Sometime in September 1962, S. M. Kartosoewirjo, the leader of a once formidable insurgency that had proclaimed an Islamic State of Indonesia (Negara Islam Indonesia, NII), was executed by a firing squad of the Indonesian Republic. This act has been recorded as the beginning of the end of the Islamic State and its so-called Darul Islam (Abode of Islam) rebellion. Forty years later, however, a young man called Iqbal wrote the following before he blew himself up along with hundreds of others at the Sari Club in Bali on October 12, 2002:

Today I say: that I am a child of DI/NII [Darul Islam/Negara Islam Indonesia] who is ready to sacrifice myself for Islam. Remember, o mujahideen of Malingping, how our imam, S. M. Kartosuwirjo, built and upheld and proclaimed the independence of the Islamic State of Indonesia with the blood and lives of martyrs, not by relaxing and fooling around the way we do today. If you are serious about seeing the glory of the buried Islamic State of Indonesia rise...
again, shed your blood so that you won’t be ashamed to face Allah, you who acknowledge yourselves to be children of DI/NII.⁴

The Bali bombings may be remembered internationally as the mark of al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia. But what of this “buried Islamic State”? And why would such a state—buried or simply forgotten to most Indonesians—be for Iqbal so compelling?

In its path-breaking work on the problem of militant Islam in Indonesia, the International Crisis Group (ICG) has identified the crucial importance of the Darul Islam (DI) movement and its “very extended family.” The ICG concludes that,

Over the last fifty-five years, that movement has produced splinters and offshoots that range from Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) to non-violent religious groups. Every time the older generation seems on the verge of passing into irrelevance, a new generation of young militants, inspired by DI’s history and the mystique of an Islamic state, emerges to give the movement a new lease on life.⁵

In this article, I will attempt to illuminate the part of Darul Islam’s past that connects Iqbal, the recent recruit, to Kartosoewirjo, the legend. I will suggest that Darul Islam is not so much a “movement” as a backward-looking community whose members regard themselves as citizens of an alternative state. They know not “Darul Islam,” but the “Islamic State of Indonesia”—a state still in existence, however vestigial, and continuous with the state proclaimed by Kartosoewirjo in 1949. This is Darul Islam’s premise. Accordingly, when Darul Islam ideologue Ustadz Adi is asked in an interview, “Do you agree with an Islamic state?” naturally he responds: “For me, the issue is no longer to agree or to disagree. The issue is one of defense. For us, an Islamic state is no longer a discourse but, rather, represents a national identity.”⁶ Thus, instead of a unified manifestation of collective action (a movement), the phenomenon of Darul Islam is perhaps best understood as a form of collective identity, and one that encompasses the range of movements and dispositions noted by the ICG. It is, in its own terms, a nation. And it is a nation to us, too, if we accept Benedict Anderson’s stripped-back definition of the nation as “an imagined political community—and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.”⁷

In his book Imagined Communities, Anderson is puzzled by the remarkable endurance and political power of nationalism, despite its “philosophical poverty.” He suggests it would be easier to understand it not as an ideology but as something akin to kinship or religion. It is the sense of fraternity in the nation—the “imagined community”—“that makes it possible over the last two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings.” This leads to his formulation of “the central problem posed by nationalism,” a question that recalls us to Iqbal’s suicide attack: “What makes the shrunken imaginings of recent history ... generate such colossal sacrifices?”⁸

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⁴ Last Testament of Iqbal, alias Arnasan, alias Acong, n.d., author collection.
⁸ Ibid., pp. 7, 5.
Here I approach the question by way of an investigation into Darul Islam post-Kartosoewirjo, when the Islamic State survived underground during Suharto's New Order regime. First I recapitulate the history of Darul Islam as a rebellion during the Indonesian national revolution. Then I chart the revival of the Islamic State during the 1970s under the auspices of close presidential advisor and intelligence czar Ali Moertopo. I argue that this revival was the result of Darul Islam taking advantage of a window of political opportunity, as two sections of the New Order security apparatus rivaled each other for control of the Darul Islam network. Finally, I show how the revival indirectly led to the emergence of the more radical offshoot, Jemaah Islamiyah. I argue that Jemaah Islamiyah splintered from Darul Islam in 1993 primarily because its leadership rejected Kartosoewirjo's Islamic State. Through the course of this historical narrative, I hope to illustrate something of the "imaginative power" of Darul Islam's religious nationalism, as well as its limitations.

In this task, I have benefited from access to somewhat fragmentary information from case file documents found in Indonesian court archives. I draw on two cases in particular. The first is that of Haji Ismail Pranoto, or Hispran, heard in the District Court of Surabaya in 1978. The Hispran case was the most extensively publicized of the trials associated with that specter of Islamic extremism known as "Komando Jihad," a group supposedly responsible for a series of bombings that resulted in the arrest, beginning in the late 1970s, of hundreds of Muslim suspects. Komando Jihad provoked much popular doubt and suspicion among a public wary of the New Order manipulating Islam in order to discredit the regime's Muslim political rivals. Covered regularly by the press, the Hispran trial was one of the most controversial: Muslim leader and former prime minister Mohammad Natsir called Hispran "an agent provocateur run by Ali Murtopo." The second case is that of Dodo Muhammad Darda, son of S. M. Kartosoewirjo, heard in the District Court of Bandung from 1983–84. Both Hispran and Dodo were jailed for attempting to revive the Islamic State of Indonesia.

The Rebellion

The Darul Islam rebellion originated amid the Indonesian guerrilla campaign for independence against the Dutch in West Java, a campaign largely fought under the auspices of the mainstream Islamic political party Masyumi. S. M. Kartosoewirjo, a Muslim politician known for his uncompromising stance towards the Dutch, was one of the founders of Masyumi as a political party in 1945. In 1947, he became the Masyumi representative for West Java, in charge of coordinating its guerrilla units, Hizbulah and Sabilillah. Van Dijk notes that, at this early stage, the Masyumi units were "just two of many guerrilla organizations fighting alongside the official Republican Army against the Dutch in West Java," but they saw themselves as the most important, and as the "Republic's 'second army' ... the first army being the Siliwangi Division of the official Republican Army in West Java." Kartosoewirjo, it

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9 I borrow this term from Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 158.
seems, was still loyal to the Republic. One account suggests he proclaimed an Islamic state as early as 1945 but retracted his declaration after Sukarno and Hatta proclaimed the Republic.\textsuperscript{12} In 1946, he was still calling for ideological differences with the Republican leaders to be put aside until independence had been won, at which point it could be determined democratically whether Islam or some other ideology would be the basis of the state.\textsuperscript{13} He did, however, gradually distance himself from Masyumi and take a harder line with the Dutch. The Renville Treaty, signed with the Netherlands on January 17, 1948, was the catalyst for Kartosoewirjo's break with the Republic. Republican leaders portrayed Renville, which ceded West Java to the Dutch, as a temporary strategic withdrawal, but for Kartosoewirjo—as for many fighters based in West Java—it was a betrayal of the revolution. Large sections of Hizbullah and Sabilillah defied the order to withdraw.\textsuperscript{14} In February, Kartosoewirjo led a conference at Cisayong that effectively suspended Masyumi in West Java and converted its organizational apparatus into an Islamic Council (Majelis Islam), with Kartosoewirjo as imam (political and religious leader). The remaining Hizbullah and Sabilillah troops formed into the Islamic Army of Indonesia (Tentara Islam Indonesia). By year's end, Kartosoewirjo was releasing statements in the name of the Islamic State of Indonesia.\textsuperscript{15}

Also by year's end, the Dutch had initiated their second military action, and Sukarno and Hatta had been captured. For Kartosoewirjo, this was a mixed blessing. It gave him the pretext to declare the Republic dead and assert his role in the revolution, but the Dutch action was considered a violation of Renville and, as such, triggered the return of the Siliwangi Division to West Java. To the surprise of Siliwangi, on its return it met armed resistance from Islamic Army troops who now considered West Java their territory alone. The result was what Darul Islam refers to as "triangular warfare": Darul Islam against both Dutch and Republican forces. Himawan Soetanto, a former Siliwangi commander who, as a young man, fought the Darul Islam in West Java, recalls his opponents' determination: "Fighting against them was tougher than if you compare it to fighting against the Dutch. [That was] because of their ideology—they were fighting for an Islamic state in Indonesia."\textsuperscript{16} In the midst of this complicated situation, on August 7, 1949, Kartosoewirjo officially proclaimed the Islamic State.\textsuperscript{17} His great conceit was to claim that, given the Republican "surrender" to the Dutch at Renville, the State had been established in a vacuum of power. Announcing the proclamation, he wrote,

Praise be to God, at a moment that is vacant (a vacuum) [sic], at a moment when there is no authority and no administration responsible ... thus at a critical moment ... the Muslim Community of the Indonesian Nation is so bold as to take a stand and position that is clear and explicit for the entire world: the

\textsuperscript{13} Van Dijk, \textit{Rebellion under the Banner of Islam}, p. 85.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p. 86; on the Cisayong conference, see Dengel, \textit{Darul Islam dan Kartosuwirjo}, p. 67.
\textsuperscript{16} Interview with Himawan Soetanto, Jakarta, July 25, 2007.
\textsuperscript{17} Van Dijk, \textit{Rebellion under the Banner of Islam}, p. 92.
proclamation of the establishment of the Islamic State of Indonesia, 7 August 1949.\textsuperscript{18}

Kartosoewirjo later announced that the national struggle for independence, which had been waged over the last four years, was over. Now a holy war (perang suci) would take its place until the Islamic State is established “100 percent de facto and de jure over all of Indonesia.”\textsuperscript{19}

The “betrayal" represented by Renville and the “vacuum of power” would become recurrent themes in Darul Islam’s nationalist mythology. And because the Islamic State was forged in the heat of Indonesia’s revolutionary struggle, it sought legitimacy not just from Islam, but from the same revolutionary nationalism that fired the struggle for the Republic. Thus the state that Darul Islam conceived had strong resemblances with its Republican sibling. For example, considering its constitution (Kanun Azasy), Van Dijk concludes, “Apart from the difference in terminology and the acknowledgement of the syari’ah, or Islamic Law, as the dominant legal system, the Kanun Azasy closely resembled the 1945 Constitution, which in fact was taken as its model, with some modifications.”\textsuperscript{20} According to the Kanun Azasy, the Islamic State would, in fact, be a “Republik”—though it favored the equivalent Islamic term, “Djumhuryah.”\textsuperscript{21} But what makes Darul Islam identity unique is its fusion of 1940s revolutionary nationalism with Qur’anic precept and Prophetic example. This fusion is symbolized in its official flag—red over white with a crescent and star—the quintessential emblem of Islam set against the same colors that represent the Indonesian Republic.\textsuperscript{22}

In the 1950s, the rebellion became increasingly ruthless, especially towards civilians, and, writes B. J. Boland, “formed one of the greatest worries for the government of the Republic of Indonesia.”\textsuperscript{23} The rebellion encompassed not just mountainous West Java but also parts of Central Java. Darul Islam rebellions characterized by local concerns also emerged in South Sulawesi, Kalimantan, and Aceh. While local factors varied, according to Van Dijk the rebellions shared two proximate causes. First, advocates felt a sense of grievance at the ascendancy of the Republican army over irregular troops and the attendant disputes over which elements of the irregular forces would be demobilized and which would be incorporated into the regular army. Second, there was disaffection with the central government’s increasing control over the provinces.\textsuperscript{24} In Java, the rebellion peaked in the mid-to-late 1950s and was marked by Darul Islam’s burning of villages that it deemed had betrayed Islam. Holk H. Dengel cites figures, probably of Republican provenance, that suggest the impact of the conflict in West Java between 1953 and 1958: 11,521 people killed, 1,298 kidnapped, 362,009 houses burned, and 1,081,713 people internally displaced.\textsuperscript{25} The rebellion quickly subsided, however, in the early 1960s. One factor

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{18} “Makloemat Pemerintah Negara Islam Indonesia No. II/7,” in Al-Chaidar, \textit{Pemikiran Politik Proklamator Negara Islam Indonesia S. M. Kartosoewirjo} (Jakarta: Darul Falah, 1999), p. 102.
  \item \textsuperscript{19} Ibid., p. 103.
  \item \textsuperscript{20} Van Dijk, \textit{Rebellion under the Banner of Islam}, p. 96.
  \item \textsuperscript{21} “Kanan Azasy Negara Islam Indonesia,” in Boland, \textit{Struggle of Islam}, p. 257.
  \item \textsuperscript{22} Ibid., p. 262.
  \item \textsuperscript{23} Boland, \textit{Struggle of Islam}, p. 54.
  \item \textsuperscript{24} Ibid., p. 340.
  \item \textsuperscript{25} Dengel, \textit{Darul Islam dan Kartosuwirjo}, p. 147.
\end{itemize}
that helped quell the fighting was the Republican army’s effective use of the “fence of legs” (pagar betis) tactic, in which villagers would be conscripted into military operations to encircle and then close in on Darul Islam redoubts. But the coup de grâce was the capture of Kartosoewirjo in June 1962, followed by his execution. It is an indication of the importance of his charismatic leadership that soon after his arrest most of the movement surrendered to government forces. On August 1, 1962, thirty-two Darul Islam leaders signed a Joint Declaration (Ikrar Bersama), in which, in return for amnesty, they renounced the movement and pledged allegiance to the Indonesian Republic. The rebellion was effectively over.

The Revival

In the 1970s, Darul Islam underwent a revival, emerging not as an open rebellion but as a clandestine community. The scene had been set with Suharto’s ascendance to power; Darul Islam and the New Order regime shared a militant anti-communism. Naturally, Darul Islam had been anti-communist from the beginning. During the rebellion, Kartosoewirjo, as imam of the Islamic State of Indonesia, had sent an apocalyptic secret letter to President Sukarno, copied to Prime Minister Mohammad Natsir, prophesizing a “Third World War” between Cold War powers. He warned of communist preparations to stage a coup d’état and urged the Republic’s leaders to protect the sovereignty of the state. He referred to his advice in an earlier secret letter, which counseled that there was no other way to ensure the security of the Indonesian state and nation other than “if the government of the Republic of Indonesia begins now, swiftly and surely, to eradicate Communism in every area.” In return for official recognition of the Islamic State, he guaranteed that “the Indonesian Republic would have a friend for life in facing any potential [threat] from without and from within, especially in facing Communism.”

Kartosoewirjo’s secret entreaties were rebuffed. But later, anti-communism did become the ideological pretext for an ambiguous relationship between Darul Islam and the state under Suharto. Darul Islam claims a role in the 1965–66 destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI), although substantial evidence of its participation is yet to come to light. Still, it is clear that, early on, a close relationship with Darul Islam was cultivated by Suharto advisor Ali Moertopo and his rogue Special Operations intelligence organization, Opsus. Moertopo had the power and creativity to forge profitable alliances with politically compromised figures, often by rehabilitating them in return for their carrying out Opsus work. In this way, Opsus employed elements from the PRRI (Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia, Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia) rebellion, the PKI,

\[\text{27 Ikrar-Bersama, Bandung, August 1, 1962, author collection.}\]
\[\text{28 S. M. Kartosoewirjo to Sukarno in Boland, } \text{Struggle of Islam, pp. 250–55.}\]
\[\text{29 ICG, Recycling Militants, p. 3.}\]
\[\text{30 I use the word “organization” advisedly. Opsus was not a formal institution; rather, it was a network of agents and intelligence officers from other institutions that was loyal to Ali Moertopo. Moertopo, who from 1970 was also a member of the state intelligence agency Bakin, apparently used Opsus on an ad hoc basis for his more clandestine operations, ostensibly with Suharto’s approval.}\]
and Darul Islam. For Darul Islam, Danu Mohammad Hasan, a commander from West Java who had signed the Joint Declaration in 1962, was the main point of contact. Danu was recruited by Opsus officer Aloysius Sugiyanto, who in early 1966 used him and his men to pursue pro-Sukarno officials who had gone into hiding, suspected of being involved in the earlier communist coup attempt. According to Sugiyanto, Danu led a failed operation to abduct Sukarno’s foreign minister and intelligence chief, Dr. Subandrio.

But it took another Darul Islam leader, Aceng Kurnia, to make the first moves to unearth the buried Islamic State. Aceng, a former bodyguard of Kartosoewirjo, was joined by a group of younger followers that included Ridwan, a former fighter under Hispran in Brebes, Central Java. According to Ridwan, Aceng alone had continued to champion the Islamic State since the fall of Kartosoewirjo. In 1968, Aceng, along with associates Djaja Sujadi and Kadar Solihat, had begun reviving contacts with Darul Islam leaders outside Java, most notably with Gaos Taufik in North Sumatra and Daud Beureu’eh in Aceh. That year, also, Ridwan and his associates established a ten-member study group to venerate past Darul Islam leaders and advance the argument that surrender in 1962 had been a mistake and that the struggle should continue. Attempts to recruit others faltered, however, amid recriminations over the 1962 defeat and the reluctance of veterans to commit without clear approval from their former senior commanders. But they eventually secured the support of one key former commander, also based in Bandung: Danu Mohammad Hasan.

The role of Danu, remarkably uncontroversial at the time, would become central to the Darul Islam revival. It was he who, in 1971, hosted at his Gang Madrosah residence Darul Islam’s first post-Kartosoewirjo reunion. Danu, who claimed to work for the state intelligence agency Bakin, persuaded the others to let the agency sponsor the event. According to one account, 250,000 rupiah was made available by Opsus for the reunion. (Hilmi Aminuddin, one of Danu’s sons and the deputy chair of the meeting committee, was tasked with receiving the funds.) Considering Darul Islam’s long time in the wilderness, the reunion was a great success. Hundreds of members attended from across Indonesia, coming and going over three days from April 24–26. A number of Darul Islam leaders made speeches, including Djaja Sujadi and Hispran. And with

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33 Interview with Aloysius Sugiyanto, Jakarta, May 11, 2008. The nature of Danu’s relationship with Opsus is unclear. At his trial, Hispran claimed that he had once slept overnight at Danu’s office in Bakin, the State Intelligence Coordinating Body that from 1970 became Moertopo’s institutional home. See Haji Ismail Pranoto, court testimony in Hispran case. On Moertopo and Bakin, see Conboy, *Intel*, p. 75.

34 A1 Chaidar interview with Ridwan, October 8, 1999.

35 Unpublished memoirs by Kang Edi, February 17, 2000, p. 2, author collection. Gaos Taufik was a former Lieutenant Colonel in the TII (Tentara Islam Indonesia) in West Java, until he was captured and forcibly transmigrated to Sumatra in 1955. Daud Beureu’eh was a long-time Islamic leader, the head of PUSA (Persatuan Ulama Seluruh Aceh, All-Aceh Religious Scholars’ Association) and the former Republican Governor of Aceh, who, in 1953, joined the Darul Islam rebellion after Aceh was subsumed into North Sumatra province. He was a long-time Islamic leader and head of

government sponsorship came government participation. Two members of the military establishment attended: Colonel Dadang of the Siliwangi Command and Colonel Pitut Suharto, an Opsus operative whose special field was political Islam.37

Ridwan, who was a member of the reunion committee, answered questions about these unusual circumstances in a 2001 interview with Darul Islam Magazine:38

- So this means the NII was being used by intelligence?
- Yes. Even Pitut Suharto attended then and gave a speech entitled “NII Supports Golkar.” Thus, since then it has been popular to say that the NII was used by Bakin.
- If it is clear they were being used, why did the mujahideen stay quiet?
- Actually, from the beginning we wanted to use Bakin. We needed support for the movement. We didn’t have funding, and support from the Muslim community [ummat] was less than total, so at the time we used Bakin.
- What about the mujahideen, didn’t they protest?
- No one protested. Because at that time we saw Bakin as a protector and as an aid to security.

But, he says, despite government sponsorship, Darul Islam maintained an independent agenda:

Behind the scenes at the reunion, a different perspective can be seen. All NII exponents were preparing an internal re-coordination. From that meeting, the sharing of contacts and taking up of tasks began. Who was tasked in Sukabumi, Tasikmalaya, East Java, and so on. Subsequently regular meetings were held at Danu Muhammad Hasan’s house.39

Thus, almost from the outset, the Darul Islam revival was based on a fundamental contradiction: the state’s cooptation of an anti-state movement. The cooptation of antithetical elements was a classic Moertopo strategy. While Darul Islam might like to emphasize that its relationship with Moertopo was one of mutual exploitation, it is likely that it was more than just this. Moertopo had gained some trust within the community by cultivating the impression that he was a covert Darul Islam sympathizer. Such an impression, however naïve, appears to have rested on Moertopo’s former role as a fighter with the Hizbullah guerrilla army during the revolution. The precise nature of Moertopo’s relationship with Hizbullah is unclear, but his identification with the group was part of the public image he cultivated. Moertopo may have further bolstered his credentials within Darul Islam by allowing it to be believed he would support Indonesia becoming an Islamic State.40

In the early New Order period, Moertopo used Darul Islam elements to target regime enemies. Now, however, he cultivated broader Darul Islam support as part of his effort to engineer a Golkar victory in the general elections of July 3, 1971. This was

39 Interview with Ridwan by Al Chaidar, October 8, 1999.
40 Cahyono, Pangkopkamtib Jenderal Soemitro, p. 195.
considered something of a challenge. Many in the government, including Moertopo, were pessimistic about Golkar’s prospects, given its lack of a support base and the presence of strong opposition in the form of the traditionalist Muslim organization Nahdlatul Ulama (NU, Revival of the Religious Scholars). Central to Golkar’s campaign was a Moertopo stratagem to erode the NU vote by establishing a Golkar-affiliated group that would appeal directly to NU’s traditionalist Muslim constituency. The appropriate vehicle was found in the somewhat obscure Islamic Education Advancement League (GUPPI, Gabungan Usaha Perbaikan Pendidikan Islam), an association formed in 1950 in West Java to foster pesantren education. In the early 1970s, under the guidance of close Moertopo associate, Soedjono Hoemardani, GUPPI went from being a moribund collaboration of several West Java pesantren to a Jakarta-based, nationwide network led by K. H. Sjarifuddin Mohammad Amin, an NU-affiliated chairman of the religious education directorate in the Department of Religious Affairs.

In mid-1970, Pitut Suharto was tasked to coopt Muslims into GUPPI. This operation—notable for the large financial rewards it offered and the fact that it targeted, inter alios, Darul Islam—is documented in a detailed study by Indonesian researcher Heru Cahyono. Cahyono reveals that large sums of money were made available through the Opsus network as inducements to join GUPPI. Based on an interview with GUPPI chairman, Sjarifuddin, Cahyono describes how some of the most influential kyai (scholar-teachers) were bought off. K. H. Tarmudzim, a kyai from East Java who ran a multitude of schools, initially declined to support Golkar; he reversed his position, however, after GUPPI offered funding to develop his schools. The first tranche of aid to Tarmudzim was in the order of fifty million rupiah—US$128,205 at the exchange rate of the time. K. H. Ali Maksum, a prominent pesantren of eight hundred students in Yogyakarta, received fourteen million rupiah. K. H. Musta’in Romly, the head of one of Java’s biggest pesantren, was given fifty million rupiah, along with special credit from the regional government for the development of his pesantren.41 The business associates of Soedjono Hoemardani and Ali Moertopo appear to have been the sources of such largesse; both were known to have close connections with Japanese businessmen through the Opsus network. Based on interviews with GUPPI Secretary-General Djamhari and Pitut Suharto, Cahyono footnotes the following snapshot of GUPPI financing:

GUPPI was a very rich organization. Aside from funds received through official requests for government assistance, GUPPI received funds that were attained by Soedjono himself. [These funds] were of a large amount and greatly exceeded official government assistance. GUPPI was able to benefit from Soedjono’s special relationship with Japanese investors. Aside from this, contributions could appear spontaneously from Soedjono’s “business associates,” friends, or national businessmen. Through the influence of the power that was so greatly associated with the Soedjono–Ali Moertopo duo, GUPPI could even attain assistance from the governor, for example, in making available transportation.42

42 Ibid., pp. 120–21.
There are fewer details regarding the recruitment of Darul Islam members, but Pitut Suharto concedes that this did, indeed, take place. He argues that GUPPI, while originally aimed at the pesantren masses and traditionalist circles, was also conceived as an organization to cultivate the entire Islamic community and to counter the radical tendencies within it. Cahyono paraphrases Pitut’s rationale as follows:

In order that there not be a recurrence of the Islamic radicalism that until now has haunted Indonesian political history, a better approach needs to be found ... Therefore an Islamic organization must be cultivated that can sustain Islamic aspirations from the various existing streams and subsequently be led in a direction that is more modern.43

But GUPPI was also a Golkar-linked organization and, as such, it was one of many corporatist bodies designed by Moertopo to immobilize opposition to the New Order by forcing diverse groups into coalitions under government-controlled umbrella organizations. As Cahyono shows, GUPPI was under the sway of figures loyal to Moertopo and Soedjono who had no background in Islamic education.

Documentary evidence confirms that at least one senior Darul Islam figure—Hispran himself—was a member of GUPPI from the outset. He held a GUPPI membership card, issued by the “Central Java Consulate,” fingerprinted and signed “H. Ismail Pranoto.” Hispran’s position is recorded as “pembina” (manager–trainer), and the date of membership is given as February 18, 1971—only weeks after GUPPI had been converted into a Golkar organization.44 Darul Islam might seem an obscure constituency to be canvassing for a general election, even if we credit it with a residual base of support in the hinterlands of West Java, near Garut, Tasikmalaya, and Ciamis.45 Moertopo, however, appears to have favored a fine-grained approach to political engineering. He also cultivated support from other, relatively small, segments of society, including Catholic youth and mystical (kebatinan) groups.46

Pitut’s GUPPI operation coincided with the signing of what can be regarded as the founding document of the Darul Islam–New Order relationship. Known as the Second Declaration (Ikrar Kedua), the document is a statement by four Darul Islam leaders, which comprised three points: (1) a reaffirmation of the first Joint Declaration and a pledge of loyalty to the Indonesian Republic; (2) a resolution not to enter or affiliate with a political party—a clause that would preclude affiliation with anyone other than Golkar, which was technically not considered a party; and (3) an affirmation of willingness to remain under the aegis of and become a force for the government.47 The statement is dated Bandung, October 28, 1970, and signed by Danu Mohammad Hasan, Hadji Zainoel Abidin, Ateng Djaelani Setiawan, and one of Kartosoewirjo’s sons, Tahmid Rahmat Basuki. As a witness for the prosecution in the Hispran trial, Ateng testified that the Second Declaration was Pitut’s idea and was meant to prevent former Darul Islam members from being drawn into party politics. But it was a

43 Ibid., p. 90.
44 Documentary evidence (item no. 20) in Hispran case.
46 Interview with Harry Tjan Silalahi, Jakarta, April 8, 2008.
47 Documentary evidence (item No. 6) in Hispran case.
controversial document. Another Darul Islam leader, Adah Djaelani, described it as "too obsequious and overacting." 48

Hispran had fewer scruples. The corollary of the Second Declaration was that Darul Islam members should support Golkar, the government electoral vehicle ostensibly above party politics, and Hispran, as part of his trial testimony, claimed that he did so readily. He described the process of his recruitment to Golkar in this way:

In the month of October, 1970, that is to say at the time of the Second Declaration done in Bandung by friends H. Danu Moh. Hasan, H. Ateng Djaelani, Abidin, and Tahmid, I was called to Bandung to meet these friends whom until then I had known by name only, and Colonel Pitut Suharto. Because Point 2 of the declaration prohibited the joining of a political party, it was suggested by Colonel Pitut Suharto [that we should] join Golkar. Because we were aware that Golkar aimed to fulfill the Revolution of 17 August 1945, we agreed. Then, after that, we returned to Brebes with the Second Declaration document, and we reported to KODIM [Komando Distrik Militer, District Military Command] Brebes, then we were invited to join Golkar in the form of GUPPI and also invited to join the campaign in Central Java and West Java.49 Later, Hispran described his role in GUPPI as that of preacher (mubalig). At the invitation of GUPPI, he preached in Brebes, Cirebon, Klaten and Solo, presumably urging his audience to vote Golkar.50 Even if we discount Hispran’s testimony as information given under duress and intended to win sympathy with the court, it is remarkable that a figure known as one of the most diehard Darul Islam leaders had been coopted into a government-affiliated organization. Hispran had become something of a legend in Darul Islam circles, as he was perhaps the only leader to have neither surrendered nor been caught in 1962. Instead, he escaped Java to live for the rest of the 1960s in Lampung, Sumatra, where he assumed a new identity as a preacher.51

But Hispran’s politically expedient accommodation with Golkar—like the accommodations made by prominent kyai—was almost certainly induced by the financial patronage that he and other Darul Islam leaders received. According to Ken Conboy, a consultant on Indonesian security affairs with direct access to intelligence circles, beginning in 1969 Opsus arranged for Darul Islam leaders to receive kerosene distribution rights in Java in return for support for Golkar. Conboy claims that Ateng Djaelani, the veteran Darul Islam commander who signed both Joint Declarations, was "ultimately placed in charge of the kerosene network allocated by Moertopo." 52 Trial evidence indeed supports the notion that Darul Islam had become part of the Golkar patronage system. Hispran, in his trial, repeatedly made reference to Ateng’s kerosene interests, as well as to the kickbacks others had received from the government: Danu Mohammad Hasan, in addition to his job with Opsus, was given a jeep and a driver; Hispran himself received building contracts for his Brebes-based company CV Sadar.

48 Haji Ismail Pranoto, court testimony in Hispran case.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Interview with Tahmid Rahmat Basuki, Malangbong, September 21, 2009.
52 Conboy, The Second Front, p. 16.
Hispran also claimed to have received a three million rupiah grant from Danu Mohammad Hasan for the building of a school.53

It appears that two Darul Islam leaders had kerosene businesses. Adah Djaelani (no relation to Ateng), a West Java Darul Islam commander who had signed the first Joint Declaration in 1962 but rejected the second, was director of the kerosene distribution company PT Sawo 11.54 Ateng Djaelani was director of the kerosene company PT Satrya Purnawarman. Upon closer inspection of Ateng’s case, it becomes apparent that it was the West Java Siliwangi Command—and not Opsus—that pioneered the patronage of Darul Islam. In an interrogation with the military intelligence command, Kopkamtib (Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban, Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order), Ateng spoke of how he got started in the kerosene business.55 After signing the Joint Declaration in 1962, he opened two roadside stalls in Bandung. As the owner of a retail store, he was also a kerosene distributor. In 1963, Ateng says, “my wife and children could live simply from the proceeds of the stalls,” he traveled to Jakarta to meet Deputy Prime Minister Chairul Saleh, whom he had known since 1945. He was carrying a letter from the Siliwangi Division commander, General Ibrahim Adjie. Ateng does not divulge the letter’s content, but whatever it was, it appears to have been helpful. General Adjie, the commander who had led the defeat of Darul Islam in 1962, was known for the concern with which he had treated his enemy. Hiroko Horikoshi notes the rather conciliatory approach the government took to Darul Islam fighters in 1962 (the execution of Kartosoewirjo notwithstanding); most were either released immediately or given amnesty. “The Siliwangi,” she writes, “headed by General Ibrahim Adjie, too, played their part by treating the surrendering soldiers with compassion.”56 But in Ateng’s case, it was more than just compassion. As a result of Adjie’s patronage and the Jakarta meeting, he was given a share in diesel distribution rights to plantations, presumably in West Java. Under the New Order, Moertopo only increased such patronage, and Ateng’s prospects continued to rise. From 1973, until the Komando Jihad affair broke in 1976, Ateng served as the West Java general chairman of Gapermigas, the Golkar-affiliated union of private oil and gas traders.

Siliwangi’s relationship with Darul Islam went far beyond just Ateng Djaelani and involvement in the oil and gas industry. The Division had cultivated a special relationship with Darul Islam since its defeat of the rebellion. Under Ibrahim Adjie, the policy that became a Siliwangi tradition was one of patronage and indoctrination (called pembinaan, or “guidance”) rather than punishment. Ostensibly this meant that not only were Darul Islam fighters reintegrated with society ideologically, but that financial and other support also saw them reintegrated economically. It was under this policy that Siliwangi intervened to reclaim the Kartosoewirjo’s land in Malangbong, West Java, for the use of the executed leader’s family. But Siliwangi’s patronage network was challenged by Moertopo during the New Order. According to General

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53 Haji Ismail Pranoto, court testimony in Hispran case.
55 Ateng Djaelani, interrogation deposition in Dodo case.
Soemitro (the 1973-74 Kopkamtib Commander who famously clashed with Ali Moertopo), rivalry emerged between Siliwangi and Opsus over control of Darul Islam after Opsus’s entry into what was considered Siliwangi territory. Former Darul Islam members, he says, “at the beginning were managed by Kodam Siliwangi so that they would not continue the movement ... but suddenly [they were] pulled by Ali Moertopo to Jakarta.” Siliwangi had no choice in the matter, and as a result, its relationship with Moertopo deteriorated. Such institutional rivalry would eventually culminate in a security scare in 1977 and the mass arrests of so-called Komando Jihad suspects.

In 1971, however, Moertopo could still claim that his political machinations had been a success. In the general election, Golkar won a landslide 62.8 percent of the vote. NU had been successfully contained, coming in second with 18.67 percent. The party Parmusi (Partai Muslimin Indonesia, Muslim Party of Indonesia) was devastated; it gained only 5.36 percent of the vote. Appropriately, Moertopo and his offsider Pitut Suharto consolidated their positions within the Golkar executive. Pitut’s role was formalized as “secretary for spiritual matters and culture.”

**Komando Jihad**

Attractive, perhaps, to young radicals, the not-so-subtle name “Komando Jihad” had, in fact, appeared before. In 1967 the name was adopted by a coalition of Muslim youth organizations, led by the Muslim Students of Indonesia (Pelajar Islam Indonesia, PII) activist Abdul Qadir Djaelani. The Komando Jihad coalition was formed as a front to support the New Order in its purge of elements of the old regime. But it lasted only a few months and seems to have spent much of its energy fighting the ban placed on it by the military authorities. The mid-1970s saw the name recycled by a new generation of Darul Islam members in Medan, Sumatra—one of them the former PII secretary for North Sumatra. They used it to describe, variously, their organization or their first operation, which, either way, represented a localized revival of Darul Islam. Although this name was not adopted beyond the Medan group, “Komando Jihad” eventually caught on with the authorities during their crackdown on the Darul Islam revival. As this crackdown was initiated on the eve of the 1977 general election, however, its timing—as well as Moertopo’s Machiavellian reputation—meant that Komando Jihad has gone down in history as a government conspiracy. Thus Damien Kingsbury in his *Politics of Indonesia* rightly observes that, “It was widely believed that the Komando Jihad did not actually exist, but was a fabrication by the armed forces for the purposes of tightening its political control.” The government was, in fact, eventually prepared to admit that the label they were using was not entirely accurate. As Tempo magazine noted, “Komando Jihad, according to [Attorney General] Ali Said,

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59 Ibid., p. 181.
is actually a term for a variety of extremist movements whose membership is led by former leaders of Darul Islam/Islamic Army of Indonesia."  

In 1973, these movements achieved a new level of consolidation. While the space for Muslim political parties shrank that year with the imposition of a two-party system of political opposition, the Islamic State of Indonesia had occasion to appoint its first imam since Kartosoewirjo. This event was the culmination of months of diplomacy. Several leaders, including Hispran, had traveled to Aceh to urge Daud Beureu'eh to consider accepting the position. Sometime in September, six key leaders met in Jakarta in a house on Jalan Mahoni owned by Romli Yakub, a former Darul Islam leader from South Sulawesi. Represented were the three command areas (Komando Perang Wilayah Besar) of Darul Islam's operations—Sumatra, Sulawesi, and Java-Madura. Sumatra was represented by Gaos Taufik, Sulawesi by Ali A. T., and Java-Madura by Adah Djaelani. Also present were Kartosoewirjo's former bodyguard, Aceng Kurnia, one of Kartosoewirjo's sons, Dodo Mohammad Darca, and Daud Beureu'eh himself. The meeting was brief but, for Darul Islam, historic. A simple command structure was formed, and Daud Beureu'eh was installed as the new imam. After eleven years, Darul Islam had its first successor to Kartosoewirjo.

Yet just as the Islamic State was taking shape, it began to fracture. Two pioneers of the 1970s revival, Dja Ja Sujadi and Kadar Solihat, had from the outset resisted moves that would entangle Darul Islam with the New Order authorities. At the 1971 reunion in Bandung, for example, they had opposed Opsus sponsorship. Now, in 1975, they broke ties with the mainstream leadership and formed a breakaway group, with Dja Ja Sujadi anointing himself imam. The Sujadi faction styled itself on the doctrine of *Jihad Fillah*, connoting non-violent jihad. This was in contrast to the faction led by Adah Djaelani, which did not eschew violence and adhered to the traditional Darul Islam doctrine of *Jihad Fisabilillah* or "jihad in the way of God." Such a schism had been in the making since the defeat of Darul Islam in 1962 and centered on the involvement in the revival of two leaders, Ateng Djaelani and Zaenal Abidin, both of whom had surrendered to Republican forces before the call to do so had been made by Kartosoewirjo, a decision that would turn out to be controversial. In his 1977 Kopkamtib interrogation, Ateng Djaelani gave the history of the dispute from his perspective. He reported that in 1962, "two days before Idul Fitri" and "long before S. M. Kartosoewirjo was caught," he had surrendered to the military in Bandung. "After surrendering, I, along with Zaenal Abidin, joined in helping to restore security through the [fence of legs] tactics of Kodam VI/Siliwangi at the time." Then, with the revival of

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63 The information on Romli Yacob is from Gaos Taufik, found in his interrogation deposition in the Hispran case. On the Mahoni meeting in general, see *Pikiran Rakyat*, February 25, 1983; and Dodo Mochamad Darca, interrogation deposition in Dodo case.
64 This top-level command structure is analogous to the TNI's (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian armed forces) Regional Defense Command (Komando Wilayah Pertahanan) structure, which was abandoned by the TNI in the mid-1980s.
65 Unpublished memoirs by Kang Edi, February 17, 2000, p. 3.
67 Ateng Djaelani, interrogation deposition in Dodo case. All quotations from Ateng in this paragraph derive from this source.
Darul Islam, rumors began to circulate that those who had surrendered before Kartosoewirjo had done so were to be considered impure or "mustamal leaders." Ateng explained that "mustamal" (from the Arabic for "used") "means water that has already been used for wudu [ablutions], thus cannot be used for wudu again." But those who had surrendered after Kartosoewirjo issued the command to do so remained pure and thus suitable for leadership positions. Among those who held this opinion was Djaja Sujadi.

But Adah Djaelani disagreed. With an eye to the position of imam, in September 1975 he called five leaders to a Meeting of Elders (Pertemuan Sesepuh) in Bandung. There he allocated positions of authority, or at least rankings, in the following order of seniority: (I) Adah Djaelani, (II) Danu Mohammad Hasan, (III) Ateng Djaelani, (IV) Zaenal Abidin, (V) Haji Ismail Pranoto.68

Adah Djaelani saw the grouping as a kind of civilian command independent from the authority of the Darul Islam military but also, perhaps, as a precursor to an imamate council or cabinet.69 According to Ateng, Adah's main motive was to generate support for himself in opposition to the Sujadi faction. It is unclear whether the elders had any operational role; still, the grouping is indicative of the perceived relative seniority of key Darul Islam leaders in the lead up to the Komando Jihad arrests.70 It is also indicative of the nebulous nature of Darul Islam's state-building. Adah's gambit created confusion as to whether the new grouping was informal or was, in fact, an official cabinet, with each of the five members responsible for particular portfolios. Hispran, who arrived late in Bandung, missed the meeting. He was told of its outcome by Ateng, who said that Adah Djaelani had been made prime minister, Danu Mohammad Hasan was now responsible for Darul Islam veterans, and Ateng himself had been named minister for internal affairs. Hispran was told he had been made responsible for communications for West and Central Java. But Hispran so doubted the legitimacy of the cabinet that in November 1975 he traveled to Aceh to consult with Imam Daud Beureu'eh. Beureu'eh, it transpired, was unaware of Adah Djaelani's initiative.71

Despite a confused and segmented organizational structure, Darul Islam members continued to reconsolidate the Islamic State. In December 1975, a meeting was called at the house of Danu Mohammad Hasan to receive Gaos Taufik from Sumatra. There Taufik, acting as envoy for Daud Beureu'eh, delivered a written order by Beureu'eh, acting as imam, to form a fighting front, or Barisan fi Sabilillah. Ateng Djaelani, who read the letter, described the order as one that called for the organization to

... immediately form a Barisan fi Sabilillah in accordance with the Islamic State of Indonesia statement No. 1/KPSI, complete with personnel. In hope that God Almighty blesses all our efforts towards the ideal of victory for the Islamic State of Indonesia.72

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68 Haji Ismail Pranoto, court testimony in Hispran case.
69 Adah Djaelani, interrogation deposition in Dodo case.
70 Ibid.
71 Haji Ismail Pranoto, interrogation deposition in Hispran case. Gaos Taufik, the organizer of Hispran's meeting with Beureu'eh, was also unaware of the appointments.
72 Ateng Djaelani, interrogation deposition in Dodo case.
As this action would only formalize the state-building efforts already quietly underway for months, it perhaps represented a move by Beur’euh to reassert his authority over Adah Djaelani and the Java leaders. Mirroring the Indonesian military’s territorial command structure, Java-based Darul Islam leaders had been installing commanders and other representatives into the Islamic State hierarchy at various levels. In 1976, the tempo of state-building quickened. Danu Mohammad Hasan spurred these efforts by claiming that Ali Moertopo was supporting them and would provide weapons for troops if Darul Islam first organized its personnel. Ridwan has recalled they were told “what’s important is that we prepare the organizational structure as fully as possible.” Court documents give a fairly consistent, if fragmentary, picture of the command structure established during this period. At the top was Daud Beureu’eh as imam and all-Indonesia Military Commander (Komandan Perang Seluruh Indonesia, KPSI). The top territorial command level was the Greater Region War Command (Komando Perang Wilayah Besar, KPWB), consisting of Java (and Madura), Sulawesi, and Sumatra. The most complete picture we have of the command hierarchy is for the Java area (known as KPWB I), as this is where the 1976 reorganizing was focused, to the relative neglect of Sulawesi (KPWB II) and Sumatra (KPWB III). The Commander (Panglima) of Java was Danu Mohammad Hasan. The Deputy Commander was Hispran. At the provincial level were nine Regional Commands (Komandan Wilayah, KW). Not all the names of the regional commanders are known, and it is likely that not all of the positions were filled. Positions had been filled, however, in Central and East Java, the two provinces that saw most of the reorganizing activity. The commander for Central Java (KW II) was Hispran. His deputy was a new recruit with a background in Hizbullah, Haji Faleh. Hispran also recruited the commander for East Java (KW III), Syamsudin.

In Central and East Java, Hispran attempted to establish the Islamic State structure at all levels below the provincial. Representatives or commanders were sought for the district (kabupaten), subdistrict (kecamatan), and village (desa). He often delegated the task of inducting recruits at these levels to his subordinates. Most new recruits, however, appear to have been sent to be formally inducted at Danu Mohammad Hasan’s house in Bandung, which was typically referred to as the “center” (pusat). For monitoring purposes, the highly centralized nature of the Islamic State must have been a great advantage to Opsus; according to Ridwan, if a meeting was a “central meeting” (pertemuan pusat), it had to be at Danu Mohammad Hasan’s house. There, often in the presence of Hispran and other Darul Islam leaders, recruits would recite an oath (bai’at), which required, inter alia, that they

... defend the existence of the Islamic State of Indonesia in order that Islamic Law applies comprehensively and most broadly among the Islamic Community of the Indonesian Nation in Indonesia.

73 Interview with Ridwan, Bandung, December 14, 2006.
74 This information is from Surat Dakwaan [Indictment] in Dodo case; and Haji Ismail Pranoto, interrogation deposition in Hispran case.
75 Haji Ismail Pranoto, interrogation deposition in Hispran case; and Moch. Syamsudin Marzuki, interrogation deposition in Hispran case.
76 Interview with Ridwan, Bandung, December 14, 2006.
77 Documentary evidence (item no. 2) in Hispran case.
Under interrogation, Dodo Muhammad Darda recounted numerous visits by new recruits from Central and East Java to Danu’s house for induction. During his interrogation, Hispran was asked why East Java was the focus of the recruitment drive. He responded that it was because of the strength of Islam in East Java, the concentration of former Hizbullah and Sabillullah fighters in that region, and the relatively high number of pesantren compared to that in West Java.

There are indications, however, that the drive was only a partial success before it was halted by the arrests of Hispran and colleagues. Hispran described being rejected several times by teachers he approached, who preferred to focus on their pesantren or university tasks rather than become involved with Darul Islam. He did admit, however, that he had success in the town of Kudus. There, in July 1976, he installed six men to form the Central Java leadership, including Haji Faleh, his future deputy commander for Central Java. All these leaders were required to report their activities to the “center.” One development is significant, in part, by its absence from the record: Hispran fails to mention that in December he succeeded in recruiting two pesantren teachers in Solo, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. These two men would later come to prominence for their role in founding Jemaah Islamiyah, a development to which we will return.

Outside Java the only significant Darul Islam revival was in Sumatra. There Gaos Taufik had recruited a small group of young men for an operation that they called Komando Jihad. Darul Islam members outside Sumatra did not recognize this name when they were later labeled with it by the authorities, but in interrogations for the Hispran trial in 1978, Taufik and his followers spoke frequently of Komando Jihad. Hispran and his followers, by contrast, preferred to use other terms for their operations, such as “Barisan fi Sabillullah” and “Jemaah Mujahidin.” In his unpublished memoirs, written in 2000, West Javanese Darul Islam leader Kang Edi uses the term “Komando Jihad” and categorically rejects the accusation that the operation was the product of government manipulation:

The Komando Jihad incident is often said to be [the result of] a manipulation by Ali Moertopo. At the meeting between Gaos Taufik and Danu Mohammad Hasan, there was an agreement to organize a revolution under the order of the second Imam of the Islamic State of Indonesia. So there was no involvement by Ali Moertopo in the Komando Jihad movement in Sumatra.

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78 Dodo Mochamad Darda, interrogation deposition in Dodo case.
79 Haji Ismail Pranoto, interrogation deposition in Hispran case.
80 Ibid.
81 Sungkar and Ba’asyir later confessed under interrogation to having been inducted by Hispran, but in their joint trial in 1982 they recanted, claiming their confession had been given under duress. They claimed that Hispran was a visitor to their pesantren but that they did not swear an oath to him or collaborate with him in any other way. See Abdullah bin Achmad Sungkar and Abu Bakar Basyir bin Abud Ba’asyir, court testimony in case No.1/Pid.Subv./1982/P.N.Skh., Pengadilan Negeri Sukoharjo (hereafter cited as Sungkar and Ba’asyir case). But in a deposition for the same trial, Hispran stated that he did indeed induct Sungkar and Ba’asyir into the Islamic State of Indonesia. Hispran confirmed this statement at the time to his friend in prison, Umar Abduh. Interview with Umar Abduh, Jakarta, July 24, 2007.
Taufik had started recruiting a new following in the early 1970s. Among those he inducted into Darul Islam who had no family background in the movement was Timsar Zubil. The two had met at the Medan office of the PII in 1967, the year that PII had become drawn into Abdul Qadir Djaelani’s Komando Jihad coalition. Timsar was the North Sumatra secretary of the PII before being drawn closer to Taufik and Darul Islam. Taufik tasked him to recruit a force to carry out acts of sabotage, which he later described as “shock therapy” for a dissolute New Order society. By 1975, Komando Jihad had taken shape. It consisted of eight men, including Timsar, under the command of an elder member, Agus Sulaeman. With the agreement of Taufik, in early 1975 six of the men traveled to Jakarta to attend a fifteen-day crash course in bomb-making at the home of a Darul Islam veteran from Sulawesi, arranged by Ali A. T. On his return to Medan, Timsar Zubil was able to procure explosives from Abdul Qadir Baraja, a Darul Islam veteran based in Lampung.

In September 1975, Komando Jihad preparations went international. A two-man delegation of Rifai Ahmad (the Lampung representative of Hispran’s company, CV Sadar) and Dainuri Saleh was sent to Malaysia to request support from the Libyan embassy. It was followed separately by Daud Beureu’eh, who carried a letter in Arabic addressed to Libyan president Muammar Qaddafi. According to Dainuri Saleh, the letter, conceived by Gaos Taufik but signed by Daud Beureu’eh as imam, referred to the “DI/TII struggle since 1949 until now to uphold the establishment of Islamic Law and the Islamic State of Indonesia.” Its focus was a request for “material and financial aid, especially firearms.” Rifai Ahmad later testified that they had hoped for 300,000 modern weapons, valued at US $12 billion—a loan that was to have been repaid, of course, but only “after the Islamic State of Indonesia had gained independence through destroying the communists.” The success of the mission apparently hinged on the cooperation of Daud Beureu’eh’s Malaysian grandson-in-law, Sanusi Juned, a London-educated banker and prominent activist in the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), who later became minister for agriculture in the Mahathir government. But at a meeting in a mosque in Penang, Juned rejected the Darul Islam delegation’s requests. He said that certain conditions for such aid were not yet satisfied, one of which was violent upheaval (pergolokan) in Indonesia. Dainuri Saleh said that, on returning to Sumatra, he reported to Gaos Taufik that the mission had been unsuccessful. Taufik told him to be patient. Around this time Dainuri Saleh also crossed paths with Hispran, who was returning from his meeting with Daud Beureu’eh in Aceh. Hispran, too, counseled patience.

But the Komando Jihad recruits were eager for action. First, to accumulate funds, they robbed a number of businesses in Sumatra. Then followed acts of sabotage. In June 1976, Anwar Jeri, the Komando Jihad member who had hosted Hispran in Medan, was ordered to throw a grenade during a Qur’an reading competition in North Sumatra. The aim, he said, was to create tension between the Muslim and Christian

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83 Interview with Timsar Zubil, Jakarta, November 25, 2006.
84 Timsar Zubil, interrogation deposition in Hispran case.
85 On Rifai Ahmad see Haji Ismail Pranoto, interrogation deposition in Hispran case.
86 Dainuri Saleh, interrogation deposition in Hispran case.
88 Dainuri Saleh, interrogation deposition in Hispran case.
communities. But the grenade failed to detonate. Next came a series of Komando Jihad bombing operations in North and West Sumatra. Timsar Zubil distributed explosives to members in pairs, and then he and a partner traveled to West Sumatra and placed time bombs in the Immanuel Hospital, a Baptist hospital in Bukittinggi, and in the Nurul Iman mosque in Padang. The Immanuel bomb, however, also failed to detonate and was discovered by hospital staff. The mosque bomb exploded on November 11, damaging the building but claiming no casualties. On Christmas Day, synchronized bombings were carried out in Medan. The targets were two churches (one Methodist, the other Catholic), a cinema, and a bar. It is unclear whether there were any casualties in these attacks. Timsar Zubil claims that they were designed not to harm anyone, but to shock the government into action against the growth of sinful behavior during the New Order. Yet the selection of targets and the timing of the attacks suggest these operations were also designed to provoke inter-religious conflict.

Around the time of the Komando Jihad operations, and perhaps in part because of them, the military’s territorial command in Java was beginning to fear that Darul Islam had grown out of control. Siliwangi commander Himawan Soetanto had been informed by military intelligence of suspicious movements by Hispran and other former Darul Islam fighters. Concerned that a revitalized Darul Islam would threaten the security of the 1977 election, on November 1, 1976, Soetanto called a meeting of Darul Islam members at the Siliwangi headquarters to remind them of their commitments under the 1962 Joint Declaration. The effort was one of “guidance” (pembinaan), Soetanto says, “so that they would not make a return to extremism.” He was surprised at how well the meeting was attended, taking it as proof that Darul Islam still existed as a community. He was also surprised by the attendance of Hispran himself. According to Soetanto, Hispran was known as one of the more aggressive Darul Islam veterans, yet he attended the meeting openly and denied he had been doing anything wrong.

Hispran left the Siliwangi headquarters a free man, but he did not stay that way for long. Unknown to him, the two original “traitors” of the movement, Ateng Djaelani and Zaenal Abidin, were about to carry out one final betrayal. About a week after the Siliwangi meeting, Ateng Djaelani mustered the courage to report the revival of Darul Islam to the Siliwangi Command. In an interrogation, Ateng described the moment as follows:

At the opportunity to meet on about 7 or 8 November 1976 with Mr. W. R. Samallo [First Assistant Kodam Siliwangi] and also at the opportunity to meet personally with the Kodam Siliwangi Commander [Himawan Soetanto] at

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90 Anwar Jeri, interrogation deposition in Hispran case.
91 Timsar Zubil, interrogation deposition in Hispran case file; and Dainuri Saleh, interrogation deposition in Hispran case file.
94 Interview with Timsar Zubil, Jakarta, November 25, 2006.
95 Interview with Himawan Soetanto, Jakarta, July 25, 2007. This is consistent with the account Hispran gave at his trial. See Haji Ismail Pranoto, court testimony in Hispran case. He says he was informed about the meeting by Danu Mohammad Hasan, who had received a letter from the Siliwangi Command asking him to call other members. He recalls that about sixty members attended.
Siliwangi headquarters, at the time it was as if my throat were blocked ... At the time I could only report in my own words, more or less, the following: “Bapak Commander, among ex-DI/TII [Darul Islam/Islamic Army of Indonesia] leaders no one is made into a cult [dikultuskan], and each has his own particular influence, so, for example, if Danu Mohammad Hasan does something to harm the state, it would not be followed by the ex-DI/TII who are under the influence of myself or others. So the foolish ones would be Danu Mohammad Hasan and a few of his followers alone.”

For Ridwan, whose understanding of the event is consistent with Ateng’s, this was treason of the highest order. By that time, he says, Darul Islam had a new structure in place throughout Java, and Ateng Djaelani and Zaenal Abidin revealed it all to Kodam Siliwangi. “It was they who exposed the secret that Darul Islam was going to reactivate ... and later everyone was arrested.” On January 8 the following year, Hispran was arrested in East Java after one of his prospective recruits, a member of the mainstream Islamic party PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, the Unity Development Party), informed the authorities of his whereabouts. On January 17, Timsar Zubil was arrested in Medan. In early February, the chief of Kopkamtib, Admiral Sudomo, announced to the nation that several members of a movement calling itself Komando Jihad had been arrested in Sumatra, Jakarta, West Java, and East Java. By June, Sudomo could report that seven hundred such arrests had been made.

In the case of Hispran, perhaps the most high-profile of the arrests, the record suggests that his interrogators (a public prosecutor and an officer of Kopkamtib) were surprised and somewhat captivated by the specter of Darul Islam and what they referred to as its “shadow state” (negara bayangari). For not only had the Islamic State modeled the Republic’s flag and constitution, it had also imitated other appurtenances of the Republic, notably the army’s territorial command structure. Thus one exchange between Hispran and his interrogators went as follows:

Is it true that with the formation of tools or instruments that represent a body or institution, that is to say, a Prime Minister ... Internal Affairs Minister ... Chief of the Java and Madura Command ... along with your formation of the leadership for Commands in the areas of Kediri and Bojonegoro, along with District Commands in Lamongan, Tuban, Nganjuk, Blitar ... that it means an already established Shadow State, the Islamic State of Indonesia?

[Hispran:] Yes, that’s correct.

In other words, established a State within a State?

[Hispran:] Yes, that’s correct.100

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95 Ateng Djaelani, interrogation deposition in Dodo case.
96 Interview with Ridwan, Bandung, July 20, 2007.
97 Interview with Ridwan, Bandung, December 14, 2006.
99 Jenkins, Suharto and His Generals, p. 58.
100 Haji Ismail Pranoto, interrogation deposition in Hispran case.
What Was Komando Jihad?

Occurring just prior to the May 2, 1977 general election, the government crackdown on Muslim “extremists” immediately generated suspicion in the Muslim community. In a post-election article, Tempo reported the complaint of PPP youth leader Husni Thamrin that his party had been disadvantaged by news that Hispran had been recruiting PPP members into Darul Islam. Darul Islam, he said, should not be characterized as the “hereditary sin” of the Muslim community. Bung Tomo, the iconic youth leader of the revolution, went even further. He published a pamphlet describing Komando Jihad as a government “creation,” a means of applying pressure “so that the Islamic community can never gain more votes than Golkar.” He singled out for blame Minister for Defense and Security General Panggabean and Kopkamtib Chief Admiral Sudomo as “Christians who currently hold power.”

Although the revelations of the existence of a resurgent Darul Islam may indeed have been exploited by the New Order to discredit political Islam, the timing and tempo of the revival, as we have seen, was set by Darul Islam itself. The evidence suggests that it was only on the approach to the 1977 election that the authorities judged that Opsus had lost control of the movement. Perhaps contributing to this judgment were indications that the movement had shifted its support from Golkar to the PPP. In early 1977, before the start of the arrests and in an apparent effort to reassert control, Pitut Suharto called on ten Darul Islam notables based in Bandung to sign another joint declaration expressing support for the government and, in addition, for Golkar. This time, however, he met with strong resistance and demands for government compensation in return for signatures. According to Ateng Djaelani, he and Zaenal Abidin agreed to sign immediately, but the others, including Adah Djaelani and Danu Mohammad Hasan, initially refused. On January 16, 1977, the prospective signatories met with Pitut at the Bakin mess located on Jalan Sukawangi, Bandung. During a long and heated negotiation, Adah insisted that they would sign the declaration only if they received political, military, and economic aid. He requested that Pitut sign a formal statement promising as much, but Pitut refused to make any concrete commitment. Instead, he offered a personal letter addressed to Adah that requested the names of Kartosoewirjo family members who needed assistance, the names of children of Darul Islam members who needed schooling, and the names of two persons who could be supported as candidates for the national parliament (DPR, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, People’s Representative Assembly) and two for the provincial parliament. With that offer, everyone present was willing to sign what was the third joint declaration by Darul Islam made at the behest of the government.

By this time, Pitut must have realized, if he were not aware earlier, that he was dealing with an emboldened and much less tractable movement than heretofore. Perhaps to redress this situation, the declaration consisted of three points that were much more explicit in expressing the signatories’ obedience to the government than the three points of the previous joint declaration; and there was no reference to Darul

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102 Ateng Djaelani, at least, gave testimony that this was the case with Hispran and others. See Ateng Djaelani, court testimony in Hispran case.
103 Ateng Djaelani, interrogation deposition in Dodo case.
Islam as a "force" that might act in concert with the government. The three points were: (1) an expression of gratitude to the New Order government for the presidential decree that permitted ex-Darul Islam and ex-PRRI/Permesta rebels to take part in the 1977 election; (2) an expression of continued support for President Suharto, the 1945 constitution, and the philosophy of Pancasila, along with support for a Golkar victory in the 1977 election; and (3) an agreement to call on all ex-Darul Islam members to resist being influenced by those who "still dream of establishing an Islamic State of Indonesia." The declaration, however, could not save even its signatories from the mass arrests that were already underway. Some, like Danu Mohammad Hasan, were arrested relatively early. Others, such as Adah Djaelani, went on the run, evading arrest for a few more years. When Adah was put on trial in Jakarta in 1983, the Bandung newspaper *Pikiran Rakyat* led with the front page headline, "Defendant Offered DPR/MPR Membership?" Adah Djaelani had revealed in court he had been made such an offer by "a colonel from a government organization. But the offer was not able to be taken up because the defendant was on the run from the authorities."

At the time, the government did, at least once, publicly concede that its intelligence service had maintained a relationship with Darul Islam and that this had spiraled out of control. In 1981—amid continuing controversy over the Komando Jihad arrests—Kopkamtib Commander Admiral Sudomo met with prominent ulama in order to mend relations with the Muslim community and dampen suspicions of a government conspiracy against Islam. He admitted that "several ex-DI/TII leaders in 1971 were indeed managed by Bakin." The aim of that earlier alliance, he added, was connected to the election—a reference to Darul Islam's recruitment to the cause of Golkar. "But if you look at their behavior in 1976, it is clear that it was out of hand and unknown to Bakin."

Popular suspicion of Komando Jihad has persisted, however, which is not surprising given the involvement of Ali Moertopo, a figure who earned a reputation for Machiavellian operations in Papua in 1962 and East Timor in 1975. Nevertheless, the theory that Komando Jihad in some way represented a "sting operation" by Moertopo to entrap Muslims and discredit political Islam is inconsistent with the circumstances of the Opsus-Darul Islam relationship, the circumstances of the government crackdown, and the facts of who gained and who lost as a result of the affair.

Opsus approached Darul Islam, as we have seen, to garner support for Golkar. For his part, General Soemitro disagreed with Moertopo's methods, but he, too, saw the need to engineer elections and capture Muslim constituencies. In a 1981 interview with David Jenkins, he said, "If you had left it to Golkar in 1971, without any interference by ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia), the Muslim parties would have won. I can assure you of that! Oh yes!

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104 Ibid.
Seventy one! Seventy seven! Without the help of ABRI, PPP would have won. And won a majority!"108

But this is only half the story. Since Danu Mohammad Hasan played his early role in targeting Sukarno regime officials, Darul Islam had probably been cultivated by the Indonesian government for its propensity to be turned to subversive purposes. This capacity would have been attractive to Moertopo, who appears to have developed a network of subversives, preman (thugs), and other compromised individuals, the primary use of which was to engineer Golkar election victories.109 It is unclear how Darul Islam elements might have been operationally involved in such engineering, if they were at all. It is clear, however, that Danu Mohammad Hasan and other Darul Islam figures were part of an array of Opsus agents, including GUPPI officers and preman, that was used to provoke the so-called Malari riots of January 15, 1974, in order to discredit Moertopo’s rival, Kopkamtib Chief General Soemitro.110 Thus, the Opsus–Darul Islam relationship can be characterized as one involving patronage offered in return for services to Moertopo, whether these services included canvassing votes for Golkar or more clandestine activities. This relationship was inconsistent with a sting operation because it meant that Opsus commanded influence over Darul Islam overtly rather than covertly. In 1971, Pitut Suharto attended the Darul Islam reunion quite openly. Everyone there knew who he was and what he wanted: Darul Islam support for Golkar.

The circumstances of the government crackdown on the Darul Islam revival also do not support the theory that this was a sting operation. The arrests of Darul Islam members were directed by Kopkamtib and the military’s territorial command in opposition to Ali Moertopo; indeed, Moertopo, far from being responsible for the crackdown, was its indirect target. His cultivation of Darul Islam had always been a controversial strategy, initially creating conflict with the Siliwangi Command. It was also a strategy he conducted in defiance of his immediate superior, the chief of Bakin until 1974, Sutopo Yuwono. Reflecting on Moertopo’s use of Darul Islam, Yuwono has said, “Back then I forbade it because the risk was large, primarily for Islam ... The phrase I used back then was ‘who is using whom?’ Because I was not convinced that they [Darul Islam] had let go of their ideas, the risk was always there.”111 But Moertopo was so close to Suharto that he could defy Yuwono’s instructions. “If Ali did it, he didn’t do it in the name of Bakin, but independently as Spri [Sekretaris Pribadi, private secretary to the president]. From his actions it was clear that he didn’t follow me anymore, that was my problem,” explained Yuwono.112

Eventually Java’s regional military commanders also turned against Moertopo. The Siliwangi commander at the time, Himawan Soetanto, has said that, in the lead-up to

108 Jenkins, *Suharto and His Generals*, p. 37.
110 Cahyono, *Pangkpkamtib Jenderal Soemitro*, chapter 29. The riots were an embarrassing lapse in security for the Suharto regime that did lead to the dismissal of Soemitro, but Moertopo was also punished for his manipulations. In a subsequent high-level meeting of security chiefs, Suharto declared that Opsus would be disbanded.
112 Ibid.
the election, the commanders of West, Central, and East Java were in agreement that Ali Moertopo’s cultivation of Darul Islam was a threat to stability in their regions.\footnote{Interview with Himawan Soetanto, Jakarta, July 25, 2007.} According to General Soemitro, East Java Commander Witarmin was so angry at Pitut’s Darul Islam activities that “they say he wanted to shoot Pitut.”\footnote{Cahyono, \textit{Pangkopkamtib Jenderal Soemitro}, p. 196.} Aware of the threat, Pitut laid low for a few weeks in Jakarta. On March 11, 1977, the Java commanders confronted Moertopo directly. Himawan recalled the moment in this way for Ken Conboy:

We were all concerned about his acquiescence to let Komando Jihad grow unchecked in our regions. Ali Moertopo told us not to worry. He said that he was letting them think they were a bulwark against communism, but was really using them for votes. Komando Jihad, meanwhile, was telling Ali Moertopo that they would guard against communism, but they were really using the opportunity to organize themselves. He [Moertopo] was overly confident and assured us he could control them. It came down to a game of who was playing whom.\footnote{Conboy, \textit{The Second Front}, p. 18.}

Himawan further recalled that Moertopo was angry at being questioned over Darul Islam.\footnote{Interview with Himawan Soetanto, Jakarta, July 25, 2007.} We can assume he was less than happy, also, when the regional military command began arresting Pitut’s Darul Islam contacts.

For his part, Ridwan does not suspect the involvement of Opsus in the arrest of himself and his colleagues, and he has acknowledged that the arrests were carried out by Kopkamtib. Ultimately, he has said, only God knows whether Moertopo was a protector of Darul Islam or a traitor. But he has insisted that “there has never been a Darul Islam movement exposed because of Pitut Suharto.”\footnote{Interview with Ridwan, Bandung, July 20, 2007.}

Finally, if the image of Moertopo as the mastermind of Komando Jihad were accurate, one might expect to see him rewarded for his success: diehard Muslim radicals had been unearthed and arrested without an outbreak of major violence and the timing of the arrests served as a blow to the electoral prospects of the Muslim PPP party, to the advantage of Golkar. But there was never any attempt by Moertopo to claim the affair as a success. Meanwhile, the public was left with the impression of Moertopo as a dubious operator who had engaged in a conspiracy against Islam. In the trials of Darul Islam suspects, there were frequent embarrassing accounts, reported in the press, of the patronage relationship between the defendants and Ali Moertopo or his intelligence organization.\footnote{For press coverage, see, for example, “Pecahnya Sesepuh,” \textit{Tempo}, September 30, 1978. Darul Islam members typically referred to Moertopo’s intelligence organization as “Bakin” rather than “Opsus,” although the latter title is more accurate.} Several defendants, including Dodo Muhammad Darda, Ridwan, and Hispran, attempted to call Pitut Suharto and Ali Moertopo as witnesses.\footnote{Interview with Ridwan, Bandung, July 20, 2007; Dodo Muhammad Darda, court testimony in Dodo case; and Putusan [Decision] in Hispran case.} Such requests were always rejected. Hispran’s defense council described these absent key witnesses as “the men who knew too much.”\footnote{Putusan [Decision] in Hispran case.} Quite naturally, then,
Aloysius Sugiyanto was eager, when interviewed, to disown Opsus's dealings with Darul Islam as a rogue operation directed by Pitut Suharto. “It was Pitut alone,” he complained, “who ruined the image of Opsus.”

The affair also had negative consequences for Opsus informant Danu Mohammad Hasan. Of all Darul Islam suspects, Danu took perhaps the heaviest fall. Despite his claim to be an employee of Bakin, he was arrested and tried just as Hispran had been before him. At his trial, he protested when his occupation was given as “farmer,” insisting that he was a member of Bakin, but he could offer no evidence to confirm his membership. He was convicted and jailed anyway. Years later, on the first day of his release from prison, Danu died a sudden death at home in circumstances that his family continue to regard as suspicious.

By contrast, the two Darul Islam leaders who informed for Siliwangi, Ateng Djaelani and Zaenal Abidin, escaped prosecution. As described earlier, at several trials Ateng Djaelani appeared as the star witness for the prosecution. When the judge at the Hispran trial asked him his “status,” Ateng replied that he was “under watch, but still employed in the interests of national security.” He did not identify his employer, but other reports make it clear that Ateng was a Siliwangi “asset” who was prepared to testify to the Darul Islam revival in a way that was critical of Moertopo’s role. In the same article that reports Bung Tomo’s critique of Komando Jihad, Tempo describes how Himawan Soetanto responded by presenting to the media “live witnesses” Ateng Djaelani and Zaenal Abidin. In a brief profile, Ateng, who is described as a supporter of Golkar, but one not afraid to criticize the government, is quoted as stating: “I have criticized the government because there was a former DI/TII leader who was managed by Bakin. In fact, this leader who was managed was one of those who returned to the forest.” The leader is identified as Danu Mohammad Hasan.

Whatever the private motives of Moertopo, we can conclude that his relationship with Darul Islam did not have the characteristics of a sting operation, that the government crackdown was not executed as part of a sting operation, and that Moertopo did not claim—much less receive—any credit for such an operation. Rather, the expedient alliance was typical of many New Order-style patron–client relationships; in this case, however, the patron was ultimately unable to control the client.

Moertopo had taken an obvious risk in cultivating a group that had traditionally expressed such an entrenched ideological opposition to the Indonesian Republic. He may have heightened that risk by conveying the impression that he would support the establishment of an Islamic state and would provide weapons to Darul Islam fighters. Such fancies may also have been the currency of Danu Mohammad Hasan, since he was in the invidious position of having to please both sides. In any case, Moertopo’s use of Darul Islam backfired, an example of what in intelligence jargon is called “blowback”—the unintended negative consequences of covert intelligence operations. Since the late 1950s, Darul Islam had been a guerrilla force never fully demobilized, its

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121 Interview with Aloysius Sugiyanto, Jakarta, May 11, 2008.
122 Interview with Ridwan, Bandung, December 14, 2006.
123 Ateng Djaelani, court testimony in Hispran case.
members never properly assimilated back into society, thus posing a minor sociological problem. When the Siliwangi Division offered to provide Darul Islam veterans with financial support and employment opportunities, this represented an effort to solve the problem. The Opsus approach, however, which involved selling hopes that an Islamic state would be established and allowing Darul Islam’s reconsolidation to go unchecked, was counterproductive to both demobilization and assimilation.

For their part, Ridwan, Timsar Zubil, and other Darul Islam figures have insisted that, despite their earlier protestations at trial, they had used their relationship with the government as cover for reviving the Islamic State of Indonesia. Although they defended themselves by claiming that they were engaged in “monitoring communism,” in fact their vaunted anti-communism was only the pretext for a mutually exploitative relationship with Moertopo. According to Ridwan, this was a pretext deployed by Danu Mohammad Hasan, but created by Moertopo himself, who is supposed to have said, “ideology must be opposed by ideology,” and thus “only Darul Islam can fight communist ideology.” But Ridwan has claimed that anti-communism was never the reason why he, Hispran, and others took up the fight again. It was only later, he said, that “it [anti-communism] was used at trial as a weapon to mitigate [the sentence],” thus it was a “formality at the trial only ... in order that the movement be seen as legal.”

The Komando Jihad affair appears to mark the beginning of Moertopo’s decline. In March 1978, he was made minister of information, a move that General Soemitro had suggested to Suharto years earlier as a way of controlling Moertopo by giving him a portfolio with clearly defined responsibilities. Meanwhile, key Opsus operatives, including Pitut Suhartono, left Bakin. Pitut maintained his close relationship with Moertopo, serving as his assistant in the ministry, where he coedited a twenty-four volume collection of Indonesia’s early nationalist literature. Moertopo’s replacement as Bakin deputy chief was Major General Benny Moerdani. Moerdani was the first person to whom Himawan Soetanto had taken his complaint about Ali Moertopo and Darul Islam; together, Soetanto has said, they then raised the issue with Moertopo. From his position in Bakin, Moerdani went on to dominate both the civilian and military intelligence fields, and, observes Richard Tanter, “the place of Opsus cowboy-style operations was displaced by equally ruthless but more bureaucratically organized [military intelligence] type operations.” Moerdani became chief of the armed forces in 1983, the year that Moertopo was dismissed as information minister. Moertopo, thoroughly overshadowed by Moerdani, died the following year.

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125 Interview with Ridwan, Bandung, July 20, 2007.
126 Interview with Timsar Zubil, Jakarta, November 25, 2006.
127 Cahyono, Pangkopkamtib Jenderal Soemitro, p. 304.
128 Conboy, Intel, p. 151.
129 For the first volume in the series (featuring nationalist poetry by Pitut), see A. Zainoel Ihsan and Pitut Suharto, eds., Aku Pemuda Kemanza di Hari Esok, Capita Selecta 1 (Jakarta: Jayasakti, 1981).
131 Tanter, “Intelligence Agencies and Third World Militarization,” chap. 9.
Darul Islam, of course, outlived Moertopo and may outlive us all. For, as suggested at the outset, rather than being a delimited, unified movement, it represents a community of radical Muslims, sustained by subsequent generations, which has spawned and may continue to spawn a variety of radical movements. It is, in a sense, a nation. Nations, however unlikely, can be remarkably persistent, as the periodic emergence of activists in eastern Indonesia under the flag of the “Republic of the South Moluccas” sometimes reminds us. Moreover, the revival of Darul Islam in the 1970s gave the movement momentum into the following decades. In the 1970s, inter-island connections were reestablished between Java, Sumatra, and Sulawesi, and a new generation was inducted into the community. The government crackdown and the sense of betrayal that went with it led to cycles of revenge, more crackdowns, and more martyrs for the Islamic State. The Islamic State of Indonesia may have been in disarray at this time, but it lived on in the imagination of its “citizens.”

Returning to the Community

From the outset, the continued existence of the Islamic State has been the central premise of Darul Islam, and a premise often taken for granted. But after the failure of the revival, a new generation of leaders brought into question its inherently state-based organizational model. The 1980s saw the emergence of a new form of Muslim activism, based on small study circles called usroh, inspired by the name for the organizational cells of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. This new approach to organizing was relatively more secretive and less overtly confrontational towards the secular state. It emphasized dakwah: religious outreach and proselytizing. Insofar as they attracted Darul Islam members, the new usroh movements represented a shift away from the Islamic State and towards the Muslim community itself as the basis of the movement—in other words, a shift toward the “grassroots.” One of the movements, known as Tarbiyah, would evolve into a mainstream post-New Order political party, the PKS (Partia Keadilan Sejahtera, Prosperous Justice Party), led by a reformed former Darul Islam member, Hilmi Aminuddin, the son of Opsus agent Danu Mohammad Hasan. Another, to which we now turn, was a more radical variant of Darul Islam that evolved into the terrorist organization Jemaah Islamiyah.

One member of the new generation who took up the usroh model was Abdullah Sungkar. It is not clear exactly when Sungkar adopted usroh, but his move coincided with the development of the Tarbiyah movement in the early 1980s. Although the lineages of the different usroh movements are obscure, as van Bruinessen observes, “It appears that various groups were influenced by the [Muslim] Brotherhood independently of one another and through different channels.” One difference between them, it seems, was demographic: Sungkar’s recruits tended to be of a provincial or rural background, while Tarbiyah followers were typically urban.

Tarbiyah eventually avoided use of the term usroh after it became associated with the more radical usroh of Sungkar.\(^{134}\)

Sungkar may have come to usroh through his association with the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, DDII), a pioneer of political dakwah in Indonesia.\(^{135}\) With a background in Masyumi, he was an early member of DDII when it was established by former Masyumi leader Mohammad Natsir in reaction to Masyumi (and Natsir himself) being barred from politics under the New Order. In Solo, Sungkar came to prominence for his politicized sermons, broadcast on Radio Dakwah Islamiyah Surakarta (RADIS), which he had helped found in 1969. In 1975, RADIS was closed down by Kopkamtib on account of Sungkar's critical sermons. Sungkar was regarded as a skilled and highly motivated preacher, and in 1970 his appointment as assistant chairman of the Solo branch of DDII enhanced his profile. In 1972, he established, with close colleague Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, the Al-Mukmin pesantren in Ngruki, near Solo.\(^{136}\) Characteristic of Sungkar's innovative and eclectic approach, the school's curriculum integrated what were considered the models of best practice provided by two existing pesantren: Gontor, for its Arabic course, and the Persis school in Bangil for Islamic law.\(^{137}\)

As we have seen, Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir were recruited to Darul Islam by Hispran in December 1976, at the tail end of the revival. The following year, Sungkar was detained for a month by Kopkamtib for boycotting the general election. In November 1978, both Sungkar and Ba'asyir were detained on charges of subversion. It was alleged that they had given anti-government sermons and refused to honor the Indonesian flag at their pesantren. But most damningly, it was charged that they had taken an oath with Hispran to defend the Islamic State of Indonesia.

Some have argued that, by this time, Sungkar had already established a dissident group of his own, and therefore his recruitment involved the merger of his group with Darul Islam. Muhammad Nursalim, a graduate of Al-Mukmin who wrote his master's thesis on the Sungkar faction of Darul Islam, recounts that "In the 1970s Abdullah Sungkar felt the need to form a jama'ah [congregation or community] as an organization for the Islamic struggle."\(^{138}\) According to Nursalim, Sungkar discussed the issue with several like-minded preachers in Solo. One of these preachers then formed a jama'ah, and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir wanted to join, but "at the advice of Abdullah Sungkar and considering the credibility of the leader, the plan was aborted." Later, "considering the importance of a jama'ah for dakwah, Abdullah Sungkar established a Jama'ah. This new organization was called Jama'ah Islamiyah." Nursalim continues:

> The problem arose of what would serve as the parent organization for this newly established jama'ah. Because, if only a jama'ah is formed, and later it is encroached

\(^{134}\) Elizabeth Collins, "'Islam is the Solution': Dakwah and Democracy in Indonesia" (2004), Ohio University website, http: // www.classics.ohiou.edu/ faculty / collins/islamsolution.pdf.

\(^{135}\) Ibid.


\(^{138}\) Suryahardy, Perjalanan Hukum di Indonesia, pp. 60, 69.
on by a competing *jama'ah*, surely an efficacious movement, which is so yearned for, will not come to pass. Because of this and various considerations, *jama'ah Islamiyah* led by Abdullah Sungkar united with *jama'ah NII* [Negara Islam Indonesia].

As this perspective is taken from Sungkar’s sympathizers, however, there may have been the temptation to overstate the continuity between the *Jemaah Islamiyah* of the 1970s and the *Jemaah Islamiyah* of the 1990s in order to lend historical authenticity to what would otherwise be a relatively new Darul Islam splinter group. After all, *Jemaah Islamiyah*—meaning “Islamic community”—is a rather generic name. But it is a fact that the name appears in association with Sungkar and Ba’asyir well before *Jemaah Islamiyah*’s formal inauguration in 1993. At their trial, as at other trials of Muslims in Central Java, the name *Jemaah Islamiyah*—among other names for an alleged Darul Islam front—was often used by prosecutor and witness alike.

In any case, it is clear that, prior to joining Darul Islam, Sungkar was a formidable political activist in his own right. We can get an impression of the man and the preacher from his performance for the court at his subversion trial of 1982. His defense statement, published the same year by one of his followers, is a withering and articulate critique of New Order Indonesia, just as sophisticated as the celebrated 1979 courtroom critique of the government delivered by student leader Heri Akhmadi. Sungkar prefaces his attack by warning that he will “speak the truth however bitter,” apologizing that this might offend the public prosecutor. He then singles out the prosecutor for failing to conduct his own investigation and, instead, basing the charge on an interrogation “done under pressure and based on a violation of fundamental human rights” by Kopkamtib, “an unconstitutional institution.” The prosecutor “does not want to think critically; to separate the problem out by seeing it from all sides.” He is “happier to think capriciously and reach perfunctory conclusions.” Sungkar recants the confession in which he had admitted swearing an oath to Hispran, saying that he was told by his interrogator, “[My task] is to make you admit to swearing an oath with H. Ismail Pranoto [Hispran]; if you don’t, you won’t be released from detention for the rest of your life.” After three days and three nights, during which he was not allowed to sleep and was made to stand for hours while being interrogated, Sungkar says he confessed. He makes more serious allegations of torture concerning his fellow detainees; for example, Abdul Qadir Baraja, he says, was dealt electric shocks thirty-one times.

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139 Nursalim, “Faksi Abdullah Sungkar,” pp. 53–54. Nursalim appears to have based this account on interviews in Solo in 2000 with two close associates of Sungkar.

140 See Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, court testimony in Sungkar and Ba’asyir case (Ba’asyir only mentions “Jamaah Islamiyah” in the context of recanting his interrogation deposition). In the 1982 case of Zubaidi bin Badri in Kudus, the prosecution appears to have used the names “Komando Jihad,” “Negara Islam Indonesia,” and “Jamaah Islamiyah” interchangeably. See *Keputusan* [Decision] in case *Pidana No. 4/1982/ Pid.B/ PN.Kds., Pengadilan Negeri Kudus*.


143 Ibid., pp. 68–69.

144 Ibid., p. 96.
In his statement, Sungkar then presents a systematic critique of the New Order's treatment of its political opponents. "The term hijacking," he writes, "... has only been known in Indonesia since the New Order regime ... All this hijacking has been master-minded by the special operations [Opsus] of this regime, the most outstanding figures of which are Ali Moertopo and Sujono Humardani." Sungkar runs through a litany of such political "hijackings," beginning with Opsus actions that "hijacked" the Muslim party Parmusi, and including the Indonesian Journalist's Association and labor and student organizations. Then he focuses on the rigging of elections to favor Golkar, noting the policy that requires government employees to support Golkar (monoloyalitas) and the fact that a permanent quota of the parliament is given over to the military.

Sungkar's critique serves to instantiate the theory, articulated most thoroughly by Mohammed Hafez in Why Muslims Rebel, that Islamist movements become militant when confronted with a combination of political and institutional exclusion and repression. While Sungkar's appeal is broadly based, invoking principles of Indonesian law and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, his main theme is that the regime has especially impinged upon the political aspirations of Muslims. He cites the case of sidelined former prime minister Mohammad Natsir to make this argument:

The New Order authorities have dominated all layers of society, to force their opinions ... [thus] a section of the Indonesian Muslim community, because they feel that their political aspirations based on the pure teachings of Islam are not accommodated, because there is no political party in the name of Islam ... has left the political stage and has gone to work in the field of da'wah and Islamic education, like, for example, Mr. Mohammad Natsir ... [Because he] feels his aspirations for political Islam are not accommodated in any Islamic political party, clear and free from all pressures, thus he has been forced to leave the political stage since 1967 ... Really, this situation has disturbed and disappointed millions of Indonesian Muslims.

Noting that he himself has followed the path of Natsir into da'wah, Sungkar expresses his exasperation at the government for trying to control da'wah also:

Thus, it now seems the field of da'wah and Islamic education has its turn to be forced to follow the opinions and thoughts of the authorities, until soon they will not allow religious interpretations based on pure religious teachings, but every religious interpretation must be in accordance with the opinions and thoughts and impulses of the authorities.

It is indeed true that, since its inception, the New Order regime had marginalized an entire stream of Indonesian politics, that represented by the Masyumi party. Masyumi had not only been a mainstream party representing "modernist" Muslims, with a

145 Ibid., pp. 74-75.
146 See Mohammed Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), pp. 28-31. In Hafez's schema, exclusion in Indonesia under Suharto was mitigated by a political system that was nominally inclusive. Repression, it might be added, was relatively selective. Thus not every Islamist's experience was as harsh as Sungkar's.
147 Suryahardy, Perjalanan Hukum di Indonesia, p. 91.
148 Ibid., p. 92.
leader of international stature in Mohammad Natsir; it was also a potential political home for deradicalized Darul Islam veterans, almost all of whom had Masyumi backgrounds. If the authorities had tolerated Masyumi, this might have helped to draw activists away from the realm of underground subversion towards the field of above-ground political opposition. Sidney Jones has rendered the counterfactual more vividly: “If political parties had been allowed to exist,” she writes, “usroh might have led to the creation of something akin to the Muslim Brotherhood-inspired PKS ... twenty years earlier, without any association with Darul Islam.”149

But in the 1980s, a repressive climate helped to ensure Darul Islam’s relevance, and in Abdullah Sungkar, the Islamic State had finally found an intellectual worthy of Kartosoewirjo. An informed critique of the New Order regime was rare in Darul Islam circles at the time. As an orator, Sungkar was probably superior to Kartosoewirjo. The latter, who served his political apprenticeship alongside Sukarno under the seminal nationalist figure H. O. S. Cokroaminoto, by his own assessment inherited his mentor’s skill for writing, while Sukarno inherited his skill for oratory.150 Recordings of Sungkar’s sermons in 1984 reveal a speaker just as charismatic as he was puritanical. He treats his congregation to potentially tiresome rants against the bid’ā (innovation) of birthday celebrations among Muslims, the “danger” of Shi’ism, and the “poison” of Western education. But always he holds his audience through the variation of emotional tone. Rants are leavened by jokes, wordplay, or clever multilingual interpretations of Qur’anic teachings, deploying Arabic, Indonesian, Javanese, and sometimes English.151

Through his charismatic leadership, Sungkar became a bridge between what might be considered traditional and modern radical Islam in Indonesia. He took Darul Islam’s insular and backward-looking radicalism and updated it with the internationalist political critique and missionary zeal of Dewan Dakwah. Just as Kartosoewirjo had recruited the prestige of post-War nationalism to the Islamist cause, Sungkar— influenced by key Islamist writers like Sayyid Qutb and Abu al-Ala Mawdudi—caught the historical moment by drawing on the puritanical salafi jihadi ideology that was ascendant internationally.

By 1985, the government was closing in on dakwah—for Sungkar, the last vestige of political space—and the usroh movement loyal to him was being pursued by the authorities, an operation that led to hundreds of arrests.152 As the prosecution brought an appeal for a longer prison sentence in their ongoing subversion case, together Sungkar and Ba’asyir fled to Malaysia. There they would build an international following and adopt a more internationalist approach in their mission to bring down the New Order regime. From Malaysia, they sent recruits to train in Afghanistan at the camp of Mujahideen leader Abdul Rasul Sayaf. Sungkar and Ba’asyir themselves traveled regularly to the Middle East and, during the 1990s, to Australia.

Despite being based in Malaysia, trained in Afghanistan, and having established a chapter in Australia, Sungkar’s faction continued to conceive of itself within the

152 For more on the “Usroh Trials,” see Tapol, Muslims on Trial, chap. 7.
framework of Kartosoewirjo’s Islamic State. This curious fact is testament to the imaginative power of Kartosoewirjo’s creation. Malaysian JI recruit and military trainer Nasir Abas writes that in Afghanistan all the recruits who were under the leadership of Sungkar were members of what he calls “Jamaah NII.” Every week, he recalls, after Friday prayers the history of the Islamic State of Indonesia was told in stages among members of this group. He learned that “The Islamic State of Indonesia, that was seen as legitimate, was believed to have been occupied by the Sukarno regime ... and as such it was an obligation for members of the Jamaah NII to liberate the land that is believed to have come under God’s Law, that is, Syariat Islam.” He was informed that “Jamaah NII already had a manual for statehood that had been applied during its administration.” Even as late as 1992, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir visited the training camp in Afghanistan and explained the Kanun Azasy, or constitution of the Islamic State. Ba’asyir told the recruits that “Indonesia must be the first place that is liberated and struggled for, not Malaysia or Singapore.” Nasir says recruits were often reminded that the first priority was preparing to fight in Indonesia, and he speculates that this was due to three factors: because most members were from Indonesia, because the struggle had first begun in Indonesia, and “because of the history of the Islamic State that had been recorded in Indonesia.”

Sungkar’s secession from the Islamic State finally came on January 1, 1993. Nasir Abas, who was still in Afghanistan, recounts being told that Ba’asyir and Sungkar had separated from Jamaah NII and that he had a choice: remain loyal to Sungkar or follow the then imam of the Islamic State, Ajengan Masduki. If he chose Masduki, Nasir would be obliged to return home immediately. The same offer was made to the others. Those who chose Sungkar had to swear an oath to him as their new leader. Nasir concludes:

From early 1993, the Indonesians at the Towrkham training camp, whether taking the Military Academy program or the short course, consisted only of those who had chosen Ust. Abdul Halim [nom de guerre of Abdullah Sungkar] as their new leader under the organization Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyah, regardless of whether they were students or instructors.

The explanations that circulate for Sungkar’s split from Darul Islam are threefold. The first two center on his personal relationship with Ajengan Masduki. The most common account reports that Sungkar fell out with Masduki over the latter’s tendency towards mystical beliefs and practices associated with Sufism. Sungkar, of course, saw these as un-Islamic. A delegation from Sungkar provided this explanation to Tahmid Rahmat Basuki in a meeting in 1993, labeling Masduki as a follower of a tarekat, or Sufi order. When Tahmid subsequently questioned Masduki, the latter replied dismissively, “the only tarekat I belong to is tarekat NII.” Still, those who were close to Masduki (who died in 2003) admit to his mystical side. What makes this an unlikely

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154 Daud Beureu’eh had long since been replaced by Adah Djaelani, who was in turn replaced by Ajengan Masduki as imam.
155 Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, p. 86.
156 See, for example, Nursalim, “Faksi Abdullah Sungkar,” pp. 55–56.
157 Interview with Tahmid Rahmat Basuki, Malangbong, September 21, 2009.
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explanation of Sungkar's behavior, however, is that from its genesis Darul Islam represented a curious mix of mysticism and militant Islam. It is unlikely that Sungkar had not already compromised with Darul Islam's militant--mystic synthesis. This synthesis was embodied in its founder, Kartosoewirjo. While Kartosoewirjo had been a prominent, and hardline, member of the modernist Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union), according to Deliar Noer, "his mystical leaning had estranged him from the other Sarekat Islam leaders." When fighting for Islamic law and an Islamic state under Darul Islam, Kartosoewirjo drew on mystical traditions, such as the messianic Joyoboyo prophecy that a Ratu Adil, a Just Prince, would appear and establish an age of prosperity. This was probably not just a strategy to manipulate support from Darul Islam's rural-peasant population base, but was an element of sincere faith and hope. Ateng Djaelani recounts a special operation launched by Kartosoewirjo to capture two magic kris (daggers), "Ki Dongkol" and "Ki Rompang," that, legend had it, could only be taken by the Just Prince or its Islamic equivalent, the Imam Mahdi. When Kartosoewirjo was captured, he was still carrying "Ki Dongkol." Darul Islam leaders besides Kartosoewirjo and Masduki had mystical sides as well, including Sungkar's recruiter, Hispran. Testifying in the Hispran trial, Timsar Zubil claimed that Hispran believed in the Joyoboyo prophesy, although this was quickly denied by Hispran himself. But one of Hispran's son's has attested to his father's mysticism.

The second explanation for Sungkar's separation from Darul Islam also revolves around a breakdown in relations between Sungkar and Masduki, but instead places emphasis on a dispute over money. As a result of his experiences in Malaysia, Sungkar had become a Darul Islam leader like no other. He had an unprecedented international reach, and it seems he was able to parley his foreign connections into financial backing. It is not surprising that, in such circumstances, he would come into conflict with Ajengan Masduki, the titular head of the Islamic State but a much less successful leader. While money may have been a factor, it, too, is unsatisfactory as an explanation for the split because, in the weak institution that was the Islamic State of Indonesia in the 1990s, Masduki was never a threat to Sungkar's operations.

The fundamental problem Sungkar had with the Islamic State was that it proved to be an ineffective institution in the struggle to establish Islamic law. This final explanation suggests Sungkar perceived that which is obvious to the outside observer: the Islamic State does not exist in any practical sense, and therefore it is an unrealistic basis for mobilizing a movement. Consider the issue of territory: one might argue that, at times in the 1950s, the Islamic State could control territory in rural West Java. But in New Order Indonesia, such territorial gains were no longer conceivable. For Sungkar

158 Still, it may be the case that this cultural--doctrinal dimension was more influential in determining allegiances at the rank-and-file level. Indeed, further research might consider whether the polarization in Indonesian Islam between traditionalism and modernism served as the cultural background to the Darul Islam--Jemaah Islamiyah split.


161 Timsar Zubil, court testimony in Hispran trial. Timsar's testimony generally served to undermine the prosecutor's case that Hispran had been operationally involved in the Sumatra bombings.

162 Interview with Miftiyakhul Falah (son of Hispran), Brebes, July 11, 2007. Miftiyakhul claimed that, before the war, his father worked as a tabib (healer), using traditional medicines and tenaga batin (inner power).
and Ba'asyir, the lack of territory amounted to a conclusive practical argument against the Islamic State, an argument that they submitted to their Australian followers at the time of the separation from Darul Islam. One follower recalls, “Bashir said that to be Darul Islam you need to have a place, some land, but they didn’t have a place or any land, so the view was that the group shouldn’t be named as a state any more but should just be named after the group or community.”\textsuperscript{163} In the words of one important Jemaah Islamiyah figure, Darul Islam followers who continued to believe in a nonexistent Islamic State had their heads in the sand.\textsuperscript{164}

Sungkar’s alternative to the Islamic State—a network of cells, or \textit{usroh}—could be seen as an implicit critique of the state’s territorial command structure. As we have seen, during the Darul Islam revival activists expended much energy on reestablishing the Islamic State’s centralized structure and hierarchy, only to see that structure easily dismantled by the authorities, thanks to government informants working from the inside. But Sungkar’s \textit{usroh} movement—with cells of closely knit members who were to refrain from communicating directly with the leadership—was designed to avoid mass exposure of members to the authorities if any one member were to be arrested and interrogated.\textsuperscript{165} The movement was successful enough to spread quickly outside Central Java, most notably to Jakarta, but further expansion was hampered by strained relations with other Darul Islam members, who were displeased by the way \textit{usroh} members operated outside of the territorial command structure.\textsuperscript{166}

This change in organizational model, which led from the concept of an Islamic State to the formation of Jemaah Islamiyah, has been explained by Abu Rusdan, the son of Hispran’s deputy in Central Java, Haji Faleh. In 2002, Rusdan was considered to be the acting amir (commander) of Jemaah Islamiyah and, more recently, has been described in \textit{Gatra} magazine as the figure most faithful to Sungkar’s vision. In an interview with the magazine, he explained the break with Darul Islam in this way:

On 1 January 1993, when we separated from the NII, the most fundamental reason was that we wanted to think concretely. If we start from the “Islamic State of Indonesia,” then the conditions can no longer be met. So we tried to return to al-Jamaah al-Islamiyah, the Muslim community.

\textit{[Gatra:] Does that mean abandoning the ideal of an Islamic state?}

The ideal of an Islamic State is not gone. What’s gone is the starting point that we still have an “Islamic State.” When we were in the NII, we still followed the Islamic State. By separating from the NII, JI was thinking from square one. Our starting point would now be with the \textit{jamaah}.\textsuperscript{167}

\textsuperscript{162} Sally Neighbour, \textit{In the Shadow of Swords: On the Trail of Terrorism from Afghanistan to Australia} (Sydney: HarperCollins, 2004), p. 103.

\textsuperscript{163} Interview with former Jemaah Islamiyah figure. October 20, 2009. The Indonesian expression was “like a frog in a coconut shell” \textit{(katak dalam tempurung)}.


\textsuperscript{165} ICG, \textit{Recycling Militants}, p. 13.

He added that members of the community were to focus on two fields, “education and dakwah”—Sungkar’s passions since the 1970s.168

By “returning to the community,” Jemaah Islamiyah was adopting the philosophy and organizational system of its Egyptian namesake, al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya. In Afghanistan, Sungkar’s recruits had developed a close relationship with Jemaah Islamiyah Egypt and perceived a great many similarities in their respective domestic situations. As they saw it, both groups suffered under tyrannical secular rulers.169 The Indonesian group took the Egyptians’ primary text, Mithaq al-Amal al-Islami (The Manifesto of Islamic Activism), as its philosophical guide, accepting its advocacy of an exclusive community “as the only method of struggle” against a secular ruler and pagan society for believers committed to restoring the Caliphate in the way taught by the Prophet.170

By 1996, Jemaah Islamiyah was codified in the General Struggle Guidelines of Jemaah Islamiyah. Authored by the “Central Leadership Council,” this was the founding document of Sungkar’s new organization. The organization’s declared purpose was to establish an Islamic state, but it avoided Darul Islam’s terminology, using the term Daulah Islamiyah to denote an Islamic state, with this state to be “the basis for reestablishing a Caliphate in the way of the Prophet.”171 Essentially, Darul Islam had split over short-term strategy rather than long-term goals. But the split led to a reformulation of identity for many in the radical Islamic community that divided people according to who would—and who would not—continue to imagine themselves as citizens of Kartosoewirjo’s Islamic State.

Yet, as the case of Iqbal in the Bali bombings shows, Darul Islam and Jemaah Islamiyah have continued to collaborate. Darul Islam recruits have also served in other bombing attacks; most notably, Heri Golun, the suicide bomber who carried out the 2004 attack on the Australian embassy in Kuningan, had a Darul Islam background. In these cases of Darul Islam–Jemaah Islamiyah collaboration, the Darul Islam nation or community appears to function as a social network in which the movement, Jemaah Islamiyah, is embedded. Darul Islam thus continues to be a crucial locus of support and regeneration for Jemaah Islamiyah, despite doctrinal differences. Indeed, with this model in mind, one might anticipate that the Darul Islam community will continue to serve as a network from which a variety of radical Islamic movements in Indonesia emerge and subside.

Conclusion

This article has traced the development of the Darul Islam network through Indonesia’s New Order regime. The analysis demonstrates that the phenomenon of Islamic radicalism was not the result of government manipulation, initiated in order to discredit political Islam, as many have claimed. Rather, the 1970s saw the revival of

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168 Ibid.
169 Interview with Nasir Abas, May 10, 2008.
Darul Islam due to the enduring legitimacy of Kartosoewirjo's Islamic State and the political cover provided to Darul Islam by the intelligence chief Ali Moertopo. The recrudescence of radicalism known as Komando Jihad was the consequence of Darul Islam's taking advantage of a window of opportunity that opened as Moertopo's Opsus intelligence organization attempted to commandeer control of the network from its traditional patrons in the military. For at least seven years, Opsus provided cover for Darul Islam's revival until the army's territorial command finally reasserted its authority.

The revival had far-reaching consequences for Islamic radicalism in Indonesia. It attracted a new type of Darul Islam recruit, epitomized by Abdullah Sungkar, who was militantly opposed to the New Order regime. Through his charismatic and entrepreneurial leadership, Sungkar succeeded in transforming a large section of the history-obsessed, backward-looking Darul Islam community into a forward-looking, goal-oriented revolutionary movement. In so doing, he became the bridge between traditional and modern radical Islam in Indonesia. Sungkar's influence culminated in the growth of the Darul Islam offshoot, Jemaah Islamiyah, which would become Southeast Asia's only transnational terrorist organization. Sungkar may have had the capacity to envision and lead JI on his own, but it was his access to the revived Darul Islam network that gave him the institutional base he needed to generate a following.

When Abdullah Sungkar separated from Darul Islam, he was rejecting its Islamic State and state-based organizational structure. His new organization, Jemaah Islamiyah, influenced by recent trends in the Middle East, adopted an ostensibly more effective model of recruitment and mobilization based on grassroots activism. No longer was the agenda to defend the Islamic State; instead, JI's younger generation of recruits was inspired by dreams of destroying the New Order. But, as we have seen, a shared past and a common goal in establishing Islamic law in Indonesia has facilitated continuing collaboration between Darul Islam and Jemaah Islamiyah, indicating that, rather than functioning as a rival movement, Darul Islam readily serves as a network of support for Jemaah Islamiyah.

Time is proving Darul Islam to be a remarkably robust network; it may yet make newer radical movements look like sectarian ephemera. But like a ruler loath to retire, the strength of Kartosoewirjo's Islamic State is its greatest weakness. Its power to move people fades with time, and yet it persists, in one form or another, oblivious to its diminishing legitimacy. Meanwhile, Indonesia continues to host an imagined community of radical Muslims who are connected, if not through their defense of the Islamic State, then through kinship, comradeship, and a respect for Kartosoewirjo's legacy.