





THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
LEYTE, 1941-1945

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LEYTE, 1941-1945

by

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FOREWORD

Professor Elmer N. Lear is a member of the faculty of Wagner College. His field research did not take place under Fulbright or Guggenheim auspices, but as a member of the United States Armed Forces, Far East, that invaded Leyte in 1943-1944. Professor Lear seized an unique opportunity to construct his account of World War II on Leyte by gathering documents and collating the stories of the principal participants in this confused drama. The reader will appreciate the initiative, ingenuity and professional motivation evident in his study.

The present study is essentially the social history of the resistance movement which emerged on Leyte during the Japanese occupation. At the same time, it is a vivid description of the disintegration of the framework of public administration and social services and in the economic organization which existed in the Philippines after four decades of American colonial administration characterized by rapid expansion in Philippine self-government. The adaptation of society on Leyte to the insecurity, violence and privations of World War II is a microcosm of the wartime Philippines. As such, it provides us with valuable understanding of the patterns of postwar political and bureaucratic behavior -- the decline of public morality, the feuds, the instability of political loyalties -- which have plagued Philippine leaders in their efforts to utilize the institutions of government to pursue normative social goals.

Frank H. Golay

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September, 1961

PREFACE

I remember how closely my companions and I followed the military bulletins released at the close of 1944. These bulletins reported the bitterly contested advance of the American Liberation forces across a remote Philippine province towards an unknown port called Ormoc. We were particularly interested in that campaign as we watched our acquaintances in adjacent company areas hurriedly gather their gear, assemble for final inspection, and embark from our South Pacific replacement depot. Rumors concerning their destination were legion, but the obvious objective was Leyte.

We had been alerted for some time. But we were already into 1945 before our cautiously moving convoy headed north. Some weeks later, towards evening, we clambered down the sides of our transport, boarded landing craft, raced towards shore and effected what to us seemed a very dramatic arrival. We hurriedly pitched tents in a battered coconut grove a short distance beyond the beach, snatched a hasty repast from our packaged rations, and then took our bearings.

We learned that we were encamped on the east coast of Leyte near the small village of Tolosa! Our tension was quite superfluous. Peace had been restored to this portion of the Island, save for the occasional enemy air raid. Whatever action we were destined for would await our next assignment, Luzon, or perhaps the Japanese home territories. Thus reassured, we suddenly became conscious of the sweltering heat and our own physical discomfort. The waters of Leyte Gulf beckoned invitingly, their iridescence magnified by the brilliance of a full tropical moon. Not long afterward, a dozen "G.I.'s" were diving and splashing about like porpoises.

As the months passed by, my knowledge of the Island and its people increased. With my own eyes, I saw the devastation wrought by the Japanese invader. And from the lips of the Filipinos working within the camp area, from the laundry-girls and shopkeepers in the village, and from the Philippine Army soldiers visiting our outdoor theatre at night, I heard harrowing narratives of Japanese sadism and Filipino suffering; tales of the local resistance movement, of the bravery of some guerrilleros and the ruthless brigandage of others, and of the tortured life confronting the ordinary people caught between the opposing fires of collaboration and resistance. I developed a profound sympathy for this people, so harassed and destitute, and withal, so cheerful, friendly and hospitable.

Some three months went by and I had not as yet conceived of the project that forms the subject matter of this study. Then one evening, on the invitation of a fellow-GI, I found myself in the recreation hall of a United States Army field hospital, mingling with Filipino civilians and army officers. (I must confess, the inducement to come was the promise that an almost forgotten delicacy, ice-cream, was to be served.) I subsequently learned that my GI friend, other American personnel, and many of the Filipinos in attendance were members of the Masonic Order and were engaged in a fund-raising drive to restore Tacloban's demolished Masonic Hall.

In the course of conversation, I was introduced to two prominent Leytenos, Lt. (later Congressman) Atilano Cinco and Maj. Fidel Fernandez. Lt. Cinco had been actively associated with the guerrilla organization of northeast Leyte. Since the Liberation, he had been an active member of the Filipino speakers' bureau, making the rounds of American military installations on Leyte and interpreting Filipino customs and problems to fascinated GI audiences. Maj. Fernandez had served as Judge Advocate General on the staff of the guerrilla leader, Col. Ruperto Kangleon, and since the Liberation had occupied the important post of the deputy governorship of Leyte. I plied both these men with questions concerning life in the Province during the period of enemy occupation, and listened with enthralment to their replies. And what was especially pleasing and exciting to me, both invited me to call upon them for further information.

At my first free moment, I paid my respects to Atilano Cinco in his "hometown" of Dagami, finding him both exceedingly gracious and remarkably lucid in his descriptions of Filipino life under Japanese rule. He paved the way for my meeting the mayor of Dagami as well as the principal of the local school, both of whom added many interesting details to the picture I had been piecing together. But my most profitable Dagami contact, aside from Atilano Cinco, was Major Alejandro Balderian.

Balderian, a stocky person of grim visage, was then on terminal leave from the Philippine Army. He had received his law degree shortly before the outbreak of the war, and was planning to resume private practice--with a possible venture into politics. But what was of particular interest to me, Balderian had been guerrilla leader of northeast Leyte. I put questions to Balderian bearing upon guerrilla organization, relations with the civilian population, combat activities, etc. Each answer touched off a chain of related questions. I left Dagami that day with an invitation to return whenever I cared to do so (I visited with Atilano Cinco and Balderian several more times), and with a very good "tip"--a reference to several officers in the process of mustering out of the service at the 1st Replacement Battalion, Philippine Army (PA).

I mulled over these orientational briefings while returning to camp. My quarters were situated fairly close to the Filipino replacement center. Inspiration struck. Could I but find opportunity to interview these ex-guerrilleros before their dispersal, I would come into possession of a rich fund of information. And possibly I would discover that some of my informants had preserved papers pertaining to the resistance movement--guerrilla documents or their own private memoirs. This would constitute a veritable treasure trove. Yes, I already began to glimpse the outline of a full and absorbing study of Leyte's guerrilla movement during the war.

My free evenings and weekends during the next two months were reserved for visits to the Filipino replacement center and the tracking down of unknown informants. First of all, I sought out the officers recommended as sources of information by Balderian. Each of these, after having been wrung dry, obligingly directed my steps to some one else--a brother officer or non-commissioned officer. I remember those sessions--the interviewees and myself leaning informally on an army cot, the light for my note-taking provided by a kerosene-filled beer can converted into a smoky lamp. Often, ex-guerrilleros from other provinces, sharing the same tent with the interviewees, would listen, breaking in from time to time to point out similarities and differences in their own experiences.

In the course of my inquiries, I learned that two other guerrilla organizations had flourished on Leyte in addition to the one officially recognized by the United States Command. And through an acquaintance, I met the leader of the principal unrecognized group, Lt. Blas E. Miranda. Miranda (a man with an engineering background) was officially on the roster of the Replacement Center, but had been placed on temporary duty with the American troops. At the time I encountered him, he was engaged in supervising the erection of a Red Cross recreation building. I was invited to the dingy house he and his family were temporarily occupying (perhaps in concealment from personal enemies) and there, over the course of several visits, was given a thorough briefing on the nature and activities of his organization (the WIGWF) and an explanation of the disunity within Leyte's resistance movement. I also came upon the whereabouts of Sgt. Francisco Rodriguez, once a regimental commander within Miranda's organization, now living with his wife in a little shack hard by the replacement center. Both referred me to former officers of their organization, located in Ormoc and in Manila, who would enlarge my understanding, if I could but reach them.

Now I commenced to systematize the congeries of facts I had been collecting. A pattern began to emerge of significant relationships, constituting a framework for further accessions of information and a tool of inquiry during interviews. I knew what to ask, what to look for. I had worked out a time sequence of significant temporal intervals during the Occupation: the pre-surrender period, the initial Japanese landings and the reconstituting of provincial and municipal administrations, the Japanese efforts towards "pacification," the beginnings of guerrilla organization, the rivalries and consolidations among the guerrilla, the extension of guerrilla influence over municipalities, the Japanese "re-invasion" and "mopping-up" campaign, the period of all-out Japanese control, the reactivation of the guerrilla during the pre-Liberation months and the American landings.

With this perspective, I became better equipped to make discerning judgments, recognizing when my informant was garbling the record for reasons of self-glorification or defamation of his opponents. In the privacy of my own thought, I was able to put certain questions to the data I had amassed, intended as hypotheses to explain wartime developments on the Island. These hypotheses underwent continuous modification as further interviews and the gradual accumulation of written materials punctured some of the notions I had been entertaining.

By this time, I was adequately prepared to reactivate a temporarily "shelved" contact, Major Fernandez. My appointment with this unusually hard-working and energetic man was at his office in the Provincial Capitol. He heaped me with data pertaining to the wartime puppet administration of the Province. In addition, he placed in my hands a letter addressed to the commanding officer of the 41st Infantry Regiment, the reorganized guerrilla outfit of Col. Kangleon that had been incorporated into the Philippine Army. The letter commended me to those concerned, requesting them to grant every courtesy in providing me with information and introducing me to the officers and enlisted men of the command.

I made two trips to Ormoc. The first was a short weekend on special pass from camp. What stands out most vividly in my mind, as I relive the visit, was the trip itself: a ride in a huge but rickety civilian truck converted into a public carrier, transporting both passengers and commodities. I recall having been jostled by a motley cargo--sacks of grain and sugar, sliding with every lurch of the vehicle, bunches of bananas and bundles of unwrapped fish dangling in my face, a menagerie of cackling chickens and chattering monkeys, crying children and cigar-smoking old women.

Some five months elapsed before I had an opportunity to follow up this initial visit. On this second occasion, (after accumulated service points had established my eligibility for discharge from the army), my request for assignment on temporary duty to the 41st Infantry was granted. These two weeks were perhaps the most profitable of my entire undertaking. The fact that I was living with Filipino military personnel, sharing their meals of rice, dried fish and gulay (in addition to American C and K rations), and swapping anecdotes with them at night enabled me to build up an excellent rapport. And my interview time was systematically apportioned, with sessions spaced all through the day and evening.

The guerrilleros I questioned were from all parts of Leyte, and were thus able to give detailed descriptions of events in the respective sectors where they had functioned during the War. I asked about the local problems of organization, relations with the municipal officials, means of subsistence, character of the Japanese garrison, nature of collaboration, and many related matters. The replies were always cross-checked for accuracy by comparison with other testimony.

The abundance of material available proved embarrassing to me during my investigations in the camp of the 41st Infantry. Every man was a storehouse of information, and every minute lost represented forfeiture of so many additional facts. I decided to concentrate upon quizzing the troops who had seen service in south Leyte, a region less known to me. And of these, I attempted to obtain a sampling from each district. I sought out the appropriate officer whose guerrilla camp had been located in a given sector for a full-length inquiry, and then conversed with enlisted men of the same outfit to fill in gaps and amend errors of individual judgment. Proximity to Ormoc also allowed me to hunt for some of Lt. Miranda's former followers, now reverted to civilian status.

Aside from the two army camps, the most concentrated yield of intelligence unearthed in all my ramblings came to light in the Capitol building of Leyte Province. Every office housed personnel who had directly experienced the effects of the Japanese Occupation and who, from their particular vantage point, contributed vital information on either the resistance movement or the puppet administration! The man who was most lavish in placing his time at my disposal was a clerk in the Provincial Auditor's Office, Enrique Potente. Potente had been guerrilla auditor in Col. Kangleon's government of "Free Leyte." He turned out to be a keen observer, and what was most rare, a very self-effacing man.

The Provincial Fiscal, Juan C. Pajo, discoursed upon criminality in Post-Occupation Leyte. Fiscal Pajo also did me a great service by interceding for me with Col. Kangleon, official leader of Leyte's resistance

movement (at the home of a mutual friend). I discovered Col. Kangleon to be a very forceful personality and a reservoir of knowledge--except in the area of the more delicate issues reflecting upon his own leadership.

Of course, I was most anxious to cross-examine the members of the puppet regime, serving under Japanese control. My major "find" was Bernardo Torres. Soon after his release from the collaborationist internment camp, the former governor granted me an extended interview. Torres, an educator before his entry into politics, was an intelligent man. He was anxious to exonerate himself, and expatiated upon all aspects of the Occupation regime--relations with the Japanese Military Administration, ties with the central government in Manila and with the Commissioner for the Visayas, food scarcity and economic controls, contact with the outlying municipalities, the "independence" campaign, and the "pacification" program. All in all, this interview was a gainful experience. And it was further enriched by the man who had served as Provincial Secretary under Torres, Atty. Antonio Benedicto.

Another leading authority consulted was Vincente de la Cruz, Judge of the Court of 1st Instance during the Occupation. The Division Superintendent of Schools for Leyte during the Occupation, Florentino Kapili, still further enlarged my understanding. Having already questioned the wartime Provincial Treasurer and Auditor, I rounded out my interviewing of provincial officialdom with a visit to the office of the still incumbent Provincial Agronomist, Victorino Berdan.

A different order of informant was the Tacloban businessman. He viewed both the Occupation regime and the resistance movement largely from the standpoint of property relations. When responding to certain questions in the course of interview, the businessman showed hard-headed realism and objectivity. Where his private interests were hit, however, he squealed with amazing tenderness. Many of the businessmen were active in the "Neighborhood Associations, and in the various merchandising organizations established under Japanese sponsorship.

Chief among my business interviewees in Tacloban were: Gerardo Villasin (Eureka Saw Mill), Margarito Redona (M. "A. Redona & Sons, Inc.), Marcelo Abesamis (Visayan Saw Mill, Mercedes Theatre), Federico V. Larraga (Manager of the Leyte Land Transportation trucking company during the Occupation), Ramon Gatchalian (Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant), and Cipriano de Luna (boat owner and speculator). To get the local Chinese viewpoint on this mercantile rivalry, I sat with the leading representative of Chinese business in the Province, T. Suya (with the aid of an interpreter), and in addition, the manager of a smaller establishment, Wong On (Far Eastern Hotel and Restaurant).

Once I had left Tacloban and directed my attention to other municipalities, informants became more scattered and information more meager. For if, after locating the residence of my quarry, he chanced to be away from home, I was compelled to leave with nothing accomplished; whereas, in the army camps, and in Tacloban, I had always been able to make a substitute call of equal value to my project. Moreover, the very task of ferreting out the residence of an informant, particularly if he dwelt outside the village center, was time-consuming. Hence, I set up fewer formal interviews, using instead the method of impromptu conversation with random contacts: farmers, fishermen, and shopkeepers.

Travel throughout east Leyte as far south as Abuyog was simple so long as one could "hitch" a ride with a fellow GI. I used this method of getting about evenings and weekends, and I devoted a few days (a week when necessary) to each municipality. In each community, I sought out for full interview the municipal mayor, sometimes the municipal treasurer, a person who had been connected with the puppet administration, a person who had been identified with the local resistance movement, a businessman, a school teacher, and anybody who might have special knowledge of a particular phase of his community's wartime history. Wherever possible, I stalked persons fitting into several of these categories, thus enabling me to conserve my time. Each of the personalities interviewed is worthy of description, in terms of his special penchants and unique perspectives.

A flood of memories fills my mind as I look back upon those sessions but I must hold in rein the temptation to give away to anecdotage. All I shall say is that I am eternally obliged to the Filipinos of Leyte for the many kindnesses and the hospitality heaped upon me.

I did not succeed in finding time for a personal tour of southeast or south Leyte. But on two occasions, I received a weekend pass to what the American troops regarded as a recreation center: Baybay, on the west-central coast of Leyte. On the second of two visits, I took an overnight tour along the southwest coast, passing through Inopacan, Hindang, Hilongos, Bato and Matalom.

The Leyte mayoralty convention of January 10, 1945 (convened at the Capitol to discuss the fixing of the 1946 election date for Leyte, as well as to draft a program for the equitable distribution of relief supplies) made possible extended conversation with municipal officials I had been unable to visit in their home communities.

I must note two other categories of informants who offered a somewhat different approach to the subject-matter of my study. The first of these were the physicians, men who because of their relative freedom from politics, military intrigue and business preoccupations were on the whole more objective.

The second category of interviewees of special interest to me were the parish priests. I was anxious to learn from the priests themselves what adjustment they had been compelled to make to the Japanese rule, whether they had been able to minister to guerrilla sacramental needs, and what their attitudes had been to various phases of wartime existence. The head of the Leyte diocese, the Rt. Rev. Manuel Mascarinas, Bishop of Palo, presented me with a comprehensive account. Amplification to clarify details in their respective local communities was provided by Padre Julio Rosales (Tacloban), Padre Lino Gonzaga (Palo), Padre Pedro Morfe (Tolosa), and Padre Pascual Guimbo (Burauen). The Rev. Juan I. Pia, minister of the United Evangelical Church (Tacloban), outlined for me the status of Leyte's Protestant community during the war and Liberation periods.

I have not referred to the teachers I had been meeting with in the various communities because they constituted a distinctive group, from my standpoint. School administrators and teachers were most cordial in opening their doors and allowing me to sit in and observe their work, and I must add that I was greatly impressed by the zeal for work displayed by the

Filipino pupils, despite the make-shift classrooms and study materials they were compelled to use. Let me add, I visited some of the private schools as well as the public schools.

In the final period of my investigations in Leyte, I became extremely selective, singling out specific individuals whose oral testimony was necessary to fill in the lacunae of my study. That is not to say that I rejected casual contacts who were informed and were representative of a certain grouping in a particular community; but I devoted a proportionately greater period of time to tracking down certain individuals I had unsuccessfully attempted to reach previously.

I had hoped for introduction to the few Americans marooned in wartime Leyte. To my disappointment, almost all had departed for Manila or the United States. Opportunely, some of my previous contacts led me to Filipinos who had served under I. D. Richardson, Gordon Lang, and Chester Peters. These men furnished me with full information about the leadership policies of the American guerrilleros. Even more providential was an encounter with two Americans: The first was an American mestizo, Robert M. Price (son of Walter Price, owner of the Leyte Land Transportation Co.) who had lived in Tacloban during the Occupation, under constant Japanese surveillance. At the home of "Bob" Price, as the people of Tacloban knew him, I met with an American educator who had taken shelter with the guerrilla of south Leyte during the Occupation, Fred Earl Warner (superintendent of the Baybay National Agricultural School). Warner's report on guerrilla society proved to be one of the most useful I had obtained.

Two other Americans amplified my knowledge of postwar Leyte: The division superintendent of schools, Albert Haynes (interned by the Japanese in 1942) discussed the educational problems of the Province. And Lt. Col. Charles W. Hall, Civil Affairs Officer, Base "K", gave me a helpful run-down on Leyte's economic status, in terms of trade and employment.

Before leaving for Manila in February of 1946, I paid a brief visit to Samar (a short ferry ride from Tacloban, across the San Juanico Sts.). At the camp of the 1st Filipino Regiment, U.S. Army, I found the American mestizo, Capt. Luis Morgan, the pioneer guerrilla organizer in Mindanao. Morgan, who had led an "Expeditionary Force" to Leyte in 1943, provided very valuable comments on the comparative strengths and weaknesses of the various guerrilla units in Leyte, in addition to information on the inter-island liaison.

I had also sought an audience with Lt. Col. Juan Causing, commandant of the 42nd Infantry Regiment, PA. However, I learned that he was in Manila, having business with Philippine Army Headquarters. I thereupon listed him as my initial interviewee as soon as I should arrive at the Philippine capital.

My voyage to Manila in a flat-bottomed boat (ISM) over the choppy inter-island waters was an experience of severe sea-sickness such as I never hope to duplicate. As soon as I had reported to my new outfit, I asked to be directed to Philippine Army Headquarters. There, inquiry concerning the whereabouts of Lt. Col. Causing elicited directions to a private residence in another part of town. After some delay in threading

my way through unfamiliar streets, I found the designated address, and the Colonel. The search was crowned with a protracted interview on a variety of important matters: the pre-invasion period in Leyte, the Leyte Special Force, Major Balderian's organization, Col. Kangleon's headquarters, the clash at Baybay between the guerrilla troops of Kangleon and Miranda, and the guerrilla rivalries on the island of Samar.

On subsequent visits to Philippine Army Headquarters, I consulted with a number of the personnel who had been guerrilleros in Leyte. Invaluable was my session with Major Marcos G. Soliman, Secretary to the General Staff. Soliman had been chief of staff in the WIGWF. He threw considerable light on the organization of the WIGWF (particularly the General Service School for Officers), on the nature of the power rivalry between Kangleon and Miranda, and on the liaison between the islands of Panay and Leyte.

Some weeks after my arrival in Manila, I received a pass to spend a few days at the army ^{rest} camp at Baguio. Here, I found time to interview two officers with whom I had made prior arrangements by mail. The first, Lt. Luciano Bonicillo, was attached to the Filipino MPs of the Mountain Province. He described his guerrilla activities in the Alangalang sector of Leyte as the chief adviser of guerrilla chief Pabilona. The other officer, Lt. Apolinar B. Quetulio (2nd Combat Engineer Bn.) had been one of Miranda's chief assistants in the early days of the Ormoc guerrilla, and later had charge of ordnance work. Both men were clear thinkers and their penetrating comments on the difficulties of guerrilla organization were very welcome.

Back in Manila, I discovered several people who had been active in the guerrilla of northwest Leyte! In particular, I was pleased to learn that Judge Cabahug, hiding in San Isidro during the Occupation, was the new Secretary of Public Works. Secretary Cabahug told me much about northwest Leyte under enemy rule, and then introduced me to his private secretary, Pedro Yap. Yap had been a guerrilla intelligence operative in Carigara (under Dr. Posoncuy), as well as the editor of a guerrilla newspaper. He in turn directed me to the Office of the Budget Commissioner, where I was able to interview another former guerrilla operative, Francisco Monge.

There were three Americans who provided information of great worth. At the Veterans Administration Office in Manila, I met Orville A. Babcock. Babcock, an educator long with the Philippine School System, had been stranded in Leyte, and had served as supervisor of schools for guerrilla "Free Leyte." He was very well versed in the guerrilla activities and the politics of Free Leyte.

My second informant, Commander Charles "Chick" Parsons, I button-holed while he was serving as naval attache to President Osmena at the Malacanan. Some months later, I succeeded in securing a long session with him at his business address, the Luzon Stevedoring Company, and learned a great deal about the liaison between Col. Fertig's headquarters in Mindanao and the headquarters of Col. Kangleon in Leyte. Parsons also evaluated the work and personality of I. D. Richardson ("American Guerrilla in the Philippines").

My third informant was Parson's brother-in-law, Tom Jurika. Jurika had been associated with Gordon Lang in the Commissary Department of Col. Kangleon, and was thus in a position to discuss authoritatively many phases of guerrilla activities in South Leyte.

Through Parsons', I also was able to trace the residence of Rosario Escano, sweetheart of I. D. Richardson (referred to as "Curly" in Ira Wolfart's book, later produced as a Hollywood photoplay)! Miss Escano described the occupation of south Leyte and guerrilla activities there, referring discreetly to the role of her lover, Richardson.

Of my many interviews in Manila, only two proved disappointing. In both cases, the persons concerned were largely non-committal in response to my questions--presumably, because they knew too much. Senator Jose Veloso, arch-collaborationist of Leyte, had temporarily withdrawn from political life. I found him on the outskirts of Manila, (the proprietor of the Florian Club--a swimming pool and night club), evidently far from destitute. He received me politely, but coldly. He promised to send me a written statement, but he failed to keep his promise.

My other disappointing interview was with the young and dapper General Peralta. I had hopes that he would divulge hidden facets of the guerrilla rivalries on the island of Leyte, since he had directed the intelligence network of the Visayas. But aside from a few generalities that were common knowledge, Peralta had little to say.

I turned to the Philippine Legislature for my final interviews! I renewed my acquaintance with Atilano Cinco and Domingo Veloso, sent to Congress by their Leyte constituencies at the 1945 general elections. Two other members of the new Leyte deputation I interviewed at their Manila residences: Congressman Juan R. Perez (Tanuan) and Francisco Pajao (Maasin). They told me much about postwar politics in Leyte, as also about wartime conditions in their respective communities! They also introduced me to an American mestiza, Mary Quaile, who had lived in Leyte during the Occupation, and whose brother had served with the outfit of guerrilla chief Antonio Cinco.

Another valuable informant, Senator Carlos Garcia, came from Bohol. However, he had evacuated to Hilongos for much of the Japanese occupation, and offered helpful insights into conditions in South Leyte.

My terminal congressional interviewee was a Moro leader elected from Lanao, Mindanao--Congressman Manalao Mindalano! The Congressman had been commanding officer of the Maranao Militia Force of the 108th Guerrilla Infantry Regiment, and supplied me with many new facts about the guerrilla of Mindanao.

In my reference to the many Filipinos interviewed, I made no mention of the documents I had been collecting. The bibliography at the end of this study carries a select listing of the materials I have drawn upon, both published and unpublished. It is my intention to deposit with the library of Cornell University the bulk of the miscellaneous papers I have gathered in the Philippines, treating with subject-matter here discussed. Some of these materials are extremely fragile from age. Their general availability will rest with the judgment of the library staff.

It is important for a research worker to recognize the limitations of his own study. In this case, there are gaps in the material bearing upon the different topics reviewed in these pages. There is little that can be done to bridge the hiatus resulting from lost, decayed, burned, and

captured guerrilla documents. Similarly, many of the reports prepared by the Provincial Capitol were lost or destroyed during the hurly-burly of the Liberation. I had hoped to find copies of Provincial records coursed on to Manila. But again, in this case, the gutting of the public buildings during the retaking of Manila from its entrenched Japanese occupiers meant the destruction of all contents. I know I had tried in vain to obtain a complete statement of the wartime finances of Leyte both from the Provincial Treasurer and the Provincial Auditor in Tacloban, and from the offices of their chiefs in Ormoc. As for the picture of guerrilla finances, it is equally muddled. Looting of municipal treasuries by bandits as well as confiscation by guerrilla groups eliminated the municipalities as a source of information. And so it went with wartime reports of litigation, tax payments, etc. Nonetheless, it is certain that there are scattered documents and private papers still extant, and unknown to me. However, it is extremely doubtful, in view of the elaborate pains taken by myself, to interview as wide a sampling of people as possible, whether any new finds would materially alter the picture of the Occupation period.

It is possible that the Military Intelligence division of the Department of Defense will some day throw open its secret files covering the Japanese occupation and the resistance movement in Leyte. While this additional data may provide amplification of certain topics discussed in these pages, I suspect that it will not contradict the substantive conclusions advanced.

One final word: My sincere apologies to any purist who may take offense at violations of accepted word usage and grammatical form in the pages that follow. I thought it best to retain unedited and intact all quoted matter, thereby preserving the flavor of the Filipino sources consulted. I refrained from placing the corrected form in brackets out of deference to those of my readers who might object to such supererogatory instruction on my part.

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CHAPTER I

LEYTE BEFORE THE JAPANESE INVASION

To most Americans, Leyte is no more than a name on a Philippine map, though a name made famous during World War II. For that matter, many Filipinos living in Luzon or Mindanao know comparatively little more about it. It is therefore appropriate that we prefix to this record of Leyte's experiences during the war years a brief account of this Island's location and resources, its people and history, and its place in the over-all Philippine system of government and education. Having sketched in this background, we shall proceed in the remainder of the chapter to a launching of our study--a description of conditions in Leyte in the interval between the outbreak of World War II and the Japanese occupation of the Island.

The Island, Its People and Resources

It is not often that one turns to an arid collection of statistics for an appreciative account of a region and its inhabitants. But the 1918 Census of the Philippine Islands deserves a place alongside the most readable travelogue for its vivid description of Leyte--its setting, resources, and people. In introducing Leyte to the general reader, we shall transcribe this section of the 1918 Census verbatim, indicating where certain data require revision to be brought up to date:

Leyte is one of the largest and most fertile islands in the eastern Visayas group. The province of that name embraces the Islands of Leyte, Maripipi, Biliran, Guiguintangan, Pamaon, Limasawa, and several other adjacent ones. The Island of Leyte is situated southwest of Samar and is separated from it by the San Juanico Straits, which is said to be one of the most beautiful waterways in the world, but dangerous because of its swift current. The province covers an area of 7,783 square kilometers, but only a small portion of the land available for cultivation is as yet under tillage, because of the unfavorable topography of the country, the scarcity of labor, and the lack of capital necessary for the development of idle lands and for the opening of roads through the forests and remote valleys. The coast is much indented, especially at Carigara Bay on the north, Sogod Bay on the south, Leyte Gulf on the east and Ormoc Bay on the west.

Tacloban, the capitol, is the most important seaport on the eastern coast, while Ormoc is the outlet on the western part.

Like Samar and other Visayan islands, Leyte is traversed by many low mountain ranges. The ridge which extends from the northwestern part of the province to its southeastern extremity is very rugged and almost impassable. There are also many extinct volcanoes of which Mahagnao is the most important.

The climate is agreeable and healthful. Due to its geographical position, the island is favored with rainfall continuously throughout the year. The northern part of the province is often visited by

typhoons during the period of the northeast monsoon, whereas the southern and central parts are seldom affected by them. Oftentimes the high winds which pass over the northern part of Leyte are so violent as to blow down large buildings, uproot big trees, and damage the entire crops planted on this portion of the island.

The coastal plains and the interior valleys are fertile and productive. Hemp and copra are the most important products exported. Although rice is grown in all the towns of Leyte, corn is the principal food of the people. Other products raised in the plains are tobacco, bananas, papayas, and pineapples. The swamps are wooded with nipa and mangroves, while the mountains yield rattan and timber for various purposes. At present there are thousands of hectares of virgin forests which await the enterprising Filipino capitalist to convert them into actual sources of wealth.

Among the domestic animals are cattle, carabaos, hogs, horses, and goats. There was abundance of cattle and carabaos in Leyte before the Insurrection, but the ravages of war and animal diseases have greatly reduced their number.

While the rivers, lakes and seacoasts abound in fish, the mountains are well timbered. Coal is found in the towns of Leyte, Ormoc and Jaro. Petroleum and asphalt are also found in the town of Leyte, the latter being mined for street paving purposes. Gold is found in Pintuyan and San Isidro; sulphur around Mahagnao; mineral springs in the crater of Mahagnao, Ormoc, San Isidro, Caibiran, Mainit, Burawen, and Carigara.

The healthful climate and productive soil of Leyte attract many immigrants from Bohol, Cebu, Masbate, and Samar. The people are industrious and friendly, their most important pursuits being farming, and fishing. Lumbering is neglected because of the lack of good roads, and because nearly all the inhabitants live near the coast away from the sources of supply.

This province has 46 municipalities and 969 barrios. The capital is Tacloban, with 15,478 inhabitants. It is located in the northeastern part of the province.¹

As inhabitants of an island forming part of the Visayas cluster, the Leytenos speak a Visayan dialect. In fact, they speak two dialects--those of the East Coast a speech akin to that of Samar, those of the West Coast, a variant of the Cebu speech. Local pride and in-breeding have developed a species of narrow parochialism among some of the Leytenos. Those so affected have entertained a traditional coolness towards Filipinos coming from Luzon, a feeling heightened to positive ill-will toward the Ilocanos. Government administrators sent to Leyte from outside the Visayas have not always received full co-operation from the local population. And this, despite the Leytean reputation for hospitality to fellow-Visayans and to Americans. However, the rise of Filipino nationalism in the pre-war period was beginning to break down this clannishness.

1. Census of the Philippine Islands--1918. (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1918), pp. 183-184.

To complete the picture of pre-war Leyte, one very important detail must be added. Leyte's population was overwhelmingly Roman Catholic in religious affiliation. The Commercial Agent placed the number of Roman Catholics at 883,962. The next largest group, the Aglipayans, totaled only 23,678; and the Protestants numbered a bare 5,181.²

There is no need to pass upon the piety of the Roman Catholics. The inhabitants of Tanauan, Palo, and Tacloban enjoyed a reputation of devoutness, while their co-religionists of the West Coast were somewhat more lax. But the important thing to note is that the population of the entire Province in their daily living, on the occasion of critical personal events (baptism, marriage, death), at the public celebration of fiestas, and to an indefinable measure in their civic thinking were influenced by the Church. Separation of church and state precluded direct ecclesiastical meddling with public education. But the omnipresent influence of religion insured a not unfriendly working relationship between the public schools and the religious authorities.

A Rapid Survey of Modern Leytean History

The inhabitants of Leyte have traditionally felt a strong emotional attachment for their Island. Its history is long and colorful. Parents³ pass on to their children stirring tales from this past. And the schools add daubs of color to the legendry:

Limasawa, an outlet south of Leyte has the unique distinction of being the place where mass was first celebrated in the Philippines. Toward the end of March, 1521, Magellan discovered this little island, which then appeared to be a prosperous community. It was here that Magellan met Rajas Calambu and Ciagu, who feasted the Spaniards and exchanged presents with them.

Leyte, which was generally called Tandaya in the early days, was the first island of the Philippine Archipelago to receive the name of 'Felipina'. On the occasion of Villalobos⁴ expedition in 1543, a party visited this island in search of food, and gave the place the name that, in a modified form, the whole Philippines now bears.³

The Filipino historian, Conrado Benitez, notes the visit of the conquistador Legaspi to Leyte:

Sailing further, the expedition reached the island of Albuyo (or Leyte) and anchored in front of the large town of Cabalian, but found the people hostile. However, a chief named Canutuan, who came to the Spanish fleet, was detained; from him much information⁴ about the country was obtained, and it was he who guided Legaspi to Limasawa.⁴

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2. Vicente F. Jaca, "Extracts from the Report of the Provincial Commercial Agent on the Economic Survey of the Province of Leyte," 1945, p. 1.
 3. Census of 1918, op. cit., p. 184.
 4. Conrado Benitez, History of the Philippines (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1940), p. 46.

Leyte passed under the jurisdiction of Hispanic Cebu in close association with the neighboring island of Samar. At first, its population appeared tractable, if not docile, accepting Catholicism from Spanish missionaries along with military suzerainty. But resentments accumulated, finding expression in reversion to paganism.

During these years of anti-Spanish ferment, the Visayas were convulsed with dread of the predatory Moros. From their home bases in Mindanao, these Filipino corsairs of the Islamic faith swarmed forth to attack after the fashion of their Moorish namesakes of the Mediterranean.

No doubt, Visayan dissatisfaction with the ineffectve Spanish protection afforded against the Moros was a contributory cause of the seventeenth century uprisings.

During the Spanish-American War, Leyte joined her sister provinces in the gallant fight against foreign oppression. The unhappy conversion of the struggle for Filipino independence into the "Insurrection" against the United States eventuated in guerrilla fighting. And in April of 1902, on the terrain of Leyte's neighbor, the "insurrectionists" made their final stand: "Samar was the last island in the Visayas to submit because of the able resistance of General Lukban."⁵

Under American rule, Leyte advanced both economically and culturally, contributing her quota of leaders to the national political life of the Philippines. While it is true that she lagged behind some of her sister provinces in modernization, it is also true that she escaped the bitterness and turbulence of peasant revolt. Thus in 1940, on the eve of the promised Philippine independence, Leyte stood rich in tradition and resources, reasonably optimistic of what the future held in store.

Some General Information on Philippine Government

Concerning Leyte in its own right, we have said all that need be said by way of introduction. Yet, inasmuch as Leyte constitutes a province of the Philippines, we must add certain data applicable to all the Philippine provinces. Primarily, we must emphasize the Philippines are not a federal union of sovereign states enjoying residuary powers. Unlike the American states, the Philippine provinces are administrative subdivisions of a national unitary government centered in Manila--albeit, historic entities with local traditions and considerable cohesiveness. As such, the provinces exercise a limited autonomy, hemmed in by a network of national administrative offices functioning in the field according to the requirements of governing executive regulations.⁶

A typical province, pre-war Leyte was governed by an elective Governor

5. Gregorio F. Zaide, Philippine History and Government (Manila: S. E. Macaraig Co., 1938), p. 419.

6. The material on Philippine government in this section is drawn principally from Hayden's treatment of the subject and the personal observation of this writer.

assisted by two other elective members functioning with him as a Provincial Board.⁷ The Provincial Board implemented orders promulgated by the Department of the Interior, prepared the provincial budget, supervised the construction of public works, and promoted the public weal. From time to time, the Provincial Treasurer, Provincial Auditor, Provincial Fiscal, and the Division Superintendent of Education would be summoned to participate (separately or collectively) in a consultative capacity at sessions of the Provincial Board.

The officials mentioned, together with the District Engineer, the District Health Officer, the Provincial Agricultural Supervisor, the Collector of Internal Revenue, the Provincial Commercial Agent and other functionaries representing the Bureau of Forests, the Post Office, etc., were all answerable to their respective bureau chiefs in Manila. But as representatives of the national administration, these field officials were expected to furnish advice and co-operate with the Governor in every way possible within their respective terms of reference.

On inspection trips through the Province, the Governor attended complaints against local officials, exercising his power to suspend officials when required. Similarly, the Provincial Treasurer conducted inquiries into fiscal malfeasance in the municipalities. The Provincial Board scrutinized municipal ordinances and orders, invalidating those deemed in contravention of national law.

The judicial system of the province formed an element of the central administration. The highest provincial court was the Court of First Instance (two chapters in Leyte--one at Tacloban and one at Maasin), possessing general criminal and civil jurisdiction, and with its judge a presidential appointee. Below this court were the justice of the peace courts, servicing one or more municipalities. The justices, appointed by the President, disposed of petty litigation, referring the graver cases to the Court of First Instance.

The public prosecutor of the province was the Provincial Fiscal, appointed by the President but paid by the province. The Fiscal also served as legal advisor to the province and its subdivisions, and exercised investigatory power on behalf of the central and local governments. A provincial jail under a warden and a network of municipal jails assumed custody over such of the convicted as were not committed to national penitentiaries.

It is to the municipalities that one must look in any genuine assessment of self-government. In the Philippines, one found a Municipal Mayor

7. Joseph R. Hayden was much impressed by the influence of the provincial governor. He wrote: "The provincial governor is, of course, the great local official... His political position as the titular, and frequently the actual, head of the party in the province gives him additional power at home and, if his party be in control at Manila, increased weight with the executive departments and the legislature...."

"In addition to these advantages, the governor is almost invariably a man of substance with influential family and business connections.... He probably is also a man with a political future...e." (Joseph R. Hayden, The Philippines: A Study in National Development (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942), p. 284.

and a non-salaried Municipal Council elected biennially, and responsible for adopting local ordinances. The Municipal Mayor, assisted by a Municipal Treasurer, a Chief of Police, a Sanitary President, and other local administrators had oversight of local affairs within the legal boundaries determined by the Department of Interior in Manila and the Provincial Board.

The municipalities themselves were divided into a poblacion and surrounding barrios. The poblacion or town center contained the municipal administrative offices, the local jail, the central elementary school (with an intermediate division of grades V and VI), the church, the market place and the larger business establishments. The outlying rural districts or barrios were administered by tenientes del barrio or barrio lieutenants (appointed by the mayor), assisted by rural police, and contained the bulk of the farming population.

The disfranchisement of the illiterate hacked away at the size of the voting population. But even this restricted electorate saw its self-determination curtailed by the action of the Provincial Board in broadly construing its power to review and annul local enactments. Furthermore, the Provincial Treasurer's surveillance of local finances sometimes seriously shackled municipal initiative in undertaking permissible projects. To be sure, such checks guarded against abuses resulting from local corruption and ignorance. Notwithstanding, unless both the municipalities and the provinces were to be vouchsafed greater latitude for experimentation and, if need be, for the making of mistakes, democracy would wither at the "rice roots."

And now, a further observation on the linkage of local with national politics. In addition to voting for the elective municipal and provincial officials, the provincial population cast votes for members of the lower house of the Philippine Congress. Leyte, for instance, was divided into five Congressional districts, each of which chose a Congressional representative. Members of the Philippine Senate were chosen at large by the entire Filipino constituency, with Leyteno candidates sometimes elected.

Of the pre-war national political parties, only the Nacionalista party of Quezon and Osmana enjoyed any importance in Leyte. But fractional strife had long been keen in Leyte's party politics. The leading contenders in Leyte had been the Enage and Veloso factions--with their candidates and henchmen vying for provincial and municipal office and also for membership in Leyte's Congressional deputation. As for the issues separating the rivals, there were none; only lust for power and gain.

In concluding this section, the present writer would stress the pre-war centripetal tendency in the administration of Philippine affairs. It is most important that the relationship between central and local governments be fully appreciated because of its direct relevance to the subject matter of this inquiry. For when it is borne in mind that a province under ordinary circumstances is held to a large extent upon the leading strings of the administrators in Manila, the degree of self-reliance evidenced by Leyte during the war years is quite remarkable. Indeed, it is upon this manifested local self-reliance that the present writer grounds his advocacy of a greater liberalization of home rule for the provinces. The extension of popular control over local affairs is one of the most effective guarantees that the legacy of American tutelage in democracy shall not be squandered.

The preceding pages have sought to highlight the background of Leyte's history and resources, and the place of this province in the larger Philippine setting." Now we are prepared to follow her career during the brief but painful interlude of Japanese occupation!

A Critical Interval: Defense and Surrender

The Japanese invasion of the Philippines preceded World War II by some three decades! It took the form of a business infiltration that dovetailed nicely with the grandiose master-plan of the imperialist schemers! Carlos Romulo has recapitulated the sequence of stages in words expressing a simultaneous loathing and admiration.⁸

These sapping operations by-passed Leyte completely. Only a handful of Japanese actually settled in Leyte, and they played a negligible part in the provincial economy. Nonetheless, the Leytenos who paid heed to world affairs were clearly disturbed by the Japanese menace. They were among those inclined to wonder whether their American guardian fully appreciated the nature of the threat. But their fears were allayed by the conviction that Japan would not dare directly challenge the colossus of the West.

Into this atmosphere of outer calm and underlying disquietude burst the bombshells of December 1941.⁹ In rapid sequence the people of Leyte learned that the bomber and fighter squadrons at Clark and Nichols fields had been destroyed, the naval base at Cavite had been wrecked, and that Japanese troops were pouring ashore at Aparri and Vigan on the northern coast of Luzon! And though Leyte itself went physically unscathed in this initial assault, its people were left stunned and bewildered."

Yet the people of Leyte displayed a remarkable resiliency of character in their quick recovery from the first shock of war. Though not without fear, the great majority did not succumb to a defeatist paralysis! Obstinate, they brushed aside the direful reports of an American debacle at Pearl Harbor, insisting that these were monstrous lies cunningly planted by the enemy. Were not American soldiers fighting on in Luzon? Would the United States government supinely permit the enemy to wipe out its fighting men? Obviously, it was only a matter of time--90 days or perhaps six months--before a massive American armada would arrive by sea and air to hurl back the treacherous invader. Meanwhile, all patriotic Filipinos must gird themselves for hardships ahead, exerting their utmost staying power until the hour of relief and revenge should arrive.

Leyte's provincial government assiduously set about cultivating a high morale among the people. Governor Torres organized a propaganda committee, consisting of himself and leading citizens of forensic ability.

8. Carlos P. Romulo, Mother America, A Living Story of Democracy (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1946), pp. 66-68.

9. For the reaction of Filipino officialdom to the Japanese attack, see President Quezon's autobiography: Manuel Luis Quezon, The Good Fight (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1946), pp. 181-207."

Collectively or as individuals they toured the Island, convoking public rallies under the chairmanship of the municipal mayors, and exhorting the public to hold firm in its resolve to carry on. A writer of local reputation, Amador Daguio, undertook the setting up and editing of a small newspaper, The Voice of Victory, dedicated to fostering Leyte's will to resist. And in every community, the mayor, assisted by the principal of the central school and his corps of teachers, constituted themselves a committee of public information, purveying whatever cheerful tidings they chanced upon and organizing patriotic assemblies.

But emotional outpourings and fervent pledges of faith did not suffice. Unless opposition to the enemy was to remain mere verbiage, certain urgent preparatory measures must be pushed. First and foremost, a system of air-raid precautions must be instituted. In keeping with a bulletin on the subject sent down from Manila, air-raid shelters must be constructed and air-raid drills put into effect. Secondly, the citizenry must be organized into home guard units. And finally, the general populace must acquire some degree of adeptness in the essentials of first aid.

As things worked out, Leyte's air-raid defense measures remained embryonic. A few shelters of very limited capacity were built as adjuncts to larger structures, such as school or municipal buildings. And some of the municipalities organized drills against bombing attack, albeit with inadequate systems of "alert" and with insufficient practice. In part, this negligence was explainable by the belief that the enemy air force would find very few targets on Leyte worth bombing. And in part, knowledge that the Island lacked effective military anti-aircraft defenses discouraged elaborate civilian measures. Fortunately, when the Japanese invasion of Leyte did come, enemy aircraft played only a minor role, so that Filipino unpreparedness did not result in a heavy casualty toll.

In other respects, Leyte's preparedness was far more thorough. Proceeding in accordance with national orders, the inspector of Leyte's Philippine Constabulary, Major Arturo Reyes, organized the male citizenry into a Volunteer Guard. Each municipality had its own VG unit, drawn up according to Reyes' specifications, and placed under mayoral supervision. Many of the barrios also had their units, directed by the resident barrio lieutenant. The municipal police, assimilated into the Constabulary by national directive for the duration of the emergency, served as a kind of cadre in the organization of the local units. Around each municipality, a defensive perimeter was staked out, and VG patrols were assigned to nocturnal sentry duty. In addition, some of the municipalities held weekly or bi-weekly musters of their VG units on Saturday or Sunday afternoons, scheduling a training program of close-order drill (without arms), instruction in military courtesy and first aid, and a public parade for popular inspiration. Where possible, Philippine Army soldiers were detailed to assist the municipal police in the execution of the training program. Of all the municipalities, Ormoc had the best-trained VG unit.

As a companion organization to the Volunteer Guard, a Women's Auxiliary Service unit came into being in each community. Generally, a well-respected public school teacher or a socialite with qualities of leadership assumed direction of the WAS unit. Perhaps the primary mission of the WAS at this time was the training of its membership in the rudiments of first-aid. The

provincial first-aid program had been organized by Dr. Aldaba, head of Leyte Provincial Hospital, and carried out by the limited number of registered nurses and the teacher-nurses of the public school. These nurses, sometimes supervised by a local physician, served as instructresses in the training of the WAS. The WAS also took over a very important social service function, the distribution of community relief to the local indigents. It might be added that the female public school teachers of each community worked with devotion and energy in the service of the WAS.

Compared with the American and British home defense networks, the VG and WAS organizations in Leyte seemed rudimentary--almost laughable. But this training received by Leyte's citizenry was to prove its worth during the Japanese occupation when similar organizations sprang up--this time affiliated with the guerrilla. For the lesson learned by these Leytenos, men and women both, was the paramount claim of the community upon the service of the individual--a service that must be disciplined and ennobled by faith in the righteousness of the democratic Filipino cause. It was the esprit de corps developed by these citizen units, together with a bit of organizational know-how, that allowed a decentralized resistance movement to come into being and continue to function despite the unremitting pressure of hostile forces. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to assert that without the psychological conditioning undergone by the men and women of Leyte in this fashion, the unsundered Filipino soldiers who were to form the guerrilla nuclei would have found their objectives impossible of realization.

One other aspect of Leyte's preparedness program must be considered here--that of civilian evacuation from the centers of population. The question of an organized evacuation of the population from the town centers and the principal barrios to the hilly and less accessible interior of the Island would be settled by the military and civilian leaders. However, the imminent possibility of an official order spurred many Leytenos to take preparatory measures on their own initiative. Dwellers along the coastal area having farm property in the interior, or relatives and friends owning such property, made arrangements to transfer reserves of food and clothing to emergency refuges removed from probable sites of enemy invasion and occupation. And many of these people took up steady residence in the interior, coming to town solely to procure necessities, visit relatives, and learn the latest news. Again, these rehearsals of populational transfer served the resistance movement in good stead. It familiarized the evacuees with the difficulties to be encountered in changed surroundings, and allowed a breathing spell for making basic adjustments to a harsher regimen. Moreover, it encouraged the propertyless to survey the public forest areas, considering them as possible sanctuaries in case of necessity. When the time came of choosing between submission to a despised regime and taking up resistance, those who had already been initiated into the fraternity of the evacuees found the second alternative less formidable.

Integral to a system of defense preparations was the procurement of foodstuffs and other basic commodities for the resisting population. From the outset, this problem eluded the grasp of the provincial administration. Merchants, anticipating scarcity, withdrew commodity supplies from their shelves. At once prices shot upward. The populace, frightened by the

spectre of starvation, stampeded into panic buying beyond immediate consumption need, being skinned by conscienceless merchants in the process. Hoarding had begun.

Feebly attempting to halt run-away prices and restore public confidence, the government addressed an appeal to sellers and buyers alike. Merchants were adjured to roll back prices, consumers to abstain from inordinate buying. And as the wardens of the civic conscience, the public school teachers were mobilized to check profiteering. Under the direction of the principal of Leyte's normal school, the principal in every municipality organized the teachers into one or more Anti-Profiteering Committees and charged them to oversee transactions. The merchants were handed price schedules drawn up in Tacloban and were expected to conform. And the merchants did pledge compliance. Unfortunately, opportunities for evasion were manifold and enforcement remained the futile procedure of moral suasion. The plague of the black market settled over the land, persisting unexorcisable during the weary war years and the trying reconstruction period. Nevertheless, the teachers held fast to their anti-profiteering assignment, knowing that they had the good wishes of the people in back of them and gratified by the slightest success.

Meanwhile, business in general was stagnating. The Japanese invasion had virtually brought the inter-island trade of the Philippines to a standstill. Only a few speculators were willing to risk the uncertainties of transacting business deals away from home. The Chinese jobbers of Leyte ceased their purchases of abaca and copra. The rock asphalt mine at Villaba shut down. The lumbering mills suspended operation. Everywhere, the businessman was waiting anxiously for the situation to clarify, unwilling to put out capital that might never be recovered.

The Provincial Revenue Agent noted at the end of March, 1942:

Business is near collapse. No merchandise is coming to replenish the limited stock of the merchant. Prices are sky high. The people are always on the rush to buy for present and future needs.... Emergency bills drove away good bills and coins for safe-keeping.... During the quarter, the great shortage of manufactured tobacco products from registered factories of Manila and America were keenly felt. Many persons are manufacturing illicit cigars and cigarettes. To minimize this trade, the undersigned deemed it wise to induce these people to open cigar and cigarette factories under emergency permits which may be approved by this office in order that tobacco dealers in Leyte would find a supply of tobacco products to continue business as retailers....¹⁰

A period of extreme financial stringency set in. The collapse of business meant the withdrawal of ready cash from general circulation. To tone up the sluggish circulation of money, Governor Torres authorized the treasurers to apply government funds in the purchase of these two raw materials, so important in the provincial economy. The treasurers established stockpiles of abaca and copra (soon to be seized by the invader), thus placing cash in the hands of the farmers. But this had small effect.

10. Ceferino E. Sevilla, "Report on Economic and Internal Revenue Conditions in Leyte for the Period Ending March 31, 1942."

Fortunately, in accordance with a national executive order promulgated at the outbreak of the emergency, government employees in the provinces, (including the public school teachers), financed by national funds, had received an advance payment of three months' salary. Expenditures by these salary recipients helped prevent the stream of money from drying up completely. And, of course, the army finance department continued to disburse to the troops stationed in Leyte.

An even more serious financial crisis threatened to develop as provincial funds approached exhaustion. After the national Quezon government had evacuated Corregidor,¹¹ it authorized the printing of emergency currency from its temporary Visayan headquarters for release to the provinces. Leyte received some of these emergency notes; they scarcely sufficed. Finally, in April, 1942, authorization from Mindanao reached Leyte for the printing of 2,000,000 in emergency money.¹² A provincial Currency Board was to be constituted (consisting of Provincial Auditor Santa Cruz, Provincial Treasurer Jimenez, and Fiscal Parades), under supervision of the Provincial Auditor, which was to undertake at once the printing of the allotted sum. The Currency Board was promptly constituted, and a printshop was set up at the small town of San Miguel. By the time of the Japanese arrival in Leyte, over one-fourth of the monies allocated to the Province had been emitted. This emergency currency was to become a chronic bone of contention between the Japanese Military Administration and the Filipino population of Leyte under its control.

All this time, despite the gradual strangulation of Leyte's economic life and the mounting hardships entailed for the people, the general morale remained buoyant! But in April, 1942, came tidings of twin disasters: the cave-in of the Bataan defense and the overrunning of Cebu. Now faint murmurings, compounded of dejection and reproachfulness towards the United States, might occasionally be heard. It was to cultivate these popular misgivings through the counsel of despair that Congressman Jose Ma. Veloso came to Leyte.

Jose Veloso had been in Manila at the outbreak of the war. Regarded in national circles as Leyte's leading politician, he could be very useful as an instrument of central policy in his home province. So it came to pass that with the surrender of Manila to the Japanese, and the establishment of a puppet government, Veloso (together with politicians from other provinces then in the capital) was thoroughly briefed on the role of the "New Philippines," and dispatched to Leyte.

On arrival in Leyte, Veloso set about launching a whispering campaign of defeatism. Slyly at first, then with increasing audacity, he gave warning against foolhardy resistance to the invincible Japanese! Why bring rack and ruin upon their beloved Province? The Japanese would prove to be lenient conquerors if only the local population was disposed to cooperate.

11. See: Quezon, op. cit. (pp. 255-278) for an intimate account of the President's mental anguish in the dark days before he had charted his line of action.

12. An employee of the Auditor's office recalled: "... we were printing the emergency currency money authorized by the President of the Commonwealth of the Philippines to finance resistance against the invaders. The
(continued on next page)

Filipino ears were now somewhat more receptive to this propaganda line. But to the great majority of the people, the Japanese were even more abhorrent than before. Soldier escapees from the front were trickling back to Leyte, their lips reciting terrible tales of Japanese atrocities. How could Veloso's lulling advice square with the painful truth of these first-hand reports? Thus it happened that at one of Veloso's public harangues, his words so infuriated an anti-Japanese audience that they literally mobbed him and would have killed him but for timely police intervention. Shortly thereafter, Veloso was arrested by the army for unreasonable utterances and interned.

As the noose of Japanese encirclement drew steadily tighter, the economic situation of the people grew progressively worse. The food shortage had become critical. By provincial executive order, an embargo was declared on export of foodstuffs from Leyte. This measure was necessary because grain speculators were callously seeking more lucrative markets elsewhere for their hoardings. To avert famine in Leyte, President Quezon's refugee government had dispatched an emergency shipment of rice to the Island. Sacks of this relief rice was allotted to the municipalities for sale at nominal change by the municipal treasurers or distribution gratis to indigents. But this was no solution.

To make matters worse, there were already some symptoms of mass hysteria. Excited reports came through of enemy vessels sighted off the Samar coast. These alarms were soon proven false, but the tense atmosphere persisted. The public schools were closed and the school children, confined to the vicinity of the household, tended to increase adult anxiety. And now people began to wonder whether the armed forces would contest a Japanese invasion.

The military defense of Leyte was entrusted to the Leyte Provisional Regiment, United States Armed Forces of the Far East (USAFFE). The Regiment was organized in December, 1941, after the 91st Infantry Regiment had moved up to the front in Luzon. The Regimental personnel consisted of trained reservists--1,968 enlisted men and 98 officers. The 1st Battalion was located at Burauen, under the command of Captain Sevilla, with Captain Erfe as Executive Officer. The 2nd Battalion, under Captain Pachico, was centered at Jaro. And the 3rd Battalion led by Captain Nolasco, had its headquarters at Ormoc. Lieutenant Colonel Causing commanded the Regiment. He and the Samar commander together came under the direction of the "Sector Commander," Colonel Theodore Cornell. And Cornell, in turn, was part of the Visayas-Mindanao Force, commanded by Brigadier General William F. Sharp.

Major Abay headed the Leyte Provincial Battalion of the Philippine Constabulary, with Major Arturo Reyes as Provincial Inspector. The Battalion had three companies, located in Tacloban (under Captain Nolasco), Ormoc (under Lieutenant Miranda), and Malitbog (under Lieutenant Alejandro). After the Japanese had overrun Masbate, Leyte's P.C. was cut off from its regular source of supplies and turned to army depots to fill its requisitions. The integration of the Constabulary with the army was a function

Footnote 12 (continued):

printing... was necessary because no money from Manila was forthcoming, ..." Enrique Potente, "A Letter to His Friend, Mr. E. Lear," p. 1.

of the Sector Command, USAFFE.¹³

That the "Leyte Provisional Regiment" would resist the Japanese was a foregone conclusion--at least by its own men. Troop morale was high, the men inspired by the gallant combat performance of Leyte's 91st Infantry Regiment. One of Leyte's civil servants wrote:

It may be remembered that during the early part of the Japs' invasion in Luzon, soldiers from Leyte and Samar fought brilliantly against the hordes of invaders, particularly in Neuva Ecija, Aparri and Lingayen. They belonged to the 91st Infantry Regiment. President Roosevelt congratulated the provinces of Leyte and Samar and commended their sons for their courageous stand against the enemy.¹⁴

After the fall of Bataan, the Regiment prepared an interior defense position at Burauen, to which it was prepared to retreat for last-ditch defense. In April, the Regimental headquarters transferred to Jaro. The quartermaster depots were also established in Jaro, concentrating stocks of foodstuffs and weapons.

The army borrowed some P300,000 in emergency currency from the provincial government to finance its commissary and carry on its defense operations! To Pedro Gonzalvez, manager of Ormoc's sugar central, the army had awarded the contract for construction work on Ormoc's landing field. An American mining engineer, Chester Peters (who was to gain notoriety as a grasping, self-appointed guerrilla chief during the Japanese occupation), worked along with Gonzalvez. And since January, from 1,000 to 2,000 Filipinos were laboring on the landing field--many being volunteers receiving nothing but rice rations as compensation. Thus, though the odds weighed heavily against this small USAFFE force, it was determined to give an heroic account of itself in the "best tradition of Leyte.

And the army could apparently count on the provincial authorities for stalwart support. A gathering of the municipal mayors at the provincial capitol decided overwhelmingly in favor of armed resistance! Governor Torres himself decided to adhere to the instructions of Vice-President Osmena, given in conference at Cebu back in March. The Governor would place the civilian population completely at the disposal of the army, and would evacuate the provincial government from Tacloban in the event of an invasion. Should the military decide on surrender, the Governor would take orders from the military. This was the situation at the beginning of May, 1942!

Then on May 6th came stunning news--the fall of Corregidor, after a magnificent defense by the ragged forces of Lieutenant General Jonathan M. Wainwright. A few days later on May 10th, Brigadier General William F. Sharp, commanding the Visayas-Mindanao Force, acceded to an appeal from Wainwright and surrendered. But the surrender order issued by General Sharp was ambiguous insofar as it affected "the American outposts" as yet

13. Interview: Col. Juan Causing, February 1946, Manila, during Causing's visit to GHQ, Philippine Army.

14. Ramon Mercado, Through Blood and Fire, (Unpublished MS, Tacloban, Leyte, 1945), p. 1.

unreached by the Japanese. Was Colonel Cornell at his headquarters in Tacloban, Leyte, also committed to surrender; or was he thrown completely on his own with discretionary power either to continue the fight or give up?¹⁵

To understand Leyte's predicament at this juncture, we must briefly review developments at General Sharp's headquarters. We are indebted for our information to a Filipino ex-guerrillero, then serving as junior officer in General Sharp's GHQ at Del Monte, Mindanao. A keen observer, Lieutenant Sabelino had been Dean of the College of Liberal Arts in the Cebu Southern College before his military activation. We shall quote excerpts from an unpublished article in which Lieutenant Sabelino wrote up an important episode:

Much has been said of the glorious surrender of Bataan and Corregidor but little has been known or heard of the last stand of the southern forces of the United States Armed Forces in the Far East. This southern segment of what was supposed to be the Philippine defense was the Visayas-Mindanao Force consisting of whatever remaining troops were left after the great bulk of the Filipino manpower was massed in the gigantic and magnificent stand at Bataan and Corregidor. Over this force intended to receive the shock of the Japanese southward and central offensive of the Philippines was tall and gaunt Major General William F. Sharp.

From the beginning of the war, the inadequacy of arms and insufficiency of equipment was very apparent. On rare occasions supply ships could penetrate the Jap blockade but they carried equipment and food supplies but not ordnance equipment vital for defense.... Life in Sharp's headquarters was a long-drawn, anxious and nerve-racking experience of compiling disasters and defeats of the Pacific and Far Eastern bulwarks of Allied defense. The feeling is that of a condemned man at the end of a line of unfortunates ready for the gallows and waiting for his turn.

The departure of Quezon, Osmena, Romulo and the earlier exodus of General MacArthur, Sutherland and top ranking officers of the U.S. Army... were not news in inner circles. To those in the know, these rapid departures from the beleaguered Philippines meant only one thing: imminent capitulation.... Just as expected, Corregidor, the mighty symbol of Uncle Sam's sovereignty in the Philippines surrendered unconditionally on May 7, 1942, by command of the gallant but ill-starred Lieut.-General Jonathan Wainwright. General Sharp read the

15. According to Col. Causing (in interview) General Sharp had sent a radiogram to Col. Cornell declaring that he had relinquished command. The following day, he wired that he had resumed command and issued instructions for surrender. On May 21st Maj. Philips arrived as emissary from Gen. Sharp. Col. Cornell summoned Causing and his staff for a conference at Jaro. Before a rapt audience, Maj. Philips explained the plight of the USAFFE prisoners-of-war in Corregidor held as hostages pending surrender of the Visayan Forces. Philips also gave assurance that the Japanese had not been mistreating those who had already surrendered.

See also Gregorio F. Zaide, Philippine Political and Cultural History (Manila: Philippine Education Co., 1957), Vol. II, p. 347.

radio message of General Wainwright to surrender unconditionally. With his characteristic firmness of conviction and high sense of honor, 'Bill' Sharp regarded the demand for surrender with the brief remark: "We do not take orders from a prisoner of war."^p

Relentlessly, the Japs launched their big and savage offensive on Mindanao.... Supply depots were destroyed by air activities and transportation was a mass of wreckage in the motor pools bombed to smithereens. Troops could not reorganize and reform their lines lest their slightest move would be noticed by the ever-vigilant enemy observation planes.... With all fronts cracked, penetrated and overrun by the enemy there was no way left for General Sharp but to accept the inevitable demand for unconditional surrender.... In short, concise language, the Japs... demanded the unconditional surrender of General Sharp and his forces or else the American soldiers who surrendered at Corregidor would be massapred..^p

Bowed but not ashamed, General Sharp acceded to the appeal. Dictating the order he loathed to make, he ordered his forces throughout the Visayas and Mindanao to lay down their arms at 8:00 a.m., May 10, 1942.¹⁶

It would appear from this that Colonel Theodore Cornell, heading the Leyte-Samar sector of General Sharp's command, was automatically implicated in the terms of surrender. In point of fact, the issue was not at all clear-cut^p Lieutenant Sabelino points out that General Sharp transmitted another order "on the eve before the surrender day releasing his forces from his command effective May 10, 1945. That was a good and well-timed start for a resistance movement...."¹⁷

What was Colonel Cornell to do? Should he court the slaughter of his troops and perhaps of the civilians as well in a heroic flouting of the surrender order? Or should he allow discretion to counsel his valor, realistically acknowledge the disparity of the contending forces, and accept a by no means dishonorable fate? The Colonel pondered hard. On May 20, 1942, he addressed the following message to Governor Bernardo Torres:^p

It is with the deepest regret that I must inform you that conditions over which I have no control have necessitated the surrender of the troops under my command. Acting on instructions from General Wainwright, through General Sharp, I have this date issued orders for initiating the surrender. I am a soldier and have received an order--there is no question about it being obeyed.

I am sending a representative to Cebu on May 22, 1942, who will guide a detachment of the Japanese Forces to Samar and Leyte. All conflict with the Japanese Forces must be avoided. The destruction or hiding of any property is strictly prohibited. Prompt obedience to the Japanese Army and their orders is absolutely

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16. Lt. Comrado S. Sabelino, PA., "The Surrender of General Sharp" (unpublished MS), pp. 1, 4, 5, 7-9.
17. Ibid., p. 9. For further information on the surrender of Gen. Sharp see: Edward Haggerty, Guerrilla Padre in Mindanao (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., Inc., 1946), pp. 18-20.

necessary.

In spite of prevalent rumors to the contrary, I assure you that I and all my fellow Americans... are acting in good faith for what we believe to be the best interests of the Filipino people.

I realize only too well the difficulties with which you will be faced and take this opportunity to suggest that you exert every effort to insure a peaceful occupation of your Province. I am convinced that such a procedure is the only sensible one, and any other will result in unnecessary hardship on your people.

With deepest personal regards, I remain

Very sincerely yours,

T. M. Cornell, Col. Inf., USA, Commanding

The young American who was destined to play an active role in the guerrilla, I. D. Richardson, recollected:

By the time I got back to Colonel Cornell's headquarters at Tacloban, he had received a dispatch from General Sharpe mis-spelled. It was something to the effect that you are hereby released from your command, surrender is imminent.

"Boy," he told me, "if you stay with us, I'll have to surrender you with everybody else. That will be my orders, and where I fall down in the surrender agreement, the Japs will fall down in their treatment of our fellows that they already have."¹⁸

If Colonel Cornell believed that his Filipino troops would docilely adhere to his capitulation order, he was much mistaken. The Regiment was racked with mutinous dissension. The crux of the argument centered in a disagreement over the validity of General Wainwright's surrender order. As one Filipino soldier put it:

The order did not satisfy the Filipino fighting instinct as real fighters for it was believed that such an order was not a genuine wholehearted one because the said General was at the point of the bayonet! With the rapid spreading of Japanese propaganda, however, out of fear from the supposed might of the Nippon Army, and thinking they could protect their families in an easier way, a few Army officers and enlisted men surrendered to the enemy. But those who have tougher and stouter hearts... braved all possible dangers and fled to the mountains to escape from the enemy. They preferred to die rather than to surrender. There was a general feeling of hatred for the Japs, and the strong faith that America will come back sooner or later to give the promised aid.¹⁹

18. Ira Wolfert, American Guerrilla in the Philippines (New York: Bantam Books, 1945), p. 33.

19. Felix Sotto, Brief History, 6th Infantry, WLCWF, (Unpublished MS, Tacloban, 1945), p. 1.

In less flamboyant language, another observer wrote:

Among the soldiers themselves there arose serious trouble between those obeying the order for surrender and those soldiers not inclined to obey the order of surrender. I might cite that incident in Barrio Tingib, Pastranna, where in the school building which was used as temporary garrison of the Philippine Army, an altercation among the opposing soldiers developed into a riot, resulting in a shooting affray and a partial destruction of the school building.²⁰

The schism that developed within the Leyte command as a result of the surrender order was of paramount significance in its bearing upon Japanese occupation of Leyte. On the one hand, it demonstrated that the Filipino will to resist would not be stilled by decisions of a top command; it declared that a policy of state running contrary to the deep convictions of the masses would not be abided. From the ranks of those whose loyalties and convictions had thus been breached would shortly evolve the nucleus of a guerrilla movement. On the otherhand, this rift, emphasizing as it did the official character of the surrender proclamation, deprived the resistance forces of legal sanction and rendered them outlaws. For the ordinary Leyteno henceforth, his path of duty was obscure, his line of direction an affair of inner illumination.

20. Potente, op. cit., p. 3.

CHAPTER II

THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION OF LEYTE

The Surrender of Leyte.--As Leyte braced itself for subjugation, it took glum comfort in one reflection--that it was to be spared the swath of ruin out by the invading Japanese across other regions of their advance. A few days before their landings on Leyte, the Japanese strafed the Ormoc airfield, setting fire to installations and riddling what few planes were on the ground. Japanese aerial reconnaissance was satisfied that this was the full extent of the pre-invasion softening-up process required.

In the pre-dawn hours of May 25, 1942, the Japanese Imperial Forces landed at Barrio Pinamopo-an, Capocan and then proceeded on to the provincial capital to receive the surrendering forces. An official report summed up:

Imperial Japanese forces peacefully occupied Leyte on May 25, 1942. Following orders of the high command, USAFFE forces in Leyte formally surrendered upon arrival of the Japanese, although only about 300 actually presented themselves out of a total contingent of 1,800. Later about 300 more surrendered, but the rest, together with their arms, went back to their homes or hid in the mountains. As there was absolutely no fighting nor any destruction of property whatsoever, there followed a short period of comparative peace and order....¹

The surrendered Filipino soldiers were interned and placed under investigation. Most of them escaped physical torture so long as they complied with regulations. But their rations were scanty, and their dormitories dirty and overcrowded. As for the American officers, they were shipped out of Leyte as prisoners of war.²

The indecision of the military was shared by Leyte's political leaders. Governor Torres was reluctant to receive the Japanese invaders openly, and place his administration at Japanese disposal. Perhaps also, he was uncertain about his personal safety should he fall into Japanese hands. At a meeting of the Provincial Board, Governor Torres and Board Member Angel Espina concurred in delegating interim powers to Board Member Pastor Salazar, a man already suspected of pro-Japanese leanings. Thereupon,

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1. B. Torres, Provincial Governor, December 21, 1942. To: Japanese Military Administration for the District of the Visayas.
 2. 1st Sgt. Martiniano Bao recalled that the surrendered troops were quartered in the 2nd Cadre Barracks, the officers occupying the upper story. The enlisted men ate USAFFE rice, and Bao became the mess sergeant. The officers contributed money to Bao, who was permitted to go to the market place and make purchases of viands.

Towards the end of July, the surrendered troops were transferred to new makeshift quarters in the Leyte Provincial High School. The Japanese employed the prisoners to groom their horses, clean the stables, cut grass as horse feed. The prisoner compound was administered along the lines of a military camp, with "taps" at 10:00 p.m.

Torres and most of the other provincial officials departed from Tacloban to their evacuation places, standing by for news of developments.

It was Salazar, the rabidly pro-Japanese Senator Jose Ma. Veloso, and certain lesser public figures who received the Japanese invasion force and entered into negotiations with the Japanese Military Administration." The Japanese made it plain that they expected full Filipino cooperation, in view of the capitulation, and that they required the prompt resumption of posts by all provincial and municipal officials under the aegis of Manila's "Philippine Executive Commission".³ Only in this way could they hasten the stabilization of social and economic life, these prerequisites of an efficient Japanese administration.

Under such pressure, Governor Torres and his administrative staff straggled back to the provincial capital, and awaited Japanese orders. The Japanese Military Administration, the governing occupation agency (backed by the might of its troops and the Kem-pai-tai, its military intelligence corps), instructed the Governor to order the return of all evacuated civilians to Tacloban and the other towns of Leyte, require that all unsurrendered soldiers report and turn in their arms, reopen the public schools, and bring about the prompt resumption of normal agricultural and business pursuits.

The Japanese Garrison:--Japanese troops, estimated at 2,000-5,000 in number, were centered in Tacloban and Ormoc during the first phase of the occupation of Leyte. From time to time they despatched patrols to check up on the behavior of the Filipinos and to look into the compliance with Japanese regulations on the part of municipal officials! From these two principal bases, the Japanese also established eight smaller garrisons! distributed over the Island at towns such as Malitbog on the south coast, Baybay on the west! Carigara in the north-center, Dulag and Palo on the east. The complement of these detachments fluctuated in size, with personnel withdrawn from one point and transferred to augment their forces elsewhere. By retaining mobility, the Japanese felt confident of their ability to police the Island, despite the relative paucity of their members during this first phase.

As they appeared to one observer in Tacloban, the majority of the

3. In his study of wartime Manila, David Bernstein wrote: "On January 23, 1942, the Japanese appointed Vargas [Jorge Vargas, lately Secretary to President Quezon] Chairman of the Executive Commission, with power to govern 'under the commands and orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces'. Six executive departments were created, headed by Filipino Commissioners! but with Japanese 'advisers'. Every one of the collaborating Filipino Commissioners appointed by Vargas... was an experienced and respected Filipino.... The lesser personnel consisted chiefly of holdovers from the Commonwealth Government.

"The Executive Commission lasted until October, 1943. It was extremely useful to the Japanese as the chief means of carrying out their will in the Philippines. It tried to conduct the normal functions of government, to provide food and relief to the thousands of destitute and hungry, to reconstruct public works destroyed in the fighting, and to induce Filipino and American guerrillas to surrender. In most of these endeavors it was not overly successful." David Bernstein, The Philippine Story (New York: Farrar, Straus & Co., 1947), pp. 162-163.

invaders

were veterans of Bataan and Corregidor campaigns and were shabby and fierce looking, big and muscular, especially the Koreans and those coming from the warring tribes of northern Japan. Any mistake made by civilians, no matter how trifling it was, which was mostly due to misunderstandings caused by language problem, oftentimes resulted in slappings of the Filipinos by the Japs. It became the basis of the bitter resentment of the former against the latter"... Consequently, the people, cognizant of the tyrannies of the invaders, as much as possible kept away from the "superior" Japs.⁴

Popular Reaction to the Surrender:--It is an impossible task to attempt to resurrect the mood of the general population. All extant accounts are colored by the subsequent activities of the narrators, by their orientation towards or away from the Japanese regime. Nevertheless, we can discern strands of dismay and of terror, of curiosity and of hope, of pugnacity and of submissiveness, sometimes peculiarly intertwined in the same person.

A clerk of the provincial auditor's office expressed the attitude of many Leytenos:

When the Japs actually landed on our shores on May 25, 1942, people came to town to watch just what the newcomers were coming to do. It was observed that some days from their arrival they did not yet show to us their wares. There were already some abuses they call slight, like for instance the catching of pigs and chickens without giving compensation to the owners, the carrying off of personal and household belongings whenever they seek quarters in private houses during the night, to let loose their mules to graze on growing fields of corn.... People tolerated these, on the belief that it is natural that some soldiers of an invading and conquering force are prone to commit some petty excesses....⁵

In the same office, the Cash Examiner and Property Inspector set down under the lurid title, Through Blood and Fire, a dramatic memoir of confused emotions:

... The decision to surrender was the least expected. The people had undergone the rigors of evacuation; entrenching themselves in the distant hills and mountains which they believed a safe place from the bullets, molestations and tortures of the invaders.... They were apprehensive thinking that at any moment they would be pitted in between the hordes of advancing forces. This decision to surrender giving as its main reason "for the welfare and safety of the civilians" the people could sigh with relief. However, a question was raised in the minds of everybody as to what would be the outcome of this peaceful surrender.... "Shall we be able to enjoy the freedom"

4. Mercado, op. cit., pp. 16-17.

5. Potente, op. cit., p. 3.

we used to have or shall we be vassals or slaves devoid of any liberty? What dangers lurk beyond?" Those were the prevailing questions of the day.⁶

But the officer who had commanded the Ormoc detachment of the Philippine Constabulary at the hour of surrender had no doubts. For him, the turn of events was deplorable:

The JIF arrived at Ormoc on 25th May 1942, occupying Camp Downes and Ormoc proper on the same date... there was confusion and panic among the civilian population. The morale of the people in the town as well as in the mountain at that time was very low....⁷

Filipinos who had stood shoulder to shoulder in indissoluble fraternity were transformed. The surrender order had melted their solidarity. Each man eyed his neighbor nervously, panting to confide his troubled thoughts, but strangely tongue-tied. An employee of the provincial auditor's office turned to his chief:

I conferred with Mr. Santa Cruz and tried to sound his opinion. I asked him as to what advice he could give. He coolly and hesitantly told me that he could not give any advice and that everyone must decide for himself....⁸

Rumors of all kinds began to circulate. The people told of Japanese soldiers rounding up all the Chinese inhabitants of Tacloban. It turned out that

these Chinese were members of the Chinese Nationalist Party and that their pictures taken during one of their gatherings was taken by a Nip photographer and was in the hands of the Japanese Military Police. Everybody seemed to be jittery... one cannot help to be distrustful.⁹

By no means objective, the recollections of several amateur chroniclers associated with the guerrilla deserve quotation as testimony to public feeling contemporaneous with the Japanese landings:

From Abuyog in the east central sector, this hate-seared narrative comes down:

Then the puppets came over and took the reins. Fired by the principles of Nippon, most of them were, of course, wolves in sheep's clothing. They vociferated loudly and much, but accomplished little, if at all, in the interest of public welfare....

6. Mercado, op. cit., pp. 1-2.

7. Blas E. Miranda, "Report on the Western Leyte Guerrilla Warfare Forces," 23 October 1944.

8. Mercado, op. cit., p. 10.

9. Ibid., p. 11.

As long as they could profit much from the Japanese occupation, all that they could probably think of was... have the Japs comb the fields, capture "misguided elements", and bow them beneath a blood-dripping Jap sword.¹⁰

Here is the reaction of Dulag, an neighboring municipality, as recalled by one of its guerrilla leaders:

When Leyte was placed in the crossroad after the surrender of Corregidor, Dulag waited for decision of the Provincial Board. The decision of the Municipal Council then was to abide with the decision of the Provincial Board. Indeed the government officials of Dulag did follow, when it was decided by the Provincial Board of Leyte (with some officials attending the conference) to lay down the arms even if at heart the municipal officials of Dulag did not have an iota of sympathy....

In the poblacion... the people did not show excitement. The Municipal Officials remained thereat in order not to invite attention and suspicion, but had to get out one by one except the Municipal Secretary, Mr. Marcial Lagunzad, who, under pressure of the responsible citizens of the town, was forced to accept the post of Puppet Mayor for the sake of the safety of the civilian population....¹¹

Albuera on the West Coast found voice in this diatribe:

... That was a period of doom for the civilian populace. Killing of civilians regardless of age, sex, rank, and education; looting of properties and abusing the women were rampant in the Japanese administration. With the enemy constantly at our heels, Democracy seemed a mere shadow...¹²

A provincial employee, shortly before abandoning his job, described the people of Tacloban:

Although the people seemed to be contented and happy, yet it was but superficial, as I could read from their faces that in the very core of their hearts the seed of hatred had already germinated. People moved mechanically. There was a prevailing tension.¹³

Summing up, another provincial employee who became a guerrilla official wrote:

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10. Francisco Aurillo, "The Philippine Resistance Movement: Abuyog Version" (Unpublished MS, Abuyog, Leyte, 1945), pp. 1-2.
 11. Eugenio Villegas, 3rd Lt. Inf., Actg. Mun. Secy., Dulag. Sept. 10, 1943. To: The Provincial Governor in the field. pp. 2-3.
 12. Sotto, op. cit., p. 1.
 13. Mercado, op. cit., p. 13.

I found that the country around us was filled with the atmosphere of dissatisfaction over the decision of the military authorities to surrender. People everywhere I found were complaining of the cowardice of our officials.

... It was already evident, however, at least in this part of the province, that the people who feel in themselves that they can endure to undergo the hardships were inclined to fight, while those who preferred easier life decided to surrender. Most of our so-called "intelligentsia and the moneyed classes also preferred to surrender...."¹⁴

Rise of Opposition to the Japanese: -- In the face of expressions of defiance, dejection and dread, we find official reports quite buoyant. Governor Torres, equating obedience to Japanese orders with mass endorsement of the changes that had occurred, issued a statement drenched with satisfaction:

... Provincial and municipal governments, by order of the Japanese Military High Command, were immediately organized. 90% of the former officials and employees returned to their old positions. The people were seemingly satisfied with the new order."¹⁵

But Taaloban officialdom was soon disabused of its fancies. Opposition to Japanese rule, inchoate at first, began to crystallize: "... business was staggering to reach its bottom of collapse..." the Provincial Revenue Agent recorded. "The public was finding it harder and harder to buy things for its needs...."¹⁶

To the pinch of economic privation was added the spur of patriotism. Armed groups formed in the districts outside the reach of the Japanese garrisons! They pledged themselves to a renewal of the fight against Japan, a fight conducted along guerrilla lines, consisting of sniping against Japanese patrols, liquidation of outspoken protagonists of Japan, destruction of materiel of military value to the Japanese, and an inflaming of the civilians against the pro-Japanese provincial government. To support these activities they turned to municipal and barrio officials for help, requiring that these representatives of the people undertake to provision them and promote the cause of resistance by appropriate local activities. The guerrilla groups also turned directly to the people, soliciting contributions for their sustenance. And now, with savageness and cunning, they launched their program of ambushes and assassinations.

Governor Torres thus accounted for the rise of opposition to the Japanese regime:

14. Potente, op. cit., pp. 2-3."

15. B. Torres, Prov. Governor. Dec. 21, 1942. To: Japanese Military Administration for District of Visayas.

16. Provincial Revenue Agent Sevilla. Report for quarter ending June 30, 1942.

Then came an influx of discontented elements and ex-USAFFE soldiers from neighboring provinces, who, because of lack of food in those places, were now seeking refuge in Leyte where food was easier to procure.... Upon arrival in Leyte, they began to preach false propagandap To a certain extent, the ground was fertile, and with not much difficulty, they succeeded in organizing bands and guerrilla. About the beginning of August, when we had almost everything normally functioning.p. troubles began. They began to cut telegraph and telephone lines,pdestroy bridges, threaten and intimidate the peace-loving inhabitants and officials cooperating with the Japanese, and sometimes kidnapping and killing them. Some began to loot stores and bodegas in remote places, stopped passenger trucks and extracted money from conductors and passengers. In some municipalities, the treasury and post office were robbed and stores were looted.p..¹⁷

There is an inconsistency, no doubt motivated by fear, running through this recountal. Torres does admit that "the ground was fertile" for guer-rilla propaganda. Some months later, he dared put his fingers on two factors:

To a certain extent, uneasiness on the part of some of those who went to the mountains was caused by fear of the Japanese due to drastic measures, such as punishing and killing done during the first months of occupation. Another remote cause is lack of money, because of the prohibition of use of emergency notes. When they found that they could not spend their money in the towns, they were forced to stay in barrios and in the mountains where the money was still in use.¹⁸

Once the stage of conflict had been reached, what followed might be characterized as the "logic of events." The Japanese, incensed at this balking of their policy, threatened harsh reprisal and backed up their threats with maltreatment or execution of suspected pro-guerrilla families. Some of the pro-Japanese leaders were themselves appalled by the brutal treatment meted out to civilian evacuees by Japanese search patrols. At the Inter-Visayan Convention, it was resolved that "civilians found or captured in the mountains should be turned over to the authorities of the Republic of the Philippines for such action as may be legal and necessary.p The same resolution also stipulated that the "Constitutional provision guaranteeing that no property rightfully belonging to the citizens of the Republic be taken without due process of law and just compensation should be rigidly respected."¹⁹

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17. B. Torres, Governor. Dec.p21, 1942. To: Japanese Military Administration for District of Visayas.
 18. B. Torres, Governor. March 1, 1943. To: Commander, District of Visayas, Japanese Imperial Forces.
 19. First Annual Visayan Convention, held in Cebu City, April 14-16, 1944. Resolution No. 6, Recommendations 5b and 5e.

For the safety of patrols, the Japanese Military Administration insisted that the area bordering both sides of the Provincial Road and other principal thoroughfares of each municipality be cleared of all obstructions to visibility. With good cause," they determined to prevent the conditions that would facilitate the laying of ambushes. This posed a serious problem in a tropical region where grasses and shrubbery grow rank unless constantly pruned, uprooted or scorched. And the evacuation of large portions of the town populations in advance of the Japanese invasion had deprived the local authorities of manpower for clearance work.

On orders of the Japanese," the Governor proceeded to despatch messages to the various mayors stressing the urgency of clearance. To the Spanish-speaking mayor of Jaro who hastened to comply, Acting Governor Salazar sent a warm letter:

El esfuerzo que usted ha desplagado para limpiar los arboles de ambos lados de la Carretera Provincial en tan poco tiempo merece nuestro encomio. Espero que su actividad sirvira de ejemplo de los otros Alcaldes de la provincia.²⁰

Other reports of compliance reached the Governor:

San Miguel: "... This municipality has cleared at least two thirds of whole length on both sides of the road. However, we are doing the work every day."²¹

Merida: "... I inform you that the order has been complied with by requiring all males from 18-60 under voluntary labor!"²²

Hilongos: "Clearing of bushes" of road sides in provincial and municipal vecinals are being started. There is not much shrubbery of roadsides within jurisdiction" of this municipality."²³

Palo: "... clearing" of road sides and tall grasses and shrubbery within this municipality has been carried out by the people. I assure your office that possibly by the end of the week everything will be in ship-shape condition."²⁴

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20. P. Salazar, Acting Provincial Governor. August 7, 1942. To: Clemente Lastrilla, Municipal Mayor, Jaro.
 21. Fortunato Lagarde, Municipal Mayor, San Miguel. July 29, 1942. To: The Governor.
 22. Custodio Mendola, Municipal Mayor, Merida. July 28, 1942. To: Provincial Governor.
 23. Melquiades Flores, Municipal Mayor, Hilongos. July 28, 1942. To: Provincial Governor.
 24. Simeon Militante, Municipal Mayor, Palo. July 28, 1942. To: Provincial Governor!

Baybay: "... poblacion, barrios and sides of the provincial road within my jurisdiction are cleared by voluntary labor."²⁵

Eventually, most of the municipalities announced the job completed. But this matter was one requiring constant attention. Repeatedly, as Japanese patrols were ambushed in the course of the occupation, Tacloban had to despatch notes of reprimand and warning to the various municipalities.

By August, the Japanese Military Administration was sufficiently perturbed by the insidious non-cooperation of the people to attempt a new approach. Turning to the interned Filipino USAFFE soldiers, the Japanese directed the highest ranking officer, Lieutenant Colonel Juan Causing, to organize the Leyte Special Force.²⁶ Some 180 men were released (with stern warning that they were still under surveillance), commissioned to help maintain law and order in the occupied areas, apprehend all suspected of opposing Japanese rule, and put down any possible anti-Japanese demonstrations. By this move, the Japanese were saying: "Behold, your late heroes are now on our side. We are not really bad fellows. Work with us for the good of your beloved Province."

Supplementing the activities of this special constabulary, the municipalities, on orders from Tacloban, organized Home Guard units. They were patterned after local civil defense organizations formed before the Japanese invasion, but now oriented in support of the invader.

Burauen reported:

I have the honor to inform that office that the Home Guards of Burauen was reorganized on August 16, 1942 with 2nd Lt. Eriberto Alibadbad as the leader and sixteen active members.... The present work of the members is purely detecting and spying suspicious persons in the Poblacion due to the fact that they are out of arms.... However it is expected that after a few days from now on the same will have thirty members as soon as more male persons will come to town.²⁷

And Caibiran transmitted "to the Office the attached complete list of the names of the members of the Home Guard in the poblacion of the municipality of Caibiran."²⁸

Neither the Special Force nor the Home Guard units materially strengthened the position of the Japanese in Leyte. They succeeded only in making the guerrilleros and their supporters more cautious. Save for

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25. G. C. Modina, Municipal Mayor, Baybay. August 3, 1942. To: Provincial Governor.
 26. Causing stated that he had declined appointment as chief of the Cebu Constabulary. In Leyte the special force had detachments at Tacloban, Alangalang, Sta. Fe, and Barugo. (Interview: February 1946, Manila, during Causing's visit to GHQ, Philippine Army.)
 27. Eriberto Alibadbad, 2nd Lt. August 17, 1942. To: The Provincial Governor.
 28. E. C. Maderazo. August 21, 1942. To: The Provincial Governor.

the few opportunists who, seeking to stand "in good with the Japanese, trapped some of their countrymen, most of these auxiliaries went about their assignments in purely perfunctory fashion.²⁹

An entirely different matter was the efficient counter-intelligence network built up by the Japanese. Procuring the services of venal Filipinos, the Japanese sent shivers of fright up the spines of the people. Did anyone give shelter to an unsundered soldier escapee? Was anyone concealing a rifle or pistol? Let him beware, for his life was endangered. Sometimes, a "stoolie" for the Japanese would intimidate the offender into paying a bribe, promising non-betrayal--only later to violate his oath and inform. These hirelings also spied on the local officials, reporting to the Japanese anyone suspected of disloyalty."

In turn the guerrilla units tightened their security controls, making short shrift of suspected informers and swearing a vendetta against collaborationists.

The upshot of all this was that" residents in Japanese garrisoned districts, particularly the poblacion or town center, and the local officials came to be branded as ipso facto pro-Japanese. The burden of" proof rested upon the townspeople in their demurral against such accusation. They must somehow, without detection by professed collaborationists, establish contact with the resisters and demonstrate their loyalty" to the cause of the resistance struggle. Similarly evacuees from the poblacion, when investigated by Japanese patrols, must clear themselves of their presumed pro-guerrilla taint to escape molestation. And the municipal officials in Japanese policed sectors must show their zeal in anticipating Japanese wishes to be regarded as fully satisfactory servants of the new regime.

With the exception of those adroit enough to straddle the fence,

29. Staff Sgt. Gregorio Gabe had been a member of the Special Force before joining the guerrilla. He stated that the Japanese had no confidence in the loyalty of these auxiliaries. (Interview: 41st Inf. Regt., Ormoc, Leyte. January, 1946).

1st Sgt. Martiniano Bao, also served in the Special Force under Captain Sevilla in the Alangalang sector. He stated that Majy Reyes had organized this outfit in September 1942, and that Causing only succeeded to the top command in October. As for the Japanese, they looked upon the Special Force contemptuously. Col. Omori often brandished his sabre menacingly when addressing the Force. The members received neither pay nor clothing--although they did receive 50 centavos apiece from a visiting Japanese general after a special inspectional review. The guerrilla, according to Bao (and this may very well be a prejudiced statement) got along amicably with the men under Captain Sevilla, maintaining close liaison. (Interview: 1st Replacement Battalion, PA, December, 1945.)

Sgt. Bibiano Mesias declared that the Leyte Special Force consisted of three 30-men platoons, two armed with rifles. After the unexpected joining of the guerrillas by Causing and his party and Sevilla's flight to Samar in early 1943, the Force was disarmed by the Japanese and confined to barracks. It was disbanded soon after. (Interview: 1st Replacement Regiment, PA, December, 1945.)

families, in fact whole areas, came to be marked out as either pro- or anti-Japanese.

St. John's observations are particularly apt:

But in the North, particularly around Tacloban, where the Japs had a lot of men and full control, the people did not like guerrillas. They were afraid of guerrillas, and they had reason. Lots of guerrillas told me: "Tacloban people pro-Jap. They do not fight Jap, they live in Jap town, therefore they pro-Jap. If I catch Tacloban man, I kill him."

.....
All that the people in the South knew was they hated Japs

When war came, and when the Japs took over the northern part of the Island, the southern people naturally got mad at the northern people. There were old feelings against the Tacloban people anyway. There probably was jealousy because the Tacloban people lived better.³⁰

In the districts firmly within Japanese grasp, the puppet officials began to work out certain forms of control that soon crystallized into definite procedures. Or more correctly, as the central government in Manila elaborated its system of controls, it sent directives to the provincial authorities for local application. The Japanese Military Administration of the Province continued as an authority plenipotentiary, handing down special directives and tampering with this or that mechanism as it saw fit.

The first few months of the Japanese occupation were months of turbulence and dread for the average Filipino of Leyte. An official of Abuyog did not exaggerate when he said:

The living condition of the people in this locality during the week was punctuated with fears and jitters.... The tenseness felt during the week was heightened by rumors to the effect that the outlaws would come over to town and make an all-out reprisal against the residents in the poblacion....

Information reaching this Office from time to time all brings sad news concerning some barrio lieutenants and peaceful citizens in the barrios being kidnapped and killed by outlaws. Bloodshed is the clamor of these maniacs and everywhere in the locality it is appallingly reaping a heavy toll in the lives of the innocent citizens.... All these casualties could not be verified as no policemen could be assigned for this purpose without endangering his own life.... This Office staggers to imagine how the people would live--especially those in poblacion--if and when the Japanese Military Detachment in this locality is withdrawn without a subsequent relief.³¹

The unwillingness of the policemen to serve, much less to actively carry on their duties, was notorious during this period. The mayor of

30. Lt. Joseph F. St. John (as told to Howard Handelman) Leyte Calling (New York: The Vanguard Press, 1945), pp. 94-95.

31. Ricardo Collantes, Municipal Treasurer, Abuyog. September 7, 1942. To: The Provincial Governor.

Barugo wrote:

The police are afraid. You know very well the present condition of many municipalities regarding the maintenance of Peace and Order. Because, if not for my courageous inducement to my policemen, no one would be willing to render service to the Police Department of my municipality at this time.³²

The police were handicapped for lack of arms. They depended upon the Home Guard to back up their efforts. The mayor of Biliran seemed to have brought affairs under control:

The peace and order of this municipality is still being controlled by the local authorities in spite of the fact that my police force are having no arms but only regulation stick. And with the organization of my Home Guards which is a great help to the maintenance of peace and order of the locality, the police force is becoming strong and may be able to cope with any accident that may occur within the municipality.

The Home Guards with 20 members have been increased to 40 members to be divided into 4 groups with 10 members each group. Each group has its own leader who is taking charge of the patrulla every night in the poblacion while the members of the police force is making patrulla in the day time with the help, of course, of the Home Guards....³³

Tacloban underwent a severe and prolonged siege of trepidation. She was invested by guerrilla groups on all sides, her water artery was choked off by the piracy of Marcial Santos and his brigands, and rumors were abroad that she would be razed to the ground. But the guerrillas never effected a penetration of the provincial capital.

32. Mayor Arpon, Barugo. October 27, 1942p To: Provincial Police Inspector.

33. Alberto Enage, Municipal Mayor, Biliran. September 15, 1942. Weekly Report to: Provincial Governor.

CHAPTER III

THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT IN LEYTE

P A R T I

A. Development of the Resistance Movement

That the cast a particular society takes on is conditioned by the circumstances of its formation may be asserted as almost self-evident. In studying the make-up of Leytean society under guerrilla control, we must begin by paying some heed to the setting--to the forces and personalities from whose concatenation emerged the phenomena under review. We have elsewhere surveyed the salient features of collaborationist society in occupied Leyte as the axis along which resistance thrust out its lines of opposition.¹ But the resistance did not reach its mature dimensions at once, much less coalesce into recognizable patterns of self-coherent individuality. We turn to an examination of this uneven development.

Again we throw back to the Japanese invasion of May, 1942. We must pursue the career of that portion of the population electing to evacuate to the mountainous interior of the Island rather than remain and accommodate itself to enemy rule. We must examine the conditions under which this fugitive population dwelt, the adversities faced, the undertow inexorably dragging many back to the occupied areas. This was the dismal opening act of resistance.

But we are studying resistance as an organized phenomenon, not as a disjointed, flapping negativism. We move on to inquire into the rise of Leyte's guerrilla groups, their generic traits, their organizational problems. We shall trace the high points of the story of guerrilla unification in the Province, indicating why full realization of unification did not come about. This historical narrative is the necessary prelude to a more functional analysis of life within guerrilla domains. We shall also scrutinize the conflict between the two principal leaders of resistance on Leyte. We do so not only because the matter is of intense interest, but also because it shows how a narrow-ranged motivation on the part of the resistance leaders could work to nullify the attainment of appropriate goals.

Evacuation

The coming of the Japanese to Leyte threw the civilian population into panic and confusion. A large proportion abandoned their possessions and scuttled to the hills. They acted with a frenzied spontaneity. Some, of course, had already contemplated evacuation to mountain refuges, and had made advance preparations. Between the time of the Japanese bombing of Manila in December, 1941, and the landing of their expeditionary force (May 25, 1942) on the beaches of Leyte, the Province had undergone a state of siege, allowing the inhabitants ample time to reflect upon their course of action. Weird tales of Japanese sadism had cast a long shadow of terror upon the minds of the credulous provincials, so that they scarcely knew what to expect. For them, flight to an inaccessible interior seemed to offer the sanest alternative. There, in concealment, they might pursue a policy of

1. Elmer N. Lear, "Collaboration in Leyte, the Philippines, Under Japanese Occupation," Far Eastern Quarterly, XI (February, 1952), pp. 183-206.

watchful waiting and observe the deportment of the invaders.²

Their stay in the mountains posed a number of grave problems for the Filipino evacuees.³ First of all, they were threatened with banishment beyond the pale of law and treated accordingly if captured. This outlawry would subject their town properties to sequestration, their mountain goods to seizure, and their persons to detention and disposition by summary justice. For no sooner had the Japanese entered Tacloban, the capital, and there established a military administration than they reconstituted the pre-invasion Filipino civilian government. And among the first instructions imparted to Filipino authorities was the order for the immediate return of the evacuees.

The Japanese were bent upon restoring law and order as early as possible. Only under such conditions could the economy function properly. And a stable economy in the conquered territories was essential for the fullest exploitation and integration of the area into the master plan of the new economic order! Pelted with edicts and regulations by their own officials"now cooperating with the Japanese, and also made fearfully aware of Japanese power as the latter dispatched patrols from their garrisons, the simple Filipino farmers were utterly disoriented and demoralized.

Second, should the Filipino decide to remain in his hideout, all these considerations notwithstanding, he was confronted with an unexorcisable specter--hunger. Whether craftsman in Tacloban, Ormoc, or the smaller municipalities, or simply farmer, his withdrawal to the mountains entailed cutting off his regular source of income. How was he to sustain himself and his family with no working capital? Even the more far-sighted, who had provided for this contingency by preparing tiny subsistence farms, would have great difficulty. For bereft of equipment, a single family might succeed in eking out some of its food requirements, but whence would come the surplus exchangeable for other commodities? And should prowling Japanese patrols uproot this family and compel it to seek a new place of concealment, how would it manage to eat, clothe itself and tend the ill?

Third, a further complication, an almost inevitable incident of the" disruption of normal civil process made itself felt! As ordinary government collapsed, the antisocial parasitical elements"of the Province burgeoned, regarding the now unprotected peaceful elements as legitimate prey to fasten

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2. In his report to the Japanese administration, the puppet Governor took account of these factors: "Due to very strong propaganda of the Americans, the minds of the people were poisoned against the Japanese, and at the beginning they simply did not want to be under the Japanese" B. Torres, Provincial Governor, March 1, 1943. To: Commander, District of Visayas, Japanese Imperial Forces.
 3. "Due to the frequent forays of the Japanese, the people of the lower" Philippine Islands have added, with grim humor, an American word to their vocabularies. This is the word 'evacuate'. Chick's [Parsons] young American guerrillas did not take long to note the similarity between the Filipino pronunciation of this word--which they called 'e-bac-whit"--and that of 'buckwheat'. The return is called balikuate, a Visayan word. Travis Ingham, Rendezvous by Submarine (New York, Doubleday, Doran & Co., Inc., 1945), pp. 76-77.

upon. Working individually or in bands, these brigands began to exact tribute from the common people, and did not stop at slaying those who balked. Sometimes, with greater cunning, these batteners upon the misfortunes of their countrymen posed as patriots, pledged to a last-ditch fight against the invader, but requiring assistance to prosecute their program. Their "shakedowns" of the evacuees were thus defended as contributions which would only be withheld by selfish, unpatriotic wretches.

As a result of these adverse influences, many of the families originally set to evacuate came to reconsider their decision. It was difficult enough to endure the asperities of uprooted life under any conditions. If in addition, these families were to be molested by the offscourings of society on the one hand, and a devilish foreign invader on the other, the resulting anguish was more than could be stomached. On top of this was the steady pull of the collaborationist appeal to return to a normal mode of life, without penalty for previous dereliction. What wild impulse moved them to evacuate in the first instance, they asked themselves. The Japanese were not actually as oppressive as they had imagined. They would return to their farm or their trade, obey regulations--and live. After all, what could they do to change the situation? If America ever came back, it would be time enough to join in the fight.

So they reasoned, and so some of them, a little hesitantly, made their return. They were not bad people, or a conscienceless lot. They were terribly muddled, and let their reactions to immediate events direct their next steps. Some of them had later occasion to repent of their return and again evacuated to the hills. Others remained, caught up in the vortex of events Significant choices are not as reversible as one might desire.

The Rise of Guerrilla Groups

The resistance movement of Leyte did not come into being as a full-blown, organized affair. Unlike the situation in other countries (where in anticipation of enemy occupation of their land, carefully organized outfits, with recognized leadership, an adroit program of operations, and often a supporting ideology that provided elan, went underground resolved to foil enemy plans of consolidating the regime), resistance in much of the Philippines, and particularly in Leyte, was a haphazard affair. It expressed no single outlook and possessed no unified program. It represented a form of adjustment on the part of sections of the population to a situation not of their own devising, wherein they saw no possibility of cooperating with the enemy and took to active opposition as the only alternative. No systematic plan for carrying on this resistance, no social philosophy to clarify the meaning of this resistance, no program of reconstruction after the expulsion of the invader provided a dynamic.

The brutal execution of an American prisoner of war by the Japanese command in Tacloban provided a strong impetus to Filipino resistance in Leyte. A member of the guerrilla government of Free Leyte caught the mood of his countrymen:

Sometime in July, 1942, the Japs inaugurated their famous practices of brutalities, tortures, bayoneting and killing people indiscriminately. People suspected of any crime by them were being herded like cattle, tied up by the neck and killed in cold blood. There may

be some hyperbole in this lurid depiction, for its suggestion of mass slaughter is misleading. But that there was a sadistic bloodthirstiness already in evidence may be accepted as substantially correct.⁷ It was at this time that Capt. James Bullock, SC, USN Reserve, and his three Filipino companions were taken from their concentration camp to the municipal cemetery of Tacloban and killed there without any known guilt. There immediately sprang up the public manifestation of the existence of the Leyte Guerrillas. Hundreds of guerrilleros armed with rifles and bolos paraded the streets of Palo, [neighboring municipality to Tacloban] a block away from the Japanese garrison, bearing the American and Filipino flags, headed by Sergeant Eusebio Teraza of the Philippine Army.⁴

The spontaneity of the guerrilla formation and upsurge may not have occurred as suggested. That there was an outburst of revulsion against the Japanese for the execution of Captain Bullock and his Filipino companions would be assented to universally. The population felt itself prostrate, at the mercy of a sanguinary beast ready to tear apart its hapless victims at the slightest provocation. No sooner had this thought registered with the Filipino, who is not meek and does not quail before his oppressor, than seditious talk began. Soon small groups of unsundered soldiers, fervent in their hatred of the conqueror, began to gather in conspiratorial cells for purposes of direct action.

Generally, the resisters were clusters of Philippine Army and Constabulary men (formerly attached to Leyte outfits and in large part natives of Leyte) distrusting Japanese pledges of no harm to all who would peacefully turn in their arms and surrender. Atrocity stories discouraged them from relinquishing their only protection--their weapons. They found refuge in the interior, remained isolated for some weeks or months in temporary hibernation, eventually emerged cautiously to reconnoitre, learned of each other's existence, and banded together for mutual support. To this original nucleus might be added survivors from Bataan and the other Luzon campaigns who took a stand on non-surrender. These "stragglers", as they were called, might have been Scouts or members of activated Leyte regiments. Now weary, dejected, and in some cases ailing from the effects of malaria, dysentery or tropical ulcers, they sought sanctuary in their own homesteads. Further increments came from younger and more vigorous civilians, never mobilized for military service, but impelled by a variety of personal reasons to throw in their lot with resistance.

"Puppet" Governor Torresé report to the Japanese command on guerrilla activities gave a fairly accurate analysis of how anti-Japanese developments began:

... The USAFFE having surrendered by order of Gen. Wainwright, there was no fighting, but less than one half of the USAFFE troops in Leyte formally surrendered. Many of the men, including many of the officers, went to the mountains with their guns. It was at first believed that they were only afraid to be made prisoners of war. For three months there was comparative peace and quiet. In September, however, hostilities began....

The causes for the disturbance of peace and order in Leyte are

4. Potente, op. cit., p. 4.

as follows:

1. Due to very strong propaganda of the Americans, the minds of the people were poisoned against the Japanese, and at the beginning they simply did not want to be under the Japanese.

2. The Filipino soldiers and officers of the USAFFE were divided. Some wanted to surrender, more did not want to. They took to the mountains and waited for an opportunity.

3. Many of them still think that America can and will send aid to the Philippines. This they hear from radios which they were able to take with them to the mountains.

4. There are many who have joined the guerrillas for no other motive than to take advantage of the situation. They rob, they plunder, they kill innocent and defenseless civilians. These are the worst types.

5. To a certain extent, the uneasiness on the part of some of those who went to the mountains was caused by fear of the Japanese due to drastic measures such as punishment and killing done during the first months of the occupation.

6. Another remote cause is the lack of money because of the prohibition of the use of emergency notes which was the only money most of the people had at that time. When they found out that they could not spend their money in the towns, they were forced to stay in the barrios and mountains where the money was still in use....⁵

These bands did not conform to any single pattern. In fact, they presented the greatest diversity. At the outset, their numbers were necessarily restricted. Firepower was of greater value than manpower. Since a goodly number of the potential resisters were weaponless at the time they established contact with the early guerrilla chiefs, they could not be immediately mustered into service. Afterwards, when the bands had achieved some degree of cohesiveness and actively launched a program of canvassing for arms and ammunition among the civilian population, the small arsenals that they succeeded in amassing made possible a further expansion.

At the close of 1942, Governor Torres wrote:

On the whole, our enemies are poorly armed and equipped. Except about three or four bands which probably have about 100 rifles and several machine guns, revolvers and automatic rifles each, the rest have only bolos and about 1 rifle to every 20 men.... Those bands operating in municipalities facing Cebu [WLGWF] and Mindanao [SIGF] are constantly receiving aid in form of money, arms, and ammunitions, brought to Leyte on paraos bancas. Groups operating in Samar go back and forth between narrow San Juanico Sts. [units of Santos and Pabilona].⁶

Torres grossly exaggerated the aid being received from outside the Province. Most of the weapons mustered by the guerrilla came from scouring

5. B. Torres, Prov. Gov., March 1, 1943. To: The Commander, District of Visayas, Japanese Imperial Forces, thru the Commander, Leyte and Samar Sector.

6. B. Torres, Prov. Gov. Dec. 21, 1942. To: Japanese Military Administration for District of Visayas.

the countryside and confiscating arms, or from improvising home-made shot-guns (latongs).

The problem of subsistence was another restrictive factor. In those parts of Leyte where the Japanese patrols did not penetrate, it was possible for guerrilla members to spend part of their time in gainful occupation, assembling periodically at a stipulated place." This combination of working and fighting was ruled out in areas where the Japanese troops effectively policed the civilian populations. Here, the resistance bands were compelled to retire to hidden, relatively unpenetrated areas and establish a kind of camp. By so doing, they cut themselves off from the possibility of directly satisfying their own food requirements, and were obliged to seek other methods (to be discussed below)!. Under these conditions, the size of their commissary was a limiting factor in their enlargement."

In the beginning, these guerrilla bands were uncertain of the scope of their activities. In certain cases, they did not really understand their reason of being. Some Filipino soldiers, thrown on their own by higher echelons, refused to lay down their arms; they feared Japanese barbarism. For them resistance was the only means of self-preservation. They would hang on, prolonging the struggle after the official capitulation until the day (sometimes despaired of--never disbelieved) of the great American deliverance.

Others, and this is indeed an extremely slippery matter to establish quantitatively, were fired by an unquenchable nationalism. For them, prudential considerations were of secondary moment. All they knew was that their nation's honor had been defiled and upon them weighed the noble task of redeeming that honor. Since so glorious a purpose could not be served individually, organization was the necessarily inferred course. And as guidance and inspiration in this direction, the history of the Philippines--nay, that of their own Province of Leyte--could be consulted.

The motivation of another guerrilla element, perhaps the largest at the outset, was clearly put by war correspondent Gunnison:

At the start, a few Filipino roustabouts saw the advantage of making up small gangs and preying on the public. They'd call themselves guerrillas but they plundered and pillaged both the Japs and the Filipinos. If they had a grudge against anyone, the word was passed and the man was killed. It grew on Leyte and Samar and elsewhere into open terrorism.

With no over-all organization, the best comparison is that of gangland mobs on each Island, with their territories marked off by gentleman's agreements between the mob leaders. All this was done in the name of the guerrilla movement. If the civilians in the barrios or towns refused to send food or information or even their daughters into the hills, they were marked as fifth columnists or pro-Japanese. Farmers were prevented from bringing food into towns. What did get in went to the black market at prices that made it nearly impossible to purchase.

... From late 1942 to late 1943 in Leyte and Samar, more civilians than Japs were killed by the irregular guerrilla bandits. The Filipino citizen lived in mortal fear of the Jap on the one hand and in apprehension of the bandits on the other.⁷

A perfect exemplification of this species of guerrillero were Marcial Santos and his concubine Ceferina Estogera:

Kangleon wanted the support of Marcel [Marcial] Santos, who was the only savage guerrilla I've been able to turn up among my inside guerrilla contacts, ... Santos had a small fleet of bancas which he stealthily operated between dusk and dawn. When he could catch a few Jap supply barges starting out at night to run between the islands or down the coast, he'd cut them off and take them over.... He sold some of the captured Jap supplies to the black-market boys and some to other bandits. But where he made his mistake was in boasting of all the money he had--100,000.

With that much money, there is also the inevitable woman--a guerrilla by the name of Peserima Espojero [Ceferina Estogera].... She ordered executions and was as brutal as Santos.

One night at a beach headquarters, two guards heard Santos plotting with Peserima to bury their 100,000 pesos. Peserima insisted that the two guards who went along to dig the hole should be killed and they were. But they weren't the same two guards who had overheard the conversation. A few nights later, the listeners came into the camp, shot Santos and captured Peserima, who had been hit in the leg as she lay beside Santos. They blindfolded her and forced her to tell where the money was, promising they'd take her to a cemetery--out of courtesy to her former leadership--dig a grave, finished her off and buried her. Kangleon got to the Santos camp just too late, but he routed up the Santos unit and it is still operating as a guerrilla army outfit.⁸

And another desperado flying the guerrilla banner was Antonio Cinco:

In peacetime he was a cochero cairametta, driver of a little two-wheeled horse-drawn vehicle.... When the Japs came in to Leyte in May of 1942, Cinco killed one who tried to commandeer his cairametta and horse.

The Japs caught Cinco and threw him into jail after a brutal beating.... But by miraculous luck Cinco was able to wiggle his feet loose from the bonds....

Cinco hit for the hills where he gathered a gang around him and began pillaging the countryside. He sent his men into the villages

7. Royal Arch Gunnison, "Filipino Firebrands," Colliers, CXIV (Dec. 16, 1944), p. 74.

8. Ibid., pp. 74, 76. (Note: It was Maj. Balderian of the 95th Regt., rather than Kangleon--then in the South--who coped with Santos. Balderian assigned Santos' unit to Capt. Pabilona's battalion.)

for food, clothing, women, money and ammunition, and his men insisted on taking more than they needed." If a civilian refused, his house would be burned and his wife or daughter taken to the hills....⁹

The guerrilla leader who respected lawful procedure was hard put to curb his more truculent subordinates. Alluding to the same Antonio Cinco, Richardson said:

... A guerrilla leader's control over his men is "elastic"! He can lead them only where they want to go. I found this out in arguing with Captain Cinco, who had been "unified" by Kangleon. Cinco... was about thirty years old, with an appearance of being powerfully built. He had been a tartenela (driver of a two-wheeled horse carriage) before the war, then had become a guerrilla leader. He was enjoying himself very much. He had more women than any other man I had ever known. But I have never seen him smile!... Cinco's face appears frozen.... Leading a man like that is a matter of tying a rope around his neck, unless you are leading him where he wants to go.¹⁰

One of the most searching critiques of guerrilla mentality was provided by an American educator in the Philippine school system, a man who had found shelter among the Leyte resisters during the Occupation and served as guerrilla school administrator.

I have been especially interested in the psychological effects of the war upon the soldiers and civilians.... Overnight the soldier was released from the discipline and the regimentation of the camp. At first he was shy, diffident, frightened and homesick.... But as time went on he gained confidence and became imbued with his own importance; he learned the power and prestige of the rifle in dealing with the civilian population. His nomadic life, easy living, freedom from responsibility made him self-important and less sensitive to the rights and feelings of others. What he asked at first as a favor he now demanded as a right. When the metamorphosis was complete, the timid soldier... came to believe that anything which advanced his own self-interest was undoubtedly for the good of all. He looted all the treasuries to secure funds for himself and his dependents--and probably believed, with all sincerity, that he was performing a patriotic act; he didn't seek the poor and starving families of the unemployed. He levied taxes and solicited contributions in order that he and his dependents might receive pay; he never saw the hundreds of teachers and other employees who had received no pay for six months. When he wished to buy rice, corn, or camotes, he fixed a low and arbitrary price; but he didn't remain at the market to see that the poor people might purchase as cheaply.

... The guerrilla believes that his role is the only important one in the community.... The civilian population have unwittingly helped to strengthen... this idea. Wherever the guerrilla goes, he is given dances and public entertainments; he is wined and dined; he

9. Ibid., p. 74.

10. Wolfert, op. cit., pp. 116-117.

is deferred to. The civilians do these things largely because they fear to give offense; the guerrilla accepts it as recognition of his worth and importance....^p The average soldier is young, poor and provincial; he has little formal education, and has never before occupied a position of authority. Although he can't govern himself, he is suddenly placed in a position where he makes laws and regulations for others. You can't expect too much justice without wisdom.... The "under-dog" is now having his day, and one shouldn't be surprised that it spoils him just a little....¹¹

Despite its somewhat patronizing air, this commentary is remarkably perspicacious^p In two respects, though, it needs correction. It does not advert to the selfish avarice of many civilians, nominally resisters, who refused to do their share, save when coerced. And it fails to point out that even the under-dog-become-ruler is capable of admirable self-restraint when brought to realize that he is part of a movement engaged in transforming his society into a better place for all.

When all has been said, the final assessment made by the same writer, still holds:

... I know most of the guerrilla "heads" on this coast--and they are, as a group, nice fellows.... But everything considered, the guerrilla has shown more restraint and common-sense than I expected.¹²

Early Guerrilla Functioning

The greater number of Leyte's guerrilla organizations began their careers in independence of one another. Whether they had a fixed camp, from which they sallied forth on various missions,¹³ or whether completely mobile, they tended to confine their operations to a few barrios, or at most, to the limits of a single municipality. If the area within their circuit was unoccupied by the Japanese, and the municipal government was functioning, they would enter into communication with the local officials, enlisting support for their enterprise. They would throw their weight behind the police of the poblacion (the administrative center) of the municipality and the rural police serving under the barrio lieutenants^p In return

11. Orville Babcock (Inchon, Leyte, November 20, 1942), unposted letter to his daughter.

12. Ibid.

13. The puppet Governor wrote: "... There are numerous bands operating throughout the whole province. Not all are ex-USAFFE. Many bandits also.... Most of the groups operate simply for purposes of banditry and they are the ones that do more harm to the people. It is also noticed that most of them try to evade encounters or engagements with Japanese forces. They commit their depredations against defenseless inhabitants." B. Torres, Prov. Gov. Dec. 21, 1942. To: Jap. Mili. Adm. for District of Visayas^p Ambushing of isolated Japanese patrols was the favorite occupation of these early bands. Thus, "four men of the Leyte Constabulary were sent out to Barrio Pawing, Palo... to verify news that a truck load of Japanese was ambushed.... The men returned... and confirmed.. .." J. Causing, Sr. Insp. Leyte Constabulary. Aug. 9, 1942. To: Japanese MP.

they would expect that "the advice they" gave to the local officials regarding public policy be accepted and acted upon and that the municipality or the barrio officials actively aid them in meeting their subsistence problems.

Where the disorganization following the Japanese invasion was carried to the point of municipal collapse, with the local officials themselves taking flight, the guerrilla helped to constitute an interim government. In some instances, the guerrilla exercised complete control over the civil government, allowing the latter only a nominal existence. In fact, after the creation of a civilian militia as auxiliary to the guerrilla, the local officials might be inducted into this force and breveted militia officers.

In the course of time, the various guerrilla units began to send out feelers to the neighboring organizations. Japanese patrols and the far-flung espionage nets of the Filipino collaborators made this necessary.¹⁴ Since a strengthening of the Japanese grip over any district meant further outposts for them from which they could advance to new absorptions, it was to the interest of all guerrilla units to maintain close contact with each other. Every scrap of information concerning Japanese reinforcements, troop movements and campaign operations gleaned by the intelligence operatives of one unit would be passed on to the others. Moreover, when the Japanese were preparing some sort of mopping-up activity in one sector, the defending unit might appeal for assistance from its neighbors. In particular, these requests for aid took the form of borrowings of ammunition and other supplies.¹⁵

In addition to such fraternal contacts brought about by the exigencies of the moment, some of the stronger and more far-sighted guerrilla chieftains looked ahead. As the American navy began to spearhead Allied

14. Puppet Governor Torres put guerrilla casualties at the end of 1942 at 1,000. "Only 100 Japanese casualties and 5 constabulary soldiers." Gov. Torres. December 21, 1942. To: Japanese Military Administration for District of Visayas. The disparity in casualties suffered by the contending sides is, of course, reversed in guerrilla accounts. There is no way of getting at an independent check on figures submitted. Both sides undoubtedly inflated the reckoning of enemies slain.

15. The organization of Marcial Santos may have been composed primarily of brigands, but it did oppose the Japanese. Its plea for arms, addressed to a stronger group, might have been formulated by any one of the small guerrilla units:

"... Remember when our hearts were so closely united in an iron of understanding for the welfare of our respective organizations? When the least thing I could have, I always gladly share with you, and in return you share fifty-fifty with me your ammunition which is your life blood itself? When my Camp was burned, I instinctly turned to "you...."

"But now that is past. You have already grown and expanded...."

"We are now at a loss as to how we could hold any longer. I realized now that it is futile. We now lack arms and ammunitions! Without your once undivided cooperation and helping hand, we will be forced to leave this Sector...." Ceferina L. Estogera. 24 April, 1943. Letter: "My dear Col. Pabilona"

efforts to wrest control of the South Pacific from Japanese dominion, and military headquarters was established in Australia, Filipinos envisioned the eventual liberation of their own Archipelago. For that purpose, it would be necessary to assemble as much data as possible concerning Japanese troop concentrations and deployments, the type and location of enemy installations, the type and quantity of Japanese resources, the routes of their supply convoys, the nature of their hold over the local economy, the alternative sites of invasion beachheads, and the character of the support they might expect from the native population. The gathering and transmitting of information, so varied and important, presupposed if not unity at least close coordination of activities among the guerrilla units of the Province.

Further, once this sort of thing should become feasible, shipments of arms, medicines, uniforms, and other supplies by submarine or airplane would depend upon Filipino demonstration of effective operational capacity. Or, to put it differently, official recognition of a guerrilla organization by Allied Headquarters, as the authorized representative of the Allied forces in a specified region, with all the rights appertaining to that status (such as promulgation of martial law effective over the civilian population, receipt of supplies from Allied sources, and a likelihood of the guerrilla troops being granted retroactive pay and various bonuses and veterans privileges, etc.), began to loom large in the minds of some of the leaders. On top of this, add the personal ambitions for self-aggrandizement on the part of some chieftains, and you have the centripetal forces at work.

It is a futile and foolish endeavor to determine which of the many groups that sprang up in Leyte is entitled to the honor of chronological primacy. Esprit de corps, surviving among the remnants of these proto-organizations even after their membership had been absorbed into larger and more permanent groups, impelled each to press claim to the distinction. Moreover, the civilian population among whom these early cells were born (provided relations between civilians and guerrilla were reasonably amicable), tend to corroborate the testimony of their own guerrilla fighters. By early June of 1942, within less than a month of the Japanese occupation, guerrilla groups were already functioning throughout the length and breadth of the Province. And their activities were not confined to the merely passive phases of ferreting out information and collecting arms. The more intrepid were already ambushing Japanese patrols, stamping out banditry, executing a swift and ruthless vengeance upon Filipino espionage agents of the enemy, and instructing the municipal officials in the proper conduct of their local administrations.

B. The Problem of Guerrilla Unification

It was only on the very eve of the American landings that the resistance movement of Leyte achieved a semblance of unification. Full and complete unification had yet not come into being. True enough, a single organization, the 92nd Infantry Division, USFIP, of Colonel Kangleon had been recognized by GHQ SWPA as the official guerrilla outfit of Leyte.¹⁶

16. USFIP--United States Forces in the Philippines, the designation adopted by Col. W. W. Fertig in Mindanao, and accepted by Col. Kangleon. The 92nd Div. Hq. also referred to itself as IAC, or Leyte Area Command.

Furthermore, it might be conceded that there was no rival organization active in the field. Nevertheless, although the Western Leyte Guerrilla Warfare Forces (WLGWF) was now largely dispersed, and although elements had been absorbed into the 96th Infantry Regiment of the Kangleon command, it succeeded in maintaining a separate cadre, and petitioned the Guerrilla Affairs Division of the United States Army's Philippine Headquarters for recognition soon after the expulsion of the Japanese. In fact, officers and enlisted men of the WLGWF offered their service to the American landing forces as guides, technicians and labor squads. The study of the organization and activities of the resistance movement on Leyte gives rise to the question--why was even partial unification so long delayed in this Province?

Captain Erfe

Surprisingly enough, in the light of this failure, it should be noted that mergers and consolidations of guerrilla bands had made considerable headway by the autumn of 1942. Indeed, one group on the East Coast, centered in the Dulag-Abuyog-Burauen-La Paz district, asserted by fiat a kind of jurisdiction over the other units in northeast and northwest Leyte, themselves in various stages of fusion. Its leader, Captain Glicerio I. Erfe,¹⁷ largely by virtue of his rank, tended to regard these other units as parts of a province-wide confederation. He attempted to back up these claims by assigning station numbers to the different outposts, establishing an intelligence liaison, and requiring the preparation of organizational reports and their submission to his headquarters. As a capstone to the structure of activities he was building, he presumed in the latter part of 1942 to draw up operational plans for the launching of a simultaneous assault by all the units against the Japanese outposts. His objective: to push back the enemy to one corner of the Island, Tacloban! Had the general attack gone off as planned, perhaps the prestige of Captain Erfe would have been augmented, and he might have welded the resistance movement into a unified whole.

Unfortunately, various wrinkles crept into the execution of this smoothly conceived plan. Its success was limited. Thereafter, Captain Erfe's supremacy was purely vestigial. His instructions were diluted to the impotence of mere suggestions. Insofar as they were intended for units on the East Coast, Lieutenant Balderian was beginning to make his influence felt! In South Leyte, Captain Erfe never had real contact, except perhaps with the unit of Lieutenant Nuique at Sogod. The coming of Colonel Kangleon to southern Leyte, his unification of the bands scattered throughout that district, and then his northward penetration into the bailiwick of Captain Erfe undermined the structure that had been built up. Moreover, in establishing close contact with the organization of Lieutenant Balderian, and nominally at any rate subjugating Balderian to his command, Colonel Kangleon was in a position to crush Erfe.

Disaffection crept into the organization of Captain Erfe. One of his trusted subordinates, Captain Landia, broke off and annexed his unit to the organization of Colonel Kangleon, while others remained only lukewarm in their allegiance. In mid-1943, Captain Erfe and some of his faithful officers were arrested on charges of insubordination and illegal issuance of

17. At the time of the Japanese invasion, Erfe was serving as Executive Officer of the 1st Battalion, Leyte Provisional Regiment, USAFFE.

currency. The organization came to an end.

For the more militant members of Balderian's command, Erfe was not sufficiently active in combat activities. On the other hand, Erfe was generally liked by the civilian population as a defender of law and order, and as a guerrilla leader who did not exercise his authority to exploit the people under color of military necessity. What damaged his chances of success as much as anything else was his inability to establish successful liaison with the other guerrilla commands outside of Leyte--much less with GHQ, SWPA.

Alejandro Balderian

The organizations of north and northeast Leyte were certainly among the earliest to get under way. Here there was a multiplicity of groups, with some struggle for supremacy among them. As the fusional process began to reduce the number of separate units in the field, Lieutenant Balderian emerged as the principal leader in the northeast, and Sergeant Pamanian along the northern coast.

By December of 1942, the value of a closer integration of all the units in this area had become apparent. An exploratory conference was held, which resulted not only in a unified military organization, but in the setting up of an embryonic provincial civil government to offset the propaganda of the collaborationist regime in Tacloban. Balderian, breveted a colonel, became the "Politico-Military Governor", and the other sector chiefs became regimental commanders and deputy military governors. It might be remarked that the personnel of this district built up a strong esprit de corps and continued to harbor a suppressed resentment against the Headquarters of Colonel Kangleon for destroying its independence." (Parenthetically, we might add that Sergeant [brevet Lieutenant-Colonel] Pamanian and his right-hand men also nurtured a share of pique against Balderian and his close associates that became manifest in the politics of Leyte after the Liberation.)

Even after his inclusion within Colonel Kangleon's table of organization, Balderian continued to exercise a good deal of practical control within his district. The commencement of the Japanese "mopping-up operations" in Leyte in December, 1943, disrupted the functioning of Kangleon's GHQ, leaving each regimental command largely on its own. Not until the summer of 1944, after Kangleon had received by submarine his sorely needed consignment of American military supplies, did he again presume to exercise effective authority in northern Leyte. In actuality then, Balderian was on his own throughout the greater part of the Japanese occupation, and even extended the area of his jurisdiction to take in the former territory of Captain Erfe.

We might add that one of the factors making possible Colonel Kangleon's ascendancy was the independent spirit of Balderian's chief intelligence officer, Dr. Ralph Posoncuy. A very capable man, he had originally been with Pamanian, until a rift had developed between them. Under Balderian, Posoncuy fretted over his status of staff officer, entailing his subordination to the line. It was only after Posoncuy's transfer to Kangleon's GHQ that he seemed to adjust. This meant the severance of Balderian's source of contact with the other guerrilla leaders outside of Leyte.

Blas E. Miranda

The real stormy petrel of Leyte's resistance movement was Lieutenant Blas E. Miranda.¹⁸ It was the irreconcilable rivalry between Miranda and Kangleon that was largely responsible for the non-formation of a single, solid guerrilla organization on Leyte.

By October of 1942, Miranda had succeeded in establishing his control (under the name Western Leyte Guerrilla Warfare Forces) over the four west coast municipalities of Ormoc, Palompon, Merida, and Albuera, and was consolidating his ground in Baybay. The next town further to the south, Inopacan was controlled by an American, Chester Peters. Peters had his eye on absorbing the three coastal municipalities below his stronghold of Inopacan. Both Peters and Miranda were ambitious men. Neither would scruple to use the other for advancing his own interests. An amicable contact had been established between the two, although not accompanied by a frank avowal of mutual aims.

In November of 1942, Peters called a conference of guerrilla leaders from the municipalities of Bato, Hilongos, and Hindang and from Sogod across the mountains. He also invited Miranda's sector leaders from Baybay to attend. A misunderstanding developed, and firing broke out between the Miranda and the "southern" elements. The "southerners" withdrew in confusion, leaving some dead and wounded behind, and losing a truck and valuable weapons.

Peters, wounded in the affray, put the blame entirely on the Miranda men, who had allegedly opened fire. Miranda later contended that the blame must be shared by Peters and the southerners, his own officers being merely the victims of circumstances, forced to fire in self-defense. On the other hand, the southerners countercharged that the entire incident was cunningly prearranged by Miranda, who was using Peters to pull his chestnuts out of the fire. Whatever the motivation, the denouement was a victory for Miranda. Disabled, Peters could no longer maintain effective control over his guerrilla organization. He was suffered to retain nominal control, acting through his lieutenant, but it was obvious that Miranda could seize Inopacan whenever he so chose.

Meanwhile Miranda let no grass grow under his feet. He engaged in diplomacy, sending one of his most reliable officers to the more southerly towns. The debacle suffered by the guerrilla units of this district created a kind of military vacuum. There could be no effective resistance to a southward thrust by Miranda legionnaires. The townspeople accordingly, at least for public show, gave the Miranda delegation a rousing welcome. Encouraged by his apparent success, Miranda's plenipotentiary was audacious enough to advance to Maasin, citadel of another American, Gordon Lang.

Lang had previously been in touch with Peters. In fact, in the summer of 1942 he himself had led a "flying squad" as far north as Baybay, dauntlessly striking against the Japanese garrison. Lang had given Peters the impression that he was favorably disposed to some sort of league that would

18. At the time of the Japanese invasion, Miranda commanded a company of the Philippine constabulary, with headquarters at Ormoc.

give their united forces control of the entire west coast. But Lang cooled off as he saw Peters slipping into the orbit of Miranda. No doubt he reflected upon the meaning of the clash at Inopacan and drew certain disturbing inferences. And so when the Miranda deputation entered his domain, Lang put on a pleasant front, while inwardly determining to frustrate what he considered an encroachment.

The Miranda-Balderian Alliance and Ruperto K. Kangleon

While the amalgamations just considered were separately taking place on both the east and west coasts, certain more far-reaching developments were also maturing. Shortly after the setting up of the "Politico-Military" government in December of 1942, Balderian and his advisers began to formulate plans for a southward expansion along the east coast. One of Balderian's deputy military governors was assigned a new sector, taking in the Abuyog district of Captain Erfe's domain, and also stretching out into the lower municipalities of Hinunangan and Hinundayan. This projected annexation was not to remain long in the paper stage. It was to be implemented forthwith. As 1942 drew to a close, a heavily armed guerrilla force moved south beyond Abuyog, commandeering foodstuffs and supplies from terror-stricken civilians along the way.

To the disunited and dismayed guerrilla leaders of the south, Lang, Francisco, Jain, Nazareno, and Nuique, this expedition of Balderian was associated with the advances and the recent political manoeuvrings of Miranda. This was a single master plan, they concluded, on the part of both expansionists to launch a concerted offensive and establish a condominium. And it looked very much as though they might succeed. Whether in actuality these movements of Balderian and Miranda were consciously synchronized is a moot matter. In any case, the southern leaders resolved that only prompt and decisive action could stop this juggernaut.

It was at this juncture that Colonel Kangleon stepped into the picture. Only recently released from a Japanese concentration camp under obscure circumstances, he had returned to his home in south Leyte, in partial retirement.¹⁹ Here he was sought out by the excited guerrilla leaders and prevailed

19. Kangleon said of himself: "Leyte is my home province. I was assigned by MacArthur as commander of the 9th MD. I was in command of this district from July 1938 until August 26, 1941. Then I was assigned Commanding Office of the 81st Infantry. My brigade commander was Col. Chastaine. We were fighting the enemy in the east and north sections of Davao until order for the general surrender was given. I refused to surrender and ordered my officers and men to escape. Chastaine and other Americans ordered me to surrender. I became a prisoner of war on May 29, 1942. I suffered at the hands of the enemy. I returned to Leyte on December 26, 1942. I found many guerrilla leaders who did not understand each other; they fought among themselves.... The people of Leyte asked me to step in; I did. I have acted for the good of the people in general...." Ruperto K. Kangleon, Col. April 9, 1943. To: Col. Wendell W. Fertig.

upon to assume command of a hastily mobilized force. Accepting, he led this striking force against Balderian.²⁰ Somewhat ignominiously, the latter permitted himself to be disarmed without a show of resistance, pleading that he had no designs of aggression, that he had been utterly misunderstood, and that the idea of his acting in collusion with Miranda was preposterous. As a token of good faith Balderian sent a detachment of his own troops to accompany the main body of Kangleon's as the latter immediately turned to the Miranda vanguard. Miranda's men were taken by surprise, disarmed, and the leaders thrown into jail for court martial.²¹

Thereafter followed negotiations between representatives of Kangleon and Miranda. A convention was drafted, which had the effect of containing Miranda behind a line running north of Inopacan. Yet this line was to cut two ways, for Kangleon was pledged to respect the territorial integrity of Miranda's sphere of influence. With the release of Miranda's deputation to the "south", a modus vivendi between the two organizations was effected, and the situation became stabilized.²²

Beneath the placid surface, however, a fierce struggle for power between the two organizations was relentlessly waged. Each consolidated its own position and strengthened its defenses.²³ But the final resolution of the conflict would be determined by forces outside of Leyte. The key to victory would be grasped by whomsoever first established permanent contact

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20. "When Kangleon slipped back to his home.", he learned that a bandit gang was nearby. He lay low for a while.... Then he decided it was time to organize the bandit gang, and it was this organization that did the "trick." Gunnison, op. cit., p. 74.
21. Kangleon's American admirer, Orville Babcock, recounted the episode: "... Then Kangleon got busy. He, Captain Lang, with 60 or 70 soldiers started south (around Sogod Bay) to intercept him [Balderian] they added to their forces as they went along and surprised the fake Colonel at Sogod, and he and all his troops surrendered to Kangleon without firing a shot. Then Kangleon struck over the mountains and surprised another detachment at Bato (on the west coast) which also surrendered without resistance. Our 'God' [Miranda] has lost much face'...." Babcock, Ilihan, Leyte, January 28, 1943. Unposted letters to his daughter.
22. In a spirit of amity, Gordon Lang wrote to the WIGWF officer at Baybay: "Received your three tins of gasoline and thank you very much. According to information, I hear that you are worried about us coming up to Baybay.... We will go no further than Inopacan. If we ever do come up there it will be for the purpose of fighting the Japs and then you will be duly informed of our coming. Please, believe me, we don't want anything but to leave things the way they are...." From now on let us cooperate...." Gordon A. Lang, Hilongos. January 24, 1943. To: "Dear Capt. Rodriguez".
23. In August of 1943 occurred the celebrated "Baybay Affair". Kangleon's forces invaded and occupied Miranda's territory in the Baybay-Albuera sector. Miranda's forces regrouped, and threw out the invaders a week later. Thereafter, all feeling between the two organizations was beyond conciliation.

with GHQ, SWPA, and contrived to secure Allied recognition of leadership over the entire Province. And the confusions in the inter-island intelligence network of the Philippines, and a degree of rivalry among the principal guerrilla leaders of the Archipelago's southern islands had direct repercussions in Leyte.

Colonel Kangleon worked feverishly to contact Australia via Mindanao! He was fortunate in early establishing contact with various American officers of the intelligence network--Colonel Wendell W. Fertig,²⁴ Lieutenant Commander Charles "Chick" Parsons,²⁵ and the radio communications man, Lieutenant I. D. Richardson of the United States Navy.

24. Father Edward Haggerty of the Ateneo de Cagayan in Mindanao has written from first-hand experience a very absorbing account of the guerrilla movement on that island. At the outset, "Western Lanao and Misamis were taken almost bloodlessly by Captain Morgan, an American mestizo. Lieutenant Colonel Wendell W. Fertig, with a splendid record at Bataan, had assumed command there and people referred to him as 'the General'.

"Now in January 1943, his [Fertig's] organization was just beginning to spread out. Major McLish in Agusan and Surigao, Major Bowler in Bukidnon and Oriental Misamis, Captain Hedges in Lanao--all had become part of his organization. I had further brought letters concerning a Cotabato leader, Lieutenant Salipada Pendatun.... Although Pendatun had... considered himself leader in Davao, Cotabato and parts of Bukidon, he would acknowledge Fertig as leader.

"That evening Fertig came in excitedly.

"We've got it, Padre; we've got it--a message from MacArthur!...!"

"Far into the night the two of us worked on decoding that message.... At last we read something like this:

"'Fertig.... You are named Guerrilla Chief!... Your men are not deserters but fighters.... In some way I will get aid to you.... For the future I reiterate my pledge!... I shall return.... MacArthur.'"

Haggerty, op. cit., pp. 49, 76-77.

Fertig considered his guerrilla organization to be "a regular part of the American Army--USFIP, United States Forces in the Philippines!" St. John, op. cit., p. 62. Also Ingham, op. cit., pp. 58-60.

25. After the fall of Manila Chick Parsons organized a group of undercover agents to gather information of possible value to allied military authorities. "Chick arrived in the United States in August 1942 and almost immediately was assigned as naval liaison officer and aide to President Quezon.... Quezon felt very much concerned over the safety of Roxas and made known his sentiments to his life-long friend General Douglas MacArthur. It became such an obsession with Quezon that MacArthur's headquarters soon devised plans to get Roxas out of the Philippines.

"For this purpose, Chick came in very handy. Because of his extensive knowledge of the islands--having roamed the seas around the Visayas and Mindanao during his early years in the Philippines--he was entrusted with the mission of contacting Roxas.... Where, when and how, Chick did not bother much at the moment but soon he was in a submarine bound for Mindanao!...

"Meanwhile, Parsons had set up a radio station for the use of Col. Fertig in making his reports to the Southwest Pacific headquarters. Chick likewise established a chain of so-called coast watcher stations

(continued on next page)

Kangleon was eventually vested with supreme command in Leyte. The issue in controversy concerns the assignment of a date when the investiture occurred." Kangleon is disposed to set an early date to this event. He contends that he had received unofficial notification of pending appointment early in 1943, with official unchallengeable confirmation coming about mid-1943. Equipped with this authority, he proceeded to proclaim the fact of his elevation, and threatened Miranda with outlawry if the latter continued to hold out. The destructiveness of the Japanese onslaught against the headquarters of Miranda at the close of 1943, plus the shipment of American arms to Kangleon, left Kangleon undisputed master of the field. To the Americans of the Liberation, Kangleon was The Guerrilla Leader.

C. Guerrilla Society

Having pieced together the history of Leyte's resistance movement and having accounted for the failure to achieve unification, we may now proceed to an examination of the society ruled by the guerrilla organizations. We discover, before proceeding very far that the society we are dealing with is one and continuous with pre-war society. True, the jolt to the customary way of life consequent upon enemy invasion and disruption of normal activities was severe, somewhat stupefying. Once the course of resistance was decided upon, however, what followed was primarily a series of problems in adaptation. There was no overturning of traditional values, no projection of new goals. How to acquire the material means for carrying on resistance, how to integrate civilian and military activities--these were the problems with which the resistance leadership was preoccupied.

To facilitate treatment of this material, we shall divide our analysis into two parts, a political and an economic. In the portion concerned with things political, we shall endeavor to understand something of the structure of guerrilla administration. We shall examine the pattern of relationships worked out in attempting to gear civil administration with military rule, seeking to discover the principles of successful adjustment. We shall then have something to say concerning the relationships between the central guerrilla authorities and the sector commanders and the cross-currents flowing between the sector commanders and the municipal officials. We shall round out this analysis by placing randomly selected municipalities under the searchlight of closer investigation, in order to see how some of the generalities we discuss took shape in particular instances. In concluding this portion, we shall note how military and civil authorities worked together to maintain law and order in the territory under their joint control."

Turning to the portion of this analysis dealing with economic affairs, we shall occupy ourselves with an important idea. We shall show how the

Footnote 25 continued from p. 46:

...." The Sunday Times Magazine, (Manila: November 24, 1946), p. 6.

According to Parson's biographer, "MacArthur had given Commander Parsons full authority to recognize the leader of a movement on any of the Islands, as soon as he could produce proof that he was capable, sincere, loyal, willing to take orders, and supported by a sufficient group of men sworn to submit to his direction and discipline." Ingham, op. cit., p. 61.

resistance movement of Leyte, concerned primarily with the restoration of the pre-war order, was led to spin out a set of controls" carrying with it the potential revamping of that pre-war order. In separate sections, we shall look to guerrilla methods of subsistence and procurement, the regulation of private property, the restriction of commerce, the control of prices, and the issuance of currency. We shall also take notice of certain public service functions of guerrilla government, the special position of municipal finance in the guerrilla area, and the subject of poor relief.

The Political Structure of Resistance in Leyte

In Leyte, we find a variety of organizational forms evolving to meet the peculiar needs of resistance. In clarifying this situation, we must repeat what we have already mentioned: Leyte lacked a pre-war political-social organization working for revolutionary or even reformist objectives and having a well-defined, disciplined structure streamlined to implement policy. Thus Leytean resistance was deprived of the know-how provided by a political party schooled in the techniques of organized opposition, whether legal or underground. Under the circumstances, resistance had to be organized from the ground up under untutored leadership and a scarcely comprehending followership.

We must further bear in mind that no leader of stature on the provincial scene of Leytean political life attempted to rally the people to resist. Elsewhere, we have pointed out that the surrender order in Leyte was promulgated by the American commander, Colonel Cornell. In the interim between the bombing of Manila and the Japanese invasion of Leyte, provincial officialdom had looked to the Quezon government to give general directions and had depended upon the local American commander for on-the-spot instructions.²⁶ In the main, the incumbent provincial and municipal office-holders were the politicians with the strongest popular backing--or at any rate, with the support of the most active of the local agricultural and commercial interests. Their reinstatement by the Japanese, after some days of confusion, meant that in effect the leading local politicians were with the invader.

In this situation, the only men available for organizing guerrilla warfare were the Philippine Army and Philippine Constabulary officers and soldiers who had gone into hiding without turning in their arms at the time of the surrender order. To these men were later added sympathetic municipal officials, local politicians, school teachers and others residing in sectors not penetrated in strength by the Japanese military forces. Hence, it was to be expected that the military mind would predominate in the actual operation of Leyte's resistance movement." And it was the attitude of the local military leader that determined the nature of civilian-military relationships.

What we shall do in this section is to describe some of the organizational forms that developed within Leyte's resistance movement, attempting to locate the center of power and assigning some reasons for the particular contour of the organizational structure in each case. Into this account, we shall weave brief sketches of some of the leading guerrilla personalities,

26. Lear, op. cit., pp. 183-184.

attempting to shed light upon their motivation and evaluating their contributions. We shall offer some general conclusions and close the section with "case studies" of conditions in several guerrilla municipalities.

Successful resistance in Leyte presupposed a close integration between the guerrilla military leadership and the civilian office-holders. This integration could be brought about in several ways. The military leaders might govern entirely by decree, depending upon their subordinate sector commanders for implementation and prepared to coerce by force of arms where obedience was not forthcoming. Under military aegis, some municipal civil functionaries might be permitted to continue in office (their discretionary authority extremely circumscribed) and liable to removal if adjudged unsatisfactory. Or at the other extreme, the civil authorities of one or more municipalities might call upon available soldiers in their district to organize combat units for defensive purposes, subject to general supervision by the civil government.

Between these two types, any number of intermediate forms might develop. Thus a joint war council of guerrilla military and civil authorities might be organized, responsible for the formulation of general policy of a total nature. This council might then allocate duties on a purely functional basis with the military leaders directing the combat phase and the civilians in charge of the political-economic-social phase. Decisions concerning the interrelation of military strategy and supply with civil affairs would be worked out in keeping with the total picture.

In another type of war council, the military component would prevail. Under these circumstances the civil authorities might be called in for intelligence regarding general conditions among the population (economic activity, health, morale, etc.). The civilian leaders would also be briefed on impending military decrees so that they might aid in the execution, paving the way for prompt acceptance by the mass of the population.

Resembling the aforementioned type, but somewhat more democratic would be the council summoning civilian leadership in a genuine consultative capacity. Under this arrangement the military chieftains would sincerely endeavor to weigh popular sentiment respecting general and specific issues. The military would invite the civilian representatives to air popular desires and grievances and would then take these views into account before declaring policy and promulgating orders affecting the civilian population.

Finally, we call attention to a hybrid military organization with first-line guerrilla troops under direct military leadership and with auxiliaries (drawn from the general male population) under civil leaders inducted into the guerrilla organization. Under this plan, civil and military leadership would together evolve an over-all program.

The Guerrilla War Council

One of the earliest guerrilla groupings was effectuated at Alangalang by Filemon Pabilona, a Philippine Army sergeant. With Lieutenant Luciano Bonicillo (former Commanding Officer of Company "L", Leyte Provisional Regiment) acting as his adviser, Pabilona set out to enlist the good will and active support of the civilian population. The two men worked out an

ingenious, if somewhat cumbersome, arrangement which they called the Guerrilla War Council. Its officers were drawn from the educated elements in Alangalang. By associating the local luminaries with their own efforts to stamp out lawlessness and subsidize their guerrilla men, Pabilona and Bonicillo hoped to enhance the prestige of their organization. The roster of officials (according to Bonicillo) listed Modesto Gatela, a local politician, as president; Vicente Ripalda, a prominent attorney, as vice-president; Tomas Tobias, a school teacher, as secretary; and Juan Pla, another teacher, as treasurer. The Guerrilla War Council dedicated itself to prosecuting the struggle against the enemy and suppressing banditry. This body remained essentially conciliatory and did not arrogate to itself legislative or executive functions. Treasurer Pla and his assistants solicited voluntary contributions both in kind and in cash in behalf of the guerrilla. The War Council also took it upon itself to keep tabs on the people dwelling in the poblacion (town center) and root out espionage in support of the Tacloban puppet government.

The towns of San Miguel, Babatngon and Barugo established like bodies, made up of their prominent citizens and carrying on similar functions. The Alangalang Council, Bonicillo stated (in interview), sought to establish a hegemony over its counterparts through a loose confederation called the Leyte Guerrilla Council. However, the expansionism of Alangalang was resisted. We might add that the general structure of the Alangalang Guerrilla War Council and its purposes and functions were set forth in a constitution with preamble, framed largely by Bonicillo, and used as a model by San Miguel and Babatngon and Barugo.²⁷

Pabilona was hailed as guerrilla chieftain by these four towns. He organized Volunteer Guards for each, regarding them as his auxiliaries. According to the general run of testimony, he was favorably looked upon by the civilians as both an intrepid fighter against the enemy and a fair, law-abiding man in his dealings with the general population. He affiliated with the then-Lieutenant Balderian and became Commanding Officer of the 2nd Battalion, 95th Infantry Regiment.

The influence of the Guerrilla War Councils was confined to a fairly small district of four municipalities. As ad hoc bodies, they were useful in bringing about a unified policy for the population of the area, in maintaining order, and in demonstrating the possibilities of a happy working relationship between the military and civilian leadership.²⁸ The

27. "Suggestive of the varied functions of the Guerrilla War Council were the instructions addressed to a civilian official:

"You are directed to audit receipts and expenditures of public funds and to examine all records of accountability in the custodies of the municipal treasuries of Alangalang, Babatngon, Barugo, and San Miguel and report immediately to this office statements of the financial status of each municipality...."

Felimon Pabilona, Major, Northern Sector, Leyte Guerrilla Forces, 3 Nov. 42 Memo to: Mr. Vicente Ripalda, Vice-President Leyte Guerrilla Council."

28. "The story of how the guerrilla of Northern Leyte organized a government to stamp out banditry during the early months of the Japanese occupation

(continued on next page)

further development of this arrangement was inhibited by the unwillingness of three of the municipalities to acknowledge the headship of the fourth, Alangalang. From this case, the lesson was drawn that further unification would await the setting up of some structure permitting the fuller participation of local politicians on a wider basis. It remained for Alejandro Balderian to point the way.

The Politico-Military Government

Lieutenant Balderian, stocky of build, swarthy, and wearing a conspicuous black handlebar moustache did not look like the typical Filipino.²⁹ His portly and somewhat fierce bearing at once singled him out. A novice in the field of law, he found his career cut short by the outbreak of the war. He was recalled to duty as a reservist, and became an officer in the Leyte Provisional Regiment. His fighting spirit rebelled against surrender to the Japanese at the time of Colonel Cornell's capitulation order. He chose the course of resistance, organizing a small unit that operated between his home town of Dagami and nearby Jaro. With an old time soldier, Damian Dadula, he busied himself gathering arms and ammunition, reconnoitering, and establishing contact with other guerrilla units of North and East Leyte. By the end of November, 1942, Balderian was convinced that the time was ripe for convoking a regional conference. Advising him in these moves were two local politicians of some prominence, Attorney (and post-war Congressman) Atilano Cinco of Dagami, and Attorney (and post-war Governor of Leyte) Mamerto Ribo of Jaro.

Balderian's first step was to undertake an exploratory conference in Capocan on December 4, 1942, where he sounded out the attitudes of the principal leaders of North West Leyte, Sergeant Felix Pamanian, Captain Corpin, and Dr. Posuncuy. The meeting was successful. It was agreed unanimously that the resistance movement would be immeasurably strengthened through the achievement of unification. It was further felt that the fullest mobilization of civilian effort could be accomplished through an over-all regional government, which might expand into a government for the entire province. Reorganization of municipal governments would also be necessary. It was resolved to hold a follow-up plenary conference with delegations from all sectors present in strength, at which time the instruments of government might be fashioned.

On December 14, 1942, some 60 delegates (Interview: Attorney Ribo) gathered together from the towns of north and east Leyte. Among those

Footnote 28 continued:

was revealed in Tacloban by Pedro V. Calo, who was chief intelligence officer of the Hill Fighters.... To meet this problem, the guerrilla formed the Leyte Guerrilla War Council under the leadership of Modesto Cadela.

"The council decreed the death penalty for any bandit, and it only required one execution to put an end to this lawlessness. The... council also refused to recognize the imperial government of Japan and provided that anyone who gave such recognition should answer with his life...." Leyte-Samar Free Philippines, March 18, 1945, p. 2.

29. Interview: Balderian's residence in Dagami, Leyte, 1945, while the latter was on terminal leave from the First Replacement Battalion, Philippine Army.

present were Attorney Cinco, Dr. Jose Lucinario (physician), Dr. Cesario Sudario (dentist), all of Dagami; Attorney Alberto Aguja, Attorney Santiago Tomelete, Dr. Posuncuy (physician), and Mr. Rocha (formerly assistant clerk of the Court of 1st Instance) from Carigara; Attorney Ribo, Council Woman Eusebia Go, and Eustaquio Ligutan (of the Provincial Auditor's Office) from Paño; Mr. Boco of Tanauan; Mr. Barantes (former supervising teacher) from Alangalang; Gregorio Suria (head of the local Volunteer Guards) from Tolosa; and other local dignitaries, in addition to the military leaders and their assistants.

A guerrilla division, the 92nd Infantry Division (not to be confused with the division of the same designation subsequently created by Colonel Kangleon), was launched, with Balderian as Commanding Officer, breveted a colonel. His staff was drawn in good measure from the organization of Pamanian, North Leyte leader. Within the command were three regiments and a Headquarters Combat Detachment.

The organization created at this convention was duplex. Besides being a combat division, it constituted the germ of what was called the Politico-Military Government of Leyte with its capital at the Island's first seat of government, Carigara. Balderian became Politico-Military Governor. His regimental commanders were the Deputy Governors of each of three districts. A fourth district existed only in plan and remained to be organized. (It was to take in lower Abuyog and the municipalities on the southeast coast.) The responsibilities of the deputy governors included supervision of the municipal governments within their respective jurisdictions, assistance to the police and other law-enforcement agencies in the event of civil disorder, protection of the civilian population against the enemy, and making provision for subsistence of the guerrilla troops with the aid of the co-operating local authorities.

Of the civilian functionaries invested with "provincial" authority at this time, we must note: Provincial Secretary-Attorney Ribo; Adviser on Justice (a special post) - Attorney Cinco; Provincial Treasurer - E. Ligutan; Provincial Auditor - E. Potente; Divisional Surgeon and Chief Health Officer - Dr. Walstrom; Chief of Chaplaincy - Padre Dominador Sudario; Fiscal-Attorney Cononoy (who subsequently declined to serve); Judge of the court of 1st Instance - Attorney Floro Cordero of Burauen (after the refusal of Judge Cabahug to accept).

Early in January, the convention reconvened, this time at Carigara. This gathering dedicated itself to drafting a policy that would guide the new regional government in its operations. First, the convention had to consider the recruitment of personnel to staff the posts in the reorganized municipal governments.³⁰ On this matter, it was decided to empower the old

30. A guerrilla civilian functionary described the operation of local government in three municipalities: "I have visited Tanauan, Dagami, and Pastrana, and there I found out that they have loaned almost all the funds they could collect to the Army. In Dagami, the officials and employees were being paid by the municipal treasurer at a uniform rate of P5.00 per month. In Pastrana, when visited, the payments of salaries were behind some eight months. It seemed however that the officers and

(continued on next page)

Commonwealth employees and functionaries to resume their positions, but to perform in accordance with all regulations emanating from the newly established central government.³¹ Another major problem was the combating of inflation--an inflation which exercised an enervating influence upon governmental activities in undermining popular morale and increasing the burden of governmental financing. It was decided to delegate responsibility for maintaining price control to the separate municipalities, urging them to enact by local ordinance a schedule of reasonable prices to which all businessmen must adhere on pain of legal penalty. The scale of prices was to be rigged at a moderate advance over the pre-war range. (Thus, rice that had been averaging P5 per cavan in pre-war times might now go on sale at P7.) Finally, and perhaps most important, the government proposed to deal with the problem of subsistence by embarking upon a full-fledged program of maximum land utilization. Increased cultivation would mean more foodstuffs for all. It was agreed that civilians in occupied towns would be permitted to go to the farms to procure food supplies, with the tacit proviso that they pass on information respecting enemy troop strength and movements as well as information about the current activities of the current government.³²

Alluding to the activities of the new government, an active civilian guerrilla wrote:

Footnote 30 continued:

employees of the various municipal governments were willing to share their lot with the volunteer guards who were serving the people without thought of compensation." Potente, op. cit., pp. 13-14.

31. Balderian may have looked to an order emanating from the Headquarters of McLish in Mindanao as sanction for the organizational wheels he had set in motion:

"Lt. Lloyd Waters, Inf., U.S. Army, contact officer of this Division! is being sent to your respective sectors by this Hq. to inform you of the assimilation of your units into this Hq., under the command of Brig. Gen. W. W. Fertig.

"Hereafter! you are all directly under this Hq....

"It is the policy of this Hq. to retain pioneers or organizers of each sector in command of same....

"Pursuant to the policies of the Commanding General, USFIP, Sector Commanders are hereby instructed to help immediately reestablish the civil governments in their respective sectors to function.... Provincial and municipal officials under the Commonwealth government.... who have not manifested pro-Jap leanings will be called to carry on the civil government wherever said civil officials are available...."

E. McLish, Lt. Col., Inf., Hq. 110th Division. Feb. 20, 1943. Memo to: All Unit Commanders: Bohol, Leyte, Samar, Paragraphs 1-3, 7.

32. Balderian's intelligence officer, Posuncuy, used to keep lists of his civilian informants who spied upon the Japanese, in his G-2 office. During the mopping-up drive, the Japanese raided this office, seizing the lists as well as a highly confidential diary (kept by Mrs. Briccio Aguilos, wife of Posuncuy's assistant) as containing considerable data on guerrilla activities. Naturally, the seizure of these documents by the Japanese exposed many Filipinos to the harsh punitive measures of the conqueror!

The sanitary inspectors have been mobilized at that time to campaign for the sanitation and improvement of living conditions of the evacuees. Agricultural inspectors were waging intensive campaigns for the production of food. The teachers were assigned to canvass homes to take census of the families, to teach home industries, and for the dissemination of information on the War.³³

Alejandro Balderian was a man of personal ambition. Young, intelligent, and educated, he nourished secret thoughts of building up a political future in his home province by winning a reputation as an intrepid fighter and a capable administrator. In ordinary times, men with established reputations and greater political talents, such as Attorney Atilano Cinco of Dagami and Attorney Mamerto Ribo of Jaro might have obstructed his political career. As it was, these two men, associated with his organization might actually help advance his future. Such considerations, set against the background of his own legal training, led Balderian to avoid unnecessary strong-arm tactics in his administrative procedures.

On the other hand, Balderian had within his command as unit leaders such ruthless, law-defying men as the notorious Antonio Cinco and the brigand Marcial Santos,³⁴ and the Centinos. These men respected only superior force and responded primarily to incentives of personal gain. Balderian was forced by these truculent personalities into tolerating certain abuses in order to forestall mutiny. The civilians within Balderian's jurisdiction suffered whenever such lapses occurred.

By investing military command with plenary powers through the device of the Politico-Military Governor and his deputies, Balderian foreclosed the possibilities of independent check in the event of abuse and also sidestepped bringing civilians into the business of policy planning and implementation. Theoretically, his advisers on civil affairs, taken in conjunction with the apparatus of law courts and municipal governments, constituted an independent force. But the local governments were preserved intact chiefly as instrumentalities to do the bidding of the military, levying taxes and subsisting the troops. (In fact, there is evidence of petty factionalism on the municipal level abetted by the military. That is to say, the local politicos supported Balderian and in return expected his acquiescence and backing in their efforts to dislodge and eliminate political rivals. There is evidence of such influences in Dagami, Burauen, and some of the other towns.) And the advisers were more concerned with smoothing the going for Balderian than in curbing the actions of the military for the benefit of the populace.

Could Balderian's organization have brought about the unification of the guerrilla forces on Leyte under his command? Probably not.³⁵ He was

33. Potente, op. cit., p. 13.

34. A fitting epitaph for Santos found its place in the report of the puppet Governor of Leyte for June, 1943: "Tacloban!.. thrilled at the news of Marcial Santos' death, bloodiest bandit of them all...." Acting Governor Salazar, Report of Activities: April 1-October 31, 1943. To: Commissioner of Interior through Dir. of Local Governments.

35. One of Balderian's heretofore trusted subordinates voiced certain

(continued)

opposed by the guerrilla leaders of South Leyte. But he did establish a friendly accord with the West Coast of the Island, controlled by the Western Leyte Guerrilla Warfare Forces. A duumvirate consisting of Miranda and Balderian enjoyed favorable omens at one time. We shall therefore proceed to consider the WIGWF!

The Western Leyte Guerrilla Warfare Forces

Blas E. Miranda was either a mountebank or something of a genius. The present writer met him during the early liberation period, when Miranda was assigned on temporary duty from the 1st Replacement Battalion, Philippine Army, to an American installation, charged with putting up a Red Cross recreation hall for the troops. Miranda had been trained before the war as an engineer, and went about his work with an air of surety. Small of stature and of boyish visage, Miranda did not immediately impress one as the commander of a guerrilla division, much less the alleged executioner of many.

To engage Miranda in conversation for any length of time was to come under the spell of a very magnetic personality. A fertile mind and articulate tongue held their audience captive, relating, while eyes glistened nostalgically, the story of one man's efforts to build a guerrilla organization out of nothing. His enemies called him an empty braggart capitalizing upon a glibness of speech to rook the credulous; his friends swore by his superior ability and driving enthusiasm. This was the man who had hoped to become chieftain of the Leytan guerrilla forces, and who held out against fusion under other leadership when balked in his ambition.

Unlike Balderian, Miranda was not a native Leyteno. Indeed, he was of Ilocano extraction--the ethnic sub-group of mountainous northern Luzon,

Footnote 35 continued:

misgivings: "... I for one have taken the initiative in the creation and organization of the Northern Leyte sector... but for the sake of unity... I submitted to you... When I did so, however, I did not have the intention of completely obliterating the distinct and separate personality of my sector.... Any meddling or interference... will be carefully scrutinized by me and I will act only if I am convinced that such action will redound to the benefit... of the people in my sector....

"Provincial officials have been appointed, who, by the very nature of their positions, will naturally assume jurisdiction in my sector. You will easily understand how jealous and solicitous I am for my powers and prerogatives after all the efforts that I have exerted towards the normalization of conditions in my sector!.. I do not want it understood that I am antipathetic... to the provincial government. I will cooperate in every way... but with this qualification; that I will always have the power to overrule...! As I also stand ready to be fair and just that... I also possess the ... commensurate authority." Felix M. Pamanian, Bvt Lt.-Col., Inf., Regimental Commander and Deputy Governor. 13 April 1943. Memo to: The CO and Military Provincial Governor, Northern-Eastern Leyte Sector, pp. 2, 3, 5.

alike despised and feared by the more "insular" of the Visayans. Miranda attributed his unpopularity in certain quarters, and particularly Colonel Kangleon's dislike of him, to his place of origin. At any rate, he found himself a 1st lieutenant of the Philippine Constabulary commanding the Ormoc detachment before the outbreak of the war. And he was among those who refused to lay down arms at the time of the surrender order.

He is known to Americans principally through his two American detractors, I. D. Richardson and Joseph St. John. Neither had come face-to-face with Miranda. Thus St. John: "I never met him, nor any of his men, so I had to pick up the story from the guerrillas who did not like him, and the people. None of the people liked Miranda."³⁶

St. John could find no good to say of Miranda:

In the first place, they knew he was a third lieutenant in the Philippine Army before the war. That is about like a warrant officer in our Army.

Bingo, come the war, and he takes over in south-western Leyte. He made himself a brigadier general, no less! Filipinos have a good sense of humor, and they laughed when none of his men was looking. But they could not laugh at what he did.

He taxed the people heavily.... He took rice from the people, and chickens and pigs and carabao and cloth....

But his main idea was to make himself rich and powerful. He wanted to come out of the war as the strong man of Leyte, the big-shot, with too much money and too many men for anybody to hurt him.³⁷

Richardson's account, while differing in detail, was equally vituperative:

... This Miranda was what is called in mixed company, a picturesque character. His real name is supposed to have been Blasmeyer. He had been a second lieutenant in the Philippine Army at the start of the war. After the surrender he promoted himself to be general and started his own borobo--guerrilla force. He is a quick boy with a bolo, and his borobo thrived.³⁸

Both St. John and Richardson, very reliable as sources of information on so many subjects connected with Leyte's resistance movement, simply permitted their loyalty to Colonel Kangleon's organization to prejudice their judgment of Miranda.³⁹

36. St. John, op. cit., p. 90.

37. Ibid., pp. 90-91.

38. Wolfert, op. cit., p. 112.

39. As for Miranda's assumption of a "generalship," the same may be said of Fertig in Mindanao. Moreover, Kangleon himself did not forbid the attribution to himself of a brigadier's rank by some of his subordinates, as military orders prepared by his adjutant attest. The long and short of the matter is that any guerrilla officer, aspiring to command a guerrilla division, was obliged to assume the corresponding rank.

The formal organization of⁴¹ the WIGWF was the culmination of a unifying process that began when Lieutenant Miranda first sought out groups beyond his small mountain camp. It represented both resoluteness and pliability--and ability to convince the other guerrilla leaders that their⁴² own contributions in furthering resistance would be respected by their investment with authority in their respective sectors, while subtly warning them that refusal to join up might result in their deprivation of leadership. Above all though, this patient, sustained spadework sought to demonstrate the advantages of a unified command for the vigorous prosecution of a mission all were implicitly engaged in furthering⁴³. Through his liaison, Miranda remained in constant touch with the sector commanders, promulgating common policy vis-a-vis the invader and Filipino collaborators and advising on organizational problems. Meanwhile, each of the sectors had been materially strengthened by the accession of USAFFE officers with practical experience in the problems of military command. At first, they remained passive, merely observing the procedures adopted by the guerrilla. Eventually, a sense of patriotic obligation impelled them to report for duty and place their capacities at the disposal of the local guerrilla. To this nucleus was added a continuous influx of enlisted men, stragglers from Luzon and soldiers separated from their commands all over the Archipelago, determined to resist the enemy from their new base of operations. The growing might of the guerrilla made a profound impression upon the civilians and induced the men of combat age to apply for admission either as combatant or as reservist.

Miranda tested the sentiment of the various sub-sector commanders regarding their willingness to attend a conference to explore the feasibility of setting up a unified organization operating on strict military lines. He found an overwhelming sentiment in favor of unification. Thereupon he convoked a conference in December of 1942, attended by the principal guerrilla chieftains of West Leyte. Among those present were two regular officers who outranked him, Major Marcos Soliman and Captain Aristoteles Olaybar. Miranda alleged (interview) that he proffered the command to Soliman, but the latter declined in recognition of Miranda's pioneer services. Both Soliman and Olaybar corroborate this assertion, but hedged on whether Miranda made the offer in good faith or merely as a gallant gesture. (Olaybar, in particular, hinted that there were times subsequently when both of them chafed under the leadership of Miranda.)⁴⁰

40. In a letter to Col. Peralta of Paray, Maj. Soliman explained how he came to join the WIGWF:

"As for me, I believe I have done my part in the Davao front. I claim no honors except that I was the only Filipino officer who was never relieved by an American officer of my duties as executive of my regiment. I had been recommended to Lt.-Coloneley as early as January 15 1942 but I only got my Major's rank about the latter part of April. This, I attributed to the fact that I was unfortunate to be assigned under an American Brigade Commander who was very much prejudiced against Filipino officers. [Kangleon, also with the 81st Inf., similarly complained in the course of an interview with this writer]. At any rate, I won a Silver Star in one of our engagements....

"I am proud to tell you that only 10% of the officers and enlisted personnel of my regiment surrendered or were caught by the Japs. They refused to surrender upon my orders...."

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Under the guerrilla rule, functions appertaining to the military in a stricter sense were commingled with civil functions. This tended to blur the separation of powers between the different branches of government, since an all-powerful military executive could override obstacles interposed by the local authorities. Practical expediency, the desire to retain the confidence of the populace and to receive the utmost support from the civilians, restrained the military from usurping plenary powers and exercising them in tyrannical fashion. On the other hand, to the extent that the civil authorities threw in their lot with the cause of resistance, to that extent they exposed themselves to punitive action from the occupying power and of necessity leaned heavily upon the armed forces of resistance for protection. This implied submission to such policies and controls as were deemed necessary by the military in the working out a unified plan of resistance.

The WLGWF never set up a provincial civil government for the zone it controlled.⁴¹ Instead, it encouraged the municipal authorities of the five sectors in its zone to carry on their normal functions, while its own GHQ would provide the needed coordination.

As Adjutant-General and first Chief-of-Staff, Conrado Sabellino was empowered with blanket authority to act in the name of the Commanding General, Miranda. Not only would Sabellino handle disputes among the officers and attempt to compose the differences, he was also commissioned to inquire into disagreements between the sector military and civil authorities and attempt conciliation. Failing in that, he might arbitrate. Investigation into the activities of alleged collaborationists added a prosecutorial character to his office. It was hardly possible for a man to wield such sweeping authority without creating personal enemies. This was the fate of Sabellino. Reports began to drift into the headquarters of Miranda that his Chief-of-Staff was subtly undermining the authority of the Commanding General by taking personal credit for the accomplishments of the WLGWF. Miranda's position was a very precarious one. Even if these rumors were unfounded, he could not afford the risk. Accordingly, Sabellino was recalled and placed under investigation. When restored, it was in the capacity of Deputy Chief-of-Staff.

The second Chief-of-Staff and the man who held this post until the

Footnote 40 continued:

"... the old spirit of once a soldier always a soldier found me hitched to the wagon again and I joined 1st Lt. Blas E. Miranda, formerly CO of the 2nd Leyte Company, PC, in Ormoc. I told him frankly that in spite of my former rank, I was willing to serve under him, in any capacity. He appointed me Chief-of-Staff and at the same time, Commander of a Service School for officers which we organized and have been operating since January." Marcos G. Soliman, Major, 81st Inf. To: "Dear Mac" [Peralta] June 5, 1943, pp. 3-4. Also, see Miranda, *op. cit.*, p.2.

41. A former officer of the WLGWF engineer corps, Lt. Coloma (directly associated with Miranda in the ordnance shop), declared that in early 1943, confidential conversations were taking place between the emissaries of Balderian and Miranda regarding an organizational fusion that might have placed Balderian at the head of Leyte's civil administration. (Interview: Florencio B. Coloma 2nd Lt., Manila, 1946).

Japanese assault" on the GHQ was Major Marcos G. Soliman, a soldier well qualified for these responsibilities. To him, Miranda delegated practically all administrative responsibility. Whenever a question of top-level policy was at issue, Miranda reposed full faith in the soundness of Soliman's judgment. And Soliman's policy might be summed up as a two-fold proposition: a) good relations with the civil authorities through a "just administration;" b) hewing to the line of military correctness within the WLGWF in order to qualify for recognition from GHQ, SWPA. Perhaps Soliman inwardly resented Miranda's failure to relinquish the commanding generalship to him. As to his loyalty, however, there could be no question. Despite repeated attempts, Kangleon could not detach Soliman from the WLGWF.

From an organizational standpoint, perhaps the greatest weakness of the WLGWF arose from Miranda's refusal to leave his own strongly guarded headquarters and undertake a tour of inspection throughout the WLGWF zone. This in itself would account for some of the abuses perpetrated by certain sub-sector and sector commanders who felt secure in their relative remoteness from GHQ. It was this self-imposed confinement that made Miranda unaware of certain developments, particularly the unpopularity of the Rodriguez command in the Baybay sector. But Miranda was convinced that the omnipresent agents of Kangleon would assassinate him at the first unguarded appearance. Extraordinary precaution was his only safeguard. ⁴²

Municipal ordinances in the WLGWF zone did not take effect before ratification by the GHQ. As liaison, a special Civil Affairs Office was created, headed by Attorney Teleron, Judge Advocate General. The duties of the Civil Affairs Officer were primarily the transmission of general instructions from the GHQ to the municipal mayors and the screening of municipal ordinances. According to Teleron, the WLGWF issued a bulletin declaring that all municipal ordinances not disallowed within 15 days after promulgation would be regarded as having full force of law. And the grounds of disapproval might range from ultra-vires in the pre-war sense of the term to inexpediency. Teleron gives an example of the vacating of a Merida ordinance proposing the dismantlement of an old public school building in order to use the materials in the erection of a guerrilla building at Barrio Matlang, Merida. Inasmuch as public school buildings were national property during the Commonwealth regime (and not provincial or municipal), the local authorities were foreclosed from exercising jurisdiction over these buildings.

To what extent did the regimental commander interfere with the municipal administration? Vicente Villegas, Academic Supervisor of West Loyte

42. Miranda received an anonymous warning: "... I regret to respectfully inform... that Lieut. Col. Ruperto Kangleon... sent his henchman--Lieut. Regner--to our Cebu Northern Sector and maliciously informed us that you and your men are to be shot on sight if ever you care to come to Cebu with your men.

"The undersigned is a mere corporal... who sympathized with you. I know that the accusations... against you are absolutely false and unfounded...."

Juan de La Cruz, your former soldier and friend. June 9, 1943.
To: Brig. Gen. Miranda."

after the war and Superintendent of Schools for the WLGWF would reject this question as calling for too simple an answer. Actually, much depended upon the personality of the mayor and the character of the sector commander. In Palompon, Mayor Parilla was a weak personality and the sector commander was the dominating figure.⁴³ In Merida, on the other hand, under the more forceful personality of Menesis, the mayoralty retained much of its normal power. In Albuera, the popular regimental commander Conrado Daffon, "the local fair-haired boy," got along amicably with mayor Barte so that there was no conflict of wills. The Japanese occupation of Ormoc put the poblacion beyond the reach of the guerrilla. But the "military mayor," administering the municipal "government in exile" in the mountain seat, was directly under the thumb of Miranda's GHQ. Baybay, further removed, was largely controlled by Sergeant (guerrilla Major) Rodriguez.

Where a working relationship was established between the regimental commander of the sector and the municipal mayor, the Municipal Council was content to let things be. In general, the municipal council would function in a self-restraining fashion, sensing the desires of the WLGWF and not introducing measures calculated to bring on a veto. The council of Palompon might be regarded as the norm in its functioning. According to Vicente Villegas, it rarely met, allowing full initiative to the regimental commander in the sponsoring of proposals. When it did convene, however, the regimental commander scrupulously refrained from dictating an agenda. In Merida! (according to the regimental S-3, Pastor) the Municipal Council on its own initiative submitted pending measures to the guerrilla authorities for approval. This was also true of Albuera. In the Ormoc sector, the GHQ rather than the regimental commander (two regiments here) generally sponsored measures for action by the guerrilla municipal government.

The combination of a Japanese offensive at the end of 1943 and American recognition of Colonel Kangleon as official guerrilla leader of Leyte reduced the WLGWF to the status of a paper organization, but with an abiding esprit de corps among its scattered remnants. Despite its defects and the abuses it may have tolerated in its first period of expansion, the WLGWF was sounder structurally than any of its rivals. While integrating the municipal administrations into the general military framework for purposes of taxation, troop subsistence, and general security, the military GHQ continued to allow considerable home rule to each of its five constituent municipalities. A Civil Affairs Officer associated with GHQ brought about the needed inter-municipal coordination of programming, and also acted as an independent check on administration by the sector commanders! There is evidence that Miranda would have set up a provincial government under a civilian governor had he received American appointment as guerrilla commander of Leyte. Perhaps the character of the WLGWF would have undergone complete remodeling under those circumstances. But judging by what was, we may say that the WLGWF showed the possibilities of achieving a high degree of efficiency while not abolishing democratic procedure.

"USAFFE All"

As the menace of Japanese invasion drew nearer daily, the Leyte home force was actively mapping out a defense. It was agreed that the local

43. Interview: Capt. A. Olaybar (in command for the WLGWF at Palompon), Tacloban, 1945.

forces would fall back upon the mountainous sector of Burauen. Among the Filipino officers responsible for action in this sector was one, Captain Glicerio Erfe. When the majority of his fellow officers surrendered to the Japanese, Erfe withdrew and went into hiding. Not long after, he was busy gathering all unsurrendered USAFFE soldiers who were prepared to plunge into resistance against the enemy.⁴⁴

Captain Erfe was the highest ranking unsurrendered USAFFE officer on Leyte. He saw himself burdened with a grave moral responsibility--the responsibility of assuring the close working together of all other officers and enlisted men who had thrown in their lot with resistance. This was an assumption not readily conceded by the others. Nonetheless, when Erfe proceeded to work out an organizational plan and issue directives to the others, his authority went unchallenged. At most, we can say that some of them tacitly disregarded his orders.

Erfe looked upon his immediate followers and the other units he learned about as "the USAFFE at large, fighting the enemy in Leyte after the general surrender." His purpose was to weld into a coordinated combat organization the scattered bands of the USAFFE at large. He regarded his own special zone the municipalities of Burauen and La Paz, for this was the site of his initial organizational activity. But Dulag and Abuyog came within the circumference of his organizational enterprise. He decided that the soldiery was too weak numerically to shoulder alone the burden of active defense. It would be necessary to eke out the scant numbers by the founding of auxiliary guerrilla units drawn from the civilians of fighting age. For that purpose, he enlisted the active cooperation of the municipal governments. A plan emerged:

Each municipality will be organized into guerrilla brigades commanded by a Brigadier General. Each brigade will be composed of so many Regiments, depending upon the population of the municipality; each Regiment will be commanded by a Colonel with a

44. Erfe dilated upon the guerrilla mission in a letter to a brother guerrilla leader: "The USAFFE is but only one organization. After the general order for surrender those officers and soldiers who surrendered were called USAFFE but those soldiers who did not surrender are called USAFFE AT LARGE.... The group to which you and I belong, believing that it was due to a higher cause... which is much higher than discipline itself, which is the only purpose for which those that are now in the concentration camp have surrendered... has prompted us not to surrender.... In the very beginning after the general surrender I found that I happen to be the most ranking officer in the line and I believe it is my moral obligation not only to the organization to which we belong but also to the people of the province of Leyte in particular and the people of the Philippines in general to subordinate myself to its needs. In this time of crisis it is for the sake of directing towards a single effort all our resources and energies, that I have self-appointed myself at the helm of the government.... I believe myself capable both physically and mentally.... However, if there is any officer ranking higher than me in the province of Leyte, I would gladly turn over the command of the USAFFE AT LARGE, Leyte, to him...."

"9", Capt., Inf." Cmdg. 14 Dec. 42. Memo to: Lt. Balderian, CO, East Leyte Sector.

complement of 990 men; each company to be organized into 110 men commanded by a captain. Each company is organized into 3 platoons of 4 squads each.

The officers shall be appointed in their respective grades and given their oath of office. They shall receive no pay and allowances but shall with the enlisted men be subsisted in kind with taxes to be levied in accordance with the resolution passed by municipal council of each municipality....⁴⁵

It was under his [Erfe's] command that the four municipalities got the following designations: La Paz, 1st Guerrilla Brigade; Abuyog, 2nd; Dulag, 3rd;⁴⁶ and Burauen, 4th.⁴⁷

What were to be the relations of the guerrilla brigades and the municipal administration? One of the sector leaders reported:⁴⁸

Here is a copy of the tentative layout of the organization which was furnished us by Captain 9. I believe it will serve as the pattern for other organizations. As per his instructions, each municipality will be a Brigade under the command of the Mayor.⁴⁹ The brigade

45. "9", Capt. Inf., Cmdg. May 22, 1942. To: Cmdg. Gen. USAFFE.

46. Aurillo, op. cit. p. 3.

47. Dulag was placed under the La Paz command for a short period of time, supposedly for reasons of administrative convenience. The move was resented by the Dulag unit. Villegas, Exec. Off., 3rd. Guer. Brig., 29 March 1943. To: Col. 9.

48. Ramon Mercado stated that his informant was "Victorio Tiozon of Terragona, Abuyog, and a leader of the guerrilla.... We learned from him that their organization which was headed by Mayor Pedro Gallego, was already under the wing of Captain 9."

49. The guerrilla government of Dulag was organized in the barrios while Mayor Nicolas Bautista was still unwillingly exercising office in the poblacion (town center) under Japanese surveillance.

"The executive power of the Municipal Mayor became evidently felt when a delegate, in the person of Mr. Eugenio Villegas... was sent to exercise the executive power.... Stealthily, as father to his children, the mayor... did not relinquish his cares over his people. Now the local officials (not of the puppet government, though some of them are also members of the guerrilla organization within the poblacion) has imposed upon themselves of their own volition, the paramount duty to keep the morale of the people, to serve the army, to maintain peace and order....

"The following men were the guerrilla functionaries of Dulag: in 1943:
1. Mr. Pedro Tupaz, the Chief of Police, has been Chief of Police from 1923 up to the time when war was declared and until after Leyte has declared its surrender, serving in different Municipalities. He is the G-3 of the Guerrilla Brigade.

2. Mr. Leovegildo Radaza is recommended Acting Justice of the Peace. He is a holder of LL.B. degree and admitted to the bar, though he did not pass. He served as Court Interpreter in the Court of First Instance at

(continued on next page)

commander will have his brigade staff composing of the members of the municipal government as follows: Vice-Mayor - Executive Officer; Secretary - S-1 (Adjutant); Justice of the Peace - S-2 (Intelligence Officer); Chief of Police - S-3 (Plans & Training Officer); and Municipal Treasurer - S-4 (Supply Officer). All the members of the brigade staff shall be appointed as captains. Then the municipality will be divided into districts and each district shall compose of three barrios. The commander of each district is a captain and is a member of the municipal council. Each barrio will be composed of 100 selected men commanded by a lieutenant, preferably the barrio lieutenant. These 100 men shall be called company; and inasmuch as there are 3 companies in each district, they shall be designated as Companies A, B, C, 1st district. The company shall then be divided into 3 platoons, each platoon to be divided into 4 squads for tactical purposes.

It may be noted that inasmuch as the captain of a district is at the same time member of the municipal council, the municipal councilors are still functioning in the municipality. In the deliberation of military matters the members of the municipal council shall be converted into war cabinet. Each district commander shall be assisted by a district staff composed of the following: S-1 - Adjutant; S-2 - Intelligence Officer; S-3 - Plans and Training Officer; and S-4 - Supply Officer.

What is the significance of this conjoining of military and civil function? Ramon Mercado reflected upon this unique arrangement at the outset of his associations with Erfe:⁵⁰

So in that case the Mayor, who has the rank of Major -- [he might have referred to the etymological common ancestry of these designations⁷ will have a dual personality. Could that be possible? I think there will be complications....

But the local organizer sets Mercado's doubts at rest:

Footnote 49 continued:

Tacloban for a period of about $1\frac{1}{2}$ years. He is the G-2 of the G.B. 3. Mr. Juan Gabriola is recommended Acting Municipal Treasurer. He is the G-4 of the G.B. He has been a teacher with two years' experience and when the war broke out he was taking his post-graduate work in Leyte Normal School.

4. Mr. Eugenio Villegas is being assigned as Acting Municipal Secretary. He was the Military Mayor and Chief of the Guerrilla Forces of Dulag since its organization. At present he is the Procurement and Supply Officer for the "L" Co., 95th Inf. Reg. He has been in the teaching profession for a period of 14 years, until the war broke out...." Eugenio Villegas, 3rd Lt., Inf., Actg. Mun. Secty., Dulag. September 10, 1943. To: The Prov. Gov. in the field, pp. 1-2.

50. Mercado, op. cit., pp. 37-39.

There can never be complications. Captain 9's idea is to avoid any clash between the civil and military leaders. That is the reason why he is appointing the Mayor as the Brigade Commander who shall be known as the Military Mayor and brigade commander. Besides, the Mayor being the head of the town, he is respected by the people. Furthermore, in the administration of his municipality, he will be able to get the maximum cooperation from his subordinates, as they are the same personnel who worked with him previous to the invasion. Moreover, it would lessen the number of collaborationists among the government employees by making them interested in the opposition.... If there will be two chiefs, the people would be at a loss as to who would be followed.

Erfe summed up:

The mission of the USAFFE AT LARGE is just pure and simple. First, to crush the enemy in the place they have occupied; after which such places as are in our hands should be turned over to the municipal mayor with appropriate ceremony with instructions to continue as usual the municipal government of the Philippine Commonwealth. His government shall be backed up by the guerrilla brigade to help him protect the life and property of the municipality; to eliminate fifth columnists; and the protection of the civilians from the invaders' patrol. The USAFFE after turning over the government to the mayor, will be used to other fronts where their presence is more important. The USAFFE AT LARGE, Leyte, is not in any way influenced by politicians, for that is against statutes for military men to mix up with politics.

As soon as all the municipalities that are now occupied by the enemy would have been cleared and returned to normal condition, then that is the time when the provincial government shall be established, officials of which shall compose of the same provincial officials provided they are not pro-Japs or in any way influenced by the enemy. They shall be directed by the highest USAFFE officer in command....

The present and the future activities of the USAFFE AT LARGE in its relation to civil authorities has been the object of careful planning by this Headquarters in order that the USAFFE AT LARGE here in Leyte will not be the recipient of criticism, ridicule, or embarrassment from the civil components of the Philippine Commonwealth during and after the war.⁵¹

Were all former occupants of public office to be automatically reinstated? Erfe specified the conditions governing the return to office of the former incumbent and the obligations devolving upon him:

As a general rule all those lawfully elected or appointed to the different offices of the civil government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines... and have been and are actually... loyal to the government... should be allowed and assisted or required to return to their respective offices and to regularly perform their respective public duties as well as to exercise their legal powers and receive their

51. "9" Capt., Inf., Cmdg., 14 December, 1942. Memo to: Lt. Balderian, CO, East Leyte Sector.

regular salaries.

All officers so appointed and returned.. shall be commissioned in the Guerrilla Warfare Service with the United States Army Forces in the Philippines and shall submit their oaths of office to this headquarters.⁵²

Erfe differentiated between the first-string soldiery of his mobile units and the guerrilla reservists (comparable to the American "State Guard" of World War II).

The mission of our mobile units will be as follows:

- a. To reinforce guerrilla units threatened, upon request of the Brigade Commander.
- b. To protect farmers from while tilling their lands!
- c. To assist the military mayors in enforcing law and order in their respective spheres.
- d. Apprehension of fifth columnists, saboteurs, and spies.⁵³

In November of 1942, an agent of General Macario Peralta, Lieutenant Jinolan, gathering intelligence data in Leyte established contact with Erfe. Lieutenant Jinolan declared that Peralta had been in contact with GHQ, SWPA, had assumed command of the resistance movement in the Visayas, and was designating his own command in Panay as the 4th Philippine Corps. (Panay had formerly been the 6th Military District). Thereupon, he suggested to Erfe that the latter organize along similar lines, perhaps adopting the designation 9th Military Corps for Leyte, the former 9th Military District. Finally, he advised Erfe to keep in touch with Peralta and thereby improve his chances for recognition.

Erfe's adjutant recorded:

... that on the 1st day of December, 1942, the guerrilla units were reorganized into the IX Philippine Corps, U. S. Army... and that Colonel Erfe and other officers and enlisted men performed the mission of Military Adviser and Assistant Military Instructors respectively, as per General Orders No. 1....⁵⁴

The internal structure of the guerrilla brigades underwent a relatively minor change but the Abuyog organization moved into the ascendancy.

The twenty-four districts commanded by guerrilla captains rose to be twenty-four battalions, each battalion no longer to be com-

52. Col. "9", Inf., GHQ, USAFFE AT LARGE, Oct. 9, 1942, Unnumbered Circular, Par. 1-2.

53. "9" Col., Inf., Cmdg. Memo to: Major P. Gallego, Feb. 3, 1943. One of Erfe's key officers, Gaudencio Almendra, was credited by St. John with introducing the WAS to Leyte's guerrillas: "The WAS girls were organized in the southern towns.... A Lt. Gaudencio Almendra of the guerrillas got the idea first and sent out announcements to all the towns." St. John, op. cit., pp. 162-163.

54. Silverio T. Paza, Affidavit, January 12, 1946, Tacloban.

manded by a captain but by a major. Gallego [Mayor of Abuyog] became a major-general and Landia [chief of police] brigadier general. They were no longer on top of only the Second Guerrilla Brigade but of all brigades under Erfe. And as for Erfe, he made himself known as Colonel of Infantry -- Military Adviser.... The four municipalities were therefore grouped together under Gallego and Landia's command, and with Erfe as Military Adviser, bore the name, 11th Leyte Guerrilla Warfare Division, IX Philippine Corps, U.S. Army.⁵⁵

By styling himself "Military Adviser", Erfe made it clear that he had no aspirations to political control of his zone. He was from Luzon and looked to the local politicians to provide the support needed for subsisting his troops and furthering his security program. The real influences in his organization were men like Mayor Gallego of Abuyog and Attorney Enerlan of Burauen. In point of fact, Erfe's organization was the only one where relationships were reversed, and the civilian officials helped to determine military policy. The device of the guerrilla brigades allowed the municipal officials to play at being soldiers and enjoy the pomp of officership. This was a sure way of retaining active civilian support. On the other hand, it permitted the infiltration of petty local politics into what should have been the exclusively non-partisan and technical aspects of military organization.

What may we say regarding the accomplishments of Erfe's organization? This is how Erfe saw himself:

Through my company commanders... this Headquarters was able to eliminate political supremacy among leaders in La Paz and Abuyog; sectionalism and tribal prejudices were put to an end; robbers, killers, and bandits were approached, routed, killed, or disbanded; enemy patrols relaxed and confined only to barrios bordering occupied towns; enemy air raids suspended, except the retaliation after the day your men encountered the Japs' patrol from Dulag: Peace and order reigneth; farmers returned to their farms; civilians returned to their household duties; merchants and businessmen ply their trade again; civil governments function regularly as before the invasion; civil government officials were required to return to their legal powers; Guerrilla Brigades were organized, commanded to Military Mayors; members of which were to render volunteer service to USFIP, inducted properly into the service in accordance with military regulations, officers given commission and an oath of office in accordance with the civil service law; a Guerrilla War Tribunal was instituted for the trial of fifth columnists, espionage, sabotage, treason, etc., which cannot be tried by lower courts and to insure justice to all persons that may be brought before it before the law; government prices on commodities of prime importance enforced; profiteering eliminated, except on occasional cases in places very remote from our control; hoarding of food-stuffs prohibited; strong consciousness of national solidarity has already consolidated the people's efforts and resources into one solid front. The complete withdrawal of Japanese forces in Sogod, Malitbog, Maasin, Matalom, Baybay, all towns in the North and their subsequent retreat to the towns of Dulag, Burauen, Tanauan, Palo, Sta. Fe and Tacloban was attributable to the initiative of this headquarters when,

55. Aurillo, op. cit., p. 4.

on October 1, 1942, it issued Field Orders No. 9....⁵⁶

These claims are somewhat pretentious, though true at their core. They represent as much Erfe's aspirations as his genuine accomplishments. For instance, he did strive to eliminate political factionalism from Abuyog and LaPaz, but his success was only partial. The feud between Captain Landia and Mayor Gallego in Abuyog was only allayed and did erupt when these two local leaders split on the question of supporting Erfe after he had fallen under the ban of Kangleon. Again the inspection procedures introduced to eliminate profiteering and hoarding were effective only sporadically. And finally as previously noted, the general attack, following the issuance of Field Order No. 9, was poorly coordinated. Whatever success was realized was partially the outcome of other factors operating at the time.

Why did Captain Erfe defy the authority of Colonel Kangleon? Had he not spoken on many occasions of this willingness to abdicate the supreme command should an officer of superior rank appear? Perhaps there was an element of selfishness in Erfe; perhaps he like Miranda (whom Erfe had also condemned) was unwilling simply to hand over to another the organization he himself had fathered.⁵⁷ But others in the organization, such as Mayor Gallego and the "Brigade" leaders, also enjoyed a vested interest in the perpetuation of the organization under their own leadership. Moreover, they had won a large measure of good-will from the civilian population. They hesitated risking the dissipation of this good-will by deeding

56. G. I. Erfe, Subject: Reply to Letter of Warning, June 9, 1943. To: Col. Ruperto Kangleon.

See also, Erfe's declaration of objectives, especially his determination to fight for the restoration of liberty and independence and his struggle to unify the resistance movement in the Province of Leyte:

a) Memorandum to Lt. Balderian, CO, East Leyte Sector, 14 Dec. 42, "9" Col. Inf., Cmdg.

b) Open Letter to: "All the people of Leyte" - Subject "What the USAFFE AT LARGE and Guerrilla Warfare Units, Leyte, are Fighting For." 11 Jan., '45, "9" Col. Inf. Cmdg.

Erfe's former adjutant declared "that this organization has checked" banditry which before this organization was rampant in the different places in the province; that fifth column activity was also reduced to the minimum; that the morale of the people sprung up into a fighting spirit that never wavered to follow the path of patriotic duty...." Paza, op. cit.

57. Part of Erfe's disgruntlement lay in Kangleon's siding with Balderian in the Balderian-Erfe rivalry for the command of North Leyte. Balderian explained to a subordinate: "... Captain Erfe told the story that he was the first to organize. ... I stood up and asked Capt. Erfe what kind of organization did he organize, whether it was an organization of Volunteer guards or of a guerrilla...." Alejandro Balderian, Col. April 28, 1943. Memo to: "My dear Lt. Col. Felix Pamanian."

One of Erfe's pre-invasion associates, heading the Sogod guerrilla group, advised: "... This is the time we have to think of others and not of ourselves.... I do not want you, Balderian and other guerrilla leaders, to misunderstand each other. If you are not working... under one Hgrs., be sure that you cooperate..! in the fight against our enemy" or in matters of food and other war materials..!". "Eligible [Lt. Nuique] Col. Inf., Sogod, 28 Jan. 1943. To: "My dear Capt. Erfe."

the organization over to new leaders who might pursue other objectives and employ different procedures. Moreover, as in the case of Miranda, Kangleon had adopted unconciliatory tactics, ignoring the human feelings involved on the part of those ousted from command.

To understand Erfe's character, one must bear in mind that he was possessed by an indomitable sense of purpose, of mission. It is with complete sincerity that he wrote: "... In this time of crisis it is for the sake of directing towards a single effort all our resources and energies... that I have self-appointed myself at the helm of the government now miserably left alone due to the collapse of our national defense...."⁵⁸

But Erfe was a God-fearing man who prayed regularly. Whatever measure of success he enjoyed he was inclined to attribute to the friendly disposition of God. Unlike some men of his stamp, he did not develop a self-righteous arrogance. Humbly--"I never forget his Divine Guidance in resolving perplexing problems. I never forget the delicate and heavy responsibilities entrusted to me by the people of East Leyte...."⁵⁹

Erfe was much more sensitive to the delicacies of interpersonal relations than most of his fellow guerrilla officers. When he found fault with a guerrilla officer, he did not use the bludgeoning method of rebuke, but tried to shame the offender in terms of his own principles.⁶⁰

When Balderian notified Erfe of plans to establish his own separatist government for Leyte, Erfe did not denounce him directly: "It is inconceivable to believe that one of my ablest leaders in the firing line could be capable of sending such a message to his superior!... No subordinate is willing to make this beautiful structure collapse to pieces by demoralizing the whole command in his endeavor to get over his superior...."⁶¹

Realizing that he had pricked the vanity of Balderian, he followed this critical statement with a letter of commendation: "... Your industry, perseverance, devotion to duty and that sense of stick-to-itiveness in the prompt accomplishment of your mission merits the praise and respect of this Headquarters!... I trust that in the future you and your men will live up to the expectation of this command...."⁶²

After Balderian persisted in executing his scheme, Erfe contented

58. "9", Capt., Inf., Cmdg. 14 Dec. '42. To: Lt. Balderian, CO, E. Ley. Sect.

59. Glicerio I. Erfe, Capt., Inf., June 9, 1943. To: Col. Ruperto Kangleon, Cmdg. Gen., 92nd Div.

60. Mayor Gallego stated that when Miranda declared he would not despatch periodic activity reports to Erfe, the latter replied with stern dignity: "I will hold you responsible for everything that will happen in that sector." (Interview: Mayor Gallego, Abuyog, 1945.)

61. "9", Capt., Inf., Cmdg. 14 Dec. '42. To: Lt. Balderian, CO, E. Ley. Sec.

62. "9", Col. 23 Dec. '42. To: Bvt. Lt. Col. Balderian, CO, E. Ley. Sec.

himself with this temperate comment in reporting to Kangleon of these activities: ".!. You may inform the Colonel about the little trouble which Brevet Lt. Col. Balderian is doing at present in his endeavor to set up a Politico Military Government... with himself as the Military governor..."⁶³

On the other hand, when Erfe himself was on the defensive, trying to justify his intransigence, he was both firm and tactful to Colonel Kangleon:

... But whatever I have humbly done for the protection of the people, both from the enemy, bandits and murderers, I have done them honestly and above reproach.... I did not build a house of cards. What I did for my soldiers and thousands of people of East Leyte will never be forgotten.... I wish to repeat here again my resignation as an Adjutant.... The next time you are in the neighborhood, please visit me.h..⁶⁴

Erfe abhorred unnecessary violence. His enemies allege that he was afraid of personal danger. He wrote: "I wish to designate that such an honor [Adjutant] be designated from... one whose family is not exposed to the enemy like mine."⁶⁵

He also says a bit self-consciously: "I have excellent disciplined fighting men.... I may not be with them most of the time, but I was not idle."..⁶⁶

The outstanding political leaders within the area formerly controlled by Captain Erfe were lavish in praising his policy. Had the other guerrilla chieftains followed his example--they said--Leyte's Resistance movement would have been blessed with greater harmony and fewer killings.⁶⁷

The Provincial Government of "Free Leyte"

"The first attempt to unify the guerrillas in Southern Leyte was made by Colonel Kangleon early January 1943." This statement by Attorney (later Congressman) Domingo Veloso is in error and should be corrected to read "successful attempt." As a matter of fact, the American Gordon Lang, heading a group based in Maasin, attempted a partial unification. He succeeded in bringing the Macrohon sector under his wing. He also established friendly contact with his fellow American, Chester Peters, at Inopacan, with Lieutenants Julia and Napoli at Matalom, and with Lieutenant Saballones at Bato.⁶⁸

63. "9" Col. Inf. Cmdg. 25 Jan. '43. To: Bvt. Capt. G. Almendra, G-3.

64. Glicerio I. Erfe, Capt. Inf. June 9, 1943. To: Col. Ruperto K. Kangleon, Cmdg. Gen., 92nd Div.

65. Ibid. 66. Ibid.

67. Interviews: Leyte, 1945. a) Burauen - Mayor Prejula; former mayor Bugho; b) Abuyog - Mayor Gallego, Mun. Secty. "Aurrillo; c) Dulag - Eugenio Villegas, principal, Dulag Academy; d) Tacloban - Atty. Enerlan (of Burauen)".

68. Commander "Chick" Parsons held both Peters and Lang in low regard.

"Lack of competition... as much as personal jealousy doubtless caused
(continued on next page)

It was Lang who organized the attack against the Japanese garrison at Baybay in September 1942. The attack was tactically unsuccessful. But as the attacking Filipino force was drawn from all the guerrilla units mentioned, the action served as an object lesson in the value of unified effort.

In October 1942, Lang and Peters decided to convoke a gathering of all the guerrilla leaders of the territory lying between Maasin and Inopacan. The conference was held in an atmosphere of extreme cordiality. Unfortunately the machine-rifle of Saballones' Bato unit served as the apple of discord. Peters encouraged Lang to demand its possession, on the ground that Lang was the most active against the enemy. Saballones refused to surrender this priceless weapon. And now provoked, Saballones demurred in the proposal that a unified command be established, with Lang as supreme commander. Saballones was overruled and the conference broke up with Lang nominally in control, but the general amity marred. Lang never followed up his powers, for responsibility in Maasin took up his full attention. Soon after his cordiality towards Peters underwent a decided freeze.

In November Peters convoked another gathering, this time with representatives of Miranda's WIGWF in attendance. This conference turned into a shooting affray before its deliberations were commenced, with Peters being wounded and several of the other leaders killed. (Lang had been absent, ill with dengue fever.) The WIGWF became the beneficiary of this fracas, making Inopacan a satellite and using it as a base for expansion southward to Hindang, Hilongos, Bato, and Matalom.⁶⁹

Footnote 68 continued:

the rivalry between the two most prominent warring groups in the south. One was led by a yeoman who had been attached to the Sixteenth Naval District at Cavite before the war, the other by a mining engineer who had lost one job after another in the Philippines. Both these men were, in Parsons' opinion, the type to take advantage of the situation, gather together a few rifles, and give their supporters poor leadership.

"Almost daily pitched battles occurred between the forces of 'Captain' Gordon Lang and 'Major X' as Chester Peters, the other leader, called himself..".

"Visiting 'Major X' first of all, Chick found him to be a boastful swashbuckler, with a mestiza wife who called herself 'Joanne of Arc,' completely intent on his sole purpose of eliminating the immediate opposition of Lang....

"Lang seemed to be slightly more amenable to reason but told Chick: 'I've just got to get Peters before he gets me. That's all.'" Ingham, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-712.

St. John's estimate of Lang corroborated that of Parsons:

"... Lang, who used to live in Minnesota, had quite a setup there with guerrillas and everything -- which included a frigidaire, a motorcycle, and a couple of automobiles. He lived in a big house, had married a Spanish mestiza named Pasing and was doing all right."

St. John, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

69. Commander Parsons learned of the "Inopacan Incident" upon his arrival in Leyte, but he was misinformed concerning the date and the principals involved:

"... The day before Chick arrived [March, 1943] a senseless encounter
(continued on next page

The American evacuee who was to become guerrilla school administrator pointed out an important psychological by-product of this incident:

... I referred earlier in this letter to the recent skirmishes among the guerrillas. Every man killed in that affray was murdered, and one who fired the shots are murderers. But no one with whom I have talked looked upon the 'killings' as a crime. Cruelty is contagious during a war.... Several persons in telling me about the 'killings' at Inopacan laughed hilariously as if it were a good joke on somebody or other.⁷⁰

Meanwhile, Lieutenant Nuique of Sogod was sending out feelers to his fellow officers in Malitbog and Pintuyan (Francisco, Jain, Nazareno) on the subject of unification. His effort came to nought. Blocked by the overweening personal ambition of the other sector leaders, unification talks bogged down. Nuique concluded that he must discover a leader who, by force of personality and recognized experience, towered above the others. He found his candidate opportunely in the person of Colonel Ruperto K. Kangleon, recently returned from a Japanese prison camp, in Mindanao.

A unification conference was held in Sogod in January, 1943, attended by all of the Southern leaders as well as by Balderian and other guerrilla chieftains of North Leyte. Kangleon was chosen Military Adviser of the guerrilla of Leyte. With the consent of the other leaders, Kangleon appointed Gordon Lang to command the Southern Leyte Guerrilla Units which, in turn, joined in confederation with Balderian's organization of East Leyte.⁷¹ The SIGU evolved into the 94th Infantry Regiment under the overall command of the 92nd Infantry Division, Leyte Area Command.⁷² On the

Footnote⁶⁹ continued:

between the two rivals had resulted in the death of forty-five young guerrilla soldiers and the wounding of Peters...." Ingham, op. cit., p. 71.

Babcock's report of the episode differed somewhat:

"I had planned to go to Sogod yesterday with Lt. M. [Mondragon] for a visit, but the trip had to be postponed. A week or so ago, M. received a note from the guerrilla head at Inopacan, inviting him to attend a conference there. M., with a handful of soldiers, crossed the mountain from Sogod to Bato, where he got a truck for Inopacan. At Hindang... the truck was surrounded by Inopacan guerrillas who, without warning, opened fire. Several of M's soldiers were killed and others wounded, and M. himself was slightly injured. His soldiers lost all their arms and ammunition." ... Cornered in a truck, there was nothing to do but flee." Babcock, Nov. 21, 1942. Unposted letter to his daughter.

70. Ibid.

71. St. John wrote: "Kangleon had no trouble getting started. For one thing, Yeoman Gordon Lang had started an organization...."

"Kangleon took over Lang's guerrillas...." St. John, op. cit., p. 91.

72. In April, Kangleon met with the principal leaders of northeast Leyte: "In our military conference held at Abuyog on April 19, 1943, at about 8:00 p.m., the following were present: Col. Kangleon; Capt. Erfe; Lt. (continued on next page)

19th of July, 1943, Kangleon proclaimed the establishment of the civil government of "Free Leyte", provincial representative of the Philippine Commonwealth government-in-exile.

Small of stature but of commanding presence, Colonel Kangleon was regarded by his troops as a man to be respected and avoided. He was a severe martinet, generally sullen and often cantankerous. He is said to have slapped and kicked subordinate officers and enlisted men under stress of anger. He had a reputation for valor, willing to lead his men personally into combat, and deriding officers of the Miranda and Erfe type who issued field orders from the safety of their headquarters. His honesty was unimpeachable, no scandals of confiscation for personal benefit or of embezzlement of municipal funds ever having sullied his name. He lived abstemiously, capable of enduring much privation, and encouraged his followers to adopt his example.⁷³

This writer interviewed Kangleon at the residence of the Provincial Fiscal Taclobane in 1945. Conversation revealed that Kangleon nourished a suppressed hostility towards alleged American racial arrogance. He charged the pre-war USAFFE with having discriminated against Filipinos in its promotional policy, as well as with having snubbed Filipino officers socially. Is it possible that he harbored some sympathy for Japanese propaganda of "Asia for the Asiatics"? At any rate, he did surrender to the Japanese in Mindanao, and his "escape" from a Japanese internment camp is set in obscure circumstances.

An army careerist of the type favoring the hierarchical structure of social organization where orders proceed down the chain of command, and where administrators on each level obey with alacrity the orders of their superior, Colonel Kangleon had scant patience for the deliberative process. He was determined that the provincial government he was establishing would

Footnote 72 continued:

Lt. Nazareno; Lt. Arias; Lt. Napoli, Brevet Lt. Olmedo; Brevet Lt. Loreno; Brevet Major Dadula; Brevet Lt. Telimban; Brevet Lt. Trinehera; Capt. Landia, Maj. Mayor Gallego; Atty. G. Enerlan; Atty. M. Vertudazo; Atty. Closa; Atty. Santos; many others and I were present:

"The subject of the conference was the revelation of the Instruction of Gen. MacArthur to Col. Kangleon to take command of the 9th Military District...." Alejandro Balderian, Col. April 28, 1943. To: "My dear Lt. Col. Felix Pamanian.

Balderian followed up the decisions of this conference to recognize Kangleon by convoking a gathering of principal absentees--those from north and northwest Leyte. Pamanian of northwest Leyte was favorable: "Permission is hereby requested to allow Lt. Col. Quintero to become my personal representative.... It is understood that he is authorized to cast his vote in any decision toward unification...." Felix Pamanian, Bvt. Lt. Col. Inf. Cmdg. 27 April 43. To: CO, Northern-Eastern Ley. Sec.

Balderian's adjutant further advised him: "Lt. Col. Quintero & Causing, Majors Posoncoy & Centino are on the way.... Lt. Col. Pabilona may join the party at Jaro. Under present circumstances Major Estojero-Santos cannot attend.... Capt. Atty. Mamerto Ribo has asked this Headquarters for permission to be present...." Luciano Bonicillo, Adj. Gen., 28 April 43. To: Col. Balderian.

73. Ingham, op. cit., pp. 72-75, 224-225.

be a creature of the guerrilla army.

No doubt, he could have governed the municipalities of his jurisdiction from headquarters and scrapped the machinery of civil administration. Oddly enough, it was Kangleon's almost religious respect for form, the outcome of his training, that made him anxious to present the semblance of an independent civil administration. He was thinking of "American recognition and of accounts" to be reckoned in the post-war period. Above all, he wanted to be looked upon as the restorer of law and order.

From the reestablishment of a provincial government for Leyte, Kangleon believed he could derive lawful authority for authorizing printing of the emergency currency, interrupted by the Japanese invasion. He knew full well that the army would be the principal beneficiary of this currency. Therefore, he took pains to create the appearance of a civil government, independent of the military, voting of its own will to provide army appropriations. He was also anxious that any policies of security, economic mobilization, and social control that he should find necessary (as applicable to all the municipalities) would emanate from an over-all civilian body. In this way, he felt that the people would be less recalcitrant towards accepting unpopular measures. He was shrewd enough to agree that purely local affairs of no consequence should be handled by civilian officials, thereby lightening the administrative load of the military.

If the provincial administration was nominally under civilian control, Kangleon made certain that his influence pervaded its activities. He made known his wishes and emphasized that his program was to be carried out as promptly as possible. The acting governor was his personal appointee, not the choice of a plebiscite. The decision to include on the Provincial Board a member representing North Leyte who found it physically impossible to attend meetings, meant that the one remaining Board member could be controlled so much more easily. In short, Colonel Kangleon had the Provincial Executive safely tucked in his pocket.⁷⁴

"Governor Demeterio, who had presided over Leyte in 1924, was made leader of our government by Kangleon and was installed in the municipal building at Maasin."⁷⁵

74. Having recognized the command of Colonel Kangleon, Major Balderian had no alternative but to dissolve his own Politico-Military governmenta

"Inasmuch as Provincial Officials have already been appointed for the reorganized government, I hereby announce the termination of my incumbency....

"I hereby direct that the following officials I have appointed by virtue of the powers vested in me by proper resolutions... terminate their incumbency... [persons named]. All other provincial officials and employees as well as municipal officials and employees... are expected to extend the same cooperation... to the new Provincial Governor, Hon. Salvador K. Demeterio, and to the other officials appointed by the District Commander." Col. Alejandro Balderian, CO, 95th Inf. Reg., "Circular Letter", July 29, 1943. To: All Provincial Officials and Employees, Province of Leyte. Par. 2-4.

75. Wolfert, op. cit., p. 118.

Serving with Demeterio as the Provincial Board was the pre-war member, Angel Espina, and the member representing north Leyte, Eleuterio Tomas. (Tomas returned to Carigara after only one week of service.) Regular meetings of the Board, according to Attorney Abiera who had served as guerrilla secretary of the Provincial Board (interviewed Tacloban, January, 1946) occurred weekly, although special meetings might be called by the Governor at any time. The provincial government would send out circulars embodying its policies to the municipalities for incorporation in local ordinances. In turn, the municipalities forwarded their ordinances to the Provincial Board for approval or disallowance. The Board would disapprove local ordinances fixing commodity prices at what was deemed improper levels. As Abiera pointed out, the price-fixing power was reserved to the President by the terms of the Emergency Powers Act. Under the extraordinary circumstances of war, the provincial government authorized the municipalities to embark upon price-fixing legislation.

"The legal hold Kangleon had over the governor," explained Kangleon's chief-of-staff, Richardson, "was his power to appoint an Army civil administration officer for the region in case he deemed it necessary. The mere existence of this power made it unnecessary ever actually to use it."⁷⁶

Discussing finances, Richardson said:

There was a loyalty tax to be collected from the people. The rate was originally 10 centavos a month for each male from eighteen to sixty, but I ordered the governor to increase that to 25 centavos a month after getting hold of a Life magazine that told of the war effort in America. The people could be sold the idea by the story of the great job being done back home. The tax would be collected by municipal officials whose treasurers would turn it in to our provincial government.⁷⁷

The provincial auditor, Enrique Potente, was empowered to audit the books of the municipal treasurers. However, the civil government was debarred from inquiry into the propriety of military appropriations.

The Provincial Board undertook to print the balance of the authorized emergency money allocated to Leyte. This money was used to finance the provincial government and the guerrilla. Salaries were paid in emergency funds to provincial officials, while special appropriations were granted to meet partial payment to necessitous municipal officials.

Guerrilla Auditor Enrique Potente provided an adequate fiscal statement:

There has been a very small collection from the regular source of revenue of the Government, since we are in war. The greater part of our revenue producing enterprises were at a standstill or have gone to the Japanese Puppet Government, as they are located within the territory controlled by them. It should also be taken into account that the greatest single item in our revenues comes from the land taxes. Not much land taxes at that time could be collected, as

76. Ibid., p. 118.

77. Ibid.

we had no right to do it, so long as the government could not guarantee to the people that their lands, to be taxes, will not be trampled by the enemy any time!

The inhabitants of the West coast of Leyte, especially in the towns of Bato and Matalom, were engaged in an extensive weaving of abaca clothes; but the people used to pay the licenses for their looms in kind (of abaca clothes), by special arrangements at that time; and the municipal governments gave these clothes as voluntary contributions to the Army where they are used as uniforms of the soldiers. Industries such as soap manufacturing, sandals, etc., were not duly taxed.

The so-called 'Loyalty Tax' which was levied from the people at the rate of P.20 per capita was collected by order of Col. Ruperto K. Kangleon, CO of the Leyte Guerrilla. As this tax has been imposed without authority of law, he has repeatedly manifested that he assumes full responsibility of the same.

The amount of P160,237.09... represents the total expenses of the Government for the general operation of said government.... It also included the following war-time expenses:

| | |
|--|-------------|
| Salaries and traveling expenses of Food Procurement Agents for the Army | P 5,804.21 |
| Relief to Volunteer Guards killed or whose houses were burned by the enemy | 18,340.00 |
| Relief to evacuees | 211.00 |
| Printing of Emergency Currency Notes | 12,108.28 |
| Distilling alcohol for fuel of automobile | 1,003.75 |
| Total | P 37,467.24 |

The overdraft of P122,611.08, or the excess of our expenses over the income... illustrates how badly we needed aid from the outside. We relied upon the printing of the emergency money for that aid.

The following is a comparative statement of the finances of the Province of Leyte during the guerrilla time (Aug. 1, 1943 to Oct. 20, 1944, comprised herein) and that of its Pre-war times:

| | <u>1943-1944</u> | <u>1940-1941</u> |
|---------------------------------------|-------------------|----------------------|
| Revenue | | |
| Taxation | 4,013.16 | 708,171.44 |
| Incidental Revenue | 25,962.31 | 61,203.93 |
| Loyalty Tax | 7,650.54 | --- |
| Total Revenue | <u>37,626.01</u> | <u>769,375.37</u> |
| Expenses of the Provincial Government | 160,237.09 | 636,123.99 |
| Balance | <u>122,611.08</u> | <u>133,251.38</u> 78 |

With these funds, many governmental functions were revised. The courts were reconstituted. Ordinary cases were handled by the local justice of the peace. Graver cases came before the Court of First Instance

at Maasin. Auditor Potente added:

The complete governmental agencies were made to function. All public works were resumed. Bridges were repaired. The health service was also resumed and postal service established. The public schools were opened in all the municipalities not occupied by the Japanese.... The government transactions increased greatly in a few months. In November, 1943, our vouchers were approaching in volume the average of pre-war transactions of the Provincial Government of Leyte. The inhabitants there were apparently contented; but oftentimes rumors were broadcast of the imminent reinvasion of that region by the Japanese.⁷⁹

Speaking of the municipalities, Richardson commented:

In the towns and barrios that the Japs had not garrisoned, municipal mayors or tinentes [tenientes] and officials in general functioned in complete autonomy, visited now and then by Japanese patrols but with decreasing regularity during 1943 as our strength increased and life for Japanese patrols became more hazardous. Each locality had its own police, but in most cases we disarmed them to equip the army, and what they did was patrol around with homemade shotguns or just clubs.

... The regular municipal functionaries were in most cases left untouched.⁸⁰

The guerrilla government sought to expand. The Auditor noted:

Efforts were made by the provincial government in the south to get in touch with the rest of the municipalities of the Province. Letters were sent to the mayors and treasurers of those municipalities which were known to have been established outside of the Japanese control. Some of the officials of said municipalities have responded, but on account of the difficulties of communication, there could not be established a continuous contact with them. Mayor Pedro Gallego of Abuyog has been designated as Deputy Governor and was assigned to undertake an inspection of the municipalities comprised in the northeastern portion of the Province. Mayor Gallego could not complete his tour... because of Japanese interception. Mr. Benito Salas of Maasin was also designated as Deputy Governor, and was commissioned for an inspection trip to the Northwest. He could accomplish his mission up to the towns of Villaba and San Isidro only, establishing schools in Villaba. It was believed then not expedient to insist on the manifestation of activities in the municipal governments established outside of the control of the Japs--in the interest of the inhabitants therein who were under continuous vigilance by the Japanese controlling the area, and in keeping also with the instructions of Gen. MacArthur to lie low in the meantime.⁸¹

In a moment of candor, Richardson declared:

The government proved very useful to us. It acted as the "goat" on all guerrilla actions disapproved of by the people. It bore the

79. Potente, op. cit., pp. 17-18.

80. Wolfert, op. cit., pp. 117-118.

81. Potente, op. cit., pp. 27-28.

expense of all improvements mutually beneficial to our army and the population--road repairs, for example, and bridges, a telegraph system that I installed later. Kangleon had an army mind. He didn't care whose money was spent as long as it wasn't the army's. Because of the civil government, I was able to give our army a number of advantages that Kangleon would have regarded as "frills" if they had to be paid for out of his funds.⁸²

In November, 1943, the government transferred to Ichon, Macrohon because the Japanese were becoming more active:

The Governor has established his office in the school home economics building. The offices of the Provincial Treasurer and Provincial Auditor were housed... in the biggest building in the Barrio... in an ideal place near the seashore and along the Provincial Road, surrounded by coconut trees. It was vacant where we found it.⁸³

The government so painstakingly built by the guerrillas disintegrated with the Japanese "reinvansion" at the end of 1943. In describing the passing of the guerrilla regime in Mindanao, Haggerty equally well epitomized the debacle in Leyte:

This invasion... was the end of a guerrilla era that had lasted nearly a year. Never again was there to be such a large thickly-populated area free from the Japs. The coastal towns were occupied, people fled to the wooded mountain slopes; the towns were deserted, the electric lights gone, and the ports where hundreds of bancas had gathered, empty....

The civil government with its... volunteer guards, school libraries, work projects, was scattered...⁸⁴

In January, 1944, Governor Demeterio was captured by the Japanese; in February, Provincial Board member Espina was caught. Colonel Kangleon thereafter assumed direct control as military governor of Leyte.

Yet the reverse suffered by guerrilla fortunes was not irreversible. As Haggerty so well put it:

But the Japs had waited too long, the taste of freedom had left too sweet a flavor to be so soon forgotten. The myth of the Jap superman had been shattered. Japanese weakness in manpower, shipping and war material was evident; our submarines were bringing us supplies and the guerrilla movement could never be shattered by a few thousand mobile Jap troops.⁸⁵

Realizing their own limitations, the guerrillas decided to play along with the conqueror, but exploit the situation for their own advantage. Then American guerrillero, St. John, explained the strategy adopted in

82. Wolfert, op. cit., p. 118.

83. Potente, op. cit., p. 19.

84. Haggerty, op. cit., p. 128.

85. Ibid.

southern Leyte:

Back in the fall of 1943, when the colonel learned from guerrillas on other islands that the Japs were going to reinvade Leyte, he contacted all the bigshots in the towns of southern Leyte. He told them the Japs were coming and then tested their sympathies.

The ones who were sympathetic were made what the["]people called puppet mayors. They used the word puppet, differently than we would. The puppet mayors actually were Colonel Kangleon's spies. They played up to the Japs to hold their jobs as mayor and even worked with the Japs a little bit. Not too much, though.

They then sent reports to Colonel Kangleon. They told him when a Jap garrison was going to move, when a patrol was going to go out, what the Japs did to the people, and all sorts of things like that. Then they did what they could to help the people in their town. "They used to lie like hell to the Japs. The Japs would catch a guerrilla and get ready to behead him, and the mayor would go to the commanding officer of the garrison and say, "This man no guerrilla. He my cousin. Pardon, sir, but I believe you make mistake."

Lots of times it worked. At least it worked often enough to make it worth while.⁸⁶

And this was the pattern of relations established throughout Leyte, except where a "puppet mayor" broke faith with the guerrilla and actively collaborated with the Japanese.⁸⁷ In such cases, the guerrilla appointed

86. St. John, op. cit., p. 155.

87. The man who accepted a guerrilla mandate to serve as a puppet mayor did so with much compunction. This is apparent in the proceedings of a town meeting held at Cabalian, south Leyte, as the Japanese re-occupation drew nigh. We here extract:

"The chairman informed the public that the object of the meeting was to select a man who will remain in the town and act as a mayor of his municipality in case of reinvasion by the enemy. This mayor will meet and entertain the enemy!"..

"Mr. S. Escarilla stood up and said that if we are going to select a person other than the actual mayor... we are just like pushing him to his grave because when the Japanese came to this place the first time, Mayor Bulacan was already a mayor... and he was appointed by them to continue his office....

"Mayor Bulacan" stood up...:

"... You perhaps remember that in the early stages of the guerrilla organization, I was terribly manhandled and confined in Camp 'G' for an act that I believed was for the good of the country I am serving. It is for this reason that I do not like to remain in the town when the Japs come back for I might be again suspected of being a pro-Jap. But if the public so desires... I will be forced to stay even at the sacrifice of my life, especially because I am of the opinion that the Japs know that this town and its mayor are supporters of the USAFFE."

"Lt. E. Ramada stood up and said that he was with the opinion of the others and in addition to that he suggested that the public should

(continued on next page)

"mountain mayors" to administer affairs in the evacuation areas. Thus, at the time of the American landings, the guerrillas were in a position to expedite the restoration of the Commonwealth government by designating sets of local officials to function in every municipality. Needless to say, this procedure made it possible for the American forces to concentrate upon military operations, assured that friendly Filipinos would take over the administration of civilian affairs.

D. Guerrilla Combat Activities

A study concerned with the resistance movement of an area would be manifestly defective were it to pass over in silence the military phase of opposition to enemy rule. In the given instance, however, it is more important that the reader appreciates the combat mission of Leyte's guerrillas than that he have a complete narrative specifying the site of every ambush-laid and the number of casualties sustained by the Japanese in every skirmish.

From the Japanese invasion of Leyte until the end of 1942, the guerrilla units were preoccupied in collecting arms, gathering foodstuffs and supplies, contacting municipal officials, stamping out banditry and policing the districts under their control. Much of their attention was necessarily diverted to defending their organizational and territorial integrity against the incursions of rival bands foraging for weapons and subsistence. Under these conditions, encounters with the Japanese were almost entirely defensive in nature--intended to discourage Japanese patrols from penetrating too deeply into the ungarrisoned portions of the island.

Yet even in 1942, the bolder guerrilla chiefs realized that only a valiant spirit could rally the dismayed civilian population to the standards of resistance. Thus, very early in the Occupation, the guerrilla units operating in the northern and eastern portions of the Island vied with one another in demonstrating their prowess, sniping at Japanese reconnaissance squads and ambushing Japanese vehicles. The then-Lieutenant Balderian, and the USAFFE soldiers who were in contact with him (Teraza, Pabilona, Bonicillo, Pamanian, Corpín, Guevara, Diaz, the Centinos, Cinco, Dadula, etc.) each won renown for himself and his little band by defying the "Invincible" Japanese.

write a petition to the CO of the 9th MD and the Provincial Governor through the CO of Camp 'G' that the actual Municipal Mayor be given authority to remain in the town...!

"Resolved: to petition to the CO of the 9th MD and the Hon. Provincial Governor through the CO for Camp 'G' that the actual Municipal Mayor be given authority to remain in the town in case of invasion by the enemy... Unanimously approved!"

"Present: Capt. C. M. Malubay, Inf.--Pol! Force & Vol. Guards; Lt. Elpido Ramada, QM Depot Cmdr.; S. Escarilla, Col. Himatagon Bolo Rgt.; V. S. Veloso, Lt. Col. Central Bolo Rgt.; Sotero Bulacan, Mun. Mayor; Rev. P. L. Ma. Ricalde, Parish Priest. P. Santillano, Supervising Principal; Yu Leong Suy, President, Chinese Community [and about 3,000 people].

Judge F. Nombrado, Chairman; S.F. Segador, Mun. Seoty. Minutes" of the Mass Meeting held at the Session Hall, Cabalian. Nov. 17, 1943.

In the south a stranded American sailor, Gordon Lang, joined with Lt. Nuique to attack successfully a small Japanese detachment at Sogod. Lang subsequently led a guerrilla band in a daring raid against a Japanese unit at Baybay. Although the attack failed of its immediate objective, the Japanese garrison withdrew to Ormoc shortly thereafter. By the end of October, Nuique, Mondragon, Francisco, Nazareno, Jain and the other pioneer organizers of the south had cleared out the remaining nests of Japanese.

In the west, the jurisdiction of the WLGWF was never an area of active fighting against the Japanese. Not that there were no encounters with Japanese patrols. The combat narrative of the 6th Infantry recorded:

On September 8, 1942... a Japanese patrol went as far as Damulaan where it was ambushed successfully under the command of Capt. Daffon. After this event, the firing line was established in the Ormoc-Albuera boundary at the Panilahan River. From thence guard duties were strengthened on good observation posts at the coast line and mountain passes which could possibly be used by the enemy. By that time Capt. Conrado Daffon was commonly known under the guise name of Robin Hood so his Headquarters was appropriately called the Sherwood Forest. The site was well chosen for guerrilla purposes at Serab Hill, Binoljo, where the soldiers going to and from the firing line could conveniently meet and rest....

During November 7, the guerrillistas under Lt. Salvo ambushed a Japanese patrol in Binoljo, during which a Japanese high officer was killed and some Jap soldiers. At the guard post the Japanese soldiers killed a volunteer guard and a few soldiers were wounded.⁸⁸

The main garrison of the Japanese in West Leyte was entrenched in Ormoc. Miranda wrote:

The primary mission of the WLGWF was accomplished when the JIF (Japanese Imperial Forces) were concentrated and pocketed in the poblacion of Ormoc on October 31, 1942, giving us the minimum loss and effect to civilian lives and properties. Since that date until 5 December 1943, when the JIF staged their colossal attack on our force the enemy was never successful in breaking our line. On the contrary heavy casualties were always inflicted on them.⁸⁹

From this statement, it can be seen that Miranda regarded his mission primarily as one of containing the Japanese within Ormoc, and cutting them down whenever they attempted to venture forth. Why did Miranda never attempt to take the poblacion of Ormoc by storm? When interviewed, Miranda stated that he believed his force was strong enough to launch a smashing attack that would have carried his men surging into the center of the town. But such bravado would have been costly and utterly futile. So long as the Japanese controlled the offshore waters, they could send a task force steaming into Ormoc Bay at any time. Furthermore, the skies overhead were also under Japanese control, putting the town at the mercy of Japanese bombs.

88. Sotto, op. cit., p. 2.

89. "Report of the Western Leyte Guerrilla Warfare Forces and Various Informations." 23 October 1944. To: The Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Philippines, p. 3.

Major Marcos G. Soliman, Chief-of-Staff of the WIGWF, described his organizational make-up:

Our organization has been patterned after a regular division with modifications, of course, to suit guerrilla purposes. We have six infantry regiments operating more or less independently with their respective service elements. The GHQ has a strong combat team which can be moved from one locality to another in case a regiment is hard pressed. All of these units are responsible for their respective areas and the usual administrative and routine reports are sent to the Division Hq.

We have a complete General Staff composed mostly of ex-reserve officers who have seen action in different fronts!

... We have in this organization only one regular officer, [in addition to Soliman, himself] Captain Aristoteles B. Olaybar. Class 1940 PMA, who was a Battalion Commander... in Cebu....

I am presenting to you our organization...:

- a. Organized originally by Lt. Miranda from among small and separate guerrilla bands...;
- b. Expanded to its present strength of 417 officers and about 12,000 men...;
- c. We have a plant for the manufacture of ammunition, grenades and land mines which is under the direct supervision of Lt. Miranda himself, who is a civil engineer by profession and an inventor by avocation;
- d. We have a base hospital under a former Chief of the Southern Hospital in Cebu with several doctors, nurses, and attendants. In addition, we have regimental and battalion aid stations...;
- e. We have some engineers, some lawyers who compose the JAGS, and of course, the AGS, the OMS Corps, some signal men, Chaplains and a General Service School for officers, and a Signal School for Signal enlisted men.⁹⁰

Only one major offensive was attempted by the guerrilla during 1942. This offensive, organized by the headquarters of Captain Glicerio I. Erfe (then laying claim to the supreme command on the Island as the highest ranking officer), ordered all unit commanders to launch a concerted attack against the Japanese garrisons in their respective sectors. Erfe's public relations office announced the outcome of the attack:

In accordance with the Field Orders No. 9, issued on October 1, 1942, by the General Headquarters USAFFE ALL, located somewhere in Leyte, a general offensive was launched on October 9, which lasted up to November 15, 1942. Results: "!!".

Towns retaken and restored to peace and order under the Commonwealth Civil Government; Carigara, Barugo, Palo, Capocan, Maripipi, La Paz, Jaro, Tolosa, Abuyog, San Miguel, Dagami, Baybay.

Remaining Jap soldiers who were garrisoning the Northern, Western, and Southern parts of Leyte were withdrawn and sent to the Eastern part to replace their comrades who were casualties during the general offensive....

It is interesting to note that the general offensive launched

90. Marcos G. Soliman, Maj. 81st Inf. June 5, 1943. To: "Dear Mac" [Peralta] p. 2.

by the USAFFE ALL and Guerrilla units in the Eastern part of Leyte on October 9, 1942, was followed by similar uprisings in practically all the Islands in the Visayas....^{91e}

In point of fact, this publicity was largely bombast. Only the units directly under Erfe's command ("USAFFE ALL") and the troops of Balderian actually carried out the assault. And on this limited front, the plans to invest Burauen⁹² and Dulag miscarried, due to faulty inter-unit liaison-- something not at all apparent to the reader of the quoted release.

Erfe took credit unjustifiably for the expulsion of the Japanese from the south, a result brought about through independent action on the part of the southern units. And it was most presumptuous to imply that guerrilla activity occurring on Panay and elsewhere followed the inspiration of Erfe's glorious deeds. Nonetheless, the "Offensive" did "strengthen the morale of the people and encouraged them to offer undoubted resistance."⁹³

Early in 1943, the guerrilla leaders of south Leyte called upon Colonel Ruperto Kangleon (freshly arrived from a Japanese internment camp) to take over command of their forces. Kangleon accepted, winning a rather lukewarm promise from Major Balderian to merge his north Leyte forces under the same command.⁹⁴ To win the respect of his north Leyte affiliates and also toughen

91. S. Paza, The Voice of the Polahans, A Weekly Release, Feb. 28, 1943, (mimeographed).

See also document: Glicerio I. Erfe, Capt. Inf., CO, 95th Regt. and Military Adviser, 11th Div., GWS. "Request Recognition of the Guerrilla Forces in Leyte Designated the 11th Div., IX Phil. Corps, U.S. Army," Par. 6. To: The Commanding General, USFIP.

92. The puppet mayor of Burauen, Jose Cordero, declared that "on October 31, 1942, thousands of guerrillas attacked Burauen for one week. Some civilians took refuge in the barracks of the Japanese. Most evacuated to the mountains.... The constituted municipal government ceased. Guerrilla guards blocked all the trails back to town...e." Jose S. Cordero, Mayor, Affidavit (Burauen: Feb. 10, 1944).

93. The American educator evacuating in the hills of Leyte observed: "During the first few months of Japanese occupation, their soldiers moved about freely. As the guerrillas became stronger and better organized the Japanese either had to increase their forces or else withdraw to a few centralized and fortified points. For the time being, at least, they have taken the latter course..." Babcock, Letter of November 19, 1942.

94. Some months later, Balderian formally affiliated with Kangleon's 9th Military District, bringing about a "re-organization of the guerrilla forces in northern eastern Leyte sector." He proclaimed: "In pursuance to the order of organization, I have temporarily assumed command, effective May 1, 1943, of the 95th Infantry Regiment, 92nd Division...e."

"The best judgment... shall be exercised as to include for assignments in the Regiment the most deserving, judged from their qualifications and meritorious services since the inception of guerrilla fighting. While preference will be given to USAFFE officer and enlisted men who did not surrender..., civilian pioneers... deserve as much right...e"

"After the selection... has been completed, the rest who cannot be possibly included in the regular Regiment for lack of arms will be kept organized... and considered reverted into the United States Army Reserve

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civilian morale, Kangleon organized a special combat troop and marched boldly into the Abuyog-Dulag district where he had several brisk encounters with the Japanese. His reputation assured, Kangleon returned to the south and proceeded to organize a regular divisional headquarters.

"At his peak," St. John observed, "Kangleon never had more than 3,000 men, plus maybe 500 women who did first aid, cooking, sewing, washing...."95

I. D. Richardson, American intelligence operative in Leyte, was called upon by Kangleon to serve as his chief of staff. Richardson wryly commented:

As chief of staff, I naturally felt it necessary to have a staff to be chief of. When I came into the picture the colonel and his eldest son, Loloy, were all the staff there was....

I found people to head up all these branches--Frederico Coaeyes, former pilot who knew regulations and knew people, he was GI; Dr. Posoncuy, a Spanish /actually Chinese/ mestizo boy, was the Best G2 you can imagine until June, 1944, when he was killed by the Japs; G3, our operations, was headed by Capt. Joe Nazareno, a fine guerrilla fighter...; G4 was Gordon Lang, an American who had been yeoman second class in the Navy, stationed in Cebu....

Propaganda was run by Gordon /Domingo/ Veloso, a former politician /post-war Congressman from Leyte/. We gave him a radio as his news source, and he turned the news into fiery words which were distributed by our transportation corps....

I took the signal corps under my special supervision. I wanted communications so that, wherever our radio station was, reports could come into it quickly....

Almost the first message I sent out were general orders to all unit commanders (1) no regular enrolled member of the guerrilla army would be regarded as a deserter by either the Filipino Army or the United States Army; (2) all guerrilla army men who had served previous to September 1, 1943, would be paid from the time of the surrender to date of termination of their services; (3) all men enlisting after September 1 would be paid from the date of enlistment, regardless of previous service in the regular Army; (4) monthly allowance against full pay--which could not be paid over at once but must be carried on

When aids in the form of arms and ammunitions will have come and the size of the command will be augmented... enlisted will preferably be made from the... Reserve." (Alejandro Balderian, Col., Inf. - 15 June 1943-Circular No. 1)

The reversion of a portion of the guerrilla enlisted personnel to a reserve status engendered bad feelings in some quarters. The Commanding Officer of the Tigbao Sector, Santos, gave warning:

"... To reduce a battalion into a company would compel me to discriminate against two-thirds in behalf of one-third who will be incorporated into a regular company....

"I have been sensing... that incident to the reorganization there will be soldiers who will be discontented who will... surely become fifth columnist against us; besides that, they have already established their rights as Guerrilla fighters." C. Estogero, E. Ley. Sec., Tigbao! 2 June 43. To: The CO, NE Ley. Sect.

95. St. John, op. cit., pp. 93-94.

the books until victory--herewith increased from 19 to 24 pesos a month; (5) a pious hope that the substantial sum of money to be paid each man after victory as salary due would be spent wisely for a farm or to start a small business.

Well then we had the makings of an Army. We had communications twenty-four hours a day. It expedited intelligence reports enormously. Intelligence was the primary mission of each unit in a Jap garrison area.... These men were being drilled and taken through practice exercises in ambushes, night maneuvers, forced marches, and target practice --without bullets....

Companies were organized on a regular army basis--with a guardhouse, barracks, mess hall, officers' quarters. These structures might be any houses or huts they found around in the hills. There would be regular guard mount....

And we had a medical corps. I made Doc Parade our chief surgeon because he had been such a good fighter. I then enrolled all civilian doctors and dentists in a reserve and concentrated all medicines and medical instruments in the area in one place. In that way we had a genuinely mobile hospital unit. All the instruments filled only two ordinary doctors' satchels....⁹⁶

During 1943, the guerrillas set as their principal objectives the containment of the Japanese⁹⁷ within a few garrison towns along the eastern coast,⁹⁸ and within Ormoc on the western coast. So tightly drawn was the

96. Wolfert, op. cit., pp. 122-128.

97. Parsons estimated that the Japanese in early 1943 "had practically no forces on Leyte at that time, probably not over three hundred in all." Ingham, op. cit. p. 71.

This would appear to be an extremely conservative estimate, probably based upon observations in southern Leyte.

98. Of Balderian's military activities, the puppet governor recorded: "Tanauan burned in April. Guerrilla forces reported busy around Julita and Dulag...." And in June, he wrote deplorably: "Events reached blood-curdling climax. The bandits went on the warpath, inspired by success in Tanauan. They burned buildings in the towns of Alangalang (one block), Jaro (the main street, the convent, schools), Carigara (the main street--five blocks, numbering 300 houses), Barugo (two schools), Pastrana (four school buildings, the municipal building). ..." (Retg. Gov. Salazar. Report of Activities: Apr. 1-Oct. 31, 1943. To: Commissioner of Interior thru Director of Local Govts.)

These buildings were burned, Balderian explained (Interview, home in Dagami, 1945) in anticipation of Japanese reoccupation of the town centers of the aforementioned municipalities. The school houses, municipal buildings, convents, and the largest private residences were invariably selected by the Japanese command as the sites of their local garrisons. In the case of Tanauan, however, what took place was pure vengeful incendiarism on the part of guerrilla chief Antonio Cinco, who believed the townspeople had betrayed the hiding-place of his wife to a Japanese patrol.

Balderian's top operation called for the wresting of the provincial capital out of Japanese hands. The puppet governor reported in June 1943: "Captured letters revealed guerrilla intention to sack Tacloban and overthrow the constituted government. Because of constant

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cordon thrown around the remaining Japanese strongholds that the puppet administrations in both Tacloban and Ormoc trembled in apprehension of mass assault. And such assault might very well have succeeded. But, as Miranda explained, the overrunning of an important town would be a costly and futile enterprise. The Japanese would reduce the guerrilla prize to rubble by air bombardment, and retake it leisurely by landing seaborne reinforcements.

Rather than mount a foolhardy offensive, the guerrilla continued and intensified their harassing operations against the cautiously dispatched Japanese patrols, and attempted to throttle all shipment of foodstuffs and essential supplies to the Japanese-garrisoned towns, particularly Tacloban.⁹⁹ Moreover, as they established contact with the inter-island resistance movement, Leyte's guerrillas intensified and perfected their intelligence activities. And in the districts they controlled, the guerrillas provided military protection for the pro-resistance municipal administrations.

By mid-1943, the Japanese on Leyte began to receive reinforcements and were able to break loose from the guerrilla stranglehold. They advanced in sufficient strength upon Carigara, Jaro, and Alangalang to compel a guerrilla withdrawal. But in December, the Japanese received large-scale increments of manpower and now undertook to break the back of resistance on Leyte as they had long threatened. A powerful assault against the headquarters of Miranda was followed by the retrieval of the five west coast municipalities administered by the WIGWF. At the same time, they swept southward along both coasts and northward to Biliran, regaining con-

surveillance and armed readiness of the people, the Japanese military, and the BC detachment, no further damage was done by the guerrilla."

That Balderian persisted nonetheless was admitted by the governor in August: "... The guerrilla made a last attempt at Tacloban by an attack on Perikhon outpost, resulting in the death of one BC sentinel" Actg. Gov. Salazar. "Report of Activities: Apr. 1-Oct. 31, 1943." To: Commissioner of Interior thru Director of Local Govts.

Colonel Kangleon felt obliged to dissuade Balderian from continuing in his campaign of arson: "I just received your letter of July 21st last. I read and reread it with profound interest. I admire your plan to deprive the enemy of shelter. However, I cannot authorize you to destroy government or private buildings.... Who will answer for the destruction of those buildings after the end of the war? Besides, we shall always be the losers. For, if the enemy really intends to occupy La Paz or other towns, with or without buildings in that town. .. he can put up... temporary shelters while we are weak to stop him. ... But how long will he stay in the Philippines?"

"Col. Balderian, victory is fast approaching.... Destruction or not destruction of buildings... we shall win the war. Besides, in the radio message, Gen. MacArthur prohibited the destruction of buildings and the declaration of martial law even in towns occupied by the enemy" Col. Ruperto K. Kangleon, Cmdg., 9MD. 5 Aug. '43. "Dear Col. Balderian."

99. The guerrilla also sought to safeguard the crops of the resisters at harvest time: "... Enemy robbing people of their food.... Patrolled districts of Dulag and Burauen, watching the rice fields that will soon be harvested.... I decided to engage our troops with enemy patrols." Ruperto K. Kangleon, Col. April 30, 1943. To: Lt. Comm. Charles Parsons.

trol for the Tacloban regime and establishing outposts at strategic points.¹⁰⁰

The guerrillas were too poorly armed to challenge this Japanese expansion. In keeping with word from USFIP headquarters of Fertig in Mindanao," they adopted a temporary lie-low policy. Father Haggerty, in close touch with Fertig and Commander Parsons, outlined the new policy:

Commander Parsons gave us a new perspective on the global war. He told guerrilla officers quite bluntly that S.W.P. was not interested in how many Japs Company A had killed! He told us plainly, and bluntly, that even if American prisoners of war were slowly dying of malnutrition, and even if all guerrillas were about to be wiped out, no rash attempt would be made to save them....

So a new phase of guerrilla war began; orders were given to make no more attacks on Japanese strong points, but to hold all territory now under guerrilla control. The plan was to quiet Jap suspicion and give"no provocation for them to send more troops.

Former American Air Corps men, Filipino telegraph and radio operators, radio mechanics, were placed at strategic watcher stations on every coast. Transmitters were built to supplement those brought in from Australia.... Guerrilla organizations now became primarily protectors of these transmitting stations. Thus all movements of enemy ships were followed and promptly reported to American submarines.
...¹⁰¹

The guerrillas of Leyte no longer had a definite territorial base. But from their mobile field headquarters, they maintained contact with many of the puppet municipal officials (some of whom they had themselves installed, thus outwitting the Japanese), furnished armed protection for the isolated watcher stations set up by American personnel on special assignment (Richardson, St. John, Heminway, etc.), and continued an uninterrupted flow of intelligence reports. But Colonel Kangleon was not content to remain

100. I. D. Richardson recounted: "The next day, December 6, the typhoon came

.... Coconuts and whole trees were whirling through the air like armor-piercing shells. This was the typhoon through which the Japs moved to wipe out Miranda, at 'Camp Heaven'.

When I woke up the next morning the guard told me a launch had passed by about four o'clock....

"The Japs landed all over everywhere that day. They took every one of our towns... and Liloan and Pintuyan on Panoan Island across the bay.

"The southern Leyte guerrillas had begun to itch the hide of them. They reached out fingers to squash us....

"The Japs landing in southern Leyte found no army to oppose them." They came charging up the beach, threw their machine guns down, threw themselves down....

"The Japs fanned out into the hills. We watched their columns walking along.... Their columns converged on nothing.... Not a shot was fired at them. They found nothing to shoot at...." Wolfert, op. cit., pp. 156-61. See also: St. John, op. cit., pp. 92-93.

101. Haggerty, op. cit., pp. 98-99. Also: Ingham, op. cit., pp. 141-142.

militarily dormant:"

... He had seven hundred men in this sector [south Leyte], about half of them with rifles. The Japs hunted them with more than five thousand heavily armed troops, a completely equipped task force.... Kangleon knew eventually the Japs would tire of sending their columns on long forced marches through thin air.... The Japs would start to withdraw "it." Kangleon could not wait until they withdrew it altogether. For political reasons, there must be a fight. "The people had supported a guerrilla army." It must fight for them. Else, how would hope of liberation be kept alive until MacArthur arrived?... The guerrillas must strike at a time in between, when the Japs were not so weak they were no longer sending out patrols but not so strong that their patrols were columns....

There is no accurate figure on Jap losses. Certainly they ran into the hundreds and perhaps eventually into the thousands.... But guerrillas seldom win and take over battlefields. They shoot until out of ammunition or until the enemy is successfully deployed. Then they retreat.... Soldiers who see the enemy drop when they fire... never consider they missed, and the man might only be ducking. They count him hit. Soldiers who hit a man count him dead. And soldier tales grow, particularly when girls are listening....

Very slowly and desperately and bloodily, Kangleon's army fought the Japs back into the coastal towns. The Japs couldn't send reinforcements. When reinforcements came, they had no fighting to do. The guerrillas would lay low. They'd just hit when the patrols were weak, and finally there were no more patrols. The Japs didn't dare leave the coast. They yielded the hills to us. But that was a long time happening. It had to wait until an American submarine came in with help for us.¹⁰²

Further north, the guerrilla was functioning in the same fashion. Abuyog's municipal secretary wrote:

The resistance movement in Abuyog during the Jap re-occupation consisted of "I" Co., 3rd Bn., 94th Infantry....

Lest anyone overestimate the strength of "I" Company, in view of its remarkable achievements, it must first be known that there were less than 30 rifles even up to the first of February, 1944, when it struck its initial blow against eight Japs at Hinay-angan....

On March 11, 1944, the company got from GHQ a little portion of the aid unloaded in Mindanao: 3 carbines, 1 sub-machine gun, and 1 BAR.

Between the first of February, 1944, and mid-April, while the company CP was still in the hills, ambushes and snipings were limited to the Abuyog-Baybay road. It was harvest time in mid-April when orders to proceed to the plains were received. The reason was obvious: The rice crop should not go to the enemy, and the harvesters must therefore be protected....

On the plains the order was successfully carried to the letter. For sheer abundance of the rice crop, however, plus the corresponding

102. Wolfert, op. cit., pp. 162, 174-182.

insufficiency of armed guerrillas to defend it at the time, not all could be harvested....

... In Maitum hill on May 5, 1944, the "I" boys gave the Japs the prelude of what was to come later during the year... The Jap patrol of about 70--even more--lost approximately half its original number..
..103

A portion of the Mindanao aid also reached Major Balderian's 95th Regiment, making possible an intensification of sniping and ambushing in the vicinity of the provincial capital. However, on the west coast, the remnant of the WIGWF (now centered outside of Merida) restricted its activities to the gathering of intelligence.

What to the guerrilla was a long-heralded event--the arrival of a submarine, its cavernous innards replete with badly needed arms and supplies, and scarcely less important, the enheartening proof that American support was not myth but immediate and palpable reality--was finally consummated in July of 1944.¹⁰⁴ Esclepiades Kuizon, a student at the Cebu Institute of Technology before the war (referred to in Leyte Calling as "Perling") and assigned as guerrilla radio operative, received the radio warning of the submarine's approach. In "The Big Fish Landing", a specially prepared account for the present writer, Kuizon recorded:

Leyte received its first notice by radio from Southwest Pacific in the latter part of June 1944, of a supply shipment to be made by submarine. I was with the Headquarters of the Leyte Area Command in the mountains of Sogod with my radio station, "TUL".... I will soon have a better radio set, I said to myself. Leyte will at last cease to be begging the leftover supplies from the 10th Military District in Mindanao which was at that time under the command of Colonel W. W. Fertig..!

... We have to keep Southwest Pacific informed of the progress of the plans and enemy dispositions.... In the morning of July 12, a radio message we received via Mindanao revealed that the submarine reported to have passed Hingatungan Point the day before. Boy--they were very much ahead of the schedule. They must be lurking in our vicinity by now, just waiting for our signals to be displayed. Due to the presence of the enemy at Laguma, we have to send them back a message to land in the alternate site where the signals will be made.

This was at San Roque. This barrio was almost as big as Silago. From Silago we hiked up the hills of Laguma. We can not follow the coastline. The Japs were busy loading lumber at Laguma. We could clearly see them with our binoculars from the hills. Damn Japs. They must be making nice barracks out of those lumbers I said to myself. After passing them behind the hills, we came down to the coast

103. Aurillo, op. cit., pp. 11-12. Also see: St. John, op. cit., pp. 143-144; Wolfert, op. cit., pp. 136-140.

104. For an enthralling narrative of Commander "Chick" Parsons' famous spy squadron, known as "Spyron", that maintained a precarious liaison between guerrilla watcher stations and supplied "Aid" to submarine, See: Ingham, op. cit., pp. 141-145, 196-198, 203-207, etc.

again and hiked along the shore towards San Roque!"..

Morning of July 14...! TUL V KUS IMI QTC - I MOST URGENT HW GA& was what I heard from Mindanao control radio station early that morning. This simply means: "TUL from KUS. How do you hear me? I have one message for your most urgent, Now, go ahead." "KUS" signal was coming in very weak. His signals were broad and kept fading away beyond readability. Good heavens--what can this message be? Very sure it must be in connection with the submarine scheduled to land that day. My dry batteries have long been run down....

Four o'clock in the afternoon, July 14. The shore was all lined up with people both volunteer guards, civilians young and old, and guerrilla soldiers, all anxious to witness the coming up to the surface of the big fish.... This ship would be the first American ship we would see after the lapse of three years. They were scheduled to surface at dusk.

Zero hour. There was a big rush of water at the distance not far from the small boat of the Colonel.... It looks like a ghost. There" was a big cry of happiness from among the crowd.... And immediately the big task of unloading the supplies began. The improvised rafts were towed towards the sub as she was guided to the landing spot by the Colonel.... No time should be lost to unload the supplies before the Jap smells the chocolate bars, cigarettes, and other appetising stuff. Every minute counts....

Ammunition, medical supplies, signal supplies and many other kinds were pouring continuously ashore. The shore was covered with piles of boxes covered by dry leaves to camouflage. At twelve o'clock midnight the unloading of supplies was finished! We did not have a bit of sleep that night. Coffee was served by... the members of the Women's Auxiliary Service....

Everybody was tired the following morning.... Some of the volunteer guards already have left with some of the supplies under their care.... As a signal man, I managed to assort all signal supplies!".. The doctors took care of the medical supplies, and the infantry for the arms and ammunitions.... Now they get rid of their home made shot guns and with the new guns, they should harass the Japs very well..".¹⁰⁵

Referring to the civilian assistance rendered, Abuyog's municipal secretary proudly noted:

On July 14, 1944, Mayor Gallego mobilized about 5,000 loyal people --volunteer guards and civilians--at barrio San Roque, ready with ropes and banana rafts. In the evening, the submarine surfaced and the men unloaded the longed-for aid!"..

In town where at least a company of Japs was always alerted, only a few people knew that across the mountains along the coast, America was coming back. And those people were the intelligence operatives and other confidential men.

105. Esclepiades Kuizon, "The Big Fish Landing", (Unpublished MS., 1945), pp. 1-6.

On that night the U. S. Submarine "Nautilus" unloaded arms, ammunition, newspapers, books, cigarettes, medical supplies, jungle boots, and chewing gum....¹⁰⁶

With their new equipment, distributed throughout the 92nd Division, the guerrillas now lashed out against the Japanese with "merciless fury. Thus, "I" Company of the 94th Regiment:

The company got ten submachine guns, five BAR'S, and no less than 70 carbinesp Other carbines were given to the volunteer guards!!..

There is no need enumerating the various encounters.... The Japs sure got hell of that aid. According to some civilians in town, after they were first ambushed with a "rat-a-tat", the Japs in Abuyog could not help mumbling, "ayuda, america"--meaning aid from the United States.¹⁰⁷

At last Colonel Kangleon was in a position to carry out a project he had long been contemplating--the formation of a guerrilla regiment in west Leyte, affiliated with his command! His propaganda officer, Lieutenant Domingo Veloso, recorded:

... The 96th Infantry was immediately organized. On July 18, 1944 Major Jose R. Nazareno, Inf., was designated the Regimental Commander. Nucleus of this regiment are officers and non-commissioned officers of the 94th Infantry, veterans of many encounters against the Japanese in the South. The regiment was assigned to cover the sector from Albuera to Biliran Island. Strength of the 96th Inf. was readily bolstered by the Miranda men who deserted their outfit....¹⁰⁸

A brief comment is called for by this quotation." A good part of the officers and enlisted men of the WIGWF remained loyal to their organization until mid-1944. After Kangleon had received "the American Aid" and unimpeachable confirmation of his appointment as Island commander became known, the "Miranda men" had no recourse but to dissolve their general staff. Those who were absorbed into the 96th Regiment acquitted themselves creditably, especially in combat with the Japanese after the American landings! On their part, however, these same "Miranda men" were disgruntled over the discrimination displayed towards them in promotions and assignments. Consequently, in 1945, many of them worked actively to reactivate their organization and secure a belated American recognition!

And now, resuming this sketch of the guerrilla combat mission, we note that in the final pre-invasion period:

The whole idea that Colonel Kangleon worked on then was to clean out as many small Jap garrisons as he could so that when the American Army came in, they would not have to bother with those little outfits, which can cause a lot of trouble. It takes a battalion of infantry a long time, sometimes, to clean out a handful of Japs with machine guns

106. Aurillo, op. cit., pp. 12, 14. Also see: Wolfert, op. cit., p. 197; and St. John, op. cit., p. 151.

107. Aurillo, op. cit., p. 12.

108. Veloso, op. cit., pp. 9-10.

in holes.

The emphasis of guerrilla warfare changed from just killing and harassing to a definite military plan. Everything that was done in the last month before invasion was pointed directly toward helping the liberating invaders.¹⁰⁹

Glancing retrospectively upon the military accomplishments of Leyte's guerrilla, then, we see them essentially as anticipatory in intent. By preventing civilian morale from flagging in defiance of a cruel Occupation Power, and by harassing the enemy relentlessly so as to deprive him of a secure base of popular support, the guerrilla was anticipating the American return and the liberation of Philippine soil. In the testimonial of Commander "Chick" Parsons:

American forces landing on Leyte possessed the most complete and extensive information of any that ever invaded an enemy-held area. This was entirely due to the loyalty and good work of the guerrilla-soldiers and their communications system.¹¹⁰

Law and Order

Wherever municipal governments were functioning within the resistance area, the apparatus of a municipal police force and a justice of the peace was theoretically available for the redressal of grievances and the maintenance of the public safety. But the functioning of these officers was dependent upon the type of control exercised by the guerrilla forces. Where the guerrilla respected the jurisdiction of the civil functionaries, they merely lent the backing of armed might to the judicial process. But where they took it upon themselves to dispense summary justice or to distort justice for their own private interests, the law officers were as if non-existent.

The guerrilla chieftains who stood in the forefront of the struggle against the Japanese on Leyte: Kangleon, Miranda, Eufe, Pabilona, Pamanian, Nuique and others, sought to bring about some approximation to a rule of law in the territory they controlled. If the usual safeguards of procedural due process could not be preserved intact, at least the substance of justice would be guarded. Espionage and collaboration must be discouraged through the judicious application of swift punishment to the guilty. But malice must not be permitted to level false accusations against the innocent, in order that neighbors might conveniently dispose of their personal enemies or improperly acquire their property.

Where an attempt was made to bring about centralization of administration within the zone of a guerrilla organization, it would invariably be accompanied by an effort to reestablish the system of provincial courts. Unfortunately, harassment by Japanese patrols interfered with the regular operation of these courts! However, the bit of litigation that actually came up, as well as the instances of military court-martial, prove the

109. St. John, op. cit., p. 176.

110. Ingham, op. cit., p. 218.

intent of the guerrilla to check violence and criminality and thwart scoundrels masquerading as guerrilla fighters.

We shall pass in review as much information as we have been able to gather concerning the provisions made by guerrilla organizations for upholding the rule of law in their respective territories! Guerrilla pretensions to being the lawful authority in Leyte were accepted by "the people in the measure that the guerrilla identified itself" with sponsoring a regime of law. Captain Glicerio I. Erfe succeeded in making that identification complete. In consequence of personal temperament and of the conditioning of previous training, Captain Erfe sought to establish a regime thoroughly in consonance with the requirements of legal process. His military command was to function with due respect for the legal norms, and the civil authorities under his supervision were to abide strictly by the dictates of law.

The organization, government, regimentation, operation and activities of the Guerrilla Warfare Service shall be in strict accord with International Law, the Rules of Land Warfare and the Articles of War (Military Law), Act of U. S. Congress of June 1920 and the Revised Penal Code and of the Rules of Courts of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.¹¹¹

All commanding officers, detachment commanders and group leaders, officers and non-commissioned officers of the Guerrilla Forces and the civil government public officials in the exercise of their legal powers shall be governed by sound principles of justice and law. They shall protect, defend and uphold the constitutions, the laws and the ideals of liberty, justice and democracy of the United States of America and of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, and shall owe loyalty and subordination to said government.

Summary executions are no longer contemplated under the civilized laws of War! No individual should be punished for any offense against the law of War unless pursuant to a sentence imposed after trial and conviction by a court or the Guerrilla War Tribunal. Those belonging to existing military organization, meeting the requirements of lawful belligerents, must be tried by Court Martial, otherwise by military commissions of Provost Courts to be designated by the Commander of the USAFFE ALL. (Sec. 7, 13, 356 Rules of Land Warfare; Articles 29, 30, Annex to Hague Convention No. IV, and Articles 81, 82, A.W., USA).

111. Erfe's Proclamation of May 21, 1943, read in part: "WHEREAS, that in order to be considered lawful belligerents in accordance with the laws of Land Warfare, to wit: First, to be commanded by person responsible for his subordinates; second, to have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance; third, to carry arms openly; fourth, to conduct their operation in accordance with the laws of war....

Glicerio I. Erfe, Col., Inf. "Proclamation," May 21, 1943.

There are times when Erfe gave the impression that his regime was operating under martial law. Yet the radiogram allegedly dispatched from Gen. MacArthur to Lt. Col. Peralta, and transmitted to Erfe for his guidance, stated: "... You can not RPT not operate under provision of martial law in the Philippines occupied as they are by the enemy STOP". What construction Erfe puts upon this is not made clear. "9", Capt., Inf. 3 May 1943. Message to Col. Kangleon.

Those belonging to civil courts shall be tried by the Justice of the Peace of the municipality and governed by the provision of the Penal Code and of the Rules of Court.¹¹²

Other guerrilla commanders professed to be concerned with the prevalence of legal process in their zones, but nowhere within Leyte do we encounter so unambiguous an expression of obligation. Here is an explicit spelling out of the sources of authority and of the norms that are to hold. A zealous regard for the distinctions in the classes of legal subjects is also shown, with the correspondent distinctions in covering sources of law. Erfe's specific administrative innovation was what he called the Guerrilla War Tribunal. Abuyog's chronicler wrote of it:

This Erfe-sponsored jury, which was composed of lawyers and some prominent men, tried people within Erfe's jurisdiction for having allegedly violated the Articles of War. The creation of this body gave credit to Erfe's administration, because, unlike other military leaders upon whose impulses respected the freedom or death of an accused or suspect, Erfe gave democracy in all and every form.¹¹³

Attorney Enerlan of Burauen, a prominent local politician and former member of the Provincial Board, was appointed President of the Tribunal consisting of 21 members.¹¹⁴ Enerlan stated (interview) that prior to the constitution of the Tribunal there had been some liquidations of alleged "fifth columnists". Now such summary procedure was interdicted. The unit leaders of the guerrilla were to turn over all apprehended suspects to Erfe's headquarters to be held for trial. Those cleared (and some of the doubtful ones) were put on probation, while the others were detained.¹¹⁵ There were no executions ordered, Enerlan said. Mayor Gallego of Abuyog added that some of the guerrilla-instituted "treason" cases were pending at the time that Capt. Erfe's organization was dissolved.¹¹⁶

112. Col. "9", Inf., GHQ, USAFFE AT LARGE. Oct. 9, 1942. Unnumbered Circular, Par. 3-5.

113. Aurillo, op. cit., p. 4.

114. Mayor Pablo Molon of La Paz was the first President of the Guerrilla War Tribunal. He had fallen into bad graces with the guerrilla while serving as mayor because of his suspected pro-Japanese opportunism. Vice-Mayor Malate, who managed to keep free of taint, was appointed acting mayor by Erfe after the guerrilla attack on La Paz. Molon eventually was exonerated and given the Presidency of the Tribunal as a token of good feeling. According to Erfe's adjutant, Molon went ahead and married the sister of a man on the guerrilla black-list, and otherwise compromised himself. He was impeached by his colleagues, and retired to his farm.

115. Paza, Erfe's adjutant, stated that the prisoners were interned at Bo. Caltayan, Burauen, and that they were considerable in number. Mayor Toreno of Burauen was one of the prisoners, but was released by Erfe.

116. Even in his mode of waging war, Erfe hewed to the line of legality. A letter addressed to his field commander read: "No burning of any house if it can be avoided, even of fifth columnists, to insure that no others belonging to innocent civilians be involved. No looting or terrorizing of civilians shall be allowed of our own troops.... Proven

As in the other zones, some of the guerrilla soldiers construed their status as a franchise to loot civilian properties and to wreak their vengeance on personal enemies. There was much disorder and sometimes crime traceable to guerrilla sources in the early days.

Erfe's staff officers and his auditor painted a sordid picture of lust and misguided zealotry:

The self-styled guerrilleros, as there was no formal organization yet, became unruly, committing brutalities against innocent civilians. Anybody who could carry a gun was a king of his domain. Unscrupulous civilians befriended illiterate soldiers who were drunk with power.... These people took the opportunity in eliminating their personal enemies Those days were the dark days in the history of the resistance in Leyte. Anybody was liable to meet his doom and go to "thy Kingdom come" for a flimsy accusation.

By the middle of August it was already discernible the restlessness of the people!.. They [the guerrilleros] could no longer see justice for they lusted for blood. They returned to the Age of Barbarism.... Should this unwarranted and wanton killings and brazen murders be tolerated? Would there be somebody to dare these bandits and stop their depredations? Were these people justified in taking into their hands the laws of the land? Their corrupt deeds were a challenge to the upright and liberty loving people. No matter how desirous a person was to stop them, yet no one tried for he was helpless.... The people were still dazed about the sudden change of government, and recent happenings set them ~~back~~.t.. They could not differentiate what was right and what was wrong. 117

It was this state of lawlessness with desperadoes "masking themselves as guerrilleros that Captain Erfe determined to rectify. His followers, no matter how autonomous they might be in conducting the combat phase of their

fifth columnists beyond shadow of doubt shall be killed at once, but suspects should be made prisoners of war pending investigations by summary court...." "9", Capt., Inf. 11 March '42. To: Lt. Balderian.

117. Mercado related two of these gruesome incidents:"

"There was a time that a soldier was made drunk by a fellow who... wanted to eliminate his barrio lieutenant. The soldier was told that the said barrio official used to receive letters from town. Without investigating further the matter, the soldier looked for the "Teniente" and shot him cold-bloodedly. Later, when the soldier became sober and perhaps realizing that he had committed a most heinous crime, he fetched in turn the informant and shot him also!..

An imbecile, who was suspected of petty thieveries, was caught in Sitio Bantayan, about two kilometers from the town of Dulag. He was brought to town for a formal charge and investigation. He was placed in the town jail. Under the usual procedure, he should have been under medical observation or be placed in the psychopathic hospital. But before he could properly investigate, thirty self-styled guerrilleros, headed by one Valeriano Asis, went to the jail and demanded the person of the accused. And in spite of the intervention of the parish priest, they lynched him.... After Asis had shot the accused, he cut the two ears and placed them on a pointed stick

(continued on next page)

activities, were expected to toe the mark on matters of administrative procedure. Unauthorized requisitioning in collecting foodstuffs from the civilian population and terrorization in general were grounds for court-martial and deprivation of command for officers and reversion to civilian status for enlisted men! 118

A sure test of the probity of a guerrilla leader may be found in the procurement procedures he adopts for getting supplies from the Civilian population. Erfe's procurement system was decentralized with each of the guerrilla brigades responsible for its own sustenance. However, in each sector the procedure tended to be uniform with solicitation limited to professed supporters of the guerrilla and with uniform records kept. Ramon Mercado, Erfe's auditor, stated "that voluntary contributions in kind were the financial foundation and support of the organization." Mercado described his duties:

... to straighten the financial status of the organization and to see to it that no malversation either in cash or in kind be committed by supply or finance officers; that through a system of accounting and auditing in accordance with the existing rules and regulations, every collection made by supply officers of the different units was reported and their work co-ordinated; that no cash was taken by the organization from the municipal funds of the municipalities within the territorial jurisdiction of Col. Erfe's guerrilla organization, except when he authorized the finance officer, 1st Lt. Domingo Gasang to get a cash advance from the municipal treasurer of Abuyog, Mr. Pedro Norega, for payment of allowances of those officers and enlisted men in the firing line... 119

which already contained several pairs, as trophy. He braggingly told the people that the man he shot a few moments ago was the eighth he had killed. He and his companions were able to escape from a platoon of Jap soldiers that arrived from Tacloban ten minutes after the commission of the "murder". Mercado, op. cit., pp. 23-24.

118. And one of the former leaders of the Dulag guerrilla adds this testimonial: "... if banditry and other criminal actions on the part of black-hearted people has not flourished in these parts was due in great part to the guerrilla organizations... gathered together under the leadership of Captain Erfe." Eugenio Villegas, 3d Lt. Inf., Actg. Mun. Secy., Dulag. Sept. 10, 1943. To: Prov. Gov. in the Field, p. 2.

119. According to Mercado (interview) the Abuyog municipal council adopted a resolution that the money appropriated for the guerrilla fighting forces be made chargeable to the national government. Erfe's Adjutant Silverio Paza, stated that in the guerrilla brigades, the Procurement Officer (holding the brevet rank of Capt.) appointed Procurement Agents (with the rank of Sgt.) to canvass all the houses in their assigned areas. Refusal to donate might lead to indirect punishment for the male householder, such as the assignment to guard the trail where the Japanese patrols were scheduled to pass. (Failure to act on this assignment might lead to internment.) The indigent were exempted from the duty of giving to the agents. Storehouses for guerrilla supplies would be built by the volunteer guards under the direction of the Procurement Agent. The supply officers of the mobile combat units might requisition from the procurement agents. See also: Ramon L. Mercado, Affidavit (Tacloban, Leyte: April 20, 1945), p. 1.

However, Erfe laid claim to blanket powers to "commandeer any article, instrument, and the like, useful to the USAFFE and with proper record" instructing his sector commanders to avail themselves of this power where necessary.¹²⁰ Moreover, "All articles taken from the enemy, Japs or fifth columnists, are regarded as spoils of war.... Spoils of war, means, any article which could be used by the soldiers of the USAFFE for any military purpose."¹²¹ This order was addressed specifically to the guerrilla soldiers, but by extension, might cover cases of appropriation by volunteer guards and other classes of Filipinos connected with the military.

What the guerrilla municipal secretary of Dulag declared of Erfe's influence upon his municipality might have been echoed by the functionaries of Abuyog, La Paz, and Burauen:

... But... let it be mentioned here that if banditry and other criminal action... has not flourished in these parts, was due in great part to the guerrilla organizations... who were gathered together under the leadership of Captain Glicerio Erfe....¹²²

One of the pioneer organizations in North West Leyte was Felix Pamanian. The maintenance of law and order and the frustration of the designs of the collaborators were among the top reasons for Pamanian's existence as a guerrilla leader. In his subsistence procedures, he was opposed to ruthless commandeering. How else make clear the distinction between banditry and patriotic resistance? He urged his followers to proceed with equal cautiousness when dealing with cases of suspected collaboration. (Of course, every guerrilla leader interviewed invariably testified that "his sector stood as a paragon of tenderness for human rights and respect for due process of law. Undoubtedly, there were cases of personal vengeance and similar motivation affecting guerrilla determinations of guilt in specifiable cases.) Pamanian's adviser, Lieutenant Guevara, had as one of his chief functions the canvassing of civilian opinion regarding the administrative conduct of the guerrilla unit leaders. (Possibly part of the benefit of such procedure was vitiated by the tendency on the part of those harboring grievances to remain silent, in fear of reprisal.)

One of the principal functions of the guerrilla intelligence department was the collecting of data on enemy espionage agents, and the ordering of arrests where necessary. Intelligence also kept tabs on the merchants coming into a sector from outside, especially from outside the Province, lest they should prove to be enemy agents. This department was centered in Carigara, under Dr. Posuncuy. (Posuncuy, although nominally under Pamanian at the outset, retained substantial independence.)

120. Capt. 9, Inf. Cmdg., 11 Dec. '42. Memo to: All Commanding Officers, USAFFE AT LARGE. These orders are imputed to instructions contained in "the message of President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the USAFFE AT LARGE in the Philippines as broadcasted on November 7, 1942."

121. Rush Larkspur [Mrs. Erfe] 1st Lt., Inf. Adj., HQ, USAFFE AT LARGE. "General Orders No. 11." 9 Nov. '42.

122. Eugenio Villegas, 3rd Lt., Inf., 95th Reg. Actng. Mun. Secty. Sept. 10, 1943. "Report" To: The Hon. Prov. Gov., p. 2.

Pamanian was further aided in his law enforcement campaign by the presence of the retired officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Luis E. Quintero. In a special affidavit Pamanian declared:

That I have known Lt.-Col. Luis E. Quintero... since January of 1942 when he was made a food procurement agent in civilian capacity for the District Quartermaster, 9th Military District.... Colonel Quintero was very valuable in helping us not only in matter of organization but also in securing material aid for the maintenance of the guerrilla units in the Sector in which he lived. [Leyte municipality]

Recognizing his value to the organization, I accepted his offer for active service on Jan. 12, 1942 [error for 1943] and he was at once designated as Provost Marshall to organize a Military Police Service for the keeping of law and order in all sectors occupied by the guerrilla. He actively campaigned with me throughout Northwest Leyte and the Islands of Biliran and Maripipi for an effective support of all communities with gratifying results.... I had been aware of his success in performing all duties assigned to him especially in the prevention of graft and other abuses which would have otherwise been prevalent had he not implemented the proper means of suppressing them.¹²³

In April 1943, Quintero was assigned to the staff of Balderian: nonetheless most of his activities continued to be centered in Pamanian's zone. In his own affidavit, Quintero wrote:

Although my definite assignment was Provost Marshal, I was entrusted with the establishment and maintenance of a concentration camp for all prisoners of Northern Leyte; that the Camp located a few kilometers from my farm had over one hundred prisoners from all guerrilla units of Northern Leyte duly maintained as to security and sustenance.

Quintero's son-in-law, Ricardo Comendador, who had been commanding officer of the Leyte (municipal) detachment, was shifted to duty as an officer under Quintero. Comendador stated (interview) that all of the internees were civilians, held on charges of collaboration or breach of the peace. Among the principal prisoners were three mayors Espoleta of San Isidro, Icaín of Naval, and Bardillon of Dagami. The prisoners planted camotes, onions, and other vegetables for their own diet. Comendador insisted that the prisoners had enough to eat and were not mistreated. Colonel Quintero stated that in the latter part of August, Balderian notified him that he (Balderian) was dispatching an investigatory committee. The committee was to determine which, if any, of the prisoners were being detained on mere hearsay evidence that could not bear scrutiny. However, the resurgence of intensified Japanese patrolling prevented the consummation of this inquest. Comendador declared that the prisoners were paroled in November of 1943, because of the imminence of Japanese assault.

Pamanian's organization and the units of the other chieftains of North and East Leyte, were brought within the fold of Balderian's 95th Infantry. The tightening up of troop discipline under the regime of the 95th Regiment was reflected in the curtailing of abuses and the abatement

¹²³. Felix Pamanian, Affadavit (Cogon, Ormoc: January 24, 1946).

in the summary execution of suspected "traitors". Balderian declared his policy to be one of handing over to the justices of the peace cases of civil litigation, while capital crimes were handled by military court martial proceedings. The regiment maintained its own concentration camp in the interior of Dagami, where perhaps 30 prisoners were held for varied offenses. In dealing with collaborationists, Balderian charged his officers to carry out careful preliminary investigation, with full reports, prior to apprehension of the suspect. Officers of lower units, when taking a suspect prisoner, were supposed to deliver him up to regimental headquarters for custody and inquest. However, Filipinos caught in the act of guiding enemy patrols might be killed on the spot under certain circumstances. The circumstances could not be defined with precision, since the guide conceivably acted under duress. Yet, the disposition to act with clemency was tempered by the realization that guerrilla lives were placed in jeopardy.

Balderian admitted that some of his officers had committed errors.¹²⁴ However, his disciplinary action was restrained by the prudent conviction that thoroughgoing strictness on his part might provoke his subordinates to assassinate him--a not rare occurrence in other provinces. For the most part, Balderian preferred a positive policy of respect for civilian rights; this he incessantly endeavored to instill in his men, rather than punish after the fact. As for the properties of known collaborationists, the guerrilla officers were not free to expropriate without specific authorization from regimental headquarters.

Under his Politico-Military government, Balderian made provision for a Court of First Instance to handle civilian cases in accordance with due process of law. There was a problem of recruiting qualified personnel possessing both the sympathy and the courage to serve under a guerrilla administration. Attorney Siayngco acknowledged having received a communication from Balderian:

Your appointment as Judge of the Court of 1st Instance for Leyte in the resumed Provincial Government, under the Commonwealth, being a necessity in the opinion of the undersigned, you are requested hereby to come to Carigara any time from March 5 to March 15, 1943 for an interview.¹²⁵

Siayngco begged off accepting the appointment because of the personal circumstances in which he found himself at the time.

Balderian's choice then lit upon Attorney Floro Cordero. But Cordero never actually exercised his office. In June of 1943, Clerk of Court Narcisso Rocha, drew up a list of cases in anticipation of the selection of a judge. No cases were actually remanded to the Fiscal. In consequence,

124. Antonio Cinco furnished a notorious example of ruthlessness: "Cinco's men developed the habit of killing Japan's 'good neighbors', leaving their faces untouched so that they might be recognized but mincing up their bodies gruesomely, then floating them downstream to their home barrio where they could serve as an example to the others. If there was no stream, they'd sneak the bodies into the main square at night and leave them there. It was an ugly kind of politics...." Wolfert, op. cit., pp. 116-117.

125. A. Balderian, CO, E. Leyte and Milit. Gov. 27 Feb. '43. To: Atty. Siayngco Basey, Samar.

the graver cases were handled by the G-2 (Intelligence) of the military. And to a large extent the unit commanders usurped this function simply because in the rough-and-ready situation of the times, they could not be bothered with long drawn-out affairs.

Within the Regiment, Attorney Cinco served as Judge Advocate and Attorney Ribo as Assistant Judge Advocate. When Kangleon established his civil government in July, 1943, Attorney Cinco became Judge of the Court of First Instance, and Ribo was appointed Assistant Provincial Fiscal of East Leyte. Attorney Ribo stated¹²⁶ that Cinco never made up a calendar of cases for hearing. The contact man between Cinco and Ribo was Calda, who had been stenographer of the Court of First Instance. Ribo recalled having filed cases involving robbery and theft and other matters with the clerk of the Court of 1st Instance then staying at Leyte, Leyte,--one Magallanes (clerk in office of Clerk of Courts before war). Nothing actually was done. Attorney Cinco asserted that the Acting Clerk of Court did receive some criminal files from Fiscal Ribo. Ribo had received these files dispatched by runner from local justices of the peace. Ribo studied the facts and charges and then drew up a formal "information". The Clerk of Court was next supposed to make up the calendar. It was the activity of the enemy, Attorney Cinco explained, that precluded the holding of hearings. (It was possible for Acting Judge Alquino to preside over cases in the other branch of the Court at Maasin because there was no immediate molestation by the enemy.)

While not interfering directly in cases involving local judicial machinery, the Politico-Military Government lent its sanction." In Jaro, for instance, according to Attorney Ascarraga (interview), men convicted of misdemeanors by the justice of the peace were jailed. Conditions in the jail were admittedly bad, and the fare was substandard." The inmates were sometimes allowed to leave the jail to get good water or cigarettes from friends. Fear of the guerrilla deterred these "trusties" from attempting a get-away. The justice of the peace would call upon the guerrilla in apprehending criminals at large. Attorney Azcarraga cites the case of a homicidist, convicted during the tenure of Attorney Ribo, who took to flight. A posse of local policemen and guerrilla soldiers overtook the fugitive within a week and shot him.

Lawlessness by VG's or local guerrillas was also punishable. Attorney Azcarraga recalls the episode of seven VG's who murdered an old man as an alleged collaborationist simply because he refused to hand over a pig. The local guerrilla commander assumed custody over the actual killer, pledging to return him for civilian trial, while the local police took charge of the others. The Japanese reoccupied Jaro before the case could come up, and the charges were dropped.

As commanding officer of the Leyte Area Command, Kangleon worked above all for a restoration of law and order. This involved conducting guerrilla activities on a disciplined basis according to military law with strict enforcement of punishment for breach of regulation. On duty and off, the guerrilla troops were expected to deport themselves as troops worthy of recognition as a unit of the Allied Pacific forces. Enlisted personnel were to obey all commands and officers were to observe punctiliously the

126. Interview: Residence at Jaro, Leyte. 1945.

chain of command. In their dealings with the civilian population, all troops were to respect the rights of person and property of the Filipino citizen. If there was to be any apprehension of suspected traitors and if there was to be any seizure of property, these things were to be done in conformity with legal process--except in cases of great urgency. Civil affairs were to be handled by the civil authorities, both provincial and municipal. Whatever requests the army would make of the civilian population, except where matters of security were concerned, would be transmitted to the proper civil authorities by the military.

Kangleon appointed Attorney Fidel Fernandez as his Judge Advocate General. Under him, Attorney Domingo Veloso, headed the Civil Affairs Section of the GHO. One of Veloso's principal functions was to check up on and eradicate suspected abuses committed by guerrilla soldiers. Kangleon also sought to bring the 95th Regiment in line with top-command policy.¹²⁷

A system of courts was set up, with a southern branch of the Court of First Instance in Maasin, and a northern branch in Carigara. Fiscal Saavedra would file the complaints, and Judge Alquino would try them.¹²⁸ Courts-martial tried cases involving military officers, including such ones

127. The actual task of controlling the subordinate officers fell upon the shoulders of Major Balderian, despite the credit assigned by the war correspondent Gunnison to Kangleon. To be sure, affiliation with Kangleon enhanced Balderian's prestige:

"The first bandit Kangleon cracked down on was 'Colonel' Isabelo Centano [Centino] a famous fish peddler and dock-walloper. Centano was a clever opportunist and one of the first to see the advantage to himself of plundering in the name of the guerrillas.... Kangleon reduced him to the rank of 'captain' and under threat of liquidation, Centano became a convert together with his unit of over five hundred Filipinos.

"A second character who later saw the light was 30-year-old 'Colonel' Antonio Cinco....

"But Cinco's efforts were drawn away from plundering when he was placed under Kangleon's staff. Like the others he played very seriously at cops and robbers. He had played robbers first but later his boys and girls received United States arms and ammunitions and were blazing away at the Japs when the first American division hit...." Gunnison, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

128. Interview: Attorney Abiera, Tacloban, 1945.

Atty. Abiera described some of the important cases that came before the Courts. Two of the cases involved Americans. The first was that of an American officer, Turner by name, who came to Malitbog in November '42, and joined up with Lang. He became intoxicated on one occasion, and shot a Chinese civilian. He was arrested, confined to quarters, and then turned over to the civil court. Turner pleaded to charges of homicide when the case came up. He was convicted, and held in custody. When the Japanese reoccupation occurred, he was evacuated to the mountains under guard. He was eventually transferred to American authorities, and sent to Australia.

Chester Peters was arraigned on charges of homicide and forgery, with Inopacan as the scene of the crimes. Peters pleaded not guilty, but the finding was guilty. After detention at Camp Terra Nova, he was taken to headquarters to prevent his falling into Japanese hands. He too was finally shipped out to Australia.

The third important case was a general court martial, involving Maj.

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as those of Captain Erfe, Major Espina, and Chester Petersa. As was already mentioned, Attorney Atilano Cinco was appointed judge of the First Branch of the Court (holding jurisdiction over the northern part of the Province) and Attorney Mamento Ribo became the Assistant Provincial Fiscal.

A concentration camp was established at Matalom on June 30, 1943, where important prisoners were interned.¹²⁹ The camp site had been formerly used by the Philippine Army and was renamed Camp Terra Nova. Cadelina was Concentration Camp Officer and was assigned a squad of guerrilla soldiers as guards, augmented by a detail of VG's serving as supernumeraries. The prisoners were made up of criminals, suspected collaborators, and a miscellaneous collection of political offenders. The heads of the prisoners

Espina, executive officer of Maj. Francisco. Espina was charged with mishandling army supplies. Espina was very popular with the VG units. They engaged the services of Atty. Abiera as defense counsel at the trial, with Maj. Abay as presiding judge. (Abiera states that he received P30 as lawyer's fee, and P30 in expense money.) The court found against Espina. Abiera states that Espina was to have been dishonorably discharged; but on the intervention of Judge Advocate General Fernandez, clemency was shown, and Espina was reduced in grade to captaincy. General Court Martial Orders No. 3, Hq. IAC - 29 Nov. 1944. (Note: Espina appealed to Philippine Army headquarters in 1946 to restore his rank, alleging a miscarriage of justice.)

A fourth court-martial proceeding, the trial of Major DeGracia, for alleged violation of orders, arose out of DeGracia's invasion of Baybay, thereby provoking "The Baybay Affair." DeGracia was reduced one grade.

In addition to the court martial proceedings enumerated, we must also mention two important cases brought before civil guerrilla authorities. In the first case, the Fiscal in Maasin filed an information against Capt. Erfe and three of his associates on the ground that they were falsely obliging the United States Government to incur monetary obligations without proper authorization by the emission of special currency. The case was left pending by the arrival of the Japanese in their re-occupation drive. Erfe was released and permitted to return to Abuyog --only to be executed by the Japanese in 1944.

Finally, we may mention the indictment of Mayor Florentino Zara of Maasin on charges of embezzlement. The case came before the court of First Instance in the Liberation period.

129. Atty. Abiera stated that the Provincial Jail was in Maasin, where 30-40 prisoners were held. The prisoners were put to work at street cleaning and other kinds of labor. Fines were turned over to the Provincial Treasurer--though in ordinary times, these had been tagged as insular monies.

The 95th Infantry Regiment continued to maintain its own concentration camp, under the charge of Major Balderian's trusted supporter, Capt. Damian Dadula. On an inspectional visit in August, 1944, Major Balderian counted 23 prisoners, including four women. He recommended: "1. The Medical Surgeon should inspect the C.C. (concentration camp) at least once a month. 2. Variety of crops be planted in the prisoners' lots to give variety of food to the prisoners, and to be self-sufficient. 3. The Officer-in-Charge should see to it that the shed-houses will not leak." Alejandro Balderian, a Major, Inf., Cmdg. 12 August 1944. Report of Inspection.

were shaven for purposes of easy identification. Cadelina asserted (interview) that the prisoners were not maltreated. They were not beaten, and were fed wholesome rations--(admittedly light, because of the general shortage.) The prisoners planted camotes to eke out their diet. On the authorization of Captain Espina the prisoners were permitted to receive gifts from civilians, including food, plates, blankets, etc.

Alfonso Borrromeop one of the guards at Terra Nova, gave the impression (interview) that Cadelina was a cruel, poverbearing tyrant. Cadelina punished the VGps severely often by the sun treatment (standing at attention in the blazing sunlight) for venial mistakes. The VG's naturally reported their experiences to the people of Matalom, who came to hate Cadelina intensely. Major Jain of the 94th Regiment came by on inspection tours once or twice a week. But the prisoners did not complain of mistreatment to Jain, fearing the vindictive Cadelina. The camp population, according to Borrromeo's figures, numbered 67 prisoners, 25 soldiers, and 15 VGps at about September, 1943. He stated that they were worked on a prison farm and were fed inadequately of rice and drief fish. In December, 1943, the camp was transferred to Malitbog.

Borrromeop's statements are substantiated by Major Jain. (Interview, 41st Inf. Regt., 1945) Rumors of Cadelina's high-handedness leaked out. Jain was convinced that Cadelina was not fitted for the job, and he was replaced. In April, 1944, Cadelina was reverted to inactive status, according to Jain, because of his harsh ways.

The area of West Leyte controlled by Miranda's WIGWF was denounced by Kangleon as a land where murder and rapine abounded: "Vicious calumny, born of jealousy"--Miranda replied.

It was his proud claim, a claim reechoed by each of the sector commanders in turn, that he had established a regime of law and order, giving the civilians a sense of security that enabled them to turn a deaf ear to the blandishments of collaborationists. Miranda's procedure consisted in ordering the cooperating justices of the peace in each municipality to reassert their jurisdiction over the lesser breaches of the peace, while reserving the graver cases for military handling. But there was an overlapping of civilian and military jurisdiction in both the venue of the cases and the disposition of the prisoners.

The justices of the peace for each municipality were inducted into the WIGWF and commissioned in the Judge Advocate Corps.¹³⁰ Attorney Teleron,

130. All of the officials were well-qualified for their tasks. All had been practicing attorneys, with the exception of Senesa of Merida, a law student who succeeded Teleron for this sector. But Ubay relieved Senesa, when Senesa was reassigned within the Merida regiment. Barte served as the military justice in Albueria, and Marilao similarly functioned in Palompon. In Baybay, Rusiana became the appointee of the Miranda administration, serving until taken prisoner by the Kangleon forces. Then Mosiano succeeded him. Polancos of Ormoc, according to his own statement, was the first legal adviser of Miranda, counseling him on the proper way to set up his guerrilla organization without running afoul of the law. Polancos became Assistant Judge Advocate General, serving until August 1943. Evangelista of Ormoc served as the sector justice of the peace.

-serving as justice of the peace in Merida, was promoted to the post of Judge Advocate General. This office was held by Teleron in conjunction with his post of Civil Affairs Officer. Thus, there was a blending through Teleron of judicial, executive, and legislative functions of government in addition to the intermingling of military and civil functions.

Enjoying an array of legal talent affiliated with his organization, Miranda dared his vituperators to bring forth evidence of his alleged banditry. What he meant is not that he or his subordinates never committed an impropriety. How could men of the caliber of his legal staff tolerate the alleged abuses, much less identify with them? Obviously, this was outright falsification! Miranda would say.

Attorney Polanco (interview) declared that he early took a stand in favor of having all legal actions conform with the canons of due process, wherever possible. He was completely opposed to star chamber proceedings against alleged collaborationists, and a fortiori to their liquidation by the military (unless taken in direct encounter). No doubt, these norms were not invariably observed, but they constituted the temper that generally prevailed.

Vincente Villegas, WIGWF Superintendent of Schools, declared (interview) that the guerrilla put fear into the hearts of the people, so that relatively few crimes were committed during this period.¹³¹ As for civil suits, most civilians were content to maintain a status quo and defer litigation to the postwar period. (This tacit understanding, incidentally, constituted but another facet of the Filipino conviction that the American liberation was just a matter of time.)

Lesser offenses committed by civilians came before the justices of the peace. On the other hand, the same personnel, sitting as Judge Advocate, handled the derelictions of the soldiery. Of course, regimental and battalion commanders and other line officers would be associated with them. Attorney Evangelista noted (interview) that the judge advocate was always subject to call at the convening of a court martial. Attorney Polanco recalled (interview) having presided at seven cases of summary court martial on charges involving absence from camp without leave, violation of guard duty regulations, conduct unbecoming a soldier, etc. According to guerrilla captain Daffon of the Albuera sector, (interview) the procedure followed required the appropriate line officer to draw up the charges and specifications and then endorse the case over to the judge advocate for handling. In the event that the case was regarded as a grave one, the matter was referred to the Judge Advocate General. Lieutenant Quetulio, chief of G-2 section, added (interview) that the regimental commander reserved final

131. The chief of staff notified Peralta in Panay:

"... The different municipal councils run the municipal governments as in normal times. All crimes committed, which before were triable by Courts of First Instance, are now triable by General Courts Martial according to the Articles of War and the Penal Code. Thus far, crimes have been reduced to a minimum, possibly very much lower than at any time before." Marcos G. Soliman, Maj. 81st Inf. June 5, 1943. To: "Dear Mac" [Peralta], p. 2.

judgment in the lesser cases, while the Commanding General was the ultimate arbiter in all cases. Generally, however, no friction developed between the line officers and their legal staffs.

Civilian lawbreakers were generally committed to the municipal jails and put to labor for the community benefit, with appropriations for their subsistence being met by the municipal council.¹³² Lieutenant Maglasang of the G-2 asserted, (interview) that a prison camp was provided in Bo. Toglong, Ormoc, where the lesser civilian and military offenders might be assigned. These prisoners were generally made to work in the fields of the abandoned estates or used as labor gangs where needed. Six weeks was the longest period of detention, according to guerrilla captain Daffon of Albuerca.

Two features of pre-war penology, monetary fines and capital punishment for crimes, were both abandoned, according to Daffon. What became of the more dangerous civilian criminal or the soldier who had committed a grave offense? According to Lieutenant Maglasang (corroborated by Attorney Polanco) this species of offender was interned in a special concentration camp located in Bo. Matagob, Palompon. These men were more closely supervised to guard against escape. And they were assigned to a regimen of heavy labor on the farms, in the base hospital, and wherever else needed. Attorney Polanco asserted that all these prisoners were released, prior to the launching of the expected Japanese assault in December of 1943.

One point that all of the men connected with the WIGWF would stress-- that any soldier guilty of perpetrating some outrage against a civilian would not be shielded from punishment because of his military status. Only in this way could the faith of the civilians in the integrity of the guerrilla be maintained. Captain Olaybar of the Palompon Regiment was a member of two general courts martial. In the one case, an enlisted man was confined to fifteen days at hard labor for felling a Chinese merchant in a fit of anger. The other case, involving homicide by a civilian, saw a sentence of 20 years' imprisonment imposed upon the murderer. (Presumably, the sentence would be binding for the postwar period, unless the prisoner were pardoned by the executive. But what became of the prisoner during the Japanese occupation of Merida, this writer has been unable to ascertain.) Gemelo Pastor of the Merida sector recalled (interview) having sat with a general court-martial board in a case involving an enlisted man charged and convicted of attempted rape. The accused was assigned to two months of hard labor in camp. This may seem like a trivial punishment for so heinous an offense. Yet it sufficed to serve as a deterrent for the troops, for they could not always expect such relative leniency. At the same time the civilians were made to understand that the guerrilla could not ride roughshod over the rights of the non-combatants. Still, there remained a residue of mistrust in the mind of the civilian regarding the outcome of any litigation between himself and a soldier, so that the civilian would prefer avoiding any altercation with the latter!

We might mention also that it was customary for the guerrilla to detain civilians entering their zone from other parts of the Province. If upon investigation they could give a satisfactory account of their business, they

132. The commanding officer in the Baybay sector, Rodriguez, stated (interview) that in his municipality, the mayor assigned the work details to the jailed.

were generally released with a reprimand--and advised to apply directly to the sub-sector commander before repeating their visit. Those who seemed at all suspicious in their ways were held longer. Suspected Kangleon agents might be interned for a period; Japanese agents would probably be executed.

We are estopped from making quantitative estimates concerning the prevalence of criminality of lawlessness in the guerrilla zones of Leyte by the absence of legal statistics. Moreover, further burdens are placed upon our judgment by the necessity of setting up criteria that will enable us to differentiate between tortious guerrilla actions, committed in the course of duty, and crimes committed under color of necessity. This is virtually an impossible task. Still, we may draw some conclusions.

We may note a general increase in violence, particularly in the troubled first period of the enemy occupation. The absence of police protection, especially outside the limits of the poblacion, obliged families to resort to self-help in place of legal redress for wrongs sustained. When the guerrilla groups began to develop, they often were obliged to assume an air of coerciveness in order to impress the civilian element and to ward off rival groups from encroaching upon their territory. As they grew, they tended to lay claim arbitrarily to whatever they believed would further their cause. To challenge guerrilla assumptions was to lay oneself open to the charge of collaborationism.

There is no way of determining how many individuals were harshly punished or executed for alleged enmity to the guerrilla cause. That there were many such instances, there can be no doubt. Shall we call such cases crime, even when preceded by some show of a hearing? Or shall we limit this designation to cases where the guerrilla offender benefitted materially, either by acquiring property or settling an old grudge score?

To the extent that the guerrilla movement attained centralization of command, to that extent there was an increasing scrupulosity for legality of procedure. The top leadership, hoping for American recognition, sought to meet the specifications of law and order within their domain of control. They therefore sought to reestablish some approximation to a peace-time system of courts and instituted certain norms and inspectional procedures to be observed by their subordinate sector commanders. Down to the very end, no clear-cut demarcation of offenses between those triable by civilian courts and those falling under the competency of the military was reached. However, we must bear in mind that guerrilla unification of command was not reached in Leyte till shortly before the American arrival--and then the Japanese were in control of a major portion of the Island. By that time, ordinary crime had been all but eliminated, whereas executions of suspected collaborationists grew in frequency. We may define guerrilla law, in the last analysis, as the will of the sector commander, tempered by his private sense of right and wrong and his fear of later punishment.

The Municipalities and the Guerrilla

A full understanding of the character of Leyte's resistance movement would require an exhaustive study of the origin, form, and procedures of the guerrilla organizations in each of the Island's municipalities. Despite the substratum of a general way of life throughout the Province, and despite the

ubiquitous impact of an enemy occupation, generalization is apt to be rash. If the main contending forces are discernible everywhere, "the particularity of their expression is equally unmistakable. And it is this diversity, evident from community to community, that marks the difference between the affairs of real people and the abstract classifications of the "academic" writer. In any one of several communities, the people may apparently be joined together in resistance to the occupation forces. Yet, closer inspection reveals a true unity of dedication to a cherished cause in the one case and a selfish wrangling for political advantage and pecuniary gain in another. Similarly, the puppet regimes set up in the various municipalities differ greatly among themselves--some being little more than a pretense to hoodwink the conqueror and others being genuinely devoted to implementing the Occupation policy, despite the cost in Filipino suffering.

As we survey the history of resistance in Leyte from the standpoint of its municipalities, certain common features emerge: We find the Japanese uncertain of their specific policies at the time of their arrival, but anxious to restore "normalcy." Their principal contingents are limited to a few centers with scattered smaller garrisons used as jumping-off points for reconnaissance patrolling. Aside from seizing firearms, radios, automobiles, bicycles, stocks of abaca and copra, and ordering the municipal officials to resume office, they interfere but little in the personal life of the Filipino inhabitants. Individual Japanese officers show unnecessary harshness and some commit abuses upon the local population.

There are communities where the municipal officials flee (Merida) or are slain (Sogod) as criminal elements terrorize a defenseless countryside (Baybay, Ormoc).¹³³ In other communities, the local officials early seek a

133. The puppet governor reported at the close of 1942: "... municipal officials cooperating with the Japanese Administration are declared enemies of the guerrilla and are being hunted. They, their families and relatives are in constant danger. When they travel in compliance with official duties, they are exposed to hazards.... So far 2 mayors have been killed; 5 mayors kidnapped, but probably living; 12 driven out of their posts.... About 50 municipal policemen lost their lives in the performance of official duties...." B. Torres, Prov. Gov. Dec. 21, 1942. To: Japanese Mil. Admin. for the Dist. of Visayas.

Tanauan, menaced by the guerrilla but not controlled by them, sustained a high official mortality rate. The municipal treasurer denounced the "bands of bandits which terrorize the lives of innocent citizens, as evidenced by the kidnapping of former Mayor J. Perez, municipal secretary Z. Roa, municipal clerk, G. Faron... and unjust killings of former Mayor Pedro Bulik and others...." Mun. Treas. Monante, Tanauan, Jan. 6, 1943. To: Prov. Auditor.

Among the municipal officials who had fled to Tacloban for sanctuary in 1942 an official compilation includes the names of Abuyog's first mayor (E. Cana), its treasurer (R. Collantes), its chief of police (J. Canavala); Jaro: mayor (C. Lastrilla), treasurer (P. Reyna), chief of police (A. Gardon); Alangalang: mayor (N. Salazar), police sergeant (A. Arivas); Pastrana: Mayor (N. Villeblanca), justice of the peace (J. Pigao) & chief of police (A. Ripalda).

Other officials joined them in 1942 or left Leyte entirely. Some of these evacuee officials found themselves destitute in Tacloban and whined
(continued on next page)

firm alliance with the local Japanese commander (Villaba, Capocan, Dagami) and vigorously push the Japanese policies gradually evolving particularly the hunting down of unsundered USAFFE soldiers. In one community (Abuyog) the municipal government evacuates as a unit determined to have nought to do with the Japanese occupation force.

Unsundered soldiers and various patriotic civilian elements are aroused to resistance by the increasingly provocative presence of the Japanese. At the same time, they wish to stamp out the lawless elements and protect the civilians. Small guerrilla groups arise. Some contact the local officials and seek support (Ormoc). Elsewhere (Maasin), they order the municipal government to evacuate or work hand-in-hand with an already evacuated government (Abuyog). They begin to put pressure on the municipal governments, requiring them to define their stand. Some of the waverers (Ormoc) decide that the risk of offending the Japanese is too great, and these officials take a stand against the guerrillas. Others, after the support of local Japanese garrisons is withdrawn in a Japanese move of retrenchment, flee (Villaba) or are killed (Capocan).

Now begins a period when the guerrilla organizations achieve maximum control. They install municipal officials favorable to their program (Merida, Capocan, Villaba, Dagami, Baybay, Maasin, Sogod)—either new personnel or carry-overs from the old administration. In one community (Maasin), the citizens themselves help determine affairs thru an Advisory Director etc. In some places (Abuyog), the officials dominate the guerrilla organization. As the guerrilla organizations fuse and some measure of centralization takes place, the local officials are expected to conform to certain over-all guerrilla policies, whose implementation is supervised by local sector commanders. A good proportion of the guerrilla leaders get along favorably with the municipal officials and the local population; a fraction does not (Baybay, Villaba). There are those who are content to let the municipal administration take care of itself, without meddling; others put their own impress upon local functioning (Baybay, Merida). In one case (Abuyog), one guerrilla organization (Kangleon) supersedes another (Erfe) without effecting any major change in the position of the local civilian administration.

Towards the middle of 1943, Japanese reinforcements begin to arrive in Leyte, and their volume swells as the year draws to a close. In many municipalities, the guerrillas prepare for the reestablishment of Japanese garrisons throughout the Province by designating certain local officials to assume office with the expectation that they will protect the interests of their Filipino townsmen and establish under-cover liaison with the guerrillas. In some cases (Merida, Capocan, Baybay, Maasin) the guerrillas are satisfied that these appointees are doing their best to carry out their mandate. In other localities, these officials turn their backs on their

for relief. Cana of Abuyog implored: "We officials have been here starving.... We can't return. We expect that something may be done in our behalf.... Whatever assistance is extended to us will have a moral effect upon the community as it will be an incentive to those who are still hostile to the present regime to come across for cooperation...." Prov. Gov. Mayor Cana, Abuyog. March 15, 1943. To: Chairman of Philippine Executive Commission.

guerrilla sponsors and become all-out collaborators (Abuyog, Sogod). Elsewhere, the guerrillas have had no say in the matter (Ormoc, Dagami, Villaba), and the local officials are undisguised Japanese tools. The Japanese policy during this period alternates between appeals for Filipino support on the basis of the "Independence" ballyhoo and cruelly repressive measures with the recruiting of Filipino laborers for Japanese projects. Among the Filipino officials are the unscrupulous who not only collaborate but graft at the expense of their victimized townspeople (Sogod, Villaba).

The guerrilla organizations follow a period of lie-low during 1944 till about April-May, confining activities to intelligence work. In July, Colonel Kangleon receives a large supply of American arms, drugs, etc., and organizes a new regiment. He assigns it to the territory formerly controlled by Miranda, whose WIGWF has been reduced to skeletal size during the Japanese "mopping-up" drive. He appoints his own local governments to administer the affairs of the evacuated population outside of the towns proper (Ormoc, Merida) and also in other parts of the Province (Sogod, Maasin, Abuyog), while his regimental commander in North-East Leyte, Balderian followed suit (Dagami, Capocan).

Factional rivalry helped to embitter politics in many municipalities of Leyte before the war. This strife persisted into the Occupation period in a number of communities. Not so in West Leyte, Miranda boasts:

All the members of the guerrilla force were instructed to forget political squabbles and party feuds. No member was allowed to capitalize on the name of the guerrilla organization to build up his political future. As a matter of fact, misunderstanding between some guerrilla units and ours was a result of political influence of some interested and ambitious politicians.¹³⁴

By "ambitious politicians" Miranda obviously has in mind Attorney Domingo Veloso of Baybay who became the chief propaganda officer of Kangleon. And if Miranda means that offering oneself as a political candidate in the postwar period is presumptive evidence of having built one's political future while ostensibly engaged in non-political civic activity, then Veloso was an offender. Veloso presented his candidacy as Congressman in the post-war elections and succeeded in being returned to Manila. But by the same token, both Bonifacio Capuyan and Gemelo Pastor of the WIGWF ran afoul of these strictures. That they were defeated in their try for office does not detract from the offense. We might likewise add that the municipal elections in Ormoc, Albueria, and the other communities were affected by the votes of the WIGWF veterans.

Many examples of the persistence of political factionalism of the bitterest sort in Leyte's municipalities could be pointed out--notwithstanding the presence of the Japanese invader. In Abuyog, the long-standing feud between Mayor Gallego and Chief of Police Catalino Landia had important consequences for guerrilla organization. Abuyog, brought within the organization of Captain Erfe, felt honored that its mayor Gallego should be raised high in guerrilla councils. Landia, given a subordinate command, chafed under the slight and directed his enmity against Captain Erfe. Entering into a carefully concealed plot with Colonel Kangleon, Landia led a detachment of guerrilla troops in ambush of Captain Erfe, placed Erfe under military arrest, and handed him over to Kangleon. Unhappily for

¹³⁴. Miranda, op. cit., p. 4.

Iandia, Kangleon appreciated the administrative ability of Gallego and appointed Abuyog's mayor guerrilla Deputy Governor for East Leyte.

In Maasin, political feuding between the group headed by the pre-war mayor, Cabrera, and the followers of the war-time mayor, Zara, was very intense. Upon the accession of Jain to guerrilla leadership in Maasin, he found it difficult to reach a good working relationship with Zara and recalled Cabrera to the mayoralty. Zara's opponents then attempted to indict him for embezzlement during his tenure of office. Before the issue could be decided, the Japanese reoccupied Maasin. It was agreed by the local guerrilla authorities that Zara might serve as puppet mayor with the understanding that he would protect Filipino interests. Testimony is conflicting in respect to his conduct in office. His political enemies charge him with having "sold out" to the Japanese, while his friends vehemently deny these charges as baseless and prejudiced. One way or the other, the situation was utterly detestable.

It is also pertinent to observe that some of the local politicians sought to stand in well with their more influential constituents by vouchsafing special dispensations from guerrilla decrees. Wrote Major Balderian of Babatngon's mayor:

... The detachment commander at Babatngon has made himself the head of a sort of intelligence division in Babatngon, with members who are old and distinctly connected with electioneering in the town. The Municipal Mayor is the man behind these, the detachment commander Capt. Lanonte being the automaton of the Mayor....

There have been instances of certain individuals who have broken the rules of this organization on the movements of civilians and sailboats, but due to the intervention... on the part of the Mayor for political reasons, my operatives could not well prosecute these people.¹³⁵

Jockeying for political advantage within the guerrilla movement sometimes extended beyond the limits of a single municipality. A conspicuous example appeared in the restrained but nonetheless keen rivalry of Attorneys Cinco (Dagami) and Aguja (Carigara)--reflected in the sometimes strained relations of their respective military proteges, Balderian and Pamanian.¹³⁶ And equally strong and equally well guarded was the unfriendly competition existing between Provincial Board Member Angel Espina and the military commander of "Free Leyte," Colonel Kangleon. In this latter case, the problem was further vexed by the unpopularity of the Protestant Espina in certain Catholic circles.

Other instances might be cited to underscore the general point--that a number of politicians, ostensibly consecrating their lives to defeating the foreign invader, were neglecting no opportunity to build political bridges to postwar preference. If the outcome of such enterprise was not

135. Alejandro Balderian, Col. 25 Jan. '43. Memo to: The Deputy Military Governor, Div. II.

136. In the postwar Congressional election, Attorney Cinco was a successful candidate, Attorney Aguja a loser.

invariably detrimental to the resistance cause, it was not because the schemers were scrupulously sensitive. Fortunately, selfishness and the common good sometimes coincided.

P A R T I I

E. The Economics of Guerrilla Control

From our inquiry into the political character of guerrilla rule, we have seen that at best guerrilla-civilian functioning exhibited cooperative planning and coordinated direction of affairs--at worst, disorganization or military oppression of the civilian population. The apparatus of economic direction exhibited the same influences. We shall proceed to examine them.

Guerrilla Subsistence and Procurement

The hub of civilian military relationships was in the domain of procurement, the complex of activities associated with provisioning the guerrilla troops. The withdrawal of the guerrilla combatants from productive enterprise and their complete preoccupation with military and associated activities threw upon their leadership the onerous responsibility of procuring subsistence! Subsistence came to be the primary locus of relationships between combatant resisters and non-combatant sympathizers, between "mountain people" and "town dwellers." To the extent that civilians contributed frequently, liberally, but above all, willingly to the fighting units, they gave visible token of their pro-American allegiance, their anti-Japanese orientation, their steadfast adherence to the guerrilla cause. In proportion, as they gave stintingly, infrequently, and then screamed "bandit" at the appropriators of their wealth, they marked themselves as foes of resistance.

A pragmatic test of loyalty proved too crude to sift accurately partisan from collaborator. Complicated factors muddled the situation and blurred distinctions. How should sympathetically disposed persons respond toward self-styled guerrilla leaders, freely appropriating whatever their eyes coveted, though the military value of these seizures was but dimly discernible? Should a professedly pro-guerrilla family donate open-handedly to a pseudo-guerrilla band, a band devoted principally to self-indulgence but delinquent in providing those protective functions justifying its very *raison d'etre*? And should the guerrilla supporter continue his active allegiance once the Japanese troops had tightened their cordon of espionage and intensified their "mopping-up" patrol operations? These are but a suggestion of the perplexities confronting the individual willing to give of his substance to the resistance movement, and yet unwilling to be despoiled or needlessly place his life in jeopardy.

From the very nature of their struggle, the guerrilla forces were dependent upon the people for foodstuffs and other supplies. Assuming a symbiotic relationship of productive and protective elements in a population fused in searing hatred of the invader, the guerrilla leadership from the very outset felt justified in soliciting material contributions. Troops in bivouac had to be messes and clothed. A dependable, fairly regularized source of supply must be had to support the central installation. When sorties were launched against the enemy, or inspectional patrols dispatched, provisions must be arranged en route. However, these levies on civilian bounty must be moderate and equitable.

At first, some of the guerrilla bands came into ill-repute for their

rapacity. In the colorful language of the American who served as guerrilla educational supervisor:

The guerrilla^e is too often a financial burden to those who can least afford it--.... But whether on or off duty, his rifle is his constant companion... it is his meal ticket. The guerrilla has no commissary and he does not carry any culinary equipment with him. He expects and receives the best of everything--and many families which can ill afford it are eaten out of house and home¹

Of what avail to gain foodstuffs and alienate civilian good will? The harassed, often destitute people must be made to see that their army was one with them in enduring hardship, in living abstemiously. The indigent masses could give only sparingly. But whatever threat of expropriation loomed up spectre-like before the eyes of the better-to-do must be allayed lest, in angry desperation, they cast their lot with the enemy.

The procedures of requisitioning, when reviewed, show a trend toward greater systematization and centralization of control. Fixed rates of assessment and standardized modes of collection would not only increase certainty of supply and improve efficiency of administration. A corollary to established requisitioning practices--the curbing of the sector commanders in their hitherto unrestrained foraging activities--was intended to enhance respect for and loyalty to the guerrilla forces. Culminating this trend was the decision of guerrilla headquarters to abandon requisitions in kind, and rely exclusively (save in special circumstances) upon purchases in the open market. Such a technique was predicated upon the unification of guerrilla forces under single command, the restitution of civil government, the steady receipt of funds from a combination of extra-provincial sources and local taxation, and the institution of sound army finance and quartermaster services^e

When the attainment of these objectives was not realized, as in Leyte, much floundering and improvisation necessarily resulted. Failure to achieve a unified command meant variation in fiscal practices among the several zones of guerrilla control. Shortage of funds brought about periodic reversion to older modes of requisitioning. Severed lines of communication necessitated considerable local autonomy and adaptation of fiscal practice to local conditions. The psychology of the people itself militated against excessive rigidity in exacting contributions. Popular restiveness under fixed arrangements such as percentage levies or specific assessments induced some unit leaders to favor the less certain but also less irritable procedures of solicitation. Sagacity pointed to confiscation of municipal treasuries² or earmarking of certain municipal revenues as a better fiscal expedient, because less directly felt by the taxpayer. What matter if a mess-officer, supply sergeant, procurement agent or other purchaser be disbursing funds of the citizens, so long as farmers and merchants were recompensed for their commodities? Better yet, if moral suasion or veiled intimidation would avail,

1. Babcock, op. cit., Letter of November 20, 1942

2. "Out of 47 municipalities," wrote the puppet governor at the end of 1942, "so far 28 treasuries and post offices have been robbed and looted.... Luckily most of this money was emergency notes." B. Torres, Prov. Gov. Dec. 21, 1942. To: Japanese Military Administration for District of Visayas.

the municipal councils might be "induced to appropriate funds in lump grant or in periodic installments for guerrilla maintenance.³ This latter arrangement would remove the piratical stigma from guerrilla fiscal operations!

Property and Its Control

Assurance that an adequate flow of supplies would reach guerrilla camps implied attention to the source of that flow, its direction and volume. The source was the private holdings in land of Leyte's propertied class and, to a lesser extent, business enterprise owned within the resistance zone. The direction and volume of flow were affected by claims upon the income of these properties and the nature of the transactions in the produce of the properties. We shall accordingly direct our attention to the guerrilla attitude towards private property, the regulations introduced looking towards its control, and related efforts to channelize commercial transactions.

To understand the guerrilla attitude towards private property is to appreciate the purely pragmatic character of guerrilla regulations. The resistance movement of Leyte carried no revolutionary implications.⁴ It raised no banners of revolt against prescription, undertook no sapping campaigns against the entrenched interests of the Island. Entreating whatever support could be obtained from the wealthier elements, the guerrilla chiefs pledged protection to private properties in return. Repeatedly, combat officers and civil authorities aligned with the guerrillas asseverated an intention to maintain the status quo: "Transfer of ownership of real properties during this period of emergency is illegal," declared a report of the 94th Infantry Regiment.⁵

And although repeatedly assailed by Colonel Kangleon and his subordinates as subversive of the established order, the Western Leyte Guerrilla Warfare Force (WLGWF) made clear its purpose to avoid upsetting the prevailing social structure:

This Command has and still is adopting the policy of status quo on cases affecting real estate, such as inheritance, sale, mortgages,

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3. In the latter half of 1943, some of the municipalities of the WLGWF adopted the practice of granting direct monetary subventions to the regiments. Only in Ormoc did the guerrilla stabilize this pattern, receiving a semi-monthly grant from the military municipal government (in the evacuation area, outside the poblacion). This grant consisted of all that remained in the municipal treasury after payment of operating charges. Neither Miranda nor Valeriano Daffon, the divisional finance officer, have ever made a full and satisfactory accounting of the disposition of these monies. Of course, there would be no way for any postwar auditor to establish a case of embezzlement, since in the vicissitudes of guerrilla administration (especially after the Japanese assault on the GHQ), the monies might have been employed in any number of ways or simply lost.
 4. An American general, in the course of a book review, declared: "Ideologies played little or no part in the guerrilla activities of the Filipinos [of Leyte]" "Brig. Gen. Donald Armstrong, "The Exploits of Lt. I. D. Richardson," The Saturday Review of Literature, XXVIII (April 21, 1945), p. 70.
 5. Office of the Provost Marshall. 26 May 1943. Report to Regt'l Comdr., 94th Inf. Regt.

boundary disputes, etc. In cases where land question is grave, forward same to this Headquarters for action!

Drastic action will be taken against officers in the Regiments attempting to settle land matters which will tend to violate the policy of status quo.⁶

The Staff Judge Advocate General and Civil Affairs Officer, the officer best placed for authoritative exposition of the Western Leyte Guerrilla policy, declared: "... With respect to civil cases affecting real property and property rights, the policy of the WLGWF was the 'status quo', i.e. conditions affecting real property and property rights at the outbreak of the war in the Philippines were maintained."⁷

During the period that the WLGWF was seeking for recognition from GHQ, WPA, its leaders constantly stressed their freedom from radical tincture, their respect for property rights, their preoccupation exclusively with the military aspect of resistance. To his friend, Lieutenant Colonel Macario Peralta, Major Soliman, Chief of Staff for Miranda, wrote: "Big landed estates have never been touched and the owners or administrators offer contributions to our forces for our maintenance and subsistence."⁸

That the guerrilla movement had dedicated itself to a purely military-political objective and lacked reform overtones is not strange. Whether farmers, merchants, school teachers, lawyers, or professional soldiers, the men who played an active part in organizing and directing the guerrilla had developed no systematized concepts of social change, no generalized philo-

6. Sabelino. 1 March 1943. General Order No. 2, Par. 1-2!

7. Special statement by Atty. Victorino C. Teleron, prepared at his residence in Ormoc, February, 1946.

8. Marcos Soliman, Maj. July 5, 1943. Letter to: Lt. Col. Macario Peralta, C.O., Panay Forces, p. 2, par. "i"! In point of fact, the WLGWF discovered that under war-time conditions the friendly beneficence of the hacenderos was of more utility for the subsistence of the organization than any program of confiscation. Many of the hacenderos associated themselves with the WLGWF in one capacity or another.

Potenciano Larrazabal, owner of a 3,000 hectare estate (former vice-mayor of Ormoc and appointed mayor in June, 1944), belonged to one of the wealthiest clans in Leyte. Yet, he had nothing but good words for the WLGWF and denied that it had sponsored drastic social changes. He himself gave generously to the guerrilla from his stock of grain, sugar, coffee and salt in addition to monetary contributions. (Interview, Tacloban, 1945)

In Merida, the hacendero Jose Martinez headed the S-4 on the regimental staff. In this same sector, Gemelo Pastor, who headed the regimental S-3 and later became CO, was the nephew of Alfonso Pastor, owning a 500 hectare estate. Pastor denied categorically that there was any planned liquidation of large-holders here.

In Palompon the regimental surgeon, Dr. Serafica, owned an 800 hectare plantation. In the Albuera sector, Andres Polancos, owning a 500 hectare estate, served as S-4. The hacendero Zaldabar, with a 500 hectare estate, had two sons serving as battalion intelligence officers in this sector (Antonio and Guillermo).

Miranda summed up the situation: "Big estates were never touched. If abandoned, the administrators were responsible for the cultivation of the
(continued on next page)

sophic constructs of economic classes irreconcilably opposed. Pre-war Leyte knew neither an active-trade union movement nor organized agrarian populism. Whatever social discontent lurked beneath the surface was directed against individual instances of exploitation and chicanery.

Inherent in the war-time relationships, although engendered by no conscious deliberation, were certain forces erosive of special privilege. For one thing, the common people, enduring unmitigated privation in their places of evacuation, could not but note the relative ease, comfort, freedom from danger enjoyed by the wealthier elements! Many the time and with much vociferousness had the great landowners and opulent merchants protested their devotion to the ideals of Filipino nationhood, sworn their attachment to democracy, pledged their all to resisting the efforts of any foreign aggressor to subjugate them. Yet, how many were to be counted among those resisting the Japanese invaders on the day of reckoning? Many quickly clasped their conquerors to their bosoms and gave full assurance of complete collaboration. Even among those who maintained a surreptitious connection with resistance were some who revealed as their primary motivation a desire to escape guerrilla reprisals through adeptly "playing their cards." A paltry hand-out in money or supplies, scarcely curtailing their own scale of living, was well worth the small risk of Japanese detection involved in return for the protection from assassination or plundering by the guerrillas.

Indeed, those Filipinos electing to remain in the towns rather than flee to the mountains and be hunted down by Japanese patrols noted how well the local plutocracy fared in comparison with themselves. Starvation, nakedness, beggary were the perquisites of the lowly. The poignant resentments born of their sufferings would not be forgotten by the masses. Individual collaborators might be formally absolved of "pro-Jap" taint, but the humble would remember where gentility stood in the time of crisis.

Exigencies of warfare necessitated adoption of regulations seriously infringing upon so-called property rights. Foodstuffs and other commodities were confiscated for the prosecution of resistance. Implicit in such procedures lay the notion that property interests were subservient to the public welfare, and could be overridden in time of emergency." Economic warfare constituted an undetachable part of modern combat. For the embattled guerrillas maximizing of output and stopping up leakages of critical items from the free to the occupied zones of the Province ranked high on the priority list of military objectives. But accomplishment of these ends entailed controls and restrictions! So it came about that guerrilla leaders, in elevating the principle of common utility above that of individual ownership, temporarily dented the edifice of private property. Joint or cooperative production arrangements worked out under the pressures of war-time living, plus the instances of violence and expropriation visited upon the most hated of the landowners by long-suffering tenants and laborers, established a precedent appropriate to social change in the future.

Small holdings, individually owned, characterized the system of land tenure obtaining in much of pre-war Leyte. On the West Coast, however, particularly in the northern portion, hacenderos had established title to

same.... Chinese and Spaniards cooperated well with the guerrilla!.... The Larrazabal family and Messrs. Varela and Uriarte were loyal supporters of the WIGWF." Miranda, op. cit., p. 5.

ample tracts, planted to sugar and corn or used as grazing land. These tracts had been leased to tenants making periodic remittances in kind on a share basis. Agricultural laborers also contributed toward making this region productive, being compensated in cash, in produce, or in some combination of the two.

9. Some of the hacenderos had come by their land in questionable fashion. Miranda stated, and other interviewees confirmed his allegation, that land-grabbing was not uncommon. By one means or another, the large landowner had succeeded in extending his own boundaries at the expense of his helpless neighbors. Litigation was always a long-drawn-out costly affair; and in such contests, the wealthy litigant had a good chance of obtaining a favorable decision.

Sometimes, the large landowners resorted to the practice of luring their neighbors' carabaos onto their own property. The farm animals would undoubtedly cause some damage. The cunning hacendero would multiply the damages incurred in his estimate, present a claim which in all likelihood could not be met by the indigent small-holder, institute suit for collection, and would obtain part of the neighbor's property in recompense.

Such fraudulent practices, together with the underpaying and sometimes non-payment of the farm laborers on the sugar plantations, stirred up over the years a smarting sense of resentment by the underprivileged against the large-holders. These murmurings always remained amorphous, finding expression only sporadically. The discontented never organized a movement for agrarian relief, much less a full-dress political movement as did their counterpart in Central Luzon. Nevertheless, the hatred was there ready to erupt.

Among the large-holders of West Leyte, none were more hated than the Mejia and Tan families in the Ormoc-Merida districts. Over the years, these clans evinced signal disregard for personal dignity and material well-being of the tenant farmers and farm laborers under their control. No wonder then that with the sundering of the normal social bonds and the removal of the inhibitions of custom, following the Japanese invasion, the big landlords, and in particular the members of these two clans, dwelt in mortal fear of the security of their properties and persons.

In the first few months after the invasion, many of these hacenderos looked to the Japanese for protection. They felt that their lives were in constant jeopardy. Sabelino (Miranda's Executive Officer in the early days and later Deputy Chief of Staff of the WIGWF) affirmed that the Mejias and Tans went to the Japanese out of fear of tenant vengeance. And Bonifacio Capuyan (Sector Commander of Merida and last Chief of Staff in the WIGWF) related that he had information directly from the tenants of Mejia that the hacendero fed the Japanese garrison during the early period.

Illustrative of this pall of fear overhanging the wealthy is the story of one, Tayag, former cashier in the Ormoc sugar central. According to Miranda (and confirmed by some of his officers), Tayag organized a guerilla outfit from among the former sugar workers in the sugar central and blackmailed some of the wealthy into contributing to his unit on pain of punishment as "pro-Jap". The manager of the sugar central, a prudent gentleman, regarded it as a sound investment to buy protection from Tayag. Tayag died during the early days of the resistance movement, but he helped to create a precedent.

When the Japanese garrisons were temporarily withdrawn from the municipalities of Western Leyte (with the exception of Ormoc), some of the frightened landlords fled to Tacloban, Manila, or other places in the

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Disaffection towards some of the landlords centering in the Ormoc-Palompon-Villaba district had long been smouldering. When the Japanese invaded Leyte, most of the larger land-holders either remained in the towns directly under Japanese supervision" or migrated to the "provincial capital, Tacloban. These absentee landlords expected their tenants to continue remitting that portion of the produce regularly assigned as rent payment. In the main, the tenants did not comply.

There were several reasons why the tenants withheld rental payments due the landlords. As already mentioned, many had long nursed a savage resentment against the cupidity of the property owners. The time was now ripe for liquidating" their obligations by completely extinguishing the title of the legal owners to their properties. Failing that, a moratorium on rent payments could be declared. Who was there to enforce the claims of the "outraged" landlords? By refusing, in the main, to cast their lot with the resistance movement, they had forfeited the patronage of the guerrilla leadership.

The views of the tenants and the military did not completely coincide, but they concurred in obstructing legal redress by the landlords." The military were especially concerned with subsidizing the troops. Flight by the landlords, their managers and foremen might disorganize production and curtail output. Maintenance of production at a high level was a dominant goal of guerrilla policy." If this could be accomplished by the granting of certain concessions to the tenants--well and good. However, the military authorities did not contemplate abandonment of the landlord's equity in the harvest to the actual reapers. While the guerrillas scrupulously abstained from vacating existing legal titles and from promoting either wholesale land redistribution or collective farming they did not withdraw from constituting a sort of receivership, and administering the properties as they saw fit.

The military raised another serious objection to forwarding crop shares to the pre-war owners! Residing in the towns where severe food stringency obtained, the landlords were tempted to sell their produce to the townsmen or to food speculators at handsomely inflated prices, or, worse still, this produce might be bought or seized by the Japanese military administration. Transfer of foodstuffs to the landlords under such conditions would puncture the guerrilla-imposed "blockade clamped upon the occupied towns of Leyte " and thus nullify an important weapon in the arsenal of resistance."

The Western Leyte Guerrilla early determined that military expediency

Visayas. Among them were the Mejias and Tans. In each of these clans, some murders occurred--with the murderers escaping unidentified. Since these men lived within the zone of the WLGWF, and since their abandoned estates were taken over by the WLGWF, what was more simple than to link the name of Miranda with these murders. Miranda categorically denied the charge that he plotted these homicides in cold blood in order to acquire coveted properties. He argued in extenuation of these deeds: (a) that the Mejias and Tans collaborated with the enemy; (b) that the deeply ingrown revulsion of the mistreated peasants against these grandees, a condition these clans were well aware of and made no effort to allay, made revenge almost a certainty once the ties of social discipline had been"relaxed.

would prevail over all considerations of proprietary rights. An order issued towards the close of 1942 reflected the guerrilla resolve that Filipino foodstuffs would not fall into the breadbaskets of the Japanese army:

1. All landowners or persons in charge of haciendas are hereby ordered to evacuate the produce of said lands within 30 days from this date of notice.

2. Failure to comply this order, such produce will be confiscated for use of the guerrilla forces.

3. The sector and sub-sector commanders are hereby ordered to execute this order.¹⁰

The development of guerrilla policy in Western Leyte towards abandoned estates is indicated in another general order:¹¹

1. Due notice is hereby published that all owners of haciendas must take charge of their estates and receive orders from the officer

10. Saco. 30 Nov. 1942. General Order No. 5-a.

11. Where cultivation continued during the absence of the landlord, the sector commander temporarily assumed the functions of the landlord. The supply officers of the regiments and smaller units would oversee the production, requiring that the tenants meet the orders emanating from the GHQ. And when it came time for the regular collection of rents, the landlord's share was taken by the guerrilla. This did not release the tenants from any responsibilities incumbent upon them for assisting the guerrilla from their own stock.

Where the estates were abandoned in the complete sense, remaining idle, the WLGWF took over their complete management. Ramon Advincula was appointed as Administrator of Abandoned Estates. This entailed the job of labor superintendent. It was his responsibility to recruit laborers to work the land and also to mill the rice. Forest concessions controlled by the absentee property-owners were also under the jurisdiction of Advincula. Most of the labor on these estates was unpaid. Work here was looked upon as a civic responsibility, and it was by representing it in this light that the barrio lieutenants helped Advincula recruit his field hands. Perhaps the bulk of the laborers were members of the Volunteer Guards, assigned on special detail to this chore and working in shifts. Additional manpower was gotten from the guerrilla concentration camp for political and war prisoners and also from the municipal jails. By doing constructive labor, the prisoners defrayed the cost of their keep. In addition, idle public lands of all kinds might be put to the plow.

In this manner then, were the idle properties operated. The innovations were purely matters of expediency, not guided by social doctrine. No doubt many of the tenants were pleased by the development. Many of them felt as though they were now the owners and that the levies upon their produce were merely communal taxes, in whose disbursement they would have a beneficial interest--and not simply rent payments. Perhaps if the Occupation had lasted longer, these temporary arrangements might have crystallized into new patterns of land tenure. The chief economic legacy of this period is something intangible. The underprivileged elements of Western Leyte saw the properties of hated hacenderos utilized for a communal purpose. If this was possible in war, why not in peace? Should economic conditions deteriorate at some future date to a point where the discontented are goaded into organizing an agrarian reform party, a precedent will be available for social action.

in charge of the Food Production Campaign.

2. Failure to cultivate their haciendas after 30 days from the time of the publication of this order, said haciendas will be administered by the Guerrilla Forces and administrators will be appointed to take charge of these neglected estates. This command will exercise the general power provided for in the Constitution of the Philippines to this effect and Emergency Power vested in the Chief Executive in this period of emergency.¹²

The legal foundations for the land policies of the WIGWF, referred to in the order just quoted, have been expatiated upon by its Judge Advocate General:

"Proceeding upon the idea of the Western Leyte Guerrilla Warfare Forces being a 'de facto' entity, the organization officiously took over the administration of the estates of absentee landlords. This action of the WIGWF finds legal bases in two statutes subsisting under the Commonwealth Government of the Philippines, i.e., the Civil Code and the Emergency Powers Act. Under the provisions of the Civil Code, any person may officiously take over the administration of an abandoned property of another, subject to such rules and regulations imposed by law in the matter; under the Emergency Powers Act, there is a specific provision which authorizes the President of the Philippines to take over the administration of idle and abandoned lands even though the owner thereof is present. It was the settled policy of the WIGWF to continue in operation the subsisting laws of the Commonwealth Government of the Philippines, and to promulgate only such rules and regulations for the internal government of its organization as were expedient and advisable under the circumstances."¹³

As legatee of the emergency powers reposed in the President, the WIGWF proceeded to promulgate its agrarian program.¹⁴ So long as the absentee landlord was not, from the guerrilla standpoint, treasonably aiding and

12. J. Ibabo, "27 Jan. 1943. General Order No. 8.

13. Statement of Atty. Victorino C. Teleron, *op. cit.*

14. A memorandum from Divisional headquarters to one of the regimental commands clarified guerrilla policy in administering abandoned estates:

"It is the policy of the WIGWF that Abandoned Estates should be administered and supervised, such that the estates can be made productive.

"Administrator or Encargado of every estate is appointed by the General Headquarters. In this case, you recommend the name of the Encargado for appointment. A certain percent commission is given to the Encargado which is determined by the Chief, Civil Affairs; however, it does not exceed ten percent.

"The product of the Abandoned Estate, after deducting the share of the tenant as well as that of the Encargado is intended for the Army; however, it should be covered with requisition and be supported with reports if withdrawn." Lt. R. Advincula, Chief, Supply-Labor Administration. 3 Aug. 1943. To: Lt. Reforzado, In Charge, Supply-Labor Administration, 6th Inf. Regt.

Some of the guerrilla units inclined at first towards the outright confiscation of abandoned properties. The civil authorities of Albura complied with the Memorandum of the Regimental Adjutant, 6th Infantry of the WIGWF, In the Field, requesting the Municipal Council to pass a resolution."

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abetting the enemy, his equity in the properties remained. The Judge Advocate General denied that a confiscatory policy prevailed.

Of the produce of said haciendas pertaining to the owners thereof, only 15% thereof was taken for the subsistence of the soldiers of the WIGWF, and a corresponding receipt was issued therefor to the respective administrators.¹⁵

The guerrilla authorities encouraged the migration of loyal Filipinos from the enemy controlled areas to the unoccupied districts. In Western Leyte, this policy meant specifically the evacuation of the town proper of Ormoc, and removal to the mountainous interior, outside the control of the Japanese garrison. Townspeople complying with this policy found themselves uprooted from their source of livelihood, and sometimes verging on starvation. To alleviate their hardships, cultivation of the abandoned estates seemed a sensible expedient. But difficulties arose in the course of trying to settle upon a fair basis of tenure. Should idle lands be partitioned, and small holdings be assigned to the landless in a grand redistribution? The guerrilla government could not approve such a step. Paternalism was permissible--not the extinction of property rights.

The authorities finally adopted a compromise measure which, while bringing relief to the necessitous, kept clear of drastic populism. Barrio lieutenants received the following instructions:

Evacuees should be given a little parcel of land to till. Arrangements should be made with the respective landowners or tenants so that they can plant something to live on. It should be understood that lands cultivated by them will be held temporarily and they will be returned to the proper owners as soon as the war is over. Lands

.. and "Resolved As It Is Hereby Resolved, that all real estate and other properties abandoned by any owner since the beginning of the Guerrilla, will be confiscated by the Government and will be turned over to the proper military authority so that the products or money produced from the abandoned properties will be used for the support of the WIGWF in the Field until the end of this Warfare." Municipal Council of Albuera [P. C. Calabia, Mun. Secty.] June 21, 1943. Resolution No. 19.

15. "As to the system of administration of abandoned estates of absentee landlords," Teleron went on to explain, "care was taken to preserve as much as possible the property rights of the owners thereof. In my capacity as the then Civil Affairs Officer, I took charge of the appointment of administrators. The Hacienda Casila of Pto. Bello, Merida, Leyte, was entrusted to Mr. Rodolfo Abanes, a relative of the Mejias [the owner]; the hacienda of Martinez at Curba and Margen, Ormoc, was administered by his son-in-law, Mr. Agapito Asturias; the hacienda of Dr. Luis Espina at San Jose, Ormoc, was administered by Mr. Necessito, assisted by the old administrator, Mr. Uldarico Conejos; the hacienda of the Escanios at Valencia was administered by the old administrator thereof, Mr. Elpidio Magalona; the hacienda of V. De Torres was administered by her son-in-law, Dr. Wenceslao Pongos, now mayor of Ormoc; and the hacienda of Vicente Torres was entrusted to his old administrator, Mr. Manuel Tan." Statement of Atty. Teleron, op. cit.

to be assigned to them should be vacant and workable.¹⁶

Cultivation of every square inch of unused land--that was the guerrilla objective. By establishment of community plots, to be worked by available manpower, the authorities turned to the public employees and officials to set an example.¹⁷

Draft animals, an indispensable element in Filipino cultivation, were not everywhere available. A memorandum from guerrilla headquarters offered a way out.... "You may request cooperation by borrowing carabaos during days when the owners do not need them."¹⁸

Outside the zone of the WIGWF, the largest landed holdings in Leyte were found in the Villaba-San Isidro district and on the Island of Biliran. (Needless to say, individual estates of large dimension are scattered throughout the Province.) These areas were under the effective control of the 95th Infantry Regiment of Major Balderian until the latter part of 1943, when the Japanese restored the local puppet administrations to their respective municipalities. The principal source of policy was Captain Pamanian, of the 1st Battalion.

As a pioneer organizer in North-West Leyte, Pamanian (a pre-war Philippine Army Sergeant in the quartermaster department) decided upon a policy of attraction towards the hacenderos. He himself was a resident of the Capocan-Carigara district, and believed that he understood the psychology of the wealthy. He avoided generally the allocation of fixed contribution quotas, leaving to the individual's impulse of generosity the actual determination of the size of the contribution. He was aided by the fact that few of the hacenderos abandoned their estates and fled to Tacloban or beyond the provincial limits. Therefore, there was no question in the main of taking over vacant estates and cultivating them for troop subsistence (with the resultant rumors of confiscation, as in the case of Miranda's WIGWF).

As long as the landholders supported his troops and maintained contact

16. By order of the Comdg. Off., Briguez. [Miranda] Nov. 28, 1942. Memo. No. 7. To: All Sector and Sub-Sector Commanders, Par. 3, Sec. (b).

17. "The Barrio Tenientes and Cabiellas, Military Policemen, Rural Policemen, and Municipal Teachers were urged to establish communal plots in their respective places, and even the Women's Auxiliary Service were also urged to have gardens for the use of themselves and the Government. The children are also urged to establish home gardens for their own use." F. R. Refordazo, Prob. 3rd Lt., QMS, In Charge, Food Production, Albuera Sector. April 1, 1943. "Report for the last 16 days of March, 1943." To: Lt. Ramon Advincula, Chief Food Production.

According to "Military Mayor" Barte of Albuera, an element of compulsion was introduced into the promotion of community planting, and the people responded energetically.... "Every barrio is required to have a communal plot to be planted to different crops or vegetables, the produce of which goes mostly to the army. Some communal plots have already been planted." E. Barte, Mil. May., Albuera. "Report of Civil Affairs for March, 1943." To: Gen. Briguez through Maj. Daffon, CO, 6th Inf.

18. By command of Brig. Gen. Briguez (Jose T. Ibabo, Maj., AGS). July 7, 1943. Memo to: Commanding Officer, LFSO. [Note: LFSO, may be Land Force Service Organization.]

with his operatives, Pamanian was disposed to wink at any transgressions that suggested collaboration with the enemy.¹⁹ He realized very well that if the individual property holder was to escape apprehension by the Japanese as a guerrilla sympathizer, he would have to pretend cooperation with the New Order. And the landholders demonstrated surpassing adroitness in this dissembling. To be fully accurate we must grant that some of the hacendados were inwardly indifferent as to the final outcome of the struggle, being concerned almost exclusively with the preservation of their holdings. Indeed, their guerrilla donations were more in the nature of "life insurance," intended to ward off liquidation by the guerrilla "hatchetmen." Moreover, since north-west Leyte was comparatively free of Japanese troops until 1944, there was less of a feeling of urgency among the guerrilleros of this zone than in the WIGWF. The espionage activities of the pro-Japanese were less intense, and the guerrilleros were inclined to be less suspicious of the goings and comings of the civilian population.

19. Leyte municipality was one of the communities where large land-holdings existed. There was a close alliance between the municipal government and the hacendero families. The mayor, Enrique Granados, owned a 400 hectare estate. The municipal secretary, Nestorio Delantar, was related to Juan Delantar—the latter, owning about 1,000 hectares! For the guerrilla, this was very fortunate. So long as they pursued a program of respect for private property rights, and they did by and large, the guerrillas were the recipients of the landowners' bounty. As mayor, Granados organized the civilian Volunteer Guards, and instructed them to transport the civilian contributions to guerrilla headquarters!

In San Isidro, too, were large land-holders producing grain, with numerous tenants holding under them. The abundance of foodstuffs available made export to other sectors, as well as outside the Province, possible, thereby fostering a fair measure of prosperity when other municipalities were experiencing a financial stringency. The populace tended to be in an optimistic frame of mind, making them more disposed to throw in their lot with the guerrilla. Capt. Pamanian acknowledged generous contributions to the subsistence of his troops from the hacenderos Martinez, Alvarez, Muertique, Aguilar, and others!

On Biliran Island, Capt. Corpin and Lt. Juan Granados received ample provisions for the local detachments. When Maj. Javelosa was given direct oversight of Biliran Island (Javelosa had been CO of the 81st Div. CM, USAFFE, in Lanzo, Mindanao, at the outbreak of the war), he succeeded even further in winning the confidence of the land-holders. Garamendi, possessing 3,000 hectares in Naval and Biliran municipalities, gave 300 sacks of rice and corn at each harvest. Alberto Enage with 500 hectares in Biliran municipality, Madraso with 300 hectares in Caibiran, and in Kawayan, Manderson and Manalot with 200 and 250 hectares respectively all gave openly. It is irrelevant here to endeavor to assay motivation.

Although there were relatively few instances of spoliation in north-west Leyte the record of the guerrilla was not unblemished. Perhaps they had less need to resort to "holding up" the wealthy for large donations in view of their "absorbing" with funds from the municipal treasuries. Maj. Javelosa estimated that approximately P25,000 were taken from the various municipal treasuries of Biliran Island in 1942-43, in addition to monies from Leyte municipality, Sarago, Carigara, etc. This is not to suggest that these monies were fraudulently employed by these guerrilla leaders for troop subsistence was an expensive proposition. But it partially explains the "go-easy" policy adopted towards the land-holders.

Enforcement of cultivation also was policy within the jurisdiction of Colonel Kangleon. The Municipal Council of Bato required:

The landowners to cultivate and to plant their agricultural lands, and confiscating those which lie uncultivated until the lapse of "time specified, and penalizing those who violate the said ordinance."²⁰

More specific in its application of sanctions, the poblacion of Libagon forced

every owner of agricultural land to put it to cultivation within a certain time limit during this time of emergency; uncultivated land shall be taken from the respective owner by the municipal government and same shall be given to person or persons designated by the Municipal Council as tenants; no share of the produce thereof shall be given to the owner of confiscated land; and penalizing those who disturb the possession of the land after same has been confiscated."²¹

Responsibility for the plowing of idle lands in the main was delegated to local authorities. However, the provincial officials were ordered to intervene directly in the furtherance of this food-raising campaign. The Provincial "Food Administrator and Agricultural Supervisor" received the specific instruction that "idle areas may be given to other persons if the owners do not cultivate them."²²

Closely associated with the land-use program, the full and judicious employment of available manpower came in for emphasis! An individual not serving with the guerrilla combat forces and not engaged in productive endeavor was a drag upon the community. An embattled community would not tolerate drones! A series of promulgations took up the question of idle manpower and sought to divert it into useful channels!

The WIGWF determined that "vagrancy should be wiped out from this sector; they [the idle] should be put to work."²³

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20. Provincial Board of Free Leyte, Oct. 26, 1943. Ordinance 19, current series, of Bato approved in Resolution 288 of 30th Session. Also see: Ordinance 20 under Resolution 93CS of Maasin, as approved by Resolution 282 of the Provincial Board of Free Leyte, "causing all agricultural lands within the municipality of Maasin to be cultivated." Resolution 64, cs, of Matalom, as approved by Res. 255 of Prov. Bd. of Free Leyte "requiring all barrio lieutenants to submit a report of all uncultivated land in their respective districts to the Mayor to determine if they are to pass an ordinance enforcing the owners or other interested persons to cultivate these uncultivated lands." An intelligence report of the 94th Inf. Regt., dispatched to Divisional G-2 on Oct. 17, 1943, attested to the success of this campaign: "Vacant lands are now being used."
21. Provincial Bd. of Free Leyte, Ordinance 12, cs., of Libagon, approved in Res. No. 245.
22. R. K. Kangleon, Col. 4 Feb. 1944. Memo: All Prov. Govt. Officials, Par. 3(c)
23. F. R. Reforzado, Prob. 3rd Lt., in charge of Food Production & Labor. 25 Feb. 1943. To: The Adj. Gen., GHQ, WIGWF, par. 4a.

Tillable land received most of this shiftless element.²⁴

All citizens carried community obligations, renderable in the form of public services. Combatting insect pests constituted an important activity at a time when diminution of the harvest meant reduction of guerrilla fighting potential. In Albuera according to its mayor,

Every person from the age of 16 to 60 years may, meaning 'must' campaign for hoppers or flyers only once a week. The campaign should be by the pakyao system at the rate of 1 petroleum can dead or killed hoppers or flyers for every 2 persons.²⁵

Men qualified by occupational training to render special services to the community might be called upon to do so. The cocheros (the hackmen) were occasionally impressed by the army to haul materials or for transport of personnel on trips dictated by military necessity. In Bato, the drivers felt that their labors were being over-taxed, and accordingly memorialized the Provincial Board to intercede in their behalf:

While the cocheros of Maasin and other towns have not been required to serve the army regularly, the cocheros of Bato gladly offer to serve the army for each tartanilla twelve hours every two weeks with the limited passengers of four persons for each tartanilla, excluding the driver, for every trip.

That to avoid commandeering or duplicity in the service, the cochero be furnished with service cards as identification that the latter has already rendered his appointed service as per schedule, and that he be exempt to serve the army until his day of service comes again, unless in extreme emergency.

Important: That the cochero submit to continuous service and commandeering, as we deem it a duty and honor to serve our army, our people, and our country, only in extreme necessity as for example in case of war or chaos!

That during peace time, the further abuses as aforesaid be stopped or curtailed.²⁶

The Provincial Board resolved to forward the petition to Colonel Kangleon for his decision.

A thorough-going conscription of manpower was never put in effect under the guerrilla regime. Compulsory service rendered was looked upon as a levy in kind, a species of commuted tax payment.

24. Non-employment of able-bodied men meant not only wastage of sorely needed productive power. The slothful were wont to devote their leisure to drinking and then on becoming intoxicated, harassed the sober, hard-working portion of the population. With the view of eliminating drunken fracas and other breaches of the peace, the authorities instructed the MPs and rural police--"do not give up searching for idle but troublesome persons in your neighborhood." Benjamin C. Barte, Chief, MP Force of Batog. Dec. 20, 1942. Instruction No. 19 at 2nd meeting of military and rural police.

25. Mayor Epitacio Barte. 3 Dec. 1942. To: Mr. Robin Hood, Military Adviser, Sherwood Forest. Regulations of this type antedated the war.

26. Provincial Board of Free Leyte, Resolution No. 181, Par. 1-4.

To sum up, we find the guerrilla leadership verbally pledged to reconstitute Leytean society in its pre-war design, but pressed by circumstances into making piecemeal modifications. The removal of a considerable proportion of the landlord class from the resistance area and their identification more or less with collaboration disposed the guerrilla leadership to bar the landlords from rent collection. On the other hand, the guerrilla emphasized the doctrine, by deed rather than by theoretical formulation, that property is vested with a public interest, and that private rights therein, if not extinguishable, are subject to far-reaching control. Communal cultivation of abandoned estates, guerrilla dictation to farmers of a planting policy, and the laying of claim by guerrilla sector leaders to rents not paid to landlords constituted impressive inroads on the traditional sanctity of private ownership. In short, resistance, requiring the subordination of private to public interest, established precedent of uncertain potency for postwar economic and social reorganization.

Regulation of Commerce

We have said that guerrilla preoccupation with subsistence led to control of supplies at the source. But that was not enough. The problem remained of directing a steady flow of foodstuffs and other vital commodities to the public markets, where they would be available at reasonable prices for army and civilian consumption. We are led, therefore, to examine three topics, closely related to one another; the general supervision of commerce by the guerrilla, the control of prices, and the regulation of currencies.

In Leyte, as elsewhere in the world, a portion of the commercial class was intent upon pursuing a "business as usual" policy. To a certain extent, they were frustrated both by the Japanese military administration in the occupied zones of the Province, and by the guerrilla authorities in the free zones. The most astute businessmen frequently succeeded in circumventing these controls. Some were detected in their attempted evasions and were penalized with varying degrees of severity.

As their primary objective, the guerrilla-devised controls sought to prevent leakages of supplies to the occupied areas where they might be appropriated by the enemy.²⁷ Within the Western Leyte zone, a variety of restrictions encumbered trade. Commercial dealings with the town proper of Ormoc, nucleus of Japanese activities on the West coast of Leyte, were strictly forbidden.

27. The puppet Governor reported grievously: "... People can't ply trades such as merchandising from one place to another. Bandits confiscate products brought from farms to poblacion" to prevent people from transporting goods...." B. Torres, Prov. Gov. Dec. 21, 1942. To: Japanese Military Adm. for Dist. of Visayas.

Torres was obliged to admit the effectiveness of the blockade: "People in the poblacion cooperating with the administration and the Japanese are the ones that suffer. When they can no longer suffer, they are forced to go to the barrios and the mountains, not because they want to join, but as a matter of life and death." B. Torres, Prov. Gov. Mar. 1, 1943. To: Cmdr., Dist. of Visayas, "Jap. Imp. Forces.

Once outside of Leyte, the enterprising merchant might succeed in evading the guerrilla commercial net, and trade with the forbidden areas of Leyte--especially Ormoc and Tacloban. But the risk involved in such enterprise was great. Not only did the violator face guerrilla detection, with punishment of confiscation, fine, imprisonment, or a combination thereof. In addition, his small craft might be overhauled by a Japanese patrol boat. If it were discovered that he had been provided with guerrilla papers or that he was not using the prescribed Japanese currency, woe betide him. And if he had been resourceful enough to buy or forge collaborationist credentials and to carry with him a supply of Japanese currency, he had no guarantee that the Japanese patrol might not confiscate his entire consignment as spoils of war.

With each other, and with the barrios of Ormoc, the unoccupied municipalities might carry on normal intercourse. Under the title of "Inter-Town Trade", a general order from the WLGWF outlined the prevailing policy and designated the local officials responsible for seeing the said policy through:

Civilians from the municipality of Baybay, Albuera, Merida, Palompon and the barrios of Ormoc (Town excepted) are hereby permitted to trade in foodstuffs and other necessities of life.

Sector and Sub-Sector Commanders or their authorized representatives must issue necessary rules and regulations, after consulting the Municipal Officials or Anti-Profiteering Committees, to protect the best interest of the civilian consumers.

Provision is hereby made that this inter-town trade be limited to local commerce and not to include inter-island commerce until necessary orders will be issued to this effect.

Exception is hereby made that products and articles coming from other towns not specifically mentioned herein and from other island provinces are free to enter but products coming from towns above mentioned cannot be exported until blockade be lifted.²⁸

Violation to any of the foregoing provisions and other rules and regulations hereafter issued by the Sector or Sub-Sector Commanders will be dealt with severely.²⁹

Flexibility on the part of the military command, consideration for local need, is evident in the provision for consultation with municipal officials prior to the promulgation of orders. Moreover, since the west coast was not self-sufficient, it was the part of wisdom to permit unilateral imports from other provinces, even while enforcing an export embargo.

To wipe out more effectively illicit commerce, the WLGWF created a special office, functioning under the control of regimental intelligence:

There is created in every municipality the Office of Harbor Inspectors, under supervision of the Regimental S-2. The unit will perform the following missions:

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28. Writing to the then Lt.-Col. Peralta on July 5, 1943, Maj. Soliman, Chief of Staff of the WLGWF, said: "Trading between towns is allowed, but exportation of foodstuffs to other places is prohibited."
 29. Command of Brig. Gen. Briguez (Jose T. Ibabao, Capt. Inf., Adj. Gen.), 31 Dec. 1942. Gen. Orders No. 18, Par. 7-11.

- a. To police the coast lines where boats can dock and sail.
- b. To enforce all orders pertaining to the blockade.
- ... e. To utilize trusted sailors to procure war materials for the use of our forces, like ammunition, medicine, powder, etc....³⁰

Between the areas controlled by Kangleon and Miranda respectively, trade was desultory, affected by relative needs and the ebb and flow of antagonisms. The "Baybay Affair" of August, 1943, brought a tightening of frontier regulations as a counterpart of intensified hostility and suspicion! Trade between Baybay and the southern communities virtually ceased. A report of the 94th Regiment to Colonel Kangleon's Headquarters noted that "Capt. Conopio³¹ recently issued an order prohibiting the civilians, especially the Chinese merchants, to bring"corn or palay to Inopacan and other [towns] in South Leyte."³²

Trade between Baybay and Burauen, across the central mountain range of Leyte did not bulk large during the war period. On the other hand, according to the testimony of Pamanian, CO of the 1st Battalion, 95th Infantry Regiment, no damming up of goods between San Isidro and Villaba on the one side and Palompon and the Ormoc barrios on the other side occurred. The WIGWF needed the foodstuffs grown in the cereal bowl, under the jurisdiction of Kangleon's division, and in return offered commodities desired by the others.³³ The main commercial difficulty between the two organizations arose out of the refusal on the part of the WIGWF to accord transit privileges for traffic proceeding" between the district of the 94th Regiment, and that of the 95th, separated by the Miranda territory. Miranda feared the political and military consequences inherent in a "corridor" and steadfastly rejected all overtures looking to that end. The traversing of the Provincial Road by a detachment of the 94th Infantry, en route from Inopacan to Abuyog, via Baybay, violated the "sovereignty" of the WIGWF domain, and constituted the opening shot of the "Baybay Incident".

30. Sulla. 9 Sept. 1943. General Order No. 80.

31. Capt. Conopio headed the Baybay Regiment of the WIGWF after the ouster of Capt. Rodriguez.

32. S2, 94th Inf. Regt. 29 Oct. 1943. Report to: CO, 92nd Div.

33. Capt. Pamanian asserted that San Isidro, as an exporter of cereals, became an important factor in the provisioning of the WIGWF zone, via Palompon. Transit through Barrio Limon and the "Ormoc Corridor" to Capocan to purchase fish and other commodities was a regular procedure for Ormoc civilians! Had he shut the Corridor, Pamanian stated, he might have brought about considerable hardship for these people of the WIGWF, if not complete strangulation of their economic life!

To balance the picture, we must note the testimony of Pamanian's assistant, Lt. Guevara, that the WIGWF supplied Pamanian with consignment of ammunition to augment the limited output of Pamanian's own ordnance shop.

"Maj." Francisco Corres of the Baybay sector and Mayor Eduardo Bugho of Burauen (under the 95th Regt.) also maintained amicable relations. See: (a) E. Bugho, Mayor, Burauen. 27 Apr. 1943. To: Lt. Col. Balderian, CO, E. Ley. Sec." (b) A. Balderian, Maj. Nov. 10, 1943. Letter to: "My dear Gen. Briguez". (c) A. Balderian, Maj. June 10, 1943. Memo for: Atty Rufo Raga.

Enforcement of the blockade provoked considerable ill-will among the merchants whose trade consequently diminished, and also among the consumers, confronted with high prices and a scarcity of needed commodities. An investigation conducted by the Judge Advocate General of the WLCWF on the subject of propaganda adverse to the organization touched upon the general effects of restrictive commercial regulations:

This office has furthermore found out that the much talked of order prohibiting the sale of foodstuffs to persons coming from other provinces or jurisdictions did much to win for us their hostility and unfriendly attitude, instead of their friendship. This ban was, of course, beneficial to the inhabitants of Western Leyte, but actually it did more harm than good, especially insofar as our relations with other provinces are concerned. The sailors (sokayonos) who came here for the purpose of buying foodstuffs, naturally felt aggrieved and when they returned to their respective provinces, they brought bad information about this organization. This situation had a turn for the worse when on one occasion many bancas were ordered tied in all municipalities under this organization. It is said that those who were affected by this order could not forget about it even to the present time.³⁴

Frustrating the efforts of conscienceless merchants engaged the vigilance of the guerrilla and local officials.³⁵ Hoarding became a serious offense. In the Albuera sector, MPs and rural police were directed to

spy upon stocks of rice, corn, dry goods and other commodities in the bodegas of the merchants and producers whom you know to have stored more than what they need for one year's consumption.³⁶

34. Alberto Ubay, Maj., JASy 1 July 1943. To: The Commanding General (through the Adj. Gen.).

35. Dread of individual starvation, not only desire for gain, acted to induce men to lay by necessities. But the caches of the merchant class and larger landholders alone reached serious proportions.

San Isidro was the center of inter-island trade in North-West Leyte. As the granary of the Island, it enjoyed a brisk trade in foodstuffs with Cebu and Bohol. The local guerrilla detachment leader, Higinio Cabiling, undertook to regulate the grain dealings of the landlords. He entertained a lively distrust of their business practices. As he observed the situation, the landlords, if unregulated, would sell to outside merchants in bulk, at prices below the competitive margin of the tenants and small owners. The small dealers, realizing the squeeze put upon them, would be obliged to dispose of their produce to the landlords (as jobbers) at ruinous prices.

Cabiling, according to his own words, was sensitive to the equities of the situation. He determined to end these engrossing practices, which yielded monopoly profits to the landlords. In pursuance of this policy, he assigned marketing quotas to the landlords that made it impossible for them to satisfy the demands of the extra-Island trade. The small producers were thus able to supplement what the big producers offered for sale, disposing of their grain to the merchants rather than the landlords at more satisfactory price schedules.

Francisco Rodriguez, sector leader of the WLCWF in Baybay, complained that the charges of malfeasance directed against him were in large measure the malicious back-biting of the wealthy merchant class, opposed to the regulations of commerce enforced to their disadvantage.

36. See next page.

Most hoarders knew how to cover up "their buying skillfully, and evade detection. They could be checked only through a close scrutiny of the prices they charged when disposing of their hoardings. The military and rural police were advised "to take note and record of selling and buying anything you see."³⁷

In certain instances, the offenders turned out to be not civilian dealers but army officials, sometimes working clandestinely through their families, utilizing the convenience and shelter afforded by their position.³⁸ Strong measures were needed as a deterrent, and they were duly incorporated in an official bulletin:

It has come to the attention of this Headquarters that officers or members of their families are engaged in business for the purpose of controlling the market and even to the extent of violating paragraph 1, Memorandum No. 22, c.s., dated February 11, 1943 on blockade on the sale of foodstuff. Such practice is condemned by this GHQ, for it undermines the attitude of the civilian toward the personnel under this command.

Hereafter any officer or members of his family engaged in business or desiring to engage in business must obtain necessary permit from the GHQ, stating the capital and kind of business, and be subject to the limitations that may be imposed from time to time.

Any officer violating this order will be dismissed from the service.³⁹

Food dealers in Tacloban and other Japanese dominated towns were willing to pay high prices "to the producers and merchants of unoccupied Leyte

36. Benjamin C. Barte, Chief, "MP Force of Batog. Dec. 20, 1942! Inst. No. 9 given to members of military and rural police.

37. Benjamin C. Barte, Chief, MP Force of Batog (as reported to the Hon. Robin Hood! Capt., Albuera Sector Fighting Unit). Dec. 13, 1942. Inst. No. 4 given to members of military and rural police at first meeting of force in Batog.

38. Some of the sub-sector commanders took advantage of their position to mulct commerce for their private benefit. That such license occurred in the Ormoc sector would accord with general hearsay among the civilians of this sector. Noya, subsector commander at Lao, Ormoc,² was a notorious offender in this respect. Traders arriving by sailboat had to pay a "kind of ad valorem customs charge assessed against their merchandise. Likewise those carrying on transactions in the market-place were compelled to pay" a sales tax levied against the value of the produce and commodities. Possibly, a part of this income went to meet the subsistence costs of Noya's detachment. But there is evidence that Noya was a heavy gambler, and that he drew upon the proceeds of these special assessments to cover gambling" losses.

Noya was not a unique practitioner of the art of fleecing merchants. Another sub-sector leader, Cabaag, also contrived a system of levies--although it gained less notoriety, perhaps because the income was devoted almost exclusively to troop maintenance. (Evangelista, military justice of the" peace of Ormoc, and Cpl. Juanito San Jose of the WLGWF, a chemist by profession, are the sources relied upon for this information.)

39. By Command of Brig. Gen. Briguez (C. S. Sabellino, Lt. Col. Inf.² Chief of Staff) 29 March 1943. Bulletin No. 4, Par. 1-3, GHQ, WLGWF.

furnishing them the necessities cut off by the guerrilla-imposed blockade. The temptation to run the blockade was great. "Laws" of supply and demand must not be violated.⁴⁰

In appraising the objection to the exportation of foodstuffs from well-supplied communities, the investigator must reckon with another consideration in addition to patriotic loyalties. Sometimes, localistic selfishness operated to restrain the "have" communities from supplying essentials to the "have-nots".

Captain Erfe's intelligence officer reported:

In my inspection tour, I found some of the civilians in the municipality of Dulag were selling their foodstuffs such as corn and rice to other towns and provinces. I suggest that this business be stopped, otherwise it would mean scarcity of food supplies for us in the future.⁴¹

It would appear that this recommendation for an embargo on merchandising transactions in this case was inspired by anticipation of genuine scarcity" in the future. At any rate, Captain Erfe received the report in this light and directed Dulag's "military mayor" to:

Please advise all merchants, traders, and peddlers and producers in your municipality to cease from selling their merchandise outside to prevent starvation among your people.⁴²

40. Intoy Diaz, of the 2nd Bn., 95th Inf. Regt., was unit commander in the Tacloban sector. For him a cause of perpetual vexation was the behavior of the local civilians. Those living in the interior barrios used to go into town for trading purposes or to purchase necessities. There were two dangers involved: (a) that the farmers selling or trading their foodstuffs in town were indirectly abetting the enemy, inasmuch as it was guerrilla policy to hamper Japanese operations by withholding foodstuffs and supplies from them; (b) that some of the rural people might connive with the enemy by transmitting guerrilla intelligence to Japanese agents, disguised as merchants, in the course of innocent-appearing business transactions. According to one of his former associates, Diaz' policy was to hold civilians presumptively innocent until their deeds belied this presumption. Civilian trucks, transporting supplies to Tacloban, might be fired upon if manned by Japanese guards or Filipino constabularymen.

The reports of the puppet governor of Leyte were replete with references to attacks on trucks made by the guerrilla. Thus, for April, 1943, he wrote:

"Passenger truck ambushed on way, and one passenger killed."

And at the time of the election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention in August, 1943: "... Women voters from the interior could not proceed to Tacloban to vote when passenger truck was attacked by the guerrilla, resulting in the wounding of BC Inspector Cirioce Lucanta." Actg. Gov. Salazar. Report of Activities: April 1-Oct. 31, 1943. To: Com. of Interior thru Dir. of Local Govts.)

41. Lt. T. Apolonio, G-2. 12 Dec. 1942. To: Capt. 9.

42. Capt. 9. 12 Dec. 1942. To: Mayor Bautista.

Nonetheless, trade between Japanese-ruled portions of the Province and Captain Erfe's zone continued. Such commercial mingling carried dangers of anti-guerrilla espionage as well as the more direct disadvantage of draining out locally-needed foodstuffs. The "Major-General" of the citizen's militia undoubtedly had contemplated both dangers when he warned his "brigade commanders":

Bringing of carabaos and palay from one place to another must be stopped. Merchants from Jap-occupied territories must be stopped from going from place to place.⁴³

After Captain Erfe's zone had passed under the jurisdiction of the 95th Infantry Regiment, controls increased in stringency. In the Dulag sector, the militia chief, appealing to the local guerrilla detachment commander, requested

reconsideration of the Memorandum of May 16, 1943--movement of palay from place to place within Dulag being restricted" and that it be revoked, and that this Headquarters [viz., the militia headquarters] be given the privilege of controlling transportation of food within the 3rd Brigade.⁴⁴

The detachment commander reconsidered his restrictive order, relaxed somewhat its severity.⁴⁵ He was not unmindful of the hardships imposed upon the town-dwellers, compelled to travel outside the Poblacion to pro-

43. Brig. Gen. Gallego. 26 April 1943. To: Brigade Commanders.

44. Brig. Villegas, 3rd Guer. Brig. 26 May 1943. To: Capt. Olmedo, CO, "C" Co., 95th Inf. Regt.

45. The revised order was coursed from the Dulag militia commander to his subordinates:

"I am quoting herewith for your information and guidance and strict compliance the letter of the commanding officer of 'L' Company [the re-designated 'C' Co.], 95th Inf. Regt.

'1. In connection with the prohibition of the passing of food-stuff within the Sector of Dulag, strict prohibition should be made in the going out and to the Poblacion.

'2. From one place to another within Dulag, provided not to the Poblacion, should be allowed, especially if they are for home consumption only.

'3. You may give certificate to any person as permission to transport foodstuff from one place to another, provided not to the Poblacion or outside of Dulag, especially where there are Japs, like Tacloban, etc.

'4. To the Poblacion, our civilian population living there may be allowed to take for their home consumption only the following:

5 gantas of corn or rice at a time, but not oftener than every 3 days

5 coconuts a week

1 bottle of oil every 3 days

'5. Please be guided accordingly. (Sgd) Jesus Olmedo, Capt. Inf., Cmdg."

"From the above you will notice that foodstuffs and others should be allowed freely to be transported from one place to another within Dulag, provided not to the Poblacion." E. Villegas, 2nd Lt. Inf., Brig. Comdr., 3rd Guer. Brig., Attached to 95th Inf. Regt. 25 August 1943"

cure foodstuffs. Simple residence within a Japanese-occupied area did not constitute circumstantial evidence of collaboration. However, surveillance was necessary! Hence, the guerrilla limited the number of comings and goings from the town proper to the outlying barrios of a municipality. Travel restrictions moreover reduced the possibility of town merchants buying up foodstuffs of the unoccupied areas for resale to the hungry town population at black-market figures.

Sometimes! food dealers living in the occupied areas, confident of their own standing, had not been compromised to the point of forfeiting approach to the guerrillas, and might petition the latter to allow the ingress of necessities. One of Tacloban's principal merchants turned to the 95th Infantry in an effusive appeal:

Sir:

... I know of your constructive policy of establishing... a period of peace throughout the province with special regard to a free pursuit of life and happiness for the inhabitants thereof with whose association we hope some day to live again that life of the dear old days. Many of us are well aware of the difficulties and privations through which the present Filipino soldiers are undergoing in almost unexplored areas. But we also know that your sacrifice and disinterestedness, with great perils for your own lives are all offered as a sublime holocaust in the altar of unequalled patriotism.

This recognition leads me to think, likewise, in the difficulties of the unknown tao and its family who during the past uncertainties have also suffered. As a matter of fact the population of Tacloban and other occupied territories have for a long time been striving to live on whatever meager produce could be gotten from the narrow strips of land within their reach....

I know that in this struggle a piece of your patriotic heart is also reserved for them....

In view thereof, I am availing of this opportunity to advance the suggestion that a constant supply of rice sufficient to cover the daily needs of the present population of the aforesaid territories be allowed to pass your guards....

Let me inform you, that there is at present constituted in Tacloban an association named 'Leyte Corn and Rice Corporation' (Lecorda), with the aim in view of negotiating, if possible, with the unoccupied towns of the province, in order to exchange with them, those commodities that would be most needed in either side of this our unfortunate predicament. But in order that the purpose sought could be made operative it is necessary that an intelligent contact with you may be established. One link therefore is missing. Please tell me how could we get it.

With the assurance of any high esteem and deepest sympathy for the sacred cause, I remain.⁴⁶

Producers desiring to transport foodstuffs outside the guerrilla-polioed area, ostensibly for the assistance of unevacuated relatives, would apply to the detachment commander for a permit. Should the traveler be stopped thereafter by guerrillamen, he would exhibit his permit as a guarantee of safe-conduct! Unauthorized visits to forbidden territory were undertaken at the risk of capture, liquidation from ambush, or detention and prosecution by

46. Gerardo Villasin, Tacloban. July 29, 1943. To: Col. Alejandra Balderian, (through Maj. Isabelo Centino).

court martial. Trucks of the Leyte Land Transportation, plying the Provincial Road between Tacloban and interior towns, frequently guarded by Japanese soldiers, or by Filipinos of the auxiliary Japanese Constabulary, were fired upon by guerrillamen lying in wait--sometimes with loss of life.

Supplies of locally-grown foodstuffs in southern Leyte were limited. Purchases made by outsiders reduced these already limited stores. To conserve local produce for local consumers, Bato passed an "Ordinance prohibiting persons from outside of this municipality from going to the barrios, mountains, and other places outside of the poblacion with the purpose of buying and purchasing local foodstuffs and penalizing those who violate said Ordinance."⁴⁷

One of the keenly-felt grievances of the southern communities arose from the selling policy of the north-western towns. Towns, such as San Isidro, Villaba and their neighbors, Leyte's granary, found it more profitable to export to other provinces, completely disregarding the miserable plight of their provincial brothers to the south. In desperation these under-supplied communities entreated the Provincial Board to succor them. Regarding their condition sympathetically, the Provincial Board passed the following resolution:

WHEREAS, the food problem is getting more and more acute in the southern coast of Leyte because this region does not bring out sufficient production of rice and corn.

WHEREAS, the products are in great abundance in most municipalities of the North.

WHEREAS, these corn and rice producing towns are exporting to other provinces such products by the thousand cavanese every year.

ALSO, to effect proper control and regulate the exportation of rice and corn to other provinces and to purchase all rice and corn that the province can afford to purchase.

FURTHER: in order to push through the above proposition, to appropriate an initial amount of P10,000 from unappropriated funds to purchase palay and corn direct from the planters of the North and other municipalities and to sell the same to the general public at cost adding, however, the cost of handling, transportation, etc., to the selling price of the same.

FURTHER: to instruct the Food Administrator to look into this matter and act immediately while the possibilities of obtaining these products in the North are open in the view of the present harvest, using the services of the Municipal Treasuries as agencies for distribution in the municipalities.

FURTHER: to request all municipal councils to pass ordinances prohibiting the exportation, of corn and rice to other provinces without previous authority from the Governor, upon recommendation of the Food Administrator.⁴⁸

By the time of the American landings, a more complete centralization of control over commerce had been accomplished. Guerrilla headquarters, directing the flow of foodstuffs, sought to smooth out the disparities in the

47. Prov. Bd. of Free Leyte. August, 1943. Resolution No. 41 approving Ordinance No. 14cs of Bato.

48. Prov. Bd. of Free Leyte. Oct. 23, 1943. Reso. No. 261 passed at 29th Ses.

quantities of consumables available to the populace throughout the Province. A memorandum addressed to the mayors of the southern towns notified them:

A great quantity of corn is for sale in North and North West Leyte; especially in barrios of Bangon, Masis, Tabing, Tabango, and Daja of the municipality of San Isidro.

This Headquarters prohibited farmers in that part of the province to export or to allow the going out of that cereal to other provinces and advised them to sell to people from towns of South Leyte.

You will inform the people of your respective municipalities that corn could be had in the places above-named. They should provide themselves with necessary pass from proper army authorities.⁴⁹

Placing abaca under a strict embargo, the guerrilla authorities were even more inflexible in granting dispensations from the ban on this top-priority war material. At a session of the Provincial Board, Colonel Kangleon was requested to appear

in order to find out if the army's prohibition of the exportation of abaca from Leyte to neighboring provinces could be regulated in such a manner as to allow abaca fiber, locally known as 'escogido' to be sold and exported under conditions that it would not fall into the hands of the Japs. The Commanding Officer stated that abaca fiber is a war material needed by the Jap army. The prohibition of its exportation by the army will stand till revoked by the same authority.⁵⁰

Whenever the possibility existed that valued stocks of war materials and foodstuffs might fall into enemy hands, guerrilla leaders would not hesitate to command their prompt destruction. The imminence of Japanese military operations in Abuyog led Captain Landia to take action:

I ordered the burning of 200,000 kilos of copra deposited by merchants in their bodegas. Some first class abaca evacuated to interior. I ordered immediate shipment of corn to Southern towns and suspended the hauling of foodstuffs to the poblacion. There is but little corn for export in Abuyog as harvest in August are about exhausted.⁵¹

It was the general practice of the guerrillas to curtail or suspend any economic activity which might in any way contribute to strengthening the hands of the enemy. Shipping, such as there was, came in for constant monitoring to reduce the hazard of the Japanese overhauling pro-guerrilla vessels as prizes of war. As the American landings drew nigh, these dangers increased correspondingly. A memorandum addressed to the mayors of Leyte explained: "For lack of bottoms the Japs are commandeering two-masted sailboats, and those big enough which could be used for transporting troops and supplies." As a preventative, therefore, the mayors were ordered to prohibit "owners of big sailboats to ply them to avoid being commandeered by the enemy."⁵²

After the battle of Leyte had gotten under way, sailing risks multiplied.

49. Maj. F. Fernandez. Oct. 10, 1944. For: Mayors of southern towns listed.

50. Prov. Bd. of Free Leyte. Aug. 9, 1943. Minutes of 6th Session.

51. CO of "C" Co., 2nd Bn., 94th Inf. Regt. 27 Oct. 1943. To: CO, 9th M.D.

52. Maj. F. Fernandez. 24 Sept. 1944. To: All Mayors, Par. 3-4.

Colonel Kangleon "to avoid loss of life and properties" finally decided: "Until further orders, no banca or sailboat will be allowed to make trips from Leyte to neighboring islands!"⁵³

Control of Prices

Suppression of profiteering and black market operations together with the adjustment of prices at a level fair to the consumer and reasonable for the producer absorbed a considerable part of guerrilla attention. Prices jumped considerably on essentials immediately that producers and handlers realized the scarcity of the items they had engrossed. Commodity values, in Albura, provided a specimen of those generally prevailing in Western Leyte.⁵⁴ Reporting to the Adjutant General's department, the officer in charge of food production in the Albura sector noted that:

Market conditions of food crops are still high, higher than the prices before the war, especially those dry goods. Campaign for antiprofitteering will be done during this month so that local prices will be lowered.⁵⁵

These conditions obtained, it must be emphasized, a full nine months after the initial Japanese landings, and when the first wild flurry of prices subsided. The optimism over the expected efficacy of an anti-profitteering drive soon faded. A month later, the same officer could only refurbish his hopes:

The prices of agricultural products in this Sector are still high in spite of the anti-profitteering campaign to lower the prices of all products. But we hope to overcome them in the near future.⁵⁶

Attempts to curb run-away prices, based upon appeals to civic responsibility, were unavailing. Profiteering must be made a public offense, with penalties annexed. Albura "prohibited any person engaged in business or merchants selling goods, food commodities, and other articles exceeding the prices fixed by the Anti-Profiteering Committee of this municipality of Albura."⁵⁷

53. R. K. Kangleon. 21 Dec. 1944. To: All Unit Commanders.

54. By the end of 1942, the mayor could state: "Profiteering in this community is already controlled." E. B. Barte, Mun. Mayor, Albura. Dec. 15, 1942. "Report of Civil Affairs from December 1-15, 1942." To: The Cmdg. Off., WICWU. The mayor's sanguine summary turned out to be an inaccurate recording of price trends.

55. F. R. Reforzado, Prod. 34d Lt. (QMS) WIGWF, in charge Food Prod. & Labor, Albura. "Monthly Report for Feb., 1943." To: The Adj. Gen., GHQ, WIGWF.

56. F. R. Reforzado, Prod. 3rd Lt. (QMS) WIGWF. "Report for first 15 days of Mar. 1943." To: The Chief, Food Prod.-Labor, GHQ, WIGWF.

57. Mun. Council of Albura. April 15, 1943. Ord. No. 1, series 1943, Art. 1. An article of the same ordinance imposed upon violators "a fine not less than one peso or not more than five pesos, with imprisonment of not less than one day or not more than five days at the discretion of the court."

This investigator has no information regarding any arraignments for violation of this ordinance.

In executing this mandate, the anti-profiteering committee floundered upon an embarrassing snag. To their dismay, they found that the people "do not care to declare against anybody whenever they are asked by proper authorities."⁵⁸

The military and rural police were also marshalled for the task of rolling back prices.⁵⁹

General Headquarters was not pleased with the headway made. For one thing, the anti-profiteering committee had failed to hold down the soaring prices.

Prices fixed by the Anti-Profiteering Committee are excessively high, thus jeopardizing the interest of the civilians. It is the policy of this Command that these conditions affecting the civilian population should be remedied at once.⁶⁰

Could it be that "peso-a-year men" had volunteered their services for the price-control campaign and remembered their former business associates when fixing price ceilings?⁶¹

58. Reforzado, In Charge, Food Prod.-Labor, Albueria Sector. April 1, 1943. Report to: Lt. Ramon Advincula, Chief, Food Prod. Labor.

59. Benjamin C. Barte, Chief MP Force, Batog. Dec. 24, 1942. Instruction No. 17 for Military and Rural Police.

60. By command of Brig. Gen. Briguez (Usualdo F. Laguitan, 2nd Lt., ACS). Mar. 29, 1943. Memorandum No. 32 to: All Regimental Commanders.

61. The actual composition of the Anti-Profiteering Committee varied somewhat from sector to sector. Generally, both military and civilian representatives were included. In the Ormoc sector, "the sub sector Commander and the barrio Lieutenants within his sub-sector shall be constituted as the Anti-Profiteering Committee to control prices." By order of commanding officer, Briguez. Sgd. Lt. Saco Sabellino. 12 Nov. 1942. Gen. Ord. No. 2 to: All sub-sector Comdrs. and Barrio Lts., Ormoc Sector.

Elsewhere, members of the Municipal Councils and teachers were enlisted. The Anti-Profiteering Committees, by the terms of a general order "to protect the best interests of the civilian consumers" were further charged with recommending appropriate measures to the military commanders for controlling inter-town trade. By command of Brig. Gen. Briguez, Jose T. Ibabao, Capt. Inf., the Adj. Gen. Dec. 31, 1942. General Orders No. 18, series 1942, Par. 8.

Holding down prices of local products would be of small avail unless certain bounds were applied to the price range on imports from other municipalities. Albueria's mayor complained: "Due to the lack of food supplies, goods and articles which are of prime necessities, some people of this municipality has to buy the necessary things from other municipalities, such as soap, etc., from Maasin, food supplies from Ormoc, aside from some traders from other municipalities that will come to sell something. Said goods and articles are purchased in high prices plus expenses. Then naturally those traders can hardly dispose their goods in accordance to the tariff of this municipality." In view of this situation, the mayor recommended the articulation of price controls within the zone of the WLGWF by a "unified tariff, giving slight differences in price for transporta-

(continued on next page)

Resentment of the profit-gougers against business curbs might incite them to action against the inspectors. In the guerrilla dominated outskirts of Ormoc, the civil authorities prudently sought military protection for their agents:

Attached is a list of members of Anti-Profiteering Board and Food Production Campaign.

Request that members working inside that sub-sector be given police protection while performing their duties.⁶²

Miranda stated in interview that he sought to improve the situation by requiring producers in the zone of the WIGWF to dispose of their commodities first to the impoverished mountain people. Moreover, producers were required to hold a varying percentage of their produce in reserve, as a protection against famine or Japanese induced emergency. Whatever remained might be disposed of by the producer in the best market, provided he did not run athwart the stringent security regulations.

From his Carigara headquarters, Major Balderian proclaimed that "prices of all commodities should be as that of the pre-war prices," and authorized the municipal council "to pass an ordinance to that effect."⁶³

Price stabilization edicts were futile without executive enforcement." An "Office of the Anti-Profiteering Officer" was created within the framework of East Leyte's "Politico-Military Government."⁶⁴ The duties of this official involved actual apprehension of violators!⁶⁴

tion expense from one place to another." E. Barte, Mayor, Albuerca. "Report of Civil Affairs for Feb. 1943." [Endorsed, C. Dafford], Par. 2, "Profiteering".

62. L. Taganas, Ormoc Military Mayor. 13 Feb. 1943. To: Commander, Sub-Sector No. 5, WIGWF.

63. Cornel Flores (Sgd. Flores) USAFFE, CO, East Leyte. Nov. 27, 1942.

64. The appointee to this office set forth the risks incidental to discharge of duty:

"I have the honor to request that, in my capacity as an Anti-Profiteering Officer, I be allowed to possess and carry a revolver for my personal protection in the performance of my official duties....

"During these days of rising emergency, I have to travel mostly in the country in order to get in touch with people who are engaged in domestic trade and commerce with a view of apprehending violators. We cannot expect people, especially the recalcitrant and hostile persons, to give us full respect, if we fail to make a good and decent front which carries with it the dignity and prestige proper to an Office Head in the province. It is, therefore, obvious that the nature of my work demands a firearm in safeguarding the interests of the Government...." Vicente F. Jaca, Anti-Profiteering Officer. Feb. 25, 1943. To: The Hon. Politico-Military Governor, Genl. Hq., Leyte Guerrilla Force.

The psychology of the Anti-Profiteering Officer was by no means unsound. In a period of political and moral subversion, the making of a good friend was of supreme importance--whether in relationship between guerrilla leaders and the populace, rival guerrilla leaders, or the Japanese military administration and the subjugated Filipinos. With infinite variations upon the same theme, the self-constituted authorities

(continued on next page)

Too many factors militated against an effective policing of the commodity market. In August of 1943, a guerrilla intelligence report could but grimly repeat the need for price control while naively averring that there "was no reason for the exorbitant prices".⁶⁵

Concentration of Japanese troops in the Tacloban area and the activity of their patrols increased the profitability of trafficking in scarce commodities. Provisioning the short-rationed townspeople of Tacloban yielded rich returns. Sound business sense dictated the diversion of foodstuffs to the forbidden town mart, regardless how acute the needs of the guerrilla troops and the non-collaborating barrio-folk. Such transactions further aggravated the price situation within the guerrilla jurisdiction.

Persisting in his anti-inflationary drive, Balderian nonetheless tacitly conceded defeat. "In view of scarcity of palay and price correspondingly raised," he explained to the procurement officers, "you are allowed to purchase palay from P4 to 4.50 per cavan."⁶⁶

The municipalities of East Leyte were frustrated in their attempt to control prices. In La Paz, the Municipal Council despaired of holding prices at a single line. Amending an earlier ordinance, it staked out the permissible bounds within which prices might fluctuate--an area ample enough to allow increases of 100%. Payments above five pesos per sack were forbidden to the buyer, as acceptance was denied the seller.⁶⁷

Southern Leyte, faced with the substantially same conditions promulgated similar restrictive decrees, comparably ineffective.⁶⁸ Failure of the municipalities to act in concert on this issue constituted a never-ending exasperation. Maasin, instituting its own price-control ordinance, petitioned the Provincial Board to urge its sister-town, Macrohon, to follow suit. Following the prescribed formula, the Provincial Board endorsed the matter to Macrohon

strove to demonstrate that theirs was an over-powering might, but to be employed with restraint and beneficence so long as cooperation was forthcoming.

The request of the Anti-Profiteering Officer was approved: "... his request herein to possess and carry a revolver while in the discharge of the duties pertaining to his office approved." Politico-Military Gov. 25 Feb. 1944. 1st Indor.

65. B. Aguilos, Capt. S-2. Intelligence Report No. 10 of 95th Inf. Regt. for period from August 15 to 31st, 1943.

66. A. Balderian, 95th Inf. 11 Sept. 1943. To: All Procure. Off., 34d Bn.

67. Resolution No. 65: Councilor E. Trinchera proposed that Emergency Ordinance No. 8, current series, fixing the prices of palay and corn to be sold at P3.00 and P2.50 per sack, respectively, be amended and approved as follows: "Municipal Ordinance No. 10--Be It Ordained!...

"Section 1. It is hereby strictly prohibited that any person or persons, association or entity, engaged in selling or buying palay or corn, either for public or private consumption is only allowed to buy or sell such palay or corn at prices ranging from P2.50 up to P5.00 per sack."

See also, Mun. Counc. of La Paz [Antero Trecene, Mun. Secty.] Mun. Ord. No. 10, adopted on 15th day of July, 1943.

68. Res. No. 108 of the Prov. Bd. of Free Leyte, adopted at its 15th Session, Sept. 9, 1943, approving: "Ordinance No. 20, under Resolution No. 99, cs, of Abuyog, fixing prices of foodstuffs and other local commodities and providing penalties for any violation of its provisions.

"for information and consideration".⁶⁹

Price stabilization remained a matter to be pressed in each community, separately. The Provincial Board was in no position to enforce common policy. However, some coordinated policy was unavoidable. The Resolution of the Provincial Board, creating the office of Provincial Food Administrator, vested in him, among other things, responsibility "... to study and find out ways by which price control in each municipality may be effective."⁷⁰

Implementing this plan, the Provincial Board subsequently determined to indorse all:

Price Control Ordinances passed by municipal councils in Free Leyte to the Food Administrator... for him to study cautiously the various prices... in order to check up the prices... and also profiteering. In order to carry out successfully the plan of this Board to furnish all Municipal Councils in Free Leyte with copies of a model ordinance for them to adopt... Further Resolved that the Food Administrator... submit to the Board a proposed ordinance which shall fix and regulate prices of commodities and prohibit profiteering.⁷¹

Foodstuffs were not the only commodities with enhanced price. The various service enterprises, enjoying strong demand, boosted their charges commensurately. Transportation was such an enterprise. The initial Japanese seizure of motor vehicles, bicycles, and carriages followed by occasional guerrilla commandeerings, put a premium on whatever transportation facilities still remained. Owners of tartanillas were quick to hoist their fees.

The citizens obliged to engage the service of hacks forced through some of the municipal councils certain restrictive measures. Inter-municipal travel would remain hampered, however, until uniform regulations had been imposed. Such were the thoughts of the people of Hilongos as their local legislative body besought the Provincial Board "to fix the tariff on tartanillas of these seven municipalities, Inopacan to Macrohon for unification purposes". And the Board seconded the resolution, indorsing "to the municipal councils of the municipalities named, requesting favorable action as they may deem wise in order to bring about the purpose of said resolution."⁷²

Notwithstanding all efforts, exhortatory or punitive inflation did not cease. Striking the same somber chord as their confreres at the other end of the Island, the intelligence officers of the South chronicled: "Price abnormally high. Government efforts to control difficult because of the law of supply and demand."⁷³

69. Prov. Bd. of Free Leyte. Sept., 1943. Resolution No. 163 indorsing Resolution No. 80, cs, of Maasin.

70. Prov. Bd. of Free Leyte, Aug. 30, 1943. Resolution No. 67, Par. 5, adopted at its 10th Session.

71. Prov. Bd. of Free Leyte. Resolution No. 164.

72. Prov. Bd. of Free Leyte. Oct. 26, 1943. Res. No. 294 of Bd. adopted at its 30th Session endorsing Res. 179 cs of Hilongos.

73. S-2, 94th Inf. Regt. "Intelligence Report from Aug. 1, 1943 to Sept. 30, 1943." To: G-2, 92nd Inf. Div.

This "law of supply and demand" became a malevolent demiurge not to be opposed much less overcome. In other words, the cornerings of a limited supply of commodities to be released at scarcity prices by speculators was equated to the self-workings of an iron law.

The collapse of the guerrilla government during the Japanese "mopping-up" campaign at the close of 1943 could only portend an intensification of this condition. Had the military made a determined and sustained effort to punish violators of the published schedule of fair prices, perhaps greater headway at holding down the cost of living could have been achieved. Why did they withhold prosecution and punishment? Dulag's procurement officer suggested the reason:

Prices may be controlled but it is not advisable because if it is done, there is a need of calling the army to help maintain the price; then the people will feel that the army is making too much use of its power, which may result in the lack of confidence of the people of the real purpose of the army.⁷⁴

Any summation of economic affairs in the resistance areas of Leyte would be but careless generalization, unless it could be broken down into specifications of time and place. In north and east Leyte "during the first year of the Japanese occupation, the people have abundant food. The great masses of the people have turned to farming.... Our food supply swelled high with the stoppage of our export."⁷⁵

The guerrilla benefited from the ample supplies of foodstuffs, the people giving unstintingly. In the case of the property-holders dwelling in Tacloban and other town centers, the guerrilla simply appropriated what they needed. "Their carabaos, usually in the hands of their tenants, who usually are guerrilleros themselves, are confiscated.... Rice, corn, and all products of their land go likewise to the guerrilla."⁷⁶

Some fishing and handicraft activities were carried on in this region, but chiefly for barter purposes. The guerrilla discouraged and actively prevented direct trading between the interior municipalities and Tacloban.

In 1943, Japanese patrol activities along the main coastal road out of Tacloban were intensified. Many of the dwellers along this patrol route were caught between the hammer of guerrilla attack and the anvil of Japanese occupation. What the economic situation was in this "borderland" may be judged by a glimpse of Dulag in 1943. A guerrilla procurement officer wrote:

Because of the good understanding between the people of the 'poblacion' and the barrio people, the inhabitants, generally speaking, do not find it risky to go on in the pursuit of their toils. However, because of the presence of the enemy which is synonymous to terror, the people are on the alert always, trying always to escape from the sight

74. Eugenio Villegas, 3rd Lt., Inf., Procurement and Supply Officer, 95th Inf. Regt. (Actg. Mun. Mayor, Dulag). Sept. 10, 1943. To: Prov. Gov., in the Field, p. 4.

75. Potente, op. cit., p. 11.

76. Ibid., p. 5.

of the Japanese whenever they can. They clear the lands with double effort and planting all kinds of crops available.

Financially speaking, approximately 60% of the people have their earning" capacity paralysed. These 60% of the people depend upon the harvest of their crops for their income. But thinking that their earnings is not enough for their own subsistence, they are forced not to sell. Hence the lack of pecuniary income.

Commerce is not extensively carried. Peddlers help the miniature commercial activity.... Of industries engaged--the more extensive is the weaving of abaca cloth." 50% of the manufactured products are exported while the other half is being used by the natives for their own use. Then there is the making of abaca slippers, sandals, mats and hats.

Salt making along the coast is also carried for home consumption.⁷⁷

In west and south Leyte agriculture and handicrafts were carried on largely without direct Japanese interference, but within the limitations imposed by a general"state of war. When the guerrilla auditor arrived in Maasin in September, 1943, after a perilous trip from north Leyte, he found:

Commerce was flowing freely.... Commerce was being carried with Bohol, Mindanao, parts of Cebu and Negros. Commercial sailboats always paraded the seas, day in and day out. The market places in Bato, Maasin and Ichon (Macrohon) were jammed with people; though the prices of commodities have already shown marked increase.... Cotton clothing was sold as high as P5.00 a meter. But prices did not matter much to the people, so long as there were no Japs to bother them.

The principal industry taken up by the people was soap-making, originating from Maasin. One Filipino in that town happened to discover the secrets and techniques of a Chinese soap maker. He lost no time in setting up his own factory of soap. [He used] local materials --lime, ashes of trees cut from mangroves and seashores, and coconut oil. Very soon soap factories grew like mushrooms in Maasin, then to adjacent municipalities. Big quantities of soap were coming out from that region.

A kilo of this soap was being sold in Maasin at that time as low as P.15. They were exported through the Japanese barriers to Manila, Cebu, Negros, Iloilo and Mindanao, and there they commanded prices of as high as P1.00 or over, per kilo. (The fabrication of this soap has been abandoned with the landing of the Americans, because the people found out that the soap brought in by the Americans was far superior in quality to the locally fabricated soap.)

Another industry is the weaving of clothes.... This was principally the occupation of women in Bato, Matalom and other adjacent towns. Ladies who should have been studying in high schools, colleges and universities have taken up hand weaving of abaca clothes this time as their occupation in those regions. Many of them became so expert that to witness them at work, they seemed to move like machines. Some of them could finish as much as 3 rolls a day. The 'ugpak' or crude cloth sold at P3.00 per roll, and the 'pinokpok' (beaten by sticks) or the smooth and finer kinds cost P3.50 to P4.00.

77. Eugenio Villegasq 3rd Lt. Inf., Procurement and Supply Officer, 95th Inf. Regt. (Actg. Mun. Secty., Dulag). Sept. 10, 1945. To: Prov. Gov., in the Field, p. 3.

Another industry taken by the people was the production of salt. This occupation was taken not only by people of Leyte but also in Samar, Bohol and possibly in many provinces. The seashore at that time was lined up with smoking furnaces where the sea water is boiled, and then mixed with coconut milk to purify the salt and make the product crystal white.

There were also the fabrications of abaca slippers, hats, baskets, handbags of different types, originating only from this war.⁷⁸

It should be pointed out that the impetus given to the development of these handicrafts was in large part traceable to the guerrilla authorities themselves. They were determined to expand the supply of goods on hand. This entailed not only the inhibitions on commerce intended to effect a more equitable distribution and assure their own supply, but also the positive stimulation of production. In west Leyte the shortage of clothing was acutely felt. Abaca became the multi-purpose miracle material, used not only in basketry but in cloth-weaving as well. In Baybay the guerrillas encouraged Mayor Tan to bring about the founding of weaving shops--an enterprise that achieved considerable success. Tan asserted that there were fewer than 10 weavers at work when he assumed office and that the figure increased to well over 100.

The guerrilla also encouraged the extraction of salt from sea water by evaporation and the making of soap by combining coconut oil with lime.

1944 brought the Japanese occupation of all Leyte and with it the end of most of these activities. The main guerrilla effort, as far as economic affairs were concerned, was to afford protection for the rice harvesters before Japanese patrols could confiscate the produce. The people in the interior barrios had to keep constantly on the move, using their wits to survive! And in the garrisoned town centers, as described elsewhere, economic activity was virtually in suspension. The resulting extreme state of destitution befalling the people of Leyte was strikingly revealed to the American troops as they drove forward to liberate the Island.

The Problem of Currency

So long as the guerrilla leadership did not adopt a program of general confiscation, it stood in sore need of money. So long as civilian producers in the resistance territories had surplus goods at hand, they too required hard cash. As we have seen, economic life in guerrilla territory did not revert to a system of barter, although direct exchange of commodities constituted an important factor. The convenience of money was perhaps even more generally appreciated because of the increased mobility of the population and the need to convert property into liquid assets.

In this section, we will consider the problems which stood in the way of a prompt settlement of the money question by the guerrilla authorities. We shall discuss the measures they adopted under the circumstances. We will also touch upon two related issues of importance for Leyte's population: (a) the currencies emitted by the guerrilla authorities of neighboring provinces and their reception in Leyte; (b) the need for small change in Leyte in the

78. Potente, op. cit., pp. 11, 28-29. See also: St. John, op. cit., p. 122.

transaction of daily affairs.

But first we must say a word concerning the guerrilla attitude towards the Japanese fiat money. Military notes emitted by the Japanese Military Administration were sternly proscribed within unoccupied Leyte.⁷⁹ In the no-man's land, regions nominally under Japanese control but thinly garrisoned, infrequently patrolled, and subject to guerrilla forays, possession of Japanese money might be deemed prima facie evidence of pro-Japanese leanings. The population dwelling within the penumbra of guerrilla control lived in a state of precariousness. The proximity of Japanese troops and their puppet auxiliaries necessitated the transaction of business affairs in a Japanese monetary medium. Yet, the possibility of guerrilla visitations was a dreadful prospect to those retaining the interdicted currency. Fearful was the dilemma.

A memorandum by a sector commander to the local officials under his jurisdiction spelled out the attitude of the guerrilla towards Japanese currency:

You are hereby directed to stop immediately the circulation of Japanese money in your municipality by advising the people to refrain from accepting it as a medium of exchange! It is contraband of war. All persons who are in possession of any such money shall surrender it immediately to the municipal treasurer who will turn over all collections to the military advisers. All treasurers are advised, when receiving the money of the enemy, to write the names of the possessors and the serial numbers corresponding to the denominations of the money being surrendered without issuing official receipts therefore as publishing the list of persons who have obeyed this order in conspicuous places in the municipality shall be deemed sufficient acknowledgment for reparation purposes in the future. Possessors of Japanese money are given until November 20, 1942 to comply; thereafter, for noncompliance, they will be considered engaged in the furtherance of the enemy's cause.⁸⁰

The average Leyteno if free to do so would spurn Japanese "Mickey Mouse" money. Its nominal value was invariably diminished in any exchange involving pre-war money or emergency notes. Every upswing of civilian morale based upon receipt of encouraging war news or rumors of impending American landings was accompanied by a corresponding depreciation of Japanese-sponsored tender. Even in the occupied areas Japanese money was devalued in clandestine exchanges so that an intelligence report at the close of 1943 could state: "In every occupied area, the exchange is" 1 peso to 2.20 pesos Japanese money."⁸¹

79. In the words of the puppet Governor: "In places dominated by them, they [the guerrillas] force the people to accept emergency notes. When they see Japanese military notes, they destroy them, and punish or kill people for using them...." B. Torres, Prov. Gov. Dec. 21, 1942. To: Jap. Mil. Adm. for Dist. of Visayas. Also, see: Ingham, *op. cit.*, pp. 165-166.

80. Filemon Pabilona, Maj., L.G.F., Sector Cmdr. & Mil. Adviser. 2 Nov. 1942. Memo. To: Mun. Mayors and Treas. of Alangalang, Batatngon, Barugo and San Miguel.

81. Col. R. K. Kangleon. 5 Nov. 1943. Intelligence Report. To: Col. W. W. Fertig.

Special circumstances warranted the making of an exception to the general rule prohibiting circulation of Japanese money:

Jap notes given to operatives should be used in paying civilian operatives who are residing inside the Jap territories, and that money can be used in purchasing articles for home consumption. If our money is used, civilian operative carrying it will be identified and his value to the organization in carrying out his mission is lost.⁸²

What then was to serve as money? Prior to the Japanese attack upon the Philippines when war clouds were already lowering, the Philippine Legislature had declared a state of emergency and vested certain extraordinary powers in the Chief Executive. Among these powers was included far-reaching controls over currency. Herein lay the currency power later arrogated by the guerrillista.⁸³

Before departing from the Philippines President Quezon had assigned to Leyte a quota of paper money for printing. Printing got under way, but the arrival of the Japanese put a temporary quietus to the enterprise.⁸⁴ Economic activity in unoccupied Leyte was severely hampered by the scarcity of currency

82. Maj. A. Balderian, CO, 95th Inf. Regt. Nov., 1944. To: 3rd Lt. Francisco D. Sosing, S-2, 3rd Bn.

83. One of Col. Kangleon's directives to his unit commanders recapitulated the nature of this delegation of power:

"... (a) Only Philippine Legislature can authorize issue of currency or bills with money value.

"(b) Prior to outbreak of war, Legislature passed the Emergency Powers to President of Philippines.

"(c) By Emergency Powers Act, President created the different Emergency currency boards in different provinces of Visayas and Mindanao to be composed of the Provincial Auditor as Chairman and Provincial Treasurer and Provincial Fiscal as members for each province. Col. Kangleon F. R. Reyes, Adj. 7 13 Sept. 1943. Memo for: Unit COs of 92nd Div. and Mun. Treasurers of 9th MD.

84. Enrique Potente, guerrilla auditor for Col. Kangleon, gave a clear resume of what had occurred: "We were printing the pre-invasion issue of the Leyte Emergency Currency notes at the small town of San Miguel, you already know, when news came to us to the effect that the military and civil authorities of Leyte had decided to surrender to the Japanese invaders. It was during those jittery days, I believe about May 20, 1942. We were shocked at hearing the news as precisely we were printing the emergency currency notes authorized by the President of the Commonwealth of the Philippines to finance the resistance against the invaders. The printing of emergency money, by the way, was necessary because no money from Manila was forthcoming, as the capital was already occupied by the Japanese; and a shipment of money which was supposed to be destined to us had gone to the bottom of the sea with the sinking of the S. S. Corregidor. On May 23, 1942, in compliance with definite orders, we stopped the printing of the money, and we burned the unissued notes and those partly printed notes on the plaza or town square of San Miguel. Our chief in the printing shop, Mr. Alberto Santa Cruz, Provincial Auditor, who was taking charge of the accounting matters, told us that there had been issued over six hundred thousand pesos to the military and civil government of the notes we have printed." Potente op. cit., p. 1.

in circulation. To this problem the guerrilla leaders directed their attention.

Captain Glicerio Erfe was forced to take action by the urgent matter of subsisting his troops! After much pondering over alternative schemes for dealing with this necessity, the GHQ of Erfe's "11th Guerrilla Division" decided in favor of the direct disbursement of pay to the troops. But what sort? A guerrilla unit enjoyed no legal warrant per se to emit currency that would circulate as legal tender, even within its own jurisdiction. A hopeful solution to this aggravating dilemma appeared in a radiogram from South-West Pacific Headquarters addressed to the then chief of intelligence in the Visayas, General Macario Peralta. Its pertinent portion read:

... IT IS NOT... PRACTICABLE TO ISSUE MONEY STOP YOU SHOULD ISSUE TO YOUR MEN CERTIFICATES SHOWING THAT THE UNITED STATES OWES THEM PAY AS ACCRUED STOP SIMILAR CERTIFICATES CAN BE USED AS REQUIRED STOP FOR PERALTA FROM GENERAL MACARTHUR STOP THE UNITED STATES WILL HONOR THEM IN THE COURSE OF TIME STOP.

This writer's copy of the radiogram, allegedly a "True Copy" of a copy, is dated 18 December 1942. Possibly this copy is spurious and an original may be non-existent. Within the Erfe zone it was widely assumed that whatever measures were drafted to implement this project were predicated upon American generosity--the guarantee of the financial Gibraltar to indemnify holders of these promissory notes.

The preamble to the resolution adopted by Erfe's organization setting up the administrative machinery for the printing of the currency cited "the exigency of the situation:

Whereas the present economic situation in the province of Leyte requires an immediate and imperative remedy which, in our opinion, rests upon the circulation of Emergency Notes throughout the province;

Whereas, our pre-war bills had been and are being collected by the Japanese forces and the printing of the same had been stopped;

Whereas, we, who are gathered here deem it necessary and indispensable to continue the printing of the Emergency Currency Notes under previous authority in order to make effective the resistance of our soldiers and relieve civilians from the present economic hardships....⁸⁵

85. This Resolution, drafted Mar. 1, 1943, at Camp San Gabriel, "Office of the Military Adviser" (Capt. Erfe) was subscribed to by all of the top-ranking officers and special functionaries. Some confusion regarding the character and backing of these notes led "Col." Ramon L. Mercado, Auditor, GHQ, to include the following clarificatory statements in his address at the Conference of May 18, 1943: "Those days when our Commanding General, Gen. MacArthur, has left the Philippines! we were like chicks without a mother hen.... Now that it has come to our mind that he left us without any means by which we could survive, he has come to us in the way that he sent messages I believe to his commanders so that these commanders were authorized to issue certificates to pay soldiers fighting against our common enemy. There are probably people who do not know about certificates because this is not entirely like the Emergency Currency Note. These certificates... we are determined to issue to pay our men negotiable in
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A scanning of log entries made by Captain Erfe indicates interminable delays in the execution of this important project.⁸⁶ Several factors were responsible for the delay. Lack of equipment essential for printing constituted a material handicap. Even more inhibitory was the hostile attitude of Colonel Kangleon to the emission of certificates by what he deemed an illegal insurgent organization. Subtle distinctions between certificates and bona fide tender were meaningless to Kangleon. As far as he was concerned, this scrip was endowed with purchasing power and was intended to circulate as a medium of exchange--hence possessing the attributes of money. Erfe himself was not too fastidious in insisting upon these distinctions, since he designated this scrip as "Emergency Currency Notes."

The actual printing of the currency was committed by the officers resolution of March 1, 1943, to the "Leyte Emergency Currency Board, created by the Commander in Chief by virtue of his power to print the amount necessary to remedy the situation."⁸⁷ To underscore the legality of its proceedings

its face and redeemable at any time either before or after this war when the American Government shall be able to furnish us the needed amount that we shall ever incur or pay men who are fighting their common enemy."

Minutes of the Conference held on May 18, 1943, at Bugho, Abuyog.

86. Concise entries in the Diary of Capt. Erfe highlight the progress in the formulation of the currency scheme:

"March 9: Conference with Guerrilla Major General Pedro Gallego and Staff; Guerrilla Brig. Gen. Eduardo Bugho and Staff [from Burauen]; Guerrilla Brig. Gen. Bernardo Closa and staff [from Abuyog], Col. Ramon L. Mercado and other responsible men in the Guerrilla Organization. Financial matters were discussed, especially about monetary problems for the pay of our soldiers in the field.

"April 4: Conference with Guerrilla Officers, 11th Division, Auditor, Mpal [municipal] Treasurers & Mayors. Drafting of the Resolution to continue the printing of emergency currency notes, in order to remedy the financial conditions of the province of Leyte.

"April 12. Conference was held in barrio Bugho, Abuyog, regarding the printing of the Emergency Currency Notes. Said conference was continued on the next day at the poblacion of Abuyog.

"April 19: Conference at Abuyog presided by Col. R. K. Kangleon. Subjects discussed: ... Printing of Emergency Money, etc.

"May 18: Conference at Bugho represented by Brigade Staffs, Division Staff Regimental Staff [of the combat unit], Members of the Guerrilla War Tribunal, Naric, Liaison Officer, Finance Division, treating the printing of Emergency Circulating Certificates. (The original of this Diary is in the possession of Capt. Erfe's former Adjutant, Silverio T. Paza, of Tacloban. A "true copy" was indited in my presence.)

87. The President of the Guerrilla War Tribunal, "Brig. Gen." Galicano Enerlan, was installed as chairman. The Auditor and the Finance and Disbursing Officers very logically were designated co-members.

The possibilities of counterfeiting and embezzlement impelled Erfe to address a special memorandum to his Auditor:

"2. Rush also the issuing of financial regulations in accordance with existing laws for the guidance and compliance of accountable and responsible officers.

"3. During the printing of the emergency notes, it is required that.....all printing paraphernalia shall be well guarded to insure that no duplicates shall be able to leak." Glicerio I. Erfe, Capt. Inf., Mil. Adv. 26 April

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and to demonstrate the grounding of this scheme upon solid popular support, the Board on the printing of Emergency Currency Certificates recommended the furnishing of

the Municipal Council of each of the five municipalities (Abuyog, Burauen, Dulag, La Paz, and Tolosa) that comprise the 95th Infantry Regiment a copy of the resolution made by the ranking officers... regarding the printing... and requesting at the same time that Body Municipal Councils, respectively to pass a resolution on their stand on the former resolution and the creation of the board for the purpose.

The Board also promised that: "The release of the said certificates will be made not later than June 1, 1943."⁸⁸

Belatedly, the essential equipment and materials were collected and the operation of printing actually commenced. Before any of these certificates could be circulated, Captain Erfe, Auditor Mercado and others were "arrested and concentrated at Matalom by Col. Ruperto K. Kangleon on the flimsy charge of masquerading, organizing a guerrilla other than the one he was organizing, and that Col. Erfe and his staff were printing and circulating emergency currency notes."⁸⁹

The WLGWF did not adopt the expedient of printing money for the financing of military activities. Not that the organization had any objection to this practice per se.⁹⁰ Utilization of other fiscal devices obviated the necessity of taking this step. Nor did Major Balderian's "Politico-Military Government" undertake to print its own currency. Only in the domain of "Free Leyte" was the printing of money boldly, as if of right, carried out.

On restoring a provincial government, Colonel Kangleon assumed that authority to continue the printing of emergency money, interrupted by the Japanese invasion, had devolved upon his government within the limits prescribed for Leyte by President Quezon. Beyond this sum Kangleon would not go until he had secured approval from the government-in-exile. His later instruction to the Emergency Currency Board constituted a clarification:

... You can print amount of P1,400,000.00, the remainder of the P2,000,000. authorized for 1942. This headquarters will advise you to print another amount when authority for it is received from President Quezon.⁹¹

1943. Memo to: Col. Ramon L. Mercado. Affidavit, Ramon L. Mercado, adjured before the Prov. Fiscal at Tacloban, Leyte," on Jan. 10, 1946. Exhibit "E"⁷.

88. Minutes of Meeting of Board on May 16, 1943, Bugho, Albueria, 4:00 p.m.

Ramon L. Mercado, affiant--Exhibit "F"⁷

89. Affidavit, Ramon L. Mercado, p. 2.

90. Statement, Atty. Teleron, op. cit

91. R. K. Kangleon. 4 Nov. 1943. GHO, 9th MD, par. 2-3.

In his Proclamation of July 19, 1943, reconstituting the Prov. Govt., Col. Kangleon included instructions bearing upon monetary matters:

"... That the Provincial Board will proceed to print Emergency Notes as required by Executive Order of the President of the Commonwealth of the

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Having decided to print money, Colonel Kangleon had next to procure the

Philippines." Proclamation of Col. Kangleon. 19 July 1943. Par. 8.

Having determined to print money, Kangleon had to set up an instrumentality to execute this project. The Provincial Board acted to create an "Emergency Currency Board to be composed of Auditor, Fiscal, and Treasurer with instructions that they would immediately proceed to the printing of Emergency Notes, taking into consideration the demand for cash within Leyte and complying with the order of the CO, 9th MD." Prov. Bd. of Leyte, 26 July 1943. Resⁿ No. 5., 1st Session.

"Along with my duties as Provincial Auditor of Free Leyte," wrote Mr. Potente, they designated me as Chairman of the New Leyte Emergency Currency Board which was established for the purpose of printing the Leyte Emergency Currency Notes." Potente, op. cit., p. 17.

The need for money was sufficiently acute to galvanize Col. Kangleon into action, collecting the necessary paraphernalia and materials for the job. Yet, while confident that the printing of this currency was not only a matter of utmost exigency but also entirely legal, he cautiously forbore from actually releasing it until he had received explicit confirmation from abroad. He "could scarcely act otherwise in view of his high-handed treatment of Capt. Erfe and his staff. To the Provincial Treasurer he wrote: "I have wired Quezon asking his authority for release. Hold for orders." Col. R. K. Kangleon. 23 Sept. 1943. To: The Prov. Treas.

The radiogram referred to was coursed through Brig. Gen. Fertig in Mindanao: "Quezon authorized Leyte Provincial Board print P2,000,000.00 for 1942. Only P600,000.00 was printed and released. Remaining P1,400,000.00 being printed. Requirements new Currency Board fulfilled. Request authority release emergency notes. Need badly." Col. R. K. Kangleon. 23 Sept. 1943. To: Gen. Fertig.

Some days later the anxiously awaited reply was received: "Your recommendations on personnel of Leyte Currency Board have been approved by Quezon. Proceed with release of currency. Don't allow army to become involved in printing." Gen. Fertig. 29 Sept. 1943. To: Col. Kangleon.

The injunction "on avoidance of military involvement in the printing process Col. Kangleon strictly obeyed. Since the army would become the primary beneficiary of the released currency, there must be no taint of suspicion that it was printing money with one hand and taking it as it came off the press with the other. By entrusting the actual printing to civilian authorities, Col. Kangleon could escape possible charges of defalcation, forgery, or organized plunder. Whatever money the army would receive should be free of duress, the voluntary donation of the civilians to their own combat troops.

Oddly enough, it was his American Chief-of-Staff, "Maj." Richards'bn, who sought to persuade Col. Kangleon to take over this job:

"My idea was to have the army print its own money, but Quezon refused. He said that must remain in the province of the civil government. I imagine it would be too easy for an army to balance its books." Wolfert, op. cit., p. 167. See also: St. John, op. cit., pp. 109-110.

So it was with a sense of relief that Col. Kangleon laconically notified the Provincial Treasurer: "President Quezon has authorized release of the Leyte Emergency Notes." Col. R. K. Kangleon. 6 Oct. 1943. To: Provincial Treasurer.

Evidently some confusion still existed. At a special session the Currency Board declared: "... it is but proper to state the total amount of money to be printed so that the Currency Board could determine the number of bills to be finished for each denomination." Leyte Emergency Currency Board at Macrohon. 28 Oct. 1943. Resolution No. 2, Excerpts from the Minutes of the Special Session.

necessary paraphernalia. Mr. Potente condensed a long chronicle of disappointments:

But we lacked a printing press, printing papers⁹² and ink. We sent agents to Bohol⁹³ and other places⁹⁴ to look for a printing press but returned empty handed." We ordered wooden markers to be made of the different denominations by local engravers. Printing ink was concocted by a local chemist. The military authorities took charge of the procurement of paper.⁹⁵ After repeated attempts we were able to produce satisfactory prints of the desired emergency notes.⁹⁶

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92. "... Right at present, the Province is lacking paper. Manila paper will make a good material for money if we have a printing press. Those we are now using do not work well on Manila, on account of it being glossy. If you could secure paper like that of the P5, send them over so that the Province will continue printing the money." Col. R. K. Kangleon. 1 Nov. 1943. Memo to: 95th Inf. Regt., Par. 4.
93. "To delegate Vice Mayor Bantug of Maasin to make trip to Bohol to look for a printing press that could either be bought or rented to print currency bills for Leyte and to confer with Provincial authorities of Bohol for purpose of getting information and to seek cooperation in securing printing press." Leyte Provincial Board. 2 Aug. 1943. Resolution No. 24, 4th Session.
94. "It has come to our attention that former Maasin printing press is stored near Provincial Building of Tacloban, in private house. At time of this writing, Provincial Government of unoccupied Leyte is sadly in need of printing press to print better Emergency Notes.
"If you are able to send in a G-2 operative to find out the existing conditions and then smuggle press and type out of city and deliver to Maasin, you will not only receive highest recommendation and promotion, but also substantial cash reward. Reward will depend upon usability of press. For a good press, this office is prepared to pay in excess of P1000 (old issue money) plus expenses.
"You will realize from reward offered that need is great." Maj. I. D. Richardson [Chief of Staff, 9th MD]. 3 Oct. 1943. Memo to: Capt. F. Pabliona [CO, Bn. 2, 95th Inf. Regt.], Alangalang, Par. 1-3.
It is revelatory of the popular attitude towards guerrilla currency that even in the case of a guerrilla officer the "old issue money" was more highly valued.
95. "We did not worry about counterfeiters. We had all the paper there was. We used all kinds. We'd have used toilet paper if we could have got it. Some of our money was printed on wrapping paper, some of Grade 3 notebook paper, lined and all.... The women made their own clothing out of abaca fiber--a rope-colored Manila hemp. They couldn't stand looking all alike, so were out of dye. In the end, we made our own ink by taking a crude oil lamp, putting a hood over it, and trapping the soot. We mixed the soot with glycerin and printed new sheets as well as money with it." Wolfert, op. cit., pp. 167-168.
96. Selecting designs for the currency involved some disagreement between Col. Kangleon and his chief of staff, Richardson. "I had some of Fertig's Mindanao money as a model," Richardson declared, "but Kangleon insisted on adding pictures to it--a carabao, a nipa hut, local scenery. It looked nearly official by the time we finished." See also, Potente, op. cit., p. 17.

Potente went on to describe the actual printing process:

The work was being done by hand. We have employed a number of laborers at least 20 of them was the lowest in number at any one time! They were composed mostly of high school and college students, and were made to master themselves in the technique of stamping the markers on the papers already cut to the size of the notes, in the most satisfactory manner acceptable to the Currency Board. The personnel consists of the following--Secretary of the Currency Board, who acts as Superintendent of the Shop, an ink chemist, two holders of each denomination marker who alternate in the tedious work, two assistants for each denomination marker to spread and dry the printed notes, numbering machine holder, holders of the markers for the seal, one holder each for affixing the facsimile signature stamps of the members of the Currency Board, and one guard. At least one member of the Currency Board was present during the work. A report of each day's work was being accomplished by the Secretary, showing the quantities and denominations of notes that were finished and those remaining unfinished during the day. The finished notes were turned over to the Provincial Treasurer every close of business each day, who issues for the amount the necessary official receipt. All the printing paraphernalia are gathered at the close of business and placed inside the safe. All these reports of daily output at the Shop and the official receipts issued by the Provincial Treasurer have been properly preserved and filed. A Record Book containing the history of the printing of the Notes is also being kept.⁹⁷

The terms of the general currency authorization limited the total pesos issue. But discretionary power remained regarding the denominations of bills to be issued. Lack of a printing press partially influenced the decision. The Provincial Board resolved "to authorize the Leyte Emergency Currency Board to print denominations lower than P1 by means of stamping outfits, suspending for the time being the printing of bigger denominations until printing press is secured."⁹⁸

The reason for abandonment of attempts to print token money was related by chief of staff Richardson:

We started off on 20-centavo bills--paper dimes.... I am no good at cost accounting, but after a week I began to get worried. There were nine men there [in the printery] and in a week they had not printed up enough money to pay themselves their own salaries. I made a rough stab at working out the expenses and found out it was costing us 40 centavos to print one 20-centavo bill. After that, we had new blocks made and stuck to 20-peso bills, where each bill represented a profit of 19 pesos and 60 centavos--\$9.80. We had been authorized to issue

97. Potente, op. cit., p. 26. Leyte Emergency Currency Board. 28 Oct. 1943. Excerpts from Minutes of Special Session, Resolution No. 2 provided:

"Whereas, it is essential to keep a complete and authentic record of the printing of the Leyte Emergency Notes

"Therefore... be it resolved by the Board in session to request Kangleon to furnish Board with copies of all radiograms affecting it for file and record purposes."

98. Prov. Bd. of Leyte. July 28, 1943. Second Session, Resolution No. 11.

2,500,000 pesos.⁹⁹

The delay in issuing the money in appreciable volume hampered military operations. In response to an entreaty for funds from the 95th Regiment, GHQ could only say:

For lack of materials and printing press, the Provincial Government is able to loan us only ₱52,000 a month. We are negotiating to increase it to ₱60,000 a month....

When the Provincial Government will be able to secure more materials and print money with more speed, I will request for more loan to meet the demand!¹⁰⁰

Rather than wait for the printers to complete their production of the entire quota of money allotted to the Provincial Board, they decided upon a partial issue: "Resolved--to authorize the Currency Board to release ₱100,000 of Leyte Emergency Notes in 20 centavo, 50 centavo, 1-peso and 20-peso denominations."¹⁰¹

And again:

Resolved--to request the Leyte Currency Board to turn over ₱500,000 out of the money that has already been printed to the Provincial Treasurer for such purposes as the Provincial Board in the interest of the administration may determine.¹⁰²

The Japanese "mopping-up campaign" in Southern Leyte halted but did not end these monetary activities.¹⁰³

We stopped the printing of the Emergency Currency Notes in the meantime, which was being done up to that time in the Trade School Shop building at Macrohon. Up to then, we were able to print ₱1,023-00.00, as shown by our records. Most of this money has been delivered by the Provincial Treasurer to the Army Finance Officer.¹⁰⁴

By May of 1944, the Japanese no longer went out on patrol from their garrisons. Resumption of printing was again feasible:

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99. Wolfert, op. cit., pp. 121-122. This figure quoted by Richardson represented an inaccuracy. As already explained, the original authorization permitted the release of 2 million pesos, and of this sum 600,000 had been turned out preceding the Japanese landings in Leyte. In his statement of expenditures, Mr. Potente computed ₱12,108.28 as the total cost incurred in the printing of Emergency Currency Notes.
100. Col. Kangleon, GHQ, 9th MD. 1 Nov. 1943. Memo to: 95th Inf. Regt., Par. 1, 6.
101. Prov. Bd. Resolution No. 155.
102. Prov. Bd. Oct. 15, 1943. Resolution No. 234, 27th Session.
103. Col. Kangleon instructed the Emergency Currency Board to "place the paraphernalia and personnel in a safe place ready for any direction of this Headquarters." R. K. Kangleon. 4 Feb. 1944. Memo for: All Prov. Govt. Officials, Par. 3, Sec. a.
104. Potente, op. cit., p. 19.

In a meeting of the Leyte Emergency Currency Board, we have decided to continue the printing of the emergency notes, which by now has gained the name of 'Guerrilla Money'. We established as our printing shop, a private house in the mountains midway between Malitbog and Macrohon. When the Japanese deserted their garrison at Macrohon, we transferred our workshop to the School Building of Barrio Lihan, an interior Barrio of Macrohon. There we completed printing our quota of P1,400,000.00.¹⁰⁵

Prior to the American landings, Colonel Kangleon handed certain currency directives to his Judge Advocate General:

... You will order the Provincial Treasurer to turn over to the Division Finance Officer, IAC, all money they have printed. You will also issue order for Provincial Treasurer, Auditor, and Fiscal to destroy all P20 bills now in possession of Abay [Major Abay, Division Finance Officer] at certain place that Maj. Francisco [then the Chief of Staff] may indicate.¹⁰⁶

When the Commonwealth Government was reestablished under President Osmeña P299,717.80 notes of the total allotted for printing to the guerrilla government remained to be issued. These unissued notes were burned by the authorities at Tacloban, leaving a residue of P1,100,282.20 to be accounted for. Mr. Potente prepared the following balance sheet:¹⁰⁷

| | |
|---|-------------------|
| Amount expended for the Army and for the National bureaus and offices | P649,150.05 |
| Amount of Advance of Cash to the various municipalities for the payment of teachers and various persons, not yet liquidated | 194,132.15 |
| Expended as aid to the Provincial Government | 122,611.08 |
| Loaned to the municipalities for organization purposes | 15,000.00 |
| Amount advanced to the Army, still to be liquidated | <u>119,388.92</u> |
| | P1,100,282.00 |

The Leyte emergency notes enjoyed a wide circulation throughout the Province. Most of the people regarded their issue as valid, sanctioned by law, and ultimately redeemable in Commonwealth currency. Nevertheless, a small proportion were not always prone to receive them when proffered. Such hesitancy prevailed on the fringes of Japanese-occupied areas. On the one hand, possessors of emergency money were liable to apprehension by Japanese patrols as sympathizers with the guerrilla cause. On the other hand, farmers and middle-men visiting the occupied areas had need of either Japanese-issued currency or pre-war money to conduct their business.

Fearing that a heightening of this tendency to refuse emergency currency would cause its depreciation and undermine the entire financial structure of the resistance movement, guerrilla leaders early adopted remedial measures. Their problem was twofold: bolstering the emergency currency and discouraging

105. Ibid., p. 19.

106. Col. R. K. Kangleon. 22 Aug. 1944. Memo for: Maj. Fidel Fernandez.

107. Potente, op. cit., pp. 26-27.

the circulation of unrecognized species. In practice, this meant the promulgating of regulations penalizing the non-acceptance of or the discrimination against guerrilla currency. It also meant the undertaking of an energetic propaganda campaign associating in the popular mind the close tie between loyal patriotism and willing receipt of emergency notes:

... All emergency money printed in Leyte, Cebu, Negros, Iloilo, or elsewhere in the Philippines, with or without stamp, is legal tender, authorized by the Commonwealth of the Philippines to be honored and redeemed at face value after the war. Enjoin the people to circulate it at par value without suffering unauthorized depreciation. Any person who refuses to receive it as a means of exchange in the market or otherwise causes other people not to receive it, or who attempts to engage in profiteering by depreciating its value shall be considered a public enemy.¹⁰⁸

Refusal to accept emergency notes might seriously affect the welfare of entire districts. North-western Leyte had long served as the granary for the population of the southern districts. But the sellers of grain were loath to receive emergency notes in exchange for their produce:

Enclosed, affidavits to show that Emergency money not accepted in San Isidro.

People of that place make alibi by saying that they do not have corn to sell. It is because they know that it will be paid in emergency money.

Because corn dealers cannot buy corn with emergency money in San Isidro and other parts of Leyte, this sector confronted with problem of how long shall old money last.¹⁰⁹

Appeals alone did not suffice to check discrimination. Thoroughly exasperated, Colonel Kangleon's legal adviser advocated sterner preventatives:

Complaints were received at this Headquarters that some people discriminated between old currency bills and emergency notes, and between emergency notes of one province and another.

Complaint that higher prices are fixed on articles when medium used to purchase are emergency notes.

To stop this discrimination and devaluation of emergency notes, it is suggested that circular below be adopted and published throughout the Division.

Circular to all Regimental and Battalion Commanders and Mayors....¹¹⁰

108. Filemon Pabilona, Maj., IGF (Leyte Guerrilla Forces), Sector Commander and Military Adviser (to the loyal civil authorities). 2 Nov. 1942. Memorandum to: Municipal Mayors and Treasurers: Alangalang, Babatngon, Barugo, and San Miguel.

In forceful terms Balderian, as commander of East Leyte, let it be known that: "Effective today, Nov. 27, 1942, Emergency Money must be accepted within the jurisdiction of Carigara. It shall have the same face value of that of the old money." Cornel Flores, USAFFE, CO East Leyte.

109. Maj. Jain, CO 94th Inf. Regt. 30 June 1943. Memo to: CO, 92nd Inf. Div.

110. See next page.

There follows a specification of penalties to be meted out to the offender:

Any person who discriminates between old bills and emergency notes issued by any province of the Philippines or who devaluates or trafficks in emergency notes shall be subject to detention in any of the detention camps of the Army from 1-5 days for first offense, from 10-20 for second, from 1-3 months for third and successive offenses; or both detention and fine.

Regimental commanders or battalion commanders or their authorized representatives are empowered to summarily determine the innocence or guilt of alleged offenders and impose corresponding penalty.

Any person found guilty by regimental or battalion commanders or their authorized representatives may appeal from this decision to the Division Commander, whose decision shall be final.

Pending determination of appeal by Division Commander, execution of penalty imposed shall be suspended.

Upon appeal, commander or his representative shall forward immediately to Division Commander through the Judge Advocate General a summary of proceedings together with all pertinent papers and affidavits in connection with the case.

Fines shall be paid to Finance Officer of regiment or battalion, receipted and accounted.

Adopting this policy as their own, the municipalities severally sought to give it effect. Bato's ordinance on the subject is in point. Its preamble reads:

An ordinance declaring legal tender the emergency money bills at their face value, and penalizing those who directly or indirectly refuse to accept at face value or charge higher prices for commodities for which emergency money notes are offered for payment.¹¹¹

Military orders and local ordinances could only attempt to frighten the refractory elements into compliance. Rarely were the penalties annexed to the violation of currency regulations actually applied. It was not strange then that even after the American landings when redemption of emergency notes seemed likely, emergency currency was not honored in certain quarters. To one of his unit commanders, uncertain as to how he should proceed against civilian violators, the acting CO of the Regiment advised: "Civilians not accepting emergency circulating notes should be left unmolested until the problem is solved by the Commonwealth Government."¹¹²

Circulation of Guerrilla Currency from Outside Leyte

The guerrilla activities of Leyte constituted but a part of a wider movement of resistance coextensive with the entire Philippines. In other

110. Capt. K. Fernandez. 1 July 1943. To: CO, 92nd Div., Par. 1-4.

111. Prov. Bd. of Leyte. Reso. No. 40 approving Ord. No. 12 cs of Bato.

112. Capt. Abarientos. 18 Nov. 1944. Memo to: Lt. Moralita (CO, 1st Bn.).

provinces, guerrilla organizations had also sprung up, varying in organization effectiveness of operation. Confronted with the same financial problems that perplexed the leaders in Leyte, they too had issued emergency notes endowed with legal tender value. Every guerrilla organization sought to disseminate its currency over as broad an area as possible. The wider the circulation of notes, the greater the possibilities of inter-provincial trade. While the several guerrilla organizations were united in fraternal insurgency, they were all too often lacking in full and accurate information concerning the character of each other's activities.

Distorted accounts of guerrilla operations drifted ashore in company with trading bancas. Liaison agents careless in sifting of data they had collected propagated twisted and incomplete accounts. So it was that the guerrilla leaders of Leyte oscillated between two tendencies: to honor that currency in order to promote trade and uphold the national character of the resistance movement; to repudiate that currency in order to safeguard the welfare of the provincials. At any one time then, certain extra-provincial currencies would be accepted by the Leytenos at par, some would be received at a discount, and some would be categorically rejected. Simultaneously, the sector commanders would be promulgating regulations warning the population not to discriminate against the emergency notes of other loyal provinces and yet advising them to beware of specific notes doubtful in value.¹¹³ Into this monetary jumble, muddying it still further, came the pre-war notes of the Commonwealth Government, sporadically accepted in both the Japanese-dominated and unoccupied zones of the Archipelago and commutable at different par value from place to place.

A memorandum emanating from the headquarters of General Fertig in Mindanao and affecting Leyte is suggestive of some of the issues aggravating the monetary question:

113. Regarding the emergency notes of other provinces, an excerpt from a guerrilla memorandum already cited may be requoted as epitomizing the basic policy adopted in Leyte: "All emergency money printed Leyte, Cebu, Negros, Iloilo, or elsewhere in the Philippines, with or without stamp, is legal tender, authorized by the Commonwealth of the Philippines...." Filemon Pabilona, Maj., L.G.F. [Leyte Guerrilla Force], Sector Commdr. & Mil. Adv. 2 Nov. 1942. Memo to: Mayor & Treasurers of Alangalang, Babatngon, Barugo and San Miguel.

Adherence to equality of notes in principle could not prevent differentiation in the day-to-day transactions of the masses. Discrimination against the Bohol emergency money by the Leytenos led the Bohol guerrilla leader to report to Maj. Balderian, Commander of the East Leyte Sector: "... These are instances that bancas loaded with corn from Leyte arrived at this province to trade. Oftentimes in the past, complaints from our civil populace reached this Headquarters to the effect that these traders refuse to receive emergency notes or if they receive them, they depreciate the value so that this Headquarters issued instructions to all Detachment Commanders (we have detachments in every town) to detain all persons that refuse to accept emergency notes, or refuse to accept in its face value. You will find in separate covers pertinent papers about this ruling. We could not trace their definite point of departure for most of them do not carry passes or authority. At present, however, such "anomalies have been reduced. And with your good policies, we are confident that these anomalies will still be reduced if not stamped out." ["anomaly" = abuse] Ismael P. Ingeniero. March 19, 1943. To: CO, 95th Inf., East Leyte Sector.

There are at present in the hands of many people P50 bills previously printed for the Philippine National Bank. Those notes are genuinely printed currency. But they are now valueless, inasmuch as the circulation thereof has never been authorized by the Insular Treasurer of the Government of the Commonwealth. The notes were illegally taken by Moros somewhere in the province of Lanao during the Japanese invasion of that province and were put by them into circulation.

... In order to prevent further circulation, all commanding officers and army personnel are ordered to wage an intensive campaign for their confiscation.

For all notes confiscated, corresponding receipt should be given by the officer confiscating them to the possessors stating therein the serial number of the bills confiscated. All bills thus confiscated should immediately be deposited with the local Municipal Treasurer or the Provincial Treasurer under official receipt.¹¹⁴

Despite this general order, the Mindanao bills of the condemned issue were accepted by the people of Leyte. The Judge Advocate General of the 92nd Division counseled their authorization in the Province as a matter of both equity and expediency.¹¹⁵ Colonel Kangleon went along with this advice. He also saw fit to sanction the circulation of the pre-war paper currency as in the best interests of the resistance movement and the welfare of the common people.¹¹⁶

114. Brig. Gen. W. W. Fertig. 17 Dec. 1942. To: All Cmdg. Off., Par. 1, 3, 4. A similar field order, despatched under the signature of Gen. Fertig as of January 20, 1943, directed commanding officers to forbid the circulation of Commonwealth 20-peso bills within their jurisdiction. A description of the bills was incorporated in the order.

We must not overlook the possibility of a political motivation to Fertig's pronouncement. His Chief of Staff, Capt. Luis Morgan, with whom he subsequently broke, had his source of power in Moro support. Perhaps, and this is only conjecture, Fertig was already contemplating weakening a suspected competitor for supreme leadership. See also: Haggerty, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

115. "... The bills being genuine, they should be accepted and their circulation allowed. This Division has issued a circular not to discriminate between 'former' bills and emergency circulating notes.

"Persons who had no participation in illegal extraction of said bills and accepted them in the best of faith in exchange of equivalent labor or goods should not be made to suffer any damage or be sacrificed for an offense committed by others.

"It is for the Government to prosecute and punish persons responsible for their extraction.

"If these bills be confiscated and their circulation prohibited, the people will be slow in accepting notes issued by and in the name of the government...." Capt. F. Fernandez, JAS. 6 July 1943. To: CO, 92nd Div., Par. 6-10.

116. Pre-war notes were used by people who spurned Japanese money, but dared not use emergency currency. In his political testament listing his beneficence to the guerrillas, Tacloban's leading Chinese merchant recorded: "Sometime in March 1942, I had exchanged the Leyte emergency money of Capt. Lopus (now Major), amounting to P2,000 with my old Treasury Certificates. Capt. Lopus, unsundered USAFFE, became a guerrilla leader in Sorsogon which at that time was occupied by the Japanese, who prohibited

(continued on next page)

Small Change

One of the serious obstacles to the restoration of economic normalcy for unoccupied Leyte was the lack of small denominational currency. Coins had vanished following the Japanese occupation. Dearth of small change formed the constant burden of all reports dealing with economic activities throughout the Province.¹¹⁷ On every purchase the buyer generally paid an additional premium, arising from the inability of the seller to make small change.

To obviate this impediment to trade, several of the guerrilla leaders (sometimes utilizing the municipal councils as instrumentalities) printed their own token scrip. Civilians holding currency of large denominations could commute this money for local scrip, thus facilitating simple transactions.¹¹⁸

The validity of this fiat money was contingent upon its redeemability. Redemption, in turn, was possible only so long as the genuine legal tender was retained by the municipal treasurer inviolate--a sort of trust fund. However, in some cases this frozen fund was wrongfully expended by municipal authorities in the furtherance of municipal objectives.¹¹⁹

the circulation of all emergency money there. According to him, he has drawn this money from the USAFFE in this locality for maintenance of his men." Suya, op. cit., p. 11.

Questions continued to arise concerning the validity of pre-war money: "Please inform us if the genuine bills, 1941, are good money. People from the west and the south say they are no good. Now, there are in Abuyog three sailboats from Bohol buying corn by paying these supposed bogus bills. I ordered them seized, and now they are detained. I confiscated more than one hundred of their P20.00 bills... Catalino Landia, Capt. Inf., Cmdg. Hq. "G" Co., 2nd Bn., 94th Inf. Regt. 14 Aug. 1943. To: The Dist. Com., 92nd Div., Par. 7.

Kangleon sent this dispatch to his regimental commanders: "Treasury notes and bank bills, series of 1941, issued by the Government of the Philippines by authority of an act of the Philippine Legislature and approved by the President of the United States of America are valid and should be allowed to circulate. Any instruction to the contrary is revoked." F. A. Reyes, 2nd Lt., Adj., 9th MD. 13 Sept. 1943. To: COs, 94th Inf. Regts.

117. Intelligence Report No. 10 of the 95th Inf. Regt., covering the second half of August 1943 (submitted by Capt. Briccio Aguilos, S-2), ranked lack of change first under the heading "Needs of the Civilian Population."

118. An Intelligence Report to the Chief of Staff, 92nd Inf. Div., covering the month of May, 1943, stated: "All guerrilla leaders have seen the acute problem of lack of change. Metallic tender driven out of circulation. They have tried to issue paper money in small changes, backed by a deposit of the larger denominations of the current paper currency. Because diverse means were used, circulation of change from one part of Province to another precluded."

119. Of course, the municipal council might later vote a restitution to the fund of the monies extracted. Thus, the Provincial Board of Free Leyte, in its Resolution No. 39 (Fifth Session--August 7, 1943) approved Resolution No. 127 of the municipal council of Hilongos providing for restitution.

In other cases military authorities, with or without local permission, took possession of all or part of this reserve fund.¹²⁰ Counterfeiting of local money represented another source of embarrassment.¹²¹ In Inapacan "Major" Chester Peters printed his own fiat notes and disbursed them on receipt of military stores and foodstuffs. Refusal of payment in such baseless currency meant self-stigmatization as a "pro-Jap" with all the unpleasant circumstances this entailed. In short then holders of local scrip were fingering mere scraps of paper backed up by no governmental resources, non-convertible, and acceptable only by courtesy.

With the approval of the Finance Service of the WIGWF, some of its constituent municipalities issued local scrip of small denomination for the convenience of the civilian population. Thus, in Albuerca:

The Chairman submitted to the Council in session samples of Emergency Circulating Notes in different denominations from 1 centavo, 5¢, 10¢, 20¢, 50¢, and 1 peso for approval, as per instructions of the Chief of Finance Service, WIGWF, during the conference held in the field.

Resolved, to recommend, as herēby recommended, the attached samples of the Emergency Circulating Notes of different denomination, for the districts of the WIGWF, in the field.

Resolved Further, to order the Secretary to submit the above-mentioned samples of Emergency Circulating Notes, with a copy of this resolution, to the office of the Chief of Finance Service through the Regimental Commander, 6th Infantry of the WIGWF in the Field for guidance and information. Unanimously approved.¹²²

On assuming official command of the resistance forces in Leyte, Colonel Kangleon proceeded to promulgate currency regulations tightening up the issuance of scrip:

... (8) That sufficient amount of small denominations be printed by action of the Provincial Board to solve the problem of small change; that all municipal governments be required to stop the issuance of local scripts, and to redeem all scripts issued by them upon release of emergency notes by the provincial government herein authorized.¹²³

120. Resolution No. 104 of the Municipal Council of Abuyog, as approved by Resolution No. 113 of the Provincial Board (15th Session)--September 9, 1943, authorized "the municipal Treasurer of the aforesaid municipality to grant cash advance to Capt. Landia for subsistence of his men and officers, which cash advance shall be taken from the deposit for local Emergency Circulating Notes...."

Resolution No. 72 of the Maasin municipal council petitioned for the replacement of monies appropriated by the Army so that, among other things, "the redemption of the Cerong notes which are in circulation may be solved."

121. Special Order 49, par. 1, of the 94th Regt., Major Porfirio E. Jain, Commanding, (dated July 23, 1943) directed: "Upon receipt of this order, 1st Lt. Andres T. Delfino, S 2 of this Regiment, will proceed to Maasin, Leyte, to file charges against Prudencio Mercado for counterfeiting Maasin Emergency Notes."

122. Mun. Council of Albuerca. Special Meeting, March 19, 1943. Resolution No. "6.

123. Col. R. K. Kangleon, 9th MD. July 19, 1943. "Proclamation."

Colonel Kangleon originally intended to stamp out all local scrip.¹²⁴ The delay in the printing of Leyte currency notes suggested to the Provincial Board the advisability of relenting and permitting the prolongation of scrip releases under controlled conditions. In authorizing Macrohon to issue local notes, the Provincial Board resolved:

Whereas the Leyte emergency notes which have been put into circulation are mostly in bigger denominations, viz.: from 20 centavos to 20 pesos due to the fact that for the present, there are not sufficient materials with which to print 5 and 10 centavo denominations for sufficient distribution to all municipalities within the province;

Whereas in view of the preceding fact, it has been made a policy by the Board to authorize the circulation of local emergency notes in each municipality in the denominations of 5 and 10 centavos for local circulation as soon as it has properly redeemed all its notes previously printed.

And whereas the municipality of Macrohon has partially redeemed its local notes;

Now therefore Resolved to authorize the municipality of Macrohon to create a local Emergency Currency Board to print local notes in the denominations of 5 and 10 centavos in an aggregate amount of 2000 pesos for strictly local circulation in exchange with authorized emergency notes. Provided to submit to this Body the names of the members of the Currency Board appointed, and the corresponding designs of the 5 and 10 centavo denominations for approval and

Provided further, that whatever will be printed will not be released without the previous approval of this Body.¹²⁵

It is to the credit of the guerrilla leaders that they recognized the need for a circulating monetary medium and showed resourcefulness in dealing with that need. It is to the credit of Colonel Kangleon that he perceived the possibilities for abuse and embezzlement in the emission of guerrilla currency and that he undertook to surround the printing and circulation of this money with precautions both legal and administrative.

Municipal Finance

The confusion brought to Leyte by the Japanese invasion was reflected in the jumbled state of most municipal treasuries. Flight of municipal officials, including the treasurers, and later raids by armed bands, seizing funds and records, disorganized the budget. With the passage of time, some semblance of reorganization was accomplished in both the guerrilla and puppet sectors. Till the end of enemy domination, however, business remained abnormal, and consequently the ordinary sources of local revenue were denied to authorities. Support of municipal functions, even in greatly attenuated

124. Maj. Balderian had banned the emission of token money scrip in his zone. Consequently, consumers, including guerrilla procurement agents, commonly bought goods in quantity in integral peso terms. Another contrivance to circumvent the need for change involved the acceptance of commodity vouchers representing the difference between the selling price and currency paid out. The vouchers were redeemable for commodities.

125. Prov. Bd. of Free Leyte. Oct. 11, 1943. Reso. No. 232, 26th Session.

form, tried the patience and ingenuity of directors of the local budgets.

Under any circumstances, outlays would never cease so long as even a shadow of government continued. Subsidization of drastically curtailed activities became a major function of municipal government. Lands had been vacated by cultivators fleeing to the hills. Tenants stopped making remittances to landowners. Businesses were abandoned. Forest concessions, plantations and their ancillary processing enterprises went unworked. Everywhere economic activity was at a standstill and private earnings abolished. On what capital and increments of wealth were taxes to be assessed? And in these stagnant waters, the wheels of government must turn and the guerrilla be subsidized.

Pushed to extremes, the localities were compelled to levy upon even the most insignificant transaction. Financial tolls might be commuted to payment in kind, but payable they remained. Municipalities long accustomed to collecting imposts on economic functionings were dependent upon license fees. But the relative importance of proceeds from this source increased dramatically during the guerrilla period.¹²⁶

Taxes of this kind were useful because of their ease of administration. Business (if not of the speculative type) was conducted in the open. Evasion was difficult. Moreover, the liability of the businessman or transactor was inflexible--a flat sum on a specified activity.

Remission of liability for tax payment on the part of property owners and income-earners was conceded in the confusion of 1942. The excepting of land taxes and residence certificates from the category of assessables expressed recognition of the large-scale evacuations. Those who had fled from the enemy-occupied town proper were forced to leave their immovables behind and could hardly be called upon to contribute tax payments on these properties. The gradual restoration of public offices led responsible officials to strain feverishly in fund-raising efforts. Those on the tax-paying lists were none too eager to give up their tolerated delinquency, especially in a period of exorbitant living costs.

Occupational license fees counted heavily in the gross tax receipts. An Albuera ordinance required leaf tobacco dealers and merchants to "secure a municipal license from the Municipal Treasurer of this municipality, before running the business." The fee was collectible in quarterly installments of three pesos and violations were punishable.¹²⁷

Applications for slaughter permits traditionally were accompanied by payments of fees. During the emergency, Albuera butchers had developed the practice of commuting these tax obligations to payments in kind--the hind leg of large cattle. Since the nearest guerrilla camp received this beef, the

126. One of Dulag's guerrilla leaders, briefly alluding to municipal finances, stated: "At present, due to the presence of the Army which practically absorbs the little income available for the municipality, there is no fund available. The only possible sources of income are as follows: (a) Cock-fighting fees; (b) slaughter fees; (c) municipal license fees." Eugenio Villegas, 3rd Lt. Inf. Actg. Mun. Secty., Dulag, Sept. 10, 1943. To: Prov. Gov. in the Field.

127. Mun. Council of Albuera. 15 April 1943. Ord. No. 2, s 1943.

municipal treasury sustained "a corresponding shrinkage in revenue! To restore the former practice would be an unthinkable"affront to the military. In an effort to compromise this issue, the Municipal Council petitioned the sector Military Adviser to certify that any "slaughterer, private or professional," is subject to pay the amount of P1.50 cash tickets [the earlier fee had been P2.80] as slaughter permit fee, aside from the perna or hind leg of large cattle slaughtered that will be given to the Headquarters, Albuera Sector, for consumption purposes!"¹²⁸

A major source of local government revenue was the tax on cockpits. If anything, the patronizing"of the cockpits increased in popularity during the war. These establishments were sure-fire objects for the imposition of operating taxes. The proprietors! however, groaned that money was tight. Answering their prayer for relief from this burden, the Albuera Municipal Council gravely acknowledging "the monetary crisis and economic condition of the world" requested the sector Military Adviser's "approval that the Fifty Pesos regular tax of cockpits in this municipality be reduced to Thirty Pesos quarterly during this emergency period and Guerrilla Warfare!"¹²⁹

Marriages continued to take place in spite of the war and fees were still collected at wedding ceremonies. Some marriages, however, were not legally solemnized and the usual registration fees were lost to the municipal treasurer.

In pre-war times, taxes were due only at specified intervals. This arrangement was not revised. Because of the slender trickle of monies into the local treasuries, financial stringency during off-periods might become embarrassing. Accounting for his low collections during the first half of December! 1942, the Treasurer of Albuera stated that January would be the collection month for a number of taxes locally imposed! As a stop-gap meanwhile, "this week we will begin campaign for branding of large cattle--a source of revenue which may be collected at any period of the year."¹³⁰

In the zone of Captain Erfe, where municipal officials were at the same time officers of the citizen quasi-military brigades, the gathering of taxes was undertaken on a military basis. The Military Mayor of La Paz, "Brigadier" of the 1st and 3rd Guerrilla Brigades,¹³¹ directed his executive officer for the 3rd Brigade to "instruct all your captains and everyone concerned to submit to you all receipts of matanzas, license fees for all collections made by them, and have them ready with cash to be turned over to Mr. Dalmacio Berdejo, G-4 for Dulag and La Paz."¹³²

Under the aegis of "Free Leyte" the Southern municipalities used the

128. Mun. Council of Albuera. Reso. No. 4, s 1943.

129. Albuera Mun. Council (Sgd. P. C. Calabia, Mun. Secty). 11 Feb. 1943.

Reso. No. 3. The resolution was approved in its first indorsement on Feb. 17, 1943. (Sgd.) Dominador Saino, 3rd Lt. (Inf.), WIGWF, Actg. Comdg. Off.

130. V. J. Competente, Treas., Mun. of Albuera. 16 Dec. 1942. Report to: Cmdg. Off., WIGWF.

131. During the temporary fusion of La Paz and Dulag, the designation of a La Paz functionary to handle Dulag monies constituted a sore point for some of the Dulag people.

132. Malate, CO, 1st & 3rd Guer. Brig. 15 Mar. 1943. Memo to: Capt. E. Villegas, Exec. Off., 3rd Guer. Brig.

licensing system heavily. Wherever an ordinance of Commonwealth origin looked promising, it was continued in force. Modifications of existing schedules and various improvisations often seemed desirable to the architects of the emergency budget. If they expected the Provincial Board to simply rubber-stamp their proposals, they were mistaken. Considerations of legality in the legislative process were never forgotten by the provincial guerrilla government, anxious not to jeopardize its pretensions to legitimacy.¹³³

The Provincial Board would not adopt the requisite resolution enabling Bato to lay down an assortment of license and special fees without previous reference "to the Provincial Fiscal for comment on its legality."¹³⁴

Some mill-owners of Sogod, chafing under a local export duty compelling them to pay ₱1 on every cavan of milled corn or grain shipped to neighboring towns, appealed for an adjustment "to present living conditions." Convinced that the local ordinance was unduly irksome, the Provincial Board instructed the mayor of Sogod "to suspend, until further orders, the effect of Ordinance No. 15 a 1943 insofar as it affects foodstuff, such as corn grain, milled corn, milled and unmilled rice and sugar."¹³⁵

When the Japanese extended their puppet regime throughout the Province in 1944, they found the municipal treasuries in a state of depletion. The situation scarcely improved during the months intervening before the Liberation, inasmuch as local revenue was drawn in the debased occupation currency. The municipalities were looking forward to some sort of indemnification from the United States to cover their war-time outlays in support of the guerrilla. But, of course, only a restored Commonwealth Government would be empowered to make representation in their name.

Social Service Functions

The dislocation of economic life incident to war thrust upon the guerrilla authorities certain functions ordinarily outside the scope of the government. These assumptions of business undertakings were all in the nature of ad hoc improvisations, mobilizations of resources for the support

133. Where questions of expediency or lawfulness were involved in fiscal procedures, the Provincial Treasurer ordinarily served as consultant. Thus, the Provincial Board submitted to this expert "for comment" a Maasin ordinance "imposing municipal licenses on beauty parlors, tobacco producers and tobacco leaf dealers." Prov. Bd. of Free Leyte. Aug. 25, 1943. Reso. No. 56, adopted at 9th Session, acting on Ord. No. 13 under Reso. No. 53 of the Mun. Coun. of Maasin.

Should the legality of a pending ordinance turn upon the precise construction of existing law, conference with the Provincial Fiscal was in order. La Paz, approving the holding of a "tabo-tabo" under license, saw the Board commit this ordinance to its legal officer. Prov. Bd. of Free Leyte. Sept. 7, 1943. Reso. No. 95 adopted at 14th Session, acting on Ord. No. 11 under Reso. No. 78 of La Paz.

134. Prov. Bd. of Free Leyte. Sept. 17, 1943. Reso. No. 140, adopted at 18th Session, acting on Ord. No. 16 of the Mun. Council of Bato.

135. Prov. Bd. of Free Leyte. Sept. 6, 1943. Reso. No. 84, adopted at 13th Session.

of resistance. Viewed in their aggregate, such activities constituted no deliberately and systematically planned revision of the established economic order.

Reference has already been made to the appropriation by the Provincial Board of monies for governmental purchase of grain whenever available for resale to the general public at cost. Centralized purchasing effected considerable savings for the consumer in the form of lower prices and tapped supplies of foodstuffs beyond the reach of the small buyer.

Where general provincial administration stood in need of certain services of undependable regularity when furnished commercially, the government might either subsidize the utility or take over operation directly itself. Of this nature was the authorization to the Governor "to make transaction with a sail-boat owner to make regular trips from Maasin to Calubian that would last ten days on each way...."¹³⁶

Arrangement of land transportation for governmental use proved more difficult. Automobiles had disappeared. Should some vehicle be discovered or reconstructed out of salvaged parts, its actual operation would still await the obtaining of motor fuel.¹³⁷ The combat forces enjoyed a priority on all critical items of this kind. Consequently, the Provincial Board resolved

to request the Commanding Officer of the 9th Military District to authorize the Provincial Government to operate "an auto for the exclusive official use of this Government; and to produce alcohol with which to operate said vehicle if granted."¹³⁸

A subsequent resolution of the Board approved a request from the Provincial Treasurer for

advance authority to spend not exceeding 200 pesos for construction of a temporary shed for a distillery for production of alcohol and for purchasing necessary materials for the same, which the Provincial Government will operate.¹³⁹

As a substitute for gasoline, the transportation service used alcohol, distilling it from tuba (fermented palm juice). The efficiency of this fuel fluctuated, depending upon whether it had absorbed moisture and

136. Prov. Bd. of Free Leyte. Oct. 22, 1943. Reso. No. 249 adopted at 28th Ses.

The terms of the transaction stipulated:

- "1. The Board gives the subsidy of 60 pesos for the round trip covering not more than twenty days.
2. Any government official embarking on this banca for purposes of inspection or otherwise in connection with his official duties be charged for his transportation at the rate of P.05 per nautical mile.

137. "Resolved: to appropriate ₱200 from the unappropriated funds"

The Japanese had confiscated whatever gasoline they could discover"

138. Prov. Bd. of Free Leyte. Aug. 2, 1943. Resolution No. 19, adopted at Fourth Session.

139. Prov. Bd. of Free Leyte. Sept. 9, 1943. Resolution No. 116, adopted at 15th Session.

whether periodic engine adjustments on the cars had been made.¹⁴⁰ The vehicles themselves were commandeered from civilians, proper receipt having been delivered to the owners. A number of stills were constructed, the main one being at Maasin.

The value of the distillery became questionable after the Japanese mop-ping-up campaign restricted operations of the transportation service.¹⁴¹

The guerrilla government undertook a number of public projects for the betterment of living conditions. Some of these activities were not novel--simply resumption of ordinary peacetime public works. They are cited here principally to show that in unoccupied Leyte the government endeavored to restore as nearly as possible the conditions of normal life.

The torrential rains of Leyte necessitated constant road maintenance. Any extended period of neglect allowed the formation of ruts seriously impeding traffic. Following the Japanese invasion, the roads fell into a state of decay. The guerrilla government sought to repair the roads, despite handicaps in the way of limited equipment and labor power.

The Provincial Board authorized "the Governor to appoint" two capitazes

140. I. D. Richardson, for a time Kangleon's chief of staff, has recalled with some humor some of the difficulties encountered by the transportation services:

"Gasoline was a nearly immediate problem. The Japs had taken all they could find. But Frank Laird got us over this hurdle. He was an American about forty-five who had served some fifteen years in the army and had been discharged because of his heart. 'You learn how to do anything in the army,' he said, and we got him some barrels, galvanized pipe, elbows, and a wrench or two, and he went into the petrol business, distilling alcohol out of tuba. He managed to get a 90 percent alcohol concentration out of the tuba, and we called Laird Chief Distillery Officer. The cars would run on the alcohol all right if you opened the gasoline jets on the carburetors or reamed them out to let in more alcohol than they would gasoline. There wasn't much power to the stuff--unless you drank it--but the cars rannand they made six to eight miles on a gallon.

"The fuel was rather treacherous. It absorbed water"very quickly. If you left half a bottle around with the cork off, in a few hours it would fill right up to the top, the tuba alcohol soaking up moisture right out of the air. The water would give our cars all kinds of trouble. But we finally had the tuba growers organized--paying them 50 centavos for a five-gallon can of the unfermented palm juice--and had seven plantsnrunning all day long and a separate still to make drinking fuel. The rainy season knocked our production down considerably by lowering the alcohol yield from the tuba. But our production on the main plant at Maasin kept fairly consistently to a daily average of from five to six gallons." Wolfert, op. cit., pp. 170-171.

141. The alcoholic output of the stills perhaps found its use in bibulous activities, rather than as a combustion agent in automobile engines. At any rate, Col. Kangleon notified the Provincial Treasurer to withhold appropriations for its maintenance: "For the time being, the distillery should not function. Its operation by now is a waste of money." By order of Col. Kangleon /F. Fernandez, Capt., 22 May 1944. Memo for: The Prov. Treas.

for the repair of the provincial roads."¹⁴²

To supervise road maintenance and related constructional activities, the provincial government created an Overseer for Public Works. Various assistants and labor gangs were to carry out approved projects. Handicapped by lack of funds, the government could not retain its full crew of maintenance men on a regular full-time basis.¹⁴³

The WIGWF had its own corps of engineers. Its activities were not only related to strictly military affairs, but also took in various public improvements. Both civil engineers and surveyors were included among the personnel. Miranda, himself with an engineering background, took a direct personal interest in the activities. Lieutenant Florencio B. Coloma, pre-war assistant civil engineer in the Bureau of Public Works, became divisional engineer of the WIGWF. The table of organization of each regiment, according to Coloma, provided for a platoon of 60 men assigned to the headquarters service company. These men might be drawn upon by the divisional Engineer Corps for various construction activities. At the outset, Lieutenant Quetulio headed this work but was transferred to intelligence section when

142. Prov. Bd. of Free Leyte. Aug. 7, 1943. Reso. No. 30, adopted at 5th Session.

143. A letter to the Provincial Board from Candido Javellana, the Overseer, touching upon the delay in repairing a branch of the provincial road raised the question of general work policy. The Board resolved "to require the Overseer and such foremen, capitazes and camineros as are necessary to return to their respective posts to look into the repair of the roads. Their employment, however, shall depend upon the existence of necessary work, without which they would be considered as on leave of absence without salary until the necessity of their return to their respective posts to look into the repair of roads. Their employment, however, shall depend upon the existence of necessary work, without which they would be considered as on leave of absence without salary until the necessity of their return to service arises.

"Be It Further Resolved that for the period when no District Engineer is appointed, the Overseer or foreman, as the case may be, be held responsible to the Provincial Board to determine as to the existence or non-existence of necessary repair work in their respective districts and should communicate with the Governor of such before any such work is started." Prov. Bd. of Free Leyte. Aug. 30, 1943. Reso. No. 73, 10th Session.

The road-workers serving the government were dissatisfied with their remuneration. Confronted with the mounting cost of living, they were hard pressed to make ends meet. The Provincial Board took notice of "an unnumbered resolution current series of the Camineros under the Bureau of Public Works requesting the Board that the daily wage of each and every caminero be increased from P.80 to P1.60." Prov. Bd. of Free Leyte. Reso. No. 180.

Referred to the Provincial Treasurer, the petition was unfavorably indorsed back, "in view of the limited income of the province at present." However, recognizing the genuineness of the road-workers need, the Board voted "to increase the daily wage of each and every caminero from P.80 to P1." Prov. Bd. of Free Leyte. Oct. 15, 1943. Reso. No. 239, 27th Session.

Coloma joined. The engineer corps constructed the base hospital, provided a clearwater system in the GHQ, dug field latrines, and built the fortifications of the GHQ. The bridges built and trails laid out in the Palompon and Merida sectors were of benefit to the civilians as well as to the army.

Of all the municipalities, Merida undertook the most far-reaching public improvements program. In addition to the obvious reason of civic betterment, the sector commander, Lieutenant Capuyan, adduced another purpose underlying these projects. Fearing that the monies in the municipal treasury were unsafe (Merida's treasury had earlier been looted), Capuyan believed that it would be better to disburse these funds in beneficial projects than to leave them sterile, a constant temptation to the unscrupulous. Capuyan won the Municipal Council of Merida to his point of view. The Council authorized the immediate appropriation of 500 pesos and set up a Bureau of Public Works. The pre-war principal teacher, Themistocles Boholst, was appointed Checker of Public Works. The Checker was responsible for the maintenance of construction records and payrolls in a condition open for audit. All told, some 4000 pesos were spent on improving the municipal roads and other public works. The Engineer Corps assisted the municipality in some of these undertakings.

The guerrillas looked with hostility upon the public works program carried on by the puppet administration. For one thing, any improvement in facilities made it simpler for enemy patrols to track them down. Secondly, a public works program helped to stabilize conditions by providing income for the unemployed." Early in January, 1943, Manila notified Tacloban that the

Japanese Military Administration has appropriated ₱5,260,000.00 for maintenance and construction of national roads and bridges in the provinces.... The Provincial Treasurer or his representative is authorized... to come to Manila for the purpose mentioned.¹⁴⁴

The guerrilla took the only measure they knew possible in expressing their opposition. In his June report, the Governor noted: "At the end of the month, the assistant engineer of the Bureau of Public Works and four laborers were killed in ambush outside of Tolosa."¹⁴⁵

Thereafter, the puppet authorities provided military protection for their public works personnel when engaged in the field.

The government could be depended upon to turn a receptive ear to suggestions for augmenting food supply. In this connection, the Provincial Agricultural Supervisor forwarded a letter from his Assistant to the Provincial Board. This letter is of interest in indicating some of the factors contributing to the food shortage and in proposing a practical remedy:

Owing to the difficulty in transportation by water, the importation of commodities in this province is greatly reduced. And inasmuch as fishing materials and implements are very scarce, and as many fishermen quit their fishing industries due to the present condition, the supply of fresh fish in the province is greatly diminished. Reducing the importation of dried fish and diminishing the supply of fresh fish raises the demand for eggs, poultry and pork.

144. Dir. of Local Govts., Luna. Jan. 14, 1943. To: The Governor, Leyte.

145. Actg. Gov. Salazar. "Report of Activities: April 1-October 31, 1943." To: Commissioner of Interior through Director of Local Governments.

The demand for these commodities is very high so that the private poultry and hog raisers cannot supply the demand. The undersigned therefore recommends to the Food Administrator and Provincial Agricultural Supervisor the putting up of three poultry and hog-raising projects for the province. The projects must be located in the municipalities where fees are abundant. Places like Bontok and Bato are suitable.

To carry out the project, the Office should request the Provincial Board to appropriate the amount of P1,000 for building poultry houses, piggery, and fences; purchase hens, roosters, sows and boars; purchase of feeds; and for salaries and wages. I presume that a project of such kind, if properly administered, will turn out profitable at the end.

Endorsement of so ambitious a scheme entailed too many fiscal considerations for the Board to act without consulting the Provincial Treasurer.¹⁴⁶

The Treasurer counseled suspending action until available funds had been determined and the Board concurred.¹⁴⁷ Not long afterwards, the Provincial Agricultural Supervisor revised his initial estimate and sought a grant of P5,000 for the project as "the Provincial Budget has already been fixed and approved." Again the Board passed on this request for a supplementary allocation.¹⁴⁸

Dissemination of choice seedlings among the general public was another agricultural project to win governmental favor. The Provincial Board voted to establish a provincial nursery and demonstration lot for the purpose of raising various types of seedlings for free distribution to the public. "Resolved, to acquire through purchase a parcel of land, not less than three hectares, in Maasin."¹⁴⁹

Thereupon, the Board proceeded to authorize the Acting Provincial Supervisor "to make proper negotiation in purchase of a lot owned by Lim Ching Liam."¹⁵⁰

Conservation of forest preserves came in for great emphasis. In something of a lyrical vein, Colonel Kangleon tacked a preamble to an Executive Order imposing various restrictions on the use of the forests:

146. Prov. Bd. of Free Leyte. Oct. 5, 1943. Reso. No. 203, 23rd Session.

147. Resolution No. 240 of the Board, adopted at its 27th Session on Oct.

15, 1943, concurred with the indorsement of the Provincial Treasurer (Oct. 12, 1943), "advising that action on the request... for P1,000... be held in abeyance until the Provincial Agricultural Fund Budget shall have been approved, and until this office shall have determined the availability of funds by actual collection of revenue."

148. Prov. Bd. of Free Leyte. Oct. 26, 1943. Reso. No. 292, 30th Session.

Resolution No. 293 of the Board, indorsing to the Provincial Treasurer a "letter from the Provincial Agricultural Supervisor, dated October 25, 1943, subsequently requesting the Provincial Board and the Provincial Treasurer 'to appropriate the amount of P5,000 for putting up poultry and hog raising project as the Provincial Budget has already been fixed and approved.'"

149. Prov. Bd. of Free Leyte. Sept., 1943. Reso. No. 153.

150. Prov. Bd. of Free Leyte, Oct. 5, 1943. Reso. No. 197, adopted at 23rd Session.

Leyte has proven to be a stumbling block to the enemy not only because of the patriotism of its inhabitants, but also because of the thick and wide forests it has which afford safe place for the evacuation and hiding of loyal Filipinos. The importance of Leyte is due to its wealth in forest products and the numerous streams it has, which give beauty to the scenery and fertility to the soil. All efforts should be exerted to conservation.

Turning to the regulatory aspects, the Order goes on to say:

It is unlawful for any person to make a 'caingin' [a clearing for cultivation of crops] in a public forest or in any manner to destroy such forest or part or products growing therein during this emergency. It shall also be unlawful for any person negligently to permit a fire which has been set upon his own premises to be communicated with destructive results to any public forest. Violations punished by imprisonment not exceeding six months, in the court's discretion.¹⁵¹

The WIGWF also appreciated the importance of conserving timber resources. Miranda wrote:

Our forests in the municipalities under the supervision and control of the WIGWF were safeguarded and protected from unwise use. Forester Datoon of the Bureau of Forestry was in charge of the investigation and inspection of all forests. Violators of the forestry law were dealt with accordingly.¹⁵²

Agricultural Policy

Other examples of emergency projects might be cited. They were all in the nature of more or less ingenious scheme intended to raise output in some limited segment of the economy or in some particular locality. What we do not find are indications of over-all rationalization of agricultural production.

While we have noted that the guerrilla pressed for the turning of every parcel of land into cultivation, we fail to encounter any comprehensive land-use program worked out on paper, much less put into operation. No talk was heard of dispossessing lazy or inefficient farmers and assigning them to other work in the interest of community welfare. No mention was made of conserving agricultural manpower by distributing land--even temporarily--to the end of shaping farm lay-outs to conform with the technical requirements of efficient tillage. And indeed the thought of compelling farmers or even of advising them to organize for cooperative marketing of their produce simply never arose because it lay outside the ken of guerrilla experience.

Long-term agricultural policy in the sense of a program for post-war land utilization and development within Leyte did not reach the point of serious discussion. Of course it might be said in protest, a guerrilla movement not unified even on a provincial scale could hardly be expected to think in economic terms ordinarily associated with national planning boards.

151. Col. R. K. Kangleon. 26 April 1944. Executive Order No. 7.

152. Miranda, op. cit., p. 5.

Such objection is merely a footnote to the general condition noted elsewhere in this study--that independent thinking on the provincial level has been stultified by an over-centralization of Philippine administration unfriendly to the exercise of initiative. And it does not invalidate the contention here advanced that the entire concept of planning from the standpoint of community well-being was foreign to the operational ideas of the guerrilla in Leyte Province.

So far we have sampled certain instances of expansion of governmental functioning under the guerrillas that resulted not from any carefully conceived plan, but rather from the non-feasance on the part of the usual agencies. Now we must move ahead to consideration of another problem whose solution devolved upon the guerrilla authorities.

Poor Relief

Almost axiomatic for an invaded territory, the privations of hunger and nakedness must be endured by a subjugated people. How much more fierce the pangs of a resistant population evacuated to the hills to avoid collaboration with the hated invader. For these families a scanty diet and tatters were accepted. But when the breadwinners were mustered for active service! the burden of feeding the hungry little ones falling upon the woman left behind became unbearable.

While practicing rigorous economy, the guerrilla civil administrations remembered the plight of the destitute and did what they could to relieve their suffering. But the guerrilla could not allow their sympathies to upset their budgeting. Allocation of funds to poor relief reduced funds available for the military or for essential "social services. In a constant tugging contest philanthropic and prudential impulses alternately won out.

Impoverishment hung like a pall over western Leyte. Dependents of deceased soldiers and militia men had first call upon the largesse of the community. A species of death benefits payable to the widow were a token of communal responsibility for the victims of war. To be sure, such compensation was piteously meager and scarcely more than carried the survivors over the first shock of the tragedy. Thereafter they must fend as well as they might, receiving paltry donations whenever the state of the municipal purse would permit.

The community conscience was prodded from time to time by public appeals.¹⁵³ Among the standing orders received by the military and rural police, campaigning for the assistance of the needy became a fixed responsibility--especially for the aid of "those wives of soldiers who are actually fighting in the front, within our district first, then to other districts."¹⁵⁴

153. Of the many hard-hit elements of the population, the fugitives from the Japanese-occupied areas--notably Ormoc and surrounding territory--stood particularly in need of charity." Virtually all of their possessions had been left behind in the precipitate flight.

154. Benj. C. Barte, Chief MP Force of Batog. Dec. 20, 1942. Ins. No. 10. To: Military and Rural Police of Albuera.

General arrangements for poor relief early engrossed the attention of the west coast communities. Limited funds delayed devising of actual machinery for this undertaking. Towards the end of 1942, Albueras mayor, admitting that no positive steps had been taken, in exculpation made it known that "we are trying our best to find ways and means for the relief of the people, especially the indigents."¹⁵⁵

By February of 1943, Mayor Barte announced that "very soon the Municipal Council will open a project for this purpose."¹⁵⁶

March and April passed. Barte summed up:

The Municipal Council has approved a resolution for relief of two wives of soldiers sent to front [i.e., Luzon] at outbreak of war and not returned. Said wives hard up in their living and given P10 each. Other means of relief not made due to lack of funds!¹⁵⁷

Eventually, relief activities were placed on a more permanent and regular footing. Out of his enthusiasm for the projects undertaken, the Civil Affairs Officer gave voice to undoubtedly hyperbolic sentiments:

For the first time in the political history of municipal governments in the Philippines did the same go paternalistic. Appropriations were made by the municipal councils from the municipal revenue to rehabilitate the helpless indigents. Thus, a political precedent in the system of municipal governmental administration has been established. A very significant one because healthfully revolutionary.¹⁵⁸

Relief was needed on the east coast and in the south as well--and for similar reasons. La Paz, through the Provincial Board, requests

an information from Col. Balderian... as to what help the authorities concerned can make for the heirs of those deceased [killed by the Japs patrolling at Barrio Sta. Ana, on or about August 25, 1943], especially that they were not inducted to the First Guerrilla Brigade.¹⁵⁹

The "Baybay Affair" also created a rehabilitational problem. When Major De

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155. E. B. Barte, Mun. May. Dec. 15, 1942. Report of Civil Affairs from Dec. 1-15, 1942, Par. 4. To: CO, WLGWU (thru CO, Albueras Sector).
156. E. B. Barte, Mun. Mayor. Report of Civil Affairs for Feb., 1943, Par. 4. To: CO, WLGWU (thru CO, Albueras Sector).
157. Mun. Council of Albueras (Sgd.--Pedro Calabia, Mun. Secty.) Report of Civil Affairs for April, 1943, Par. 4. This appropriation, earmarked specifically, was prompted by the special "recommendation of the Adjutant General, by command of the Brigadier General of the WLGWF. In the Field, that the Municipal Council of this municipality may create a resolution for relief of indigent women... whose husbands were sent to the front at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija." Mun. Council of Albueras [Sgd.--Pedro Calabia] Mun. Secty.⁷ Reso. No. 14, adopted April 30, 1943.
158. Victorino C. Teleron, Capt., JAGS, Staff Judge Adv. Gen. & Civil Affairs Off. 31 May 1943. Report on Civil Affairs. To: The Adj. Gen., WLGWF, in the Field.
159. Prov. Bd. of Free Leyte. Oct. 11, 1943. Reso. No. 228, adopted at 26th Session, acting on Reso. No. 83, cs., of La Paz.

Gracia of Colonel Kangleon's command, in his surprise attack on Baybay routed the local garrison, that part of the population opposed to the Miranda rule welcomed the invaders. The reestablishment of Miranda control presaged retribution upon the disloyal element who therewith escaped across the Western Leyte "frontier". The towns offering sanctuary to these "rebels" had to adopt emergency assistance measures.

As the implacable opponent of the Miranda government, Attorney Domingo Veloso (elected Congressman in the 1946 elections) implored Governor Demeterio of "Free Leyte" (that is, in the Kangleon zone) to give support:

During and after the recapture of Baybay by the forces of Miranda, most of the people of that municipality evacuated to Inopacan, Hindang, Hilongos and Bato in order to be far from the scene of battle. At present, over 1,000 Baybayanos are scattered in these southern towns, waiting for the restoration of peace and order and the reestablishment of a just government in Baybay by the forces of the 92nd Division.

Meanwhile, these innocent victims of circumstances, far from their homes, and without their lands on which to fall back, are forced to make a living under the most miserable conditions... rather than submit to the rules of the Briguez State.

On behalf of these suffering compatriots, I respectfully address this letter in order to request the Hon. Provincial Board to extend a helping hand by appropriating a relief fund for these unhappy Baybayanos.

The Governor proved sympathetic. On receiving the Governor's communication, the Provincial Board resolved to "refer the said letter to the Food Administrator and Acting Provincial Agricultural Supervisor, requesting him to make proper survey investigation of said evacuees from Baybay and report on his findings with recommendations."¹⁶⁰

Subsequently, former Mayor Modina of Baybay appeared before the Provincial Board adding his testimony in favor of assistance to the refugees.¹⁶¹ In the face of indisputable need, the Board could not temporize. It resolved:

... to extend relief to Baybay evacuees in the municipalities of Inopacan, Hindang and Hilongos, authorizing for this purpose the Provincial Treasurer to release from the unappropriated fund in the Provincial Treasury the amount of ₱240 to be distributed as follows:

For the evacuees in Inopacan, ₱100; for Hindang, ₱40; for Hilongos, ₱100.

Further Resolved: that for the distribution of this relief, the Mayor of Baybay is authorized to determine who among the evacuees are to receive aid. He is instructed to be in contact with the Mayors of

160. Prov. Bd. of Free Leyte. Sept. 1, 1943. Reso. No. 81, 11th Session.

161. His estimate of the number of fugitives is lower than Veloso's. He cited 250 evacuees in Inopacan, more than 50 in Hindang, more than 200 in Hilongos, about 24 in Bato, a few in Matalom and some in Macrohon. However, he declared that the stream of evacuees had not ended at the time of his count.

the above-named municipalities who are also instructed to cooperate with and extend aid to said Municipal Mayor.^{161a}

Summarizing, we may say that there took place a noteworthy growth of governmental powers during the period of guerrilla control in Leyte. However, to infer from these developments any long-range trends in this direction would be quite unwarranted. We may arrive at such conclusions independently, however, by projecting into the future a recurrence of extraordinary circumstances either of economic depression or social unrest when the usual agencies for the transaction of affairs had been broken down." In the war-time expansion of governmental jurisdiction, tentative and uneven though these enlargements were, we might discover models for later deliberate planning!

F. Education for Resistance

A war of popular resistance against a foreign conqueror can be successfully waged only by mobilizing the total resources of a people. In Leyte, the guerrilla leadership understood this principle with sufficient clarity. They labored manfully to enlist and develop the invisible resources of the population to the end that the invader's yoke might be cast off. In the sections that follow we shall concern ourselves with guerrilla efforts to arouse and educate what we might call loosely the "will to resistance."

Elsewhere¹⁶² we considered the program drawn up by the puppet government in Tacloban to win over the population to accepting Japanese dominion. It was important that the guerrilla nullify this appeal and replace it with their own counter-propaganda. We shall take up the guerrilla program of counter-indoctrination as the foundation of their resistance campaign.

Once having won over a sizable segment of the population to support their objectives, the guerrilla had next to train them to resist with intelligence and effectiveness. First of all, the civilian elements absorbed into the guerrilla combat force must be schooled in the fundamentals of soldiering, while soldiers and specialist civilians called up to officerships must be given leadership training. Secondly, the auxiliaries, both men and women, marshalled as a home defense force, must be given special training. We shall consider the guerrilla program of mass education for military resistance.

Scarcely less important, the guerrilla undertook an intensive public health campaign to maintain the physical fitness of Leyte's population in the face of the debilitating conditions of war. Let the stamina of the population droop, the guerrilla leadership realized, and enemy surrender propaganda would exert an irresistible influence. We must therefore inquire into the health education program as part and parcel of the general resistance program.

Religion also entered into the picture. Leyte's population is made up largely of adherents to Roman Catholicism. The guerrilla were anxious to have the weight of institutional religion aligned on their side. Short of this, they were concerned that the religious obligations of the devout should in no wise collide with their duties as resisters. We shall pause then to touch upon the status of organized religion during the Occupation years.

^{161a}. Prov. Bd. of Free Leyte. Sept. 4, 1943. Reso. No. 83, 12th Session.

¹⁶². Lear, op. cit., pp. 190-201.

Finally, we turn to the question of education in the traditional, formal sense of schooling for the young. The guerrilla were concerned that the public schools in the area under their control should again function as a stabilizing influence in a period of turmoil and distress!

Guerrilla Propaganda

During the first phase of the war in the Pacific, when one after another the citadels of Western power toppled before the advancing Japanese forces, the people of Leyte were thrown into deep despondency. Filipino hopes that the initial Japanese smash attacks would be repulsed--the attackers thrown reeling back as soon as the Allies recovered from their surprise--met grim disappointment. With the passage of months, the Japanese dug in, consolidated their holds, and spoke of a long period of imperial rule. Their agencies of propaganda: press, radio, movies, mass meetings and controlled public schools--backed up by the strong and terrible arm of counter-intelligence, worked around the clock. And the conquerors painted bright pictures of untold blessings, provided the local population collaborated with them--warned of instant and frightful reprisal in the event of non-cooperation.

But the Japanese failed to win the friendship of the people of Leyte, though they succeeded in cowing large elements into submission. Despite their pretense of championing the rights of the Orientals against the oppression of Occidental imperialism, of restoring dignity to the degraded colored peoples in defiance of the supercilious whites, of building a new pan-Oriental culture purged of degenerate Western influences, the Japanese conducted themselves as cruel taskmasters interested almost entirely in exploiting their subjects. No new concepts of citizenship emerged, notwithstanding the fanfare of mass rallies. To the Filipino was reserved the role of the docile, obedient servant eligible for charity so long as he performed the tasks assigned to him with alacrity. And an occasional kick or slap was in order simply to give reminder of who was master.

The resistance movement in Leyte had its origin in revulsion against Japanese demeanor as much as in positive affirmation of Filipino nationalism and democracy. The guerrilla leaders realized that hatred against the invader was growing even if inhibited from public expression. They determined to capitalize upon every mistake made by the Japanese in their Occupation policy and daily behavior in order to make them appear as heinous as possible. Much of guerrilla propaganda took the form of scathing denunciation of Japanese cruelty and stupidity, coupled with an expose of what they called "the hypocrisy of the enemy's" Filipino spokesmen. The rest of the guerrilla outpourings in broadside or at gatherings of the barrio folk was directed towards giving the lie to Japanese claims of victory in the Pacific war and in replanting the seeds of faith in American liberation.¹⁶³

163. The puppet Governor acknowledged the effectiveness of anti-Japanese propaganda: "Many still think that America can and will send aid to the Philippines. This they hear from radios which they were able to take with them to the mountains...." B. Torres, Prov. Gov. March 1, 1943. To: Commander, District of Visayas, Japanese Imperial Forces.

In this section, we will look into the nature of guerrilla propaganda in Leyte as carried on by some of the leading guerrilla organization. The guerrilla units of Eastern Leyte carried a good part of the burden of counter-propaganda. Eastern Leyte was the center of enemy troop concentrations; here the pro-Japanese propaganda was most intensively disseminated. One such unit declared:

In order to enliven the spirit and keep up the morale of both fighting men and the civilian population, and to disseminate correct information about the war situation, both at home and abroad, this headquarters has organized a Propaganda Corps.

This guerrilla unit's program, duplicated by other organizations, consisted of the following activities:

A unit of this Corps is editing a news-sheet, 'The Bugle,' which came out under this name on November 11, 1942, an outgrowth of the 'News Highlights' which first came out on October 19, 1942.

This news-sheet shall be, as heretofore, issued daily and on a non-profit basis. And for our sources of news we use the daily broadcasts of the following stations: KGEI--Sn. Francisco, KWID--Sn. Francisco, KET--Sn. Francisco and BBC--London.

The following is the Table of Organization of the Editorial and Business Staff of 'The Bugle':

| | |
|---------------------|--|
| Editor | Chief, Propaganda Corps |
| Associate | Chief, S-1 Stenographer & Typists . Members, S-1 |
| Business Manager". | Chief, S-4 Circulation Manager". Chief, S-2 ¹⁶⁴ |

The amalgamation of the East Leyte guerrilla outfits under the command of Major Balderian presaged a stepping up of resistance propaganda output, as well as improvement in quality of the releases. The able Dr. Ralph Posuncuy, Balderian's intelligence chief, assumed directorship of the enterprise. He worked out an ambitious program including the holding of public meetings in the barrios (and in the towns, wherever possible) designed to whip up public sentiment for resistance and elicit material support for the guerrilla. He also printed inflammatory leaflets secretly distributed by his operatives.

The difficulties that Posuncuy sought to overcome were presented in more limited context by one of his followers, treating the psychological obstacles encountered:

The VOFP's job was made harder by the fact that Mr. and Mrs. Average Reader opened their paper expecting to read of the bombing of Tokyo, the landing of American soldiers in the Philippines or the sudden miraculous end of the war. But the day's news told only of fighting in remote, far-flung places.... The local situation did not lend encouragement to despairing hearts. People scanned the sea and air in vain for a sign of those planes and ships which, they were told, were coming out of American factories and shipyards by the thousands. Not a few Thomases shook their heads in doubt. Japs and more Japs were pouring into the island. The guerrillas, already running low in ammunition, were carrying on a fight, brave, but seemingly futile and hopeless.

164. Lt. F. Balagtas, S-1, Hdqtrs No. 8, Leyte Guerrilla Forces, USAFFE, 11 Nov. 1942. Par. 1-4!

The job of the man who has to soothe a suffering patient by telling him that the doctor would surely come--in spite of the fact that a fierce storm is raging, the bridges are down, the rivers swollen, and the roads badly destroyed--has never been easy or enviable. And yet that in effect was the VOFP's job. To tell the people that America was coming back, no matter what.... To contribute to Japan's strength and fighting power by helping supply her factories with needed raw materials would be to delay the day of our deliverance and prolong our period of agony. The guerrillas had done their job of harassing the enemy, disrupting his plans and hindering his efforts to make the most out of his occupation of the country. It would be up to the civilians to do their share, too, by remaining loyal to the cause and refusing to cooperate with Japan.

That was the burden of all VOFP preachings. It was asking the people to make sacrifices and endure hardships.... But the great majority of the people... were prepared to give more than just enough. The people feared and hated the Japs so much--a fact for which we stand indebted to the Jap soldier himself, who with his brutal ways did a very efficient job of making himself most sincerely hated.¹⁶⁵

The VOFP was the Voice of the Free People, a fortnightly laboring in the guerrilla cause, first published by Posuncuy's office in November, 1942. The setting up of the VOFP is recalled in a Liberation number of the same publication, dated January 18, 1945. Adorned by a coverpiece symbolizing "Revival," the issue carried an article entitled, "The Story of a Voice":

... The Japs had full control over the press and radio. Jap periodicals, leaflets and pamphlets literally rained over the country giving the people the Jap side to the news and issues"of the day. The people were tired of hearing about the exploits of the invincible Imperial Japanese Fleet, the ever-victorious Imperial Japanese Army. ... They wanted to read some real, honest news--not the sort of hash ground out by the sleek Japanese propaganda machine in Tokyo. If a guerrilla newspaper could only be published....

Soon Capt. Posuncuy & Co. got busy translating the idea into" reality.... Somehow they got together some nondescript equipment and materials: a battered but still serviceable mimeograph, several radio sets, badly needing repair, some stencils and paper salvaged from schoolhouses and municipal buildings. The press looked more like a junk room than anything. But what the budding publishers lacked in materials, they made up with their ingenuity and spirit. Burning their midnight oil, they labored and sweated over their first issue.

The first issue made its debut unobtrusively, with no fanfares and without benefit of any prominent man's benediction. It was a modest beginning, containing some war news and a reproduction of President Roosevelt and President Quezon's inspiring messages to the Philippine people given on the occasion of the 7th Anniversary of the Philippine Commonwealth, then an exile government. The news had to be checked and rechecked carefully against errors; atlases and encyclopedias had to be consulted--a tedious process which became a matter of routine with every succeeding issue and which eventually earned for the

165. P. L. Yap, "The Story of a Voice," The Voice of the Free People, January 18, 1945, p. 3.

paper a reputation for accuracy and reliability. The paper was given a name: "The Voice of the Free People." It was more than a name; it was, unwittingly, an apt description of a queer situation--of a people of an enslaved country remaining free. As the Japs were to find out later, the Philippines was conquered but not the Filipinos.¹⁶⁶

In December, 1942, Posuncuy learned of the presence in San Isidro of Pedro Yap, a young man with a journalistic flair. Yap had edited several college publications as an undergraduate at the University of the Philippines. He consented to serve as chief of Posuncuy's Propaganda Corps (including the editorship of the VOFP) when the situation and the need for directorship in this important branch of resistance work was outlined to him. Yap said of the public reaction:

The response of the public was gratifying. In time, people began clamoring for the VOFP. It was to them an oasis in a veritable desert of lies and misinformation.... To the people reached by its circulation, the VOFP gave out news which no Jap-controlled newspaper would even dare to publish--news of Allied air, naval and land victories in all theaters of the war, of Jap and Nazi losses and of the gigantic war production of America, the arsenal of democracy.¹⁶⁷

The VOFP played an important part in stiffening civilian morale and deserves some comment regarding its lay-out. The outer cover was an off-set from an original sketching, tastefully done on a stencil sheet, a sketching changed with every issue. Then would follow a timely editorial, a commentary on some phase of the over-all war situation, on Japanese intentions vis-a-vis the Philippines, or on the policies of the local puppet officials. The feature section carried varied articles, some political, some moralistic and exhortative, some literary. A final section consisted of a brief round-up of the latest news events throughout the world, mainly concerned with military operations. Interspersed throughout the paper or in one section were chatty tid-bits about personalities within the local guerrilla movement, intended to foster a comradeship among the troops and to knit closer ties between civilians and guerrilla. In addition to editor-in-chief Yap (nom de plum Y. Plaredo) were Hermenegildo Granados serving as news editor (Gil Grand), Angel Enteroso as art editor (Enso Gelanrete), Fortunato Pore (Purita Fortuna) as business manager.

Let us offer a few excerpts from a typical issue, that of June 19, 1943, from the editorial of that date devoted to an analysis of the Japanese "independence" pledge to the Filipinos:

But if the Japanese propaganda magicians think that they can hypnotize us into submission by continually harping on the prospect of our getting independent within this year as Premier Tojo promised they are sadly mistaken. We cannot easily be hoodwinked into accepting promises--especially when such promises come from Tokyo. We know exactly just what value to attach to Japanese promises.... The tide of war in the Southwest Pacific and in China has clearly turned! Japan is suffering heavily from the terrific blows.... If she withdraws from the Philippines, Japan would lose face. And to lose face, for Japan, is unthinkable. For this reason, she must be thinking now of a good face-

166. Ibid., p. 2.

167. Ibid., p. 3.

saving excuse. By promising to grant us our independence on condition that we cooperate with her wholeheartedly, Japan could say later, when she will be forced to withdraw from the Philippines, that she is only making her promise good.... But there is one thing which the Japanese propagandists have missed in their calculations. They have forgotten that we are a people trained in the processes of democracy. ... Hence we have been trained to think for ourselves.... Japan's version of independence is freedom granted to a people to obey and follow her wishes and her dictates.... Clarifying the condition of Burma's independence, the Japanese Premier explained that the independence of Burma will not be based on the Anglo-American idea of independence..!. The Philippines will become a mere piece in the huge Japanese jig-saw puzzle, the so-called Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.... America has promised us Real independence. We believe in America's word. We are fighting side by side with her..!. The victory of our cause means not only the liberation of one nation, but of all nations which are suffering under the heel of the modern tyrants.

Here is a sober assessment of hollow Japanese pretensions, an exposure of chicanery, and with enough emotional ring to arouse a detestation in Filipino hearts of this Japanese imposture.

A timely article on "Teodora Alonzo," mother of the Philippine national hero Jose Rizal must have offered some consolation to the mothers whose sons were risking their lives in prosecuting the cause of resistance. The article concludes:

For a mother to rear a genius and a hero to manhood, to watch him grow into a fine, well-principled man, to see him persecuted for his ideas and ideals, to suffer persecutions herself on his account, to witness his martyrdom and finally to see his country do him honor and justice is perhaps more than any mother can ask for. And yet, that--in a nutshell--is the life of Teodora Alonzo Realonda.

Another article, entitled "Our Sixth Column," a reprint of "a speech delivered at the General Convocation of Volunteer Guards held at Barrio Cutay, Carigara, June 12, 1943," by Captain Briccio Aguilos undoubtedly found an appreciative audience among a wide segment of the civilians:

So far, we have succeeded in keeping these parts of our country free from the contaminating and polluting touch of the enemy. But the enemy seems to be resuming his activities. Increased vigilance on our part, therefore, is necessary. A volunteer guard, as the name suggests, must ever be on the guard. It is a grave responsibility and a difficult task which all volunteer guards are expected to perform to the best of their ability. It is a duty which they owe to themselves, to God, and to country.

There is power in the simple directness of this appeal and invocation.

Under the caption of "Here and There," the "Roving Reporter" commented:

Speaking before a capacity crowd which gathered to witness the first Home Guard competition to be held in Carigara last June 12,

Col. Balderian stressed the importance of planting short-time crops in order to prevent any shortage of food.... Sixty-eight student officers, comprising the second batch of graduates of the Officers' Service School, took their diplomas last June 14. Topping the list of graduates was Capt. Robert Walsstrom (MC). Lts. P. Posuncuy and A. Mate got second and third places, respectively.... Motor alcohol from tuba which can be used to run cars has been successfully produced in experimental quantity by the AIACO.... Miss Anita Trani became the wife of Major Pio Oritz in a quiet and simple ceremony held at the Carigara church last Thursday, June 17. Miss Henrietta Tonolete was the bridesmaid and Capt. P. Kierulf, the best man. After the ceremony, the wedding breakfast was served at the house of the bride's grandmother....

The war news, consisting of a global coverage, is temperate in tone, containing no blood-thirsty war-whooping against Japan, but attempts to create the impression by a mountainous heaping of items in every theater of operations that the massed might of the Allies is simply irresistible. The section closes with a quotation from Franklin D. Roosevelt: "The light of democracy must be kept burning. To the perpetuation of this light, each must do his share...."

Yap recalled with pride:

The VOFP staff continued to put out the paper despite the enemy. The press had to keep moving, taking care not to stay in any one place too long. The Japs might come to know its address, and pay the paper a surprise visit. But eventually the Japs caught the VOFP. In a surprise midnight raid, on November 7, 1943, the Japs found their prey in a small hut deep in the forest of Carigara. Most of the men, including Capt. Posuncuy, managed to escape though. The Japs killed three, captured two of the VOFP editors and smashed the printing equipment. And equipment at the time was even harder to replace than editors.... The VOFP as a news organ of the guerrilla met its tragic end in that November raid. But as a voice speaking for freedom and human dignity, it never died. It cannot and will never die... so long as there be men willing to forego the privilege of living in comfort and ease, of drinking coffee every morning, of never missing a meal, of sleeping in soft warm beds, and of wearing shoes and well-pressed clothes--men who would rather forego all these than lose their rights and dignity as free men.... Men like Dr. Ralph Posuncuy who sacrificed a lucrative practice and a life of ease and comfort in order to dedicate his life to freedom's cause, preferring death, in the end, to surrender....¹⁶⁸

Not only the 95th Regiment, but the battalion too carried on their propaganda activities. Francisco Monge reported (in interview) that the "Propaganda Publicity Corps, Intelligence Section" of Battalion 2 had its own radio set, mimeograph machine and accessories. He depended upon friends in Tacloban to supply the materials and secretly to recharge the radio batteries whenever they began to go low. They called their little paper the Karatung, which sometimes appeared as often as twice weekly. It was not as finished a piece of work as the VOFP, but it was distributed widely by intelligence operatives and their agents. The S-2 office of the battalion was mobile. Unfortunately, Japanese counter-intelligence informed the enemy at

168. Yap, op. cit., p. 4.

the time the S-2 was in San Miguel. The Japanese dispatched a patrol which raided the S-2 office (June 19, 1943) capturing the printing materials, two radio batteries, and the Karatung office file. The remains of the paper were finally lost during the American shellings, which destroyed the evacuation place.

A guerrillero summed up the resistance propaganda work in north-east Leyte:

While the pro-Japanese were publishing the Leyte Shimbun newspaper in Tacloban.... publications in mimeographed form were being circulated to the mountain people to counteract the pro-Japanese paper. They were being published in Carigara, Jaro, Babatngon, where radio receiving sets were available....¹⁶⁹

The same writer also paid tribute to the efforts of the public school teachers.

The teachers were assigned to canvass homes to take a census of the families, to teach home industries, and for the dissemination of information on the War. Lectures were being conducted by the teachers in different places to bolster up the morale.¹⁷⁰

In east central Leyte, Captain Erfe was faced with the reality of the enemy occupation. The material fact of enemy oppression was indisputable. He could not argue this away. He could only appeal to the love of nation and of freedom, and the promise of American aid in an unspecified future. The rapacity and intimidation practiced by outlaw bands posing as guerrilleros only deepened the sense of mass despair. Under these circumstances, it is not to be wondered at that there was "plenty of loose talk and the people could not be prevailed upon to stop it."¹⁷¹

Erfe mustered all his resources to inflame the population of his zone to the cause of resistance. His cause was a righteous cause and no true Filipino could fail to respond to its appeal. In an open letter to the people of Leyte, he declared:

... I should like to take this opportunity, as the Commanding Officer, USAFFE AT LARGE, LEYTE, and the Guerrilla Warfare Serving Units, to mention here-under what our soldiers and guerrilla men are fighting for and pray to Almighty God for our ultimate victory.

- a. Preservation of human liberty and democracy
- b. Preservation of our way of life and the principles of self respect
- c. To uphold rule of right and justice
- d. To preserve our future independence..!.
- e. To be free from fear of aggression and subjugation by a nefarious nation
- f. To safeguard the life and properties of our civilian population from lawless and subversive elements.

169. Ibid., p. 13.

170. Potente, op. cit., p. 13.

171. Mercado, op. cit., p. 26.

g. Elimination of sectionalism and regional prejudices, but instead to instill in the people a stronger consciousness of national solidarity which now, more than ever before, necessitates consolidation of our efforts and resources into one solid and united front.¹⁷²

This Headquarters directs, therefore, that all Commanding Officers, Detachment Commanders and Brigade Commanders should read this Message to all their soldiers and guerrilla men and to civilians in order to eliminate doubts as to what our soldiers and guerrilla men stand for in their stubborn resistance against the invaders; and in order that they shall know the noble purposes and aims of our countrymen who have voluntarily taken up arms; that besides the perpetuation of those that are already mentioned above, freedom of worship, freedom of speech, freedom to follow our own conviction and the dictates of our heart shall be preserved forever in our midst.¹⁷³

And in another message, addressed to the guerrilla leaders, he urged them to remember the glorious traditions of Leyte:

You have heard and read in the history of Leyte, the exploits of Polahan and guerrilla warriors of Francisco Flordelis of Hilongos forty three years ago. The guerrilla units now well organized in Leyte shall not be found wanting in their exploits against the barbarian invaders now bent on slaughtering; marauding our people in Leyte. Our guerrilla fighters are well selected men of bravery and daring, ready to sacrifice their life and their loved ones in order to destroy this 'Scourge of God.'¹⁷⁴

Erfe, in many other messages and proclamations, sought to whip up the will of the people to endure the privations of resistance rather than succumb to the alternate terror and blandishments of the Japanese.¹⁷⁵ With a

172⁴ This point is unique. None of Leyte's other guerrilla leaders included it among expressions of fighting aims. It suggests Erfe's own sensitivity to his Ilocano extraction in a region populated by Visayans traditionally suspicious of Ilocanos!

His guerrilla auditor, Ramon Mercado, voiced the same anxiety that localistic narrowness might vitiate the effectiveness of guerrilla propaganda. He too was a non-Visayan and in his stumping he found himself saying: "It is true that I am not a native of this province. But the place of birth is not important. What is important is that I am like you -- a Filipino. The last drop of blood that flows in my veins is Filipino. The place where I was born is within the jurisdiction of the Philippines. And therefore, I am your brother who feels what you feel and having a sentiment as yours. As a Filipino, it is not only my pride and birth right, but it is my solemn duty to fight for my country's rights and ideals...."

Mercado, op. cit., p. 26.

173. 9 Col. Inf., GHQ USAFFE AT LARGE, 11 Jan. 1943. Subject: "WHAT THE USAFFE AT LARGE AND GUERRILLA WARFARE UNITS, LEYTE, Are Fighting For."

To: All the people of Leyte, Par. 2-3.

174. Prov. of Leyte. 11 Jan. 1943. Memo. No. 13. To: All Commanding Officers, Detachment Commanders, Brigade Commanders.

175. Elsewhere, Erfe had declared that "the love to live a life of right and justice has prompted us not to surrender and to form the so-called USAFFE AT LARGE, Leyte. This organization because of that inspiration prefers to

(continued on next page)

sense of the dramatic, Erfe used every contrivance to get his message across. Thus, Erfe directed that the mayor of Burauen, be "installed... immediately after the taking of the town with an appropriate ceremony, with all his people present. This is necessary in order to mark the return of democracy in his civil government...."176

Erfe had the active, unceasing cooperation of his subordinates in the furtherance of his purposes. Ramon Mercado recites some of the conditions faced in these exhortations in "the Dulag sector:

We started a systematic campaign meeting the barrio lieutenant and some influential people, and in places where there were many evacuees talking to them on the importance of united action for a common cause. At first we found the people cool and frigid about the idea for fear that when caught by the Japs they would suffer torture and possibly death. It was not only for themselves that they were afraid, but for their families as well. It was already a common knowledge among the people that when a guerrillero was caught, he and his family were killed. But due to our incessant pounding on them the sense of patriotism, coupled with the idea of the liability of being killed even if they were not members of the underground, their doubt vanished and they joined the movement freely and enthusiastically.

In our campaign, I stressed the necessity of being united for mutual help and protection. I said, 'It is important in this time of emergency to have mutual understanding for by such we may be able to protect ourselves and escape the brutalities of our enemy. We have two kinds of enemies to deal with. The enemies from within and the enemies from without. From within are those quislings who may be with us now. This kind of enemy could hardly be recognized for he is like us--a Filipino. From without are the Japs who at times can be mistaken for Filipinos. With an organization, we will not only be able to repel the tyranny of the invaders but we may be able to stamp the activities of the quislings and ultimately catching them....

'We can never be slaves. We have learned from our tutor, our beloved USA, to be free and liberty loving people. We were taught to

live and die fighting the enemy wherever opportunity opens." 9, Capt. Inf., Comdg. USAFFE AT LARGE. 14 Dec. 1942. Memo to: Lt. Balderian.

And in a ringing manifesto, at the time of his final reorganization, Erfe said: "... WHEREAS; we know that the progress of a nation has for its firm foundation her independence and liberty, thus the citizens treasure this the noblest and sublime sentiment before which should fade the fear for the safety of our interests and of our families and for which we should not hesitate to shed blood that we may break the barbarous abuses of the enemy;

WHEREAS; this truth, that resistance is inspired by justice and right, is exemplified in the history of all civilized nations, for none of these would tolerate the least aggression against its territory without being ready to sacrifice the last drop of blood in the defense of its national integrity...." Glicerio I. Erfe, Col. Inf., Mili. Adviser, 11th Guer. Div. 21 May 1943. "Proclamation."

176. 9 Comdr. USAFFE AT LARGE, Leyte. 1 Nov. 1942. "Post Haste Memo".
To: Lt. Balderian, #1050.

lead a democratic life, but such life is being curtailed, nay withheld from us, by the tyrannical and despotic invaders. But we will not regain the lost freedom by just sitting and being indifferent. We have got to do something. We have got to fight. Fight with all our might. Fight for our right; fight for the rights of our children's children; fight for our liberty and freedom. I am appealing to your sense of patriotism to defend our country's freedom. Let us unite and fight for a common cause, common principle and common ideal against our common enemy. Let us sacrifice. There is no sweeter, better and greater sacrifice than that sacrifice made for the freedom of our country. 177

To maintain morale, it was necessary for Erfe to show that Leyte was not totally cut off from the world outside. How else could promises of Allied aid to the conquered Islands be made known? It was also of vital importance to give the lie to enemy boasts of victory after victory in the Pacific war and of Axis victories elsewhere. Erfe came to regard the dissemination of favorable war news and the making of prognostications on that basis as a highly important aspect of his mission. Silveria Paza, serving as Erfe's chief clerk before his appointment as Adjutant, used to make transcriptions of short wave news broadcasts from San Francisco (Station KGEI) received on the Headquarters radio set. Erfe was further aided by the addition to his staff of Manuel P. Mondejar, who had received some training as a newspaperman along with his legal education. Mondejar was appointed Chairman of the Propaganda Corps and also Editor-in-Chief of the Headquarters journal.

The Abuyog guerrilla brigade was actively engaged in its own propaganda work:

On the morning of March 30, 1943, 'PIONEER' a mimeographed tabloid containing but four pages greeted the eyes of the people for the first time in many months. It was published by the second guerrilla brigade and contained foreign war news, local briefs, editorial column, and a vernacular section. It was the local version of what the Public Relations Office publishes for the armed forces! The paper went as far as the municipalities of Baybay, Tacloban, and Carigara, but came out only four times--eight pages in its second and third issues, and six, but wider, pages in the last. It could not come out beyond June, 1943, since we who stood behind it ran short of stationery and were called to teach when schools were reopened in places not occupied by the enemy. 178

Residents of east-central Leyte will testify concerning the effectiveness of Erfe's propaganda messages and activities. Ironically, Erfe's organization fell short in selling itself to higher authorities and failed to gain American recognition as a bona fide guerrilla outfit. A more successful liaison with CHQ, South-west Pacific, might have brought a more favorable issue.

Maintenance of civilian morale was one of the primary missions of the WLGWF. The civilians had to be convinced that collaboration with the Japanese was unpatriotic, that the Japanese victories were only temporary and would be soon reversed by growing Allied might, that the United States would redeem her pledge to establish an independent Philippines--and, on the

177. Mercado, op. cit., pp. 35-36.

178. Aurillo, op. cit., p. 4.

other side, that those apprehended as collaborationists would be dealt with fittingly. An indispensable item in such a program was a radio set that could tune in to the world outside blockaded Leyte. The Japanese confiscated whatever radio sets they could lay their hands on during the initial stages of the occupation. Miranda was able to salvage some damaged sets and brought them to his GHQ.

Listening in on an overseas newscast for the guerrilla had been a 24-hour assignment for Sevilla. The news was too important for even a jot to be missed. Sevilla alternated with his wife in standing sentinel and making transcriptions.¹⁷⁹ One of the most heartening pieces of news from the standpoint of effect upon troop morale, according to Sevilla, was that of the American landings on New Guinea. The Aleutian campaign also created a stir for it stressed the invincibility of the American home base. As for the speeches of President Roosevelt, they were received with elation, copied in quantity, widely distributed, and interpreted in local Visayan dialect for the English illiterates by the guerrilla officers.

When a runner buzzing with excitement entered the GHQ, brandishing last-minute newscopy from an overseas broadcast, he was generally referred to the desk of the Deputy Chief of Staff. Conrado Sabellino in his capacity as chief of the Propaganda Corps. had as major assignment the dissemination of pro-Allied propaganda among troops and civilians alike. Orientation hours were arranged for the soldiers, during which time the latest news was related and interpreted by a unit-officer while the enlisted men were encouraged to discuss its significance. Sabellino had the responsibility of contacting the units directly or through assistants and priming the unit officers. In every barrio, community assemblies were held, generally presided over by the barrio lieutenant. Here the Volunteer Guards and all interested civilians had the opportunity to hear and talk over the latest military developments on all fronts.

Sabellino's office also distributed copies of interesting news stories and political cartoons, all designed to bolster troop morale. In the months of September and October, 1943, when the Japanese released their barrage of Philippine independence propaganda (Made-in-Tokyo independence, as the guerrilla styled it), Miranda specially commissioned Sabellino to offset this appeal.¹⁸⁰ And Miranda believed this counter-propaganda was very necessary in view of the effect of the Japanese appeal.¹⁸¹

In southern Leyte, the name of Attorney Domingo Veloso surmounted the list of propagandists selected by Colonel Kangleon to head his propaganda

179. During the time of the Baybay attack by the Kangleon forces, Sevilla transferred his set from the GHQ. He feared that it might be confiscated in the event that the southerners should storm the GHQ. Four months later, he undertook the painful job of disconnecting the wires and abandoning his set in the mountains. The Japanese had begun their mop-ping-up campaign. Radio sets were not only being seized; possession of a set sealed the fate of the owner.

180. The WLGWF propaganda releases were at once spirited and to the point!

181. Only in terms of Japanese persuasiveness could Miranda account for the treachery of some of his own followers who personally led the Japanese cohorts in their assault upon his GHQ.

service. Veloso's methods were essentially the same as those used by the other guerrilla spokesmen. He made effective use of the school teachers in agitating among the barrio folk in favor of resistance and in urging the people to hold fast against the demoralization accompanying arrival of Japanese reinforcements.

Unfortunately for the cause of Leyte's resistance movement, Attorney Veloso had a pet hate--the WIGWF of Miranda! For this there are several explanations. One is that he had been serving as justice of the peace in his home community of Baybay during the first phase of the Japanese occupation, and was frightened by a "flying squad" (sent by Miranda) into flight to the "south." Another--that he was nursing a bitter family grudge against his cousin and namesake Dr. Domingo Veloso (chief surgeon of the WIGWF) and was prepared to damn any organization granting honors to this kinsman. Attorney Veloso himself declared that he hated the WIGWF because it was a corrupt and tyrannical organization.¹⁸²

Be that as it may, Veloso devoted much of his efforts (with the complete accord of Colonel Kangleon) to vituperative articles and speeches against the WIGWF, inflaming the population of the southern communities to abhor Miranda as an ogre little better than the Japanese. Not only that, representatives of the guerrilla movement in neighboring islands while on visit to Leyte, had their ears filled with lurid accounts of Miranda's gruesome organization. Unfortunately, this vilification campaign backfired. It led some of the people to regard all of the guerrillas as cutthroats and robbers and hence to accept Tacloban's characterization of the guerrillas as outlaws--enemies of the people.

By and large, we may say that the anti-collaborationist propaganda disseminated by the guerrilla groups on Leyte was highly successful. It brought encouragement and faith to thousands of Leyte's people during the darkest hours of the enemy occupation. It brought news of Allied victories in a global war that flatly contradicted Japanese reports of mastery everywhere. And it helped to weld bands of fellowship among the "resisters, showing them that they were not alone in the struggle, but were in partnership with other groups carrying on in neighboring municipalities.

Guerrilla Officership Training

A citizen army, if it is to be more than a nondescript collection of men authorized to bear arms publicly, requires considerable training. And training implies the presence of trainers, men reasonably versed in at least the rudiments of military science. The guerrilla organizations of Leyte experienced an acute lack of trained officers capable not only of leading but of developing latent leadership capacity among the non-commissioned officer personnel. It was to cope with this deficiency that each of the guerrilla organizations set to work establishing general service officer training schools.

The administrative and instructional staffs of these schools were drawn from the few commissioned officers already serving with the guerrilla forces. Quite often the commanding officer of the organization recognized his own

182. Interview: 41st Inf. Regt., Leyte, 1945.

incapacity to function as commandant of the training school and sought desperately for a qualified administrator. Thus Alejandro Balderian, but a lieutenant at the outbreak of the war, found himself breveted a colonel and heading a guerrilla division at the beginning of 1943 with no experienced field grade officers to lean upon for advice. Blas E. Miranda, breveted a brigadier general, had been but a constabulary lieutenant when the Japanese came to Leyte. It is true that Glicerio Erfe, pretender to the guerrilla headship of Leyte in the early period, was a captain and had had some previous administrative experience as adjutant, but this scarcely sufficed for the job at hand.

Fortunately for Miranda and Balderian, circumstances conspired to enable the setting up of service schools within their territories. In the case of Miranda, a highly competent officer who had before the war been sent by the Philippine Army to attend a special training course at Fort Benning, Georgia, Major Marcos Soliman, had taken refuge at Palompon, Leyte, within the jurisdiction of the WLGF. Miranda learned of his whereabouts, invited him to join up with his guerrilla, and appointed him chief of staff with the special mission of founding a General Service School and serving as superintendent.

Balderian's service school was founded under yet more peculiar circumstances. One of his subordinates succeeded in ambushing a small party of high ranking officers sent out on a pacification mission by the puppet authorities in Tacloban. When captured, they pleaded that their supposed mission was simply a hoax, a plot hatched by them to enable them to throw down their collaborationist assignments without risking decapitation at Japanese hands. Be that as it may, they were handed over to Balderian and taken into custody. Balderian had the perspicacity to appreciate the possibilities of exploiting this windfall. Lieutenant Colonel Juan Causing and Major Abay were appointed to set up and administer a general service school with their assistants Lieutenant Radaza and Sergeant Gabe acting as instructors.

The guerrilla leaders were to afford their unit commanders the benefit of this special training at once. Many of the mainstays of Balderian (such as Pabilona and Pamanian) or of Miranda (such as Daffon) had been only sergeants before the war and had much to learn about the responsibilities of officership. It was urgent that they acquire the needed skills with the utmost dispatch so that they in turn might impart information to their subordinates.

A special series of short courses lasting from four to six weeks was instituted at the guerrilla division headquarters--of each of the organizations. The first class of enrollees consisted generally of the executive officer of each sector command and one or more unit officers. Upon graduation from this course, the executive officer would temporarily assume charge of his unit, while the commanding officer went on temporary duty with the service school. In the case of some units, the cadre was incomplete or inexperienced with the result that a deprivation of officers, even temporarily, was quite serious. Nevertheless, each unit worked out its own adjustments and was all the stronger for the training its officers had received.

The courses of instruction were in no sense novel. They included the old stand-bys (as prescribed by U. S. Army training manuals) of close order and extended order drill, military courtesy, first aid, etc. What constituted their special value, in terms of their adaptation to conditions of guerrilla warfare, were the lectures on military-civilian relations. Unfortunately, insufficient attention was devoted to this most important subject with the result that needless blunderings in public relations were committed by the guerrilla officers.

In addition to the direct effect this training program had of improving the officership of the guerrilla units, it also exerted a significant secondary influence upon the general morale. The guerrilla commanders were insightful enough to realize that the stock of resistance would rise in the minds of the people if the public was kept informed of all measures undertaken to improve the quality of the fighting men. Accordingly, the guerrilla undertook to give the widest possible publicity to the training program. Along the same line, the public was invited to the special graduation ceremonies held at the termination of each training period. It was a gala event, attended not only by the families and friends of the proud graduates, but by companies of the Volunteer Guards drawn up in full array. Local politicians lent prestige to the occasion by their presence and utilized the opportunity to exhort the people to remain true to Filipino ideals and to confirm their faith in a speedy delivery at the hands of American liberation force. Graduation stood out as a joyous and yet solemn event in the minds of Leyte's resisters!

Training the Guerrilla Auxiliaries

Mention has been made of the Volunteer Guards. It is important that they be considered in this general section, wherein we are concerning ourselves with the education of the citizenry for resistance. The Volunteer Guards, sometimes known as "bolomen" after the arms with which they were usually equipped, were an auxiliary guerrilla force drawn from the male citizenry. They consisted of the older men and adolescents as well as the men of fighting age who for one reason or another were exempted from active combat duty. They were organized into companies and regiments under the general supervision of the sector commander of the combat detachment. They might be headed by a retired professional soldier or by some person of local influence--frequently the barrio lieutenant in the rural barrios and the mayor in the town (where the town was under guerrilla control).

The Volunteer Guards would assemble weekly, usually on Sundays, either at a guerrilla camp or an open area for parade and drill. Lectures and demonstrations in first aid, military courtesy and allied subjects would also take place. In addition to these prescribed times of assembly, the VGs, as they were known, were to hold themselves in readiness for muster either by units or as individuals. They might be called on for a great variety of labor services: soliciting foodstuffs for the combat troops, hauling supplies to points of storage, cultivating communal fields for the benefit of the troops. And, of course, the VGs were expected to mount guard at stipulated outposts, keeping sharp lookout for the approach of enemy patrols and giving warning by a jungle code of bamboo drumming. In the event of skirmishing between guerrilla units and Japanese patrols, the VGs were expected to render whatever service they could.

Colonel Kangleon's guerrilla auditor, himself a volunteer guard, related the multifarious activities of the VGs:

The number of able-bodied men were such that we could install outposts of volunteer guards located at less than $\frac{1}{2}$ kilometer distance from each other, detailing three guards at each post at a time; each man serving only once a week on a 12-hour duty. These guards perform a number of duties, among which were: to keep peace and order, to be posted on the movements of the enemy and relay news to the next outpost, advise the surrounding inhabitants of any precautionary measures, examine passersby of suspicious characters and when in doubt to turn them over to the quarters of the corporal or higher authorities; to serve as guide of newcomers, to help people needing assistance on the way, carry official matters from his outpost to the next, including correspondence. As this volunteer guard service extended to the whole length and breadth of the Province of Leyte, letters and other communications relayed thru their service travel very fast. The network of this service extended across the mountains.

These guards serve voluntarily and spontaneously.... Everyone believed that it was his duty to render service during those trying days.... The officers were--captain, lieutenant, sergeant and 1 corporal in every outpost.

... It is our opinion that, above all, the volunteer guards as a unit has played the most important role in the prosecution of the resistance against the Japs.¹⁸³

Supplementing the VGs were the various units of the WAS, the Women's Auxiliary Service. Each sector, and sometimes sub-sector, had its unit organized by the women themselves under the supervision of the local guerrilla commander. These women rendered service to the guerrilla cause in a variety of ways.

First of all, the WAS was active in the food production campaign. These "Amazons" cultivated small gardens on previously untilled land, raised poultry, and went about exhorting the people to dig up their fallow land. In addition, they cultivated special plants which could be used as tobacco substitutes, rolled into cigarettes and distributed to the guerrilla troops.

The WAS, furthermore, undertook special weaving projects. From hemp the women fabricated uniforms for some of the troops and special bandaging cloth from kapok. They also made mats, slippers and hats, sold at very low cost to the people with the proceeds donated to the guerrilla.

In the public health program, the WAS played a prominent role. These auxiliaries received basic instructions from guerrilla medical personnel and then traveled about the barrios advising the people on waste disposal, water purification, and dieting. They also received first aid instructions, serving as aids to the few army nurses and staffing first aid stations set up by the guerrilla.

From the standpoint of bolstering morale, the WAS played an indispensable

183. Potente, op. cit., pp. 8-10. Also see: Wolfert, op. cit., pp. 127-28.

part. The women organized dances and entertainment for the troops, serving as hostesses and preparing refreshments. Moreover, they sponsored a variety of social functions among the public-at-large, donating the not inconsiderable proceeds to the guerrilla.¹⁸⁴

Public Health

The ability of a population to offer resistance to a determined conqueror depends in large measure upon its stamina. The guerrilla leadership understood this only too well. Part of its program of education for resistance was directed to the maintenance of public health as the most obvious way of preventing enervation of the will to resist. There were many factors militating against the success of the program.¹⁸⁴ First of all, under conditions of evacuation, a considerable part of the resistance population was compelled to subsist on emergency rations. Many persons, and particularly the children, were affected by dietary inadequacy, suffering loss of vitality and the onset of deficiency diseases. Added to this was the effect of improper sanitation in the ramshackle emergency habitations occupied by the evacuees in the hills. Unsurrendered soldiers returning from Luzon, their bodies racked with malaria and amebiasis, served as carriers of disease among a population already enfeebled. The incidence of tuberculosis, pneumonia and other respiratory diseases, along with tropical ulcers and a host of skin maladies, rose rapidly. And in the face of this general deterioration of health, the supply of drugs and surgical materials reached exhaustion while the limited number of physicians and nurses on the Island before the war decreased still further.

The guerrilla undertook an emergency campaign of preventive medicine and public hygiene. The population was instructed to plant camotes (a tuberous plant easy to cultivate) and a variety of greens and to exploit systematically and thoroughly the food potential of coconuts, bananas, and bamboo sprouts. They were encouraged to use abaca fiber for emergency clothing in keeping warm during the chill of the rainy season. And they were urged to adhere to certain minimal sanitary precautions in disposing of waste.¹⁸⁵

Of all the guerrilla organizations, the WIGWF was without question the most active in the field of medicine and public health. The crowning glory of the WIGWF was its base hospital located in the General Headquarters,

¹⁸⁴. See: St. John, op. cit., pp. 162-65.

¹⁸⁵. The guerrilla did not have an easy time in convincing the population of the extreme urgency of taking proper sanitary measures. Dr. Veloso complained:

"As per reports to this office, majority of the civilian population as well as the soldiers have been indifferent to the existing Sanitary rules and regulations. Removal of bowels are done outside... toilets and Army latrines. Pigs are allowed to stay under cottages and allowed... to scatter their wastes. Surroundings are filthy.

"To avoid the occurrence of water-borne diseases, such as cholera, dysentery, etc., you are enjoined to do your best to make the people in your sector adhere as much as possible under present circumstances to sanitary rules and regulations for the safety of all." Domingo Veloso, Maj. MC, Chief, Base Hospital. Jan. 13, 1943. Memorandum to: Cmdg. Off., Sub-Sectors, Ormoc, Par. 1-2.

San Jose, Tangnan, Ormoc--

one of the best hospitals ever built in the Visayas by any guerrilla organization. The division Surgeon, (Dr. Domingo C. Veloso)¹⁸⁶ was formerly the Assistant Director of the Southern Islands Hospital, Cebu. Major and minor operations were performed. The hospital was opened to officers, enlisted men and civilians.¹⁸⁶

Under the general supervision of the Division Surgeon, regimental hospitals were established in every municipality within the sphere of the WIGWF. Competent physicians and nurses in each municipality were inducted into the service. They also treated civilian patients while conducting these hospitals. A dozen medical aid men given special training were assigned to each sub-sector.¹⁸⁷ First aid stations, dispensaries and puericulture centers were also opened up and staffed. Obviously in a province whose health facilities had been limited even in peace-time, the capacity of these establishments to service the ailing was severely restricted under war-time stresses. Nonetheless, Miranda boasted that "dysentery cases which were reported at Baybay about June 1943 were immediately eradicated."¹⁸⁸

The units of the Women's Auxiliary Service found in every sector were of great assistance to the troops. Under the supervision of the regimental physician and any nurses available, these women received valuable instruction in the essentials of first aid, plus information about materia medica and public sanitation. Many of the WAS units prepared bandages and compresses as special projects, and volunteered regular service as nurses' aids.

Miranda's own Ordnance Shop made some simple surgical instruments, while his chemist (Mr. G. Zambo) "conducted research on the possibility of using Philippine plants to substitute imported drugs which could not be bought or procured."¹⁸⁹

Miranda reported that his zone was free of animal diseases brought on by pests. "The Chief of the Veterinary Corps, Dr. R. C. Mandin, was always on trips to inspect the different barrios. Veterinary school graduates of the WIGWF assisted him in his work."¹⁹⁰

186. Miranda, op. cit., pp. 3-4.

187. The guerrilla leadership took this training program very seriously and expected all trainees to toe the mark. A memorandum from GHQ makes this plain:

"Expedite the sending of your lady students to the School of Auxiliary Nursing which will open on August 2, 1943.

"Said students must comply with the requirements set forth in a previous training directive issued to this effect." C. S. Sabelino, Lt. Col., Inf. 1 Aug. 1943. Memo to: COs, In the Field, Par. 1-2. Sabelino was Deputy Chief of Staff at this time.

188. Miranda, op. cit., p. 5.

189. Ibid., p. 4.

190. Ibid., p. 5.

The veterinary school referred to was established by the WIGWF alonge with an auxiliary nursing school.¹⁹¹ The graduates, while employed primarily by the military, were available for civilian consultation as well.

If the WIGWF was outstanding in its medical work, the other organizations did their utmost to provide medical service for troops and civilians and to educate the general public in a preventive medicine program. Dr. Jose Lucinario of Dagami stated (in interview) that he was summoned by Major Balderian to his headquarters to treat soldiers wounded in the attack against the Japanese garrison of Dagami. Some time after, Balderian called upon his chief intelligence officer (a physician by profession and locally celebrated as a man of unusually varied attainments), Dr. Posuncuy, to establish a base hospital at Carigara. It was a modest enterprise comparing unfavorably with that of the WIGWF, but rendering very valuable service. According to Dr. Lucinario, the wounded and the ill who could not be treated satisfactorily at unit dispensaries were sent on to the base hospital. The number of inmates never fell below 60 and at one point reached 200. The meagre facilities were badly over-taxed. Captured medical supplies plus contributions from pre-war druggists were employed stintingly. Some experimentation with local herbs was tried. Ordinary cloth was sterilized and used as bandage material.

Balderian sent Dr. Lucinario on tour of the battalions to check the health conditions of the troops. He was assisted by two registered nurses and three nurses aides. The WAS also supplied first-aiders, chiefly pre-war teachers. The VGs rendered valuable help in performing various heavy labor chores at the base hospital and the emergency aid stations.

At the base hospital Dr. Posuncuy's assistant, Dr. Walstrom, gave instruction in the fundamentals of medicine to enlisted personnel sent up on temporary duty for training as medical aid men. When Dr. Tiu became Regimental Surgeon of Balderian's 95th Regiment, he provided for the creation of regular medical companies. He notified his colleagues serving as battalion surgeons to take the following steps:

Select 20 men from each Bn., giving preference to those EM with medical training of the previous PA or USAFFE, to compose the medical platoon under a Bn. surgeon. These EM will be distributed to the different Cos at an average of one company aid man to a platoon, and two assistants for the Bn Surgeon, usually a sergeant and a corporal.

Each Bn Surgeon is entitled to a Sergeant (duty), a Corporal and 18 First Class Pvts.

Request all Co commanders to submit to your Office all names of EM that are with medical training so as to facilitate your choice in the selection of your personnel.

Submit to this Office as soon as you can your strength and the distribution of your men to the different Cos. Include also the educational qualifications and as to whether they are Reservists or not

191. "There are only twelve medical men for every Sub-Sector. If you have this number and all have gone training at the Base Hospital, then you don't have to send any more." Jose T. Ibabao, Capt. Inf., The Adj. Gen. Jan. 11, 1943. Memorandum to: CO, Sub-Sector No. 5.

and where they were assigned before the surrender.¹⁹²

The training course offered improved steadily. By mid-1944, the Regiment decided to establish a

School for First Aiders... in an ideal place, safe from attack by the enemy.

a. The purpose of this school is to train two EM from each unit into highly efficient and disciplined First Aiders. EM selected to attend this school must be at least primary school graduates. Preference should be given to intermediate and high school students.

b. The following subjects will be taught in the training:

- (1) Organization of the Medical Corps
- (2) Military Courtesy and Discipline
- (3) First Aid and Emergencies
- (4) Materia Medica
- (5) Anatomy and Physiology
- (6) Wounds and Fractures
- (7) Dental Care

c. The length of training will be 15 days. It will commence on 15 August to 30 August 1944... The Commandant of the School, the Regimental Surgeon, will provide the necessary textbooks and references for the students.¹⁹³

One might be skeptical about the advisability of instituting this type of "cram course." Even though some care was given to the educational qualifications of the candidates, they could scarcely digest so much matter in so short a period of time. Nevertheless, the guerrilla was showing its appreciation of applied theory in this vital field.

The 95th Regiment also enjoyed the services of one dentist, Dr. Cesario N. Sudario of Dagami. Using Dagami as his base, Dr. Sudario went on circuit throughout the zone of the regiment, inspecting the teeth of the troops and rendering emergency treatment. For drilling purposes, he used a foot engine drilling machine. He had his personal dental equipment and used his supply of oral medicaments sparingly. On several occasions, Dr. Sudario came without a hair's breadth of capture by scouting Japanese.

The situation in South Leyte was not essentially different. Dr. Andres S. Lao, holding an MD degree from Santo Tomas University, evacuated to the hills when the Japanese arrived. In October, 1942, he joined the guerrilla unit of Major Francisco at Malitbog, serving as "Medical Inspector." Later, he was appointed Battalion Surgeon for the 1st Battalion, 94th Infantry Regiment. He organized a small hospital and kept it in operation during 1943. There were only 8 beds available at first and no surgery was attempted. The VGs gathered medicine from the public school dispensaries of the district. One registered nurse and one dentist served with Dr. Lao.

192. Nestorio U. Tiu, (Bvt) Capt., 95th Inf. Regt., Regimental Surgeon. 6 April 1943. Memo to: All Bn. Surgeons, 95th Inf. Regt., 92nd Div., Par. 1-4.

193. B. V. Abarientos, Capt. Inf., Exec. O. 18 July 1944. Training Directive No. 1.

Dr. Lao undertook an active extension program of public health. He visited the units of the WAS, lecturing on sanitation and diet and giving demonstrations in first aid. With the information imparted, the WAS leaders would visit the barrios of their municipality, exhorting the people to boil water of uncertain purity and to dig pit latrines to prevent the outbreak of disease. Dr. Lao recalled (in interview) a serious outbreak of dysentery in Hinunangan in 1943. He and two other guerrilla physicians, Drs. Velasco and Parado, were called upon to render emergency service. The patients were treated with a diet of fried banana and an infusion of guava leaves.

Dr. Lao recalls how great was the joy of the medical staff when shipments of drugs and other supplies reached Leyte by American submarine in July, 1944. The WAS proceeded to organize a network of first aid stations serving the barrios, ministering to the local population. (Dr. Lucinario acknowledged that part of this supply reached the territory of the 95th Regiment in North Leyte.) Dr. Jose Gaviola, serving in the Abuyog sector in 1944, declared that he was extremely handicapped for want of medical supplies until the submarine consignment was distributed.

The Divisional Surgeon for Kangleon's 92nd Division, Dr. Mercado, had his headquarters at Sogod. He did not have a base hospital on the order of that operated by the WIGWF. But he did an important job coordinating services and promoting the public health extension campaign through lecture and demonstration.

Religion

Leyte, like the other provinces of the Philippines, is a predominantly Catholic region. During the Japanese occupation, the Church adopted a policy of cautious neutrality. In the zone of the WIGWF, organized religion continued to be an active force in the lives of both the combatants and the civilian population. As in the case of justices of the peace, physicians, and other professionals, some of the priests were inducted directly into the WIGWF--in this instance into the Chaplaincy Corps. These priests recited mass and administered the sacraments to the troops. Sometimes the priests would have to go considerable distances to officiate at guerrilla encampments! Both officers and enlisted men were expected to give notification through proper channels at GHQ of their intention to take the marriage vows. Neither at marriage ceremonies for enlisted men nor on the occasion of baptismal rites for their children would the officiating priests collect a fee. Wherever possible, the church was called upon to provide last unction and to preside over the burial of one of its communicants.¹⁹⁴ "

From the Japanese standpoint, membership in a chaplaincy corps in itself constituted a breach of neutrality and ranged the priests on the side of resistance. A fortiori, delivery of sermons to the troops exhorting a continued resistance sufficed to obliterate the protection as an incident of his status. The Reverend Father Pablo Penserga, head of the Chaplaincy Corps (and assistant priest of Ormoc Parish before the war), and some of his colleagues were even worse offenders in that they preached to the masses as

194. Brig.-Gen. Briguez (Jose F. Ibabao, Maj., The Adj. Gen.)! 8 Feb. 1943.
To: CO, Sectors and Sub-Sectors!

well as to the troops. And the consequence, according to Miranda, was that some were apprehended by the Japanese for investigation, some were punished, and one or two executed. Francisco Corres, one of the pioneer guerrilla organizers in the Albuera sector, related (in interview) that the Japanese executed one of the parish priests in the early period because of his alleged guerrilla connections.

Capuyan reported, in interview, that Pedro Penaranda served as regimental chaplain in the Merida sector. And Rodriguez declared, "in interview, that Padre Daffon held mass for the troops of his Baybay regiment. We might add that only on rare occasions would the entire personnel of a regiment assemble for religious communion. Generally on a Sunday, the chaplain would hold mass several times, making a tour of the battalions.

To balance this account, we must note that some of the parish priests would have nothing to do with the guerrilla. In fact, one or two were believed to be engaged in espionage activities against the guerrilla. Captain Olaybar of Palompon claimed that Padre Astorga, while nominally regimental chaplain, never actively officiated.

Educating the Young

It might be supposed that the resistance forces, hemmed in as they were by the enemy occupation troops and hunted down by reconnaissance patrols gave no thought to the education of the young. After all their success depended on mobility not of themselves alone but, if necessary, of their loyal non-combatant supporters. The educational enterprise with its fixed school buildings no matter how flimsy and its patterned behavior arising out of the relatively stable pupil-teacher relationship would seemingly nullify or curtail this mobility. But the resistance chief thought in other terms.

In their judgment, they represented the legitimate sovereignty. They were the residuary legatees of the Commonwealth Government temporarily in exile. It was their mission to convince the ordinary Filipino that he must hold firm in his allegiance to the lawful authorities. But everywhere was the evidence that the Occupation Power was entrenching itself for an enduring stay while denouncing the defiant as outlaws. Japanese punitive squads harassed all suspected of abetting the guerrilla.

Only by inspiring a definite belief in the invincibility of the Allied forces could the resistance leaders shore up a sagging morale. What better way to demonstrate a confidence in the future than by turning to the education of the younger generation. Parents would be reassured on seeing the teachers going about their appointed tasks!

Regarding the actual system of guerrilla-sponsored "instruction in Leyte, we must content ourselves with but a skeletal reconstruction. Pertinent documents have perished in large part, irretrievably buried," burned, decayed, or otherwise lost to the investigator. Needless to say, no more unification was achieved in this branch of guerrilla activities than in other phases of Leyte's resistance movement.

Let us direct our attention to the sector of "Resistance Leyte"

controlled by the Western Leyte Guerrilla Warfare Forces. The organizational conference of the WIGWF took place at the end of December, 1942. The setting up of a hybrid "military-civilian" government was intended as the cornerstone of a more normal society. Reopening of the public schools would build upon this. Sector commanders took the initiative, contacting the municipal mayors. In turn, the mayors were to instruct the principals of the elementary schools to commence enrollments.

Vicente Villegas, West Coast Academic Supervisor in the Liberation period, served as General Supervisor of Schools for the five West Coast municipalities united under the WIGWF banner. Son of a former Tanauan mayor, Villegas held bachelor's and master's degrees from Silliman University and further had studied law at the University of the Philippines. At one time he had been district supervisor of Palompon, Leyte, and until the outbreak of the war was academic supervisor in Negros. Puppet Governor Torres' offer to appoint him to the division superintendency of Leyte during the Japanese occupation was spurned. Instead, Villegas evacuated to his farm in Palompan whence he was pressed into service by the WIGWF.

Within the jurisdiction of the WIGWF, Villegas recalled in an interview in Tanauan in 1945, classes were generally reopened by June of 1943 and continued to function with certain interruptions until October of that year. Most of the pre-war teachers came forward in response to the guerrilla muster. High school graduates were called upon to serve in the emergency and complete the teacher rosters. The average salary earned was P15 per month, with some teachers in the Ormoc sector receiving P25. In a few barrios, the local folk provided lodging and board for out-of-town teachers.

Many parents were reluctant to send their children to these guerrilla-operated schools. Dread of Japanese patrols often paralyzed those who had thrown in their lot with resistance. Moreover, under circumstances of sharp privation, the children were needed to assist in the eking out of a livelihood. The GHQ of the WIGWF did not attempt to coerce school attendance.

It is not surprising that under war-time conditions, the schools abandoned their more exacting peace-time standards. Typical was the temporary waiver of the standing central office regulation that no school might be established other than on a school site of at least one hectare in area. This modification was necessary to allow for location of schools in suitable places of concealment.

The pinch of an insufficiency of books experienced in other parts of Leyte was not so acute here.¹⁹⁵ School storerooms and individual holdings provided basic supplies. But stationery and other supplies were appropriated by the military.¹⁹⁶ In most cases, teachers did away with written lesson

195. During the first months of the occupation, the Japanese did not come to the West Coast of Leyte in force; the poblacion, or town center, of Ormoc was the main exception. Consequently there was not too much confiscation of public school equipment and no censoring of textbooks.

196. In all of Leyte's guerrilla zones the schoolhouse served as an important storehouse for stationery used by the guerrilla clerical staffs. Many of the buildings were locked, instruction having ceased, making

plans, and reduced their administrative paper work to a minimum. Paper leaves were the writing materials of the children, with pointed sticks the instruments of inscription.

The principals submitted monthly supervisory reports! Serviliano de la Cruz, principal of Albuera before the war, served in his own municipality under the guerrilla. Also serving at home was Martin Banes--installed in the Ormoc principalship and before the war serving as head teacher in one of the barrios, Barrio San Jose. Rizal Zapanta substituted the Baybay principalship for his pre-war Hilongos assignment. And Eugenio Viacrucis and Jose de Ocampo traded posts in Dagami and Biliran for new ones in Palompon and Merida, respectively. The WIGWF zone could justifiably boast that its educational administrators were all experienced persons, even if some of the emergency teachers fell short in qualification.

We have more information concerning Albuera than for any of its sister-municipalities within the area of the WIGWF. Insofar as educational procedure is involved, we may take Albuera as fairly representative of the other four. Its principal, Serviliano de la Cruz, was inducted into the guerrilla with the rank of probationary 3rd Lieutenant and the civilian title of Supervising-Principal Teacher. In addition to his regular duties, he was expected to submit regular reports of his charge to the Adjutant General of the WIGWF, coursed through the regimental commander of the 6th Infantry.

The chronicler of Albuera's war-time history acclaimed the Regimental CO, Conrado Daffon, as the initiator in the reopening of the local schools!

He also thought of the school children, and brought the matter before the Commanding General for approval. This was approved and school houses were built in the evacuation places among the hills. He left the task to Lt. Serviliano De La Cruz (principal teacher), who also did not leave a stone unturned to carry out this noble project.¹⁹⁷

De La Cruz reported: "Regular classes from grades I to III were first opened from January 15, 1943, in consonance with the verbal instructions of the Commanding Officer and of the Military Municipal Mayor of Albuera, Leyte."¹⁹⁸

seizure fairly simple. Sometimes midnight pilferage or armed robbery might be resorted to where the custodians were disinclined to part with their stock of paper, pencils, ink, and most precious (when available) typewriter.

An intelligence report of the guerrilla 94th Infantry Regiment alluded to this source of equipment: "Office supplies", expendable and non-expendable properties have been secured from schools, including kitchen utensils, plates, etc. [probably taken from that popular warehouse--the home economics building], properly receipted." S-2, 94th Inf. 14 July 1943. "Report of July 1-15, 1943." To: AC of S, G-2, 92nd Inf. Div.

197. Sotto, op. cit., p. 3.

198. S. de la Cruz. "Narrative and Inspectional Report of Schools of Albuera, Leyte." To: Adj. Gen.

But a week later, the Supervising-Principal Teacher notified his staff:

Complying with the suggestion of the Brigadier General of the WIGWF in the Field, as per written endorsement shown to me by the Municipal Mayor of Albuera, Leyte, I have the honor to inform you that all classes of the public schools will be discontinued for the time being, and will be opened in June, 1943.¹⁹⁹

This order was rescinded shortly thereafter upon the receipt of new instructions from the GHQ:

To comply with the contents of the indorsement, second paragraph, reopening of classes, dated February 3, 1943, of the Chief of Staff of the WIGWF, and with the request of the other authorities, regular classes of nearly all classes (grades), opened in the school year 1940-1941, have been reopened beginning March 1, 1943.²⁰⁰

It was one thing to order the reopening of the schools of Albuera and another to provide financial maintenance. Mayor Barte hoped the municipal council might vote the necessary appropriations. He accordingly sought out the Supervising-Principal for pertinent figures. Serviliano de la Cruz was pleased to reply:

In compliance with the contents of your letter... requesting the number of teachers to be employed... based on the number of pupils who reported to school last Friday... the Municipality needs 26 teachers, including the undersigned. To insure a scientific, just, educational, and customary way of giving compensation, it is deemed fitting and proper... to follow the same or uniform percentage of reduction which the other municipal employees receive, based on the following basic salaries which the teachers concerned received during peace-time:
 1 teacher at P80.00; 5 teachers at P55; 7 teachers at P50;
 1 teacher at P45; 12 teachers at P40.²⁰¹

The mayor appeared before the Municipal Council, which adopted the following resolution.

Whereas, in view of the instruction of the Chief of Staff... regarding the reopening of classes, "... classes from grades one to five were opened...". The sixth grade class was not opened due to lack of pupils.

Whereas, to the effect that this municipality has no sufficient fund and income to maintain the salaries of twenty-six teachers... the Council unanimously resolves to inquire the Chief of Staff... as to what to do with these teachers!²⁰²

To the bewildered Municipal Council, the GHQ could only advise that Albuera's teachers render their services gratuitously. The Municipal Council mulled over this advice and resolved:

199. Serviliano de la Cruz. Jan. 21, 1943. To: All Teachers and Others.

200. S. de la Cruz, *op. cit.*

201. S. de la Cruz. March 13, 1943. To: The Military Municipal Mayor.

202e Pedro Calabia, Mun. Secty. Mar. 19, 1943. Reso. No. 5.

Whereas, in the event that the teachers of this Municipality have already rendered their services beginning March 1, 1943, until this date, without compensation, due to the insufficiency of funds;

Whereas, in view of the first indorsement of the Adjutant General of the WIGWF by command of the Brigadier General, dated March 30, 1943, addressed to the Military Municipal Mayor of this Municipality, the Council resolved to adopt... the provisions of paragraph 3 of this same indorsement that teachers services be rendered voluntarily.

Lest the teachers be abandoned to total destitution, the Municipal Council

Further resolved to approve that teachers rendering their services voluntarily will be given an allowance at the rate of P10 for every teacher concerned, and P15 for a Supervising-Principal Teacher, monthly from March 1, 1943 to June 30, 1943 respectively.²⁰³

The arrangement, though a mere palliative, worked retroactively to the benefit of the teachers.

To cover this appropriation, the Municipal Council was compelled to adopt a further measure:

The supplementary municipal budget, General Fund, as approved by the Municipal Council in its meeting held on April 2, 1943 under Resolution No. 8, was resubmitted before the Council, due to the transfer of funds, known as the Matriculation Fees, to the amount of P538.48 to the General Fund, that will be included to the appropriation for the teachers allowances. Resolved to transfer the amount... to the general fund that will be included in the appropriation of teachers allowances for four months, from March 1, 1943 to June 30, 1943, respectively, as itemized in the same supplementary budget.²⁰⁴

What was to be the fate of Albueras schools after June, 1943?

The chairman submitted before the Council a Memorandum, dated June 11, 1943, of the Assistant Adjutant General, WIGWF in the Field, which enquires the Municipal Mayor if there is fund available that will cover the expenses for the reopening of schools in the ensuing year 1943-1944, and the number of teaching positions to be created by the Municipal Council.

Be It Resolved by the Council to inform... the Assistant Adjutant General, WIGWF, through the Military Adviser, 6th Infantry, that there is no fund available to cover the allowance of teachers and other expenses for the reopening of schools as required in the above-mentioned Memorandum.²⁰⁵

Albueras schools had a plenitude of textbooks, though mostly in secret storage. The Supervising-Principal directed the teachers to

gather all textbooks, etc. in the hands of the pupils, who did

203. P. Calabria, Mun. Secty. April 6, 1943. Resolution No. 9.

204. P. Calabria, Mun. Secty. April 6, 1943. Resolution No. 10.

205. P. Calabria, Mun. Secty. June 15, 1943. Resolution No. 18.

not return the textbooks, etc. when the schools had a sudden and unexpected closing!"... Teachers should hold all textbooks, manuals, and other things which belong to school and which are in their hands and should keep or hide them as safely as... if they were their own; but they should be under receipts that should be kept and receipted by the Barrio Lieutenants, whose receipts should be submitted to me together with the teacher's receipts. Teachers should submit reports on things, textbooks, etc. regained from the pupils, as asked during our meeting. They should submit a list of losses. Those teachers who have not yet inventoried as assigned by me should do so at once, or those who have not yet begun should get all the books, etc. from the pupils and others and return them to Mr. B. Mercado or to me, who should give the information whether teachers have losses or not.²⁰⁶

De la Cruz was a conscientious administrator. He aimed to achieve the highest standards for education within reach. He checked to see that his teachers were prepared, and that they were given as much equipment as the municipality could provide, and he was also solicitous of the well-being of the pupils and tried to improve the physical conditions of the school plant. In his conferences with the teaching personnel, de la Cruz took up the following points:

(a) Construction of outhouse to every school, and other possible facilities of standard schools.

(b) Strict economy on the use of supplies: paper, pencils, chalk, etc.

(c) Seeing to it that every teacher has... copies of the necessary textbooks, manuals, supplementary readers, copies of new courses of study of all subjects in the two single-session plan, etc.²⁰⁷

The WIGWF succeeded in firmly welding school and community. Albuera well illustrated this unity. When its classes hardly recommenced were ordered to discontinue instruction, it was feared that the popular morale might be undermined:

Teachers should use their tact in informing their pupils, the parents of their pupils, and the persons who labored to construct or borrow the school buildings, in order that they would not be discouraged, afraid, and disgusted; but he kept encouraged, brave, and inspired to help make the schools a success, when the schools open in June, 1943. To keep the morale of the people, to retain the good faith and love of the people in us who have helped open the schools, the following reasons and explanations may be presented... in favor of the discontinuance of the classes for the time being: (1) lack of clothing; (2) lack of school supplies; (3) lack of textbooks....

These same general directions indicated how the community might help. To handle the lack of supplies for the schools, the Anti-Profiteering Committee would be called upon "to inventory all stores so that the things greatly needed in the school, as well as the public, can be bought or secured at reasonable prices."^m

* The empty school buildings could become the centre of loom-weaving:

206. S. de la Cruz. Jan. 21, 1943. To: All Teachers and Others.

207. S. de la Cruz. "Narrative, etc.," op. cit.

Our proposed school buildings now were not built or secured in vain, inasmuch as they may become the industrial and social center of all members of the Women's Auxiliary Service (WAS) which can sew cloth and other things later on.

In the task of carrying out the inventory of school properties, the teachers were assured: "You may secure help from the Barrio Lieutenants, Military Police, Volunteer Guards, etc., who can facilitate the recovery of the things."²⁰⁸

The school buildings used by the guerrilla were made available through the exertions of the adult community. The supervising-principal teacher made acknowledgment:

Temporary school buildings constructed by the people and borrowed or rented spacious buildings are being used to house the pupils. All of them are located not less than two kilometers from the provincial road. Coconut groves, other trees, mountains, hills, location and appearance are used as camouflage.²⁰⁹

What proportion of the pre-war teachers reported for service in the schools of Albuerca? Mr. de la Cruz stated: "Nearly all teachers who are living here and who were employed in the school year 1940-1941 are being employed." Among the exceptions were: "Lieut. Dominador Salvo and Lieut. Benjamin Barte, who recently submitted their resignation effective April 2, 1943, and are taking up active duties in the 6th [guerrilla] Infantry." Others mentioned were on maternity leave.²¹⁰

Despite the war, the supervising-principal teacher took his supervisory functions seriously. "Individual conference was conducted after the observation of every teacher where the ways and means to improve the work was brought out."

The supervising-principal had the following comments to make regarding the quality of instruction in the different subject-areas:

1. Language: In most classes observed, the drills in correct usage were not snappy and lively and very few pupils participated. The language forms were not used in normal conversational situations fixed by the teachers. Too often (in many schools), the teacher simply called upon pupils to use the word in a sentence. (This does not give the practice needed to use that word in normal situations demanded by common social usage.)

2. Art Education: In a grade I recitation, whose aim was to teach color recognition, the recitation was a failure for there was no color chart or object representing different colors.

3. Reading: Development of words or groups of words in one class were not in context forms. They should be in context forms and should be expressed in the different situations in order to make them clear in the minds of the pupils.

208. Serviliano de la Cruz. Jan. 21, 1943. To: All Teachers and Others.

209. S. de la Cruz, "Narrative, etc." op. cit.

210. Ibid.

The drill in sentence meaning of "yes" or "no" in --- school was quite good, but there were only a few sentences; thereby, it lasted only less than 2 minutes. Three to five minutes should be devoted to drill lesson in the primary grades. The other types of sentence meaning... should be used also.

In oral reading, while one was reading, the others were also opening their books. There was no real audience situation as per her aim. For oral reading (of training type) purposes, a story read in past week or months may be used. If ever a lesson involves both silent and oral reading, there should be an aim for each. Pages 203-204 of "Reading Activities in the Primary Grades--Storm and Smith" gives "How to Make the Audience Interested in Oral Reading."

4. Arithmetic: In---- school, the teacher presented the lesson properly only that she failed to diagnose the pupils' difficulties in certain processes. As noted, more than one half of the class were following the wrong procedures, yet the teacher did not know about it. Inventory test should be given first before the new process or combination is taken up. Remedial teaching should be given at once. While the pupils are working on exercises and problems, the teacher should go around from pupil to pupil to find out their difficulties and to give the pupils concerned the necessary help.²¹¹

We may take passing notice of the school organization in two of the other municipalities. Aristotles Olaybar, Commanding Officer of the Palompon Regiment, testified in interview in Tacloban in 1945 to the reopening of the schools in his municipality under WIGWF auspices. Teachers received a bare P20 in salary. The program of studies roughly approximated the pre-war combinations.

Speaking for Merida, Bonifacio Capuyan, its regimental Commanding Officer, took credit for the reopening of the schools in October, 1942. This is very probable inasmuch as Capuyan undertook a complete reorganization of the municipal government at that time! In 1943, the Merida schools were brought within the general system of the WIGWF.²¹²

The WIGWF was more than a passive spectator to the educational process. It assumed the burden of education. In addition to general orientation lectures on the progress of the war and the principles at stake in the conflict, the guerrilla instituted special projects. The national Baybay Agricultural School was utilized, first by the Baybay Regiment and then by the GHQ, as a special training center for troops on detached service where they might acquire the know-how essential for increasing crop yields.²¹³ Of

211. Ibid.

212. Capuyan named Marcos Baylon, a Merida teacher, as principal of its war-time school. This apparently conflicted with Villegas' data where Jose de Ocampo is cited as holding this position. The discrepancy may be explained if we remind ourselves that Capuyan was transferred to another command and that a change in the principalship may have occurred after his departure.

213. The WIGWF made good use of this school. Miranda's guerrilla officers and non-commissioned officers attended the reopened school on detached service, studying methods of poultry production and other subjects vital to troop feeding.

During this period of WIGWF control of the Baybay Agricultural School,
(continued on next page)

broader interest was the literacy program.

The instruction in the rudiments of literacy was a cooperative enterprise staffed jointly by the municipal teachers and the regimental officers." In April, 1943, a memorandum circulated among the regimental commanders: "Submit a report on the progress of the Adult Education Campaign in your sector."²¹⁴

One of the regiments (source not identified) replied: "We were successful in helping our soldiers to write their names and read, through this campaign."

According to the General Supervisor of Schools, Vicente Villegas, the chief credit for this program must be accorded Bonifacio Capuyan of the Merida Regiment. Under an Ormoc school teacher, Felipe Adolfo, attendance at these extension classes was made compulsory for all regimental illiterates. Civilians interested in learning how to write were also eligible. Outside of Merida, Villegas testified, this program met with less success.

During its short-lived career of independence, the "Politico-Military Government" of East Leyte displayed an unmistakable interest in education. Even before fully consolidating his organization, Major Balderian (alias Colonel Flores) had appreciated the utility of reopened schools as a bulwark fortifying the guerrilla cause. He designated the district supervisor of Jaro as his chief instrument for accomplishing this purpose and instructed Captain Felix Pamanian (alias Major Mayo M. Ricarte) to oversee the matter.

Captain Pamanian replied:

In connection with your verbal instructions to the Supervising Teacher of Jaro, Mr. Isodor Durana, regarding the opening of classes, we have talked about the matter yesterday during the visit of the members of the Staff of this Headquarters to Jaro. Mr. Durana is hesitant to open said classes as according to him he cannot assure the safety of the lives of the children in case of emergency. We have agreed therefore that the opening of classes in Jaro can be done in the future and not at this time.²¹⁵

Eustaquio Ligutan, clerk in the provincial auditor's office and a native of Carigara, declared in interview that the guerrilla reopened the

the puppet superintendent of schools in Tacloban remained quite unaware of the use to which these properties were being put. He wrote to Manila: "Many attempts were made to open the Baybay Agricultural School, but all in vain. This is due to hard transportation and communication. Several letters of this Office to Mr. Lanier in charge of that school were never answered. It is feared that either our letters did not reach him, or his replies were not received." F. Kapili, Actg. Div. Supt. Aug. 1, 1944. "Annual Report for the Academic Year, 1943-1944."

214. Usualdo F. Laguitan, 1st AGS. 23 Apr. 1943. To: All Regtl. Cmdrs., WLGWF.

215. Mayo M. Ricarte, Maj., QMS. Oct. 25, 1942. Memo to: Col. Flores, Inf.

schools in his municipality. A local teacher, Estaquio Boncaras, served as principal. The principal continued at his post until the Japanese despatched their mopping up squads to the municipality. Then he went into hiding and was replaced by a Japanese appointee.

Major Balderian's Administrator of Biliran Island, Martin Javelosa, stated in interview that he reopened the schools of his bailiwick in July, 1943. The teachers were put on a salaried basis, but actually received no payment. After August, the schools were compelled to close. Rumor of an imminent Japanese occupation in force discouraged pupil attendance.

Supervisor Durana's records were either destroyed or lost. At any rate, they did not come to the attention of this investigator. We know of the Carigara school, and there are some indications that the guerrilla may have opened classes in Jaro, Dagami, and Alangalang under Durana's supervision.

Aside from their classroom duties, the teachers rendered signal aid to the guerrilla government:"

The teachers were assigned to canvass homes to take census of the families, to teach home industries, and for the dissemination of information on the war. Lectures were being conducted by the teachers in different places to bolster up the morale.²¹⁶

When Colonel Ruperto Kangleon inaugurated the guerrilla government of "Free Leyte", he turned to Orville Babcock, pressing him to assume the superintendency of schools. Babcock, an American with considerable administrative experience in the Philippine school system, had served as a superintendent during the years 1930-35. He was on inspectional visit to the schools of Leyte as representative of the Central Curriculum Office and was trapped by the Japanese invasion. Babcock declined in favor of his Filipino friend, Manuel Gaviola, a district supervisor in Hilongos. Gaviola was installed by the guerrilla governor Demeterio with the title of General Supervisor of Schools; Babcock consented to serve as special supervisor.²¹⁷

The Japanese had succeeded in temporarily opening the schools of South Leyte. Following the Japanese retirement from the area, the schools promptly shut down. Babcock, provided with a bicycle for the carrying on of his functions, set about to resume classes under new auspices.²¹⁸ From the end

216. Potente, op. cit., p. 13.

217. "Regarding the restoration of the old system of public instruction, announcement was made by the General Supervisor of Schools at Maasin (this position was equivalent, one way or another, to the division superintendent of schools) to the effect that classes left off in December, 1941, because of the war, were to be resumed in October, 1943. For obvious reasons, each municipality was considered one supervisory district, with a supervisory principal in charge." Aurillo, op. cit., p. 70.

218. Babcock felt that he could not manage his job single-handed. He suggested to the General Supervisor that he take on an administrative assistant. Gaviola petitioned the Provincial Board for an additional staff member, and the Board acted favorably. "A letter from the General Supervisor, dated October 4th, recommending for approval the appointment of Leonardo Torredos, formerly District Supervisor for Liloan, as Financial"

of September to mid-December, 1943, he made the rounds of the municipalities, exhorting both teachers and parents. Through the deputy governor for North Leyte, Gaviola also envisioned the opening of the schools elsewhere in the Province. This latter project was abandoned for reasons set forth in a letter to the Provincial Board:

The undersigned understands the financial problem the Board is facing at this time, and in order not to aggravate the situation, it is believed advisable to hold the opening of schools and classes in the municipalities of Biliran, Calubian, Caibiran, Naval, Maripipi, San Isidro, Kawayan, Villaban and Leyte in abeyance until the financial condition of the province become stable and defined. Under the present circumstances, it is reasonable not to make further expansion of our educational program.

In a verbal conversation I had with the Deputy Governor, Mr. Salas, I was informed that our enemy (the Japanese) make frequent visits to these municipalities, causing the disturbance upon the inhabitants of the towns. These unfavorable conditions affect the school attendance. Possibly because of the disturbance, classes are not held for the children are evacuated to their far-away-interior barrios, while the teachers continue to receive their pay, advancing as their reason that they remain in their respective posts. Under this condition, no amount of instruction will become worthwhile, and hence, it does not warrant the expenditure of public funds.

The transportation facilities to these places at this time are awfully difficult, dangerous, and very expensive. Correspondence to these places is very much delayed, so that instructions issued to them would be worthless when they are received.

The seventeen municipalities from Inopacan down to Hinunangan, including Abuyog where authority to reopen the schools and classes has been given, would be, for the time being, sufficient to begin with. Later, however, when conditions permit, the reopening of schools and classes in the other municipalities in the east may be considered favorably.²¹⁹

The municipalities of East Leyte were in closer contact with Colonel Kangleon's GHQ than were those of North Leyte. The war-time chronicler of Abuyog related:

Mayor Gallego was appointed Deputy Governor for East Leyte.... Mayor Gallego conferred with the Commonwealth officials of such municipalities as La Paz, Dulag, Burauen, Dagami, Pastrana, and Tolosa regarding the opening of the old system of public education....

Since neither the district supervisor nor the principal teacher for Abuyog before and at the outbreak of the war was available at the time, Mayor Gallego's unbiased recommendation for the vacancy was at once sought for. Decidedly, from among the old teachers and the new

Clerk and Field Supervisor, attached to the office of the undersigned, effective upon his taking the oath of office, to assist in supervising and administering the work of the Supervising Principals and teachers in the field." Prov. Bd. of Free Leyte. Resblution No. 200.

219. Manuel S. Gaviola. Sept. 25, 1945. To: Prov. Bd. (included in Res'b. No. 198 of the Prov. Bd. of Free Leyte.)

ones, Mr. Rosario S. Tan became the Mayor's logical choice. On September 16, 1943, therefore, the teachers commenced their services.

Classes promptly opened on October 1, 1943, quite as normally as when the last hostilities were only a nightmare. And for the first time in twenty months, the local kids got back to the four walls provided for them freely by the Commonwealth Government, but closed to them on December 8, 1941, by the sons and grandsons of Nippon....

Then November ensued. The threat of Japanese re-occupation... now became imminent. Teachers and pupils and the people became restless. In their stations, the teachers stayed with no little sacrifice, particularly in their pocketbooks. Now, with the Japs at the gates of Abuyog, what if they would not be able to draw even only their first month's salaries?²²⁰

The La Paz schools had opened but were not provided for in the appropriations granted the General Supervisor of Schools. Its Municipal Council (Resolution No. 82) requested "that the Military Teachers be given chances for appointment as classroom teachers on the opening of schools and classes in said municipality...."

The Provincial Board took no action, deciding to refer the matter to the General Supervisor (Resolution No. 229)! The designation "military teachers" has reference to the period when La Paz belonged to the guerrilla command of Captain Erfe. At that time the teachers were looked upon as an adjunct of the guerrilla staff. With the absorption of La Paz and its sister communities into the jurisdiction of Kangleon, the teachers expected similar treatment and were disappointed over the delay in confirmatory action. The General Supervisor's recommendations were in the offing but were cut short by the return of the Japanese.

The General Supervisor of Schools depended upon appropriations in guerrilla emergency money granted by the Provincial Board of Free Leyte. Gaviola submitted

for approval the following appropriations for traveling expenses and subsistence for the General Supervisor and his personnel, and for the seventeen Supervising Principals in the seventeen municipalities in which classes are actually functioning: P2,530.²²¹

The Provincial Board declined to act, referring the request to the Provincial Treasurer. Treasurer Kaadavero returned this communication to the Board:

Returned to the Board with the information that if the amounts requested by the General Supervisor of Schools are necessary, this Office will have no objection to the inclusion of the items in the budget for the office of the General Supervisor of schools.

The Provincial Board thereupon resolved to "include in the Annual

220. Aurillo, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-8.

221. This sum was itemized:

P500 for the General Supervisor and his personnel for the period October 1, 1943, to June 30, 1944.

P1,530 for the 17 Supervising Principals, at P10 per month.

Provincial Budget" the items requested.²²²

The Board also ratified the plantillas of teachers' salaries submitted for a ten month period by the municipalities of Maasin (P31,070), Macrohon (P10,750), Malitbog (P24,900), Sogod (P24,580) and Libagon (P8,420) payable by the provincial treasurer. Guerrilla auditor Potente computes cash advances to the municipalities at P194,132.15 in aggregate.²²³

Babcock felt that the salaries paid out by the Provincial Board were too high.²²⁴ He favored a policy of retrenchment, but his opinion was vetoed. The general supervisor believed that the multitude of civic duties thrust upon the teacher--crop production work, anti-profiteering supervision, propaganda missions, in addition to home visitation to improve pupil attendance--justified paying the teachers as much as possible.²²⁵

In his tours Babcock discovered that the school children were keenly interested in their studies. Only hunger and lack of clothing could keep them away. They had practically no textbooks. Banana leaves and sharpened sticks did duty as writing materials. As far as possible, writing was eliminated from classroom work. Oral drill in arithmetic and reading were the principal procedures. Shopwork for the older boys and home economics for the girls were necessarily dropped.

In most municipalities, the guerrilla classes went as far as Grade IV only, though some municipalities succeeded in setting up intermediate grades. The two single-session plan was followed for maximum utilization of school resources!

Raymundo Aldana assisted Babcock as field supervisor, receiving P110 in emergency money as monthly salary. He visited Macrohon, Malitbog, and Abuyog, as well as Sogod.²²⁶ He noted a falling off in attendance in the

222. Provincial Board of Free Leyte. Resolution No. 218.

223. Potente, op. cit., p. 27.

224. For a number of months, Babcock and other Americans in South Leyte were receiving monthly loans from the guerrilla government of P40. He also received a direct loan from Colonel Kangleon of P300.

Babcock's attitude no doubt occasioned surprise to many Filipinos! They had always thought of Americans, particularly American educators, as unstinting backers of the educational enterprise. Perhaps under the circumstances Babcock believed other governmental expenses deserved priority.

225. Teachers were widely used in food procurement service for guerrilla troops. When Col. Kangleon reorganized his food procurement work, he ordered "that the Office of Food Administrator of Leyte will establish a net of food procurement agencies.... Only Government employees, preferably teachers, will be appointed as agents..!" R. Kangleon, Col. 10 Feb. 1944. Executive Order No. 3.

The superior intelligence of the teacher, his self-denying devotion to duty, his preparedness to hold fast to his assignment where others would shrink unless offered adequate remuneration, his essentially unbusinesslike approach made him the logical choice for this post. The teacher could combine in a single mission food procurement and propaganda work intended to buttress the morale of the populace.

226. Aldana had been district supervisor in Sogod before the Japanese invasion, and it was he who reopened the schools of that municipality.

latter part of November 1943 as tidings of Japanese reinforcements for Leyte reached the ears of the people. Aldana was on an inspectional tour in Abuyog when the Japanese reached South Leyte. Japanese reoccupation brought in its wake the closing of the schools until the attempt to reopen them by the "collaborationists."

Guerrilla educational policy had its negative or inhibitory facet. Concerned as the guerrilla authorities were with promoting the education of the young, they were equally anxious that school-age children outside of their jurisdiction should be shielded from what they considered the baleful influence of the collaborationist schools. Beyond this, they sought to offset the stabilizing effect that the functioning collaborationist schools exerted upon Japanese-Filipino relationships.

Florentine Kapili, Superintendent of Schools in Leyte's puppet administration, noted with satisfaction in September, 1943, that "in the task of pacification, the organization of classes serves as a great inducement in convincing the people to return to their homes in the poblacion." This is precisely what the guerrilla were determined to prevent. Constant acts of sabotage, perpetuated by the fighting units of resistance, directly or indirectly aimed to bring about the temporary or permanent closing of the schools!

How successful were the guerrilla in this objective? Reports drawn up by puppet officials supply some information. The principal of Leyte municipality mourned:

It is indeed a regret that on Septe. 24 [1942] no pupil reported to school. The people were going away from the poblacion to their evacuation places due to the trouble caused by the bandits [Read "guerrilleros"]. Thinking that the pupil may return to school as soon as possible, the teachers waited for them up to the end of the month. I stayed in my station up to the month of October, still waiting for the return of the children to school. Believing that the return of the children may be delayed, I then left for Tacloban to report personally the aforementioned situation....²²⁷

Dulag was one of the municipalities whose schools managed to stay open a good part of the time. But on January 9, 1943, "the Head Teacher of Dulag reported that due to unwholesome incidents, the school in his municipality was closed, beginning November 1...."

This, in the words of the superintendent of schools! He went on to report that most of the other schools closed "in the month of November or December, 1942, due to unwholesome incidents that happened in the poblacion of the different municipalities."²²⁸

Capoocan groped its way towards school organization. It

was allotted five teachers, and the Mayor was requested to instruct the

Almost half of the pre-war enrolment of pupils reported to school. Most of the teachers were on hand. The schools in that municipality had almost their full stock of books and supplies--a most fortunate situation.
227. Anglesio Tugado, Leyte Elementary School Principal. Nov. 19, 1942. To: The Div. Supt. of Schools.
228. Report of September, 1943.

Acting Principal to submit the enrolments!... Unfortunately, no report has been received until the end of the school year. Evidently the classes were not able to continue due to unwholesome incidents.²²⁹

All of these reports refer elliptically to attacks or to other intimidatory actions by the unmentionable guerrilla forces! On two occasions, guerrilla bands struck in direct assault at entire communities. Of course, instruction by the local school was disrupted. The superintendent of schools recorded dolefully:

The site of the poblacion of Dagami is very pathetic. This town was burned by guerrilleros some time during the month of November, 1942, and practically no house was left. From Dagami to Burauen, more than 90% of the houses of the barrios of Guinarona and Buri were burned, including school houses.²³⁰

Guerrilla opposition failed to bring about the closing of the schools. But it did succeed in discouraging many parents from sending their children to attend classes, notwithstanding orders from the puppet government at Tacloban.

Elsewhere, we have inquired at some length into the general nature of Leyte's resistance movement, scrutinizing its social and economic philosophy. Our inquiry failed to disclose any tendencies of fundamental social revolutionary import as, for instance, were notable in Central Luzon. It is true that some changes of wider significance were instituted by the Western Leyte Guerrilla Warfare Forces, but they were of a tentative character, their unfoldment interrupted by the reestablishment of the Philippine Commonwealth. Little effort was exerted to provide the children with a deeper insight into the nature of Filipino life and an appreciation of the instrumental character of knowledge in the solution of practical affairs. There was no experimentation with the child-community-centered orientation of education.

Instruction hewed to the traditional formalistic lines, albeit with slightly more flexibility because of the unfavorable material conditions! Except for the fact--and its emotional significance is not to be minimized--that the guerrilla-sponsored schools were uncensored and symbolized a realm of Filipino freedom further hardening the resolve to throw off the conqueror, no important differences in educational philosophy and practice were to be found in Leyte whether occupied or unoccupied.

G. Guerrilla Counter-Action

The Sabotage of Tacloban's Pacification Program

The guerrilla resolved that things should not go smoothly for the collaborationist regime. In every way possible, they carried out a policy of sabotage and terrorization. What they lacked in weapons, they sought to compensate for in determination and cunning. First of all, they tried as

229. F. Kapili, Actg. Div. Supt. July 1, 1943. To: Director of Pub. Instruction, Manila.

230. Report of December, 1943.

long"as possible to delay the return of the evacuees to the poblacion. As the mayor of Alangalang described the situation:

...At present there are only 30 families in the poblacion and our efforts to increase the number of returning families meet with little success because guerrilla elements controlling the barrios outside the poblacion are prohibiting or preventing the people to come in, or have contact with the authorities. They threaten to kill, kidnap, punish, or inflict injuries to those who are attached to, and cooperate with, the present regime.²³¹

The authorities were likewise unable to collect taxes. Dulag's mayor prudently advised: "Under present circumstances, collections of taxes through embargo of properties is not recommendable, as lives are dangerous on the part of the collection employees...."²³²

The Provincial Treasurer pompously opined: "It is propitious to make every citizen conscious of his duties and obligations."²³³

But the matter was not helped by verbal wisdom.

Violence was the general pattern. Abuyog's treasurer informed his chief in Tacloban:

Market collector Justo Bayot together with Policeman Fulgencio Chaves, in the course of duties, were kidnapped by bandit or guerrilla elements when they happened to be out of the poblacion.... It is the consensus that they have already been murdered. It is a known fact that bandit elements are persecuting those attached to or cooperating with the present government.²³⁴

Carigara enjoyed not the semblance of tranquility:

On March 4, 1944, at 4 PM, Filiciano Rival, municipal chief of the police, was kidnapped by guerrillas.... The same day, noon, T. Brazil, Barrio Teniente of Naugisan, was kidnapped by an unknown....

About 700 guerrillas now roam the fields of Carigara--led by Balderian, Pabilona, Cinco, Centino--looting innocent civilian's of their food and clothing, forcing them to stay in the mountains despite their willingness to stay in the poblacion....²³⁵

Where a town was beginning to settle down, the guerrillas were sedulous in recreating pandemonium. The mayor of Cabalian wrote in consternation:

On February 3, at 2 AM, the Japanese garrison of this municipality was attacked by guerrillas.... Prior to the attack, everything in the town was normal. Now everything is in turmoil again. The people

231. Nicolas Salazar, Mun. Mayor, Alangalang. Oct. 1, 1943. To: Prov. Gov.

232. Marcial K. Lagunza, Mun. Mayor, Dulag. Sept. 18, 1943. 3rd Indorsement.

233. Prov. Treas. Jiminez. Jan. 27, 1943. 5th Indorsement.

234. Ricardo Collantes, Mun. Treas., Abuyog. April 15, 1944. To: Prov. Treas.

235. Prudencio Borgueta, Mun. Mayor, Carigara. March 7, 1944. To: Prov. Gov.

have fled to the mountains for fear there will be another attack on the garrison.... Advise what I shall do.²³⁶

Before the Governor could reply, the Mayor reported:

another encounter between the Japanese garrison and the guerrillas last Sunday, February 6th, in Barrio Pong-oy, 2 km from the poblacion.... I have found it very difficult to make civilians come to town and their homes in the barrios. I am keeping intact all municipal employees as they are made to report to their respective jobs daily.... As it is, everybody is in hiding. I beg that the Municipal Treasurer, through your office, be authorized to pay employees from any fund available.²³⁷

And the Mayor of Hilongos, while reporting "general enthusiasm", also noted:

On the night of February 3, 1944, the garrison was attacked. The populace was frightened; it began to evacuate. I have tried to maintain morale. A patrol encountered the guerrilla 3 km. from town....²³⁸

The Mayor of Sogod expressed disappointment with the results of his reorganization tactics:

... The far-off barrios are deserted by civilians who hide in the mountains on account of the propaganda and threat of guerrillas. Almost all of this people are employed as VG to serve as watchers while they are hiding and at the same time they are bread-earners. Government activities cannot be extended to these places.... No active members of the guerrilla surrendered to take advantage of Amnesty.... In the barrios, few lots under cultivation due to unsettled conditions. Acute scarcity of food in the central.... Trading very slow because there is no article for commerce.... Need food and clothing badly.... Collections of government slow.... Real property tax poorly collected because we cannot locate whereabouts of owners as our activity is limited to central. Suggest detachment of Japanese in most important barrios for ample protection of civilians returning to their homes, and to cut propaganda from the wild source.²³⁹

And the Mayor of Naval spoke of sinister broodings:

Until now, the local guerrilla chieftain is still in hiding.... The other day, I was reliably informed that the town's discontented elements were organizing a bolo battalion to strike at their pet enemies when the garrison is withdrawn. If this is not stopped with drastic measures, you know what this will lead to with some mutineers still at large.... The people do not have the right attitude to the new governmental set-up. Blame age-long politics. Besides, the Republic came in so suddenly in this part of Leyte that the people do

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236. S. Bulacan, Mun. Mayor, Cabalian. Feb. 4, 1944. To: Prov. Gov.
 237. S. Bulacan, Mun. Mayor, Cabalian. Feb. 10, 1944. To: Prov. Gov.
 238. Romanic Ruiz, Mun. Mayor, Hilongos. Feb. 8, 1944. To: Prov. Gov.
 239. Mun. Mayor Labata, Sogod. March 31, 1944. To: Prov. Gov.

not know yet the Government and officials they should be loyal to....²⁴⁰

Villabays mayor, categorically declaring his municipality to be "completely normal," went on to qualify--

except in Barrio Kahigan, where people seem restless because of the influence of Mercoleta and Pamanian, who are still keeping a part of their organization intact near or around the forest of Matoloto.... I have been writing letters to Capt. Mercoleta and one to Maj. Pamanian. I hope they would understand the purpose of our government....²⁴¹

These guerrilleros understood only too well..!".

A pathetic misunderstanding of the concept of "normalcy" marked the report of the Mayor of Malitbog. His cringing anxiety to please distorted his perspective:

... On February 1, 1944, I left for barrio San Isidro with members of the Propaganda Corps of the Japanese Imperial Forces.!!.. After the truck went as far as 5 km from the poblacion, we were treacherously attacked by guerrillas.... I cried over the incident before a Japanese officer, because it would stamp a bad impression upon my administration. ... Since my return from Tacloban, I have been working hard and cooperating with the Commanding Officer of the local Japanese Garrison, with a view of obtaining peace in the municipality.... A record crowd greeted Col. Yosiake and Assemblyman Veloso and party last January 25th. In other words, there was already a state of normalcy in the municipality.

Now the good mayor came to infer from the turning out of the populace in goodly throng--obviously, for some, a matter of prudential consideration to avoid bad odor with the Japanese--that all was well with the municipality escapes understanding. It took but little to upset these tranquil relations. As the Mayor proceeded to relate:

After that sad incident, the civilians, due to fear, returned again to the mountains, especially in places near the scene of the happening. I have to campaign again for their coming down in order to spare their lives. What the administration has accomplished has been set back.²⁴²

Thwarting the Food Production and Labor Programs

The guerrillas also sought to nullify the effects of the puppet government's food production program. The Governor reprimanded the mayor of Tarragona:

The Food Campaign in your municipality is very slow. Enforcement of the Provincial Executive Order No. 6 for establishment of home gardens

240. Restituto R. Copuaco, Actg. Mun. Mayor, Naval. Feb. 10, 1944. To: Prov. Gov.

241. Vicente M. Veloso, Mun. Mayor, Villaba. Feb. 8, 1944. To: Prov. Gov.

242. R. Vano, Mun. Mayor, Malitbog. Feb. 2, 1944. To: Prov. Gov.

by every family is practically neglected...".²⁴³

San Miguel's results were negligible: "Guerrilla activities handicap the food production campaign. Only yesterday, C. Diola was killed by a guerrilla."²⁴⁴

And Matalom: "The Food Production Campaign is not active due to guerrilla activities. People in the poblacion and in all barrios content themselves to work little and stay in hiding places, because of frequent sounds of guns and bombs."²⁴⁵

The Provincial Agronomist attested to the success of guerrilla sabotage in hampering production:

Because of periodic outbreak of guerrillas and bandits in La Paz, Tarragona, and mainly Abuyog, the great source of corn seeds, no more seed corn at present procurable....

... This Office needs cooperation of the military authorities in order that farmers can harvest paly. Failure means famine and no seed procurement. The rigorous control of foodstuffs movement from one municipality to another has in a way favored the bandits, since the producers are afraid to bring their stuffs to the town to their own houses and to their relatives. Flow of cereals in Eastern towns up to Carigara and Tacloban should be liberated to fast spread to the people in order to save most from the clutches of the hands of lawless elements, who are in Eastern districts and need food. Rural districts of great rice requirements should be patrolled incessantly....²⁴⁶

And in mid-May, 1944, the Governor seconded this unfavorable report: "... Despite pacification campaign, situation not greatly improved..."²⁴⁷

The guerrilla were particularly incensed against those Filipinos who consented to serve as laborers on Japanese military installations. Many incidents occurred, arising out of this matter. Thus, the Mayor of Carigara reported:

Last Friday, about 8:15 A.M., three Japanese Army cars came to Carigara to get the 206 civilians to work in Jaro, Leyte, in the construction of Japanese Army nipa houses and digging fox holes. At Km. 49, we were ambushed by guerrilleros and a rain of bullets came from both sides of the Provincial Road. Seven civilians were instantly killed, and one died in Jaro Japanese hospital. Seventeen were wounded and among them, three are still expected not to survive. That was the 10th day of the work of the Carigara civilians since August 15....²⁴⁸

243. B. Torres, Prov. Gov. Feb. 24, 1944. To: A. Matoza, Mun. Mayor, Tarragona.

244. Mayor Villeramus, San Miguel. April 8, 1944. To: Prov. Gov.

245. A. Olo, Mun. Mayor, Matalom. March 24, 1944. To: Prov. Gov.

246. V. Berdan, Prov. Agronomist. April 20, 1944. Agricultural Report.

247. P. Salazar, Prov. Gov. May 20, 1944. Agricultural Report.

248. Prudencio Borgueta, Mun. Mayor, Carigara. Aug. 28, 1944. To: Prov. Gov.

Failure of Collaboration

Mute but eloquent was the testimony declaring the failure of the collaborationist program of winning over the Province. It took the form of a wave of resignations from municipal office. The governing motivation, of course, was carefully cloaked behind seemingly valid reasons: ill-health, the need for greater income, family obligations outside the municipality, etc. Nonetheless, the excuses offered, plausible individually, were less tenable in the mass, suggesting some common underlying malaise--fear of retribution" at the hands of the guerrilla.

The Acting Mayor of Carigara, humbly urged that "the work of the mayor is too big for his head and ability.... It is earnestly requested that he be relieved of his work as Acting Mayor...."²⁴⁹ Such modesty bespoke true regard for the welfare of the municipality.

Another confession of inadequacy is a self-administered municipal purge. Wrote the treasurer of the same Carigara municipality:

... I have the honor to state further that the above resignation is based on the belief and understanding of the undersigned... that Mr. Eugenio Domingo is not... fit to hold the above position! Hence, for the good of the service....²⁵⁰

The Mayor of Biliran simply tendered his resignation, "effective on receipt."²⁵¹

The Mayor of Dulag pleaded "poor health--return to plantation" as ground for his resignation.²⁵²

So, too, did Macrohon's chief executive.²⁵³

And Paulo Jaro informed the Governor: "I resign as your confidential assistant."²⁵⁴

As the months wore on, there took place an acceleration of the tempo of resignations! Some of those resigning were outspoken in accounting for their action. The Acting Mayor of Jaro wrote in desperation: "Six months of loyal and strenuous service has eaten my vitality. Bandits and guerrillas have twice made attempts on my life. Wife and children worried...."²⁵⁵

And the Mayor of Calubian: "... No peace and order. We are wanted by the guerrillas. Family staying in Tacloban. Turning over the pistol given by garrison...."²⁵⁶

249. Guillermo V. Babagay, Actg. Mayor, Carigara. May 19, 1944. To: Prov. Gov.

250. Eugenio Domingo, Actg. Mun. Treas., Carigara. May 19, 1944. To: Prov. Gov.

251. Alberto Enage, Mun. Mayor, Biliran. May 20, 1944. To: Prov. Gov.

252. M. Lagunzad, Mun. Mayor, Dulag. March 3, 1944. To: Prov. Gov.

253. Vicente D. Evarretta, Actg. Mun. Mayor, Macrohon. Feb. 15, 1944. To: Prov. Gov.

254. Paulo Jaro. Feb. 27, 1944. To: Prov. Gov.

255. Joaquin Anover, Actg. Mayor of Jaro. Aug. 10, 1944. To: Prov. Gov.

256. Enrique Q. Enaje, Mun. Mayor, Calubian. Aug. 23, 1944. To: Prov. Gov.

And the Labor Agent responsible for recruiting Filipinos to work for the Japanese in asking to resign remarked: "Last month, I asked for 30 days leave for my health. It didn't do any good...."²⁵⁷

Bitterly, the Mayor of La Paz wrote: "I have worked with the Japanese in order that the Government we are enjoying under their protection will be welcomed by all citizens. My labors in vain."²⁵⁸

Less conspicuous but more numerous were the school teachers, policemen, clerks and various functionaries who resigned in swarms.

The resignations from provincial and municipal posts were but the surface dimensions of something deeper. Fear of guerrilla reprisal was not potent enough to bring about this general malingering. Below the surface, a ferment of hatred against the Japanese invader, the wanton plundering invader, the cruel despotic invader, was seething in a million breasts.²⁵⁹ The legend of a "Co-Prosperity Sphere" survived only as the butt of sardonic quips. And awe of Japanese might was beginning to evaporate. Even those who cherished no special love for the Americans were estranged. Under conditions of such pervasive disaffection, Filipino officials and public servants saw release from office as the sole way of deflecting popular malice from themselves onto their Japanese overlords!

Those who would speak of the Japanese as the "fellow-Oriental" were unconvincing.

Visions of Japanese sadism could not be erased from the mind's eye. The Provincial Agronomist gave warning to the Governor:

I have seen with my own eyes this morning our poor Municipal Agricultural Inspector.... Fornillos with a bleeding head as he came out of the Japanese military barracks. After a short interview with him of what had happened, I found out that he was beaten by a Japanese soldier and that most probably he was suspected a bad person. The scandalous torture aroused the interest of a big crowd at the municipal building and I am afraid the news may be spread to all nooks of the municipality and create hatred....²⁶⁰

Many Filipinos shuddered and froze at the mere sight of Japanese soldiers for their behavior was utterly unpredictable. One could never know when a spasm of sadism might move a unit of soldiers or a single private to commit some atrocity.

The people remembered the ruthlessness of the Japanese whose reconnaissance patrols killed peremptorily. The Mayor of Abuyog reported that "during the recent patrol tour of the local Japanese military detachment to Barrio Comatin, one person said to be affiliated with a guerrilla band was

257. Antonio M. Brillo. Sept. 2, 1944. To: Prov. Gov.

258. Pedro K. Palana, Mun. Mayor, La Paz. May 12, 1944. To: Prov. Gov.

259. See: Marc T. Greene, "The Filipinos Are Ready," Asia and the Americas, XLIV, (September, 1944), pp. 399-402.

260. Agronomist Berdan. Nov. 10, 1943. To: Prov. Gov.

shot and killed.²⁶¹

It was enough that a person's guerrilla affiliations should be only a matter of conjecture to jeopardize that person's life. As for a cluster of dwellings or a whole barrio suspected of disaffection, it might be blotted out from the sky or razed to the ground by flame. Carigara reported:

... However, on the 4th instant the people were nervous due to the Imperial Japanese soldiers burning of about 27 houses big and small in the barrio of Caghalo and a house in the barrio of Sogod. At about noon of the same day, Japanese airplanes dropped about 9 to 12 bombs in the neighborhood of the barrios of Sogod and Canlampay. ... The motive of the burning and bombing was due to the alleged keeping or maintaining of mountain soldiers in these places.²⁶²

In many cases, the Japanese caught sight of a group of timorous civilians fleeing before them and at once assumed that they were guerrilleros or auxiliary bolomen. Many mayors found it necessary, as did the Mayor of Burauen, to warn the people that "they could not hide in their evacuation places, as they are at the mercy of the Japanese soldiers if found while on patrol duties."²⁶³

Richardson gave vivid description to the plight of the refugees from Japanese ferocity:

The people of the towns ran frightened into the hills. That made the Jap food position in the towns serious. Their garrisons were living off the townspeople. They were forcing them to work. The Japs could not exist in deserted barrios. They went into the hills with fifth columnists, hunting the evacuees, those who had buqweed. When the fifth columnist identified a buqwee family as townsfolk, it was compelled to return home. The hill families were killed to keep them from aiding the guerrillas. The hill barrios were burned to keep guerrillas from living off them....

I myself watched while the Japs in force burned four barrios. That was why we fought close to the coastal towns rather than pick the more advantageous ambush spots in the hills for our battlefields. We wanted to fight the Japs back out of the hills to save the barrios and save the people there and keep the Japs bottled up in the towns. We knew they wouldn't kill the people they were living off.²⁶⁴

Japanese patrols constantly harried the Filipino farmer, especially at harvest time. The Mayor of Palo complained:

Permit me to inform your office that rice harvesting in Barrio

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261. Eleuterio A. Cana, Mun. Mayor, Abuyog. Sept. 22, 1942p To: Prov. Gov., Weekly Report.
- 262e Mariano P. Salvacion, Mun. Secty., Carigara. Sept. 8, 1942. To: Prov. Gov.
263. Eduardo R. Bugho, Mun. Mayor, Burauen. Oct. 1, 1942. To: Prov. Gov. also: Jeremias Pal, Mayor, Matalom. Aug. 1, 1942. To: Prov. Gov. (Item 1 in the Matalom report bears on the same matter.)
264. Wolfert, pop. cit., pp. 180-181. See Ibid., pp. 164-165; Haggerty, op. cit., pp. 185-190.

Pitogo and sitios nearby after a few days from now will be in full swing.!!.. The Japanese detachment in Sta. Fe, Pastrana and Palo which daily goes there on patrol whenever they see persons harvesting rice along the way bring them to a certain place or in the barrio proper for Pitogo for the alleged purpose of attending a meeting, of which all of them are ordered to surrender their arms.... I am also sure that if this practice of arresting innocent persons working in the farms will not be stopped, the time will come when there will be no more harvesters in our rice fields....²⁶⁵

The Japanese also seized construction materials throughout the length of their stay. Thus, in Burauen, the "bodega of the Municipal Treasury, valued at P361.01 was demolished, and materials consisting of galvanized iron sheets and lumber were taken to the landing field under construction at barrio San Pablo by order of the Japanese Forces."²⁶⁶

School buildings served as warehouses for construction supplies. The division superintendent was obliged to request the mayors to keep a record of confiscated materials "like wood, galvanized iron, fence wire, etc."²⁶⁷

And the provincial property clerk advised the Provisional Treasurer:

... I think it would be better if we will write a letter to the Japanese Military Authorities requesting... that before a thing belonging to the Provincial Government is removed from a certain place, permission must first be obtained from the Provincial Treasurer....²⁶⁸

--A vain illusion!

The sham of "independence" was apparent to most of Leyte's Filipino population, even to those who found it expedient to feign enthusiasm. The arrogant behavior of the conqueror and the frequent violation of Philippine law by the Japanese soldiery in their dealings with civilians made burningly clear what the "true relationship was. The provincial officials appealed to the Commissioner for the Visayas for advice and help. They recognized the ridiculousness of their position in urging the people to feel warmly disposed towards Japan while they suffered indignities and brutalities. The Commissioner could only offer promises:

... The President himself says he is willing to share the difficulties and sufferings of his own people.!!.. An understanding has been reached between the General Liaison Office of the [Japanese Visayan command] and this Office whereby illegal searches and lootings and other crimes... may be reported to the office of the former, giving names of culprits, date of crime, and details for action....²⁶⁹

By the middle of 1944, disillusionment with the Japanese regime was complete. Yet the people had nothing palpable to look forward to as a substitute. Despite guerrilla reports of Allied victories in the South-

265. Generoso Alvarado, Mun. Mayor, Palo. Feb. 19, 1944. To: Prov. Gov.

266. Mayor Cordero, Burauen. March 13, 1944. To: Prov. Auditor.

267. F. Kapili, Div. Supt., Report of September, 1944.

268. A. Sumayod, Actg. Property Clerk. May 6, 1943. To: Prov. Treas.

269. Commissioner for the Visayas, P. Gullas. Memo Order No. 23.

Pacific, the United States troops were far away. Meanwhile, they continued to sustain the crushing burden of an army of occupation and all the miseries this entailed.

Then July--and news broke (through the grapevine) of an American submarine surfacing off Abuyog, defying Japanese supremacy in Philippine waters and beaching arms and essential supplies for use of Colonel Kangleon's guerrillas. More convincing, American cigarette and chewing gum wrappers were circulated, together with copies of the OWI magazine, Free Philippines. The effect was electrifying--exhilarating to guerrillas and their secret well-wishers, depressing to the remnant of pro-Japanese.

The haughty bravado of the victor had vanished. A whining self-righteousness rapidly becoming a self-pity was henceforth the dominant motif. In place of caroling victories, Tacloban's propaganda was now deploring the "cruel inhumanity" of the American armed forces.

It was obvious that as the year wore on and Axis fortunes wore thin, the propagandists were reduced to squeezing the last drop of juice from the rind of a lemon. An editorial of August 15th in the Leyte-Samar Bulletin read: "According to geographic categorical imperative our national salvation lies with all other Asiatic nations. To go against the logic of contemporary events would be to fly away from the face of truth." (p. 2)

On August 19th as the American tide drew inexorably closer, the Bulletin plastered across its banner-head: "P. I. Apostolic Delegate Disgusted with U. S. Barbarism" and proceeded to expatiate in an article on the disgraceful "defilement of Nippon soldiers' remains." (pp. 1 and 4)

Significantly, by September 3rd, the editorial was discussing "Air Raid Shelters and Drills" (p. 4) and the September 6th issue went into "The Pointers of Aerial Defense for the Public." (p. 2)

And while Tacloban continued to play the mummy down to the very end, pretending that Allied flights over Leyte were made by Japanese aircraft, the population was preparing for the Liberation, and the guerrilla leaders were drawing up their proscription lists of "enemies of the nation."

Japan's Last Days on Leyte

September, 1944, ushered in the waning phase of Japan's power in Leyte. Superficially all was still the same. Japan was well entrenched in the Island, her hired Filipino minions continued to spy on enemies of the regime, and helpless civilians labored in ever greater numbers in Japanese military installations. Provincial and municipal officials associated with the government continued to issue directives exhorting the people to more strenuous exertions in behalf of the "Philippine Republic."

But conformity to regulations under the watchful eyes of the Kem-pei-tai no longer meant awe of Japanese might. It meant cautious self-control, repression of an almost irresistible urge to shout in stentorian voice, "The Yanks will soon be here." Everyone had heard of the new guerrilla regiment organized by Colonel Kangleon, equipped with American arms, and sent to the Ormoc area

to replace the disintegrated Western Leyte Guerrilla of Miranda! It was no secret that the Japanese detachments in the South and West were anxious. A guerrilla officer observed:

The enemy, feeling the pressure of Col. Kangleon's men, ceased to patrol and confined themselves to their garrisons. Successful raids on enemy garrisons were effected forcing the enemy to abandon isolated outposts.²⁷⁰

And in the East and North, it was obvious that the guerrilla was becoming increasingly defiant. On top of all this came rumors of guerrilla advice to civilians of coastal towns to prepare for evacuation. Clearly, the day of Liberation was approaching. But that was all the more reason for the citizen in occupied Leyte to tread softly, avoid giving offense to the touchy Japanese, save his neck from beheading, and thus survive until the glorious day of redemption.

Yet a strange disquietude disturbed what should have been a pure jubilation, howbeit suppressed. This was the uneasiness of those reflecting upon the parts they had been playing under the Occupation and suddenly becoming contrite. How many edicts of the guerrilla command had they violated, unmindful of grave warnings that records of such misdeeds would be preserved? And now that the heavy paw of the invading beast would soon be removed, would the vengeful hand of the guerrilla strike?

Among the most apprehensive of those who had incurred guerrilla ill-will were the Filipino constabularymen. Many had become thoroughly odious in the eyes of the people for the ruthless opportunism they had shown on their patrols. Those with fairly clean records were anxious to dissociate themselves from their comrades. If they could sneak away and surrender to the guerrilla, offering to fight by way of penance, perhaps their lives would be spared.

Singly, in pairs and trios, constabularymen began to vanish from their outfits during September.²⁷¹ The Japanese, at first tricked into believing they were casualties of guerrilla kidnapping or shooting, soon realized

270. Veloso, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

271. The American guerrillero, Richardson, commented on this development:

"I don't know what effect the great September raid had on the other islands of the Philippines, but where I was it had this effect: the commanding officers of the BCs in the area [southern Samar] came calling to see me. He walked directly up to a volunteer guard... and said, 'Please tell Major Richardson I would like to talk to him.... I have come to offer you my services and the services of my command.'

"... A day later a Jap patrol came down the road from Hiporlos. Perhaps all the BCs everywhere and all the fifth columnists and traitors and Jap spies and rats everywhere were jumping from the sinking ship.... Anyway this Jap patrol, thirty of them, came to disarm the BCs, and the BCs laid an ambush for them."

Wolfert, *op. cit.*, pp. 22b-29.

that their auxiliaries were deserting. Always suspicious of the constabulary, the Japanese now stripped them of most of their weapons and maintained a careful vigilance. Henceforth, flight would be more difficult. The constabularyman must now plan on escape to the safety of American lines, should the expected invasion take place, before the double nemesis of Japanese soldier or guerrilla avenger could pick him off.

Government officials, clerks, school teachers, merchants and farmers who had dealt with the Japanese now engaged in a frantic last-minute effort to stave off conceivable punishment. Had they ever given foodstuffs, clothing, or stationery supplies to the guerrilla? They must exhume the crumbled slip of mildewed paper that was a guerrilla receipt! Had they passed on some scrap of intelligence to the disguised guerrilla operative in town? They must hasten to locate him and remind him of this service. And if, though they ransacked their memories, they could think of no positive deed rendered in behalf of the resistance movement, they must do two things: (a) they must contrive in their minds for public presentation as convincing a case as possible, demonstrating the extenuating character of the circumstances surrounding their ostensibly pro-Japanese "actuactions"; (b) they must locate a blood relative active in the guerrilla, or some friendly neighbor on good terms with the guerrilla, and implore this person to intercede in their behalf.

Meanwhile, as if to buoy up their own courage, the Japanese proclaimed loudly and insistently that the Americans would never return to Leyte. How could they? Were not the Japanese sinking American ships and destroying American planes at a rate faster than new ones could be constructed? But then in October, American reconnaissance planes flew overhead. Even then the Japanese naively hoped to hoodwink the people. These were Japanese planes, part of the aerial covering provided to protect the Filipinos against the devastation the inhuman Americans would rain down if they were only given the chance.

The residents of Tacloban were not provided with air raid shelters-- even of the flimsiest, make-shift sort. Neither were they alerted against possible air raids by drill in scurrying to safety, in rescue work, and in debris clearance. And the Japanese persisted in this headstrong insouciance even after American bombers began to pock-mark Leyte's landing fields in mid-September.²⁷²

272. Tacloban's newspaper, The Guardian, in a mood of reminiscence, observed in 1945: "... One year ago last... September 12, about nine o'clock in the morning, the first pre-invasion bombing startled Tacloban. Taclobaners in the know that the Americans were only after military objectives, did not go to their improvised air-raid shelters, but enjoyed seeing the spectacular feats of the airmen in rendering the Kataisen airstrip useless! Later, through the human grapevine telegraphy, we learned that the American forces were 300 miles away from Davao...." The Guardian, Sept. 22, 1945, p. 2.

An American ex-guerrillero then stationed in southwest Leyte, sparkled as he recalled the same memorable occasion:

"But on the morning of September 12 I saw hundreds of airplanes in the sky. At first, I thought it was just another bunch of Jap airplanes, but then I said to my radio operator, 'My God, those must be United States airplanes! Look how many there are!'

.....

Continued on next page

Elsewhere on the Island, the Filipino civilians were making preparations for the long-awaited American onslaught. Many municipalities had two local governments, one in the poblacion answerable to the Tacloban administration and one in the hills under guerrilla auspices. The guerrilla instructed their civilian officials to give notice that the poblacion-dwellers must evacuate. Thus, the chronicler of Abuyog recorded:

September, 1944. Mayor Gallego passed the word to town warning everybody to leave the place by all means before the end of the month. He repeated it for days and he meant it.... The civilians in the poblacion... gradually diminished without the Japs' notice. By mid-October, 1944, the poblacion of Abuyog was only a poblacion of Japs, except for some Chinese civilians who were also prepared to slip away into the swamps. The people were scattered in the barrios along the coast as well as inland....²⁷³

October came, finding Leyte in a state of seige. Most of the towns along the East coast had been evacuated. The last traces of commerce and fishing had disappeared. Farmers had abandoned their fields. A tense expectancy hovered everywhere.

In the North, guerrilla units were pointed not far from the towns, ready to storm in and take over. In the Ormoc sector, and the neighboring municipalities of the West coast where Japanese concentrations were strong, guerrilla reconnaissance was intensified. Here too, evacuation had been proceeding, but not as completely as on the East coast.

It was in the South, however, where Kangleon had direct oversight of guerrilla operations that the guerrillas displayed the most aggressive spirit. The exploits of Company "I" of the 94th Regiment drew wide notice:

The guerrillas, better armed and better manned than they had ever been, began stronger raids on Jap garrisons. Captain Landia's company of 110 men raided the garrison in the town of Abuyog, a garrison of about 80 men.

It was short and sweet! The guerrillas came in from several directions and were swarming all over the town before the Japs knew what was happening.

The guerrillas fired from behind fences, from around the corners of houses, from trees, from all over. Taken by surprise, the Japs did

"Then they began to bomb Cebu City. Boy, we could hear those explosions all the way over to Leyte. The people cheered and hollered....

"People dragged American flags out of mothballs and waved them and hollered 'Kill the Japs! Kill the Japs!...'

"After while the airplanes came back. They got over the freighter again, and two of them peeled off....

"... In Hilongos, where I was, everyone climbed to the top of houses or into trees so they could see what happened to the freighter.

"That day was a holiday of course, and everyone stayed out on the streets talking and laughing and singing. It was the happiest day Hilongos had had in years, the day of the beginning of the Liberation." St. John, op. cit., pp. 167-70.

273. Aurillo, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

not do very well. Thirty Japs were killed....²⁷⁴

And Abuyog's chronicler boasted:

Almost immediately before the invasion of Leyte by MacArthur's retaking forces, the Japs stationed at Hinunangan, a municipality south of Abuyog, and numbering about a hundred, sneaked away northward via the jungles. A unit of the southern Leyte guerrillas followed them at once and requested the 'I' boys to block the way. The 'I' men did. In the jungle fight that ensued, the trailing unit sustained some casualties, the Japs... most, but the unit in the block suffered none.²⁷⁵

Yet, let it not be imagined that the Japanese were resting idly. On the basis of intelligence reports gathered and sifted, the 95th Infantry of Major Balderian pieced together the following picture of Japanese tactics under way since July:

The enemy, about a division in strength, is massed in the northeastern part of the province. They are preparing a coastal defense from Abuyog to Tacloban with a strong support of artillery pieces. Aside from improvement of old roads along the coast and across the province they are constructing a series of dust roads between towns. Their present activities tend to show the following:

- a. They expect American landing forces between Tacloban and Abuyog.
- b. They will utilize the towns of Palompon, Ormoc and Baybay for landing reinforcements and exit in case of retirement utilizing Ormoc-Tacloban road and Baybay-Abuyog road.
- c. They will utilize the dust roads they are constructing to repulse our forces already in the province from disturbing their rear installations, and together with lateral trails already in existence as a route of withdrawal or reinforcements in the event that roads are rendered unserviceable.²⁷⁶

The Japanese were also very much aware of the guerrillas. They had enough respect for the guerrilla to organize a huge espionage program. Headquarters of the 95th Infantry sent out an urgent warning to its subsidiary units:

Reliable information has been received... to the effect that there are over 1,000 spies sent to this province by the Japanese. These spies who are from Cebu and Bohol are trained for high class espionage work.... The enemy through their agents will organize dances, gambling... fiestas, tuba and wine drinking parties. All these gatherings are designed to attract the attention of our soldiers with the hope that they become careless.... Then the enemy will be able to obtain information relating to our plans, intentions, and above all, the movements and concentration of our troops. In order that the enemy's intention will fail, it is directed that all the said dances... be immediately stopped. Any soldier or civilian who violates these limitations should be given drastic action.²⁷⁷

274. St. John, op. cit., p. 178.

275. Aurillo, op. cit., pp. 12-13.

276. Armandez Guevara, 1st Lt., Inf. Regt. Plane and Training Officer, 95th Inf. 92nd Div. IAC. August 22, 1944. Plans of Attack, Par. 1.

277. B. V. Abarientos, Capt., Inf., Ex. G. & Adj., 95th Inf. 28 June 1944. Memorandum: All Unit Commanders 95th Inf. Regt.

Warning was also relayed to the West coast district under command of the 96th Regiment:

Report from my operatives: BC officers sent to Baybay for espionage work, pretending to be merchants.... Riding in paraos.... Mopping operations beginning the first week of September from Abuyog to Baybay will employ 12,000 Japs.²⁷⁸

The outnumbered and outgunned guerrilla of the 94th and 96th Regiments avoided for the most part direct skirmishes with the Japanese. The Japanese therefore turned on the civilians, slaying many in these "mopping" operations for alleged sympathy with the guerrilla.

Appropriation of foodstuffs was intensified, especially in rich cereal-growing areas.

Enemy has reoccupied San Isidro for purposes of getting supply of corn! Enemy set quota of 9,000 sacks for said town. Big hacienderos were given their respective quota! Japs pay in textiles, cigarettes, soap, sugar, or P12 Philippine Treasury Notes per cavan. Enemy bluffs hacienderos that corn they got used for feeding their 20,000 laborers in Eastern towns.²⁷⁹

As already mentioned, recruitment of Filipino laborers for work on landing fields and military installations was greatly expanded. These laborers were brutally treated after the first American bombings. "Japs directed fire at laborers working in landing fields at Burauen to revenge. Many killed. According to laborers who escaped when American planes strafed."²⁸⁰

Reports were widely bruited about that Filipino youth would soon be called up for combat duty. "Laurel issued conscription of youth. Advise people in occupied area to stay away from the enemy," Colonel Kangleon warned.²⁸¹

In the provincial capital, some signs of crisis were beginning to appear. Guerrilla intelligence learned:

All BCs in Tacloban disarmed by Japs. Maj. Reyes unmolested, but without arms. Prominent residents and puppet government employees closely watched by Japs. Salazar and Japs forbid evacuation of residents from Tacloban. Employment of forced labor in landing fields and military installations continues regardless of sex.²⁸²

The branch bank closed. So did the public schools and the two functioning parochial institutions in Tacloban. The Japanese seized the Leyte

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278. A. Balderian, Maj., 95th Inf. Aug. 30, 1944. To: Maj. Jain, CO, 94th Inf.
279. A. Balderian, 95th Inf. Sept. 10, 1944. To: Col. Kangleon, CO, IAC.
280. A. Balderian, 95th Inf. Sept. 13, 1944. To: Col. Kangleon, CO, IAC.
281. R. Kangleon, CO, IAC. Sept. 16, 1944. To: Maj. Balderian, CO, 95th Inf.
282. A. Balderian, Maj., 95th Inf. Oct. 4, 1944. To: Col. Kangleon, CO, IAC.

Land Transportation Company, confiscating the remaining trucks, garage equipment, and P27,000 in cash.

Yet withal, the Japanese continued to maintain a fantastic facade of self-assurance. Indeed on October 17 they convoked a monstrous parade, wryly named a "Victory Parade", celebrating the destruction of the United States fleet--at the very moment when a titanic armada was assembling for the big push towards Leyte's shores.²⁸³

A Retrospective Glance at Leyte's Japanese-Sponsored Regime

It is fitting that we make some evaluation of the Japanese-sponsored regime in Leyte. First we must note that the regime lacked effective leadership. Manila determined policy; Tacloban applied this policy with such emphasis as was exacted by the local Japanese Military Administration. This meant considerable rigidity. We saw this inflexibility illustrated in several important instances.

Governor Torres attempted to restore business stability. To do this, he sought to validate the emergency currency that constituted the principal tender in circulation among the masses. He pleaded his case as eloquently as he could but found the Japanese adamant.

Secondly, the Governor sought the restoration of motor transport to civilian control as an indispensable adjunct to the functioning of commerce. Again he was thwarted.

Finally he hoped to establish an armed constabulary adequate in strength to support effectively the execution of the provincial program. But the distrustful Japanese held back the issuance of weapons. The gubernatorial arm remained withered, too weak for the tremendous task of pacification.

These examples of the Japanese Military Administration working at cross-purposes with the Governor illumine the inner incoherence of the Leytean occupation regime. The primary mission of the administration was the restoration of pre-war "normalcy." By normalcy was meant the return of every family to its pre-war abode, the resumption of peacetime vocations, and the ending of armed resistance to the Japanese occupation. These conditions could be met if and only if the inhabitants of the Province felt confidence in the benevolent intentions and strength of the regime!

Japanese policy militated against the economic recovery of the Province and the effective implementation of the Governor's pacification program. This had a two-fold effect. On the one hand, Filipinos prepared to abide by the conquest of Leyte as a given fact were unwilling to accept economic adversity. On the other, families that had evacuated to the interior were not sufficiently impressed by the might of the Tacloban regime to dare defy the guerrilla resistance edicts.

Overriding all these considerations was one indubitable fact. Philippine

283. See George A. Malcolm, American Colonial Careerist (Boston, The Christopher Publishing House, 1957) for reference to Cmdr. "Chick" Parsons' role in alerting Col. Ruperto Kangleon to the impending American naval bombardment.

officialdom was instructed to present the case for acquiescence to Japanese rule in terms of the benevolence and Oriental kinship of the ruler. The regime was allegedly founded upon the rule of law and those resisting were in point of fact outlaws. But the humble Filipino" observing Japanese decorum could not but doubt whether the sovereign occupation power actually regarded itself as bound by law. He saw a gulf" separating the conquered from the conqueror. His own interests were given no consideration. The conqueror behaved with a cruel arbitrariness, valuing only his imperial advantages. This being the case, propaganda about Philippine independence was a stinging mockery.

One more word. The inhabitant of Leyte was told that in the new Philippines all true Filipinos must place the corporate interest above that of selfish individual calculation. But while he suffered from malnutrition and his family wore tatters, he observed privileged few looking sleek and contented. He sweated, earned a few pesos, and was speedily plundered of his earnings by the hawks of the market-place. All must suffer equally, he was told. But he knew that relief supplies were being syphoned off into the maw of corrupt officials and their influential wealthy hangers-on.... And now he was completely disfranchised.

Perhaps if the Japanese had overrun the entire Province at the time of their initial invasion, the Tacloban administration might have enjoyed a more successful rule. As it was, the administration's control was confined to a small district on the North-East coast until 1944. By then, the population had grown to hate the Japanese, while feigning compliance with their regulations. And in a few months, word of an American counter-invasion was in the air...."

Collaborationism

In this study, the focus of our concern has been the resistance movement of war-time Leyte. Clearly, however, implicit in the very notion of resistance is an affirmation--a thesis to be resisted. The thesis in this case is the Japanese "New Order" and the instrument of affirmation is the armed might of the Occupation Power.

The metaphor describing the Japanese-Filipino encounter would be inaccurately represented as simply unilinear thrust and counter-thrust. More truly evocative of the real situation would be a triangular representation. So conceived, the Occupation Power would constitute the base-line, the collaborating Filipino regime would serve as one side and the Resisters would constitute the remaining side. To complete the statement, we note that the metaphor applies to a dynamic system, whose momentary position measures the resultant force of the components' inter-play.

But the metaphor breaks down as soon as collaboration is interpreted as merely a dependent variable, a function of Occupation policy. To be sure, it is intermeshed with the Occupation regime. But it has its own autonomous lines of force to some extent influencing Occupation policy. This distinction takes on importance as soon as collaboration is judged by moralistic criteria. Indeed, a clear account of collaboration becomes imperative in any adequate interpretation of "resistance." Hence, the need for commentary on this term prior to any final appraisal of Leyte's resistance movement.

The word "collaboration," itself neutral, has undergone the same career as has "appeasement." It has become a highly-toned emotional term. Its derivative "collaborator" when attached to some person as a descriptive, indicates far more than that the person in question had lent his support to a certain program or cause. Perhaps the rendering of the term most adequately explaining its popular connotation is that of "selling out"--the surrendering of some self-evident "good" in return for advantage of intrinsically inferior worth, shorter durability or more limited scope.

Let the term "collaborator" or "collaborationist" (a stronger form) be attached to a person, and he becomes by virtue of that label a moral degenerate. In short, an abstraction is indiscriminately applied to all who associate themselves with the regime established in a conquered nation by an enemy invader. The conditions that give rise to such association, the nature of the association, and the consequence of such a relationship do not constitute criteria for the application or withholding of the designation "collaborationist" in a given instance. From this it follows that all collaborationists are of the same stripe, alike infected by the same degeneracy.

However, the historian who would investigate empirically the characteristics of "collaborationism" at a given time and place (in this instance, Leyte) will not be satisfied with such cavalier treatment of a subtle and complex matter. By the fitting of all individuals under consideration in the single Procrustean bed provided by the above categorical definition, certain significant distinctions are amputated. All those to whom the category applies are, by semantic analysis, wicked. Conversely, those to whom the category is inapplicable are self-evidently patriots of sterling excellence, stalwartly resisting blandishments and intimidation that would seduce them from their unquestionably proper course.

Needless to say, there is much vagueness and loose thinking connected with the employment of the term. This is not to argue that "collaborationism" should be dropped as empty of content. But it must be employed circumspectly and only after the criteria for its employment have been fully specified.

We should not hesitate to consider as Filipino collaborationists those who gave public expression to their pro-Japanese orientation even prior to the arrival of the Japanese in Leyte and who worked consistently with the Japanese towards the realization of Japanese objectives after their arrival. In Leyte, Pastor Salazar of the Provincial Board (subsequently Governor Salazar) and Senator Jose Veloso were the leading protagonists of a pro-Japanese orientation. Does this attitude in itself justify their damnation? Not until we have examined the nature of Filipino-Japanese relations.

It is here proposed that the only valid test for pronouncing judgment upon the political relationship between two peoples, one powerful and the other dependent, is the test of the people's welfare. During the pre-war Commonwealth regime, the Philippines were under American sovereignty while enjoying a substantial measure of autonomy. In Leyte, the bulk of the population experienced little direct contact with the United States or with Americans. The few American businessmen and military officers in Tacloban or the handful of Americans in the interior who had intermarried and "gone native" scarcely caused a ripple in the lives of the people. The United States affected Leyte economically in providing a market for its important

abaca and copra output. However, agriculture had been sufficiently diversified on this Island" so that the imbalance of one- or two-crop economics did not disturb the population.

Culturally, the United States had influenced Leyte primarily through the public school system. But here again, the high mortality in public school education meant that very few youngsters reached the high school level. Hence, their knowledge of the English language and of American ideas was rather patchy. On the other hand, the literati who went on for a high school and occasionally a college education to become Leyte's school teachers, professionals, municipal officials, and provincial bureaucrats and political leaders were considerably influenced by American ideas. And through this educated leadership, the American influence was kept alive among the masses.

Politically, Leyte was a Province of the Philippines, and therefore governed under the United States Constitution. As component of a democracy she enjoyed the advantages of representative government and of free expression of opinion. While popular illiteracy and bureaucratic corruption to some extent vitiated the practical operation of democracy, this form of government was generally accepted by the bulk of the people as the most desirable and the most promising for Leyte's future.

As discussed elsewhere, Leyte had no organized labor and peasants' movement, much less a left wing organization expressing cynicism over a political democracy lacking popular control in the economic sphere. Yet the wealthier landed and business groups of the Province demonstrated no group preference for right wing totalitarianism. They seemed quite convinced that the existing state of affairs afforded them all the requisites for continued enjoyment of their privileged position. Although grumbling against Chinese economic influence in merchandising was becoming more audible, the Filipino business class of the Province felt that they were quite competent to handle the situation locally once popular support had been enlisted.

The issue of immediate independence from the United States was not of burning concern in Leyte as in some of the other Philippine provinces. Most of the politically interested people were content in the knowledge that independence was close at hand. Apprehension over the economic terms of the independence agreement with the United States was not acutely felt in Leyte as in other provinces with radical movements that had devoted special research to the question and had conducted popular campaigns casting suspicion upon American economic motivation. The politicians, lawyers, and businessmen of Leyte who had gone to Manila to practice, as also some of the officers and soldiers who had served in that area, nurtured in some cases a different sort of grievance. Sooner or later they had encountered instances of social discrimination at the hands of Manila American colony. Their Malayan and Spanish heritages sensitized them to such slights. Moreover, they perceived the inconsistency between American democratic preachments and the social snobbery of Americans. Contact with other Filipinos who had sojourned in America and had experienced more sharply the cutting edge of American racial inequality intensified their pique. These were the people who on returning to Leyte were prone to carp at American policy in the political and economic fields--their criticism being in essence a projection of their outraged demands for fair play.

What had Japan to offer that might appeal to the Filipino? The Filipino could only judge on the basis of Japan's previous action as disclosed in China. Japan's defiance of the Western Powers had elicited the admiration of the Oriental who resented white supremacy. But was this negative attitude enough to make Japan a desirable ally for the colonial colored races in their campaign for freedom? Japan had posed as the champion of the subjugated Orientals, but her policy in China belied her pretenses. In the wake of her conquering armies, massacre, pillage, and desolation remained. And the integration of such of the Manchurian and Chinese economies that fell under her rule plainly showed that Japan, and not the native population, was to benefit from any change. Moreover, the Japanese did not treat the conquered populations as social equals but unmistakably pushed them down to a lower level. The governments set up by the Japanese were transparently of the puppet variety beneficial to the small privileged clique prepared to do the bidding of their imperial masters.

In Leyte, at any rate, the Filipino population had disclosed no inclination to throw off its American allegiance for Japanese rule. Even those who bore no love for the United States were terrified by the stories of unspeakable Japanese barbarism. What then can we say of those few, typified by Jose Ma. Veloso and Pastor Salazar, who openly voiced their preference for Japanese rule? Simply that they were opportunists, awed by Japanese might, convinced that Japan was destined to seize the Philippines and successfully retain them and therefore determined to jump on the band wagon and become the local gauleiters regardless of the consequence for their countrymen.

In the case of Leyte, therefore, we are prepared to say that Japanese rule promised a definite sinking of the fortunes of the people. Bold support of the Japanese meant a deliberate disregard of popular interests for selfish purposes. Under these circumstances, collaboration with Japan was a censurable course of conduct, not because it was "collaboration", not because it meant repudiation of political obligation to the United States, but because pragmatically it meant possibly irreparable damage to the Philippines in general and to the Province of Leyte in particular.

Howbeit, if outright deliberate collaboration with the Japanese invaders was morally blameworthy, it did not necessarily follow that support of the United States in the war against Japan was the course open to the people of Leyte. To understand the position of the average Leyteno, we must bear in mind a rounded picture of the situation by May of 1942 when the Japanese invaders reached the shores of Leyte.

First, we must note that Leyte as a province made its due contribution to the defense of the islands by mustering combat troops who saw action in Luzon. It had in addition a regiment entrusted with the defense of home soil. It also prepared within limits set by its resources a network of civilian defense agencies. At the outbreak of the war, despite the bombing of Manila and the subsequent news of the Pearl Harbor debacle, the population of Leyte believed with complete faith that America would promptly avenge this blow and stave off complete disaster. But as the months went by and Filipino blood was shed, it became painfully clear that the mother country was sending neither an air force nor a navy to their rescue. Inevitably, doubts began to well up in the minds of some concerning America's capacity or even her willingness to come to the defense of the Filipino. That being the case, many wondered whether the Filipino should continue to resist. The doubts were intensified by news of Japanese successes in other military theaters of

South East Asia.

Meanwhile, the Japanese had overrun Luzon, Cebu and others of the Visayas group and were pushing ahead in Mindanao. The provincial government and the Leyte Provincial Regiment continued to speak of resistance. But when following General Sharp's capitulation order in Mindanao, Colonel Cornell ordered the termination of resistance preparations in Leyte, what were the Filipinos to do?

That Filipino soldiers and patriotic civilians disregarded the surrender order and subsequently organized for guerrilla warfare against the invader did not alter the fact that the constituted American authorities of Leyte had ordered surrender. Technically, those soldiers who failed to report and surrender their arms were mutineers, and their civilian supporters were outlaws. Under these circumstances, the Filipino officials of Leyte who reported for duty and were subsequently organized into a collaborationist government were hardly guilty of criminal parricide.

It is beside the point to argue that the officials in question, had they been men of clear vision and sterling character, would have seen that Japanese rule was antithetical to Filipino interests. The fact of the matter is that most politicians are ordinary men with some capacity for altruistic action, but also prone to make decisions on the basis of proximate forces and not remote abstractions. For them, there was the actuality of irresistible Japanese military power and the order that normal governmental functioning be resumed without delay. Someone had to serve. Why not those already incumbent who presumably had popular support, who were experienced, and who would undertake the moral obligation to protect Filipino interests against the conqueror as far as would be possible?

The decision to collaborate with the Japanese carried certain implications. Primarily these Filipino administrators were pledged to make their offices operate as efficiently as possible. And they realized that the Japanese would hold them strictly answerable for non-feasance. Hence, they were forced into the position of opposing non-cooperation as obstructing the success of their administrations, and fighting the guerrilla who threatened their lives and work. Such is the irony of enemy rule that it tends to incite civil conflict.

For the ordinary Filipino, Japanese rule was a fait accompli. That meant that he must comply with all regulations of the collaborationist government: resumption of his normal occupation, acceptance of Japanese currency, sending his children to school, complying with Japanese security regulations--and avoiding involvement in the guerrilla movement. Had the Japanese shown a true interest in Filipino well-being and had they dealt wisely and considerately towards the conquered respecting the Filipino's sense of dignity, they might have won over the preponderance of the population towards their regime.

For consider these facts. The Japanese did rule through the officials elected by the Filipino people. Moreover, they soon granted independence whose sham nature was not apparent to the poor peasant. Under these circumstances, Filipino self-rule seemed to be protected. Why then should they prefer the rule of the United States who, when all was said and done, had abandoned them to foreign conquest? Moreover, Japanese propaganda about

"Asia for the Asiatics" had some appeal to the literates led to believe that the Filipino would share in the wealth of the Orient--an Orient no longer to be exploited by Western capitalists for their private benefit! For the poor peasant of Leyte, who had never enjoyed abundance, the substitution of a set of Japanese political leaders for the American set did not promise to disturb his material circumstances one way or the other.

Furthermore, stories about the conduct of the guerrilla groups in the early period of organization did little to jar acquiescence in Japanese rule. Many of the so-called guerrillas were little better than roaming bands of brigands, shaking down the people with promises of furnishing protection while actually doing nothing. They seemed to direct their wrath not against the well-armed Japanese, but against such of their own countrymen who dared denounce their rapacity.

When these pseudo-guerrillas occasionally fired upon a Japanese patrol, they needlessly jeopardized the life of civilians by carrying out their ambush in the vicinity of a cluster of habitations! The Japanese would subsequently dispatch a punitive patrol, believing that the civilians were harboring guerrilla fighters, and sometimes wiping out whole groups of families. Moreover, individual guerrilleros, harboring a grudge against some individual, would charge him with actively abetting the Japanese and thereupon proceed to liquidate him. Finally many of the town dwellers, as those in Tacloban and Ormoc, felt that the guerrilleros were unnecessarily heartless in imposing a blockade on foodstuffs from the surrounding countryside and inflicting starvation upon them.

Governor Bernardo Torres reached the heart of the issue in his address to his fellow Leytenos on the occasion of the announcement of Philippine "independence":

I have been accused of being a Japanese agent, a Japanese slave. I am not either. I am a Filipino agent, working to the best of my ability to serve my unfortunate country at an unfortunate time in her history. I am doing what I am doing because my sincere belief is that it is for the good of our people and country under the present circumstances. I am a civilian, a government official. I am entrusted with the administration of government which means peace, order, and security" in my beloved province which, however, has not as yet come to know these things. If I had been a military man, I might have fought in the battlefield and after the surrender of the Filipino troops, I might have chosen either of these two: to surrender to the Japanese as ordered by Gen. Wainwright or to take the risk and fight in a guerrilla warfare. Any of these two choices I might have chosen because in choosing one I would have been led by principles dear to me, even as those soldiers of ours who have chosen, chose their decision because by doing so, they knew they were doing justice to themselves and were being loyal to their principles. Who is wrong and who is right, who is a traitor and who is not, is not the question--for that can never be decided--just as well say that the thousands of Filipino soldiers who fought in Bataan, Corregidor, and Mindanao but who surrendered are all traitors and a few guerrillas are all patriots, or vice versa. The question of whether in making our choice we are in the right is not within our power to know, but what is important, what should guide me is the question: Are we choosing a decision which will benefit in the long run, under our present plight, the great interests of the country?

Many soldiers have chosen to surrender! Are they then traitors? Some soldiers have chosen not to surrender. Are they then patriots? Who will decide? And who will say that I am a traitor to my country because I happen to have been called to make government--peace, order, security--function in our provinces? I was not privileged to fight in the battlefield and make a military choice. I was fated by circumstances to be the governor of our province before and during this war. I could only make a civilian choice--I made it in good faith, and with no selfish or unpatriotic thought.... I am receiving no advantages from the Japanese for this choice...; on the contrary, I have invited the threat of some of my brother Filipinos to welcome me with bullets if I should speak of peace and order and the dignity and honor of independence to our people....

And even now, if I were to choose between loyalty to America, loyalty to Japan, or loyalty to our beloved country the Philippines, I prefer a thousand times to be loyal to our country if in being disloyal to the other nations I can prove my love and offer my services to the Philippines and serve her best interests and work for the happiness of her own people....

I wish only for the unity of our people. I wish for peace and order, first, as a preparation and foundation for that unity.... But I can do credit to myself and be faithful to the memory of our heroes by doing my best to help unite all Filipinos not for any nation or race but for themselves, for the ideal that all the Filipinos should stand together, as one, in victory and defeat, in happiness or suffering."..²⁸⁴

Whether on grounds of logic or morals, there would appear to be nothing untenable about the position adopted by Torres. He asserts that while his choice of action was uncoerced, at the same time it was not undetermined. His decision to serve under the new regime was contingent upon the circumstance that he was holding office, the supreme executive office of his province, when the enemy invasion occurred. Weighed down by responsibilities not to be lightly discarded, he reflected upon a situation murky with perplexities.

The situation was not of his making. It was brought about by the defeat of the sovereign power, epitomized in the surrender of General Wainwright. Obligations of fealty were at that moment dissolved. What remained was the overreaching obligation so to act that his country and his people might best prosper.

There was also a matter of guesswork, of faith, involved. If Torres was reasonably certain of Japanese success on the basis of the best information available, and if his basic postulate was that a small nation will only destroy itself if it does battle against a victorious empire, and if his unquestioned axiom was that a nation must not condemn itself to annihilation if it can possibly prevent that fate--then, the course of collaboration he embarked upon was the only course open for him.

No light shone indicating the path to be trod unflinching by the true patriot. Torres looked within himself and saw the path of collaboration

284. Bernardo Torres, Prov. Gov., "Proclamation on Philippine Independence," pp. 4, 5.

with the conqueror as the only means of salvaging the destiny of his people from the calamity that had befallen them. Perhaps he was in error, he conceded, insofar as his knowledge of the material circumstances was concerned. Conceivably his analysis was faulty, his understanding lame. But from the standpoint of subjective intent, of purity of motive, he insists that his action was unimpeachable.²⁸⁵

What, then, is the upshot of this disquisition? A protest is here made against the snap judgment holding all collaborators to be wicked men on the basis of a prior classification. For in truth, collaboration can only be equated with wickedness if we can demonstrate empirically that all who collaborate thus act on the prompting of wicked motives and also that the outcome of their action involves wickedness. Thus we are appealing to a principle to establish that individual collaborators are wicked, which principle itself must be confirmed by the exhaustive examination of individual instances. And in Leyte, at any rate, blind adherence to a formula will lead to a serious misjudgment.

In truth, the social complex called collaborationism that we are attempting to assess proves recalcitrant to simple moral analysis. For the individual Filipino of Leyte, the situations at the time of the Japanese invasion was blurred, ambiguous, highly plastic--in a word, what the social psychologist would call an unstructured situation. The convergence upon the individual of a host of inconsistent elements and conflicting claims: an official surrender order, an attachment to democratic patterns of living identified with loyalty to the United States of America, a revulsion against Japanese totalitarianism and brutality, a sensitivity to assertions of white racism, aspirations for an independent Philippines, a localistic attachment to the home Province and a desire to preserve it from devastation, a sense of responsibility for family welfare, and a desire to survive the war--all these deprived the individual of a frame of reference, of norms for judging right from wrong.

The course of conduct finally evolved, therefore, was a function of the individual's perception of a very muddled situation. Those attitudes previously dominant in the individual's make-up, those aversions which were strongest, those impulses operating most powerfully in addition to the unique play of chance factors in each case together wrought the individual's role. If such characterization appear unsatisfactory to the mind seeking simple polarization of right and wrong, let it be said in justification that the process of life does not abide the convenience of the classifiers.

Now that we have said this much, some further remarks are necessary. It may have been true that at the outset of the Japanese occupation of Leyte, many of the Filipinos decided to reserve judgment, forbearing from resistance for reasons already reviewed. With the passage of time, however, Japanese occupation policy had a chance to unfold and the ruthlessness and cruelty of the conqueror became clear. It was also very patent that self-rule was a hollow affair--a papier-mache setting for the imposition of a Japanese program. Sanctity neither of Filipino person nor property was observed by the Japanese. It was then that the full significance of American democracy came

285. For comment by an American correspondent on Torres, see: Robert Shaplen, "Lovely Americans," The New Yorker, XX (November 18, 1944), p. 50.

to be appreciated, and the faults of the American rule appeared venial alongside the reality of Japanese tyranny.

As Japanese rule came to revolt the spirit of the Filipino, the conduct of his puppet countrymen also became more insufferable. Men like Salazar and Jose Ma. Veloso acted not at all like the guardians of Filipino interest, but pursued with fanatic zeal the wishes of their Japanese masters. And such who complained when struck with whips were promised scorpions. Those of the municipal mayors and other local functionaries who never wearied of service in the interests of the Japanese--raising more than the quota of men needed for compulsory labor in Japanese installations, informing the Japanese against those Filipinos who were lax in meeting certain of their obligations, leading Japanese patrols to hunt down alleged guerrilla sympathizers in the town--these were the true collaborators, for they were betraying the interests of the Filipino people in order to elevate their own position in the eyes of the powers that be. Likewise detestable were the local officials who kept Japanese emergency rations for their own private hoard. And along with them, the ravenous "buy and sell" merchants preying upon the needs of the people for private gain.

When Japanese occupation policy in Leyte had matured to the point where its heinous character was generally acknowledged, the Filipinos who had evacuated to the hills and thrown in their lot with resistance were bound to feel that the town-dwellers were their enemy. Those who were unable to evacuate through force of circumstances were duty-bound to mitigate their collaboration by scrupulously avoiding involvement in the anti-resistance movement and by holding down to an absolute minimum their public acts of compliance with Japanese mandate. Those who failed to moderate their collaborationism thereby forfeited special consideration; objectively speaking, they were working against the interests of their people.

Insofar as the issue of collaboration raises ethical questions, we may profitably reconsider the case of Governor Torres! In judging whether his actions were formally right, we need only ask whether he acted as he believed he should act in the light of circumstances as he understood them. We are debarred from probing the soul of the man Torres and are willing to accept his words at face value! But the material rightness of his action is another thing again.

Torres asserted that the only loyalty of moment to him was a loyalty to the Philippines. Completely irrelevant and therefore a pseudo-problem was the issue of taking a stand on loyalty either to Japan or America. The sole imperative on which he chose to act was that of loyalty to his own land and people!

But this is taking a superficial approach. In point of fact, the Philippines were prostrate under the boot of Japan. Despite bombast on the diplomatic level, it was apparent that Japanese rule was despotic and not benevolent. To speak of national welfare intelligently was to take into account the realities of subjection to Japanese rule.

It was all very well to call for unity among the Filipino people as Torres did. But he must raise the question "unity for what?" Merely to stand together was not enough. The Filipinos also held ideals of liberty and democratic government. If these were mere abstractions, verbalisms, there still remained the negative ideal of freedom from exploitation. The

Filipinos of the resistance raised doubts at precisely these points. They too wanted unity. But they sought to prevent the unity of bondage, which was an external unity only. They would fight to recover what they believed their country had lost when it was overrun by the Japanese.

For a straightforward rebuttal of Governor Torres' line of reasoning, the guerrilleros turned to an open letter prepared by Governor Tomas Confesor of Iloilo and widely circulated in Leyte. Reprinted in a small mimeographed guerrilla paper entitled News, it was prefaced by the following editorial comment:

We take pleasure in publishing a letter of Governor Confesor to puppet Governor Caram of Iloilo when the latter, together with Col. Furukawa, went around that province 'on a mission of peace'. Nothing can be a better expression of the genuine sentiments of a true Filipino.
...

In the last part of the letter, the governor could not as yet mention the fall of Italy and her declaration of war against Germany, the plight of the Japanese in the Solomons and New Britain, the bombing of Java, Borneo and Celebes, and the devastating raids over Europe, because the letter was written only at the early stage of the general Allied offensive. With firmer conviction and greater enthusiasm, Governor Confesor can write this letter NOW when Japanese defeat is evident and sure.

Dated February 20, 1943, Confesor's temperately defiant message read, in part:

... I entirely disagree with Mr. Vargas when he stated that the Japanese independence proposition is definite and clear while that of America is ambiguous. On the contrary, it is that of the Japanese which is nebulous, vague and indefinite. The terms and conditions in this regard are phrased in such manner that only puppets could understand them clearly, people who have no freedom to use their will and other mental faculties.

I agree with you when you say that our people are 'experiencing unspeakable hardships and sufferings' because of these hostilities; but you should realize that our people are bearing these burdens cheerfully because they are doing it for the good and noble cause.... Now that Japan is attempting to destroy our liberties, should we exert any effort to defend them? Should we not be willing to suffer for their defense?...

.....
I firmly believe that it is not wise and statesmanly for our leaders in these their darkest hours to teach our people to avoid suffering and hardship at the sacrifice of fundamental principles of government and the democratic way of life...e. You puppets love ease and comforts so much as to compel you to barter the liberties of our people for anything...e.. You are besmirching to the maximum degree the character of our people.
.....

It is therefore evidently fallacious and insincere on your part to state that you are not pro-Japanese nor pro-American but a pro-Filipino. What do you mean by a pro-Filipino? If you have any objectives and

ideals at all, do you believe in realizing them more effectively under a totalitarian and absolute system of government or under a democracy? ... In other words, on what concrete grounds does your pro-Filipinism rest?

You were decidedly wrong when you told me that there is no ignominy in surrender. That may be true in the case of soldiers who were corralled by the enemy consisting of superior forces with no way of escape whatsoever. For when they gave themselves up they did not repudiate any principle of good government and the philosophy of life which inspires them to fight heroically and valiantly.

.....
 You also brought the point that the Japanese are generous because they freed the Filipino soldiers whom they captured. In this connection, let me ask you this question: Is it not a fact that the former USAFFE men are now working as PC under the Japanese Army and are compelled to fight and kill their own people who are still resisting...?

... If Lincoln revised his convictions (during the Civil War) and sacrificed them for the sake of peace and tranquility as you did, a fatal catastrophe would have befallen the people of America.... I prefer to follow Lincoln's example than yours and your fellow puppets.

... You people who have surrendered to the Japanese do not know of any news but those given by them to you. It shows again that you are ignorant of what is going on. For your information and guidance, let me tell you that Japan is digging her grave deeper and deeper every day!.. In Europe, Germany is in flight pursued by the Russians. In Africa, Tripoli and Tunisia have fallen into the hands of the Allies.... The Italians will soon demand for separate peace.... What are you going to do next, revise your convictions again?...²⁸⁶

And should Torres have pleaded in extenuation that his presence protected the populace from Japanese excesses, the guerrilleros would have answered along the lines of an American investigator: "... And there has been no proof that, on any important matter, the Filipino puppets prevented the Japanese from doing what they wanted to do."²⁸⁷

It does not follow from this that all who espoused the cause of resistance were selfless men of high resolve. Just as we must look into the circumstances that brought about collaboration in individual cases, so we must consider cases of resistance on their own merit. First, we must note that the municipal officials who sided with resistance did not necessarily so act because of principle. Merely to deny that a man was implicated in collaboration does not suffice to affirm the contrary--that he acted boldly in behalf of resistance!

In some instances, the Japanese did not penetrate a given sector. Or if their patrols did pass through, they failed to establish a garrison. Thus the local government did not fall under Japanese control. When the guerrilla troops developed in these sectors, they hastened to make contact with the municipal administration, bringing it into line with the

286. NEWS, Vol. I, No. 6 (October 28, 1943), pp. 2, 2A, 2B.

287. Bernstein, op. cit., p. 159.

program of the guerrilleros! In such cases, the municipal officials became "patriots" without benefit of their own conscious election.

In other areas where the Japanese had brought the municipal government under control of the Tacloban regime, the guerrillas sometimes felt powerful enough to establish rival administrations in the interior barrios. The personnel of these administrations were often recruited from the rival political faction that had failed to win out at the previous election. Neither side necessarily acted on principle. It was the old case of tweedle-dum and tweedle-dee--naked rivalry for the spoils of local office. Between factions in some municipalities, a long-time enmity had existed. It was only to be expected that if the faction in office found itself ranged on the side of collaboration, the faction out of office would loudly condemn its adversary and proclaim its devotion to resistance.

In point of fact, many municipalities were exposed to vindictive action by the Japanese and the guerrilleros alike. They therefore determined upon a course of expediency. While seemingly paying close heed to Japanese regulations and delivering public addresses in behalf of the "New Order," they surreptitiously furnished supplies to the guerrilleros and attempted to stay the hand of the Japanese whenever they contemplated punitive raids against guerrilla hide-outs.

At the end of 1943, when the Japanese received considerable reinforcements and launched their mopping-up campaign to root out thoroughly the guerrillas, the latter realized that they were destined to lose control of the municipalities under their sway. In both the zones of Kangleon's "Free Leyte" and Miranda's WLGWF, the guerrilla sector commanders authorized the appointment of sets of municipal officials to return to the town and serve under Japanese direction. But they were pledged to protect Filipino interests as best as they could. In some cases, these men had been active supporters of the guerrilla. But in the changed circumstances of complete Japanese control, they found themselves implicated in a network of activities that were contrary to the interests of the Filipino people.

Thus Attorney Ribo of Jaro, a prominent supporter of Major Balderian's Politico-Military Government, found himself compelled to remain in town after the Japanese returned in force. Soon he was heading the local Neighborhood Association and in other ways suggesting that he had completely recanted of his late guerrilla associations. Similarly, some of the leading attorneys in Western Leyte who had been active in Miranda's organization found themselves tied in with the NAs of their municipalities and a host of other collaborationist activities. Indeed, it would appear that some of the charges of collaborationism leveled against municipal officials formerly with the WLGWF may have been simply another expression of the inveterate antagonism between Kangleon and Miranda. Let us examine the situation more closely.

When the Japanese unleashed the deadly offensive against the WLGWF in December of 1943, they all but wrecked the regime so slowly built up in West Leyte over a year and a half. As was indicated, the ranks of the resisters were utterly decimated. The people returned to the towns in droves, apparently prepared to cooperate with the Japanese order.

Not only Ormoc town but all of the five municipal centers were brought

directly under the heel of the enemy. Obviously, the guerrilla could no longer have direct contact with the mayors and municipal councils! But in actuality the WIGWF had planned for such a contingency. It had been apparent in November that the increased enemy activity in Ormoc Bay and elsewhere had only one connotation--a renewal of the offensive. The guerrilla GHQ did not know exactly when the invaders planned to strike, but they realized very well that they could not withstand a large-scale attack. This was precisely why Miranda had always demurred to the suggestion that he occupy Ormoc. He knew that his forces would be sent scuttling as soon as the enemy brought up sizable reinforcements, equipped with all the latest weapons and, if necessary, given aerial support. But what would be the policy of the guerrilla when the Japanese with their Filipino puppets undertook to wipe out their guerrilla administration?

Recognizing their own powerlessness before the massed superiority of the enemy, the GHQ decided to authorize the municipal governments to put up a nominal front of cooperation with the enemy. Mayor, treasurer, chief of police and all the others would accept the authority of the Japanese Military Administration. But as far as humanly possible, they must sabotage the substance of the Japanese war effort. Moreover, they must not betray the presence in town of guerrilla operatives who would continue to keep the unsundered resisters apprised of Japanese activities and intentions.

In keeping with this resolve, the guerrilla authorized the appointment of municipal officials ostensibly aligned with the Japanese regime. There was no problem in Ormoc. The guerrilla had never controlled the town center where the Japanese had maintained a continuous garrison. But in the other towns the Japanese control had been intermittent. In Baybay, Mayor Paterno Tan, originally appointed under Japanese aegis, stayed on during the re-occupation. The mayor of Palompon, Parilla, was instructed by Chief of Staff Soliman (prior to the latter's departure to the Camotes Islands) to return to the town from his mountain hide-away and pretend to serve the Japanese. Soliman's purpose in so ordering was to spare the interior barrios of Palompon the destruction that would certainly descend upon them if the Japanese would be obliged to send out "pacification" detachments. As to the character of Parilla's tenure, there are some who accuse him of having exceeded the bounds of necessity in his zealotry to serve his new master. But others spring to his defense and attest that he only collaborated as far as he had to to avoid stirring up the delicate Japanese suspicions!

Guerrilla mayor Serafin Menesis also took to the hills during the Japanese re-occupation. But he was inducted into the guerrilla, becoming G-4 when the general staff was reorganized under Capuyan. In his stead, Frederico Boholst was authorized to go to Merida center and form a new administration under Japanese rule. Guerrilla Capuyan declares that Boholst did as well as he could under the circumstances.

Mayor Epitacio Barte received a vote of confidence to serve on at Albuera under the Japanese. Some of the other municipal officials left in office and the vacancies created were filled by new appointees. Conrado Daffon, guerrilla organizer in Albuera and long its regimental commander, is of the opinion that the municipal officials only went through the motions of cooperating with the Japanese.

When Major Nazareno, as commanding officer of Kangleon's 96th Infantry

Regiment, moved into the zone of the WLGWF, he regarded all of the functioning municipal governments as ipso facto collaborationists! Since he had no dealings with the WLGWF as such and did not consult with those former members of the WLGWF who had been inducted into his regiment in regard to the character of these local governments, he was disposed to deal with them in a summary fashion! This attitude hardly comported with that of his fellow officers of the 94th Regiment (his former outfit!) who, under similar circumstances, had authorized trustworthy civilian officials to return to their respective municipal buildings and make a pretense at collaborating with the Japanese.

Mayor Epitacio Barte of Albuera met a harsh fate. According to testimony,²⁸⁸ Barte was invited by Comacho, Nazareno's sector commander, to a conference. Barte accepted and was slain! Arcadio Menesis, first concillor of Albuera, replaced him as mayor.

Mayor Federico Boholst of Merida met a similar fate at the hands of Nazareno's forces. Nazareno's new appointee was Rubino Mendiola, who held office till the prewar mayor returned from his wartime place of evacuation.

Mayor Parilla of Palompon was more fortunate. Evidently he managed to avoid antagonizing the new leaders. Nazareno confirmed his tenure and he continued to serve until February, 1945. Oddly enough, he was belatedly denounced and interned in the Tacloban stockade in February as a collaborator. But he was released some months later.

In Baybay, Paterno Tan was appointed mayor by the Japanese. During 1944, Tan had no further contact with the rump WLGWF. But as Kangleon's forces began to emerge from their hibernation, they sent Lieutenant Filemon Pajares into the Baybay sector. Tan claims that he established successful contact with Pajares so that his name was not entered upon the guerrilla blacklist.

And now, consider some of the military leaders of the resistance." Colonel Kangleon commenced his career during the Occupation as a surrendered officer. According to many reports, Kangleon, who had been associated with Major Soliman in Mindanao prior to General Sharp's surrender order, had made a private compact with Soliman not to surrender. But he changed his mind at the last moment, gave himself up, and was interned in a Japanese camp at Butuan, Agusan, Mindanao. Whether he escaped from this camp as some contend or was released by the Japanese is a matter of dispute. But the point remains that the leader of Leyte's resistance movement began as a surrendered officer!

On the other hand, Major Soliman, who did not surrender and who came to Leyte and joined Miranda as chief of staff of the WLGWF, ended up as a surrendered officer. This came about after the smash assault in December of 1943 by a Japanese force against Miranda's headquarters--an assault that almost shattered the organization. Soliman felt constrained to give up under the circumstances lest his family's safety be endangered.

Let us attend one more instance--a dramatic one involving four officers of Kangleon's staff.²⁸⁹ Two of them, Lieutenant Colonel Causing and Major

288. Daffon, supported by his adjutant Jabillo, so testified.

289. "... Kangleon's deputy, Fidel Fernandez, a prominent pre-war attorney,
(continued on next page)

Abay, had been coerced into joining the Japanese-organized Leyte Home Force constabulary at the beginning of Japanese rule in Leyte. The third, Attorney Fidel Fernandez, was a member of the editorial staff of the Leyte Shimbun, thus lending his talents to the cause of collaborationism. These three, along with Causing's son, a Lieutenant Radaza and a Sergeant Gabe (also of the Home Force), were sent on a pacification mission to persuade a guerrilla leader, Marcial Santos, to surrender. The three principals assert that they accepted the assignment in that it offered them an opportunity to "escape without suspicion from the work they really detested (and without exposing their families to Japanese torture) and that they had been secretly negotiating with the guerrilla to effect their escape. At any rate, they were ambushed by Captain Pabilona and Major Balderian, taken prisoner, and placed under investigation. They were subsequently transferred to Colonel Kangleon's command as valuable increments to his inadequate guerrilla staff. Colonel Causing became Kangleon's chief of staff and subsequently a guerrilla leader on nearby Samar Island; Major Abay became Finance Officer of the division; and Attorney Fernandez was commissioned, became Judge Advocate General, and in time was promoted to a majority. Radaza and Gabe were also assimilated into the guerrilla.

What we are trying to point out by these and other possible examples is that to a large extent chance decreed what motives would be victorious in the inner struggle of competing motives determining whether an individual in Leyte was to be guerrilla or collaborationist! Many Filipinos who were mustered into the puppet constabulary hated their work. Some deserted when they had the chance. No doubt, some regaled themselves with the authority and security they fancied they had gained for themselves through their association with the victorious Japanese. These were crude opportunists. But can we condemn all the constabularymen as traitors and praise all the guerrillero as patriots?

Recognition that a man's behavior is conditioned by antecedent events, that it is in that measure determined, is not to destroy the significance of ethical choice or to undermine the foundations of juridical personal responsibility. So long as a person is not physically constrained, so long as he can deliberate within himself and exercise conscious choice, we regard him as a free agent and thus responsible for his own decisions. But we must pay scrupulous attention to the conditioning circumstances affecting his motivation, we must pay some regard to that motivation as well as to the long-term character set of the man before we presume to form an ethical judgment. Short of this, we are left with no alternative but to brush aside the entire ethical problem as irrelevant and proceed by some arbitrary dictum: viz, that all who are by objective criteria ranged on the side of an enemy invader are by definition "collaborationists" and hence deserving of any treatment mechanically annexed to this classification.

If the reader will go along with the argument advanced thus far (which in essence asks that we avoid the indiscriminate usage of catchwords), then

had been ordered by the puppet governor, Salazar [Torres was then governor], to go out to the hills to arrange for Kangleon's [Marcial Santos] surrender.. Fernandez and another leading citizen named [Colonel] Causing said they would be delighted to try to arrange something. They made a splendid arrangement--to join Kangleon's [Balderian's] guerrillas themselves. Now they are both active in the new Philippine government..." Gunnison, op. cit., p. 77.

we are prepared to make an important concession--a concession comporting with popular feeling. We aver that the true resister, the Filipino animated by a positive love for his native land and a deep belief in the democratic way of life, acted with nobility and courage in spurning collaboration with the enemy-instituted regime. And as a corollary, we hold that the Filipino who knowingly bartered personal honor and national welfare in collaborating with the enemy and further sacrificed the well-being and very lives of the resisters for the sake of personal ease, such an individual is deserving of the bitterest calumny and the severest punishment that an outraged society can apply.

Summary

To the student of guerrilla warfare who approaches his subject armed with definite ideological convictions, the guerrilla movement of Leyte will prove a sorry disappointment. Here he will find neither fervent dedication to the overthrow of a pre-war social order--a social order denounced as morally reprehensible and economically wasteful--nor even the more modest drafting of a program for the mitigation of specific social evils. Indeed, the student will discover that intellectual analysis of the relationship between the individual and society is signally absent, along with the correlate inquiry into the optimal disposition of community resources.

This should not be taken to signify that pre-war Leyte was an island paradise, that its people were devoid of grievances and that they could project no visions of a better postwar life for themselves. What it does mean is that their aspirations were extremely nebulous, vague dreams of personal and community betterment, somehow to be conjured into actuality by the very termination of the war. There was nothing articulate about all this in the sense of a systematic linking of cause and effect in order to solve concrete problems!

But to one acquainted with the background of the provincial resistance movement, this seeming torpor would occasion no surprise. Social ills there were, along with an awareness of dissatisfaction. But on this preponderantly agrarian island with a high proportion of its population illiterate, no organization existed to serve the needs of the discontented, to clarify frustrations and formulate modes of intelligent grappling with difficulties. The local intelligentsia, primarily professionals of land-owning or mercantile antecedents, saw the problem entirely in terms of increasing aggregate production and hastening modernization. Those of this class who associated themselves with Leyte's resistance movement transposed their customary notions to the wartime setting. To the extent that they exercised influence, their ideas and activities were directed to a restoration of the pre-war order.

The military element composing the resistance organization carried their distinct perspectives over into the new situation. The few professional soldiers of officer rank sought to make their combat organizations replicas of the pre-war Philippine army. In insisting upon troop discipline, they aimed to gain a respectable name for their organizations and thereby qualify for official recognition conferred by Allied headquarters in Australia. In a limited way, their influence was good for they compelled the 'semi-brigand bands to toe the mark or face expulsion while at the same time blotting out

the undisguised bandit elements. Their influence was bad in that they tended to regard the pro-resistance civilian authorities as rubber-stamps, suitable primarily for appropriating funds and furnishing supplies.

Among the non-officer brackets of the professional soldiery-become-resistance-fighters, two types were distinguishable. There were those who simply hated the invader and were determined to harass his regime until such time as the arrival of American aid would allow a full-scale counter-offensive. And then there were those more intriguing cases of men with a long-standing under-dog complex. These men saw guerrilla warfare as a windfall for the heaping of glory and wealth upon themselves. Until the war sergeants and corporals, receiving a small pittance and leading a none too comfortable existence, they now breveted themselves captains, majors, and colonels, took command of whole sectors, and dictated to municipal officials how they should run their administrations (including how much money they should allot to the guerrilla). This species of soldier became the type of guerrilla sagamore most embarrassing to the guerrilla commanders and most disconcerting to the loyal civilians of the resistance movement.

Equally interesting as a subject of study were the reserve officers and the civilian politicians directly commissioned into the guerrilla. Some of them, perhaps most, went about their assignments quietly, conscientiously, and efficiently. But others, seeking fame and a possible cache of loot, labored to groom themselves for postwar advantages in politics and business.

Lacking an ideological basis, the guerrilla organizations with their heterogeneous and often self-centered leadership found they could agree on a minimal program of non-cooperation with the puppet regime and military opposition to the Japanese. Their declared goal was the reinstatement of the Commonwealth Government with an immediate objective of maintaining law and order and upholding faith in the fulfillment of the promised American liberation. Unhappily, this purpose and this program were not sufficiently compelling to overcome the competing motivation of self-interest. The result was the unwillingness of the sector chiefs to accept a supreme leadership and unite under a single command. Unambiguous orders from Allied headquarters would no doubt have proven decisive, but these orders were confused by conflicting ambitions within the inter-island intelligence network."

As previously stated, the guerrilla organizations of Leyte conducted their military and administrative operations unguided by (or unimpeded by, if the reader so regards it) any compelling social doctrine. Nevertheless, implicit in the resistance function was some inchoate concept of corporate unity, of a total community pulling together for greater strength and more efficient husbanding of assets. And this undeclared postulate required as a subhead the marshaling of communal resources. With this as a beginning, the guerrilla proceeded to spin out a reticulation of controls on property and trade, designed to maximize assets at the disposal of the guerrilla troops while choking off the flow of products to the enemy. Further, the resulting concept of community--a community of resisters--justified the levying of a variety of taxes in money and kind, in practice adjusted to the capacity of the citizen to give (and often weighing quite heavily upon the wealthy), constituting a drastic departure from pre-war practice. As a crowning measure, one of the two principal guerrilla organizations adopted the attitude that estates abandoned by collaborators were community property and should be worked for guerrilla benefit. This viewpoint, taken with the widespread unofficial moratorium on payment of rents, tended to subvert the

vested property rights! All in all, the exigencies of armed resistance led to a host of measures which, taken separately, had only ad hoc significance, but regarded in their totality pointed to a modification in the general conception of private property and in the relation of the property-holder to society.

How the civilian population reacted to these controls depended in considerable measure upon the nature of the relationship subsisting between the guerrilla leadership and the local governments. Where the guerrilla worked out appropriate administrative devices for joint consultation and planning by the military and civil directorship and where they allowed the civilian authorities a measure of responsibility in the executory and evaluative phases, the results were consistently superior. There is no need to enumerate at this point the variety of schemes adapted to strengthening the military-civilian nexus other than to remark that some of these schemes showed considerable ingenuity.

In concluding this overview of Leytean resistance, we must advert to a major guerrilla function--that of education for resistance. First we must say (although we treated this matter under a different heading) that guerrilla adherence to legal procedure, manifested in efforts to eliminate banditry, in the curbing of the more rapacious guerrilla chieftains (without going so far as to drive them to open revolt), and in the instituting of civilian courts wherever possible, in itself served to impress the people with the worth and honor of the enterprise. Second, the enrollment of the general population as a civilian defense and espionage force through the medium of the Volunteer Guard and Women's Auxiliary Service units furnished the ordinary citizen with an exhilarating sense of mission, an inner drive that comes only through direct personal involvement in a cause. Finally, the meritorious achievements of the guerrilla propaganda department deserve special mention. Not only did the guerrilla combat the disheartening effect of so-called war news disseminated by Japanese agents along with the pernicious publicity releases concerning the "made-in-Japan Philippine Republic", but guerrilla spokesmen also stirred Filipino hearts to remain true to their traditional love of freedom, loyal to the democratic way of life and staunch to their conviction that American liberation would soon be at hand.

In the campaign to bolster public confidence and mobilize the resources of resistance, the public school teachers took the lead." This group of men and women employed their education and the local esteem they commanded for a variety of purposes--to arouse patriotic sentiment, to stimulate greater crop productivity, to denounce hoarding and profiteering, to procure subsistence for the guerrilla, to give training in first aid and to campaign for the observance of public hygiene. It is to be regretted that in their own specialization, the education of the young, the teachers carried over into the guerrilla schools the pre-war academic curriculum, instead of constructing a new community-child-centered curriculum more appropriate to the newly evolved concept of community and the novel conditions of life. However, the teachers did display remarkable improvisatorial ability in providing instruction with virtually no instructional materials. And above all, the resistance teachers were preserving within Leyte an oasis for the imparting to the youth the finest precepts and ideals of Filipino life uncorrupted by the foreign invader.

In short, Leyte's guerrilla movement aimed not to make over a way of

life and did not promise future abundance to its supporters. Its orientation was exclusively outward, directed against the expulsion of a tyrannical invader who had destroyed democratic liberty and plundered the land of its wealth. Holding large portions of the population steady in a course of non-cooperation with the enemy and firm in their hope for redemption (while at the same time preparing detailed intelligence reports of tremendous value to the Liberation forces then in staging for their big drive), the guerrilla accomplished wonders. Whatever its defects, the guerrilla of Leyte succeeded in carving a glorious name for itself. Future generations of Leyteno school children, reading accounts of guerrilla exploits in their history books, will glow with inward pride as they reflect that the deeds of their fellow-provincials made possible the selection of their Island--Leyte--as the invasion site for the liberation of their country.

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