CURRENT DATA ON THE INDONESIAN MILITARY ELITE

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In issues No. 36 and 37 (October 1983 and April 1984) of Indonesia, readers were offered a tentative, preliminary analysis of the drastic, interrelated changes in the structure and leadership of the Armed Forces which began in March 1983. Issue No. 36 was devoted largely to the political coming of age of the "men of AMN," or the postrevolutionary officers who started to graduate from the Military Academy (located at Magelang, Central Java) in 1960. Issue No. 37, on the other hand, focused on the consequences of implementing Law 20/1982, which separated the functions of Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and created distinct bureaucracies under each (far the more powerful being the pyramid under Commander-in-Chief General L. "Benny" Murdani). The present text is intended to complete the series by looking at the "reorganization" set in motion in the spring of 1985 and scheduled for completion by April 1, 1986. Though a few personnel decisions remain to be taken, the general character of this reorganization is clear and its political implications at least partially decipherable. In any event, it is apparent that by next spring not only will the reorganization be complete, but all three armed forces, as well as the police, will be fully in the hands of the postrevolutionary generation of officers, leaving only a few key positions in the Armed Forces' Headquarters (Mabes ABRI) still held by an inner coterie of Murdani old-timers. In this sense the year 1985-86 will be as historic a turning point for the military in Indonesian politics as were 1945-46 and 1965-66.

What is the essential nature of the recent reorganization? In formal terms, it has meant the liquidation of a whole tier of overstaffed, combined-service interregional commands—the Kowilhan and Kostranas—and the consolidation of units of control at the regional level.¹ As far as the Army is concerned, the former sixteen Regional Commands (Kodam I-X, XII-XVII) have been amalgamated into ten new-style Regional Commands, producing a structure strikingly reminiscent of the seven "TT" (Tentara dan Territorium) of the early 1950s, before the onset of regional warlordism and self-conscious policies of ethnic divide and rule by Jakarta.² Thus the new Kodam 1 (an amalgamation of Kodam I-III) covers almost the same zone as the old TT/I (adding only the Natuna Islands), while Kodam 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 (ex-Kodam IV, VI, VII, VIII, and an amalgam of IX, X, and XII), coincide with the old TT/II, TT/III, TT/IV, TT/V, and TT/VI. Kodam 7 (merging Kodam XIII and XIV) covers the core of what was earlier TT/VII. Where the organization of 1985 differs from that of 1955, the explanation lies

¹. The four Kowilhan were disbanded by Murdani between July 6 and 15, 1985. Kostranas followed on the 16th.

². Sinar Harapan, March 16, 1985, contains a well-informed article by military specialist Atmadji, which discusses in detail the similarities and differences between the set-up of the 1950s and the new organizational format.
TT Divisions (1950-1958)

Kodam Divisions (1958-1985)

"New Style" Kodam Divisions (1985)

(from Sinar Harapan, March 16, 1985)
in contemporary politico-military exigencies. The shape of Kodam 8 (combining Kodam XVI [Maluku] and XVII [Irian Jaya]), with its headquarters in Jayapura, reflects serious concern with the OPM (Free Papua Organization) insurgency and the massive, embarrassing flight of thousands of Irianese across the border into Papua-New Guinea. Similarly Kodam 9 (ex-Kodam XVI) exists primarily for efficient prosecution of the continuing war against Fretilin nationalist resistance in occupied East Timor.\(^3\) Kodam 10 (ex-Kodam V), on the other hand, controls the politically crucial metropolitan region of Jakarta—the zone where any successful coup would have to be mounted.

A number of former Kodam have been degraded to the status of Military Resort Commands (Korem), analogous to the Komando Distrik Militer (KDM) of the early 1950s—for example, the old Kodam IX (East Kalimantan), X (South Kalimantan), and XV (Maluku); others represent small clusters of Korem, e.g., the old Kodam I (Aceh), II (North Sumatra), III (West Sumatra/Riau), XII (West Kalimantan), XIII (North Sulawesi), XIV (South Sulawesi), and XVII (Irian Jaya). Murdani has stated that he expects eventually there will be approximately forty such Korem altogether: \(^4\)

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All the new Kodam commanders are to have the same rank, Major-General, in contrast to previous practice where the Kodam commanders in Java typically had ranks one step higher than those in the Outer Islands.\(^5\)

In this context, it is significant that all the previous territorial infantry brigades have been liquidated, officially on the grounds that they have proved very expensive and unwieldy, and in practice never took the field as brigade-sized units. Their component battalions are now mostly to be assigned to the administrative and operational control of the Korem commanders, with each Korem having at least one such battalion as its local "strike force" (alat pemukul). Each Kodam commander will have only a single battalion directly under his personal command. Furthermore, each city where a Kodam is headquartered (i.e., Medan, Palembang, Bandung, Semarang, Surabaya, Banjarmasin, Makasar, Jayapura, and Denpasar) will form a separate Komando Militer Kota (KMK) with its own commander (all Kodim [Komando Distrik Militer, Military District Commands]

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3. The same *Sinar Harapan* article states explicitly that the Lesser Sundas and Bali were originally supposed to be part of Kodam 5 (East Java) or 7 (Sulawesi), but that the problem of East Timor convinced the authorities to maintain the old Kodam XVI as a new Kodam 9 (Nusatenggara).


in these KMK will be eliminated as well). These changes, which underline the very limited military power directly at the Kodam commanders' disposal, suggest that in some ways their role will be more like that of the former Kowilhan commanders than that of the powerful Kodam commanders of the 1950s. An additional development of some importance is the inauguration of specialized social-political staffs at both the Kodam and Korem levels, whose mission is ostensibly the handling of what promise to be pressing problems of finding employment for supernumerary military personnel.

If one compares the levels of command in the new Army hierarchy with those of the existing civil administration, one notices that they tend to coincide only at the lower rungs. A Kodim still typically corresponds to a civilian kabupaten. But the Korem are generally equivalent to the long-abolished Residency (karesidenan), while most Kodam cover a cluster of Provinces (propinsi).

This pattern is likely to have curious consequences insofar as most provincial governors are still very high-ranking retired military officers. The example of West Java, where the Kodam commander is a Major-General (R. I. Siregar), the

6. For further detail on these changes, see Atmadji's article in *Sinar Harapan*, March 16, 1985, cited above.

7. According to *Angkatan Bersenjata*, April 10, 1985, a new Assistant for Social and Political Affairs will be attached to each Kodam's Chief of Staff, while the Korem will get staff officers for social-political affairs. The organizational implications of all this are rather obscure. Hitherto, "social and political affairs" have been handled by the local Assistants for Intelligence (Aspam), Territorial Affairs (Aster), and Karyawan, or Functional Group, Affairs (Asyawan). How their turf will be shared with the new Assistants may prove to be a ticklish problem. For further discussion and analysis, see Lincoln Kaye's long article in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 24, 1985, pp. 23-26.
Governor a Lieutenant-General (Yogie Suwardi Memet), and the Korem commanders colonels, will probably become more frequent, with all the attendant conflicts of authority and complications of protocol.

Another change of major importance for the distribution of power within the Army is the further centralization of control over its elite combat units in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief. In August 1985, the old Kopur I and II (Battle Commands I and II) within Kostrad were abolished and replaced by Operational Divisions I and II, both headquartered in the immediate vicinity of Jakarta. The appearance of these novel division-size operational units serves to underline the effective elimination of the time-honored territorial divisions (especially Siliwangi, Diponegoro, and Brawijaya) as more than sentimental memories. Alongside Kostrad and its Operational Divisions stand the Special Forces (Kopassus, formerly Kopassandha) or Red Berets, and the recently (1984) formed Fast Reaction Strike Force (Pasukan Pemukul Reaksi Cepat), or Green Berets, a special elite unit directly responsible to the Commander-in-Chief, for deployment in case of urban riots, hijackings, and other spectacular emergencies. (Another important, and increasingly visible force, this time not under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, is the Presidential Security Squad [Pasukan Pengawal Presiden—Paswalpres]).

Parallel to these changes in the Army are no less striking reorganizations within the Navy and Air Force, which also have their political implications. The most significant innovation in both services is the elimination of the prevailing "general staff" leadership structure inherited from the late 1950s and 1960s, when, with Sukarno's encouragement, the Navy and Air Force organized themselves as much as possible on lines comparable to, and rivalrous with, the Army. Under the new system the Navy and Air Force Chiefs of Staff will each be assisted by three powerful Deputies (for Operations, Personnel, and Logistics); and each Deputy will supervise the work of three or four semiautonomous Directorates, each headed by a Director. Alongside this bureaucratic pyramid will be ranged some specialized agencies and a central operational command.

In the case of the Air Force, the seven Regional Air Commands (Komando Daerah Angkatan Udara—Kodau) have been eliminated, to make way for two vast Operational Commands (Komando Operasional—Koops): one based in Jakarta covering western Indonesia along a line running north from the West-Central Java border to roughly the West Kalimantan—South Kalimantan divide, the other, based in Makasar, covering the eastern half of the archipelago. Both commands are to be directly subordinated, for operational purposes, to the Commander of the National Air Defense Command (Kohanudnas), a senior officer attached to Armed Forces' Headquarters. In turn the Operational Commands will control all but three of the country's air bases (those at Yogyakarta, Solo, and Bandung, used mainly for training purposes, will remain under the authority of the Air Force's Education Command [Kodikau]). On each base the old dualism of control between the air base commander and the local wing commander has been liquidated in the former's favor. Finally, the status of the Air Force's elite strike force, Kopasgat (Komando Pasukan Gerak Cepat), a sort of rival

8. These two commands will be held by graduates of AMN Class 2 (1961); the 46-year-old Col. Warsito, former commander of Korem 084 (Surabaya), and Col. Muslim Massewa, former commander of Korem 141 (Watampone). See Angkatan Bersenjata, August 9 and 10, 1985.

9. See the detailed account given in Atmadji's column in Sinar Harapan, April 1, 1985.
to the army's Kopassandha/Kopassus and the Navy's Marines, has been severely reduced; it will no longer function as a single, coherent unit, but will have its personnel spread out in small groups at various strategic locations. 10

Something rather similar has happened to the Navy. The old and prestigious Armada has been split into two—a Western Armada based in Jakarta (eventually in Teluk Ratai, South Lampung) and an Eastern Armada based in Surabaya. The previous eight Regional Naval Commands (Komando Daerah Angkatan Laut—Kodaeral) have been swept away (creating a problem of finding jobs for 3,000-4,000 superfluous personnel). 11 Various naval bases are to be rationalized into two tiers—roughly five fully equipped First Class Bases (Pangkalan Utama Angkatan Laut—Lantamal), and a larger number of more skeletally furnished local installations. 12 In both services it is expected that in the future the Chiefs of Staff will be three-star officers; the Deputies and Fleet/Operational Command commanders two-star; and the Directors and (major) base commanders one-star.

These reforms have at least two political implications. On the one hand, they further reduce the status and autonomy of both Navy and Air Force, whose inner structures now more resemble those of the Department of Defense and Security and the Police than that of the Army. Their functions, too, are to be largely administrative and technical in character. Neither service will any longer have regional command levels that in any way parallel or rival the Army's Kodam and Korem. On the other hand, operational control of the fighting arms of both services has been even more securely monopolized by Mabes ABRI in the person of the Commander-in-Chief. It is safe now to say that at no previous time in Indonesia's history has a military man on active service had such complete control of the country's fire power as General Murdani.

What has been the official rationale for these enormous changes? The basic justification has been an explicitly formulated shift in the mission of the armed services. General Murdani is on record as stating that the changes are "based on the assumption that a conventional war, such as World War II, the Korean War, or the Iran-Iraq conflict, will not occur in island Southeast Asia for the indefinite future" and that therefore "today, the emphasis remains on internal security—problems of social disorder, subversion, and so on." 13 Given this mission, it is logical that the Air Force and Navy, primarily designed for wars with external enemies, should take a back seat. The prime roles are to be taken by the Army and by the Police (which is soon to be greatly expanded and technically upgraded). 14 Additional reasons offered have been the need

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10. Ibid.

11. These potential unemployment figures were given personally by Admiral Romly, the Navy Chief of Staff. He added that the number of flag rank officers (i.e., admirals) would soon be reduced from the traditional 70 or so to 46. Sinar Harapan, June 14, 1985, as cited in Indonesia Reports 9 (July 1985): 37. This may be the appropriate place to record the unique service that John A. MacDougall has done to all Indonesianists by preparing and publishing this detailed, day-by-day log of current developments in Indonesia.


14. Testifying before Commission III of the DPR (Parliament) in early October 1984, National Police Chief Police General Anton Sudjarwo said that the current size of the Police (150,000 men) would be increased to 180,000 by 1989, and
for budgetary austerity in worsening economic circumstances (the technology-heavy Navy and Air Force are man for man much the most expensive services to maintain); the importance of increasing efficiency by cutting out duplication of functions, padded bureaucratic hierarchies, and irrelevant formal parallelisms; and the rapid decline in the number of officers available for key functions, as the huge 1945 Generation goes finally into retirement and the quite small, early (1960s) graduating classes of the AMN take over military leadership.

All these rationales support Murdani's contention that the reforms are intended to produce for the first time in Indonesia a professional military establishment constructed on conventional international lines; and thus (though Murdani does not quite say so) to eliminate the top-heavy, inefficient, politicized structures inherited from the Revolution and the Sukarno years. Murdani has repeatedly put great emphasis on new requirements for promotion to key posts, and the replacement of the 1945 Generation's loose camaraderie by a more impersonal, competitive spirit. It used to be, he noted in a significant interview with Tempo, that military jobs were allocated according to whether you were "BTM" (Berjuang Terus-Menerus—Never Absent from the Struggle), i.e., had participated in the Revolution and in the military's various postrevolutionary campaigns. Now the four chief criteria will be: 1) loyalty to Pancasila ideology; 2) fighting spirit and professional ability; 3) personal integrity; and 4) morals. He indicated his expectation that in the future there will be hundreds of colonels competing intensively for 40-50 general officer positions. The ultimate target is for no more than 10 percent of military personnel to be officers, i.e., approximately 2,500 for the Army and 270 to 300 each for the Navy and Air Force. There can be little doubt that in all this Murdani is not merely speaking for efficiency and rationalization, but consciously retailoring promotion criteria to the backgrounds and aspirations of the now dominant postrevolutionary generation of military officers. These people may not like the stress on tight competition, but they will certainly appreciate the explicit end to BTM-ism and all it stands for.

How easily have these changes been accomplished, and what, if any, problems are likely to arise on their account? To all appearances things have gone quite smoothly, a tribute to Murdani's personal authority and capable political management. At the same time it is obvious that serious criticisms have been voiced within the military, and anxiety continues with regard to developments over the longer haul. Murdani himself has said that he has been reproached by "bapak-bapak kita" (i.e., retired members of the Generation of '45) for leading the Army away from its traditions towards a professional army on American or Japanese lines; and for quietly beginning the abandonment of the doctrine of dwifungsi (dual function) which legitimizes permanent military control over

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17. Ibid.
the country's political life. Indeed, he did at one point appear to question publicly whether in the longer term the doctrine will be maintained.\textsuperscript{18} (Perhaps because the internal military reaction was unfavorable, Murdani has since strongly reemphasized his commitment to dwifungsi, most recently in a heavily publicized speech to the politically important Annual Working Conference of the Armed Forces' Social and Political Affairs Officers.)\textsuperscript{19} At the same time, no one who has followed General Murdani or watched his "style" since becoming Commander-in-Chief would accuse him of political self-abnegation or failing to safeguard the political interests of the officer corps. Some conspicuous recent examples of his thoughtfulness are: the "dropping" (titipan) of AMN graduate, class of 1961, Brig. Gen. S. Nugroho, a long-time personal aide, into the post of Under Attorney-General (Jaksa Agung Muda) for Intelligence Affairs;\textsuperscript{20} the designation of Under Attorney-General (jaksa agung muda) for Intelligence Affairs;\textsuperscript{20} the designation of the obscure Brig. Gen. C. J. Rantung as Governor of North Sulawesi (Rantung was told of this designation not by Lt. Gen. Supardjo Rustam, the Minister of the Interior, but by Lt. Gen. Gunawan Wibisono, Murdani's Assistant for Social and Political Affairs);\textsuperscript{21} Governor of Jakarta Lt. Gen. Suprapto's public admission that new appointments of mayors for North and Central Jakarta were being held up "pending the decision of the ABRI Commander";\textsuperscript{22} and the overriding of the Riau Provincial Assembly's majority support of a civilian candidate (Ismail Suko) for Governor in favor of the incumbent, long-time Murdani favorite Maj. Gen. Imam Munandar.\textsuperscript{23} A different sort of concern has repeatedly been expressed by Army Chief of Staff Rudini over the past two years. This officer, who avoids Murdani's peremptory style, has over and over again tried to reassure his subordinates that their futures are safe and that no one will end up unemployed.\textsuperscript{24} After all, he has been saying,
the changes in progress represent a reorganization, not a "rationalization" of the Armed Forces. 25 His aversion to the term *rasionalisasi* underscores the military's bitter experiences in the "rationalizations" of 1948 (which largely precipitated the bloody Madiun Affair) and of the early 1950s (which became a prime factor in the politico-military regional crisis of 1956-58). On each occasion, soldiers who believed they were being dumped from the Army reacted violently. Rudini's assurances seem—so far—to have had their effect, but it is probably too soon to tell how deep dissatisfaction and anxiety really run. 28 In any event, it is clear that the Army (and Navy and Air Force) are still heavily overofficered. 27

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nonmilitary positions. Henceforth fewer officers would be appointed as provincial governors, department secretaries-general, *bupati*, etc. On the other hand, single-term assignments to "civilian" functions would be made a normal part of a successful officer's career. For example, an able officer might serve one term in a local provincial assembly (DPRD), and, if he did well, go on to become a Korem commander. Officers in civilian postings would receive the standard civilian salaries for these jobs, minus their continuing military pay.

These statements reflect the fact that for two decades the huge superfluity of army officers inherited from the Revolution and the military politics of the Sukarno era has been handled by the distribution of patronage in the civilian sector. (The policy has also ensured full military control over the state apparatus and the state-controlled sectors of the economy.) Once in civilian posts, officers of the Generation of 1945 rarely returned to the strictly military hierarchy. The rather small numbers of officers produced by the AMN in the 1960s has meant that the "internal" reasons for giving officers civilian jobs no longer exist. Yet if the doctrine of dwifungsi is to remain viable, civilian postings must be firmly integrated into the normal military career pattern. See Kaye's useful discussion in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 24, 1985, pp. 25-26.

25. Speaking to Commission I (Security) of the DPR in November 1984, Rudini explicitly stated that the current reforms represented a *reorganisasi*, not a *rasionalisasi*. See *Indonesia Reports* 2 (December 1984): 47.

26. In June 1985, Justice Minister Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Ismail Saleh announced a plan, approved by Murdani, to hire up to 30,000 retired members of the Armed Forces as security guards at detentional and correctional facilities throughout Indonesia, with 10,000 "coming on board" at the first stage. Shortly thereafter, the Director-General of Corrections, Police Maj. Gen. Hudioro, said that the 149 Lembaga Pemasyarakatan (correctional institutions) and 276 Rumah Tahanan (prisons) in Indonesia require about 29,000 guards (i.e., about 70 per institution). He added that priority in recruiting would be given to retired or retiring senior NCOs and low-ranking officers. See *Indonesia Reports* 9 (July 1985): 23 and 31, citing *Kompas*, June 9, and *Berita Yudha*, June 12, 1985. These figures give a sharp impression of the scale of the impending unemployment problem in the military and of the quantity of official places of detention in Indonesia.

27. In a parliamentary hearing in November 1984, Rudini told the legislators that the proper ratio between officers, NCOs (mainly master-sergeants and sergeants), and men (corporals and privates) in a modern army is 1:3.5. At present the Indonesian Army has a 1:1.37:3 ratio, but the reorganization should ensure an improvement to the level of 1:2.62:3.74—still very officer-heavy. See *Indonesia Reports* 2 (December 1984): 47.
If we now turn from the implications of the new bureaucratic and command structures to those of the related personnel changes, the main developments seem to have been as follows:

As a group, the new powerholders are men born between 1934 and 1938, i.e., should expect to retire between 1990 and 1994. The proportion of ethnic Javanese, now close to 80 percent, represents a marked increase over our last listing. The old divisional affiliations that were so important to the Army politics of the 1950-1980 period have virtually lost all meaning. The crucial "connections" now are to the RPKAD (especially during its heyday as the spearhead of the anti-Communist campaign of 1965-66) and to the coterie of men responsible for handling the East Timor "problem" from 1975 to 1985. And although in sheer numbers the graduates of Class 1 (1960) of the Military Academy now predominate, the really key players continue to be Murdani's classmates in the P3AD of the 1950s: Maj. Gen. Sutaryo is Murdani's Assistant for Intelligence; Maj. Gen. Dading Kalbuadi is his Assistant for Logistics; Maj. Gen. Soetarto is commander of Kodam 9 (i.e., East Timor); and Maj. Gen. Soeweno is commander of Kostrad. Maj. Gen. C. I. Santoso's transfer from Assistant for Functional Group (Karyawan) Affairs in Mabes ABRI to Secretary-General of the Department of Transmigration should be read as Murdani's move to take full control of the explosive mass-transmigration program in West Irian, which has caused major problems not only for the Irianese—11,000 of whom have fled over the border in the past 18 months—but for the Indonesian government in its diplomatic relations with Papua-New Guinea and its public relations with the international press. Santoso served as Kodam commander in Irian between 1978 and 1982, and is intimately acquainted with the region. But P3AD control cannot continue for very long, since Murdani is the youngest member of the group and his own retirement from active service is due in the fall of 1988.

The most interesting individual personnel changes have taken place in the politically sensitive capital city, and appear to be related to the "succession" issue, both within the Army and Armed Forces, and at the national level. For some time most observers had been predicting that the first postrevolutionary officer to become Army Chief of Staff would be Maj. Gen. Try Sutrisno. Graduating in 1959 from the Army Technical Academy (Aktekad) in the last class before that institution was merged into the newly established AMN in Magelang, he appeared an ideal candidate from both the military and political points of view. He had been Chief of Staff of Kodam XVI under Soeweno and Dading Kalbuadi in the years 1977-78, during the major antipopulation campaigns in East Timor that resulted in the loss, by firearms, starvation, and related disease, of at least a hundred thousand lives. Thereafter he had four successful years

28. An article in Angkatan Bersenjata of June 28, 1985 claimed that only three true '45-ers were left in the Army—Rudini, Triantoro, and Soelarso; only one in the Navy—Romly; and one in the Air Force, Air Force Chief of Staff Sukardi, who entered the Air Force in 1953, but had served in the TRIP [Student Army] during the Revolution. The article went on to note, however, that the staf dekat (intimate staff) of Murdani continues to be mainly '45-ers.

29. A big loss to this group has been caused by the recent death of Lt. Gen. Gunawan Wibisono, ex-Chief of the Social and Political Affairs Staff in Mabes ABRI.

30. In a recent interview with a correspondent from Asiaweek, East Timor Governor Mario Carrascalao estimated the death toll at 100,000. See Asiaweek,
as commander of Kodam IV in South Sumatra before moving up to become commander of the metropolitan command in 1982. On the political side, he had served as adjutant to Suharto in the middle seventies and seemed a personal favorite with the President. In the Jakarta command he had been considerably more popular than his predecessor, Norman Sasono, and had made conspicuous efforts to be on good terms with the city's large pious Muslim population. Another, perhaps ambiguous, advantage was that though more or less the same age as the first AMN graduates, he was not among their number and thus was not regarded as representing or leading a cohesive military clique. His last year as commander in Jakarta, however, was more or less a disaster, beginning with the bloody Tanjung Priok affair in September 1984 in which dozens of people were killed by troops nominally under his authority, followed by the bomb attacks on branches of Liem Sioe Liong's Bank Central Asia, the devastating explosion at the Marines' arsenal in Cilandak, and a series of spectacular (and suspicious) fires in major buildings. (He also experienced difficulties with his own troops.) Commanders in other regions where far less serious disturbances have taken place have typically been punished (after a face-saving interval) by being sent into military oblivion: for example, Maj. Gen. Sukotjo, commander in Central Java at the time of the widespread anti-Chinese riots in late November 1980, was dismissed on January 27, 1981. Because of these disasters, and persistent rumors that Murdani was displeased with his overall performance (especially his cultivation of Islamic groups), there was some reason this spring to think that he might after all not become Chief of Staff. But presidential favor seems to have stood him in good stead and he has succeeded Triantoro as Deputy Chief of Staff. Since Rudini, the Breda group's one holder of the Chief of Staffship, is scheduled for retirement in December 1985, it is now more or less certain that Try Sutrisno will shortly "make the grade."

The interesting question, however, is how much the Chief of Staffship now means. Rudini has served capably but apolitically. His predecessor Poniman

August 2, 1985. Less interested parties tend to put the figure at from two to three times this figure.

31. See the rather effusive profile of him in Tempo, October 27, 1984.

32. In the course of his interview with Reuters' correspondents cited above at note 18, Murdani appeared inadvertently to concede his personal direction of the crushing of these riots. He told Peter Millership that: "If [Priok] was not an isolated incident, would I not have been lynched in the pesantrens that I visited just two or three weeks ago?" Indonesia Reports 3 (January 1985): 30.

33. The chronology is: September 12, 1984, the Tanjung Priok riots; October 4, bombing of two BCA branches; October 17, burning down of the big PT Supermi factory; October 22, burning of the Sarinah Jaya shopping complex; October 29, explosion of the Cilandak arsenal; November 11, a large fire in the Kartika Plaza Hotel; November 13, gutting of the Sarinah Department Store; February 12, 1985, burning down of an army depot and warehouses in North Jakarta; July 10, gutting of the nine-story Metro Building; and July 21, burning of the eight-story RRI (State Radio and Television) headquarters. In addition, numerous smaller factories, restaurants, theaters, and nightclubs have been consumed by mysterious flames.

34. Try Sutrisno himself noted that between 1983 and 1984 the numbers of disciplinary violations by members of the Jakarta Garrison had risen from 77 to 187. See Indonesia Reports 4 (February 1985): 31.
(the present Minister of Defense) was a mainstream administrator. One has to go back to the tenure of General Widodo in the late 1970s to recall a Chief of Staff who exercised visible independent authority. Moreover, since 1983, power in the military has been so centralized and concentrated in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief (who is a commander, not a staff officer, after all) that one could argue that the officers who have real muscle are those who work in Murdani's immediate entourage. Seen from this angle of vision, AMN Class of 1960 "stars" like Maj. Gen. Edy Sudrajat and Maj. Gen. Soegiarto—who are younger than Try Sutrisno, but are now Murdani's Assistants for Operations and Personnel—may actually be as influential as the Army Chief of Staff.

It is in this context that certain developments have occurred which suggest the possibility of a degree of conflict between the political interests of the President and those of the Commander-in-Chief. What are these developments? The first is one to which I have already alluded, namely that Suharto has much to gain by Try Sutrisno's rise towards the Army Chief of Staffship, but Murdani very little. As we have seen, Murdani has been speaking in a way that suggests he wants to voice the group interests of the Military Academy graduates; furthermore, he has been talking emphatically about the need to lessen dependence on foreign sources for weapons and weapons systems by developing a local munitions industry—remarks which not only are likely to appeal to the AMN men and to nationalist sentiment in general, but also imply a criticism of thirty years of army dependence on the US for weapons, training, logistical support, and so on.35

The second is the very curious choice of Lt. Gen. Triantoro as Gunawan Wibisono's successor in the important position of chief of Murdani's Social and Political Affairs staff. Triantoro is universally regarded as a competent but undistinguished functionary who will in any case have to retire next year and is thus an interim appointment. One could argue that if Try Sutrisno was to be moved up into Triantoro's Deputy Chief of Staff position, something prestigious had to be found for Triantoro. But the obvious place for an officer of his stripe is a high post in the Ministry of Defense. That Murdani has taken him on as his political right hand man, rather than promoting a trusted crony like Sutaryo or Dading Kalbuadi, may suggest an intervention from the palace, or an intervention by anti-Murdani groups in the immediate presidential entourage.

The third development is the unusual choice of Maj. Gen. Sugito as Try Sutrisno's successor as commander of Kodam 10 in Jakarta, and the decision not to permit him to follow Try Sutrisno's precedent of doubling as Chief of Staff of the Metropolitan Garrison Command (Jakarta's equivalent to the nine KMK). Sugito's elevation has not come about through normal channels, i.e., through previous appointment to less important peripheral Kodam. Try Sutrisno had earlier been commander of Kodam IV. All his predecessors had followed comparable routes: Norman Sasono was ex-commander of Kodam XII, Mantik of Kodam IX, Poniman of Kodam XV, Makmun Murod of Kodam IV, and Amir Machmud of Kodam X. Sugito has come in direct from doubling as Commander of Kostrad's Airborne Combat Command and Commander of the Operations Security Command in

35. In 1984, a Strategic Industries Council was set up to ensure that in the future the Armed Forces depend as little as possible on foreign equipment. This council is headed by Minister for Research and Technology B. J. Habibie. For details, see the Murdani interview printed in the June issue of Swasembada, as cited in Indonesia Reports 10 (August 1985): 12.
East Timor. Indeed he told the press that he was informed of his new appointment only two weeks before it was announced publicly, and felt sad to be leaving his "boys" and the people of East Timor in the midst of accomplishing an important pacification and "hearts and minds" campaign there. As usual, the military's public relations machinery has been publicizing Sugito as yet another "simple," "democratic," "popular," "ready-to-listen" senior officer, but Tempo, probably correctly, quotes fellow officers as referring to him as orang tempur ("a real fighter"). Not only has Murdani controlled operations in East Timor from the start, but Sugito's Timor service coincides with the very hard-line stand taken there since 1983, following the recall of the moderate commander of Korem 164 (East Timor), Col. Purwanto. Prior to that, Sugito had served for four years as Defense Attache in Hanoi, whose leaders Murdani has been so conspicuously cultivating that he has severely embarrassed Foreign Minister Moctar Kusumaatmadja. This history suggests that Sugito is a tough personal protege of Murdani, rather than a palace favorite; thus his appointment may be a sort of "equalizer" for the palace's elevation of Try Sutrisno. At the same time, Sugito's failure to double as Chief of Staff of the Jakarta Garrison quite possibly represents palace countermeasures.

Fourth is the transfer of Kopassus/Kopassandha commander Brig. Gen. Wismoyo Aris Munandar to serve as Soetarto's Chief of Staff in Kodam 9. On the surface this represents a promotion, since service in East Timor is highly coveted in the officer corps, and since there is every chance that Wismoyo will eventually succeed Soetarto. Yet it is striking that, at his inauguration, Soetarto

36. See the biographical sketch in Sinar Harapan, August 7 and 9, 1985. There is something puzzling about Sugito's being referred to as being in charge of Komando Operasi Keamanan, since "Operasi Keamanan" was the code name for the major ABRI offensive of April-September 1981. This code name was presumably made obsolete with the launching, in August 1983, of "Operasi Sapu Bersih [Operation Clean Sweep]."


38. Some background may be useful here. Korem 164/Wira Dharma (East Timor) was officially set up on March 26, 1979, with Col. Adolf Sahala Rajagukguk as its first commander. Rajagukguk was a real hard-liner, and gained international notoriety when Amnesty International published secret documents he had signed authorizing the use of torture against people suspected of Fretilin connections. These documents were dated July 1982, and it is likely that Rajagukguk was withdrawn soon afterwards. In any case, in the last months of Gen. Andi Mohammad Yusuf's tenure as Commander-in-Chief, and probably in accordance with Yusuf's relatively "soft," "hearts and minds" approach to counterinsurgency, the moderate Col. Purwanto was sent out to be Korem 161's second commander. Secret negotiations were begun between Purwanto and the Fretilin guerrilla leader, Kay Rala Xanana, which resulted in a ceasefire in March 1983, just as Murdani was replacing Yusuf as Commander-in-Chief. The ceasefire lasted until early August, when a Fretilin band reportedly ambushed and killed some unarmed military personnel. Murdani took the opportunity to launch a large-scale offensive ("Operation Security"), and Purwanto was replaced by the hard-line Col. Rudito. Rudito died of cancer in a Dutch hospital in mid-January 1985. See Tempo, February 9, 1985. His replacement, Col. Rahardjo, is said to be more moderate.

went out of his way to inform the public that the transfer was really a promotion, and not a demotion. 40 Why? It is widely rumored that Wismoyo, who is married to a younger sister of Mrs. Suharto, and is thus a brother-in-law of a President who is famous for being nice to his relatives, consistently reported directly to the President via Mrs. Suharto during his tenure as Kopassandha commander, i.e., deliberately did not follow the military chain of command up through Murdani. His removal to a staff job in Kodam 9 is therefore likely to have been agreeable to Murdani. Furthermore, his successor, Brig. Gen. Sintong Pandjaitan, looks to be very much a Murdani figure. Aside from a combat role in the "countercoup" of October 1, 1965 (he participated in the recapture of the RRI installations from September 30 Movement troops), he was in operational command of the spectacular Operation Woyla on March 31, 1981, when paratroopers under Murdani's overall direction recaptured a Garuda airliner hijacked by "Muslim extremists" at Bangkok's Don Muang airport. 41

Finally, it is perhaps worth drawing attention to the recent changing of the guard in the new Tjakrabirawa—the Presidential Security Force, Paswalpres. The force's long-time commander (since 1978), Brig. Gen. R. Sardjono, has gone to Mabes ABRI to become head of the combined services' military police. 42 His successor, Col. Pranowo, was previously head of the military police in Kodam V/Jaya. It is possible that Pranowo represents an ally of his old commander, Try Sutrisno; but it is just as possible that he is an ally of the former Chief of Staff of Kodam V, Eddy Nalapraya, one of Indonesia's most capable intelligence specialists and long regarded as Murdani's "eyes and ears" within the metropolitan military command.

Obviously, the observations above are speculative in character. In any given instance, they may be completely mistaken. But it is unlikely that they all are. At the very least one could suggest that a certain hypothesis needs confirmation or refuting. In a nutshell this hypothesis is: Try Sutrisno's elevation, Triantoro's new appointment, and the division of power in the Jakarta command represent palace interests; while the appointment of Sugito, the transfer of Wismoyo, and possibly the replacement of Sardjono by Pranowo, express the interests of Murdani and his entourage. In any case, the next appointments to watch are the selections of successors to Rudini and Triantoro.

* * *


42. It is interesting that since Sardjono's transfer a series of important changes in the functions and powers of the military police have been announced. From now on the Navy and Air Force will not have their own police, but will be serviced by a unified Corps Polisi Militer under the control of the Armed Forces' Military Police Center (Puspol ABRI). On the other hand, this agency has yielded its authority over military prisons to the Armed Forces' Legal Upbuilding Body (Babinkum ABRI), and, more significantly, its responsibility for what is termed pembinaan teknis pengamanan (roughly "technical management of security") for the President and Vice President and their families, to the Army Chief of Staff. In other words, control will lie with Rudini, and probably, in due course, with presidential favorite Try Sutrisno. See *Angkatan Bersenjata*, June 18, 1985.
The list approximates the format used in earlier issues of *Indonesia* and is for the period ending September 30, 1985. Those officers whose careers have already been detailed in *Indonesia*, issues 36 and 37 (October 1983 and April 1984), and for whom no substantial new information has been forthcoming, have their names marked with an asterisk. Those in *emphasized type* are new office holders, or those old-timers for whom new information has come available; they and their "biographies" are listed in alphabetical order at the end of this compilation, followed by a brief glossary of some of the most used abbreviations.
ARMED FORCES HEADQUARTERS (Mabes ABRI)

I. Commander-in-Chief

Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces

Gen. Leonardus Benjamin ("Benny") Murdani* (b. October 2, 1932, Cepu) (P3AD) 28.III.83 (30 months)
Gen. Andi Mohammad Yusuf Assistant for Security, Hankam; Head, Strategic Intelligence Center; Deputy Head, Babin RPKAD J

Commander of Kopkamtib

Gen. Leonardus Benjamin Murdani 29.III.83 (30 months)
Admiral R. Sudomo As above RPKAD J

II. Staff Echelon

Chief of the General Staff (Kasum)

Gen. Darjatmo Vice-Adm. Mohammad Romly
AMN Yogya I, 1948 Commander, Kowilhan III
SI J

2. Vice-Marshall Oetomo c. 10.XI.84 (10½ months)
Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force Air Force J

Chief of the Social and Political Staff (Kassospoi)

1. Lt. Gen. M. Kharis Suhud* 11.IX.78 - 25.II.84 (64½ months)
Gen. Darjatmo Ambassador to Bangkok
AMN Yogya I, 1948 SI J

Inspector-General, Mabes ABRI
RPKAD J

Deputy Army Chief of Staff Ordnance J

Inspector-General (Irjen ABRI)

? Inspector-General of the Army
RPKAD J

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1. Gunawan died suddenly in Houston on June 27, 1985 while under treatment for heart disease.
2. First Marshal Iskandar
Assistant for Security [Intelligence] (Aspam)
Maj. Gen. M. I. Sutaryo
(P3AD)

Assistant for Operations (Asops)
1. Lt. Gen. M. Sanif*
2. First Marshal Ibnu Subroto
   (b. c. 1938) (AMN 1, 1960)

Assistant for Territorial Affairs (Aster)
   (b. 1930)
   (Breda?)

Assistant for Communications and Electronics (Askomlek)
1. Vice-Marshall Tedjo Suwarno
2. First Marshal Soebagyo

Assistant for Security and Social Order (Askamtibmas)
2. In March, the retirement from active service and the subsequent appointment as ambassador to Rangoon and Katmandu of Maj. Gen. Soeharto was announced. But it is not clear when exactly he relinquished this post.

3. There is some reason to think that Widyo Sarwono may have retired, but there is as yet no information on his successor.

4. On July 31, 1985 Santoso took up a new position as Secretary-General of the Department of Transmigration (overseeing the huge planned transmigrations to West Irian).
Head, Armed Forces' Financial Center

Col. Rachmansyah c. 23.III.85 (6 months)
Finance Corps

Central Executive Organs (Lakpus)

1. Governor, National Defense Institute (Lemhannas)
   Maj. Gen. Soebijakto* 31.V.83 (28 months)
   (b. August 17, 1929, Wates)
   (Breda) Lt. Gen. Sutopo Juwono
   Officer seconded to the Commander-in-Chief
   B J
2. Commander-General, Armed Forces' Academy (Akabri)
      Commander, Kodam VIII
      B J
   2. Lt. Gen. (Marines) Kahpi Suriadiredja* 21.II.85 (7 months)
      (b. June 14, 1931, Bandung) Commander, Kowilhan IV
      Marines S
3. Commander-General, Armed Forces' Staff and Command School (Sesko ABRI)
   1. Vice-Marshall Aried Riyadi* 16.V.83 - 23.VI.84 (13 months)
      Vice-Admiral Prasodjo Mahdi
      Commander, Combined Air Strike Command (Kopatdara)
      Air Force ?
      ?
      ?
      J
4. Head, Armed Forces' Mental Upbuilding Center (Pusbintal)
   First Admiral Dr. Tarmizi Taher ?
   Brig. Gen. M. Soegeng Widjaja ?
   Navy J
5. Head, Research and Development Center (Puslitbang)
      (Breda) Maj. Gen. Otty Soekotjo
      Head, Army Data Collection and Processing Center
      Signal Corps J

5. The heads of two other bodies functioning directly under the Commander-in-Chief—the Strategic Policy and Planning Staff (Srenum) and the Armed Forces' Strategic Intelligence Body (Bais)—have yet to be announced to the public.

6. Aried Riyadi's retirement was announced in November 1984.

6. Head, Armed Forces’ Historical Center (Pusjarah)  
Brig. Gen. Gatot Surjadi  
? 1982 (c. 3 years)  
Brig. Gen. (Titular) Dr. Nugroho Notosusanto  
? SI J

7. Head, Armed Forces’ Medical Center (Puskes)  
Maj. Gen. Dr. Kurnia Natadisastra  
c. 2.VI.79 (76 months)  
Brig. Gen. Dr. Abdullah Hasan  
Medical Corps S

8. Head, Armed Forces’ Military Police Center (Puspom)  
? – c. November 84?  
Maj. Gen. Kartojo  
CPM J

2. Brig. Gen. R. Sardjono  
c. late February 85 (7 months)  
Head, President’s Security Squad (Paswalpres)  
CPM J

9. Head, Armed Forces’ Information Center (Puspen)  
First Admiral Emir H. Mangaweang  
17.VI.83 (27½ months)  
Brig. Gen. Drs. Encung A.S.  
? ?

10. Head, Armed Forces’ Survey and Mapping Center  
Brig. Gen. Utaryo Surodirono  
8.XI.83 (23 months)  
Vice-Admiral D. U. Martojo  
Topography Corps J

11. Head, Armed Forces’ Legal Upbuilding Body (Babinkum)  
Maj. Gen. M. Djaelani SH  
? (certainly by 1984)  
? ?

12. Head, Armed Forces’ Supply Body (Babek)  
Maj. Gen. Dading Kalbuadi*  
(b. April 14, 1931, Cilacap)  
(P3AD)  
c. March 1983 (c. 30 months)  
Commander, Kodam XVI RPKAD J

7. Gatot Matrai’s retirement was also announced in November 1984, but he may have stayed on temporarily until Sardjono assumed the position.
13. Head, Armed Forces' Functional Group Upbuilding Body (Babinkar)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name and Position</th>
<th>Appointment Period</th>
<th>Commanding Officer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>


14. Commander, National Strategic Command (Kostranas)

First Marshal Roesman* (b. c. 1933, Karanganyar, Kebumen) c. January 1983-16.VII.85 (30 months) Air Vice-Marshals Sukardi Chief of Staff, Kostranas Air Force J

15. Commander, National Air Defense Command (Kohanudnas)

1. Vice-Marshals Iskandar* 9.X.78-c.8.VIII.84 (c. 70 months) Air Vice-Marshals Suwando Governor, Air Force Division, Armed Forces' Army Air Force J

2. First Marshal Hartono c. 8.VIII.84 (14 months) Air Force J

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**SERVICE HEADS AND ARMY HIERARCHY**

**Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces**

Gen. Leonardus Benjamin ("Benny") Murdani* (b. October 2, 1932, Cepu) (P3AD) 28.III.83 (30 months) Gen. Andi Mohammad Yusuf Assistant for Security, Dept. of Defense and Security; Head, Strategic Intelligence Center; Deputy Head, Babin RPKAD J

**Army Chief of Staff**

Gen. Rudini* (b. December 15, 1929, Malang) (Breda) 7.III.83 (31 months) Gen. S. Poniman Commander, Kostrad D J

**Navy Chief of Staff**

Admiral Mohammad Romly* (b. December 8, 1928, Tulungagung) 4.XII.82 (34 months) Admiral Walujo Sugito Chief of Operations Staff, Dept. of Defense and Security Navy J

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8. Kostranas was formally liquidated on July 16, 1985.
Air Force Chief of Staff

Air Marshal Sukardi*
(b. December 1931, Bojonegoro)

Chief of the National Police

Police General Anton Sudjarwo*
(b. September 21, 1930, Bandung)
(Brimob)

Commander of the Marine Corps (KKo)

Brig. Gen. (Marines) Muntaram*
(b. c. 1934-35, Cianjur)

Deputy Army Chief of Staff

1. Lt. Gen. Bambang Triantoro*
(b. January 7, 1931, Surabaya)

2. Maj. Gen. Try Sutrisno*
(b. November 15, 1935, Surabaya)
(Aktekad 4, 1959)

First Assistant (Intelligence)

1. Maj. Gen. Ari Bandiyoko*

2. Brig. Gen. I Gde Awet Sara*
(b. March 3, 1936, Bali)
(Aktekad 4, 1959)

Second Assistant (Operations)

1. Maj. Gen. Prajitno*
(Breda?)

2. Brig. Gen. Adolf Sahala Rajagukguk
(b. December 31, 1938, Medan)
(AMN 2, 1961)

Third Assistant (Personnel)

1. Maj. Gen. Sudiman Saleh*
(b. June 5, 1928, Yogya) (Breda)
2. Brig. Gen. **Syaukat Banjaransari**  
   (b. c. 1937) (AMN 1, 1960)  
   26.VI.85 (3 months)  
   Chief of Staff, Kostrad  
   J  

Fourth Assistant (Logistics)  

Maj. Gen. Ishak Odang*  
23.V.83 (28 months)  
Lt. Gen. Haroen Soewardi  
Head, Army General Supply Service  
S?  

Fifth Assistant (Research and Development)  

1. Maj. Gen. Darsoyo*  
   (Breda)  
   23.V.83 - 26.VI.85 (25 months)  
   Lt. Gen. Supardjo  
   Deputy Assistant for Territorial Affairs, Dept. of Defense and Security  
   J  

2. Brig. Gen. **Sukarto**  
   (b. c. 1938) (AMN 1, 1960)  
   26.VI.85 (3 months)  
   Deputy Governor, General and Army Division, Armed Forces' Academy  
   J  

Assistant for Territorial Affairs  

1. Brig. Gen. Harjono Prawirodirdjo*  
   (b. 1929, Malang) (Breda)  
   23.V.83 - 2.1.84 (7 months)  
   Lt. Gen. Abdul Rivai Harahap  
   Deputy Governor, General and Army Division, Armed Forces' Academy Cavalry/B  
   J  

2. Brig. Gen. Ida Bagus **Sudjana**  
   (b. June 5, 1937, Bali)  
   9.X.84 (12 months)  
   Commander, Kodam XII  
   Balinese  

Commander, Army Strategic Reserve (Kostrad)  

Lt. Gen. Soeweno*  
   (b. c. 1929, Madiun) (P3AD)  
   24.V.83 (28 months)  
   Lt. Gen. Rudini  
   Second Assistant (Operations) to the Army Chief of Staff  
   RPKAD  
   J  

Governor, General and Army Division, Armed Forces' Academy  

Maj. Gen. Untung Sridadi  
   Tjokrowidjojo*  
   (Breda)  
   c. 6.VI.83 (28 months)  
   Maj. Gen. Sudiman Saleh  
   Army Inspector-General  
   J  

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9. Harjono died suddenly on January 2, 1984. It is not clear who filled in between that date and Sudjana's inauguration, but probably it was Harjono's deputy.
Commander, Army Staff and Command School

1. Maj. Gen. Bagus Sumitro*  
   (AMN Yogya II, 1949)  
   27.IV.81 - ?.83 (?)  
   Maj. Gen. Bambang Triantoro  
   Commander, Kodam XV  
   B  

   (Breda)  
   ?.83 (?)  
   Head, Research and Development Center,  
   Armed Forces' Headquarters  
   Signal Corps

Commander-General, Army Logistics Command

Maj. Gen. Yoes Adipoernomo  
(AMN Yogya II, 1949)  
26.IX.77 - ?.11.83 (64 months)  
Maj. Gen. Amir Judowinarno  
Deputy Commander-General, Army Logistics Command  
Quartermaster Corps

Commander-General, Army Research, Development and Training Command

Maj. Gen. Sebastian Soekoso*  
(P3AD)  
25.V.83 (28 months)  
Lt. Gen. Bambang Triantoro  
Commander, Kodam XV  
RPKAD

Commander, Kopassus [Kopassandha]

1. Brig. Gen. Wismoyo Aris Munandar*  
   (b. February 2, 1940)  
   (AMN 4, 1963)  
   6.IV.83 - 22.V.85 (25½ months)  
   Lt. Gen. R. Yogie Suwardi Memet  
   Commander, Group I Kopassandha (Serang)  
   RPKAD

   (b. September 4, 1941, Tarutung)  
   (AMN 4, 1963)  
   22.V.85 (4 months)  
   Commander, Airborne and Secret War  
   Training Center [Pusandha Linud] of  
   Kopassus  
   RPKAD  
   Toba Batak

Commanders of Territorial Commands (Kodam)

1. Bukit Barisan (North Sumatra)
   Maj. Gen. Suripto*  
   (b. February 18, 1934)  
   (AMN 1, 1960)  
   27.IV.85 (5 months)  
   Commander, Kodam III  
   D  

10. Bagus Sumitro retired in 1983 and must have been replaced shortly thereafter.
11. Since Yoes Adipoernomo retired in 1983, no announcement has been made  
    about his successor.
12. In the spring of 1985, Kopassandha was reformed as Komando Pasukan Khusus  
    (Kopassus), or Special Forces Command.
13. The new Kodam I was formed on April 27, 1985 from the merger of the former  
    Kodam I-III, which were liquidated on April 25-26. Command was inherited by  
    ex-Kodam III commander Suripto, while the former commanders of Kodam I (Nana
2. Sriwijaya (South Sumatra) 14
   1. Maj. Gen. Roestandi A. Moestafa*  
      (b. July 20, 1933, Bandung)  
      (Akad Zeni 1956)  
      9.IV.85 - 23.V.85 (1 ½ months)  
      Commander, Kodam IV  
      Engineers S  
      23.V.85 (4 months)  
      Director, Social and Political Doctrine  
      Development, Armed Forces' Staff  
      and Command College  
      Engineers/D J  

3. Siliwangi (West Java) 15
   1. Maj. Gen. Edy Sudradjat*  
      (b. c. 1938) (AMN 1, 1960)  
      9.IV.85 - 18.V.85 (1 month)  
      Commander, Kodam VI  
      RPKAD/B J  
      (b. c. 1938) (AMN 2, 1961)  
      18.V.85 (4 ½ months)  
      Commander, Kodam XIII  
      Sipirok Batak  

4. Diponegoro (Central Java) 16
      (b. June 2, 1936, Karanganyar,  
      Kebumen) (AMN 1, 1960)  
      9.IV.85 - 18.V.85 (1 month)  
      Commander, Kodam VII  
      D J  
      (b. June 4, 1935, Jepara)  
      (AMN 1, 1960)  
      18.V.85 (4 ½ months)  
      Commander, Kodam II  
      Cavalry J  

5. Brawijaya (East Java) 17
   1. Maj. Gen. Soelarso*  
      (Breda)  
      9.IV.85 - 14.V.85 (1 month)  
      Commander, Kodam VIII  
      RPKAD/D J  

Narundana) and II (Harsudiyono Hartas) became commanders of the new Kodam 4 and 7.

14. When the former Kodam IV became the new Kodam 2 on April 9, 1985, its  
    territory remained unchanged. Roestandi A. Moestafa, who had been commander  
    of Kodam IV since May 9, 1983, stayed on just long enough to oversee the change  
    in nomenclature.

15. When Kodam VI became Kodam 3 on April 9, 1985, its territory remained  
    the same. Edy Sudradjat, Kodam VI's commander since April 16, 1983, stayed  
    on just long enough to handle the change.

16. When the former Kodam VII became the new Kodam 4 on April 9, 1985, its  
    territory remained unaltered. Soegiarto, who had commanded it since April  
    7, 1983, stayed on briefly to oversee the change.

17. When the former Kodam VIII became the new Kodam 5, its territory remained  
    the same. Soelarso, its commander since May 19, 1983, stayed on for a short  
    while to supervise the change.
18. The new Kodam 6 was formally inaugurated on May 1, 1985, and represented a merger of Kodam IX, X, and XII, which were formally liquidated during the previous week. The new commander, Faisal Tanjung, had not previously held a major territorial command. Awet Sara, who had been commander of Kodam IX since May 5, 1983, was moved to become Assistant-1 (Intelligence) to the Army Chief of Staff. Syamsudin, commander of Kodam X since December 19, 1982, was transferred to become head of the reorganized Infantry Center (Pussif) in Bandung. In the case of Kodam XII, Ida Bagus Sudjana, who had been commander since December 30, 1982, replaced Harjono Prawirodirdjo (after the latter’s sudden death) as the Army Chief of Staff’s Assistant for Territorial Affairs. From October 11, 1984 till it was liquidated, this Kodam was commanded by the former Chief of Staff of Kodam X, Col. Pardjoko Suryokusumo. On the formation of the new Kodam 6, Pardjoko became its Chief of Staff.

19. The new Kodam 7 was formally inaugurated on May 4, 1985, and represented a merger of Kodam XIII and XIV, which were formally abolished a few days earlier. Rajagukguk, commander of Kodam XIII since May 30, 1983, moved up to become Assistant-2 (Operations) to the Army Chief of Staff. It is still unclear what new assignment has been given to Soetedjo, who commanded Kodam XIV from April 13, 1983 until its liquidation.

20. The new Kodam 8 was formally established on May 9, 1985, and represented a merger of Kodam XV and XVII, which were closed down shortly beforehand. Its first commander, Hasudungan Simandjuntak, had been commander of Kodam XV since May 17, 1983. Raja Kami Sembiring Meliala, commander of Kodam XVII since June 14, 1982, appears as yet to have received no new assignment of importance. It is instructive that the headquarters of the new Kodam is not, as one might expect, in Ambon, but in Jayapura, West Irian.
9. Udayana (Nusatenggara)\(^{21}\)

Maj. Gen. R. P. D. Soetarto*  
(P3AD)

- 9.IV.85 (6 months)  
  Commander, Kodam XVI

10. Jaya (Greater Jakarta)\(^{22}\)

1. Maj. Gen. Try Sutrisno  
   (b. November 15, 1935, Surabaya)  
   (Aktekad 4, 1959)

- 9.IV.85 - 9.VIII.85 (4 months)  
  Commander, Kodam V
  Engineers

   (b. c. 1939, Yogya)  
   (AMN 2, 1961)

- 9.VIII.85 (1\(\frac{1}{2}\) months)  
  Commander, Airborne Combat Command,  
  Kostrad; Commander, Security Operations Command, East Timor
  RPKAD

Head, State Intelligence Coordination Board (Bakin)

Gen. Yoga Sugama  
(b. May 12, 1925, Tegal)  
(Rikugun Shikan Gakko  
[Japanese Military Academy])

- 28.I.74 (140 months)  
  Lt. Gen. Sutopo Juwono  
  Deputy Ambassador to the UN

Commander, Presidential Security Squad (Paswalpres)

1. Brig. Gen. R. Sardjono  
   - ??.78 - 30.I.85 (c. 7 years)  
   - CPM

2. Col. Pranowo  
   - 30.I.85 (8 months)  
   Commander, Military Police, Kodam V
   CPM

21. Kodam 9, the new form of Kodam XVI, was inaugurated on April 9, 1985.  
Soetarto, Kodam XVI commander since May 18, 1983, has stayed on in spite of  
the change.

22. Kodam 10, a Kodam with a special status, was inaugurated on April 9,  
1985, as a reincarnation of Kodam V. Try Sutrisno, Kodam V commander since  
December 27, 1982, stayed on for four months after the transition, before  
being promoted to Deputy Army Chief of Staff. It is striking that whereas  
Try Sutrisno had concurrently held the post of Chief of Staff of the Metropolitan  
Command (Kas Garnizun), this job is now in the hands of Col. K. Harsono, AMN  
2 (1961), previously in charge of Security (Intelligence) in the Army Headquarters'  
Inspectorate.
Biographies

Faisal Tanjung

61 Graduated from AMN, Class 2.
84-? Served in Kopassandha.
85- Commander, Kodam 6.

Gunawan Wibisono

b. November 1, 1931, Rembang.
54 Graduated from P3AD with Murdani.
55 Paracommando training.
55-72 Rose in RPKAD.
66 Major. "Popular" figure on staff of RPKAD Commander Col. Sarwo Edhie Wibowo.
72 Lieut.-Col. Commander, Cadet Regiment, Akabri.
76-78 Chief of Staff, Kodam VIII.
78-82 Governor, General and Army Division, Akabri.
82-83 Commander-General, Seskogab.
83-84 Inspector-General, Department of Defense.
II.84-VI.85 Chief of the Social and Political Staff, Mabes ABRI. Died June 27, 1985.

Had taken part in operations against the Darul Islam, Malaysia (Dwikora), and the September 30th Movement, and had served in the Garuda VIII force to the Middle East in the last half of 1975.

Harsudiyono Hartas

57 Completed senior high school.
60 Graduated from AMN, Class 1.
? -71 Major (Cavalry). Deputy Commander, First Cavalry Battalion, Kostrad.
72 Attended Seskoad.
75 Attended Seskogab and went to New Zealand.
77-? Commander, First Cavalry Brigade, Kostrad.
78 Went to the US. Served on Army Chief of Staff's personnel planning staff.
81-83 Deputy Governor, General and Army Division, Armed Forces' Academy.
83-85 Commander, Kodam II.
85 Went to S. Korea.
85- Commander, Kodam 4.

Speaks Sundanese, Javanese, and English fluently.

Nana Narundana

b. c. 1937, Tasikmalaya.
60 Graduated from AMN, Class 1.
68 Completed Suslapa.
70 Deputy Commander, Cavalry Battalion, Kodam VI.
71 Studied at Seskoad.
74-75 Chief of Staff, Korem 012, Kodam II in Pematang Siantar.
75-76 Assistant-2 (Operations), Kodam II.
77 Attended Seskogab.
78-80 Commander, Korem 022, Kodam II, in Padang Sidempuan.
81 Attended Lemhanas.
? Deputy Commander, Army Center for Territorial Development, Bandung.
81?-83 Chief of Staff, Kodam XVII.
83-85 Brig. Gen. Commander, Kodam I.

Married to Andi Bunga, a Buginese aristocrat.

Pandjaitan, Sintong
b. September 4, 1941, Tarutung.
59 Came to Java after completing senior high school.
63 Graduated from AMN, Class 4.
65 As Second Lieutenant in the RPKAD, led attack to recapture RRI building from the September 30th Movement.
81 Led the RPKAD/Kopassandha attack on the hijacked Garuda airplane in Bangkok on March 31. Operation Woyla.

Pardjoko Suryokusumo
b. c. 1939.
60 Graduated from AMN, Class 1.
? Attended Seskoad.
? Attended Seskogab.
? Attended National Defense College in the US.
83-84 Colonel. Chief of Staff, Kodam X.
84-85 Commander, Kodam XII (last commander).
85- Chief of Staff, Kodam 6.

Fluent in French, English, and German.

Rajagukguk, Adolf Sahala
b. December 31, 1939, Medan.
61 Graduated from AMN, Class 2.
? Platoon Commander in Battalion 605, Kodam X.
? Company Commander in Battalion 604, Kodam XIII.
? Company Commander, Cadets' Regiment, Akabri.
? Deputy Commander, Headquarters Detachment, Kodam XIII.
? Commander, Battalion 711, Kodam XIII.
? Taught at Seskoad.
? Commander, Brigade 6, Kodam VII and Kostrad.
? -82 Colonel. Commander, Korem 164/East Timor, Kodam XVI.
82-83 Chief of Staff, Kodam XIII.
83-84 Colonel, then Brig. Gen. Commander, Kodam XIII.
84-85 Deputy Commander, Army Staff and Command College.
85- Maj. Gen. Assistant-2 (Operations) to the Army Chief of Staff.

Attended Army Staff College in England in 1972-73; has taken Kupaltu and Suslapa. Fluent in English, Batak, and Javanese.
Saiful Sulun


60 Graduated from AMN, Class 1.
62 Took Kudarlap (Basic Field Course); also took a course in Leningrad.
66 Graduated from civil high school. Chief of Staff, Field Artillery Battalion/Nanggala.
67 Took Advanced Officers' Training Course, Cimahi.
68 Took commando course at Batujajar.
74-77 Commander, Fourth Field Artillery Battalion; Deputy Assistant-1 (Intelligence), Kodam X; Assistant-1 (Intelligence), Kodam X.
74 Attended Seskoad.
75 Attended Seskogab.
? Took Intelligence Officer Advanced Course, Manila.
81 Attended Lemhannas (Class 14).
77-81 Member of Parliament and the MPR.
81? Officer seconded to the Functional Affairs Staff, Ministry of Defense and Security.
81-82 Assistant-1 (Intelligence), Kowihan I.
83-84 Colonel. Chief of Staff, Kodam IV.
84-85 Brig. Gen. Chief of Staff, Kodam VIII.

Married to Drs. Zulfikar Mahadi, a niece of Haji Agus Salim on her mother's side.

Simandjuntak, Hasudungan

60 Graduated from AMN, Class 1.
? Assistant-2 (Operations), Kodam V.
? Commander, Regimental Combat Team, East Timor.
? -83 Commander, Infantry Training Center (Pussenif).
83-85 Brig. Gen. Commander, Kodam XV.

Siregar, Raja Inal

b. March 5, 1938.

61 Graduated from AMN, Class 2.
? Platoon commander in Battalion 603.
? Commander, Panzer Company, Third Infantry Battalion.
65-68 Assigned (intelligence work) to Central Java.
68-69 Took Suslapa.
69-? Assigned (intelligence work?) to Makasar.
72 Spent a year in the Philippines.
73-74 Attended Seskoad.
74-78 Deputy Assistant-1 (Intelligence), Kodam II.
78-81 Assistant-1 (Intelligence), Kodam II. Active against Gerakan Aceh Merdeka.
81-82 Assistant-1 (Intelligence), Kodam VI.
82-84 Chief of Staff, Kodam II.
84-85 Commander, Kodam XIII.
85- Commander, Kodam 3.

Has excellent English thanks to year in Manila.
Sudjana, Ida Bagus


60 Graduated from AMN, Class 1.
61-66 Second, then First Lieutenant. Training officer at the Field Artillery Training Center (Pusdik Armed).
67-? Captain. Deputy Commander, Ninth Field Artillery Battalion.
70 Major.
73 Lieut.-Col.
75-77 Commander, Second Field Artillery Regiment, Kostrad.
78-81 Colonel. Commander, Korem 121, Sintang, West Kalimantan.
81 Top marks for written work, regular course, Lemhannas.
81-82 Brig. Gen. Chief of Staff, Kostrad.
82-84 Commander, Kodam XII.
84- Assistant for Territorial Affairs to the Army Chief of Staff.

Has taken Suslapa Arhanud and attended Seskoad and Seskogab.

Soegeng Soebroto

60 Graduated from AMN, Class 1.
83-85 Chief of Staff, Kodam V (10).
85- Assistant-4 (Logistics) to the Army Chief of Staff.

Soegiarto

b. June 2, 1936, Karanganyar, Kebumen.

60 Graduated from AMN, Class 1.
64 Joined RPKAD.
72-73 Commander, Battalion 401/Para, Kodam VII and Kostrad in Sron dol.
76-77 Commander, Cadets' Regiment, Akabri.
77-78 Commander, Indonesian contingent to UN Forces in the Middle East.
78-79 Chief of Staff, Kodam III.
79-83 Brig. Gen., then Maj. Gen. Commander, Kodam XIV.
83-85 Commander, Kodam VII (4).
85- Assistant for Personnel, Mabes ABRI.

Has been through Advanced Officers' Training Course-II; Seskoad; and Seskogab. Earned special promotion from Lieut.-Col. to Colonel for outstanding performance in East Timor.

Sugito

b. February 15, 1938, Yogyakarta.

61 Graduated from AMN, Class 2.
64 Joined RPKAD.
75 Reportedly first Kopassandha commander to make parachute landing in East Timor.
78-82 Defense attache in Hanoi.
83 Attended Lemhannas.
83-85 Commander, Airborne Combat Command, Kostrad, with major responsibilities in East Timor as Commander, Security Operations Command, East Timor.
85 Commander, Kodam 10.

Served 3 years in West Sumatra.
Sukarto

b. c. 1937.

60 Graduated from AMN, Class 1.
? Defense Attache, Bonn.
? Assistant-5 (Planning), Kodam VII.
85- Assistant-5 (Research and Planning) to the Army Chief of Staff.

Syaukat Banjaransari

b. c. 1937.

60 Graduated from AMN, Class 1.
? Head, Bureau for Presidential Security, President's Military Secretariat.
-85 Brig. Gen. Chief of Staff, Kostrad.
85- Assistant-3 (Personnel) to the Army Chief of Staff.
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