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A widely shared view among researchers of Indonesian politics claims that, despite a series of post-Suharto reform programs, the military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, or TNI) still plays an influential—if not a dominant—political role in determining the direction of a new democracy born in 1998. The proof of this is usually provided by two sources. The first is the political reality in the country's various conflict areas, where the logic of military operations transcends the power of civilian leadership. As typically seen in Aceh, Papua, Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi, and Maluku, the civil—military power balance in these places tends to be distorted by the military's hijacking of civilian initiatives in the name of security. The second is the progress of institutional

1 I am grateful to Takashi Shiraishi and Jeff Kingston for critical comments on an earlier version of this essay. Thanks also to Deborah Homsher for her editorial work. The core argument of this essay was presented at the conference, “Indonesia: The New Order and its Legacy,” held at the Australian National University, November 18-19, 2005. I thank Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy for giving me the opportunity.

military reform. The post-Suharto efforts to transform the military into a professional organization amenable to civilian control are widely assessed as "half-hearted," incomplete, and stagnated, a condition resulting from a number of causes: the lack of civilian reform initiatives, the military's own resistance to fundamental reform, and the decline in external pressure on the military following the US-led global anti-terrorism campaigns, initiated in 2001.3

In seeking to comprehend the incomplete nature of military disengagement from political power, the scholarship has largely concentrated either on analysis of TNI's institutional reform or of its involvement in political violence in remote areas. This trend has, however, left an important question untouched—i.e., what are civil–military relations in everyday politics in "non-conflict" areas where a majority of citizens live and work? In a time of democratization and decentralization, how has unfettered political competition shaped local elite politics and how has it changed the pattern of civil–military relations? This essay addresses such questions and thus sheds a new light on the study of the post-New Order military in politics. This approach takes into account the scope of academic inquiry that has already examined the development of local power elites in the age of decentralization.4 How has the collapse of Suharto's New Order shaped the emergence and role of new local elites and attendant political accommodations? It is in this context that the development of local civil–military relations will be analyzed, and I will discuss and compare these developments in West, Central, and East Java.5

We first look at the reshaping of power elites in these three provinces after the 1999 general elections. We will discuss how the decline of Golkar and rise of PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia–Perjuangan, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) generated several important changes in local civil–military relations. Next we examine the changing patterns of civilian politics in these three provinces as triggered by decentralization projects introduced in 2001. We see how local elites invented new political strategies for diverting funds from development projects, how local heads (governors, regents, and mayors) accommodated the new political contestation in order to maintain their power, and how local military elites took part in this process. Then we discuss a new aspect of "civic" participation in local politics. Here I describe how local elites orchestrated civic protest by involving preman (hoodlums) to gain politico-economic benefits, and how this resort to "civilianized" violence shrank the space of civil society in these three provinces. Finally, we focus on the gubernatorial


5 Countless people assisted me in conducting fieldwork in Jakarta, Surabaya, Semarang, and Bandung during my visits. However, many of these names cannot be mentioned for obvious reasons.
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The elections of 2003 and attempt to map the theatre of civil–military politics in order to clarify the extent and significance of local civil–military elite collusion.

The period between the two general elections in 1999 and 2004 can be fairly interpreted as the first phase of Indonesia’s democratic transition following the fall of Suharto. During this phase, various institutional reforms were initiated aiming to dismantle authoritarian practices. Notable reforms included the separation of police from the military, the empowerment of parliaments, introduction of free elections, and the promotion of local autonomy. My focus is limited to this initial period of regime change. The second phase began in 2004 with the Yudhoyono presidency and is continuing with a series of direct elections for local leaders from June 2005. During this phase, TNI no longer holds privileged parliamentary seats at both national and local levels. Clearly the new political dynamics have had an impact on local civil–military relations. Whether these changes will significantly shrink the vested interests of the New Order remnants remains to be seen.

1999 Elections and the Reshaping of the Power Elite

Local politics during the Suharto era were more or less controlled by the trinity of Golkar, the military, and local bureaucracy. Jakarta’s central government distributed development budgets to local governments, which then allocated those funds to various projects. Local business groups were instructed to affiliate with Golkar in order to participate in these projects. This traditional “concession circle”—consisting of Golkar, local bureaucrats, and business elites—became deeply embedded in the local political economy during the three decades of Suharto’s rule. The military was expected to play a watchdog role, using coercion and violence to repress social forces critical to the concession circle, such as students, workers, and intellectuals. During elections, the dominance of Golkar was secured by the military, bureaucrats, and business circles who organized votes for the government party.

This structure of local dominance during the New Order era faced a serious challenge during the 1999 general elections, reflecting popular support for democratization and reformasi that had precipitated, and gathered momentum following, the fall of Suharto in 1998. The elections resulted in the victory of Megawati’s PDI-P, which obtained 34 percent of total votes at the national level and defeated Golkar (22 percent)—that party’s first electoral defeat since the beginning of the New Order. The 1999 elections also brought about the collapse of Golkar dominance in local parliaments, where the PDI-P now emerged as the leading party in thirteen provincial parliaments. At the regency level, PDI-P achieved majority positions in seventy-six out of ninety-nine parliaments (i.e., about 80 percent) in the three provinces of West, Central, and East Java. This sweeping electoral victory of the

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6 The percentages of PDI-P votes were as follows: Jakarta (39 percent), West Java (33 percent), Central Java (44 percent), Yogyakarta (36 percent), Banten (35 percent; part of West Java at the time of 1999), Bali (79 percent), North Sumatra (40 percent), Lampung (40 percent), South Sumatra (39 percent), Bangka Belitung (35 percent), Bengkulu (30 percent), Central Kalimantan (35 percent), and East Kalimantan (34 percent). PDI-P won all provinces in Java except East Java, where the PKB (National Awakening Party) won by a narrow margin of 35 percent (PDI-P, 34 percent). Cf. Dwight Y. King, Half-Hearted Reform: Electoral Institutions and the Struggle for Democracy in Indonesia (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2003); and Kevin Raymond Evans, Sejarah Pemilu dan Partai Politik di Indonesia (Jakarta: PT Arise Consultancies, 2003).
PDI-P effectively ended the long-time dominance of Golkar in the local power structure and forced modification of the established concession regime. The power shift in local parliaments compelled local governments to form new alliances with new political elites in distributing the benefits of concession businesses and development projects. This also encouraged businessmen to work closely with the PDI-P politicians—many of whom were also local entrepreneurs—in West, Central, and East Java. It was natural for business circles to reinforce their ties with the PDI-P, which now enjoyed a parliamentary majority in 80 percent of all regencies in the three provinces. In this way, the center of local politico-economic power shifted away from Golkar to the PDI-P.7

The 1999 elections also influenced the position of the military in local politics in these provinces. The military’s regional commands, which had uniformly supported Golkar during the New Order era, had to adapt to the new political environment. In places where Golkar retained its parliamentary supremacy, the military maintained existing ties, while in places where the PDI-P won the elections, regional military commands had to forge new alliances in support of the new local concession regime. These regional developments led to the collapse of the military’s uniform political orientation and forced local military commands to respond to local political developments. The apparent loss of central uniformity in the military response to the post-election political constellation effectively provided local commands with a degree of institutional flexibility, boosting their discretion in adjusting to everyday local politics. This political development was reinforced by the financial crisis that beset the military commands, a crisis precipitated by the snowballing bankruptcy of military businesses following the 1998 Asian economic crisis. In consequence, many local commands that had relied on “subsidies” generated by these military businesses were forced to develop their self-financing capacities. In the post-New Order era, this meant deepening ties with local elites who had access to economic resources.8

For instance, the Siliwangi Military Command (Kodam III/Siliwangi), which oversees West Java, is known for having strong intelligence capabilities that help it maintain good access to economic resources. It is widely known that its “partners” include local wood traders who are deeply involved in illegal logging in West Java. In forests near the Citarun River in Bandung and the Cimanuk River in Garut, for example, illegal logging is conducted by local gangs and dealers who depend on the security apparatus in transporting the logs.9 It is also apparent that the human trafficking syndicate in Indramayu, the network of illicit drug traders in Bandung, and

7 Similar developments are observed elsewhere, such as in Yogyakarta and North Sumatra. On the analysis of these places, see Richard Robison and Vedi R. Hadiz, *Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets* (London/New York, NY: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), pp. 245-47.


9 Interview with a local journalist from *Pikiran Rakyat* (Bandung), June 21, 2004. According to a local environmental NGO, DPKLTS (Dewan Pemerhati Kehutanan dan Linkungan Tana Sunda, Council for Observing Forests and the Environment in the Land of Sunda), the scale of illegal logging in West Java has radically expanded since 1999, and some powerful local politicians are benefiting from this blackmarket business (interview with DPKLTS, June 22, 2004). This kind of story does not appear in local media because of pressures brought to bear at the editorial level.
the youth gang specializing in vehicle theft in Bandung are generating opportunities for the protection rackets operated by local security enforcers.10

In Central Java, the Diponegoro Military Command (Kodam IV/Diponegoro) is facing quiet popular movements demanding the return of land seized by the military in the 1960s. During the mid-1960s, military-orchestrated killings and arrests/exiling of alleged communist sympathizers facilitated confiscation of their land.11 Now facing pressures to return the land that has been used by the Kodam Diponegoro for its business activities, the local military elite has sought political protection, and thus a new alliance with PDI-P politicians became indispensable.12 At the same time, the Kodam ratcheted up its campaign of bahaya ex-tapol (vigilance against ex-political prisoners) and relied on its intelligence services to approach kiai (Islamic teachers) and persuade them not to join the land restitution campaigns led by young NU (Nahdlatul Ulama) leftists.

In East Java, the Brawijaya Military Command (Kodam V/Brawijaya) and the Eastern Naval Fleet Command long profited from real estate and protection rackets involving industrial areas and red-light districts in Surabaya.13 These activities depended on a tacit understanding with the local government and parliament, and thus the defeat of Golkar forced the military to switch its attention to the new dominant political forces in East Java, namely PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, National Awakening Party) and PDI-P, in order to secure the business interests of local commands.

The divorce of Golkar from the military, as seen in the three provinces above, also expanded the kiais’ political influence in the formal political arena. During the Suharto era, the Golkar-military alliance was a backbone of the New Order regime throughout the archipelago. Following the collapse of Suharto’s rule, the military faced powerful

10 West Java’s political community generally believes that these illegal operations are conducted, or at least managed, by local preman affiliated with powerful ethnic associations, namely Angkatan Muda Siliwangi (AMS) and Gabungan Inisiatif Barisan Siliwangi (Gibas). However, the organized vehicle theft racket, which steals vehicles in Bandung and transports them to areas in the southern part of the province, such as Tasikmalaya, is virtually monopolized by a group of high school drop-outs who call themselves Briges (Brigadir SMA 7), naming themselves after their high school.

11 The demand for the restitution of lands in Central Java was raised mainly by ex-PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia, Indonesian Communist Party) members and their families in cooperation with younger generation activists affiliated with Nahudatul Ulama (NU), the largest Muslim organization in Indonesia. After the fall of Suharto, NU began promoting reconciliation with ex-PKI supporters who had not forgotten being attacked violently by NU’s paramilitary wing (Ansor) during the transition to the Suharto government. About the military crackdown on PKI in Central Java, see, for example, Robert Cribb, ed., The Indonesian Killings 1965–1966: Studies from Java and Bali (Clayton, Victoria: Monash University, 1990), chap. 6. As part of this process, the military carried out a large-scale requisition of land in Central Java, a stronghold of PKI. It is LAKPESDAM (Lembaga Kajian dan Pengembangan Sumberdaya Manusia), the research and development body of NU, led by young NU leftists, that has taken the initiative in attempting to recompense the “victims” of those days (commonly called korban 1966).

12 Interview with an anonymous lawyer close to the governor of Central Java (January 13, 2004).

13 It is well known that the sex industry in Surabaya, which is perhaps the largest in Indonesia, operates under the aegis of the army and the navy, with their territories fixed in favor of the latter. The larger entertainment and amusement sites are said to be protected by the navy, while the short-time hotels and street prostitution are controlled by the army. This “gentlemen’s agreement” is accepted by the army because it overwhelmingly controls the real estate business in East Java. Interviews with two local journalists and the director of a gender-issue NGO in Surabaya (June 24-25, 2003).
civil pressure to reform and consequently decided to be “neutral” in the 1999 elections, as emphasized by the “new paradigm” that the TNI adopted in 1998.14 For Golkar, TNI’s unilateral decision was a serious blow, as the party faced a popular backlash and stiff competition from other political parties in 1999. It was against this backdrop that Golkar elites in Java reconfirmed the “utility” of kiai to fill the vacuum created by the military’s abrupt abandonment—the military had always been the caretaker of Golkar victories in Java’s elections. Hundreds of kiai, who were expected to mobilize mass support, were intensively lobbied by local Golkar leaders. As a result, many kiai agreed to participate in activities outside the boundaries of their religious domain, thereby boosting their influence in the formal political process. The subsequent inflow of material benefits, both in terms of personal funds and support for their pesantren (Islamic boarding schools), proved irresistible, and they were quickly incorporated into the elite concession circles in many places. This development was then exploited by Abdurrahman “Gus Dur” Wahid, an influential kiai and the charismatic leader of NU. He saw the possibility of becoming the country’s president if he could successfully consolidate influential kiai under his leadership and transform this religious muscle into the political base of his PKB. In this way, the post-Suharto realignment of the local concession regime involved PDI-P, business circles, the military, bureaucrats, and also the religious community. This development is evident in the first wave of political change in West, Central, and East Java, triggered by the democratic project of “free” elections in 1999.

Decentralization: Anjing Mengigi Tulong

The next wave of change involved a shift in the pattern of concession hunting among local elites, resulting from the introduction of another democratic project—i.e., decentralization. The significant decentralization legislation passed in 1999, but was not implemented until 2001.15 This decentralization “big bang” policy16 transferred the management of local economic resources from the central administration to local governments (particularly at the regency/city levels), providing them with wide discretion in making use of these resources. Undoubtedly, the competition for tapping these resources intensified among local power elites following the implementation of this policy. In the three provinces of West, Central, and East Java, typically the escalation of intra-elite contestation for concessions focused on regional governments’ development projects. Local bureaucrats spoke of “good governance” and “administrative transparency” in project implementation, embracing the rhetoric of “administrative reform,” which was ostensibly to be accomplished by relying on


15 More accurately, the two laws—UU No. 22/1999 tentang Pemerintah Daerah and UU25/1999 tentang Perimbangan Keuangan Antara Pemerintah Pusat dan Daerah—are regarded as the major decentralization laws influencing local politico-economic life.

16 The term “Big Bang” was used by the World Bank in assessing the impact of Indonesia’s decentralization projects. See World Bank, “Decentralizing Indonesia” (World Bank Regional Public Expenditure Review Overview Report [Report No.26191-IND], June 2003), chap. 1.
market forces and "free competition." In many cases, however, tenders and bids were orchestrated behind the scenes, exposing the weaknesses of civil society in monitoring the process. As a result, the elite practice of privileged distribution of concessions was, in many places, reinforced rather than weakened.

A new government ordinance in 2000 required local leaders (governors, regents, and mayors) to submit annual "accountability reports" (laporan pertanggunjawaban, or LP) subject to examination by local parliaments. If local councilors approve LPs by in-house voting, local leaders can continue their terms of office, but if the councilors withhold approval, the local leaders are sacked before completing their term in office. This new wrinkle in the rules of the game influenced greatly the political maneuvering of many governors, bupati (regents), and mayors, who were now no longer held accountable by the central government. Subject as they were to local parliaments, they intensified their efforts to woo and co-opt the majority in their local assemblies, resulting in a redistribution of largesse away from central authorities to local "rent" seekers. They typically approached the members of the leading faction in the local parliament and took "necessary measures" to shepherd their LPs successfully through the approval process. These "necessary measures" involved: (1) allocating business contracts for government projects to companies linked with the faction leaders, and (2) extracting some slush funds from the routine budget for distribution as "operational funds" for faction members. If the region was rich in economic resources, the proportion of locally acquired revenue (Pemdapatan Alokasi Daerah, or PAD) in the government budget was high, and the scale of corruption, including bribery of local councilors, was commensurate.

For example, in Bandung city, the government allocated 8 percent of PAD for the city council in fiscal year 2002, which was almost twice the level of the Suharto era. As a result, the total government expenditure for the city council increased by 400 percent between 1997 and 2002. This reallocation of resources demonstrates how the new monitoring powers of local councils translate into financial benefits. Civil society organizations have reasonably suspected that the government increases local council budgets principally in order to co-opt councilors. Local NGOs try to monitor the

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17 The ordinance is "PP108/2000 tentang Tatacara Pertanggunjawaban Kepala Daerah." It was, however, abolished at a later date in line with the revision of UU No.22/1999 in 2004; that revision implemented direct elections for local leaders.

18 The 1999 law on local governments (UU No.22/1999 tentang Pemerintah Daerah), in its articles 18 and 19, provided wide-ranging authority to local parliamentarians vis-à-vis governors, bupati, and mayors, including the following rights: (1) to ask for the accountability of the governor, bupati, and mayor; (2) to request information for the regional government; (3) to conduct investigations; (4) to amend regional regulation drafts; (5) to stipulate the expenditures budget of the parliament; (6) to propose the dismissal of the governor, bupati, and mayor if warranted; and (6) to supervise the implementation of regional government policies, revenue, and expenditures budgets.

19 For various patterns of corrupt use of budgeted funds by local leaders, see, for example, a detailed analysis provided by "Ramai-ramai Menjarah Uang Rakyat," and "Ledakan Korupsi dan Rezim Paranormal," both in Kompas, March 9, 2003.


21 Interviews with NGO workers at Bandung Institute of Governance Studies (BIGS), March 29, 2004; at Sarasehan Warga Bandung (Sawarung), March 30, 2004; and at the Center for Social Analysis (Akatiga), March 30, 2004.
murky aspects of city budgets, including expenditures for the city council, with limited success. "It is extremely difficult to conduct research on how the budget is actually used, because it involves the problem of tenders in public projects and procurements. Once we touch on these issues, we are confronted by endless intimidation," according to a local NGO leader. In Bandung's political community, it is widely believed that about half the value of a contract is transferred to the mediators—such as PDI-P politicians and bureaucrats—as kickbacks. Given the weak monitoring ability of civil society organizations, these political transactions have become standard operating procedures for local leaders seeking to co-opt politicians who have a say in approving annual LPjs.

Central Java is a stronghold of the PDI-P, and Semarang, Solo, Kudus, and Cilacap are known as PAD-rich districts, where the local governments manage to raise "operational funds" in abundance. Moreover, in Central Java, twenty out of thirty-five local leaders (regents and mayors) were PDI-P affiliated during 1999-2004, and it was in these places that the party dominated both executive and legislative branches. This party dominance led to vigorous lobbying for PDI-P projects, both institutionally and individually, and the semi-automatic approval of LPjs in the councils. As seen in the regencies of Semarang, Grobogan, Tegal, Pemalang, Banyumas, Kebumen, Magelang, Kendal, Batang, and Kudus, regents also acted as PDI-P's chapter heads, usually enjoying majority control of local councils. It did not take long for them to start behaving as *raja lokal* (local kings), as these *bupati* now reigned over their regency's post-Suharto elite concession circles. Similar developments in executive-legislative relations were evident in East Java.

Local politicians in the three provinces learned innovative ways to extract maximum resources from local governments. A popular phrase, *anjin mengigi tulong* (a dog bites bone), conveys a sense of the consequences of their new "skills," describing local politicians whose teeth not only bite through flesh, but also sink into the bone, making it too painful to scream. This problem should be assessed in the context of post-Suharto local transformations; in this case, the series of decentralization projects significantly expanded the economic resources of local governments, but the results were obviously not all positive. These projects radically activated political competition among local politicians who hoped to gain access to these resources, and also motivated local leaders to use such resources in manipulating local legislators.

Undoubtedly these new dynamics driving legislative-executive politics influenced civil-military interactions at the local level. Many heads of local governments now enjoyed wider discretion in allocating economic resources, called "tactical funds," and with these funds they attempted to maintain or buy the political support of bureaucratic networks, including local military institutions. As Marcus Mietzner argues, the executive branches of local government were obliged to cultivate good relations with TNI because the fractious and fickle nature of local legislatures made them unreliable. In fact, politically savvy regents and governors knew the strategic importance of co-opting TNI, as it held a block of parliamentary seats that could provide the deciding votes during the approval of LPj. Unlike many civilian

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councilors, whose political conduct reflects the influence of lobbying from various pressure groups, politicians in uniform were believed to act based on the instructions of local military headquarters. Therefore, local leaders often found it more reliably effective to secure the political loyalty of the military faction in the parliament by lobbying the territorial command.

TNI elites in local commands understood the value of controlling the swing vote, and they offered their support in return for policy rewards, for example, budgetary allocations and inclusion of the military lobby in the administrative decision-making process. One regent claimed, "... the military is crucial for political stability here, and I have successfully incorporated TNI in my administration by giving it more say in Muspida, which is now called Muspida++."\(^{23}\)

Allegedly the creation of this expanded assembly, "Muspida++," was aimed at preventing political instability that might be ignited by confrontations between TNI and the police. TNI-police confrontations were evident in many places during the post-Suharto era, often triggered by police efforts to muscle in on military side-businesses, notably protection rackets for gambling and prostitution.\(^{24}\) The expanded Muspida incorporated lower-level military leaders, providing them a forum in which to express their frustrations. This new decision-making process also provided preferential budgetary treatment for the military commands, making increased operational funds available as a way to placate those who might otherwise defend their turf through violent means.\(^{25}\) "In some regencies, Muspida is almost hijacked by local military elites who use intelligence information to influence regents," according to some political journalists in West Java.\(^{26}\)

Local military elites effectively exploited the political vulnerability of local leaders who had begun to enjoy wider discretion in the use of local economic resources. The new monitoring process established in 2000 with the LPj provided ample opportunity for the military to draw on its intelligence, political, and security strengths to take advantage of decentralization and extract sufficient resources. This demonstrates the institutional adaptability of the military in responding to the new rules of the game and their need to forge new alliances and develop new methods for resource extraction.

\(^{23}\) Interview with Samsul H. Siswoyo, Regent of Jember, East Java, June 26, 2003. In the case of Jember, Muspida (Musyawara Pimpinan Daerah, or Regional Leadership Assembly) during the New Order invited only District Commanders (Dandim) to take part, but after the 1999 elections and under the leadership of the post-New Order regent, not only these Dandims but also Subdistrict Commanders (Danramil) and some strategic battalion commanders were invited to provide policy input to Muspida.

\(^{24}\) For a description of a series of such clashes, see The Editors, "Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite," *Indonesia* 75.

\(^{25}\) On the political problem of local governmental budgets being appropriated for TNI operations, see, also, Imparsial, "Regional Budget for TNI: A Threat for Civilian Control over the Military," *Catatan Imparsial* 1 (March 2004).

\(^{26}\) Interviews with anonymous journalists from *Pikiran Rakyat* and *Koran Tempo*, Bandung, March-April 2004.
“Civic” Participation and Feudalistic Political Mobilization

As competition intensified among local political elites for concessions and graft, political engineering of “civic protest” became a means of lobbying. Since government projects—such as land-use planning, village or community development, and even welfare projects—were promoted in tandem with the implementation of autonomy laws in 2001, local legislators seemingly reinvented the strategy of mobilizing “local residents” to protest against projects by organizing demonstrations. After drawing attention to these outbursts of “civil unrest,” the orchestrating politicians would shrewdly demand the establishment of special parliamentary committees (pansus) to discuss the government project in question. Government officials in charge of the project under consideration had no choice but to “consult” with the politicians who raised the issue. What typically happened was that these politicians performed as “mediators” in solving the problem and made lucrative deals with the officials through the process. In exchange for “calming” local residents, officials ensured that the project contracts were allocated to companies connected to the “mediator.”

This theatre of “civic protest” and the subsequent deals with government officials became a favored and effective means of fundraising by local politicians. This is a tactical method that serves to exploit the vulnerable nature of the post-Suharto local government that needs to show some respect to “citizens” and “residents.” Orchestrating “grassroots” movements to protest against the government soon became a conventional practice in the everyday political process. Astute politicians organized various types of “resident groups” so that they were prepared to pounce on any opportunity to shake down the government. As one prominent politician claimed, “... access to local concessions now depends on how many pasukan [corps] you can prepare to demonstrate your importance to the government.”

Consequently, elite politicians established a variety of interest groups calling themselves resident forums, youth groups, labor associations, farmers’ assemblies, environmental NGOs, ethnic delegations, and religious representatives, to name a few. Many local politicians tactically exploit the government’s support for “civil society” and mobilize these groups as an effective political weapon for maximizing economic benefits. Political power can be measured in terms of the scale of “mass protests” that a politician can mobilize and the number of groups that he or she controls in the constituency.

The manufacturing of “civil society protests” requires manpower to get people into the streets. Local hoodlums (preman) have played a decisive role in mobilizing protests and, given the dire economic circumstances prevalent throughout the region, have had little trouble in recruiting “protesters.” Since the economic crisis in 1997–1998, which boosted the number of unemployed youth, the recruitment of such people has become extremely easy and less costly. Thus, a “broker” business has emerged, which has helped local politicians organize many types of civic protests. These brokers who could provide crowds were a convenient resource for elite politicians because they only needed to make a phone call when they wanted to organize a mass protest. Therefore, many prominent local politicians embraced several different mobilization brokers and

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27 Interview with Ade Komaruddin, Deputy Chair of Golkar Faction in National Parliament, October 9, 2003.
enjoyed the power of commanding the "voice of the citizen" in very flexible ways. "It is nothing but a reflection of paternalistic culture, which is prominent in my constituency," said a prominent local PDI-P figure.\(^\text{28}\) Those who were regarded as brokers of mass mobilization included, for example, families of ethnic leaders, informal leaders in adat communities, religious teachers, and local preman leaders.

Perhaps the most famous such broker in Indonesia is Jakarta's Al Fadloli El-Muhir (commonly known as FEM), who has been very active in orchestrating mobilization projects for different political elites at the national level since he established Betawi Brotherhood Forum (Forum Betawi Rempug, or FBR) in July 2000.\(^\text{29}\) The Forum purports to protect the ethnic interests of the Betawi people, who—according to the FBR—are the original inhabitants of Jakarta and not respected appropriately. In the cause of representing Betawi residents, FEM has demonstrated his power by organizing violent rallies against targets as requested by political elites including Fauzi Bowo, Vice Governor of Jakarta; General (ret.) Wiranto, ex-TNI commander; and Akbar Tanjung, former parliamentary speaker and ex-chairman of the Golkar party.\(^\text{30}\) It is widely known that FEM—in his capacity as a kiai—has used his pesantren, Pondok Kopi in Cakung, East Jakarta, for collecting "donations" from Jakarta's power elites who request "civic protests" be staged by FBR. Over the past few years, FEM and his FBR have rapidly emerged as the most powerful ethnic preman brokers in Jakarta.\(^\text{31}\)

\(^\text{28}\) Interview with Alit Kelakan (Deputy Head of PDI-P's Bali Chapter), July 31, 2003. In Bali, the problem of land development has sparked many residential protests, for which he, Kelakan, was known to have mobilized local youth (pemuda) associations. Those who know Kelakan (Vice Governor of Bali since 2003) suggest that his power derives from his close personal relationship with AAN Ratmadi, the blue-blooded bupati of Badung, who is descended from Puri Satria (a kingdom in Denpasar). Ratmadi, who is popularly called Coklat, had allowed Kelakan to employ youth leaders of "customary villages" (desa adat) affiliated with Puri Satria as agents for mobilizing youth organizations. Interview with an official at the provincial government of Bali (July 31, 2003). About Puri Satria and its political culture in Bali, see, for example, "Di bawah Bayang-Bayang Bangkitnya Aristokrasi," Kompas, April 11, 2005.

\(^\text{29}\) About FBR, see Ian Douglas Wilson, "The Changing Contours of Organised Violence in Post-New Order Indonesia" (working paper No. 118, The Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University, April 2005); and Untung Widyananto, "Antara Jago dan Preman: Studi Tentang Habitus Premanisme pada Organisasi Forum Betawi Rempung (FBR)" (MA thesis, Faculty of Social and Political Science, University of Indonesia, 2005).

\(^\text{30}\) FEM mobilized FBR to stage a violent attack on the Urban Poverty Consortium, a Jakarta-based NGO, which condemned the public project in Jakarta that had evicted masses of poor residents in March 2002 to promote land development. Also, in March 2002, a group of thugs attacked the headquarters of Kontras (Komisi Untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan, Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence), which was headed by a prominent human-rights activist, Munir. The incident occurred two days after Kontras had organized a protest in front of Wiranto's house. Thugs destroyed the office of Kontras and called on Munir to stop investigations into the killings of pro-democracy students during the last days of Suharto. These killings are widely attributed to members of the military who were bent on quelling protests when Wiranto was the military commander. Many believed that these thugs were sent by FBR, which had its office in Menara Imperial—the building also occupied by Wiranto's office. FEM also helped Fauzi and Sutiyoso by preparing counter-demonstrations against civil-society activists who opposed Sutiyoso's reelection for governor of Jakarta, with Fauzi as his running mate, in September 2002. FBR was also called to help Akbar Tanjung in February 2004, when students rallied in front of the Supreme Court demanding Akbar be convicted for corruption.

\(^\text{31}\) During the Suharto years, a certain balance of power existed among major ethnic preman forces in Jakarta, notably among groups residing in Betawi, Sunda, Madura, Ambon, and East Timor. The balance was seemingly broken partly because of the increasing utility of "indigenous" identity in the age of local autonomy, and partly because of the dwindling finances of these preman groups (only the Betawi preman continue to thrive financially because their status as a self-described "indigenous" organization has proven valuable to the city administration when conducting its dirty operations). FEM successfully gained
During the Suharto era, the two most infamous semi-official preman groups, i.e., Pemuda Pancasila (PP) and Pemuda Panca Marga (PPM), enjoyed the privileges they earned working as the coercive forces for regime maintenance throughout the archipelago. Many illegal and underworld businesses cooperated closely with these organizations, and they apparently worked for Golkar campaigns. They also enjoyed a dubious reputation as “public enemy Number 1” due to their strikebreaking activities and extensive cooperation with military intelligence. The collapse of the New Order significantly undermined their relative ascendancy in the preman world. In this era of intensified competition from similar “service providers,” these organizations adopted a flexible attitude towards working with emerging elites, and the PP stopped formally supporting Golkar, freeing its members to back whichever parties they wished.

Diversification of underworld power has been discernible, most notably involving a growing number of local ethnic identity groups, political party-affiliated youth organizations, and religious vigilantes, oddly mirroring the rapid growth of civil society NGOs in the early 1990s. The proliferation of such organizations and their embrace of preman tactics resonated with the increasing need of local power elites to practice mass mobilization as a practical weapon in their everyday competition for concessions. Against this backdrop, the political coalition of local elites and preman has been strengthened in radical ways in West, Central, and East Java. Local politicians have tapped the political power of preman and the “popular” protests they can orchestrate in order to gain access to the government’s economic resources. This trend even generated a power shift between the two sides, as some preman brokers started to behave as dalang (puppeteers) of politicians, exercising a strong influence in the formulation of official lists of party candidates for the general elections in 2004.

In the case of West Java, the capital city of Bandung and industrial areas located along the northern coast (called pantai utara, or pantura) have been hotbeds of preman. In West Java, a “youth” organization named Angkatan Muda Siliwangi (Youth Force of Siliwang, AMS), which was established by the West Java military command in the 1970s, is acknowledged as the most powerful preman group. The leading figures of AMS have acted as powerful political brokers in the field of mass mobilization; these include, for instance, Erwin Sumaatmadja and Rusna Kosasih, who chair the AMS central executive, and their caretaker, Uu Rukmana, who chairs the advisory board of the AMS. Johny Hidayat, who heads the Bandung chapter of AMS, and Adjat, the

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32 For the origin and development of PP, see Loren Ryter, “Pemuda Pancasila: The Last Loyalist Free Men of Suharto’s Order?” Indonesia 66 (October 1988): 45-73.

33 Loren Ryter, “Reformasi Gangsters,” Inside Indonesia 82 (April-June 2005). The post-Suharto local governments also extensively recruit members of PP and PPM to the civil service police unit (Pamong Praja), and they are mobilized to carry out violent policies, such as evictions of residents from their land. For details, see Stein Kristiansen and Lambang Trijono, “Authority and Law Enforcement: Local Government Reforms and Security Systems in Indonesia,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 27, 2 (2005): 236-54; and Human Rights Watch, “Indonesia: Condemned Communities: Forced Evictions in Jakarta,” Human Rights Watch 18, 10 (September 2006).

34 Interviews with a member of Pamong Praja, Jember government, East Java, and Machmud Sardjukono (Head of Golkar’s Jember Chapter), both on June 26, 2003.
general secretary of AMS, are also prominent brokers. AMS has regional branches in all West Java regencies and in Banten, and its structure resembles that of the military command. AMS places its agents in many villages and districts for industrial workers, and its power to mobilize “the youth” overshadows that of its competitors.

This network, which links local elites and grassroots activists in a patrimonial way, has effectively countered many civil society organizations that attempt to promote mass solidarity based on the class interests of laborers and farmers. Several Bandung-based NGOs have endeavored to organize both industrial workers in pantura areas and agricultural employees in the southern area of the province, where many regencies—like Garut, Cianjur, Sukabumi, Ciamis, and Tasikmalaya—remain relatively impoverished. These attempts, however, have not borne fruit, largely because they are constantly blocked by the preman in the area who—with coercive and economic resources—maintains the patrimonial hierarchy of local political elites. Here, the activities of civil society movements trying to promote class-oriented initiatives to represent the interests of disadvantaged citizens, based on “horizontal” social solidarity, conflict with the elite model of organizing the masses based on “vertical” solidarity. The latter model, which has been sustained by political, coercive, and capital powers, is so dominant that the activities of civil society organizations are easily disrupted and rendered ineffective.

It is not only the AMS that has played a significant preman role in maintaining the elite’s vertical model of mass mobilization. A group that separated from AMS in 2001, i.e., GIBASS (Gabungan Inisiatif Barisan Anak Sunda Siliwangi, Joint Initiative of the Sundanese Sons of Siliwangi), also enjoys wide influence in Bandung. Members of GIBAS have helped the city administration resolve many “problems” that could not be solved by legal means, involving, for example, eviction of kaki lima (street vendors) and slum clearance for land-development projects. It is also widely believed that the protection rackets of GIBAS members in the city’s brothels and gambling dens, which amount to more than four hundred, are much more extensive than those of other competing preman groups. Both AMS and GIBAS identify themselves as the most effective, committed guardians of the wide-ranging ethnic interests of the Sundanese people, and their local networks are made available to prominent Sundanese brokers such as Rudi Gunawan, who heads the West Java Chapter of HKTI (Himpunan Kerukunan Tani Indonesia, Indonesian Farmers’ Union) and Syafei, who commands

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35 Rusuna, chairman of AMS for the period 2004–2009, even works as a member of the provincial parliament in West Java after having been elected in the 2004 elections. Erwin, who was succeeded by Rusuna as AMS chairman, was the deputy treasurer of Golkar’s West Java Chapter.

36 GIBASS was later renamed as GIBAS by dropping “Sunda” from the original name. GIBAS is said to be more “militant” than AMS. Its Bandung branch head, Roni Romdhoni, is another famous power broker.

37 The growing number of gambling dens in West Java has always been associated with the name of Ferry, who is said to be a Chinese-Indonesian widely regarded as the local gambling king. Many local journalists identify several big casinos (e.g., Warung Internasional) as parts of his shadowy business empire, which he manages when not engaged with his official work as the owner of a factory outlet company. Among political circles in Bandung, it is also openly rumored that Ferry has tried to block the entry of Tommy Winata, who is always described as the gambling king of Jakarta, into Bandung and Subang. To defend his turf, Ferry has intensified his money lobbying activities through provincial politicians and military elites. Regarding the sex industry and the city’s reluctance to crack down on it, see “Sex, Budget and the City,” BUJET 8 (August–September 2003): 5-30.
Paguyuban Pasundaan (Sundanese Association), another leading ethnic lobby group in West Java.38

In East Java, we see similar developments. During the Gus Dur presidency, East Java’s underworld was largely overwhelmed by NU’s vigilante corps, named Banser (Barisan Ansor Serba Guna, literally translated as Multipurpose Front for Ansor, the youth wing of NU). East Java society is traditionally the heartland of NU power and influence. The birth of Gus Dur’s presidency in 1999 encouraged Banser to expand its underworld activities.39 However, his impeachment in 2001, and the subsequent promotion of Megawati as his successor, facilitated the emergence of a PDI-P-affiliated vigilante corps, BMI (Banteng Muda Indonesia, The Indonesian Young Bulls), in the preman sector. In many places, BMI’s aggressive expansion of protection rackets, ranging from traditional cockfights and secret lotteries (toto gelap or togel), to the brothels and industrial extortion operations, ignited a public furor over its barbaric methods. Except for places directly controlled by pesantren, BMI successfully took over major underworld territories previously controlled by Banser, according to a local politician in East Java.40 The apparent emergence of BMI was also backed by elements of long-standing preman groups, such as PP and PPM, who joined forces with BMI. Moreover, some powerful ethnic associations, for instance IKABRA (Ikatan Keluarga Brawijaya, the Association for Brawijaya Families) and IKMI (Ikatan Keluarga Madura Indonesia, The Indonesian Association of Madurese Families), soon discovered that BMI was an ideal strategic partner because it had few qualms about engaging in underworld business and it also enjoyed direct access to the central government. IKABRA and IKMI strengthened their relationships with BMI by sending members to support its activities.41 The preman territory of East Java was, in this way, wrested from Banser by BMI, a process that relied on Madurese preman leaders whose “rough” behavior proved to be an obvious advantage in doing business.

Industrial areas around Surabaya Bay, for example, have long been a playground of these ethnic preman groups. They have often been hired by enterprises to engage in strikebreaking and union busting. They have also performed well in evicting the poor in order to promote land-development projects initiated by the city administration.42 In the local political community, it is widely believed that the top clients of IKABRA and

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38 HKTI’s central executive board is now headed by Lt. Gen. (ret) Prabowo, once the powerful son-in-law of Suharto, who was sacked from the military on suspicion of abducting pro-democracy students in the last days of Suharto’s regime. He is now a businessman and a member of Golkar’s central executive board, under vice-president Jusuf Kalla’s leadership since 2005.

39 For details, see Hairus Salim HS, Kelompok Paramiliter NU (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2004).

40 Interview with Machmud Sardjijono, the Head of Golkar’s Jember Chapter, June 26, 2003.

41 As a result, IKMI’s relationship with the local PDI-P circle was also deepened. IKMI’s official declaration supporting Megawati’s candidacy in the presidential elections of 2004 reflected this development, mounting a direct challenge to Gus Dur and his PKB, who tried to block Megawati.

42 After the introduction of regional autonomy, a deluge of development projects stirred up a growing number of land disputes in Surabaya. Local NGOs have helped organize protests against the forced eviction of farmers and inhabitants, but they have been violently suppressed by Madurese preman, who send hit-men and kidnappers in order to terrify activists and quell demonstrations. Interview with Dedi (chairman of LBH’s East Java Chapter), June 25, 2003. “It is stupid to kill NGO activists, because it is enough to make a phone call to them and then mention that I am now in front of your son’s primary school ... You know this is not Jakarta, where any tiny event like this may make news in the print media,” said a government official in East Java (interview, June 2003).
IKMI include the inner circle of Imam Utomo (East Java Governor), Maj. Gen. AD Sikki, the commander of Brawijaya Military Command, and some “charismatic” kiai (kiai khos) who patronize local politicians.\textsuperscript{43}

Clearly, the preman's political role has been enhanced significantly in recent years. Their emergence illustrates how decentralization and democratization initiatives have been captured by local elites in ways that have consolidated feudalistic political practices in various places of Java.\textsuperscript{44} It should be noted in particular that static ethnic identities—such as Sundanese, Madurese, and Betawi—have become very effective tools for political mobilization, as they structurally bind local power elites and people in "vertical solidarity" against the "horizontal" model employed by the civil society movement. As a result of this development, the underworld networks and coercive strategies of preman circles have become vital tools for gaining political power and the economic spoils it confers on those who hold office. The mobilization of preman in everyday politics naturally has led to their participation in periodic political events, such as elections for local leaders. Although the quantitative-qualitative development of local NGOs and media mark an advance in the post-Suharto process of democratization, their influence remains muted. This is because they are weak in monitoring the activities of the political elite and holding them accountable in an atmosphere where intimidation and violence is widespread and transparency is limited.

**Locally Electing Governors: The Theatre of Civil–Military Politics**

The institutionalization of preman political participation clearly influences patterns of military involvement in local politics. The elite mobilization of the feudalistic preman network relieved the military from directly resorting to violence in order to secure the political goals of its allies, the local power elites. This situation helped TNI bolster its post-New Order propaganda touting its own "political neutrality," while also giving it a relatively free hand in dealing with political competition among civilian elites. The advantages conferred on the TNI were clearly evident during local elections, when civilians sought support from the TNI, which could thus weigh different offers and carefully calculate which candidates would be most suitable as strategic partners. The 2003 gubernatorial elections in West, Central, and East Java provided excellent examples of how local military commands adjusted to their king-making role in maximizing their institutional interests.

In West Java, the gubernatorial election was conducted in May. The constellation of party politics favored the PDI-P, which formed the largest faction in both the provincial parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD I) and in twenty out

\textsuperscript{43} The relationship between the Brawijaya Command and the Madurese preman dates back to the 1960s, and these ties further developed under the Suharto government, particularly after a Madurese army general, R. Hartono, became Brawijaya Commander in 1990 and was later promoted to Army Chief in 1995. In 1995, Imam Utomo also became Brawijaya Commander and inherited Hartono's Madurese network, which had been used by military interests. Obviously Utomo, as governor, has benefited from this legacy.

\textsuperscript{44} The overall problem posed by the elite's capture of local democracy is well discussed by Michael S. Malley in his "New Rules, Old Structures, and the Limits of Decentralisation," in Local Power and Politics in Indonesia, ed. Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy, pp. 102-116.
of twenty-five regency parliaments (DPRD II). Thus it was natural for PDI-P cohorts in West Java to nominate their party leaders for the governorship. From the outset, PDI-P’s central and provincial executives were determined to nominate Rudi Harsatanaya, the head of PDI-P’s West Java chapter and a Megawati loyalist since the 1980s. This decision, however, provoked strong resistance from local Sundanese elites who saw Rudi—a Chinese Sumatran—as a candidate unlikely to represent the voice of the Sundanese community in West Java. Sundanese power brokers responded immediately by blocking the nomination of Rudi and organizing a statement of opposition to his nomination by seven party regency chapters. This rift caused an internal split in the PDI-P organization in West Java. Anti-Rudi lobbying was led by two of the ethnic associations discussed above, i.e., AMS and GIBAS, which called for “Sundanese governors for Sundanese society.” Two prominent ethnic leaders forcefully lobbied the local elite community. They were Mashudi and G. P. Solihin, both retired three-star generals, former commanders of Kodam Siliwangi, and former West Java governors. Mashudi privately consulted with Maj. Gen. Iwan Ridwan Sulandjana, who himself was Sundanese and commander of Kodam Siliwangi. Solihin, in his capacity as a founder and adviser of AMS, also conducted wide-ranging lobbying of the local elite by drawing on his organizational network.45

In the face of such pressures, Megawati’s party headquarters finally decided to withdraw the nomination of Rudi and joined a coalition with PKB, which nominated retired Maj. Gen. Tayo Tarmadi, ex-commander of Kodam Siliwangi, as the candidate for governorship, in the expectation of securing the support of Siliwangi generals. In the end, Rudi was forced to be a running mate of Tarmadi. A general-ranking officer in Bandung, however, predicted that those who knew Tarmadi would never support him because he was corrupt and would behave arrogantly towards the current Siliwangi commander.46 These circumstances all benefited Golkar, which had lost the 1999 elections in West Java. Maj. Gen. (ret) Nurhaman, the head of Golkar’s provincial branch, had strong ties with local military elites in the Kodam Siliwangi. Backed by Mashudi and Solihin, Nurhaman worked effectively to convince TNI that it would be beneficial to support Danny Setiawan, the Golkar nominee, for the West Java governorship.47

The election for governor was conducted by an intra-parliament vote involving all one hundred members. Tarmadi expected to secure the thirty votes from PDI-P members and twelve from the PKB faction, totaling forty-two votes. Golkar calculated that its own twenty-one votes and fourteen votes from the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, United Development Party), as well as thirteen votes from other small parties, would give it at least forty-eight votes. It also anticipated that it could exploit the PDI-P’s internal rift through vote-buying.48 The situation thus seemed to favor Setiawan. Satisfied with this turn of events, the TNI faction that had ten votes in the

45 Interview with Mashudi, March 29, 2004. Solihin explained that the move was necessary both in order to block non-Sundanese from governing the province and to prevent the corrupt PDI-P from dominating the provincial government. Interview, June 22, 2004. Both Mashudi and Solihin were supporters of Golkar.

46 Interview with an officer attached to Sesko TNI (Military Staff and Command College), April 28, 2003.

47 Interview with A. Nurhaman, June 22, 2004. Setiawan was a local bureaucrat who had served as the secretary of West Java’s provincial government.

DPRD decided to abstain from voting in the name of its "political neutrality." However, by refraining from casting its ballots, the TNI sent a clear message that it preferred Setiawan, the civilian bureaucrat, rather than Tarmadi, the ex-military officer. Abstaining also helped Tarmadi save face while avoiding an open breach with Megawati’s PDI-P, still the dominant party in West Java. Thus, the Siliwangi Command adroitly assessed the political situation, secured its institutional interests, and managed this feat without actually using its leverage.

Two months later, in July 2003, another gubernatorial election was conducted in East Java. The incumbent, Imam Utomo, was nominated by PDI-P for reelection, and he was challenged by PKB, which nominated Abdul Kahfi, a retired police brigadier-general. The latter was “recommended” by Gus Dur as the official candidate of PKB; in casting his support to Kahfi, Gus Dur ignored the preference of many NU elites in East Java who wanted to form a coalition with PDI-P by nominating Saifullah Yusuf, the secretary general of NU, as Utomo’s running mate. The PKB held thirty-three seats in the one-hundred-member DPRD against the PDI-P’s thirty-one seats. The third largest party, Golkar, had eleven seats and decided to support PKB. A coalition of small parties that formed the Joint Faction (F-GAB) with eleven seats supported PDI-P. Thus, the power balance in the parliament was roughly equal. “It was TNI that had the deciding vote,” according to a leader of F-GAB. How was TNI lobbied and what determined its decision in the voting?

The fact that Utomo was a former Brawijaya Commander (1995-1997) did not automatically guarantee him the support of the current commander, Maj. Gen. A. D. Sikki; these tactical, calculated shifts of allegiance among military officers resembled similar maneuverings in West Java, outlined above. However, in East Java’s highest military circles, it was extremely difficult to accept Kahfi, a one-star police general, for the governorship due to institutional rivalry. The top generals who took part in the provincial Muspida were all two-star generals, including Sikki himself, Commander of Navy Education Command (Dan Kodikal), Commander of Eastern Naval Fleet (Pangarmatim), and Commander of the 2nd Infantry Division of Army Strategic Reserve (Pangdiv-2 Kostrad). There was thus an institutional resistance from the local TNI leadership to the PKB-nominated Abdul Kahfi.

49 Rudi himself recalled that if PDI-P nominated its own gubernatorial candidate, the party would not split during the vote, and TNI would follow the PDI-P. Interview, March 29, 2004. Even Megawati was reluctant to endorse Tarmadi, who was nominated by PKB. She still remembered an event in 1996 when her visit, as the party chairperson, to the West Java chapter was blocked by Tarmadi, acting as Siliwangi Commander, with his unpersuasive explanation that there had been a “security concern.” This problem with Megawati helped convince Maj. Iwan Ridwan that Tarmadi would be defeated by Setiawan.

50 Utomo’s campaign leader claimed that there were three reasons for the PDI-P’s support for Utomo. First, he was an ex-Kodam commander in East Java who knew how to handle security problems in the province. Second, his family had a base of fanatic supporters in Jombang. Third, Utomo promised to support PDI-P’s electoral campaign in the 2004 general elections. Interview with A. Soepomo (Deputy Head of PDI-P’s East Java Chapter, June 25, 2003). On the other hand, Gus Dur was unhappy with Saifullah Yusuf, who had repeatedly expressed his concerns about Gus Dur’s personalization of PKB. The nomination of Kahfi was, however, not acceptable for many kiais because Kahfi had no background in NU; he was affiliated with the rival Muslim social organization, Muhammadiyah.

51 Interview with Achmad Ruba’ie (Deputy Head of National Mandate Party [PAN]’s East Java Chapter), June 25, 2003.
Second, within the TNI leadership in East Java, there was an institutional memory of “bad times” that they had suffered during the Gus Dur administration. The Brawijaya Command was annoyed by Gus Dur, who relied on the intelligence of kiai and had repeatedly intervened in personnel matters involving Korem commanders. Also, in the last days of his presidency, Gus Dur had mobilized militant supporters called pasukan berani mati (willing martyrs) in several cities throughout East Java to fight against troops from the Brawijaya Command who were trying to pacify fanatic supporters of Gus Dur who opposed his impeachment. The bad blood resulting from this standoff explains Kodam’s anti-Gus Dur sentiments and active lobbying against his chosen candidate. Generals perceived that if Gus Dur’s candidate prevailed, his influence would increase to the detriment of the military’s autonomy and interests.

Third, the logic of preman politics significantly pushed TNI to defend Utomo. During the electoral campaign for the governorship, powerful ethnic associations, such as IKMI and IKABRA, were active behind the scenes in silencing several NGOs opposed to Utomo’s reelection. Strengthening ties with Utomo was important for ethnic preman circles eager to block Kahfi’s advance because they believed that he was close to a Jakarta gambling king. The prospect of his election posed a serious threat to the local gambling bosses, and thus the reelection of Utomo was deemed imperative. It was this underworld territorial war that encouraged IKMI and other social forces—such as FKPPI and PPM—to campaign for the incumbent Utomo. It was in this context that the Brawijaya Command was also intensively lobbied by them.

Four days before election day, Sikki gathered the local TNI top brass, involving all Korem commanders, Pepabri (Persatuan Purnawirawan Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, the Association of Retired Military Officers), FKPPI, and PPM, and issued a statement that Kahfi was not really a candidate of the PKB, but rather was the candidate of Gus Dur. Those who attended this meeting at the Utami Hotel got the message that Kodam was behind Utomo, and were therefore convinced of Utomo’s impending reelection. On July 17, 2003, Utomo was indeed reelected, gathering seventeen more votes on top of the expected forty-six votes, thanks largely to the support of TNI and the split within the PKB. As in West Java, local military elites assessed the civilian power balance, identified their institutional interests, and acted

52 Brawijaya Command supervises four Korems (regional military commands) in the territory.
53 For an account on the conflict between Gus Dur and TNI, and the former’s attempt to mobilize his militant mob, see Tatik S. Hafidz, Fading Away? The Political Role of the Army in Indonesia’s Transition to Democracy, 1998-2001, IDSS Monograph No. 8 (Singapore: Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, 2006).
54 According to a DPRD member who was a leader of Utomo’s campaign team, Kahfi’s main source of financial support was Tommy Winata. Anonymous interview, June 24, 2003. As discussed above, the threat posed by Winata’s business expansion was also a political factor in West Java. Similar threats and responses emerged in Southeast Sulawesi and Papua.
55 FKPPI (Forum Komunikasi Putra-Putri Purnawirawan TNI) is the Communication Forum for Sons and Daughters of Retired TNI. The names of Iwan and Weifan are often heard in discussions about Surabaya’s powerful gambling kingpins. Surabaya’s political community was well informed about the political positioning of these two Chinese-Indonesians in the gubernatorial election. It was said that they moved to block Kahfi by financially assisting political brokers of IKMI and IKBRA in their efforts to promote Utomo. Their lobbying included approaches to various kiai who could issue a fatwa urging PKB politicians to vote against Kahfi. This political operation needed a large amount of “vitamins”—local electoral jargon for money politics—and many suspected that the underworld was a major supplier of such vitamins.
Local Civil—Military Relations

A week after the reelection of Imam Utomo, there was another gubernatorial election, this time in Central Java. This province was the second largest stronghold of the PDI-P after Bali, and therefore it was expected that whoever won the party's support would win the election. Thus, Mardijo, the head of PDI-P's Central Java Chapter and a long-time party loyalist, decided to mount a challenge to the reelection of incumbent Mardiyanto by nominating himself as the PDI-P candidate. However, Megawati's party headquarters told him to withdraw and instructed PDI-P to join forces with PKB in supporting Mardiyanto. Mardijo felt disgraced and decided to run for election anyway, a decision that led Megawati to dismiss him from the post of provincial chapter head. As a result, PDI-P, the largest party in Central Java, was split between those who supported Mardijo and those who followed Megawati's instruction to abandon him. Again, the contestation among civilian elites effectively opened a space for politicking by the Kodam generals.

The split within the PDI-P was helpful to the Chief-of-Staff of Kodam Diponegoro, Brig. Gen. Salim Mengga. Mengga was torn between PDI-P's candidate and Mardiyanto, as the former represented the dominant concession elite in Central Java while the latter had been his superior when Mengga served as socio-political assistant (Assospol) in 1997–98, when Mardiyanto was Diponegoro Commander. Megawati's decision to oppose Mardijo's ambitions solved Mengga's dilemma, giving him free rein to support Mardiyanto.

The role of NU in this election was also vital for the Kodam. In the past five years, the Central Java NU had enjoyed good relations with Mardiyanto, who understood the strategic significance of the kiai's political role in handling local governance. Many kiai favored Mardiyanto's reelection, which would facilitate further inflows of development budget for their pesantrens. In contrast, they opposed the emergence of Mardijo, who had patronized the most militant segment of PDI-P's paramilitary wing, called Komar (Komunitas Marhaenisme). Komar's aggressive expansion in the underworld of Semarang and Solo had destabilized the balance of power between Komar and Banser, organizations that had previously divided up the turf between them, resulting in growing frustration among Banser leaders. They repeatedly lobbied kiai and NU executives to complain about this situation and convince Mardijo to persuade Komar to stop encroaching on their turf. In a move that reflected these

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56 Megawati allegedly disliked Mardijo's wife, who was a prominent businesswoman in Semarang. Local political elites believed that Mardijo had not made up his own mind to run for election despite the lack of support from party headquarters in Jakarta, but that, in fact, his wife had persuaded him to stay in the race by promising to provide "vitamins" to fund his campaign and to woo PDI-P votes. Interviews with Lt. Gen. (ret) Ismail, former Diponegoro Commander and ex-governor of Central Java, June 30, 2004.

57 A colonel was dispatched from Kodam to Mardiyanto's campaign team to give him access to Kodam's intelligence. Interviews with a member of the Central Java Electoral Monitoring Committee (Pamwaslu), and a member of an anti-corruption NGO in Semarang, both on July 24, 2003.

58 PDI-P could not control Komar because of the rapid expansion of the latter following the 1999 election victories of the latter following the 1999 election victories of the latter following the 1999 election victories of the latter, which opened a door for new Komar members who were previously affiliated with AMPI (Angkatan Muda Pembaharuan Indonesia, Indonesian Renewal Youth Force), a paramilitary organization of Golkar. Interviews with Gatot (Deputy Head of Education Section, PDI-P Central Java Chapter) and Noor Ahmad (Deputy Secretary General of Golkar's Central Java Chapter) both on January
frustrations, NU quickly nominated Mardiyanto as the candidate for the gubernatorial election, and it was Muhammad Adnan, popularly called Gus Adnan, Chairman of the Central Java Branch of NU, who became the main broker involved in consolidating support for Mardiyanto. For Gus Adnan, NU in Central Java was an independent political force that could influence local party politics by supplying a significant number of NU members to all major parties in the province. “In East Java, NU is ambivalent about PKB because it is Gus Dur’s one-man-show, while in West Java, NU has operated under the shadow of Golkar, but here (in Central Java) it is autonomous and orchestrates all political parties,” he insisted while explaining how Mardiyanto had ensured the prosperity of kiai during his first term in office. This proved a key point in NU’s campaign for Mardiyanto’s reelection. In order to cement its relationship with Mardiyanto, NU—via PKB—nominated the non-partisan Ali Mufiz, Deputy Chairman of NU’s Central Java Branch, as his running mate.

Having secured this political arrangement, NU approached Kodam Diponegoro, promising that NU would maximize cooperation with TNI and the police to maintain social order in post-election Central Java. Mengga and his top brass welcomed this approach, as they also were unhappy with Mardijo’s Komar. Komar was thought to be involved with radical anti-TNI leftists identified by Kodam as members of korban 66, who were demanding the return of lands seized by the New Order army, as discussed above. Quelling this movement was an institutional imperative for the Diponegoro Command, which stood to lose a great deal if it was forced to return the land in question. To avoid this scenario, it sought the support of NU for its bahaya ex-tapol (vigilance against ex-political prisoners) campaign; Islamic support would increase that campaign’s credibility. In this context, Kodam joined forces with NU in supporting Mardiyanto’s reelection. The voting in the DPRD was conducted on July 24, 2003. As anticipated, the PKB and TNI voted for Mardiyanto, while PDI-P, although split between the two candidates, also favored Mardiyanto, propelling him to victory with sixty-two votes.

The three gubernatorial elections in Java all demonstrate the TNI’s active political participation. There was no unitary instruction from TNI headquarters in Jakarta to support either incumbents or candidates from the leading party, as was the case during the New Order era. Rather, Kodams were given autonomy to support candidates who would maximize the local military interests both politically and economically. In each case, the TNI relied on its informal networks involving religious, ethnic, and retired military elements in its political maneuverings. Generals showed themselves adroit at manipulating civilian political competition and using their power to ensure institutional interests were not compromised by electoral outcomes. In fact, these elections facilitated the strengthening of ties between provincial leaders and local TNI elites.

14, 2004. Central Java’s alleged gambling kings, namely Bambang Raya and Aseng, were also said to be unhappy with Komar’s encroachment on their togel territory, and were thus also pro-Mardiyanto.


60 Mardijo obtained only thirteen votes, while another candidate, retired Maj. Gen. Kirbiantoro, who was nominated by the United Development Party (PPP), received twenty-two votes. Kirbiantoro was ex-Commander of Kodam Jaya (Jakarta), and rumors suggested he was sponsored by Tommy Winata in Jakarta. Communications with journalists in Semarang, July 2003. As always, it is difficult to prove such a story.
Conclusion

We have discussed the development of local politics in Java and its impact on the political role of the military during the period between 1999 and 2004, i.e., the first phase of democratic transition in Indonesia. During this phase, the post-Suharto reformasi movement pushed several significant democratic projects, including the 1999 elections, decentralization, civic participation in politics, and elections (not appointment) of governors. What was the political impact of these projects in Java and how did the TNI respond to the changing rules of the game and the shifting political landscape? These are the core questions addressed in this essay, which attempts to clarify the changing pattern of local civil–military relations.

First, the democratizing impact of the 1999 elections on elite politics was immense, bringing about an end to the three decades of Golkar dominance. About 80 percent of all DPRD II in the three provinces experienced the rise of new power elites affiliated with PDI-P, and this led to the reshaping of local concession regimes involving mainly politicians, bureaucrats, businessmen, and the military. In the face of this power shift, local military commands were given greater autonomy by the central command in forging and adjusting local alliances with civilian elites for the sake of securing institutional interests.

A series of decentralization projects also produced a wave of political change in the three provinces that modified the pattern of concession hunting among civilian elites. Access to increased resources and greater budgetary discretion, coupled with the new rule of LPj, led to more widespread corruption. Local legislators used their power in the form of LPjs to siphon off maximum benefits from development projects. Given that this institutionalized graft involved many parasite politicians, the corrupt modus operandi, driven by collusion, became pervasive and more sophisticated. The monitoring capacity of local anti-corruption NGOs did not keep pace and has been effectively stymied. In order to share in the spoils of government, the territorial military commands skillfully mobilized their bargaining power vis-à-vis local leaders. The new arrangement of Muspida was an invention of local leaders to pay for the political loyalty of TNI.

In response to the growing role of civil society organizations in empowering various groups in local communities, the political elite has increasingly developed and relied on preman brokers to mobilize mass support for their political goals. This mode of “civic” participation by groups employing coercion and extortion is organized to help power elites tap into various concession projects. Group identities, defined by such markers as ethnicity, religion, kingdom, and kinship, are nurtured to undermine the power of civil society organizations. The patrimonial networks of preman are used to counter the development of class-based horizontal social solidarity vis-à-vis the political elite. With some exceptions, this “civilization” of violence reduced TNI’s direct role in containing civil society, helping the military to burnish its image and focus its institutional resources on securing its own agendas. Thus, the outsourcing of violence to preman bolstered TNI’s credibility at the price of extensive gangster involvement in democratic processes and institutions.
These developments were evident in the 2003 gubernatorial elections held in the three provinces in Java. It was expected that the election of governors would increase political accountability and improve local governance compared to the New Order practice of appointing regime loyalists. We have shown how these elections considerably bolstered the political bargaining power of local military elites who skillfully exploited civilian contestations for power and money, tactically collaborated with dominant social forces, and shrewdly developed ties with electoral victors.

It can be argued that the legacy of New Order politics is still very influential in the local political arenas in West, Central, and East Java during the first phase of democratic transition. How will this initial phase of political reformasi shape the direction of the second phase? Structural reform may take some time to happen, but it seems that there are some new seeds of change. Since 2005, local leaders are popularly elected. As a result of this reform, there will be no LPjs in parliaments. Also, following the 2004 general elections, TNI's parliamentary seats have been abolished. Will popular elections for local heads help promote a more robust civil society? Will these representatives take initiatives to break the chain of elite concession circles? How does the abolition of military involvement in parliaments promise to change local civil–military relations? It is still too early to answer these questions, but the changes in regional political structures at least offer prospects for eliminating the phantom of the New Order, which has shadowed democratic consolidation in West, Central, and East Java.

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61 Some positive tendencies (for example, in Jambi, West Sumatra, North Sulawesi, South Kalimantan, and Central Kalimantan) are discussed in Marcus Mietzner, “The 2005 Local Elections: Empowerment of the Electorate or Entrenchment of the New Order Oligarchy?,” unpublished manuscript.