CURRENT DATA ON THE INDONESIAN MILITARY ELITE

(Prepared by the Editors)

Periodically over the last fifteen years we have prepared lists of officers holding key positions in the hierarchy of the Indonesian Armed Forces to help readers keep abreast of current developments. (The last previous listing was in *Indonesia*, No. 33 [April 1982] which included changes through February 1982.) We have been able to do so because changes of personnel have typically been incremental, and because when a major organizational change took place, as in October 1969, the transformation occurred quickly and smoothly, without involving any drastic redistribution of power or personnel. This is not the case with the recent reorganization. The changes that got under practical way in March 1983 are unprecedented in their scope and complexity, and seem unlikely to run their full course before well into 1984. Essentially, they can be understood as involving two distinct, yet interrelated processes: (1) a generational shift which has virtually eliminated the "Generation of '45" from the Armed Forces' hierarchy; (2) the organizational reverberations of the separation of the functions of Minister of Defense and Security and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces mandated by Law 20/1982. Perhaps fortunately for the editors, the evidence for the generational shift was largely complete as of the beginning of July 1983, and seems reasonably susceptible to preliminary analysis. On the other hand, although General S. Poniman and General L. B. "Benny" Murdani assumed on March 28, 1983 the twin top positions that had earlier always been held by a single officer, the division of authority and responsibility between them has yet to be resolved; and until it is resolved many billets remain either empty or held on a caretaker basis. Accordingly, we have decided to focus attention in this issue primarily on the generational shift and the massive rotation of officers in command positions. We hope to follow up, in our next issue, with a description and analysis of the major organizational transformation now under way, and the new pattern of staff appointments.

* * *

The three months March, April, and May 1983 saw more, and more dramatic, personnel changes in the military elite than at any other time since the overthrow of Guided Democracy in 1965-66 (see Table A), more than the total number of changes for the years 1981 and 1982 combined. Between December 1982 and June 1983 forty-seven offices acquired new holders. These included the Minister of Defense; the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces; the Commander of Kopkamtib; all four Service Chiefs; the Deputy Army Chief of Staff and all six of his assistants; the Commander of the Army Strategic Reserve (Kostrad); three out of four Regional Defense Commanders (Pangkowilhan); fifteen out of sixteen Territorial Commanders (Pangdam); and the leaderships of all key educational institutions.

The underlying meaning of these massive changes is a seismic generational shift within the military, and especially the Army, hierarchy. This shift, in turn, is the product of the "crossing" of two quite distinct factors: (a) the peculiar "manpower
### TABLE A
Changes of Holders of Listed Positions*
from March 1982 through June 1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>1982</th>
<th>1983</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6 (7?)†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Total number of positions = 77: 48 of the 77 changed, 36 of them within 3 months.
† The Chief of the Operations Staff was replaced between December 1982 and March 1983, but the actual date of this change is not known.

Out of 50 "key" jobs, 39 were changed. This included all Kodams, 3 of 4 Kowilhans, all four Heads of Services, KKO and Kopassandha, all Educational Centers, Kostrad and National Strategic Command, all Deputy and Assistants to KSAD.

history" of the Indonesian Armed Forces; and (b) the military's long-standing, self-imposed rule--broken only under exceptional circumstances--that no officer may remain on active service after reaching the age of 56.

During the four years (1945-49) in which the infant Republic of Indonesia fought against a returning Dutch colonialism, the revolutionaries attempted to compensate for greatly superior Dutch armaments, financial resources, communications apparatus, training, and discipline--as well as virtually complete dominance of the sea and air--by a huge, decentralized popular military mobilization. If the core of these forces was formed by youthful veterans of military organizations established by the Japanese Occupation authorities in 1943-44 (Peta on Java, Madura, and Bali, Gıyûgûn on Sumatra), the bulk consisted of countless spontaneously formed armed paramilitary organizations of the most varied political colorations.

By the end of the Revolution a sizeable part of these organizations had been absorbed into the Army, which by then numbered well over 350,000. When the Dutch departed, the Republic was left with a huge military force that it could not afford to maintain on a peacetime basis (thus many of the bitter intramilitary conflicts of the 1950s stemmed from efforts made by cabinets and military leaderships to reduce the Army to a manageable and affordable size). The manpower surplus was above all an officer surplus, and, moreover, one of a specially delicate kind.
For the revolutionary forces had sprung up virtually overnight, and thus its officers, NCOs, and rank-and-file were all of the same generation. Sudirman, the legendary Commander-in-Chief in the Revolution, assumed this office late in 1945 at the age of 32. Abdul Haris Nasution became Army Chief of Staff when barely 30 years old. Accordingly, during the 1950s virtually no officers could be retired on grounds of age. It was largely for this reason that an embryo military academy set up in the revolutionary capital of Yogyakarta in 1945 was permitted to die in 1949. Its very small third, and last, class was sent away to study at the Dutch Military Academy in Breda. A new military academy was only established (in Magelang) in the late 1950s, and it produced its first crop of graduates in 1960. With the exception of the Breda group, and a quite small number of young men trained at the Pusat Pendidikan Perwira Angkatan Darat (P3AD—Army Officer Training Center) in Bandung and some rudimentary technical schools (for army engineers, etc.), virtually no new officers were produced during the 1950s. This "vacuum," of course, helped to give the veterans of the Revolution a very long lease of power. (For example, Suharto was already commander of the Diponegoro Division in Central Java at the age of 35, and became head of the Army at 44.) But it also meant that when the age-56 retirement rule began to bite, it would do so with a severity unimaginable in a professional officer corps with a less unorthodox history. In such conventional armies there is typically at any one moment an even upward gradient in the numbers of officers born in successive years; in the Indonesian Army, by contrast, the numbers of officers (active, say, in the late 1970s) who were born between 1923 and 1927 vastly outnumbered those born between 1928 and 1932. Thus the dramatic personnel changes of 1983 must be seen as a sort of after-shock to the postrevolutionary collapse of officer-recruitment.*

In the command structure of mid-1983, only one Peta (Generation of '45) veteran remains—the belatedly pensioned Defense Minister, General Poniman. And he remains only because Law 20/1982, separating the functions of Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, explicitly opens the former position to officers no longer on active service. Into the vacuum have poured, in a rush, graduates of the revolutionary-era Yogyakarta Academy, the Dutch Military Academy at Breda, the P3AD at Bandung, and the revived Military Academy at Magelang. For none of these groups has been large enough to fill the place of the Generation of '45 on their own.

The Successors

What are the salient characteristics of the "new men"? In what ways are they like or unlike their precessors? How far, among themselves, do they form subgroups to which real political significance can be attached?

As a group, they are undoubtedly much better schooled, in the conventional professional sense, than their forebears. Many received, at a relatively early age, considerable training overseas, especially in the US, but also in England, Australia,

* For somewhat different reasons, the Navy and Air Force have been facing analogous problems. During the Revolution, the Republic had no significant air or naval arms. During the 1950s their growth was slow and feeble, not least because the new state was too poor to afford the colossal expense of importing modern warships and airplanes. Only in the 1960s, thanks to substantial aid from the Socialist bloc, did they come into their own. Regarded by the Suharto forces as generally pro-Sukarno, they were (especially the Air Force) heavily purged in 1965-66. Both thus experienced generational bunching like the Army, but their bunchings occurred ten years or so later.
Pakistan, and elsewhere. Much of this training has been in specialized fields—in­
telligence, logistics, electronics, tank warfare, and so on. A sizeable number of
them are competent in one, two, or even three Western languages. Almost all have
spent long periods as trainers, instructors, and teachers in Indonesia's expanding
military educational system--while waiting for their seniors to age sufficiently to
give them opportunities to assume responsible command positions and acquire field
experience.

Such "field experience" as they have had has been significantly different from
that of most veterans of the Revolution. Where the latter won their spurs in a pop­
ular, semiguerilla struggle for national independence, some of the former have
served abroad in international forces stationed in the Congo, the Middle East, and
Vietnam, and many have participated in a variety of internal counterinsurgency
campaigns and have fought against the "popular, semiguerilla struggle for national
independence" of the East Timorese.

It seems likely that, as a consequence, their loyalties differ significantly from
those of their seniors. Because the Generation of '45 came to maturity in a decen­
tralized struggle, and typically fought, guerrilla-fashion, on home territory, their
loyalties were often markedly regional. Hence the strong "vertical" (linking of all
ranks) attachment that made soldiers proud to be "men of Siliwangi," "men of Dipo­
negoro," or "men of Brawijaya." The new men, however, more the products of
classrooms and parade grounds than of rice fields and mountain redoubts, seem to
have few such regional/divisional ties. They are rather linked "horizontally" to
class- or school-mates; Breda, P3AD, and AMN now substitute for Siliwangi, Bra­
wijaya, and Diponegoro. And because their numbers are small, and they have lived
closer together (and more separated from everyone else) than their predecessors,
they know each other extremely well.

At the same time there are significant differences within the "successors,"
which need to be borne in mind in assessing their future political role. As these
differences hinge largely on the places and times in which the officers variously
received their formative education, we can conveniently adopt a fourfold classifica­
tion as follows (see Table B):

**TABLE B**
Schools and Classes of Listed Officeholders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Year of Graduation</th>
<th>Names</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yogya Academy</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Susilo Sudarman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yogya Academy</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Bagus Sumitro; Supardjo (?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breda</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>Harjono Prawirodirdjo; Prajitno (?); Rudini; Sudiman Saleh; Soelarso; Supardjo (?); Untung Sridadi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3AD</td>
<td>c. 1952</td>
<td>Murdani; S. Soekoso; Soeweno</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers' Academy</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Roestandi A. Moestafa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Academy</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>I Gde Awet Sara; Try Soetrisno</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMN, Magelang</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Edy Sudradjat; Harsudiyono Hartas; Ida Bagus Sudjana; Nana Narundana; Sembiring Meliala; Simandjuntak; Soegiarto; Suripto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMN, Magelang</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Rajagukguk; Soetedjo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMN, Magelang</td>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Wismoyo Aris Munandar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
a. The Men of Yogya. The first of our four groups to receive a military education, it is also the senior in age (see Table C). Of the small number of officers in this group holding positions in the present listing, the youngest whose age can be identified was born in 1929. As of 1983, then, their ages range from 54 to about 57, meaning that some have already retired and others will soon be gone. During the Revolution their ages would have been 16-19 (in 1945) to 20-23 (in 1949). Because Yogyakarta was the beleaguered, and eventually occupied, capital of the revolutionary Republic, the Academy was forced to recruit largely from youths then living on Java, with the natural consequence that the overwhelming majority of the cadets were Javanese. For the same reason, their training inevitably had a somewhat ad hoc, rudimentary character. Their experience of the Revolution was rather ambiguous, for though they shared in general terms the atmosphere and vicissitudes of the struggle for national independence, they did so mainly in school. Only in the last year of the Revolution, after the Dutch attack of December 19, 1948 and the dissolution of the Academy, did they actually participate in any fighting. For this reason, more than age (some members of the "Generation of '45" were in fact virtual contemporaries), they remained largely in the shadow in the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s, and only began coming into their own towards the end of the last decade. It is thus more than likely that they have no very warm feelings towards the Generation of '45, including its most prominent current member, President Suharto. And since many were already colonels in 1965-66, when the New Order was established, they have no special reason to feel they owe their careers to him. If they have any sentimental loyalties, these are more probably attached to their old commandant, retired Lieutenant-General G. P. H. Djatikusumo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Birth</th>
<th>Present Age</th>
<th>Scheduled Retirement Year</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Yoga Sugama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Poniman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Romly; Sudiman Saleh; Susilo Sudarman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Rudini; Supardjo; Soeweno; Harjono; Yogie S. Memet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Anton Sudjarwo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Bambang Triantoro; Kahpi Suriadiredja; Sukardi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Murdani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Roestandi A. Moestafa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Suripto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Harsudiyono Hartras; Muntaram; Try Soetrisno</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>I Gde Awet Sara; Nana Narundana; Soegiarto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Soetedjo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Rajagukguk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Wismoyo Aris Munandar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(a widely respected figure believed to be quietly critical of many aspects of the New Order), than to the President.

b. The Men of Breda. Originally recruited to form the Yogya Academy's third class, these officers are a year or so younger than the Yogya group, and just as heavily Javanese in ethnic composition. But if, like the Yogya men, they shared, in a general sense, the revolutionary experience, their formative training came in the celebrated Military Academy of the ex-colonial master. The education they received was a thoroughly modern one, along conventional European lines, with careful specializations in the cavalry (tank), artillery, logistics, finance, and other branches. This education, conducted of course in Dutch, rather than in Yogya's Indonesian, was intended to produce a first generation of professional officers. As it turned out, they were not only the first group of cadets to be trained abroad, they were also the last; for while they were in Holland, Dutch-Indonesian relations steadily deteriorated, principally over the West Irian issue, and no second group was ever sent. This meant that the "Breda men" numbered no more than the 36 youths who were graduated in 1955. (The graduates of Class I and II of the Yogya Academy numbered 196 and 149, respectively.) Their return to Indonesia coincided with the onset of the regional crisis and the height of the Darul Islam movement. Many of them thus got their first real battle experience in counterinsurgency operations, and later served with the Caduad, formed in 1961, which, still commanded by General Suharto, became Kostrad in 1963. More, then, than their immediate seniors were they hitched directly to Suharto's rising star.

c. The Men of P3AD. The data available on the trainees at this center, located in Bandung, are much more fragmentary than those on the Yogya and Breda groups. They seem to have been almost exact contemporaries of the Breda group. For example, the new Army Chief of Staff, Breda graduate General Rudini, and the new Kostrad Commander, P3AD graduate General Soeweno, were both born in 1929. Some seem to have been born the previous year. It is known that the new Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (Pangab), General Murdani, born in 1932, was among the youngest. He would have been 13 when the Revolution broke out and just turned 17 when it ended. Youths in this age bracket often participated in the fighting, either as rank-and-file soldiers or NCOs in the regular Army, or as activists in the myriad paramilitary organizations; it is thus likely that many of the P3AD men saw a good bit of combat, probably more than did the Yogya and Breda cadets. The P3AD was not in fact a "cadet" academy, but a school for further training of young men with previous military experience. From the data available it appears that the same factors that caused a heavy overrepresentation of Javanese (and to a lesser degree Sundanese?) in the Yogya and Breda groups, operated for the P3AD. At least one can say that all the P3AD officers on our list are ethnic Javanese.

The first group of P3AD graduates (possibly also the last--it is not clear when the school was closed or changed its name and purpose) stepped out, as it were, onto the streets of Bandung in 1952, just at the time that Col. Alex Kawilarang, who commanded the West Java Military Region and the Siliwangi Division from that city, was setting up the embryo of what would soon become the famous RPKAD. Perhaps naturally, a good number of these P3AD men moved over, then or later, to this elite unit, and maintained their identification with it forever after. In 1953, Kawilarang's still "local" commando unit was transferred, along with its first commander, Major Moh. Idjon Djanbi (a tough Eurasian who earlier went by the name of Visser), to Army HQ in Jakarta. The transfer was effected by Col. Zulkifli Lubis, the legendary Japanese-trained intelligence "whiz," who had become Acting Army Chief of Staff in the wake of Col. A. H. Nasution's fall after the so-called "October 17, 1952 Affair." It was during Lubis' two years (1953-55) in control of the Army
that the unit expanded and assumed its most celebrated name, and Lubis' ties with it seem to have been strong; for when Lubis, replaced by a reascendant Nasution in September 1955, attempted a coup in November of the following year, RPKAD units under Major Djaelani played a key role. (The coup plans assigned the RPKAD the task of kidnapping Nasution and his closest confidants—a curious foreshadowing of the events of October 1, 1965.) This episode is worth bearing in mind since the present Pangab, General Murdani, was then Chief Instructor at the RPKAD school at Batujajar (just outside Bandung); the present Kostrad Commander, General Soeweno, was then in the RPKAD's officer corps; and General Sebastian Soekoso, former Commander of Kodam 15, and now Commander-General of the Army's Development and Training Command (Kobanglit AD), is known to have been briefly arrested for his participation in the failed RPKAD coup. All three had been classmates earlier on at the P3AD.

What is striking about the subsequent careers of the P3AD group (which we might rename the P3AD-RPKAD) is that their associations with "intelligence" and political activism have remained very strong—far stronger than has been the case for any of our other three subgroups. The group's "star," Murdani, led RPKAD commando units against the rebel Permesta capital of Menado in 1958, and achieved national fame, alongside the less fortunate (late) Lieutenant-Colonel Untung, by leading parachute drops into West Irian during the Irian campaign of 1961-62. Along with fellow P3AD-RPKAD leaders C. I. Santoso and Soeweno, he played a key role in the massacres of PKI supporters in 1965-66. The same group had much to do with the military suppression of the Free Papua Movement after Santoso became Territorial Commander there in 1978. As for the invasion and occupation of East Timor, Murdani masterminded it from Jakarta, while his P3AD-RPKAD associates Dading Kalbuadi and Soeweno executed his policies on the spot from 1975 to 1983.* No less significant are the group's close personal ties to President Suharto, which date back to his days as commander of Cudaut (1961-63). From Cudaut's inception, the RPKAD formed its elite core, and it retained this role after Cudaut was transformed into Kostrad in 1963. It fought directly under Suharto when as Mandala Commander he led the campaign against the Dutch in West Irian, and likewise when as Kostrad Commander he crushed the PKI in 1965. And since 1974, Murdani has essentially dominated the political intelligence bureaucracies of Indonesia for his long-time chief.

d. The Men of Magelang. All but one of the Magelang men on our list were graduated from the AMN (National Military Academy)'s first two classes (1960 and 1961). Born between 1934 and 1938, the oldest of these men was 15, the youngest 11 when the Revolution ended. When the New Order was set up early in 1966, they were relatively recent Academy graduates and most were about 30 years old. In terms of training, their experience was probably closest to that of the Yogya group, in that they got a reasonably conventional, apolitical, and domestic schooling. The planner of the Academy was Djatikusumo, former head of the Yogya Academy; and its first commandant was Surjosularso, a Solonese aristocrat like Djatikusumo, who had been trained at Breda in the late 1930s. During the 1970s and early 1980s the AMN graduates have participated in various counterinsurgency campaigns. A few played roles in East Timor between 1975 and 1979, but it appears that these were subordinate, and there is no indication that members of the group had much hand in policy making. Many have been connected with Kostrad, but well after Suharto

* In addition to Murdani, Kalbuadi, and Soeweno, at least the following current officeholders have been involved in the military operations in East Timor: Rajaguk-guk; Sembiring Meliala; Edy Sudrajat; Sutarto; Try Soetrisno; and probably Bagus Sumitro.
relinquished direct command over it. Thus in terms of ties to the President they lie, along with the Breda group, in the middle of the spectrum that runs from the Yogya men to the P3AD-RPKAD men. The feature that marks this group most decisively off from all the others is its multi-ethnicity.* It is striking, for example, that only half of the Magelang men on our list are Javanese, the rest being variously Sundanese, Batak, and—mirabile dictu—Balinese.†

In our listing at least twelve of the sixteen territorial commands are held by AMN graduates, and their distribution tells us something both about the Magelangers and the nature of the military control system under the late New Order. Batak generals now run Irian Jaya (West Irian), Protestant North Sulawesi, and Protestant and Muslim Maluku—but not Protestant Batak North Sumatra. Balinese generals run West and East Kalimantan, but not the West Nusatenggara in which their home is located.‡ The commander in Sundanese West Java is a Javanese, but not, as so often before, a Javanese with long previous service in the area with its Siliwangi Division. This pattern highlights both the solidity of the center's control and its ability to ignore "localist" ethnic sentiment, as well as the Magelangers' absence of significant "Divisional" ties.

There are three officers on our list who do not precisely fit into the four groups described above. All are late 1950s graduates of small technical military academies. Far and away the most important of them is Try Soetrisno, presently commander of the politically sensitive Metropolitan Territorial Command in Jakarta. Born in 1935, he is the same age as many of the Magelangers, though a 1959 graduate of the Army Engineers' Academy. His mildly "outsider" status among the younger men is, however, more than compensated for by his very close ties with President Suharto, whom he served as personal adjutant for almost five years (1974-78).

The Politics of Generational Shift

What the government calls "successed" elections, largely rubber-stamp "participatory" state organs, and a civilian technocracy aside, the Suharto regime has from its onset been a military regime, and Suharto's personal ascendancy has

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* As we have seen, most of the officers of the Generation of '45 came from Java and Sumatra, where the Japanese established sizeable military units in 1943-45, and where, in 1945-49, the Dutch were least successful in their pacification campaigns. During the early 1950s, when regional dissidence was severe and Jakarta's control weak, the Army high command devoted its training efforts to young men who were either native inhabitants of Java or had been brought up there. But by the time the AMN was established General Nasution and his confidants were determined to "renationalize" the younger officer corps and made explicit efforts to recruit cadets on a regionally proportional basis. These efforts were, in addition, very much in line with the strongly nationalist atmosphere of "the transition to Guided Democracy."

† This represents the first time that Balinese—once celebrated as warriors all over the western half of the archipelago—have entered the top military elite. Their absence hitherto can be explained in part by a ruthlessly successful Dutch pacification effort in 1946-49, the notorious reluctance—till recently—of Balinese to leave their island, and the relative backwardness of educational institutions in Bali in the 1950s.

‡ One of these Balinese, I Gde Awet Sara, is not actually a Magelanger. He was graduated in 1959 from the Army's Technical Academy in Bandung. But he is of the same generation as the AMN cadets on our list.
depended on maintaining control over the Armed Forces. This control has been achieved by four basic means, three of which are well known and widely commented on, while the fourth merits special attention in connection with our generational shift.

First and foremost has been Suharto's "historic" role in the destruction in 1965-66 of the Indonesian Communist Party and its left-wing nationalist allies, and the subsequent overthrow of President Sukarno (de facto by the coup of March 11, 1966, de jure in 1968). These events assured the Army its institutional integrity and unchallenged dominance of Indonesian life, and earned Suharto an enormous fund of intramilitary legitimacy.

Second has been the vast patronage available to him in the form of jobs and money. On the one hand, the massive purge of the Communist and nationalist left from state organs of all kinds, and at every level, down even to the village, left thousands of positions open for filling with grateful followers and potential opponents within the Army. And insofar as the events of 1965-66 permitted an extensive, if largely unpublicized, purge within the Army itself—as well as the virtual gutting of the Air Force and the Navy (especially its elite Marine Corps), the numbers of "job seekers" in the military were far less than those confronting any previous top Indonesian military leader. On the other hand, the massive foreign aid provided the anti-Communist, pro-American New Order regime, and, after 1973, the colossal rise in world oil prices, gave Suharto financial resources for buttressing his position beyond the dreams of any predecessor. There cannot be many senior and middle-ranking Army officers (at least those who have not served time in prison) who have not benefitted substantially from the flow of largesse, even if its distribution has been far from even-handed. It was largely this patronage resource base that permitted Suharto to "solve" the problem of the "excess officer manpower" of the Generation of '45. (Thousands of these officers found comfortable berths in state corporations, erstwhile civilian ministries, local governments, and representative bodies.) It also permitted a reduction in the overall size of the Armed Forces to a level well below that of 1950 (even though Indonesia's population has almost doubled since that year).

Third has been an astute manipulation of military factions and watchful distribution of key military functions. Dangerously "militant" allies of the early New Order period, such as the commanders of the strategic Java territorial commands—Generals Dharsono, Surono, and Jasin—were deftly maneuvered out of power and kicked upstairs. General A. H. Nasution, in many ways the father of the Indonesian Army, was assigned the prestigious but powerless position of Chairman of the MPRS, and not long afterwards sent into retirement and obscurity. Even those senior officers identified as long-time aides and personal confidants of Suharto have had their ups and downs—Alamsyah, Yoga Sugama, even Ali Murtopo are cases in point. Key henchmen like Generals Suryo, Sudjono Humardhani, Panggabean, Amir Machmud, and Yusuf have in turn been edged into the background. The position of Kostrad Commander, from which Suharto seized the presidency, has been rotated more rapidly than any other position in the top echelons of the military hierarchy (see Table D). Nor has Suharto forgotten to fill many key posts with what one might call "military cripples"—in other words, men whose religion, ethnic background, or historic experience in an Army dominated by abangan-Muslim Javanese effectively precludes them from serious ambitions for the presidency: obvious examples are two recent Ministers of Defense, the Protestant Toba Batak Panggabean, and the Muslim Buginese Andi Mohammad Yusuf; and the long-term
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Military Background</th>
<th>Ethnic Background</th>
<th>Religious Affiliation</th>
<th>Length of Term</th>
<th>Months in Office</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1. Suharto</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>abangan</td>
<td>1.III.61-1.V.63 (Commander of Caduad)</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>1.V.63-7.XII.65 (Commander of Kostrad)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Poniman</td>
<td>SI</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>abangan</td>
<td>18.IV.73-4.V.74</td>
<td>12⅔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Himawan</td>
<td>SI</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>abangan</td>
<td>4.V.74-4.1.75</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>(Yogya I)</td>
<td></td>
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<td>9. Lopulisa</td>
<td>SI</td>
<td>Ambonese</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>4.1.75-19.1.78</td>
<td>36½</td>
</tr>
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<td>10. Wiyogo</td>
<td>SI</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>abangan</td>
<td>19.1.78-20.III.80</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Yogya I)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Ismail</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>abangan</td>
<td>20.III.80-24.1.81</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Breda</td>
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<tr>
<td>13. Soeweno</td>
<td>RPKAD</td>
<td>J</td>
<td>abangan</td>
<td>24.V.83-</td>
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<td></td>
<td>P3AD</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Average tenure (excluding Suharto) = c. 19 months
intelligence "czar" and current Commander-in-Chief, Catholic Eurasian Benny Murdani.*

The fourth and most pertinent factor in the present discussion is Suharto's role as the "founding father" of Cadudad-Kostrad between 1961 and 1965. The first to hold command of this force, he also held it longer than anyone else. As we noted earlier, he thereby forged personal ties of some importance with the younger generation, above all the P3AD-RPKAD group, but also, if to a lesser extent, with the Breda and Magelang men. What perhaps should be emphasized here is that he was almost unique among the Generation of '45 in having such extensive cross-generational relationships, which have lasted well after he relinquished direct command of Kostrad, of the Army, and of the Ministry of Defense.

How does this complex of factors help to explain Su harmless intramilitary maneuvers in recent years? One must begin with the startling contrast between what one might term the "Jakarta Spring" of 1983 and the Suharto policy of the 1970s and early 1980s, which, as we emphasized in earlier listings, placed enormous emphasis on continuity, in other words, keeping trusted subordinates in key positions for many years beyond the normal tour of duty. As of early July 1983 only one such figure remained in place, 59-year-old retired General Yoga Sugama, who has held the essentially nonmilitary post of Bakin chief for an astonishing nine and a half years (113 months).

There is no doubt that the central reason for the change in policy has been the retirement-age norm, which inexorably drove old trusted subordinates out of active service, even though they would be retained as long as possible. This norm is so fundamental to the professional standards, so crucial to the morale of junior and middle officers in all modern armies that political leaders tamper with it at their peril. It is safe to say that nothing would have more dangerously solidified military opinion against Suharto than any significant attempt to break the rule, or arbitrarily, and for obvious political reasons, to change the traditional retirement age. The problem facing the palace was thus how to handle the inevitable generational change with maximal advantage. This objective accounts more than anything else for the series of strange episodes, beginning in the summer of 1980, which preceded the "Jakarta Spring," and for the "Spring" itself.

The series began when the retirement rule was allowed to force Army Chief of Staff General Widodo out of office. As of early 1980 Widodo was perhaps the one remaining Generation of '45 officer still on active service with Suharto-ish credentials for the presidency. He was an abangan Javanese from Central Java, and a veteran of Peta and the Revolution. A Diponegoro Division stalwart, he had held a succession of key command posts, and played an important role in the cataclysm of 1965-66. During his tenure as Army Chief of Staff he had been able to fill most of the immediate positions under his control with his personal choices and appeared to be popular inside the Army. But if he were to act, he would have to act before April 1980, when he was due to retire. In the event, he did nothing, perhaps because he was lured with empty promises of being made either Minister of Defense or Kopkamtib Commander. In accordance with Army tradition, he was succeeded by his Deputy, S. Poniman, a Solonese who had spent most of his career with the Siliwangi Division. Widely regarded as a competent, but colorless and unambitious, officer, and with only two years to go before retirement, Poniman seemed an ideal choice from the palace's point of view. The problem then arose of who should become his deputy. Traditionally, the post went to the commander of the most impor-

* It is a mild curiosity of Indonesia's military history that the founder of the RPKAD and its best-known son should both be Eurasians.
tant Regional Command, Kowilhan II, which covers Java, Madura, and Bali. The
officer holding this position in the summer of 1980 was General Wijoyo Suyono, a
Peta veteran and Brawijaya Division man with a strong personality and a reputation
for ambition. (The palace may also have worried about his ties to General Sumitro,
the powerful Brawijaya general who ran Kopkamtib till his fall from power after the
"Malari" riots in January 1974.) Accordingly, Wijoyo Suyono was not given the
Deputy-ship (and thus the likelihood of the Chief of Staff-ship) but instead was
made Deputy Commander of Kopkamtib under Admiral Sudomo, two years his senior.
There he remained until December 1982, when he was abruptly and prematurely
sent into retirement. The really curious thing, however, is not Wijoyo Suyono's
being passed over for the post of Deputy Chief of Staff, but that the position was
left empty for the almost three years that Poniman served as Army Chief of Staff
(1980-83). The "Yogya men" had three obvious candidates for the position—Susilo
Sudarman, Commander of Kowilhan I; Wiyogo Atmodarminto, Wijoyo Suyono's suc­
cessor as commander of Kowilhan II; and Himawan Sutanto, commander of the Na­
tional Strategic Command (Kostranas)—but none was given the job.

The next "oddities" occurred in 1982, the last full year of Suharto's third
presidential term, and their timing probably has to be understood in this context.
The final months of his second term (December 1977-February 1978) had been
marked by clear signs of disagreement within the top military elite and by massive
student protests. Repression and patronage had been successfully employed to
silence this opposition, but Suharto was plainly anxious to avoid their recrudes­
cence on the eve of his fourth term.

First of all, when Poniman's turn for retirement came, in July 1982, the rules
were quietly bent in his favor, in contrast to what had happened to Widodo. He
was permitted to remain at his post and on active duty for a further nine months--
till Suharto's reelection for a fourth term had been "successed." That the palace
felt some awkwardness about this maneuver is suggested by the fact that when, in
December 1982, the other three service chiefs were simultaneously replaced (and
Wijoyo Suyono pushed into early retirement), very little publicity was given to
what normally would have been a major public occasion. Clearly, a bigger "splash"
would have underlined the "absence of change" in the Army, and Poniman's contin­
uing in office when his exact contemporary, Walujo Sugito, was retired as Navy
Chief of Staff, and Ashadi Tjahjadi, two years his junior, as Air Force Chief of
Staff.

Second was the timing of the passage of Law 20, to which we have earlier
alluded. Nothing suggests that this timing was prompted by administrative need,
demands for efficiency, or external crisis. The New Order military had got along
perfectly well without it for sixteen years. Moreover, the vagueness of the law,
and the fact, referred to earlier, that its practical effects have still not been
worked out a whole year later, strongly suggest that its passage was determined
by political considerations.

Some of these considerations can be deduced from a look at the military losers
and winners in the "Jakarta Spring." The most obvious loser was General Yusuf,
till March 1983 Minister of Defense and Armed Forces' Commander-in-Chief, and
thereafter head of the Financial Audits Agency—a civilian post of which the only
significance is that its insignificance made it a suitable place to find figurehead
Vice-Presidents (Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX in 1968; General Umar Wirahadikusu­
mah in 1983). Yusuf was not due to retire till 1984, and he was replaced as De­
fense Minister by a man two years his senior. Yet it is unlikely that Yusuf was the
main target of the maneuvers we have been describing, since he had never succeed­
ed during his five years in office (1978-83) in gaining effective control of his
ministry, and his early popularity with the civilian world had apparently faded away. Less obvious, but more important, losers were the "men of Yogya," who, we noted above, are the least tied/committed to Suharto of all the post-Generation of '45 leadership subgroups. None was named Minister of Defense, none Pangab, and none Army Chief of Staff. Given the expected pattern of retirements it looks as if they will never hold either of the latter positions. Indeed it seems fairly clear that Poniman's failure to appoint a deputy, and the very unusual prolongation of his term in office as Army Chief of Staff were designed to prevent a Yogya man from assuming control of the Army.

And the winners? A fair assessment must await the full implementation of Law 20, and we expect to return to this question in the next issue of Indonesia. On a preliminary basis, one can suggest the following:

i. The Generation of '45. General Poniman's appointment as Minister of Defense in effect opens this major ministerial post to retired officers, and most retired officers are members of that generation. Poniman can stay on indefinitely at Suharto's pleasure, and the President faces no institutional restraints in replacing him with another favored member of his own generation at some future date. From the palace's point of view this means a semipermanent division of power between the old and new military guards, which will surely help to ensure its own supremacy.

ii. The P3AD group, above all its leader General Murdani. We will defer a full discussion of Murdani till our next issue. Suffice it to say that the appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of an intelligence specialist who has never personally commanded any unit larger than a battalion is extraordinary and defies all the norms of professional modern militaries. It does, however, represent an acknowledgment of the dominance of "intelligence" in New Order political arrangements, and Murdani's unofficial status as Suharto's closest aide and the second most powerful man in Indonesia for the past seven to eight years. Murdani's old comrade from P3AD days, General Soeweno, is now Kostrad Commander; and two other important members of the group, Dading Kalbuadi and C. I. Santoso, have already been announced as Assistants for Logistics and Functional Group Affairs. If the implementation of Law 20 eventually assigns these positions to Murdani's sphere, they will reinforce his power directly; if they are assigned to the Defense Ministry, Murdani will have "his" men working directly under the Minister.

iii. The Breda group. General Rudini's appointment as Army Chief of Staff is clearly a triumph of sorts for this group. And Rudini has lost no time in appointing former classmates to his immediate staff. His personal ascendancy within the group may be underscored by the fact that when he eventually appointed a deputy, he did so only after all other key Army appointments had been made, and that his nominee, Lieut.-General Bambang Triantoro, is a colorless ordnance officer who has never held a command position of any kind (i.e., would be unacceptable as Army Chief of Staff). But looked at from another angle, Rudini's position is rather equivocal. As we noted earlier, the Breda group is extremely small and in itself cannot really form a solid power base. Breda men control only one territorial command (E. Java), and one regional command (Kowilhan III--if General Supardjo is really a Breda man). Rudini himself must retire in 1985, and meantime he is positioned over still-active Yogya men, like Susilo Sudarman, and under a P3AD man, General Murdani, who is three years his junior. In a culture which stresses the importance of age, and a profession which is deeply attached to seniority, Rudini's position thus has its delicate aspects.

iv. The men of Magelang. In sheer quantitative terms, this group has been the major beneficiary of the "Jakarta Spring." But again, the details suggest a more complex picture. The "golden boy" of Class I, General Soegiarto, who was
the first of his group to become a Pangdam (Kodam XIV, in May 1979), now heads Kodam VII (C. Java) and the Diponegoro Division, a position once held by Suharto himself and former Army Chief of Staff Widodo. But he is, as it were, "balanced" by General Try Soetrisno, one year his senior, in the politically pivotal Kodam V (Metropolitan Jakarta). As noted earlier, Try Soetrisno is not a Magelanger, and thus a bit of an outsider, but he is exceptionally close to the President. The odds are excellent that he, not Soegiarto, will succeed Rudini as Army Chief of Staff in 1985.

We may conclude by observing that the President appears to have succeeded in achieving what was postulated as his main objective: handling the generational shift in such a way as to maximize his own power. With the exception of the "men of Yogya" all the subgroups in the post-Generation of '45 military elite have benefitted from the "Jakarta Spring," but these benefits have been distributed intelligently in the spirit of divide et impera.

* * *

As an experiment we have decided to append to the present listing as much relevant biographical data on each new appointee as are presently available to us (arranged alphabetically at the end of the lists). The numbers after the appointees' names refer to these biographies. Inevitably, the completeness of such data varies greatly from individual to individual. We should add that "blanks" in an officer's career record very often reflect intelligence assignments. As these biographies include many military abbreviations in addition to those we usually use, we are including a separate glossary, which should make them easier to follow.

Postscript:

On August 16, 1983, Suharto issued Presidential Decision No. 46/1983, describing the new organizational structure of the Defense Department, but not that of the Pangab's staff. In our next issue we hope to outline these structures and list the officers occupying the most important of the positions.
### Glossary of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
<th>Translation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Akabri</td>
<td>Akademi Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia</td>
<td>Indonesian Armed Forces' Academy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Akad Teknik</td>
<td>Akademi Teknik</td>
<td>Technical Academy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Akad Zeni</td>
<td>Akademi Zeni</td>
<td>Engineers' Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMN*</td>
<td>Akademi Militer Nasional</td>
<td>National Military Academy</td>
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<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Brawijaya</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bakin</td>
<td>Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara</td>
<td>State Intelligence Coordinating Agency</td>
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<td>BB</td>
<td>Bukit Barisan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brimob</td>
<td>Brigade Mobil</td>
<td>Mobile Brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>Caduad</td>
<td>Cadangan Umum Angkatan Darat</td>
<td>Army General Reserve</td>
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<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Diponegoro</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>Javanese</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KKO</td>
<td>Korps Komando (Marinir)</td>
<td>Marines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kobangdiklat</td>
<td>Komando Pengembangan Pendidikan dan Latihan</td>
<td>Training and Education Development Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kobanglit AD</td>
<td>Komando Pengembangan dan Penelitian Angkatan Darat</td>
<td>Army Research and Development Command</td>
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<td>Kodak</td>
<td>Komando Daerah Kepolisian</td>
<td>Police Area Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kodam</td>
<td>Komando Daerah Militer</td>
<td>Military Area Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kodau</td>
<td>Komando Daerah Angkatan Udara</td>
<td>Air Force Area Command</td>
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<td>Kodim</td>
<td>Komando Distrik Militer</td>
<td>Military District Command</td>
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<td>Komapta</td>
<td>Komando Samapta</td>
<td>Readiness Command (Police)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kopassandha</td>
<td>Komando Pasukan Sandi Yudha</td>
<td>Army Paracommando Command (Special Forces)</td>
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<td>Kopkamtib</td>
<td>Komando Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban</td>
<td>Command for the Restoration of Security and Public Order</td>
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<td>Kopur</td>
<td>Komando Tempur</td>
<td>Combat Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kopur Linud</td>
<td>Komando Tempur Lintas Udara</td>
<td>Airborne Combat Command</td>
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<td>Korem</td>
<td>Komando Resort Militer</td>
<td>Military Subarea Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kores</td>
<td>Komando Resort</td>
<td>Subarea Command (Police)</td>
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<td>Kostrad</td>
<td>Komando Strategi Angkatan Darat</td>
<td>Army Strategic Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kostranas</td>
<td>Komando Strategi Nasional</td>
<td>National Strategic Command</td>
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* This was incorporated as the General and Army subdivision of the new Armed Forces' Academy (Akabri) as of October 5, 1966.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
<th>English Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kowilhan</td>
<td>Komando Wilayah Pertahanan</td>
<td>Defense Region Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KSAD (Kasad)</td>
<td>Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat</td>
<td>Army Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kupaltu</td>
<td>Kursus Perwira Lanjutan Satu</td>
<td>Advanced Officers' Training Course I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lemhannas</td>
<td>Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional</td>
<td>National Defense Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pangab</td>
<td>Panglima Angkatan Bersenjata</td>
<td>Armed Forces Commander</td>
</tr>
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<td>Pangdam</td>
<td>Panglima Daerah Militer</td>
<td>Military Area Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3AD</td>
<td>Pusat Pendidikan Perwira Angkatan Darat</td>
<td>Army Officer Training Center</td>
</tr>
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<td>Pangkowilhan</td>
<td>Panglima Komando Wilayah Pertahanan</td>
<td>Commander of Defense Region Command</td>
</tr>
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<td>Pomad</td>
<td>Polisi Militer Angkatan Darat</td>
<td>Army Military Police</td>
</tr>
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<td>RPKAD (Kopassandha)</td>
<td>Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat</td>
<td>Army Para Commando Regiment</td>
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<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sundanese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satgas</td>
<td>Satuan Tugas</td>
<td>Task Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sekumad</td>
<td>Sekretariat Umum Angkatan Darat</td>
<td>Army General Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seskau</td>
<td>Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Udara</td>
<td>Air Force Staff and Command School</td>
</tr>
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<td>Sesko</td>
<td>Sekolah Staf dan Komando</td>
<td>Staff and Command School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seskoad (previously SSKAD)</td>
<td>Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat</td>
<td>Army Staff and Command School</td>
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<td>Seskoal</td>
<td>Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Laut</td>
<td>Navy Staff and Command School</td>
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<tr>
<td>Seskogab</td>
<td>Sekolah Staf dan Komando Gabungan</td>
<td>Joint Services' Staff and Command School</td>
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<td>SI</td>
<td>Siliwangi</td>
<td>Army General Staff</td>
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<td>SUAD</td>
<td>Staf Umum Angkatan Darat</td>
<td>Officers' Advanced Course</td>
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<td>Suslapa</td>
<td>Kursus Lanjutan Perwira</td>
<td>Combat Engineers Battalion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yon Zipur</td>
<td>Batalyon Zeni Tempur</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### SERVICE HEADS AND ARMY HIERARCHY

**Minister of Defense and Security**

1. Gen. Andi Mohammad Yusuf  
   (b. June 23, 1928, S. Sulawesi)  
   17.IV.78 – 28.III.83 (59 months)  
   Gen. Maradean Panggabean  
   Minister of Industry  
   Hasanuddin Buginese

2. Gen. S. Poniman  
   28.III.83 (3 months)  
   Army Chief of Staff  
   SI

**Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces**

1. Gen. Andi Mohammad Yusuf  
   17.IV.78 – 28.III.83 (59 months)  
   Gen. Maradean Panggabean  
   Minister of Industry  
   Hasanuddin Buginese

2. Gen. Leonardus Benjamin  
   ("Benny") Murdani  
   (P3AD)  
   28.III.83 (3 months)  
   Assistant for Security, Dept. of Defense and Security  
   Head, Strategic Intelligence Center  
   Deputy Head, Bakin  
   RPKAD

**Commander of Kopkamtib**

1. Admiral R. Sudomo  
   (b. 1926, E. Java)  
   17.IV.78 – 29.III.83 (59 months)  
   Gen. (and President) Suharto  
   Chief of Staff, Kopkamtib  
   Navy

2. Gen. Leonardus Benjamin  
   Murdani  
   29.III.83 (3 months)  
   As above  
   RPKAD

**Deputy Commander of Kopkamtib***

Gen. Wijoyo Suyono  
(b. May 1, 1928, Tulung Agung)  
27.XII.80 – 4.XII.82 (23 months)  
Gen. Yoga Sugama  
Commander, Kowilhan II  
B/RPKAD

**Army Chief of Staff**

1. Gen. S. Poniman  
   (b. July 18, 1926, Solo)  
   15.IV.80 – 7.III.83 (35 months)  
   Gen. Widodo  
   Deputy Army Chief of Staff  
   SI

2. Lt. Gen. Rudini  
   (Breda)  
   7.III.83 (4 months)  
   Commander, Kostrad  
   D

* After General Wijoyo Suyono's abrupt retirement, no successor was appointed. It is generally believed that General Murdani opposes the appointment of a new deputy.
Navy Chief of Staff
1. Admiral Walujo Sugito
   (b. July 9, 1926, Yogya)
   18.VI.77 - 4.XII.82 (6½ months)
   Admiral R. Subijakto
   Deputy Navy Chief of Staff
   Navy

2. Vice-Admiral Mohammad Romly
   4.XII.82 (7 months)
   Chief of Operations Staff, Dept. of
   Defense and Security
   Navy

Air Force Chief of Staff
1. Air Marshal Ashadi Tjahjadi
   (b. May 5, 1928, Gombong)
   18.VI.77 - 4.XII.82 (6½ months)
   Air Marshal Saleh Basarah
   Deputy Air Force Chief of Staff
   Air Force

2. Air Vice-Marshal Sukardi
   4.XII.82 (7 months)
   Commander, Kostranas
   Air Force

Chief of the National Police
1. Police Lt. Gen. Dr. Awaloeddin Djamin
   26.IX.78 - 4.XII.82 (50 months)
   Police Gen. Drs. Widodo Budidarmo
   Ambassador to Bonn
   Minangkabau

   4.XII.82 (7 months)
   Chief of Police, Jakarta
   Police (Brimob)

Commander of the Marine Corps
1. Lt. Gen. (Mar.) Kahpi Suriadiredja
   (b. June 14, 1931, Bandung)
   28.VII.77 - 7.V.83 (69 months)
   Lt. Gen. (Mar.) H. Mohammed Anwar
   Chief of Staff, Marine Corps
   Marines

2. Brig. Gen. (Mar.) Muntaram
   7.V.83 (2 months)
   Chief of Staff, Marine Corps
   Marines

Commander, First Regional Defense Command
(Kowilhan I--Sumatra and W. Kalimantan)
Lt. Gen. Susilo Sudarman
   (Yogya I)
   31.XII.80 (30 months)
   Maj. Gen. Wiyogo Atmodarminto
   Commander-General, Armed Forces
   Academy
   SI/Cavalry

Commander, Second Regional Defense Command
(Kowilhan II--Java, Madura, Nusatenggara)
1. Lt. Gen. Wiyogo Atmodarminto
   (Yogya I)
   2.1.81 - 12.II.83 (25 months)
   Lt. Gen. Wijoyo Suyono
   Commander, Kowilhan I
   SI
2. Lt. Gen. R. Yogie Suwardi
Memet

Commander, Kodam VI
SI/RPKAD  
Cirebonese

Commander, Third Regional Defense Command
(Kowilhan III—Sulawesi, S., C., and E. Kalimantan)

1. Lt. Gen. R. Himawan Sutanto
(b. September 14, 1929, Magetan) (Yogya I)
29.1.81 - 7.III.83 (25 months)
Lt. Gen. Leo Lopulisa
Commander, Kostranas
SI  
J

2. Lt. Gen. Supardjo
(Yogya II)
7.III.83 (4 months)
Assistant for Politics, Strategy, and
General Planning/Assistant for Logistics, Dept. of Defense and Security
SI  
J

Commander, Fourth Regional Defense Command
(Kowilhan IV—Maluku and Irian Jaya)

1. Lt. Gen. R. Seno Hartono
(b. 1927, Madiun) (Yogya I)
28.IV.81 - 8.III.83 (22½ months)
Vice-Admiral Drs. R. M. Soebroto Joedono
Assistant for Operations, Dept. of Defense and Security
SI/RPKAD  
J

2. Lt. Gen. (Mar.) Kahpi Suriadiredja
8.III.83 (4 months)
Commander, Marine Corps
Marines  
S

Deputy Army Chief of Staff
Lt. Gen. Bambang Triantoro

28.V.83 (1 month)
Commander-General, Army Research, Development and Training Command
Ordnance  
J

First Assistant (Security)

(Breda)
2.II.81 - 23.V.83 (28 months)
Maj. Gen. Abdurrahman Suhodo
Commander, Kodam III
D  
J

2. Brig. Gen. Ari Bandiyoko
23.V.83 (1 month)
Commander, Kodam IV
Engineers/B  
J

Second Assistant (Operations)

(b. 1929, Madiun) (P3AD)
30.X.78 - 23.V.83 (55 months)
Maj. Gen. H. Endang Sukma
Commander, Kodam XVI
RPKAD  
J

2. Brig. Gen. Prajitno
(Breda?)
23.V.83 (1 month)
Artillery?/SI  
J
Third Assistant (Personnel)
   28.VIII.78 - 23.V.83 (57 months)
   Maj. Gen. Abdullah Sadjad
   Deputy Assistant for Security, Dept. of
   Defense and Security
   D

   (Breda)
   23.V.83 (1 month)
   Governor, General and Army Division,
   Armed Forces' Academy
   B

Fourth Assistant (Logistics)
1. Lt. Gen. Haroen Soewardi
   ?.XII.77 - 23.V.83 (65 months)
   Maj. Gen. Iksan Soegiarto
   Commander, Kodam IV
   B

2. Brig. Gen. Ishak Odang
   23.V.83 (1 month)
   Head, Army General Supply Service
   ?

Fifth Assistant (Research and Development)
1. Lt. Gen. Supardjo
   (b. August 21, 1929, Nganjuk)
   (Yogya II)
   c. 25.1.76 - 23.V.83 (88 months)
   Brig. Gen. Suprapto
   Commander, Kodam X
   D

2. Brig. Gen. Darsoyo
   (Breda)
   23.V.83 (1 month)
   Deputy Assistant for Territorial Affairs,
   Dept. of Defense and Security
   ?

Assistant for Territorial Affairs
1. Lt. Gen. Abdul Rivai Harahap
   7.1.78 - 23.V.83 (88½ months)
   Maj. Gen. Andi Azis Bustam
   Commander, Kodam I
   BB

2. Brig. Gen. Harjono
   Prawirodirdjo
   (Breda)
   23.V.83 (1 month)
   Deputy Governor, General Army Division,
   Armed Forces' Academy
   B/Cavalry

Commander, Army Strategic Reserve (Kostrad)
1. Lt. Gen. Rudini
   (b. December 15, 1929, Malang)
   (Breda)
   24.1.81 - 24.V.83 (27 months)
   Maj. Gen. Ismail
   Commander, Kodam XIII
   D

   (P3AD)
   24.V.83 (1 month)
   Second Assistant (Operations), Army
   Chief of Staff
   RPKAD
Governor, General and Army Division, Armed Forces' Academy

   (b. June 5, 1928, Yogya)
   (Breda)

   Tjokrowidjojo³⁷ (Breda)

Commander, Army Staff and Command School

Maj. Gen. Bagus Sumitro²⁸
   (Yogya II)

Commander-General, Army Logistics Command

Brig. Gen. Yoes Adipoernomo*
   (Yogya I)

Commander-General, Army Research, Development and Training Command

1. Lt. Gen. Bambang Triantoro
   (b. January 7, 1931, Surabaya)

2. Brig. Gen. Sebastian Soekoso²⁶
   (P3AD)

Commander, Kopassandha

1. Lt. Gen. R. Yogie Suwardi Memet
   (b. 1929, Cirebon)

2. Brig. Gen. Wismoyo Aris Munandar³⁰
   (AMN 1963)

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* Yoes Adipoernomo retired in February 1983, and there is no information yet on his successor.
Territorial Commands (Kodam)

I. Iskandarmuda (Aceh)
   Brig. Gen. R. A. Saleh
   Chief of Staff, Kodam VI
   Sl
2. Brig. Gen. (Cavalry) Nana Narundana 20.IV.83 (2 months)
   (AMN 1960)
   Chief of Staff, Kodam XVII
   Cavalry

II. Bukit Barisan (N. Sumatra)
   (AMN 1960)
   Brig. Gen. M. Sanif
   Commander, Airborne Combat Command, Kostrad
   B/RPKAD
   (AMN 1960)
   Deputy Governor, General and Army Division, Armed Forces' Academy
   Cavalry

III. 17 Agustus (W. Sumatra)
   (Breda)
   Brig. Gen. Soelarso
   Commander, Kopur II, Kostrad
   SI?
2. Brig. Gen. Suripto 7.V.83 (2 months)
   (AMN 1960)
   Chief of Staff, Kostrad
   D

IV. Sriwijaya (S. Sumatra)
   Brig. Gen. Obrin Setyakusumah
   Chief of Staff, Kodam XVI
   Engineers
   Deputy Assistant for Security to Army Chief of Staff
   Engineers/B
3. Col. Roestandi A. Moestafaa 9.V.83 (1½ months)
   (Akad Zeni 1956)
   Defense Attache, Belgrade
   Engineers

V. Jaya (Greater Jakarta)
   Lt. Gen. G. H. Mantik
   Commander, Kodam XII
   CPM
2. Maj. Gen. Try Soetrinson 27.XII.82 (6 months)
   (Akad Teknik 1959)
   Commander, Kodam IV
   Engineers
VI. Siliwangi (W. Java)
1. Lt. Gen. R. Yogie Suwardi Memet
   (b. May 1929, Cirebon)
   (AMN 1960)

VII. Diponegoro (C. Java)
1. Lt. Gen. Ismail
   (b. December 31, 1927, Maos, Banyumas) (Yogya I)
   (AMN 1960)

VIII. Brawijaya (E. Java)
   (b. January 18, 1928) (P3AD)
   (Breda)

IX. Mulawarman (E. Kalimantan)
2. Col. I Gde Awet Sara
   (Akad Teknik 1959)

X. Lambung Mangkurat (S. and C. Kalimantan)
2. Brig. Gen. Syamsudin
   (AMN 1960?)

XII. Tanjungpura (W. Kalimantan)
   (Breda)
XII. Merdeka (N. and N.E. Sulawesi)

   (Breda)

2. Col. Adolf Sahala Rajagukguk
   (AMN 1961)

XIII. Hasanuddin (S. and S.E. Sulawesi)

   (b. June 2, 1936, Karanganyar,
   Kebuman) (AMN 1960)

2. Brig. Gen. Soetedjo
   (AMN 1961)

XIV. Pattimura (Maluku)

   (P3AD)

2. Brig. Gen. Hasudungan Simandjuntak
   (AMN 1960)

XV. Udayana (Nusatenggara)

   (P3AD)

2. Brig. Gen. R. P. D. Sutarto
   (P3AD)

XVI. Cendrawasih (Irian Jaya)

   (b. c. 1930-31) (P3AD)

30.XII.82 (6 months)
Chief of Staff, Kostrad
? Balinese

28.1.81 - 30.V.83 (28 months)
Brig. Gen. Rudini
Deputy Governor, General and Army
Division, Armed Forces' Academy
Cavalry

30.V.83 (1 month)
Chief of Staff, Kodam XIII
Toba Batak

19.V.79 - 13.IV.83 (47 months)
Brig. Gen. Kusnadi
Chief of Staff, Kodam III
J

13.IV.83 (2½ months)
Chief of Staff, Combat Command
(Kopur) II, Kostrad
SI/RI/PKAD

24.IV.81 - 17.V.83 (25 months)
Brig. Gen. Bagus Sumitro
Commander, Airborne Paracommando
Training Center
RPKAD

17.V.83 (1½ months)
Commander, Infantry Training
Center, Army Research, Develop-
ment and Training Command
Toba Batak

8.VII.78 - 14.VI.82 (47 months)
Brig. Gen. Imam Munandar
Chief of Staff, Kodam X
RPKAD
   Chief of Staff, Kodam XIII
   RPKAD Karo Batak

Head, State Intelligence Coordination Board (Bakin)
Gen. Yoga Sugama 39

Biographies

1. Ari Bandiyoko
   68-70 Major. Commander, Yon Zipur 5, Kodam 8, based at Kepanjen, Malang.
   70-71 Seskoad.
   ?-82 Deputy Assistant for Security to the Army Chief of Staff.
   82-83 Commander, Kodam 4.
   83- Assistant-1 (Security), to the Army Chief of Staff.

2. Awet Sara, I Gde
   b. 3.III.1936, Bali.
   59 Graduated from Army Technical Academy (Engineers) in Bandung.
   62 First Lieutenant. Deputy Company Commander, RPKAD.
   65-70 Captain, then Major. Company Commander, AMN Cadets' Regiment.
   66 Succeeded Rudini as Head of Sections 1-2 (Intelligence-Operations) of
      the AMN Cadets' Regiment.
   70-73 Major, then Lieut.-Col. Deputy Commander, Yon Zipur 1, Kodam 2.
   73 Commander, Combined Operations Coordinating Center Indonesia/
      Malaysia (Sarawak).
   73-75 Lieut.-Col. Commander, Kodim 1207, Kodam 12.
   75-78 Lieut.-Col., then Colonel. Assistant-1 (Security), Kodam 12.
   78-83 Defense Attache, Kuala Lumpur.

Graduate of Seskoad and Lemhannas. Fluent in French and English.

3. Bambang Triantoro
   b. 7.1.1931, Surabaya.
   37-47 Educated through junior high school in Surabaya.
   48-50 Finished SMA in Bandung while serving in Army as Second Lieutenant.
   50-58 First Lieutenant, then Captain. Instructor and Training Officer at
      Army Ordnance School in Jakarta.
   57 Trained at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, for 9 months.
   59-63 Major. Served in Ordnance branch of Army in Jakarta.
   64-69 Lieut.-Col. Chief of Operations and Training Division, Army Ordnance
      Center, Jakarta.
   67 Attended Seskoad, Class 4.
   69-72 Colonel. Served as Executive Officer, Operations Division, Army HQ
      in Jakarta.
   72-73 Deputy Assistant-2 (Operations) to the Army Chief of Staff.
83-  Deputy Army Chief of Staff.

Speaks some English and some Dutch.

4. Darsoyo

55  Graduated from Dutch Military Academy (Breda).
83-  Assistant-5 (Research and Development) to the Army Chief of Staff.

5. Harjono Prawirodirdjo

b. 1929, Malang.
55  Graduated from Dutch Military Academy (Breda).
72-73 Commander, Indonesian contingent to UN forces in Middle East.

6. Harsudiyono Hartas

b. 1935, Jepara.
60  Graduated from AMN, Class 1.
? -71 Major (Cavalry). Deputy Commander, First Cavalry Battalion, Kostrad.
72  Attended Seskoad
75  Attended Seskogab.
83-  Commander, Kodam 2.

7. Ishak Odang

??
83-  Head, Army General Supply Service.
83-  Assistant-4 (Logistics) to the Army Chief of Staff.

8. Kahpi Suriadiredja

b. 14.VI.1931, Bandung

Early 50s attended Dutch Naval Academy in Den Helder.
56  Joined Marines (KKO) on his return.
64  Captain. Commander, Amphibious Battalion (KKO).
? -69 Lieut.-Col. Commander, Naval Academy Cadets' Regiment.
69-?  Chief of Staff, Marines' Education and Training Center.
70  Studied in the United States.
?  Commander, Brigade 52 (KKO).
?  Head, Navy Provost–Marshal Corps.
? -77 Chief of Staff, Marine Corps.
83-  Commander, Kowilhan IV, in Biak.
9. Muntaram
b. c. 1935, Cianjur.

58 Graduated from Naval Academy, Surabaya.
65 Captain (KKO). Commander, Naval Academy Cadets' Corps.
c. 73 Served in Garuda IV team to Vietnam.
? Head, Military Police, Kowihan I.
75 Studied at Seskogab.
81 Studied at Lemhannas.
?–83 Chief of Staff, Marine Corps.

Has had amphibious training in the US.

10. Murdani, Leonardus Benjamin
b. 2.X. 1932, Cepu. Son of R. G. Murdani Sosrodirdjo, a railway employee, and a Catholic Eurasian mother. Raised in Solo, though did not complete high school till 1957 (in Bandung).

51–52 Trained at P3AD (with Soekoso, Kalbuadi, Santoso, and Soeweno).
52 Instructor for embryo RPKAD (Korps Komando AD/KKAD).
52–54 Instructor, Infantry Cadre School, Bandung.
54–55 Instructor, Commando School, Batujajar.
55–56 Chief Instructor, Commando School, Batujajar.
56–57 Company commander, RPKAD, in action vs. DI/TII, W. Java.
58 First Lieutenant. Led RPKAD unit in assault on Permesta forces in Menado.
59 Took Company Officer Course, Bandung.
60–61 Took Amphibious Training Course, at Amphibious Training Command, Little Creek, Norfolk, Va., USA.
62–63 Captain, then Major. Commander, Battalion 530/Para, Kostrad. Led "Operasi Naga" infiltration of Dutch positions around Merauke.
63–64 Commander, newly formed Battalion I/RPKAD.
64 Operations Officer, RPKAD.
65 On Operations Staff, Kostrad.
65–? Assistant-1 (Intelligence) Kopur, Kostrad.
67–71 Lieut.-Col. Liaison Officer, Kuala Lumpur.
71–74 Chargé d'affaires, Seoul.
74 Headed Satgas, Kopkamtib.
77– Head, Strategic Intelligence Center, Dept. of Defense and Security.

Catholic.

11. Narundana, Nana
b. c. 1936, Tasikmalaya.

60 Graduated from AMN, Class 1 (Cavalry).
? Chief of Staff, Korem 021, Kodam 2, in Pematang Siantar.
? Assistant-2 (Operations), Kodam 2.
? Commander, Korem 022, Kodam 2, in Padang Sidempuan.
? Deputy Commander, Army Center for Territorial Development, in Bandung.
79–83 Chief of Staff, Kodam 17.  

12. Poniman, S.  
b. 18.VII.1926, Surakarta. MULO education in colonial times.  
44 Japanese military training at Bogor (Kanbu Kyōiku Tai, Cadre Training Corps).  
44–45 Company Commander (shōdanchō), Peta, at Cimahi.  
57–5? Chief of Staff, Regiment 11, Siliwangi Division.  
64 Studied at Seskoad.  
64–66 Chief of Staff, Kodam 3.  
68–70 Commander, Kodam 15  
73–77 Lt. Gen. Commander, Kowilhan I.  
77–80 Deputy Army Chief of Staff.  
80–83 General. Army Chief of Staff.  
83– Minister of Defense and Security.

13. Prajitno  
55 Probably graduated from Dutch Military Academy (Breda).  
?–72 Colonel. Commander, Second Field Artillery Regiment.  
72–? Assistant-1 (Intelligence), Kostrad.  
83– Brig. Gen. Assistant-2 (Operations) to the Army Chief of Staff.

14. Rajagukguk, Adolf Sahala  
b. 31.XII.1938, Medan.  
61 Graduated from AMN, Class 2.  
? Platoon Commander in Battalion 605, Kodam 10.  
? Company Commander, Cadets' Regiment, Akabri.  
? Taught at Seskoad.  
? Commander, Brigade 6, Kodam 7 and Kostrad.  
?–82 Commander, Korem 164 [Dili, E. Timor], Kodam 16.  
82–83 Colonel. Chief of Staff, Kodam 13.  

Attended Army Staff College in England 1972–73; has taken Kupaltu and Suslapa. Fluent in English, Batak, and Javanese.

15. Romly, Mohammad  
46–50 In naval section of People's Security Body (BKR Laut) and successor organizations; fought on land, in Java.  
54 Got initial regular naval training, in Marines' school.  
?–64 Lieut.-Col. (Acting?) Chief of the Fleet.
64-65 Personnel Officer (Pa A-3) to the Fleet.
65-66 Colonel. Operations Officer to the Fleet, and Assistant-2 (Operations) to the Mandala Siaga (Confrontation) Strategic Command.
67 Studied at Seskoal.
68-70 Commodore. Director of General Planning, Navy.
70-? Assistant-5 (Communications and Electronics) to the Navy Chief of Staff.
71-77 Rear Admiral. Governor, Akabri, Navy Division.
77-78 Vice-Admiral. Deputy Navy Chief of Staff.
78-82 Chief of Operations Staff, Dept. of Defense and Security.
82- Navy Chief of Staff.

16. Rudini
50 Graduated from SMA. Platoon commander in Brawijaya Division.
55 Graduated from Dutch Military Academy at Breda.
55-59 Training officer with, later Commander of, Battalion 518, Kodam 8, in Malang.
59-66 Attached to AMN as instructor; then Company Commander, Cadets' Regiment; then Assistant 1-2 (Intelligence/Operations) to this Regiment.
66 Studied at Lemhannas.
68-70 Lieut.-Col. Commander, Battalion 401/Para.
70-72 Chief of Staff, Airborne Brigade 18/Kostrad, in Jember.
72-74 Commander, Airborne Brigade 18.
73-74 Colonel. Commander of Indonesian contingent to UN forces in Middle East.
74-76 Chief of Staff, Kopur Linud, Kostrad.
76-77 Commander, Kopur Linud, Kostrad.
77-78 Brig. Gen. Chief of Staff, Kostrad.
78-81 Commander, Kodam 13.
83- Lt. Gen., then General. Army Chief of Staff.
Married in 1959. Fluent Dutch and English, passive German.

17. Roestandi A. Moestafa
b. 20.VII.1933, Bandung.
56(? ) Graduated from the Army Engineers' Academy in Bandung.
56-57 Platoon commander in Yon Zipur in TT/VII (E. Indonesia)
57- Deputy Commander, Detachment 1, Yon Zipur "A," in Kendari.
62 Served in Indonesian contingent to UN forces in the Congo (Garuda VIII).
68-72 Commander, Yon Zipur 2, Kodam 6.
72-75 Assistant-2 (Operations), Kodam 12.
75-78 Operations officer attached to the Dept. of Defense and Security.
78-83 Defense Attache in Belgrade.

Has studied at Seskoad, Seskogab, and Lemhannas. Fluent in Dutch and English, passive in French.
18. Sembiring Meliala, Raja Kami

60  Graduated from AMN, Class 1.
69-  Captain. Succeeded Soetedjo as Commander of the Special Warfare Detachment of the Paratroop Training Center.
?  Deputy Commander, Airborne Special Warfare Training Center (Pusdik Sandha/Linud).
?  Instructor at Seskoad.
?  Commander, First Infantry Brigade ("Jaya Sakti"), Kodam 5 and Kostrad.
?  Personal Secretary to the Army Chief of Staff.
?  Assistant-2 (Operations), Kostrad.
?  Commander, Indonesian contingent to UN forces in Middle East.
79  Commander, Regimental Combat Team 18, in "Operasi Seroja" in East Timor.
79-82  Chief of Staff, Kodam 13.
82-  Brig. Gen. Commander, Kodam 17.

Fluent in English and German.

19. Simandjuntak, Hasudungan

60  Graduated from AMN, Class 1.
?  Assistant-2 (Operations), Kodam 5.
? -83  Commander, Infantry Training Center (Pussenif) in Bandung.

20. Sudiman Saleh

b. June 5, 1928, Yogya.

55  Graduated from Dutch Military Academy (Breda).
?  Was at one time Commander of Indonesian contingent to UN forces in Middle East.
70  Attended General Staff and Command College, Ft. Leavenworth.
83-  Assistant-3 (Personnel) to the Army Chief of Staff.

21. Sudjana, Ida Bagus

60  Graduated from AMN, Class 1.
81  Top marks for written work, regular course, Lemhannas.
? -82  Chief of Staff, Kostrad.
82-  Brig. Gen. Commander, Kodam 12.

22. Sudjarwo, Anton

b. 21.IX.1930, Bandung.

52  Graduated from senior high school in Magelang.
54  Attended the Police Academy in Sukabumi.
54-56  IP. Police chief in Palopo.
56  Adjutant to National Police Chief Sukanto Tjakrodiatmodjo.
56-57  Head of Traffic Police, Makasar.
57-58  AKP. Attached to Foreign Relations Section of Police Headquarters' Organization Bureau.
59-61  Company Commander in Brimob.
60 Took "Ranger" training in Porong.
61 Took infantry training in the US.
62-64 Commander, Battalion 1232/Vanguard (Pelopor) in Brimob.
62 Led unit infiltrating Irian Barat.
64-72 AKBP. Commander, Vanguard Regiment, Brimob.
68 Attended Police Staff College in Lembang.
69 Passed "jumpmaster" (paratroop) course at Sukasari.
69-72 Also headed Security Command for Tanjung Priok and Pasar Ikan.
72-74 KBP. Commander, Kores 102, Kodak 10, in Malang.
74-? Commander, Komapta.
74-? Commander, Kodak 11 (West Kalimantan).
74-? Commander, Kodak 2 (N. Sumatra).

23. Sudradjat, Edy

60 Graduated from AMN, Class 1.
61-63 Platoon Commander in Battalion 513, Kodam 8, in Jember.
66-? Operations officer, Battalion 1/RPKAD in Jakarta.
71 Studied at Seskoad.
71-73 Deputy Assistant-1 (Intelligence), Kopassandha, Jakarta.
73-75 Commander, Group IV RPKAD in Jakarta.
75 Studied at Seskogab.
75-78 Commander, Infantry Training Center in Bandung.
78-79 Chief of Staff, East Timor Task Force, Dept. of Defense and Security.
80 Studied at Lemhannas.
81-83 Commander, Kodam 2.

24. Soegiarto

b. 2.VI.1936, Karanganyar, Kebumen.

60 Graduated from AMN, Class 1.
72-73 Commander, Battalion 401/Para, Kodam 7 and Kostrad in Srondol.
76-77 Commander, Akabri Cadets' Regiment.
77-78 Commander, Indonesian contingent to UN forces in Middle East.
78-79 Chief of Staff, Kodam 3.
83- Commander, Kodam 7.

Has been through Advanced Officers' Training Course-II; Seskoad; and Seskogab.

25. Sukardi

b. December 1931, Bojonegoro.

51 Graduated from high school.
52 Entered Flying School.
54-58 Fighter pilot, Husein Sastranegara air base, Bandung.
58-60 Flight Instructor, Squadron II, Halim air base, Jakarta.
60-63 Flight Instructor, Training Wing 001, Adisucipto air base, Yogyakarta.
63-65 Major. Commander, Squadron II, Operations Wing 001 at Halim air base, Jakarta.
65-66 Assistant Director, Foreign Supplies, Air Force HQ.
66-67 Head, Bureau of Purchasing and Materiel Supply, Air Force HQ.
68-70 Colonel. Commander, Halim air base, Jakarta.
70-73 Commodore. Commander, Kodau 7, Maluku and Irian Barat.
73-75 Commander, Kodau 5, Jakarta.
75-77 First Air Marshal. Assistant for Operations, Dept. of Defense and Security.
77-81 Deputy Commander, Kowilhan II.
82- Air Force Chief of Staff.

26. Soekoso, Sebastian
51-52 Trained at P3AD (with Murdani, Kalbuadi, Santoso, Soeweno).
56- Lieutenant. Arrested by subordinates in RPKAD during the "Lubis Affair."
66-67 Commander, Battalion I/RPKAD, succeeding C. I. Santoso (q.v.).
67 - Commander, newly-formed Group I/RPKAD.
? -81 Commander, Airborne Paratroop Training Center.
83- Commander-General, Army Research, Development and Training Command.

Catholic.

27. Soedarso
Young brother of General Surjo (?). In Revolution fought with Djaikusumo's Ronggolawe Division, in north-central Java.
55- Graduated from Dutch Military Academy in Breda.
55- Platoon commander in Battalion 437, Kodam 7.
62- Adjutant to Gen. A. H. Nasution as Armed Forces' Chief of Staff.
69- Studied at Seskoad.
75- Studied at Lemhannas.
77-79 Deputy Assistant-1 (Security) to the Army Chief of Staff.
81-83 Maj. Gen. Assistant-1 (Security) to the Army Chief of Staff.
83- Commander, Kodam 8.

28. Sumitro, Bagus
49 Graduated from Yogya Military Academy, Class 2.
? -69 Lieut.-Col. Assistant-6 (Functional Group Affairs), Kodam 17.
69-70 Assistant-5 (Territorial Affairs), Kodam 17.
70- Colonel. Commander, Korem 163 in Bali.
? -78 Attached to Lemhannas.

29. Supardjo
b. 21.VIII.1929, Nganjuk.
55- Graduated from Dutch Military Academy in Breda.
55-57 Deputy Commander, Battalion 318, TT/III, in Ciamis.
57- Commander, Battalion 318, Kodam 6.
67- Studied at Seskoad.
69 Lieut.-Col. Chief of Staff, Kodam 12.
70 Went for training in the US.
71-74 Colonel, then Brig. Gen. Deputy Commander, Joint Services' Staff and Command Education Institute.
74-76 Commander, Kodam 10.
76 Went for further training in the US.
76-83 Assistant-5 (Research and Planning) to the Army Chief of Staff.
81-83 Maj. Gen. Doubled as Assistant for Logistics, Dept. of Defense and Security; perhaps also Assistant for Planning and Budgeting.
83- Lt. Gen. Commander, Kowilhan III.

30. Suripto
b. 18.11.1934.
60 Graduated from AMN, Class 1.
64 First Lieutenant. Company Commander in Cadets' Regiment, AMN.
65 Took Kupaltu.
65-68 First Lieutenant, then Captain. Acting Deputy Commander of Battalion 203, Kodam 5, in Jakarta.
68 Took Suslapa.
69 Acting Operations Officer, First Infantry Brigade, Kostrad, in Jakarta.
70-? Major. Commander, Battalion 202, Kodam 5.
71-72 Commander, Kodim 0502, Kodam 5 in C. & N. Jakarta.
73? Lieut.-Col. Attended Seskoad.
74-77 Assistant-1 (Security), Kodam 17.
75 Attended Seskogab.
77-78 Deputy Head, Army Information Service.
78-81 Colonel. Assistant-1 (Security), Kodam 6.
81-82 Assistant-1 (Security), Kowilhan I.
82-83 Chief of Staff, Kodam 12.
83- Chief of Staff, Kostrad.
83- Commander, Kodam 3.

31. Susilo Sudarmman
b. 10.XI.1928, Cilacap.
48 Graduated from Yogya Military Academy, Class 1.
48-49 Instructor at the Academy, and Operations Officer, Sub-Wehrkreise 104, Yogaykarta.
50-51 Assistant-1, Bureau of Training, Ministry of Defense.
51-52 Attached to Bureau II, Joint Staff, Armed Forces' Staff.
52-53 Attached to SUAD-II, Army HQ.
53-54 Inspectorate Officer, Cavalry, Bandung.
54-55 Bureau of Education, Cavalry Training Center, Bandung.
55-56 Instructor, SSKAD, Bandung.
56-58 Chief of Section II (Operations), Cavalry HQ, Bandung.
58-59 Commander, Cavalry School, Bandung.
60-61 Head of Tactical Department, Cavalry HQ, Bandung.
65-67 Lieut.-Col. Commander, Military Academy Cadets' Regiment.
67-68 Colonel. Commander, Cadet Division, Akabri.
70-73 Defense Attache, Washington, D.C.
75-78 Assistant for Personnel and Manpower Development, Dept. of Defense and Security.
80- Commander, Kowilhan I.

32. Sutarto, R. P. D.
? Army Cadre School (?).
54 Company Commander in Battalion 309/Kodam 6.
       Cited as one of few non-RPKAD to pass freefall jumpmaster course at Batujajar.
68 Took Suslapa.
69 Led Battalion 330 in operations against PGRS/Paraku in W. Kalimantan.
70-73? Lieut.-Col. Chief of Staff, First Infantry Brigade, Kodam 5 and Kostrad, in Jakarta.
73-? Commander, First Infantry Brigade.
? -79 Assistant-2 (Operations), Kodam 5.
79-? Unspecified function in Army HQ (probably intelligence).

33. Soetedjo
b. 28.VII.1937, Cilacap.
61 Graduated from AMN, Class 2. (Had completed SMA B in Cilacap previously.)
61-64 Platoon and Company Commander, Battalion 131, Kodam 3.
65-? Company Commander in Battalion 2/RPKAD.
? -69 Captain. Commander, Code Detachment (? Dan Sandha), Special Forces/Paratroop Training Center.
69-? Assistant for Research and Development at this center.
? -76 Commander, Group IV, Kopassandha.
76-80? Lieut.-Col., then Colonel. Commander, Infantry Brigade 12, Kodam 6, in Cianjur.
80-82 Assistant-2 (Operations), Kodam 6.
82-83 Chief of Staff, Kopur II, Kostrad.
Fought against Kahar Muzakar in 64-65 under Yusuf.

34. Soeweno
b. c. 1929, in Madiun. In later Revolution fought in TRIP (E. Java) and TP (C. Java).
51-52? Trained at P3AD (with Murdani, Soekoso, Kalbuadi, Santoso).
53-63 Served in RPKAD.
63-64 Major. Trained abroad.
64-67 Commander, Battalion 2/RPKAD, in C. Java.
67-? Commander, Group II/RPKAD.
? -76 Colonel. Commander, Special Forces/Paracommando/Airborne Training Center at Batujajar.
76-78 Brig. Gen. Commander, Kodam 16.
78-81 Assistant-2 (Operations) to the Army Chief of Staff.
79 Headed Joint Task Force for "Operasi Seroja" in E. Timor.
35. **Syamsudin**

60? Graduated from AMN, Class 1?
? -73 Major. Chief of Staff, Kodim 0803, Kodam 8, in Madiun.
73-? Sent to serve with Garuda V contingent to ICCS supervising ceasefire in Vietnam.
? -82 Chief of Staff, Kodam 17.
81-82 Studied at War College in the US.
82- Brig. Gen. Commander, Kodam 10.

36. **Try Soetrisno**

b. 15.XI.1935, Surabaya.

56-59 Trained at Army Technical Academy in Bandung.
60-62 Platoon commander in Yon Zipur 2, in Palembang.
68-70 Captain. Deputy Commander, Yon Zipur 9/Para, in Bandung.
70-71 Captain, then Major. Commander of Amphibious Yon Zipur 10, in Pasuruan.
71 Studied at Seskoad.
74-78 Adjutant to the President.
78-79 Chief of Staff, Kodam 16.
82- Commander, Kodam 5.

37. **Untung Sridadi Tjokrowidjojo**

55 Graduated from Dutch Military Academy in Breda.
57-64 Instructor at AMN, rising from Second Lieutenant to Major.
? Educated successively at the Yugoslav Army Staff and Command School; Lemhannas, Class 10; Defense Management Course in the US.
64-69 Lieut.-Col. Commander, Battalion 410, Kodam 7, in Blora.
69-? Commander, Kodim 0733, Kodam 7, in Semarang City.
77-? Commander, Fourth Infantry Brigade, Kodam 7 and Kostrad, in Slawi.
77-? Commander, Kopur Linud, Kostrad.
73? Commander, Indonesian contingent to UN forces in Middle East.
? -80 Chief of Staff, Kostrad.
82-83 Inspector-General of the Army.

38. **Wismoyo Aris Munandar**

b. 10.II.1940.

63 Graduated from AMN, Class 3.
Has attended Seskoad and Seskogab.
66 Attached to special Military Police Task Force (Satgas Pomad) which guarded the President (Suharto?) in early days of the New Order.
81 Played key role in "Operasi Woyla"--recapture of hijacked Garuda airplane at Bangkok.
83- Colonel, then Brig. Gen. Commander, Kopassandha.

Married to Ibu Tien Suharto's younger sister.
39. Yoga Sugama

b. 12.V.1925, Tegal. During the Japanese Occupation attended the Rikugun Shikan Gakkō (Japanese Military Academy) in Japan.

48- Returned to Indonesia.
48-49 Intelligence officer with the Banyumas Military Command.
49-50 Intelligence officer with the Gunung Jati Regiment, C. Java.
52-53? Received intelligence training at Maresfield, England.
55-59 Major. Assistant-1 (Intelligence), TT/IV (C. Java) under Suharto.
59-? Lieut.-Col. Commander, Regimental Combat Team (RTP)-II, in W. Sumatra.
62 Deputy Assistant-2 (Operations) to the Army Chief of Staff, in charge of training military attaches.
62-65 Military Attache in Belgrade.
65-66 Assistant-1 (Intelligence), Kostrad under Suharto.
67-? Personal Assistant (Aspri) to the President in charge of intelligence and security.
67-68 Deputy Head of Bakin.
69-70 Head of Bakin.
70-77 Head of G-1, Dept. of Defense and Security.
72-74 Maj. Gen. Deputy Head of the Indonesian Mission to the UN.

40. Yogie S. (Suwardi) Memet, R.
b. May 1929, Cirebon.

62 Captain. Deputy Commander, Battalion 330/Kujang I/Para (attached both to Kodam 6 and Kostrad).
67-68 Lieut.-Col. Commander of Kodim 0618, Kodam 6, in Bandung City.
69-70 Chief of Staff, Brigade 17 Airborne/Kujang, Kostrad.
70 Top marks in 7th class of Seskoad course.
73 Deputy Commander, Kopassandha.
77-75 Commander, Kopur Linud, Kostrad.
83- Commander, Kowilhan II.