

CURRENT DATA ON THE INDONESIAN MILITARY ELITE (CONTINUED)

(Prepared by the Editors)

In the previous issue of *Indonesia* (No. 36, October 1983), we offered readers a tentative, preliminary account of a remarkable series of interrelated changes in the leadership of the Indonesian Armed Forces, which began in March 1983. We noted that in terms of personnel the historic changes involved the final departure of the "Generation of '45" from active duty, and the emergence of a generation too young to have had any military experience in the Revolution. On the organizational level, we called attention to the first steps being taken to implement Law 20/1982, which specified that the functions of Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (Pangab), hitherto normally held by a single person, would henceforth be entrusted to two separate individuals. Our political analysis concluded that these changes had been adroitly timed and shrewdly handled by President Suharto to tighten his grip on the Armed Forces under circumstances which might otherwise have threatened to loosen it.

Our account was, however, necessarily preliminary, in that although a large number of personnel changes had already taken place when we went to press, nothing had been made public as to the planned division of roles--and power--between the Minister of Defense and the Pangab.

On August 23, 1983, however, Presidential Decree 46/1983 was made public, laying out in some detail the new organizational structure of the Ministry of Defense.¹ This was followed by the promulgation of Presidential Decree 60/1983, dated November 17, establishing in somewhat less specific terms the structures to be subordinated to the Pangab.² Although a number of ambiguities remain unresolved, and a number of lacunae unfilled, we believe that the overall picture is sufficiently clear to permit a preliminary diagnosis--without waiting for the expected final clarifications scheduled for promulgation this April with the inauguration of the new Five-Year Plan. We expect to follow up this analysis with a supplement in the October 1984 issue of *Indonesia*.

To assist our readers, we propose to divide our analysis into two: first we will discuss the formal functions and powers of, as well as appointments to, the Ministry of Defense and the Mabes ABRI (ABRI Headquarters); then we will turn to a consideration of the political implications of the changes.

1. See *Angkatan Bersenjata*, August 25, 1983. On November 8 and 29 there followed the inauguration of all officers appointed to fill both "Echelon I" and "Echelon II" positions in this structure. See *ibid.*, November 9 and 30, 1983.

2. See *Sinar Harapan*, November 23, 1983. The facts that this decree was apparently not published in the Armed Forces' newspaper and that it was not followed by a series of large-scale inaugurals underline in advance what we conclude from the following detailed analysis: namely, that the Pangab has inherited the great bulk of the powers, functions, and key personnel of the combined Defense Ministry/ABRI Headquarters of the past, while the "new" Defense Ministry is indeed largely new.

The Ministry of Defense. By the original terms of Presidential Decree 46/1983, the Minister was to be served directly by a so-called "Echelon I" of senior aides: namely, a Secretary-General; an Inspector-General; three Directors-General (for General Planning and Budgeting; for Personnel, Manpower, and Veterans' Affairs; and for Materiel, Facilities, and Services); an Agency Head (for Industrial/Technological Research and Development); and two Heads of Centers (Surveying and Mapping Center and Education and Training Center). Forming "Echelon II" were seven Bureau Chiefs under the Secretary-General; one Secretary and four Inspectors under the Inspector-General; one Secretary and three or four Directors under each Director-General; and one Secretary and three Chiefs of Centers under the Agency Head. Implementation of the decree has involved certain deviations from this structure, though none of them is of great importance. The Secretary-General "lost" one of his bureaux (Legal Management) to the Pangab, so now is in charge of only six. The Ministry lost the Surveying and Mapping Center to Mabes ABRI, but got, as it were in exchange, the National Reserves' Center (Puscadnas). It also took over the Defense Management Institute (now the Education and Training Center) and the Data Gathering and Processing Center (now the Data Collection and Processing Bureau). (For the revised structure, see Chart I.)

The organizational picture that emerges suggests that this new Ministry is drastically weaker than any of its predecessors in the 38½ year old history of the Republic. It has almost none of those functions that give real political power: intelligence, operations, logistics, territorial management, and functional group affairs. The functions it does have are essentially of a routine administrative or technical character. The core of the Ministry is a truncated version of the old Hankam's Administrative Staff--a connection underlined by the fact that Lt. Gen. Jogi Supardi, prior to becoming the new Secretary-General, was head of that now defunct staff. But if one compares the functions of the Secretary-General to that of the old Kasmin (Kepala Staf Administrasi), one notes that the former lacks the latter's authority over personnel, logistics, or finance.

Still more striking is the fact that, if we are to believe an explicit statement by the Minister himself, his Ministry will have *no* regional offices (Kantor Wilayah--Kanwil).³ This means that unlike every other Ministry of importance, Defense will not have its own independent eyes and arms outside the capital and across the vast territory of Indonesia. All regional activity is thus to be the Pangab's responsibility, and the Minister will have to work through (i.e., effectively under) him.

The impression of weakness conveyed by these structural arrangements is reinforced by a survey of the Ministry's newly appointed personnel. The Minister himself, retired General S. Poniman, is a undistinguished but competent and loyal member of the Generation of '45. He is assisted by three Lieutenant-Generals, all well-regarded and capable officers, but all now retired.⁴ Otherwise, as the following table underscores, the appointments are largely of obscure middle-ranking officers (many from the politically impotent navy and air force) and typically from the specialized services (finance corps, ordnance, engineers, medical corps, and so on). In other words, the institutional meagerness of the Ministry is matched by the political insignificance of its staff.

3. *Angkatan Bersenjata*, November 9, 1983.

4. Two of them, Ignatius Jogi Supardi and Soekemi Soemantri, are prominent members of the first class graduated from the Yogja Military Academy [1948]. We suggested, in the analysis contained in Part I of this discussion, that one element in Suharto's maneuvering was to prevent any member of this group assuming any key position at the top of the Army prior to his retirement.

CHART I

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND SECURITY (HANKAM)




TABLE A

| Rank | Army | Navy | Air Force | Police | Civilian |
|--------------------------|-----------------|------|-----------|--------|----------|
| Lt.-Gen. or equivalent | 3 (all retired) | - | 1 | - | - |
| Maj. Gen. or equivalent | 1 | 1 | 2 | - | - |
| Brig. Gen. or equivalent | 8 (1 retired) | - | - | - | 2 |
| Colonel or equivalent | 9 (1 retired) | 9 | - | - | - |
| Totals | 21 | 10 | 3 | 0 | 2 |

The Pangab. Even without the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 60/1983, it was logical to infer that the Pangab would control virtually all the levers of power in the old structure--not least from what the Ministry had been assigned by Decree 46/1983. One could also have noted the enormous disparity in the media attention paid to the Pangab as opposed to the Minister;⁵ and the Minister's explicit cession of control over Armed Forces' activities everywhere outside the capital. The service chiefs are directly subordinate to the Pangab, and, as their titles indicate, each is a *staff officer*, not, as he is, a *commander* (panglima). As Panglima, the Pangab also directly controls the operational chains of command down through the commanders (panglima) of the Kowilhan, Kodam, Korem, Kodim, and Koramil; as (once again) Commander (Panglima) of Kopkamtib, he directs the hierarchy of "security" operatives in the Armed Forces' territorial structure. Presidential Decree No. 60/1983 does however expand on this information and provide a fairly complete picture of the formidable apparatus under the Pangab's authority. By the terms of the decree, ABRI is to be divided into three main components:

- A. Headquarters (Mabes ABRI);
- B. The Services (i.e., the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Police); and
- C. National Operations Commands, i.e., the National Strategic Command (Kostranas), the National Air Defense Command (Kohanudnas), and the four Regional Defense Commands (Kowilhan I-IV).

B and C are both traditional and self-explanatory. A is neither. According to Degree 60/1983, Headquarters is to be stratified into four "levels [*tingkat*]" (rather than signifying ranks within a single chain of command, "level" appears more to denote mere status). These four levels are:

5. For example, immediately after the announcement of Presidential Decree 46/1983, Murdani, not Poniman, gave a mini-State of the Armed Forces' message. He noted that their present size of 425,000 (including the police) would not go higher than 500,000 and that even this figure was very low proportional to the country's population (about 1/300th). Estimating the Armed Forces' average cost, over the 1978-83 period, at 3.27 percent of G.D.P. and 12.02 percent of the budget, he declared that in the future a major effort would be made to build up Indonesia's defense industry so as to avoid dependence on outside sources of supply. *Angkatan Bersenjata*, August 29, 1983. Furthermore, Murdani has twice during 1983 been featured on the cover of the popular weekly *Tempo*, Minister Poniman not once. The long interview with Murdani contained in *Tempo*, October 15, 1983, on the future of the Armed Forces, makes no mention of Poniman, and by its tone and explicitness of detail demonstrates the speaker's assurance of being the only real decision maker.

- I. The leader and deputy leader;⁶
- II. Staff;
- III. Support [*pelayanan*]; and
- IV. Central executive bodies and staff.

The "staff level" includes a variety of positions and functions, but its institutional core is composed of a Chief of the General Staff (Kasum), a Chief of the Social and Political Staff (Kassospol), and an Inspector-General. The Chief of the General Staff is the same officer who was Chief of the Operations Staff in the old system (i.e., Lt. Gen. Himawan Sutanto), a continuity which reinforces our sense that the two titles cover largely the same function. A similar continuity of personnel (Lt. Gen. Kharis Suhud) indicates that the Chief of the Social and Political Staff is basically the same as the old Chief of the Functional Affairs Staff (Kaskar). It has not yet been announced which subordinate staffs the two new Chiefs will direct, but it is likely, for reasons to be adduced below, that the Chief of the General Staff will retain Operations, Territorial Affairs, Communications and Electronics, and Security-and-Public Order; and will lose Intelligence, while gaining (from the old Administrative Staff) Logistics. The Chief of the Social and Political Staff will retain Social-and-Political-Affairs and Functional Group Affairs.

Of particular interest is what has happened to General Planning, Finance, and, above all, Intelligence in the old structure. *Sinar Harapan*, which has good contacts in the military, has suggested (November 23, 1983) that the function of General Planning "will probably be performed by a special staff directly under the Pangab," i.e., in practice on a par with the Chiefs of Staff. It is reported that the Armed Forces' financial affairs will be controlled by an Armed Forces' Financial Center, again directly under the Pangab--not the Minister of Defense. On Intelligence, we are slightly more reliably informed. A new body has been created, entitled Bais-ABRI (Badan Intelijen Strategis ABRI--Armed Forces' Strategic Intelligence Agency), with equal status to the Chiefs of Staffs--again directly under the hand of the Pangab. Press accounts indicate that this organ supersedes the old Ministry of Defense's Strategic Intelligence Center (Pusintelstrat Hankam), headed by the present Pangab from 1977 to 1983.⁷ This elevation of Intelligence, while unorthodox from a standard military point of view, reflects the Indonesian reality that "intelligence is everything" and that the present Pangab has for a decade been his country's undisputed intelligence czar. Whether an Assistant for Intelligence will still exist, and who will operationally head Bais, are still matters which have not been made public, but this should not distract attention from the importance of recent developments.

It remains only to emphasize one significant aspect of the new intelligence organ's name: *Badan* (Agency) rather than *Pusat* (Center, as in Pusintelstrat). As *Sinar Harapan* describes it, the term *Badan* in ABRI parlance refers to an institution that imposes centralized control in its "field" throughout the Armed Services. *Pusat*, on the other hand, refers to an institution which replicates at the central level partly autonomous organizations within each of the services. Thus "Bais-ABRI probably will perform those intelligence functions within ABRI's domain which up till now were carried out by each of the services' intelligence staffs." In effect, the creation of Bais, its titling and its status, represent a concentration of "intelli-

6. It is reliably reported that General Murdani does not intend to fill this second post.

7. See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, February 9, 1984, pp. 18-19; *Sinar Harapan*, November 23, 1983.

gence capabilities" in *institutional* terms which until now has only existed in *personal* terms--i.e., Benny Murdani's simultaneous holding of three key intelligence positions.

Level III need not detain us, since it comprises only the technical offices of General Secretariat (Setum), Armed Forces' Headquarters Detachment (Denma Mabes), and the Communications and Electronic Unit (Satkomlek). These all represent direct carryovers from the old Hankam system.

The fourth level--termed that of *pelaksana pusat* (central executive organs)--corresponds to the old "Heads of Agencies within the Department of Defense and Security" that we have traditionally catalogued. Presidential Decree 60/1983 ordains that of these 17 agencies no less than 13 remain (unchanged) with the Pangab, namely:

1. National Defense Institute (Lemhannas)
2. Armed Forces' Academy (Akabri)
3. Armed Forces' Staff and Command School (Sesko ABRI)
4. Armed Forces' Mental Upbuilding Center (Pusbintal ABRI)
5. Armed Forces' Research and Development Center (Puslitbang ABRI)
6. Armed Forces' Historical Center (Pusjarah ABRI)
7. Armed Forces' Medical Center (Puskes ABRI)
8. Armed Forces' Military Police Center (Puspom ABRI)
9. Armed Forces' Information Center (Puspen ABRI)
10. Armed Forces' Survey and Mapping Center
11. Armed Forces' Legal Management Agency (Babinkum ABRI)
12. Armed Forces' Supply Agency (Babek ABRI)
13. Armed Forces' Functional Group Management Agency (Babinkar ABRI)

(Of the remaining four, three have effectively gone to the new Ministry of Defense, [see above p. 146], while Pusintelstrat has been transmogrified into Bais). It is also worth noting, in the light of the distinction between Agencies (Badan) and Centers (Pusat) referred to above, that *all* the old Agencies have remained with the Pangab. Indeed two of the most important of them, Babek and Babinkar, are held simultaneously by the Pangab's Assistants for Logistics and for Functional Group Affairs--who, in the persons of Major-Generals Dading Kalbuadi and C. I. Santoso, are key members of Murdani's inner circle.

Politics. Mention of Dading and Santoso brings us directly to the question of how far the appointments to the Mabes ABRI structure confirm the implications of the organizational-institutional picture. We can, it seems, be confident that structure and personnel are tightly interrelated. After all, the Pangab, General Murdani, has for much of the past decade been regarded as one of the two or three most powerful (if not actually No. 2) men in Indonesia. This power derived operationally from his concurrently held positions as Assistant for Intelligence in the Ministry of Defense (since 1974), Head of the Strategic Intelligence Center since 1977, and Deputy Head of Bakin (the State Intelligence Coordinating Agency) since 1978. This combination of positions allowed him to dominate the complex net of interlocking intelligence hierarchies through which Indonesia is effectively ruled. But the fact that he was entrusted with these positions then, and with the Pangabship now, has everything to do with his personal and political relationship to Suharto. It is likely that this relationship began at the time when Murdani held his last troop command, i.e., in 1962 when he led Paratroop Battalion 530 in operations against Dutch positions in West New Guinea. These operations were directed personally by Suharto, at that time the (first) commander of Kostrad, the Army's Strategic Reserve. The relationship must have rapidly become intimate and political, since by 1965 Murdani was Suharto's Assistant for Intelligence. He was a key

player in the destruction of the Communist Party (1965-66), the overthrow of the Old Order (1966), and the ending of Confrontation with Malaysia (1966-67). After a stint as Liaison Officer (i.e., intelligence coordinator) in Kuala Lumpur, he went to serve as Chargé d'Affaires in Seoul (1971-74), in the heyday of the regime of General Pak Chung Hee.

The Pak regime was in those days rather widely regarded as a successful model of an economically dynamic, military-controlled, anti-Communist, pro-American regime, and there is some reason to think that Murdani was sent to discover what lessons might be learned from its political and economic successes. (These were the days before the OPEC oil bonanza). He was brought back to head Military Intelligence in the wake of the anti-Tanaka (and antiregime) riots of January 1974. In 1975 he led the group of military and intelligence specialists who successfully urged an iron fist vis-à-vis the nascent independence movement in East Timor. (Murdani's old mentor Ali Murtopo had argued for negotiations with Portugal and a series of "black" operations against Fretilin--but these had clearly failed by November 1975.)⁸ Thereafter Murdani--though formally only a staff officer in charge of intelligence--ran the campaign for the "pacification" of East Timor. Finally, he played an important role in containing the last serious popular protest against Suharto's continuing rule--the student-led outbursts of 1978. It can thus be said that Murdani has been at hand, and played a supportive role, during virtually every crisis in Suharto's career over the past two decades.⁹

Trust is trust, to be sure. But it is typical of Suharto's political shrewdness and instinct for self-preservation that he has always played key subordinates off against one another. Why has such power been given to Murdani? Two sorts of answers suggest themselves. First, one striking feature (commented on by many observers) of the cabinet inaugurated on March 19, 1983 (i.e., when Poniman was installed as Minister of Defense and Murdani as Pangab) was that Suharto had finally disposed of the last of the group of military leaders who had helped him consolidate power and whom he had always balanced off against each other.¹⁰

Gone (to comfortable, ceremonially attractive, but powerless posts) were: Ali Murtopo, Andi Mohammad Yusuf, Amir Machmud, Alamsyah, Maradean Panggabean, and so forth. It was noted that for the first time Suharto felt powerful enough to dispense with all of them and pick a cabinet (and a vice-president) entirely of his personal choosing. In this light the selection of Murdani as Pangab made a certain sense. It showed that the President felt free to: (a) ignore the claims of the "transitional generation" in the Army, i.e., the first two classes graduated from the Yogya Military Academy in 1948-49; (b) appoint as Pangab a man three years

8. See, e.g., Hamish McDonald, *Suharto's Indonesia* (Blackburn, Australia: Fontana/Collins, 1980), p. 207.

9. It might be added--even though the reference is not precisely to a crisis--that Murdani is widely believed to have personally directed the extrajudicial executions of at least 4,000 "criminals" (*gali2*) in the months immediately following his elevation to Pangab. See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, September 29, 1983. Although Murdani has repeatedly denied this role, it has been indirectly confirmed by his former mentor Ali Murtopo, who told the press late in July that the killings were "in accord with normal Hankam procedures." It is, of course, inconceivable that these executions could have taken place without Presidential orders. (These *gali2* frequently sported tattoos. This doubtlessly accounts for Murdani's otherwise strange statement, made during a visit to the Armed Forces' Military Academy, that cadets were forbidden to have themselves tattooed. See *Angkatan Bersenjata*, August 3, 1983.)

10. See the rather pointed comments in *Tempo*, March 26, 1983.

younger than his subordinate, the Army Chief of Staff; (c) elevate a man who had had no direct combat experience for twenty years. In other words, the appointment of Murdani was to be understood as an expression of Suharto's untrammelled will. Nonetheless, it should also be noted that Murdani is at least nominally a Catholic, i.e., a member of a tiny religious minority in Indonesia, and thus presumptively unacceptable as a future head of state. (One assumes that if Murdani suddenly felt the call of the muezzin, his situation would be less secure.) He is also partly European (German) by descent, and again, one assumes that, since this fact has been well publicized, it is regarded as a fatal obstacle to any Murdani dreams of being Indonesia's third President one day.

One would expect, given the fact that an already very powerful man was being given an unprecedentedly powerful post, that the officers appointed under him would reflect this confluence. These expectations are borne out by the evidence available. The Pangab appears to sit in solitary eminence. As we have noted, the office of Deputy Pangab has not been filled. Murdani's two Chiefs of Staff are a curious pair, both notably older than he. Lt. Gen. Himawan Sutanto, Chief of the Operations Staff, is a prominent 1948 Yogya Military Academy graduate who will retire next year without becoming either Army Chief of Staff or Pangab, as for years he might have expected. Lt. Gen. Kharis Suhud, Chief of the Functional Affairs Staff, is an old intelligence specialist, retired from active service, but who holds concurrently with this high position in the Armed Forces' power structure the post of Vice-Chairman of Parliament!¹¹ We may assume this straddle suits both Suharto and Murdani--it is certainly a most graphic symbol of the subordination of the legislature to intelligence specialists in the executive.

Below these two older men on the way out come the key "assistants." The most politically important of these are the Assistantships for Territorial Affairs, Social and Political Affairs, Logistics, and Functional Group Affairs. Currently these posts are held by Major-Generals Eddy Nalapraya, Goenarso, Dading Kalbuadi, and C. I. Santoso. All have intelligence backgrounds, while the latter two are long-time Murdani associates from the P3AD of the early 1950s. Nalapraya was Murdani's personal eyes-and-ears in the politically sensitive Kodam V (Greater Jakarta Territorial Command) while acting as Chief of Staff to Generals Norman Sasono and Try Soetrisno. Goenarso was intelligence chief for Kowilhan II (Java, Madura, Bali) before being appointed to head the Armed Forces' Information Center in 1978. Dading was Murdani's long-time proconsul in East Timor; C. I. Santoso ran counterinsurgency operations in West Irian in the years 1978-82. It is probably an indication of Murdani's "excess of power" and of his political shrewdness that the man for some years regarded as the No. 2 figure in Indonesian intelligence, Maj. Gen. P. Soebijakto, has been assigned to be Governor of the National Defense Institute.

The constellation of officers in Murdani's entourage is characterized above all by long experience in intelligence, counterintelligence, and counterinsurgency. It is perhaps worth concluding with a table indicating the relevant experiences in Timor and West Irian of some of the key new figures in the upper echelons of the Indonesian military's high command.

* * *

11. For explicit confirmation of this doubling as late as June 1983, see *Angkatan Bersenjata*, June 20, 1983.

TABLE B

| Name | Military Background | Current Position | Experience in Timor or West Irian |
|--|---------------------|--|---|
| <i>Timor</i> | | | |
| Gen. Benny Murdani | P3AD | Pangab/Pangkopkamtib | Has overall control of Timor policy, in part as Assistant-1, Hankam and Head, Strategic Intelligence Center. |
| Maj. Gen. Dading Kalbuadi | P3AD | Assistant for Logistics | Commander, East Timor "Battle Command" 1975-78; Commander, Kodam 16, 1978-83. |
| Maj. Gen. Soeweno | P3AD | Pangkostrad | Commander, Kodam 16, 1976-78; Commander, Operasi Seroja 1979; Assistant-2 Operations, Hankam, 1981-83. |
| Lt. Gen. Yogie S. Memet | P3AD | Pangkowilhan II | Commander, Kopassandha, Special Warfare Command, 1978-83. |
| Maj. Gen. (Marines) Kahpi Suriadiredja | Marines | Pangkowilhan IV | Ran Marines portion of Operasi Seroja 1979 in E. Timor. |
| Lt. Gen. Supardjo | Breda | Pangkowilhan III | Assistant for Logistics, Hankam, 1981-83. |
| Maj. Gen. Soelarso | Breda | Pangdam 8 | Deputy Assistant-1 to Army Chief of Staff, 1977?-79; Assistant-1, 1981-83. |
| Gen. Rudini | Breda | Army Chief of Staff | Commander, Kostrad's Airborne Battle Command, 1976-77; Chief of Staff, Kostrad, 1977-78; Commander, Kostrad, 1981-83. |
| Maj. Gen. Try Soetrisno | Ak Tek AD | Commander, Kodam 5 | Chief of Staff, Kodam 16, 1978-79. |
| Maj. Gen. Edy Sudradjat | AMN I | Commander, Kodam 6 | Commander, Kostrad's Airborne Battle Command, 1977?-78?; Chief of Staff, Joint Task Force, Hankam, for East Timor, 1978-79. |
| Brig. Gen. R. K. Sembiring Meliala | AMN I | Commander, Kodam 17 | Commander, RTP-18 (Combat Regiment) in Operasi Seroja 1979. |
| Brig. Gen. A. S. Rajagukguk | AMN II | Commander, Kodam 13 | Commander, Korem 164 (Dili), c. 1981-82. |
| Brig. Gen. Soetedjo | AMN II | Commander, Kodam 14 | Group Commander in Kopassandha, 1975-76. |
| <i>West Irian (West New Guinea)</i> | | | |
| Maj. Gen. C. I. Santoso | P3AD | Assistant for Functional Group Affairs, Pangab | Commander, Kodam 17, 1978-82. |
| Brig. Gen. Suropto | AMN I | Commander, Kodam 3 | Assistant-1, Kodam 17, 1974-77. |
| Brig. Gen. Nana Narundana | AMN I | Commander, Kodam 1 | Chief of Staff, Kodam 17, 1979-83. |
| Brig. Gen. R. K. Sembiring Meliala | AMN I | Commander, Kodam 17 | Commander, Kodam 17, 1982- |
| Brig. Gen. Syamsudin | AMN I | Commander, Kodam 10 | Chief of Staff, Kodam 17, 197?-82. |

The following list approximates as far as possible our usual format. As in Part I of this update, we have appended some biographical information, this time for only a few of the most important officeholders whose biographies were not included in the previous issue. An asterisk after the officer's name indicates that biographical information on him is given. For the abbreviations used, readers are referred to the glossary in our previous issue.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND SECURITY (HANKAM)

Minister

| | | |
|-----------------|--------------------------|---|
| Gen. S. Poniman | 28.III.83 | |
| | Gen. Andi Mohammad Yusuf | |
| | Army Chief of Staff | |
| | SI | J |

Secretary-General¹²

| | | |
|--|------------------------------------|-----------|
| Lt. Gen. Ignatius <i>Jogi</i> Supardi* | 8.XI.83 | |
| (AMN Yogya I, 1948) | Chief of the Administrative Staff, | |
| | Hankam | |
| | Artillery | J |
| | | |
| 1. Chief, General Affairs Bureau | | |
| Brig. Gen. S. Momon H. Adiputra | 29.XI.83 | |
| | Head, Army Finance Office | |
| | Finance Corps | Sundanese |
| | | |
| 2. Chief, Security Bureau | | |
| Navy Col. Sudiarsoyo | 29.XI.83 | |
| | ? | |
| | N | J |
| | | |
| 3. Chief, Organization Bureau | | |
| Col. Ir. Ibrahim Mardjoeki | 29.XI.83 | |
| | ? | |
| | ? | ? |
| | | |
| 4. Chief, Public Relations Bureau | | |
| Col. Soenarso | 29.XI.83 | |
| | ? | |
| | ? | J |

12. The Secretary-Generalship is a transformation of the former function of Chief of the Administrative Staff, and is held by the same officer, Jogi Supardi. But its real power has been drastically reduced--it has lost control of the old personnel, logistics, and financial staffs, which have passed into the hands of General Murdani, the Commander-in-Chief (see below).

| | | | |
|---|----------------|---------------------------------------|--------------|
| 5. Chief, Data Collection and Processing Bureau ¹³ | | | |
| Navy Col. (E?) Ir. Djafar Basri | 29.XI.83 | | |
| | ? | | |
| | ? | | ? |
| 6. Chief, Foreign Relations Bureau | | | |
| Lt.-Col. Drs. Soemijono | 29.XI.83 | | |
| | ? | | |
| | ? | | J |
| Inspector-General | | | |
| Lt.-Gen. Widyo Sarwono* ¹⁴ | 8.XI.83 | Assistant for Finance, Hankam | |
| | | Finance Corps | J |
| 1. Secretary | | | |
| Brig. Gen. Soesilo Prawiro Sentono | 29.XI.83 | | |
| | ? | | |
| | Ordnance Corps | | J |
| 2. Inspector for Program Implementation | | | |
| Brig. Gen. S. H. Ismojo | 29.XI.83 | | |
| | ? | | |
| | Ordnance Corps | | J |
| 3. Inspector for Personnel Management | | | |
| Brig. Gen. (Titular) Selardi | 29.XI.83 | | |
| | ? | | |
| | - | | J |
| 4. Inspector for Finance and Supply | | | |
| Brig. Gen. Drs. R. O. Sobandi | 29.XI.83 | | |
| Adisaputra | ? | | |
| | ? | | ? Sundanese? |
| 5. Inspector for Special Affairs | | | |
| Navy Col. (A) Suhardi R. | 29.XI.83 | | |
| | ? | | |
| | N | | J |
| Director-General for General Planning and Budgeting ¹⁵ | | | |
| Rear-Admiral F. M. Parapat | 8.XI.83 | Assistant for Politics, Strategy, and | |
| | | General Planning, Hankam | |
| | N | | J |

13. This is apparently the old Data Gathering and Processing Center of Hankam.

14. As late as February 1984 Widyo Sarwono was concurrently holding both this position and his old job of Assistant for Finance, a post now under the Pangab (see below).

15. By Presidential Decree 46/1983, this first of three Director-Generalships directly under the Minister was to have a Secretariat and four subordinate Directorates. But by the time appointments to these latter were announced on November 29, the

| | | | |
|--|----------------------------------|--|-----|
| 1. Secretary | | | |
| Brig. Gen. (Titular) Sri Suharto | 29.XI.83 | | |
| | ? | | |
| | - | | J |
| 2. Director of Budgeting and Expenditures | | | |
| Navy Col. (A) Amin Muhadi | 29.XI.83 | | |
| | ? | | |
| | N | | ? |
| 3. Director of Control Management | | | |
| Navy Col. (A) Anis | 29.XI.83 | | |
| | ? | | |
| | N | | ? |
| 4. Director of Financial Administration | | | |
| Col. Soewastomo | 29.XI.83 | | |
| | ? | | |
| | Finance Corps | | J |
| Director-General for Personnel, Manpower and Veterans' Affairs | | | |
| Lt.-Gen. <i>Soekemi</i> Soemantri* ¹⁶ | 8.XI.83 | | |
| (b. August 13, 1926, Magelang, C. Java) | Assistant for Personnel and Man- | | |
| (AMN Yogya I, 1948) | power, Hankam | | |
| | Cavalry | | J/S |
| 1. Secretary | | | |
| Col. N. K. Effendi | 29.XI.83 | | |
| | ? | | |
| | ? | | ? |
| 2. Director of Mobilization/Demobilization and Civil Defense | | | |
| Col. Tjahjono | 29.XI.83 | | |
| | ? | | |
| | ? | | J |
| 3. Director of Personnel Indoctrination and Management | | | |
| Col. Suyitno | 29.XI.83 | | |
| | ? | | |
| | Adjutant-General | | J |
| | Corps | | |

Directorate for General Affairs had disappeared. Moving from a powerful position in the old Hankam structure, Admiral Parapat retained only the technical, nonpolitical elements of the job. "Politics and Strategy" remain under General Murdani's control.

16. Soemantri is concurrently Head of the National Research Center (Puscadnas), now also within the Ministry (see below). As Director-General it appears that he has been able to retain most of the functions he had in the earlier Hankam system.

| | | | |
|---|---|--|--------------|
| 4. Director of Veterans' Indoctrination and Administration | | | |
| Col. Imam Basiran Hadisaputro (AMN Yogya II, 1949) | 29.XI.83 ? ? | | J |
| Director-General for Materiel, Facilities, and Services | | | |
| Air Vice-Marshal Benjamin Parwoto | 8.XI.83 ? AF | | J (Catholic) |
| 1. Secretary | | | |
| Brig. Gen. Azis Mugni | 29.XI.83 General Inspector of Supply, Hankam Engineers | | ? |
| 2. Director of Materiel | | | |
| Air First Marshal Mulyanto Anwar | 29.XI.83 ? AF | | J |
| 3. Director of Facilities and Services | | | |
| Brig. Gen. Heru Gunadi | 29.XI.83 ? Engineers | | J |
| 4. Director of Health and Rehabilitation | | | |
| Air First Marshal Dr. Susilo Widodo | 29.XI.83 ? Medical Corps | | J |
| 5. Director of Supply [Pengadaan] | | | |
| Navy Col. (T) Eman Abdul Rachman | 29.XI.83 ? Navy | | S |
| Head, Agency for Industrial/Technological Research and Development [BPPI&T]¹⁷ | | | |
| Brig. Gen. Hardijono | 8.XI.83 Head, Data Gathering and Processing Center, Hankam Artillery | | J |
| 1. Secretary | | | |
| Navy Col. (Kes) Drs. Soerastomo | 29.XI.83 ? Navy | | J |
| 2. Chief, Center for Science/Technology Research and Development | | | |
| Navy Col. (Kh) Ir. Sarworo | 29.XI.83 ? Navy | | J |

17. This agency is directly under the Minister.

| | | | |
|--|------------------------------------|--|-----|
| 3. Chief, Center for Raw Materials/Infrastructure Research and Development | | | |
| Navy Col. (Kh) Ir. K. Harsono | 29.XI.83 | | |
| | ? | | |
| | Navy | | J |
| 4. Chief, Center for Industrial Research and Development | | | |
| Col. Ir. Eddie Soeharja | 29.XI.83 | | |
| | ? | | |
| | Finance Corps | | ? |
| Head, Armed Forces' National Reserves Center (Puscadanas) ¹⁸ | | | |
| 1. Maj. Gen. R. A. Saleh* | | | |
| (b. May 13, 1928, Jakarta) | 15.II.82 - ? | | |
| | Maj. Gen. Julius Henuhili | | |
| | Commander, Kodam I | | |
| | SI | | S |
| 2. Lt.-Gen. Soekemi Soemantri | | | |
| | ? | | |
| | Assistant for Personnel and Man- | | |
| | power Development | | |
| | Cavalry | | J/S |
| Head, Education and Training Center ¹⁹ | | | |
| Maj. Gen. Muhartono | 8.XI.83 | | |
| | Maj. Gen. Drs. Abdulkadir | | |
| | Head, Management Institute, Hankam | | |
| | Artillery | | J |

ARMED FORCES HEADQUARTERS (Mabes ABRI)

I. Commander-in-Chief

Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces

| | | | |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|--|---|
| Gen. Leonardus Benjamin ("Benny") | 28.III.83 | | |
| Murdani | Gen. Andi Mohammad Yusuf | | |
| (b. October 2, 1932, Cepu) | Assistant for Security, Hankam; | | |
| (P3AD) | Head, Strategic Intelligence Cen- | | |
| | ter; Deputy Head, Bakin | | |
| | RPKAD | | J |

Commander of Kopkamtib

| | | | |
|---------------------------------|-------------------|--|---|
| Gen. Leonardus Benjamin Murdani | 29.III.83 | | |
| | Admiral R. Sudomo | | |
| | As above | | |
| | RPKAD | | J |

18. This Center has been transferred from the old agency structure of Hankam, and is directly under the Minister.

19. This apparently replaces the old Management Institute in the former Hankam structure, of which Muhartono was also head.

II. Staff Echelon

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. Chief of the General Staff (Kasum) ²⁰ | |
| Lt. Gen. R. <i>Himawan Sutanto*</i> (b. September 14, 1929, Magetan) (AMN Yogya I, 1948) | c. February 1983 Vice-Admiral Muhammad Romly Commander of Kowilhan III SI J |
| 2. Chief of the Social and Political Staff (Kassospol) ²¹ | |
| Lt. Gen. M. Kharis <i>Suhud*</i> | 11.IX.78 Gen. Darjatmo Ambassador to Bangkok SI J |
| 3. Inspector General (Irjen ABRI) | |
| Lt. Gen. <i>Gunawan Wibisono*</i> | ? (1983) ---- Inspector General of the Army RPKAD ? |
| Assistant for Intelligence | |
| 1. Gen. Leonardus Benjamin Murdani | 5.VII.74 - ? Maj. Gen. M. Kharis Suhud Charge d'Affaires, Seoul RPKAD J |
| 2. Maj. Gen. M. I. Sutaryo | ? ? ? J |
| Assistant for Operations | |
| Lt. Gen. M. <i>Sanif*</i> | ?.VII.81 Maj. Gen. Seno Hartono Commander, Kodam II SI S |
| Assistant for Territorial Affairs | |
| 1. Maj. Gen. Naya Iskandar Sumantri (AMN Yogya I, 1948) | ?.VIII.81 - c. 30.V.83 (c. 21 months) Maj. Gen. Andi Azis Bustam Chief of Staff, Kowilhan II Kodam V S? |
| 2. Maj. Gen. Eddy Marzuki Nalapraya (b. 1930) | c. 30.V.83 Chief of Staff, Kodam V Kodam V Jakartan |

20. This position replaces the former Chief of the Operations Staff. Gen. Sutanto is scheduled to retire in late 1985.

21. This position replaces that of the former Chief of the Functional Affairs Staff (Kaskar). Gen. Kharis Suhud is concurrently, and has been for some time, Vice-Chairman of Parliament. (See *Angkatan Bersenjata*, June 20, 1983.) He officially retired on January 17, 1983.

Assistant for Communications and Electronics

| | | |
|--------------------------------|---|---|
| Air Vice-Marshal Tedjo Suwarno | 27.VII.78 Maj. Gen. Drs. Suryadi Deputy Assistant for Communications and Electronics AF | J |
|--------------------------------|---|---|

Assistant for Security and Social Order

| | | |
|-----------------------------------|---|----|
| 1. Police Maj. Gen. Issukandar | 19.II.77 - ? Police Maj. Gen. Drs. Achmad Mauludin Governor, Police Division, Armed Forces' Academy Police | J |
| 2. Police Maj. Gen. Drs. Poerwata | ? ? Police | J? |

Assistant for Personnel

| | | |
|------------------------------------|--|-----|
| 1. Lt. Gen. Soekemi Soemantri | ?.VII.78 - Maj. Gen. Susilo Sudarman Assistant for International Coopera- tion, Hankam Cavalry | J/S |
| 2. Maj. Gen. Suharto ²² | ? ? ? | J |

Assistant for Logistics

| | | |
|--|---|---|
| 1. Lt. Gen. Supardjo (b. August 21, 1929, Nganjuk) (AMN Yogya II, 1949) | ?.V.81 - c. February 1983 (c. 21 months) Rear-Admiral R. Kasenda Fifth Assistant to the Army Chief of Staff D | J |
| 2. Maj. Gen. <i>Dading</i> Kalbuadi* (b. April 14, 1931, Cilacap) (P3AD) | c. February 1983 Commander, Kodam XVI RPKAD | J |

Assistant for Finance

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Lt. Gen. Widyo <i>Sarwono</i> * ²³ | 6.IX.75 Maj. Gen. Suhanto Officer seconded to the Army Chief of Staff Finance Corps | J |
|---|---|---|

22. It is unclear which Suharto this is. Nor is it clear whether this position still exists, as the latest references to it are from August 1983.

23. Lt. Gen. Widyo Sarwono has retained this post ad interim, in addition to his appointment as Inspector General in Hankam (see note 14 above).

Assistant for Social and Political Affairs

Maj. Gen. *Goenarso S.F.**

4.III.80
 Brig. Gen. Prpto Prajitno
 Head, Armed Forces' Information
 Center
 B J

Assistant for Functional Group Affairs

Brig. Gen. Chalimi Imam *Santoso**²⁴
 (b. c. 1930-31)
 (P3AD)

30.V.83
 ?
 Commander, Kodam XVII
 RPKAD J

The following three bodies are directly under the Pangab; their staffs have apparently not yet been formed:

- A. Strategic Policy and General Planning Staff (Srenum)
- B. Armed Forces' Financial Center
- C. Badan Intelijen Strategis ABRI (Bais-ABRI)²⁵

Central Executive Organs (Lakpus)

1. Governor, National Defense Institute (Lemhannas)

1. Lt. Gen. Sutopo Juwono
 (b. May 27, 1927, Klaten)

13.XI.78 - 31.V.83 (54½ months)
 Lt. Gen. Sajidiman
 Ambassador to The Hague
 SI J

2. Maj. Gen. *Soebijakto**²⁶
 (b. August 17, 1929, Wates)
 (Breda)

31.V.83 -
 Officer seconded to the Commander-
 in-Chief
 B? J

2. Commander-General, Armed Forces' Academy (Akabri)

1. Lt. Gen. Julius Henuhili
 (b. November 27, 1928)
 (AMN Yogya I, 1948)

29.XII.80 - 7.VI.83 (29 months)
 Maj. Gen. Susilo Sudarman
 Head, Armed Forces' National
 Reserves Center
 Artillery/SI Timorese

24. It is unclear who Santoso's predecessor was. Maj. Gen. Satibi Darwis held the position from about January 1974 to September 1978. After that, it seems to have been held on an interim basis by Satibi's deputy, Brig. Gen. Susanto J., but this is not certain.

25. This body replaces the former Strategic Intelligence Center, which Murdani headed. It is unclear who heads the new body, though there has been speculation in the press that Murdani's former deputies Sudibjo Rahardjo and Muhammad Arifin will be top figures there.

26. Soebijakto was until recently a close aide to Murdani and the Number 2 man in intelligence.

- | | |
|--|--|
| 2. Lt. Gen. <i>Murgito*</i> (b. January 18, 1928) (P3AD) | 7.VI.83 Commander, Kodam VIII B J |
| 3. Commander-General, Armed Forces' Staff and Command School (Sesko ABRI) | |
| 1. Vice-Admiral Prasodjo Mahdi (b. January 13, 1927, Madiun) | ? .V.81 - 16.V.83 (24 months) Vice-Admiral R. E. Suprpto Commander, Armada Navy J |
| 2. Air Vice-Marshal <i>Aried Riyadi*</i> | 16.V.83 Commander, Combined Air Strike Command (Kopatdara) Air Force ? |
| 4. Head, Armed Forces' Mental Upbuilding Center (Pusbintal) | |
| 1. Brig. Gen. M. Soegeng Widjaja | ? (1980) - ? Maj. Gen. Drs. Sumitro Kartosujono B J? |
| 2. Rear-Admiral Dr. Tarmizi Taher | ? ? Navy ? |
| 5. Head, Research and Development Center (Puslitbang) | |
| 1. Maj. Gen. Otty Soekotjo | 6.XI.78 - ?.II.83 (c. 52 months) Air Vice-Marshal Dr. R. Sunarjo Head, Army Communications Service Signal Corps J |
| 2. Maj. Gen. Theo <i>Soemantri*</i> (Breda) | ? .II.83 Head, Army Data Collection and Processing Center ? J |
| 6. Head, Armed Forces' Historical Center (Pusjarah) | |
| 1. Brig. Gen. (Titular) Drs. Nugroho Notosusanto | ? (1977) - ? (1982) (None, new position) - J |
| 2. Brig. Gen. Gatot Surjadi | ? (1982) ? Sl J |
| 7. Head, Armed Forces' Medical Center (Puskes) | |
| Brig. Gen. Dr. Kurnia Natadisastra | c. 2.VI.79 Brig. Gen. Dr. Abdullah Hasan ? Medical Corps S |
| 8. Armed Forces' Military Police Center (Puspom) | |
| 1. Maj. Gen. Kartojo | 31.VII.78 - ? Maj. Gen. Atam Surakusumah Army Provost-General CPM J |

| | | | |
|---|----------------------------------|---|---|
| 2. Brig. Gen. Gatot Matrai | ? | | |
| | ? | | |
| | CPM | | J |
| 9. Head, Armed Forces' Information Center (Puspen) | | | |
| 1. Brig. Gen. Drs. <i>Encung</i> A.S.* (b. July 31, 1928, Cilacap) | 4.III.80 - 17.VI.83 (39½ months) | Brig. Gen. Goenarso S.F. Deputy Head, Armed Forces' Information Center | |
| | Information Service | | J |
| 2. Brig. Gen. Emir H. Mangaweang | 17.VI.83 | | |
| | ? | | |
| | ? | | ? |
| 10. Head, Armed Forces' Survey and Mapping Center | | | |
| Brig. Gen. Utaryo Surodirono | 8.XI.83 | Vice-Admiral D. U. Martojo Topography Corps | J |
| 11. Head, Legal Upbuilding Board (Babinkum) ²⁷ | | | |
| 12. Head, Armed Forces' Supply Agency (Babek) | | | |
| 1. Maj. Gen. Haryo Suroso | c. V.79 - 82? | Maj. Gen. Drs. Suraryo Iskandar | |
| | ? | | J |
| | ? | | |
| 2. Maj. Gen. M. R. Sunardjo | 82? - c. III.83 | | |
| | ? | | |
| | ? | | J |
| 3. Maj. Gen. <i>Dading</i> Kalbuadi* ²⁸ | c. III.83 | Commander, Kodam XVI RPKAD | J |
| 13. Head, Armed Forces' Functional Group Upbuilding Board (Babinkar) | | | |
| 1. Maj. Gen. Mansyur (b. 1925) | 15.VI.77 - ? | Maj. Gen. Suharto Member, DPR | |
| | SI | | S |
| 2. Maj. Gen. Widodo Mulatto (AMN Yogya II, 1949) | ? - 29.V.83 | | |
| | ? | | |
| | ? | | J |

27. It is unclear who now holds this position. The last known occupant, Lt. Gen. E. J. Kanter SH has been retired for some time and is in charge of the government's top anticorruption agency.

28. *Dading* is also Assistant for Logistics, the first time these two functions have been performed by the same person.

3. Brig. Gen. Chalimi Imam *Santoso**²⁹ 29.V.83
Commander, Kodam XVII
RPKAD J
- Commander, National Strategic Command (Kostranas)
1. Air Vice-Marshal Sukardi 18.IV.81 - c. Jan. 1983? (c. 20 months)
(b. December 1931, Bojonegoro) Maj. Gen. R. Himawan Sutanto
Deputy Commander, Kowilhan II
Air Force J
2. Air First Marshal *Roesman** c. Jan. 1983 -
(b. c. 1933, Karanganyar, Kebumen) Chief of Staff, Kostranas
Air Force J
- Commander, National Air Defense Command (Kohanudnas)
- Air Vice-Marshal *Iskandar** 9.X.78 -
Air Vice-Marshal Suwondo
Governor, Air Force Division, Armed
Forces' Academy
Air Force J

Biographies

Aried Riyadi

- ? -66 Colonel. Head, Bureau of Supplies (Biro Pengadaan), Air Force.
67-68 Director of Operations, Air Force.
68-69 Chief of Staff, Kodau 5, Jakarta.
69-70 Commodore. Commander-General, Air Force Education Command (Kodik)
at Kaliurang.
? -83 Air Vice-Marshal. Combined Air Strike Command (Kopatdara).
83- Commander-General, Armed Forces' Staff and Command School.

Dading Kalbuadi

- b. 14.IV.1931, Cilacap. Attended SMP in Purwokerto, SMA in Solo, graduating
in 1957 (*sic*).
- (51-52?) (P3AD)
- 55 Entered military (? *sic*).
57 Attended Infantry Company Grade Officers' Course, Bandung.
58-? In RPKAD. Rose from platoon commander to company commander, to
liaison officer, to logistics officer, to commander of Group II.
63 Received training in the US.
65 Received training in the USSR.
? Graduated from Army Staff and Command School (Seskoad).
73-75? Colonel. Commander, Region V (Bien Hoa), of Indonesian contingent
under International Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS)
of the cease-fire in Vietnam (Garuda V).
75-78 Brig. Gen. Commander, "Defense Territory" of East Timor.
78-83 Commander, Kodam 16.

29. C. I. Santoso also holds the post of Assistant for Functional Group Affairs, the first time this duplication has occurred.

83- Maj. Gen. Assistant for Logistics, Materiel Development and Installations, Dept. of Defense and Security; head of the Armed Forces' Supply Board.

Speaks English, Dutch, Javanese.

Encung A. S., Drs. (sospol)

b. 31.VII.1928, Cilacap. Son of R. Soenarjo Brotosuwarjo. A Protestant.

46 Joined army as corporal.
 47- In Tentara Pelajar (Student Army).
 49 Fought in Banyumas.
 57-? Head, Information Staff, Kodam 13.
 62-65 Assistant Chief, Army Information Service, Jakarta.
 65-67 Information Chief, Ampera Cabinet.
 68-72 Head, Baglis (?) /Production, Army Information Service.
 72-76 Action Officer, Armed Forces' Information Center.
 76-80 Deputy Head, Armed Forces' Information Center.
 80-83 Head, Armed Forces' Information Center.

died 27.VII.83.

Goenarso S.F.

66 Major. Attached to Kodam 7.
 68 Lieut.-Col. Assistant-1 (Intelligence), Kodam 13, and head of local Intelligence Task Force (Satgas Intel).
 ? -78 Colonel. Assistant-1 (Security), Kowilhan II.
 78-80 Brig. Gen. Head, Armed Forces' Information Center.
 80- Maj. Gen. Assistant for Social and Political Affairs, Dept. of Defense and Security.

Gunawan Wibisono

66 Colonel. On RPKAD staff.
 75-76 Commander, Garuda 8/2. Middle East (Suez).
 ? -78 Brig. Gen. Chief of Staff, Kodam 8.
 78-81 Governor, Armed Forces' Academy, Army Division.
 83- Lt. Gen. Inspector-General, ABRI.

Himawan Sutanto, R.

b. 14.IX.1929, Magetan.

48 Graduated from Yogya Military Academy (Class I).
 49-50 Second Lieutenant. Platoon commander in Battalion 204 (Battalion Nasuhi), in Ciamis.
 50-51 Platoon commander, Battalion 204, in Bangka.
 51-55 First Lieutenant. Company commander, Battalion 204, in Bangka.
 55-57 First Lieutenant, then Capt. Operations officer with the Sixth Regiment, in Lampung.
 56-57 Took Air Liaison Officer Course.
 57-59 Company commander, Army Military Academy's Cadet Regiment.
 59-60 Took Associate Infantry Officer Course, Ft. Benning.
 60 Major. Staff instructor, Military Academy.
 60-61 Staff officer with Indonesian contingent to UN Forces in the Congo (Garuda II).

- 61-64 Commander, Battalion 330/Kujang 1, of Kodam 6 and Kostrad, in S. Sulawesi, fighting Kahar Muzakar.
- 64 Lieut.-Col. Commander, Military District Command 0609, Kodam 6, in Bandung kabupaten.
- 64-66 Chief of Staff, Brigade 15, Kodam 6, in Sukabumi.
- 66-68 Colonel. Commander, Brigade 17/Airborne, comprising paratroop Battalions 305, 328, and 330.
- 66 Also commander, "Sadaguri" Satgas for presidential security, Bogor.
- 68-70 Assistant-2 (Operations), Kodam 6.
- 70-72 Colonel, then Brig. Gen. Deputy Commander, Armed Forces' Academy, General and Army Division.
- 72-74 Commander, Kodam 4.
- 74-75 Maj. Gen. Commander, Kostrad.
- 75-78 Commander, Kodam 6.
- 78-81 Commander, Kostranas.
- 81-83 Lt. Gen. Commander, Kowilhan III.
- 83- Chief of the Operations Staff, Dept. of Defense and Security.

Iskandar

- ? -68 Colonel. Operations Officer, Air Defense Command (Kohanud).
- 68-72 Chief of Staff, National Air Defense Command (Kohanudhas).
- 72-? First Air Marshal. Commander, Kodau 1, in N. Sumatra.
- c. 75 Governor, Armed Forces' Academy, Air Force Division.
- 78- Air Vice-Marshal. Commander, Kohanudnas.

Jogi Supardi, Ignatius

- 48 Graduated from Yogya Military Academy (Class I).
- 56 Captain. Assistant Military Attache in Peking.
- 57 Assistant Military Attache in New Delhi.
- 58 Major. Commander, Field Artillery Education Center, Cimahi.
- 62 Lieut.-Col. Commander, Field Artillery Education Center, Medan.
- 64-66 Commander, Artillery Brigade, Kostrad.
- 66-68? Colonel. Assistant-3 (Personnel), Kostrad.
- 68 Studied at Lemhannas.
- 69?-71 Colonel, then Brig. Gen. Deputy Assistant-3 (Personnel) to the Army Chief of Staff.
- 72-74 Commander, Kodam 16.
- 74-76 Commander, Seskoad.
- 76-80 Maj. Gen. Assistant for Politics, Strategy and General Planning, Dept. of Defense and Security.
- 80- Lt. Gen. Chief of the Administrative Staff, Dept. of Defense and Security.

Catholic.

Murgito

b. 18.1.1928.

- 48 Second Lieutenant. Headed Depot Section of a battalion in East Java.
- 51-52? Trained at P3AD.
- ? -69 Lieut.-Col. Chief of Staff, Korem 081, Kodam 8, in Madiun.
- 69-? Head of Information, Kodam 8.
- 71 Studied at Seskoad.
- 71 Commander, Second Infantry Brigade, Kostrad.

- ? Commander, Military Sub-Area Command 083, Kodam 8, in Malang.
- 73 Colonel. Commander, Region I (Hue), of Indonesian contingent to ICCS in Vietnam (Garuda V).
- 76 Chief of Staff, Kodam 9.
- ? -80 Chief of Staff, Kodam 8.
- 80-81 Brig. Gen. Commander, Kodam 9.
- 81-83 Maj. Gen. Commander, Kodam 8.
- 83- Lt. Gen. Commander-General, Armed Forces' Academy.

Fluent in Dutch and English.

Roesman

b. c. 1933 in Karanganyar, Kebumen. Younger brother of former Air Force Chief of Staff Rusmin Nurjadin.

- 54 Graduated from Flight School at Kalijati (Bandung)
- In 50s Studied at Flight Instructor School, Halim air base (Jakarta); taught at Kalijati and the Adisucipto air base.
- In 60s Commander of Squadron 11; of Squadron 14 (Mig-21s) in Wing 003 at Iswahyudi air base (Maospati).
- 66-68 Colonel. Commander, Halim air base. (His brother was then head of the Air Force.)
- 68-70? Commodore. Headed the Air Force Academy.
- 70?-71 Deputy Chief of Staff, Kostranas.
- 71-? Chief of Staff of Kostranas.
- ? Air Vice-Marshal. Commander of Kostranas.

Saleh, R. A.

b. 13.V.1928, Jakarta. High school education in the colonial period.

- 45 Attended the infant Military Academy at Tangerang.
- 60 Attended Jungle Warfare School, Singapore.
- 65-66 Commander, Kodim 0416, Kodam 4, in Muara Bungo, South Sumatra.
- 66-68 Assistant-2 (Operations), Kodam 1.
- 68-71? Deputy Chief of Staff, Kodam 1.
- 75-76 Defense Attache in Manila.
- 76-78? Chief of Staff, Kodam 1.
- 78-82 Brig. Gen. Commander, Kodam 1.
- 82- Maj. Gen. Head, Armed Forces' National Reserves Center.

Sanif, M.

- 62-65 Major. Commander, Battalion 328/Para, Kodam 6 and Kostrad.
- 62? Decorated for role in capture of DI/TII "Imam," Sekarmadji Kartosuwirjo.
- 66-68 Lieut.-Col. Chief of Staff, Airborne Brigade 17/Kujang under Himawan.
- 68-71 Colonel. Commander of Airborne Brigade 17.
- 7?-79 Commander of Infantry Training Center (Pussenif).
- 79-80 Brig. Gen. Commander, Kodam 12.
- 80-81 Commander, Kodam 2.
- 81- Maj. Gen. Assistant for Operations, Dept. of Defense and Security.

Santoso, Chalimi Imam

b. c. 1930-31.

51-52? Graduated from P3AD.

65-66 Major. Commander of Battalion 1/RPKAD (Paratroop Regiment)/Kostrad.

66 Attended Kupalda (Advanced Officers' Training Course)-II in Bandung.

67-? Lieut.-Col. Commander of newly formed Group IV/RPKAD.

? -78 Brig. Gen. Chief of Staff, Kodam 10.

78-82 Commander, Kodam 17.

82- Assistant for Functional Group Affairs, Dept. of Defense and Security.

83- Head, Armed Forces' Functional Group Upbuilding Board.

Fluent in Dutch.

Sarwono, Widyo

64 Lieut.-Col. Head of Finance, Kodam 7.

67 Assistant-1, Army Finance Directorate.

73 Brig. Gen. Head, Army Finance Center.

75- Maj. Gen. Assistant for Finance, Dept. of Defense and Security.

Soebijakto, P.

b. 17.VIII.1929, in Wates.

c. 47-49 Fought with TRIP (E. Java) and TP (C. Java).

55 Graduated from the Dutch Military Academy at Breda.

61-62 Artillery Advanced Course in the US.

? Commander, Battalion 13/105 Kostrad (*sic*).

65-68 Assistant Military Attache in Moscow.

68-69 On the intelligence/operations staff of the Army Chief of Staff.

70-71 Studied at Seskoad.

73 International Defense Management Course, in the US.

? -77 Graduated from Lemhannas.

77-? Defense Attache in Moscow.

? -83 Seconded to the Commander-in-Chief (intelligence).

83- Maj. Gen. Governor, Lemhannas.

Suhud, M. Kharis (Charis)

b. c. 1928 in West Java.

50-53 Capt. Commander, Battalion 326, Kodam 6.

53-54 Acting Chief of Staff, Bandung Garrison Command, and Assistant for Intelligence.

54-55 Studied at Seskoad.

56-57 Chief of Staff, Bandung Garrison Command.

57-61 Assistant-1 (Intelligence), Kodam 6.

61-62 Studied at Ft. Leavenworth.

67?-70 Brig. Gen. Military attache, Washington, D.C.

70-71 Assistant-1 (Intelligence) to the Army Chief of Staff.

71-74 Maj. Gen. Head of G-1 (Intelligence), Hankam.

74-78? Ambassador to Bangkok.

78- Lt. Gen. Chief of Staff for Functional Affairs, Hankam.

Soekemi Soemantri

b. 13.VIII.1926 in Magelang, son of R. M. S. Sosrorawito and Sundanese wife.

- 48 Graduated from Yogya Military Academy (Class I).
- 50-52 Attached to Armored unit.
- 60-61 Took Advanced Officers' Training Course-II.
- 60-62 Capt. Military Attache in Bonn.
- 62-63? Lieut.-Col. Commander, Fifth Cavalry Battalion, Kodam 4.
- 6? Studied at Sesoad (Class 4).
- ? Chief of Staff, Cavalry Training Center.
- ? Deputy Director for Education Development, Dept. of Defense and Security.
- ? Deputy Director for Materiel Development, Dept. of Defense and Security.
- ? -74 Deputy Assistant for Materiel Development, Dept. of Defense and Security.
- 74 Brig. Gen. Commander of Indonesian contingent to ICCS in Vietnam (Garuda VII).
- 75-78 Maj. Gen. Assistant for International Cooperation, Dept. of Defense and Security.
- 78- Lt. Gen. Assistant for Personnel and Manpower Development, Dept. of Defense and Security.

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- 55 Graduated from Dutch Military Academy in Breda, Artillery section.
- 68-? Major. Chief of Staff, Air Defense Regiment, Kodam 2.
- 83?- Maj. Gen. Head, Research and Development Center, Dept. of Defense and Security.