

---

# JAWARA IN POWER, 1999–2007

Okamoto Masaaki  
and Abdul Hamid<sup>1</sup>

The fall of Suharto in 1998 and Indonesia's transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic and decentralized regime was a dramatic change that triggered a great deal of interest among social scientists studying Indonesia. One of the most intriguing topics is the rise of violent groups and organizations at the local level.<sup>2</sup> Transitions from one regime to another are often characterized by social instability and insecurity, and such conditions may allow the rise of groups and organizations that use violence to achieve their goals. They may take the form of vigilante groups intent on defending their ethnic- or religious-based communities, or the form of gangsters' organizations that make the most of local insecurity to expand their socio-economic and political power. For example, post-authoritarian Russia was characterized by the socio-economic emergence of violent entrepreneurs.<sup>3</sup> In the case of Indonesia, the revolutionary period from 1945 to 1949, especially 1945–1946, was likewise an era

---

<sup>1</sup> This article is based on research conducted under the aegis of JSPS–NRCT Core University Program. We deeply appreciate the referees' comments and the editors' persistent efforts to improve the article.

<sup>2</sup> There are several studies on these groups and organizations. On the rising militias in North Sulawesi Province, Indonesia, see Michael Jacobsen, "To Be or What to Be—That is the Question," *Southeast Asia Research Center Working Paper Series*, No. 29 (Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong, 2002), pp. 1–30. On the Jakarta-based FBR (Forum Betawi Rumpug, Betawi Brotherhood Forum) and FPI (Front Pembela Islam, the Defenders of Islam Front), see Ian Douglas Wilson, "Continuity and Change: The Changing Contours of Organized Violence in Post-New Order Indonesia," *Critical Asian Studies* 38,2 (2006): 265–97. Also on FBR, see Untung Widyanto, "Antara Jago dan Preman: Studi Tentang Habitus Premanisme pada Organisasi Forum Betawi Rumpug (FBR)" (Master's thesis, University of Indonesia, 2005). On several emerging "security" groups and organizations, see *Kelompok Kekerasan dan Bos Lokal di Era Reformasi*, ed. Abdur Rozaki and Okamoto Masaaki (Yogyakarta: IRE Press, 2006).

<sup>3</sup> See Vadim Volkov, *Violent Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism* (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 2002).

marked by the activities of autonomous *jago*, or bandits. The *jago* sometimes successfully seized social and even political power at local levels. For example, during the revolutionary period, in Kerawang district, one *jago* called Boebar seized the office of district head (*bupati*) and installed himself as *bupati*. In Tangerang district, the people (*rakyat*) rose up and the father of *rakyat* (*Bapak Rakyat*) expelled the Tangerang *bupati*, R.A. Padmanegara, from office and established his own government. Usually, their autonomy relative to the state didn't last long, however, and the state reasserted control, forcing the *jagos* to cooperate or putting them under tight controls and limiting their political exposure to the public.<sup>4</sup>

A decade has passed since the fall of Indonesia's authoritarian Suharto regime, and violent groups in the nation have prospered. This does not mean that Indonesia is on the verge of collapse and should be considered a failing or failed state.<sup>5</sup> On the contrary, Indonesia is becoming more stable, for the activities of private security providers (such as *jago* or *jawara*, as explained below) do not directly lead to ethnic and religious violent conflicts, even though these actors tend to be violent and to disperse violence throughout the country.<sup>6</sup> The fact that the state is no longer the sole authority,

<sup>4</sup> There are several studies on *jago* in Java. On the *jago* during the colonial period, see Ong Hok Ham, "The Inscrutable and the Paranoid: An Investigation into the Sources of the Brotodiningrat Affair," in *Southeast Asian Transitions: Approaches through Social History*, ed. Ruth McVey (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1978). Also see Ong Hok Ham, "The Jago in Colonial Java: An Ambivalent Champion of the People," in *History and Peasant Consciousness in South East Asia*, ed. A. Turton and S. Tanabe Senri (Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology, 1984). See also Henk Schulte Nordholt, "The Jago in the Shadow: Crime and 'Order' in the Colonial State in Java," trans. Ernst van Lennep, *RIMA* 25,1 (Winter, 1991): 74–92. On the revolutionary period, for example, see Julianto Ibrahim, *Bandit dan Pejuang di Simpang Bengawan: Kriminalitas dan Kekerasan Masa Revolusi di Surakarta* (Wonogiri: Bina Citra Pustaka, 2004). On the *blater* (thugs) in Madura, see Abdur Rozaki, *Menabur Kharisma Menuai Kuasa: Kiprah Kiayi dan Blater sebagai Rezim Kembar di Madura* (Yogyakarta: IRE Press, 2004). On the *jawara* in Banten, see Sartono Kartodirdjo, *The Peasants' Revolt of Banten in 1888: Its Condition, Course and Sequel—A Case Study of Social Movements in Indonesia* (s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966); Michale C. Williams, *Communism, Religion, and Revolt in Banten* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1990); M.A. Tihami, "Kiyai dan Jawara di Banten" (Master's thesis, University of Indonesia, 1992); and Ian Douglas Wilson, "The Politics of Inner Power: The Practice of *Pencak Silat* in West Java" (PhD dissertation, Murdoch University, 2002).

<sup>5</sup> In 2002, Robert I. Rotberg categorized Indonesia as "another example of weakness avoiding failure despite widespread insecurity" and "a state that is designated weak but that encompasses and spreads into the category of failure—the precursor to true failure." See Robert I. Rotberg, "The New Nature of Nation-State Failure," *The Washington Quarterly* (Summer 2002): 85–96. On the other hand, Michael Malley contends that the country's conditions are less dire than popularly believed: "...Indonesia appears vulnerable and weak, but hardly failing, let alone failed or collapsed." See Michael Malley, "Indonesia: The Erosion of State Capacity" in *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), p. 183. Malley mentions three factors that moderate the impact of political and economic challenges that arose in 1997–1998 (i.e., the unchallenged state's territorial claims, the relatively good socio-economic conditions, and international support for Indonesia's territorial integrity as well as political and economic reform), but he misses the fact that the political oligarchs in Golkar (the ruling party) preempted the institutional reform of political systems from the authoritarian to the democratic, and that this preemption alleviated the radicalization of the political movements. On the internal dynamics within Golkar during the critical period 1997–1999, from the perspective of an insider, see Akbar Tanjung, *The Golkar Way: Survival Partai Golkar di Tengah Turbulensi Politik Era Transisi* (Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 2007). Akbar Tanjung proudly emphasized how successfully he and other Golkar cadres kept Golkar alive and paved the way for democratization in a "moderate" way.

<sup>6</sup> "*Jawara*" is the local term for thugs. During the Dutch colonial period, *jawara* operated as a kind of rural strongman or "man of prowess" living in and around villages in Banten. They were skilled in Indonesian traditional martial arts called *pencak silat*. Some were even believed to possess magical powers (*ilmu*). *Jawara* were part village security and part outlaw. They inhabited the underground world of bandits and thieves, and were often involved in criminal activities such as robbery and extortion. Their ambivalent

the single coercive force, and the chief stake-holder in Indonesia has not led to the chaos some might have predicted.

The state has changed its stance toward private forces<sup>7</sup> and has delegated wider authority to private forces than before, not only because of the state's reduced capability to maintain order in a tumultuous society, but also because of the government's changing paradigm vis-à-vis security, which I explain later. This change enables several locally entrenched violent groups and organizations to continue to wield their socio-economic and political influences, and in many cases the individuals controlling them have shrewdly transformed themselves into powerful local oligarchs.

Those powerful local oligarchs are not as strong and independent as journalists' stories of *Raja Kecil* (small king) depict, however. Just after the introduction of democratization and decentralization, many articles stressed the rise of *Raja Kecil*s, who were said to be autonomous from the central government and who had reportedly entrenched themselves in their own bailiwicks. Unfortunately, those researchers paid less attention to the limits or the circumscription of local power. In fact, the local heads in Indonesia are not typically formidable warlords, and they are not entirely autonomous. The central government sometimes intervenes in local politics using its legal and political power if major state stakes are highly threatened or local politics become too chaotic or corrupt. The local oligarchs can be targeted for investigation and arrest if they don't obtain the strong and multilateral political support of actors within the central government.

The World Bank report entitled "Fighting Corruption in Decentralized Indonesia" (Memerangi Korupsi di Indonesia yang Terdesentralisasi), May 2007, detailed the data on corruption cases brought against local parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD) members and the local heads of districts and cities. Based on the data from all the high public prosecutors' offices from 2002 to September 2006, there were 265 corruption cases against DPRD members. Moreover, twenty-nine provincial public prosecutors' offices handled cases that named 967 DPRD members as suspects, the accused, or the condemned. During the same period, permits were issued to investigate 327 provincial DPRD members and 735 district or municipal DPRD members. There were also forty-six corruption cases involving sixty-three local heads as either suspects, the accused, or the condemned. Based on the data from the department of home affairs during 2004 to early 2006, permits were issued to investigate seven governors and sixty *bupati*/mayors or vice *bupati*/mayors.<sup>8</sup> For example, as of September 2007, the governor in East Kalimantan was in jail and two

---

status in society, plus their physical and "magical" abilities, gave them informal social and political power. See Okamoto Masaaki, "An Unholy Alliance: Political Thugs and Political Islam Work Together in Banten," *Inside Indonesia* 93 (August–October 2008), viewed at <http://insideindonesia.org/content/view/1101/47/> on September 29, 2008.

<sup>7</sup> To some it may seem strange that private forces of any kind are given power, but both their existence and influence are considered normal in Indonesia. Private forces' core members often have strong relationships with official "security" organizations, such as the police and military, while the groups' common members are recruited from among the poor. The existence of private security forces has been ensured because the police and military forces continue to use them as security enforcers and because they fulfill a generally useful role within society.

<sup>8</sup> Taufik Rinaldi, Marini Purnomo, and Dewi Damayanti, "Memerangi Korupsi di Indonesia yang Terdesentralisasi: Studi Kasus Penanganan Korupsi Pemerintahan Daerah," Justice for the Poor Project, Bank Dunia, 2007, p. 2.

governors in East Nusa Tenggara and West Kalimantan had been interrogated as suspects. *Bupati* in Kutai, Garut, and Kendal and mayors in Kendari, Medan, and Kupang had been interrogated as suspects. The arrest of Syaekani, *bupati* of Kutai district, in East Kalimantan, and one of Indonesia's leading local oligarchs, clearly demonstrated the limited autonomy of local oligarchs.<sup>9</sup>

In addition, many local governments are not resource rich, and therefore some local oligarchs depend on rents from the central government to ensure their own politico-economic power, and in that sense they are local rent-seekers who are often limited by the central government.<sup>10</sup>

This paper analyzes the fluctuating relationship between the central government and local violent oligarchs, focusing on Banten, Indonesia. It is in the Banten area that a violent local oligarch has most successfully entrenched himself economically and politically, at least until now. There are area-specific reasons for this success. First of all, the Banten area is located in the vicinity of the capital, Jakarta, and, therefore, security is quite important and private security providers can flourish in collaboration with the police and military. The local oligarch has organized these private security providers. Second, *jago* and *jawara* in the Banten area have used coercive force to gain social influence and to secure local political power during a time marked by disturbances. Third, the Banten region is just far enough from Jakarta to have poverty-stricken areas. As such, it is unattractive to competent intellectuals and businessmen, who can choose to live elsewhere. The result is the absence of an intellectual middle class, the presence of which could effectively restrain the success of violent rent-seekers.

There are already several case studies on the Banten area, such as the works of Syarif Hidayat (on Tuan Besar) and Lili Romli (on "bossism plus").<sup>11</sup> In our opinion,

<sup>9</sup> Syaekani was sentenced to six years in prison and forced to forfeit around 50 billion rupiah for his role in three corruption cases (involving the equilibrium fund, land acquisition for Loa Kul airport, and social-aid monies). The Golkar party didn't give Syaekani any clear political help even though he was one of its leading figures in the province. See "MA Vonis Syaekani Enam Tahun," Kompas.com, viewed at [www.kompas.com/read/xml/2008/07/29/00512211/ma.vonis.syaekani.enam.tahun](http://www.kompas.com/read/xml/2008/07/29/00512211/ma.vonis.syaekani.enam.tahun) on October 14, 2008.

<sup>10</sup> Wahyu Prasetyawan aptly describes the importance of the political network of local elites to the central government, focusing on the resource-rich areas and on conflicts concerning the control of state-owned natural resources. Actually, the political networks linking regions to the central government are also important in many areas where the natural resources are scarce and revenues from those sources minimal. In such places, the rents received from central and local governments provide vital revenues. See Wahyu Prasetyawan, "Government and Multinationals: Conflict over Economic Resources in East Kalimantan, 1998–2003," *Southeast Asian Studies* 43,2 (September 2005): 161–90; and Wahyu Prasetyawan, "The Unfinished Privatization of the Semen Padang: The Structure of Political Economy in Post-Suharto Indonesia," *Indonesia* 81 (April 2006): 51–70.

<sup>11</sup> See Syarif Hidayat, "'Shadow State'?: Business and Politics in the Province of Banten," in *Local Power and Politics in Indonesia: Decentralisation and Democratisation*, ed. Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003), pp. 203–24; and Lili Romli, "*Jawara* dan Penguasa Lokal di Provinsi Banten (2001–2006)" (PhD dissertation, University of Indonesia, 2007). Lili Romli added the term "plus" to Sidel's "bossism" to help describe the local politics in Banten because, according to Lili Romli, the *jawara* controls not only public servants but also civil society (p. 258). In our opinion, Sidel's concept of "bossism" is that the predatory nature of local strongmen in the Philippines is caused by the nature of the Filipino state and "bossism" emphasizes the irrelevance of the framework of patron–client relationships to explain local politics in the Philippines. In that sense, it is not correct to extend Sidel's argument of bossism this way. The local strongman's control of civil society is part of Sidel's concept of "bossism." And furthermore, as

these works put too much emphasis on the autonomous hegemony of one local oligarch, Chasan Sochib, and tend to ignore the fragile aspect of his political base, especially after the introduction in 2006 of direct regional-head elections. Instead, this paper will examine Chasan Sochib's susceptibility and vulnerability both to the central government and to demands from his own constituency; it will also explore his ideology and his strategy to maintain and reinforce his fragile power base. His nationalist ideology serves him well because it allows the central government to support him for achieving and maintaining Banten's political stability.

The Banten area is located at the western tip of Java Island. Serang city, the provincial capital of Banten province, is about a two-hour drive from Jakarta. The Banten area separated from West Java province in 2000 and became a separate province with a population of about eight million persons. Based on the 2000 census, 95.7 percent of the total population are Muslim and 46.9 percent consider themselves to be ethnic Banteneese.

The Banten area is largely composed of two parts (see map on the next page). The northern area has been settled mainly by ethnic Javanese and the southern area mainly by ethnic Sundanese. The northern area is where the *jawara* are concentrated, and they supported the communist uprising in 1926. The two areas' dividing line is around the subdistricts of Ciomas and Pabuaran; these subdistricts are Sundanese-speaking and famous for their *ulama* (Islamic preachers) and *jawara*.<sup>12</sup> Chasan came from this area. The political, economic, social, and cultural center of Banten has always been in the north and the north dominates the south. But interestingly, there appears to be no history or record of friction between the two language groups, their regional identity as Banteneese being the stronger factor.<sup>13</sup> Therefore, despite all their differences, both those living in the northern and southern parts of Banten jointly decided to call themselves Banteneese and to have their own province of Banten, an effort that was finally realized in 2000.

Administratively, Banten province is composed of three cities (Serang, Cilegon, and Tangerang) and four *kabupaten*, or regencies (Serang, Lebak, Pandeglang, and Tangerang). The northern and eastern parts of the province—that is Cilegon city, Serang city, the northern part of Serang district, and Tangerang city and district—are industrial areas. The southern part of the province that includes Lebak, Pandeglang, and the southern part of Serang district are poor, agricultural areas. Many *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools) exist, especially in the southern regions. The *ulama* in *pesantren* function as informal leaders, as do the *jawara*. As noted earlier, *jawara* are rural strongmen or semi-socially embedded men of prowess who are skillful in *pencak*

---

we mentioned, Chasan's controlling power is not so strong enough against the central government and the civil society.

<sup>12</sup> M. A. Tihami, "Kiyai dan Jawara di Banten" (Master's thesis, University of Indonesia, 1992), pp. 30–32, 50.

<sup>13</sup> Michael C. Williams, *Communism, Religion, and Revolt in Banten* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1990), p. 2. One exceptional case was the movement to establish a South Banten province in 2002. After the Banten province was established, Uwes Qorni, one of the staunch southern supporters of the new Banten province, was quite disappointed with the dominant role of the northern elite in the provincial administration and the provincial development projects, and so he pressed for the establishment of an independent southern province. But after his death, the movement to establish a South Banten province ceased. "Isu Provinsi Banten Selatan Menguat," *Harian Banten*, February 16, 2002.

*silat* (Indonesian traditional martial arts), and some are believed to have magical power, called *ilmu*.<sup>14</sup> *Jawara* partly live in the underground world and are often involved in criminal activities.<sup>15</sup> This ambiguous social status and their physical and alleged magical powers give them social standing. They were initially identified in Java in the early nineteenth century.



### Historical Encounter of the State with the Javanese Underground

In the early nineteenth century, Bantenese *jawara* were known to the Dutch colonial bureaucrats, and the Banten area was notoriously insecure.<sup>16</sup> During the nineteenth century, Banten was one of the most restless areas of Dutch-ruled Java. In the period 1810–1870 alone, no fewer than nineteen uprisings are recorded to have taken place there.<sup>17</sup>

In Java, the business of a thief is an occupation which is a part of the municipal service, which provides many people with a job, some with an investment, and which provides many benefits to its protectors ... No *desa* [village] headman

<sup>14</sup> "*Ilmu*" is of Arabic origin and has two meanings. One is "science" or "knowledge" and the other is "supernatural knowledge." Within the Banten context, the meaning of *ilmu* is "supernatural knowledge."

<sup>15</sup> Masaaki, "An Unholy Alliance."

<sup>16</sup> Williams, *Communism, Religion, and Revolt in Banten*, pp. 45–47.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 79.

considers his *desa* complete and in good order if it does not have at least one thief—often several who are under the command of the oldest or cleverest thief, who is called *Djago* ...<sup>18</sup>

The above report, which we find fascinating, was written in 1872 by a private tobacco planter at Kediri. He sketched a situation of the Javanese countryside where cattle rustling, intimidation, arson, land-tax fraud, and physical violence occurred daily and where the colonial administration had lost its grip completely.

In colonial Banten, the main actors were *jawara*. As mentioned above, *jawara* have a kind of social power that allows them sometimes to violate community rules and (threaten to) use force as necessary. Some of them ripped off the “security” fees or land fees from the gambling dens and brothels, or were engaged in criminal activities or activities that were “almost” crimes, such as mooching and blackmailing. *Jawara* have been responsible for rustling and selling cattle through their own region-wide network. Others became “security providers” for villages as valets for the respective village heads, or they themselves became village heads.

From the early nineteenth century onwards, the Dutch colonial state started to expand its power down to the village level in Java. The opium farm revenue system operated by Chinese entrepreneurs developed hand-in-hand with the official bureaucracy and initiated widespread cooperation between village heads and *jago*, or *jagabaya* (the local Javanese term for a bandit). Village heads had become terminal bureaucrats rather than influential community leaders. These village heads drew their authority from the Dutch colonial state by being recognized officially as the “formal” leaders of the village, and they exploited the villagers by demanding tax and corvée labor at the request of the Dutch colonial state. The village heads thereby strengthened and centralized their own and the Dutch power in the villages. Some *jago* or *jagabaya* came to serve the “formal” village heads and helped them collect tax by intimidation and violence, while other *jago* gained power by assisting the Chinese opium farmers in colonial Java.<sup>19</sup> A network of cooperation and tolerant relationships among village heads, *jago*, and the central government are generally understood to have linked the Dutch colonial state and villages in Java. The history in the Banten area was a little bit different, however.

The consolidation and centralization of power under village heads was only partially successful in the Banten area<sup>20</sup> because the colonial opium cultivation system—typically, a key element in the consolidation and centralization of power at the local level—never took root in that region.<sup>21</sup> The Banten area was closed for opium sales and did not host an official opium farm.<sup>22</sup> As a result, conspicuous power sharing

<sup>18</sup> See Nordholt, “The Jago in the Shadow: Crime and ‘Order’ in the Colonial State in Java,” pp. 74–91.

<sup>19</sup> For a definitive description of the opium farming system in colonial Java, see James R. Rush, *Opium to Java: Revenue Farming and Chinese Enterprise in Colonial Indonesia, 1860–1910* (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 1990).

<sup>20</sup> Uemura Yasuo, “19 Seiki Kohan—20 Seiki Shotou Jawa Madura no Desa Schuchou no Shakaiteki Chii wo Megutte [On the Social Status of the Desa Head in Java and Madura in the End of the Nineteenth Century to the Early Twentieth Century],” *Toyoshi Kenkyu* (Oriental Studies) 47,3 (1988): 86–87.

<sup>21</sup> Fujita Eri, “Shokuminchiki Jawa no Chourou to Banten Sonraku [The Influential Persons and the Bantenese Villages in Colonial Java],” *Shigaku Kenkyu* (Historical Studies), 234 (2001): 39–42.

<sup>22</sup> Rush, *Opium to Java*, p. 27.

between the formal leaders and informal leaders persisted in Banten, and the state's penetration into society was weak, for it had no motive to exert control over private violence in that region. For this reason, *jawara* continued to exist in the Banten area as an independent and influential social power, along with *ulama*, even into the twenty-first century. In the late nineteenth century, an anti-colonial struggle called the Cilegon rebellion erupted in Banten. *Jawara* and *ulama* fought together against the Dutch colonial forces. In the 1920s, when the communist party expanded its influence rapidly, some Bantenese *jawara* again allied with *ulama* and joined the party to resist the Dutch. The Bantenese branch of the Indonesian communist party even established a *jawara* section and *ulama* section.<sup>23</sup>

After the Japanese occupation ended in 1945, a power vacuum emerged. Even though Sukarno and Hatta immediately declared the independence of the Republic of Indonesia, the republic had no substance, and in many places order disintegrated. In the case of the Banten area, the disruption of order was followed by a social revolution that incited ethnic and class conflict. The Dutch colonial regime and the Japanese military regime had elevated outside elites to be Banten's top bureaucrats. The majority of them were Sundanese from the Priangan area, who frequently found it difficult to adjust to their new posting because of its profoundly Islamic atmosphere and the lack of formal respect shown to them. This difficulty prompted these ruling elites to coin the term "Banten *bantahan*" (recalcitrant or obstinate Banten).<sup>24</sup> On the other hand, the Bantenese were unhappy with being ruled by outsiders and harbored xenophobic feelings. Therefore, the end of the Japanese occupation provided *jawara* and *ulama* the opportunity to lead an uprising to force the Sundanese bureaucrats from power and grab the "formal" power for themselves.<sup>25</sup> The social and political turbulence moved *jawara* and *ulama* onto the political stage. But the takeover of the local state by informal leaders did not last long. When the Indonesian state seized sovereignty from the Dutch in 1949 and started to construct the new nation, *jawara* were ousted from their upper-level bureaucratic positions. Many of them rejoined the criminals' underworld.

### ***Jawara in the New Order***<sup>26</sup>

The state became strong again with the rise of Suharto as president in the mid-1960s, after a long period when the state had been relatively weak. The notorious September 30 affair in 1965 initiated the new era, as the military, led by Suharto, began rounding up purported enemies of the state, and military and Islamic activists killed

<sup>23</sup> Williams, *Communism, Religion, and Revolt in Banten*, p. 196.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 68–70.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 275–309; Okamoto Masaaki, "Kakumeiki wo Ikinuita Shokuminchi Kizoku Kanryoutachi (Pangreh Praja): Indonesia Nishi Jawa Shuu no Baai (The Colonial Aristocratic Bureaucrats [Pangreh Praja] Surviving the Revolution: The Case of West Java, Indonesia)," *Southeast Asian Studies* 38,2 (2000): 211–12.

<sup>26</sup> Part of this section comes from Okamoto Masaaki, "Local Politics in Decentralized Indonesia: The Governor General of Banten Province," *IAS Newsletter* 34 (July 2004): 23; and Okamoto Masaaki, "Indonesia niokeru Chiho Seiji no Kasseika to Shuu 'Soutoku' no Tanjo: Banten Chiho no Seiji: 1998–2003 [Activated Local Power Politics in Indonesia and the Birth of a Provincial 'Governor-General': Politics in the Banten Area, 1998–2003]," *Southeast Asian Studies* 34,1 (June 2005): 3–25.

approximately 500,000 “communists” and arrested around a million more.<sup>27</sup> From that time, the authoritarian Suharto regime started to control Indonesian society using both the carrot and the stick. The state was omnipresent. *Jawara* and *ulama* in Banten soon became the targets of these efforts to regain control.

Banten’s New Order regime cemented the ethnic divide between rulers and the ruled, which had its roots in the Dutch colonial period. Mainly Sundanese from the Priangan area held the important administrative and military positions of *bupati*, regional secretary, and district military commander. For example, twelve out of seventeen *bupatis* in Serang, Lebak, and Pandeglang from 1970 to 1998 were non-Bantenese (with the ethnic identity of one of the seventeen being unknown).<sup>28</sup> A small number of Bantenese obtained relatively high bureaucratic positions; just 10 percent of middle-level bureaucratic positions in Serang district in the late 1990s were held by native Bantenese.<sup>29</sup>

Bantenese informal leaders—*ulama* and *jawara*—were co-opted into the political machines of the governing party, Golkar (Golongan Karya, Functional Groups), in the early 1970s. Ironically, the New Order government followed the example of the Banten section of the 1920s communist party in organizing two social powers. In 1971 *ulama* were organized into the Ulama Work Squad (SatKar Ulama) and local *jawara* were organized into the Martial Artist Work Squad (SatKar Pendekar) in 1972; this group was subsequently renamed the Indonesian Union of Bantenese Men of Martial Arts, Art, and Culture (Persatuan Pendekar Persilatan Seni Budaya Banten Indonesia, PPPSBBI). The 122 PPPSBBI-affiliated *silat* schools in Banten were mobilized to support Golkar during the election, alongside the military and police. Chasan Sochib, who often said, “I am a *jawara* [*saya seorang jawara*],”<sup>30</sup> was the *jawara* who became the SatKar Pendekar’s general chairman and one of the executive committee members of the SatKar Ulama. He acted as a bridge between the military, bureaucracy, and Golkar, and to Banten’s society, including the underground (criminal) world. According to Chasan, three thousand *jawara* serve him and are on standby at all times.<sup>31</sup>

### Chasan Sochib: Product of the New Order

Chasan was born in Serang regency in 1930. He attended a *pesantren* before joining a guerrilla warfare unit during the revolutionary period. His job experience, starting with logistic support for the Siliwangi military division, began in 1967. Two years later he founded a construction company, CV Sinar Ciomas, later PT Sinar Ciomas Raya, which frequently won government contracts for road and market construction projects,

<sup>27</sup> The actual numbers of those killed, arrested, and detained remain unknown. According to different sources, the death toll varies from 78,000 to a million, and the number of those arrested varies from 600,000 to 1,700,000. See Robert Cribb, ed., *The Indonesian Killings: Pembantaian PKI di Jawa dan Bali 1965–1966* (Yogyakarta: Mata Bangsa, 2000), pp. 23–25, 78–79.

<sup>28</sup> Masaaki, “Indonesia niokeru Chiho Seiji no Kasseika to Shuu ‘Soutoku’ no Tanjo: Banten Chiho no Seiji: 1998–2003,” p. 9.

<sup>29</sup> Interview with Rusli Ridwan on May 4, 2000. Rusli Ridwan was the regional secretary of Cilegon city from 2000 to 2005 and, at this writing, has been vice mayor of Cilegon since 2005.

<sup>30</sup> “Putri Gubernur Jenderal di Tampuk Daerah,” *Tempo* 9 (December 2007), p. 34.

<sup>31</sup> “Tubagus ‘Abah’ Chasan Sochib: Saya Memang Gubernur Jenderal,” *Mimbar Daerah* 1,9 (November 17–23, 2003).

such as the Rau Market construction project and road building projects in Bekasi district and Karawang district. His involvement spread to the Krakatau Steel State Company, the largest steel company in Southeast Asia, and into tourism and real estate. He also held key positions in associations such as the Regional and Central Chambers of Commerce and Trade (Kamar Dagang dan Industri, Kadin) and the Indonesian National Contractors' Association (Gabungan Pelaksana Konstruksi Nasional Indonesia, Gapensi), putting his men on these associations' executive committees at the local level.

Certifications from Kadin and Gapensi are necessary for government procurement. Chasan used this requirement to coordinate projects in the Banten area. Coordination brought him more money and economic power. Kartiwa Supriatna, a resident (vice governor) of West Java province in charge of the Banten area in 1976–1983, attested to Chasan's project-coordinating skills at that time and thus his ability to amass social prestige and wealth.<sup>32</sup>

With his coordinating and enforcing power in hand, both the *jawara* under his control and his other followers became his (sub)contractors and received a share of his profits or became bureaucrats. For example, Embay Mulya Syarif, who later became critical of Chasan, was helped by him and became a cadre of Gapensi and the head of Kadin in Serang district. The one-time (2000) secretary general of PPPSBBI headquarters, Kasmiri Assabudu, owned a construction company, Bunda.<sup>33</sup> Uci Sanusi, another contractor associated with Chasan, later became a local parliamentarian in the district. The present secretary general of PPPSBBI in Serang district, Mas Santoso, joined the local bureaucracy and later became head of Serang district's sanitation department.<sup>34</sup>

Chasan's activities were not limited to the *jawara* and business worlds. He was one of the founders of a private university and the Banten Museum, and he remains the head of the Serang branch of Generation '45 (a committee for former members of Indonesia's independence forces).

Chasan became influential in many aspects of Bantenese life and played a role as interlocutor for Jakarta and Bandung; outsiders appointed as top bureaucrats relied on him and his network as a bridge to the Bantenese world. The locally stationed police and army officers had a close relationship with him. Chasan's and the PPPSBBI's ideologies are quite nationalistic, and he boasted that PPPSBBI was the only NGO that "protected [the people], defending the state and nation" and also "defending the police" and "defending the military."<sup>35</sup> Chasan even went so far as to say that

<sup>32</sup> Interview with Kartiwa Supriatna on December 8, 2003.

<sup>33</sup> Khatib Mansur, *Profil Haji Tubagus Chasan Sohib beserta Komentar 100 Tokoh Masyarakat Seputer Pendekar Banten* (Jakarta: Pustaka Antara Utama, 2000), pp. 208–9.

<sup>34</sup> Chasan's nurturing of his protégés went on for years. Consider the case of Danu Ahmad, who became the head of Gapensi in Serang district in 2000. When he was twenty years old in 1977, Chasan interviewed him and asked whether he could read, write, and do math (calculations). Despite answering yes, Danu Ahmad became a sort of personal valet to Chasan, attending to his hygiene and wardrobe. Two years later Danu became Chasan's confidant. Several months later he was given a check worth 15 million rupiah as a retirement allowance and told to go start a new business. Danu Ahmad thereupon established a construction company, Danu ATSS Perkasa. *Ibid.*, pp. 168–70.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 89.

PPPSBBI loved the police and military because these organizations had supported the mandate for the independence proclamation of 1945.<sup>36</sup> In fact, PPPSBBBI assisted the police and army by providing *silat* training to their members<sup>37</sup> and some financial aid from its business profits.<sup>38</sup> Given his local power networks and nationalistic ideology, Chasan was able to establish close ties with Golkar's central board members, such as Akbar Tanjung, and the army leaders in the New Order. The fall of Suharto in May 1998, however, changed this informal governing system. Chasan, product of the New Order, was now suddenly endangered.

### Rise of the Reformed Chasan Sochib

The *Reformasi* had wide repercussions in Banten. Students mounted a nationwide protest movement against Suharto and his regime, demanding his resignation and the reformation of government. Student demonstrators criticized Chasan for his closeness to Suharto. He responded: "You know, Pak Harto [Suharto] is still our president. We should respect him!" However, Chasan's attitude changed when Suharto resigned. When students confronted him following that event, he jumped on the *Reformasi* bandwagon, saying "Pak Harto really resigned. After his resignation, I finally decided my attitude. Pak Harto resigned after a long contemplation. Now I will support the *Reformasi* definitely, too."<sup>39</sup> In other words, just as Suharto's resignation showed that he, Suharto, had had a change of heart after much thoughtful consideration, he, Chasan, could change his mind, too, about *reformasi*.

A favorable wind has blown for Chasan. The movement to separate Banten from West Java province began in February 1999. At first Chasan was far from supportive of such a plan; his company was engaged in a large-scale road construction project in Tasikmalaya district, having been hired by the West Java provincial government. Yet when he realized that the separatist movement had deep-rooted and widespread support in Banten, he became an enthusiastic proponent. He became the general adviser to the Coordination Committee to Establish Banten Province (Badan Koordinasi Pembentukan Provinsi Banten, Bakor) in February 2000. Bakor was the core organization to promote the establishment of the new province. Mass mobilization, money, and a lobbying campaign aimed at the central government all eventually bore fruit. In October 2000, the law establishing Banten province was passed in parliament. Thousands of Bantenese welcomed the change, and Chasan, shrewdly, had ensured that he was in a position to take credit for it.

### Chasan Sochib's Entrenched Power

Banten's successful drive to establish itself as an independent province benefited Chasan by improving his former, tarnished image as a staunch supporter of Suharto.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> See Wilson, "The Politics of Inner Power," p. 259; and "Polwil Banten Gandeng Pendekar," *Harian Banten*, August 3, 2001.

<sup>38</sup> Interview with an NGO activist on December 6, 2003.

<sup>39</sup> Heri Ch. Burmelli, "Kolom Heri Ch. Burmelli: Chasan Sochib Sosok Fanatisme Banten Paling Hebat," *Banten Ekspres*, March, 20–26, 2000.

But the movement alone was not enough to enable him to entrench himself economically and politically. He realized that he would have to institute new forms of local governance to garner full political and economic power. So he supported democratization and decentralization, which gave local entities the opportunity to participate in politics by using various types of social power. In particular, those structures allowed businessmen and religious leaders to emerge as political actors. Violent social actors, such as *jawara*, were not intended to be empowered. Yet the *jawaras'* power did increase. The new state's inherent weakness relative to that of Suharto's state might be one of the reasons that *jawara* gained power, but more fundamentally, the post-*Reformasi* state simply accepted the participation of vigilante groups more readily than had the New Order government, which always tried to manage and on occasion even eradicated private security forces that became intractable. In the post-Suharto state, the role of the police in maintaining internal security was increased vis-à-vis the military, and the police gave a substantial role to private security forces. This is shown in the new law on the police. Article 3, Law No. 2/2002, on the National Police of Republic of Indonesia, stipulates that the policing function is the responsibility of the National Police of the Republic of Indonesia, which can be assisted by:

1. Special Police
2. Investigating Officer of Civil Servants, and
3. Civilian Militia<sup>40</sup>

The Indonesian police clearly recognize vigilante security groups and organizations, and they tend to allow these groups great operational latitude. For example, in Bali and West Sumbawa, respectively, it is accepted that two "traditional" local vigilante groups—the Pecalang in Bali and the Lang-lang in West Sumbawa—will handle local security and maintain order.<sup>41</sup> In fact, the Pecalang in Bali are undergoing a period of revival, as they appear to have claimed and been entrusted with the responsibility to preserve Bali's customs and cultures from external influences that many consider threatening.<sup>42</sup> Publicly, of course, the police do not recognize violent criminal organizations as security providers, but it is often difficult to draw the boundary between "normal" security providers and "criminal" security providers once security becomes privatized. The fact that all private security providers emphasize their partnership with formal security forces tends to make the distinction between

<sup>40</sup> Actually, a civilian militia (*bentuk-bentuk pengamanan swakarsa*) was mentioned as a legitimate security force in Law No. 28/1997, which was signed by Suharto on October 7, 1997, about a half year before his resignation. However, elucidation of the article related to the civilian militia only mentioned *satuan pengamanan lingkungan* (surroundings security units) under the state surveillance system, such as Satpam, Hansip (civil defense force), and the *ronda* (night guard). The article didn't mention business companies in the security sector (*badan usaha di bidang usaha pengamanan*). Law No. 28/1997 was the product of the New Order, and civilian militia-type security was expected to be part of the state's surveillance system, and not to be delegated to independent organizations.

<sup>41</sup> Kombes Pol. Pur. Drs. M. Wresniwiro, "Membangun Sistem Penagamanan Terpadu," *Membangun Budaya Pengamanan Swakarya*, ed. Kombes Pol. Pur. Drs. M. Wresniwiro, A. Haris Sumarna dan Dede Permana S. (Jakarta: Yayasan Mitra Bintibmas, 2002), pp. 6–8.

<sup>42</sup> I Ngurah Suryawan, "Bisnis Kekerasan Jagoan Berkeris: Catatan Awal Aksi Pecalang dan Kelompok Milisi di Bali," *Kelompok Kekerasan dan Bos Lokal di Era Reformasi*, ed. Okamoto Masaaki and Abdur Rozaki (Yogyakarta: IRE Press, 2005), p. 98.

“normal” and “criminal” even more vague. This collusion between parts of the formal security forces and private security providers is commonplace in Indonesia.

Recognizing the fundamental changes in the role of private security, Chasan turned to his old methods—reliance on *jawara*—to take control of Banten province, first economically and then politically. In November 2000, Hakamuddin Jamal, from South Sulawesi province, was appointed as provisional governor to organize the provincial government, select the provincial parliament, and direct the parliament in choosing its first definitive governor. At Hakamuddin Jamal’s inauguration ceremony, Chasan stood beside Hakamuddin. Hakamuddin later asked Chasan to guarantee the security of the province and rewarded him and his followers for their support with numerous contracts for construction projects.<sup>43</sup>

Throughout the period of Gus Dur’s presidency (October 1999 to July 2001), political instability was high. Religious and ethnic conflicts in Ambon and Poso intensified, the Papuan independence movement became more violent, and bombs exploded in the Philippines embassy in Jakarta and the Jakarta stock exchange. The area surrounding Jakarta, including Banten, was to be secured by any means. Chasan was well-prepared to secure the province in collaboration with the state apparatus. With strong support from the state, Chasan became the new Banten provincial branch head of Kadin in December 2000 and of Gapensi in April 2002. Chasan became an honorary secretary to the Banten provincial branch of the consultants association for all Indonesia (Ikatan Nasional Konsultasi Indonesia, INKINDO) in January 2003 and became the head of the Construction Business Development Committee (Lembagga Pengembangan Jasa Konstruksi, LPJK) in January 2001. LPJK is an important committee that coordinates many contractors’ associations that were organized after the fall of Suharto.

Chasan installed his followers as cadres in those organizations<sup>44</sup> and put them and his children into the newly built business-association branches of Banten. These include the Indonesian Association of Indigenous Entrepreneurs (Himpunan Pengusaha Pribumi Indonesia, HIPPI), Indonesian Association of Construction Contractors (Asosiasi Kontraktor Konstruksi Indonesia, AKSI), and Indonesian Association of Goods Suppliers and Distributors (Asosiasi Rekanan Pengadaan Barang dan Distributor Indonesia, Ardin).<sup>45</sup>

In addition to his business successes, Chasan became politically powerful. In April 2001, he became one of the supervisory committee’s five members to represent the civil society.<sup>46</sup> This committee supervised another committee that had the right to determine the final parliamentarians based on the 1999 election results. It is not clear to

<sup>43</sup> Interview with Heruman Haeruman on August 11, 2003.

<sup>44</sup> For example, the cadres of the Banten provincial Kadin branch in 2001–02 were as follows: Iyus Suptandar, Aceng Ishak, Ratu Atut Chosiyah (one of Chasan’s daughters), Tb. Lulu Kaking, Aenk Chaerudin, Danu Achmad, Irja Kharis, and Tatu Chasanah (one of Chasan’s daughters). They are all either his allies or his children. On the name list of the Banten provincial Kadin branch, see KADIN, *KADIN Indonesia Directory 2001/2002* (Jakarta: KADIN, 2001), pp. 303–5.

<sup>45</sup> Interview with an NGO activist on August 26, 2003.

<sup>46</sup> See “Ternyata Panitia Pengawas Belum Dilantik: Bagi Kursi DPRD Batal,” *Fajar Banten*, April 5, 2001; and “Tb Chasan Sohib Masuk Anggota Panwas: Dilantik Bersama 240 Pegawai Pemprov,” *Harian Banten*, April 10, 2001.

what extent Chasan exerted his influence on the selection process, but it was said that a Javanese, Dharmono K. Lawi, from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan, PDI-P), was chosen as the speaker of the provincial parliament because of Chasan's influence.<sup>47</sup>

**Table 1**  
**Seat Distribution in Banten Provincial Parliament**

PDI-P	19
Golkar	12
PPP	11
Al-Bantani	10
ABK	9
Military and Police	8

Note: A political party that obtains more than 10 percent of the seats can make its own faction in the parliament. A parliamentarian from a political party that has fewer than 10 percent of the seats has to join a certain faction or has to make a faction with other parliamentarians from different parties. Al-Bantani faction consists of three from National Awakening Party (PKB), one from the United Justice Party (PKP), one from United Party (Partai Persatuan), one from Indonesia Sarekat Islam Party, one from Masyumi party, one from People Sovereignty Party (PDR), one from Nahdlatul Ummat Party, and one from Indonesia Democrat Party (PDI). The ABK (Amanat Bintang Keadilan) faction consists of six members of National Mandate Party (PAN), two from the Justice Party (PK), and one from the Crescent Star Party (PBB). (PDI-P = Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle; Golkar = Party of the Functional Groups; PPP = United Development Party.)

In December 2001, the election for provincial governor was held in the provincial parliament (see Table 1 for the seat distribution). A Javanese politician, Djoko Munandar, from the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP), and Chasan's daughter, Atut Chosiyah, from Golkar, won the governorship and vice governorship (see Table 2).<sup>48</sup> Atut is Chasan's first daughter by his first wife, Hj. Wasiah. Atut was born in Ciomas, Serang District, in 1962. She graduated from a banking school in Bandung and was operating a construction company when her father asked her to run for the vice governorship. Despite her inexperience in politics, Chasan chose her because she had a *jawara*-like strong mind and self-confidence. In the election, out of sixty-nine votes cast, the Djoko-Atut pair captured thirty-seven votes—twelve Golkar votes, eleven PPP votes, eight votes from military and police

<sup>47</sup> Interview with Ampu Tanujiwa on December 4, 2003.

<sup>48</sup> Chasan had even thought to choose Heruman Haeruman (ex-Bappenas deputy head), Ampu Tanujiwa (ex-Maulana Yusuf Kodim commander), and Hakamuddin Jamal (provisional provincial governor). Chasan did approach Haeruman, but he politely declined Chasan's offer. And it was Djoko Munandar (vice mayor of Cilegon city and the provincial branch head of PPP), with eleven PPP seats in the provincial parliament, who took the opportunity (*naik perahu*) to run as governor with Atut. Interview with Heruman Haeruman on August 11, 2003.

factions, and some from the ABK (Amanat, Bintang dan Keadilan, Mandate, Crescent and Justice) and Al-Bantani factions.<sup>49</sup> That electoral victory would have been impossible without Chasan's financial support and *jawara's* threats of violence aimed at parliamentarians.<sup>50</sup>

**Table 2**  
**Election Results of Banten Provincial Governor and Vice Governor**

Candidate for Governor (occupation)	Candidate for Vice Governor (occupation)	Recommending Factions	Votes
Joko Munandar (Vice Mayor of Cilegon and Provincial Branch head of PPP)	Atut Chosiyah (Director of a Construction Company)	PPP and Golkar	37
Ace Suhaedy Masdupi (Director of a Lippo Group Company)	Tb. Mamas Chaeruddin (Provincial Branch Head of PDI-P)	PDI-P	23
Heruman Haeruman (Professor at Bogor Agricultural Institute)	Ade Sudirman (High Official at Department of Foreign Affairs)	Al-Bantani	5
Abstentions			4
Total Votes			69

Actually, during the process of creating an independent province of Banten, Chasan had already expressed his strong desire that Atut be the first vice governor and said that he didn't care who the governor would be.<sup>51</sup> It was rumored that, before election day, he bribed the provincial parliamentarians.<sup>52</sup> On December 3, election day, *jawara* dressed in black and armed with *golok* (a machete-like knife) from PPPSBBI "secured" the parliament and two to three *jarawa* "guarded" each parliamentarian's car.<sup>53</sup> Money and threats were quite effective in influencing the election results in

<sup>49</sup> "Djoko-Atut' Pemimpin Banten" *Harian Banten*, December 4, 2001. Interview with Mamas Chaeruddin (provincial branch head of PDI-P) on April 1, 2004.

<sup>50</sup> One of the best descriptions of the election is Abdul Hamid's graduation thesis. See Abdul Hamid, "Peran *Jawara* Kelompok Rawu Terhadap Kemenangan Pasangan 'Djoko-Atut' Dalam Pemilihan Gubernur Banten dan Wakil Gubernur Banten Periode 2001-2006" (BA thesis, University of Indonesia, 2004).

<sup>51</sup> Interview with Ampu Tanujiwa on December 4, 2003, and with Aceng Ishak on April 1, 2004.

<sup>52</sup> Abdul Hamid, "Peran *Jawara*," pp. 93-94.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 95.

Chasan's favor. It was ironic that Chasan fought to establish the province for the Banten people, but he chose two ethnic outsiders, Djoko and Darmono K. Lawi (provincial PDIP cadre of Javanese origin), for the governorship and the provincial DPRD speaker's post. Installing ethnic outsiders to the executive and legislative top posts made it convenient for Chasan to control post-Suharto Banten.

Now Chasan could intervene in provincial government policies regarding personnel and budgeting. The provincial parliament was ineffective in stemming his intervention. The vice chairperson of committee A (in charge of governance) from the Islamic Justice party (Partai Keadilan, PK) even said, lamentably, "The provincial government seems to be afraid of making policy decisions even though the plenary session in the provincial parliament already agreed with the decisions."<sup>54</sup> "We just wait for the agreement of *Rau*" is an often-heard cliché among provincial executives,<sup>55</sup> *Rau* being the place where almost all of Chasan's business groups and associations reside. Chasan's network of social alliances, with its physical power, could effectively force its will upon the local government. Facing this criticism of his "dominant societal power" (a term used by the Regional Planning Bureau Head of Banten Province), Chasan said, "It is not a problem in a democratic country if there exists a social power. We are not in a communist country. The people should have power under the present new paradigm."<sup>56</sup>

Chasan's company won construction projects to build the Banten Regional Police headquarters, the Provincial Parliament building, the Provincial Government complex, and several main roads. He also owned land that was sold to the government for unusually large amounts. For example, the Provincial Government procured the land for its new police headquarter from Chasan and others. The procurement price was Rp. 231,500 per square meter, a price substantially higher than the average land price of Rp. 200,000 per square meter.<sup>57</sup> Chasan was said to control more than 60 percent of the development budget of those projects worth more than 5 billion rupiah, and in many cases Chasan's competitors were given no opportunity to submit bids for the contracts.<sup>58</sup> He himself admitted that Sinar Ciomas Raya Co. Ltd. handled all projects worth more than 10 billion rupiah, and he gave his followers the projects worth less than that amount.<sup>59</sup>

<sup>54</sup> "Ade Marfudin, Wakil Ketua Komisi D DPRD Banten: Gubernur Didominasi Kekuatan Luar," *Mimbar Daerah*, 1,9 (November 17–23, 2003): 3.

<sup>55</sup> "Kekecewaan dan Dominasi Kelompok Rawu di Banten," *Sinar Harapan*, December 27, 2002.

<sup>56</sup> "Dua Kelompok Elit Nyatakan Siap Bertemu," *Harian Banten*, July 2, 2002.

<sup>57</sup> According to the 2005 Report by the Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan, BPK).

<sup>58</sup> Interview with a provincial parliamentarian from ABK on December 27, 2007. When Irsyad Djuwaeli, from Golkar, in the national parliament, criticized that open bidding was not always held in the Banten province, Chasan justified it, saying, "If the public tenders were held for the provincial development projects, the local businessmen could not receive any share of the projects." See "Mahasiswa Minta M3B Bukan Untuk Golongan: Chasan Sochib: Lebih Baik Dibentuk Bamus," *Harian Banten*, June 19, 2002.

<sup>59</sup> "Tubagus 'Abah' Chasan Sochib: 'Saya Memang Gubernur Jenderal,'" *Mimbar Daerah* 1,9 (November 17–23, 2003). Even if Sinar Ciomas was awarded a project, the company was said to subcontract it to another contractor after receiving the commission fee. Interview with Ampu Tanujiwa on December 4, 2003.

Chasan proudly stated, "I am actually the Governor-General. If he [Djoko Munandar] goes wrong in leading Banten, I will correct him. I am most responsible for him. He rose with my support."<sup>60</sup> Chasan's power is not unlimited, however, and he understands that he may not act independently from the central government in Jakarta. That is why he co-opts important national-government figures in Jakarta by appointing them as members of PPPSBB's honorary or advisory boards every time they visit Banten. Some of those who have been appointed include Da'i Bachtiar (the head of the Indonesian police), Taufik Kiemas (husband of ex-president Megawati), Guru Sukarnoputri (Sukarno's son), and MA. Rahman (ex-attorney general).<sup>61</sup> Chasan has maintained strong links with Golkar's central board, while Atut successfully forged a close relationship with Jusuf Kalla, Golkar's vice president, and, with Jusuf's support, she became Golkar's vice treasurer of the central board (2004–2009). These strong and multilateral political networks seem to have saved Chasan and his daughter from being charged with corruption.

For example, *bantenlink.com*, a news website about Banten province, detailed two corruption cases involving Chasan and Atut. One concerns the corruption related to land procurement in Karangsari. The other has to do with the abuse of an emergency budget established to support the purchase of parliamentarians' houses. In the latter case, the governor, Djoko Munandar, and three other legislative members, Daromono (speaker), Mufrodi (vice speaker), and Muslim Djamaluddin (vice speaker), were found guilty. Atut, Chaeron Muchsin (provincial secretary), and other provincial government officers attended the meetings during which it was decided how to use the emergency fund, but they are free, at least until now, and Atut has never been questioned by the prosecution.<sup>62</sup> Depending on how the political tide turns, however, Chasan and Atut could be summoned at any time by the police or the prosecution. That could occur if central-government leaders discover a more attractive alternative to the Rau group's influence and resources, or determine that the Rau group's network has weakened and become relatively ineffective. In either case, Chasan and Atut could be seen as dispensable and lose whatever political protection from suspicion and prosecution that they now enjoy.

Naturally there has been opposition mounted against the Rau group's dominance in Banten. Some ex-Bakor members formed an anti-Rau organization named M3B (Majelis Musyawarah Masyarakat Banten, Deliberative Council of Bantenese Society), but it was ineffective. Moreover, the media in general fear to be too critical of Chasan, as machetes could be their reward for any criticism.

<sup>60</sup> The Governor-General was a Dutch colonial bureaucratic guardian from the Netherlands East Indies during colonial times. Chasan was unhesitatingly dubbed as the colonial top guardian.

<sup>61</sup> Romli, "*Jawara* dan Penguasa Lokal di Provinsi Banten (2001–2006)," pp. 237–38.

<sup>62</sup> The rumor was that Djoko was arrested to clear the road for Atut to become the provincial governor, considering the fact that Djoko's arrest occurred about a year before Banten's direct gubernatorial election. Atut could mobilize the provincial bureaucracy freely if Djoko was out and she became the acting governor.

### Direct Election of Governor: Time for Change or Time for Further Consolidation?

In November 2006, the first direct election of the provincial governor was held in Banten province. This election represented a potential departure from the dominance of the Rau group in the province. But the Rau group was well-prepared. A few years before the election, the governor, Djoko Munandar, had been arrested for corruption, and at that time Atut Chosiyah became the acting governor. That promotion gave her a free hand to mobilize the provincial bureaucracy to ensure her victory in the 2006 election.

#### *Party Support for Atut*

Four pairs of candidates ran for the election, as shown in Table 3. The Rau group, of course, supported the acting governor (that is, Chasan's daughter, Atut). The new decentralization law, No. 33/2003, stipulated that each pair of candidates for governor and vice governor needed the support of political parties. The Rau group sought support mainly from the largest party in the province, Golkar, led by Jusuf Kalla, and the third largest party in the province, PDI-P, led by ex-president Megawati.

**Table 3**  
**Banten Governor Election: Candidates, Supporting Parties, and Results**

Candidate for Governor	Tryana Syamun	Atut Chosiyah	Irsjad Djuwaeli	Zulkieflimansyah
Candidate for Vice Governor	Benjamin Davnie	M. Masduki	Mas A. Danili	Marissa Haque
Supporting Party (Seats in the Provincial Parliament)*	PPP (8) PAN (4)	Golkar (16) PDI-P (10) PBR (5) PBB (3) PDS (2) PKPB (1) Partai Patriot (0)	Partai Demokrat (9) PKB (5)	PKS (11) PSI (1)
<i>Number/percentage of votes per district or city:</i>				
Serang District	175,297/23.4%	282,698/37.7%	33,759/4.5%	258,419/34.4%
Cilegon City	25,339/16.8%	58,509/38.7%	4,276/2.8%	63,044/41.7%
Lebak District	118,435/22.2%	278,805/52.3%	29,029/5.4%	106,401/20.0%
Pandeglang District	151,723/30.0%	214,202/42.3%	26,474/5.2%	113,780/22.5%
Tangerang District	258,263/22.7%	434,468/38.1%	38,849/3.4%	407,403/35.8%
Tangeran City	89,219/17.1%	176,775/34.0%	15,535/3.0%	239,148/45.9%
<b>Banten Province (totals)</b>	<b>818,276/22.7%</b>	<b>1,445,457/40.2%</b>	<b>147,922/4.1%</b>	<b>1,188,195/33.0%</b>

Source: Provincial Election Committee

\* PPP = United Development Party; PAN = National Mandate Party; Golkar = Party of the Functional Groups; PDI-P = Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle; PBR = Reform Star Party; PBB = Crescent Star Party; PDS = Prosperous and Peace Party; PKPB = Functional Party for National Concern; Partai Patriot = Patriot Party; Partai Demokrat = Democratic Party; PKB = National Awakening Party; PKS = Prosperous Justice Party; PSI = Islam Sarekat Party

Some of the provincial Golkar cadres clearly opposed Atut because of her lack of leadership. However, the final decision was not made by Golkar's provincial branch but by its central board. Golkar gave high priority to the accuracy of polling results and used two polling agencies, Saiful Muzani's LSI (Lembaga Survei Indonesia, Indonesian Survey Institute) and Denny JA's LSI (Lingkaran Survei Indonesia, Indonesian Survey Circle, an offshoot of Saiful's LSI). The result of polling in 2005 showed the highest support for Atut, at around 20 percent. In second place was Marissa Haque, a famous actress, and in third place was Tryana Sjamun, a rich businessman.

Some of Golkar's board members tried to support Tryana instead of Atut in order to break down the dominance of the Rau group. Tryana belonged to the Icar (Aburizal Bakrie) faction within Golkar, and the member in charge of the Banten province on the central board was changed from Tajuddin Nursaid to Agus Gumiwang Kartasasmita, son of Ginandjar Kastasasmita, an ally of Icar.<sup>63</sup> Icar was one of the most successful businessmen supported by Ginandjar, an influential technocrat during the New Order and, in 2001, head of the House of Regional Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, DPD), which was in charge of decentralization policies. Ginandjar's son belonged on Icar's side. So, perhaps the change was instigated by the Icar group to bolster Golkar's potential support for Tryana.

Tryana's supporters moved to increase his popularity in the province, but the second polling in January 2006 showed that Atut still had the highest rate of support, 20 percent, compared to only 8 percent for Tryana.<sup>64</sup> Based on these low approval ratings, Tryana's supporters suggested that he choose the popular Marissa as his vice-gubernatorial candidate on the assumption that their combined votes could surpass the votes for Atut. He rejected this strategy, and the support for his candidacy waned in Golkar.<sup>65</sup>

On July 2, 2006, the provincial branch of Golkar organized a convention to confirm the candidates for governor, but the convention committee only permitted Atut to run in the convention.<sup>66</sup> Other potential candidates, such as two Golkar members from the national parliament, Aly Yahya and Irsjad Djuwaeli, withdrew from the contest. (Aly Yahya took the registration form, but he never submitted it.) Two of Golkar's central board members, Agung Laksono and Kartasasmita, intervened in the selection process at the provincial level. This "undemocratic" negation of the convention touched off a severe backlash from some of the provincial branch cadres. Sam Rachmat, one of the selection team members, called a press conference to criticize the process and was subsequently forced to resign from Golkar's provincial branch. Not surprisingly, the convention chose Atut as Golkar's sole candidate for the Banten governor's race by

<sup>63</sup> Tajuddin was the regional coordinator for Jakarta and Banten, but later his jurisdiction was limited to Jakarta, and Agus was put in charge of West Java and Banten. Interview with a Golkar cadre on December 4, 2007.

<sup>64</sup> The polling by Denny's LSI in May 2006 showed that Atut's popularity rose to 38.7 percent while Tryana's was at 10.3 percent. See LSI's (Lingkaran Survei Indonesia) survey report, *Laporan Survei Propinsi Banten* (May 2006).

<sup>65</sup> Interview with a young Golkar cadre from the central board on February 7, 2007.

<sup>66</sup> "Konvensi Golkar Disayangkan," *Radar Banten Online* (<http://www.radarbanten.com/>), accessed on June 26, 2006.

acclamation. Sam was not fired, but instead was installed as the provincial team head to ensure Atut's victory (Tim Sukses Atut).<sup>67</sup> The Rau group was quite skillful in its dealings with a recalcitrant party member. Sam had no choice but to support her and risk losing face if she lost the contest.

The Rau group shrewdly intervened in PDI-P's decision-making process as well. A PDI-P assembly member, Marissa, wished to run for the governorship and had strong support in the provincial branches. Marissa is a famous actress, and her husband, Ikang Fauzi, is a well-known rock singer from Lebak district; their fame promised to be an important resource in the election. The special regional working meeting (*Rapat Kerja Daerah Khusus, Rakerdasus*) of the PDI-P provincial branch was held on April 5, 2006, to decide PDI-P's gubernatorial and vice-gubernatorial candidates. Atut won 714 votes, while Marissa garnered just 543 votes, meaning that a PDI-P parliament member lost to a Golkar cadre. This upset was possible because some of the PDI-P provincial cadres belonged to the Rau group, and vote buying was quite effective in convincing other non-Rau group members to support Atut, according to Marissa. Marissa rejected the result, saying "the prime reason to reject the result is that the process of *Rakerdasus* was rife with money politics and the result was totally different from the aspiration of active PDI-P provincial members."<sup>68</sup> Later, the central board of PDI-P chose Atut as the party's sole gubernatorial candidate.

These other parties also supported Atut: two Islamic parties, Star and Crescent Party (Partai Bulan Bintang, PBB) and Crescent and Reformation Party (Partai Bintang Reformasi, PBR); one Christian party, Peace and Welfare Party (Partai Damai Sejahtera, PDS); and the two nationalistic parties, Concern for the Nation Functional Party (Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa, PKPB) and Patriot Party (Partai Patriot). The internal conflict within PBR was notably curious. The PBR provincial branch selected six candidates for governor, but the president of PBR, Zainuddin MZ, formerly an influential Islamic preacher, held a plenary meeting in Atut's house and rejected those six candidates, nominating her instead as PBR's gubernatorial candidate, even though she was not among the six candidates chosen by the local PBR branches.

### Finding Atut's Partner

The Rau group successfully obtained the support of seven parties (these seven parties account for 37 of the 75 seats in the provincial parliament). The next challenge for the Rau group was deciding who should be Atut's running mate. Someone from the Tangerang area would be ideal, as more than half of the voters lived there. The Rau group had weak influence in the Tangerang area, however. The Tangerang area is urbanized and ethnically heterogeneous, so the provincial bureaucratic links and the *jawara* network that the Rau group could mobilize were not always effective there. Moreover, undecided voters constituted the majority.

Another problem for the Rau group was that the Tangerang district head, Ismet Iskandar, and Tangerang's mayor, Wahidin Halim, were united in their dissatisfaction with acting-governor Atut's policies and leadership. So together they tried to find

<sup>67</sup> Interview with Sam Rachmat on February 1, 2007.

<sup>68</sup> "Marissa Haque Tolak PDI-P Calonkan Atut," *Gatra*, August 6, 2006.

someone who could better represent the politico-economic interests of the Tangerang area as governor or vice governor. At first, Wahidin had intended to run for election himself, and some candidates, including Atut, even solicited him to be their vice-gubernatorial running mate. However, he wished to be governor, but finally bowed out of the race altogether, partly because he estimated he could not win the election. So Wahidin, in coordination with Ismet, allowed Tangerang's regional planning agency head, Benyamin Davnie, to run for election as Tryana's partner. (Tryana, who was born in Pandeglang district, needed support from the Tangerang area.) The team of Tryana–Benyamin presented a viable threat to the Rau group.

The Rau group at first leaned toward choosing a famous ex-Tangerang district head, Zakaria Machmud, as Atut's running mate, but finally chose H. M. Masduki, an ex-social department head from West Java province. He was selected because he had several times been subdistrict head in the Tangerang area, was the son of a locally famous *ulama*, and was a relative of Benyamin and could win over some part of his constituency. On September 1, 2006, the Golkar provincial branch formally named Masduki as Atut's vice-gubernatorial running mate. Other parties followed suit, and on September 6, 2006, the Atut–Masduki pair was declared formally with their registration to the provincial election committee.

### PKS as Tough Competitor

The Rau group's strongest opponents were the candidates from the second-largest party in the Banten province, PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, Prosperity and Justice Party). PKS was established by an Islamic proselytizing group found mainly at major universities, such as the University of Indonesia and Technology Institute of Bandung. PKS, which has its own leader development system, has expanded its constituencies mainly in urban areas, with the intent of influencing "political morals." The proportion of votes gained by PKS in Banten increased rapidly, from 2.6 percent in 1999 to 11.9 percent in 2004. PKS attracted voters not only from the urban middle class but also from the urban labor class, with strongholds in the Tangerang and Cilegon areas. The core members of PKS are typically in their thirties and politically inexperienced with regard to holding public office. The PKS therefore sought a capable gubernatorial candidate from outside its ranks, to be paired with a PKS member as the vice-gubernatorial candidate. PKS needed a leader of experience to aid the party's political expansion and give it credibility, and the Banten gubernatorial election was the first good opportunity to arise after PKS's successful mayoral campaign in Depok.<sup>69</sup>

PKS approached Wahidin. Wahidin, a career bureaucrat and graduate of the University of Indonesia, had a great deal of experience dealing with several Islamic organizations. He was popular among the citizens of Tangerang city because of his populist approach toward the people and his Islamic piety. When the Tangerang city government issued a bylaw, No. 8/2005, against prostitution, which had the flavor of

<sup>69</sup> The Depok mayoral election was held in July 2005, with PKS's candidate, ex-minister Nur Mahmudi Ismail, winning the election. PKS chose him as the party's candidate even though he was not a core member of PKS. PKS regarded Ismail's administration as a showcase for other regions, that is, to show that PKS-led governments were not radically Islamic as some claimed, and that PKS was a "normal" party and was not so different from other political parties. Interview with Zulkieflimansyah on February 11, 2007.

Islamic law, it was rumored that Wahidin had strategically engineered its passage in order to win the support of PKS in his run for the governorship. Finally, however, Wahidin declined to run because of weak financial backing and the likelihood that he would lose to the incumbent.

PKS finally approached Marissa, after the PDI-P chose Atut. PKS's choice was based on the calculation that it already enjoyed substantial support among urban voters and Marissa's popularity as a well-known actress could attract votes from the rural area. Marissa accepted the offer with the condition that she would run for the election as a vice governor and Zulkieflimansyah, a cadre of PKS, would be her partner as candidate for governor. Zulkiefli was born in NTB (Nusa Tenggara Barat, West Nusa Tenggara Province) in 1972 and has been a University of Indonesia lecturer of management. He holds two master's degrees and earned his doctorate in England. He was elected as a member of parliament from PKS in 2004. PKS expected its Zulkiefli–Marissa pair to be formidable challengers against Atut–Masduki.

### **Rau's Election Strategy: Rice in Exchange for the Rural Poor's Votes**

According to the provincial head of Tim Sukses Atut, 65 percent of the people in Banten Province are "pragmatic"—meaning ready to barter their vote—while only 35 percent can be called "rational," since they actually consider and judge the qualities of the candidates when voting for governor, which is why money counts so much in winning the gubernatorial election.<sup>70</sup> Capitalizing on voters' materialism was one of the most significant characteristics of the Atut–Masduki campaign. "Only an affluent man can afford to judge what is good and what is bad"<sup>71</sup> and the most urgent matter for the rural poor is to feed themselves and their families. Moral judgments are secondary to rice for survival. The Atut–Masduki team understood this non-ideological concept of "the conquest of rice" quite well. The team targeted the most needy *orang hutan* (forest people) in the rural areas. The team distributed money to them without triggering any accusations from the election observation committee. The committee was made up of middle-class people who didn't dare to check remote rural areas and had no power to investigate the legality or illegality of any candidate's campaign tactics. Additionally, the Atut–Masduki team adopted a sell-buy vote-getting system called *sistem jual-beli*. The team chose five people as vote canvassers for each polling station (Tempat Pemungutan Suara, TPS) and provided each one with a campaign slush fund based on the number of voters they were expected to buy. If the number of votes for Atut in a given TPS surpassed the number that was expected, any leftover money need not be refunded to the campaign.<sup>72</sup> Also, *serangan fajar* (dawn attack), the buying of votes at dawn on the day of the election, was common.

<sup>70</sup> Interview with a Golkar provincial cadre on February 1, 2007.

<sup>71</sup> Miyazaki Manabu, *Kindai Yakuza Kotei Ron: Yamaguchi Gumi no 90 Nen* [Positive Argument on Modern Yakuza: 90 Years of Yamaguchi Yakuza Group] (Tokyo: Tsukuma, 2007), p. 269.

<sup>72</sup> If the actual votes cast for Atut didn't equal the votes that were "purchased," the vote canvassers had an obligation to return money to the campaign team, according to the contract. Such refunds didn't occur, however, because Atut won the election anyway. Confidential interview on February 1, 2007.

The Atut–Masduki pair supposedly spent around 300 billion rupiah (US\$33 million) in total and 70 percent of the money took the form of provincial projects geared to support the pair.<sup>73</sup>

### The Historical Federation of *Jawara* Organizations: PPPSBBI and BPPKB

In October 2005, a social organization called “The Unified Banten Volunteers” (Relawan Banten Bersatu, RBB) was initiated by Chasan and was supported by seventeen others, including Lulu Kaking, the provincial head of the Patriot Party and the Pancasila Youth (Pemuda Pancasila), and Aep Saefudin, the secretary general of PPPSBBI. The “formal” reason for the establishment of this organization was said to be the fact that *reformasi* had deviated from its initial purposes. According to its founders, RBB was formed to resist the threat of national disintegration and any biased interpretation of the national motto, “unity in diversity.” RBB would reportedly be based on the fighting soul, spirit, and values of 1945—*Jiwa Semangat Nilai '45*<sup>74</sup>—that had been forged during the Indonesian revolution for the independence, 1945 to 1949. This formal RBB platform was quite similar to PPPSBBI’s and showed influences from the New Order.

Six months later, the actual purpose of RBB was revealed. The real commander was neither Chasan nor any of the other seventeen supporters, but Chasan’s first son, Chaeri Wardana, who had studied management at an Australian university. Wardana tried to consolidate *jawara* and forge them into this new organization, RBB, by coordinating two of the most influential *jawara* organizations, the PPPSBBI and the Agency to Develop the Potentialities of the Bantenese (Badan Pembina Potensi Keluarga Besar Banten, BPPKB), in order to elect Atut governor. BPPKB had been established on July 8, 1998. The founder and president of BPPKB is Noer Indradjaja SH, who in 2006 was the head of the legal section of Sunter Agung Co. Ltd and recently established a new company, Melawai Jaya Realty Co, Ltd. Sunter Agung is a holding company of Agung Podomoro Business Group and Melaway Jaya Realty is a group company of Agung Podomoro. This group manages twenty-seven large-scale property projects in Jakarta and its surrounding area, with a total capital of 15 trillion rupiah.<sup>75</sup> When Noer Indradjaja founded BPPKB, an ethnic Bantenese-based organization, eight families from Pandeglang district also joined. BPPKB grew rapidly, with membership reaching 8.7 million as of February 2006 and branches in almost all Indonesian provinces, according to a BPPKB leader (this claim may be exaggerated). BPPKB sources claim that it has four million members residing in Jakarta, Bogor, Tangerang, and Bekasi. The organization’s area of influence in Jakarta covers West Jakarta and North Jakarta, including Tanjung Priok harbor. These areas are still the frontiers for real estate developers. BPPKB builds command posts (*pos komando*, *posko*) to demonstrate their presence and power throughout the city. If their figures are correct,

<sup>73</sup> Confidential interview on February 1, 2007.

<sup>74</sup> “Laporan Khusus: Relawan Banten Bersatu: Mengantisipasi Disintegrasi Bangsa,” *Teras*. June 2006, p. 49.

<sup>75</sup> See: [www.tokohindonesia.com/ensiklopedi/t/trihatma-kusuma-haliman/index.shtml](http://www.tokohindonesia.com/ensiklopedi/t/trihatma-kusuma-haliman/index.shtml), accessed on October 14, 2008.

then in terms of membership, BPPKB has already surpassed other Bantenese organizations that have operated in Jakarta, such as Warga Banten and PPPSBBI.

RBB began operations in March 2006, and its establishment was formally declared in May 2006. RBB's unique organizational structure, shown in Table 4, consisted of two pillars—the cadre (executive board) and the family. This organization relied on both a typical modern organizational structure and familial network. It seems that the function of the familial network was to control the cadres. RBB had its coordinators even at the village level. The May 2006 ceremony to celebrate the founding of RBB was essentially a show of force, meant to demonstrate support for the Atut–Masduki candidacy. It was attended by local oligarchs and strongmen dressed in colors that demonstrated their support for Atut, whose influential family connections were clearly recognized. Aep Saefuddin of PPPSBBI challenged those who dared to question these tactics: “Do you really think that we can keep the post-election condition under control if we fail to have Atut win the gubernatorial election?”<sup>76</sup>

In February 2007, after the election, an RBB cadre explained the situation in this way, clearly outlining the character of RBB and *jawara* in general.

The spiritual core of RBB is BPPKB and PPPSBBI. If PPPSBBI and BPPKB are made to act separately, it is no good. Their image would suffer. In the future, mature thinking and emotional approaches with no violence would be evidently smarter. We really hope to show that the characteristics of the Bantenese are tough [*keras*] but not coarse [*kasar*]. If a person treats us politely, we will also treat him politely. But if one tricks us, we will take coarse actions to deal with him. That is why we are prepared to face anyone or group [that is critical of Atut's success] when the provincial election committee made an announcement yesterday that Atut won the election. Any group that harasses the constitution will face the Bantenese people, in this case, RBB. RBB is supported by PPPSBBI and BPPKB and also by others, including 118 schools of *pencak silat*.<sup>77</sup>

The above shows that (1) PPPSBBI and BPPKB collaborated to support Atut, (2) the Bantenese, especially *jawara*, are regarded as *keras*, (3) *jawara* will not hesitate to use violence when they feel harassed, and (4) *jawara* may use more peaceful measures to solve problems in the future, if possible. The clear message was that *jawara*, both from PPPSBBI and from BPPKB, were prepared to be mobilized if Atut faced difficulties.<sup>78</sup>

### Co-opted Young Intellectuals

Wardana knew that the social powers of *jawara* were not always effective in winning direct elections. Shows of force could result in a backlash against Atut. So, on March 10, 2005, he established a new organization, the Institution for the Unified Banten (Lembaga Banten Bersatu, LBB). This was a think tank designed to help Atut win

<sup>76</sup> Interview with Aep Saefudin on February 5, 2007, by a young NGO activist, Anis Fuad.

<sup>77</sup> Confidential interview with an RBB cadre on February 5, 2007.

<sup>78</sup> One cadre of the Tim Sukses admitted that the organization had prepared a secret strategy for Atut–Masduki if the pair lost the election. Interview on February 1, 2007.

**Table 4**  
**Tentative Executive Board of RBB in Banten Province**

<i>District/City</i>	<i>Executive Board</i>	<i>Family</i>
Tangerang City	Lurah H. Marhaman Komang H. Syukur H. Lurah Dody Anwar Roni (BPPKB) ex-Colonel Samlawi Muslih M. Junaedi Toni	Drs. Hikmat Tomet Moh. Alwi Juri
Tangerang District	H. Jahudi Lurah Maje'n H. Udin Syhbudin H. Oong H. Haer Edi Senopati	H. Aden Lilis K. H. Tavip
Serang District	U. Uding (BPPKB) KH Ali Nurdin KH Suhemi Ibnu Saba Abdurrahman ex-Colonel Umar Navis H.M. Hartono H. Madurip	Hj. Rt. Lilis K. H. Uci Sanusi H. Tb. Yana Kaking
Cilegon City	H. Ade Miftah H. Nana H. Ahmad (BPPKB) H. Habibudin H. Zaidan Rifa'i Heri Herianto	H. Tb. Chaerul Zaman Asep Keben H. Fuad SE
Pandeglang District	H. Edi Jupraeni H. Jajat Muhahidin H. Iding H. Gojali Endoh (BPPKB) H. Maman E. Samuti	Hj. Rt. Tatu Hasanah SE H. Juanda Hj. Tita Rusdinar
Lebak District	H. Hadi Mulyana H. Irja Kharis H. Sumantri H. Kasmin H. Rusmani (BPPKB) KH Drs. Mubin Arsudi H. Apih Juli H. Heri Agus Wisas	H. Sadeli H. Tb. Didi Satibi H. Juhaeri

Source: Laporan Khusus: Relawan Banten Bersatu: Mengantisipasi Disintegrasi Bangsa, Teras Juni 2006, p. 48.

the election. Wardana recruited sixty members, the majority of them young intellectual activists. For example, one of the recruits, Ferry Muchlis Ariefmuzzaman, was an ex-head of the Islamic Students' Association (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, HMI) in Ciputat, Tangerang. Others included Komarudin and Hamied, HMI activists in Ciputat; Erdi Bachtiar, an activist from Indonesian Islam Student Movement (Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia, PMII); and Ahmad Jazuli, vice director of the Banten provincial branch of National Committee for Indonesian Youth (Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia, KNPI). The young cadres from a modern Islamic boarding school (*pondok pesantren*), Pondok Pesantren Daar El Qoram at Gintung, Tangerang, joined LBB, too. Many of these young students come from the Tangerang area. Clearly, Wardana was following a strategy to draw in the rational voters in Tangerang through the young intellectuals. And pollster Denny JA, executive director of Lingkaran Survei Indonesia, was invited to act as a consultant for Atut–Masduki's election team.

LBB at first utilized the RBB network to mobilize the masses and to display the posters and banners of Atut–Masduki. RBB had coordinators at the subdistrict and village levels. Later, however, when Wardana became aware of the poor performance of RBB's subdistrict and village coordinators, he developed his own connections there. He included Chasan's family members as coordinators, and they were expected to control the funding for the campaign at the community level, to display campaign posters and banners, and to mobilize people at the grassroots level.

The most important duty of LBB was to formulate the campaign strategy, including funding, logistics, events, and programming, and to promote the positive characteristics of Atut–Masduki. For instance, LBB printed 1.7 million copies of a 2006 calendar with the photo of Atut as acting governor and started to distribute them in October 2005.<sup>79</sup>

LBB used every opportunity and institution to publicize acting-governor Atut. The provincial bureaucracies were fully mobilized. Agah M. Noor, the program division head of LBB and coordinator of the provincial government projects, was nicknamed by the provincial bureaucrats "the fourth regional secretary"<sup>80</sup> because of his coordinating expertise. All the provincial projects were Atut-labeled ones, forcibly imprinting the image of Atut on voters' minds. The money, materials, and benefits from government projects were attributed to Atut. Agah also initiated so-called "Santa Claus" activities. When a provincial department started up a development program called "*safari pembangunan*" (development safari) in which Atut herself visited the location and distributed food and other goods in accordance with the needs of the community, other provincial departments were obliged to contribute 10 to 25 million rupiah to the program. This largesse a snowball effect, and the recipient communities received large benefits from each program. Atut's "Christmas" boxes were thus popular and effective in eliciting the sympathy of rural community members. Almost all of those communities voted for Atut on election day, according to an anonymous, highly placed officer in the provincial government.

<sup>79</sup> A focus-group discussion was held to choose the best photo of Atut to use for the calendar.

<sup>80</sup> The Banten provincial government has just three regional secretaries.

Additionally, an event organizer whom Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono had hired during his presidential election campaign and one of Indonesia's most famous photographers worked together to produce a finely tuned and well-made-up Atut, so that she would be well received by the rural people. Wardana's wife, Airin Rachmi Diany, an actress, helped out. LBB intensively produced and distributed positive propaganda for Atut. Atut was heavily publicized as an ideal woman and mother who devoted herself to religious and social activities. To further this effort, Agah intervened in the activities of the provincial bureau of public relations by ordering that the provincial government's LBB-designed ad be published locally. Three local newspapers carried this ad, calling attention to the province's acting governor—Atut.

In conclusion, the political resources of the Atut–Masduki team were social materialism, bribery, an Atut-oriented bureaucracy, and a well-groomed Atut. Add to that the influence of the twin organizations RBB and LBB, which provided physical power and young, intellectual power, respectively.

### **Atut–Masduki: Winners by a Slim Margin**

The election was held on November 6, 2007. The Atut–Masduki team defeated the Zulkiefli–Marissa team by the slim margin of around 7 percent. Atut–Masduki gained a sweeping victory in the Lebak and Pandeglang districts and won by a slim margin in the Serang and Tangerang districts; the pair lost to Zulkiefli–Marissa in the Cilegon and Tangerang cities, as shown in Table 3. This result was virtually identical to the two LSIs' polling predictions.

Despite the polls, the Atut–Masduki team had been expected to win easily. So why did the incumbent win by only a slim margin? First of all, there existed widespread discontent with the local hegemony of the Rau group in Banten province. Second, PKS's solid political machine ran smoothly, especially in the urban area. But why, if many of the local elites were dissatisfied with the Atut administration, did the incumbent win the election at all? First, of course, the political resources of Atut were unequalled. Second, the popularity of Marissa could not beat the rice and other "gifts" that Atut distributed freely to *orang hutan* in rural areas. Third, the Tryana–Benyamin pair did not distribute as much campaign money to the *tim sukses* (success team) as their supporters had hoped. Tryana himself emphasized "clean politics" in his election campaign.<sup>81</sup> However, less money resulted in fewer votes. Without the money, the *tim sukses* were not sufficiently motivated to garner votes for Tryana.

### **Epilogue: From Election to Consolidation and Regeneration**

The New Order state organized *jawara* into a regionally centralized organization, later called PPPSBB, in the early 1970s. Previously, *jawara* existed as an informal collective social agent that could play the role of both negative and positive mediator

<sup>81</sup> It is not clear whether Tryana really wanted to win the election. One of the most important motivations to run for the governorship might have been to show his seriousness to dedicate himself to Bantenese development. His staunch supporters were twice disappointed with him when he declined to run for the governor in 2001 and again declined to run for the DPD election in 2004. Interview with Tryana Sjamun on April 16, 2007.

or problem solver or social “security” enforcer. *Jawara* sometimes helped the rural poor (i.e., as a positive service provider) and at other times exploited them (i.e., as a negative service provider). Modern ideology had almost no meaning for *jawara*. Their weapons have been intimidation, *pencak silat*, blow and assault, and *ilmu*. These *jawara* have no inherent (ideological) direction; sometimes they rise in revolt against the current central government, as if to defend the people, and at other times they mobilize to crush the people’s resistance movements. *Jawara* have been a semi-socially embedded entity. The New Order state decidedly transformed them, however. Many *jawara* milked economic benefits from the state and obtained contracts for state-related business or projects. The corollary was the *jawaras’* dependence on the state and their increasing detachment from society during the New Order, as *jawara* started to advocate a nationalist ideology.

The fall of Suharto was both a challenge and an opportunity for the nationalistic *jawara*, as the state made a partial retreat from all aspects of life. Democratization and decentralization gave wider economic and political opportunities to local societies. Threats and the occasional exercise of violence and shows of force proved to be important and quick tools for politico-economic capital accumulation, especially at the local level. The state has been tolerating private security forces’ existence and that has caused the further collusion between sections of the formal forces (military and police) and private forces, especially at the local level. The changing paradigm of the state regarding “security” has had broad impacts upon society. The police have separated from the military and claimed an increasing role in enforcing internal security, in the process effectively legalizing the civilian militias that assist them. This development follows a global trend toward increasingly privatized security enforcement and increased “sanctioned” violence.

The security business has become a profitable enterprise, and private security groups can vary from professional enterprises to *yakuza*-style (organized crime) operations. Security objectives and the methods used to implement them likewise vary. The ambiguous character of the security business in post-Suharto Indonesia represented a rare opportunity for *jawara* to expand their economic resources by controlling the local governments. PPPSBBI “secured” (*mengamankan*) Banten province by sending black-clad members as body guards during president Megawati’s visit in 2004, while BPPKB has rapidly expanded its membership and its business by providing “security” for those who are prepared to pay for their “negative” service.

The Rau group successfully retained the governorship, allowing its members and supporters to consolidate their politico-economic power and maintain their benefit-producing system by milking the provincial budget. Another fact to be pointed out is that the Rau group’s success in the 2007 election paved the way for the smooth transfer of power from Chasan to his son(s) and daughter(s). Chasan has repeatedly said, “There is no more meaningful thing in my life other than making my children leaders,”<sup>82</sup> and he did it faithfully. His eldest son, Wardana, showed his capability by commanding the election campaign while his eldest daughter, Atut, became governor by presenting herself as an ideal Bantenese woman and starting to forge the politico-economic power of the Rau group. The regeneration of the Rau group had

<sup>82</sup> “Putri Gubernur Jenderal di Tampuk Daerah,” *Tempo*, December 9, 2007, p. 36.

begun. Chasan is now rumored to receive few visitors who ask for his signature on various documents; instead, they are directed to see Wardana and Atut. Wardana's first, main job after the election was to reshuffle provincial governmental posts, with those who had supported Atut during the election and showed loyalty to Wardana typically getting the best positions.<sup>83</sup>

Chasan has been married to many women, but has kept four legal wives in the Islamic sense, and has many children and sons- and daughters-in-laws.<sup>84</sup> Some of them are involved on the economic and political stage, too. Airin, the wife of Wardana, ran in the Tangerang district elections for vice-district head. Her partner was PKS's Jazuli Juwaini. Lilis Karyawati, Chasan's daughter, is now the Serang district head of Kadin. Hikmat, Atut's husband, and Wardana are the vice heads of provincial Kadin, and Chasan's third wife, Ratna Komalasari, and Chasan's daughter Tatu Chasanah are heading the committees in provincial Kadin. Atut's son Andika Hazrumi will run in the DPD election in 2009. Chasan's son Haerul Jaman is now running for vice mayor in Serang city. The Rau group seems to be reaching its zenith now, with one tabloid journalist calling Chasan "the king of Banten" (*Raja Banten*).<sup>85</sup> However, it remains to be seen how long Rau's success will last.

Two problems haunt the Rau group. The first is a governance problem. The provincial government is more and more neo-patrimonial, and all politico-economic rent is exclusively allocated to the group. Personnel policies are not based on the merit system but on one's loyalty to the Rau group. As a result, the performance of the local government has suffered, and anger from outside the group is on the rise. For example, eight years have passed since construction of the provincial government office building started, but it is still not finished. The perception is that the administration's performance has been compromised.

The second problem is Rau's loosening ties with the political center, a network that it had fostered mainly through Golkar. In February 2008, the Tangerang district head election was held, and the Rau candidates lost by a wide margin to the incumbent, Ismet Iskandar, and his running mate, Rano Karno, a famous actor. Based on its experience in the previous gubernatorial election, the Rau group had formed an acrobatic but rational coalition with yesterday's enemy, PKS. Rau campaigned for PKS's Jazuli for *bupati* and Airin, the wife of Wardana, for vice *bupati*. The huge amount of money and public-relations effort invested, however, did not bear fruit. The incumbent, supported by the central boards of Golkar, PDI-P, PPP, and another twelve parties, won the election. Even though Atut was a Golkar board member, her support and the Rau group's support of Jazuli and Airin antagonized some of the Golkar cadres and may have weakened Rau's local power base. Golkar's political preference, especially that of its central board, might revert from the Rau group to others, and the prosecutor's office might thereafter suddenly resurrect stalemated corruption cases that target the Rau group or its supporters.

<sup>83</sup> "Kabinet Tanda Jasa," *Komunitas Tabloid Investigasi* 1,3 (February 1–15, 2007): 3–6. They needed to pay for the positions, too. One department head position was said to cost around one million rupiah. Interview with an NGO activist on February 10, 2007.

<sup>84</sup> "Putri Gubernur Jenderal di Tampuk Daerah," *Tempo*, December 9, 2007, p. 36.

<sup>85</sup> "Prof. Dr. Haji Tubagus Chasan Sohib: Pendekar dan Raja Banten," *Kabinet Indonesia* 13,2 (2006): 1.

*Jawara* may always exist as a social power, but might not exist as political actors without strong support from the central government. Because *jawara* are violent rent-seekers who often act outside the legal realm, they need political asylum (protection) to operate and remain influential. The era of democratization and decentralization in Indonesia is not the era of politically autonomous *Raja Kecil*, small kings, but rather the era of nationalistic or state-entrenched local oligarchies, bolstered by the return of the transformed Indonesian state.