
Peter Carey

Introduction

The history of the Indonesian occupation of the former Portuguese colony (1975–99) has yet to be written. While its legacy continues to be played out in present-day political struggles between the older and younger generations, particularly over the question of which language to adopt, we possess little understanding of the ways in which the East Timorese interacted with the Indonesians during those terrible years. Despite the wealth of secondhand accounts of the occupation period, a vital ingredient

1 I wish to record my thanks here to the Leverhuime Foundation (London), the Southeast Committee of the British Academy (London), and the Oppenheimer Fund of Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford, for their generous support for the research on which this study is based. I would also like to thank Cristina Cruz and Carlos Guerreiro of the former Comissão para os Direitos do Povo Maubere (Commission for the Rights of the Maubere [Timorese] People) for their help in setting up all the interviews with the East Timorese exile community in Lisbon in 1999–2000.

2 See note 43 below.
has been missing—the voices of the East Timorese people themselves. Apart from the testimonies collected by the late Michele Turner, the remarkable autobiographical memoir of the clandestine resistance leader, Constâncio Pinto, and the brief account of the young student activist (and present-day chief-of-staff of the East Timor Defense Force), Donaciano Gomes, the personal witnesses of this younger or “new” generation (geração foun) who had their schooling and grew to maturity during the Indonesian occupation period (1975–99) have not been heard. This is all the more remarkable when we consider that many of these young men and women subsequently became involved in the clandestine and armed resistance movement (i.e., the Forças Armadas de Libertacão Nacional de Timor-Leste, Falintil) and are now destined, like Donaciano, to make their mark as future leaders of the newly independent Republic. Others, who were never active participants in the resistance movements, nonetheless experienced the pain and tragedy of these years and have their own stories to tell of the often ambivalent relationship with the Indonesians.

In 1999, just as their homeland was passing through the final agony of the TNI-inspired (TNI, Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National Army) militia killings, the August 30 independence referendum, and the final Indonesian withdrawal, I had the opportunity to interview some twenty-three East Timorese exiles in Portugal and the UK with a colleague, Dr. Viet Nguyen-Gillham, who had worked with female victims of violence in the former Yugoslavia. For the purposes of the present study, only fourteen of these twenty-three are quoted, and three of these, the late liurai

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6 This term is now used to denote the Indonesian-educated younger generation who were not part of the 1975 leadership generation and did not share their factionalism and party conflicts rooted in the August 1975 civil war. Their different intellectual formation under the Indonesian regime and their use of Bahasa rather than Portuguese are also distinguishing features; see further Fernando de Araújo, “The CNRT Campaign for Independence,” in *Out of the Ashes: Deconstruction and Reconstruction of East Timor*, ed. James J. Fox and Dionísio Babo Soares (Adelaide: Crawford House, 2000), p. 108, n. 1.

7 The late Michele Turner interviewed some of these members of the younger generation for her moving collection, *Telling*, and I used some of these for the historical introduction in Steve Cox and Peter Carey, *Generations of Resistance: East Timor* (London: Cassell, 1995). But Turner restricted herself to the East Timorese exile community in Australia, many of whom had been out of East Timor for several years, and she had no access to the cohort of young East Timorese activists (including the three Falintil members we interviewed) who eventually made their way to Portugal—often by jumping over the fences of foreign embassies in Jakarta, or through the good offices of the International Committee of the Red Cross—in the mid 1990s.

8 Dr. Viet Nguyen-Gillham had had particular experience of working with Croat and Bosnian Muslim women in Bihac, Mostar, and other so-called UN-protected “safe havens” in the former Yugoslavia in 1994–97 at the end of the civil war (1991–95), and in the post-Dayton Accord era. I would hereby like to record my gratitude to her, particularly for the help she gave me with the interviews conducted with East Timorese women.
(customary chief) of Atsabe, Guilherme Gonçalves, the young daughter of a former colonial civil servant, Ana Maria Vitor, the even younger and distinctly apolitical Délfinha Maria de Jesus de Rego Soriano, and the former member of the Popular Organization of Timorese Women (Organização Popular de Mulher de Timor, OPMT), Bernardina Fernandes Alves (nom-de-guerre “Ohar”) are cited only in one or two passages. Others, such as the two Dili-based members of the student underground, Martinho Maia Gonçalves and Domingos Matos, together with the Lospalos-born Ejídio Dias Quintas, are given much more space. Why? Principally because these young men (and unfortunately the men very much outnumbered the women in the “new” generation exile community in Portugal) were distinguished by their links with the resistance movement. Indeed, if there is a central theme to the present survey, it is that of the political awakening of these young men under the pressures of the occupation.


This is the story then of a generation’s coming of age, a generation schooled by the Indonesians, but one that—while members were still in their teens—began to reassess their future and move towards a rejection of what Jakarta had to offer. In so doing, they developed their own methods for opposing Jakarta’s colonialism, thereby destroying Indonesian hopes that they might accept their enforced membership of the unitary Republic and abandon once and for all their parents’ dream of an independent
East Timor. In concentrating on these pro-independence youngsters, there is an inevitable foreshortening of the frame of what was happening in East Timor during these years. A fuller picture might include less “heroic” members of the occupation generation: Timorese orphans brought up by Indonesian officers, many of whom are now more familiar with inner-island Indonesia than distant Timor; Timorese women who married (more or less voluntarily) Indonesian men and brought up families in Timor and Indonesia and consider themselves both Indonesian and Timorese; activists on the political left who were driven more by communist political ideology than Timorese nationalism; convinced Catholics (including ordained priests and religious) for whom all forms of violence were abhorrent and who tried to tread a middle way between the resistance and the Indonesian occupiers; and collaborators who were convinced that the future lay in union with Indonesia rather than the establishment of a politically and economically problematic micro-state. A more rounded study of the occupation must eventually bring these very different participants in the Indonesian era into the frame, for they were just as representative of these occupation years as the pro-resistance activists who dominate the present account. The work of East Timor’s Truth, Reception, and Reconciliation Commission may help here in allowing these very different voices to be heard and making available a rich collection of primary interview material for future historians.9

Those East Timorese living in exile in Lisbon and other European cities in the late 1990s were a privileged group: most had had access to higher education. Indeed, nearly all had graduated from senior high school during the Indonesian-occupation period, and many had either benefited from tertiary education in universities and technical colleges in inner-island Indonesia or had enrolled in courses in their places of exile. This immediately set them apart from over 99 percent of their fellow countrymen and women who had enjoyed no such opportunities. Apart from the late liurai of Atsabe and the second Indonesian-appointed Governor of East Timor, Guilherme Gonçalves (1919–99, in office 1978–82), whose presence in Lisbon was fortuitous,10 all those we interviewed had arrived in Portugal between 1990 and 1998. Most had come through

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9 The Commission was established by the East Timor Transitional Administration (ETTA) cabinet in December 2000 and endorsed by the National Council of East Timor on April 25, 2001. It has two principal functions: (1) seeking truth about the pattern and scope of human rights violations in the past (i.e., for the whole occupation era [1975–99] and the August 1975 civil war and its aftermath when many UDT (União Democrática Timorense, Timorese Democratic Union) and Fretilin supporters died at each other’s hands, including some four hundred UDT prisoners who were murdered by Fretilin after the Indonesian invasion in December 1975); and (2) facilitating community acceptance of those who committed lesser crimes. Serious crimes are currently being left for prosecution by the Serious Crimes Investigation Unit established by the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) in 2000–2002; see William Schabas, “Prosecuting Atrocities: Contributing to Democratic Transitions,” in Nationbuilding in East Timor, ed. Graça Almeida Rodrigues and Heather Wharton (Clementsport, Nova Scotia: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 2002), p. 128. The present Commission team contains many leading Indonesia and East Timor specialists (Gerry and Helene van Klinken, Patrick Burgess, Galuh Wandita, Akihisa Matsuno, Kieran Dwyer, Susana Barnes, Douglas Kammen, and Geoffrey Gunn) working under the direction of Pat Walsh, erstwhile Director of the Human Rights Office of the Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA) and Coordinator of the East Timor Talks Campaign, and is likely to lead to a significant corpus of interview material that may soon be available to scholars to reconstruct the history of East Timor during these terrible years.

10 Guilherme Gonçalves had come to Europe to participate in the fourth All-Inclusive East Timorese Dialogue at Schloss Krumbach in Austria in November 1998 and been forced to seek medical help in Lisbon after being taken gravely ill; he later died there in October 1999.
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the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the majority after entering foreign embassies in Jakarta. Only two (both women) had made their way to Portugal by private means. One of these, Delphina Maria de Jesus de Rego Soriano (born Dili, 1976), was helped out by an uncle who had reached Lisbon under ICRC auspices and arranged for her passport and travel documents to be bought for her in East Timor. Apart from Gonçalves (b. 1919), all were born between 1950 and 1978, with by far the greatest number (16 out of 23) having birthdays in the decade 1968–78. This meant that the 1968–78 cohort were at most seven years old, or in Class 2 of primary school, when the December 7, 1975 Indonesian invasion took place. The majority of their schooling was thus destined to take place under the occupation.

A sizeable number (6 out of 23) were Fataluku from the extreme eastern or Ponta Leste (Eastern Point) region of the territory. Constituting some 3 percent of Timor’s 800,000 ethnic Timorese inhabitants, this notoriously independent-minded ethnic group had provided the backbone of the armed resistance to the Indonesians after the fall of the Mt. Matebian redoubt in November–December 1978. Another important cohort (9 out of 23) had been born and brought up in East Timor’s capital Dili with parents who hailed from the country’s more westerly ethnic communities (i.e., Mambai, Galolé, Belu, Bunaq, and Kemak). Only two were of Chinese-Timorese descent. None hailed from the capital’s tiny Arab community at Kampong Alor (home of the present prime minister, Mário Alkatiri) and only a few (Gonçalves was a notable exception here) had any significant pre-1975 contact or blood relationship with the Portuguese. Leaving aside instruction at the hands of Catholic priests and lay brothers, whose quality was universally praised, the handful who had contact with their Portuguese colonial masters were generally less than impressed with their racial attitudes, one even going so far as to describe them as “arrogant” and “unwilling to mix with the local Timorese population.” (Interview with António Campos, former Falintil commander, Lisbon, April 15, 2000)

In the following paper, I will explore several aspects of the East Timorese-Indonesian relationship in the period immediately before and during the twenty-four-year occupation. These include East Timorese perceptions (or more accurately misperceptions) of their vast neighbor during the late Portuguese colonial era and the variety of East Timorese-Indonesian contacts during the occupation itself. I have divided the discussion of the latter into four sections: (i) contacts with the Indonesian military, and the distinctions that the East Timorese themselves made between the various Indonesian army elite units and territorial battalions; (ii) the nature of the relationships that developed on the school benches of the newly established Indonesian primary schools (Sekolah Dasar, SD), junior high schools (Sekolah Menengah Pertama, SMP), and senior high schools (Sekolah Menengah Atas, SMA); (iii) the key incidents or “turning points” which caused many of the young East Timorese I interviewed to “wake up” to the realities of the regime under which they were being forced to live; and (iv) the ways in which the East Timorese learned to live alongside the Indonesians while intensifying their clandestine resistance. The latter was a form of “sleeping with the enemy” by no means unique to East Timor (for example, in Nazi-occupied France, 1940–44, it was both literally and figuratively true), but which the East Timorese seemed to have developed into a fine art. I draw these together in a brief conclusion before adding a postscript, which considers the current inter-generational conflict between the Portuguese-educated (pre–1975) and the Indonesian-educated cohorts,
looking especially at the issue of the adoption of Portuguese as the official language of East Timor. This study represents research in progress, and the interviews conducted so far are merely the first part of a much larger project on East Timorese oral histories of the occupation that I intend to write during the coming year (2003-4) on the basis of more extensive research amongst non-elite Timorese in Timor itself.

In terms of periodization, it may be useful for those unfamiliar with the recent history of East Timor to see the Indonesian occupation in three phases: (1) the initial years of conquest between 1975-79, when most of the conservatively estimated 150,000 deaths (out of a total pre-1975 population of 700,000) occurred;11 (2) the middle period of the partial “consolidation” of the occupation regime during the next decade (1979-89) that lasted until the “opening” of East Timor by the Suharto regime in January 1989; and (3) the final decade (1989-99), which witnessed the rapid unraveling of Jakarta’s authority as the situation in East Timor became internationalized through events such as the November 12, 1991 Santa Cruz massacre and the October 11, 1996 Nobel Peace Prize award to Bishop Belo and José Ramos Horta. At the end of this decade, the collapse of the Suharto regime (May 21, 1998) and President B. J. Habibie’s (in office, 1998-99) impetuous January 27, 1999 promise to give East Timor either autonomy or independence hugely accelerated events in East Timor, leading directly to the deployment of a UN Assistance Mission (UNAMET) to prepare for the August 30, 1999 independence vote.

1. Through a Glass Darkly: East Timorese Perceptions of Indonesia in the Immediate Pre- and Post-Invasion Period

It was said that if one wished to post a letter to Jakarta from Dili in the late Portuguese colonial era, the missive had to go all the way to Lisbon first before it could be delivered to the Indonesian capital. Almost certainly apocryphal, this tale points to an important truth—namely, the almost complete isolation in which East Timor was kept by the Portuguese right up to the end of their occupation. The political situation in Portugal itself contributed directly to this state of affairs: the fall of the monarchy and proclamation of the Republic in October 1910 opened a turbulent period in Portuguese

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11 A debate has developed between scholars regarding the number of deaths during the occupation, especially during the first five years (1975-80), when the bulk of the deaths occurred. An early evaluation of the available population statistics by Gabriel Defert (pseudonym for a French Foreign Ministry official and specialist on Indonesia who defended his doctoral thesis on East Timor at the University of Paris in 1988-89), deriving from the Catholic Church and the Portuguese colonial and Indonesian governments, suggested a conservative death toll of between 170,000 and 212,000, based on the pre-1975 population of 700,000 and the partial Indonesian government census of 567,000 in 1981. The difference in estimates arose from different calculations of the annual population increase in the period 1975-81, from a low of 1.1 percent to a high of 2.2 percent; see Gabriel Defert, Timor Est. Le Génocide Oublié: Droit d'un people et raisons d'États (Paris: Éditions L'Harmattan, 1992), pp. 147-51. A much lower figure of fifty thousand deaths in the 1975-80 period has been advanced by Robert Cribb in his “How Many Deaths? Problems in the statistics of massacre in Indonesia (1965-66) and East Timor (1975-1980),” in Violence in Indonesia, ed. Ingrid Wessel and Georgia Wimhoefer (Hamburg: Abera Verlag, 2001), pp. 82-96. This figure has recently been rejected by Ben Kiernan, who has concluded that a toll of “150,000 is likely close to the truth. If we include victims of post-1980 massacres and of the 1981-82 famine, the figure is substantially higher.” See Ben Kiernan, “The Demography of Genocide in Southeast Asia: The Death Tolls in Cambodia, 1975-79, and East Timor, 1975-1980,” Critical Asian Studies 35,4 (December 2003).
politics brought to an end only by the establishment of Dr. António de Oliveira Salazar’s clerico-fascist “Estado Novo” (New State) (1930–68). Deeply suspicious of the Protestant powers, especially the Dutch in the neighboring Netherlands East Indies, who were thought to harbor pro-German sentiments during World War I, and fearful that the pitiful Portuguese military would be no match for potential predators like the Japanese, successive Portuguese governments strove to keep their distant Southeast Asian colony isolated and inconspicuous to prevent it from falling under the control of foreign powers. This was particularly the case under the Salazarist dictatorship, when Timor gained notoriety as a tropical “Siberia,” a place of exile for political opponents who were banished as deportados (those deported) to the furthest reaches of the ultramar (overseas empire). Even these precautions failed to prevent Allied incursions at the outbreak of the Pacific War and a full-scale Japanese invasion in February 1942. When in December 1961 Salazar lost Goa to Nehru’s India, the aging dictator became increasingly paranoiac. He made strenuous efforts to hang on to Portugal’s African possessions, dedicating 40 percent of the Portuguese national budget to the military costs of colonial defense. But by the time ill-health forced him from office in June 1968, three costly colonial wars in Africa had all but consumed his empire. In fact, the colonial dégringolade (collapse) changed the face of modern Portugal, preparing the ground for the Armed Forces Movement (Movimento das Forças Armadas) coup-de-maill of April 25, 1974—the virtually bloodless “Carnation Revolution”—which set Western Europe’s most underdeveloped state on the road to democracy and eventual membership in the European Community (post-1993, European Union) in 1985.

It is thus no surprise that isolation and backwardness were the features most remarked on by Western travelers to Portuguese Timor. For observers from the British naturalist Alfred Russel Wallace in the early 1860s, through Joseph Conrad, who described Dili in his classic novel, Victory: An Island Tale, in 1915, to the Australian consul Jim Dunn exactly half a century later, the epithets “miserable,” “poor,” “pestilential” and “quaint and incongruous” were what sprung to mind when

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12 Leading sons of deportados who assumed leadership roles after 1974–5 were Mário and Manuel Carrascalão, and José Ramos Horta, whose fathers had been exiled for anti-Salazarist activities in the 1930s. In Horta’s case, his father, a full-blood Portuguese and son of an anarcho-syndicalist, who had himself ended up as an exile in East Timor (1927–42), had participated as a naval gunner in a mutiny involving two frigates of the Salazarist marine that had attempted to put to sea from Lisbon and sail to Spain to join the Republican side at the start of the Spanish civil war (1936–39). The mutineers were intercepted by pro-Salazarist vessels at the mouth of the Tagus river, the crews arrested, and most later banished to Portugal’s African colonies and East Timor. See further José Ramos-Horta, Funu: The Unfinished Saga of East Timor (Trenton, NJ: North Sea Press, 1987), pp. 7–8; and Luís Cardoso, The Crossing: A Story of East Timor (London: Granta Publications, 2000), pp. 98–99.

13 Between 1974 and 1976, Portugal had two presidents, six provisional governments, and two coup attempts. Even after the transition to democracy with the elections of Mário Soares and his Socialist Party (Partido Socialista, PS), and that of Ramalho Eanes (1976–86) to the presidency in 1976, the process of political consolidation proved turbulent. Between 1976 and 1982, Portugal had eight constitutional governments (more than one a year). The economic and domestic situation began to stabilize only between 1982 and 1986 during the long incumbency of Soares’s PS-PSD (Partido Social Democrata, Social Democrat Party) coalition (1983–85), which oversaw the entrance of Portugal into the European Community (EC).

14 Portugal became a member of the European Community on January 1, 1986 at the same time as Spain and Greece.
contemplating this most remote outpost of the Lusitanian empire. How different this was from the situation in the pre-Iberian and pre-formal colonial periods from the sixteenth to the mid-nineteenth centuries, when, in addition to the perennial Chinese and Hadhrami Arabs, Javanese, Bugis, Makasarese, and Butonese merchants had frequented the island, which was famed for its supplies of sandalwood, for commercial purposes. In this period, the seat of the first Portuguese governor in Lifau (later the Portuguese enclave of Oecussi-Ambeno in the Netherlands-East Indies Residency of Timor) had been popularly known as the “Makasar Shore” (Panté Makasar), so ubiquitous were the local Bugis and Makasarese trading there; and no colonially inspired frontiers separated Portuguese Timor (Timor Leste) from the rest of what is now the eastern Indonesian province of Nusa Tenggara Timur (NTT), which includes West Timor, Flores, Pantar, Alor, and other neighboring islands.

It seems clear that the Portuguese colonial administration in the post-war era permitted very little information about developments in their vast neighbor to penetrate the closed world of late-Lusitanian East Timor. Thus the dramatic events of the late 1940s, when the young Indonesian Republic fought and won its independence from the Dutch (1945-49), had limited impact in the colony. While many interviewees born in the Portuguese period knew about the first Indonesian President, Sukarno (in office, 1945-67) and his championing of Third World issues, the turbulent years of his “Guided Democracy” (1959-65) regime were only fitfully understood. Even the PRRI-Permesta (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia, Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia; Perjuangan Semesta Alam, Inclusive Struggle) revolts in the outer islands (West Sumatra, North Sulawesi) in 1957-61, which had direct repercussions in East Timor when some Permesta members sought refuge in the colony and played a role in inciting an anti-Portuguese revolt in the district of Uatolari in June 1959 (a revolt which then spread to Viqueque and Ossú), were known only to those who lived in the immediate environs. As for the mid-1960s and the bloody repression

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17 The Makassae second-line Portuguese colonial army (tropas) soldier, Moises do Amaral (b. 1950), who grew up in Uatolári in the 1950s, was one of the those who experienced the bloody aftermath of this abortive revolt at first hand. He explained:

After the outbreak of the Outer Island rebellions in Indonesia [1957-61], a group of remnants of the Permesta rebellion in North Sulawesi, whom I thought then were members of the Indonesian Communist Party [Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI], came to Viqueque as political exiles. They then mounted a revolt against the Portuguese colonial regime by asking local people to join them to get their independence. My own sub-district [posto] of Uatolári and my small hamlet near Uatolári township were involved. The Portuguese brought in large numbers of Angolanese and Portuguese troops to crush the revolt, and during this campaign, they burned my father’s carpentry store and his house. They killed the goats and pigs, forcing my family to
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which brought General Suharto and his New Order (1966–98) to power following the army’s crushing of the so-called GESTAPU (Gerakan September Tiga-Puluh, September 30 Movement) and the destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), these fateful events had only a distant resonance in East Timor. Indeed, the Portuguese colonial officials appear to have ensured that this was the case by exercising tight control over news coming into the colony and access across the border to Indonesia.

While most of those interviewed who had been born in the Portuguese era knew the names of the Indonesian presidents and admitted to a passing knowledge of the existence of Suharto’s New Order, few had been across the border into West Timor, and, even if they had, their impressions of the Indonesia of the late 1960s and early 1970s were scarcely favorable. “Very poor, very disorganized, and really quite brutal” was the judgment of one East Timorese member of the second-line section of the Portuguese colonial army (tropas), who knew from his fellow army colleagues on the frontier about the Indonesians who came in from Atambua and other places in West Timor looking for food and economic opportunities in the richer eastern part of the island. In the words of this Portuguese army private:

Most were dressed very poorly [and] some were hostile to the situation in Indonesia which seemed to be very bad at that time. When [the frontline troops] gathered up these border crossers who had entered [East Timor] illegally and tried to send them back using the PIDE [Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado, International Police for the Defense of the State, i.e., the Salazarist secret police], they were not received by Governor El Tari in Kupang. He said he did not want these orang [delinquent people] being sent back. The Atambua-border crossers also said that if they were sent back to Atambua and the [local Indonesian] government knew that they had tried to get into East Timor, they would all be killed. [They said], in Atambua if you have a buffalo, the second buffalo has to be given to the government. If you have a kebon [market garden, orchard], half the crop has to go to the government. So there was a perception of Indonesia as being (1) very poor; (2) very disorganized; (3) really quite brutal. (Interview with Moises do Amaral, Lisbon, April 11, 1999)

Although some had access to radios—there were no newspapers in East Timor until the launch of A Voz de Timor (The Voice of Timor) in the early 1970s — the broadcasts were essentially about events in Portuguese-run East Timor and developments in the distant Portugal of Salazar’s Estado Novo (New State). “We would not know about what was going on in West Timor, let alone [inner island] Indonesia,” stated the same private in Portugal’s colonial army. Others indicated that although they did listen to the radio and knew about major events such as the Vietnam War (1961–73), they never discussed politics, even in their own families. One woman born in the late 1950s, who later went on to become a member of the OPMT and a female combatant on the north-central front in the late 1970s, stated: “We knew, or at least my parents knew, that if

flee up to Mt. Matebian for refuge. I was nearly ten years old at the time. Several members of the local elite [liurai] and local village heads [chefé de suco] joined in, and there was a major crackdown by the Portuguese. Many people were sent to Angola, to Atauro and to Dili as prisoners. [Many] others were killed [some estimates put the death toll as high as one thousand; see Gunn, Timor Loro Sae, p. 260.]— seven were killed in my hamlet near Ua Tolari alone in the aftermath of this crackdown.

Interview with Moises do Amaral, Lisbon, April 11, 1999.
we discussed politics that could be dangerous. [My parents] were afraid that if they spoke of such things, the children would talk about them outside and they themselves would come under the surveillance of the PIDE. So although we knew about such things we did not discuss them.” (Interview with Bernardina Fernandes Alves, *nom-de-guerre* “Ohar,” Lisbon, April 12, 1999).

The Portuguese even seem to have encouraged a view of Indonesia as “backward” and “uncivilized” in order to highlight the supposed benefits of living under the protection of Lisbon in a colony that they pretended was something of an island of peace in a violent and politically tumultuous region. Echoing the words of Bernardina Fernandes Alves, the OPMT member, the young Domingos Sarmento Alves (born Ossú, 1964), who later became one of the leaders of the clandestine movement and local leader of Renetil (Resistência Nacional dos Estudantes de Timor Leste, East Timorese National Students’ Resistance), and who now is special advisor on international relations to President Xanana Gusmão, stated that his teachers at the Salesian School at Venilale “had very negative views [about Indonesia] . . . they said it was a very backward country. It was a place which was dirty, where people ate with their hands and didn’t use knives and forks.” (Interview with Domingos Sarmento Alves, Lisbon, November 13, 1999). The same views were reflected by the octogenarian customary chief of Atsabe, Guilherme Gonçalves, a member of the privileged generation of Portuguese-educated *assimilados* (assimilated natives18), when he described Indonesia as “a country which is very behind, very backward . . . . They made a lot of promises [to me and the East Timorese] but never lived up to any of them.” (Interview with Guilherme Gonçalves, Liurai of Atsabe, Lisbon, April 14, 1999)

Few interviewees, however, gave so vivid an indication of the sheer scale of the ignorance regarding Indonesia as the young Domingos Matos (born Dili, 1972), who was in his first year of Portuguese primary school when the Indonesians invaded in 1975. As Matos told us:

> I didn’t know what country these people had come from actually. We had no maps at home, no atlases or globes. I really didn’t know where Indonesia was. I thought that perhaps the Indonesians were from China because we were constantly calling them *tuan,19* which I think is a version of *tuan besar* [Big Sir], the usual address we used for the Chinese, and I thought they were from China, even from Beijing. My father too saw them as Chinese. It was only when I was about eight years old [in 1979] when I was going to the [Indonesian] primary school that I realized they were from Indonesia.

> When I was eight, in the primary school, we learnt Indonesian and Indonesian history. Indeed, in the period 1975-80, my father and mother had constantly said the *tuan* were only here to bring the situation in East Timor under control. “They are here to bring peace to our country,” they said reassuringly. But then they didn’t leave. They stayed and stayed, and the situation caused them to question

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18 Donald Weatherbee, “Portuguese Timor: An Indonesian Dilemma,” *Asian Survey* 16,12 (1966): 684. The *assimilados*, who constituted a miniscule 0.25 percent of the 700,000-strong pre-1975 East Timorese population, enjoyed special privileges under the Portuguese, including freedom from corporal punishment, labor services, and payment of the head tax.

19 *tuan*: title of respect for adult Dutch males, colonial period; male head of household, “master”; or term of address, equivalent to “sir.”
why? My parents remembered the Fretilin flag under which we had declared our
independence on November 28, 1975, which was replaced [after December 7,
1975] by the merah-putih, the red-and-white flag of the Republic of Indonesia.
Then this merah-putih continued to float over Dili, and it was never taken down.
The situation was confusing for me too. If the Indonesians had come here just to
bring the situation under control, why didn't they leave? My parents seemed to
be quite afraid: they talked in hushed tones and said the country was now being
colonized by Jakarta and that was why the Indonesians were not going home.
(Interview with Domingos Matos, Lisbon, November 7, 1999)

It is evident that the depth of the confusion and misunderstanding about Indonesia
in the years leading up to the 1975 invasion made it much more difficult for the East
Timorese leaders of the recently established pro-independence and pro-autonomy
parties to develop a coherent analysis of the New Order regime and the motivations
of the Indonesian generals. Even if they had, there was little chance that the subsequent
invasion would have been avoided, but perhaps a more nuanced and informed view of
Indonesia amongst the local population might have enabled the East Timorese to come
up rather sooner with more skillful ways of handling the invaders, thus mitigating some
of the mindless savagery of the early conquest years.

2. Varieties of East Timorese Responses to the Indonesians during the Years of
Military Occupation and Clandestine Struggle (1979–99)

(i) Relations with the Military

In the early years following the Indonesian invasion, East Timor was a divided
territory: the main population centers and lowland areas came under Indonesian
military control, but Falintil units continued to hold substantial territory in the
mountains where Fretilin (Frente Revolucionária de Timor Leste Independente,
Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor) organized life in the so-called
"liberated zones." It was only at the end of this initial period of occupation (1975–79)
that the Indonesians, with the help of counter-insurgency aircraft (OV-10F Broncos)
supplied courtesy of Jimmy Carter's "human rights" administration (1976–80), broke
through into the mountains and destroyed the remaining Falintil strongholds. This was
the period which witnessed the most dramatic loss of life amongst the civilian
population, partly through intensive aerial bombardment, partly through hunger due to
the displacement of large numbers from their lands, and partly through the intentional
targeting of Fretilin leaders and their families by the Indonesians. Domingos Sarmento
Alves, whose family had been forced down from the mountains above Ossú to
Viqueque, described this period vividly to us:

"It was a very very tense situation in 1979–81. There were constant killings.
The Indonesians showed a smiling face to try and speed up the surrender
process, but once the formal resistance on Mt. Matebian was at an end and the
scattered Falintil remnants began to gather under Xanana's leadership [at Mt.
Paichau] in the Ponta Leste region, the killings began in earnest. The Indonesians
killed off the surrendered Fretilin soldiers one by one. Sometimes I remember
members of Fretilin playing football with each other, and the next morning they
just simply were not there any more. They just disappeared by night. Every night there were killings.

"One could say that the Indonesians had now begun to openly flaunt the fact that they could torture people with impunity. So they went about their [gruesome] work realizing that they had the upper hand and did not need to present a smiling face any more. Realizing that the formal Fretilin resistance was now formally defeated and with no journalists or outsiders filing reports, they began to flaunt their cruelty openly. I remember a public castration and killing of a first cousin of the second Fretilin President, Nicolau Lobato [in office, 1977–78], who had himself been killed on December 31, 1978. This first cousin was brought out before the entire community of Viqueque, who were forced to witness the mutilation, and [he] was castrated in public and then killed. Some of the locals had to take him and bury him—or at least what was left of him—in a grave which they had dug close to the river.

"Then there was another situation in 1979 when Uatolári was attacked. There were two people [Falintil fighters?] who were publicly beheaded, and the Indonesian military brought the heads back to the Viqueque district military headquarters [Kodim], where they took photographs of soldiers standing on their [the severed] heads, the heads on the ground, or putting them up on tables. In the end they placed the heads on pikes and displayed them [outside the Kodim 1630 HQ in the center of town]. Every day was like that: there was always a killing [and] something was always going on at night.

"I would also like to talk about another incident that affected me very deeply at the time in 1979–81. One of my school friends was a young girl of eleven and her father was Timorese. He was a local mechanic, and he mended vehicle engines. [One day] an Indonesian sergeant came out of the military base in Viqueque and asked the father of this young girl if he would be able to repair his truck. The East Timorese mechanic obviously didn’t understand much Indonesian so he refused. His daughter, the young eleven-year-old, was then shot dead right in front of him. She was shot in the eye, and the bullet came out at the back of her head, and she fell to the ground. This all happened just a hundred meters from my own house right in the middle of Viqueque at seven o’clock in the morning just as we were setting out for school. It was a real hellhole in Viqueque at that time.”

"Were there no priests who might have been able to alleviate the situation?"

"Yes, there was Father Domingos, who later became known as Padre Maubere, ‘the priest of the Maubere [highland Timorese] people.’ He was sent to serve the combined parish of Ossú and Viqueque, but because of the power which the Indonesian military wielded at that time he could really do very little. It was a situation of absolutely no hope. We had no links with the outside world, and there were no journalists coming in and out to report. It was a situation where complete impunity prevailed. Indeed, it was such a dangerous place that usually mothers didn’t allow their children to go out on the roads at night for fear of what might happen. You might have a soldier cleaning his gun and then fire testing the weapon, but if he was in a frustrated mood he might randomly test it against a human being who just happened to be walking by. People were just not safe on the streets. It was a completely willful situation. People were attacked with impunity and for no apparent reason. It was completely random."
"C Company of [the locally raised] Timorese battalion 745 [based in Baucau, many of whose recruits hailed from neighboring West Timor and other eastern Indonesian areas20] gained a terrifying reputation for violence and cruelty. They killed every night. We used to say that really a chicken was of more value than a human being because at least chickens were counted up—and the owner might say, well, I will have that one today and that one tomorrow, and I will save those others for next week or a month’s time. But with human beings they just picked them off as and when they pleased. Every night there were disappearances. Even in my school there were girls who were raped or forced into sexual relations with Indonesian soldiers, and we did not dare say anything. If you said anything there would be serious repercussions.” (Interview with Domingos Sarmento Alves, Lisbon, November 13, 1999)

In January 1981, just seven months before he moved to Dili to pursue his studies and board with an uncle in the marginal safety of the colonial capital, Domingos (then aged sixteen) and one of his classmates experienced what it was like to fall foul of this selfsame C Company unit. A Timorese auxiliary (Tentara Bantu Operasi, TBO)

20 For a good discussion of the Indonesian attempt to “Timorize” their military operations by setting up locally recruited battalions 744 (based in Dili) and 745 (based in Baucau), see Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, The War Against East Timor (London: Zed Books, 1984), p. 40, who note that Indonesian efforts to recruit Timorese started early in the war in 1976 (i.e., a year after the December 1975 invasion). Besides the two “Timorese” battalions, which were in fact only half East Timorese when formed (the rest being recruited from West Timor, Java, and other parts of Indonesia, especially NTT), a civil defense corps (Hansip/Pertahanan Sipil) composed entirely of East Timorese was set up. But the Indonesian military received little benefit from the armed “Timorese” units they created. The brutal and senseless killing ordered by ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia) commanders shocked and disheartened many local recruits, and by the 1980s the number of East Timorese in these formations was being rapidly reduced (by 1999, it had dropped to just 23 percent). Many Hansip soldiers also deserted to Falintil, taking their weapons with them, especially during the March-August 1983 ceasefire, when a whole Hansip unit in the village of Kraras (near Viqueque) close to the south coast turned on a contingent of Indonesian army engineers, killing all seventeen of them before fleeing into the mountains to join up with Fretilin. See Cox et al., Generations of Resistance, p. 31. By the end of their occupation in the late 1990s, not a single one of the 211 senior officers/commanders in the Indonesian military in East Timor appears to have been East Timorese. Most of those still serving with ABRI (post-April 1999, ABRI became TNI) were kept at the most junior levels (90 percent were corporals and privates, and the majority of these were not even full-time soldiers, but were Milsas [Militerisasi, part-time reservists]); see Samuel Moore (pseud.), “The Indonesian Military’s Last Years in East Timor: An Analysis of its Secret Documents,” Indonesia 72 (2001): 28. Only one of the four Battalion 744 and 745 members identified by the National Human Rights Sub-Commission (KOMNASHAM’s) report for Human Rights Violations in East Timor (KPP-HAM) was guilty of human rights abuses during the pre-and post-August 30, 1999 referendum violence; Private (First Class) Luis appears to have been East Timorese. The others, Infantry Majors Yakraman Yagus and Jacob Djojo Sarosa, commanders of Battalions 744 and 745 respectively, and Captain Tatang, the commander of 744’s B Company, hailed from Indonesia proper—Yagus apparently from either Ujung Pandang (Makasar) or NTT, Sarosa from Kupang, and Tatang from West Java. See further A. Hasibuan and T. M. Lubis (chairpersons), “KPP-HAM Report. Indonesian Investigation into Human Rights Violations in East Timor,” para 73, Jakarta, January 31, 2000, published in H. Macdonald et al., “Masters of Terror—Indonesia’s Military and Violence in East Timor in 1999,” Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defense (Canberra: Australian National University, 2002); and Cameron W. Barr, “A Brutal Exit: Battalion 745,” The Christian Science Monitor 13 (2000), who refers to the killing of the Dutch journalist, Sander Thoenes (then on assignment for The Financial Times, Vrij Nederland, and other Dutch newspapers) in the Becora district of Dili on September 21, 1999, apparently at the hands of members of Battalion 745, who were passing through the district at the time.
working for the Indonesians reported them as saying that given the situation in Viqueque, it was a miracle that they were still alive and that “although the Indonesians accused Fretilin of being ‘communists,’ really they were even more ‘communist’ than the Timorese pro-independence party, considering the way they behaved.” (Interview with Domingos Sarmento Alves, Lisbon, November 13, 1999). Knowing that once this comment reached the ears of C Company, they would be done for, Domingos and his friend decided to appeal to the head of intelligence (KASI-1) at the Kodim. They invented a story about a crush on one of Domingos’s school friend’s attractive young female classmates, which had brought him into conflict with a Battalion 745 soldier. As Domingos told us, they knew that their only salvation was to trust that rivalries within the Indonesian army would work in their favor. What followed is a dramatic illustration of both the violence that underlay relations between the separate ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia) commands in occupied Timor, and the lack of unified military hierarchy:

We left our classroom and went straight to the intelligence officer’s office, reporting that the school was about to be attacked. He said “Nonsense: we cleared this up yesterday, all this business about the love affair.” But no sooner had he uttered these words than his office came under siege. Battalion 745 soldiers in full battle dress started climbing through the windows, and we clung for dear life to the intelligence officer. We bound our arms tightly around him because we knew if we let go we were dead. We heard him shouting: “Mana senjata? Mana pistol saya?”[Where is my weapon? Where is my pistol?] We thought that if the 745 soldiers took out their guns and started firing, the intelligence officer would also be killed and they would be held responsible for his death. Obviously they didn’t want that, so we held on to him for dear life. But they beat us cruelly, hundreds of blows raining down on our backs. Then they started battering us with the table and used the chairs to prise off our arms. One of the 745 soldiers drew his stabbing knife with a garuda [mythical bird] embossed hilt and started hitting us with it. I had deep wounds to my head and the whole of my bottom lip was ripped open so that afterwards I couldn’t drink water for weeks without the liquid running down my neck. We were in a truly dreadful situation. Covered in blood, we clung to the intelligence officer who eventually slipped to the ground. Forced to release our grip, we were dragged from the office, hauled across the street and flung down the steps leading to the school where the 745 soldiers began beating our heads with stones. The intelligence officer immediately phoned the Kodim commander who had just come back from his afternoon siesta. He wasn’t even in his uniform since he had been resting. As he came over to the school with his orderly hurrying behind him

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21 On the numerous agents provocateurs and spies, the latter referred to as “clowns” (bufo) by the Timorese, see Peter Carey, “A Personal Journey through East Timor,” in The East Timor Question: The Struggle for Independence from Indonesia, ed. Paul Hainsworth and Stephen McCloskey (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000), p. 23. Bishop Belo once observed that East Timor under Indonesian occupation was a society “where one half of the population was paid to spy on the other half.” See Clare Dixon, “Cry of a Forgotten Land,” The Tablet, November 22, 1991.

22 KASI stands for Kepala Seksi (Section Head), of which there were usually four levels in the ABRI/TNI territorial command structure: KASI-1 = intelligence; KASI-2 = operations; KASI-3 = logistics; KASI-4 = personnel. I am grateful to Benedict Anderson for this information.
carrying his things, he began buttoning himself into his tunic. We met him outside the school as he was putting on his uniform and reported what had happened. He ordered us to the Kodim HQ where we were put in his personal quarters. There we were kept for two days and nights while the 745 soldiers laid siege to the Kodim. They took up positions just across the road in front of the church. With an armed face-off taking place, the Kodim commander and his 745 Battalion opposite number started shouting at each other: "What do you think you’re doing? Why are you treating these schoolchildren like this?" the Kodim commander yelled. The breakdown in military discipline was complete. At night the 745 soldiers invaded the Kodim and came into the kitchen with their guns, but we were by then safe in the commander’s bedroom.

When I eventually got out to Dili [in July 1981] I heard that this C Company unit had got completely out of control and had killed an Indonesian marine corps [KKO, Korps Marinir] NCO on the boy scouts’ field [lapangan pramuka]. Several 745 soldiers were later arrested for this crime and imprisoned after being dishonorably discharged from the army. (Interview, Domingos Sarmento Alves, Lisbon, November 13, 1999)

While the experience of East Timorese, who, like Domingos, lived in remote districts, and especially those who had been forced down from the mountains, was almost universally terrible, there were some exceptions. The young Aquiles Sequeira (born August 10, 1978), for example, spoke to me warmly about the same marine corps unit from Surabaya, which Domingos had mentioned, during the period it was stationed in Aquiles’s native Loré district in 1987–88:

We had units of the Wanra [Perlawanan Rakyat, People’s Resistance], a sort of civil defense unit or militia, which were recruited from the western part of East Timor, namely, from Maliana and the border area near Atambua, and they were constantly coming back to our house. Sometimes they brought food and in the evenings we would invite them in to drink palm toddy [tuak]. They often took me back to the local military post, and I was quite happy there with the Indonesian soldiers. In fact, I didn’t know what was really going on [politically] at the time. Instead, the Indonesians often seemed to play with us children, and I thought they were rather good people. At that time [1987–88], the war was getting fiercer and the unit stationed in our area were marines [KKO] from Surabaya. (Interview with Aquiles Sequeira, Lisbon, April 10, 1999)

Likewise, in the colonial capital, Dili, the situation seemed to depend very much on where one lived and what particular units were based in one’s quarter of the city. Indeed, as the Indonesian occupation began to establish more regular structures once the campaign to control the mountainous hinterland had been more or less won by the early 1980s (only some three hundred Falintil fighters continued to hold out in the extreme eastern tip of the island under the leadership of Xanana Gusmão, a number which fell to less than one hundred by the end of the decade), the East Timorese began to develop a very acute appreciation of the nuances and differences both between various Indonesian military units and between the different ethnic groups from which they were drawn. Thus, the young Domingos Matos, whose family lived in the early 1980s in the Bairro Petê area close to the elite helicopter-borne Indonesian Kopasgat
(Komando Pasukan Gerakan Cepat, Rapid Reaction Unit) airforce commando base, had a very different view of his Indonesian neighbors than did the terrorized Domingos Sarmento Alves in far-off Viqueque, where the notorious C Company of East Timorese Battalion 745 held sway:

"[Relations with the Indonesians] were pretty good. The Kopasgat were an elite force, and they behaved quite well. They gave us rice and other food, and indeed did the same to all the other families living around the base."

"Was the rice and food only for those who worked in some official capacity for the Indonesian local administration?"

"No, it was for everybody, for all the families living around the airfield. In fact, the Kopasgat men used to come to our house to wash because they had no washing facilities of their own at their base. There thus seemed to be a reasonably cordial relationship between the Indonesians and the locals there."

"Did your mother and father speak Indonesian?"

"No, we only communicated by hand signals with the soldiers." (Interview with Domingos Matos, Lisbon, November 7, 1999)

Interestingly, when problems arose between Matos’s family and the Indonesian military, these involved the local Koramil (Komando Rayon Militer, Sub-District Military Command) rather than the elite airforce commando unit quartered in their area:

"It was [only] in 1980 that the first incident occurred that caused me to begin to feel a bit disturbed and start to take a different view of the situation. We had a pig at home which went missing and my mother went down to the local army base—not the Kopasgat but the regular army base [Koramil]—to argue with the soldiers because she suspected that they had taken the pig and eaten it. She asked for the pig back in quite insistent language. That evening, the commandant of the base, a field officer, came round armed with a pistol and ordered my mother to sit down and began interrogating her, pressing the barrel to her temple and whiplashing her with the pistol butt."

"What language did the interrogation occur in?"

"In Tetum and Indonesian. In fact, we had an interpreter, a woman who spent time going to and fro to Kupang [in West Timor] so that she knew some Indonesian and could act as an interpreter. It was at that time that the feelings began to arise in me that the situation was anything but normal. I was then eight years old." (Interview with Domingos Matos, Lisbon, November 7, 1999)

It is clear from the testimony of one of one of Matos’s younger contemporaries, Ana Maria Vitor ("Nina") (born Díli, 1974), a Díli resident and daughter of a junior civil servant in the Portuguese colonial administration who spoke Bahasa fluently (a language he had apparently learnt on his own initiative in the Portuguese era), that knowledge of Malay or Indonesian was of little avail in providing protection against the Indonesian authorities:

My father was able to speak Malay—he was quite a linguist and had learnt it out of intellectual curiosity during the Portuguese period—so we decided to stay in Díli and not go into the mountains. But, despite his fluency in Bahasa, we still had problems. For example, we had trouble with an East Timorese neighbor who
knew my family was giving rice and other necessities to the Fretilin forces in the mountains [in 1976-78]. He reported my father to the authorities, and they put him in prison. I was still very small then. (Interview with Ana Maria Vitor, “Nina,” Alvalade, Lisbon, April 14, 1999)

The same problems were experienced by another Dili-based female, Delfina de Rego, whose father had actually worked as a junior civil servant for the Indonesian local government in Dili before succumbing to an illness in 1982. As we have seen, she eventually bought herself out of East Timor in 1996 with the help of an uncle based in Lisbon. (Interview with Delfina Maria de Jesus de Rego Soriano, Lisbon, November 10, 1999) At a slightly later epoch in the mid-1980s, after the breakdown of the March-August 1983 ceasefire, which had been negotiated by the Indonesian special forces (Kopassandha, Komando Pasukan Sandhi Yuda, Covert Warfare Forces Command; post-December 1986, Kopassus, Komando Pasukan Khusus, Special Forces Command) local intelligence chief, Colonel Gatot Purwanto, and Xanana Gusmão, many local men began going up to join the armed resistance in the mountains. At this time, two young Fataluku boys from the Ponta Leste region, Ejídio Tomas Dias Quintas (b. 1975) and Honório de Araújo (b. 1977), growing up in the village of Mihara (near Lospalos), who both later went on to play a role in the post-1989 clandestine movement, began to develop a very detailed knowledge of the types of units which were billeted in their area, learning to distinguish the battalion numbers and their respective regional affiliations, military competence, armaments and equipment:

At that time, the only Indonesians [around Mihara] were soldiers. There were no transmigrants then, no people who opened warungs or small shops. The Indonesians there were all essentially combat troops, mainly from the infantry battalions 641 from East Kalimantan, 745 from Minahasa [North Sulawesi], 710 from Menado, 700 from North Sulawesi, cavalry, and Arméd, an artillery unit. (Interview with Ejídio Dias Quintas and Honório de Araújo, Lisbon, November 9, 1999)

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23 By late 1982, Falintil was launching a number of attacks in many parts of the country, especially the south and east, and in November 1982 even attacked Dili. Increasingly placed on the defensive, a number of local commanders entered into ceasefire agreements with Falintil, culminating in the countrywide ceasefire agreement signed on March 23, 1983; see Pinto and Jardine, East Timor’s Unfinished Struggle, p. 266, n. 1. Also Colonel Gatot Purwanto and the other Indonesian commanders involved in negotiating the ceasefire, e.g., Major (now Major-General) Willem da Costa, hoped that by agreeing to the countrywide cessation of hostilities, they might achieve a “Sulawesi” solution to the East Timor problem: namely, the sort of arrangement that ended the Permesta rebellion (1957–61) in North Sulawesi in 1961, involving a ceasefire combined with amnesty arrangements, and an honorable part for the rebels in a post-rebellion settlement. This proved a chimera in the East Timor situation, however, since there was no sense of common history to which the Indonesians could appeal. One of the central ideas of the “Sulawesi” solution had been the restoration of the Indonesian “unitary” state (negara kesatuan Republik Indonesia), but this meant nothing to the Timorese guerrillas who never had any intention of joining Indonesia and suspected a trap in the various amnesty promises, given what had happened in 1978–79, when so many Fretilin fighters had come down from the mountains under the flag of peace only to be subsequently murdered by the Indonesians. Instead, Xanana and other Falintil commanders used the breathing space of the ceasefire to rebuild their armed strength, consolidate their underground networks, reorganize their supply lines, and restore links with the civilian population and the outside world, links that reinvigorated the international solidarity movement and prepared the ground for the emergence of the student-led urban clandestine resistance in Dili and other towns in the late 1980s. See Budiardjo and Liem, War against East Timor, pp. 44-7.
Like Domingos Sarmento Alves, they noticed that the Indonesian security forces were far from united amongst themselves. Indeed, in 1984, they witnessed a major clash between two battalions, one from Aceh and the other from West Kalimantan (Pontianak), over the Acehnese unit’s conduct in their home village:

There were often fights between the police and the army, usually over issues to do with money or commercial issues or property. Often there were armed stand-offs between different military units. We remember a military unit, Battalion 100 from the Iskandarmuda Command [Kodam I] in Aceh. It started carrying out mass killings around Mihara, lots of corpses were being chucked around and left lying in the open around the village. Some were thrown down wells, others were put in animal pens, and all these bodies had to be burned. Battalion 623 from Pontianak in West Kalimantan [Kodam XII Tanjungpura] got very upset about this and decided to take on the Acehnese Battalion. They wanted them out of Mihara. This was in 1984. So many people had been kidnapped, tortured, and executed by Battalion 100 from Banda Aceh that the rival battalion from West Kalimantan took them on [and expelled them]. (Interview with Ejídio Tomas Dias Quintas and Honório de Araújo, Lisbon, November 9, 1999)

Another aspect that the keen-eyed Ejídio noticed was that many Indonesian soldiers had their own agenda and were looking after their own interests rather than acting as members of a unified and professional army. This gave those working for the
clandestine resistance ample opportunities to pursue their activities and even procure armaments and other necessary supplies for the resistance in the mountains from the Indonesians:

I often talked with them and they told me: "Quite frankly, I am working for myself, I am working for my own family. I have got to survive, and as far as my religion is concerned, it teaches me not to torture or execute people. Basically, I am here to advance my own interests, not that of the state. I am not really a 100 percent paid-up Indonesian nationalist in this respect. I have to look at the present conditions; and I have to tell you straight that if you do something which is against the rules and I see you doing it, then I am going to arrest you. But if you do something [illegal] which I don't see, then that is entirely up to you. I am not going to go around officiously investigating everything. It is thus entirely up to you. If you want to carry out actions which are not above-board, then provided I don't see it, that's fine—what I don't see, I don't know." (Interview with Ejídio Dias Quintas, Lisbon, November 9, 1999)

Such opportunities for barter were especially exploited by those who pretended to be working as spies for the Indonesians. The former were, in Ejídio's words,

to some extent the eyes and ears of Falintil—they worked ostensibly for the Indonesians but they also reported back via estafeta [the clandestine messenger system] to Falintil on the situation of the local Indonesian garrison, the disposition of their forces, where the units were from, what arms they had. They bartered, stole, or bought weapons, ammunition and uniforms, in fact anything Falintil needed, and it was a [highly effective] way of actually infiltrating the Indonesian military and getting support for Falintil. (Interview with Ejídio Dias Quintas, Lisbon, November 9, 1999)

(ii) Relations at School

As the Indonesians settled into the occupation of East Timor in the early 1980s, one of their top priorities was to establish an Indonesian-language school system. They began with the primary level (Sekolah Dasar) and required that all young East Timorese in the six-to-thirteen age group attend. In their view, this educational experience would gradually win over the younger generation (born in the early to mid 1970s) to an acceptance of Indonesian rule, just as the Dutch "ethical policy" (1901–20s) in late-colonial Indonesia/Netherlands East Indies was to induce Indonesians to accept Dutch rule. Thus, while the pre-1975 generation, schooled under the Portuguese, was written off as irreconcilably opposed to Jakarta's annexation, hopes were pinned on the "new" generation, in particular members of the younger—Indonesian-educated—Timorese elite, some of whom would go on to tertiary education in inner-island Indonesia itself. (By the end of Indonesian rule, there were over one thousand Timorese students enrolled in various Indonesian universities and tertiary colleges, the majority in Java and Bali.) The reality was very different, however. Far from winning over the younger generation, Indonesian schooling, especially at the junior and senior high school level, became a highly divisive experience, reinforcing the East Timorese younger generation's sense of separate identity and the validity of their political aspirations for independence. Nearly all those interviewed spoke of the poor quality of the education provided by the Indonesians. This was particularly the case in
areas outside Dili. In the Ponta Leste region, the young Honório de Araújo reflected that when he left school at thirteen, "I really had nothing of value in my head. It was a very primitive form of education, where the pupils were physically abused. There was constant corporal punishment. It was a sort of boot camp school, very rough and ready." (Interview with Honório de Araújo, Lisbon, November 9, 1999) There was also a shared view that Indonesian schoolteachers tended to favor Indonesian students over East Timorese, a discrimination which contributed to the growing sense of separateness that pupils from the two communities began to feel as they went through the various levels of the Indonesian school system. Martinho Maia Gonçalves (b. 1970) spoke to us as a member of the first generation schooled under the Indonesians in the East Timorese capital:

It started when I was in Class 1 of my junior high school [SMP] in 1985. Before then I was in primary school [1976–84]. Certainly my friends and I were not happy with the Indonesians. We had strong anti-Indonesian feelings, and we called those children of military families at the school the *grenat* [grenade] group from the Indonesian, "*gerakan anak tentara*" [army children's group]. We felt aggrieved because priority seemed to be given in terms of access to the high school [SMA] and junior high school [SMP] to Indonesian children, especially children of military families. There were often fights, and we frequently came to blows. From that time onwards I never really wanted to mix with the Indonesians. (Interview with Martinho Maia Gonçalves, Lisbon, April 15, 1999)

In 1988, Martinho and his fellow East Timorese students mounted a demonstration in front of Governor Mario Carrascalão's office in downtown Dili to protest the fact that so many "newcomers" from Indonesia had succeeded in passing their exams for entry into senior high school, while scores of East Timorese had failed, a demonstration backed by Raimundo, the sympathetic East Timorese Bupati of Dili at the time. (Interview with Martinho Maia Gonçalves, Lisbon, April 15, 1999) When a second test was held and some male East Timorese pupils found themselves still excluded, they took their frustration out on the Indonesians, assaulting Indonesian female students in the school canteen, an unlovely but seemingly common behavior pattern amongst young Timorese males who have a habit of venting their frustration by beating up women.24 At such times, according to Martinho, the Indonesian army "[would come] to try and sort things out and offer the Indonesians some protection." (Interview with Martinho Maia Gonçalves, Lisbon, April 15, 1999)

Many other post-1975 "new" generation Timorese remarked on this pattern of growing separation from their fellow Indonesian students in junior and senior high

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24 In the year 2000, there were some 169 documented cases of domestic violence by Timorese men against women, including some involving members of the politically prominent Timorese elite (e.g., Dr. Sérgio Lobo, the former chairman of the ETTA's Department of Health). Such crimes are now the single most important category of offense, constituting some 40 percent of all criminal cases against persons and property being heard in the Timorese courts. See further Milena Pires cited in Maggie O'Kane, "Return of the Revolutionaries," *The Guardian* (London), January 15, 2001; and Peter Carey, "Challenging Tradition, Changing Society: The Role of Women in East Timor's Transition to Independence," in Rodrigues and Wharton, *Nationbuilding in East Timor*, p. 96; and, for a longer discussion of the violent legacy of the occupation in terms of crimes against women, see Peter Carey, "Dimensions of Domination: Institutionalised Violence against Women during the Indonesian Occupation of East Timor (1975-99)" in Wessel and Wimhoefer, *Violence in Indonesia*, pp. 185–209.
school. The Timorese poet, João Aparício, who earlier trained for the priesthood in an Indonesian seminary in Malang in East Java, relayed his memories to us in this way:

In July 1992, I went back to Malang to begin my Bachelor's degree. In East Timor, the situation was very bad. This was the aftermath of the November 12, 1991 Santa Cruz massacre. Many of my friends were dying and disappearing. There was just no freedom to speak or live as ordinary people. Despite all their educational upbringing, my friends just could not live normally. This caused an inner revolt in me. I was staying in the seminary, but it was becoming clearer and clearer in my mind that this was not my path in life. There was a growing conflict between me and the rector, Fr. João, who was a Javanese. He seemed to have two weights and two measures: one for the Javanese and one for the Timorese. There were fifteen of us [lay] brothers from East Timor [training for the priesthood], and we were constantly being told by the rector that we should agree to integration and should tell the Bishop [Belo] that the diocese of Dili should be joined with the Indonesian Bishops' Conference [KWI, Konperensi Wali-Gereja Indonesia] rather than remaining under the direct administration of the Vatican. [I was told that] I should not think so much about my homeland, but should develop a broader and more Catholic viewpoint. I protested to the rector that this was not the way forward. But he remained hard in his attitudes, and in the end I just decided to leave. I wrote to Bishop Belo telling him that really I did not have the calling to be a priest, but I did not mention at the time that I would go abroad. (Interview with João Aparício, Lisbon, April 11, 1999)

Domingos Matos, who was at that time back in Dili, attending junior high school in the Comoro area near the airport, recalled that:

“My schooling was not very regular and the surroundings not particularly good. It seemed that the Timorese in my neighborhood were gradually being overwhelmed by inner-island Indonesians, particularly Javanese, who were coming to settle in Dili.”

“Was this happening before the formal opening of the territory in January 1989?”

“Yes, even in the early [to mid] 1980s, the pattern was becoming clear: Dili was becoming an increasingly Indonesian city, and transmigrants were flooding in large numbers.”

“Was there a sense that you were being marginalized at school?”

“No, the class one of primary school I was in was entirely for East Timorese children. The inner-island Indonesians and Javanese were educated elsewhere; they certainly didn't come to my class at school. But when I went into class two and three, there were quite a few children of Indonesian transmigrants, and the school became increasingly mixed. I did not feel terribly easy with a lot of Indonesians there. In 1985, I graduated from primary school and went to the Number Two junior state high school [SMP-II] at Comoro where the airport is now. There I really began to understand what the situation was like in East Timor.” (Interview with Domingos Matos, Lisbon, November 7, 1999)

It was above all the study of Indonesian history and constitutional law (i.e., the basic law [Undang-Undang Dasar, UUD] of 1945) that caused young East Timorese
like Domingos Matos and his friend Martinho Maia Gonçalves to reflect more deeply on the iniquities of the Indonesian occupation. As Domingos explained to us:

I began to study history, the official national history of Indonesia. I also looked at the basic constitutional law [UUD] which said that the Indonesian people and state would recognize and respect the freedom of all other people in the world. I then began to put two and two together in terms of the actual situation in my own country. (Interview with Domingos Matos, Lisbon, November 7, 1999)

Martinho’s experience paralleled this, but with an interesting twist, in that at times his Indonesian teachers clearly felt acutely embarrassed by what they were being called upon to defend, embarrassment which sometimes even forced them to leave the classroom in order to cover their feelings:

I knew from pretty early on what the score was, but when we were studying Indonesian history we also looked at the Basic Constitutional Law of 1945, which stated that “freedom was the right of all peoples and all nations.” We would often provoke our teacher into reflecting on whether this basic constitutional law was being applied properly in East Timor, and whether, in view of the fact that the Indonesians had risen against the Dutch25 and against the Japanese [1942–45], we asked whether the East Timorese situation was not rather similar? Surely this was also a colonial situation? Usually the teacher kept silent, but sometimes he said “what we are dealing with here has to do with the Portuguese. We are [not] dealing with the Dutch and the Japanese. It is not appropriate for you to bring this up. If you look at the geography of the situation, Kupang and Dili are very close, as are West and East Timor. It is all part of one community, one brotherhood and one nation.” When we replied, “It is the Portuguese not the Dutch who colonized us here,” most teachers were never prepared to go to the bottom of it, or to dig very deeply. On the rare occasions when they did, they provided theoretical explanations that were not very practically grounded. Sometimes teachers would be so embarrassed that they would just leave the room. One teacher I remember, Ida Bagus, from Bali, had problems controlling his laughter. He used to constantly remind us saying, “don’t burst into laughter, don’t laugh!” One of my friends, who was extremely naughty, always provoked him by bursting into laughter, and then Ida Bagus would have to leave the room in order not to feel embarrassed before the whole class. (Interview with Martinho Maia Gonçalves, Lisbon, April 15, 1999)

The case of Ida Bagus struck us as interesting. We asked whether [Bagus’s] particularly acute embarrassment was a sign that as a Balinese he felt differently about the official Indonesian line than did his Javanese colleagues—his uncontrollable laughter being a natural inner-island Indonesian way of hiding his sense of shame? “Actually no,” Martinho replied, “most were the same and spun us the same story, but there was one teacher from Flores, a Catholic, I remember, who always took the trouble to talk to us. And he would say: ‘Look, this international issue [of East Timor’s political status] is not finished yet. It is still in the hands of the United Nations and is

25The Indonesians had risen against the Dutch during the 1603–1942 colonial period and in 1945–9 while the young Republic was fighting for its very existence.
very far from having been resolved.’ But he was a rare person, most were pretty stiff and unbending.” (Interview with Martinho Maia Gonçalves, Lisbon, April 15, 1999)

This reluctance to question the official line seems also to have been reflected in the attitudes of the Indonesian student body, most of whom were children of military or civil servant families. (By the 1990s, there were upwards of 21,500 troops in the territory—one for every thirty-eight inhabitants as well as some eight thousand police and 28,000 civil servants, including schoolteachers.) When Honório de Araújo came to Dili in the mid-1990s to study at the Technical Middle School (Sekolah Teknik Menengah) in the staunchly pro-Frelilin suburb of Becora in the eastern part of the city, he noticed that:

If there was some political discussion, the school community usually divided into two groups—the Timorese and the Indonesians—rather than into various shades of Indonesians. If there was a showdown, it would always be East Timorese taking the side of other East Timorese against the “Javanese” [in this case not necessarily ethnic Javanese from Central and East Java, but any inner-island Indonesians]. We played football together, went on picnics together, but we never invited the “Javanese” or Indonesians to our homes. That said, there was of course a greater degree of affinity between us with those from Nusa Tenggara Timur [NTT] than there was with those from other Indonesian islands. Most of the Indonesian children were children of civil servants and army officers. Therefore they really felt they had to support what their parents were doing. It was very rare to find a “Javanese” who took a different view. It was different, of course, with members of the Indonesian democratic opposition such as members of Megawati’s PDI [Partai Demokrasi Indonesia], or with the PRD [Partai Rakyat Demokrasi], but it was on the whole difficult. But I do remember a boy from Aceh. He had a very different view and was following the situation [in East Timor] very very intensely. He said to me later, “East Timor must go first, but we will follow you: one day we will also demand our independence.” He was extremely keen to observe events in East Timor and had a very close solidarity with us. (Interview with Honório de Araújo, Lisbon, November 9, 1999)

(iii) Turning Points

Honório’s experience with his young Acehnese friend points up the fact that certain encounters and events—often seemingly quite fortuitous—shaped the way in which members of the Indonesian-educated generation began to view the occupation. For some, these incidents marked the dawning of a new political awareness, a coming of age that changed their emotional and mental horizons for ever.

One of Honório’s Fataluku contemporaries in the Lospalos area was Aquiles Sequeira (born August 10, 1978). Brought up in a small hamlet in the sub-district of Loré near the south coast, he lived in a region where there were frequent encounters between Falintil and the Indonesian army. As was the custom amongst the local Fataluku population, where Catholicism had yet to penetrate very deeply, his father

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26 Moore, “Indonesian Military’s Last Years in East Timor,” p. 25.
27 The term “Javanese” (Javaneses), along with the more common “Malae” (Malay), is used in Tetum to denote any foreigner, in this case straight-haired people from Western Indonesia and the Malay peninsula.
Peter Carey

had married twice. Aquiles was the youngest child of the second wife. His mother’s younger brother was staunchly pro-Fretilin and was fighting with the local Falintil units in the nearby forest. In the mid-1980s, Aquiles suddenly began to become aware of the situation:

“I did not know this at the time, but my mother was constantly sending food and provisions to her younger brother in the forest. I did not really know much about who Fretilin were, but I often went out to the family plot where we grew sweet potatoes, maize, dry-field padi, mangoes, and melons. It was there that I was asked on one occasion to go to find some Fretilin members and give them food. In the center of our plot of land was a small palapa [palm leaf] house where we used to retire after working in the fields and where we would prepare food in the traditional way and have our meal out in the open underneath this little shelter. It was there that, as a young boy, having been sent out by my mother, I had my first meeting with Fretilin fighters who were resting beside our hut. Up to that time I knew nothing about Fretilin. Indeed, I used to ask myself whether they were human beings or not. I knew that they were defending our country by fighting against the Indonesians, but this was the first time I was actually in contact with them.

“One of the figures who made the greatest impression on me was the local Fretilin company commander [in Iliomar], Armando Nolasco, whose nom-de-guerre was Koro Asu [died 1987]. He struck great fear into the Indonesians because he was so adept at mounting ambushes on ABRI patrols. The forests in his area were literally killing grounds. Indonesian territorial battalions entered there, and they were lucky to come back with half their numbers. There was one particular instance in which seventeen were killed all at once. If any of Koro Asu’s lieutenants were killed, he was prepared to kill fifty to sixty in return. He was not like other commanders, who fought only during the late evening or nighttime. He was prepared to strike in broad daylight.

“I first saw Koro Asu with my own eyes at the time when Xanana entered into a brief ceasefire with the Indonesian commander, Colonel Gatot Purwanto, in March-August 1983. Koro Asu came down from the mountains with another Fretilin commander, Falo Chai [Fernando Teles, died 1985], to join in the negotiations. They even organized a football game between Fretilin and ABRI, with the Timorese allowing the Indonesians to win two-love. I was then nearly five years old. Koro Asu made a speech to the younger generation saying: ‘Your struggle is not yet finished. You will continue this in the years to come.’”

“What happened after that?”

“In 1985–86, when I went up to Class Four of primary school, a change occurred in my life because I began to realize what was happening, and I began to think what should we do to rectify this situation. There was so much torture and so many victims. In 1989, I went up to Junior High School [SMP] in Lospalos, and I began to understand what the score was and what was going on vis-à-vis Indonesia. In my times off school, I went back to my old village in Loré subdistrict. My older brother had by then been working for a long time with our brothers in the bush as a member of the clandestine movement. At that time the

See above, n. 21.
number of Indonesian spies was increasing. Indonesian military intelligence [Satgas (Satuan Tugas) Intelijen, Intelligence Taskforce, SGI], was increasing its reach, and everyone who was working for Fretilin in the mountains was being searched for. I wanted to know how we could get out of this situation, how we would be able to fight for a free East Timor, to bring the truth of the situation to the outside world.” (Interview with Aquiles Sequeira, Lisbon, April 10, 1999)

For the young Martinho Maia Gonçalves, growing up as a teenager in Dili in the mid-1980s, it was not so much one event as a gathering consciousness brought on by the stories told him by neighbors, friends, and family of what was really happening in the countryside and in the mountains that opened his eyes to the true nature of the occupation:

“"I particularly remember we had a neighbor, an East Timorese, whose cousin was in the mountains fighting for Fretilin. He even showed us a photograph of him. It had been taken before he went up into the mountains to join Fretilin, but our neighbor told us what his cousin’s experiences had been, how he had witnessed mass killings and the various incidents which had propelled him to take up arms and join the guerrillas in the mountains. But I don’t think it was just my contact with this particular neighbor. I heard lots of things at this time [i.e., mid 1980s]. I heard about violations of women, of women being raped in front of their husbands, of brothers having to kill brothers under the gun barrels of the Indonesians. I became more and more angered, and when discussing these things [with my friends], the process of politicization began to take on its own dynamic. It was not something that happened suddenly, just like that ... it couldn’t be ascribed to one event or particular incident. Rather it was a gathering consciousness.”

"Can you clarify the sources of information for the rapes and the killings? Were they from friends, from school mates, or from other people?"

“Actually, it was from friends at school, [and] from family members who also had victims within the family. In fact, one of my uncles had joined Fretilin in the mountains in the 1975–79 period and had surrendered [following the fall of Mt. Matebian]. I heard a lot of stories from that source too. The information came from relatives and friends. There were all sorts of lines of communication, not just the one.” (Interview with Martinho Maia Gonçalves, Lisbon, April 15, 1999)

A rather similar process was experienced by Martinho’s friend, Aviano Faria, a Dili resident of mixed Timorese-Chinese parentage. For him events much closer to hand in Dili itself, indeed in the street outside his own home, were sufficient to change his view of the occupation. The conclusion he drew was not just that resistance was necessary, but also that there was an urgent need for the moral uplift of the East Timorese people themselves, who were being debased daily by the occupation forces, a view remarkably similar to that which had inspired the Javanese pioneers of the zaman kebangkitan nasional (“national awakening era”)29 in the early years of the twentieth century:

29 The beginning of the zaman kebangkitan nasional in Indonesia is usually dated to the foundation of Boedi Oetomo (“Noble Endeavour”) organization by Dr. Wahidin Sudirohusodo (1857–1917), and Dr. Sutomo
"What really made me afraid and acutely aware of what was happening in East Timor was not just what was being said or what was happening in school, but the actual environment in which we were living from day to day. We were always seeing Indonesian soldiers in full battle dress—and this was in the capital Dili. Even if they were in civilian dress, they would still carry their side arms with them. It thus seemed to be a pretty odd environment in which the Indonesians were going round armed to the teeth the whole time. Indeed, for me it brought on a sort of trauma. I mean the military were everywhere. I can remember a particular incident when a truck full of soldiers in battle dress careered round a corner and ran over a child in the middle of the road. Of course, when you have an incident like that the whole family comes out to see what was going on and to try and help their child. And the family obviously wanted to take on the soldiers and started making a fuss then and there. But the soldiers said to them—and I was still only eight or nine at the time—'don't you dare make any fuss about this; go and collect the remains of your child; take him home and bury him. If there is any protest from you lot, you will all be following your child to an early grave.' This was such a shocking experience for me and caused me to reflect that things were in no way settled [in East Timor] nor in any way in a normal state.

"And there was another incident where the army came to arrest someone whom they had accused of being involved in politics. He happened to be a neighbor of mine [in Balide]. And the Indonesians just marched straight into his house without a by-your-leave or anything. When they didn't find the person they were looking for, they started beating up his wife and family, whom they all took into custody. As children, we of course all went to see what was going on, and this was such a shocking experience because it just happened on our doorstep. It made me feel extremely bitter and revolted. I really wanted to find out the true facts of the situation [in East Timor], and of course I listened very intently to the Indonesian TV and radio, but I soon came to understand that I was not getting the true facts from the Indonesian TV and radio networks. So I began to tune in to foreign radio broadcasts, to Radio Netherlands, and Australian and Brazilian stations. The last was, of course, in Portuguese, which I could readily understand. Then I began to gather data from which I could construct a proper intellectual understanding of the situation, and on which I could actually base my own political attitudes. Thus the beginnings of my intellectual opposition to the Indonesians started to be grounded on real fact.

"One of the things that really made me aware of the situation was when I started hearing arguments amongst the East Timorese themselves. They always seemed to be coming to blows about the loss of their pigs, livestock, etc. If their children came to blows, the parents would also come out of their houses and start taking it out on the grown-ups in the other family. This really opened my eyes, because it seemed as though we were sinking to a level below that of animals. This decline in basic moral values seemed to me very serious. The fact that a child could just be run over in the street by the military and there was no apology or redress meant that we didn't even have the status of animals. I mean, if you ran over an animal outside someone's house, you would at least stop and
go into that person's house and offer to pay for it, saying, 'Look, I am desperately sorry this happened, I inadvertently ran over your animal. Here, please accept some small compensation.' But for us, even that basic respect was denied. And I went to my father and said: 'Look, this situation is going on and we are being treated worse than animals. We've got to do something about it, otherwise we are just going to go down the drain.'

'I took the view that the only correct way forward was to keep totally silent in the face of the Indonesians. I mean, if you said anything to them it was totally counterproductive. So from that moment on, I was on the look out for ways in which I could use my skills in the clandestine movement.'

"How old were you then?"

"Fourteen years old, at the junior high school [SMP]. The year was 1984."

(Interview with Aviano Faria, Lisbon, November 5, 1999)

While for some a more cumulative or gradual awakening may have been the norm, at least one of those interviewed indicated that he had been specifically encouraged by an older generation Timorese, a local policeman, to see the occupation through different eyes. Egas (born Dili, 1971), like Aviano, is of mixed Chinese-pribumi (native Timorese-Indonesian) parentage. His father, who had left the family home shortly after
his son's birth, was a Cantonese building contractor with family in both China and Taiwan, and his mother was Indonesian: she had been brought up in Atambua in Indonesian West Timor, but her maternal family was from Roti. The pair had met at Balibo, a market town close to the Indonesian border. Following his parents' break-up, Egas had been adopted by a close neighbor in the parish of Balide where his family lived. Thus he was brought up by a local East Timorese family and, despite his unusual background, saw himself as a Timorese rather than a peranakan (mixed blood Chinese-Indonesian), and identified with the local rather than the Indonesian community. A thoughtful and intense young man, Egas, like others we interviewed from the Indonesian-educated generation, later went on to play a significant role in the East Timorese student movement as a member of the Organization of Timorese Youth (Organizacao de Juventude de Timor Leste, OJETIL), the main rival to the older established Renetil. In 1983–4, when he was still at Indonesian primary school, one of his friends showed him a newspaper clipping about a conference at which José Ramos Horta, the East Timorese resistance's roving foreign spokesman (now the East Timorese Foreign Minister), had made a speech. As Egas explained:

That was really my first political awakening. I was also aware of arrests and interrogations in Dili, about a black Chevrolet which may have been used by Indonesian military intelligence [SGI] that went round at night picking people up. Things were certainly not as they should be [tidak beres] in Dili when I was growing up.

In 1986, I left primary school and went on to my junior high school [SMP]. One of the principal figures in terms of my dawning political awareness was a Timorese policeman who used to come round to the house. I didn't realize at the time that the policeman was in fact involved with the clandestine movement. From time to time, he would test us by throwing out questions like: "What is your view of the current situation?"; "Isn't the situation really quite unfair?"; "What do you think of the Indonesians?" He was sort of preparing the ground. Then I can remember on February 5, 1986, after the policeman had played football with us, he began to talk to us directly about the situation in East Timor. That was the first major awakening for us.

After the February 5, 1986 conversation, I was brought into contact via my policeman friend with the clandestine movement. Contact was made with a group in Atleu, which used to be a major military base during the Portuguese colonial period and had been a great center of Fretilin support in the early years of the war [1975–77]. My policeman friend helped us to have discussions about culture, about how East Timorese culture was different from that of inner island Indonesia, particularly Java and Bali, and he also talked about the economic situation, saying that although East Timor was not hugely rich, it nonetheless had sufficient resources to support itself. He said the reason people were dirt poor was because of the exploitation of the Indonesians.

Through these topics of conversation—both economic and cultural—which he brought up, I began to get a clearer sense of what the real situation was in the country. In 1986–87, I became involved in the underground resistance, and there were conversations and discussions about the two ways of going forward, namely, whether we should adopt the moderate route, or the more in-your-face, radical, and violent path. (Interview with Egas, Lisbon, April 8, 1999)
Martinho Maia Goncalves's, Aviano's, and Egas's very different experiences of political awakening can be usefully contrasted with that of Aviano's friend, João Dias, who was later to play such a crucial role as a witness to the military hospital killings which followed the November 12, 1991 Santa Cruz massacre. For João, it was the trauma of his father's death in 1984 after a period of prolonged torture at the hands of the Indonesian military that really shook him and brought him face-to-face with the realities of the Indonesian occupation. Again, this is the story of a Dili-based youngster who was still in the first year of Portuguese-language primary school when the Indonesians invaded in December 1975. Like Aviano, João came of age after going through the Indonesian school system in East Timor, although later he went to college in Java. His father, who had served in the Portuguese colonial army (*tropas*) and had risen to the rank of corporal, did his best to get along with Timor's new colonial masters. However his former career in the *tropas* became a liability when this fact was incautiously divulged by his parish priest to a local Indonesian army officer:

"My father was ex-Portuguese army, as he had been a corporal in the *tropas* (Portuguese colonial troops). The local Indonesian lieutenant-colonel asked the priest what my father had done during the Portuguese colonial period, and the priest rather incautiously gave away that my father was a member of the Portuguese army. The colonel made a joke of it and said: 'Well, in that case he could maybe enter the Indonesian army!' My father replied: 'I am well over forty
now and too old to contemplate a new military career.' That moment marked the
time when my father started to be constantly interrogated. Luckily, we were
staying with a priest [at] the time and the Indonesians did not dare arrest him.
But one year later [1976], we went back to live in Becora. My father was forced
to do guard duty at night to protect the local vegetable and fruit plots. They had
to carry sharp knives to kill any Fretilin who tried to get food. My father did not
want to do that duty. He said he did not want to kill other Timorese.

‘From the moment when he started to refuse guard duty, the family began to
have a really difficult time. My father was always being pulled in for questioning.
We lived at the time in [various places] in Kuluhun, Becora, and the kampung
[city neighborhood] of Bécussi. In the afternoon, my father went out to our
vegetable plot to get food. The Indonesian military [ABRI], however, used the
opportunity to steal my mother’s sewing machine and all our tins of food. My
father started to argue with ABRI, telling them to desist from taking our
belongings, but because they had guns and he did not it was all very difficult. It
was a time of great provocations. This went on through the late 1970s and early
1980s. Then in 1983, my father was arrested and did not come back. He went to
the sub-district military [Koramil] headquarters, and we went to find him there,
all eight of us. We were locked in the bathroom of the headquarters for a week
and were given one small basket of rice a day. I had an important role to play
because I had to translate my father’s Tetum into Indonesian because my father
couldn’t speak Bahasa. The Indonesian interrogators used their military belts.
Now one of these standard issue belts had a small buckle, but the other, which
was used for carrying heavy military equipment, had a very heavy buckle on it. It
was this they used to hit him over the head and in the abdomen. Maybe because
the torture was happening in front of his own children, he did not wince, show
pain, or move his head. In fact, he had a smile on his face. Nevertheless, the
torture was very severe. Both his stomach and his head swelled up. There was no
medicine for him. After seven days at the Koramil command post, we were
allowed home. But no sooner had we been home a bare two days than at five
o’clock in the morning we heard a knock on the front door. The Koramil command
was asking my father to return. My mother said, ‘Look, my husband can’t walk.
Why don’t you allow us to remain at home where we can find him some goat or
chicken and try to get him into a slightly stronger state?’ But the Koramil refused
to listen. They wanted us all to come. But when we turned up without my father,
they sent the seven of us to the Kodim, the district military office. The Kodim
commander said, ‘You’ve just [got] to go home and make sure that all of you turn
up!’ My mother said to me, ‘João, let us go to see Father [Alberto] Ricardo [a
well-known Timorese priest who was then in charge of the Motael parish]. Maybe
he can talk some sense into him.’ So Father Ricardo came with us to the East
Timor regional command [Korem] headquarters. At the time the commander-in-
chief [panglima] of the Indonesian army, General Leonardus Benyamin [‘Benny’]
Murdani [in office, 1983–88] was there. Father Ricardo tried to reason with the
Indonesian military. A huge number of phone calls were made to the Koramil and
Kodim, and eventually they made us a declaratory letter [serat pernyataan], and
we were all told to go. They said they wanted to send us all to prison, maybe to
the small offshore island of Ataúro where all the political prisoners were sent. In
fact, my father died just a few days later [March 15, 1984]. He died almost as
soon as he reached the hospital. The Indonesian military authorities made a joke of our misfortune: ‘Since the Portuguese were so good to you, they are going to send food, medicines, and everything else you need when you are in Atauro.’ But we knew the situation in Atauro was very grave for the people detained there, and many prisoners, especially the very young and very old, were dying. It was a dry, volcanic island, and there was no water. In fact, my mother reflected, ‘They wouldn’t even have got us to Atauro anyway. They would just have pushed us overboard as we were making the crossing.’ So she was determined we wouldn’t leave.”

“Was that the turning point in your life; your father’s death in such tragic and terrible circumstances?”

“Yes, I felt very bitter indeed against those who had tortured my father. But as life went on in the 1980s, I began to see that as part of history, part of my own family history. But on November 12, 1991 came the Santa Cruz massacre, and that reawakened with redoubled force all my old feelings of bitterness.”

(Interview with Joao Dias, Lisbon, April 10, 1999)

We will return to Joao’s testimony shortly, but now we must consider the responses of the “new” generation to this grievous situation: how did those Indonesian-educated and mainly Dili-based East Timorese survive? How did they manage to keep up appearances with their Indonesian neighbors, while deepening their clandestine resistance activities? The answers to these questions lie in the differing strategies they adopted, strategies which cover a range of tactics from outright confrontation to more or less ingenious forms of deception and subterfuge.

(iv) Sleeping with the Enemy

For the hot-headed Egas, direct confrontation was the answer. Together with some school friends, he decided to single out the most vulnerable amongst the Indonesian newcomer population, namely civilian professionals serving the Indonesian transmigrant community, of which perhaps as many as 100,000 (both official and unofficial) eventually had made their way to the territory in the course of the 1980s and 1990s.\(^\text{30}\) As we have seen from Martinho Maia Gonçalves’s testimony, their

\(^{30}\) For figures on the numbers of Indonesian transmigrants in this period, see Kiernan,” Demography of Genocide in Southeast Asia,” citing Soewartoyo, “Migrasi Internal di Timor Timur: Kajian di daerah tujuan pasca intergrasi,” Analisis CSIS, tahan 26 no. 3 (May-June 1997), pp. 265-75; and Frédéric Durand, Timor Loro Sae: pays au carrefour de l’Asie (Bangkok: IRASEC, 2002), p. 87. According to Kiernan, citing John Taylor, EastTimor: The Price of Freedom (London: Zed Books, 1999), p. 124, and Defert, Génocide Oublié, p. 182, the first officially sponsored transmigrants from Java and Bali (fifty out of an ultimate total of five hundred families, according to Taylor, six hundred families according to Defert) arrived in 1980, and most were sent to the fertile Maliana plain in the northwestern part of East Timor close to the frontier with West Timor. According to Defert, by 1984, some five thousand Balinese “model farmers” (petani teladan) had been settled across the territory, again most going to the western districts of Suai, Bobonaro, and Maliana, where some intermarried with the local population and would have stayed on after the August 30, 1999 independence referendum, but for the actions of the Indonesian military and pro-integrationist militias. Soewartoyo gives a total of 14,142 transmigrants for the period 1980-85, and a further 15,550 in 1986-88. After subtracting return and outward migration, which became easier after the official “opening” of East Timor in January 1989, Soewartoyo counts a figure of 33,618 “lifetime” transmigrants by 1990. This figure, however, does not take account of the large number of “unofficial” or self-directed transmigrants, particularly Bugis, Butonese, and Makasarese from South Sulawesi, who began to arrive in East Timor in ever larger numbers following the January 1989 “opening.” Taking these unofficial arrivals into account,
presence had changed the character of Dili from a predominantly Timorese to an Indonesian town:

In 1986–87, I was drawn towards the more confrontational stance. I can remember an incident in Becora in 1988 in which I attacked an Indonesian doctor in his surgery. The doctor and eight of his [Indonesian] patients were assaulted. Eight of my group were taken in for questioning; five were released and three brought before an examining magistrate. Two of these were released for being drunk and disorderly. One was imprisoned for a time. When he got out, he joined the resistance. I look back on this assault on the Indonesian doctor with a certain sense of shame because I feel that he was just carrying out his professional duties. However, there was a strong sense of antagonism at this time against Indonesian transmigrants. Even though they were innocent victims of the situation, they were nonetheless part and parcel of the Indonesian colonial occupation of East Timor. (Interview with Egas, Lisbon, April 8, 1999)

For young East Timorese women like Ana Maria Vitor ("Nina"), whose family were strong Fretilin supporters, the attitude adopted was less one of direct confrontation than an overt form of passive resistance. In part, this was due to her sex and the need to protect herself against the unwanted attentions of her Indonesian army neighbors in the Becora area. She explained:

"We had Indonesian neighbors in Dili, Indonesians serving in the military. They used to come round to our house from time to time to shoot the breeze and engage us in conversation. When they came round, they would come to the front of the house and sit down, and we would all go out to the back. So they would be sitting in the front alone. No one would serve them any food or drink. Then gradually the penny would drop, and they would realize that they were not wanted there. Partly, we didn’t want to speak with them because they always wanted to speak with the girls, and we soon realized that they had an ulterior motive."

"Did your parents encourage you to give them the cold shoulder?"

"No, it came entirely from ourselves. Even in junior [SMP] and senior [SMA] high school, the East Timorese and Indonesian students were both going their separate ways. We began to have separate groups at school both amongst our peer groups and friends." (Interview with Ana Maria Vitor, Alvalade, Lisbon, April 14, 1999)

For most young East Timorese males involved in the clandestine movement, such an overt form of resistance was deemed inappropriate because it would have aroused

Frédéric Durand estimates a figure of 85,000 by 1990, whereas the Italian Jesuit priest, Mauro di Nicola, in "East Timor—The Springs of Social Justice," Uniya Newsletter (Jesuit Social Justice Centre, Sydney) (Spring 1995), gives the much higher figure of 180,000 (out of a total population of 830,000) for the mid-1990s, a figure that must include the families of officials and military and police personnel. For a rather lower estimate (814,000) of the total population of East Timor at this time, see UN General Assembly, "East Timor," Working Paper prepared by the Special Committee on Decolonisation, June 17, 1996 (A/AC, 199/2049), 2, para 1; and for figures on the number of transmigrants in April 1997 (161,095 in the 15–60 age group in a total population of 867,000), see the statistics supplied by Dr. Armando Maia, Vice-Rector of the Universitas Timor Timur, during a visit by the present author to East Timor in April 1997, cited in Carey, “Personal Journey through East Timor,” pp. 26, 30, n. 25.
Indonesian suspicions. As noted above, Aviano Faria (born Dili, 1970) was the child of mixed blood Chinese-East Timorese parentage, who later survived the Santa Cruz (Dili) massacre (November 12, 1991). Earlier, I mentioned his view that silence was the golden rule when it came to dealing with the Indonesians, and that he needed to find other, more subtle, means to resist. During that interview, we invited him to expand on his remark, asking him if he meant a form of “spiritual resistance,” the sort that some pro-Free French showed the occupying Germans in Paris, when it was common to see people walking down the Champs Elysées with two staves (deux gaules) in hand to remind everyone of the existence of Charles de Gaulle, the head of the Free French Government in London? Or, did he mean something more overt, like Ana Maria Vitor’s never speaking to Indonesians unless spoken to, or answering in monosyllabic words, so the Indonesians would know they were not wanted? He answered:

No! The form of resistance we used was quite different from that. It was the sort that must never be noticed by the Indonesian military. We were always trying to get close to the Indonesians. We gave them all sorts of things to eat and drink. We invited them to festivals and to parties. In the Balide area where I lived in Dili, there were a lot of Indonesian professional and business people, and they had children. We got close to those children, and they mixed with us quite freely, and we were always asking them to our house, and we treated them like an elder to younger brother. We also invited members of the Indonesian army to play football and volleyball, so they would be lulled into a false sense of security, lulled into a sense that we had really accepted them, and we were like their own children. This was the way we lived amongst the Indonesians in a sort of double life: [taking] an outward apparent pleasure in their company and deepening [our] inner resistance. This was how things worked in a situation of complete domination. If we wanted to hold a meeting amongst our own group, what we would often do, if it was difficult to hold that meeting in private, would be to throw a party to which the Indonesians would be invited. In the midst of the party, while the Indonesians were dancing in the marquee outside in the garden, or drinking beer, we would gather in a room in the house surrounded by beer bottles. Speaking in Tetum Dili or Tetum Terik [an archaic form of Tetum used by some East Timorese communities mainly in the south of the country], we would discuss our own business while the party was in full swing. We would tell the Indonesians: “This is a party for you; this is a party for our ABRI brothers—make sure that security is tight so that nobody comes here to disturb us!”

This was a way of getting round the problem of actually holding meetings, because obviously, if one held a meeting in private with a lot of young people coming together, that would arouse a lot of suspicion amongst the Indonesians. But if the meeting was held as though it was a party in the midst of a larger party, and there were lots of young people getting together, then that would be seen as normal. No suspicions would be aroused, and we could actually share what we wanted to talk about together. We might discuss politics, we might discuss our family situations, or we might share snippets of information. And all this could be done under the very noses of the Indonesians, without in any way arousing their suspicions.

There were those who took the view that there should be a more outright form of confrontation and who behaved more radically. They took on their teachers at
school and started contradicting them. But we also succeeded in bringing these people around to our way of thinking. In my view, the path of confrontation was born of frustration. Some of their fathers had lost their jobs, and many had a very difficult situation at home. But we brought them around eventually to our way of thinking, which said that maybe the best way forward is to put up this pretended front to the Indonesians. (Interview with Aviano Faria, Lisbon, November 5, 1999)

The practical advantages of such a policy of ostensible friendship and acceptance are nicely illustrated by two contrasting testimonies from the 1990s, one by João Dias, who was working then for the Indonesian Army as a lab technician in the military hospital in Díli, and the other by Ejídio Dias Quintas, both of whom we have heard from above.

João witnessed the killings, which came to be known as the “second massacre,” immediately following the November 12, 1991 Santa Cruz bloodbath. Indeed, he explains how he intentionally maneuvered himself into a situation where he could use his professional position at the Díli military hospital to document and perhaps prevent some of the more underhand murders being carried out by the Indonesians on the hospital premises. Rather like Aviano and his friends, he feigned loyalty to and friendship with the Indonesians. This involved making a very public show of commitment to both his professional duties and the hospital where he served, in order to convince his Indonesian medical colleagues that he was the genuine article, a “new” generation Timorese who had assimilated Indonesian values:

I was at school at that time [in 1984 when my father was killed]: I hadn’t graduated from high school [SMA], so I worked my way through school by selling things on the street. I sold fried bananas, singkong [cassava], and cakes. Sometimes I was just so hungry that I ate everything there was on the plate I was selling from, and when I came back my mother was always cross with me, and gave me a hard time. Sometimes I bought bottles of drinks and sold them at a higher price. Sometimes I just sold ordinary dried firewood. [With the small income this brought me], I was able to work my way through high school, and eventually I went to Madiun in East Java to study at the Military Technical Analysis School [Sekolah Analisa Teknik Militer]. Since they paid my salary, they expected me to work for them, which indeed I did, until I eventually left East Timor in December 1993. I was not just any ordinary young official or student at school, and later in my work at the Wira Husada no. 4 Military Hospital, I thought a lot about how I could stop them killing people. I planted flowers in front of the hospital, and turned up to water them [every day]. When the Indonesian doctors and the other clinical staff saw that, they said: “João, you really love this hospital don’t you?” This gave me a special entree. The Indonesian staff thought I was quite special, but in fact I had a secret agenda. I wanted to see when they brought in grievously wounded Falintil soldiers, and get their names so that I could send these to Amnesty International or to the Legal Aid Foundation [Lembaga Bantu Hukum, LBH] in Jakarta to make sure that

31 On this second massacre, see Max Stahl, “Indonesians fed ‘Death Pills’ to Wounded,” Sunday Times (February 13, 1994).
when the Indonesians tortured them they were not going to be killed. We knew
only too well what usually happened to wounded Falintil members. Indeed, we
only have to recall what happened to the commandant of the Falintil Second
Sector in Baucau, David Alex [David da Costa], who was wounded in a gun
battle in Baucau [June 25, 1997], and died later that day [following extensive
torture by SGI], after he had been taken by military helicopter to the Wira
Husada hospital in Dili. So in fact I had a secret role. I was there in the hospital
as a secret witness. I was not there just as any other ordinary young person
working as a lab technician. I was there in a special role. On November 12, 1991,
came the Santa Cruz massacre, and that reawakened with redoubled force all my
old feelings of bitterness. I was forced to take part in a second massacre that
involved the poisoning and killing of my friends who were brought into the
military hospital, and were drugged to death [with formaldehyde pills] by the
Indonesian authorities. I felt strongly enough about this to tell the filmmaker Max
Stahl, [who shot the video footage of the Santa Cruz massacre later shown in
numerous TV news broadcasts, films, and reports on East Timor]. I also sent
news of what I had witnessed to the offices of the Legal Aid Foundation, as well
as to Holland and the outside world. Max said he wanted to publish this [and]
tell the whole world about the second massacre. He said, “Look, if you are going
to tell the world about this, your life will not be secure here in Timor. Please try to
get out. I suggest you go to Geneva to tell the UN Human Rights Commission
[UNHRC] what has happened.” I asked my mother what I should do, and she
said: “I would prefer to have a son who is still alive but far from me than a son
who is dead by my side.” So I got out and went to Geneva, Canada, and Japan to
testify. That was the way I saw that I would be able to continue to support our
struggle. (Interview with João Dias, Lisbon, April 10, 1999)

João’s older contemporary, Domingos Sarmento Alves, who had arrived in Dili
from Viqueque in July 1981, also saw an opportunity to deepen his commitment to the
clandestine movement while pretending to be a fully assimilated “new generation”
Timorese. As he told us:

In 1984, there was an announcement from the Indonesian government in Dili
that every student who got through their senior high school [SMA] graduation
exams would get a guaranteed place in an inner-island Indonesian university. So
we had a chink of light here. We began to meet in discussion groups amongst
friends at the SMA to encourage each other to study hard, so that we could go on
to university. In 1986, we founded a sort of study group. We began to vie with

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32 David Alex Daitula (1950-97), the son of a liurai family in Baucau and charismatic commander of the
Falintil Second Military District, was captured following a gun battle with Indonesian special forces in
Baucau at 2.30 am on June 25, 1997. He sustained wounds in his arm and right leg which prevented him
escaping. He was taken by Kopassus to the SGI “Red House” (Gedung Merah) interrogation center in
Baucau, where he appears to have been extensively tortured. He died in hospital during the night of June
25/26 after having been flown by military helicopter to Dili and was buried in secret at Bidau-Santana
cemetery at 8.30 the following morning without any of his family being informed or allowed to see his body.
See Amnesty International (London), “Report: David Alex was Shot in Battle,” July 1 1997. See also,

33 Broadcast by Yorkshire TV (January 7 1992) in the documentary by Peter Gordon, “In Cold Blood: The
Massacre of East Timor.”
Peter Carey

our Javanese and other inner-island Indonesian classmates academically. As it turned out, 98 percent of my SMA year group got through their exams, and many were able to go on to university. It was then that I developed a sort of plan. I was aware that the Indonesians aimed to send the brightest and best East Timorese out to Java and Bali for tertiary education. This would facilitate integration and inculcate in us a sense of racial, cultural, and educational identity with the Indonesians. We saw straight through this, but decided that we would go to Java and Bali anyway to turn the Indonesian strategy on its head by actually engaging with younger generation Indonesians. While the Indonesian government hoped that we would return from our studies feeling like Indonesians, we decided we would begin to educate our fellow Indonesian students about what was going on in East Timor.

It was partly because of this that we founded Renetil, the East Timorese Students’ National Resistance organization, in 1988. We wanted to prevent the isolation of East Timorese students in the economic, cultural, and political spheres. We also tried to use the facilities that the Indonesians gave us to support the struggle in East Timor. Ten percent of our scholarship money was put into a Renetil fund, and we used this to buy food, clothes, medicines, and other necessities for the resistance, and to send information about the struggle outside the country. So we were essentially part of the clandestine front. Every major town and city in Java and Bali where there was a university had a Renetil office, and we contacted every Timorese student who came out to inner-island Indonesia to join our organization. In fact, every Renetil member had a task. We had a political research and analysis department to investigate trends in world opinion following the end of the Cold War, and we also had a propaganda department to get through to Indonesian students on campus. We had a big job here countering official Indonesian propaganda that East Timor was a backward Portuguese colony that they had gone [on] to develop; and that there were no human rights abuses. We tried shock tactics. If an Indonesian student asked us: “What do you eat in East Timor? Do you eat rice?” we would reply “No, we eat bullets there!” We would then start a conversation about the various types of oppression we suffered. We talked frankly about what was going on, bringing out photos, cassettes, letters, and other writings. We made contact with the university senates and debated the situation saying, “Our struggle is with Suharto, not the Indonesian people. It is a struggle like yours against the Dutch in the 1920s and 1930s. Moreover, at least ten thousand Indonesian soldiers have perished in East Timor since the December 1975 invasion. It is a huge drain on your resources.” In this way, we made every effort to get through to Indonesian intellectuals and tell them what was going on. We even gave some of these people Tetum code names: Dr. George Aditjondro of the Christian University in Salatiga [Universitas Satya Wacana], for example, was known as “Railakan” [lightning flash]. (Interview with Domingos Sarmento Alves, Lisbon, November 13, 1999)

By the 1990s, especially after the international outcry over the November 12, 1991 Santa Cruz massacre, this policy began to pay off in terms of support from radical Indonesian student groups such as Infight, which were themselves campaigning for an
end to the Suharto dictatorship and political reform (*reformasi*) in Indonesia.34 Increasing numbers of pro-democracy activists in these groups started to realize that the struggle for *reformasi* in Indonesia proper and the resolution of the East Timor problem were closely linked. They would also later acknowledge the part played by the East Timor issue in bringing about the fall of Suharto in May 1998. By this time, Renetil’s strategy of engaging with Indonesian students had helped spawn several new solidarity organizations, including SMIT (Solidaritas Mahasiswa Indonesia Timor, Indonesia-Timor Student Solidarity), an offshoot of the radical PRD, Fortilos (Forum Timor Loro Sae, East Timor Forum), successor to an organization set up to help East Timorese facing trial after the Santa Cruz massacre, and Solidamor (Solidaritas Mahasiswa untuk Penyelesaian Damai Timor Timur, Student Solidarity Organization for a Peaceful Settlement in East Timor), which campaigned for self-determination in East Timor and a peaceful end to the conflict.35 Renetil was also remarkably successful in getting information about what was happening in Timor out of the territory; the Australian lawyer, Robert Domm’s, interview with Xanana Gusmão in his mountain base near Ainaro in September 1990 being perhaps its greatest coup.36

Unlike Domingos, João, and the others whose testimony we have heard in this section, Ejídio was not a Díli resident or a graduate of an inner-island Indonesian university, but came to the Timorese capital after finishing his administration and bookkeeping course in Lospalos. This was some two years after João and Aviano (himself a Santa Cruz victim) had fled East Timor for Portugal (December 1993), and a year after Domingos had organized the highly successful sit-in by twenty-nine East Timorese protesters at the US Embassy in Jakarta at the time of the November 1994 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit that resulted in his own exile in Portugal.37 By this time, the situation in Díli had stabilized somewhat, and there were good work opportunities available. Ejídio came to Díli to take up a job in a Surakarta-based transport company, PT Wiracita, which had offices in that city, all the while continuing his support for the Falintil fighters in the mountains:

I was working at that time for the resistance and my duties were to provide a link with the *estafeta* which provided communications and supplies to the Falintil units in the mountains. I worked in the PT Wiracita transport office; they gave me

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34 These Indonesian pro-democracy groups played a significant role following the Santa Cruz massacre in organizing the public demonstration on November 19, 1991 in Jakarta during which seventy—mostly Indonesian — demonstrators were arrested. See Jonathan Thatcher, “East Timor Protesters Detained in Indonesian Capital,” *Reuters* (Jakarta), November 19, 1991; and personal communication, Liem Soei Liong, August 12, 2003.


36 For a detailed description of Robert Domm’s visit, see Pinto and Jardine, *Unfinished Struggle*, pp. 126-34. Domm’s interview was broadcast by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) Radio National on October 28, 29, and 30, 1990 under the title “Report from the Mountains of East Timor: Interview with Resistance Guerrilla Commander, Shanana [sic] Gusmão.”

a motorbike, and also a house in Dili, where I also hid one of the guerrilla commanders, Commandante Riak. I went around everywhere between Lospalos and Ermera, which was where the Falintil supreme commander, [Nino] Konis Santana [1959–98], was operating at the time. My fate was good. I was able to carry out my duties without ever being arrested, or tortured, or in other ways bothered by the Indonesians. I was able to carry letters for the guerrillas; going back to my home village from time to time, and using the house in Dili, where Commandante Riak was hiding, to make many contacts, to meet people, and to get information out to foreign journalists while they were visiting Dili. We knew we would soon be free. At that time, I was a friend of a certain Indonesian lieutenant, Murdani, from Infantry Battalion 527, an East Javanese battalion. He often came to my house. I did it on purpose [cultivating this friendship] so that the Indonesians would have no suspicions about me, and so that Lt. Murdani would himself not suspect anything. He often came to hang out at my house; to drink, smoke, and relax. And all the while Commandante Riak was in another room in the house, but the Indonesian lieutenant never knew that there was a guerrilla commander right there under his nose in the very same building!

(Interview with Ejidio Dias Quintas, Lisbon, November 9, 1999)

By the time Ejidio was working in Dili on behalf of the resistance in 1995–97, it was clear to him that the days of the Indonesian occupation were numbered:

People were becoming more and more bold in terms of the actions they were taking. They were becoming bolder too in facing down the Indonesian army. There were lots and lots of difficulties being made for the Indonesian transmigrants, and we knew from the way things were going that the occupation was not for very much longer. Our purpose was to get world attention about what was going on in East Timor, which meant getting information out to journalists, or to anyone else who was visiting. We were not against the Indonesian people per se; we were essentially fighting to be a self-standing and independent country. We were not fighting the Indonesian people. The Indonesians were just ordinary people like ourselves. We did not accept the Indonesian regime, but we were not against the ordinary people of Indonesia. (Interview with Ejidio Dias Quintas, Lisbon, November 9, 1999)

Although Ejidio himself had to flee East Timor in February 1997, eventually seeking asylum in Portugal after entering the French embassy in Jakarta, his feeling that the occupation did not have long to run was soon to be borne out by events in Indonesia. During the next two years (1998–99), following the fall of Suharto on May 21, 1998, his successor, the mercurial Ir B. J. Habibie (in office, 1998–99) offered in quick succession promises of wider autonomy (June 9, 1998), and then of a referendum on Timor’s political future, including the choice of separation from Indonesia (“berpisah dengan Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia”) (January 27, 1999). Eventually, on August 30, 1999, the Timorese people themselves cast their brave and overwhelming vote for independence in the face of TNI-inspired militia violence that ultimately laid waste the whole territory and displaced two-thirds of the population before the September 20, 1999 arrival of the Australian-led International Force in East Timor (InterFET).

Throughout this period, many of the Indonesian-educated “new” generation activists and students (850 from universities in Java, Bali, Lombok, and Lampung
alone) left their studies to return to East Timor, at Xanana Gusmão’s urging, to help prepare the population for the referendum. The same happened in East Timor itself, where students from the University of Timor Timur (UNTIM) and the Polytechnic in Hera (just to the east of Dili) threw themselves enthusiastically into the campaign, some paying with their lives at the hands of the Indonesian military and pro-autonomy militias. An umbrella organization, the Presidium Juventude Loriku Ass‘wain Timor Loro Sa’e (The Youth Presidium of the Parakeet Warriors of Timor Loro Sae), which formed under the aegis of the National Council of East Timorese Resistance (CNRT) to unify all the youth movements in East Timor, also facilitated cooperation amongst the various student and youth organizations (Ojetil, Renetil, etc.) ahead of the vote.38 Thus the role played by the younger generation in ensuring the success of the referendum was significant, and reflected the survival skills learned by them under the uniquely challenging conditions of the occupation.

Conclusions

The forging of a “new” generation in the fires of the occupation is one of the most significant developments of the Indonesian period. The educational, linguistic, and political experience of the years 1975–99 produced a cohort of East Timorese, now in their late twenties and thirties, who were able to make a significant contribution to the independence struggle. The emergence of the urban-based clandestine movement, particularly in Dili, in the late 1980s was heavily dependent on their skills. Their knowledge of Indonesia, its language, and its institutions (particularly the modus operandi of its army and police force) far surpassed that of their Portuguese-educated seniors, ending for good the Salazarist-imposed isolation or “fado-style tragedy” (fado, fateful), as José Ramos Horta put it.39

During these twenty-four years, Timorese society changed profoundly. The colonially distorting images of Indonesia as a place of “Chinese” misters (tuau) and Atambua-based border crossers were replaced by a more realistic vision of the country. Although Indonesian poverty, brutality, and backwardness may have been confirmed following the December 1975 invasion, sheer survival during the occupation necessitated a much keener understanding of the way in which Indonesians thought and operated. Members of the “new” Indonesian-schooled generation acquired this knowledge, often through bitter experience, and learned how to live alongside the Indonesians in seeming acceptance of their rule, while disguising their own support for the resistance. The Santa Cruz massacre of November 12, 1991 may have stripped this fiction bare, but almost to the last many senior Indonesian generals and intelligence officers remained convinced that a pro-integration vote could be secured, evincing a

39 See Horta, Funu, p. 45. “Fado” from the Latin fatum (fate), in modern Portuguese has the meaning of “destiny one cannot avoid” or “yearning for things lost,” in particular lost or unrequited love. In Lisbon, it is especially associated with a form of blues-style vocal music set in the slow modinha mode and played on the guitar or Portuguese mandolin, which was brought back to Portugal from Brazil in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. A lament for the tragedy of life and of things past and gone, it epitomizes all the melancholy—some would say, lugubriousness—of the Portuguese soul and of the country’s faded colonial glory. Its greatest recent exponent was Amália Rodrigues (1920–99), the so-called “queen of fado,” who made a brief visit to East Timor to entertain the Portuguese colonial garrison in the early 1970s.
The strategy of the younger generation in lulling the Indonesians into a false sense of security—for example, through participating in the June 7, 1999 Indonesian general elections—contributed critically here. At the same time, their successful cultivation of sympathetic pro-democracy student groups in Indonesia assured them solidarity during the crucial transition years of the mid- to late 1990s, when Indonesia passed with surprising speed from Suhartoist autocracy to the false dawn of democracy and reformasi under interim Presidents B. J. Habibie (1998–99) and Aburrahman Wahid (1999–2001). The brief window of political opportunity that swung open at this time (and closed all too soon after the accession of Megawati Sukarnoputri in July 2001) gave East Timor its chance of freedom, a chance seized in part by the Gerakan fou\(\text{ou}\) and their skillful pre-referendum campaign in April-August 1999.

Partial though they are, the oral testimonies of the “new” generation exiles in Lisbon in the late 1990s point to a clear pattern of gathering political awareness beginning in junior high school (SMP) and continuing on through senior high school (SMA) and university. Compulsory courses in Indonesian national history and the 1945 Constitution taught by inner-island Indonesian schoolmasters, who had difficulty disguising their sense of embarrassment at questions on Timor’s different experience of colonial rule, sharpened political convictions favoring separateness. What formal Indonesian schooling left unfinished, the education of the street completed, with members of the Gerakan fou\(\text{ou}\) undergoing a crash course in survival in a Timor in which the rule of law was enforced through the barrels of Indonesian guns. The ability to think quickly and know the strengths and weaknesses of their new Malae (foreign) masters often meant the difference between life and death. Lessons learned under these conditions are not easily forgotten. In present-day Timor Loro Sa’e, the legacy of this generation of occupation survivors is perhaps the country’s most precious resource. But what honor will they have in a nation where the Portuguese-educated 1975 generation still seem to call the shots?

Postscript

On December 3, 2002, the violent arrest of a twenty-year-old secondary school student by the East Timorese National Police (Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste, PNTL) in the midst of a school examination sparked protests by his fellow students and teachers. The following day, the level of violence escalated as the students were joined by other protesters, who began to gather around key buildings in the center of Dili, including the parliament, government offices, and the UN Police headquarters. During the following hours, hundreds of rounds of live ammunition were fired into the crowd.

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40 See Moore, “Indonesian Military’s Last Years in East Timor,” pp. 30, 34, quoting General Feisal Tanjung, then Coordinating Minister on Politics and Security in President Habibie’s (in office, 1998-99) government. As late as June 1999, some were still reporting that some 75 percent of the East Timorese were in favor of integration with Indonesia, and that only a handful of anak nakal (naughty children) amongst the Indonesian-educated Timorese students were causing problems. The fact that over a third of the 400,000-strong Timorese electorate participated in the June 7, 1999 general election, casting a 47 percent vote for the government’s Golkar party and 35 percent for Megawati’s PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia–Perjuangan, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle), certainly helped to keep the fiction of widespread pro-integrationist sentiment amongst the wider East Timorese population alive.
by the police, mostly by members of the newly formed and inexperienced Rapid Intervention Unit (RIU). A secondary school student was shot and killed outside the National University (Universidade Timor-Leste) opposite the parliament building, and three others were injured. Later in the morning, another youth was killed and six more wounded as the RIU fired on fleeing protesters in the Colmera area just to the west of the town center. Throughout the day, as the center of Dili was turned into a free fire zone, protesters moved between various parts of the city burning buildings and looting. Amongst the places attacked were Prime Minister Mário Alkatiri's Kompong Alor residence and that of his brother (both buildings were burnt to the ground). The Dili mosque and several foreign-owned businesses, including the Australian-owned downtown supermarket "Hello Mister," were similarly targeted, some being set on fire; others were looted. Eyewitnesses reported that the crowd was being directed on the ground by individuals seen riding ahead on motorbikes. Some even spoke of influential figures fanning tensions by making provocative speeches scorning the PNTL. The selection of sites was thought to be intentional, reflecting "new" generation discontent with the prime minister and his close political allies, as well as the economic influence of foreigners, especially Australians. Some seventy-seven people were arrested that day, and twenty-eight more on December 5, the majority of whom were not involved in the violence, but were innocent bystanders, including children making their way home from school. In the highly charged atmosphere of the Dili police headquarters, witnesses saw PNTL officers hitting and punching detainees as they were brought in for questioning. All but nine were released during the following three days, and a semblance of calm was restored.41

What can we make of this bloody event, the worst in East Timor's history since the immediate post-August 30, 1999 referendum violence? Might this be excused as part of the inevitable trials of a newly independent state, a country still living with the consequences of the Indonesian occupation—dirt poor, partially fledged, and administratively inexperienced? Perhaps. But it also may reflect a deeper social malaise. With the return of the 1975 generation of political exiles from their lusophone and antipodean diasporas, and the descent of the older Falintil commanders from the mountains, a new battle has been joined in East Timor. To borrow Daw Aung San Suu Kyi of Burma's telling phrase, the "new" generation in East Timor are now engaged in their "second struggle for independence," a struggle to secure a new democratic future for their country and ensure that the skills learned during the Indonesian period are validated in the post-independence era.42 As Bernardina Fernandes Alves put it to us:

We have to realize there are now two major influences on our country. One was, of course, the 450-year legacy of the Portuguese. The other was the impact of the Indonesian invaders. These two have profoundly shaped our culture and society.

. . . . . There are lots of good people who have been schooled under the Indonesians. Well over a thousand graduated from universities in inner-island


42 Daw Suu was referring in her original remark to the Burmese anti-colonial struggle against the British in 1908-42 and the present-day fight for democracy in military-ruled Burma which her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), has spearheaded since its formation in September 1988.
Indonesia alone during the occupation. Amongst these are many fine, educated, and capable people. We do not necessarily have to look to those who lived outside and studied in Portugal, Canada, Australia, or the UK. As for the Falintil commanders in the mountains, they also learned an enormous amount. These are the people we will have to draw on in terms of the leadership potential of our country. The younger generation, who grew up in the Indonesian period and mastered Bahasa, they will have a special function in guiding our country in terms of its future relations with Indonesia. Maybe we are going to be in for a big culture shock. So many of us have lived outside the country for so long, it's going to be really hard for us when we all get back together in East Timor. We must be prepared for the long haul. We must learn to work together and develop a lot of compassion, accommodation, and forgiveness for one another. (Interview with Bernardina Fernandes Alves, *nom-de-guerre* “Ohar,” Lisbon, April 12, 1999)

Nowhere is this need for compassion, forgiveness, and accommodation more evident now than in the struggle over language, an issue which had much less salience during the occupation proper, when Bahasa appears to have been easily adopted as a *lingua franca*, at least amongst the Indonesian-educated urban elite.43

Why then is this the issue apparently fueling such tensions along generational lines? There is, of course, much more than language at stake here. Briefly put, however, the decision to adopt Portuguese as a national language, a decision taken at the CNRT (Conselho Nacional de Resistência Timorense, National Council of Timorese Resistance) conference in Dili in August 2000 on the initiative of 1975-generation leaders such as José Ramos Horta and Xanana Gusmão, made members of the younger generation born and schooled during the occupation feel that their entire educational

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43 The issue of language in present-day East Timor requires a separate study in its own right. During the occupation, the Portuguese-educated, 1975 leadership generation continued to use Portuguese as their favored language of discourse, at least amongst fellow members of the elite (with non-elite Timorese, they spoke either in Tetum or in one of the regional languages). Some of those we interviewed, for example, José Augustinho Sequeira, *nom-de-guerre* Somotxo, (born 1960), a former bodyguard of Xanana Gusmão and later adjutant to both Falintil chief-of-staff Taur Matan Ruak (1990–94) and Commander Nino Konis Santana (1994–98), who joined the armed resistance in his native Lospalos in September 1976 at the age of sixteen when the Indonesians had yet to exercise full control over the region, never learnt Indonesian and continued to use Portuguese, Tetum, and his native Fataluku throughout the war. One of the reasons was that he remained fighting in the mountains for the entire occupation and never had occasion to study Bahasa. Interview with José Augustinho Sequeira (Somotxo), Lisbon, April 15, 2000. Those few who survived the war in the mountains were also ignorant of Bahasa, as were the Fretlín, UDT ( União Democrática Timorense, Timorese Democratic Union), and other political leaders who escaped into lusophone exile and sat out the occupation in Portugal or the former Portuguese colonies in Africa. However, the Catholic Church in Timor, the only quasi-independent institution in East Timor during the occupation, did deal directly with the language issue by refusing to adopt Bahasa as the language of the liturgy, when Portuguese was banned by Jakarta in 1981, and opting for Tetum instead. The *Colégios* (Church centers), where often the wives, children, and orphans of guerrilla fighters were looked after, also kept alive both the Portuguese language and lusophone traditions throughout the occupation. (The *Colégios* consisted of a parish church; a convent for priests, ordained religious, lay brothers, and nuns; a boarding school for boys and girls; and a large tract of land partly rented out to local farmers and partly cultivated by the boarders themselves to grow food for their school kitchens.) See Peter Carey, “The Catholic Church, Religious Revival and the Nationalist Movement in East Timor, 1975–98,” *Indonesia and the Malay World* 27,78 (1999): 83–6.
experience under the Indonesians was being set at naught. Given the abysmal economic situation at the present time, a situation which is not likely to improve until 2004-5, when the first royalties (US$25-50 million a year) are received from the offshore LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) fields in the Timor Gap in significant amounts, many well-qualified “new” generation East Timorese are now unemployed and have little prospect of getting white-collar jobs in the near future. Some sense that they could well become the equivalent of a “lost” generation. The older (pre-1975 generation) elite, who were educated in Portuguese-language schools or lived in exile in Portugal and the lusophone colonies in Africa (Angola, Mozambique, Cabo Verde, Guinea-Bissau, São Tome e Príncipe), have succeeded to power in the new political order. The new “independence” generation, born in the mid- to late 1990s, and now entering primary school, will soon taste the fruits of a lusophone education. In contrast, the Indonesian-educated occupation generation feel that they are to some extent being ignored. Some fear that by the time the pre-1975 generation move on and the economy improves enough to secure them jobs, they will not be in a position to benefit from the new opportunities. Instead, they worry that they may be leap-frogged by the “independence” generation, who will have the language skills and educational advantages to command the top political and administrative posts in the new hydrocarbon-rich and OPEC-affiliated East Timor when they eventually graduate a decade hence. Existing tensions along generational lines have already spilled over into violence, as evidenced by the December 4, 2002 events detailed above.

Even at the highest levels of government there appear to be doubts about the wisdom of the language policy. This was vividly illustrated by a comment made by one of the few members of the occupation generation to secure a cabinet post in the new Fretilin-dominated administration, Arsénio Paixão Bano, Minister for Labor and Solidarity, who said that he was getting increasingly frustrated attending cabinet meetings conducted solely in Portuguese, when he alone amongst the cabinet ministers had little knowledge of that language. He wanted to express himself in Tetum (the lingua franca and second national language of East Timor) or Indonesian. The fact that some members of the 1975 generation elite—though not the current Prime Minister, Mário Alkatiri, whose family is of Yemeni Arab extraction and whose first childhood language was Malay—have no knowledge of Indonesian, and only a passive understanding of Tetum, is viewed negatively by the occupation generation, not to speak of the wider population, most of whom know some Bahasa but are almost wholly ignorant of Portuguese. It is significant that when Bishop Belo offered a literary prize for the best work by young Timorese poets and writers shortly before his resignation as Bishop on November 26, 2002 and subsequent departure for Portugal, a prize designed to encourage literary compositions in Tetum and Portuguese, most of the best work submitted in the poetry category was in Bahasa. While Belo took this in good spirit and immediately broadened the submission qualifications to include Indonesian compositions, most members of the older Portuguese-educated generation now in power may be less accommodating. The new Justice Minister, Ana Pessoa, for example, is insisting on the exclusive use of Portuguese in her department, and José Ramos Horta has gone on record dismissing Bahasa as “a language of donkeys,”

44 Interview with Arsénio Paixão Bano, Dili, September 10, 2002.
echoing the views of the Javanese prince, Pangeran Dipanagara (1785–1855), nearly two centuries earlier, who declared that "Malay is the language of chickens that no ruler in Java wishes to hear."46

In the international context, however, the choice of Portuguese is by no means as irrational as some of the younger generation critics make out. After the Indonesian invasion, the UN member states that actually helped East Timor when no one else would—apart from the former colonial power, Portugal, which did rather little in the 1976–82 period—were the recently liberated Portuguese African colonies. Mozambique, for example, bankrolled José Ramos Horta as East Timor’s unofficial representative at the United Nations General Assembly in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and provided safe haven in Maputo for a number of Fretilin leaders, including Alkatiri. Even the right-wing regime in Portuguese-speaking Brazil offered support from time to time, especially in the late 1990s.47 So reliance on the lusophone world has proven its worth. Moreover, in terms of international reach, Portuguese is a far more internationally connected language than Indonesian.48 It remains the language of state in Portugal’s former African colonies and in Brazil, where the 180 million-strong population has developed its lusophone inheritance in new and exciting ways. As for Tetum, many years of linguistic development will be necessary to bring it up to the level of an effective national language.

One other benefit of choosing Portuguese is that it would make any future subversion by Jakarta far more difficult by creating a linguistic line between East and West Timor that will be much sharper and easier to monitor. The only drawback at the moment appears to be the sheer cost of the Portuguese national language policy that will weigh heavily on the cash-strapped Timor Loro Sa’e government for years to come. For example, the bill for translating and publishing proceedings in the National Assembly and the criminal courts in four languages (Tetum, Indonesian, Portuguese, and English) is likely to top US$6 million, or nearly 10 percent of the total budget of US$65 million in fiscal 2002–3. There must also be a question about whether distant and economically straitened Portugal really has the political will to continue contributing the resources necessary to ensure the success of the current policy of lusophonization in East Timor over an extended ten to twenty-year period.

46 José Ramos Horta’s remark was reported to me by Arnold Kohen, personal communication, August 8, 2003; and on Dipanagara’s view, see Algemeen Rijksarchief (The Hague), Johannes van den Bosch Private Collection 391, J. H. Knoerle, “Aanteekeningen gehouden door den 2e Luit. J.H. Knoerle betreffende de dagelyksche verkeering van dien officer met den Prins van Djocjakarta gedurende eene reis van Batavia naar Menado, het exil van den genoemden Prins,” Menado, June 20, 1830, p. 41.

47 For a highly personal and idiosyncratic account of Horta’s years at the UN, see Ramos-Horta, Funu, pp. 97-158, 165-72.

48 Outside the 230-million strong population of Indonesia, Bahasa is only spoken in the tiny oil-rich sultanate of Brunei (340,000) and Malaysia (22 million). While in terms of total numbers of Indonesian/Malay speakers (over 250 million) this may seem impressive, the countries of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (Communidade dos Pais da Lingua Portuguesa, CPLP) outweigh Bahasa-speaking Southeast Asia linguistically (there are some 300 million Portuguese speakers worldwide), as well as diplomatically and economically. In Brazil’s case, in terms of the size of its domestic economy reckoned in per capita GDP terms: in fiscal 2002–3 this amounted to US $500 billion, making it the ninth largest economy in the world, three times the size of Indonesia’s (US$145 billion) and over twice that of Malaysia’s (US$200 billion).
If members of the “new” generation want to succeed to power during the coming decade, they must show a greater understanding of the political realities. Instead of rioting in downtown Dili, they should use the current electoral system to organize an effective, uncorrupt, and non-gangsterish electoral opposition to the Portuguese-educated generation who have come to power in the post-referendum period. After all, as Indonesian-language speakers, they belong to a far greater electoral majority than do the tiny lusophone elite. But they must make their case politically, rather than by violence. Moreover, if they want to secure a future for themselves in a Timor where Bahasa is still used, it is incumbent on them to produce a new generation of Indonesian-language speakers. If they fail here, not only will Timor be the poorer, but their fears of becoming a “lost” generation will be only too tragically fulfilled.

Erratum: The author notes that the name, Ejídio, which recurs in the text, should be spelled Egídio.