


MAP A THE KINGDOMS OF BALI



After I Gusti Gde Raka, *Monografi Pulau Bali* (Jakarta: Djawatan Pertanian Rakjat, 1955)

STATE, SOCIETY AND POLITICAL CONFLICT IN BALI, 1945–1946

Geoffrey Robinson

This once so peaceful island is now bowed down by a terror of revolutionary youths, principally in the kingdoms of Tabanan and Badung, which threatens to cause a total dislocation of the so well-ordered Balinese social system. . . . So long as this evil is not combatted, normal government administration on Bali cannot be expected.¹

There is a conspicuous gap, both analytical and historical, in the scholarly study of modern Bali. The missing years are 1945 to 1966, and the unuttered theme is political conflict. It is probably no coincidence that the lost decades of Balinese history were also the most openly "political" and the most violent in this, or perhaps any, century. This article is a modest response to the provocative silence. It is the story of political conflict in Bali between August 1945 and March 1946; a time of intense political activity and violence after the defeat of the Japanese, and prior to the return of Dutch KNIL (Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger, Royal Netherlands Indies Army) troops.² This period of slightly more than six months constitutes a critical juncture in Bali's social and political history. During these few months the terms of Balinese political discourse were fundamentally and irrevocably changed, mass political and military mobilization occurred on an unprecedented scale, and new political and social conflicts emerged while old rivalries became more visible and often more acute. From late 1945 through 1948 political conflict on Bali was chronic and frequently violent. With the exception of one large-scale battle, in which 96 died in one day, all of the casualties fell in close guerrilla combat, in ones and twos, some stabbed, others beheaded or burned in their houses, the lucky ones

1. Report from the Secretary of the Cabinet, Sanders, early April 1946. S. L. Van der Wal (with P. J. Drooglever and M. J. B. Schouten), ed., *Officiële Bescheiden Betreffende de Nederlands-Indonesische Betrekkingen, 1945-1950*, 12 vols. (hereafter *Officiële Bescheiden*) (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1972-1984) 4 (Document No. 33), p. 84. The term *pemoeda* (*pemuda*) is literally the Indonesian word for youth or young person. It is used here, however, in a stricter, political/sociological sense to describe the revolutionary younger generation of Indonesians, who played a central political and military role in the period of the Indonesian Revolution 1945-1949 and after. For a more complete appreciation of the concept of *pemuda*, see B. R. O'G. Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution, Occupation and Resistance 1944-1946* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), especially ch. 2, pp. 16-34.

2. Recent contributions to the regional history of the Indonesian Revolution make comparison an inviting prospect. See, for instance, Audrey Kahin, ed., *Regional Dynamics of the Indonesian Revolution* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985). I have chosen, however, to focus exclusively on the case of Bali, primarily because we do not yet have a single history in the English language of the island during this period. The only relatively complete study of the Revolution in Bali, to my knowledge, is Nyoman S. Pendit's *Bali Berjuang* (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1979), originally published in 1954.

shot. Moreover, after December 1945, the fighting took place primarily in the villages and the rural parts of Bali. There were no forward lines of combat, no safe areas nor impenetrable mountain sanctuaries. It was a war in which nobody could choose to remain neutral.³

When the Dutch returned on March 2, 1946, Bali was in a state of turmoil, and the lines of social and political division had been drawn. Dutch military and political strategists discovered that they had been sorely mistaken in their assumption that the Balinese had no interest in politics and would welcome the restoration of Dutch authority.⁴ Although some 2,000 KNIL troops managed to land at Sanur beach and Benoa without firing a single shot, within one week they were facing a fierce guerrilla resistance.⁵ A secret (Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service) overview of the week March 22–29, 1946, reported that "everywhere anarchy prevails and terror is taking on serious proportions."⁶ There were, however, significant variations in the extent and degree of political conflict and resistance. The base areas of resistance, and the major centers of open political conflict were within the kingdoms of Tabanan,

3. Nyoman Mantik, a Balinese *pemuda* leader who spent the Revolution in Java and Bali as a liaison officer, claims that the fighting in Bali was more intense than that in Java. (Interview: I Nyoman Mantik, April 5, 1986.) Dutch officers who took part in the occupation of Bali and who later served in Java and Sumatra described the fighting in Bali as "much worse than in Java," "severe and intensive guerrilla combat," and "far worse than expected." (Interviews: former officers of the KNIL Bali/Lombok Brigade, May 1987.)

4. Dutch military and political reports from late 1945 and early 1946 consistently predicted that resistance to a Dutch reoccupation of Bali would be minimal or nonexistent. A report from December 1945, for instance, claimed that ". . . if a landing of Netherlands troops within a very short period would take place, the Balinese people and its chiefs would collaborate with the Netherlands." See "Data About Bali From Schlager," December 8, 1945, Algemeen Secretarie Batavia 1e Zending (hereafter AS-1), XXII/19, Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague (hereafter ARA), Inv. No. 2.10.14. A military document noted: "No resistance expected at and after landings. . . . Cooperation of Balinese is certain." In "Situation as of December 3, 1945," AS-1/XXII/19, ARA, Inv. No. 2.10.14.

5. In the first few months after the Dutch return to Bali (March 2, 1946), several hundred Balinese were killed by KNIL troops and their Balinese auxiliaries, and thousands were taken as "prisoners of war." Over the course of the Revolution (1945–1949), roughly 1,400 Balinese died on the Republican side alone, and a further 700 died fighting on the side of the Dutch. See the list in Pendit, *Bali Berjuang*, pp. 368–90, for his figure of 1,371 deaths on the Republican side. The figure of 700 Balinese is my own estimate of those who died fighting on the side of the Dutch or their allies, and those who were the unrecorded (unknown) victims of terror from both sides, and is based on the weekly and monthly casualty statistics from Dutch military and political reports. The relevant archives are: 1) "Overzicht en Ontwikkeling van de Toestand Troepenco Bali/Lombok" (hereafter OOT) in "Rapportage Indonesie" (hereafter *R/*), Nos 740–41 (ARA), Inv. No. 2.10.29; 2) "Wekelijksch (Militaire) Inlichtingenrapport" (hereafter *WIR*), in *R/* No. 737, ARA, Inv. No. 2.10.29; 3) "Politiek Verslag" (title varies), in AS-1, ARA, Inv. No. 2.10.14. Additional copies of the monthly OOTs and the weekly WIRs for Bali/Lombok are held by the Ministerie van Defensie Archieven Depot [hereafter MvD] in The Hague, Inv. 32/1, GG-5, 1407.

6. "Geheim Militaire Overzicht--NEFIS," No. 5, March 22–28, 1946, in *R/* No. 151, ARA, Inv. No. 2.10.29.



Balinese pemuda fighters in Buleleng. At left, I Negah Wirta Tamu (Cilik), a former Peta section commander, active in various struggle organizations until the final surrender in January 1950. (From Njoman S. Pendit, ed., *Album Bali Berjuang* [Denpasar: Jajasan Kebaktian Pedjuang Daerah Bali, 1954].)



"Anti-Pemberontak" (AP), based in Sangsit, Buleleng, one of many local militia working closely with the Dutch (KNIL) forces in Bali. Here, some AP members armed with spears are gathered round a Dutch Piper-Cub aircraft, used for reconnaissance, propaganda, and occasional armed attacks. Photograph from Douwes Dekker Collection, Dept. of Manuscripts and University Archives, Cornell University Libraries.

Badung, and Buleleng.⁷ (See Map A.) Jembrana was an early center of Republicanism in 1945, but it did not remain a base area for long. The four kingdoms in the eastern part of the island—Bangli, Karangasem, Klungkung, and Gianyar—were not areas of widespread Republican sympathy. The latter two were, in fact, notoriously pro-Dutch, while the former were more divided. Even within the base areas of Republican resistance, there were significant numbers of Balinese prepared to cooperate, politically and militarily, with the arriving Dutch forces.

It simply made no sense, therefore, when the Dutch spoke of "the Balinese" as a single entity, because the people of Bali were already acutely divided, and on both sides of the issue they were prepared to fight. The six months prior to the return of the Dutch, then, also suggest some of the reasons why "the Revolution" was experienced as a war among Balinese and not directly as a fight between "the Balinese" and "the Dutch." If the "Revolution," in Bali, is understood as a local civil war rather than a regional manifestation of a national war of liberation, the conflictual politics of the Sukarno era and especially the bloodletting of 1965–1966 make a good deal more sense.⁸

But how had a society with a reputation for order and harmony fallen, by March 1946, into a condition of chaos and political conflict? What had moved the ostensibly apolitical and peaceable Balinese to become involved in violent "terrorist" *pemuda* organizations? Why did the strength of the resistance vary as it did within Bali, and in particular why was open political conflict concentrated in the kingdoms of Tabanan, Badung, and Buleleng? The general thrust of the argument made here is that open political conflict and widespread resistance occurred where there obtained both a particular configuration of social forces and economic relations and a collapse or sudden weakening of state authority. The variation in social/economic formations within Bali—in particular, in the structure of the rivalry between the different noble houses (*puri*), the nature of caste relations and social mobility, economic relations, and the political legacy of the Japanese period—strongly influenced both the geographical and the social distribution of conflict in 1945–1946 and thereafter.

Political conflict was not merely a playing out of perceived social or economic injustices, however, but the consequence of struggles to establish or to dominate state structures at the regional (Bali) and local (kingdom) level. Thus, for example, the initial concentration of violence in Tabanan and Badung, and the apparent peacefulness or stability of Klungkung and Karangasem, were the result not simply of the somewhat different socioeconomic conditions prevailing in these regions—though it was partly that—but also of the differing capacities of the local state in each place to exert its authority in preventing or controlling such conflict.⁹

7. The Indonesian term is *kerajaan* which is most easily translated as kingdom or principality. Depending on their current administrative status under the Dutch, the rulers of the *kerajaan* were known as Raja, "Stedehouder," "Regent," "Bestuurder," and "zelfbestuurder," but also by their royal titles such as Cokorda, Dewa Agung, and Anak Agung. The term Raja is preferred here.

8. Estimates of the numbers killed in Bali after the coup of October 1, 1965, range from a low figure of 30,000 to a high of over 100,000. Given that the population in Bali at the time was roughly 1.5 million, both of these figures represent quite extraordinary losses. The strength of the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) and the severity of the backlash in Bali have never been a secret, but to my knowledge there has not been a single serious study of the events of 1965–1966 there.

9. Anderson makes a similar argument for the case of Java in 1945–1946. (Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, pp. 138–66 and 332–69.) It is interesting that a similar

The remainder of this article is divided into three sections. The first of these explains briefly what I mean when I use the terms "state" and "state structures," and outlines, theoretically, that part of the argument concerned with the character of states. The next section examines the social and economic forces which influenced the pattern of political conflict and violence between August 1945 and March 1946. It pays special attention to variations within Bali, with a view to understanding the geographical distribution of resistance and violence. The third section examines the character of the various state structures affecting Bali during the same period. It begins with a brief description of the role of the "national" states, British, Dutch, Japanese, and Indonesian. This is followed by a more detailed characterization of the "regional" Japanese and Republican states in Bali, which emphasizes their fundamental weakness, in spite of Japanese military might. Finally, a brief comparison is offered of two kingdoms in Bali—Tabanan and Klungkung—in order to shed greater light on the impact of local states on patterns of political conflict and resistance.

What Are "States" and "State Structures"?

For the argument I am making, it is important to clarify what is meant here by the terms "state" and "state structures." The latter are understood as the bodies, institutions, and organs through which a particular class or group exercises four primary tasks of domination vis-à-vis a given population: a) political ordering and administration; b) economic surplus extraction and circulation; c) coercive control; and d) judicial/ideological hegemony. "State structures" include legislative and executive bodies, fiscal and monetary institutions, military and police forces, bureaucratic institutions, judicial systems, and frequently, religious bodies. Taken together, then, these are the structures which make up the entities we usually call states.

The term "state structures" is used here primarily because it suggests the plurality, or the internal heterogeneity of states. It therefore avoids the implication that there is an essential unity about a state, either in its capacity to "act," or in its "character" ("capitalist" states, are in some respects also "feudal"; "bureaucratic" states are often partly "patrimonial" etc). This does not mean that we must dispense with the term "state" altogether, but simply that we are able to distinguish between the whole entity (the state) and its component parts (state structures).

That having been said, it must be recognized that more than one "state" may exist within a given territory; for example within a single nation-state. The existence of discrete but overlapping levels and types of state-like authority, is most evident during periods of political transformation or confrontation. Yet even in times of peace and stability such overlapping authorities are not unusual.¹⁰ These are not

period of chaos and conflict had accompanied the collapse of the Dutch state in Bali in 1942, at the time of the Japanese takeover. At that time, however, the Japanese were able to establish control with relative swiftness, bringing the violence to a halt within a month. In 1945-1946, on the other hand, neither the Japanese nor the Republican elements of the regional (Bali) state had the capacity, nor perhaps the will, to control the rising political turmoil—boycotts, murder, kidnapping, burning, looting, etc.

10. Wars of independence or secession, for example, are conflicts between at least two rival claimants to state authority over a territory and population, and they frequently entail the co-existence of two fairly complete sets of state structures. In times of peace, challengers at the center may try either to seize control of the old state apparatus, or they may attempt to establish independent state structures, including militia, judicial structures, systems of taxation, ideological norms etc. In

simply different levels in a single state hierarchy—though in some cases they may be this—but derive or draw their authority (ideological, coercive, economic etc) from different sources, or else have substantial autonomy from a higher or more central state.

Both of these aspects of states—the coexistence of various levels and types of state authority, and the internal heterogeneity or "dividedness" of states—are useful in understanding the pattern of political conflict in Bali in 1945–1946, and thereafter. As a start, it is possible to identify at least three levels of state authority which affected political relations in Bali at this time: 1) the "national" level structures, centered on Java, including those of the British, Dutch, Indonesian Republican, and Japanese governments; 2) the "regional"—level states centered in Bali, including those of the Japanese, the Balinese Republicans, and after March 1946, the Dutch; 3) the local—level states centered in each of the eight kingdoms of Bali.

The collapse or weakening of the higher, or more extensive, states effectively increased the political centrality of those at lower levels, and resulted in a devolution of political authority at least to the level of the eight kingdoms. This devolution had three principal effects on political relations there. First, it created a political opening for rival state elites; the older Republicans and nationalists in the KNI (Komite Nasional Indonesia), and also the younger activist *pemuda*, who quickly founded local branches of nationalist youth organizations such as Pesindo, PRI, BPRI (Badan Pemberontak Republik Indonesia), BKR/TKR, and ISSM.¹¹ Second, it meant that there was greater potential for political conflict to develop among the eight kingdoms, due to the absence of a powerful Bali-wide state authority. Third, it meant that, for the first time in several decades, the actual political authority of the various kingdoms became the determining factor in the maintenance of political order within their respective territories. With the surrender of the Japanese, vast differences in the strength of the eight kingdoms became immediately apparent. The weakness of state authority in Tabanan and Badung, for example, provided early opportunities and impetus for the expression of a variety of existing social and political conflicts, for the emergence of new political leaders, and for the development of new political ideologies and styles. Where the local (kingdom) state remained strong, as in Klungkung and Gianyar, these opportunities were limited, and political mobilization, if it occurred at all, was at the behest of a landed aristocracy.

peripheral areas of a country, political challengers/elites more often attempt the latter; that is, to set up alternative state structures. This describes fairly, for example, the emergence of highly autonomous feudal lords in frontier regions, and the growth of rebel bands and millenarian movements, such as the Hoa Hao of Cochinchina, the Saminists of Central Java, and Saya San in Burma. (See W. Brustein & M. Levi, "Rulers, Rebels and Regions 1500–1700." Paper presented to the Meeting of the American Sociology Association, Detroit, MI, 1983; E. J. Hobsbawm, *Social Bandits and Primitive Rebels* [Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1959]; and Hoa Hue Tam Tai, "Dreams of Peace and Plenty: Vietnamese Millenarianism and its Modern Fate" [manuscript, 1981]).

11. The Bali branch of Pesindo (Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia) was founded November 13, 1945; PRI (Pemuda Republik Indonesia) on November 13, 1945; BKR (Badan Keamanan Rakyat) on August 31, 1945; TKR (Tentara Keamanan Rakyat) on November 1, 1945; ISSM (Ikatan Siswa Sekolah Menengah) in September 1945.

Social and Economic Forces—The Sources of Conflict

The social and economic bases of conflict in Bali are too numerous and complex to be treated satisfactorily in an article. What is offered here, therefore, is only a broad outline of the main sources of conflict in 1945–1946. For convenience these can be grouped as follows:

- (a) Rivalries between noble houses ("puri");
- (b) Issues of caste;
- (c) Relations of production—economic issues;
- (d) The Japanese legacy—military, political.

Although in some respects the character of Bali was remarkably homogeneous, internal variation was of considerable importance in determining the incidence and pattern of political conflict there. Differing socioeconomic conditions affected the kinds of issues which were to become politically salient in each area. They also influenced the type of political alliances which were likely or feasible, and the store of political options and resources (organizational, ideological, military, economic) which were available for political mobilization.

(a) Puri Politics

Among the most important sources of conflict in 1945–1946 were the historical rivalries which existed among Bali's noble houses, or "puri."¹² These rivalries centered on matters of social status, control of land and labor, and access to political or administrative and religious office, especially the offices of Raja, Punggawa (District Head), and Sedahan Agung (Chief Irrigation and Tax Officer).¹³ In a strict sense,

12. The terms "puri" and "jero" describe an extended household of Satria caste with a genealogical claim to high (noble) status. In theory, relative status is based upon a principle of proximity to a core or royal lineage. The houses of those most closely related to a "reigning" Raja may legitimately be referred to as "puri gde," while those more distantly related are designated, in declining order, as "puri," "jero gde," and "jero." (See Clifford Geertz, *Negara, The Theatre State in Nineteenth Century Bali* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980], pp. 26–34; also see Clifford Geertz and Hildred Geertz, *Kinship in Bali* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975], ch. 4, pp. 117–52.) In practice, however, there is a more or less continuous debate over status claims. (See Geertz, *Negara*, p. 60; also Clifford Geertz, *Peddlers and Princes* [Chicago and London: University of Chicago, 1963], p. 24.) Indeed, in precolonial Bali, rebellions and revolts were often led by challenging puri; for example in Gianyar in the 1880s. (See I Wayan Dunia, "Pemberontakan Cokorda Oka Negara di Gianyar Tahun 1884–1890," Skripsi, Universitas Udayana [UNUD], 1984.)

13. With the imposition, after 1906, of a territorially based system of political authority, and a rapid expansion of private ownership in land, control over people and control over land became enmeshed, and differences in landed wealth became an increasingly important aspect of political and social power. Control of formal political office became similarly important. One consequence was that the focus of puri rivalry and factionalism expanded to encompass not simply the claims to status and deference, which Geertz argues were central in late nineteenth century Bali, but also control over political office, land, and labor. The major political offices, as they were understood in the 1940s, were Raja, Punggawa, of which there were several in each kingdom, and Sedahan Agung. In addition to these posts, there were others which were coveted including: Manca—an assistant District Head; Sedahan—Tax and Irrigation Officer for an entire watershed; Judge on the Raad van Kerta—the Judicial Council for

these rivalries often had little to do with the issues of nationalism or Indonesian independence, but in the period after August 1945, they came increasingly to be framed in the idiom of this debate. The political mobilization which occurred at this time, in the name of *merdeka* (freedom, independence), and (all-Indonesia) Republicanism on the one hand, and "Balinese autonomy" (from Java) and "Loyalism" (to the Dutch) on the other, accentuated the conflict not simply between the noble houses, but also between their respective followers. New and often intense social, political, and ideological conflicts, were forged in the course of this mobilization.

In some places, such as Tabanan, the ideological question (Republicanism vs. Loyalism) was already an important basis of conflict prior to 1945, largely because of the prewar development of a nationalist movement there. In the 1930s, Tabanan had the largest and most active branch of the moderate nationalist party, Parindra, and a large number of affiliated organizations, including the Rukun Tani (rural marketing and savings coops). Private schools with a nationalist orientation, such as the Taman Siswa, also received an enthusiastic reception here and in Denpasar, and developed rapidly in the prewar period.¹⁴ What happened in Tabanan in the late 1930s, occurred also in other parts of Bali over the course of the Revolution as the ideological debate over nationalism became a real political issue, and not simply a guise for other struggles.

The political landscape was complicated somewhat by the fact that Bali had been colonized piecemeal by the Dutch.¹⁵ Although after 1938 the eight kingdoms of Bali all had the status of self-governing territories, each headed by a descendant of the old hereditary rulers, five had experienced reasonably long periods of "direct rule" under the Dutch, while three had, with minor interruption, remained as areas of "indirect rule." In the former category, the kingdoms of Buleleng and Jembrana succumbed to Dutch military force in 1849, and were brought under direct colonial rule by 1882. Badung, Tabanan, and Klungkung resisted Dutch penetration in the first decade of this century, but became direct-ruled territories between 1906 and 1908.¹⁶ In these kingdoms, where the Dutch embarked on a strategy of "rationalizing" political and administrative structures, the surviving members of the Raja-puri (the noble houses of the various Raja) lost (temporarily) their royal status, and in most cases their landed wealth. Leading members were exiled for a time to Lombok, or were given low-level government jobs as clerks, foremen, or police assistants. In 1929, in recognition of the political failure of the rationalization plan, the descendants of the former Raja were permitted by the Dutch to assume their old royal titles, those in exile were invited to return and were officially designated as "Bestuurders"

Native Law (*adat*) in each kingdom. For a description of these offices in precolonial Bali, see Geertz, *Negara*, pp. 63-67.

14. Parindra-Bali was originally founded by the Javanese medical doctor, Murjani, who came to Bali in the mid-1930s. The first branches were established in Jembrana, where Murjani lived, and then in Singaraja, Denpasar, and Tabanan. (Pendit, *Bali Berjuang*, pp. 7-14.)

15. The following summary is based on Dr. V. E. Korn, *Het Adatrecht van Bali* (The Hague: Naeff, 1932), pp. 112-13, 309, 315, 317; and W. F. van der Kaaden, "Geschiedenis van de Bestuursvoering over Bali en Lombok van 1898-1938," *Tropisch Nederland* 11 (1938-1939): 203-8, 219-24, 234-40, 253-56, 265-72.

16. In Badung, the Raja and several hundreds of his followers died in the now famous *puputan* (a heroic last stand cum mass suicide) of 1906. In the same year, the kingdom of Tabanan fell to the Dutch, and shortly thereafter the Raja and his son took their own lives. The Raja of Klungkung was killed leading a *puputan* in 1908, in the face of insuperable Dutch military might.

(Rulers) within their former kingdoms, now called "Negara."¹⁷ In 1938, in a more comprehensive Dutch move toward decentralization, they were officially restored to their former status as "Zelfbestuurders" (Autonomous Rulers) or Raja, with a measure of real authority within their respective "Landschappen" (Realms).¹⁸

In these formerly direct-ruled territories, however, the Raja-puri often lacked their earlier material means and royal legitimacy. This was especially true of the royal families of Buleleng and Jembrana, where the memory of royal authority had seriously faded. It was also very much the case in Tabanan and Badung. The exception to the rule was Klungkung, where the Raja-puri was able to reestablish its authority, wealth, and prestige with the assistance of the colonial government. The weakening of the royal tradition in the western kingdoms left the Raja-puri more vulnerable to challenges in the period 1945-1946, but, with the possible exception of Tabanan, it did not send them into the protective arms of the Dutch in 1946.

Three of Bali's Raja--Bangli, Karangasem, and Gianyar--elected for a variety of reasons not to resist Dutch incursions at the turn of the century. Instead, they recognized Dutch sovereignty and were in return designated as "Stedehouders" (Representatives of the Dutch colonial government), and after 1913, as "Regent" within their kingdoms. These indirectly ruled territories, or "Gouvernements Landschappen," were established in Karangasem in 1896, Gianyar in 1901, and in Bangli in 1909. Although Bangli and Gianyar officially became "direct-ruled" areas in 1917, the role and the position of their Raja remained substantially unchanged.¹⁹ Moreover, the Raja-puri were permitted to retain their landed wealth, and family members continued to occupy high political offices. Thus with the "restoration" of 1938, the royal tradition in these kingdoms remained strong.²⁰ It must be stressed, however, that the paramount position of the Raja-puri in these areas had always depended to a great extent on the backing of the colonial state, and this was reflected in the general willingness of the Raja of the eastern kingdoms to cooperate with the arriving Dutch forces in 1946.

Although under the Dutch and Japanese regimes, certain noble houses maintained their paramount positions in their kingdoms, other houses, many of them independently wealthy and socially influential, did whatever possible to challenge the incumbents' positions. Changes under the Dutch and Japanese were uncommon, because both regimes tended to follow a purely hereditary-based system for filling high political offices. But the collapse of state power, in 1945-1946, provided a unique opportunity for competing houses to act upon their claims and overthrow an incumbent who had been dependent upon the colonial state.²¹ Where there was no higher authority to

17. The relevant legislation is "Stbl. 1929 No. 226."

18. The relevant legislation is "Stbl. 1938 No. 529."

19. The relevant legislation for the changes in Bangli and Gianyar is "Stbl. 1916 No. 162" and "Stbl. 1917 No. 518." Beginning in 1921, Karangasem was nominally governed by the "Karangasemraad" which was an experiment in decentralization. It left the Raja (still called the "Stedehouder") with a certain amount of autonomy within his kingdom. "Stbl. 1921 No. 758."

20. In Gianyar and Bangli, for example, the men who were named as "Zelfbestuurders" in 1938, had been serving as "Regent" since 1913.

21. It is commonly said in Bali that the Revolution was an opportune time to "*mem-balas*" or get back at one's rivals or enemies. (Interview: I Nyoman Pegeg, September 16, 1986.) The Raja of Gianyar, and later Prime Minister of NIT (Negara Indonesia Timur, East Indonesia State), Anak Agung Gde Agung, portrays the revolutionary

guarantee the right of a lord or puri to political title, power became a matter of evident control over a population and/or territory and Republican organizations became valuable political allies. The challengers for the position of Raja were sometimes economically more powerful, and socially more influential than the incumbents, constituting, in effect, a rising landed elite. The collapse of the old state structure was the precondition for their political rise, and for the concomitant decline of the old aristocracy.

Puri rivalries existed on some scale in virtually every kingdom, district, and village on the island. Some of the larger and more important struggles, particularly those involving Raja-puri, are worth noting here, because these rivalries strongly influenced the character of political conflict in each of the eight kingdoms. Two of these kingdoms, Bangli and Karangasem, will not be discussed, due to a lack of reliable information.²²

Badung: The major rivalry in Badung was between the Puri Pemecutan and the Puri Satria, both located in Denpasar. Whereas these puri had shared power (as co-regents) in precolonial Badung, the Dutch had selected the patriarch of Puri Satria (then known as Puri Denpasar), to become "Bestuurder" in 1929, and then in 1938 had restored him to the position of Raja or Zelfbestuurder of Badung. The post of Punggawa Kota²³ had for a time been filled by members of the Puri Pemecutan, but they still resented their exclusion from the top office of Raja.²⁴ In the period prior to the Dutch landing in early 1946 there was no substantial puri-based opposition to the Republican movement in Denpasar but Badung was nonetheless divided politically on the basis of allegiance to different puri. After four years of Japanese rule, the Puri Satria still held power, but it was economically weak and lacked influence in large areas of the kingdom. Because two of the Raja's sons were involved in the KNI and the BKR/TKR, the Raja was unwilling to take any firm action against the

period in Bali as "a time of intrigue and calumny." (Interview: Anak Agung Gde Agung, May 18, 1987.) These descriptions resonate rather strongly with Geertz' description of politics in late nineteenth century Bali. (Geertz, *Negara*, p. 62.)

22. The most important rivalries in these kingdoms appear to have been *within* or very close to the puri. There seems to have been some unpleasantness in Bangli, for instance, between the immediate family members of the Raja, and those of his brother, A. A. Gede Agung Anom Putera, after the latter was passed over for the position of Regent in 1934. Anak Agung Gde Muditha and Anak Agung Gede Ngurah, the sons of Anom Putera, and therefore also nephews of the Raja of Bangli, were two of the most prominent and respected *pemuda* leaders in Bali. Dutch sources speculate that the young men joined the resistance out of a sense of the injustice done to their father, but that they were still close enough to the Raja to be guaranteed considerable freedom of action. (See R. J. F. Post, "Nopens Zelfbestuurder Bangli," December 29, 1947, *Archive—Resident Boon/47*.) Two of the sons of the Puri in Karangasem were responsible for the organization of the BKR/TKR in the kingdom. However, in April, with the assistance of the Dutch, the Raja Karangasem set up an anti-Republican militia, AIM (Anti Indonesia Merdeka). (Pendit, *Bali Berjuang*, p. 80. Interviews: I Made Wijakusuma, March 22, 23, 1986; Dewa Made Dhana, October 10, 1986.)

23. *Kota* means town. In each kingdom, the capital was designated as a separate district, and was administered by a "Punggawa Kota." This almost invariably led to political rivalries between the Raja and the Punggawa Kota.

24. Interview: I Gusti Bagus Oka (former Sekretaris Paruman Agung Bali 1946-1949), December 19, 1986.

Republican movement.²⁵ Members of the wealthier and more influential Puri Pemecutan (commanding a strong base of loyalty in Denpasar and the western part of the kingdom) had also been active in nationalist circles since the early 1930s.²⁶ In an effort to win the allegiance of the stronger Puri Pemecutan, and simultaneously undercut the nationalist resistance in Badung as a whole, the Dutch dismissed the existing Raja (from Puri Satria) in mid-1946 and bestowed the title on the patriarch of Puri Pemecutan.²⁷ This move succeeded in weakening the Republican movement considerably, and it also ensured that the division between the two puri continued through the Revolution and beyond.²⁸

Buleleng: In Buleleng, it was rivalry between the Raja-puri (Puri Agung Buleleng) and the Puri Sukasada which had dominated the political scene at least since the

25. The sons involved in the resistance were Cokorda Ngurah Agung and Cokorda Bagus Agung. The Dutch saw the Puri Satria as a center of subversive activity in South Bali: ". . . een van de belangrijkste kernen van subversieve activiteit in Zuid-Bali, in de poeri van deze zelfbestuurder was gevestigd," Secret report on Badung, by Secretary of State for Home Affairs, H. van der Wal, December 15, 1948, *Ri*, No. 737/12, ARA Inv. No. 2.10.29. Some Balinese say that the Raja himself, though old and infirm, was an ardent Republican, and did not regret relinquishing the post in 1946. (Interview: I Made Wijakusuma [PRI founder and leader, ex-Head MBU-DPRI-Sunda Kecil 1946-1948], March 23, 1986.) Wijakusuma also suggested that the old Raja's Republicanism was based in his desire for revenge for the defeat of 1906, in which his father, the then Raja, and hundreds of family and followers of the puri, died.

26. Together with five others, including two Javanese, one Ambonese, and Nyoman Pegeg, the head of the Puri Pemecutan (I Gusti Ngurah Gde Pemecutan) formed the "Studi Club Ganesha" in the early 1930s to discuss the works of Hatta and Sukarno. When these works were banned, and the club outlawed in 1933, the members struck on the idea of establishing a Taman Siswa School in Bali. (Interview: Nyoman Pegeg, July 31, 1986.) In the early revolutionary period, the leaders of the PRI and the TKR (Wijakusuma and Ngurah Rai respectively) reportedly consulted with the Cokorda on matters of political and military strategy. On one occasion the Cokorda met with twelve *balian* (men and women with magical/spiritual power) to discuss their possible support for the Republican resistance. (Interview: I Made Wijakusuma, March 22, 1986.)

27. See "Overzicht Politiek Situatie," May 1946, in *Archive--Resident Boon/46*. (This refers to a collection of papers of the Resident Bali/Lombok, Dr. M. Boon, made available to me by a Dutch scholar who had received them from the Boon family. At some point they will be available in the ARA. "46" refers to the year of the document.) The old Raja of Badung was eased out of his post in April 1946. For a full discussion of the rationale behind the Dutch decision, see the secret report on the situation in Badung, December 15, 1948, in *Ri*, No. 737, ARA, Inv. No. 2.10.29.

28. It is sometimes said that the Puri Pemecutan betrayed the Revolution after accepting the position of Raja in 1946. Others point out that the head of the puri (Cokorda Pemecutan) consulted with the main Republican leader, I Gusti Ngurah Rai, prior to accepting the position, because he feared that this move might undermine the resistance. According to this version of events, Ngurah Rai encouraged the Cokorda to accept the job so that he might help the resistance "from within." (Interviews: Nyoman Pegeg, July 31, 1986; I Made Wijakusuma, March 22, 1986; Anak Agung Kecor, September 6, 1987.)

imposition of indirect Dutch colonial authority in 1849.²⁹ As a result of the unwillingness of the Puri Sukasada to acquiesce in Dutch authority, several of its leading members were sent into exile. The Dutch acknowledged the Puri Agung Buleleng as the Raja-puri until 1882 when direct rule was imposed, and then again after the nominal restoration of 1929. After a period of exile, the Puri Sukasada became the main supplier of Punggawa Kota and in 1945 was still voicing its claim to the throne of all Buleleng. Mr. I Gusti Ktut Puja, whom the Republic appointed Governor of Sunda Kecil in August 1945, was from the Puri Sukasada, and many other prominent nationalists also had close relations with the puri.³⁰ The Puri Agung was not unsympathetic to the Republic, but the new Raja (Anak Agung Nyoman Panji Tisna, appointed 1944) was more inclined to favor peaceful, parliamentary methods than most of the *pemuda* would have liked. For a variety of reasons—not the least of which being that he had converted to Christianity—Panji Tisna resigned as Raja in 1947, and was replaced by his brother, Mr. Djelantik.³¹

Gianyar: The Puri Agung Gianyar had a number of challengers for the status of Raja-puri.³² These were concentrated in the western border region of the kingdom, and included the leading puri of Ubud, Mas, Pliatan, Pejeng, and Sukawati. Members and followers of these puri were strong initial supporters of the Republic, and many joined the PRI and the BKR to fight against the militia of the Raja of Gianyar,

29. The man designated by the Dutch as the Raja at this time was apparently the former Patih. The Puri Sukasada claims that theirs is the lineage of the actual Raja at the time of the Dutch attack and victory, in 1848–1849. A Dutch report from 1945 acknowledged that the two puri had "an equal claim to the throne." "Nota Herbezetting Bali," November 1945, *Archive—Resident Boon/45*.

30. A Dutch report from November 1945 noted that the "influential" Puri Sukasada had a good number of strong and well-educated members apart from Mr. Puja. By comparison, among the male offspring of the Puri Agung there were "in fact no powerful, well-educated personalities." The influence of the Puri Sukasada extended well beyond Buleleng. (*Ibid.*, p. 1.) It is said that the Puri Sukasada frequently married women from Banjar Jawa in Singaraja. Banjar Jawa was later known as a center of Republican resistance and a focal point of nationalist consciousness in Buleleng. (Interview: I Gde Rahjasa [ex-*pemuda* leader, Buleleng], October 9, 1986.)

31. According to some accounts, Panji Tisna resigned because he could not reconcile his sympathy for the nationalist cause with his desire to do an honest job as Raja, which included maintaining peace and order. Others suggest that he "lacked moral courage," "had no convictions," or that he was at heart an artist and writer, and not a politician or leader. Some ex-*pemuda* claim that he was not sympathetic to the Republic at all, but was actually pro-Dutch. (Interviews: I Gusti Bagus Oka, December, 1986; Pak Item [I Ketut Wijana, former *pemuda* leader, Buleleng], September 29, 1986; Anak Agung Santosa, [son of A. A. Nyoman Panji Tisna], October 11, 1986.)

32. For some idea of the history of these challenges, see H. J. E. F. Schwartz, "Aanteekening Omtrent Het Landschap Giangjar," *Tijdschrift voor het Binnenlands Bestuur* 19, 3 (1900): 166–89. The Puri Giangyar had lost credibility in the eyes of many when it surrendered to the Dutch without a fight in 1900. The Raja at that time requested the status of "Stedehouder," which had been bestowed by the Dutch on the former Raja of Karangasem in 1896 and, in exchange, recognized the full sovereignty of the Dutch in his kingdom. Many also regarded the Puri Agung as an "upstart puri" because it was said to have been established by a commoner from Badung. (Interview: Nyoman Pegeg, September 16, 1986.)

the PPN.³³ Yet divided amongst themselves, they were unable to unseat the Puri Agung during the Revolution, and the rivalry persisted after independence.³⁴

Jembrana: Two principal houses of the kingdom, Jero Pasekan and Puri Agung Negara, had been competing for the position of Raja—puri for the better part of a century, but the Dutch favored the latter.³⁵ Nonetheless, the Raja and his son (Anak Agung Bagus Suteja, later Governor of Bali), had nationalist sympathies, and their puri formed the core of early KNI and *pemuda* organizations in the kingdom. Nearly half of the nationalist activists contacted by the Javanese Republican "propagandist" Soekardani in October 1945, were family members, or employees of the Puri Agung.³⁶ Open armed resistance, though strong at the outset, did not last long in Jembrana, particularly after the Dutch arrested the Raja's son, Suteja. Jero Pasekan, the house of the Punggawa Kota, was a center of anti-Republicanism, and with the help of the Dutch, it set up the anti-Republican militia, BPP (Badan Pemberantas Pengacau—Body of Fighters against Terrorists).³⁷

Klungkung: The Puri Agung Klungkung had very few serious royal competitors

33. PPN (Pemuda Pembela Negara—Youth for the Defense of the State/Kingdom). The PPN, established by the Raja in late 1945, was dubbed "Pemuda Pembela NICA" (Youth for the Defense of NICA), by Republican *pemuda*. On September 20, 1945, the Raja of Gianyar, Anak Agung Gde Agung, was kidnapped by *pemuda* gangs in the vicinity of Tegalalang between Gianyar and Denpasar. Through the intervention of the BKR leader, Nyoman Pegeg, he was released. A few days later, however, another attempt was made near Batubulan. This time he managed to escape in his car, returning promptly to Gianyar where he began planning the formation of the PPN. The kidnapping attempts were apparently initiated by the puri of Ubud and Pliatan, and possibly others, and were carried out by members of the PRI. Some of the older nationalists (like Nyoman Pegeg) regarded the kidnapping as "politically very stupid." And one *pemuda* activist (Dewa Made Dhana), who met with the A. A. Gde Agung prior to the incident, recalls that in early September the Puri Gianyar seemed prepared to go along with the Republic. A. A. Gde Agung himself claims that this act of "terrorism" turned him against the resistance. (Interviews: Anak Agung Gde Agung, May 18, 1987; Nyoman Pegeg, September 16, 1986; Bapak Reti, July 30, 1986; Dewa Made Dhana, October 10, 1986.)

34. In the 1950s the Puri Agung Gianyar (in particular, A. A. Gde Agung) became a powerful center of PSI strength, while many followers of the rival western puri favored the PNI and the PKI.

35. This summary is drawn from the collected archives and writings of the Jembrana historian, I Wayan Reken (deceased), and from I Ketut Wartama, "Sedjarah Perkembangan Djembrana," Skripsi UNUD, 1972.

36. Of a list of Balinese Republican activists contacted by Soekardani, over half (20 persons out of 37) were from Negara (kingdom of Jembrana). Of these, nine persons were clearly connected with the Puri Agung; seven were family members and two were employees in the office of the Raja. ("Lijst van Personen, waarmede de propagandist Soekardani in aanraking is gekomen," A.S.-1/XXII/19, ARA Inv. No. 2.10.14.)

37. The head of this house was Westra Utama, who seems to have been the driving force behind the anti-Republican movement in Jembrana. The BPP was known to Republicans as the "Badan Penjilat Pantat Belanda" [Body of Ass-lickers of the Dutch].

by 1945.³⁸ The Raja's main local rivals were the Punggawa Kota (I Poetoe Gde Pengoejoengan), who was not a *triwangsa* (of the three highest castes), and the Sedahan Agung (I Wajan Merdana), also of low caste, and as a native of Bangli, a "foreigner." These men lacked the social, political, and material base necessary to challenge the position of the Raja, yet both attempted to do so under the banner of Republicanism, and both, together with two others, were murdered by the Raja's militia (BKN) in March 1946.³⁹ The Raja construed Republicanism as "outside aggression" from Klungkung's old rivals, Badung and Bangli and from Islamic Java. These claims were made more credible by the fact that bellicose armed *pemuda* and BKR groups from Badung did come to Klungkung in September and October 1945 to mobilize the local population.⁴⁰ Offended and threatened by the actions and demands of the *pemuda* groups, the Dewa Agung took an early stand against the Republic.

Tabanan: In Tabanan a large number of wealthy and influential *puri* and *jero* with strong Republican sympathies were in a position to challenge the poverty-stricken and politically weak Raja-puri, Puri Gde Tabanan.⁴¹ The 1945-1946 pattern of rivalry apparently did not parallel the major factional split of the turn of the century between the allies of Puri Gde and those of Puri Kaleran.⁴² The rivalry in Tabanan,

38. The Dewa Agung had some limited trouble with his own family, when one of his sons, Cokorda Anom, joined the *pemuda* without his father's permission. On discovering this the Dewa Agung told the Controleur that he was prepared to resign as Raja. At the same meeting, Cokorda Anom, deeply embarrassed, begged the forgiveness of both his father and the Controleur. In Klungkung only one high-caste household, the Griya Pidada (Griya = Brahmana household) was an active source of Republican resistance to the Dutch, but it failed to mobilize the kind of mass following necessary for a serious political challenge. Its head, Ida Bagus Pidada, was in fact more active in Denpasar politics, becoming a member of the KNI in 1945. For a more detailed treatment of the Raja of Klungkung, see below pp. 43-47.

39. The BKN (Badan Keamanan Negara) was set up by the Raja of Klungkung in November 1945 to combat the rising tide of Republicanism in his kingdom. (Pendit, *Bali Berjuang*, p. 80.) The Raja himself claims that it was set up in January 1946. The responsibility of the BKN for these murders and other acts of "terror," are confirmed by Dutch intelligence reports. See, for example, "De Gebeurtenissen in Kloengkoeng op Maart 4, 1946," *Archive—Resident Boon/48*.


40. Pendit, *Bali Berjuang*, pp. 78-79. *Pemuda* leaders admit that the actions of the BKR and PRI who descended upon Klungkung in August and September were provocative and "too hot-headed." The Dewa Agung was the only Raja who categorically refused to fly the Republican flag over government offices and the *puri* in late 1945. According to one account he justified his refusal by reference to his collection of "lontar," which he said indicated that the day was inauspicious. (Interview: Dewa Made Dhana, October 10, 1986.) For the Dewa Agung's own interpretation of events up to March 1946, see his letter/report to the Resident of Bali/Lombok, December 6, 1948, *Archive—Resident Boon/48*.

41. The situation in which the Raja of Tabanan found himself is described in more detail below, pp. 43-47. See also A. A. W. A. Ellerbeck, "Personalalia—Tabanan," *Archive—Resident Boon/46* and van Beuge, "Report on Situation in Tabanan," MvD, Inv. No. 32/1-GG.8-D, p. 1.

42. Geertz describes the factionalism in Tabanan, around 1906, in some detail. On one side were the Puri Gde, Dangin, Denpasar, Taman, Oka, Anom, Anyar, and the Jero Subamia, and on the other were the Puri Kaleran and Kediri and the Jero Gde Beng, Kompiang and Tegoh. (Geertz, *Negara*, pp. 60-61.)

MAP B

TABANAN - POLITICAL SYMPATHIES OF MAJOR PURI AND PUNGGAWA, 1945



Based on information in Ellerbeck, "Personalia."

in effect, was not between the Raja—puri and one major challenger (as was the case in most other kingdoms), nor between "the kingdom" and "the outsiders" (as the Raja construed it in Klungkung) but among several influential and wealthy puri and jero—of which Tabanan had an unusually large number—dotted about the kingdom. The vast majority of these puri had Republican sympathies, and this meant that the resistance movement soon spread beyond the town of Tabanan. (See Table A and Map B.)

Table A
Major Puri and Jero in Tabanan and Their Political Orientation, 1946

Location	Puri Name	Politics
Tabanan (Kota)	Puri Gde	Loyal (Dutch)
	Puri Kaleran	[unknown]
	Puri Anom	Republican
	Puri Anyar	Loyal (Dutch)
	Puri Kompiang	Loyal (Dutch)
	Jero Beng	Republican
	Jero Subamiya	Republican
Krambitan	Puri Pemecutan	Republican
	Puri Anyar	[unknown]
	Puri Gde	Republican
Kediri	Puri Kediri	Republican
Kaba—Kaba	Puri Kaba—Kaba	Republican
Marga/Blayu	Puri Marga/Blayu	Republican
Jegu	Puri Jegu	Republican
Sam—Sam	Puri Dewa—Dewa	Republican

Source: Compiled from A. W. A. A. Ellerbeck, "Personalalia," *Archive—Resident Boon/46*.

Moreover, in addition to the noble houses, there were a number of wealthy "commoner" houses with substantial landed possessions and considerable political power. The weak Raja—puri was forced to flow with the tide, neither leading nor resisting the Republican mobilization. The Raja's "passivity" provided his challengers, and the *pemuda*, with a great deal of political room for maneuver.

* * *

It is tempting to argue that the Republican banner was taken up by political challengers or climbers (especially by the non-Raja-puri). This appears to have been the case in Badung (Puri Pemecutan), in Gianyar (the puri of Ubud, Mas, Pliatan, Pejeng, and Sukawati), in Klungkung (the Punggawa Kota), and in Buleleng (Puri Sukasada). On the other hand, in Jembrana, it was the Raja-puri which took a strong Republican stand, and in Badung the Puri Satria was a center of Republicanism even before it was displaced as Raja-puri. In Tabanan and in Karangasem, too, it was the Raja who were the first to declare their support for the Republic, although they later changed their tune. It does not seem that political status alone—that is the status as incumbent or challenger—can fully explain the political positions of the different puri.

Nor is it possible to argue that it was only the weakest or the poorest puri which supported the Republic, because several of the pro-Republican puri and jero (e.g., Subamia and Kaleran in Tabanan, Pemecutan in Badung, Sukasada in Buleleng) were both wealthy and influential. It does, however, appear to be the case that *weak* Raja-puri (incumbents) took up with either the Republican or the Dutch, depending on which side seemed most powerful locally. In other words, they followed the movement of social forces, rather than acting to influence them. *Strong* Raja-puri, on the other hand, took positions in accordance with a prior or principled choice, for or against the Republic.

Beyond this distinction, the bases of political choice are difficult to unravel; they often reflected simply the personal preference of a leading member of the family. It is said, for example, that the Raja of Klungkung had an inordinate fear that Bali would succumb to Islamic domination in the event of a Republican victory.⁴³ This fear of Islam colored all of his political decisions. There were, however, some broader patterns as well. For example, the better educated Raja and puri members, tended to support the Republic. The Raja of Jembrana, and his son, for instance, were among the best educated of the royal families. The Raja of Tabanan, on the other hand, was regarded as one of the most poorly educated of Bali's Raja.⁴⁴ A notable exception to the rule, however, was the Raja of Gianyar (Anak Agung Gde Agung), a highly educated man, but at the same time an early opponent of the Republic.⁴⁵

The pattern or the structure of puri rivalry in each kingdom affected the character of political conflict at this time, and in later years. There were basically three structural types of puri rivalry—dispersed, polarized, and hegemonic—and these were

43. Pendit, *Bali Berjuang*, p. 79. The Dewa Agung's fear of Islam was mentioned repeatedly in interviews with Balinese ex-*pemuda*, and older civil servants. (Interview: I Gusti Bagus Oka, December 18, 1986; I Made Wijakusuma, March 22, 1986; Professor J. van Baal, May 1987.)

44. The Raja of Tabanan completed only four years (of seven) at the HIS [Hollandsch-Inlandsche School, Dutch Native School] in Denpasar. His brothers also went without education. According to a Dutch Controleur (Ellerbeck), the puri simply did not have the money to send the family to school.

45. Anak Agung Gde Agung had studied law in Batavia. Although he now claims that he was an ardent nationalist from the start, his attitude and actions during the course of the Revolution have left some room for doubt on this score. He became the prime minister of the Dutch-inspired NIT, when it was set up in December 1946. (For A. A. G. Agung's version of his own nationalist credentials, see his *Dari Negara Indonesia Timur ke Republik Indonesia Serikat* [Yogyakarta: UGM Press, 1986]. For a different view, see Rosemary Hilbery, *Reminiscences of a Balinese Prince*, Southeast Asia Paper No. 14 [Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1979], p. 29.)

associated with three distinct patterns of political conflict and mobilization. Resistance was strongest where both the incumbent (Raja) puri and one or more challenger puri had some Republican sympathies. This gave the movement a somewhat broader base, but, at the same time, gave rise to factionalism within the resistance. This pattern of *dispersed* rivalry was found in Badung, Buleleng, and Tabanan. Where strong puri divided for and against the Republic, mobilization was swift and political conflict was initially more acute, but the resistance did not last long, particularly when the Dutch arrived and supported the anti-Republican puri. This pattern of *polarized* puri conflict occurred in Jembrana and West Gianyar. Where there were no significant puri challengers, the Raja-puri could establish political control and a clear ideological hegemony. Political mobilization in these kingdoms was state-initiated, and the resistance to the Dutch was by far the weakest. This *hegemonic* pattern existed in Klungkung and most of (eastern and central) Gianyar.

The relationship between the structure of puri rivalry and the nature of political resistance raises a second point of interest; the vulnerability of puri-based political resistance to the Dutch. Where a single puri was the sole or the primary basis of political mobilization, the loss of puri leadership (through arrest or a change of heart), could mean a sudden end to, or interruption of, the political movement. This seems to have been the case in Jembrana. Where, on the other hand, there were many puri involved on the Republican side, or where there were a variety of local bases of political mobilization (e.g., *pencak silat* gangs, independent military organizations, religious groups), the resistance was far more resilient. This was especially true of Tabanan, but to some extent also of Badung and Buleleng.

These three kingdoms shared certain other features which may have influenced the pattern of their puri politics. First, they were, economically, the most prosperous kingdoms in Bali. The opportunities for the accumulation of wealth, and therefore the basis for the establishment of new and influential puri and commoner houses—a rising landed and entrepreneurial elite—were much greater here than in other parts of Bali.⁴⁶ The number of powerful puri meant, quite simply, that there were more potential centers of puri political mobilization. Second, these were the most "cosmopolitan" of the kingdoms of Bali which, among other things, meant that new political ideologies, and models for mobilization—especially those from Java—were most accessible here, and that the link with the educated *pemuda*, as well as the older prewar nationalists and intellectuals, was more natural.⁴⁷ Finally, these were kingdoms with weak Raja, from the point of view of both their material wealth, and their influence over the populations of their kingdoms.⁴⁸ The Raja were no longer a true landed aristocracy, but declining salaried administrators. Their weakness effectively expanded the area which was beyond the scope of the "center" in each kingdom, and created the conditions for the emergence of alternative local state structures, either under the leadership of a local puri, or of an independent band of *pemuda*.

46. A number of Balinese informants suggested the importance of such a new rising class in the political development of Tabanan. (Interview: Ida Bagus Wisnem Manuaba, an early moderate nationalist leader, member KNI, later PSI leader in Bali, July 10, 1986.) Moreover, social mobility did not only find expression in the creation of new puri, but also in the expanding wealth of low-caste Tabananers.

47. Wijakusuma suggests that this was an important factor in the greater national/Republican awareness of the Puri Satria in Denpasar. (Interview: I Made Wijakusuma, March 23, 1986.)

48. In Badung, this was no longer true after April 1946, when the old Raja (Puri Satria) was replaced by the more influential head of Puri Pemecutan.

(b) Issues of Caste

It needs to be said that the Revolution in Bali was not primarily a movement of the lower castes against the higher. The caste character of the Revolution, however, did change over time. At the outset, in 1945–1946, men and women of all castes (Brahmana, Satria, Wesya, and Sudra) were found in roughly equal measure on both sides of the political debate. Men of high caste, especially the Satria and the Brahmana, figured prominently in the leadership of the earliest nationalist organizations, including the KNI, and the BKR/TKR.⁴⁹ They were in a good position to lead because, on the one hand, by virtue of their caste, they were thought to possess the "natural" ability and right to do so, and, on the other, they often had the requisite material resources, and a ready-made group of followers upon whom they could rely for immediate political and military support.⁵⁰ There were historical reasons as well for the primary leadership role of the *triwangsa*. Among the most important of the original BKR commanders were men with prewar military experience in the Balinese Prajoda Corps.⁵¹ The Prajoda officers had been deliberately selected, by

49. At least 75 percent of Bali's nationalist activists in October 1945 were men of the top three castes (*triwangsa*—Brahmana, Satria, Wesya). The *triwangsa* represent only about 10 percent of the general population. (See "Lijst van Personen," A.S.—1/XXII/19, ARA Inv. No. 2.10.14.) The first commanders of the BKR in Bali were, without exception, *triwangsa*, and a large number of them were of the families of the Raja. (See footnote 52, for the list of BKR/TKR commanders in each kingdom in early 1946.) Even in the *pemuda* organization, PRI, there was a heavy *triwangsa* presence. The vice-head was Cokorda Agung (a Satria) of the Puri Satria; head of the defense section was Ida Bagus Tantra (a Brahmana); head of the information section, Ida Bagus Sadnja (a Brahmana). Finally, on the basis of Republican casualty statistics, we can estimate that roughly 35 percent of all men with officer rank were *triwangsa*. Among the men of non-officer rank, only about 9 percent were *triwangsa*. The positive relationship between rank and caste status is even stronger among the highest-ranking officers. Statistics compiled on the basis of "Daftar Pahlawan Pejuang Kemerdekaan R.I. Daerah Tingkat I Propinsi Bali, Gugur Antara Tahun 1945 s/d 1950" (Yayasan Kebaktian Proklamasi, Daerah Tingkat I, Propinsi Bali, n.d.).

50. The relationship between a Balinese lord and his followers is perhaps best captured by the "patron-client" concept. Under the Dutch regime, the nature of this relationship was primarily economic and ceremonial, with followers being called upon to contribute to the ritual and material projects of the lord (*puridiensten*). In precolonial times, however, military service had been a major part of the subject's obligation to the lord. (See Mark Hobart, "Orators and Patrons: Two Types of Political Leader in Balinese Village Society," in *Political Language and Oratory in Traditional Society*, ed. Maurice Block [London: Academic Press, 1975], pp. 65–92.)

51. The Prajoda Corps was a native military auxiliary force, set up by the Dutch in 1938. It had its equivalents in Java, Madura, and other parts of Indonesia. The idea was to enlist the support of the local population—in Bali, the high caste and high-ranking population—in defense of the Netherlands Indies. The Dutch, however, showed little confidence in the Prajoda Corps at the time of the Japanese attack in 1942. They were summarily disarmed and sent home. Toward the end of the Japanese period, a number of Prajoda officers began to meet secretly to discuss and plan anti-Japanese actions, and formed one of the early focal points for anti-Japanese and nationalist organization in 1945. (Interview: Meganada, September 18, 1986.)

the Dutch, from families of high birth. The BKR commanders in Bali, then, were very likely to be high-caste men.⁵²

It is important to note, however, that the *triwangsa* did not dominate the leadership positions throughout the Revolution, nor were they equally powerful, even at the outset, in all parts of Bali. Among the prominent *pemuda* leaders, for example, were a number of men of low caste including I Made Wijakusuma (leader of the PRI and later of the MBU-DPRI [Markas Besar Umum-Dewan Perjuangan Republik Indonesia]-Sunda Kecil), I Gede Puger (an anti-Japanese activist, who became leader of Pesindo),⁵³ Nyoman Mantik (PRI and later MBU-DPRI-Sunda Kecil), and Nyoman Pegeg (Leader BKR-Sunda Kecil, later in Intelligence Section of the TKR). While their caste origins did not in any sense disqualify them for leadership roles, it was really their education which distinguished them as credible leaders. All were well educated by Balinese standards, and three of the four had studied in Java, which was extremely rare for Balinese of any caste. Indeed education in Java, or in one of the nationalist Taman Siswa schools in Bali, was an experience shared by most of Bali's young and lower-caste Republican leaders, particularly those who were active in the urban-based movements in Denpasar and Singaraja.⁵⁴

It was through the independent Taman Siswa Schools, established in Bali in the mid- and late-1930s, that Balinese first gained some appreciation of the currents of nationalist thinking in Java. Educational opportunities, particularly for those of low caste, had been severely limited in Bali, and so the new nongovernment schools also provided a welcome opportunity for those who could not attend the HIS in Singaraja or Denpasar, and who could not afford to go to Java for their schooling. Not every low-caste boy or girl could afford to attend the Taman Siswa (or the associated schools, Taman Dewasa and Taman Indah), it is true, but by the late 1930s there were as many as 200 pupils at the Denpasar school, and under the Japanese an estimated 600.⁵⁵ During the revolutionary period, the name was changed to Saraswati School, but it continued to be a center of nationalist sentiment and organization.⁵⁶

52. In March 1946, the TKR Commanders in each kingdom were as follows: Badung, I Gusti Putu Wisnu (ex-Prajoda); Buleleng, Dewa Made Swedja (ex-Prajoda officer); Jembrana, I Gusti Bagus Kajun (ex-Prajoda officer); Bangli, Anak Agung Anom Muditha (ex-Police officer); Gianyar, I Dewa Gde Anom Asta (ex-Prajoda officer); Tabanan, I Gusti Wayan Debes (ex-Prajoda); Karangasem, Anak Agung Made Karang. The Commander of the TKR Resimen Sunda Kecil was I Gusti Ngurah Rai (ex-Prajoda officer). (See Lt Kol ter Meulen, "Nota Betreffende Bali," March 16, 1946, *Archive—Resident Boon/46*.)

53. And was later a leader of the PKI (Bali).

54. The nationalist activists in the town of Denpasar, in October 1945, were almost exclusively men of lower caste, or non-Balinese (thirteen of seventeen persons). They were primarily educated men, including three medical doctors, at least two school teachers, a school head, other members of the urban middle class—a director of an export firm, the head of Bank Rakyat—and various government servants. (See "Report on the Situation on Bali and Lombok, Compiled from the Notebooks of the republican Propagandist Soekardani," A.S.-1/XXII/19, ARA, Inv. No. 2.10.14.)

55. There was no Taman Siswa in the north until 1941 when one was established in the district town of Tejakula. (Interview: Dewa Made Dhana, October 7, 1986.)

56. Interviews: I Nyoman Pegeg, September 16, 1986; Dewa Made Dhana, October 10, 1986. For a discussion of the Taman Siswa Schools and education in Bali, see I Gusti Putu Wirata, "Pergerakan Taman Siswa di Bali, Tahun 1933 Sampai Tahun

The Taman Siswa network forged an important link between the nationalist movement on Java and Bali. The central figure in this network was the Javanese nationalist, Wiyono Suryokusumo, who lived and taught in Bali for several years prior to the Japanese occupation. Balinese graduates of Taman Siswa almost uniformly point to Wiyono (or Suryokusumo as he was known in Bali) as the inspiration for their later nationalist activism. More concretely, it was through Wiyono that Balinese nationalists were brought in touch with men like Sjahrir and Djohan Sjahroezah and were encouraged to organize an anti-Japanese underground and then later a branch of the PSI.⁵⁷ Personal friendships and networks developed through other schools as well. At the HIS in Singaraja, the Balinese teacher Nengah Merta inspired a number of the most prominent *pemuda* leaders.⁵⁸ In short, the schools, particularly high schools, formed an important basis for the development of nationalist consciousness and for the formation of networks of solidarity. For the simple reason that these schools were located in the major towns, this consciousness was essentially an urban phenomenon. At the same time, the generally greater enthusiasm for education among low-caste as opposed to high-caste Balinese, meant that this did not represent a shift in the attitudes of the aristocracy, but rather gave expression to the aspirations of a moderately affluent lower caste.

There were non-*triwangsa* leaders in the countryside as well. Lower-caste leaders often emerged in places, or among populations which either had no powerful local lord, or where this man was not popular with the people. This was often the case in the mountain regions and areas of cash-crop production, and away from the older subsistence rice-producing settlements of the south-central region. The peripheral regions were frequently occupied by migrants. Ties to a particular lord tended to be somewhat looser in these regions, particularly for those who owned their own land. Small-holders, producing cash crops such as coffee, cloves, vegetables, and fruit, tended to be more dependent upon Chinese traders, money lenders, and the market, than upon a local *puri* or lord.⁵⁹

1943," Skripsi UNUD, 1971. A Dutch report from 1946 blames most of the trouble in Bali on education. ("Van het studeren van te jonge menschen op Java komt veel van de ellende," "Rapport Bali" (undated), A.S.-1/XXII/19, ARA, Inv. No. 2.10.14.)

57. Interview: I Nyoman Pegeg, September 16, 1986. Pegeg made frequent trips between Bali and Java during the Japanese period, in order to keep in touch with the underground. During the Revolution he became a member of the Paras [Partai Rakjat Sosialis—Socialist People's Party], though he never established a Bali branch. The formation of a Bali branch of the PSI seems to have come only in 1950, with the direct assistance of a young PSI activist from Yogya, Bapak Daino. Djohan Sjahroezah was a founding member of the Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia, and a central figure in the anti-Japanese underground in Java. Together with Sjahrir he founded the Paras which fused with Amir Sjarifuddin's Parsi to form the PS [Partai Sosialis]. On February 12, 1948, Sjahrir and Djohan led the split from the PS and established the PSI. (From "In Memoriam Djohan Sjahroezah," Panitia Setiakawan Warga Sosialis Surabaya, 1968.)

58. These included Ida Bagus Indra, Pak Item and Pak Cilik. (Interviews: Pak Item, September 29, 1986; Pak Cilik [I Nengah Wirta Tamu], December 19, 1986.)

59. Interview: Dewa Made Dhana, October 7, 1986. These frontier communities were sociologically quite different from the ancient lowland villages. The story of Dewa Made Dhana's family is instructive. After the defeat of the Raja of Tabanan in 1906, many of his followers fled to the northern frontier of the kingdom. Dhana's father was one of these. Originally from the southern village of Sam-Sam, after 1906 he fled to the northwest and established a new village (now Bowong Cina) near Pupuan,

In the more densely populated rice-growing regions, it was not uncommon for a lord to be unpopular with "his" people. There were many possible reasons for unpopularity, including excessive demands for unremunerated labor on the home or public works projects of the lord (*puridiensten*), or for contributions to ritual/ceremonial events (*heerendiensten*), unfair terms of tenancy (where the lord was also landlord), and so on. In the absence of a higher state authority, such a lord was more vulnerable to challenge. In such situations, influential men and women of the community—*balian*, experts in black and white magic, *pencak silat* adepts, *jago*, or others with a reputation for "kesaktian"—led the struggle against the old lord, usually in the name of "merdeka."⁶⁰ This appears to have been the case for the gangs in north-central Badung and Tabanan such as "Beruang Hitam" (Black Bear), "Kucing Hitam" (Black Cat), and many others besides.⁶¹

As the Revolution proceeded, the question of caste came increasingly to the fore. Men of lower caste became more prominent in the leadership posts and, significantly, men of higher caste stopped using their caste titles.⁶² In the 1920s there had been open debate, largely among the urban educated elite in Singaraja, regarding the caste system.⁶³ In its broadest outline, this had been a fight between, on the one hand, educated Sudra who favored meritocracy, democracy, and modernization, and on the other, high-caste defenders of existing caste relations. This debate was resolved, superficially, through Dutch intervention in favor of the latter group. Beneath the surface calm, caste issues remained an important source of political conflict. After 1945, it was once again primarily the educated Sudra who tried to move the struggle in an anti-feudal direction, and this contributed to a radicalization of the Revolution, and to fears of genuine social revolution.

There were, then, essentially three types of Republican leaders, from the point of view of caste. First, there were men of high caste, especially from influential

where he grew *padi*, vegetables, and coffee. In this frontier region, there were no taxes to be paid, and the coastal towns of Buleleng (e.g., Seririt) could only be reached on foot or horseback. By the 1930s, however, the area had become more accessible and the Dutch system of taxation had penetrated to the most remote villages. Not surprisingly, the area became quite anti-Dutch and known as a "*daerah pergerakan*" well before the war. Here, far from the metropolitan centers of Singaraja and Denpasar, an independent Parindra school was established in 1939.


60. Personal communication: Dr. Henk Schulte Nordholt, May 3, 1987. Schulte Nordholt suggested that this was the case in the area around Blahkiuh, central Badung.

61. Interview: Putu Mudera (member of the Beruang Hitam), May 2, 1986. The Beruang Hitam was a band of ten or twelve well-armed men (six pistol-mitrailleur, one sten gun, two rifles), which roamed widely about north Badung and Tabanan, meting out revolutionary justice to known or suspected traitors.

62. The shift toward low-caste leadership can be seen, for instance, in the changing composition of the leadership of the MBU-DPRI, as early as July 1946. Another major shift in this direction came in the aftermath of the devastating battle at Marga, in which many of the original leaders of the BKR/TKR were killed, including I Gusti Ngurah Rai.

63. The debate over caste distinctions and privileges emerged within the organization Shanti (founded in 1923 in Singaraja). Shanti split in 1924 along caste lines. A *triwangsa* group established the magazine *Bali Adnyana*, while the Sudra position was expressed in the magazine *Suryakanta*. In 1926 the *Tjwadega Hindu Bali* was established in Klungkung in an effort to avert the spread of caste conflict from north to south Bali.

MAP C FOOD CONSUMPTION AREAS - BALI (1948)



After Raka, *Monografi Pulau Bali*.

puri, both urban and rural. They dominated the Republican military (BKR/TKR) and political (KNI) leadership in the early part of the Revolution. Second, there were the urban educated *pemuda*, largely of lower caste, who were prominent in the urban-based political organizations (AMI, PRI, Pesindo). After December 1945, under pressure from the Japanese, they fled the urban areas, and began mobilization in the countryside. Third, there were local leaders (non-puri based) in rural areas, who dominated the scene where the state apparatus was weakest.

(c) *Relations of Production--Economic Issues*

The main economic themes bearing on the matter of political conflict in 1945-1946 can be conveniently summarized as follows: 1) the "plus" and "minus" regions of Bali; 2) landlord-tenant relations; 3) the Japanese economic legacy.


"Plus" and "Minus" Regions: In the 1940s Bali could be divided roughly into regions of relative economic prosperity and surplus (the "plus" regions) and those of economic hardship or deficit (the "minus" regions).⁶⁴ One standard measure of relative prosperity is the availability of desired food staples for local consumption. In Bali, the desired staple was (and is) rice. Relatively prosperous regions were those in which the population was able to eat rice virtually every day. In less prosperous regions rice had to be mixed with other less desirable staples such as corn, beans, and tubers (cassava). According to this measure, the "plus" areas included eastern Tabanan, southern Badung, parts of Buleleng, a coastal strip of Jembrana, and a small island of land around the town of Klungkung, while the "minus" areas included most of the eastern kingdoms of Klungkung, Karangasem, Bangli, and Gianyar.⁶⁵ (See Map C.) Another measure of prosperity is the availability of a marketable surplus. Tabanan produced almost all of Bali's rice exports (about 15,000 tons per year), and, together with Badung and Buleleng, dominated the production of other exportable cash crops. At this level of generality, then, it would appear that it was the relatively prosperous kingdoms of Bali which formed the core area of the Republican resistance. The obvious exception, of course, was the town of Klungkung.

There are a number of possible explanations for this pattern, which can only be touched upon briefly here. One of these concerns the importance of *material resources* in the sustenance of any political movement or edifice. In the case of a guerrilla movement, such as existed in Bali, food and shelter are prerequisites to any action; indeed the search for these is often the primary task of a guerrilla band. Guerrilla base areas, then, must be located in regions with easy access to food surplus. Base areas established in deficit regions place an undue strain on the local economy and the local population. The guerrilla resistance in Bali was no exception. The same logic applies to other political entities, including states; they too require a substantial surplus to survive. Klungkung had such a surplus, and judging from the available evidence, much of this was concentrated in the hands of the Raja himself.

64. This distinction between "plus" and "minus," or "prosperous" [*makmur*] and "impoverished" [*miskin*] regions, is one frequently made by Balinese with some knowledge of the island as a whole. It is generally said that the prosperous regions are Tabanan, Badung, and Buleleng, while the poor areas are Bangli, Karangasem, and Gianyar. Jembrana and Klungkung are said to be somewhere in between [*lumayan*]. (Interviews: I Gusti Bagus Oka, December 19, 1986; Hans Harten [Head of the Bali Agricultural Office, 1946-1950], May 18, 1987.)

65. I Gusti Gde Raka, *Monografi Pulau Bali* (Jakarta: Djawatan Pertanian Rakjat, 1955), pp. 46-47.

MAP D AGRICULTURAL LAND USE - BALI (1949)



After Raka, *Monografi Pulau Bali*.

A look at the agricultural land-use map of Bali (Map D) reveals that the first centers of resistance were located in rich rice-growing (*sawah*) areas where the staple food was 100 percent rice: east Tabanan, south-central Badung, Buleleng, coastal Jembrana. After the arrival of the Dutch, in March 1946, the bases moved higher into the mountains, and out of the rich rice-producing lowlands. Yet even here, it was necessary to find an area of sufficient surplus. The first base area of the MBU-DPRI (April-June, 1946), at Munduk Malang, for instance, though high in the mountains, was located amidst high quality *sawah*, on which were produced two crops per year. The same was true of Bengkel Anyar in Tabanan and of the various base areas in the north, such as Bebetin, Munduk, and Panji. It was when the guerrilla groups were forced to abandon these choice productive areas that the resistance began to crumble.

Landlord-tenant Relations: Peasants in the "plus" areas of Bali differed from those in the "minus" regions in two important respects. First, the percentage of peasants who owned their own land was greater in the "plus" areas, and the average size of land holdings was larger.⁶⁶ Second, the terms of tenancy for *sawah* in the "plus" regions were significantly more favorable to the tenant, than was the case in the "minus" regions. Map E provides a general picture of the different systems of tenancy practiced in Bali at this time. The most favorable system for the tenant was *nandu*, in which the yield was divided 50-50 between the landlord and tenant. This system predominated in the western kingdoms of Buleleng, Jembrana, Tabanan, and Badung. The systems less advantageous to the tenant were *nelon*, *ngapit*, *nerapat*, and *melaisin*, which prevailed in the eastern part of the island.⁶⁷ The worst terms of tenancy by far were found in Gianyar, one of the strongholds of anti-Republicanism. It would appear, then, that the resistance was strongest not amongst peasants who were most deeply exploited, but rather amongst those who were relatively well off.

While the peasants in the plus areas may have been more vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the market (as was the case in 1931-1934), they also seem to have had somewhat greater economic autonomy or independence from local lords. Support for the Revolution in this sector, it may be suggested, was not a defensive reaction to greater oppression, but the act of a relatively prosperous and secure peasantry. The disadvantageous terms of tenancy in the eastern kingdoms suggest that tenants

66. In 1950, about 85 percent of the land in Bali was privately owned. This privatization of land came about as a consequence of the Dutch land-rent system. The level of tenancy on *sawah* land in Tabanan was the lowest in Bali, with only about 16 percent farming *sawah* as tenants. (See I Gusti Gde Raka, *Monografi Pulau Bali*, p. 34.) According to Hoekstra, of those owning land in Tabanan, the average size of holding was, for *sawah*, 0.61 ha, and for dry land, 1.08 ha. Overall, this meant an average size of land holding of 0.86 ha, which was a significantly higher average than in other kingdoms. (See H. J. Hoekstra, "Nota van Toelichtingen betreffende het in te stellen Zelfbesturend Landschap Tabanan" [Regeerings commissaris voor de Bestuurshervorming in de Groote Oost, 1938].)

67. These terms describe different systems for the division of yield between owner and tenant. Under the *nelon* system the landlord received three-fifths and the tenant two-fifths of the yield; under *ngapit*, the division was two-thirds for the landlord, one-third for the tenant; under *merapat*, three-fourths for the landlord, one-fourth for the tenant. The *melaisin* system required that the tenant pay the landlord an amount of money for the privilege of cultivating the land in question. It should be noted that the terms of tenancy varied slightly depending on the crop being cultivated (e.g., whether *padi* or *palawija*). (I Gusti Gde Raka, *Monografi Pulau Bali*, pp. 33-34.)

in these areas were in a state of considerable dependency and vulnerability vis-à-vis the local land-owning aristocracy. This is a condition which would clearly inhibit acts of resistance or political mobilization, unless these were initiated by the lord himself.⁶⁸

Japanese Economic Legacy: The greater productive capacity of the central region may have affected the population in a negative way as well. According to Dutch sources, Japanese extractions of basic foodstuffs and forced labor were greater in these areas than in other parts of Bali.⁶⁹ By 1945, Tabanan and Badung, the traditional areas of rice surplus, were both suffering shortages. The temporary economic crisis in these kingdoms probably brought issues of water control, access to food, and control of markets and trade, into much sharper focus. Indeed, judging by the nature of the first acts of violence here in 1945—attacks on Chinese and Chinese-controlled markets, water "robbery" and sabotage, general looting—such economic struggles were among the central issues of the early Revolution in Tabanan, Badung, and perhaps also Buleleng.

Japanese exploitation, however, did not have the effect of uniting the population against the Japanese, because much of the actual work of extraction and policing was performed by Balinese officials, including village heads, Punggawa, and Mandur (foremen).⁷⁰ The Japanese system of exploitation, then, tended to divide those Balinese who suffered, from those who appeared to benefit, from their collaboration. Government servants, and employees of Japanese companies, for example, were given extra allotments of, or special vouchers to purchase, rice, cloth, kerosene, and other scarce commodities, while producers of these commodities often went without.⁷¹


68. Pendit, among others, describes these two regions of the island in terms of the strength of "feudalism" in each; in the eastern kingdoms, he writes, feudalism was still "tebal," thick or strong.

69. Ellerbeck argues that the concentration of Japanese and Japanophiles was greatest in Tabanan, because of its greater productive capacity. He also argues that the earlier development of nationalism in Tabanan had to do with the substantial economic opportunities there, which drew entrepreneurs from Java and other parts of the island. (A. A. W. A. Ellerbeck, "Politiek Overzicht Over het Landschap Tabanan," September 16, 1946, *Archive—Resident Boon/46*.)

70. Under the Japanese there were monthly meetings with the Punggawa, who were given instructions for their districts regarding, for example, the amount of rice which had to be collected, the number of bamboo poles required by the government from each district, the targets for production of export crops like cotton, cloves, and coffee, the number of men who must be levied to work on roads and public works or to go abroad as "voluntary" labor (the Barisan Pekerja Sukarela Bali—BPSB), and so on. These instructions were then conveyed to the perbekel and other officials in each district. The popularity of a Punggawa, not surprisingly, depended upon his willingness or ability to resist the excessive demands of the Japanese. ("Tjatanan dan Pembijaraan Waktoe Sangkepan Para Poenggawa." This document is among papers of the former Raja of Buleleng [deceased], Anak Agung Nyoman Panji Tisna, which his family kindly made available to me. Hereafter these papers will be referred to as *Archive—AANP Tisna*.)

71. Whereas most families were permitted to purchase only one liter of kerosene a month, government servants and "kepala rakyat" were allowed five liters a month. Moreover, Punggawa were asked to prepare estimates of the amount needed in the district each month, and this inevitably opened up opportunities for corruption. Each family, regardless of size, was allowed an allotment of 1/4 Kg of rice/corn

MAP E TENANCY SYSTEMS - BALI (1948)



KEY

$1/2 - 1/2$ = Owner $1/2$, Tenant $1/2$ of crop

$2/3 - 1/3$ = Owner $2/3$, Tenant $1/3$ of crop

$3/4 - 1/4$ = Owner $3/4$, Tenant $1/4$ of crop

After Raka, *Monografi Pulau Bali*.

Chinese businessmen were exempt from most of the onerous tax and labor levies imposed on the Balinese population, and there were many cases of their having benefitted economically by a too-willing collaboration with the Japanese.⁷² Balinese officials also took advantage of the Japanese interregnum to accumulate land through administrative fiddling. In short, there was cause for a considerable enmity to develop amongst Balinese themselves, between Balinese and Chinese, and to a lesser extent, between Balinese and the Japanese state.

(d) *The Japanese Legacy--Military and Political*

The importance of Japanese political ideology and military instruction in the emergence of a revolutionary "pemuda" consciousness, and a new militant political style in Java, has been carefully analyzed by Anderson.⁷³ The evidence from Bali suggests that the Japanese regime had a similar effect on the consciousness of Balinese *pemuda*, and upon the style of Balinese politics.⁷⁴ It was in the auxiliary forces, and to a lesser extent in the village security organizations, set up by the Japanese, that the younger generation of Bali received their first military (especially guerrilla) training, an acquaintance with militant pro-Asian political thinking, and the inspiration that freedom might be achieved through violent struggle, even against great military odds.

Bodies such as Peta (Pembela Tanah Air, Defenders of the Fatherland), Kaigun Heiho (land-based Navy auxiliary), Kenpeitei (Military Police), Seinendan (Youth Corps), and Bo Ai Tei Sing Tei (Pasukan Berani Mati or the Kamikaze Corps), provided both an organizational model for later military organization in Bali, and a good part of the ideological foundation for the struggle against all colonial domination, Japanese included.⁷⁵ An important component of the anti-Japanese underground

mix per day. Civil servants were allowed to consume 100 percent rice and could purchase a guaranteed amount at fixed prices. (See "Tjatan . . ." [August 1945], *Archive--AANP Tisna*.)

72. In Buleleng, for example, a Chinese businessman (Tan Boen King of Banyuwatis) reportedly secured twenty-five horses and twelve wagons (*dokar*) for next to nothing from a Japanese official. (See "Notulen Sangkepan Pangreh Pradja Keradjaan Boeleng, 2 August 1947," *Archive--AANP Tisna*.) Chinese merchants also received vouchers for and extra quotas of scarce commodities, such as cloth. (See *Programs of the Japanese Government in Java and Bali* [Honolulu: OSS, Research and Analysis Branch, 1945], p. 214.) The Chinese also gained land-ownership rights equal to those of "bumiputra" in Bali. ("Tjatan . . ." [March 1945], *Archive--AANP Tisna*.)

73. Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, pp. 16-34. Also see Anderson, "Japan, The Light of Asia," *Southeast Asia in World War II, Four Essays*, ed. Josef Silverstein, Monograph No. 7 (New Haven: Yale Southeast Asian Studies, 1966), pp. 13-50.

74. It should be pointed out that the development of a *pemuda* political consciousness and political power seems to have been part of a deliberate strategy on the part of the Japanese. In Buleleng, as early as March 1943, the Japanese were recommending that vacant seats in the Paruman Negara be filled with *pemuda*, and not with older traditional elites. (See "Pasal Oendian Anggota Paruman Negara Baru," March 22, 1943, *Archive--AANP Tisna*.)

75. The formation of the Peta on Bali began in early April 1944. According to Japanese reports, the number of applicants in Bali was fifteen times the anticipated need. The second wave of recruitment began in July 1944. By this time, the Japanese commander in Bali had already been favorably impressed by the "strong fighting

movement in Bali emerged within the body of these Japanese military structures in 1944–1945, particularly within the Peta.⁷⁶ The core of the Republican Army in Bali (the BKR later TKR) was drawn from the ranks of the Peta, the Seinendan, and the Bo Ai Tei Sing Tei.⁷⁷

In the atmosphere of political uncertainty which prevailed after August 1945, the military skills learned from the Japanese were at a premium. Even older nationalists came to regard the organs of civil administration such as the KNI as irrelevant to the immediate struggle, and left them to set up the BKR. Ex-Peta men felt (and still feel) strongly that they were uniquely qualified to lead the resistance. In the words of a former Peta captain:

In all honesty, from the point of view of fighting spirit [*semangat*], we Peta soldiers were among the best soldiers in the world, while the Dutch were not in the same league.⁷⁸

spirit" and the "ferocity" of the Balinese trainees. As of August 1, 1945 there were 1,626 Peta troops on Bali, while in Java there were 35,855. (See *Programs of the Japanese Government*, pp. 115–16.) The Kaigun Heiho was set up at roughly the same time as the Peta, the first candidates reporting for training on July 31, 1944. ("Tjataan . . ." [August 1944], *Archive—AANP Tisna*.) The formation of Seinendan units began in November 1943. The Bo Ai Tei Sing Tei (or Bo'ei Tsingtai) was set up in March 1945. There were a number of other quasi-military bodies established in Bali, including a Voluntary Youth Defense Corps, known as Sitbular [*sic*]. Open to both men and women, it involved a 30-day period of military training. It was established in April 1945. (See *Programs of the Japanese Government*, p. 116. For more information on the various military bodies and organizations in Bali, see *Explanations Regarding All Kinds of Armed Bodies [The Headquarters of the 16th Army, Java] Nishijima Collection, Materials on the Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia, The Institute of Social Sciences, Waseda University, Tokyo, No. JV.45.*)

76. According to some informants, there was a deliberate strategy of infiltrating bodies such as the Seinendan, Peta and, importantly, the Japanese intelligence organization, Yama Butai. (Interviews: Wayan Rana, September 21, 1986; I Made Wijakusuma, March 22, 1986.) Particularly active in the anti-Japanese underground were men of the rank of Cudanco (captain) in the Peta. A group of some fifteen Cudanco-Peta is said to have gathered in the village of Bangsal Gaji on August 16, 1945, for a ceremonial raising of the Indonesian flag. (Interview: Bp. Meganada, September 18, 1986.) The key figures in the anti-Japanese underground were: Nyoman Pegeg, Made Wijakusuma, I Gusti Ngurah Rai, I Gusti Putu Wisnu, Wayan Sambuh, Nyoman Mantik, Gde Puger, and Gusti Bagus Sugianyar. (For more details of the origins of the movement, see Pendit, *Bali Berjuang*, pp. 41–44.) It should be noted that there was also an important civilian anti-Japanese underground which had links with the Sjarir underground in Java.

77. The ex-Daidanco (Major—Battalion Commander) of the Peta Bali were the principal formateurs of the TKR Bali, November 1, 1945. (Pedit, *Bali Berjuang*, p. 99.) The military men who gathered to plan the April 8, 1946 attack on Denpasar, for example, included no fewer than 19 ex-Peta officers (1 Cudanco [Captain], 14 Syodanco [Lieutenant]), and a Japanese Lieutenant Colonel [Hera Utji], the former Vice-Sirei of the Navy for Sunda Kecil. (See, I Gusti Ngurah Pindha, *Kirikumi Besar2an Terhadap Kota Denpasar*, Serie Gempilan Perjuangan Physic di Bali, No. 1, 1973, p. 7.) Among the most prominent ex-Peta officers were I Gusti Bagus Sugianyar, I Gusti Wayan Debes and Pak Cilik. (Interview: Pak Cilik [ex-Peta Captain], December 19, 1986.)

78. I Gusti Ngurah Pindha, *Kirikumi Besar2an*. A similar view was expressed by

In the towns, Japanese schools and sports clubs provided opportunities for, and experience in, relatively large-scale mobilization, which became important during the Revolution.⁷⁹ They were also significant as centers of shared "modern" experience; bases of a collective consciousness and solidarity significantly different from those of the family, the *banjar*, or the religious community.⁸⁰ In Singaraja, for example, one of the earliest centers of *pemuda* activity and radicalism was the Japanese high school, Cu Gakko (Tjugako). It was the students of this school who were the first followers of Gde Puger.⁸¹ In Denpasar, the students and teachers of the Cu Gakko organized pro-Republican mass rallies and meetings as early as October 1945. They established the student political organization, ISSM, which later formed the core of the PRI membership under Wijakusuma, and carried out extensive information and propaganda work in Denpasar and the surrounding villages.

In rural areas, *pemuda* organizations were established on the basis of existing Japanese organizations (e.g. the Seinendan) and clubs, often adopting without adjustment the old lines of command and membership.⁸² Japanese military doctrine, with its emphasis on the spirit of struggle (*semangat*), and the importance of *kesaktian*, resonated strongly with indigenous Balinese traditions of self-sacrifice, and the spiritual bases of power.⁸³ Indeed, it was under the Japanese that Balinese *pencak silat* underwent a renaissance, resulting in a proliferation of local *silat* clubs. In 1945, according to one estimate, there were at least three or four *silat* adepts in almost every *banjar* in Badung and Tabanan, and in some *banjar* as many as fifty. These were tolerated and even encouraged by the Japanese, and they became important bases of *pemuda* organization and solidarity during the Revolution.⁸⁴

other ex-Peta officers interviewed.

79. Educational opportunities expanded rapidly in Bali under the Japanese. According to Japanese sources the number of students attending school in Bali increased from 25,775 in 1942 to 32,263 in 1943, and then to 49,700 in 1944. Over the same period, the number of schools grew from 238 to 266. (See *Programs of the Japanese Government*, pp. 296-97.) There was also a rapid proliferation of youth clubs and organizations. The Bali Young Men's Association, for men aged 12 to 30, was set up in Denpasar in November 1943. By February 1944, there was a Bali-wide Federation of Young Men's Associations. (*Ibid.*, p. 114.)

80. The Japanese also acted to weaken some of these older social bonds. For instance, they attempted to do away with obligatory work for religious ends (*eerendiensten*). This was an unpopular move amongst Balinese of the older generation: "When the Japanese attacked the temple duties, we older people knew they were lost." ["Toen de Japanners den eerendiensten aantastten, wisten wij ouderen dat zij verloren waren."] (See "Rapport Bali," 1946, AS-1/XXII/19, ARA, Inv. No. 2.10.14.)

81. Gde Puger worked at the Japanese radio station in Singaraja, Hosokoku, which allowed him to keep abreast of developments in Java. The station was located next to the Cu Gakko. (Interview: Dewa Made Dhana, October 7, 1986.)

82. Pendit, *Bali Berjuang*, p. 145.

83. The spirit of self-sacrifice is central to the tradition of the *Satria* (warrior). The clearest manifestation of the spirit is the *puputan*. (See above n. 16. On the spiritual bases of power, see Connor's work on Balinese "*balian*." Linda H. Connor, "In Darkness and Light: A Study of Peasant Intellectuals in Bali" [PhD Dissertation, University of Sydney, 1982].)

84. One example of this type of organization was ESSTI, Eka Sentosa Stiti (Kesetiaan Tunggal Kepada Dharma, Bangsa, Tanah Air dan Hyang Widhi Tuhan Yang Maha

In sum, in addition to the "traditional" bases of social and political organization, such as the *banjar*, the *desa*, the *subak*, the religious community, and the attachment to a particular lord or *puri*, there emerged under the Japanese regime, an alternative network of organizations, with a new more militant political style, and in many cases with a deep resonance in indigenous Balinese conceptions of power. As in Java, these were monopolized by the *pemuda*, and it was the *pemuda* who through these organizations were able to become the real revolutionary vanguard.

In very broad outline, these were the social-economic issues and forces which seem to have influenced the outbreak and shaped the character of political conflict and political resistance in Bali, 1945-1946. It is clear that *puri* rivalry, caste conflict, economic struggles between landlord and tenant, and anti-collaborator sentiment existed to some extent in every kingdom. Yet there were substantial differences within Bali in the way that social-economic conflict was manifested and resolved *politically*. This section has shown, I think, that the political differences between western and eastern Bali can be understood, in part, as a consequence of the different social and economic conditions which prevailed in each region.⁸⁵ We have seen, for example, that the western kingdoms shared certain economic and social features which were conducive to an earlier and broader political mobilization. In addition, the discussion of *puri* rivalries has shown that the structural patterns of *puri* conflict found in the western region were more likely to encourage widespread political conflict and large-scale resistance, than those found in the eastern kingdoms.

Taken together, these social-economic patterns suggest the existence of two rather different social structural configurations in Bali. In the western regions, we can identify essentially five social groups, the relations between which strongly influenced patterns of political conflict and resistance. Very briefly, these were: (i) an urban administrative/professional middle class, concentrated in Singaraja and Denpasar; (ii) an educated, lower-caste urban *pemuda* group; (iii) a declining, salaried aristocracy; (iv) a rising landed elite; (v) a reasonably prosperous and independent peasantry, with substantial links to urban and export markets. The moving forces in the political mobilization and the resistance of 1945-1946 were the *pemuda* and the rising landed elite, and they were supported to some extent both by the relatively prosperous peasantry and by some among the urban middle class.

This configuration or alliance of social forces was quite inconceivable in the eastern kingdoms for the simple reason that the class or social structure here was not at all the same. To summarize: (i) the urban administrative/professional middle class was very much smaller; (ii) the educated *pemuda* group was smaller and isolated from the main political currents on Java; (iii) the salaried aristocracy was not so clearly on the decline; indeed the small aristocracy not only dominated the local administrative structures, but continued to be the major land-owning elite; (iv) there was no rising landed or entrepreneurial elite in a position to challenge the

Esa), which was established first in Badung, and later spread to Tabanan, Giangyar, and Karangasem. The founder was Made Regog, who worked with the Yama Butai (Japanese intelligence organization). The main activity of the group was training in *pencak silat* the objective of which was "to concentrate spiritual energy and physical strength." (Interviews: Bp. Meganada, September 18, 1986; Wayan Rana [General Secretary of ESSTI], September 21, 1986.)

85. Although Jembrana was similar in most respects to the other western kingdoms, open resistance there did not last as long. This was primarily due to the quick and heavy penetration of Dutch forces, and to the effectiveness of Dutch political maneuvering in 1946.

old aristocracy; (v) the peasantry was less prosperous, and more dependent upon the old landed aristocracy. In short, the groups which were central to the political mobilization and resistance in the western kingdoms simply were not present in sufficient force in the east. The old aristocratic elite continued to dominate the scene, and for this reason any political mobilization was from the top down.

As plausible as these social structural arguments may seem, they tell only a part of the story. Political organization, participation in political action, fighting between villages, the murder of Chinese, guerrilla warfare; these do not spring in any sense naturally from a given social and economic situation. They occur within a larger, political environment, an environment which is shaped very substantially by states. For example, rivalries between Balinese *puri* had always existed, but it was only in the absence of a higher political authority, that they became important bases of open political mobilization and conflict. It is not possible to draw conclusions about the importance of, say, the *pemuda*, the peasantry, or the Raja, without first establishing the political and particularly the state parameters within which they were operating. It is to this task that we may now turn.

States—National and Regional

The "National" States in Indonesia

The British, Dutch, and Japanese states centered outside Bali, affected Balinese politics in this period primarily by their absence. British and Dutch state authority, in particular, extended only in the most marginal way to Bali, and the long delay in Dutch reoccupation left a vacuum of "national" state authority for over six months.⁸⁶ There were, however, isolated events through which these external states exercised an intermittent influence on Balinese politics before March 1946. News of clashes between Indonesian and British Indian troops in Java (especially the Battle of Surabaya, November 1945), for instance, increased suspicion in Bali regarding the motives of Allied forces, and stimulated the growth of military organizations like the TKR. An unauthorized and provocative landing in Singaraja, by a Dutch naval party in October 1945, increased Balinese hostility, and gave the Revolution its first Balinese martyr.⁸⁷ Perhaps most importantly, after November 1945, the British, concerned by reports of increasing political unrest in Bali yet still unwilling to permit a Dutch (KNIL) reoccupation of the island, urged the Japanese to take more aggressive measures to maintain political order there.

The capitulation of the Japanese, on August 14, 1945, of course, was of enormous importance in Bali, as it was throughout the Japanese-occupied territories of South-east Asia. By the terms of the surrender the Japanese were delegated the task of maintaining peace and order in these territories, but the knowledge of their defeat changed irrevocably the nature of their political authority.⁸⁸ Their strength, in

86. The Raja of Buleleng described the effect of national state weakness quite neatly in his conversation with a missionary in late October 1945. According to the missionary, the Raja said that he "was still unprepared to follow the Republican movement, but that the situation was getting more difficult because no Dutch or English forces were coming." ("Data About Bali," December 8, 1945, AS-1/XXII/19, ARA, Inv. No. 2.10.14.)

87. The Balinese *pemuda*, shot by the Dutch, was I Ketut Merta. For an account of the "Abraham Crijnsen" incident, see Pendit, *Bali Berjuang*, pp. 87-94.

88. See Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, particularly ch. 7, "Pemuda in

Indonesia, lay then almost entirely in their military capacity, and, as Anderson has shown, the Japanese military commanders themselves were often disinclined to employ force of arms against the mass actions of the Republicans. Some Japanese units preferred to hand over arms and other supplies to the *pemuda* groups, or even to fight actively on the side of the Republic.⁸⁹ In short, the Japanese defeat in August 1945 weakened considerably the overarching or national-level state structures in Indonesia.

The Republican state, centered in Java, extended its influence to Bali in part through its delegation of legislative power to the newly established KNIs. Far more important, however, was the ideological or symbolic power of the Republic and its *merdeka* message, which passed to Bali by various routes, including radio broadcasts (especially those of the Surabaya *pemuda* leader Bung Tomo), written material, and the journeys of individuals between Java and Bali.⁹⁰ The founders of the main *pemuda* organizations in Bali (Pesindo and PRI) were men with close personal contacts within the *pemuda* organizations of Yogya and Surabaya, and they established the Bali branches of their organizations immediately after returning from Java in September of 1945.⁹¹ On October 1, 1945, word was received by radio in Denpasar and Singaraja that the Republic had been recognized by China, the Soviet Union, and the United States. There was immediate rejoicing, a flurry of mass rallies, and, by the end of the week (October 6–8), a mass demonstration in Singaraja demanding that the Japanese relinquish political power.

The movement of military materiel and troops from Java to Bali did take place in the months prior to the Dutch landing, but this never happened on a very large scale. More important than the actual transfer of military capacity, was the symbolic recognition, by Java's Republican military command, of the authority of the main Balinese military leaders. Indeed, throughout the revolutionary era, the main significance of the central Republican state, for Bali, was not material but symbolic. To an important degree the resistance in Bali moved to the rhythm of the struggle in Java.

Arms," pp. 125–66.

89. In Central Java, for example, General Nakamura began handing arms over to the Republicans in considerable quantity as early as October 5, 1945. (*Ibid.*, p. 145.)

90. A speaking tour of Bali by Sukarno in June 1945 also left a deep impression. In November 1945, representatives of various Republican Ministries, as well as officers of the TKR, came on an official mission to Bali. (Pendit, *Bali Berjuang*, p. 98.) In October a group of seven Balinese *pemuda* went to East Java in search of arms and information, and made contact with Bung Tomo, and with Republican Navy Headquarters. In the second half of December 1945, I Gusti Ngurah Rai led a delegation to Java, returning in April 1946 with supplies, reinforcements and instructions from Army Headquarters in Yogyakarta. For a detailed account of the relationship between the Navy and Bali's Republican forces in 1945–1946, see Rochmat Hardjawiganda et al., *Operasi Lintas Laut Banyuwangi–Bali* (n.p., Departemen Pertahanan Keamanan, Pusat Sejarah ABRI, 1982).

91. According to Pendit, Made Wijakusuma, founder of the PRI, had gone to Java in mid-1944, to establish links with the Javanese anti-Japanese underground. His main contact in Yogya was the former Taman Siswa teacher and activist, Wiyono Suryokusumo, who had lived and taught in Bali in the 1930s. (Pendit, *Bali Berjuang*, pp. 42–43. Also, interview: Made Wijakusuma, March 22, 1986.)

The "Regional" Japanese State in Bali

The capitulation, of course, affected the authority of the "regional" Japanese state, all the more so as Bali lay within the command area of the Japanese Navy, which in substantial portions of East Indonesia, had surrendered early on to Australian and Dutch troops. In the six month period prior to the Dutch return (March 2, 1946), regional (Bali-wide) state power was divided between the Japanese military and the local Republican civilian bodies.⁹² They shared, though seldom cooperatively, the tasks of state, and, as a consequence, the regional state per se was seriously weakened.⁹³ Mr. I Gusti Ketut Puja was appointed Governor of Sunda Kecil by Sukarno on August 23, 1945, and the civil administration was officially turned over to Puja and the KNI on October 8, 1945. Republican authority was circumscribed by Japanese military power in Bali. Japanese troop strength in early January 1946, for example, was reported to be 3,136 men (more than three battalions), of which 1,146 were Navy and 1,990 were Army troops.⁹⁴

Though the Japanese, by virtue of their near monopoly of the coercive apparatus, were in a position to put down any major *anti-Japanese* uprising they were unable to prevent, and perhaps also unwilling to become involved in, the local and district-level political turmoil which characterized this period. Initially, they turned a blind eye to the formation of Republican political and military organizations such as AMI, Pesindo, PRI, and the BKR. For a time they took virtually no steps to prevent the settling of old scores—against landlords, Balinese government officials, Chinese, etc.—at the local level. Moreover, they allowed some arms and supplies to be stolen or captured by local *pemuda* bands, and a handful of Japanese soldiers actually joined the *pemuda* ranks.⁹⁵ The scale of these transfers and desertions was rather small when compared to those in Java, and one effect was that the *pemuda* remained seriously short of weapons throughout the revolutionary period. Nonetheless, they

92. Pendif refers to the existence of "two governments" in Bali at this time, the Japanese and the Republican. (Pendif, *Bali Berjuang*, pp. 69–70, 75.)

93. State weakness was not unique to Bali. Indeed it was a condition which prevailed for some period of time in most parts of Indonesia after the defeat of the Japanese. There were important differences, however, in the duration and the character of state weakness, and these in turn affected the strength and nature of the resistance in each place. (Kahin, ed., *Regional Dynamics of the Indonesian Revolution*, p. 19. Also see Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, pp. 138–39.) The long delay in the return of Allied troops (over six months), and the weakness of both the Japanese and the Republican regimes there, meant that Bali existed in a condition of near statelessness for an unusually long time.

94. For details of troop distribution within Bali, see "Nefis Overzicht Gegevens Over Bali," *Archive—Resident Boon/45*, p. 6.

95. Evidence to this effect comes primarily from interviews with *pemuda* active in these areas: Bapak Meganada, September 18, 1986; I Made Wijakusuma, March 23, 1986. The famous *pemuda* leader, Nyoman Buleleng, was a Japanese army soldier, and of the ninety-six men who died in the battle at Marga, at least seven were Japanese. Pendif reports that the BKR commander from Singaraja (I Made Putu) met with the Japanese Army Commander in Kediri, regarding a transfer of arms. Wijakusuma met with the Japanese "Sirei" in Denpasar. (Pendif, *Bali Berjuang*, pp. 96–97.) According to Meganada, attacks were "staged" with the foreknowledge of the Japanese officers at Sempidi and Bela (Mengwi), in order to transfer weapons without giving the appearance that the Japanese were doing so voluntarily.

were symptomatic of a certain weakening—in spite of its military strength—of the Japanese state in Bali during this period.⁹⁶

Early in December 1945, however, there were clear indications of a shift in Japanese policy toward the Republic, very likely on orders from the British. The Japanese presented the Republican administration of Mr. Puja with an ultimatum demanding, among other things, the return of some 2,000,000 Guilders which had earlier been appropriated without fuss by the KNI—SK. In response to this ultimatum and to the new Japanese get-tough policy, Republican forces decided to stage a simultaneous assault on all Japanese military installations on the island, on the night of December 13, 1945.⁹⁷ By all accounts, the attack was a dismal failure. Completely overpowered by the well-armed Japanese troops, Republican forces were forced to flee the major towns.

The Japanese attitude toward the Republicans toughened further after this attack.⁹⁸ Whereas in the immediate post-capitulation period they had remained passively within their bases, in December 1945 Japanese troops resumed full military patrols, took direct reprisals against the *pemuda*, and arrested the leaders of the KNI, including Ida Bagus Putra Manuaba and Governor Puja. At the same time they began to encourage the Raja to form a political counterweight to the regional Republican administration. These efforts led to the creation of a Dewan Raja—Raja (Council of Raja) in January 1946. If the initial passivity of the Japanese had provided an opportunity for Republican political mobilization, the new get-tough policy had the effect of forcing the movement out of the towns and into the countryside. December 1945 then marks the beginning of the rural guerrilla phase of the resistance in Bali. Moreover, the arrest of the older Republican leaders at this time, meant that the Republican movement was now quite firmly in the hands of the *pemuda* who had fled to the villages.⁹⁹

The "Regional" Republican State in Bali

The problem of state weakness in Bali was not solved by the early efforts of the older Republicans, led by Governor Puja and the KNI,¹⁰⁰ to establish a regional

96. For more information on the administrative structure of the Japanese state in Bali, see "Bestuur Over Bali en Lombok tijdens de Japanse Bezetting en Daarna" (undated), *Archive—Resident Boon/46*.

97. Interviews: I Made Wijakusuma, March 22, 1986; Ida Bagus Tantra (Pak Poleng), April 11, 1986.

98. Pendit, *Bali Berjuang*, pp. 101–7.

99. The TKR—Badung had been based in the Puri Satriya (Denpasar). They fled first to the Puri Kesiman on the outskirts of town, but, still threatened by the Japanese, they retreated to the villages of Pegayaman, Bakung, and Carangsari, and from there dispersed further to begin information/propaganda work. Carangsari was the home of the commander of the Bali TKR, I Gusti Ngurah Rai, who was of puri Carangsari. (See Zainabun Harahap, *I Gusti Ngurah Rai, Pahlawan Dari Pulan Dewata* [Jakarta: Lembaga Sedjarah Hankam, 1968].) Wijakusuma went to the village of Kelating Sangging (Tabanan) at this time. (Pendit, *Bali Berjuang*, pp. 108–10, 117.)

100. Bali's KNI had seventeen members, two representing each of the eight *kerajaan*, and one from the islands of Nusa Penida and Djoengoel Batoe. The KNI also had a Working Body (Badan Pekerja) of three: I Gusti Bagus Oka, Dr. Angsar, and Ida Bagus Putra Manuaba. Manuaba, an older moderate nationalist, was also the Head

administration. Paradoxically, one of the greatest weaknesses of the Bali-KNI leadership was its dependence upon the leaders and organizations based in Java. In the absence of clear orders from Java—a common situation—Mr. Puja and the older nationalists appeared overly cautious and indecisive at a time when boldness and independent thinking were clearly called for.¹⁰¹ On the Dutch side as well, Mr. Puja's indecisive style drew much criticism. The CO-AMACAB [Commanding Officer—Allied Military Administration Civil Affairs Branch] Bali, J. van Beuge, for instance, complained that Puja's indecisiveness "lends support to passive resistance and boycott campaigns."¹⁰² In the Dutch analysis, then, the weakness of the Republican state apparatus in Bali was contributing to the condition of political turmoil.

The establishment of a Republican administration, weak though it was, provided an unprecedented opportunity for the growth of other nationalist organizations in Bali, and through them the spread of Republican ideas, first in the towns, and later in the countryside. Following the model in Java, an effort was made in November 1945, to consolidate the various struggle groups into a single fighting and propaganda unit, the TKR.¹⁰³ The TKR leaders managed to establish a Bali-wide structure and line of command, but local autonomy of the constituent units was still considerable, and indiscipline was a serious problem. Moreover, as in Java, there were serious differences between the TKR and the moderate KNI leaders over questions of strategy and tactics. The KNI preferred to have nothing to do with the December assault on the Japanese, and won the displeasure of the TKR commanders by refusing to provide financial support for the action and for the armed resistance in general.¹⁰⁴

Another serious weak spot in the Republican state in Bali was that it had no independent control over police and military forces. In late December, the Japanese disarmed the Balinese police force (about 511 men, most of them armed), and called in all sport and hunting weapons.¹⁰⁵ Although some of these policemen joined with

of the KNIP of Sunda Kecil (of which Bali was one part). He later became a prominent PNI politician in Bali, and a Member of Parliament. Other active KNI members were: Nyoman Kajeng, Gusti Gde Raka, Made Mendera, Gusti Ketut Katon, and I Made Putu. (Ibid., p. 125.)

101. In discussions with the Dutch, Dr. Djelantik commented that Mr. Puja could not provide general leadership for Bali, but that he [Puja] would be unwilling to see the Raja become leaders. (See "Punten uit de mededeelingen van Dr. Djelantik" [undated], A.S.—1/XXII/19, ARA, Inv. No. 2.10.14.) Many activist Balinese say now that they were also impatient with Puja. (Interviews: I Made Wijakusuma, April 3, 1986; Nyoman Pegeg, July 31, 1986.)

102. Document No. 313 in *Officiële Bescheiden*, 3:585.

103. They were assisted in this by two officers sent from Java, Capt. Subroto Aryo Mataram (the son of a prominent Yogya nationalist) and Capt. Sumarsudi, both of the Bagian Penyelidik (Military Intelligence) TKR, Div. IX, Yogyakarta. Subroto stayed on as the chief liaison officer for most of the Revolution. (Pendit, *Bali Berjuang*, pp. 99–100.) Javanese had also been brought to Bali to assist in the Peta training in February 1944. Among the more prominent were Zulkifli Lubis and Kemal Idris. (Interview: Pak Cilik [ex-Peta Captain], December 19, 1986.)

104. This issue led to an angry exchange between I Gusti Ngurah Rai and Puja, in which Ngurah Rai charged Puja with standing in the way of the resistance. (Archive—Resident Boon/46.)

105. According to a British intelligence report (October 1945), many Balinese policemen had joined up with the Republican resistance, or at least had failed to act firmly

the *pemuda*, the Republican administration did not thereby gain control of a police force. For, as stated earlier, Mr. Puja and his colleagues in no sense controlled the various *pemuda* organizations. In October 1945, a British reconnaissance team in Bali reported that: ". . . there is no one at the head of the Military Organization [in Bali] and therefore any armed resistance will suffer from a lack of coordination."¹⁰⁶ Even when the Sunda-Kecil branch of the TKR was formed, one could not speak of any autonomous Republican control over military force. For the large number of independent bands, guerrilla units, self-defense (*pencak-silat*) corps which had developed so quickly after the capitulation were beyond the control of the TKR, and the KNI, and remained that way throughout most of the revolutionary period. In March 1946, the estimated strength of the Bali TKR was between 500 and 1,000 men. A far greater number of people, both men and women, were actively involved in independent military and political organizations. In Tabanan, for instance, the TKR unit under the command of I Gusti Wayan Debes, reportedly had only thirty-eight men, but the total number of *pemuda* activists was estimated by Dutch sources to be in the tens of thousands.¹⁰⁷

In short, to the extent that Republicanism was a force at all in Bali, it was not the KNI but the *pemuda* and student organizations (PRI, Pesindo, ISSM, BPRI, etc.), together with the TKR, that carried the flame. These local *pemuda* organizations and military units did not contribute much to the strength of the official Republican state on Bali under the moderate KNI. Indeed, ideological differences, and lack of cooperation within the Republican camp inevitably weakened it. These internal differences, moreover, were to become important sources of division among Balinese in later years, and bases of political party affiliation after the achievement of independence in 1949.

Governor Puja, of course, was acutely aware of the frailty of his own government. He also recognized that, though much had changed under the Japanese, the Balinese Raja still exerted considerable power and influence within their realms, in some cases quite independent of any higher authority. He sought, therefore, to bolster his administration by gaining their cooperation. The Javanese "propagandist" Soekardani employed the metaphor of a horse-drawn carriage to describe the political relationship between the Raja, Governor Puja, and the mass of the Balinese people: "The driver is Mr. Poedja, the horses are the eight Princes [Raja], and the passengers are the people."¹⁰⁸ Nor was Puja alone in his estimation of the importance of the Raja.

against it. In March 1946, Lt. Col. F. H. ter Meulen reported that the police apparatus throughout Bali was in a state of disorganization, while in Tabanan and Buleleng "the entire police apparatus has collapsed." (F. H. ter Meulen, "Nota Betreffende Bali," March 16, 1946, *Archive—Resident Boon/46*.) Some Dutch reports suggested that the police had been substantially disarmed even before the December 13 incident. Certainly other armed Balinese units, such as the Peta, were deprived of access to weapons as early as March 1945, in the aftermath of the Peta uprising in Blitar Java. (See Pendit, *Bali Berjuang*, p. 39.)

106. "Recce Report," 1945, *Archive—Resident Boon/45*.

107. Ter Meulen, "Nota Betreffende Bali" *Archive—Resident Boon/46*. For Bali as a whole, in December 1945, the TKR was thought to possess the following weapons: 5 machine-guns, 2 light machine-guns, 30 rifles, 50 pistols, 3,000 rounds of ammunition, 100 hand-grenades.

108. "Report on the Situation on Bali and Lambok compiled from the notebooks of the Republican propagandist Soekardani," AS-1/XXII/19, ARA, Inv. No. 2.10.14. What is curious about this metaphor is that, perhaps unintentionally, the highest orders



June 29, 1938 Swearing in of the eight Raja as Autonomous Rulers (Zelfbestuurders) at Pura Besakih. Seated from left to right are the Raja of: Tabanan, Klungkung,* Badung,* and Bangli;* the Commander of the Prajoda Corps; the Raja of Karangasem;* the Resident of Bali and Lombok, H. J. B. Moll; the Head of the Department of Outlying Territories, Mr. W. Hoven; the Raja of Gianyar; the Assistant Resident of South Bali, B. Cox; and the Raja of: Jembrana* and Buleleng. The Raja whose names appear with an asterisk (*) were still in power in 1945. Photograph from *Tropisch Nederland* 11, 17 (December 12, 1938): 266.

Many of the *pemuda* leaders, including those of the lowest caste such as Made Wijakusuma, agreed that the Raja must not be antagonized, but where possible cultivated as allies. The Revolution, at least at this early stage was not to be anti-Raja (or even anti-feudal) but "pro-*merdeka*."¹⁰⁹

The clearest manifestation of the KNI's weakness and caution was its decision of January 29, 1946, which effectively surrendered political authority to the Raja and the "Paruman Agung" the legislative body originally set up by the Dutch in 1938. The KNI leaders, arrested in the aftermath of the December 13, 1945, affair, were released from prison on January 21, 1946 on the condition that they acknowledge the authority of this body which had been recently reconstituted on the initiative of the Japanese.¹¹⁰ The KNI's "makloemat," issued on February 9, 1946, read as follows:

Considering the status of the island of Bali as a "special territory" of the Republic of Indonesia, [and considering] that even "special territories" have an obligation to join in establishing a system of government which is appropriate to the existing situation, therefore with recognition of the promise/willingness of the Rajas of Bali to honor that obligation, with this resolution, it has been decided:

To surrender the rights and the power which are in the hands of the Republic of Indonesia, which according to the 1938 regulations regarding the government of the kingdoms (State Gazette, 1938, No. 529) were not yet in the hands of the kingdoms, to the Paruman Agung—in its

(the Raja) have taken the role of the beasts of burden, while the common mass of the population have become the idle passengers in a form of transportation ordinarily reserved for kings and aristocrats.

109. The decision to seek the support of the Raja was taken at a meeting in Denpasar between Wijakusuma, I Gusti Ngurah Rai, and I Gusti Ngurah Wisnu. This meeting took place shortly after a series of heated exchanges between the Raja of Klungkung and the *pemuda*. (Pendit, *Bali Berjuang*, pp. 79–81.)

110. Pendit, *Bali Berjuang*, p. 126. The Dutch had set up the original Paruman Agung on September 30, 1938, as a sort of all-Bali "legislative" body. Under the Japanese, it had been renamed twice (in August 1942, Poesat Oeroesan Negara², and in August 1943, Sjutyo-Renmei), but had been quite powerless, under the direct control of the Japanese minseibu. The reconstituted Paruman Agung of January 1946 was made up of two bodies, the "Dewan Radja-Radja" and the "Madjelis Rakjat." The members of the former were the eight Raja, one of whose number was the chairman. The members of the latter were chosen by the Paruman Negara of each kingdom, and were twenty-nine in number. This body was chaired by one of the Raja, who was assisted in his work by a "Badan Bekeraja" (Working Body) of five members. The Paruman Negara, the quasi-legislative bodies in each kingdom, were chaired by the Raja in each territory. The members included: all Punggawa, the Sedahan Agung and the vice-chairman of the Raad van Kerta [Council of Judges]. Of the remaining positions, one-fourth were named by the Raja, and three-fourths were drawn from designated functional and minority groups including: "Perbekel," "Bendesa" or "Klian desa," "penloerah," "sedahan abian," "pekaseh," Chinese, and Arabs. A tiny number of seats were made available to representatives of the new social and political organizations such as the PRI, BBI, Paruman Pandita Darma, Masyumi, Persatuan Wanita Indonesia, and Balische Christenen. The total number of seats in each of the Paruman Negara were as follows: Karangasem—26, Klungkung—18, Bangli—18, Gianyar—26, Badung—28, Tabanan—26, Buleleng—27, Jembrana—19. (See Document No. 313 in *Officiële Bescheiden*, 3:581–82.)

new form and new composition—with the stipulation that whatever is enacted by that body, may not deviate from the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.¹¹¹

If the act of surrendering power to the Raja was indicative of the weakness of the regional Republican state, the legal and political terms of reference of the act suggested an important reason for that weakness. While acknowledging the general (negative) authority of the Republican Constitution, the decision clearly treated the Dutch "Zelfbestuursregeling" of 1938 as the relevant regulation regarding political authority in Bali. Moreover, by turning power over to the Paruman Agung, the KNI demonstrated an explicit institutional continuity with the Dutch era, thereby calling into question its own *raison d'être* and legitimacy.

The granting of *formal* governmental authority to the Paruman Agung was consistent with Dutch plans for the pacification of Bali,¹¹² and it met with the enthusiastic approval of most of the Raja. The selection procedures were designed to ensure the dominance of the Raja and other reliable or "moderate" elements. Only a token effort was made to include *pemuda* and other new political and social organizations. Yet it was not only the inherent conservatism of the Paruman Agung which was problematic. More troublesome was the question of whether it could do the job of running Bali. There were a number of reasons to doubt that it could.

First, the Dutch had not created the Paruman Agung to *govern* Bali. It had been set up as a body to discuss, intermittently, a variety of issues of general (i.e. Bali-wide) interest, such as forestry, agricultural extension, education, highways, health, and so on. Secondly, and this is most important, it had been intended to function under the chairmanship of a Dutch Resident. The central, authoritative power for Bali as a whole, then, had continued to be the Dutch state.¹¹³ In the absence of an outside *executive* authority, the Paruman Agung could not be expected to function properly. Finally, even in its advisory function, the Paruman Agung had an extremely brief institutional history. The tradition of cooperation among the Raja was not well established. Executive decisions and initiatives had always come at the behest of higher authority, first the Dutch and then the Japanese. By contrast, the chairman of the 1946 Paruman Agung, the Raja of Buleleng, Anak Agung Nyoman Panji Tisna, had no recognized superior authority over the other Raja.¹¹⁴

The weakness of the Republican administration of Mr. Puja, after its surrender of authority to the Paruman Agung, was only too clearly revealed less than two weeks after the Dutch return. With no opposition, Dutch troops on March 11 arrested Puja, and other Republican officials, reoccupied the Governor's residence (the former Dutch Resident's house), and raised the Dutch flag above it.¹¹⁵ This action signaled the end of an important stage in the struggle for regional state power in Bali.

111. The decision was No. 01-1-20, signed by Mr. Puja and Ida Bagus Putra Manuaba, and issued as a "Makloemat" on February 9, 1946. (*Archive—Resident Boon/46.*)

112. See, for example, "Nota Herbezetting Bali," *Archive—Resident Boon/45.*

113. *Ibid.*

114. The decision to name one of the eight Raja as chair of the Paruman Agung was taken February 4, 1946, by the Paruman Agung itself. ("Peraturan No. 43/1946.")

115. In addition to Governor Puja, the Dutch arrested Ida Bagus Putra Manuaba, and Head of the Tax Office, I Gusti Nyoman Wirya. The Dutch action was allegedly taken upon orders from the British Commander of the 5th Indian Division (Surabaya), General Mansergh. The date, March 11, 1946.

For over six months Puja's Republican administration had claimed sovereign political authority, but it had "shared" power with the defeated Japanese and finally also with the Paruman Agung. The basis of Governor Puja's power had clearly never been as solid as that of the Dutch Residents and the Japanese Minseibu. In part this was a problem of poor local organization, of ideological differences with the revolutionary *pemuda*, and a lack of coercive capability, and in part it was a function of his administration's peripheral position within the larger Republican state upon which his authority ultimately depended. The weakness of this "regional" state in Bali, particularly in view of the near vacuum of "national" state power, created opportunities for the extension of political struggle down to the local level. Here the Raja and the *pemuda* quickly moved to the center of the political stage in Bali.

Local States

The reactions of the Raja to the transfer of civilian authority from the Japanese to Bali's Republicans on October 8, 1945 had been mixed. Two Raja, Cokorda Ngurah Gde of Tabanan and Anak Agung Ngurah Putu of Karangasem, were said to have addressed large gatherings (of roughly 5,000 people) and declared themselves "to be in support of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia."¹¹⁶ It soon became clear, however, that these declarations sprang from a sense of insecurity in the face of Republican mobilization, rather than a strong or principled commitment to the Republic. More clearly opposed to the transfer of authority were the Raja of Klungkung, Dewa Agung Oka Geg (who refused to allow the Republican flag to fly over government offices in his kingdom) and the Raja of Gianyar, Anak Agung Gde Agung.¹¹⁷ A brief comparison of the political initiatives of the Raja of Tabanan and Klungkung and the condition of state authority in each kingdom, from August 1945 to March 1946, should provide a sense of the way in which political conflict and resistance were conditioned by the character of local states.

116. "NEFIS Overzicht Gegevens Betreffende Bali", January 2, 1946, Bundel "Bezetting Bali," Sectie Militaire Geschiedenis (hereafter, SMG). The Raja of Buleleng was regarded as having pro-Republican sympathies, but he apparently took no public position in support of the transfer. He seems to have been concerned to put an end to the more violent actions of the *pemuda*, and hoped that the establishment of a moderate Republican administration would do this. In Jembrana the Raja was known to have been a moderate nationalist even before the war, but his stance at this juncture was not clear. There is a good chance that his position was influenced by the opinions of his son Suteja, who was an important *pemuda* leader. The Raja of Bangli was apparently also sympathetic to the Republic, but chose not to express this in an open or public forum. The Raja of Badung did nothing to interfere with the growth or actions of *pemuda* organizations in his area, and appeared to welcome the transfer of sovereignty. A good number of Rajas, then, had some sympathy for the Republic, but most took no public position; their approach was to wait and see.

117. Anak Agung Gde Agung had only recently taken over the post from his father, Anak Agung Ngurah Agung, who had been dethroned by the Japanese in August 1943 and exiled to Lombok in October 1943. At the same time as the son became prime minister of NIT in 1946, a brother, Anak Agung Gde Oka, became Raja of Gianyar. Details of the Dewa Agung's political maneuvering in Klungkung at this time can be found in a long letter he sent to the Resident of Bali/Lombok in answer to anonymous accusations that the Dewa Agung and his militia (BKN) had employed unscrupulous methods in the months prior to the Dutch return. (Archive--Resident Boon/48.)

In Tabanan there was an almost complete breakdown of normal state power.¹¹⁸ In the words of the Dutch CO-AMACAB, Van Beuge:

The Rajah's government is hopelessly out of gear and has no power or perhaps not even the will to preserve order, or to cooperate with our troops. It will be our duty to restore law and order with all means at our disposal and try to protect the peaceful citizens from terrorists and intimidation. Unless we do this the rot may spread to other districts, where at present there is order and peace.

Many of the district-chiefs and village headmen have lost their former authority and have simply given up or are in a completely lethargic state, so that the very foundations of the formerly so closely-knit Balinese society have crumbled and groups of young terrorists are free to do as they please.¹¹⁹

The collapse of state power also entailed the decay of essential state structures, such as the taxation and judicial systems, and their replacement by alternative systems, initiated by Republican *pemuda* and local bands. Judicial and tax officials (e.g., members of the Raad van Kerta, and the Sedahan) were either unwilling or unable to perform their duties under these conditions.

In Klungkung, on the other hand, the basic elements of state authority—administrative structures, the taxation system, the judicial and coercive apparatus—continued to function reasonably well. The Dewa Agung managed to retain a firm grip on his own officials, people and territory, and Dutch authorities were confident of his ability to maintain order and to limit the chances for Republican mobilization:

The Raja of Klungkung, Dewa Agung Oka Geg, is at present by far the most resolute of the Rajas. He has the situation completely under control, and from the outset he has taken a strong stand against the Republic.¹²⁰

The difference between Tabanan and Klungkung was perhaps most evident in the military sphere. The anti-Republican militia established in Klungkung by the Dewa Agung in late 1945 (BKN) had an estimated 5,000 recruits by January 1946. The local BKR/TKR, by contrast, had managed to mobilize only about 100 between August and December, 1945.¹²¹ By March 1946, Republicanism had the status of an unusually weak resistance movement in Klungkung and this did not change substantially throughout the revolutionary period. The local state in Klungkung, then, had a near monopoly

118. A good sense of the chaos which prevailed in Tabanan at this time is provided in a detailed political report of the Controleur A. W. A. A. Ellerbeck, "Personalia—Tabanan," *Archive—Resident Boon/46*. Other useful descriptions are found in van Beuge, "Report on the Situation in Tabanan," March 12, 1946, MvD, Inv. 32/1-GG8-D; A. W. A. A. Ellerbeck, "Politiek Overzicht Over het Landschap Tabanan," September 16, 1946, *Archive—Resident Boon/46*.

119. Van Beuge, "Report on Situation in Tabanan," March 12, 1946, MvD, Inv. 32/1-GG8-D, pp. 1-2. In a note appended to this report the commander of the Bali/Lombok Brigade, Lt Kol ter Meulen, wrote: "In the case of Tabanan I shall change my policy if necessary and take strong military measures unless an improvement in the situation occurs."

120. *Officiële Bescheiden*, 3:589-90.

121. The Dewa Agung was quite clear in stating that the purpose of the BKN was to combat the pernicious influence of the Republic. Actions taken to intimidate, torture or kill were seen by him as acceptable if they were directed at these (Republican) enemies of king and "country." See *Archive—Resident Boon/48*.

on the means of force even before the arrival of the Dutch. This distinguished it fundamentally from Tabanan, where independent *pemuda* organizations, the BKR/TKR, and guerrilla bands took the military initiative, and the local state lacked any autonomous control over military or police forces.

The task of the Dewa Agung of Klungkung was facilitated by a number of factors which set his kingdom apart from many of the others, and from Tabanan in particular: 1) the absence of any serious royal pretender; 2) the historical weakness of the prewar nationalist movement and of the administrative middle class in Klungkung; 3) the comparatively small size of the kingdom, and therefore the absence of peripheral (inaccessible) territories within it; 4) the persistence of "feudal" relations of production in the countryside, which implied a greater structural dependence of peasants upon the landholding aristocracy.

In addition to structural/historical factors, the particular resources and political skills of the various Raja were of considerable importance in determining the course of events within their kingdoms. Land was one important political resource. Raja with substantial landed wealth tended also to have large followings, and those with limited holdings often lacked political and social influence. The Raja of Tabanan was among the poorest in Bali and he was widely acknowledged as one of the weakest. In 1942, his puri owned a mere 14 hectares of "very mediocre" *sawah* and a small amount of dry land. The total was not in any way sufficient to support the simplest ritual obligations nor even the normal material needs of the puri.¹²² The Raja of Klungkung, on the other hand, reportedly owned very substantial tracts of land, and he was easily the most powerful and respected of the Raja in Bali.¹²³

The authority of the Raja of Klungkung was also enhanced by the reputation he had gained as protector of his people through three years of Japanese rule. Furthermore, he showed himself to be much more adept than most at using the confused legal and political situation of 1945–1946 to his own advantage.¹²⁴ Before

122. Most of the lands of Puri Gde Tabanan were confiscated by the Dutch in 1906. Indeed, the situation was so bad that in 1941 the government bought the puri a few hectares of land, and assisted in paying off its accumulated debt. (See A. W. A. A. Ellerbeck, "Personalia—Tabanan," *Archive—Resident Boon/46*.)

123. I have been unable to establish any precise figures on the holdings of the Dewa Agung, but most Dutch sources indicate that they were considerable. (Interview: Prof. J. van Baal [former Assistant—Resident, Bali, 1946–1947], May 9, 1987.) One of the main reasons for this seems to have been that in Klungkung the royal lands were not confiscated by the Dutch at the beginning of the century. Dutch civil servants interviewed indicated that they had been well aware of the large holdings of some of the Raja and Punggawa, but that they did not make it their business to investigate these matters too thoroughly. They had also been aware that these men were in a position to increase the size of their holdings by administrative juggling, and to this type of behavior the Dutch preferred to turn a blind eye. During the land-reform of 1963–1965, the Dewa Agung was said to have been one of the major landowners, but land-reform officials would not dare to redistribute his land. (Interview: Anonymous official at the Kantor Agraria, Bali [land-reform section], November 1986.) Supporters of the Dewa Agung today claim that he has only modest landed possessions. It may indeed be true that the land which is now registered in his personal name is minimal, but this is not an adequate measure of the land which is effectively under his control—e.g., land which is registered in the name of wives, sons, daughters, relatives and other loyal dependents.

124. Pendit, *Bali Berjuang*, p. 70. In fact the situation was so unclear that Ida

the Dutch arrived, he had removed all potential political opponents from office, and had replaced them with members of his own family or his trusted friends. By contrast, the Raja of Tabanan lacked both reputation and political skill. At the time of his father's death, in 1939, he had not been named Raja by the Dutch, because he was deemed too young and inexperienced. Until late 1944, when the Japanese finally appointed him Raja, Tabanan was ruled by a Governing Committee of four, chaired by the Punggawa Kota. Thus, in 1945, he had scarcely one year of experience as Raja, and his credibility was seriously compromised by an apparent dependence on the Japanese. Moreover, five years of rule by Governing Committee had contributed to the weakness of the royal tradition in Tabanan. In March 1946, J. van Beuge described the abilities of the Raja as follows:

Not much was expected of him, and unfortunately this has proved only too true. He is a figure of no authority and a weak character, and probably lost the little prestige he had in the eyes of his people by an overservile attitude toward the Japanese.¹²⁵

He was thus quite unable to exercise control over administrative and political appointments. A number of Punggawa, perbekel, and other "state" functionaries were killed, kidnapped or otherwise swept from office in Tabanan, under pressure from a powerful "revolusi sosial." Others joined the Republican side, thereby weakening still further the authority of the Raja and his "state" (see Table B).¹²⁶

Had the structures of administration been more clearly defined, the rules more widely agreed upon, and most importantly had they been enforced by a powerful higher state authority, then the personal style and resources of the various Raja would likely have been much less important than they were. But the period August 1945 to March 1946 was, above all, a time of enormous uncertainty and near statelessness. This near vacuum of national and regional state authority exposed the political capacities of the various Raja and their local state structures, so that if political authority devolved, it did so in different measure from kingdom to kingdom. The Dewa Agung's ability in this respect did not mean that Klungkung completely escaped the political turmoil of the post-capitulation period, but it did contribute to a swift resolution of *open* and widespread *societal* conflict, and the temporary victory of anti-Republican forces there. Moreover, it meant that political conflict and violence in Klungkung were, by and large, initiated and controlled by state forces, and not by autonomous political and military organizations. As a consequence, political rivalry—

Bagus Putra Manuaba (KNI) went to Java to get some answers in September 1945. Manuaba returned without any further clarification, having been told that the solution of these problems was up to the government of the province of Sunda Kecil. (Ibid., p. 75.)

125. "Report on Situation in Tabanan," MvD, Inv. No. 32/1-GG8-D, p. 1.

126. "The Raja is hiding, scared to death, in his puri, and does not dare to go out. The Punggawa Kota was murdered, the Bendesa fled from the pemudas who wanted to kill him. The District and Kingdom offices were closed. In Penebel, everything was empty, the Punggawa murdered, his family in refuge, the District office closed and empty; the village Heads in hiding. In Krambitan the District government had disappeared, as also in Badjra (District Selemadeg) and Blajoe (District Marga). The old Punggawa of Kediri died in 1945. His successor stayed in the town of Tabanan. The District office of Kediri was closed. Only in Baturiti was there a clerk . . . who as much as possible, tried to do his work, although he was right in the midst of the pemudas and dared not leave his village." ("Politiek Overzicht," *Archive—Resident Boon/46*.)

for example between the Punggawa Kota and the Dewa Agung—did not have the opportunity to develop into mass-based political struggle, or social revolution.

Table B
Political Orientations of Punggawa and Other Officials
in Tabanan, 1945–March 1946

Office/Title	Puri of Origin	Politics
Punggawa Kota, Tabanan	Puri Kompiang, Tabanan	Loyal/Dutch
Punggawa Marga	Puri Marga/Blayu	Republican
Punggawa Bajera/Selemadeg	Puri Bewa ² , Sam ²	Republican
Punggawa Krambitan	Puri Pemecutan, Krambitan	Republican
Punggawa Kediri	Puri Kediri	Republican
Punggawa Penebel	[unknown]	Loyal/Dutch
Sedahan Agung, Tabanan	Jero Beng, Tabanan	Republican
Sedahan Pupuan	Jero Subamiya, Tabanan	Republican
Mantri Politie, Tabanan	Jero Subamiya, Tabanan	Republican

Source: Compiled from A. W. A. A. Ellerbeck, "Personalialia," *Archive—Resident Boon/46*.

In Tabanan, by contrast, the Raja was unable to establish a firm grip on the state apparatus in his kingdom, and political violence quickly became open and widespread. It is true, of course, that the social forces contributing to a Republican resistance were far less formidable in Klungkung than in Tabanan. Nonetheless, the different long-term outcomes in these kingdoms had a great deal to do with the capacity of the Raja to maintain the integrity of the local state in the political vacuum which followed the Japanese capitulation. The processes of state decay and political mobilization went hand in hand.

Conclusions

The comparison of Tabanan and Klungkung suggests some general conclusions regarding the sources of political conflict and resistance in Bali during this period. In particular it allows us to articulate more carefully the relationship between state "weakness" and political conflict. The "weakness" of the local state in Tabanan had two dimensions. First, the Raja and his puri lacked any autonomous basis of political authority. Economically and politically, the Puri Gde had long been a salaried dependant of the central state; that is, a functionary of a larger state apparatus, and not in any sense the center of an autonomous local state. When the larger colonial apparatus collapsed, after August 1945, the power of the Raja of Tabanan collapsed with it. Secondly, the condition of the Raja-puri affected strongly the other components of the local state, which rested squarely on the executive authority and legitimacy of the Raja himself. As his authority deteriorated, so too did the structures beneath him. In virtually every arena of state activity—administrative, economic, judicial, coercive—the local state effectively ceased to exist in Tabanan in this period. In both of these respects, by contrast, Klungkung was manifestly a "strong" local state.

The deterioration of state power in Tabanan was the primary condition for the open *political* articulation of existing social and economic conflicts and grievances,

such as those outlined above. The absence of a regulating or hegemonic state, provided a unique opportunity for political mobilization and for the expression of new political ideas, without the normal constraints. This distinguished Tabanan very clearly from the kingdom of Klungkung. The opportunity was only meaningful politically, however, to the extent that there were people prepared to take advantage of it, who had the means, organizational, economic, and ideological, to do so. In this respect, too, Tabanan was unusually well equipped, because in addition to a reasonably strong *pemuda* group and a substantial land-owning peasantry, it also had a large number of wealthy *puri* and ex-government officials, with the resources and the political inclination to mobilize on behalf of the Republic of Indonesia.

With the decapitation of the local state hierarchy, moreover, the conventional line between "the state" and "society" became blurred, and this constituted a second important condition for the development of a resilient political resistance. Former state officials (e.g., Punggawa, Sedahan, Members of the Raad van Kerta) now became central leaders of "societal" mobilization under the banner of Republicanism. The economic, social, and political resources which had once been harnessed for the purposes of the colonial state were now the basis for the emergence of autonomous quasi-state structures throughout the kingdom of Tabanan, and much of Badung and Buleleng. A significant segment of the landed elite/ex-officialdom, allied themselves with the Republican *pemuda*, and contributed in this way to the further weakening of the old local regime. In this respect, the processes of state decay and societal mobilization were inseparable, and the more complete the disruption of the old state structures, the more resilient was the resistance.

Yet the political mobilization of the *puri* and the *pemuda* in this period was not primarily aimed at bringing down the old state, but at establishing new ones. These efforts were necessarily scattered, and did not produce a fully articulated or unified state apparatus. The political ideals and the political style of the Republic, however, did gain wide currency at this time, and this meant that in important respects the old regime was beyond repair. When Dutch forces landed, they were stepping into a society already divided, and already in the throes of a political struggle over regional and local state power. Under the circumstances, they could not hope to play the role of neutral guarantors of "rust en orde." Instead, they became the new, and undoubtedly the most powerful, competitor for state power in Bali.