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
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Jung Bahadur

By

Baburam Acharya

(Purnima, 27, Aswin 2029 (September-October 1972), p. 178).



On Wednesday, Magh Badi 9, 1902, King Rajendra appointed Jung Bahadur as General, with the Dafdarkhana Kumarichok, the Basantapur Tahabil, and the Bhandarkhal under him.

On Wednesday, Aswin Badi 11, 1903, King Rajendra appointed him as Mukhtiyar and Commander-in-Chief.

On Kartik Badi 11, 1903, King Rajendra announced that he would leave for Kashi. He directed that both civil and military officials should act according to the orders of Jung Bahadur, and that the junior Queen and her sons should be prevented from coming back to Nepal, and punished if they committed treason.

On Thursday, Kartik Sudi 10, 1903, King Rajendra wrote a letter to Surendra as follows: "I am leaving for Kashi. Ascend the throne if I am imprisoned. Otherwise, do so when I attain the age of forty years."

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Nepal: Strategy for Survival

BY

Leo E. Rose

Reviewed by Randhir Subba

(Randhir Subba, "Sri Leo E. Roseko Pustak". (Leo E. Rose's book). Samaj, Bhadra 11, 2035 (August 27, 1978).

The title of Leo E. Rose's book "Strategy for Survival" which was published in 1971, sheds light on its subject-matter: the longer-term methods and strategy adopted by Nepal for its survival. Leo E. Rose has written this book after several years of study and research on Nepal's foreign policy during the past two centuries. His diligence must be appreciated. But a thorough study of the book compels one to conclude that it was written with preconceived notions, and that the author's attention has gone only to those events that underscore these notions. No reference has been made in this book to those historical events that refute his preconceived notions. Wherever any reference has been made, their meaning has been distorted.

This article seeks to comment on the conclusions of the author. Leo E. Rose has refrained from directly writing that Nepal was not a sovereign state and only indirectly hinted at this. In order to refute that hint, it is essential to think over some historical events.

After the present kingdom of Nepal was founded 200 years ago, Nepal has been constantly vigilant and successful in maintaining its identity. As a result of the 1757 Plassey War, the British Empire was founded in India. It began to spread in northern India, and within a few decades, the whole of northern India, except Punjab and Kashmir was incorporated into the British Empire. Later, Punjab, Kashmir and other states in Southern India too were incorporated. But Nepal was successful in safeguarding its independence and sovereignty. The main criterion of sovereign independence is freedom to maintain foreign relations and determine an independent foreign policy.

Prior to the Nepal-British war of 1814-16, Nepal had relations with both China and Britain. According to the then prevalent custom, foreign relations were maintained through exchange of envoys from time to time. Nepal had a foreign policy of its own to regulate relations with these countries.

The Sugauli Treaty of 1816 did not take away this freedom of Nepal. Nepal's foreign relations thus remained unhampered, and Nepal did not lose the freedom to determine its own foreign policy. The treaty gave Nepal-British relations a written form, but did not create any obstacle

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in Nepal's relations with China and Tibet. Indeed, these relations continued as before. Contacts were maintained later also with Afghanistan and Burma. In 1855-56, the Nepal-Tibet War occurred, and for nearly 100 years afterwards, Tibet abided by its treaty with Nepal'.

Nor is there any substance in the view that because of the 1792 Nepal-China treaty Nepal lost or limited its sovereignty. That every five years a goodwill delegation used to go to China from Nepal to offer presents to the Chinese Emperor is only one aspect of the eastern world attitude. The concept of sovereignty as is prevalent these days originated in the West. The western concept of sovereignty has been adopted by the entire world these days. According to the modern concept, a nation which enjoys the right to establish foreign relations is sovereign. That Nepal sent presents to the Chinese Emperor every five years cannot mean that Nepal lost its sovereignty. Even after signing the 1792 treaty Nepal fought and concluded treaties with Tibet, as well as with the British Empire. Nepal's freedom to maintain foreign relations and determine policies governing these relations remained intact.

Let us now discuss Leo-E. Rose's conclusions. He has mainly tried to stress two points:

(1) From the time of Prithvi Narayan Shah Nepal had requested Chinese help to fight the British Empire but it never received any.

(2) Economic factors are important in determining a country's foreign policy. It is due to economic factors that Nepal had to fight with Tibet frequently and maintain relations with China. It is for this very reason that in today's context Nepal needs to maintain full cooperation with India. Nepal should formulate its foreign policy accordingly.'

It is on this basis that Leo E. Rose has criticized the nonaligned policy of Nepal. This policy has been propounded primarily in the context of the rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States. It aims at non-alignment in relations with them. Leo E. Rose regards Nepal's exposition of the nonaligned policy in its own context to maintain equal friendship with both India and China is an unrealistic and untimely. He has even made sarcastic comments on these principles propounded by Nepal'.

Leo E. Rose's first conclusion is erroneous. That Nepal never received any help from China when it sought such help against British-India is historically correct. But what was China's condition during the past two centuries. China itself was weak and exploited by imperialist powers at that time. Nearly 175 years ago Napoleon had said: "China is a sleeping lion".

Let it sleep. Do not wake it up." The international situation during the last two centuries marked by the climax of imperialism. Today, this situation has changed so much that a small but resolute country such as Vietnam has been able to defeat even France and the United States.

Let us now discuss Leo E. Rose's second conclusion. His arguments may confuse and might have confused many Nepalis. For those few persons who wonder what may happen to Nepal if the supply line of all essential commodities such as salt and kerosene oil is cut off, and who, therefore, believe that we should surrender, his logic may be impressive, but world history shows that although economic factors have determined the foreign policy of a country, pressure tactics too have a limit when a country gives greater importance to its national prestige than to economic factors. Money and bread alone are not all in life. Many imponderable factors too inspire an individual's actions. As in the case of individuals, the values of a country are not always related to economics.

History is full of accounts of millions of people who sacrificed themselves for the sake of their religion. Due to a feeling of self-respect, even poor men have fought legal battles with millionaires for the sake of an inch of land. Nationalistic considerations led the queens of Chittor to fight even against Pathans and Mughal, who were much more powerful and numerous. The women of Rajputana immolated themselves through "Johar", but did not surrender. A nation can sacrifice everything for the sake of its sovereignty. In 1953, Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia agreed to a discontinuation of U.S. aid, but did not succumb to pressure. Cuba did not care for economic assistance from the U.S.A., the most powerful nation in the world. When their sovereign status was at stake, the people of Vietnam had no thought for their weakness, poverty, and helplessness. They did not kneel down before France at the very beginning with the apprehension that France would impose a blockade on the supply of essential commodities. They were ready to die, and ultimately defeated the French. They fought with the world's strongest power for thirty years and ultimately emerged victorious.

For this reason, the way in which the Nepali people have interpreted the term nonalignment is the correct and realistic one for them.

If we have to import all essential commodities from outside today, will we never be able to produce them ourselves? In the present international situation, it may be very difficult for us to reach the international market, but will this situation last for ever?

Should we, in the present situation, accept defeat and let others determine our foreign policy? The author is definitely in the negative.

Every country takes its national interests into consideration'. Is there any enlightened man who will remain indifferent to the dignity, independence, and sovereignty of his country? In the present age, no nation can abandon its sovereignty merely on grounds of its geographical and economic constraints. As Leo E. Rose himself has noted, Nepal has remained highly alert on this question for the past two hundred years'. We cannot forsake freedom to formulate our own stand on international issues keeping the national interests in view, and for anyone to express any reservations on this question is to insult the Nepali people.

If any Chinese journalist write in a newspaper that the people of Lhasa descend to Kathmandu during the winter, as if it was their winter capital, the Nepalis will only feel amused. But actually, 5,000 Indian tourists visited Kathmandu during this summer because of the sweltering heat in India, and an Indian correspondent even remarked that they seemed to have treated Kathmandu as though it was their summer capital. Thus the writings of Chinese and Indian journalists on an identical issue evoke different reactions. This is probably because the British used to shift their summer capital from Calcutta to Darjeeling and from Delhi to Simla.

In 1971, Pakistan disintegrated, and Bangladesh emerged as an independent nation'. But the tussle among different forces did not end even with that event. Thousands of people were killed even after the creation of Bangladesh. Ultimately, Mujibur Rahman himself was assassinated. Nobody can predict the shape of things in Bangladesh, for the struggle between the forces that were behind its emergence and those that murdered Mujibur Rahman, are still strong. It hardly need be pointed out that both forces represent external powers, not the people of Bangladesh.

Another change was the overthrow of King Zahir Shah of Afghanistan in a coup d'etat. In that coup, one of his own relatives Daoud, was proclaimed Head of State. There was another coup d'etat in 1978, in which the entire Daoud family was murdered. Now a Marxist regime has been installed in that country. The new rulers of Afghanistan have reopened the issues of Pakhtoonistan and Baluchistan in Pakistan. What factor has inspired the new rulers of Afghanistan to interfere in the internal affairs of Pakistan?

A tussle has started in Afghanistan. Nobody knows what the future has in store.

Leo E. Rose has discussed events until 1969 only in his book. He probably wrote the book in 1970 and published it in 1971. At that time, Mr. Kissinger had not visited Peking, nor had the U.S. President done so. The table tennis tournament had not been held at Nagoya in Japan, and Sikkim had not been "merged" into India.

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Many developments have taken place in south Asia and Africa since 1971: Ethiopia, Somalia, Congo, South Yemen, Zaire. The conclusion might have been different had Leo E. Rose written a book on Nepal's long-term strategy for survival with due consideration to the international situation in the light of all these developments.

Nepal's Defeat in the Nepal-British War

By

Mahesh Raj Pant

("Bi. Sam. 1871-72 Ko Nepal-Angrejjyaddhama Nepal-le Harnama Euta Thulo Karan". (A major reason for Nepal's defeat in the 1814-15 Nepal-British war). Purnima, Year 1, No. 1, Baisakh'2021 (April 1964). pp. 47-58).

The Nepal-British war of 1814-72 Samvat is an important event in the history of Nepal and India. It put a stop to the campaign of territorial conquest that the Nepali people had started in 1801 Samvat. Nepal was compelled to sign a treaty with the British surrendering one-third of its territory. The British also suffered much loss in the war, even though they had been attaining easy success through intrigues.

(Note: Their victory in the Battle of Plassey in 1814 Samvat enabled the British to impose their domination in Bengal. Nawab Sirajuddaula of Bengal assembled a force of 50,000 to fight the British, who had only 3,000 troops. It was, therefore, difficult for the British to defeat Nawab Sirajuddaula in the battle-field. But the British attained an easy victory, because they had already won over Mir Jafar and Roy Durlabh, generals of Sirajuddaula, to their side.

(This account is based on Ishwari Prasad and Sharad Kumar; Arvachina Bharat Ka Itihasa (A history of modern India), p. 73.

In his book Bharatmen Angreji Rajya (British rule in India) (1st. ed.) p. 946, Sundarlal writes: "The British were badly defeated by the Nepali forces at several places. Some British generals proved themselves to be very incompetent and cowardly and so were dismissed by the Governor-General. The Nepal war was the fiercest and bloodiest war fought by the British until that time in India."

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Similarly, in his Britishkalin Bharataka Itihasa (A history of British India) (PP. 219-20), P.E. Roberts writes: "The first Nepal war, started by Lord Hastings, was quite different from the big wars he fought with the Marathas. Lord Hastings has been blamed for his inability to understand the intricacies of war. But Nepal is the most difficult country in the world from the viewpoint of warfare. The Gorkhalis are braver than any other Indians, except the Sikhs. We must realize that the troops engaged in this war had no experience of fighting in mountainous terrain. Generals, with the exception of Ochterlony, proved the incompetence. The Gorkhalis had not been able to muster more than 12,000 troops, whereas the British invading force consisted of 34,000 men. Even then, the British suffered much loss of life and property. General Gillespie, of the Battle of Java fame, was stopped at the first round of fighting at a hill fort and was killed. General Martindell was repulsed when he launched an attack on Jythak. Ochterlony alone was able to maintain his position in the attack on western Nepal."

On Kartik 18, 1871, Samvat, Lord Hastings, Governor-General of the East India Company, declared war on Nepal from Lucknow. War then started formally. British troops had, however, entered Nepal in the west twelve days previously.

(Note: The diary of Daivajnyashiromani Laxmipati Pande, which is in the possession of Mohan Nath Pande, contains the following entries. The words written in parentheses have been added to explain the meaning:

On Aswin Sudi 7, 1871 Samvat (Kartik 6), British troops intruded into Khusyalpur, which is situated in Nepali territory. From there they reached Dehra on Aswin Sudi 9 (Kartik 8), and Nalapani on Aswin Sudi 11 (Kartik 10). Captain Balabhadra Kanwar was in command of the Nepali fort at Nalapani. There was an exchange of fire at six ghadis after sunrise (about 8:30 A.M.), and nine men of the enemy were killed. Two men lost their lives on our side. The enemy then withdrew to Dehra).

Taking advantage of the most important festival of the Nepalis, the Dashain, the British had actually started the war eight days before it was formally declared. 34,000 British troops then advanced in five sectors with the objective of occupying the entire area from Morang in the east to Handur in the west.

In this war, the British were defeated by the Nepalis from the Koshi region to the Karnali region. In the Jamuna region, the Nepali were not able to defeat the British, but at least defended themselves. However, they could not even defend themselves in the Gangetic region.

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It is not easy to identify the reasons for Nepal's defeat in this war, because the reasons were many.

1. Since the sixteenth century of the Vikrama era, the Renaissance in Europe had led to considerable development in technology. This development eluded India. Consequently, Nepal's weapons were inferior to those used by the British.

(Cf. Jawaharlal Nehru: Glimpses of World History, chapter captioned "Renaissance or Reawakening"; Jayachandra Vidyalankar: Itihasa Pravesha (An introduction to history), chapter captioned "Jnyana-Jagruti-ka Abhava" (Lack of knowledge and enlightenment); and Surya Bikram Chyawali: Amarsimha Thapa, chapter captioned "Harka Karan" (Reasons for defeat).

2. Through pressure and intimidation, the British obtained a loan of Rs 25 million from Nawab Ghaziuddin of Oudh for the Nepal war. With this money, they recruited troops and procured military equipment and supplies. The Nepalis did not have so much money, nor were they in position to borrow from any source. Consequently, they have fewer troops and less equipment and supplies than the British.

3. In 1849 Samvat, Kirkpatrick visited Nepal as the envoy of the Company government. He wrote a book on whatever he saw and knew about Nepal and presented it to the high-ranking authorities of the East India Company. The book was published in 1867 Samvat.

In 1859 Samvat, Hamilton remained in Kathmandu for one year along with the British Resident, Knox. He employed several persons to collect information about Nepal. After he was forced to leave Nepal, he stayed two years in the border areas and collected further information. Hamilton thus made strenuous efforts to collect secret information about Nepal. In 1876 Samvat, he published his book on Nepal and dedicated it to Wellesley, who was Governor-General of the East India Company at the time he was in Nepal.

In Nepal, on the other hand, the tradition of education in politics was absent. Consequently, the Nepalis were unable to collect information about the country or to acquire the secrets of the British.

4. After returning to Nepal from Kashi, the Swami Maharaj, Ran Bahadur, summoned King Prithvipala Sen of the vassal Kingdom of Palpa and put him in jail. Palpa was then annexed by force, when Ran Bahadur was assassinated by his half-brother, Sher Bahadur, Prithvipala Sen was accused of being an accomplice in the crime. Bhimsen Thapa had been killed in cold blood on this charge. This action naturally undermined the trust of the vassal States in the government of Nepal. Consequently, some of them went over in support of the British during the Nepal-British war.

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(Note: It is true, of course, that the British offered many allurements to the prominent generals of Nepal and even promised to make them rulers of areas under their control in an attempt to win them over. But the bhardars of Nepal, who had been taught the lesson of patriotism by Prithvi Narayan Shah, did not succumb to the temptation. They did not attempt to become rich by rebelling against their country.

(Based on the chapter "Jwalanta Deshabhaktira Swarthatyaga" (Shining patriotism and spirit of sacrifice) in Amara Simha Thapa).

5. During the war, the British conducted much propaganda to undermine the morale of the Nepalis. For Nepali officials, on the other hand, it was necessary to acquire information about developments in another province from the spies of the British.

These are the main reasons for Nepal's defeat in the Nepal-British war. There are several other reasons as well. A separate essay is necessary to discuss them thoroughly.

The present essay intends to discuss the fifth reason in detail.

A letter written by Chautariaya Bam Shah, administrator of Garh and Kumaun, and his colleagues to the government of Nepal is interesting in this context. The letter has never been published before, hence the full text is given below (in translation) :-

"We had already submitted a report from the place where the dead body of (Chautariya Hastadal Shah, who was killed in the battle of Gannath on Baisakh 13, 1872 Samvat) was cremated. We then transported supplies and ammunitions across the (Maha) Kali river on four elephants and 600 porters. Some supplies are still being transported.

Hearsey was captured. When he was defeated in the battle, Gardner reported to the Governor-General (Lord Hastings) that he was being besieged by 24,000 Gorkhalis. Previously, when fighting started, they had 22,000 or 23,000 troops in all at different places. When that report was received, they assembled 30,000 or 32,000 troops equipped with flintlocks. The figure includes 14,000 or 15,000 in Kali-Kumaun, as well as some in Pali and Almora. At Pilibhit, in the Tarai region of Doti, 5,000 or 6,000 troops have been stationed at important points. However, he is talking about stopping the fighting everywhere, even on my side. I have deputed Sardar Jasmardan Thapa and subedar Jayakrishna Thapa to Almora to study the situation and submit a report.

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"Colonel Gardner has sent the following message:

"On the western front, you have lost Suryagarhi. Captain Bhakti Thapa, Subedar Hridaya Simha Thapa, and one other Subedar were killed in the battle. Kaji Ajambar Pantha was wounded in the battle of Jythak-Gadhi and was captured, while Captain Balabhadra Kanwar was killed. Many men were killed on both sides. 700 (Gorkhali) troops went over to Ochterlony. There is an acute scarcity of food at the places where the Budha Kaji (Amara Simha Thapa) and Kaji Ranjor Thapa (Amara Simha Thapa's son) are stationed. The siege is heavy."

"We had an exchange of communications twice, once by post and once by courier. After a reply is received, we shall procure supplies and ammunition, as well as regular troops, from there."

"The son of Mahesh Baniya of Almora has brought the following information from Harihar: "I saw (Ajambar) Pantha Kaji brought there. I heard what the captains were talking among themselves. So far as the situation here is concerned, arms and supplies have already been procured. When I asked whether friendly relations will continue or not, they said, "Report the matter to the palace. If your King desires to maintain such relations with our masters, obtain his firm consent. We shall try our best to ensure that strong friendship is maintained between your King and the British. If this proposal is acceptable, the Governor-General is now at Azamgarh in Farrukhabad. Send him presents soon along with a very capable person in such a way as to convince him. Any delay will make the situation more difficult for you."

"On receiving reports about the enemy's pressure on Almora, Rudravira Shahi reached Dadeldhura travelling day and night. When we informed him about these arrangements, he stayed on in Dadeldhura. On hearing this, Gardner expressed desire to meet him. Because we were unable to take Gardner to Dadeldhura, we asked Rudravira Shahi to come here. Rudravira Shahi reached Baitadi on Baisakh Sudi 7 (Jestha 4, 1872 Samvat).

"Gardner, who is accompanying us, is a colonel. He had first come here as commander when the fighting started. His brother has come as Governor, with authority to hold negotiations and administer the territory. Colonel Gardner, his brother, and 30 or 35 other generals, captains, and other military officers are staying at Khilapati Champavati to hold talks with us."

With greetings from Bam Shah, Chamu Bhandari, and Angad.

Baitadi, Tuesday, Baisakh Sudi 8, 1872 (Jestha 5, 1872 Samvat).

(The original document is in the possession of Ranji Tewari).

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(Notes: In 1869, Captain Hearsey, disguising himself as a mendicant, had infiltrated into Garh-Kumaun by eluding Nepali guards. He was captured by them and handed over to Chautariya Bam Shah, who was administrator of Garh-Kumaun at that time. Bam Shah had released him with the permission of the government of Nepal. (Aitihāsika-patra Sangraha, Pt. 1, pp. 104-10). On Chaitra 22, 1871 Samvat, Chautariya Bam Shah's brother Chautariya Hastadal Shah, defeated Captain Hearsey in Kali-Kumaun. Hearsey was wounded and became a prisoner of the Nepalis. (Badridatta Pande, Kumaunka Itihasa (A history of Kumaun), pp. 417-18).^a

The British used to distribute leaflets containing propaganda about the tyranny of the Nepalis and their own liberality in order to incite Nepali subjects. These leaflets were different according to conditions on the eastern and western fronts. The text refers to such a leaflet distributed by the British in Kumaun.

On Poush 2, 1872 Samvat, the British government issued the following leaflet in the name of the inhabitants of Kumaun:

"The British Government has long been receiving distressing reports about the tyranny and atrocities of the Gorkhals. It is acquainted with the situation that is prevalent under Gorkhali rule. So long as there was friendship between the Gorkhali government and the British government, and their relations were regulated by a treaty, it was the duty of the British government to maintain friendship with the Gorkhali government.

"For that reason, the British Government had no choice but remain a silent spectator to the reign of Kumaun under Gorkhali rule. However, the Gorkhals have now unjustly invaded British territory without any provocation. The British government has been compelled to fight against the Gorkhals to save its prestige and protect its rights. It gladly utilizes this opportunity to liberate the people of Kumaun from the hands of tyrants. The British government has, therefore, despatched troops to drive out Gorkhali troops and authority from Kumaun for ever. In this great task, the the people of Kumaun must help the British government by every possible means, and obey its orders peacefully. Under the benign and impartial rule of the British, the legitimate rights of the people of Kumaun, and their life and property, will be fully protected."

This leaflet was circulated widely. As a result, the Pathans whom the Gorkhals had recruited in their army defected to the British.

(A History of Kumaun, pp. 409-10).

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The leaflet maintains that the British government was compelled to fight against the Gorkhalis because they unjustly invaded British territory without any provocation. This is a blatant lie.

The British were eager to occupy territories in the Himalayan region for British settlements. However, they were hesitating to fight against the Nepalis because Napoleon's influence was growing in Europe and he was working against them. Napoleon was finally defeated in 1870 Vikrama. Only thereafter did the British start the war against Nepal.

(British Rule in India, pp. 928-32, and chapter captioned "Napoleon" in Glimpses of World History).

Bam Shah's letter shows how the British tried to undermine his morale with the report that Balabhadra Kunwar had been killed at the battle of Gythak-Garhia. However, Balabhadra Kunwar did not lose his life at that battle.

Balabhadra Kunwar had shown to the British at the battle of Nalapani that the Nepalis fought bravely. The British had to strive very hard to capture the small fort of Nalapani, Gillespie, who had earned fame at the Battle of Java, lost his life at Nalapani. Balabhadra Kunwar and his men fought to the last; they evacuated the fort only after the supply of drinking water had run out. The British forces had withdrawn in the battle of Gythak-Garhi, and Balabhadra Kunwar had not been killed there. In fact, he did not lose his life during the Nepal-British war. After the war, he went to Lahore, capital of the Punjab. King Ranjit Singh of the Punjab appointed him in his army.

During the Sikh-Afghan war of 1879 Samvat, the Nepalis had fought bravely on the side of the Sikhs. It was in this war that Balabhadra Kunwar was killed. Bhimsen Thapa had sent men to Lahore to collect information about this war. The Nepalis who had been appointed in the Punjabi army by Ranjit Singh sent a letter to Bhimsen Thapa, some excerpts from which are as follows:-

"Greetings from subedar Banamali Pantha, subedar Umed Singh Thakur, subedar Bhawani Singh Khatri, subedar Dal... and other Jamadars... The men whom you had sent to find whether Giridhari is alive or dead have come here."

"There was fighting at Naushera in Peshawar with Azim Khan on the third day of the month of Chaitra... Captain Balabhadra Kunwar, subedar Bam Singh Khadka, Jamadar Aiman Khawas, Jamadar Rup Singh Khadka, Jamadar Jivan Singh Tura, and 50 soldiers were killed on our side."

Lahore, Thursday, Magh Sudi 13.

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(The original document is in the possession of Ramji Tewari).

This shows that Balabhadra Kunwar was killed at Naushera in Peshawar on Chaitra 3, 1879 Samvat.

In his letter to the government of Nepal, Bam Shah said that he had crossed the Mahakali river and encamped in Baitadi, because there was no point in trying to fight the British in Kumaun, and also because the British too wanted to end the war.

Bam Shah was thus the first person to accept defeat in the Nepal-British war. He has not asked for reinforcements so that he might attack Kumaun. This shows that British propaganda had already undermined his morale.

But the blame does not lie on British propaganda alone.

Bhimsen Thapa's influence in the government of Nepal started increasing after he accompanied the Swami Maharaj, Rana Bahadur, back to Nepal toward the end of 1860 Samvat from Kashi, where they had gone in 1857 Samvat. Rana Bahadur Shah was assassinated in Baisakh 1863. He was succeeded by a minor, hence Bhimsen Thapa wielded considerable power. On the charge of being the accomplices of Sher Bahadur, Rana Bahadur Shah's assassin, Bhimsen Thapa removed many old bhardars from the scene. Many bhardars were exiled to distant areas on one pretext or another. Bhimsen Thapa was thus able to monopolize power. This policy of Bhimsen Thapa had hurt the feelings of Bam Shah, who belonged to the royal family, and was already advanced in years.

(Note: A document dating back to the time of Laxmipati Pande shows that Bam Shah was born in 1812 Samvat).

This may have been another reason why Bam Shah was not eager to continue fighting. He even appears to have toyed with the idea of defecting to the British if Bhimsen Thapa took strong action against him on the charge that he crossed the Mahakali river and went to Baitadi.

(Note: The British offered many allurements to persuade Bam Shah to defect to their side when they came to know that Bam Shah was dissatisfied with Bhimsen Thapa. However, Bam Shah, notwithstanding his dissatisfaction with the Thapa, had no desire to become rich by acting as a traitor to his country. (A History of Kumaun, p. 410, and Kumaun, p. 120).

There is no doubt that for some time Bam Shah was undecided about his future course of action, because his brother was killed in the war, he had received reports that Nepal had been defeated on the western front, and he was not happy with Bhimsen Thapa's policy.

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However, true to the teachings of Prithvi Narayan Shah, he remained a patriot to the last. Bhimsen Thapa's eyes too were opened after the war. That was why he did not take any strong action against Bam Shah).

Bam Shah's state of mind is well illustrated by the following account.

On Baisakh 17, 1872 Samvat, Bam Shah surrendered. Three days later, on Baisakh 20, 1872 Samvat he crossed the Kali river and left for Baatadi under the supervision of Colonel Gardner. A few days later, he reached Pithoragarh and met Gardner at Jhulaghata. He told Gardner: "I am feeling very apprehensive about the reaction I will get from Kathmandu on the question of my leaving Kumaun. My enemy, Amara Simha Thapa, will lay the entire blame on me for the evacuation of Malaun. The Khasas of Nepal (this was the derogatory term that Bam Shah used for the Thapas) will believe in what Amara Simha Thapa says, and put my life in danger. This, of course, is a far-off question, but I wonder how my decision to leave Kumaun will be received in Kumaun. If the matter is considered wisely, they will realize the justification of ending the war which had been started without any provocation, by relinquishing the territories situated across the Kali river. His Majesty has affection for me, but he is in the hands of my enemies. I shall not feel surprised, therefore, if the army is ordered to put me to death. For that reason I prefer to stay on in Kumaun until a reply is received from Nepal."

Colonel Gardner gave assurances to Bam Shah, and advised him in his personal capacity not to lose heart but to try to defeat the enemy. He also advised Bam Shah to cross the Kali river, occupy Doti, and become King of that region. Bam Shah summoned Kaji Chamu Bhandari, told him what Gardner had said, and sought his advice. Kaji Chamu Bhandari then advised Bam Shah to act according to the advice given by Colonel Gardner if the British Government would help him, since he was not on good terms with the minister of Nepal.

(Letter No. 32, enclosed with Lord Mara's letter of Jestha 21, 1872 Samvat).

Bam Shah intended to leave Jhulaghata, cross the Kali river, go to Betheri, and seek the advice of his brother, Rudravira Shah. In his letters of Jestha 8 and 10, 1872 Samvat, the Governor-General endorsed the proposal that Colonel Gardner had made with regard to Doti and agreed to render financial and military assistance to Bam Shah.

Subsequently, Edward Gardner, administrator of Kumaun, met Bam Shah, Chamu Bhandari, and Rudravira Shah twice. He met Bam Shah and Chamu Bhandari the first time, and Rudravira Shah alone the second time.

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When Edward Gardner raised the question of Doti, they said they would act according to his proposal only if they had no other alternative. They said so without much enthusiasm.

(Amara Simha Thapa, pp. 159-61. The western calendar dates have been converted into equivalent samvat dates).

Bam Shah had no information about the progress of the war in the western and eastern sectors. He was thus compelled to depend on information supplied by British agents. That was the reason why he crossed the Mahakali river and went to Baitadi. Such events may have taken place in other sectors also.

We may conclude that one important reason for Nepal's shattering defeat in the Nepal-British war was the inability of the officials of one province to know what was happening in other provinces and the adverse impact of the British propaganda on their morale.

Pagari-Salami Levy in Chitaur

Umanidhi Pantha had been granted authority to reclaim virgin forest lands in Chitaur, Belaun, Dasjhot, Gadikhar, and Maryadpur.

A sum of Rs 15 was collected as Pagari-salami from newly settled moujas. The rate was the same for existing moujas also.

Both the ijaradars who had been granted contracts for reclamation and settlement and the settlers were dissatisfied with this payment, which they considered too high.

On Jestha sudi 8, 1866 samvat, therefore, a royal order was issued revising the rates of the Pagari-salami levy for newly-settled moujas in these areas as follows:-

First year	...	Rs 6	on each mouja.
Second year	...	Rs 8	"
Third year	...	Rs 12	"
Fourth year	...	Rs 15	"

Regmi Research Collection,
vol. 40, p. 45.

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Prices of Essential Commodities
A.D. 1852 and 1900

Prices of a number of essential commodities stipulated under contract for supply to the royal household in A.D. 1852 had been given in Regmi Research Series, Year 8, No. 1, January 1, 1976, p. 19.

Similar figures are now available for A.D. 1900 also.

A comparative table of the two sets of figures is given below:-

<u>Description</u>	<u>Quantity per rupee</u>	
	<u>1852</u>	<u>1900</u>
<u>Masino</u> rice	22 mana	9¼ mana.
<u>Marsi</u> rice	30 mana	11¼ mana.
<u>Tauli</u> rice	32 mana	13¼ mana.
<u>Mas</u> pulse (husked)	30 mana	12¼ mana.
<u>Mugi</u> pulse	12 mana	11 mana.
Salt:	10 mana	-
Indian	-	5¼ mana.
Tibetan	-	5½ mana.
Ghee	1 dharni	Rs 2 and 11 annas per dharni.
Tumeric powder	28 mana	15½ annas per pathi.

(A.D. 1901 figures obtained from: "Ijara Grant to Ganesh Das Ratna Das for supply of Commodities". Marga Badi 11, 1957 (November 1900). Regmi Research Collection, Vol. 70, pp. 630-46).
