The diary provides an extensive record of the political developments which took place in Surakarta over these years. Its information is not, however, presented as a continuous narrative, and the author never supplies a résumé of previous events; nor does she set her narrative within a framework of political theory. It therefore often appears cryptic to an outsider, and more so on those occasions where it is clear that the diarist herself was not party to the political strategies of all those involved in the developments unfolding as she wrote. Even Mangkunégara himself, with whom the diarist was closest, may at times have had reason to be less than frank and open with her about his intentions. Nevertheless, the general trend of developments in the different relationships involved could not be kept secret, and angry interviews and hurried nocturnal consultations did not escape the notice of the court abdi (retainers). It is clear too that Mangkunégara liked to maintain the morale of his followers by keeping them informed of any political gain he felt he had made, or any stand he took for what he believed was right. Because of the sometimes artless, sometimes summary, style of the diarist, and the sparseness of her interpretative comment, the present writer has found it essential to use the letters of V.O.C. officials, reporting on the political developments they saw, to fill in the lacunae and elucidate the way in which a linked series of events unfolded in Surakarta over this period: on their own, the entries of the diary often appear as a series of not obviously connected stills, like the changing pictures of a bioscope. The material of the diary has not been amalgamated with that from the V.O.C. archives, however: the testimony of the diarist is presented in italics followed by the data from V.O.C. archives and the present writer's comments and explanations. By this separation, it is hoped that the reader may be able to form some idea of the perceptions of the two sides of a particular political and cultural encounter, and to see where they diverge and where they coincide. It should be noted that only entries dealing with political events of major importance have been included, and that many others, noting less important "political" events,¹ have

¹ Omission of this detail weakens, however, the impression that the diary gives of a fairly high level of political turbulence: see below p. 109.
been omitted in the interests of brevity and relative coherence of presentation. Developments are presented in simple chronological order, as they occur in the diary. Initially, it had seemed that a better analytical perspective might be achieved by analyzing the different relationships involved—between the Mangkunegaran and the Pakubuwanan houses, between the Pakubuwanan and the V.O.C., between the Mangkunegaran and Yogyakarta, etc.—under separate headings, but this separation was impossible to maintain, for developments (or even expected developments) in one relationship clearly very much affected the balance of others.

* * *

Prelude

The first entry dealing with political affairs of major importance occurs under Slasa-Pon 26 Sapar 1710 AJ [Tuesday, January 20, 1784 AD] recording that the Dutch Resident [F. C. van Straalendorff] gave Mangkunegara a letter from the Governor of the northeast coast [Johannes Siberg], promising him the V.O.C.'s protection both for himself and for his descendants provided they remained allies of the Company. Furthermore, Mangkunegara was promised the succession to the throne of Mataram if the Sultan should die.

In the events of 1790-91, an alleged undertaking by Siberg that Mangkunegara would become ruler of Yogyakarta if the first Sultan predeceased him was to be a major factor in the maneuvers of the different parties. This record in the diary supports the interpretation that Mangkunegara, at least, genuinely believed that such an undertaking had been made by a representative of the V.O.C. As regards the second part of the entry, it is noticeable how, even outside times of crisis or of succession to the throne, the Mangkunegaran was very conscious of the proximity of Yogyakarta. There are a number of entries in the diary reporting the presence of Mataram "spies," presumably with a reciprocal interest in Surakarta.

In Puasa 1712 [July 1786] "letters from Mecca" arrived in the mosques of Sala, Pranaraga, and Patiyaniman. These were "Arabic letters calling on the forgetful to come to their senses," and were "suppressed" by the Sunan.

The diarist's entry on these admonitory letters is unfortunately very brief—unfortunately, because it tells us only enough to know that these letters must have been in the same vein as two which were discovered in Surakarta nearly eighteen months later, and which caused Greeve, Siberg's successor as Governor of the northeast coast, a great deal of concern on account of their political implications.  

2. 31R. It was this same letter, as reported by the diarist, which exempted Mangkunegara from observing the awisan: see Part I, p. 38.
3. The two major successor states to the former kingdom of Mataram are usually known as the Sunanate of Surakarta and the Sultanate of Yogyakarta. Because Yogyakarta was situated in the region of Mataram, however, it inherited the old name, which is often used by the diarist. She also uses the toponym Sala (pronunciation and modern spelling Solo) much more frequently than the official designation Surakarta to refer to the kraton (negri sala), its ruler (prabu sala) and his people (wong sala).
4. "tɛlik mataram": see, for example, 68R, 169R, 211L.
5. "surat arab ingkang lali kinen emut" (81L).
6. "sinilɛp" (ibid.).
7. See Greeve to Batavia, January 1, 1788, in Koloniaal Archief [henceforth KA]
Greeve's two letters purport to be from a king who is "from Mecca" but has a Javanese title (Susuhunan Ayunjaya Adimurti Senapati Inggalaga) and who will come soon and displace the present king of Sala. The latter is described as dishonoring his royal and priestly forbears, being himself nothing less than the Devil's king, a rebel against God and the angels, an enemy of his country, one who gives no good law, and in whose land food and clothing are expensive and rain scarce. The letters comment sharply on the present ruler's alliance with the Europeans ("A King of the Europeans, you please God no more; it is finished with you; get out, you apostate from the Faith!") and deride his reliance upon them. ("Shall the Europeans, then, indeed be more powerful than God?") They are couched in esoteric terminology and make reference to omens such as rainbows of different colors.

There is a gap of some eighteen months between the letters reported by the diarist and those reported by V.O.C. officials: the diarist mentions no later letters, the V.O.C. officials no earlier ones. Were they the same letters? It is unlikely that they would have remained in circulation for so long, especially if, as the diarist claims, the Sunan wished to suppress them. It seems more probable that the phenomenon of prophetic, warning letters was more widespread than the V.O.C. was aware: Arabic letters posted in mosques were not likely to come to the attention of the Dutch representation, especially since it was then led by the highly unreliable and self-interested Palm. The circumstance that the letters reported by the diarist were posted in the fasting-month lends support to this supposition, for this was the time of year when a devout Muslim could be expected to call on his co-religionists to remember their religious duties. The evidence of the diary also shows that such letters were posted as mosques in places outside the capital (one of them in a region, Pranaraga, where Mangkunégara's sons held appanages). Finally, the Sunan's suppression of the earlier letters suggests that they too were unflattering in their description of his rule.

In the same month, Raden Mas Kareta, half-brother of Mangkunégara and father of Wirakusuma, returned to Sala from exile.8

As we shall see, these relatives of Mangkunégara, and particularly Wirakusuma, were shortly to achieve importance through the actions of the Crown Prince, heir to Pakubuwana III.

At the end of the month of Dulkaidah 1712 AJ [late September 1786] 160 Yogyakarta soldiers from two prajurit corps visited Sala and gave békasa performances for the Sunan, as well as in the Dutch loji [factory].9

After the death of the Dutch (First) Resident Palm in 1789, the Sunan's court made serious complaints to Governor Greeve about Palm's behavior, which are discussed below. Among the numerous grievances listed was that Palm had compelled the kraton to receive a dance-party from Yogyakarta.10

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8. 81.
9. 85L, 88L.
10. See Greeve to Batavia, July 5, 1789, in KA 3708, VOCOB, 1789. Greeve says
The Formation of an Alliance

On 14 Rabiulakir 1713 AJ [February 3, 1787 AD] the Sunan's Patih, Jayaningrat, came to ask Mangkunegara whether he dared to intensify his quarrel with the Sultan of Mataram, or not; to which Mangkunegara replied that the intensification or slackening-off of the quarrel would be according to what the Sunan himself desired: he, Mangkunegara, would accede to either decision. 11

A couple of months later Mangkunegara's son, Raden Suryakusuma, whose appanage was in Pranaraga, married the Sunan's daughter, Raden Ayu Supiyah. The preparations for, and celebration of, the marriage are described in some detail. 12

Eight people were arrested on the order of the Sunan. These were Wirakusuma, the Crown Prince's Patih, and his associates, including one woman and a certain Haji Jakariya.

Shortly after this, the Sunan requested Mangkunegara to appoint one of his men, Nur Besari, one of the Mangkunegaran kaum, as a sort of liaison officer with the Sunan's establishment, so that the two houses would be able to work things out together. 13

Listed thus without context or background, these events do not immediately suggest that significant developments were underway in Surakarta. From the archival records, however, it is clear that the Crown Prince, though still very young, was already attempting to impose his own ideas. A letter from Palm to Siberg in April 1787 mentions that the recently returned Raden Mas Kareta had been permitted by Pakubuwana III to wear the European clothes (complete with wig) which he favored, but that the Crown Prince had forced him to revert to traditional Javanese attire. 14 This was in the context of the Crown Prince's association with "Muslim Popes" who had even, according to Palm, begun attacking the Sultan of Mataram's subjects and driving them from their rice-fields. These men, among them Wirakusuma, were subsequently exiled by the Dutch at the request of the old Sunan, and the Crown Prince even thanked the Resident—or so the Resident reported 15—for only that this happened "some time ago," but Ricklefs dates the visit to 1785 on the basis of Yogyakarta sources. Ricklefs, Jogjakarta, p. 284 n. and p. 298. There seems no reason to doubt the diarist's date, however, in view of her usual accuracy when checked against archival records, and it seems both from the diary and from Greeve's letter than only one visit was made.

11. 101: nulya ing malėm jumungah / tanggal kawan wēlas ing rabiylakir / papatih janingrat rawuh / sowan pangran dipatya / pinanggiyan ing kamar asuka rēmbug / pabēn lan wong kasultanan / pangran dipati tinari // purunēn kēncēng lan nora / aturira pangran dipatya / punapa karsaning ratu / sumongga karsa nata / kēncēng tumut lamun kēndo inggih tumut / punapa karsaning nata / pangran dipati umiring // Two syllables are lacking from the second line of the second verse; the last vowel here should be an i.

12. 98-110. See also Part I, pp. 36-37.

13. 111-112.

14. 2. Siberg to Batavia, April 26, 1787, in KA 3655, VOCOB, 1788. These events are also described in Ricklefs, Jogjakarta, p. 270 and pp. 287-88. Note however that R. M. Kareta was not Mangkunegara's brother but his half-brother, and that Ricklefs incorrectly reconstructs his name as "Krēti."

15. See Siberg to Batavia, July 13, 1787, in KA 3655, VOCOB, 1788.
showing him what evil counselors they had been. But the elements present in this episode—Islam, nativism and aggression towards Mataram—were to recur in the Crown Prince's later career as Sunan Pakubuwana IV. As late as 1792 (that is, after the timespan of the diary), he was to request the V.O.C. to allow Wirakusuma to return from exile, a request which was, however, refused. 16

The second important development began with the first tentative steps towards an alliance between the Sunan's house and the Mangkunegaran. In view of the difficulties this would later produce for the V.O.C., it is ironic that the Company itself had first used its influence in promoting the alliance, for the marriage between Mangkunegara's son and the Sunan's daughter was arranged only after Palm's intervention. The Sunan had already refused three times to give a daughter to a prince of the Mangkunegaran. 17 From the diary it becomes clear that at the same time as the Sunan was being pressured by the V.O.C. to consent to this marriage, he was sounding out Mangkunegara to see if he could count on him as an ally against Mataram. And after the marriage went through, we see the appointment of a liaison officer, Nur Bésari, for cooperation between the two houses.

Early in 1714 AJ the Sunan's men were hard at work reconstructing the pagélaran and leveling the alun-alun. The Sunan asked Mangkunegara to provide men for this work, but Mangkunegara declined to do so. 18 Evidently the Resident had supported or prompted the Sunan's request, for some time later, on 19 Mulud [December 29, 1787] the former came to visit Mangkunegara in a bitter mood, and accused the prince of carrying tales to the Governor of the northeast coast [presumably in the letter which he had recently despatched but whose contents are not recorded by the diarist]. Mangkunegara replied that there had now been five Residents and four Patih, 19 but he had never before been required to do this work: his obligations were only to work on the loji and the Pëngging canal; 20 and to see that his taxes were paid. He went on to say that he had not appeared in audience at the Garëbég celebrations because the Sunan had been sick: he had in fact been prevented from visiting him. It would be improper for him to be seen in public eating and drinking at a celebration while the ruler was sick. He then refused the Resident's invitation to celebrate the Dutch New Year at the loji for the same reason, and Palm retired. The diarist comments that he was in the wrong, and looked it.

Mangkunegara was not the only member of the Surakarta aristocracy who had a quarrel with Palm. Resident Palm died on May 11, 1788, 21 and it was only then that Greve realized that something was seriously wrong. The Sunan's court complained that (apart from insulting them by such offenses against manners as the serving of "spoiled drinks" at receptions), Palm had interfered in their judicial decisions, and exacted an enormous amount of unpaid labor for building works, not only on the Company's buildings but also for his private benefit, beating and

16. See van Overstraten to Batavia, March 2, 1792, in KA 3859, VOCOB, 1793.
18. 124.
19. That is, in Mangkunegara's time in Surakarta, and including the Resident and Patih of the time.
20. Maintenance of this canal was a fairly onerous task, for there were frequent breakthroughs of its water, leading to flooding.
mistreating the laborers and keeping them from attending to their rice-fields.\textsuperscript{22} Mangkunegara was not the man to be browbeaten into undertaking more than his established obligations, and it was probably because of his obduracy over providing labor and his general resistance to Palm's high-handedness that the latter had reported him to Greeve for various misdemeanors. When Greeve informed Mangkunegara of Palm's accusation that he had not attended the Garébeg celebrations, Mangkunegara replied that he had been denied access to the palace, and Greeve then requested Palm not to offend the old prince. Palm assured the Governor that "no Javanese, much less Mangkunegara, has ever been offended by me."\textsuperscript{23} A more serious accusation which Palm made at this time was that Mangkunegara was carrying on a clandestine correspondence with his ex-wife, Ratu Bendiara. (See further below.) This accusation is not recorded in the diary.

\textit{A maulana and indung\textsuperscript{24}} of Mangkunegara, by name Ki Démak, was arrested on 7 Rabiulakir 1714 AJ [January 16, 1788] because Tumenggung Puspanegara\textsuperscript{25} told tales (wadul) to the Company. Six days later, Puspanegara arrived unexpectedly at the Mangkunegaran to bring this message: the Sunan [Pakubuwana III] begged his elder brother's [i.e., Mangkunegara's] forgiveness for past errors and wrong actions. Furthermore, let him give advice and correction to the heir apparent, and to all the Sunan's Tumenggung and Wédana. Let him not forsake us!

This extraordinarily conciliating and respectful plea conveys the implication that Pakubuwana III well knew that Mangkunegara must have been tried to the limit by the arrest of his indung, and begged him to understand the circumstances which would compel the Sunan to execute Ki Démak. The announcement of the execution came next day, when two messengers came from the Sunan asking Mangkunegara's permission to have Ki Démak torn to pieces on the morrow. The diarist says he was accused of practicing sorcery on a certain Wringin Anom. Mangkunegara said only "As the king wishes"; and the execution---presided over by the Crown Prince in place of his ailing father, and witnessed by all the court, including the sélir, and by the Dutch officials, but not by Mangkunegara---duly took place. Ki Démak had his skin cut from his body and his throat cut; Tanjung Anom was burnt.\textsuperscript{26}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{22} See Greeve to Batavia, July 5, 1788, in KA 3708, VOCOB, 1789.
\item \textsuperscript{23} See Greeve to Batavia, January 1, 1788, in KA 3708, VOCOB, 1789.
\item \textsuperscript{24} \textit{indung} is a term used in a number of senses, for example, to denote a person who lives in his own house built on land owned by someone else (see G. P. Rouffaer, "Vorstenlanden," \textit{Adatrechtbundels} 134 [1931], p. 204). It seems likely in this context however that it denotes a kraton official of a particular rank, one below those of panewu, wadana, and kliwon. (For the use of pangindung as a title of office, see Soeripto, \textit{Ontwikkelingsgang der vorstenlandsche wetboeken} [Leiden: Ijdo, 1929], pp. 141-43; also G. J. Oudemans, \textit{Javaansche wetten en andere bepalingen, geldig in Jogjakarta ten dienste van landhuurders, beheerders en geemploieerden van ondernemingen en van den Javaansche ambtenaren in dat gewest} [Yogyakarta: Buning, 1897], 1, p. 142.)
\item \textsuperscript{25} A Tumenggung Puspanegara had been dismissed from his position as an officer in Mangkunegara's "Kanoman" corps about a year and a half earlier, after being accused of highway robbery (83L). If this is the same man as the Tumenggung Puspanegara who appears here as someone in the Sunan's service, he would have had an obvious reason to bear a grudge against Mangkunegara, and perhaps also have access to information about suspicious personages under his protection.
\item \textsuperscript{26} 133L-135L.
\end{itemize}
Ki Démak—according to the diarist a maulana, one distinguished in Islamic learning, and from his name perhaps an authority connected with the religious center of Démak—was accused by Palm of being the author of the two admonitory and "seditious" letters which had so worried Greeve, and, according to the Dutch record, that was the reason for his execution. The "Tanjung Anom" executed with him was implicated in the same matter, for he was named as one of the envoys of the "ruler of Mecca" prophesied in the letters to come and displace the existing, compromised, ruler of Surakarta. Immediately after Palm's death, Greeve received a letter from Pakubuwana III which actually requested the Resident's dismissal, and, among many other complaints, claimed that Palm had enforced the burning of Ki Démak, a form of sentence unheard of on Java. (The diarist, it will be noted, reports that while Tanjung Anom was burnt Ki Démak suffered an even more barbarous end.) Greeve himself was never convinced that Ki Démak was the real culprit, and the fact that the diarist makes no mention of any letters is not only surprising in view of the Dutch concern to find their author, but also suggests that Ki Démak and his associates in the Mangkunegaran really did have nothing to do with the letters. It seems that Palm had put pressure on the ailing Pakubuwana III to execute Ki Démak and thus satisfy his superiors in the Company by providing a culprit. The Sunan had thus been caught between the pressure from Palm and the expected wrath of Mangkunegara at the execution of the maulana, who was under his protection—reinforced, it would seem, by the Crown Prince's resistance to Palm's attempts to force his wishes upon the court. At the same time as Greeve received news of the Surakarta court's numerous complaints about Palm (his action over Ki Démak, his insults, his exactions of labor, and his interference in the Sunan's jurisdiction over his subjects), he was also informed of the dismissal of Tumenggung Puspanegara, Palm's favorite, whom the Resident had forced the Sunan to appoint in preference to his own son-in-law. Since Puspanegara ended his career in the wilderness of Ayah (the usual place of exile from the Surakarta kraton) at the Crown Prince's instigation, it is likely that the Prince owed his dismissal to the same political adversary. One question remains as a matter of speculation: did one of those to whom Palm's demands were becoming more than could be tolerated—Mangkunegara himself, Pakubuwana III, or (a more likely candidate than his declining father) the Crown Prince—in fact find a release from the situation in poisoning the odious Resident? Greeve himself suspected that this might have been the case, and it may be that, while Pakubuwana had restricted himself to requesting Palm's dismissal, he had been forestalled by the more direct action of one of his relatives.

Palm was replaced by Andries Hartsinck, the Resident of Rëmbang, whose appointment had been recommended by Greeve on May 12 and was ratified before June 12, when the new Resident set out for Surakarta. When Greeve himself visited Surakarta, in August, he had the opportunity of discussing with Mangkunegara Palm's accusation that he had been carrying on a clandestine correspondence with his ex-wife, Ratu Bëndara, who had been back with her father, the Sultan of Yogyakarta, for twenty-five years. Mangkunegara indignantly denied this accusation. On reviewing the reports he had received from the Yogyakarta Resident, van Ijsseldijk, which consistently stated that it was highly improbable

27. See Greeve to Batavia, January 29, 1788, in KA 3708, VOCOB, 1789.
28. Greeve to Batavia, July 5, 1788, in KA 3708, VOCOB, 1789.
29. See 149L for the record of Puspanegara's exile.
30. Greeve to Batavia, June 12, 1788, in KA 3708, VOCOB, 1789.
31. See, for example, van Ijsseldijk's letters of January 4 and 9, in KA 3708, VOCOB, 1789.
that Ratu Bündara had either motivation or opportunity to carry on such a risky connection, Greeve concluded that Palm had in fact manufactured the description he had given (with much circumstantial and sentimental detail) of Mangkunėgara's "confession" to him, "brother Palm," on January 5. Such was the end of Palm's Residency and its legacy. His successor Hartsinck was to provide no fewer surprises.

The diarist records another source of political turbulence in the region at the end of Palm's period of office and continuing into that of his successor: the matter of Brangtakusuma. Palm is recorded as asking Mangkunėgara on 12 Rabiulakir 1714 AJ [January 21, 1788] to arrest Brangtakusuma. On this matter too, Mangkunėgara refused to oblige Palm, but Brangtakusuma was nevertheless subsequently arrested and sent to Sēmarang on 1 Besar 1714 AJ [September 2, 1788].

Brangtakusuma was one of the numerous sons of Pangeran Rangga of Jajar who were still at large in the Grobogan area. The family was revered because of their descent from the wali Sunan Kalijaga and Pangeran Rangga himself had been a rebel of exceptional reputation. It was alleged that Mangkunėgara's eldest son, Pangeran Prabu Amijaya, had supported him, and this may have been the reason behind the Mangkunėgara's unwillingness to assist in the round-up of Rangga's sons, though Palm's general conduct would have made their cooperation unlikely even on neutral matters. Brangtakusuma and two of his brothers, Ranggakusuma and Sumawijaya, surrendered to Palm, and were interviewed by Greeve on his visit to central Java. Greeve also hoped to persuade the Sultan of Yogyakarta to hand over four other brothers at this time. Subsequently, Brangtakusuma showed evidence that he did not really repent of his former lawless life, and was indeed sent off to Sēmarang, on September 1st or 2nd. The two other brothers, appearing more compliant, were provided with the means to live a settled life.33 34

On 21 Arwah 1714 AJ [May 27, 1788], not long after Palm's death and Tumēnggung Puspanėgara's dismissal, Pakubuwana III bestowed the title "Pangeran Mangkubumi" on Mangkunėgara's grandson, hitherto known as Pangeran Surya Mataram (and as a boy as Raden Mas Sadat).35 On 21 Dulkaidah [August 23, 1788], however, the Resident came to the Mangkunėgara kraton to ask that the name be changed: the Sunan had given in to pressure from the Company. Discussions between the Sunan, the Company, and Mangkunėgara followed. The Resident proposed the name "Natakusuma," which Mangkunėgara favored; the Sunan suggested "Candrakusuma." Eventually, "Surya Prang Wadana" was agreed upon; but the young prince felt great shame at his change of name, and in the Mangkunėgara kraton was called simply "Pangeran Wetan" ("the Prince of the East").

While the discussions over the name were taking place, the Crown Prince of Mataram made a trip to Dēlanggu with three relatives and his army. The Resident came to tell Mangkunėgara to be on his guard, and the prince gave orders to his army to defend Surakarta. A party of the elite corps was sent out to Dēlanggu but found that the Crown Prince had turned back the same day.

32. See Palm's letter of January 6, appended in Greeve to Batavia, January 12, 1788, in KA 3708, VOCOB, 1789.
33. See Greeve to Batavia, August 29, September 3, and September 10, in KA 3708, VOCOB, 1789.
34. 148R. R. M. Sadat had celebrated his fourteenth birthday on 15 Arwah 1707 AJ [August 6, 1781 AD]--4R.
35. 148R-166R.
These events—the bestowing of the name "Mangkubumi" and the hostile reaction to this act which followed from the side of Yogyakarta—were to be repeated almost exactly in the more serious political crisis of 1790.

The information which Greeve's letters give on the events of 1788 is as follows: on June 12 the bestowal of the new name on Pangeran Surya Mataram was noted. On August 22, following upon his visit to Yogyakarta, Greeve wrote to Resident Hartsinck asking him to request Mangkunégara to agree to accepting another name, which would be given in the name of the "keijzer" (the Sunan) and the Company, and therefore carry even greater honor to the recipient: the Sunan had already agreed to this after Greeve had talked to him. It appears that the Sultan of Yogyakarta had not actually objected to the name Mangkubumi until he heard of the excessive exuberance and glee which Mangkunégara had displayed over the matter. After this, the Sultan went so far as to tell his Patih, Danurêja, in the presence of the Yogyakarta Resident van Ijssel dijk that, if any Surakarta men committed offenses (such as cattle stealing or other aggressions) against his people, they should be put to death. Van Ijssel dijk expostulated that assaults against subjects of the other principality were always dealt with by the intervention of the Residents (and not by direct reprisal), and evil consequences would follow if this arrangement were to be abandoned. The Sultan replied that that would not be on his head, and that the name should be withdrawn within ten days. On September 2, Hartsinck reported to Greeve the intrusion of the "large party of armed men" under the command of the Yogyakarta Crown Prince together with Pangeran Ingabei and Pangeran Dipakusuma (also given as Jayakusuma) to Dëlanggu. Later, it appeared that the Sultan had in fact sent out a second armed party.

When asked to account for this incident, the Sultan told van Ijssel dijk that the Crown Prince had acted without his knowledge and would be reprimanded. He added, however, that he must have taken this action because he was "his father's son," and could not bear to think of anyone else claiming equality with his father (by assuming the name he had borne as a prince). Ricklefs is of the opinion that the Dëlanggu trip was probably without aggressive intention. However, although it is impossible to know with certainty how far he might have gone, the Sultan's earlier instructions to Danurêja and the fact that he sent out a second armed party, taken together, indicate a strong and direct reaction from Yogyakarta. Greeve's own guess was that the Sultan was trying to see what impact a

36. According to Ricklefs, Jogjakarta, pp. 262 and 300, the name "Surya Mataram" had been disallowed by the Company in 1780. This does not accord with the evidence of the diary (where it is used for this prince up until the granting of the name "Mangkubumi"), nor with this letter, where Surya Mataram is described as a "grandson of the Sunan and son of Pangeran Prabu." He was the son of Pangeran (Arya) Prabu (Amijaya), Mangkunégara's eldest son, and a daughter of Pakubuwana III.

37. See Greeve to Hartsinck, August 22, enclosed in Greeve to Batavia, August 29, in KA 3708, VOCOB, 1789.

38. See van Ijssel dijk to Greeve, August 28, and the Sultan to Greeve, August 29, enclosed in Greeve to Batavia, September 3, in KA 3708, VOCOB, 1789.

39. See van Ijssel dijk to Greeve, September 6, in Greeve to Batavia, September 10, in KA 3708, VOCOB, 1789.

40. See Greeve to Batavia, September 10, in KA 3708, VOCOB, 1789.

surprise attack would have on Sala, where Pakubuwana III was in a very weak condition, while at the same time expressing his old hatred for Mangkunégara.

In Java many names could only be taken by people of a certain rank. For obvious reasons, names such as Buminata ("ruler of the world") and Mangkubumi ("he who holds the world in his lap") were the prerogatives of royalty. When a further crisis arose the following year over the second bestowal of the name "Mangkubumi" in Surakarta, the Sultan went so far as to state in a letter to the Company that no two people could have the same name. He claimed that he intended to change the name of his son-in-law Jayaningrat in order not to offend the Surakarta Patih of the same name, who was senior to him; and gave further examples of a junior person being required to give up a certain name already borne by a senior. Yet it seems that this principle was not applied in any uniform or straightforward manner, at least now that there were three courts more concerned with maintaining their independence of action than with cooperation. Pakubuwana IV was to claim, when the second "Mangkubumi" affair arose, that this name was not currently borne by the Sultan and could therefore be taken by someone else. It may also be noted that "Mangkunégara" was part of the title of the Yogyakarta Crown Prince (as of all Mataram crown princes) yet was also prominently displayed in Surakarta. It is clear that the fact that "Mangkubumi" had been the Sultan's own name, and that its bestowal on a Mangkunégaran prince had been the occasion for triumphant exuberance, had given particular offense. Yet Pakubuwana III also vetoed "Natakusuma," favored by Mangkunégara, on the grounds that it was currently borne by a Yogyakarta prince, and would therefore be likely to give rise to further opposition from that side.

While noting the humiliation which the withdrawal of the title "Mangkubumi" had caused in the Mangkunégaran, the diarist also makes it quite clear that the cause of this humiliation was pressure applied by the Company, in response to the reaction from the Sultan of Mataram over the appropriation of "his" name. Though the Sunan, now very sick, had given way before this pressure he was not himself complicit in the humiliation: rather, he was doing a great deal to improve the fortunes of Mangkunégaran's sons. Before the Company asked that the name Mangkubumi be withdrawn, the Sunan had agreed to provide SuryamSrjaya with an appanage in Wirasaba, and also to elevate Suryakusuma, who was married to the Sunan's daughter, to the rank of Pangeran (he became Pangeran Purbanagara) and to increase his appanage lands with the addition of Trénggalek. After the withdrawal of the title Mangkubumi, a messenger came from the Sunan to the Mangkunégaran announcing that yet another of Mangkunégaran's sons, Suryadimurti, would be given a position in MamSnang: this was apparently unsolicited. He also sent a very conciliatory message assuring Mangkunégaran that he had unqualified authority over all his Mangkunégaran subjects and owed no one service, and so might carry on his business free of envy.

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42. See van Ijsseldijk to Greeve, April 29, 1790, enclosed in Greeve to Batavia, May 19, in KA 3802, VOCOB, 1791.

43. See Greeve to Batavia, September 10, 1788, in KA 3708, VOCOB, 1789.

44. 153R-158L. See Part I, pp. 44-46, on the courting of the V.O.C. by marks of honor and ceremonial presents which the Mangkunégaran undertook in order to gain the Company's support for these appointments.

45. The passage reads: pangeran adipatya / antuk jangji lan sang prabu / mung eca anare lënggah // mabarang saliring kardi / kalitan kendël kewala / lir wong anggur upamine / tan këna den-iri karya / eca neng dalêmira / ing sawëwëngkona-
The Sunan's overall plan appears to have been, not to humiliate the Mangkunégaran, but to build it up, and at the same time to offer a calculated offense to the Sultan of Mataram, for in terms of aristocratic Javanese convention the bestowal of the name could be seen as nothing else.

As Pakubuwana III's last illness became graver, however, everyone concerned evidently became more fearful that something untoward would take place at his death.

The diarist comments on the lack of trust between the Sunan and his son and the Company. The Sunan suggested that, as he would not recover from his sickness, his son should be elevated to the throne. According to the diarist, the Company officials feared that if this were done the Sultan of Mataram might make a similar request on behalf of his heir, whom the V.O.C. was not willing to elevate as yet; so that a decision was postponed until the arrival of Governor Greeve. Though Greeve did agree to install the Crown Prince while his father was still alive, it was too late, for the old Sunan died just afterwards.

This is confirmed by Greeve who, in a letter of September 20, 1788, for example, remarked that, although it was desirable to effect a smooth change of reign, under Company supervision, before Pakubuwana III actually died, such a step had a major disadvantage. This was that it might encourage the considerably older Crown Prince of Yogyakarta to try to assume the throne, against anticipated opposition from the Sultan, whom Greeve saw as a "childish" old man, still, however, possessed of a strong desire to rule. On September 26, Greeve reported that he

The term wong anggur (also angguran or penanggur) denoted a class of villagers who had no agricultural land of their own, and by extension (at least in central Java where the obligation to perform compulsory labor services was tied to the ownership of land) a person not bound to fixed service and who could freely dispose of his own time. (See C. Poensen, "Iets over de Javaansche desa," Mededelingen van wege het Nederlandsche Zendelinggenootschap, 38 [1894], pp. 32 ff.) It is probably the latter sense that the Sunan—or the diarist—had in mind when comparing Mangkunégaran to a wong anggur. In other regions, the term angguran seems to have been used in a rather different sense. (See, for example, J. W. de Stoppelaar, Balambangansch Adatrecht [Wageningen: Veenman, 1927], pp. 16 ff., 25-26, 34, and 114, and F. Fokkens, Eindresumé van het bij besluit van den Gouverneur-Generaal van Nederlandsch-Indië van 24 Juli 1888 no. 8 bevolen Onderzoek naar de Verplichten Diensten der inlandsche bevolking op Java en Madoera (Gouvernements-landen) op last van Zijne Excellentie den Minister van Koloniën, 2 parts [Batavia: Jav. Boekhandel en Drukkerij, 1901-2], 1, p. 5; and 2, pp. 4-5.) Fokkens found that the villagers classified as (inter alia) angguran or penanggur were those who were allotted performance of certain services on behalf of the village head, in return for which they were exempted from other usual forms of service. Since the people in this category were often among the more well-to-do villagers, and since they could choose to substitute payment in cash or kind for their services to the village head, we should also see them as something of a privileged group.

46. 167R.

47. The diarist records the appearance and seizure of two more "Mataram spies" at this juncture, indicating Yogyakarta's lively interest in developments in Surakarta (169R).

had agreed to install the Sala Crown Prince, but on his return to the Dutch factory received news of Pakubuwana III's death.⁴⁹

**Reassertion of Political and Cultural Autonomy**

The heir to the throne now requested of Greeve that once he became Sunan the Company should not negate any decision he made with respect to his officials and relatives, or concerning the treatment of rebels; and the Governor is said to have agreed to this request, even assuring the future ruler that he could govern Resident Hartsinck like one of his own Dipatis⁵⁰ and that all his wishes would be carried out.

This seems at first sight a very remarkable amount of license for Greeve to have allowed the young Sunan. However, Greeve had been deeply concerned about the effect of Palm's high-handedness—his exorbitant requests for unpaid labor and his interference in the Sunan's administration of justice—in alienating the old Sunan and the Crown Prince. It is, therefore, not improbable that he did make some such undertaking to the latter—not, perhaps, a wise move. Letters written by the Company's officials give the impression of a curious determination to maintain a belief in the—at bottom—"amiable" and "lovable" character they had ascribed to the future Pakubuwana IV. They failed to consider the possibility that the—to them—undesirable attitudes he sometimes displayed were not entirely an overlay which could be removed together with the "evil counselors" believed to have been responsible for it. It was to become apparent when the Crown Prince assumed his father's powers that he had unexpectedly firm ideas as to the direction he would take, as well as a surprising ability to reject, however politely, considerable amounts of "fatherly" advice intended by Company officials to deflect him from his path.

It seems that all eyes were on Mangkunégar'a's reaction to the Sunan's death. The heir apparent presented him with a horse to "gain his favor" (mèndët galih);⁵¹ and after the Sunan died, the Resident is said to have told the Governor of an old adat whereby the royal relatives were forbidden to enter the palace upon the monarch's death.⁵² The Governor, however, replied that times had changed (sejen mèngko lan ing nguni) and that it was not necessary to follow this adat since the relatives could not be "planning anything." However, it was indeed better that Mangkunégar'a should not be allowed to enter the palace, for he was a man of stature and senior in rank (gède tur kapèrnah tuwa).

Greeve's letters provide evidence that Mangkunégar'a had actually attempted to use the occasion of Pakubuwana III's death to try to gain greater power for himself. He had apparently intended to enter the kraton with a large armed party,

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⁴⁹. Greeve to Batavia, September 26, 1788, in KA 3708, VOCOB, 1789.
⁵¹. 168.
⁵². The reason behind such a proscription is obvious, though its efficacy in deterring pretenders from challenging the designated heir could not have been very great.
but was confined to his own residence by Greeve. It seems that Greeve had to impress strongly upon Mangkunégará that he owed homage to the new Sunan, Paku-buwana IV. On the occasion of the latter's investiture, the old prince showed noticeable displeasure and made slighting remarks about the queen—Pakubuwana's second wife, the daughter of Pangeran Purbayá. Mangkunégará also made a request to be allowed to hold his 4,000 cacah as tax-free land, or to be given another 600 cacah. This request was not granted. The diarist is silent on these unsuccessful bids for a stronger position.

Immediately after the burial of the royal corpse, the diarist records the arrival of a letter from the Sultan of Mataram which caused great agitation in Sala. It was a letter of challenge (sérat tunggul panantang) to Governor Greeve, which read: "Edelheer, you elevate my grandson as king. If you elevate Mangkunégará in title and appanage, I warn you, the world will not be in a good state. You will meet with trouble; all your works will be frustrated, if I am still king."

The letter referred to here must be an undated one to Greeve, wherein the Sultan says that he is pleased with the elevation of the Surakarta Crown Prince but that, if Mangkunégará or his children ask the Company for greater fortune or for the kraton of Surakarta, it will not be agreeable to him. He claims also to have told Hartingh at the time of Gianti [1755] that Mangkunégará's descendants would be, like those of Surapati, enemies of the Company for seven generations. (The consistency with which Surapati's descendants had fought on the side aligned against the Dutch in a series of wars had made them something of a legend on Java.) In view of the outstanding loyalty of later Mangkunégaran princes to the colonial government, however, the Sultan's forecast was not an accurate one, though it may perhaps be indicative of the strong anti-Dutch sentiment he perceived in his erstwhile ally, Mangkunégará.

On reading this letter, the Governor smiled, though he went red in the face and inwardly his heart burned. He showed it to the Resident, who was even less able to conceal his emotion, and ordered 400 troops to be on the alert at all times, and ammunition to be brought from Sémbarang. He said that, although he had arranged with the dead Sunan to elevate his son on 4 Sura 1715 AJ [October 5, 1788 AD], he would not wait for this date. Stating that it was the Company's burden to raise kings, he went to see the heir to the throne who reacted strongly, saying: "Sala and Mataram do not give one another orders, and if I wish to elevate my uncle [Mangkunégará] in title or in land, it is not under the jurisdiction of

53. See Mangkunégará's letter of September 26, 1788, and Greeve to Batavia, September 26, October 1, and October 15, 1788, in KA 3708, VOCOB, 1789.
54. Jav. dëlér (Dutch edelheer, title of a member of the Raad van Indië, Governor-General's Council) is always used when referring to the Governor of the north-east coast.
55. putu (like raka, elder brother and other similar terms) is used for a wider spectrum of relationships than its English translation, "grandson." Here it refers to the Sultan's great-nephew, the young Pakubuwana IV.
56. 171L: délér sira ngadégëna / raja marang putuku ki dipati / ngadég ratu putuningsun / lamun mangkunagara / yen mundaka namane lan kang lulingguh / ingsun peing marang sira / yékti jagat nora běcik // němu ewuh lakunira / gawenira mabarang nora dadi / yen sun makisîh mąděg ratu /
57. This letter from the Sultan to Greeve was enclosed in Greeve to Batavia, October 1, 1788, in KA 3708, VOCOB, 1789.
Yogyakarta: Why should the Yogya people take any notice? It is as if they wish to test me. Well, let them try me. Uncle is still strong in battle.\textsuperscript{58}

The Governor calmed him, saying that it was the Company who would make him king, and that they would keep guard, for a year if necessary. The enthronement took place on Monday 29th Besar 1714 AJ.\textsuperscript{59}

A couple of months after Pakubuwana IV's accession, an incident occurred in the Mangkunegaran in which Mangkunegara's Dutch coachman, "Espit"\textsuperscript{60} was stabbed by a lurah named Wijanarka. He had been quarrelling with the lurah and had struck him. Wijanarka was immediately seized and handed over to the Resident, and the coachman was given an [unspecified] amount of money in compensation. However, the diarist saw this affair as typifying the dominant characteristics of the Mangkunegaran men: they are fearless without exception and do not suffer blows without retaliating. They are unafraid of death in battle, like the Pangeran Buminata and Singasari, following their common enemy against a figure of such seniority as the old Sunan.\textsuperscript{61}

\textsuperscript{58} 171R-172L. His words were: nora prentah-pinarentah / wong sala lan wong matawis // nadyan insun ngunjakêna / nama agêng marang uwa dipati / muwuhana sawahipun / dudu bawah wong yogya / ya pagene praduli wong yogya iku / pama arêp ngayonana / wong yogya mring awak mami // eh payo den ayonana / maksih këncêng si uwa ing ajurit / . . .

\textsuperscript{59} In fact it took place on 28th Bësar, i.e., September 29, 1788. See Pakubuwana IV's letter of October 3 to the Prince of Orange and Nassau, enclosed in Greeve to Batavia, October 1, 1788, in KA 3708, VOCOB, 1789. As September 29 (28th Bësar) was a Monday, it seems that the diarist has given the wrong date to the day.

\textsuperscript{60} This must refer to Mangkunegara's equerry, Corporal Pieter Bloemhart, who was later, in 1790, to be the principal channel of communication between the Mangkunegaran household, which was then set on a collision course with the V.O.C., and Governor Greeve. See below, p. 93.

\textsuperscript{61} These two princes, Buminata and Singasari, brothers of Pakubuwana II, were extremely important figures in Mangkunegara's career, for they had been his close, if not constant, companions through many troubled years. They had gone into rebellion in 1743 and, according to a Babad which describes the "Chinese war," were with Mangkunegara when he assumed his royal title (Pangeran Adipati Anom Mangkunegara) and status, shortly after his break with the Sunan who had been proclaimed by the pro-Chinese party. This Sunan (Raden Mas Garêndi, the "yellow Sunan") was now about to surrender to the V.O.C. (See Babad Petjina [Semarang: van Dorp, 1874], pp. 397-412.)

Singasari, like Mangkunegara only a teenager in 1743, fought on his side in a number of major battles (such as the attack on Surakarta on July 28, 1750--see Part I, p. 10). Unlike Mangkunegara, however, he was never to surrender either to the V.O.C. or to any Javanese ruler, and he remained at large in the Malang region, joining forces with Surapati's descendants, until he was finally captured in 1768 by the V.O.C. expedition against Balambangan. He died in chains in Batavia before he could be exiled. There seems to have been a significant Islamic element among his following in Malang, and this may have been a cultural characteristic which he had in common with Mangkunegara (on Singasari, see Ricklefs, Jogjakarta, pp. 130-38).

Buminata's career was more chequered. In September 1749 he submitted to Pakubuwana II and the Company, and on December 15 of that year he was made
She tells the story of a lurah who with his carpenter's adze killed a thief and was promoted into the priyayi (the adze itself was also promoted and became an item of the regalia), and of the Pangeran Dipati's peacock which attacked and wounded a messenger of the Sunan who was coming and going rather too frequently; and then digresses with an account of the other household animals who could "think like human beings."62

The lurah whose action gave rise to this celebration of the martial spirit of the Mangkunegaran was sentenced to be set to fight a tiger on Kūmis 6 Jumadilakir 1715 AJ [March 4, 1789]63 but was at the last moment pardoned by the Sunan. Instead, one of the relatively infrequent tiger-buffalo contests was held, and the Resident saw the tiger die.64

It is surprising to find no record of this stabbing of Bloemhart, which must surely have made quite a stir in both Dutch and Javanese circles in Surakarta, in the archival letters of the time. There are in fact no letters at all relating to central Javanese affairs between November 10 and December 24, 1788.65 Nor is there any record of the planned execution and eventual pardon of the attacker in March 1789.66 This is presumably another example of Resident Hartsinck's practice of not reporting bad news from Surakarta for as long as he could avoid it. (See below, pp. 86-87.) The whole affair as reported in the diary is uncannily like the account of an attack made by one of the officers of the Sultan of Yogyakarta on a V.O.C. dragoon in 1783.67 In this case too the offender was ultimately pardoned, and, in place of a fight between him and a tiger, a tiger-buffalo fight was held.

Scarcely half a year after his succession, Pakubuwana IV sacked a number of those who had held office under his father and replaced them with new men.68 In this reshuffling the Mangkunegaran house gained rather than lost and accordingly moved closer to the Sunan: Pangeran Prang Widana was assured by Pakubuwana that he would give his blessing to a hereditary succession in Mangkunegara's line and was himself given a certain authority over the other children of the family and their landholdings.69 Subsequent to the sacking of two tumenggung in Pranaraga, a son of Mangkunegara (Padmanegara, now bearing the title of Pangeran Arya) was appointed over their combined holdings, amounting to 6,000 cacah.70

Crown Prince, to succeed the newly-installed Pakubuwana III (son of Pakubuwana II, and thus nephew of Buminata). He rebelled again, however, at the beginning of 1753, submitting once more to the Company two years later. He was exiled to Banda and then to Ceylon, where he died in 1783, at which time Pakubuwana III still refused permission for his descendants to return to Java. (See P. J. F. Louw, De derde Javaansche Successie-Oorlog [Batavia: Albrecht & Rusche, 1889], pp. 26–33 and 73, and Ricklefs, Jogjakarta, p. 90.) The "old Sunan" referred to by the diarist is more likely to have been Pakubuwana II than Pakubuwana III.

62. 180.
63. Either the day or the date is incorrect here: 6 Jumadilakir/March 4 was not a Tuesday but a Wednesday.
64. 191R–192L.
65. See KA 3708, VOCOB, 1789, and KA 3754, VOCOB, 1790.
66. KA 3754, VOCOB, 1790.
68. See, for example, 187R, 195L.
69. 198R.
70. 206.
diarist records that Mangkunegara was not privy to this decision but accepted the command of the Sunan and the decree of God with appropriate concurrence. In other passages too it is recorded that Mangkunegara's sons acted independently and not always in a way of which their father approved. Later, for instance, Pangeran Padmanegara conspired with Pangeran Purbanegara, who also had an appanage in Pranaraga, to petition the Sunan to remove two other sons of Mangkunegara, Suryataruna and Suryakusuma, from their appanages in Kediri, give these to Purbanegara, and amalgamate the two Pranaraga appanages under Padmanegara. The Sunan did give Purbanegara the combined Kediri appanages, but did not similarly increase Padmanegara's holdings (he gained half of Purbanegara's old appanage but had to give half of his own Pranaraga appanage to Suryataruna. Suryakusuma was given an appanage in Pance). Mangkunegara deeply disapproved of this attempt by two of his sons to take their brothers' lands.71

At the same time as his sons were being advanced, Mangkunegara himself dreamed that all the houses of the Dutch and Chinese, and the residence of Pangeran Purbayo, were burnt down one night. Mangkunegara was also having discussions with the young Sunan about "standing firm" on all matters, though no agreement had yet been reached.72 Somewhat later the Resident, worried about the three guru the Sunan had chosen and by the Sunan's completely altered behavior and his refusal to sign a contract put forward by the Company [see below], decided to ask Mangkunegara for counsel. The diarist records that the Resident maintained secret communications with Mangkunegara, and that Governor Greeve regarded him "as a father. "73

The new Sunan continued to appoint his own candidates to office: Tunenggung Wiraguna was sacked and replaced by a kliwon who was given the title Kanjuruhan Wilatikta.74 When the Sunan received a letter from Greeve requesting that his three guru, Raden Santri, Ki Saleh, and Bahman, be surrendered to the kumpeni, he did not comply but in fact elevated the first to the position of wadana with the title Tunenggung Prawiradigda. Wiradika of Dayaluhur was dismissed and exiled from the kraton, for, according to the diarist, practicing sorcery on one of the princesses. He was replaced by a certain Jalalen, described as a "cover" (aling) for the Sunan's three guru. Later, the diarist records the Dutch reaction to the appointment of Prawiradigda: the Resident and the Adjutant, both wearing Javanese clothing, paid a nocturnal visit to the ruler on 13 Besar 1715 [September 4, 1715].

71. 235L. The appointment of Suryakusuma (he was the second of Mangkunegara's sons to be given this name, which had been borne by Purbanegara until his elevation to the rank of Pangeran), previously named Suryadimurti and before that Raden Mas Samada or Samat, is mentioned in a rather unclear passage in an undated letter from Mangkunegara to Hartsinck, enclosed in Greeve to Batavia, September 10, 1788, in KA 3708, VOCOB, 1789. The appointment of Padmanegara is noted in Greeve to Batavia, September 30, 1789, in KA 3754, VOCOB, 1790.

72. 199R-200L: rēbo wage ing siyam kang sasi / taun alip ing dalu nupėna / pagriyan walandi kabei / lawan pacinan iku / sami kobar [kobar] katingal wēn̄gi / lan kobar [kobar] kapurbayan / pang[m]pening dalu / sarēng sang prabu taruna / rēmbag kēncēng panggah saliring prakawis / nanging dereng mupakat //

73. 203L-204L.

1789] to ask why he had taken such a step. Pakubuwana replied that in this way he would find out whether the man was good or bad—and that, if the Governor wanted to know what a santri was like, he could send Prawiradigda to Semporang. 75

On July 19, 1789, Greeve's suspicions of the court at Surakarta were aroused by reports that the Sunan was plotting to slaughter all Europeans in Java. This information, from a young Javanese woman, was passed on to him not by the Surakarta Resident but by the Dutch Commandant at Salatiga. When Greeve asked Hartsinck to make an investigation, the latter reported that all was in order at the court except for the presence of two "popes," Raden Santri and Bahman, who had a wide following which included the Sunan, Mangkunëgara's grandson Prang Wardana, and many other princes. It was owing to the influence of these "popes" that the Acte van Overeenkomst—an agreement laying down procedures for regulating trade and for solving problems that might arise between the principalities from disputes over land and water rights and from theft, highway robbery, etc.—had not been signed: this is clearly the unspecified "contract" mentioned by the diarist. Mangkunëgara himself had allegedly recommended that the Company "get rid of" these "popes" by secret means rather than enter into a confrontation with the young Sunan; but Greeve considered that this would be too risky. At the same time, the Yogyakarta Resident, van Ijsseeldijk, reported that the kraton there had received information that Pakubuwana IV was making regular visits to the mosque, was burning all the European uniforms of his father's army, and in fact wished to drive the Europeans from Java altogether. 76

In September, the numerous replacements made by the Sunan among his senior officials became known to Greeve. Resident Hartsinck denied that Wilatikta was a "pope," and claimed that he had just been appointed to replace a sick man. This is certainly in conflict with the diary, which represents Wilatikta as the chief of the Sunan's guru. Greeve was better informed about the type of man appointed as the new Tumënggung of Dayaluhur, but, again, the information came from a source other than Hartsinck. It was the Resident of Tegal, J. L. Umbgrove, who reported that, when he had asked this "knave" to come and see him, and offered him a drink of wine or beer to congratulate him on his appointment, the new Tumënggung had actually refused, and said that his predecessor had been too fond of this "Dutch custom." 77

Greeve decided to write to the Sunan, warning him of the dangers of having such evil advisers and asking him to arrest them as a sign of his trust and friendship with the Company. He had had no doubt that this request would be fulfilled, and was therefore dumbfounded when the Sunan refused, saying that Greeve should not listen to evil rumors. He himself would guarantee the advisers: surely the Company trusted his word? After the promotion of Raden Santri, Greeve noted that the whole principality was virtually in the hands of this man, as the Surakarta Patih was only a "foolish creature." He also noted that the Sunan was technically within his rights in making these replacements since, according to the contracts with the V.O.C., only the appointment of a patih required both parties' approval. It may be that he was at this stage deliberately using his untrammeled rights over other appointments to isolate the Patih, and deprive him of all power of action. In reporting the promotion of Raden Santri, Hartsinck echoes the words used by the diarist; the Sunan had said that he would now see whether the man was good or bad.

75. 208R-209L.
76. See Greeve to Batavia, August 3, in KA 3754, VOCOB, 1790.
77. See Greeve to Batavia, September 30, 1789, in KA 3754, VOCOB, 1790.
Greeve was also greatly shocked by Hartsinck's nocturnal visit to the kraton: he spent some effort in enquiring from the other European office-holders in Surakarta just exactly what Hartsinck had been wearing (békéd or long trousers?). In either case, the visit was a disgraceful departure from the proper ceremony which should attend a Resident's visit to a Sunan. Furthermore, stylistic changes in the Javanese of the Sunan's letters seemed to provide evidence that Hartsinck himself had had a hand—for whatever reason—in the composition of recent letters to Greeve. 78 7 9

It is striking that the evidence both of the diary and of Greeve's informants indicates that Pakubuwana IV was taking a pro-Islamic and anti-European direction: attending the mosque and reading the kutbah, (as his brothers Pangeran Pamot and Pangeran Arya Mataram—later Mangkubumi—as also did on some occasions), instructing his men to perform their prayers properly, sending a party to inspect the Demak mosque with a view of building a replica, forbidding alcohol and opium, replacing European clothes with Javanese or Middle Eastern styles, and reportedly planning to attack the Europeans in residence. It is also striking that Mangkunégaras's dream bracketed together not only the Dutch and their chief ally at Surakarta, Pangeran Purbaya, but also the Chinese—half a century after the "Chinese war" in which the young Mangkunégaras had taken the side of the pro-Chinese party against the V.O.C. His sentiments of this period, bracketing the Dutch and Chinese together as allies, point forward to the Java War.

From about this time relations between Sala and Yogyakarta begin to command significantly more of the diarist's attention. On the first day of 1716 AJ [September 21, 1789] Tuménggung Mangkuyuda and Tuménggung Kanduruhan were sent out with an armed force to Kabaderan, where the kétib had reported the presence of rebels (sixteen men and one woman) from Putat, under the jurisdiction of Mataram. She comments that these rebels (who were in the event seized by villagers while the two Tuménggung and their men sheltered from the rain) were directed by the "Yogyakarta people" (that is, by the kraton and, ultimately, by the Sultan). When she later reports that the kumpéni had handed them over to the Sultan and that as a result two of his punggawa were exiled to Ceylon, she says that this was just by way of being an offering to remove shame from the Sultan himself (tutup lingsém ing galih / rénsik kakalióh kang punggawa / kangjéng sultan / dadiya babaten ngisin). Two days after the apprehension of these rebels, two of Mangkunégaras's lurah seized another "Mataram spy," chained him up and mishandled him. The Company intervened, and asked that the man be handed over to them, which was done. The Mangkunégaras maintained face, however: the diarist comments that "the Pangeran Adipati did not intend to put to death this man, whose crime merited it." 80

78. See Greeve to Batavia, September 30, 1789, in KA 3754, VOCOB, 1790.
79. For example, 218L, 239R (the inauguration of the new mosque by the Sunan), and 240L.
80. 199R.
81. Greeve to Batavia, September 30, in KA 3754, VOCOB, 1790; see also, diary 233-39.
82. 187L.
83. For example, 199R, 240L, 247L.
84. 211L-212R.
A few weeks later, the ringleaders among the Kabaderan rebels, including the woman (named "Sontrang"), were publicly executed in the presence of the Sunan and the Resident.

The locus of this rebellion, which is described in Greeve's letter to Batavia of October 24, 1789, was the Pêngging area northwest of Surakarta. Since those involved seemed to be the Sultan's subjects--the "Putat" mentioned by the diarist is presumably the village of that name in the Grobogan region--they were handed over to him. He subsequently gave them back to Surakarta, saying that they had only resided in his territory for a short time. The Sultan said he had made an inquiry into the matter which had found that those concerned were simple-minded. Believing their "rebellion" to be blessed with supernatural help, they had marched through the countryside singing and making no attempt to conceal their presence. The Sunan took the matter more seriously, however, since their aim had apparently been to take his kraton.

The Sultan did exile some members of his court at about this time: the son and four grandsons of his dead younger brother, Pangeran Mangkukusuma. In a letter of 12 Sura 1716 AJ (October 2, 1789 AD), he notified the V.O.C. that he was exiling them for their "bad behavior" and the insecurity they had caused in the city; no mention is made of an incursion into Surakarta territory. It may be that the diarist, as a loyal member of the Mangkunëgara household, blamed every disturbance on the Sultan; it is equally possible that the Sultan was in fact trying to conceal his support of this incursion and attempting to make it appear the spontaneous inspiration of a few simple-minded people.

There seems to be no record in the letters of this period of any other "Mata-ram spy" being captured by Mangkunëgara's men and subsequently handed over to the Dutch factory.

Over this period the atmosphere in Surakarta must have been unusually charged: the Sunan continued to sack and replace his officials, publicly executing thieves and rebels. He also held unusually frequent tiger-buffalo fights, which were attended by both Dutch functionaries and his own men, dressed like haji in turbans and jubah. In general, he gave the Company officials evidence that he was "a different man from his father," an observation which, says the diarist, they reported to Sëmarang, but otherwise kept to themselves. Both Mangkunëgara and the Sunan were increasing their armed forces.

It was also a time when the fate of the Company's chief representative in Surakarta was being decided. The diarist records that on 21 Sapar 1716 [November 10, 1789] Resident Hartsinck, returning from Sëmarang, came to tell Mangkunëgara that he was to be dismissed and replaced by the Company's Second Resident ("Petor") at Tëgal, who was the [Governor-] General's son-in-law. Then in

85. See KA 3754, VOCOB, 1790.
86. Enclosed in Greeve to Batavia, October 12, 1789, in KA 3754, VOCOB, 1790.
87. 213.
88. 217R, 231R, 238, 239R.
89. 227R.
90. 216, 228R, 238L, 240R (here Pakubuwana orders his wadana and mantri to arm their men and to provide horses), 243R.
91. 216R-217L. The diarist consistently uses the word "Petor" to denote Second Residents.
early December the Tumenggung of Banyumas, Pangeran Arya Mataram, and Pangeran Rangga went to Hartsinck with [unspecified and by implication unjustified] accusations against Mangkunegara, who was leading a peaceful existence in accordance with his undertaking to the Company. The diarist claims that the evil genius behind these accusations was the now widowed mother of the Tumenggung of Banyumas, whose animus against Mangkunegara dated back to the period when, her husband still alive, she had been having an affair with another man of high position, Tumenggung Cakranegara. The diarist also claims that, when Pakubuwana III had dismissed her husband from his appointment, he had also given the order that she, as a "whore-mouth" and a "queen of devils," should be put to death. But she was reprieved, and her son succeeded to the Banyumas appointment, so that she continued to make trouble with gossip and slander. Finally, the diarist claims that Hartsinck had formed an alliance with this clique in order to be kept on in his post as Resident, and had promised Pangeran Rangga 500 real if this were to happen.92

Greeve had now reported Hartsinck's unsatisfactory performance of his duties to the Governor-General and Council, and on November 6 received their decision to dismiss Hartsinck from his post. Greeve did in fact then suggest that Hartsinck be replaced by the (First, not Second) Resident of Tegal, J. L. Umbgrove, who was the son-in-law of Governor-General Alting, as the diarist states. Alting did not, however, accept Greeve's suggestion--perhaps he already had Umbgrove in mind for the lucrative Residency of Cirebon to which he was appointed the following year, and where Alting liked to have a member of his family.93 It was not until April 12, 1790 that Greeve received notice that J. Fr. Baron van Reede tot de Parkeler (then head of the V.O.C.'s Japan factory but with previous experience in Java) had been nominated as First Resident of Surakarta. In the meantime Hartsinck, who had asked to remain on in the city until he could wind up his affairs, was granted permission to stay on until August 1790,94 and did not actually leave until September 4.95

The Tumenggung (i.e., Bupati) of Banyumas, whose widow plays so prominent a part in the slander campaign reported by the diarist, was Yudanegara. Pakubuwana III had dismissed him in 1780 because of a secret overland mission to Bantân he had made apparently for the Sultan of Yogyakarta, to whom his father (Dana-reja I) was Pathi.96 Reports from 1772 allege that Mangkunegara had some sort of conspiratorial relationship with Yudanegara at that time,97 and the evident personal enmity between the Prince and Yudanegara's unfaithful wife would be understandable in such a context. It seems that her slanders had little effect, probably because Mangkunegara was then well placed with the Sunan, and Hartsinck was no longer in a position to do him harm with the V.O.C.

Even more interesting perhaps is the diarist's allegation that Hartsinck was involved with a court faction and had offered to pay Pangeran Rangga 500 real if he were continued in his post as Resident. At first sight, it seems unlikely that a
Dutch Resident would rely on a faction of the Javanese aristocracy to forward his career. Yet Hartsinck's behavior up to this point had been so strange as to warrant his removal: he had delayed reporting any news of the Sunan's suspicious activities until Greeve heard about these from an unofficial source; he had denied that Wilatikta was a "pope" or that his appointment betokened anything out of the way, though Greeve had heard, again from a source other than Hartsinck, that Wilatikta had openly spoken against Dutch ways; and it appears that he had even been helping the Sunan to compose his correspondence to the Company (not to speak of making nocturnal visits to the kraton in Javanese dress). All these things point to Hartsinck's serving two masters to advance his own affairs, so that the diarist's claim that he had offered 500 real to secure his position is not so fantastic. The most probable reconstruction of the sequence of events to this point is as follows: the Sunan, in his moves to replace the officials of his father's reign with his own appointees and in general to strengthen his own position, had mobilized his troops, and taken the additional precaution of buying off the V.O.C. Resident. Susceptibility to money bribes was not unknown among Residents, even after the demise of the V.O.C., with its notoriously "corrupt" officialdom. We find later cases, such as that of the Surakarta Resident Rijck van Prehn, who was dismissed in 1820 after receiving 2,000 real for his complaisance in the appointment of Secawikrama as Pith, 6,000 real for a similar attitude in the appointment of Pangeran Purbanegara as Bupati of Kediri, and in all a total of 14,500 real in such payments.98 It would seem that, when Greeve announced to Hartsinck that he was going to be replaced as Resident, the direction of the money-flow was reversed, as Hartsinck attempted to induce his associates to guarantee his continuation in his appointment. The obvious question is why he should think that these Javanese associates would be able to exert any influence on V.O.C. decisions. The answer may be found in Greeve's attitude. The Governor had been very shocked at the revelation--after Palm's unexpected death--of the amount of offense Hartsinck's predecessor had given the Surakarta aristocracy over a whole range of matters.99 Greeve had then actually taken the trouble to write a memorandum to Hartsinck,100 when he took up his new appointment, instructing him to achieve a position of influence with the Sunan, the Crown Prince, and Mangkunegara, by winning their trust with friendly treatment. Hartsinck had certainly done so, and may have hoped that the amicable, complaisant relationship he had established with the aristocracy would be all he needed to ensure the V.O.C.'s blessing for his continuance in office: and why not pick the fruits of this amicable connection?

The Company had, then, been represented by two very different, but equally dangerous, representatives in Surakarta. The first, Palm, had thought he could bully the Javanese aristocracy into acting as his lackeys and provisioners and had thoroughly offended them by his contemptuous breaches of established procedure. The second, Hartsinck, seems to have accepted the role of a passive accomplice and made himself comfortable in this, abandoning the vigilance, faithful reporting, and subtle manipulation of the political balance which the V.O.C. required from men in his position. There is no doubt that the significant blank areas in Hartsinck's reporting contributed significantly to the developing crisis.

99. See above, pp. 71-74.
100. Appended to Greeve to Batavia, July 5, 1788, enclosure no. 11, in KA 3708, VOCOB, 1789.
Passages of Arms

On 22 Arwah 1716 AJ [May 7, 1790] the Sunan proclaimed at a public audience that he had bestowed names and titles on two of his brothers: Pangeran Arya Matar-ram was henceforth to be known as Pangeran Mangkubumi, and Raden Mas Saidi was to be known as Pangeran Buminata. A few weeks later, on 14 Siyam [May 28] he sent Tumënggung Kanjuruhan Wilatikta on a secret journey into Yogyakarta territory. The diarist does not record what force of men accompanied him, but says that he suffered a tactical defeat by the Mataram soldiery to the considerable shame of the Sunan, who did not appear at the Saturday tournament for two weeks.101

On 28 Siyam, the Sunan received a letter from the "Dëler Sëmarang" [the Governor, Greeve] asking him to replace the title "Pangeran Mangkubumi" with "Pangeran PugSr." The diarist explains that the Sultan was greatly angered by Sala’s disparaging appropriation of his names: there was not only a "Pangeran Mangkubumi" but also a "Tumënggung Sujanapura," and the Sultan as a boy had been called Raden Mas Sujana.

The Sunan hesitated, but eventually stood firm. Then on 20 Bësar [August 31, 1790], the same day that the new Resident [J. F. Baron van Reede tot de Parke-lär] was installed, the diarist records the first news of raiding parties from Matar-ram causing serious damage. Neither Mangkunëgara nor the Sunan reacted immediately: the diarist explains that they were waiting to see what the Company did.

Greeve received the news, "as unexpected as unpleasant," of the Sunan's bestowal of the contentious name Mangkubumi, in a brief letter from Hartsinck of May 6.102 He was immediately anxious about the probable repercussions in Mataram.

The "secret expedition" under Kanjuruhan Wilatikta was not reported to Greeve: it is impossible to tell whether Hartsinck knew anything of it. However, the evidence of the diary that the Sunan was beginning to take an aggressive attitude to Mataram (and the giving of this name cannot, in the Javanese context, have been intended as anything less than a calculated insult) is strengthened by the fact that Greeve received letters from Mangkunëgara claiming that van Straalendorff (First Resident of Surakarta 1767-84) had promised him on two occasions that he would be given the throne of Mataram on the Sultan’s death. It seems clear that Mangkunëgara knew that something was in the wind, and was endeavoring to find out what profit he could expect if he remained on the Company’s side instead of joining the Sunan in his planned agression against Mataram.

Mangkunëgara claimed that van Straalendorff had made this promise to him in the name of the "Edelheer at Sëmarang" (the Governor of the northeast coast) on 2 Jumadilakir 1700 AJ and again on 26 Sapar Je 1710 AJ.103 The first date falls


102. See Greeve to Batavia, May 19, in KA 3754, VOCOB, 1790.

103. See enclosures 10 and 11, Mangkunëgara to Greeve, received at Sëmarang on May 15 and 17 respectively, in Greeve to Batavia, May 19, in KA 3802, VOCOB, 1791.
outside the period covered by the diary, but under the second date the diarist has
in fact entered a note recording just such a promise (see above, p. 68). This
indicates that Mangkunéagara genuinely believed he had been given such an under-
taking. Further, it is not at all improbable that van Straalendorff had at least
hinted at such a possibility: the Company was very prone to the use of threats or
bribes with Javanese princes and, as de Jonge has remarked,\(^{104}\) frequently did not
keep its word. This was, indeed, a technique which Greeve himself was to use
later with Pakubuwana IV.\(^ {105}\) Not surprisingly, the disillusionment he underwent
sometimes led the prince concerned to become embittered towards the V.O.C. and
even on occasion to become dishonest in his own behavior.

Greeve was alarmed to hear of Mangkunéagara's claims on Yogyakarta. He post-
poned giving Mangkunéagara an answer while he made enquiries about the military
situation. These revealed that Mangkunéagara had at least 500 men in his house-
hold, on wages, and could easily summon another three to four thousand. His in-
formant remarked that Mangkunéagara was popular among his men—"criminal
wretches" as many of them were—because of his former leadership in war and be-
cause of the good treatment and protection which he always gave them. The Com-
pany's military reserves, in contrast, numbered exactly 243.\(^ {106}\) Greeve himself
was of the opinion that Mangkunéagara could in fact call up as many as 10,000 men
within three days.

In his letter of June 11,\(^ {107}\) Greeve, who was then trying to persuade the Sunan
to change the offending name to "Pugër," reported that there had been no military
movements so far (the diarist's evidence suggests that minor skirmishes were al-
ready taking place), although he had received a report that the Sunan and Mang-
kunéagara had formed a contingency plan for the eventuality of the Sultan's death.
This would involve blocking passage for the Company's troops to Yogyakarta.
Greeve did not believe this information, although he did request military reinforce-
ments and tried to arrange for the Sultan's abdication in favor of the Crown Prince,
under Company auspices. By June 24, it was clear that the Sultan would not agree
to this,\(^ {108}\) and was, moreover, extremely annoyed because Mangkunéagara's grand-
son Prang Wadana was reputedly giving shelter to Yogyakarta highway robbers.
Van Ijsseldijk reported that he had had the greatest difficulty in preventing the
Sultan from seeking justice himself.\(^ {109}\) Mangkunéagara denied that his people were
supporting these robbers, although he said that he had formed three complete com-
panies of prajurit from Yogyakarta refugees.\(^ {110}\) Through June and July Greeve
and the Sunan continued to argue their respective positions about the contentious
name: Greeve claimed that "Pugër" was a more prestigious name and could be ac-
cepted without humiliation as a mark of the special favor of the Sunan and the
V.O.C.; the prince who was to be so distinguished then himself claimed that he
did not have sufficient lands and men to live up to such a high title; the Sunan

\(^{104}\) J. K. J. de Jonge, *De Opkomst van het Nederlandsch Gezag in Oost Indië*
(The Hague: Nijhoff, 1878), 10, p. LXXIII.

\(^{105}\) See below, p. 98.

\(^{106}\) See F. J. Rothenbuhler to Greeve, May 16, in Greeve to Batavia, May 19, in
KA 3802, VOCOB, 1791.

\(^{107}\) KA 3802, VOCOB, 1791.

\(^{108}\) On the Sultan's reaction, see Ricklefs, *Jogjakarta*, pp. 322-23.

\(^{109}\) See Greeve to Batavia, June 24, in KA 3802, VOCOB, 1791.

\(^{110}\) See Mangkunéagara to Greeve, June 25, in KA 3802, VOCOB, 1791.
agreed to add Greeve's "Pugër" to his brother's name, but not to withdraw the previously bestowed "Mangkubumi," saying that he could not go back on what he had publicly confirmed. He said that the Sultan, who, after all, no longer used the name "Mangkubumi," was behaving very wrongly in relaying threats to him via the Company, instead of addressing him in a friendly way as a fellow ruler; and that he did not intend to be misused as his father had been in 1788 (that is, on the occasion of the bestowal of the same contentious name on Mangkunégara's grandson and its subsequent withdrawal because of pressure from the Company).\footnote{111}

Greeve's attitude towards the Sultan was very ambiguous. On the one hand, having received reports that four to five thousand soldiers were being paraded in Yogyakarta,\footnote{112} the Governor was fearful of aggression from the Sultan, and therefore reproached him for his belligerent stance. On the other hand, he felt that it was necessary to ensure the Sultan's military cooperation in the event of an attempt by Mangkunégara to conquer Mataram.\footnote{113} Van Ijsseldijk reported that the Sultan had declined to give precise information about the size of the military force available to him, merely saying that he had "enough" men; and that he had broken off all correspondence with Surakarta.\footnote{114} Greeve later estimated that the Sultan's forces would total about 7,000 men, the same as those of the Sunan.\footnote{115}

Greeve was gathering together as many troops as the various stations of the V.O.C. could spare: he detained about 120 on their way from east Java to Ceylon,\footnote{116} and a further forty-five men and three officers arrived in Semarang by ship a little later.\footnote{117} He then received 119 Württemberger troops from the Cape garrison and 250 troops from Batavia. But high mortality and sickness ate into these numbers, so that Greeve found it necessary to detain another fifty troops bound for Malacca.\footnote{118}

By August 6, minor skirmishes were reported between the Sultan's and Sunan's men, causing the deaths of a few combatants on either side. By the end of the month Greeve had managed to strengthen each of the central Javanese garrisons by a hundred men and now asked permission to use another fifty men who had been bound for Malacca, ninety-six sepoys who had arrived from Makassar under their own officers, as well as one or two companies of Württembergers.\footnote{119} Feeling that the military situation was now sufficiently in the Company's favor, he at last passed on to Mangkunégara the letter containing the Governor-General's statement of June 11 to the effect that he, Mangkunégara, had no hope of succeeding to the Yogyakarta Sultanate. Greeve had long feared what the reaction to this letter might be.

In the event, however, Mangkunégara took this disappointment without public protest, writing politely to Greeve that he would always follow the Company's

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{111.} See above, pp. 75-76.
  \item \textbf{112.} See Greeve to Batavia, July 3, in KA 3802, VOCOB, 1791.
  \item \textbf{113.} Greeve to Batavia, July 29, and Greeve to the Sultan, July 22, in KA 3802, VOCOB, 1791.
  \item \textbf{114.} See van Ijsseldijk to Greeve, July 27, in KA 3802, VOCOB, 1791.
  \item \textbf{115.} See Greeve's diary, in KA 3833, VOCOB, 1792, sub November 5.
  \item \textbf{116.} Greeve to Batavia, June 26, in KA 3802, VOCOB, 1791.
  \item \textbf{117.} Greeve to Batavia, July 3, in KA 3802, VOCOB, 1791.
  \item \textbf{118.} Greeve to Batavia, July 29, in KA 3802, VOCOB, 1791.
  \item \textbf{119.} See Greeve to Batavia, September 4, in KA 3833, VOCOB, 1792.
\end{itemize}
Greeve was beginning to have a hopeful view of the prospect of preserving the peace (at least for the time being) when this was dispelled by the news that the Sultan's troops had attacked villages of both Mangkunégara and the Sunan, the former on account of Mangkunégara's pretensions to the Yogyakarta throne, and the latter on account of the insult offered by the bestowal of the name Mangkubumi. The Sultan and the Crown Prince of Yogyakarta claimed that they for their part had suffered a number of attacks by the Mangkunégaran: that Mangkunégara's grandson by marriage, Jayawinata, had plundered a Yogya village and burnt and robbed a Chinese tollgate; and that his son Suryakusuma had plundered the Sultan's mancanagara subjects on their way to Yogya with their yearly offerings of produce.\(^{121}\)

Greeve not only told van Ijsseldijk to expostulate with the Sultan over these attacks, but also decided to withhold the moneys paid to him for the coastal tolls, usually collected at the beginning of September and the major source of monetary income for the Javanese rulers. A few days later, however, he decided to let the Sultan have the money after all, in order, he said, not to seem to be favoring the Sunan.\(^{122}\)

The new Surakarta Resident, van Reede, reported that Mangkunégara was not returning these Yogyakarta attacks, saying that, even if the Mataram soldiers appeared before his very dalém, he would sit still and do nothing without orders from the Sunan and the Company. Later, however, van Reede received news that Mangkunégara's men had, in fact, devastated a village in the Bayalali area, though Mangkunégara himself denied knowledge of this,\(^{123}\) and it seems that his grandson Prang Wadana was responsible.\(^{124}\)

Van Ijsseldijk suggested at this juncture that Mangkunégara and his family should swear an oath to live in peace with Mataram. The Sultan subsequently agreed to withdraw his troops from the field if this were done, but refused to reopen relations with Surakarta until the name was retracted. The Sunan said that he had no men in the field except a few under his brother Mangkubumi whom he had sent out to defend his villagers, and would now withdraw. Mangkunégara also said that he had only defensive postings, and asked the Company either to bring about a real and lasting peace or to allow him to take his revenge. The Surakarta side also asked for compensation for the devastation caused.\(^{125}\)

On September 9, van Ijsseldijk reported to Greeve that Mangkunégara's men had actually murdered the Sultan's nephew, Raden Sumadikara, and brought his head to Surakarta, and had taken prisoner a brother-in-law of the Yogyakarta Crown Prince. The Sultan was furious, and only the "courageous action" of the

\(^{120}\) Mangkunégara to Greeve, August 29, in Greeve to Batavia, September 4, in KA 3833, VOCOB, 1792.

\(^{121}\) See letter of van Ijsseldijk to Greeve, September 3, and letter of the Yogyakarta Patih Danurèja to Resident van Ijsseldijk, in Greeve to Batavia, September 4, in KA 3833, VOCOB, 1792.

\(^{122}\) Greeve to Batavia, September 7, in KA 3833, VOCOB, 1792.

\(^{123}\) See van Reede to Greeve, September 4 and 6, in Greeve to Batavia, September 7, in KA 3833, VOCOB, 1792.

\(^{124}\) See Greeve to Batavia, September 9, in KA 3833, VOCOB, 1792.

\(^{125}\) Ibid.
Patih, who threatened to resign, prevented him from taking revenge. Finally (and reluctantly) Greeve decided he had to intervene in person. He left Sémbarang on September 15 with an escort of dragoons; a further 374 men awaited the arrival of porters. This step was partly motivated by a letter he had received from the Sunan suggesting that, since there were likely to be many pretenders to the Sultan's throne after his death, trouble could be avoided by dividing Yogyakarta among his children. Greeve felt this proposal would destroy the necessary equipoise between the two kingdoms, which was the foundation of the Company's mastery of Java, and that it was probably a cover for the Sunan's plan to swallow the fragments of Mataram one by one.

As remarked above, the diarist notes that the Sunan and Mangkunégara were concerned to see how the Company would react, and on the first day of the new year, 1717 [September 11, 1790 AD], the Sunan himself called on Mangkunégara to discuss the situation, an unprecedented departure from normal protocol. According to the diarist, he left it to Mangkunégara to say whether he would stand firm against the Company, and Mangkunégara agreed to do so. Afterwards, he discussed the matter with his sons, and a few days later Governor Greeve arrived from Sémbarang. By now, Mangkunégara's démang were bringing in heads of fallen Yogyakarta warriors. On 11 Sura [September 21, 1790] a deputation from Yogyakarta—the Patih DanurSja and two Tuménggung—was brought by the Dutch Resident to Sala to speak with the Sunan, who, according to the diarist, addressed them with open insults, bringing Greeve to the point of tears. Mangkunégara himself bought up large stocks of rice, readied his army, and sent Pangeran Prang Wadana to consult with the Sunan.

Greeve tried to give Mangkunégara a letter from the Sultan, but the prince refused to receive it. He went to see the Sunan, who remained unbending, and advised him not to try to apply pressure on his "uncle," who was a man not to be frightened once he had made up his mind—in fact, he might actually stab Greeve. The diarist then notes that Greeve decided not to visit Mangkunégara after all, and went instead to the Patih's house. Now 300 south Indians in the Company's service arrived in Sala from Sémbarang; the Residents of Surakarta and Yogyakarta and Greeve continued to try to intimidate Mangkunégara, in vain. The two Patih—Jayaningrat of Sala and DanurSja of Yogyakarta—swore an oath in the Dutch factory. This was on 18 Sura 1717 [September 28, 1790].

126. See van Ijsseldijk to Greeve, September 9, in Greeve to Batavia, September 11, in KA 3833, VOCOB, 1792.
127. See Greeve's diary, September 15, in KA 3833, VOCOB, 1792.
129. 251L.
130. 252L.
131. 253L.
132. 253R-254L, 15 Sura 1717 [September 25, 1790].
133. The diarist notes that they were "unbelievers" who looked like [Middle-Eastern] Muslim traders (koja), and were paid the same as Dutch troops, adding that the Governor [Greeve] hoped that they would terrify the Javanese into obedience. There was a significant proportion of sepoys among the V.O.C. troops: see above, p. 90.
The Company had decided to offer Mangkunégara 4,000 real per annum, but he refused: only 4,000 cacah would do. He also asked for the return of his wife and sélir. Greeve refused this last request, but promised to try to get the cacah.

Greeve's diary (in KA 3833) gives the following account of the events between September 15 and the swearing of the oath by the two Patih: on the vexed question of the name, he made the surprising discovery that before bestowing it, the Sunan, mindful of Yogyakarta's reaction in 1788, had actually discussed the matter with Hartsinck, who had allegedly told him that he was perfectly within his rights to call his brother "Mangkubumi." Greeve summoned Hartsinck back from Sámarang to Surakarta (which he had left only on September 4) and extracted from him a confession of his responsibility in the affair, which was then sent on to the Sultan. Greeve told the Sunan that, since Hartsinck had given him the Company's permission, however wrongly, the Company would not now ask him to withdraw the name Mangkubumi. On September 21 a Yogyakarta party arrived and asked if the Company would agree to the Sultan's bestowing the name "Mangkubumi" on his own grandson, the son of the Crown Prince, by way of compensation for its use in Surakarta. This solution having proved acceptable to all sides, the matter of the name was no longer an issue.

The quarrel between Mangkunégara and the Sultan was, however, not so easily resolved. Both sides claimed that the other had been the first to attack. Greeve proposed a peace plan, evidently based on van Ijsseldijk's earlier suggestion, by which all parties would sign a Contract of Reconciliation (Contract van Bevreeding). The Yogyakarta reaction to this suggestion was much more favorable than Greeve had hoped, but Mangkunégara continued to insist that the only acceptable token of the Sultan's peaceable intentions would be the return of Ratu Bëndara and his two sélir. This was clearly an impossible demand and could only signify that Mangkunégara meant to obstruct the road to peace. On the 26th of September, however, Mangkunégara sent his European equerry, Corporal Pieter Bloemhart, to tell Greeve that his children, Pangeran Purbanégara and Pangeran Padmanégara, were pressing him to adhere to the Sunan's counsel, so that he was not able to oblige Greeve in what he had requested. Greeve also received reports that the Mangkunégaran forces were continuing their attacks.

Moreover, the Sunan's behavior still presented difficulties, even after the "Mangkubumi" issue was resolved. On the one hand, he proposed that he should marry one of the daughters of the Yogyakarta Crown Prince and, when Greeve later went to Yogyakarta, asked him to select for him the most beautiful of the princesses. On the other hand, he put a long series of procedural difficulties in the way of the Contract of Reconciliation. Although Greeve's diary does not record that the Sunan verbally abused the Yogyakarta party (as described in the Mangkunégaran diary), he does record that the Sunan unduly delayed sending his Patih on a reciprocal visit to Yogyakarta.

134. The wife referred to was Ratu Bëndara, daughter of the Sultan of Yogyakarta who had now been back with her father for twenty-seven years. See above, p. 73. Two of Mangkunégara's sélir had defected to Mataram and had apparently joined the Crown Prince's household: see below.

135. This bears out the point made above (p. 76) that, though the Sultan may have claimed categorically that "no two people can have the same name," in practice a more flexible approach was adopted. The solution of this particular case, invoking as it did a counter-principle (perhaps new) of parity between the two courts, apparently allowed Yogyakarta to feel that honor was satisfied.
After the Patih of Yogyakarta and of Surakarta had finally put their seals on the Contract on September 28, Greeve told Mangkunégaara that he too must put his seal on it, on the following day. Mangkunégaara continued, however, to insist on the return of his wife and sélir, and his equerry Bloemhart told Greeve that Mangkunégaara had had a conference with his sons and his grandson Prang Wadana. Later in the day, Mangkunégaara told Greeve that, if he were compelled to renounce his wife and sélir, the Company should do something to compensate him, as it had so often said that he was under its protection, and he had put up with so much bitterness in its name. He asked for 4,000 cacah; Greeve offered 4,000 real per annum, but Mangkunégaara said that he could not "sell his wife for money." He also told Greeve that it was the Sunan who was forcing him to be intransigent; and Greeve himself knew that five of Mangkunégaara's sons held appointments from the Sunan, and could lose these if the Sunan were alienated. At the same time, Greeve was receiving information, via the V.O.C.'s chief ally, Pangeran Purbaya, that "serious things" were happening in the kraton, and he should be on his guard. The Sunan's generally uncooperative behavior gave added credence to these rumors, as he refused to put his seal on Mangkunégaara's request to the Sultan of Yogyakarta to provide the 4,000 cacah, and was also unwilling to pay for the upkeep of the V.O.C.'s military reinforcements, saying that he had given Greeve no occasion to bring such a large force.136 Two days later,137 the Sunan sent a letter to Greeve with a fresh request, that is, that the pSngulu of Sémaraang and of Yogyakarta should be obliged to obtain the approval of the Surakarta pSngulu for marriages they contracted. Greeve postponed answering this letter until peace had been fully restored.

The Mataram raids continued; Mangkunégaara's dèmang and a large force under Pangeran Prang Wadana pushed the invaders back, conquered some Yogyakarta villages, and took the heads of four men of rank (Raden). Greeve ordered the fighting to be stopped, and the Mangkunégaaran forces obeyed. The diarist explains that this was done for two reasons: first, Greeve had undertaken to get the 4,000 cacah; and second, the Yogyakarta forces had Dutchmen with them. She also says that Pangeran Prang Wadana was extremely exasperated by this stop to the fighting, and had to be calmed by his father. The Mangkunégaaran troops too were disappointed and did not like to retreat before the "kumpéni's" pressure.138

On October 1, Prang Wadana, who had been absent from Surakarta for four days, returned home on his grandfather's orders. On the 3rd of the month, however, it was reported that Prang Wadana was still attacking the Sultan's people in Pajang and Gunung Kidul. Greeve decided to send Dutch officers from the Surakarta and Yogyakarta garrisons out to these areas to see what was happening.

However, Greeve returned from Yogyakarta unsuccessful: he had not persuaded the Sultan to allocate 4,000 of his cacah to Mangkunégaara.139 The prince refused to accept money, and Greeve, having annoyed the Sunan too (by pretending to be ill and causing a kraton party to be cancelled), left in humiliating disarray for Sümarang.

136. See Greeve's diary, under October 1, in KA 3833, VOCOB, 1792.
137. According to Ricklefs (Jogjakarta, p. 330), Greeve did not learn of this request until October 11. It is, however, found in the diary entry for October 3.
138. 256R.
139. 257.
140. 258; see also Ricklefs, Jogjakarta, pp. 329-30.
In Yogyakarta, Greeve had indeed been unsuccessful in obtaining the 4,000 cacah. The Sultan would not even speak of Ratu Bândara; the sèhir could not be returned because they had borne the Crown Prince's children. He asked Greeve to intervene on his behalf and rescue one of his regents from Mangkunégara's men. It appears that, at this stage, Mangkunégara's men had captured considerably more of the Sultan's villages than the Sultan's men had of his, so that the military advantage was with the Mangkunégara.

It was officially settled that the name "Mangkubumi" would be given to the Sultan's grandson Pangeran Anora; and that the setting of the Sultan's and Sunan's seals on the Contract of Reconciliation should also take place. The Sultan agreed to ask the Crown Prince to add his seal to the Contract, as Mangkunégara had requested.

Back in Surakarta, Greeve reported to the Sunan that, although he had in fact seen the Crown Prince's daughters en déshabillé, he could not give a good description of their appeal to the eye. The Sunan repeated his request for recognition of the primacy of the Surakarta pèngulu, adding that he wished to be recognized as the "first prince" on Java. Greeve reported to Mangkunégara his failure to obtain the 4,000 cacah, and the prince once again refused to accept the 4,000 real, saying that this would not compensate for the shame he had suffered.

Greeve excused himself from the reception planned by the Sunan because he feared that it was to be the scene of treachery against the Company, and returned to Sêmarang. He left the Resident, van Reede, to arrange for the Sunan to put his seal on the Contract.

As soon as Greeve left, Mangkunégara created new corps of soldiery—-from volunteers, including some santri, who pressed their services upon him—and these went out to fight the Yogya forces at Jimbung and Matésih on 8 Sapor 1717 [October 18, 1790]. This time, however, they had to retreat before the Yogyakarta forces. The diarist explains that this was because the Sultan's men had Dutchmen with them, and because the Sunan did not keep his promise to support the Mangkunégaran forces. The prince himself did not take part "because he had boils."

News of further attacks by Mangkunégara's men, in the Gunung Kidul region, came as early as October 13, the day Greeve left Surakarta. Now that he himself was safely back in Sêmarang, Greeve instructed van Reede to tell the Sunan that the Company knew of his underhand support for Mangkunégara, and also wrote to the Yogyakarta Resident instructing him to take an equally firm stance and warn the Sultan not to resort to force. Greeve continued to strengthen his military backing. Batavia had been unable to supply more troops but had authorized him to hire Madurese, and he had asked for 500 from west Madura and 300 from Sumenênp. He was also assembling in Sêmarang the regents from the pasisir, who were directly under the V.O.C., with their armed men. There were about 1,500 of these troops by October 27 and half of them were to remain in Sêmarang, together with the Pangeran of Madura and of Sumenênp with their personal soldiery (numbering 1,500), until the total force of 1,600 they had offered to Greeve had

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141. On Greeve's visit to Yogyakarta, see Ricklefs, Jogjakarta, p. 328.
142. See ibid., p. 329, on this episode.
143. 26OL. časar karingén (= korengén) gérahe.
144. The V.O.C. advanced Greeve large sums of money—over 100,000 rijksdaalders—for hiring these troops. See Greeve to Batavia, November 8, in KA 3833, VOCOB, 1792.
been assembled. Finally, Greeve was also able to obtain assistance from the crew (not numerous) of three ships under the command of Staringh, which were to have been repaired at Batavia. On October 25, Greeve received news that the Sultan's men had retaken all their Gunung Kidul villages from Mangkunégara.

On 23 Sapar [November 2, 1790] Mangkunégara's men finally dispersed on kumpêni orders and he accepted the offer of 4,000 real per annum. He rationalized his position by saying that he was now old and sick, and obeyed all the kumpêni's commands, to be able to sit and sleep in peace; and that the Sunan had betrayed him, going back on his promise. On 27 Sapar [November 6, 1790] he signed a solemn agreement (sêrat prajangji) in the Dutch factory.

In his letter to Batavia of October 28, Greeve remarked that the Sunan appeared to be withdrawing his support from Mangkunégara. He was informed of the latter's decision to accept the 4,000 real and swear the oath to live in peace with Yogyakarta on November 1st. On the third of the month, the Sultan said that the Yogyakarta Crown Prince would swear a reciprocal oath. Since both sides had suffered damage, their claims for compensation would require further assessment.

Greeve had now bought off Mangkunégara, and on the 5th he received news that Prang Wadana had fallen out with the "popes." This gave the V.O.C. a much better prospect of bringing the Sunan to heel. Only 260 troops had so far arrived from Madura, but by November 7 Greeve was able to make up his total of 500 west Madurese and 300 from Sunénêp by commandeering men from the personal bodyguards of the two Madurese princes with him in Semarang.

The Yogyakarta raids did not immediately cease, but were no longer the main focus of attention for the actors on the Sala stage. This was now on the Sunan's continuing refusal to surrender his guru to the kumpêni. The Sunan put his army on the alert, and the kumpêni began to bring in troops from Sunénêp, Madura, and south India, and later from Yogyakarta and Kaduwang. The arrival of two Dutch naval officers is also noted. On 8 Mulud [November 16] the Resident visited Mangkunégara and told him that the Company had broken with the Sunan and intended to depose him. Garêbêg Mulud [the 12th of the month,}

145. See Greeve's diary for October 20 and 27, in KA 3833, VOCOB, 1792.
147. In KA 3833, VOCOB, 1792.
148. See Greeve's diary, November 5 and 7, in KA 3833, VOCOB, 1792.
149. In fact they continued during the next few weeks: see 260R and 266R.
150. 261R.
151. "Madura" is used in the diary, as it was generally until a much later period, to mean only west Madura, from Bangkalan to Sampang.
152. 262.
153. 261R: an "amral laut lan kapitan" (Admiral and Captain).
154. 262.
November 20, 1790] is described as a time of deserted markets, and panic and confusion among the Sunan's subjects. 155 The Sunan himself did not even appear for the customary celebrations. But now he decided to play for time, summoning representatives both of his santri advisers and of the opposing party, led by the Patih. More troops, from Sampang, Sumenep, and Yogyakarta, moved in, and these forces were disposed at strategic points around the city. 156 By 17 Mulud [November 25], Mangkunegara had already received the first payment of his annual 4,000 real. The next day, the Sunan capitulated, handing over five of his advisers—Wiradigda, Kanguruhan, Saleh, Pangeran Panengah and Bahman—to Pangeran Purbaya, who brought them to the Dutch factory. From there they were taken to Semarang. 157

The information from Greeve's diary on the events of these weeks can be summarized as follows: on November 5, Greeve decided that it was essential that the "popes" be handed over to the Company. When he was informed by Pangeran Purbaya on November 9 that the Sunan had decided to "live or die" with them, he made a contingency plan in case the Sunan should flee his kraton. Mangkunegara—chosen, as Greeve later explained, because he was a formidable man who could "maintain himself," whereas the Sunan's son and heir was still a child 158—would replace him. On the 10th, the 300 Sumenep troops left Semarang for Surakarta, accompanied by fourteen sepoys and some European troops, presumably the thirty soldiers and thirty artillerymen who had arrived on the 8th of the month. 159 Many of these had been sick, and Greeve had to draw on the already weak Semarang garrison to make up the strength of this force (Diary, November 9). On the 16th, Greeve received news that the Sunan had called up his regents and their armed men, some of whom (those from Banyumas) had already reached Surakarta. On the 18th, news arrived from Yogyakarta that the Sultan had strengthened his forces in the field to far more than 2,000 men, and that his mancanagara regents with another 2,000 would approach Surakarta from the east by the morrow. On the 19th, the 500 west Madurese troops left for Surakarta. 160

A review of the above material suggests that Ricklefs' account of this crisis 161 underestimates the Company's military resources, or overstates its military weakness. Ricklefs lists only some of the companies of European troops which arrived in Semarang during this time (the Wurttemberg troops but not the 250 from Batavia and the other contingents noted above), 162 enabling Greeve to strengthen the central Javanese garrisons with 100 men each and still to have left a force of 374 men to back him up when he left for central Java. 163 It is true that these European forces were very seriously affected by illness 164 and that their deployment for the

155. 262R.
156. In the pasowanan kidul, the pakêbonan, around the Mangkunegaran, and on the south side of the pasar pon (leaving only the southeast to the Sunan's men).
157. 263R.
158. Greeve to Batavia, December 1, in KA 3833, VOCOB, 1792.
159. Greeve to Batavia, November 8, in KA 3833, VOCOB, 1792.
160. Diary, November 18, and Greeve to Batavia, November 20, in KA 3833, VOCOB, 1792.
162. See above, p. 90.
163. See above, p. 92.
164. Ricklefs, Jogjakarta, pp. 326 and 333-35.
south-central Javanese operation could only be achieved at the cost of weakening the Company's other garrison posts; but the Company had also a second arm to its military strength in the "native auxiliary" forces. Apart from the 500 Madurese noted by Ricklefs,\textsuperscript{165} Greeve had also obtained 300 men from Sunan\’p and had assembled in Semarang the large force of soldiers mentioned above.\textsuperscript{166} One should not discount the degree to which the services of such troops could be relied upon, especially in view of the fact that the V.O.C. had advanced very large sums of money indeed to Greeve for the purpose of hiring them.\textsuperscript{167} This assessment of the Company's resources leaves out of consideration the question of how the different central Javanese forces—those of the Sultan of Yogyakarta, estimated at between 4,500 and 7,000 men, those of Mangkunegara, now estimated at 2,000, and those of the Sunan himself, estimated at 7,000\textsuperscript{168}—would in fact have aligned themselves had it come to war.

\textit{Retreat}

In the event it did not come to war; for on November 20 the Surakarta Resident sent news that the Sunan had decided to relinquish the "popes"—himself suggesting, in fact, that the foremost among his previously most confidential counselors should be executed. Greeve interpreted this to mean that the Sunan would rather take this drastic step than merely hand them over to the Company, because they "knew too much." He told him that the Company did not require their deaths, although he thought that, if the Sunan should insist on this, it would at least be a salutary example to other potential troublemakers.\textsuperscript{169} He asked the Sunan that the replacements to the posts vacated by the popes should be "honest men" (brave lieden) and, for these appointments only, should swear an oath of loyalty to the Company. On November 26, news came that the Sunan had handed over the five "chief popes" (as named in the diary) to Pangeran Purbaya, who took them to the V.O.C. fort. The Sunan was granted the Company's forgiveness and the troops began to disperse.

On December 1, Greeve wrote to Batavia explaining his strategy: he had not—however it might have appeared from what he had said—intended actually to depose the Sunan without the Governor-General's authorization, but had judged it useful to give the impression that he did in fact intend to take this ultimate step. His plan to put Mangkunegara on the throne had been purely a precaution for the eventuality that the Sunan himself took the step of leaving his capital.

\textit{From this point on, a "reconciliation" between the Sunan and the Dutch began, and the troops and officers and kump\'n\'i officials began to return to their normal posts.}\textsuperscript{170} The Sunan dismissed another of his officers, Tumenggung Sujanapura, on the kump\'n\'i's request,\textsuperscript{171} and resumed the social niceties. He visited the Dutch in their factory and even, the diarist records, drank alcohol (as did his dignitaries)

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{165} Ibid., p. 335.
  \item \textsuperscript{166} See above, pp. 95-96.
  \item \textsuperscript{167} See above, note 144.
  \item \textsuperscript{168} See Greeve's diary November 5 and 18, in KA 3833, VOCOB, 1792.
  \item \textsuperscript{169} See Greeve to Batavia, November 25, in KA 3833, VOCOB, 1792.
  \item \textsuperscript{170} 264L-268L.
  \item \textsuperscript{171} 268L.
\end{itemize}
to please them, although he usually took only tea or coffee. He had not drunk alcohol in earlier gatherings with Dutch officials.

As the Dutch troops were dispersing, the diarist records that strange things happened in Sala: a jajal arrived and caused great uproar in and about the Sunan's palace. Later the sound of drums and rifles was heard: those in the east of the city thought it came from the west, and vice versa.

This was the end of the crisis: after this, and for the rest of the period covered by the diary, Surakarta life returned to its normal tenor, which was not, as we have seen, entirely dull.

The crisis did, however, leave behind some problems which were not to be resolved within the period covered by the diary. The damage claims by both sides were finally settled as follows: the Surakarta side estimated their losses at 16,000 real and the Sultan his at 10-11,000. The Sultan, therefore, agreed to pay 4,000 to Surakarta, which was accepted as satisfactory. There is no record of what part of the 4,000 real went to Mangkunegara.

It is clear from the V.O.C. letters of the period immediately following that the alliance of interests between the two Surakarta princely houses had now definitely broken down, as a result of the different ways in which Pakubuwana and Mangkunegara had withdrawn from confrontation with the Company. The Company, however, once it had brought about the peaceful installation of the Yogyakarta Crown Prince (this took place on April 2, 1792), also wished to ensure the succession of Mangkunegara's heir, Prang Wadana, to his grandfather's position, supported by the same grant of land and labor, the 4,000 cacah granted to Mangkunegara by Pakubuwana III. Pakubuwana IV objected to making this grant hereditary, saying that he had a numerous family to provide for, and that his father had granted the 4,000 cacah for Mangkunegara's lifetime only. He requested that the grant to Mangkunegara's heir be reduced to 2,000 cacah, or that at the very least, all Mangkunegara's holdings over and above 4,000 cacah should be surrendered: these included the wadana-ship of Banyumas and the districts of Panjér and Pamérden. Governor P. G. van Overstraten, considering 4,000 cacah the necessary minimum endowment to maintain the Mangkunegaran house as a substantial ally for the Company, accepted the second proposal, and an agreement was drawn up at a conference between Governor and Sunan on August 8, 1792. Prang Wadana would be a Pangeran, but would not bear his grandfather's "high title" of Pangeran Adipati.

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172. See, for example, 251R (the Sunan's reception of Greeve).

173. See, for example, 265R: sang nata angu[n]juk awis / saběn-saběn sang nata angu[n]juk wedang // mangke miturut walanda / marma nata ngu[n]juk awis / upruk lan děler lautan / kang piněndet ingkang galth / angecani kump[ê]ni / santana patih tuměng-gung / nginum awis sadaya ajirh tumurut kump[ê]ni / . . . The diarist makes it quite clear that the drinking of alcohol was a special departure from the Sunan's usual custom. In the Mangkunegaran, of course, alcohol was regularly served at festivities.

174. Jalal (or dajal) is the Antichrist who, according to Muslim eschatology, will appear before the Day of Resurrection. The diarist records his alleged appearance in the briefest terms and it is a matter of speculation whether or not this is intended as an omen of the imminence of the last days.

175. See Greeve to Batavia, May 10, 1791, in KA 3833, VOCOB, 1792.

176. See van Overstraten to Batavia, April 2, April 25, July 15 and November 3, 1793, in KA 3859, VOCOB, 1793.
Near the end of the diary,177 the diarist gives an analysis of Mangkunegara's political position. Once again, she compares him with a wong anggur178 (lir ngang-gur saumpama), but claims also that he is "acknowledged as the child" (ingakSN anak) of the Company, in contrast to the rulers of Sala [Surakarta] and of Mataram [Yogyakarta], who, with all the people of Java, are ruled (kareh) by the Governor [of the northeast coast], for it is the Company which possesses supreme authority. She goes on to say that, because Mangkunegara does not owe service to the Sunan, he does not have to attend court at the Garbèg celebrations, as the Bupati do.

This is an extremely interesting formulation. First, we see Mangkunegara, who had for so long relied on his own strength, now in his old age brought to accept the fact that it was the Company that guaranteed his present position. Second, we find an acknowledgment of Company rule over the whole of Java, including the Sunan and the Sultan. The sources used by Ricklefs, in contrast, apparently present this relationship between the Sultan and the Company as one of alliance, rather than of dependency on a sovereign power.179 Sometimes the relationship is described in familial terminology: the Governor-General is the eyang (grandfather) of the Javanese rulers. Mangkunegara also represents his relationship with the Company in this terminology, though the word used (anak, "child") implies rather less distance. In the case of the Sunan and the Sultan, however, the relationship is presented as one of power and subordination unmodulated by these familial overtones: they are "ruled" by the Company. This is not the only acknowledgment from a Javanese source of the Company's power over all Java,180 but it is nevertheless interesting in that it comes from within the central Javanese aristocracy, and suggests—even given its tendentious desire to point up the importance of Mangkunegara's rivals, the Sunan and the Sultan—that the extent of Company power over all Java was by no means discounted there, even by those who would have been reluctant to acknowledge it publicly.

The diarist's other claim, that Mangkunegara was not obliged to attend court at the Garbèg celebrations, ran counter to the explicit provision among the terms of the 1757 agreement that he should do just this.181 It is equally clear from the diary that Mangkunegara actually attended the Sunan's court as little as possible and, as noted above, Resident Palm had on one occasion reported him to higher authority for not attending the Garbèg Mulud celebrations.182 Attending or not attending on the occasion of the Garbèg was a matter of particular significance, for it was then that all those who owed service to the Sunan were expected to appear at court as evidence of their continuing loyalty; and even during the period of his political alliance with the Pakubuan kraton, such a public affirmation of subordinate status was something that Mangkunegara avoided as long as possible.

177. 292L.

178. On the use of the term "wong anggur" to indicate a person who was not bound to perform service for anyone, see note 45 above.


181. See Hartingh to Batavia, March 29, 1757, in KA 2802, VOCOB, 1758.

182. See above, p. 71.
Conclusion

The juxtaposition of the diary record and the account given in the V.O.C. letters of the period gives the historian a perhaps unique opportunity to compare two types of original record, one Dutch and one Javanese, before their reworking into official "histories." One might very well expect that records from two such divergent organizations as a Javanese princely kraton and a Dutch trading company would differ greatly in their perceptions of the important issues of the period. The comparison made here reveals that this is not the case. The area where the two records coincide is greater than where they diverge, and their divergence can be attributed more to the necessity of both sides keeping certain secrets, and to imperfections in their means of gathering information, than to differences in their perception of the overall situation.

Taken together, the diary and the V.O.C. records of the time provide sufficient evidence (despite the problems, discussed below, in using this material) to attempt a reconstruction of Mangkunegara's role in Surakarta politics and the motivation behind his actions. Three decades before the development of the crisis described above, the V.O.C. had made, and then perpetuated, the mistake of leaving Mangkunegara, and his large household of family and followers, without a secure provision for their support, in immediate proximity to one of the two major Javanese princely houses. The Company envisaged Mangkunegara as a "wall" between these two houses, and its officials referred to him as "our prince," expecting loyal service from him. Yet he had profited from his alliance with the V.O.C. only to the extent of receiving a small endowment, which was, moreover, not even secured to his heirs. After several decades in this unsatisfactory position, and with any hope of further advancement from the Company unfulfilled, it was hardly surprising that he and his heirs should consider whether a different alliance would bring better returns. As we have seen, even the weak and old Pakubuwana III showed interest in finding out whether Mangkunegara was prepared to intensify his quarrel with Yogyakarta, or not.\(^{183}\) And when his more aggressive son embarked upon a policy of "standing firm against Mataram and the Company" (that the two were inseparably linked in the Surakarta view is one of the interesting insights provided by the diary), Mangkunegara had to decide how much he stood to gain or lose if he agreed to join the Sunan, and therefore enquired from Greeve whether the Company did in fact intend to give him or his descendants the throne of Mataram when the Sultan died, as he claimed he had been promised. It is clear that his sons and grandsons, moved by the fire of youth and their uncertain prospects, were also exerting considerable pressure on him to grasp the initiative firmly at this point. When (by September 4th) he had ascertained that the Company denied his claims to the throne of Mataram (and even reproached him for making them), he formed an alliance with Pakubuwana IV, at the same time demanding of Greeve such an impossibly high price for his continued cooperation with the V.O.C. that he must have felt himself to be in a position to take a very hard line with the Company. Whether he calculated that he would be able to reduce his price in subsequent negotiations should the development of events make rapprochement with the V.O.C. the wiser course, we are not really in a position to know. Mangkunegara subsequently abandoned his alliance with Pakubuwana for two related reasons: the Sunan had left the Mangkunegaran forces to do the fighting on their own (the diarist's claim is borne out by the archival evidence); and, after initial successes against the Yogyakarta forces, Mangkunegara's men began to get the worst of the passages of arms. He therefore agreed to accept Greeve's offer of 4,000 real per annum,

\(^{183}\) See above, p. 70.
which he had earlier refused. Nevertheless, we can see from the diary that this yielding to the Company’s pressure was something which he felt had to be excused. He did so on the grounds of his age and the Sunan’s failure to give him the support promised. These are grounds peculiar to his particular situation, and there is no evidence that he felt warfare was no longer conceivable as the ultimate political stratagem by this period. Rather, failure to live up the Mangkunégaran martial values was something which had to be explained away.

The above account has dealt with the crisis of 1790 in rather more detail than is found in Ricklefs’ chapter on the subject, particularly on the issue of the name "Mangkubumi," Hartsinck’s role, the military preparations of the V.O.C. (troop movements July to September 1790), and Pakubuwana IV’s different proposals. Such detailed treatment has brought out certain questions of interpretation. On the central question of Pakubuwana IV’s aims, Ricklefs has concluded that Greeve allowed himself to be fed a "mass of rumor" by those at court who had lost out in the Sunan’s replacement of his chief officials, and should have realized that Pakubuwana wanted no more than what he had requested on October 3: that Surakarta be recognized as the senior kraton, that the money from the pasisir should be paid entirely to Surakarta, and that the pengu lu of Surakarta should be senior to those of Yogyakarta and of Sémang. He did not, contrary to "rumor," wish to attack the V.O.C., but in fact desired to obtain its support for Surakarta’s position. Before dismissing these reports as rumor, however, it is worth remarking that Greeve and other representatives of the V.O.C. had to operate within a context in which virtually all their information on the political aims of the Javanese aristocracy was acquired aurally, through the personal testimony of those involved at the center or at the periphery. Neither the Sunan nor his fellow princes produced council minutes, or other records supplying evidence of firm decisions officially taken. The later historian, like the V.O.C. officials, is therefore in a difficult position, and must have good reason for preferring one personal testimony and dismissing another, since each of them has the standing of one version of the truth which a particular person wished to purvey to a specific audience on a specific occasion. In these circumstances, we must ask whether there is reason to believe that Pakubuwana IV was more candid in making that particular request than the courtiers were in their statements—or, indeed, than Pakubuwana himself was on other occasions when he requested other things, such as the division of Mataram or, again, the unification of the two kingdoms by means of a marriage between himself and a Yogyakarta princess. It seems to the present writer that the courtier’s allegations that Pakubuwana IV was planning to attack the Company are comparatively better corroborated: the diarist’s record shows that he certainly asked Mangkunégaru to join him in an attack against Yogyakarta and the Company, and this is confirmed also by a Yogyakarta text which alleges that the Sunan wished to conquer Yogyakarta and annihilate the Dutch, as well as to recover the pasisir.

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184. This point is discussed below, p. 109.
185. Ricklefs, Jogjakarta, ch. 9.
186. Ibid., pp. 329-31. (The date is given here as October 11 but, as remarked above [n. 137], the Sunan had already made this proposal on the 3rd.)
187. The Company’s problem in dealing with this sort of testimony is well exemplified by their difficulty in deciding whether Brangtakusuma and his brothers "really," as they periodically claimed, wanted to settle down as law-abiding subjects: see above, p. 74.
188. Ricklefs, Jogjakarta, pp. 318-19. The connection between getting rid of the
In attempting to assess how firm Pakubuwana IV really was in his commitment to this proposal made to Mangkunégara, we are faced with a difficult problem fundamental to the historian's understanding of other cultures at other times: the interaction of individual personality, social and political conditions and institutions, and what may be broadly termed "cultural factors." From the evidence of his later career, there can be little doubt that Pakubuwana IV was neither distinguished in military leadership nor a particularly astute politician. In P. B. R. Carey's detailed analysis of the "sepoy conspiracy" we see this Sunan once more employing the tactic he had used with Mangkunégara: encouraging another party to act openly against a common enemy, and then leaving his ally in the lurch. Since this tactic would seem to have accomplished little beyond exasperating both parties with him, his use of it can, with some justification, be seen as indicating that Pakubuwana personally lacked the capacity to follow through his chosen strategy. Yet his strategies themselves do not appear eccentric or even atypical if we view them against the background of political behavior throughout the eighteenth century. Indeed, it is possible that in making this multiplicity of proposals the Sunan was reproducing a common pattern: a preliminary process of bargaining, bluff, and exploratory moves, which would eventually lead to a realignment of the chief political forces according to the balance of strengths and weaknesses revealed by this very process. As a new contender for power, Pakubuwana IV was attempting to establish how far and by what means he could improve his present position. In a sense, he desired all the things which he had proposed, or, more precisely, all those that a working alliance could bring about. Since this process inevitably made not only allies but also enemies, it had, under the conditions prevailing before 1755, which encouraged individuals to pursue their interests by taking up arms, naturally led to a determination of the strength or weakness of the different parties by force majeure. What Pakubuwana IV apparently did not realize was that not only did the V.O.C. not wish to see central Java undergo another of the political rearrangements or shakedowns which this form of political maneuvering brought about, but that it was able to deploy very considerable resources to prevent this. The Company did not wish the contestants to reenter the arena to determine their respective military and political strengths—which was in a sense ironic, since it had itself supplied not a little of the motivation behind the contest. On a number of occasions during the eighteenth century, the Company's support had been crucial in making and un-making rulers, from the unfortunate Mangkurat III onwards. It must have been quite clear to Javanese of high birth from their own and their fathers' political experience that the V.O.C.'s decisions were based only partly on considerations of legitimacy, and for the rest on considerations of political expediency. The Company had entered into alliances with those princes with whom they could profitably be concluded. Such princes had to be, obviously enough, those who were willing to cooperate (at least after a certain point in their careers). They also had to be, at least when the Company found itself hard pressed, men able to command a substantial following and to maintain themselves against opposition. In view of this, it was quite natural for an ambitious man both to try to prove that his was the more legitimate claim (as Mangkunégara's own son Pangeran Purbanégara was to do in 1792 when he attempted to convince the visiting Governor Dutch and reclaiming the pasisir and its enormous revenues (of which the central Javanese rulers now received only a tiny percentage) needs no elaboration. While quoting this text, Ricklefs describes its account of Pakubuwana's plans as "unlikely."

van Overstraten that he, and not Mangkunégara's grandson, Pangeran Surya Prang Wadana, should succeed as Mangkunégara II\textsuperscript{190}), and to establish himself, by force if necessary, as the most formidable figure in his own circle. Since the Javanese aristocracy was growing rapidly (the Mangkunégara birth-rate was not exceptionally high) and its resources were not, there were many who were interested in establishing their preeminence. Mangkunégara's inability to prevent his sons from plotting among themselves to cut out other sons from the available appanage lands mirrors on a relatively small scale the situation in the aristocracy as a whole.\textsuperscript{191}

Yet the Company was by the late eighteenth century firmly set against the emergence of the "naturally strong," though when it appeared that his attempts to preserve the status quo had failed and a violent resolution was likely, Greeve reverted once more to the old strategy in his proposal to replace the intransigent Pakubuwana IV with Mangkunégara, known as someone who could "maintain himself." He did not, in the event, need to use this strategy, because Pakubuwana backed down before the break with the Company became irreparable.

If Pakubuwana IV appears to have been neither particularly astute nor heroic, a man more prone to start things than to carry them through, a historian interested in the personal contributions of the crucial figures in this crisis would have to add that the V.O.C. representatives appear in no more favorable colors. Of the two First Residents at Surakarta who had been sent there with the expectation that they would be vigilant, polite, and ingratiating, alert to the development of trends harmful to the Company and quick to initiate the action necessary to abort them, neither had fulfilled these expectations. Palm had, by his excessive demands for labor, his interference in court judicial proceedings, and his general rudeness, given the Sunan and his family reason to feel badly oppressed by the V.O.C.; with the arrival of Hartsinck an arrogant Resident was replaced by one so complaisant and venal that he was prepared to keep silent, as those who had earlier been forced to accept humiliation prepared their resurgence, and maintained his fainéant stance as tension between the two principalities rose to a level which his superiors would have considered dangerous to the Company's interest.

If the Surakarta Residents' shortcomings contributed significantly to the Company's unpreparedness to deal quickly and informedly with developments there, it is questionable how well Governor Greeve dealt with these developments once they became his responsibility. He was, as Ricklefs suggests, a person of no great personal courage.\textsuperscript{192} It is clear from his diaries that his favored tactic was to refrain from doing anything to make the Sultan and Sunan suspect that the Company was in any way displeased with them so long as he himself was at their courts; but to instruct the Residents to take a "hard line" with them once he was safely back in Sámarang. He tended also to take a stand on an issue but subsequently to withdraw from it or change his mind; as when, for example, he withheld payment of the \textit{strandgelden} (the sum paid each September as rent for the pasisir and its incomes) but shortly afterwards let both rulers have them after all.\textsuperscript{193} He was given to sermonizing, especially in his letters to the young Pakubuwana IV, whom he on

\textsuperscript{190} This attempt on Purbanégara's part is reported in van Overstraten to Batavia, November 3, 1792, in KA 3859, VOCOB, 1793.

\textsuperscript{191} See above, p. 82.

\textsuperscript{192} Ricklefs, \textit{Jogjakarta}, pp. 326-30, gives an amusing description of one of Greeve's court visits, when his liability to take fright became fully apparent.

\textsuperscript{193} See above, p. 91.
one occasion exhorted to be magnanimous like the "truly great princes" of the world. Such an exhortation is hardly likely to have had the desired effect on a young Sunan bent more on the exercise of princely powers than of moral restraint (and indeed, it is hard to see what other truly great princes Greeve had in mind as exemplars). Finally, his letters do not seem to reveal a well-developed political judgment: in many instances he appears to be striving to maintain a "balance" so delicate as to be, in practical terms, inoperable. We see this in his efforts to prepare the Sultan to take to the field in defense of Yogyakarta against Mangkuné-gara's "outrageous pretensions" to its throne, while at the same time enjoining the old and choleric ruler against any premature action; and in his efforts to preserve not only peace on "blessed Java" (as he frequently calls it, apparently without irony) but also a "sufficient" (though not "excessive") degree of rivalry between the two principalities. Although he directed the military preparations competently enough, his ineptitude with the Javanese princes may well have increased their exasperation with the Company and unwillingness to cooperate with it.

It would seem then that, as far as the personal qualities of its representatives were concerned, the Company cannot have been at an advantage. When, among a small representation, three of these were Palm, Hartsinck, and Greeve, it is not surprising that much of its information was inaccurate or late and its tactics sometimes counterproductive. Nevertheless, the Company did enjoy significant advantages. The small size of its personnel was a source of strength as well as sometimes of weakness; and on the whole its personnel were at least reasonably subject to discipline ("united," in view of the behavior of a number of its Residents, would certainly be an untenable claim). Even its most dubious employee, Hartsinck, begged and was granted forgiveness for the faults he had committed. This ability to impose discipline is in marked contrast to the Surakarta aristocracy, where even the Mangkuné-garan, which probably really did possess the high degree of corporate spirit and loyalty to its leader which the diarist lays stress upon, was not able to control the ambitious young scions of its line. Within the kraton corporate unity depended very much on this type of comparatively weakly institutionalized esprit de corps; the V.O.C., on the other hand, had a well-established chain of command, in which it was much clearer who had the right to give orders, and what constituted insubordination or dereliction of duty.

There are several reasons for this contrast. The Dutch employees of the V.O.C. were foreigners in a land where life would have been difficult for them if they abandoned their loyalty to the Company and decided to chance their own arm or make other alliances. Though outright defections had occurred, they were few in number. Again, the Company's employees were bound by economic ties much more directly to their employers than was the case for those in the service of Javanese princes. Despite the stereotype of the underpaid, and therefore corrupt and disloyal, Company servant, those who rose to respectable rank were well compensated and knew that they would enjoy the fruits of office. The Company was

194. See his letter to Pakubuwana IV of May 15, 1790, enclosed in Greeve to Batavia, May 19, 1790, in KA 3802, VOCOB, 1791.

195. See Greeve to Batavia, July 20, 1791, in KA 3857, VOCOB, 1793. Had the full extent of Hartsinck's activities been known, this forgiveness would almost certainly not have been granted.

196. A number of Europeans had actually defected from the Company to fight with Mangkuné-gara himself in the early 1750s: see Louw, Derde . . . Oorlog, p. 75.

197. The Company was not as unsympathetic in the matter of "private trading" by
able to allot financial rewards to those who rendered loyal and able service more easily than a Javanese ruler, whose resources were mainly in land and manpower and therefore hard to prise from one person and transfer to another. Competition for such resources was difficult to regulate. The greater liquidity of its economic resources was an enormous advantage to the Company in its military campaigns: for the military arrangements described above (only the beginnings of the projected warfare) Batavia sent Greeve almost ten times the amount which the Sunan and the Sultan each received annually from the rent paid them for the pasisir. The V.O.C. had assumed the control of, and the power to tax, the commercial productivity of Java and, even though, like the Javanese princes, very much of its revenue was in kind, the Company's basis in a well-developed commercial network meant that these revenues could be converted and used for ambitious enterprises beyond the scope of any prince. Both the Sunan and the Sultan saw the desirability of tapping the Company's liquid funds by obtaining loans, though the amounts involved were not particularly large in terms of the sums the Company's senior employees had at their disposal for their commercial enterprises. The effect of economic constraints on Mangkunégaran's ability to maintain a significant army, and the development of the Mangkunégaran's economic dependency upon the Company, have been discussed in the first part of this article.

If the Javanese aristocracy lacked the V.O.C.'s institutional and economic mechanisms for unified action, this is not to say that they were not bound by common ties at all. To depict Pakubuwana IV himself simply as an ambitious schemer furthering his own ambitions by miscellaneous stratagems would be an inaccurate representation of his role. But the ties which bound the aristocracy together, and which directed and limited Pakubuwana's ambitions, were rooted in the moral and cultural environment rather than in more formal arrangements, and their hold over individuals and groups is therefore difficult to measure. This is exemplified by Pakubuwana's appeal to Islam. The present writer feels that Ricklefs' suggestion that Pakubuwana IV was advancing a faction committed to pre-Islamic Javanese beliefs is not supported by the diary or by the Dutch archival material, despite Raffles's suspicion in 1815 that this Sunan was then conspiring with Indian sepoys to restore "Hindu" rule. A detailed study of this so-called "sepoy conspiracy" its employees as is sometimes thought. In April 1786, for example, it advanced loans of 2,500 guilders to Siberg (the then Governor of the northeast coast) and 1,500 guilders each to the First Residents of Surakarta and Yogyakarta for private trade. The Sunan received a smaller loan (1,000 guilders) at the same time. See entry for April 20, 1786, in the accounts given in KA 3628, VOCOB, 1787.

198. See Part I, note 164, on Mangkunégaran's difficulties in attempting to regulate his appointees' use of the economic resources under their control.

199. See above, note 144. Conversion of the rijksdaalder (in which the campaign accounts are given) to the real (Spanish dollar, of which the Sunan and the Sultan received 10,000 per annum for the lease of the pasisir lands) can be done by calculating 50 stuiver to the rijksdaalder and 64 to the real. (Note that there is an error in the table in E. Netscher and J. A. van der Chijs, De Munten van Nederlandsch Indië, Verhandelingen van het Bataviaasch Genootschap, 31, 2 [1864], p. 55, where the real is given at 80 stuiver in 1785.)

200. On the Sunan, see above, note 197, and on the Sultan, Ricklefs, Jogjakarta, pp. 121 and 246.

201. Ricklefs, Jogjakarta, p. 333.

does not provide evidence that Pakubuwana really shared the Indian sepoys' religious beliefs, however much he may have been interested in their Hindu ceremonies and in the shared religious past of India and Java. What he may well have shared with them is an early mode of cultural nationalism—some might say xenophobia—in the face of European encroachment, of which a previous manifestation in the period covered here may be seen in his banning of European dress in favor of Javanese or Middle-Eastern styles. On the other hand, it is clear from both Dutch and Javanese accounts that Pakubuwana was making a considerable effort to appear as a patron and promoter of Islam, regularly attending the Friday prayer, and sometimes himself delivering the kutbah, instructing his men on the duty of performing the prayers regularly, building a replica of the Dūmak mosque, and proscribing alcohol and opium. It is less easy to ascertain whether he was personally—as opposed to politically—a devout Muslim, though he did specially solicit a Koran written by Mangkunęgara and was at least well enough schooled to make a convincing instructor and kutbah-reader. Nor is it claimed that a Javanese aristocrat of this period would have considered that obedience to the prescriptions of Islam meant, necessarily or potentially, a proscription of those elements of his cultural and intellectual life which derived from other, older Javanese traditions. What remains is a strong support of Islam, a policy which his forefathers had also considered proper or useful: his grandfather, Pakubuwana II, had been the founder of a number of pésantren, including the famous Tégalsari, which Pakubuwana IV continued to patronize. During the reign of his father, Pakubuwana III, it had been a member of Mangkunęgara's kaum who was appointed as liaison officer between the two Surakarta kraton, and it is likely that Islam continued to provide links between the two kraton under Pakubuwana IV, given its central role in the Mangkunęgaran.

The diary provides a perhaps surprising amount of evidence of the dominant place of Islam as an organizing principle in at least one Javanese court; and on the other hand, no evidence of the currency of pre- or non-Islamic "Javanist" philosophies. This lack of evidence of the latter body of tradition does not prove that it played no part in Javanese intellectual life, since the diary is a record of political practice and not of philosophical ideas. Nevertheless, the positive evidence of this notable practical commitment to Islamic ibadah remains, and it seems likely that future scholars will need to reassess the contribution of Islam to norms of social and political behavior in eighteenth-century central Java.

There were however perceptible differences in the way the two men, Pakubuwana IV and Mangkunęgara, expressed their religious commitment: Pakubuwana's proscription of alcohol would hardly have been popular in the hard-drinking

203. A related question is the extent to which extra-court representatives of Islam, the kyai and the pésantren community, did feel at this period that commitment to Islam should be exclusive of such elements and might have put pressure on the court to follow such a line, as the price for their support of the ruler. The evidence for and against this proposition cannot be considered here.

204. Tégalsari was founded by Pakubuwana II in 1742, during his exile after the capture of the kraton by the "Chinese" party. He also made other foundations in the area. Pakubuwana IV married one of his nieces to the kyai of Tégalsari, and gave her as dowry the adjacent village of Karang-gebang as a hereditary grant. On Tégalsari, see Ongkohkham, "The Residency of Madiun: Priyayi and Peasant in the Nineteenth Century" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1975), pp. 47-48, and for a late nineteenth-century description of this still renowned pésantren, P. J. Veth, Java (Haarlem: Bohn, 1875-82), 3, pp. 714-15.

205. See above, p. 70.
Mangkunegaran. And in general, it seems that the martial pride of the Mangkunegaran, where, as we have seen, something of the atmosphere of the "armed camp" kraton of earlier decades was still maintained, tended to despise the somewhat bloodless tone of the court of Pakubuwana and his brothers. There is an amusing description of the abysmal showing made by the Sunan's brother, Mangkubumi, at a court dance performance, so that (the diarist claims) even the Resident was disgusted at the sight of this "limp priyayi" (priyayi lanas) attempting the martial bêksa while looking as if he were frightened of something. During the nineteenth century a refined, renunciatory official culture would be perfected, which is usually referred to by this same term, "priyayi," now carrying a connotation of sought-after status. The Mangkunegaran, in contrast, clearly represents the lifestyle of the old Javanese noblesse d'êpée, still insisting on the old martial values, but never again to dominate in the way it once had done.

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Not all of the general conclusions which seem to emerge from this study of political developments in Surakarta accord with those put forward by Ricklefs on the basis of his pioneering study of Yogyakarta at the same period—a study which is without doubt a remarkable tour de force and a work of immense usefulness, without which subsequent scholarly work on these decades would have been immeasurably poorer. Nevertheless, the evidence for Surakarta, represented by the diary in combination with Dutch records, suggests that some of Ricklefs' conclusions regarding the Javanese aristocracy as a whole may need reexamination.

The clear evidence of the court's commitment to Islam—whose influence in central Java must be seen, in the opinion of the present writer, to have been much stronger than Ricklefs acknowledges—has already been discussed; as has the evidence that Javanese aristocrats were not, after all, impervious at this period to the force of the Company's claims (largely unspoken though these were) to "rule" them. Ricklefs also diagnoses a major change in the overall political program of the Javanese aristocracy during the latter half of the eighteenth century, in which they "eliminated" certain political "options," which were found to be no longer viable under the changed circumstances of the divided kingdom; and takes the Surakarta crisis of 1790 as a watershed in this general trend. He writes: "The elder generation of the Javanese courtly élite had accepted the fact of division. But some of the younger generation had not yet learned the lesson of its necessity. They were soon to do so"; and concludes that by the end of the period described here the Javanese had "decided warfare could not resolve their central problem." This is a large statement, and one which gives rise to certain problems. "The Javanese" (even the Javanese ruling class) do not exist as an organic entity any more than do "the French" or "the Americans," and, if one wishes to invest them with decision-making powers, one must ask by what means they could arrive at a consensus for the solution of a problem, or even decide what their "central problem" was. The Javanese state was notably weak in institutions by which common programs could be formulated and carried out, either through a well-established order of rank or chain of command (as illustrated by the constant rivalry among the numerous sons of the first Sultan of Yogyakarta who had claims upon the succession,

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206. 291L. The term "priyayi" appears to be used here in the sense of "junior prince," rather than a member of the bureaucratic nobility.

207. Ricklefs, Jogjakarta, p. 284.

208. Ibid., p. 415.
and between Crown Prince and Sultan), or by conciliar or consultative mechanisms (which could not draw in those pangaran and other notables who had decided to forsake the court and defy its authority in the regions). One becomes increasingly conscious of what a fragile—at times even a notional—thing we refer to as "the Javanese state." At the period with which we are concerned, the formalization of the cadastral affairs of the principalities, of consultative procedures for settling disputes between their respective subjects, and so on, was well underway, owing not a little to Dutch pressure in this direction. Yet the problem of obtaining a political consensus seems to have remained intractable. We have seen how difficult it was even for the Mangkunégaran—one among three kraton—to impose a common political program and an agreed tactical approach on all its members. For the aristocracy as a whole, there is no evidence that a consensus was developed through either formal or informal consultation: rather the reverse. There is no reason to suppose that either the older generation or the younger had, as a whole, learned to renounce warfare. Even after his retreat in 1790, Pakubuwana IV would not seem to have learned this lesson, in view of his later involvement in the sepoy conspiracy. While he seems to have favored the tactic of using an ally as "front man" (perhaps a technique learned from his father, who, as we have seen, showed interest in using Mangkunégar in this way), this was, nevertheless, directed towards engineering the overthrow by violence of the established order, from which he evidently hoped to profit. (It might also be noted that we find Pakubuwana IV pursuing in 1790 another of the old political strategies which Ricklefs sees as having now been abandoned—marriage diplomacy.

In fact, both the evidence of the diary and that of the V.O.C. archives record the existence of a continuing low-level turbulence—by no means every incident of which has been mentioned in the present account, which has necessarily been limited to developments of major importance. This continuing turbulence beyond, but not far beyond, the capitals, came partly from the initiative of Yogyakarta too, for sorties were sent out from there when circumstances seemed to suggest that there was a chance of seizing an advantage by doing so. If the usual dampening factors were significantly weakened, and an ambitious prince decided to seize the opportunity presented, such skirmishes were likely to escalate into warfare on a larger scale.

Of the dampening factors which usually prevented such an escalation, the one which operated with the greatest consistency was the presence of the V.O.C., committed to a far more rigid and permanent political order than the notably fluid one which had existed for so long. In analyzing the crisis of 1790, the present writer has stressed the relative effectiveness of the V.O.C.'s ordering presence in dampening conflict, at least when it had flared up to an unacceptable level, an effectiveness attributed to its more highly organized structure and its far more mobile military and economic resources. Its military forces may have been quantitatively inferior to those which the three central Javanese kraton might, hypothetically, together have called into the field, had they united in such an effort though

209. This aspect of the Javanese state is well described by Ricklefs in ibid., ch. 1, esp. pp. 18-26.

210. Ibid., ch. 4, describes the abandonment of marriage diplomacy as a means of reuniting the divided kingdom at an earlier period. See, however, p. 93 above on Pakubuwana IV's attempts to arrange his marriage to a Yogyakarta princess.

211. Ricklefs states (ibid., p. 415) that the partition of the kingdom in 1755-57 rendered unlikely a uniting of Javanese armies against the Dutch. In the present
numerical superiority is not the only factor to be considered in calculating military advantage—but its economic resources were undoubtedly of a superior order.

If this assessment of the relative effectiveness of the V.O.C. appears to be much like a restatement of an old colonial myth, it may perhaps be said that the myth contains, at least for a certain period of time, a measure of truth, and that it is this which explains the heavy intellectual bonds which it was able to impose upon the colonized. At other periods, of course, the colonial strengths may well be transformed into weaknesses, since superior economic resources may produce a prodigality which can be attacked by those who know how to make do with less, and the "perfecting" of military and bureaucratic structures becomes a self-sustaining process with little relation to realities. Then the colonized reveal their own strengths, rejecting the role allocated to them by the myth. These strengths develop in response to severe problems, and those created by the intrusion of the V.O.C. into Javanese life at this period were by no means small. Ricklefs concludes that adaptation to these changed circumstances was only partially successful and very serious problems remained unsolved. He also suggests that, with more men of great leadership qualities, such as Mangkubumi and Mangkunégara, a new type of political system might have developed. 212 On the evidence presented here, could Mangkunégara have been expected to contribute significantly to such a renovation? He was, without doubt, a man of great leadership qualities, possessing in superabundance the capacities which had made a prince preeminent among his peers in the old way of life. He was a military commander of notable subtlety, and himself a great warrior, excelling in archery and horsemanship. He was widely respected and beloved for his personal qualities, not just his military prowess but also his excellence in other fields: he was an enthusiastic dancer of the békasa and other traditional styles, and a stern critic of the performance of others; and he could as well turn his hand to writing out the Koran and instructing his followers on their religious duties. He was not, furthermore, without the capacity to change with changing times. Of the three youthful princes--Mangkunégara himself, Buminata and Singasari—who had begun their military careers together in opposition to the V.O.C., the two others had persisted in this opposition to the end. One died in chains in Batavia and the other in exile in Ceylon. Though Mangkunégara himself at first believed that his sheer primacy on the battlefield allowed him to insist on accession to the throne of Mataram as sole ruler, something the Company could not possibly have countenanced in view of its commitment to the existing ruler, he did ultimately accept the necessity of compromise, and was provided with a settlement, undoubtedly less than he would have received had he made a more correct judgment earlier, but nevertheless better than death or exile. At the end of his career we see him reconciled to his situation as the "child of the Company," and asking for instruction on how to grow the new export crops whose cultivation the Company wished to promote. 213 Yet despite his capacity for political adaptability and openness to contracting the alliance which seemed most helpful to him at a particular juncture (not least in the period whose events are described here), there are no signs of the reformer or innovator utilizing a systematic approach, desiring the construction of new forms of social and political organization

writer's opinion, such a united force was equally unlikely, because of structural and institutional weaknesses, under the old, "undivided" kingdom (and had never in fact occurred except, arguably, in the 1628-29 campaigns of Sultan Agung). To look back to the pre-1755 situation as one of "one king, one kingdom" is to focus on an ideal at the expense of reality. But this is another question.

212. Ibid., p. 423.

213. See above, p. 100, and Part I, p. 35.
better suited to changed times, criticizing the old society and its values as an effective process of renovation would have required. It may be that the diary is an inadequate reflection of the intellectual dimension of Mangkunégarar's personality; but there is no other evidence of such qualities in him, and it is reasonable to suppose that a prince whose remarkable endowments so destined him for pre-eminence in the old order was not one we might expect to see as architect of the new.

Errata (Part 1)

p. 3, note 5: for "metonym or transliteration" read "metonym or tralatition."
p. 4, line 9: should read "and, at at least weekly intervals. . . ."
p. 5, note 12: for "Bezantschapsreizen" read "Gezantschapsreizen."
   note 15: for "Nederlantsche" read "Nederlandtsche."
p. 22, verse 2: for "dikir" read "dikir."
p. 29, note 162: for "7,354" read "7,794."
p. 44, verse 2, line 2: for "piyambak" read "tiyambak."
p. 45, note 244: for "awawuh" read "awuwuh."

Verse separation should occur
p. 8 between lines 10 and 11
p. 14 between lines 2 and 3.
p. 15 between "kehnya kang salat ing masjid" and "pan tigang atus sawidak."