Israeli Education Policies as a Tool for the Ethnic Manipulation of the Arab Druze: Israel and the Occupied Syrian Golan

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ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates decisions and processes of ethnic manipulation within the education system in Israel using archival documents, textbooks, and interviews to guide its arguments. The paper studies taught in Druze schools in Israel and the Occupied Syrian Golan OSG, documents interviews of Druze teachers and activists, and compares Israel's educational policies with international laws. Next, it examines the particular conditions of the Syrians in the Golan as an occupied people in the proximity of the Syrian civil war. The author argues that the state of Israel employs tactics of minoritization and ethnic manipulation against its Arab Druze communities in the OSG and Israel proper in order to maintain its ethnocratic regime.

Institutionalized efforts of manipulation include the separation of Druze from the Arab school system, the construction of separate Druze holidays, and mandatory conscription to the Israeli army. Through these tactics, Israel has misappropriated Druze agency, undermined their identity, and manipulated their ethnic heritage. Within the education system, Israel's policies have created a Druze community that is uninformed about its history, disconnected from its culture, and confused about its identity. While Syrians in the Golan do not serve in the Israeli army, the effects of identity suppression have been magnified in the region due to the Syrian civil war and the consequent closure of their (limited) access to Syria.

International law requires Israel, as a signatory to several covenants and partner in multiple treaties, to provide an education that preserves and promotes the culture and history of ethnic minorities—especially peoples in occupied territories. This includes an accurate representation of the borders of the State, inclusion of notable Arab Druze historical figures, and an education about their Arab culture and heritage. Finally, this thesis argues that while several international covenants and treaties are relevant to the acceptable cultural and historical representation for minorities and indigenous groups, the need to specify what that means remains. Adding General Comments and having the Special Rapporteur on Education visit Israel, combined with increased pressure from non-governmental organizations, would ultimately increase the state's accountability for and adherence to those conventions.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Amal Aun is a Palestinian citizen of Israel. She is the daughter of the internally displaced refugees Nasser and Wafa. After completing her bachelor's degree at the University of Haifa with a major in social-linguistics and a minor in Israel and Palestine studies, she continued to work with different local and international organizations that advance human rights and social justice for indigenous minorities in Israel. Today, Amal is a Fulbright scholar and an International Peace Fellow pursuing her MPA at the Cornell Institute for Public Affairs (CIPA) with a concentration in human rights and social justice, particularly relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Amal believes that cultural rights are essential components of human rights and hopes to leverage her academic experience to promote that notion throughout the Middle East.

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"انه لا يتصور على وجه الكرة وجود أمة تشعر بذاتها ,تعرف نفسها ,قائمة بنفسها إلا إذا كانت

حافظة لتاريخها ,واعية لماضيها ,متذكرة لأولوياتها ومبادئها ,مقيدة لوقائعها ,مسلسلة لأنسابها ,

خازنة لآدابها ,ومما لا يقوم به إلا علم التاريخ "

- أمير البيان، شكيب أرسلان

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It is unimaginable to have a nation on this planet that can feel, know, and independently establish itself without saving its history, being aware of its past, remembering its priorities, being bound to its present, continuing its ancestry, and protecting its literature; **something that only the study of history can achieve.**

- The Prince of Eloquence, Shakib Arslan[1]

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[1] Shakib Arslan is a renowned Arab poet and an influential national figure who advocated for the Pan-Islamic unity of the Arab world as a main component of the nation's success. He was a Lebanese Druze.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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List of Key Definitions

1. **Druze:** The Druze are a religious community that was founded in the eleventh century as a branch of Ismaili Shiite Islam in Egypt. Today, the Druze live mainly in Lebanon, Syria, and Israel. They speak Arabic as their native tongue, and share culture and cuisine with the larger Middle East.

2. **Minoritization:** It is a political practice of people in power that isolates and separates target communities from the larger surrounding to weaken them.

3. **Ethnic Manipulation:** It is a political tactic of people in power that aims at changing the collective identity of target communities and assigning them ethnic attributes in a way that is political advantageous for those in power.

4. **Ethnocracy**: It is a political regime that prioritizes one ethnic community in the state and abroad over its other citizens, by providing unique economic, political, and social opportunities for them.

5. **Nakba:** Or "Catastrophe"; it is the Palestinian terminology for the 1948 war in which over 170,000 palestinians fled or were forced out of their homes, and over 400 Palestinian villages were destroyed. The Israeli narratives dubs this war "The Independence War," as it resulted in the creation of the State of Israel.

6. **Palestinian Community in Israel:** They are the Palestinian Arabs that remained in the land that became part of Israel. They are mostly internally displaced persons from other villages around historic Palestine.

7. **Millet System**: A system created by the Ottomans that required non-Sunni Muslims to have separate religious representatives to handle their personal affairs with the Ottoman rulers. Jewish, Greek-Orthodox Christians, and Armenians were organized in separate systems.

8. **Al-Sham:** Or "The Levant." It is the historic terminology of the region currently incorporating Syria, Lebanon, Israel/Palestine, and Jordan.

INTRODUCTION

Ethnic and religious communities in the Middle East have lived under the control of several colonial powers in the past century alone. Ottoman, British, and French powers, following their own self-interests, employed divide-and-conquer tactics to maintain their authority over the native peoples. This time-honored technique of divide-and-conquer has manifested itself in different ways over the years, with a focus on religious identities as a key element. While the Ottomans required non-Sunni Muslim communities to assign official religious representatives to mediate between them and the government, the French made national political promises to the Christian community in Lebanon, and the British shared their recommendations with Israel to "arouse the activity and interest of the [...] Druze" to support their national project.[2] This research focuses specifically on the last of these three examples: the institutionalized efforts of the Israeli Government to win over the Druze community in support of its political, economic, and social control of the land.

The government's minoritization efforts in relation to the Druze include the labelling of their sect as a separate national entity in the state of Israel, something that is unheard of in Druze localities in Lebanon or Syria.[3] They also included the mandatory army conscription in 1956 for Druze youth, and an official separation of the Druze curriculum in 1975.[4]

The Israeli government has not kept its minoritization efforts of the Druze a secret. In a government reply to a "complaint letter" that includes Druze signatories, the Government Office for Arab Relations, represented here by Mr. Yehousha` Felmann, explains:

> *"The last people with a reason to complain against the state of Israel should be the Druze. Not only were they not oppressed, but they were given extraordinary rights. This*

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[2] Karayanni, M. (2016). Tainted Liberalism: Israel's Palestinian- Arab Millets. *Constellations*, *23*(1), 71-83. See also Doyle, P. (2016). *Lebanon*. Bradt Travel Guides. P. 16. See also Israeli National Archives, (1949) in a dispatch from British Official to Israel. Please see Figure 1.

[3] Kaufman, Ilana. "Ethnic affirmation or ethnic manipulation: The case of the Druze in Israel." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 9, no. 4 (2004): 53-82.

[4] Kaufman, I. (2004). Ethnic affirmation or ethnic manipulation: The case of the Druze in Israel. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, *9*(4), 53-82.

was not done randomly, but with a plan and intention, which was to deepen and expand the distance between them and the Arabs among whom they live."[5]

Israel has used the school curriculum to "deepen and expand the distance between [the Druze] and the Arabs."[6] These deliberate educational policies have exacerbated the divide between Druze identity and larger Arab identity. According to Dr. Amal Jammal, a political scientist from Tel Aviv University and a Druze himself, the current structure of the educational system in Druze schools creates "an extremely difficult identity crisis for Druze youth, especially since their cultural connection [with Arabs] has disappeared."[7]

Israel's efforts to create a separate Druze identity are part of a larger scheme to isolate each ethnic minority within the state. In 2015, for example, the Israeli Minister of Education, Naftali Bennett, rejected a proposal to include a story depicting a romance between an Arab and a Jew in the state curriculum. The ministry's statement explained that there is a need to maintain "the identity and the heritage of students in every sector," and such an intimate relationship "threatens that separation."[8] The following chapter will shed light on the importance of separation and "purity" in an ethnocratic regime.

The Syrian Druze in the Occupied Golan have had slightly different experiences and sources of influence affecting their collective identity. They have experienced over 50 years of continued militarization and occupation of their land, and many have lost their homes in the process.[9] Their more direct and antagonistic relationship with Israel has resulted in lower degrees of assimilation with the Israeli society compared to the Druze in Israel Proper. Additionally, according to Aamer Ibraheem, a Syrian activist from Occupied Majdal Shams, the Syrian civil war has "impacted every aspect of [the lives of people in the Golan.]"[10] With the eruption of war in 2011, the native inhabitants' already limited freedom to travel to Syria has been completely severed due to

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[5] Translated from official government letter titled "הנדון: מכתבו של בר-יהודה בעניין הדרוזים בעוספיא" dated June 14, 1950. Please see List of Figures, Figure 2.

[6] Ibid.

[7] טלילה נשר, "מחקר: תוכנית הלימודים לדרוזים מוחקת זיקה לערבים" הארץ (2012), הושג מ-
https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/education/1.1893874

[8] "Arab-Jewish love story rejected for Israeli schools", (2015), Aljazeera. Retrieved November 21st, 2017 from:
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/12/arab-jewish-love-story-rejected-israeli-schools-151231102739368.html

[9] Halabi, Usama R. "Life under occupation in the Golan Heights." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 22, no. 1 (1992): 78-93.

[10] From an Interview With Aamer Ibraheem, on October 3, 2017.

security concerns.[11] Additional resources that once provided cultural and political education, like summer camps and afterschool programs, have also been terminated.[12] Israel's continuous rejection of the Human Rights Committee's (HRC) repeated requests to extend its legal obligations under international covenants, like the ICCPR, to occupied territories, limits the people's access to basic protections of their human rights, including education.[13] These regional political shifts, together with the imposed school curriculum and the reality of occupation, have all contributed to the unique identity changes for the Syrian Druze.

The Druze

Druze is a monolithic religious sect that developed from Ismaili Shi'ite Islam during Fatimid Caliphate in eleventh century Egypt. Under the rule of Al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah there, the Druze sect evolved and was open to new converters.[14] After Al-Hakim's fall, the Druze experienced oppression and persecution, leading them to take refuge in the Levant.[15] They speak Arabic as their native language and share culture, tradition, and food with the larger Arab Shami society. Today, Druze communities can be found in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel, comprising together around one million people.[16] In Israel, Arab Druze communities are mainly found in the northern part of the country and represent about 2% of the population.[17] They can be divided, for the purpose of this research, into two main categories: Palestinian Druze of 1948, and Syrian Druze of 1967.

The Syrian Druze reside in the Occupied Syrian Golan; a mountainous area in Southwest Syria known for its strategic location (bordering Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel), and rich water

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[11] "Human Right Violations Committed by the State of Israel in the Occupied Syrian Golan." (2017), Al-Marsad - Arab Human Rights Centre in the Golan Heights. P. 5.

[12] From an Interview With Aamer Ibraheem, on October 3, 2017.

[13] See "Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of Israel, 112th session, November 2014, P. 2.

[14] Parsons, Laila. *The Druze between Palestine and Israel 1947–49*. Springer, 2000.

[15] Ibid, See also קופמן, אילנה, and Ilana Kaufman. "A" Covenant of Blood" Between Druze and Jews: Two Narratives/" ברית הדמים" בין יהודים לדרוזים: שני נרטיבים." זמנים: רבעון להיסטוריה (2005): 44-53. See also Aboultaif, Eduardo Wassim. "Druze Politics in Israel: Challenging the Myth of "Druze-Zionist Covenant"." *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 35, no. 4 (2015): 533-555.

[16] Parsons, (2000).

[17] Theodoro, E. Angelina, "5 Facts About Israeli Druze, A Unique Religious and Ethnic Group." Pew Research Center. 2016.

sources.[18] During the 1967 war, Israel occupied 1,250 ^{2} of its 1,750 ^{2}, and returned 100 ^{2} after the 1973 war.[19] While historically the OSG had a heterogeneous religious community of Syrian Muslims, Christians, and Druze, today's native population consists almost entirely of Druze.[20] During the war, over 130,000 Syrian Arabs, who comprised more than 95% of the original population in the Golan, fled or were expelled by Israeli troops.[21] Today, a sole 26,000 people remain in the five main villages in the OSG: Majdal Shams (the largest of them), Buqa`atha, Ein Qinya, Masa`ade, and Ghajar.[22] The reasons for the Druze remaining in their homes, while all other Syrian Arabs being driven out or fleeing the war, were a combination of the distant and elevated geographic location of those five villages - something that provided protection in the face of the Israeli attacks - as well as the history of Majdal Shams during the 1929 revolt - when villagers left their homes only to come back and find them completely destroyed.[23] Therefore, Halabi explains, "they [the residents of Majdal Shams] did everything they could to stop people from fleeing, in some cases even intervening physically."[24] Following the occupation, Israel administered military rule until the end of 1981, when it illegally annexed the territory and applied civil law in the region.[25] After the annexation, the Syrian residents of the OSG refused Israeli citizenship; and until this day, they continue to have "permanent residency" status, and an "unidentified" nationality.[26] Their unique status hinders, among many things, their freedom of movement.

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[18] Halabi, Usama R. "Life under occupation in the Golan Heights." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 22, no. 1 (1992): 78-93.

[19] Halabi, Usama R. "Life under occupation in the Golan Heights." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 22, no. 1 (1992): 78-93.

[20] There are two Christian families, one in Majdal Shams and one in Buqa`tha. See also, Halabi, Usama R. "Life under occupation in the Golan Heights." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 22, no. 1 (1992): 78-93.

[21] Ibid

[22] Halabi, Usama R. "Life under occupation in the Golan Heights." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 22, no. 1 (1992): 78-93.

[23] Ibid

[24] Ibid

[25] Kennedy, R. Scott. "The Druze of the Golan: A case of non-violent resistance." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 13, no. 2 (1984): 48-64.

[26] Please see List of Figures. Figure 7.

Theoretical Framework

There are two components to the theoretical framework of this research. The first is the socio-political framework that advances the examination and interpretation of the educational policies employed by the Israeli government to minoritize and isolate the Arab Druze community from its surroundings. The second component is the legal responsibility of the State to prevent the intentional erasure of Arab culture and heritage from the Druze community's collective identity as put forward by international covenants and declarations. Together, these theoretical components provide a unique and holistic lens to examine and evaluate the State of Israel's educational policies.

Ethnocracy

An integral premise upon which this research is based is the notion of ethnocracy and ethnocratic regimes. Oren Yiftachel, who has researched ethnocratic laws both in Israel and abroad, has developed the leading framework for analyzing this political ideology. The term is built on two main principles: "First, ethnicity, and not citizenship, is the main logic around which state resources are allocated; and second, the interests of a dominant ethnic group shape most public policies."[27] The regime is motivated, therefore, by the moral obligation of securing the homeland for its people. This process of facilitation often requires the domination of the ethnic group, within the borders of the state and beyond, of capital and economic globalization.[28]

Ethnocratic regimes, especially those described as "open-ethnocracies,"[29] usually face a recurring challenge to balance the "ethnos," the ethnic community in power, with the "demos," the democratic rule of the community residing within its borders. According to the ideological premise of ethnocratic regimes, "the 'ethnos' enjoys clear legal and institutional prominence.

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[27] Yiftachel, Oren. "Israeli society and Jewish-Palestinian reconciliation:'Ethnocracy' and its territorial contradictions." *The Middle East Journal*(1997): 505-519.

[28] Sassen, Saskia. "The de facto transnationalizing of immigration policy." *Challenge to the nation-state: Immigration in Western Europe and the United States* (1998): 49-85.

[29] Yiftachel, Oren, and As' Ad Ghanem. *Towards a theory of ethnocratic regimes: learning from the Judaization of Israel/Palestine*. na, 2004. See also, Yiftachel, Oren. "Understanding 'ethnocratic' regimes: the politics of seizing contested territories." Political Geography 23, no. 6 (2004): 647-676.

Ethnicity, rather than citizenship, constitutes the main criterion for distributing power and resources."[30]

In India, for example, the political ideology of "Hindu Rashtra", or Hindu nationalism, which is heavily based in the hierarchal caste system, has been identified as an ethnocratic political aspiration.[31] The basic principle of Hindu nationalism is that "Indian nationhood [is] 'naturally' Hindu in its boundaries and content."[32] While the Indian government's reliance on this ideology has declined in the past century, the rise of the right-wing hindu-nationalist party PJB, under Narendra Moody's leadership, has brought back an ethnocratic regime to the Indian State.[33] A Hindu-nationalist approach to governing India has paved the way to the "Sanskritization of culture" (or creating a culture of Hindi that is distinct from Urdu or any other form of language), increasingly perceiving Indian Muslims as a "demographic threat," and finally, a rise in diasporic nationalism from Hindu Indians around the world.[34]

Ethnocratic regimes, in Israel, India, or beyond are therefore sustained by the following elements of governance:

- Ethnic segregation through different generations, which ensures the 'purity' of the ethnos and protects it from outside contamination, thus maintaining its superiority

- The power of the 'ethnos' that extends beyond the borders of the State. Citizenship guarantees only partial rights and authority. The ethnic group in power, however, has unlimited access to financial and political resources

- Exclusivity of religion, especially when it is reflected in cultural and linguistic boundaries. This element of ethnocratic regimes is maintained, and even strengthened, in the context of this research, by Israel's Millet System.[35]

Israel, like its British predecessors, maintained the Millet system, an Ottoman heritage that allowed for religious communities to be organized and represented in front of the ruling powers

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[30] Kedar, Alexandre. "On the legal geography of ethnocratic settler states: Notes towards a research agenda." *Current legal issues* 5 (2003): 401-441.

[31] Sen, S. (2015). Ethnocracy, Israel and India. *History and Sociology of South Asia*, *9*(2), 107-125.

[32] Ibid, P. 116.

[33] Ibid, P. 117. See also Anderson, J. (2016). Ethnocracy: Exploring and extending the concept. *Cosmopolitan Civil Societies: An Interdisciplinary Journal*, *8*(3), 1-29.

[34] Sen (2015). P. 118.

[35] Yiftachel, Oren, and As' Ad Ghanem. *Towards a theory of ethnocratic regimes: learning from the Judaization of Israel/Palestine*. na, 2004. As the abovementioned three elements detail, ethnocratic regimes hold the value of exclusivity and "purity" very close to heart. Unlike religious regimes with relevant discriminatory practices, they do not facilitate the integration of the "other" into the group by converting. The purity of the ethno extends to generations, and translates to exclusive power.

according to their specific community.[36] The Israeli government has not only maintained this system but uses it as evidence of its pluralism and inclusiveness to this day.[37] In an official document by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, published in 1961, it is mentioned:

> "*In fact, the Moslem and Christian religious courts have jurisdictional powers exceeding those of the Jewish rabbinical courts [...] This state of religious judicial autonomy continues to be maintained in Israel; lately, indeed, it has been extended to the Druze community, and Druze religious courts are now being established.*"[38]

A deeper understanding of this "tainted pluralism", as Karayanni describes it, reveals Israel's underlying objective in maintaining this system: namely, to reinforce the governing ethnocracy. Religious segregation is paramount in maintaining the needed hierarchy, especially when inter-related with ethnicity.[39] This is particularly relevant to ethnocratic regimes since, in Israel, it is not a choice but rather a decision forced on the different religions by the State. Personal matters, like marriage and divorce, can only be conducted in religious, not civil, courts[40]. Just as the Millet system has historically been leveraged to categorize and separate colonial subjects, Israel maintains it as a tool to minoritize and segmentize the Palestinian-Arab community on the basis of anything but their collective national identity.[41]

Minoritization

To provide a contextual basis for Israel's policies of minoritization, it is critical to develop an understanding of what minoritization is and what being a minority entails. Minority comes from the word "minor", a child or a person unable to take care of themselves, and in need of an adult's governing.[42] In the context of the US, historians have written about minorities as "bodies and communities of racial others [that] are represented on a lower stage of

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[36] Karayanni, Michael. "Tainted Liberalism: Israel's Palestinian- Arab Millets." *Constellations* (2015).

[37] Sezgin, Yüksel. "The Israeli Millet System: Examining Legal Pluralism Throuh Lenses of Nation-Building and Human Rights." *Israel Law Review* 43, no. 03 (2010): 631-654. See also Karayanni, (2015).

[38] Karayanni, Michael Mousa. *Conflicts in a Conflict: A Conflict of Laws Case Study on Israel and the Palestinian Territories*. Vol. 5. Oxford University Press (UK), 2014.

[39] Karayanni, 2015.

[40] Karayanni, Michael Mousa. *Conflicts in a Conflict: A Conflict of Laws Case Study on Israel and the Palestinian Territories*. Vol. 5. Cile Studies, 2014.

[41] Karayanni, Michael. "Tainted Liberalism: Israel's Palestinian- Arab Millets." *Constellations* (2015); See also Karayanni, 2014; Sezgin, 2011.

[42] Tsibiridou, Fotini, "Multiplying minoritization processes for new migrants: From Legal Positism to Creative Hermeneutics", ANNUAIRE INTERNATIONAL DES DROITS DE L' HOMME, Volume VI, (2011). P. 294-313.

(intellectual, moral, economic) development and thus in need of governance and discipline by whites."[43] In Europe, Fotini Tsibiridou has explained the phenomenon of minorities as a byproduct of modernity, and described it as the "subordination processes and discrimination practices of particular people subjected to and excluded from dominant national entities, because of their language or [ethnic or national] origin."[44] Belonging to a minority, therefore, does not necessarily relate to demographic distribution, but to relations of power and control.[45]

In his book *"The Emergence of Minorities in the Middle East,"* Benjamin White uses primary sources from the period of the French Mandate to track the frequency of use of the terms "minority" and "majority." According to White, French officials rarely referred to the communities using either term. It is of particular importance, however, to observe how historians retrospectively assigned those terms to different communities in French Mandate Syria.[46] Similarly, archival documents from the period of the British Mandate, listed under the British Library's categorization as "Religious Communities in Jerusalem and Minorities in Israel" refer to different religious groups as "communities" and not "minorities" or "majorities."[47] The development of the political concept of nation-states, White argues, motivated the recognition of minorities and majorities to facilitate the concentration of power for one group or another.[48] Tsibiridou goes as far as arguing that "minoritization processes" constitute a form of "modern segregation" that generates new "ethnic, national, [and] social" divisions.[49]

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[43] Montgomery, Alesia. "Reappearance of the Public: Placemaking, Minoritization and Resistance in Detroit." *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 40, no. 4 (2016): 776-799.

[44] Tsibiridou, Fotini, "Multiplying minoritization processes for new migrants: From Legal Positism to Creative Hermeneutics", ANNUAIRE INTERNATIONAL DES DROITS DE L' HOMME, Volume VI, (2011). P. 294-313.

[45] White, Benjamin Thomas. *The emergence of minorities in the Middle East: the politics of community in French mandate Syria.* Edinburgh University Press, 2011.

[46] White, Benjamin Thomas. *The emergence of minorities in the Middle East: the politics of community in French mandate Syria.* Edinburgh University Press, 2011.

[47] Bejtullah, D. Destani, (2005) *Cambridge Archives, Volume 1* "Minorities in the Middle East : religious communities in Jerusalem, 1843-1974 and minorities in Israel. Volume 1. 1843–1918 ".

[48] White, 2011.

[49] Tsibiridou, Fotini, "Multiplying minoritization processes for new migrants: From Legal Positism to Creative Hermeneutics", ANNUAIRE INTERNATIONAL DES DROITS DE L' HOMME, Volume VI, (2011). P. 294-313.

Scholars have described processes of minoritization of indigenous populations in Mexico, Asians in the United States, Palestinian women and Bedouins in Israel, and Kurds in Iraq.[50] It is interesting to see how governments use different legal tools to implement these policies. Shields et al, for example, explain how schools in Israel and Mexico implement pathologization methods as means of minoritizing indigenous populations. Whether by demonizing local cultures, languages, or habits, educational institutions aim to minoritize their indigenous populations by disconnecting them from their identity.[51] As an extension, the Israeli government has been using both existing and new legal tools to maintain Jewish geographic, social, and political control over Israel/Palestine. As this paper will show, the legal heritage from both the Ottomans and the British has inspired the Israeli government's ongoing efforts to control and manipulate the self-expression and ethnic identification of its minorities.

Ethnic Manipulation

While minoritization refers to the tactic of separating and isolating a group to weaken them -and more easily control them, ethnic manipulation discusses the tactic employed by external powers that manipulates a group's collective identity into a more beneficial reconstruction. These tactics often coexist, but are distinct concepts that influence their recipients differently. In the context of Israel, ethnic manipulation comes before minoritization. As these new "ethnic communities" emerge, the state works toward minoritizing them to maintain its hegemonic control.

The scholarly dialogue around ethnicity and ethnic identity relies heavily on philosophical discussions around homogeneity, cultural boundaries, and the common internal struggles for "political, [...] religious, schismatic, linguistic, and territorial" power.[52] Some schools of thought argue that ethnic identities are natural and deeply rooted in one's self, referred to as the Primordial model. Others adopt the Constructivist model which argues that ethnic identities are

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[50] Shields, Carolyn M., Russell Bishop, and André Elias Mazawi. *Pathologizing practices*. New York, NY: Lang, 2005. See also Lee, Sharon S. "The de-minoritization of Asian Americans: A historical examination of the representations of Asian Americans in affirmative action admissions policies at the University of California." *Asian Am. LJ* 15 (2008): 129. See also Shalhoub-Kevorkian, Nadera. "The grammar of rights in colonial contexts: The case of Palestinian women in Israel." *Middle East Law and Governance* 4, no. 1 (2012): 106-151. See also Eqeiq, Amal. "Writing the Indigenous: Contemporary Mayan Literature in Chiapas, Mexico and Palestinian Literature in Israel." PhD diss., 2013. And White (2011).

[51] Shields et al, (2005).

[52] Kaufman, Ilana. "Ethnic affirmation or ethnic manipulation: The case of the Druze in Israel." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 9, no. 4 (2004): 53-82.

constructed through social and political mobilization efforts and are as "short-lived" as those efforts.[53] Brass explains that ethnicity and nationalism are "social and political constructions. They are creations of elites who draw upon, distort, and sometimes fabricate materials from the cultures of the groups they wish to promote in order to protect their well-being or existence or to gain political and economic advantage."[54] According to that same school of thought, "[e]thnic identity becomes politicized under certain circumstances, notably those of conflict with other ethnic groups."[55]

The constructivist model highlights the power and authority that the elite have over their own community, and presents that power of influence as hierarchical and exclusive. An interesting comparison can be drawn between this approach to identity formation and "ethnic manipulation"; a theory that requires external efforts and motives (namely by the state) to be applied to the target community for the same end goals of "gain[ing] political and economic advantage."[56] Both the constructivist model and ethnic manipulation influence the identity of the target group, the former is an influence on the group from within, and the latter is implemented by external powers. The crucial difference here is the community's agency.

Historically, colonial, postcolonial, and post-industrial states have all used tactics of ethnic manipulation for different purposes, most commonly to maintain control over native communities through the famous 'divide and rule' strategy which entails showing preferential treatment to one group over others.[57] Ethnic manipulation also requires state agents to seize up on already-existing values within the target community, and use them as distinctive ethnic attributes.[58] This process has also been named the process of "ethnicization", and has been

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[53] Ibid, See also Brass, Paul. "Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison" Sage Publications, (1991).

[54] Brass, Paul. "Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison" Sage Publications, (1991), P.8

[55] Kaufman, Ilana. "Ethnic affirmation or ethnic manipulation: The case of the Druze in Israel." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 9, no. 4 (2004): 53-82. See also Horowitz, Donald L. *Ethnic groups in conflict*. Univ of California Press, 1985.

[56] Ibid. See also Brass (1991)

[57] Kaufman, Ilana. "Ethnic affirmation or ethnic manipulation: The case of the Druze in Israel." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 9, no. 4 (2004): 53-82.

[58] Brass, Paul. "Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison" Sage Publications, (1991), P.292. The Israeli government has employed this tactic towards the Druze community by attributing the choice of the religious Druze figures to be loyal to Israel as a collective ethnic attribute of "loyalty to the power." For more, please refer to Khnifess, Amir. "Israel and the Druze political action : between politics of loyalty and politics of violence." PhD Thesis. SOAS, University of London (2015) P. 32.

described as "the moulding of identities and organizational patterns of communal groups in ways that serve the state or its élites."[59]

The theory around ethnic manipulation, or ethnicization, is based on an assumption of receptivity from the target community, and limits the "success" of the process to a certain extent of "legitimacy" of the state-imposed alteration. Specifically, Brass argues that states cannot do "whatever they want with the culture and symbols of the culture," but, within a level of "popular support", sometimes it is successful.[60] Simply, this means that colonial powers could not create identities out of thin air; but they could use their power and resources to reinforce, regroup, and accentuate certain aspects of an identity to make it exclusive.

Legal Responsibilities

One of the main contributions of this work to existing literature lies in its cross-disciplinary approach to interpreting the impact of Israel's educational policies on its minorities. There are various legal requirements that the state of Israel is bound by in regards to education. These range from the Convention on the Rights of the Child, to the International Labor Organization's (ILO) Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of 1989. The different conventions and treaties complement and strengthen the ethical argument pertaining to the acceptability of Israel's policies towards the Arab Druze. Specifically, this research examines the government's policies in the field of education within the framework of several international treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 (ICCPR), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities of 1992 (UN Minorities Declaration), the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organizations' (UNESCO) Convention Against Discrimination in Education (CADE) of 1960, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples. Importantly, this legal framework will borrow from the analysis and recommendations found in the general comments and concluding observations of these conventions.

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[59] Frisch, Hillel. "State ethnicization and the crisis of leadership succession among Israel's Druze." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 20, no. 3 (1997): 580-593.

[60] Kaufman, Ilana. "Ethnic affirmation or ethnic manipulation: The case of the Druze in Israel." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 9, no. 4 (2004): 53-82. See also Brass (1991).

In 1991, the state of Israel ratified the ICCPR, becoming party to the Covenant and is thus legally obligated to implement its provisions. This binding commitment provides an instrumental legal framework to examine and evaluate Israeli policies in the field of education. Specifically, Article 27 of the Covenant, states that:

> "In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such *minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture,* to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language."[61]

This article details the legal obligations that member states, such as Israel, have towards the ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities that reside within their territories. It signifies the importance of enjoying one's culture as a collective, a community. And as the United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner has emphasized: "All human rights are [...] indivisible, interrelated and interdependent. The improvement of one right facilitates advancement of the others. Likewise, *the deprivation of one right adversely affects the others*."[62] Therefore, this research will equally borrow from other legal sources to help interpret the legal responsibility of the Israeli state towards its minorities, with the Druze as an example. In order for a community to "enjoy [its] own culture," this research argues, there needs to be several conditions available to that end, central to which are adequate representative and comprehensive education, as guaranteed in Article 4, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Minorities Declaration:

> *"4. States should, where appropriate, take measures in the field of education, in order to* **encourage knowledge of the history, traditions, language and culture of the minorities existing within their territory.** *Persons belonging to minorities should have adequate opportunities to gain knowledge of the society as a whole."*[63]

The United Nations Minorities Declaration does not have the same legally binding authority as the ICCPR or the ICESCR. It is deemed by the UN Guide for Minorities, however, as one of the

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[61] "The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights", 1996, Article 27.

[62] "What Are Human Rights?", 1996-2017, The United Nations Human Rights Office of High Commissioner.

[63] "The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities", 1992, Article 4, paragraph 4.

most important declarations on minority rights as it represents "important political and moral commitments by States that may influence their conduct of international relations."[64]

In its Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, UNESCO defines the word "culture" as "the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of society or a social group [...] it encompasses, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs."[65] This research will investigate the extent to which the state of Israel has provided the space and tools for the Arab Druze within its territory to study their "history, traditions, language and culture."[66] According to the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), to which Israel became party in 1991, Article 13, paragraph 3:

> *"3. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to choose for their children schools, other than those established by the public authorities, which conform to such minimum educational standards as may be laid down or approved by the State and to **ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions**."*[67]

It is the obligation of the State, and right of the parents, therefore, to ensure the conformity of the educational material with the parents' "own convictions." The Covenant repeatedly refers back to the right and the power of parents or legal guardians to determine the "acceptability" of the education provided to their children. The special rapporteur on the right to Education similarly explains that *"education in all its forms and at all levels shall exhibit the following interrelated and essential features: a) availability; b) accessibility; c) acceptability; and d) adaptability."*[68] In the General Comment no. 13 on the ICESCR, the Committee on Economic and Social Council explains the element of "acceptability" as:

[64]"Minorities, the United Nations and Regional Mechanisms," Pamphlet no. 1 of the UN Guide for Minorities. OHCHR. (2017). P. 7. Retrieved 15 December 2017, from
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuideMinorities1en.pdf

[65] "UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity Cultural Diversity Series No. 1 a vision a conceptual platform a pool of ideas for implementation a new paradigm" (2001), P. 4 Retrieved November 25, 2017 from:
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001271/127162e.pdf

[66] "The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities", 1992, Article 4, paragraph 4.

[67] "International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights", Article 13, paragraph 3, New York, 16 December 1966.

[68] "Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education," OHCHR. Retrieved November 25, 2017 from:
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Education/SREducation/Pages/SREducationIndex.aspx

"the form and substance of education, including curricula and teaching methods, have to be acceptable (e.g. relevant, culturally appropriate and of good quality) to students and, in appropriate cases, parents; this is subject to the educational objectives required by article 13 (1) and such minimum educational standards as may be approved by the State (see art. 13 (3) and (4));"[69]

Substance of education, as stated above, can be measured through relevance, cultural appropriateness, and quality. These standards, however, may be subjective and general, and can prove challenging to measure. Especially since the Commitee's General Comment no. 13 provides very little explanation on the matter by adding: "States have obligations to respect, protect and fulfil each of the "essential features" (availability, accessibility, acceptability, adaptability) of the right to education. By way of illustration, a State must [... take] positive measures to ensure that education is culturally appropriate for minorities and indigenous peoples, and of good quality for all."[70] What, then, would the element of "acceptability" in education look like? Here, again, the Convention Against Discrimination in Education, as well as the Convention on the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples emphasize the importance of providing an education that is "*in keeping with the wishes of the pupil's parents* or legal guardians," and is "*developed and implemented in co-operation with them to address their special needs, and [incorporates] their histories, their knowledge and technologies, their value systems and their further social, economic and cultural aspirations.*"[71]

Finding information about states' requirements in regards cultural appropriateness, historical relevance, and geographical accuracy in schools poses a true challenge to human rights advocacy. Especially when compared to other issues surrounding education like accessibility and

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[69] The Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, "IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, and CULTURAL RIGHTS General Comment No. 13 (Twenty-first session, 1999), The right to education (article 13 of the Covenant)" December, 1999. http://www.right-to-education.org/sites/right-to-education.org/files/resource-attachments/CESCR_General_Comment_13_en.pdf

[70] Ibid. Also, please see International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Human Rights Committee, "Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of Israel, 112th session, November 2014, P. 2. Israel continuously rejects the applicability of the covenants in the occupied territories, and argues -against the set guidelines and jurisprudence of international humanitarian law, the international Court of Justice, and the Human Rights Committee- that its commitments are "territorially bound [... and do] not apply with respect to individuals under its jurisdiction."Importantly, the disparities between domestic and international legal standings of the OSG would render the element of "acceptability" greatly contested and even obsolete, especially since Israel recognizes the OSG as its legal territory, as opposed to the international community.

[71]Convention Against the Discrimination in Education" UNESCO, 1960. P. 4 Article 1 and Article 2(b). See also International Labor Organization, "C169 - Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169)", Article 27. http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C169

anti-discrimination efforts, international legal bodies have yet to explicitly advance standards of cultural suitability and community agency when it comes to schools. The following chapters will highlight the importance of engaging in discussions about advancing these specific standards in schools.

Historical Context

For the past seventy years, the Palestinian community in Israel has experienced several attempts by Israel to divide and separate its sub-groups, both on religious and social bases. Some of these attempts, to differing degrees, have been successful. Three prominent examples are those represented by the unique status of Bedouin (nomads) Palestinians, Christian Maronites, and most notably, the Druze. Bedouins are a community of Arab tribes that follow a lifestyle of traveling and herding livestock. In Israel, Bedouins are designated a special minority category, separate from that of Arabs.[72] One Bedouin school principal in the south of Israel commented on this phenomena saying "it is not enough what they are doing to us. Now they tell us we are an ethnic group."[73] According to the Israeli Knesset, they are a "subgroup [...] with cultural, historical, social, and political uniqueness."[74] Additionally, the close ties between Lebanon's Maronites and Israel have spread to include Israel's small Maronite community, and grant it an official government-issued Christian-"Aramaic" national identity, instead their original Arab one.[75] A small nationalist Maronite group in Israel holds the belief that they are ethnically Aramaic, and not Arab, and hope to revive that identity.[76] The Knesset has even passed a bill to financially facilitate the bureaucratic procedure of changing the identity for them.[77]

Today's Druze community in Israel, as this paper suggests, has come to see itself inherently different from the Arab-Palestinian community surrounding it; while acknowledging a partial

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[72] Abu-Rubiyya, Salim, Fawzan al-Athauna, and Salman al-Bador. "Survey of Bedouin schools in the Negev." *Israel Equality Monitor* 5 (1996).

[73] Nordstrom C., Martin J.; "The Paths to Domination, Resistance, and Terror: Resisting 'Ethnicity': The Israeli State and Bedouin Identity" (1992) University of California Press. P. 85.

[74] The Knesset, "Bedouins in the State of Israel". Knesset.gov.il. (last accessed May 27, 2017)

[75] Open Knesset, "Yishivat Melia'h Meta'rikh 12/02/2014" (last accessed May 27, 2017)

[76] Svetlova, K. "Maronite Christians Seek To Revive Aramaic Language" (2012). Retrieved December 14, 2017 from https://forward.com/news/israel/164127/maronite-christians-seek-to-revive-aramaic-languag/

[77] Open Knesset, "Yishivat Melia'h Meta'rikh 18/01/2017" (last accessed May 27, 2017)

Arab identity, they do not see themselves as Palestinians.[78] Many align themselves politically with the Israeli government, and are greatly immersed in Jewish-Israeli society.[79] This is partially attributable to their mandatory military service, their separate educational system, and their religious leadership that advocates for the "blood pact" between the Druze and Jews.[80]

The government's integration of these elements in the community's daily life help create their collective memory. It is particularly done through public commemorations of religious and national events, celebrations of notable community figures, and a distinct political narrative that is shared among the group and passed on through the school. An institutionalization of these events, by local or national governments, can instill a distinct identity, especially when created with that goal in mind.

British and French Legacy

During the period of the Mandate, Druze identity and religious uniqueness were matters of discussion among the British. In a dispatch issued to British officials in Mandatory Palestine in 1929, and in response to a published letter in the Palestinian community, a British official explains:

> *"The wording of this letter is unfortunate as by inserting in the letter the words "your appointment as Head of the Druze community" Government appears to have been thereby committed to the recognition of a Head of a separate Religious Community which, in the opinion of the Attorney-General, they were not ready to acknowledge."[81]*

It appears that the recognition of a distinct Druze religious community, separate from the Muslim one, was novel and had important political consequences. The British at that time understood this fact and decided against it.[82] In 1931, the issue of a separate representation for the Druze in Mandatory Palestine re-emerges in archival documents. Between 1931 and 1936, a series of

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[78] Nisan, Mordechai. "The Druze in Israel: Questions of identity, citizenship, and patriotism." *The Middle East Journal* 64, no. 4 (2010): 575-596.

[79] Kaufman, Ilana. "Ethnic affirmation or ethnic manipulation: The case of the Druze in Israel." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 9, no. 4 (2004): 53-82.

[80] Aboultaif, Eduardo Wassim. "Druze Politics in Israel: Challenging the Myth of "Druze-Zionist Covenant"." *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 35, no. 4 (2015): 533-555.

[81] Betjullah, D. Destani (2005) "Minorities in the Middle East : religious communities in Jerusalem, 1843-1974 and minorities in Israel. Volume 2. 1819–1954."

[82] Israel National Archives.

correspondences sent to and from the British government evaluates this step. The first letter on the topic comes from a British official in Palestine requesting the recognition of a Druze religious Head, separate from the Muslim representatives. Initially, the request was granted by Britain. On May 29th, 1936, Max Nurock, the Chief Secretary, sent another dispatch stating that the abovementioned request "should be considered cancelled." He clarifies that it is not the intention of the Government *"to take any steps towards recognizing the Druze community as a separate community apart from the Moslem community."*[83] It is particularly interesting to note that, as part of this correspondence, the British use the French experience of recognizing a separate Druze entity as an argument against the policy. They describe it as *"a political move designed to separate the [region of] Hauran Druses from the Lebanon, and the latter seem to have accepted their authority only gradually and under protest."*[84]

The British, like the French, tried to identify and attract religious minorities to align themselves with them against the Sunni-Muslim majority.[85] The principal minority group they targeted was the Druze. Since, according to a dispatch from a British official in Beirut, *"the Maronites are dedicated body and soul to France and England no longer has any choice; it must proceed with the Druzes."*[86] In this dispatch, the British official is referring to the cooperation that was created between the Christian Maronite community in Lebanon and the French Mandatory powers. It has been documented that the French saw in the Maronite community a natural ally to help continue the Christian nature of the Mandate system, and had promised them to make Lebanon the national home of the Maronite Christians.[87] Regarding the British-Druze cooperation, it is unclear from these documents the degree of reciprocity the British received from the Druze.

This strategy of minority alliances was also adopted by Ben-Gurion; he repeatedly referred to it as "my enemy's enemy."[88] A member of the Jewish Agency commented on Ben-Gurion's strategy to attract Druze cooperation:

> *"It is an attempt to create spots of light and hope amidst a dark Arab sea."*[89]

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[83] Betjullah, D. Destani (2005) "Minorities in the Middle East : religious communities in Jerusalem, 1843-1974 and minorities in Israel. Volume 2. 1819–1954."

[84] Ibid

[85] Parsons, 2000.

[86] Ibid

[87] Ibid

[88] Shlaim, Avi. *The iron wall: Israel and the Arab world.* WW Norton & Company, 2001. See also " تاريخ الدروز في العصر القديم والحديث"اللجنة العامة لمنهاج التاريخ في المدارس الثانوية والمختلطة في الوسط الدرزي، وزارة التربية والتعليم، مروان جرار ٢٠١٠

This cooperation was also suggested by the British in 1949 for the Israeli government in a document named "in the service of Israel". The document recommended:

> "In the benefit of securing the following benefits for Israel: [...]
> 6. To arouse the activity and interest of the Maronite-Druze communities in Lebanon and other minorities for the said purpose."[90]

The history of Druze resistance is necessary for understanding the evolution of the history of the Druze as a whole. Archival documents highlight several Druze nationalist figures who fought against both the powers of the Mandate, and Israel. Shakib Arslan, a Syrian Druze nationalist, was described in 1929 by the British as the "principal instigator of this movement". This "movement" refers to the "Pan-Islamic cooperation" identified by the British as a threat to their existence as European forces.[91] This same dispatch describes the goals of the movement as:

> "The achievement of independence of all Moslem people who are subject to European influence."[92]

It is important to emphasize here that Shakib Arslan, who continued to play an integral role in the fight against colonialism of any kind in the following years, is described as one the main leaders of a "pan-Islamic" movement.[93] His leadership role reinforces the understanding of Druze identity as one of an Arab nationality and Islamic attributes. This understanding is also acknowledged by the British. Which means that any attempt on their part to separate the Druze from the Arab-Muslim community is in fact a move of political minoritization.

Israeli Policies

toward the Druze

The Druze in Israel have officially been recognized by the Israeli government, through their government-issued identification cards, as "Druze" by nationality (in 1956), and not just religion (in 1949).[94] This recognition is particularly peculiar due to the entire region's relationship with

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[89] Ibid

[90] Israel National Archives, 1949

[91] Betjullah, D. Destani (2005) "Minorities in the Middle East : religious communities in Jerusalem, 1843-1974 and minorities in Israel. Volume 2. 1819–1954."

[92] Ibid

[93] Naffa'a, A. S. The Arab Druze and the National Palestinian Movement Until the-48, *Al-Manahil*. 2009.

[94] Kaufman, Ilana. "Ethnic affirmation or ethnic manipulation: The case of the Druze in Israel." *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 9, no. 4 (2004): 53-82. See also " اللغة العربية في خدمة مشروع التدريز- مراجعة نقدية لكتب تعليم الادب العربي في المدارس الدرزية"، د. يسري خيزران، معهد دراسات،

the Druze. In both Lebanon and Syria, Druze are considered a part of the Arab Lebanese/Syrian nation, and belonging to the religious Druze belief.[95] Their collective identity as a separate unit in Lebanon/Syria is based on religion, and not a different national identity. Due to their Muslim legacy, Druze continue to celebrate Eid Al Adha (The Islamic holiday that marks the end of the pilgrimages) until this day. It is part of their collective social and religious heritage and is actively preserved in Druze communities throughout the world. As other Muslims, they celebrate it for four continuous days with feasts, festivities, and family visits. In Israel, however, Eid Al Adha is not considered an official holiday for the Druze. In 1969, the Israeli government actively decided to cancel the Eid from being an official holiday for the Druze, and maintain it just for Muslims.[96] Alternatively, Ziyarat Al-Nabi Shuaib (the celebratory visit to the tomb of the Druze Prophet Shuaib) has been officiated as the Druze holiday in Israel.[97] According to the Ministry of Education, Druze holidays also include the visit to Prophet Sabalan and Prophet Al-Khader. The latter, incidentally, highlights the unique relationship the Druze sect has with Judaism.[98] Al-Khader's holiday has been celebrated since the 1960's only among the Druze community in Israel. Official holidays in both Syria and Lebanon exclude all three abovementioned holidays.[99] Religiously, there is no basis for the discrepancy, especially within a tight religious community such as the Druze.

These policies aim at not just promoting, but manufacturing, a distinct Druze identity, separate from the larger Arab and Muslim one. Through institutionally disconnecting the Druze from the larger Arab world, the government proactively alters the collective memory of future Druze generations and their conceptions of their collective identity.

This unique national status of Druze in Israel is further complicated when contrasted with the lack of a similar official recognition of the Arabs in the country. In 2002, a member of the Israeli Knesset, Azmi Bishara, proposed a bill to recognize the Arab community in Israel as a national

[95] Bennett, Marjorie Anne. "Reincarnation, marriage, and memory: Negotiating sectarian identity among the Druze of Syria." (1999).

[96] " اللغة العربية في خدمة مشروع التدريز- مراجعة نقدية لكتب تعليم الادب العربي في المدارس الدرزية"، د. يسري خيزران، معهد دراسات،

[97] Ibid

[98] English website of Israeli Ministry of Education, 2014. Last accessed on Oct 30, 2017.

[99] Lebanese government official website: http://www.dawlati.gov.lb/web-content-detail/-/asset_publisher/5QjpqbvuiHyh/content/public-holidays-2015 Last accessed in Oct 30, 2017. See also The Syrian government official website: http://www.discover-syria.com/bank/6140 Last accessed on Oct 30, 2017
There has been no evidence of any unofficial celebration pertaining to these holidays in Syria and Lebanon on the Internet.

minority, on the basis of their Arabic language, and Arab heritage and tradition. The bill did not pass. The Minister of Justice at the time replied to the proposal by stating that they "reject this bill" because,

> *"The principle of protecting individual rights, including those of minorities, is found in the Declaration of Independence"*[100]

In his answer, the minister implied that there is no need for a further official recognition for Arabs beyond the minority status. This specific quote, additionally, highlights the Declaration's guarantee of the protection of "individual rights," and not collective ones. A comparative review of the Government's enthusiasm about supporting and recognizing the Druze as a national minority within few months of the country's establishment, versus its premeditated rejection of doing the same for the more inclusive Arab group, underscores the Government's interest in a "divide and rule" policy.[101] It is one way, among several others, to maintain this separate and exclusive collective identity for the Druze in Israel. While Israel is ethnicizing the Druze religious group, its official government policies, exemplified by the rejected bill above, de-legitimize the ethnic identity of the Arabs within.

In 1953, the Israeli government conducted a "sampling process" in six Druze villages to check for reactions from Druze elders and youth regarding the future mandatory army conscription.[102]According to the British dispatch on the topic, the decision (of the sampling) was received with "widespread dissatisfaction" and "defiance." Druze religious figures also resisted the enforced conscription.[103] Sheikh Amin Tarif, for example, the spiritual Head of the Druze community until his death in 1993, threatened members of the community who joined the Israeli army with excommunication.[104] The document mentions 15 young men who could not get married by the Sheikh unless and until they resigned from their role in the army reserves.[105] The

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[100] Translated, Knesset records, session 317, 2002.

[101] Nisan, Mordechai. "The Druze in Israel: Questions of identity, citizenship, and patriotism." *The Middle East Journal* 64, no. 4 (2010): 575-596.

[102] Bejtullah, D. Destani, (2005) *Cambridge Archives, Volume 1* "Minorities in the Middle East : religious communities in Jerusalem, 1843-1974 and minorities in Israel. Volume 1. 1843–1918 ".

[103] Betjullah, D. Destani (2005) "Minorities in the Middle East : religious communities in Jerusalem, 1843-1974 and minorities in Israel. Volume 2. 1819–1954."

[104] Nisan, Mordechai. "The Druze in Israel: Questions of identity, citizenship, and patriotism." *The Middle East Journal* 64, no. 4 (2010): 575-596.

[105] "הלשכה לענייני ערבים", משרד ראש הממשלה, (1953). Please see original document in List of Figures, Figure 3.

mandatory conscription was officially implemented for all Druze men in 1967.[106] Syrian Druze in the OSG, however, are exempted from this service.

Furthermore, an interesting phenomenon that surrounds the public experience of Druze in Israel is the widespread presence of Druze-related monuments around the northern part of the country. For the purposes of this investigation, two types of monuments will be discussed. First, there are the monuments of fallen Druze soldiers during Israeli wars. It is a national Israeli tradition to engrave the names of fallen soldiers on stones as a gesture of respect and remembrance. Since Druze in Israel are subject to mandatory army conscription (with the exception of the Syrian Druze in the OSG) , their soldiers are also part of this national tradition.

The culture of monuments in Israel is a part of a need and a strategy of commemoration and perpetuation.[107] It is an essential mechanism for not just remembrance, but the adoption and recognition of victory; it is, in the most basic meaning of it, a creation of a collective memory for a group of people.[108] Figure 4 is an image of a monument for a Druze soldier, Saleh Tafish, who was killed during his service in 1992.[109] Each monument marks a significant addition to, not only the national scenery of the country, but the nation's collective memory. Through these monuments, the Druze community becomes intertwined, culturally as well as politically, with country's image of itself.[110]

The second type of monument found in major Druze towns is the statue of Sultan Pasha Al-Atrash, a nationalist Syrian Druze leader who fought against French and British control during the period of the Mandate. He was a proud Arab nationalist and the head of the Druze revolt in 1925.[111] Even in the context of the Zionist-Palestine struggle, Sultan Pasha was very clear about both his deep conviction of the Arab identity of the Palestinian Druze, and the need to fight against Zionist control over Palestine.[112] Today, there are statues of Al-Atrash in the OSG city of

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[106] Firro, K. M. (2001). Reshaping Druze Particularism in Israel. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, *30*(3), 40-53.
[107] "הביטחון משרד עזריאהו, מעוז ",קולקטיבית זהות בעיצוב הזיכרון תרבות של מקומה. 2010. See also " מעוז ",ההנצחה של ההיסטוריה אביב תל ,עובד עם ,עזריאהו, 1996.
[108] Ibid
[109] Please See List of Figures, Figure 4. Stated on the image in Hebrew.
[110] Robinson, Shira N. *Citizen strangers: Palestinians and the birth of Israel's liberal settler state*. Stanford University Press, 2013.
[111] Epstein, Eliahu. "The druzes of palestine." *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society* 29, no. 1 (1942): 52-63.
[112] " التربية وزارة ،الدرزي الوسط في والمختلطة الثانوية المدارس في التاريخ لمنهاج العامة اللجنة"والحديث القديم العصر في الدروز تاريخ ٢٠١٠ جرار مروان ،والتعليم See Also List of Figures, Figure 5.

Majdal Shams and the village of Hurfeish in Israel Proper.[113] It is particularly intriguing how the vast majority of the Druze community in Israel (with the exception of the Syrian Druze in the OSG) have managed to maintain their respect and appreciation for Sultan Pasha, without necessarily knowing or agreeing with his Arab-nationalist aspirations.[114]

In order to understand more about this process of reconciliation between the two extreme manifestations of collective identity among the Druze, it is necessary to study the educational material that is being taught to the Druze community in Israel, and as an extension, the Occupied Syrian Golan. The following chapter will analyze educational material from different stages of Druze schools (primary, middle, and high school).

Education for the Arab Druze

> *"Arab education is a victim of Israeli pluralism not only in that it is directed and managed by the majority, but it is also a tool by which the whole minority is manipulated ... [It] is not only an example of the Israeli pluralism by which Arabs are denied power, it is also a means through which the lack of power can be maintained and perpetuated. Arab citizens are marginal, if not outsiders… The Arab Education Department is directed by members of the Jewish majority, and curricula are decided upon by the authorities with little, if any, participation of Arabs. Arab participation does not exceed writing or translating books and materials according to carefully specified guidelines, nor does it extend beyond implementing the majority's policies."*[115]

The current schooling system in Israel is divided into five main sectors: State, State-Religious, Private, Arab, and Druze. While the majority of Israel's students are enrolled in State schools, many students receive education in one of the other four sectors.[116] According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this separation allows for the "multi-cultural nature of Israel's society" to be

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[113] Please See List of Figures, Figure 6.

[114] This indicated in a poll conducted by Radai et al (2015) indicating that 71% of Druze consider themselves to be "Israeli", and exert "firm support [for] Zionist [political] parties." Please see Radai, Itamar, Meir Elran, Yousef Makladeh, and Maya Kornberg. "The Arab citizens in Israel: Current trends according to recent opinion polls." *Strategic Assessment* 18, no. 2 (2015): 101-116.

[115] Abu- saad, Ismael. "Separate and unequal: the role of the state educational system in maintaining the subordination of Israel's Palestinian Arab citizens." *Social Identities* 10, no. 1 (2004): 101-127. P. 111. Quoted from Sami Mar`i (1978).

[116] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "EDUCATION: Primary and Secondary", (2013) Retrieved on November 15, 2017 from: http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/aboutisrael/education/pages/education-%20primary%20and%20secondary.aspx

accommodated.[117] In reality, this is a prime example of what Karayanni describes as "tainted pluralism." To allegedly meet those multi-cultural needs, the Ministry of Education has developed and published different textbooks for different sectors, among which are history and language textbooks.[118] While the content of the textbooks might differ from one sector to the other, the Israeli Ministry of Education explains that the purpose of the History curriculum in all sectors is to "advance a shared responsibility towards the state of Israel."[119]

There has been extensive academic literature and journalistic coverage exploring general inequalities in education between Palestinian-Arab and Jewish citizens.[120] Inequality and discrimination between Arabs and Jews in the school system have been documented through substantial gaps in annual budgets, frequency of textbook renewal and update, and cultural and linguistic considerations and adaptability.[121] According to the Education Policy professor, Ismael Abu-Saad, this discrimination in education is not a result of bad policy or planning, but rather an expression of the ideological nature of the State.[122] The 1953 Law of State Education explains that the aim of education in Israel is to "base [it] on the values of Jewish culture."[123]

Considering these motivations and general consequences of the discriminatory education system, the following chapter will provide a targeted review of the Druze curriculum focusing mainly on the History, Arabic, and Civics curricula. It will importantly reflect the experiences and challenges the teachers and community share as a result of these curricula.

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[117] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "EDUCATION: Primary and Secondary", (2013) Retrieved on November 15, 2017 from: http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/aboutisrael/education/pages/education-%20primary%20and%20secondary.aspx

[118] اللغة العربية في خدمة مشروع التدريز- مراجعة نقدية لكتب تعليم الادب العربي في المدارس الدرزية"،(٢٠١٣) د. يسري خيزران، معهد " دراسات

[119] The 2017 ''ליבה לתכניות הלימודים בהיסטוריה במערכת החינוך הישראלית בממלכתי, בממלכתי- דתי, ובמגזרים הערבי והדרוזי''. Israeli Ministry of Education Website for Druze and Circassian schools. The Manual for Core Curriculum for History. Retrieved from: https://sites.google.com/a/druzenet.tzafonet.org.il/drhistory/home/spry-lymwd-mwsrym-bhystwryh

[120] The Palestinian-Arabs, being the largest non-Jewish community in the State, are commonly compared to their Jewish counterpart of detect discrimination. For the scope of this paper, Syrian Arab experiences (particularly in education) are extremely similar to other non-Jews under Israeli control.

[121] Abu- saad, Ismael. "Separate and unequal: the role of the state educational system in maintaining the subordination of Israel's Palestinian Arab citizens." *Social Identities* 10, no. 1 (2004): 101-127. P. 106-108. See also Coursen-Neff, Zama. *Second class: discrimination against Palestinian Arab children in Israel's schools*. Human Rights Watch, 2001. P. 15-17

[122] Abu- saad, Ismael. "Separate and unequal: the role of the state educational system in maintaining the subordination of Israel's Palestinian Arab citizens." *Social Identities* 10, no. 1 (2004): 101-127. P.

[123] Ibid, P. 106.

It is important to note that evidence provided in this chapter is mainly the result of first-hand review of textbooks and multiple interviews with History, Geography, and Civics teachers in Druze schools. Their names will remain confidential, as requested.

Separate School System

Prior to 1975, the Israeli education system had only four separate sectors.[124] In 1974, two government committees were formed to discuss possible strategies to strengthen the Druze-Israeli relationship: the first committee was administered by the Knesset internal affairs (Schechterman Committee), and the second was the government committee of Arab affairs (Ben-Dor Committee).[125] The recommendations of the two committees were submitted in 1975 and included among other things, the separation of Druze schooling from the Arab community in an attempt to improve their socio-economic status and facilitate their integration in the State. The Schechterman committee specifically recommended:

a.   The creation of a Druze-Jewish intellectual committee at the Ministry of Education responsible for managing the Druze school curriculum

b.   The integration of Druze-Israeli awareness in the Druze curriculum

c.   All teachers in Druze schools should be from the Druze community

d.   It is mandatory to invite Druze veterans and wounded Druze soldiers to give lectures at Druze schools to facilitate the integration of Druze students into the Army

e.   Increasing the numbers of Druze university students in fields of teaching and education.[126]

The Ben-Dor Committee provided further recommendations to separate Druze schools from Arab school curriculum and administration and create and publish History, Arabic, and Hebrew books specifically written to meet the aforementioned vision of separation.[127]

In 2010, a case study investigating the role of Druze high schools in shaping the Israeli-Druze identity, explains that:

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[124] State, State-Religious, Arab, and Private.

[125] اللغة العربية في خدمة مشروع التدريز - مراجعة نقدية لكتب تعليم الادب العربي في المدارس الدرزية"، د. يسري خيزران، معهد دراسات

[126] اللغة العربية في خدمة مشروع التدريز - مراجعة نقدية لكتب تعليم الادب العربي في المدارس الدرزية"، د. يسري خيزران، معهد دراسات

[127] Ibid

"Our [Druze high school's superintendent] aim is to educate towards deepening the roots of Druze belonging and love of the other based on the principle of 'protecting brethren'. We strive to educate our pupils to be proud of their belonging to the Druze ethnic group and to the State of Israel, such that they will be able to declare their belonging overtly in a strong voice and take pride in their belonging."[128]

This policy indeed manifests itself, as this research will show, in the material that is taught in schools, and the extracurricular activities implemented there. The school in the case study above is described as clean and well-kept, with images of Israeli political figures hung in the common yard.[129]

The physical separation between the Druze and non-Druze Arab students based on their sectarian identity is by itself a major first step towards Druze isolation from the larger Arab community.[130] As the Committee recommended, the teachers and staff in Druze schools are also members of the Druze community. Interactions with non-Druze Arab children and youth, therefore, have been largely limited since 1975 to Druze living in mixed villages like Shafa`mer or Ramah. Even then, historically, different religious sects live in different parts of the town, making communal relationships extremely limited.[131] The separation of the schools, and the creation of the separate curricula are equally geared towards increasing the sense of loyalty and assimilation that Arab-Druze students have towards the State of Israel. Nation states around the world aim at increasing those feelings among their citizens. In this context, however, it is morally and legally questionable that, together with the separation, the school textbooks in different Israeli curricula overwhelmingly depict Arabs as "hostile, deviant, cruel, immoral, and unfair."[132] These depictions in Israeli textbooks are implemented with goals of pathologization, minoritization, and ethnic manipulation of Arabs in general, and Arab-Druze in particular. A former advisor of

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[128] Court, Deborah, and Randa Abbas. "Role of Druze high schools in Israel in shaping students' identity and citizenship." *Education, Citizenship and Social Justice* 5, no. 2 (2010): 145-162.

[129] Ibid

[130] اللغة العربية في خدمة مشروع التدريز- مراجعة نقدية لكتب تعليم الادب العربي في المدارس الدرزية"، د. يسري خيزران، معهد دراسات

[131] بوابة التربية والتعليم شفاعمرو – مبنى المدينة" استخدمت من موقع:
https://sh.sisma.org.il/shfbaladi/SitePages/%D7%9E%D7%91%D7%A0%D7%94%20%D7%94%D7%A2%D7%99%D7%A8.aspx

[132] From a study of over 124 textbooks in Israeli schools in 1998. Quoted from Abu- saad, Ismael. "Separate and unequal: the role of the state educational system in maintaining the subordination of Israel's Palestinian Arab citizens." *Social Identities* 10, no. 1 (2004): 101-127. P. 108.

Arab Affairs to the Prime Minister once said that "[the government's education] policy towards Arabs is to keep them illiterate [...] if they were educated, it would be difficult to rule them."[133]

The Sterilization of Collective Memory

through the school curriculum

The process of creating a collective memory for a group inherently entails the subsequent formation of boundaries with others.[134] It is, indeed, the "collective concept for all knowledge that directs behavior and experience in the interactive framework of a society" and one that can be strengthened and maintained through "repeated societal practices and initiation."[135] The collective memory here as well relates to the group's ability to replicate its image over and over again, through stories, rituals, anniversaries, and public displays.[136] Furthermore, it has the power to direct one's action both inside and outside the group. According to Assmann and Czaplicka, the creation of a collective identity requires the following elements:

1. The Concretion of Identity, i.e. 'what we are' and 'what we are not;'
2. The Capacity to Reconstruct.[137] And,
3. Organization, or the "institutionalized communication" or representation.[138]

The Druze collective memory, this paper argues, has gone through a process of sterilization that prevents it from generating a natural continuity of memory following the above-mentioned elements. The government has manipulated 'who they are,' limited their reconstruction of memory, and formed isolated institutionalized representation for the Druze.[139] This sterilization, by definition, did not eliminate the entire collective memory, but rather carefully altered it to create one homogenous narrative that promotes the government's policies.

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[133] Ibid. P. 123

[134] Sorek, Tamir. *Palestinian commemoration in Israel: Calendars, monuments, and martyrs*. Stanford University Press, 2015.

[135] Assmann, J., & Czaplicka, J. (1995). Collective memory and cultural identity. *New German Critique*, (65), 125-133.

[136] Ibid, P. 129

[137] As Assmann and Czaplicka argue, no culture is able to completely preserve its memory. It is rather their efforts of reconstruction within the "contemporary frame of reference" is what makes those memories. Ibid. P. 130.

[138] The "institutionalized communication" refers to a community's representation against government bodies, among others. Ibid, P. 130-131.

[139] This refers back to the Millet System, and separate school system.

Within the school system, this sterilization manifested itself initially by the separation (or isolated institutionalized representation - point #3 above), and then by the selective reconstruction of memory for the Druze (point #2). Just like the Israeli Ministry of Education eliminated any text that includes the word "Watan" (Homeland) from Arabic textbooks during the military rule until 1966, the same government, and government policy, continued to impact the Druze minority in the 1970's.[140] In the Arabic textbooks taught in Druze high schools today, L.H. explains, the only mention of the word "Watan" is in reference to the Arab World post WW1.[141] According to Khaizaran, one of the most notable aspects of the Druze textbooks in both history and culture is the fact that any text that would include an allusion to the Druze connection with either Arab or Muslim heritage or culture has been left out. Additionally, Druze writers known for their Arab nationalism, such as Samih Al-Qassim, have either been eliminated from any Druze textbooks or included in a marginal, non-nationalist way.[142] Khaizaran describes Samih Al-Qassim, one of the most famous writers in the Palestinian community in Israel and abroad, who happened to be Druze, as an author who was so "present by being absent from Arabic textbooks."[143] Following his review of the Arabic textbooks taught in Druze schools, Khaizaran argues that an author of Al-Qassim's magnitude could not have been simply forgotten from Arabic textbooks in a curriculum that arguably aims at highlighting a holistic Druze culture.[144] A simple scan of Al-Qassim's background and writing would explain the difference between advancing knowledge about Druze authors and figures, advancing a notion of Druze particularism, and redirecting the identity reconstruction efforts of the community. Al-Qassim writes, in his poem "The Gate of Tears", referring to the Palestinian Nakba and its aftermath:

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[140] Robinson, Shira N. *Citizen strangers: Palestinians and the birth of Israel's liberal settler state*. Stanford University Press, 2013.

[141] From an Interview with L.H., a Druze high school teacher from Daliat Al Carmel.

[142] اللغة العربية في خدمة مشروع التدريز- مراجعة نقدية لكتب تعليم الادب العربي في المدارس الدرزية"، د. يسري خيزران، معهد دراسات

[143] اللغة العربية في خدمة مشروع التدريز- مراجعة نقدية لكتب تعليم الادب العربي في المدارس الدرزية"،(٢٠١٣) د. يسري خيزران، معهد " دراسات

[144] Ibid

Our loved ones ... behind the borders	"أحبابنا ..خلف الحدود
Are waiting for a grain from their wheat	ينتظرون حبّةً من قمحهم
How is our home that we left	كيف حال بيتنا التريك
And how is the face of our earth ... Will it know us if we return?!	و كيف وجه الأرض ..هل يعرفنا إذا نعود ؟!
Oh my...	يا ويلنا..
The rubbles of a lost displaced people	حطامَ شعب لاجئ شريد
Oh my... the lives of slaves	يا ويلنا ..من عيشة العبيد
Will we return? Will we return?	فهل نعود ؟ هل نعود ؟[145]"!

Samih Al-Qassim's writing has been characterized as anti-establishment and revolutionary. He was arrested multiple times for his activism and poetry, the earliest of which was his arrest following his refusal to join the mandatory army service for Druze youth, stating that "Druze youth should be exempt [from army service], as they are Arabs."[146] Nonetheless, he was a member of the Druze community and an internationally renowned poet.

The History curriculum in Druze schools follows the same framework of selective education. The curriculum can be divided into two sections: middle and high school. While middle school History classes do not cover anything pertaining to Israel or the Druze, high school curriculum requires a minimum of 30 hours teaching about the Holocaust, 5 hours about the unique Druze history, including "the integration of the Druze in Israel", and 7 hours about the socio-religious fabric of the 19-20th century "Arab World."[147] "The History of the Druze" book covers historical aspects of the Fatimid rule in Lebanon and the Levant until early contemporary Lebanon. The book does not cover modern aspects of particular Druze history. Even though a Druze activist

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[145] شعر بوابة الدموع - سميح القاسم. استخدمت من:
https://www.diwandb.com/poem/%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A9-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%85%D9%88%D8%B9.html

[146] See article in List of Figures, Figure 8.

[147] 2017 The ״ליבה לתכניות הלימודים בהיסטוריה במערכת החינוך הישראלית במלכתי- דתי, ובמגזרים הערבי והדרוזי״ .Israeli Ministry of Education Website for Druze and Circassian schools. The Manual for Core Curriculum for History. Retrieved from: https://sites.google.com/a/druzenet.tzafonet.org.il/drhistory/home/spry-lymwd-mwsrym-bhystwryh

noted an exaggeration of the role of Druze figures in the history textbook, the main controversy surrounding the curriculum pertains to what is missing from it.[148] Just as Samih Al-Qassim is missing from the language textbooks, national figures like Shakib Arslan and Sultan Pasha Al-Atrash, two of the most influential Arab Druze leaders, are similarly missing from history textbooks in the current curriculum.[149] When asked, high school history teacher E.I explained that "they know Sultan Pasha. They know him as a Druze hero, but not an Arab nationalist."[150]

In Civics, the government manipulates the first element (concretion of identity) of the Druze community from a very young age. In the Civics book for second grade entitled "Life Together in Israel" there is a chapter about wedding ceremonies; it is divided into four categories: Jewish, Muslim, Christian, and Druze.[151] For the last three categories, wedding traditions vary minimally (beyond the presence of a priest or a Sheikh), and usually due to an urban/country divide, rather than a religious one. But in the book, the elements of the same wedding tradition are divided into three categories and (almost randomly) assigned a sect.[152] In the fourth grade civics book, there is a chapter about "Arab **AND** Druze Citizens in Israel (emphasis added)."[153] The 3-page chapter presents images of different towns and villages across the country that have people from different religions living in them.[154] These efforts of distinguishing the "us" and "them" are confusing for the outside readers simply because they are hollow. There is no explanation of how those two categories differ beyond the title. This confusion is felt accordingly in the various Druze schools and communities. In an interview with the regional content director of the Druze Youth Centers administered by the Israeli organization Ma`ase, W.K. explains that her role includes creating content and overseeing its implementation across 13 Druze villages in the state, with over 500 Druze participants. Her observation is clear, "we are confused" she said, "we do not know who we are. We are in a constant state of perplexity."[155] W.K. was not the only one. Every teacher that was interviewed for this research had noted the same worrisome phenomenon. A.S., a high school History and Geography teacher from Yarka, shares:

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[148] From an Interview with S.F. on September 21, 2017.

[149] According to L.H, Shakib Arslan is only mentioned in an elective Arabic unit in his text describing his pride in Bani Ma'arouf (another name for the Druze sect).

[150] From an Interview with E.I. on November 25, 2017.

[151] "الحياة معا في اسرائيل" للصف الثاني (٢٠٠٩)، صالح علي سواعد، بيلي سفير، وزارة التربية والثقافة والرياضة ص. ٦٢.

[152] Ibid.

[153] "أحبك موطني" للصف الرابع (٢٠١٧)، محمد يوسف، وزارة التربية والتعليم. ص. ٤٩.

[154] Ibid.

[155] From an Interview with W.K. on November 24, 2017.

"My students once asked me how do I define myself. I said I am an Arab and a Druze. They then asked, 'why did you say Arab if you are a Druze?' and I had to explain that I am an Arab by nationality and a Druze by religion."[156]

According to a Human Rights Watch report on Arab Education in Israel's schools, "[t]he government devotes inadequate resources to developing the subjects unique to Arab education."[157] When asked about the type of knowledge they pass to their students about history, culture, and the region, especially with the limited written material about the topic, high school History teachers had a common response: "it is extremely restricted;" "there is no place for outside information or sharing our perspective on the issue."[158] A.S. explains "we avoid talking about these [political] issues. We could be fired."[159] She goes on to explain that the principal of her high school already gave her a "final warning" about political discussions with her students and explained that it is unacceptable.[160] In general, there seems to be a constant sense of fear from "Big Brother" in the education system.

From an international legal perspective, the acceptability of education in the Druze schools can and should be achieved through the promotion of the minority's history, tradition, and culture. According to the previous evidence provided in this paper, the Israeli government is currently providing a curriculum that is not only unacceptable to the community's needs and priorities, but also suppressive of their culture, language, tradition, and history. The government's regulation of the curricula has resulted in a violation of the state's commitment set forth in the basic pillars of education stated in Article 13 of the ICESCR. This criterion of "acceptability" is a vehicle that promotes effective education: an education that advances "human rights and democracy" and can be experienced as "one of the joys and rewards of human existence."[161] The fear that was expressed by multiple teachers from different Druze villages and schools, together with the warning their received from their superiors, are especially alarming, as they establish evidence

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[156] From an Interview with A.S. on November 25, 2017.

[157] Coursen-Neff, Z. (2001). Second class: discrimination against Palestinian Arab children in Israel's schools. Human Rights Watch.

[158] From an Interview with E.I. on November 25, 2017.

[159] A.S. interviewed on November 25, 2017, explains that there is a general sense of fear when talking about anything political in schools. Teachers would simply avoid it.

[160] Ibid.

[161] "Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education," OHCHR. Retrieved November 25, 2017 from: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Education/SREducation/Pages/SREducationIndex.aspx

for undemocratic censorship for the freedom of speech - a right that is guaranteed by ICCPR under Article 19, paragraph 2.[162]

The violation of the teachers' rights to freedom of expression does not only harm their financial and emotional well-being, but equally harms the guaranteed right of the students to "enjoy their own culture."[163] The United Nations Minorities Declaration specifies the state's responsibility to "take measures in the field of education in order to encourage knowledge of the history, traditions, language and culture of the minorities existing within their territory."

In a 2018 news report on the local Israeli TV channel "10" titled "A Lesson in Silencing (closing-mouths)", the reporter begins his segment saying that "in Arab schools, students almost never learn about their own history."[164] He interviews both Arab and Jewish students only to show that neither has learned anything about the Palestinian perspective or experience. One of history teachers that was interviewed explains that "schools were historically used as a mechanism for control and suppression in Israel against the Palestinians," and that she attempts to distance herself and her students from the government's "taming" attempts through the curricula.[165]

Policies of Identity (Re-)Construction

from Around the World

Is Israel unique in its efforts to manipulate, ethnicize, and reconstruct the identities of the people it controls? A survey of colonized communities from around the world shows that colonial powers have long employed this technique to similarly facilitate and advance their political control over the local communities. In his paper on South African traditionalism, Thomas Spear describes how the British engaged (and succeeded) in the "creation of tribalism" and changed the local communities from "fluid social groups recruited on the basis of kinship and patronage," to "rigid ethnic categories" to help preserve the "social order" needed to subordinate them to

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[162] "The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights", 1996, Article 19.
[163] Ibid, Article 27.
[164] "Channel 10 report on History and Civics Curricula in Arab Schools." https://www.facebook.com/1832355110337862/videos/2040830186157019/
[165] Ibid.

colonial rule.[166] They have taken several actions that resulted in "invented" traditions and collections of folklore that were not otherwise traceable by the natural development of the local communities.[167] These inventions, Terence Ranger explains, were necessary first steps to create common ground between them and the Africans upon which they would build the legitimacy of their rule.[168] Their inventions ranged from the stratification of working classes (and the exclusivity of the whites' group), to the invented traditions in British schools that "validated the British governing class."[169] These schools had names like King George V, the Director of Education in 1927 explains, "as a reminder to the backward races of their participation in the empire."[170]

As a specific example, the colonial powers in Kenya worked towards the politicization of ethnic identities as means for their political control. Professor Kimani Njogu explains that "although the ethnic labels […] have pre-colonial origins, they became comprehensive and rigidly ranked categories only in the colonial period."[171] Timothy Parsons of Washington University explains that colonial powers in Kenya needed to shift the existing fluid categories into "manageable administrative units," something that would facilitate their rule.[172] Colonial powers assumed the primitivity of those tribes and found their reconstruction "moral and defensibile."[173] Similar to this paper's example of Arab Druze, Parsons describes how individuals from Kenyan tribes would identify themselves with several "ethnic" categories, thus emphasizing the fluidity of pre-colonial identities (that confused the colonizers).[174] They would also connect their identity to the

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[166] Spear, Thomas. "Neo-traditionalism and the limits of invention in British colonial Africa." *The Journal of African History* 44, no. 1 (2003): 3-27.
http://bsc.chadwyck.com.proxy.library.cornell.edu/search/displayIibpCitation.do?SearchEngine=Opentext&area=iibp&id=00114556
[167] Ibid. See also Hobsbawm, Eric, and Terence Ranger, eds. *The invention of tradition*. Cambridge University Press, 2012. P. 1-2
[168] Ibid. P. 211-213.
[169] Ibid. P. 217.
[170] Ibid.
[171] Africa Uncensored, "In Tribe We Trust," January 2018. Youtube Video.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ubeb3-VQjew
[172] Parsons, Timothy. "Being Kikuyu in Meru: Challenging the tribal geography of colonial Kenya." *The Journal of African History* 53, no. 1 (2012): 65-86.
[173] Ibid. P.66.
[174] Ibid. P. 67.

geography of the place: the name and location of their tribes were primary contributors to their collective memory.[175]

Similarly, lands in Nicaragua constitute an essential element of indigenous peoples' collective memories and identities. In his mapping project on indigenous lands, Karl Offen explains the important role that historiography plays in "national discourses, popular sentiments, and public policies," that ultimately "influences an indigenous politics of identity."[176] Offen specifically relates to the native's narrative on their lands and how the contrasted official Nicaraguan narrative, that "appear in school curriculum materials, popular literature, daily newspapers, in conversations and scholarly work," overwhelmingly "denies them genuine rights to territory as ethnic groups."[177] This example connects directly to the residents of the OSG and how their territory, and thus identity, is viewed - both locally and internationally. The fact that through Israel's occupation of the Syrian Golan, and consequent renaming and repurposing of geographic pieces of lands, the natives of the OSG have lost an essential part of their identities. The power of what Offen calls the "conventional wisdom" that is sponsored by the government and appears in public and academic spaces forcefully alters the reality. Through school curricula, Israel is reconstructing a Druze identity that is ethnic in nature, and Israeli in geography and politics. Students in the OSG who grow up in homes that identify as Syrian Arab, and go to schools learning how the borders of Israel include their ethnically "Druze" towns, go through conflicting processes of identity formation. If the "conventional wisdom" remains as is, these students ultimately lose their cultural collective identity.

The Particularism of the Occupied Syrian Golan

There needs to be a separate section detailing the impacts of responsibilities towards Israeli education in the Occupied Syrian Golan. This needs stems from the peculiar reality of their occupation. While the Syrian Golan is internationally recognized as an occupied territory (in an armed conflict) under the United Nation Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) and 338 (1973),

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[175] Ibid. P. 69.

[176] Offen, Karl H. "Narrating place and identity, or mapping Miskitu land claims in northeastern Nicaragua." *Human organization* 62, no. 4 (2003): 382-392.

[177] Ibid. P. 386.

domestic Israeli Law deems it part of Israel under the Golan Heights Law (1981), and subsequently extends domestic legal jurisdiction to it.[178] In either context, however, as the The United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner's (OHCHR) "International Legal Protection of Human Rights in Armed Conflict" explains:

> *"[T]he applicability of the regime of international humanitarian law during an armed conflict does not preclude the application of the Covenant" and that "the provisions of the Covenant apply to the benefit of the population of the Occupied Territories, for all conduct by the State party's authorities or agents in those territories that affect the enjoyment of rights enshrined in the Covenant and fall within the ambit of State responsibility of Israel under the principles of public international law."[179]*

The Israeli government is therefore required to take into consideration the implementation of practical steps to advance the guaranteed rights of the Golan natives. The importance of education in the OSG is further complicated by the impact of the Syrian civil war on the collective experience of the OSG natives. Israel's perspective the Golan will be illustrated through a brief review of geography textbooks, followed by an analysis of the impact of the Syrian civil war and consequent identity transformation, presented through anecdotal episodes from the locals.

Geography, Terminology, and Law

In all Geography textbooks created for different elementary and middle school levels, the borders of the State include both the Palestinian Occupied Territories and the Occupied Syrian Golan as part of the State. In the fourth grade civics textbook for all Arabic speakers, occupied Buqa`tha village is listed as an "Arab village in the North of Israel close to the Syrian-Israeli borders."[180]

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[178] "The Syrian Golan," The Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic at the United Nations. Retrieved on November 25, 2017 from: https://www.un.int/syria/syria/syrian-golan See also: "The Golan Heights Law-5742-1981- 14 December 1981," Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affair. Retrieved on November 25, 2017 from: http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/mfadocuments/yearbook5/pages/83%20the%20golan%20heights%20law%20-%205742-1981-%2014%20december.aspx

[179] "International Legal Protection of Human Rights in Armed Conflict", (2011) The United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (OHCHR). Retrieved on November 25, 2017 from http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/HR_in_armed_conflict.pdf

[180] "أحبك موطني"، (٢٠١٧) أ. محمد يوسف، وزارة التربية والتعليم. ص. ٩.٢٣ See List of Figure, Figure 9.23 .

In the middle school geography textbook "Isra`il: Al-Insan W-al Mada" (Israel: The Human and the Verizon), the authors briefly describe the "significant wars" that Israel had experienced. Under the 1967 war, the author explains:

> *"The Arab countries did not recognize the state of Israel [...] Egypt and Syria attacked Israel. Following the 1967 war, the territory under Israeli control had expanded greatly and had come to include the Golan Heights, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and the Sinai Peninsula. Additionally, a part of Jerusalem have come under Israeli control ever since."*

Both the biased terminology and the lack of adequate information documented in geography textbooks are noteworthy. In this paragraph, the three Jewish-Israeli authors describe the war, and the subsequent occupation as an "expansion of land control," as if more land was simply created. Education in general, and for people under occupation in particular, should aim to advance knowledge, particularly one that is relevant to the daily lives of the people receiving it. Mr. Ibraheem, a 25-year-old Syrian activist from occupied Majdal Shams, explains: "There was never any political knowledge in [our] schools. The word Occupation was never mentioned. We never had the space to [...] identify ourselves as Syrian." The OHCHR's "International Legal Protection of Human Rights in Armed Conflict" explains that "[o]nce under the control of the enemy, in an occupied territory, [the occupied people's] proper working must be facilitated by the occupying Power and, in the last resort, should local institutions be inadequate, the occupying Power must make arrangements for *the maintenance and education, if possible by persons of their own nationality, language and religion.*"[181] Effectively, international human rights and humanitarian law requires occupying powers to actively engage the occupied communities in their own education. According to the Parental Committee of Majdal Shams, since the 1967 occupation, the Israeli government has been overseeing the processes of hiring and firing principals, teachers, and staff.[182] In the early

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[181] "International Legal Protection of Human Rights in Armed Conflict", (2011) The United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (OHCHR). P. 18. Retrieved on November 25, 2017 from http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/HR_in_armed_conflict.pdf

[182] In early 1980s, teachers who protested against the Israeli annexation plan were dismissed from schools without compensations. Israeli courts deemed these arbitrary procedures "legitimate". Source: "The Occupied Syrian Golan

years of the occupation, there were not enough qualified Syrian Arab teachers to teach in the OSG schools, and the several testimonials describe having soldiers teach instead.[183] The State had had the power in the past to even dismiss teachers and principals who did not conform to State policy regarding political matters. Today, they explain, multiple teachers have received warnings from officials about their activism.[184]

These targeted and oppressive attempts to increase the sense of loyalty of the Druze to the state, while problematic for many communities around the world, are morally and legally reprehensible for communities in the Golan who live under occupation. As the legal framework of this paper introduced, international human rights and humanitarian law require occupying forces to extend the applicability of the state's ratified treaties to the communities they rule. This includes the communities' rights to culturally appropriate education that maintains the parents agency and role in deciding on their children's education, as well as the state's responsibility in educating the students on their history, language, culture, and traditions. For communities in the Occupied Golan, this includes the history of the 1967 war and consequent occupation, the illegal annexation, and Syrian cultural and traditional events. The State of Israel has continuously failed to do so, and has alternatively followed a strategy of reconstructing and sterilizing their collective experiences, memories, and ultimately identity, as fits the political goals of the state.

Terminology is powerful. As the previous section illustrated, terminology changes realities, norms, and identities. In this case, terminology impacts how OSG residents view themselves - both in terms of ethnicity and citizenship- and how they relate to their surrounding as a whole. The United Nations Group of Experts on Geographical Names (UNGEGN) has published a document in 2014 discussing the "judaization, changing and distortion" of Arab names as part of protecting the cultural heritage of the places.[185] While still nationalistic in nature, this

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Background", (2005) Al-Marsad The Arab Centre for Human Rights in the Golan Heights. Retrieved on November 25, 2017 from: http://golan-marsad.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/background-golan.pdf

[183] From an Interview with the Majdal Shams Parental Committee on September 20, 2017. Also, from an Interview with Aamer Ibraheem on October 3, 2017.

[184] From an Interview with the Parental Committee in Occupied Majdal Shams on September 20, 2017. They also gave an example of one teacher who expressed an objection to an activity taking place in a Majdal Shams school and consequently had Israeli intelligence contact him and ask him to refrain.

[185] The Arab Division of Experts on Geographical Names, UNGEGN, 2014.
https://unstats.un.org/unsd/geoinfo/UNGEGN/docs/pdf/arab%20division.pdf

preservation is necessary for protecting the collective memories, culture, and identity of people, especially those under occupation.

The Effects of War on Identity

Beyond the school curriculum and the techniques of minoritization that the Israeli government has imposed on the Syrian Druze in the OSG, there are external factors that have contributed to the shifts in cultural identities seen and expected among Golan natives, most notably, the Syrian civil war.

In the November 2017 issue of the Hebrew publication of Globes Magazine, four Syrians from the OSG were interviewed. In the interview, the author describes occupied Majdal Shams as "Little Tel-Aviv" in its modernity and nightlife - something that distinguishes it from other Druze towns in Israel, he explains. The article describes how the Syrians in the OSG have "turned their back to Syria and are becoming more and more Israeli every passing day." One of the Syrian males interviewed explains, "within 5 years, we will all be Israeli. Just wait and see."[186]

Before the eruption of the Syrian Civil war, the natives of the OSG were allowed limited visitation rights to Syria. According to the amended Nationality Law, there were specific categories that would allow Syrians in the Golan to visit Syria; they included:

- Religious Druze men,
- Women over 70,
- Students receiving education in Syria.[187]

In 2012, the Israeli government terminated visitations to Syria for security reasons.[188] Due to their physical and emotional proximity to the war, Syrian activists in the Golan also discontinued any cultural and educational activities they used to hold, most notably, Al-Sham summer camp. Al-Sham (meaning Levant) had operated for almost 20 years in the OSG, and provided an

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[186] "השתכנזנו" - המילה הכי נפוצה במג'דל שמס: הגולן במתיחות" (2017), דרור פויר, גלובס מגזין.
http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001211807
[187] "Human Right Violations Committed by the State of Israel in the Occupied Syrian Golan." (2017), Al-Marsad - Arab Human Rights Centre in the Golan Heights. P. 5.
[188] Ibid.

environment of cultural and educational enrichment for Arab Syrians. According to Aamer Ibraheem, who attended almost every Al-Sham summer camp since his childhood:

"[Al-Sham Summer Camp] was one of most shaping experience of my identity. The Syrian flag was always there. The names of the tents were always names of destroyed Syrian villages. Every year, we would see the police come to take people who are managing the camps, especially after the second day following the [Syrian] flag rising ceremony. And we understood it was because of it."[189]

Ibraheem explains that since the war, camp activities have been terminated, and no other framework has taken its place.[190] He continues to describe how the "cultural and religious center for the Druze" has shifted from Syria to other Israeli Druze towns and villages. He warns that the border closure has accelerated the "Israelization" process for the Syrian residents.[191] In 2017 Majdal Shams, one could hear few times a month the town's local speakerphone driving around the village announcing the death of Druze elders from villages and towns around Israel. "The connection [with Druze in Israel] is now beyond religion," Ibraheem explains, "now we see them as the model for our future."[192]

Concluding Remarks: Army Service and the Future of the Golan

One substantial difference between the Arab Druze in the Golan and the rest of Israel is the fact that they are not required to serve in the Israeli army. Army service has been identified as one of the most forming experiences for the Israeli society. Some argue that "[the Israeli] military service represents the most conscious experience of the state they will ever have."[193] Indeed, it has greatly contributed to the development of a "Druze-Israeli" identity within the Palestinian

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[189] From an Interview with Aamer Ibraheem on October 3, 2017.
[190] Ibid.
[191] Ibid.
[192] Ibid
[193] Oliver Wenner, "The Israeli Defense Force and National Identity." Harvard Political Review, (2012). Retrieved on November 27, 2017 from: http://harvardpolitics.com/world/the-israeli-defense-force-and-national-identity/

Arab Druze.[194] This difference in army experiences between the Palestinian and Syrian Druze could possibly explain why, even when describing a process of ethnic manipulation, Syrian Druze would describe a process of "Israelification" and not "Druzification" as if one comes before the other. This has also been seen in civics textbooks. Particularly, in the fourth grade civics book, the Syrian village of Buqa`tha (comprised almost completely of Syrian Druze), is identified as an "Arab" village in Israel, while the village of Yarka (with the same religious composition) is identified as a "Druze" village.[195] The army service, one can argue, has created an Israeli identity among its Druze participants that does not feel foreign anymore.

Finally, the uncertainty that surrounds the Occupied Syrian Golan in terms of nationality, citizenship, and territorial control, has raised genuine concerns about pragmatic political alignment with Israel. "The Syrian Druze are Arabs," explains A.S. in an attempt to not be misunderstood, "they are REAL Arabs. But what would happen to them if they align themselves politically with Israel if the Golan was returned to Syria? They will be seen as traitors, and their life will be in danger. They would never do that." This argument does not seem unrealistic. In 1980, the religious figures in the OSG came together and published an announcement stating that:

> *"Anyone that has the Israeli citizenship will be considered an infidel, and a pariah to his Arab Druze traditions. He will be boycotted in all religious and social ceremonies."[196]*

Political, ideological, and pragmatic considerations all contribute to the shifts and changes in the identities of the Syrian Arab Druze in the Occupied Syrian Golan. This research attempted to analyze the significant role that education plays in the larger scheme of things. Specifically, it is important to consider Israel's legal role as an occupying power in providing an education that is accessible and acceptable to the local community. This could be done through a stronger, more genuine engagement between the state authorities and the occupied people in determining the education curricula that they want to advance. This includes providing an education that is factually accurate and culturally suitable.

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[194] Firro, K. M. (2001). Reshaping Druze Particularism in Israel. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, *30*(3), 40-53.

[195] "أحبك موطني"، (٢٠١٧) أ. محمد يوسف، وزارة التربية والتعليم. ص. ٨+٢٣

[196] "من الذاكرة الجولانية،" موقع الجولان الالكتروني (١٩٨٠\١١\٢٨) حصل عليه من:
http://jawlan.org/openions/hist_show.asp?sn=643

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Israeli government follows an ethnocratic governing regime. It is a regime that prioritizes a specific ethnicity over other ethnicities or all other citizens. In this case it is the prioritization of Jewish benefits and goals over those of non-Jews. The maintenance of this governing system requires directed efforts to weaken the "others" and attract allies. An old political strategy that has been used to this end is the strategy of "divide-and-conquer." The state of Israel has used its authority to divide and conquer non-Jewish communities across several different fields. This research focuses on the Arab Druze experiences in regards to the state's attempts at ethnically manipulating them and causing a cultural break between them and other Arabs. This has been done through imposing compulsory army service on them (except in the OSG), labelling them as ethnically Druze, and isolating their schools and curriculum from other Arab schools in the system. The separation of the school system was implemented with the intention of strengthening Israeli-Druze relations and advancing an "Israeli-Druze Identity." Accordingly, the new Druze curriculum focused on Druze-specific experiences, eliminated any national Arab bonds, and filtered the historical information that may harm the goal of achieving closer Druze-Israeli ties. This policy of separation has resulted in a sense of confusion for some Druze youth about their identity. This confusion should be expected. They speak the same language as other Arabs and share history, traditions, cuisine, and religious holidays with them. The school curriculum that tries to advance this isolated identity has not provided any substantial contextual reference to the alleged differences between Arabs and Druze, thus only magnifying the confusion felt by the students.

The Syrian Arab Druze in the OSG have similarly experienced attempts of cultural suppression in the education system. They have voiced their great concerns about the lack of education about their occupation and history. Importantly, the inaccurate depictions of the state's geography and borders in school curricula have further manipulated their collective identity and culture. In addition to the inadequacy of the education system in the OSG, the Syrian civil war has significantly contributed to the shifts in the collective identities for people in the Golan. The termination of their limited access to Syria has caused their religious and cultural center to turn to the Palestinian Druze in Israel, further isolating them from their history and particular

national traditions. The civil war has also impacted local cultural activities that have been providing Syrian Arab education for generations. Their vacancy has not been filled since 2010.

As an internationally-recognized occupied territory, the OSG should receive the international protections guaranteed in the various covenants and treaties that Israel has ratified. This includes a culturally acceptable education curricula, and the community's agency in protecting its cultural heritage in schools. The State of Israel's continuous refusal to abide by its responsibilities has made it exceptionally difficult to see advancements in this field. It is equally challenging to hold the state accountable for its violations when the international documents do not specify the standards for educational "acceptability" - not to mention that lack of any requirements detailing the importance of historical accuracy. As evident from cases in Nicaragua and others, different depictions of historical and geographical realities yield substantial differences in collective identities. It is, therefore, crucial to take measurable steps towards incorporating the above-mentioned standards and criteria into the general comments and concluding observations of the relevant covenants and treaties to advance the cultural and educational rights of minorities, indigenous peoples, and people under occupation around the world. A simple start would be in commissioning the Special Rapporteur (SR) on Education to Israel to evaluate the four pillars of education in schools under Israeli control. A request for SR has been standing since 2008.

Specific Recommendations:

1. As most of the abovementioned treaties and declarations explain, referring back to the wishes of the parents or legal guardians in relation to the content of their children's education, is one of the most democratic and representative ways to improve the current situation. **Giving parents the autonomy** to have a systemic and impactful input on their children's education is the surest way to secure the cultural representation and preservation of any community, let alone those under occupation.

2. From 2008 until today, there has been a change in the Special Rapporteur (SR) on Education. It is recommended that, since Israel has not agreed to the visit of the previous SR, **the new SR should extend a renewed request for a visitation to the state of Israel**. The visitation and consequent research would be invaluable in shedding light on

both the general gaps and inequalities in Israeli education, as well as the need for cultural-specificity for people in the OSG in particular. It is extremely important to put international pressure on Israel for this visitation to take place.

3. International pressure can also be accomplished with **the help of civil society organizations and non-governmental organizations** (NGOs) through extensive publications on and documentation of the issue. Especially since the different committees receive updated information partially from NGOs for the List of Issues (LoI) that they present to the state under review, their cooperation in covering the issue of cultural miseducation can pressure the government of Israel to take active steps towards reform.

4. General Comments have commonly been added periodically to provide more nuanced understanding of the different articles of every international legal agreement. General Comment no. 13 of the CADE, specifically, provides very little explanation on the matter of culturally-specific education by stating that: "States have obligations to respect, protect and fulfil each of the "essential features" (availability, accessibility, acceptability, adaptability) of the right to education. By way of illustration, a State must [... take] positive measures to ensure that education is culturally appropriate for minorities and indigenous peoples, and of good quality for all."[197] Seeing how the explanation itself is still ambiguous and does not provide concrete steps to be taken by governments, it is recommended that **the CESCR publishes an updated General Comment on the cultural aspect of education**. This would help states be informed and held accountable vis-a-vis this responsibility.

The power of education is unlimited. It can create, educate, and empower; and it can be used to manipulate, suppress, and dominate others. This research has presented an example of the latter.

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[197]The Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, "IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, and CULTURAL RIGHTS General Comment No. 13 (Twenty-first session, 1999), The right to education (article 13 of the Covenant)" December, 1999. http://www.right-to-education.org/sites/right-to-education.org/files/resource-attachments/CESCR_General_Comment_13_en.pdf

LIST OF FIGURES:

S E C R E T
Memorandum submitted in the service of Israel

I. Druze Community:-

1) Geographical distribution and outstanding Druze families:-

   (1) Israel:- population is almost sixteen thousand souls,
        concentrated in the north part of the country. The
        leading families are the Khause (Ahn Sinan), Tarif
        (Julis) and Muadi (Yerkar). Until 1928 the three
        families jointly and in harmony represented and mana-
        ged the communal affairs of the Community. Since,
        dispute arose between the Tarifs and the Khauses and
        all the community splitted this way or the other
        including the Muádi family. The split remains and
        since increased and subsided according to current
        events of the day. At present remains potential.

   (2) Lebanon:-

        (i) Lebanon north:- population is about fifty
        thousand souls, concentrated in the mountains east

3. Proposed scheme:-

        In the service of securing the following benefits
        for Israel:-

        In the service of securing the following benefits
        for Israel:-
    1. The establishment of peaceful and friendly relations
        with Syria and Lebanon.

    2. To secure friendly relations with institutions, secular
        and religious heads and organisations.

    3. To discover unfriendly movements and plans.
    4. To create a friendly public opinion.
    5. To contact the persons concerned in Syria and Lebanon.
    6. To arouse the activity and interest of the Meronite -
        Druze communities in Lebanon and other
        minorities for the said purpose.

3.7.49

Figure 2:

מדינת ישראל

לשכת ראש הממשלה

נחמיה ארגוב

יהושע פלמון

כט בסיון תשי
14 ביוני 1950

הנדון: מכתבו של בר-יהודה בענין
הדרוזים בעוספיה.

האחרונים אשר להם סבה איזו שהיא להתאונן על ממשלת
ישראל הם הדרוזים.לא רק שהם לא קופחו,אלא שהם נהנו מזכיונות
יתר נכבדים,ולא רק במקרה אלא לפי שמה ובמחכון.וזאת על מנת
להעמיק ולהרחיב את המרחק שבינם ובין החושבים הערבים אשר בתוכם
הם גרים.

Figure 3:

לשכת היועץ לעניני ערבים / משרד ראש הממשלה

הנדון: בקור אמין וסלמאן סריף במשרד הדתות
מכתבכם: 21215/4/1096 מיום 20.8.53

מבלי להתעכב על פרטים בלהי מדויקים בתזכירו של אמין
סריף בענין האסיפה בעוספיה וקשריה עם הגיוס וכן בענין הסכסוכים
שהקצינים אמנון ושמעון מעוררים בעדה הדרוזית אשר בקר יסודם.-

רצוני לקבוע בנקודה אחת פלדעתי היא דעינה ביותר ודאורי
היה להביאה לידיעתו של שר הדתות והיא ענין פלוג העדה לשבי חלקים
אשר האחד הוא מתנגד לגיוס ולא רק כי עמדתו זו נובעת בעצם
מהתנגדרה לישראל בכלל.-

הב' ... שבבקר ... מהתנגדרה לגיוס עמדו בצורה גלויה ביותר שבי השייכים
... במשרד הדתות, דבר זה הגיע לנאומים בכפרים במקדמה
פומבי לאמירפרה השאירה עם דקכי חדה ולהעפולה נמרצה בכפרים נגד
הגיוס שאגב הצלחה בידה לא קטנה.-

בכמה כפרים מצאו אנשינו אם מכוביהו של שיך אמין יוצאו מהמכפר
בשעה שבאו לדרום אם המגריסים בו. בכפרים הודרו לבו נככדים כי קבלו
הורארה מהשייכים לא לתת אנשים לגיוס.-

נוסף למעולה הגלויה מפעיל שיך אמין להך רהי בענין. הוא
הוציא הוראאו רחזא כי כל אדם המשרה כצבא אינו זכאי לקבל אם חדה
הדרוזים דבר השולל ממנו גם אם אפשרות חנשואין.-

בכפרו של השיך אמין, ג'ולים מצוריים 15 היילים משוחררים
שאינם יכולים להתחתן זה שנים אלא בהנאי שיבאו משרות המלראים ואז
ירואיל להעניק להם אם רהם.-

תעמולהו של השיך הנ"ל נגד הגיוס התלה לא מהיום ולא
מהסמרוסרבים שמבהלים הקציניים שסדון ואמנובן. בעצם יפי המלחמה כשבה
1948 כשהגיעו אלינו 10 מהנדבים ראטרודים מג'ולים המפעיל שיך אמין
נגדם להך המור ראיומים עד כרי איום כי יפסור אם שמרותיהם לצבאר
של קאוקג' והלה יהרום אם בהיתה ריאסור אם בני ביתם.-

Figure 4:

Figure 5:

The leaflet says :-

At the moment when the Arab people in all their countries are engaged in the struggle for freedom with the colonialists and the Zionists and are encountering the conspiracies of the U.K., France and Israel for the elimination of Arab nationalism Jewish propaganda claims to have succeeded in spreading dissension amongst the Palestine Arabs and to have drawn a part of them to the Jewish side. It is even claimed that the Druses have linked their fate to Israel's. It has been possible for Israel to exploit some weak persons and traitors in her deceptive campaign. In so doing Israel is following in the footsteps of her colonial founders, particularly France, which colonized Syria and was all the time attempting to diffuse communal dissension. The Druses in Jebel Druze were most affected by such policy but they were nevertheless able to foil the colonialist's plans. They revolted several times and have left an honourable record in the history of the Arab struggle.

Figure 6:

Figure 7:

(source: http://mondoweiss.net/2016/08/occupied-identity-colonialism/ , accessed Oct 30, 2017)

Figure 8:

Historical Jewish Press (JPress) of the NLI & TAU

מעריב, 10.07.1960, page 11

נעצר צעיר דרוזי המערער
על „חוקיות הגיוס"

— מאת סופר „מעריב" בנצרת —

צעיר דרוזי, סמיר אליקאסם, בן 22, אשר סירב
בסוף השבוע שעבר להתייצב לשירות סדיר בצה"ל,
נעצר בביתו על ידי המשטרה האזרחית ונמסר לידי
המשטרה הצבאית.

אל־קאסם, בן למשפחה
אמידה בכפר ראמה בגליל,
עוסק בהוראה בכפר עין
אלאסר, בקירבת מקום מגוריו.
הצעיר ידוע בכל הסביבה כי
משורר, המפרסם מדי שבוע
שירים לאומניים לוהטים.

אל־קאסם, שהיה צריך ל־
התגייס כבר לפני 3 שנים,
קיבל ארבע פעמים דחיות
מטעמים שונים. עתה, לפני
מועד התייצבותו, שלח מכתב
לנשיא־המדינה, בו הוא מבקש
לשחרר „את הצעירים ה־
דרוזיים, שהם ערביים", מ־
חובת הגיוס. לאחר שקיבל
תשובה, כי עליו לפנות ל־
משרד־הבטחון, שלח הצעיר
הדרוזי לראש הממשלה מכתב,
שאילו צריף את כל תעודותיו
הרשמיות. כן הקשר סמיה

אל־קאסם עם מנסור קרדוש,
מראשי קבוצת „אל־ארד" ה־
לאומנית בנצרת.
אל־קאסם טוען, כי המנהיגים
הדרוזיים אינם מייצגים את
הנוער הדרוזי, וכי אין לגייס
דרוזים כדי שיילחמו נגד
אחיהם הערבים. כן מאיים
אל־קאסם, שאם ייעצר, יכריז
על שביתת רעב.

Figure 9:

4. الحدود الناتجة عقب حرب 1967

لم تعترف الدول العربية بدولة إسرائيل وبخطوط الهدنة التي تحددت عام 1949 . وفي عام 1967 أغلق المصريون مضائق تيران وشنت مصر وسوريا هجوما على دولة إسرائيل . في أعقاب حرب 1967 اتسعت المساحات الخاضعة للسيطرة الإسرائيلية اتساعًا كبيرًا فباتت إسرائيل تسيطر على هضبة الجولان ومناطق الضفة الغربية وقطاع غزة وشبه جزيرة سيناء . كما أصبح شطرا مدينة القدس تحت السيطرة الإسرائيلية منذ ذلك الحين .

وفي عام 1973 نشبت حرب بادرت فيها مصر وسوريا إلى شن هجوم على إسرائيل التي واجهت حربًا ضارية . وبعد انتهاء تلك الحرب طرأت تغييرات طفيفة على حدود إسرائيل مع مصر وسوريا في إطار اتفاقيات فصل القوات : حيث أعيد جزء بسيط من سيناء إلى مصر ، وأعيدت مدينة القنيطرة إلى سوريا .

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