The once-secret CIA document published for the first time below has multiple significance for scholars of American-Indonesian relations in the cold war period.1 First and foremost, this long memorandum offers a rare opportunity to gauge the substance and quality of policy analysis in the CIA's Deputy Directorate for Plans (henceforth DDP), whose Far East Division under Desmond Fitzgerald2 prepared it at the order of DDP Director Richard Bissell in mid-March 1961.3 Normally DDP does not produce papers which can be characterized as a mixture of intelligence estimate and policy implications, as Bissell describes the contents of the report in his cover memo. The DDP's formal responsibility within the CIA is exclusively for "clandestine services" of three main types: intelligence collection, counterintelligence and covert actions, involving a whole range of operations (or "dirty

*This article is a modified version of a segment of a larger study about the politics of policy formulation on Indonesia in the Kennedy and early Johnson administrations. I am indebted to the American Philosophical Society and the Vassar College Faculty Research Committee for grants which facilitated this research.

1See my note on the source of this document on p. 156.

2In the shakeup of DDP personnel following the Bay of Pigs fiasco, Fitzgerald was made Deputy Chief of the DDP's Western Hemisphere Division. See Philip Agee, Inside the Company: CIA Diary (New York: Stonehill, 1975), p. 320. Subsequently, in early 1963, Fitzgerald was made Chief of the Special Affairs Staff responsible for covert Cuban operations. In this role, Fitzgerald figured prominently in the AM/LASH assassination plot against Castro. See U.S., Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Interim Report No. 94-465, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975 (henceforth Church Committee, Report on Assassination Plots), especially pp. 85-90, 170-76. Subsequently Fitzgerald rose to the number three post in the CIA, Deputy Director for Plans. For two revealing anecdotes on Fitzgerald's role in U.S. Vietnam policy, see David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Random House, 1972), pp. 348-49, 408.

3It is Bissell's personal recollection that Fitzgerald probably authored the DDP Indonesia paper. Interview with Richard Bissell, November 1973. In January 1961 Fitzgerald had the opportunity to study the Indonesian situation at first hand. During a visit to Jakarta he conferred not only with his Chief of Station, Vernet Gresham, but his policy antagonist Ambassador Jones. "Ambassador Jones' 1961 Appointment Book," Box 3, Jones Papers. (These recently opened papers of the late Ambassador are deposited in the Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University.)
tricks") from placing articles in foreign newspapers to assassinating foreign political leaders. It is thus not the responsibility of the DDP to prepare intelligence estimates, a job which is assigned to the other side of the CIA structure, the Deputy Directorate for Intelligence (henceforth DDI). Working in part from the raw data reported by the DDP, but mainly (ca. 80 percent) from open sources, it is the DDI that prepares the several types of finished intelligence products that are designed to serve the policy maker. Not only is intelligence analysis outside the DDP's jurisdiction, but the making of policy recommendations is formally excluded from the functions of both DDI and DDP. This DDP memorandum is therefore significant not merely because it is a once-secret CIA document, but because it is a policy memorandum authored by the DDP.

The significance of this DDP paper derives also from the critical period in American-Indonesian relations during which it was produced. For the early months of 1961 saw major changes developing in both the international setting and the domestic politics of both countries.

In the larger international system, the advent of the Kennedy administration marked both a global intensification of the cold war and a new emphasis on the Third World as a cold war battleground. This intensification was immediately apparent in the rapid escalation of Soviet-American competition for influence over the highly strategic and resource-rich nonaligned state of Indonesia.

Meanwhile, in Jakarta President Sukarno was preoccupied with consolidating the political and institutional arrangements of the highly personalized authoritarian political system of Guided Democracy, which he had proclaimed with army support in July 1959. Concurrently, in the sphere of foreign policy Sukarno had elevated his campaign for the liberation of West Irian--the last remnant of the former Dutch East Indies--to top priority. Breaking diplomatic relations with the Dutch

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*For brief, but highly reliable discussions of the inner structure of the CIA in the early 1960s, see Church Committee, Report on Assassination Plots, pp. 1-12. Also see U.S., Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, hearings on Covert Action, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975. Also see Agee, Inside the Company, especially pp. 39-45 and the appendix, which has three charts showing the evolution of the basic organization of the CIA. For the most authenticated overview of the CIA's organizational history, see U.S., Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Final Report No. 94-755, "History of the Central Intelligence Agency," in Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports, 94th Cong., 2nd sess., 1976, pp. 1-108 (henceforth Church Committee, History of the CIA).

*For a scholarly, moderately revisionist history of the cold war paying close attention to both Soviet and American policy, see Walter LaFeber, America, Russia and the Cold War, 1946-1972, 2nd ed. (New York: Wiley, 1972).


*For a perceptive, but critical perspective on Sukarno's foreign policy from a
in August 1960 and collecting his first major military loan from the USSR in January 1961, the Indonesian president was bent on securing American diplomatic support as well for the rapid achievement of this objective.

In Washington, meanwhile, the election of John F. Kennedy had set in motion the shuffling of policy makers and the reviewing of priorities and policies that normally marks the transfer of power from one president and his party to another. High on the Kennedy agenda was bringing new urgency and empathy to U.S. relations with the Third World, of which Indonesia was perceived as a major, if largely unknown, leader. Given Sukarno's bold confrontation strategy for liberating West Irian, it was clear that by at least the end of the year the young administration would face a complex and crucial test of these still uncrystallized policies.


For the most thoroughly documented and systematic exploration of the 1962-70 Indonesian elite's outlook, see Franklin B. Weinstein, "The Indonesian Elite's View of the World and the Foreign Policy of Development," Indonesia, 12 (October 1971), pp. 97-152. This article, together with the explication of a theory of the functions of Indonesian foreign policy appear in Weinstein's Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence: From Sukarno to Suharto (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976). Finally, for one of the few overviews of the history of Indonesian foreign policy since independence, again see Franklin B. Weinstein, "Indonesia," in Wayne Wilcox et al., Asia and the International System (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop, 1972), pp. 116-45.

The top-level Kennedy foreign policy appointments are portrayed most fully in sociological and psychological, as well as political terms, in David Halberstam's often scathing The Best and the Brightest. Also see the more sympathetic sketches in the Kennedyphe memoirs cited below.

The literature on Kennedy's foreign policy includes major studies from diverse ideological perspectives. Still fundamental, especially for Kennedy's policies in the Third World, are the major initial Kennedyphe memoirs. Those most useful for this study were: Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965); Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy (Garden City: Doubleday, 1967); and William Attwood, The Reds and the Blacks (New York: Harper and Row, 1967). Two later memoirs are also useful because of their differing vantage points and interpretations. See W. W. Rostow's laudatory The Diffusion of Power, 1957-1972 (New York: Macmillan, 1972), and the disillusioned liberal Chester Bowles's critical Promises to Keep (New York: Harper and Row, 1971).

Thanks to a mid-February decision by President Sukarno to take up President Kennedy's open-dated invitation to visit Washington in late April, the American government had to meet that test much sooner than expected. The scheduling of Sukarno's visit thus had the effect of galvanizing the DDP and all other aspirant architects of Kennedy's Indonesia policy into intensifying their competition for influence. It was the occurrence of this clearly defined ten-week period of preparation for Sukarno's visit that not only explains the timing of the DDP's paper, but also adds another dimension to its significance for the scholar. For the relative suddenness and the high stakes involved in the Sukarno visit meant that the production of comparable documents from divergent agencies and individuals was unusually heavy. A three-year effort by the author and the highly competent archivists of the Kennedy Library has led to the declassification of most of these rich documentary sources. The extraordinary DDP policy memorandum thus takes on added significance precisely because it can be viewed not in isolation, but alongside various contemporary memoranda with which it was contending for presidential attention and approval.

Although the politics of policy formulation in anticipation of Sukarno's visit involved organizations, groups, and individuals that were outside as well as inside the U.S. government, the focus here will be on the politics of organizations and individuals (now popularly known as "bureaucratic politics") within the executive branch. Involving

10For the memoirs of two participants in the preparations for the Sukarno-Kennedy meeting, see Howard P. Jones, *Indonesia, the Possible Dream* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovish, 1971), especially pp. 188-201; and Rostow, *Diffusion of Power*, pp. 192-96. Although not directly involved, both Schlesinger, *A Thousand Days*, pp. 532-36, and Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, pp. 361-81, have clearly drawn on both documents and personal interviews to reconstruct the meeting and the 1961 context.


11My forthcoming book on the politics of Indonesia policy formulation under Kennedy and Johnson attempts to integrate these documentary sources with extensive interview data and various secondary sources. Hopefully other scholars, both Indonesian and American, will also begin exploiting these documents.

12The ambiguous and misleading term "bureaucratic politics" is used here, more as a symbol than a rigorous category, to connote a broad approach geared to the highly political process by which foreign policy is formulated. This eclectic approach resembles most closely the one employed in Hilsman's *To Move a Nation*, especially chapters 1-8, 35, 36; and Abraham Lowenthal, "'Liberal,' 'Radical,' and 'Bureaucratic' Perspectives on U.S. Latin American Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Retrospect," in Julio Cotler and Richard Fagan (eds.), *Latin America and the United States* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974), pp. 212-35. Also see Charles Stevenson, *The End of Nowhere: American Policy toward Laos since 1964* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972). There is thus no attempt here to apply rigorously either of the three models of the foreign-policy formulation process that Graham Allison developed in his *The Essence of Decision* (Boston: Little Brown, 1971). A less rigorous but more fully illustrated presentation appears in Morton Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1974). Finally, see the highly lucid and instructive, if admittedly still primitive, effort of a distinguished
the middle-level bureaucratic echelons from the start, this politics engaged the higher-level policymaking circles (i.e., people with the rank of Assistant Secretary and above) as early as mid-February 1961. While winning only brief attention from a president preoccupied with the escalating crises in Laos, Vietnam, Cuba, and the Congo, Indonesia did command substantial interest in the weekly meetings of a more informal interagency policy-planning forum just below the National Security Council (NSC) in status. This was known as the Tuesday lunch group and its membership embraced the senior officials of the four most powerful agencies in the foreign policy-cum-national security complex: McGeorge Bundy, the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs; Walt Rostow, the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs; George McGhee, Counselor of the State Department and Chairman of its Policy Planning Council; Paul Nitze, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA); Robert Amory, Deputy Director of the CIA for Intelligence (DDI); and Richard Bissell, Deputy Director of the CIA for Plans (DDP).

The fact that the DDP paper was prepared at Bissell's initiative for this highly influential Tuesday lunch group underlines its real political importance. For, unlike many other memoranda of the Sukarno visit period, the DDP paper not only reached the desks of top policymakers, but probably was actually discussed by them.


In employing even an eclectic bureaucratic politics approach here, I am acutely aware of its inherent limitations. Apart from the familiar dangers of seduction by "models" and their baggage of often murky jargon, the most serious risk is the implicit embrace of more fundamental empirical and value assumptions about the locus and nature of power in both the American political system and in America's relations with the Third World. For a provocative, if fragmented, discussion of whether the bureaucratic politics approach constitutes a complement to or a substitute for "the radical perspective" (especially the models of the dependency school) and "the liberal perspective," see the conflicting views outlined in "Some North American Perspectives," in Ibid., pp. 129-37. For other related dangers see I. M. Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 65-72.

13Interviews with officials concerned with Indonesia in all the major foreign policy agencies confirm the constant difficulties involved in competing with major crisis areas for the limited attention of the president and his staff. For a brief discussion of this "attention" problem, see Stevenson, End of Nowhere, pp. 129-30.

14As the membership suggests, this group was seen as a vehicle for long-range planning, as well as a forum for debating current sub-crisis-level problems. See Rostow, Diffusion of Power, p. 169.

15Given the high prestige still enjoyed by the CIA--and especially the DDP--in this pre-Bay of Bigs period, the likelihood of Bissell's colleagues reading and reacting to the DDP paper seems high. See Church Committee, History of the CIA. Regrettably, however, the Kennedy archives yield only one memorandum reacting directly to the paper. Written by White House adviser Robert Komer, this particular document has been denied declassification by the NSC. In that Komer came to his White House role after nearly a decade as an intelligence analyst in the DDI, his reaction to the DDP paper would be especially valuable for weighing intramural CIA factional
Purposes of This Commentary

In offering a brief and tentative commentary on this extraordinary DDP document, the first task is to sketch more fully the larger "bureaucratic politics" setting of which the Tuesday lunch group was only a small, albeit powerful, component. After introducing the DDP's allies and adversaries the commentary turns directly to explication of the actual meaning of the paper. Here a brief survey of the DDP's assessment of Indonesian politics (what Bissell's cover memorandum calls the "intelligence estimate" component of the paper) precedes a more lengthy analysis of DDP's policy recommendations. Attention is given both to the DDP's appraisal of three broad alternative policy postures and its stand on the immediate policy issues that ranked at the top of the Indonesian-American agenda in early 1961, namely, the escalating Dutch-Indonesian dispute over ownership of West New Guinea (or West Irian) and the interrelated question of American military and economic assistance to the Sukarno government. In explaining the DDP's views, the commentary seeks to illuminate how and why the DDP's assumptions relate to those of other major executive agency participants in the policy debate of the spring of 1961. A brief conclusion addresses the complex empirical question of how much influence the DDP's perspectives appear to have had on the ultimate target of all the aspirant architects of Indonesia policy--President Kennedy.

The Bureaucratic Politics Setting

Before proceeding with the interpretative summary it is necessary to introduce briefly the *dramatis personae* of this "bureaucratic politics" struggle for influence. Since the collapse of the abortive U.S.-supported rebellion against Sukarno in the spring of 1958, the major bureaucratic groups and leading personalities had tended to arrange themselves into two informal coalitions or factions. Variously characterized by former participants and commentators, they are labeled here as the "accommodationists" and the "hard-liners." In early 1961, with the advent of a new administration, both the internal composition of the factions and the balance of power between them was in flux.

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16The following brief and tentative sketch of the nature and distribution of influence on Indonesia policy within the Kennedy administration in early 1961 derives in part from a more extensive analysis of the influence patterns in 1962-63 contained in my "Kennedy Initiatives," pp. 84-95. The portrayal here also builds, however, on my conversations over the last six years with most of the former officials identified below. To protect their anonymity--at least with regard to particular judgments about particular personalities--I have limited footnoting in this section primarily to relevant published sources and documents. Reinforcing this decision is my recognition that a more credible reconstruction demands both more data and greater familiarity with decision-making theory than I currently command.
This process of factional realignment added to the complexity of and the stakes involved in the politics of Indonesia policy formulation. Especially given the circumstance that few of the new top policy officials—including the president—had had any substantial contact with Indonesian problems, there was considerable opportunity for the surviving factional leaders to convert their new policymaking superiors to their respective views.\textsuperscript{17}

The Hard-liners: The DDP and the EUR

In early 1961 a small group within the DDP's Far Eastern Division functioned as the junior partner in a hard-liner coalition dominated by the State Department's Bureau of Western European Affairs (EUR).\textsuperscript{18} While the EUR's opposition to accommodation with Sukarno stemmed from an instinctive Europeanist, pro-Dutch outlook, the DDP's Far Eastern Division was basically Asianist and intensely Sukarnophobe in orientation. Despite these differing perspectives the two hard-liner groups worked effectively till late fall 1961 to slow the offensive mounted by the expanded forces of the accommodationists—especially on the West Irian question.\textsuperscript{19} This partial success depended heavily on their ability to secure some influential backing at the top levels of their respective parent organizations. Though motivated by a limits-of-power philosophy rather than the Sukarnophobia of his Far Eastern Division, DDP Director Bissell not only endorsed their paper but actively promoted its viewpoint in the strategic Tuesday lunch forum.\textsuperscript{20} Concurrently, within the State Department, at least with regard to the crucial matter of West Irian, the EUR could count on the strong support of both U.N. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson and Secretary Rusk himself.\textsuperscript{21} These notable gains from among Kennedy's new appointments were, however, offset by other bureaucratic shifts that in December 1961 ultimately gave the accommodationists full ascendancy over Indonesia policy. Among the personnel changes damaging to the hard-liner camp was the

\textsuperscript{17}I am indebted to former Ambassador James Bell for his emphasis on the significance of this knowledge factor in accounting for Ambassador Jones' relative success in commanding an audience in Washington. Interview with Bell, July 1976. Compare Stevenson, End of Nowhere, pp. 129-32.

\textsuperscript{18}See Jones, Indonesia, pp. 180-81, 191, and Hilsman, To Move a Nation, p. 377.

\textsuperscript{19}EUR dominance in late 1961 was reflected in the U.S. posture in the U.N. General Assembly debate on West Irian in October-November 1961. See Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, p. 534; Jones, Indonesia, pp. 200-201; and Henderson, West New Guinea, pp. 122-27. The efforts of not only Ambassador Jones but also of White House advisers to moderate the de facto 'Europeanist' policy adopted by the American U.N. delegation are repeatedly manifested in the contemporary government memoranda. See NSF:CO--West New Guinea.

\textsuperscript{20}Interview with Richard Bissell, November 1973.

\textsuperscript{21}As noted below, Rusk's support was influenced probably more by his attachment to the moral principle of self-determination than by a Europeanist outlook. Interview with Robert Johnson, August 1970. In fact, given his early professional involvement with East Asia, Rusk brought to Southeast Asian problems—Indonesia, as well as Vietnam—a sense of urgency about checking Chinese communist expansionism that precluded the detachment that his "Europeanist" Under Secretary, George Ball, brought to the Vietnam issue. See Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest, pp. 306-46.
loss of the most ardent spokesman for the Asianist-Sukarnophobe viewpoint inside the State Department. This was Hugh Cumming, State's Director of Intelligence and Research from 1956 to his retirement at the end of the Eisenhower administration in late 1960. Cumming's importance lay above all in the fact that he had effectively used his close connections with the Dulles brothers to cement a personal and institutional link between hard-liners in his INR and both the CIA's analysts in the DDI and its operators in the DDP. It is this linkage role that makes credible, for example, reports that Cumming had a major role in securing top-level sanction for the DDP's abortive operation in support of the Indonesian regional rebellions in 1957-58. The failure of that operation had already eroded the influence of the Sukarnophobes in the INR and the DDP, but Cumming's replacement by Roger Hilsman was a clear symbol of the growing threat to the hard-liners posed by many Kennedy appointments. Although his influence as Director of the INR was more limited than Cumming's had been, Hilsman's subsequent appointment in early 1963 as Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs saw him emerge as a major architect of the administration's grand accommodationist strategy for channeling Sukarno's nationalism into "constructive" channels.

The Accommodationists: Ambassador Jones and the President's New Men

As study of the DDP document reveals, the DDP correctly perceived the recently reappointed American Ambassador to Indonesia, Howard Jones, as the most articulate, persistent, and influential spokesman of the accommodationist faction. What is not directly evident from the DDP paper is that Jones's views commanded rising support in several strategic locations within the administration. His firmest base of strength was in the middle levels of the State Department's Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (FE). Two key desk officers, Lindquist for Indonesia and Ingraham for Australia, shared with their boss, James Bell,

22This account of Cumming's role in the formulation of U.S. policy is based on the testimony of several informants who prefer anonymity. For a brief reference to Cumming's posture on Indonesia in 1957 in the context of the broader story of the genesis of the CIA's covert action program against Sukarno in the fall of that year, see the memoirs of Cumming's successor as Ambassador to Indonesia: John Allison, Ambassador from the Prairie (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), pp. 293-344, especially p. 308.

23For a highly perceptive, if sometimes self-serving, analysis of Hilsman's role in policymaking, see his To Move a Nation, especially pp. 361-412. One step Hilsman took in early 1961 was to invite scholars of a more moderate orientation to challenge the often militantly anticommunist memoranda produced for government consumption by Rand Corporation Indonesia analyst, Guy Pauker. Interview with Professor George McT. Kahin, August 1976.

The Kennedy archives for early 1961 testify dramatically to the easy and extensive access that Pauker enjoyed throughout the executive branch at that time. Not only are many of his memoranda and published articles prominent in the file, but he appears to be on a first-name basis with both White House advisers, including Walt Rostow, and DDP officials. The extent to which this extraordinary access translated into influence over policy is a question which I address in my forthcoming book as part of the broader issue of the role of scholars in the politics of Indonesia policy formulation.
Director of the Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs, both personal affection for Jones and strong support for his advocacy of an accommodationist strategy toward Sukarno. They would, for example, have readily joined the Ambassador in applauding the New Year's Resolution drafted by his Deputy Chief of Mission on the West Irian issue: "... We've got to settle the West Irian dispute, and the only way it will ever be settled will be if Indonesia gets it."25

This small group of what might be called "true Jonesians" dominated both the Embassy and the FE's Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs. As of early 1961, however, they had not yet found a sympathetic and powerful ally at the crucial policymaking level. Although the Acting Assistant Secretary John Steeves shared Jones's sense of urgency about settling the West Irian dispute, both he and the newly designated Assistant Secretary Walter McConaughy lacked the personality and political weight to represent the FE effectively in intra- or interdepartmental discussions. Not until Averell Harriman's appointment as Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs in November 1961 would the Jonesians in State benefit from a receptive and influential boss. Only then was the FE able to contain the hitherto paramount influence of EUR over U.S. policy on West Irian.

Outside the State Department, the accommodationists' coalition included quiet backing from army elements in the Department of Defense. Together with DOD's civilian political advisers in the Office of International Security Affairs (ISA), these elements prized the intimate relationship with the Indonesian army generated by the still modest program for training Indonesian officers in the U.S. Plans were already

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24 Reinforcing these attitudes was the fact that all three men had served at least briefly in the Jakarta Embassy under Jones between March 1958 and December 1960. Interviews with Lindquist in December 1973; Ingraham in June 1970 and July 1971; Bell in July 1976.

25 Jones, _Indonesia_, p. 191.

26 For Steeves' views on West Irian, see Allison, _Ambassador from the Praire_, pp. 331-32. As for the importance of Harriman's appointment as Assistant Secretary for the Far East, this is stressed in most of the relevant memoirs. See also my "Kennedy Initiatives," pp. 77-84, and Henderson, _West New Guinea_, pp. 142-43. The legacy of McCarthyism is subtly and colorfully depicted in James Thomson's account of the FE as "dominated by Cold Warriors and staffed largely by the cowed." On China policy especially, the FE proved resistant to policy change as it "clung tenaciously to the doctrine of containment and isolation." See James C. Thomson, Jr., "On the Making of U.S. China Policy, 1961-9: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics," _China Quarterly_, 50 (April-June 1972), pp. 220-43. For further embroidering on Thomson's themes in relation to Vietnam policy, see Halberstam, _The Best and the Brightest._

under way for expanding that program and also for initiating a civic action program to assist the Indonesian army's operations in rural areas.28

The accommodationists also included some analysts in the DDI. While reflecting some of the DDP's pessimism in its current intelligence estimates, the DDI's stance on West Irian also diverged from the DDP view on several grounds—as evidenced mainly in a memorandum authored by DDI director Amory.29

Ultimately the most significant center of emerging backing for accommodation was the White House. There the president's two top national security advisers, Bundy and Rostow, had agreed that Rostow would have responsibility for Indonesia, as part of his more extensive assignment to most of the Third World outside Latin America.30 A somewhat more pragmatic and sober accommodationist than the often ebulliently optimistic Jones, Rostow was disposed to endorse qualified versions of the Jones initiatives on West Irian and aid.31 Rostow's views had in part been influenced by the increasingly strong advocacy of accommodation by his two chief assistants, Robert Komer and Robert Johnson.32 Their internal staff memoranda to Rostow in March and April

28The first documentary evidence that the Kennedy administration's enthusiasm for counterinsurgency would affect U.S. relations with the Indonesian army is a remarkable memorandum authored by the legendary General Edward Lansdale in April 1961. Then assigned to Defense Secretary McNamara's office as a special assistant, Lansdale proposed that the Sukarno visit be used as an occasion to sell not only the army, but Sukarno, on the advantages of an American-sponsored civic action program. See Memorandum from E. Lansdale to R. L. Gilpatric: "U.S. Visit of Sukarno, Defense Action," April 12, 1961, NSF:CO--Indonesia.

29Amory's memo is cited below in the course of the analysis of the DDP's stand on West Irian.

30Rostow reports the division of labor with Bundy as follows: "There was plenty for both Bundy and me to do. We first split up the crises. He took Cuba, the Congo and Berlin, although I joined in the latter from time to time. I took Laos, Vietnam, Indonesia—and the developing world, generally, except Latin America, where Goodwin and Schlesinger operated. I also was assigned the organization of policy planning from the White House end." Diffusion of Power, p. 168.

31In his memoirs, Rostow not only endorses the pragmatic reasoning behind U.S. pressure on the Dutch to relinquish West Irian to the Indonesians, but he voices support for the general accommodationist line of 1961: "I do not regret the American effort to channel Sukarno onto another path. And in Kennedy's time, from the earliest days in his administration I did all I could to encourage that policy. . . ." See Rostow, Diffusion of Power, pp. 192-96. The documents from early 1961 corroborate the thrust of his claim, but also show Rostow reluctant, in his final briefing memorandum to Kennedy on the eve of Sukarno's visit, to recommend unequivocally that West Irian must go to Indonesia as soon as possible. See Rostow's memorandum to Kennedy, "Main Points for Sukarno Visit (Supplement to the authoritative State Department summary)," April 22, 1961, NSF:CO--Indonesia.

32Robert Komer had recently been transferred to the National Security Council Staff after nearly a decade as intelligence analyst for the CIA's DDI. By contrast, Robert Johnson had served as a member of the NSC staff since 1951 and had graduated to the third-ranking staff post by 1961. See Johnson's revealing testimony to the Church Committee about his motives for volunteering to report what he recollected
reflect a deepening commitment to the accommodationist strategy.\textsuperscript{33} The assertive Komer in particular began to urge that the White House challenge the Europeanist-dominated State Department's tendency, supported by Secretary Rusk, to determine Indonesia policy.\textsuperscript{34} It was this shift in the substance and bureaucratic assertiveness of the president's men in the White House that would eventually insure the overall ascendancy of the accommodationists in Kennedy's Indonesia policy. Just as in the case of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs at State, the culmination of these changes would await the shuffling of State and White House officials in December 1961.

The evolution of the White House staff's orientation and influence was, of course, critical not only to the outcome of the "bureaucratic politics" struggle, but also to the crystallization of the dispositions of President Kennedy himself.\textsuperscript{35} These dispositions were ultimately the most decisive factor in raising the accommodationists to the threshold of dominance over Indonesia policy by the time of Sukarno's arrival in Washington late in April.

An Interpretative Summary—DDP Assessment

Fundamental to the DDP's adamant hard-line policy posture is its grim general assessment of "Indonesia's growing vulnerability to communism" (par. 1).\textsuperscript{36} Registered in the opening sentence of the paper, this assessment rests on two basic assumptions about the dynamics of Indonesian politics. On the one hand, Sukarno is the "key factor" in promoting the communization of both Indonesia's domestic politics and its foreign relations. On the other hand, there is no discernible "countervailing force" with sufficient political strength to challenge Sukarno. Complaining that the anticommunist dissident movements which

\textsuperscript{33}Although Komer emerges as more blunt than Johnson, both seem disposed by early April to urge a bold and early U.S. initiative to secure West Irian for Indonesia. See below p. 148 and footnote 51.

\textsuperscript{34}In a trenchant letter to Rostow in early April Komer concludes a biting critique of State's U.N. trusteeship proposal with a strong complaint about State's apparent ability to circumvent the NSC staff advisers in reaching the president.

"Incidentally, I still have yet to see State coming up with any policy alternatives in their papers, so President would at least know range of choices open to him. WNG would have been ideally suited to this approach.

"Was it prearranged that after earlier PG discussion and request for revision of S/P paper new version should go straight to JFK over Rusk's signature? It seems to me this gives us only \textit{ex post facto} reprise on whether such papers fill the bill."


\textsuperscript{35}See below, pp. 153ff., for a discussion of Kennedy's views.

\textsuperscript{36}References to particular passages in the DDP document printed below will be made by noting in parentheses in the text the appropriate paragraph number of the document. Paragraphs cited from Attachments A and B will be designated by number and preceded by either A or B.
led the disastrous 1958 regional rebellions "have been permitted to wither from lack of sustenance," the DDP concludes that they "no longer represent a viable force in being" (par. 1). As for the Indonesian army, to which the U.S. had shifted its political hopes after 1958, the DDP judges it as "progressively more ineffectual in its containment of communism" (par. 1). (Enunciated in the opening summary paragraph, these assessments of communist and free world "assets" in Indonesian politics find often emotional, even paranoid, elaboration in the two attachments to the central paper, entitled appropriately "A. President Sukarno--Key to the Indonesian Situation" and "B. Countervailing Forces.")

Closely linked to these estimates of Indonesian political forces is a highly pessimistic view of the capabilities of the U.S. The United States is viewed as powerless either to deter Sukarno from his communication policies or to resuscitate the ineffectual countervailing forces. Only the removal of Sukarno can prevent the eventual legal accession to power of the PKI, but "crude and violent measures" are not acceptable instruments of U.S. policy. In short, the situation is fundamentally hopeless.

The DDP's Policy Recommendations

Consistent with its basic assumptions, the DDP views the Indonesian president as the crucial factor in weighing the merits of proposed changes in U.S. policy. The DDP paper broadly identifies and evaluates three major alternative policies for dealing with Sukarno. In the DDP's own terms, these are designated: "appeasement," "a hardening posture, without hostility," and "crude and violent intervention." In assessing these alternatives, the DDP seems obsessed with discrediting "appeasement," in other words, the policy of seeking an accommodation with Sukarno. But while unrelenting and concrete in its criticisms of "appeasement," the DDP is less emphatic and less clear about its own policy preferences. It appears finally to embrace, without enthusiasm, "a hardening posture, without hostility" and to reject "crude and violent intervention." There remains, however, at least a note of uncertainty about the firmness of the DDP's disavowal of the very methods that are its peculiar professional area of expertise.

Rejection of Appeasement

The DDP's preoccupation with disparaging Ambassador Jones's proposals for accommodation with Sukarno can be seen even in the opening

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37For the shift of U.S. policy in April 1958, see Jones, Indonesia, chaps. 5-7, especially pp. 121-27.

38The emotional, even paranoid view of Sukarno in Attachment A closely parallels the views dominant in the CIA and apparently in the State Department in the fall of 1957 at the time of the formation of the Ad Hoc Interagency Committee to plan DDP covert actions in support of the anti-Sukarno regional rebellions. The only published account drawing on internal State Department documents from this period is Allison, Ambassador from the Prairie, chap. 11, especially pp. 307-15. For a dramatically contrasting assessment of Sukarno's grievances against the U.S. and the prospects of appealing to his vanity, see Jones, Indonesia, pp. 181-84.
paragraphs devoted to assessing Indonesian politics rather than debating policy. In a thinly veiled attack on Jones, the DDP abruptly warns that "even . . . achievement of a modus vivendi between the United States and Sukarno could not stave off" eventual PKI accession to power by acclamation (par. 2).

West Irian

Deferring further disparagement of Jones's general accommodationist posture, the DDP turns in paragraph 4 to attacking Jones's position on the most pressing policy question that was confronting American policymakers in early 1961: what stand the U.S. should take on the rapidly escalating Indonesian-Dutch dispute over West Irian. 39 This dispute had reached a dangerous turning point in January 1961 with the Indonesians' acquisition of $400 million in arms from the Soviet Union. The CIA estimate that by the end of 1961 the military advantage would pass from the Dutch to the Indonesians raised the "specter" of a Soviet-armed Indonesia attacking Dutch positions in West Irian.40 Viewing this eventuality as catastrophic for the free world, Ambassador Jones's cables to Washington repeatedly conveyed the urgency of an active U.S. role in achieving a prompt settlement of the Dutch-Indonesian quarrel.41 For Jones this meant U.S. intervention to insure that Indonesia secured West Irian. Not only was such action seen as essential to any viable long-term settlement, but, Jones believed, the removal of the West Irian dispute from Indonesian domestic politics was the key to checking Indonesia's drift toward communism.

Ambassador Jones would have been pleased by the DDP's initial comment on the West Irian issue. Recognizing the credibility of "the threat of war between Indonesia and the Netherlands over West Irian" (par. 4), the DDP tacitly conceded that Sukarno's shrewd coercive diplomacy, backed by the massive new arms agreement with the Soviet Union, had fundamentally altered the terms of a dispute that had been stalemate since 1950. As Jones and his Embassy staff correctly calculated, only the threat of war would jolt Washington into altering its long-standing policy of "impartiality" or passive neutrality.42 Just as the Europeanist State Department had already the previous fall begun responding to Jones's urgings by shifting from passive to active neutrality,43 so now the intensely Sukarnophobe DDP conceded for the first time that the U.S. "may be forced to abandon" impartiality for involve-

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40 For reference to this critical assumption, see Dean Rusk Memorandum for the President, "Subject: Proposal for Dealing with the Dutch-Indonesian Dispute over West New Guinea (West Irian)," April 3, 1961, NSF:CO--West New Guinea.

41 For the Ambassador's cables on West Irian in early 1961, see Jones, Indonesia, pp. 188-93. Compare Allison's efforts to change Washington's stance on West Irian in 1957 in Allison, Ambassador from the Prairie, pp. 328-44.

42 Jones, Indonesia, p. 191.

43 See footnote 45 below.
ment should the crisis deepen (par. 4). This shift would in turn require the U.S. to take a stand on "the validity of Indonesia's claim to sovereignty over West Irian." Having raised this probability, the DDP quickly dismisses the relevance of assaying "the legal merits" by contending that the two protagonists view the ownership issue "as a bare contest of power" (par. 5). Although self-conscious about this apparent "simplification" of the issue, the DDP analyst is clearly obsessed with moving to the heart of the DDP brief on West Irian—and, very likely, the most urgent DDP priority in the jousting for influence over Kennedy's approach to Sukarno's April visit.

In the longest single paragraph on the West Irian question, as well as in the entire paper, the DDP confronts Ambassador Jones's West Irian policy on the grounds that are most decisive in the thinking of all the official participants in the policy debate—"the security interests of the United States" (par. 6). Having already voiced the general warning that Jones's proposed rapprochement with Sukarno would not alleviate the central problem of Indonesian vulnerability to communism, the DDP now seeks to demonstrate the perils in the main step in Jones's rapprochement strategy. "We believe that accession to Indonesia's claim as long as Sukarno is in power would not serve the best interests of United States security in that part of the world. . . . In sum, by backing Indonesia's claim to sovereignty over West Irian, we may inadvertently help to consolidate a regime which is innately antagonistic toward the United States" (par. 6). The consequences of the Ambassador's policy are thus seen not only as futile, but even counterproductive.

The five contentions presented by the DDP to bolster this conclusion conflicted with the key assumptions of the accommodationists, including, in part, the views of the Director of the DDI. In predicting the likely course of Sukarno's foreign policy after he had secured West Irian with American diplomatic help, the DDP warned that Sukarno would reward the U.S. for its help by "cementing relations with the Soviet Union" and by embarking on "further irredentist ventures" (par. 6). This forecast directly contradicted the calculations of the pragmatic accommodationists, as well as the sometimes idealistic hopes of the Ambassador, that Sukarno could be enticed by the U.S. initiative into devoting himself to domestic economic development and adopting a western-oriented nonalignment stance abroad.

While Ambassador Jones was, in fact, more sanguine than he concedes in his memoirs about beneficial consequences of Sukarno's securing West Irian with U.S. diplomatic assistance, he was at the time more directly concerned with the alleged domestic political impact of U.S. diplomatic intervention. Here, by contrast, the DDP underscores its earlier appraisal of the growing ineffectiveness of the Indonesian military as an anticommunist force—so long, at least, as Sukarno continued to be successful in neutralizing the army's sporadic anticommunist maneuvers. While Jones was painfully aware of the army's political weaknesses, including the chronic vacillation of Army Chief of Staff, General Nasution, noted in the DDP's Attachment B, he was more hopeful about the army's overall prospects, especially if the West Irian issue could be settled. In short, Jones remained an exponent of what the DDP regarded as the faulty thesis that the Indonesian army would ultimately rescue Indonesia from the communist abyss (par. Bl).
Very probably unknown to Ambassador Jones at the time was the strong parallel position enunciated by the CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence, Robert Amory. Reflecting a major cleavage between DDI and DDP assessments of Indonesian politics, Amory's views directly challenged the DDP's pessimism about the prospects of the army and other anticommmunist forces in the wake of Indonesia's acquisition of West Irian.

That brings me to the principal basic question of the object of the exercise. This I envisage to be the elimination from Indonesian politics of the issue on which, to our discomfort, Sukarno, the Communists, and the Army are united. This can only be accomplished by, in effect, assuring the accession to Indonesia of Irian at a date sufficiently near in the future to cause the Indonesians to feel that the battle in principle is won. This will, of course, redound to Sukarno's credit, which is too bad. But, most importantly, once it has come about the bonds which now link the Army to Sukarno and inhibit all its efforts to counter his increasing accommodation of the Communists will loosen, if not disappear. In time the fundamental antipathy of the military and the Moslem hierarchy to Communism will emerge and give us a lever by which Indonesia may be guided into Indian-style genuine neutrality.44

The DDP concludes its assault on the political assumptions behind the accommodationist policy on West Irian by announcing support for the only concrete proposal formally under consideration in Washington. Originating in the wake of the State Department's reassessment of West Irian policy in November 1960, this proposal called for a United Nations trusteeship for West Irian. Reaffirmed in a memorandum authored by George McGhee, the State Department's Counselor, in mid-February, the U.N. trusteeship concept was emerging as the fallback position of those eager to avoid war but opposed to Indonesia's acquisition of West Irian.45 In the formal recommendation section of the memorandum, McGhee urged:

3. Initiate as soon as possible confidential discussions first with the U.S. Secretary-General and then on the highest possible level with the Dutch, Indonesians, Canadians, Malayans, Indians, and British with a view to obtaining their agreement in principle to the establishment of a U.N.-administered trusteeship for West New Guinea. Discussions with the Dutch should be timed to occur two days before a meeting to be arranged in advance between our Ambassador and Sukarno.

a) Discussions with the Dutch should include a detailed review emphasizing our increased concern at the deteriorating situation, our estimate of the consequences of inaction and our determination to take steps in the direction of an eventual resolution of the


problem. We should also let the Dutch know that the U.S. response to Indonesian attack on West New Guinea would be within the context of our responsibilities under the Charter to support U.N. action against aggression.

b) In discussions with Sukarno we should take the following line: The Dutch are in effective physical possession and control of West New Guinea. It appears impossible to get a direct transfer of the territory to Indonesia. The proposal for a trusteeship would (1) give the Indonesians a much greater opportunity to attempt to accomplish their purpose in the United Nations than they would have in the absence of a trusteeship, and (2) afford much greater freedom for both the Indonesians and the people of West New Guinea to form closer relationships.

The center of Dutch support in Washington was still, of course, the EUR. Both loyalty to a faithful Dutch ally and the politico-strategic imperative of NATO unity in the face of renewed Soviet pressures on Berlin reinforced the EUR's general Europeanist outlook. By mid-February, however, following the shifts evident in the position of even the intensely anti-Sukarno Dutch Minister Luns, EUR came to favor the concept of a Dutch transfer of West Irian to U.N. trusteeship.46

Although the DDP paper reflects little of this orthodox Europeanist orientation of the EUR, the analogy between Sukarno and Hitler (par. Al) does suggest an uncritical transfer of Western European "lessons of history" to an Asian setting. Far more decisive, however, in shaping the DDP perspective on West Irian was, again, its hatred for Sukarno. Despite the divergent roots of their attitudes, the DDP and the EUR both attach similar conditions to their approval of the State Department's U.N. trusteeship proposal. After applauding its virtues in "defusing the West Irian time bomb" and relieving the U.S. of the incubus of siding with the Dutch on a colonialist issue, the DDP is unequivocal on the two issues most salient among the Dutch supporters. The United States had to oppose vigorously any resolution of the issue involving either Indonesian use of arms or compromising on self-determination procedures (par. 7).

Anticipating the Ambassador's objection that "the Sukarno regime" would balk at conditions which had the clear intent and effect of denying Indonesia control of West Irian, the DDP assigns the U.S. the role of imposing these terms on Indonesia. PURPOSELY ambiguous about just how this might be done, the DDP's militant language certainly suggests at the very least that Washington should renew Secretary Dulles's 1958 pledge to Dutch Foreign Minister Luns, to provide the Dutch with logistical support in the event of an Indonesian attack on West Irian.47 Certainly

46 For the leading analysis of Dutch governmental, political and press opinion on West Irian, see Arend Lijphart, The Trauma of Decolonization (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).

47 The high priority that Foreign Minister Luns attached to securing President Kennedy's reaffirmation of Secretary Dulles's pledge is dramatically revealed in the record of Luns's meeting with Kennedy on April 10, 1961. Also revealed in that same record is the Kennedy administration's determined effort to retreat from the Dulles pledge to a refusal to provide military assistance outside the framework of the United Nations. See Dean Rusk Memorandum to John F. Kennedy: "Call by Dutch Foreign Minister Luns," especially fourth attachment: "Talking Points re West New Guinea Issue,"
a verbal warning alone would not meet the DDP insistence that the U.S. "confront [Sukarno] with unmistakable manifestations of United States resolve not to permit a settlement of the West Irian issue by force of arms..." Whatever the intent of the DPP, however, the Kennedy administration was determined to avoid being drawn into an armed conflict in support of what would be widely seen as the colonialist position.

On the question of adherence to self-determination procedures, the DDP again calls for "vigorous opposition" to any compromise. This DDP position seems to have appealed not only to Europeanists and Sukarnophobes, but to "idealists" like Secretary Rusk, the most influential and persistent spokesman for the principle of self-determination. While not prominent in the spring phase of the debate, two other champions of the principle of self-determination expressed both their personal convictions and the perspectives inherent in their bureaucratic roles at the United Nations. Both Adlai Stevenson (the Cabinet-level Ambassador to the U.N.) and Harlan Cleveland (the Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs) had by early April begun to raise their voices in what became a sustained campaign throughout the year to resist U.S. compromising on self-determination for the inhabitants of West Irian.

Just as the administration did not exhibit a monolithic position on the degree of U.S. interest in preventing Indonesia from using force, so it soon found itself split on the application of the principle of self-determination. While virtually all American policymakers felt an emotional attachment to a principle that was deeply ingrained in the dominant American ideology, many resisted its absolutist application in the case of West Irian. A few, like Ambassador Jones and some of his academic allies, were familiar enough with the long history of the West Irian dispute to know that the Indonesians in fact had a cogent position on the self-determination issue. Leaving aside the question of Dutch abuse of that principle in refusing for over a decade either to negotiate with Indonesia on the issue or to initiate steps toward self-determination within West Irian, the Indonesians argued that the West Irianese had already exercised their right of self-determination when the Dutch East Indies received its independence as the Indonesian state in 1950.

Pragmatic realpolitik was, however, the primary basis for the position of Ambassador Jones and his allies in the internal debate. Apart from his staunch friends on the Indonesia desk, Jones enjoyed strategically placed backing from two of Walt Rostow's White House assistants, Robert Komer and Robert Johnson. With varying degrees of reluctance they had concluded that the principle of self-determination must be sacrificed before the intertwined imperatives of avoiding war and the expansion of communist influence in Indonesia. For these pragmatists the U.N. trusteeship concept was seen as acceptable only if it could be transformed into a vehicle for achieving their primary


48See footnote 19 above. 49See Henderson, West New Guinea, p. 46.
50See especially footnotes 32-34 above.
policy aim, i.e., the most rapid possible transfer of West Irian to Indonesian control with only a token observance of self-determination procedures. Certainly this was the posture Komer advocated in his blunt critique of the State Department's proposal in early April:

Walt--

I confess great puzzlement over State's West New Guinea memo to the President. It now puts the issue clearly but comes up with no commensurate solution. If the prime reason for a policy shift is to keep Indonesia from sliding away, we must come up with a solution which is broadly satisfactory to the Indonesians. If we do not, we merely let ourselves in for a peck of trouble without gaining the advantage which led us to move in the first place.

Unfortunately, State's proposal is about the minimum movement we can make. [censored]. Why move at all in this case?

Of course, if we are proposing trusteeship [censored] it might make sense. But if this is the case, why not tell the President? And why not spell out how the proposal (e.g., a plebiscite in three years) could be used to convince Sukarno that we are really moving in his direction.

The trouble with State is that it never thinks these problems through to the end. I'm sure we all agree that Indonesia will eventually get WNG, that we cannot afford to buck Sukarno on this issue while the Soviets back him [censored]. But we always enter these painful transitions with a little move that stirs up a ruckus and leads us from crisis to crisis before the issue is resolved in the way we knew it would be in the first place, but with all parties mad at us.51

While finally taking a position closely parallel to Komer's, Robert Amory, Director of the CIA's DDI (where Komer served prior to 1961), qualified his firm recommendation for transfer to Indonesia with insistence on formal adherence to the self-determination principle:

I believe we can have no morally justifiable position short of a properly supervised plebiscite, farcical as that will be considering the stone age level of the West New Guineans. Indonesia has no claim ethnically to their allegiance and certainly has shown no administrative capability that would justify turning the Irians [sic] over to them as wards. Thus, our room for maneuver seems limited to the question of duration, and I would suggest we start at ten years and be willing to slide to five, or even three.52


52For Amory's unequivocal support for transfer of West Irian to Indonesia, see the remarks quoted above on p. 145. Amory's full reaction to the U.N. trusteeship proposal appears in his memorandum for George McGhee: "Comments on Memorandum of February 15: 'Possible UN Resolution on West New Guinea,'" February 20, 1961, NSF:CO --West New Guinea.
Military and Economic Aid as the Core of a Two-Level Post-West Irian Strategy

The interest of the pragmatic accommodationists in securing West Irian for Indonesia derived from long-term hopes as well as short-term imperatives. If the West Irian issue could be settled quickly to Indonesia's satisfaction, there was the possibility of launching a two-level post-West Irian strategy to channel Indonesian energies into more "constructive" channels. The overt level envisioned a comprehensive western program of economic assistance designed to lure Sukarno away from foreign adventures and into domestic development. Concurrently, a more modest and less overt program of military (and police) assistance would seek to strengthen both the capabilities of conservative security forces and the intimacy of their ties to the American military. While few of the accommodationists shared the high optimism of Ambassador Jones about the overt strategy of wooing Sukarno, all of them viewed military assistance as indispensable for ensuring that the army would not only check any PKI move to seize power, but also rule a post-Sukarno Indonesia.

As already noted, the DDP evinced deep skepticism about the feasibility of both levels of this long-term accommodationist strategy, as well as the wisdom of responding to short-term imperatives to win West Irian for Sukarno. Accordingly, it is not surprising that, in turning to the issue of military and economic assistance, the DDP again registers adamant opposition to Jones's renewed pleas for Washington to counter Soviet aid diplomacy by continuing "a moderate program of economic and military assistance sufficient to bolster the political position of our friends within Indonesia..." (par. 8). Consistent with this posture, Jones had argued the previous October that the U.S. should satisfy enough of the Indonesian army's request for arms to stop it from turning to Moscow. Washington's decision then was to respond instead to Dutch pleas not to arm an aggressive Sukarno. Indeed, Washington had gone even further by quietly slowing the delivery of modest small arms supplies already committed to Indonesia. Now in the wake of General Nasution's January arms deal with the USSR, Jones revived his appeal for resumption of a moderate level of aid. Despite its desire to inspire the Indonesian army to move more firmly against the Indonesian communists, the DDP felt that military aid entailed not only the same risks associated with diplomatic support to Sukarno on West Irian, but illusions about U.S. influence in the post-West Irian period. "We are disposed to argue that our national policy should be to treat Indonesia as a case in which appeasement, whether by word or by deed, will buy us nothing. Hence to propose stepped up aid as a blueprint for future action simply begs the question whether Communist ascendancy in Indonesia can be curbed as long as Sukarno remains in power. We believe it cannot" (par. 8).

The DDP's Expressed Preference for a "Hardening" Posture

Despite what could be read as an implicit policy recommendation to remove Sukarno from power, the DDP analyst immediately warns that

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53See my "Kennedy Initiatives."

there is very little that the U.S. can do to accomplish that objective. In a gloomy lecture on the "extremely limited influence" of the U.S. in Indonesia, the DDP seems resigned to a grim limits-of-power perspective that clashes with the DDP's professional proclivity for an active, interventionist policy (as evidenced by its contemporary operations in Cuba, the Congo, Laos, and Vietnam). Moreover, the emphatic and deeply pessimistic language of the DDP departs from the confident, activist style of the new "tough-minded" Kennedy advisers.

It would be gratifying to be able to propose an alternative course of action by the United States which would stand a good chance of turning the course of events in Indonesia in a constructive direction. Unfortunately, this is a situation in which the influence that the United States can exert, at least in the short run, is extremely limited, if (as must be assumed) crude and violent intervention is excluded. Any "carrot" in the form of economic or military aid or diplomatic support that is freely given will (for reasons set forth above) be used simply to consolidate an essentially unacceptable regime. Any "stick" the United States would be willing to use would be too feeble to destroy the regime and would simply accelerate the process of disorganization which (it is argued above) is the probable prelude to a constitutional Communist take-over. [Par. 9]

Before attempting to account for this extraordinary DDP pessimism, it is instructive to note the modest claims the DDP makes for what it endorses as "the least unsatisfactory policy for the United States" (par. 9). By "a hardening in our posture, without overtones of hostility or anger," the DDP policy hopes "to alert the conservative elements among Indonesia's leadership to the ineluctable necessity of choosing between absorption by the Communist Bloc and associations [sic] as an equal within the comity of free Western and Asian nations" (par. 10). Especially when the DDP defines the political stakes in the stark alternatives of their militant cold war ideology, the question arises again as to why the DDP is prepared to conclude that there is so little that could be done to get rid of Sukarno.

To answer that critical question, two contrary interpretations must be considered. The first is that the DDP's restraint was primarily a reaction to its abortive intervention in 1957-58 on the side of regional dissidents. The second contends that circumstantial evidence requires further inquiry as to whether the DDP paper represents a subtle effort to promote the very crude and violent measures it ostensibly rejects.

The DDP's Ostensible Rejection of Crude and Violent Measures

The credibility of the DDP's apparent renunciation of crude and violent intervention in Indonesia rests not only on the DDP's own words, but also on the likelihood that Washington policymakers were then skeptical about the feasibility of launching covert operations in Indonesia.

That skepticism stemmed, first and foremost, from the DDP's abortive efforts in 1957-58 to support the unsuccessful regional rebellions
against Sukarno. Although only alluded to obliquely in the memorandum (par. A2), that debacle had sensitized many--though not all--the DDP staff to the risks involved in external manipulation of complex and volatile Indonesian politics. Moreover, regardless of its own preferences, the DDP surely recognized that the foreign policy bureaucracy would react to any renewed DDP pleas for action with considerable reserve. Even the intimate Tuesday lunch group and the Special Group, the NSC subcommittee responsible for authorizing covert action, would presumably balk, in view of a very recent failure that had left the U.S., by the DDP's own judgment, "virtually bereft" of political assets in Indonesia (par. B4).

A further legacy of the abortive 1958 intervention argued even more powerfully against any new DDP operations. The case of the American pilot, Allen Pope, was still so diplomatically sensitive that the DDP avoided mentioning it even in this secret memorandum. Characterized officially by President Eisenhower as "a soldier of fortune," Pope was captured by Indonesian authorities after his plane was shot down during a bombing raid on Ambon in April 1958. Subsequently tried and sentenced to death as an enemy of the state, Pope still remained in a Jakarta prison awaiting Sukarno's decision whether or not to carry out the sentence. As both governments recognized, Indonesia's capture of Pope provided Sukarno with the means to put significant pressure on the U.S. government. While that pressure by itself could not produce substantive policy initiatives, it could function as another deterrent against any further CIA clandestine operations. Finally, as is now evident from a declassified top secret memorandum from the CIA Director Allen Dulles to President Kennedy in early April, the Agency itself attached substantial importance to winning the release of a loyal employee.

Apart from the impact of the 1958 debacle on both the real and perceived prospects for DDP plotting in Indonesia, the DDP shared the crisis-centeredness which affected the entire foreign policy bureaucracy. Already preoccupied with major paramilitary activities, as well

55Prof. George McT. Kahin is currently writing a book that will provide the first comprehensive analysis of the motives behind and the political consequences of the American intervention in the 1957-58 rebellion. In the interim, the best documented but still fragmentary accounts of U.S. policy in 1957-58 are to be found in Jones, Indonesia, pp. 113-56, and Allison, Ambassador from the Prairie, pp. 295-344. Among the many secondary accounts, see especially the succinct summary, based on Indonesian public and private sources, in Daniel S. Lev, "America, Indonesia, and the Rebellion of 1958," United Asia, 17 (July-August 1965), pp. 305-9. Also see James Mossman, Rebels in Paradise (London: Jonathan Cape, 1961); and William Stevenson, Birds' Nests in Their Beards (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964).

56Former U.S. officials inside the CIA and in other agencies have told me of the caution engendered in all but a few of the DDP's personnel responsible for Indonesian affairs.

57The CIA's declassification of the Dulles memorandum on Pope provides the first public admission by the CIA of its covert support for the rebellion--not only its employment of Pope, but its covert "political-action program" in support of "the anti-Communist, pro-West dissident movement" in Indonesia in 1957-58. See Allen Dulles's memorandum for Brig. General Chester V. Clifton, military aide to the President, "Allen L. Pope," April 7, 1961, NSF:CO--Indonesia. Given the significance of this document, it has been included as an appendix to this article. See below pp. 167-69.
as with political operations in Cuba, Laos, and the Congo, there was an instinctive reluctance in the DDP to stretch already overextended resources to assume the risks of even a modest scheme against Sukarno. Closely related was the tendency already evident in the Southeast Asia branch of the DDP's Far Eastern Division to view the crises in Laos and Vietnam as an excuse for avoiding involvement in Indonesia—even though, at least in retrospect, DDP Director Bissell readily concedes Indonesia's greater political and strategic significance for the United States. Probably troubled by an enforced passivity in the face of the deteriorating situation in Indonesia, the DDP also manifested, along with other agencies, a tendency to escalate its estimate of the stakes involved in checking communism in Indochina.58

Despite the plausibility of the thesis that the DDP was genuinely resigned to the necessity of avoiding crude and violent measures, attention must be accorded a contrary conjecture, also based on both a reading of the DDP paper and its bureaucratic context.

Most important is the nagging suspicion that the implicit recommendation of the DDP's analysis is to take immediate action to remove the root of the Indonesia problem—Sukarno. But what action? For the analysis systematically discredits the effectiveness of all the major measures mooted for checking Sukarno and communism. Revival of the regional dissidents is hopeless; the army remains at best a highly problematic countervailing force; and the U.S. is virtually bereft of influence, with no effective "carrots" or "sticks"—except for those "sticks" which it "must be assumed are excluded." In short, Sukarno is the problem: yet there are no viable means to deal with him, except those crude and violent measures which are ruled out.

Confronted with this analysis, any official imbued with the new president's determination to meet the expanding Soviet challenge on the Third World cold war battleground would be likely to insist on re-examining the prohibition on crude and violent measures. Certainly the DDP invites such a reexamination by signaling its own unhappiness with Washington's apparent refusal further to sustain the dissident regionalist movements (par. B2). Although the DDP asserts that by 1961 it is too late to resuscitate these movements, the implication is that a more astute U.S. policy would have been to continue to support them—presumably at least with funds—as a potential asset when a changed situation permitted some form of renewed political action against Sukarno.

The availability of assassination in 1961 as an extraordinary and yet logistically simple form of intervention also forces some revaluation of the DDP's policy posture. Although understandable not mentioned in the memorandum, the DDP's approval and practice of assassination in the early Kennedy years is well established. The Church Committee has documented DDP assassination plots directed at Lumumba, Trujillo, and Castro in this period.59 Even more notable is the testimony of former DDP Director Bissell that the CIA also plotted the assassination of Sukarno. In the only published lines from that testimony, the Committee reports: "Former Deputy Director for Plans Richard

59Church Committee, Report on Assassination Plots.
Bissell testified that the assassination of Sukarno had been 'contemplated' by the CIA, but that planning had proceeded no farther than identifying an 'asset' whom it was believed might be recruited to kill Sukarno. Arms were supplied to dissident groups in Indonesia, but, according to Bissell, those arms were not intended for assassination (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 89).

If one argues that the DDP's real intent was to urge immediate and violent action against Sukarno, how can one account for the at best highly ambiguous presentation of their views? The most likely explanation of course would be the severe bureaucratic constraints on such candor. As already noted, the DDP was presumably acutely aware of the widespread tendency in the foreign policy bureaucracy to blame the DDP for the 1958 debacle and to be suspicious of new DDP proposals. Moreover, as the Church Committee has also shown, proposals for covert action--let alone for assassination--are not necessarily set down in written memoranda. Calculated ambiguity serves not only to preserve secrecy, but also to obscure responsibility. Finally, there is the possibility--for which, however, there is no direct evidence in this instance--that the DDP chose to circumvent the Special Group altogether and plan covert operations independently of that formal executive authority.

Conclusion—The Influence of the DDP/Hard-line Position

The President's Posture during Sukarno's Visit

Whatever the degree of toughness preferred--and practiced--by the DDP, President Kennedy in his meeting with President Sukarno in late April began to embrace the main ingredients of the accommodationist strategy which the DDP paper decried so bitterly as "appeasement." While his views were much closer to the cautious version of accommodation urged by his White House aides than the more optimistic version represented by Ambassador Jones's hopes for a "new era" in U.S.-Indonesian relations, the president was willing to take the first steps in testing the wisdom of Jones's assumptions about both Sukarno and the army.

Although he carried through an assiduously planned personal effort to appeal to Sukarno's vanity, Kennedy did appear to bow temporarily to the Dutch and the DDP-EUR hard-liners by deferring the tangible policy initiatives sought by Ambassador Jones. On economic aid, for instance, he made only a heavily qualified offer to assist Indonesia's newly proclaimed eight-year development plan. A comparable modest initiative in military assistance for civic action seemed certain to win Kennedy's eventual endorsement, but again implementation was postponed. Ostensibly the same pattern of modest gestures but delayed substantial initiatives seemed to prevail on the central issue of West Irian. It is notable that despite Sukarno's willingness to pledge Pope's release, the Indonesian leader did not impress Kennedy favorably. In fact, Kennedy developed a strong dislike for a man whom

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60Ibid., p. 4.

61Ibid., especially pp. 6-9 and 260-81, concerning "Findings and Conclusions Relating to Authorization and Control."
he viewed as morally corrupt, not only for his widely publicized philandering (which had offended Secretary Rusk and others) but also for his apparent indifference to the well-being of his then 100 million people. Unlike the DDP, however, the president did not permit his personal antipathies to influence his policy judgment.62

The DDP and EUR may have taken solace in this lack of major changes in U.S. policy toward Indonesia, as well as in Kennedy's new personal dislike for Sukarno. Yet, as already evident from the discussion at the outset of this commentary, even in April 1961 the trends in U.S. bureaucratic politics were definitely moving toward pragmatic accommodation. Reinforcing those bureaucratic changes were the dispositions of President Kennedy himself.

The President's Dispositions63

As reflected both in the rhetoric of his inaugural address and in his initial actions in Laos, Cuba, and the Congo, President Kennedy attached the most urgent priority to meeting what he perceived as an awesome challenge from a monolithic communism expanding into the Third World. As manifested in his rapid adoption of a more sophisticated and costly military strategy of flexible response, he acted decisively in 1961 to strengthen what might be called the Third World frontiers of the informal American empire. Especially in 1961-62 Kennedy seems to have been very much a part of a cold war ambience which, the Church Committee found, led many of the most respected American officials to believe that assassination "was in the best interests of the country." Accordingly, one is inclined to conclude that Kennedy's preference for noncoercive strategies in Indonesia did not derive from any special moral repugnance for "crude and violent" measures, so long as they could be justified by the cause of "the free world."

Congruent with this conjecture about Kennedy's probable adherence to conventional cold war morality is the contention of James MacGregor Burns, his most perceptive biographer, that Kennedy lacked firm moral commitments. At the same time, some revisionists tend to be unfair to Kennedy in discounting other dimensions of his approach to foreign policy, especially in the Third World. Certainly compared to Eisenhower and Dulles, if not to Stevenson and Bowles, Kennedy exhibited understanding of and sympathy for Third World nationalism, neutralism, and nonviolent social revolution.

While not as salient as his cold war instincts, Kennedy's understanding and sympathy were probably necessary, if by no means sufficient, preconditions for his opting for the strategy of accommodation. Finally, Kennedy's intensely activist personal style should not be overlooked. He welcomed opportunities to test out the new theories of economic development and counterinsurgency, just as he warmed to the personal challenge of dealing with other heads of state as well as his own policy advisers--including those from the DDP.


63This section draws on a wide range of sources, some of which are noted above in footnotes 9 and 10.
The Ascendancy of the Accommodationists in the Kennedy Years

Not until December 1961 would the confluence of these presidential dispositions with Sukarno's military escalation and the shuffling of high-level White House and State Department officials produce a formal, public U.S. decision to intervene diplomatically in the Dutch-Indonesian dispute over West Irian. Beneath the surface, however, it had been clear for some time to all the policy insiders that the U.S. had recognized that West Irian must go to Indonesia even if Irianese self-determination had to be pro forma. That decision in turn signaled the rise of the accommodationists to ascendancy as architects of Kennedy's ambitious initiatives for channeling Sukarno's radical nationalism into constructive domestic development. Not until over three years later, in the summer of 1964, amid both escalation of the U.S. war in Vietnam and Indonesia's budding alliance with China, did the hard-liners achieve parity, if not ascendancy, in American policy formulation.

Whether the revival of the hard-line orientation in 1964-65 also produced a revival of the covert actions launched in 1957-58 must await the declassification of DDP documents for the months leading up to the abortive "coup" of October 1, 1965.

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Note

Richard Bissell, the Central Intelligence Agency's Deputy Director of Plans in March 1961, ascribes the likely authorship of the secret memorandum reproduced here to his subordinate Desmond Fitzgerald, then Chief of the Far East Division of the DDP. As indicated in Bissell's cover memorandum, he sent Fitzgerald's paper to top administration foreign policy officials, including McGeorge Bundy, President Kennedy's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. It is thus not surprising that Bundy's copy of the original memorandum appeared on the Kennedy Library's inventory of Kennedy's National Security File: Country Series--Indonesia. Prepared in 1973 at my request, this inventory of document titles permitted me not only to gauge the significance of this document, but to identify it with the precision necessary to initiate a formal request to the CIA for "mandatory classification review." By the terms of President Nixon's post-Pentagon Papers Executive Order 11652 (March 8, 1972), any classified document more than ten years old was henceforth subject to such review. Happily for both scholars and the American public, the CIA responded favorably to my request. In a letter to the Kennedy Library on September 9, 1973, the Agency authorized the declassification of the entire twenty-two page document with the minor exception of a brief reference to source material on p. 6.

For scholars interested in studying the original document in the context of other relevant Indonesia material in the Kennedy period, I recommend a trip to the Kennedy Library. Currently housed in the Federal Records Center on 380 Trapelo Road in Waltham, Massachusetts, the Library is staffed by highly intelligent and responsive archivists who can lead the researcher through the intricacies of not only the National Security File but a number of other relevant declassified and unclassified materials, including an extensive collection of oral history interviews donated by major officials from the Kennedy period. Although manifestly less valuable than the Library itself, the Carrollton Press's Declassified Documents Reference System now provides ready access to microfiche copies of the originals, as well as a useful index to newly released documents.
General Subject: FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Agency of Origin: CIA Document Date: 3/27/61
Document Serial #: .... Number of Pages: 23pp
Location: NATIONAL SECURITY FILES (Collection/Files)
          COUNTRIES (Series)
          INDONESIA (Sub-series)
          Volume I, January-March 1961 (Folder Title)
          113 (Box Number)
Brief Description: R.M. Bissell memo to McG. Bundy, W.W.
Rostow, G. McGhee, P. Nitze and R. Amory with attached
paper: "Indonesian Perspectives" including attachments to the
paper, A: "President Sukarno - Key to Indonesian Situation"
and B: "Countervailing Forces"
[N.B. A brief reference to source material on p. 6
of the basic paper was deleted by CIA in order to open this
document.]

Authority for Opening: CIA letter of 9/6/73
SUBJECT: Indonesian Perspectives

1. Indonesia's growing vulnerability to communism stems from the distinctive bias of Sukarno's global orientation, as well as from his domestic policies. The former propels that country toward the Soviet orbit. The latter sap the political foundation of any organized attempt to deny the Communist Party a mass base, strive to neutralize the Indonesian Army as a force opposing communism, and permit economic maladministration to stifle all constructive impulses toward improving the lot of the Indonesian people. Dissident movements on Java and the outlying islands, which have a basically anti-Communist orientation, have been permitted to wither from lack of sustenance. They are now virtually on their last legs and no longer represent a viable force in being. In Attachment B to this paper, entitled "Countervailing Forces?", we attempt to shed light upon the factors which render the Indonesian Army progressively more ineffectual in its containment of communism, and present an estimate of dis­sident strength upon which we base our conclusion that as a political power factor it no longer counts.

2. Economic factors are likely to play a decisive role in making Indonesia ripe for a Communist takeover. While it can be argued that the vast majority of the rural population of Indonesia are impervious to the hardships of life on a bare subsistence level, the urban proletariat, especially in Java, may be found less supine. An Eight-Year Plan has been launched, predicated on the availability of foreign loans on an unrealistic scale of magnitude. A growing budgetary load will have to be borne in order to fund Indonesia's preparations for a showdown over West Irian. The expansion of Indonesia's military establishment is bound to make heavy inroads into Indonesia's financial resources. Consequently, a continuing and accelerated decline in the economic life of Indonesia is very probable. While economic atrophy may set the stage for a Communist uprising, we consider it more likely that (barring completely unforeseen developments) Sukarno's "Guided Democracy" will be permitted by the PKI to run its natural course. This would enable the Communist Party to take over the leadership of Indonesia at a time when radical changes in the methods of administering Indonesian domestic affairs become the inescapable alternative to perpetual chaos. Even achievement of a modus vivendi between the United States and President Sukarno could not stave off such a development.

3. While many factors of the Indonesian situation remain objects of contention, it would be hard to deny Sukarno's responsibility for the economic decline of Indonesia. That his dictatorship may possibly endure as long as he lives strikes us as the crux of the Indonesian problem. In Attachment A of this paper, entitled "President Sukarno - Key to the Indonesian Situation," we are attempting to throw into more striking relief the many insoluble problems besetting Indonesia, which can directly be traced back to Sukarno's personality and to the
political philosophy that animates him. As we see it, Sukarno's continued leadership of Indonesia—irrespective of his momentary friendships with the Bloc or the West—renders Indonesia increasingly more vulnerable to PKI strategy, which is to make its decisive bid for legal power under circumstances of economic and political chaos with all other political solutions evidently exhausted.

4. The forthcoming talks between Presidents Kennedy and Sukarno will take place in the shadow of a threat of war between Indonesia and the Netherlands over West Irian. The United States, having thus far observed "impartiality" regarding this issue, may be forced to abandon this stance, should the crisis deepen. With abandonment of "impartiality" connoting involvement, the United States Government will have no choice but to take a position regarding the validity of Indonesia's claim to sovereignty over West Irian.

5. This paper does not intend to address itself to the legal merits of the respective claims advanced by Indonesia and the Netherlands. Both nations have made it abundantly clear that they do not consider the ownership issue as "sub judice" but as a bare contest of power, with Indonesia claiming that its national independence will necessarily remain incomplete and in permanent jeopardy as long as the Netherlands maintains its hold over West Irian. We realize that this may be considered a simplification of an issue which has become a highly sensitive internal political question in both countries, complicated by considerations of national pride and "face" and by the entire history of Dutch-Indonesian relations.

6. Without suggesting that other factors can be ignored in determining United States policy regarding West Irian, we believe that one important aspect has not as yet been given sufficient consideration—namely, how United States interests will be affected if Indonesia carries the day and ownership of West Irian is awarded to her. We believe that accession to Indonesia's claim as long as Sukarno is in power would not serve the best interests of United States security in that part of the world. We consider it likely that Indonesia's success in this particular instance will set in train the launching of further irredentist ventures already foreshadowed in lectures given by Professor Yamin, an avowed extremist who, however, is a member of the Indonesian cabinet close to President Sukarno. Success would be bound to cement relations between Indonesia and the USSR, which, in addition to throwing the full weight of its political support behind the West Irian campaign, is liberally providing Indonesia with military aid specifically designed to enable her to oust the Dutch from West Irian by force of arms. President Sukarno's prestige and power in Indonesia and in Asia as a whole would grow immeasurably, since nothing succeeds like success. Even assuming that it were the weight of United States power and prestige which gained Indonesia a bloodless and prestigious victory, we would not gain that country's respect, let alone affection. Indonesia's leadership would see to it that the true record of events would be slanted to substantiate the boast that it was the threat of USSR intervention, the leadership
of President Sukarno and the unflinching support given him by the Communist Party which combined in making this victory possible. Predictions that the Indonesian armed forces, once freed from their preoccupations with the Dutch threat, would be able to concentrate upon dislodging communism from positions of influence tend to ignore the demonstrated effectiveness of President Sukarno's tactics of never allowing the army a sufficient breathing spell to consolidate and methodically deploy its political strength in combatting communism. There is nothing to encourage the belief that President Sukarno intends to abandon those tactics once West Irian has been annexed. In sum, by backing Indonesia's claim to sovereignty over West Irian, we may inadvertently help to consolidate a regime which is innately antagonistic toward the United States.

7. The proposal of a United Nations trusteeship, which the Department of State appears to favor, would go a long way toward de-fusing the West Irian time bomb which President Sukarno himself has primed. It would present an at least temporary solution of the problem, permitting the United States to escape the opprobrium of having sided with the Netherlands on a "colonialist" issue. However, unless confronted with unmistakable manifestations of United States resolve not to permit a settlement of the West Irian issue by force of arms, and of our vigorous opposition to turning this area over to the Indonesians without any observants of self-determination procedures, the Sukarno regime would be unlikely to acquiesce in the imposition of such a trusteeship.

8. It has been argued [censored] that the new policy of the Soviet union vis-a-vis Indonesia leaves us with only one practicable alternative, namely, "to continue a moderate program of economic and military assistance sufficient to bolster the political position of our friends within Indonesia and to enable those who are willing to stand on principle to do so without being submerged by the overwhelming temptation of and pressures engendered by Soviet offers." The foregoing alternative would seem to epitomize policies that have been tried by the United States Government since Indonesia gained her independence and that have failed in the attainment of their set objectives to keep Indonesia out of Communist hands. We are disposed to argue that our national policy should be to treat Indonesia as a case in which appeasement, whether by word of [sic] by deed, will buy us nothing. Hence to propose stepped up aid as a blueprint for future action simply begs the question whether Communist ascendancy in Indonesia can be curbed as long as Sukarno remains in power. We believe it cannot.

9. It would be gratifying to be able to propose an alternative course of action by the United States which would stand a good chance of turning the course of events in Indonesia in a constructive direction. Unfortunately, this is a situation in which the influence that the United States can exert, at least in the short run, is extremely limited, if (as must be assumed) crude and violent intervention is excluded. Any "carrot" in the form of economic or military aid or diplomatic support that is freely given will (for reasons set forth above) be used simply
to consolidate an essentially unacceptable regime. Any "stick"
the United States would be willing to use would be too feeble
to destroy the regime and would simply accelerate the process
of disorganization which (it is argued above) is the probable
prelude to a constitutional Communist take-over. Under these
difficult circumstances we believe that the least unsatisfactory
policy for the United States is to apply pressures, but politely
and without public recrimination, to offer favors, but only on
tough conditions, and in these ways to create such inducements
as we can for the Indonesian elite, both civilian and military,
and for Sukarno himself, to behave in a more constructive
fashion.

10. At the very minimum we should not now entertain any
major increases in the scale of economic or military aid to
Indonesia and we should lose [sic] no opportunity to make clear
that the reason for our negative action is that the Indonesians
are in no position to make effective use of such resources in
pursuit of goals we can support. Perhaps this pressure can
best be applied affirmatively by giving the impression that we
would consider substantial economic aid if difficult but essen-
tially technical conditions were met and that we would consider
increased military aid if we had confidence that Indonesia would
not resort to aggression against the Dutch and that their mili-
tary services had not already become dangerously dependent on
Communist Bloc support. Our attitude on these major matters,
and on specific political issues as they arise, should be made
known, using all available contacts, to the military establish-
ment and the leading politicians as well as to Sukarno himself.
Such a hardening in our posture, without overtones of hostility
or anger, would serve to alert the conservative elements among
Indonesia's leadership to the ineluctable necessity of choosing
between absorption by the Communist Bloc and associations as an
equal within the comity of free Western and Asian nations. To
take the opposite position—to appease Sukarno on the West Irian
and other questions, and to compete with the Bloc in economic
and military aid in the vain hope of gaining time—would, we
believe, finally destroy the resolve of conservative elements
to oppose Sukarno's policies and to act as a brake on the left-
ward and downward course of Indonesia.

11. The coming talks between the President and his Indone-
sian guest offer an important opportunity to convince Sukarno
of the firmness of the United States position on an occasion
when the treatment accorded him should be flattering and should
itself convince him of the importance this government attaches
to the future of his country. It is important that "red carpet"
treatment and the circumstance of a Presidential meeting should
not give him the impression that the United States is prepared
to support him in the basically hostile and unconstructive
course he currently pursued.
SUBJECT: President Sukarno - Key to the Indonesian Situation

1. It is evident that Sukarno today and for the immediate future decides the fate of Indonesia. This clearly focuses upon him responsibility for the drastic turn of events in Indonesia which has resulted in its abandonment of true neutrality in exchange for a posture of cold-war alignment with a power-bloc committed to the destruction of the United States. Our policies, unless they are attuned to a correct assessment of President Sukarno's personality and philosophy of government, will be found wanting. There is nothing exceptionally enigmatic about Sukarno, his role as one of the founders of Indonesia being a matter of well documented historical record. Until recently he was among the most accessible of Asia's national leaders. Many prominent Westerners have met him, some enjoyed his personal friendship and few have been entirely unsusceptible to his personal charm. President Sukarno also makes no effort to dissimulate his true ideological predilections. Like Hitler, he is an open book, there to be read. Those who refuse to draw the proper conclusions may not be victims of Sukarno's charm, but victims of self-delusion.

2. President Sukarno has been described as a man vainly seeking accommodation with the West and, finally seeing Indonesia's legitimate national aspirations consistently rebuffed, reluctantly seeking closer accommodation with the Communist bloc. We question whether it is entirely justified to attribute the unsatisfactory state of our relations with the regime of Indonesia to rebuffs administered to Sukarno by the Eisenhower Administration. Sukarno, after his last visit to the United States, returned to Indonesia reportedly convinced more firmly than ever that the United States wishes him ill and is anxiously awaiting his political demise. We are told that if only President Eisenhower had included Djakarta in his Far Eastern itinerary, all might have come out well; that had Sukarno, during his last sojourn in the United States, been treated with more consideration by the American press and singled out by President Eisenhower for special attention, relations between the two countries would not have dropped to their present low. It may be appropriate to mention in this context that no other Asian leader has been accorded a state reception quite as lavish and cordial as President Sukarno received when he came to our shores on his first visit. The late Secretary of State, Mr. John Foster Dulles, on his visit to Indonesia is said to have carried away a not unfavorable impression of Sukarno. This notwithstanding, President Sukarno, after his visits to the USSR and Red China in 1956 as a curtain raiser to the introduction of "Guided Democracy," embarked on a campaign of vilification of the United States and its system of government. The only serious grievance which Sukarno has to justify the animosities he now appears to be harboring against the United States would be the support received by the rebellion on the outlying islands; Sukarno and his advisors surmise that it enjoyed the official backing of the United States Government.
3. Sukarno needs foreign policy successes, his domestic performance having been an unbroken chain of failures. Without the support of the Communist bloc, he would be unable to score any major foreign policy successes. The Afro-Asian bloc is unlikely to choose him as its leader, although it will probably support him on "colonialist" issues. His close alignment with the USSR, and the acquisition of West Irian with Soviet support, would redound to the growth of his stature in the eyes of the leaders of that bloc.

4. There is reason to believe that the Soviets have taken Sukarno's measure and handle him accordingly, by assiduously pandering to his aspirations to become an international big-shot. He may by now have become as susceptible to Soviet influence as he was to Japanese influence in the years 1942-1945. The Soviets know that, unlike other neutralist leaders of the caliber of Nehru, Nasser and Nkrumah, Sukarno is highly manipulatable. To view the relationship between Sukarno and the Kremlin in its entirety as a product of love unrequited by the United States, flies in the face of facts. Evidence can be adduced to show that Sukarno's own political proclivities are such that he would normally tend toward leftist alignments. He acknowledges himself to be a socialist, and that he has a predilection toward totalitarianism, can hardly be denied.

5. A great deal has been written about President Sukarno's relations with the Communist Party of Indonesia. By fastening on the question whether he himself is or is not a Communist, the issue can only be obfuscated. Even Sukarno's most effective apologist, Foreign Minister Subandrio, does not deny that Sukarno is firmly resolved to avail himself of Communist support in the implementation of his concepts and programs, and admits that such support has been generously forthcoming. That this arrangement has served to foster the enormous growth of organized communism in Indonesia is generally admitted. No serious student of the use of the "organizational weapon" by communism could conceive of its being effectively contained within the mechanism of a National Front organization.

6. Whether or not Sukarno has reached a formal understanding with Khrushchev to restrain the army's attempts to contain Communist influence in Indonesia remains a moot point. Dependable Indonesian observers feel that Sukarno is compelled by historical forces to move in a certain direction: he is anti-Western and wants to continue the Indonesian Revolution. Sukarno has no choice but to protect the Communist Party of Indonesia, because he needs support from a revolutionary group, and no other group but the Communists can give it to him. The army, though it had its origin in revolution, is not revolutionary enough for his purposes. Consequently, the relationship between Sukarno and the Communist Party is a natural one. As long as it supports him, he will be glad to leave it alone. Concomitantly, he can utilize it, and does, to forestall any attempts on the part of the army to increase its political leverage. This arrangement makes it quite easy for Sukarno to remain friends with the USSR and, for that matter, Red China.
7. Unless the Communist Party commits a major tactical blunder, unfurling its true colors prematurely, the already close relationship between Sukarno and the Communist Party is bound to be further intensified. Inasmuch as Sukarno is either blind to or acquiescent with Communist strategy in Indonesia, the eventual upshot of this alliance can be safely predicted. Here is indeed a man foolishly seeking to ride the back of a tiger and bound to end up inside.

8. The belief that, as a last resort, Sukarno and the Indonesian Army in league would crush any move to establish Communist ascendancy is based upon a number of erroneous premises. The Communist movement in Indonesia no longer seeks a direct confrontation with the forces opposing it but has embarked upon a successful policy of legal accession. The Indonesian Army, on the other hand, by the admission of its Chief of Staff, General Nasution, has likewise abandoned all thought of crushing the Communist movement by force. This renunciation has been variously interpreted as an act of farsighted statesmanship on Nasution's part (implying the existence of a long range master plan for dealing with the Communist threat), as a recognition of the army's inability to confront the PKI without confronting Sukarno, or as a by-product of the West Irian crisis. The possibility that the army may no longer be in full control of its own destiny because of serious Communist penetrations into the ranks of its officers' and non-commissioned officers' corps, though plausible has been relegated since we lack sufficiently hard intelligence to substantiate it.

9. Our policies, in order to be realistic, should be predicated upon the assumption of an untrammeled continuation of Communist growth as long as President Sukarno is at the helm. Such growth, however, cannot continue indefinitely without leading to a Communist takeover--most likely by constitutional, less likely by revolutionary means. Ambassador Jones, in November 1960, commented on the tenor of Sukarno's speeches as reflecting an "increasingly leftist, anti-West line which [is] believed [to] stem from [the] extraordinary effect [the West Irian] issue [is] exerting on [the] President's thoughts." He found President Sukarno "preoccupied with defining Indonesian socialism" and as appearing to "have in mind some form of national communism." He felt that Sukarno's "recent trip to the United Nations General Assembly appears to have strengthened [his] belief [that] 'socialism' is the wave of [the] future." In pursuing the course he has mapped for his country's foreign policy (whatever may be its cause), President Sukarno will be found neither appeasable nor susceptible to more tangible inducements. Only his removal from power would offer some hope that trends that now seem inexorable can still be reversed. Hence, any policy move on our part, designed to shore up Sukarno's power and prestige, would be shortsighted, especially if we are interested in a radical elimination of the economic abuses upon which the Communist movement in Indonesia can be presumed to thrive.
SUBJECT: Countervailing Forces?

1. The Indonesian Chief of Staff, General Nasution, is frequently mentioned as a military strongman who will step into the breach once Sukarno's policies have led Indonesia to the brink of disaster. Nasution himself has spared no effort to dispel the notion that he wishes to become Indonesia's man of destiny and challenge President Sukarno in that role. Yet, in the face of a consistent record of yielding to Sukarno on several major counts, those foreign observers who pin their hopes on him persist in their conviction that Nasution is following a set strategy, allowing for major tactical deviations. We cannot share this estimate. The Sukarno/Nasution axis appears quite durable. We further believe that a bloodless Sukarno victory over the Dutch in West Irian would make a profound impression upon the Indonesian High Command, confronting its more conservative and basically anti-Sukarno elements with the same dilemma which led to the collapse of the resistance movement within the German General Staff after Hitler acquired the Sudetenland without firing a shot. In sum, we cannot visualize General Nasution as generating any vital impulses toward a saner foreign policy, at least not as long as the West Irian issue is in suspense. We are further prepared to take Nasution's word for it that he does not seek a confrontation with the Communist Party of Indonesia. We are awaiting more conclusive data before associating ourselves fully with Professor Guy Pauker's thesis that the Moscow talks may have forced General Nasution into a de facto alliance with the Communist Party. After all, Nasution has permitted, and at times indeed encouraged, anti-Communist actions launched by his subordinate commands. Thus far he has not gone down the line with the Communists, and, within President Sukarno's official family, he represents one of the few remaining voices of reason. We are hence at this stage disinclined to write him off entirely as an "asset" in the effort to contain the Communist Movement in Indonesia.

2. The dissident movement, as an effective countervailing force to Sukarno's policies, will probably have to be counted out. Recent developments lend substance to the claims of the Indonesian Army that it has the dissidents on the run.

A. Sumatra

(1) The dissident forces in Sumatra total about 7,000 armed men and are located in Atjeh, Tapanuli and Central Sumatra. The strongest of these elements, the 5,000-man "Banteng Division" in Central Sumatra, although it exerts widespread control over rural areas and represents the best organized and most unified of the dissident commands, has recently had defections of two key officers and "several hundred" troops.

(2) Troops in Tapanuli, now numbering 1,000 - 2,000 armed men, have been harassed and scattered by
the Indonesian Army until they now lack the numbers, equipment and coordination necessary to undertake any counteraction against forces opposing them. The original Tapanuli fighting force has dwindled by almost 25 percent over the past three years, owing to surrenders and casualties. One military group in south Tapanuli is threatening to "secede" from the dissident movement and form a separate theocratic state. This move might encourage the strongly Muslim Atjehnese to follow suit and terminate their uneasy alliance with the dissident movement.

(3) Until recently the dissident forces in Atjeh, presently numbering about 1,000 armed men, have appeared well-organized and well-supplied. However, Indonesian Army attacks and a general inability to acquire resupplies of arms and ammunition have served to push Atjehnese forces inland. They still control most of the Atjehnese countryside, however.

B. Celebes

(4) Most recent reports indicate that 1,000 or more of the 2,500 - 3,500 dissidents force in North Celebes surrendered with their arms to the Indonesian Army in Menado in late February. Colonel Sumual, the de facto military commander, will apparently remain in disdence, but troops remaining loyal to him appear to comprise the equivalent of only two battalions. Colonel Kawilarang, one of the most prominent dissident military leaders since the start of the uprising, is reportedly surrendering and will be resettled overseas by the Indonesian Government for an indefinite period.

C. Java

(5) The Indonesian Army has long admitted that the 8,500-man dissident force in West Java constitutes the most deeply entrenched and troublesome dissident force in Indonesia, but there are recent indications that the Indonesian Army is launching an "all-out" offensive against this group.

3. We conclude from the above estimate that the dissident position is becoming progressively worse and that the dissident forces are likely to break up into marauding bands or surrender within the next six months. This conclusion should serve to put to rest any expectation that it can be resuscitated by methods short of United States intervention on a major scale. It should dispose of the theory that the loss of Java to communism may not automatically spell the loss of the whole of Indonesia as long as dissident forces on the outlying islands hold fast.

4. Summing up our conclusions, we find ourselves virtually bereft of all countervailing elements which, of their own accord or in response to external stimuli, could effectively challenge or modify the policies of the Sukarno regime.
Appendix

Central Intelligence Agency

Office of the Director

7 April 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR:

 Brig. General Chester V. Clifton
 Military Aide to the President
 The White House

Attached is the memorandum you requested yesterday concerning Allen Lawrence Pope.

I should, of course, be happy to provide orally or in writing any further details which may be required.

(Signed)

Allen W. Dulles
Director
1. In November 1957 at a high level in our government approval was given to a special political action program in Indonesia calling for the maintenance as a force in being of the anti-communist, pro-West dissident movement established by anti-Sukarno military commanders in Sumatra and the Celebes. This program later authorized the provision of arms and other military aid to the dissidents including air support. Several C.A.T. pilots volunteered for this work, ostensibly took leave from their C.A.T. jobs and, as "Soldiers of Fortune" employed by the dissidents, undertook combat missions. On 18 May 1958 one of these pilots, Mr. Allen Lawrence Pope, was shot down by anti-aircraft fire and captured while making a bombing attack upon shipping in Ambon, Celebes.

2. Pope was tried before an Indonesian Military Tribunal in December 1959 on various counts of aiding the enemies of Indonesia and bearing arms against Indonesia. He was convicted and sentenced to death on 29 April 1960. A military appellate court upheld this decision in December 1960. An appeal may be announced at any time. Recent information from the Indonesian Prosecutor indicates that it may come prior to President Sukarno's departure in late April 1961. If, as expected, the Supreme Court confirms the death sentence, Indonesian law requires a thirty-day delay before the execution of the sentence, during which Sukarno must personally concur in the execution of the sentence and Pope will be granted the opportunity to appeal for presidential clemency.

3. Throughout his many interrogations and the trial itself, Pope has maintained his story that he volunteered to fly for the dissidents of his own free will in the belief that in so doing he would be helping to fight communism. He has not implicated the United States Government in his activities. The Indonesian authorities, however, are by now well aware that the Dissident Movement was given support and encouragement by the governments of the United States, [censored].

4. Although preservation of Pope's cover story has required considerable circumspection on the part of U.S. officials in dealing with Indonesian authorities on this subject, the U.S. Embassy in Djakarta has been able to maintain contact with Pope and with the Indonesian officials immediately concerned with his case. Following the imposition of the death sentence, both Secretary of State Herter and Ambassador Jones took appropriate opportunities to express to Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio their concern over the severity of the sentence and the damage which its execution might have on U.S.-Indonesian relations. In December 1960 Pope's wife visited Indonesia and was granted a personal interview with President Sukarno in order to plead for Sukarno's intercession on her husband's behalf. Sukarno promised to give the Pope Case his "very deepest con-
sideration." At this meeting, Ambassador Jones presented to Sukarno a letter from President Eisenhower expressing a personal interest in the Pope case. In January 1961 U.S. Air Force General White expressed to Indonesian Air Force Chief of Staff Suryadarma the hope that the Indonesian Government might see fit to extend leniency to Pope as a gesture of good will toward the United States. Mrs. Pope has recently returned from Indonesia and has written to President Kennedy requesting his intercession on her husband's behalf. She plans to return to Indonesia to be present when the Supreme Court decision is handed down.

5. Despite certain debatable aspects of the Indonesian legal proceedings, it is undoubtedly true that Pope was guilty of the major charges on which he was convicted. It is quite apparent, however, that the final disposition of the case will be determined on political rather than purely legal grounds. The expected timing of the Supreme Court's announcement of its decision suggests a connection with the forthcoming meeting between President Kennedy and President Sukarno.

* * *

6. In my opinion Pope's conduct both before and after his capture entitles him to our gratitude and any appropriate action to mitigate his sentence.