

REPORT ON
THE CHINESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

December 1950

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PREFACE

The role of the Chinese in Southeast Asia is one of three major subjects of investigation with which the Southeast Asia Program of the Department of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University, is primarily concerned in its social science research. The other two general fields of research concentration are technological and economic development and political structures and ideologies in the region. It is clear that all three areas of study are functionally related, that an increasing understanding of one topic should provide greater understanding of the others.

Research and training seminars conducted by the Department in Ithaca during 1949 and 1950 indicated positively the importance of the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia for any realistic assessment on a regional basis of the economic and political situation in a major portion of the Far East. It was also made apparent through a survey of the literature in the Wason Collection at Cornell that much additional field research following a variety of provocative leads should be carried out among the Nan-yang Chinese themselves wherever practicable. Field work in central Thailand sponsored by Cornell in 1948-49 demonstrated that a beginning could be made among the rural Chinese rice millers and traders. Research on the urban Chinese in the Federation of Malaya sponsored by the London School of Economics was also producing extremely useful results. However, only limited or sporadic work was being carried on by other agencies. There still remained the question, accordingly, of how much more could be accomplished effectively in the various political units of Southeast Asia through coordinated and systematic research efforts carried out openly by interested outsiders most of whom would normally have been trained to work in China proper.

It was to seek an answer to this question that the Department commissioned Mr. William Skinner to conduct a survey of the Chinese in Southeast Asia when he emerged in Hong Kong in late August 1950, after spending almost all of the previous twelve months in western China, a locality to which he was unlikely to return for scholarly purposes for some time. Mr. Skinner, of the Cornell Department of Sociology and Anthropology, had received Chinese area and language training from Professors Biggerstaff, Briggs, Hockett, Reubens, and Shadick and Miss Gaskill in the Department of Far Eastern Studies, and had a considerable acquaintance among persons conveniently scattered about the Far East. He spent the autumn months of 1950 in visiting the important centers of Chinese population in each of the political units of Southeast Asia. As Field Director of the Cornell Southeast Asia Program, he expects to return to Bangkok in the summer of 1951 to carry on a specific research project among the Chinese of that area, as well as to provide facilitation for the planning and execution of field study by the staff and students of Cornell and other institutions.

Mr. Skinner's report on the Chinese in Southeast Asia is reproduced herewith for the use of persons outside Cornell who may be interested in the summary results of his survey. Written during his return to America in December, 1950, it is based entirely on data which were gathered during his admittedly rapid transit of the Southeast Asian countries. It pretends to be neither complete nor in any way definitive. However, it has the virtue of being both recent and systematic, and is remarkably thorough in view of the brief time spent gathering the material. Members of the Department of Far Eastern Studies at Cornell responsible for planning a comprehensive and practicable research program on the Chinese in Southeast Asia have found this Skinner report extremely useful. On the assumption that for some time to come others with like interests will also find it useful, the report is issued in this form.

As in the case of this and previously issued reports, the Department of Far Eastern Studies at Cornell will continue from time to time to reproduce for limited distribution the results of work done by staff and students which, while not necessarily definitive in character, are nonetheless judged to be of value to those working on related problems in the fields of Chinese, Southeast Asian, or Indian studies.

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Ithaca, New York
February, 1951

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INTRODUCTION

1. Scope and Aims.

This report is an attempt to summarize some of the more concrete data about overseas Chinese gathered during a quick survey of the various countries of Southeast Asia, during September, October and November, 1950. Less than 2½ months was spent on the entire survey, though the time available for actual investigation was at a maximum since all travel was by air. Happily, it was possible in almost all cases to visit the chief center or centers of Chinese population in each of the political units. The limitations of time and the wide geographical scope, however, meant that depth and detail had to be sacrificed in favor of an over-all picture. Historical perspective is almost entirely lacking; concentration has been on the up-to-the minute situation.

The aim of the survey was to provide information useful in planning social scientific research among the overseas Chinese. No suggestions for specific research projects are included in this report, but the material itself suggests certain problem areas in the life of the overseas Chinese communities and in part gives a basis for deciding which aspects of Chinese life can best be studied in which localities. In keeping with the aim of the survey, the data presented here are arranged in such a way as to facilitate reference. The Chinese in each political unit are treated separately, but the same specific headings are used in each case. Thus it is possible to find the information about, say, Chinese education in each country with no undue trouble. This method of arrangement also makes very apparent gaps in the information obtained. The data, then, are grouped under the following headings in the case of each political unit: 1) Size and distribution of the Chinese population and of the dialect groups within it; 2) Chinese occupations and business organizations, 3) Other organizations, especially those by region or dialect group, 4) Chinese education; 5) the Chinese press, 6) Chinese politics, with regard to both China and the local situation, 7) the relations of the Chinese with local peoples and governments, including material on immigration and assimilation; and 8) Research materials and facilities with respect to the Chinese communities.

2. Sources of Information

In most of the cities visited, the main sources of information were the Chinese themselves. In almost every case, I visited Chinese newspaper offices, Chinese schools, Chinese business firms, and the offices of various Chinese organizations. Generally most of the Chinese I interviewed were businessmen, newspapermen, educators and political leaders. Language was no great selective factor, because it was possible to find individuals representative of almost any Chinese group who could speak either English or Mandarin. The fact that I am an American, however, meant that it was difficult if not impossible to talk with out-and-out Communists among the Chinese communities. This does not by any means imply that my contacts were restricted to pro-Kuomintang Chinese. Most of the people I talked with were neither KMT nor CP members, and many were strongly pro-Peking and/or pro-Communist.

Three other groups of people were used as sources of information. 1) In most countries, government officials directly concerned with the Chinese communities were very ready to cooperate; e. g., British Colonial servants in Malaya, Thai government officials in Siam, Dutch and Indonesian officials in Indonesia. 2) Then in several countries there

were academic people concerned with the Chinese in one way or another. Thus I am greatly indebted to various staff members of Rangoon and Chulalongkorn Universities and of the Universities of Indonesia and Malaya. In addition, several anthropologists now doing research among the Chinese in Southeast Asia shared their findings and impressions with me. 3) In several countries, furthermore, there were individuals attached to United States consulates, embassies and Information Service offices who had special knowledge of the local Chinese communities. They were extremely generous of their time and information. In all countries, U. S. diplomatic personnel were helpful and cooperative.

Finally to a much lesser extent, I have relied on certain publications. These have been primarily of two kinds: 1) government publications, such as census reports, releases of Public Relations departments and various ministries, and 2) articles concerning the local Chinese that are either unpublished or published locally, and written either by government officials or scholars. It would be too cumbersome, and probably pedantic in a report of this kind, to give the source of each datum. It has been necessary, of course, to judge and select from conflicting reports and data; having done this, I alone take responsibility for what follows.

3. Southeast Chinese Dialect Groups

Over 90% of the Chinese in Southeast Asia have their origins in Southeast China, especially the provinces of Kwangtung and Fukien! In the overseas Chinese communities many important social, economic and even political distinctions follow dialect-group lines. To give clarity to some of the material presented later, a general picture of Chinese dialect groups, as conceived by the overseas Chinese themselves, will be given here. Several of the "dialects" here mentioned are really languages, in the sense that they are mutually unintelligible; surely Cantonese, Swatow-Amoy, Foochow, and Hakka are as distinct from one another as, for instance, are the various Romance languages of Europe. But "dialect" here will be used to refer to what linguists would call both dialects and languages. Dialect areas can, of course, be subdivided right down to the village level, and this is done organizationally by many Southeast Asian Chinese communities! Certain comparatively large dialect areas, however, are generally recognized as important throughout SE Asia, and it is these I want to mention now.

Going from north to south along the Fukien coast, the first important dialect area is 1) Hokchiu, which consists of Foochow and hinterland. Next comes 2) Hokchiaⁿ, consisting of an area centering on Fu-tsing hsien, south of Foochow, and next 3) Henghua, parts of Henghua and Siensa hsien, north of Amoy. The next major dialect area is 4) Hokkien, a large area of some 15 hsien consisting of Amoy and hinterland. (Hokkien is actually the local pronunciation of Fukien, but the term, both written and spoken, is generally used in Southeast Asia only for southern Fukien.) Going on south into Kwangtung, the next major dialect area is 5) Teochiu (Ch'ao Chou)ⁿ, which consists of some ten hsien with its cultural center and outlet at Swatow. Next comes 6) the Cantonese area, which consists of the whole of the central districts of Kwangtung and bits of southeastern Kwangsi. 7) Hainan (Hailam) island is the only other major dialect area with direct access to the sea.

The most important inland dialect area is 8) that of the Hakkas, which includes primarily northern Kwangtung and southwestern Fukien. Hakkas are also found in south Kiangsi, south Hunan, and Hainan, and some from these areas have also migrated to southeast Asia. The

major port of embarkation for the Hakkas is Swatow. 9) The Kwongsai dialect area in central and eastern Kwangsi is also an emigrant region. The only other important inland emigrant dialect area is 10) Yunnan; from which migrants have gone overland to Burma and in smaller numbers to Siam and Indo-China.

In addition there are several smaller, less important; and less universally recognized dialect areas, including 11) Chaoan, a hsien in southern Fukien whose dialect is midway between Hokkien and Teochiu, and 12) Liuchow, consisting of the Liuchou peninsula in southern Kwangtung. Throughout Southeast Asia, all the Mandarin-speaking areas (except Yunnan in some countries) and the Wu-dialect areas are grouped together and called 13) San Chiang (for Kiangsu, Kiangsi and Chekiang) or Shanghai dialect area.

Of all these recognized dialect areas, migrants from five are of overwhelming numerical superiority in Southeast Asia constituting together about 90% of the overseas Chinese of the area. These five dialect groups, in order of numerical strength are 1) Teochiu, 2) Hokkien, 3) Cantonese, 4) Hakka, and 5) Hainanese. They will be the only groups dealt with in any detail in the following report.

THAILAND

1. Population

Recent estimates of the size of the Chinese population in Thailand vary from one to four million. The demographic picture of the Chinese is less clear in Siam than in any other Southeast Asian country. Speaking most generally and to the best of my knowledge, there are over 750,000 Chinese nationals (China-born immigrants who consider themselves Chinese citizens, most of whom have registered as such with the Chinese consul), over 1,500,000 ethnically pure Chinese, over 2,000,000 who are unquestionably Chinese culturally (habitually speak a Chinese dialect, adhere to clearly Chinese customs), around 3,000,000 who consider themselves Chinese, are culturally at least as Chinese as Siamese, and for the most part are ethnically at least half Chinese; and over four million who have Chinese blood. The major criterion for "Chinese-ness" used in this report will be whether or not the individual considers himself Chinese (at least culturally, if not politically); consequently for Thailand I have adopted three million as a very rough estimate of the number of "Chinese". Several writers in the literature and both Siamese and Chinese to whom I talked concurred in this figure.

Probably slightly less than half of the Chinese in Thailand reside in the lower Menam delta, including Bangkok, while the other major concentration of Chinese is in the Kra Isthmus region. The large up-country cities and towns all have considerable Chinese populations, while almost all villages have at least a few resident Chinese families.

In Thailand, Teochiu is clearly the dominant dialect group. Teochiu dialect along with Siamese are the trade languages of the country. The following estimates on the relative proportions of the major dialect groups in Thailand are based on size of membership in regional associations, and on immigration figures for the years when they were compiled: Teochiu 60% (1,800,000 persons), Hakka 12% (360,000), Hainanese 12% (360,000), Cantonese 10% (300,000). Smaller groups of some importance

include Hokkien and Taiwanese.

2. Occupations and Business

The Chinese control commerce and retail trade in almost every city and town of the country. Furthermore, they have a large share of the import-export and wholesale business centering in Bangkok. Crucial to an understanding of their economic position in Thailand is the fact they own and operate about 80% of the rice mills. After harvest, almost all paddy is sold to Chinese (often in payment of credit extended by the Chinese to the Siamese farmers at sowing time), who then transport it to the mills, most of which are located in Bangkok. Technically the government buys all the rice in the country, but in many cases this is merely a device whereby the government acquires the difference between the official rate of exchange and the free market rate. Most of the rice export is still carried on by Chinese firms who either actually buy rice from the government or technically do so by paying the difference in rates to the government. Over 70% of the rice export goes to Chinese import and export firms in such commercial centers as Singapore and Hongkong. Chinese traders in the small towns operate as money-lenders and extend credit with which Siamese farmers partially finance their operations.

In addition to rice and the innumerable retail and craft trades, Chinese are prominent in pig breeding, fishing, and timber. Chinese sell young pigs to Siamese farmers, who keep them a year or so as scavengers and then sell to Chinese butchers; the Siamese eat pork, but on religious grounds refrain from slaughtering pigs. In coastal fishing, the Chinese, as a general rule, buy fish (caught by Siamese or the smaller number of Chinese fishermen) which they process and sell locally and export. Chinese also own and operate most of the sawmills.

Chinese are not prominent as land-owners, except in certain regions of central Thailand, and their agricultural pursuits are mainly limited to pepper farming and truck gardening. Chinese, however, provide most of the labor for the rubber plantations located mainly in the Kra Isthmus. Aside from rubber, the heavy Chinese population of the latter region, mainly composed of more recent immigrants, is occupied as tin mine workers and merchants in the towns and villages. The Chinese dominate labor, as well as business, commerce and artisan industry. It is estimated that approximately 70% of the non-agricultural labor supply in Thailand is Chinese, a much higher proportion than in any other Southeast Asian country, except the colony of Singapore. The most important trade union organization is the Communist-dominated Central Labor Union. Some forty unions, including almost all crafts and trades, are affiliated with the CLU; a few predominantly Thai unions belong but most are purely Chinese organizations. The most militant of these member unions are the dockworkers and the rice-mill workers. The total membership is in the neighborhood of 50-60,000. The CLU sent delegates to the WFTU Conference in Peking in November, 1949. A few years ago, the Thai Labor Union was founded by the government, primarily to keep workers from falling into the hands of the Communists. The Secretary-general, Sang Phanotai, is in fact a government official. Most member unions of the TLU are exclusively Siamese in membership; they are not free unions, since strikes and other militant tactics are not really permitted. The TLU claims a membership of 40,000, but this figure is doubtless inflated. In addition, there is, in Bangkok, a small KMT-backed labor union of no importance.

Most of the trade guilds and other non-union occupational organizations in Thailand are now almost entirely employer and manager organizations. There are over fifty of these T'ung-yeh Kung-hui (Same-occupation Associations) in Bangkok; they cover almost all businesses in which Chinese are important. Few are at all politically active, but economically the most important are the Bangkok Rice Guild, the N. E. Thailand Rice Guild (and so on for the various regions of the country), the Rice Brokers Guild, the Sawmill Owners Guild and the Insurance Guild. These organizations function in all possible ways (e. g. price-setting, fighting adverse legislation) to protect and enhance the special interests of members.

All the major cities and towns have their Chinese Chambers of Commerce. The Bangkok Chamber is of course the most important and is the leading Chinese organization in the country. The Bangkok Chamber has over 5000 members, including both firms and individuals, the latter usually proprietors of small businesses. Elections of officers are held every other year in December. There are no nominations; members vote for any one member. The fifteen with the highest number of votes form the executive committee, the next seven are the supervisory committee, and the next ten are alternates. The fifteen members of the executive committee then select from their number a chairman, secretary and treasurer and two other members of the five-man standing committee. One result of this weird electoral system is that the numerical strength of the various dialect groups in the Chamber is usually reflected rather closely among the officers. Teochius always form a majority of the executive committee. The organization has very nice premises, on which are the buildings of what was once a chamber-run middle school, closed after the government ban on Chinese secondary education.

The Chamber has two main functions: 1) protecting and enhancing Chinese business interests and 2) acting as intermediary between the Chinese community and the Thai government. In connection with the first, the Chamber used to publish a paper with financial and commercial news, now discontinued. It still issues certificates of origin for goods exported by Chinese firms from Bangkok, and these are recognized in the main ports of Southeast Asia. When questions affecting the entire Chinese community come up -- even non-business questions such as education or charity -- the Chamber calls together representatives from the seven main regional associations (see below), the major benevolent society, and the leading western hospital (T'ien Hua) to discuss the matter and arrive at recommendations or other conclusions. In most cases, these crises are perpetrated by government action, and in many cases the government approaches the Chamber leaders directly on immigration, educational or business problems!

The question of KMT control of the Bangkok Chamber came to a head in the fall of 1947. The Chinese consul gave what was virtually an order to the Chamber to reorganize according to the laws of China before the December 1947 elections; the desired reorganization involved mainly allowing only firms to be members. The Chamber refused to change its by-laws and went ahead with the elections, at which point the consul declared the whole organization, as well as the elections, illegal. The Chinese consul probably pressed the point out of fear that Communist infiltration would be easier in the case of 2000 or more individual members than of only the city's leading business firms. In 1948 a compromise was reached whereby the Chamber again registered with the Nationalists' Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee; but the Chamber never did change its by-laws. Since 1948, the organization has

slowly swung to the left. The present chairman, Chang Lan-ch'uan (Sabat Malakun) began to work with pro-Communists in 1949, though after the United Nations intervention in Korea he has re-affirmed his pro-Chiang inclinations. In any case, on the present executive committee there are at least half a dozen Communist Party members or close party followers. There are also a couple of pro-KMT men among the Chamber leaders, but the majority of the leaders and the vast majority of the Chamber members are political fence-sitters.

Since the revolution of 1932, one of the main planks in almost all government platforms has been the loosening of the Chinese hold on trade. The legislation of the 1930's required the registration of all businesses, keeping accounts in Siamese, employment in all industries of a certain proportion of Thai citizens, etc. In the early 1940's, some 27 occupations were specifically reserved to Thai nationals. In February of 1949 another Royal decree excluded Chinese from several more occupations, including such varied lines as rice cultivation, barbering, trishaw and taxi driving, forestry, Thai-language printing and salt making. The definite bias against Chinese business of most Siamese administrations for the past twenty years has resulted in as little consternation and disruption of the Chinese community as it has for two reasons. First, the restrictions on occupations has not been on those which are the main economic basis of the Chinese community. Such restrictions as have been imposed resulted mainly from pressure of small well-organized groups and from the realization of the government that such restrictions were relatively unimportant enough not to disrupt the economy. Secondly, the Chinese have shown sufficient acumen and shrewdness to get around many of the restrictions (by accepting Thai nationality, using Siamese names, taking Siamese partners, buying licenses, etc.) in which they have been passively aided by Thai reluctance to take to business.

3. Regional and Other Organizations

There are seven Chinese regional organizations given a kind of unofficial recognition by the government and generally considered to represent the vast majority of at least the Bangkok Chinese. The largest and by far the most important is 1) the Ch'ao Chou Hui Kuan (Teochiu Association), with about 7000 members, mostly individuals but including some business firms. Of these, some 4,700 are in Bangkok, 67 in the Kra Isthmus and the rest up-country. The association runs a large primary school in Bangkok, and has its own graveyard, though some Teochiu families still send the remains of their deceased back to China. This organization has a branch in Swatow, not particularly active, but which cares for Teochius returning to China from Thailand and which now co-operates with the Communist-sponsored Swatow Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau, established in November, 1949. The Teochiu Association is the only regional organization in Bangkok that is unequivocally Communist oriented. The Association puts out a monthly magazine called Ch'ao Chou Yueh Pao, which began publication in May, 1950. The first issue gave numerous data about the organization of membership of the association, while later issues have featured news about Ch'ao Chou and various aspects of commercial life in Thailand; this publication, however, is not openly propagandistic for the Peking regime.

Three regional associations are of about equal importance, though all are secondary to the Teochiu Association. These are 2) K'ie Chu Tsung Hui (Hakka Association), whose chairman is a non-political businessman and which has in reality no political coloring. The Hakka Association also operates a primary school. 3) Hainan Hui Kuan, which

is definitely pro-KMT in policy. Its chairman is an influential businessman, Yun Chu-t'ing, a dual national known in Siamese as Kosol Hoontrakul. A former chairman of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, he was a member of the KMT Overseas Chinese Committee, and delegate to the KMT PPC in 1947. He took part in the 1950 Double Tenth Celebration in Bangkok and headed the recent loyalty mission to Taiwan. The Hainan Association operates a primary school with some 1500 students. 4) Kwang Chao Hui Kuan (Cantonese Association), which runs an outstandingly large and good primary school. The Association is neutral politically, with a tendency, if any, favoring the KMT.

The remaining three of the recognized regional associations are much smaller: 5) Taiwan Hui Kuan, which is pro-KMT, 6) Fu Chien Hui Kuan (Hokkien Association), politically neutral and 7) Chiang Che Hui Kuan (Chiang for Kiangsu, Che for Chekiang), which includes Chinese other than those from Kuangtung and Fukien, but whose members come mainly from Shanghai and Ningpo. In addition to these seven, there are other smaller regional associations. One of special interest is a rival Hainan association which has only one fifth the membership of 3) above. It is strongly pro-communist, being headed by Chou Cheng, member of the Peking Regime's Commission of Overseas Chinese Affairs. This association runs a school which was raided by the Thai police because of pro-Communist activities and teachings. Most of the smaller regional associations in Thailand are those of specific hsien and hsiang in Ch'ho Chou District.

The social functions of these regional associations are the predominant ones. Made up mainly of China-born, the associations in their activities offer occasions for sharing news and reminiscences about the home district and indulging in recreation with friends and relatives who speak the same dialect. But the regional associations also act to protect the special business interests of members insofar as they are identified with particular occupations, to bury members in district cemeteries, and to aid indigent members. Most of the regional associations hold at least monthly dinners in the central headquarters, and members can go there at any time for mah jong and other recreation.

The Pao Teh Shan T'ang (Report Virtue Benevolent Society) is an important force in the Bangkok Chinese community. It operates annually on a budget approaching 1½ million baht (U. S. \$75,000), almost entirely contributions from members. It carries on many of the usual Chinese benevolent society functions, but stresses medical service: About two-thirds of its funds go to the second largest Chinese hospital in Bangkok (Hua Ch'iao), with which the society is associated. Its chairman, Ch'en Chen-Ching, is a rather pro-Communist Teochiu, while the vice-chairman is the prominent Communist, Yi Mei-hou, now in Peking. Another important organization about which I have learned next to nothing, is the T'ien Hua Hospital, which offers good western medical facilities, is supported solely by the Chinese community, and has a kind of official standing in that community. There are also four prominent kinship organizations in Bangkok called chia-she (family societies), a kind of modified lineage organization.

Before and especially during the last war, several secret societies, all connected with the Hung Men, were active in Thailand. Since the war they have become defunct in Bangkok, though there are likely lodges still functioning in rural areas.

4. Education

Chinese schools have been perhaps the gravest issue in the undeclared war of the Thai government on the Chinese cultural minority. The government has since the early 30's been more or less determined that all children born in the country shall be educated as good Thai citizens, and negatively it has implemented this feeling by more and more restrictive measures against schools. Positively it has done little in the way of offering alternative and attractive Siamese education. During the 30's, several score of Chinese schools were closed for failure to comply with various requirements as to curriculum, and eventually all Chinese secondary education was outlawed. For a brief period after VJ day, restrictions on the Chinese were relaxed, and the number of Chinese schools in the country swelled to over 450. Many of the new ones were small and did not conform to the regulation requiring the use of Siamese as the medium of instruction. Since 1945, many schools have folded of their own accord, while about 85 have been closed by the government. Closures are made for the following reasons: 1) employing teachers without teaching permits, 2) teaching Chinese language only, 3) teaching Communism, 4) teaching excessive loyalty to China, 5) using unauthorized texts, 6) making changes in curriculum without authorization, 7) failing to keep certain school records in Siamese, etc.

The curriculum for all schools is set by the Ministry of Education. Chinese schools are allowed to give a total of ten hours per week in Chinese language, and in addition two hours per week of history and geography may be taught in Chinese. Thus of the thirty class hours per week, eighteen must be in Siamese. Actually most Chinese schools cover more ground per term in the Chinese than in the Siamese subjects by crowding more into the Chinese class hours and requiring homework in Chinese. According to law, all teachers in Chinese schools must pass an examination in Thai, though they are given a two-year period of grace. Furthermore, owners and principals of all schools in Thailand must be Siamese, so Chinese schools have Siamese figureheads as "owner and principal" for registration purposes.

In May, 1948, the Ministry of Education announced a quota system limiting the number of Chinese schools. Under the quota, eight schools would be allowed in Bangkok, three each in Thenburi, Chiangmai, Ubon and Korat and two each in all other changwad for a grand total of one hundred and fifty-four. To date the system has not been enforced; the Ministry has stated that schools now open in excess of the quota will be allowed to remain open unless they violate present regulations. Enforcement of regulations has been more stringent during the past year. A force of eleven inspectors, three of whom speak Chinese, is maintained by the Ministry of Education to check on the Chinese schools. In May, 1950, three Bangkok Chinese schools were raided, the headmasters of each deported (for Communist activities) and fifteen teachers arrested. One of the three was closed entirely. At the end of October, the Chinese community was up in arms over a series of fourteen closures in one up-country city which left only five Chinese schools operating there. The Ministry of Education claimed that the schools were teaching Communism, and said that it would not reduce Chinese schools to the quota limits at this time. The official in the Ministry who has charge of supervising Chinese schools is very anti-Chinese, and personally holds that the Chinese should not be allowed to have any Chinese schools.

Actually, probably the majority of Chinese schools in Thailand

are pro-Communist in the sense that the teachers are leftist and have introduced Communist text-books and teaching materials. The teachers, being mainly China-born, young, and underpaid, are especially susceptible to Communist teachings, which they pass on, usually imperfectly digested, to their pupils. But Communism is a comparatively recent complication in the whole question, and the vast majority of the Chinese population feels that the government is using the red scare merely as an excuse to carry out its unfair anti-Chinese policies.

At present there are slightly fewer than three hundred Chinese schools in Thailand, all primary, with an estimated total enrollment of about 80,000. These schools are usually attended by children between the ages of ten and fourteen. Few children go on for any secondary education; Chinese language is not even an elective in the Thai secondary schools. There has been talk of alleviating the problem by setting up schools under joint Sino-Thai supervision, but the first attempt (by the Teochiu Association and the Ministry of Education) came to nothing.

5. The Press

All the daily Chinese papers of Thailand are published in Bangkok. All are morning papers, while three have afternoon editions as well. All five have full-sized pages and also put out a single, special Sunday edition, including, with the exception of the Hua Ch'iao Jih Pao, a rotogravure picture supplement. Each paper, regardless of political affiliation, gives financial and commercial news for the business community. The Bangkok press is one of the most leftist in Southeast Asia; in the few months before November, 1950, however, there was a discernable swing toward the center. In order from left to center in political policy, the five Bangkok Chinese dailies are as follows:

1) Ch'uan Min Pao, with a circulation slightly under eight thousand (eight pages), is the Communist organ. It relies mainly on canned New China News Agency (Communist information service, hereafter referred to as NCNA) material, and picks up from Radio Peking important speeches and pronouncements which it publishes the same day. Frequently it reprints editorials from important Communist organs in China, and sometimes from the Hongkong Ta Kung Pao. It uses some AP and UP material, but with headings giving a pro-Communist slant. About twice weekly, the paper publishes its own editorials. Its policy is the straight CP line, except for a definite reticence about Thai internal and external policy. For example, it published no editorial remarks on the sending of Thai troops to Korea. In June, 1950, the Thai government announced that it would tolerate no further criticism of its allies, though no action has as yet been taken against the Chinese press. Nonetheless, the Ch'uan Min Pao uses "X" instead of "Mei" (American) when referring to American imperialism. Among its pet hates are the "Pai-Hua" or white Chinese, that is, the capitalists who fled China when the Communists took over, settling in Hongkong and Nan Yang; and the Nationalist consul and staff in Bangkok. The staff of the Ch'uan Min Pao are on the whole good newspapermen with better than average esprit de corps; they tend to keep apart from other newsmen. The paper is affiliated with the bookstore in Bangkok which serves as an outlet for Chinese Communist literature.

2) Hua Ch'iao Jih Pao, with a circulation of about six thousand, has grown from four to eight pages within the past six months.

because (the paper claims) of increased reader interest and the inclusion of more information for businessmen. Pro-KMT when it started again after the war, it was actually subsidized by the Nationalists a few years ago. Now, however, it is rabidly anti-KMT and follows the CP line on China though not on all world issues. In 1949, as the pro-Communist policy began to jell, there was a split in the staff, and many eventually quit; went to work for other papers. It uses NCNA, UP, AP and a bit of USIS material, the last very occasionally and without accreditation. Ownership is said to be in the hands of over two hundred stockholders, but it is actually run by two Hakkas, the brothers Li. The elder, who used to work for the U. S. army in Kunming during the war, writes most of the (very pro-Peking) editorials, while the younger brother manages the paper and is the real dynamo. Neither man is a CP member, nor is the paper subsidized.

3) Chung Yuan Pao with Chung Yuan Wan Pao (evening edition) each with a circulation of about twelve thousand, is probably the most influential paper in Bangkok. The morning edition (eight pages) runs long editorials about three times a week, while the evening edition (four pages) has short editorials daily. The paper uses some NCNA material, quite a bit of UP, AP and Reuters, some USIS, and much material from its own special correspondents in China. It is backed by half a dozen big businessmen (in rice, rubber, insurance, teak, pawnshops) of whom only one, the most influential, is pro-Communist. The paper is clearly pro-Peking in policy, but neither violently anti-American nor violently pro-Russian, though it shows tendencies in both directions.

4) Hsing Hsien Jih Pao (eight pages) and Hsing T'ai Wan Pao (evening edition, four pages), with a circulation for each of about nine thousand, are owned by Aw Boon Haw, the Tiger Balm "King" and greatest newspaper magnate in Southeast Asia. When it was established on January 1, 1950, it rather upset the Bangkok newspaper market, and the circulation of opposition papers dropped. Up until August, 1950, it was at least as pro-Communist as the Chung Yuan Pao, but it became lukewarm towards the Chinese Communists in August and in September no longer printed pro-Communist editorials. Now it is clearly independent, and steers a rather sane middle course. It carries daily long editorials that are analytical and dispassionate. It is perhaps the best of the Bangkok Chinese papers for local news -- better coverage and less bias. It rarely uses NCNA, relies on UP, AP and Reuters, and also uses quite a bit of USIS material, especially pictures. It has little good to say for the U. S., but doesn't rant either. Most of the news about China proper, however, is pro-Peking, probably because of the lack of non-Communist news sources.

5) Kuang Hua Pao and Kuang Hua Wan Pao (evening edition) have circulations of about eight thousand each. Its eight-page evening edition is Bangkok's best. Somewhat further right than Aw Boon Haw's paper, it uses no NCNA, occasionally carries a little Central News Agency (Kuomintang information service, hereafter referred to as CNA), and uses a lot of USIS releases. Two or three times a week it carries editorials noted for a definite middle-of-the-road stand and considerable objectivity. The editor is himself pro-Western and anti-Communist, but the paper's policy can be called neither anti-Communist nor pro-KMT. China news is more often than not pro-Peking. Now neutral, it could seemingly easily revert to a pro-KMT position.

Bangkok's Chinese press includes only one non-daily of any i

portance: The Tzu Yu Pao, with a circulation of about two thousand, is official KMT organ, now attempting a rather limping comeback. Formerly a small tabloid, it changed in April, 1950, from a weekly to twice weekly. Then in September it doubled in size to four full-sized pages. The editor runs the paper almost single-handed. Its news is mostly canned CNA material, while its editorials are a rehash of the KMT line. It carries almost no local news, though it recently ran a series of articles on Thailand's Chinese Communists. One periodical published in Bangkok, the Ming Chu Hsin Wen, is of considerable importance. A monthly, it is the official Communist magazine. It duplicates almost exactly the format and style of Hsueh Hsi, the most popular magazine in Communist China. It specializes in the "new learning" and reprints of the laws, proclamations and speeches of the Peking regime.

6. Political Situation

The Chinese Communists have been more successful in Thailand than in any other country in Southeast Asia, a fact all the more remarkable for the Thai government's anti-Communism. Several factors help to explain their success. First of all, of all the Southeast Asian governments, that of Thailand has been most consistently repressive of the Chinese. In addition to the various restrictions along business and educational lines already mentioned, the government has imposed rigid restrictions on immigration and sending of remittances to China. Chinese have been granted no political rights whatsoever, and can only watch in frustration the government pursue an ever more anti-Chinese program, while exerting what pressure they can through their own unofficial community organizations. The government's policy is doubtless an understandable one, but it has resulted in more and more disillusionment with the value of playing a law-abiding role in keeping with the restrictive status-quo. In this state of affairs, a large number of Chinese in Thailand have welcomed the formation of a strong, united government in Peking, and are looking forward to effective protection and championship from Peking. Radio Peking has already gratified its listeners with numerous accusations against the "American tool" and "fascist", Phibun Songgram, regarding his policies towards Chinese education, commerce, immigration and civil rights. The Chinese Communists and their sympathizers, playing skillfully on these discontents, have infiltrated the most important of the Chinese organizations; the Chinese schools and press are also serving their interests more than those of any other political group. Secondly, it must be remembered that the Phibun regime is anti-Communist more in proclamation than in enforcement. The government has neither a policy of enlightened anti-Communism nor one of strong-arm enforcement of anti-Communist measures.

After VJ Day, the Chinese Communists, who had spear-headed anti-Japanese activities in Thailand during the war, came out from underground and established their own schools, press and bookshop. They cashed in on the wrath against collaborationists and exacted money from many of the latter. Many Chinese businessmen whose record was only slightly or nominally stained, made contributions to CP front organizations out of fear, while many of them enjoyed being known as progressive and were cajoled into continuing their aid. The KMT, known in Thailand as the Chung Kuo Hui Kuan, also enjoyed a revival in Thailand after the war, and its cause was strengthened by the signing of the Sino-Siamese Treaty of Amity in March, 1946, which for the first time assured diplomatic protection to the Chinese minority and theoretically limited the right of the Siamese government to repress the Chinese. A Nationalist

ambassador arrived in Bangkok in 1946, and eventually five consulates were established throughout the country. The Nationalist government's and KMT's power to do anything on behalf of the Thailand Chinese was greatly weakened as the tide turned in favor of the Communists in China. The whole temper of the Chinese community changed in 1949, and when the Nationalists were reduced to their one stronghold on Taiwan, they found it necessary to close all five consulates in Thailand. The Bangkok branch of the KMT, meanwhile, lost most of its following, and in the middle of 1950 consisted of little more than three main leaders. With no effective alternative before the Chinese community, the Communists had a clear field.

The Chinese Communist Party of Thailand has a history of some twenty years. In 1946, a long-standing Thai law prohibiting Communism was repealed in connection with obtaining Soviet approval of Thailand's admission to the UN, but actually another anti-sedition law just as clearly outlaws the Party. So, for the most part, it has operated underground, and still does. The number of card-carrying members is probably somewhat over two thousand. Party organization follows the usual lines with a Central Executive Committee, a Secretariat and a large number of special committees on propaganda, organization, labor, economics, education, etc. The main strength is in Bangkok, but there are branches in other centers of Chinese concentration, notably Songkla and Haadyai. Members of the Central Executive Committee supposedly include Yi Mei-ho (standing Committee of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce; vice-president of the Shan T'ang); Chou Cheng (chairman of the smaller Hainan Association) and Ch'iu Chi (delegate to the PPC and Trade Unions conference in Peking 1949). Yi and Chou are both members of the Peking regime's Commission on Overseas Chinese Affairs. The Chinese CP of Thailand was instrumental in the establishment of the Thai CP, a smaller and less important body; the latter has concentrated on people of mixed blood who are both Chinese and Thai in allegiance. The Chinese CP maintains close relations with its Thai counterpart, and, it is said, with the Viet Minh in Indochina and the Soviet legation in Bangkok. There is also evidence that it has working arrangements with the Malayan Communist terrorists. Early this fall the Thai CID rounded up some eighteen Chinese on suspicion of being Communists in cahoots with the Malayan terrorists. The Thai government, incidentally, has an agreement with the British relating to the role of the Malayan-Thai jungle border in the Malayan emergency. Police of both countries can go forty miles over the border to chase terrorists, and some Thai police are being trained in jungle warfare in Malaya.

Chinese Communist propaganda in Thailand is directed mainly at the Chinese community but also at the Thais. It supplies material to Lok Chai (Thai language Communist daily) and to the Statesman Weekly (Thai language pro-Communist) as well as its own Chinese press. There are many facets to Communist propaganda. When the audience is the Siamese people, it tries to identify the Thai government with the reactionary and imperialist US, which is reportedly trying to get economic hegemony in Thailand and planning aggression throughout Southeast Asia. Premier Phibun is said to have sold out his country to the highest bidder. Against the common interests of the Thai and Chinese people are stressed, along with their need for unity in the struggle against the imperialists and their puppets. Another line stresses the common features of Buddhism and Marxism, while still another urges the Thai people not to resist Communism when it sweeps into Thailand but to accept this friendly and correct doctrine. Generally the loudest tune played is that Communism represents the winning side. Communism is glorified in its two strongholds, and postwar advances of world communism are pointed to as evidence that the

victory of Communism is inevitable. The U. S. and the western world w
it are pictured on the brink of capitalist disaster.

For the benefit of the Chinese in Thailand, Communist propa
emphasizes and magnifies every restriction and unfavorable action take
against the Thailand Chinese as outrageous violations of every worthy
principle in the books. The Thai government's blame in this propagand
is usually shared by the U. S. Radio Peking has recently joined the at
tack with vitriolic and violent attacks on the Thai government. The w
campaign is designed, it would appear; 1) to frighten the Thai governme
into inaction, 2) to place the Chinese Communists in the role of liber
ors of the oppressed overseas Chinese, 3) to stir up further antagonis
on the part of the local Chinese to the Thai government and 4) to stre
en the dependence and loyalty of the Thailand Chinese to the Peking
government.

The range of Communist activities from education to laborch.
already been indicated in previous sections. The set-back which the
Communist cause seemed to suffer at the time I visited Bangkok due to
vigorous UN intervention in Korea, has doubtless been more than made u
in the past month. The first peak of the Communist tide in Thailand w
reached in the early months of 1950, after the Chinese Communists con-
solidated the Chinese mainland. In February, a Thailand Chinese loyal
mission (whose membership was not made public) went to Peking; the del
tion released a report which was printed in June in the Communist pres
but did not return to Bangkok in a body.

After the UN action in Korea, the pro-KMT elements in Thai-
land seemed to take heart. At the time of the 1949 Double Ten, many
leaders of the Chinese community had gone around to every shop asking
that the Nationalist flag not be flown nor any other celebration carri
out. In 1950, however, the Thai government made it clear that anyonec
flew the Peking regime's flag on October 1st would be thrown in jail;
government forbade demonstrations. The Chinese consul declared Double
Ten a holiday, and the Thai government acceded; the holiday was genera
recognized and some shops even flew the Nationalist flag. The biggest
effort of the pro-KMT element during the past year was the loyalty miss
which left for Taiwan October 27th. There were fourteen delegates,
headed by Yün Chu-téng, chairman of the Bangkok Hainan Association.
The group was seen off at the airport by a crowd of about one hundred,
flew to Taiwan, had audiences with the Generalissimo, toured the islan
for three weeks, and otherwise provided pro-KMT newsc. But the recent
KMT revival is a small and puny thing alongside of the constant and un
remitting progress of the Chinese Communists in Thailand.

There is some reason to believe that the Chinese community
a whole is not as pro-Communist as the press would indicate. It may be
that some of the more neutral papers are pro-Peking for fear of repris
at the hands of the Communists. In any case, most Chinese are not so
much pro-Communist as pleased that China is now strong; they are other-
wise apolitical.

7. Relations with the Siamese

Relations between the Chinese in Thailand and the Thai nati
were apparently very smooth up until the 'teens of the present century.
The growth of both Chinese and Thai nationalism, however, began to poi
the relationship, and by the early thirties considerable antagonism ha
been engendered between the Chinese and at least the politicians among

the Thais. Intermarriage was almost always looked on with favor, and offspring could always, if desired, be accepted as Chinese. In point of fact, the offspring of a Chinese man and Thai woman (the reverse alliance almost never occurs), regardless of sex, usually learn Siamese. But the sons are more often brought up as Chinese and sent to Chinese schools, while the daughters frequently cling closer to the mother and are more assimilated. Such daughters as often marry Siamese as Chinese. Intermarriage is now infrequent among the business and educated classes, though it is still common among laborers in Thailand. Before the growth of nationalism, Chinese became pretty well assimilated by the third generation. Since the Hokkiens were the first group to come to Siam in any numbers, they are by far the most assimilated group. As is the case in many other Southeast Asian countries, many of the most prominent Thai leaders have Chinese blood. Ironically, several of the most anti-Chinese Thai politicians have in part Hokkien ancestry.

The Thai government considers all persons born in their country to be Siamese unless they have registered as nationals of a foreign country. All but the foreign-born Chinese, then, are Siamese nationals unless they have applied for Chinese citizenship by registering with their Chinese consul. As Siamese nationals, they can theoretically avoid restrictions against the Chinese. The Thai government requires that all stores have signs in Thai, and most Chinese have adopted Siamese names at least for business purposes. These evidences of assimilation are more superficial than significant. The government policy of repression and restriction has forced unity and group consciousness on the whole Chinese community and effectively stopped further assimilation. It must still be remembered, however, that the anti-alien movement in Thailand is a government and not a people's movement. Face to face relations between Chinese and Siamese in the course of daily affairs continue friendly and are generally unmarred by tension.

As the anti-alien movement gained momentum in the 1930s the entry fee for immigrants was raised from thirty to two hundred baht. An immigration act of 1938 empowered the Minister of the Interior to fix the amount of money each alien must have in his possession when entering, and to establish quotas for aliens of any particular nationality or category of any nationality. Immediately after the war, large numbers of Chinese arrived in Thailand: Between January and August, 1946, 34,000 came and scores of thousands more were waiting in Swatow for passage to Bangkok. Many of these, of course, were former residents of Thailand returning from visits or enforced stays in China. During the brief postwar lapse in anti-Chinese fervor in 1946, the quota for Chinese was set at 10,000, but after one year it was reduced to two hundred annually. Actual immigration has been considerably above this figure during each of the past years. Immigration is managed in the following ways: Some Chinese wanting to come get themselves registered in Hongkong as British subjects or in Macao as Portuguese subjects and thus gain entry on other than the Chinese quota. Others get in on a temporary visa and keep paying squeeze to get it extended. Or when a Thailand Chinese dies, a sizeable fee will keep officials from erasing his name from the register; then a man at the dock can give the deceased's name as his own, saying that Bangkok is his bona fide residence and that he was in Swatow on a visit. Or, by the direct approach, a bribe of around 30,000 baht will put any name on the quota for the following year. The main difficulty with all these methods is that they cost money, and plenty of it. Now that prices have been stabilized in China, on the one hand, while the cost of living in Thailand has risen, on the other, the incentive to migrate has greatly

lessened. It seems likely that for the past six months the Chinese leaving Bangkok for Swatow outnumber those coming.

8. Research Materials and Facilities

There are no large Chinese libraries in Thailand, as might be expected, since not only higher but secondary Chinese education is barred. Probably some regional associations maintain small libraries for the use of members. So far as is known, Chulalongkorn University and the other institutions of higher learning have not been concerned with the Chinese community as subjects for any kind of research. The Thailand Research Society (Siam Society) is concerned, among other things with sociology, but has devoted no special attention to the Chinese. Both the U. S. Embassy and USIS in Bangkok subscribe to the Chinese newspapers. The Embassy copies of all papers are sent to the State Department and presumably find their way eventually to the Library of Congress. USIS keeps its copies about two months, after which it destroys them (lack of space).

CAMBODIA

1. Population

Just as Cambodia is more akin culturally and (before the French) historically to Thailand than to Vietnam, so the Chinese population of Cambodia is more similar in its makeup to that of Thailand than to that of Vietnam. The size of the Chinese population in Cambodia has been variously estimated at from one hundred to three hundred thousand. The 1936 census gave 106,000 Chinese in the country, a decrease from the 1931 figure of 148,000. The 1936 census, however, was by registration and undoubtedly large numbers of Chinese refrained from registering in order to escape payment of the head tax. The 1936 census also recorded about 100,000 Sino-Cambodian Métis, many of whom were culturally Chinese and considered themselves Chinese rather than Cambodian. The best estimate I can arrive at for the 1950 Chinese population is 250,000, which figure includes those Sino-Cambodian métis who were reared as and consider themselves Chinese. About 150,000 of this number live in Phnom-Pen, the capital and metropolis of the political unit. This city presents the most interesting picture of culture contact: The population is composed of about a third each of Chinese, Cambodian and Vietnamese. The remainder of the Chinese population is concentrated in the rice plains, where Chinese traders are to be found in almost every village and town. It is said that one can closely estimate the size of a native community in Cambodia by noting the number and size of Chinese shops in its marketing center.

As in Thailand, the Teochius are clearly the dominant dialect group among the Chinese. However, the Cantonese and Hokkiens are more numerous than either the Hakkas or Hainanese; the reverse of the situation in Thailand. Very rough estimates of the proportion of the major dialect groups are as follows: Teochiu 60% (150,000), Cantonese 20% (50,000), Hokkien 7% (15,500), Hakka and Hainanese 4% each (10,000). No data were available for the distribution in the country of these various groups.

2. Occupations and Business

To a large extent, the Chinese control internal marketing of local products and the retail trade in Cambodia. They have built up a comprehensive rice purchasing system that covers the whole of the country, and own well over half the rice mills. The Chinese have a virtual monopoly of fishing and pretty well control market vegetables and pepper. Some Chinese are in rubber growing as well. But very few Chinese are engaged in the cultivation of the staple crops such as rice, though Chinese do own considerable agricultural land which they rent out to Cambodians.

As in Thailand, the government has placed many restrictions on Chinese participation in various occupations and trades. For many businesses, patents or licenses are issued only to Cambodians, though frequently the latter, lacking capital and know-how, sell their patents to the Chinese who then run the businesses.

As in all of Southeast Asia, there is considerable occupational specialization by dialect group. The Teochius predominate in business, but are to be found also as agriculturalists and boatmen. The Cantonese predominate among artisans and are important in commerce. The Hokkiens, too, specialize in trade and business. The Hainanese are mostly pepper planters and domestic servants, while the Hakkas tend to be workmen and agriculturalists.

There are many trade and occupational guilds in Cambodia, but no Chinese Chamber of Commerce. Phnom-Penh has a Chamber of Commerce, headed by a Frenchman, dominated by the French, and with only French, Cambodian and Vietnamese voting members. There are, however, two Chinese consultative members, as against fifteen voting members. The bulk of the import-export trade is reserved for the French and Indochinese by the device of denying permits to the Chinese.

3. Regional and Other Organizations

In 1891, the French divided the Chinese in Cambodia into five "congrégations", which pattern has persisted to the present day. The Chinese in Phnom-Penh and the other cities are grouped into Cantonese, Teochiu, Hokkien, Hainanese, and Hakka congregations, to the last of which members of all other dialect groups belong. The chief of each congregation, who is supposedly elected by the entire congregation membership over eighteen years of age, is the official intermediary between the Cambodian administration and the Chinese in the congregation. He is personally responsible for their behavior. Each congregation in the person of the chief is responsible for taxes, duties, hospitalization fees, deportation fees, and the upkeep of community schools, hospitals and pagodas. In theory, at least, the French do not interfere with the internal affairs or politics of the congregations, which are run, it is said, according to Chinese law. I have no information about the actual functioning of these congregations in Phnom-Penh, except that they function fairly efficiently, at least from the French point of view.

4. Education

Chinese schools are found in Cambodia wherever there are sizeable Chinese communities. In the cities these are sponsored by the various congregations, and even in rural areas they tend to be run by

dialect groups. Instruction is in Kuo Yü, however, and one need not necessarily be a Cantonese, say, to attend a school run by the Cantonese congregation. The two best Chinese schools in the country are the Teochiu and Cantonese schools in Phnom-Penh, with one thousand and nine hundred students respectively. The French authorities will not allow Chinese schools above the primary level, though the larger Phnom-Penh schools evade this restriction by offering extension work which in effect goes up to the junior middle school level. Students who want senior middle school must go to Cholon in Vietnam, and those who want higher education must go abroad, usually to China, Hongkong or France.

There has unquestionably been some infiltration of Chinese Communists into Chinese schools; especially the Hokkien schools are suspected. However, Communist influence is not so open that Communist textbooks have been introduced.

5. The Press

The Chinese press in Cambodia, limited to Phnom-Penh, is definitely on a bush-league scale. The Cholon (Vietnam) papers arrive in Phnom-Penh by air and truck the day of publication and have a significant circulation. The entire press in Indochina is rigidly controlled by the French and several papers have been closed. Phnom-Penh, however, boasts the only independent and courageous Chinese paper in the whole of Indochina. It is allowed to continue publication for window dressing purposes and precisely because it is published in "back-woods" Phnom-Penh rather than Cholon or Haiphong. This paper, 1) the Hsien Shih Pao, with a daily circulation somewhat over one thousand, is the most widely respected paper in Cambodia. Along with the other Phnom-Penh Chinese papers, it has four tabloid-size pages. It relies entirely on radio for its news, and is willing to quote Peking radio regularly. Its policy is definitely pro-Peking, though it is independent of the CF line on world issues. The other Phnom-Penh Chinese daily, 2) the Kung Yen Jih Pao, has a circulation slightly under one thousand. Its policy is very pro-KMT, and in other ways also it is indistinguishable from the usual Cholon paper. Two other Chinese papers are published in Phnom-Penh: 3) The Kung Shang Pao, which comes out three times a week, and 4) the Hua Shang Pao, published twice weekly. Both papers are neutral, or rather don't attempt to have any editorial policy, and neither is at all influential. All the papers pirate news from any and all news agencies and radio broadcasts.

6. The Political Situations

There is a Chinese Nationalist consul in Phnom-Penh, and he does his best to encourage the KMT branch in Cambodia and the pro-KMT press. One of the special problems he now has concerns the Nationalist troops who crossed the Indochina border a year ago and are now interned on an island off the Cambodian coast.

Generally speaking, the Chinese in Cambodia are caught in the middle of political rivalries and guerilla warfare that do not directly concern them. The Viet-Minh are active in south Cambodia and eastward along the road to Saigon. A group of Cambodian nationalists, the Issaraks, is active over almost all the countryside. While occasionally in the past, these two groups of guerillas have worked together, of late their differences have precluded cooperation. In any case, the French have tried to get the two fighting each other, and have succeeded to some

extent, mainly because Cambodians still look on Vietnamese (of whom the Viet Minh ranks are composed) as traditional enemies. The Chinese in the rural areas are subject to taxes and protection fees by both groups. Usually when a guerilla band passes through a rural community it taxes each home or shop according to size, apparent prosperity, and whether tiled or thatched. The tax may vary from one hundred to one thousand piastres (U. S. \$2. to \$20.) In all cases, the Chinese are sought out because they are generally the wealthiest inhabitants of each village. Wealthy Chinese from Phnom-Penh dare not travel in the country unprotected, for if picked up by guerillas, they are relieved of all money and valuables and often held for large ransoms. These activities are not so much a result of an anti-Chinese bias on the part of the guerillas as of the fact that most wealth is concentrated in Chinese hands and the guerillas desperately need money to keep going.

7. Relations with the Cambodians and French

The Chinese relations with the Cambodians have on the whole been as good as with any other native people in Southeast Asia. In spite of the close cultural ties between the Vietnamese and Chinese, their mutual relations have been far less cordial than those between the Chinese and Cambodians, who have been influenced mainly by Indian and Siamese cultures. The rate of intermarriage between Chinese and natives has probably been higher than in any other Southeast Asian countries. Without the Chinese contribution to the Cambodian stock, the natural decrease of the Cambodian population would have been considerably greater in the past century. It is estimated that there are well over 100,000 persons now living who had Chinese fathers and Cambodian mothers. In the past at least, most of the Sino-Cambodian métis merged with the Cambodian population within two generations. Several reasons of different order can be mentioned to account for the high rate of miscegenation. For one, the number of Chinese women who migrated to Cambodia was until very recent years far smaller than the number of males. For another, the Cambodians have a widespread belief that hybrid vigor results from such miscegenation; that the offspring of such matches are superior to both parents in health and stamina. And then, a Chinese husband is still considered an excellent match for a Cambodian girl, since the immigrant is usually more industrious than the average Cambodian. Furthermore, the Cambodians prize light skin color, and Cambodian coloring is generally darker than that of the Chinese. Finally, it must be remarked that religion is no bar to intermarriage in Buddhist Cambodia as it is in many parts of Malaysia. There has inevitably been some resentment and envy coupled with admiration in the Cambodian's attitude towards the Chinese, and this has shown itself mainly in pressure on the government to restrict certain occupations and trades to the native peoples. But friction is nonetheless almost wholly lacking in daily contacts between the two peoples.

Relations with the French have in the past been generally good. The Chinese tolerated high taxes and various restrictions imposed on them, because they were permitted free trade and provided with a stable political regime. French capital, invested in railroads, transport facilities and agricultural loans, increased the volume of production and trade which were largely in Chinese hands. Chinese resentment against the French, however, has grown considerably since the war, inasmuch as their regime has been more repressive and less stable than ever before. Trade has fallen off, and the Chinese are not adequately

protected in the rural areas. Under these circumstances the Chinese are more than ever wont to complain about specific grievances. Rather cut off from direct access to Communists and Communist propaganda, the Cambodian Chinese are nonetheless growing more radical in their political outlook since the status quo holds few desiderata for them.

The French have off and on during their period of control in Cambodia restricted Chinese immigration. With the Communist victory in China, the French, in July, 1949, ruled that no Chinese can disembark in Indochina without a national passport visaed by French consular officials in the place of departure. In consequence, Chinese immigration into Cambodia has virtually ceased for the time being.

8. Research Materials and Facilities

There are small Chinese libraries in the headquarters of the Teochiu and Cantonese congregations in Phnom-Penh; both subscribe to some of the newspapers and some incomplete files may exist. No other research materials or facilities came to my attention.

VIETNAM

1. Population

The most reasonable estimate for the 1950 Chinese population of Vietnam is about 750,000. The 1936 census showed less than 300,000 Chinese and Sino-Annamites in what is now Vietnam, but it is generally recognized that all Chinese who could manage it did not register during the census in order to avoid paying head tax. About 80% of the Chinese population of the country is in the former province of Cochin-China, which includes the rich rice-land of the Mekong delta, about 15% is in Tongking, which includes the Red River delta, and the remaining 5% live in the coastal strip which was formerly called Annam.

The rural-urban distribution of the Chinese (as well as the Vietnamese) population has been greatly altered as a result of the disturbances involving the Viet Minh. In South Vietnam, in particular, the Chinese have been concentrated in a few centers, notably Cholon, to facilitate military protection against the guerillas. Probably over 400,000 Chinese now reside in the twin cities of Cholon-Saigon, with most of these in Cholon, which has become, after Singapore, the largest Chinese city in Southeast Asia. The other urban concentrations of Chinese are in Tongking: Haiphong with about 35,000 and Hanoi with perhaps 15,000.

The proportion of the dialect groups is quite different from that in Cambodia. The Cantonese are the dominant group, and since Cantonese is the trade language, almost all Chinese can speak some. The following proportions are only a very rough estimate, though the ranking of the groups is most probably correct: Cantonese 45% (337,500), Teochiu 30% (225,000), Hakka 10% (75,000), Hokkien 8% (60,000), and Hainanese 4% (30,000).

2. Occupations and Business

That the Chinese control most of the internal trade in Vietn is all the more remarkable when it is realized that they form only 3% of the country's population. The Chinese buy up most of the paddy" in Cochin-China and a large part of it in Tongking, transport it to mills, which again are mostly Chinese owned; and until recent export and exchange controls, they exported much rice to Chinese firms in the main port cities of Southeast Asia. Postwar disturbances have caused rice production to drop disastrously and"probably even a smaller proportion of the present production is handled by Chinese. Few Chinese actually grow rice, except for Hakka farmers in Tongking. The Chinese specialize, however, in truck and pepper gardening and pig breeding, and are important in sugar, cotton and fisheries. In addition to rice mills, they own and operate most of the sawmills and sugar refineries in the country. They are excluded by law from owning the best rubber and rice growing lands, and all mines. But they are large holders of urban property. Most Chinese are occupied with business, industry and commerce; few are employed on large plantations, in contrast to many areas of Malaysia.

The Cantonese predominate as both retailers and artisans. The Hokkiens* importance in commerce is greater than their numbers would indicate. Teochius are proportionately less occupied in industry. Most of the farmers are Teochiu, Hakka and Hainanese (the latter especially in pepper). Most of the cooks are Cantonese, Teochiu and Hainanese, and most of the boatmen are Cantonese and Teochiu, while most workmen are Hakka and Cantonese.

The economic position of the Chinese has been greatly affected by the insecurity and paralysis of commerce since the end of the war. Very rigid trade controls have been established whereby all major transactions in southern Vietnam are channeled through official French control organizations, and practically all foreign trade with northern Vietnam is paralyzed. The net result is that the foreign contacts of Chinese merchants are greatly limited and that excessive preference is given to large French import-export firms. Many Chinese traders have resorted in the meantime to smuggling and illegal" currency transactions.

Cholon has the usual Chinese trade and occupational guilds. All of the larger cities have Chinese Chambers of Commerce, which perform the usual services for members and to date have shown no official interest in other than KMT politics.

3. Regional and Other Organizations

In 1906 for Cochin-china and shortly after for the rest of Vietnam, the French divided the Chinese into five congregations. As in Cambodia, the chief of each congregation is personally responsible for the behavior and performance of civic duties of members. When the Chinese army occupied northern Vietnam in 1945, it considered the congregation system humiliating to the Chinese and unilaterally dissolved them. After considerable negotiations with the Chinese, the French re-established these throughout the country in 1948, but with slight revisions in the direction of democracy (election of the chiefs by universal suffrage of both sexes) and a new name: "les groupements administratifs chinois regionaux."

As before, the new regional Chinese administrative groups are responsible for providing community and civic services for their members. In Cholon each of the five groups operates a school, and most maintain hospitals and temples as well. The Cantonese group, as the largest, maintains the best temples and hospitals. It has just supplemented its large Chinese-medicine hospital with a new western hospital which is as well-equipped as any in the city.

4. Education

The literacy rate of the Chinese is probably lower in Indochina than in any other Southeast Asian country. The congregation system has enabled the French to keep tight control over Chinese education. The only Chinese middle schools in all Southern Vietnam and Cambodia are in Cholon, where the three largest congregations maintain them. Kuo-yu is the medium of instruction, and English as well as French is taught as a foreign language. The Chinese Communists have been more active in schools than in any other field in Vietnam. The French have closed down several schools, and increased surveillance over the others. Demonstrations by Chinese students have resulted in the arrest and harsh treatment of many and general indignation on the part of the Chinese.

5. The Press

The entire press in French-occupied Vietnam is strictly controlled, though not by direct censorship. Rather from previous examples, newspapers know full well that if they get out of line they will be closed. For example, in 1947, a liberal Chinese paper called Tzu Jan Jih Pao was started by a Chinese newspaperman brought in by liberal Frenchmen who had hopes of seeing an independent, liberal, critical paper in the Saigon area. The new editor had the temerity to editorialize about Asiatic nationalism, freedom and other concepts which happened also to be espoused by Communists, and the paper was closed in 1949 on charges of propagating the Communist line. Out of fear, then, if not conviction, virtually no play is given to the Chinese Communists. Radio Peking is sometimes quoted when it is a very important story, but nothing politically dangerous will be touched. When, in the summer and early fall, UN forces were being pushed down to their Pusan beachhead, several of the Chinese papers let the whole story go rather than risk saying something offensive to the French.

Chinese papers in Vietnam are published in Cholon and Haiphong; only one or two are published in the latter city, and about these I have no data. There are five Chinese dailies in Cholon, three of which are fairly long established and well-known, and two of which are new and rather unimportant. In order of importance, these are: 1) Yuan Tung Jih Pao, with somewhat over ten thousand circulation. It is the most nearly independent and objective of the lot. The editor, Thai Van Huyen is a newspaperman of long standing and experience. In policy the paper is mildly pro-KMT, mildly critical of the Peking regime, and cautious on French policy in Vietnam. 2) Fu Nu Jih Pao, with a circulation of about five thousand. It is consistently and thoroughly pro-KMT and absolutely uncritical of French policy. In spite of the fact that it has a female editor, Mrs. Ly Thu, and is called The Women's Daily, its coverage is much the same as the other papers. 3) Chung Kuo Jih Pao, with a circulation of around three thousand. The most rabidly pro-KMT paper in Cholon, it is probably also the least objective in its news

columns. 4) Ho P'ing Jih Pao, with under one thousand circulation. It started publication only in September, 1950. An unsophisticated tabloid with incomplete news coverage, it appears to aim at the less well-educated Chinese. No clear-cut editorial policy had emerged by early October when I last saw it; it seems to be rather neutral and un-critical. 5) Hua Nan Jih Pao, with a circulation well under one thousand. Also a new paper, it is of no real importance. The three larger Cholon papers subscribe to CNA, and one or two to the Pan-Asiatic service in Hongkong. None subscribes to the bigger western agencies, though all pirate from them rather freely. USIS in Saigon supplies news releases and feature material in French to all the papers, and the Chinese papers especially are wont to use them.

6. The Political Situation

The Chinese Nationalists have consulates in Saigon, Hanoi and Haiphong, and the one in Saigon appears to be running with considerably more sanguinity than the present situation in China would seem to warrant. The Chinese press is almost wholly pro-KMT, and only pro-nationalist political organizations are apparent. But this superficial picture of a KMT stronghold in a country on the brink of going over to the Communist-led Viet Minh is almost surely deceptive. There are several inklings of Communist activity, especially in the schools, and unquestionably there is much help and liaison between the Chinese and the Viet Minh. The Chinese have been made especially conscious since the war of the advantages they might gain if they were accorded vigorous protection from a strong Chinese government.

To the outside observer, most of the Chinese in Vietnam have a rather hazy picture of the issues at stake in the country and of the consequences of victory for either side. Risking gross errors of over-generalization, the following might be said: Anxious mainly about the return of stability which would permit their businesses to prosper, the Chinese are not overly concerned who brings it about: In view of their unpopularity with the Vietnamese, and French as well as Vietnamese fears that they will be loyal to Communist China, the Chinese are fearful of their status under a victorious anti-Communist French and Vietnam regime. Although fearful of the economic policies which a victorious Viet Minh might adopt, they seem to hope that the latter's alliance with Communist China would temper its policy towards themselves or that the Peking government would prevent the Viet Minh from adopting excessively restrictive measures. In any case, the Vietnam Chinese are in a most uncomfortable position: Unwilling to take sides, they are forced to cooperate with either side whenever necessary.

In Cholon, for instance, the Chinese merchants are double taxed, by the French and by the Viet-Minh. The latter hand-grenade shops that do not pay up. The French are unable to offer adequate protection, so the Chinese businessmen do not dare report anything to the city police. In the countryside, the Viet Minh get even more: They collect a kuo-lu (road transport) tax on all merchandise going to Cholon-Saigon. One must pay protection to the Viet Minh in order to carry on any enterprise in the sometimes-French-controlled areas. Frequently the Viet Minh blackmail Chinese who "produce things for the French" into closing up shop entirely. For example, a Chinese rice mill owner near Cholon, whose rice went to the city, was told to stop operations or have his mill blown up. Doubtless the situation is even less comfortable for the Chinese in Tongking.

Peking Radio and the few Communist publications that find their way into Vietnam have plenty to say about conditions in the French-controlled areas. The Chinese business slump is blamed on the opportunities which the puppet Bao Dai regime has given French and Vietnamese bureaucratic capitalists to grab up everything in sight. The closure of rice houses is due to exorbitant taxation rather than Viet Minh interference with production and distribution. Politically, it is said, the French imperialists and KMT agents collude in the persecution of progressive Chinese. They are, it is alleged, thrown into prison, detained, beaten up, deported, and their womenfolk assaulted. The Communists further charge French cultural imperialism (e. g. forceably introducing French textbooks into Chinese schools), the detention of Chinese youths attempting to return to their motherland, the suppression of democratic movements, etc.

But this propaganda directed at the Chinese is of little importance. The local Chinese themselves cannot really influence the outcome of the present struggle. There seems little question but that they will enthusiastically acclaim the victor, whichever side that may be.

7. Relations with the Vietnamese and the French

i For centuries the Chinese have been in close contact with the Vietnamese, with one result that the latter are closer in religion, language and other cultural aspects to the Chinese than are any other Southeast Asian people. The historical relationship of the two peoples, however, was marked by repeated Chinese attempts at domination. The threat of Chinese political domination was brought home to the Vietnamese once again when Chinese armies occupied the northern half of the country right after the war. The Chinese attempted unsuccessfully to bring the native nationalist movement under pro-KMT leadership and aroused further antagonism by exploiting and looting. The Vietnamese, therefore, have an ambivalent feeling for the Chinese, regarding them as both cultural brothers and traditional enemies. Sino-Vietnamese relations in the country today evidence this ambivalence. The Chinese are conscious of their cultural and business superiority, while the Vietnamese look on them with mixed envy, resentment and admiration. Some Vietnamese, especially the Tonkinese, are learning business skills and the intricacies of trade through their relations with the Chinese, but the Chinese readily regained their economic position in South Vietnam after they returned there from a few years in China during the depression.

Just as friction generally has been greater between the Chinese and the local people in Vietnam than in Cambodia, so the rate of intermarriage in Vietnam is far lower. There are about 750,000 Chinese living among 24,000,000 Vietnamese and the number of Sino-Annamite métis is only about 75,000; while in Cambodia there are 250,000 Chinese among 3,000,000 Cambodians and over 100,000 Sino-Cambodian métis.

Up until 1935, the Chinese in Indochina had the same legal position as other foreign Asiatics, but the Nanking Sino-French agreement of that year granted the Chinese most-favored-nation treatment. The Chinese legal position in Vietnam was improved by the Sino-French treaty of 1946 which granted them tax status equal to that of Indochinese nationals and jural status equal to that of French nationals. But the French have tended to ignore all these niceties in the period of

the postwar emergency. The Chinese appreciate the French mainly because they were once able to ensure peace and stability and because they served to check Vietnamese antagonism.

8. Research Materials and Facilities.

Nothing is known in these respects, except that USIS in Saigon subscribes to the Chinese newspapers and sends back issues on to the Library of Congress in Washington.

BURMA

1. Population

The last Burmese census for which results are complete was taken in 1931. About 194,000 Chinese were listed, though the census probably classed as Burmese many Burma-born Chinese. In any case, almost all recent estimates (Burmese, Chinese and Western) agree on the figure of 300,000; shocked and delighted by the agreement I will not presume to tamper with the figure in any way, though it may be a little small for 1950. This population differs from the Chinese population in other Southeast Asian countries by including a sizeable group of immigrants who came overland from China rather than by sea. From Yunnan, which has a long common border with Burma, has come a rather permanent Yunnanese population to trade, mine and engage in agriculture. Their number now is likely smaller than before the war, inasmuch as there was a large-scale exodus at the time of the Japanese occupation, and the post-war insurrections and disturbances in upper and eastern Burma, where the Yunnanese were concentrated, have caused a reduction in trade and closure of most mines.

About half the total Chinese population of Burma, however, is found in and around the Irrawaddy Delta, including Rangoon (50,000) and Moulmein (15,000). In this area, the Hokkiens form at least half the Chinese population, and Cantonese most of the remainder. Hakkas form a much smaller, though third largest, group. For the entire country, the proportions of the various dialect groups are roughly as follows: Hokkien 40% (120,000), Cantonese 25% (75,000), Yunnanese 20% (60,000), Hakka 8% (24,000), Hainanese 3% (9000).

2. Occupations and Business

In Burma, the Chinese are second to the Indians both in trade and in labor. Most of the non-agricultural labor force in Burma is supplied by Indians, one notable exception being the Chinese who worked in some of the mines in the eastern part of the country. Inasmuch as the mines have run either part time or closed down entirely during the past few years, the number of Chinese workmen is now negligible. On the other hand, the number of intellectuals is smaller than among the Chinese populations of, say, the various Malaysian countries. The great majority of the Burma Chinese have not gone beyond primary school, and few have ever attended Rangoon University. And apart from a few market gardeners, there are no Chinese agriculturalists. In consequence, the Chinese population is almost exclusively devoted to business

and commerce and industry. Thus, for instance, the task of the Chinese Communists is more difficult, sociologically speaking, than in Thailand, with its large group of Chinese laborers.

Indians rather than Chinese are dominant in the rice trade, though the latter have a share. Chinese as well as Indian retail shops are found in almost all the towns and cities of the country. Over 40% of all the Burma Chinese are traders and merchants. The Indians have been returning in ever greater numbers to their homeland since the war, however, and the position of Chinese traders has been improving. Furthermore, the Chinese have never been second to the Indians in handicraft industry; almost 40% of the Chinese are artisans, that is, carpenters, metal and leather-workers, etc. Chinese have been picking up more and more of the fishing trade since the war.

Chinese Chambers of Commerce are located in all the larger cities. The one in Rangoon has a certain amount of governmental recognition and sends a representative to Parliament. All the major firms are members. It has, since the ascendancy of the Chinese Communists, gone along with Peking, but not entirely. The Secretary-general, a Democratic League member, is very pro-Communist, but the Chairman is a former KMT man whose heart is not really with the Communists. Many members of the Chamber are not pro-Communist, nor even pro-Peking. Another important business organization is the Burma Chinese Trade Association, which is nine-tenths Hokkien in membership. It has gone almost completely Communist in the past year or so. In addition there are numerous trade organizations and guilds, usually called t'ung yeh kung hui, which represent all the various trades which the Chinese follow.

3. Regional and Other Organizations

The two largest regional associations in Rangoon are on a provincial basis, the Fu Chien T'ung Hsiang Hui (Fukien Association) and the Kwang Tung Kung Szu (Kwang-tung Association). The Fukien Association is very pro-Peking, the Cantonese Association much less so. In addition there are Yunnanese, Hainanese, and Chekiang-Kiangsu associations. The remaining district associations are almost all at the hsien level, mostly Hokkien. Hakkas and Teochius can belong to the Kwangtung Association. The functions of these organizations are usual, though they tend to be less important in Burma than either the trade guilds or Pang Hui, the so-called secret societies.

Two factions of Pang Hui are found in Burma, both stemming from the major federation of anti-Manchu secret societies, the Hung Men. About one hundred and fifty years ago, a dissident group developed in the Hung Men of several Southeast Asian countries. In most places the split was healed, but not in Burma. The dissidents became known as the Pai Pang (Whites), the full title of their present organization being in translation Society for Reconstructing Virtue. The orthodox group is now known as the Harmonious Victory Association, or Hung Pang (Reds). Up until about a year ago, the two groups of societies were in intense rivalry, which readily flared into violence. When Communists began to infiltrate these societies, however, anti-Communist leaders from both camps got together in an attempt to heal the long-standing breach. They were surprisingly successful; I attended a tea in Rangoon at which the secretaries-general of the two societies sat side-by-side, an unheard-of occurrence a few years ago.

The Reds just built a new central hall in Rangoon this year. A large modern building decorated with mirrors and glass, it rather incongruously houses an elaborate shrine-temple on the first floor, which is well supplied with hocus-pocus paraphernalia of the Hung Men. The second floor is a big dining-club room, with society platitudes and pictures of the Peach-Garden Pact, etc., on the walls. Outsiders are not allowed on the top floor, where initiations and secret meetings are held. The Reds have thirty-six lodges in all, eleven in Rangoon, and claim a membership of about 40,000. Hokkiens are dominant in leadership and membership. The leadership of some of the lodges as well as the central organization has been partially captured by pro-Communist elements; but some lodges still take a public pro-KMT stand. Both Pang Hui aver full allegiance to Sun Yat-sen and his principles.

The White's hall is less pretentious and somewhat more traditional. The first floor is a combination shrine and tea-drinking lounge. The second floor is a dining-club room with photos of all past officers on the walls. It was pointed out to me that only the wealthy are elected to office, because, in the course of their duties, officers must contribute liberally from their own pockets for the various celebrations and functions. The third floor is a dormitory for poor members visiting Rangoon and for members of the sawmill guild, which is affiliated with the society. The chairman of the Whites, Mr. Ch'iu I-ch'ueh, is also president of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce. The Secretary-General, handily enough, works for police intelligence. In the Whites, Cantonese are of equal importance with Hokkiens. Leadership is much less pro-Communist than is the case with the Reds. The Whites have five branches in Rangoon, and somewhat less than thirty in the rest of the country. This society also claims a membership of about 40,000. In fact, it is said that the great majority of adult Chinese men in lower Burma are members of one or the other of the two Pang Hui.

At the present time, violence between the two societies has ceased. Now the underground intrigue and murder at which these organizations are so adept is being used for larger political purposes. In October, 1950, several Chinese Communist newspaper men were ambushed and beaten, and rightist leaders have received threats and been shot at. When I left Rangoon in late October, the city police were calling separate meetings of the pro-Communist leaders and anti-Communist leaders in an attempt to avoid further violence.

Clan associations also proliferate in Burma. Over eighty of them have headquarters in Rangoon alone. This does not mean that an equal number of different surnames is involved, for two reasons: 1) There are different organizations for the more common surnames depending on what district or village the people of that name came from. In the extreme case, there are thirteen clan associations for the Ch'ien (in Hokkien, Tan) surname. And 2) some organizations are for from two to six different surnames. These combinations are for the most part traditional ones based on sworn brotherhoods in Chinese legends and history.

4. Education

The Chinese schools in Burma are virtually unregulated by the government. Only those schools which desire to have matriculation certificates for their graduates conform to the regulations of the Burmese

Ministry of Education, and very few Chinese schools do so desire. It is not even required that Burmese be taught, much less that it be a medium of instruction, as is Thai in Thailand. In Rangoon there are 28 Chinese schools, of which one is Methodist and one Catholic. Eight of these are middle or other secondary schools, while the others are primary. There are about one hundred and eighty Chinese schools in the rest of the country, of which only three are middle schools (in Kangtung, Moulmein, and Bassein). Most of these are primary schools with one teacher, serving very small communities.

The lack of government supervision leaves a clear field for the political struggle between the Communists and the KMT for control of Chinese schools. The Communists seem to have all the advantages: The help of the Chinese embassy, the appeal of allegiance to the homeland, the new textbooks coming out of China which conform to the Communist line, young teachers unhappy about the status quo, etc. The KMT supporters, however, insisted that they consider the situation an opportunity as well as a threat. They are importing textbooks from Singapore, and concentrating on giving better education. Nonetheless the Communists are clearly winning the battle. All but four or five of the Rangoon Chinese schools have adopted the Chinese Communist school curricula.

5. The Press

There are four Chinese dailies and three weeklies published in Rangoon, which constitute the only Chinese press in Burma. Compared with the Burmese press, the Chinese papers are far more enterprising: They go out for news while the Burmese journalists tend to wait for handouts. The Chinese press makes good use of radio: It picks up material especially from Radio Peking, Radio India, UP and AP. The four dailies in order of size follow:

1) The Chung Kuo Jih Pao has a circulation of about four thousand, and varies in size from eight to twelve pages. A prewar paper, it was the first to start up again after the Japanese left (July 1945). It is probably the only paper that subsists on its income alone, and it has a difficult time of it. With no wealthy backers and over one hundred stockholders, it is a straight commercial enterprise. The chairman of the board of directors is Ch'en Hung-tien, a Cantonese from Taishan. The paper supposedly has some circulation in Calcutta as well as the rest of Burma. At present its policy is neutral with pro-Peking tendencies. It was veering more and more to the left until July 1950, at which time a noticeable shift back to neutral occurred. The former editor, who wrote of American imperialists in the news columns and who reprinted editorials from Communist organs in China, was sacked in late summer. Since it has no Monday edition, it allowed the Tzu Yu Pao, a newly started pro-KMT weekly, to use its presses on Sunday for the first few editions. (Two of the staff members of the Chung Kuo Jih Pao volunteer their services for this KMT weekly). However, when the Communist press attacked the Chung Kuo Jih Pao as a tool of the KMT, it refused to allow the Tzu Yu Pao further use of its presses. Its present policy is that the Peking government is the government of China (it refers, e. g., to Chou as "our Foreign Minister"), and it seldom criticizes the Peking regime. Most of its news stories about China have a slant favorable to the new regime, but this is true mainly because only Communist news sources are available. It does not follow the CP line, however, and tries to be neutral in international affairs.

2) The Chung Hua Shang Pao has a circulation of over three thousand, and is fast catching up with the Chung Kuo Jih Pao. It is almost solely owned and run by Ts'ao Feng-mei, the Burma "timber king", like Chien above, also a Taishan Cantonese. His rivalry with Ch'en reached a climax in 1948 when Ts'ao started this paper, taking a sizeable portion of the Chung Kuo Jih Pao's staff with him. It is now the most conservative of the Rangoon dailies. Shortly after the Korean war began, the most left-wing of the paper's columnists was fired. It was also the only Rangoon daily which did not support the Communist-inspired, peace-signature drive. Still it is far from right wing, but rather center and neutral. It is not anti-Peking, though for one objective article on Korea (which did not even go so far as to say that the North Koreans attacked), it was violently flailed by the Communist press as a tool of the imperialists. It uses only a little USIS material, and then mostly pictures and without accreditation.

3) The Hsin Yang Kuang Pao is the only evening Chinese paper and has a circulation of about twenty-five hundred. "A prewar paper, it used to be the best in Rangoon. Its publisher is Hsu Sze-min (Burmese: Subin), the Democratic League man earlier mentioned as Secretary-general of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce. He has been the fair-haired boy of the pro-Communist elements for the past year or so, having led the welcome for the new Chinese Ambassador from Peking and chaired for the October 1st celebration this year. The paper gradually went over to the Communists in 1949, and now rabidly follows the CP line, with emphasis on anti-Americanism. A better paper than the other Communist daily, it prints more news, quotes western news services more frequently, and even prints American statements about China, though edited and given twisted headings.

4) The Jen Min Pao, with a circulation of about two thousand, started about three years ago as a Democratic League organ. It was then a small and unimportant paper, but when the Communists reached their ascendancy in China and the Democratic League went over to them, it greatly increased in importance. As a matter of fact, it is the Communist organ in Burma, since the Democratic League is the major CP front organization in the country. The publisher is Yeh Chen-jung, chairman of the Burmese branch of the Democratic League. Early in 1950, it induced several wealthy businessmen to sink money into the paper, and it is now full-sized, with usually eight and sometimes twelve pages. Some of the most active Chinese Communist political workers in Rangoon are on its staff.

The three weekly Chinese papers, from right to left, follow:

1) The Ching Feng Pao is a new paper launched only October 10th of this year. It is put out by former employees of the Kuo Min Jih Pao, a KMT organ which folded in April, 1950, after the KMT subsidy was discontinued. It is no improvement over the old paper, follows a rabid KMT line. It is going through its funds rapidly, and probably will not last. 2) The Tzu Yu Pao was started in September of this year and already has a circulation of three thousand. A wealthy rice-mill owner is the main backer, while Chuang Juan-wu, the main leader of the anti-Communist Chinese in Rangoon, is the sparkplug on the staff. It started on independent initiative, has no formal or financial connection with the KMT, though it is virtually a KMT organ. The main impulse behind the paper is opposition to Chinese Communist influence, but the staff feel the KMT is the only alternative. The paper's attacks are concentrated on the Soviets and World Communism rather than the Peking regime,

and the importance of the UN is emphasized. Only six of the staff are paid at all; the rest give part time services free. 3) The Sheng Huo Chou Pao, with a circulation probably around one thousand, is a Communist sheet started around the first of the year. Having dropped all pretense of journalistic dignity, it specializes in name-calling, personal attacks, and nosing into the private affairs of local people. It violently attacks; for instance, Chinese who visit or do business at the U. S. Embassy, those who sell U. S. publications, etc. It always refers to the Tzu Yu Pao by a name with the same sounds meaning "shit-grease paper". For the rest it publishes CP propoganda.

6. Political Situation

Burma, of course, was among the first countries to recognize the Peking regime. The Nationalist ambassador left Burma in July, though part of the staff went over to the new regime. Two of these returned to Peking for indoctrination. The ambassador from Peking arrived in August and was formally and enthusiastically welcomed by various representatives of the Chinese community. One aspect in particular of his arrival irked the Burmese government: A former head of the Rangoon branch of the Democratic League had made himself thoroughly unpopular with the Union government which was then in the thick of its fight with the Burmese Communists. He fled the country, wanted on charges of subversion. He later applied for a re-entry permit and was refused. Then he turned up with the new ambassador as second secretary in the Embassy. I was told (by biased members of the Chinese community, to be sure) that the Embassy personnel have acted more as a CP branch or a government organization in Communist China than as a diplomatic mission; that is, they have been more interested in furthering the Communist cause than in giving aid and assistance to Chinese nationals in Burma. In any case, up until September, the Burmese government had pretty well left the Chinese community alone, but they became so suspicious after the new embassy opened that they established a Commission of Chinese Affairs to keep an eye on things.

If there is a Chinese CP in Burma, it lays very low indeed, and works entirely through the Democratic League. Though the government has not outlawed Communism in Burma and has recognized the Chinese Communists, it would probably not tolerate an open Chinese CP as such, since prominent among the insurgents in Burma are two Communist groups. Another reason why there may not be a Chinese CP is that the country already has its own indigenous CP recognized by the Cominform (quite different from Thailand where the Chinese Communists really launched the Thai CP), and Cominform policy is clearly not to have a separate party for each national minority. Still another reason can be found in the makeup of the Burma Chinese community, short on proletariat and intelligensia, and long on petty bourgeoisie. It may be felt that the Democratic League would have greater appeal for such a community than the CP as such.

Anti-Communist and pro-KMT elements in Burma have definitely taken new heart since the US and UN took their "strong" line on Korea. In addition to the establishment of the two KMT weeklies and the slight swing away from the left of the two non-Communist dailies, one can point to the rather vigorous and enthusiastic celebration of the 1950 Double Ten. The preparatory committee, headed by Mr. Chuang of the Tzu Yu Pao, expected a few hundred, but had a couple of thousand participants instead. Several trade guilds and secret society lodges entered floats in

the parade, etc. The preparatory committee whipped up a public letter which presumed to state that the Chinese community of Burma swore allegiance to the Nationalist government on Taiwan; the message was cabled to Chiang, Truman, Lie, and others. There has also been an increase in anti-Communist terrorist activities.

7. Relations with the Burmese

The Chinese seem always to have gotten on very well with the Burmese. Never an economic or political threat because of their small numbers, the Chinese have also not been antagonistic towards Burmese culture. Most Chinese have partially adopted Burmese dress and many patronize the Burmese Buddhist shrines. At the "national" Shwedagon pagoda in Rangoon are many temples erected by wealthy Burma Chinese. Among certain Burma-born Chinese, assimilation has gone as far as any place in Southeast Asia. The Indians have always been more to be feared in Burmese eyes than the Chinese, and the Chinese are often referred to as Pauk-paw (kinsmen). Intermarriage has always been widespread, considering the size of the Chinese community.

8. Research Materials and Facilities

Rangoon University, the only institution of higher learning in the country, has shown no scientific interest in the Chinese community. Files of the Chung Kuo Jih Pao back to 1945 and of the Chung Hua Shang Pao since its founding are kept in the respective newspaper offices, and I was assured that they would be available for American researchers. The Rangoon USIS subscribes to all the papers, and sends old copies on to the Library of Congress.

SINGAPORE

1. Population

Before the war, Singapore, along with Penang and Malacca in Malaya, and Labuan off North Borneo, was one of the Straits Settlements. But in 1948, after the Malayan Union scheme fell through, the island was detached from the other settlements and from the rest of Malaya and made into a separate crown colony. If Singapore is included with the rest of Malaya, the Chinese are the largest single group; but with Singapore detached, the Malays have a slight predominance in the rest of Malaya. The colony of Singapore is about 3/4ths Chinese in population. A reliable estimate (based on the 1947 census figures) for mid-year, 1950, gives a total Chinese population of approximately 790,000 out of 1,011,000 total. This Chinese population is, of course, overwhelmingly urban: 81% of the Singapore Chinese population is urban, and 78.7% of the total Singapore urban population is Chinese. 60% of the Chinese population of Singapore is Straits born. The sex-ratio has improved greatly in the past few decades, though there is much variation among dialect groups. The number of females per thousand males is as follows: Cantonese 1,219, Hokkien 886, Teochiu 825, Hakka 768, and Hainese 557.

Hokkiens are the dominant dialect group, Teochiu and Cantonese

next, followed by Hainanese and Hakkas. The proportions of the major dialect groups follow, with mid-1950 estimates of the absolute numbers in parentheses: Hokkien 39.6% (313,000), Cantonese 21.6% (171,000), Teochiu 21.5% (170,000), Hainanese 7.2% (57,000), Hakka 5.5% (43,000), and Hokchiu 1.3% (10,300). Of these the Hakkas and Cantonese are disproportionately rural and the Hainanese and Hokchiu disproportionately urban. In the city itself, there is some concentration of dialect groups. The so-called Chinatown has a solid section of Hokkiens, and there are smaller nuclei for other groups. A few of the villages in the rural part of the island are one-dialect group communities, but most villages are quite mixed both as to race and to dialect groups among the Chinese.

2. Occupations and Business

According to the 1947 census report, of every 10,000 Chinese males, 5,670 are gainfully employed. A majority of these are engaged in commerce, finance and manufacturing. To be precise, out of the 5,670 Chinese males who are gainfully employed in every 10,000, 1,610 are occupied in commerce and finance, 1,319 in manufacturing, 907 in transportation and communication, 496 in personal service, 483 in agriculture, 401 in public administration, 96 in professional service, 79 in fishing, 53 in entertainment and sport. It goes without saying that in a Chinese city like Singapore, the Chinese predominate in almost every line of commercial and business endeavor.

The occupational division of the Chinese in Singapore according to whether Malaya or China-born is very instructive. (Figures from the 1947 Social Survey of Singapore municipality):

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Malaya-born Chinese</u>	<u>Non-Malayan-Born Chinese</u>
Highest professionals & big business	2.5%	1.1%
Medium business	1.7	2.4
Minor professions	5.8	3.7
Clerks	16.3	4.1
Shop-keepers & assistants	13.1	18.6
Overseers and foremen	1.4	0.7
Skilled workers	16.1	9.5
Semi-skilled workers	27.2	39.6
Unskilled workers	13.4	18.5

This seems to confirm what is generally said, that the Chinese immigrants tend to get their start as shop assistants (and later keepers) and semi-skilled and unskilled laborers, and that the Straits-born tend to be clerks, professionals and skilled laborers. The surprising thing is the high proportion of immigrants who have made a success in medium and big business; it is not uncommon to find in Singapore well-to-do Chinese merchants who were born paupers in China and are completely illiterate in Chinese or English.

No one dialect is the trade language, though the pre-eminent economic position of the Hokkiens means that Hokkien is the most useful dialect for business purposes. There is considerable occupational specialization by dialect groups, though less than in smaller, more homogeneous communities. The Hokkiens dominate big business and the export trade. The Cantonese predominate as artisans of all kinds, and

the Hainanese, as everywhere, are the coffee-shop owners, waiters and domestic servants. The Teochius are more catholic in their preferences than the other groups. The Hakkas have almost a monopoly on pawnshops in the city and go in extensively for market gardening.

The Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Singapore is the largest and most important Chinese organization in all Southeast Asia. It numbers scores of millionaires among its members, many of whom have appropriated such romantically descriptive titles as rubber-king, tin-baron, timber-king, etc. The Chamber is officially recognized by the government and elects one of its members to the Legislative Council. The undisputed leader of the whole Chinese community, it takes up matters that are larger than the scope of any one regional or trade organization. There are scores of trade organizations and guilds, one or more for every conceivable occupation and calling.

3. Regional and Other Organizations

Regional associations in Singapore are at four levels: The provincial, the prefecture, the hsien, and the village. The two provincial associations are, of course, Fukien and Kwangtung; membership of the former includes Cantonese, Teochiu, Hakkas and Hainanese. Hokkiens dominate the former, and Teochius the latter. The Hakkas have an association of their own which does not fit into the above scheme since members come from Kwangtung, Fukien and Hainan; it is called the Khek Community Guild, and its president is Aw Boon Haw, the Fukien Hakka millionaire who is prominent as newspaper magnate and medicine manufacturer. It would be too cumbersome to list all the regional associations, but the largest in order of importance, regardless of territorial scope, are: 1) The Fukien Association, the richest of all, whose president is Tan Lark Sye, a prominent millionaire, and which maintains four excellent Chinese schools in Singapore; 2) The Teochiu Association, which owns a great deal of Singapore real estate and has a large membership, 3) the Khek Community Guild, 4) the Kwangtung Association, 5) the Hainan Association, and 6) the Amoy Association.

There are over 100 regional associations in all. A cursory study of their membership (done by Maurice Freedman) reveals that the members are 1) overwhelmingly China-born, 2) predominantly middle-aged, and 3) mostly businessmen who hope to gain from membership some advantages for their businesses. The larger regional associations are politically important because the big towkays (successful businessmen) gain control and maneuver them on the political scene. The great mass of members are not interested in political or other policy; and consequently when it is said that an association is of a certain political hue, the comment generally applies only to the oligarchy of leaders. Wealth is virtually the only criterion of leadership in the Chinese community. Other aspects of the Chinese gentry pattern are unnecessary: One can be illiterate and still head an association. All of this is explicitly recognized by most Chinese who hold that the wealthiest should lead if for no other reason than that they must put forth a lot of money in sponsoring various celebrations and causes.

In the sense mentioned above, the Fukien Association is clearly pro-Peking. Tan Kah Kee, the most prominent pro-Communist Chinese in Southeast Asia, is a member, and his kinsman, Tan Lark Sye, is president. The leaders are not sympathizers of the Malayan Communist terrorists, however. As a matter of fact, Tan Lark Sye recently lost a US \$6,000,000

factory through Malayan Communist arson. Most of the regional associations pursue a mildly pro-Peking or neutral course. Only one or two smaller ones are outright anti-Communist nor pro-KMT.

There are innumerable clan organizations in Singapore, but they bear little resemblance, according to Maurice Freedman, to clans in China. In large part this may be due to the fact that immigrants came from poor families in China who probably never had the gentry kinship patterns to any extent. In any case, the lineage system has been virtually dropped. Genealogies are lost and forgotten: Whether or not people are actually related in the same lineage is often unknown and anyway unimportant. Having the same surname is the real tie, and that not very strong. Generation names are seldom used, and then often not in the traditional way. Ancestor worship has degenerated into a veneration of those ancestors who lived in Malaya. In the placement of ancestral tablets in cemetery temples, generation rank, descent and sex are unimportant; a place of honor on the altar can be bought for the tablet of any ancestor. Under these circumstances, clan associations are most important where the members come from the same village. For the most part, they are social organizations of people with the same surname and the same dialect.

Of some importance in Singapore community life are the numerous recreational, dramatic and athletic clubs. One of these, the Ch'ien Chin Hui (Progressive Society), a musical and dramatic society, has gained considerable notoriety for its opportunism, though its case is extreme rather than atypical. In 1942, it was among those organizations which welcomed the Japanese and cried Banzai; in 1945 it was the first to welcome the British back; during the postwar revival of the KMT it held great pro-Nationalist rallies, and in 1949 it was the first group to hoist the Peking flag. It has been dubbed the "money-first society," which in Chinese has the same sounds as its real name.

4. Education

Chinese education is probably of a higher standard in Singapore than any other region of Southeast Asia, (possibly excepting the Philippines). Some 11.2% of the entire Chinese population is enrolled in registered schools, as against 7.3% for Malays and 6.6% for Indians. The schools attended by Chinese are of very many different types, but the first logical breakdown is into schools where the medium of instruction is respectively Chinese or English. In 1948, there were approximately 58,000 Chinese students in Chinese schools and 25,000 Chinese students in English schools.

Most of the English schools are government or government aided schools. They are generally of high standard, and the government has plans for increasing their number and size so that English education will eventually be available for all who want it. English schools are divided into three stages: primary, with three years; elementary with four years, and secondary with four years. Primary education in government English schools is now free. Kuo Yu is offered as a foreign language in the English schools, which offering takes the curse off them for many Chinese parents who want their children to have both English and Chinese. About twice as many Chinese boys as Chinese girls attend English schools.

In 1948, there were one hundred eighty-four Chinese schools,

of which nine were for boys only, six for girls only and the rest mixed. There are no government-run Chinese schools. Of the 58,096 pupils, 40,320 were boys. A breakdown of these schools follows:

	<u>No. Schools</u>	<u>No. Pupils</u>	<u>No. Teachers</u>
AIDED CHINESE SCHOOLS:			
Primary only	47	27,596	760
Primary with normal	4	3,429	87
" " secondary	2	2,574	53
" " normal & secondary	1	1,319	42
Secondary only	1	1,030	38
Secondary with normal	1	810	29
PRIVATE CHINESE SCHOOLS:			
Primary only	125	21,266	512
" with secondary	1	34	3
Secondary only	1	38	6

Government aid to Chinese schools was begun in 1924 and gradually extended. The schools which apply for aid are assessed according to efficiency and compliance with the Educational Code, and grants are paid according to grade on the number of pupils in average attendance. For primary students grants range from M\$5 to M\$10 (M\$3 = US \$1), for secondary students from M\$12 to M\$18, and for normal students M\$25. Fees charged in primary schools vary from M\$1.50 per month in the lowest classes to M\$10 in middle schools. Under the government's ten year program, which began in 1948, the fees of a yearly increasing proportion of primary students will be paid by the government until, in 1958, full free primary education is attained.

Kuo Yü is the medium of instruction in all the Chinese schools, and the curriculum is a modified version of that formerly used in China. It includes Chinese, arithmetic, general knowledge, civics, physical training and handwork in the first two years. English is added in the third year, and history, science and geography complete the higher primary curriculum. Equipment, accommodations and textbooks are inadequate by western standards in most of the Chinese schools, though the larger schools sponsored by the Fukien and Cantonese associations in particular are of a high standard. The standard of English is quite low in most of the Chinese schools.

Of the teachers in Chinese schools who teach in Chinese, 355 in 1948 were Straits-born and 957 China-born, while the majority of the teachers of English were Straits-born. The China-born teachers tend to be more pro-Peking than those born in Malaya. Chinese schools tend to reflect the political tendencies of their sponsors. Thus teachers in the four Hokkien schools are rather pro-Communist. In August, Communist activity was uncovered by the government in two large Chinese schools, and occasionally when students arrive in the morning, the schools are plastered with pro-Communist slogans and posters. But on the whole, the Chinese schools in Singapore are not pro-Communist in their teachings.

The University of Malaya, located in Singapore, is composed of Arts (Raffles) and Medical (King Edward VII) colleges. Much of the original endowment came from wealthy Chinese merchants, but there is still some feeling in the Federation about the fact that the great majority of the students are Chinese. In 1949-50, 407 out of the 645 students were Chinese. Nonetheless every advantage is given Malay applicants, and

three out of every four scholarships are reserved for Malays.

5. The Press

Singapore is the largest Chinese publishing center in Southeast Asia. Singapore newspapers and magazines, as well as those from Hongkong, can be bought in most countries in the region. The three Singapore dailies, in order of importance are:

1. Nan Yang Shang Pao and Nan Fang Wan Pao (evening edition) It was no less a personage than Tan Kah Kee who founded the Nan Yang Shang Pao in 1932. It has grown into the largest, most influential, and probably the best Chinese paper in Southeast Asia. Its circulation is about 48,000, about one-third of which is in Singapore proper, the rest in Malaya and neighboring countries. One edition is run off at twelve midnight and then flown to Ipoh and Penang and sent by special van to Kuala Lumpur. The Singapore edition comes off the presses at five a. m. The average issue is eight pages, twelve on Sunday, though on special occasions it can turn out a twenty-four page issue. Its presses (Duplex unitubular) are the newest and best. The paper is a member of the UP, AP and Reuters, and has its own correspondents in several Chinese capitals. The Managing Editor, George E. Lee, unquestionably puts out an editorially interesting paper. A board of writers, no two of whom have the same opinions, rotate in writing the daily lead editorial. One day the editorial page calls the Peking regime totalitarian and an enemy of world freedom, and the next day one learns from the same page of the never-ending wonders of the greatest revolution in Chinese history. Generalizing from this round-robin, its policy tends to be anti-Communist, but rather pro-Peking; what it is most "pro" are Chinese commercial interests. Its news play is generally very fair and impartial. In October of this year, a month after the demise of Singapore's only Chinese evening paper, it launched an evening edition, the Nan Fang Wan Pao. It started with a press run of fifteen thousand, but its actual circulation has not yet attained that figure.

2. Hsing Chou Jih Pao. Aw Boon Haw entered the Singapore newspaper field with this paper in 1929. His paper has always been noted for its speedy news service, good printing, and good coverage on Southeast Asian problems and sports. Its present circulation is about thirty-five thousand and like its major rival, it has a large circulation in the Federation. Aw owns an airplane which flies the paper to the major Malayan cities every morning. A year or so ago, Aw and his papers were quite pro-Chinese Communist, but when his Canton Tiger Balm factory was confiscated by the Communists in April of this year, he (and gradually his papers) took a dimmer view of the Peking regime. Now the Hsing Chou Jih Pao has a new editor who is much less pro-Communist than his predecessor. Present policy is quite neutral and independent; critical and objective editorials are a regular feature. The paper belongs to UP, AP, Reuters and Pan-Asiatic, a new Hongkong agency. It might be mentioned here that Aw recently launched the English-language Singapore Tiger Standard, which is designed especially to appeal to English-speaking Asiatics. It has a large Chinese readership, and tends to champion the Chinese cause in local politics.

3. Chung Hsing Jih Pao. One of the many Chinese papers started in Singapore after the war was the Chung Nan Jih Pao, which in 1947 was taken over by some prominent KMT leaders and put out as a KMT organ under the name of Chung Hsing Jih Pao. It now has a circulation

of about seventeen thousand and an average size of eight pages. However, its influence seems on the decline. It is still a KMT organ, and rabidly anti-Communist; its managing editor, Tay Koh Yat, is the local KMT leader. It is a member of UP, AP, Reuters and CNA, and it uses large quantities of USIS material.

Only one of the several leftist papers established in Singapore after the war survived more than a year, namely the Nan Ch'iao Jih Pao, also founded by Tan Kah Kee. It was a Democratic League organ, put out morning and afternoon editions and had a circulation of about twelve thousand. When the government put out a call for volunteers in the anti-terrorist campaign, it alone among the Singapore papers refused to print it. The paper was rather cautious on local British policy, but very pro-Communist and anti-American. British authorities raided the paper in September of this year and arrested seven of the staff. Documents were supposedly uncovered to prove that the staff had close connections with the Malayan Communists, that it was selling victory bonds for the Peking regime, etc., and under emergency regulations the paper was closed on September 20th.

Seven major Chinese periodicals and any number of yellow and pornographic Chinese magazines are published in Singapore. The two most important of the former are Hsing Chi Liu (Saturday Review) and the Nanyang Monthly, both popular general magazines published by the Nan Yang Shang Pao Press.

6. The Political Situation

Political developments in all of Malaya, including Singapore, have been more or less of a whole, and they will be dealt with at greater length in the section on the Federation. With regard to China-oriented politics, suffice it to give here a brief background for the Communist-KMT struggle. Members of the Communistic Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army, were given an enthusiastic welcome by most Chinese when they emerged from the jungles in 1945. They pressed the Communist cause with considerable vigor until they antagonized the British to the point of arresting several Communist leaders in 1946. The Malayan Communist Party has always been over 90% Chinese, and its inner councils wholly so. The Communists made especially great advances among Chinese labor, and by 1947 dominated most of the Singapore unions. They inspired a series of severe strikes in 1947-48, which anti-Communists claim were aimed at crippling the island's economy. In any case, Communist tactics shifted radically in the spring of 1948: Most Communists, including labor leaders, went underground and the jungle insurrection began. The party was outlawed in the colony in July, 1948.

On the whole, the Chinese community gradually became disaffected of the Malayan Communists between 1946 and 1948. The prewar ban on the KMT was not reimposed by the British authorities, and the Nationalists extended their influence by leaps and bounds. Several branches of the KMT and of its San Min Chu I Youth Corps were established in Singapore. Much weaker now than in 1948, the KMT is still probably the strongest political organization in the Singapore Chinese Community. Its leader, Tay Koh Yat, is director of the Chung Hsing Jih Pao, the party organ.

If one may generalize on the political feelings of the Singapore Chinese, it would seem that most are fence sitters so far as their

KMT-Communist conflict is concerned. Perhaps the majority of those with decided opinions are more pro-KMT than pro-Peking. In any case, the vast majority do not want a Communist government in Singapore.

As far as Malayan politics are concerned, the main postwar issue has been the proposed Malayan Union. A scheme for the union rather than federation of all of Malaya with equal rights for all residents of the country, the Malayan Union would have greatly improved the Chinese position in the country. But what the British disinterestedly call an upsurge of Malay nationalism and what some more critical Chinese call British sabotage of the plan eventually led to the substitution in February, 1948, of the Federation of Malaya, with Singapore detached as a crown colony. What seemed to the Chinese to emerge most clearly from the long and bitter fight over the Union was that the Chinese community was too aloof and disorganized politically to make its weight properly felt. One result was the formation of the Malayan Chinese Association, which aims at safeguarding the rights of Malayan Chinese and uniting the Chinese with the other cultural groups in Malaya as partners in the country. It is comparatively unimportant in Singapore, as opposed to the Federation, but it does have a working committee in the city, headed by Chong Thutt Pitt. Stronger in Singapore is the Straits Chinese British Association, whose president is the lawyer, T. W. Ong. It represents the interests of the anglicized, local-born Chinese. It seems to be just as happy that Singapore remains a British colony.

The colonial government is moving very slowly towards a more widely-based democracy. The Executive Council is made up of eleven members, all appointed by the governor. The Legislative Council consists of the governor as president, four ex-officio members, five nominated official members, four nominated unofficial members, three members elected one each by the Chinese, Indian and Malay Chambers of Commerce, and six popularly elected members. To vote, a person must be a British subject or be born in Malaya or British Borneo, not have done anything in the previous three years to suggest his allegiance to a foreign power, be twenty-one or over, and have resided in the island for a total of three years, including at least one year of the preceding two. Elections are held annually in December. The Chinese, however, thoroughly irked with their treatment at the hands of the British, boycotted the 1948 and 1949 elections. Registration was higher for this year's elections, and many Chinese may vote. For some reason, Chinese are running in only two of the six constituencies.

The colonial government includes a Secretariat for Chinese Affairs, successor to the pre-war Chinese Protectorate. The Secretariat, headed by several Chinese-speaking Britishers, is concerned with all specifically Chinese problems, as well as the registration and regulation of societies. In 1949 the prewar Chinese Advisory Committee was revived, consisting of appointed Chinese community leaders and meeting under the chairmanship of the Secretary for Chinese Affairs.

7. Relations with the Malays and British

Malays constitute only 7.7% of the colony's population; their relations with the Chinese are of much less importance than in the Federation. Intermarriage virtually stopped in the late nineteenth century; it was never prevalent, due mainly to the religious differences between the two peoples. The Chinese sex ratio is now sufficiently normal that there is no impulse for the Chinese to marry outside of their cultural

In spite of the British historical policy of favoring the Malays as opposed to alien groups in their administration of Malaya, a surprising number of Singapore Chinese have pro-British feelings. The large numbers of English-school-educated, English-speaking, younger Chinese have adopted many western values, and when they compare the situation in Singapore with that in other Southeast Asian countries, they feel that under the British these values are more closely attained. In many cases, as clerks and other government officials, the very livelihood of this segment of the Chinese population is tied up with continued British administration. This group is almost entirely anti-Communist, deplores Britain's attempted recognition of Peking, and approves of the British closure of the Democratic League newspaper.

Another group, typified by China-born business leaders, is less sanguine about British policy. They still smart under the failure of the Malayan Union plan, and wonder out loud why the British are so wary about exporting democracy along with gin. They are rather unhappy about the British maintainance of social superiority and aloofness, their policy of always acting so as to maintain respect if nothing else. But resentment seldom develops into anything else, because this group benefits by the British maintenance of a free port with low taxes and an ever-rising standard of living.

The British now maintain very strict control of Chinese immigrants. In addition to wives and children of Malayan residents and persons who can prove birth in Malaya, occasionally professional men and "skilled workmen for trade and industry, if not available locally" are also admitted as immigrants. Virtually no other Chinese are admitted. As a matter of fact, in 1949, Chinese emigration exceeded immigration by over 23,000 (64,970 versus 88,627). The S. S. Van Heutz, which arrived from Chinese ports in early November, had a typical passenger list. Of the 936 Chinese passengers, 776 were former residents (a resident being defined as a person who has lived in Malaya for eight years continuously) 41 were British subjects, and 119 were new immigrants. Almost all of these last were wives and children of Chinese residents. Malayan residents who want to visit China can do so for not more than two years, and are usually given certificates of readmission before they leave Singapore."

8. Research Materials and Facilities

The London School of Economics has, following the recommendations of Professor Raymond Firth, inaugurated actual anthropological research of the Singapore Chinese community. Maurice Freedman, a very able and acute young anthropologist, has just completed two years of research into the Chinese family there, and Alan Elliot, another LSE-trained anthropologist, is just finishing his first year of research into Chinese religious practices, spirit-mediumship in particular. Mainly under the impetus of these two researchers, the China Study Group has been formed, composed of both English and Chinese with a scholarly interest in Malayan Chinese. Five or six papers have already been read at their monthly meetings. Alan Elliot is currently secretary of the group.

The Nan Yang Hsueh Hui (South Seas Society), an academic group larger and of longer standing than the China Study Group, "is concerned mainly with historical research of both China and Southeast Asia. Its president is Mr. Tan Yeok-Seong of the Nanyang Book Company, one of the leading Chinese scholars in the colony. The Society publishes twice yearly a journal in both Chinese and English. The quarterly journal of

the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, also published in Singapore, occasionally contains articles relating to the overseas Chinese. Finally, one must mention the China Society, which is interested in things Chinese, especially cultural and artistic. It has a cosmopolitan membership, and sponsors lectures, painting exhibitions and Chinese entertainments. It publishes an Annual Publication, with occasional learned articles, translations and book reviews. Mr. Lee Kim Chuan, Deputy Director of the Public Relations Office, is the secretary.

The University of Malaya has no chairs of sociology, anthropology or Chinese studies, nor any tradition of research. The Vice-chancellor, Dr. T. H. Silcock, hopes to establish a Chinese Studies department and to inaugurate social scientific research within the next year or two. Dr. Silcock expressed readiness to cooperate in any way with American scholars carrying on research in Malaya. The University library has no books or materials written in Chinese, though it has most of the periodicals which concern Far Eastern and Southeast Asian studies.

Raffles Museum and Library, a government institution, likewise has no collection of Chinese-language materials. What would most interest American researchers is the western-language collection on Malasia in the Kew Room. The books there are divided geographically as follows: Malay Archipelago (general), British Malaya, Sumatra and neighboring islands, Java and neighboring islands, Borneo, Celebes and Moluccas, and the Philippines. Almost all Southeast Asian learned journals are available, bound, way back into the nineteenth century. There are many books and archives which would be valuable in tracing the history of Malaysian Chinese. One obviously helpful book is Song Ong-siang: One Hundred Years' History of the Chinese in Singapore - London, John Murray, 1923.

In addition, there are in Singapore several small Chinese libraries, belonging either to private individuals or to clubs, regional or clan associations. Some are directed at particular subjects, e. g., a particular district group or clan. I saw one of these, the private library of Tan Yeok-seong. He had almost complete the Nan Yang Yen Chiu, a Chinese quarterly concerned with Southeast Asia and published by Chinan University in Shanghai, a Japanese catalogue on Southeast Asia published during the war, seven or eight Chinese books on the Chinese in Southeast Asia (none, however, more than a general survey based on second-hand sources).

The Singapore USIS subscribes to all the Singapore and Federation Chinese newspapers, which it files. Those over six-months old are forwarded to the Library of Congress.

FEDERATION OF MALAYA

1. Population

The mid-year, 1950, estimate for the Chinese population of the Federation is 2,008,000, which is 38.5% of the total population. Malays form about 44% of the country's population. The Federation is divided into the two former Straits Settlements, Penang and Malacca, and nine Malay States, which are ruled by Malay sultans. Of these eleven units, the Chinese have an absolute majority in two: Penang (55.42%) and Selangor (51.03%), and are the dominant group in three other states: Johore (48.06%), Perak (45.60%) and Negri Sembilan (42.74%). The Chinese population generally is concentrated in the western settlements and states; in certain of the eastern states the Malays form over 90% of the population. The Chinese are most numerous in Perak (444,509 in 1947), Selangor (362,755), Johore (354,788), Penang (247,411), and Negri Sembilan (114,411).

The proportion of the various dialect groups is considerably different from that in Singapore. Hokkiens, Cantonese, and Hakkas form over three-quarters of the total Chinese population. The 1950 figures are as follows: Hokkien 28.6% (574,000), Cantonese 25.7% (516,000), Hakkas 21.1% (424,000), Teochius 10.9% (219,000), Hainanese 5.6% (112,000), and Kwongsai 3.8% (76,000). Historical accident and occupational preference have led to a highly variable distribution of these groups throughout the country. The Hokkiens, the first dialect group to come in large numbers to Malaya and preeminently urban and commercial, are concentrated in the two former Straits Settlements, in Selangor with its metropolis of Kuala Lumpur, and in Johore. They are also widely employed in agriculture in the last two states and in Perak. The Cantonese predominate on the Malay States as such, where they are engaged equally in commerce, industry, agriculture and mining. They form the largest single dialect group in Perak, Negri Sembilan and Pahang. The Hakkas, as in China are the most rurally inclined of the Chinese dialect groups and they provide, with the Cantonese, the bulk of the tin-mining population. The Teochius are, by an accident of early association, the most numerous dialect group in Kedah. Except in this one state, they tend to prefer urban occupations. The Hainanese are concentrated in towns and villages in the rubber-growing districts. They form the largest group in Trengganu, which has a very small Chinese population. The Kwongsai are concentrated in a few districts in the states of Perak, Pahang and Johore. The four most important dialect groups, for the eight subdivisions of the Federation with sizeable Chinese populations are listed below, with 1947 figures in thousands in parentheses:

	<u>First</u>	<u>Second</u>	<u>Third</u>	<u>Fourth</u>
Selangor	Hokkien (108)	Cantonese (100)	Hakka (97)	Teochiu (21)
Penang	Hokkien (107)	Cantonese (55)	Teochiu (49)	Hakka (22)
Johore	Hokkien (117)	Hakka (77)	Teochiu (55)	Cantonese (49)
Malacca	Hokkien (37)	Hakka (23)	Cantonese (13)	Hainanese (12)
N. Sembilan	Cantonese (37)	Hakka (35)	Hokkien (22)	Hainanese (7)
Perak	Cantonese (167)	Hakka (98)	Hokkien (81)	Teochiu (33)
Pahang	Cantonese (29)	Hakka (21)	Kwongsai (18)	Hokkien (4)
Kedah	Teochiu (33)	Hakka (31)	Cantonese (25)	Hakka (16)

In the two former Straits Settlements, which were the first parts of the country to be settled by the Chinese, the great majority of

the urban population is Chinese (70% in Penang, 73% in Malacca), and the great majority of the Chinese population is Straits-born (70% in Penang, 66% in Malacca). In the Federation as a whole, 63.5% of the Chinese population is local born, and census figures seem to indicate that nearly 90% of the Chinese born in Malaya since 1931 and still surviving remain in the country. The Chinese population of the country is thus remarkably permanent. In all states but the two (Kelantan and Trengganu) with the smallest relative Chinese population, more than half of the urban population is Chinese.

2. Occupations and Business

The distribution of the Chinese population in the Federation by industrial group is quite different from that in Singapore. Of every 10,000 Chinese males in the Federation, 5,580 are gainfully employed, and of these 2,390 are occupied in agriculture, 1,050 in commerce and finance 849 in manufacturing, 346 in personal service, 269 in mining, 225 in transportation and communication, 172 in fishing, 110 in public administration, and 79 in professional service.

Agriculture is the most important occupation of the Chinese in every state or settlement except Penang. More than half the gainfully employed Chinese men in Johore, Pahang and Negri Sembilan are agriculturalists. The term, agriculture, covers many different followings, and one of the most important is rubber production. Chinese planters are, for the most part, small holders by comparison with the large European estates. In many states there are Chinese Rubber Planters Associations. The Chinese estate population (consisting mainly of workers and tappers on European rubber estates) in 1947 was 114,422 out of a total estate population of 412,330. The Chinese are the most industrious of the estate workers, though not the steadiest, and they prefer piece-rate or contract work. Occasionally they overtop in their eagerness to make money. After the Emergency began many planters began to lay off their Chinese employees because they were more union conscious and susceptible to Communist influence. However, in the past year many Chinese have been reemployed due to the high price of rubber and the general labor shortage. In most parts of the Federation, Hakkas predominate among rubber tappers.

Most Chinese agriculturalists are small holders, and probably the majority of these have no legal title to their land. They are what is termed "squatters" and constitute the biggest problem in the country, since they perforce cooperate with the Communist Terrorists. The major crops, aside from rubber, are vegetables, pepper, rice, and pineapple. Pig and poultry raising are important secondary occupations, and the Chinese virtually monopolize the production of these staples.

The second and third most important occupations in all the states (except Penang, where they are first and second) are commerce and finance and manufacturing. Here the Chinese rather thoroughly dominate the field. In the skilled artisan and building trades, sawmills, oil mills, soap factories; in banking, pawnbroking, money lending; and in import-export (next to Europeans in some lines), the Chinese take the lead. Most rubber dealers and exporters are Hokkien; most shopkeepers, especially grocers and artisans, are Cantonese; most pawnbrokers Hakkas, and most timber sawyers Kwongsais. In Penang, Hokkien is the trade language, and on the peninsula Cantonese and/or Hakka generally serves.

Mining is the fourth most important Chinese occupation in Perak.

and Selangor, and of large relative importance in Pahang, Negri Sembilan and Trengganu. It was the opening of the tin mines in the middle nineteenth century that started the mass immigration of Chinese into the peninsula. Hakkas and Cantonese clearly predominate among mine workers, in both European and Chinese mines. Most of the tin mines are Chinese-owned, but they are small compared to European-owned ones. In consequence the production of the latter outstrips Chinese-owned mines about eight to five.

Personal service is either fourth or fifth among Chinese occupations in all states. Chinese take the lead in tailoring, dress-making, cobbling, hotel keeping, restaurant and coffee-shop keeping, waiting and domestic service. The Hainanese and Hakkas tend to predominate in most of these lines.

Fishing ranks fifth to seventh in Johore, Selangor, Perak, Malacca, Penang and Kedah. In certain isolated Chinese fishing villages such as Gila and Pasir Hitam in Perak, Palau Ketam in Selangor, and Pulan Kukub in Johore, the male population lives almost entirely by fishing. Unfortunately, the population of the villages is increasing while the fishing grounds are not, and the authorities may have to restrict licensing.

In Penang, Kuala Lumpur, Ipoh, Malacca, Johore Bahru, and several of the small towns in the Federation, the usual Chinese trade and business guilds are to be found. In particular, the rubber planters, tin mine owners and various retail traders have organized. The major Chinese Chambers of Commerce are located in Penang, Malacca and the capital cities of seven of the nine Malay states. The most important are those of Penang, Kuala Lumpur and Johore Bahru, each of which has over two thousand members. The nine most important of the Chambers have formed the Associated Chinese Chambers of Commerce, which elect two representatives to the Federal council.

3. Regional and other organizations

Regional associations at all levels from province to village are to be found in Malaya. I actually visited only Penang and Kuala Lumpur, and so can speak in detail only for these two cities (the two largest in the Federation). In Penang, where the Hokkiens predominate, there is no overall Hokkien Association; rather the dialect group is organized into separate hsien associations. There are Cantonese, Teochiu Hakka, Hainan and Hokchiu associations and of these the Hakka Association is the strongest. As in Singapore, most members are China-born. In Kuala Lumpur the seven major regional organizations are Kwangtung, Fukien, Teochiu, Hakka, Kwongsai, Hainan, and San Chiang Associations. Hokchiaⁿ and Hokchius belong to the Fukien Association. Usually dialect overrides territorial ties; e. g., a Hakka from Ch'ao Chou can join the Teochiu Association if he so desires, but he will almost always join the Hakka Association instead. The various village and hsien associations and many of the clan associations of a given district usually affiliate with the appropriate one of the seven main regional associations. These regional associations, as elsewhere, act as mutual-help societies, give death benefits, provide social-club centers, and in many cases have small libraries.

In Kuala Lumpur, the Selangor Chinese Assembly Hall is of great importance to the Chinese community. Not a society itself, it is

rather a central meeting place for all sorts of organizations, programs, lectures, benefits, etc. It serves the entire community, regardless of dialect group. Some regional associations and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce have their offices in the Assembly Hall. There are in Kuala Lumpur two so-called dramatic societies, the Chiu Lok, made up predominantly of English-speaking Chinese; and the Yan Keng, with a largely Chinese-speaking membership. Both are over thirty years old. Their main purposes are charitable: Through benefits and direct solicitation they gather funds for distribution among the needy. Especially among the English-speaking Chinese, recreation and athletic organizations are of considerable social importance in both Penang and Kuala Lumpur.

Pang Hui, or Triad secret societies, still exist in parts of the Federation. In Malaya, they early degenerated into protection and intimidation organizations controlling gambling, smuggling, prostitution, opium and similar rackets. In the decades before 1942, they were outlawed and gotten under effective control by the British authorities. When the British took over in 1945, however, the law governing the registration of societies was not reintroduced, and a secret society called Ang Pin Hui emerged in Penang, and other related societies sprang up in Kedah, Perak, Selangor and Johore. At first the Ang Pin Hui apparently included some ex-MPAJA guerillas in its membership, but soon the secret societies were avowedly anti-Communist. Some allied themselves with the KMT groups, and political murders occurred. The authorities then reimposed the ban on Pang Hui and by 1947 had pretty well suppressed the groups. In some areas of the Federation, remnants of these societies engage in opium smuggling and run opium dens, and there have been a few clashes since the emergency began between Triad groups and Communist terrorist forces. There are no active lodges now in the larger cities.

4. Education

In 1949 there were about 1,340 Chinese schools of all types in the Federation, with a total enrollment of 202,800, boys outnumbering girls eight to three. Of these schools, 29 are old-style private schools teaching the Chinese classics, 41 are mission schools, 24 are estate schools (run by European estate managers, as required by law), 139 are night-schools, 2 are government free schools, and 20 are private free schools. Practically all the remaining 1085 are the usual modern or semi-modern schools run by the Chinese communities generally or by regional associations. Schools sponsored by regional associations are more prevalent in rural areas than in the cities. There has been a large increase in enrollment since 1945, and accommodations are very inadequate in many cases. There is a dearth of trained teachers as well, because, during the Japanese occupation, many Chinese teachers lost their lives and none were trained. Curricula are similar to those prevalent in Nationalist China, with added units of English. Textbooks are locally published, and most have been revised since 1946. A new civics text, written with special reference to Malaya, was completed and introduced this fall in the middle schools.

Some of the best Chinese schools receive limited government aid, about M\$6 per year per student. The majority of the schools' income, however, comes directly from members of the Chinese community. Trustees of the schools are always chosen from among the wealthy and are then expected to make especially heavy contributions. Many schools solicit regular subscriptions from prominent community members, of perhaps M\$2 per month. Almost all schools give benefit concerts at least once a year. Prominent Chinese citizens are prone to give large sums occasion-

ally for the prestige value; frequently they get a building or classroom named for them. Few contributions, however, are as large as the M\$200,000 gift which Aw Boon Haw recently gave a Penang school for new buildings.

Many Chinese attend English schools, just as in Singapore. Some of these are run by the government and some by missions. About 30% of the English education in Malaya (including Singapore) is provided by Methodist schools, and approximately 30,000 of their 38,000 students are Chinese. Tuition for English schools is slightly less than for Chinese schools, because the former get much more government aid.

I can be somewhat more specific for the two cities I visited. In Penang, there are three Chinese middle schools, one for girls, two for boys. There are also five English high schools attended by Chinese; except for the one free school among them, the majority of their students are Chinese. Three English primary schools are also attended mainly by Chinese. Finally there are about a score of Chinese primary schools. Most of the Chinese schools have boards of trustees drawn from the whole Chinese community; only two are operated by regional associations. Probably the best Chinese middle school in all of Malaya is the Chung Ling High School in Penang. With fifteen hundred students, all boys, and an entirely Chinese teaching staff, the school maintains a standard as high as most American high schools. English is compulsory from the beginning, and the aim is to teach more and more courses in English as the grades ascend. Everything in the senior year except Chinese language is taught in English. The buildings are modern, well planned and beautifully equipped. It is what it is because of several large contributions. Most of the classrooms are named in large (English) letters after the man with whose funds it was built. With its high-standards, the school gets a comparatively large government subsidy, M\$10,000 a term. But its expenses run about M\$10,000 per month. Interestingly enough, the principals of the Chinese schools in Penang agreed last month to introduce Malay as a secondary subject from the fifth grade up.

In Kuala Lumpur, there are also three Chinese middle schools, two for boys and one for girls. The second boys' school was started after a quarrel between Cantonese and Hokkien factions on the board of trustees of the then-existing one Chinese boys' school. There are about thirty Chinese primary schools, including one large, so-called Confucian school, which is a compromise between the old-style Classical school and the modern type. About fifteen English schools exist, several mission-run, and most with Chinese student bodies. On the whole, the Kuala Lumpur Chinese community prefers an English education, but English schools have not the facilities to accommodate more than a portion of the applicants.

5. The Press

Four Chinese dailies are now published in the Federation, two in Penang, and one each in Ipoh and Kuala Lumpur. In order of importance, these are:

- 1) Kuang Hua Jih Pao, Penang, with a circulation of about nine thousand. The paper was established in 1910 by no less a personage than Sun Yat-sen, who was then in Malaya soliciting support for the revolutionary cause. Most of the men who run it are KMT members and its policy is clearly pro-KMT and anti-Peking. It is a member of the AP, UP

and Reuters, and has very good local coverage. Its average size is eight full pages!

2) Hsing Pin Jih Pao, Penang, with a circulation of about six thousand. It belongs to Aw Boon Haw's "star" chain of papers. It gets China news indirectly from Singapore, does not rely on radio, nor subscribe to either CNA or NCNA. It does belong to UP, AP, and Reuters. The editor and managing director are both Fukien Hakkas, as is Aw Boon Haw himself. Its policy is neutral, and corresponds almost exactly to Aw's Singapore Chinese daily. It was founded in 1939, but began anew in 1945 after the hiatus of the Japanese occupation.

3) Chung Kuo Pao, Kuala Lumpur, with a circulation of about five thousand. The present managing director, Mr. Chin Chi-Miao started the paper as a small tabloid in 1946 in competition with a larger pro-Communist paper. He gradually built it up, and when the other paper was banned at the beginning of the emergency in 1948, he had a clear field. Now it is a full-sized eight-page daily (except Sunday)! It publishes its own editorials daily. Right of center, it is vigorously anti-Communist and rather pro-KMT. A strictly commercial venture, it is now making money.

4) Chien Kuo Jih Pao, Ipoh, with a circulation of about four thousand. Established in 1940, it is a full-sized paper of usually eight pages. In policy it too is pro-KMT and anti-Communist.

Another Chinese paper, the Hua Ch'iao Hsiao Pao, is published in Kuala Lumpur, but only irregularly. The editor, Lim Shua-chuan, is a renegade Communist, now very pro-KMT! Whenever he has enough advertising to make money on an issue, he puts it out; which means from two to four times monthly. He relies heavily on USIS material. The Federal Chinese Secretariat in Kuala Lumpur puts out semi-monthly a Chinese paper specifically for squatters. Called the Nung Min Hsiao Pao, it has a circulation throughout the Federation of about 25,000. It explains the governmental policy towards squatters, tells what has been done, and gives news of the various resettlement projects.

Mention should also be made of the Hsien Tai Jih Pao, a former Penang Daily which was closed by British authorities on September 20, 1950. With a circulation of about nine thousand, its success in Penang was remarkable considering its pro-Communist policy. It was closed at the same time and under the same circumstances as the Nan Ch'iao Jih Pao in Singapore.

It has already been mentioned that the Singapore Chinese papers circulate widely in the Federation.

6. The Political Situation (Parts of this section are plagiarized from an article by W. L. Blythe.)

I have reserved for this section material relating to the Emergency, as it is called in Malaya, that is, to the armed terrorism of the Communist-led guerillas in the Malayan jungles. First a brief recapitulation of the events leading up to the Emergency, which began in 1948, is in order.

Communism was first heard of in Malaya in the early 1920's when the Comintern established a Far Eastern Bureau at Shanghai, and

Chinese Communist agents tried to propagate the doctrine among both Malays and Chinese in Malaya. They succeeded only in penetrating night schools and craft guilds of the Hainanese section of the Chinese Community. Reorganizations of the Malayan CP took place occasionally, but in spite of new emphases on multi-racial organization, the direction of the Party and the majority of members remained Chinese. Unlawful in Malaya, the Party worked underground, but was nonetheless rather successful in penetrating labor unions. By the end of 1939, the Party had attained surprising control of much of the Chinese community by vigorously espousing the anti-Japanese cause and generally appealing to patriotism. In 1939 and early 1940, it adopted an ever more anti-British policy, staging a series of anti-British outbreaks, but these activities were soft-pedaled on instructions from China not to endanger the policy of British aid to China. When Germany attacked Russia in the summer of 1941 the Malayan CP adopted a pro-Allied policy, and so, when the Japanese attacked in December, representatives of the Party were invited to attend the government-sponsored Chinese Mobilization Committee. When Singapore fell in February, 1942, the Communists took to the jungle and formed the Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army. Later British officers were sent into Malaya by submarine and parachute to act as liaison officers with the MPAJA, and arms and supplies were furnished by air.

Meanwhile the Malayan branches of the KMT (also illegal, just as the MCP) had, after two or three years of cooperating with pro-Communists, decided in 1940 that they were being engulfed. They denounced the Communists and withdrew their support from CP front organizations. When the Japanese came, most KMT members kept to their shops, although one band of KMT guerillas, called the Malayan Overseas Chinese Self-Defense Army, took to the jungles, where they continued their antagonism against the MPAJA as well as the Japanese.

At the close of hostilities the Chinese Communists made great initial gains. The MPAJA took over control in many areas of Malaya, and received a warm welcome from the mass of Chinese inhabitants. They set up headquarters in most towns and villages throughout Malaya, from which they administered, concentrating on the elimination of collaborators. The wartime isolation of the Malayan Communists from those in China and the attraction to the Party during the occupation of many Malayan-born Chinese made of the MCP much more of a strictly Malayan organization than it had been in prewar days. In any case, the MCP followers made a strong bid after the war for control of the entire country. Leftist newspapers were established everywhere, and the jungle heroes reigned supreme. British troops arrived in September, 1945, however, and did their best to contain Communist power. Finally in December, the MPAJA agreed to disband and disarm. Payment was made for arms handed in, and many were, but quantities of arms remained cached away in the jungle. The disbanded MPAJA soldiers formed an ex-service Comrades Association, and various front organizations, the New Democratic Youth League, Women's Association, and Labor Unions. These groups and Peoples Committees took over the MPAJA headquarters in the various towns.

Right after the war, there was also immediate and vigorous activity on the part of the KMT. Emissaries were flown in from China, branches of the KMT and the San Min Chu I Youth Corps were quickly re-established. In most towns and villages, headquarters were set up as near as possible to the Communist headquarters, but with the Nationalist twelve-pointed star instead of the hammer and sickle. Most Chinese

shopkeepers supported the KMT effort since they were finding the weight of Communist control more than they could bear. Clashes took place between the various organizations of the two camps.

Communist representatives had been nominated to the Advisory Councils which during the British Military Administration (up to March, 1946) performed certain legislative functions. But the rigidity of the Communist members on these Councils discredited the Party in the eyes of the British authorities and some of the public. When, in February, 1946, the Communists attempted to stage a large anti-British demonstration, many of the Party's leaders were arrested. The CP was able to make little more political hay out of the struggle over the Malayan Union than was the KMT. Throughout Malaya, the MCP was faced by a swiftly-expanding KMT, no longer fettered by prewar restrictions, and backed in many cases by ruthless Pang Hui. CP funds were dwindling, Party activities throughout the labor movement were uncovered with alarm by both KMT and government authorities; and there was some criticism by Party members of the leaders' policies which seemed to have lost for the Party its big chance.

Finally, the MCP leadership was reshuffled, and in March, 1948, (following the Calcutta meeting of Asian Communists), a decision was reached to re-establish the MPAJA, organize jungle camps, and embark on armed revolt. As an introduction, the Party ordered an immediate intensification of strikes at rubber factories, incendiarism, strikes among dock workers, the throwing of hand grenades, etc. In April, a campaign of murder started, directed mainly against KMT members among shopkeepers, school teachers and labor foremen, but extending also to European managers of rubber estates and tin mines. The "Emergency" had begun.

The Communist-led insurrection has some very strange aspects, not the least of which is that the guerillas, never more than 5000 strong, have been able to hold at bay over 18,000 regular troops (British, Malays and especially Gurkhas), 70,000 police, and several squadron of the Royal Air Force. Three factors stand out as an explanation of this peculiar state of affairs. 1) Three-fourths of the country is still virgin jungle, broken by estates and small-holdings, but nevertheless almost continuous from Johore to the Thai border. It is ideal guerilla country, and virtually precludes direct campaigns of annihilation on the part of security forces. 2) The group of at least 300,000 Chinese squatters, scattered and unprotected by government police or armed forces, have no alternative, no matter what their inclinations, but to cooperate with the insurgents. Sufficient food, money and other necessities are thus readily available to the guerillas. 3) With the Communist success in China, and the general post-war advance of world Communism, the insurgents feel theirs to be an inevitably victorious cause. Their morale is unquestionably higher than the security forces opposing them. The wave-of-the-future psychology and strong Communist belief in the historical infallibility of Marxist doctrine can not be discounted in the success of their efforts.

The Central Executive Committee of the Malayan CP entirely Chinese, runs the campaign through directives issued to the committees in the various states. This central committee is the apex of an hierarchial structure based on, "in addition to the regular uniformed fighting units who spend most of their time in the jungle, both part-time bandits who are often small-holders or estate workers by day, and

an elaborate civilian support organization. Much attention is devoted to propaganda, and almost every state has regular cyclostyled news-sheets. It is possible that a few trained agents have infiltrated into Malaya from China or elsewhere, but most informed people think the improvement in tactics is due to experience and an overhaul by local Communist leaders of their methods. There is no evidence of side-scale smuggling of arms and ammunition. Murder is continually committed for no other reason than possession of the gun someone may be carrying. Some feel that availability of arms and ammunition is the only factor limiting the insurgent strength. In 1949, taking their cue from the Communists in China, the insurgents began calling themselves the Malayan National Liberation Army. Now all manifestos are issued in the name of a certain unit or branch of this organization. It is interesting to note that most of the terrorists are Hainanese and Hakkas.

On the strictly military level, the situation has been as follows. Insurgent-inspired incidents reached their first peak in late 1948, followed by a comparatively low rate of murders and sabotage throughout 1949. During much of that year, it is conjectured that the Communists were engaged in regrouping and retaining. In any case, 1950 saw a great increase in incidents, which has continued unabated throughout the year. The security forces suffer from poor intelligence, but it has been found that bombing attacks on presumed jungle insurgent camps do result in fewer incidents. The pressure of the terrorists is constant. They attack unexpectedly, sometimes by day, more often by night. Every estate and every village which does not cooperate with the insurgents, must maintain heavy security forces. No one but the insurgents travels or ventures outside after dusk.

Surprisingly enough, civilian victims of the terrorists have been mainly Chinese. Since the beginning of the Emergency through October, 1950, 1,180 civilians have been killed, 700 wounded, while 343 are still missing. Of the dead, 788 were Chinese, 187 Malays, 78 Indians, 58 Sakai, and 53 Europeans. In addition 270 regular police and 185 special constables, mostly Malays, have been killed by the terrorists. The Federal government claims that up to October, 1950, 1,487 bandits have been killed, and 530 suspects arrested. Of the latter, 130 were sentenced to death, 136 imprisoned, 181 acquitted, with other cases either withdrawn or pending. February, 1950, was named "anti-bandit" week, and an all-out effort at recruitment for security forces and anti-insurgent activities was made. The Chinese response was very poor, and the campaign was generally ineffective.

It has already been mentioned that the insurgents enjoy the effective cooperation of most of the Chinese rural population. In some areas, among the poorer Chinese squatters, much of this cooperation is voluntary: the guerillas are as correct as possible under the circumstances in their relations with these people and usually pay for the food they requisition. Other Chinese, who disapprove of terrorism, sympathize with the insurgents as brother Chinese allied with the present government of China. Most of the cooperation, however, is a direct result of the fact that adequate police protection is wanting, and of the effective terrorization of the Chinese population. Chinese are frequently killed, either because they did not contribute sufficient funds or food or because they were suspected of having given information to the government.

The Federation authorities soon understood the key role in

the rebellion played, however passively, by Chinese squatters. In early 1949, several drastic measures were taken, in the course of which whole villages were removed to detention camps and suspect Chinese illegally in Malaya were deported. Well over 7000 Chinese are still in detention camps as such, and about 6,450 have been repatriated. With complete Communist control of China, however, deportation to China has ceased. By mid year, 1950, reasonable and even sensible plans were drawn up by authorities to provide a long-range solution to the squatter problem, and these were adopted by regulations in May and October, 1949.

The main feature of the new government approach, now being followed, is that the Chinese rural population in unprotected areas shall be regrouped and resettled, and provided with adequate defense against insurgent encroachment. In the process, it is hoped that land hunger of the squatters will be satisfied and their low living standards and conditions of oppression improved. The new communities are of three types: 1) settlements, whereby police protection is provided for groups of squatters holding temporary leases, and located in sections which can be made secure by building roads and police posts, 2) Regroupings, whereby squatters are removed to nearby areas where they are regrouped in a more compact and easily protected community, and 3) Resettlements, whereby squatters are removed completely some distance from their original homes to newly built camps. To date, somewhat over 20,000 persons have been brought under control in one or another of these types of communities, while it is estimated that 290,000 remain to be settled, resettled or regrouped. When the Emergency began, many squatters moved to protected villages of their own initiative. Many others were attracted to estates and mines during 1950 by the high wages resulting from the inflated world prices for rubber and tin. And estate owners caused all their employees to move onto the estates and undertook their protection. In all these ways, the squatter population was reduced apart from the government's settlement programs.

I was able to visit one resettlement camp in Johore and to get first-hand accounts of several others throughout the Federation. More or less typical is the following procedure for setting up a camp. First a site is selected, taking into account both ease of defense and suitability for agriculture. Some two acres must be allowed per family for vegetable growing, and larger plots for pineapples and pepper. Next, a large, temporary kongsi is built, into which the families to be resettled move. Once there, the ex-squatters help with the building of their homes. All buildings are temporary, many made of unseasoned wood, but adequate sanitary facilities are provided and the layout is spacious and in accord with modern planning. Those families within two and a half miles of the camp have fourteen days to move, during which they are given a subsistence allowance of M\$3 per day, and M\$30 to build a hut. Those more distant are taken to the camp, and put in kongsis until their new quarters are completed; their subsistence allowance lasts twenty weeks. When the huts are completely built, the kongsi buildings are used as schoolhouses. The whole business costs the government an average of M\$300 per family.

Most of the camps aim at a size around 200 families, though a few, including the one I saw, are somewhat larger. Resettlement camps bear some resemblance to Chinese walled villages: the actual residences are clustered within a barbed-wire enclosure and all residents retire to the encampment at night for protection. Cultivated lands are outlying

from the camp. The eventual aim is to replace the temporary structures with permanent dwellings, and to make of the camps model towns. At present, the camps are administered by a British Colonial servant with a knowledge of Chinese, under whom is a Chinese assistant town superintendent. Internally, the organization is modeled on the pao-chia system of Nationalist China, with leaders popularly elected. Most of those resettled are reconciled to or pleased with the new arrangement; practically all appreciate the protection afforded. After a year or so, all residents are given full title to their holdings. Many show their feeling of permanency by planting crops that will take several years to bear.

The resettlement program is being held up by three factors: First of all, the Malay rulers are reluctant to waive rights to land earlier set aside solely for Malays. Secondly, there is a shortage of European colonial administrators with a knowledge of Chinese. And third, funds are not adequate for rapid progress. Still it is planned eventually to bring practically all of the rural Chinese in the country under administrative and military protection.

In 1948 when the Emergency began, the Chinese community was in a rather ugly mood, from the government's point of view. The controversy over the Malayan Union had embittered many Chinese; their resentment was less against the Malay people than the British and their Malay political stooges. In part the Communists cashed in on this bitterness, and they certainly gained prestige from Communist advances in China. It seemed quite possible, in short, that the Communist insurgents would gain widespread popular support from the Chinese Community. It is therefore a remarkable development that in the past two years the overwhelming majority of the Chinese have repudiated the insurgents and that they have begun to unite and give active help to the anti-insurgent campaign.

In February, 1949, the move to unite the Chinese community to protect its own interests in the country resulted in the formation of the Malayan Chinese Association. The cause of the squatters was taken up by the new organization, which started to raise funds to alleviate the hardship of resettlement. Actually, most of the Association's energies have been directed toward uniting the Chinese and gathering strength. Membership has grown rapidly, especially among non-English speaking Chinese; it is now about 140,000.

Its leaders are mainly towkays, conservative by nature. Nonetheless, they have worked hard to awaken the Chinese from their political apathy and inaction. In November the President of the MCA, Tan Cheng Lock, delivered a scathing attack on Chinese fence-sitters who have done nothing to help the authorities out of fear of terrorists or "lack of public spirit." He accused most Chinese of being concerned only with their business and with keeping well out of the Emergency. This sort of talk has some results: it is convincing many Chinese that their grievances against the British are meager when placed alongside of what they would lose in the event of terrorist advances. Certainly the MCA, if not the voice, is the most important voice of the Malayan Chinese. All the Chinese members of the Federal Council are members, and the MCA will probably select candidates to run in the municipal elections scheduled for 1951.

Under the Federal constitution, the British High Commissioner

has the responsibility, among others, of "safeguarding the special position of the Malays"; and the government structure clearly reflects this bias. The High Commissioner presides over an almost exclusively Malay Executive Council. The Legislative Council consists of the High Commissioner as president, three ex-officio members, the nine presidents of the State Councils of the Malay States, a representative each from Penang and Malacca, and fifty unofficial members? The fifty seats are allotted as follows: Labor 6, Planting (rubber and oil palms) 6; Mining 4, Commerce 6, Agriculture and Husbandry 8, Professional, Educational and Cultural 4, Settlements 2, Malay States 9, Chinese Community 2, and one each from the Indian, Ceylonese and Eurasian communities. The two representatives from the Chinese community are elected by the Associated Chinese Chambers of Commerce. Of the other forty-eight Council members, there are fourteen other Chinese, representing rubber, tin, education, etc. It is likely that the government will make formal recognition of the MCA when new councilors are selected early next year by appointing one or more from an MCA-prepared list of nominees.

The Chinese community is almost universally discontented with the Federal set-up. The many anglicized Chinese in Penang, for instance, look with envy on the rapid advance in social welfare and education in the colony of Singapore. While there are free Malay schools, government aid is negligible for Chinese schools. Three out of four scholarships for the university are reserved for Malays. They feel that the Chinese, the wealthiest group in the Federation, are being milked so that Malay sultans and politicians can have ever more expensive motor cars. The Chinese everywhere say that they desire only equal rights with the Malays and adequate representation in Kuala Lumpur, where their fates are now so largely determined. Discontent in Penang has reached the point where there is serious talk of petitioning the crown to "detach Penang from the Federation and make it once again a colony. More conciliatory voices, however, will probably continue to prevail. Resentment over the Federal question remains the largest obstacle to full Chinese support of the British anti-terrorist campaign.

The Malayan Chinese, most of whom are local-born, and who have plenty of local political problems, are probably as disinterested in China politics as any Chinese in Southeast Asia. Their history in parts of the Federation is centuries old; they have prospered there and their interests are there. The prestige of the KMT has greatly declined in the past three years, and the Chinese Communists and front organizations are outlawed. Though this "cannot be said of most Southeast Asian countries, it is my impression that the majority of the Malayan Chinese are not pro-Peking, much less pro-Communist. With regard to China, most are fence-sitting or indifferent. However, KMT leaders in Penang, Kuala Lumpur, Malacca and Johore Bahru are planning a loyalty mission to Taiwan similar to the missions which have already gone there from the Philippines, Sumatra, and Thailand. According to public announcements, the mission will be the largest of its kind, and is a concrete expression of "the recent majority switch among overseas Chinese to the support of Chiang and the Nationalist regime." It is scheduled to leave early in 1951.

7. Relations with the Malaya and British

The earliest Chinese immigrants, especially the Hokkiens who went to Malacca and Penang, married Malay women in most cases, since the

brought no women with them whatsoever. Intermarriage decreased as soon as Chinese women came, however, and stopped almost entirely by the late 19th century. The Malacca "Baba Chinese" still show their Malay blood in such obvious features as skin color, and in Malacca in particular there has been considerable assimilation of Malay patterns. Many Chinese born in Malaya can speak Malay; few, however, speak only Malay. There is a surprising number of Chinese, especially in Penang, who speak English well, are poor in their native Chinese dialect, speak no Kuo Yü, and are illiterate in Chinese. It is interesting to note that the Malays quite frequently adopt Chinese children, especially girls; that is, they buy them from Chinese parents who are too poor to bring them up or have enough children already.

Chinese culture has changed radically in the Malayan setting. Much culture change really involves dropping patterns no longer necessary or appropriate. Some small elements involve assimilation of Malay patterns, but most of the changes are in the direction of anglicization and modernization. Most of the educated Chinese are far more British in attitude and way of life than their Malay counterparts. In family, kinship and marriage patterns and in social and recreational patterns, the Chinese are moving toward the modern British model. Nonetheless, almost the full range of patterns from traditional Chinese to modern British can be found in all aspects of the culture of the Malayan Chinese.

Towards the British, the Chinese attitude is generally ambivalent. Chinese admire and imitate British culture, but they smart under British social superiority and (often unconscious) anti-Chinese bias. Towards the Malays, Chinese have feelings varying from disdain to indifference, most often perhaps one of condescension.

Federation immigration policy parallels closely that of Singapore. In 1949, the number of Chinese emigrants exceeded that of Chinese immigrants (40,257 to 31,479).

8. Research Materials and Facilities

Most Chinese libraries were destroyed or damaged during the war, and there were never many. Now only a few of the dialect and clan associations in Penang, Kuala Lumpur, and Malacca have material of any use. Some clan books and early records of the Chinese are likely available. USIS in Singapore subscribes to the four Chinese dailies in the Federation, and keeps them in file.

SARAWAK

1. Population

British North Borneo is, for mainly historical reasons, divided into three distinct political units. Sarawak, before the war the British-protected land of the White Rajahst became a crown colony in 1946. Brunei, a sultanate, remains a British protectorate, though its British High Commissioner is the Governor of Sarawak. North Borneo, before the war the last state of a British chartered company, was, like Sarawak, reorganized as a British colony after the war. I did not visit Brunei, which has a miniscule Chinese population, and what information I have about the Chinese there will be included in this section on Sarawak.

A reliable estimate of the Chinese population of Sarawak and Brunei for November, 1950, based on the excellent 1947 census report, is 162,000. Of these, fewer than 9,000 reside in Brunei. About 65% of the Chinese population is Borneo-born. Sarawak is divided administratively into five Divisions, the First being in the far west and the Fifth in the east. The great majority of the Chinese reside in the First Division (with its major city, Kuching) and the Third Division (with its major city, Sibul).

The relative importance of the dialect groups is, aside from North Borneo, peculiar in Southeast Asia. Hakkas and Hokchius (Foochow) are the dominant groups. The proportions of the various groups and 1950 estimates of their absolute size follow: Hakka 31.4% (51,100), Hokchiu 27.5% (44,800), Hokkien, including Chaoan, 15.2% (23,600), Cantonese 10.6% (17,300), Teochiu 8.7% (14,200), Hainanese 3.0% (4,800), and Henghua 2.9% (4,700). The distribution of these dialect groups throughout the country is highly variable; there are several noticeable concentrations. More than half the Chinese population of the First Division are Hakkas, with Hokkiens second and Teochius third. The Hakkas, however, are mainly rural, and in Kuching (the metropolis of the Division and the colonial capital), Hakkas are third after Hokkiens and Teochius. Hakkas are also the predominant group in the Second and Fourth Divisions and in Brunei. In the Third Division, however, Hokchius form over 65% of the Chinese population, and Sibul, the Division seat, is popularly called "Little Foochow". It happens that in the Fifth Division, with a Chinese population under 2,000, Hokkiens are in the majority.

2. Occupations and Business

Rubber production, trading and processing constitute the most important industry in Sarawak, and the Chinese predominate at all stages of operations. Most of the Chinese planters are small holders, the average Chinese holding being 5.81 acres, while fewer than 60 own estates over 100 acres. Somewhat over half the tappers in the country are Chinese. Small Chinese rural stores collect rubber from the planters and distribute groceries on credit in return. Those stores usually do not deal directly with exporters, but with bazaar shops which serve as middlemen, that is, which supply grocery stocks to, and buy up rubber from, the rural shops. The bazaar shops then sell the rubber, in most cases to one of the nine big exporters. There is decided concentration of dialect groups at the various levels of the rubber trade,

reflecting general economic distinctions among the dialect groups. Rural Chinese planters, in the First Division at least, are almost all Hakka. Rural shop owners are 87% Hakka, but bazaar dealers are only 13% Hakka, the remainder being evenly divided between Teochius and Hokkiense. Of the nine main exporters, only one of the smallest is Hakka; four are Hokkien and four Teochiu.

A large number of rural Chinese are engaged in planting paddy (rice). 11,018 Chinese are so occupied, of whom 1,337 also work jungle produce. Market gardening, of which the Chinese have a virtual monopoly, occupies 7,376 Chinese. While most of the sago is produced by Melanaus, the majority of sago factory owners are Chinese. The vast majority of sawmill owners and workers are likewise Chinese. Malays and Melanau, as well as Chinese, engage extensively in fishing, though the latter predominate in drying, salting and handling. Almost all Chinese fishermen are Henghua.

The Chinese have complete dominance of Sarawak's commerce, wholesale and retail, as well as banking, pawnbroking and money-lending. Of the 705 Chinese businesses and shops in Kuching, 455 are separately owned by single owners, 57 by partners of the same family, 151 by partners of the same dialect group, and only 42 shared by partners of different dialect groups. Only 10% employ shop assistants from other than the owner's dialect group. Considerable occupational specialization by dialect groups is also evident in Kuching, where, for instance, 70% of the vegetable retailers and 54% of Chinese druggists are Hakka.

Chinese also constitute at least three-fourths of the country's manufacturers and artisans. Here again, especially in the lines which require some special skill, there is occupational specialization by dialect group. In Kuching, for example, 84% of the bicycle shops are Henghua, all the tinsmiths are Hakka, 59% of goldsmiths are Hokkien, all clock and watch shops and 60% of shoemakers are Cantonese, 78% of tailors are Hakka, all carpenters are San-chiang (Mandarin), and 55% of charcoal makers Liuchow.

There are seven gold mines operating in Sarawak, almost all Chinese owned and worked. Chinese predominate as professionals, including physicians, surgeons, midwives, dentists, teachers, and even letter writers. Likewise in catering, hotel keeping, cooking, domestic service, and personal services such as hairdressing, laundering and undertaking, the Chinese are dominant. The Hainanese run 78% of the coffee shops and predominate in domestic service. Most of the bus and taxi owners and drivers are Chinese, as are all owners and pullers of rickshaws and trishaws. 35% of Chinese bus-drivers are Henghua.

There are Chinese Chambers of Commerce in Kuching, Sibiu and eight other towns in Sarawak. Commercially, Hokkiens and Teochius are dominant, and fittingly enough, the chairman of the Kuching Chamber of Commerce is Hokkien, the vice-chairman Teochiu. A few of the occupational organizations and guilds have recently been reorganized into unions, e. g., the Kuching Coffee Shop Workers Union, and the Wharf Laborers Union. But for the most part the traditional or employers' guild still obtains. Examples are the Chinese Grocers Association, the Sibiu Coffee Merchants Association, the Kuching Rubber Exporters Association, the Sarawak Chinese Practitioners and Druggists Association, and the Sibiu Millers Association. With the high degree of occupational specialization by dialect group, several of these guilds are affiliated

with regional associations.

3. Regional and Other Organizations

Most of the dialect groups mentioned in the introduction to this report are represented in Sarawak, and of these the Hakkas, Cantonese, Hokkiens, Hokchius, Teochius, Hainanese, and Chaoan have one or more regional associations in the country. Originally the Hakkas from various localities in China had formed separate organizations, but recently an over-all association was formed in Kuching. There are also several t'ung-hsiang-hui at a lower level than the larger dialect areas. Generally the place name of an association refers to a wider area than that from which all members come; thus a name may refer to a prefecture, while all members really come from only one hsien. Almost always, a dominant group in each regional association comes from a still more restricted area, sometimes a single hsiang or village. Occasionally the dominant group in a given association is from the same clan.

Clan organizations are particularly important in Sarawak, according to the research of T'ien Ju-K'ang. To a considerable extent, the surname group as a whole takes the place of the local clan or lineage in China. Take, for instance, the T'ien clan. From the third and fourth lineages (fang) of this clan in the one-clan village of T'ien Chu in Ch'ao-an came several immigrants who now have over six hundred descendants in Kuching. The fourth lineage is the smaller and richer, and most of its family heads are engaged in commerce, while the third lineage, much larger, is composed mainly of unskilled laborers. Between the two are bonds of clan solidarity, though enthusiasm for clan affairs comes mainly from the poorer branch. Sarawak also has a group of over six hundred Hakka T'ien's from Hweilai, with no traceable genealogical connection between the two. Nevertheless, each is realistically considered simply a segment of the T'ien group in Sarawak as a whole; the sense of mutual solidarity between the two is greater than that existing between two separate local clans of the same surname in China. In 1923 a mock tomb was constructed in the Chaoan cemetery with a reference to the origin of the T'ien clan in China and an expression of hope for continued prosperity "by all the descendants who worshipped here together and created this tomb."

While the localized sub-clan does not exist in Sarawak, clan relationships nonetheless tend to be localized. Among the poorer classes, almost every clan has its local center, or home base, around which its wider ramifications are gathered. The leadership of clan organizations is not a matter of seniority. Rather it is the informal recognition of the preeminent position of a certain individual, especially his economic status. According to Dr. T'ien, the Chinese rural economy hinges on the framework of clanship, and kinship is the major basis of rural social organization.

4. Education

There are now about two hundred twenty Sarawak schools in which Chinese is the medium of instruction. A fairly sizeable number of these are mission-sponsored or supported. In Sibü, where the Christian element is strongest, probably most of the Chinese schools were established by missions or churches. Now, however, mission control is nominal in most cases: the Chinese prefer to run their own schools as a community, and not to have special religious training in them. In

proportion to Chinese population, schools are much better developed in Sibü and the Third Division than elsewhere. The following figures are for 1949; enrollment has since risen about 10%:

<u>Division</u>	<u>No. of Schools</u>	<u>No. of Pupils</u>
First	63	7,834
Second	12	1,079
Third	112	10,417
Fourth	18	2,180
Fifth	5	273

Since the war all Chinese schools in the First and Second Divisions of the usual community-run type changed their names to Chung Hua Hsüeh Hsiao (Chinese School). All the schools in Kuching have, since the war, been united under one board of thirty members, including the socially and economically most powerful Chinese in the city. Where before the war there were four small junior middle schools, Kuching now has only one, a much better school. Kuching has 341 students in the junior middle school, and 3,135 in the five primary schools. Sibü, on the other hand, demonstrates the disadvantages of disunity. It now has eleven junior middle schools, all small and poorly staffed, and all in competition for students and teachers. Competition is so stiff that various schools are resorting to guaranteeing passing grades or graduation in the quickest time, etc. The Education Department in the government is planning a universal examination to be taken by all junior middle students at the end of each year. It is hoped that the exam will show up the poorer schools and put pressure on the community to revise the system. Sibü has the only Chinese senior middle school in Sarawak; started last year by the Methodist Mission, it now has only fifty students, all in the first year. The Kuching school board is now drawing up plans for senior middle schooling. Secondary education in particular has made great strides since the war; the proportion of primary graduates who continue into junior middle has risen from one-tenth to one-half. Education is especially popular among the Sarawak Chinese. Some families, it is said, pay up to one-fifth of their budget on school fees! 17.6% of the total Chinese population are students.

In the average Chinese school, tuition for lower primary is M\$2.50 per month, for upper primary M\$4, and for junior middle M\$6. Eighty of the Chinese schools are government-aided, but with only token grants. Total grants-in-aid to Chinese schools are less than M\$50,000 annually, while actual expenses run well over \$1,500,000. Private subscriptions and contributions are of great importance; hence school boards are usually run by the financial leaders of the community. Appointment of teachers and curriculum are likewise in their hands. Curricula generally conform rather closely to the recommendations of the KMT Ministry of Education. Probably most of the teachers have pro-Peking inclinations, but a majority do not teach any propaganda as such. A minority of the more militantly pro-Communist have tried to change curricula along the lines of Peking's recommendations, and to some extent have altered their teaching materials. But most have succeeded only in antagonizing the conservative businessmen on the school boards. Some teachers have lost their jobs over the matter.

Some 3,874 Chinese students are enrolled in Mission English schools. While English is the medium of instruction, Chinese is offered as a secondary course. The tuition for English schools is somewhat

higher than for Chinese schools: M\$4, M\$6, and M\$8 for lower primary, upper primary and junior middle, respectively. Graduates of Chinese junior middle schools often go on to mission English schools, in which case they begin at the 5th year.

5. The Press

Four Chinese dailies are published in Sarawak, two in Kuching and two in Sibü. All papers get China and world news entirely by radio. All are morning papers of tabloid size. They are:

1) Chung Hua Jih Pao, Kuching, with a circulation of about six hundred. Formerly a pro-KMT paper, it became independent in policy after the Communists took over in China. It prints news from all sources and sides. It runs very few editorials, and then usually about local issues. Its main concern is commercial news and problems. The directors are prominent Chinese leaders in Kuching.

2) Chung Hua Kung Pao, Kuching, with a circulation of about five hundred. The paper is directed mainly by teachers, young people and a few small merchants. It has a weaker staff, and its local coverage is poorer than that of the Chung Hua Jih Pao. It is pro-Communist and may have connections with the Chinese CP. It constantly runs anti-KMT and anti-U. S. material. It has been careful, however, not to go so far as to risk closure (In keeping with a sedition ordinance, the Chinese Secretariat keeps tab on Chinese papers; in case of suspicious articles, a paper can be prosecuted if the Attorney-General so recommends.) It publishes few editorials. It prints many more copies than its actual paid circulation; some are given away, but the Secretariat suspects that others are smuggled into Singapore now that the pro-Communist paper there has been closed.

3) Ta T'ung Jih Pao, Sibü, with a circulation of about five hundred. Nominally neutral, it publishes bulletins from Peking as well as Taipeh and western sources. But its pro-KMT inclinations are evident from the headlines and makeup. The chairman of the paper's Board of Directors is the chairman of the Sibü Chinese Chamber of Commerce.

4) Ch'iao Sheng Pao, Sibü, with a circulation of less than three hundred. It was established in September, 1950, by a former editor of Ta T'ung Jih Pao who was sacked. Pro-Communist, it stoops rather low in making disgusting remarks about the USA and the UN.

One other paper is put out in Kuching, the Shih Shih P'ing Lun, published on Thursdays and Sundays. It is really a one-family paper; the editor's daughter helps him put out the paper, and his son handles distribution. It is only one sheet (two pages) in size. The literary quality of the paper is better than that of any of the dailies. It has a clear-cut policy: pro-KMT and anti-Communist. It runs more and longer editorials than the dailies. Its circulation is only two to three hundred, and it probably operates at a loss.

6. The Political Situation

Since the early days of the Brooke regime, the Chinese community has been controlled by indirect rule. Those leaders who had greatest influence with the Chinese were appointed Kapitans China, each of whom was to administer and be responsible for specific Chinese com-

munities. This indirect rule is still continued in Sarawak. The Chinese are thus treated as a single political entity, which in fact they really are not. Dr. T'ien has also raised doubts whether the "recognized Chinese leaders" are in fact representative of the community whose interests they are supposed to serve.

Wealth is the path to power. A rich towkay automatically gains a high social position. Through patronage and lending money, he builds up a clique of followers, usually clansmen or those of the same dialect group. Patronage of a towkay is necessary for almost everyone in the social structure. Elections for all kinds of associations are inevitably won by the man with the largest clique of debtors and proteges. Power in the Chinese community is highly concentrated: a few individuals have influence penetrating every aspect of social life: commerce, finance, schools, newspapers -- and government office. Official appointment as a Kapitan China means that one can occasionally get some favor from the government and can impress the community with official standing.

The Secretariat for Chinese Affairs handles all specifically Chinese affairs, deals directly with the Kapitans China, registers and controls societies, and acts as protector of labor.

As something of a backwater in Southeast Asia, Sarawak was until recently neglected by the KMT, though the San Min Chu I Youth Corps existed under the guise of Boy Scouts. In 1948, however, a Nationalist consulate was established in Kuching, after which a branch of the KMT was set up. The big leaders of the Chinese community were wooed by the consul and the KMT with various symbols of prestige, and considerable headway was made. But the KMT got started only to suffer an eclipse. The consulate closed early in 1950, and the KMT branch folded.

At the present time, the Chinese populace is more openly pro-Peking than that in Singapore or Malaya. The Communist flag is not outlawed, as in Malaya, and it is seen in many club halls. Several newly formed unions are pro-Communist. No formal Chinese CP branch is known to exist, however. After the war, progressive youth were organized in Ch'ing Nien She (Youth Societies) modeled on the New Democratic Youth Corps. Branches are found in the major cities.

7. Relations with the Natives and British

The British colonial government seems to be adhering to a policy of keeping Sarawak a Malay country, though Malays are a minority, and it is historically questionable whether they actually antedated the Chinese in the country. In any case, as in the Federation of Malay, Malay education is all at government expense, and administrative posts are primarily given to Malays. Resentment among the Chinese, however, is not marked. In view of the political situation in the Far East, the British have virtually stopped Chinese immigration.

The Chinese sex ratio has been quite disproportionate until very recently. Even the 1947 census listed 81,372 males to 63,766 females in Sarawak. One result of this imbalance has been considerable intermarriage with native peoples (though not Malays), usually occurring between Chinese male agriculturalists in the outlying districts and Sea Dyak or Land Dyak women. The children of these mixed marriages usually follow their fathers culturally, and are generally accepted by the Chinese.

community. As in Malaya, the practice of adoption by native families of Chinese children is not infrequent, and such children are usually absorbed into the native communities. Generally, relations between Chinese and most of the natives are harmonious and mutually advantageous.

8. Research Materials and Facilities

Between September, 1948, and October, 1949, a Chinese anthropologist trained at the London School of Economics, Dr. T'ien Ju-k'ang, carried on field research into the organization of the Chinese community in Sarawak. His report which I have read and drawn on in this section may eventually be published and can in the meantime be seen in London. There is a government museum in Kuching whose curator is also the official ethnologist of the colony, but his attentions have not been directed to the Chinese. USIS in Singapore subscribes to and files two of the Sarawak Chinese dailies, the Chung Hua Jih Pao and the Ta t'ung Jih Pao.

NORTH BORNEO

1. Population

The last census in North Borneo was taken in 1931, at which time the Chinese numbered 47,800, about 17.7% of the total population. A population check carried out in 1947 for food control purposes, and a comparison with the neighboring states of Sarawak and Brunei, make possible a reasonably accurate estimate for 1950. Probably the Chinese now number about 70,000, roughly 20% of the total population. The colony is divided into three residencies: East Coast, West Coast, and Labuan and Interior. The Chinese population is largest in the first of these and smallest in the last. The Chinese tend to be concentrated in the towns and along the coasts. They form over three-quarters of the population in Sandakan, and over half in Tawau and Jesselton. Nonetheless, as in Sarawak, a sizeable proportion of the Chinese population is rural.

Hakkas form an absolute majority of the Chinese population in the colony. 1950 estimates for the various dialect groups follow: Hakka 56% (39,000), Cantonese 26% (18,200), Hokkien 7% (4,900), Teochiu 5% (3,500), and Hainanese 3% (2,100). Most of the Cantonese live along the east coast, there being a long-standing trade route from Sandakan to Hongkong and Canton. Most of the Hokkiens, on the other hand, live on the west coast, where they came, for the most part, from Singapore. Most of the Chinese population of Labuan, a former Straits Settlement, now a part of North Borneo, is Hokkien. The Hokkiens and Teochius are more urban than the Hakkas and Cantonese.

2. Occupations and Business

Rubber is the basis of the economy of North Borneo. As the rubber industry grew up, Chinese were the main source of tappers and other labor. But since they much preferred their own individual enterprise, they tended to stop work on the estates as soon as they had accumulated enough to buy their own small holdings and pigs, or to set up their own shops. Many Chinese, having learned the techniques on the

estates, soon planted their own rubber. Now about half the rubber production is from Chinese small-holdings, and about half from large European estates. Each small holder, as a general rule, has his own hand wringers, but usually only one Chinese in each area has a smoke-house; for the use of which the others pay a fee. Rubber from Chinese holdings usually reaches the ports smoked. Most of it is shipped to Singapore for grading and packing, though two Chinese firms in Jesselton can do this processing and thus export direct to such places as New York. Now that the world price of rubber is high, the Chinese community generally is prosperous.

On the east coast, especially around Sandakan, the Chinese are engaged more in the production of timber, firewood (for export to Hongkong, catch (used in tanning and dyeing, made from mangrove bark) and copra. Everywhere jungle products are brought down to Chinese traders by the native collectors, in exchange for credit, groceries and money. Cantonese and Hakkas predominate in this trade.

The colony's commerce and finance are largely in Chinese hands. In order of numerical strength in these lines are Cantonese; Hakkas, Teochiu and Hokkien; Hokkien, Cantonese and Teochiu very disproportionately favor commercial endeavor. Cantonese and Hakkas form by far the majority of the manufacturers and artisans in the country. Hakkas, the oldest dialect group in the colony, predominate in the professions and public service. Most of the government clerks are Hakkas or Sino-Dusuns. Most of the restaurant keepers are Cantonese; while Hainanese are disproportionately coffee-shop owners and waiters. The Chinese, however, do not control the rice trade, which is a government monopoly.

There are few trade or occupational guilds, though Chinese rubber planters have formed an organization in the northern part of the colony. All the important cities and towns, however, have Chinese Chambers of Commerce, of which there are about ten. These are mutually independent, though they consult one another when common problems arise. In Jesselton about three-quarters of all Chinese firms belong to the Chamber. When the Chinese consulate in Jesselton closed early in 1950, many of its functions were taken over by the Chamber of Commerce. The latter has separate committees on education, commerce, social activities, etc. It sponsors and runs one of the Chinese primary schools in the city, and takes up subscriptions for it and the other Chinese schools. It handles many of the marriages in the Chinese community, and holds benefits and celebrations. As the leading organization and mouthpiece of the Chinese community, it is approached by the government's Secretariat for Chinese Affairs when problems especially affecting the Chinese arise.

3. Regional and Other Organizations

The Hokkiens; Hakkas, Cantonese; Teochius and Hainanese all have regional associations, which function largely in the social and recreational realm. Weddings are frequently held in the halls of these associations. Leadership is largely a function of wealth. Clan associations are either lacking or unimportant. A few Chinese recreation and other social clubs are found in the larger cities. One of these was infiltrated by Communists after the war and closed by the government.

An organization of particular interest in North Borneo is the Basel Church. Basel missionaries had been doing work in Kwangtung among the Hakkas for several decades when in 1882 an Englishman went to Hongkong to get Chinese families to reclaim the North Bornean jungle for farming. He contacted a pastor in the Basel Mission, and thus started a stream of Christian Hakkas to North Borneo, Kudat, Jesselton and Sandakan in particular. With no missionaries for the first several decades, they established their own churches. After the war, during which the church suffered great losses, the Hakka Christians appealed to the Lutheran World Federation for help and got financial aid and three American missionaries. The Basel Church has over three thousand members and operates ten schools.

4. Education

Chinese schools receive no government aid whatsoever in North Borneo. There are eighty Chinese schools, privately supported by school fees and contributions of the Chinese communities, with about 8,500 students, of whom 5,760 are boys. There are no Chinese senior middle schools and only three junior middle, one in Tenom (with only the first year), one in Jesselton (with only the first two years), and one in Kudat (with all three years). There is an Inspector of Chinese Schools who periodically visits schools throughout the colony and encourages higher standards. Teachers of all schools are registered, though there is little control of textbooks or curriculum, which is generally based on the recommendations of the Chinese Nationalist Ministry of Education, with added hours of English.

There are in addition fifty-nine mission schools, about half of which are for Chinese. In some of the mission-run primary schools, Kuo Yü is the medium of instruction, with English taught as a foreign language. In many of the mission primary schools and in the few junior middle schools, English is the medium of instruction with Chinese offered as a separate course. There are also several small estate schools with Chinese students, supported entirely by the European companies which own the rubber estates. English instruction in Chinese primary schools is very poor, and one result of the dearth of junior middle schools is that many parents send their children first to Chinese primary schools and then start them all over again in English primary schools.

5. The Press

Only one Chinese paper is published in North Borneo, The Hua Ch'iao Jih Pao in Jesselton. The editor, a young Hokchui originally from Sarawak, single-handedly puts out the paper every day except Sundays. Almost his only source of world news is Chinese radio broadcasts. It does not run editorials nor concern itself greatly with political issues; a pro-Nationalist slant is evident, however. There is no official censorship, but the Assistant Secretary for Chinese Affairs reads the paper thoroughly, and whenever he finds anything questionable he calls in the editor for a chat. Circulation is around seven hundred. Plans are now afoot to start another Chinese newspaper in Sandakan.

6. The Political Situation

There are no Chinese political organizations as such. The KMT

once had a branch in the colony, but it recently dissolved. A minor flurry of pro-Communist activities in one or two associations brought on closure by the government. So far as is known, no Pang Hui are in operation. Four Chinese are appointed by the government to the Colonial Legislative Council; all are prominent businessmen. The North Borneo Chinese appear less pro-Peking than their brethren in Sarawak. They show much more interest in local affairs than in China politics.

The Chinese have myriad grievances against the government. They feel it unfair that the government should completely support Malay vernacular schools and give no aid to Chinese vernacular schools. They resent the fact that all remaining undeveloped land of any value is reserved for "natives". They observe cynically that the best qualified governmental employee of Chinese extraction receives less pay than the most poorly qualified British employee. They chafe under the rigid immigration restrictions which make it difficult or impossible to get Chinese relatives and friends or even former Borneo residents into the colony. But at present, as in other times of prosperity, none of these matters is made a great issue.

7. Relations with Native Peoples and the British

On the whole, relations among the various races in North Borneo have been excellent. In the course of their trade, the Chinese have had close dealings with the Dusuns, Muruts and Bajaus as well as Malays. Some feel that the Dusuns may have absorbed an earlier Chinese settlement in Borneo; they seem to have several Chinese culture traits and perhaps somewhat more Mongoloid features. In any case, relations between the present-day Chinese and Dusuns is close, and intermarriage of Chinese and Dusun women is frequent. The children of such marriages are called Sino-Dusuns, and are considered to be an excellent type. They are more often reared as Chinese, and if the father prospers, they get a Chinese and/or English education. Sino-Dusuns are looked up to by Dusuns and thoroughly accepted by the Chinese. Chinese traders in the interior also marry women of other tribes, but not so frequently. There is little antagonism between the Chinese and the Malays, who form a small but culturally important minority.

The British administrators feel that Borneo should belong to the Borneans, which in practice means aiming at a Malay country. Such education as is provided for the native peoples is mostly in Malay. The tendency is to regard the Chinese as aliens who must be restrained from getting more than their share. The Chinese regard the same tendency as one denying them equal rights. They claim that for most of them, North Borneo is their home, that they mainly built up the country, and that they deserve better than second-class citizenship. As in Malaya and Sarawak, the British are especially wary of the large Chinese population in view of the Communist victory in China. They have stopped all Chinese immigration.

8. Research Materials and Facilities

USIS in Singapore subscribes to the Jesselton Hua Ch'iao Jih Pao.

INDONESIA

1. Population

The present demographic picture of Indonesia is very unclear, since the last census was held in 1930. That census, which was incomplete for parts of Borneo, listed 1,233,000 Chinese throughout the Dutch East Indies. Including Borneo, recent estimates for the Chinese population of Indonesia vary from one and a half to two and a half million, with most centering between two and two and a quarter million. Somewhat arbitrarily, I have adopted the figure of 2,100,000 as the Chinese population for 1950. In certain regions of western Borneo, Bangka, Billiton and the east coast of Sumatra, the Chinese form over half the population. For all of West Borneo, East Sumatra and the smaller islands in between, the Chinese form about one-sixth of the total population. In Java and Madura, the other parts of the archipelago where they are concentrated, the Chinese number about 900,000. As a result of post-war disturbances, more and more Javan Chinese have moved to urban areas. Now the Chinese number about 300,000 (out of 1,800,000) in Djakarta, 100,000 (out of 700,000) in Surabaya, and about 10% of the population of other large cities.

Over 70% of Indonesia's Chinese are native-born. The distinction between Peranakans (native-born) and Totoks (China-born) is quite important in Indonesia. The vast majority of Peranakans are Hokkien and Hakka. While the Peranakan sex ratio is roughly equal, that of the Totoks is very askew in favor of the males. Most of the Totoks are concentrated in the outer islands.

Hokkiens and Hakkas, who came to Indonesia in large numbers as early as the first half of the eighteenth century, form the great majority of the Chinese population. 1950 estimates of the proportions and numbers of the various dialect groups are as follows: Hokkien 47% (987,000), Hakka 21% (441,000), Cantonese 12% (252,000), Teochiu 8% (168,000), and Hainanese 3% (63,000). Hokkiens form well over half the Chinese population of Java and Madura, and slightly over half in Celebes and other eastern islands. Hokkiens are disproportionately urban and tend to predominate in the towns of even those parts of the country whose Chinese are otherwise mainly Hakka or Cantonese. Hakkas form the great majority of the Chinese population in West Borneo, Bangka and Billiton. They are also very important in Java, East Sumatra, and the Rhio archipelago. The Cantonese are more widely distributed; but with a slight concentration in Java, east and south Sumatra, east Borneo, and Celebes. The distribution of the Teochius parallels rather closely that of the Hakkas; they are disproportionately important in northwest Borneo, the east coast of Sumatra and the Rhio archipelago. Hainanese are mainly city-dwellers, and rather evenly distributed throughout the country.

2. Occupations and Business

More Chinese are employed in commerce than in any other equally broad field. They predominate among all shopkeepers and traders, and control most of Indonesia's imports and exports from other Asiatic countries. In the rural areas it is almost always the Chinese traders who retail groceries and other essentials, extend credit for agriculture, and buy up crops for transport to the cities.

Over half the Hokkiens in the country are engaged in commerce, in which they are easily the dominant dialect group. In Java and Madura, Hakkas are also heavily engaged in commercial enterprise, especially groceries and piece goods. Industry in Indonesia is also in Chinese hands. Here Cantonese are clearly the dominant group. They are the carpenters, metal workers, petroleum skilled workers, and other artisans, and predominate in the production of textiles, rubber goods, and several other manufactures.

Mining of course is of great importance: gold in west Borneo, and tin in Bangka, Billiton, and the east coast of Sumatra. In the old days, the labor force of these mines was almost entirely Chinese, but in the past few decades they have been replaced in part by Indonesians in the tin mines. Almost all tin mines were Dutch-owned, but most of them are now Indonesian state enterprises. Very few mines are Chinese-owned, though Chinese are widely employed in management. Hakkas predominate in mining, with Cantonese and Teochius next. Chinese were also much more important as estate laborers formerly than at present; thousands of them were once employed as workers on Sumatra tobacco estates and on rubber estates in Java, Bangka and Billiton, but they have been largely replaced by Indonesians. Nonetheless there are still many Chinese small holders in rubber. General agriculture is an important Chinese occupation only in West Borneo, Bangka, Billiton and some sections of Sumatra. There are also a couple of districts in Java, notably Tangerang, with large numbers of Chinese agriculturalists. In Borneo, Bangka and Billiton, Hakkas and Teochius make up the majority of the agriculturalists, while in Java and west Sumatra the Hokkiens do. Most of the country's labor is Indonesian; the Chinese, many of whom were originally imported as laborers, have tended to set up their own individual enterprises -- commercial, industrial or agricultural -- as soon as possible.

It is generally recognized that the Totoks are more industrious and enterprising than the local-born Chinese. The latter are simply not willing to work twelve and fourteen hours a day in the struggle for economic success. The older Peranakans are now in large part employees of business firms, clerks and professional people, accountants, lawyers, doctors. Within the past few decades, the rice trade has largely passed out of Peranakan and into Totok hands. A disproportionate number of rural traders, importers and exporters are China-born. Some of the wealthiest businessmen in Java are Totoks. Certainly the Chinese generally are disproportionately wealthy: in 1937, the Chinese, less than 2% of the country's population, included 29% of those with incomes of 900 guilders and over. During the period of postwar unrest, the Chinese have unquestionably profited greatly, by illegal as well as legal means. The Chinese controlled the black market before exchange controls made it less important. The Chinese' standard of living has risen appreciably since the war, while that of the Indonesians has not.

Occupational organizations and trade guilds are innumerable, covering every possible field. Those in Djakarta include organizations of rice merchants, foodstuffs importers, canned goods dealers, wine makers, mechanics, constructors, trishaw drivers, Chinese doctors, dentists, etc. There are also scores of Chinese Chambers of Commerce -- one in almost every city and town in the archipelago. In Indonesia, however, Chinese Chambers of Commerce are concerned almost solely with

commercial affairs; general leadership is provided by the Chung Hua Tsung Hui, which is the supreme organization of the Chinese communities in most cities.

3. Regional and Other Organizations

Regional associations at all levels from the province to the village are found throughout the country. By far the majority of members are Totoks. In Djakarta the largest organizations are those of the Hokkiens, Cantonese, Teochius, Hainanese and Hokchius; the Hakkas are organized by hsien for the most part. In Surabaia, the Kwangtung Association includes all dialect groups in the province except for the Hakkas, who have their own. Each of the various dialect groups from Fukien, however, has its own association: Hokkien, Hokchiaⁿ, Henghua, and Hokchiu.

The Chung Hua Tsung Hui, found in most cities and towns, had its inception under the Japanese occupation. In 1942, the Japanese abolished all the old Chinese Associations as such and stimulated the formation of central Chinese organizations for each locality, called Hua Chiao Tsung Hui. The Japanese then dealt with the Chinese communities solely through these organizations, held them responsible for the good behavior of the Chinese, for raising funds for Dai Nippon, etc. They also functioned, in the usual way of Chinese organizations, as social, recreational and benevolent societies. The Chinese got used to these organizations during the three years of the occupation, and particularly liked the solidarity which they gave the Chinese community. So, under the present name, they were continued after the war. During the first postwar years, the Tsung Hui worked hand in glove with the Chinese Nationalist consulates.

The present organization is pyramidal. Most of the Chinese regional associations, commercial and trade associations, schools, etc. in each community belong to the Tsung Hui of that locality. The Tsung Hui in Djakarta has over ninety member organizations; that in Surabaia over fifty. Then all Tsung Hui, over one hundred in all, are coordinated in the combined Chung Hua Tsung Hui in Djakarta. In the past year and a half, the political split within the Chinese community has greatly weakened the Tsung Hui, and something of a rival has arisen in the newly formed (November, 1950) Affiliated Solidarity Association. But these developments will be recounted in Section 6 on the Political Situation.

4. Education

Considering the size of the Chinese population in Indonesia, Chinese-language education is not as well developed as in other Malaysian countries (e. g., Malaya and the Philippines). In Indonesia, to which Chinese came in large numbers earlier than elsewhere in Southeast Asia, many Peranakans who definitely consider themselves Chinese are nonetheless illiterate in Chinese and habitually use Dutch or Malay in their homes. The Hokkiens who came to Java during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were almost wholly illiterate, and most married Indonesian women. By the third generation, many Hokkiens could not speak their own dialect at all. They neglected education (Chinese education did not get its real impetus in Southeast Asia until after the Chinese Revolution) until Dutch and Malay schools were established. The Hakkas and Cantonese, however, had a higher rate of

literacy when they came. They established their own schools from the beginning and never stopped the use of their native dialects in the home. Thus most Cantonese and Hakkas are literate in Chinese, though at the same time many of the Peranakans among them can also speak and read Malay.

Many of the wealthier Peranakan families have for the past forty years sent their children to Dutch schools, while most of the others have attended Indonesian schools. Peranakans generally, however, have become more "Chinese" since the 1920's, and more and more parents, themselves illiterate in Chinese, have sent their children to Chinese schools. At the present time, Dutch schools are gradually closing down for lack of teachers, and to a lesser extent, of funds. Any many Chinese realize that the usefulness of the Dutch language will decrease with time, and that the desirability of a Dutch education in strongly nationalistic Indonesia is questionable. Indonesian schools present further disadvantages: textbooks are poor, there are few good translations into Indonesian from Chinese or European languages, and there is no college training available in the Indonesian language. For purely practical as well as nationalistic reasons, then, Peranakans are coming to favor Chinese schools. Now, perhaps, slightly less than half of the children of Peranakans attend Dutch and Indonesian schools. Still, the majority of Chinese school students are children of Totoks.

Chinese schools in Indonesia are for the most part community projects run by boards of trustees who are prominent businessmen. Some, but not most, are sponsored by specific regional associations. The best and largest of the middle schools offer English, Dutch, French and Malay as foreign languages, but most offer only one or two of these. English is now unquestionably the top foreign language. The government requires that schools which are to get any government aid must teach so many hours of Malay. Only very few Chinese schools, however, receive any government aid. There is virtually no government regulation or control of Chinese schools. One inevitable consequence of this laissez-faire policy is that Chinese Communists are well on the way to gaining effective control of Chinese education in the country. Totoks generally tend to be much more pro-Communist than Peranakans and since they predominate among the parents of students and among the trustees, pro-Peking teachings are at least tolerated in most schools. Most teachers are China-born, young and pro-Peking. Everywhere principals complain that lack of foreign exchange has made it almost impossible to obtain new textbooks and equipment. Most of the texts are in consequence battered and pre-Communist, though some of the wealthier middle schools have introduced new books from Peking.

Let us look somewhat more closely at the Chinese Schools in Djakarta and Surabaya, the two major cities of Java. In Djakarta three of the Chinese schools go up as high as senior middle, two more up through junior middle, while the remaining thirty-five are only primary. All the schools are overcrowded, due to the last post-war influx of Chinese into the city. The oldest Chinese school in the city is that of the Chung Hua Hui Kuan. With about 4,200 pupils from primary to senior middle, it starts instruction in Chinese and introduces more and more English until all appropriate courses are taught in English during the final year. There are about one hundred teachers; most of those teaching Chinese are China-born, and most of those teaching English are Java- or Straits-born. This school, however, is in several ways a peculiar case. Its students are mostly offspring of Peranakans; its

teachings are non-Communist; and it alone in Djakarta gets a government subsidy. All the other middle schools are clearly pro-Peking.

In Surabaia there are four Chinese middle schools and fifteen Chinese primary schools. The oldest middle school, the Hsin Hua Chung Hsüeh, is now entirely pro-Communist. It plays a leading role in Chinese community life and spearheads pro-Communist and anti-American propaganda. The Chung Hua Chung Hsüeh and the Lien Ho Chung Hsüeh are both rather split: half the teachers are pro-Communist while the less militant half are non-Communist. The former school is housed in what used to be a Dutch school before the war; it is now completing large extensions and improvements. The latter has also just recently moved into a new home, a building that was formerly the palatial home of a wealthy Chinese merchant. Only one of the middle schools, the Min Kuang Chung Hsüeh, is clearly non-Communist. It is the poorest of the lot, and also includes primary classes. Each of the middle schools has an enrollment of over one thousand students. Three or four of the primary schools are also controlled by pro-Communist elements.

Many Peranakans in both cities question the wisdom of teaching so much politics in the schools, and some feel quite strongly about Communist indoctrination of ten-year-olds. Some newspapers have suggested government intervention and control.

5. The Press

The Chinese press in Indonesia is complex and vigorous. The main publishing center for the country is Djakarta, but because of the dispersed nature of the archipelago, important Chinese publishers are located in Medan (for Sumatra), Surabaia (for East Java and Madura), Pontianak (for Borneo), and Macassar (for Celebes and the eastern islands). Fifteen Chinese language dailies are now published in the country (and possibly one or two more that I missed). Of these, I have detailed information only about the three Djakarta and the four Surabaia papers. The following is the complete list:

1) Hsin Pao, Djakarta, with a circulation of 20-25,000, is the largest and most influential Chinese language paper in the country. Its director, Ang Jan Goan, is a rich man, active in Chinese philanthropy. The paper has an old tradition of Chinese nationalism, and appeals strongly to those with closest ties to China. In earlier years, it advocated reform in the KMT, and when the Communists swept to victory in China, it quite naturally swung to a pro-Peking position. It uses all the western news agencies and NCNA, but recently dropped CNA. With good makeup, excellent coverage, and good if strongly opinionated editorials, it is definitely a popular and profit-making establishment.

2) T'ien Sheng Jih Pao, Djakarta, with a circulation of 10-12,000, is published by a prominent millionaire businessman. The staff is overloaded with people formerly connected with the Nationalist Embassy and members of the KMT. Primarily a business venture, it makes a profit. With a strongly pro-KMT editorial policy, it nonetheless prints pro-Communist news releases alongside of those from Taipei and western agencies." Its circulation has not increased in recent years, as has that of the Hsin Pao. For the 1950 Double Ten, it put out a commemorative edition complete with a facsimile of the Nationalist flag, but Communists tipped off the Indonesian police and the entire

issue was confiscated. It is much less influential than the Hsin Pao.

3) Sheng Huo Pao, Djakarta, with a circulation of about 8,000, is a Communist organ, probably subsidized. In addition to NCNA, it uses AP and UP releases, though frequently edited and with twisted headlines. It has correspondents in China, but its local coverage is comparatively poor. With a very small editorial staff, it is poorly edited and publishes mainly canned NCNA editorials.

4) Hua Ch'iao Hsin Wen, with a circulation of about 5,000, is the largest and most independent and interesting of Surabaya's Chinese papers. The editor, Ch'en P'ing-hung, a former member of the KMT, is at present a wavering non-Communist. He and the pro-Peking editor of the paper's sister Malay edition, the Java Post, engage in never-ending arguments about Chinese politics. In any case, the Hua Ch'iao Hsin Wen presents a variable policy, sometimes praising and sometimes criticizing the Peking government. It is at least not consistently pro-western or pro-KMT, though certain editorials may be construed in such a light. The paper has grown greatly since editor Ch'en, a trained journalist, took over shortly after the war.

5) Ch'ing Kuang Jih Pao, Surabaya, with a circulation of about 2,000 is a KMT organ. It was the first Chinese paper to be established after the war, at which time it had the backing of many prominent businessmen. The KMT subsidy of the paper ended in 1948. It follows the usual KMT, anti-Communist line, and makes considerable use of CNA and USIS materials.

6) Ta Kung Shang Pao, with a circulation of about 1,200, is the only outright Communist Chinese daily in Surabaya. Formerly owned by a single businessman, it has been reformed as a stock-holding company. It has the usual anti-American, pro-Soviet, pro-Peking, CP line.

7) Tung Cha Wa Jih Pao, Surabaya, with a circulation of about 1,500, was established only in the fall of 1950. The publisher is new to the business, but the editor, Yeh, is a professional journalist, and also a former KMT member. The paper is nominally neutral in policy, but actually favors the Nationalists.

The three Medan dailies are 8) Su Men Ta La Min Pao, pro-Peking, circulation about 4,000, 9) Hsin Chung Hua Pao, pro-KMT, circulation about 3,000, and 10) Min Chu Jih Pao, pro-Communist, circulation about 2,000. The two Pontianak dailies are 11) Chung Hua Jih Pao, and 12) Li Ming Pao. There are also two Chinese dailies published in Macassar: 13) Mei Jih Tien Hsin, and 14) K'uang Lu Jih Pao. Semarang in Middle Java also has one Chinese daily, 15) Min Sheng Jih Pao.

Chinese periodicals other than dailies are also numerous in Indonesia. There are about ten weeklies and the same number of semi-monthlies and monthlies, mostly published in Djakarta. The two most important of all of these are the Hsing Ch'i Pao, a pro-KMT weekly newspaper, and the Cheng Lun Hsing Ch'i Pao, a pro-Peking weekly magazine. The Djakarta Communist organ, Sheng Huo Pao, also puts out a weekly magazine.

Of equal importance in Indonesia with the Chinese language press is what is called the Chinese-Maleis press: Chinese owned and operated and partly Chinese-read newspapers and periodicals. All of

these publications are in Indonesian Malay, though many use peculiar idioms and Chinese borrowings characteristic of the Malay spoken by Peranakans. There are about ten Chinese-Maleis dailies in the country, four weeklies, ten semi-monthlies, and about fifteen monthlies.

The two largest and most influential of the Chinese-Maleis dailies are the Sin Po (Hsin Pao) and Keng Po (Ching Pao). Hsin Pao's Malay edition was established forty years ago, before the Chinese language edition. However, as a reflection of the rising proportion of Peranakans who are literate in Chinese, the circulation of the Malay edition has been gradually falling while the Chinese edition has been increasing. Only about 15% of the 18,000 subscribers of the Hsin Pao's Malay edition are Chinese. The Malay edition is less pro-Communist than the Chinese, though it is still pro-Peking. Keng Po is the largest Chinese-Maleis daily, with a circulation of 21,000. A much more sizeable proportion of its readers are Chinese. Though in general the Sin Po and Keng Po represent the same financial group, their editorial policies are somewhat different. Keng Po is anti-Communist and anti-Peking so far as international relations are concerned, though it looks with favor on the internal reforms carried out by the Chinese Communists. The most important Chinese-Maleis periodical, the Star Weekly, is also owned by Keng Po. It carries a one-page review of world affairs, nan- other of local affairs, while the rest of the paper is devoted to features and departments: family, medical, serials, advice for the love-lorn, etc. The four Surabaya Chinese-Maleis dailies in order of importance are: 1) Pewarta Surabaya, pro-western, circulation 7,000, 2) Trompet Masyarakat, pro-Communist, circulation 6,000, 3) Java Post, pro-Peking, circulation 5,000, and 4) Perdamaian, circulation 4,600.

6. The Political Situation

The KMT branches in all the larger Indonesian cities still function, though their membership has greatly decreased and their activities have become attenuated in the past two years. Political initiative in the Chinese community has clearly passed to the Communists, who are making steady progress. In April, 1950, the Working Committee for Establishing Diplomatic Relations between Indonesia and China was established in Djakarta, sponsored by Hsin Pao, Sheng Huo Pao, the very left-wing Chinese Teachers' Association, various schools -- over one hundred left-wing organizations in all. Branches of the Committee were also established in other cities, including Bandung, Semarang and Surabaya. In addition to operating in the fashion suggested by its name, the Working Committee groomed itself to take over the functions of the Chung Hua Tsung Hui.

As the Communists swept to victory in China in 1949, several of the progressive member organizations of the Tsung Hui in the major cities criticized it for its pro-Nationalist ties. Eventually several member organizations of the Djakarta and Surabaya Tsung Hui withdrew from the combined Tsung Hui in Djakarta. While some pro-Communists advocated reforming the Tsung Hui from within, more and more came to feel that the Working Committees should be reorganized as coordinating organizations for the Chinese community. However, especially in Surabaya, a good many Chinese felt that the Tsung Hui should try to transcend politics insofar as possible in order to maintain Chinese unity.

Ambassador Wang arrived in Djakarta from Peking in August,

and, symbolically according to some, moved into the suite in the swank Hotel Des Indes which had been recently vacated by the U. S. Ambassador. With its stated aims achieved, the Working Committees switched to full-time Communist propaganda and concerted efforts to increase the ranks of its affiliated organizations. They were aided by the new diplomatic mission, which gave its blessing to the Committee and several of whose members devoted their entire energies to work among Chinese schools and organizations. Celebrations of the First Anniversary of the People's Republic (October 1st) were held all over the country under the auspices of the Working Committees.

The new Embassy from Peking, according to some sources, has not been entirely popular. As in Burma, it has tended to stress Communist propaganda instead of the usual diplomatic activities. One report has it that the Ambassador has floored the Indonesian government by requesting permission to open twenty-three Chinese consulates in the country. It is also said that since his arrival, Communists have stepped up their work among Indonesian labor unions, which displeases both the government, which is plagued by strike problems, and employers, many of whom are Chinese. Some Chinese feel that Ambassador Wang's stress on close ties between overseas Chinese and their homeland will only inspire repressive measures from the Indonesian government. Some of Wang's more violently anti-U. S. speeches have occasioned protests from the American Ambassador to the Indonesian government.

On November 5, 1950, the former sponsors of the Djakarta Working Committee announced the formation of a new organization called T'uan Chieh Ts'u Chin Hui (Affiliated Solidarity Association), which is trying to take over the consolidating functions of the now fairly moribund Djakarta Chung Hua Tsung Hui. In Surabaya, about twenty-five progressive organizations have also formed a left-wing, pro-Peking central association. Most of the Chinese organizations in Surabaya, however, still affiliate with the Tsung Hui. The latter is attempting to maintain Chinese unity on the basis of common problems and programs to which all can agree: to bridge the differences between Peranakans and Totoks and between pro-KMT and pro-Communist elements. As the official mouthpiece of the Chinese community, it has of necessity taken formal cognizance of the Peking Embassy. Mr. Hsieh Kuo-Chung, chairman of the Surabaya Tsung Hui, went to Djakarta to pay a formal call on Ambassador Wang and to accompany one of the new consuls on a visit to Surabaya. Mr. Hsieh also took official part in the October 1st celebrations in Surabaya. But he likewise participated in Double Ten festivities. In this he was not alone: many Chinese leaders publicly took part in both October 1st and October 10th festivities.

The Working Committees and their successors are the CP front organizations in Java. In Medan, Sumatra, however, the Democratic League is the leading pro-Communist organization. No one knows for sure whether there are formal branches of the Chinese CP in Indonesia. It is generally recognized, however, that Chinese Communists work closely with Indonesian Communists; one of the prominent leaders of the latter speaks fluent Mandarin.

Probably most of the politically conscious Totoks are pro-Peking. Many more of the Peranakans have adopted a wait-and-see policy. They tend to favor Mao's internal policy but to oppose his foreign policy. Many of the pro-Peking businessmen are unduly naive about China's New Democracy: they point out that there is a star in Peking's flag for

National Capitalists, that New Democracy is not Communism, etc. But most Indonesian Chinese are ready, as opportunists or realists, depending on one's viewpoint, to accept any government in power in China and to rejoice in a strong, powerful, and united China. As Ang Jan Goan, director of Sin Po, put it to me, the overseas Chinese may be considered shareholders in China's government. They cannot hope, as a minority, to have any voice in selecting the directors (government leaders) or in deciding company (national) policy, but they do hope for their share of the dividends (protection from the home government). As elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the most enthusiastically pro-Communist elements are found among teachers and youth. Pro-KMT elements in Medan (Sumatra) were the first among overseas Chinese to send a loyalty mission to Taiwan.

The Indonesian government has squarely faced the problem of Chinese dual nationality. If after 1951, Chinese-born in Indonesia do not renounce Indonesian citizenship, they will become Indonesian citizens and must give full allegiance to Indonesia and not to China. It is expected that few Peranakans will renounce Indonesian citizenship. The measures do not affect Totoks, who remain Chinese nationals.

The major Chinese political organization oriented towards Indonesian politics is the PDTI (translated from Malay as the Democratic Party of Indonesian Chinese. It was founded during the Japanese occupation as the Persatuan Tionghua. Composed entirely of Peranakans, its aim is to achieve equal rights for Indonesian citizens of Chinese extraction. Its president, Thio Thiam Tjong, is very capable, but tainted in Indonesian eyes by having been an advisor of Van Mook. Some Peranakans feel that now the Chinese should infiltrate Indonesian political parties rather than set up their own, thereby arousing suspicion.

The Dutch had developed indirect rule of the Chinese to its ultimate in the East Indies. There were full hierarchies of Chinese "natural leaders" given military titles, culminating in a Kapitan China who was responsible to the Dutch administrators. The system was discontinued in Java and Madura in the 1920's, but has continued right up to the present time in some parts of the country, notably Borneo and Bangka. The system will probably soon end, but in the meantime Indonesian officials replace the Dutch.

When the Indonesian government was re-established a few years ago, nine Chinese members of the parliaments of the various federal states were appointed to the Federal parliament. Six were from Java and one each from Borneo, Sumatra and Celebes. Earlier this year the Chinese M. P. from Borneo went to Holland and renounced his Indonesian citizenship in favor of Dutch. All the eight Chinese MP's are prominent Peranakan businessmen.

7. Relations with the Indonesians

The earlier Chinese immigrants intermarried rather freely with native women, and many Peranakan families are from their physical appearance obviously part-Indonesian. For the most part, offspring were reared as Chinese, and many persons largely Indonesian in stock and even in culture still consider themselves Chinese. Intermarriage has now virtually ceased.

The most assimilated group of Chinese in the country are the agriculturalists of Tangerang. Hokkiens took to agriculture there over a century ago, before Dutch restrictions on the alienation of agricultural land. Their descendants are indistinguishable from Indonesians in physical appearance, speak only Javanese Malay and lead a life almost identical with that of the Javanese farmers near them. However, they retain their Chinese surnames (though now they use Indonesian given names), and some still arrange their homes in the Chinese fashion, with altars in the rear. They consider themselves Chinese and are so considered by their neighbors, with whom relations had been friendly up to 1946. At that time, a few ultra-nationalist Indonesian leaders ran amok and the wrath of their followers was turned on the Chinese farmers. Some six hundred were killed and a few thousand fled to Djakarta. The Tsung Hui in the latter city provided emergency relief and then tried to find some sort of employment for them. Tangerang Chinese had no business sense whatsoever, so most had to be farmed out as servants and laborers. Now most of these refugees have returned to their homes in Tangerang. There was talk of sending them to Borneo, but they did not want to go.

Most Peranakans of third generation and over speak no Chinese and have lost all contact with families in China. Acculturation is marked, and there is a distinct Peranakan way of life. In dress, Peranakan women conform to various Indonesian styles, but with distinctive variations which set them apart. There are also Peranakan dishes, neither Chinese nor Javanese. There are even Peranakan bands which play something rather close to Javanese music on Chinese instruments. When they can afford it, Peranakans always live in Western-style homes. Even the most desinicized of Peranakans, however, consider themselves Chinese, and most resent being called Indonesian.

In the days of Dutch rule, there was unmistakable resentment against the Chinese on the part of many Indonesians, who resented their shrewdness, acquisitiveness, their economic power, and their acquiescence in Dutch rule. Some of the earlier Indonesian Nationalist movements were anti-Chinese. Immediately after the war there were several anti-Chinese risings, and these along with the fighting between Dutch and Indonesians caused many Chinese to flee the rural areas. Since the transfer of sovereignty, relations seem to have improved somewhat. Resentment is still prevalent among the Indonesians, however; many point out that the Chinese alone have prospered economically during the post-war disturbances (which is true), and that they controlled the black market which was disrupting the national economy before stringent exchange controls were clamped on.

Chinese remittances to China were stopped completely by the Indonesian government in March of this year, except in the few cases that do not involve loss of foreign exchange. The Chinese Embassy is now trying to work out an arrangement whereby the Chinese in Indonesia can legally remit money to China. The new immigration laws are very strict. Aside from a token Chinese quota, other immigrants, usually technical people, must be invited by the government. And the government is not inviting people from Communist China. There is a growing feeling among Indonesians that the activities of Chinese Communists in the country must be curbed.

8. Research Materials and Facilities

There is a Sinological Institute at the University of Indo-

nesia in Djakarta, headed by a Dutch Sinologue, Dr. Meijer. The Institute is not very popular with the Chinese community because both its present and former directors formerly worked for the Dutch government when its policy towards the Chinese was solely repressive. All the regular students are Peranakans. The library and curriculum are concerned almost entirely with China rather than the overseas Chinese. Nonetheless, advanced students are expected to write a thesis based on investigation of some aspect of the local Chinese community and using local Chinese written materials. Dr. Meijer believes he could supply from the Institute one or more Peranakan students with a knowledge of local Chinese dialects, Dutch, English and Malay, to assist American sociologists in their research.

There are only a few private Chinese libraries aside from that of the Institute. USIS offices in Djakarta, Surabaya and Medan subscribe to the local Chinese daily newspapers. Back copies are sent on to the Library of Congress.

PHILIPPINES

1. Population

Dr. Otley Beyer, head of the Museum and Institute of Archaeology and Ethnology of the University of the Philippines, maintains that one out of every ten residents of the Philippines is descended in part from Chinese ancestors or is of Chinese racial type. Of these, probably over 180,000 are racially full Chinese, and over 120,000 racially half-Chinese. There are, however, probably no more than 150,000 Chinese nationals as such. The question of how many of these more or less inclusive groups actually consider themselves Chinese is a moot one indeed. Most estimates place the figure between 200,000 and 250,000. 230,000 seems a reasonable estimate. Probably 90,000 of these live in Manila; by far the majority of Philippine Chinese are urban.

Hokkiens form the vast majority of the Chinese population in the country, probably about 70%. Most of the remaining (20% of the whole) are Cantonese.

2. Occupations and Business

The American and the Chinese shares of the total trade of the country are approximately equal; one-third each. Chinese, however, conduct well over half the retail trade of the islands. They do most of the buying, milling, storing and trading of rice. The Bell Commission report seems to have been quite correct in stating that the Philippine rural economy would collapse if the Chinese were eliminated from business, not only because they provide retail goods and extend credit, but because they also enable farmers to store their grain. There are no storage facilities in rural villages, and most Filipino farmers do not have enough grain to make it worthwhile to ship it to the cities. Chinese merchants, however, buy up the grain (or take it in payment of credit extended) and ship in large quantities to Manila and other cities for storage. A surprising number of the wealthiest and most prominent "Filipino" families in the

country were originally founded by Chinese businessmen. The Chinese position in industry is also second only to Americans, but I have no figures. Hokkiens dominate all lines of Chinese endeavor, except hotels, restaurants and laundries which are predominantly Cantonese.

Occupational guilds and other Chinese business associations are found in all the major cities; there are over one hundred in all. The thirty-four in Manila include associations of Chinese lumber merchants, hardware dealers, textile importers, grocery importers, general retailers, and even dried-fish importers. Most of these organizations are affiliated with Chinese Chambers of Commerce, of which there is one in the capital of every province and in several of the other commercial cities. The Chinese General Chamber of Commerce in Manila acts as the chamber for the city and as the head organization for all commercial associations in the country. Most Chinese business associations and Chambers of Commerce throughout the country are affiliated, directly or indirectly, with the General Chamber of Manila. Affiliated organizations are not bound by orders from the Manila Chamber, but in practice they tend to follow the latter's suggestions. The Manila Chinese Chamber is approached by the government on all problems concerning Chinese commerce. Charities such as the Red Cross and Community Chest are handled by the Chamber for the whole Chinese business community. Matters quite outside the realm of commerce, however, are referred to other Chinese organizations; e. g., educational matters to the Chinese Educational Association; health matters to the Chinese Hospital Association.

One of the major tasks of the Chinese Chambers of Commerce is closely to follow the legislation and decrees affecting alien businessmen, and combat those adverse to Chinese interests. They have plenty to keep them busy. The anti-alien movement, directed mainly at ending Chinese domination of the economy, has gained considerable momentum since the war. Some of the bills to this general end introduced in Congress were not passed, others were passed and vetoed by the President, while still others became law; in several cases, the intent of the anti-alien laws has not been achieved in practice. A sweeping bill for the "nationalization of the retail trade" was eventually not passed, largely because of the arguments and general stink raised by the Chinese Chamber of Commerce. A bill requiring that 60% of the payroll of all factories employing more than ten persons must go to Filipinos, was passed by Congress but vetoed. One bill which became law provides that all businesses must keep accounts in English, Spanish or Tagalog; to some extent Chinese merchants adhere to this requirement, but almost always duplicate books are also kept in Chinese. When the Manila Market (retail) was supposedly closed to Chinese merchants by granting permits only to Filipinos, actually many of the Filipino licensees sold their rights to Chinese and acted as frontmen for Chinese businessmen. Likewise, when flour importing was placed under permit and permits were allotted only to Filipinos, the latter, lacking foreign contacts and know-how, in many cases sold actual rights to Chinese importers.

One of the worst post-war blows to Chinese interests in the Philippines was the Supreme Court ruling on the Krivenko case (Nov. 1947). One article of the 1935 constitution (still in effect) held that all agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain shall be limited to Philippine citizens, or corporations 60% of whose capital is owned by citizens. In effect, the Supreme Court ruling was

that agricultural lands, as used in the Constitution, included residential lands as well. Thus no Chinese can now acquire even private urban land unless he inherits it from his father or other ascendant who acquired it before 1935. Nor can Chinese buy industrial sites on which to build factories. There are a few loopholes which need not be mentioned here; the general result is that it requires all the ingenuity the Chinese have to get new land to use even for industrial and residential purposes.

3. Regional and Other Organizations

Cantonese have regional associations in most of the larger cities, and in Manila there are hui-kuan for Teochius and Hainanese. The Hokkiens run practically everything anyway, so an overall regional association is obviated. There are several Hokkien t'ung-hsiang hui (organizations at the hsien and village level) and clan associations.

4. Education

There are about sixty Chinese schools throughout the Islands, at least one in every province. Chinese schools generally follow the six-four pattern, which means four years of lower primary, two of upper primary, two of junior middle and two of senior middle. Of the twenty Chinese schools in Manila, one is lower primary only, eleven full primary only, five primary and junior middle combined, two lower primary, junior and senior middle combined, and one everything from kindergarten to senior middle. The three middle schools in Manila are all very well equipped and staffed. In the provinces, most Chinese schools are only lower or lower and upper primary, but one school in Cebu goes up through senior middle, and five schools (two in Iloilo city, and one each in the cities of Zamboanga, Cobato and Davao) go up to junior middle. Total enrollment in the Chinese schools is about 20,000, roughly divided equally between Manila and the provinces.

Most of the Chinese middle schools offer both Chinese and English curricula, the former in the morning and the latter in the afternoon. Most students take both, but some take only one. The English curriculum is under the Director of Private Schools in the Ministry of Education, and conforms to the government standards. The Chinese curriculum is in accord with the recommendations of the Ministry of Education of the Chinese Nationalists and is directly under the supervision of the Chinese Embassy. There is no interference in or regulation of Chinese education by the Philippine government. Most of the students are Chinese nationals, and principals and teachers generally consider that the primary aim of Chinese education is to make the students good Chinese citizens and good Philippine residents. Tuition in senior middle schools is about 150 pesos per year for the Chinese curriculum and 130 pesos for the English curriculum, but it is less in junior middle and about half that in primary schools (officially 2 pesos - U.S. \$1, on the black market 2.50 pesos). There is no government aid to Chinese schools, and most of their income is from private subscriptions and contributions.

5. The Press

There are at present five Chinese dailies in the Philippines, all published in Manila. Right after the war several pro-Communist papers were established, but in 1946 the three remaining Chinese papers

with pro-Communist tendencies were closed through the combined action of the Nationalist Embassy and the Philippine Government. Now the Chinese press shows little variation in political policy. In order of size and importance, the Manila Chinese dailies are as follows:

1) Hsin Min Jih Pao, the only Chinese afternoon paper in Manila, has a circulation of ten thousand and is unquestionably the most influential Chinese paper in the country. Manila subscriptions and sales account for sixty-five hundred of the circulation, and copies are sent by air, bus and mail to the main cities of the provinces; there are 420 subscribers in Cebu, 243 in Iloilo, and 225 in Davao. The paper is a member of UP, AP, INS, Reuters, Pan-Asiatic and the Philippine News Service. Regularly of twelve pages, it abounds with commercial and shipping news and features, including American comics with Chinese sub-titles. Supposedly independent and neutral in its policy, it is actually anti-Communist, highly critical of the Peking regime, and tends to be pro-KMT. It also puts out a weekly English edition (called Fookien Times), with a circulation of about thirteen thousand.

2) Kung Li Pao, approximately eight thousand in circulation, is the largest and oldest of the Chinese morning papers. Established in 1911 as the official organ of Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary party, it was a KMT organ up until 1941. It resumed publication on February 8, 1945 (as did the Hsin Min Jih Pao), and getting off to an early start has dominated the morning field ever since. Regularly eight pages, it subscribes to UP, AP, Reuters and CNA. Its editorial policy is definitely pro-KMT, and some refer to it as a semi-official organ. It admits getting continued financial help from wealthy KMT members, but claims it is not subsidized as such.

3) Hua Ch'iao Shang Pao has a circulation of about five thousand. Established in 1921, it grew out of a monthly trade magazine and has always emphasized commercial news. Closed, as were all Chinese papers, in 1941, it resumed publication in April, 1945. But since most of its equipment was destroyed, it had a very tough time getting started again. It now considers itself in a position to offer serious rivalry to the Kung Li Pao, and is currently eight full pages in size. More truly neutral than any of the other Chinese papers, it still is far from consistently pro-Peking. Editorially it tends to leave Chinese politics alone, and concentrates on straight news, especially for the business community.

4) Ta Chung Hua Jih Pao, also usually an eight page paper, has a circulation of four thousand or less. Founded in 1945, it later combined with another post-war paper, the Chiang Kai-shek Press. It is the official KMT organ in the country, and was subsidized by the Party at least up to last year. A member of UP, AP and CNA, it follows the straight KMT line.

5) Min Tsu Jih Pao, with a circulation of two thousand or less, is controlled by Cantonese interests. Its post-war antecedents are the Chinese Commercial Bulletin, which later changed hands and became the Chinese Daily Advertiser, which failing in turn, was bought up by Cantonese interests. At present the Cantonese Association or individual Cantonese businessmen make up its deficit. It relies almost entirely on UP and CNA, and is pro-KMT in editorial policy.

The Nan Yang Chou Pao, a Chinese weekly, is also published in Manila, as is the Pacific Digest, an English language weekly owned and largely read by Chinese.

6. The Political Situation

Chinese Communists were openly active in the Philippines during the year or so immediately following American recapture of the Islands. It is also known that there are several Chinese Communist advisors to the Hukbalahap insurgents now raising increasing havoc throughout the country. The Chinese Communists are entirely underground now and there are not even any front organizations operating, due to the repressive anti-Communist measures of the present administration. The Chinese community of Manila, at least, appears to be predominantly pro-KMT, but I was in the city too short a period to guess how genuine this superficial impression is. Certainly the KMT is the only active Chinese political organization to be found, and it works closely with the Nationalist Embassy.

Chinese born in the Philippines are not automatically citizens of the country. If they desire citizenship, they must go through a very stiff naturalization process, the requirements of which preclude a large proportion of even the Philippine-born. Before the war, offspring of Chinese-Filipino marriages could declare at majority whether they wanted to be Philippine citizens; since the war, they too must be naturalized to obtain Philippine citizenship.

The major political issues concerning the Chinese have to do with the anti-alien movement in its various aspects. The most important of these is the commercial and economic, and some of the recent legislation in these categories has already been mentioned. Another indicative law recently raised the initial registration fee for aliens over fourteen years old to fifty pesos. This runs into a lot of money for large Chinese families with adolescent children. The anti-Chinese movement has become something of a political football in the Philippines. While the Chinese have fought the movement with very virtuous and self-righteous public statements and propaganda, it has also used every means at its disposal (especially money) to defeat measures prejudicial to its interests.

7. Relations with the Filipinos

The sex-ratio of the Chinese in the Philippines has always been abnormal, and in consequence intermarriage with Filipino women is quite common. Amoy, whence most immigrants came, is probably the strongest Christian stronghold in China, so many immigrants were already Christians, and thousands more entered the Catholic Church in the Islands, in part as a necessary preliminary to marriage with Catholic Filipino women. The Chinese in the Philippines are more strongly Christian than those anywhere else in Southeast Asia.

Most of the Chinese economic pioneers in the Islands founded families by marrying Filipino women, and in due time their descendants became Philippine citizens. In most cases the family name was formed of the full Chinese name of the founder, while his offspring took Spanish Christian names. The Cojuanco family, for instance, one of whose members is now a Senator, was founded by a Chinese surnamed Kuo who bought virgin forest land and developed it into a rich sugar cane area. President Quirino's wife comes from the Syquias family, also

founded over one hundred years ago by a Chinese (named Shih, Sy in Hokkien). Another prominent family of Chinese origin, which has intermarried less with Filipinos than the others mentioned, is the Sycip family, now headed by two brothers, both Philippine citizens. One, Albino Sycip, is director of the Chinese Banking Corporation. The other, Alfonso, is a past chairman of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce. Modernization and assimilation of Philippine patterns have gone far, especially among the older Hokkien immigrants. There is, of course, strong economic pressure to Philippinize, and many Chinese residents are trying to naturalize.

Immigration since the war has been greatly restricted; for Chinese the quota is five hundred. There has always been plenty of corruption in this matter. Since the war, by passing sufficient money to the right people, Chinese could get friends and relatives in under the quota. A certain proportion of the Chinese quota was often distributed to certain senators and officials who then took their squeeze. This whole story was made public by the opponents of the present administration, and a big row ensued. It was always cheaper, in any case, to get a temporary visitor's visa from the Philippine consulate in HK and then overstay in the Islands. Thousands have done just that, and now when they are rounded up they claim they are anti-Communist and cannot be sent back to Fukien. In October, 1950, the granting of visitor's visas to Chinese was stopped completely. A law has also passed the lower House reducing the Chinese quota to fifty, and it has a good chance of becoming law.

8. Research Materials and Facilities

I was unable to obtain information along these lines. However, I gather that the University of the Philippines has given more scientific attention to the local Chinese community than any other universities in Southeast Asia. There is no Chinese language officer as such in the U. S. Embassy, and it does not maintain files of the Chinese newspapers.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

1. The Chinese Population in Southeast Asian

Except for the British territories in Southeast Asia, all population estimates given in this report have been mere guesses, some better informed than others. A total of estimates will likely, but not necessarily, counterbalance errors. In any case, it appears from the summary table below that there are between nine and ten million Chinese in Southeast Asia, forming roughly 6% of the total population of the region.

1950 POPULATION ESTIMATES FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA

<u>Political Unit</u>	<u>Chinese Population</u>	<u>Total Population</u>	<u>% Chinese of Total</u>
1. Vietnam	750,000	24,000,000	3.1%
2. Cambodia & Laos	250,000	3,500,000	7.1%
3. Thailand	3,000,000	18,000,000	16.7%
4. Burma	300,000	17,500,000	1.7%
5. Federation of Malaya	2,008,000	5,235,000	38.4%
6. Singapore	790,000	1,011,000	78.1%
7. Sarawak & Brunei	162,000	550,000	29.4%
8. North Borneo	70,000	320,000	21.9%
9. Indonesia	2,100,000	72,000,000	2.9%
10. Philippines	<u>230,000</u>	<u>20,000,000</u>	<u>1.2%</u>
TOTALS	9,660,000	162,116,000	6.0%

It is noteworthy that the Chinese form larger proportions of the total populations in the four British territories than elsewhere, and that they are numerically quite insignificant in the Philippines and Burma, when compared to the total population.

The estimates of proportions of the various dialect groups in each country are even less reliable than those of the total Chinese population. However, the following sums are made in order to give an idea of the magnitude and relative importance of the five major dialect groups in Southeast Asia.

TABLE: Estimates for 1950 of the size and distribution by political unit of the five major Chinese dialect groups in Southeast Asia

(Under each dialect group heading comes first the estimated percentage of all the Chinese in the political unit in question which that dialect group forms, and second the estimated absolute number in the country belonging to that dialect group.)

<u>Political Unit</u>		<u>Teochiu</u>		<u>Hokkien</u>		<u>Cantonese</u>		<u>Hakka</u>		<u>Hainanese</u>
1. Vietnam	30:	225,000	8:	60,000	45:	337,500	10:	75,000	4:	30,000
2. Cambodia (inc. Laos)	60:	150,000	7:	15,500	20:	50,000	4:	10,000	4:	10,000
3. Thailand	60:	1,800,000	3:	90,000	10:	300,000	12:	360,000	12:	360,000
4. Burma	1:	3,000	40:	120,000	25:	75,000	8:	24,000	3:	9,000
5. Fed. Malaya	10.9:	219,000	28.6:	574,000	25.7:	516,000	21.1:	424,000	5.6:	112,000
6. Singapore	21.5:	170,000	39.6:	313,000	21.6:	171,000	5.5:	43,000	7.2:	57,000
7. Sarawak (& Brunei)	8.7:	14,200	15.2:	23,600	10.6:	17,300	31.4:	51,100	3.0:	4,800
8. N. Borneo	5:	3,500	7:	4,900	26:	18,200	56:	39,200	3:	2,100
9. Indonesia	8:	168,000	47:	987,000	12:	252,000	21:	441,000	3:	63,000
10.1 Philippines	2:	<u>4,600</u>	70:	<u>161,000</u>	20:	<u>46,000</u>	2:	<u>4,600</u>	3:	<u>6,900</u>
		2,757,300 (28.5%)		2,349,000 (24.3%)		1,783,000 (18.5%)		1,471,900 (15.2%)		654,800 (6.8%)

In this connection, it should not be forgotten that other dialect groups form important segments of the Chinese population in specific countries, notably the Hokchius in Sarawak and Brunei (27.5%: 44,800), the Yunnanese in Burma (20%: 60,000), and the Kwongsai in the Federation of Malaya (3.8%: 76,000). It will be seen from the table that over 85% of all the Chinese in Southeast Asia are Teochius, Hokkiens, Cantonese or Hakkas.

2. Chinese Communist Policy regarding the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia

There is every evidence that the Chinese Communists consider Nanyang Chinese to be of extreme importance to the various causes of the People's Republic and of world revolution. I have no clue, of course, to Chinese Communist intentions. Here I want only to mention some of the measures taken by the Communists in China and Southeast Asia to gain the allegiance and cooperation of the overseas Chinese. Communist policy in this regard, is directed by the Commission of Overseas Chinese Affairs, established at Peking in 1949. The Director is Ho Hsiang-ning, and vice-directors include Liao Cheng-chih (Central Committee member of the CP); and Li Tieh-min (Standing Committee member of the Malayan Branch of the Democratic League). Other Southeast Asian Chinese members of the Commission include Tan Kah Kee (prominent Hokkien millionaire from Singapore), Tai Tsu-liang (Executive Committee member of the Southeast Asian branch of the Democratic League); Fei Chen-tung (chief secretary of the General Association of Overseas Chinese in Medan, Sumatra), Yi Mei-hou (Standing Committee member of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, Bangkok), Huang Chang-shui (chief secretary of the Hongkong-Philippines Importers and Exporters Association), and Chuang Ming-li (vice-chairman of the Penang branch of the Democratic League).

In Kwangtung and Fukien there are other government organizations concerned mainly with overseas Chinese. Of these the most important is the Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee of the Kwangtung Provincial People's Government (KOCAC), founded in February 1950. Since its inauguration, the Committee has concentrated on giving special services and assistance to returned overseas Chinese and to the families of Overseas Chinese in the province. Among other activities up to the fall of 1950, the KOCAC 1) used its good office as mediator in disputes involving the property of overseas Chinese, in order to protect the interests of the latter; 2) gave assistance to overseas students seeking higher education by finding quarters for them, obtaining preferential treatment from the Department of Culture and Education, and recommending them to "appropriate" institutions; 3) made every effort to facilitate remittances from overseas Chinese by maintaining close contacts with the Bank of China (People's Bank), and dispatching cadres to visit emigrant communities for a full grasp of the overseas remittance situation; 4) intervened in the behalf of returning overseas Chinese who, through ignorance of new regulations, brought foreign currency and other articles in excess of quotas, obtaining for such persons partial or complete restoration of confiscated money and articles; and 5) studied conditions of land ownership in selected emigrant communities, including some in the Swatow-Ch'ao-chou (Teochiu) area, the East River (Cantonese) area, and the Hsingning-Nehsien (Hakka) area, from all of which emigrants have gone mainly to Southeast Asia. In this respect, it

should be noted that a special article in the Agrarian Reform Law empowers authorities to "handle" land and houses owned by overseas Chinese in accordance with appropriate measures determined with due regard for their (overseas Chinese') interests"

Overseas Chinese Affairs bureaus and committees have also been established in Hainan, Hsingning, Meihsien and Swatow." The bureau in the latter municipality has concentrated on performing amenities for overseas Chinese entering and leaving China. It began registering all such persons and simplified entry and departure procedures. In conjunction with the General Labor Union, it wiped out practices of extortion formerly indulged in by wharf workers. Members of the Bureau "regularly stayed overnight at the wharves to take care of overseas returned travelers and to assist in the maintenance of order." It also introduced reforms in the practices of shipping companies to prevent blackmarketing in steamer passages. According to Communist sources, over five thousand overseas Chinese reached Swatow as a result of deportation orders issued by the reactionary governments of Southeast Asia. After liberation the Bureau undertook care of the destitute among these refugees.

Generally it may be said that the official organizations for Overseas Chinese Affairs provide special services and amenities which, aside from humanitarian reasons, are designed to win over by deed the returned overseas Chinese and overseas Chinese families. Direct propaganda is a secondary function, though naturally important. On the arrival of steamers from Southeast Asia, cadres bring copies of the Communists' "Statement to Overseas Chinese" for distribution, and "simple publicity work" is carried out. When the currency situation began to stabilize in the summer of 1950, direct propaganda was carried on among overseas Chinese returning and leaving the country to step up remittances. Family members of overseas Chinese were urged to write their people abroad informing them that the People's Government had the situation in hand and that more and bigger remittances would be welcome.

The official Bureaus in all cases have stimulated the formation of Returned Overseas Chinese Associations. These have now been formed for Kwangtung province as a whole, for Swatow, Canton and for Amoy. These unofficial organizations devote themselves almost entirely to propaganda. The report of the "Nanyang Returned Chinese Association of Swatow", for instance, states that the organization devoted major attention to "publicity among overseas returned Chinese to win them over to the New Democracy through various kinds of meetings and private friendly contacts" and "the establishment of liaison with progressive Chinese newspapers published abroad, and the publication through their columns of actual conditions prevailing in the home districts of the overseas Chinese." The Amoy Association does similar work. One of its "open statements to overseas Chinese says in part:

". . . . we take this opportunity to express to overseas Chinese all over the world our sense of gratification, and the hope that all of us will exert concerted efforts for the smashing of the malignant rumors of the bandit agents, the exposure of the shady machinations of the warmongers, and the manifestation of the exemplary tradition of patriotism among the overseas Chinese in the common task of constructing a free and democratic New China."

Just what the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission in Peking does is clothed in mystery, but the membership on it of CP and Democratic League leaders suggests that it to some extent directs the activities of Communists and Communist-front organizations in the various Southeast Asian countries. It is in the closest contact with the two Southeast Asian Embassies from Peking, in Rangoon and Djakarta. Enough has already been said about Chinese Communist activity in Southeast Asia to indicate that they act either through front organizations, such as the Democratic League, the Working Committees (in Indonesia) and labor unions, or entirely underground. Nowhere does a Chinese CP operate openly, not even in those countries which have recognized the Peking government.

The broadcasts of Radio Peking that are beamed to Southeast Asia are a powerful propaganda voice. Those, together with releases of the New China News Agency, provide the major source of pro-Communist news, and the latest CP line for Communist and progressive organs throughout Nanyang. The Chinese Communist propaganda line among overseas Chinese appeals mainly to patriotism and to hopes for strong diplomatic and economic protection from the People's Government in Peking. In this respect it exaggerates and protests all the measures of Southeast Asian governments which may be interpreted as anti-Chinese. The Peking government finds cruel exploitation and oppression of Chinese everywhere in the region, and notes that the situation has improved only in Burma and Indonesia where Peking Embassies have opened.

The Chinese Communist line has few kind words for any Southeast Asian government: In Malaya, the British imperialists, it is said, have arrested several tens of thousands of overseas Chinese, mostly innocent citizens. And on the pretext of raising funds for educational purposes they are said to have imposed the income tax for the exploitation of overseas Chinese. In Vietnam, the French imperialists collude with KMT agents in the persecution of progressive Chinese, while French bureaucratic capitalists force Chinese merchants to play second fiddle. In Thailand, the fascist government of Phibul is coming under the direct control of American imperialism, and so the lot of Chinese is especially hard. Chinese interests have been greatly harmed by the infiltration of American capital. Chinese schools have suffered the most serious oppression, and only one hundred-odd are still in operation. Workers and peasants in Thailand live a hard life, and eat the worst of food. As for the Philippines, where American imperialism has full sway, Chinese businessmen are persecuted mercilessly. Quirino is a fascist, puppet, stooge, tool and otherwise just what the Americans ordered. Even Indonesia has a false democracy, and its government is reactionary and in collusion with Dutch imperialism. And in Burma, which comes off best of all, remittances are restricted and in the ensuing black market the Chinese have been exploited.

It will be noted that the Chinese Communists try to give the impressions 1) that the Peking government is concerned with protecting the economic interests of Chinese businessmen, and 2) that the introduction of western capital and western economic aid (imperialism, that is) is opposed to the economic interests of the Chinese. Another more subtle way by which the Communists appeal to the overseas Chinese merchants is to stress the fact that capitalism when not imperialistic, is an integral part of China's New Democracy.

Two immediate aims of these lines are 1) increased remittances to China from overseas, and 2) investment by overseas Chinese of capital in China.

3. The Policies of Southeast Asian Governments towards the Chinese

No Southeast Asian government is sanguine about the problems posed by the Chinese populations within its jurisdiction. Large groups of the Chinese in the region, because of the nature of the sub-culture they carry, are better suited for business and commercial enterprise than any of the indigenous peoples. (One exception to this generalization is provided by the Minangkabaus of southern Sumatra, who do better in business on their home ground than do the Chinese and who offer serious commercial competition in other centers of Indonesia.) Consequently in all political units of the region, the Chinese control a highly disproportionate share of commerce, finance, and industry, and in several countries completely dominate the national economy. Especially in Thailand and the Philippines, to a lesser extent in Indonesia, Malaya and Indochina, and to a lesser but still considerable extent in Burma and British Borneo, this economically powerful position of the Chinese is cause for apprehension on the part of indigenous peoples and Westerners alike. Fears have been compounded by the Communists' success in China, the consequent swing of a large body of overseas Chinese opinion to pro-Peking and/or pro-Communist attitudes, and the aggressive propaganda and indoctrination carried out by overseas Chinese Communists and their sympathizers. Economic control and Communism are the two issues around which anti-Chinese governmental policies center, though both are often considered to be parts, along with lesser issues, of the question of local nationalism.

The areas remaining under European control present a somewhat special picture. Both Britain and France propound the doctrine that eventual domination of their colonial areas must be reserved for the indigenous peoples. French policy needs no additional comment. The British, for various and changing reasons of imperial policy, have during the years and throughout the Empire 1) practiced the policy of divide and rule, and 2) especially favored Mohammedan peoples. The post-war difficulties in Malaya centering around the proposed Malayan Union are to some extent legacies of this approach, the ghost of which is still not laid. Most British colonial servants in the Far East still have a more or less open anti-Chinese bias. Political control and special economic and cultural rights are reserved for Malays in all British territories in Southeast Asia. The fact that the Chinese greatly outnumber the Malays in British Borneo, and have a slight preponderance in all of Malaya (including Singapore) seems only to reinforce British pro-Malay policy. Singapore has been separated from the rest of Malaya, so that the Malays have a plurality in the Federation. Recent Indo-

nesian immigrants can more easily obtain political rights in the Federation than Chinese who have lived there since childhood. Malay education is all free, while there is no Chinese vernacular education provided by the government.

Chinese in British territories have much cause for resentment against governmental policy and British attitudes. The relative absence of rabid anti-British feeling among them may be largely attributed to the fact that the socially and economically powerful Chinese -- usually also the politically conscious elements -- have prospered in part because of British-maintained stability, British-encouraged commerce, British-administered jobs, and British-sponsored education. The Chinese community will likely develop extreme anti-British attitudes only when the collapse of British power in Southeast Asia is imminent. Lack of extreme anti-British opinion does not imply the presence of widespread, untempered pro-British attitudes, however, and the British problem is to gain sufficient Chinese enthusiasm for their policies, especially those related to the Malayan emergency, that their power will not collapse.

In view of the situation in the Far East generally and in Malaya in particular, the British now need popular support of the Chinese even more than of the Malays. The reversal of policy necessary to gain maximum Chinese support is unlikely to occur, however, because the British fear 1) that equal rights for Chinese would result in the transformation of their territories into Chinese countries, and 2) that they (the British) would be unable to keep such Chinese-controlled countries, even if included in the Commonwealth, from adopting policies more favorable to China than to the UK.

In two of the independent Southeast Asian countries, Thailand and the Philippines, anti-Chinese attitudes and policies are an integral part of local politics. In both countries the Chinese are utilized as scapegoats. Philippine politicians shamelessly divert general discontent over economic and political deterioration from themselves against the Chinese minority. Even in the face of this rough treatment, left-wing and pro-Peking attitudes have not developed to any great extent among the Philippine Chinese. Reasons can be found in the makeup of the Chinese community, the nature of Philippine internal politics, and the Philippines' position in world politics. To a greater extent than in any other Southeast Asian country, Chinese in the Philippines are big businessmen: importers, exporters, financiers, industrialists and retailers. If these powerful people believe half of what they read (about Communist China) in the Philippine papers they control, they can be under no illusions that capitalists of their kind would fare well under Communism, in New Democratic or any other guise. Furthermore, their enterprises are clearly tied up with American interests, which make no secret of opposition to Communism. The threat to the status of Filipino ruling cliques posed by the Communist-led Hukbalahap rebellion and by "Communist" social reform is enough to insure rabid anti-Communism in the Philippines on a par with that in the U. S. In these circumstances the Chinese cannot afford to express even progressive notions, much less opinions favorable to Peking. Finally, close military and economic ties between the U. S. and its former possession insure the subservience of the Philippine government to the United States' intransigently anti-Communist foreign policy. Philippine Chinese know that the Islands would be the last country

in Southeast Asia which the U.S. would allow to fall under Communist control. For their own interest, then, leaders among the Philippine Chinese oppose Communism and must ingratiate themselves with Americans and Filipinos who are themselves rigidly anti-Communist, at home and abroad.

In Thailand the situation is rather different. The Chinese population with its sizable proportion of laborers -- both plantation and non-agricultural -- is more prone to Communist influence, and the presence of a vigorous Thailand Chinese Communist Party poses a more direct threat to the government. Thus very real fears of Chinese Communism reinforce longer-standing nationalistic fears of Chinese infiltration and cultural and economic power. The Thai government, however, seems to realize only vaguely that its rabid anti-Chinese policies are cementing the Chinese community into a cohesive, well-organized, non-Siamese in-group, and driving that community into the arms of Communism itself. It is unrealistic to deplore the unassimilability of the Chinese while pursuing precisely those policies that make assimilation impossible. To prohibit and restrict Chinese education while not offering attractive alternative education is sheer folly and provocation.

Governmental policies towards the Chinese in Burma and Indonesia have, since the transfer of sovereignty, been ill-defined and laissez-faire. Burma and Indonesia both have relatively small Chinese populations (1.7% and 2.9% of the respective totals). The regimes of these countries, while perhaps inept, are not reactionary, and of course both have recognized the Chinese People's Republic. Furthermore, both countries feel insecure with the Western bloc of nations, in view of their recent struggles to sever ties with European colonial powers, and they cannot afford to antagonize the two huge Communist powers of Asia. It is noteworthy, however, that both governments have, since the arrival of Peking emissaries, taken increased interest in the activities of their Chinese minorities. There is some evidence that Indonesian politicians may try to reduce popular dissatisfaction with their failure to solve certain of the country's pressing problems by diverting feeling against the Chinese.

4. Chinese Political Opinion in Southeast Asia

Large segments of the Chinese population in every Southeast Asian country are disinterested in politics -- locally, in China, and on the international scene. Their concerns extend little beyond the business of making a living and the immediate influence of political pressures on their daily lives. Since Chinese generally have few political rights and responsibilities, such interest as the masses have in local politics is passive. In every country, however, the educated Chinese generally, as well as those uneducated merchants with wide business contacts, take a very real interest in politics. Whether major concern is with local or China politics varies from country to country.

Political attitudes are a function of many different factors. One might mention the interests of the various socio-economic groups within the Chinese communities, the current economic situation as it affects the prosperity of the Chinese community, local governmental policy towards the Chinese, the nature of information

and opinion in the Chinese press (in turn often a function of the special interests of newspaper publishers), the type and effectiveness of external propaganda (e. g., from Peking, Taipeh, and via various American media), and shifts in the balance of power in the Far East.

To gauge the current state of Chinese political opinion is no easy matter, and one which I can attempt only on the basis of inadequate material and experience in the area, and with grave misgivings. Perhaps the safest way is to summarize press opinion and then mention ways in which this opinion may distort the true distribution of attitudes.

The total circulation of Chinese daily papers in Southeast Asia is in the neighborhood of 325-340,000. Total circulation for the forty-five dailies discussed in this report is about 330,000; and there are seven or eight small newspapers in Tongkong and the outlying parts of Indonesia for which information as to circulation and political viewpoint is unavailable. The inclusion of data on these papers, however, would not materially alter the tentative conclusions offered here. The over-all picture of press opinion can be clarified by classifying the papers according to political viewpoint, and then totaling the circulations for each classification by countries, as in the adjoining table. The following classification seems to be of maximum usefulness for this purpose:

- A. Communist organs and pro-Communist.
- B. Ardently pro-Peking, but with reservations on world Communism.
- C. Neutral with a pro-Peking slant.
- D. Really neutral.
- E. Neutral with a pro-KMT slant.
- F. KMT organs and thoroughly pro-KMT.

Country	Total Circulation of all Chinese Dailies of each Shade of Opinion					
	A	B	C	D	E	F
Thailand	8,000	30,000	18,000	16,000		
Indochina		1,000			1,500	19,000
Burma	4,500		4,000	3,000		
Singapore & Malaya			58,000	41,000	5,000	30,000
Br. N. Borneo		800		600	1,200	
Indonesia	11,200	27,000		5,000	1,500	16,000
Philippines					15,000	13,500
Totals	23,700	58,800	80,000	65,600	24,200	78,500

Generally speaking, then, for every reader of Communist organs or pro-Communist dailies, there are two readers of papers which are less rabidly Communist but still ardently pro-Peking, three readers of neutral papers with a pro-Peking slant, two readers of really neutral papers, one reader of neutral papers with a pro-KMT slant, and three readers of KMT organs and ardently pro-KMT papers. Or even more summarily, the ratio among readers of 1) really neutral papers, 2) mildly and ardently pro-KMT papers, and 3) mildly and ardently pro-Peking papers is roughly 1 : 2 : 3.

It is likely that especially in one respect these figures are an imperfect reflection of the real distribution of political opinion among the Southeast Asian Chinese. A greater proportion of newspapers than of politically conscious individuals are special pleaders for the extreme causes of the Peking regime and of the KMT. Just as in the U. S. most newspapers are either Republican or Democratic in policy while most individuals are neither or are fence-sitters, so in Southeast Asia there is more polarization in the Chinese press than in the Chinese communities themselves. This tendency is less sharply shown in these figures because they exclude weeklies which generally prove to be more extreme in political viewpoint than dailies. The Chinese communities are polarized too, of course, but the point to be made here is that the clustering immediately around the two poles of pro-KMT and pro-Peking attitudes is probably less concentrated in the populace than these figures for the press indicate. My opinion is that perhaps three-quarters of the politically conscious Chinese fall within the neutral range (from C through E), rather than half (as of press opinion).

Another reservation should also be made. Anti-Communist pressures external to the Chinese communities in Vietnam and the Philippines are such that the Chinese cannot express leftist opinions publicly. In consequence actual opinion in the Chinese communities of these two countries is doubtless further left than press opinion. The same probably holds true for Singapore and Malaya where two leftist papers with rather large circulations were recently closed by the authorities. It is noteworthy that Thailand, whose government has had the most thorough and long-standing policy of repressing the Chinese minority, has the most thoroughly leftist Chinese press in Southeast Asia.

I do feel that three features of Chinese political opinion are fairly accurately reflected in this material on the press: 1) that the ratio of those mildly and ardently pro-Peking to those mildly and ardently pro-KMT is roughly three to two, 2) that there was a clearly perceptible swing of opinion away from the Communist and Peking cause during the fall of 1950 (following upon the vigorous US and UN intervention in Korea), and 3) that the most typical attitude of the Southeast Asian Chinese is one of neutrality with a pro-Peking slant. The average Nanyang Chinese with political consciousness is a fence-sitter who tends to consider the Chinese People's Republic his government (insofar as any non-local government is "his"), and who hopes and expects that the strong and united regime in Peking will give him more protection and cause for pride than any other Chinese government of his time. He is not Communist, however, not even pro-Communist as contrasted with pro-Peking. Enlightened policies and practice on the part of non-Communist forces can still induce the vast majority of Southeast Asian Chinese to travel the roads towards freedom and democracy.

APPENDIX: Identification List of the
Chinese press in Southeast Asia

<u>Wade Romanization (citation form)</u>	<u>Title in Chinese</u>	<u>Romanized Masthead (if any) or Translation of Chinese Title</u>
Thailand:		
Ch'üan Min Pao	全民報	Chuanmin Pao
Hua Ch'iao Jih Pao	華僑日報	Chinese Overseas Daily News
Chung Yuan Pao	中原報	Chinese Daily News
Hsing Hsien Jih Pao	星暹日報	Sing Sian Yit Pao
Hsing T'ai Wan Pao	星泰晚報	Sing Thai Wan Pao
Kuang Hua Pao	光華報	(Light of China Press)
Tzu Yu Pao	自由報	(Freedom Press)
Min Chu Hsin Wen	民主新聞	(Democratic News)
Cambodia:		
Hsien Shih Pao	現實報	Le réaliste
Kung Yen Jih Pao	公言日報	La voix publique
Kung Shang Pao	工商報	Journal du commerce et de l'industrie
Hua Shang Pao	華商報	(Journal of Chinese Commerce)
Vietnam:		
Yuan Tung Jih Pao	遠東日報	(Far Eastern Daily) ^a
Fu Nü Jih Pao	婦女日報	(Women's Daily)
Chung Kuo Jih Pao	中國日報	L'information Chinoise
Ho P'ing Jih Pao	和平日報	(Peace Daily)
Hua Nan Jih Pao	華南日報	(China-Nanyang Daily)

<u>Wade Romanization (citation form)</u>	<u>Title in Chinese</u>	<u>Romanized Masthead (if any) or Translation of Chinese Title</u>
Burma:		
Chung Kuo Jih Pao	中國日報	New China Pao
Chung Hua Shang Pao	中華商報	China Commercial Times
Hsin Yang Kuang Pao	新仰光報	New Rangoon Evening Post
Jen Min Pao	人民報	Zin Min Pao
Ching Feng Pao	勁風報	Kiang Phone
Tzu Yu Pao	自由報	Freedom Pao
Sheng Huo Chou Pao	生活週報	The Life Weekly
Singapore:		
Nan Yang Shang Pao	南洋商報	Nanyang Siang Pau
Nan Fang Wan Pao	南方晚報	(Southern Evening Post)
Hsing Chou Jih Pao	星洲日報	Sin Chew Jit Pao
Chung Hsing Jih Pao	中興日報	Chung Shing Jit Pao
Hsing Ch'i Liu	星期六	Saturday Review
Nan Yang Yueh K'an	南方月刊	Nanyang Monthly
Federation of Malaya:		
Kuang Hua Jih Pao	光華日報	Kwong Wah Yit Pau
Hsing Pin Jih Pao	星檳日報	Singpin Jih Pao
Chung Kuo Pao	中國報	The China Press
Chien Kuo Jih Pao	建國日報	Kin Kwok Daily News
Hua Ch'iao Hsiao Pao	華僑小報	Overseas Chinese Weekly
Sarawak:		
Chung Hua Jih Pao	中華日報	Chinese Daily News
Chung Hua Kung Pao	中華公報	Chung Hua Journal
Ta T'ung Jih Pao	大同日報	Ta Tung Daily News
Ch'iao Sheng Pao	僑聲報	(Overseas Chinese Voice)
Shih Shih P'ing Lun	時事評論	The Current Critic

<u>Wade Romanization (citation form)</u>	<u>Title in Chinese</u>	<u>Romanized Masthead (if any) or Translation of Chinese Title</u>
North Borneo:		
Hua Ch'iao Jih Pao	華僑日報	Overseas Chinese Daily News
Indonesia:		
Hsin Pao	新報	Sin Po
T'ien Sheng Jih Pao	天聲日報	Thien Sung Yit Po
Sheng Hwo Pao	生活報	Seng Hwo Pao
Hua Ch'iao Hsin Wen	華僑新聞	Chinese Daily News
Ch'ing Kuang Jih Pao	青光日報	Tsing Kwang Daily Press
Ta Kung Shang Pao	大公商報	Tay Kong Siang Po
Tung Cha Wa Jih Pao	東爪哇日報	The East Java Press
Su Men Ta La Min Pao	蘇門答臘民報	Sumatra Bin Poh
Hsin Chung Hua Pao	新中華報	New China Times
Min Chu Jih Pao	民主日報	Democratic Daily News
Chung Hua Jih Pao	中華日報	Chung Hwa Jit Pau
Li Ming Pao	黎明報	Lee Ming Pau
Mei Jih Tien Hsin	每日電訊	Daily Telegraph
K'uang Lu Jih Pao	匡廬日報	The Daily Chronicle
Min Sheng Jih Pao	民聲日報	Min Sheng Daily Press
Hsing Ch'i Pao	星期報	Sunday Post
Cheng Lun Hsing Ch'i Pao	正論星期報	Cheng Lun Weekly
Philippines:		
Hsin Min Jih Pao	新閩日報	Fookien Times
Kung Li Pao	公理報	Kong Li Po
Hua Ch'iao Shang Pao	華僑商報	Chinese Commercial News
Ta Chung Hua Jih Pao	大中華日報	Great China Press
Min Tsu Jih Pao	民族日報	Chinese National Daily News