INTERVIEW WITH
MARIO CARRASCALÃO

This transcript is an abridged version of a four-hour interview with Mário Carrascalão on March 20, 2002 at the Acait Bistro in Dili, East Timor. It focuses primarily on Mário Carrascalão’s relations with the Indonesian government and military from 1975 until the end of his second term as Governor of East Timor in 1992. The interview was conducted by Ben Anderson, Arief Djati, and Douglas Kammen. The interviewers’ questions have been deleted in order to save space and avoid the distraction of multiple voices.

The Carrascalão family has been intimately involved in East Timorese politics for half a century. Born in São Braz de Alportel in the Algarve, Portugal, Manuel Viegas Carrascalão worked as a printer in Lisbon and was a prominent anarchist and trade union leader in the 1920s. In 1927, after being arrested for his political activities, he was deported to Portuguese Timor, where he married the daughter of a Timorese liurai (chief). The couple had ten children. The Carrascalão family remained in Portuguese Timor during the Japanese occupation, but after the World War II the family returned to Portugal. In 1946, Manuel Viegas Carrascalão was “pardoned” by President Salazar, the head of Portugal’s fascist Estado Novo (New Order) regime, and asked to return to Portuguese Timor, where he was given a vast coffee plantation and later became Mayor of Dili.

The fifth of ten children, Mário Carrascalão studied forestry in Lisbon, served as head of the Forestry and Agriculture Department in Portuguese Timor, and was a member of the ruling Portuguese National Action Party. In 1974 he was a founding member and President of the Timorese Democratic Union. In 1977 he joined the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and from 1982–1992 served as Governor of East Timor under Suharto’s New Order. He lives in Dili and is the head of the Social Democratic Party and a member of parliament.

1 Three other people were present during the interview: Djuanda [full name], Ganang [full name] and Johanna Maria.
I. The Timorese Democratic Union: 1975–1976

As everyone knows, I was one of the founders of the first political party in Portuguese Timor which aimed to prepare East Timor for independence. That was UDT [the Timorese Democratic Union]. But what happened is that in August [1975], outside of my control, UDT carried out a coup d’état.

When the coup happened, I was in the south as the head of the Department of Agriculture and Forestry. On August 6, I left Dili for the south coast where there were several experimental centers. On the way there I met Xavier do Amaral, who was traveling from Maubisse to Turiskai with two or three thousand of his followers. Even though I was the head of the UDT political committee, I only heard about the coup by radio on the afternoon of the 12th. What’s going on, I asked, what’s going on? The coup was carried out by the right wing [members of the party]. They said they were forced to do it because they heard that Fretilin planned a coup for August 15. I wasn’t there, so I don’t know. I wasn’t involved, and this was already a fait accompli. You could say it was a fait accompli.

The next day, the 13th, a man named Sarmento, who happened to be on my staff, showed up and said: “You have to be in Same at five in the afternoon. I’m in charge here.” This is the story. On the way there he arrested someone who had malaria. I said he shouldn’t treat people who work with us that way. He responded that they would stage a counter coup and kill everyone.

On August 15, I was able to return to Dili because my brother Joao came to Same in a plane piloted by an Australian named Roger. They landed in Same bringing weapons or something.

When I returned to Dili there was a civil war, you could say it was a civil war. UDT was in control, but I didn’t have any authority any longer. My younger brother Joao was the commander of the August 11 anti-communist movement. They were in power, so I couldn’t do anything. Fretilin hadn’t countered yet, but they were making preparations. Then it turned into a war between parties, with UDT and Fretilin confronting each other.

Those of us from UDT retreated to the border. We were still on the East Timor side of the border, but because Fretilin attacked with mortars we were forced to cross into

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2 Before the Armed Forces Movement coup in Portugal on April 25, 1974, the only political party allowed in East Timor was Portugal’s ruling National Action Party (Accao Nacional Popular). Mário Carrascalão was a representative of ANP.
3 The Timorese Democratic Union (União Democratica Timorense, UDT) was founded on May 11, 1974. Mário Carrascalão was the first party President.
4 The coup was staged on August 11, 1975.
5 Francisco Xavier do Amaral was the President of the Revolutionary Front of an Independent East Timor (Frente Revolucionário do Timor Leste Independente, Fretilin). He is currently Vice President of the Democratic Republic of East Timor.
6 By August 1975, Francisco Lopes da Cruz had replaced Mário Carrascalão as President of UDT. In 2000, he was the Indonesian ambassador to Greece.
7 This was called the Movimento Revolucionário Anti-Comunista.
Indonesian territory. This had all been set up by the Indonesian government—by Bakin agents Louis Taolin, Anton Papilaya (whose real name is Anton Sumarjo, a good man), and Sinaga. They were in Atambua. They organized for the group that carried out the coup to hold a demonstration to declare that the entire population of East Timor was in favor of integration with Indonesia. I said to them: “We want help from Indonesia, but when things return to normal we want the people to decide if they want to integrate or not.” That was my principle.

But the process continued with meetings in Rome and Portugal. Adam Malik came to Atambua, but not to talk about what was set out in the Rome Memorandum of Understanding. By that time we didn’t have a say. We were taken to Bali and instructed by people from Bakin and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on how to answer questions asked by the international community.

People were sent to the United Nations, to Europe, to the Middle East, and to Asia. My younger brother Joao was sent to the Middle East. But he spoke out against integration, so was rushed home. I was sent with a group to the United Nations. Gonçalves was the leader. I was trusted to sign the statement in the name of the people of East Timor. I only made a statement as a member of UDT. And I had to read Gonçalves’s statement, which was written by someone from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia. That’s how things developed.

We already knew what had happened in Dili. The Indonesian government formed a kind of Assembly and selected the members, who met and agreed to the one item on the agenda—integration without a referendum. Then in June the members of the Assembly went to Jakarta to petition President Suharto to send a fact-finding mission. This was all part of a scenario. The fact-finding team consisted of ambassadors—including from the United States, and Iran—who went to East Timor. I still remember, I asked the deputy, a woman from India, who went to Baucau and Viqueque, what the reaction of the East Timorese was. She answered that people said yes, they supported integration, but their eyes said no.

After that the process continued. At the People’s Representative Assembly in Jakarta there were all kinds of irregularities. For example, the translation of the Portuguese language statement by the first Governor of East Timor, Arnaldo dos Reis [Araújo] said that he wanted Timor to be like Hawaii is for America. But the meaning

8 When Fretilin took control over Dili, UDT first retreated to Liquiça, where they remained for several weeks. They retreated from Liquiça to the border around September 15, 1975.
9 Major General Ali Murtopo, the Deputy Head of Bakin (the State Intelligence Coordination Body) and Head of Special Operations (Operasi Khusus), began covert operations in East Timor in 1974.
10 On October 14, 1975, General Ali Murtopo arrived in Lisbon to meet with the Portuguese government. On November 2, 1975, Indonesian Minister for Foreign Affairs Adam Malik and Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs E. Melo Antunes signed a Memorandum of Understanding in Rome stating that Portugal was responsible for the decolonization of Timor Leste and agreeing to meet to discuss “the establishment of a transitional governing mechanism . . . .”
11 Guilherme Maria Gonçalves, the liurai of Atsabae, was a leader of Apodeti. See footnote 15.
12 The Temporary Government of East Timor (Pemerintah Sementara Daerah Timor Timur) was formed on December 17, 1975. Mário Carrascalão was appointed Head of the Expert Staff (Kepala Staf Ahli).
13 On July 17, 1975, Suharto signed a bill “integrating” East Timor into Indonesia.
of the statement wasn’t translated. Everything was made to support integration. It was
the same when [Minister of Internal Affairs] Amir Machmud visited. The statement
written by Arnaldo dos Reis [Araújo] was given to two people from the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, but disappeared and was never read out.


After that, in early 1977, [Major] General Benny Moerdani invited me to his office
in Tebet [in Jakarta].14 When I arrived, Lopes da Cruz, Wirawan from Bakin, Benny’s
man Sutiatso [unidentified], and another man from Bakin named Suparman were there.
Benny Moerdani said: “I think it would be good if you join the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.” I answered: “Ok, but I think to become a diplomat one should feel like a
citizen who wants to defend his country. But I don’t feel that I’m an Indonesian yet.” I
still remember, everyone present lowered their heads, afraid of Benny Moerdani’s
reaction. Benny Moerdani responded: “Don’t feel surprised. That’s natural. We’ve been
separated for four hundred years. It’s understandable for him to feel that he isn’t
Indonesian.”

Six or seven months later Benny Moerdani summoned me to Jakarta again. He
asked: “Do you feel like an East Timorese [orang Timor Timur] or not?” I answered:
“I’m Timorese. I feel that I’m Timorese.” He responded: “If you feel that you’re a good
Timorese, then you also feel that you’re Indonesian.” “That’s your view,” I said, “but I
still feel that I’m East Timorese.” To which he responded: “but if you feel that you’re
really Timorese, then you can join the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.” So I joined the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

I was at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for two years. There were all kinds of
difficulties. For example, administration. People who had held high ranks under the
Portuguese were given high ranks when they joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Even though they were no different than me. I wasn’t given a high rank because . . .
Still, I joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In August 1980 I was sent to New York with the title Mr. Local Counselor. Local.
On the way, the plane stopped in Kuala Lumpur. One of the people on the team was
in a car that got into an accident. When the [Indonesian handlers] arrived, I had
already left. The news was all over. They didn’t trust us. In New York I was given all
kinds of tasks. I monitored the Security Council, and I was the Indonesian deputy for
Namibia and a member of the Special Committee Against Apartheid.

I often met [Jose] Ramos-Horta and Mari Alkatiri to talk about East Timor.15 They
asked me to run [i.e. defect from Indonesia], but I didn’t want to. If I ran I wouldn’t be
able to do anything.

14 Leonardus Benjamin “Benny” Moerdani held three posts at the time: Commander of the Security and
Order Restoration Command’s Intelligence Task Force (Satuan Tugas Intelijen, Komando Pemulihan
Keamanan dan Keteribatan), Ministry of Defense Assistant for Intelligence, and head of the Strategic
Intelligence Center.
15 José Ramos-Horta and Mari bin Alkatiri were both overseas at the time of the Indonesian invasion and
worked on the Fretilin diplomatic front. Alkatiri is currently the Prime Minister of East Timor and Ramos-
Horta is the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
I was visited by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director for the Asia Pacific from Jakarta. He said that I should be ready for good news, that I was going to be given a certain job. After that, I’ve forgotten the month, I received a telephone call from [the Indonesian embassy in] Washington saying that I should go to Washington immediately to meet with General Benny Moerdani at the Watergate Hotel because he wanted to speak with me. I went. Straight out, he said: “I need you to become Governor of East Timor. The current governor is an embarrassment to Indonesia. Corruption is out of control and the people can’t say a word. So I need you for the job.” I responded: “Why me, sir, why does it have to be me?” “You’re the only person who can do the job,” he said. I answered: “In that case, I have to go back to New York first to see my wife because we always make decisions together.”

So I went to New York and explained it all to my wife. She said: “You know, you don’t have any enemies in East Timor. Not from Fretilin and not from Apodeti.16 As governor, you could clean up the corruption.” I said to my wife: “If that’s your view, I’ll accept. And if it is okayed in Jakarta, we’ll go to Dili together.” So I went to Washington again and told General Benny Moerdani I’d do it. Then I went to Jakarta, and they did the paperwork right away. While that was being done, I came to East Timor for two or three days and then returned to Jakarta.

Back in Jakarta, where I was staying at the Kartika Chandra Hotel, Major Azis Hasyim, who had extraordinary power in Timor, approached me. He said I probably needed some money. “What for?” I asked. “Don’t forget, this will be your last time in New York, where things are expensive. To buy presents in New York you’ll need money.” I said I didn’t need money; in New York I received a big salary, so didn’t need more money. But don’t forget, I think that Major Azis was just an intermediary and really didn’t like corruption. So I went to New York and then returned here.

The People’s Representative Assembly, which is really fictitious, voted [on my appointment]. I was given two assistants, Frederik Witoelar and one other. At the time there was a problem because [Francisco] Lopes da Cruz wanted to become governor.17 Dading [Kalbuadui] also wanted to become governor.18 They weren’t happy about my selection.

When I became governor, I asked all departments to write reports so that I’d know what the situation was. The reports said that there wasn’t anything going on, that everything was fine, just fine, and the people were satisfied. So how was I to find out what was actually going on? The governor was like a puppet and didn’t have any power. The people in power were the Commander [of the Security Operations Command, Koopskam] and the Sub-Regional Military Commander [Danrem], and the Development Implementation Team [Tim Pelaksana Pembangunan, TPP].

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16 Assosiação Popular Democrata de Timor (the Timorese Popular Democratic Association, Apodeti) was founded on May 27, 1975.

17 Francisco Xavier Lopes da Cruz succeeded Mário Carrascalão as President of the Timorese Democratic Union.

Moerdani in Jakarta was in charge of implementation. I was like a figurehead. The head of the implementation command was Kalangi, Colonel Kalangi. Colonel Kalangi gave orders as the head of the East Timor government from his house next to the Hotel Turismo. He was also the Regional Secretary.

So I went to Jakarta and said sorry, but if things are like this I don’t want to be governor. How many governors are there? My regional secretary is in charge, he’s in power. So is the Sub-Regional Military Commander. I visited the districts and the District Administrators were just for show. The District Military Commanders were in charge. So I went to Jakarta and said this can’t continue. They said that as governor I wasn’t under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Ministry of Internal Affairs, like in other provinces where governors’ authority was stipulated in Law 5 of 1974 on regional government. But not me. They said: “You aren’t the sole authority. Because of conditions in East Timor, the military is still in charge.” Oh, so I said well, if this doesn’t change, if TPP and other practices aren’t abolished, I don’t want to be governor.” The President finally issued a new decree, and I felt that I could get something done.

III. Meetings with Xanana

In January 1983 I received a message from Colonel Purwanto, who was meeting with Xanana in Larigutu. He asked me to go to Larigutu because he had run out of arguments in his debates with Xanana. So they prepared a helicopter, and I went. I was shocked: there were about twenty-five Fretilin members—a platoon—and wow, they gave me an armed salute. [Laughter] I was surprised. The meeting with Xanana lasted forty-five minutes. I sat next to Xanana and in front of us there was the Fretilin flag. Xanana explained to me that the meeting wasn’t to surrender. No. He said, “We want to ask for your help, for you to tell the world that there are peace talks.” This went on for a while. I said, “I don’t have any authority whatsoever. I can tell the Foreign Minister and General Benny Moerdani but that’s all I can do. How can news get out? Everything is always going to happen tomorrow [sesuk-sesuk], but there isn’t anything here now. Timor doesn’t have any telephones, nothing.” So you could say there wasn’t any point to the meeting. Colonel Purwanto was there, near me, and the meeting was being watched by the Indonesian military. I went there by military helicopter, which landed about one hundred, maybe two hundred meters from the meeting place. And that was also watched by RPKAD. I still remember, I took out my rosary and gave it to Xanana and said “Here, as Timorese, let’s not forget [our religion].”

19 José Alexandre “Kay Rala Xanana” Gusmão was the commander of the National Liberation Army of East Timor (Forças Armadas de Libertação Nacional de Timor Leste, Falintil). Major Purwanto commanded Nanggala 52 from late 1982 until early 1983; when his unit completed its tour in East Timor, Purwanto was retained to continue negotiating with Xanana. These negotiations led to a ceasefire agreement on March 21, 1983. Mário Carrascalão’s meeting with Xanana took place two days later.

20 In 1975, RPKAD (Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat, Army Commando Regiment) had already become the Special Warfare Force Command (Komando Pasukan Sandhi Yudha, Kopassandha), but it was still popularly referred to by the old name. In 1985 it became the Special Forces Command (Komando Pasukan Khusus, Kopassus).
Not long after that, in April if I'm not mistaken, I received word that Xanana wanted to meet with me in Areana. That’s about five kilometers from Venilale. But he wanted to meet alone. He didn’t want anyone else present, no tape recorder, no photos, nothing. That meeting was in April or May, I’ve forgotten the exact date.

Purwanto took me by helicopter to Venilale, where I was met by Pastor Locatelli and Aleixo Ximenes, from Baucau. Father Locatelli drove us in the direction of Areana, about five kilometers from Venilale. They stopped and told me to walk about five hundred meters [into the bush]. I saw the grass was really high. Woa, I’m dead! I said okay, but I didn’t promise. I didn’t see anyone, there wasn’t a soul. I walked alone. In the middle [of the high grass] there was a small hut, and Xanana came out and walked toward me. To the side I saw about one hundred Fretilin armed guerrillas. And I thought, I’m dead. Even Xanana was carrying a pistol [points to his hip]. I said, “So that’s the way you are, you . . . .” And I thought, I’m dead, I’m already dead. “You’re the commander but carry a pistol; I don’t even have a little pistol.” He said, “Don’t forget, to get here I had to walk on foot about twenty kilometers, with all kinds of risks.” I think he must have come from around Mundo Perdido. Okay, after that we sat alone—no witnesses—and he asked me to talk about the process of Timor’s integration.

I told him everything that had happened. The meeting started at 9:00 in the morning, and we finished talking at about 2:30 or 3:00 in the afternoon. There was only coffee to drink, and without sugar. When I was about to leave, I said: “You shouldn’t feel that you lost. And I don’t have to feel that I lost. We’ve come together . . . . At some point there will be a solution for Timor. How many of our people are there? According to the Indonesian census 555,000, that’s all. But if you . . . carry on the armed struggle, Indonesia can bring in one million. No problem. That’s my conclusion.” He responded, “No. If you’re really Timorese, if you really feel like a Timorese, there’s one thing I want to ask. First, you have to find a way so the Indonesian generals can continue the ceasefire for three months, so that I have three months to reorganize. I need three months.” I said I couldn’t promise, but that I was motivated to continue the peace talks. The last thing he said was “you take care of the people, I’ll take care of Bapak-bapak.” That’s what he said. That meeting was before April 12.

On April 12, 1983, Benny Moerdani visited [East Timor] to celebrate Idul Fitri. That night he had a meeting until 9:00 at night. The next morning at 8:00 I received a telephone call saying that General Benny Moerdani wanted to meet me in Baucau at 9:00. A helicopter was already ready, so I departed and was there at 10:00. He and his staff came to the VIP room. When I entered the door was closed, and the two of us were alone together. He said, “Do you want the peace ceasefire to continue or not?”

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21 Father Locatelli, an Italian priest, worked in East Timor and was in communication with the resistance.
22 Mundo Perdido is the highest peak in the mountain range separating the districts of Baucau and Viqueque.
23 Mário Carrascalão said this in English, but with Indonesian pronouns. Timorese use the Indonesian word Bapak (meaning father or mister) to refer to the Indonesian military, and at times to Indonesians more generally. The discussion, of course, was in Portuguese.
24 Later in the interview Mário Carrascalão added: “I met with Xanana twice in 1983, once in front of the military and the other time just the two of us—not as the governor and commander, but as Timorese.” There is good reason to believe that subsequent meetings took place.
I answered, “You already know my position. I want this to be resolved peacefully. That’s my character. I’m not someone who wants weapons; I like peaceful people. You already know my position.”

Moerdani said, “In that case you have to answer questions [that arose in our meeting] last night. We talked until 2:00 in the morning but Sutarto and Purwanto couldn’t give my staff answers.25 At 2:00 am I said, let’s stop here so that tomorrow I can talk to the governor first. He’s the one who knows for sure, he can speak Tetun.”

So I said, “Sir, if you want me to speak Javanese, I’ll speak Javanese. But who knows, I might not be able to answer the questions.”

To which Moerdani responded, “Okay, if you’re ready, open the doors.”

About twenty staff members had come to Baucau on a Pelita Airlines plane. Some were hardliners, some were so-so—there were all kinds. The questions all centered around guarantees. If there’s a peaceful solution to this, can we guarantee that East Timor will remain part of Indonesia? What’s the position of the population? How would they respond? That’s what they wanted to know. I said “As things are now, how should I know?” The questions went on for about an hour until there were no more questions. Then Benny Moerdani cut in. To this day, this is one thing I still don’t [understand] . . . Xanana asked for three months. I didn’t tell the generals about that. Benny Moerdani also gave me three months. He said, “I’ll give Sutarto and Purwanto and the governor three months to help Timor by peaceful means. OK, let’s go home.”

After that, Sutarto stood up, waiting for Benny Moerdani. Purwanto was behind me and said, “Ach, my political career is finished.” To which I answered, “No. The general told you to finish it the way you wanted to.” But Purwanto was already pessimistic. Or perhaps there was something else. And they left.

Eight days later, at 6:00 in the evening Purwanto called me. “Governor, do you have time [to meet]? Around 8:00?” I said, “My wife isn’t here in the evening, so we can meet at my house.” He said, “No. Let’s meet on the beach here [in front of Purwanto’s house]. That’s better.” He arrived at 8:00, right on time. Purwanto said, “What I’ve been worried about is happening. He came back to East Timor—Prabowo.26 Under these conditions, no one—civil or military—can enter or leave East Timor without my knowledge. It turns out he came, and he went into the interior. To Viqueque, around Bibileo. I don’t know what he was doing. I just don’t know anymore.”

When Xanana met with us in Areana he said he would speak with the Central Committee. I had heard that after our meeting Xanana informed the Central Committee

25 Brigadier General Sutarto appears to have been Commander of the Kostrad First Infantry Division at the time. He was then appointed Commander of Regional Military Command IX/Udayana.

26 After they attended a counter-terrorism course in Germany, in March 1982 Major Luhut Pandjaitan and Captain Prabowo Subianto were appointed to form a new Kopassandha counter-terrorism unit, named Detachment 81. In October 1982 Luhut went to attend a command and staff course, leaving Captain Prabowo in charge of Detachment 81. In November 1982, Prabowo led this unit on an operation into Papua New Guinea territory. His appearance in Viqueque was therefore associated with the unit’s second operation. For a somewhat different version that does not mention the late March or early April arrival in Viqueque, see Ken Conboy, Kopassus: Inside Indonesia’s Special Forces (Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2003), pp. 289-297.
of our discussion in Areana. The commander of the Red Brigade [Brigada Vermelha], Commander Paulino Gama, who is called Mauk Moruk, revolted against Xanana, against Xanana’s group. And they started . . . The strange thing is that after that Paulino Gama surrendered, he surrendered to Commander Widya Sugito. And when Gama came down [from the mountains] to surrender, Commander Sugito gave him a major’s uniform and took him all over, showing Paulino Gama off.

IV. The Kraras Massacre

On August 6, while I was in Jambi [to see the transmigration program there], there was a tragic occurrence. It was coordinated by Prabowo. I wasn’t witness, but this is what I was told by Timorese and by the military. At the time, the District Military Commander in Viqueque was Major Hidayat, from Special Forces [Kopassandha]. He later became District Administrator in Viqueque. The story is like this. Prabowo came to make arrangements with local officials. During the ceasefire, [Hidayat] and the District Secretary [Sekwilda] Daniel relied on a member of the Civil Defense Force [Hansip] to make contact with the folks in the forests. The Civil Defense Force man made a lot of friends in the forest. He was married to a beautiful woman. His wife said that when he was meeting with the folk in the forest, members of the military had harassed her. The strange thing is that one day this guy reacted and hit the military personnel who had bothered his wife. People said this had been prearranged, it had all been set up to create an incident.

The Civil Defense man was taken to Viqueque. After about a week, Major Hidayat, the District Military Commander, said “Hey, you didn’t bring any clothes. You haven’t changed your clothes for a week.” He said he wanted to go back to Kraras to get some clothes, but didn’t know if he’d be allowed to go alone. Hidayat said he trusted him, so he went back to Kraras. When he arrived in Kraras, his wife run up to him and said that she had been raped by a number of military personnel. So the Civil Defense man ran to the forest to tell the friends he had made during the ceasefire. They attacked Kraras village, where fifteen or sixteen members of a combat engineering battalion were preparing villagers for a cultural show to be held on August 17. They opened fire on the engineers.

One person was already on top of a house there [so wasn’t killed], and he reported the attack to the commander of the 501st Battalion. Soon after, the battalion attacked Kraras, and the villagers ran into the forests. They were there until September. That’s when Prabowo was posted back to East Timor. People knew that he was close to President Suharto and others, that he was trusted by them. Prabowo sent a memo to


29 The Civil Defense Force was found throughout Indonesia, but only in East Timor were members armed and included in military operations.

30 According to one source, Prabowo returned to East Timor on August 28, 1983.
military personnel [to deal with the situation]. But when about two thousand villagers came out of the forest, the military immediately took thirty of the children and executed them. That’s what people say.

That day Colonel Rudjito [who had recently replaced Purwanto as Sub-Regional Military Commander for East Timor] told me that “all the villagers from Kraras have come out of the forest, so I’m going to relocate them to a place called Lereng Mutin, near the beach.” I said “Commander, they might need food. I have ten tons of corn stored in Viqueque for emergencies. If you want it, you could use it to feed them. Please do.” He said no. “No, I don’t want it. We have to prove to them that what you [Governor Carrascalão] told them [about the ceasefire] is bullshit.” I responded, “Just the opposite. If you give them food, look after them, treat them well, they might become close to you. But if you don’t . . .”

Soon after that, Bishop Belo visited Viqueque.31 When he returned to Dili, he met with me and said, “Pak Mario, I’m going to tell you something that you might not believe. I went to Lereng Mutin. There weren’t any men. Only women and children. There weren’t any houses either. When the military took them to Lereng Mutin, the military took all the villagers’ possessions. They don’t have houses—they’re living in a field. They killed all the adult men, all of them. There are a few who ran into the forest. And they were all buried near the Luca river.

The man who drove the bulldozer to dig the grave was named Asal. He used to work as a mechanic in the Forestry Department, and I was his boss. So I looked for him. But he had dug the mass grave, the military killed him too, but said that Fretilin did it. Fretilin people said that more than one thousand people were buried on the banks of the Luca river. Others said hundreds were disappeared. I went to visit. When I arrived there were only women. But no men. Only women and children. And the children were only about three or four years old. There weren’t any older children. They were all wearing black.

I was furious. I wrote an angry letter to the commander. “You killed all the men. Killed the older children too. This is wrong.” I received a letter, which I still have, from Zacky Anwar [Makarim], who was the Head, or maybe Deputy Head, of Intelligence [in East Timor], if I’m not mistaken.32 He wrote a letter, really, saying that his subordinates shot [the villagers]. And he apologized. I said don’t apologize to me. Apologize to the families. That was the first time someone in the military apologized.

Benny [Moerdani] once said that he didn’t want what happened in Irian Jaya to happen in East Timor. When they [the military] went into Irian Jaya, they took everything the Dutch had left and got rich. He said that should never happen here. Benny is militaristic, that’s true. But I don’t think he enriched himself in East Timor. As far as I know, he was the only person who dared to go against Suharto. I don’t know if

31 Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, who had been outside of East Timor since the Indonesian invasion, was appointed Apostolic Administrator of East Timor on May 16, 1983.

32 In 1999, Major General Zacky Anwar Makarim oversaw the organizing of pro-Jakarta militias in East Timor. In February 24, 2003, the Deputy General Prosecutor for Serious Crimes filed an indictment charging Zacky Anwar Makarim and seven other men (six from the military) with having committed crimes against humanity.
people like him or not. Each time he came here he’d ask who the criminals are. “I don’t know,” I would answer, “ask your people.”

When the Kraras massacre happened Prabowo was on his third tour here. He was thought well of during his first and second tours. I don’t know what happened, but after that he was out of control.

V. Opening East Timor

[By mid-1985] more and more East Timorese were going to school. But there weren’t jobs. I couldn’t do anything because there weren’t jobs. There wasn’t any social control either. There were murders every day. Every day. I couldn’t take it. So at a meeting of governors in Jakarta I recommended opening East Timor in order to create employment. At the time, Supardjo Rustam was Minister of Internal Affairs. He said employment is a problem in all of Indonesia. I answered, “But in other parts of Indonesia the lack of employment doesn’t make people anti-Indonesian. In East Timor... [laughter]... it’s different.” By 1988 I was totally fed up with the conditions in East Timor. It couldn’t continue. On Fridays [when Governor Carrascalão received people to hear about problems] people would talk from morning until night about problems here. I couldn’t take it. And the military didn’t pay attention to my efforts any longer.

This relates to Try [Sutrisno]. After the [governors’] meeting, I spoke with Try for four hours. He said: “Governor, you have to understand something. I’m the Commander-in-Chief. As the Commander-in-Chief I have to trust my subordinates. So how about this: I’ll trust you 50 percent, and I’ll turn the other 50 percent over to my boys.” That’s what he said. You don’t believe it, but that’s the truth. I asked for East Timor to be opened. That was in 1988.

I wanted to meet with [President] Harto. I went to Rudini first. He was Minister of Internal Affairs. I said: “Rudini, I want East Timor to be opened. If it isn’t opened, I can’t continue as governor. This is too much. This is more than I can handle. The people are suffering too much. There isn’t any employment.”

He said, “If that’s what you want, it is best for you to speak with Harto. We don’t have authority to do it. And if Harto asks me, I’ll support you.” That’s what he said. To meet with Harto, a governor had to make arrangements with the Minister of Internal Affairs. He immediately arranged his staff to process [the meeting] so Harto could meet with me. When I went to meet Harto, Rudini was already there. He’d come in advance and was in the waiting room. “Don’t forget,” he said, “I’ll support you.”

So I entered. I told Pak Harto about the conditions in East Timor. He asked me what the solution was. I said, “Mr. President, maybe we could open East Timor, sir. Open it in stages. First, open it to Indonesians, so Indonesian citizens can enter Timor. For the second stage, maybe foreigners could be allowed to visit.” He was quiet for a moment. Then he said, “I agree.” “If you agree,” I responded, “I’ll leave your office and tell journalists right away.”
"Not so fast," he said. "Wouldn’t it be better if I sent Solichin to East Timor. Then, based on Solichin’s report I could make the decision [to open East Timor]."

"That isn’t necessary, sir," I said. "Solichin doesn’t need to go visit. If you agree, I . . ."

This was the first time I saw that Pak Harto wasn’t the only one in control in Indonesia. "Don’t forget," he said, "this is a very dangerous move for you." That’s what he said to me.

But outside there were journalists. I told them right away. At the time, Benny Moerdani was in Tokyo. When he returned to Jakarta he made a statement to the press that if anything should happen, not to blame the Ministry of Defense.

I asked to meet with Benny Moerdani. A week later I succeeded in meeting with him. I said, "Pak Benny, you know that I have never broken a single Indonesian regulation in East Timor. Never. But you also need to know that I’m not loyal to individuals. I’m your friend, but I’m not loyal to Pak Benny. My loyalty isn’t to individuals."

"What’s this all about?" he asked. "What’s going on?"

"You said not to blame the Ministry of Defense if something happens. We can’t go on living in isolation as if we’re . . ." He was surprised.

"Hey, when I returned from Tokyo you forgot to tell me that you had spoken with reporters."

"Yeah, just forget about that," I said.

"Why didn’t you report to me first? If you had told me, I might have made a different statement to the press."

I don’t think he was playing games. He was serious. I really think he wanted East Timor’s integration [to succeed], but he didn’t want the Timorese people to cause new problems for Indonesia. Benny Moerdani is a nationalist. But he’s a militaristic nationalist. That’s my impression.

VI. Commander Mulyadi

Mulyadi’s arrival is what ruined things. He was commander at the time of the Pope’s visit. He gave instructions to prevent people from coming to Dili from the districts. The demonstration still isn’t clear. What I heard, and this contradicts what people in the resistance say, is that [the demonstrators] were allowed, with Mulyadi’s knowledge, to enter the site where the Pope spoke.

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33 Solichin Gautama Poerwanegara was the Secretary for Operational Guidance of Development (Sekretaris Pengendalian Operasional Pembangunan).
34 Pope John Paul II visited East Timor on October 12, 1989.
35 For a version of events from the resistance, see Constancio Pinto and Matthew Jardine, East Timor’s Unfinished Struggle: Inside the Timorese Resistance (Boston: South End Press, 1997), pp. 106-113.
Benny, who was then Minister of Defense, also came for the Pope’s visit to Timor. I took him to the airport, together with Mulyadi. Benny said to Mulyadi, “Mulyadi, no crap, don’t go arresting people.” But when the plane took off, Mulyadi said to me at the airport, “Benny is in charge nationally, but in East Timor I’m running the show.” That very day he started to make arrests. I don’t know if its true, but people say so.

There was a report on the front page of *Berita Yudha* or *Angkatan Bersenjata* . . . that Pastor Locatelli had defiled the Pope’s visit to East Timor, that he’s the one who arranged the demonstration at Tacitolu.36

I went to Jakarta. In Jakarta there as a meeting that was also attended by the Deputy Head of BAIS (Badan Intelijen Strategis, Strategic Intelligence Agency), General Sutaryo. I saw the article, the report in the newspaper about Pastor Locatelli. I said: “That isn’t true. I know Pastor Locatelli isn’t like that.” General Sutaryo responded, “If you don’t believe it, go home to East Timor, and I’ll instruct Commander Mulyadi to show you the video cassette with a confession of a man named Franco.” I went back to East Timor, and I called Mulyadi. “Mulyadi, here’s the scoop, I want to see the video.” “Right, right,” he said, “I was given permission by Jakarta. Ok, I’ll bring Franco. He’ll explain.” So Franco came and sat down. But it was as though he was reading from a script.

I said: “Pak, he didn’t make this confession freely. He’s reading. Franco, tell me what you know about the Pastor. I didn’t come for this [charade]. I want to see the video. Franco, you don’t have to be afraid to tell you story. If they threaten you, I’ll take you to Bali and get you work there.”

This was all set up, set up to destroy Father Locatelli. They were already at odds with Prabowo. I saw what happened [during the Pope’s visit] with my own eyes—I was sitting in the front row. Prabowo was there too. Abilio Soares’s younger brother Tito started throwing chairs. When people hold a demonstration it is normal to carry banners. Tito Soares threw the first chair in order to cause chaos. There were thousands of people! I was sitting next to Benny Moerdani. I stayed seated, [but] Benny stood up and started giving orders to his people. I don’t know what he said.

**VII. The Santa Cruz massacre**

[In October 1991] there were three or four people hiding in the Motael church. The military suspected that Xanana was hiding there. One day I received a letter from a villager from Maliana who complained about Father Ricardo at Motael Church. The villager went to the Motael church to ask the priest to come to his village because his grandfather or uncle was about to die. In Portuguese we call it . . . — the last sacrament. When he entered the Motael church yard, three or four youths beat him up.

I wrote a memo to Father Ricardo and sent a copy to the Bishop, saying that the Father had to make sure that things like this didn’t happen in the church yard. That might make good Christians afraid to go to church. Father Locatelli and Father Ricardo came [to see me], together with a woman with one or two children. They said that the

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36 *Berita Yudha* and *Angkatan Bersenjata* were military-owned newspapers. Tacitolu, a few kilometers west of Dili, is where the Pope celebrated mass in East Timor.
Youths who beat the villager from Maliana were only there at night, at certain hours, but during the day went somewhere. They didn’t even help to sweep up or clean the church. He said that he wanted to turn them over to the police to teach them a lesson, but on one condition, that the police didn’t torture them. I wanted to be there as a witness as well. “In that case,” I said, “let’s write a letter to the police saying that the youths were [at the church] before mass was held. Write a letter to the police, to Police Chief Gatot. It’s up to him if he wants to take action.” But the military saw the presence of the youths as a reason to attack the Motael church.

Before this, [the military was making] preparations for the Portuguese parliamentary visit. There were two kinds of preparations. One group was trained to demonstrate against the Portuguese, another group to demonstrate in favor of the Portuguese.

But on October 27, one day before Youth Day, which is on October 28, at 1:00 in the morning, I received a phone call saying that there had been a shooting at the Motael church. I didn’t have a driver at home. I said to my wife, let’s go see what’s happening. She agreed. When we arrived at Motael Church, the police were there, including the police chief, and also the Bishop [Belo]. There were two people with injuries. One in the middle of the road [Luis Sebastião] had a bullet wound that entered here [pointing to his abdomen] and came out here. The other had been stabbed.

People had gathered. I could see [because] there were street lights, not like now. I said to the police, “You couldn’t have shot him because the bullet entered here and exited here [pointing]. A shot like that, I don’t believe it. It isn’t possible.” Members of the Police Mobile Brigade responded: “That’s right, we didn’t shoot him.” When we went inside, Rudy Warouw [the Sub-Regional Military Commander] wasn’t there.

The next day I presided over the Youth Day ceremony. Before ceremonies, the commander and other officials usually came to my office, and we’d wait until the ceremony began. I asked Pak Warouw, “Hey, Pak Warouw, I can’t believe the incident last night. You and the head of intelligence didn’t show up. I was there and so was the Bishop and the chief of police. Strange. I don’t understand.” He said no one had woken him up to tell him about the shooting. “But I was woken. Why? I’m not in a position to do anything. Why weren’t you woken? This doesn’t make sense.”

The attack on the church was carried out by Fernandes’s group. Fernandes is from Viqueque. Beforehand, they had a meeting at the home of Armando Mariano, who is pro-integration. At the time Armando Mariano was Head of the Education and Culture Bureau (Kepala Dinas Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan).
dealt with humanely. So how did this happen?” He answered, “I didn’t know about it.”

There was a procession for Sebastião’s burial. The Bishop was there. When they passed in front of the police station, someone threw rocks at the police. The police were angry. Something was wrong.

On November 10 or 11, I’ve forgotten exactly, [Pieter] Kooijmans from the United Nations was supposed to visit. But a strange thing happened on the 10th. The Garuda flight didn’t arrive, and neither did the Merpati flight. So the visit had to be rescheduled for the 11th. Because of that, [my] meeting with Kooijmans didn’t take place; it was canceled. It was postponed to the 12th.

From the beginning, this all had been announced over Republic of Indonesia Radio. They issued an announcement that everyone who had attended the funeral for Sebastião should come out. The word for that in Timorese [Tetun] is moruk. Everyone, invite everyone. But this announcement wasn’t made over Republic of Indonesia Radio—I don’t know the reason—but it was announced over military-owned Radio Lorosae.

After the [massacre on the] 12th, I investigated at both Republic of Indonesia Radio and Radio Lorosae to find out who had requested that the announcement be made. The strange thing is that the person at Radio Lorosae said that two people had come and made the request, but no one wrote down their names. I don’t believe this.

On the 11th, I received information from the Head of the Industrial Bureau, whose name is Barreto, who is pro-integration, that there was going to be a big demonstration on the 12th, beginning from Motael Church. I said: “That it isn’t my business. Tell the security forces to be on guard, guard so nothing gets broken. He reported to [Police Chief] Gatot, and Gatot said not to worry, nothing would happen.

After hearing this, I went about things as usual. I was at the office at 6:45 am. On the way I passed in front of Motael Church. The church yard was full of people, but there wasn’t anyone inside the church. I asked my assistant, “Hey, we’re forgetting our religion. If this is an important religious day, how is it that we don’t know about it?” “Sir,” he said, “it isn’t a religious day. I don’t know what’s going on, but this isn’t a religious day.” So I went straight to the office. On the way to the office, there wasn’t a single police officer on the street, nor any military people. Empty, it was all empty. Just let be.

Not long after that, at about quarter of eight or so, there was a demonstration. I went out on the veranda with my camera to have a look. The demonstration was very orderly. There was a group of two hundred to three hundred people. Then the street was empty. Then another group of two hundred people, all very orderly. It was fine. I took pictures, then went back inside. As is usual for funerals, [the people in the procession] were carrying flowers.

38 Pieter Kooijmans was the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights.
39 Aifunan moruk, literally “bitter flowers,” means to place flowers on a grave.
40 He added later: “I gave the pictures I took to the national investigative team that came here.”
But after I went inside, there was chaos. People started running left and right, to the District Military Office (that is now the museum). That's where someone stabbed Major Gerhan. The person who stabbed him wasn't a demonstrator; he was a Timorese who was working for the military to provoke the military to respond. Lots of people saw the stabbing. I didn't see it. I only heard about it.

At about 8:00, there was shooting up there [points in the direction of Santa Cruz]. I went out of my office. A member of the media was interviewing one of my staff. I wasn't allowed to go [to Santa Cruz]. But the military forgot that I had an assistant, my assistant, Lieutenant Colonel Manurung. I thought we could go to the Bishop's, so we went. But the Bishop couldn't go [to Santa Cruz] either because there were hundreds of youths running into his residence. He usually helped youths who entered his residence seeking food or other assistance. The youths said that lots of people had been taken to the hospital in the Toko Baru neighborhood.

There were two Americans at the Bishop's place when I was there. One woman and one man. One of them was covered in blood. S/he said, "The military took my passport and money." I said to my assistant, "Manurung, tell the military to return his/her passport. They can't do that to foreigners." S/he also said that there was a New Zealander who was probably killed. When they ran, the New Zealander was in critical condition, shot. That was Kamal.

From there I went to the Hospital in Toko Baru, where I saw a number of people with serious injuries. Some were almost dead. But I heard that most [of the injured] weren't there; most were taken to the military hospital up above. So I thought OK, I'll go via the Kuluhun Road to Santa Cruz. The military had closed the road around Santa Cruz. There were still people running. My assistant told the military personnel to let the governor through to see what was going on. When I passed in front of the Santa Cruz cemetery, military personnel in civilian clothes were cleaning the road with sand—cleaning up the blood with sand. Military people were in civilian clothes, but I could tell that they were hiding their weapons. You could tell they were military by their physiques. I also happened to see three trucks parked in front of the cemetery, but I didn't pay attention.

When we were passing the three trucks, my assistant said, "Sir, look to the right, look to the right. The trucks are full of bodies." One of the trucks was full of bodies. I don't know what was under the bodies. And it smelled. I went back to the office and immediately sent a . . . . To the Minister of Internal Affairs. I had to report the situation. As governor, I had to report to Minister Rudini.

41 Gerhan Lantara, an ethnic Bugis from Bone, South Sulawesi, was the Deputy Commander of the 70th Infantry Battalion (Maros). From 1980-1982 he served as the Commander of Company C in the 744th Infantry Battalion (Dili). From June 1998 until c. 2001 he was Commander of the Kostrad 17th Infantry Brigade, which was involved in the November 1998 Semanggi massacre in Jakarta. In September 1999, he also served as Commander of Sector A (Dili) in the Martial Law Authority Operation Command. In May 2002 he was appointed Commander of Korem 012 in Banda Aceh.

42 Later in the interview, Mário Carrascalão explained that Manurung was from BAIS and attended meetings with intelligence officers every week.
At about five in the afternoon, Rudy Warouw and [Sintong] Panjaitan told me that nineteen people were dead and ninety-one injured. I immediately said, “Sir, you must have made up those numbers because they are easy to remember. This year is 1991. To lie, one has to have a good memory. But if you don’t have a good memory, don’t lie. I don’t believe those numbers. I saw a truck full of bodies, sir.” Oh, they didn’t want to change [their story].

Before that, after going to Santa Cruz, I went home and told my wife, “I promised the Bishop to help provide food. Go to the Bishop’s place and see what he needs. After that, go to Santa Cruz cemetery and see if my mother’s grave has been damaged.”

She went to the Bishop’s, and then they went to Santa Cruz together. When they arrived at Santa Cruz, there were still lots of kids under arrest there. She saw about fifty youths with their hands tied behind their backs put in a truck. [While she was looking at them], someone on guard duty said, “You and the Bishop have to leave here immediately, it is very dangerous here.” So they had to leave.

[When I saw her later], I asked my wife to try to visit Wirahusada Hospital. I wanted to go there, but was told that I wasn’t allowed. Even my military assistant, Lieutenant Colonel Manurung, wasn’t allowed to go there. My wife went there the next day. The people there hadn’t been shot; they had all been disappeared. Before that, I had heard from doctors (who didn’t want their names mentioned) that they had been forced to kill people by injecting them with water. They said that some of the people in the morgue were still alive. So a week later I went to the military hospital. I was allowed to go. The people there hadn’t been in the demonstration. There was someone of Chinese descent whose leg was injured, but hadn’t been shot. I asked if he had been in the demonstration? He answered in Tetun, “No sir, I took my kid to the school run by nuns, but they arrested me and brought me here. The youths in the demonstration weren’t brought here.”

I heard that a Timorese who worked for one of the battalions that fired [into the cemetery] wanted to speak with me. In ten years as governor, I never recorded a conversation with anyone. Never. That time I thought it was necessary to make a recording, to have a witness, as a kind of proof, that what I found out was correct and substantiated. His name was Carlos Mustafa—he was given the name Mustafa by someone in the military. Mustafa was from Oecusse. He came to see me and said that a day before the Santa Cruz demo a number of people came to his battalion’s base [and said] that his battalion was going to be sent home, was going home, [but] first they had an assignment. Something like that. He didn’t hear it clearly. He was on guard duty, and the people speaking were inside. He couldn’t hear everything that was said. After the visitors left, the commanders . . . krek, krek, krek [sound of cocking automatic weapons] and said, “We’ll do it tomorrow.” I asked why you went along with it.

43 Major General Sintong Panjaitan was Commander of Regional Military Command IX/Udayana, covering Bali, West and East Nusatenggara, and East Timor. He and Warouw were discharged from the military because of the Santa Cruz massacre.

44 Wirahusada Hospital was owned by the military.

45 Later in the interview Mário Carrascalão added: “The military authorities might have been afraid that Manurung would tell me what he saw.”
“No,” he said, “It wasn’t like that. We were hiding. We knew that the next day they were going to shoot up Santa Cruz. So we ran.”

At midnight on the 13th or 14th, I’ve forgotten the date, Mustafa said they drove trucks to Tibar. The lights in Dili had been turned off. After the turn-off to Ermera, there’s a road to the left that goes to the garbage dump. Mustafa was told to get out of the truck. “You dog, you can’t come. Get out.” But because it was dark he followed the trucks. He said graves had been dug near the garbage dump, one to the left and one to the right. The youths [who had been arrested] were executed there. I have a photo, I think it was sent by someone from Falintil, showing exactly where they buried people near the dump. I’m surprised that to this day no one has looked for the mass grave.

I told the National Investigating Committee. They kept the information I gave them until the last day of the investigation. On the last day of the investigation, [Chief Police] Colonel Gatot guided them to the location. They dug around. But they dug about five hundred meters before the actual location and so didn’t find anything.

After the [referendum] in 1999, I went out there to have a look. I wasn’t a witness, so I wanted to see what I could find. There was a woman who said that up until 1999 every time she went home she placed flowers there. Someone had seen the kids murdered there. The morning I went to find the location the grass was already high. I spent a whole day there alone. I wasn’t a witness, but I also heard that about two weeks before I went out there dogs dug up human bones and were carrying them around.

But that wasn’t the only [location used] after November 12. There was also information about graves in Hera. Someone from BAIS, from the intelligence agency, said that nineteen people had been buried there. The National Investigative Team dug up the nineteen graves.

If you look at the video [made by journalist Max Stahl], you can see that [on November 12 military personnel] were wearing two sets of clothes. One might say they wouldn’t be recognized by the demonstrators, but they took these off when they started shooting.

Other bodies were put in gunny sacks weighted with stones and dropped from helicopters into the sea. They dug graves in many places, not just in Tibar. In Tacitolu, in Tibar, and in Maliana. The District Administrator in Maliana was Adrian Lopes da Cruz. He told me that before the Portuguese parliamentary visit [the military] dug a big hole there and planned to bury people in it.

So I don’t know how many people were killed. But when I was governor, many women reported to me in private that their family members disappeared. At the time I counted 425 people [killed or missing]. I was also given photographs, but don’t know if they are authentic or not.

I think [Sub-Regional Military Commander] Warouw knew [there was going to be a massacre], or at least suspected something. Warouw is very straight. Even naive, perhaps. He was manipulated by other people. The massacre happened when he was meeting with Kooijmans from the United Nations. There could be more to that. And

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46 When he was Governor, Mário Carrascalão chose the location of the dump.
afterwards Warouw praised and gave an award to the battalions that did the shooting. Warouw is a good friend of mine, and I think he was the best commander who ever served in East Timor. But I still have questions about Rudy Warouw. It isn’t possible that a good commander wouldn’t know [there was going to be a massacre].

I’m not from the military, but I think Warouw was sacrificed. You should also know that I spoke with Benny Moerdani after the massacre in Jakarta. Benny Moerdani is someone who helped me a great deal; he prevented other people in the military from doing all sorts of things. And I trust Benny. Benny said that they might have to sacrifice Warouw.

When the National Investigative Team was going to be sent, Benny told me that Jailani was a good man.47 I said, “Sir, we need really upright people who can get to the bottom of this. If not, the situation in East Timor won’t be safe and might even get worse. The November 12 [massacre] will happen again and again.” He said Jailani was a good man, but they might have to let Warouw take the fall. So I don’t really believe that Rudy Warouw was involved. Benny said he’d have to be sacrificed.

In East Timor there were two clear groups—Prabowo’s group and the group that was pro-Benny [Moerdani’s]. Sintong [Panjaitan] and Warouw were in Benny’s group. Prabowo’s group killed and did all sorts of things. I think we already mentioned Syafrie [Syamsuddin]. When the riots happened in Jakarta in May 1998, oh, I saw it was the same people. [Laughs]

I spoke with Warouw [before he was fired], but he just spouted Sintong’s line. I was disappointed with him because he remained loyal to his superiors. If something like [the Santa Cruz massacre] happens, one should be more open, make a sacrifice for the sake of truth. But he didn’t. It was like he was afraid. So maybe he was involved after all. That’s my impression. Someone who wasn’t involved would show more courage.

There’s something else [about the massacre] that doesn’t fit with the story given by the resistance. I spoke with Bishop Ximenes Belo about this. We know that the resistance organized [the funeral procession and demonstration]. But the military infiltrated. Bugis people from Sulawesi made some of the pictures of Xanana. Bugis civilians. Bishop Belo said that there was infiltration from both sides—from the military and those in the forest [i.e. the resistance movement]. The way the resistance tells the story, they arranged the whole demonstration. But it wasn’t like that. I found out about this from the Bishop.

VIII. Selection of a New Governor

I received lots of requests from the people. There were two sides. One group said, “Pak Mario, just serve out your term. While you’ve been governor we have refrained from doing all sorts of things. But when your term as governor is over, we’ll start.” The other group said I couldn’t be replaced. I told them I wasn’t allowed to serve another term because the regulation is that governors can only serve for two terms. This group

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47 Jailani was the head of the National Investigative Team.
even sent a letter to Pak Harto and messages were sent via Prabowo to [Suharto’s wife] Ibu Tien, and she passed them on to Pak Harto.

After the November 12 [massacre], I had an audio cassette [of the shooting]. The only person I let listen to it was Rudini. He had a house on Gatot Subroto Street, and we listened to it there together. There must have been more than nineteen people killed. It was like a war for two minutes. Rudini is a principled man, but that was the first time he disappointed me. After we listened to the cassette, he said that my version of events was correct [meaning more than nineteen people killed]. But for that reason I had to keep my mouth shut. Rudini said he wanted to extend my term as governor for two years if I . . . . My impression was he wanted to buy me. It was awkward. That afternoon when journalists came [to see me], I said “No, there were more than nineteen people killed, and I want to find out the truth.”

[Then] we heard that Pak Abilio [Soares] was a candidate for governor. I went straight to Pak Rudini and said, “Pak, I’m very disappointed. For the past year I’ve worked myself to death, from morning until night. Someone like Abilio will ruin it all.” He said, “You’re right. When we landed [i.e. invaded] in 1975, Pak Abilio was my driver!” [Laughter] He continued, “But don’t worry. I’ll speak with Pak Harto.” About a week later, I went to Jakarta and [Rudini] told me, “There isn’t anything I can do about it. I met with Pak Harto and told him that Abilio had been my driver.” But Pak Harto said, “Do you mean by that that I couldn’t become president because I’m the son of a peasant?” [Laughter]

Actually, there were two other candidates. Mariano Lopes da Cruz and Rui Lopes. Rui Lopes was Theo Syafei’s [candidate]. Rui Lopes was also working with Xanana. He was a double agent. Pak Theo Syafei told me the military wouldn’t accept Pak Abilio. After we capture Xanana, we’ll find out from Xanana what Rui Lopes is really like. So [the military backed] Mariano Lopes da Cruz to replace me as governor. But there were instructions from Jakarta to make sure that Abilio became governor. The members of the People’s Representative Assembly [in Jakarta] were instructed on how to vote. That’s how it worked. When I became governor, they were all told to chose me. So Rui and Mariano lost to Abilio. Actually, Abilio already knew he was going to become governor.

IX. The Bureaucracy and Education

I think I was fairly successful as governor because I didn’t take sides. Indonesian wanted the number one man [i.e. their governor] to be Apodeti and number two UDT. People with Fretilin backgrounds weren’t allowed to get positions. I said no. As the governor, they had to be treated equally. You can’t treat people differently. So there were Fretilin [people] who served as mayor of Dili, Fretilin people as directors in the banks, as bureau heads, everywhere. That was the only way to do things. If we took sides, we couldn’t accomplish much. But this way, we could do all sorts of things, and people didn’t have a reason to take action against me. For example, people wanted someone from Apodeti chosen. Every time I appointed someone from Fretilin [i.e. with a Fretilin background] as head of something, someone from the military would show up, either immediately or after a while, or send one of their people. They’d say “That guy’s like this, he’s GPK [Security Disturbance Group, Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan],
sir. Sir, you’re letting the enemy inside [the bureaucracy].” I’d tell them that my principle is this, “He’s GPK if he’s in the forests. That’s your business—military to military—shooting. But the people aren’t GPK.” The people are all the same, so I’d employ him. That’s why they couldn’t do anything to me.

The problem was this. Whenever we needed to fill a position, there were always people who said that there weren’t any qualified Timorese. But if there weren’t any qualified Timorese, then we should start preparing people for the future. They had to learn, so why not give them opportunities? We started to increase the number of scholarships every year. To leave here, they [the candidates] were examined very closely by the military. Most of them became anti-Indonesian after they left East Timor [to study in Java and Bali]. That’s why [the military] wanted to close East Timor off. I said open East Timor.48

With scholarships, if they [the military authorities] knew [that someone was from a Fretlin family], they would come and say I couldn’t give the person a scholarship, this and that. But everyone from Apodeti was allowed scholarships. But I never agreed when they said that someone couldn’t go because he or she was the child of a GPK. Including Xanana’s son Nico. Xanana’s son liked roller skating. But he wasn’t allowed to go to Java because he was Xanana’s kid. So I called [the military authorities]. “Why can’t Nico go?” They said: “Oh, that’s Xanana’s son. Xanana’s in the forest. This kid is still . . . .” I asked them to give me proof that Nico was anti-Indonesian.

At one time I had eight hundred million Rupiah for scholarships. So we wanted to send new university students outside of East Timor. Because I fought with them [the military authorities], they wanted to nix anyone who wasn’t from an Apodeti family. They tried to win by working through the Ministry of Internal Affairs. So I went to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Minister Supardjo Rustam had cut eight hundred million Rupiah from the [provincial] budget. I said to Supardjo, “Pak, if that money isn’t returned, if you cross that money out of the budget, you can also cross out my name as governor.” He immediately ordered the Directors to return the eight hundred million Rupiah. They only wanted one group to become cadres [i.e. those who receive opportunities] in East Timor. Their short-term plan was to develop cadres.

After the November 12 [massacre], Apodeti people started to side with the resistance. At the start of Abilio’s [Soares’s] term as governor here, in 1999, at the time of the referendum, very few people were Apodeti. People like Apodeti leader João Martins were poisoned. João Martins keeled over when he was giving a speech at a school. He died there. Sarmento, the mayor of Dili, died. They said from a heart attack. The man who was mayor of Dili, who had once been a sub-district head, also died of a heart attack. They were all young. People could see that if you started siding that way . . . it would happen. So Apodeti started to lose its strength. After 1992, Apodeti started to drown. I think that was because of Xanana Gusmão’s coalition movement.

48 He added: “Even as the governor, to leave East Timor—even to go to Jakarta—I had to get a stamp from the military. I wasn’t allowed to leave until I had gone to get a travel pass [surat jalan] stamped by the military. People probably don’t know that. To go to their fields, people in the village had to get a letter from the Village-level Guidance Officer [Bintara Pembinaan Desa, Babinsa].”
When Xanana said that he wasn’t Fretilin, only the commander of Falintil, that’s when the war started to be won. Apodeti and UDT people who had been enemies of Fretilin could also join the movement. I’ve forgotten the year of the East Timorese People’s Reconciliation and Unity Movement [Gerakan Rekonsiliasi Persatuan Rakyat Timtim, 1998]. It was all Xanana. From Xanana. It’s starting again now. I see that the situation is starting to change.