CURRENT DATA ON THE INDONESIAN MILITARY ELITE

Ben Anderson

More than two years have now elapsed since the conclusion of the three-part series in Issues 36 (October 1983), 37 (April 1984), and 40 (October 1985), which analyzed the major changes in the structuring and leadership of the Armed Forces inaugurated in March 1983. These two years have witnessed some significant developments which warrant a revised format for the "Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite" series. The two main modifications involve dropping the listing of positions in the Department of Defense and Security (Hankam), and including new data on regional leaderships at the Kodam (Military Region Command) and the Korem (Military Resort Command) levels. In the analysis offered in issue no. 37, it had been argued that Law 20/1982, formally separating the functions of Minister of Defense/Security and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, would reduce the former to political insignificance, while creating an enormous concentration of power in the latter. The past two years have confirmed the validity of this prognosis, to the point that it seems largely irrelevant to chart personnel transfers within the Department of Defense/Security. On the other hand, the territorial reorganization of 1985, by which the old combined-service interregional commands (KowiRian) were abolished, and the number of Kodam reduced from sixteen to ten seems to have run into some obstacles, so that attention is warranted particularly to those regions which prior to 1985 were Kodam-level, but were subsequently reduced to Korem status. Furthermore, since Commander-in-Chief General Murdani has made clear that the Korem commands are to be key jobs for middle-ranking officers destined for top military and political posts in years to come, it will probably be useful to start keeping a systematic eye on Korem leaderships, as well as on the chief-of-staffships of the ten Kodam. In Issue 46 (October 1986) an attempt will be made to give full listings with some preliminary analysis.

I. Structural-Sociological Developments

A. Generational

The past two years have seen the retirement from active service of all members of the so-called '45 Generation, and virtually all those of the "bridging" generation (i.e., the products of the Yogyakarta Military Academy of 1948 and 1949, the Dutch Military Academy at Breda, and the P3AD [Army Officer Training Center] of the early 1950s). Retirement has normally meant taking up new positions in the Department of Defense, as well as other ministries and government agencies, seats in parliament, ambassadorships, or jobs in state- or state-supported enterprises. The sole "bridge" left on active duty is the Commander-in-Chief himself, and he would

1. One important exception is Breda-educated Maj. Gen. Soebijakto Prawirosoebroto (long-time deputy to Murdani while the latter was Armed Forces' intelligence czar) who has been kept on, in retirement, as Governor of Lemhannas.
have been required to retire at the end of October 1987, had President Suharto not granted him a special one-year extension.

The result of these retirements has been the rise to leadership of the first two graduating classes (1960 and 1961) of the Military Academy (AMN), with the former predominating in top staff jobs in Jakarta, and the latter in the key regional commands. Class Three (1962) graduates have still, with a couple of notable exceptions, to make their mark beyond the Korem level. The men of Classes One and Two were born between 1935 and 1938, were young boys during the Revolution, in their early thirties at the time of the 1965 "Coup," in their early forties when the East Timor War began in 1975, and are today in their early fifties. (In so far as they have real combat experience [and a good many do not], it has been in East Timor, and the experience has not been notably successful.)

B. Service and Ethnicity

In the earlier analyses, it had been pointed out that the rise of the AMN graduates meant the ascendancy of a group of officers whose formative experiences and emotional solidarities derived from the classroom, rather than from anticolonial guerrilla warfare. Hence a rapid decline was predicted in the importance of affiliation with the historic territorial Divisions (Siliwangi, Diponegoro, Brawijaya, etc.) which were born during the Revolution of 1945-1949. This prediction is largely confirmed by the way in which printed minibiographies of leading AMN graduates are now organized. There are only rare mentions of Divisional attachment, while emphasis is typically placed on technical service branch (Infantry, Artillery, Cavalry, Engineers, and so on). As might be expected from the pattern in other modern militaries, Infantry is, formally at least, the privileged branch, but the others are quite well represented. Unofficially, however, it is pretty clear that experience in "Intelligence" may be the single most significant qualification for leadership in the Suharto-Murdani era. A rough calculation on the basis of fragmentary evidence suggests that well over one-third of all the officers listed in this issue have "Intelligence" backgrounds of one kind or another.

In ethnic terms, the Javanese are overwhelmingly dominant (well over 70 percent of the current listing). Sundanese come next, but, at less than 10 percent, a very long way behind. After them, a minimal scattering of Batak, Balinese, Minangkabau, Buginese, and so on. Seven of the ten Kodam commanders are Javanese, while one is Sundanese and two Batak. It is not altogether clear why Javanese dominance should still be so strong. In earlier years the obvious explanation was the concentration of Republican combat troops in Java and Sumatra during the Revolution, and the expulsion of most Sumatran revolutionary-era military leaders during the civil war of the late 1950s. But the Military Academy, as designed by General Nasution and others in the late 1950s, was intended to overcome ethnic jealousies by recruiting on a broadly proportional, demographic basis, with no favoritism for the Javanese as such. That Indonesia today has, in Ida Bagus Sudjana and I Gde Awet Sara, two very prominent Balinese generals, while there were no Balinese generals at all in the entire '45 Generation, shows the sincerity and effectiveness of the Nasution policy. Thus the ascendancy of AMN Javanese probably occurred in the 1970s by a selective promotion process—whether for political reasons or not remains uncertain.

C. The Regional Pattern

The territorial reorganization discussed in Issue no. 40 has produced a structure consisting of ten Kodam and thirty-nine Korem. Kodam 1 (N. Sumatra) has six Korem, 2 (S. Sumatra) has four, 3 (W. Java) has four, 4 (C. Java) has four, 5 (E. Java)
has four, 6 (Kalimantan) has four, 7 (Sulawesi) has five, 8 (W. Irian and the Moluccas) has four, 9 (Lesser Sundas) four, and 10 (Metropolitan Jakarta) none. Kodam 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10 are more or less unchanged renamings of the old Kodam IV, VI, VII, VIII, XVI, and V. Kodam 1 amalgamated Kodam I, II, and III; Kodam 6, Kodam IX, X, and XII; Kodam 7, Kodam XIII and XIV; and Kodam 8, Kodam XV and XVII.

What is curious, however, is that over the past two years no renumbering of Korem has taken place to fit the new Kodam structure, indeed the numbering of some new Korem has adapted to the "old" pattern rather than the new.

It should be explained that in the "old days," and in accordance with the typical rationality of military command structures, the numbering of territorial units at different levels was intended, and did, reflect hierarchies of jurisdiction and command. Thus, for example, if the Kodam of Central Java was assigned the number VII, its four constituent Korem would be numbered 071 through 074, and the thirty-five lower-level Military District Commands (Kodim) — roughly corresponding to the kabupaten of the civilian administration — would be numbered 0701 through 0735. As things now stand, however, Kodam 1, based in Medan, has under it six Korem numbered 011, 012, 022, 023, 031, and 032 (and the Kodim follow the same pattern). Korem 011 and 012 were the two traditional Korem in Kodam I (Aceh), and the numbering reminds everyone of this. Korem 031 and 032, however, are new, products of the merger and repartitioning of the three Korem earlier composing the now-liquidated Kodam III (West Sumatra and Riau). Yet, they still bear the 03 numbering of Kodam III, thus keeping the "West Sumatra" tradition alive and visible. The odd retention of the pre-reorganization regional codes has also affected South Sumatra and Java, where no Korem were eliminated in 1985, in that the 01, 02, and 03 series have been kept for the North Sumatra Korem, "forcing" Kodam 2 (S. Sumatra) to stick with the old Kodam IV's 04 series, and Kodam 3–5 to retain the old Kodam VI–VIII's 06, 07, and 08 numbering. In Kodam 6 (Kalimantan), the Korem also underscore their old origins: 091 corresponds territorially to old Kodam IX (East Kalimantan); 101 and 102, the combined Kodam X (South and Central Kalimantan) developed when Kodam XI (Central Kalimantan) was eliminated on February 14, 1974; while 121 is Kodam XII (West Kalimantan) in new guise. The numbering of Kodam 7's five Korem (131 and 132; 141, 142, and 143) shows the residual visibility of the old Kodam XIII (North Sulawesi) and XIV (South Sulawesi). A final most interesting case is Kodam 8, an amalgamation of old Kodam XV (Moluccas) and XVII (West Irian). For this new Kodam, not only has Kodam XVII's 17 numbering been retained for its former Korem, but the liquidated Kodam XV has also been given (as Korem 174) a late number in the same series.

These anomalies suggest that General Murdani has felt it necessary to proceed cautiously with his territorial reorganization, and that he recognizes the continuing strength of local sentiments and loyalties among the soldiers (especially in the Outer Islands). He is certainly fully aware that these sentiments helped break up the territorial system of the 1950s (to which his new system bears so strong a resemblance). At the same time, there may be important long-term implications in the retention of these anomalies. The reduction of, say, Kodam XIII to Korem 131 means a reduction in the rank of its commander, from Brigadier-General to Colonel. At the same time, the Governor of North Sulawesi (covering exactly the same area as Korem 131) is likely to be a retired Major-General or even Lieutenant-General. The Korem commander has to report to Jakarta via Kodam 7's HQ in Makasar, while the governor answers directly to the Minister of the Interior. Retention of the 13—numbering serves to remind the people of the region, including the soldiers in it, that in the very same ("ethnically" defined) territory, the local "military" leadership is decisively lower in status than the "civilian" leadership, and that this structural situation will persist even if Jakarta nominates a civilian to the governorship. There are here the seeds of a quiet decline in the authority of the dwifungsi doctrine,
II. Politics of the Changes

Any analysis of the political side of recent developments in the Indonesian military elite must necessarily focus on the pivotal figure of General Murdani. As of December 31, 1987 (the cut-off point for this article), he had served as Armed Forces' Commander-in-Chief and as Kopkamtib Commander for almost 5 years (57 months) making him not only the highest officeholder in the Armed Services but the active-duty officer with the longest tenure. In previous articles, emphasis was laid on the extraordinary concentration of power achieved by Murdani over these years—partly the result of the institutional changes created by Law 20/1982, partly of the reduction of all service chiefs to the status of "his" staff officers, partly of his long, iron grip on the state's more effective intelligence bureaucracies, and partly of the active support of President Suharto. It was then argued that the reason for this concentration of power was that Suharto needed someone capable, determined, and trustworthy to manage the generational transition in the Army, not least because the Army had always been the political guarantor of the New Order regime. This confidence appears to have been well-placed in that the transition, and the accompanying structural reforms, have been carried out smoothly, and now seem firmly in place.

Yet there is one interesting exception, the Draft Law on the Military (RUU Keprajuritan), which was amply discussed at the October 21-23, 1987 Rapim ABRI (Armed Forces' Leadership Annual Conference), with the likelihood that it would be presented to the Parliament (DPR) in December. The most significant feature of this bill is that it envisages raising the normal retirement age for ranking officers (colonel and above) from 55 to 60, a change justified on the grounds of customary practice in the US and Thai militaries, and the greater physical fitness and longevity of postrevolutionary Indonesians. What is very interesting is that the bill seems clearly not designed to keep Murdani as Commander-in-Chief for another five years. For while the draft bill was being worked on in committee, Murdani is said to have offered (in May) his resignation to the President in view of his soon reaching, on October 2, 1987, the 55-year limit on active duty status according to the existing law. The President chose to use the escape clause in the existing law to give Murdani an additional one-year extension of his active duty status. Since the Draft Law could have been presented at any time in the last three years (making Murdani's continued tenure unproblematic), it seems obvious that the President has decided that Murdani will be out of the Commander-in-Chiefship by some time next year.

What will happen then to Murdani, and what to the offices he holds and the policies he secures? It may be helpful to start with Murdani himself, before turning to the question of Suharto's own intentions.

At 55, Murdani is at the height of his powers in every sense. He has been an active player in military politics for over thirty years, starting from his junior participation in the failed Zulkifli Lubis coup of 1955, through the crushing of the Permesta rebellion in North Sulawesi in 1958, the campaign for West Irian in 1961-1962 (when he was parachuted into Dutch-controlled territory), the murky maneuverings of 1964-1966 whereby the Suharto group came to power in Jakarta and ended Confrontation with Malaysia, the first major intraregime crisis of the New Order in January 1974 (Malari), the assault on East Timor (1975), up to the present. For
most of this period he has been intimately associated with Suharto (who in many ways has made his career).  He has dominated Indonesia's military intelligence apparatus since 1974 (and one key function of this system is the internal monitoring of loyalties within the Armed Forces). Finally, he has played a central role in Indonesia's foreign relations, including special missions to Vietnam and China, as well as making policy on Papua New Guinea and East Timor.

Since 1983 he has husbanded his power jealously. The positions of Deputy Commander—Chief and Deputy Commander of Kopkamtib have been abolished. It is widely believed that even after assuming the two top military jobs in March 1983, he refused to give up direct control of ABRI Intelligence, and continues personally to direct the shadowy activities of BAIS (Strategic Intelligence Agency). Since 1983 he has also taken an increasingly visible role in Indonesian domestic politics—outside the strictly military sphere. He is generally credited as masterminding the "mysterious killings" of 1983–1985 in which, if Amnesty International is correct, about 8,000 petty criminals were extralegally executed mainly by military personnel in mufti.

He took personal responsibility for the violent handling of the Tanjung Priok Affair in September 1984. He has regularly and openly intervened in appointments to governorships, bupati-ships, memberships in national and provincial legislatures, and posts in important state agencies. It is clear that he made substantial contributions to the "opposition" PDI party in the April 23, 1987 elections, and he has visibly cultivated rural ulama and aristocratic politicians in Java and the Outer Islands. It has reached the point that many Indonesians speak of two major political factions in current political life, the "Murdani group" and the group of General Soedharmo, who is currently head of the government's party Golkar, as well as Minister of State (effectively the President's domestic chief of staff).

At 55, Murdani is ten years older than Suharto was when he seized power from Sukarno in 1965–1966. It is difficult to imagine that he does not aspire to becoming President himself. Until he relinquishes his current offices he controls all the significant firepower in Indonesia; and he has been assigning key members of the "Timor group"—officers who worked closely with him on East Timor over the years—to key positions in the present military hierarchy. If anyone could make a coup against Suharto, it would be Murdani. At the same time, he has to think about the political liabilities of being a Catholic and of partly-European descent (how great a liability in fact these traits would be remains uncertain. Many powerful Third World military leaders come from religious and/or ethnic minorities, e.g., Hafez al-Assad, Idi Amin, Yakubu Gowon, etc.). Furthermore, he does not have much time left.

The problem is that once he ceases to be Commander—in—Chief and Commander of Kopkamtib, any other job will mean a substantial loss in power. Perhaps only the Vice—Presidency would have any attraction for him, but there is as yet no sign that Suharto is planning anything along these lines.

How is Suharto himself likely to be thinking about the future? We may start a tentative analysis by focusing on two questions: what are the implications of the RUU Keprajuritan, and what is the character today of high—level army factionalism?

2. It is very rare anywhere for an officer to be appointed Commander—in—Chief whose largest previous unit of command was a battalion.

3. He was Chargé d'Affaires in Seoul from 1971 to 1974, at the height of the Park Chung Hee military dictatorship, and certainly learned a lot from the experience. He remains the most "Korean" of Indonesian officers.
A. The RUU Keprajuritan

The obvious beneficiaries of the RUU Keprajuritan are the Military Academy graduates of 1960–1963. Even if they privately believe that their professional capacities are greater than those of the Generation of ’45, they have rather little to show the public to demonstrate this superiority. The only major war in which they have been involved has been the twelve-year counterinsurgency in East Timor, which continues at great cost in Indonesian and Timorese lives and resources, with little prospect of victory in sight. Moreover, they have had to wait for a long time to become controllers of their country’s armed forces—not so much long by conventional, international standards, as by comparison with their predecessors. Suharto was Divisional Commander in Central Java at the age of 35; Major-General Setiyana, who took over this same position at the beginning of 1987 was then 48; Suharto was Army Chief of Staff at 44, while General Try Sutrisno, who took up this post in June 1986, was then almost 51.

The RUU Keprajuritan should guarantee these officers almost a decade of active-service duty at the top (Sutrisno, among the oldest, is now 52). While the age-extension for active service will surely create dissatisfaction among graduates of post-1963 graduating Magelang classes, who could have hoped to rise more quickly under the existing system, from Suharto’s point of view the law should serve as an invaluable form of personal patronage as well as discouraging political ambitions among the AMN-generation army leaders. It will also leave to members of Suharto’s own Generation of ’45 a monopoly of militarized positions in the state bureaucracy and state enterprises. From this perspective, the RUU Keprajuritan represents the final step in a well thought-out plan to handle the transfer of real military power to a group of younger officers without close personal ties to the President, with maximal smoothness and minimal short- and long-term risks to the regime.

B. Factionalism

In the final part of the analysis presented in Issue no. 40, it was suggested that the pattern of personnel transfers seemed to indicate some tension between the interests of General Murdani and those of President Suharto. Do the changes of the past two years bear this analysis out? Possibly, but not necessarily. What is certain is that the changes have meant an increase in Murdani’s power in the capital city. The commander of Kodam Jaya (Metropolitan Jakarta), Major General Sugito, who came in directly from doubling as commander of Kostrad’s Airborne Combat Command and of the Operations Security Command in East Timor, is clearly a Murdani protégé. His new Chief of Staff, Brig. Gen. Arie Sadewo, came in from heading one of BAIS’s Directorates (H/Wan—meaning?) where he would have worked very closely with Murdani. And the new Commander of Kostrad, Maj. Gen. Adolf Rajagukguk, has long been a Murdani instrument in East Timor. He was the first commander of Korem 164/East Timor when it was set up on March 26, 1979, and later served as Commander of Kodam 9 (Lesser Sundas) which oversees East Timor’s military administration.4

There may also be something to be learned from examining the timing of appointments over the past two years. Table A lists all appointments aside from those of Korem commanders and Kodam chiefs of staff; Table B covers this residual group.

4. He gained a certain international fame when Amnesty International published secret documents he had signed authorizing the use of torture against people suspected of Fretilin connections.
Table A

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Table B shows a pattern of steady change which suggests a system of routinized turnovers, never more than five a month, and typically around two or three. There are only five months out of twenty-five where no changes at all occur. Table A, on the other hand, shows very marked oscillations, with thick clusters in April 1986, January 1987, and August 1987. Especially notable is the heavy clustering of appointments (seventeen in March–May 1986) just prior to Try Sutrisno's becoming Army Chief of Staff. If we further recall that his elevation took place about eight months later than it "should have" (i.e., his predecessor General Rudini was permitted to stay in the job for eight months after he should have gone into retirement); that the seventeen above appointments included most of the Assistants to the Army Chief of Staff (i.e., saddling Try with a set of Assistants by no means certainly of his choosing); 5 and that six months had to elapse before a sizeable number of new appointments were made—then we may be inclined to think that Try's position is much less strong than Murdani's despite his being widely viewed as Suharto's personal favorite among the New Generation of senior officers. In fact, rumor has it that there are two loose factions within the active-duty military elite, one composed of "hard" East Timor veterans with strong ties to Murdani, the other a "soft" clique nominally headed by Try, and composed of "mainstream" professionals without conspicuous intelligence and counterinsurgency backgrounds. Yet even if these rumors have some basis in reality, it does not necessarily mean that Suharto has been putting his weight forcibly behind one and against the other. It may suit his book to keep them in rough competitive balance.

But this tactic will not solve the problems of what to do about Murdani, and what to do about the offices he now holds. The present concentration of power in Murdani's hands is the result of a particular crisis—specific set of needs, talents, and opportunities, and is unlikely to be maintained after Murdani's departure. One possible solution would be to put command of the Armed Forces and of Kopkamtib in separate hands, as more or less happened in the days of Generals Panggabean and Sumitro. It is not clear that the Kopkamtib Commander has to be an officer on active service, so perhaps Murdani could retain this office after retirement, especially if the egregious Yoga Sugama, nominal head of Bakin for the past thirteen years, were to yield his post to Murdani. Another alternative, the rebuilding of the Ministry of Defense under Murdani's leadership, seems less likely. Law 20/1982 is firmly in place, and a major institutional upheaval would be required to create

5. Usually an incoming official of this rank is expected to have the freedom to pick his own staff right away.
a Defense Minister more powerful than the Commander-in-Chief; and it would be an upheaval very difficult to justify in terms of present needs or current army doctrine. Only if the Minister were concurrently Kopkamtib Commander would the appointment be minimally attractive. Still another alternative for Suharto is to name Murdani his Vice-President in March 1988, easing him out of real power, but compensating for this by naming him his successor. But for twenty years Suharto has been very careful to avoid appointing a Vice-President who could plausibly succeed him (he clearly intends to be, in fact, if not in name, president for life), and it seems unlikely that he will change his style at this stage. Yet it is also uncertain whether Suharto really trusts the Military Academy types sufficiently to be able to dispense with Murdani's capacities and knowledge; no one in Indonesia knows where more bodies, physical and figurative, are buried than he.

In any case, the decisions will be coming very soon now. In line with past practice Suharto will announce his Vice-President in March, and a cabinet reshuffle will certainly be carried out around the same time. We shall then have a much clearer picture of Murdani’s future and of the way power within the military is going to be allocated, formally and informally, over the coming five years.

* * *

April 1, 1988
Postscript

Since the above analysis was completed, a series of important transfers has begun, which will probably continue throughout the rest of 1988. It is not possible yet to offer a confident interpretation, so that these concluding notes are necessarily speculative.

The chain of events opened on February 10, when, after a private meeting with the President, General Murdani told the press that he was being retired from active duty and would promptly be replaced by Army Chief of Staff General Try Sutrisno. The transfer duly took place on February 29, preceded on February 23 by Edy Sudradjat becoming Army Chief of Staff. Sudradjat was then succeeded in early March as Deputy Chief of Staff by Adolf Sahala Rajagukguk, the Kostrad Commander, who was replaced on March 15 as Kostrad Commander by Sugito, Commander of Kodam Jaya. The previous day Sugito himself had been replaced as Jaya Commander by Diponegoro Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Suryadi Sudirja.

It was widely noticed that on leaving the Commander-in-Chiefship Murdani did not give up the other key post he held, that of Kopkamtib Commander. As of this writing it is still unclear what the future of Kopkamtib will be and whether Murdani will continue to control it. A number of highly placed officials have said publicly that Kopkamtib’s mission is to be thoroughly revamped, with more emphasis being laid on securing economic stability and security. It has only been made plain that whoever eventually heads it, or its successor, that person will not be the new Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief.

In the meantime, at the MPR meeting on March 11, Lt. Gen. Sudharmono, State Secretary and General Chairman of Golkar, emerged as Suharto’s chosen candidate for Vice-President. This candidacy was the first in the history of the New Order to arouse visible antagonism, most evidently from the military. An obscure Brigadier-General (Ibrahim Saleh), a member of the Armed Forces’ fraksi in the MPR, startled the session by springing to the speaker’s podium to protest the President’s selection. John Naro, the slippery head of the Muslim PPP party, put forward his own candidacy, purportedly with some military backing. Moreover, the Armed Forces’ fraksi ostentatiously refrained from cosponsoring Sudharmono. But in fairly short order these
murmurs of dissent were silenced. Naro withdrew his candidacy, and the military fraksi in the end joined the unanimous approval of the President's choice. Two weeks later, the new Cabinet was announced, and the questions about Murdani's future as a retired officer were partly settled by his nomination as Minister of Defense and Security replacing General Poniman.

It is difficult not to read this series of curiosities as—at least in part—a political struggle between the Palace and Armed Forces' Headquarters. The most plausible explanation of Murdani's abrupt removal as Commander-in-Chief a bare month before the MPR session is that Suharto had already privately decided not to make Murdani his Vice-President and potential legal successor, and thought it prudent to remove him from command of troops before breaking the disagreeable news. If one looks at the promotions and transfers that followed in late February and early March, most of the beneficiaries are thought to be Murdani men—generals with RPKAD backgrounds, deep involvement in East Timor, and significant intelligence ties. (In other words their careers look very different from Try Sutrisno's.) It is also worth noting that, on January 15, Rear Admiral Soedibyo Rahardjo was installed as the new Chief of the General Staff (the no. 2 position in Armed Forces' Headquarters) replacing Lt.-Gen. Ida Bagus Sudjana. The admiral is a former BAIS man and long-time intelligence aide to Murdani. If this line of speculation is correct, it suggests that Murdani has been trying to remain a powerful force and policy-determiner in Armed Forces' Headquarters, even after he has lost the Commander-in-Chiefship. His retention, for the time being, of the Kopkamtib command, points in the same direction.

On paper, Murdani's appointment as Defense Minister is an honorable promotion, one that it would be difficult to complain about in public. But the fact is that, as a result of Law 20/1982, in the drafting of which Murdani had a major hand, the Defense Ministry is a pale shadow of what it was in the days of Generals Nasution, Suharto, Panggabean, and Yusuf. As detailed in an earlier analysis (see *Indonesia*, No. 37 [April 1984]), its functions are routine-administrative and it has no institutional extensions in the provinces. During his five years as Defense Minister General Poniman was a largely invisible figure. If we add that, at least formally, the Defense Minister does not answer directly to the President but is supposed to go through the Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security, Suharto faithful Admiral Sudomo, it looks as though Murdani has for the time being lost a good deal of power. If, as is likely given his character, he now attempts to reinvent the Defense Ministry, it will be hard not to set the Commander-in-Chief and the Minister on an antagonistic course—which may, of course, suit the President's book. The key things to watch in the coming months will be: (1) whether Murdani manages to keep control of Kopkamtib, and of the labyrinthine intelligence networks that he has dominated since 1974; and (2) whether Try Sutrisno proves able to create his own group in Armed Forces' Headquarters, and free himself wholly or partially from the appointees of his predecessor.

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The format approximates that used in the previous listing (*Indonesia*, No. 40 [October 1985]) and is for the period ending December 31, 1987. (Additional material on the regional leaderships at the Kodam and Korem levels will be included in Issue 46 [October 1988].) A glossary of some of the most used abbreviations follows. There is, finally, a list of the members of the Fifth Development Cabinet announced by President Suharto on March 21 after the closing of the 1988 MPR session.
ARMED FORCES HEADQUARTERS (Mabes ABRI)

I. Commander-in-Chief

Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces

Gen. Leonardus Benjamin ("Benny") Murdani  
(b. October 2, 1932, Cepu) (P3AD)  
28.iii.83 (57 months)  
Gen. Andi Mohammad Yusuf  
Assistant for Security, Hankam; Head,  
Strategic Intelligence Center; Deputy  
Head, Bakin  
RPKAD  

Commander of Kopkamtib

Gen. Leonardus Benjamin Murdani  
28.iii.83 (57 months)  
Admiral R. Sudomo  
As above  
RPKAD

II. Staff Echelon

Chief of the General Staff (Kasum)

1. Vice-Marsh al Oetomo  
(b. April 15, 1935, Malang)  
c. 10.xi.84—18.iv.86 (17 months)  
Lt. Gen. R. Himawan Sutanto  
Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force  
Air Force  

2. Lt. Gen. Dading Kalbuadi  
(b. April 14, 1931, Cilacap)  
(P3AD)  
18.iv.86—5.i.87 (8½ months)  
Assistant for Logistics to the C-in-C  
Armed Forces; Head, Armed Forces'  
Supply Body (Babek)  
RPKAD  

(b. June 5, 1937, Bali)  
(AMN 1, 1960)  
5.i.87—10.x.87 (10 months)  
Assistant for Social and Political  
Affairs to the C-in-C Armed Forces  
Balinese

Chief of the Social and Political Staff (Kassopol)

1. Lt. Gen. Bambang Triantoro  
(b. January 7, 1931, Surabaya)  
21.viii.85—5.i.87 (16½ months)  
Lt. Gen. Gunawan Wibisono (deceased)  
Deputy Army Chief of Staff  
Ordnance  

2. Lt. Gen. Soegiarto  
(b. June 2, 1936, Karanganyar,  
Kebumen) (AMN 1, 1960)  
5.i.87 (12 months)  
Assistant for Personnel to the Army  
Chief of Staff  
D  

Inspector—General (Irjen ABRI)
1. Air Vice—Marshal Iskandar
   c. iii.1984—31.v.86 (c. 26 months)
   Lt. Gen. Gunawan Wibisono (deceased)
   J
2. Rear Adm. Gatot Suwardi
   (b. January 21, 1935, Jember)
   31.v.86 (19 months)
   Commander of the Fleet, Eastern Zone
   J

Assistant for General Planning (Asrenum)
1. Vice Adm. F. Parapat
   ? (1980)—? (1986)7
   Maj. Gen. Ignatius Yogi Supardi
   J
2. Air Vice—Marshal Tedy Roesdi
   ? 1986
   Hayuni
   A Director in BAIS
   ?

Assistant for Security [Intelligence] (Aspam)
   (P3AD)
   ? 1983—?
   Maj. Gen. Soelarso
   ?

   ?
   ?

Assistant for Operations (Asops)
   (b. April 22, 1938, Jambi)
   (AMN 1, 1960)
   c. 30.iv.85—16.vi.86 (131/2 months)
   First Air Marshal Ibnu Subroto
   Commander Kodam VI (3)
   SI
2. Rear Adm. Soedibyo Rahardjo
   c. vi.86 (c. 18 months)
   Head, External Affairs Directorate of
   BAIS (1984)
   ?

7. He was concurrently Director—General of Budget and General Planning in the Defense and Security Department in March 1986.
8. In November 1986 he was also reported to be Deputy Head of BAIS. (AB November 26, 1986.)
9. I have been unable to find any information on Maj. Gen. Soedibyo and it is likely he too served in BAIS.
Assistant for Territorial Affairs (Aster)

   (b. 1932)
   c. 15.v.85–? viii.86 (c. 15 months)
   Maj. Gen. Eddy Marzuki Nalapraya
   Chief of Staff, Kodam 4
   J

   ?.viii.86 (16 months)
   ?
   ?

Assistant for Communications and Electronics (Askomlek)

Air Vice—Marshal Soebagyo
   ? xi.1984 (38 months)
   Vice—Marshal Tedjo Suwamo
   Air Force
   J

Assistant for Security and Social Order (Askamtibmas)

   c. 20.vi.85–? (29 months)
   Police Maj. Gen. Drs. Poerwata
   Chief of Police, N. Sumatra
   Police
   J?

Assistant for Personnel (Aspers)

   c. 30.iv.85–c. 1.i.87 (20 months)
   Maj. Gen. Suharto Partoatmodjo
   Commander, Kodam VII (4)
   D
   J

2. First Marshal Soedarma
   c. 1.i.87 (12 months)
   (probably) Director, Personnel and
   Placement, Air Force
   Air Force
   J?

Assistant for Logistics (Aslog)

1. Lt. Gen. Dading Kalbuadi
   c. ii.1983–c. 18.iv.86 (38 months)
   Lt. Gen. Supardjo
   Commander, Kodam XVI
   RPKAD
   J

2. Rear Admiral Emir Hamzah
   Mangaweang
   c. 30.iv.86–?? (7)
   Head, Armed Forces’ Information Center
   Buginese
   Navy

3. Rear Admiral A. Rahadi
   ? (7)
   ?
   Navy

10. Reportedly he became Secretary-General of the Social Affairs Ministry in about August 1986.

11. AB reports that on June 20, 1986 he was also made Deputy for Administration to the Head of National Police. It is not clear how long he kept his old job.
Assistant for Finance (Asku)

Lt. Gen. Widyo Sarwono\(^\text{12}\) 6.ix.75—7
Maj. Gen. Suhanto
Officer seconded to the Army Chief of Staff
Finance Corps

Assistant for Social and Political Affairs (Assospol)

1. Maj. Gen. Goenarso S.F. 4.iii.80—c. 30.x.85 (c. 68 months) [retired November 1985]
Brig. Gen. Prapto Prajitno
Head, Armed Forces’ Information Center
B

2. Maj. Gen. Ida Bagus Sudjana c. 30.x.85—5.i.87 (14 months)
Assistant for Territorial Affairs to the Army Chief of Staff
Balinese

3. Maj. Gen. Harsudiyono Hartas 5.i.87 (12 months)
(b. June 4, 1935, Jepara)
(AMN 1, 1960)
Commander, Kodam 4
Cavalry

Assistant for Functional Group Affairs (Asyawan)

1. Maj. Gen. Roestandi A. Moestafa c. 9.viii.85 (28\(\frac{1}{2}\) months)
(b. July 20, 1933, Bandung)
(Akad Zeni, 1956)
Maj. Gen. Chalimi Imam Santoso
Commander, Kodam 2
Engineers
S

2. Col. Rachmansyah c. 23.iii.85—?

?—Finance Corps

2. Col. Drs. H. F. Putong c. 23.ix.86
Finance Corps

Head, Sub Dinas Pembiayaan
[Sub Service for Expenditures ??]
Armed Forces’ Financial Center
Navy
J

Head, Armed Forces’ Financial Center

Central Executive Organs (Lakpus)

1. Governor, National Defense Institute (Lemhannas)

Maj. Gen. Soebijakto Prawirosoebroto c. 31.v.83 (49 months)
(b. August 17, 1929, Wates)
(Breda)
[retired November 1985]
Lt. Gen. Sutopo Yuwono
Officer seconded to the C—in—C
B

\(\text{12}\) It is almost certain that Gen. Sarwono has retired, but I have been unable to find any note of a successor.
2. Commander—General, Armed Forces' Academy (Akabri)
   1. Lt. Gen. (Marines) Kahpi Suriadiredja
      21.ii.85—15.xi.86 (21 months)
      Commander, Kowilhan IV
      (b. June 14, 1931, Bandung)
   2. Rear Adm. Soegiatmo
      15.xi.86 (13½ months)
      Governor, Naval Academy
      Navy

3. Commander—General, Armed Forces' Staff and Command School (Sesko ABRI)
      23.vi.84—12.iv.86 (21½ months)
      Vice—Marshal Aried Riyadi
      [retired November 1986]
      (b. c. 1937) (AMN 1, 1960) Assistant for Research and Development to the Army Chief of Staff
      Cavalry
      12.iv.86 (20½ months)
      Head, Armed Forces' Mental Upbuilding Center (Pusbintal)
      (b. c. 1937) (AMN 1, 1960)
      VPAM

4. Head, Armed Forces' Mental Upbuilding Center (Pusbintal)
   1. Rear Adm. Dr. Tarmizi Thaher
      1982—c. 30.viii.87 (c. 60 months)
      Brig. Gen. M. Soegeng Widjaja
      Minangkabau
      (b. Padang, 1936)
   2. Col. H. N. Nurdin
      30.viii.87 (4 months)
      Head, Army Mental Upbuilding Service
      Engineers

5. Head, Research and Development Center (Puslitbang)
      c. 4.vi.83—1.xii.86 (c. 42 months)
      Maj. Gen. Theo Sumantri
      Engineers
      (b. c. 1930) (AMN 1, 1953) ?
   2. Col. Lukman R. Boer
      1.xii.86 (13 months)
      Deputy Head, Center for Research and Development, Armed Forces' Headquarters
      Engineers

6. Head, Armed Forces' Center of History and Tradition (Pusjarah)
   Brig. Gen. Gatot Surjadi
   1982—1.xi.86 (7)
   Brig. Gen. (Titular) Dr. Nugroho Notosusanto (deceased)
   SI

13. Gatot Surjadi retired in November 1986 and no note has been found of his successor. In October 1987 the deputy head of Pusjarah was Col. (Cav.) Soeparmo. (AB October 20, 1987.)
7. Head, Armed Forces' Medical Center (Puskes)
   1. Maj. Gen. Dr. Kurnia Natadisastra c. 2.vi.79—c. 1.vii.87 (97 months)
      [retired November 1985]
      Brig. Gen. Dr. Abdullah Hassan
      Medical Corps S
   2. Brig. Gen. P. Pasaribu c. 1.vii.87 (6 months)
      ? Toba Batak

8. Head, Armed Forces' Military Police Center (Puspom)
   1. Brig. Gen. R. Sardjono c. late Feb. 85—15.vi.87 (c. 28 months)
      Brig. Gen. Gatot Matrai
      Head, President's Security Squad (Paswalpres)
      Military Police J
   2. Brig. Gen. Hadi Baroto 15.vi.87 (6½ months)
      ? Military Police J?

9. Head, Armed Forces' Information Center (Puspen)
   1. Rear Adm. Emir Hamzah Mangaweang 17.vi.83—24.iv.86 (34 months)
      Brig. Gen. Drs. Encung A.S.
      ? Navy Buginese
   2. Brig. Gen. Pieter Damanik (b. October 18, 1934, Pematang Siantar)
      24.iv.86—16.x.87 (18 months)14
      ? Simalungun Batak

10. Armed Forces' Survey and Mapping Center (Pussurta)
       Vice Adm. D. U. Martojo
       ? Army Topography Corps J
    2. First Admiral Sri Waskito (b. February 21, 1937, Solo)
       8.iv.86 (21 months)
       (AAL 1959)
       Head, Navy Hydro-Oceanographic Service
       Navy J

11. Head, Armed Forces' Legal Upbuilding Body (Babinkum)
    ? ? ?

14. Damanik was appointed to a position in the foreign office on October 16, 1987, but I have found no report of his successor. (AB, October 17, 1987.)
12. Head, Armed Forces' Supply Body (Babek)
      c. March 83—c. April 86 (37 months)
      Commander, Kodam XVI RPKAD
   2. Col. Soemartono
      c. April 86 (?) (20 months?)
      Cavalry

13. Head, Armed Forces' Functional Group Upbuilding Body (Babinkar)
   Maj. Gen. Roestandi A. Moestafa
   c. 15.vii.85 (29/2 months)
   Maj. Gen. Chalimi Imam Santoso
   Commander, Kodam 2 Engineers

14. Commander, National Air Defense Command (Kohanudnas)
   1. Vice—Marshal Hartono
      c. 8.viii.84—11.vi.87 (34 months)
      Air Vice—Marshal Iskandar
      ?
      Air Force
   2. First Air Marshal Ateng Suarsono
      11.vi.87 (6½ months)
      Commander, Koharmat AU (Air Force Maintenance and Supply Command [Pemeliharaan dan Pembekalan AU])
      Air Force

SERVICE HEADS AND ARMY HIERARCHY

Commander—In—Chief of the Armed Forces
   Gen. Leonardus Benjamin (*Benny*), Murdani
   28.iii.83 (57 months)
   Gen. Andi Mohammad Yusuf
   Assistant for Security, Dept. of Defense and Security; Head, Strategic Intelligence Center; Deputy Head, Bakin RPKAD

Army Chief of Staff
   1. Gen. Rudini
      (b. December 15, 1929, Malang) (Breda)
      7.iii.83—24.vi.86 (39½ months)
      Gen. S. Poniman
      Commander, Kostrad D
   2. Gen. Try Sutrisno
      24.vi.86 (18 months)
      Deputy Army Chief of Staff Engineers

Navy Chief of Staff
   1. Adm. Mohammad Romly
      (b. December 8, 1928, Tulung Agung)
      4.xii.82—17.iv.86 (40 months)
      Adm. Walujo Sugito
      Chief of Operations Staff, Dept. of Defense and Security Navy
2. Admiral Rudolf Kasenda  
(b. May 15, 1934, Rantepao)  
17.iv.86 (20\(\frac{1}{2}\) months)  
Deputy for Logistics, Armed Forces' C-in-C  
Navy Torajan

Air Force Chief of Staff  
1. Air Marshal Sukardi  
(b. December 1931, Bojonegoro)  
4.xii.82–17.iv.86 (40 months)  
Air Marshal Ashadi Tjahjadi  
Commander, Kostranas [now abolished National Strategic Command]  
Air Force J

2. Air Marshal Oetomo

Chief of the National Police  
1. Police Gen. Anton Sudjarwo  
(b. September 21, 1930, Bandung) (Brimob)  
4.xii.82–3.vii.86 (44 months)  
Police Lt. Gen. Dr. Awaloedin Djamin  
Chief of Police, Jakarta Police J

(b. 1935, Bogor)  
3.vii.86 (18 months)  
Chief of Police, Central Java Police J? S?

Commander of the Marine Corps  
1. Maj. Gen. (Marines) Muntaram  
(b. c. 1933–34, Cianjur)  
7.v.83–7.i.87 (44 months)  
Lt. Gen. (Marines) Kahpi Suriadiredja  
Chief of Staff, Marine Corps Marines S

7.i.87 (12 months)  
Chief of Staff, Marine Corps Marines J? Madurese?

Deputy Army Chief of Staff  
1. Lt. Gen. Try Sutrisno  
21.viii.85–16.vi.86 (10 months)  
Lt. Gen. Bambang Triantoro  
Commander, Kodam V (10) Engineers J

2. Lt. Gen. Edy Sudradjat  
16.vi.86 (18\(\frac{1}{2}\) months)  
Assistant for Operations, Armed Forces' C-in-C Si J

First Assistant (Intelligence)  
Maj. Gen. I Gde Awet Sara  
(b. March 3, 1936, Bali) (Aktekad 4, 1959)  
26.vi.85 (30 months)  
Maj. Gen. Ari Bandiyoko (deceased)  
Commander, Kodam IX Engineers Balinese
Second Assistant (Operations)
   (b. December 31, 1938, Medan)
   (AMN 2, 1961)
   26.vi.85—c. mid—March 86 (8½ months)
   Maj. Gen. Prajitno
   Commander, Kodam XIII
   D
   Toba Batak

   c. mid—March 86 (21½ months)
   Deputy Assistant for Operations (Waas Ops) to the Army Chief of Staff
   ?
   Buginese?

Third Assistant (Personnel)
   (b. c. 1937) (AMN 1, 1960)
   26.vi.85—c. February 86 (8 months)
   Maj. Gen. Sudiman Saleh
   Chief of Staff, Kostrad
   ?
   J

   c. February 86 (c. 22 months)
   Deputy Assistant for Personnel to the Army Chief of Staff
   ?
   ?

Fourth Assistant (Logistics)
1. Maj. Gen. Ishak Odang
   23.v.83—7.vi.85 (c. 24 months)
   Lt. Gen. Haroen Soewardi
   Head, Army General Supply Service
   ?
   S?

   (b. Surabaya) (AMN 1, 1960)
   7.vi.85—4.viii.87 (c. 26 months)
   Chief of Staff, Kodam 10
   B?
   J?

   4.viii.87 (5 months)
   ?
   Engineers
   J?

Fifth Assistant (Research and Development/Planning and Budgeting)
1. Maj. Gen. Sukarto
   26.vi.85—c. 12.iv.86 (8½ months)
   Maj. Gen. Darsoyo
   Deputy Governor, General and Army Division, Armed Forces' Academy
   Cavalry
   J

2. Brig. Gen. Tiopan Bernhard Silalahi
   (b. 1940) (AMN 2, 1961)
   c. mid—March 1986 (20½ months)
   Chief of Staff, Kodam 4
   D
   Toba Batak

Assistant for Territorial Affairs
   9.x.84—30.x.85 (14½ months)
   Brig. Gen. Harjono Prawirodirdjo (deceased)
   Commander, Kodam XII
   ?
   Balinese

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¹⁵ Syaukat Banjaransari then became Military Secretary to the President, replacing (14.ii.86) retired Air Vice—Marshal Kardono.

30.X.85 (26 months)
Chief of Staff, Kowihan IV
Hasanudin? Menadonese

Commander, Army Strategic Reserve (Kostrad)

1. Lt. Gen. Soeweno
(b. c. 1929, Madiun) (P3AD)
24.v.83–30.i.86 (32 months) [retired
November 1986]
Lt. Gen. Rudini
Second Assistant (Operations) to the
Army Chief of Staff

(b. November 18, 1934,
Temanggung) (AMN 1, 1960)
30.i.86–21.viii.87 (19 months)
Commander, Kodam 1

21.viii.87 (4 months)
Commander, Kodam 9

Governor, General and Army Division, Armed Forces' Academy

Tjokrowidjojo (Breda)
c. 6.vi.83–8.iii.86 (33 months) [retired
November 1986]

(b. 1936) (AMN 1, 1960)
8.iii.86–c. 1.ix.87 (18 months)
Commander, Kodam 8
Infantry

(AMN 2, 1961)
c. 1.ix.87 (4 months)
Deputy Governor of General and Army
Division, Armed Forces' Academy

Commander, Army Staff and Command School (Seskoad)

(Breda)
4.vi.83–27.v.86 (36 months)

27.v.86 (19 months)
Deputy Commander, Army Staff and
Command School

Commander, Kopassus (Special Forces Command)

(b. September 4, 1941, Tarutung)
(AMN 4, 1963)
22.v.85–8.viii.87 (26 1/2 months)

8.viii.87 (5 months)
Deputy Commander, Kopassus

### REGIONAL MILITARY LEADERS

#### KODAM (Military Region Command) 1

**BUKIT BARISAN** (North Sumatra)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KODAM Commander</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Maj. Gen. Soeripto</strong></td>
<td>27.iv.85–28.i.86 (9 months)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander Kodam III</td>
<td>D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b. September 20, 1936, Cirebon)</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Kodam I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AMN 1, 1960)</td>
<td>Engineers Cirebonese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. Brig. Gen. Asmono Arismunandar</strong></td>
<td>6.vi.87 (7 months)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b. c. 1938, Ponorogo)</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Kodam 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AMN 2, 1961)</td>
<td>B?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### KODAM 2

**SRIWIJAYA** (South Sumatra)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panglima</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Panglima</td>
<td>Maj. Gen. Roestandi A. Moestafa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director, Social &amp; Political Doctrine</td>
<td>Development, Armed Forces’ Staff and Command College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer/D</td>
<td>J</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. Maj. Gen. R. Soenardi</strong></td>
<td>24.viii.87 (4 months)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b. December 31, 1937, Yogya)</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Kodam 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AMN 2, 1961)</td>
<td>Cavalry</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### KODAM 3

**SILIWANGI** (West Java)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panglima</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maj. Gen. Raja Inal Siregar</strong></td>
<td>18.v.85 (29½ months)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b. c. 1938)</td>
<td>Maj. Gen. Edy Sudrajat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(AMN 2, 1961)</td>
<td>Commander Kodam XIII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>16. Supadmo was killed in a helicopter crash on this date.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>17. Newspaper accounts suggest that Ali Geno was abruptly removed because of openly criminal behavior by some of his subordinates.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DIPONEGORO (Central Java)

   (AMN 2, 1961)

   (b. February 12, 1939, Solo)
   (AMN 2, 1961)

BRAWUAYA (East Java)

   (b. January 6, 1937, Medan)
   (AMN 1, 1960)

   (b. Surabaya)
   (AMN 1, 1960)

TANJUNG PURA (Kalimantan)

Maj. Gen. Faisal Tanjung
   (AMN 2, 1961)

WIRABUANA (Sulawesi)

Maj. Gen. Nana Narundana
   (b. c. 1937, Tasikmalaya)
   (AMN 1, 1960)

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CENDRAWASIH (Irian Barat & Maluku)

**Panglima**

   Commander, Kodam XV
   Infantry Toba Batak

2. Brig. Gen. Setiyana 13.iii.86—9.i.87 (10 months)
   Chief of Staff, Kodam XIII

   (AMN 4, 1963) 9.i.87 (12 months)
   Chief of Staff, Kodam 9 RPKAD

UDAYANA (Nusatenggara)

**Panglima**

   Commander Kodam XVI SI

   Assistant for Operations to the Army Chief of Staff D Toba Batak

   Commander, Artillery Weapons Center Artillery

KODAM JAYA

**Panglima**

Maj. Gen. Try Sutrisno
Commander, Airborne Combat Command, Kostrad; Commander, Security Operations Command, East Timor RPKAD

* * *

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19. After graduating from the Military Academy, he had 3 1/2 years in Ceram—Maluku, then was a Battalion Commander in Padang; then served 3 1/2 years in the Embassy in Vientiane; then to Kostrad before going to Kodam XIII in 1985.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>Tenure (Months)</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Head State Intelligence Coordination Board (Bakin)</td>
<td>Gen. Yoga Sugama</td>
<td>28.i.74</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>Lt. Gen. Sutopo Yuwono Deputy Ambassador to the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(b. May 12, 1925, Tegal)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Rikugun Shikan Gakko (Japanese Military Academy))</td>
<td>28.i.74</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>Lt. Gen. Sutopo Yuwono Deputy Ambassador to the UN</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviations</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>ABRI</td>
<td>Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akabri</td>
<td>Akademi Angkatan Bersenjata</td>
<td>Indonesian Armed Forces’ Academy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Akad Zeni</td>
<td>Akademi Zeni</td>
<td>Engineers’ Academy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aktekad</td>
<td>Akademi Teknik Angkatan Darat</td>
<td>Army Technical Academy</td>
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<td>AMN</td>
<td>Akademi Militer Nasional</td>
<td>National Military Academy</td>
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<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Brawijaya</td>
<td>Javanese</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAIS</td>
<td>Badan Intelijen Strategis</td>
<td>Strategic Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bakin</td>
<td>Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara</td>
<td>State Intelligence Coordinating Agency</td>
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<td>BB</td>
<td>Bukit Barisan</td>
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<td>Diponegoro</td>
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*Abbreviations*
# THE FIFTH DEVELOPMENT CABINET

As Announced by President Suharto on March 21, 1988

(Asterisks denote active or retired military officers)

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<th>Minister of:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Home Affairs</td>
<td>* Rudini</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Ali Alatas, S.H.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defense and Security</td>
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<td>* Susilo Sudarman</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Drs. Radius Prawiro</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Welfare</td>
<td>* Soepardjo Rustam</td>
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<td>Drs. Moerdiono</td>
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<td>Ir. T. Ariwibowo</td>
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</table>
Agriculture
National Planning and Development (concurrently Bappenas vice chairman)

Dr. Ir. Sjarifudin Baharsjah
Prof. Dr. Benny Sugiarto Muljana

In addition to these ministers, there are high-ranking state officials who are accorded state ministerial ranks. They are:

Commander of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia
Attorney General
Governor of the Central Bank

* Try Sutrisno
Sukarton Marmosudjono, S.H.
Dr. Adrianus Mooy