
REPRESENTING THE INDONESIAN PAST: THE NATIONAL MONUMENT HISTORY MUSEUM FROM GUIDED DEMOCRACY TO THE NEW ORDER¹

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Encased within the base of the Indonesian National Monument is a museum featuring a series of colorful dioramas or picture models. These dioramas tell the story of the Indonesian past by means of a chronological progression of scenes covering more than four centuries of history, from before 1600 to the twentieth century. Behind the dioramas themselves, however, is another story of how and why each of these scenes came to be included in this official record of the Indonesian past.

Museum Sejarah Monumen Nasional (hereafter Museum Monas) makes a fascinating case study because the formation of Museum Monas spanned two ideologically different regimes, that of Guided Democracy (1959-65) and the New Order (1966-98). In both periods, President Sukarno and President Suharto respectively set priorities for and shaped the visions of the museum. Although the Guided Democracy version of Museum Monas was never installed in the base of the national monument, due to the disruptions caused by the 1965 coup attempt and the ensuing change of government, sufficient traces of this museum vision were preserved to determine its view of Indonesian history. By 1964, the first museum committee had

¹ I would like to thank Charles Coppel, Tim Lindsey, Angus McIntyre, Antonia Finnane, Charles Schencking, Helen Pausacker, Robert Horvath, Michele Ford, Mary Donnelly and the anonymous reviewer for *Indonesia* for their comments on this article and/or related chapters of my thesis.

published its plans for the museum, including details of the significant events to be represented in this summation of the national past and detailed information on how the scenes were to appear both visually and in narratives.² In addition to these surviving records, interviews with committee representatives provide sufficient material to enable us to reconstruct how the scenes of this museum would have appeared if they had been completed before the abrupt end of Guided Democracy. The New Order vision of the past was, until 1998 at least, still on display in Museum Monas in the form of dioramas. There are also surviving records detailing the process by which the New Order committee formulated these museum scenes.³

Museum Monas provides a remarkable opportunity to explore how two different regimes sought to construct the national past and, at the same time, define Indonesian society. To date, there have only been two studies of Indonesian history museums, both of which focus on museums of the New Order period.⁴ Museum Monas allows us to examine some of the continuities and breaks between history making in the Guided Democracy and New Order eras. While these have been numerous studies of New Order historiography, very few studies, with the exception of Klooster's and Frederick's, have contrasted history making in these two periods.⁵

² The two key reports used are Panitia Museum Sedjarah Tugu Nasional, *Laporan Lengkap Lukisan Sedjarah Visuil Museum Sedjarah Tugu Nasional: Laporan Umum* (Complete report on visual descriptions of the history scenes for the National Monument History Museum: General report) (Djakarta: Panitia Museum Sedjarah Tugu Nasional, 1964) (hereafter *Laporan Umum*); and Panitia Museum Sedjarah Tugu Nasional, *Laporan Lengkap Lukisan Sedjarah Visuil Museum Sedjarah Tugu Nasional: Hasil Penelitian C, Menuju Sosialisme Indonesia*, (Complete report on visual descriptions of the history scenes for the National Monument History Museum: Research results for Section C, towards Indonesian socialism) (Djakarta: Panitia Museum Sedjarah Tugu Nasional, 1964) (hereafter *Hasil Penelitian C Menuju Sosialisme Indonesia*). I am most grateful to Bapak Uka Tjandrasasmita for the care he took to preserve these materials and for his generosity in making these documents available to me.

³ The details of planning for these scenes are recorded in the monograph, Prajogo, *Tugu Nasional Laporan Pembangunan 1961-1978*, (Report on the development of the national monument 1961-1978) (Jakarta: Pelaksana Pembina Tugu Nasional, 1978) (hereafter *Tugu Nasional*). Additional information on the new museum scenes and the process of compiling them that appears in this article is derived from interview material, observations of the museum in 1997-98, and the 1990 edition of the museum guidebook: *Monumen Nasional Dengan Museum Sejarah Nasionalnya*, (The National Monument and the National Monument History Museum) (Jakarta: Badan Pengelola Monumen Nasional, 1990) (hereafter *Monumen Nasional*).

⁴ Hans Antlöv has examined Monumen Yogya Kembali (which houses a museum) and Museum Pusat ABRI Satriamandala. See Hans Antlöv, "The Revolusi Represented: Contemporary Indonesian Images of 1945," *Indonesia Circle*, 68 (1996): 1-21. Schreiner has examined historical representation in three museums, which he describes as national struggle museums: Museum Benteng Vredeberg, Museum Pusat ABRI Satriamandala, and Museum Keprajuritan. See Klaus Schreiner, "History in the Showcase," in *Outward Appearances: Dressing State and Society in Indonesia*, ed. Henk Schulte Nordholt (Leiden: KITLV Press, 1997), pp. 99-117.

⁵ Two exceptions are H. A. J. Klooster, *Indonesiërs Schrijven hun Geschiedenis: de Ontwikkeling van de Indonesische Geschiedbeoefening in Theorie en Praktijk, 1900-1980* (Dordrecht: Foris Publications, 1985); and William Frederick, "Reflections in a Moving Stream: Indonesian Memories of the War and the Japanese," in *Representing the Japanese Occupation in Indonesia: Personal Testimonies and Public Images in Indonesia, Japan, and the Netherlands*, ed. Remco Raben (Zwolle: Netherlands Institute for War Documentation and Waanders Publishing, 1999), pp. 16-35.

For both Sukarno and Suharto, Museum Monas constituted a canvas upon which they could inscribe their own formulations of the Indonesian past and the core values they believed ought to guide Indonesians. These two prescriptions of Indonesian identity were quite different, however. For Sukarno, the museum was supposed to represent Indonesia's path towards socialism; this was its broad theme. The overarching goal of investing the people with a national spirit and a belief in Indonesia's greatness was also a priority for him. Suharto, on the other hand, intended that the museum project the more universal values of the Pancasila back onto the past, in addition to incorporating and displaying the changes in national direction that had been initiated by his newly emerging regime.

Both regimes appointed different committees to implement their differing visions of the past. The first committee, headed by the then-Minister for Education, comprised a range of bureaucrats and academics working for the Sukarno government. The New Order committee, under the guidance of the regime's central military historian, was considerably smaller. Each regime expected the official historians working for them to produce records of the Indonesian past that answered that regime's ideological needs, but this was no simple task. In the case of Museum Monas, the two museum committees had to sacrifice certain ideological principles for others. For the Guided Democracy committee, ultimately the representation of socialism was sacrificed to the goal of representing a united nation, whereas for the New Order committee, displays celebrating the principle of national unity were finally crowded out by displays picturing the new regime's restoration of the nation's core values, the values of Pancasila.

Despite the different visions of the Indonesian past proposed by Sukarno and Suharto and the apparent ideological differences between the two regimes, however, the two versions of Museum Monas shared several continuities. Both regimes assigned a very high priority to the planning and development of this museum because of the contemporary belief held both inside and outside Indonesia that museums could inspire people and even influence their values.⁶ Mohamad Amir Sutaarga, head of the ethnology collection at Museum Pusat (now Museum Nasional) and later director of the same museum, was the most important figure involved in developing museums in Indonesia in the 1950s and 1960s. In the late 1950s, Sutaarga argued that "museums were not just a means of guarding against the loss of national culture . . . but also an institution which could advance civilisations."⁷ Echoing scholars who had outlined the mission of the modern museum in Europe,⁸ Sutaarga expressed his opinion that

⁶ For a survey of comparable topics covered at the International Council of Museums (ICOM) conferences, see "Thirty-four Years of Co-operation between UNESCO and ICOM," *Museum* 32 (1980): 154-62.

⁷ Moh. Amir Sutaarga, "Masalah Museum di Indonesia," in Moh. Amir Sutaarga, *Persoalan Museum di Indonesia* (Museum Issues in Indonesia) (Jakarta: Direktorat Museum Direktorat-Djenderal Kebudayaan Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, 1971) (originally published in *Siasat* 2 (May, June, July, August 1958): 8.

⁸ Bennett draws upon Foucault's analysis of liberal government to argue that museums in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century were seen as a means of inculcating citizens with civic values. Tony Bennett, *The Birth of the Museum: History, Theory and Politics* (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 17- 24.

museums were didactic institutions and a means of guiding Indonesian citizens.⁹ Sukarno and Suharto saw Museum Monas as a significant location in which to define the most important elements of the Indonesian past and hence dictate national priorities.

Modern history museums usually attempt to tell a progressive, linear story of advancement. This message is communicated not only by the displays, but also by the physical path a museum visitor must follow through a display sequence in a museum.¹⁰ Those who design museums are thus able selectively to represent what constitutes progress or the national direction. This is particularly true in the case of Museum Monas, for both committees decided to represent history right up until the period of the regimes then in power.

The choice of both regimes to use dioramas as the only medium of historical representation in this museum reflects not only the strengths of this medium, but also the two regimes' perceptions of the functions of history. One advantage of using dioramas to represent history is that they are three-dimensional, thereby allowing a suitable recreation of complex scenes. In this sense, they have the capacity to bring the past alive and to "take the viewer through the window and create the illusion that he or she is present at a scene or an event in a way that would not normally be possible."¹¹ Sukarno suggested that the diorama form of visual display

. . . would allow people who come to the museum in seeing these displays alone, [to] see the stages of Indonesian history from what has happened long ago to the period of the opening of the national monument.¹²

Visual historical displays effectively turn "time into space [which] enables them to be used as an apparatus of social memory."¹³ They are therefore a powerful way of representing identity. The man charged with the task of designing the revised New Order version of Museum Monas, Nugroho Notosusanto, had ideas similar to Sukarno's concerning why the diorama medium was suitable for Indonesian audiences.¹⁴

Dioramas are each only able to represent one particular moment in time. In this sense, they reduce history to a series of images. Many of the questions critics have

⁹ Sutaarga, "Masalah Museum di Indonesia," p. 8.

¹⁰ Bennett, *The Birth of the Museum*, p. 179.

¹¹ Tom Hewitt, "Diorama Presentation," *Journal of the Australian War Memorial* 5 (October 1984): 35.

¹² Panitia Museum Sedjarah Tugu Nasional, *Laporan Umum*, p. 195.

¹³ Masao Yamaguchi, "The Poetics of Exhibition in Japanese Culture," in *Exhibiting Cultures: The Poetics and Politics of Museum Display*, ed. Ivan Karp and Steven Lavine (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991), p. 61.

¹⁴ Departemen Pertahanan-Keamanan Pusat Sejarah ABRI, *Pedoman Penyelenggaraan Museum ABRI, ABRI (Guide for the Co-ordination of ABRI Museums)* (Jakarta, Departemen Pertahanan-Keamanan Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, 1973), p. 3.

raised concerning the accuracy of photographs as representations of the past can be applied to dioramas as well.

Photographs are not, as often assumed, a mechanical record. Every time we look at a photograph we are aware, however slightly, of the photographer selecting the sight from an infinity of other possible sights.¹⁵

Like photographs, dioramas are also the product of a number of selections. Schreiner has suggested that the prolific use of dioramas in New Order museums may be motivated by the desire to provide “a definitive and authoritative interpretation of historical facts.”¹⁶ This is consistent with trends in both Guided Democracy and New Order historiography.

This article investigates firstly the visions of the Indonesian past put forward by Sukarno and Suharto for this museum. I examine each vision and how they differed. Secondly, I consider who the history makers—the people commissioned by each leader to implement their vision of the past—were. Thirdly, I analyze the museum-making process by scrutinizing how each committee responded to the guidelines set by Sukarno and Suharto, respectively. I explore the challenges they encountered in implementing these visions and the negotiations that they conducted with each other and the two presidents to produce an approved version of the Indonesian past. Lastly, I compare the Guided Democracy and New Order versions of this museum, reflecting on which elements of Sukarno’s vision were retained, altered, or omitted by the new regime and why. Each committee’s representations of the recent past, of the Guided Democracy and New Order periods, respectively, were especially important, as they constituted mirror reflections of both regimes. An interesting difference between the two committees was the decision by the New Order museum committee, in contrast to Sukarno’s committee, to fill all the available diorama domes in this museum.

Two Visions of the Indonesian Past

Sukarno took a very personal interest in Museum Monas. From the beginning of the project, he played a prominent role in shaping the museum’s design.¹⁷ He was General Chairman of the museum committee and acted as overseer for the entire project, often meeting with the committee to discuss ideas for the museum. He signed all preparatory documents for the museum, including the individual scene descriptions and sketches.¹⁸

Sukarno intended the museum to conform with the goals of the national monument within which it was encased. For Sukarno, the possession of a national monument was

¹⁵ John Berger, *Ways of Seeing* (London: BBC and Penguin Books, 1987), p. 10.

¹⁶ Schreiner, “History in the Showcase,” p. 108.

¹⁷ Soemartini, (a member of both Museum Monas committees), interview by author, Jakarta, February 21, 1998.

¹⁸ A. D. Saleh (Assistant to both Museum Monas committees), interview by author, Jakarta, January 12, 1998.

a vital sign of nationhood. In defense of the enormous expense of the project, he often related the advice given to him by the then-General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev, on the necessity of monuments. Sukarno praised Khrushchev's advice, claiming,

a nation does not need material goods only, but it also has spiritual needs, mental needs . . . Because of this although I am still criticized, I continue my efforts with all your help to build a national monument as a symbol of the greatness of the Indonesian nation.¹⁹

Sukarno felt that representing Indonesia's greatness was vital, given Indonesia's recent experience of colonialism, in order to encourage self-respect and build the self-confidence of a people who, he suggested, were "likely to be lacking these qualities from the effects of long colonial rule."²⁰ While the tall column of the monument capped by a golden flame was meant to symbolize the spirit of independence, the museum encased within the base of the monument was to represent the roots from which the spirit of independence sprang, or the origins of the Indonesian nation.

In Museum Monas, Sukarno turned to the historical record as a means to unify Indonesians and promote national pride. To date, no museum had so comprehensively covered Indonesia's history. Sukarno's interest in history as a stimulus for nationalism dated back at least as far as his famous 1930 speech, "Indonesia Accuses," in which he argued that the first step necessary for raising national consciousness was to "show the people that the life they lived long ago was a good life."²¹

His commitment to Museum Monas in the early 1960s was also inspired by his visits in 1959 and 1961 to the Mexican National Museum. An inscription on the exit of the National Museum of Mexico particularly impressed Sukarno. It read:

. . . we leave the museum behind, but not history, because history continues with our life. The Motherland is a continuity, and we all are laborers toiling for its greatness. Out of the past we received the strength required for the present. Out of the past we received the purpose and encouragement for the future. Let us then realize the responsibilities for freedom in order to deserve more and more the honor of being Mexicans.²²

Three years after his second visit to Mexico, in one of the meetings for the planning for the Museum Monas, Sukarno recalled his reaction to this museum inscription:

¹⁹ Panitia Museum Sedjarah Tugu Nasional, *Laporan Umum*, p. 195.

²⁰ Sukarno, "Nation Building and Character Building," in *New Forces Build a New World: Indonesian Policy Series of the Department of Foreign Affairs*, Tenth Anniversary of First Asian-African Conference, Executive Command (Jakarta, 1965), pp. 30-31.

²¹ Roger K. Paget, *Indonesia Accuses! Soekarno's Defence Oration in the Political Trial of 1930*, ed., trans., annot., introd. Roger K. Paget (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 79.

²² Ganis Harsono, *Recollections of an Indonesian Diplomat in the Sukarno Era* (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1977), pp. 230-31.

That inscription caught my imagination and I also wanted to make the Indonesian nation, all the Indonesian nation from Sabang to Merauke, toil for our greatness.²³

In this inscription he found an eloquent expression of his own feelings that the past was a useful resource for motivating the people to strive to reclaim their potential.

Sukarno planned that the museum scenes would reflect a clear sense of progression in the story of Indonesian history; most importantly, it would tell a story of progression towards a brighter future. Echoing ideas from his 1930 speech, Sukarno said to the first museum committee for Museum Monas, "the one thing necessary to know is our majestic past, our dark present, and the promise of working towards a rebirth in the future."²⁴ He requested that the thirty-two scenes reflect the popular concept (often espoused by Sukarno himself) of a national past that divided into three parts: a golden age (Section A); the colonial experience (Section B); and a period defined by the country's reclamation of its former glory (Section C). In his directives to the museum committee, Sukarno dictated that the aim of the last section (Section C), showing the country's return to its greatness, was to display the nation's movement towards Indonesian socialism. This was consistent with Sukarno's view that socialism was the final stage in Indonesia's history. For Sukarno, the long-term aim of the Guided Democracy period was the achievement of "a just and prosperous society and the elimination of imperialism everywhere."²⁵ He described the transformation by which this would be achieved as consisting of two stages: first the national anti-imperialist phase, and then the social anti-capitalist phase.²⁶

After some deliberation, Sukarno decided that the museum would contain a total of thirty-two diorama display domes. Of these thirty-two possible scenes, Sukarno gave the committee license to "determine twenty-four of the most important events in Indonesian history to date," whilst requesting that eight diorama display domes be left empty. He suggested to the committee that these empty platforms be labeled with the following message: "Hey, future generations, it is your responsibility to fill these diorama display domes." That responsibility, claimed Sukarno, "is a sign of the greatness of our Indonesian nation."²⁷ After some initial planning, the total number of scenes was increased to forty-eight to accommodate a greater selection of scenes from the Indonesian past. In the end, therefore, Museum Monas, as envisioned by Sukarno, would have twelve spaces on each of its four walls, with eight to be left blank.²⁸ Once the committee agreed on which scenes to include, responsibility for discussing the

²³ Panitia Museum Sedjarah Tugu Nasional, *Laporan Umum*, pp. 196-97.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 196-97.

²⁵ Peter Christian Hauswedell, "Sukarno: Radical or Conservative? Indonesian Politics 1964-65," *Indonesia* 15 (April 1973): 105.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 116-17.

²⁷ Panitia Museum Sedjarah Tugu Nasional, *Laporan Umum*, p. 195.

²⁸ *Ibid.* See also Report for September 1963–August 1964 provided in Prajogo, *Tugu Nasional*, p. 55.

historiography and planning the imagery for each of the scenes was divided up among the committee members.

Although the version of the national past compiled by the Guided Democracy museum committee was never installed in Museum Monas, by 1963 the committee had completed their written descriptions of the scenes to be installed. The sketches prepared by the team of artists awaited approval from Sukarno at the time of the coup in October 1965. During the period of violence, turmoil, and rapid change following the coup, the museum project lay dormant. Four years later, in 1969, the now-established Suharto regime turned its attention to this museum.

The New Order regime clearly recognized the potential of this museum as a site through which it could remake the story of the Indonesian people in accordance with its own blueprint of nation- and character-building. Like Sukarno, Suharto also considered history a valuable ideological tool. The New Order's appreciation of history's significance as a tool of the state became apparent in the early years of this regime. Within forty days after the 1965 coup attempt, for example, the Armed Forces History Center had produced the first official interpretation of the coup attempt.²⁹ This project was of great importance to the New Order state, for its legitimacy rested on the public's belief that the PKI, and not the Army, was behind the coup.

Suharto considered this museum to be so important that he set revised Presidential guidelines for it. In these guidelines, he stated that the newly formed museum committee was not bound by the decisions of the old committee.³⁰ This instruction indicates that Suharto believed the emergence of a new regime warranted a fresh look at the Indonesian past. This was consistent with an important theme promoted by the central New Order ideologue, Ali Moertopo: that the New Order itself constituted "a negation of the Old Order, a renovation along new lines and patterns, especially of values."³¹ While Sukarno's three-part division of history was largely maintained, the focus of the last phase—the return to glory—was altered, so that now the act of "fulfilling independence" (*mengisi kemerdekaan*), rather than achieving socialism, constituted national "glory."

In his 1969 Presidential decision on the museum, Suharto specified that the museum scenes were to satisfy three conditions. They were 1) "to be inspirational in the sense of inspiring the struggle of the Indonesian nation in the present and the future to reach the national goals as recorded in the preamble to the 1945 Constitution" (the Pancasila); 2) "to strengthen Pancasila awareness"; and finally, 3) "to form an historical milestone for the establishment of the New Order according to the decisions

²⁹ Staf Angkatan Bersendjata Pusat Sejarah Angkatan Bersendjata, *40 Hari Kegagalan "G-30-S" 1 Oktober-10 November 1965* (The forty day failure of the G-30-S 1 October-10 November 1965), (Jakarta: Pusat Sedjarah Angkatan Bersendjata, 1965).

³⁰ Prajogo, *Tugu Nasional*, p. 148.

³¹ These are the words of Ali Moertopo, who was one of the New Order's most important ideologues. Ali Moertopo, *Some Basic Thoughts on the Acceleration and Modernization of Twenty-five Years of Development* (Jakarta: Yayasan Proklamasi, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1973), p. 35.

of IV and V General Sessions of the MPRS and the Special session of MPRS."³² The first two of these goals stressed the new regime's emphasis on the Pancasila. The third goal directed the museum committee to reflect, in their displays, the changes in national direction mandated by politicians in the parliamentary sessions held in the transition years from 1966 to 1968. The decisions made in these sessions included, amongst many other things, the decision to enhance the military's political role, to abandon socialism as a national goal, to ban the Communist party, and to strip Sukarno of his titles. The newly formed government also decided to increase emphasis on religion, to ratify the Letter of March 11th, in which Sukarno handed power over to Suharto, and to appoint Suharto the new President.

The Two Museum Committees

Sukarno and Suharto thus outlined two different visions of the Indonesian past to be represented in Museum Monas. Responsibility for translating these general visions into specific scenes from the Indonesian past fell to the two respective Guided Democracy and New Order committees. Museums derive much of their authority from the perception that they are unauthored texts, yet they remain the products of their creators.³³ For this reason, it is necessary to look briefly at the composition of both committees charged with planning the Museum Monas, and to consider the ideological context in which they worked before examining the challenges they faced in implementing Sukarno's and Suharto's visions.

The Acting Chairman of the Guided Democracy museum committee was Professor Priyono, Minister of Primary Education and Culture. In his Ministry portfolio, Lee suggests that Priyono "tried faithfully to incorporate the symbols and themes of Guided Democracy."³⁴ Priyono strongly supported Sukarno's political ideas, especially the call for the development of a truly national culture. He was adamantly anti-West, and for this reason he enjoyed considerable support from the PKI and other leftist organizations.³⁵

In 1963, Priyono appointed a committee of thirty-two persons, subject to Sukarno's final approval. Of the total committee, fourteen were from the University of Indonesia; five were from the Department of Education; three from the Bureau of Archaeology and Archaeological Remains; one from the Institute of History and Anthropology; one from the Department of Information; one from the Bureau of Public Education; one from the Department of National Research; one from the Department of Religion; one from the Bureau of Culture; one (Amir Sutargaa) was the Head of

³² Prajogo, *Tugu Nasional*, p. 148. The museum guidelines were outlined by Suharto in Presidential decision No. 6, 1969.

³³ Ivan Karp and Steven Lavine, "Introduction," in *Exhibiting Cultures*, p. 1.

³⁴ Lee Kam Hing, *Education and Politics in Indonesia 1945-1965* (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1995), p. 182.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 165-66, 182, 234.

Museum Pusat; two were military representatives, and one was an unaffiliated historian. The make-up of the committee, which included only six historians, reflects the relative immaturity of history as a discipline in Indonesia and a reliance on other related disciplines, such as archaeology.³⁶ The composition of this committee suggests that Sukarno and Priyono felt it necessary to draw on a broad range of expertise to produce the most desirable version of the Indonesian past. The list suggests that they wanted many voices—including those speaking from religious and military perspectives—to be heard. Yet most members of the committee, by virtue of their position as professionals and bureaucrats working for the Sukarno government either at the University of Indonesia or in government departments or agencies, found themselves relatively constrained when it came time to share opinions with their colleagues.

In the period of Guided Democracy, historians and all other public figures were under pressure to toe the Sukarnoist line by incorporating Manipol-Usdek ideology,³⁷ which celebrated the ongoing, progressive revolution towards socialism into their work. The historian Taufik Abdullah suggests that history underwent Manipol-isasi (or was required to reflect the ideology of Manipol) in this period to such an extent that historical thinking was constrained by power holders for the purposes of “the revolution.”³⁸ The pressures toward ideological conformity were strongly felt by members of the committee from the University of Indonesia, which became embroiled in the PKI’s anti-imperialist drive. The government specifically targeted certain universities, demanding that the faculty increase emphasis on the ideologies of Manipol-Usdek.³⁹ In April 1964, Sukarno banned the Cultural Manifesto (Manikebu), a manifesto centering on a call for greater freedom of expression outside the confines of revolutionary rhetoric. Purges followed of Manikebuists or “reactionary elements,” especially in the area of education.⁴⁰ This put specific pressure on faculty members of the University of Indonesia. Although none of the committee members was signatory to

³⁶ When Priyono selected this committee, a number of institutions supported the study and writing of history, namely the Institute for History and Anthropology, the Indonesian Scientific Institute for Historical Research, the Association for the Advancement of National History, and the Center for Army History. History, however, was still a fledgling discipline. See Sartono Kartodirdjo, “Historical Study and Historians in Indonesia Today,” *Journal of Southeast Asian History* 4,1 (1963): 22-29; and Nugroho Notosusanto, “Problems in the Study and Teaching of National History in Indonesia,” *Journal of Southeast Asian History* 6,1 (1965): 1-16.

³⁷ The abbreviation “Manipol-Usdek” refers to the Political Manifesto of the Republic, the name given to Sukarno’s 1959 Independence Day speech. Manipol was subsequently schematized into five central ideas (to which the term Usdek referred). These are the 1945 Constitution, Indonesian socialism, Guided Democracy, Guided Economy, and Indonesian identity. See Rex Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics, 1959-1965* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1974), p. 95.

³⁸ Taufik Abdullah, *Sejarah: Disiplin Ilmu, Rekonstruksi Masa Lalu, Berita Pikiran* (History: The academic discipline, reconstruction of the past, recorded memories) (Jakarta: Proyek Pengkajian Dinamika Sosial Budaya Dalam Proses Industrialisasi-LIPI, 1994-95), p. 202.

³⁹ Lee, *Education and Politics in Indonesia 1945-1965*, p. 301.

⁴⁰ Keith Foulcher, *Social Commitment in Literature and the Arts: the Indonesian Institute of People’s Culture 1950-1965* (Clayton: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1986), pp. 124-27.

the Manikebu, they worked in close proximity at the university to signatories and were thus alert to the need to prove their revolutionary credentials. This provided the committee with extra incentive to incorporate Sukarno's contemporary ideologies and visions into the museum.

It is difficult to determine the political leanings of these members of the committee, given the 1959 presidential decree forbidding senior civil servants from joining political parties.⁴¹ Several persons on the committee were, however, notable for their engagement in politics. Subandri Prijosoedibjo was leader of the left-wing faction of the main teacher's union in Indonesia, the PGRI (Persatuan Guru Republik Indonesia, Teacher's Association of the Republic of Indonesia). With revolutionary zeal, the union, under Subandri's control, called for radical reforms of the country's education system.⁴² Two similarly disposed members were the brothers Tjan Tjoe Sim and Tjan Tjoe Som, who earlier established the HSI (Himpunan Sarjana Indonesia, Association of Indonesian Scholars) an organization of intellectuals with left-wing or pro-PKI sentiments.⁴³ Another committee member, Dahlan Mansoer, was head of the teachers' training division. He was not aligned with a specific party, but was strongly pro-Sukarno.⁴⁴

Not all the members of the initial committee, however, were Sukarno loyalists. S. Parman, who had served as military attaché to London between 1959-1962, during a period of heightened Cold War tensions, was Chief of Army Intelligence at the time he joined the committee. Parman's inclusion in the group illustrated the active role played by the Army in national affairs in the Guided Democracy period.

Another noteworthy member of the museum committee was Nugroho Notosusanto, who eventually became the most important official historian for the New Order regime. In the period of Guided Democracy, Nugroho was a history lecturer from the University of Indonesia. He was then mostly known for his short stories rather than his historical writing. Nugroho was probably included on the committee because he was a former student of Priyono's.⁴⁵

While most members of the museum committee remained untouched by the tumultuous political transition from Guided Democracy to the New Order, others were targets of political "retooling." Amongst those ousted from the government were a number of more senior members of the original museum committee. Priyono, the Acting Head of the museum committee, then coordinating Minister of Education and Culture, became a target of the KAMI (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia, Indonesian Student Action Front) student campaigns.⁴⁶ Priyono was also the target of Islamic and

⁴¹ Lee, *Education and Politics in Indonesia 1945-1965*, p. 185.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 187.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 224, 232.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 188.

⁴⁵ Irma Nugroho Notosusanto, interview by author, Jakarta, February 11, 1998.

⁴⁶ Soe Hok Gie, *Catatan Seorang Demonstran* (Writings of a demonstrator), (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1983), p. 162.

Catholic groups who had previously opposed his secular education policies.⁴⁷ In general, he was unpopular with the New Order regime because of his strong support for Sukarno and his support for the implementation of Indonesian socialism. Priyono was replaced as Coordinating Minister of Education in mid-1966.⁴⁸ Soemardjo was another victim of the government "retooling" campaign. Following the coup attempt, Sukarno appointed Soemardjo Minister for Basic Education as part of the short-lived cabinet of one hundred ministers.⁴⁹ His appointment provoked much protest especially, from the Islamic KAPPI (Kesatuan Aksi Pelajar Pemuda Indonesia, Indonesian Student and Youth Action Front), the Islamic Indonesian Student and Youth Action Front) which considered Soemardjo to be pro-PKI and an atheist.⁵⁰ On March 12, 1966, only sixteen days after he had taken up office, Soemardjo was put under house arrest on the grounds that there were "sufficient indications" of his connection with the PKI/Gestapu.⁵¹ Subandri of the PGRI, a member of the original museum committee, was also arrested, but then released.⁵²

It could be expected that several members were in awkward positions following the coup, since they must have been approved by both Priyono and Sukarno in order to have been assigned to the museum committee in the first place. Yet none of the committee members was a Communist party member and most managed to keep their positions in the different universities and government departments where they had been employed during the Sukarno regime. In this sense, most members of the committee escaped the kind of persecution that Communist party members suffered. One committee member, S. Parman, became a victim of the 1965 coup attempt. He was named by the 30 September Movement as a member of the "Council of Generals," a group of high-echelon military men accused by the movement of having joined with the CIA in plotting against Sukarno.

When work on the museum project finally resumed in 1969, the New Order was firmly established. The new regime appointed a smaller museum committee and handed control of the museum project over to Nugroho Notosusanto. There were several reasons behind the regime's appointment of Nugroho to this position. Although it was true he had participated in the first museum committee, a fact that might have worked to his disadvantage with the new regime, by 1969 Nugroho was acting as head of the Armed Forces History Center. By the time the Museum Monas project was resumed, he had already completed several important histories on behalf of the New

⁴⁷ Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, rev. ed. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988) p. 185.

⁴⁸ Lee, *Education and Politics in Indonesia 1945-1965*, fn. 152, p. 346.

⁴⁹ Oei Tjoe Tat, *Memoar Oei Tjoe Tat, Pembantu Presiden Sukarno* (Memoirs of Oei Tjoe Tat, Assistant to President Sukarno) (Jakarta: Hasta Mitra, 1995), p. 199.

⁵⁰ Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, p. 185.

⁵¹ From Suharto's TV and radio speech in Sutjipto, *ABRI Pengemban Suara Hati Nurani Rakyat* (ABRI Guardians of the Voice of the People's Hearts and Minds), vol. 1, (Jakarta: Matoa, 1966), pp. 19-20. As provided in *ibid.*, p. 195.

⁵² Lee, *Education and Politics in Indonesia 1945-1965*, p. 339.

Order regime.⁵³ Having served in the independence struggle as a member of the Student Army, Nugroho was a committed nationalist and a firm supporter of the military. Following the independence struggle, he had, in fact, wanted to become a soldier. When his father opposed this idea, Nugroho acceded to his father's wishes, but it appears he never completely gave up his military ambitions. Nugroho was therefore a person whom the army-dominated regime felt it could trust to present its version of the national past.⁵⁴

The new museum committee differed from the first in several respects. Firstly, it was reduced from thirty-two to just ten people: six members of the first committee, plus four new members.⁵⁵ Secondly, Nugroho tightly controlled the new committee after he took over in 1969. There was a sense that this project had become government or military business alone.⁵⁶

While Taufik Abdullah implies that historians felt greater freedom to express their views free of ideological language at the beginning of the New Order,⁵⁷ written histories were not released from the shackles of the state's ideological needs during this period. Official historians were required to project the regime's preoccupation with the Pancasila and to provide justification for the military's political role. This is evident in the guidelines Suharto set for the museum committee.

While both committees were closely monitored by Sukarno and Nugroho, respectively, both committees in turn controlled the artists who worked on this project. Sukarno initially called upon two of the first modern Indonesian sculptors, Saptoto and Edhi Soenarso, to create the dioramas.⁵⁸ Sukarno, himself a trained engineer, was very fond of art, and he enjoyed friendly relationships with many well-known artists. He appointed Saptoto head of the museum artistic committee and sent Saptoto and Soenarso to Japan between 1962-63, and then to Mexico, to study the process of making both figurines and dioramas. Following the 1965 coup attempt, Nugroho awarded Soenarso the contract for making the dioramas. Soenarso went on to become the official diorama artist for the majority of diorama museums that exist in Indonesia

⁵³ The most important publication Nugroho was responsible for was the official version of the coup attempt: Pusat Sedjarah Angkatan Bersendjata, *40 Hari Kegagalan "G-30-S" 1 Oktober-10 November*.

⁵⁴ For more on Nugroho see my thesis, "Claiming History: Military Representations of the Indonesian Past from Late Guided Democracy to the New Order" (PhD dissertation, Melbourne University, Melbourne, 2002).

⁵⁵ The new members were Drs. Harsja W. Bachtiar, Moela Marboen, Lim Manus, and Gusti Ng Rai Miskun. Prajogo, *Tugu Nasional*, p. 85.

⁵⁶ Soemartini, interview by author, Jakarta, February 21, 1998; and A. D. Saleh, interview by author, Jakarta, January 12, 1998.

⁵⁷ Abdullah, *Sejarah; Disiplin Ilmu, Rekonstruksi Masa Lalu, Berita Pikiran*, pp. 202-03.

⁵⁸ Both Saptoto and Soenarso were amongst the first students to go through the Indonesian School of Fine Arts, ASRI, established in 1950 in Yogyakarta. Their teachers included Hendra and Affandi, two artists who were known for their sympathetic portrayal of the *rakyat*. See S. Broto, "Monumen: Sebuah Ungkapan dan Penyaksian Sejarah Perjuangan Bangsa," ("Monuments: An expression of and form of testimony to the history of the national struggle") *Senakatha; Media Komunikasi dan Informasi Sejarah*, Pusat Sejarah ABRI 13 (January 1992): 43.

today. Soenarso claims that up until his most recent projects in the 1990s, he was "not allowed freedom of expression in his work and that those who commissioned him usually wanted the dioramas made to their own tastes."⁵⁹ He suggested that the Armed Forces History Center—and Nugroho in particular, who lived to 1985—played a significant role in closely supervising and ultimately approving diorama images. The museum committees largely controlled the artists, according to this artist.

Quite dissimilar people, with very different politics, thus headed the two museum committees. Priyono was a strong supporter of Sukarno and his ideologies and had close ties to the PKI. He presided over a committee of civil servants who were under pressure to follow Sukarno's ideological line. Nugroho Notosusanto, the head of the New Order committee, was a pro-military historian who had established his credentials as head of the Armed Forces History Center. The New Order museum committee was much smaller than Sukarno's committee, and was firmly controlled by Nugroho. The early years of the New Order regime were also characterized by relatively strict ideological conformity. Suharto expected the new museum committee to comply with this revised ideological focus. Both committees exerted firm control over artists working on this project.

Implementing these Two Visions of the Indonesian Past

Implementing Sukarno's Vision

The overarching themes that shaped Sukarno's vision of the Indonesian past were: progression towards a brighter future, characterized by Indonesian socialism, and appreciation of Indonesia's greatness as a nation. Although the Guided Democracy museum committee attempted to project these two themes in the dioramas, the themes were not always compatible. The committee was also constrained by the material with which they had to work (the record of Indonesian history), the need to represent the ancient roots of the Indonesian nation (sometimes difficult to unearth), and Sukarno's request that the museum should promote a sense of unity and spirit amongst Indonesians. To add to the difficulties, committee members differed in their opinions about how best to represent the past and how far to go in representing the nation's revolutionary spirit, and they disagreed about which scenes ought to conclude the museum sequence (understanding that eight dioramas were to be left open for future contributions). Some committee members clearly felt uncomfortable following Sukarno's ideas to their culmination. Sukarno, however, had the final say in this museum plan. He wanted his themes to be clearly illustrated, and he also wanted the museum's display to show and clarify Indonesia's place in the world.

The task of representing a progression towards socialism in Indonesia was a challenge to the Guided Democracy committee. It was not until 1965, after the plans for the scenes were compiled, that Sukarno declared that Indonesia had reached the

⁵⁹ Ibid. Edhi Soenarso, interview by author, Yogyakarta, September 8, 1997.

next stage of the Revolution.⁶⁰ The committee was therefore encouraged to project the momentum of an escalating revolution into these scenes at a time when there was fairly limited evidence of such change. It was the scenes in Section C of the museum, covering 1900 to 1964, that most obviously attempted to represent the nation's advance along the path towards socialism.

One of the clearest representations of Indonesia's revolutionary path was to be a scene depicting the 1926 Banten West Java revolt, a well-known communist revolt against the Dutch. Between 1926-27, the PKI instigated revolts in West Java and West Sumatra largely in response to pressure exerted by its impatient supporters for revolution against the Dutch.⁶¹ The diorama that was meant to illustrate the revolt of 1926—and capture the atmosphere of revolution⁶²—would feature the attack on the Glodok Jail that occurred on the night of the November 12-13, 1926. The committee proposed a scene in which more than two hundred people, armed with various weapons, were approaching the jail, intending to destroy this symbol of colonialism. They intended this visual representation to remind the audience of the storming of Bastille in Paris on July 14, 1789, an act which launched the French Revolution.⁶³ Until the early 1960s, the predominant scholarly interpretation of the French Revolution, espoused most adamantly by French left-wing socialist scholars, was the Marxist view that it represented a bourgeois revolution, or the transition from feudalism to capitalism, rather than a transition from absolute monarchy to democratic republicanism.⁶⁴ In the context of Sukarno's desire that the scenes project a sense of movement towards socialism, the scene of Banten 1926 was to function, like the symbol of Bastille, to represent the spark that ignited the Indonesian revolution.

This scene effectively endorsed a PKI-led rebellion as part of the record of the national past. At the time the museum scenes were formulated, the Indonesian Communist Party was glorifying the 1926-27 anti-colonial revolts as examples of communist participation in the anti-colonial struggle.⁶⁵ Although the communist rebellions failed, and in fact marked the beginning of a new era of heightened Dutch oppression, these acts of defiance still figured as evidence of communist participation in the anti-Dutch resistance. From the 1950s, the PKI leadership had always shown

⁶⁰ He declared this in his 1965 "Berdiri di Atas Kaki Sendiri" (To stand on one's own feet) speech. Hauswedell, "Sukarno: Radical or Conservative?" p. 125.

⁶¹ Harry J. Benda and Ruth McVey, eds., *The Communist Uprising of 1926-1927 in Indonesia: Key Documents*, Translation Series (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1960), pp. xxiii-xxiv.

⁶² On the back wall of the diorama case, the symbol of fire (representing the fire of revolution) was to be visible soaring in the sky along with the names of the leaders who planned the Revolution. Panitia Museum Sedjarah Tugu Nasional, *Hasil Penelitian C Menuju Sosialisme Indonesia*, p. 29.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Gary Kates, *The French Revolution: Recent Debates and New Controversies* (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 1-17.

⁶⁵ McVey notes this trend in contemporary PKI histories. Ruth McVey, "The Enchantment of the Revolution: History and Action in an Indonesian Communist Text," in *Perceptions of the Past in Southeast Asia*, ed. Anthony Reid and David Marr (Singapore: Heinemann Educational Books/Asian Studies Association of Australia, 1979), fn. 22.

itself eager to demonstrate its own nationalist credentials, as it resumed a stronger role in politics but still often found itself hobbled by mistrust towards the Party originating from the bloody 1948 Madiun rebellion.⁶⁶

The committee, however, was not completely comfortable with this endorsement of the Banten action. The historical summary accompanying a list of scenic details notes that although the PKI planned and executed the revolt of 1926, "the revolt was broad and not limited to PKI members only." The note concludes that because of this, and the fact that the aim of the rebels was to overturn the colonial government, the revolt could be termed a "national" revolt.⁶⁷ This commentary reflects unease within the committee in response to armed revolution and PKI leadership. It also shows that the committee was under pressure to avoid singling out one force within society, as that might suggest divisions within the nation; the aim was to represent the anti-Dutch resistance movement as a united struggle against a foreign enemy. The committee made this choice despite the fact that in 1960, scholars of Indonesia, Harry Benda and Ruth McVey, had published a collection of documents on the uprisings of 1926-27 and argued, from that evidence, that these revolts were not part of a nationalist uprising, but were instead a localized expression of anti-Dutch sentiment.⁶⁸ Thus, although the committee intended the scene to highlight the first phase of revolution, they stopped short of emphasizing class-based struggle in this scene, because of the potential divisions within Indonesia that this might expose. Other scenes, such as one that featured Heroes' Day and dioramas depicting Dutch and Japanese colonialism, similarly stressed anti-imperialism, but not class struggle.

There were also scenes in this museum vision that seemed to clash directly with Sukarno's advocacy of anti-imperialism. This was particularly true of the scenes that illustrated Indonesia's golden age, titled: "The Greatness of Sriwijaya," "The Building of Borobudur," "The Siliwangi Royalty," "The Palapa Oath of Gajah Mada," "Baabullah," and "Ali Mughayat Sjah." In these dioramas, the museum committee sought to glorify former kingdoms and their rulers. While this fulfilled Sukarno's request that the museum represent the nation's majestic past, it contradicted the president's contemporary anti-imperialist rhetoric. Sukarno had been personally criticized for the same contradiction when he mixed his denouncements of foreign imperialists with approving references to the Majapahit kingdom. In 1960, for example, a South Sulawesi rebel suggested that Sukarno's references to Majapahit indicated Sukarno himself had imperial ambitions, which he disguised by calling for resistance against foreign imperialism.⁶⁹

The museum committee clearly decided that the benefits of representing these symbols of the golden age to outweigh the disadvantages posed by such

⁶⁶ John Legge, *Sukarno: A Political Biography* (New York: Praeger Publications, 1972), p. 254.

⁶⁷ Panitia Museum Sedjarah Tugu Nasional, *Hasil Penelitian C Menujju Sosialisme Indonesia*, p. 30.

⁶⁸ Benda and McVey, eds., *The Communist Uprising of 1926-1927 in Indonesia*, pp. xxi-xxii.

⁶⁹ Kahar Muzakar, "Down With the New Majapahitism!" in *Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-1965*, ed. Herb Feith and Lance Castles. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1970), p. 331.

contradictions. To understand why they made this choice, we need to examine exactly which parts of the golden age they highlighted. Regarding Majapahit, that scene was to focus on the Palapa Oath (the Unity Oath), according to which Gajah Mada promised never to eat *palapa* fruit again until all of the kingdoms (territories desired by Majapahit) were united. This oath was interpreted by nationalists, especially Muhammad Yamin, as a representation of early nationalism, of the will to unite the people of Indonesia.⁷⁰ The oath allowed nationalists to make a spatial link between the territory of the Indonesian nation as it existed in the 1960s and that which existed at the time of Majapahit. It was the geographic reach of Majapahit and the greatness of this kingdom which the museum committee sought to emphasize. Similarly, for the diorama featuring Sriwijaya, Sukarno instructed the committee to emphasize that kingdom's greatness. But why were there so many scenes focusing on the golden age?

All these scenes functioned to give the Indonesian nation an appearance of great depth and age. They also served as a model for what Indonesians might look forward to in the future. Eric Hobsbawm has noted that relatively new modern nations "generally claim to be the opposite of novel, namely rooted in the remotest antiquity."⁷¹ By beginning the museum exhibits with representations of the golden age, the museum committee decisively located Indonesia's origins prior to the arrival of the Dutch. In this sense, the museum display was not inconsistent with anti-imperialism. The section of the museum depicting the golden age—in contrast to Section B of the museum, which featured anti-colonial resistance—presented an image of former national stability. Projecting an image of stability onto the distant past was important to the president and his committee, as there was little evidence of stability in the more recent past, which encompassed a series of rebellions against the centralized state. Representations of the golden age therefore served as models of stability and illuminated a time when Indonesians ruled themselves.

The proposed representations of Indonesia's golden age also depicted this period as one characterized by abundance. To impoverished Indonesians, the subtext was that they would soon experience abundance again, when socialism finally arrived. Robert Cribb and Colin Brown note that during the Guided Democracy era Indonesia's economy, which was already weakened from the independence war and mismanagement in the 1950s, continued to decline due to the expense of the two military campaigns in 'West Irian' and Malaysia and to the government's general neglect of the economy. They compare the hardships suffered by the people in these years with those of the 1930s Depression and the Japanese Occupation.⁷² Representation of the golden age must be understood in this context: that the

⁷⁰ Anthony Reid, "Indonesian Historiography—Modern," in *A Global Encyclopedia of Historical Writing*, Volume A–J, ed. D. R. Woolf (New York: Garland Publishers, 1998), p. 465.

⁷¹ Eric Hobsbawm, "Introduction: Inventing Traditions," in *The Invention of Tradition*, ed. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (London: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 14.

⁷² Robert Cribb and Colin Brown, eds., *Modern Indonesia: A History Since 1945* (London: Longman, 1995), pp. 89–90.

Indonesian people had expected, but never enjoyed, improved prosperity after independence.

Sukarno also intended these representations of the golden age to convince foreign visitors of Indonesia's greatness. In a 1963 speech welcoming the first Museum Monas committee, he said,

I hand it over to you [the committee] to make the whole of the Indonesian nation live in the imagination of the highest greatness. Work as well as you can so that when this museum is opened each person who enters, Indonesian *or foreigner* will feel "Yes the Indonesian people were a great people, Yes the Indonesian people are becoming a great people again."⁷³

Building on the sentiment of the 1955 Asia-Africa Conference and his then recent formulation of *nefos* (the newly emerging world forces), Sukarno demanded recognition of new nations, such as Indonesia, as equals among others.⁷⁴ His emphasis on Indonesia's former greatness was part of his more general argument that Indonesia must be allowed to take her place in the world as a significant power.

As noted above, Sukarno suggested that the committee fill the designated diorama display domes with representations of events reaching to that year, leaving eight blank. The museum committee debated where the designated museum scenes should end. Committee members were divided between those who believed the scenes should conclude with August 17, 1945, the date of the proclamation of independence, and those who believed it should end at *Trikora* (Tri Komando Rakyat, Triple Command to the Indonesian People), consisting of the demand to prevent the formation of a Dutch created Papuan state, to raise the Red and White flag in 'Irian Jaya' and to prepare for general mass mobilisation. Of the eleven committee members, O. D. P Sihombing and Soeroto proposed that the scenes of Section C end at proclamation, seven of the remaining members favored concluding with *Trikora*, and two were undecided. The committee drafted two versions of scenes that could be included for each of these end dates.⁷⁵

The debate over the end-point of Indonesian history as it was to be represented in the museum demonstrates the tension the recent Indonesian past created for committee members. Those who voted for August 17, 1945 had taken into account a variety of concerns which perhaps not all committee members were willing to broach. Some committee members clearly felt uncomfortable with the recent direction of the nation. Like others in society, they possibly had no wish to see the Revolution perpetuated indefinitely, and hence they did not even wish to represent the progression of the "revolution." Those people who voted to designate the Proclamation of Independence

⁷³ Panitia Museum Sedjarah Tugu Nasional, *Laporan Umum*, p. 198 (my emphasis).

⁷⁴ Sukarno, "To Build the World Anew," President Sukarno's Address Before the Fifteenth General Assembly of the United Nations on Friday September 30, 1960, Department of Information, Republic of Indonesia, 1960, pp. 45-46.

⁷⁵ Panitia Museum Sedjarah Tugu Nasional, *Laporan Umum*, p. 38.

Day as the capstone of Indonesian history were also alert to the difficulty of dealing with the 1950s, a decade of regional rebellions and of freer political expression. Those who voted for *Trikora* as the most appropriate conclusive event, on the other hand, showed more support for the anti-imperialist fervor of the period. In choosing this scene as the end-point, they granted priority to the recent past over more distant events. In the end, Sukarno's will prevailed and the Presidential Decree of 1959, *Trikora*, and *Ganefo* (Games of the New Emerging Forces) were chosen as the final scenes to be depicted in the museum.

Implementing Suharto's vision

Under Suharto's guidelines, the New Order museum committee sought to make the military a central focus of the revised version of Museum Monas and even looked for ways to project a martial tradition further back into the Indonesian past. The committee also faced the obstacle of representing the abstract Pancasila values as part of a longer Indonesian tradition. Nugroho Notosusanto seriously considered the issue of how to deal with Sukarno as an historical figure. The scene that provoked the most serious deliberations, however, was the one representing *Supersemar* (*Surat Perintah 11 Maret*, The letter of March 11, 1966). While he generally avoided intervening in plans for the museum to the extent his predecessor had done, Suharto took great interest in this scene, and he made his opinions known.

Suharto instructed the New Order committee to make certain the exhibits reflected recent changes in national direction, especially increased military influence. The dilemma for the committee was that the Indonesian military had only been created in 1945, while the museum displays covered more than four centuries of history. In Section B of the museum, dealing with anti-colonial resistance, the New Order committee had planned to include depictions of virtually the same heroes as the Guided Democracy committee. They chose, however, to emphasize the military deeds of these men rather than their status as individual heroes who resisted colonialism. The scene labeled "*Pahlawan Diponegoro*" (the hero Diponegoro) in the 1964 outline, for example, was changed to "*Perang Diponegoro*" (the Diponegoro War). The word *perang* (war) similarly replaced the word *pahlawan* (hero) in scenes concerning Iman Bonjol and Si Singamangaradja. By shifting the emphasis in these scenes, the museum committee head, Nugroho, attempted to highlight a tradition of knighthood or soldiery to further "naturalize" and justify the New Order military's increasing role in domestic politics. An interesting adjustment to the scene titled "The Birth of the Indonesian Military" was the addition of a backdrop showing Borobudur (see Figure 1). Borobudur is a symbol for the ancient past, for the golden age, the time at which Indonesia was great.⁷⁶ By positioning the military in the foreground of Borobudur,

⁷⁶ See Anderson's description of the process by which Borobudur became a logo for national identity. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 2nd ed. (London: Verso, 1991), p. 184.

Nugroho attempted to associate this ancient temple with Indonesia's military, thereby suggesting that the nation's military tradition was equally old.

Just as the Guided Democracy committee struggled in its attempts to represent socialism as a tradition rooted in the Indonesian past, the New Order committee struggled to demonstrate past evidence of abstract principles of the Pancasila, including belief in one God, humanitarianism, nationalism, democracy, and social justice. Some of these themes are nonetheless discernible in the new 1969 museum scenes. The committee, for example, added four scenes representing the role of religions in promoting national unity. The four new religious scenes included 1) "The Blend of Sivaism and Buddhism in Temples," 2) "The Pesantren as a Unifier of the Indonesian Nation in the Fourteenth Century," 3) "The Activities of the Protestant Church in the Process of Uniting the Indonesian Nation," and 4) "The Role of the Roman Catholic Church in Unifying the Nation." This was clearly an attempt to include reference to the first principle of Pancasila: belief in one God. The New Order museum committee's recognition of these religions is significant, given the anti-Communist alliance formed between religious organizations and the military in order to overthrow Sukarno and destroy the PKI. Many who joined this alliance believed that religion was under-emphasized during the Guided Democracy period. Indeed, two members of the Guided Democracy museum committee, Priyono and Soemardjo, were sacked from the government because of their alleged lack of support for religions. The New Order government, by contrast, made religion a significant priority.



Figure 1. *Hari Lahir ABRI* (The Birthday of ABRI)

Image from Badan Pengelola Monumen Nasional di Jakarta, *Monumen Nasional Dengan Museum Sejarah Nasionalnya*, Jakarta, 1989, p. 47. Approximately 1 m. high x 1.5 m. wide.

Attempts to create awareness of the Pancasila in other scenes are more difficult to decipher. The third principle of the Pancasila nationalism is represented in many of the scenes carried over from the first committee, including the focus on anti-colonial resistance. Featured as the fourth principle of the Pancasila, "democracy" posed a challenge to the committee. The 1955 elections were the first elections to be held in Indonesia, but by 1969, those were still the only national elections to have taken place in the country. At the time of the museum's creation, the government had just announced its decision to hold Indonesia's second elections. Citizens who expected that Indonesia would return to a multi-party system now that the period of Guided Democracy had come to an end were pressuring the government to organize national elections.⁷⁷ The inclusion of a scene representing the 1955 election could be seen as an act intended to reassure the Indonesian people that elections were to be part of Indonesian political culture. The values of humanitarianism and social justice are less easily discernible in the museum scenes.

The New Order committee reduced the emphasis on the connection between Sukarno and the Pancasila in the scene concerning the creation of the Pancasila. The version of this scene planned by the 1964 committee was entitled "*Lahirnya Pancasila*" (The birth of the Pancasila). This scene was to depict Sukarno's first articulation of the five principles of the Pancasila on June 1, 1945.⁷⁸ In the revised scenes planned for the 1969 museum, the title and focus of this diorama are subtly changed to fit Nugroho Notosusanto's own theory of the origins of the Pancasila. According to that theory, Sukarno was only one of three of the *penggali* (excavators) of the Pancasila, and in fact the real birth date of Pancasila was August 18, 1945, the date on which the Pancasila was legally confirmed, together with the 1945 Constitution.⁷⁹ The title of the revised scene was "*Pengesahan Pancasila dan UUD 1945*" (The Ratification of the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution). Although the order and exact wording of the principles of the Pancasila did change slightly between June 1 and August 18, essentially Nugroho's revision was based on a pedantic distinction designed to disassociate the Pancasila from Sukarno so that the New Order regime could claim the Five Principles as its own.⁸⁰ The scene "*Hari Kesakalian Pancasila*" (Sacredness of Pancasila Day) (see below Figure 3) also highlighted the New Order's links to the Pancasila.

The New Order committee had to decide not only how to deal not only with Sukarno's ideological influence on the original museum plan, but also how to deal with

⁷⁷ Herbert Feith, "Suharto's Search for a Political Format," *Indonesia* 6 (October 1968): 99.

⁷⁸ Panitia Museum Sedjarah Tugu Nasional, *Laporan Umum*, p. 54.

⁷⁹ Departemen Pertahanan Keamanan Pusat Sejarah ABRI, *Sepuluh Tahun Pusjarah ABRI* (Ten years of the Armed Forces History Center), (Jakarta: Departemen Pertahanan-Keamanan Pusat Sejarah ABRI, 1974), p. 24. The first publication of this work was Nugroho Notosusanto, *Naskah Proklamasi yang Otentik dan Rumusan Pantjasila yang Otentik* (The authentic proclamation document and the authentic formulation of the Pancasila) (Jakarta: Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI, 1971).

⁸⁰ Sukarno's original formulation listed the five principles of nationalism, internationalism (humanitarianism), democracy (consent), social justice, and belief in one God. By August 18, when the Pancasila was incorporated into the preamble to the 1945 Constitution, the principles were listed as; belief in One God, humanitarianism, nationalism, democracy, and social justice.

him as an historical figure. During the period between the 1965 coup and 1969, Sukarno had gradually been eased out of office. However, the military leadership still feared Sukarno's ability to rally the people. Nugroho, the museum head, was particularly concerned with controlling what he described as a cult of personality focused on Sukarno.⁸¹ Nugroho seriously considered the question of how former heroes who were then discredited should be represented in the historical record. An assistant to Nugroho recalls that, on his visit to the Mexican museum prior to resuming the museum project, Nugroho was specifically interested in how Mexicans represented people who had once been deemed meritorious, but who were now considered traitors.⁸² In the end, he decided that any person involved in actions that attempted to destroy Indonesian unity would be branded a traitor.⁸³ The revised museum plans did not, however, dare to depict Sukarno as a traitor. Instead, his roles in Indonesian history were pruned back. The revised Pancasila scene, in which Sukarno still appeared, constituted a more subtle form of "writing Sukarno out of history." Three other scenes proposed by the 1964 committee, in which Sukarno was featured as the principal actor, were also erased in the 1969 plans. These included the scenes showing Bung Karno in front of the Colonial Court and in the act of issuing the Presidential Decree of July 5, 1959, as well as a diorama about *Ganefo* (see below). One member of the Guided Democracy committee, angered by these revisions, adamantly declared that Sukarno's role in the national past had not been exaggerated in the first committee's plans.⁸⁴ Yet Sukarno's role in shaping the original plans for this museum undoubtedly prompted committee members to feature him in as a key figure in Indonesia's history.

Ironically, after Nugroho reduced the number of scenes glorifying Sukarno, he attempted to promote a similar cult of personality featuring Suharto. He inserted Suharto, together with other military men, into new scenes. Suharto appeared in exactly three scenes in the 1969 museum plan, including the "Liberation of West Irian," "*Hari Kesaktian Pancasila*," and "*Surat Perintah 11 Maret (Supersemar)*"; the general had figured in no scenes in the first museum plan. General Sudirman was also awarded one scene focusing exclusively on his role as the first commander during the 1945-49 Revolution.

Because it was such a crucial representation of both the return to stability in Indonesia and the legitimate transfer of power to Suharto, the *Supersemar* museum scene involved the committee in long deliberations. Prior to the unveiling of *Supersemar*—a document allegedly written by Sukarno to Suharto, granting then-General Suharto authority to take actions insuring the stability of the nation—Sukarno retained substantial power and still had a mass following, especially from members of

⁸¹ Nugroho Notosusanto, *Tercapainya Konsensus Nasional 1966-1969* (The achievement of national consensus 1966-1969) (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1985), p. 31.

⁸² A. D. Saleh, interview by author, Jakarta, January 12, 1998.

⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ Soemartini, interview by author, Jakarta, February 21, 1998.

the PKI, PNI, and elements of the military. He also resisted the Army's attempt to take control of the government.

Throughout the New Order period, the events of *Supersemar* remained controversial, since the document signed on this day subsequently disappeared and has remained lost.⁸⁵ According to the most common narrative of events on March 11, Sukarno called a cabinet meeting at the Palace in Jakarta. During the course of the meeting, a note was passed to Sukarno informing him that the palace was surrounded by unidentified troops. He quickly left the room and took his private helicopter to the Bogor palace. Three senior army officers who were present at the meeting, Major General Basuki Rachmat, Brigadier General M. Jusuf, and Brigadier General Amir Machmud, reported these events to Suharto and requested Suharto's permission to meet the president and confirm the commitment of the army to the President. They then traveled to Bogor by train to meet with Sukarno. During the course of the meeting, Sukarno allegedly drafted the Letter of March 11, according to which he handed over powers to Suharto "to take all measures considered necessary to guarantee security, calm, and stability of the government and the revolution."⁸⁶

Questions repeatedly arose concerning the role of Suharto in these events. For many it seemed improbable that Sukarno would voluntarily surrender power. Some suggest the letter of March 11 represented a disguised coup.⁸⁷ In his autobiography, however, Suharto specifically states that he never considered the purpose of *Supersemar* to be a takeover of power. The letter of March 11 "was not an instrument to carry out a disguised coup. *Supersemar* was the beginning of the struggle of the New Order."⁸⁸ In his biography of Suharto, Robert Elson suggests it is highly unlikely Suharto gave the three generals explicit instructions, or that any draft letter was prepared before the trip, but it is likely he commissioned them to pressure Sukarno.⁸⁹ One factor which remained essential to Suharto's version of *Supersemar* was his own explanation for his absence from the cabinet meeting on March 11, which he claimed was due to ill health.

The installation of the *Supersemar* scene in Museum Monas was delayed until the committee had an opportunity to discuss its final form with the President. Because of the sensitivity of this event, Suharto was invited to inspect the proposed diorama image of *Supersemar* for Museum Monas. The original version of this scene depicted Suharto standing in pajamas in the guestroom of his house with the three Generals. Suharto suggested that it was improper for him to appear standing in pajamas. In the second version of this scene, Suharto subsequently appeared in uniform, but the

⁸⁵ "Hilangnya Naskah Surat Perintah 11 Maret tak Perlu Dipersoalkan," (There is no need to make an issue of the fact that the original letter of March 11 has been lost), *Kompas*, March 11, 1997.

⁸⁶ Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, pp. 179-92.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 187-96.

⁸⁸ Soeharto, *Soeharto: Pikiran, Ucapan, dan Tindakan Saya: Otobiografi seperti dipaparkan kepada G. Dwipayana dan Ramadhan K. H.* (Jakarta: Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1989), p. 174.

⁸⁹ Robert E. Elson, *Suharto: A Political Biography* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 137.

President rejected this option as well, protesting that this was not a "correct" representation of the event, for he had indeed been wearing pajamas.⁹⁰

In order to straighten out the representation of the events of *Supersemar*, President Suharto organized a meeting in 1976 at his home, Jalan Haji Agus Salim 98, together with General Amir Machmud, General Jusuf, Mashuri S. H., and Brigadier General Nugroho Notosusanto.⁹¹ The final version of the scene of *Supersemar*, which was approved by the president, showed Suharto lying in bed in pajamas while speaking to his generals (see Figure 2). In light of the tension surrounding that day's cabinet session, the supposed threat to President Sukarno's safety, and the fact that these related events presented General Suharto with an opportunity to grasp power, it is most unlikely he lay passively in bed while instructing the generals how to play the next move. Presumably Suharto chose this particular image to highlight the passive role he played in this transfer of power. The pajamas also recall Suharto's claim that he missed the cabinet meeting due to ill health, suggesting he could not have manipulated a coup in his condition and was almost forced to accept power. The image implies that *Supersemar* was a spontaneous document.

The night before Suharto was due to inspect the revised scene for *Supersemar*, on March 11, 1977, precisely eleven years after the actual event, Jakarta experienced very heavy rain. As a result, the museum, which is situated three meters below ground, was flooded with up to 30 cm. of water. The leakage spilled into many diorama cases. The inspection consequently had to be delayed for one week.⁹² More superstitious Indonesians may have interpreted this as a sign of displeasure from the deceased Bung Karno.⁹³

An examination of the processes each museum committee went through in order to compile their versions of the national past reveals the difficulties each committee faced in implementing the guidelines Sukarno and Suharto envisioned for the museum. Both committees were constrained by the record of the Indonesian past with which they had to work. This record contained limited evidence, for example, of socialism and of concrete demonstrations of the Pancasila values. While the Guided Democracy committee sought to emphasize anti-imperialism, at the same time it chose to uphold feudal kingdoms as admirable precedents for the nation. The golden age was a particularly potent symbol for the Guided Democracy regime in that it offered Indonesia origins which pre-dated the arrival of the Dutch and a vision of Indonesians ruling themselves, while at the same time experiencing stability and abundance. Members of the Guided Democracy committee negotiated which scenes to include and how to represent them. The New Order committee, presided over by Nugroho, faced

⁹⁰ Material in this paragraph is based on an interview with diorama artist Saptoto. Saptoto, interview by author, Yogyakarta, October 29, 1997.

⁹¹ Mutiara, *Thn XV*, 261 (February 3, 1982): 9.

⁹² Prajogo, *Tugu Nasional*.

⁹³ Sukarno is perceived by some to have a supernatural presence. Many followers of the former President flock to his grave for his posthumous blessings. Some believe he was a spiritually powerful being and that he continues to have some influence.

the challenge of how to project the military's contemporary dominance back into the past. The new committee particularly emphasized the first principle of the Pancasila by depicting the contributions of different religions throughout Indonesian history. In response to Nugroho's perception that the cult of personality built around Sukarno was a threat to the New Order, the second committee trimmed back illustrations of Sukarno's role in the nation's recent history, while at the same time exaggerating Suharto's historical roles. Suharto's intervention in the planning of the *Supersemar* scene, the last in this museum, indicates that he judged this scene to be the most important and appropriately conclusive.

The Two Versions of Museum Monas Compared

Several important similarities and differences between the two versions of this museum can be discerned. It is clear that rather than creating a new record of the past, the New Order committee was more concerned with reworking the existing record. Nugroho retained the basic three-part formula of the Indonesian past set by Sukarno. Where the two versions of the museum differed most were in their representations of twentieth-century history.

The two versions of Sections A and B of the museum, dealing with the golden age and anti-colonial resistance, were fairly similar, yet the New Order committee slightly altered what features, and therefore messages, would be emphasized. As noted above, the heroes of anti-colonial resistance highlighted in the Guided Democracy version of Museum Monas became important referents for a martial tradition in the New Order version of this museum. Like the Guided Democracy version, the New Order version of Museum Monas included scenes featuring Borobudur, Sriwijaya, and Gajah Mada's oath. The revised version of Museum Monas, however, omitted previous scenes featuring the royal leaders of the Siliwangi Kingdom, Sultan Baabullah and Sultan Ali Mughayat Sjah. By contrast, the new committee added several new golden age scenes, including one illustrating the construction of the Waringin Sapta dike in the eleventh century, under the command of King Airlangga; one showing the visit of an envoy from China to the kingdom of Majapahit in 1405; and models of the Bugis trading ships of the fifteenth century. These scenes provided evidence of a ruler assisting farmers and of maritime traders' readiness to negotiate and conduct business with foreign countries. The tone of these scenes was thus slightly different from that of earlier scenes, as they reflected the new regime's emphasis on development and openness to the outside world, especially for the purposes of trade. The New Order regime, however, similarly intended representations of the golden age to serve as a model for Indonesians of a period of former stability and abundance. This was an important model, given the large-scale economic and political transition underway in the early years of the New Order.

For both regimes, representation of the golden age encompassed a promise to return Indonesians to a period of greatness and abundance. Where they differed was in their formulations of the pathways that would lead the nation to recapture this greatness.

For Sukarno, this path directed Indonesia towards the completion of the revolution and the implementation of socialism, whereas for Suharto and the new military regime, the ideal path guided Indonesians towards the achievement of the military-dominated, Pancasila-centered New Order.

Consistent with the idea that modern museums ought to offer their audiences narratives of progress, the last scenes in each proposed version of this museum dictated the direction in which Indonesia was heading. For this reason the main differences between the two museum visions could be found in their representations of twentieth century history, more specifically, post-1945 history. The final scenes in each museum plan included depictions of each respective regime and its achievements.

Sukarno intended the conclusive, designated scenes in the Guided Democracy version of Museum Monas to represent the beginning of the climax towards which Indonesians had been striving. The first of the scenes covering Guided Democracy, focused on the Presidential Decree of 1959, was a very significant symbol for the regime. It was by means of this decree that Sukarno abolished the elected Constituent Assembly and introduced a return to the 1945 Constitution. For this reason, the museum scene served as an effective marker of the beginning of the Guided Democracy regime. The Presidential Decree of 1959 was to be remembered as a turning point in the path towards the achievement of Indonesian socialism, or a resumption of commitment to the Revolution. This scene endeavored to create a sense of a break with the past, interpreted as a positive change in national direction. The scene also highlighted the 1945 Constitution, a central pillar of the Guided Democracy regime.

The final two scenes in the Guided Democracy version of Museum Monas, focused on *Trikora* and *Ganefo*, further developed the theme of anti-imperialism in the Indonesian national past. The *Trikora* scene, entitled "The Return of West Irian," was to depict the Indonesian victory in the anti-imperialist campaign against the Dutch.⁹⁴ The *Ganefo* International sports games were held in response to Indonesia's suspension from the Olympics, publicized as an "anti-imperialist" alternative.⁹⁵ The games were held between November 10-22, 1963, and all new "emerging forces" were invited.⁹⁶ The scene depicting *Ganefo* was to appear as a snapshot of the games, with Sukarno and the Minister for Sport present. Slogans used for this event, such as "Onward No Retreat," "With *Ganefo* We will Build the World anew," "*Ganefo* is a Challenge to Imperialism," were to be hung around the diorama dome.⁹⁷ The last two scenes thus

⁹⁴ The characterization of the 'West Irian' campaign as an anti-imperialist cause was of course a highly subjective representation, as the people of West Irian, in fact, wanted independence not only from the Dutch, but also from the Indonesians. Papuans are still waging this struggle for independence in the post-Suharto era.

⁹⁵ The International Olympics Committee decided to suspend Indonesia from the Olympics in response to Indonesia's refusal to issue visas to the athletes of Israel and Nationalist China for the 1962 Asian Games in Jakarta. Ewa T. Pauker, "Ganefo 1: Sports and Politics in Djakarta," *Asian Survey* 4,4 (April 1965): 172-73.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 171-85.

⁹⁷ Panitia Museum Sedjarah Tugu Nasional, *Hasil Penelitian C Menuju Sosialisme Indonesia*, p. 68.

reflected an escalation of the anti-imperialist campaign. Like the scene of the 1926 revolt, they did not represent class-based revolution.

The two scenes that Sukarno insisted should be the last in the museum, those featuring *Trikora* and *Ganefo*, reflect his increasingly radical politics. One committee member, Dr. Sutjipto Wirjosuprato, claimed that these two scenes were important because they provided evidence of the important role played by Indonesia in determining the course of world history.⁹⁸ These scenes were to signal Indonesia's emergence onto the world stage. In this way, they also satisfied Sukarno's request that the museum scenes highlight Indonesia's greatness as a nation.

The fact that Sukarno intended to leave the final eight diorama domes empty for future generations to fill suggests either that he was not content with the point Indonesia had reached by 1964, or that he could not see a way forward without compromising national unity. Although land reform laws had been passed as early as 1959, officials hesitated about implementing them, largely because of their own interests in maintaining the social order.⁹⁹ Sukarno could, however, have instructed the committee to include representations of the spontaneous *aksi sephiak* (land seizures), which began in 1964. It seems, however, that Sukarno was not ready either for the next phase of revolution or for the divisions these might well incite among his people.

The tension between representing a path towards socialism and producing a narrative of the Indonesian past that stressed internal unity was paramount for the Guided Democracy museum committee. The core values this committee sought to embody in its vision for the museum were: national unity, advancement towards socialism, and Indonesia's greatness as a nation, both in the past and in the present.

The last scenes in the New Order version of Museum Monas focused on the transition to the New Order. The version of the transition set down in this museum encapsulated in three scenes of *Hari Kesaktian Pancasila*, "*Aksi Aksi Tri Tuntunan Rakyat*" (Actions for the Three People's Demands) (abbreviated as *Tritura*), and *Supersemar* would become a familiar trilogy in official representations of the transition period for the next thirty years.¹⁰⁰ These were the most important scenes in this museum because they were attempts to establish the legitimacy of the new regime.

⁹⁸ "Introduction" in Panitia Museum Sedjarah Tugu Nasional, *Laporan Umum*.

⁹⁹ Lance Castles, "Socialism and Private Business: The Latest Phase," *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 1,1 (June 1965): 13-14.

¹⁰⁰ In his observations of the commemorative billboards celebrating forty years of independence found outside Monas, Maurer also notes that the transition period was visually represented in the three scenes of the coup attempt, *Tritura* and *Supersemar* Jean-Luc Maurer, "A New Order Sketchpad of Indonesian History," in *Images of Malay-Indonesian Identity*, ed. Michael Hitchcock and Victor T. King (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 219. The same version of events was also carefully replicated in mass media, official histories, school textbooks, and films. See, for example, the progression of images and commentary in *Fajar Orde Baru (Lahirnya Orde Baru): Dokumentasi Sejarah dan Latarbelakang Kebangkitan Orde Baru beserta Laporan Pembangunan Indonesia Dalam Satu Dasawarsa Menjelang Tahun Pertama Repelita III* (The dawn of the New Order: Historical documents and background on the rise of the New




Figure 2. *Hari Kesaktian Pancasila* (Sacred Pancasila Day)

Image from Badan Pengelola Monumen Nasional di Jakarta, *Monumen Nasional Dengan Museum Sejarah Nasionalnya*, Jakarta, 1989, p. 60. Approximately 1 m. high x 1.5 m. wide.

The scene entitled "*Hari Kesaktian Pancasila*" represents the military's suppression of the 1965 coup attempt, on October 1, 1965, as the salvation of the Pancasila. Like the Guided Democracy diorama that would have featured Sukarno issuing his 1959 Presidential Decree, this scene was meant to depict a significant break with the past, and, once again, to associate the Pancasila closely with the New Order regime. By the time this museum scene was designed, representations of events on October 1 had already become familiar icons in the regime's portrayals of its own origins. Each year since 1967, October 1 had been commemorated at the site where the bodies of the victims of the coup attempt had been dumped.¹⁰¹ Most Indonesians would recognize the scene chosen as the subject of the diorama image (see Figure 3) due to the repeated circulation of photographs taken at the site of Lubang Buaya on the day the bodies were recovered from the well. Major General Suharto is depicted in his khakis and sunglasses standing over the well at Lubang Buaya, overseeing the recovery of the

Order and a report on the development of Indonesia in the one decade approaching the first year of the third Repelita), (Jakarta: Alda, 1979).

¹⁰¹ See my article, "Commemoration of 1 October, 'Hari Kesaktian Pancasila': A Post Mortem Analysis?," *Asian Studies Review* 36,1 (March 2002): 39-72.

bodies of the murdered army generals who fell victims to the coup. This scene and the accompanying text replicate the official version of the 1965 coup attempt, according to which the communists are held responsible for the coup and the military are positioned as the saviors. It also positions the communists as an anti-Pancasila force.

The scene known as *Tritura* focuses on the 1966 student protests resulting from Sukarno's lack of response to the three demands to lower prices, ban the Communist party, and purge the Cabinet of Sukarnoists and Communists.¹⁰² The diorama features a group of students and other members of society assembled in front of Monas. Members of the crowd are holding up placards detailing each of the demands. A group of students, wearing the yellow jackets of the University of Indonesia, stand at the forefront of the crowd, facing a Cakrabirawa soldier holding a rifle, who appears at the front of the scene with his back to the diorama lens. A bloodied yellow student shirt, presumably that of student martyr Arief Rahman Hakim, is visible on the ground between the students and the soldier. It appears as if the students are demanding an explanation. In modern Indonesian history, students have a reputation for acting as a societal moral force.¹⁰³ The committee's inclusion of this scene in the museum is meant to suggest that the military, working with the students to crush the Communists, also constituted a moral force. The caption to the scene notes that this student action was "*disokong* [supported] by all the Pancasila forces in ABRI, in political parties, and in defiant mass organizations."¹⁰⁴ The scene attempts to highlight popular support for the new regime in the form of a Pancasila alliance.

Both these scenes highlight divisions within Indonesian society at the time of the coup attempt. On the one hand, we see the Pancasila forces—the patriots—in society, and then, on the other hand, we are shown the PKI and other non-Pancasila forces: the traitors. This is quite a contrast to the Guided Democracy's portrait of recent Indonesian history, which was committed to disguising divisions within Indonesian society.

While the *Tritura* and *Hari Kesaktian Pancasila* scenes highlight opposing forces within Indonesia, the last scene devised by the 1969 committee, *Supersemar*, described above, signaled an end to this conflict. The three scenes of *Tritura*, *Hari Kesaktian Pancasila*, and *Supersemar* introduce the New Order by highlighting a background of heightened conflict within Indonesia between pro and anti-Pancasila forces and the resolution of this conflict by means of the Letter of March 11, which was subsequently used to ban the Communist party. These scenes accentuate the potential fragility of Indonesia's unity, especially if the Pancasila is not correctly implemented. The New Order story of the Indonesian past in this museum attempts to highlight the existence throughout Indonesian history of the Pancasila values; the threat to these values posed by the communists; and the New Order regime's restoration of these values.

¹⁰² John R. Maxwell, "Soe Hok Gie; A Biography of a Young Intellectual" (PhD dissertation, The Australian National University, Canberra, 1997), pp. 137-41.

¹⁰³ Edward Aspinall, *Student Dissent in Indonesia in the 1980s* (Clayton: Center of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1993), p. 7.

¹⁰⁴ *Monumen Nasional*, p. 62.



Figure 3. *Surat Perintah 11 Maret 1966* (The instruction of March 11, 1966)

Image from Badan Pengelola Monumen Nasional di Jakarta, *Monumen Nasional Dengan Museum Sejarah Nasionalnya*, Jakarta, 1989, p. 62. Approximately 1 m. high x 1.5 m. wide.

In contrast to Sukarno, Nugroho decided to fill all the diorama cases in Museum Monas. This was symbolic of the emerging regime's ideas about both the past and the future. Although they can be upgraded, dioramas are expensive and thus a relatively permanent form of display. By filling up all the remaining dioramas, the regime claimed this symbolic space as its own, hindering future governments from adding to this story of the Indonesian past. To audiences moving through the museum, following a sequence of exhibits arranged in a chronological progression, the fact that the last, previously empty, diorama cases were now to be filled with scenes showing the birth of the New Order suggested that the New Order regime was the climax of Indonesian history. It also implied that Indonesian history was no longer perceived as a progressive revolution ultimately to be completed by the people. But the decision to fill all the diorama domes also involved a drawback. The New Order government faced a problem when it wanted to add to the story of its own regime. Four new scenes were later added to the central wall of the museum for that purpose.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁵ These included the 1969 Plebiscite in 'Irian Jaya', the "integration" of East Timor in 1975, the Non-Block Movement, and the IPTN (Industri Pesawat Terbang Nasional, National Airplane Industry).

Sukarno and Suharto set their own guidelines for this museum because of their belief that Museum Monas would act as an important mechanism for instilling values in Indonesians. They also felt that this museum would allow them to prescribe the direction in which Indonesia was heading. Both leaders charged two different museum committees with the task of inscribing into the dioramas their own formulations of the fundamentals of Indonesian society. The committees were different in several respects, but they faced the same kinds of pressures to please their respective patrons and reflect contemporary ideology in this museum. For each committee, the process of projecting these visions of the national past proved complex.

The final messages communicated by the Guided Democracy version of Museum Monas differed from the guidelines set by Sukarno. The committee struggled to highlight Indonesia's progression towards socialism, a difficult task because there was limited evidence for that reading of Indonesian history and because of the potential divisions these scenes might expose within the nation. This committee put a high premium on demonstrating a history characterized by national unity. With Sukarno's approval, they even chose to persist in promoting the symbols of Indonesia's golden age, despite the clash this appeared to create with anti-imperialist rhetoric. The Guided Democracy version of Museum Monas finally gives precedence to nationalism over socialism in official representations of history in this period. The conclusive scenes in the Guided Democracy version of Museum Monas, scenes relating to *Ganefo* and *Trikora*, signaled the beginning of Indonesia's return to its former greatness and the country's emergence as a leading opponent of imperialism in the world and as a significant new force in world history.

The New Order's interpretation of the nation's relatively distant past, depicted in museum Sections A and B, dealing with the golden age and anti-colonial resistance, was not radically different from the interpretation offered by Sukarno's committee. For the New Order regime, the golden age served a similar purpose, promising the people a return to stability and abundance. In Section B of the museum, Nugroho featured many of the same heroes the Guided Democracy committee had selected, but he altered their situations slightly in order to project a martial tradition backwards. The New Order committee focused on establishing historical evidence to show that the Pancasila had acted as a significant factor in Indonesia's past—they highlighted especially the contributions of Indonesia's different religions—and to show that the New Order regime was guided by, and ready to defend, the Pancasila. The New Order vision of the Indonesian past placed less emphasis on Indonesia's place in the world and more on the internal dynamics of this country as a Pancasila-centered society.

The greatest contrast between these two versions of the Indonesian past is apparent in the scenes dealing with the most recent past, because it was these scenes that spelled out the direction towards which all Indonesians should be heading. This highlights one of the most important continuities between history-making in both these periods: the use of history to bolster each regime's legitimacy. Nugroho erased a number of scenes dealing with Sukarno and his anti-imperialist messages. For Suharto, the last scene in this museum—the *Supersemar* scene—was by far the most sensitive, as

it was supposed to signal Suharto's passivity in this key political transition from Sukarno to Suharto.

While the Guided Democracy committee and Sukarno gave priority to dioramas depicting nationalism and a united Indonesia citizenry, Nugroho was prepared to expose divisions within the Indonesian nation. He did so in order to legitimize the new regime, and also to suggest to his audience that Indonesian unity was, in fact, fragile, a condition that would have to be developed under the guidance of the New Order. Nugroho featured the Communists as national traitors. The existence of internal enemies throughout Indonesian history became a dominant theme in official New Order historiography.

Through the Guided Democracy version of Museum Monas, Sukarno sought to inspire future action by reminding Indonesians of their former greatness. He entrusted future generations with the task of completing this national resurgence. While he suggested this promise would be fulfilled by the final achievement of socialism in Indonesia, his role in this museum indicates hesitation on his part to represent, let alone encourage, divisions amongst Indonesians. Suharto, by contrast, communicated a much more modest message in his version of the museum. The New Order dioramas also promised a return to a period of abundance, but since the sequence of displays concluded with scenes picturing the New Order's assumption of national leadership, it became clear that the New Order itself, and not future generations, would fulfill this promise. The ideological blueprint this committee offered for the future entailed the maintenance of Pancasila values under the ongoing direction of the New Order regime.