IN MEMORIAM: ADAM MALIK

A. M. Hanafi

On the evening of September 5 I received a phone call from Buyung Nasution SH with the sad news: "Oom, they say Pak Adam Malik died yesterday." I felt shocked and at the same time deeply moved. How surprising that it was Buyung Nasution who was prepared to phone me!\(^1\) If it were not for him, how would I have known [so soon] that my old comrade-in-arms had returned to his Maker? The following evening, Dr. Go Gien Tjwan also phoned. He was a close friend of the departed.

That Saturday I got a call from the Indonesian Embassy in Paris, informing me of the death of ex-Vice President Adam Malik: the protocol section of the Embassy would be receiving condolences up till Monday. I felt more proud and moved to learn that the Government of the Republic of Indonesia was officially declaring its grief by ordering the Red-and-White flag to be flown at half mast at the death of Bung Adam Malik. I had no idea how his funeral rites were being arranged in Jakarta, but in the Embassy's Book of Condolences I wrote: "I would hope that if possible the Government will permit his family to hold a *tahlilan*\(^2\) and a reading from the Qu'ran at Menteng 31, the historic headquarters of the Generation of '45."

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The train of my memories hurtled back through all the twists and turns of the experiences I had shared with Bung Adam.

They began at the end of 1938. I met him for the first time in Buiten Tijgerstraat (in what used to be called Glodok).\(^3\) My elder brother Asmara Hadi introduced me to him. *Pemuda* [activist youth] Adam Malik was small and thin; he spoke briefly but to the point (his Indonesian had a strong Medan accent, and once in a while his Mandailing intonation would come through); and he smiled a lot.\(^4\) On Buiten Tijgerstraat Adam Malik got the nickname "Si Akoy." I heard that it was Asmara Hadi who first tagged him so. In any case, his close friends preferred to call him by this name—it felt warmer and more intimate. "Si Akoy" meant that he succeeded wonderfully in blending

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1. The surprise is probably because in the crisis years of 1965-66, Buyung Nasution SH (today the well-known human rights advocate) was a rising New Order activist, while Hanafi, identified with the left, was being driven into exile.
3. The old Chinese quarter of Batavia/Jakarta, located at the north end of the city.
4. Adam Malik was born to the Nasution *marga* of the Mandailing Batak people, but in adult life dropped his *marga* name.
in with his neighbors, most of whom were Chinese families. In fact the whole group of Indonesian pemuda who shared a house on Buiten Tijgerstraat (Adam Malik, Sipatuhar, Pandu Kartawiguna and Hakim) were accepted without problems by the local Chinese inhabitants.

The context of my first meeting with Bung Adam was my bringing him, directly from Bengkulu, a secret letter from Bung Kamo. Bung Kamo had sent me to Batavia (the old name for Jakarta) so that I could "drink the holy water of the movement [pergerakan]," as Bung Kamo put it. From the moment we met and became friends Adam Malik and I were never separated as comrades-in-arms: from the time of Achieving Indonesia's Independence, through the Revolution and the period of establishing the Republic, to the very end of his days. With the deaths of my old Pemuda Pelopor Proklamasi [lit.---Youths Pioneering the Proclamation of Independence] friends, like Sukarni, Chaerul Saleh, Wikana—and now Bung Adam Malik too—I don't know how many still survive of the Komité van Aksi Eleven? (i.e., the eleven members of its leadership), who ignited the Revolution of August '45. NICA of course called them "a gang of young extremists." But it was they who kicked open the Gateway of National Independence by pressing the National Leadership, Bung Kamo and Bung Hatta, from Rengasdengklok to Pengangsaan Timur 56, to announce the Proclamation—not on the 18th, but on the 17th of August 1945! Each time the anniversary of the Proclamation is celebrated, their names are always set aside—not by History, but by political considerations, in the interests of what they call "national harmony and unity."

The Revolution of August 17 '45 was not something dreamed up by "youth extremists" in een slaploze nacht [in one sleepless night]—though to be sure they never closed an eye from the time Bung Kamo and Bung Hatta returned from Saigon. It was the product of a determination to struggle ignited

5. In February 1938 Sukarno was moved by the colonial authorities from Flores (where he had spent four years of "internal exile") to Bengkulu. There he made the acquaintance of the twenty-year-old Hanafi.

6. A reference to a famous brochure issued by Sukarno in March 1933. Here it is used figuratively for the focus of nationalist politics during the last decade of Dutch colonial rule.

7. Eleven is meant in the double English sense—the number 11 and [football] team.

8. NICA—Netherlands Indies Civil Administration—the skeleton administration set up in late 1945 by the returning Dutch colonialists.

9. On Rengasdengklok see below, note 26. Pegangsaan Timur 56 was Sukarno's private home in 1945. It was in his front yard, on the morning of August 17th, that the Proclamation of Independence was first pronounced. The promulgation had (more or less) been scheduled for the 18th by the Japanese-sponsored Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence, but Hanafi and his fellow pemuda, anxious to have a Proclamation completely free of Japanese taint, attempted (successfully) to have it announced a day early, and not in an official venue.

10. Summoned by Field Marshal Hisaichi Terauchi, the Japanese supremo for the "Southern Areas," Sukarno and Hatta arrived in Saigon on August 11. Terauchi informed them that Tokyo had given the go-ahead for them to proclaim an independent Indonesia within the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The pair left for home on the 13th, and reached Jakarta on the 14th. The Emperor Hirohito broadcast Japan's unconditional surrender to the Allies the following day.
by the action-program for Achieving Indonesian Independence with the blood and the souls of the pemuda themselves—from the collapse of the Dutch Indies Empire under the boots of General Imamura at Kali Jati, right through the Japanese Occupation without a break, up to the savage and horrifying explosion of Allied atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Indeed, the long-smoldering sparks of armed revolution had been spread by those "young extremists" from the very start of the Japanese Occupation.

On his release from the prison at Nusakembangan, my elder brother Asmara Hadi told me that Bung Adam alias Si Akoy was looking for me, as well as Sukarni and Chaerul Saleh. The reason was that Bung Kamo was greatly concerned to gather round him "seasoned youths" as he spurred the Horse of Opportunity to Achieve Indonesian Independence by [tactical] cooperation with the Japanese.

Why was it we three whom Bung Adam sought? It was pretty clear to me he'd talked things over with Bung Kamo. After all, Sukarni was a radical pemuda leader, who'd always worked underground; to be sure an admirer of Tan Malaka, but also willing to accept Bung Kamo as his leader. Chaerul Saleh was a pemuda intellectual, a student at the Law Faculty and Chairman of the PPPI. As for me, people said "he's an anak mas of Bung Kamo," but I myself don't believe this. In political matters, family and anak mas were always secondary for Bung Kamo. I think I was picked because I was secretary-general of the Barisan Pemuda Gerindo, and thus had an "intact" underground organization during the Japanese Occupation. Anyway, Bung Adam invited the three of us to a meeting at his house, to prepare a struggle-program and to defend Bung Kamo. By that time Bung Adam no longer lived on Buiten Tijgerstraat: his old house had been torn apart by the PID as Dutch colonialism lay in its death throes. He was now sharing a house with Imam Sutardjo on Gang Arab in Sawah Besar. The product of this meeting was the establishment of the Asrama Angkatan

11. On March 8, 1942, General ter Poorten, commander of the Netherlands Indies Army, surrendered to the Japanese CO General Imamura at Kali Jati, just outside Bandung, after putting up a brief, ignominious fight.

12. A small island off the southern coast of Java, it was, in colonial and later times, a notorious "maximum security" prison for hardened criminals and political offenders.

13. Tan Malaka, the celebrated Minangkabau revolutionary, had been chairman of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in 1921-22, before being forced into exile. He strongly opposed the disastrous PKI uprising of 1926-27, and subsequently he formed his own revolutionary party PARI (Partai Republik Indonesia) from his place of refuge in Bangkok.

14. PPPI—Perhimpunan Peladjar-Peladjar Indonesia (Association of Indonesian Students)—was the most radical of the student associations of the immediate prewar period.

15. Anak mas—favorite pupil or follower.

16. Gerindo was the most left-leaning of the legal nationalist political parties in the late colonial period. Its youth arm (Barisan Pemuda), headed by Wikana, included some Communists, and was involved in the early anti-Japanese resistance.

17. Politieke Inlichtingendienst (Political Intelligence Service)—the colonial secret police.
Baru Indonesia [Asrama of the New Generation of Indonesia] at Menteng 31, which opened in August 1942, with Sukarno as Chairman, Chaerul Saleh as Vice-Chairman, and A. M. Hanafi as Secretary. Bung Adam himself continued to run the press agency Antara, which was later transformed into Domai by the Japanese. Still, there was always close cooperation and division of revolutionary tasks between us and Bung Adam. The establishment of the Asrama Angkatan Baru Indonesia was the first step in the aksi of the Proclamation Youth, and it was also the first youth organization of the Japanese period—preceding the Poetera, the Djawa Hokokai, etc.

At that time I regarded Bung Adam as a pejuang [freedom fighter] sympathetic to Tan Malaka's PARI. His personality was attractive, his political insight was brilliant, and he was very good at getting along with others in the pergerakan [nationalist movement]. After his brother, Yahya Malik Nasution, was sent to Digul by the Dutch, many people (including, of course, the PID!) saw Bung Adam as his successor in carrying on the struggle of PARI. That was why Sukarni was so close to him, for Sukarni admitted frankly that he was a cadre of Tan Malaka's PARI. But in the struggle to Achieve Indonesian Independence, ideology was not a matter of fundamental importance—everyone wanted Indonesian Independence. Let the followers of each ideology compete (but not at each other's expense!); history will decide which one reaches the finishing line first. This was also why Bung Karno as National Unifier was always a central factor. Everyone agreed that Bung Karno was a Symbol of the Revolution. Still, I was often at my wit's end when Sukarni and Wikana (a follower of the PKI-Musso) were together. Usually Bung Adam and I had to act as "Referees," to part them when they were at the point of blows. That was also the reason why I was all the more keen to establish firmly Bung Kamo's "unity" political line.

The Asrama Angkatan Baru Indonesia was quite different from the abortive "Pemuda Angkatan Baru" [New Generation Youth] which was born and died in July 1945. To be sure, the sponsors of the "Pemuda Angkatan Baru Indonesia" were more or less the same people, including Bung Adam, B. M. Diah, and others. But the newborn organization was destroyed by the Japanese after it announced its opposition to the formation of the Gerakan Rakyat Baru—which did not

18. Domai was the official wartime Japanese news agency.
19. Aksi—from the Dutch actie—means something like "mass political action."
20. The two largest and most important political organizations sponsored and controlled by the Japanese Occupation authorities.
21. Digul (Boven Digul) was the notorious political concentration camp set up by the Dutch colonial authorities in the malarial swamps of southern West Irian.
22. An allusion to the famous formulation of the respected prewar nationalist leader Dr. Soetomo: pro-independence groups should emulate one another to promote independence, not compete with one another for power.
23. The veteran Communist Musso had secretly returned to Indonesia in 1935 and tried to revive the PKI, which had been shattered in the repression following the failed uprising of 1926-27. Musso and his group violently denounced Tan Malaka as a "Trotskyist" who had undermined the party's unity by his vocal opposition to the uprising.
24. The last Japanese-sponsored organization of the Occupation period, it represented a final attempt to mobilize all indigenous groups behind the Japanese war effort. It collapsed, partly because of pemuda opposition, but mainly
dare include demands for "Indonesian Independence Now" in the shape of a sovereign People's Republic [in its program]. The GRB was thus stillborn. The youth leaders were hunted down by the Japanese. I myself was jailed in Glodok Prison, and was only released through the intervention of Pak Haji (Agus Salim).25

Bung Adam Malik's role and participation during the Proclamation Days only made us admire and value him the more. The history of the Revolution of August 1945 has made the name of the village of Rengasdengklok famous.26 Possibly there would have been no Proclamation of August 17 if there had been no "Rengasdengklok Affair." A mere hypothesis? Ah, were it not for the Pemuda Pelopor Proklamasi—the so-called "young extremists"—perhaps it would not have been Bung Karno and Bung Hatta who became President and Vice-President of the Republic of Indonesia. Even though the youth were violently opposed to everything that "stank" of the Japanese or the colonialists, still they firmly defended Bung Karno and Bung Hatta against those who slandered them as "Japanese collaborators."

But who was it who actually decided on the Rengasdengklok operation? Sukarni? Chaerul Saleh? Wikana?—to mention just a few names. Who indeed? True enough, at the meeting at Tjikini 71 on the evening of August 15, all of us were united in the burning desire to have the Proclamation announced by Bung Karno and Bung Hatta at Rengasdengklok, "the first liberated area of the Republik"—for the Peta there were ready and prepared to serve as stoottroepen [shock-troops] in its defense. I'm prepared to say that without Bung Adam Sukarni would have wavered; he'd make a big noise, he'd roar the house down, but he wouldn't dare to take a big decision without Bung Adam's support. It was only after little Bung Adam appeared, and Sukarni had whispered in his ear, that it was unanimously agreed that Sukarni, Chaerul Saleh and Jusuf Kunto would rouse Bung Kamo and Bung Hatta in the dead of night and take them off to Rengasdengklok. Just before daybreak on August 16th! If today I think back to the Rengasdengklok Affair, I feel pride in imagining the faces of Sukarni, Adam Malik, Chaerul Saleh, and Wikana.

because the Japanese were already close to surrender, and lost interest in it.

25. The well-known prewar maverick Islamic politician. A bitter enemy of the PKI, he became the Republic's Foreign Minister in 1947.

26. On the evening of August 15, 1945 (the day of the Japanese Government's surrender) a group of radical pemuda, angered at the refusal of Sukarno and Hatta to break with the Japanese and declare Indonesia's independence on their own, decided to force the two leaders' hands. In the early hours of August 16th, Sukarno and Hatta were abducted by a small group of these radical youths and taken to Rengasdengklok, a rural township an hour or two's drive northeast of Jakarta. There the local commander of the Peta (Fatherland Defense Force), an auxiliary army formed by the Japanese in 1943, had arrested the two or three resident Japanese military and declared a zone of freedom. Sukarno and Hatta, however, refused to give in, and the pemuda were forced to bring them back to Jakarta on the evening of the 16th. As the result of complicated negotiations with the Japanese authorities, a meeting of Indonesian leaders was held that night at the home of Admiral Maeda (liaison between the Japanese Navy and the Japanese Army Administration on Java, and regarded as a friend by many Indonesian elite politicians). By the early hours of August 17 the text of a proclamation of independence was worked out, and it was promulgated in Sukarno's front yard late that morning.
But—and I don't know whether this should be regretted or not—Wikana (and Jusuf Kunto) leaked the secret of Rengasdengklok to Mas Bardjo (Mr. Subardjo); Mas Bardjo and Mbah Diro then rushed off to fetch Bung Kamo and Bung Hatta back to Jakarta, with the result that the text of the Proclamation was composed in the house of Admiral Maeda, Mas Bardjo's Big Boss [sic]. At that time we were furious with Wikana. Wikana was an employee of Mas Bardjo.*7

But no regrets are worth clinging to today. Everything has become history. The Pemuda wanted Indonesian Independence Now. Bung Karno and Bung Hatta too. Yes, we all wanted it. We differed on means, and were in conflict a bit over timing—but history united us all. This then was the destiny of the Indonesian Nation which we all love, and which is blessed by the Almighty: The Proclamation of August 17, 1945!

The first organization to be born and to step to the front of the struggle to establish the Republic of Indonesia was called Komité van Aksi. (Bung Adam described all of this in his brochure Sekitar Proklamasi.) Its headquarters was also at Menteng 31. For the purposes of this In Memoriam, I should mention that the person who suggested this name (which was agreed to unanimously) was Bung Adam Malik. Simple, nothing fancy at all. But right on the nail for a nation that demanded: Action! Not "Wait a moment," Not "See what everyone else is doing"—no, but "Act now" [beraksi sekarang juga]. Tomorrow is another day, tomorrow the Allies will be here!** The Komité consisted of pemuda leaders—eleven men all told. That's why they were often referred to as the Menteng 31 Eleven: Sukarni, Wikana, Chaerul Saleh, Adam Malik, A. M. Hanafi, Pandu Kartawiguna, Djohar Nur, Kusnaeni alias Pancen, Darwis, Maruto Nitimihardjo, and Armunanto.

The truth is that the Komité van Aksi was the very first arm of the Republic, even though it was not an official institution. Still it was independent, and in revolutionary terms it was legitimate [sah], since its aksi served as guideposts which were followed by the masses in Jakarta and in the regions. The Komité van Aksi maintained itself in function at the Menteng 31 Headquarters until it successfully secured the move of Bung Karno and Bung Hatta to Yogyakarta in January 1946.*9

At Chaerul Saleh's suggestion, the Komité van Aksi urged the immediate formation of a National Committee,** and also that the Peta and Heiho automatically

27. Mr. Subardjo, a well-known older generation nationalist politician, directed a political asrama or dormitory for Admiral Maeda during the later Occupation years. He protected a number of young left-wing activists, such as Wikana, by putting them on his payroll or into the asrama. Sudiro (mbah) was Subardjo's second-in-command.

28. After the official Japanese surrender, Indonesians of all political stripes expected an immediate landing of Allied troops. In the event this did not occur in any real force until the very end of September 1945.

29. A series of attempted assassinations of prominent Indonesian leaders by trigger-happy Dutch colonial troops (in December 1945) forced the Republican government to move its capital to the safety of distant Yogyakarta in January 1946.

30. Independent Indonesia's first "parliament," formed late in August 1945 by adding to the membership of the Japanese-era Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence a large number of well-known prewar politicians and youth leaders,
become the Republican Army (TKR). Adam Malik was deputed to accomplish the formation of this National Committee. As for the first action-program, drawn up at Menteng 31 and later printed and distributed—Pandu and I formulated it, but it was Bung Adam Malik with his brilliant mind who dictated the final version. The [only setback was that] negotiations with Daidancho Kasman Singodimedjo to have the Peta directly and officially go over to the Republic ran aground. Furthermore, when the Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence met for its final—and subsequently highly controversial—meeting on August 18th, it did, to be sure, approve the draft Constitution of 1945 and (on the motion of Oto Iskandar Dinata) vote in Bung Karno and Bung Hatta as President and Vice-President; but, at the same time, Oto Iskandar Dinata also proposed the dissolution of the Peta, arguing that "everything smelling of the Japanese must be abolished." Wasn't this misguided patriotism on the part of Bung Oto Iskandar Dinata? The Komité van Aksi did not regard it as a mistake of Oto Iskandar Dinata himself [alone], but rather that of the Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence as a whole, since it had a very damaging effect on the people's struggle to defend their Republic. Naturally the Japanese rushed off to order Peta's dissolution. Still, even without the Committee's proposal, the Japanese would have dissolved Peta—for they were afraid.

With the dissolution of the Peta (Daidan Jakarta) by Daidancho Kasman Singodimedjo "thanks to his loyalty to his superiors," the strategy of the Komité van Aksi had immediately to be revised. Adam Malik was deputed to stay continuously at Bung Karno's side, while the others organized the arming of the youth, an effort pioneered by the Pemuda API of Menteng 31.

The Mass Rally in Ikada Square, September 19, 1945.

Ah, Historic Day that made all our hearts beat! It was the Komité van Aksi that organized it. The Komité was determined to show the world openly that the Republic of Indonesia now stood Sovereign and Independent, free of Japanese influence, and that it would be defended with the blood and soul of the entire Indonesian Nation. Like it or not, it has to be said that Bung Karno and Bung

31. Heihō—an indigenous auxiliary military force organizationally incorporated into the Japanese Armed Forces (unlike the Peta).
32. Kasman Singadimedjo, a prominent prewar Islamic politician, was in the Japanese Occupation period made Commander (Daidancho) of one of the two Peta battalions stationed in Jakarta during the Occupation.
33. The Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence had been established by the Japanese military authorities on August 7, 1945.
34. Oto was a well-known prewar Sundanese nationalist politician who during the Occupation became "adviser" to the Department of Internal Security of the Japanese Military Administration.
35. The author implies that the Japanese feared a major mutiny by patriotic young Indonesians in the Peta.
36. Angkatan Pemuda Indonesia (Younger Generation of Indonesia), headed by Wikana, was the first organized youth group to appear in Jakarta after the Proclamation of Independence. The acronym API means "fire."
37. The Japanese name for the Dutch-period Koningsplein; today Medan Merdeka, the main square in the center of Jakarta.
Hatta opposed the idea of the rally, arguing that the Japanese were still in effective control, and functioning as the policemen of the Allies. Furthermore, representatives of the Allies had already landed in Jakarta. They were thus afraid of a needless bloodbath. Indeed they did more than oppose. Both the President and the Vice-President threatened to resign if the mass rally was not cancelled. But by then the People had already filled the square to overflowing, pouring in from every region and waving the Red-and-White Flag, completely ignoring the Japanese ban. To hell with them [the Japanese]! For us pemuda, the threats of Bung Karno and Bung Hatta were kejam banget [Javanese, "very harsh"], even worse than a UN Veto today. So Bung Adam Malik was sent off once again to coax Bung Karno and Bung Hatta—whether they wanted to be abducted once again or were prepared to negotiate! For if Bung Karno did not appear [at the rally], a bloodbath could ensue. (We also threatened Bung Adam Malik that if he didn't manage to bring Bung Karno along....!!) In this way, Bung Karno was once again "fait accompli"ed. Fortunately Adam Malik was (thus) successful in his diplomacy. From that time on, Bung Adam was recognized among us as having a special "expertise" and for the first time acquired the nickname "diplomat." Naturally, Menteng 31-style diplomat!

Yet for us at Menteng 31 the Mass Rally at Ikada had immediate unpleasant consequences. That night, or rather just before dawn on September 20, 1945, the Japanese pounced. I was arrested together with Darwis; D. N. Aidit, Manaf Roni, Sidik Kertapati, M. H. Lukman, and Wahidin Nasution were also picked up. We were taken to the Kempeitei [HQ], and then to Cipinang Prison. However, since it became known that its [Head] Warden Jusuf was a relative of mine from Bengkulu, we were later moved out and incarcerated at Bukit Duri Prison instead.

After two nights there, Adam Malik joined us. I was taken aback to see him—we met while having breakfast. He laughed out loud, we smiled, then all of us burst into laughter. "What the hell are we doing here?" we said, one after another. Bung Adam said firmly: "Let's appoint Bung Hanafi our 'dictator.' We've got to get out of here as soon as possible... after all, we're [Indonesia is] Free." Why "Dictator?" we all asked in puzzlement. "So we can all be disciplined [by him], and carry out his orders without arguing!" said Bung Adam. So I divided the group into two gangs. Adam Malik and Wahidin would jump out [of the window] first, while Darwis and I would bring up the rear. We negotiated with Head Warden Pak Tengku Thajeb (father of Dr. Sjarif Thajeb), persuading him to leave some pistols lying about on a table where they could easily be grabbed.

38. After Tokyo's sudden surrender on August 15, 1945, the Allied commanders were worried that Japanese field commanders in various parts of occupied Southeast Asia might arm local nationalists as revenge for their country's defeat, or might simply abandon the task of maintaining law and order until the victors arrived. Accordingly, all Japanese commanders were radioed strict orders to maintain the status quo of August 15.


40. The Thajebs were a prominent family of Acehnese nobility long settled in Jakarta. Dr. Sjarif Thajeb was a pemuda activist in 1945, later became a well-known military politician, serving for some years as Minister of Education under the New Order.
We still were not through with breakfast when suddenly I saw the Japanese soldiers climbing into a truck. The minute the truck had disappeared, Adam Malik leapt out of the jail, with the rest of us close behind. Two Indos who'd over guard duty at the gate (God knows where they had come from), their eyes popping out, tried to stop Sidik. Maybe because they saw two pistols in my hands, maybe too because Pak Tengku Thajeb roared out angrily: "Laten ze maar er van doorgaan als jullie niet dood willen worden—Let them go if you want to stay alive" the two guards stared bewilderedly and let Sidik go. I pushed him out ahead of me and we ran off and disappeared into the Djatinegara market. All Revolutionary Honor to Pak Tengku Thajeb!

Times change. During the New Order period Adam Malik rose from Minister of Trade to become Minister of Foreign Affairs; then rose again to become Vice-President of the Republic of Indonesia. I was happy to see him rise. In fact I wanted to see him become President—if possible. And why not? For the history of his struggle as a radical nationalist declared that: hij heeft het verdien 

At one time I felt bitter and disappointed in him. When he was Minister of Foreign Affairs I was dismissed as Ambassador to Cuba, and the passports of me and my family were cancelled—with the result that I could not return to the motherland. But later on Bung Adam and I, on a personal level, asked each other's forgiveness. All misunderstandings were straightened out, I was admiring and proud of him when he as Vice-President, along with President Suharto, announced the Rehabilitation of Sukarno the Proclaimer. About that time I met Bung Adam Malik in Brussels, it was October 1979. He was on his way home from attending the Non-Bloc Conference in Havana. Deeply moved, we hugged each other warmly, as old comrades-in-arms, in the presence of my children Demayanti and Dito, and of Alex Alatas SH, the Vice-President's Secretary. Even though our positions by then were as far removed from one another as earth and sky—he the number two man in the Republic of Indonesia that we all love, and I an exiled persona non grata—yet in our hearts, our spirit, there was no change [from the old days]. On the card he gave me he wrote: "Saudara Hanafi, I hope [to see] you and your family again in the motherland." I regard this card as the most cherished keepsake that Bung Adam could give me and my family.

It turned out that my meeting with Bung Adam in Brussels was our last. He had no more chance to wait for my return. Innalillah wa inna Illahi Roji'Un. For Bung Adam I pray: "May the Almighty with His Love guide you. Amen."

If I may express my hopes to the family of Bung Adam—as I wrote in the Condolence Book of the Indonesian Embassy in Paris: "I would hope that if possible the Government will permit his family to hold a tahlilan and a reading from the Qu'ran at Menteng 31, the historic headquarters of the Generation of '45." For Tuhan Allah is pleased with praise and thanks be to Him as is appropriate.

41. In the early days of the New Order Sukarno was regularly denounced either as the mastermind of the "October 1, 1965 coup" or as strongly sympathetic to it. In 1970 he died while still under house arrest. In the later 1970s, for various political reasons, the Suharto government decided to encourage a cautious partial rehabilitation of his name.