
CURRENT DATA ON THE INDONESIAN MILITARY ELITE

The Editors

The present listing identifies the holders of key positions at TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National Army, including all service branches) Headquarters as well as at the Army's central and top regional commands between February 1, 2001 and February 1, 2003. But the increasing secrecy of the military about its personnel changes since Maj. Gen. Sjafrie Sjamuddin replaced Air Vice-Marshal Graitto Usodo as TNI spokesman in February 2002, together with the absence of the military's own daily newspaper since the collapse of Angkatan Bersenjata during the financial crisis of 1997-98, make it difficult systematically to update changes at the Korem level. In this update, therefore, we list the holders of key positions at TNI Headquarters and the Army's central and highest-level regional commands, and include those at the Korem level whose information was available.

As noted in the last update of current military data, the Army under the leadership of General Endriartono Sutarto strengthened its internal unity in the process of distancing itself from controversial President Abdurrahman Wahid, who was engaged in an all-out confrontation with the parliament, or DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat).¹ The period covered in this report illustrates two key, and visibly contradictory, subsequent developments. On the one hand, the group led by Endriartono Sutarto, now commander-in-chief of the TNI, and his ally, Ryamizard Ryacudu, now Army Chief of Staff, has consolidated its grip over the high command at the center. On the other hand, the high command's control over regional commands and their subunits has continued to decline. The former development has to a large extent been facilitated by the government-military alliance established by President Megawati Sukarnoputri,

¹ The Editors, "Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite: January 1, 1999-January 31, 2001," *Indonesia* 71 (April 2001): 135-73.

who replaced Abdurrahman Wahid in July 2001. The erosion of central military control over regional commands and their units, on the other hand, reflects enduring structural problems that the military has faced since the economic crisis and the fall of Suharto. These two developments combined have led to the abandonment of reforms aimed at streamlining and professionalizing the military and at curtailing the military's political power and involvement.

Below, we start with our analysis of personnel changes during the period covered by this report. We then look at the dynamics of military politics in the transition from the presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid to the presidency of Megawati. Finally, we examine the relationship between the military and the government under Megawati and the deepening institutional crisis inside the military.

A. Ethnic-Regional and Academy Backgrounds

The information available about elite military officers' ethnic backgrounds is not very satisfactory. Table 1, however, shows that Javanese constitute 45.8 percent of the officers listed, proportionally more than the previous listing, where only 35 percent were Javanese, but smaller than the New Order average. In all, at least fourteen ethnic groups have some representation in this elite. It is not clear why Javanese representation has been low in the past few years.

Table 1: Ethnic Regional Distribution of the Military Elite

Ethnicity	Number
Javanese	33
Batak	6
Sundanese	5
Menado	3
Acehnese	2
Madurese	2
Minangkabau	2
Buginese	2
Arab	1
Ambonese	1
Betawi	1
Makassarese	1
Palembang	1
West Timorese	1
Unknown	11
Total	72

Table 2 shows the timing of personnel changes during the period of this listing. There were four big "waves" of personnel changes—in June 2001, in February and July 2002, and in February 2003—each of which affected more than 100 senior officers at TNI headquarters and at the three service headquarters. (A reshuffle in October 2001

affected eleven generals in strategic positions at TNI headquarters and in the army, but it involved a limited number of officers, that is only twenty-five at TNI headquarters and eighteen in army commands.) It is also important to note that there have been three big turnovers just in the past twelve months (between February 2002 and February 2003), which reflect the ongoing process of regeneration in the military leadership as well as the consolidation of power at the center in the hands of Endriartono and Ryacudu.

Table 2: Timing of Personnel Changes

		TNI HQ	Army	Total
2001	February	5	3	8
	March	-	-	-
	April	-	-	-
	May	-	-	-
	June	6	10	16
	July	-	-	-
	August	-	2	2
	September	-	-	-
	October	2	9	11
	November	-	-	-
	December	-	-	-
	2002	January	-	-
February		3	8	11
March		-	-	-
April		-	-	-
May		1	4	5
June		1	1	2
July		3	15	18
August		-	-	-
September		-	-	-
October		-	-	-
November		-	4	4
December		1	2	3
2003	January	-	-	-
	February	2	19	21
Totals		24	77	101

The February 2001 reshuffle took place when Abdurrahman Wahid was still president and was connected with a reorganization of the Department of Defense. In this reorganization, the number of directorates-general increased from three to five, of which four were held by military officers.² This change effectively nullified the original

² See our previous essay in *Indonesia* 71 (April 2001).

plan to “civilianize” all eleven top-echelon (Eselon 1) posts, as announced by Juwono Sudarsono, Abdurrahman Wahid’s Defense Minister from November 1999 to August 2000; it also demonstrated that Juwono’s successor, Defense Minister Machfud, gave up on the civilianization plan. The reshuffle in June 2001 was routine, without any major political significance, though it is important to note that two Kodam commanders lost their jobs because of their mishandling of religious and ethnic conflicts in Maluku and Central Kalimantan.³

The reshuffle in August 2001 was the first under the Megawati presidency, and was preceded by new military appointments (she chose a new presidential military secretary and military bodyguards), announced even before she announced her new Cabinet.⁴ It was followed by another in October 2001, in which the legacy of Abdurrahman Wahid’s intervention in military personnel matters was wiped out. The reshuffle put priority on rejuvenating Army influence in BAIS (Armed Forces Intelligence Agency), though the agency head remained Abdurrahman Wahid-appointed Air Vice-Marshal Ian Santoso Perdanakusuma. Endriartono Sutarto also strengthened the operations section of the army with officers from Kostrad and Kopassus.

Then in February 2002, a really big reshuffle took place, affecting about 120 officers. It paved the way for a long-awaited generational change in the military structure under Admiral Widodo as TNI Commander-in-Chief and Endriartono as Army Chief of Staff. Endriartono also “revived” the careers of former Prabowo allies, such as Maj. Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin and Maj. Gen. Idris Gassing, both with a Kopassus background, by appointing them to important positions.⁵ The February 2002 reshuffle was succeeded by another in July 2002, a month after Endriartono replaced Widodo as Commander-in-Chief and Ryacudu became Army Chief of Staff, in which the generational change was accelerated. Ryacudu also consolidated his new position by the placement of officers who had served on his staff when he was Kostrad commander to strategic positions.⁶ Finally, the February 2003 reshuffle was the second big change under Endriartono and Ryacudu, affecting more than 120 officers. The retirement of twenty-six generals provided the occasion for further “regeneration” of the military. In announcing the Commander’s Order for the reshuffle (Surat Keputusan

³ They are Brig. Gen. I Made Yasa, commander of Kodam XVI/Pattimura, and a Balinese, who was deeply unpopular among Muslims in Ambon, and Maj. Gen. Djoko Besariman, commander of Kodam VII/Wirabuana, who was held responsible for mishandling the Sampit violence in March 2001.

⁴ Brig. Gen. Hasanudin replaced Vice Marshall Budi Santoso as Military Secretary for the President. Brig. Gen. Nono Sampono replaced Maj. Gen. Amir Toha as Commander of the Presidential Security Squad. Nono served as adjutant to former military commander Benny Murdani, who attended the transfer ceremony. Military sources say that the change was made without any consultation with the military headquarters.

⁵ As the man suspected of having masterminded the May 1998 riot in Jakarta, Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin’s “comeback” was controversial and surprised some military officers.

⁶ Lt. Gen. Sumarsono, who served Ryamizard Ryacudu as his chief of staff at the Kostrad, was promoted to Deputy Army Chief. Brig. Gen. Erwin Sujono, who served as Chief of Staff, Kostrad First Infantry Division, under Ryamizard Ryacudu, is now Commander, Kostrad Second Infantry Division, after a brief stint as Chief of Staff, Kodam V/Brawijaya. Commander of Kostrad Second Infantry Division, Maj. Gen. Djoko Santoso, was appointed as Commander, Kodam XVI/Pattimura, and now serves as Commander, Kodam Jaya.

Panglima TNI No Skep/30/II/2003, signed on February 3), Endriartono said specifically that it would encourage generational change in the organization. It is important to note in this context that both commanders and chiefs of staff at five Kodams (out of twelve) were appointed by Endriartono and Ryacudu.⁷ The change no doubt contributed to the consolidation of their power at the center.

Tables 3 and 4 show the distribution of officers in Class terms. In two years, from February 2001 to February 2003, major institutional power at TNI Headquarters shifted from officers of Classes 1970 and 1971 to those of Classes 1971 and 1972, while in the Army, Classes 1970 and 1971 gave way to Classes 1972 through 1974.

Table 3: Academy Class Distribution of Officers in Strategic Positions

Class of	(February 1, 2001)		(February 28, 2003)	
	TNI HQ	Army	TNI HQ	Army
1966	1	-	-	-
1968	1	-	-	-
1970	2	9	-	-
1971	6	15	5	4
1972	4	6	5	10
1973	1	6	2	8
1974	-	4	2	12
1975	-	2	-	5
1976	-	-	-	1
1977	-	-	-	-
Unknown	2	-	2	3
Navy	3	-	2	-
Air Force	3	-	3	-
Marines	-	-	1	-

Table 4: Academy Class Distribution in Kodam and Korem

	Kodam Commander & Chief	Korem Commander
1972	4	-
1973	5	6
1974	9	9
1975	4	6
1976	1	4
1977	-	6
1978	-	1
Unknown	1	8
Total	24	40

⁷ Both Commanders and Chiefs of Staff were replaced in Central Java (Kodam IV), Sulawesi (Kodam VII), Maluku (Kodam XVI), Papua (Kodam XVII), and Jakarta (Kodam Jaya).

Class 71 officers maintained their presence in TNI Headquarters thanks to their Class leader, Endriartono. Though officers of Classes 72 and 73 now provide 18 out of 43 officers in the Army's central and top regional commands, their days are most likely numbered, since Ryacudu, Class 74, will surely advance the careers of his own classmates and officers of Class 75.⁸ It is also useful to note in this context that officers of Classes 77 and 78 are now being appointed as Korem commanders.

B. The Military in Transition from Abdurrahman Wahid to Megawati

The premature collapse of the Abdurrahman Wahid administration in July 2001 before completing its term (1999-2004) was a practical reminder for party politicians that the military remained a major power center in the Indonesian republic. The independent decision of the military leadership to abandon Abdurrahman Wahid strongly influenced party politicians in the parliament to step up their challenge to the president. A substantial majority of DPR members supported his "impeachment," not only because of their growing frustration with his erratic leadership, but also because they knew—after their close consultations with the military leadership—that the Army wanted Wahid to go and that the military would support the DPR even if the "impeachment" process led to violence, as Abdurrahman Wahid threatened. It is ironic, and disturbing, that constitutional processes and mechanisms were maintained in part because the military remained an independent power center.

There is no doubt that Abdurrahman Wahid's assertion of civilian supremacy and his intervention in internal military affairs, above all in personnel matters, rankled with the generals. He was looked upon as a manipulator and schemer working to divide and weaken the military. Megawati, on the other hand, seemed a good bet, since she was not hostile to the military and was unlikely to meddle in military affairs. During the final days of the Abdurrahman Wahid administration, Army Chief of Staff Endriartono took the initiative in determining the political stance of the TNI, repeatedly bypassing his Commander-in-Chief Admiral Widodo.⁹ The arguments he often made, that the military was merely maintaining political "neutrality" and respecting "constitutional" processes, were clearly attempts to obscure its rejection of civilian supremacy. It was a plain case of political insubordination to a civilian president, even if some might think it was justified because he was unpopular, ineffective, or disturbingly erratic. While the power and prestige of the military had declined since the fall of Suharto, the Army leadership retained its institutional skills in pursuing its political interests and seized this opportunity to demonstrate its muscle. Civilian political leaders invited the military to play politics and thereby

⁸ For more about this monopolization, see Siddharth Chandra and Douglas Kammen, "Generating Reforms and Reforming Generations: Military Politics in Indonesia's Democratic Transition and Consolidation," *World Politics* 55 (October 2002): 96-136.

⁹ For more about Endriartono Sutarto's maneuvers and the intra-military politics leading to the fall of Abdurrahman Wahid, see Jun Honna, *Military Politics and Democratization in Indonesia* (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), Chapter 8.

helped revive military power. The military has thus recovered from those difficult days under B. J. Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid, when it was held responsible for human rights abuses and more generally for the nation's ills, and when there was strong popular pressure for the military to "go back to the barracks." It is the political comeback of the military that is the most important development in the past two years, both in the center and in the provinces and districts.

The presidential transition from Abdurrahman Wahid to Megawati was also important for the internal military political developments. The military elite had been deeply divided since the mid-1990s, as demonstrated most clearly by the open rivalry between Suharto's son-in-law, Lt. Gen. Prabowo, and Suharto's former adjutant Gen. Wiranto. During the Habibie presidency, when Wiranto served both as TNI Commander-in-Chief and as Minister of Defense, he purged and/or coopted Prabowo's former allies and did his best to consolidate his power base. But this led to a backlash in the Army.

Deeply frustrated by the way he was treated by his superiors, and the stagnation of military reform under Wiranto, Agus Wirahadikusumah, representing a small group of reformist officers, insisted on the need for institutional reforms, such as the abolition of territorial command structure, the very base of military political power, and he offered himself as an instrument for President Abdurrahman Wahid to intervene in internal military affairs.¹⁰ Abdurrahman Wahid successfully undermined Wiranto's position in the military, and duly awarded Agus Wirahadikusumah, promoting him to command of Kostrad. This angered senior army officers, who closed ranks to fend off presidential intervention in military affairs. They were led by officers close to Wiranto, but were joined by officers attached to the new Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Widodo, who saw presidential meddling as institutionally dangerous and therefore unacceptable.

Throughout his presidency, Wahid repeatedly used Agus in his battle with Endriartono, then Army Chief of Staff. When the DPR voted in early February 2001 to issue a first warning memorandum to initiate the "impeachment" process against the President, Abdurrahman Wahid told Endriartono to prepare for martial law. He wanted to dissolve the DPR, which in his view was unconstitutionally attempting to topple the government. When Endriartono defied the presidential order, Wahid threatened to replace him with Agus as Army Chief of Staff.¹¹ Endriartono responded to the threat by mobilizing support from senior army officers at a public gathering on March 1, where they appealed for internal solidarity and pointedly rejected outside intervention in the Army's personnel affairs.¹²

¹⁰ See The Editors, "Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite: January 1, 1999-January 31, 2001."

¹¹ For more details, see Endriartono Sutarto's interview, "Endriartono Sutarto: TNI Tidak Mau Terjebak," *Tempo*, March 4, 2001.

¹² Maj. Gen. Saurip Kadi, a friend of Agus Wirahadikusumah, protested at the meeting against the decision, made by the military/police faction in the DPR, to support the issuing of the first memorandum. "Saurip Kadi Protes Sikap Fraksi TNI Soal Buloggate," *Republika*, March 2, 2001.

Then, at the end of April, the DPR sent a second memorandum, demanding that President Wahid improve his performance or risk being impeached by a special session of the People's Consultative Assembly, the MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat). Five days later, Wahid responded by threatening to dissolve the DPR and called on the Army leadership to implement his order. This move was rejected by Endriartono,¹³ and the President once again sought to replace him with Agus Wirahadikusumah. The Chief of Staff defended himself successfully, organizing yet another high-profile Army solidarity meeting in mid-May in Bandung, where all the Kodam commanders jointly stated that they would reject "a political general" (obviously referring to Agus Wirahadikusumah) replacing Endriartono. The Deputy Army Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Kiki Syahnakri, also weighed in, saying that the army was united behind Endriartono.¹⁴ Agus tried to make his case effective by couching his support for the President in the name of civilian supremacy. He argued that "[i]f an administration fails to function because of disputes among the political elite, the constitution allows the government to issue a decree to dissolve the parliament." He criticized those generals who supported Endriartono in defying the presidential order and argued that the "TNI has come to be involved in maneuvers to oust him [Abdurrahman Wahid]."¹⁵

While the conflict escalated between the President and the Army leadership and between supporters of Endriartono and of Agus, the TNI leadership under Admiral Widodo worked with Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, retired general Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono, to defuse the crisis. He led a Cabinet team (Tim 7) to work out a compromise between the DPR and the President. But many army officers ignored TNI Headquarters and undermined Bambang Yudhoyono's mission. TNI Headquarters was visibly frustrated by Endriartono's rejection of the President's orders and by his effort to position himself as representing the military as a whole.¹⁶ The inability to curb Endriartono and his supporters in the Army doomed Yudhoyono's mission and led to his dismissal from the position of Coordinating Minister on June 1, 2001.

Endriartono argued that he was only maintaining the military's independence from the political process. In his view, this meant that the military should be brave enough to confront the national leadership if its policy did not conform to the "national interest" as defined by the military. He wrote in the June 20, 2001 issue of *Kompas* that under certain circumstances "it is TNI's duty to reject the order of the President." This statement was generally welcomed by the DPR (and the public at large). But some people, both in the military and the DPR, were understandably skeptical of Endriartono's high-profile behavior and suspicious of his political agenda.

¹³ See Abdurrahman Wahid's interview in "Laughing Amid Ruins," *Newsweek*, May 21, 2001; and Endriartono Sutarto's comment in "Army Urges Gus Dur Not to Disband DPR," *Jakarta Post*, May 10, 2001.

¹⁴ "TNI Nyatakan Tidak Terima 'Jenderal Politik,'" *Koran Tempo*, May 16, 2001; "TNI-AD Loyal Terhadap Sutarto," *Media Indonesia*, May 17, 2001.

¹⁵ Quotations are from "TNI Chiefs Say No to Dissolving DPR," *Jakarta Post*, May 18, 2001.

¹⁶ Military spokesman, Air Vice Marshal Graitto Usodo, indicated this concern in an interview. See "Marsekal Muda Graitto Usodo: Lebih Baik Saya Diam," *Koran Tempo*, May 19, 2001. In private, one of Admiral Widodo's assistants strongly complained about Endriartono Sutarto's inveterate disregard for military procedures.

It appeared to such observers that he was making overtures to Megawati and, in emphasizing his own role in bringing down Abdurrahman Wahid, seeking to curry favor with her. They believed that in defending the Army's "independence," he was asserting the military's political power and lobbying to succeed Admiral Widodo as Commander-in-Chief under the incoming Megawati government.

Ryacudu also contributed greatly to the fall of Abdurrahman Wahid. Kostrad Commander since August 2000 and enjoying a close personal relationship with Abdurrahman Wahid because of his family's NU background, he dropped a bombshell in May 2001, when he announced his support for the DPR. At a gathering of Kostrad soldiers, he said that the military should be loyal to the President since he was legitimately elected by the people, but would adjust its position to conform with public sentiments and the "people's desires."¹⁷ He thus joined Endriartono in publicly aligning the army with the DPR. If he only wanted to resist the presidential emergency plan, there was no pressing need to say that the military would side with the "people."

The statement was political in nature, it was intended to be so, and it reinforced the DPR pressure on the President. Mahfud M. D., the civilian Defense Minister and a close ally of Abdurrahman Wahid, openly accused the generals of disobeying the president and meddling in politics by supporting the DPR in its fight with the president. For Mahfud, this open defiance and sabotage was nothing but a violation of military law (chapter 103 on disobedience), deserving a jail sentence of two years and four months.¹⁸

Ryacudu also played a crucial role in the final stage of Abdurrahman Wahid's eclipse. Having "lost" control of the Army, the President sought to save his increasingly desperate situation by manipulating the police, hoping that they would enforce a state of emergency if he declared it. He planned to dismiss Police Gen. Bimantoro as a "disloyal" Police Chief and to replace him with a more amenable police officer, Senior Commissioner Gen. Chaeruddin Ismail, without consulting the DPR, even though the appointment of police and military chiefs had to be approved by the parliament. The President went ahead with this plan on June 2, when he suspended Bimantoro as Police Chief and named Chaeruddin as Deputy Police Chief. Then, on July 20, he announced Chaeruddin's appointment as acting Police Chief. This brought the presidential confrontation with the DPR to a head. Fearing a possible large-scale clash between Abdurrahman Wahid supporters—who would be escorted by the police—and military troops guarding the DPR, parliamentary members rushed through the process to dismiss Wahid as President. They held an MPR special session the next day, on July 21, 2001. Following the announcement, Ryacudu called for an alert and mobilized army troops. More than two thousand soldiers were mobilized the next day, including troops from Kopassus, the Navy, and the Air Force. As the organizer, he announced that the military was totally united. Other Army leaders stated that this show-of-force was intended to "warn" Abdurrahman Wahid against

¹⁷ The people here referred to the DPR. "Ikhar Kesetiaan Kostrad: Tetap Loyal Kepada NKRI," *Kompas*, May 21, 2001. "Kostrad Vows to Side with the People," *Jakarta Post*, May 21, 2001.

¹⁸ "Mahfud Slams TNI and Police for Disloyalty," *Jakarta Post*, June 14, 2001.

mobilizing his supporters and provoking national instability.¹⁹ The message was clear for parliamentary members—go ahead with the “impeachment” without hesitation.

“Empowered” by the military, the MPR voted on July 23 to dismiss the President and elected Megawati as his successor. Ryacudu’s show-of-force, which was publicly rationalized as showing the military’s “neutral” and “professional” concern to prevent political instability, had a powerful political impact. Party politicians fully understood the enormous importance of the military’s stance. Megawati’s new government showed its gratitude by rewarding the military and its leadership both institutionally and individually.²⁰

The fall of Abdurrahman Wahid demonstrated one significant feature of post-Suharto military politics. While the military no longer towers over the political process and has to work with civilian political elites, it retains institutional capabilities to adapt itself to shifting power relations—calculating the balance of power among rival forces, offering and withdrawing its support, and exploiting conditions to maximize its own gains. The political crisis triggered by President Abdurrahman Wahid’s confrontation with the DPR created an opportunity for the military to regain a decisive political role as opposition political forces sought its support and invited it back into legitimate politics. Skillfully playing its role as the guarantor of national stability and undermining civilian supremacy in the name of “national interests,” the military regained some of the political power it had lost in the immediate post-Suharto years.

C. TNI under Megawati

President Abdurrahman Wahid was widely resented in the DPR and the military for his self-centered, erratic leadership and his political interventions in military affairs. In contrast, and unlike her father, Megawati has never shown any strong leadership and has relied on her advisors and inner circle members in making decisions. Since she became the PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, Indonesian Democratic Party) chair in 1993, she has gathered not a few generals around her, above all those who were frustrated with Suharto’s alliance with “modernist” Islamic forces in the form of ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Se-Indonesia, Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals).²¹ When she was elected president, many of these senior officers thus emerged as her advisors and ministers. Hendropriyono and Agum Gemelar were appointed to Cabinet positions, respectively as head of BIN, the national intelligence agency, and as minister of transportation.

¹⁹ See Honna, *Military Politics and Democratization in Indonesia*, p. 192.

²⁰ This political reality led insiders to suspect a hidden agenda in Ryamizard Ryacudu’s call for an alert at the crucial moment. It is believed that he was coached by those in Megawati’s inner circle, including Ryamizard’s father-in-law, Gen. (ret) Try Sutrisno, Maj. Gen. (ret) Theo Sjafei (Megawati’s political advisor and a good friend of Try Sutrisno), and Taufik Kiemas (Megawati’s husband).

²¹ Typically those who were affiliated with the former military commander (1983-88) Gen. Benny Murdani tended to draw close to Megawati, including Try Sutrisno, Theo Sjafei, Agum Gemelar, and Hendropriyono. The latter two officers were involved in the 1993 events which led to Megawati’s election as the party chairperson.

Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono returned as Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs. Theo Syafei is known to be a trusted advisor to the President. Wiranto, whom Abdurrahman Wahid dismissed in the early months of his presidency and who was (and still is) in a vulnerable position because his role in the 1999 massacres and destruction of East Timor, also welcomed her presidency, at least in part because of his good relationship with Taufik Kiemas, her husband. They all are retired army generals, whose meddling in military affairs officers on active duty naturally hate. But it was Hendropriyono who soon emerged as the most controversial. Intensely ambitious, he intervened regularly in military affairs to promote his own political agenda and thereby antagonized the military leadership.

As the head of national intelligence agency, Hendropriyono embarked on consolidating his own power base there, sidelining many BIN officers recruited by his predecessors, Zein Maulani and Arie Kumaat, and recruiting officers of his own, above all those with a Kopassus background. Maj. Gen. Muchdi Purwo Pranyoto, the Commander-General of Kopassus in the crucial days in 1998, who was made non-active because of his role in the illegal kidnapping (and in some cases "disappearance") of young activists, was made his deputy. Officers who saw their careers at a dead-end because of their roles in human rights violations in East Timor and other areas also joined the BIN. Hendropriyono also obtained presidential approval to establish local branches of BIN throughout the archipelago. All these moves have made Army officers nervous, because they fear Hendropriyono may take over the intelligence function from the military, dominate the state intelligence apparatuses, and remake himself as a power broker for the President.²²

Though it is generally understood that the military now enjoys more freedom and power under Megawati, many generals on active duty say they are under pressure to be *alat pemerintah*, an instrument of the government. This pressure comes from their politically well-connected seniors. One can see a manifestation of this tension in the maneuvering around Admiral Widodo's replacement as TNI Commander-in-Chief by Endriartono. This question became a major issue in October 2001, when the first major reshuffle took place under Megawati. Sembiring Meliala, a retired major general, a member of Megawati's PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle), and Deputy Head of the First Commission in the DPR, who was known to be close to the group led by Theo Syafei and Try Sutrisno, said publicly that as Widodo had already reached the mandatory retirement age of fifty-five, he should promptly retire, to facilitate the generational change in the military leadership. He added that neither Endriartono nor Kiki Sjahnakri, his deputy, were eligible to replace him, since they too were almost at the mandatory retirement age. In his view, younger officers such as Ryacudu and Djamari Chaniago should be considered.²³ This was a clear sign that some members in Megawati's inner circle were reluctant to promote Army Endriartono to the top position of the military.

²² As seen in the earlier section, a major reshuffle took place in the military strategic intelligence agency, BAIS, in October 2001. This helped strengthen the presence of the army in BAIS.

²³ See "Widodo AS Diminta Segera Pensiun," *Media Indonesia*, October 17, 2001. Sembiring attracted public attention in 1992 when the military was under the leadership of Try Sutrisno. As a member of the military

The reason was perhaps quite straightforward. Endriartono's crucial role in bringing down Abdurrahman Wahid worried not a few in Megawati's government. They wondered aloud whether he would one day do the same to Megawati, if she asked the military leadership to support her political agenda, especially in the run-up to the general and presidential elections in 2004. Those in the presidential circle understood very well that the government would be in danger if its relationship with the military deteriorated. One way to avoid trouble was to place a proven loyalist officer at the top of the military. Megawati's advisors, such as Sembiring Meliala and Try Sutrisno, had reservations about Endriartono and suggested Ryacudu, who was believed to be more malleable, happened to be Try Sutrisno's son-in-law, and came from the same home town as Taufik Kiemas.

The question became more complicated when another candidate emerged for the job. The ambitious former army chief of staff, Gen. Tyasno, gained the support of Hendropriyono. Endriartono moved fast to block this intervention. First, he ruled out the possibility of Ryacudu being elevated by emphasizing the military commitment to a "professional" promotional system which stipulated that only generals with past experience as service chiefs (and/or deputy commanders-in-chief) could become TNI Commander-in-Chief.²⁴ This argument also destroyed the chances of Djamari Chaniago, Chief of the TNI's General Staff. Second, he denied Tyasno any chance by "protecting" Admiral Widodo. Though the change in the military leadership was widely expected, and there were strong pressures for "regeneration," Endriartono successfully lobbied the other service chiefs to express support for Admiral Widodo until 2004.²⁵ Needless to say, he did not really mean to support Widodo's retention as TNI Commander-in-Chief, because that would mean the end of his own military career. But he was well aware that the majority of senior Army officers were expecting him shortly to replace Admiral Widodo, and that they resented the intervention in internal personnel matters by retired officers of the presidential circle. The statement of support for Admiral Widodo thus served only as a warning that there would be resistance to Tyasno's appointment as Commander-in-Chief.

faction in the DPR, he openly expressed dissatisfaction with the selection of ICMI-linked Harmoko as Golkar chairman.

²⁴ "Seniority Should be Taken into Consideration for TNI Chief Post: Endriartono," *Jakarta Post*, October 23, 2001. This was an agreement reached by top generals in the final months of Abdurrahman Wahid's presidency in order to prevent him from replacing Widodo with someone who might follow the president's instruction to implement martial law. Some officers claimed that the validity of the agreement expired when Abdurrahman Wahid stepped down, because the selection of the military commander-in-chief was basically an exclusive right of the president. For Endriartono Sutarto, the strategy of extending the agreement, allegedly for the sake of "professionalism," helped him resist intervention in military affairs.

²⁵ In October 2001, Endriartono Sutarto openly opposed the idea of having a new military commander-in-chief installed, and persuaded navy and air force chiefs to support his initiative. "We [three service chiefs] think it is not time to replace Admiral Widodo," Endriartono Sutarto declared in mid-November 2001. This was then endorsed by the military headquarters when military spokesman, Graitto Usodo, officially stated that Admiral Widodo would remain in the position until 2004. See "KSAD: Panglima TNI Belum Perlu Diganti," *Kompas*, October 19, 2001; "Mabas TNI Belum Ingin Ganti Widodo AS," *Kompas*, November 22, 2001; "Widodo AS Tak Diganti Sampai 2004," *Suara Karya*, December 7, 2001.

The message was read correctly by Taufik Kiemas, the president's husband. A shrewd power-broker, he had no intention of antagonizing Endriartono and other top active service officers. He was well aware that the military's support would be crucial in the 2004 elections and did not want to risk a confrontation. It is widely believed that Taufik Kiemas personally insisted on naming Endriartono as the new TNI Commander-in-Chief and Ryacudu as Army Chief of Staff in order to cultivate the support of military elites for the PDI-P. Should Endriartono's loyalty become doubtful, he could be replaced by Ryamizard Ryacudu any time before the election. This policy was then supported by those retired officers who trusted Ryacudu. Endriartono replaced Widodo in June 2002.²⁶

The rise of Endriartono accelerated some notable trends. First, the Army regained its ascendancy within the TNI in which, under Abdurrahman Wahid, the Navy and Air Force had played an increasing role, as exemplified by Admiral Widodo himself, Air Vice-Marshal Graitto Usodo (TNI spokesman), and Air Vice-Marshal Ian Santoso Perdanakusuma (head of BAIS). The first two are now retired, with Widodo replaced by Endriartono and Graitto Usodo by Maj. Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsoedin. Second, Endriartono and Ryacudu consolidated their leadership in the TNI with the placement of field-type Army officers in strategic positions. They were aware how deeply the military had been divided since Suharto's waning days and how devastating the factional fighting had been for the institution. Endriartono's attempt to reconstruct the military involved nurturing officer solidarity and reviving the Army's sense of its own dignity by promoting the image of the military as a "guardian of national integration." It was against this background that officers with combat, intelligence, and strategic experience were favored for promotion, regardless of their public image. Officers with Kostrad background and experience in East Timor have been especially prized; this had led to the rehabilitation of Kopassus officers who were once close to Prabowo and had been sidelined because of their involvement in the kidnapping of anti-Suharto activists.²⁷

Endriartono's leadership is built on the support of the Army under Ryacudu and emphasizes the "unity and discipline" of the military to overcome the recent "tradition" of factional cleavages. The Endriartono-Ryacudu pair at the top of the hierarchy is no doubt the most solid we have seen in the recent history of the Indonesian military, in which all the earlier pairs (such as Feisal Tanjung/Hartono, Feisal Tanjung/Wiranto, Wiranto/Subagyo, Widodo/Tyasno, and Widodo/Endriartono) had personal difficulties. The two members of the current pair share a hardline view on the civil-military relationship. In their view, the military would benefit more from placing organizational priority on security issues that cannot

²⁶ After this procedure, Ryamizard Ryacudu was installed as Army Chief of Staff and Endriartono Sutarto as the Commander-in-Chief in June 2002. With the establishment of the new TNI leadership, the relationship between Hendropriyono and the military leadership has steadily worsened, as we discuss in the next section.

²⁷ The former Kopassus Group-4 (intelligence) Commander, Col. Chairawan, who was made "non-active" in 1998 because of his role in kidnapping cases, is now revived under the Sutarto leadership, most recently as head of the military's joint investigation team, which has been assigned to investigate military involvement in the killings of Freeport employees in Papua in August 2002.

be handled by civilians and the police rather than from conducting internal military reforms and shrinking the political role of the military. Hence the emergence of the military leadership under Sutarto and Ryacudu has meant that reform measures have been effectively abandoned in the name of solidarity and institutional rejuvenation.

Nor is there any sign that President Megawati has any inclination to push for military reform. From the military's perspective, she is an extremely accommodating president who refrains from any intervention in internal military affairs. This, however, does not mean that the military leadership now enjoys full autonomy, nor does it imply that the military has used its organizational power to control the government. Although military officers in the central command are no longer factionalized and are becoming more cohesive, the military as an institution has long been ridden with internal problems. These problems are now rapidly becoming unmanageable. The central command, for instance, is fully aware that territorial commands are extensively involved in illegal business activities and are orchestrating business-generating violence due to severe financial problems. The next section discusses this question and its political implications by focusing on developments over the past two years. The current military leadership has been so preoccupied with these serious institutional problems that there has been little effort or inclination among the military elite to reverse today's civil-military balance in their favor at the national level.

D. Military Business Activities and Regional Instability

(1) The Collapse of YKEP and its Impact

The financial meltdown of the military since the Asian economic crisis of 1997 has been of great concern to its leaders. This concern is less about the government's defense budget than it is about the collapse of military-owned business enterprises. It is well known that the official government defense budget has long covered only around 30 percent of actual military spending; the remaining 70 percent has been self-financed by the military.²⁸ Almost all military operations of the Army have been self-financed because the defense budget barely covers maintenance costs. Salaries of soldiers have also been covered by off-budget schemes. While it is clear that the military has relied extensively on off-budget funds, it is not clear exactly how the remaining 70 percent is generated. It is generally understood that these funds come from three sources: (1) military enterprises under its complex of *yayasan* (foundations), (2) security and other military "services" (e.g. transportation) for civilian "clients," and (3) illegal/criminal businesses orchestrated, or backed, by military personnel (and units), including protection rackets. Even within the military, the contributions of various business activities to off-budget funds remains murky.²⁹ Given the fact that type-1 enterprises

²⁸ See, for example, International Crisis Group, "Indonesia: Keeping the Military under Control," Jakarta/Brussels: ICG, September 20, 2000.

²⁹ Type-3 business activities are mainly conducted by the lowest level in the command structure (i.e. individuals and troops) and are thus often unknown to Kodam/Korem commanders. Type-2 business activities are largely managed by the Kodam and Korem headquarters, while the army central command is

have long been tied to Suharto's family business concerns and Chinese-*pribumi* conglomerates, however, there seems to be no doubt that their contribution to the off-budget funding has been significant.³⁰ Given the problems such enterprises have experienced since 1997-98, however, off-budget funds have shrunk considerably, leaving the military high command strapped for cash.

The Asian economic crisis also damaged the Army's own enterprises and exposed their weaknesses: endemic corruption and poor management. The fall of Suharto, the patron of the Army, was soon followed by the snowballing bankruptcy of many enterprises under the control of Army *yayasan*, above all Yayasan Kartika Eka Paksi or YKEP. Army Headquarters under Subagyo (1998-99) and Tyasno (1999-2000) had no way to investigate the real extent of this crisis, but found that many of its enterprises were not functioning as fundraising machines. It was really under Endriartono (2000-2002) that the Army leadership came to understand these bankruptcies posed a fundamental threat to the entire institution and decided in 2001 to conduct a full investigation by employing foreign accounting firms. The result after an eight-month audit was a real jolt: only two of the thirty-eight army enterprises under the YKEP were generating profits.³¹

This grave loss of income from army enterprises has inevitably resulted in an increase in the ratio of off-budget funds derived from protection, extortion, and other illegal activities. Moreover, because Army Headquarters had to slash funding for local commands, the latter have implicitly been told they must become self-sufficient. This trend has notably changed the Army's institutional orientation at the local level. Given central command budget cuts, every territorial command must boost its own fundraising ability by increasing reliance on type-2 and -3 businesses. Territorial units are therefore strongly encouraged (in practice) to become parasitic on local politico-economic elites who can help their fundraising, and also to deepen their involvement in informal and illegal business activities. The central command has no effective way to prevent this development. Rather it understands the practical concerns and urgent needs of the local units to feed their soldiers, and thus looks the other way. This has led to a serious criminalization of local army units and contributed to the proliferation of organized violence in many regions, as we discuss below.

not in a position to supervise their activities. It is only type-1 business activities that the army headquarters can deal with directly.

³⁰ About military enterprises in the early Suharto era, see Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978), Chapter 11; Richard Robison, *Indonesia: The Rise of Capital* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1986), Chapter 8. For more recent activities, see Indria Samego, et. al., *Bila ABRI Berbisnis* (Jakarta: MIZEN, 1998); Angel Rabasa, John B. Haseman, and James R. Hosek, *The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challengers, Politics and Power* [MR-1599], Rand Corporation, September 2002, Chapter 7.

³¹ See Ernst & Young, "Yayasan Kartika Eka Paksi: Strategic Review Report Phase II," December 2001. The two companies are PT. Sinkona Indonesia Lestari (Kina Processing) and PT. ITCI Kartika Utama (Forest Concession Holder). This means that the army in this post-Suharto era has come to rely more heavily on forest business and its connected activities, such as illegal logging and timber smuggling. This pattern has been confirmed by civil society groups in Kalimantan, Papua, Aceh, and other areas.

The impact of the financial crisis on the military has been amplified by two government policy measures, that is, the separation of the police from the military and the promotion of regional autonomy, both introduced by President Habibie in 1999. The official division of roles between the military and the police is not clear-cut, but in general the police has assumed responsibility for domestic security affairs, while the military's official function is now limited to national defense.³² This "reform" has significantly contributed to the squeezing of "turf" controlled by the Army for its fundraising activities. For example, "traffic control" and "town patrol" tasks once made it possible for the Army to charge special traffic fees to those people who wanted to transport illegal goods, and also to collect protection money in return for providing special treatment for underworld businesses, such as gambling, prostitution, and drug trafficking. The payoffs constituted the "welfare" fund for field units. The Army lost this turf once the police obtained institutional autonomy, including control of the lucrative traffic and town patrols. In response, soldiers have become more directly involved in underworld activities, for instance direct trafficking in illegal materials, in their attempt to compensate for the loss of turf and payoffs.

The advent of regional autonomy has also led to an escalation in the criminal behavior of local army units. The new regime of regional autonomy has effectively channeled more tax revenues to district and mayoralty governments. Local elites—politicians, businessmen, and mafia—have major stakes in the control of local governments. Democratization led to greater political participation and competition in many regions. Thus different types of alliances are now in the making in many different places, in order to tap into financial resources now made available locally.

This trend is evident generally, but is particularly noticeable in resource-rich provinces that are retaining a greater share of revenues under the new regime, where "democratic" competition is often transformed into naked power struggles over control of the "loot." Local elections of governors, district chiefs (*bupati*), and mayors have become the major impetus for intra-elite fighting, involving exposés, scandals, impeachment of incumbents, and mobilizing mass demonstrations to attack government and political party facilities.³³ These political games have discredited civilian political institutions and democratic mechanisms. Besides, naked power struggles have generated opportunities for local army commands to determine the winners and losers of the political contests. In the rough and tumble of local politics, gaining the favor of the local army command is often essential to control the political situation.³⁴ In this context, there are clear incentives for local legislatures to curry favor with the local army elite and facilitate their fundraising activities. Local army leaders

³² The arrangement was formalized by MPR decrees in 2000, i.e. Ketetapan MPR No.VI/2000 Tentang Pemisahan Tentara Nasional Indonesia dan Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia and Ketetapan MPR No.VII/2000 Tentang Peran Tentara Nasional Indonesia dan Peran Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia.

³³ The most recent cases include elections for governor in South Kalimantan (September 2002), South Sulawesi (December 2002), and Lampung (December 2002).

³⁴ See Marcus Mietzner, "Business as Usual?: The Indonesian Armed Forces and Local Politics in the Post-Soeharto Era," unpublished manuscript, 2002.

are keenly aware of their influence and seek to benefit from this situation both institutionally and personally.

The practice of “give-and-take” is common in local civil-military relations, and it can be argued that the nascent and somewhat hesitant assertion of civilian supremacy has turned out to be a critical factor slowing the process of military disengagement from non-military fields.³⁵ Local politicians have strong incentives to reintegrate the military in the political process in order to prevail in “open democratic” political competition. In the election for *bupati* of Sampang (Madura, East Java) in July 2000, for instance, the military overtly sided with the PKB candidate, and permitted PKB demonstrators to run amok.³⁶ In the December 2002 gubernatorial election in Lampung, the local PDI-P legislature was instructed by the Megawati-led party central executive to nominate a brother of Army Chief of Staff Ryacudu.³⁷ In the planned gubernatorial election in West Java, it was reported in January 2003 that the PKB would nominate the ex-Kodam commander, Maj. Gen. (ret) Tayo Tarmadi.³⁸ In North Sumatra, the PDI-P decided to select its candidate for the governorship (2002-2005) from a list of retired generals, insisting that they were talented in uniting people from different social backgrounds.³⁹ These examples demonstrate the growing civilian use of the military in local politics. This manipulation of democratic political processes significantly diminishes the authority of local governments and parliaments over local military leaders and serves to undermine efforts to restrict the army’s activities in type-2 and -3 businesses.

In summary, post-Suharto politico-military transformations and the financial crisis have dramatically shrunk the power and oversight capacity of the army’s central headquarters over local commands. This tendency has boosted the fundraising incentives for territorial units, involving underworld business dealings. Under these circumstances, successful fundraising is lauded, not scrutinized. Significantly, these developments have contributed to the escalation of conflict and violence in local areas as battles intensify over turf and illegal activities, as discussed below.

(2) Parasitic Army Business Activities: Local Varieties and Similarities

No doubt the situations in Papua and Aceh (Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam) are distinctive cases. In contrast to many other areas, where civilian political parties have

³⁵ For a revealing account of this trend in several regions, see the following report by academic researchers. Vilters, *Meretas Hubungan Sipil-Militer di Kabupaten dan Kotamadya* (Jakarta: Vilters, 2001).

³⁶ Latief Wiyata and Kusnadi, *Proses Demokratisasi di Indonesia: Kasus Pemilihan Bupati Sampang, Madura, Period 2000-2005* (Jember: LPPM, 2001). This comprehensive report made by the local NGO is well summarized in Mietzner, “Business as Usual?”

³⁷ After the PDI-P candidate lost the election, the elected candidate was prevented from assuming office by the government, which cited allegations of corruption. “Drama di Lampung, Gubernur Terpilih Terancam Gugur,” *Media Indonesia*, December 20, 2002.

³⁸ “PKB Calonkan Tayo, Banyak eks TNI Jadi Balon Gubernur Jabar,” *detikcom*, January 22, 2003. Reportedly, Golkar is also ready to nominate another retired general.

³⁹ “PDI-P Backs Ex-Generals for the Top Post in North Sumatra,” *Jakarta Post*, March 1, 2003.

been empowered and are at the center of local political processes, both Papua and Aceh are burdened with dysfunctional local government institutions due to overwhelming security concerns. Instability and violence in these regions have helped the TNI maintain its ascendancy over local politics, even after the ending of so-called DOM (Daerah Operasi Militer, Military Operation Zones) by the Habibie administration. Local army commands provide security guards for large multinationals such as Freeport and Exxon-Mobil. They are quite aware that lingering unrest in connection with separatist movements has conveniently amplified corporate security concerns, and effectively boosted fees paid to the local army for security services.⁴⁰ Faced with the need for a reliable flow of funds, local territorial commands have partly relied on squeezing multinationals. To this end, the persistence of low-intensity conflict is indispensable. From the military's "business" perspective, the conflict should not be so intense as to drive the multinationals away, but also not too unthreatening because this might give the police an opportunity to take over the security "service." Hence the enduring and low-intensity unrest in Papua and Aceh, where foreign multinationals are operating, is ideal for maximizing the extraction of security fees by local army commands.

In Papua, a highly publicized incident in which unknown gunmen shot Freeport employees on August 31, 2002 serves to highlight the role of the military in generating threats to justify demands for security services.⁴¹ Although the truth is not yet officially acknowledged, three theories concerning the military's role are widely discussed. One theory suggests that the shooting was part of a military plan to implicate the separatist movement led by the Free Papua Organization (OPM, Organisasi Papua Merdeka), and then to classify the OPM as a "terrorist" group. This would produce a "breakthrough" in Indonesia's often criticized "slow" efforts to crackdown on terrorism in support of the global anti-terrorism campaign and perhaps pave the way for a resumption of US military assistance and training. Another theory says it was a result of internal conflicts among Freeport's security personnel, leading one group to hire soldiers to carry out an attack that would expose and discredit the ineffective security services of the existing military provider, perhaps as a prelude to a

⁴⁰ For more about the problem, see, among others, International Crisis Group, "Aceh: Why Military Force Won't Bring Lasting Peace," Jakarta/Brussels: ICG, June 12, 2001. Even the former Defense Minister, Juwono Sudarsono, openly argued that elements within the military incited unrest in Papua in order to convince Freeport that their ongoing presence was necessary. Quoted in Lesley McCulloch, "Trifungsi: The Role of the Indonesian Military in Business," paper presented at the International Conference on "Soldiers in Business: Military as An Economic Actor," Jakarta, October 17-19, 2000, p. 29.

⁴¹ Two Americans and one Indonesian were killed and eighteen others injured. On December 26, 2002, the deputy chief of the Papua regional police, Brig. Gen. Raziman Tarigan, reportedly stated that army soldiers were involved in the killings. "Police Say Indonesian Army Behind Ambush," *Agence France Presse*, December 26, 2002. This incident led the United States to send FBI agents to conduct a joint investigation with the Indonesian police. A noted human rights NGO, ELSHAM, conducted its research in cooperation with the regional police and published a report implicating the army in the shooting. See ELSHAM Papua, "What Happened at Freeport: Revealing the Attack of Freeport Employees in Timika, Papua," September 25, 2002.

switch in providers.⁴² The third theory suggests that the Army, which was in negotiations with Freeport regarding security guard fees for fiscal year 2003, tried to persuade/threaten the company to agree to a price hike by “proving” how dangerous the district remains. We cannot tell for sure which theory is the closest to the mark, but it is clear that the OPM was not responsible for the “hit.” Army violence in Papua is well documented, and Kopassus has been implicated in the assassination of the Papuan pro-independence leader, Theys Hiyo Eluay in November 2001.⁴³ It seems reasonable to conclude that the Army was involved in the Freeport attack, especially if one considers “cui bono.” Considering the pattern of army relations with Freeport, and the current financial hardships plaguing of the territorial command, the third theory seems most plausible.⁴⁴

Military ascendancy in local politics is firmly established in Papua. Aside from preying on Freeport, the local military command has relied heavily on the forest business, one of the main economic sectors in the province. This includes illegal logging, protection rackets for civilian smugglers, stealing of timber products, and so on.⁴⁵ The military has also provided transportation services for foresters, both legal and illegal. Political instability in Papua has enhanced the need and demand for military “security services,” as the risk incurred if one fails to pay off the Army is well known—i.e. one will be robbed by army personnel. Given the local army command’s increased need to fund itself, it is not surprising that it is hostile to local government supervision and scrutiny. Thus, it has effectively stifled the development of civil society because it could potentially threaten the army’s business activities. Ensuring military ascendancy in the region is of paramount importance, and thus fomenting instability to justify a strong military presence is essential. As the military’s financial needs have increased,

⁴² It is widely believed that the company has privately employed hundreds of military men, both retired and on active duty, as security advisors and private soldiers.

⁴³ About the killing of Theys, see, for instance, the investigation report produced by ELSHAM, “Preliminary Report: The Abduction and Assassination of Theys Hiyo Eluay was Premeditated and Politically Motivated,” Jayapura, December 13, 2001. This report stated that Kopassus soldiers were involved in the murder. The army leadership at first denied the allegation, but later admitted the possibility. From January 2003, military tribunals started to prosecute seven Kopassus soldiers.

⁴⁴ One key question that also concerns the FBI is at which level of command this operation was planned. *The Washington Post* (November 2, 2002) reported that a very reliable source told it that Commander-in-Chief Gen. Endriartono Sutarto was in the meeting to discuss the plan and ordered the shooting. Those close to Endriartono Sutarto strongly believe that this was disinformation provided by Hendropriyono to the CIA. They saw this as an attempt to discredit Endriartono Sutarto. He sued *The Washington Post*, and in late February 2003, the newspaper finally agreed to announce that the story was not based on firm evidence. Endriartono Sutarto’s direct involvement seems unlikely, as it would be highly unusual to have such a discussion in the presence of the Commander-in-Chief. An army general said that if such a discussion took place, existing procedures would ensure that no one above the level of his deputy assistants would be invited to the meeting so that the Commander-in-Chief would not be implicated in any way.

⁴⁵ It is reported, for instance, that more than half of the eaglewood business in Kaimana district has been controlled by the local army, which threatens the local people by telling them they must obey the military or risk having their licenses cancelled. See *Suara Pembaruan*’s three-day coverage of military business: “Bisnis Tentara (1) Menyiasati Anggaran yang Timpang?” *Suara Pembaruan*, December 2, 2002; “Bisnis Tentara (2) Menjaga Aset Freeport Hinga BPPN,” *Suara Pembaruan*, December 3, 2002; “Meraup Untung di Tengah Konflik,” *Suara Pembaruan*, December 4, 2004)

so has the need to create unstable conditions conducive to fundraising activities. Thus, it appears that there is a link between the simultaneous post-1998 rise in regional political instability and the greater need of local army commands for alternative sources of funding. (It may be even more complex. A Papuan journalist close to the Kodam commander reported that this commander—who, according to the journalist, tried to carry out his duties responsibly—told him when drunk that his position was impossible. Local Kopassus and Kostrad units claim they are responsible only to their headquarters in Jakarta, while local military personnel who have been in residence a long time answer “Yes, pak,” and pay no attention to instructions, as they do not expect any Kodam commander to last more than eighteen months.)

Similar developments can be seen in Aceh, where a new Kodam (Iskandar Muda) was established in February 2002. This was officially justified in terms of maximizing local security. The new territorial command inherited lucrative cash cows from Kodam I/Bukit Barisan that had previously controlled the area. Exxon-Mobil has paid the military for security services, just as Freeport has done in Papua.⁴⁶ This “business” is the greatest source of income for the Kodam. It is frequently reported that soldiers, pretending to belong to the separatist movement led by GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, Free Aceh Movement), cause security disturbances in order to convince Exxon-Mobil to hire more security guards, and, consequently, contribute more to the military. It is Kostrad units under the command of the Kodam which are deployed to “secure” Exxon-Mobil facilities.

Apart from squeezing big multinationals involved in the oil and LNG sectors, the local army has also intensified other business activities in Aceh. The port business is more or less controlled by the army.⁴⁷ Traffic routes in the region are divided into “turfs” and allocated to separate army units.⁴⁸ As in Papua, the parasitism of troops stationed in Aceh is flagrant. It is widely reported that army units are involved in the drug trade, and in the selling of military equipment such as pistols, rifles, explosives and uniforms—even to GAM! Criminal business activities of the military are flourishing in an atmosphere of no accountability and a dire need for extra-budget funds. By sustaining a low-intensity security problem, the military is able to justify its continued presence and extraordinary measures that insulate it from scrutiny. There is no way the central command can impose discipline on local troops, even if it wished, and in

⁴⁶ For more details, see, for example, International Crisis Group, “Aceh: Why Military Force Won’t Bring Lasting Peace,” Jakarta/Brussels: ICG, June 12, 2002.

⁴⁷ In East Aceh, for example, fishing ships are required to pay operation fees to Kopassus units. It is reported that those fishermen who refused payment (Rp. 100,000/ship) had their ships destroyed by fire.

⁴⁸ In West Aceh, the traffic route to Banda Aceh is full of soldiers who demand payoffs even from mini-buses. In South Aceh, vendors and farmers who bring crops to local markets are forced to pay passage fees to each army unit controlling the area. If they refuse to pay, troops threaten to arrest them on the charge of supporting GAM. Once civilians are arrested, their families are asked to pay for their release. Similarly, troops are deployed along the Exxon-Mobil pipeline road, and they conduct operations in nearby villages, demanding money from passengers in every vehicle that passes along that road, including poor villagers on their bicycles. For more, see International Crisis Group, “Aceh: Why Military Force Won’t Bring Lasting Peace.”

fact such criminal entrepreneurship is tacitly accepted, while local governments are unable and disinclined to rein in the military.

Ambon also suffers from the same nexus of military-business-insecurity dynamics. As in Aceh, the military leadership under Wiranto established a new Kodam (XVI/Pattimura) in Ambon in 1999. Here too the financial situation is severe due to the endemic communal warfare which has both increased the operations costs of the local command and reduced the revenue from local business elites whose economic activities have been damaged by the fighting. Territorial units are therefore heavily dependent on one of the few still-active commercial activities: the harbor business. Troops not only collect harbor dues, but also conduct security checks of incoming and outgoing ships, which generate large payoffs. Clearly the military is not stopping the flow of guns and agitators and instead has made this into a business opportunity. Moreover, the wartime harbor business involves local gangs, and they have cooperated with the military for mutual *gotong-royong* benefit: payoffs and protection.⁴⁹ This ensures that the Kodam which is supposed to quell local disturbances has in fact facilitated and benefited from the escalation of violence and mayhem.

It should also be noted that the standard salary for soldiers is absolutely insufficient to maintain their neutrality and discipline in conflict zones. The official territorial doctrine says that as the TNI is a people's military, soldiers should always be united with the people. As if perversely embodying the doctrine, troops in Ambon have fought for people who are killing each other. Soldiers deployed to certain communal areas naturally get close to the residents and fight against other communities protected by other soldiers, a situation that leads to proxy wars. This phenomenon is reflected in the growing number of deserters who abandon their units and work as mercenaries. According to Brig. Gen. Mustopo, commander of Kodam XVI in 2001-2002, about 18 percent of his soldiers, or several hundred troops, deserted in 2000 alone.⁵⁰ Some of them became mercenary snipers, bombers, and trainers who organized Ambonese youth and taught them military skills, such as bomb-making.⁵¹ Clearly the military is part of the deepening conflict in Ambon, and, as in other areas, the shortage of military funds has led the military to create and tap new business opportunities. Ironically, security forces are engendering insecurity as a survival strategy, and profiting from sowing unrest. They are acting as both arsonists and firemen.

Indonesia's recent security disturbances are not only limited to the conflict-ridden regions discussed above, where separatist movements and "religious" warfare have

⁴⁹ About gangs and their military links, see, for example, "Dari Coker sampai Laskar Kristus," *Tempo*, May 19, 2002; "Siapa Beking 'Papi' Berti," *Tempo*, May 26, 2002.

⁵⁰ "Maaf, Salah Pengertian," *Tempo*, May 26, 2002. In January 2001, territorial troops exchanged fire with deserters and arrested twenty-nine of them. "Jurus Baru Membabat Para Desertir," *Tempo*, June 16, 2002. Military deserters are also active in Aceh. For more, see International Crisis Group, "Indonesia: The Search for Peace in Maluku," Jakarta/Brussels: ICG, February 8, 2002.

⁵¹ See, for example, "Alumni Galala dan Pasukan Siluman," *Tempo*, June 16, 2002. Even national police spokesman, Saleh Saaf, once asserted that in many bombing cases in Ambon, military men and possibly deserters have been involved. "Pangdam Pattimura Siap Tindak Anggota TNI Terkait Pemboman," *Media Indonesia*, October 24, 2002.

erupted. Security forces have generated organized violence and social disorder wherever they are stationed.

Disorder is caused, for example, by “turf wars” between the TNI and police in many local cities. One of the biggest clashes between soldiers and police units took place in September 2001 in the East Java town of Madiun. It followed similar clashes in Bogor and Serui, Papua, the previous month.⁵² The Madiun incident started from a brawl at a gas station between Kostrad and police personnel, but it quickly developed into a bloody rampage. About three hundred members of Kostrad’s Airborne Infantry Battalion 501 ran amok, attacking the Madiun police station and several other substations in the town. During this gunfight, two students were killed, and more than twenty others were wounded, while dozens of vehicles and government offices were damaged. This embarrassing incident forced the then Kostrad Commander, Lt. Gen. Ryacudu, to take disciplinary action against those of his men who were involved. He summarily dismissed the battalion chief and deputy chief, as well as twenty battalion members. In addition, more than one hundred army personnel were later charged for participating in the incident. The deadly clash was instigated by a small dispute, but it had deeper roots in the turf war between the battalion and the police. Both had been actively involved in local protection rackets of gambling and prostitution, but, as discussed earlier, the growing participation of the police in “town patrolling” after gaining independence from the military not only reduced the turf of army troops, but also cut into their protection business. Endriartono, then Army Chief of Staff, admitted: “It is no secret that they back illegal businesses in the area,” referring to gambling dens, brothels, and the drug trade.⁵³ Kostrad’s rampage reflected the accumulated resentment of army soldiers who were forced to live close to the edge. It is revealing that a dispute between the two security services escalated into something which resembled gang warfare.

A similar conflict erupted in the town of Maumere, Flores, in August 2002, following some small-scale clashes in other areas, for instance in South Sulawesi, a month after the Madiun incident. The Flores case also illustrates the consequences of more aggressive military fundraising activities.⁵⁴ The lingering police-military rivalry over the local protection racket was intensified when the police arrested a powerful local businessman, who was the harbormaster controlling port-related business, on charges of smuggling timber. Since this illegal trade benefited the local military, the arrest and cessation angered local units. The tension reached a peak when a brawl between navy and police personnel at a local pub led to the involvement of army troops and escalated into an exchange of attacks. The enraged soldiers finally occupied the Maumere police station. This incident further provoked fear of the

⁵² One policeman was injured in the Bogor case, and two infantrymen were killed and two police members were wounded in the Serui clash.

⁵³ “Army Chief Says Madiun Victims Shot by Police,” *Jakarta Post*, September 20, 2001. He also claimed that the frequency of TNI-police clashes dramatically increased by 300 percent in the period after the separation of the two institutions.

⁵⁴ For a good investigation of this case, see International Crisis Group, “Tensions in Flores: Local Symptoms of National Problems,” Jakarta/Brussels: ICG, October 10, 2002.

military, especially of the army, which was believed to have staged riots the previous month in order to boost its fundraising activities.⁵⁵

A month after the Maumere incident, violence between the army and the police broke out in Binjai, North Sumatra, a town near Medan. As in other cities, the police-military turf wars created tensions. These were amplified by the establishment of Kodam Iskandar Muda in February 2002, which effectively cut Kodam I/Bukit Barisan off from its long-time lucrative operations in Aceh and restricted its activities to North Sumatra, West Sumatra, and Riau. The impact was tremendous because it resulted in the loss of most fundraising activities involving Exxon-Mobil and other large multinational "clients" in Aceh.⁵⁶ In response, army units in Kodam I/Bukit Barisan tried to compensate for this loss of income by stepping up type-3 business activities, with or without the approval of the Kodam leadership. The collapse of military discipline has been accompanied by flourishing criminal activities by local gangs. Medan, for example, has long been notorious for their presence, and as a result is often dubbed *kota preman* (the city of hoodlums).

For quite some time, the underworld economy in Medan and nearby towns has been largely controlled by two politically well-connected gangs, namely Pemuda Pancasila (PP) and Ikatan Pemuda Karya (IPK).⁵⁷ (After the 1999 general elections, which left the PDI-P as the dominant party in the Medan parliament, PDI-P's youth organization, Banteng Muda, aggressively competed for turf and stimulated inter-gang violence.) During the New Order, the partnership between the military and PP had been a fixture both at the national and the local level. But after Suharto's fall, and as a result of the economic crisis, the military diversified its gang partnerships in an effort to maximize fundraising. By the same token, PP, appreciating the new role of the police in domestic security, successfully coopted the district police in Medan. This in turn encouraged the IPK to develop ties with the military. Each backed by a security apparatus, the PP and IPK escalated their turf-war and waged a proxy police-military battle in Medan.

Binjai is under the influence of Medan gangs and is therefore not free from such developments. Police-military tensions escalated after the police took over the Army's role as "traffic warden," overseeing the Aceh-Binjai traffic route. This had long been a vital fundraising operation for the Army that yielded "special fees" to smugglers for transporting illegal timber, marijuana, and other proscribed items. The tension between the police and the military reached a peak when an IPK-linked drug dealer was arrested by the police. Soldiers from the Army's airborne battalion 100/PS rushed to the police station to ask for his release, and when the demand was rejected, three truckloads of soldiers from the battalion attacked the police station, burned police

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 4. The riot enabled the local army to display its presence and in that way highlight the supposed inability of the police to handle security disorder in the area. This action was meant to convince the business community to shift its security-guard contracts from the police to the army.

⁵⁶ But the Bukit Barisan Command retains lucrative ties to the LNG business in Riau.

⁵⁷ "Berebut Lahan di Kota Preman," *Tempo*, October 20, 2002. These two were also paramilitary organizations which had often been mobilized by the New Order military to assist security operations in Aceh.

cars and facilities, and finally occupied the place. With this attack, around 1.5 tons of marijuana disappeared, most probably "confiscated" by the battalion.⁵⁸ The next day, this predatory attack led to another clash between the two parties; the ensuing gunfight stopped almost all public activities and resulted in the deaths of eight people, including two civilians, while several people were wounded. The rampaging battalion even fired rockets at the headquarters of the local Brimob (police mobile brigade) unit and seized the place until persuaded to disarm and withdraw the next day.⁵⁹

This clash in Binjai once again demonstrates the importance that soldiers and their commanders attach to underworld business activities and underlines the deep institutional crisis that is now confronting the military. Territorial commands are losing power and authority to control local army units as well as individual soldiers. Despite the cohesion among the military elite under the leadership of Endriartono and Ryacudu, the central command does not have any immediate answer to the current institutional crisis that seriously threatens social order and peace all over Indonesia.

(3) *Who Killed Reform?*

The cases outlined above demonstrate how the post-Suharto military has been playing the role of national "destabilizer." This behavior is totally inconsistent with the military's self-proclaimed role as the protector of the national interest and political stability. The escalation of regional conflicts and social disturbances in recent years is directly related to the internal crisis of the military, i.e. its financial meltdown.⁶⁰ As military spokesman, Maj. Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsoedin, once frankly admitted, military professionalism worked at 30 percent strength because it only received 30 percent of its necessary budget.⁶¹ In her speech at the TNI's anniversary on October 5, 2002, President Megawati emphasized the problem of the under-budgeted military, admitting the government's failure to allocate a sufficient budget. But to her suggestion that the military withdraw from its business activities, Endriartono responded by saying that the military would not engage in business activities if the government could

⁵⁸ "TNI's Illegal Businesses Back in Spotlight," *Jakarta Post*, October 3, 2002. The clash broke out on September 28, 2002 and developed into a two-day city battle. The fact that the drug suspect was first arrested in the house of a battalion soldier, along with the disappearance of 1.5 tons of marijuana from the police station, further convinced the public that the military was deeply involved in drug syndicates.

⁵⁹ After the incident, Ryamizard Ryacudu, Army Chief of Staff, discharged twenty soldiers involved in the gunfight and transferred all soldiers in the airborne unit. But the Kodam leadership seemed to believe that the police were the cause of the problem. Assistant for Intelligence to the Kodam commander, Col. Iwan Priliyanto, claimed in frustration that soldiers got emotional because the police were so arrogant. "Anggota Linud 100 Emosi Karena Arogansi Polisi," *Media Indonesia*, October 8, 2002.

⁶⁰ We do not mean to imply that state-centered factors are more important than local factors and contexts in explaining regional instability, and therefore more deserving of study. But the military factor is common in many problem areas, and thus it helps us understand the logic that informs and exacerbates nationwide instability in post-Suharto Indonesia.

⁶¹ "Jangan Lagi Berbisnis, Jenderal," *Tempo*, October 13, 2002.

provide an adequate budget.⁶² His statement represents the view that such practices are a necessary evil.

Yet, clearly, the TNI leadership is facing a huge chain-of-command and disciplinary crisis. The decline in morale and discipline is reflected in the leadership's loss of control over territorial units due to their extensive involvement in type-3 businesses in recent years.⁶³ Although the situation is far different, the problem reminds us of Benny Murdani's military (ABRI, Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia) in the 1980s, which conducted a large-scale organizational reform (*reorganisasi*) to cope with budget shortfalls.⁶⁴ Under the slogan of KEEM (Kecil tetapi Efisien, Efektif dan Modern, small but efficient, effective and modern), the military leadership under Murdani streamlined the institution by reducing the number of Kodam from sixteen to ten. This rationalization project at that time incited concerns among many officers about the reduction of prospective command positions in ABRI, but Murdani prevailed in the reorganization and strengthened the power of the central command. If Endriartono, who is now confronted with the same problems of budget and command control, wants to emulate Murdani's "success" in dealing with this crisis and wipe out the negative legacies of the New Order military, he would seem to have no choice but to rationalize the bloated command structure.

But the current TNI leadership has in fact expanded the command structure. Their argument is that political instability in outlying provinces requires more troops in those regions. Ryacudu has flatly warned: "If you want to see national disruption, just destroy the territorial commands."⁶⁵ His view may well represent the majority's attitude among current military elites whose mind-set, developed during the New Order, is based on a deep skepticism about civilian abilities to lead the nation and unify the people. Since the retirement of Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo, there is no longer any high-ranking officer willing to "listen" to civilian critiques on the issue of downsizing the military's territorial structure.⁶⁶

Rather than weakening its territorial commitment, the current military leadership thinks of extending it. The lingering conflicts in Aceh, Papua, Maluku, Kalimantan, and

⁶² The government in fact increased the military budget in 2002, from 7.7 trillion rupiah in 2001 to 13 trillion, while the development budget in the year 2002 reached 1.4 trillion rupiah, or 240 percent higher than the 599 billion rupiah allocated in 2001. The budget increase, however, does not seem to have translated into any meaningful improvement in military professionalism.

⁶³ Even non-territorial units, for example the prestigious Presidential Security Squad (Paspampres), share the same problem. Its commander, Maj. Gen. (Marine) Nono Sampono, admitted in February 2003 that many of his soldiers had been involved in criminal businesses in Jakarta to compensate for their low salaries. Nono thus decided to downsize the Squad, in a bid to improve discipline.

⁶⁴ About Murdani's reorganization, see *Indonesia* 37 (April 1984).

⁶⁵ "Letjen TNI Ryamizard Ryacudu: Saya Bukan Palembangisme," *Tempo*, April 7, 2002.

⁶⁶ Three months before his retirement, Agus Widjojo finalized a vision to reform the territorial command structure. The proposal called for the military to disengage from non-defense fields in all Kodams in the coming twelve to nineteen years, starting in Java. Agus Widjojo, "Refungsionalisasi dan Restrukturisasi Pembinaan Teritorial (Sumda/Potensi Nasional Utk Duk Kep Pertahanan)," *Jakarta*, August 13, 2001. But this proposal failed to please civilian critics, who believed that twelve years was too long to wait for reform.

other places have provided a rationale for the military to expand its presence, rather than reduce and improve its effectiveness through internal reforms. This inclination is exacerbated by the country's civilian political leadership, which has been preoccupied with the coming 2004 general/presidential elections. Declining domestic pressure for military reforms reflects the political dynamics of party dependence on military support.

Moreover, since Al Qaeda's terrorist attack on New York and Washington DC on September 11, 2001, the Bush administration has orchestrated intensive anti-terrorist campaigns all over the world. These efforts have encouraged the improvement of security surveillance in Indonesia. In some circles there are strong suspicions that Indonesia harbors various terrorists and that the global terrorist network of Al-Qaeda maintains a sub-network called Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in Indonesia.⁶⁷ The deadly October 12, 2002 bomb blast in Bali, which killed about two hundred people, mostly Westerners, ratcheted up pressure on the Indonesian government to improve its domestic security apparatus. In response, the Head of BIN, Hendropriyono, announced plans to expand its intelligence network by establishing regional branches nationwide.⁶⁸ Army Chief of Staff Ryacudu openly called for the revival of the military's domestic security role.⁶⁹ This proposal is backed by the current Minister of Defense; the upcoming defense white paper reportedly also emphasizes the need for an enlarged military role in internal security affairs. Thus, the diminishing domestic pressure to reform the military and growing US pressure to improve Indonesia's security apparatus has significantly contributed to the growing assertiveness of the military. The ongoing efforts to reassert a domestic security role reflects the military

⁶⁷ See Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), Chapter 4, and International Crisis Group, "Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates," Jakarta/Brussels: ICG, December 11, 2002.

⁶⁸ Many political insiders see the plan as one meant to serve his political ambitions—i.e., to develop cooperation with US counterparts; to lead the domestic intelligence community; to claim power that would enable him to identify or invent domestic "terrorists"; to insinuate, whenever necessary, that the designated terrorists maintain relations with Islamic political leaders, particularly Amien Rais, the leading challenger to Megawati in 2004; to undermine the power and unity of political Islam to challenge Megawati in 2004; to become the primary contributor to Megawati's presidential re-election; and to wield his political power as kingmaker. Perhaps having sensed the threat of such circumstances, Amien Rais seems to have become very cautious in publicly attacking Megawati. In fact, many, including Maulani (former chief of BAKIN, antecedent of BIN) and Amien himself, suspect Hendropriyono of engineering the arrest of three Indonesians in the Philippines in March 2002 for their alleged possession of explosives. They may have been linked to the PAN (National Mandate Party) circle (one of them served as the former treasurer of the party). See "Mantan KaBAKIN: Penangkapan Tiga WNI atas Pesan dari Jakarta," *Media Indonesia*, April 2, 2002. Hendropriyono's right-hand man in BIN, Maj. Gen. (ret) Muchdi (Deputy IV), contacted Amien the day after their arrest for questioning.

⁶⁹ "KSAD Tegaskan Kembali NKRI Tidak Boleh Pucuh," *Kompas*, February 21, 2002. The statement came after his meeting with prominent retired officers, including Wiranto and Prabowo. Interestingly, Hendropriyono and Agus Widjojo were not invited, reflecting the fact that both Endriartono Suharto and Ryamizard Ryacudu tend to dislike them. Shortly before the emergence of Endriartono Sutarto and Ryamizard Ryacudu as leaders, Agus Widjojo, the military territorial chief, publicly stated that it was better to appoint a new TNI commander based on the rotational rule among three service chiefs. This statement effectively opposed the appointment of Endriartono Sutarto. Air Force Chief of Staff Marshall Hanafie Asnan voiced his support for the idea at the air force anniversary celebrations on April 7, 2002.

view that splitting the military and police was a mistake and one of the key causes of destabilizing turf battles.

The military's desire to expand territorial units not only reflects its concerns about rising political instability, but is also aimed at easing the financial difficulties of territorial commands. With the expansion of local autonomy and the redirection of revenues to the district and city governments, the military has planned to establish new Kodam and Korem.⁷⁰ Establishment of a West Kalimantan Command is, for example, widely considered to be the next goal, following the creation of such commands in Maluku and Aceh. Similarly, North Maluku and Flores have emerged as the candidate areas for new Korem.⁷¹ There are also plans to establish three Kodam in Papua if it is divided into three provinces. The expansion of territorial units may improve the military's security surveillance capacities and will also significantly contribute to the deepening of ties with local power elites, because the geographical area being covered by each Kodam/Korem will be much smaller. A new territorial unit, with a more manageable number of troops and area of operations, may enjoy greater autonomy and power to control local society. This development has raised expectations for more systematic and stable fundraising practices by territorial commands in many regions. That this will make the army more disciplined and professional, however, is highly improbable.

⁷⁰ There was at first a plan to reorganize the territorial structure into seventeen Kodams by 2004, but this idea was only partially implemented in Aceh and Maluku. The proposal called for: Kodam I/Iskandar Muda (Aceh), Kodam II/Bukit Barisan (North Sumatra), Kodam III/Iman Bonjol (West Sumatra, Riau, Jambi), Kodam IV/Sriwijaya (Lampung, Bengkulu), Kodam V/Jaya (Jakarta), Kodam VI/Siliwangi (West Java), Kodam VII/Diponegoro (Central Java, Yogyakarta), Kodam VIII/Brawijaya (East Java), Kodam IX/Tanjungpura (West Kalimantan), Kodam X/Lambung Mangkurat (Central and South Kalimantan), Kodam XI/Mulawarman (East Kalimantan), Kodam XII/Sam Ratulangi (North and Central Sulawesi), Kodam XIII/Hasanuddin (South and Southeast Sulawesi), Kodam IVX/Udayana (Bali and North Nusa Tenggara), Kodam XV/Nusa Tenggara (East Nusa Tenggara), Kodam XVI/Pattimura (Maluku), Kodam XVII/Trikora (Papua).

⁷¹ In Flores, the local parliament rejected the proposal in November 1999. In North Maluku, the plan is intact. "Satgas Bantuan Militer Jadi Personel Korem," *Media Indonesia*, October 2, 2002.

Cutoff date: February 28, 2003

Office

Officeholder

Date and Place of Birth, Ethnic Origin
Class and date of graduation
Divisional or Service Background
Date of Installation
Officeholder's previous post
Name of Predecessor

Armed Forces Headquarters

Commander-in-Chief of the TNI

-Admiral Widodo Adisutjipto
b. Aug. 1, 1944, Boyolali (Central Java),
Javanese
Navy Academy 1968
Navy
5 xi 99 - 7 vi 2002 (31 months)
Deputy Commander-in-Chief of TNI
Gen. Wiranto
-Gen. Endriartono Sutarto
b. Apr. 29, 1947, Purworejo (Central Java),
Javanese
Akmil 1971
Infantry
7 vi 02 - (9 months)
Army Chief of Staff

Chief of the General Staff (Kasum)

-Lt. Gen. Djamari Chaniago
b. April 8, 1949, in Palembang,
Minangkabau
Akmil 1971
Infantry
8 iii 00 - (36 months)
Deputy Army Chief of Staff
Lt. Gen. Suaidi Marasabessy

Chief of the Territorial Staff (Kaster
TNI)

-Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo
Javanese
Akmil 1970
Infantry
9 xi 99 - 29 x 01 (23 months)
Commander, TNI Staff and Command School
The post was abolished on Oct. 29, 2001.

Inspector-General (Irjen TNI)

-Vice-Admiral Djaelani
?
Navy
14 vi 00 - 15 ii 01 (8 months)
Inspector-General of the Navy
Air Vice-Marshal Tamtama Ali
-Vice-Admiral Bernard Kent Sondakh
b. July 9, 1948, North Sulawesi,
Menadonese
Navy Academy 1970
Navy
15 ii 01 - 1 v 2002 (14.5 months)
Assistant for Operations to Navy Chief of
Staff
-Vice-Admiral Stanny [Stanley] Fofied
?
Navy
1 v 02 - (10 months)
Commander, Navy Educational Command,
2000

Assistant for General Planning (Asrenum)
to the TNI Commander-in-Chief

-Maj. Gen. Purwadi
Javanese
Akmil 1971
Cavalry
3 xii 99 - ?
Commander, Kodam III /Siliwangi
Maj. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah
-Vice-Admiral Slamet Subiyanto
Javanese
Navy
? - 3 ii 03
?

*Assistant for General Planning (Asrenum) to the
TNI Commander-in-Chief, continued*

-Vice-Admiral Djoko Sumarjono
Javanese
Navy
3 ii 03 –
Assistant for Security to Navy Chief of Staff

*Assistant for Intelligence (Asintel) to
Chief of the General Staff*

-Rear-Admiral Yoost Frederieck Mengko
Menadonese
Navy
? (by 19 vii 99) - 1 vii 02
Expert Staff Coordinator to Navy Chief of
Staff
-Brig. Gen. (Marines) Moch. Luthfie Witto
?
Marines
1 vii 02 – (8 months)
Director "C," BAIS

*Assistant for Operations (Asops) to Chief
of the General Staff*

-Maj. Gen. Adam Damiri
b. Nov. 20, 1949, Bandung, Sundanese
Akmil 1972
Infantry
c. 5 xi 99 – (39 months)
Commander, Kodam XI/Udayana
Maj. Gen. Endriartono Sutarto

*Assistant for Territorial Affairs (Aster) to
Chief of Territorial Affairs*

-Maj. Gen. Djoko Mulono
Javanese
Akmil 1970
Infantry
c. 2 x 98 - 15 vi 01 (32.5 months)
Assistant for Territorial Affairs to Army
Chief of Staff
Held by Military Chief of Territorial Staff Lt.
Gen. Agus Widjojo, 15 vi 01 - 29 x 01

*Assistant for Territorial Affairs (Aster) to Chief
of Territorial Affairs, continued*

-Maj. Gen. Sang Nyoman Suwisma
b. Mar. 10, 1949, Balinese
Akmil 1971
Infantry
c. 20 vi 01 – (20 months).

*Assistant for Personnel (Aspers) to Chief
of General Staff*

-Maj. Gen. Soeparto S.
b. Sept. 7, 1944, in Kudus, Javanese
AMN 1966
Infantry
14 viii 97 - 15 vi 01 (46 months)
Head of General Affairs, Secretariat,
Bakorstanas (Coordinating Body for
National Stability)
-Maj. Gen. Sutardjo
Mar. 16, 1945, Purworejo (Central Java),
Javanese
Akmil 1970
Infantry
15 vi 01 - 3 ii 03 (19.5 months)
Commander, Kodam II/Sriwijaya
-Maj. Gen. Prabowo Suharto
Javanese
Akmil 1972
Artillery
3 ii 03 – (1 month)
Director of Education, Army Education and
Training Command

*Assistant for Logistics (Aslog) to Chief of
General Staff*

-Maj. Gen. Tabrie
?
Akmil 1972
Infantry
c. 5 xi 99 - 1 vii 02 (32 months)
Head, TNI Supply Body (Babek TNI)
Maj. Gen. Makmun Basri

Assistant for Logistics (Aslog) to Chief of General Staff, continued

-Air Vice-Marshal Mburak Ginting
Karo Batak
Air Force
1 vii 02- (7 months)
Assistant for Communications and
Electronics to Military Chief of
General Staff

Assistant for Social Communications (Askomsos) to Chief of Territorial Affairs

-Maj. Gen. Yahya Satyawiria
Sundanese
Akmil 1971
Infantry
c. 5 xi 99 - 15 ii 01 (15.5 months)
Expert Staff for Domestic Politics to
Minister of Defense and Security
Maj. Gen. Sudi Silalahi

-Maj. Gen. Djibut Hindartono
Javanese
Akmil 1971
Infantry
15 ii 01 - (24.5 months)
Deputy Assistant for Territorial Affairs to
Military Chief of Territorial Staff

Head, BAIS TNI (Military Strategic Intelligence Body)

-Air Vice-Marshal Ian Santoso Perdanakusuma
b. July 17, 1948, Madurese
Air Force Academy 1970
Air Force
12 i 00 - (37.5 months)
Commander, Air Force Second Operational
Command
Lt. Gen. Tyasno Sudarto

Deputy Head, BAIS TNI (Military Strategic Intelligence Body)

-Maj. Gen. T. P. Sihombing
Toba Batak
AMN 1968
Intelligence/Infantry
c. 2 i 98 - 1 x 01 (45 months)
previously served as Danrem 174 Ambon
(May 93 to June 94)

-Maj. Gen. R. Eddy Firmanto
Javanese
Akmil 1972
Infantry
1 x 01 - (16 months)
Director, Directorate "A," BAIS

Central Executive Organs

Commander-General, Military Academy (Danjen Akmil)

-Air Vice-Marshal Chappy Hakim
b. Dec. 17, 1947 in Yogyakarta, Javanese
Air Force Academy 1971
Air Force
c. 14 vi 00 - c. 29 iv 02 (22.5 months)
Assistant for Personnel to Air Force Chief of
Staff
Vice-Admiral Bambang Surjanto

-Air Vice-Marshal Lambert F. Silooy
Menadonese
Air Force
c. 29 iv 02 - (10 months)
Assistant for Planning to Air Force Chief of
Staff

Commander-General, Military Staff and Command School (Sesko TNI)

-Lt. Gen. Djadja Suparman
b. Dec. 11, 1949, in Sukabumi, Sundanese
Akmil 1972
Infantry
c. 1 iii 00 - (36 months)
Commander, Army Strategic Reserve
Lt. Gen. Endriartono Sutarto

Head, Military Mental Upbuilding Center
(Pusbintal)

-Brig. Gen. Mismar Anas
Minangkabau
Akmil 1971
c. 16 ii 98 - ? xii 02 (58 months)
?

-Brig. Gen. Machfud H. W.
Javanese
Akmil 1972
Infantry
? xii 02 - (3.5 months)
Chief of Staff, Kodam VI/Tanjungpura

Head, Military Research and
Development Center (Puslitbang)

-Brig. Gen. A. Harsono
Javanese
Akmil ?
Infantry
11 iv 97 - 15 ii 01 (46 months)
Deputy Head, Research and Development
Center

-Brig. Gen. Idi Sanwardi
Sundanese
Akmil 1971
Artillery
15 ii 01 - (24.5 months)
Expert Staff for Economics and Finance to
the TNI Commander-in-Chief

Head, Military Center for History and
Tradition (Pusjarah)

-Brig. Gen. Sjaiful Islam
?
Akmil 1971
Infantry
c. 23 x 99 - 15 ii 01 (15.5 months)
Director for Mobilization and
Demobilization, Department of Defense
and Security

*Head, Military Center for History and Tradition
(Pusjarah), continued*

-Brig. Gen. Busri Boer
?
Akmil 1971
Engineers
15 ii 01 - (24.5 months)
Head, Army Mental Upbuilding Service

Head, Military Medical Center (Puskes)

-Brig. Gen. Dr. Krismanto Prawirosumarto
Javanese
Army Medical Corps.
c. 1 xi 00 - (28 months)
Head, Gatot Subroto Hospital
Rear-Admiral Dr. Harijanto Mahdi

Head, Military Police Center (Puspom)

-Maj. Gen. Djasri Marin
b. Sept. 30, 1948, in Payakumbuh, W.
Sumatra, Minangkabau
Akmil 1973
Military Police
19 x 98 - c. 15 ii 02 (40 months)
Deputy Head, TNI Military Police Center
-Maj. Gen. Sulaiman Ahmad Bakri
Acehnese
Akmil 1974
Military Police
14 iii 02 - (12.5 months)
with Lemhannas

Head, Military Information Center
(Puspen)

-Air Vice-Marshal Dian Graitto Usodo
b. Feb. 7, 1944, in Temanggung, Javanese
Air Force Academy 1968
Air Force
12 i 00 - c. 15 ii 02 (13 months)
Expert Staff of TNI Commander-in-Chief
Maj. Gen. Sudradjat

*Head, Military Information Center (Puspen),
continued*

- Maj. Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsuddin
 - b. Oct. 30, 1952, in Makassar, Makassarese
 - Akmil 1974
 - Infantry (Special Forces)
 - c. 15 ii 02 – (12.5 months)
 - Expert Staff Coordinator for the TNI
 - Commander-in-Chief

**Head, Military Legal Upbuilding Body
(Babinkum)**

- Maj. Gen. Timor P. Manurung
 - Batak
 - Akmil 1971
 - Ordnance
 - 15 vi 98 – 1 vii 02 (48.5 months)
 - Auditor-General of the TNI
- Brig. Gen. F. X. J. Sukiman
 - Javanese
 - Akmil 1973
 - Ordnance
 - Akmil 1973
 - 1 vii 02 – (8 months)
 - Deputy Head, Military Legal Upbuilding
Body

Head, Military Supply Body (Babek)

- Brig. Gen. Herman Ladjidja Djuni
 - Sundanese?
 - Akmil 1972
 - Infantry
 - c. 5 xi 99 - c. 15 ii 02 (27.5 months)
 - Officer seconded to Logistics Staff, TNI
Headquarters
 - Brig. Gen. Tabrie
- Brig. Gen. Amari
 - ?
 - Akmil 1973
 - Ordnance
 - c. 15 ii 02 – (12.5 months)
 - Officer seconded to Logistics Staff, TNI
Headquarters

Commander, Western Fleet

- Rear-Admiral Si Putu Ardana
 - Balinese
 - Navy
 - 6 vii 00 - 15 vi 01 (11.5 months)
 - Assistant for Planning to Navy Chief of
Staff
 - Rear-Admiral Indroko Sastrowirjono
- Rear-Admiral Djoko Sumaryono
 - b. July 14, 1951, in Bandung, Javanese
 - Navy Military Academy 1973
 - Navy
 - 15 vi 01 - 3 ii 03 (19.5 months)
 - Assistant for Security to Navy Chief of Staff
- Rear-Admiral Ali Mualimin Santoso
 - Javanese
 - Navy
 - 3 ii 03 – (1 month)
 - Senior Staff, Lemhannas

Commander, Eastern Fleet

- Rear-Admiral Adi Haryono
 - b. July 13, 1946, in Kediri, Javanese
 - Navy
 - 31 viii 99 - 15 vi 01 (21.5 months)
 - Deputy Commander, TNI Staff and Command
School
 - Rear-Admiral Edi Sujadi
- Rear-Admiral Sahroni Kasnadi
 - Javanese
 - Navy
 - 15 vi 01 - ?
 - Assistant for Planning and Budgeting to
Navy Chief of Staff
- Rear-Admiral I. W. R. Argawa
 - Balinese
 - Navy
 - ? -3 ii 03
 - Deputy Assistant for Operations to TNI
Chief of Genral Staff
- Rear-Admiral Slamet Subiyanto
 - Javanese
 - Navy
 - 3 ii 03 – (1 month)
 - Assistant for General Planning (Asrenum) to
the TNI Commander-in-Chief

**Head, National Air Defense Command
(Kohanudnas)**

- Air Vice-Marshal Wartoyo
Javanese
Air Force
1 xi 00 - 15 vi 01 (7.5 months)
Commander, Air Force Educational
Command
- Air Vice-Marshal Zeky Ambadar
b. Dec. 8, 1948, in Jakarta, Arab
Air Force Academy 1972
Air Force
15 vi 01 - 12 xi 02 (17 months)
Expert Staff for Economics and Finance to
the TNI Commander-in-Chief

Service Heads and Army Hierarchy

Army Chief of Staff

- Gen. Endriartono Sutarto
b. Apr. 29, 1947, Purworejo (Central Java),
Javanese
Akmil 1971
Infantry
9 x 00 - 3 vi 02 (20 months)
Deputy Army Chief of Staff
Gen. Tyasno Sudarto
- Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu
b. June 21, 1950, in Palembang, Palembang
Akmil 1974
Infantry
3 vi 02 - (9 months)
Commander, Kostrad

Navy Chief of Staff

- Admiral Indroko Sastrowiryono
b. April 10, 1947, Karanganyar (Central
Java), Javanese
Navy Academy 1971
Navy
9 x 00 - 1 v 02 (19 months)
Deputy Navy Chief of Staff
Admiral Achmad Sutjipto

Navy Chief of Staff, continued

- Admiral Bernard Kent Sondakh
b. July 9, 1948, N. Sulawesi, Menadonese
Navy Academy 1970
Navy
1 v 02 - (10 months)
Navy Inspector-General of the TNI
- Air Force Chief of Staff**
- Air Marshal Hanafie Asnan
b. Nov. 7, 1945, in Bangkalan, Madurese
Air Force Academy 1969
Air Force
29 vi 98 - 29 iv 02 (46 months)
Assistant for Logistics to Air Force Chief of
Staff

- Air Marshal Chappy Hakim
b. December 17, 1947, Yogyakarta, Javanese
Air Force Academy 1971
29 iv 02- (10 months)
Commander-General, TNI Academy

Commander of Marine Corps

- Maj. Gen. Harry Triono [Triyono]
b. Dec. 22, 1947, in Cepu, C. Java, Javanese
Navy Academy 1971
Marines
8 xii 99 - 15 xi 02 (35.5 months)
Chief of Staff, Marine Corps
Maj. Gen. Suharto
- Maj. Gen. TNI (Mars) Achmad Rifai
?
Navy Academy 1972
Marines
15 xi 02 - (3.5 months)
Chief of Staff, Marine Corps

Deputy Army Chief of Staff

-Lt. Gen. Kiki Syahnakri
b. 1947 in Karawang, Sundanese
Akmil 1971
Infantry
24 xi 00 - 3 v 02 (17 months)
Commander, Kodam IX/Udayana
Lt. Gen. Endriartono Sutarto
Held temporarily by Army Chief of Staff (3 v 02 - c. 1 vii 02)

-Lt. Gen. Sumarsono
Javanese
Akmil 1972
Infantry
c. 1 vii 02 - c. 3 ii 03 (7 months)
Chief of Staff, Kostrad

-Lt. Gen. Darsono
b. Dec. 29, 1948, in Tuban, Javanese
Akmil 1972
Infantry
c. 3 ii 03 - (1 month)
Chief of TNI's Education and Training
Command

Army Inspector-General

-Maj. Gen. Djoko Subroto
b. Jan. 19, 1947, in Kediri, Madurese
Akmil 1970
Infantry
c. 4 i 99 - c. 15 ii 02 (37.5 months)
Commander, Kodam V/Brawijaya
Maj. Gen. Nurdin Jusuf

-Maj. Gen. Ismed Yuzairi
b. Jan. 1, 1949, in Sawahlunto,
Minangkabau
Akmil 1971
Infantry
c. 15 ii 02 - 3 ii 03 (11.5 months)
Commander, Army Infantry Weapons Center

-Maj. Gen. Achmad Yahya
b. Oct. 11, 1948, Bangkalan, Madurese
Akmil 1971
Infantry
3 ii 03 - (1 month)
Commander, Kodam Jaya

Assistant for Security (Aspam)

-Maj. Gen. I Dewa Putu Rai
Balinese
Akmil 1971
Signal Corps
30 vi 00 - 3 ii 03 (31 months)
Head, Army Information Service
Maj. Gen. M. Noor Aman
We do not know who currently holds this position.

Assistant for Operations (Asops)

-Maj. Gen. Sjahrir M. S.
b. July 20, 1947, in Baturaja, Minangkabau
Akmil 1971
Infantry (Special Forces)
30 vi 00 - c. 27 x 01 (16 months)
Commander, Army Special Forces
Maj. Gen. Amir Sembiring

-Maj. Gen. Harry Kosasih
Sundanese
Akmil 1971
Infantry
c. 27 x 01 - c. 14 xi 02 (12.5 months)
Commander, First Infantry Division, Army
Strategic Reserve

-Maj. Gen. Hadi Waluyo
b. April 3, 1950, in Malang, Javanese
Akmil 1972
Infantry
c. 14 xi 02 - 3 ii 03 (2.5 months)
Commander, Kodam VI/Wirabuana

-Maj. Gen. Cornelis Simbolon
b. July 14, 1951, Pangurunan, N. Sumatra,
Toba Batak
Akmil 1973
Infantry
3 ii 03 - (1 month)
Commander, Kodam IV/Diponegoro

Assistant for Personnel (Aspers)

-Maj. Gen. Suprpto
 Javanese
 Akmil 1970
 Infantry
 c. 1 iii 00 – 15 vi 01 (15.5 months)
 Assistant for Territorial Affairs to Army
 Chief of Staff
 Maj. Gen. Sukardjo

-Maj. Gen. Mohamad Husni Thamrin Razak
 ?
 Akmil 1972
 Infantry
 15 vi 01 – (20.5 months)
 Expert Staff Coordinator for Army Chief of
 Staff

Assistant for Logistics (Aslog)

-Maj. Gen. Irvan Eddyson [Edison]
 b. Aug. 13, 1946, in Morotai, ?
 Akmil 1970
 Cavalry
 10 ix 99 - 15 vi 01 (20 months)
 Governor, Military Academy (Akmil)
 Maj. Gen. Wahidin Yusuf

-Maj. Gen. Maruto W. S.
 Javanese
 Akmil 1971
 Engineer
 15 vi 01 – (20.5 months)
 Director for Planning and Budget,
 Department of Defense

Assistant for Planning and Budget
 (Asrena)

-Maj. Gen. Sugiarto Maksum
 Javanese
 Akmil 1970
 c. 17 iii 98 - 3 v 02 (49.5 months)
 Deputy Assistant for Research and
 Development to Army Chief of Staff

Assistant for Planning and Budget (Asrena),
 continued

-Maj. Gen. Bambang Sutejo
 Javanese
 ?
 Engineers
 3 v 02 – (10 months)
 ?

Assistant for Territorial Affairs (Aster)

-Maj. Gen. Sang Nyoman Suwisma
 Balinese
 Akmil 1971
 Infantry (Special Forces)
 30 vi 00 - 15 vi 01 (11.5 months)
 Chief of Staff, Army Strategic Reserve
 (Kostrad)
 Maj. Gen. Saurip Kadi

-Maj. Gen. Arnold Rajagukguk
 Toba Batak
 Akmil 1972
 Infantry
 15 vi 01 – c. 14 xi 02 (17 months)
 Deputy Assistant for Territorial Affairs to
 Army Chief of Staff

-Maj. Gen. Sudibyo Tjiptonegoro
 Javanese
 Akmil 1972
 Artillery
 14 xi 02 - (3.5 months)
 Commander, Kodam II/Sriwijaya

Commander, Army Strategic Reserve
 (Kostrad)

-Lt. Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu
 b. June 21, 1950, in Palembang, Palembang
 Akmil 1974
 Infantry
 1 viii 00 – c. 1 vii 02 (23 months)
 Commander, Kodam Jaya
 Lt. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah

*Commander, Army Strategic Reserve (Kostrad),
continued*

-Lt. Gen. Bibit Waluyo
b. August 5, 1949, in Klaten, Javanese
Akmil 1972
Infantry
c. 1 vii 02 – (8 months)
Commander, Kodam Jaya

*Chief of Staff, Army Strategic Reserve
(Kostrad)*

-Maj. Gen. Songko Purnomo
Javanese
Akmil 1971
Infantry
c. 2 xii 00 - c. 15 ii 02 (14.5 months)
Commander, Kostrad Second Infantry
Division
Maj. Gen. Willem T. Da Costa

-Maj. Gen. Sumarsono
Javanese
Akmil 1972
Infantry
c. 15 ii 02 – c. 1 vii 02 (4.5 months)
Commander, Kodam IV/Diponegoro

-Maj. Gen. Andi Sjamsul Mappareppa
Buginese
Akmil 1973
Infantry
c. 1 vii 02 – (8 months)
Commander, Kostrad First Infantry
Division, Army Strategic Reserve

*Commander, First Infantry Division, Army
Strategic Reserve*

-Maj. Gen. Harry Kosasih
Sundanese
Akmil 1971
Infantry
14 vii 00 - 27 x 01 (15.5 months)
Maj. Gen. I. Gede Purnawa

*Commander, First Infantry Division, Army
Strategic Reserve , continued*

-Maj. Gen. Andi Sjamsul Mappareppa
Buginese
Akmil 1973
Infantry
27 x 01 – c. 1 vii 02 (8 months)
Chief of Staff, Kodam II/Sriwijaya

-Maj. Gen. Rudjiono
Javanese
Akmil 1973
Infantry
c. 1 vii 02 – (8 months)
Deputy Army Inspector-General to the Army
Chief of Staff

*Commander, Second Infantry Division,
Army Strategic Reserve*

-Maj. Gen. Achmad Djunaedi Sikki
b. Aug. 27, 1950, in Bone, S. Sulawesi,
Buginese
Akmil 1973
Infantry
26 i 01 - 1 x 01 (8 months)
Chief of Staff, Kostrad First Infantry
Division, Army Strategic Reserve
Maj. Gen. Mahidin Simbolon

-Maj. Gen. Djoko Santoso
b. Sept. 8, 1952, in Solo, Javanese
Akmil 1975
Infantry
1 x 01 – c. 1 vii 02 (9 months)
Chief of Staff, Kodam IV/Diponegoro

-Maj. Gen. Agustadi
Javanese
Akmil 1974
Infantry
c. 1 vii 02 - c. 3 ii 03 (7 months)
Chief of Staff, Kodam XVII/Trikora

-Maj. Gen. Erwin Sujono
b. Feb. 5, 1951, Bandung, Javanese
Akmil 1975
Infantry
c. 3 ii 03 - (1 month)
Chief of Staff, Kodam III/Siliwangi

Governor, General and Army Division,
Military Academy (Akmil)

- Maj. Gen. M. Noor Aman
Javanese
Akmil 1971
Intelligence
11 vii 00 - 9 viii 01 (12.5 months)
First Assistant (Security) to Army Chief of Staff
Maj. Gen. Sjamsul Ma'arif
- Maj. Gen. Iping Sumantri
Sundanese
Akmil 1971
Infantry
9 viii 01 - c. 15 ii 02 (6 months)
Deputy Governor, Akmil
- Maj. Gen. Prabowo Suharto
Javanese
Akmil 1972
Artillery
c. 15 ii 02 - 3 ii 03 (11.5 months)
with Lemhannas
- Maj. Gen. Yunus Palar
Menadonese
Akmil 1972
Infantry
3 ii 03 - (1 month)
Deputy Commander, Army Staff and
Command School (Seskoal)

Commander, Army Staff and Command
School (Seskoal)

- Maj. Gen. Suadi Atma
b. June 22, 1947, in South Kalimantan, ?
Akmil 1970
Infantry
28 i 01 - c. 1 vii 02 (17 months)
Deputy Commander-General, Military
Academy
Maj. Gen. Bibit Waluyo
- Maj. Gen. Willem Da Costa
April 13, 1949, in Kupang, West Timorese
Akmil 1971
Infantry
c. 1 vii 02 - (8 months)
Commander, Kodam IX/Udayana

Commander, Education and Training
Command (Kodiklat)

- Lt. Gen. Amir Sembiring
b. Aug. 3, 1947, in Pancur Batu, North
Sumatra, Karo Batak
Akmil 1970
Infantry
5 vii 00 - 1 x 01 (15 months)
Assistant for Operations to Army Chief of
Staff
Maj. Gen. Sumardi
- Lt. Gen. Sjahrir M. S.
b. July 20, 1947, in Baturaja, Minangkabau
Akmil 1971
1 x 01 - c. 1 vii 02 (9 months)
Assistant for Operations to Army Chief of
Staff
- Lt. Gen. Darsono
b. Dec. 29, 1948, in Tuban, Javanese
Akmil 1972
Infantry
c. 1 vii 02 - 3 ii 03 (7 months)
Commander, Kodam III /Siliwangi
- Lt. Gen. Hadi Waluyo
b. April 3, 1950, in Malang, Javanese
Akmil 1972
Infantry
3 ii 03 - (1 month)
Infantry Assistant for Operations to the
Army

Commander, Infantry Weapons Center
(Pussenif)

- Maj. Gen. Ismed Yuzairi
b. Jan. 1, 1949, in Sawahlunto,
Minangkabau
Akmil 1971
Infantry
14 vi 00 - c. 15 ii 02 (20 months)
Commander, Army Territorial Center
Maj. Gen. Abdul Rahman Gaffar

*Commander, Infantry Weapons Center (Pussenif),
continued*

-Maj. Gen. Songko Purnomo
Javanese
Akmil 1971
Infantry
c. 15 ii 02 – (12.5 months)
Chief of Staff, Army Strategic Reserve
(Kostrad)

Commander, Army Territorial Center

-Maj. Gen. Max Markus Tamaela
Ambonese
Akmil 1970
Engineers
14 vi 00 - 15 ii 01 (8 months)
Commander, Kodam XVI/Pattimura
Maj. Gen. Ismed Juzairi
-Maj. Gen. Hadi Waluyo
b. April 3, 1950, in Malang, Javanese
Akmil 1972
Infantry
15 ii 01 - 15 vi 01 (4 months)
Deputy Assistant for Operations to Army
Chief of Staff

-Maj. Gen. Sabam Saragih
Batak
Akmil 1970
Infantry
15 vi 01 - c. 15 ii 02 (8 months)
Deputy Inspector-General to the Army Chief
of Staff

-Maj. Gen. Bambang Widodojanto
Javanese
Akmil 1972
Infantry
c. 15 ii 02 – 1 vii 02 (4.5 months)
Deputy Commander, Army Territorial
Center

-Maj. Gen. Mustopo
Javanese
Akmil 1972
Infantry (Special Forces)
1 vii 02 – 3 ii 03 (7 months)
Commander, Kodam XVI/Pattimura

Commander, Army Territorial Center, continued

-Mahidin Simbolon
b. 1951 in Samosir, North Sumatra, Toba
Batak
Akmil 1974
Infantry (Special Forces)
c. 3 ii 03 – (1 month)
Commander, Kodam XI/Trikora

*Commander, Special Forces Command
(Kopassus)*

-Maj. Gen. Amirul Isnaeni
b. March 29, 1952, in Malang, Madurese
Akmil 1975
Infantry (Special Forces)
14 vi 00 – c. 1 vii 02 (24.5 months)
Deputy Assistant for Security to Army Chief
of Staff
Maj. Gen. Sjahrir M. S.
-Maj. Gen. Sriyanto
Javanese
Akmil 1974
Infantry (Special Forces)
c. 1 vii 02 – (8 months)
Deputy Commander-General, Kopassus

*Commander, Presidential Security Guard
(Paspampres)*

-Maj. Gen. Amir Tohar
?
Akmil 1974
Ordnance
c. 6 xi 00 – ? viii 01 (9.5 months)
Commander, Intelligence Task Force, BAIS TNI
Maj. Gen. I Putu Wingarta Sastra
-Maj. Gen. Nono Sampono
Javanese
Navy Academy 1976
20 viii 01 – (18.5 months)
Deputy Commander, Presidential Security
Squad

Regional Military Leaders [Commanders]

Kodam (Military Region Command)

I/Bukit Barisan (North Sumatra)

Commander, Kodam I/Bukit Barisan

-Maj. Gen. I Gede Purnama

b. March 29, 1948, in Bali, Balinese

Akmil 1971

Infantry

18 vii 00 - c, 15 ii 02 (19 months)

Commander, First Infantry Division, Army
Strategic Reserve

Maj. Gen. Affandi

-Maj. Gen. Idris Gassing

b. May 1951, in Makassar, Makassarese

Akmil 1974

Infantry (Special Forces)

c. 15 ii 02 - 7 x 02 (7.5 months)

Inspector of Material, Department of
Defense

-Maj. Gen. Tri Tamtomo

b. Feb. 15, 1951, in Bogor, Javanese?

Akmil 1974

Infantry

7 x 02 - (5 months)

Chief of Staff, Kodam Jaya Garrison

Chief of Staff, Kodam I/Bukit Barisan

-Brig. Gen. Asril Hamzah Tandjung

Mandailing Batak

Akmil 1973

Infantry

c. 5 xi 99 - 15 ii 01 (15.5 months)

Attended course at National Resiliency
Institute

Brig. Gen. A. E. H. Rajagukguk

-Brig. Gen. Usman Basjah

?

Akmil 1972

Infantry

15 ii 01 - 1 x 01 (7.5 months)

Officer seconded to TNI Headquarters

Chief of Staff, Kodam I/Bukit Barisan, continued

-Brig. Gen. Zamroni

Sundanese

Akmil 1975

Infantry (Special Forces)

1 x 01 - (17 months)

served simultaneously as Dirlat Kodiklat

AD and Commander, Operations

Implementation Commander (Kolakops)
in Aceh

Korem 011 Lilawangsa (Lho Seumawe)

-Col. Mohamad Jahja

Akmil 1974

Infantry

c. 26 ix 2000 - (4 months)

Assistant for Intelligence, Kodam I Bukit
Barisan

February 5, 2002: Korem 011 placed under new
Kodam I Iskandar Muda

Korem 012 Teuku Umar (Banda Aceh)

-Col. Sjarifuddin Tippe

b. June 7, 1953, Sinjai, S. Sulawesi, Buginese

Akmil 1975

Engineers

8 v 99 - (21 months)

Commander, Army Engineers Education
Center

February 5, 2002: Korem 012 placed under new
Kodam I Iskandar Muda

Korem 022 Pantai Timur (Pematang Siantar)

-Col. Bambang Slamet Ismojo

Javanese

Akmil 1974

Cavalry

? (by 2 vi 2000) - c. 18 iv 01

-Col. Hendra Rizal

Akmil 1976

Infantry

c. 18 iv 01 - 27 iv 02

Commander, Candradimuka Regiment

*Korem 022 Pantai Timur (Pematang Siantar),
continued*

-Col. Zulkarnaen Pane
Toba Batak
Akmil 1975
Infantry
27 iv 02 - ? (7 months)
Assistant for Intelligence, Kodam III/
Siliwangi

Korem 023 Pantai Barat (Sibolga)

-Col. Adrianus Taroreh
b. Aug. 1, 1951, Tomohon, Menadonese
Akmil 1974
Infantry
c. 26 ix 2000 - 24 iv 01 (18 months)
Commander, Army Infantry Education
Center
-Col. Markus Kusnowo
Javanese
Akmil 1975
Infantry
24 iv 01 - ?
Commander, Core Regiment, Kodam III
Siliwangi
-Col. Agung Revulton
Akmil 1977
? (as of 29 vii 02) -
Commander, 18th Infantry Brigade, Kostrad

Korem 031 Wirabima (Pekanbaru)

-Col. Mazni Harun
b. July 13, 1949, Agam, Minangkabau
Akmil 1974
Artillery
3 v 99 - 3 v 01 (24 months)
Assistant for Intelligence, Kodam Jaya
-Col. Darmawi Chaidir
Akmil 1974
Infantry
3 v 01 - (23 months)
?

Korem 032 Wirabraja (Padang)

-Col. Soeprijanto
Javanese
Akmil 1974
Infantry
c. 26 ix 2000 - (25 months)
Director for Functional Development, Army
Intelligence Center

Kodam II/Sriwijaya (South Sumatra)

Commander Kodam II/Sriwijaya
-Maj. Gen. Sutardjo
b. in Purworejo, Javanese
Akmil 1970
Infantry
18 xi 99 - 15 vi 01 (20 months)
Commander, Army Infantry Weapons Center
Maj. Gen. Affandi
-Maj. Gen. Sudibyo Tjipto Negoro
Javanese
Akmil 1972
Artillery
15 vi 01 - ? xii 02 (18 months)
Deputy Commander, Army Education and
Training Command
-Maj. Gen. Sunarso
Javanese
Akmil 1973
Artillery
? xii 02 - (2.5 months)
Chief of Staff, Kodam II/Sriwijaya

Chief of Staff, Kodam II/Sriwijaya

-Brig. Gen. Sjamsul Mappareppa
Buginese
Akmil 1973
Infantry
14 vi 00 - 1 x 01 (15.5 months)
Chief of Staff, Kostrad First Infantry
Division
Brig. Gen. M. Ansjori Deas

Chief of Staff, Kodam II/Sriwijaya, continued

-Brig. Gen. Sunarso

Javanese

Akmil 1973

Artillery

1 x 01 - ? xii 02 (14.5 months)

Officer seconded to Territorial Staff, Army
Headquarters

-Brig. Gen. Sjahrial B. P. Peliung

Minangkabau

Akmil 1973

Infantry

? xii 02 - (2.5 months)

Officer seconded to Army Education and
Training Command (Pabanlat Kodiklat
AD)

Korem 041 Garuda Mas (Bengkulu)

-Col. Wilono Djatiwijono

Javanese

Akmil 1975

Infantry

8 xi 2000 - ?

Commander, Army Intelligence Education
Center

-Col. Mulhim Asyrof

Akmil 1976

Engineers

? - 13 xi 02

?

Korem 042 Garuda Putih (Jambi)

-Col. Juktayana Tjitra Witjaksana

Akmil 1973

Infantry

30 x 2000 - 13 xi 02 (25 months)

Coordinating Officer, Expert Staff, Army
Information Service

-Col. Mulhim Asyrof

Akmil 1976

Engineers

13 xi 02 - (1.5 months)

Korem 043 Garuda Hitam (Lampung)

-Col. Mudjiono

b. April 10, 1951, Yogyakarta. Javanese

Akmil 1975

Infantry

22 v 99 - 22 iv 02 (35 months)

Deputy Commander, Korem 164 Dili

-Col. Chairuddin Azis

B. Jun. 8, 1951, Padang. Minangkabau

Akmil 1975

Infantry

22 iv 02 - (8 months)

Assistant for Territorial Affairs, Kostrad

Korem 044 Garuda Dempo (Palembang)

-Col. Djoko Susilo Utomo

b. Nov. 9, 1952, Bandung. Javanese

Akmil 1975?

Infantry

? v 2000 - 12 iv 02 (23 months)

Commander, Army Intelligence Education
Center

-Col. Djafar Sofyan

Akmil 1975

Engineers

12 iv 02 - (8.5 months)

Assistant for Planning, Kodam
V/Brawijaya*Kodam III/Siliwangi (West Java)*

Commander, Kodam III/Siliwangi

-Maj. Gen. Zainuri Hasyim

b. July 22, 1946, in Malang, Javanese

Akmil 1971

Infantry

13 vii 00 - 24 vi 01 (11.5 months)

Commander, Kodam VI/Tanjungpura

Maj. Gen. Slamet Supriyadi

-Maj. Gen. Darsono

b. Dec. 29, 1948, in Tuban, Javanese

Akmil 1972

Infantry

24 vi 01 - c. 1 vii 02 (12 months)

Chief of Staff, Kodam III /Siliwangi

Commander, Kodam III/Siliwangi, continued

-Maj. Gen. Iwan Ridwan Sulandjana
b. March 1, 1951, in Bogor, Sundanese
Akmil 1974
Infantry
c. 1 vii 02 – (8 months)
Chief of Staff, Kodam III /Siliwangi

Chief of Staff Kodam III/Siliwangi

-Brig. Gen. Darsono
b. Dec. 29, 1948, in Tuban (Central Java),
Javanese
Akmil 1972
Infantry
3 vi 98 - 15 vi 01 (36.5 months)
Commander, Korem 064 Serang

-Brig. Gen. Iwan Ridwan Sulandjana
b. March 1, 1951, in Bogor, Sundanese
Akmil 1974
Infantry
15 vi 01 – c. 1 vii 02 (12.5 months)
Officer seconded to the Operations Staff,
Army Headquarters

-Brig. Gen. Erwin Sujono
b. Feb. 5, 1951, in Bandung, Javanese
Akmil 1975
Infantry
1 vii 02 - c. 3 ii 03 (7 months)
Chief of Staff, First Infantry Division, Army
Strategic Reserve

-Brig. Gen. Mulyono
Javanese
Akmil 1974
Infantry
c. 3 ii 03 – (1 month)
Commander, Korem 061 Bogor

Korem 061 Suriakencana (Bogor)

-Col. Mulyono
Javanese
Akmil 1974
Infantry
16 i 2001 - c. 6 ii 03 (25 months)
Commander, Core Regiment, Kodam III/
Siliwangi

Korem 062 Tarumanegara (Garut)

-Col. Burhanurdin Amin
?
Akmil 1976
Infantry
c. 26 ix 2000 - ?
Assistant for Intelligence, Army Strategic
Reserve

-Col. Osaka Meliala
b. Mar. 7, 1953, North Sumatra, Karo Batak
Akmil 1976
Artillery
? (by 26 vii 02) -
Assistant for Planning, First Infantry
Division, Kostrad

Korem 063 Sunan Gunung Jati (Cirebon)

-Col. Mochamad Irianto
b. Jan. 31, 1951, Sumenep, Madurese
Akmil 1974
Infantry
c. 15 iv 2000 - c. 30 x 02 (28.5 months)
Commander, Core Regiment, Kodam Jaya

-Col. Imam Santoso
Javanese?
Akmil 15 1975
Infantry
6 ix 02 - (5 months)

Korem 064 Maulana Yusuf (Serang)

-Col. Bambang Sukresna
Javanese
Akmil 1974
Infantry
c. 26 ix 2000 - (27 months)
Assistant for Planning, Kodam II/Sriwijaya

Kodam IV/Diponegoro (Central Java)

Commander, Kodam IV/Diponegoro

-Maj. Gen. Sumarsono

Javanese

Akmil 1972

Infantry

10 vii 00 - c. 15 ii 02 (19 months)

Deputy Assistant for Personnel to Army
Chief of Staff

Maj. Gen. Bibit Walujo

-Maj. Gen. Cornelis Simbolon

b. July 14, 1951, Pangurunan, N. Sumatra,
Toba Batak

Akmil 1973

Infantry

c. 15 ii 02 - c. 3 ii 03 (12 months)

Deputy Assistant for Operations to Army
Chief of Staff

-Maj. Gen. Amirul Isnaeni

March 29, 1951, in Malang, Madurese

Akmil 1975

Infantry (Special Forces)

c. 3 ii 03 - (1 month)

Commander, Kodam VI/Wirabuana

Chief of Staff, Kodam IV/Diponegoro

-Brig. Gen. Djoko Santoso

b. September 8, 1952, in Solo, Javanese

Akmil 1975

Infantry

14 vi 00 - 1 x 01 (15.5 months)

Deputy Assistant for Social
Communications to Chief of Territorial
Staff

Brig. Gen. Songko Purnomo

-Brig. Gen. Muhammad Ali Fathan

Javanese

Akmil 1972

Engineers

1 x 01 - c. 3 ii 03 (16 months)

Expert Staff for Economic Affairs to Army
Chief of Staff*Chief of Staff, Kodam IV/Diponegoro, continued*

-Brig. Gen. Salim Mengga

?

Akmil 1974

Cavalry

c. 3 ii 03 - (1 month)

Commander, Army Cavalry Weapons Center

Korem 071 Wijayakusuma (Purwokerto)

-Col. Supiadin Yusuf A. S.

Akmil 1975

Infantry

27 x 2000 - 12 v 01 (7.5 months)

Assistant for Operations, Kodam IV/
Diponegoro

-Col. Mufad Santoso

Akmil 1973

Engineers

12 v 01 - (19.5 months)

Staff, Kodam IV/Diponegoro

Korem 072 Pamungkas (Yogyakarta)

-Col. Bambang Suherman

Javanese

Akmil 1973

Infantry

3 i 2000 - 17 v 02 (28.5 months)

-Col. Suwarno

Javanese

Akmil 1977

Cavalry

17 v 02 - (7.5 months)

Personal Secretary, Army Chief of Staff

Korem 073 Makutarama (Salatiga)

-Col. Adji Wijono

Javanese

Akmil 1974

Infantry

27 viii 2000 - (28 months)

Assistant for Territorial Affairs, Kodam
IV/Diponegoro?

Korem 074 Warastratama (Solo)

-Col. Karsadi
b. March 17, 1952, Pematang, Javanese
Akmil 1974
Infantry
21 i 2000 - (as of 9 iii 02) ?
Commander, Core Regiment, Kodam IV/
Diponegoro

-Col. Wibowo Ms.
Javanese
Akmil 1975
Infantry
? (by 12 vii 01) - ? v 02
?

-Col. Sarining Setyo Utomo
Javanese
Akmil 1976
Infantry
? v 02 - (8 months)
?

Kodam V/Brawijaya (East Java)

Commander, Kodam V/Brawijaya

-Maj. Gen. Sudi Silalahi
b. July 13, 1949, in Pematang Siantar, Toba
Batak

Akmil 1972
Infantry
16 xi 99 - 1 x 01 (22.5 months)
Assistant for Social Communications to
Chief of Territorial Staff
Maj. Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu

-Maj. Gen. Achmad Djunaedi Sikki
b. Aug. 27, 1950, in Bone, S. Sulawesi,
Buginese
Akmil 1973
Infantry
1 x 01 - (17 months)
Commander, Second Infantry Division, Army
Strategic Reserve

Chief of Staff, Kodam V/Brawijaya

-Brig. Gen. Djoko Setijono
b. Tulungagung (East Java), Javanese
Akmil 1974
Infantry
14 vi 00 - 1 vii 02 (24.5 months)
Adjutant to President Abdurrachman Wahid
Brig. Gen. Sudibyo Tjiptonegoro

-Brig. Gen. Suhartono
Javanese
Akmil 1975
Infantry
1 vii 02 - (8 months)

Korem 081 Dhirot Saha Jaya (Madiun)

-Col. Mochamad Ibnu Hadjar
Akmil 1973
Infantry
c. 11 ii 2000 - c. 9 v 01 (15 months)

-Col. Djamhur Suhana
Sundanese
Akmil 1975
Cavalry
c. 9 v 01 - (19.5 months)
Commander, Cavalry Education Center

Korem 082 Citra Panca Yudha Jaya
(Mojokerto)

-Col. Tris Suryawan Adiwijaya
b. W. Java, Sundanese
Akmil 1973
Infantry
c. 26 x 2000 - c. 9 iv 01 (6.5 months)
Assistant for Territorial Affairs, Kodam V/
Briwijaya

-Col. Eko Irianto
Akmil 1974
Infantry
c. 9 iv 01 - 7 v 02 (11 months)
Inspector, Kodam III/Siliwangi

*Korem 082 Citra Panca Yudha Jaya (Mojokerto),
continued*

-Col. Sukasmono
Javanese
Akmil 1976
Engineers
7 v 02 - (8 months)
Assistant for Logistics, Kodam V/
Brawijaya

Korem 083 Baladhika Jaya (Malang)

-Col. Suryjo Gino
Javanese
Akmil 1976
Infantry
30 iv 99 - ?
-Col. Sugeng Hariyadi
Javanese
Akmil 1975
Artillery
? (by 10 vii 01) - 10 ix 02
-Col. Hadi Lukmono
b. Oct. 9, 1954, Pati, Javanese
Akmil 1977
Artillery
10 ix 02 - (3.5 months)
Commander, Artillery Education Center

Korem 084 Bhaskara Jaya (Surabaya)

-Col. Bambang Suranto
b. Oct. 6, 1952, Javanese
Akmil 1974
Infantry
11 ii 2000 - ?
Commander, Korem 081 Madiun
-Col. Zulkarnaen Usman
Akmil 1975
Infantry
? - 13 ix 01
?

Korem 084 Bhaskara Jaya (Surabaya), continued

-Col. Soedarsono
b. Aug. 18, 1949, Yogyakarta, Javanese
Akmil 1973
Infantry
13 ix 01 - (15.5 months)
Assistant for Territorial Affairs, Kodam
V/Brawijaya

Kodam VI/Tanjungpura (Kalimantan)

Commander, Kodam VI/Tanjungpura
-Maj. Gen. Djoko Besariman
Javanese
Akmil 1970
Engineers
14 vi 00 - 15 vi 01 (12 months)
Commander, Army Staff and Command
School
Maj. Gen. Zainuri Hasjim
-Maj. Gen. Hadi Waluyo
Javanese
Akmil 1972
Infantry
15 vi 01 - 14 xi 02 (17 months)
Commander, Army Territorial Center
-Maj. Gen. Arnold Rajagukguk
Toba Batak
Akmil 1972
Infantry
14 xi 02 - (3.5 months)
Assistant for Territorial Affairs to Army
Chief of Staff
Chief of Staff, Kodam VI/Tanjungpura
-Brig. Gen. Azrai Kasim
b. in Padang, Minangkabau
Akmil 1971
Infantry
14 vi 00 - 1 x 01 (15.5 months)
Chief, TNI Center for Command and
Guidance
Brig. Gen. Yudo Wibowo

Chief of Staff, Kodam VI/Tanjungpura, continued

-Brig. Gen. Machfud H. W.

Javanese

Akmil 1972

Infantry

1 x 01 - (17 months)

Deputy Assistant for Personnel to Army

Chief of Staff

*Korem 091 Aji Suryanatakusuma
(Balikpapan)*

-Col. Tri Subagio

Javanese

Akmil 1973

Infantry

c. 25 i 2000 - 3 v 02 (27 months)

-Col. Hotma Marbun

Toba Batak

Akmil 1977

Infantry

3 v 02 - (8 months)

Commander, Core Regiment, Kodam VI

Tanjungpura

Korem 101 Antasari (Banjarmasin)

-Col. Efrizal Ramli

Akmil 1974

Infantry

c. 12 iv 2000 - c. 20 iv 01 (10 months)

Director for Development, Army Infantry

Weapons Center

-Col. Sudarmaidy S.

Akmil 1974

Infantry

c. 20 iv 01 - (20 months)

Korem 102 Panju Panjung (Palangka Raya)

-Col. Sihono

b. Dec. 28, 1950, Sukoharjo, Javanese

Akmil 1973

Engineers

25 i 2000 -

Commander, Training Center for Military

Teachers

*Korem 102 Panju Panjung (Palangka Raya),
continued*

-Col. Hatta Syafrudin

Akmil 1976

Infantry

? (by 8 viii 02) - (8 months)

*Korem 121 Alambhana Wana Wai
(Pontianak)*

-Col. Sumurung Simanjuntak

Toba Batak

Akmil 1975

Infantry

12 x 2000 - (3.5 months)

Assistant for Logistics, Kodam

IV/Diponegoro

-Col. Marciano Norman Sasono

Javanese

Akmil 1978

Cavalry

? (by 3 v 02) -

*Kodam VII/Wirabuana (Sulawesi)
Commander, Kodam VII/Wirabuana*

-Maj. Gen. Achmad Yahya

b. Oct. 11, 1948, in Bangkalan (East Java),
Madurese

Akmil 1971

Infantry

3 viii 00 - c. 1 vii 02 (23 months)

Expert Staff Coordinator to Army Chief of
Staff

Maj. Gen. Slamet Kirbiantoro

-Maj. Gen. Amirul Isnaeni

b. March 29, 1951, in Malang (East Java),
Madurese

Akmil 1975

Infantry (Special Forces)

c. 1 vii 02 - 3 ii 03 (7 months)

Commander-General, Army Special Forces

-Maj. Gen. Suprpto

Javanese

Akmil 1974

Infantry

3 ii 03 - (1 month)

Chief of Staff, Kodam VII/Wirabuana

Chief of Staff, Kodam VII/Wirabuana

-Brig. Gen. Mustopo
 Javanese
 Akmil 1972
 Infantry (Special Forces)
 c. 30 vii 00 - 15 vi 01 (10.5 months)
 Officer seconded to Logistics Staff, Army
 Headquarters
 Brig. Gen. Mohamad Husni Thamrin Razak

-Brig. Gen. Darsup Yusuf
 Sundanese
 Akmil 1972
 Infantry
 15 vi 01 - c. 15 ii 02 (8 months)
 Expert Staff on State Defense and Security
 Systems Management to Army Chief of
 Staff

-Brig. Gen. Suprpto
 Javanese
 Akmil 1974
 Infantry
 c. 15 ii 02 - 3 ii 03 (12 months)
 Chief of Staff, Second Infantry Division,
 Army Startegic Reserve

-Brig. Gen. Muslihan Sulchan
 ?
 Akmil 1974
 Artillery
 3 ii 03 - (1 month)
 Deputy Commander, Army Territorial
 Center

Korem 131 Santiago (Manado)

-Col. Manahan Rumahorbo
 Toba Batak
 Akmil 1974
 Infantry
 c. 25 x 2000 - (26 months)
 Commander, Core Regiment, Kodam VII/
 Wirabuana

Korem 132 Tadulako (Palu)

-Col. Hamdan Z. Nasution
 Mandailing Batak
 Akmil 1974
 Infantry
 10 iii 2000 - (10.5 months)
 -Col. Suwahyuhadji
 Akmil 1976
 Infantry
 ? (by 9 vi 01) -

Korem 141 Toddopuli (Watambone)

-Col. Nasib Alamsyah
 b. Jan. 19, 1950, Tarakan
 Akmil 1973
 Infantry
 29 v 2000 - c. 1 v 02 (23 months)
 Officer seconded to Social Communications Staff,
 Armed Forces' Headquarters
 -Col. Rahmat Budianto
 Javanese
 Akmil 1976?
 Infantry
 c. 1 v 02 - (8 months)
 Assistant for Operations, Kodam
 V/Brawijaya

Korem 142 Taroada Tarogaru (Pare Pare)

-Col. Soeharnanto
 Javanese
 Akmil 1974
 Engineers
 ? (by 13 vi 2000) -

Korem 143 Haluoleo (Kendari)

-Col. Makmursyah
 Akmil 1973
 Infantry
 ? (by 22 vi 2000) -
 Seconded to Army Territorial Center
 -Col. Muhaimin?
 ? - c. 7 i 03

Korem 143 Haluoleo (Kendari), continued

-Col. Inf. Nanang Djuana Priadi
Sundanese
Akmil 1977
Infantry
C. 7 i 03 - (1 month)

Kodam XVII/ Trikora (Irian Barat and Maluku)

Commander, Kodam XVII /Trikora (Irian Barat)

-Maj. Gen. Mahidin Simbolon
b. 1951, in Samosir, Toba Batak
Akmil 1974
Infantry (Army Special Forces)
22 i 01 - 3 ii 03 (24 months)
Commander, Second Infantry Division, Army Strategic Reserve
Maj. Gen. Tonny Anton Rompis

-Maj. Gen. Nurdin Zaenal
b. May 4, 1950, Bandung, Sundanese
Akmil 1974
Infantry
3 ii 03 - (1 month)
Chief of Staff, Kodam XVII/Trikora

Chief of Staff, Kodam XVII/Trikora

-Brig. Gen. Karel Albert Ralahalu
b. in Tanjung Alang, Maluku, Ambonese
Akmil 1972
Infantry
14 vi 00 - 15 ii 01 (8 months)
Officer seconded to Territorial Staff, Army Headquarters
Brig. Gen. M. Idris Gassing
-Brig. Gen. Agustadi S. Purnomo
Javanese
Akmil 1974
Infantry
15 ii 01 - 1 vii 02 (4.5 months)
Officer seconded to Army Headquarters

Chief of Staff, Kodam XVII/Trikora, continued

-Brig. Gen. Nurdin Zaenal
b. May 4, 1950, Bandung, Sundanese
Akmil 1974
Infantry
1 vii 02 - 3 ii 03 (7 months)
Deputy Assistant for Security to Army Chief of Staff

-Brig. Gen. Getson Manurung
Batak
Akmil 1974
Infantry
3 ii 03 - (1 month)
Officer seconded to Operations Staff, Army Headquarters

Korem 171 Praja Vira Tama (Sorong)

-Col. Mangasa R. Saragih
Simalungun Batak
Akmil 1974
Infantry
c. 1 xi 2000 - (25 months)
Assistant for Intelligence, Kodam VIII/Trikora

Korem 172 Praja Vira Yakthi (Abepura)

-Col. S. K. Ginting Munthe
Karo Batak
Akmil 1973
Infantry
? (by 1 x 2000) - 21 iv 01
-Col. Bambang Sumarno
Javanese
Akmil 1975?
Infantry
21 iv 01 - ?
Staff, Military Headquarters
-Col. Agus Muljadi
Javanese
Akmil 1975
Infantry
? (by 3 vii 02) -
?

Korem 173 Praja Vira Braja (Biak)

-Col. F. X. Agus Edyono

Javanese

Akmil 1973

Infantry

? (by vii 98) - (as of 3 vi 01) - ?

-Col. Soehardi P. D.

Javanese

Akmil 1974

Infantry

? (by 28 viii 01) - c. 15 viii 02

-Col. Tri Usadi Setyoko

Javanese

Akmil 1974

Infantry

c. 15 viii 02 - (5 months)

Commander, Core Regiment, Kodam
III/Siliwangi

*Kodam XVI/Pattimura (Maluccas and
North Maluccas)*

Commander, Kodam XVI/Pattimura

-Brig. Gen. I Made Yasa

b. Nov. 11, 1950, in Jembrana, Balinese

Akmil 1973

Infantry

14 vi 00 - 15 vi 01 (12 months)

Officer seconded to Army Headquarters

Brig. Gen. Max Marcus Tamaela

-Brig. Gen. Mustopo

Javanese

Akmil 1972

Infantry (Army Special Forces)

15 vi 01 - ? v 02 (11 months)

Chief of Staff, Kodam VII/Wirabuana

-Maj. Gen. Joko Santoso

simultaneously Commander of Security

Restoration Operations Command

(Koopslihkam) in Maluccas and North

Maluccas

b. Sept. 8, 1952, in Solo, Javanese

Akmil 1975

Infantry

? v 02 - 3 ii 03 (8.5 months)

Commander, Second Infantry Division, Army
Strategic Command

Commander, Kodam XVI/Pattimura, continued

-Maj. Gen. Agustadi S. Purnomo

Javanese

Akmil 1974

Infantry

3 ii 03 - (1 month)

Commander, Kostrad Second Infantry
Division

Chief of Staff, Kodam XVI/Pattimura

-Col. Syarifuddin Sumah

b. Mar. 16, 1950, Manado, Gorontaloese?

Akmil 1973

Infantry

c. 1 xi 00 - 3 ii 03 (27 months)

Commander, Korem 041 Bengkulu

Col. Agus Suyitno

?

*Kodam IX/Udayana (Balie, East and
West Nusatenggara)*

Commander, Kodam IX/Udayana

-Maj. Gen. Willem T. Da Costa

b. April 13, 1949, in Kupang, West Timorese

Akmil 1971

Infantry

c. 6 xi 00 - c. 1 vii 02 (20 months)

Chief of Staff, Army Strategic Reserve

Maj. Gen. Kiki Syahnakri

-Maj. Gen. Agus Suyitno

b. March 23, 1951, in Bojonegoro, Javanese

Akmil 1973

Infantry

c. 1 vii 02 - (8 months)

Chief of Staff, Kodam IX/Udayana

Chief of Staff, Kodam IX/Udayana

-Brig. Gen. Agus Suyitno

b. March 23, 1951, in Bojonegoro, Javanese

Akmil 1973

Infantry

c. 1 xi 00 - c. 1 vii 02 (20 months)

Chief of Staff, Kodam XVI/Pattimura

Brig. Gen. Mahidin Simbolon

Chief of Staff, Kodam IX/Udayana, continued

-Brig. Gen. T. H. Sinambela
b. in Medan, Toba Batak
Akmil 1972
Infantry
c. 1 vii 02 – (8 months)
Officer seconded to Territorial Staff, Army
Headquarters

Korem 161 Wirasakti (Kupang)

-Col. Budi Heriyanto
Javanese
Akmil 1974
Infantry
2 x 2000 - 2 x 01 (12 months)
Assistant for Operations, Kodam
IX/Udayana
-Col. Muswarno Moesanip
Akmil 1975
Infantry
2 x 01 - ?
?

Korem 162 Wirabhakti (Mataram)

-Col. Suseno Yudoprawiro
Javanese
Akmil 1973
Infantry
31 x 2000 - (26 months)
Inspector of Personnel, Army Inspectorate-
General

Korem 163 Worasatya (Denpasar)

-Col. Endang Suwarya
Sundanese
Akmil 1973
Infantry
1 xi 2000 - 22 iii 01 (5 months)
Officer seconded to Operations Staff, Armed
Forces Headquarters

Korem 163 Worasatya (Denpasar), continued

-Col. Amin Syamsuddin
b. Nov. 17, 1950, Banyumas, Javanese
Akmil 1975
Artillery
16 iv 01 - ?
?
-Col. Sabar Yudo Suroso
Javanese
Akmil ?
Artillery
? (by 26 i 02) - c. ? v 02)
Commander, 1st Artillery Regiment, Kostrad
-Col. Hotmangaraja Panjaitan
Toba Batak
Akmil 1977
Infantry
c. ? v 02 - (8 months)
Commander, Group II, Special Forces

Korem 164 Wiradharma (Dili)

-Col. Noer Muis
b. 1953, Kuala Simpang, East Aceh,
Acehnese
Akmil 1976
Infantry
13 viii 99 - 30 iii 00 (1 month)
Commander, Combat Training Center
(Baturaja, South Sumatra)
Liquidated on Mar. 30, 2000.

Kodam Jaya (Greater Jakarta)

Commander, Kodam Jaya
-Maj. Gen. Bibit Walujo
b. Aug. 5, 1949, in Klaten, Javanese
Akmil 1971
Infantry
22 i 01 – c. 1 vii 02 (17.5 months)
Commander, Army Staff and Command
School
Maj. Gen. Slamet Kirbiantoro

Commander, Kodam Jaya , continued

-Maj. Gen. Achmad Yahya
 b. Oct. 11, 1948, in Bangkalan (East Java),
 Madurese
 Akmil 1971
 Infantry
 c. 1 vii 02 – 3 ii 03 (7 months)
 Commander, Kodam VII/Wirabuana

-Maj. Gen. Djoko Santoso
 b. Sept. 8, 1952 in Solo, Javanese
 Akmil 1975
 Infantry
 3 ii 03 – (1 month)
 Commander, Kodam XVI/Pattimura

Chief of Staff, Kodam Jaya

-Brig. Gen. Lintang Walujo
 b. in Banyuwangi, Javanese
 Akmil 1972
 Infantry
 c. 30 vii 00 - 3 ii 03 (30 months)
 Officer seconded to Army Territorial Staff
 Brig. Gen. Romulo Roberto Simbolon

-Brig. Gen. George Toisutta
 b. 1953, Ambonese
 Akmil 1976
 Infantry
 3 ii 03 – (1 month)
 Chief of Staff, Second Infantry Division,
 Army Strategic Command

Korem 051 Wijayakarta (Jakarta Timur)

-Col. R. Sutetyo
 Javanese
 Akmil 1973
 Infantry
 11 x 2000 - 9 iv 02 (3.5 months)
 Assistant for Territorial Affairs, Kodam
 Jaya

-Col. E. Edi Sunadi D.
 Akmil 1976
 Infantry
 9 iv 02 - (9 months)
 Staff, Army Intelligence Center

Korem 052 Wijayakrama (Jakarta Barat)

-Col. Koesnadi
 Akmil 1973
 Infantry
 c. 1 x 2000 - (27 months)
 Commander, Core Regiment, Kodam
 II/Sriwijaya

Kodam Iskandar Muda (Aceh)

Commander, Kodam Iskandar Muda

-Maj. Gen. Djali Jusuf
 b. 1949, Sigli, Pidie, Aceh, Acehnese
 Akmil 1972
 Infantry
 5 v 02 – (10 months)
 Deputy Commander, Operations Command
 (Kolakops), Aceh (under Zamroni)

Chief of Staff, Kodam Iskandar Muda

-Brig. Gen. Syarifudin Tippe
 b. June 7, 1953, Sinjai, S. Sulawesi, Buginese
 Akmil 1975
 Engineers
 5 v 02 - 3 ii 03 (9 months)
 Attended National Resiliency Institute
 course

-Brig. Gen. Endang Suwarya
 b. Dec. 11, 1950, Bandung, Sundanese
 Akmil 1973
 Infantry
 3 ii 03 – (1 month)
 Deputy Assistant for Operations to Army
 Chief of Staff

Korem 011 Lilawangsa (Lho Seumawe)

-Col. Mohamad Jahja
 Akmil 1974
 Infantry
 c. 26 ix 2000 - 4 v 02 (18 months)
 Assistant for Intelligence, Kodam I/Bukit
 Barisan

Korem 011 Lilawangsa (Lho Seumawe), continued

-Col. H. Azmyn Yusri Nasution

b. 1954, Medan, Mandailing Batak

Akmil 1977

Infantry

4 v 02 - (7 months)

Assistant for Operations, Army Strategic
Reserve

Korem 012 Teuku Umar (Banda Aceh)

-Col. Endang Suwarya

Sundanese

Akmil 1973

Infantry

7 iv 01 - c. 2 v 02 (11 months)

Commander, Korem 163 Bali

Korem 012 Teuku Umar (Banda Aceh), continued

-Col. Gerhan Lentara

b. Bone, South Sulawesi. Bugis

Akmil 1978

Infantry

2 v 02 - (7 months)

Assistant for Operations, Kodam
III/Siliwangi