INDONESIAN CULTURAL POLICY IN THE REFORM ERA

Tod Jones

The focus of research about the relationship between the state and culture in Suharto-era Indonesia depends on the researcher's field of research. Political scientists who studied the New Order tended to use culture as an explanatory device for political behavior without considering the state's influence over culture or culture's use as a tool of governance. Researchers investigating other fields, such as anthropology, the performing arts, and literature, demonstrated a strong understanding of the importance of the state-culture relationship. Within these fields, a small number of articles were particularly influential in shaping our understanding of Suharto-era cultural policy, providing a framework for later research. This research is important because it establishes a relationship between an arena of state activity (culture, narrowly defined by the state) and the assumptions and practices of Indonesians.

1 The author thanks Krishna Sen for her guidance, comments, and feedback, and Curtin University for the opportunity to undertake and develop this research.

2 Simon Philpott, Rethinking Indonesia: Postcolonial Theory, Authority, and Identity (London: Macmillan, 2000). Ken Young's comments on political research in Southeast Asia also apply to Indonesia; see Ken Young, "Political Science and Southeast Asia: The Neglect of Gender," in Why Gender Matters in Southeast Asian Politics, ed. Maila Stivens (Melbourne: Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1991).


5 In the next section I discuss the fields that fit into this definition and how they are organized.
By examining the objectives and intended outcomes of national policy details and programs, cultural-policy research can be used to draw conclusions about how the state imagines and understands Indonesians. Researchers have used these findings to interpret state policies relative to a number of research topics concerned with culture—such as state regulation of customary practices, literature, the arts, popular culture, and the media, among others. The most influential articles on cultural policy are focused on the authoritarian, Suharto-era state, which raises the question of whether their approaches are still relevant in present-day Indonesia, with its freely elected parliament and significantly changed political system.

In this article, I take a narrow definition of cultural policy, addressing only those policies focused on activities that have been designated "cultural" by the Indonesian state, which I recognize as a heterogeneous institution with conflicting motivations and interests. I will examine how these policies were designed to influence the behavior of Indonesians. It will be necessary to consider broader social changes, in particular those caused by state policies, if they alter the context of cultural activities and trends (for instance, one might consider the way political decentralization has influenced individuals' inclination to participate in local rituals). Cultural-policy research therefore cannot only focus on policy-making, but should track the relationships among narrowly defined cultural policies established by the state, the practices of practitioners and audiences, the ambitions of policy makers to influence characteristics and behaviors, and the ways in which these policies have changed Indonesian "cultures," broadly defined as ways of life.

The purpose of this article is primarily to assess how cultural policy in Indonesia has changed since the resignation of Suharto (1998), and the degree to which an influential body of research on New Order era cultural policy is still relevant today. The first section addresses research that has analyzed the cultural-policy goals of the New Order state. It then focuses on three influential, widely referenced articles, published over a fifteen-year period by Greg Acciaioli, Keith Foulcher, and Philip Yampolsky, which capture perspectives from both anthropology (Acciaioli) and arts researchers (Foulcher), and provide accounts of the thrust and detail of policy. The first aim of this discussion is to link Suharto-era cultural-policy research to the broader

---


8 Yampolsky is an ethnomusicologist and could fit into either category. However, his recording work on regional music would most likely place him in the "arts research" category.

field of cultural-policy research by examining the concept of “authoritarian” cultural policy. Connecting these ideas to broader cultural-policy approaches both provides a basis for hypothesizing about the characteristics of New Order cultural policy and assists in achieving the primary aim of this paper—to examine how cultural policy in Indonesia has changed since the fall of Suharto.

My intention is to provide a broad assessment of cultural policy change by drawing on events of both national and regional importance across Indonesia as a starting point for cultural-policy analysis of the Reformasi (post-Suharto) period. West Java receives the most attention, as it was one of my bases during an extended stay in Indonesia in 2001. (The examples from West Java in each of the sections on non-national cultural policy indicate that diversity exists within jurisdictions as well as between them. I also conducted interviews and collected data during four subsequent visits between 2001 and 2009, including visits to Padang, Pekan Baru, Makassar, Lombok, Bali, and Yogyakarta. While it is impossible to be comprehensive with this kind of approach, it suits the national scope of this paper, and supports the creation of a hypothesis that will be tested by future research.

Indonesian Cultural Policy under Suharto: The View from Indonesian Studies

Before turning to the three articles that defined New Order cultural policy, it is important to clarify the classifications that divide culture into workable chunks in Indonesia. The key division is between tradisional culture, which encompasses indigenous cultural practices that are generally linked to indigenous ethnic groups, and moderen culture, which refers to contemporary cultural forms originating from Indonesia and overseas that bridge regions and, often, nations. Many commentators prefer to use the respective terms regional (or, in some cases, local) and national or Indonesian in order to avoid the value judgments that might be implied by “traditional”/“modern” designations. However, in Indonesia the term national has been used to refer to patriotic pieces rather than genres. Following Yampolsky, I use the term regional to refer to cultural practices and knowledge linked by history, language, or culture to a particular region, and, often, ethnicity, and I use the term pan- Indonesian to refer to contemporary culture that relies on the national language and is perceived to be shared by all Indonesians.

Late Dutch colonial governance was an important driver of the construction of regional cultures in Indonesia, and the colonial state’s designation of regional cultures became a spatial organizing principle that influenced the nation into the next century. Dutch administrators viewed their mission as guiding natural “organic” cultural processes towards their evolution and thus fostering the improvement of the indigenous populations. Indigenous Indonesians fared poorly within the cultural

---

11 It should be noted that ethnic culture that is not indigenous falls outside of this division, and is generally ignored in cultural policy. This has created difficulties in gaining cultural recognition for large migrant ethnic groups, in particular Indonesian-Chinese, who also had their culture suppressed by the state throughout the New Order era. See Charles Coppel, Studying Ethnic Chinese in Indonesia (Singapore: Singapore Society of Asian Studies, 2002).
12 Frances Gouda, Dutch Culture Overseas: Colonial Practice in the Netherland Indies, 1900–1942 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1995).
taxonomy that supported the continuation of Dutch rule. They were categorized as lacking the capacities for full participation in colonial society and were not granted the rights of full citizenship. In addition to legitimizing colonial rule, the pluralism of the cultural categories also supported the “divide and rule” tactics of the Dutch state in the face of the threat of unified opposition from either nationalist or Islamic groups. The New Order state, like the Dutch, also marginalized Islamic political parties and was highly suspicious of Islamic groups. John Pemberton’s research indicates that the New Order state drew on the constructed tradition of the Javanese courts in order to legitimize itself by presenting its authority as cultural, and that it used ritual to represent Javanese society as inherently stable and ordered. In this scheme, organized Islamic groups were consigned to a marginal position because they potentially threatened the existing order. Pemberton’s account of the changing use of practices deemed culturally Javanese demonstrates how state power has shaped and continues to shape Javanese tradition, ritual, and culture, during the colonial period, and then during the New Order period.

Pemberton’s analysis of Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature Park (Taman Mini Indonesia Indah) reinforces his argument about the New Order’s use of tradition. The New Order regime created Taman Mini as a state-sanctioned sacred representation of the nation, effacing both colonial pasts and violent New Order beginnings, and denying the authority of potential opposition movements, including those inspired by Islam. In the words of Shelley Errington, “Taman Mini is not a ‘model of’ Indonesia, ... but a ‘model for’ Indonesia,” which explains why this monument is so often mentioned by scholars who study the use of culture by the New Order regime. Researchers often highlight the hierarchies that Taman Mini constructs to separate and categorize ethnic cultures. Representations of each ethnic group’s culture become increasingly homogenous for those groups that reside at a distance from the “cultural center” of Java. Acciaioli argues:

[Taman Mini] constructs the generic Indonesian, and presents all the local variety of Indonesian cultures as regional variations, defined by administrative divisions in matters of detail, upon basic shared themes, the purported “local genius” or basic cultural substratum of Indoniessanness. What diversity is evident is generated centrally, permitted embroidery upon an homogenised broadcloth

---

dictated by government officials bent on constructing a generic type, whether of abode or costume, promulgating the message of sameness rather than difference.\footnote{Ibid., p. 39.}

The construction of regional cultures became the vehicle for New Order cultural pluralism and an important focus for New Order cultural policy.

While the New Order regime came to power in 1965, a number of years passed before commentators began to accurately perceive and articulate its characteristics and strategies for maintaining control.\footnote{Ken Ward, “Indonesia’s Modernisation: Ideology and Practice,” in Showcase State: The Illusion of Indonesia’s “Accelerated Modernisation,” ed. Rex Mortimer (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1973).} This was largely because, until the elections in 1972, the new military rulers were consolidating their hold on power and devising an approach to government that accorded with their political needs and ideological position.\footnote{David Bourchier, “Lineages of Organicist Political Thought in Indonesia” (PhD dissertation, Monash University, 1996); and Ward, “Indonesia’s Modernisation: Ideology and Practice.”} Following the fall of Sukarno and the state-sanctioned massacre of communists, regional practices in a number of locations stopped due to perceived connections between art forms, artists, and persecuted political parties. It was only in the early 1970s that these art forms returned, defended by bureaucratic or military backing. The state replaced the political parties as an important sponsor of the regional arts. Furthermore, the resources available for state intervention in culture increased markedly from the early 1970s due to substantial oil revenues and economic growth.\footnote{Bisri Effendi, “Reyog Ponorogo: Kesenian Rakyat Dan Sentuhan Kekuasaan,” Masyarakat Indonesia 2,24 (1998): 205-27; Barbara Hatley, “Cultural Expression,” in Indonesia’s New Order: The Dynamics of Socio-Cultural Change, ed. Hal Hill (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1994), pp. 216-66; Victoria M. Clara Van Groenendael, The Dalang Behind the Wayang (Foris: Dordrecht, 1985).} The first researchers to address the topic of New Order era cultural policy were anthropologists and researchers in the fields of regional arts, and their articles began to appear in the mid-1980s.\footnote{Acciaioli, “Culture as Art”; and Toby Alice Volkman, “Great Performances: Toraja Cultural Identity in the 1970s,” American Ethnologist 11,1 (1984).}

In contrast to regional artists, practitioners of pan-Indonesian culture who were not affiliated with opposition political parties experienced a brief period of popularity and intellectual freedom in Jakarta following the start of the New Order state in 1965. This group of intellectuals was characterized in the 1960s and 1970s by the term “universal humanism,” a term that arose through debates about and around the poet Chairil Anwar from the early 1950s.\footnote{Keith Foulcher, “Literature, Cultural Politics and the Indonesian Revolution,” in Text/Politics in Island Southeast Asia: Essays in Interpretation, ed. D. M. Roskies (Athens, OH: Ohio University Monographs in International Studies, Southeast Asia Series, 1993), pp. 221-56.} As political mobilization increased in the final years of the Sukarno regime in the early 1960s, universal humanism, understood in the 1960s as the assertion that “the autonomy of the individual artist, free from political involvement, was the precondition for genuine aesthetic achievement,”\footnote{Ibid., p. 246. The term’s meaning has altered over time. See also David Hill’s research on the universal humanists in the 1980s. David T. Hill, Who’s Left? Indonesian Literature in the Early 1980s, Working Paper No. 33 (Melbourne: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1984). An important document for this group was the *Manifes Kebudayaan* (*Manikbeu*), a statement issued by a group of academics and artists in opposition to the politics and orientation of the supporters of Sukarno and the communist-}
rallying point of anti-Sukarno artists. In the years following the New Order era massacre and incarceration of communists and their alleged allies, “universal humanist” artists became closely aligned with young artists associated with the student movement and with modernizing intellectuals. They occupied a dissident niche\(^{20}\) where their actions and critical stance was, for the most part, tolerated by the New Order state.

Formed as a loose collection of affiliates, rather than an organization, this group was at the vanguard of cultural production and debate in the mid-to-late 1960s, when many members of the Indonesian opposition were killed, jailed, or marginalized. However, this group proved to be an awkward partner for the New Order state due to its members’ commitment to freedom of expression. Their disavowal of mass politics, the apolitical position of many universal humanists, their preference for spiritually uplifting rather than political art, and their opposition to communism were features that would become entrenched in state-sanctioned approaches to culture. The universal humanists coalesced around the Ismail Marzuki Cultural Park (Taman Ismail Marzuki, TIM) that they helped create with the Governor of the Special Region of Jakarta, General Ali Sadikin, in 1968. As the New Order state consolidated its position of power, and imposed even stricter control following the Malari riots\(^{27}\) and large student demonstrations in 1977–78, independent and critical commentary was censored more strictly. TIM increasingly came under state control.\(^{28}\) Additionally, the views of the universal humanists (which were engrained in much of the arts establishment) were challenged by the development of alternative perspectives, such as the New Art Movement\(^{29}\) and contextual literature (sastra konteksuai).\(^{30}\)

Another change that began in the 1970s had implications for both pan-Indonesian artists and the New Order state. Declining attendance figures in the 1980s and 1990s forced TIM to open itself to commercial ventures such as a cinema complex and craft shops, and its management became increasingly oriented towards attracting private capital, signaling a decline in the popularity of the version of pan-Indonesian culture and arts in vogue since the mid-1970s.\(^{31}\) The marketplace increasingly became the


\(^{20}\) The term “dissident niche” is borrowed from Edward Aspinall, “Political Opposition and the Transition from Authoritarian Rule: The Case of Indonesia” (PhD dissertation, Australian National University, 2000).

\(^{27}\) Malari is an acronym for the Fifteenth of January Disaster (Malapetaka Lima belas Januari), which refers to riots in January 1974 sparked by the visit of the Prime Minister of Japan. Those involved were protesting corruption, high prices, and government support for foreign investment that competed with local businesses.


\(^{31}\) Hill, “The Two Leading Institutions: Taman Ismail Marzuki and *Horison.*”
provider of cultural goods for the majority of Indonesians in the 1980s and 1990s. The New Order’s success at expanding the economy was also connected to significant social change. Between 1990 and 2000 (which includes three years of a severe economic downturn), consumer expenditure increased by a factor of 7.6 (from 117,120 billion rupiah to 888,631 billion rupiah). The most noticeable and far-reaching change that resulted from this growth has been the spread of consumer culture, portrayed in the writings about the New Rich and in a small body of research that also studies the consumption patterns of the urban working class.

In Asia, the spread of consumer culture and the increasingly rapid movement of information associated with capitalist goods and services created some consternation among the national governments. The governments of Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, China, and Burma opposed the cultural changes and the related political and social messages allegedly promulgated by international capitalism with a discourse that praised so-called “Asian values,” which emphasized hard work, family values, respect for authority, social responsibility, discipline, and the citizens’ support of their leaders. In the name of preserving Asian values, governments consolidated their political power by stirring up populist opposition against the West, a convenient bogeyman, and its supposedly lax values, and they maintained their political control by restricting press freedom and human rights by labelling them “Western” and thereby defining them as incompatible with an Asian way of life.

The New Order regime employed a version of Asian values in its attempts to influence the habits of its populace. Adrian Vickers and Lyn Fisher, for instance, write:

All the elements of “Asian values” can be found in the way the New Order attempted to clarify and institutionalize “Indonesian values.” The ideals of family and authority were there, as was a construction of a Western “Other.”


An important feature of the Indonesian values discourse has been the political justification of a more authoritarian political system in response to criticisms from advocates of liberal-democratic models and associated individual rights. However, this “values” discourse was employed by the New Order state even more widely and pervasively as a form of control over cultural practices associated with the nation. The regime attempted to use the official state ideology of the Pancasila and associated programs to instill a model of conduct into the population through education and by influencing public debate. In this regard, David Birch’s comment about Asian values also applied to Indonesia:

What we need to understand is that new realities, new definitions and new structures are being determined by powerful forces within the Asian region, driven by powerful economic capital and, aligned to that, the developing cultural capital of what constitutes the public cultures of “Asianness.”

Indonesian values discourses, as noted by Bourchier, also had a “proactive aspect,” for they were used to help “create” Indonesian citizens. Before considering the influence of this state-supported narrative on Indonesian cultural policy, its characteristics need to be considered in more detail.

One of the first articles to focus on cultural policy was anthropologist Greg Acciaioli’s article on the influence of the state on the relationship between cultural practices and communities, captured in the title of his article “Culture as Art: From Practice to Spectacle in Indonesia.” In this work, Acciaioli laments the way that the Suharto-era state’s imposition of a “civic religion” changes the ritual function of the arts, transforming certain customs into “art” and reordering life in the communities where those customs were followed. Acciaioli identifies three elements of this process that relate to cultural policy. First, he identifies how rituals were transformed to fit with the state’s civic religion, including the application of moral standards that accorded with those of the dominant local religion (generally Islam or Christianity). Second, Acciaioli recognizes the level of power that officials must have been able to wield in order to dictate such changes to communities (also confirmed by

---

38 It should be noted that the “Indonesian values” discourse strengthened pre-existing discourses about Indonesian identity. Thus, this was not a new phenomenon so much as a reinforcement of a conservative understanding of Indonesian culture.


40 Bourchier, “Indonesianising Indonesia: Conservative Indigenism in an Age of Globalisation,” p. 207. Researchers have assessed how values discourses have been used in the construction of Indonesian citizens through Leigh’s and Parker’s research on education; through Ramage’s research on alternative readings of government discourses such as the Pancasila, including interpretations which are used to argue in favor of democratic reforms; and also through opposition to official discourse, such as opposition to the regime’s assertion that individual rights are not an important aspect of being Indonesian. See Bourchier, “Indonesianising Indonesia: Conservative Indigenism in an Age of Globalisation”; and Vickers and Fisher, “Asian Values in Indonesia?” See also Barbara Leigh, “Making the Indonesian State: The Role of School Texts,” RIMA 25,1 (1991): 17–43; Lynnette Parker, “The Creation of Indonesian Citizens in Balinese Primary Schools,” RIMA 26,1 (1992): 42–70; and Douglas E. Ramage, Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam, and the Ideology of Tolerance, Politics in Asia Series (London: Routledge, 1995).

41 Acciaioli, “Culture as Art.”

Widodo\textsuperscript{43} and Weintraub\textsuperscript{44}). Third, Acciaioli invokes Matthew Arnold in order to demonstrate that the Indonesian state conceived of itself as the "bringer of true Culture"\textsuperscript{45} rather than holding the more anthropological view of "culture" as constituted by different ways of life, a wider interpretation that would have made it possible for the state to encourage and nourish a variety of cultures, both customary and pan-Indonesian.

Keith Foulcher's "The Construction of an Indonesian National Culture: Patterns of Hegemony and Resistance"\textsuperscript{46} begins by echoing Acciaioli's points regarding the centrality of regional culture to Indonesia's cultural policy and the erosion of the ritual function of the arts. However, Foulcher's discussion of national culture is broader than Acciaioli's, as he establishes a framework to evaluate texts that engage with national culture. Foulcher identifies a key organizing principle of the New Order's approach to national culture: while "modern" cultural practices associated with technology and progress are required for "development," these practices are thought to bring about "negative side effects" in the form of lifestyle changes that have been characterized as foreign to Indonesia. To counteract these "side effects," the state vigorously constructed "Indonesian" values and traditions through a large investment in the promotion of the visual and decorative aspects of indigenous Indonesian cultures.

Foulcher identifies a second feature of cultural policy in Indonesia. He writes that:

... there has been an increasing tendency to align "Indonesia" with a redefined priyayi Java ... an eclectic combination of aspects of a kebatinan\textsuperscript{47} world view and the Dutch colonial mix of public morality and private self-interest, all elaborated against a backdrop of the arts, customs, and etiquette of the courts of Central Java.\textsuperscript{48}

Foulcher thus argues both that elements of Javanese culture have been predominantly used to represent "Indonesian" culture, and that this "Indonesian" culture is the product of the process of transformation identified by Acciaioli, rather than an offshoot of Javanese court culture or an expression of the cultural diversity of the Javanese.\textsuperscript{49}

Philip Yampolsky's article "Forces for Change in the Regional Performing Arts of Indonesia"\textsuperscript{50} differs from the two already discussed as it analyzes the history of

\textsuperscript{43} Widodo, "The Stages of the State."

\textsuperscript{44} Andrew N. Weintraub, "Contest-ing Culture: Sundanese Wayang Golek Purwa Competitions in New Order Indonesia," \textit{Asian Theatre Journal} 18,1 (2001).

\textsuperscript{45} Acciaioli, "Culture as Art," p. 161.

\textsuperscript{46} Foulcher, "The Construction of an Indonesian National Culture."

\textsuperscript{47} Kebatinan is Javanese for "spiritualism."


\textsuperscript{49} In addition to being an important organizing principle of New Order cultural policy, Foulcher argues that attempts to mitigate the "negative side effects" of development also underlay the promotion of nationalist symbols and gestures (such as the promotion of national heroes and state control of the national language). Clarke E. Cunningham, "Celebrating a Toba Batak National Hero: An Indonesian Rite of Identity," in Changing Lines, Changing Rites: Ritual and Social Dynamics in Philippine and Indonesian Uplands, ed. Susan D. Russell and Clarke E. Cunningham (Ann Arbor, MI: Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, University of Michigan, 1989); Janet Hoskins, "The Headhunter as Hero: Local Traditions and Their Reinterpretation in National History," \textit{American Ethnologist} 14,4 (1987).

\textsuperscript{50} Yampolsky, "Forces for Change."
Indonesian cultural policy with a focus on the New Order era. He begins with a discussion of section thirty-two of the Indonesian constitution, which stipulates that “The government shall advance the national culture of Indonesia,” and analyzes the confusion surrounding the government’s definitions of national culture (as both hierarchical and plural) and the role of the state with regards to regional culture and what is referred to as “national” culture (kebudayaan bangsa). Yampolsky also discusses the official Clarification of section thirty-two, which reads:

The culture of the nation is culture that arises as the product of the thought and character of the entire people of Indonesia. Old and authentic culture is found in high cultural achievements [lit.: peaks of culture] in regions throughout Indonesia [and is] considered the culture of the nation. Cultural effort must be directed to the advancement of civilization, cultivation, and unification, and should not reject new materials from foreign culture that can develop and enrich the culture of the [Indonesian] people and raise the level of humanity of the Indonesian people.

Yampolsky, in particular, draws attention to the problems that result from designating “peaks of culture” and establishing contrasts between “old and authentic” cultures and new or hybrid cultural forms. Section thirty-two therefore provides the state with the obligation to “advance” a national culture and offers a confused definition of what constitutes that “national culture,” clarified only by a reference to the “high cultural achievements in regions throughout Indonesia.” After briefly discussing the cultural policies of the Indonesian state between 1945 and 1965, Yampolsky focuses on the New Order period, a time when oil revenues made a systematic set of cultural programs possible.

Yampolsky also provides a more detailed summary of the programs sponsored by the state’s cultural apparatus, the Directorate of Culture. He describes the “thrust” of the directorate’s activities as threefold. First, the directorate attempted to control the political content of artists’ public performances through concentrating on incorporating government messages into speeches and song lyrics, and mandating the proper use of the Indonesian language. Second, the directorate sought to control moral content, to prevent any insult to the five official religions of Indonesia and proscribe any association with or portrayal of activities considered immoral (for instance, drunkenness and sexual license, which were associated with particular regional forms). Third, the directorate’s activities have attempted to “upgrade artistic quality.” Based on an assumption that regional arts are “too rough, too crude: not respectable,” officials have incorporated “urban” standards (for staging, production values, programming, instruments, and costumes, to name a few aspects). Yampolsky identifies the festivals, competitions, and commissions sponsored by the directorate as its primary tools for influencing national culture.

While my focus has been on how these articles have characterized cultural policy, Yampolsky and Acciaioli draw attention to the introduction of mass-produced cultural products (in particular, cassettes and television) and tourism, and their transformative influences on regional culture. The Directorate of Culture did begin to address emerging popular forms and mass culture in the 1990s, but only in a very limited way, through research rather than policy intervention. Tod Jones, “Indonesian Cultural Policy, 1950–2003: Culture, Institutions, Government” (PhD dissertation, Curtin University of Technology, 2006).
The New Order state's cultural policies were put into effect by a substantial nationwide bureaucracy. At the end of Repelita VI in 1998, 74,722 people were employed full-time under the supervision of the Directorate of Culture across Indonesia, and many more were employed for specific tasks.\textsuperscript{53} There were sizable offices reporting to Jakarta in every province, city, and regency. A Penilik Budaya, or Cultural Officer, was designated to every subdistrict (kecamatan) in Indonesia and assigned a centrally determined set of tasks, reporting to a line office at the regency or city level.\textsuperscript{54} Independently of the line offices, a number of cultural institutions located in various provinces were organized so that their supervisors reported directly to the national office in Jakarta. These included the twenty-four Cultural Parks, eleven Historical and Traditional Values Research Bureaus, nine Preservation of Historical Remains and Archaeology Reserves, ten Archaeology Bureaus, six specialized museums, twenty-five provincial museums, and the Borobudur Research and Conservation Bureau. Centrally defined programs were being run across Indonesia by a large, centralized organization, leading cultural observer Jennifer Lindsay to write that, "By 1998, state control of cultural activity in Indonesia was so thorough that in retrospect it is difficult to pinpoint its incremental build-up over thirty-two years."\textsuperscript{55}

In the 1990s, the regime's cultural policy still privileged a highly regulated model for guiding and fostering "national culture," despite the importance of the market as the provider of cultural goods. The government bureaucrats in charge of promulgating culture competed with entrepreneurs engaged in the market, who were also intent on providing Indonesians with entertainment, and this competition between the state and the market significantly changed how the majority of Indonesians gained access to culture and the choices available for them. In the 1990s, it became increasingly difficult for the government to regulate the media, for instance, because of the proliferation of different media outlets and technologies, providers, and means of production and distribution.\textsuperscript{56} Artists and observers also became more critical of the directorate's policies and positions during this period, as evidenced by the widespread criticism of Director General Sedyawati's support of the decision to ban Ratna Sarumpaet's play Marsinah, which portrays the story of a female labor activist who was killed by the military in 1993.\textsuperscript{57}

The state responded to the challenges posed by the market in two ways in its cultural policies. First, it shifted its emphasis from the positive aspects of developing a national culture and began to focus, instead, on threats posed by negative outside

None of the articles discusses the context created by the annihilation of left-leaning political parties and affiliated artists in the mid-1960s, acts of suppression that created the conditions for the high level of state intervention that followed, although all of these authors and many of their readers would be well aware of these events. Keith Foulcher, \textit{Social Commitment in Literature and the Arts: The Indonesian Institute of Peoples' Culture, 1950-1965} (Melbourne: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1986); Hermawan Sulistyow, \textit{Pulu Arit Di Ladang Tebu} (Jakarta: Kepustakaan Gramedia Populer, 2000).


\textsuperscript{54} See \textit{Keputusan Kementerian Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan 0304/01/1984}.


\textsuperscript{56} Krishna Sen and David T. Hill, \textit{Media, Culture, and Politics in Indonesia} (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2000).

influences that would weaken Indonesian culture unless efforts were made to protect
the nation’s cultural values and heritage. Second, some attempts were made to adapt
cultural policy to the changing situation. Contemporary culture became a topic of
research in Indonesia in the 1990s, although the amount of study focused on
contemporary arts was still dwarfed by the attention given to indigenous cultural
forms. Additionally, the Directorate of Culture began to organize a triennial
Indonesian Arts Festival (beginning in 1995).

There are no connections to the field of cultural policy in these articles written in
the 1990s, largely because most of them precede the turn to a new focus on state policy
in cultural studies. Without a broader field of reference, the reader can grasp the
differences that have distinguished the cultural policies of Indonesia from those of
Western nations, but she gains little sense of the influence of international trends in
governance on Indonesian policies. Tony Bennett’s research provides a method of
tracing these links through his application of Michel Foucault’s theory of
governmentality. Bennett locates the origins of contemporary cultural policy in the
beginnings of liberal rule, when liberal ideas were translated into policies and
programs, informed by the emerging natural and historical sciences. He writes:

In the nineteenth century ... the most ardent advocates of public museums, free
libraries, and the like typically spoke of them in connection with courts, prisons,
poorhouses and, more mundanely, the provision of public sanitation and fresh
water.60

Liberalism’s focus on the freedom of its subjects and the growing use of the new fields
of demographics and economics shaped the task of government. Now government was
understood to be responsible for regulating naturally occurring processes in society
through its measurement of populations, while, at the same time, adjusting policies to
vary these rates to accord with state-sanctioned norms.61 Regarding liberal
government, Foucault stated:

The setting in place of ... mechanisms or modes of state intervention whose
function is to assure the security of those natural phenomena, economic
processes, and the intrinsic processes of population: this is what becomes the
basic objective of governmental rationality. Hence liberty is registered not only as
the right of individuals legitimately to oppose the power, the abuses, and
usurpations of the sovereign, but also now as an indispensable element of
governmental rationality itself.62

Culture was part of the liberal mode of governance—a way of shaping conduct that
was appropriate for a government that was committed in principle to securing the

59 I explore this topic in more detail through analysis of Indonesian cultural policy across the twentieth
(2007).
61 Michel Foucault, “Governmentality,” in The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, ed. Graham
62 Foucault on April 5, 1978, quoted in Colin Gordon, “Governmental Rationality: An Introduction,” in The
Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality.
freedom of its subjects from state control, while also guiding them to well-being and prosperity. The application of liberal methods of governance in colonial nations differed considerably from their application in Europe. Indigenous colonial subjects were not thought to be in a fit condition to handle the rights of citizenship. The liberal scholar John Stuart Mill wrote in relation to the continuation of slavery that: “This mode of government is as legitimate as any other, if it is the one which in the existing state of civilization of the subject people most facilitates their transition to a higher stage of improvement.”

When Suharto and his allies began searching for a doctrine that would justify their continued rule, they found it in the defense and support of economic development, a concept that was pivotal in New Order cultural policy. In Indonesia, the term “development” (pembangunan) is understood to emphasize economic and physical development rather than the potentially dynamic project of nation building. The Indonesian government has employed its pro-development doctrine to depoliticize the allocation of state resources and invest more authority in the state, identified as the knower and arbiter of its subjects, although, as Tania Li observes, such claims are often and easily disturbed. Both Heryanto and Jonathan Rigg and his coauthors stress the particularities of pembangunan in Indonesia and show that the state discourse concerned with development has been assembled from both national and international semantic and political histories and had a special salience for the New Order regime. An indication of the importance of pembangunan was a declaration by the 1983 parliament that gave Suharto the title “Father of Pembangunan” (Bapak Pembangunan). Both Simon Philpott and Li identify development as a form of governmentalization of the state that was particularly important under Suharto. Pembangunan was connected to cultural policy both through alliances formed around the beginning of the New Order state, but also through the work of Ali Moertopo, an important strategist in the early years of the New Order who was highly influential in the Department of Education and Culture.

Since 1945, numerous development programs have been implemented in postcolonial countries, often using aid money from Western states, with the goal of improving the practices and welfare of postcolonial subjects. Barry Hindess connects this “improving” function to the features of liberal colonial administration. Much like

---

65 Li, “Compromising Power: Development, Culture, and Rule in Indonesia.”
67 Li, “Compromising Power: Development, Culture, and Rule in Indonesia”; and Philpott, Rethinking Indonesia.
the colonial subject, the subject of a development policy or program requires capacity building before he or she can achieve the goal of autonomous action. Hindess writes:

The aims of the [liberal] project have barely changed, but the end of empire has transformed the conditions in which it can be pursued ... the liberal project is now pursued by significant minorities in non-Western states, many of whom have adopted some version of the earlier liberal view of the people among whom they live, and also, more remotely, by Western states themselves working through a different range of indirect means.70

While I accept the central thrust of Hindess’s argument about the continuities that link imperial rule and development projects, 71 I would be more cautious about characterizing development as a “liberal project” given its varying forms in different nation-states, many of which were decidedly non-liberal and loudly rejected liberalism. Instead, development itself can be understood as an authoritarian form of governance, which is compatible with the internationally accepted liberal framework, exercised over and within non-Western nations in a range of programs, including programs concerned with population control, child rearing, and education.72

The cultural policy approach taken in this article draws from Tony Bennett’s argument that culture’s connection with governance, and its role in modern governance, is the reason why culture and cultural institutions have proliferated. Bennett’s focus on the governmental, programmatic, and instrumental conditions that give rise to cultural practices clearly informed his definition of culture:

Culture is more cogently conceived, I want to suggest, when thought of as a historically specific set of institutionally embedded relations of government in which the forms of thought and conduct of extended populations are targeted for transformation—in part via the extension through the social body of the forms, techniques, and regimens of aesthetic and intellectual culture.73

Understanding Indonesian cultural policy as constructed through authoritarian governance assists in explaining the characteristics of that policy identified by Acciaioli, Foulcher, and Yampolsky, and the reasons for the New Order state’s huge investment in cultural projects. Unlike in Western nations during the same period, where artistic independence from government control was considered important, in

70 Ibid., p. 108.
71 The existence of a form of continuity is also suggested by the emergence in 1945 of the contemporary meaning of “development,” at a time when many colonies became independent nation-states. Syed Alatas, in his book The Myth of the Lazy Native, provides an interesting and relevant exploration of the historical links between colonial and developmental discourses. He writes regarding the representation of indigenous Southeast Asians: “The image of the indolent, dull, backward, and treacherous native has changed into that of a dependent native requiring assistance to climb the ladder of progress.” See Syed Hussein Alatas, The Myth of the Lazy Native (London: Frank Cass, 1977), p. 8.
72 Marc DuBois, “The Governance of the Third World: A Foucauldian Perspective on Power Relations in Development,” Alternatives 16,1 (1991): 1–30. The form of development practiced in Indonesia has been critiqued by economists (such as Amartya Sen), but was also admired before the Asian financial crisis as a remarkable economic achievement with the prospect of strong future growth. See Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York, NY: Knopf, 1999); and Hal Hill, The Indonesian Economy since 1966: Southeast Asia’s Emerging Giant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
Indonesia there was little focus on cultural or artistic freedom as the ideal condition for high-quality outcomes in the creation of artworks and performances. Pan-Indonesian artists, who generally advocated this principle of independence due to links with Western forms and ideas, were not subject to the same level of intervention as regional artists were, but they did suffer from state censorship. The level of intervention into regional arts by government officials, and the characterization of some regional arts as “too crude, too rough,” fits well with the cultural policy model that posits the involvement of an authoritarian government. The reasons for the centrality of “development” in New Order discourse, and its use and importance to the Suharto regime, are also clear, as well as its importance to defining a set of ideals that underlay cultural policy interventions. The way interventions by the state corrected both the behavior of audiences (altering their interactions with performances through staging, enforcing moral standards) and altered the aesthetics of performance is perhaps the most direct example of how cultural policy operated on the bodies of performers in an authoritarian milieu. The question explored in the rest of this article is whether the authoritarian cultural policy model is relevant for Indonesia in the post-Suharto, Reformasi era. Has cultural policy changed, and, if so, what are the drivers of change?

Political Change in the Reform Era

Suharto’s successor, B. J. Habibie, had little choice but to institute reforms, given the demands from numerous groups, popular support of Reformasi, and his need to prove his democratic credentials. However, his reformist initiatives were mitigated by his close relationship with members of the Suharto-era elite. The two presidents who followed Habibie did not implement wide-ranging reforms. Following the 1999 elections, Abdurrahman Wahid became president despite his National Development Party having won only 11 percent of the seats in parliament. This low level of support and Wahid’s idiosyncratic leadership style caused widening divisions within his cabinet and in parliament, prevented pursuit of any extensive reforms, and led to the premature end of his government. Unlike Habibie and Megawati, Wahid attempted a number of cultural initiatives, perhaps because of his background as a serious intellectual with longstanding connections to the artistic and literary community. Two key Wahid initiatives were his pronouncements on ancestral religions, which helped relax restrictions around related cultural practices, and his decree legalizing communism, which led to a conservative backlash that precipitated his ouster from the presidency. Megawati followed a conservative political agenda from the time of her inauguration in 2001. Following widespread celebration, Megawati disappointed reform-minded supporters and observers through her lack of leadership, particularly


Initial assessments of the Reformasi era classified it a “transitional period,” a time when Indonesia was gaining the features of a liberal democratic polity.\footnote{Arief Budiman, “The 1998 Crisis: Change and Continuity in Indonesia,” in Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia, ed. Arief Budiman, Barbara Hatley, and Damien Kingsbury (Melbourne: Monash Asia Institute, 1999); and Gerry van Klinken, “How a Democratic Deal Might Be Struck,” in Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia.} Indeed, Indonesia did develop some of these attributes, including free and fair elections and a legislature that is now central to law making. However, the post-Suharto political and electoral reforms tended to entrench the power of the legislature and political parties without ensuring that the elected politicians were held clearly and directly accountable to voters.\footnote{Greg Fealy, “Parties and Parliament: Serving Whose Interests?” in Indonesia Today: The Challenges of History.} Richard Robison and Vedi Hadiz argue that the political-business groupings (oligarchies) of the New Order regime have adjusted to take advantage of the new political climate and institutions, limiting the possibilities of political and economic reform.\footnote{Richard Robison and Vedi R. Hadiz, Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets (London: Routledge Curzon, 2004).} Moderate observers, like Harold Crouch, have reached similar conclusions regarding the limited extent of reform. Crouch writes that “the state is weak because it itself is made up of powerful competing vested interests. The state has been penetrated by interests that are opposed to reform.”\footnote{Crouch, “Political Update 2002,” p. 33.} Although there have been more positive signs of reform initiatives under Yudhoyono than under his predecessors,\footnote{Van Klinken, “Indonesian Politics in 2008.”} the process has been slow. The picture that emerges from political analysis is of a country where the groups most committed to democratic reform have struggled to exert influence over political processes, and far-reaching democratic change has been resisted. Institutional change did happen, but it was initiated within divided political institutions that were responsive to groups and interests that favored the status quo.
Immediate Impact of Reformasi: Winding Back State Control of the Arts

An immediate impact of Reformasi was a widespread demand for freedom of expression that was quickly manifest in the candid reporting of the crisis in the media and among contemporary urban artists. The early manifestations of Reformasi need to be distinguished from later changes that emanated from the bureaucracy and the Reform-era regimes. The immediate changes were generated through popular pressure for reform, combined with demands from media organizations and their audiences for a more critical media, and they were carried out without the involvement of the state. Contemporary urban artists working mainly in pan-Indonesian forms were among those who were most involved in Reformasi. They quickly began to incorporate Reformasi themes in their works and became increasingly critical of social and political events. Another effect of the reformist tendencies amongst pan-Indonesian artists was the almost immediate rejection of the state’s licensing protocol for arts events in many urban areas.

In the cities, the licensing regime ended quickly after the fall of Suharto, as the organizations and individuals who held arts events stopped asking for permits, and the police no longer enforced the requirements. The end of the licensing regime has facilitated the emergence of small arts institutions and performance venues throughout Indonesia. One such venue is Rumah Nusantara, in Bandung, West Java. A group of local artists headed by Aat Soeratin, a well-known local actor from television and theater, began Rumah Nusantara at the end of 1998. Rumah Nusantara is based in a house on the outskirts of Bandung that has been transformed into a performance space, shop, and cafeteria. The house has been provided to the organization rent free and, instead of charging for tickets to events, Rumah Nusantara staff collect donations from audiences at the end of a performance. Performers usually donate their time and are friends of members of the organizing committee. Although this arrangement makes programming difficult, Rumah Nusantara manages to stage regular performances that are reasonably well attended. An arts institution like Rumah Nusantara could not have survived the New Order era level of regulation with any public prominence. Similar arts organizations have sprung up in other cities as well. Notably, there is Kedai Kebun in Yogyakarta and Komunitas Salihara in Jakarta; the latter is a comparatively well-funded project that provides alternative performance space to artists and would have been difficult to run under the New Order censorship regime. The increased degree of flexibility in regulation of the arts has provided space for initially smaller, and now larger, arts organizations to grow.

The end of the licensing regime has only been partial. At the conclusion of 2003, artists outside of the large cities, such as in Cirebon (130 kilometers from Bandung, and also in West Java), were still seeking permits from the government and paying police and their local cultural office for licenses. This difference between the conditions faced...
by pan-Indonesian artists and those encountered by practitioners of regional arts reflects the uneven impact of Reformasi and the continuation of a division between how the two kinds of artists relate to the state. Pan-Indonesian artists have adopted Reformasi themes and become increasingly vocal in their criticism of social and political events, in addition to benefiting from the end of the licensing regime of arts events. There has not been an equivalent impact among regional artists who were less involved in the largely urban Reformasi movement.

Decentralization, and the Growth of Ethnic and Local Identity Politics

In contrast to the immediate, fragmentary changes initiated by citizens inspired by Reformasi, the changes brought about by institutions during the reform era have altered cultural policy more broadly and consistently across the archipelago. Following the fall of Suharto, observers of Indonesian politics noted a change in the level at which important political decisions were being made. For instance, Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy indicate the new political importance of sub-national levels through their call to focus on comprehending “what is happening at the local level,”90 and Gerry van Klinken has called for a “disaggregation” of the Indonesian state in Indonesian political analysis.91 Such changes have implications for cultural policy. The overlap among a number of new conditions—such as the splintering of political power, the mobilization of ethnic and local identities through cultural events and groups, and institutional changes to the state’s cultural apparatus due to decentralization—is complex. To understand how these conditions intersect, we must consider the social and political pressures at the national and sub-national levels.

The fall of Suharto was accelerated, in part, by increasing opposition from regional elites who had felt ignored and sidelined during the New Order era. Particularly prominent among the regions that demonstrated separatist and federalist aspirations were four provinces rich in natural resources: Aceh, Papua, Riau, and East Kalimantan.92 The East Timorese were engaged in fighting for independence. Habibie responded to these challenges with a piece of legislation that has shaped reform era politics. The Regional Autonomy (Otonomi Daerah) legislation was passed in August 1999, and was touted as a response to federalist and separatist ambitions and cited as proof of the president’s and parliament’s democratic credentials.93 The central element in the bill was the decentralization of various areas of government, including the offices of education, health, the environment, labor, public works, natural resource management, and tourism and culture, such that a large measure of authority devolved to the regency/municipal level, along with a much larger share of revenue and the power to raise revenue.94 Another important element is that appointments at

94 For a more detailed analysis, see: Aspinall and Fealy, “Introduction: Decentralisation, Democratisation, and the Rise of the Local”; Wihana Kirana Jaya, “Fiscal Decentralisation and Its Impacts on Local
all levels of government are now made by the concomitant legislatures, not the national executive, as was previously the case.

In the context of these changes, it is not surprising that local elites made use of ethnic identity to attract support and reinforce their authority. Van Klinken, in his exploration of the new and significantly altered political patterns emerging in Central and East Kalimantan, demonstrates the increasing importance of ethnic identity to local elites in local political configurations, particularly in contests over control of the state. Research from this time records a growing politicization of ethnic identity in a variety of locations across Indonesia, including Jakarta, and a renewed importance for ethnic organizations that can operate as political machines at a local level. In Bandung, for instance, the mayor has a close relationship with the Siliwangi Youth Force (Angkatan Muda Siliwangi, AMS). AMS was formed as part of the anti-communist crackdown, and its name refers to legendary Sundanese kings who ruled the Sunda kingdom in West Java. AMS was involved in protests opposing the reform of the city administration and in support of the construction of highly profitable subdivisions in a conservation zone. A related trend in Bandung has been the widespread demand that important local positions in the bureaucracy be given to "native sons" (putra daerah).

The reform era has also seen an explosion of new political units, with their associated legislatures and administrations. Between 1999 and 2007, the number of provinces has expanded from twenty-six to thirty-three, while the number of regencies/municipalities has expanded from 303 to 456, with over five thousand local government bodies (kecamatan) now operating in Indonesia. State recognition can have a substantial impact on the funding and promotion of regional culture, particularly when certain cultural practices are promoted as representative of the largest ethnic group in the area, and also the locality. Evidence is emerging of a revival of cultural...
practices by ethnic groups that had previously figured as minority factions in comparatively large administrative regions, but have become the majority groups since the administrative regions in which they reside have shrunk. There has also been a revival of royal houses (kraton) in a number of locations, which in West Kalimantan and Banten have connections to new administrative areas, while the phenomenon itself is closely linked to political decentralization and the increased importance of local support.\(^{101}\)

Accompanying the political mobilization of people along lines of ethnic and local identity is the growth of ethnic and local cultural practices. The links between political decentralization, local and national power structures, and regional practices in a number of locations across Indonesia is explored in the edited volume *The Revival of Tradition in Indonesian Politics.*\(^{102}\) Jamie Davidson and David Henley note that this “revival” encompasses both increased public interest in regional practices that have broad implications for local politics and government, as well as more narrowly artistic cultural revivals, which have little influence on politics, and that the revivals can be either secular or connected to religion.\(^{103}\) While the dynamics of this general “revival of tradition” are diverse, there are increasing opportunities for groups with regional knowledge to contest political decisions that have been usually made by the political elite; those challenging the elite increasingly use and refer to regional traditions and customs.\(^{104}\) The dark side of this revival is the use of tradition to justify excluding migrants from resources or targeting them for discrimination, including monetary payments,\(^{105}\) and, in some cases, deadly violence.\(^{106}\) Bali and West Sumatra have both strengthened versions of the traditional systems of local governance and weakened the desa system forced on them by the New Order regime.\(^{107}\) Greg Acciaioli has studied a similar case and describes a return to traditional legal systems among the To Lindu people in Central Sulawesi following the end of New Order centralism.\(^{108}\) In Bandung, local content, particularly Sundanese language, customs, and crafts, has been integrated into school curriculums.\(^{109}\)

The growth of ethnic identity politics has also produced a series of large conferences on local ethnic cultures, often sponsored by local government and international organizations. These conferences have drawn attention to the central

\(^{101}\) Gerry van Klinken, “Return of the Sultans: The Communitarian Turn in Local Politics,” in *The Revival of Tradition in Indonesian Politics.*

\(^{102}\) Henley and Davidson, eds., *The Revival of Tradition in Indonesian Politics.*

\(^{103}\) Jamie S. Davidson, “Culture and Rights in Ethnic Violence,” in *The Revival of Tradition in Indonesian Politics.*


\(^{105}\) Carol Warren, “Adat in Balinese Discourse and Practice,” in *The Revival of Tradition in Indonesian Politics.*

\(^{106}\) Henley and Davidson, eds., *The Revival of Tradition in Indonesian Politics.*


\(^{108}\) Greg Acciaioli, “Re-Empowering the Art of the Elders: The Revitalisation of Adat among the To Lindu People of Central Sulawesi and Contemporary Indonesia,” in *Beyond Jakarta: Regional Autonomy and Local Society in Indonesia.*

\(^{109}\) In 2001, the regencies in Bandung had drafted legislation to include in the curriculum for all primary-school-aged children opportunities to view and experience local arts. Interview with Dana Setia, Bandung, November 20, 2001.
state's neglect of particular indigenous ethnic cultures and have been often linked to conservative political positions that marginalize migrants, alienating them from both political and cultural resources.\textsuperscript{110} For instance, Ajip Rosidi's opening address at the International Conference of Sundanese Culture (Konferensi Internasional Budaya Sunda, KIBS) in Bandung, West Java, from August 22 to 25, 2001, stressed the lack of national government concern for Sundanese culture, a need for government action to address Sundanese cultural decline due to encroachment from consumer culture and the cultures of migrants to the region, and the importance of international linkages for both the recognition of, and research into, Sundanese culture.\textsuperscript{111} Sundanese are the largest ethnic group in West Java and are indigenous to the region. KIBS's primary sponsor was the Toyota Foundation, followed by the West Java Provincial Government. KIBS followed similar conferences that had been held in Central Kalimantan in December 1998, Riau in January–February 2000, Papua in May–June 2000, and Minahasa in August 2000,\textsuperscript{112} as well as a conference focused on Malay identity held in Batam in September 2001.\textsuperscript{113} These conferences are products of the links between regional culture, customary governance structures, and electoral politics, linkages that have been strengthened by political decentralization and the engagement of international organizations.

\textbf{Structural Change and Resistance in the Directorate of Culture}

A potential sea change in cultural policy was signaled in 1999 through a restructuring of the Directorate of Culture, so that culture is now linked to tourism rather than education. The move to tourism, although accomplished during the reform era, had its origins in the structure of Suharto's short-lived final cabinet. The national guiding policy document, \textit{Broad Outline of State Policy 1999–2004} (\textit{Garis Besar Haluan Negara 1999–2004}, \textit{GBHN}) provides insights into how this revision of the directorate's structure interacted with the authoritarian cultural policy model. The \textit{GBHN} indicates that New Order era discourses remain important for framing cultural policy, particularly through the following broad statement:

To cultivate and manage the national culture of the Indonesian nation, which has its origins in the noble cultural heritage of the nation, national culture that contains universal values including belief in the one true God has the goal of supporting the care of harmony in social life and developing the national civilization.\textsuperscript{114}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{110} Jones, "Indonesian Cultural Policy, 1950–2003."
\item \textsuperscript{111} Ajip Rosidi, "Mengapa Kibs?" paper presented at the Konferensi Internasional Budaya Sunda, Bandung, 2001.
\item \textsuperscript{112} Van Klinken, "Indonesia's New Ethnic Elite."
\item \textsuperscript{114} The \textit{GBHN} elsewhere confirms the continued centrality of national development by its statement that a critical attitude to cultural values needs to be maintained to develop values that are conducive to "facing opposition to national development in the future." Majelis Perwakilan Rakyat, \textit{Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara 1999–2004} (Jakarta: Sinar Grafika, 1999), p. 30.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
The high priority given to the promotion of tourism also brought about some change, in particular through configuring “traditional arts and culture” as a “vehicle” for the development of national tourism and its promotion overseas.\[^{115}\]

Internally, the directorate has undergone numerous restructurings. The key elements of the restructure were the division of the Directorate of Culture into two directorates—the Directorate of Cultural Values, Art, and Film (Directorat Nilai Budaya, Seni dan Film), and the Directorate of History and Archaeology (Direktorat Sejarah dan Purbakala)—and the inclusion of mass cultural forms, specifically film and video, within the purview of official cultural policy.\[^{116}\] Two broader changes also reconfigured the culture portfolio: the process of decentralization, and the related downgrading of the Directorate of Culture to a state ministry, which led to a reduction in funding and staff.\[^{117}\] In the cultural portfolio, decentralization meant that regional offices that had previously been part of the national bureaucracy, as well as a number of special purpose units, which included the Cultural Parks (Taman Budaya), provincial museums, and a range of research institutions, now came under the control of the lower levels of government.\[^{118}\] Bureaucrats within the Directorate of Culture have generally not responded well to these changes. Most share a commitment, thanks to their own studies and work history, to promoting culture as a tool of national development, and they conceive of culture’s role as central to maintaining national cohesion and identity. Cultural commentators Teuke Jacob and Rahman Arge, free from the burden of state employment, have accused the government of neglecting its duty to lead the nation in the promotion of Indonesian culture, a duty mandated by the 1945 Constitution, and of thereby “stunting” cultural growth. Despite sustained protests,\[^{119}\] presidential and cabinet support for the reconfiguration of the directorate and its mission could not be overcome.

More recently, the state has proposed legislation intended to establish intellectual property laws that seek to address and protect cultural traditions.\[^{120}\] Based on World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) initiatives to strengthen intellectual property regimes in developing countries and trade agreements, Indonesia’s 2002 copyright law protects individual creators in ways that are modeled on Western legislation. It also includes cultural-property provisions that award “folklore and people’s cultural products” to the state in perpetuity and “works whose creators are not known” to the state “on behalf of the interests of the creator” for fifty years. The

\[^{115}\] Ibid., p. 31.

\[^{116}\] The goals for film may not please either commercial or independent filmmakers. According to the GBHN, film is included to ensure “healthy” cinematic developments in order to “improve religious morality and national astuteness, develop positive public opinion, and increase economic value.” Ibid.


\[^{118}\] These were the Historical and Traditional Values Research Bureaus (11), the Preservation of Historical Remains and Archaeology Reserves (9), Archaeology Bureaus (10), special museums and the National Museum (6), the National Gallery, and the Borobudur Research and Conservation Bureau.

\[^{119}\] Protests were covered in the media and occurred during the Fifth Cultural Congress in West Sumatra in October 2003. The recommendation for an “autonomous” Department of Culture was even one of the formal recommendations of the conference. MAM, “Rekomendasi Kongres Kebudayaan Agak Emosional,” *Kompas*, October 24, 2003.

specific implementing legislation was not passed by the end of 2009,\textsuperscript{121} despite intentions to implement this legislation before 2010\textsuperscript{22} and the release of a draft law, which was expected to lay the groundwork for passage of the final law. The draft law escalates bureaucratic supervision of regional cultural practices through regulation of reproductions or adaptations of material arts, music, theater, dance, stories, and ritual ceremonies under the rationale of protecting artists' and communities' rights and increasing national prosperity through the creation of wealth. Improper attribution of artworks, offensive uses of these forms, or a failure to obtain the appropriate agreements and licenses would lead to civil or criminal penalties under the draft law. In their analysis of this legislation, Lorraine Aragon and James Leach argue that the division between individual rights and community rights ignores the priorities of practitioners, which they characterize as "locally autonomous access to, and culturally normative use of, their arts canon, not exclusive and legalized ownership."\textsuperscript{123}

The most recent cabinet reorganization, in October 2011, has seen the culture portfolio moved and linked once again to education in the Ministry of Education and Culture (Kementerian Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan), but a policy portfolio of the "creative economy" has been left with tourism in the Ministry of Tourism and the Creative Economy (Kementerian Pariwisata dan Ekonomi Kreatif). The two directorates of culture will be once again united, but with question marks over the relationships between different ministries and directorates. The division splits the regulation of mass cultural forms (including mass media, music) between the Department of Communication and Informatics (Kementarian Komunikasi dan Informatika, formerly the Ministry of Information), and the Ministry of Tourism and the Creative Economy, while including other areas, such as performing arts and fine arts, in the latter Ministry and the Ministry of Education and Culture. This division signals that the state has decided to pursue the creative economy agenda through trade and industry policies in specific areas of activity rather than through the Directorate of Culture and its view of culture as influencing development through shaping the behaviors and attitudes of Indonesians.\textsuperscript{124}

Underlying both the amalgamation of cultural development with tourism and the drafting of intellectual property legislation was a shift in the function of culture for the state; culture is no longer perceived as exclusively a tool of nation building, intended to foster national unity, but has shifted to a greater emphasis on generating employment and revenue from culture, via tourism, and now also a creative industries model. Such a change, although consistent with patterns in other countries and the push for creative industries, contradicts the New Order era focus on protecting culture from outside influences, although this perspective is still prominent in the bureaucracy. Yet the Yampolsky article, discussed above, suggests there is little contradiction between these sets of goals if they are viewed from a wider perspective.

\textsuperscript{121} Antara, "Ri Encourages Adoption of Cultural Heritage Convention," \textit{Antara}, August 27, 2009.


\textsuperscript{123} Aragon and Leach, "Arts and Owners," p. 620.

\textsuperscript{124} The key documents for this shift are found in a set of reports from 2008, published by the Department of Trade, outlining and advocating a creative industry model. See Kolompok Kerja Indonesia Design Power, "Pengembangan Ekonomi Kreatif Indonesia 2025" (Jakarta: Departemen Perdagangan, 2008); and Kelompok Kerja Indonesia Design Power, "Pengembangan Ekonomi Kreatif Indonesia 2025" (Jakarta: Departemen Perdagangan, 2008).
Addressing the state and tourism, Yampolsky argues that the processes are not opposed but instead reinforce each other, as they both redesign indigenous arts "for external consumption, whether by tourists ... or festival audiences." Viewed from this perspective, the directorate has not altered its character significantly, for it remains an intrusive and state-oriented entity that continues to justify its own activities by asserting that they strengthen the nation by fostering economic growth. The degree to which the creative economy agenda will involve the Directorate of Culture is unclear at this stage, as is the extent to which it will influence its traditional policy areas.

Cultural Policy in Decentralized Indonesia: The Characteristics of Regional Diversity

Decentralization, in addition to making the state more sympathetic to popular concerns about local majority ethnic cultures and the demands of ethnic cultural organizations, has also created opportunities for non-national levels of government to reassess policy content. Although the responsibility for most cultural policy activities was decentralized and relegated to the regency and city governments, some responsibility was shouldered by the provincial governments, including management of the cultural parks, museums, and the provincial-level cultural office, and the coordination of province-wide cultural activities. Decentralization created opportunities for provincial and regency level governments to restructure the cultural apparatus that came under their control and reassess their priorities. In West Java, four departments were brought together to form the Provincial Office for Culture and Tourism.

The West Java strategic planning process for 2001 to 2005 continued to reflect the "development" approach of the New Order period. "West Java regional culture" was defined as "the basic capital and the dominant factor in supporting the success of national development," and was therefore deemed in need of close supervision. The new Office of Tourism and Culture limited the scope of culture to the regional, indigenous culture and arts of West Java, excluding contemporary and popular culture and arts and the culture of migrants from other places inside and outside of Indonesia. A second planning document, put together by the United States-educated Head of the West Java Culture and Tourism Office, advocated the implementation of "good governance" through a strategy of "customer service." This document was couched in terms that reflected a neo-liberal policy approach that typically promotes individual development, primarily through staff development and partnerships with the private sector.

An event in West Java that incorporated a variety of (at times contradictory) approaches was the stakeholder policy-planning process held in November 2001. The

126 Indonesia has six levels of government administration: national, provincial, regency, city, local (kecamatan), and village. The village level is unimportant in many urban areas.
purpose of the Planning Dialogue for Culture and Tourism in West Java was to establish an agenda for culture and tourism and address the issues, concerns, and potential benefits of combining the two areas. While it criticized cultural policy for focusing too much on state institutions and not enough on public participation, the final report also drew from New Order era policy discourses in its focus on “preserving” the culture of the Sundanese (the largest ethnic group in West Java) and combating negative foreign influences.

129 Journalist Abdullah Mustappa observed that not many of the suggestions were new and some differed little from established practice. However, the access granted to a broad group of stakeholders and a broad set of cultural practitioners from across West Java constituted a substantial change from the nationally centralized process of cultural policy making that had prevailed during the New Order era. In West Java, new discourses about the role of the state and a greater inclusiveness in policy formation indicated that change is possible, while suggesting that this change would come about through a slow and incremental process.

The impacts of decentralization on cultural institutions were varied. While some Cultural Parks (Taman Budaya) were no longer conducting activities and were only used as practice venues in some regions (such as West Sumatra, North Sumatra, and South Sulawesi), other Cultural Parks had received increased funding from provincial administrations (for instance, in West Java, Surakarta, and East Java). Decisions on funding were dependent on a variety of factors, including the finances of each respective province, the importance of support of the arts as a method for generating and maintaining political support in an ethnic constituency, and the attitude of the political party and individuals in power towards the role of the arts in society. The evolution of the West Java Cultural Park (WJCP) exemplifies the incremental process of change that typically affected these institutions during Reformasi. The WJCP became more focused on holding performances and exhibitions and drawing in visitors from the local community and abroad. The increased activity has raised its standing in the local arts community, although it is still viewed as overly concerned with bureaucratic goals rather than contributions to the arts. Iyus Supriatna, the director of the WJCP, has noted a slight change in types of performances. While the WJCP was under the Directorate of Culture, the Cultural Park hosted many visiting troupes of performers from other areas, but the provincial government is now more focused on staging art from West Java. Supriatna also noted that, although the provincial government now approves the budget and yearly schedule of activities, at the end of 2001 the same “Technical Instructions” that had long been used were still in force, and the WJCP’s routines remain unchanged. In the strategic plans developed by the Provincial Office for Culture and Tourism, the WJCP was given the task of “developing culture and increasing the appreciation of society towards culture.”


131 “Cultural Parks” is the literal interpretation of Taman Budaya, and is preferred over “Cultural Centers,” as another set of institutions were specifically called “Cultural Centers” (Pusat Kebudayaan). The word Taman has nationalist connotations due to the prominence of the Taman Siswa schools established by Ki Hadjar Dewantara. The Cultural Parks comprised a group of buildings and one or more venues that often included a museum and research institutions.

developing art through collaboration, revitalizing and increasing public appreciation of art, and increasing the creativity and capacity of artists; second, nurturing art through protecting, researching, inventorying, reconstructing, and documenting art; and, third, using art for education, rituals, and religion, for helping the economy and increasing tourism, and to enrich the diversity of art. In summary, the role and programs of the WJCP have remained relatively unchanged although the Cultural Park has gained prominence as a performance venue.133

Decentralization brought positive changes to some regions. In the Bantul regency in the Special Region of Yogyakarta, a group of performers and admirers of the indigenous popular theater genre ketoprak established the Bantul Ketoprak Communication Forum (Forum Komunikasi Ketoprak Bantul, FKKB). The FKKB draws its membership from each of the areas within the regency and has broad-based support. It successfully lobbied the government for public funding to subsidize performances,134 and it regularly documents its use of those funds for the local legislature.135 The relationship between the FKKB and the regency reflects a liberal approach to cultural governance, such that a group of active cultural workers can lobby for public funding for mutually agreeable goals and then report outcomes to an elected assembly. This arrangement contrasts with structures prevalent during the New Order era, during which the vast majority of state-funded cultural activities were implemented by state institutions.

This does not mean that all cultural institutions have benefited from decentralization. In decentralized Indonesia, funding for cultural policy is reliant on the attitude of the regent.136 FKKB was fortunate because the Regent of Bantul strongly supported local culture, but members were concerned that future funding would shrink if the regent stepped down. In other regencies where Islamic political parties were in the majority, such as Depok and Indramayu (both in West Java), cultural policy funding was stopped altogether.137 Conservative Islamic politicians do not view culture as an appropriate medium for teaching the lessons of citizenship, instead preferring Islamic education. While there are increased opportunities to make claims for resources based on cultural rights, competition for funding is fierce, and many cultural workers I spoke to reported reductions in public monies for cultural activities. Hence decentralization has created a highly varied funding landscape, with

133 A seminar to discuss the “repositioning” of the WJCP following decentralization indicated that the arts community in West Java desired a change in operation. Many of the speakers voiced criticisms similar to those heard during the New Order era. The reform most frequently recommended called for loosening the “bureaucratic style” of the WJCP by increasing its flexibility, increasing its networks with other arts institutions and artists, and making strategic decisions to transform the WJCP into a “public possession.” Speakers suggested privatizing some of the WJCP’s operations; reducing the number of events to focus on large, popular performances; broadening the performance genres; and making the institution independent from the provincial government. See Soni Farid Maulana and Ahda Imran, “Sarasehan Reposisi Taman Budaya Jawa Barat: Fleksibilitas, Network, Gula Dan Semut,” Pikiran Rakyat, November 9, 2000.

134 Each region has its own committee and receives a designated portion of funding.

135 Ketoprak is expensive to produce due to the large scale of its productions (some involving hundreds of people) and its elaborate costumes. The FKKB organized two large ketoprak festivals in 2005, one of which was broadcast on local television and on a popular local radio show.

136 The regent (btipati) is the head of a regency (kabupaten) and holds a position equivalent to that of a mayor.

137 Bondan Nusantara, interview, Bantul, January 5, 2006.
opportunities to make cultural claims for resources increased in some regencies and provinces, and significantly diminished in others.

**The New Public Morality in Indonesia**

The growing debate over public morality, often linked to religious groups, has also influenced cultural policy. Religious groups in Indonesia have censured behavior throughout the twentieth century, and their actions, along with the actions of ethnic groups and of state, customary, and cultural organizations, have long been part of the milieu in which people have debated the relevant issues and shifted the boundaries of acceptable public performance (see, for instance, Harnish on performance in Lombok and Picard on Bali). While this configuration has never been uniform and the arts are more diverse in decentralized Indonesia than they were under the New Order, two changes do indicate a trend towards increased policing of public behavior by religious bodies. First, open elections have led to the return of Islamic political parties, the members of which have been particularly vocal regarding a perceived national decline in morality as state control has relaxed. Second, the reduced presence of the military has emboldened Islamic social groups, and members of these groups have intervened in the activities of other Indonesians, at times with violence, when they perceived that there has been an affront to Islamic teachings. Two events of national significance illustrate the current influence of public morality debates on cultural practices and their potential to influence cultural policy.

While concern over the interventions of Islamic groups, like the Islamic Defenders' Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) and Laskar Jihad, has an influence on cultural activities at the local level across Indonesia, the impact of these groups is most clearly demonstrated through the response to an artwork at the inaugural CP Biennale in April 2005. The exhibit of paintings, titled *Pinkswing Park*, by Agus Suwage and Davy Linggar, displayed at the Bank Mandiri Museum, was forced to close following public statements and an attack by FPI members. *Pinkswing Park* offered multiple depictions of model Isabel Yahya and soap opera star Anjasmara naked among trees, with white dots providing cover to protect the sensibilities of modest viewers. Following the actions of FPI and the reaction of public figures in the media, the CP Biennale's curator, Jim Supangkat, closed the Biennale permanently.

The second example is anti-pornography legislation that was proposed in 2002 and passed, after fierce debate and revision, in 2008. Originally designed to restrict the distributors of pornography and the media, the bill was expanded in 2005 to include curbs on “porno-action” (*porno-aksi*), which referred to “pornographic” or erotic dress

---

138 Harnish, “‘Digging’ and ‘Upgrading.’”
140 While it should be noted that Suharto made concessions to Islamic demands, particularly in the 1990s, he generally took a nationalist position to cultural exhibits and would not tolerate actions by Islamic groups without state approval.
or behavior in public. Under the draft bill as it stood in late 2005 and early 2006, public kissing, “erotic” dancing, and the display of any “sensual” part of the body were banned. There were exceptions for (indigenous) cultural performances, sports, and arts activities, but these were restricted to sports buildings and arts spaces, which required government permits. Early in 2006, the draft anti-pornography legislation sparked large protests across Indonesia, and debates raged in the media and parliament over the bill. While supporters focused on supposed moral decline and the welfare of children, opponents of the bill focused on its effects on women (who were held to be responsible for violence against women due to their clothing) and its effects on culture.

The cultural arguments mounted against the bill took two forms. First, opponents argued that the legislation imposed Saudi (or Wahabi) culture on Indonesians. Second, they asserted that the bill ignored and threatened Indonesia’s multiculturalism by attempting to homogenize local cultures. This argument was made by both politically liberal groups (generally in major cities) and by conservative cultural organizations around Indonesia. In Bali, a number of “Defenders of Tradition” (Penjaga Budaya) were appointed to prevent any outsiders from interfering with local ceremonies. The most telling and effective move against the bill was carried out in the provinces of Nusa Tenggara Timur, Bali, and North Sulawesi, where local authorities warned that the draft bill was unlikely to pass through the Peoples’ Regional Representative Council, the national office that represents regional interests. A watered-down version of the law, which still included a broad definition of pornography that addressed behavior in public performances and nudity, was passed in October 2008. The governor of Bali quickly stated that the law would not be applied in Bali, due to that island’s reliance on tourism and its strong cultural lobby.

Legislation shaped at the national level needs to be considered alongside the many laws passed at the regency and city levels that regulate individual behavior in ways that can be highly restrictive on local arts and cultural practices perceived as incompatible with Islamic laws. Public displays of affection, inappropriate dress, and the consumption of alcohol have been regulated in provinces such as Cianjur and Garut, West Java. In places where syariah law has been implemented, new legal guidelines for behavior have often been justified as both already engrained in local customs (adat) and as defining and taking precedence over those customs. Such a definition of adat has long been held by conservative Islamic groups that seek to resolve conflicts between their interpretation of Islam and adat practices in their own

---

142 Radical Islamic groups like FPI have also lobbied against groups that practice versions of Islam that they consider flawed, with some success. These protests have had an impact on the cultural practices of those groups. See van Klinken, “Indonesian Politics in 2008: The Ambiguities of Democratic Change.”


147 This is the case in Aceh and West Sumatra. See M. B. Hooker, Indonesian Syariah Defining a National School of Islamic Law (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008).
favor. In 2008, approximately 160 local religious regulations were made by local
government in at least 24 of Indonesia’s then 33 provinces. Bandung took a different
route with its religious programs, choosing instead to engage a variety of religions in a
civic program called “Bandung: Religious City” (Kota Agamis Bandung). Representatives from Islamic, Catholic, Buddhist, and Hindu organizations produced a
declaration that called for mutual tolerance and respect, and for the groups to strive
together to address social and environmental issues. However, a pluralistic approach
to religion is not necessarily in itself pluralistic for the broader community. The
“Religious City” program was invoked when the authorities chose to relocate
prostitutes from the Saritem entertainment district, to ban singer Dewi Persik from
Bandung, and to pressure local night clubs to close during Ramadan.

Cultural Policy in the Reform Era

Decentralization and democratic elections in Indonesia have not led to a
widespread, innovative, and inclusive cultural policy. The absence of a strong political
alliance that could drive far-reaching reform has severely limited the scope of policy
reform. In this climate, the authoritarian cultural policy model established during the
New Order remains relevant to Indonesia in the Reform era, although its influence has
substantially declined due to the fracturing of cultural policy. Its influence is still
strong in the national cultural bureaucracy, in national policy, and in particular regions
where there is strong continuity between the Suharto and post-Suharto eras in political
and policy approaches. However, the process of political decentralization and the
weakening of the central state have created opportunities for conservative and liberal-
minded opposition to contest this model. There are some similarities here to the early
years of the New Order era, during which a number of competing discourses about
culture and its uses vied for dominance, and regional arts were being revived through
associations with the state. In contemporary, decentralized Indonesia, however, state
support is now being provided through new units at the lower levels of government
associated with specific ethnicities, rather than through a strong central state. Since the
central state has reduced its control, there are more opportunities for non-elites to use
culture to influence political and civic decisions, and the approach of the previous,
Suharto-era government has not been as comprehensively rejected as was the case with
Sukarno-era cultural policy. The competing approaches to cultural policy are also
unlikely to be resolved in the same way they were in the 1960s, with the imposition of
the authoritarian cultural policy model by a strong central government.

A way to understand the current set of influences on the state’s cultural policy is to
examine the competing ways that culture is being used as a tool of governance. This

148 For an historical examination of these conflicts (although this study does not focus on a region with
strong syariah provisions), see Robert W. Hefner, “The Politics of Popular Art: Tayuban Dance and Culture

and Malaysian Affairs* 43,2 (2009): 53–103. It should be noted that conflict between cultural practices
(particularly popular and folk practices) and Islam have long been present in Indonesia, and what changes
is the ascendancy of different groups and attitudes in society and in relation to political power. For
instance, see Hefner, “The Politics of Popular Art: Tayuban Dance and Culture Change in East Java.”

article has demonstrated that broadly similar trends are occurring across Indonesia, and the examples from West Java indicate that strikingly different trends can exist in close proximity to each other, and sometimes in the same municipality. If one considers the trends and events of the Reform era, four different uses of culture can be identified in policy, although any conclusions drawn at this time are tentative and need to be borne out in further research due to the fractured and slow process of policy and institutional change in Indonesia.

First, arguments by certain Islamic groups in favor of stricter control over morality threaten to cause a closer regulation of cultural activities, and a related rejection of the importance of culture as a mechanism for altering the conduct of Indonesians, leading, in some cases, to a reduction of state funding for cultural activities, or a redefinition of cultural activities as a form of Islamic education. These groups advocate religious activities and education as a more appropriate tool than culture for the enlightenment and development of the nation. Second, liberal understandings of the role of culture continue to be evident in cultural policies (for both indigenous and contemporary culture) that utilize culture for progressive social change, and in the arguments for the creation of a tolerant multiculturalism and cultural activities. In this approach, the state’s role is to facilitate and protect contemporary and indigenous cultural practices that contribute to a tolerant and creative multicultural society. Third, conservative indigenous elements are making use of local ethnic sentiment for either their own political goals and/or to strengthen a conservative version of local indigenous culture. A conservative approach to regional culture also argues for state protection of multiculturalism, although those who advocate such an approach generally aim to protect particular indigenous practices linked to a local ethnic constituency. Finally, the authoritarian cultural policy model has survived and continues to focus on national economic development. Cultural policy continues to be justified as a tool of social and economic development and as a way to offset the effects of development. The consequences of the increasing emphasis on wealth generation again appear to threaten and affect regional artists most seriously. Their priorities receive little attention in the copyright legislation, and the state has allowed, or even encouraged, continued heavy-handed intervention in their activities.

Cultural policy in the Reformasi era is influenced by the ongoing presence of the authoritarian cultural policy model among a bureaucratic elite with close ties to cultural academics that privileges national culture and national development, and liberal and conservative groups’ advocacy of local cultural rights. In some locations, the existence of cultural policy is under threat, along with the legitimacy of cultural difference, with Islamic political groups rejecting the use of culture as a tool of governance altogether. In most localities, there is a trend towards more opportunities in cultural policy for tradition and locality to contest nation and modernity, from conservative and progressive positions. Cultural policy outcomes at the local level vary and protection of cultural diversity is far from enshrined; what the state has enshrined is a diversity of cultural policy.