

# TWO PAPERS ON PHILIPPINE FOREIGN POLICY

THE PHILIPPINES AND THE SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATIONS  
THE RECORD OF THE PHILIPPINES IN THE UNITED NATIONS

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The Philippines  
and the  
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization  
by  
Roger M. Smith

I

Within the past decade, the Philippines, in her attempt to formulate a satisfactory foreign policy, has had to contend with a basic dilemma inherent in her relations with certain key nations. On the one hand, the Philippines, because of her proximity to East Asia, has become security conscious, and she has sought to clarify and strengthen the United States defense commitment to her. On the other hand, she has experienced the need to identify herself with Southeast Asian nations, who have viewed with suspicion her affiliation with the United States.

The establishment of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), whose membership includes Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan, France, Great Britain, and the United States, has appeared to offer her one possible solution to this dilemma. But while the Philippines has been one of the most persistent advocates of a regional defense organization for Southeast Asia, she appears to have entered an important caveat with respect to her commitment to SEATO. It would thus seem that the Philippines has not only called her willingness to participate into question, but she has also raised an important question about the validity of the regional approach to the defense against Communism in Southeast Asia. The crux of the problem, then, and the one under consideration here, is, what is the Philippine felt need with respect to SEATO, especially as it affects her external defense requirements?

The Philippine desire for some kind of Southeast Asian alliance may be traced to 1939.<sup>1</sup> At that time, Filipino

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1. Felipe Mabilangan, "Indications of a Philippine Foreign Policy," in Philippine Papers, prepared for study meetings of the Philippine Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR). (Manila: Philippine Council, IPR). July, 1939.

nationalist sentiment advocated a united front of the colonies to counter-balance the growing commercial and political power of Japan. But in terms of the radically different conditions originating in the post-war period, and particularly because of the crumbling Nationalist China regime, President Elpidio Quirino voiced the concern of Filipinos with external security in March, 1949, when he called for an alliance among Asian nations to combat Communism.<sup>2</sup> As far as India was concerned, however, Quirino's wish to include Nationalist China and South Korea, and the plan's anti-Communist nature, conflicted with her neutral position. In addition, the United States declined to give its support to the idea, apparently feeling that it was not within its interests to do so. Quirino's idea received a cool reception from the United States Congress.<sup>3</sup> The most that President Truman was willing to do was to affirm that the United States would help the Philippines to remain "free and self-reliant," and to watch with sympathetic interest the efforts of the non-Communist Asian nations to unite for political security.<sup>4</sup>

Undaunted, Quirino declared that United States support was not a necessary condition for the formation of the union. However, the Indian position that any cooperative effort by Asians should be aimed at promoting a neutral position in the cold war evidently caused Quirino to change the goal upon which he had set his sights.<sup>5</sup> Changing tack, he specified that the emphasis of his proposed Pacific Union would be on political, economic and cultural, rather than military, cooperation.<sup>6</sup>

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2. Good accounts of the Philippine efforts to create an alliance are found in Philippines Free Press, May 27, June 3, 1950; "The Baguio Conference," Philippine Yearbook, 1950-1951 (Manila, 1951), and Pedro L. Baldoria, "Alliance in the Pacific," Saturday Mirror Magazine (Manila), October 3, 1953.
  3. New York Times, August 9, 1949.
  4. New York Times, August 11, 1949.
  5. In this connection, see A. Appadorai, "India's Foreign Policy," International Affairs XXV (1949) 1, pp. 37-46, and M. N. Querol, "Freedom and Peace, Foundation of Philippine Foreign Policy," Philippine Yearbook, 1950-1951 (Manila, 1951), pp. 16, 18.
  6. Republic of the Philippines, Letter of Instructions of H. E. Elpidio Quirino, President of the Philippines, to Hon. Carlos P. Romulo, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, and other documents on the proposed Pacific Union, Manila, August, 1949.

On May 26, 1950, Australia, Ceylon, India, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia met at Baguio. The Final Act of the conference provided for modest cooperation in the political and economic fields, and for somewhat more cooperation in the social and cultural fields. No agreement, however, was reached on any sort of lasting cooperation among the participants. The whole question of the cold war and Communist subversion was avoided, in accordance with pre-conference promises.

According to one Filipino observer, Quirino's effort was an extension of Philippine domestic policy. "The Philippines is interested in raising the economic levels of its people, in making them live in peace and freedom with their neighbors...." To achieve these ends, the Philippines "needs the strength of collective action and the assurance of collective security."<sup>8</sup>

The Baguio Conference of 1950 may best be described as a small, first step forward toward regional cooperation. For Filipinos, however, the problem seemed to be whether small, first steps were enough and whether there would be time in which to take the steps which must follow.

The making of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty stems directly from a change in the attitude of the United States toward the general area of the Far East. No less important for this revolution in thinking than the events leading up to the Geneva Agreements of 1954 were the earlier collapse of the Nationalist regime in China and the outbreak of the Korean war. American policy had been based on the expectation that China could be helped to become sufficiently unified and strong to act, in friendly relationship with the United States, as a stabilizing force in the area. This expectation had been abandoned by 1950, and the outbreak of the Korean war confirmed the need for some alternative policy.

In connection with this change, negotiations were begun to secure a peace treaty with Japan which would enable that country to become independent and to recover its strength. During the negotiations, the Philippine government seems to have expressed its unwillingness to conclude a treaty with Japan unless it could be assured of American support in the event of renewed Japanese

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7. Secretariat of the Baguio Conference, Final Act and Proceedings of the Baguio Conference of 1950. Manila, n. d., p. 508.

8. M. N. Querol, op. cit., p. 16.

aggression.<sup>8</sup> In order to secure her adherence to the Japanese peace treaty, the United States signed a treaty of mutual defense with the Philippines on August 30, 1951.<sup>9</sup> This agreement, which went into effect on August 27, 1952, was to remain in force indefinitely, subject to one year's notice of termination by either party. In Article III, provision was made for consultation between the two countries "whenever in the opinion of either of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of either of the parties is threatened by external armed attack in the Pacific." Both the United States and the Philippines recognized, in Article IV, that "an armed attack in the Pacific area" on either of them would be dangerous to the "peace and safety" of both and each agreed to "act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes."

The signature of this treaty did not mean, however, that the United States was yet willing to undertake specific commitments in all of Southeast Asia. It maintained this position until well after the advent of the Eisenhower Administration in January, 1953, and the deteriorating situation in Indochina throughout that year.

## II

In the face of the collapse of France in Vietnam, the United States Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, in March, 1954, expressed the view that "united action" was needed in the area to meet the Communist threat.<sup>10</sup> At the conclusion of a meeting with Prime Minister Eden of Great Britain, on April 13, a statement was issued which declared that England and America were ready "to take part, with the other countries principally concerned, in an examination of the possibility of establishing a collective defense, within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, to assure the peace, security and freedom of Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific."

Philippine response was immediate. To some it seemed that the United States had come to realize, at last, the validity of the view set forth earlier by Senator Claro Recto.

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8. R. H. Fifield, The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia, 1945-1958 (New York: Macmillan, 1958), pp. 78-79.

9. U. S. Treaties and Other International Agreements, Vol. 3, Pt. 3, No. 2529.

10. New York Times, March 30, 1954.

... if America really believes that war is inevitable, then let her give Asia a resolute leadership we can trust; let her give us the same unconditional pledges and guarantees and the same actual evidence of a spiritual equality and common fate that she has given to her kinsmen and allies in the Atlantic community; and we shall have justification for the risk of war and the incentive to make common cause.<sup>11</sup> p

President Ramon Magsaysay was reserved in his response. He urged the West to support the right of Asian peoples to self-determination. He said the Philippines would support any moves toward establishing an alliance if this were done, and if the Philippines were given a plain and unequivocal guarantee of United States help in case of an attack.<sup>12</sup> Some members of the Philippine Congress saw in the American statement a move to gain Asian support for the French position in Indochina.<sup>13</sup>

While President Magsaysay was reserved following the American declaration, and cautious voices were making themselves heard in the halls of the Philippine Congress, a quiet, but firm policy stand did emerge from other sources within the government. Vice-President Carlos P. Garcia, speaking as Secretary for Foreign Affairs, announced that the Philippines would favor a "loose coalition." The situation in Southeast Asia was critical for his country, he said, and the Philippines should add its weight to a warning to Communist China against further aggression. Garcia said, in effect, that for the Philippines to be neutral would be to court disaster.<sup>14</sup>

In the search for a policy, President Magsaysay and Congressional leaders met in Baguio and decided that one means by which a direct threat to Philippine security might be counteracted would be to implement the defense alliance with the United States. Other decisions must have been reached at this meeting, for, on the next day, the President issued a policy statement in which he said the Philippines would support a regional defense organization. This decision, however, was qualified by the following conditions:

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11. Quoted in Philippines Free Press, April 17, 1954.

12. Manila Times, April 19, 1954.

13. Philippines Free Press, April 17, 1954; Manila Bulletin, April 19, 20, 1954.

14. Philippines Free Press, April 17, 1954.

First, that the right of Asian peoples to self-determination is respected; and second, that the Philippines be given a clear and unequivocal guarantee of United States help in case of attack under our Mutual Defense Pact.<sup>15</sup>

As Dien Bien Phu crumbled and the Geneva Conference had still to reach an agreement, the United States began to take the lead which Senator Recto had urged. In late May, United States Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wilson, met with President Magsaysay in Manila. At the conclusion of their meeting, it was announced that a joint Philippine-United States Defense Council would be set up to implement the provisions of the mutual defense treaty. Meanwhile, in Washington, military staff discussions began among the representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, Australia and New Zealand. This group formed the so-called Five-Power Staff Agency, which had been formed in 1953, with terms of reference covering Southeast Asia. Their deliberations were reported by the press as of great value to all countries in Southeast Asia.<sup>16</sup> This being the case, it is not surprising that the Philippines protested its exclusion from the talks. The Philippines was concerned because it saw its manpower as essential to whatever defenses might be created.<sup>17</sup>

At the end of June, the West declared that it would press forward with plans for collective defense in Southeast Asia, irrespective of whether the Geneva negotiations were successful or not.<sup>18</sup> As far as the Philippines was concerned, with the conclusion of the Geneva talks, the question of whether or not she would participate became academic.<sup>19</sup>

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15. Republic of the Philippines, "President Magsaysay's Policy Statement of April 18, 1954," Official Gazette, 50 (April, 1954), p. 1540.

16. New York Times, June 4, 1954.

17. Ibid., June 5, 1954.

18. Ibid., June 29, 1954.

19. For an interesting series of articles on Indochina and Philippine security, see Lt. Col. Uldarico S. Baclagon, "The Indo-China War and the Philippines," Manila Times, April 20-24, 1954. Therein, the author predicts the change in Communist tactics which was to assume great importance for SEATO a year after its creation, i.e., the shift to subversive tactics. Baclagon suggests that no matter which way the situation in Indochina goes, the Philippines will be involved by virtue of its close ties to the United States. It is, therefore, necessary, he said, that the Philippines be prepared for any eventuality.

At the end of July, President Magsaysay announced that the Philippines favored a Southeast Asia defense organization, "subject to the implementation of the mutual defense pact with the United States."<sup>1</sup> He also announced that an all-party conference would be held to decide the Philippine role in such an organization.<sup>20</sup> This conference was held on July 29, and

... unanimously approved the proposal of the President for the participation of the Philippines in a conference of free nations, particularly the United States and those of Asia, that will discuss the security situation in Asia and devise the best ways and means of resisting<sup>21</sup> Communist aggression in Asia through collective action.

It will be recalled that Great Britain was of the view that there would never be any real security in Southeast Asia, much less a fully effective defense organization, without the understanding and support of the Colombo Powers. One has only to recall the efforts of the Philippines at establishing a regional organization in the area to realize that it, too, supported this view. In accepting the fact that the refusal of the Colombo Powers (excepting Pakistan) to join an alliance was based on their view of it as a military arrangement, the Manila Times observed that all Asians were against aggression, tyranny, foreign conquest and rule by force, and that this was inherent in the character of a free people.

Starting from this premise, and abandoning all notions of specific military alliances or agreements, we submit that the Philippines cannot do better than to propose to all friendly free nations of Asia... that all join... in a united declaration to the effect that Asia, as free Asia, deplores and condemns any move or action by any power to overcome and to conquer, to invade or to compel by superior force, any nation in Asia which has won its sovereignty, and to continue in domination of any people in Asia which is seeking its freedom.<sup>22</sup>

The Times then called upon the President to make such a declaration, which, of course, he had already done in his April policy statement.

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20. Philippines Free Press, July 31, 1954.

21. Ibid., August 7, 1954.

22. Manila Times, August 8, 1954.

There was, then, a recognition of divergent interests and a plea for a meeting of minds on some common ground. Having noted this, and at the same time feeling that time was of essence in considerations of a defense organization, the Philippines turned to matters of security and how it might best be realized.

During August, Philippine Congressmen, led by Senator Eulogio Rodriguez, publicly stated their support of Philippine participation in the forthcoming meeting, which was to be held in Manila. Their belief was that the meeting would reveal to what extent the anti-Communist West was willing to uphold democracy in Asia. They also called for a concrete statement from the government spelling out Philippine objectives, with a view to facilitating passage of any measures which would serve to implement the commitments the country might make.<sup>23</sup>

These objectives, formulated earlier in April, were stated in a communique issued by the government on August 15.

The Government of the Republic of the Philippines has agreed with other like-minded governments that the situation in Southeast Asia calls for the consideration of the establishment of a collective security arrangement, in accordance with the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, to strengthen the fabric of peace and freedom in the general area of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific.<sup>24</sup>

The specific objectives were those which the Philippines would hold in joining any collective security system: (1) That the self-determination of small nations in the region be respected and guaranteed by the big powers, and (2) that the United States will fully guarantee protection of Philippine political integrity in case of external attack, or strive for a NATO-type treaty for Southeast Asia.

This last point almost dominated the discussions among Filipino administration and Congressional leaders in August. It was cause for considerable seesawing between what was thought to represent the best interest of the Philippines, and how the Congress would act when and if it would be necessary to call a

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23. Manila Times, August 5, 1954.

24. Printed in the Manila Times, August 15, 1954.

Southeast Asia alliance into action.<sup>25</sup> Opposition to a so-called "automatic provision" prevailed in the Senate because it would mean a surrender of Congress's war-making and treaty ratification powers.<sup>26</sup> Later, it was reported there was agreement between the President and Senate leaders on the Philippines pressing for a "NATO-type" treaty for the member states.<sup>27</sup>

But the major point of contention during August was stirred up by Senator Claro Recto who called for an abandonment of all plans for the meeting, particularly in the light of the rejection of the plan by India, Burma, and Indonesia. As an alternative, he called for a strengthening of the mutual security pact with the United States so that the United States would be bound to come to the aid of the Philippines automatically, in case of attack.<sup>28</sup>

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25. The relevant sections of the NATO, ANZUS, and SEATO treaties, which flit in and out of the arguments, are as follows:

NATO. "Art. 5. The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self defense, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with other Parties such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."

"Art. 11. This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes." See "North Atlantic Treaty," United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 34, No. 541 (1949), pp. 244-255.

ANZUS. "Art. pIV. Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." See "Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States of America, September 1, 1951," in Collective Defence in Southeast Asia, a report by a study group of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London, 1956), pp. 175-177.

SEATO. "Art. IV. Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." See "Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty," Department of State Bulletin 31 (September 30, 1954) 795: 393-396.

In essence, Recto was suggesting that the most critical question which Filipinos should pose at the Manila conference was, "How can the alliance possibly strengthen Philippine security?" Since the Philippines enjoyed a mutual defense arrangement with the United States, it could not gain additional security by including the mainland countries of Thailand and Pakistan in a new arrangement, unless a pledge of common action to resist aggression was correspondingly tightened to resemble as closely as possible the pledge--as he saw it-- in the NATO treaty. These views had their counterpart in the Philippine House of Representatives in the person of the Chairman of the House Foreign Relations Committee, Representative Miguel Cuenco.<sup>29</sup>

In all fairness to Senator Recto and Representative Cuenco, one must note that they were essentially correct in their assumption that the Philippines was pursuing an unrealistic policy in calling for an alliance with some kind of automatic provision for aid in case of an attack. Although its language may be stronger, the NATO treaty does not contain an automatic provision. A SEATO treaty, because of the very disparate interests of its signatories, could not.<sup>30</sup> Their stand, then, in connection with the aims of the Philippine government on this matter, may be taken as the more realistic, i.e., the Philippines should aim for greater guarantees from the United States within the confines of the mutual defense treaty.

The voices of opposition notwithstanding, the government went ahead with its plans. On August 21, Magsaysay's draft of a so-called Pacific Charter was approved.<sup>31</sup> It called for a

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26. Manila Times, August 18, 1954.

27. Ibid., August 21, 1954.

28. See his views in Ibid., August 5, 29, 1954.

29. His immediate reaction to the United States statement came in April, 1954, when he cautioned the President to "go slow about possibly throwing the country into the vortex of international politics." Philippines Free Press, April 17, 1954. To Cuenco, a really effective military organization was impossible; reliance should be placed on the mutual defense alliance, and any regional organization should be designed to "work... for the adoption of measures for the economic and social upliftment of the peoples of Southeast Asia, particularly the Filipino people." Manila Times, September 6, 1954.

30. The only treaty which comes close to containing an "automatic clause" is the Rio Treaty. This pact, however, never figured in the discussions. See "Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, September 2, 1947," United Nations Treaty Series, vol.30 (1948), pp. 55-116.

31. Manila Times, August 21, 1954.

recognition of the rights of subject peoples to self-determination, the assistance of the alliance members in implementing that point, collaboration among the signatories to improve the socio-economic conditions in Southeast Asia, and a common pledge by the members to support a system of collective security for the preservation of peace and freedom.

On August 26, Filipino officials objected to United States draft versions of the treaty which included the word "communist" in specifying the aggression against which the organization would act. They felt that in pinpointing "communist" the alliance would militate against the acceptance of the overall proposal by some Asian states. The government further objected to expanding the treaty area to include Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, and to exclude Formosa. Here, objections were raised on the grounds that it would impose obligations upon the Philippines which it would not be able to carry out and would leave its important northern flank unprotected.<sup>32</sup>

Late in the month, the Philippine delegates objected specifically to the absence, in the United States draft, of a "NATO-type automatic clause."<sup>33</sup> But on the 29th, in what appears to have been a rather abrupt shift in position, they said they would agree to a treaty which included "some" of the features of the NATO treaty, but not necessarily the automatic clause. Although it is not clear what brought about this shift, it may be suggested that word had reached the Philippines of the impending arrival of Secretary of State Dulles with some very specific provisions for strengthening the mutual defense alliance. Still there is some doubt that a change in policy did, in fact, come about at this juncture, for evidence is available to suggest that on non-public, official levels, the Philippines was still very much in pursuit of the automatic provision.

The third United States draft<sup>34</sup> provided for consultation among members in the event that one of them should be attacked. The Philippines proposed the substitution of an article, taken directly from Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which would satisfy their desire for an automatic reaction on the part of the members in case one of them was attacked in the treaty area.

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32. Manila Times, August 26, 1954.

33. Ibid., August 28, 1954.

34. Ibid., August 31, September 1, 2, 1954. The text of the third draft appeared in the press on August 31, and commentaries on it continued until September 2. Although it is not certain, it is likely that the press obtained copies of the document from among Congressmen who were members of the Philippine delegation.

A second provision provided that if a signatory were actually under armed attack, the several members would "act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." The Philippines protested in favor of a more direct, immediate and spontaneous retaliation similar to that provided in NATO. Yet, the American version, while based on Article IV of the ANZUS treaty, was also in accordance with the NATO pact. For, while Article 5 of the latter agreement calls for joint action in case of attack, Article 11 states that the provisions of the treaty shall be "carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes."

Still a third provision of the American draft treaty raised Philippine objections. The United States version explicitly excluded Formosa from the treaty area. It was the Philippine view that to restrain Communism in the treaty area, the whole free Asian area should fall under the protective wing of the alliance. In addition, the Philippines contended that an attack on Formosa would expose her northern flank to a dire threat. This view was buttressed by Filipino military strategists who considered Formosa's security as vital to Philippine external defense.<sup>35</sup>

To sum up, on the eve of the SEATO meeting, as well as on the arrival of Secretary Dulles for consultations regarding the mutual defense treaty, the Philippines was insisting that it would not accept a "watered down" organization. It would seek an alliance patterned after NATO; one in which the signatories would agree to support the rights and freedoms of all peoples in Southeast Asia and agree to take steps to assure progress of all nations toward self-rule and independence; it would urge the members to work jointly for economic and social development; and insist that the treaty area include all the territorial limits of the signatory countries in Southeast Asia and also of the non-member states that might later join the organization.

In the Philippine view, the United States was not sufficiently sensitive to the dangers of Communism in Southeast Asia. It was her fear that in the face of Communist aggression, the United States would not react promptly enough to save the Philippines.

With the arrival of Secretary Dulles, and the close of the United States-Philippine Mutual Defense Alliance talks, the Philippines received assurance on this point. Secretary Dulles pledged the

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35. A discussion of the Philippine defense objectives in connection with the treaty will be found in the Manila Times, September 2, 1954.

automatic United States reaction the moment the Philippines was attacked. In addition, the United States would take immediate steps to help the Philippines strengthen its armed forces. Mr. Dulles said,

This relationship [United States-Philippines over 55 years] offers us the best possible basis for co-operation to meet the new danger which has arisen since the end of World War II in Asia.... I have been told that concern has been expressed that the United States might not come to the aid of your country in the event it were subjected to aggression. I wish to state in the most emphatic terms that [the] United States will honor fully its commitments under the Mutual Defense Treaty. If the Philippines were attacked, the United States would act immediately. We expect the Philippines to contribute to its own security to the extent of its capabilities. To that would be added United States air, naval and logistical support. The United States intends to maintain and use its air and naval bases in the Philippines. These provide concrete evidence of United States ability and intention to take necessary counter-measures. The United States emphasizes the fact that in the event of war, its power to take the offensive against points of its choosing will, in conjunction with the efforts of the Philippine forces, provide a major contribution to the security of the Philippines.

The President of the United States has ordered the Seventh Fleet to protect Formosa from invasion by Communist aggressors. In the case of the Philippines, no specific orders are required; our forces will automatically react.<sup>36</sup>

The Manila Times commented that, "Secretary Dulles' emphatic statement should clear away all doubts on the nature and form of these commitments, while the specific proposals before the United States-Philippines continuing council should dispel all charges that no clear-cut positive steps are being taken to implement them."

Despite the optimism of the Times, however, Senator Recto was not satisfied. According to the Senator, the United States pledge which appeared in Dulles' statement was not in the final

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36. Manila Times, September 5, 1954.

communiqué issued by the joint council. "I say it is disquieting because under said Treaty there is no such commitment of the United States forces reacting automatically in the case of an attack on the Philippines," he said.<sup>37</sup> But the Senator was taking more than just literary license in this instance, for the text of the joint communiqué incorporated all of Secretary Dulles' statement, and added: "If the Philippines were attacked, the United States would attack [sic] immediately."<sup>38</sup>

Immediately thereafter, the Philippines announced its willingness to sacrifice its demands for an automatic provision. Instead, it would now favor including the self-determination provision. The Philippines felt that to rid the Manila Conference of the suspicion of other Asian countries that it was rigged to "buttress the crumbling colonial empires of the Western powers," it was incumbent upon them to issue an explicit declaration to the contrary.

### III

In his address at the opening of the Manila Conference on September 6, 1954, President Magsaysay failed to refer to the principles set forth in his Pacific Charter. Senator Francisco Delgado, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, however, was very forthright about the Philippine position.

Another vital point which my Government desires to propose is the unequivocal recognition of the principles of self-determination for Asian peoples and their right to self-government or independence. It should be incorporated as an outstanding article in the covenant. It is the appeal of this article, we believe, that will reach deep into the hearts of the Asian peoples and galvanize them into giving the organization determined and ardent support. For this many an Asian people will fight to the death. This principle has been incorporated in the Charter of the United Nations.... We cannot now take a step backward and let down the hopes of the Asian peoples by remaining silent.... It is by the appeal of this article on self-determination embodied in the covenant of the organization that we hope to win to our side the uncommitted millions of Asia.<sup>39</sup>

But while the Philippines regarded the inclusion of such an article as taking the "wind out of the sails of so-called

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37. Manila Times, September 6, 1954.

38. Ibid., September 5, 1954.

39. Philippines Free Press, September 11, 1954.

independent-minded Asian champions," i.e., the Colombo Powers,<sup>40</sup> Great Britain managed to have the meeting defer consideration of the proposal until the various governments could be notified. In the Philippine view, a setback was in the making.<sup>41</sup> While there may have been an expectation of some opposition, it was probably a shock to many Filipinos that Great Britain should engage in what seemed to be delaying tactics. Britain's chief delegate, Lord Reading, had been quoted as saying, "There is no reason for anyone to be suspicious of SEATO unless they are designing aggression."<sup>42</sup> Filipinos undoubtedly looked to Great Britain, therefore, to give real meaning to those remarks by supporting Magsaysay's proposal.

Despite the British argument that a self-determination provision was "unnecessary," the Filipinos nevertheless won their battle to have it included, and they did so with strong United States support.<sup>43</sup> The pledge to uphold equal rights and self-determination, contained in the preamble of the Treaty, was reinforced by a separate declaration now known as the Pacific Charter. Proclaiming anew their devotion to these rights, the signatories went on to say that they were "each prepared to continue taking effective practical measures to ensure conditions favorable to the orderly achievement" of these purposes; that they would "continue to cooperate in the economic, social and cultural fields in order to promote higher living standards, economic progress and social well-being in this region;" and that they were "determined to prevent or counter by appropriate means any attempt in the treaty area to subvert their freedom or to destroy their sovereignty or territorial integrity."

Even though the Philippines strove for the inclusion of what it deemed to be an important statement of principle, it did not lose sight of its strategic position in the treaty area, and of the necessity that the conference, in President Magsaysay's words, "...build an adequate system of defense around an exposed and threatened sector of the free world...."<sup>44</sup> However, the

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40. Stated by Philippine delegate Salvador P. Lopez who, at that time, also headed the Philippine delegation to the United Nations General Assembly. Manila Times, September 4, 1954.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid., September 5, 1954.

43. See Dulles's remarks in Philippines Free Press, September 11, 1954.

44. Republic of the Philippines, "Text of President Magsaysay's Address and other documents pertaining to the Manila Conference," Official Gazette, Special Supplement, Vol. 50 (Manila, September, 1954) No. 8.

Philippines backed down on its insistence for a "NATO-type" provision and approved a modified form of the ANZUS alliance. At that time, the Filipinos felt they had achieved more than was generally expected.<sup>45</sup> Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Raul Manglapus, in what appears to have been a series of speeches made after the conference to enlighten various civic groups, stressed this point.<sup>46</sup> President Magsaysay saw in the treaty and in the United States-Philippine alliance, "a powerful bulwark for our country against Communist aggression or aggression from any source whatever." It will, he said, protect the Philippines against subversion, and promote economic well-being and self-determination in the area.

The military provisions of the Treaty constitute the armor designed to protect the area against aggression. The provisions on economic development and self-determination formulated in accordance with the principles enshrined in the Pacific Charter, are the heart and soul that give the Treaty life and meaning for the peoples of Asia.<sup>47</sup>

The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, along with the Pacific Charter, was signed in Manila on September 8, 1954. The core of the treaty is to be found in Article IV, in two important paragraphs. The first deals with armed attack, in which case the member states would take action in accordance with their constitutional processes. The second concerns subversion, in which case the members would consult immediately on the measures which should be taken to combat it.

The treaty also contains an American reservation to Article IV with respect to the elimination of the word "communist" in describing aggression. The Philippine view on this point was that inclusion of this word would militate against acceptance of the overall treaty by some Asian states.<sup>48</sup> This, of course,

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45. Manila Times, September 9, 1954.

46. See Manila Times, September 16, 21, 23, 1954; Philippines Free Press, September 18, 1954. See also Felino Neri, "The Southeast Asia Security Alliance Pact," Special Features Bulletin, Department of Foreign Affairs, Division of International Information (Manila, September 27, 1954).

47. Manila Times, September 10, 1954.

48. For the United States reservation, see "Understanding of the United States of America," appended to the Treaty. See also the speech of Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs Raul Manglapus before the Manila Overseas Press Club on September 15, in which he asserted that the elimination of the word "communist" was a basic stand of the Philippines. Manila Times, September 16, 1954.

raises the questions concerning Philippine reaction to disputes and/or aggression not of Communist inspiration but which, nevertheless endanger the peace and security of the treaty area. What would be the Philippine position in case of, say, India's aggression against Pakistan concerning Kashmir--an issue which came up during the Karachi conference of the SEATO Council in 1956; or of possible trouble on the Thai-Cambodian border? Would instances of this type be within the purview of Philippine national interest, especially since the resultant insecurity might be fruitful for Communist advances?<sup>49</sup> Questions such as these have been raised by Senator Recto and Representative Cuenco, but answers in public have not been forthcoming from the government.

If the Philippines was unsuccessful in obtaining all that it wanted in September, 1954, it meant to continue trying to improve upon the agreement. In the meantime, President Magsaysay was of the view that "...we have taken the most realistic and logical course open to us."<sup>50</sup> When he sent the treaty to the Senate for ratification, he said, "The Treaty is a forward step in the development of a more comprehensive collective system of security in the region, as earlier advocated by the Philippines."<sup>51</sup>

Both the majority floor leader, Cipriano P. Primicias, and the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Francisco A. Delgado indicated that the treaty would be ratified within a short time. Primicias said that the treaty would strengthen the existing defense commitments of America to come to the aid of the Philippines in case of attack. He recalled Secretary Dulles' reaffirmation of America's automatic retaliation pledge. Senator Claro Recto, ranking member of the foreign relations committee, also affirmed that the treaty would be acted upon favorably. But, he pointed out, there was nothing in the treaty which the Philippines did not already have under the mutual defense pact with the United States. Recto was still unwilling to involve the Philippines with other nations unnecessarily, especially when his country was better protected under the provisions of the mutual defense treaty.<sup>52</sup>

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49. For a general discussion of the problems which SEATO faces in connection with non-Communist aggression in the treaty area, see Ralph Braibanti, International Implications of the Manila Pact, 13th Conference, IPR, Lahore, Pakistan, February 3-14, 1958 (New York: IPR, 1958), pp. 15-16. h

50. Manila Times, December 31, 1954.

51. Letter dated January 17, 1955, Philippines Senate, Congressional Record, Vol. II, No. 3, 3d Cong., 2d Sess., January 26, 1955, p. 33.

52. Manila Times, February 3, 1955.

After a brief debate, the treaty was approved by the Senate, 18-0-2. Senator Recto abstained, asserting that

The treaty is too much and at the same time too little. Too much in the sense that under its terms we accept commitments to back the provisions of the treaty when we do not have the necessary power to back it, and too little in the sense that it affords very scant protection to the Philippines as far as external defense is concerned.<sup>53</sup>

Senator Ruperto Kangleon also abstained because of the lack of an automatic provision in the treaty which, he said, makes it "inherently weak and as such it is an invitation to aggression more than it deters it."<sup>54</sup>

The Manila Times commented that the Philippine ratification would serve to accelerate plans for the implementation of various provisions of the treaty that would give "bones and sinew" to the objective of containing communism. Philippine association with a collective defense treaty "that has wisely provided, however general the terms may be, for the adoption of defensive measures in military, political and economic fields strengthens our position in this part of the world."<sup>55</sup>

#### IV

Since early 1955, the Philippines has consistently worked for the strengthening of the treaty by urging upon the members the establishment of concrete methods by which to deal with subversion, a plan of economic and military assistance, and for cooperation between SEATO and other regional defense organizations, NATO and the Baghdad Pact.

At the first meeting of SEATO in Bangkok, February 23-25, 1955, the establishment of a combined force for the region, and a decision on a firm line on which the SEATO members would fight if the Communists moved southward from North Vietnam were reported to be sought by the signatories.<sup>56</sup> As far as can be determined, the Philippine delegation, headed by Vice-President

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53. Philippine Senate, Congressional Record, op. cit., No. 12, February 8, 1955, p. 134.

54. Ibid.

55. Manila Times, February 9, 1955.

56. Ibid., February 14, 1955.

Garcia, went to Bangkok with more specific objectives in mind. Mr. Garcia outlined a three-point Philippine proposal.<sup>57</sup> First, the creation of a secretariat to serve as the administrative arm of the organization.

In the light of contemporary events it must have become quite obvious and crystal clear to all that we need right now at least a modest but strong secretariat that will be under the direction of the council to execute and carry out its policies, maintain constant and close coordination and cohesion, and keep unrelenting continuity of efforts and activities of the SEATO.

The Philippines wished, second, for the creation of a continuing military committee to survey the military needs of member nations and assess the contribution each could give to a defense organization that might be set up later.

Recent events in or around the treaty area of SEATO have made imperative and urgent the implementation of Articles IV and V of the Manila Treaty referring specially to collective defense [the dangers of armed aggression, subversion, and the provision for setting up a consultative committee].

Thirdly, Mr. Garcia proposed that the organization consider the economic aspects as of equal importance to the military.

In our humble view we have to do something concrete and tangible and with least delay to increase at an accelerated tempo the productivity of the peoples in the treaty area improve their mastery of democratic know-how for the wise and well-measured exploitation and conservation of their natural resources and for the expansion of trade in the area.

The final communique of the Bangkok conference was indicative of such progress as had--or had not--been made.<sup>58</sup> Conscious as they obviously were of the growing pressures of Communist China, the conferees noted that they "met in circumstances which give increasing urgency to the objectives of the

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57. Manila Times, February 24, 1955.

58. See "Communique on the meeting of the Council of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, Bangkok, February 25, 1955," Department of State Bulletin 32 (March 7, 1955), pp. 371-373.

Treaty," and reaffirmed both their governments' devotion to the principles of peace and stability and their support for Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam.<sup>59</sup> To further the common aims of the members, it was agreed, as the Philippines had urged, to establish a group of military advisers, as well as committees for analysis and planning in the fields of economic development, Communist subversion, and cultural and labor activities.<sup>60</sup> These committees would report to the Council of Foreign Ministers of the eight nations, which would meet at least once a year, normally at Bangkok, and in its absence to the ambassadorial representatives of the eight powers stationed in the same city. Provision was also made for a secretariat.

From the Philippine point of view this was small accomplishment when measured against the bold decisions it had anticipated. Along with Pakistan and Thailand, the Philippines hoped that SEATO would become a vehicle for major economic aid. The Philippines had suggested the adoption of a European Payments Union-type of economic organization. But when the United States expressed its unwillingness to establish special aid programs for SEATO members, the Philippines changed its proposal to the creation of short-term economic measures to assist areas subjected to Communist pressures, presumably referring to Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam. Vice-President Garcia was of the opinion that the Philippine plan would stimulate a great flow of goods and social improvements which would be an effective means of combatting unrest and preventing alienation of free peoples.<sup>61</sup>

Later, President Magsaysay expressed the Philippine desire for economic development in a forceful way.

I do not minimize the importance of a strong collective military defense in Asia, but I insist that only vigorous and intelligent economic development of this region can produce the concrete proof that much the best hope lies in a free society.<sup>62</sup>

Many of the delegates had hoped to create a common air and land force; Australia, at Bangkok in 1955, and later, was to press insistently for the commitment of American ground troops

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59. Covered by the treaty as cocalled "protocol countries".

60. Manila Times, February 25, 1955.

61. Ibid., February 26, 27, 1955.

62. Stated in a transoceanic press conference, Manila to New York City, and quoted in the New York Times, March 18, 1955.

to the Southeast Asia area. In this connection, the Philippines indicated its willingness to provide volunteers to a SEATO army if called for, provided, however, that they be "equipped, supplied and maintained" by the United States.<sup>63</sup> p

While none of these actions was precluded by the conference's decisions, none of them seemed likely at that time. Furthermore, the early results of the various SEATO committees' activity (some of which has been necessarily masked by security considerations) did not give much indication of rapid progress toward stated goals. More than a few critical voices were raised in the Philippines implying that the United States was not living up to expectations. Prime among these was the voice of Claro Recto, who, in the midst of the debate on the Revised Trade Agreement with the United States, warned of too close a tie to America.

I beg to state again that American policy in the Philippines is but a part of her broader policy in Southeast Asia... and therefore her concern for us will depend... on whether it is to her well-considered self-interests to stay in this area or not.<sup>64</sup>

Officially, the United States was pleased with the results of the Bangkok meetings.<sup>65</sup> But other members were displeased because they had sought at Bangkok more definite American military commitments than had been forthcoming, and several would have preferred to establish then a unified, common military staff on the NATO model. Mr. Dulles' position on United States military commitments was made clear: "The Bangkok conference and the agreements reached there make the way of an aggressor hard."<sup>66</sup> There were already sufficient armed forces in the general area to deter direct military aggression, and, therefore, the real problem was indirect subversion and infiltration.

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63. Manila Times, February 26, 1955. The Philippines was, earlier, reported to have suggested to the United States a plan for an international air force for Southeast Asia. While the plan was reportedly received with interest in Washington, there was no official comment from either the United States or the Philippines. See Manila Times, February 7, 1955.

64. Philippine Senate, Congressional Record, op. cit., No. 63. April 27, 1955, p. 834.

65. New York Times, February 26, 27, 28, 1955.

66. Manila Times, February 27, 1955.

This same view had been revealed previously, in October, 1954, in connection with a Pakistani military assistance mission to the United States. At that time, the Pentagon policy seemed to be that military programs should be scanty unless the region was under imminent threat or direct attack. The Manila Times said that if this was the case, then there was no need for a security system, no need for a SEATO meeting in September.

This is a position we cannot accept. We believe there was a pressing and immediate necessity for an organization for mutual defense... and this necessity obtains today and will continue to obtain for an unpredictable time.

We believe that, once this premise is accepted--as it must be by all who do not wilfully blind themselves to the course of events--there must be adequate implementation of the security system inherent in the Manila Treaty.

A treaty with teeth is no guarantee against aggression if the dentures are kept in water ten thousand miles away, while people fatuously pray that this emergency 'cools off' and goes back to sleep.<sup>67</sup> When things wake up and start getting hot, it may be too late to move the teeth into position.<sup>67</sup>

Mr. Dulles reiterated the United States intention to aid any member of the Manila Pact subject to Communist attack. He maintained that, with the availability of modern weapons, the United States was stronger in the Far East than it had been at the climax of the war against Japan in 1945, and he enumerated a rather formidable aggregation of American forces. This, he argued, was quite sufficient to discharge American obligations. In the meantime, the United States must not be tied down in any one area. It was imperative that United States forces be mobile and prepared to strike on whichever of three fronts--Korea, Formosa, or South-east Asia--the fluid situation might demand.

It was obvious, and perhaps it still is, that the United States was reluctant to become involved in a joint defense

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67. Manila Times, October 19, 1954. A few weeks earlier, it was reported that the Philippine armed forces were working with the United States on a blueprint to coordinate Philippine external defense with American military plans. Lt. Gen. Jesus Vargas, Chief of Staff of the Philippine armed forces, told the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security, that the automatic provision in the mutual defense treaty had considerably strengthened the security of the Philippines. Manila Times, September 28, 1954.

effort with relatively weak Southeast Asian ground forces, largely, it would be presumed, because of its policy which assigns the role of defense to highly mobile naval, air and amphibious units. That this would seem plausible is indicated by the type of military planning which has been undertaken by SEATO.<sup>68</sup>

In speaking of a "fluid situation," however, Secretary Dulles touched upon a sensitive area for some of the delegations, particularly because his remarks implied that SEATO forces would be made available in case of fighting over Formosa, which had been deliberately excluded from the treaty area. For Filipinos, however, recalling their earlier concern that Formosa was not to be included, the United States position must have been a welcomed one. This certainly was the case, particularly when considered in the light of the debate then underway in the Senate concerning President Magsaysay's proposal to support President Eisenhower's Formosa Resolution.

President Magsaysay asserted that

Formosa and the Philippines figure importantly in the defense pattern against aggression in this part of the world. The two countries, by virtue of their geographical proximity and respective defense commitments, have a vital stake in the resolute maintenance of this defense pattern. We cannot, therefore, be indifferent to the events that are transpiring in that area nor be unconcerned with the ultimate fate of the island. Our interest extends to the measures that have been taken to defend it against aggression. Formosa is vital to our national security. It must remain free and in friendly hands. For these reasons, I welcome the decision of the United States Government clarifying its stand on the Formosa question. I trust that this policy of firmness will achieve its avowed purpose of deterring further acts of Communist aggression in this area. We stand squarely behind the United States in its determination to achieve this purpose.<sup>69</sup>

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68. See below, pp. 45-48.

69. Republic of the Philippines, "President Magsaysay's statement on United States stand on Formosa, February 3, 1955," Official Gazette, Vol. 51 (February 1955), p. 682. See also "Joint Resolution on Defense of Formosa," Department of State Bulletin 32 (February 7, 1955), p. 213.0

The majority of the Senate supported the President's stand and generally denied allegations that the President had given a blanket endorsement to any and all moves, including those of an aggressive nature. Senators Montano and Zulueta attacked the President's critics for carping at the mutual defense treaty as "better than nothing" because it did not provide for "ironclad guarantees" of Philippine security, and for chafing against SEATO's lack of an automatic provision. The support which the United States reaffirmed in September, 1954 was emphasized.<sup>70</sup>

Senator Laurel, however, moved to bury the Senate resolution in committee. He thought the Philippines should be particular about endorsing a "declaration of a president of a foreign power" lest the Philippines be subverting its sovereignty.<sup>71</sup> He did not, however, press his position, saying that Senator Recto would have plenty of time "to deliver his speech and prolong the proceeding."

When Senator Recto took the floor, he declared that the President's endorsement of the Formosa Resolution implied that there was a pattern of defense in the Pacific area for Formosa and the Philippines, i.e., the United States would put as much effort into the defense of Formosa as into that of the Philippines.<sup>72</sup> Therefore, if Filipinos were ready to die for the Philippines, they should be equally ready to sacrifice their blood for Formosa. In essence, President Magsaysay endorsed an Eisenhower request for authority to attack the Asia mainland, Recto said. The Senator then referred to a Nacionalista Party caucus which, on February 10 and 11, had approved a compromise resolution reiterating the Philippines treaty obligations. He said the compromise had been tentative because Magsaysay would not give his approval, largely, Recto charged, because the President had already committed the Philippines beyond its treaty obligations.

Senator Delgado closed the debate. He came to the defense of the President, denying the charge that Magsaysay had violated the Constitution by making secret commitments without Congressional consent.<sup>73</sup> To this Recto lashed back, accusing Delgado of being an agent of the United States, the Philippines of being an American colony, and the President of being ignorant of the real meaning of the Formosa Resolution.<sup>74</sup>

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70. Philippine Senate, Congressional Records, op. cit., Nos. 20, 21, February 18, 21, 1955, pp. 208, 217-221.

71. Ibid., p. 223.

72. Ibid., pp. 254-260.

73. Ibid., No. 26, February 28, 1955, pp. 323-326.

74. Ibid., No. 27, March 1, 1955, p. 367.

Bound up within this debate, also, was Recto's criticism of the Philippines involvement in SEATO. He again drew attention to the fact that the Philippines could find no adequate protection in the treaty. He cited the NATO Treaty and its so-called automatic clause.<sup>75</sup> But Senator Recto's holding action was to no avail. The President's stand was approved, 21-1. The resolution was made even more unanimous when, after differences in wording and other technicalities were ironed out, the House and Senate passed a joint resolution approving the President's action by an overwhelming vote on March 9.

With the conclusion of the first annual SEATO ministerial meeting, the Philippines, while generally pleased with its results, would not have claimed that SEATO was as tight an alliance as it would have wished. It felt that SEATO's development was lagging. Perhaps its most serious drawbacks were political rather than military, i.e., at the time of the Bangkok meeting, it might have been more effective against an outright military attack than it was proving itself in relation to the "peaceful" Communist tactics which had been slowly developing since the death of Stalin. Because of this shift in tactics, SEATO's emphasis has been on subversion since 1956.

During the rest of 1955, Philippine interest in SEATO was maintained primarily by its own work on subversion and the interest shown by the alliance's members in the Philippine experience. In addition, some interest may have been stirred up by the flurry over foreign policy created by Senator Recto during the 1955 election campaign.

Wielding tactics, whose repercussions were to make themselves bitterly felt in the eventual split between factions of the Nacionalista party, Senator Recto castigated Magsaysay on several counts. He first took the President to task on the South Vietnam question,<sup>76</sup> accusing him of attaching greater weight to the

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75. See comments on Recto and the so-called automatic provision, supra, pp. 5-6.

76. In early 1955, Vice-President Garcia had tied the Philippine recognition of Cambodia and Laos to an implementation of the aims of SEATO. Manila Times, January 7, 1955. But the recognition of South Vietnam was held up because of the "imminent danger of Vietnam becoming entirely communist." It may also be recalled that Philippine policy toward the former Associated States had been given shape in early 1954 when Magsaysay, while indicating his willingness to support the United States against Communist aggression in Indochina, was more favorably inclined to "an affirmation of the rights of all peoples to freedom and independence." President Magsaysay's policy statement of April 18, 1954, Official Gazette, op. cit.

persuasion of an American air force colonel than to the recommendations of his advisors.<sup>77</sup> The Philippines recognized South Vietnam in mid-July 1955. According to the President, recognition would not only strengthen the attempt of free countries in Southeast Asia to establish a common front against Communism, but would also be in fulfillment of Philippine commitments under SEATO.

But the key to the Magsaysay-Recto dispute was the issue of pro-Americanism v. pro-Asianism. In Magsaysay's view, the very existence, security and prosperity of the Philippines were rooted in American friendship and assistance. To Senator Recto, on the other hand, the courting of American favors was distasteful, and he perceived as being the rightful goal of Philippine foreign policy the establishment of more amicable relations with neighboring Asian nations. That Recto was opposing closer relations with an important Asian neighbor, and the President opting for them, would seem to indicate only the highly personal nature of their disagreement.<sup>78</sup>

Pressured into a showdown, the President appeared before the 31-man executive committee of the Nacionalista party, and demanded Recto's removal.<sup>79</sup> In early August, Senator Laurel introduced a compromise resolution designed to prevent further dissension within the party. This agreement was a weak endorsement of the President's foreign policies in general as expressed in the party's platform. The President was dissatisfied because it evaded the main issue: Who was to be the chief policy-maker in the country? He thereupon sent a letter to Senate President Rodriguez requesting a second meeting and a clarification of support. The President wanted to strengthen the original resolution by "committing our republic to a dynamic and positive participation in world affairs" as opposed to Recto's advocacy of a pro-Asian position.

The second executive meeting convened on August 10, with Recto absent. It issued a new resolution which affirmed the party's faith in Magsaysay, and endorsed Philippine adherence to SEATO and the security treaty with the United States. The committee upheld the President's support of the United States in its defense of Formosa and endorsed a policy of maintaining and strengthening relations with the United States.

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77. Philippines Free Press, July 23, 1955.

78. For an informative article on Recto's opposition to the President, see L. O. Ty, "Breakup," Philippines Free Press, July 30, 1955.

79. Salvador F. Zaide, "Foreign Policy as an Election Issue," Freedom (Manila) V (April 13, 1956), 15.

Following the initial estrangement, President Magsaysay refused to allow Recto to run for re-election on the Nacionalista party ticket. Recto, thereupon, continued his political career as a "guest" candidate of the Liberal party. While he claimed he was not attacking the President personally, Recto did accuse him of being a puppet of the United States. The Senator was re-elected in the process, but the considerable decline in his vote-getting abilities was indicative of the great popularity which the President enjoyed.<sup>80</sup>

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80. The opposing positions of the Senator and the President, and their breakup, recalls the "Asia for the Asians" controversy of early 1954. In February, 1954, the then Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Leon Ma. Guerrero, in an address at the Manila Law College called for a new Philippine foreign policy which would be based on an "Asia for the Asians" principle, i.e., an actively stressed Asian nationalism would be the best possible defense against an Asian Communism. Manila Times, February 6, 1954. The address and the slogan precipitated a political furor in Manila; critics reminded the public of Japan's wartime use of the slogan, and of its current use by the Communists. Manila Bulletin, February 8, 1954. Among the press, the Times came to Guerrero's defense. In an editorial on February 7, it said: "To clarify our stand... we see no inconsistency between an intelligent implementation of the 'Asia for Asians' stand and the continuing program of strengthening our American ties." Guerrero, himself, stoutly defended his speech, saying that the policy antedated that of the Japanese, and that it was now being misused by the Communists. He insisted that he was merely reflecting the nationalist views of the administration.

Senator Recto entered the fray with the statement that he would do "everything in my power" to make "Asia for Asians" a basis of foreign policy if the administration had not yet adopted it. That the administration had done so was indicated quickly by Vice-President Garcia, who asserted that the idea was a cornerstone of Philippine foreign policy and was, in fact, a restatement of Magsaysay's views as contained in the State of the National address. Manila Times, February 9, 1954. The President's address is contained in the Manila Times, January 26, 1954.

The President's views were not made known until February 22 (when the controversy arose he was on a vacation fishing trip). Then, during an address at Clark Field air base, he declared "Recently there has been a discussion of this administration's

With slightly over one year's participation in SEATO, Philippine foreign policy had remained unaltered. It had helped to establish an Asian collective security system, and now it worked for the strengthening of that system, albeit with primary dependence on the United States for defense protection. It wished, also, to establish closer political, economic and cultural ties

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policies. Such discussion is healthy and wholesome in a democracy. But there has come out of that discussion an effort to express our policies in slogans. From the past administration, we know you cannot govern--you cannot achieve progress--by slogans....

"One danger in expressing through a slogan is that it is easy to distort a phrase. Already the slogan 'Asia for the Asians' is being trumpeted over Radio Peiping, and by Communist propaganda channels elsewhere as a cry of hostility of our people towards the American people. This is a lie. I see nothing incompatible between friendship and sympathy for our Asian neighbors and the continuation of our especially warm relationships with the United States." Manila Times, February 23, 1954.

Meanwhile, a debate raged among politicians over the wisdom of the statement. The President, apparently, sought compromise. On March 9, a caucus of Nacionalista and Liberal senators decided that "Asia for the Asians" was an expression of the Philippine stand on the right of self-determination and independence of all Asian nations, for closer cultural and economic relations, and for mutual cooperation between Asian countries as a group and within the framework of the United Nations. Manila Times, March 10, 1954.

At a breakfast meeting with members of the Senate and House on the 10th, the President came to an agreement with the conclusions of the caucus. While his statement did not refer directly to the slogan, neither did it repudiate it. The Philippines was pledged to support a "healthy Asian nationalism" while, at the same time, it would maintain its ties with the United States. Manila Times, March 11, 1954. Many, however, have taken the stand that the President did repudiate it. See Manila Bulletin, March 11, 1954; and Republic of the Philippines, Department of Foreign Affairs, Division of International Information, "The First Decade of Philippine Independence," Special Features Bulletin, Series of 1956, Nos. 41-42.1 (Manila) October 8, 15, 1956. Senator Recto was of the opinion that the President's pronouncement was watered down because he had "to appease certain pressure groups." Nevertheless, he expressed "mild" satisfaction with Magsaysay's stand. Manila Times, March 11, 1954.

with its non-Communist neighbors<sup>81</sup> That this last objective was well on its way to realization, was evidenced by Philippine participation in the Bandung Conference in April, 1955, and its recognition of Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam.

As for SEATO itself, as far as Filipinos were concerned, it could be viewed as an adjunct of the mutual defense treaty with the United States. Things might be accomplished under SEATO that could not be under the mutual defense alliance, e.g., creating plans for combatting Communist subversion, regional economic planning, etc.<sup>82</sup>

As the second annual meeting of SEATO was about to convene in Karachi on March 6, 1956, SEATO in a report of its first year's activities noted that the alliance "has been an effective stabilizing influence" upon the Southeast Asian region.<sup>83</sup> It said, further, that

... the objective of SEATO will not be realized until the member nations know that their defense against any aggressor is assured; that their social and economic lot has been improved; and that the internal structure of

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(continued from p. 28)

It is possible to say, on the evidence of Recto's position, and the dissatisfaction expressed by other Congressmen since 1954, that there exists in the Philippines a group which while subscribing nominally to close relations with the United States, is basically far more sharply oriented to Asia in its thinking. If this group were to gain ascendancy, it is possible that Philippine foreign policy would undergo radical changes. This is, probably, the reason for R. H. Fifield's views in his Diplomacy in Southeast Asia op. cit. p. 107, and earlier in "Philippine Foreign Policy," Far Eastern Survey XX (February 21, 1951), 4.

81. See Carlos P. Garcia, "The Conduct of Philippine Foreign Affairs in a Year of Tension," Fookien Times Yearbook (Manila, 1954), p. 13.
82. See Raul S. Manglapus, "Four Frustrated Forecasts on Philippine Foreign Policy," ibid., 1955; Octavio L. Maloles, "The World Situation from a Philippine Point of View," (Speech to War College Group, U. S. Embassy, Manila, May 23, 1955), Republic of the Philippines, Department of Foreign Affairs, Division of International Information, Official Texts Series (Manila, 1955).
83. U. S., Department of State, SEATO, First Annual Report of Council of Representatives, March 1956. Department of State Publication 6305, Far Eastern Series 72 (Washington, March, 1956), p. 2.

their countries has been so strengthened that subversion directed from without cannot succeed.<sup>84</sup>

The report seems to have been dominated by concern with subversion, and perhaps rightly so, for it was issued, and the second annual meeting was about to take place, at a time when Communist tactics were centering on penetration through economic and technical assistance, trade promotion, and political infiltration.

Philippine Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs Felino Neri framed his country's foreign policy in the new perspective of threat to freedom in Southeast Asia:

The new direction of Soviet world diplomatic strategy which is aimed at winning the so-called uncommitted countries... through the extension of technical and economic aid, has pointed up the need for an intensification by the Western powers of their programs of economic assistance to these countries. In that event, it is incumbent upon us to take full advantage of such assistance. We should also not miss similar opportunities afforded by our participation in the Colombo Plan and membership in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.<sup>85</sup>

Of particular concern to the Philippines was actual Communist-backed dissidence in Laos, and subversion in South Vietnam. "The situation clearly calls for much more than what has been done to cope with it including the common effort through collective action."<sup>86</sup>

The Karachi meeting came to the same conclusions which worried the Filipino policy makers. In its communique, SEATO noted the shift in Communist tactics, and pointed out that this meant that efforts by the Communists would be continued "to subvert, weaken and overthrow the political, economic and social systems which have been freely chosen by the peoples of the area."<sup>87</sup> The Philippine chief delegate, Vice-President Garcia, was fully aware that his country's foreign policy was in need of new direction.

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84. Ibid., p. 15.

85. Felino Neri, "Bringing into balance, a review of last year's record in foreign affairs," Republic of the Philippines, Department of Foreign Affairs, Division of International Information, Special Features Bulletin, Series of 1956, No. 3 (Manila, January 16, 1956), p. 5.

86. Ibid., p. 6.

87. "Communique of the meeting of the Council of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, Karachi, March 8, 1956," Department of State Bulletin 34 (March 19, 1956), pp. 447-449.

SEATO must provide an effective answer not only to the threat of overt aggression but also to the rapidly developing danger of political and economic penetration and subversion of the treaty area.<sup>88</sup>

On the eve of the third SEATO meeting, at Canberra, Mr. Garcia reiterated the Philippine concern with subversion, and the need to combat it in the treaty area. The alliance recognized the Philippine position in its final communique saying that specific projects had been approved "to detect, appraise, expose and combat subversion." But despite the acknowledgment that public awareness of how and where subversion was occurring was an essential prerequisite for effective action, SEATO remained close-mouthed about its activities in this field.<sup>89</sup>

Later, in November, 1957, a "seminar" on subversion was held in Baguio. The papers of the participants, including a long report on Philippine experience in combatting the Huks, by Lt. Gen. Jesus Vargas, and a personal account by former Huk Tarciano Rizal, were published by SEATO in Seminar on Countering Communist Subversion, in November 1957. The seminar's purpose was to focus public attention on the nature and extent of Communist subversion. In the main, however, the plenary sessions' reports do not do this as far as Southeast Asia is concerned; the reports of discussions in the committee sessions, which may have been more substantive, have not been made public.<sup>90</sup>

The Philippine chief delegate expressed the view that if SEATO were put to a military test, it would protect "freedom in the treaty area."<sup>91</sup> Mr. Garcia, however, continued to express dissatisfaction that economic planning was not being carried forward by SEATO. He was of the opinion that economic problems were in need of immediate solution, for they slowed down the effectiveness of defense plans.<sup>92</sup>

Reaction to the conference was absent from the Manila press, which fact was no doubt due to President Magsaysay's untimely death on March 17. Later in the year, however, the Manila Times,

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88. New York Times, March 7, 1956.

89. See "Final Communique of the Third Meeting of the Council of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, Canberra, 11-13 March, 1957," SEATO, The Second Year (Bangkok, SEATO, 1957).

90. Infrap pp. 39-40.

91. Manila Times, March 14, 1957.

92. Ibid., March 13p 1957.

editorially, asserted that the organization had come a long way since 1954 towards achieving its objectives: its military force was strengthened by the United States, but in time SEATO would have its own armed units; military progress had forced the Communists to shift to subversion and SEATO's emphasis was now aimed at combatting that tactic. The Times also reiterated the Philippine economic theme: Defense planning cannot be effective without economic planning.<sup>93</sup>

The fourth meeting of SEATO was held in Manila, in March, 1958. There, the Philippines proposed that the operations of the alliance be coordinated with other free-world organizations. The idea, which was first proposed by the then acting foreign secretary, Felixberto Serrano, on November 1, 1957, was reported to have found wide acceptance among the members of the pact.<sup>94</sup> The Philippines advised a cautious attitude towards admitting into SEATO nations within and outside the treaty area, such as Nationalist China and Japan.<sup>95</sup>

In addition, the Filipinos again proposed closer economic collaboration leading to the establishment of an economic development fund, perhaps to counter the economic expansion being undertaken by Japan.

... Asian countries... such as Thailand, Pakistan and the Philippines, would be able to use to better advantage economic benefits which will not have political overtones as that which Japan might offer.<sup>96</sup>

In this connection, however, the organization was of the view that the principal means of attaining the objectives of economic

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93. Manila Times, September 15, 1957.

94. Ibid., March 4, 1958. Secretary Dulles, in November, 1958, revealed that there was, perhaps, closer contact between the several regional organizations than they were ready to admit. "The world is so interconnected now that we all recognize that it's difficult to deal with these matters [problems of world diplomacy] on a purely regional basis and that the threat of war everywhere and that defense everywhere is necessary for defense anywhere. ... we have made important steps in recognition of that principle.... We [NATO] have been having consultations much more fully with the representatives of the... SEATO countries." News conference in Washington, November 7, 1958, and quoted in the New York Times, November 8, 1958.

95. Although in the fall, 1958, the Philippines said it would approve the admittance of Malaya. Manila Times, September 19, 1958.

96. Stated by Secretary Serrano, and quoted in the Manila Times, March 4, 1958.

progress could be best met through extensive bilateral economic arrangements rather than through a SEATO plan.<sup>p</sup> It was announced that Australia offered some \$2.2 million for purposes generally related to defense; the United States announced the contribution of \$2 million for vocational and on-the-job training, and France, New Zealand and the United Kingdom offered aid for various aspects of technical training.<sup>97</sup>

Of striking significance, in terms of economic development of Southeast Asia, has been, on the one hand, the repeated demands of the Philippines for greater economic activity by SEATO and, on the other hand, SEATO's refusal to embark on any development scheme.<sup>p</sup> The answers to questions about this probably lie in the absence of a regional consciousness among the Southeast Asian nations. "The development of nationalism<sup>98</sup> is more likely than the early growth of regional solidarity."<sup>98p</sup>

That this is more than just probable is evidenced by the reaction of Asian states to the United States Asian Development Fund. In the 1956 United States foreign aid budget requests, President Eisenhower asked Congress for a special \$200 million appropriation for the support of projects purporting to promote greater economic strength in the region as a whole, or in groups of countries in the area. Congress later reduced this amount to \$100 million and indicated that it would be available for obligation through June 30, 1958.

Subsequently, at the Simla Conference, held in India, May, 1955<sup>p</sup> to decide upon uses to which the money might be put, it was decided by Asian states that, while a regional treatment might be accorded certain projects, such a move was generally undesirable because the arrangements would require more time to be brought into execution. Furthermore, it would introduce a regional organization between them and the United States, with consequent loss of American interest in and support for national economic objectives.<sup>99</sup> This is, however, no more than a rationalization for a nationalism characterized by failure to look beyond one's own borders in search of areas where mutually beneficial arrangements in the economic sphere could be effected.

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97. See the final communique in the Manila Times, March 14, 1958.

98. R. H. Fifield, "Philippine Foreign Policy," op. cit., p. 35.

99. New York Times, May 14, 1955. Delegates were sent by Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Nepal, Pakistan, South Vietnam and Thailand. A British delegate represented Malaya, Singapore and Borneo.<sup>p</sup> The Philippines sent only an observer, while Ceylon and Burma did not attend at all.

In the light of the Philippines continually expressed concern for SEATO's lack of action in the economic sphere, the question may be asked: Why did the Philippines feel that the Simla Conference merited only the attendance of an observer rather than an active participant? One answer might be found in the nationalism of the new states; another in the fact that, as far as the Philippines was then concerned, Southeast Asia did not constitute a viable economic area.

While proposed uses of the Asian Development Fund totaled \$100 million, formal obligation of money amounted to only \$8.5 million. Most of this was allocated to transportation projects of benefit to India, Nepal, Afghanistan and Pakistan. None of it involved the Philippines, except, possibly, the \$2 million for a program designed to alleviate skilled labor shortages in Southeast Asia. The President's report to Congress, in early 1958, concluded:

The development of suitable projects has been slow, primarily because the concept of joint economic undertakings among Asian countries is new and often runs into political and economic differences which take time for them to reconcile.<sup>100</sup>

No new funds were requested for fiscal year 1958-1959 for the Asian Economic Development Fund.

While SEATO has consistently refused to enter the economic sphere in a way commensurate with the officially expressed desires of Filipinos, the Philippines has continued to urge a change in emphasis. Prior to the fifth annual SEATO Council meeting in Wellington, April 8-10, 1959, Philippine Foreign Secretary Serrano, while on a trip to Bangkok, indicated that the Philippines would press strongly for action in the field of economic development.

SEATO has been most beneficial in promoting peace in this area. There is no doubt about that. But SEATO should also give material benefit to member states. To increase the organization's stature in the eyes of non-member nations, SEATO should see what it can do in the way of mutual assistance and self-help. Because of its essentially military nature, SEATO has not attracted some nations. But with member nations showing obvious benefit from economic aid, SEATO will become more attractive.

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100. Report to Congress by the President on the Mutual Security Program for the six months ended December 31, 1957 (13th semiannual report) (Washington, May 22, 1958), p. 24.

Our method of assistance would be for the more wealthier members... to pool resources to give aid. I will not relax in my effort to bring this plan into operation, until SEATO sees its way clear to exploit the plan to its full advantage.<sup>101</sup>

However, Serrano became ill in Singapore just as he was to board a plane for Wellington. He was replaced as chief Philippine delegate by Ambassador (to Australia) Jose F. Imperial.

Ambassador Imperial, backed up by the Thai delegation, presented his country's point of view, perhaps not as forcefully as Serrano would have done, but, nevertheless to the point.

Two problems continue to be of paramount concern to us: First, the effort to combat the Communist menace in the form of open or of hidden aggression. Second, the establishment of a solid basis for the healthy development of economic and political institutions.<sup>102</sup>

Economic problems were, for the first time, the main concern of an annual SEATO meeting,<sup>103</sup> perhaps as a result of the recognition that, as the Manila Times put it, "A military posture is not sufficient by itself to strengthen members. The more fundamental problem is to promote practical economic projects, encourage economic unity...."<sup>104</sup>

In addition, the 1959 annual report of SEATO<sup>105</sup> placed great importance upon the dangers of Chinese Communist economic activity in Southeast Asia. The report of the Secretary-General said that,

... by carefully timed unloading of low-priced goods, Communist China has upset local markets in the treaty area, and has affected the normal flow of trade with the free countries of the world. A part of the proceeds from the sale of these goods is used for the

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101. Manila Times, April 4, 1959.

102. Ibidi, April 9, 1959.

103. "Communique of Fifth SEATO Meeting," New York Times, April 10, 1959.

104. Manila Times, April 13, 1959.

105. Manila Times, April 1, 1959; Bangkok World, April 4, 1959.

purposes of propaganda and subversion.

Just what SEATO intends to do about this situation was not revealed, but the Council did recommend several economic development measures to be undertaken in 1959-1960. A study is to be made of the feasibility of setting up "rural development centers" in Asian member nations which would provide vocational guidance and advice to the people on ways to improve their standard of living. In addition, it was announced that the United States will contribute \$400,000 to a SEATO-directed, three-year cholera research project.<sup>107</sup>

But it would seem that, once again, the Council failed to produce economic plans satisfactory to Asian members.<sup>108</sup> In fact, it has been reported that Asian economic proposals did not excite interest among the non-Asian members until a bit of old-fashioned lobbying was carried out.<sup>108</sup> It may be assumed that the American view--that SEATO should not duplicate the work of the Colombo Plan--prevailed.

Perhaps because it feels that the United States is not taking the lead in economic matters that it should; perhaps, also, because of a growing feeling that it really should try to implement another of its foreign policy cornerstones--build up and maintain friendly relations with her Southeast Asian neighbors--the Philippines recently has embarked upon a plan to form an Asian collective economic, political and cultural defense against Communism. The plan has taken shape under impetus provided by President Carlos Garcia. In connection with his expressed desire "to make our country a cultural hub linking the East and West,"<sup>109</sup> the President told the Manila Overseas Press Club on December 18, 1958, that, "The forging of closer ties with our free Asian neighbors is a specific of the administration's foreign policy."

Later, as he outlined his government's foreign policy for 1959, he filled in more of the details of his idea. The government would pursue a

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106. See also, "Communique of Fifth SEATO Meeting," op. cit., and statements of C. Douglas Dillon, United States Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, United States chief delegate to the meeting, in New York Times, April 11, 1959.

107. Bangkok World, April 10, 1959.

108. See the statement of Thailand's Foreign Minister, Thanat Khoman, Bangkok World, April 17, 1959.

109. Manila Times, October 7, 1958.

... foreign policy designed to solidify free Asian nations into a strong collective bloc--barangay-- to challenge Communist aggression in the economic, political and spiritual areas.<sup>110</sup>

And he announced that he would soon travel to South Vietnam and Malaya to advance his idea.<sup>110</sup>

The Manila Times sought to buttress Garcia's idea by emphasizing that the plan did not mean a change in Philippine foreign policy. "Confident of the stability and durability of our traditional relationships, we are now prepared to broaden our horizons to explore additional areas of friendship and cooperation."<sup>111</sup>

The first official Asian reaction to Garcia's "barangay" came from Malaya, and it was negative. Prime Minister Tengku Abdul Rahman rejected the idea of signing an anti-Communist pact with the Philippines, or any other country, because "it would antagonize many other Asian countries."<sup>112</sup> However, he was willing, and in fact visited the Philippines, to talk of means by which Asians might cooperate in an economic development program. He emphasized the need for economic stability, "because it is the only way to combat ideas we do not like. Communism then will have no appeal since it can offer nothing that successful democracy can already provide." A Philippine-Malaya joint communique, issued on January 7, 1959, echoed these ideas.<sup>113</sup> Rahman later said that Malaya would be happy to host an economic and cultural conference, and that Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam and Indonesia would be invited to attend. By April, 1959, discussions between the Philippines and Malaya had progressed to a point where both sides were examining each other's detailed proposals.<sup>114</sup> While it was reported, in May, that Secretary Serrano was seeking Garcia's approval of the Malayan proposal, no further details have been released.

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110. Manila Times, December 20, 1958. The only unofficial Asian reaction which I was able to discover was in a few leftist and nationalist Indonesian newspapers. Generally, left-wing papers viewed the proposal as a SEATO-inspired move to weaken the Afro-Asian bloc. See National Press Digest III (Djakarta) January 17, 21, 1959) 4, 7. The nationalist press discussed the plan in terms of its effect--negative--on Indonesian sovereignty. See National Press Digest III (February 18, 21, 1959), 13, 14. Criticism of the plan also came from the Soviet Union. See D. Volsky, "Za kulisami 'aziatskovo kluba'" (Behind the scenes of the 'Asian club'); Sovremennyi vostok (Moskva), June, 1959, No. 6.

Related to President Garcia's idea have been the Philippines most recent relations with South Vietnam and Indonesia. On April 26, in Saigon, President Garcia and Ngo Dinh Diem signed a treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation, which was described as the first important step towards realization of the plan.<sup>115</sup> And, on April 28, the Philippines signed its first cultural agreement with an Asian nation: Indonesia.

How far President Garcia's plan will go will depend on how much energy Filipinos are willing to devote to it, and how much sacrifice, in terms of cooperation, the several Southeast Asian participants are willing to make. At the present, it is certainly too early to make a meaningful evaluation of it.

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At the first SEATO meeting in Bangkok, the delegates agreed to the adoption of a working paper on subversion and infiltration by Communists. They took note of Philippine "unorthodox" methods of combatting subversion through "a stepped up psychological war and through land reforms, greater production and rural improvement program."<sup>116</sup> The Council Representative also established a Committee of Security Experts, primarily to help them deal with particular technical aspects of counter-subversion work. This committee, composed of some 70 civilian and military specialists, met at Camp Murphy in Quezon City on September 12, 1955, for a series of secret sessions.<sup>117</sup>

The Philippine position was set forth by Brigadier General Pelagio Cruz, Armed Forces Chief of Staff and chairman of the Philippine military staff planners' group, and Defense Under Secretary Jose M. Crisol. Cruz warned that Communist subversion had already infiltrated the economic, political, social, military and religious institutions in a large part of the treaty area. He indicated that the Philippine position was that there should be only one

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111. Manila Times, December 23, 1958.

112. Ibid., January 3, 1959.

113. Ibid., January 7, 1959.

114. Ibid., April 13, 1959.

115. Ibid., April 27, 1959.

116. Ibid., February 25, 1955.

117. This committee actually met three times in 1955, but because of the secret nature of its work, two of the meetings were not reported in the press.

agency in each country to direct counter-subversion efforts. Crisol called for a joint civilian-military effort not only to destroy the armed strength of the Communists, but also to win the "mass base" through the institution of much-needed reforms, particularly in the rural areas.<sup>118</sup>

Col. Nicanor T. Jimenez, Philippine Armed Forces Public Affairs head, was chosen to chair the military conference. He brought specific Philippine experience to the meeting by tracing the rise of the Huks, the attempts to combat the threat by purely military efforts, and the evolution of a civilian-military method which finally broke the movement.<sup>119</sup> He said that since local Communist agents have succeeded in infiltrating a number of institutions and pressure groups, and because of the lack of facilities and sufficient evidence to convict them, the military authorities in the Philippines have adopted measures only to neutralize their activities.<sup>120</sup>

Editorial opinion on the anti-subversion meeting in Camp Murphy was varied, and interesting in the light of the secret nature of the talks. The Manila Times restricted itself to a comment on the relations of the civilian and military organizations.

It is common knowledge that it is the civilian ranks that are infiltrated, weakened, or converted into a supporting revolutionary force by the Communists. The military takes over when the subversive activity becomes more or less overt, not before. How to identify subversion, how to fight, how to bring it to military notice, and how to create conditions that would make it difficult for subversion to thrive are largely civilian responsibilities.<sup>121</sup>

The Manila Bulletin was concerned that "subversion has never taken on the aspect of reality" for the people.<sup>122</sup> It said that the SEATO meeting should contribute to Asian security by giving the public knowledge about subversion and how it works in Asia.

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118. Manila Times, September 13, 1955.

119. The details of this experience were made public in 1957 by Gen. Jesus Vargas. Infra pp. 41.

120. Manila Times, September 15, 1955.

121. Ibid, September 13, 1955.

122. Manila Bulletin, September 13, 1955. Italics mine.

Later, the Bulletin charged that the meeting never got down to considering itself as engaged in a war. It asserted that the arts of diplomacy were inadequate to deal with subversion.<sup>123</sup> Lacking details, one is unable to judge the assertion of the Bulletin, or the viability of the meeting. The final communique was non-committal, restating only that the delegates recognized the necessity of making a joint (military-civilian) effort, that each country must fight subversion with whatever means are at its command, and the importance of a continuing exchange of ideas for the achievement of a common goal.<sup>124</sup>

A year later, the second annual report of SEATO noted the "quiet and steady development" economically and politically, in the member states, but warned that subversion was now the "main threat." It pointed out that the Philippines was aiding some of the countries covered by the Manila Pact by training personnel for counter-subversion activities.

Communist official statements make it clear that the ultimate objective in the Treaty Area continues to be the establishment of distinct Communist regimes.... [The] main effort [is] to subvert [and it] consists in the infiltration of political, youth and cultural movements and trade unions.<sup>125</sup>

Despite the trepidation which followed recognition of the subversive threat, SEATO reports do not contain much detail of its activities, nor of the Philippines, in counter-subversion. We know only that the work comes under the general supervision of the Military Advisers, and its Permanent Military Planning Staff. These bodies are assigned the task of detailed planning for collective defense of the area and are so organized to ensure such planning on a continuing basis. Working very closely with the military planners is a so-called Expert Committee of the Organization, the Committee of Security Experts, which deals directly with the problem of subversion.<sup>1</sup>

Throughout much of the material that is available, references have been made to the Philippine contribution in this field. But until the publication of some of the discussions in the first full-dress SEATO meeting on subversion, in November, 1957, one could only assume that the Philippines was sharing knowledge gained in combatting the Huks.<sup>126</sup>

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123. Manila Bulletin, September 19, 1955.

124. Philippines Free Press, September 24, 1955.

125. SEATO, the Second Year (Bangkok: SEATO, 1957).

126. Seminar on Countering Communist Subversion (Baguio: SEATO, November, 1957).

Jesus Vargas, Secretary of Defense of the Philippines, detailed for the seminar the measures which the Philippines had taken to curtail and eliminate the activities of Communist dissident elements.

Actual political, economic and sociological conditions obtaining in a country, special attitudes, likes and dislikes of the population, specific tactics used by the enemy, circumstances of geography and other external or foreign factors--all this, it is believed, has a bearing on the success or failure of probable solutions.<sup>127</sup>

He outlined the way in which the Communist Party originated and grew in the Philippines, noting that, during the period, 1930-1950, the Philippines did not fully appreciate the problem which existed in its midst and, as a result, treated the resultant difficulties as routine police matters. The Philippine effort was complicated by socio-economic problems which the government was trying to correct through economic development schemes; by malpractices within the government, and by a general distrust among the people of the government.

General Vargas analyzed the Philippine experience in terms of five distinct phases. The first was known as the "cut-and-try" phase, during which the government continued to treat the situation as a routine police problem. The results were inconsequential. The government then shifted to a second phase, during which time it tried a policy of attraction. Initiated under the administration of Elpidio Quirino in 1948, it involved a general amnesty for the Huks who voluntarily laid down their arms. But when it became obvious that the Huks were using this phase to regroup, reorganize and rehabilitate themselves, the government resumed its police action. According to Vargas, the only redeeming aspect of the situation at this point was the realization by the government, and later by the nation as a whole, that the solution to the problem was well beyond the reach of normal police action, and that a more integrated national effort had to be exerted.

The program then entered phase four wherein the armed forces were called upon to spearhead the anti-dissident campaign. Under the leadership of the then Secretary of National Defense, Ramon Magsaysay, the Communist threat was studied intensively as to the reasons for its success and with an objective view of what could be done. Thus it was discovered, said Vargas, that the growth and success of the Communists' activities was due to a general discontent obtaining throughout the country. This was traced to

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127. Ibid., p. 87.

the existence of unprecedented graft and corruption in the government. Abuses committed by some members of the military, the almost total absence of social and economic reforms, and the almost universal poverty of the people who felt they were abandoned and completely left out from the dispensation of national benefits, all contributed to the discontent.

"In short," Vargas declared,

the government realized that it had to correct discontent, poverty, corruption, ineptitude, abuses, and other social ills in order to destroy the base upon which Communism in the Philippines thrived.

It was necessary to deny it the fertile ground on which it flourished. Thus, phase five, or the national policy of "all-out force and all-out friendship." Simply stated, the policy promised mercy and a helping hand to misguided elements who voluntarily renounced allegiance to Communism and sincerely sought the ways of peace, and the use of force and the iron hand against those who would continue to defy the government.<sup>128</sup>

While General Vargas attributed Philippine success in crushing the Huk movement to this program, he did not indicate that all of the internal problems facing the country had, by any means, been fully solved. His great emphasis, on the contrary, was on the continuing nature of the program.

At the present, SEATO's concern is with the major threat to Southeast Asian security and freedom. The members have had impressed upon them that no one type of counter-measure will be generally effective, primarily because each case will be unique. It is probably also the case that there is no effective deterrent which could operate to restrain subversion. We are, however, confined largely to speculation, because SEATO has neither made available any clear information on the nature of the threat in Southeast Asia, nor of what plans it is making to combat it. This is unfortunate, for presumably subversion will begin among the people. But if the people know little or nothing about its nature, how can they be expected to be aware of the danger they are in?<sup>129</sup>

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128. See *ibid.*, pp. 80-86, for a point-by-point detailing of the fifth phase.

129. SEATO has published a number of pamphlets in Urdu, Thai, French and English, on the role of Communism in labor unions, schools, etc. But a question needs to be raised about them: Are these publications too sophisticated for a people with little experience with Communism and, for that matter, democracy? Are the people politically literate?

The Manila press has pointed out that "subversion has never taken on the aspect of reality" for the people. If, as General Vargas has asserted, the best way of combatting subversion is through economic, political and psychological measures, then the individual countries, if not SEATO, should be taking greater initiative and more direct action than has been taken up to now.

As if to lend substance to his earlier statements, General Vargas, in March, 1959, declared that,

It may come as a surprise to many of us, but the truth is... we are losing out to the enemy in many respects, specifically in connection with their parliamentary or legal struggles<sup>130</sup>

Speaking in Iloilo City, on March 18, Vargas anticipated accusations that he was trying to influence the Congress into approving the, then, proposed budget for the defense budget. But, he said, he felt "strongly compelled to reapprise our people of the rising danger of Communism in our country.¶ Since the Philippine Communists had suffered defeat in military operations, their present tactic has been to identify themselves with legitimate causes¶ "while working against us with methods not entirely legitimate.¶ To gain popular support for their immediate objective of establishing an "anti-American-oriented government," local Communists exploit nationalistic sentiments.

In defense of his assertions, the Secretary of National Defense produced several "highly classified" Communist documents which had recently been intercepted by military intelligence agents. Among them was the so-called "Political Transmission No. 11p" from which he read excerpts to the Senate Committee on Revision of Laws.<sup>131</sup> Through influence exerted upon the electorate, the document states, the Communists hope to shape a "Filipinistic" government which will "bring the people closer to our [Communist] strategic aims.¶ (Vargas claimed that, already, some 400 of 2200 Filipino labor unions were suspected of having been infiltrated; that party cells had been established among student groups and within educational institutions.)

The Filipino Communists claim they will solve the problem of internal peace "because we know that the main obstacle to the solution of this problem is imperialist intervention;" that they will raise the standard of living by means of "national industrialization and the opening of trade relations with the new Democratic and Socialist countries;" and, lastly,

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130. Quoted in Philippines Free Press, May 2, 1959.

131. Manila Times, April 4, 1959; Philippines Free Press, May 2, 1959.

... should the American imperialists intervene in the elections to make certain that the candidates of the united front are defeated, then there will be greater opportunities for exposing the imperialists. This depends on the steps to be taken by the movement and members of the nationalist united front.<sup>132</sup>

It is of interest to note that there has been an upsurge of nationalism in the Philippines, which seems bent on asserting the country's independence of the United States in the making of its own foreign and domestic policies, but which, at the same time, its proponents insist is not anti-American.<sup>133</sup> On February 26, 1959, this nationalism took on an organized form, in shape of the "Kilusang Makabansa" or KMB. Its proclaimed aims are as follows:

... abrogation of the Parity Amendment in the Philippines constitution [i.e., nationalization of industry]; the Filipinization of our educational system and institutions; the pursuance of an independent foreign policy determined by our national interests; the forging of close ties with our Asian neighbors through all forms of mutually beneficial agreements; the adoption on the part of the Administration of a bold nationalist program as a measure against all forms of imperialism, ideological or otherwise; the Filipinization of all major public utility industries; the adoption and implementation on the part of the Administration of a vigorous program of social justice, which, above all, is a constitutional provision and, therefore, a veritable mandate; the adoption and implementation of a nationalist industrialization program.<sup>134</sup>

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132. The foregoing quotations were taken from excerpts of "Political Transmission No. 11," printed in Philippines Free Press, May 2, 1959. "Political Transmission No. 15," captured along with No. 11, has been cited by the Senate as a 90-page "vivid, factual and incisive picture of the political-economic state of the nation." Therein is contained, directly, if not by implication, the points at which Philippine parties are most vulnerable to attack. See Philippines Free Press, May 16, 1959.

133. See speech by Senator Claro Recto to the Manila Rotary, printed in Manila Times, June 5, 6, 7, 1959.

134. Taken from a paid advertisement of the KMB in the Manila Times, May 27, 1959. It was reported that the KMB's "Manifesto" was adopted by some 200 delegates from the nation at large at a convention in Quezon City on May 24,

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The similarity in aims boosted by the Communists and the KMB, though impressive, does not necessarily signify kinship between the two organizations. While we cannot afford to play ostrich to the possibility that the KMB may be serving as a Communist front, there are at least two other equally probable interpretations which can be proffered to explain this congruence in objectives. The similarity in professed aims may be purely coincidental--if so, this would certainly not be the first time that two organizations whose memberships are mutually antagonistic have promoted the same causes. The possibility, suggested by Vargas, also exists that the Communist party is consciously attaching itself to an innocent KMB, hoping in this way to reap the fruits borne by the nationalist movement.

The question may still be raised: If "subversion has never taken on the aspect of reality" for the people, and the Communist party is, in fact, pursuing the same aims as the nationalist movement, how are the people to distinguish between them?

Among the reasons leading to the meeting of the eight SEATO nations in September, 1954, was their desire to achieve greater security through greater unity. A foundation for common action was established in the collective defense pact. At the outset, and throughout the five years of SEATO's existence, the members have sought this sense of unity in the organization's military activities. To achieve their purpose, they have planned and carried out a series of military training exercises. These exercises have followed three general lines of development: maritime exercises, involving sea and air forces; air-ground, in which air units have given support to army units deployed in the field, and sea-ground, involving support of land operations by naval forces.

The training program began in February, 1956. FIRMLINK was an air-ground operation in which United States forces from Okinawa and the Philippines, and the Thai armed forces formed the major groups of participants. Small detachments came from other members as well, excepting Pakistan and France, both of which claimed they had not had enough time to prepare for the maneuvers. Although the Philippines participated only in a perfunctory way, it was evident to the nation that military

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(continued from page 44)

1959. Fifty-three provincial directors and 28 city directors were selected from among the delegates and sworn into office by Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Jesus G. Barrera. Among the KMB's leaders are: Col. D. Mohammad de Venancio, national chairman; Blas F. Ople, vice-chairman; Fernando A. Esguerra, organization director; and Raoul Inocentes, secretary-general.

assistance from the SEATO countries would be forthcoming in case of need.<sup>135</sup> Most accounts indicate that this first operation was to be mainly a United States show, to prove that the United States could deliver a highly mobile striking force and in a short period of time. Philippine efforts consisted in tent-pitching, inspection and mortar drill, but it was expected that she would participate more fully in later operations.

These followed in September-October, 1956, with ALBATROSS, an air-sea exercise directed by Australia; RIDHEE, in January, 1957, an air-ground maneuver directed by Thailand; BEACON HILL, in March, 1957, an amphibious training exercise involving United States army, navy and air force units in cooperation with Philippine army groups; ASTRA, April-May, 1957, an air-sea problem conducted by Great Britain; SEALINK, in May, 1957, sponsored jointly by the United States and the Philippines, but directed by the latter; AIRLINK, May-June, 1957, directed by Thailand; PHILBLINK, an amphibious exercise held in Dingalan Bay, on the eastern coast of Luzon; and VAYUBUT, an air-ground exercise in Thailand, April, 1958, to test the capability of SEATO tactical air forces to assist in the defense of a member nation.

In late 1958 and early 1959, SEATO exercises continued in the general area between Manila and Bangkok. All of the members, except France and Pakistan, in December, 1958, demonstrated the role of aviation in national security, in a grand showing of some 250 aircraft over Manila. Lampang, Thailand, was the site, in February, 1959, of KITISENA, an operation designed to prove the effectiveness of atomic weapons' support of ground troops. The following month, SEATO put on air defense exercises--AIR PROGRESS--at Bangkok. In addition to the usual SEATO observers, representatives were on hand from Laos and South Vietnam to watch 42 sorties flown, as well as to receive instructions in the tactical uses of turbo-prop transports.<sup>136</sup> Of unusual interest in this case, was a SEATO "show of force" over Chiangmai. It was reported by the mayor of that city that a "jet-like object" had flown south and then north over Chiangmai, frightening the inhabitants. Would SEATO reassure the people? SEATO responded with several flights of jets.<sup>137</sup>

In April, while naval exercises--SEA DEMON--were being conducted near Singapore, the so-called "Flying Brothers" staged

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135. Philippines Free Press, February 25, 1956.

136. Bangkok World, March 3, 4, 1959.

137. Ibid., March 5, 1959.

maneuvers over Tarlac, Philippines. Although it was reported that the maneuvers were not particularly startling, Filipino military spokesmen announced that they provided a measure of increased "understanding" among the air forces of the United States, the Philippines, Nationalist China, South Korea and Thailand.<sup>138</sup>

Naval exercises continued through mid-1959: HALANG DAGAT was staged in May to demonstrate the ability of SEATO to defend Manila Harbor in an emergency; and Operation SADDLE UP, in June, worked out the problems of coordinating paratroop and amphibious operations on the coast of North Borneo.<sup>139</sup> In connection with this last operation, it is interesting to note the creation of a "new training area," near Rampayan, North Borneo, for British forces, but which, presumably, could be used for army units of all SEATO members.<sup>140</sup>

Exercise HANDA, a combined United States-Philippine command post exercise, designed to show how quickly United States forces could be brought from Hawaii to defend the Philippines, was conducted at Fort McKinley on June 22, 1959. This operation, admittedly of the sand-box variety, employed United States forces under Filipino command. In addition, it was announced that combined planning was conducted for "possible future movements" of United States and Philippine forces "to another SEATO area."<sup>141</sup>

SEATO has proudly reassured itself that there has been a definite increase in the overall capacity of the members to resist armed aggression. This has resulted primarily from the members devoting considerable effort and resources to increasing the combat effectiveness of their armed forces. Along with the exercises has gone modernization, re-equipment, more efficient disposition and more intensive training of forces. The military

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138. Manila Times, May 8, 1959.

139. North Borneo News & Sabah Times (Jesselton), June 12, 1959; Sarawak Tribune (Kuching, North Borneo), June 15, 1959.

140. Besides the several bases which are located in the Philippines and Thailand, other Southeast Asian sites which SEATO forces could use, either for training, or in actual warfare, are located at Butterworth, in northern Malaya (the site of the "Southeast Asia Strategic Air Reserve" under the command of an Australian air commodore); a French airbase at Seni, in Laos, and the several military bases in South Vietnam.

141. Manila Times, June 23, 1959.

exercises have, according to the official SEATO report, improved the coordination among the various national forces<sup>142</sup>

We have, however, only the public pronouncements of SEATO with which to substantiate whether objectives have been achieved or not. Knowing the disparate interests of the many members, especially the United States, and presented with rather vague descriptions of successes in military operations, and planning to combat subversion, one is led to the conclusion that "success" cannot yet be measured.<sup>143</sup> At best, we must treat SEATO's optimistic claims with caution.

Since 1954, the Philippines has been among the most consistently vocal supporters of military planning and, especially, of a regional armed force. To give substance to its position, it has utilized its Office of Southeast Asia Military Affairs (OSEAMA), established in June, 1954, to promote collective security, and to further coordinate its armed forces activities with the regional operations of SEATO. Through this office, also, Thailand, Indonesia and South Vietnam military personnel have been furnished with training in counter-subversion work.<sup>144</sup>

But there has also been an undercurrent of Filipino dissatisfaction with the state of their armed forces and with the requirements of external defense. This matter has been intricately tied up with the military bases agreement with the United States, with the amount of military aid being furnished by the United States, and with the requirements of internal security. The Philippines Free Press, at times, has raised the question of the necessity of a large Philippine armed force.<sup>145</sup> The

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142. SEATO, Record of Partnership, 1957-1958 (Bangkok: SEATO, 1958); "Communique of Fifth SEATO Meeting," New York Times, April 11, 1959. According to New Zealand Brigadier Leonard W. Thornton, SEATO's chief military planner, a continuous program of combined exercises are the only means of getting the eight armed forces to work as a team. Furthermore, while "contingency planning" will continue, three SEATO exercises are scheduled during 1959-1960. Manila Times, June 2, 1959.

143. For criticisms of SEATO as an effective military alliance, see John K. King, Southeast Asia in Perspective (New York: Macmillan, 1956), Ch. 17, and Ralph Braibanti, "The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty," Pacific Affairs XXX (December, 1957) 4: 321-341.

144. Philippines Free Press, January 14, 1956.

145. See, for example, the writings of T. M. Locsin, passim, but especially in the issue of September 1, 1956.

great problem of the Philippines is economic, not military, says this weekly journal. If the United States is going to maintain bases and personnel in the Philippines, and the country remains dependent upon the United States, why does the country need a large-sized army?

In place of a professional army, there [should] be a citizen-~~are~~ trained by the government at a minimum cost. With such an army, the Philippines could no longer take part in spectacular operations abroad, of course; the only expeditionary force it would send would be to Jolo should the Moros start acting like some of their Christian brothers again. The illusion of being a power in the world is one that the Philippines would just have to forego; it is nice but we have no money. P

The Manila Times takes the opposite view. It feels that the situation in the Far East is critical and that the Philippines should be prepared in the event an emergency should occur. And to be prepared, the army program of four divisions should be implemented as soon as possible.<sup>146</sup>

On the surface, it would appear that the Philippines has proceeded upon the assumption that its armed forces are vital, not only to its internal security, but to its external defense as well and to the entire Southeast Asian region insofar as it might be called upon to fulfill its commitments under the SEATO agreement. By the very nature of its economic problems, however, it has had to rely upon aid from the United States and other sources to try to bring its fighting strength up to what it considers part four combat-ready divisions, a modern jet air force and a navy capable of operating in deep water.

To supplement steady decreases in the amount of appropriations given to the armed forces by the Congress each year,<sup>147</sup>

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146. See, for example, Manila Times, February 1, 1955.

147. For fiscal year 1954-1955, the Congress appropriated ₱170,838,342 for the Defense Department, of which over ₱151 million was specifically for the armed forces. The larger amount represents 30 percent of a total budget of over half a billion pesos. (₱2: \$1) Republic of the Philippines, 3d Cong., 1st Sess., Republic Act 1150, June 17, 1954. For the next year, the defense appropriation declined slightly to ₱170,202,073, although it remained 30 percent of the total budget. Republic of the Philippines, 3d Cong., 2d Sess., Republic Act 1350, June 18, 1955. The department's proposed allocation for fiscal year 1957 dropped sharply to  
(continued on next page)

the Philippines has eagerly accepted, in the period 1954-1957, \$89 million from the United States, and probably much more in unannounced aid,<sup>148</sup> as well as some \$1.1 million from Australia in goods and services under a SEATO mutual defense assistance program.<sup>149</sup> The Philippines has also participated in the United States program of training SEATO military personnel in America and in Southeast Asia. Although the number of Filipinos actually trained is not known, it is reported that the United States had, during 1956, trained nearly 11,000 officers and non-commissioned officers,<sup>150</sup> and by early 1958, this number had risen to well over 25,000.<sup>151</sup> In addition to the Philippine Military Academy, which has been aided directly by the United States, the armed forces will benefit by the SEATO Defense College, to be established in Baguio some time in the future.<sup>152</sup>

With all of this aid, however, there is still dissatisfaction. Perhaps the chief of the Joint United States Military Advisory Group (in 1956), Maj. Gen. Wayne C. Smith, approached the hard truth when, in the face of protests from top Filipino military figures, he stated that United States military aid was conditional in nature. He said the aid was dependent on three factors: (1) the

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₱134.2 million, which figure probably represented a more realistic appraisal of actual needs. In any case, the President believed that the reduction would enable funds to be diverted to the "nation building program." "President's Budget Message," in Republic of the Philippines, Budget for the Fiscal Year 1957, (submitted Feb. 6, 1956), (Manila, 1956), p. 17-a. Figures for 1958 and 1959, respectively, were reported by the press as ₱173,231,220 (Manila Times, Feb. 10, 1957) and ₱194,852,810 (Manila Times, Feb. 11, 1958). Given the downward trend, however, these figures cannot be taken as realistic, particularly the latter, which was reported during a government "austerity" program. Manila Times, February 7, 1958.

148. Manila Times, March 16, 1957. David Wurfel has estimated that the Philippines has received a cumulative total of \$1 billion in the period 1947-1956. See "The Philippines" in Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia, George McT. Kahin, ed., (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1959), p. 500.

149. Philippines Free Press, September 4, 1956.

150. Manila Times, September 5, 1956.

151. SEATO, Record of Partnership, 1957-1958, op. cit., p. 9.

152. Although this institution was to have been established in mid-1958, agreement had not been reached on the financial arrangements by mid-1959. Manila Times, May 13, 1959.

financial capacity of the government to put up the counterpart funds to match the dollar value of the aid; (2) the extent to which the country is exposed to Communism; and (3) the operational capacity of the armed forces to absorb the aid given.<sup>152</sup>

One is, at least, led to raise questions after considering the explanations of two Secretaries of National Defense. In September 1956, Secretary Balao said that the Philippines lacked funds for an increased buildup of the armed forces. "We are a poor country. The administration is more inclined to divert funds for more urgent projects such as the rural development program."<sup>153</sup> Two years later, the same explanation was voiced by Secretary Vargas, formerly Chief of Staff of the armed forces. He said there was a lack of defense planning in the Philippines due to inadequate appropriations from the Congress. "Our defense plans are drawn not so much dictated by actual needs or threats of aggression, but by what Congress and the administration are predisposed to appropriate for defense."<sup>154</sup>

Despite the obvious implication here, however, the Philippines continues to request aid from the United States. In the fall, 1958, with anxiety caused by the Formosa situation running high, all that the Filipino negotiators were able to extract was the promise that "... the United States would always stand side by side with the Philippines in any emergency."<sup>155</sup> Since then, Australia has announced that it had set aside some \$1.1 million as SEATO arms aid to the Philippines. Other amounts were to be set aside for the training of Filipino armed forces in Asia.<sup>156</sup>

Perhaps the reluctance of the United States to grant additional aid to the Philippines stems not only from the unwillingness of Filipino legislators to devote more of their country's resources to its armed forces, but also to a lack of agreement among Filipino military people on where the proper emphasis should be placed. This was recently underscored by statements by Admiral H. A. Felt, United States Pacific Commander, and by the new Philippine Secretary of Defense, Alejo Santos. In discussing, before the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the need to determine the actual defense requirements of any country before deciding how much or what kind of United States military aid it should get, Admiral

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152. Philippines Free Press, April 14, 1956.

153. Manila Times, September 12, 1956.

154. Ibid., January 1, 1958.

155. Ibid., October 10, 1958.

156. Ibid., October 18, 1958.

Felt said,

For example, in the Philippines, I found the Filipinos thinking in terms of World War II, trying to create a large army, and having no appreciation of the fact that if they are attacked it would probably be by air. They had no appreciation of the importance of building up their air force.<sup>157</sup>

It was immediately denied, both in Washington and Manila, that all Filipino defense authorities were deserving of attack. At first glance, it would seem that the denials by Filipinos were justified, for in May, 1959, Secretary Santos had indicated that the Philippine emphasis, in terms of her external security, would be on missiles, nuclear weapons and modern, jet aircraft.<sup>158</sup> And on June 23, Philippine armed forces Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Manuel F. Cabal had disclosed that not only had the air force just received 20 new F-86 Sabrejets from the United States and that even more modern aircraft were on order, but that Admiral Felt was thoroughly familiar with the Philippine development program which includes the general modernization of all the armed forces, the construction of a network of air bases and an effective early air warning system.<sup>159</sup>

Yet, the supposition goes awry when one considers the subsequent statements of Secretary Santos. On June 28, at a press conference in Cagayan de Oro, Santos said he did not favor the acquisition of modern aircraft because it would "terribly disrupt" the armed forces budget. Any move to further modernize the air force to the detriment of the ground forces would be viewed with disfavor, he said. "We don't need actually the most modern jet fighter as long as a world war is not fought on our soil." His plans for improvement include obtaining the necessary equipment for the infantry and other facilities for intelligence and counter-intelligence work.<sup>160</sup>

It would seem that an important problem, for Filipino and American policy-makers, is raised here. The Philippines, since 1954, has counted four infantry divisions as its "minimum defense requirement." Yet, her combat readiness, in terms of the army, stands at one division. If it is true, as it has both been implied and asserted, that United States aid is, in some part, conditional on action taken by the Filipinos, then it must be concluded that the Philippines has

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157. Manila Times, June 25, 1959.

158. Ibid., May 27, 1959.

159. Ibid., June 24, 1959.

160. Ibid., June 29, 1959.

been dragging its feet. The reasons probably lie in the Philippine expectation that, in any case, the United States will take care of its external defense needs.

It may, further, be suggested that there is more opposition than meets the eye to Philippine troops fighting overseas, either in a SEATO action, or in support of the United States, under the terms of the Mutual Defense Agreement of 1950. If this is a valid assumption, at least as far as SEATO-Philippine relations are concerned, then Filipinos were probably apprehensive about the recent SEATO discussion of the idea of a "fire brigade," i.e., a highly mobile infantry force of brigade strength, to be kept in readiness to meet emergencies, e.g., a call from Laos for aid against the Viet Minh.<sup>161</sup> There was no report on the outcome of the discussion, except that some members felt that the disfavor of the neutral Asian nations would make the unit more of a liability than an asset.

Opposition to over-commitment has been voiced by Senator Recto since 1950. How many Filipinos hold, in addition, the view of Representative Miguel Cuenco on Philippine troops fighting outside the Philippines?

... by what stretch of imagination can an attack by Russia or Red China on Pakistan be considered as an attack on the Philippines? How can we convince our people that an attack on Karachi is an aggression against Manila, both cities being separated by about eight thousand miles?<sup>162</sup>

More recently, on the occasion of the passage of Senate Resolution 40, which makes Philippine consent mandatory before the United States may use local bases for war purposes which would affect Philippine territorial integrity, Senator Lorenzo Sumulong declared:

Under the mutual defense accord with the United States and the SEATO, we are not automatically committed to declare war in case of attack against any of the other signatory nations, say on Thailand, or the United States 7th Fleet, cruising off Formosa.

These treaties provide that in such cases we can only declare war in accordance with our constitutional processes. In other words, a two-thirds vote of each

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161. Bangkok World, April 11, 1959.

162. Manila Times, September 6, 1954. See also Manila Times, August 8, 1956.

house of Congress is necessary to involve us in war<sup>163</sup>

It may thus be assumed that Filipinos realize that the "automatic" clause, the absence of which caused such a storm of controversy in the discussions on SEATO in 1954, is a double-edged sword. Was the absence of support for Recto at that time and again in 1955, evidence of a Philippine answer to a quid pro quo? At the present time, the position of Laos has been placed in jeopardy by Communist-led military action; the SEATO Council, in April, 1959, described that country as the "hot" spot of Southeast Asia. But, in June, as the Laotian government was being pressed more closely by Communist-supported rebel forces, Secretary of Defense Santos declared that it was a "strictly internal affair," and that the Philippines should not meddle in it. Furthermore, it was not a matter for SEATO, he said.<sup>164</sup>

## VI

The prime objectives of the nations of Southeast Asia are to maintain a viable independence, and to raise their living standards. The significant achievement of these objectives will not be realized at all if their policies are threatened by aggression, either overt or subtle. It would seem clear that the object of the signatories to the Manila Treaty was, and is, to help the countries of Southeast Asia achieve the security necessary to develop their own way of life in peace and independence. Insofar as the existence of the Treaty has brought a greater sense of security in the region (recognizing, of course, that security may be an unmeasurable factor) it will have achieved all that its signatories had hoped for it.

For the Philippines, however, SEATO has been of secondary importance in terms of external defense. While she has participated actively in military planning and operations, her interests are still felt to be best served by the bilateral mutual defense alliance with the United States. This would seem to raise the question of the general appropriateness of a regional organization for the fulfillment of Philippine foreign policy objectives.

Apart from the special problems in Southeast Asia with which the Philippines must contend in seeking to shore up one cornerstone of her foreign policy, i.e., the development of closer relations with her neighbors in the area, it is open to argument for the Philippines how far this regional arrangement is a plausible answer to the problems of external security. Much can be said against the treaty, though little has been said publicly in the Philippines except by Senator Claro Recto<sup>163</sup>

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163. Philippines Free Press, April 11, 1959.

164. Manila Times, June 3, 1959.

The West has emphasized the global nature of the present struggle. It is obvious, then, that if the United States and the Communist bloc clash in war, the region in which the warfare might take place is comparatively irrelevant. It may depend on the temporary convenience of the attacker; but if there is war, it is unlikely to be confined to one region. Is there not, then, a dangerous element of artificiality in a nation's dependence upon a regional security concept? In this light, Senator Recto's opposition to Philippine participation in SEATO acquires a new importance.

Furthermore, developments on the Philippine political scene in recent years suggest that the mutual defense treaty with the United States plays a much more important role in Philippine external defense considerations than SEATO does. Yet, a fundamental contradiction is involved here. The mutual security treaty involves commitments for the Philippines, as well as for the United States. But Filipino reaction to the Formosa situation, and to events on the Indochina peninsula, as well as their attitudes expressed in terms of military defense budgets, indicate that they are neither willing nor able to engage in any kind of defense measures in Southeast Asia, except those directly concerning the Philippines.

This still leaves unanswered the question, What is the Philippine felt need with respect to SEATO? The Philippine view, set forth in the Pacific Charter, is that the strength of the alliance, and consequently of her own security, depends on the extent to which the political and economic problems facing the Southeast Asian nations can be solved.

These problems are inextricably tied to the new tactics on which the Communists have been embarked since 1954. Since that time, the incursion by the Communists into Southeast Asia has been held to be most likely in the form of subversion, infiltration, and the exploitation of weakness, taking advantage of internal dissension of the kind from which South Vietnam suffered before Diem was able to consolidate his position. Subversion is easier for the Communists to initiate and nourish than for the free world to resist with appropriate counter-measures, which are political, economic and psychological, rather than military.

Yet the record of the Communists in the Far East is such that it cannot be taken for granted that no military threat exists. The Treaty was designed to establish a system of collective security against any such military threat. The signatories must, therefore, be assured of effective military power in or readily available to the area for without it economic and political action may prove insufficient and the whole of Southeast Asia may slide under Chinese Communist domination.

At the present time, however, it is considered much more likely that the sovereignty or political independence of a member state is threatened by other dangers. This position is less simple than one which calls for military action "to meet the common danger." The members have agreed to consult on the measures that should be taken. But consultation is worthless unless it is followed by action; subversion, however, can only really be effectively combatted from within, as the Philippines has so aptly indicated, and it is doubtful if much could in fact be done directly by the other partners once it had succeeded. Moreover, indirectly, the assurance of support against open external attack, may enable them themselves to deal more boldly and successfully with subversion. One may conclude then, that this is the reason why the Philippines has put such emphasis upon strengthening the American commitment to her defense, and upon the problem of subversion.

But what of the economic side? In all the Southeast Asian countries, the real bulwark against subversion must be internal stability and orderly government. It is useless to direct resources toward economic betterment if the more flagrant forms of venality create precisely those conditions which beget success for Communist subversion. The Philippines has indicated her realization of this fact, and has endeavored to maintain a program which it has found to be successful as a means by which to crush Communist subversion.

The Philippines has, since 1954, argued within the councils of SEATO for the organization to play a greater role in the field of economic assistance. In this connection, she has urged the United States, which could afford to expand its economic and technical assistance, to take the lead. By implication, the Philippines makes the suggestion that there is every reason for the United States to be constructive in its attitude toward Southeast Asia and not merely defensive in its attitude toward Communism. Yet, Philippine action on the one occasion when the United States made an effort at encouraging regional development (even though it was not within the confines of SEATO)--the President's Asian Development Fund--would seem to belie her words.

Since that time, the Philippines has seen fit to embark upon a plan for developing economic, political and cultural ties with other Southeast Asian nations. Her hope is that an independent--of the United States--course will achieve what SEATO feels it cannot in the way of economic development. At the present it is too early to say that the Southeast Asian nations, by themselves, will be able to work out an effective regional plan. At the most, we can say that further political maturation must take place before the regional concept, on an economic level, will be meaningful for Southeast Asia.

The Record of the Philippines  
in the United Nations



# THE RECORDS OF THE PHILIPPINES IN THE UNITED NATIONS

by  
Mary F. Somers

## Introduction

Philippine statesmen have frequently named membership in the United Nation and adherence to the principles of its Charter as a major component of their nation's foreign policy. Therefore, a study of Philippine actions in the United Nations General Assembly should provide a useful key to other goals of this policy: friendship with the United States and with the free nations of Asia, support for regional international collective security arrangements,<sup>1</sup> and support for the aspirations of colonial peoples for national independence.

The current President of the Philippines, Carlos P. Garcia, while he was serving as Vice-President and secretary for foreign affairs, emphasized that his foreign policy, especially in relation to the United Nations, would consist of an attempt to further better relations with the United States, the Asian countries, and with Spain and Latin America.<sup>2</sup> Although Philippine President Ramon Magsaysay, in early 1954, claimed that increased friendship for both the United States and the Asian nations was not a contradiction in terms;<sup>3</sup> in practice, in the United Nations, an anti-colonial stand has caused the Philippines to vote with the Asian nations and against the USA, while the goal of "collective security" has allied them more closely with the United States. Philippine alignments with Latin American states, as will be shown later, vary partly with the changing attitudes of this "bloc" itself.

This paper will concentrate primarily on issues in the General Assembly, since this is the only United Nations body where Philippine membership has been continuous over the ten-year period chosen for study. The Philippines served on the Trusteeship Council (1948-1950) and on the Economic and Social Council (1951-1953), and served a "split term" on the Security Council with Yugoslavia (1956).<sup>4</sup> However, most controversial issues discussed in these organs were later referred to the General Assembly and its committees for debate and resolution, so reference will not be made to Philippine positions in these agencies.<sup>5</sup>

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1. R. n. H. Fifield, The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia, 1945-1958 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), p. 60.
  2. A. Vandenbosch and R. A. Butwell, Southeast Asia Among the World Powers (Lexington, Ky.: University of Kentucky Press, 1957), p. 93.
  3. State of the Nation Address, January 25, 1954, cited in Fifield, op. cit., p. 86.
  4. Fifield, op. cit., pp. 471-472.
  5. 1948 was chosen as the starting point for this study because it was in that session that the issues discussed here became really clear-cut. At the time this paper was written, the 1957 records were the latest ones available.

### Voting Records

Distinct trends are present in the aggregate of Philippine General Assembly votes during Sessions III through XII of the United Nations. The votes have been divided into six categories: those concerning 1) world peace, atomic energy, and disarmament, 2) colonialism and racism, 3) human rights and international law problems, 4) economic questions, 5) membership, and 6) procedural and administrative matters. In each case, all roll-call votes are recorded, including even votes on individual paragraphs of a resolution or amendments to the resolution.<sup>6</sup> Because of their special significance, these tables are reproduced below.<sup>7</sup>

In each table, the first figure given for a country represents the number of times the country voted with the Philippines--Yes, No, or Abstaining. The last figure shows the number of times the country voted in direct opposition to the Philippines, one voting Yes, one No. The middle figure shows the number of times the countries differed by abstention, that is, where one of the two abstained and the other took a definite stand. Differences in totals indicate absenteeism. The heading "Latin America" is used for a combined "score" for the nations of the area, based on that of five "indicator" countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, and Mexico.

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6. Admittedly the recording of each vote does give some issues more weight in the tabulation than others; however, in practice these seem to be those regarded as most important by the voters themselves, hence the multiple votes on one question. The primary disadvantage of this multiple counting appears to be that it gives weight to unimportant differences of opinion on individual phrases of a resolution when there is agreement on the resolution as a whole.
7. Information for Tables 1 to 6 was compiled from United Nations Official Records of the General Assembly, Sessions III through XII.

Table 1

## World Peace, Atomic Energy, Disarmament

	<u>Latin America</u>	<u>Burma</u>	<u>India</u>	<u>Indo- nesia</u>	<u>Paki- stan</u>	<u>Thai- land</u>	<u>Aus- tralia</u>	<u>USA</u>	<u>USSR</u>	
Sess. III	13-10-2	14-10-1	12- 9-1	-----	5-6-3	11- 1-2	18-4-3	12-11-2	3-9-13	
IV	19- 2-1	19- 1-1	14- 8-0	-----	19-2-1	10-12-0	19-2-1	11- 2-9	9-2-11	
V	2- 2-0	9-11-4	7-13-4	10-10-3	18-5-1	19- 3-2	17-5-2	19- 3-2	1-4-18	
VI	6- 0-0	3- 2-1	2- 3-1	2- 3-1	4-2-0	6- 0-0	5-1-0	6- 0-0	1-0- 5	
VII	14- 1-0	22-11-2	5- 8-2	4-11-0	6-7-0	14- 1-0	12-2-1	12- 1-2	0-1-14	
VIII	1- 0-0	0- 1-0	0- 0-0	0- 1-0	0-1-0	1- 0-0	1-0-0	1- 0-0	0-0- 1	
IX	4- 0-0	1- 2-1	1- 2-10	1- 3-0	4-0-0	4- 0-0	4-0-0	4- 0-0	1-0- 3	
X	1- 0-0	0- 1-0	0- 1-0	0- 1-0	1-0-0	1- 0-0	1-0-0	1- 0-0	0-0- 1	
Emerg. Sess. (Suez)	I	6- 0-0	6- 0-0	6- 0-0	6-0-0	6- 0-0	1-4-1	6- 0-0	3-3- 0	
Emerg. Sess. (Hungary)	II	14- 0-10	4-10-1	2-11-2	1-13-1	14-0-1	13- 1-1	14- 0-1	1-2-12	
	XI	23- 1-0	15- 6-3	9-11-4	10-11-3	21-3-0	22- 2-0	21-2-1	23- 1-0	4-4-16
	XII	12- 2-0	4- 5-5	4- 5-5	4- 5-5	9-5-0	12- 1-0	13-1-0	12- 2-0	1-2-11
Total agree	135	77	62	38	107	119	126	121	24	
Abstain	18	60	71	58	31	21	21	20	27	
Disagree	4	19	20	13	6	5	10	16	105	
% agree	86	49	40	35	74	82	80	77	15	
% disagree	2.5	12	13	12	4.2	3.5	6.4	10	67	

Table 2  
Colonial and Racial Issues

	<u>Latin America</u>	<u>Burma</u>	<u>India</u>	<u>Indo- nesia</u>	<u>Paki- stan</u>	<u>Thai- land</u>	<u>Aus- tralia</u>	<u>USA</u>	<u>USSR</u>
Sess. III	18-5-7	25-2-3	24-5-1	-----	26-3-1	12-8-7	11-5-14	11-7-12	16-8-6
IV	14-3-2	15-3-1	16-2-1	-----	16-3-0	13-6-0	6-5- 8	7-4- 8	13-3-3
V	22-1-0	21-1-1	22-0-1	19-3-0	19-1-2	19-3-1	4-6-13	16-2- 5	12-8-3
VI	7-1-1	9-0-0	9-0-0	9-0-0	9-0-0	5-4-0	1-3- 5	3-4- 2	6-0-3
VII	12-5-1	15-3-0	16-2-0	17-1-0	15-3-0	12-4-2	3-7- 8	5-7- 6	12-6-0
VIII	15-2-3	19-0-1	18-1-1	18-1-1	19-1-0	20-0-0	0-7-13	8-6- 6	16-2-2
IX	16-3-1	15-5-0	13-5-2	13-6-1	16-2-2	12-7-1	2-7-11	8-7- 5	16-3-1
X	7-2-1	6-4-0	7-3-0	8-2-0	9-1-0	8-2-0	1-4- 5	3-3- 4	7-1-2
XI	8-2-0	7-1-2	7-1-2	7-1-2	9-0-0	9-1-0	5-1- 4	7-2- 1	7-0-3
XII	8-2-0	6-2-2	7-2-1	6-3-1	8-2-0	10-0-0	3-4- 3	7-3- 0	5-3-2
Total agree	127	138	139	97	146	123	36	75	110
Abstain	26	21	21	17	16	35	49	45	34
Disagree	16	10	9	5	5	11	84	49	25
% agree	75	82	82	75	93	73	21	44	65
% disagree	9.5	5.9	5.3	3.9	3.2	6.5	50	29	15

Table 3

## Human Rights and International Law Problems

	<u>Latin America</u>	<u>Burma</u>	<u>India</u>	<u>Indo- nesia</u>	<u>Paki- stan</u>	<u>Thai- land</u>	<u>Aus- tralia</u>	<u>USA</u>	<u>USSR</u>
Sess0 III	13-2-1	3-12-1	5-8-3	-----	8-6-2	8-4-1	13-2-1	13-1-2	2-4-10
IV	5-0-0	4- 1-0	3-2-0	-----	3-2-0	2-3-0	3-0-2	2-1-2	4-0- 1
V	1-1-0	0- 2-0	1-1-0	0-2-0	0-2-0	1-1-0	1-1-0	1-1-0	1-0- 1
VI	3-1-0	3- 1-0	1-1-2	3-1-0	3-1-0	1-3-0	0-1-3	0-1-3	3-1- 0
VII	2-3-0	1- 4-0	2-3-0	1-4-0	2-3-0	3-2-0	3-2-0	3-2-0	0-4- 1
VIII	3-0-0	2- 1-0	2-1-0	2-1-0	3-0-0	3-0-0	2-1-0	3-0-0	2-0- 1
IX	2-1-0	2- 1-0	2-1-0	3-0-0	2-0-1	3-0-0	1-0-2	1-1-1	2-1- 0
X	3-0-0	0- 2-1	0-0-3	0-3-0	3-0-0	3-0-0	2-1-0	3-0-0	0-1- 2
XI	0-2-0	0- 2-0	0-2-0	1-1-0	0-2-0	2-0-00	0-2-0	2-0-0	0-2- 0
XII	1-0-0	0- 1-0	0-1-0	0-0-1	1-0-0	1-0-00	1-0-0	1-0-0	0-0- 1
Total agree	33	15	16	10	25	27	26	29	14
Abstain	10	27	20	12	16	13	10	7	13
Disagree	1	2	8	1	3	1	8	8	17
% agree	75	34	36	44	57	66	59	66	32
% disagree	2.3	4.6	5.5	4.4	6.8	2.4	18	18	39

Table 4  
Economic Questions

	<u>Latin America</u>	<u>Burma</u>	<u>India</u>	<u>Indonesia</u>	<u>Pakistan</u>	<u>Thailand</u>	<u>Australia</u>	<u>USA</u>	<u>USSR</u>
Sess. III	3-2-0	4-1-0	3-1-1	-----	1-2-0	0-3-0	3-2-0	3-2-0	0- 2-3
IV	12-3-0	1-1-0	11-4-0	-----	13-2-0	12-2-0	12-3-0	9-6-0	2-12-1
V	3-0-0	3-0-0	1-1-1	3-0-0	3-0-0	0-3-0	0-0-3	0-0-3	2- 1-0
VI									
VII	2-2-0	1-3-0	2-2-0	2-2-0	1-2-1	1-3-0	2-1-1	2-1-1	0- 4-0
VIII									
IX	1-0-00	0-1-0	0-0-1	0-1-0	0-1-0	0-1-0	1-0-0	1-0-0	0- 0-1
X									
XI									
XII	1-1-0	1-1-0	1-1-0	1-1-0	1-1-0	1-1-0	1-1-0	1-1-0	1- 1-0
Total agree	22	10	18	6	19	14	19	16	5
Abstain	8	7	9	4	8	13	7	10	20
Disagree	0	0	3	0	1	0	4	4	5
% agree	73	59	60	60	68	52	63	53	17
% disagree	0	0	10	0	3.5	0	13	13	17

Table 5

## Questions Concerning Admission of New Members

	<u>Latin America</u>	<u>Burma</u>	<u>India</u>	<u>Indo- nesia</u>	<u>Paki- stan</u>	<u>Thai- land</u>	<u>Aus- tralia</u>	<u>USA</u>	<u>USSR</u>
Sess. III	4-1-0	1-2-2	2-2-1	-----	2-1-2	2-3-0	3-1-1	4-1-0	2-1-2
IV									
V	1-1-0	0-2-0	0-2-0	2-0-0	1-1-0	0-2-0	0-2-0	0-2-0	0-2-0
VI	1-0-0	0-0-1	0-0-1	0-0-1	0-1-0	1-0-0	0-1-0	1-0-0	0-0-1
VII	1-2-0	0-3-0	0-3-0	0-3-0	0-3-0	1-2-0	1-2-0	1-2-0	1-1-1
VIII									
IX									
X	13-4-0	13-4-0	13-4-0	13-4-0	13-4-0	13-4-0	13-4-0	16-1-0	13-4-0
XI	5-0-0	5-0-0	5-0-0	5-0-0	5-0-0	5-0-0	5-0-0	5-0-0	5-0-0
XII	1-0-0	1-0-0	1-0-0	1-0-0	1-0-0	1-0-0	1-0-0	1-0-0	1-0-0
Total agree	26	20	21	21	22	23	23	28	22
Abstain	88	11	11	7	10	11	10	6	8
Disagree	0	3	2	1	2	0	1	0	4
% agree	76	59	62	72	65	68	68	82	65
% disagree	0	8.8	5.9	3.4	5.9	0	2.9	0	12

Table 6

## Procedural and Administrative Questions

	<u>Latin America</u>	<u>Burma</u>	<u>India</u>	<u>Indo- nesia</u>	<u>Paki- stan</u>	<u>Thai- land</u>	<u>Aus- tralia</u>	<u>USA</u>	<u>USSR</u>
Sessn III	13-3-0	5-6-4	9-7-0	-----	8-6-2	10-5-1	13-1-2	11-3-2	3-4-8
IV	0-0-3	1-0-2	1-1-1	-----	1-0-2	3-0-0	0-0-3	2-0-1	0-0-3
V	1-1-0	1-0-0	1-1-0	1-1-0	1-1-0	0-2-0	1-1-0	2-0-0	0-1-1
VI									
VII	2-0-0	2-0-0	2-0-0	2-0-0	1-1-0	1-0-1	0-0-2	0-0-2	2-0-0
VIII	2-0-0	1-0-1	2-0-0	1-1-0	2-0-0	2-0-0	0-1-1	0-1-1	1-0-1
IX	2-0-0	1-1-0	2-0-0	2-0-0	2-0-0	2-0-0	1-1-0	2-0-0	0-1-1
X	5-0-0	2-1-2	1-1-3	2-3-0	5-0-0	5-0-0	4-1-0	5-0-0	1-0-4
XI	2-0-0	1-0-1	1-0-1	1-0-1	2-0-0	2-0-0	1-0-1	1-0-1	0-0-2
XII	2-2-0	2-2-0	1-3-0	0-4-0	3-1-0	2-2-0	3-1-0	3-1-0	1-2-1
Total agree	29	16	20	9	25	27	23	26	8
Abstain	6	10	13	9	9	9	6	5	8
Disagree	3	10	5	1	4	2	9	7	21
% agree	77	45	56	47	66	71	61	68	22
% disagree	7.9	28	14	5.3	11	5.3	24	18	57

### World Peace Questions

On questions related to world peace (Table 1), the Philippines voted most frequently with the Latin American states, Thailand, and Australia, in that order. The lower rank for the USA, lower even than that of any individual Latin American state listed, would seem to indicate that the bond between the United States and its former colony is not too strong, even on questions of security. However, closer examination of the issues on which the two states differed contradicts such an impression.

The Palestine question has been included in this table as an issue affecting international peace. It was neither strictly a matter of East-West difference nor one of security, and the Philippines apparently did not see it as such. Resolutions on Palestine and on the internationalization of Jerusalem account for four of the votes in 1948 (III), ten in 1949 (IV), one in 1950 (V), and three in 1952 (VII). If these votes were eliminated from the tabulation, instead of 16 votes opposing the USA, only three would remain: one each in Sessions III and V and Emergency Session II. In 1948, the Philippines voted against the USA (and with the USSR) on the question of Greece.<sup>8</sup> The 1950 difference of opinion was on a single section of a resolution on Korea,<sup>9</sup> and that in Emergency Session II on the phrase "under United Nations auspices" in a lengthy resolution on the Hungarian crisis, the rest of which the Philippines and the United States approved.<sup>10</sup> If the latter two had been listed as single votes (instead of recording each separate roll-call), they would have shown the agreement of the Philippines on the basic issues involved. Therefore, if the Palestine issue and these two verbal differences are disregarded, only one opposing vote remains for the entire ten-year period, and none after the first year.

By a similar process, most of the agreeing votes of the Philippines and the USSR can be explained as insignificant. The elimination of the Palestine votes alone would reduce the 15% agreement figure to less than 8%. These data would again point out the lack of any essential agreement between the Philippines and the Soviet Union on peace and security questions, for of the 13 remaining agreements, some were unanimous votes, or at least show the United States and the USSR voting together. The Philippines has voted in direct opposition to the USSR fully two-thirds of the time on these questions.

From the above discussion, and from the closeness of Philippine voting patterns to those of the Latin American states and Thailand and Australia, it seems that, in fact, the Philippines' policy in the United Nations has been one of strong support for Western and pro-Western nations on matters of East-West conflict. This policy differs markedly from that of Indonesia, India, and Burma, because of the frequent abstentions of those nations on votes involving East-West conflict.

An outstanding example of Philippine-United States solidarity on a question involving international "collective security" is that of the Korean

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8. Official Records of the General Assembly, Session III, Plenary Meeting 168.

9. Official Records, Session V, Plenary Meeting 294.

10. Official Records, Emergency Session II, Plenary Meeting 571. p

War and the related questions of the recognition and intervention of the People's Republic of China. This issue illustrates most clearly the pro-Western inclination outlined above, and shows that, even before the outbreak of the Korean War, the foundations had been laid for Philippine policy in this respect.

Speaking in the General Assembly on September 23, 1948, Brigadier General Carlos P. Romulo, Chief of the United Nations Delegation, urged the small nations of the world, through the United Nations, to use their collective strength as a force for peace apart from the great powers (a theme common to many Asian speakers). He stressed the need for military as well as moral implementation of this policy with the establishment of a United Nations police force to enforce that body's decisions.<sup>11</sup> Two years later, this force was a reality, at least in Philippine eyes, for that country was the first, by act of its Congress, to make its Korean contingent of troops available specifically for United Nations use, envisioning that same "police force" it had favored earlier.<sup>12</sup>

Philippine speakers, however, linked this question not only with the problem of collective security, but also with their traditional anti-colonial position. In a speech clearly designed for Asian ears, Romulo again cited the need for both moral and military force to secure the peace, saying, "We are fighting in Korea for a way of life--the way of truth, of freedom and of human dignity--and we want the peoples of Asia, Africa, and elsewhere to know that this is the road which we are preparing for them." The Korean problem was another legacy of "colonial imperialism," and it was the task of the United Nations to free Korea--and all Asia--from political bondages and economic poverty.<sup>13</sup>

On the question of Korea, more than on any other single issue, the "Afro-Asian bloc" (or Arab-Asian bloc, at that time) began to ally for the preservation of peace, especially after the Chinese intervention in the war in late 1950. The Philippines cooperated with the "bloc" (Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen) in the submission of draft resolutions calling on the North Korean and Red Chinese forces to guarantee not to cross south of the Thirty-eighth Parallel and asking for a United Nations conciliation team.<sup>14</sup> But on questions pertaining more directly to the conduct of the war, the Philippines often differed (usually by abstention) with many of these countries.

In December, 1950, Romulo was one of the first to bring the question of Red China's intervention to the attention of the General Assembly, invoking the "Uniting for Peace" resolution passed one month earlier to circumvent the veto-deadlocked Security Council.<sup>15</sup> He urged Assembly action against China for this intervention and ridiculed the USSR's claim that these were only

11. Official Records, Session III, Plenary Meeting 139.

12. Official Records, Session V, Plenary Meeting 283.

13. Ibid.

14. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1950 (New York: Department of Public Information, United Nations, 1951), p. 245.

15. Resolution 377E(V), the "Uniting for Peace" resolution of November 3, 1950, had been favored by all four Southeast Asian members of the United Nations. Fifield, op. cit., p. 478.

"volunteers" fighting against United Nations troops.<sup>16</sup>

The first United Nations resolution on this subject, Resolution 384(V), asked for a three-man cease fire team to help settle the question of intervention. This was essentially the draft sponsored by the thirteen Afro-Asian countries, including the Philippines. After the team's report on the situation, however, the attitude of the latter toward Red China "hardened."<sup>17</sup> The Philippines did not support the resolution of the other twelve nations for a commission to seek peaceful settlement of the Chinese intervention issue, and instead voted with the United States-led majority on Resolution 498(V), February 1, 1951, to brand Red China as an aggressor in the war, and for Resolution 500(V), which imposed an embargo on strategic shipments to Red China from member states.<sup>18</sup>

The Philippine view on recognition and admission of Red China supports that of the USA. In fact, the Republic has no diplomatic relations with any Communist state. The Korean War, however, brought the China issue into sharp focus.<sup>19</sup> In 1951, the Philippines, along with Canada, Ecuador, India, Iraq, Mexico, and Poland, was made a member of a special committee of the General Assembly on the question of the representation of China.<sup>20</sup> The committee submitted no recommendation, but Romulo expressed the Philippine stand when he stated, in November 1951, that while Red China was still an "aggressor" against the United Nations, its representation would be unthinkable.<sup>21</sup> Later, he praised the Korean action as a vindication of collective security and of the United Nations and the policies of the USA.<sup>22</sup> (As for Formosa, delegate Joaquin M. Elizalde in 1953 called it "the last stronghold and hope of democratic China.")<sup>23</sup>

In the following years, Philippine delegates favored close General Assembly supervision of the Panmunjom truce talks,<sup>24</sup> voluntary repatriation of prisoners-of-war (as did India, against the Communist proposal for compulsory return),<sup>25</sup> and, in 1953, delegate Salvador P. Lopez sharply criticized the Communist nations for making propaganda out of its charges of United Nations "atrocities" in Korea without allowing impartial investigation of the situation.<sup>26</sup>

When he called for Charter revision in a 1954 address, Romulo deplored the paralysis of the Security Council caused by the veto, as illustrated by the Korean question. There effective action had been possible only in the absence of the USSR, and the success of the venture he attributed to pure chance.<sup>27</sup> Delegate Felixberto M. Serrano, during the same session, echoed the

16. Official Records, Session V, Plenary Meeting 319.

17. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1951 (New York: Department of Public Information, United Nations, 1952), pp. 207-229.

18. Ibid.

19. Vandenbosch, op. cit., pp. 97-98, Fifield, op. cit., pp. 96-97.

20. Yearbook, 1951, pp. 17-22.

21. Official Records, Session VI, Plenary Meeting 342.

22. Ibid., Plenary Meeting 348.

23. Official Records, Session VIII, Plenary Meeting 448.

24. Official Records, Session VI, Plenary Meeting 375.

25. Official Records, Session VII, Plenary Meeting 399.

26. Official Records, Session VIII, Plenary Meeting 465.

27. Official Records, Session IX, Plenary Meeting 479.

United States viewpoint with a strong protest against the retention by Communist China of United Nations prisoners-of-war (in this case American airmen) after the armistice in Korea and contrary to the agreement for truce.<sup>28</sup>

The representation of China called forth Philippine comment again in 1956, when delegate Arturo M. Tolentino endorsed the United States motion to postpone discussion of the issue. The question, he felt, was "inappropriate and untimely" in view of the conflicts in Hungary and the Middle East then demanding United Nations' attention, and he further recalled that Red China had paid little heed to the United Nations at the time of the Korean War.<sup>29</sup>

Thus the Philippine desire to develop the United Nations into an instrument of "collective security"<sup>30</sup> in the Korean question forced it into close alliance with the USA, so that even the differences-by-abstention decrease sharply after 1950. This was not, in its own eyes at least, at the expense of its anti-colonial stand. In fact, it chose to view the Korean War itself as an anti-imperialist mission.

### Colonial and Racial Issues

The figures shown in Table 2 demonstrate the Philippine foreign policy of support for the self-determination of colonial peoples. Here, the Philippines has cooperated closely with Pakistan, India, and Burma. The Latin American countries as a group agree 75% of the time with the Philippines. (Individual countries, such as Argentina and Chile, often have disagreed with the Asian countries on these issues.) Interestingly enough, the country has voted nearly two-thirds of the time with the Soviet Union, while it has directly opposed Australia on one-half of the roll-calls, and has voted against its "traditional ally," the USA, as much as 29% of the time. A closer look at two of these issues will bear out these trends.

Voting on discrimination by the Union of South Africa against its citizens of Indian origin (an issue which later came to include discussion of the government's entire racial policy "apartheid") is included in this table because both the votes and the debate show its link with colonialism in the minds of the United Nations members. Furthermore, roll-call votes on at least one of the two issues appear in the records of nine of the tenthsessions under discussion. At first, the Philippines favored conciliation between South Africa and India and Pakistan;<sup>31</sup> however, it pointed out, as did several Latin American states, that this could hardly be considered a purely domestic matter (as South Africa insisted), because questions involving human rights were international matters by nature.<sup>32</sup>

28. Ibid., Plenary Meeting 508.

29. Official Records, Session XI, Plenary Meeting 579t

30. Romulo seems to have been the strongest Philippine exponent of United Nations "collective security" for, in 1956, Serrano spoke at length on the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East, but not at all in this context. Ibid., Plenary Meeting 593.

31. Official Records, Session III, Plenary Meeting 213.

32. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1948-1949 (Lake Success, New York: Department of Public Information, United Nations, 1950), pp. 304-310. This differs markedly from the United States view.

By 1952, following the failure of negotiations between the three nations concerned, the Philippines signed a resolution with the other Asian and African countries calling for an end to the discriminatory legislation and also submitted a proposal for a general discussion of apartheid. Although the Afro-Asian "bloc" did lead this debate, many of the Latin American states supported them,<sup>33</sup> and did so again in 1953, despite continued South African obstinacy.<sup>34</sup> The Philippines was equally vigorous in its opposition to the South African tactic of unilateral appropriation of the League of Nations mandated territory of South-West Africa instead of negotiation for a United Nations Trusteeship relationship for the area.<sup>35</sup> On the Indians in South Africa and apartheid questions, Philippine votes compared to Indian were 30-0-0, to the USSR, 23-7-0, to the Latin American countries, 28-2-0, and to the USA, 17-10-3.

On the Indonesian question, Philippine anti-colonial attitudes reveal themselves even more strongly. In 1948, Romulo called the strife in that country a threat to the peace comparable to the Greek guerrilla war or the unnatural division of Korea, and in the same speech very pointedly stated to the colonial powers that even "foreign-inspired" upheavals in their possessions were based on legitimate grievances.<sup>36</sup> During the same session, he objected to the Netherlands' transmission of data from Indonesia on the same basis as from a non-self-governing territory on the grounds that Indonesia was an independent nation and was recognized by the Philippines as such.<sup>37</sup> In 1949, he strongly criticized the Netherlands for violation of its agreements and urged that the General Assembly apply strong pressure on the Dutch to keep their commitments in the future.<sup>38</sup> That year the Philippines also submitted, with thirteen Afro-Asian nations, a request for inclusion of the Indonesian question in the agenda.<sup>39</sup> Finally, in welcoming Indonesia to the United Nations in 1950, Romulo cited Philippine efforts in the Security Council (as a non-member) to secure the independence of that nation. The Philippines, he pointed out, had recognized the Republic of Indonesia since 1947 and considered its admission to the United Nations important for that organization and for Asia as well.<sup>40</sup> The active role of the Philippines on this question helped to establish the precedent for considering the self-determination of colonial peoples an international question and not one of purely domestic jurisdiction, as the colonial powers had insisted.<sup>41</sup>

Philippine-Indonesian relations are considered an index of the adaptation of the former to its situation in Southeast Asia and of its success as an intermediary between West and East. The question of the dispute between the Netherlands and Indonesia over West Irian (West New Guinea) is at present the key to this relationship. In order to take a stand on the issue in the

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33. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1952 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953), pp. 292-306.
34. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1953 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954), pp. 186-198.
35. Official Records, Session IX, Plenary Meeting 494.
36. Official Records, Session III, Plenary Meeting 139.
37. Ibid., Plenary Meeting 155.
38. Ibid., Plenary Meeting 208.
39. Document A/AC.91/L/50, General Assembly, Session IV.
40. Official Records, Session V, Plenary Meeting 239.
41. Division of Cultural Affairs, Embassy of the Philippines, The Philippine Republic in the United Nations (Washington, D. C., 1956), p. 5.

United Nations, the Philippines must solve the dilemma between collective security and anti-colonialism, between the South-East Asia Treaty and Australia on one hand, and nationalism and Indonesia on the other.<sup>42</sup>

In 1955, the Philippines cooperated with 14 other Asian and African nations on a letter asking for the inclusion of the West Irian question on the agenda. Both in committee and in the Assembly, it voted for the unanimous resolution expressing "hope" for fruitful Netherlands-Indonesia negotiations on the subject.<sup>43</sup> At the following (XI) Session, the Philippines did not sign the resolution submitting the question for further discussion. In the First Committee, and in the General Assembly, the Philippines favored a resolution asking for a three-man "good offices committee" which, although it had the support of the Afro-Asian group, the Communist bloc, and some Latin American states, failed to get the required two-thirds majority.<sup>44</sup>

At the 1957 Session, when this issue came to a vote in the General Assembly, the Philippines did not vote at all on the resolution (although it did favor putting it on the agenda). This was not simply a matter of absenteeism, for earlier in the same session, its delegate answered the roll call, and, just after the conclusion of the West Irian debate, the Philippine delegate made a speech on the definition of aggression.<sup>45</sup> In the First Committee, where the West Irian issue was being debated prior to the Assembly discussion, the Philippines voted with the Afro-Asian group, the USSR and its satellites, and some of the Latin Americans in favor of a resolution calling for negotiations (the United States abstained, while Australia and the Netherlands voted against it). The Philippine delegate, Senator Emmanuel Pelaez, claimed friendship for both parties to the dispute and explained that he had voted positively on the resolution because his country wished to uphold the principle of negotiation in such questions. He further stated that the affirmative vote "implied no judgment on the merits of the claims or issues in dispute."<sup>46</sup>

For that session, at least, the Philippines seems to have failed to solve the dilemma, and it may even be that the security issue was beginning to take precedence in its policy. Perhaps the Philippines was becoming more conservative on colonial questions than it had been earlier.

The votes tell a slightly different story. Of seven votes on the West Irian question in Sessions IX through XII, the Philippines voted with India

42. Fifield, op. cit., pp. 91-94.

43. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1956 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957), pp. 61-62, Resolution 915(X).

44. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1957 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), pp. 125-127. The United States abstained on this vote.

45. Official Records, Session XII, Plenary Meeting 724.

46. Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Session, Committee I (Summary Records), 912th Meeting. Senator Pelaez resigned from the United Nations delegation because of its position on West Irian. He claimed that he had been told to vote in favor of the Assembly resolution only if it gained the support of the Netherlands and Australia. Delegation Chairman Felixberto M. Serrano and foreign ministry spokesmen insisted that he had only been told to abstain on the vote or, if he preferred, to absent himself from the chamber during the roll-call. They explained that because of Indonesia's nearness to the Philippines and because of Australia's membership in SEATO, "We did not want to take sides." See: "Pelaez Rebuked," Nati Valentin, Manila Times, December 5, 1957, pp. 1-2.

and the Soviet Union 7-0-0, with the Latin American states 6-1-0 (although there was sharp division on three of these affirmative votes), differed by abstention with the USA 0-7-0, and opposed Australia, 0-0-7.

Although the above issues do not indicate it, Table 2 does show that Philippine votes grew more like those of the United States over the ten-year period, but there is no similarly marked trend toward Australia (a more conservatively "colonial" power), nor is there a marked trend away from India and Burma. If Philippine and United States votes on colonial issues have become more similar, it is the United States and not the Philippines which has changed its outlook.

### Human Rights and International Law

The Latin American countries, followed by Thailand and the United States, are the nations most frequently allied to the Philippines on human rights and international law issues. These include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, freedom of information, the violation of human rights in Bulgaria and Hungary, and other, primarily legalistic, questions. The general trend of voting also favors the Asian "neutrals," Burma, India, and Indonesia. Argentina (probably because of the Peron dictatorship's influence prior to 1955) is an exception among the Latin Americans in its absence of alliance with the Philippines on these matters.

Freedom of information (freedom of the press) is a question of long-standing interest to the Philippines.<sup>47</sup> In 1948, Romulo named freedom of information and a more general observance of all human rights as an essential for world peace.<sup>48</sup> Later in that session, he repeated that this freedom would be the key to world public opinion and therefore the key to peace and security. He cited the responsibility of the press for self-censorship and praised the six-nation resolution (drafted by Columbia, France, Mexico, Peru, the United Kingdom, and the United States) substituting this concept for the previously suggested one of "totalitarian" government censorship, especially of foreign correspondents.<sup>49</sup>

Delegate Salvador P. Lopez, in 1949, agreed for his country to postpone vote on the freedom of information question until the submission of a total draft declaration on human rights.<sup>50</sup> In 1952, delegate Narcisio Reyes expressed his country's impatience to see the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights enforced and criticized the "political" and "moral" impediments to its fulfillment in the modern world. Again he named the observance of human rights as the true basis for world peace.<sup>51</sup>

47. The Philippine Republic in the United Nations, p. 1.

48. Official Records, Session III, Plenary Meeting 139.

49. Ibid., Plenary Meeting 209.

50. Official Records, Session IV, Plenary Meeting 232.

51. Official Records, Session VI, Plenary Meeting 374.

### Economic Questions

These are the resolutions on technical assistance, international trade, development, and the reports of the Economic and Social Council. The general trend of the voting would seem to indicate that the Philippine views on the subject are those of the under-developed countries in general.

Although the number of votes on economic questions (30) is insufficient for a close analysis of the trends, they do show that economic development has been a major concern of the Philippines in the United Nations from the earliest sessions. In 1949, Elizalde called for an intensive United Nations effort to end hunger and poverty and to promote social and economic stability, thereby laying the "foundations for political stability."<sup>52</sup> In 1952, Diosdado Macapagal equated economic development, human rights, and self-determination as three goals of primary importance to the United Nations.<sup>53</sup>

1953 witnessed the first proposal for a special United Nations fund for economic development (SUNFED). Although the United States and the United Kingdom have opposed the plan, the nations of Southeast Asia have been especially eager to see its establishment with provision for grants-in-aid and low interest loans to governments for the "social overhead" projects necessary to economic development.<sup>54</sup> The Philippines has given the proposal strong support, and, at the following session, Romulo voiced criticism of the "virtual pigeonholing" of SUNFED by the "more advanced countries" and urged them to give better support to this project and also to pay more close attention to the observance of human rights in colonial countries.<sup>55</sup> As a necessary prerequisite to world peace, economic development ranks extremely high in Philippine eyes.

### Membership and Procedural Questions

So many of the 34 votes involving admission of new members to the United Nations were unanimous that any trends in Philippine voting are, on these matters, obscure. On a recent question of membership, in 1955, the Philippines supported a 41-nation resolution for the admission of 16 states. On the vote itself, however, it abstained from voting on the admission of the Communist states,<sup>56</sup> presumably because it does not recognize them diplomatically. The United States and some of the Latin Americans also abstained on these votes. Later votes on membership, such as the admission of Malaya, were completely unanimous.

On purely procedural questions (such as adjournment, time and place of meetings, etc.) and on votes relating to the administrative organization of the United Nations, the Philippines allied frequently with the Latin American countries, Thailand, the USA, and Pakistan. The tendency to unite with Western and pro-Western nations, contrasted with the low affinity (22%) for

52. Official Records, Session IV, Plenary Meeting 241.

53. Official Records, Session VI, Plenary Meeting 308.

54. Fifield, op. cit., pp. 492-493.

55. Official Records, Session IX, Plenary Meeting 479.

56. Official Records, Session X, Plenary Meeting 555.

the USSR, does seem to indicate common sentiments on the nature of the United Nations itself shared by the Philippines and the West.

### Total Votes

A compilation of all the roll-call votes, taking the five Latin American "indicator" states as individuals, would show Mexico as the state most frequently aligned with the Philippines, with Brazil, Cuba, Thailand, and Pakistan also closely allied. The reasons for such cooperation with Thailand and Pakistan can be found in common alliance with each other and with the West, in common Asian heritage, in common need for economic aid, in anti-Communism, and in anti-colonialism (which is less typical of Thailand than of Pakistan).

The causes for the closer alignment with the three Latin American countries are probably more complex. However, the question "Asian or Latin American?" applied to Philippine United Nations alliances disregards the underlying agreement of both these areas on many vital questions. They share similar problems of economic development and similar attitudes on colonial questions, although the Latin Americans have not been so emphatic, so consistent, or so unanimous as the Asian countries in their anti-colonialism.

Most obvious answer to the question of why the Philippines should be more closely allied to the Latin American policies than are other Asian states is their mutual alliance and friendship with the USA. Added to this is a strong feeling of opposition to international Communism. Finally, the Spanish colonial heritage (Portuguese in Brazil), with its legal and religious traditions, probably does act, at least in the minds of the policy-makers, to reinforce the mutual interests of the Philippines and the Latin American states and to encourage their cooperation.

One trend is particularly discernible in these tables: that of closer agreement with the USA in later years. If the agreement-disagreement percentages for the first three sessions, 1948, 1949, and 1950, are compared with those for the last three years (including the Emergency Sessions), evidence of an actual change in policy can be discerned. The agreement in the case of the United States, on all votes, has risen from 58% to 84%; while the disagreement has dropped from 21% to 5%.

If the same analysis is applied to the votes of the USSR, the agreement figures are seen to have grown from 33% to 37%, but the disagreement votes have also climbed, from 39% to 46%, indicating a sharper definition of issues in recent years. Contrasted with both of these is the drop in percentage of agreement with India from 63% to 48% and the growth of disagreements from 7% to 17%. The percentage figures for Mexico or Chile, on the other hand, would be relatively constant; while those for Pakistan and Thailand show a definite increase in agreements and a virtual absence of disagreements since 1955.

Speculation as to the cause of this apparent shift in emphasis leads first to the conclusion that the "hardening" of Philippine attitudes on the Cold War after February 1951<sup>57</sup> (near the end of Session V) was reflected in

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57. See above, note 17.

its voting policy by a closer alignment with the USA. The Indo-China threat and the formation of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization also may have been responsible for the change in outlook since 1955. Certainly, as was suggested in the discussion of Table 2,<sup>58</sup> the United States may have changed its policy. It is certain that, since 1950, India has been even more determined than before to stand free of either major power alignment. By contrast, Pakistan and Thailand, just as the Philippines, have tended to grow closer to the West since the Korean conflict, and, therefore, they have grown closer to one another. In turn, it would seem that the more "conservative" trend of Philippine voting since 1950 was largely caused by security considerations.

### Conclusion

Documents and statistics from an international organization cannot always show the influence individuals have had on its operations. Since the San Francisco Conference of 1945 General Romulo has been the central figure of Philippine participation in the United Nations. He served as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Political Committee in 1948 and as President of the General Assembly for the Fourth Session, in 1949.<sup>59</sup> His speeches point out the singleness of purpose of his country in its desire for freedom, peace, and security for all peoples of the world and its willingness to work--or fight--for that aim, in cooperation with other nations of the world which share this desire. Anti-Communism, anti-colonialism, economic development, and support for the United Nations, all may be summed up in this single aim.

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58. See above, p. 72.

59. The Philippine Republic in the United Nations, p. 1.

KEY TO VOTES IN TABLES 1 AND 2

Table 1

- Session III: 25 votes. 3 on control of atomic energy, 8 on disarmament, 8 on FrancoSpain, 4 on Palestine, 11 on Greece, 1 on United Nations Commission for Korea.
- Session IV: 22 votes. 7 on Greece, 3 on control of atomic energy, 10 on Palestine, 2 on threats to the independence of China.
- Session V: 24 votes. 16 on Korea, 2 on the China question, 3 on Spain, 1 on Palestine, 1 on control of atomic energy, 1 on "uniting for peace."
- Session VI: 6 votes. 2 on collective measures for peace, 1 on Germany, 1 on China, 1 on Korea, 1 on United States "aggression" in Eastern Europe.
- Session VII: 15 votes. 9 on Korea, 13 on Palestine, 13 on China.
- Session VIII: 1 vote. 1 on Korea.
- Session IX: 4 votes. 2 on Korea, 1 on China, 1 on Kuomintang forces in Burma.
- Session X: 1 vote. 1 on China.
- Emergency Session I: 6 votes. 6 on Anglo-French-Israeli action in Suez area.
- Emergency Session II: 15 votes. 15 on situation in Hungary.
- Session XI: 24 votes. 15 on Hungary, 3 on China, 6 on Suez.
- Session XII: 14 votes. 4 on China, 2 on Syria, 5 on disarmament, 1 on UNEF, 1 on Korea, 1 on peaceful coexistence.

Table 2

- Session III: 30 votes. 16 on Italian colonies, 4 on information from non-self-governing territories, 5 on Trusteeships, 1 on South West Africa, 1 on Indians in South Africa, 2 on Indonesia, 1 on human rights in non-self-governing territories.
- Session IV: 19 votes. 4 on Trusteeships, 7 on Italian colonies, 7 on South West Africa, 1 on information from non-self-governing territories.
- Session V: 23 votes. 7 on Trusteeships, 3 on Italian colonies, 8 on Indians in South Africa, 13 on South West Africa, 2 on information from non-self-governing territories.
- Session VI: 9 votes. 3 on South West Africa, 1 on Indians in South Africa, 2 on Morocco, 13 on Trusteeships (including Italian membership in Council).
- Session VII: 18 votes. 4 on apartheid in South Africa, 2 on non-self-governing territories, 3 on human rights and self-determination, 2 on Morocco, 3 on Togoland, 4 on Trusteeships.
- Session VIII: 20 votes. 4 on apartheid, 6 on Morocco, 11 on Indians in South Africa, 2 on Tunisia, 2 on information from non-self-governing territories, 4 on South West Africa, 1 on Trusteeships.
- Session IX: 20 votes. 4 on apartheid, 4 on Trusteeships, 2 on information from non-self-governing territories, 13 on South West Africa, 4 on West Irian, 1 on Tunisia, 2 on Cyprus.

Session X: 10 votes. 3 on information from non-self-governing territories, 3 on Trusteeships, 1 on apartheid, 1 on West Irian, 1 on Algeria, 1 on Cyprus.

Session XI: 10 votes. 2 on apartheid, 2 on Algeria, 2 on Togoland, 2 on information from non-self-governing territories, 1 on Somali frontier, 1 on West Irian.

Session XII: 10 votes. 2 on apartheid, 2 on Indians in South Africa, 1 on West Irian, 1 on South West Africa, 2 on information from non-self-governing territories, 1 on Trusteeships, 1 on Cyprus.

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