
PAN-ISLAM AND RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM: THE CASE OF KARTOSUWIRYO AND NEGARA ISLAM INDONESIA

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Introduction¹

Guided by the theological understanding that the Koranic message was delivered to be heard by human beings of all lands and ethnicities, and conscious of the historical spread of Islam from the Iberian peninsula to China and Southeast Asia, Muslim leaders have often called for the Islamic *ummah* (community) to unite to revive an Islamic political order. By the turn of the twentieth century, the pan-Islamic ideal had begun to be seen as a viable solution to Europe's domination over Muslim lands, in the Middle East as well as in the Indian subcontinent. Yet, as the Ottoman caliphate was slowly losing its authority, anti-colonialism came to be interpreted in nationalist terms, with pan-Islam playing only an occasional role to rally support for independence movements on the international level. Historical trajectories clearly show that pan-Islam, as a political project aimed at the creation of a transnational Islamic state, had already been abandoned in the Middle East before the abrogation of the Caliphate in 1924. Nonetheless, it should not be forgotten that the debates and initiatives that followed the caliphate's collapse (often referred to as the "caliphate question"), and which were aimed at its revival, injected new life in pan-Islamic ideals, especially at the geographic peripheries of the Islamic world.

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This article begins with an assessment of the impact of such discussions (of both a pan-Islam movement and the caliphate collapse) on the Islamic anti-colonial movement in the Netherlands East Indies. Analyzing the politics of the Indies' Islamic party, Partai Sarekat Islam, and the writings of its prominent leader, S. M. Kartosuwiryo (1905–62), between 1928 and the 1950s, the following pages will address the question of how the pan-Islamic ideal interacted with nationalist aspirations. During the post-independence period, Kartosuwiryo distanced himself from the Indonesian Republic, establishing in 1949 the Islamic State of Indonesia (Negara Islam Indonesia, NII). The Darul Islam (DI) was formed by Kartosuwiryo in West Java in 1948, and in the early 1950s had expanded to Aceh, South Sulawesi, and South Kalimantan. As Sukarno shaped the unitary state of Indonesia in 1950–51, the DI became a political and military obstacle to the realization of such a project. The conflict between the Republican army and the Darul Islam continued until 1962, when Kartosuwiryo was arrested and executed as an enemy of the state, and 1965, when other regional leaders were arrested. The following pages examine Kartosuwiryo's approach to the threads connecting independence, the formation of a nation-state based on Islam, and the religious duty and desire to create an Islamic state unifying the whole Islamic *ummah* beyond national borders.²

Part 1: Java's Trans-Oceanic Connections in the Early Twentieth Century—Westernization and Islamization of the Anti-Colonial Movement

With the coming of the modern age, European mercantile expansion to Southeast Asia placed the Indonesian archipelago in a new position, whereby it received a steady flow of cultural inputs from Europe. Moreover, at the start of the nineteenth century, as the Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, VOC) went into bankruptcy and the Dutch government took control of its trading activities, the level of contact between Europe and Southeast Asia increased even further. Helped by a system of indirect rule, during the 1800s the Dutch colonial administration maintained as much distance as possible between "Europeans" and "Natives," but, after a hundred years of domination, the central government in The Hague called for a new assimilation, otherwise known as its "Ethical Policy." Aimed at uplifting the indigenous society, from 1901 until the end of colonial rule the Ethical Policy promoted education, tackled irrigation challenges, and reshaped emigration rules. A major outcome of the Ethical Policy was the dissemination of European history, politics, culture, and values among local elites through the expansion of Western-style schooling. Moreover, the Dutch *ethici* (advocates of the Ethical Policy) promoted the

² The political career of Kartosuwiryo and the formation of his Islamic state ideology have been investigated by the author of this article in Chiara Formichi, "Kartosuwiryo's Role in the Creation of the Islamic State of Indonesia (Negara Islam Indonesia), 1927–1949" (PhD dissertation, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 2009). Previous scholarly publications addressing the Darul Islam movement are B. J. Boland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982); Holk H. Dengel, *Darul-Islam: Kartosuwirjos Kampf Um Einen Islamischen Staat Indonesien* (Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden, 1986); Hiroko Horikoshi, "The Dar-ul-Islam Movement in West Java (1942–62): An Experience in the Historical Process," *Indonesia* 20 (October 1975): 59–86; Karl D. Jackson, *Traditional Authority and National Integration: Darul Islam in West Java* (Berkeley, CA, and London: University of California Press, 1980[1971]); C. A. O. Nieuwenhuijze, "The Darul Islam Movement in Western Java," *Pacific Affairs* 23,2 (1950): 169–83; and Cornelis Van Dijk, *Rebellion under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia* (Leiden: KITLV, 1981).

pursuit of higher education in the Netherlands (notably to Amsterdam and Leiden), further exposing this new indigenous intelligentsia to ideas of self-determination, nationalism, workers' unions, and students' organizations.³

At the same time as this European influence was growing, another connection had been developing, which placed Java and Sumatra within networks of Islamic authority, education, and political activism. Advances in seafaring greatly increased the flow of *Jawis* to the holy places of Islam. *Jawis*, the collective name used in the Middle East to describe Southeast Asian Muslims, had been undertaking the journey to the Arabian Peninsula for centuries, but in the first quarter of the twentieth century the number of *Jawi* pilgrims increased dramatically.⁴ It had been a long-established tradition that pilgrims would extend their stay in the region to meet other Muslims who came from different corners of the world, to exchange experiences and opinions, and to share their knowledge about religious matters. After centuries of Mecca's superiority as a center of learning—at the end of the 1800s, approximately 5,000 *Jawis* were based there⁵—Egypt slowly overtook Mecca as a favorite destination for Southeast Asian Muslims. If in 1912 there were only twelve *Jawis* in Cairo,⁶ in 1919 there were roughly fifty or sixty Indonesians, and by 1925 over two hundred Southeast Asian students were living in the Egyptian capital.⁷ Two factors played a crucial role in this shift of preference: first, the victory of Ibn Sa'ud, who, being supported by 'Abd al-Wahhab, was seen as opposed to the "acculturated" stream of Islam practiced in Asia;⁸ and, second, Muhammad 'Abduh (1849–1905) and Rashid Rida's (1865–1935) development of Islamic modernism attracted increasing numbers of students to al-Azhar University.⁹

While some sectors of the population in the Netherlands were inveighing against the capitalist system, and while other Europeans were engaged in anti-imperialist debates, Muslims in Mecca and Cairo discussed the issue of independence from "infidel" colonial rule and the possibility of establishing a transnational Islamic state. The ongoing anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist debates were not perceived as a threat by

³ R. Van Niel, *The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1960), chapter two, is still the most exhaustive treatment of the Ethical Policy and the formation of an indigenous intelligentsia in the early twentieth century. Specifically on *Ethici* and Islam, see Michael F. Laffan, *Islamic Nationhood and Colonial Indonesia: The Umma Below the Winds* (London: Routledge, 2003).

⁴ Michael Feener, "New Networks and New Knowledge: Migrations, Communications, and the Refiguration of the Muslim Community in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, in *The New Cambridge History of Islam*, vol. 6, ed. Robert Hefner (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 39–68.

⁵ Z. Dhofier, "The Intellectualisation of Islamic Studies in Indonesia," *Indonesia Circle* 58 (1992): 21.

⁶ Michael F. Laffan, "An Indonesian Community in Cairo: Continuity and Change in a Cosmopolitan Islamic Milieu," *Indonesia* 77 (April 2004): 7.

⁷ William R. Roff, "Indonesian and Malay Students in Cairo in the 1920s," *Indonesia* 9 (April 1970): 74.

⁸ The Emir Ibn Sa'ud began the reconquest of Hejaz in 1902 by occupying Riyadh and conquering the whole region of Nejed by 1906. In 1913, he invaded the region of Hasa, and in 1912 he invaded Jebel Sammar. In 1924, he managed to expel Sharif Hussein b. Ali from Mecca, and between 1925 and 1926 he triumphed in Medina and Asir. The new territories were unified in 1934 under the name "Saudi Arabia." Two years later, Ibn Sa'ud proclaimed himself King of Nejed and Hejaz.

⁹ See Azyumardi Azra, *The Origins of Islamic Reformism in Southeast Asia* (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai'i Press, 2004). Among several pieces published on this topic, M. C. Ricklefs's *Polarizing Javanese Society: Islamic and Other Visions (c. 1830–1930)* (Singapore: NUS, 2007), pp. 57–74, offers a valid overview of the dynamics and data involved in the Middle East–Java connection. The formation of a self-conscious religious intelligentsia in Java and Sumatra resulting from this network has been thoroughly examined in Laffan's *Islamic Nationhood*.

colonial governments, but, rather, as a source of intellectual enrichment for indigenous populations.¹⁰ Yet, the pilgrimage and the spread of pan-Islamic ideas were not accepted by the authorities as innocuous. Afraid of pan-Islamic trends, and believing that the pilgrimage had the power of transforming “peaceful Indonesian *hajjis* into rebellious fanatics,”¹¹ the East Indies government hampered the performance of the pilgrimage. Such interference lasted until the turn of the century, when Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje (1857–1936) was installed in Batavia as Adviser for Arabic and Native Affairs. A highly esteemed scholar of Islam, Snouck was successful in arguing that the pan-Islamic threat was non-existent, as the Caliph himself had “deposited it [pan-Islam] in the museum of political antiquities.”¹² Also, Snouck maintained that the Indies Muslims were neither fanatics nor enemies of European rule, and, based on his own experience in Mecca, he concluded that “the holy city was certainly not the hotbed of any anti-colonial conspiracy.”¹³ What Snouck could not predict was the impact that the abrogation of the Ottoman caliphate would have on the Indies Muslims in the 1920s, and the consequent polarization of Islamic intelligentsia and Westernized secular nationalists.

In the mid-1920s, politicians of the caliber of Sukarno (1901–70) and H. O. S. Cokroaminoto (1882–1934), leaders of, respectively, the secular Perserikatan Nasional Indonesia (the early embodiment of Partai Nasional Indonesia, PNI, or Indonesian National Party, established in 1928) and the religious nationalist movement Sarekat Islam (established around 1911–12), dedicated most of their political efforts to uniting the anti-colonial front. This attempt was pursued by reducing ideological differences and highlighting the common ground shared by nationalism, Islam, and socialism.¹⁴ As Sukarno advocated the common origin of these ideologies and their shared opposition to foreign domination, Cokroaminoto focused instead on the internationalist strategies of Islam and socialism. Although in the beginning Cokroaminoto did not promote pan-Islamic ideals, under the influence of Sarekat Islam’s “second-in-chief” Haji Agus Salim (1884–1954), Cokroaminoto came to realize the political benefit of connecting the Indonesian struggle to a wider movement, as it provided the party with additional strength in a moment of crisis. So it was that by 1930 he had fully embraced this idea.¹⁵

The Emergence of Pan-Islam and the Abolition of the Caliphate

Prior to discussing the relationship between Islamic nationalism and pan-Islam in the Netherlands East Indies, it is appropriate to define briefly the origins of pan-Islamic ideas, and how they spread from 1860s Turkey to 1920s Indonesia. Pan-Islam

¹⁰ Van Niel, *The Emergence*, p. 57.

¹¹ Harry Jindrich Benda, “Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje and the Foundations of Dutch Islamic Policy in Indonesia,” *The Journal of Modern History* 30 (1958): 86.

¹² Benda, *Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje*, p. 86.

¹³ Martin van Bruinessen, “Muslims of the Dutch East Indies and the Caliphate Question,” *Studia Islamika* 2,3 (1995): 117.

¹⁴ See Umar Said Cokroaminoto, *Islam dan Sosialisme* (Yogyakarta: Tride, 2003 [1924]); and Sukarno, “Nasionalisme, Islamisme dan Marxisme,” in *Dibawah Bendera Revolusi* (Jakarta: Panitia Penerbit Dibawah Bendera Revolusi, 1926).

¹⁵ See the analysis of “Persatuan Ummat Islam se-Dunia,” *Fadjar Asia* (January 21, 1930, p. 1), which is part of “Keterangan Asas Partij Sarekat Islam Indonesia.”

was developed as a political concept by the Young Ottomans in the second half of the nineteenth century, and was intended to match European ideas of pan-Slavism, pan-Hellenism, and the like, in an attempt to unify the Islamic community under the authority of the Ottoman sultan.¹⁶

The term was soon taken up by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838–97) and Muhammad 'Abduh; as the Ottoman term *ittihad-i Islam* ("unity of Islam") was translated into Arabic as *al-Wahda al-Islamiyya*, the change of context also induced a subtle shift from advocating geo-political unity to religious unity. Pan-Islam came to signify that all Muslim peoples should cooperate with each other in their individual efforts to gain independence from infidel rule, and, possibly (but *not necessarily*), unite eventually under a single spiritual and political leadership.¹⁷ This is what Nikki Keddie defined as "proto-nationalism," a movement built upon a mixture of anti-imperialism and Islamic ecumenical sentiments.¹⁸ If Afghani had left a breach open for some sort of political unity, in his later years 'Abduh narrowed the interpretation of this concept to a purely religious vision of pan-Islam, focusing on the feeling of belonging to one community and excluding aspirations for geographical unification.¹⁹ His disciple Rashid Rida, though, kept swinging between concepts of "religious brotherhood" (as his articles in the early issues of *al-Manār* testify) and the need for a caliphate that would combine spiritual and temporal authority, Islam being the unity of *al-dīn wa al-dawla*²⁰ ("religion and government"). Later, a similar approach was taken up by Hasan al-Banna (1906–49), founder of the Ikhwān al-Muslimīn (Islamic Brotherhood) in Egypt, and an advocate of pan-Islamic nationalism. This debate reached Muslims across the Netherlands East Indies through the flow of pilgrims and students returning from their stay in the Middle East, the distribution of Arab newspapers, and a flourishing local press. The greatest impact was probably affected by al-Azhar University's periodical, *al-Manār*, but local journals such as *al-Imam* (Singapore), *Seruan Azhar* (Batavia and Cairo), and *al-Irshad* (Surabaya) also played an important role.²¹ As the powers of the Ottoman sultan were gradually reduced and pan-Islamic activities were heavily curtailed, the Young Turks' leadership found this ideology valuable to rally external support for their new regime. In 1913, the Committee of Union and Progress formed a pan-Islamic league in Istanbul, the Benevolent Islamic Society, which gathered Turks, Egyptians, Tunisians, Arabs from Yemen and the Hejaz, and Indians.²² As the Middle

¹⁶ This outline follows Jacob M. Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organisation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 14–18.

¹⁸ Nikki R. Keddie, "Pan-Islam as Proto-Nationalism," *The Journal of Modern History* 41,1 (1969): 17–28.

¹⁹ Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, pp. 25–27.

²⁰ Muhammad Rashid Rida, *Le Califat dans la Doctrine de Rašīd Rīdā: Traduction Annotée d'al-Hilafa au al-Imāma al-'uzma (Le Califat ou l'Imāma Suprême)*, vol. 6, trans. Henri Laoust, *Mémoires de l'institut français de Damas* (Beirut: Institut Français de Damas, 1938).

²¹ A recent discussion of the impact of *al-Manār* and the development of a Modernist press in the Indies is in Laffan, *Islamic Nationhood*, pp. 142–51, but the subject had already been examined *in passim* by W. R. Roff, *The Origins of Malay Nationalism* (London and New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1967), and in more detail by Jutta E. Bluhm, "A Preliminary Statement on the Dialogue Established between the Reform Magazine Al-Manar and the Malayo-Indonesian World," *Indonesia Circle* 32 (1983): 37–38; and by Natalie Mobini-Kesheh, "The Arab Periodicals of the Netherlands East Indies," *Bijdragen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Indische Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* 152,II (1996): 236–56.

²² Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, pp. 86–92.

East was hit by the internal dismantlement of the caliphal institution and the external fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire, throughout the 1920s pan-Arabism and nationalism began to enjoy wider support than pan-Islam in the region. Yet it is at this historical juncture that Muslims at the periphery of the Islamic world began to play a crucial role in the revival of the Caliphate.²³

As a minority that had served as the ruling class for centuries, Indian Muslims had been juggling with ideas of political Islam since the sixteenth century. At the turn of the twentieth century, pan-Islam in the subcontinent enjoyed a new wave of support, to the extent that a request was placed at the Sublime Porte for a consul to be appointed in Calcutta. Thanks to a thriving press, and the circulation of English-language materials, India's Muslims were aware of the politics affecting the Ottoman Empire, and followed the intellectual debate on pan-Islam. It is interesting to note that Landau sees pan-Islam in this context as mostly bearing a nationalist significance, in the sense that the existence of a transnational Islamic state was perceived as a guarantee for the survival and well-being of India's Muslim minority. Despite the wide internal support for the Khilafat Committee—its conference in 1919 was attended by several Sunni leaders, but also Shi'is, Ahmadis, and Mahatma Gandhi—the pan-Islamic agenda was gradually transformed into a nationalist one with the fall of the caliphate in 1924.²⁴

The activities of the Khilafat movement stirred admiration from across the Muslim world, and in 1925 the al-Islam congress in Yogyakarta decided that an envoy would be sent to India to establish relations with the Central Khilafat Committee. In 1924, Partai Sarekat Islam leaders had already established in Surabaya a Central Komite Chilafat, and later that year the same city hosted the al-Islam congress, aimed at discussing how to approach the caliphate question. Eventually, Cokroaminoto attended the Meccan Mu'tamar 'Alam Islami in 1926, and Haji Agus Salim was sent as the Indies' delegate in 1927.²⁵

The fact that the caliphate question began to gain support in the Indies only in the 1920s, when the rest of the Islamic world was shifting from pan-Islam to nationalism, is a circumstance that should be analyzed in conjunction with the state of political activism in the archipelago. What must be borne in mind, then, is that before the 1920s the Indies' anti-colonial movement was not yet ideologically defined. I am here suggesting that the Indonesian nationalist movement emerged with all its ramifications as a result of a transformation that took place in the 1910s. Accepting the fact that the first organizations to advocate independence from colonial rule were Budi Utomo (established in 1908, and representing the aristocratic *priyayi* elite) and Sarekat Dagang Islam (established in 1905 to protect the commercial interests of Muslim *batik* traders, later to become the Sarekat Islam party), the argument follows that the nationalist movement, per se, emerged from fractures within and conglomerations involving these

²³ For more on the Khilafat movement, see A. C. Niemeijer, *The Khilafat Movement in India, 1919–1924* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1972); and S. Oliver-Dee, *The Caliphate Question: The British Government and Islamic Governance* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009).

²⁴ Landau, *The Politics of Pan-Islam*, pp. 86–92.

²⁵ Amelz, H.O.S. *Tjokroaminoto: hidup dan perjuangannya* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1952), pp. 163–151, 174. And for an extensive investigation of the Indies' Muslims' reaction to the abrogation of the caliphate, see Bruinessen, "Muslims of the Dutch East Indies."

first groups, a reshaping that occurred along ideological lines. This process of diversification from a general idea of “indigenous advancement” to the formation of well-defined Islamic, communist, and nationalist parties, with agendas molded according to domestic needs and international models, passed through a transitional period in which each organization had multiple political souls. Just as Sarekat Islam had split into a socialist and an Islamic wing in the mid-1920s—and support for the party had begun to decline—the caliphate issue, the Islamic state ideal, and the pan-Islamic project quickly became important elements in rallying support among Indies Muslims. Appeals to a transnational network of alliances functioned to strengthen the party’s position against Sukarno’s nationalism and Semaun’s socialism. The case for the achievement of independence from colonial rule as part of a transnational movement was made even stronger by the argument that striving for the unity of the *ummah* was seen as a religious duty.

Part 2: The 1920s and 1930s—From Islamic Nationalism to Pan-Islam

Kartosuwiryo on Islam and Nationalism

Scholars of colonial Indonesia, in particular Takashi Shiraishi, have argued that by the mid-1920s political Islam in the East Indies was in steep decline, with communism and secular nationalism taking its place among the indigenous population.²⁶ I contend, however, that although Sarekat Islam had been seriously weakened by the split between the religious and the communist wings, and by the soaring enthusiasm for Sukarno’s Perserikatan Nasional Indonesia, the Islamic party did not decline but instead entered a new phase. The focus was no longer on relieving the indigenous population from colonial mistreatments, but rather on laying out the platform for an independent state of Indonesia based on Islamic precepts. And it should be added that this shift was possible mostly because of Haji Agus Salim’s dedication to the caliphate question, and his increasing influence on drawing the party’s agenda.

Kartosuwiryo joined the Islamic party at a moment of shifting balances, and although he had been Cokroaminoto’s personal assistant and protégé since his entrance into Sarekat Islam, Agus Salim had a greater impact than Cokroaminoto on Kartosuwiryo’s political vision. Born in a village at the border between East and Central Java (Cepu) in 1905 as the son of a low-ranking colonial-government employee, Kartosuwiryo attended Dutch schools up to the Nederlands Indische Artsen School (Netherlands Indies Doctors’ School) in Surabaya. After being expelled for dabbling with communist activism, he joined the Islamic nationalist party (Partai Sarekat Islam) in 1927. Kartosuwiryo emerged as a prolific, yet controversial, journalist for the PSI newspaper *Fadjar Asia*, and in less than a decade he had become secretary of the party’s executive committee, chairman of the West Java branch, and vice-president of the central board. In the first year of his contributing to *Fadjar Asia*, Kartosuwiryo’s articles show the double influence of Cokroaminoto and Salim, but by late 1929 his religious commitment emerges as predominant. On the pages of *Fadjar Asia* he advocated, as foundations of the anti-colonial struggle, political non-cooperation with the Dutch and the establishment of a state based on Islamic principles and jurisprudence. As the

²⁶ Takashi Shiraishi, *An Age in Motion: Popular Radicalism in Java, 1912–1926* (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 1990).

nationalist struggle unfolded, Kartosuwiryo continued to express his commitment to an Islamic vision of an independent state of Indonesia, and the tension between nationalism and pan-Islamism kept surfacing in his writings until the 1950s.

Kartosuwiryo first raised the issue of Islamic transnationalism in July 1928, when he was entangled in the already mentioned debate on socialism and Islam, initiated in 1924 by Cokroaminoto and continued in 1926 by Sukarno. Arguing for Islam's primacy, Kartosuwiryo pointed to the socio-political dimension of the *hajj* pilgrimage, which made it a physical manifestation of Islam's brotherhood that crossed boundaries of ethnicity, language, and nations.²⁷ The term "pan-Islam" appears for the first time in late September 1928, when commenting on the colonial authorities' mismanagement of justice, Kartosuwiryo calls for Indonesian Muslims to "wake up" and join the one organization, PSII (Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia, Islamic Union Party of Indonesia), that defends the people and is ready to sacrifice itself to ensure its top priority, pan-Islamism: "our movement dedicates each and every bone of its body to *Pan-Islamisme*."²⁸ As appears clear in subsequent articles, at this point in time Kartosuwiryo saw pan-Islam not as a goal per se, but rather as a political tool. I am not suggesting that Sarekat Islam was *instrumentalizing* pan-Islam as an element of its political propaganda, but rather that the idea of a global community united by the same religious beliefs and striving for the same rights to freedom from foreign domination was considered a powerful rallying point for political action. It took a few more years before Kartosuwiryo developed a vision of pan-Islam as the final goal of his struggle, then represented by the creation of what can be called a "transnational political entity," namely, a state based on Islamic laws and unifying the *ummah* worldwide.

Despite the existence of several secular political parties that proclaimed themselves to be "inter-Asiatic," to Kartosuwiryo only Islam called for pure and genuine cooperation across borders, because this effort was inspired by religion rather than political opportunism. Showing how difficult it was to balance nationalism and pan-Islam intellectually, Kartosuwiryo also added that an additional function of Islamic internationalism, also known as inter-Islamism, was the creation of a network of Islamic countries that desired to cooperate with each other on the road to nationalism.²⁹ This apparent contradiction, which recalls the ideological shift in the Indian Khilafat movement, soon attracted the attention of the nationalist newspaper *Keng Po* (a Chinese-owned daily paper printed in Batavia). In November 1928, its editorial argued that "in Islam there is neither Nationalism nor Internationalism." But this polemic, instead of harming the Islamic faction, became an ideal platform for *Fadjar Asia* to use to enlighten its readership further concerning the political duties of Muslims. Kartosuwiryo's argument was twofold, as, on the one hand, he proved Islam's commitment to nationalism by invoking the Prophet's saying, "love for the homeland is a part of faith" (id. *Cinta akan tanah tumpah darah itu adalah sebagian daripada iman*). On the other hand, Kartosuwiryo pointed to the struggle to become "one *ummah*" as the theorization of internationalism, and to the duty to perform pilgrimage as the "broadest, purest, and holiest" manifestation of that struggle. Kartosuwiryo thus concluded that secular nationalists did not fully understand the complexity of Islamic

²⁷ S. M. Kartosuwiryo, "Perdjalan ketanah Soetji," *Fadjar Asia*, July 20, 1928.

²⁸ S. M. Kartosuwiryo, "Aniajaan dan Siksaan," *Fadjar Asia*, September 26, 1928.

²⁹ S. M. Kartosuwiryo, "Pertjaja kepada diri sendiri dan ...," *Fadjar Asia*, October 31, 1928.

nationalism, which was aimed not at the freedom and promotion of one people, one race, or one kingdom, but was instead pursued for the prosperity of “the One God, One Belief, One Prophet, One Flag” of Islam.³⁰

Kartosuwiryo’s articles published in 1929 focused on domestic politics, but as the debate among indigenous parties intensified, Kartosuwiryo offered his reflections on the different characteristics of nationalist ideologies in the Indies. In *Islam dan Nasionalisme*, Kartosuwiryo succeeded in balancing his warnings that national pride might result in confrontations among different nations with preserving the notion that one should love the motherland. To avoid this potentially “deviationist attitude,” Kartosuwiryo argued that patriotism should follow the model of Monotheism, and thus be directed towards what he called “*Mono-Humanisme*,” a term here used to define “the unity of the human race to become one *ummah*” (*persatoean manoesia mendjadi satoe Oemmat*). As Islam is “not just a way to establish relations between humans and God,” but it can guide relations between humans, organizations, and so forth, then it can help shape a wider concept of nationality (*kebangsaan*) that is not limited to its “usual understanding.”³¹ A couple of months later, Kartosuwiryo explained these differences, contributing to the debate on how nationhood was perceived under colonial rule. In this article Kartosuwiryo explains that for Budi Utomo, it is “Javanese nationalism”; for Sukarno’s PNI, it is “pan-Asianism”; but for himself and the PSII, *kebangsaan* was to be interpreted differently, not to be linked to worldly desires or limited by any territorial borders. It was instead wide and broad, and only connected to religious belonging and to the unity of Islam; Islamic nationalism was only dedicated to the prosperity of God.³² Although limited, these comments show Kartosuwiryo’s understanding of nationalism as a feeling of being solely guided by religion and aimed at the establishment of a borderless Islamic nation.

PSII’s Struggle for the Unity of the Islamic Ummah across the World

By 1930, Sarekat Islam had changed its nature from being an Islamo-socialist organization to an Islamic party committed to pan-Islam. Between October 1929 and January 1930, the PSII executive committee edited the party’s constitution by including a new first article titled *Persatoean dalam Oemmat Islam* (Unity in the Islamic Community). There it was stated that the unity of Indonesian Muslims was “a step towards the unity of the Islamic community across the world,” and the section on national freedom thus became the second article of the *Keterangan Asas* (Foundation Statement). This concept of Indonesian Muslims’ unity being one aspect of the worldwide unity of the *ummah* was then repeated in the first and second articles of the constitution, titled *Persatoean Pergerakan dan Organisatie* (Unity of the Movement and Organization) and *Toedjoean* (Aims), respectively.³³

³⁰ S. M. Kartosuwiryo, “Islamisme, Nasionalisme dan Internasionalisme I,” *Fadjar Asia*, November 3, 1928; and “Islamisme, Nasionalisme dan Internasionalisme II,” *Fadjar Asia*, November 7, 1928. Quote from *Keng Po* and Koranic verse (in Indonesian) included in: Kartosuwiryo, “Islamisme, Nasionalisme dan Internasionalisme I.”

³¹ S. M. Kartosuwiryo, “Islam dan Nasionalisme,” *Fadjar Asia*, May 24, 1929.

³² S. M. Kartosuwiryo, “Berekor Pandjang,” *Fadjar Asia*, July 2, 1929.

³³ “Persatuan Ummat Islam se-Dunia,” *Fadjar Asia*, January 21, 1930.

Thus, in the short time between 1928 and 1930, Sarekat Islam and Kartosuwiryo had completed the shift from viewing pan-Islam as an ideology useful for gathering the necessary support and strength to achieve Indonesia's national independence, to advocating Islamic nationalism as a step towards the worldwide unification of the *ummah*. The sources do not offer any insight on why such a change occurred so rapidly at this point in time; however, I would like to offer one interpretation, which looks at the Islamic party in the wider context of Indonesian domestic politics at the turn of the decade. By 1930, the cooperative efforts to unite the deeply fragmented Indonesian anti-colonial movement had failed, as eventually PSII withdrew its support from the PPPKI (Permufakatan Perhimpunan Politik Kebangsaan Indonesia, Agreement of Indonesian People's Political Association), and PSII prepared the ground to go its own way. Following Sukarno's arrest in 1929, the PNI had gradually disintegrated, and the labor union movement had incurred the same fate, as Tjipto Mangunkusumo, the leader of the movement, had been sent into exile in 1928. In 1931, the colonial government had appointed as new governor-general the former Minister of War Bonifacius de Jonge, a conservative politician openly opposed to any move towards Indonesian self-government. I suggest that, at a time when the nationalist movement had lost most of its leadership and momentum, Sarekat Islam leaders chose to appeal to a greater goal than achieving self-rule, a goal that was sanctioned in the scriptures as a religious duty, in order to stir a new wave of enthusiasm among its followers. As a result, the achievement of the unity of the Islamic community became the first priority of the Islamic party.

Following this shift, the decade of the 1930s was marked by an increased politicization of Islam in the Sarekat Islam party, and a deepening of its commitment to the international cause of Islam. Cokroaminoto opened the 1931 congress with a quote from Mohammad Ali of the British-Indies Khilafat Committee: "It is a wrong conception of religion that you have if you exclude politics from it; it is not dogma, it is not ritual."³⁴ This congress was more outward-oriented than previous ones, as the issues regarding India, Palestine, and the Berbers of Morocco were discussed at length, and two motions in support of the respective Muslim factions were passed. While PSII considered political developments affecting Muslim communities in the wider Islamic world, events in the Indies were attracting the attention of Muslim leaders in the Middle East. For example, Sayed Amin al-Husaini of Palestine had sent a telegram to Cokroaminoto to discuss the situation in Palestine, but also to condemn Sukarno's PNI for its secularism.³⁵

The decline of Partai Sarekat Islam, which had already begun in the 1920s consequent to the split between the Islamic and communist wings and the imprisonment of several leading figures in the aftermath of the 1926 uprisings, reached its nadir in the mid-1930s, exacerbated by the internal conflict concerning the noncooperation policy. This policy, which advocated the pursuing of Indonesia's independence without cooperating with the colonial authorities, had been

³⁴ "17e Nationaal Congres van de Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia" [June 23, 1931], Archief van het Ministerie van Kolonien [hereafter AMK], 1901-1940: Kabinet Verbaal Geheim [hereafter KVGeH] no.368, Nationaal Archief, The Hague [hereafter NA].

³⁵ "Verslag van het 17de Congres der Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia" [April 11, 1931], AMK, 1901-1940: KVGeH no. 368, NA.

implemented and withdrawn several times by both nationalist and Islamic groups since the establishment of the Volksraad in 1917; however, by the 1930s, Sukarno had abandoned this approach, while Kartosuwiryo had made it the core of his anti-colonial struggle. Reinterpreted in Islamic terms, noncooperation became *hijrah*, referring to Muhammad's "migration" from Mecca to Medina in the year 622, and thus symbolizing the beginning of a new era solely inspired by Islam. Since Cokroaminoto's death in 1934, the fragile balance of PSII's leadership had collapsed under the tensions between Kartosuwiryo and Agus Salim, the new leaders of the party's directorate.³⁶ Kartosuwiryo was commissioned to write a pamphlet elucidating the theoretical underpinnings and political implications of the noncooperation policy, and as Kartosuwiryo's booklet, "Sikap Hijrah Partai Sarekat Islam," was distributed at the twenty-second party congress in September 1936, it stirred a final confrontation with Salim.³⁷

As far as PSII's transnational effort is concerned, there are two instances showing the interest of the party's executive to be part of a worldwide Islamic community. First, when describing the spread of the Islamic world in 1930 ("Doenia Islam Tahun 1930" [Islamic World in the Year 1930], introduction to volume one), the map showing the Islamic territory includes North Africa, the Middle East, the area around the Bosphorus, Persia, and Afghanistan, but also large parts of Russia (Central Asia), India, the area around the Gulf of Bengal, the Indo-Malay region, the area north of Vietnam, and an area overlapping the China-Mongolia border. Second, in the subsequent volume of the booklet, one of the political goals of the *Program Tandzim* of PSII is defined as

... building brotherly relations with Islamic communities in other nations in order to increase the meetings and eventually build a *Persatoean Oemmat Islam se-Doenia* [unity of the Islamic community worldwide] [...] besides that PSII feels responsible to build relations with other Islamic *ummahs* in other countries, in order to achieve a worldwide unity of the Islamic community. Such are the demands of a strong belief in Pan-Islam that stirs the desire to bring together all the Muslim communities of the world to become one Muslim Community that does not want to split apart or to be divided.³⁸

This pledge to support pan-Islam had already been expressed in August through a press communiqué directed at "seek[ing] and get[ting] connections with Muslim-Communities outside our own Country," and in which the PSII presented itself as

... the first political party in Indonesia based on a religious foundation [...] [T]he first step is to get connections with the press in various Muslim countries, by whose intermediaries it may well be hoped that our voice, the voice of the

³⁶ Maklumat H. Agoes Salim, Abikoeso, dan Kartosowirjo, Ma'lumat No. 33, *Ladjanah Tanfidzjah PSII Kepada terhormat seluruh Ladjanah Afdeeling PSII*, Jakarta, December 17, 1934, in Amelz, H.O.S. *Tjokroaminoto*, pp. 146–48.

³⁷ S. M. Kartosuwiryo, "Sikap Hidjarah P.S.I.I." (Madjilis Tahkim Partai Sjarikat Islam Indonesia ke-22: 1936), Chapter 3.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

thousands who are united in our party in an isolated Muslim land, may be heard by our co-religionists in those far-off countries.³⁹

Expressing his take on the *hijrah* debate on the pages of the periodical *Pergerakan*,⁴⁰ in late 1936 Salim stated that he was not any longer ready to work within the party if this meant conflict with the colonial government.⁴¹ Feeling marginalized in his cooperative efforts, Salim decided to leave PSII and establish a new faction, the Komite Penyadar PSII (PSII Awareness Committee).⁴² The year 1937 was a troubled one for Kartosuwiryo's leadership; the colonial authorities reported that at least twenty-one branches of PSII had manifested their discontent towards the *hijrah* policy, with some passing their allegiance to the Komite Penyadar,⁴³ and that only seventy branches out of 131 participated at the Bandung Congress (July 22–23, 1937).⁴⁴ However, from the prologue to the 1940 pamphlet "Daftar Oesaha Hidjrah," it appears that the Bandung Congress had chosen Kartosuwiryo as chairman of the committee in charge of compiling a new pamphlet, and that a draft had already been approved by the 1938 congress in Surabaya.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, by January 1939, PSII's central board expelled many members in the Garut area (West Java), based on the rumor that, under Kartosuwiryo's leadership, some PSII branches in West Java had shifted away from party interests and were instead propagating mystic teachings.⁴⁶ The *Overzicht van de Inlandsche en Maleisisch-Chineesch Pers* ("Summary of the Native and Malay-Chinese Press") reported that PSII's executive committee had found in Kartosuwiryo's *hijrah* pamphlet the foundation of a Sufi *tariqa* ("order"), fully in conflict with PSII principles and Islam in general, and as he refused to stop the reprinting of the brochure, Kartosuwiryo was expelled.⁴⁷

The "Daftar Oesaha Hidjrah PSII" was printed in Malangbong (Garut, West Java) in March 1940, but neither in the prologue nor in the main text is there any mention of the fracture between PSII and Kartosuwiryo's Komite Pertahanan Kebenaran-PSII (Committee for the Defense of the Truth, KPK-PSII), suggesting that the pamphlet had been written before, but printed after, the split. Reasserting several of the concepts

³⁹ "Contact PSII met het buitenland" [August 13, 1936], AMK, 1900–1963: Geheime Mailrapporten [hereafter GMr], 1914–1952 no. 146, NA. [English in the original].

⁴⁰ "De PSII Brochures 'Hidjrah'" [January 18, 1937], AMK, 1900–1963: GMr, 1914–1952 no. 150, NA.

⁴¹ "Overzicht van de Inlandsche en Maleisisch-Chineesch Pers", ed. Bureau voor de Volkslectuur en Aanverwante Aangele (Weltevreden: Drukkerij Volkslectuur), August 22, 1936.

⁴² "Vergadering van het 'Comité Penjadar Barisan PSII' te Batavia op Februari 1937" [February 28, 1937], Algemeen Rijksarchief: Rapportage Indonesie 1945–1950 no. 306, NA.

⁴³ *Overzicht*, January 30, 1937.

⁴⁴ See "Congres PSII te Bandoeng Juli 1937" [August 9, 1937], AMK, 1900–1963: GMr, 1914–1952 no. 152, NA; and "Verslag van de openbare zittingen en de openbare vergadering van het Drie-en-twintigste Congres van de Partij Sjarikat Islam Indonesia (PSII), gehouden te Bandoeng, van 19 tot 25 Juli 1937," in "Congres P(artij) S(jarikat) I(slam) I(ndonesia) te Bandoeng, Juli 1937" [September 17, 1937], AMK, 1900–1963: GMr, 1914–1952 no. 153, NA.

⁴⁵ S. M. Kartosuwiryo, "Daftar-Oesaha Hidjrah PSII bagian Muqaddima," 1 ed. (Malangbong [SS W/L] Java: Poestaka Dar-oel-Islam, March 1940), reprinted in Al-Chaidar, *Pemikiran Politik Proklamator Negara Islam Indonesia S. M. Kartosoewirjo: Fakta Dan Data Sejarah Darul Islam* (Jakarta: Darul Jalah, 1999), pp. 461–76.

⁴⁶ A. Harry Poeze, ed., *Politiek-Politioneele Overzichten van Nederlandsch-Indie, 1935–1941*, vol. IV (Leiden: KITLV Uitgeverij, 1994 [January 1939]), p. 257.

⁴⁷ *Overzicht*, June 17, 1939.

already proposed in the past decade, Kartosuwiryo focused on the necessity to pursue pan-Islam, implement *shari'a*, and reunite *agama dan dunia* (*dīn wa dawla*, religion and government) to ensure the improvement of the status of the Indonesian people. Chapter six of the pamphlet is titled *Persatoean Manoesia dan Kesatoean Allah* (Unity of Humanity and Oneness of God), with the subtitle *Al-Ittihad-oel-Islam dan Wahdaniyat Allah* (Unity of Islam and Oneness of God), and summarizes the terminology used to define the concept of Islamic unity. In this chapter, Kartosuwiryo argues that PSII's goal of unifying the Islamic world, here addressed as *Persatoean Doenia Islam* and *Daroel Islam* (Abode of Islam), could only be achieved after humanity had dedicated itself to being fully devoted to God. It is this very pillar of Islam that, in Kartosuwiryo's view, represents the key

... to achieve a) the perfect unity of the Islamic world, internally as well as externally; b) unity among Muslims; c) equality among human beings of all social levels before and outside the law, equality in international relations, and between one *ummah* and the other *ummahs* ...⁴⁸

Kartosuwiryo concluded that the ultimate stage of this process would have thus been the building of a new world, the *doenia baroe*, and of an Islamic world, the *Dar-oel-Islam*, *Daroel-Falah*, or *Dar-oel-Fatah*.⁴⁹

On the eve of the Japanese invasion, Kartosuwiryo was fully dedicated to the pan-Islamic project of bringing together the Islamic *ummah* from around the world within the framework of an Islamic state. It is important to note that, in these writings, the spiritual unity of the *ummah*, the *al-Ittihad-oel-Islam*, *Doenia Islam*, *Doenia Baroe*, *Dar-oel-Islam*, *Daroel-Falah*, or *Dar-oel-Fatah* is constantly reconnected to the necessity to implement *shari'a* law and obtain the physical unification of the Islamic community.

Part 3: From an "Islamic" Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere to the Negara Islam Indonesia

The 1940s marked a watershed in the Indies' political environment, as in March 1942 the Japanese Army landed on Java, bringing to an end three centuries of Dutch presence in the archipelago. Japanese rule, although brief, was as important for Indonesia's future as for the development of Kartosuwiryo's political strategy. Japan inverted the Dutch approach of "regarding Indonesian politics as a troublesome irritation,"⁵⁰ envisaging instead a drastic change in the way the local administration was run. On the political scene, the Japanese presence brought forward actions aimed at the elimination of Western influences in Asia, with the goal of building the Greater Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Since Indies Muslims had been exposed to years of anti-Western propaganda, stirred by calls to support Islam, and impressed by Japan's many recent military victories, they perceived the Japanese as liberators, and its reforms in the field of party politics were received with great enthusiasm.⁵¹ The PSII leadership,

⁴⁸ Kartosuwiryo, "Daftar-Oesaha," in Al-Chaidar, *Pemikiran Politik*, p. 437.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944–1946* (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 31.

⁵¹ See M. A. Aziz, *Japan's Colonialism and Indonesia* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955); and Harry Jindrich Benda, *The Crescent and Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation, 1942–1945* (The Hague:

for example, interpreted the order to dismantle all political parties and organizations as a sign of the Japanese government's genuine interest in making Indonesian nationalists stronger, by unifying their deeply fragmented front.⁵² Similarly, Japan's agenda to see Asians ruling in the region earned it a warm welcome in the Indies. In August 1942, PSII president Wondoamiseno commented on the recent Japanese arrival as an event to be thankful to God about; the brave sacrifice of the Japanese Empire (Dai Nippon) had freed the Indonesian people from 340 years of Dutch colonization, and

... had lifted it from the mud of subjugation and humiliation [...] now there is no more ethnic differentiation, everyone is equal, this is the blessing of the leadership and protection of our brother Japan.⁵³

In late September 1943, another Islamic leader wrote in *Asia Raya* that the final aim of the Indonesian people was

... the fulfillment of the duty to defend themselves as an Asiatic race, to defend religion, sovereignty, and justice as Muslims, and to support the realization of *Hakko Itjoe* ["the world one house"] as ordained by Allah.⁵⁴

Kartosuwiryo was equally enthusiastic about this regime change, as shown in his articles published in the bi-monthly magazine *Soeara MIAI* throughout 1943.⁵⁵ The most striking feature of these articles is Kartosuwiryo's cooperative approach to the new authority, as it appears that he was attracted by the thought that Dai Nippon's ideal of a *doenia baroe* could be shaped into an Islamic state. This vision pushed Kartosuwiryo to shift his outward attention away from the Middle East and towards Asia. His first pledge in support of Dai Nippon appears in *Bekal Bathin dalam Perjuangan*, published on March 1, 1943. In this article, Kartosuwiryo argues for Japan's "earnest endeavor [to] the common welfare and prosperity of Greater East Asia," and calls upon the Muslim community of Java to lend its material support in such a struggle. Within a few months, the concept of *zaman baroe* (new era) was expanded by Kartosuwiryo to embrace the project of a "new world" comprising the whole East Asian region.⁵⁶ By mid-May 1943, Kartosuwiryo proclaimed that cooperation with the Dai Nippon was *wajib* (religious duty) for all Muslims, and that the establishment of a *Keloearga Asia-Timoer-Raya* (Greater East Asia Family) was to be pursued as the final step of the gradual Islamization of the whole of society, a process that begins with the family, and

W. van Hoeve, 1958). For additional details on the bureaucratic transition, see Shigeru Sato, *War, Nationalism, and Peasants: Java under the Japanese Occupation, 1942–1945*, ed. Asian Studies Association of Australia (St. Leonard's: Allen & Unwin, 1994), pp. 22–45. For additional details on mobilization, see Sato, *War, Nationalism, and Peasants*, pp. 36–59; and Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, pp. 16–34.

⁵² Letter of PSII President W. Wondoamiseno to L.A.P.S.I.I. Pare-Pare and Teteadji, Surabaya [August 6, 2602 JIY/1942 CE], Archief van de Procureur-Generaal Nederlands-Indies [hereafter APG] no. 1007, NA.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Words of Muhammad Zain Djambek, quoted in M. Slamet, *The Holy War "Made in Japan,"* vol. II, Japanese Machinations series (Batavia [Jakarta]: np, 1946), pp. 12–13.

⁵⁵ S. M. Kartosuwiryo, "Bekal Bathin dalam Perjuangan," *Soeara MIAI* (henceforth *SMIAI*), March 1, 1943; "Menoedjoe ke Arah Dar-oel-Islam dan Dar-oes-Salam," *SMIAI*, March 15, 1943; "Fardl-oel-Ain dan Fardl-oel-Kifajah dalam Islam," *SMIAI*, May 1, 1943; "Kewadajiban Oemmat Islam Menghadapi 'Doenia Baroe,'" *SMIAI*, May 15, 1943; "Baitoel-Mal pada zaman Pantjaroba and Tarich Bait-al-mal zaman Rasoeoellah clm dan choelafa-oer-rasidin r.a.a.," *SMIAI*, June 28, 1943; "T'tibar Madjazy dan Ma'any" *SMIAI*, July 15, 1943; and "Benteng Islam" *SMIAI*, September 1, 2603 JIY/1943 CE.

⁵⁶ Kartosuwiryo, "Fardl- oel-Ain dan Fardl-oel-Kifajah," *SMIAI*, May 1, 2603 JIY/1943 CE.

reaches up to the neighborhood, the village, and the world. At this stage, however, the scope of Kartosuwiryo's idea of an Islamic front (*Benteng Islam*) was limited to the building of companionship (*mushahabah*) and brotherhood (*oekhoewwah*) among all layers and sections of the greater East Asian population in order to ensure the success of the co-prosperity sphere. It had become evident that Kartosuwiryo was imagining this *Doenia Baroe* in Islamic terms, as a bridge towards the after-life (*Dar al-Akhirat*),⁵⁷ a vision he reiterated once again in September when he described this "new world" of the *Keloearga Asia-Timoer-Raya*, achieved through the struggle of pure Muslims, as a reflection of the *Dar-oel-Islam*.⁵⁸ Keeping in focus his final goal of living in a society that fully followed Islamic rules—at the individual as much as at the administrative and legal levels—Kartosuwiryo interpreted the Dai Nippon's project to build a pan-Asian state in combination with its inclination towards Islam. It appears that the fact that neither most Japanese nor the majority of the Asian population followed Islam was not perceived by Kartosuwiryo as an obstacle towards the creation of an Islamic "Greater East Asia Family."

National Interests Prevail

With the capitulation of Japanese forces in August 1945, the subsequent SEAC (South East Asia Command) landing, and the eventual reinstatement of Dutch colonial rule, the initial efforts to transform Indonesia into an independent state failed. Nonetheless, the Indonesian population now had strong and solid citizens' organizations, and opposition to the Dutch authority was fierce. In the mid-1940s, Indonesia was on its own in the struggle against the Netherlands' colonial ambitions: plans to recreate a caliphate had been long since abandoned, as pan-Arabism and pure nationalism dominated the scene in the Middle East; pan-Asianism had collapsed under the weight of the Allied forces; and socialist internationalists had suffered a heavy blow with the dissolution of the Third International. All that Indonesian politicians were left with was their desire to be independent, and so their attention turned to domestic priorities.

The changed international political context was reflected in Kartosuwiryo's writings. At a regional level, Kartosuwiryo was still a prominent party leader in West Java, his chosen constituency since 1930. At the national level, he was nominated secretary of the executive committee of Masyumi in November 1945; in the following year, he became a party delegate for the Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat (KNIP, Central Indonesian National Committee), and at its second assembly in Malang (February–March 1947), he was chosen by KNIP's president to be one of the forty-two members of the *Badan Pekerja* (Working Committee).⁵⁹ Kartosuwiryo's willingness to participate in parliamentary politics led him to be very controlled in his statements, and the contingent circumstances pushed him to focus on national politics. Kartosuwiryo's restraint did not last long, however. Following the Dutch military

⁵⁷ Kartosuwiryo, "Kewadajiban Oemmat Islam Menghadapi 'Doenia Baroe,'" *SMIAI*, May 15, 2603 JIY/1943 CE.

⁵⁸ Kartosuwiryo, "Benteng Islam," *SMIAI*, September 1, 2603 JIY/1943 CE.

⁵⁹ See "Sidang Badan Pekeraja K.N.I.Poesat," *Merdeka*, March 27, 1947; and Deliar Noer and Akbarsyah, *K.N.I.P.: Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat. Parlemen Indonesia 1945–1959* (Jakarta: Yayasan Risalah, 2005), p. 396.

attack on West Java in July 1947, Kartosuwiryo refused the position of minister of defense in the Republic's government and instead returned to West Java to lead the anti-Dutch resistance.⁶⁰

In August 1946, the Priangan regional Masyumi Information Office (Dewan Penerangan Masyumi Daerah Priangan) published one of Kartosuwiryo's speeches, which had been delivered in Garut the previous month, and which was titled "Haloean Politik Islam" (The Goal of Political Islam). This pamphlet offers a clear view of Masyumi's political agenda, and, more importantly, it provides a detailed vision of the party's strategy to achieve independence and to ensure a relevant role for Islam in the future nation-state. As the possibility that communism, socialism, or nationalism could rise to political ascendancy was not excluded, Kartosuwiryo argued that, during the revolution, the *ummah* should strive to build a "new world" in full conformity with the Qur'an—that is, to build a *Doenia Islam*, *Dar-oel-Islam*, or *ad-daulatul Islamiyah*. It is worth noting that in this pamphlet there are no more references to the outside world, and the *Doenia Baroe/Dar-oel-Islam* vision—which in the 1930s and early 1940s was comprehended as an Islamic political entity spreading beyond the territorial borders of the Indonesian archipelago—appears to be understood only in nationalistic terms. At this point in time, Kartosuwiryo was deeply concerned with the unity of the anti-colonial front, hence he not only supported the "parliamentary way" to establish an Islamic state, but also strongly condemned fanaticism, as it "easily threaten[ed] the unity of the nation [*persatoean bangsa*] and of the struggle, [and] result[ed] in splits and betrayals that are especially unwished for in these times when all citizens ought to feel obliged to join the National Revolution."⁶¹

In 1946, Kartosuwiryo was thus actively fomenting a national revolution aimed at winning independence from foreign domination. The fight for independence was expressed in terms of revolution and *jihad*, with the "greater struggle" of the soul against worldly desires and foreign influences—corresponding to the social and individual revolutions—playing a primary role in comparison to the "lesser struggle," or armed national revolution. In contrast to the vocabulary he used in the 1920–30s, now Kartosuwiryo declared that the duty and responsibility of each Muslim was to defend and build national sovereignty, instead of striving for the unity of the *Oemmat Islam se-Doenia*.⁶²

As the Dutch pursued their post-WWII goals, their first "police action" in July 1947 resulted in the invasion of the republican territory of West Java. Consequently, Kartosuwiryo's take on politics became increasingly focused on Indonesia and West Java. In the Priangan area, Masyumi and its armed militias, Hizboellah and Sabilillah (established under Japanese patronage in 1944), were enjoying ever-increasing support from the population. This was in part because the militias' actions were more effective than those pursued by the regular republican administration and the Tentara Negara Indonesia (TNI, Indonesian National Army). This situation led the head of the

⁶⁰ "Het Republikeinsche Kabinet Sjarifuddin, IV Kabinet 3 Juli 1947"; "Kabinet Sjarifuddin Ve Kabinet (4 Juli 1947–23 Jan 1948)" and "Kabinet—Sjarifuddin Ve Kabinet (na wijziging op 11–11–1947)" in APG no.731, NA.; and "Soesoenan Kabinet Baroe," *Merdeka*, July 4, 1947.

⁶¹ S. M. Kartosuwiryo, *Haloean Politik Islam* (Garut: Dewan Penerangan Masjoemi, 1946), p. 14.

⁶² S. M. Kartosuwiryo, *Haloean Politik Islam*.

republican police in Tasikmalaya to notice that, in December 1947, "Masyumi in the Priangan increasingly resembled an independent government."⁶³

With the United States as mediator, the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic reached what is called the Renville agreement, signed in January 1948, which established that West Java should become a Dutch-controlled area, thus free of Indonesian military presence. It was decided that the deadline for troop evacuation was the end of February 1948; Colonel Nasution led 22,000 men of the TNI Siliwangi division out of the region,⁶⁴ yet it was clear that most militias were not going to withdraw. The separation of West Java from the republican territory, and the presence of Hizboellah and Sabilillah fighters beyond the Renville agreement's van Mook line, which defined territorial sovereignty in Java, have to be considered crucial factors in determining why Darul Islam and the Tentara Islam Indonesia (Islamic Army of Indonesia) formed in the first months of 1948. According to Dutch sources, Kartosuwiryo, reacting to the evident implications of the Renville agreement, called for a conference to undertake the reorganization of West Java's Masyumi constituency as early as the end of 1947.⁶⁵

Following the signing of the Renville agreement, two more meetings were organized in West Java that prepared the ground for the formation of the Darul Islam movement. One conference was arranged in Pangwedusan, Cisayong, on February 10–11, and a second one took place in Cirebon on March 1.⁶⁶ On this latter occasion, Kartosuwiryo and his *Estates General* created the political and military structures needed to confront Dutch authority. First, they declared the dissolution of Masyumi's organization and activities in West Java, as the current political agreements between the Republic and the Dutch had put the regional branch of Masyumi in an untenable situation.⁶⁷ Second, the various militias were merged to form a unified army, Tentara

⁶³ "Kantor Polisi Tasikmalaya, perihal Politieke situasi" [December 9, 1947], Arsip Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia no. 495, Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, Jakarta [hereafter ANRI].

⁶⁴ Abdul Haris Nasution, *Tentara Nasional Indonesia*, 2 vols. (Jakarta: Seruling Masa, 1968); and Merle Calvin Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia since C.1200*, 3rd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p. 227.

⁶⁵ According to "Territoriaal ts.Troepencommandant West Java Afd.Generale Staf Bureau I.V.D. No.G.355/200 Re Negara Islam" [June 12, 1948], APG no.997, NA, this meeting happened in September 1947. But another source indicates that this meeting may have taken place in November 1947; see "'C' Divisie '7 December' Staf 3e Inf.Brig.Groep Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst No. IV-P/bb—Geheim/Persoonlijk, Madjelis Oemat Islam" [August 12, 1948], APG no.997, NA; and "De Daroel Islam-beweging in West-Java. CMI publicatie no. 91" [September 29, 1948], Archief van het Algemeene Secretarie Nederlands-Indische no.3977, NA.

⁶⁶ Moegi Prihantoro, *Penumpasan Pemberontakan DI/TII, S. M. Kartosuwiryo di Jawa Barat* (Bandung: Dinas Sejarah, Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat, 1982), pp. 59–65. Details on the events that led to the transformation of the West Java branch of Masyumi into the Darul Islam group are present in several documents produced in the 1947–50 period by Dutch and Indonesian sources, related to the government, the Army, and the Darul Islam itself. The source here referred to is a commented compilation of archival documents published by the Indonesian Army in 1982 (first edition 1974), and it has been chosen as a comprehensive published source, the details of which have been—in the given instance—corroborated by this author through other sources. For an extensive, archive-based reconstruction of the formation of the Darul Islam and Negara Islam Indonesia, see Chiara Formichi, "Kartosuwiryo's Role in the Creation of the Islamic State of Indonesia (*Negara Islam Indonesia*), 1927–1949" (PhD dissertation, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 2009).

⁶⁷ "Dunia Masyumi Menghentikan Usahanya" [March 1, 1948], in "Pelaporan No.14/7/48 Perihal 'Darul Islam'" [July 17, 1948], Djogja Documenten [hereafter DjogjaDoc] no.218h, ANRI.

Islam Indonesia, that would operate from the west side of the van Mook line.⁶⁸ The aim of this army was to: “in a tactful way attain local control, succeed in taking power from the Republic, and include [its territory] within the Islamic state.”⁶⁹ Third, the Kartosuwiryo group’s political agenda was to revolve around the need to establish a *Negara Baroe*, also identified as a democratic Islamic state. It is clear that, at this point, Kartosuwiryo’s only concern was to create an Islamic state in the western part of Java, and future expansion to the republican territories was only an alternative in case the republican government in Yogyakarta was to be dissolved.⁷⁰

Part 4: The NII’s Promotion of a Worldwide Federation of Islamic States

The situation created by the Renville agreement was further aggravated by the Dutch army’s second “aggression.” On December 19, 1948, the Dutch army invaded Central Java, entered Yogyakarta, and captured the republican cabinet. President Sukarno, Vice-President Hatta, Prime Minister Sjahrir, Minister of Foreign Affairs Agus Salim, and several others were held captive while the Dutch seized control of all major cities in Java and Sumatra, imposed censorship, and limited the movements of the UN-led Committee of Good Offices. This event was a serious setback to the process of creating an independent state of Indonesia. The Dutch were aiming at establishing *de facto* authority, and this situation pushed Kartosuwiryo further to pursue his project for an Islamic State. As the international community’s pressure on the Dutch government soared, the latter was forced to release the cabinet officials as well as accelerate the process to transfer sovereignty. This transition was eventually regulated by the Rum–Van Royen Statement, signed on May 7, 1949, which sanctioned the formation of a federal state of Indonesia (Republik Indonesia Serikat, RIS), under the symbolic leadership of the Dutch Queen, by December 31, 1949.⁷¹ Kartosuwiryo reacted to this turn of events by proclaiming the creation of the Negara Islam Indonesia (NII) on August 7, 1949, and, two weeks later, releasing his political *Manifesto*.

The text of the NII Proclamation does not provide many details, but it presents several of the fundamental aspects of Kartosuwiryo’s political stand. The text is said to have been drafted in the basic unit of this Islamic state, *Madinah Indonesia*—a name reminiscent of Muhammad’s *hijrah* from Mecca to Medina and his subsequent establishment of an Islamic “nation” there—and it identifies this state as a *Negara Karunia Allah* (State Granted from God), or *ad-daulat-al-Islamiyah* (Islamic government), and a *Darul Islam* (Abode of Islam). This proclamation was to be recognized across the world, “because the *ummat Islam Bangsa Indonesia* is convinced that the moment has already arrived to pursue this holy duty, to guard the safety of the NII, and for its

⁶⁸ “Rencana Ketenteraan Oemmat Islam” [March 1, 1948], DjogjaDoc no.218h, ANRI.

⁶⁹ “Dunia Masyumi” [March 1, 1948], DjogjaDoc no.218h, ANRI.

⁷⁰ “Program Politik Ummat Islam” [March 1, 1948], DjogjaDoc no.218h, ANRI.

⁷¹ George McTurnan Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1969), pp. 332–50. An interesting account of these events and of the reactions of the international community is offered by several articles in *TIME Magazine*; see “Regretfully Obligated,” December 27, 1948; “So Moves the World,” January 3, 1949; “Merdeka!,” January 10, 1949; and “What About the Baby?,” January 10, 1949.

population to look after the sanctity of religion, and especially to 'establish God's Justice in the World.'⁷²

Although there were some hints regarding a potential transnational dimension of the NII in the *Proklamasi*, no open statement was made in this direction until the "Manifesto Politik I/7" was released in late August 1949. There were two aspects of this pamphlet that make it relevant to Kartosuwiryo's transnational aspirations for the NII, as it mentions both a worldwide revolution, and the spread of the Islamic state. Kartosuwiryo argued that it was only through a third world war, "more devastating and violent than the previous ones," that the national revolution could be transformed into a World Revolution (*Revoloesi Doenia*).⁷³ The idea that a third world war would favor the holy struggle of Muslims around the world had been suggested by Kartosuwiryo for the first time in November 1948, but it was not until the *Manifesto* was drafted that he expressed a clear vision of how such an event would affect political developments in Indonesia and in the wider Islamic world.⁷⁴

The World Revolution is seen as the fourth phase of the transition from colonial dominion to Islamic state: the first phase was represented by the initial rebellion of the Indonesian *ummah* in the Priangan; the second phase had begun after the proclamation of the NII in August 1949, which had annihilated the concept of an Indonesian Republic and had established a degree of Islamic rule in some areas of Java. (Kartosuwiryo's expectation for some major international event to trigger a third world war emerges clearly in the pamphlet, as such an event was necessary to trigger the following phases.) Phase three was characterized by the gradual introduction of Islamic law in other areas of the archipelago, thus empowering the NII to a level that would allow for its *de facto* sovereignty over an extended region, while phase four aimed at the establishment of the *Negara Karunia Allah*, or Negara Islam Indonesia. Although this *Negara Karunia Allah* is still defined as the Islamic State of Indonesia, the different territorial scope of the NII in phases two and four is clear. In this last stage, the Indonesian *ummah* was to cultivate international relations that, with time, would become increasingly organic until the formation of a single *Negara Karunia Allah*.⁷⁵ This approach suggests that this Islamic state was to evolve from a regional dimension to a national and then international one, and eventually make a last "qualitative" step towards transnationality.

It is safe to state that Kartosuwiryo himself was unclear on the relationship between his Negara and the wider Islamic world. What transpires, however, is an (understandable) eagerness to make his NII into the core of a borderless, transnational Islamic state established through the efforts of the *ummah*. It should not be forgotten that in 1947 Pakistan had become separated from India, Abu 'Ala al-Mawdudi's articles were still calling for pan-Islam, and al-Banna's *Ikhwani* ideology still enjoyed support and was gaining traction throughout the Middle East. An Indonesian army booklet, published in 1974, shed additional light on the NII's attempt to expand its

⁷² "Proklamasi berdirinja Negara Islam Indonesia" [August 7, 1949], Penumpasan DI-JaBar [hereafter DI Jabar] no. 14, Arsip Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Jakarta, [hereafter ABRI].

⁷³ S. M. Kartosuwiryo, "Manifesto Politik Negara Islam Indonesia No. 1/7" (1949), Chapter VI, point 1.

⁷⁴ "Negara Islam Indonesia Maklumat no.3" [1 Muharram 1368 AH./November 2, 1948, CE], DI Jabar [folii], ABRI.

⁷⁵ Kartosuwiryo, "Manifesto Politik," Chapter VIII, pp. 6–9; and Chapter IX, pp. 7–10.

influence. From the documents presented in this booklet, it emerges that, in the 1950s, connections were to be forged between nation-states, and no longer between Islamic communities. As the Darul Islam-Negara Islam Indonesia spread to the outer regions of the archipelago—Aceh, South Sulawesi, and South Kalimantan—its administrative structure came to include a vice-*imam* for foreign affairs, and an “ambassador abroad,” so to conform with the new expansionist approach of the NII. These two positions were filled by the Darul Islam-Aceh leaders Daud Beureueh and Hasan Tiro, respectively.⁷⁶

The 1974 report also republished documentation released by the Chief Prosecutor (*Jaksa Tinggi*) mentioning that Kartosuwiryo’s efforts were directed towards the creation of a Perserikatan Negara–Negara Islam Seluruh Dunia (Federation of Islamic States across the World). This is reminiscent of Kartosuwiryo’s 1936 *Sikap Hidjrah* pamphlet. However, the shift of focus from *ummah* to *negara* suggests a fundamental change from transnationalism to internationalism, from the vision of a single borderless Islamic state to a federation of Islamic nation-states. The report also explains how this union was to be achieved in seven stages. Following the establishment of the NII, the *Negara basis (Madinah Indonesia)* in the Bandung region had to consolidate itself militarily; in the meantime, Hasan Tiro would be working on an agreement with the republican government to limit its sovereignty and shape the *ad-daulat al-Islamiyah*. The NII also had to be consolidated internally, in order to achieve the strongest position in Asia, and then begin an outward process to connect with other nations that had already returned their governments to the rule of Qur’an and Hadith, such as Egypt, Pakistan, and Malaysia. The NII was also to support Islamic rebellions across the world, following the example of the Ikhwānūl Muslimīn. When this was all in place, the Perserikatan would be framed within pan-Islam and shaped in a cooperative body called Dewan Khalifatullah Fil’ardi (Council of the Representatives of God on Earth).⁷⁷ Finally, a short note in an archival document also mentions that, in the early 1950s, Kahar Muzhakar, Darul Islam leader in South Sulawesi, had sent a delegation to the Sulu islands in the Philippines to lay out the foundations of an Islamic state there.⁷⁸

In 1950, Kartosuwiryo stated that the NII represented the implementation of “God’s will on Earth,”⁷⁹ and on the tenth anniversary of the NII’s proclamation, in

⁷⁶ Prihantoro, *Penumpasan*, pp. 80–81. Daud Beureueh and Hasan Tiro continued to lead the Islamic struggle in Aceh and on the international stage, respectively; however, while Beureueh stressed the religious nature of the Acehnese rebellion, for Tiro the core of the issue was ethnicity, as his establishment of the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka in the 1970s demonstrated. See Edward Aspinall, *Islam and Nation* (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009). Aspinall also mentions Tiro’s position as ambassador of NII in 1954. See *ibid.*, p. 75.

⁷⁷ Prihantoro, *Penumpasan*, pp. 80–81. The source is identified in the footnote as: *Jaksa Tinggi Rd. Sunario*, as published in Pinardi, *Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo* (Jakarta: PT Badan Penerbit Aryaguna, 1964), p. III. The idea that connections existed between the Darul Islam and the Egyptian Ikhwanul Muslimin has also been put forward by Van Nieuwenhuijze. In the forward to his *Aspects of Islam*, he mentions a meeting with the central committee of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1950, during which he “was struck by a vivid interest in the West Java Darul Islam movement—interest supported by a good deal of rather detailed information.” C. A. O. Van Nieuwenhuijze, *Aspects of Islam in Post-colonial Indonesia: Five Essays* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1958), p. xi.

⁷⁸ Proyek Pemasyarakatan dan Diseminasi Kearsipan Nasional Indonesia, *Gerakan separatisme di Indonesia tahun 1945–1965* (Jakarta: Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, 2003), p. 44.

⁷⁹ “Ma’lumat Komandemen Tertinggi no. 5,” S. M. Kartosuwiryo, *Madinah-Indonesia*, 27 Dzulqaidah 1369 AH/September 10, 1950 CE, in Al-Chaidar, *Pemikiran Politik*, p. 575.

1959, he declared himself *Khalifatullah dan Khalifatun Nabi* (Representative of God and Representative of the Prophet) in the Indonesian archipelago.⁸⁰ What is interesting about this self-proclamation is that it appears to be in contrast with the popular understanding of Kartosuwiryo's position as NII's *Imam*. According to Sjarifuddin, the author of one of Kartosuwiryo's early biographies, Kartosuwiryo's followers believed that he had received the *Wahyu Cakraningrat Sadar*, a divine revelation that bestowed on him the title of *Khalifatullah seluruh ummat manusia*, or "representative of God to the entire Islamic community," without the "territorial" limitation of the Indonesian archipelago.⁸¹ I would like to suggest that the discrepancy between the popular belief and Kartosuwiryo's self-appointment was a product of his own leadership style. To his followers, Kartosuwiryo was *the Imam*, the only leader of the Islamic community—*kita hanya mengenal satu Ullil Amri Islam, satu Imam-Panglima T.A.P.N.I.I., tidak lebih, dan tidak kurang*.⁸² But, as he projected himself to the outer Islamic world, Kartosuwiryo presented himself as a regional leader for an international—rather than transnational—Islamic state.

Conclusions

In this paper, I have traced the ever-changing and nuanced attitude of Kartosuwiryo towards pan-Islam and religious nationalism. The problematic relationship between these two trends has already been discussed in the context of the late-colonial Middle East by Landau and Nikki Keddie, and for the contemporary Saudi *Salafi* movement by Madawi al-Rasheed.⁸³ This paper is a first attempt to analyze pan-Islam and religious nationalism's origins and impact on political Islam in Indonesia in the first half of the twentieth century. The spread of the pan-Islamic ideal in the Indies has been presented here in the context of the "decline" of political Islam in the Indies, and by looking at the historical events that culminated in the abrogation of the Ottoman caliphate in the mid-1920s, which further stimulated the debate on the organization of the Islamic *ummah* worldwide. In this article, I have argued that pan-Islam emerged, first, as a pivotal element of Sarekat Islam propaganda in the 1920–30s, as this feeling of communal belonging and struggle united Muslims of varying ideological orientations; however, pan-Islam also emerged as a distinctive feature of Kartosuwiryo's writings in those circumstances where appeals to international and transnational dimensions of Islam supported domestic political goals. A clear example has been the combination of post-caliphate debates and the fragmentation of the Sarekat Islam party.

In his first articles in 1928–29, Kartosuwiryo wrote that commitment to the pan-Islamic ideal was a viable ideology to achieve international cooperation among Muslims who were working towards the independence of their own countries. By

⁸⁰ "Ma'lumat Komandemen Tertinggi no. 11," S. M. Kartosuwiryo, *Mardlatillah*, August 7, 1959, in Al-Chaidar, *Pemikiran Politik*, p. 623.

⁸¹ Amak Sjarifuddin, *Kisah Kartosuwiryo dan Menjerahnja*, 3rd ed. (Surabaya: Grip, 1963), p. 7.

⁸² "Ma'lumat Komandemen Tertinggi no. 11," clarification n.6. "We only recognise one *Ullil Amri Islam*, one Imam-Commander of the Tentara Angkatan Perang Negara Islam Indonesia [Islamic Army of the NII], nothing more, nothing less."

⁸³ Madawi al-Rasheed, "The Local and the Global in Saudi Salafi Discourse," in *Global Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement*, ed. Roel Meijer (London: Hurst, 2009), pp. 301–20.

1930, however, the Sarekat Islam party's constitution stated, instead, that the unity of the Indonesian *ummah* was a step towards the unity of the Islamic community worldwide. Kartosuwiryo's 1936 *Sikap Hidjrah* pamphlet envisaged Islamic brotherhood across nations as a means to unify the entire Islamic *ummah*, and he reconfirmed this aspiration in 1940, so that on the eve of the Japanese invasion the unity of Indonesian Muslims was still seen as just part of unifying the entire Islamic world, of creating a new world (i.e., the *Doenia Islam* or *Daroel Islam*). Japanese administrators were successful in leading religious leaders to read the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere project in Islamic terms, and Kartosuwiryo also adhered to this vision, stating that the *keloearga Asia Timoer Raya* was a *Daroel Islam*. In the greater scheme of things, however, this accommodation with the Japanese represented a reduction of the Darul Islam project to an Asian regional perspective.

This long-lasting commitment to an outward-oriented Islamic state—whether this be across the Muslim world or across Asia—was eventually halted by the Dutch return, which instigated a shift in focus. Kartosuwiryo and other political leaders further narrowed their ambitions to the creation of an Indonesian nation-state independent of foreign rule. The territorial scope of the *Doenia Baroe/Daroel Islam* was first scaled down to the borders of the Netherlands East Indies, and, with the 1948 Renville agreement, it scaled down even further to West Java, with Kartosuwiryo's expansionist desires limited to the Indonesian Archipelago. After the proclamation of Negara Islam Indonesia in 1949, tensions with the Indonesian Republic increased, and Kartosuwiryo's state became—for some—symbolic of Islamic opposition to the Pancasila state. Kartosuwiryo's *Manifesto Politik* appealed once again to the *ummah*, and suggested a political progression from West Java to the Islamic world, focusing on both inter-state and inter-community connections. As the NII expanded to Aceh, South Sulawesi, and South Kalimantan, the Islamic state's leaders began to look at the wider Islamic world. As relations between the NII and the Republic of Indonesia deteriorated through the 1950s, inter-state relations were deemed the apt strategy to form the *Negara Karunia Allah* and a "worldwide union of Islamic states" that would eventually establish the *Khalifatullah Fil'ardi* within the structure of an Islamic federation of nation-states.

The rationale behind the shifting prioritization of pan-Islam over nationalism, and internationalism over transnationalism, between the 1920s and the 1950s, is left unanswered by the sources, as neither Kartosuwiryo nor the PSII directorate ever deemed it necessary to explain the logic behind their policies. Nonetheless, throughout the historical analysis of these complex relations, I have highlighted the connections between appeals to an external, self-standing, sanctified aim and periods of political crisis in the Indonesian Islamic movement. Projecting the local struggle towards the establishment of a broader Darul Islam, or *ad-daulat-ul-Islamiyah*, provided additional motivation and strength to the Indonesian *ummah*, regardless of who the enemy was. Thus, I conclude that the goal of creating an international union of Islamic nation-states shifted to one of unifying a transnational Islamic community not because of pure ideological intents, but because of surrounding historical circumstances.