If we had known we would only get $60,000 [from our candidate], we could as well have taken somebody from inside the party. Why should we support a candidate from outside the party if we only get $60,000? People from within the party could have paid this much as well. We hoped for $200,000. If there’s a candidate outside the party who is able to pay this, we will support him [in the next elections]. If not, we will take somebody from inside the party.2

— Amir Uskara, Head, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, Gowa

Introduction

Interviewed about his party’s role in the 2005 regional elections in Gowa, South Sulawesi, local Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP, United Development Party) head,
Amir Uskara, made it clear that getting funds was a primary purpose behind the party’s choice of candidate for regent. Further, he implied, it would continue to be so in the future. This raises a troubling issue for those interested in Indonesia’s democratization. If political parties are a primary building block of democracy, as many political scientists have observed, and if the parties are not making their decisions based on the best interests of their constituents (if they are not aspiratif, in Indonesian political parlance), how well will democracy in Indonesia be able to function?

This paper presents a detailed picture of the party-candidate relationship in an Indonesian regency during the regional elections (pemilihan kepala daerah, pilkada) of 2005–2006, drawing on in-depth interviews with candidates and party bosses, analyses of official government documents, and nongovernmental organization reports, as well as extensive research in local newspaper archives. The paper builds on existing analyses of the regional elections by Nankyung Choi, Marcus Mietzner, and Jacqueline Vel. Observing the weakness of the party-candidate bond, in which money and simple legal requirements have seemed the building blocks of a none-too-healthy connection, the paper applies insights from the party system institutionalization approach to illuminate ways in which the nature of the currently typical party-candidate relationship impedes the consolidation of Indonesia’s democracy in the regions.

3 Regional elections were held throughout Indonesia in 2005–2006 for regents (bupati) and vice-regents (wakil bupati). These executives head up regency governments (kabupaten). This level of government—the district—is directly below the province and is the focal point of Indonesia’s devolved governance, thus an important prize.


5 There are three main local newspapers in South Sulawesi, namely, Pedoman Rakyat, Fajar, and Tribun Timur. The reporting of these newspapers on local politics is generally biased. Pedoman Rakyat was taken over in 2005 by Peter Gozal, an ethnic Chinese hotel owner and close ally of the powerful Yasin Limpo clan. Syachrul Yasin Linpo, vice-governor of South Sulawesi, owns a piece of the paper and writes a weekly column. The politicization of the newspaper by the Limpas has resulted in a rift between the newspaper editors/staff and the new management. Apparently, the newspaper employees went on strike in February 2007. There have been no new issues of Pedoman Rakyat published since March 2007. Fajar, a newspaper owned by Jawa Pos Group and Alwi Hamu, is closely associated with the provincial elections commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, KPU). The head of the provincial KPU, Aidir Amin Daud, was a long-time reporter for the paper and still writes editorials. Many regency election commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum Daerah, KPUD) members in the districts are former Fajar journalists, including the head of KPUD in Gowa, Zainal Tahir. This is problematic for coverage because the elections commissions in South Sulawesi are themselves tainted with allegations of corruption; therefore, those affiliated with the commissions could not be expected to report in a forthright manner on themselves. In this paper, we try to rely primarily on newspaper articles from the relatively more neutral Tribun Timur, owned by Kompas/Aksa Mahmud. For an analysis of the coverage of 2005 Pilkada in Gowa regency, see Abubakar AR, “Konstruksi Realitas Politik Dalam Media Massa-Suatu Tinjauan Analisis Framing Pemberitaan Pilkada di Kabupaten Gowa, Sulawesi Selatan, Pada Harian Tribun Timur dan Harian Fajar,” Skripsi S-1, Jurusan Ilmu Komunikasi, Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik, Makassar: Universitas Hassanuddin.

Gowa was chosen as the subject of the case study because the area was once a stronghold of the Golkar party, the party of the regime during Suharto’s authoritarian rule. Golkar’s share of the vote in South Sulawesi, the province in which Gowa is located, during the Suharto era averaged 87 percent. But, while still dominant in the democratic elections held in the province since 1999, Golkar is not the omnipresence it once was. We wanted to investigate and learn what the situation was like for Golkar and other parties as they competed in the area’s first-ever direct elections for heads of regional governments. What could the parties’ and candidates’ evolving relationships tell us about Indonesia’s democracy?

This paper begins by outlining the party system institutionalization approach and then highlights briefly our findings from applying the framework to Indonesian local politics. The paper provides in-depth information on the nature of the party-candidate relationship in the regional elections in Gowa, tracking the relationship from nomination, to campaign, to election day and after. Lastly, the paper discusses what the nature of the party-candidate relationship suggests about Indonesia’s democratization.

Party System Institutionalization

This study builds on the work of Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully in their volume on Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America and of Mainwaring’s individual work in his book, Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil. In these volumes, the authors contend that it is important to study the institutionalization of the party system as a means of understanding politics in recent democracies. In order to discern the level of institutionalization in a given system, Mainwaring and Scully recommend examining four features of the party system: the degree of stability in inter-party competition; the extent of party roots in society; the legitimacy that parties and elections are perceived to have in determining who governs; and, lastly, the solidity of the parties as organizations.

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7 Golkar did not technically have the status of a party under New Order legislation, which recognized two parties and one Golkar, a unique entity. However, Golkar did fulfill a party’s functions of fielding candidates in the controlled elections. Since its post-New Order reorganization and re-registration for the 1999 elections, Golkar has had the legal status of a political party in Indonesia—one of many. The term New Order (Orde Baru) is used to distinguish the new regime from the Old Order (Orde Lama) of former president Sukarno.

8 Biro Humas KPU, Pemilu Indonesia Dalam Angka dan Fakta (Jakarta: KPU, 2000).

9 Golkar’s share of the vote declined from 66.7 percent to 44 percent in parliamentary elections in South Sulawesi from 1999 to 2004. In 1999, Golkar’s nearest rival, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP, the United Development Party), scored 8.4 percent. In 2004, its nearest rival, the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS, the Justice and Welfare Party), scored 7.3 percent. So, despite the decline, Golkar was still well ahead of the competition. Source: Election Commission Data.

10 Mainwaring and Scully use the term “third-wave democracies” from Samuel Huntington’s seminal article. We choose to revise that term, however, to encompass new democracies as a whole. By the late 1990s, before Indonesia’s transition, some were questioning whether the Third Wave was over. For Mainwaring and Scully, see S. Mainwaring and T. Scully, Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995).
According to Mainwaring and Scully, institutionalized party systems (systems with regularized inter-party competition and parties characterized by strong roots in society, legitimacy, and highly developed organizations) are typically found in the advanced industrial democracies, though they have sprouted in some newer democracies, too. Institutionalized systems provide a stability and structure to politics that make the system operate with greater predictability. In institutionalized systems, parties are able to fulfill one of their most important democratic functions: allowing voters to hold the government accountable.

In contrast, in relatively uninstitutionalized systems, parties do not provide an underlying structure to the operation of politics the way that institutionalized party systems do. Parties come and go from one election to the next. Parties' social roots are weak, leading to instability as voters float from one party to another. Parties in relatively uninstitutionalized systems are often weak as organizations, and many display personalistic characteristics (where the individual leader matters more than the party itself) and a lack of internal discipline and professionalism.

Weakly institutionalized parties make governance difficult in a number of ways. When parties tend to rise and fall so rapidly, it becomes difficult to hold politicians accountable because of a lack of connection between a party and specific policies enacted. Without social roots, parties are often ill attuned to constituents' interests, and, as a result, they develop policies and govern in a way divorced from the popular will. Weak party organizations, especially those lacking discipline, make developing and passing a legislative program a severe challenge. In weakly institutionalized systems, legitimacy is also often called into question, raising the possibility that opponents to the government might shake or even overturn the system. It would be naïve to expect a strongly institutionalized party system and stable voting patterns in a government that has broken free of a powerful dictatorship as recently as Indonesia's has. However, this is not an all-or-nothing proposition. The degree of institutionalization apparent can still tell us a lot.

One of the authors has done work on institutionalization of the party system at the national level in Indonesia.\footnote{See, Paige Johnson Tan, “Indonesia Seven Years after Suharto: Party System Institutionalization in a New Democracy,” \textit{Contemporary Southeast Asia} 28,1 (April 2006): 484–508. See also, Paige Johnson Tan, “The Anti-Party Reaction in Indonesia: Causes and Implications,” \textit{Contemporary Southeast Asia} 24,3 (December 2002): 88–114.} She has broken down Indonesia's party politics according to Mainwaring and Scully's criteria to determine the degree of institutionalization apparent. From the national perspective, the 2004 national elections, both parliamentary and presidential, as well as the first rounds of the regional elections, represented a step toward deinstitutionalization of the party system due, most significantly, to the primacy of candidates' personalities in the direct elections of the president and the regional heads. The one positive outcome the author has found related to the issue of accountability. The author discovered that voters had some ability to punish those parties that appeared to be acting against their interests (particularly the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia–Perjuangan [PDI-P, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle] of former president Megawati Sukarnoputri) and reward parties that seemed to promise solutions and clean governance (such as the Islamist Partai Keadilan Sejahtera [PKS, Justice and Welfare Party] and Partai Demokrat [PD,
Democratic Party] of now-President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono). Still, Mainwaring and Scully’s finding that accountability is difficult to effect in uninstitutionalized systems is still borne out. Even if chastened, Megawati’s PDI-P scored better than PKS and PD put together (though PD captured the presidency).

Narrowing the focus from the national to the local level, this paper seeks to use data on the party-candidate relationship gathered from the 2005 regent elections in Gowa, South Sulawesi, as a window to understanding the degree of institutionalization of the party system at the regency level. The party-candidate relationship was shown by Mainwaring in his study of Brazil to be a key element in the institutionalization equation; it cuts across all four of the criteria to determine party-system institutionalization. Candidates in Brazil are very independent of their parties, a condition that weakens the latter. For example, when elections are determined by individual candidates’ popularity, the respective parties’ influence and strength can fluctuate wildly from one round to the next, resulting in an unstable system of inter-party competition. Also, if politics are based on individuals and their charisma, parties do not need to establish strong roots in the population. In addition, in cases where the candidates are significantly more important than their own parties, political parties as organizations fail to acquire the legitimacy they would have gained from the voters’ support. Lastly, if candidates can and do raise their own funds and carry out their own campaigns, there is little need to develop the party as an organization. Is the political situation in Indonesia similar to that in Brazil, or are Indonesia’s political parties more strongly institutionalized?

What we find in Gowa is that parties are changing dramatically in response to the stimulus of local elections. Golkar, once the dominant party of the area, has splintered, so that it is no longer able to encapsulate the ambitions of its many notables. Three of the four regent candidates in the 2005 pilkada were Golkar or former Golkar members. The party itself has been captured by the powerful Yasin Limpo clan. Further, it was the Yasin Limpo clan’s substantial wealth and powerful network, rather than the party, that secured the victory of Ichsan Yasin Limpo in the regent’s race. The parties in Gowa were guaranteed a role in the regional elections due to legal requirements, but in reality they became merely subcontractors of campaign work, charging their wealthy candidates for their nominations and campaign services. Candidate-party pairings were made on the basis of personal relationships, as well as financial and legal considerations, and represent an ad hoc approach antithetical to institutionalization. In conclusion, we think about what this relative lack of institutionalization suggests for politics in Gowa and for Indonesia’s democratization. We begin by introducing the law on regional elections that set the stage for pilkada Gowa.

Parties and Candidates in the 2005 Regent Elections in Gowa

The legal framework for the pilkada was Law 32/2004, which, along with subsequent presidential instructions and input from the Constitutional Court, required that candidates for the regional head races be nominated by a party or coalition of parties that had earned 15 percent of the vote in the most recent election for parliament at that level of government, or that controlled 15 percent of the seats in the local
legislature. This stipulation guaranteed the parties a role in the local contests, though it remained for the parties and candidates in the regions to determine what that role would be. Candidates were to be selected locally, though important parties like Golkar reserved the rights of their provincial and national authorities to intervene in candidate selection. Golkar even pledged to hold nominating conventions, as the party had done with the selection of its presidential candidate in 2004.

Below we compare the nomination procedures by which parties in Gowa chose their candidates for regent and vice-regent (or, perhaps more accurately, how candidates chose their parties), and the ways these campaigns were run; we also describe post-election-day relations of the four pairs of candidates with their respective parties. An analysis of these processes sheds a bright light on the nature of the party-candidate relationship.

Candidate-Party Relations in the Nomination Process Prior to the 2005 Pilkada

The Nomination of Ichsan Yasin Limpo and Abdullah Razak Badjidu

Ichsan Yasin Limpo and Abdullah Razak Badjidu were supported by three parties: Golkar, Partai Persatuan Demokrasi Kebangsaan (PPDK, United Democratic Nationhood Party), and PD (Partai Demokrat, Democratic Party). Oddly, this team only decided to seek the nomination of Golkar after already being nominated by PPDK and PD. This was strange because Golkar had long been the strongest party in Gowa, and Ichsan himself was a sitting Golkar legislator in the provincial parliament. Further, if Ichsan had decided to jump ship from Golkar, a nomination by PPDK and PD would have been sufficient to reach the mandatory 15 percent electoral threshold to


13 “Penentuan Calon Bupati Golkar Lewat Voting: Calon Tetap Golkar Jadi Ketua Kampanye,” Tribun Timur, February 5, 2005, p. 1. Interestingly, the role of the national and provincial authorities in the nomination process was strengthened through a change of party internal rules after the 2005 pilkada. See Michael Buehler, “Local elite reconfiguration in Post-New Order Indonesia: The 2005 elections of district government heads in South Sulawesi,” Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs 41,1 (August 2007): 21. The pilkada were perceived as disastrous for the Golkar party throughout Indonesia. According to a Golkar internal document from April 2006, the party lost 63 percent of all pilkada in Indonesia in 2005 and 50 percent of those carried out in the first four months of 2006. See Dewan Pimpinan Pusat (Central Leadership Board) Golkar, Laporan Perkembangan Pilkada Per Senin 3 April 2006 (Jakarta: DPP Golkar, 2006). In many areas, unpopular incumbents who had power with their local branches pressed for their renomination, only to carry the party to defeat. Against this backdrop, the central party board in Jakarta is trying to regain control over the local nomination process of the party’s candidates for upcoming races. In this vein, the central party board cut back the voting power of the district branches in the nomination process for pilkada candidates from 65 percent to 20 percent, as a comparison of the party’s internal voting regulations before and after 2005 pilkada shows. See Golkar DPP, Petunjuk Pelaksanaan DPP Partai Golkar Nomor: Juklak-1/DPP/Golkar/II/2005 tentang Tata Cara Pemilihan Kepala Daerah Dari Partai Golongan Karya (Jakarta: Sekretariat Jenderal DPP Partai Golkar, 2005), p. 28, para. 1c; and Golkar DPP, Petunjuk Pelaksanaan DPP Partai Golkar Nomor: Juklak-5/DPP/Golkar/IX/2005 tentang Perubahan Juklak-01/DPP/Golkar/II/2005 Tentang Tata Cara Pemilihan Kepala Daerah Dari Partai Golongan Karya (Jakarta: Sekretariat Jenderal DPP Partai Golkar, 2005), p. 32, para. 5d.


allow nomination of candidates for the election. How did the three-party coalition behind this pair of candidates come together?

Ichsan Yasin Limpo’s nomination by the two small parties largely originated from old personal bonds between Ichsan and the district bosses of PPDK and PD, Rahman Syah (PPDK) and M. Yusuf Bangsawan (PD). According to one of Ichsan’s campaign managers, the candidate had no other option but to accept the offer for nomination by these two parties given his close personal links to the two party leaders. The nomination was later supported by eleven of PPDK’s twelve subdistrict branches; however, the proposed nomination caused open dissent among subdistrict leaders of PD. Their spokesman, Mustari, stated that the decision of their party boss did not reflect the aspiration of the people of Gowa regency. Mustari especially criticized the evaluation process that had determined the selection of the candidates and the fact that nomination decisions were made behind closed doors by the party bosses. The subdistrict branches of PD eventually acquiesced to the decision of the party bosses, but in fact they had few other options besides abandoning the party or refusing to cooperate with the campaign, as they had no voting role in the nomination process. If Ichsan won the election after the subdistrict representatives refused to support him, this would have separated PD from the perks of power, as we will see below. Neither PPDK nor PD held a convention, though Ichsan maintains that his nomination by these parties came from “the bottom up.” After locking up PPDK and PD, Ichsan then sought the support of Golkar.

At one time, it seemed likely that Golkar would nominate its party head in Gowa, Tenri Olle Yasin Limpo, Ichsan’s sister, a woman who had proven her ability to cultivate votes in the district and had repeatedly expressed her interest in running for


18 To illustrate the interlocking relationships among families and power brokers in Gowa, it should be noted that when Ichsan Yasin Limpo was nominated by PPDK in early February 2005, Rahman Syah, the head of PPDK, was also the head of KNPI (Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia, Indonesian National Youth Council) in Gowa district (see “Hari Ini Musrab KNPI Gowa Dibuka,” Tribun Timur, February 12, 2005, p. 22). He was thus under the authority of the province head of KNPI, Haris Yasin Limpo, Ichsan’s younger brother. See “Suara Beringin: Bulletin Partai Golkar Makassar,” no. 6 (August 2006), p. 12. Furthermore, the national party boss of PPDK, Ryaas Rasyid, was born in Gowa regency. This former director of Indonesia’s regional autonomy program is a close friend of Syachrul Yasin Limpo, the vice-governor of South Sulawesi province, who is also the older brother of Ichsan Yasin Limpo.

19 Anonymous, personal communication with Michael Buehler, May 3, 2006. PD Gowa had initially suggested five names to the PD at the provincial level, namely, Ichsan Yasin Limpo, Hasbullah Djabar, Mapparendra Tutu, Dewie Yasin Limpo, and Syahrir Daeng Jarung. The provincial party branch of PD then evaluated these potential candidates and returned the revised list, containing only Ichsan Yasin Limpo’s and Syahrir Daeng Jarung’s names, to the district branch of the party. The district branch then chose Ichsan Yasin Limpo from the two names left. See “PPDK dan Demokrat Pastikan Usung Ichsan: Bersaing Dalam Pilkada Gowa,” Tribun Timur, February 3, 2005, p. 22.

20 Ismail, Vice Head PPDK Gowa, personal communication with Michael Buehler, May 24, 2006.

21 “Anak Cabang Partai Demokrat Tolak Ichsan: Anggap Putusan Dewan Pakar Sepihak Soal Pilkada,” Tribun Timur, February 4, 2005, p. 22. This type of criticism has been a common one in South Sulawesi and in Indonesia more broadly during the regional head races.

22 It was a common practice throughout South Sulawesi and Indonesia as a whole for candidates to be arbitrarily chosen without consultation between the central party authorities and representatives at the lower levels.

23 Ichsan Yasin Limpo, Gowa regent, personal communication with Michael Buehler, March 8, 2007.
In one report that illustrates how Tenri Olle Yasin Limpo had constructed her political base, the local Tribun Timur tells of her touring Gowa with other Golkar officials a few months before the regional elections in a fuel truck to distribute five thousand liters of gasoline at well below the market price to several districts, including the potential power bases of opponents. In order to gain access to the fuel, people had to have a voucher from the village chief, a requirement that tied them into the Golkar power structure that still predominated. Despite her role in preparing the political ground, however, Tenri Olle Yasin Limpo was not to be Golkar’s candidate.

According to Ichsan Yasin Limpo, the family carried out grassroots surveys to determine popular attitudes toward the three Limpo children with aspirations to run for bupati: Ichsan, Tenri, and Dewie. At a meeting of the clan presided over by Syachrul Yasin Limpo, former mayor of Gowa, then the current vice-governor of South Sulawesi province and head of the family since his father’s incapacitation, Ichsan and Tenri presented their plans for the district along with descriptions of their own individual and financial resources in order to establish their qualifications for conducting a campaign. Dewie, though invited, was not present at the meeting and was thus presumed by the family not to be “serious” about running. Citing the polls that had shown him to be more popular than Tenri, Ichsan would later state that those surveys helped convince the “family” to choose him as its preferred candidate for the 2005 pilkada. Tenri was not happy with the decision, which she claimed came from Syachrul, but she accepted it, even later serving as one of the chief coordinators of Ichsan’s campaign. Having been given the nod by the Yasin Limpo family, Ichsan would be easily chosen as Golkar’s candidate. The Golkar convention was a pro forma exercise. Lacking the family’s approval, neither Dewie nor Tenri would be nominated by other parties to stand in the elections.

An examination of the broader political picture in Gowa and South Sulawesi helps clarify why Golkar, PPDK, and PD would accede to the Yasin Limpo family’s decision and support Ichsan as their candidate. The powerful influence of the Yasin Limpo clan

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24 In the parliamentary elections of 2004, Tenri Olle Yasin Limpo won a total of 11,178 votes in district Gowa IV, while her competitors in that district were only able to earn a few hundred votes each (KPU Gowa, 2004-Model EB 1 DPRD KAB/KOTA Gowa IV). In other words, in a voting district with a total of 37,416 voters, Tenri Olle Yasin Limpo alone received 30 percent of the votes.


26 Irman Yasin Limpo, brother of Ichsan, personal communication with Michael Buehler, March 8, 2007. According to Ichsan, members of the family are concerned that too many Limpos now occupy too many political positions. It is feared that popular opinion may turn against the family if the Limpos are perceived as trying to “monopolize” political power.

27 Ichsan Yasin Limpo, Gowa regent, personal communication with Michael Buehler, March 8, 2007.


29 A former head of Golkar in Gowa, Malingkai Ma’nung, also wanted to be the party’s bupati candidate, but since he received no support from the influential Yasin Limpo family through the party organization, he was eliminated convincingly at the convention. The Golkar convention is attended only by Golkar members, and the inner workings of the convention were not reported publicly. We have only scraps of information by which to gauge what transpired. When one of the authors tried to get information on the convention from Ichsan Yasin Limpo, he was told only that Ichsan’s nomination was decided upon in the “same way” as nominations at “all levels.” Ichsan Yasin Limpo, Gowa regent, personal communication with Michael Buehler, March 8, 2007.

30 Whether nominations were sought after the family meeting is not known.
dates back to Suharto’s New Order period (1965–1998), a time when the family accumulated great wealth. Burhan Magenda has noted the continuing importance of aristocrats in South Sulawesi politics.31 The patriarch of the Yasin Limpo clan is Yasin Daeng Limpo, an aristocrat from Cikoang–Bontonompo32 and thus a major social notable (tokoh masyarakat). Magenda provides information on Limpo’s background:

[Yasin] Daeng Limpo was born into the family of Karaeng Polombangkeng, Takalar. He was educated at the Inlandsche School in Makassar and was active in guerrilla units ... during the revolution. In the late 1950s, he was Assistant to Pangdam Hasanuddin for Territorial Affairs and in the early 1960s he was a member of the provincial [Daily Governing Council], until 1966. In 1967, with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, he was Head of the Veterans Office in Makassar.33

From the 1960s, Yasin Daeng Limpo was influential in the Central Organization for Indonesian Independent Workers (Sentral Organisasi Karyawan Swadiri Indonesia, SOKSI), a military-dominated group designed to counter rising communist strength.34 SOKSI was one of the organizations that came together to found Golkar in 1964, and it was Golkar that the new military regime, taking over in 1965, would turn to as the electoral and bureaucratic vehicle for its rule. Because of Yasin Daeng Limpo’s role in SOKSI, and thus in Golkar, he was well positioned to prosper both politically and economically under the New Order. He served in various high-level political positions from the 1960s to the 1990s: as South Sulawesi Golkar head and as regent in Gowa and two other neighboring regencies, as well as speaker and vice-speaker of the provincial legislature,35 and even as acting governor for a time.36 In addition, Yasin Daeng Limpo served a stint in the potentially lucrative position as head of various province-level state-owned enterprises.37

Magenda tells us that “young officers of aristocratic origin could not have found a better time than in the early 1960s” for moving into civilian jobs.38 We would argue that the fact that Yasin Daeng Limpo was a second-level military official—as opposed to a top-tier one—contributes to his political and economic power in the area. This sounds counter-intuitive unless one takes into account the fact that top-level military officers were removed from their home provinces following the rise of Suharto and relocated throughout the nation.39 Since he held a position just under this top level, Yasin Daeng

36 Ichsan Yasin Limpo, Gowa regent, personal communication with Michael Buehler, March 8, 2007.
Limpo was able to build a base of political and economic power in South Sulawesi and remain to oversee and cultivate it.40

One can get some idea of Yasin Daeng Limpo’s network by observing his role in the Boy Scouts, an organization he headed in South Sulawesi for almost forty years.41 The Boy Scouts were not just boyish good fun in New Order Indonesia. Boy Scout gatherings allowed Yasin Limpo to lead tens of thousands of young men and to network with other notables both within and outside the province.42 Boy Scouts played important social roles, too, providing services that were not provided by government agencies;43 thus allowing Yasin Limpo to be seen as a provider of largesse to the wider public. Boy Scouts also played important roles in the New Order’s controlled elections, supporting Golkar and the ruling regime and encouraging others to do likewise.

Building on Yasin Daeng Limpo’s economic and political groundwork, his wife and children have kept the tradition of political activism and influence alive. Several are active in organizations strongly linked to New-Order-era Golkar, such as Kosgoro (Kesatuan Organisasi Serbaguna Gotong Royong, the Union of Multifunctional Mutual Assistance Organizations) and the FKPI (Forum Komunikasi Putra-Putri Purnawirawan TNI/Polri, Communication Forum for Sons and Daughters of Retired Police and Military). Many in the family have also taken leadership roles in the Boy Scouts. Yasin Daeng Limpo’s wife and several children have served in the national, provincial, and regency-level legislatures. As mentioned above, Tenri, Ichsan, and Dewie all occupy important political roles or aspire to do so.44 Ichsan has followed many of the same paths as his parents and siblings. He was previously active in the Boy Scouts, Kosgoro, FKPI, and Golkar. He served in the provincial parliament for South Sulawesi from 1999 to 2005. It was from this launching pad that he began his campaign for regent. He made an unsuccessful bid to be selected bupati of Takalar in 2003, when the election was still in the hands of the local legislature, before his successful bid to become regent of Gowa in the pilkada of 2005.45

Information on the Yasin Limpo clan’s wealth is difficult to obtain, but informants in South Sulawesi generally refer to the family as one of the wealthiest and most prominent in the province, particularly in Gowa. They control numerous businesses, including nightclubs. Before Ichsan Yasin Limpo became bupati in Gowa, he was a businessman, taking care of various family enterprises in South Sulawesi province.46

40 Dias Pradadimara, Head, Center for the Study of Eastern Indonesia, Hasanuddin University, Makassar, personal communication with Michael Buehler, March 6, 2007.
45 Dewie Yasin Limpo is expected to run for bupati of Takalar, a neighboring regency, in the upcoming pilkada. She has collected support from Partai Persatuan Pembangunan and Partai Merdeka. An even broader coalition of parties may be constructed by nomination day. See, “Dewie Yasin Limpo Temui PPP Sulsel,” Tribun Timur, March 1, 2007 (online). http://www.tribun-timur.com/view.php?id=41791&jenis=bulukumba
46 Some of these businesses include PT. Resultan Perkasa (Komisaris), Multi Kontrindo (Direktur), PT Fita Ayu (Direktur), PT Multi Engkatama (Direktur), PT. Latimojong Citra Makmur Sejahtera (Komisaris Utama). KL2SS/WWL 2005, p. 3.
The Limpos have also started to move into media; they now hold a stake in *Pedoman Rakyat*, an important regional newspaper, and the radio station, Suara Celebes. In addition to their own enterprises, the family has wealthy national allies, including Surya Paloh, a media magnate and national head of FKPPI; Wijanarko Puspoyo, head of Bulog (Badan Urusan Logistic Nasional) the national logistical agency for the distribution and pricing of foodstuff commodities; and Edwin Kawilarang, a wealthy businessman and member of the Regional Representatives Council (DPD, Dewan Perwakilan Daerah) from North Sulawesi. Other allies include Sulawesi-based ethnic Chinese such as Anton Obey and Peter Gozal. Informants tell us that the Chinese support the Limpos in return for some vague promise of “protection.” Limpos also serve on the boards of Chinese-run businesses, an additional source of wealth for the family.

Information on Ichsan’s finances, if not the entire family’s, should be available, as candidates for *bupati* were required under the election law to submit personal financial reports in conjunction with their campaigns. Unfortunately, however, these reports are not credible. For example, according to figures reported by the candidates, Peter Gozal supported Ichsan’s campaign with US$1,870. Other donors included A. Darussalam (US$5,000), Saad Iranda Dollar (US$3,820) and Bahar Ngitung (US$3,640). Campaign funds officially reported totalled US$14,330. Tenri Olle Yasin Limpo, Ichsan’s campaign coordinator, acknowledges the campaign spent at least US$400,000. So, there is a clear discrepancy between money reported to be coming into the campaign and money going out from the campaign.

The Limpo family’s position in South Sulawesi, and its wealth and power, tell us much about politics in the region. In addition, it is important to understand the reason for the pairing of Ichsan with Abdullah Razak Bajidju, candidate for *wakil bupati* (vice-regent), as it sheds further light on the party-candidate relationship. Abdullah Razak Bajidju is from a family with a power base in the hill regions of Gowa district. Abdullah’s father was a subdistrict head (*camat*) in the hill country and still controls many of the votes there. In the recent history of Gowa, the hill regions never managed to send one of their *putra daerah* (native sons) to the office of *bupati* or *wakil bupati*. By appointing a *tokoh masyarakat*, social notable, from this region as his running mate, Ichsan Yasin Limpo increased his chances considerably to gather votes in subdistricts that lie in the mountainous parts of Gowa regency. Though it is clear that Abdullah’s potential power to attract votes in the upland areas made him a valuable partner for Ichsan, the exact process by which Ichsan and Abdullah came together is not transparent. We do know that PPKD had put forward a number of names for a prospective running mate, and Abdullah was not among the party’s top choices. In the end, both Ichsan and PPKD came to favor Abdullah, a Golkar man, as their candidate for vice-regent. The PPKD head in Gowa, Rahman Syah, was quoted in the press saying that regulations for the 2005 pilkada stipulated that the candidate for regent have no more than “25 percent” of the power to select his deputy regent; it appears,

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however, that Ichsan’s influence weighed in at more than 25 percent when it came time to choose his running mate, as PPDK did not get one of its top choices.

Due to the wealth and power of the Yasin Limpos, Ichsan was considered the favorite in the 2005 race for bupati in Gowa. He faced serious competition from the son of the last king of Gowa, Maddusila Andi Idjo, and other candidates.

The Nomination of Maddusila Andi Idjo and Usman Mahyuddin

Personal bonds between the candidate and party cadres, royal lineage, and money were the decisive factors in the nomination of Maddusila Andi Idjo and Usman Mahyuddin by the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP, United Development Party) and Partai Bintang Reformasi (PBR, Reform Star Party). As mentioned above, Maddusila was the son of the last king of Gowa, making him an attractive candidate from the parties’ perspective as royal and aristocratic lineage is still perceived to be of great importance in the politics of South Sulawesi. Entering the contest, Maddusila already had the status of an important social notable and extensive name recognition.

Further, Maddusila was an old friend of Muhammad Amin, the former head of PPP in Gowa, whom Maddusila favored as a running mate. It was only Muhammad Amin’s sudden death six months before the elections that changed these plans. Under the leadership of Amin, PPP had supported Maddusila in the contest for bupati in 1999, and he had maintained close contact with the party’s cadres since. Furthermore, it was very much a necessity for PPP to nominate a relatively wealthy candidate from outside the party, as the party’s cadres were simply too poor to stand any chance of running a successful campaign, given the high expenses a candidate had to face in the pilkada. (In a sampling of Indonesia’s regent races, the campaign expenses for winning candidates averaged US$1.6 million, according to Rinakit.) The necessity of looking outside the party for candidates was common in Gowa and in the wider South Sulawesi province as well. Small parties especially had to be “flexible.”

Since the nomination by PPP alone was not enough to bring him up to the 15 percent threshold required for nomination, Maddusila brought PBR into the coalition. This party was a natural ally for PPP, as PBR was an offshoot of the party, so there were “emotional bonds” between the two, according to Gowa PPP Chairman Amir

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52 Maddusila Andi Idjo, Gowa candidate for regent, personal communication with Michael Buehler, May 22, 2006.
53 Amir Uskara, Head, PPP Gowa, personal communication with Michael Buehler, May 24, 2006.
54 Andreas Ufen points out that the need to buy a candidacy is something entirely new in Indonesia’s politics. It did not exist during the 1950s era of parliamentary democracy (nor was it relevant during the New Order years). See Andreas Ufen, “Political Parties in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Between Politik Aliran and ‘Philippinisation,’” German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA), Working Paper No. 37, December 2006. http://www.giga-hamburg.de/content/publikationen/pdf/wp37_ufen.pdf. The US$1.6 million figure comes from a study by S. Rinakit, “Indonesian Regional Elections in Praxis,” IDSS Commentaries, Singapore, 2005. Rinakit is cited by both Ufen (“Political Parties in Post-Suharto Indonesia”) and Choi (“Local Elections and Democracy in Indonesia”).
55 “PAN Kesulitan Ajukan Calon Kepala Daerah,” Tribun Timur, February 7, 2005, p. 1. Quotation from Zainal Abidin, South Sulawesi head of the PPDK.
Uskara. Maddusila’s nomination by PBR was further facilitated by the fact that the party’s head, Jamaluddin Tiro, was another close friend of Maddusila.

This pairing of regent and vice-regent candidates again illustrates significant aspects of the party-candidate relationship in Gowa. PPP head Amir Uskara himself had hoped to be paired with Maddusila on the ticket. PBR’s head, M. Syahrir Bahar, blocked that plan, however, insisting that Maddusila’s partner be someone with a mass base in the district. The scheme backfired in the end, as Maddusila’s running mate turned out to be an unknown in the district, chosen purely for his wealth. Usman Mahyuddin is a military figure who had occupied a number of potentially “wet,” or lucrative, positions that might well have allowed him to accumulate funds to assist with the costs of campaigning.

In addition to Ichsan Yasin Limpo, scion of the powerful Yasin Limpo clan, and Maddusila Andi Idjo, son of the last king of Gowa, the incumbent bupati, Hasbullah Djabar, was campaigning for reelection.

The Nomination of Hasbullah Djabar and Abdullah Latif Hafid

Partai Amanat Nasional’s (PAN, National Mandate Party) nomination of Hasbullah Djabar was determined primarily by financial considerations. PAN’s chairman in Gowa, Nurdieni Wahab, points out that there were a number of party cadres seeking the nomination; however, as with a number of the PPP’s aspirant candidates, discussed above, nearly all were too poor to run a successful campaign. Hasbullah Djabar, once with Golkar, seemed a good choice, though he had no previous connection to PAN. The party also considered Dewie Yasin Limpo as a candidate, further demonstrating the power of the Yasin Limpo clan in Gowa politics.

The additional nomination for Hasbullah by Partai Merdeka came about as a result of the PAN nomination. The two parties pursued the idea of linking up well before the selection of candidates was even on the table. The nomination did not come about without scandal, though. One candidate who was asked by a party representative to pay a US$200 “registration fee” to be considered as a candidate reported party officials to the police when his name was not passed to Jakarta for consideration. Party officials responded by accusing the potential candidate of engaging in money politics. In the next volley, the potential candidate reported the provincial party secretary to the

56 Amir Uskara, Head, PPP Gowa, personal communication with Michael Buehler, May 24, 2006.
57 Maddusila Andi Idjo, Gowa candidate for regent, personal communication with Michael Buehler, May 22, 2006.
60 Nurdieni Wahab, Head, PAN Gowa, personal communication with Michael Buehler, May 24, 2006.
61 The link-up between the two parties was extremely unpopular among some at the subdistrict level in PAN, resulting in demonstrations openly calling for PAN’s Gowa chairman to step down. See “Pertemuan PAN-FM Nyaris Rusuh,” Tribun Timur, February 11, 2005, p. 22.
62 Ahmad Pidris Zain was the candidate who lodged the accusation. See police report, STPL/66/11/2005/SPK-Resta, undated.
police for slander. Eventually, Partai Merdeka was forced to issue a statement that the registration fee was against party internal rules. The party sacked the party ward boss who had pocketed the money from the prospective candidates.

From Hasbullah's perspective, PAN seemed a good alternative as a party since Golkar had been captured by the Yasin Limpos and he had no chance of receiving a nomination from that quarter. In fact, Hasbullah had come to power as bupati as understudy to Syachrul Yasin Limpo, Ichsan's brother, taking over as bupati when Syachrul moved up into the vice-governor's position. Without the Limpos and Golkar to support him in the 2005 race, Hasbullah stood little chance of winning, but PAN seemed a good shot. Hasbullah's family had maintained a long association with the Islamic organization, Muhammadiyah, from which PAN draws much of its support. Hasbullah had no connection with Partai Merdeka but needed another party's support to reach the threshold mandating that he be supported by 15 percent of the local parliament's representatives.

Perhaps because of the problems surrounding Hasbullah's candidacy, as described above, he was unable to secure a wealthy running mate or one with a great deal of pull with voters in the subdistricts of the regency (Hasbullah himself was considered weak because he had come in on the Limpos' coattails and had only served two years). Running mate Abdullah Latif Hafid's résumé shows him as a bureaucrat who had followed a regular career trajectory (village head, ward head, subdistrict head, regency administration). His bureaucratic postings at the regency level do not appear to have been in very "wet" positions, thus it is unlikely he brought a great deal of money to the campaign.

The Nomination of Sjachrir Sjafruddin and Djabbar Hijaz

The emerging picture of the nomination processes described so far shows parties nominating candidates based on personal bonds, financial considerations, or the need to surmount the 15 percent legal hurdle, rather than because of party affiliation or ideological criteria. Many candidates came from outside their respective nominating parties and remained independent of the party throughout. Three of the bupati candidates (Ichsan, Hasbullah, and Sjachrir) were Golkar or former Golkar cadres. Affluent candidates could pay the cost of the campaign and could also pay the party itself. The candidacy of Sjachrir Sjafruddin and his running mate, Djabbar Hijaz, the fourth pair of candidates in Gowa, most clearly exemplifies this last phenomenon: the significant role played by the candidates' wealth in these elections.

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65 "Ketua Partai Merdeka Pallangga Dipecat: Terkait Pelaporan Balon Bupati ke Polisi," Tribun Timur, February 14, 2005, p. 22. All the problems with Partai Merdeka and the registration fees fueled the complaints of PAN officials who did not wish to team up with the party. "DPC: Ganti Ketua Partai Merdeka Gowa," Tribun Timur, February 18, 2005, p. 22.
67 PAN had five seats in the local parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah [DPRD] II), while Partai Merdeka had two.
The résumé of Sjachrir Sjafruddin, a local businessman who made most of his fortune in the cocoa industry and owns cold storage facilities that service the fish and shrimp industry in South Sulawesi, shows that he followed Golkar’s cadre training courses until July 2003. He was also a Golkar candidate in the 2004 elections for the national parliament. Because he was assigned an unfavorable position on the party’s list, however, despite his strong individual vote totals, Sjachrir was not allowed to enter the legislature in 2004. Disappointed with Golkar and confident of his personal pull with voters, Sjachrir brought together thirteen parties, mostly small, to back his candidacy for bupati. Of the thirteen, only PKS enlisted other prospective candidates. All other parties nominated Sjachrir Sjafruddin, their patron, exclusively.

Most of these thirteen parties were extremely weak in Gowa, as illustrated by the fact that only one in thirteen was able to gather enough votes in the 2004 local legislative elections to actually win a seat in the regency parliament. As this party coalition was set up purely to serve the political goals of Sjachrir Sjafruddin and his running mate, it is little surprise that there were no previous relations between the candidates and the parties whatsoever. In fact, the candidate for vice-regent, Djabbar Hijaz, a previous Golkar stalwart, claimed that he was seeing the names of the thirteen parties that supported his candidacy for the first time when one of the authors of this article presented him with a list during an interview one year after the elections. Unsurprisingly, after Sjachrir Sjafruddin and Djabbar Hijaz’s narrow loss in the pilkada, this unwieldy coalition would fall apart.

The tales of how the various candidates came to be nominated by their respective parties have illustrated much about the nature of the relationships between candidates and parties in Gowa. These interactions will be further illuminated by examining relations between these entities during the election campaign.

69 Sjachrir Sjafruddin was the clear frontrunner, with 31,444 of the 124,111 votes from Golkar party members in Gowa. This was almost twice the number earned by Ny. Nurhayati Yasin Limpo (15,873), Ichsan Yasin Limpo’s mother, who was allowed into parliament because of her higher position on the party’s list. KPU, Keputusan Komisi Pemilihan Umum, KPU 2004 44/SK/KPU Tahun 2004 Sulsel 1, p. 7.
72 This party was PKS (KPU Gowa, Surat Pencalonan Ist/GPPG/IV/2005, p. 6).
74 It was also during this interview that Djabbar Hijaz, with a grin, admitted to one of the authors of this paper that he was just seeing the election results of the 2005 Pilkada for the first time. His obvious lack of interest in pilkada led some to speculate that he was a shill for the Limpo camp, used to draw away votes that might otherwise have gone to Maddusila.
75 Nassaruddin, Former Head, PKS Gowa, personal communication with Michael Buehler, May 29, 2006.
Candidate-Party Relations in the Election Campaign

As in other districts of South Sulawesi, many politically ambitious figures in Gowa unofficially began their campaigns months or even years before the two-week official campaign period. One of the aspirants (Ichsan’s sister) set up banners all over the district, saying “Dewie Yasin Limpo is ready to develop Gowa,”76 while another politically ambitious figure distributed calendars to popular foodstalls and roadside restaurants showing his picture above the slogan, “If there is SBY77 in Indonesia, in Gowa there is APZ—Ahmad Pidris Zain.”78 Other banners displayed messages such as “Andi Maddussila Andi Idjo—son of the last king of Gowa—is suitable to lead Gowa.”79 We will see below that the early campaigning was significant in the construction of personal networks of support for candidates.80 In Gowa, and the wider province of South Sulawesi, campaign materials like buttons, posters, stickers, and calendars played up the individual candidates rather than the parties supporting them. Campaign platforms were homogenized and had limited connection to anything a party could be said to stand for. Islam, at issue in many parts of Sulawesi as regencies consider the implementation of syariah law, played no part in the race in Gowa.

The Campaign of Ichsan Yasin Limpo and Abdullah Razak Badjidu

Ichsan Yasin Limpo started to campaign in the Gowa villages in early January 2005, a full six months before the elections. Since he was not yet nominated by any party, he began to build on the support of his “clan,” according to his older sister Tenri Olle Yasin Limpo.81 As the pilkada neared, however, Ichsan Yasin Limpo expanded upon the family’s network and drew on party structures, particularly Golkar’s. Compared to Golkar’s branches in other districts of South Sulawesi, Golkar in Gowa was relatively well consolidated and visible during an intensive campaign at the subdistrict level. From the perspective of the Golkar Gowa head, Tenri Olle Yasin Limpo, the party machine of Golkar in Gowa could be trusted to support the candidate effectively since there was a strong figure—her—at the top of the party who imposed discipline.82

76 “Dewie Yasin Limpo Siap Membangun Gowa Lebih Baik,” Tribun Timur, February 14, 2005, p. 1. According to her brother Ichsan, Dewie Yasin Limpo did not, in the end, find a party that would nominate her because she did not have the family’s support, and thus she did not run for regent in the 2005 Gowa pilkada. Ichsan Yasin Limpo, Gowa regent, personal communication with Michael Buehler, March 8, 2007.
77 SBY: Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Indonesia’s president.
80 Interviewees in South Sulawesi often referred to this as building a candidate’s ketokohan, which perhaps might be translated as figure-ness or social notability-ness. See also Buehler, “Local Elite Reconfiguration in Post-New Order Indonesia,” mentioned above for a discussion of the importance of subdistrict networks in 2005 pilkada.
82 Ibid. As head of Golkar in the district, Tenri Olle Yasin Limpo appears to view the party as key. However, as we examine the nominations and campaigns in the bupati elections, it will become increasingly clear that it was the Yasin Limpo clan, rather than the Golkar party, which was key to Ichsan’s victory.
As outlined above, the two other parties, PPDK and PD, were part of Ichsan Yasin Limpo’s campaign by virtue of the close personal relationship between the candidate and the two district party bosses. The potential of these two relatively weak parties to yield votes for Ichsan Yasin Limpo was limited. PPDK had picked up just a third of Golkar’s vote in the parliamentary races in 2004; PD just 14 percent of the total. Tenri Olle Yasin Limpo denied outright that PPDK and PD had any share in Ichsan’s victory, and claimed that if Ichsan had only used PPDK and PD, he certainly would have lost, since these two parties were practically nonexistent at the subdistrict level.83

The small role parties played in Ichsan Yasin Limpo’s campaign is illustrated by a statement from one of his campaign managers:

It’s like this. The Indonesian people are not too smart. They are still traditional84 voters. Voting is not based on a party’s program. There’s no direct relation between a party and its constituency. There’s only a direct relation between the party and its cadre. But the people don’t have a relation with the party. The people in Indonesia still very much depend on the opinion of social notables. They don’t ask: is [the candidate] affiliated with this or that party, but [they ask] what is the choice of the social notable? Because the people here are still very traditional, [they] don’t vote for the program of a candidate who wants to become mayor or governor. It’s not the program that is looked at, but the person. A programmatic campaign is thus unnecessary.85

The role of parties during the campaigning for the 2005 *pilkada* was even played down by party bosses such as Tenri Olle Yasin Limpo, who in communication with one of the authors expressed her opinion that the people of Gowa would not base their voting decisions on a candidate’s party affiliation but rather on the profile of the figure himself.86

Apparently recognizing that political parties involved in this campaign were relatively weak, Ichsan Yasin Limpo chose to use three kinds of campaign teams. The first team would consist mainly of members of the three parties that nominated him. In this team, Golkar, the biggest party in Gowa, was dominant. The second team consisted of members of the vast Limpo family. The third team then consisted of friends, businessmen, and followers who would campaign in Ichsan Yasin Limpo’s name. All three teams were coordinated by Tenri Olle Yasin Limpo, who summoned weekly meetings with the teams in order to evaluate weaknesses and strengths of the campaign effort.87 Supplementing the efforts of these teams, running mate Abdullah Razak Badjidu, from the upland areas of Gowa, played a crucial role as an individual in attracting votes in the hill country, positioning himself as a representative of a notable family in a historically underrepresented area.

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83 Ibid.
84 Contemporary political science has attempted to steer clear from depictions of some societies as “modern” and others as “traditional.” However, among Indonesian analysts, this is a common view of the political system.
86 Tenri Olle Yasin Limpo, Head, Golkar Gowa, personal communication with Michael Buehler, May 5, 2006. The statement from the campaign manager (quoted above) and one from Tenri Olle Yasin Limpo clearly suggest that this *pilkada* was characterized by personalistic campaigns and weak parties.
87 Ibid.
The campaign itself was largely driven by the efforts of power brokers—such as religious figures, large landholders, and bureaucrats—who could lobby in the subdistricts and who often distributed goods to the people, much as was the case with the other candidates' campaigns, outlined below. As one of Ichsan Yasin Limpo's campaign managers pointed out, it was not so much that cash was handed out directly to the people (though this happened, too), but instead, citizens were given *sembako* (*sembilan bahan pokok*, the nine necessities for daily living, including rice, sugar, fuel, salt, salted fish, cooking oil, coffee, eggs, and flour) or small vendors were overpaid for their products. Additionally, the campaign would carry out public improvements to win public favor. These included replacing broken streetlights and repairing streets. Several interviewees mentioned that Ichsan's team also paid electricity bill collectors to lobby voters with the promise that, in those subdistricts where Ichsan Yasin Limpo won a majority of votes, people would be excused from paying their electricity bills for half a year. Intimidation may have been an important, though not decisive, factor in the race as well. The Limpo family owns several private security forces, such as the Brigade 9-11 and Brigade 02, and controls hundreds of thugs (*preman*) in the district.

These activities were very expensive. According to Tenri Olle Yasin Limpo, her family paid over US$400,000 to the three parties to get them campaigning. These funds came from substantial family coffers and the deep pockets of influential friends and associates. The parties contributed no funds to the campaign. They were instead paid for their contributions by the family-controlled campaign funds.

*The Campaign of Maddusila Andi Idjo and Usman Mahyuddin*

Like Ichsan and others, Maddusila started to campaign before the official campaign period. According to his own account, he flew in from Jakarta twice a month during the three years prior to the 2005 elections and campaigned in the villages of Gowa, where his aides and friends would organize gatherings of 200 to 300 people. During most of these gatherings, he would simply promote himself for *bupati* based on the fact that he was the son of the last king of Gowa. As mentioned above, aristocratic—or better yet, royal—connections are still believed to have power in South Sulawesi.

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89 This tactic had apparently already been tested successfully during earlier elections by other candidates, according to an interview with a representative of an anti-corruption NGO based in Makassar, the capital of South Sulawesi. Anonymous, personal communication with Michael Buehler, May 3, 2006.
90 Dirk Tomsa, “Bloodied but Unbowed: Golkar Still Dominates Indonesian Politics,” *Inside Indonesia* 83 (2005). Online: http://www.insideindonesia.org/edit83/p17-18_tomsa.html. Anecdotal evidence from Gowa suggests that *preman* were active in the days before the election attempting to coerce voters. They were also present on election day, often as candidate witnesses in the polling stations.
91 This figure is in line with the estimate from one of Ichsan Yasin Limpo’s campaign managers, who said that expenses for such activities amounted to a total of US$300,000. On election day, the costs paid by Ichsan for witnesses, t-shirts, and food at the polling stations added another US$75,000. Anonymous, personal communication with Michael Buehler, May 3, 2006.
politics. It was clear that Maddusila based his campaign on his royal connections, but this factor was not enough to win the election, as we shall see.

According to the local PPP head, the party was unified and active in its support of Maddusila's candidacy. According to Maddusila, though, the bonds between himself and PPP were cemented by his alliance with Muhammad Amin, the former party head. Since Maddusila's party nomination in both the 1999 and 2005 elections had been based on these personal relations, the death of Muhammad Amin automatically changed Maddusila's relationship to the rest of PPP. In contrast to 1999, in 2005 Maddusila was asked by PPP for funds to finance his entire campaign. The PPP head, Amir, agrees that his party asked Maddusila to bear the cost of the campaign. Maddusila himself was sure that if Muhammad Amin had still been alive, he would not have had to pay any money to get the PPP to campaign for his cause. Still, Maddusila believed that he got away comparatively cheaply (having spent US$100,000 on his campaign) and was pleased he did not have to hand over “billions of rupiah” (several hundred thousand dollars), as other people did to purchase active support from their parties.

Maddusila and the head of the PPP differ over how much he promised and paid to the party for the campaign. Amir claims the party was promised US$200,000. Maddusila claims only to have given US$5,000 to PPP (and US$2,000 to the smaller PBR). An independent audit report (probably less reliable than the candidate’s own estimate) shows Maddusila’s campaign cost approximately US$64,000. It was in the context of a discussion over funds with one of the authors that the PPP head, Amir Uskara, expressed the opinion quoted at the beginning of this essay. Had he known that PPP would receive only US$60,000 from Maddusila, he suggested, he would have gone with a candidate from inside his own party.

Money was an issue throughout the campaign. The vice-regent candidate on Maddusila’s ticket was chosen because he had the means to replenish the campaign’s war chest. Usman Mahyuddin, completely unknown to Maddusila until two weeks before pilkada, would, it was hoped, bring funds to the campaign. One small fact indicates the ephemeral nature of these coalitions of convenience in the pilkada: Maddusila has never again met with his partner since their loss in the elections. Like the temporary arrangement between Maddusila and his proposed deputy, the

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94 Amir Uskara, Head, PPP Gowa, personal communication with Michael Buehler, May 24, 2006.
95 Maddusila Andi Idjo, Gowa candidate for regent, personal communication with Michael Buehler, May 22, 2006.
96 Amir Uskara, Head, PPP Gowa, personal communication with Michael Buehler, May 24, 2006.
98 Amir Uskara, Head, PPP Gowa, personal communication with Michael Buehler, May 24, 2006.
100 According to an independent audit report handed in to the KPU, Maddusila’s campaign expenses amounted to about US$64,000 (IDR 644,013,577). Usman dan Rekan, Laporan Audit Independen Atas Laporan Dana Kampanye: Pasangan Calon Drs. A. Maddusila Andi Idjo dan Drs. IR. Usman Mahyuddin MT (Sulawesi Selatan: Kabupaten Gowa, 2005), p. 2.
relationship between the candidate and the PBR was also shallow. PBR was a negligible contributor to the campaign; clearly, this small party had been invited to join the alliance for the sake of its legislative votes, so the candidates could reach the 15 percent threshold. The PBR party in Gowa is largely defunct, with no structures at the district—much less the subdistrict—level. Only in one subdistrict (Bajeng) was the party able to deliver some public votes to the team due to the presence of an influential man who was associated with the PBR and who threw his weight behind Maddusila.

All of this made Maddusila question the sincerity of the parties in their support of his candidacy. In contrast to the parties, the people from his personal network, the *team relawan* (team of volunteers), did not ask for money but demonstrated a "moral commitment" to support his cause. Maddusila also found the personal network to be more effective than the parties in garnering votes. For future elections, the once-and-future candidate plans to establish his own party, the Association of the Families of the People of Gowa (KKMG, Kerukunan Keluarga Masyarakat Gowa). According to his own account, "people from all parties, faiths, and ethnicities can join KKMG." He would welcome an overhaul of the election law that would allow independents to run for office, thus freeing him and his campaign from entanglement with the parties.

*The Campaign of Hasbullah Djabar and Abdullah Latif Hafid*

Like Maddusila, Hasbullah Djabar ran into trouble with his parties over money. As incumbent *bupati* of Gowa at the time of *pilkada*, Hasbullah Djabar spent his two years in office continuously traveling to the villages in his district to campaign for reelection. This he did in his function as *bupati* and without any kind of party support. In the 2005 *pilkada*, according to the recollections of both Hasbullah and the local PAN party leader (PAN was one of the parties supporting his candidacy), the relationship between candidate and party was not smooth during the campaign. Hasbullah felt that he was unsuccessful in managing the campaign team, which included party figures and social notables. He said his experience did not prepare him to manage the effort. Prior to his stint as *bupati*, he had just been a subdistrict-level official (*camat*), and thus a bureaucrat.

PAN was part of the campaign team (*tim pemenangan*) that, according to local party head Nurdieni Wahab's accounts, initially established a campaign structure covering villages all over Gowa. This *tim pemenangan*, however, never became functional, as Hasbullah Djabar failed to provide sufficient funds. The following long quotation from Nurdieni Wahab is extremely illustrative of the party-candidate relationship:

> In fact, the candidate [Hasbullah] didn't comply with our financial request ... Why didn't the candidate support our team? He didn't pay enough ... According to my scenario, in order to run the *tim pemenangan* effectively, we needed [US$400,000]. But it is a fact that our candidate didn't support us ... The campaign

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102 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105 Nurdieni Wahab, Head, PAN Gowa, personal communication with Michael Buehler, May 24, 2006.
team was created, all members of the team had a meeting in a hotel ... and the team explained to the candidate, Hasbullah Djabar, that the team needs A, B, C, D, things like accommodation, clothes, bands for music. You know, all this the team needed, also transportation, gifts, yes, gifts for the people, like sembako. So, this totaled [US$400,000] ... During the meeting he said that he would try to think about it ... This really is a big question for me; why did he not pay us? You know, according to the elections commission [financial] report, our candidate was very rich106 ... He only paid us [US$14,000] as of one week before [the elections]. It wasn't enough ... I heard that he went down to the villages himself to explain his vision and mission to the people without consulting with the party. I was warning him. Why? How to be effective if you don't support your team? He said he didn't have enough money. That was a big problem ... Many, many members of the team ... finally didn't care about the elections any longer.107

According to Nurdieni Wahab, PAN cadres never met with Hasbullah Djabar again after the meeting in which they asked for the US$400,000.108 According to Hasbullah, who attempted to build a campaign structure involving the parties and his social network, but who failed due to a complete inadequacy of funds, it all came down to money. “Power is money ... [In Indonesia ] it’s [becoming] like the United States [where] rich people can run for the presidency ... but people without money cannot be active [in politics].”109 These incidents and perspectives demonstrate the distance and dissatisfaction separating the candidate from the party.

The Campaign of Sjachrir Sjafruddin and Djabbar Hijaz

Parties were also not prominent in the campaign of Sjachrir Sjafruddin. The pair’s campaign team relied on their vast personal and family networks, rather than party figures.110 Additionally, Djabbar Hijaz, Sjachrir Sjafruddin’s running mate, the candidate for vice-regent, had a prominent role in the district bureaucracy, and this provided him with a formidable opportunity to tap into various networks at the subdistrict level. In his function as head of the Department of Religion in Gowa, Djabbar was in charge of the annual pilgrimage (haj) of Gowa residents to Mecca. He had thus become acquainted with hundreds of pilgrims from Gowa over the years, many of whom were wealthy, controlling businesses or land, which made them influential notables in the subdistricts. When haj travel was liberalized under the Habibie administration (1998–1999), Djabbar, like many Department of Religion

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106 According to election laws, candidates had to submit a report listing their assets to the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), which then hands over this information to the local election commission (KPUD). The KPK report listed Hasbullah Djabar’s personal wealth as US$371,000 (IDR 3,710,000,000). See KPK, “Pengumuman Harta Kekayaan Penyelenggara Negara,” 2005, p. 2.

107 Nurdieni Wahab, Head, PAN Gowa, personal communication with Michael Buehler, May 24, 2006.

108 Ibid.


110 Abdullah Djabbar Hijaz, Gowa candidate for vice-regent, personal communication with Michael Buehler, May 24, 2006.
bureaucrats, took advantage of the opportunity to get involved in the travel business. His travel agency could have been a rich source of funds for the campaign.\footnote{Due to the poor quality of campaign finance reporting, it is not possible to discover how any of the campaigns were funded with any accuracy.}

Having examined the nominations and campaigns of our four candidate pairs, we turn now to look at how the elections turned out.

**Pilkada Results in Gowa**

The election in Gowa did not go off entirely smoothly. There were charges that non-locals had voted in the district contest. Apparently, ballots were photocopied after the supply ran out, raising fears of fraud. Charges were leveled, as in many other areas, that some who did not wish to support the winners were deprived of their voter cards.\footnote{JPPR, “Laporan Naratif: Program Pemantauan Pemilihan Kepala Daerah (Pilkada) Tahun 2005” (Makassar: Jaringan Pendidikan Pemilih Untuk Rakyat Sulawesi Selatan, 2005).} These sorts of problems led to demonstrations at the local elections commission office, along with the blockading of streets in the capital city.\footnote{CETRO, “Daftar Inventaris Berita Media Cetak tentang Pilkada,” undated, http://www.cetro.or.id/}

In the end, though, the results did stand. They were quite balanced in terms of candidates’ relative strengths. Unlike other contests in South Sulawesi (results of which can be found in Appendix I), in Gowa, no candidates were “parachuted” in from the outside, and thus all had some local networks of support upon which to draw.

The results in Gowa, as seen in Table 1, below, support the theory that it was personal and family networks and funds that were decisive in this pilkada. The victor in the race, Ichsan Yasin Limpo, who earned 32 percent of the vote, was from the most prominent family in the district. His sister was the head of the local Golkar branch. His brother was a former bupati of Gowa who had gone on to become vice-governor of South Sulawesi province. The family’s business interests and wealth were extensive. The fact that Golkar played a role in this candidate’s victory does not negate our point that it was the personal—or in this case, family—network that was decisive.

In Gowa, the Golkar party and the Limpo family have virtually become one. It is impossible analytically to separate what is Golkar and what is the clan’s network. In fact, the Golkar party in Gowa regency is thoroughly penetrated by the Limpos. Family members construct their own networks of support through jobs and other largesse that would not necessarily be available to a Golkar member who was independent of the clan. Ichsan’s campaign guru, his sister, Tenri Olle, purchased Golkar’s work during the campaign through significant financial payoffs. Dirk Tomsa, working on Golkar nationally, finds that Golkar’s “frequently praised party machinery is, in actual fact, not as superior as the public has often assumed ... [T]he real core of the party’s power in the regions was ... grounded ... in its ability to accommodate local power holders.” Local power holders like the Limpos.\footnote{Dirk Tomsa, “The Defeat of Centralized Paternalism: Factionalism, Assertive Regional Cadres, and the Long Fall of Golkar Chairman Akbar Tandjung,” *Indonesia* 81 (April 2006): 7.}
Table 1: Election Results, Regional Head Elections, Gowa Regency, 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bupati Candidate</th>
<th>Vice-Bupati Candidate</th>
<th>Vote Share (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ichsan Yasin Limpo</td>
<td>Abdullah Razak Badjidu</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andi Maddusila Andi Idjo</td>
<td>Usman Mahyuddin</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sjachrir Syafruddin</td>
<td>Djabbar Hijaz</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hasbullah Djabbar</td>
<td>Abdullah Latif Hafid</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL** 100

Source: Election Commission Data

The other three candidates all had plainly weak relationships to their parties. Again, the focus of the campaign was on the candidates’ own networks. Maddusila Andi Idjo campaigned on his standing as son of the last king of Gowa; this was good enough to earn him second place, with 28 percent of the vote. Local analysts attributed his falling short in the race to a shortage of funds.\(^{115}\) For the wealthy Sjachrir and his well-connected running mate from the Department of Religion, Djabbar, the preeminence of person over party is obvious. Sjachrir and Djabbar cobbled together thirteen small, most essentially nonexistent, parties and managed to earn 26 percent of the vote, finishing third, but still with a healthy share of public support. Incumbent bupati Hasbullah drew on his two years in office and his connections to people on the ground earned through that capacity. But, Hasbullah had been brought into Gowa politics by the Limpos. Fighting against them, he never stood a chance. He finished well back in the race, coming in fourth, with just 14 percent of the vote.

The nomination process and the give-and-take of the campaign both demonstrated the candidates’ and the parties’ relative distance from each other. Candidate-party relations after the campaign further drive home the point.

**Candidate-Party Relations after Pilkada 2005**

Candidate-party relations after the *pilkada* support the argument that candidates were independent from the parties that nominated them. Only the winning candidates maintained a relationship with their party after the election; following the victory, Ichsan made sure that some of the loyal party cadres were given access to government positions. With the losing candidate pairs, the relationship of candidate to parties broke down either during the campaign or by election day.

Ichsan Yasin Limpo, the successful candidate, maintained relations to all three parties that nominated him. This is most obvious in the case of the Golkar party, which is closely intertwined with the Limpo family in Gowa, as mentioned above. Members of PPDK, another party that supported Ichsan, were also rewarded for their support. In one example, a close relative of local PPDK party head, Rahman Syah, was appointed to a “wet” position as the regional secretary (*sekretaris daerah, sekda*) for the regency of

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\(^{115}\) Dias Pradadimara, Head, Center for the Study of Eastern Indonesia, Hasanuddin University, Makassar, personal communication with Michael Buehler, January 20, 2006; Aidir Amin Daud, Head, Provincial Elections Commission, personal communication with Michael Buehler, January 24, 2006.
Gowa in the context of the reappointment of the district administration.\textsuperscript{116} An anonymous source also confirmed that PD would be rewarded for its role in the election. The head of PD in the regency, who also owns a construction company, will be treated favorably in upcoming contests for government contracts, one of the authors was told.\textsuperscript{117}

The relationships of all the other Gowa candidates with their respective parties broke down before or soon after the 2005 pilkada. Relations between Maddusila and his parties, the PPP and PBR, deteriorated severely after the election. The party cadres, disappointed with Maddusila for reneging on his promise to support the parties financially, are in the process of looking for another candidate and donor for upcoming elections.\textsuperscript{118} Maddusila himself is currently campaigning for the reelection of the incumbent governor of South Sulawesi, Amin Syam in the province; direct elections for that post will be held in 2007. Remember that Maddusila’s opponent, Ichsan Yasin Limpo, got the nod from Golkar in the 2005 pilkada. Yet Maddusila’s support for a Golkar leader does not mean that he and Ichsan have become allies. By choosing to assist Amin Syam, Maddusila continues his opposition to the Limpos, for it is known that Ichsan’s brother, Syachrul Yasin Limpo, the incumbent vice-governor, aspires to run for the governorship in 2007.\textsuperscript{119} This demonstrates how personal rivalries trump party allegiances in South Sulawesi.

The relationship between Hasbullah Djabar and the parties that nominated him had already broken down during the campaign. As the head of the local PAN pointed out in an interview, the PAN party cadres met their candidate only once and currently do not even know his whereabouts.\textsuperscript{120} Hasbullah suffered a stroke after the pilkada. Some informants in South Sulawesi attribute his illness to his failure to become bupati.

Findings

To many Indonesians, the idea that politicians should be creatures of their parties is seen as antithetical to democracy. For them, the party epitomizes a self-interested organization. It is often said that elected officials should have the interests of constituents—or the broader nation—in mind rather than the narrow interests of a political party. However, parties are necessary for the successful functioning of a modern, liberal democracy. As Mainwaring and others have demonstrated, low levels of institutionalization in the parties and the larger multiparty system have some foreseeable effects for the way government will function. This paper has studied the

\textsuperscript{116}“Yusuf Sommeng Resmi Sekkab Gowa,” \textit{Fajar}, June 22, 2006, p. 26. The appointment of Yusuf Sommeng to the position of sekda was a gesture intended to thank Rahman Syah, the head of PPKD and close relative of Yusuf Sommeng, for his party’s support during the 2005 pilkada. Yusuf Sommeng’s wife is the sister of Rahman Syah’s wife. “Istri Ichsan Berhenti Jadi PNS,” \textit{Tribun Timur}, August 16, 2005, p. 22.

\textsuperscript{117}Anonymous, personal communication with Michael Buehler, May 3, 2006.

\textsuperscript{118}Amir Uskara, Head, PPP Gowa, personal communication with Michael Buehler, May 24, 2006.

\textsuperscript{119}Our reviewer points out that Syachrul will be running with the support of PAN in the race. If he wins, this will provide additional evidence that it is personal networks, rather than parties, that matter. Ichsan would win as regent of Gowa with Golkar’s support. Syachrul may win as governor of South Sulawesi without it. Vice President Jusuf Kalla, national head of Golkar, has entered the race supporting another candidate, further muddying the waters.

\textsuperscript{120}Nurdieni Wahab, Head, PAN Gowa, personal communication with Michael Buehler, May 24, 2006.
nature of the party-candidate relationships in the 2005 elections for bupati in Gowa, an event that provides a window into the workings of post-New Order elections generally and thereby offers significant information concerning Indonesia’s evolving political system.

Our analysis of the 2005 pilkada in Gowa highlights the independence of the regency’s candidates relative to the area’s political parties. The parties could block someone from becoming a candidate, it is true. The 15 percent hurdle guaranteed the parties a role in the game; however, candidates were campaigning long before they found parties to give a stamp of approval to their efforts ... years ahead in several cases. This settles the chicken-and-the-egg debate quite definitively for Gowa. It was the candidate who came first, not the party. As a rule, candidates originated from outside the parties that nominated them;121 relationships between candidates and parties were formed on an ad hoc basis, often as a result of personal, not political, bonds and only shortly before the elections.

It was the individual candidates who were the focus of the campaigns. Campaign material hardly referred to the parties or their platforms. It was the candidates’ personal and family networks, along with funds collected from the candidates and their associates, that appear to have been decisive in determining the outcomes of the races. Wealthy individuals could jump parties without jeopardizing their chances very much. The parties expected to be paid by candidates for their services in the elections.

In the wake of the election (if not before), with the exception of the victors Ichsan Yasin Limpo and the parties supporting him, the parties and their respective candidates went their separate ways, as unconnected as if the brief alignment of their trajectories had never occurred.

We find, as Mainwaring did in Brazil, that on the local level in Gowa, parties are relatively weak compared to candidates. The system of pilkada — direct local elections— has contributed to weakening the parties. In 1999, when regents and mayors were still elected via the local parliament, the parties’ role was relatively important due to the fact that candidates needed the parties’ votes in parliament in order to get elected. In other words, it made sense for potential candidates to invest real effort seeking support from the strongest party in the local parliament during the period from 1999 to 2004. Since 2005, however, this has no longer been the case. Except when they helped a candidate surmount the 15 percent threshold, the parties were not useful to aspiring political entrepreneurs, except perhaps as subcontractors of political services, and, even then, several candidates seem to have preferred relying on their personal and family networks to handle campaign duties. Overnight, Indonesia’s system has gone from one in which the parties were seen to have a stranglehold on politics122 to one in which, at least in the regions, they were significantly weakened, reduced to service providers for local powerholders. The parties do not seem to have used the

121 Ichsan was previously allied with Golkar, but not with PPDK and PD, the first parties to support him. Maddusila came from outside PPP/PBR. Hasbullah was an outsider to PAN and Partai Merdeka. Finally, Sjachrir was a Golkar man, with no previous connections to the coalition of parties supporting him.

opportunities and advantages the 2005 regional elections did present them—such as money—to improve their organizations. As one South Sulawesi interviewee pointed out, the parties “just survive.”

And even survival has become more difficult for the parties. In July 2007, the Constitutional Court threw out several articles of Law 32/2004 on regional elections. Of particular interest to us here, the article requiring that parties play a role in candidate nomination has been jettisoned, thus clearing the way for independent candidates to stand for office. For many democracy advocates in Indonesia, this is a landmark victory. Examples from this paper highlight why democracy campaigners might favor a role for independent candidates: the parties seemed to add little value to the election campaign in Gowa in 2005; the parties’ grubbing for money from prospective candidates represented a stain on Indonesia’s democracy.

However, lessons from other nations on party system institutionalization and its importance for democracy suggest that we should not be sanguine about the possibilities that weak parties and independent candidates are the be-all-and-end-all solution to problems of Indonesia’s democracy. In fact, weak parties may promise that politics in Gowa, and similar areas of Indonesia, may be expected to operate as do the fluid, relatively uninstitutionalized, party systems that Mainwaring examined in Brazil.

Parties will likely come and go in the regions, their fates determined primarily by the individuals and families to whom they hook their carts. Party organizations will remain weak, as powerholders have no incentive to develop a competing locus of authority, and parties have less immediate cachet in local politics. The vote will show high levels of volatility from election to election, as parties remain unconnected to voters at the grassroots level. The nature of party competition will likely be very different at the local levels as opposed to the national level. Without parties to smooth the flow of legislating, gridlock may result, alienating the executive, now Ichsan Yasin Limpo, from the local legislature. Perhaps in Gowa the Limpos’ vast patronage network will mitigate this danger, as the wheels of cooperation can be greased. Still, governing promises to be tumultuous in Gowa, threatening perhaps the credibility of the proposition that this nominally democratic system can offer solutions to the regency’s problems. The structure of politics will be based not on inter-party competition but likely around competition between loose networks of notables. Round One went to the Limpos.

Parties facilitate one of the key features of a democracy: enabling voters to hold politicians accountable. Theoretically, in Gowa and other areas like it, it might be possible for voters to hold individual politicians or thickly aligned networks of notables accountable for governance. If Ichsan Yasin Limpo governs ineptly during his term in office, it is possible for the voters to eject him and other Limpo allies from office in the next elections. This may indeed be the pattern of politics that emerges in Gowa, with the Limpos on one side and rivals on the other. In studying new democracies like Brazil, though, Mainwaring finds that a focus on personalities is not associated with strong bonds of accountability between the rulers and the ruled. In Gowa, we foresee

individual powerholders and their networks circumventing the democratic “accountability” cycle with patronage and gifts of basic goods, reinforced, in some cases, by intimidation, all to maintain their authority. This was the case in pilkada 2005.

Historically, Golkar experienced success in South Sulawesi through coopting notables into its network of patronage. But, Golkar has changed as a result of the regional elections. More than ever, in Gowa, it is now a creature of the Limpo clan, paid to campaign just as other parties are. Many of its top personalities have taken a step back from the party, choosing to campaign for themselves or others and affiliating themselves with other parties; Golkar simply cannot continue to succor all the notables it once encompassed during the New Order years. Three of the four regent candidates were Golkar or former Golkar; two, obviously, ran (or were forced to run) under the banners of different parties. Whether Golkar can be more than a creature of the Limpos, a party that exists for itself—a key feature for an institutionalized party system—is in doubt. Those with the power to develop Golkar’s organization, the Limpos, have the least incentive to allow the party to develop out of their control. Further, the Constitutional Court’s decision abolishing the parties’ monopoly control of candidate nominations may put Golkar more firmly under the Limpos’ thumb.

To conclude, it might be tempting to say that we are seeing a return to the past in Gowa, a new feudalism, with society led by wealthy notables who are elevated to office by their alliances as much as they are elected. This fits the case of Ichsan Yasin Limpo’s victory in Gowa. Or, it might be tempting to say that we are seeing an entirely new pattern of politics evolving in Indonesia’s regions. After all, the bluest of bloods, Maddusila Andi Idjo, son of the last king of Gowa, was rejected at the polls. In fact, looking around South Sulawesi, most victors in the pilkada of 2005 (see Appendix I) were not from aristocratic backgrounds.

Yet, it seems one must appreciate the local social structure in Gowa and Indonesia’s exceptional political trajectory in order to understand politics at the local level. Whatever its unique qualities, however, Indonesia’s system is comparable to the political systems of other new democracies. What Mainwaring and Scully found, looking at these new democracies in Latin America, was that the level of institutionalization of the party system was key to making sense of a nation’s politics. Countries with institutionalized parties and party systems experienced one type of politics. Countries with uninstitutionalized systems experienced another. The relative independence of candidates from parties in the 2005 pilkada in Gowa suggests that Indonesia shares important features with other overwhelmingly uninstitutionalized systems, with foreseeable effects for the country’s politics.
Appendix I: South Sulawesi Regent Elections, June 27, 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regency</th>
<th>Candidate Pair (Bupati Candidate Listed First)</th>
<th>Parties Supporting</th>
<th>Vote Share (percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gowa</td>
<td>Ichsan Yasin Limpo and Abdullah Razak Badjdu</td>
<td>Golkar, PPK, PD</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sjafruddin Sjafruddin and Djabbar Hijaz</td>
<td>PKS, PNI-Marhaenisme, PBS, PIB, PNBK, and other small parties</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hasbullah Djabar and Abdul Latif Hafid</td>
<td>PAN, Partai Merdeka</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maddusila Andi Idjo and Usman Mahyuddin</td>
<td>PPP, PBR</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selayar</td>
<td>Syahrir Wahab and Nur Syamsina Aroeppala</td>
<td>PPP, PBB, PKB</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ince Langke and Kompol Muh. Arsyad</td>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abd Fattah and AKBP (Furn) Lewang</td>
<td>Partai Merdeka, Pelopor, Demokrat, PKPI, PKPB, and other small parties</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Syamsul Alam Ibrahim and Usman Arsyad</td>
<td>PDI-P</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chaeruddin and Irwan Umar</td>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulukumba</td>
<td>Syukri A Sappewali and H Paddasi</td>
<td>PDI-P, PKB, PBB</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Syafrrudin Amjar and Abdul Kahar Muslim</td>
<td>PSI, PKPI, PPNUL, PPIB</td>
<td>26</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mappigau Samma and Andi Mutamar Mattotorang</td>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Syahrir Sahib and Moh. Arifin</td>
<td>PPP, PBR, PKPB</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mahfud Mansyur Sulthan and Abdul Mannan Syamsuddin</td>
<td>PAN and other small parties</td>
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<td>Maros</td>
<td>Nadjamuddin Aminullah and H A Paharuddin</td>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>44</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Irwansyah Kasim and H Anwar Ismail</td>
<td>PKB, Partai Merdeka</td>
<td>31</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Bachtiar Mahmud and Syarifuddin Djamal</td>
<td>PPP, PPDK</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Anwar Baso Mapparessa and Haifa Rahman</td>
<td>PAN, PKS</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pangkajene Kepulauan</td>
<td>Syafrrudin Nur and Kemal Burhamuddin</td>
<td>Golkar, PAN, PKS</td>
<td>58</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gaffar Patappe and Efendi Kasmin</td>
<td>PDI-P or PPDK, PSI, PPNUL, Partai Merdeka, other small parties</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Taufik Fachruddin and Ilyas Mangewa</td>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Candidates</td>
<td>Parties</td>
<td>Votes</td>
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<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Barru</td>
<td>Muhamad Roem and Kamir Dg Mallongi</td>
<td>Golkar, PPP, PDK, PD, PSI</td>
<td>52</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Andi Anwar Aksa and Andi Hasan Syukur</td>
<td>PDI-P, PBR, PBSD</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Basir Palu and Idris Bau Mange</td>
<td>PKS, PKB, PBB</td>
<td>23</td>
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<tr>
<td>Soppeng</td>
<td>Andi Sutomo and Andi Sarimin Saransi</td>
<td>PD, PAN, PM, PSI, PPNUI</td>
<td>40</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Harta Sanjaya and Syarifuddin Rauf</td>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Munafah M and Rizal Mappaturu</td>
<td>PKS, PDI-P</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bismirkin Manrulu and Burhanuddin Tajang</td>
<td>PDK, PBB, PIB, PNBK, PKPI, PKPB, PKB, PBR,</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Patriot Pancasila, PPP, Pelopor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tana Toraja</td>
<td>Johanis A Situru and Palino Popang</td>
<td>PD, PKPI</td>
<td>33</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ruben R Tandirerung and Yusuf Gelong</td>
<td>PNI-Marhaenisme, PPD, PD6</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Yermia Sampe Palendokan and Russel Rumpa</td>
<td>PDI-P</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Petrus Pasulu and Daniel Bombing</td>
<td>Unseated parties</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deka Paranoan and YT Tandipayuk</td>
<td>PPDK, PAN</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Markus Nari and MT Alloverung</td>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luwu Utara</td>
<td>Luthfy A Mutty and Arifin Junaedi</td>
<td>PPDK, PKS, PDI-P</td>
<td>47</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Arsyad Kasmar and Triyono</td>
<td>Golkar</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Daud S Laratu and Hasdullah Malloco</td>
<td>PPP, PBB, PKB</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luwu Timur</td>
<td>Hatta Marakarma and Saldy Mansyur</td>
<td>Golkar, PAN</td>
<td>46</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abd Majid Taher and Sudarman Upa</td>
<td>PDK,PBB</td>
<td>26</td>
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<td>Nur Husain and Muchtar Wahid</td>
<td>PKS, PKB</td>
<td>24</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Arif Rachim and Palabiran Kanna</td>
<td>PPP, PDS, PDI-P</td>
<td>4</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: * Winner of the contest is in bold.