

PATTERNS OF MILITARY CONTROL IN THE INDONESIAN HIGHER CENTRAL BUREAUCRACY

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Summary

This article analyzes current military penetration of Indonesia's higher central government bureaucracy. Any civilian or military officeholder in this bureaucracy is referred to as a *karyawan*. The article focuses on the incumbent Cabinet and topmost echelon of civil service officials. Findings are based on public biographies of these persons and published specialized secondary sources on the Indonesian military. The principal conclusions follow below.

The Higher Central Bureaucracy

The Indonesian military has long played a "dual civil and military function." Military *karyawan*, active duty and retired officers in civilian assignments, comprise an increasingly visible, influential, and strategic segment of the dominant military faction, that of President Suharto and his 1945 Generation supporters.

- The military *karyawan* in the higher central bureaucracy are especially critical actors in maintaining the Suharto regime.
- Together with their civilian *karyawan* colleagues, virtually all of them wield decision-making powers of some considerable degree.
- Some mix of military and civilian *karyawan* occurs in all Cabinet Departments except the Department of Defense and Security, now entirely military-controlled.
- The Indonesian armed forces' doctrinal commitment to preventing civilian control of the military has resulted in the Department of Defense and Security becoming effectively equivalent to the consolidated armed forces' staff and command structure.

Extent of Military Penetration

Active and retired military *karyawan* now occupy half the positions in the Indonesian higher central bureaucracy.

- At the highest levels, military penetration remains near complete (the President and his principal immediate aides) or has increased (Coordinating Ministers) over the course of the New Order regime (1966 to the present).
- Shifts to historical high points of military penetration occurred in the two top Departmental positions (Ministers and particularly Secretaries-General), a pattern reinforced by an increase in military Inspectors-General attached to each Department.

* The views expressed here are solely the author's and do not necessarily reflect those of the US International Communication Agency or government of the United States.

--Civilians maintained clear numerical edges only in positions with the most specialized functions (Ministers of State and Directors-General), but in both such instances work under mainly military supervisors.

--There is no practical evidence suggesting an effort to "recivilianize" even gradually those slots now held by military karyawan in the higher central bureaucracy.

Structuring Military Domination

Military karyawan, in concert with supportive civilian karyawan colleagues, dominate the affairs of every Cabinet Department.

--The most crucial Departments for ensuring regime maintenance, Defense and Security and Home Affairs, are under the most solid military control (100 percent and 89 percent of their leading positions, respectively).

--Over the duration of the New Order, the armed forces have never held less than 90 percent of the leading positions in the Department of Defense and Security.

--Internal armed forces personnel and organizational changes in 1965-66, 1969-70, 1974-75, and 1978-81 increasingly concentrated power centrally in the Army, the Defense Ministry in Jakarta, and the person of the Defense Minister himself.

--Military penetration of the Department of Home Affairs has risen more steadily and markedly over the course of the New Order than in any other Department (from 29 percent of the leading positions in 1966, to 71 percent in 1971, and 89 percent currently).

--Greater military penetration of particular Departments (Information, Social Affairs, Religion, Foreign Affairs, and Justice) has proceeded alongside the increase in military incumbency for specific categories of office. In two other Departments (Communications, Manpower and Transmigration) military penetration continued at high levels throughout the New Order.

--There is no Department in which the military is not suitably placed, through filling the Secretary-General or Inspector-General slots or more usually both, to control and remain apprised of the full range of Departmental activities. Direct Presidential involvement in Departmental affairs serves to maintain these capabilities.

--The topmost civilian technocrats and career civil servants, whose tenure depends on their maintaining the trust of military patrons, are at least as active public proponents of government policies as the military karyawan.

--Save only in two cases, all civilians of Ministerial rank have one or more explicit military credentials or linkages which enhance their attractiveness to, or ability to work with, their military colleagues.

Military Karyawan Role Enhancement

Once disparaged by senior officers, karyawan assignments now carry increased rank and prestige.

--Disparagement of karyawan assignments by military officers has decreased as the perceived importance of controlling the central bureaucracy and its actual penetration by the military has increased.

--Wide public visibility and the impeccable military credentials of many serving military karyawan have also worked to elevate the prestige accorded the role by older and younger officers alike.

--The attractiveness and power of the military karyawan role has been yet further enhanced because the Army, the most prestigious service, occupies the great bulk (81 percent) of military karyawan positions.

--Finally, the military karyawan has grown in officer esteem because the military ranks of those holding these positions have sharply escalated (from mainly Lieutenant-Colonels or Colonels to Major-Generals in the case of the Army) over the course of the New Order.

Generational Power Monopoly

The 1945 Generation, those who successfully waged armed struggle in the Indonesian Revolution, retains a near monopoly of military karyawan slots in the higher central bureaucracy and intends to hold this power base for at least the next five years.

--This solid control by the 1945 Generation persists despite the fact that all those military karyawan born by 1925 (61 percent of the total) have now been retired from active duty status.

--The Ministry of Defense and Security maintains effective control of retired military karyawan by holding military rank promotion exercises for them and mandating their membership in a military retirees association, through which loyalty to the armed forces is reinforced. Retired military karyawan also remain embedded in long-term webs of patron-client and close friendship networks, mainly composed of fellow officers.

--The determination of President Suharto and the readiness of the 1945 Generation to continue in karyawan roles make chances of a voluntary generational succession within military karyawan ranks remote over the next five years.

--There is not yet a single graduate of the new military academy at Magelang filling a karyawan position in the higher central bureaucracy.

The Successor Generation Crisis

The 1945 Generation faction loyal to President Suharto evidently intends to retain its dominance in the higher central bureaucracy to preside over a smooth transfer of leadership to Young Generation officers in the Army staff and command structure. This formula for generational succession is unlikely to succeed.

--The 1945 Generation Army leadership (from all current factions) has given assurances to the Young Generation Army officers that an intra-Army inter-generational power transfer will be substantially accomplished in 1983. Defense and Security Minister General Yusuf has on many public occasions promised Young Generation officers this change of generations within the Army will occur.

--The formula for regime maintenance thus seems to be that for some indeterminate period of time there will be a sharp and unprecedented cleavage between two major military power centers, the 1945 Generation military karyawan controlling politics and the Young Generation officers in the staff and command structure controlling the guns.

--It is far from clear that the Young Generation Army officers will accede to their subordinate political role in this emerging new-model New Order.

--No justification exists in Army doctrine for such generational stratification in the carrying out of the political aspects of the armed forces' dual civil and military function.

--It is likely that Young Generation Army officers will therefore increasingly probe privately and publicly the operational meaning of the armed forces' dual function in a changing Indonesia.

--Several important retired 1945 Generation factions already critical of the Suharto faction's implementation of the dual function include widely respected officers who have influenced the Young Generation intellectually during their professional military education.

--Successful generational successions in political leadership in Malaysia and Singapore are also likely to heighten Young Generation Army officers' concerns that the means for a comparable transition in Indonesia has not yet been fully worked out.

Introduction

In this article I will assess the scope, patterns, and implications for regime maintenance of penetration of Indonesia's higher central bureaucracy by the country's dominant military faction. That bureaucracy is defined here as the incumbent Third Development Cabinet (Kabinet Pembangunan III) and the topmost echelon of officials in its component Departments.¹ Any civilian or military officeholder in the higher bureaucracy is referred to as a *karyawan*, essentially an honorific equivalent of "functionary."²

This particular group of military *karyawan*, active duty and retired officers in top civilian bureaucratic assignments, comprise an increasingly visible, influential, and strategic segment of the broader military elite, particularly in the context of the vital regime maintenance issue of generational succession within ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Republic of Indonesia Armed Forces).³ Other major military elite segments, such as other *karyawan* long active in the public and private sectors of the economy or active-duty flag- and field-grade officers within

1. Appendix A contains a full list of offices and their civilian and military incumbents in the Indonesian higher central bureaucracy. Positions in what are officially labeled Higher State Institutions (Lembaga Tertinggi/Tinggi Negara) and Non-Departmental Government Boards (Lembaga Pemerintah Non Departmen), vary greatly in potential influence and fall outside the focus of this article. However, such positions ought to be included in a more complete study of military *karyawan*. A list of civilian and military incumbents in leading roles in these additional bodies appears for reference purposes in Appendix B. About half these incumbents, as in the higher central bureaucracy, are military *karyawan*.

2. The elastic coined term *karyawan*, as used in the broadest sense by the military, embraces any "worker" in a civilian (*sipil*) position, governmental or nongovernmental. However, *karyawan* most often denotes higher-status government officials, whether civilian or military.

3. Includes the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Police. Some recent sentiment for separating the Police from ABRI and restoring their civilian role (lost since 1961) has been voiced by parliamentarians of both opposition parties. However, the Police internal security role is thoroughly integrated with that of the Army and government intelligence agencies. Reaction from pro-government parliamentarians and from the National Police Chief was therefore predictably negative. Still, the Police, despite better overall educational qualifications at senior officer levels than the other services, hold relatively few *karya* positions. See *Kompas*, September 8, 24, and 25 and October 2, 1981, and *Angkatan Bersenjata*, September 16, 1981.

the general and separate services' staff and command structures, are treated here only when they overlap with the karyawan in the higher central bureaucracy.

Full-dress studies of the Indonesian military are remarkably few, usually historical, sometimes overly general, and occasionally ideologically laden.⁴ Opportunities for sustained, direct, scholarly access to Indonesia's military establishment are controlled and pose real limits in outsiders' ability to answer some basic questions. Particularly relevant here is the unavailability of any official Indonesian roster of military karyawan.

However, it is also the case that a very large amount and considerable variety of pertinent public source materials have simply not been fully exploited or even examined.⁵ Findings reported here, derived from both these primary data and reliable secondary sources, are current as of mid-December 1981. The new (post-1972) spelling system is used throughout for all Indonesian words, including personal names.⁶

The Higher Central Bureaucracy

For analytic purposes, the higher central bureaucracy here encompasses the Development Cabinet and its top Departmental leadership. Specific offices included are

- the Presidency (Kepresidenan)--the President and Vice-President,
- the State Secretariat (Sekretariat Negara)--eight key aides supporting the Presidency,⁷

4. Appendix D contains a list of the more important of these studies written in English. For a dated but useful review of some of the earlier literature, see Ulf Sundhaussen, "The Military in Research on Indonesian Politics," *Journal of Asian Studies*, 31, 2 (February 1972), pp. 355-65. For a recent survey from a different perspective, see Richard Robison, "Culture, Politics, and Economy in the Political History of the New Order," *Indonesia*, 31 (April 1981), pp. 1-29.


5. One major, almost wholly neglected, resource is the wide variety of Indonesian military magazines and journals, such as *Dharmasena* (Hankam), *Karya Wira Jati* (Seskoad), *Ketahanan Nasional* (Lemhanas), *Akabri* (Akabri), and *Darma Putra* (Kostrad). Similarly, military-sponsored or related newspapers like *Angkatan Bersenjata* and *Berita Yudha* have seldom been used in a systematic way despite the wealth of explicit materials on the military appearing daily in them. General and specialized biographic directories and rosters also remain unexploited. Since this last category of resources has been employed extensively in this article, a list of the more useful compilations appears in Appendix C. Most of the limited number of major monograph-length studies on the Indonesian military are cited in Appendix D.

6. Personal names appear in the new spelling (*ejaan yang disempurnakan*) even when the individual involved uses the old spelling or some mix of old and new. This facilitates accurate pronunciation of names by readers not familiar with the large number of persons involved. Indonesian newspapers frequently spell a given individual's name in several ways. Consequently, readers needing reliable guides to personally preferred spelling of names should consult the Jakarta telephone directory and official government publications.

7. Effectively, this means supporting President Suharto. Vice-President Malik relies mainly on his own personal staff selected by the Secretariat. The Head (Kepala)

- three senior Coordinating Ministers (Menteri Koordinator), each at least nominally responsible for oversight of several Cabinet Departments,
- three Ministers of State (Menteri Negara) assigned special functions,⁸
- seventeen Ministers (Menteri), heads of the Cabinet Departments proper,
- six Junior Ministers (Menteri Muda) handling specific programs,⁹
- eighteen Secretary-General (Sekretaris Jenderal) level persons, usually the top civil servant in a Department,
- seventeen Inspectors-General (Inspektur Jenderal) empowered to inquire into any matter within their respective departments,
- seventy-one Directors-General (Direktur Jenderal), numbers varying among Departments, subordinate to their respective Secretaries-General.

The idealized formal, as opposed to the actual informal, lines of authority in this hierarchy of positions (for any given Department) appears below. Such organization charts for the higher central bureaucracy are sparse and inconsistent. The relationships shown are therefore indicative rather than definitive.



of the Presidential Household (Rumah Tangga Kepresidenan), while an aide, does not have Secretary (Sekretaris) rank and is excluded from consideration.

8. State Secretary Sudharmono also has the personal rank of Minister of State, but because he functions as the paramount Presidential aide in the State Secretariat, is counted only in that category.

9. Five under Cabinet Ministers and one (Women's Affairs) under a Coordinating Minister (People's Welfare).

While it is difficult to be precise, informally power is concentrated in the President, with the State Secretary (Sekretaris Negara) acting very effectively as the principal screen. Generally, the Coordinating Minister for Economic, Financial, and Industrial Affairs (and indirectly through him, his long-time economist Ministerial colleagues) and the Department Ministers under the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs (and that Minister himself to a lesser degree) are best able to gain the cooperation of State Secretariat gatekeepers for direct access to the President.

The Commander of Kopkamtib (Komando Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban, Command for the Restoration of Security and Order), as head of the principal state intelligence body with operational responsibilities, has unique Presidential access, even though he is nominally under the Minister of Defense. Similarly, other lesser officials may sometimes wield more power than formal superiors because of personal ties to leading figures in and out of government. However, all the positions in the higher central bureaucracy are power centers of some significance. Virtually all incumbents, including Directors-General, appear regularly and prominently in the press, most often in roles of decision makers or implementers of decisions of those above them in the bureaucratic hierarchy.

Coordinating Ministers by one or another name¹⁰ have been present in Indonesian Cabinets since 1959. During President Sukarno's Guided Democracy and President Suharto's early New Order, such persons were both more numerous and more powerful than in the current Third Development Cabinet. As the total number of portfolios in Cabinets declined, so did first the number and then the power of Coordinating Ministers. Generally, increased power for Department Ministers has meant decreased power for Coordinating Ministers. Today's three Coordinating Ministers do not appear in the press as frequently as the Department Ministers they oversee.

Political and Security Affairs Coordinating Minister Panggabean and Economic, Financial, and Industrial Affairs Coordinating Minister Wijoyo are able to exert influence when necessary, due to their having the confidence and ear of the President. People's Welfare Coordinating Minister Suroso enjoys neither, and has accordingly played in public the figurehead role designed for him. Panggabean covers the important "security" Departments, Wijoyo all the "development" ones (plus Communications), and Suroso the lesser "social" domains.¹¹

Among the Departments, Hankam (Departemen Pertahanan Keamanan, Department of Defense and Security) differs in two major respects from all others. First, it is literally wholly controlled by the military. Second, it has neither a Secretary-General nor any Directors-General.

Military control of Hankam has its roots in the so-called 17 October 1952 Affair, a failed coup d'etat led by General Nasution and his military modernizers but confounded by Sukarno's resistance. Subsequently, civilian politicians were able to replace with ease key figures in a sharply divided Army. By 1955, both "pro 17 October" and "anti 17 October" military had become convinced such "civilian inter-

10. "Core Ministers" in the July 1959 Work Cabinet (Kabinet Kerja), "Deputy First Ministers" in the March 1962 Work Cabinet, and "Chief Ministers" in the July 1966 Ampera (Amanat Penderitaan Rakyat, Message of the People's Suffering) Cabinet.

11. This hardly means the "social" Departments are inconsequential. Indeed, three of these Departments--Religion, Manpower and Transmigration, and Education and Culture--perform important political control functions over Muslim organizations, the urban labor force, and university and secondary school students respectively, each seen as potentially destabilizing forces by the regime.

**ALLOTMENTS OF PORTFOLIOS TO COORDINATING
MINISTERS IN THE THIRD DEVELOPMENT CABINET**

<i>Political and Security Affairs Minister (General Panggabean)</i>	<i>Economic, Financial, and Industrial Affairs Minister (Professor Wijoyo)</i>	<i>People's Welfare Minister (General Surono)</i>
Home Affairs	Finance	Education and Culture
Foreign Affairs	Trade and Cooperatives	Health
Defense and Security	Agriculture	Religion
Justice	Industry	Social Affairs
Information	Mining and Energy	Manpower and Transmigration
	Public Works	
	Communications	

ference" could only be halted if the Defense Minister was a military man selected in accordance with seniority principles. This demand was formalized in what is now known as the "Yogya Charter." Since 1959, the Defense Minister has "by tradition" been military. Under Suharto's New Order, ABRI's now doctrinal rejection of "civilian control of the military" has reached the point where Hankam is for all practical purposes equivalent to the consolidated ABRI staff and command structure.

The Hankam Minister doubles as Commander (Panglima) of ABRI. Immediately under him are two closely related positions: Deputy Commander (Wakil Panglima) of ABRI/Commander of Kopkamtib and Chief-of-Staff (Kepala Staf) of Kopkamtib. These two positions were equated to those of Secretary-General in other Departments. One step down in Hankam's precedence order are seven positions with Chief-of-Staff rank (distinct from the autonomous Kopkamtib apparatus). Strictly from an organizational point of view, their rank is similar to that of Directors-General in other Departments. Three of these positions are the top military staff slots, Chiefs-of-Staff for Operations, Administration, and Functional Affairs. The remaining four are Chiefs-of-Staff of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the National Police Chief.

Extent of Military Penetration

Active and retired military officers now occupy half (50 percent) of the 145 positions in the Indonesian higher central bureaucracy.¹² Specifically, these military karyawan include

12. The Indonesian government does not publish for public consumption a list of its officials containing any military ranks they may have. Consequently, this and all subsequent figures were derived as follows. A list of last known incumbents in what is here termed the higher central bureaucracy was extracted from *Buku Alamat Pejabat Negara R.I. 1981 (Republic of Indonesia Government Officials Address Book 1981)*, an annual quasi-official roster distributed by Yayasan Kesejahteraan Jayakarta Kodam V Jaya (Jayakarta Welfare Foundation of Military Area Command V, Greater Jakarta). Nine national daily newspapers were then used to verify this list and ascertain changes in incumbents. This yielded a list of 145 incumbents, 144 known to be current and one the last known. Each name on this list was then checked for military or civilian status by using an alphabetic file of public military biographies put together mainly from the sources cited in Appendix C. The final list complete with current military ranks of incumbents is given in Appendix A.

- the President (a retired four-star General),
- seven of his eight principal aides (88 percent) in the State Secretariat,¹³
- two of the three Coordinating Ministers (Political and Security Affairs, People's Welfare, both retired four-star Generals),
- eight of seventeen Department Ministers (47 percent),
- two of six Junior Ministers (33 percent),
- sixteen of eighteen Secretary-General level slots (89 percent),
- eleven of seventeen Inspector-Generalships (65 percent),
- twenty-five of seventy-one Director-General level posts (35 percent).

In addition, the Head and Deputy Head of Bakin (Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara, State Intelligence Coordinating Body), responsible for internal security estimates, are military (General Yoga Sugama and Lieutenant-General L. Benny Murdani, respectively). Bakin does not usually appear in official lists of government offices¹⁴ but maintains an extensive network and reports directly to the President.¹⁵

Trends

How does this level of penetration compare with earlier periods in the New Order? Some reliable reference points are tallies made by Crouch for 1966,¹⁶ Emmerson

Conceivably, a very few military figures may not have been identified as such, and even fewer civilians may have been categorized as military. Any such errors should not materially change any of the conclusions drawn here, but the author would appreciate knowing of any suspected misclassifications.

13. Sometimes this group is collectively referred to loosely as "the palace," so named because of their ready access to President Suharto, whose ceremonial headquarters is Istana Merdeka (Independence Palace).

14. These two top Bakin officials are not counted in the higher central bureaucracy, as defined here.

15. General Yoga has been Head of Bakin since 1974 and remains in this position despite his retirement from active duty in mid-1981. He was simultaneously Chief-of-Staff of Kopkamtib from mid-1978 through the end of 1980. Lieutenant-General Murdani, despite his low public profile one of the most important figures in the regime, is not only Deputy Head of Bakin but also Assistant for Intelligence (Asintel) and Head of the Strategic Intelligence Center (Kapusintelstrat) in Hankam (both positions technically under the Chief-of-Staff for Operations). He is also a Suharto confidant on par with Information Minister Lieutenant-General Ali Murtopo and Inspector-General for Development Major-General Sujono Humardani. Together with them, he is a major patron of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, one of the few persistently influential think-tanks in Indonesia. With Defense Minister General Yusuf, he has been intimately involved with managing the conflict in East Timor. For more details, see Hamish McDonald, *Suharto's Indonesia* (Blackburn [Australia]: Fontana Books, 1980).

16. Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), pp. 241-42. His figures are based on an August 8, 1966 *Angkatan Bersenjata* list including military statuses.

for 1967,¹⁷ and MacDougall for July 1971.¹⁸ These are the principal trends.

- The President remains military (from 1967 on), the Vice-President civilian (from 1973).¹⁹
- The President's principal aides remain overwhelmingly military (all 8 in 1971, 7 of 8 in 1981).
- Earlier counterparts of today's Coordinating Ministers were less likely to be military (1 of 5 in 1966, 0 of 3 in 1971, 2 of 3 in 1981).
- Ministers of State, with their specialized responsibilities, continued to be wholly civilian (1971 and now).
- Department Ministers were 44 percent military at the beginning of the New Order in 1966-67 and in July 1971, dropped to 22 percent military in the new Cabinet appointed in September of that year,²⁰ but now stand at an all-time high of 47 percent military.²¹
- Military-held Secretary-Generalships stood at 55 percent in 1966-67, dropped to 41 percent in 1971, but have dramatically increased to 89 percent today.
- Inspector-Generalships declined slightly from 73 percent military in 1971 (when only 11 Departments had them) to 65 percent now (when all do). Over this same time period, however, the absolute number of military Inspectors-General increased from 8 to 11.
- Director-Generalships seem to have been held at constant levels of military incumbency over the course of the New Order (36 percent in 1966, 36 percent in 1971, 35 percent in 1981).

At the highest levels, military penetration has remained near complete (the President and his principal immediate aides) or increased (Coordinating Ministers). Cyclic shifts to historical high points of military penetration have occurred in the two top Departmental offices (Ministers and particularly Secretaries-General), a pattern reinforced by an increase in military Inspectors-General in the upswing phase of the cycle. Civilians managed to maintain decisive numerical edges only

17. Donald K. Emmerson, "The Bureaucracy in Political Context: Weakness in Strength," in *Political Power and Communication in Indonesia*, ed. Karl Jackson and Lucian Pye (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 100-103. His 1967 figures are based on informed persons' knowledge of whether an incumbent was military or civilian.

18. Tallied from a list including military ranks in O. G. Roeder, compiler, *Who's Who in Indonesia* (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1971), pp. 521-28.

19. Sukarno remained titular President in the Cabinet formed in July 1966. Suharto became Acting President in March 1967 and President in March 1968. The Vice-Presidency was vacant from 1956 until March 1973.

20. A consequence of the July 1971 elections in which the government-backed Golkar (Golongan Karya, Functional Groups) obtained 63 percent of the recorded popular vote.

21. This exceeds the figure for any Cabinet during Sukarno's Presidency, even those from the Guided Democracy period of 1959-65. Based on Emmerson's tallies derived from Susan Finch and Daniel Lev, compilers, *Republic of Indonesia Cabinets 1945-1965* (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1965).

in positions with the most differentiated functions (Ministers of State and Directors-General) although in both instances worked under mainly military superiors.

There is as yet no practical evidence of any effort to "re-civilianize" even gradually military karyawan slots in the higher central bureaucracy. Such a reversal of the historic trend would seriously upset the many dependent clients of serving military karyawan. However, occasional statements by military spokesmen refer to ABRI's need only to guard "the strategic points" in the administration of the country.

Structuring Military Domination

For regime maintenance it is more critical that the military control certain Departments than others. One indicator of how President Suharto and his closest colleagues assess this matter is the proportion of top slots, from Coordinating Minister down to Directors-General, filled by military officers. Using this gauge, the most crucial Departments are now Hankam (100 percent of its leading positions occupied by the military) and Home Affairs (89 percent).

Effective total military control of Hankam has its motivational origins in the united ABRI determination that never again should civilians be placed in positions whereby they could create disunity within or among the several armed services. Indeed, examination of Hankam rosters for 1966, 1971, and 1981 shows that ABRI has never held less than 90 percent of that Department's top slots.²² Moreover, these figures conceal unprecedented major organizational consolidation of the military staff and command structure over the course of the New Order.

This prolonged process of concentrating power at the center began simply with the reshuffling, dismissal, detention, or killing of military officers considered unreliable in the purges and battles following the murders of six Army generals on the night of September 30, 1965 (officially labeled the 30 September Movement, Gerakan September Tiga puluh, with the deliberately sinister acronym Gestapu). Centralization advanced more sharply between November 1969 and April 1970 when service heads were downgraded from Ministerial rank to Chiefs-of-Staff (Chief for the Police) and lost operational control over their respective forces. Their staffs were shifted to Hankam. A revised system of Regional Defense Commands (Komando Wilayah Pertahanan, Kowilhan) integrating services in the field together with removal of "native sons" from top command roles outside Java effectively ended any recurrent threat of "warlordism." All these changes also worked to institutionalize Army dominance over the other services.²³

Another centralization exercise during 1974 and 1975 followed the anti-Japanese, anti-government riots of January 1974 with their related intra-Army intrigues (officially, the 15 January Calamity, Malapetaka 15 Januari, Malari). This shifted major staff and specialized agencies from Kopkamtib, seen as having abused power in anti-regime power plays, to clear Ministerial control under a rationalized system of

22. Based on the same sources as in the "Trends" section, except that, since Crouch provides no breakdowns by Department, tallies had to be made from a raw list of July 1966 positions (the Ampera Cabinet) found in Editors, "Continuity and Change: Four Indonesian Cabinets Since October 1, 1965," *Indonesia*, 2 (October 1966). Positions in 1966 and 1971 subsequently consolidated were coded under their 1981 counterparts. Chief Ministers (1966) and certain State Ministers (1971) were equated with counterpart Coordinating Ministers (1981).

23. For details, see Editors, "Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite after the Reorganization of 1969-70," *Indonesia*, 10 (October 1970), pp. 195-208.

functionally ordered Chiefs-of-Staff and their principal Assistants (the current organizational format).²⁴

Particularly after General Yusuf's appointment as Minister in 1978, still more power flowed to the center as a consequence of the need to deal with unanticipated protracted resistance in East Timor, increased outlays for arms and equipment modernization, long-delayed improvements in conditions of service for non-commissioned officers (*bintara*) and enlisted men (*tamtama*), adherence to plans for retiring senior officers at age 55, and carefully calculated promotions for some younger ones.

While ABRI's struggle for ascendancy in Hankam began late in the period of Parliamentary Democracy (1949-57), its pursuit of dominance in Home Affairs is of more recent vintage. In no other Department has military penetration increased so steadily and markedly over the course of the New Order (29 percent of top slots in 1966, 71 percent in 1971, 89 percent in 1981). ABRI's doctrine of a guerrilla-based territorial defense, official state policy from December 1960, already inclined it to exert influence in areas within the domain of Home Affairs (as well as other Departments outside Hankam).

But the Second Army Seminar in August 1966 yielded a revised doctrine, justifying a considerably expanded non-military role for ABRI in deciding almost all national issues.²⁵ Within Home Affairs, ABRI's presence grew, along with doctrinally sanctified felt needs to control or oversee the governmental apparatus from provincial down to village level,²⁶ to assure positive outcomes in periodic electoral exercises,²⁷ and to advance regional development projects on which the regime's legitimacy came increasingly to rest.²⁸

24. For details, see Editors, "Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite," *Indonesia*, 18 (October 1974), pp. 153-67.

25. See particularly Chapter 4, "Indonesian Military Literature," in Harold Maynard, "A Comparison of Military Elite Role Perceptions in Indonesia and the Philippines" (Ph.D. dissertation, The American University, 1976).

26. Through such military-dominated joint civilian-military institutions as the regional parliaments (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, Regional People's Representative Council) and consultative forums (Musyawarah Pimpinan Daerah, Regional Leadership Deliberation). For a thorough fleshing out of how the Home Affairs' control system works, see Ronald Grant, "Administration in the Province of West Java: Patterns of Integration and Problems of Coordination" (Ph.D. dissertation, Northern Illinois University, 1976).

27. Again through military-controlled institutions, including particularly the political party-surrogate Golkar, and the mandatory membership of Korpri (Korps Pegawai Republik Indonesia, Corps of Officials of the Republic of Indonesia). The two most extended treatments of such corporatist trends in Indonesia are David Reeve, "An Alternative to the Party System in Indonesia: An Historical Evaluation of the Functional Group Concept" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Sydney, 1977) and Dwight King, "Social Mobilization, Associational Life, Interest Mediation, and Political Cleavage in Indonesia" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1978).

28. This aim involves the cooperation of technocrats (mainly economists), who, with the military and central bureaucracy, form the current ruling "triarchy," with local Chinese financiers (*cukong*) and foreign investors and experts in supporting roles. The most complete and balanced treatment of the technocrats is "Technocrats as Modernizers: The Economists of Indonesia's New Order," a 1975 University of

Among the remaining Departments, the most direct high-level military participation occurs in Information, Social Affairs, Communications, Religion, Foreign Affairs, Justice, and Manpower and Transmigration. Excepting only Communications and Manpower--where military penetration has remained at relatively high levels (between 40 percent and 82 percent) throughout the New Order--these Departments are also the only ones registering marked increases to high levels of such involvement from 1966 to now.

Thus, besides a rise in military occupancy of certain categories of office in the higher central bureaucracy, there has occurred an accompanying military penetration of many particular programmatic sectors of government. The quantum leaps apparently occurred after the intra-regime power struggle peaking visibly in the January 1974 riots (Malari). In retrospect, Malari marks the watershed of the Suharto 1945 Generation faction's internal consolidation and consequent broad seizure of the higher central bureaucracy.

There is no Department--even those overseen by the one civilian Coordinating Minister--in which the military is not suitably placed to control and remain apprised of its full range of activities. In nine of seventeen Departments, the Secretary-General and Inspector-General positions are both held by military officers. In the other eight Departments, one or the other of these posts is held by a military man. (See the table on the next page.) In addition, Department Ministers periodically report to the President, much more typically one by one rather than in a limited or full Cabinet setting. Many of these meetings result in a press conference in which the Minister merely announces the Presidential imprimatur on a heretofore unrevealed Departmental decision or passes on a Presidential instruction he has received.

Generally, the higher central bureaucracy has become rationalized, energized, and more coercive in pursuing the goals of the New Order.²⁹ In their own positions, civilian technocrats and career bureaucrats are at least as active public proponents of government policies as the military karyawan. Almost all of these civilians hold their positions because they, just as the military karyawan, have in the past earned the trust of President Suharto or some other high-level military patron. If the current University of Indonesia Faculty of Economics team of leading technocrats has groomed successors, they are not yet numerous at these highest levels of the central bureaucracy. Moreover, none of these civilian bureaucrats belongs to an opposition party. All formally give sole loyalty (*monoloyalitas*) to the government-backed party-surrogate Golkar (Golongan Karya, Functional Groups). No Department is any longer a fief of a particular party, such as Religion once was for the Nahdatul Ulama³⁰ and Information for the Partai Nasional Indonesia.³¹

Michigan dissertation by John James MacDougall (a namesake not otherwise related to the present article's author, John A. MacDougall).

29. This global conclusion, originally drawn by Donald Emmerson in the mid-1970s, is amply confirmed today by recurrent editorials in the Indonesian press explicitly noting the striking power and intrusiveness of the central bureaucracy. Consistent with such patterns, about 62 percent of Golkar's candidates for the May 1982 parliamentary (DPR, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, People's Representative Council) elections *reportedly* come from the government bureaucracy and 16 percent from ABRI. (*Indonesian Observer*, November 4, 1981). Indeed, the regime has been called a "bureaucratic polity" (Karl Jackson) and a "bureaucratic dictatorship" (Heri Akhmadi).

30. The conservative Muslim Scholars party, now "fused" with three other smaller Muslim parties in the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, Development Unity Party).

DISTRIBUTION OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN INCUMBENTS IN THE HIGHER CENTRAL BUREAUCRACY*

Department	Position						
	Percentage Military	Coordinating Minister†	Department Minister	Junior Minister‡	Secretary-General	Inspector-General	Directors-General
Home Affairs	89	M	M	-	M	M	4M, 1C
Foreign Affairs	50	M	C	-	M	M	1M, 3C
Defense and Security	100	M	M	-	2M	M	7M
Justice	50	M	M	-	M	C	1M, 3C
Information	57	M	M	-	M	M	3C
Finance	30	C	C	-	C	M	2M, 4C
Trade and Cooperatives	38	C	C	M	M	M	3C
Agriculture	40	C	C	C	M	M	2M, 3C
Industry	38	C	C	-	M	M	1M, 3C
Mining and Energy	14	C	C	-	C	M	3C
Public Works	12	C	C	C	C	M	3C
Communications	56	C	M	-	M	C	3M, 2C
Education	44	M	C	M	M	C	1M, 3C
Health	38	M	M	-	M	C	4C
Religion	56	M	M	-	M	C	2M, 3C
Social Affairs	57	M	M	-	M	M	3C
Manpower and Transmigration	50	M	C	C	M	M	1M, 2C

* For a listing of the Departmental Ministers and Senior Civil Servants in these Departments, see Appendix A.

† M stands for military, C for civilian incumbent.

‡ Indicated for those Departments that have a Junior Minister.

Except for Agriculture Minister Sudarsono and Junior Minister for Women's Affairs Lasiyah, every civilian Minister has one or more explicit military credential or linkages which could enhance his attractiveness to, or ability to work with, military colleagues. These include:

- claimed military service during the 1945-1949 Revolution (at least Wijoyo, Sumarlin, Salim, Radius, Subroto, Suhud, Harun Zain, Daud Yusuf, Affandi, Martono) and afterward (Radius, Suhud);
- lecturing at the Army Staff and Command School (Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat, Seskoad), National Defense Institute (Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional, Lemhanas), other military schools, and/or participation in the key Second (1966) or Third (1972) Army Seminars (at least Wijoyo, Salim, Wardhana, Subroto, Purnomosidi, Mochtar);
- involvement in planning or executing a major military campaign (Subroto);
- supervision of local manufacture of arms and military equipment (Habibie);
- service on the Hankam staff (Affandi);
- previous leadership in military-related or supported organizations (Martono, Batubara).

Military Karyawan Role Enhancement

Karyawan positions, even in the higher central bureaucracy, have not traditionally been regarded as choice assignments by Indonesian military officers. Command duty, tied to now venerated or romanticized memories of the Revolution against Dutch colonialism, suppression of nation-destroying regional rebellions, and assaults crushing repeated communist treachery, was seen as embodying most closely ABRI's heroic mission. The apparent loss of the "idealism of struggle" is now often bruited about in press interviews with senior officers. Indeed, the only remaining "battlefield" today is East Timor and the last previous one (under Sukarno) was Malaysia, episodes which the intensely nationalistic ABRI leadership, as well as junior officers, find easier to equate with recent national disarray than past national glory.

Earlier disparagement of the karyawan role has also decreased as the perceived importance of controlling the government bureaucracy and its actual penetration by the military has increased. Wide public visibility through the mass media and the impeccable military credentials of many incumbents have also worked to enhance the prestige accorded the karyawan role by both younger and older military officers. Assignment and promotion committees within the Hankam increasingly understand that certain officers are particularly suited by administrative and technical talents or temperament for karya rather than military staff and command positions. A minority of officers may even aspire to certain karyawan positions regarded as "wet," offering opportunities for personal or institutional graft. General Yusuf has warned senior officers publicly that ABRI should not be used as a stepping-stone to prestigious karya slots.

The most prestigious service within ABRI is the Army, and it is the Army which holds four-fifths (81 percent) of military karyawan posts in the higher central bureaucracy. Moreover, these Army karyawan are almost all high (flag-grade) com-

31. The Indonesian National Party, now "fused" with two other "nationalist" and two "non-Muslim religious" parties in the PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, Indonesian Democracy Party).

missioned officers (*perwira*). Twelve percent are four-star Generals, 22 percent Lieutenant-Generals, 52 percent Major-Generals, and 10 percent Brigadiers. The remainder (two officers) are Colonels. In the other services, the distribution is even more skewed toward the higher ranks. Eighty-three percent of Navy karyawan are Admirals or Vice-Admirals, 72 percent of Air Force karyawan Marshals or Vice-Marshals, and the sole Police representative a General.

Further, the average rank of military karyawan has clearly escalated from available 1966 and 1971 benchmarks. At the beginning of the New Order, a plurality (44 percent) of Army karyawan were only Colonels or Lieutenant-Colonels, whereas now the single most frequent rank is Major-General (52 percent). Younger officers can readily follow in the press periodic promotions in military rank among serving karyawan. These various shifts clearly have enhanced the clout of military karyawan in their respective Departments.

Generational Power Monopoly

The Generation of 1945 (*Angkatan 45*), participants in the Revolution, retains a near monopoly on military karyawan positions in the higher central bureaucracy. Most (61 percent) of these karyawan were born by 1925 (making them at least twenty years old in 1945) and all but two of the remainder by 1930. Only Cabinet Secretary Brigadier General Murdiono and Junior Minister for Youth Affairs Air Major Abdul Gafur belong clearly to the Young Generation (*Generasi Muda*).

This solid control by the Generation of 1945 persists despite the fact that all those military karyawan born by 1925 have now been retired from active duty status.³² While some have received their karyawan appointments after or upon retirement, more have simply retired in place. Even if these retired officers are no longer formally within some Hankam command chain, Hankam influence on them remains heavy, quite apart from continuing influences by the webs of patron-client (*bapak-anak buah*) and close friendship (*kawan akrab*) ties in which they remain embedded.³³ Hankam-run honorary promotion (in military rank) exercises are held for them even after retirement, most recently in September 1981.³⁴ The corporatist Association of Retired Members of the Indonesian Armed Forces (*Persatuan Purnawirawan Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Pepabri*), to which they belong, is controlled by regime loyalists.³⁵ Pepabri enjoins them at its annual

32. The sole apparent exception is Lieutenant-General Kharis Suhud, the important Functional Affairs Chief-of-Staff in Hankam responsible for making military karyawan assignments.

33. *Bapak-anak buah* ties are vertical patronage relationships among unequals. While difficult to ascertain, their importance among the Indonesian military has long been conceded. *Kawan akrab* ties are horizontal cooperative relationships among peers. No one has systematically investigated the role these play among the Indonesian military. Unless one posits marked cultural discontinuities between the predominantly Javanese military and their technocrat colleagues, these intimate friendship bonds should be significant among the military as well (perhaps especially so among retired military, military karyawan, and graduates of the military academy in Magelang). For the seminal article on *kawan akrab* ties among the technocrats (with some military examples as well), see John James MacDougall, "Elite Friendship Ties and Their Political Organizational Functions: The Case of Indonesia," *Bijdragen Tot de Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde*, 137, 1 (1981), pp. 61-89.

34. For the complete list, see *Indonesia Times*, September 9, 1981.

35. Retired General Makmun Murod is the new General Chairman (*Ketua Umum*). He is a former Kostrad, Kostranas, and Kowilhan II Commander as well as ex-Army

national congresses and other ceremonial occasions to remain always fighters (*pejuang*) who can never be separated (*dipisahkan*) from ABRI.³⁶

Given President Suharto's expressed desire to spend the rest of his life serving the people because there is nothing he wants to do more³⁷ and the continuing readiness of his military age cohort to perform *karya* duty, any voluntary change of generation (*alih generasi*) within the phalanx of military *karyawan* is remote over the next five years. If such a generational succession among these *karyawan* has even been planned, it is not a subject of general public discussion as is the succession for active duty military in the staff and command structure.³⁸

At most, carefully selected officers from the misnamed bridge generation (*generasi jembatan* or *schakel generatie*)³⁹ have been seconded to some of these *karya* slots. These figures broadly encompass officers schooled at the wartime Akademi Militer in Yogyakarta (classes of 1948 and 1949/50),⁴⁰ the short-lived and controversial Candradimuka Academy at Bandung (in 1951 and 1952),⁴¹ and a variety of other shorter courses in Indonesia and abroad (mainly under General Nasution's sponsorship between 1950 and 1960) before the Akademi Militer Nasional (AMN), now known as Akabri (Akademi Militer Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia), opened at Magelang (in 1957, with its first "fully professionally-trained" graduating class in 1960).

There is not one Magelang graduate among the military *karyawan* in the higher central bureaucracy. If there is any ultimate intent to move Young Generation

Chief-of-Staff, sensitive positions all. Pepabri deliberately tolerates a few "heretics," such as the Solo aristocrat Lieutenant-General GPH Jatikusumo, thereby neutralizing them to some degree. Pepabri also publishes *Purnawirawan*, a generally tame journal for which ABRI retirees may write for those of like status.

36. For recent examples of this emotional appeal, see *Angkatan Bersenjata*, September 22, 1981.

37. *Antara*, November 5, 1981. *FBIS Daily Report Asia & Pacific*, Vol. 4, No. 217, November 10, 1981. The November 6, 1981, *Kompas* reports Suharto's actual words as the lead sentence of its lead story on page one: "Bagi saya tak ada lain, saya hanya ingin menggunakan sisa-sisa hidup saya untuk mengabdikan bagi kepentingan rakyat." The statement, made to the third Congress of the government-backed KNPI (Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia, Indonesian National Youth Committee), seems Suharto's indirect Javanese way of saying he intends to remain President until he dies. Interestingly, *Antara's* English service quotes Suharto as having said he wished to serve "the nation and the state," not "the people" (*rakyat*), his actual choice of word.

38. For example, see the highly illuminating article by Bondan Winarno, "Alih Generasi: Alamiah atau Terencana?" in *Mutiara*, No. 252, September 30-October 13, 1981.

39. Misnamed because the concept is too often tied to officers' military education institution(s) rather than to age. As a consequence, many officers who self-identify as Generation of 1945 find themselves annoyingly categorized as "transitional" or "bridge," a less prestigious location.

40. Includes here Sabara (education interrupted), Yogi Supardi, and Atwar Nurhadi on the active list; and Urip Widodo, Sukoco, Pang Suparto, and Aswasmarmo, retired.

41. Includes here Worang, Panggabean, Surono, Ahmad Tahir, and Tirtosudiro, all retired.

officers into these karya jobs, it is difficult to understand why that process has not even begun. Suharto has instead facilitated moving retired officers of any age into these positions by an October 1981 regulation forming a military reserve.

The Successor Generation Crisis

By maintaining dominance over the state apparatus via its military karyawan staffing patterns, the Generation of 1945 leadership loyal to President Suharto seeks to assure itself the political stability required for a smooth generational transfer of leadership positions elsewhere within the Army by sometime in 1983. What is entailed there is not simply a seeding of the Army staff and command structure with token representatives of the Young Generation but rather a wholesale intra-Army intergenerational power transfer.

The Generation of 1945 senior officers (from all current factions) made what amounts to a solemn contract to this effect in the Third Army Seminar in 1972.⁴² The consensual results of those cross-generational meetings were subsequently published and used as instructional materials in the various military educational institutions. Defense Minister General Yusuf has on many public occasions given assurances this power transfer will occur and should not be resisted, and other senior Army spokesmen have cautioned civilians neither to worry about nor meddle in the process.

The overall design thus eventually would entail two major power centers: the retired military karyawan of the 1945 Generation in the higher central bureaucracy and the active duty Army staff and command structure of the Young Generation. For some indeterminate period of time the cleavage between the retired Army officers in control of politics and the active duty Army officers in control of the guns would therefore be sharply drawn. The formula for regime maintenance would essentially be shifted from depoliticization to repoliticization.

It is not inconceivable that such an arrangement could remain stable, but its longevity would be inherently limited by the aging and dying off of the 1945 Generation. Before then, it strains credulity to think the 1945 Generation will voluntarily relinquish *on schedule* the *top* Hankam posts it now so tightly grasps as levers controlling the career fates of the Army's Young Generation. At year-end 1981 just four Magelang graduates--Brigadier-Generals Sugiarto, Edy Sudrajat, Tri Sutrisno, and Sarwono--had been appointed Military Area ("Divisional") Commanders

42. This March 1972 seminar arose as a consequence of a Seskoad survey ostensibly revealing marked difference in outlook between the then current class and the 1945 Generation leadership (only the Seskoad students were actually surveyed). The seminar aimed to forge an inter-generational agreement on which of the values of the 1945 Generation could be transferred as an inheritance to the Young Generation and on the mechanisms for achieving this end. A very abbreviated English version of this "agreement" (actually the 1945 Generation version only) is given in Nugroho Notosusanto, *The Transfer of Values in the Indonesian Armed Forces*, published by Hankam's Center for Armed Forces History in 1974. The major and lengthy summary volume in Indonesian is titled *Dharma Pusaka 45*. At least five other volumes resulting from the seminar are publicly available: *Himpunan Amanat*, *Himpunan Prasaran*, *Himpunan Hasil Perumusan Sindikat I s/d VI*, and *Academic Appraisal tentang Pewarisan dan Integrasi*. This mine of information bearing on the issue of generational succession remains unanalyzed by outsiders. Extensive surveys of 1969-1978 Akabri graduates (all perwira) in 1978-79 and 1980-81 have distressed ABRI's 1945 Generation leadership once again. A glimpse of these survey results is provided in "Sekolah Tentara, Tidak Kebal," *Tempo*, May 30, 1981, pp. 66-67.

(Pangdam) or their Chief-of-Staff (Kasdam). The change of generations within the Army clearly has been begun by General Yusuf but is not yet proceeding at a pace the Young Generation might have anticipated.

Even leaving aside other political forces in Indonesia, it is far from clear the Army's Young Generation would accede to the formation, much less the temporary institutionalization, of such a new model New Order. Essentially, the emerging arrangement consigns the Young Generation military to a continuing secondary and subordinate political role. Save perhaps for some adroit token appointments of younger officers, only the 1945 Generation military would reap the top positional rewards in the civil (*sipil*) side of ABRI's dual function (*dwi fungsi*). Only the Young Generation would be performing the military (*militer*) side.

It is possible, but on the basis of present evidence unlikely, that the Suharto 1945 Generation faction actually now posits a pressing, near-future need to reduce significantly this cleavage. Should such a felt need develop, it may come too late for Suharto himself, and perhaps his faction generally, to reap the full benefits for regime perpetuation of moving toward construction of a network of interpersonal links across generational lines. At present, General Yusuf, by virtue of his presiding (more intimately than Suharto) over assignments and promotions and his well-publicized prodigious travel to field commands, would appear to be the principal beneficiary of such interpersonal bonds as have been forged. It is implausible that approximately six thousand younger Army officers actually have, or personally see, their fates, orchestrated primarily by Suharto himself.

ABRI doctrine does not sanction generational stratification in the carrying out of its dual function. At minimum, the Young Generation could charge a deviation from a still valid core ABRI doctrine. But another more likely outcome would seem an increasingly active private and even public probing of the operational meaning of ABRI's dual function in a changing Indonesia. It is likely this will mark the emergence at the national level of the Young Generation's more politically skilled officers. This process may be spurred by General Yusuf's March 1982 declaration that publication of a sounder (*lebih utuh*) formulation of ABRI's civil mission (*kekaryaan*) was imminent.

Already several retired 1945 Generation ABRI factions have attacked the ruling 1945 Generation faction for expanding the civil side of the dual function far beyond what was originally envisaged. Past writing by widely respected current ABRI 1945 Generation "outs" has comprised major textual material in the professional military education of the ABRI Young Generation.⁴³ Among others, retired General

43. The impact of the four-year academy course at Magelang for Army cadets (*taruna*) is great. Cadets are effectively isolated from the surrounding civilian society and subjected to rigorous indoctrination and training. Discipline is harsh. *Angkatan Bersenjata* and other official ABRI publications are staple reading fare. Cadets have better classrooms, accommodations, and food than in most non-military educational institutions in Indonesia. When allowed to leave the campus for Magelang, an old garrison town of the Dutch colonial army, they are discouraged from eating at roadside stalls (in favor of the better restaurants) or using pedicabs (in favor of motorized transport). They graduate with an expectation they will become a ruling class and exhibit considerable self-confidence and esprit de corps. Besides being very disproportionately Javanese, about 40 percent of new Akabri cadets come from ABRI families. For more details, see various issues of *Akabri* and Peter Britton, "Indonesia's Neo-Colonial Armed Forces," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, 7, 3 (July-September 1975), pp. 14-21.

Nasution, considered influential among these post-Revolutionary officers, has widely published stinging critiques of the later New Order regime.⁴⁴

Indonesia's succession politics are not occurring in a regional vacuum. While politically aware officers remain Indonesia-centric in outlook, more attention is paid other ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) members than in past years. Many of Singapore's and Malaysia's younger Ministerial-level leadership have visited with their Indonesian counterparts, some many times. Dr. Mahathir's ascension to the Malaysian Prime Ministership was especially widely commented on in the Indonesian press as a smooth and successful generational transfer of power which Indonesia might admire or even emulate. His subsequent anti-corruption campaign has been similarly acknowledged.

But Indonesia has no dominant ruling mass-based political party comparable to Malaysia's UMNO (United Malay National Organization) or Singapore's PAP (People's Action Party) through which those countries' generational successions have so far been so well managed. Nor on closer examination would the "free-fight liberalism" within UMNO or the PAP's "guided democracy" meet ideological canons of acceptability among almost any of Indonesia's dominant and alternative elites. Still, the plain facts of ongoing successful generational transitions in these two neighboring states will aggravate the naggingly insistent perception that Indonesia's own change of generations is a necessary end without a sufficient means. The odds for anomic change therefore increase.

44. Two groups of ABRI's 1945 Generation "outs" cluster in the Forum for Study and Communication of Retired Officers (Forum Studi dan Komunikasi Purna Yudha, or Fosko) and the Institute for Constitutional Awareness (Lembaga Kesadaran Berkonstitusi, or LBK). In one of the rare studies of retired ABRI officers, these two more vocal factions are discussed by Ulf Sundhaussen, "Regime Crisis in Indonesia: Fact, Fiction, Predictions," *Asian Survey*, 21, 8 (August 1981), pp. 815-37. For a forthright statement by retired General Nasution on how he perceives the New Order to have deviated from his initial formulation of the "dual function" concept, see his "Dwi Fungsi: Pada Mulanya dan Kini," *Prisma*, 9 (December 1980), pp. 39-43. A cautious, but essentially sympathetic, summary of Nasution's views may also be found in Ulf Sundhaussen, *Social Policy Aspects in Defense and Security Planning in Indonesia, 1945-1977*, Southeast Asian Occasional Paper Series (Queensland: James Cook University, 1980). Retired officers and their associations will play more important political roles in the future than in the recent past and deserve close attention.

APPENDIX A
THE THIRD DEVELOPMENT CABINET AND
SENIOR DEPARTMENTAL OFFICIALS

The positions and incumbents comprising the Indonesian "higher central bureaucracy," as the term is used in this article, are listed in full below. The list is believed current as of mid-December 1981. One incumbent (asterisked) is the last known occupant of his position and may or may not still be current. Personnel changes which are known to have occurred since this list was compiled are mentioned in footnotes. Military officers are distinguished from civilians by the military rank preceding their names. The notation (R) after such a rank means that the officer is retired whereas (?) means that it is not known whether the officer is retired or on active duty. Absence of either notation means that the officer is on the active rolls. Titles placed before or after names are usually abbreviated and may be distinguished from parts of the name by absence of any period following them.

Key to Abbreviations

Brig-Gen	Brigadier-General (Army)
Col	Colonel (Army)
Dr	Doktor (holder of doctoral degree)
Drs/Dra	Doktorandus/Doktoranda (male/female holder of doctoral degree not involving dissertation)
Gen	General (Army)
H	Haji (one who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca)
Ir	Insinyur (holder of engineering degree)
K	Kiai (venerable Islamic religious teacher or scholar)
Kopkamtib	Komando Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban (Command for the Restoration of Security and Order)
Lt-Gen	Lieutenant-General (Army)
MA	Master of Arts
MA Sc	Master of Arts and Science
Maj-Gen	Major-General (Army)
MBA	Master of Business Administration
MPA	Master of Public Administration
MPH	Master of Public Health
MSc	Master of Science
Ny	Nyonya (Mrs., Madam)
PhD	Doctor of Philosophy
Prof	Profesor (Professor)
R	Raden (Javanese aristocratic title)
RM	Raden Mas (Javanese aristocratic title somewhat higher than Raden)
(R)	Retired (from active military duty)
(?)	Retired or active military status not known
SE	Sarjana Ekonomi (Master of Economics)
SH	Sarjana Hukum (Master of Law)
*	Last known incumbent in position

Positions and Incumbents

<i>President</i>	Gen (R) Suharto
<i>Vice-President</i>	Adam Malik

State Secretariat

Minister of State/State Secretary
 Cabinet Secretary
 Military Secretary
 Secretary, Development Operations
 Control Secretariat
 Inspectors-General, Inspectorate-
 General for Development

Lt-Gen Sudharmono SH
 Brig-Gen Drs Murdiono
 Air Vice Marshal Kardono

Lt-Gen (R) R Solihin Gautama Purwanegara

E. Sukasah Somowijaya
 Maj-Gen (R) Sujono Humardani
 Maj-Gen (R) Hein Victor Worang†
 Maj-Gen (R) Tahir

Coordinating Ministers

Political and Security Affairs
 (Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs,
 Defense and Security, Justice,
 Information)
 Economic, Financial, and Industrial
 Affairs (Finance, Trade and Coop-
 eratives, Agriculture, Industry,
 Mining and Energy, Public Works,
 Communications)
 People's Welfare (Education and
 Culture, Health, Religion, Social
 Affairs, Manpower and Transmi-
 gration)
 Junior Minister, Women's Affairs

Gen (R) Maradean Panggabean

Prof Dr Wijoyo Nitisastro

Gen (R) Surono Reksodimejo
 Ny Lasayah Sutanto SH

Ministers of State

Perfecting the State Apparatus
 Research and Technology
 Development Supervision and
 Environment

Dr Johannes Baptista Sumarlin
 Prof Dr Ir Baharuddin Yusuf Habibie

Prof Dr Emil Salim

*Departmental Ministers and Senior Civil Servants**Home Affairs*

Minister
 Secretary-General
 Inspector-General
 Directors-General
 Social and Political Affairs
 General Government and
 Regional Autonomy
 Rural Development
 Agrarian Affairs
 Regional Development

Gen (R) Amir Machmud
 Maj-Gen (R) R Suprpto
 Maj-Gen H Eddy Sabara

Maj-Gen (R) R Prapto Prayitno

Brig-Gen (?) H Ahmad Adnawijaya
 Maj-Gen (R) Drs Umar Said Joyosaputro
 Maj-Gen Daryono SH
 Drs Atar Tarigan Sibero

Foreign Affairs

Minister
 Secretary-General
 Inspector-General

Prof Dr Mochtar Kusumaatmaja
 Air Vice Marshal Sudharmono
 Lt-Gen (R) Sarwo Edhie Wibowo

† Maj-Gen Worang has died and the position is now vacant.

Directors-General	
Political Affairs	H Munawar Syadzali MA
Foreign Economic, Social and Cultural Affairs	
Safeguarding of Foreign Relations	Gusti Rusli Noor
Protocol and Consular Affairs	Maj-Gen (R) RM Suyono Wiryo Atmojo SH Yoop Ave†
Defense and Security	
Minister/Commander of the Armed Forces	Gen Andi Muhammad Yusuf
Deputy Commander of the Armed Forces/Commander, Kopkamtib	
Chief of Staff, Kopkamtib	Admiral R. Sudomo
Inspector-General	Gen Wijoyo Suyono
Chief of Staff, Operations	Air Vice-Marshal (?) Subambang
Chief of Staff, Administration	Vice Admiral Muhammad Romly
Chief of Staff, Functional Affairs	Lt-Gen Ignatius Yogi Supardi
Chief of Staff, Army	Lt-Gen M. Kharis Suhud
Chief of Staff, Navy	Gen S. Poniman
Chief of Staff, Air Force	Admiral Waluyo Sugito
Chief of Police, Indonesia	Air Marshal Ashadi Cahyadi Police Gen Dr Awaluddin Jamin MPA
Justice	
Minister	Lt-Gen Ali Said SH
Secretary-General	Maj-Gen (R) Nasrun Syahrin SH
Inspector-General	Kamil Kamka SH
Directors-General	
Law and Legislation	Hadipurnomo SH‡
Public Judiciary Development	Suroto SH§
Rehabilitation	Ahmad Arif SH MPA
Immigration	Maj-Gen (R) Nichlany Sudarjo
Information	
Minister	Lt-Gen (R) Ali Murtopo
Secretary-General	Maj-Gen (R) Sutikno Lukitodisastro
Inspector-General	Maj-Gen (R) Drs H Slamet Heryanto
Directors-General	
General Information	Drs Joko Kartodiharjo MPA
Radio, Television, and Film	Drs Sumadi
Press and Graphics Development	H Sukarno SH
Finance	
Minister	Prof Dr Ali Wardhana
Secretary-General	Maj-Gen (R) Elly Sungkono
Inspector-General	Yusuf L. Indradewa SH
Directors-General	
Budget	Maj-Gen (R) Yusuf Ramly
Tax	Drs Salamun A. T.
Domestic Monetary Affairs	Drs Oskar Suryaatmaja
Foreign Monetary Affairs	Drs R Sugito Sastromijoyo MA Sc
Customs	Lt-Gen (R) Wahono
State Monetary Control	Drs Gandhi

† Yoop Ave has been replaced by R Achmad Jumiril.

‡ Hadipurnomo has been replaced by Harsono Adisumarto SH MPA.

§ Suroto has been replaced by H Rusli SH.

Trade and Cooperatives

Minister
 Junior Minister,
 Cooperative Affairs
 Secretary-General
 Inspector-General
 Directors-General
 Domestic Trade
 Foreign Trade
 Cooperatives

Drs Radius Prawiro

Lt-Gen (R) Bustanil Arifin SH
 Vice Admiral Lalu Manambai Abdulkadir
 Maj-Gen (R) R Sukoco

Karjono Wirioprawiro
 Prof Dr Suhadi Mangkusuwondo
 Prof Dr Ir Sujanadi Ronohadiwiryo MSc

Agriculture

Minister
 Junior Minister, Food Production
 Secretary-General
 Inspector-General
 Directors-General
 Food Plant Agriculture
 Plantations
 Fisheries
 Forestry
 Animal Husbandry

Prof Ir Sudarsono Hadisaputro
 Ir Ahmad Affandi
 Maj-Gen (R) Panuju
 Maj-Gen (R) R Mung Parhadimulyo*

Ir Wardoyo
 Brig-Gen (?) R Pang Suparto Atmodipuro
 Vice Admiral Iman Sarjono†
 Dr Sujarwo
 Prof Dr Ir Johannes Humantal Hutasoit

Industry

Minister
 Secretary-General
 Inspector-General
 Directors-General
 Basic Metal Industry
 Basic Chemical Industry
 Miscellaneous Industry
 Small Industry

Ir Abdul Rauf Suhud
 Maj-Gen (R) Ir Agus Sujono
 Commodore (R) R. J. Sulamet

Ir Eman Yogasara
 Ir Hartarto Sastrosunarto
 Ir Kusudiarso Hadinoto
 Brig-Gen Gitosewoyo SH

Mining and Energy

Minister
 Secretary-General
 Inspector-General
 Directors-General
 General Mining
 Oil and Natural Gas
 Energy

Prof Dr Subroto
 Drs Sutaryo Sigit
 Col Atwar Nurhadi

Prof Dr John Ario Katili
 Ir Wijarso
 Prof Dr Ir Samaun Samadikun

Public Works

Minister
 Junior Minister, People's Housing
 Secretary-General
 Inspector-General
 Directors-General
 Highways
 Irrigation
 Buildings Construction

Dr Purnomosidi Hajisaroso
 Drs Cosmas Batubara
 Dr Yulianto Mulyodiharjo‡
 Col (R) Imam Sukoto§

Ir Suryatin Sastromijoyo
 Ir Suryono Sosrodarsono||
 Ir Radinal Mochtar

† This position is now occupied by Rear Admiral Aburachman.

‡ Dr Yulianto Mulyodiharjo has died and been replaced by Ir Suryono Sosrodarsono.

§ This position is now occupied by Drs Herman Rusdi Usman.

|| Ir Suryono Sosrodarsono has been replaced by Ir Y. Sudaryoko.

Communications

Minister
 Secretary-General
 Inspector-General
 Directors-General
 Land Communications
 Sea Communications
 Air Communications
 Post and Telecommunications
 Tourism

Air Marshal Rusmin Nuryadin
 Lt-Gen (R) Ahmad Tahir
 Ir Sutomo Adisasmito
 Nazar Nurdin
 Pongky Suparjo†
 Air Vice Marshal (?) Sugiri
 Maj-Gen (R) Suryadi
 Lt-Gen (R) H Ahmad Tirtosudiro‡

Education and Culture

Minister
 Junior-Minister, Youth Affairs
 Secretary-General
 Inspector-General
 Directors-General
 Basic and Secondary Education
 Higher Education
 Extra-curricular Activities,
 Youth and Sports
 Culture

Prof Dr Daud Yusuf
 Air Major Abdul Gafur Tengku Idris
 Lt-Gen (R) Sutanto Wiryoprasonto
 F. X. Sudiyana SH
 Brig-Gen (R) Prof Darji Darmodiharjo SH
 Prof Dr Ir Doddy Achdiyat Tisna Amijaya
 Prof Dr Washington Pandapotan Napitupulu
 Prof Dr Ny Haryati Subadio

Health

Minister
 Secretary-General
 Inspector-General
 Directors-General
 Public Health Development
 Health Services
 Food and Drug Control
 Prevention and Combating of
 Contagious Diseases

Maj-Gen (R) Dr Suwarjono Suryaningrat
 Maj-Gen (R) Dr Suyoto
 Dr Bahrawi Wongsokusomo MPH
 Dr R Subekti Harjodiwiryo MPH
 Dr IGM§ Brata Ranuh MPH
 Dr Midian Sirait
 Dr M. Adhyatma MPH

Religion

Minister
 Secretary-General
 Inspector-General
 Directors-General
 Islamic Guidance and Haj Affairs
 Islamic Institutions Development
 Protestant Guidance
 Catholic Guidance
 Hindu and Buddhist Guidance

Lt-Gen (R) H Alamsyah Ratu Perwiranegara
 Brig-Gen (R) H Aswasmarmo SH
 H Abdul Qadir Basalamah
 Maj-Gen (R) H Ahmad Burhani Cokrohandoko
 H Anton Timur Jaelani MA
 Pestos Nehemia Harefa
 Maj-Gen (R) Ignatius Joko Mulyono
 Gde Puja MA SH

Social Affairs

Minister
 Secretary-General
 Inspector-General

Maj-Gen (R) Sapparjo
 Maj-Gen (R) Albertus Maruli Tambunan
 Maj-Gen (?) Ibnu Hartomo

† No biography available. According to one source, a possible Navy Vice Admiral. However, no military title appears in his Jakarta telephone book listing.

‡ This position is now occupied by Yoop Ave.

§ Balinese title, possibly I Gusti Made.

Directors-General	
Social Development	Drs Agung Yuwono Cokrosuseno
Rehabilitation and Social Services	Drs Yuwono
Social Aid	Drs Ade Harun Alrasyid
Manpower and Transmigration	
Minister	Prof Drs Harun Alrasyid Zain
Junior Minister, Transmigration	
Affairs	Martono
Secretary-General	Maj-Gen (R) Urip Widodo SH
Inspector-General	Maj-Gen (R) H Marsan Siregar SH
Directors-General	
Development and Use of Manpower	Ir Drs Danang Jokowiworo Yudonegoro
Protection and Care of Manpower	Utoyo Usman SH
Transmigration	Maj-Gen (R) H Kadarusno

APPENDIX B
HIGHER STATE INSTITUTIONS AND
NON-DEPARTMENTAL GOVERNMENT BOARDS

The abbreviations and conventions used here parallel those in Appendix A. Positions and incumbents in this list are believed current as of mid-December 1981. Persons with an asterisk after their names, however, are the last known incumbents in their positions and may or may not currently hold them.

Higher State Institutions

People's Consultative Assembly/People's Representative Council (MPR/DPR, Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat/Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat)†

Head	Gen (R) Daryatmo
Deputy Head	Mashuri SH
Deputy Head	Mohamad Isnaeni‡
Deputy Head	KH Masykur
Deputy Head	Maj-Gen (R) R Kartijo Sastrodinoto
Deputy Head	Brig-Gen (R) H Ahmad Lamo
Secretary-General	Lt-Gen Wang Suwandi SH

Supreme Court (Mahkamah Agung)

Head	Lt-Gen Mujono SH
Deputy Head	Purwoto S. Gandasubrata SH

Supreme Advisory Council (DPA, Dewan Pertimbangan Agung)

Head	Dr KH Idham Khalid
Deputy Head	Prof Dr Sunawar Sukowati SH
Deputy Head	Lt-Gen (R) Gusti Pangeran Hario Jatikusumo
Deputy Head	Maj-Gen (R) Dr Sujono Sumodiwiryo
Deputy Head	Dr H Jaelani Naro SH

Supreme Audit Board (Bapeka, Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan)

Head	Gen (R) Umar Wirahadikusumah
Deputy Head	Maj-Gen (R) R H Ahmad Sudrajat

Office of the Attorney-General (Kejaksaan Agung)

Attorney-General	Lt-Gen (R) Ismail Saleh SH
Deputy Attorney-General, Development	Kohar Hari Sumarno SH
Deputy Attorney-General, General Supervision	Brig-Gen Sugiri Cokrodiyo SH
Deputy Attorney-General, Intelligence	Brig-Gen (R) Datuk R. Mulia SH
Deputy Attorney-General, Operations	Muhammad Salim SH

† The same top officials now head both institutions.

‡ Mohamad Isnaeni has been replaced by Drs Harjantho Sumodisastro.

Non-Departmental Government Boards

State Personnel Administration Board (BAKN, Badan Administrasi Kepegawaian Negara)	
Head	Maj-Gen (R) A. E. Manihuruk
State Administration Institute (LAN, Lembaga Administrasi Negara)	
Head	Prof Dr Sondang Paian Siagian MPA
Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS, Biro Pusat Statistik)	
Head	H M. Abdulmajid
State Code Institute (Lembaga Sandi Negara)	
Head	Dr Rubiono Kertopati*
Logistics Affairs Board (Bulog, Badan Urusan Logistik)	
Head	Lt-Gen (R) Bustanil Arifin SH
Deputy Head	Maj-Gen (R) Sukriya Atmaja
National Atomic Energy Agency (Batan, Badan Tenaga Atom Nasional)	
Director-General	Prof A. Baiquni MSc PhD
Telecommunications Council (Dewan Telekomunikasi)	
Head	Air Marshal Rusmin Nuryadin
National Development Planning Board (Bappenas, Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional)	
Head	Prof Dr Wijoyo Nitisastro
Deputy Head	Prof Dr Johannes Baptista Sumarlin
National Space and Aviation Institute (Lapan, Lembaga Penerbangan Antariksa Nasional)	
Head	Air Vice Marshal (R) Dr R Sunaryo
Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI, Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia)	
Head	Prof Dr Ir H Bachtiar Rifai
National Archives (Arsip Nasional)	
Head	Dra Sumartini
National Survey and Mapping Coordination Board (Badan Koordinasi Survey dan Pemetaan Nasional)	
Head	Maj-Gen (?) Ir Pranoto Asmoro

National Defense and Security Council (Wanhankamnas,
Dewan Pertahanan Keamanan Nasional)

Secretary-General
Deputy Secretary-General

Lt-Gen (R) Ahmad Wiranatakusumah
Admiral Mahmud Subarkah

National Family Planning Coordinating Board (BKKBN,
Badan Koordinasi Keluarga Berencana Nasional)

Head

Maj-Gen (R) Dr Suwarjono Suryaningrat

Capital Investment Coordinating Board
(BKPM, Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal)

Head

Ir Suhartoyo

Technology Study and Application Board (BPPT,
Badan Pengkajian dan Penerapan Teknologi)

Head

Prof Dr Ir Baharuddin Yusuf Habibie

Bank Indonesia

Governor

Drs Rahmat Saleh SE

Operation Order Central
(Opstibpus, Operasi Tertib Pusat)

Head

Maj-Gen Empi Yohan Kanter SH†

Board for Molding, Education, Implementation, Orientation,
Living and Practice of the Five Basic Principles (BP7,
Badan Pembinaan Pendidikan Pelaksanaan Pedoman
Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila)‡

Head

Maj-Gen (R) Hari Suharto SH

State Intelligence Coordinating Body
(Bakin, Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara)§

Head
Deputy Head

Gen (R) Yoga Sugama
Lt-Gen L. Benny Murdani

† Apparently still on active duty although past age 55.

‡ Not readily comprehensible either in Indonesian or English. This is also at least the second version of what the seven Ps stand for. For the political significance of this, see David Jenkins, "The Tale of P4--and How P7 Irked P3," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 24, 1981.

§ Not listed as Non-Departmental Government Board in any official listing but included here on de facto basis.

APPENDIX C
SELECTED BIOGRAPHIC SOURCE MATERIALS

The variety of sources from which biographic information on the Indonesian military may be drawn is quite large. What appears below reflects only one of these types of sources: compilations of biographies using a uniform format. Most of these resources also include numerous biographies of civilians. Name lists of several types proved quite valuable as well but are not included here. The author would appreciate knowing of additional major compilations.

Major Biographic Compilations

A. Official Hankam Directories

Departemen Pertahanan-Kemampuan, Pusat Sejarah ABRI. *Siapa-apa (Who's Who) Pejabat Teras Hankam/ABRI*. Penerbitan Sementara Edisi Ketiga. 1971.

Departemen Pertahanan-Kemampuan, Lembaga Sejarah. *Siapa-apa (Who's Who) Staf Pertahanan-Kemampuan*. Penerbitan Sementara Pertama. 1967.

B. Official and Quasi-Official DPR/MPR Directories

Lembaga Pemilihan Umum. *Buku Pelengkap IV Pemilihan Umum 1977. Ringkasan Riwayat Hasil Pemilihan Tahun 1977. Buku I. Buku II.* (2 vol.) Circa 1978.

Lembaga Pemilihan Umum. *Ringkasan Riwayat Hidup Anggota DPRD-I. Hasil Pemilihan Umum Tahun 1977 untuk Wilayah Jawa.* 1979.

Lembaga Pemilihan Umum. *Ringkasan Riwayat Hidup Anggota DPRD-I. Hasil Pemilihan Umum Tahun 1977 untuk Wilayah Sumatera.* 1979.

Departemen Dalam Negeri, Direktorat Jenderal Sosial Politik (Direktorat Pembinaan Umum). *Ringkasan Riwayat Hidup Anggota DPRD-I. Hasil Pemilihan Umum Tahun 1977 untuk Wilayah Kalimantan & Sulawesi.* 1980.

Departemen Dalam Negeri, Direktorat Jenderal Sosial Politik (Direktorat Pembinaan Umum). *Ringkasan Riwayat Hidup Anggota DPRD-I. Hasil Pemilihan Umum Tahun 1977 untuk Wilayah Nusa Tenggara, Maluku, dan Irian Jaya.* 1980.

Lembaga Pemilihan Umum. *Riwayat Hidup Anggota-Anggota Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Hasil Pemilihan Umum 1971.* (1 vol.) Circa 1973.

Parlaungan, compiler. *Hasil Rakjat Memilih Tokoh-Tokoh Parlemen (Hasil Pemilihan Umum Pertama--1955) di Republik Indonesia.* 1956.

Kementerian Penerangan. *Kami Perkenalkan.....!* 1954.

C. Privately Published Directories

Tim Redaksi Majalah Tempo. *Apa & Siapa Sejumlah Orang Indonesia 1981-1982.* Jakarta: Grafiti Pers, 1981.

Roeder, O. G., and Mahmud, Mahiddin, compilers. *Who's Who in Indonesia.* Singapore: Gunung Agung, 1980.

Roeder, O. G. *Who's Who in Indonesia.* Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1971.

The Indonesian Military Leaders: Biographical and Other Background Data. 2nd ed. Jakarta: Sritua Arief Associates, 1979.

Who's Who in Indonesian Military. 1st ed. Jakarta: Sritua Arief Associates, 1977.

Who's Who in Indonesian Business. 1st ed. Jakarta: Sritua Arief Associates, 1975.

D. Official Japanese Source

Gunseikanbu. *Orang Indonesia Jang Terkemoeka di Djawa*. Tjetakan Pertama. 2604 (1944).

Minor Biographic Compilations

Departemen Sosial, Badan Pembina Pahlawan Pusat. *Pahlawan Pembela Kemerdekaan*. Seri Pahlawan Nasional. 1972.

Angkatan Darat, Pusat Sejarah Militer. *Biografi 9 Pahlawan Revolusi Indonesia*. Undated.

APPENDIX D
 SELECTED MONOGRAPH LENGTH STUDIES
 ON THE INDONESIAN MILITARY

Below is a reading list of monograph length studies focusing explicitly on the Indonesian military or containing much significant material on it not easily available elsewhere. Relevant article-length materials and general works on Indonesian politics have been excluded in the interest of drawing attention to a limited number of studies containing large amounts of information. The list is not exhaustive. Western sources in English prevail, but some Indonesian primary sources and a variety of viewpoints are represented.

- Akhmadi, Heri. *Breaking the Chains of Oppression of the Indonesian People*. Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project Translation Series, 1981.
- Anderson, David. "Military Politics in East Java: A Study of the Origins and Development of the Armed Forces in East Java between 1945-1948." Ph.D. dissertation, London School of Economics and Political Science, 1976.
- Anderson, Benedict, and McVey, Ruth. *A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965 Coup in Indonesia*. Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project Interim Reports Series, 1971.
- Crouch, Harold. *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978.
- Departemen Pertahanan-Kemampuan, Markas Besar Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat. *Dharma Pusaka 45*. Jakarta, 1972.
- Departemen Pertahanan-Kemampuan, Sekolah Staf dan Komando Angkatan Darat. *Doktrin Perdjuangan TNI-AD "TRI-UBAYA-CAKTI"*. Bandung, 1966.
- Departemen Pertahanan-Kemampuan, Staf Teritorial. *Doktrin Teritorial Nusantara. Buku-I & Buku-II*. Jakarta, 1978.
- Departemen Pertahanan-Kemampuan, Pusat Sejarah ABRI. *30 Tahun Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia*. Jakarta, 1976.
- Gregory, Ann. "Recruitment and Factional Patterns of the Indonesian Political Elite: Guided Democracy and the New Order." Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1976.
- Harvey, Barbara. *Permesta: Half a Rebellion*. Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project Monograph Series, 1977.
- Harvey, Barbara. "Tradition, Islam, and Rebellion: South Sulawesi 1950-1965." Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1974.
- Hering, B. B. *Sukarno and His Soldiers: A Documentary Study of the T.N.I.* Brussels: Centre du Sud-Est Asiatique et de l'Extreme Orient Monograph Series, 1977.
- Maynard, Harold. "A Comparison of Military Elite Role Perceptions in Indonesia and the Philippines." Ph.D. dissertation, The American University, 1976.
- McVey, Ruth. "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army, Part I," *Indonesia*, 11 (April 1971), pp. 131-76; and "Part II," *Indonesia*, 13 (April 1972), pp. 147-81.

- Mrazek, Rudolf. *The United States and the Indonesian Military 1945-1965: A Study of an Intervention*. (2 vols.) Prague: Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences Oriental Institute, 1968.
- Moehkardi. *Akademi Militer Yogya Dalam Perjuangan Pisik 1945-1949*. Jakarta: PT Inaltu, 1977.
- Muhammad Rusli Karim. *Peranan ABRI Dalam Politik*. Jakarta: Yayasan Idayu, 1981.
- Nasution, Abdul Haris. *Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare*. Singapore: Donald Moore Books, 1965.
- Notosusanto, Nugroho. *The PETA Army during the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia*. Tokyo: Waseda University Press, 1979.
- Pauker, Guy. *The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management*. Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1963.
- Robison, Richard. "Capitalism and the Bureaucratic State in Indonesia, 1965-1975." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Sydney, 1977.
- Roeder, O. G. *The Smiling General: President Suharto of Indonesia*. Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1970.
- Simatupang, Tahi Bonar. *Report from Banaran: Experiences during the People's War*. Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project Translation Series, 1972.
- Sundhaussen, Ulf. "The Political Orientations and Political Involvement of the Indonesian Officer Corps 1945-1966: The Siliwangi Division and the Army Headquarters." Ph.D. dissertation, Monash University, 1971.
- Utrecht, Ernst. *The Indonesian Army: A Socio-political Study of an Armed, Privileged Group in the Developing Countries*. Queensland: James Cook University South East Asian Monograph Series, 1980.