 1877?), pp. 238-240.

11. O'Shaughnessy, p. 233.

12. Juanmartí to Antonio Zarandona in Madrid, May 12, 1882, *CMSJ*, V, p. 187e. See also Pastells, *Misión*, I, p. 451.

13. They believed, for example, that the Padres accompanied the soldiers to rally them on and toughen them in battle. Datu Uto had high regard for the "panditas Cristianos," especially Fr. Juanmartí; Pastells, *Misión*, I, p. 137.

14. Ignacio Durán to Father Superior, May 11, 1883, *CMSJ*, V, p. 205.

the intelligence, in the heart and in the mode of conduct of the *libertos*.¹⁵ They came to respect the Jesuits and their wards, and this was, to Fr. Juanmartí, the reason why the Tamontaka establishment, practically defenseless, was not harassed at all by the neighboring *rancherías*.¹⁶

A peak in the number of defections seems to have been reached in 1884. On the tenth of June, Fr. Bannasar wrote that whole families were being attracted either by the well-being of their relatives among the *libertos* or by practical necessities to settle in Tamontaka.¹⁷ Famine broke out again in 1884, contributing to the increase in the number of hill people in the Mission who sought refuge from Magindanaos raiding them for food supplies. Out of extreme poverty and hunger, many Muslims as well as slaves sold their own children to the Jesuits.¹⁸ As of December of 1884, more ransoms had been made during the past six months than during the previous two years.¹⁹

By the mid-1880's the Jesuits had contributed two elements to the situation in the Pulangi. First, by encouraging the settlement of hill people near Tamontaka and by providing material aid and protection to defecting slaves and freemen, the Jesuits were exerting pressure on the source and actual manpower complement of the *datus*. The ownership of slaves, symbol of a *datu's* power, was being undermined through subtle and non-coercive means. Second, the Jesuits had established a *rapport* with the neighboring *datus* and *panditas*, creating in the south branch of *sa-ilud* a set of potential allies which the Spanish government could, and later did, tap in the event of renewed conflict with Buayan. The techniques which were used during this period to "attract" the population of *sa-ilud* to the Spanish side were to be used shortly thereafter in dealing with *sa-roya*.

In 1882, an epidemic of cholera struck the valley of the Pulangi, taking a heavy toll of lives in the *rancherías* of the south branch of the delta, in Lasedan, Lara, Taviran, and in the *sa-roya* districts of Buayan and Talayan. It devastated the whole southeastern coast of Mindanao up to Sarangani bay and then crept upward to the lake Buluan area. Among the casualties were the *Datu Amirol* and the *Rajah Mudah* of Cotabato, Maminteng.²⁰ The Spanish government failed to name a new *Rajah Mudah* because the strongest claimant to the title, *Datu Mamakū*, was the brother of *Rajah Putri*, Uto's wife. Thus, when the Cotabato Sultan died in April 1884, there was some confusion over the succession. Hesitation on the part of the government led to rivalry and feuding among various *datus* of royal blood, none of whom was powerful enough to rise above the rest. Other *datus* found in this chaotic situation an opportunity to increase their independence from the Sultanate.

Nieto gives us a glimpse of the internal situation following the death of the Sultan. The Magindanaos of the south branch of the delta, says Nieto, felt slighted and suspicious of the Spaniards because their protegé *Datu Mamon* was not named *Rajah Mudah* after Maminteng's death. Those of the north branch of the delta below Libungan maintained that the new *Datu Amirol*, a staunch ally of Spain, was "an old dotard." They were restless and cynical about the fortunes of the Sultanate. The rest of the *rancherías* of *sa-ilud*, those of *Datus Galan*, *Kamama* and *Buisan*, were taking advantage of the confusion to raid and rob other *rancherías*. But the most significant element of the situation, concludes Nieto, was *Datu Uto* himself, who was "exercising pressure over everybody."²¹

The whole issue, in fact, revolved around *Datu Uto*. The Spanish government, which could have avoided all the trouble by immediately naming a new Sultan, wavered because it was attracted to the possibility of having *Datu Uto* himself as Sultan of Mindanao,

15. *Misión*, I, p. 451.

16. Juanmartí to Zarandona, May 12, 1882, *CMSJ*, V, p. 186.

17. Guillermo Bannasar to Father Superior, June 10, 1884, *CMSJ*, VI, p. 62.

18. This type of transaction surprised the Spaniards at first sight and made them believe that there was lack of love and paternal affection among the native inhabitants. But parents who sold their children to others were confident that they would not be maltreated except in the rarest exceptions, and that they would pass later to the category of free subjects of their *datu*; Blumentritt, "Los maguindanaos," p. 281.

19. Bannasar to Father Superior, Dec. 31, 1884, *CMSJ*, VI, p. 71.

20. Juanmartí to Father Superior, Jan. 13, 1883, *CMSJ*, V, p. 196.

21. Nieto *MS*, p. 63.

perhaps in order to bring the Datu into the Spanish sphere of influence. Eventually Pablu, son of the deceased, was elected, but Nieto implies that the Spaniards had no choice but to comply with certain provisions of their treaties with the Cotabato Sultanate which laid it down that the Magindanaos of *sa-raya* were to be considered enemies and thus precluded from holding office at Cotabato. "Thus the Spaniards were *forced* to name a Raja Muda and a Sultan from among those who were their allies. These were virtual puppets."²² It was clearly stated, in a memorial to Madrid drafted in the spring of 1885 by the Government of Mindanao, that Datu Uto was the only person who deserved to be named Sultan by Spain. If Spain had her way, Uto might have become Sultan and the course of Cotabato history significantly altered, but the government had to bow to internal considerations, such as the conflict between *sa-ilud* and *sa-raya*. The most that could be done, concludes the 1885 memorial, was to adopt a policy of attracting Uto over to the Spanish side and treating him kindly.²³

It must be pointed out that the above memorial originated from Zamboanga where a liberal governor of Mindanao, Julio Serina, held office. There were others of a more conservative bent who felt that a policy of armed conquest rather than attraction ought to be implemented in the Pulangi. Even the Jesuits were not immune from this kind of thinking. Among the criticisms of Spanish policy by Fr. Ricart in 1883 was the inaction which he felt had come to characterize the Sword and the Cross: the Spaniards had become content with the possession of isolated points manned by soldiers administered to by the missionaries; the policy of attraction was badly understood and had degenerated into condescension.²⁴ In 1884, governor-general Joaquin Jovellar visited southern Mindanao, and "his impression at the sight of the deplorable state of the island could not be more sad." In the following communication to the Minister of Ultramar in Spain, Jovellar summarized the situation as he saw it:

The program of occupation is completely paralyzed; due to lack of resources or a misapplication of the "system," we have been set back twenty years. Nothing is farthest from signifying permanency and progress than the material state of all our establishments; the ruins of former edifices hardly exist; in Pollok the old fort and barracks have completely disappeared; the fort of Cotabato has also disappeared, not a stone over stone has remained; and the smaller [forts] of Libungan, Tumbao, Taviran and Tamontaka . . . cannot be more than provisional: the detachments are, in all places, badly lodged, in buildings sometimes eaten up by termites or threatened with ruin; in Cotabato the munitions are rendered useless by the lack of powder magazines. . . .²⁵

For years, the military installations in Magindanao had been in this sorry state. Jovellar's sudden interest in them means that Manila's outlook was changing; the pendulum was shifting towards a military solution to the Magindanao problem. As Nieto Aguilar puts it, the governor-general came to the conclusion "that a period of activity without compromising in great and costly operations should be initiated."²⁶ Jovellar immediately called for an allotment of 100,000 Pesos for the use of the military. Among his suggestions were: to improve defensive positions; to build better barracks, hospitals, storehouses, powder magazines; to occupy Lalabuan, a source of smuggled firearms; to transfer the Davao naval station to Sarangani bay; and to extend Spanish control to the "middle course" of the Pulangi river, meaning Buayan.²⁷

Jovellar's plans took some time to be implemented, for the Manila government had to consider the alternative policy suggestion originating from the governor of Mindanao which was one of accommodation toward Uto. However, the militaristic governor of Cotabato, Federico Roldan, anticipated Manila's decision by engaging in a series of actions designed to provoke an armed conflict with Datu Uto.²⁸ What these imprudent acts were is not clear from the sources, but Pastells states that these were truly unjust to Uto.²⁹

22. *Ibid.*, pp. 64-66.

23. *Ibidr*, p. 244.

24. Juan Ricart, S.J., "Informe sobre la reducci3n de Mindanao . . .," Manila, Jan. 17, 1883, reprinted with added notes in *CMSJ*, X, p. 600.

25. Montero y Vidale *Pirateria*, p. 642.

26. p. 43.

27. Montero y Vidal, *Pirateria*, pp. 642-643; Nieto Aguilar, p. 43.

28. The Cotabato governor seems to have had a lot of freedom of action since his aggressive designs were contradictory to the "peaceful attraction" policy of his immediate superior, the Governor of Mindanao. This may be a reflection of new centralization policies after 1860 (see Robles, part II).

29. *Misi3n* II, p. 54.

Moreover, governor Roldan had designs, as yet unauthorized by Manila, to establish a garrison at Uto's stronghold of Bakat.

The Datu's reaction, upon hearing of such threats against him, must have been one of surprise or disbelief, because prior to Foldan's governorship in 1885 Cotabato had followed a policy of accommodation rather than confrontation. In a letter to the governor dated April 23, 1885, Datu Uto expressed his reaction to the Spanish move:

Greetings to the Governor of Cotabato--I understand that you are about to advance to Buayan, as they have told me. Just the same, you presently know that I am loyal to Spain, so that, even if today they required me to wear a *sombrero*, I would wear one. I am letting you know that I am transferring all my belongings to another location. With regard to all my followers who have marched, I ask you to order the men to wear *sombreros* and the women to wear *sayas*, and if they do not comply, then it is true that they have not gone [hayan ido] with the Spaniards, and so also with the other datos.³⁰

In this rather puzzling letter, Uto seems to be saying that the Spaniards ought to give him a chance to prove his friendship with them. Wearing the *sombrero* (Spanish wide-brimmed hat) and the *saya* (skirt used by Christian Filipinas) is a way of expressing submission to Spain. Of course, the wily Datu does not expect much from such an appeal. Resigned to another invasion of his district, he is transferring his wealth farther inland. Montero y Vidal says that, from this time on, Uto took a more militant stance.

. . . His withdrawn and apprehensive posture was transformed into manifest rebellion. He failed to reply to the letters of the governor of Cotabato, and established with his *bancas* a veritable blockade of the numerous passages of the river. He brought terror to all parts by his robberies and assassinations.³¹

It was not only the threat on Bakat which brought about this change in Uto's posture. There was something more immediate: the subversion of his following's loyalty to him. Cotabato Governor Roldan believed that the best way of breaking Uto's power was to foment desertions among his subjects. His method is not stated explicitly in the sources, but most likely it anticipated the decree sent later during the year (1885) by the central government, stating that slaves seeking refuge under the Spanish flag were to be automatically free, without any ransom or other form of indemnification being paid to their former masters.³² Whatever Roldan's method exactly was, we can be sure that it was in the spirit of the Jesuit efforts at Tamontaka. The result was a spate of defections from among Uto's slaves and even relatives; this made the Datu "disturbed and uneasy."³³ His complaints to the governor having been repeatedly ignored, Datu Uto then embarked upon a series of assassinations and terrorist acts directed against his former subjects.

A recorded incident at Tamontaka is the beheading of a Muslim who was preparing to renounce his faith and become Christian. Four months previously, he and his brother had escaped from Uto's *rancheria* and had come to live in the Mission.³⁴ In Cotabato, the bloody killing of a former slave by one of Uto's assassins precipitated an investigation for the district judge. Uto was declared guilty of indirect participation in the crime. The judge, a rather conscientious magistrate, posted signs in the most conspicuous places calling for the Datu to present himself at court. There was even a demand that the governor throw him in jail. Roldan was sane enough to see the absurdity of the judge's demands; nevertheless, he considered the situation serious because of the rising spate of assassinations. The case was brought to the central government which, at that time (mid-1885), was about to adopt formally the policy of "peaceful attraction" as advocated by Serina. The Audiencia did not consider itself competent and authoritative enough to sanction the judgment of the Cotabato court of law; besides, there was the question of whether or not Uto was subject to Spanish law. To prevent further embarrassment, the district judge was recalled to Manila.³⁵

The above incident finally caused the central government to abandon the policy of "peaceful attraction" toward Uto, calling it an "untimely" move. A state of war was

30. Published in Franci and Parrado, I, p. 347.

31. *Piratería*, pp. 657-658.

32. Pastells, *Misión*, II, p. 56.

33. Francia and Parrado, I, p. 348.

34. Pastells, *loc. cit.*

35. Felipe Canga Argüelles, "La Isla de Mindanao," *BSGM*; XXII (1887), pp. 225-226; Montero y Vidal, *Piratería*, p. 656.

declared in Cotabato.⁶ Soon afterwards, governor Roldán received Manila's authorization to set up a garrison at Bakat.⁷ Just as the notice arrived, however, the project was postponed because of the timely arrival of Roldán's immediate superior, the Mindanao governor Serina in May or June of 1885. Serina's intervention must be seen as another reflection of the liberal-conservative rivalry mentioned earlier. He had backed the policy of accommodation and attraction toward Uto which Manila rejected, and now he was in Cotabato to take over the situation and hopefully to find a peaceful solution to the brewing conflict. Another purpose of his coming was to consult his friend Fr. Juanmartí, the acknowledged authority on Magindanao internal affairs. But what the Jesuit recommended was no different from Roldán's policy: for effective Spanish domination in the river, the installation of a garrison at Bakat was imperative.⁸

Governor Serina must be credited with a genuine desire to work things out with Uto in spite of the aggressive designs of his aides Juanmartí and Roldán. Since communications between Cotabato and Buayan had been cut, he enlisted the help of Datu Mamakú in forwarding a letter to the Datu requesting that a *bichara* be held in order to hear the latter's complaints and to attend to whatever just claims he would make. Upon receipt of Uto's affirmative reply Serina, Juanmartí and Mamakú set out for Buayan. In spite of the tension pervading Bakat because of the presence of hundreds of armed warriors, the party was received well. In a lively *bichara* that lasted a full two hours, Datu Uto voiced out his grievances against certain governors and lesser officials of Cotabato and also against certain datos in the delta who were stirring up trouble for him. Serina promised justice and reparations for the damages inflicted upon Uto.⁹ It is doubtful whether the governor wanted anything more than that tensions between Uto and the Spaniards be eased. Fr. Juanmartí, however, seems to have interpreted the outcome of the *bichara* differently. In a letter to the Father Superior dated July 25, 1885, he states:

Our fears and lack of confidence were melted away. The way was open to mutual understanding in the future and to require from them (the Moros) what is believed to be just and necessary. . . e . Now the government can establish itself wherever it is found suitable.¹⁰

It is strange how Juanmartí could have arrived at the conclusion that the occupation of Bakat was ever closer to realization after the conference. This impression would have been farthest from the minds of Uto and even Serina. In fact, governor Roldán apparently believed that his plans for the Bakat garrison would never materialize as a result of the *bichara*, for in disgust he sent in his resignation.¹¹

Serina was true to his word. In the months that followed, various runaway slaves of Uto were handed back. The Datu was indemnified in cash for the damages he claimed to have incurred. Presents were even sent to him. The benevolence of Serina is amply pointed out by Montero y Vidal. Uto, on the other hand, is pictured as an ungrateful wretch, who did not change his conduct, who refused further conferences as long as he was unsatisfied with the deal he was getting, and who refused to answer letters sent him.¹²

The weakness in Montero y Vidal's account is that he ignores certain decrees of the central government in the light of which Datu Uto's recalcitrance is understandable, if not justifiable. It is quite clear from Pastells that, not long after the Serina-Uto conference, the Civil Government of the Archipelago passed a resolution to the effect that slaves seeking refuge under the Spanish flag would be "by that mere fact" free, except in cases where the ransom would be more suitable. Moreover, Serina himself in late-1885 received direct orders from the governor-general to install a fort at Bakat.¹³ Serina had no choice but to comply. In January 1886, Serina, Juanmartí and Naval Commander Vicente Roca led a flotilla of four gunboats and a transport ship that proceeded to occupy Bakat. Datu Uto's immediate response was to retreat farther inland. As Fr. Bannasar puts it:

I have never believed that he [Uto] would resign himself to live beside the Spaniards, because then we would know everything he does, and to him that is not convenient. *Que male agit, odit lucem.*¹⁴

-
36. *Ibid.* 37. Nieto MS, p. 244. 38. Pastells, *Misión* II, p. 54.
 39. *Ibid.*, pp. 54-55; Montero y Vidal, *Piraterías* p. 658.
 40. *CMSJ*, VII, p. 44. 41. Pastells, *Misión*, II, p. 56.
 42. *Piraterías* p. 658. 43. Pastells, *loc. cit.*
 44. Bannasar to the Father Provincial, Jan. 23, 1886, *CMSJ*, VII, p. 49.

It was after the Spanish takeover of his Bakat stronghold that Uto refused to show up at conferences arranged by Serina and to answer letters sent him.

According to Pastells, three factors brought about the dissolution of the Serina-Uto treaty. First, the controversy between Uto and Roldán over the matter of defecting slaves had not been resolved. Second, the increase in the number of Spanish ships and troops in the Pulangi due to the establishment of the Bakat fort made Datu Uto apprehensive to the extent that he refused to discuss matters with the Spaniards any longer. Third, Uto believed that he had the strength to expel the Spaniards from Magindanao once and for all. The presence of a new fort in the very heart of *sa-raya* gave him an opportunity to rally together the Magindanaos of the middle Pulangi "who up to then had been very much divided." Then Pastells goes on to say that the establishment of the Bakat fort was very much justified because it prevented Uto from aggressively expanding into the delta.⁵ It is rather difficult to accept this rationale for Spain's own aggressive designs. The evidence leads us to believe that the occupation of Bakat was the fruit of the expansionist aspirations of men like Governor-general Jovellar, Fr. Juanmartí and governor Roldán. The whole trouble started when the Spanish establishment succeeded in seducing Uto's slaves and followers to defect. In a society where a leader's position depends upon the possession of slaves and the ability to attract a following, the predicament of Uto is understandable. His predicament, together with the knowledge of his enemy's designs to occupy Bakat, caused him to undertake his only measure which may be termed "aggressive": he directed the *sa-raya* Magindanaos to hold back food supplies destined for Cotabato. One news report, in fact, states that the occupation of Bakat was necessary in order to restore the food supply to Spanish points in the delta.⁶

Hostilities were initiated by Datu Uto's men under a special set of circumstances. The projected site of the Bakat fort happened to be adjacent to a grove of trees which sheltered the ancestral tombs of Uto's family. A detachment of Magindanao warriors had been left to guard it. On the thirteenth of February, 1886, Serina ordered the grove to be demolished, while respecting the tombs, since it was feared that some of the trees might be felled to block the river passage. The Magindanao sentries would not allow this, nor would they withdraw without express orders from Uto. A shot was fired, and a skirmish took place which left thirteen dead on both sides.⁷ The burial grove was razed to the ground.

According to Blumentritt, it was the defilement of the sacred tombs of the Buayan ruling family by the Spaniards which started the war.⁸ The next day, bands of Uto's followers set fire to the naval coal depot and the barracks at Cotabato. Resentment against Christians found violent expression in killings and burnings in homes and market-places. On the fifteenth, three *juramentados* set fire to the dormitory of the *libertos* at Tamontaka. The whole building was destroyed, the blaze spreading to the house of the missionaries, the church then under construction, and on to the rice fields. Damage was placed at 20,000 Pesos; eighty children were left homeless.⁹

The primary target of Datu Uto's forces was the garrison at Bakat, a dagger in the heart of Buayan. Heavy bombardment by cannon proved ineffective. Then attempts were made to storm the fort; again these were futile, and the casualties on the Magindanao side were heavy. As the colonial army led by Serina advanced to conduct retaliatory measures Datu Uto, seeing that no ground was being gained in the costly struggle, sued

45. *Misión*, II, p. 58. Special attention has been given here to the views of Montero y Vidal and Pastells because their books (*Piratería* and *Misión*), being standard works on Mindanao history, have probably determined what is known about Datu Uto to the public outside Magindanao itself. Being staunch supporters of Spanish rule has naturally influenced their histories.

46. ? *Española*, número 89, 1886 (newsclipping attached to Nieto MS).

47. Pastells to Father Superior, Feb. 22, 1886, *CMSJ*, VII, p. 53; see also *Misión*, II, p. 59.

48. "Los maguindanaos," p. 276. A parallel case is that of the Javanese prince Diponegoro, who raised the standard of revolt when the Batavia government decided to construct a road over some of his property where a sacred tomb stood; Hall, p. 544.

49. Miguel Saderra Masó, *Misiones Jesuíticas de Filipinas* (Manila, 1924), p. 76; Pastells to Superior, Feb. 22, 1886, *CMSJ*, VII, p. 53; Father Superior (Ricart) to the Father Rector of the Ateneo Municipal de Manila, March 13, 1886, *CMSJ*, VII, p. 56. The prominence of *juramentados* indicates that the action was regarded as part of *jihad*, the Holy War. From the historian's point of view, the greatest loss in the Tamontaka fire was a large number of Magindanao and Tiruray manuscripts.

for peace. On the 28th of March, the white flag of surrender was carried to the Spanish camp by Datu Kabalo (Uto's Minister of War), the pandita Ali, and other prominent datos. They begged (Rogar) that hostilities be stopped and that the Spanish forces should advance no farther than Bakat, "since they were very poor and desired peace."⁵⁰ Emis-saries, they said, had already been sent to all parts of the Pulangi to round up the roving bands who were molesting those who refused to support Datu Uto.

Seriña was prepared to acquiesce provided that a petition signed by Uto and Rajah Putri was presented to him. The next day there arrived such a document from Uto pleading that the Spaniards occupy other points in the river *except* Bakat, because the area, the site of the ancestral tombs, was sacred to the Magindanaos. Perinat makes the curious assertion that Uto promised personally to surrender Bakat eight to ten days after a Spanish withdrawal; "without doubt his desire was not to lose his prestige or his moral force over the Moros by making them believe that he was ceding it [Bakat] voluntarily and not by force."⁵¹ Although Perinat comes close to understanding Uto by linking his prestige to the loss of Bakat, it does not follow that the Datu would have gained by ceding Bakat voluntarily. The fact is that Bakat's loss was a disaster to the Uto camp. The most prominent of his officials promised to submit to Spain if only Bakat were evacuated by the Christian intruders. Seriña, however, preferred to maintain the Spanish foothold.⁵²

Bakat was, in all respects, lost. Not only Uto's ancestral tombs but also the most strategic point in *sa-raya* were in Spanish hands. Uto stood to lose not only prestige but also the revenue he used to collect from every vessel that made its way from *sa-raya* to *sa-ilud*. What was worse, however, was that the loss of Bakat was only one part of the story. When Datu Kabalo and the pandita Ali pleaded for peace on the grounds of poverty, they may have had in mind the fall of another key point--Sarangani bay.

When the Spanish steamship *Pasig* was passing by the Sarangani straits on the way to Davao in 1880, it paused to establish contact with some naval tenders which for several days had been keeping a watchful eye on the inhabitants of the coast and making cartographic adjustments. A French passenger on the *Pasig*, Joseph Montano, remarks in his journal that ". . . [Sarangani bay] does not have as good a reputation as Illana bay."⁵³ Montano must have learned from his companion, Davao governor Rajal, that illicit trade was being suspected in Sarangani bay, which explains its surveillance by the Spanish Navy. In January 1883, the Jesuit Fr. Ricart called for the installation of a naval station at Glan, in the southeastern part of the bay, in order to cut communications between the inhabitants of Mindanao and Malays who frequented the outlying islands.⁵⁴ In 1884, Rajal himself, in a report to the Geographic Society of Madrid, stressed the necessity of occupying Glan, Buayan and other points on the bay in order to curtail the smuggling of firearms to the Magindanao rebels.⁵⁵ Rajal's report must have had a bearing on Jovellar's decree, later during the year, which called for the naval station at Davao to be transferred to Sarangani bay.

Perinat tells us that on April 15, 1886, Datu Diamaro ascended the Glan river with eight *vintas* and thirty-two men. He came in a peaceful manner at first, but, upon arrival at the *rancherías* of Datus Taup and Makampao, he tried to incite them to rise against the Spanish stockade at Glan. The two datos were, however, loyal to Spain, and he failed. Diamaro then in irritation seized the supplies he wanted and sailed to Buayan on the northwest shore of the bay. After his visitor's departure, Datu Taup hurried to inform the Spanish commander of the incursion. At Glan, he met other Sarangani datos who were presenting similar complaints.⁵⁶

Thus, in April 1886 Glan was in Spanish hands and effective control over the entrance to Sarangani bay was exercised. This may have happened as early as 1885, for many Sarangani datos had apparently switched sides already. A Spanish military map of 1886 indicates that in January, 1886, Datu Uto opened a new route to the west of Bakat, leading to the sea.⁵⁷ That he tried to use this torturous route across the Tiruray mountains implies that Sarangani bay was closed to him by the end of 1885. Datu Diamaro's mysterious appearance in the bay has its own background. Diamaro was one of

50. Perinat, I, p. 30.

51. *Ibid.*

52. Montero y Vidal, *Piratería*, p. 664.

53. pp. 206-207.

54. "Informe," p. 607r

55. *Exploración*, p. 187.

56. Perinat, I, p. 32.

57. "Cuerpo de Estado Mayor del Ejército. Filipinas. Isle de Mindanao." (Madrid?, Depósito de la Guerra, 1886), Map in the Newberry Library.

Uto's principal lieutenants, who led the Magindanao forces that tried to oust the Spaniards from Bakat in February and March.⁵⁸ When, by the beginning of April, it was clear that Bakat was lost, Uto in desperation must have sent Diamaro down to open up his southern supply line. But Diamaro failed to rally most of the Sarangani datus to his cause, although he succeeded in adding some thirty more *vintas* and seventy men to his fleet. Two months later, his base in the bay was destroyed by a punitive expedition sent out from Cotabato.⁵⁹

If the Spanish occupation of Bakat was, according to Montero y Vidal, "equivalent to the death of Uto's influence," no less was the Spanish control of Sarangani bay. The Magindanaos in the interior were being gradually cut off from outside support. No fire-arms from Sulu could enter; the benefits of trade vanished. The implications of this situation were grasped early enough by the datus of *sa-ilud*, especially those in the south branch of the delta. Their resentment towards Uto (due probably to his coercive tactics), their leanings toward Spain, and not in the least their own ambitions led them openly to declare war against him in 1886.

Friction between Uto and certain sultans and datus of *sa-ilud* had been evidenced since at least 1878, when the Magindanaos of the south branch of the delta under Datu Ayunan refused to ally with Uto, who by then had gained the support of most of the other datus. In 1880, Uto's attempt to descend to Cotabato to confer with the governor was blocked by Datu Buisan of Tumbao, and a battle would have ensued had it not been for the intervention of the Spanish garrison nearby. By this time, it was evident to the colonial authorities that Buisan was at war with Uto.⁶⁰ In 1883, there occurred an incident which illustrates the basis of most of these internal rivalries. Four *libertos* had escaped from Tamontaka, allegedly having been "seduced" by previous escapees. No one had the slightest idea of the whereabouts of the four until, surprisingly, a letter arrived from Datu Uto stating that the fugitives had sought refuge with the Sultan of Talakuku (Tumbao). A few days later another letter arrived with more precise information on the hiding place of the four. The authorities lost no time in confronting the Sultan, who had no choice but to return his "guests."⁶¹ This incident may appear to be petty, but in the Magindanao social context it is significant. The Sultan of Talakuku was the only other Magindanao chief, besides Uto, who could boast of an extraordinary following, especially slaves.⁶² Thus, although they were nominally allies, there was also a certain amount of rivalry between them. Besides, Datu Uto knew that the Sultan was becoming very friendly with the Spanish establishment. He could not allow fugitives from Tamontaka to continue to seek refuge in Talakuku and thus bolster the latter's manpower. Control of manpower was often the root of internal conflicts in Magindanao.

The Talakuku Sultan's signing, in 1884, of a treaty of unconditional surrender and submission to Spain in return for protection against Datu Uto⁶³ was the culmination of a process by which the chiefs of the south branch of the delta were recruited as allies of Spain against the *sa-riya* datus headed by Uto. This "anti-Uto faction," however, could not lift a finger against Uto as long as the latter's position was secure. The initial role they played was indirect: aiding the colonial government and the Jesuits in their program of enticing defections from the enemy's ranks.⁶⁴ But after the fall of Bakat and Sarangani bay, the inhibitions of these chiefs dissolved; their aggressiveness became more pronounced. This mood is reflected in a message sent by Datu Uto to the Cotabato governor in June, 1886:

I plead that you allow me to wage war *only* with those datus--such as Ayunan, Gugu, Galan, Sultan of Talakuku--who have been fomenting hostilities between Spain and myself. If these datus are able to do something to me, you can still have them as good friends. And if I do something to them,

58. Juanmartí to Father Superior, July 26, 1886, *CMSJ*, VII, p. 67; Pastells, *Misión*, II, p. 66.

59. *Ibid.*

60. Ramon Béa to Jose Ignacio Guerrico, Oct. 26, 1880, *CMSJ*, IV, p. 131.

61. Juanmartí to Father Superior, April 7, 1883, *CMSJ*, VI, pp. 59-60. Since these *libertos* had been ransomed, they seem to have been regarded as "belonging" to the Jesuits.

62. Nieto MS, p. 62.

63. Saleeby, *Studies*, p. 61.

64. This is hinted at in the 1885 Uto-Seriña conference, where the subjects of slave-defections and Uto's denunciations of his *sa-ilud* rivals seem to have gone hand in hand.

you can still have their women, to be given to your soldierse For these datus are the ones who have set Rajah Putri against the Spaniards.⁶⁵

Governor Serina replied that the pro-Spanish datus were not at fault; it was Uto who was guilty of outrages, assassinations and overall rebelliousness. From the Spanish viewpoint this may have been true, but to Datu Uto his own actions were a justified response to the undermining of his following by the Spaniards and their native allies. He also must have known that, six days prior to the date of the above message, Datus Ayunan and Galan, leading some eighty-seven warriors, had joined a Spanish detachment in the destruction of the *rancheria* of Barung which was allied to Buayan. Eight days later, these rival datus contributed 280 men to the expedition against Uto's foremost ally, the Sultan of Talayan.⁶⁶

The month of July, 1886, saw a series of colonial victories over Uto's vassal-Datu Kambing, Datu Kaliz (of Libungan), and the Sultan of Talayan. In September, Datu Uto sued for peace, which was summarily rejected by the new Cotabato governor, Jaime San Feliu. As early as April, the Father Superior of Tamontaka had expressed worry at the bellicosity of certain members of the Spanish forces who were not satisfied by the conquest of Bakat and complained that they had not penetrated into the interior, that Uto and most of the "renegade" sultans and panditas were still at large, and that "the race [had] not been exterminated." The Jesuit Superior thought that this attitude "displays the great ignorance which is held of the things and the people of the Rio Grande."⁶⁷ Another Jesuit, however, had a different view of the situation. In September, 1886, Fr. Juanmartí wrote the Father Superior that he considered conciliation and peace out of the question. He liked governor San Feliu's reply to Datu Uto's peace offer: the Spaniards had decided to implant a cluster of Christian settlements on the plains of Buayan, for which plan the Magindanaos need no longer occupy the banks of the river.⁶⁸

San Feliu's audacious plan was not to be realized owing to the arrival in Magindanao of the liberal governor-general, Emilio Terrero. The latter had come to punish Datu Uto militarily, but he was not an extremist like the Cotabato governor. The grand assault against Buayan, personally led by Terrero, took place in January, 1887. The outcome was almost predictable as the superior forces of Spain--artillery, cavalry, gunboats and infantry--slowly ascended the river, destroying every Magindanao fortification on the way to Buayan, including Uto's *kota*. On the 24th of January large cannons were installed at Bakat and trained on the Muslim *kotas*. The next day the sound of the *agun* was heard repeatedly from Uto's temporary stronghold farther up the Bakat river at Pidsandana. The Datu was in deep trouble; the beating of the *agun* was "without doubt to call together a junta and to discuss with the datus what it was best for them to do."⁶⁹ But the end was near; a few weeks later Pidsandana itself was overrun.

On the 28th of February, 1887, Datus Kalibandung and Andig, men of great stature in the Kudarangan Sultanate (northern Buayan), presented to Terrero a letter from their sultan, an uncle of Uto, who offered to mediate with his nephew in order to end the destructive war. The proposal was accepted; Spanish protection was extended to Kudarangan.⁷⁰ A week later Tambilawan, Rajah Mudah of Kudarangan and Uto's cousin, declared his loyalty to Spain in an audience with Terrero, and as proof he offered to restore the supply of foodstuffs to the delta. The following day Datu Silungan, another uncle of Uto, arrived with a peace mission from his nephew composed of the *mantris* Boat and Dalandung. The conditions for peace imposed by the Spaniards were immediately accepted, and the trio promised to return the next day with the signed treaty.⁷¹

65. Published in Perinat, I, p. 34. Rajah Putri, Uto's distinguished wife, was always on good terms with the Spaniards, who respected and liked her.

66. *Ibid.*, p. 33.

67. Father Superior of Tamontaka to the Father Rector of the Ateneo Municipal de Manila, April 5, 1886, *CMSJ*, VII, p. 59.

68. Juanmartí to Father Superior, Sept. 20, 1886, *CMSJ*, VII, p. 72.

69. Juanmartí to Father Superior, Feb. 9, 1887, *CMSJ*, VI&I, p. 121. See the following first-hand accounts of the war: Perinat, II (his diary); Rincón, *Diario*. Perinat was a member of the Terrero expedition, while Rincón covered the affair for the *Diario de Manila*. For secondary accounts, see Montero y Vidal, *Piratería*, Ch. XLIII; Pastellse, *Misión*, II (based on *CMSJ*, VIII).

70. Rincón, March 9, 1887, p. 170.

71. *Ibid.*, p. 172.

On March 10, 1887, Datu Uto sent his capitulation, signed by himself, Rajah Putri, and all the principal sultans and datus of Buayan. They acknowledged themselves as loyal and obedient subjects of the King of Spain, pledging henceforth not to use any but the Spanish flag. Defensive positions which Terrero's forces had not touched were to be destroyed. They bowed to the ruling that all Moros navigating the Pulangi and its tributaries must hold safe-conduct passes signed by the Cotabato governor or the garrison commanders. Those inhabitants who committed crimes against person or property were to be punished accordingly. War was not to be made with the datus of the lower Pulangi (*sa-ilud*) who had collaborated with Spain. On the other hand, the "vanquished" hoped that their religion and customs would be respected. They expressed their gratitude for the concessions granted by Terrero: they would be allowed to continue in possession of their "ancient properties"; their ancestral burial grounds would be respected; and they would be allowed to build dwelling places in Bakata.⁷²

The Terrero government ratified the above terms, allegedly on the strength of Rajah Putri's signature.⁷³ The governor-general's decision irritates Retana and Montero y Vidal, leading them to label the Terrero campaign as an instance of political showmanship rather than substantial gain.⁷⁴ After all, Datu Uto had not been captured and his prestige was still running strong among the people of *sa-raya*. The charge of "political showmanship" is much too harsh, however, if it is seen in the light of the liberal-conservative controversy that was raging in administrative circles at the time. Retana, who took it upon himself to defend the conservative position in his journal *La Política de España en Filipinas*, is representative of those writers, the majority, in fact, who placed Datu Uto in the same category as the Filipino revolutionaries, as a rebel to be crushed militarily and obliterated from the Magindanao scene. Terrero, on the other hand, represents a minority line of thinking in Manila which saw Uto as a legitimate Magindanao leader to be dealt with in a civil manner by Spain.

Yet there is substance to the assertions of Montero and Retana that the impact of Terrero's campaign was minimal. The destruction of Datu Uto's defenses and *kota* and the procurement of a formal document of submission were mere formalities compared to preceding developments. The Jesuits and Cotabato officials had succeeded in winning allies among the datus of *sa-ilud* and initiating a rash of defections from the ranks of Uto's slaves. Spanish control had been established over Sarangani bay in late 1885. Strategic Bakat had been occupied in early 1886. When the Spanish establishment was exerting effort to convince the sultans and datus that wealth and power were to be gained from cooperating with the colonial government, the very bases of Datu Uto's wealth and prestige were being undermined. The consequences of this for his career would be felt sooner or later.

72. The treaty has been published in Perinat, II, pp. 130-131 (footnote); Montero y Vidal, *Piratería*, pp. 103-104 of appendix.

73. See Wenceslao Retana, "Prologo," p. xxxiv.

74. *Ibid.*; Montero y Vidal, *Piratería*, p. 689; Perinat, Francia, Parrado, Nieto Aguilar and others do not give this criticism; in fact, they go to the opposite extreme of excessively praising Terrero's victory.

CHAPTER VII

UTO'S DOWNFALL AND ITS AFTERMATH (1887-ca. 1892)

Datu Uto's defeat in March 1887 did not end his career. His following was by and large intact; the territory upriver from Bakat was entirely under his control. This situation was learned by Pastells when he visited the pagan tribes in the headwaters of the Pulangi sometime in mid-1887e. He could feel the overpowering influence of the Buayan datu even in the remotest mountain settlement. In fact, he unexpectedly received a note from Uto assuring him that his missionary activities would in no way be obstructed.¹

Painfully aware of the loss of Sarangani bay and Bakat, Datu Uto must have decided that the best course of action was to establish close relations with the Spanish and Magindanao establishment in *sa-ilude*. In August 1887, he sent word to Mindanao governor Juan Salcedo, who was touring the Pulangi, requesting an audience with him.

The datus asked him [Salcedo] for permission to fetch Utoe. Salcedo did not replye. Some Moros jumped into their *vintas* and left swiftly in search of Uto. Several datu-friends stayed with Salcedo, and he invited them to go hunting for birds that were numerous in the lakese. Then as nightfall was approaching the sound of the *agun* resounded in the waterway of Bakat, and the Moros shouted with expressions of joy, "Uto! Uto!"²

There was no doubt in the minds of the Spaniards present that Uto's prestige had not waned in his *rancheria* at Bakate. But he no longer appeared to be the defiant chieftain of a few months earlier. Practically prostrating himself before his former enemies, he tried to convince them of "his peaceful intentions and of his love for Spain."³ Salcedo was willing to accept Uto's entreaties, and both parted ways reassured of peace and good relations between them.

Coming to terms with the Spanish authorities was only the first step in Datu Uto's program. His next move was to secure the election of his brother-in-law and protegé Datu Mamaku as Rajah Mudah and successor to the Sultan of Cotabato.⁴ With this diplomatic victory came his boast that he would exact tribute through his petty officials in the market of Cotabato.⁵ Uto had another important ally in *sa-ilud*, Datu Kaliz, who had established himself at Libungan after the Terrero campaign. Kaliz protected the emissaries of Uto who were sent to collect tribute in his territorye. Cotabato governor Adolfo Horguín reported in March 1888 that the moral influence and superiority of Datu Uto were being sustained in Libungan at the expense of Spanish interests.⁶

Libungan presented no problem for Uto since the datus of the north branch of the delta had never really been co-opted into the Spanish establishment.⁷ But those on the south branch were different. Loyal supporters of Spain, they were responsible for some of the disasters which had befallen him. Now he was bound by the 1887 treaty to respect the independence and political leanings of these datus. Yet he still hoped to influence

1. "Viaje por el interior de la isla de Mindanao," *BSGM*, XXV (1888), p. 39.

2. Montero y Vidal, *Piratería*, p. 737e.

3. *Ibide*. Montero says this with obvious sarcasm.

4. Horguín, "Comunicación," March 30, 1888, in Salcedo, p. 96. It is interesting to note here the similarity between Mamakú and the eighteenth-century rebel Malinog. Both were members of the Cotabato royal family, and yet were protegés of Buayane.

5. Horguín, *loc. cit.* Uto based this claim on the support he enjoyed particularly among the Cotabato Chinese through his ally Datu Piang, a Chinese-Magindanao. See Pastells, *Misión*, III, p. 413; Majul, "Chinese relationship," p. 158.

6. Horguín, *loc. cit.*

7. Pastells, *Misión*, II, p. 67 (example given)e.

them. Datu Uto tried to get the most prominent of the pro-Spanish group, Datus Ayunan and Ara, to present themselves before him at Buayan. Was it to bribe them or to make a plea for unity against the foreign intruders? Governor Horguín was certainly aware of what could happen, and so he firmly refused Ara and Ayunan permission to journey upriver. When the two datus tried to do so, they were blocked by river patrols. Horguín simultaneously sent ultimatums to Rajah Mudah Mamaku and Datu Kaliz, warning them of the consequences of disobeying Spanish laws.⁸

A major opportunity presented itself to Uto when the Cotabato Sultan died in 1888. His protégé Mamaku being Rajah Mudah, all that was needed for his accession to the throne was the confirmation of the *rumah bichara* of Cotabato. But, says Montero y Vidal, the Sultanate had become so fragmented that the majority of the datus who normally composed the *rumah bichara* had become independent rulers and were complacent regarding the election of a new sultan. This situation enabled Datu Uto to stage "a farce of an election" in favor of Mamaku. When the majority of the datus got wind of this, however, they staged a complaint to the governors of Cotabato and Mindanao. Since the deceased Sultan left no male heir, it was unanimously suggested that the Datu of Sibuguey (north of Zamboanga) should succeed to the throne. The Spanish government, which shared with the complaining datus a deep distrust of Uto's motives, rejected Mamaku's election and declared the latter to be "unsuitable."⁹ Thus, the son of the mid-century Sultan Kudrat of Cotabato was rejected by the Spaniards and his fellow datus because of his connections with Datu Uto. He soon transferred his residence to Sarangani bay, where he lived the rest of his days.¹⁰

Meanwhile, things were happening in *sa-raya* itself compared to which Uto's failures to extend his influence in *sa-ilud* are insignificant. As we have observed, the basis of a Magindanao chief's power and prestige was the number of his following, of which we may speak of slaves and free dependents, relatives and allies. We have seen the Jesuit and government efforts in the early 1880's to subvert the datu-slave relationship, leading to mass defections of the latter to Tamontaka and other Spanish-protected points. There were defections even among high-ranking individuals in the Uto camp, examples being the Sultan of Talakuku who submitted in 1884 and the Sultan of Kudarangan in early 1887.¹¹ This trend continued in even greater proportions after Uto's military defeat by Terrero. This phenomenon prevented him from reviving his hegemony in the Pulangi. It was not that the Spaniards coerced his allies to submit but that the Spanish establishment became increasingly a convenient recourse for those sultans and datus who, for reasons we shall see, wanted to sever their ties with him.

The Sultan of Talayan's break with Datu Uto in mid-1888 is the most celebrated case in the Spanish sources, not only because of its disastrous effort on Uto but also because of the insight it gives on methods of "internal" conquest. The Talayan Sultan had been the most faithful and trusted of Uto's allies. Talayan's five hundred fighting men, noted for their skill and bravery in war due to their experience with the Tirurays, Manobos and other hill peoples who fought them, had always formed an important complement of Buayan's forces during skirmishes with the Spaniards. Moreover Talayan was, to use the words of the Cotabato governor, "a bulwark of Muslim fanaticism," where the activities of panditas and sherifs were most concentrated.¹¹ Datu Uto's defeat of 1887, however, seriously diminished his prestige and what the Spanish sources refer to as his "moral force." The panditas' call for unity under the Datu Buayan clashed with other, perhaps more important, conditions for successful leadership.

In a half-desperate attempt to ensure the continued support of Talayan, Uto arranged a marriage between the son of the Sultan and a daughter of one of his concubines. The Sultan appears to have vacillated, and, when this came to the notice of governor Horguín, the latter seized the opportunity to apply the familiar colonial tactic of exploiting internal dissensions to secure allies. Horguín sought the counsel of Datu Ayunan, who was a relative of the Sultan of Talakuku, who in turn had ties of "material interests" with the Sultan of Talayan. Through this chain of communications the Talayan Sultan was made to understand that the marriage arranged by Uto was disadvantageous since, according to some indigenous laws, the daughter of a concubine is never as noble as the son of a legitimate mother.

Upon hearing of his ally's secret dealings with the pro-Spanish camp, Uto posted some of his men to Talayan under the guise of presenting a dowry. Having thus tricked their way in, they made off with the *lantakas* (a symbol of rank) of the Sultan. For the

8. Horguín, *loc. cit.*

9. Montero y Vidal, *Piratería*, pp. 649-650; Saleeby, *Studies*, p. 61.

10. Saleeby, *Studies*, pp. 60-61.

11. Horguín, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

latter, this was the last straw. Counseled by Horguín and Ayunan, he decided to repudiate the Uto-arranged marriage, thus signifying the final break. As the threat of war with the more powerful Uto loomed before the Talayan Sultan, the latter soon opted for unconditional submission to Spain.^{d²}

Governor Horguín was even hesitant to accept Talayan's submission because of its long history of hostility to Spain. Perhaps he was unsure of the Sultan's real motives in submitting; was his professed friendship for Spain merely a superficial display designed to obtain Spanish aid against an internal rival? Horguín nevertheless handed out a list of conditions, which were immediately accepted by the Sultan. Then he called for a *bichara* to be held at Cotabato, but this time the Talayans demurred. They wanted it held at Taviran, with Datu Ayunan as intermediary. In the first place, they wanted to keep in close touch with their home base which was being threatened by Uto. In the second place, they had come to trust Datu Ayunan. In fact, if anyone is to be given credit for Talayan's transfer of loyalties, it is Ayunan, not the Spaniards:

[The Sultan of Talayan] was convinced that those who are sheltered by the Spanish flag live in peace respected by all who appreciate the well-being of the Datus Ara, Ayunan and others who, holding our delegation and protected by our forts, are compensated for with all kinds of distinctions. These examples made those of Talayan decide to aspire for equal prerogatives; not contributing a little were the Datus Ayunan and Ara who . . . made use of their *bicharas* to demonstrate . . . the advantages of our protection, up to the point that [the Talayans] decided to opt for the King of Spain unconditionally.^{d³}

Datu Uto's reaction was to send a force of eight hundred men to Talayan. Led by Datu Dalgan, a relative of the Talayan Sultan, it was under the strength of this kinship tie that the band was able to penetrate the *rancherías*' defenses. Once inside, they forced the Sultan to hand over carabaos, paddy and arms. But when Dalgan tried to exact from the other datus, the latter resisted and a battle ensued.^{d⁴} Noting the gravity of the situation, the Spanish government sent Uto a letter demanding an end to his provocations and to the hostilities. A note was also sent to his "Minister of War" Datu Kabalo, who was then in Manila paying his respects to the governor-general.^{d⁵} Nevertheless, hostilities persisted; Kabalo hastened back to Magindanao only to join the *melée*. On February 10, 1888 governor Horguín, in a communication to the governor of Mindanao, strongly urged the occupation of Talayan as a means of effecting a final blow on Uto. He argued that victory would come easily since the Datus Ayunan, Ara and Butu had pledged to help their new ally, the Sultan of Talayan, with a relief force of seven hundred warriors.^{d⁶}

At this point, the Spanish military could have moved in and occupied Talayan at the invitation of the Sultan, but governor-general Terrero was no expansionist and so the idea was squashed. The internal conflict appears to have subsided, only to break out again in the middle of the year. Again it was caused by the break-up of a marriage, attesting to the importance of marital ties in Magindanao alliances. This time the marriage of one of the Talayan Sultan's daughters with Datu Piang, a follower of Uto, did not materialize, and Piang was threatening to attack Talayan perhaps to recover his dowry. The Sultan then requested that a company of the Spanish Army should occupy his territory, and again Terrero refused, in spite of attempts by the Mindanao governor Salcedo to alter Manila's decision.^{d⁷} Here is another reflection of the liberal-conservative dispute that was then raging in Spanish administrative circles. The important point to be recognized is that the Sultan of Talayan, one of Datu Uto's key allies, had willingly turned to Spain. The latter's policy of attraction had worked. We can be sure that the Sultan, a devout Muslim, had no real love for Spain. What he saw, and aspired for, were the benefits, such as wealth and Spanish titles, which the pro-Spanish datus Ayunan, Ara and other enjoyed.

12. *Ibid.*; Horguín, "Comunicación," Feb. 10, 1888, in Salcedo, pp. 90-91.

13. Salcedo, "Comunicación," April 24, 1888, in Salcedo, p. 108.

14. Horguín, March 30, 1888, in Salcedo, p. 100r

15. Montero y Vidal, *Piraterías*, p. 738.

16. Horguín, Feb. 10, 1888, in Salcedo, p. 92.

17. Pastells, "Memoria," pp. 613-614. Salcedo subsequently resigned.

While the conflict between the Talayan Sultan and Uto was taking place, another incident occurred which, says Pastells, had an even more disastrous effect on Uto's prestige. Datu Abdul, another of Uto's allies, had been having an amorous relationship with his patron's daughter. The relationship apparently dragged on for a long time because Abdul could not raise the funds needed for the traditional ceremony and wedding feast. Perhaps this brought pressure from the community and Uto himself. Abdul became exasperated, says Pastells, and decided to quit the scene altogether. He packed all his belongings, slaves and dependents (numbering almost a thousand), and even houses onto rafts and floated down to Tumbao to establish himself under the protection of the Spanish fort there. Abdul's "floating *rancheria*," as it was called, caused quite a sensation in Tumbao and its vicinity and surely caused Uto some loss of face. What sort of datu was he who could not even keep his core following intact? Uto immediately offered Abdul his daughter without any more conditions if only he would return to Buayan to live in his company. But Datu Abdul refused. Shortly thereafter, some thirty to forty families, mostly slaves, left Uto and sought refuge in Cotabato.¹⁸

Faced with a depletion in his ranks, Datu Uto presented his complaints to the governor of Cotabato. He did not seek action against Datu Abdul and other datos who had deserted him, for it was their prerogative as datos to choose their loyalties so long as their new patrons could provide them protection. But slaves were another matter. They belonged to a datu, and they were the symbol of his status and prestige.

Conferences were held in Cotabato regarding the wisdom or otherwise of restituting Uto's slaves. Opinion was quite divided, but the Spaniards were no longer ignorant of the importance of slaves in the prestige system. Uto's complaints were dismissed. He then appealed to the governor-general through a letter in which beneath a thousand protests of gratitude he begged that his slaves be returned. The governor-general replied, in a letter which he gave Pastells to read to Uto, that slavery was not authorized in the Islands, that each individual was free to live wherever he chose, and that he could not force anyone to live in a predetermined place unless in special circumstances, which in Uto's case did not exist. Pastells concludes: "this position completely upset the plans of the astute datu; the hopes he had of dominating, with moral and physical influence, the Moros of the Rio-Grande were dashed. . . ."¹⁹

On March 2, 1888 the governor of Mindanao commented with deep satisfaction that the unconditional submission of Talayan had led to a deep factional split in Magindanao. The Sultans of Kudarangan, Talakuku and Talayan, and the Datus Ara, Ayunan, Abdul, and others were all poised against Datu Uto who, although himself professing submission to Spain, had been led to absolute discord with the pro-Spanish chiefs.²⁰ The growth in numbers and prestige of this "anti-Uto faction" must be seen as one of the causes of further defections within Uto's proximate following. This faction was primarily based in *sa-ilud*; the balance of power was beginning to shift back to the delta.

The governor of Mindanao further stated that "most of the other datos are inclined to Ayunan or Uto."²¹ Ayunan was the head of the pro-Spanish, anti-Uto faction. His career deserves a closer examination, for it is an illustration of how a native chief was able to build up his position within the framework of submission to the colonial master. Was Datu Ayunan merely a Spanish puppet, or did he use his association with Spain to further his own, basically indigenous, goals?

Unlike the Cotabato Sultans, Ayunan was in a specially favored position. Whereas Cotabato became subject to intense colonization, the Magindanaos soon becoming a minority among Chinese, "Indios," and Spaniards, Ayunan's base at Taviran was in the center of the south branch of the delta, in the vicinity of an isolated Spanish fort. Here Ayunan could still be a Magindanao chief in the traditional style--having a retinue of slaves, for example--while dealing with the colonial establishment. When, in the early 1860's, most of the inhabitants of *sa-ilud* fled upriver seeking Buayan's patronage, he chose to remain where he was. Perhaps he very early perceived that the invaders did not have the manpower and resources effectively to dominate the Pulangi, and that, in fact, they would soon be somewhat dependent upon the population for their subsistence. Such was the case of the garrison at Taviran.²² In May 1866, Ayunan was formally elected, under the auspices of Spain, to head the Magindanaos of Taviran. A census taken then attributes him with a substantial following of three thousand.²³

18. *Ibid.*, p. 614.

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 614-615.

20. "*Instrucciones* dadas por el Gobernador de Mindanao al del 58 Distrito . . . o," March 2, 1888, in Salcedo, p. 116.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 117.

22. Burriel MS, p. 125.

23. Pastells, *Misión*, I, p. 68.

From 1866 to 1878, no explicit mention is made of Ayunan in the available sources. It is almost certain, however, that he figured prominently among the anonymous friendly datus of the delta's south branch mentioned in the Jesuit letters. The fact that he is described in 1886 as belonging "body and soul" to the Spaniards and that he had assimilated many Spanish customs, among them monogamous marriage, suggests that a great deal of interaction had taken place between him and the Jesuits at Tamontaka.²⁴ He must have been one of the datus who, observing the talents of the missionaries in education, medicine and agriculture, broke the wall of silence between them in the late 1870's and early 1880's.

It has been mentioned previously that during Datu Uto's height of power in 1878 Datu Ayunan, heading the Magindanaos of *sa-ilud*'s southern sector, was the only independent datu of significance who did not ally with Buayan. But in spite of his friendliness with the Jesuits, he did not commit himself to an alliance with Spain until Uto's position was seriously threatened by various circumstances in the mid-1880's. As Saleeby aptly puts it, Ayunan's move was "shrewd" because he was much lower in rank than Uto and apparently intended to use the Spanish alliance as a means of building up his own position.²⁵

Sometime in late 1885 or early 1886, Ayunan declared war on Uto. He and his followers joined Colonel San Feliu's troops and other native allies (among them *libertos*) in an attack on Datu Kaming of Libungan, an ally of Uto. Rincón did not fail to note Ayunan's display of courage on behalf of Spain, the rousing cries of "Viva a España" with which he egged his men on.²⁶ For this he was amply rewarded. After the battle, Ayunan petitioned the governor that a captured datu and others be placed under his wing. Consent was granted with the sole condition that the captives fight on the Spanish side; in addition, Ayunan was placed in charge of the conquered territory. The process was repeated after the victory over Datu Kali's forces some months later. More captives came to swell Ayunan's following; more territory came under his control. It is hard to tell who profited most from these victories--Ayunan or Spain.

To Datu Uto, the situation was crystal clear: Ayunan had loomed as a serious rival. Indeed, Ayunan was even implicated in the Spanish program of enticing his slaves to defect.²⁷ Attempts were made to assassinate Ayunan.²⁸ In 1886, two of his brothers were treacherously cut down by Uto's agents.²⁹ Toward the end of the year he retaliated by having two datus close to Uto beheaded.³⁰

By the time of the defections of the Sultans of Kudarangan and Talayan in 1887 and 1888, Datu Ayunan had laid the groundwork, in terms of manpower and territory, for securing leadership of the anti-Uto faction. Presumably he had accumulated wealth through the food trade with Spanish forts; unfortunately, we are not told about the resources of this man. The possibility of gaining wealth through dealing with the Spanish establishment was, in fact, one of the reasons for the Talayan Sultan's emulation of Ayunan. Another reason may have been the desire to achieve status within the Spanish colonial framework. Datu Ayunan was fond of displaying certain prestige symbols in order to assert his superiority. Some of his distinctions were the *Escudo al Valor*, awarded for loyalty to Spain, which he and his brothers wore on their chests, and the cane general Moriones had given him as a gift and which he carried around together with the traditional *kris* on the hilt of which passages from the Koran were inscribed.³¹ But what Ayunan appreciated most was the title *gobrnadorcillo del delta* (petty governor of the delta), by which he preferred to be addressed rather than by the title *datu*.³² This Spanish title elevated him from the ranks of petty datus of *sa-ilud*; he was *the datu* of *sa-ilud*, and as such he stood as the counterpart of Datu Uto of *sa-raya*.

The Spanish government was well aware that Ayunan was no mere puppet and that he was using his alliance with Spain to further his own interests. In 1888, governor

24. Rincón, Dec. 12, 1886, p. 65. Ayunan had a brother named Datu Sanhuan (St. John). He was assassinated.

25. *History of Sulu*, p. 262.

26. Dec. 12, 1886, p. 66.

27. There is the story of Atek, a slave of Uto, who escaped from Bakat. After several months of hiding, he was able to present himself to Ayunan, who in turn introduced Atek to the governor of Cotabato; Perinat, II, p. 126.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 47.

29. Rincón, Nov. 27, 1886, p. 41.

30. *Ibid.*, Dec. 12, 1886, p. 66.

31. Pastells, *Misión*, II, p. 312.

32. Rincón, *loc. cit.*

Salcedo stressed the need to watch the datu carefully without his knowledge. He warned Horguín not to be led by Ayunan's slyness to give up "impartiality" and be "a slave to his aspirations for prestige." Ayunan's frequent trips to Talayan were watched; he was not allowed to enter Buayan territory.³³ It was surely feared that an alliance between Uto and Ayunan might materialize, thus threatening as seriously as ever the fragile Spanish hold over the river valley.

But by the time of Ayunan's rise to power, the Spanish establishment had less and less to worry about Datu Uto. After 1888, his career was practically ended, or at least that is what the available sources imply. In the early 1890's General Weyler erected a fort at Parang-Parang, on the road between the Pulangi valley and the Illanun coast, thus cutting Uto off from his remaining source of smuggled arms. Additional forts were built in Tinukup and Kudaranga "to close up the exits which could be used by Datu Uttu, no doubt the most dreadful of all Mindanao."³⁴ Forts were also built on the northern border between Magindanao and pagan territory "to prevent the said datu from continuing to exercise domination over the rest. . . ."³⁵ Pastells is of the opinion that fear of Spanish military action forced Uto to toe completely the line of the pro-Spanish datus, to transfer his residence near Cotabato "that he might conserve his full prestige."³⁶ Fear of military action is only a partial explanation, however. The Spaniards had practically drawn a net around Uto, cutting him off from all sources of slaves and firearms. The Spanish tactic of establishing forts to sever the local channels of communication, beginning with Zamboanga in the sixteenth century, reached its fullest spread toward the end of Datu Uto's career. This measure had consequences for his following. For example, in 1893 Datu Piang and Rajah Mudah Dalgan, both prominent followers of Uto, turned against their patron when the latter "stopped handing over to his two rivals the *lantakas* and carbines which they requested from him."³⁷ Bereft of wealth, expressed in terms of slaves, cash and firearms, the Datu of Buayan could no longer attract a following. Nothing more is heard of him till his death around 1902.³⁸

The decline of Datu Uto does not mean the waning of that ethos of which his career was a representation. The Pulangi valley, especially *sa-raya*, was never truly "pacified" by Spain. In 1888, when the majority of the Muslim political hierarchy was beginning to accept submission to Spain, the governor of Mindanao made the following statement:

. . . My labors have been directed principally at destroying the Moro unity which has been lamentable to us, since the sherifs who come from Mecca and proceed from Singapore travel about these rancherias, preaching incessantly the Holy War and complete unity to struggle against us.³⁹

Steps were taken to prevent Datu Ayunan from expanding his power; indeed, he seems to have become a relatively minor figure in the 1890's. But perhaps it was not merely Spanish interference which prevented Ayunan from becoming the "successor" of Datu Uto. For a new leader was rising in Magindanao--Datu Piang.

Datu Piang was a Chinese-Magindanao who, as we have seen, was formerly Uto's "Minister of Lands." He was married to the daughter of Datu Ayunan and, says Saleeby, "learned his methods." He allied himself with Spain and secured the latter's support and protection. According to Saleeby, "by shrewd tactics he dispossessed his former master Uto of his best land, attracted most of his following and caused his downfall."⁴⁰ His *rancheria* was north of Bakat, sheltered by the new Spanish fort at Reina Regente. It grew in population as Uto's followers were attracted to it. Piang was also able to win the support of several notable *sa-raya* datus, among them Ali and Djimbangan, both

33. Salcedo, "Instrucciones," in Salcedo, p. 117.

34. Wenceslao Retana, *Mando del general Weyler en Filipinas, 5 Junio, 1888 - 17 Nov. r. 1891*; apuntes y documentos para la historia política administrativa y militar de dichas islas (Madrid, 1896), p. 358.

35. *Ibid.*

36. *Misión*, III.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 229.

38. The British explorer, A.O.H. Savage-Landor, visited Uto's grave near Cotabato while the mourning period was still in effect. He describes Uto's impressive-looking grave. He also visited Rajah Putri, whose house is described as an arsenal. Nothing more is said; II, pp. 132 ff.

39. "Comunicación," April 24, 1888, in Salcedo, p. 108.

40. *History of Sulu*, p. 262.

formerly belonging to the Uto camp. But one of Piang's greatest assets, something which was denied Uto, was his considerable influence in Cotabato itself, where it is said that all the Moros as well as the Chinese supported him.⁴¹

The Spanish government welcomed the opportunity to control the Cotabato Chinese as well as a vast number of Magindanaos through their friend Datu Piang. And a loyal friend he seemed to be, for, when he and Dalgan were in Manila at the time of the Tagalog uprising, they voiced their opposition to the revolutionaries, declaring themselves true subjects of Spain.⁴² But what the Spaniards had feared of Ayunan became a reality in Datu Piang. When, in 1899, the Spaniards had to evacuate the Pulangi valley after the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States, Piang's loyalty to Spain vanished, but not his own aspirations for power.

The reaction that set in after the Spanish withdrawal was vicious. Datu Piang declared himself Sultan of Mindanao, in spite of the fact that he, a half-breed, had the least precedent by way of kinship ties and genealogy to back such contention. Having gained the support of the *sa-ilud* datus he, together with Datus Ali and Djimbangan, declared war against the *sa-raya* datus above Buayan who previously had not submitted to Spain and were now reluctant to recognize Piang. The triumvirate emerged victorious; the prestige of Piang reached unprecedented heights. Back in Cotabato and Tamontaka the reaction against the remnants of Spanish and Christian rule was severe. Even before the Spanish evacuation, the Tamontaka Jesuits had become apprehensive when Datu Andong, son of pro-Spanish Datu Ara (often mentioned alongside Ayunan), began acting "with great arrogance,"⁴³ telling Christian converts to return to their former *rancherías* where they had only been slaves. There had been cases of attacks on Christians and the disfiguring of statues of Catholic saints. With the rise of the triumvirate in September 1899, the members of the Provisional Government left behind by the retreating Spaniards were turned upon by Ali and Djimbangan, with the tacit consent of Piang. Cotabato itself was sacked; the Church and convent badly damaged. Images, engravings and other devotional objects were publicly desecrated; the pent-up wrath of the Magindanaos against the Christian colonizers reached a peak of expression.⁴⁴ Individuals sympathetic to the Philippine Revolutionary Government at Malolos were not spared such wrath. As Delor-Angeles puts it, the memory of "*indio*" participation in campaigns against the Magindanaos was still strong, and moreover, "it was ridiculous from the Muslim point of view for the Sultanates and datuships, proud of their long history of resistance to Spanish imperialism (while their racial brethren in the north submitted), to acknowledge the authority of Malolos."⁴⁵ Christian Filipino revolutionary officials were executed in Cotabato; their women were publicly shamed.⁴⁶ The rest of the Christian population fled to the hills, except the Chinese who were protected by Piang.⁴⁶

Piang's reign in Cotabato was short-lived. In December, 1899, American occupation forces arrived in the Pulangi, putting an end to armed conflicts in *sa-ilud*. But the Americans were just another colonial power, successor to the ousted Spaniards. It is strangely reminiscent of the 1860's that *sa-ilud* was quickly pacified and Datu Piang co-opted into the American establishment, while resistance to American rule continued in *sa-raya*. Perhaps we should not now be surprised that the resistance was led by Datu Ali, a descendant of the Buayan ruling family and ex-follower of Datu Uto. His career was brief compared with Uto's owing to the greatly superior strength of the American military, but while his career lasted it took many of the forms of his predecessors', as can be seen from the following account by Major General Leonard Wood:

At the date of writing this report [September 1904] conditions throughout the Province are peaceful, with the single exception of the presence of an outlaw in the upper Cotabato valley--Datto Ali of Kudarangan. This Moro (Ali) flatly refused to obey the anti-slavery law and attempted to raise the whole Cottabato valley in revolt. . . . His fortifications were taken and destroyed in March and his following dispersed. It is believed that his main work was the largest ever constructed by a Moro in these Islands. It was larger than 20 of the largest cottas of the Lake region [Lanao] or Sulu, and would have easily held a garrison of four or five-thousand men. It was well located, well built, well armed, and amply supplied with ammunition. There were embrasures for one hundred and twenty pieces of artillery. 85 pieces were captured, among them many large cannon of from 3 inches to 5½ inches caliber.

.

41. Pastells, *Misión*, III, p. 410.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 215.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 411.

44. p. 63.

45. *Ibidr*

46. Pastells, *loc. cit.*

Ali is at present at large, with an armed following of fifty or sixty men [cf. Uto's "slave army"] and a miscellaneous following of a hundred or two people, who accompany him under compulsion from place to place, carrying food, etc., and whose personell is frequently changed. As the hereditary datto of the upper valley [*sa-raya*] the people at heart sympathize with him, but not to the extent of openly taking up arms in large numbers.⁴⁷

Datu Ali of Buayan was the last Philippine Muslim "outlaw" of renown to resist American rule through armed means.

Today, on the site of Datu Uto's capital in Buayan, stands a flourishing market town judged a most convenient stop-over for traders plying the Pulangi and its numerous tributaries.

Once a week on market day, people from the neighboring areas flock to the central part of the town, which is a street that runs along the swift-flowing river. . . .⁴⁸

According to a 1939 census, this town, now named Datu-Piang or Dulawan, had the largest concentration of Magindanaos in the whole province of Cotabato. In 1962, Maceda estimated that it had the largest concentration of Muslims in the whole province.⁴⁹ Indeed, the present-day situation reflects the importance that has been given in this study to this center of power in *sa-raya*, whose prestige in the eyes of the Magindanaos came to eclipse that of the city of Cotabato in the nineteenth century. The former site of Buayan is still the seat of Muslim Magindanao civilization, while Cotabato City has come to be politically and culturally dominated by the Philippine National Government which is predominantly Christian in outlook. Today, the process of colonization that began in the days of Spanish rule continues, as Christian immigration into the Pulangi valley is encouraged with the goal of integrating the region into the Philippine national polity and easing population pressures elsewhere. The tendency, until recently, of the national government to neglect the interests of the Philippine Muslims has tended to fan resentment among some groups. In early 1968, a Muslim Independence Movement was launched with headquarters at Pagalungan, the middle zone between *sa-ilud* and *sa-raya*. Sometime in the early eighteenth century it was in the vicinity of Pagalungan that the rebel Malinog held out against the advancing Spanish-Cotabato forces. And it was precisely at that place that Datus Maghuda, Uto and others first raised the flag of resistance to the Spanish intrusion in the second half of the nineteenth century.

47. "First annual report of Major General Leonard Wood, U.S. Army, Governor of Moro Province" (Zamboanga, Sept. 1, 1904), pp. 9-10; in U.S. Moro Province, Reports of the Governor, 1903/04 - 1912/13.

48. Maceda, p. 19.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

GLOSSARY

<i>baniaga</i>	enslaved captives of war or hill people
<i>bichara</i>	dialogue, conference
<i>bois</i>	land tax
<i>bolo</i>	general purpose sword-like cutting tool
<i>cachil</i>	Moluccan princely title, used in Magindanao
<i>caracoa</i>	rowing barge
<i>danao</i>	lake
<i>haji</i> (Ar.)	honorific title for one who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca
<i>indio</i>	Spanish pejorative term for Malayan natives of the Philippines
<i>jihad</i> (Ar.)	Holy War
<i>juramentado</i> (Sp.)	"one who has made an oath"
<i>kampilan</i>	battle sword used by the Philippine Muslims
<i>kris</i>	dagger, supposedly endowed with magical properties
<i>kota</i>	fort
<i>laksamana</i>	Malay title for admiral of the royal fleet
<i>lantaka</i>	long, heavy brass cannon, generally smelted in Borneo and Java. They guarded the <i>kotas</i> and were a symbol of power.
<i>liberto</i> (Sp.)	"freed-man," referring to an ex-slave
<i>mantri</i>	in Magindanao, member of a datu's advisory council
<i>maramaya</i>	Magindanao military title
<i>marayao</i>	the class of freemen, below that of datu
<i>olipon</i>	debt-bondsmen
<i>pagdato</i>	tribute given to a datu
<i>pandita</i>	Muslim priest and learned man
<i>prau</i>	outrigger vessel, fitted with sail, prowed at stem and stern
<i>putri</i>	princess
<i>rajah</i>	title of Hindu origin meaning "ruler"
<i>raja laut</i>	"ruler of the sea," the title of the admiral of the Magindanao fleet
<i>rajah mudah</i>	"vice-king" and heir apparent to the sultan
<i>rancheria</i> (Sp.)	term loosely applied to settlements presided over by a datu; characterized by strong kinship ties among its members
<i>rescate</i> (Sp.)	"ransom"
<i>rumah bichara</i>	the sultanate's council of ministers, composed of the highest-ranking datu
<i>sa-ilud</i>	"in the lower valley"
<i>sa-raya</i>	"in the upper valley"
<i>sakop</i>	free (non-slave) subjects or followers of a datu
<i>shari'a</i> (Ar.)	the Islamic Law
<i>sherif</i> (Ar.)	(Magindanao: <i>sarip</i>) highly respected religious figure claiming descent from the Prophet Mohammed; lower in the hierarchy than <i>pandita</i>
<i>vinta</i>	outrigger sailing vessel of the Philippine Muslims; noted for its sail of colorful design
<i>wata-mama</i>	"first-born male," also a title referring to the next in line of succession after <i>rajah mudah</i>

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Manuscripts

- Blanco, Ramon Erenas Riero y Polo. "Memoria acerca del estado de la Provincia de Zamboanga, 1862-1871" (Memorial concerning the situation of Zamboanga Province, 1862-1871)ę, Zamboanga, July 26, 1871, 133pp.ę MS in the Newberry Library, Chicago
- Burriel, Juan Nepomucenoę "Ytinerario de la excursi3n hecha 3 Mindanao y Jolo de orden de Excmoe Sre Capitan General, Don Rafael Echague" (Itinerary of the trip made to Mindanao and Jolo by order of His Excellency the Captain General, Don Rafael Echague), Nov. 5, 1862-Jan. 22, 1863, 215pp., MS in the Newberry Library, Chicago.
- Cordoba, Juan de. "Gran Rio de Mindanao" (Great River of Mindanao), Pollok, Aug. 30, 1854, 70pp., MS in the Newberry Library, Chicago.
- Cordova, Fernando Fernandez deę "Sobre el rio grande de Mindanao" (Concerning the great river of Mindanao)ę, Isabela, April 28, 1855, 11pp.ę MS in the Newberry Library, Chicago
- Crespo, Romaldo y Guerra, to the Governor and Captain General, Manila, June 31 [sic]ę 1855, 19pp., MS in the Newberry Library, Chicago.
- Gayangos, Antonio Martel de. "La Ysla de Mindanao; su estado actual y las reformas que reclama" (The Island of Mindanao; its present state and the reforms called for)ę, undated (caę 1878)ę 165pp.ę MS in the Newberry Library, Chicago
- Mascaro, Ramon de, to the Governor and Captain General, Manila, June 21, 1855, 28pp., MS in the Newberry Library, Chicago.
- Montero, Claudio y Gay, to the Governor and Captain General, "Exploraci3n del rio grande de Mindanao," Manila, June 31 [sic]ę 1855, 44pp., MS in the Newberry Library, Chicago
- Nieto, Ladislaoę "Mindanao; P3ginas Sueltas" (Mindanao; Scattered Pages ?), Zamboanga and Jolo, 1885-1887, 273pp., MS in the Newberry Library, Chicago.
- Oyanguren, Jose Cruz de. (Opinion on the administration of the region of Mindanao and Jolo), Manila, July 17, 1855, 56pp., MS in the Newberry Library, Chicago.

Collections of Documents

- Beyer, Henry Otley (ed.)ę Philippine customary law. A collection of source material brought together, 1912-1931, first as a part of a general Philippine ethnographic study and later (in a more specific form) as a contribution to the European, American, and Philippine committees engaged in the collecting andęstudy of the customary law of Indonesiaę Manila, 1931, 9 volsę (microfilm)ę
- Blairę Emma Helen, and James Alexander Robertson. *The Philippine Islands, 1493-1803*. 55 volsę, Cleveland, 1903-9.
- Cartas de los Padres de la Compania de Jesus de la Misi3n de Filipinas* (Letters of the Priests of the Society of Jesus of the Philippine Mission)ę, 10 volsę, Manila, 1877-95 (titles vary slightly)ę
- U.S., Moro Province, Reports of the Governor, 1903/04 - 1912/13, bound volume in Olin Library, Cornell Universityę

Original Works in Spanish and French

- "Algunas reflexiones sobre el 58 Distrito de Mindanao llamada del Centro" (Some reflections about the 5th District of Mindanao called the Center), anonymous, *CMSJ*, II, 1879, pp. 231-237. This article appeared the previous year in the magazine *Oceania*.
- Alençon, Ferdinand Philippe Marie d'Orleans, duc d'. "Luçon et Mindanao, récit et souvenirs d'un voyage dans l'extreme Orient," *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 191 (May 15, 1870), pp. 341-374.
- Arguelles, Felipe Canga. "La Isla de Mindanao; Conferencia, 19 Abril 1887," *BSGM*, XXII (1887), pp. 236-262.
- Barrantes, Vicente. *Guerras Piráticas de Filipinas; contra mindanaos y joloanos* (Piratical Wars of the Philippines; against mindanaos and joloans), Madrid, 1878.
- . "Peligro de Mindanao," *La Política de España en Filipinas*, IV, 83 (April 10, 1894), pp. 102-103.
- Bernaldez, Emilio y Fernandez de Folgueras. *Reseña Histórica de la Guerra al Sur de Filipinas; sostenida por las armas españolas contra los piratas de aquel archipelago* (Historical account of the War in the Philippine South; sustained by Spanish arms against the pirates of that archipelago), Madrid, 1857.
- Blumentritt, Ferdinand. "Los maguindanaos, estudio etnográfico," *BSGM*, XXXV (1893), pp. 267-285.
- Campos Tomás, Mariano. "Estudio del Pulangi (Mindanao)," *La Política de España en Filipinas*, series in vols. VII-VIII, 1897-98.
- Carta de P. Marcelo Francisco Mastrillo á P. Salazar (letter of Fr. Mastrillo to Fr. Salazar), *BSGM*, XXII (1887).
- Colín, Francisco. *Labor Evangélica* Pablo Pastells, ed. 3 vols. Barcelona, 1900-1902. The original was published in 1663.
- Combés, Francisco. *Historia de las Islas de Mindanao, Iolo, y sus Adyacentes* Wenceslao Retana, ed., Madrid, 1897. Originally published in 1667. English translations in: *BRPI*, XI, pp. 99-182; *Mindanao Herald*, VI (Feb. 3, 1909), by J. H. Sutherland. These are only partial translations.
- Concepción, Juan de la. *Historia General de Filipinas*. 14 vols., Manila, 1788-92. Trans. in *BRPI*.
- Cuevas, Jose Fernandez. "Relación de un viaje de exploracion a Mindanao, 1860" (Account of a voyage of exploration to Mindanao, 1860), *CMSJ*, VIII, pp. 5-61.
- Francia, Benito y Ponce de Leon and Julian Gonzalez Parrado. *La Islas Filipinas: Mindanao*. 2 vols., Havana, 1898.
- Gainza, Francisco. *Memoria y Antecedentes sobre la Expediciones de Balanguingi y Jolo* (Report and Background of the Balanini and Jolo Expeditions). Manila, 1851.
- Garin, Arturo y Sociats. "Memoria sobre el Archipiélago de Joló," *BSGM*, X (1881), pp. 110-113 and 161-216.
- Gayangos, Antonio Martel de. "Laguna de Lanao en la isla de Mindanao," *BSGM*, XIV (1883), pp. 377-380.
- Masó, Miguel Saderra. *Misiones Jesuíticas de Filipinas, 1581-1768 y 1859-1924*. Manila, 1924.
- Montano, Joseph. *Voyage aux Philippines et en Malaises* (May 1879-June 1881). Paris, 1886.
- Montero, Claudio y Gay. "Exploración en Mindanao," *BSGM*, XV (1883), pp. 115-133. This is a publication of his manuscript of 1855.
- . "Los moros malayo-mahometanos de Mindanao y Jolo," in Conferencias sobre las Islas Filipinas, 2a conferencia, *BSGM*, I (1876), pp. 317-337.

Montero, Jose Y Vidal. *Historia General de Filipinas; desde el descubrimiento de dicha Islas hasta nuestros dias* (General History of the Philippines; from the discovery of said islands up to the present day) 3 vols, Madrid, 1894.

———. *Historia de la Piratería Malayo-Mahometana en Mindanao, Jolo y Borneo*. Madrid, 1888r

Morga, Antonio de. *Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas*. Jose Rizal, ed., 1890 (first published in Mexico, 1609)r Translated into English (Rizal ed.) by Encarnacion Alzona, Manila, 1962r

Nieto Aguilar, Jose. *Mindanao, su Historia y Geografía* Madrid, 1894.

Parrado, Juan Gonzalez *Memoria acerca de Mindanao* Manila, 1893r

Pastells, Pablo. "Informe sobre la isla de Mindanao," Manila, Aug. 15, 1888, in Pastells, *Misión*, III, Document 11, pp. 478-91.

———. "Memoria del R. P. Pablo Pastells," Manila, March 15, 1892, *CMSJr* IX, pp. 599-667.

———. *Misión de la Compañía de Jesus de Filipinas en Siglo XIX* 3 vols, Barcelona, 1916-1917.

Pazos, Pio A. de. *Jolo; Relato Histórico Militar desde su descubrimiento por los españoles en 1578 a nuestros dias* (Jolo; Historical Military account since its discovery by the Spaniards in 1578 up to the present day) Burgos, 1879r

Perinat, Alfonso y Lasso de Vega. *Operaciones Militares en el Rio Grande de Mindanao*. Manila, 1888r Part I: historical account of Pulangi; Part II: fragments of hisa journal of 1887.

Portilla, Segundo de la, and Claudio Montero y Gay. "Expediente . . . etc." (also known as "Memoria de la Portilla"), Manila, Oct. 7, 1867, in Francia/Parrado, II, pp. 101-145.

Rajal, Joaquin y Larre. "Conferencia acerca de la isla de Mindanao," *BSGM*, XVIII (1885), pp. 177-92. Speech given March 3, 1885.

———. *Exploración del Territorio de Davao*. Madrid, 1891.

"Relación de la Gran Isla de Mindanao y de su conquista por los Españoles" (Account of the Great Island of Mindanao and its conquest by the Spaniards), a fragment from a book apparently published in Mexico in 1638; *BSGMr* XXII (1887), pp. 111-114.

Retana, Wenceslao *Mando del General Weyler en Filipinas, 5 Junio 1888-17 Noviembre 1891; apuntes y documentos para la historia política, administrativa y militar de dichas islas* (General Weyler's Command in the Philippines . . . facts and documents for the political, administrative and military history of said islands) Madrid, 1896.

———. "Prologue" to Combesá *Historia*, Madrid, 1897 (see citation above).

Ricart, Juan. "Informe sobre la reducción de Mindanao . . ." (Advice concerning the conquest of Mindanao), Manila, Jan. 17, 1883r First published, with updating notes, in *CMSJr* X (1895), pp. 587-612.

Rincón, Manuel Maria. *Cinco Meses en Mindanao; operaciones en 1886-87*. Cartas al "Diario de Manila" (Five Months in Mindanao; operations in 1886-87. Letters to the "Manila News")a Manila, 1894.

Salcedo, Juan. *Proyectos de Dominación y Colonización de Mindanao y Jolo*. Gerona, 1891. Contains a good number of "Communications" of the Cotabato and Mindanao governorsa

Santayana, Agustin. *La Isla de Mindanao; su Historia y su Estado Presente, con algunas reflexiones acerca de su porvenir* (The Island of Mindanao; its History and Present State, with some reflections concerning its future) Madrid, 1862.

Torrubia, Joseph. *Dissertación Histórica-política*, 1753. Pp. 68-90 transa in *BRPI*, XLVI, pp. 38-43.

Vazquez de Aldaña, Antonio, and Valentin Gonzalez Serrano. *España en la Oceania* (Paginas de la guerra de Jolo). Manila, 1876.

"Viaje por el interior de la isla de Mindanao" (anon.), *BSGM*, XXV (1888), pp. 39-41.

Vidal, Sebastian y Soler. *Memoria sobre El Ramo de Montes en las Islas Filipinas* (Memorial concerning the Forestry Department in the Philippine Islands ?). Madrid, 1874. Appendix B: "Facts about the island of Mindanao."

Other Works Cited

Angeles, F. Delor. *Mindanao; the Story of an Island* (A Preliminary Study). Davao City, 1964.

Belcher, Sir Edward. *Narrative of a voyage of H.M.S. Samarang, during the years 1843-46*. London, 1848.

Costa, Horacio de la. *The Jesuits in the Philippines, 1581-1768*. Cambridge, 1961.

———. "Muhammad Alimud-din I, Sultan of Sulu, 1735-1773," *JRASMB*, XXXVI:1 (1965), pp. 43-76.

———. *Readings in Philippine History*. Manila, 1965.

———. "A Spanish Jesuit among the Maguindanaus," *Comment*, XII, 1st Qtr., 1961, pp. 19-41.

Dampier, William. *Dampier's Voyages, consisting of a New Voyage Round the World, etc.* John Masefield, ed., 2 vols., New York, 1906. Dampier was in the Philippines 1686-7.

DasGupta, Arun Kumar. "Acheh in Indonesian Trade and Politics: 1600-1641." Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Cornell University, 1962.

Ewing, J. Franklin. "Juramentado: Institutionalized Suicide among the Moros of the Philippines," *Anthropological Quarterly*, XXVIII (N.S. 3-4), 4 (Oct. 1955), pp. 148-155.

Felix, Alfonso, Jr. (ed.). *The Chinese in the Philippines, 1570-1870*. Vol. I, Manila, 1966.

Forrest, Thomas. *A Voyage to New Guinea, and the Moluccas, from Balambangan: including an account of Magindano, Sooloo, and other islands*. London, 1779.

Gibson-Hill, C. A. "Magindano," *JRASMB*, XXIX (1956), p. 184.

Gowing, Peter Gordon. *Mosque and Moro; a Study of Muslims in the Philippines*. Manila, 1964.

Gullick, J.O.M. *Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya*. London, 1958.

Hall, D. G. E. *A History of South-east Asia*. 3rd ed., London, 1968.

Hunt, J. "Some particulars relating to Sulo in the Archipelago of Felicia," in J. H. Moor, *Notices of the Indian Archipelago and Adjacent Countries*. Singapore, 1837.

Keppel, Henry. *The Expedition to Borneo of H.M.S. Dido; for the suppression of piracy, with extracts from the Journal of James Brook, Esq. of Sarawak*. 2 vols., London, 1846.

Kuder, Edward M. "The Moros in the Philippines," *Far Eastern Quarterly*, IV, 2 (1945), pp. 119-126.

Landor, A. Henry Savage. *The Gems of the East*. 2 vols., New York, 1904.

Leroy, James A. "The Philippines, 1860-1898; Some comment and bibliographical notes," *BRPI*, LII, pp. 112-207.

Lietz, Paul S. *Calendar of Philippine Documents in the Ayer Collection of the Newberry Library*. Chicago, 1956.

- . "Mindanao in the nineteenth century," in *Conference on Mindanao, Papers*. Chicago, 1955.
- Maceda, Jose M. "The Music of the Magindanao in the Philippines." 2 vols. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of California in Los Angeles, 1962.
- Madigan, Francis C. "The early history of Cagayan de Oro," *PS*, II, 1 (Jan. 1963), pp. 76-130.
- , and Nicholas P. Cushner. "Tamontaka reduction. A community approach to Mission work," *Neue Zeitschrift für Missions-Wissenschaft*, XVII, 2 (1961), pp. 81-94.
- . "Tamontaka: a sociological experiment," *American Catholic Sociological Review*, XIX, 4 (Dec. 1958), pp. 322-336.
- Majul, Cesar Adib. "Chinese relationship with the Sultanate of Sulu," in Felix (ed.), *The Chinese*, I, pp. 143-159 (see entry above).
- . "Islamic and Arab cultural influences in the south of the Philippines," *JSEAH*, II (Sept. 1966), pp. 61-73.
- . "Political and historical notes on the old Sulu Sultanate," *JRASMB*, XXXVIII (July 1965), pp. 23-42.
- . "The role of Islam in the history of the Filipino People," *AS*, IV (Aug. 1966), pp. 303-315.
- Mednick, Melvin. *Encampment of the Lake; the Social Organization of a Moslem-Philippine (Moro) People*. Research Series, V, Philippine Studies Program, University of Chicago, 1965.
- . "Some Problems of Moro History and Political Organization," *PSR*, V (1957), pp. 39-52.
- Moertono, Soemarsaid. *State and Statecraft in Old Java*. Ithaca, Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project, 1968.
- O'Shaughnessy, Thomas J. "Philippine Islam and the Society of Jesus," *PS*, IV (1956), pp. 215-245.
- Phelan, John Leddy. *The Hispanization of the Philippines; Spanish Aims and Filipino Responses*. Madison, 1959.
- Reber, Anne Lindsey. "The Sulu World in the 18th and early 19th centuries: a historiographical problem in British writings on Malay piracy." Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Cornell University, 1966.
- Reid, Anthony. "Nineteenth century pan Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia," *Journal of Asian Studies*, XXVI, 2 (1967), pp. 267-283.
- Robles, Eliodoro. *The Philippines in the Nineteenth Century*. Quezon City, Philippines, 1969.
- Roessingh, M. P. H. "Dutch Relations with the Philippines: a survey of sources in the General State Archives, the Hague, Netherlands," *AS*, V, 2 (1967), pp. 377-407.
- Roff, William R. *The Origins of Malay Nationalism*. New Haven, 1967.
- Rutter, Owen. *The Pirate Wind; tales of the Sea-Robbers of Malaya*. London, 1930.
- Saber, Mamitua. "Four Papers on Mindanao-Sulu" (mimeographed copy in Olin Library, Cornell University). Articles include: "Spanish fleet on lake Lanao," "Muslim social organization," "The Muslim minority in the Philippines," "Some observations on Maranao social and cultural transition."
- Saleeby, Najeeb M. *The History of Sulu*. Manila, 1908. Documents may be found in the appendix.
- . *Studies in Moro History, Law and Religion*. Manila, 1905. Magindanao and Sulu genealogies and codes of law are published here.

- Schrieke, Bertram Johannes. *Indonesian Sociological Studies*. 2 vols. The Hague, 1957.
- Smith, Clifford N. "A History of the Moros. A study in conquest and colonial government." Unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Chicago, 1948.
- Sopher, David. *The Sea Nomads*. Memoirs of the National Museum, V, Singapore, 1965.
- U.S. Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department. *A Pronouncing Gazetteer and Geographical Dictionary of the Philippine Islands, U.S.A.* Washington, Government Printing Office, 1902.
- Wada, Sei. "The Philippine Islands as known to the Chinese before the Ming Period," *Toyo Bunko, Memoirs*, IV (1929), pp. 121-166.
- Wickberg, Edgar. *The Chinese in Philippine Life, 1850-1898* New Haven, 1965.
- Wingfield, Lewis. *Wanderings of a Globe-Trotter in the Far East*. 2 vols. London, 1889.
- Wolters, O. W. "China's Irredenta: the south," *The World Today*, XIX, 12 (1963), pp. 540-552.
- Wood, Grace L. "The Tiruray," *PSR*, V, 2 (April, 1951), pp. 12-39.