It is not surprising that much of the writing done to date on politics among Indonesians in the early decades of the twentieth century has been centered on the development of Indonesian nationalism during those years. Nationalism had, after all, emerged from the Japanese occupation with sufficient energy to fuel an already hard-pressed Indonesian populace through a four-year struggle for complete independence from the Dutch. Aware of the ultimate victory of that political force in 1950, scholars were naturally alert to its earlier potential when they turned to look at the final years of the Dutch colonial era in the East Indies. As a result, however, writings on the political history of Indonesia in this century reflect a certain unilinear approach: what is considered most significant in the period 1900-40 is whatever was happening then to the ideas, the leaders, and the institutions which were to become important in the years after 1940. Such an approach makes for a comprehensible and fascinating story of struggle, but it also detracts somewhat from the richness of the Indonesian historical experience of those earlier years; for it tends to neglect or to downgrade those elements of Indonesian life not ordinarily thought of as parts of the nationalist movement. Although historians in the past decade have begun to ask important questions about that nationalist movement, about its strength, its appeal, and its vitality in the first thirty-four years after its birth in 1908,

1Easily the most influential writing on the politics of the period 1900-1942 in the Dutch East Indies is the first 100 pages of George McT. Kahin's *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952). Clarity of vision and the ability both to synthesize and to make the synthesis understandable combine in the initial three chapters of that work to convey the sweep of the Indonesian nationalist movement in such a powerful way that subsequent writings of any worth on that period inevitably had to confront the concept that that movement constituted the soul of political life among Indonesians in those years. Most of the general histories on Indonesia or on Southeast Asia simply picked up on Kahin's work. But even the finer books done since on the period, centered though they be on topics, strictly speaking, other than nationalism, have in some way had their value judged and their contributions measured by the way in which they relate to, and relate more information about, the nationalist movement. (I think here of Ruth T. McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism* [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965]; Harry J. Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun* [The Hague: van Hoeve, 1958]; Deliar Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1942* [Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1973]; and Robert Van Niel, *The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite* [The Hague: van Hoeve, 1960]; others of course will choose other works.)

the phenomenon of nationalism still continues to monopolize center stage in the drama of political history in that period and seems even to have been accepted as the only character worthy of serious study and comment.

To obtain a more nearly true idea of what was actually transpiring in the Indies, at least some attention should be directed away from the more famous political figures and from their ideas, their dilemmas, and their movement. The political situation outside the heart of nationalist activities can not only reveal different sets of problems and different approaches to their solution but also might help produce a clearer picture of the difficulties faced by Indonesian nationalist leaders both in the years before and in those after independence.3

The document presented below is a 1934 report on the Pakempanan Kawulo Ngajogjakarta (PKN, Organization of the Subjects of Jogjakarta). As its name suggests, this PKN was neither radical in its politics nor open to all in its membership standards. Though it has merited occasional mention in works written on prewar politics in the Indies,4 the PKN was not admitted to the pantheon reserved for the better known nationalist political parties, and awareness of it has gradually diminished both among scholars and in most of Indonesia. The history of the PKN parallels that of many local study clubs and associations of farmers and merchants founded by Indonesians in the 1920s and 1930s, groups which gave their members an opportunity to experience organizational life but them simply withered away. It was, like them, founded for specific purposes, it prospered somewhat for its first few years, and it then floundered because of its inability to achieve many of its aims. Where the PKN should perhaps be differentiated from such groups, however, is in that it set out to become a political party for the

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3An example of the way in which attention directed away from the center of major political activities can be rewarded is the study of the Saminist movement. Few would claim any major historical importance for the movement itself--the area in which it had appeal is very limited and the total number of people involved is unlikely to have been much over 10,000--but it threw considerable light on the conditions of the Javanese peasantry, the changes being wrought in that condition, and the choices which that peasantry had to face. See, among others, The Siauw Giap, "The Samin and Samat Movements: Two Examples of Peasant Resistance," Revue du Sud-Est Asiatique, 67, 2 (1967), pp. 304-10, and 68, 1 (1968), pp. 107-13; Harry J. Benda and Lance Castles, "The Samin Movement," Bijdragen tot de taal-, land-, en volkenkunde, 125 (1969), pp. 207-40; Victor King, "Some Observations on the Samin Movement of North-central Java," Bijdragen, 129 (1973), pp. 457-81; and Pieter Korver, "Saminism as Millenarianism," Bijdragen, 132 (1976), pp. 249-66.

common people of Jogjakarta and for a few years was extraordinarily successful in this. In fact, this Jogjakarta people's party became the largest political organization in the Indies in the 1930s, with over a quarter of a million registered members. The course of its existence provides interesting material for gauging the potential for and the numerous obstacles hindering popular political participation under the Dutch in that decade.

The document recounts the history of the PKN's birth, growth, organization, and activities. The document, however, did not merely chart the life of the PKN; it also played an important part in that life. For it is a report by the Dutch Governor of Jogjakarta condemning both the party and its leader and recommending to his administrative superiors in Batavia that consideration be given to abolishing the former and disgracing the latter. Though neither of these harsh measures was taken, the party was thereafter scrutinized and harassed to such an extent that it was forced to drop its political pretensions and to concentrate on social and economic programs. Despite this mutation after 1934, the PKN survived as an important force in Jogjakarta down to and even after the Second World War. It endured both as an active organization in itself and as a symbol of a commitment toward its peasant members on the part of its founder and leader, Pangeran Ario Surjodiningrat.

When Pangeran Surjodiningrat initiated the establishment of the Pakempan Kawulo Ngajogjakarta in June 1930, he was already a rather unusual man working in a rather unusual official capacity. He was the son of the late Sultan of Jogjakarta, a half-brother of the sultan then reigning, Hamengku Buwono VIII, and a man expert in the lore and the practice of traditional Javanese dance and music. Because of this, the Pangeran enjoyed immense prestige and an emolument that was enormous by the standards of the Indies. Unlike the vast majority of his uncles and half-brothers, however, Pangeran Surjodiningrat did not simply rest on his status or hold down some sinecure in the kraton (palace). Instead he chose to take on an active, full-time position as a working civil servant in Jogjakarta. There is a historical background to the fact that his post as Controleur for Agrarian Affairs was both a fairly new one in Jogjakarta and one which made him an employee not of the Sultanate of Jogjakarta but rather of the central government of the Dutch East Indies.

At the end of the Diponegoro War (1825-1830), the Dutch permitted the truncated and splintered remnants of the old Central Javanese empire of Mataram to maintain their status as individual "self-governing states." For the Dutch administration on Java, retaining the Vorsten-
landen (Princely Territories) as the site for four separate, indirectly ruled entities initially meant little additional trouble: the Susuhunan of Surakarta, the Sultan of Jogjakarta, the Mangku Negoro, and the Paku Alam were permitted the trappings of Javanese rule while the actual power to determine policy in the area of Jogjakarta and Surakarta rested largely with the Dutch officials who were nominally advisors to the governments of these rulers. For Dutch commercial interests, this meant that parts of these areas remained open for private exploitation even when the Cultuurstelsel, the "cultivation system" operated for the benefit of the government, dominated agricultural production in the rest of Java. Dutch entrepreneurs responded to this opportunity by signing pacts which enabled them to establish plantations in the Vorstenlanden for raising pepper, coffee, tobacco, indigo, and, finally and most important, sugar. For the Javanese princes and their families, this arrangement insured a steady monetary income and the continued existence, on a reduced scale, of the traditional Javanese polity and of the rights and privileges of the nobility within it. For the farmers of the Vorstenlanden, tied to the land and with no assets but their labor, it simply meant new burdens added to already difficult lives, a situation tempered only by the feeling that they were in some fashion closely connected to the spiritual strength of their prince.

When the Dutch gave more serious attention to reform in the Indies after 1900, the Vorstenlanden began to seem less like traditional states and more like anachronisms. Even though some important institutional changes had been wrought in the seven decades since 1830, they remained backward. Farmers there still had no guaranteed access to land, the rights to which lay with the ruler and were practiced by appanage-holders. The systems for public transportation, education, communications, and administration were pitiable in comparison with those in the areas of Java under more direct Dutch rule. There was little differentiation between the funds of the self-governing states and those of their royal families. As pressure was exerted from Batavia for change in the Vorstenlanden, alterations in these conditions began to pick up speed. Separate and fairly strict budgets were drawn up for the royal families and for the local administrations over which they ruled. The number of Indies government officials in the area increased considerably. The technical services underwritten by the

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7In the areas controlled by the Mangku Negoro, the chief agent for the production of export crops came to be neither the Dutch government nor Dutch private interests but rather the principality itself. See A. K. Pringgodigdo, Geschiedenis der Ondernemingen van het Mangkoenagoeroeche Rijk (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950). In Jogjakarta, neither the Sultanate nor the Pakualaman directly operated any plantations.

8The budgets for the royal families were in fact "fairly strict" only when they were drawn up, and not when they were being put into practice. The traditional obligations of princes, particularly their obligations to contribute to the support of close relatives, together with the need to maintain a living style worthy of their dignity meant that living within these personal budgets was extremely difficult, and they ran up heavy debts, much to the dismay of the Dutch administration.

9In Jogjakarta, the basic administrative staff maintained by the Indies government in 1889 consisted of one Resident, one Assistant Resident, and one Controleur. In 1929, this had grown to one Governor, one Resident, five Assistant Residents, and two Controleurs. There were also increased numbers of police and other support officials. Some of these increases had occurred in Surakarta earlier than they did in Jogjakarta.
local governments, services such as health, irrigation, roads, education, and accounting, expanded greatly, as did the corps of trained Dutch technicians employed to run them. Most basically, the land tenure system in the Vorstenlanden was completely reorganized:10 ownership of land came to be vested in newly created kalurahan (villages); secure and inheritable land-use rights were granted to the peasants who actually worked the fields; the European plantations had to pay wages for the labor used on their crops as well as rental fees both to the local government and to the peasants who had rights to the lands they used.

When Pangeran Surjodiningrat was appointed Controleur for Agrarian Affairs in Jogjakarta in July 1928, the Sultanate was thus undergoing a period of basic and fairly rapid change. Parallel with the upper levels of the Sultanate's administration there was an expanding European administration which served both to keep the Indies government in Batavia informed of developments in the local area and to assist the Governor of Jogjakarta in his advising of the governments of the Sultanate and the Pakualaman. The Pangeran was part of this administration, and his particular tasks were closely connected with major reforms in Jogjakarta. He was partly responsible for maintaining the records of land ownership and land transfers in the region, and this meant he was expected to tour areas outside the city of Jogjakarta to check that the newly formed villages were correctly reporting and recording local transactions.11 But although efforts had begun to bring Jogjakarta and the other Vorstenland principalities into line with government systems elsewhere in Java, much still remained to be done. The Jogjanese were still taxed at a higher rate than Javanese outside the Vorstenlanden,12 and the poll tax and certain other traditional taxes, eliminated years before in directly ruled Java, were particularly vexing to the populace.13 The educational system in Jogjakarta, though it was expanding, still fell far short of official standards in other places in the Indies.14 Local representative bodies, viewed as

10The best description of the changeover and of the new system is G. Schwencke, Het vorstenlandsche grondhuurreglement in de praktijk en het grondenrecht in Jogjakarta (Jogjakarta: H. Buning, 1932).

11For the security of both the Dutch administration and the Sultan, it had become traditional for pangerans (adult brothers and sons of ruling and late sultans) rarely to venture forth into the countryside. When he began work with the office of Agrarian Affairs, Pangeran Surjodiningrat would have been the only pangeran regularly seen outside the city of Jogjakarta.

12"Nota betreffende den druk der belastingen op de landbouwende bevolking in het cultuurgebied van het gewest Jogjakarta (Regentschappen Kalassan, Sleman, en Bantoel)," p. 10. This paper was prepared in 1924 by H. J. van Mook, then Controleur for Agrarian Affairs; it can be located in the Institute for the Tropics in Amsterdam.

13The poll tax (in 1930, f.3 p.a. for each Jogjanese with rights to land) was a substitute for earlier personal obligations owed by farmers to the Sultan; it was paid directly into the treasury of the Sultanate. Because of their fixed nature, such traditional levies could be particularly resented in difficult times, such as the 1930s. James Scott explored the reasons for this in The Moral Economy of the Peasant (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), pp. 13-34.

14See pp. 3360-40 of the "Memorie van Overgave" of Governor J. E. Jasper, Mr 3259/29. (This and other administrative documents are from the old Colonial Ministry
the keystones for modernizing reform because their performance would
show how well local areas were progressing and also indicate the direc­
tions in which the local populace thought future progress ought to
head, existed for none of the Vorstenland principalities.

The Pangeran's motivations for founding the Pakempan Kawulo
Ngajogjakarta in the middle of 1930 seem quite sound. Because of his
own limited education, Pangeran Surjodiningrat was inclined toward a
concern for the uneducated. Because of his position as Controleur, he
was familiar with and saddened by the conditions of poverty which
existed in the rural areas of Jogjakarta, where the vast majority of
the Sultanate's subjects lived. Because of his birth, he was interest­
ed in seeing the Sultanate continue as a separate political entity
organized along the lines of a traditional Javanese state, and his ex­
perience indicated to him that this would be possible only if the
nobility could justify its existence through service to the Jogajanese
commoners. Radical nationalists claimed that this PKN was to be a
party not for the people but for the "-ningrats" and that such an or­
organization, and the great potential for divisiveness present in its
local accent, was hardly needed in what was already a politically try­
ing time. The Dutch also charged that the PKN was founded only to
insure the appointment of Pangeran Surjodiningrat as speaker of the
local assembly that was scheduled to be formed to serve the Vorsten­
landen.

There is an element of truth both in the nationalists' claims and
in the Dutch charges, but they are beside the point. If the PKN were
to succeed in demonstrating that the nobility was dedicated to serving
the people and could perform a useful function in doing that, then the
interests of the "-ningrats" would indeed be served. If the appeal of
the local nobility and of the works they wished to accomplish were
sufficient to generate serious popular support, then these elements
might better be seen as useful nuclei around which political efforts
might orbit than as forces distracting attention from the secular na­
tionalist movement, which in Jogjakarta had been only minimally suc­
cessful. It was probably true that Pangeran Surjodiningrat would not

and are maintained in The Hague by the Department of Interior Affairs. The Mailrap­
porten will be cited as Mr, followed by the register number and the year and the
Verbalen as V followed by the date and the register number.) In these pages, Jasper
compares the system in Jogjakarta with those in directly governed Bagelan and North
Banjumas, and finds it far off the pace, though neither of the other two areas could
have been considered advanced or rich.

15The Pangeran's education was limited to a few years of tutoring in the kraton
and to some serious training in the traditional arts. His son, Pak Wasisto Surjodi­
ingrat of the Department of Mathematics and Physics at Gajah Mada University, sug­
gested to me that the Pangeran's concern for the illiterate and the unschooled sprang
from his awareness both of the handicap he himself suffered as a result of his lack
of formal education and of the fact that he was able to overcome this to some extent
only because he had the time and money to enable him to expand his interests. My
interview with Pak Wasisto took place in Jogjakarta in February 1975.

16See paragraph 11 in the document below.

17Jogjakarta had earlier been a center of Indonesian political activity, but in
the years after the split in Sarekat Islam (see McVey, The Rise, pp. 76-124), radical
politics in the city produced neither heat nor light, and lost contact with the coun­
tryside. Major political groups continued to hold congresses and meetings in Jogja­
karta, but they possessed no large popular following there.
have hesitated overly long before accepting any offer to serve as speaker of a Vorstenland council, and leading a party which tied together the interests of nobility and peasantry would not have hurt his chances of receiving such an offer. It is also fair to say, however, that as a pangeran, as a civil servant, as one fluent in Dutch, and as a man respected for his positive attitude both toward the maintenance of tradition and toward preparation for the future, he would have been an extremely strong candidate for such a position in any event. On the whole, the party seems to have been founded as the realization of the Pangeran's conviction that Jogjanese society could and should improve its social and economic situation through a concerted, organized effort on the part of its various component elements.

Pangeran Surjodiningrat was almost certainly unprepared for what happened soon after the PKN was launched. As word spread throughout the Jogjakarta area that an organization led by the royal family had been set up to assist peasants, people came in by the score and then by the hundreds and the thousands to sign up as members. The natural respect that the Jogjanese felt for their Sultan's family was coupled with the PKN's promise that some form of tax relief for farmers would be sought in a time of deepening depression. Such a crush of people resulted that the Pangeran was caught without enough secretaries to sign up potential members, without any trained leaders to organize at local levels, and without any serious platform of programs for the party to pursue. Despite his earnest intentions and his heartfelt concern for Jogjakarta's peasants, Pangeran Surjodiningrat was also personally unprepared for many of the responsibilities of heading a party with tens of thousands of members. He had had some previous experience in organizational life, but nothing had prepared him for the constant flow of requests, complaints, and just plain information that came his way once the party burgeoned. The importance of the PKN to him also meant that he could not easily choose subordinates and delegate responsibility to them. He was not only unprepared for the flood of members and for the responsibilities of leading a mass party,

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18 Speaking at a later date, Pangeran Surjodiningrat related having to ask students to help temporarily with the enrollment of new members because the lines of people waiting to sign up were so long. See Suwirjo's report, November 11, 1933, p. 3, on the political gathering in Surakarta. Ms 1487/33. In the last months of 1930 the Jogjakarta papers often carried stories about people lining up by the hundreds to enlist in the PKN.

19 This was to remain a sore point for the PKN throughout its existence. See William J. O'Malley, "Indonesia in the Great Depression: A Study of East Sumatra and Jogjakarta in the 1930's" (Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University, 1977), pp. 318-22, and particularly p. 321.

20 The first resolution passed at the first PKN Congress concerned a request that Indonesians from outside Jogjakarta who were serving with the government in Jogjakarta be considered Jogjanese when they wished to purchase land (it being forbidden to alienate land to people not subjects of the Sultanate). This hardly seems like a topic chosen to appeal to popular tastes or concerns.

21 The Pangeran had been one of the founders of the Prinsenbond, an earlier, exclusively noble group. He was a member of Budi Utomo's Jogjakarta branch (and remained a member during the time he was leading the PKN), and he was a leader of Krido Bekso Wiromo, a society formed for the preservation and instruction of traditional dances.
but he was even less prepared for some of the hostility awakened by the PKN.

That existing parties in the Indies would not be overjoyed by the emergence of yet another competitor was something easily foreseen. Reactions ranged from glum acceptance of the PKN's birth and rise by the local branches of some parties to outright opposition to it by other political forces. The PKN leadership handled some of these reactions fairly well, and, as a result, the party's ties with political groups of many stripes soon became if not warm at least cordial. But the opposition from the administrative bureaucracies in Jogjakarta was something less easily predicted and less easily parried. Because the involvement of a number of pangerans in the PKN seemed to imply the Sultan's endorsement of the party, most officials, both Dutch and Jogjanese, were initially reluctant to do more than fume when the party's members were guilty of irregularities or of excessive enthusiasm. As time passed, however, these officials began to see the PKN as some kind of shadow government, handling unofficially, and poorly, many of the matters for which they themselves were trained and responsible. Whenever the PKN concerned itself with affairs such as taxation, land, schools, sugar plantations, or cooperatives, officials charged with the supervision of these matters thought the PKN used that concern as a means to criticize them and to insinuate itself between the people and the legal government. Gradually, officials began to crack down on these PKN interlopers and to report their behavior and misbehavior to administrative superiors. As reports accumulated in the office of the Governor of Jogjakarta, Pangeran Surjodiningrat found himself called onto the carpet by the Governor to explain the actions of members of his party and to receive stern warnings that untoward incidents must cease. Only after a number of such warnings had failed to produce a more strictly disciplined and a more closely supervised party was the document below prepared and sent to Batavia. Through it the administration's pent-up hostility toward the PKN was unleashed.

There are a number of strange features to the report. Although it recommends that strong measures be taken against the PKN and against its chairman, it makes no convincing case that they constituted a serious threat to public order, either at the time of the report or in the future; in fact, the report describes a situation that is clearly well in hand. The sketch of Pangeran Surjodiningrat appearing in the report—which portrays his character as vacillating, easily led, shifty, ambitious, weak—is most assuredly a misrepresentation. He had been considered a model pangeran before he started the party; he remained steadfast in his commitment to serve the peasantry through the PKN when...
it would have been easy for him, as for the other pangerans involved, to turn his back on it all and retire to a life of leisure; he remained unshaken by the seriousness of the charges and threats levied against him. The position of the Sultan as described in the report is also unlikely to have accorded with reality. Instead of a confused man uncertain as to how to oppose a half-brother who was attempting to subvert his government and to steal his people's allegiance from him, Hamengku Buwono VIII was, in the early 1930s, a shrewd adept at getting most of what he wanted. As a Sultan at the height of his powers he was surely aware that one negative word from him to Pangeran Surjodiningrat would have made the PKN a thing of the past. Perhaps strangest of all was the suddenness of the report: in nothing that he wrote before or after did the author of the report, H. H. de Cock, Governor of Jogjakarta, give any indication of the sentiments toward or about the PKN or the Pangeran that he expresses in the report.

Strange or not, the report was written by a powerful official, and it accomplished many of de Cock's aims. His successor in office, J. Bijleveld, was empowered to take whatever steps he thought necessary to handle the PKN problem. Under Bijleveld the Binnenlands Bestuur (Dutch administrative elite), the Sultanate officials, and the Jogjakarta police moved in swiftly and surely to halt, and then to preclude, any PKN-connected disturbances. They hounded and harassed PKN local leaders, and Pangeran Surjodiningrat was given repeated warnings on even the smallest infringements by party members. Three times the PKN newspaper was forced to stop printing, and it then folded. By the end of 1935, the PKN had withdrawn for good from the political field. Thereafter, it continued to work on such social and economic matters as attempting to combat illiteracy, starting health programs, and getting the Jogianese to use their collective economic skills and needs together for the benefit of all. The reduction in scope, however, resulted in a reduction in size and enthusiasm, so that by the time the Japanese disbanded it in 1942, along with all other political organizations, the PKN had for years been merely an echo of its former self and of what it once had promised to become.

The PKN's brief political career and the document below that traces it, reemphasize some important points about the Indies in the 1930s and reveal some others. Police and administrative officials had wide discretionary powers, which they were not reluctant to use. Though members of the local nobility headed the PKN and though it was clearly intended to operate only within legal boundaries, it came under

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25In 1930, the Sultan had won a long, tough, drawn-out battle with the Dutch over finances. Word of this had gotten out, and the people of Jogjakarta were delighted by the news. See Bintang Mataram, November 14, 1930; the Bintang Mataram story drew heavily upon a Soerabajasche Handelsblad article.

26See Letter #764/G.E., Governor of Jogjakarta to Procureur-General, dated July 5, 1935, Mr 840½/35. This is a report written by Bijleveld saying that he did not believe it was necessary to exile the Pangeran or to take any extraordinary measures against the PKN: the crackdown being administered by the normal administrative and police personnel was proving sufficient.

27The daily paper Oetoeoan Indonesia came into PKN hands in April 1934. By September 1935, publication of it had been temporarily suspended three times for printing articles found objectionable by the police. It went out of business late that month.
heavy fire from officials. This was not because it constituted any threat to the continuation of Dutch rule or to the security of the Sultanate but simply because it interfered occasionally with business as usual, striking an unwelcome discordant note against the regular hum of the bureaucratic machinery. Certain things about that machinery are also clarified.

The PKN's ability to insert itself between the people and the bureaucracy, whether it was a conscious effort or not, says much about the distance between officials and the society they were attempting to guide. Though the bureaucracy, with its technical and administrative services, had been largely introduced into Jogjakarta's countryside only with the massive reform in the land-tenure system in the twentieth century, it had already become so formalized that people were reluctant to approach it with their claims and complaints. They brought these instead, in the 1930s, to the PKN. In addition, many of the services which made the PKN attractive were services which the Ethical Policy had been designed to provide. The PKN offered help in such fields as adult education, health information services, and marketing. The fact that the people welcomed such help although government programs already existed in these areas, indicates something of the disparity between theory and practice where official projects were concerned. Most striking, however, was the PKN's success in becoming a mass organization. Partly because of the Great Depression which took money out of the hands of the people and reduced many once again to a level of bare subsistence, the 1930s is all too easily seen as a poor time for political organizing, and indeed most branches of most parties were stunted in those years. But the PKN, by offering people services and assistance at the precise time when these were needed, managed to capture the allegiance and devotion of thousands of Jogjanese and to become a major factor in its region. Led by a man who was knowledgeable about local conditions and connected with local traditions, the PKN, by pursuing not intellectual satisfaction but palpable results through plausible programs, demonstrated that popular political participation was a possible if hazardous venture in the Indies of the 1930s.
SECRET REPORT ON THE POSTURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE "PAKEMPALAN KANOEOLO NGAJOJAKARTA" AND ITS CHAIRMAN PANGERAN ARIO SOERJODININGRAT*

1. Prior to the establishment of the P(akempalan) K(anoelo) N(gajogjakarta), articles appeared in local Javanese- and Malay-language newspapers commending the rebirth of a "Prinsenbond" ["Princes' Union"], an organization which would be formed by blood relatives, down to the fifth level, of His Highness the Sultan.\(^1\) The Prinsenbond, founded in 1914, had mentioned its aims in Article Two of its constitution:

1st - The promotion of the interests of its members;
2nd - The promotion of their particular culture.

2. A committee was formed, at the initiative of Pangeran Ario Soerjodiningrat, a brother of the Sultan, to consider whether such an organization might be desirable. The committee, which consisted largely of relatives of the Sultan, originally resolved to resurrect the old Prinsenbond. This did not come about, however, because such an organization, an association made up only of members of the royal family, was thought to be inappropriate in this modern era. In contrast to the old exclusive and conservative Prinsenbond, the aim was to be a "people's party" which would strengthen the Jogjakarta principality on a democratic basis.

3. Pangeran Adipati Ario Praboe Prangwadono, now Mangkokenagoro VII, had once raised the question in the Volksraad of whether the Indies government intended to abolish the self-governing principalities in the Indies or to maintain them.\(^2\) The government had responded that

\*The original of this report was submitted by the Governor of Jogjakarta, H. H. de Cock, to the Governor-General on October 15, 1934. The copy with which I worked was in the archives of the former Ministry for Colonies now maintained by the Ministry for Interior Affairs in The Hague and is listed there as Mailrapport 1179 geheim/1934. I am grateful to the Ministry for Interior Affairs for permission to use this and the other administrative documents cited.

\^1Though the Javanese-language \textit{Sedio Tomo} and the Indonesian-language \textit{Bintang Mataram} did comment in April and May of 1930 on the possibility of a rebirth of the Prinsenbond, neither of them actually commended such a possibility and there was indeed little reason for them to do so. The old Prinsenbond, set up in 1914 largely through the efforts of Pangerans Tedjokusumo, Surjodiningrat, and Purbojo (later to become Sultan Hamengku Buwono VIII, the reigning sultan when this report was written), had accomplished little of note in its lifetime. Its only major action had been to send a delegate to accompany those of Sarekat Islam, Budi Utomo, and the Regentenbond on the 1917 mission to the Netherlands which sought unsuccessfully to win the support of the Dutch parliament for the establishment of an Indonesian militia. In 1921-22, in the course of the family politics surrounding the ascension of Hamengku Buwono VIII to his position, the Prinsenbond quietly passed away.

\^2P. A. A. P. Prangwadono served as a member of the Volksraad from May 1918 to May 1921 and again from June 1923 to May 1924.
the future of the self-governing principalities would depend upon the will of the people. Mindful of this, the promotors [of the PKN] wanted to give the subjects of the Self-governing Principality an opportunity to make known, in powerful tones, their desire that the Principality be maintained and strengthened.

4. After some members of that committee had been installed as a temporary governing board, a meeting was held on the 29th of June 1930, at the home of Pangeran Ario Tedjokoesoemo, a younger brother of His Highness the Sultan, to form the P.K.N. The founders, who were simultaneously members of the governing board, were:

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<tr>
<th>Chairman:</th>
<th>P. A. Soerjodiningrat</th>
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<td>First Vice-Chairman:</td>
<td>P. A. Tedjokoesoemo</td>
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<td>Second Vice-Chairman:</td>
<td>P. A. Hadikoesoemo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Vice-Chairman:</td>
<td>P. A. Djojokoesoemo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Secretary:</td>
<td>R. M. Ongkowidjojo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Secretary:</td>
<td>R. Soediro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Treasurer:</td>
<td>R. A. Hadiwinoto</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Treasurer:</td>
<td>R. Adjeng Soerti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Treasurer:</td>
<td>R. Adjeng Loerni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputies:</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

The overwhelming majority of the members of this first governing board are kinsmen of the reigning Sultan of Jogjakarta.³

5. At this meeting where the organization was founded, P. A. Soerjodiningrat explained that over the course of time a gap had widened between the nobility and the common people. This gap ought to be closed. At the same time, a serious attempt had to be made to strengthen the ability of the Principality to govern itself. In connection with this,

³In fact, all of these people were relatives of the Sultan. There were in 1930 other pangerans who were not associated with the PKN; the five who were PKN officers were the only pangerans with reputations for probity. R. M. Ongkowidjojo, the First Secretary, was a son of P. A. Tedjokusumo. R. Adjeng Surti and R. Adjeng Lurni were daughters of Pangeran Surjodiningrat; they worked as staff in the office of Agrarian Affairs.
he focused on the prospect of political participation by the Sultanate's subjects in the governing of the Sultanate. This could be achieved by having P.K.N. representatives sit in the Bale Agung which was to be instituted.  

6. The statutes of the organization "Pakempalan Kawoelo Ngajogjakarta," which was established in the city of Jogjakarta, state its aim:

1. strengthening the Jogjakarta Principality and its royal family, in the sense that self-government be attained, to the extent that it is possible, on a democratic footing;

2. the social and economic elevation of the native people of Jogjakarta.

The organization attempts to reach that goal through legal means and through the cooperation of the different classes which form the native populace of Jogjakarta. (see Appendix I--the P.K.N. Statutes.) Appendix II is a drawing of the flag and of the emblem of the organization. In the emblem, there is written "Pakempalan Kawoelo Ngajogjakarto, malem Senin Wagé 2 Sapar Djiawal 1861-29 Juni 1930." The design on the flag and the emblem is a number-chronogram; the meaning of this is rendered in Appendix III.

7. The governing board of the organization consists of at least fifteen members. They must be members of the organization itself, and they have to be named, or dismissed, at a public gathering (congress) of the members. The governors hold office for three years, but they can be immediately reelected to their positions. There is a special method for choosing the chairman. The governors divide the tasks among themselves. The chairman appoints the kepala wargo, the leaders of the local chapters of the organization; these representatives of the organization are chosen with or without the suggestion of the people with whom they will be working. Nonetheless, deputies are occasionally present in the villages, to take care of the collecting of dues. The dues are 2½ cents per month, and they must be paid into the central treasury.  

8. Members receive a membership card with a serial number on it when they join.  

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"The Bale Agung was the name of the local representative council being proposed for the Vorstenlanden.

"In the 1930s, the relationship between the guilder and the dollar was not steady, since the devaluation of the two and their removal from the gold standard took place at different times. The normal figure used for the period is US$1 = f.2.50. This makes a member's dues 1½ per month.

"To some members, a PKN card was a kind of talisman, guaranteeing that its holder would partake in whatever gains the party was able to achieve. W. Oates notes that early Sarekat Islam members also treasured their cards, keeping them long after they'd dropped out of the organization. See W. Oates, "The Afdeeling B," *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, 9, 1 (1968), p. 109. See also Selosoemardjan, *Social Changes*, pp. 189, 193-94, for the importance of membership cards in Gerinda, the successor organization to the PKN."
9. At the founding, Pangeran Tedjokoesoemo was the vice-chairman for social affairs, Pangeran Hadikoesoemo was the vice-chairman for economic affairs, and Pangeran Djojokoesoemo was the vice-chairman for political affairs. The higher leadership rested with the chairman, Pangeran Soerjodiningrat. Later, this sharp differentiation of tasks became blurred, and everything fell back into the hands of the chairman.

10. The P.K.N. has a Central Cooperative Section, which buys and sells rice, dried cassava, and other crops. This was originally under Pangeran Hadiwinoto, but the leadership of it rests with P. A. Soerjodiningrat. In addition, the P.K.N. had cooperatives erected in the villages. These had their own leadership, chosen at a meeting of the members of the cooperative convened for that purpose; a representative of the P.K.N. governing board had to be present at such a meeting. These cooperatives buy the necessary articles from the Central Cooperative.

11. The P.K.N. also has a "press committee," which stands up to oppose any erroneous reports in the press. It also valiantly opposed the Timboel and the Soeara Oemoem (of 21 November 1932) when these two papers, reopening the old conflict between Ir. Soekarno and the chairman of the Jogjakarta people's party, Pangeran Soerjodiningrat, reported that this people's movement served, in actuality, only the interests of the "ningrats."  

12. The native press was generally skeptical of the "little political party," seeing it as a "bulwark" against established organizations such as Boedi Utomo, Partai Sarekat Islam, Partai Nasional Indonesia, and Sarekat Islam. That press opined that the P.K.N. was set up at the initiative of the "Sana party," or at least that it was set up so that the "Sana" influence should not be an alien one. The press wanted to hear from the chairman the why's and wherefore's of the widening gap between the people and the mobility, and it feared that in this time of unity similar provincial organizations would rise up in other localities.

13. Advisors of Pangeran Soerjodiningrat from the commencement of this effort have been: Mr. Gondokoesoemo, a son-in-law of the chairman who had been a prominent member of the Perhimpoenan Indonesia in The

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7The magazine Timboel, in its October 1932 issue, and the daily Soeara Oemoem of November 21, 1932, did touch upon an old wound when they brought up the claims of "ningrat-ism" against the PKN. Pangeran Surjodiningrat and Sukarno had exchanged ideas on the topic in public before, and when these new attacks on the PKN appeared, the Pangeran complained to the Partindo leader that they would serve no purpose. Sukarno apologized in print, saying that he himself had no hand in writing the articles.

8The "Sana" ("over there" or "them") were the Dutch or the Dutchified, while the "Sini" ("here" or "us") were Indonesians, in the argot of the nationalists. Bintang Mataram, the local Indonesian-language paper in Jogjakarta in the early 1930s, had begun to ask these questions and raise these issues even before the PKN was officially instituted and had kept it up for four months, until it began to see that the PKN was, in fact, trying to do much of what it had promised to do. See Bintang Mataram, May 29, 1930, and July 12, 1930, for typical articles in this vein; July 14, 1930, for a response by the PKN, and a two-day opinion article on October 27-28, 1930, wherein the editor, Drijowongso, a Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia leader, began to pull back from his anti-PKN line.
14. The P.K.N. immediately displayed great industry by arranging multiform meetings, by forming different cooperatives, and by establishing an information bureau.

15. The information bureau, in the city of Jogjakarta, was directly under P. A. Soerjodiningrat. He persuaded the members to seek his intermediation and help whenever they had complaints to lodge against the European or Native administration. The help consisted of advice and of adapting the complainants' tales into request-forms which were submitted to the Administration.

16. The novelty of this movement, and, certainly not to be discounted, the piquancy of a situation which had the exclusive Oriental nobility bending down to the people, caused members to join the P.K.N. in great numbers.

17. The first Congress of the P.K.N. was held from the 24th to the 29th of May, 1931, on the aloon in Jogjakarta. By that time, the

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9It is fair to say that in actuality none of these gentlemen could be called an advisor to the Pangeran on PKN matters. He was acquainted with all of them, but he was not extremely close with any of them. Mr. Gondokusumo lived and worked in Magelang and rarely visited Jogjakarta; according to members of the Surjodiningrat family, he would not in any event have been called upon for political advice. R. T. Nitinegoro was neither originally from Jogjakarta nor of royal descent; though he was on good terms with Pangeran Surjodiningrat (they were both members of the Jogjakarta chapter of Budi Utomo). He told me in an interview in February 1975 that they rarely had any chance for private discussions and that when such an opportunity did arise they never discussed PKN policy. The Pangeran was not on close personal terms with either Notosuroto or Mr. Sujudi. Government attempts to link the PKN with Mr. Sujudi, who was Jogjakarta's foremost Indonesian lawyer and its natural leader in nationalist politics, would continue. It was at Mr. Sujudi's house that Sukarno was arrested in December 1929, and Mr. Sujudi was one of Sukarno's lawyers in the trial proceedings which started in August 1930. The contradiction between the nationalists' being extremely upset with the PKN as a "ningrat" party and Mr. Sujudi's being an advisor to the PKN is obvious.

10Most of the work of the information bureau was done by the Pangeran himself and by his daughters Surti and Lurni. This was a kind of formal continuation of a practice long followed by the Pangeran, who would open his doors once evening a week to people seeking his help or suggestions. Selosoemardjan, Social Changes, p. 187, notes that the custom was continued after World War II.

11This was on the alun-alun tor, the large field just north of the kraton in Jogjakarta (some of the later congresses would be held in the alun-alun kidul on the other side of the kraton). The use of the alun-alun would have been taken to signify the Sultan's implicit approval of the PKN. Newspaper coverage of this congress can be found in Bintang Mataram, May 26 and 27, 1931. An official report on it is Letter #K-21/1 G.E., Advisor for Native Affairs to Governor-General, dated July 8, 1931, Mr 726X/31.
membership count had already passed 100,000. The chief items discussed at the Congress were:

1--improving the welfare of the Principality's subjects by establishing consumer cooperatives;

2--the desirability of classifying as Sultanate's subjects those natives of areas outside Jogjakarta who are employed as civil servants in the Principality. At present, as subjects only of the Indies and not of the Principality, they have no right to land;

3--combating illiteracy;

4--the desirability of reducing the poll tax still further.

18. After this congress, the P.K.N. immediately displayed great activity in the area of consumer cooperatives, so that at the second Congress, a year later, it could be announced that 105 such organizations had already been established, with a collective capital of f.25,000.

19. Here lay open ground which, if exploited knowledgeably by the P.K.N. leadership, could have yielded beautiful perspectives. But here, also, this knowledge was lacking, and P. A. Soerjodiningrat, in effecting measures designed to serve the interests of the populace, displayed a gross overestimation of his own ability and a dangerous rashness.

20. According to the well-known Radhahamal Mukerjee, in his The Foundations of Indian Economies, "Co-operation is becoming a science in the West. In India, however, it seems that we have not gained much both from the practical experience as well as the theoretical study of the subject in Western countries. Though the co-operative movement has taken a firm hold in Indian soil, there has been little attempt to utilize the existing village social structure. To this extent the movement is not organic, a growth from within." 12 Mukerjee's observations are valid in a general sense for our Indies, but they are particularly true in the special case of the P.K.N. leadership.

21. In the fashion in which it is led and stirred up by P. A. Soerjodiningrat in his capacity as leader of the P.K.N. Central Cooperative, the cooperative movement in this organization is no reflection of any spontaneous development of the cooperative spirit among the people (the farmers, for instance) who must ultimately themselves be the members of, and the guardians of the welfare of, their cooperatives. P. A. Soerjodiningrat lacks a broad and deep knowledge of the nature of cooperatives and of the various divergent demands and stipulations which must be satisfied for different sorts of cooperatives to be successful. He did not absorb this knowledge by osmosis during his brief acquaintance in Holland with the system of cooperatives existing there. 13 Naively, he supposed that he could get along easily without

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13 In 1926-27, Pangeran Surjodiningrat visited the Netherlands to represent the Sultan at the celebration of the silver wedding anniversary of Queen Wilhelmina. He visited cooperatives for inspection tours when he was in Holland.
the help and cooperation of the experts whom the government always has
available to promote this form of economic development; also naively,
he supposed that he would be able to decree the direction in which the
cooperaive movement itself must develop.

22. For this reason, then, the cooperative organizations, which in
actuality had been set up by practically any Tom, Dick, and Harry,
entered into decline after the first flicker of life. Many ills can
be diagnosed. As a rule, the local leaders were totally unsuitable.
Self-interest often came to the fore, and criminal proceedings had to
be initiated against these local leaders. All was not fine and dandy,
then, with the cooperatives. A good purpose, however, had been served
by these endeavors: cooperatives have become acceptable to the common
people through familiarity with their value as an economic weapon. P. A. Soerjodiningrat would, however, have had to practice caution and
sobriety if the people were not to have been made "bingoeng" (confused)
by having had loosed upon them an avalanche of consumers', producers',
credit-, auction-, and purchasing cooperatives, of a so-called "coconut
monopoly," and of still others.

23. As is to be expected, not much has survived of this well-inten-
tioned but foolhardy movement. 24

24. The natives showed tremendous interest on the occasion of the
celebration of the tenth anniversary of the reigning Sultan's having
been elevated to his position, something which clearly demonstrates
that the people still harbor a cherished love for their Prince. Bin-
tang Mataram, in an article commenting on this, greeted with joy the
fact that P. A. Soerjodiningrat, with his P.K.N., had had a gamelan
perform under a shed on the aloon-aloon, in honor of the royal jubil-
lee. 25

25. His Highness the Sultan made two audience halls on the aloon-aloon
available exclusively for gatherings of the P.K.N.

Because this report is an attack on the P.K.N rather than an evaluation of gov-
ernment services, candid comments about those services, comments which ordinarily
would not be passed on to higher channels, occasionally come through. In the case
of this paragraph and the one above it, the general tenor is that the P.K.N was foolish
to attempt to set up cooperatives without the necessary expertise. Underlying this,
however, is the theme that government cooperative service personnel had had that ex-
pertise all along but had done nothing with it, even though the people's need for
cooperatives was such that they leaped for them at the first opportunity that came
along. Such an evaluation of cooperative experts' inability to get things moving
would have been unlikely to appear in any report written directly about them.

PKN ventures of various kinds continued to form an important part of the Jog-
jakarta economic landscape down to the Japanese occupation. Rice producers' and con-
sumers' cooperatives, organizations for sharing the costs of such ceremonies as
circumcisions and funerals, and an effort which produced and marketed clothing were
most noteworthy among them.

The real message for Bintang Mataram in the celebration of the Sultan's jubil-
lee was not the P.K.N involvement but rather that it was celebrated with so much more
enthusiasm than had been displayed by the people on the occasion of Queen Wilhelmina's
birthday a short while before (September 3, 1930, was her 50th birthday). See Bin-
tang Mataram, October 23, 27, and 28, 1930.
26. At the Second Congress in 1932, the following subjects were discussed:

1--the reorganization of the European administration in the Vorstenlanden;

2--the institution of a federation of the four self-governing principalities in Jogjakarta and Soerakarta;

3--the reduction of the plantation compensation.

27. The P.K.N. proved to be in agreement with the formation of a federation of the (Central Javanese) self-governing principalities provided that the representatives of the federative board should be appointed by the Bale Agong [High Council] (to the chairmanship of which P. A. Soerjodiningrat himself would be delighted to be appointed by the Sultan). Through this line of argument, the leadership of the P.K.N. made it clear that it was lacking any insight into the aim of these two institutions.17

28. Since the third point could not at that moment be surveyed completely, the decision to postpone the discussion of it showed a bit more maturity.

29. At the Congress, introductory talks were given by Mr. Raden Tomenggoeng Wongsongoro on "Our National Economic Development" and by Pangeran Ario Adikoesoemo on the land tax. This latter talk gave rise to a motion urging that the land tax be lowered. Ki Hadjar Dewantoro spoke on "Popular Education." A fourth talk, by Mr. Djojodigoeno on the Bale Agong, led to the adoption of a motion calling for the speedy installation of that body.18

30. In July 1933, the Third P.K.N. Congress was held in Jogjakarta.19 (In 1934, no P.K.N. Congress was held because of the depression; instead, a P.K.N. Conference was held in Jogjakarta, preceded by the First P.K.N. Youth Congress.) On the occasion of this Third P.K.N. Congress, a new governing board was chosen:

17The PKN was not alone in lacking insight into the aims of the Bale Agung or of the federative board: neither organization ever got off the ground. Though the Governors of Jogjakarta and Surakarta, the Vorstenland princes or their representatives, and a few other officials met together on a monthly basis, and though the Bale Agung was ordinarily one of the chief topics up for discussion at those meetings, no agreement was ever reached which enabled it to be established. Ultimately, the Susuhunan set up a rather ineffective representative council on his own; nothing similar was established in Jogjakarta before the Second World War.

18The treatment given the 1932 Congress in the Jogjakarta Dutch-language daily Mataram gives an idea of how important, and how serious a threat, the Dutch thought the PKN was. On July 19, 1932, Mataram did publish an article on the meeting that was causing thousands of people to flock into the city, but the amount of space devoted to it was about a third of that given the same day to a complete listing of the passengers departing Batavia on the steamship "P. C. Hooft."

19An official report of the Congress is contained in Letter #1375/K.I.-Geheim, Advisor for Native Affairs to Governor-General, dated August 26, 1933, Mr 1060/33. Coverage in the local Indonesian-language paper is in Oetoesan Indonesia, July 29 and 31, and August 1, 1933.
Chairman: P. A. Soerjodiningrat
Vice-Chairmen: P. A. Tedjokoesoemo and P. A. Hadikoesoemo
General Secretaries: P. A. Boeminoto* and R. Loerah Atmotjondroprodjo
(who had earlier been called R. M. Ongkowidjojo)
General Treasurer: P. A. Hadiwinoto
Treasurers: R. Adjeng Soerti Soerjodiningrat and R. Adjeng Loerni Soerjodiningrat
Deputies: P. A. Djojokoesoemo
R. Wadono Poespodirdjo
R. Wadono Soerjomoertjito
R. Atmodarminto
R. M. Pringgosastropranowo
R. M. Sastrodibroto
R. M. Sosrosoemarto*
R. Soedono
R. Prawirodihardjo* (since cashiered because of irregularities)
R. Soemoharjono
M. Martosoemarmo*
M. Ng. Ronosetiko
R. Loerah Prawirowardojo*
R. Pandji Djojowilojo
M. Soehardjo
R. Panewoe Diposoemowinoto*
P. A. Soerjowidjojo*
R. T. Poespodiningrat*
R. T. Mangoenkoesoemo*
R. Loerah Tjongdroomoewindojo*
R. Loerah Atmosoeprapto

Founder and Propagandist: R. Pandji Baoesentono20

(* = new member of the board)

31. Here is an example of how this election was staged. In the kaloe­rahan (village) Komadoeng, a meeting of P.K.N. members was held on 16 July 1933, under the leadership of a certain Pontjodimedjo, chairman of the "Tjondrosari" cooperative in Komadoeng. The meeting got under way at 9:30 AM with Pontjodimedjo mentioning that the old P.K.N. governing board had been in office for three years already and that a new board must now be chosen. He then read the names of the candidates for the board from a list given him by the old board. The P.K.N. members present, about 300 in number, offered no objections to those proposed, and they also voted to retain P. A. Soerjodiningrat as chairman. At 10 AM, the meeting was terminated. The approved list of candidates was then sent in to the P.K.N. governing board in Jogjakarta. Thus, the old governing board itself drew up the list of candidates, made itself capable of being reelected, and saw itself designated again for three more years. This course of things throws a pretty strong light on the practical application, within the group itself, of the kind of democracy being championed.

20Noteworthy in the new governing board are the addition of two more pangerans (Buminoto and Surjowidjojo) and the inclusion of a person not of royal descent (R. P. Diposumowinoto, who was related to Pangeran Surjodiningrat by marriage). Prawirodihardjo was dismissed in 1934 for selling membership cards to villagers.
32. The first speaker at this 1933 Congress was Raden Wadono Soerjomoertjito; he spoke on different measures for improving native agriculture. P. A. Soerjodiningrat broached a plan for a central sales-cooperative for agricultural products, to be set up in Pakem sub-district in Sleman district. It was to be modeled after the central sales-cooperative in Westland, which he had seen during his own stay in Holland.

33. The second speaker was Raden Mas Soerjodiningrat. He is a son of the chairman and is studying at the Law School in Batavia. He spoke about the Koloniale Bank letter. In that letter, the Bank indicated that compensation ought to be given to some firms for the transition of conversion land from sugar cultivation over to rice agriculture. This was because the firms in some cases would be using the land for only one of the two monsoons (West monsoon: 1 November to 31 March; East monsoon: 1 April to 31 October) before the transition, and they ought thus to be given back some funds since assessments were made against them for the entire year. Raden Mas Soerjodiningrat also spoke about the possibility of reducing the rental fees paid by the Vorstenland agricultural plantations.

34. Another speaker, S. H. H. Sewojo, insisted that popular education ought to be expanded, and yet another, R. Atmodarminto, argued that it was desirable to abolish the obligatory deliveries (tata-tjara) in the regencies Goenoeng-Kidoel and Koelon-Progo.

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21 The Koloniale Bank controlled five major plantations in the Jogjakarta area.

22 Conversion lands were those which had been occupied under long-term lease agreements by plantations under the old system of land tenure. Before the great reform of the twentieth century, plantation lands (usually in stretches of about 1000 ha.) were leased from the Sultan or from appanage-holders; the farmers living on those lands were given a certain percentage (usually 40%) of the land to be used for their food crops and were expected to provide their labor, wage-free, to work the remaining fields for the plantation (40%) and for the appanage-holder or his agent (20%). Under the new system, the plantations still had guaranteed access to the same amount of acreage, but they paid their rental fees directly into the treasury of the Sultanate and had to pay the Jogjanese peasants their wages.

23 When it became clear that the depression was to be a lasting phenomenon, the companies which controlled the plantations in the Vorstenlanden sent representatives to meet with officials to discuss lowering the lease fees they were paying to the self-governing states. For a report on one such meeting, held in Jogjakarta December 9-11, 1933, see Letter #A.I. 27/2/16, Director of the Binnenlands Bestuur to Governor-General, dated December 13, 1933. The planters were ordinarily successful: according to E. M. Stok, chief of the office of Agrarian Affairs in Jogjakarta from February 1935 to January 1939, the plantations were awarded reductions every year from 1932 to 1937. See his "Memorie van Overgave," pp. 145-55, Mr 852X/39.

24 These two regencies, Gunung-Kidul in the southeast and Kulon-Progo in the southwest of Jogjakarta, were dry and had poor soil on hilly slopes. Because of this, it was thought that the land given as salary to local office-holders represented insufficient income for them to live as they ought. Accordingly, villagers were forced to pay local taxes, in money or in kind, when they did anything out of the ordinary (marriage, slaughtering cattle, etc.). These taxes were called tata-capa. Research done on them immediately after the PKN call to abolish the taxes revealed that they yielded an average of f.168.97 per year to village heads (for a sample of 12 villages); this brought total earnings for village heads in the sample...
35. After these speeches, this Congress adopted the following three motions:

**Plantation Leases**

The organization Pakempalan Kawoelo Ngajogjakarta, on the occasion of its Third Congress, held in Jogjakarta from the 27th to the 31st of July 1933 and attended by some 60,000 people;

- having heard discussions concerning the request of the Koloniale Bank, directed toward the Vorstenland Self-governing States, that it should be liable for only half of its annual rent on lands which it used for sugar for only six months out of the year before turning them over for rice agriculture;
- having also heard discussions concerning the request of the Vorstenland Agriculture Organization for a 40-50% reduction in its rents;
- convinced that the Koloniale Bank's point of view is not tenable and that the Vorstenland Agricultural Organization's request is not open to compliance, since granting it would deal a severe blow to the financial capability of the Vorstenland;

has decided
to recommend to the Vorstenland Self-governing States, along with the two governors of the Vorstenland, that the above mentioned requests of the Koloniale Bank and the Vorstenland Agricultural Organization be rejected and that contracts be dissolved whenever plantations are not able to live up to their obligations;

respectfully to present this motion to the Vorstenland Self-governing States and to the two governors of the Vorstenland; and

- to see to its distribution to the press and then to continue on with the order of the day.

**Desa-Education**

The organization Pakempalan Kawoelo Ngajogjakarta, etc.;

- having heard discussions concerning the acute shortage of desa-schools (peoples' schools) in the Jogjakarta area;
- convinced that education is essential to the development and progress of the people;
- convinced that the small number of desa-schools ought to be supplemented;
- convinced that the 1933 budget makes no mention of the expansion of education in the Jogjakarta area;

has decided
to recommend to the two Self-governing States and to the Governor of Jogjakarta that they proceed with the expansion of the number of desa-schools in such a way that there be at least one desa-school in each katurahan, that the appointed teaching staff be given salaries in the form of lands which can be taken out of the kas-desa land, and that, given the difficult circumstances in which the village folk are caught up, it is desirable that there be no tuition for the students;²⁵

²⁵When the ownership rights to land became vested in the villages and inheritable usufruct rights came to reside with peasants who worked the land, the village as a collectivity retained rights to work 20 percent of the land owned by the village. Some of these lands were to be given over as salary to village officials, others were
respectfully to submit this motion to the two Self-governing States and to the Governor of Jogjakarta; and to see to its distribution to the press and then continue on with the order of the day.

Toto-tjoro

The organization Pakempalan Kawoelo Ngajogjakarta, etc.; having heard discussions concerning the toto-tjoro doesoen (obligatory deliveries) which press on the people in Goenoeng-Kidoel, Koelon-Progo, and Adikarto;26 convinced that the toto-tjoro is not compatible with the spirit of the times and presses too hard on the people, particularly in this depression period; has decided to recommend to the two Self-governing States and to the Governor of Jogjakarta that this toto-tjoro be abolished; to present this motion with all due respect to the two Self-governing States and to the Governor of Jogjakarta; and to see to its distribution to the press and then continue on with the order of the day.

It should be mentioned that at the end of 1932, the P.K.N. numbered approximately 235,000 members, that the organization commanded some f.55,000 in capital at the time, and that in the year 1932 its cooperatives had turned a profit of around f.5,000.

36. In the shape in which they were drawn up, these three motions can do nothing but give the wrong impression to the man in the street.

37. The first motion, for instance, the one concerning the plantation leases, completely overlooks the economic interests which the people have in the survival of the great Jogjakarta sugar and tobacco plantations. It also overlooks the all but insurmountable financial difficulties which the Sultanate would have to contend with if the hope of the motion that the "contracts be dissolved" were actually to come about. If the plantations are forced through insolvency to return the conversion lands to the Jogjakarta Principality and thus let the land revert to the people, the consequence will be that the Principality will find itself deprived of the income from the plantation compensations. Since these compensations make up approximately 31% of the income in the budget, it would be impossible to do without them at this time. In fact, it is exactly in order to prevent the disappearance of the agricultural plantations, which are such a bright star in the economic constellation of the Jogjakarta Principality, that it is necessary, as a crisis measure, to grant a temporary reduction in the to be pention lands for those who had had secure positions under the old system but were left out when the new system was initiated, and still others were to be rented out, either to landless villagers or to those who wished to expand their planted areas. This last group of lands were the kas-desa lands; the rental fees from them were to make up the village treasury.

26Adikarto, south of Kulon-Progo, was the hinterland of the Pakualaman. According to Pringgosoekodiprodjo, tata-cara was in fact no longer practiced in Adikarto in the 1930s. De Wisselvallige inkomsten, pp. 30-35.
compensation. This will insure that at least a part of these compensation funds continue to flow into the Principality's treasury.  

38. The second motion, concerning education in the villages (and it should be mentioned here that the P.K.N.'s struggle to set up more Peoples' schools on its own is praiseworthy), not only gives an incorrect impression of affairs but even suggests, incorrectly, that there are shortcomings on the part of the Sultanate. Popular education here is wholly funded by the Sultanate, about f.110,000 being budgeted for that purpose. In the 1933 budget, there was an item for expansion of that education by 15 small schools; they were set up in that year. The budget did not permit for any further expansion in this difficult period. It would have been better if this motion had omitted any reference to the fact "that the 1933 budget makes no mention of the expansion of education in the Jogjakarta area." A single glance at the budget for that year would have shown those who drew up that motion that things were entirely different (the 1934 budget for the Principality also sets aside funds for expansion of small schools in the Sultanate). They also must have known that fulfillment of the desiderata in the motion would always fall into the realm of the impossible. What use could this have served other than to arouse among the people expectations which could never be realized? Each kalurahan with its own peoples' school! Why, where would all the students come from? And from what incomes would the Sultanate pay the cost of all this? Certainly the minimal tuition existing now would not be sufficient. And as for the idea of paying teachers with kas-desa lands, well, there is not enough land to take care of this, and even if there were, this concept is wholly unacceptable to the teachers, something clear from the protests which they have registered in their organization and in the native press.

39. The desire expressed in the third motion, for the abolition of the toto-tjoro, also does not spring from any common desire on the part of the people affected, those in Koelon-Progo and Goenoeng-Kidoel. In those stretches, where the appanages (loenggoehs) are of insufficient

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27There is much to de Cock's argument here: the Sultanate's budget was highly dependent on the lease fees from the plantations, and from the perspective of that budget it would be preferable to have a reduced income from the plantations than no income at all. Unfortunately, neither the plantations nor the people were concerned primarily with the budget of the Sultanate. The plantations were interested in striving for the lowest possible costs each year, and with their plans guided by accounting rationality rather than by emotion, memory, or the needs of the Sultanate's treasury, they felt free unilaterally to renege on their leases when it was economically sensible for them to do so; in the 1930s, 5000 hectares of long-term-lease sugar lands were given up by plantations in Jogjakarta (see Stok's "Memorie van Overgave," p. 25). For the peasants of Jogjakarta, the major objective in those trying years was to obtain either money or access to land. Since the sugar plantations had let them down monetarily (in 1933, sugar plantations in Jogjakarta would pay out to the people only 29 percent of what they paid in a normal, pre-Depression year), they would have been just as happy to have the plantations fail and thus open up the sugar lands to them. (On the plantations' payments to the people, see Appendix III to Letter #12, Government Commissioner for the Sugar Industry to Governor-General, dated March 31, 1933, Mr 474/33[V 22 Feb 34 8].)

28In the library of the Mangkunegaran in Solo there is the draft budget for the Sultanate for 1933. In it, there is no allocation for new schools.
area and fertility to be able to afford the village heads and other village officials a proper wage, the toto-tjoro form a supplement to the incomes of the village governments. The people themselves see the necessity of these deliveries and do not find this custom to be any pressing burden. When new village heads are chosen, there are always discussions with the voters about the extent to which these levies can be done away with. At those times, it is striking how little inclination there is to proceed with abolition of the toto-tjoro, it being quite obvious that this would indeed be difficult if there were nothing to take its place. When the peng-arem2 (pension lands) are finally freed, they can be added to the appanages of the village officials and, that being done, then some deliveries can be terminated. If the unexpressed aim of this motion be that with the abolition of the toto-tjoro does the Sultanate ought to provide compensation for the village governments, then that, properly, is just going to remain a pious wish. The Principality will never be able to afford the great costs attendant on that and hardly needs to have that kind of immovable burden dragging around its neck. The chairman of the P.K.N., and it is largely from him that these motions emanate, has tried to score heavily. He has, however, succeeded only in defeating his own purposes. For the things that he proposes are only unattainable desires, and they represent little in the way of appropriate measures which might lead to strengthening the native people, socially and economically. A lack both of ability and of the knowledge necessary for an understanding of the topics in question permitted Pangeran Ario Soerjadiniringrat not to comprehend the consequences of his actions. Those actions may, under the letter of the statutes (Article 4), have been well intentioned, but given the milieu here and the way in which those actions worked, they caused undesirable consequences the direct opposite of every good intention. The motions were placed with great aplomb, asking gratuitously for merely small gifts for the people and acting as though the way in which the response to the requests would be carried out could simply be taken for granted. But this causes the same people to feel that they live in a Principality where the Prince does not care how his subjects are doing. And when the foundering wishes persist in not being immediately fulfilled, then the people think that they live in an obstinate Sultanate.

40. The same tendency can be seen in the appearances of the P.K.N. chairman at different propaganda meetings. At the first congress of the organization P.K.S. (Pakempalan Kawoelo Soerokarto) held in Solo from the 4th to the 6th of November 1933, for instance, he time and again philosophized self-confidently and triumphantly on the reduction in the land tax and the poll tax, citing this as a result of the work of the organization, for which he himself had supplied the initiative.29

29 Under the old land-tenure system, the appanage holders were mostly nobility who lived in the city of Jogjakarta. Their local representatives, who lived on the land and directed the peasants in its use, were called bekels (agents). These bekels were entitled to 20 percent of the produce of the land or to have 20 percent of the land worked for them. When the reform was instituted, those bekels who were not elected village officials were given noninheritable rights to certain village lands as pensions for their old positions. These pension lands were called peng-arem2, and they were supposed to become kas-desa lands after the bekel's death. See note 25 above.

30 Neither the newspaper report of the PKS meeting (Oetoesan Indonesia, November 8, 1933) nor the official police report (Suwirjo's Report, dated November 11, 1933,
41. In actuality, this taking credit for reductions in the land tax and poll tax is all only for popular consumption. He has certainly known all along and still knows that it was the Self-governing State which took the initiative for these measures in the people's interest. He himself, working for that Self-governing State as a Controleur for Agrarian Affairs, had cooperated in the relevant preparations and calculations, which were done at the agrarian office. Pangeran Ario Soerjodiningrat has misused knowledge he had gained from his official position by seeing that motions were passed at congresses which pressed for abolition of the poll tax and reductions in the land tax. With misleading conviction, he makes known to the people that reductions are a consequence of his initiative and of the actions of the P.K.N. It was also known to him that only a modest reduction in the land tax could be granted and that a complete abolition of the poll tax could not come about. That is why at the congress when the motions were taken he saw that the people were warned not to entertain too high an expectation concerning the practical results of the motions.

42. Now this whole thing can be considered as simply a clever little ploy on the part of a leader, but if it is, then it is certainly one of an unwelcome caliber. Because again the impression is being fixed that the Self-governing State is falling short in its duties and is not prepared to forward any motion connected with the interests of the people.

43. The leader and his P.K.N. organization are working their way up to becoming a force next to, and within, the Self-governing State.

44. Pangeran Ario Soerjodiningrat is not disloyal, but he is not the person to stand at the head of a large organization with many members living throughout this whole area. He lacks leadership capacity, he is no longer in control of this bulky organization. This all has to lead to excesses, and indeed these have begun to crop up. Thanks to the actions of the Binnenlands Bestuur and the police, however, these excesses have been instantly stifled.

45. According to a police report of 6 November 1930, #267/G.E., there occurred, shortly after the P.K.N. had been set up, an incident at a propaganda meeting in Ringinsari. The Kepala wargo, Sopitojo, predicted the arrival of a Ratu, meaning P. A. Soerjodiningrat. When a question was placed to him about this, P. A. Soerjodiningrat declared that he had done nothing to foster any prediction about the arrival of a Ratu and that he would immediately put an end to the making of such wrong predictions by P.K.N. leaders.

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Mr 1487X/33) record anything of this tone in their accounts of the Pangeran's talk on this occasion. The PKS, though inspired by the PKN, was quite different from it. See Pluvier, *Oversicht*, p. 82. Another scholar is at present doing work on politics in Surakarta in the 1930's, and he is likely to echo the conclusion that the PKN and the PKS differed seriously in many respects.

31 See *Bintang Mataram*, July 12, 1930, had made the same point.

32 See Dahm, *Sukarno*, pp. 1-20, for a brief enlightening exposition of the role of the Ratu Adil (the Just Prince whose coming would bring about an ideal kingdom for his subjects) in Javanese political thought. Dahm also notes that 1930 was a particularly propitious year for a Ratu Adil. (Ibid., pp. 109-19.)
46. In February 1931, a member of the P.K.N. in Padjang kalurahan, in Bantul regency, named Sodikromo trumpeted all around that P.K.N. members no longer had to perform village rounds and would be free from income taxes. There was no need any longer to be fearful of the lurah, the assistant wedono, or the regent; these could no longer institute any investigations, only Pangeran Soerjodiningrat could do that. This Sodikromo failed to present himself for services in the village, and he would not heed the summons of the village head.

47. In the presence of the then Resident of Jogjakarta, the chairman of the P.K.N. responded "that such actions on the part of a member of his organization did not meet with his approval." The person concerned should be taken care of, while he, at the next meeting of the P.K.N., would mention that such actions were in conflict with the aims of the P.K.N.

48. This Sodikromo was prosecuted under the criminal law by the government and was fined, but, again, no forceful measure was taken by the P.K.N. chairman.

49. At approximately the same time, Hardjohoetomo (of Sawahan kalurahan) propagated among the people the idea that members of the P.K.N. no longer came under the jurisdiction of the lurah since he, Hardjohoetomo, was now P.K.N. kepala wargo and had become their head (ngloerahi kowe). To an inquiry about this, Pangeran Soerjodiningrat replied: "I doubt whether the accusations are true. (Hardjohoetomo had denied everything in front of the Pangeran.) I have pointed out to him, quite emphatically, that he must always act correctly toward the desa government."

50. A certain Setrokario, a P.K.N. kepala wargo, held a meeting at his house in Degan kalurahan, Kulon-Progo regency, on the evening of 7 May 1931. It was attended by some 50 people. (The fact that the police were not notified of the meeting beforehand was a consequence of the original Binnenlands Bestuur estimation that the P.K.N. was an organization aimed at forwarding the social and economic interests of the people.) This elderly Setrokario opened the meeting by mentioning that it was a P.K.N. gathering. Then the kepala wargo, who can't read and who had to have his nine-year-old son read the P.K.N. statutes beforehand (the whole thing is some kind of farcical comedy!), said that the Javanese lives on his own land but that power lies in the hands of the "pamarentah blanda" [sic, Dutch government], which gathered the fruits and advantages of the land to itself. He pointed out the symbol printed on the P.K.N. membership cards--a banyan tree around which a snake had coiled itself (the word, ngraboti, also connotes being adversely affected by something, for instance, by fire). According to him, the banyan tree stood for the fatherland (tanah air kita) and the snake represented the European administration and capitalism. Earlier, before power had come into the hands of the white administration, taxes were few and light. Since then, they are high and they are due so frequently. There's no penalty connected with the tax, however, and therefore it all seems easier somehow to the people.

33Acting as night watchmen and doing work on roads and on irrigation ditches and dikes were normal services that villagers had to perform.
When I asked P. A. Soerjodiningrat for a report on what he intended to do about all this, he said that he was wondering how the lurah had found out about the affair. He also mentioned that he had pointed out to Setrokario that such expressions were not to be repeated and had threatened to dismiss him from the organization.

At still other larger and smaller meetings all over this area, various kepala wargo had proclaimed, among other things, that P.K.N. members were free to make salt, didn't have to pay the tax on their bicycles, and no longer were obliged for corvee or the market taxes if they showed some indication of membership in the "Negri koempoelak kidoel bêtêng" [literally, the "government of the south-of-the-fortress organization," i.e., this countryside organization = the PKN].

Another incident occurred in March of 1932. A 60-year-old man, Tomoredjo, alias Soegijo, a P.K.N. kepala wargo, passed himself off as the confidant of Pangeran Ario Soerjodiningrat. He propagandized for the Pangeran's taking over the place of the old Rijksbestuurder, who had been dismissed, according to Tomoredjo, because he had made things difficult for the people.

Pangeran Ario Soerjodiningrat never takes forceful measures against these people who preach about the ideal state which is coming. Instead, he is always glazing things over and acting mild.

Pangeran Ario Soerjodiningrat's attitude has shown that he has little real insight into things. It is undoubtedly due to this that the P.K.N. kepala wargo, almost at regular intervals, make illegal declarations like these for the common people to hear.

For instance, two P.K.N. ring leaders, Kertojoedo and Resodjojo, 67 and 60 years old respectively, were sentenced to jail, the former for one year, the latter for nine months.

The charges read as follows:

With regard to Kertojoedo:

"I. That he, on a certain date in January 1933 at approximately 7 am, in the dwelling of Wongsoredjo, in the village of Gemelen, Imogiri sub-district, in the Soerakarta enclave of Kota Gede district, openly, always within the hearing of people who had gathered together in the house of Wongsoredjo, which was open to all, and therefore the same as if in public, did verbally urge:

Salt was a government monopoly in the Indies, and since its price was relatively stable, it always became a comparatively expensive item in times of deflation.

The Rijksbestuurder was the patih or grand vizier of the Sultan. He was the chief administrative official of the Sultanate, responsible to, and salaried by, both the Sultanate and the Indies government. The timing of the incident described in this report in confusing: the old Rijksbestuurder, Pangeran Danuredjo VII who had held the position since 1912, was granted a furlough because of serious illness in May 1933; he died on October 16 of that same year. He was replaced by the Regent Kota of Jogjakarta. Under no conditions would a son of a Sultan have been considered for the position.

Because Imogiri is the site of the traditional burial places of the royalty of the Mataram empire and of their descendants, a small area there was treated legally as part of the Susuhunanate of Surakarta.
a. that the pawn tax and land tax not be paid;
b. that corvee for the repair of roads not be done; and
c. that the poll tax not be paid;
by saying to those people, 'if you have ever been a member of the organization, then you don't have to pay the poll tax or the land tax any more, and if you get a tax bill, accept it but don't pay it. There is no longer any need to perform corvee or to buy off of it,' or words to that meaning and effect, all of this in defiance of legal regulations."

"II. That he, at the above mentioned time and place, deliberately uttered words in which disturbance of the public order was preached or by which an atmosphere for such a disturbance was created by speaking to those present in that dwelling of Wongsoredjo with the words: 'If the lurah or another member of the village government assigns you any task, you don't have to do it. The pack of them are only "front men" (tjalon—candidate) who'll be killed later. I'm the real leader, the one with the power in his hands around here. All of the teakwood in the Goenoeng-Kidoe forests has become mine. If you want some wood, just get it--there's no need to pay,' or words to that meaning and effect."

With regard to Resodjojo:

"I. That he, on the night from Wednesday the 25th to Thursday the 26th of January 1933, in Kembangsore desa, Imogiri sub-district, in public, always within the hearing of people who had gathered in the dwelling of a man named Wonokromo, which was open to all, did verbally urge:
a. that taxes (poll tax, pawn tax, or land tax) not be paid; and
b. that the people whom he addressed not pay corvee;
by saying, 'Brothers, I advise you to join the P.K.N., as I did. If you become a member, then you no longer have to perform corvee along the roads or other kinds of services. If the lurah assigns you some task, then you don't have to follow his orders. The lurah is just a candidate. Taxes have been abolished this year. If you get a tax bill, accept it, but don't pay it.'"

"II. That he, at the time and place mentioned above, deliberately spoke out recommending the disturbance of public order by saying to those present the following words: 'If members of the village government assign you corvee, then you must oppose it. If someone has died, you don't need to bring any report to the lurah or members of the village government.'"

57. At the court trial here, it became clear that the P.K.N. ring leaders must indeed possess greater power in the eyes of the common people than do, for instance, the lurahs. Both defendants are subjects of the Solo Self-governing State. When the Chairman of the Court remarked that they thus ought not actually to be in the P.K.N. since this was an organization of the subjects of the Sultanate, they conceded the point but said that their chairman, Pangeran Soerjodiningrat, had no objection since the small Sunanate's area was entirely surrounded by that of the Sultanate.38

58. An example of the intimidation employed at propaganda meetings like these is given by a witness in the first of these cases, that

37For commercial and flood-control purposes, and for traditional reasons connected with majesty, teak forests were off-limits to commoners in search of wood for fires or for construction.

38Subjects of the Paku Alam also joined the PKN in the 1930s. Pringgodigdo (Sedjarah Pergerakan Rakjat, p. 155), notes that in 1940 a separate Pakempalan Kawulo Pakualam was formed to serve the subjects of the Paku Alam, but that nothing came of it before war broke out.
witness being Wongsoredjo, the owner of the house in which the gathering was held. He insisted in his testimony that the accused, Kertojudo, had indeed used such inflammatory words (as those cited above) and had, in addition, said that if his listeners didn't join the P.K.N., then they would be driven to a village on the top of Merapi where they would stay together with the Dutch!

59. Also, there were often cases of kepala wargo spreading rumors of the coming of the "Ratu Adil," meaning P. A. Soerjodiningrat.

60. In Patoek sub-district, in Goenoeng-Kidoel Regency, a number of villagers, at the instigation of a P.K.N. ring leader, presented themselves at the home of the sub-district head in order to return the bills which they had received for the land tax. This problem, as is the case with so many others like it, was solved in a calm and dignified fashion by the Binnenlands Bestuur.

61. There is no limit to the misleading impression of affairs presented the people by P.K.N. ring leaders. In various villages in Jogjakarta regency, these members said that:

- the lungguhs and peng-arem (appanages held by village officials and by pensioners) would be repossessed and divided among the P.K.N. kepala wargo, as a form of salary;

- the koolie shares would be redivided, exclusively among P.K.N. members;³⁹

- those not in possession of a P.K.N. membership card would not be recognized as subjects (kawoelo) of the Self-governing State; they could expect to be exiled to Digul;⁴⁰

- the P.K.N. would set up its own kaums, replacing the existing village kaums.⁴¹

62. When the P.K.N. chairman had all this brought to his attention, he did what he usually does: answer that he had sincerely stressed to these people that such expressions were strongly disapproved of and that such things were not intended by the P.K.N.

63. On another occasion, it was reported to Pangeran Ario Soerjodiningrat that kepala wargo were busy selling the cards which acted as credentials for a P.K.N. deputy, cards which were distributed by the P.K.N. governing board (pangreh P.K.N.). Initially he just acted dumb ["Jantje van Leiden"], answering that it could not be true since he knew nothing about it. When the Binnenlands Bestuur first took steps

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³⁹A kuli was a peasant who received inheritable rights to work the land on which he had labored. The "koolie-shares" refers to the way the land was divided up during the land-tenure reform.

⁴⁰This was the notorious camp for political prisoners in the southeastern part of Dutch New Guinea.

⁴¹The kaum were village-level religious officials, responsible for such things as registering divorces; ordinarily, there was one kaum in each village, though if villages were made up of more than one settlement there might be one for each settlement.
towards prosecuting the P.K.N. leaders involved in this affair, attempts were made, successfully, to make the whole situation murky. Nevertheless, P. A. Soerjodiningrat eventually had to have the biggest scoundrel in the affair, a certain Prawirodihardjo, kicked out of the P.K.N.

64. It is striking how the kepala wargo, probably by the additional emphasis in their speech, bring Pangeran Soerjodiningrat's name more and more to the fore at the meetings.

65. For instance, there was a meeting attended by some 40 people at the house of the P.K.N. kepala wargo Tjondroprawiro in Gedjawan desa on 7 November 1933. There Tjondroprawiro announced that he had met with Pangeran Soerjodiningrat the evening before and that the Pangeran had mentioned to him that "though we men are kawelo of the Sultan, we still nonetheless come under the (Indies) government also, but the P.K.N. will ask the Government to adjudge us a complete Self-governing State." ("aken ada permoeoehoenan mengadep Kandjeng Gouvernement, boewat kita semoewa bisanja hidoep di loewarnja Kandjeng Gouvernement.") Moreover, these meetings would continue to be held on the evenings of Rebo Legi.²

66. Asked about this, the Pangeran again denied that he said those things. This still left unanswered the questions of whether he himself was responsible for being placed to the fore more and more frequently and of whether it was he, again, behind the P.K.N. initiative for upgrading and strengthening the Self-governing State. He well knew already that the Administration (Regeering) advocated the stimulation of self-reliance in and the strengthening of the Self-governing State, though certainly by other paths than those followed by the P.K.N. These latter paths can only lead to dead ends.

67. A serious affair is one which took place in Poerworedjo village, Pakem sub-district, Sleman district, Jogjakarta regency, on 12 November 1933. The sober report of the chief of Pakem sub-district who was connected with the affair is appended to this document [not attached to the translation]. Djoparto, the kepala wargo of Poerworedjo's chapter of the P.K.N., started the meeting by declaring to the approximately 160 people there that now Pangeran Soerjodiningrat is the Ratu, Vorst [Prince], of all Muslims and the Vorst of all members of the P.K.N. The Assistant Wedono of Pakem, who was attending the meeting, silenced Djoparto. Welling up with righteous indignation, the Assistant Wedono himself spoke out, explaining to the audience that Djoparto's allegations were incorrect, that in the Rijk Jogjakarta there was only one Ratu, Vorst, namely Sri Padoeka Kandjeng Sultan, and that all others were his subjects. Djoparto, it having been requested of him that he not proceed in the same spirit with which he had started speaking, answered that he was only reporting that which Pangeran Soerjodiningrat had said to him and to many others, among them the governing body (comité) of the Poerworedjo P.K.N. For this reason, he had no fears for the way he was acting. Those committee members corroborated Djoparto's declaration. The acting Resident of Jogjakarta reported this incident to the Procureur-General of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands Indies, including with his report that of the Assistant Wedono of Pakem. The Procureur-General, in his letter #6696/A.P., dated

²A juncture of the 7-day week and the Javanese 5-day week; hence, every 35 days.
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7 December 1933, wrote that "it is not possible to press a case against Djoparto or Pangeran Soerjodiningrat under Article 153 (b) of the Criminal Code on the basis of Djoparto's words." If it is true that Pangeran Soerjodiningrat said that 'P.K.P. Soerjodiningrat djadi Ratoenja sekalijan orang wargo P.K.N. di dalem negeri Jogjakarta' [Pangeran Surjodiningrat is the Prince of all PKN members in the state of Jogjakarta], or words to that effect, (and the attitude of the committee at the 12 November P.K.N. gathering gives the impression that this was indeed the case), it can then be assumed that this constituted an action directed against the government of the Sultan. I wholly concur with your opinion that the Assistant Wedono of Pakem was acting correctly when he silenced and then refuted Djoparto."

68. Shortly after the event in Poerworedjo village, I spoke with Pangeran Soerjodiningrat about it in the presence of the acting Resident. I let him know that such expressions were not permissible, whether said by him to the kepala wargo or by the kepala wargo to the people. The Pangeran seemed to be well acquainted with the event, and the only answer he gave was that he could never have said such things "because there are some Catholics to be found among the teachers at the P.K.N. people's schools"!

69. On that occasion, I told Pangeran Soerjodiningrat that, in the Vorstenland sphere and mentality, the combination of, on one side, Pangeran--half-brother of the Prince--Government official--Honorary Major (a la suite) in the K.N.I.L. General Staff and, on the other side, leader of a political party which was unasked for and which had thus far acted in this fashion to help strengthen the Jogjakarta Principality and its royal house was, in my personal opinion, unacceptable. Furthermore, I drew his attention to the composition of the P.K.N. leadership, which is basically undesirable and is unsuited for the stated aims of the organization. It was clearly because of this, I told him, that neither he nor the other leaders were capable of leading the organization in the right direction. In addition, I let him know that His Highness the Sultan had brought to my attention his displeasure over the dangerous direction in which the organization was headed and his indignation over the incident in Poerworedjo village.

70. In a courteous fashion, that of the Javanese of class, he showed his appreciation for the frank way in which I had discussed this with him. He also acknowledged his awareness of the feelings which the Sultan harbored for the P.K.N. and which he had already discussed with him on a few occasions.

71. Despite this, the seriousness of the situation apparently never quite penetrated to the Pangeran. To this day, no powerful measures have been taken against the kepala wargo Djoparto, who had, after all, told lies, even according to Pangeran Soerjodiningrat (see the copy of a 22 December 1933 letter from Pangeran Soerjodiningrat in his capacity

43 Article 153 (b) forbade advocating the overthrow of Dutch rule in the Indies; it was the usual cause for prosecuting political activists.

44 Close male relatives of the Vorstenland princes, upon being raised to the position of pangeran, were ordinarily given honorary commissions in the KNIL (Koninklijke Nederlandsche Indische Leger, Royal Netherlands Indies Army).
as P.K.N. chairman which is included as Appendix 5). This is thoroughly unacceptable (see the letter of the Procureur-General which is cited above). It is precisely this circumstance [the government's tolerance of Pangeran Soerjodiningrat's inactivity] which could well be the reason for the Pangeran's otherwise uncalled for weak measures against delinquents in general and against this offender in particular.

72. Because of this, P.K.N. leaders, after a pause, again held meetings, this time in Toeri and Ngaglik sub-districts (Sleman district, Jogjakarta regency). At these meetings, propaganda work was done for mutual assistance organizations for funerals and circumcisions, the purpose of which is to lower the costs connected with these. At the same time, however, propaganda work was done to raise the luhur [glory] of the kraton nobility (Bangsawan Kraton) and to strive "soe-paja Radja dan kawoelanja Jogjakarta dapat memerintah sendiri Negeri Jogjakarta itoe. Oleh sebab Negeri Jogjakarta itoe negerinja sendiri jaitoe samanja roemahnja sendiri, kalau itoe roemah di tata dan di atur oleh lain orang, apa," the question was put, "orang2 di vergadering boleh?" To which the audience in this instance replied, "Tidak."

73. It is obvious that such a suggestive question is a very risky one, directed at meddling with the Government and to an audience of undeveloped people, some of them younger than 18.

74. The Government does indeed intend that self-reliance on the part of the Self-governing State should be heightened. But certainly not in the fashion suggested at this gathering. Here it was as though any involvement of the Netherlands Government in Self-governing State affairs ought not to be tolerated. The police correctly forbade the speaker at all these meetings, the P.K.N. propagandist R. Atmodarminto, from continuing on with his speech, and the gatherings then dissolved. In the notices given for these meetings, it was mentioned that the topics would be cooperation and so forth. In actuality, however, there were readings dealing with the struggle between the V.O.C. and the Javanese Principality and from those readings conclusions were drawn and brought forward in the guise of questions, in the manner demonstrated above. It is clear, then, that this is just a refined method for leading the Binnenlands Bestuur and the police down the garden path.

75. On one occasion, there was held in Jogjakarta a so-called conference of the governing board of the P.K.N. cooperatives. It was attended by about 1000 people, and P. A. Soerjodiningrat sat at the head table. One of the speakers was R. Atmodarminto (In June 1934, the P.K.N. leadership established a debating club with R. Atmodarminto as chairman and S. H. H. Sewojo as Secretary; the mutinous spirit in which the debates will be held can thus be imagined, and P. A. Soerjodiningrat known the mentality of these two gentlemen!). He made known that

\[\text{The letter says simply that Djoparto had admitted to lying on that occasion, that the Pangeran said no such thing to him, and that he had been warned not to lie again. It is not attached to this translation.}\]

\[\text{To strive "so that the ruler and subjects of Jogjakarta can themselves govern the state of Jogjakarta. Because the state of Jogjakarta is a state that stands on its own, just like a house(hold?) stands on its own. Would you people gathered here permit your house(hold)s to be organized and ordered by other people?" "No."}\]
"jang fihak desabestuur (loerah desa en prabot desa) jang mengakoe orang toeanja orang desa, tetapi tida membri pertoeloengan saperloenja, tetapi melahan P.K.N. jang dapat meneloengnja. Njatalah, bawah jang mendjadi toeanja raja boekan loerah desa dan lain2nja, tetapi P.K.N."

Though he certainly can be considered to know that such talk can have an undesirable influence among the people and can thus undoubtedly hamper the task of the Binnenlands Bestuur, P. A. Soerjodiningrat tolerated this quite calmly.

76. The attitude of the Sultan with respect to the P.K.N. has been predominantly passive.

77. This attitude is explained not only by the fact that Article 4 of the (P.K.N.) statutes sets one of its goals as the strengthening of the Principality and its Princely House. In addition, this attitude can in large part be explained by the impression given by the (Indies) government that it had no objections to the establishment of the P.K.N. This was imparted by the fact that, as is well known, the late Mr. Ir. H. J. Kiewiet de Jonge, Government's Spokesman for General Affairs in the Volksraad, had played an important role in the founding of the P.K.N., even, I might say, to the point where he might have been considered its promotor.48

78. The Sultan took this same wait-and-see policy toward the unpalatable affair of P. A. Soerjodiningrat and his flirtation with the more extreme organizations such as Partai Indonesia and Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia. He attended public gatherings held by these parties and rose from his seat when "Indonesia Raja" was being sung.

79. Even though these actions of the Pangeran--P.K.N. chairman did not meet with the approval of the Sultan, no criticism was made until after the receipt of the 25 August 1932 letter #45/G.E. which my predecessor [van Gesseler Verschuir] wrote. In that letter, mention was made of a conversation which had been held with P. A. Soerjodiningrat. In the conversation, it was made known to the Pangeran that since he was not only a Controleur for Agrarian Affairs, and thus a Government official, but also a Major on the General Staff (at his own expense), he was thus subject to the ruling of Government Circular #341X of 18 October 1929.49 At that same meeting, it was clearly explained both that and why any repetition of his actions (rising for the singing of "Indonesia Raja" at a P.I. meeting on 29 July 1932) would not be tolerated, especially not the fact that he--a Government official and officer--had taken part

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47 "it's the village government (the village chief and his assistants) who claim to be (act as) parents for the desa folk. But they don't give them the help they need. Instead, they oppose the PKN, which can help them. It's clear, then, that it's the PKN, and not the village chief and the others, that's (acting as) the parents of the common people."

48 Kiewiet de Jonge had spoken to Pangeran Surjodiningrat in 1928 about the need for a "middle-class" party to act as a counterweight to the nationalists. See Letter #85/G.E., Governor of Jogjakarta to Governor-General, dated June 6, 1930, Mr 581X/30. The Pangeran would occasionally thereafter say that that was when he first began to think of forming the PKN.

49 The circular forbade any actions by government employees which could be construed as signifying opposition to the government.
in a testimonial for the exiled Dr. Tjipto.\textsuperscript{50} It was made quite clear that he would have to accept all of the consequences of any repetitions of such actions.

80. The Sultan responded with Letter \#53, dated 1 September 1932. The appropriate part of it reads: "My younger brother Pangeran Ario Soerjodiningrat told me that he did indeed attend the Partai Indonesia public meeting held in Jogjakarta on the 29th of July of this year. He said, however, that he attended in his capacity as representative of the organization P.K.N., which was the capacity in which he had been invited by the [PI] chairman. To this, I remarked that he could not unbind this from his position as Pangeran and as an official; he will always continue to be called Bendoro Pangeran Soerjodiningrat."

81. One more time the Sultan took his younger brother P. A. Soerjodiningrat to task. This was when, persisting in his attitude, the Pangeran on yet another occasion had risen for the singing of "Indonesia Raja," an incident alluded to in Letter \#320/A, written by the First Government Secretary and dated 12 December 1932. I myself discussed the letter's contents with His Highness the Sultan.

82. From all of this, it is clear that the Sultan has let the way in which he conducts himself toward the P.K.N. and its chairman depend entirely upon the point of view which the Government takes toward that organization and its leader.

83. In the meantime, it is a pity that no more forceful steps were taken against P. A. Soerjodiningrat than those dictated by the following words from the First Government Secretary's letter mentioned above: "Meanwhile, after all that has happened, it is no longer possible to refrain from passing on to the Pangeran a remark on behalf of the Government. It shall be put to him verbally that the Government thoroughly disapproves of the fact that he has taken a position in conflict with existing regulations and especially of the fact that he has persisted in maintaining this position after he has been made aware that it was the wrong one. His attention had already been drawn to the fact that such unpleasantness could be avoided if persons of his position were to forgo contact with an organization of such outspoken anti-government character as Partai Indonesia."

84. When I spoke with him about the contents of the letter, the Pangeran made no definite comment about the Government's warning, but he repeatedly and expressly let it be known that his policy as leader of the P.K.N. entailed not having the P.I. and P.N.I. prejudiced against his organization, for he feared that otherwise many of his members would desert. Then, for his own profit, he flirted with and played the good guy toward organizations which were hostile to the Government, defying thereby the well-intentioned attitude of the Government. He did this by sending his children who were members of the P.K.N. governing board to public meetings beforehand and having them rise to show respect for "Indonesia Raja," then he would put in his own appearance at the meeting after the song had been sung.

\textsuperscript{50}Dr. Tjipto Mangunkusumo was exiled from Java (for the second time) in December 1927. He spent the 1930s in Banda Neira, one of the nutmeg-producing islands 100 miles southeast of Ambon.
85. In May of 1933, during its Congress in Jogjakarta, the Periketan Perserikatan Istri Indonesia [Union of Indonesian Women's Organizations] held a reception. In attendance were P. A. Soerjodiningrat, his wife and daughter, and Pangeran Ario Djojokoesoemo, all of them invited as representatives of the P.K.N. When "Indonesia Raja" was sung at the reception, all of the P.K.N. representatives rose. This was not the P.I. or the P.N.I. but rather an extremely progressive women's organization to whom sympathy was being shown, and once again P. A. Soerjodiningrat defied the Government's warning. 

85 [sic]. That the former Government Spokesman, the late Mr. Kiewiet de Jonge, had good intentions when he advocated the establishment of the P.K.N. (which was something that all took place behind the back of the European administration and something to which my predecessor as Governor, quite correctly, took serious objection) is hardly to be doubted. But the intended purpose of the organization and the structure chosen for it display a lack of knowledge of local conditions.

86. In creating a moderate people's party, it was always hoped that a bulwark would thereby be thrown up against the action of the extreme organizations such as the P.I. and the P.N.I. In order to make this dish a bit more tempting, the organization was intended to have social-economic activities also. But it was precisely in the 1930s that the extreme parties began to fade. They had no fascinating influence on the people [here], people who led a calm life, who were coping peacefully with the stronger rights to land and with the other advantages which came to them through the great Vorstenland reorganization, and who preferred nothing more than to be left in peace. In such a situation, extreme parties found no fertile ground in which to grow, and their influence steadily dropped. In addition, the Binnenlands Bestuur, together with the police who are very active here, were completely capable of continuing to dominate these organizations.

87. From this angle, it appears that an organization such as the P.K.N. was premature. It would never have been produced out of the natural pressure of circumstances nor out of the wishes or needs of the people. But also the form taken by the leadership of this organization is not at all appropriate in this Vorstenland milieu, and it forms a source of conflicts.

88. In this Eastern society, the Prince is a sacred ruler. Because of this, not only are the people subject to him, but also, and most importantly, the Pangerans are subject to him, for it is through his will that they are raised to their high positions. They are to be the foremost subjects when it comes to being attentive to the will of their lord and master. He, the Sultan, and he alone, shall and will take care of the welfare of his subjects. In this mental framework, it is entirely incomprehensible to the people that P. A. Soerjodiningrat should set himself up right beside their Prince, as leader of a political democratic organization (although the P.K.N. was not originally considered to be a political organization, it was not long before it began to traverse the slippery terrain of politics), as their protector, as the one who looks out for their interests. This gives rise to the impression that the Prince, the Principality, has come up short and that the Pangeran is opposing his Prince.

89. In Soerakarta, the Pakempalan Kawoelo Soerakarta is an organization which in the description of its purposes differs noticeably from
the P.K.N. but which in actuality is very much like it. The P.K.S. also places great emphasis on Princely dignity, but there it is understood that, in the milieu in which the organization must function, it is wrong and undesirable to have the leadership rest in the hands of a Pangeran, even though some of the Pangerans [there] are sympathetic to the P.K.S. (In addition, His Majesty the Soesoehoenan would never tolerate such a thing.) Also, in the Pakempalan Kaweolo Mangkoe Negara, which was created at the instigation of His Highness the Mangkoe Negoro as a counterweight to the P.K.S., there is no Pangeran as leader, despite the fact that the Prince keeps in close touch with the leadership of the organization. Regardless of whether it is indeed a desirable relationship, having the leadership of the P.K.N. in the hands of a Pangeran, a close family member of the Sultan, is the weak spot in the whole setup. The Sultan sees in his half-brother's behavior a threat to his own rule and public position. Of course, they do not agree on this matter, but the Pangeran does not want to listen to the counsel and admonitions of the Sultan. The consequence has been enmity between the two brothers.51

90. The Sultan may have initially been well-disposed toward the P.K.N., probably expecting that, with its massive following among the people, it would be part of an effort to support his Princely rule. Now, however, the feeling which he has for it has been radically altered.

91. The Sultan is not involved at all in P.K.N. action and was never consulted about it by P. A. Soerjodiningrat. This may be astonishing, but in this way, though the goal pursued by the P.K.N. is the strengthening of the Jogjakarta Principality and its Royal House, there is still an advantage in that the Prince was held out of the sphere of conflict.

91 [sic]. Steadily and intelligently, the Sultan has closely observed the development of the P.K.N. with real interest.

92. When he was apprised of the incident in the village Poerworedjo, the incident described above, the Sultan's displeasure and indignation reached a peak. When last we spoke, His Highness asked me whether now was not the time to relieve Soerjodiningrat of his position as Pangeran and to exile him (one thinks here of history, where mention is made of kraton personages who were exiled by the Prince for far less serious reasons). The Sultan also asked me whether the Government would forbid Pangeran Soerjodiningrat to continue to wear the uniform of Her Majesty's Army. His Highness had foreseen all of this and felt the P.K.N.'s political action to be an attack on his rule and a threat to peace and

51The two were, indeed, not close in the 1930s, but they had not been close since the early 1920s. What lay between them was not so much a matter of party politics as a matter of family politics. For a number of years in the 1930s, Pangeran Surjodiningrat did not appear in the kraton, and at one point a marriage between one of his sons and a daughter of the Sultan was delayed because of ill-feeling between the men. The Sultan, however, never gave any public display of enmity; he continued to send a personal representative to sit in for him at PKN congresses, and these representatives would arrive in pomp in one of the state carriages. When a conservative Dutch-language paper described the ties between the Pangeran and the Sultan as deteriorating, Oetoesan Indonesia, by that time owned by the PKN, responded, quite circumspectly, that the ties between the two were just as they had always been. (See Java Bode, June 30, 1934, and Oetoesan Indonesia, July 3, 1934.)
order. Significantly, the Sultan cited the Italian general Balbo, whose expedition with 24 airplanes had aroused such admiration and enthusiasm among the Italians that Mussolini saw a threatening danger to his own position and immediately named Balbo governor in North Africa (Libya).52

93. Pangeran Soerjodiningrat spoke at the P.K.S. congress in Solo on Sunday the 4th of November last year. According to the police report, the Pangeran on that occasion said that the people do not exist for the Prince, but rather that the Prince exists for the people. Because he was a part of the family of the Prince, he felt that he still had a debt of honor to pay to the people. The organization of the Kraton family must cooperate in promoting the interests of the people. All would then be one and it could then be said that subject and ruler (kawoelo and Goesti) go together.

94. His Highness the Sultan saw in this nothing other than P. A. Soerjodiningrat's placing himself to the fore and pushing the Prince to the rear. "Because the Pangeran always presumes to handle everything on his own and never discusses matters beforehand with the Prince."

95. Indeed, this intrusive, unrequested, and undesired help from a Pangeran, his half-brother, is unacceptable. What's more, Pangeran Soerjodiningrat, in his zeal, has drawn five other Pangerans into the movement. These have in general been little active as P.K.N. leaders, and they very certainly can find a better way to work together to heighten the prestige and rule of their Prince than by chasing around after the chairman.

96. As was said earlier, this Pangeran means well by the people, but, the slight democratic tint notwithstanding, he prides himself on his Princely lineage and he unassailably holds up his Pangeran status as being a connection to the Kraton tradition. Because it is precisely this tradition and blood relationship which are the instruments with which he consciously plays the chords of true Javanese sentiment, so devout and deferential toward Princely dignity, so full of sacral reverence for their Eastern ruler and his close blood-relatives. As a half-brother, P. A. Soerjodiningrat partakes in this Princely glory. This close relationship is the great drawing power which makes the people join the P.K.N., of which a descendant of a Prince is the leader. And these same people, completely interested, are looking forward to the effects of the behavior and of the actions of this Pangeran on the position of their Sultan, in whom they will always continue to see a holy person whose rule bears a holy character.

97. The Pangeran Soerjodiningrat himself said not so very long ago that if the Pangerans and the rest of the Javanese nobility had no people's party to support them, these so-called "ningrats" would gain

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52Balbo was an early and feisty supporter of Mussolini, having actually taken part in the planning of the march on Rome. From 1929 to 1933, he was chief of the Italian Air Ministry. In that capacity he led squadrons of Italian planes on long-range flights to South America and to the United States. When he returned from the latter tour, he was greeted as a hero in the Italian press and found himself soon thereafter stationed as the Governor in Libya. He was killed over Tobruk in the Second World War when his plane was accidentally downed by Italian flak. The comparison is interesting.
enemies and be eliminated. It is well within his rights to defend the Javanese nobility, but it has become clear that he was wrong to take upon himself the leadership of a people's party for that purpose. This has meant movement into political terrain and, of necessity, has aroused reaction on the part of other political parties. It is because of this that he has had his "Liebäugeln" [flirtation] with the P.N.I. and the P.I., attending their public meetings and rising when "Indonesia Raja" was sung. This had to give the wrong impression to his followers but, the Pangeran said to me, "prudence dictated it; otherwise, the other parties would have tricked him out of his members." But this has also meant that this Pangeran has steadily come under the influence of his friend Mr. Soejoedi, the P.I. man.

98. Other effective ways were open to him to strengthen the status and position of the Javanese nobility. By taking part in and by contributing seriously to the good administration of the Principality under their Prince, the nobility will not only promote the self-reliance of and strengthen the Self-governing State, but they can also help to advance the interests of the people and thereby actively show solidarity with the people.

99. But it tickles P. A. Soerjodiningrat's vanity quite a bit to know that he's the leader of a great people's party. He's a Pangeran leader, admired by many. He has united around himself a party administration made up purely of members of noble birth, among them five Pangerans and two of his daughters. In this way, he has been able to make himself king in the land of the blind and to be at the helm of the administration of this so-called democratic organization. Yet, being a figure of only little power, and a weak personality, he lacks the characteristics necessary for a successful leader. From the dry summary of facts already mentioned, to which yet others can be added, it is crystal clear that P. A. Soerjodiningrat has failed to take forceful and vigorous measures against leaders (kepala wargo) of his party who have spoken seditious language. This demonstrates a lack of a sense of responsibility on the part of the P.K.N. leadership. This leadership never knows what is happening and always endorses over to the Binnenlands Bestuur and the police the responsibility which it should be bearing. These services are always fully prepared to nip these excesses in the bud and thereby, even though it is unjust, bring upon themselves the epithets of "opposers" and "oppressors" of the P.K.N. movement. (On the 28th of April 1934, the P.K.N. took over the "Sinar Asia" printing firm and the daily newspaper Oetoesan Indonesia from the P.P.P.B.53 for a price of f.11,000. Pangeran Soerjodiningrat, with the consent of the P.K.N. governing board, named as chief editor of Oetoesan Indonesia a certain Brotokesowo, alias Gatot Sastrodihardjo, who had been the chief editor of the very progressive nationalist daily Aksi; the direction and administration of the paper have been assumed by the Pangeran's daughter. The article entitled "Keloeh kesahnja rajarajat Indonesia" [Complaints of the Suffering of the Indonesian People], which appeared in the Oetoesan Indonesia editions of 16, 18, 19, and 20 June 1934, was of such serious nature that the Procureur-General of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands Indies found it necessary to

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53Perserikatan Pegawai Pegadaian Sumutera (Union of Native Pawnshop Employees)--a Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia-influenced organization. Pawnshops were a government monopoly, and their employees were thus considered civil servants, a category which seriously limited their political range.
warn the chief editor to be more moderate. Since he was familiar with
the mentality and the political inclinations of the chief editor, it
was up to the Pangeran to prevent the appearance of risky, politically
tendentious articles.) (According to the August 1934 report on the
political situation in the Jogjakarta area, those consulted concerning
the construction of a "Gedong Rajat Indonesia di Mataram" included not
only Mr. Soejoedi, Dr. Soekiman, and Ir. Soeratin, all well-known fig-
ures in the world of extreme nationalist politics, but also P. A.
Soerjodiningrat.)

100. It cannot be said that all of these undesirable expressions
originate with just a few people in the P.K.N. who, given the oppor-
tunity, meant to agitate others and to bring the leftist element into
this movement. The extremist statements and incitements have been too
frequent for that to be the case, and they have occurred in too many
P.K.N. branches, spread out all over the Jogjakarta area.

101. At present, a lull has come in these incitements to illegal ac-
tions, but this is not a consequence of any forceful measures taken by
the P.K.N. leadership. Instead, it is due partly to the paternal
mediation of the elite Binnenlands Bestuur corps in the area and partly
to the energetic and effective measures of the police.

102. Propaganda meetings are being convened everywhere by the [PKN]
central leadership. At these, the setting-up of burial- and circum-
cision-societies is being promoted and it is being urged that the chil-
dren of P.K.N. members join the P.K.N. youth organization. The most
important point at these meetings, however, is to urge the members to
pay their dues regularly. (The organization's books were balanced as
of the 22nd of November 1933; a reading of them at that time indicated
that the P.K.N. had as of that date signed up 229,680 members, while
up to that date in 1933 there had been received in dues--2.5 cents per
member per month--a sum of f.17,844.17. This means that the members
had paid dues for only three months out of the eleven for that year.
This poor result shows a complete insufficiency in discipline. These
unhealthy figures are probably connected with the number of people who
sign up and get a membership card with a serial number on it but never
again pay their dues. These should be cashiered and no longer be con-
sidered as members.)

103. P. A. Soerjodiningrat shows little vigor, preferring that others
pull his chestnuts out of the fire for him. It is precisely in this
attitude, and in the fact that he is not strong enough to hold the
P.K.N. on the right track, that a great danger lies.

104. In addition, the leader has little knowledge of men, something
which plays a role in his choice of people to become propagandists,
kepala wargo, cooperative leaders, etc.

105. Here are some recent examples of this:

106. A certain Soediman, alias S. H. H. Sewojo, was vice-chairman of
the Mataram branch of the Perkoempoelan Goeroe Bantoe.54 He was dis-
missed by the Director of [the Department of] Education and Religion
from his position as a teacher's assistant at the Second Public Native

54Organization of Assistant Teachers.
School of the second class in Jogjakarta. This was done because S. H. H. Sewojo was guilty of [writing] a pamphlet in which he had neglected the obligations to the government which were his as a civil servant. In addition, he had failed to consider the special demands placed upon his behavior, both in school and out, by his responsible position as an educator of youth. He had also lost sight of the limits imposed upon him by the position of trust which he had assumed when he became involved with political propaganda, with trade-union actions, and with other similar expressions of organizational life.

107. In that pamphlet appeared this passage: "actieve daad jaitoe actie aken di toendjoekan kepada jang wadjib. Di dalam kita mendjallankan actie, tida bedo dengan orang berperang, hanja sadja tida bersendjata bedil meriam." These words led to criminal prosecution of this S. H. H. Sewojo for having contravened Article 154 of the Criminal Code. The incriminating words, according to the Procureur-General of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands Indies, ["]were not to be taken as anything other than a provocation to action against the Administration, which had initiated and carried through the economizing in question, and therefore against the Government in the Netherlands Indies. This action was to be conducted in the fashion of a war, but with the difference that no material weapons, such as guns, etc., were to be employed." The Procureur-General of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands Indies considered legal prosecution not only possible but even desirable.

108. Even though the leader of the P.K.N. knew something of all this, it was precisely this S. H. H. Sewojo whom the P.K.N. central leadership installed as chief propagandist. It was to be he who was sent to the gatherings and meetings of the different branches in order to make propaganda for the P.K.N. youth organization and to see to the teaching of proper lessons for the education of youth. This person is still active as propagandist of the P.K.N. (At the September 1934 congress of P.K.N.-Muda, the secretary, R. A. Pratiwi, announced that the organization had already enrolled 2844 members, including 102 girls.)

109. Another example: At the Third P.K.N. Congress, a motion was carried concerning the plantation leases. The main drift of this motion was that if the plantations were unable to live up to their obligations, then there should be proceedings directed at nullifying the contracts (the topic in question was the so-called conversion arrangement). The sugar plantation "Gondangliopoero," a conversion plantation which had also been permitted to rent free land "free-hold," wished to switch over from its old, costly (rental) contracts, which it could no longer pay, to newer, cheaper contracts, a switch which would involve paying a compensation to the landowners affected. In order to induce some unwilling [landowners] to agree to this, the plantation employed "handlangera," extenders or agents, who would receive a premium of f.2.50 for each contractant who could be persuaded to switch over.

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55The authorities are going to be shown some active deeds, some action. The actions which we're going to get under way are no different from war, except that there aren't going to be any guns."

56If plantations wished to set up in or to expand into lands which had not previously been leased under the old system, they had to strike individual agreements with all of the farmers who had rights to the land they wished to use.
This is an action which certainly already is to be condemned. The significant thing connected with it, however, was that among these "extenders" were to be found P.K.N. kepala wargo, people with undesirable personal histories. Among them were a certain Soerono (from Kalidjoerang kalurahan) who had already been convicted of theft a number of times before, and Kromodimedjo, who had been convicted of "begal" [robbery] and "clandestine stocks of arak." From this example, it is clear that the P.K.N. leadership, in choosing its foremen, (kepala wargo), displays not only a lack of knowledge of men, something which had already declared itself through the monotonous summary already given of the unbelievable expressions and actions by kepala wargo at gatherings and meetings, but also a lack of fastidiousness.

110. The leader of the P.K.N. was also apparently unable to prevent the kepala wargo, and thus the P.K.N., from trying to insert themselves as a force between the people and the native administration and village officials. Witness their instigating the people to make salt illegally, to return their tax bills to the administrative officials, to pay no heed to the orders of the Regents, the Wedono's, and the Assistant Wedono's but to listen instead to the kepala wargo. Witness their enticing statements about becoming P.K.N. members above all things, because then one would no longer come under the orders of the lurah but would have the kepala wargo as his leader. Witness also the many other facts which have already been related.

111. To [its] overestimation of [its] own power, the [PKN's] so-called "information-bureau" has contributed in no small amount. The bureau was led by P. A. Soerjodiningrat, who was thereby able to persuade P.K.N. members to seek his intermediation and help whenever there were complaints to be brought against the European or native administration. This gave the incorrect and unfair impression that the administration would ignore any verbal or written complaints which the people might bring to it directly.

112. The attached copy of the 3 January 1934 secret report of the Assistant Resident for Agrarian Affairs (Appendix VI) [not attached to translation] deals with a complaint of some people from Goentoeran kaloerahan in Bantoel regency. From the report, the undesirable consequences of the combination [within one person of] Pangeran Soerjodiningrat--Controleur for Agrarian Affairs--Chairman of the P.K.N., and, at the same time, leader of the so-called "information-bureau" are quite evident. On account of the conduct shown by Pangeran Soerjodiningrat in that instance, the Assistant Resident in question has found it necessary that the Pangeran no longer be permitted to investigate village complaints, including complaints about land.58

57This was not Governor de Cock's first contact with such dealings. Before he was appointed Governor in Jogjakarta, he had been Resident of Surabaja, and in that capacity he had also run into problems with middlemen and pressure from above when contracts between plantations and farmers were being renegotiated. See his August 9, 1932 report in Mr 1058X/32.

58In this instance, the Pangeran had, against standing policy, accepted the complaint, investigated it, and made a decision without checking the situation with either his superior or the local Jogjanese official. Since the complainants were PKN members who had spoken to the Pangeran at his residence about the problem shortly before, and since his findings were for the complainants where earlier and subsequent
113. Whenever P. A. Soerjodiningrat appears in a village in connection with his outdoors tasks as Controleur for Agrarian Affairs, the small man, and especially the P.K.N. member, sees in him not the official but the leader--his leader--of the P.K.N., a person of particular regard and authority because the Government lets him wear his Major's uniform at all times.

114. In the Vorstenland areas, then, he now occupies a very special and exceptional position. This already comes across distinctly in his relationship to the (Indies) Government's and the Self-governing State's regulations.

115. As a Controleur for Agrarian Affairs, the Pangeran is subject to the rules established by the Netherlands Indies Government for its civil servants: his pay as Controleur for Agrarian Affairs is regulated by those rules; he receives his allowances for his children and his leaves of absence through them; the regulations forbidding membership in certain organizations apply to him; and he is included in the Government's pension fund.

116. The Government's income tax, however, is not assessed against his incomes, of which his salary as Controleur for Agrarian Affairs forms only a small fraction (he has always drawn payments from the Principality because he is a Pangeran). In addition, he exercises rights to land, rights which are permitted only to subjects of the Self-governing State.

117. As a [Netherlands Indies] civil servant, P. A. Soerjodiningrat is properly a subject of the Netherlands Indies. In practice, however, because his position as Pangeran is considered to take precedence, P. A. Soerjodiningrat is taken to be a subject of the Self-governing State, although one obliged to respect those governmental personal rules which pertain to a civil servant. The position of this Controleur for Agrarian Affairs in the official order of things, then, bears a very distinctive stamp. This is still further accentuated by the fact that P. A. Soerjodiningrat is also Major à la suite of the General Staff of the Netherlands Indies Army. It is a consequence of all this that it can happen that this Controleur for Agrarian Affairs, after having fulfilled some ceremonial obligations as Pangeran during office hours, performs his outdoor tasks as Controleur for Agrarian Affairs while dressed in his Major's uniform.

118. The qualities already mentioned, those of, on one side, half-brother of His Highness the Sultan, Pangeran, and Major à la suite of the General Staff of the Netherlands Indies Army, and, on the other side, chairman of the P.K.N., mean that this Civil Servant-subject of the Self-governing State cannot, as Controleur for Agrarian Affairs, be entrusted with the tasks which could be assigned to a "normal" Controleur for Agrarian Affairs. Furthermore, his relationships to and his contacts with both leaders and people have an entirely different character than they would if he were just a "normal" Controleur for Agrarian Affairs. On the one side, the people-P.K.N. members consider him to be a man of regard and authority, standing above the Binnenlands Bestuur. On the other side, the Binnenlands Bestuur sees in him both investigations found against them, this was, with good cause, considered improper. When Pangeran Surjodiningrat was no longer allowed to take complaints, however, villagers no longer came to the Office of Agrarian Affairs with their complaints.
the Pangeran, a close relative of a Sultan, which in the Vorstenlanden means a fearful and intimidating figure, since he is the descendant of a Sultan, and also the underminer of rule, who with his P.K.N. wishes to penetrate between the people and the administration.

119. It is my conviction that a speedy end should be made to the relationships mentioned here, relationships which are most undesirable and which will constitute a danger as long as they endure. This should be done by dismissing P. A. Soerjodiningrat from [Netherlands Indies] service and by accepting, at the same time, his resignation from Her Majesty's Armed Forces.

120. My views with regard to the P.K.N. and its leader find complete agreement on the part of His Highness the Sultan. He would like nothing better than that the GOVERNMENT should proceed to take the strongest measures against his half-brother--Official for Agrarian Affairs--Major on the General Staff. He would feel in this a great support for the more forceful attitude which he himself is going to take toward the present P.K.N. and its leadership by eventually forbidding his Pangerans to be members of the organization. In my opinion, no revolution or rebellious attitude on the part of the people will be caused by this. This is because it is hardly to be expected that the members will initiate any activity to maintain the status of the P.K.N. They do not really see any profit in the organization; they are just running along, following the Chairman--Pangeran.

121. Pangeran Ario Soerjodiningrat himself has already said aloud that if he had to choose between leadership of the P.K.N. and the office of Controleur for Agrarian Affairs, he would remain faithful to his organization and stay on as chairman of it.

122. This is, in short, a summary of the grounds which have led me to this conviction:

I. No need exists in the Vorstenlanden for an organization such as the P.K.N. with its two-fold [bisexual or amphibious] purpose--a political and a social-economic endeavor. This dual nature is the problem. The political action especially is harmful to authority and causes serious complications that can not be tolerated any longer without danger. On social-economic terrain, meanwhile, little effective has been accomplished. In no way has the P.K.N. achieved its objectives.

II. The weak personality of the leader, P. A. Soerjodiningrat, is to blame for this. He lacks the inner strength and abilities, the self-control, needed to hold the P.K.N. on the correct course. On the contrary, it is precisely in and through his vanity, his overestimation of himself, and his rashness that there is displayed an individuality complex that is of great danger to any strengthening of the Jogjakarta Principality and its Royal House. Because it originates from a descendant of a Sultan, his attitude and his continuing direct and indirect criticism of Princely rule, criticism which is anything but constructive, will have a tremendous suggestive influence for as long as they last. This will constitute a force which, if it goes too far in this Oriental environment, will do irreparable mischief and finally undermine confidence in Princely rule. The maintenance and correct guidance of Princely rule is not only advantageous in this immediate area but is
also, and no less, important for sustaining general *rust en orde*, of which the Government is the guardian.

III. The weak spot is in the complexity of the position of P. A. Soerjodiningrat—Government official and wearer of the military uniform—Pangeran and half-brother of His Highness the Sultan—leader of the P.K.N. This is the weak spot in the way that the organization is set up and in the leadership given to it, and both of these are sources of complications and conflicts. P. A. Soerjodiningrat, in his attitude and in his actions, has shown himself unwilling to consider the obligations enjoined upon officials in general, and upon military personnel in particular, by their relationship to the Government. He has also not formed a proper idea of the demands placed on his conduct by his special position. In defiance of the Government's disapproval of his rising for the singing of the song "Indonesia Raja," he has persisted in this. And in defiance of the Government's disapproval of his contacts with an organization of such pronounced anti-Government character as "Partai Indonesia," he still maintains enduring relations both with the progressive political parties and with his friend Mr. Soejoedi, the still highly influential P.I.-leader. As Controleur for Agrarian Affairs, he is no longer as efficacious as he should be and he misuses his official knowledge to the benefit of his own purposes and to the disadvantage of the Jogjakarta principality. The advice of his half-brother and Prince, His Highness the Sultan, finds no ear with him but is instead ignored with a Sovereign air. The Sultan, with his Oriental sentiment, sees and feels in the actions of the Pangeran and the P.K.N. nothing more nor less than an inadmissible attempt to attack, to weaken, his Princely rule and position. The passive behavior of His Highness the Sultan must be ascribed to the long-suffering attitude taken to date by the Government toward P. A. Soerjodiningrat's actions. In this attitude, the loyal Sultan can discern no support for any powerful action of his own. The inimical attitude of the Sultan toward his half-brother is now filled with great tension. To my mind, it is necessary that strong corrective measures, in the forms suggested above, be taken by the Government with regard to Pangeran Ario Soerjodiningrat, that is, the acceptance of his unsubmitted letters of resignation for the Civil and Military Services of the Netherlands Indies.

Jogjakarta
15 October 1934
The Governor of Jogjakarta
H. H. de Cock
Appendix I

Statutes of the Pakempalan Kawoelo Ngajogjakarta

Chapter 1--Establishment, Name, Lifetime, and Site.

Article 1. The founders, whose names are given below, hereby establish an organization with the name "Pakempalan-Kawoelo-Ngajogjakarta."

Article 2. The organization starts today and will exist for an indefinite length of time.

Article 3. The organization is based in Jogjakarta.

Chapter 2--Goal.

Article 4. The goal of the organization is:

1. The strengthening of the Jogjakarta Principality and its Royal House in the sense that, as much as it is possible, self-government can be reached on a democratic footing;

2. The social and economic elevation of the native people of Jogjakarta.

Article 5. The organization tries to attain the goals set out above by legal means and through cooperation among the different classes from which the native people of Jogjakarta is formed.

Chapter 3--Finances.

Article 6. The funds of the organization are formed through the periodic contributions of members and extraordinary members, and all other legal means.

Chapter 4--Government.

Article 7. (1) The governing board consists of at least fifteen members, all named at a general gathering and chosen from and by the members (if necessary, also from among the extraordinary members).

(2) The members of the governing board sit for three years. They step down together, but they can be immediately rechosen.

(3) Intervening vacancies may be temporarily filled by the governing body. The definitive filling will take place at the next general gathering of the members.

Article 8. The chairman of the organization will be specially chosen. On the whole, tasks will be divided among the members of the governing board. They will choose from among themselves three Vice-Chairmen, two general secretaries, and three treasurers.

Article 9. (1) The governing board represents the organization, both legally and otherwise, and it is responsible for all of its deeds, both those deeds of the board and those done under its management.

(2) The Chairman, the Secretaries, and the Treasurers together form the daily ruling body.

Chapter 5--Members and Extraordinary Members.

Article 10. (1) The organization recognizes members and extraordinary members.

(2) They are named by the organization's governing board.

(3) Only subjects of the Sultanate can be members.

(4) Extraordinary membership is limited only to natives who are not subjects of the Sultanate, and they have an advisory voice.
Article 11. Membership can be obtained through inquiring with the governing board.

Chapter 6--Donators and Honorary Chairman.

Article 12. (1) The governing board is empowered to name one or more donators and an Honorary Chairman.

(2) They have entrance to all general gatherings, and the Honorary Chairman has, as well, rights to attend meetings of the governing body and to speak with an advisory voice.

Chapter 7--Gatherings.

Article 13. (1) The meetings of the governing body are valid only when 3/5 of its members are present, while for gatherings of the membership, half of the number of members and of the governing board are needed.

(2) If it should occur that the demands made in 13 (1) above are not met, then a second gathering, for the same purpose, can be held within a month regardless of the number of members present.

(3) Decisions taken by a gathering are valid whenever a majority of those present approves.

Chapter 8--Dissolution of the Organization.

Article 14. (1) The organization can dissolve itself by a vote of that inclination of at least 3/4 of the valid membership at a gathering convened for that purpose; at the gathering, at least 2/3 of the governing board must be present, and there must be at least 50 members.

(2) Upon dissolution, the gathering will decide upon the disposition of property.

Chapter 9--Amendments.

Article 15. Changes in these statutes can only be brought about by a majority of 2/3 of the voting membership on a decision for which the meeting was called.

Chapter 10--Governing Body.

Article 16. At the beginning, the members of the governing body consist of: (those named in paragraph 4 of the document above).
Appendix III

Explanation of the P.K.N. Emblem

The figure-chronogram consists of:¹
- the leaves of the tree (ron)
- the great snake (Nāga)
- a tuft of dried grass (soeket garing)

The tree apparently simply signifies the final achievement of a beautiful harmonious whole.

According to insights obtained, the chronogram should be read in the following order:

Ron-ngemoet (to have in the mouth)--Naga--soeket garing.

Ron = 1. Ron is derived from the word darani, which means bearer or earth. There is only one earth.

Ngemoet = 6. Ngemoet is connected to "roso," taste, one of the senses. Earlier, men knew only six tastes: spicy, sour, bitter, fatty sweet = hearty (goerih), salty, and sweet.

Naga = 8. The original meaning of this word is elephant. The eight directions are guarded by eight elephants. Their names: Airawata, Pundarika, Wamana, Kumuda, Ajana, Puspadanta, Sarwwaboma, and Supratika.

Soeket garing = 0.

The figure chronogram thus comes out as the Javanese year 1680, which according to Dutch reckoning is 1755: the year of the establishment of the Jogjakarta Sultanate.

¹A recent brief description of chronograms in Javanese literature is to be found as Appendix II in M. C. Ricklefs, Modern Javanese Historical Tradition: A Study of an Original Kartasura Chronicle and Related Materials (London: University of London School of Oriental and African Studies, 1978), pp. 239-44.