

REVOLUTION AND SOCIAL TENSIONS IN SURAKARTA 1945-1950

(Soejatno)

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Social Structure and Cultural Orientation

Traditional terminology in Surakarta recognized three social classes. First, there were the *santono dalem*, or family of the ruler, categorized as the group of noblemen and princes and thus as the ruling class. Second, there were the *abdi dalem*, the officials or bureaucrats of the kingdom. Third were the *kawula dalem*, the masses, in other words, the ruled. From this elementary division it is clear that the first two classes were ruling classes, while the third was the ruled.¹ The structure of a ruling class is determined by political type, cultural level and individual differences. By taking these three factors into account, we can understand the totality of the social structure of feudal society.

Koentjaraningrat has shown that Javanese society in general, and Central Javanese society in particular, was divided into two main groups, the *wong cilik* [little people] and the *priyayi* [gentry].² This division was very clear in Surakarta. The *santono dalem* and the *abdi dalem* there could be categorized as the *priyayi*, with a subdivision between *priyayi gede* (*priyagung*) or upper *priyayi*, and *priyayi cilik* or lower *priyayi*. The *kawula dalem* corresponded to the *wong cilik*. (In connection with Geertz' trichotomy of *santri*, *abangan* and *priyayi*, I believe that in Surakarta essentially four groups existed: *santri priyayi*, *abangan priyayi*, *santri wong cilik* and *abangan wong cilik*.³) The social distance between the *priyayi* and the *wong cilik* was very great.⁴ Social positions were very difficult to achieve⁵ and social

1. "Ruling social class" indicates that class "which performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantage that power brings." The ruled class is the class that serves the ruling class. See Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939), p. 50.
2. See Koentjaraningrat, "Tjelapar: Sebuah Desa di Djawa Tengah Bagian Selatan," in Koentjaraningrat (ed.), Masyarakat Desa di Indonesia (Jakarta: Universitas Indonesia, 1970), p. 140.
3. Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960), pp. 118-21, 224. For a comparison of the division *priyayi-wong cilik* and *santri-abangan-priyayi*, see Sartono Kartodirdjo, The Peasants' Revolt of Banten in 1888, Its Condition, Course and Sequel (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1966), p. 50, note 84. Cf. Sartono Kartodirdjo, "Struktur sosial dari masyarakat tradisional dan kolonial," Lembaran Sedjarah (Fakultas Sastra dan Kebudayaan, Universitas Gajah Mada, Yogyakarta), No. 4 (1969), p. 32.
4. The concept of social position is borrowed here from Nicholas S. Timasheff, Sociological Theory, Its Nature and Growth (New York: Random House, 1967),

mobility from the wong cilik up into the priyayi was very rare.

In Surakarta the santri priyayi consisted mainly of officials in the religious domain. They were called *abdi dalem pangulon* or *abdi dalem pametakan* (the latter term being drawn from the root *petak* [white] as opposed to *abang* [red] in *abangan*). The *abdi dalem pangulon* consisted of Penghulu (with the rank of Raden Temenggung) at the top, Katib, Ngulomodamel, Jaksa, Ngulomomiji, Muazin, Mudarin, Kebayan, Syarif and Marbot.⁶ Another religious group which could be classified as religious officials were the *abdi dalem Suronatan*, who had special responsibility for taking care of the Suronata Mosque and the Great Mosque. The *abdi dalem pangulon's* functions were to handle marriage and inheritance among the *priyantun dalem* and the *priyantun jawi*. The entire body of royal religious officials can be termed the official religious elite. The segment of this group which resided in the villages was known as the *abdi dalem perdikan*. It consisted of *juru tebah*, *marbot* and *modin*, whose responsibility was to take care of royal tombs outside the city.

The santri wong cilik generally included those who studied religion in *pondok* or *pesantrèn* under *kjai* or *ulama*. In relation to the traditional bureaucracy these elements can be classified as the "unofficial religious elite."⁷ The more important *pesantrèn* in Surakarta were Jamsarèn (near the city), Kacangan (Boyolali) and Kalioso (Sragèn). During the Revolution the santri from these *pesantrèn* played a key role in organizing local defense.

The *abangan wong cilik* in general inhabited both the villages and the towns. Most of the official staff of the *kalurahan desa* [administrative village] were *abangan* (except for the *modin*), and these people formed the village elite.⁸ The typical feature of politics in the village, as a traditional political institution, was decision-making by *musyawarah* and *mufakat*.⁹ The concept of *gotong-royong* was exploited

p. 315. Social position refers to social groups which are formed by individuals and stand in a "patterned relationship."

5. There are two types of social position in society--those easily obtained and those achieved only with difficulty. See Peter I. Rose (ed.), The Study of Society (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 330.
6. On the *abdi dalem pangulon*, see my paper "Kolonialisme Barat dan Kemunduran Radja2 Surakarta abad XIX," presented to the second National History Seminar in Yogyakarta, August 26-29, 1970, pp. 17-19.
7. Cf. Sartono Kartodirdjo, "Agrarian Radicalism in Java: Its Setting and Development," in Claire Holt (ed.), Culture and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 78.
8. Within village government the village elite consists of: the lurah, carik, bayan, ulu2, modin, jogoboyo. Cf. Margo L. Lyon, Bases of Conflict in Rural Java (Berkeley: University of Berkeley, Research Monograph Series No. 3, 1970), pp. 32-34. Before the Proclamation of Independence there were other components of the village elite such as: petinggi, ronggo, demang, etc. See R. Soepomo, De Reorganisatie van het Agrarische Stelsel in het Gewest Soerakarta (The Hague: L. Gerretsen, 1927), p. 20.
9. Jeanne S. Mintz, Mohammed, Marx and Marhaen: The Roots of Indonesian Socialism (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 12-13, 15.

with brilliant success during the Revolution for the purposes of repairing rail-lines, roads, buildings and irrigation systems.¹⁰ Gotongroyong also greatly facilitated mobilization for local defense.

Feudal society was also marked by two cultures--a palace culture (essentially priyayi) and a popular culture (essentially that of the wong cilik). These cultures were distinctive in their use of language, art, morality, ethics, manners, dress and housing. In art, we find a palace art and a popular art.¹¹ In the Surakarta kraton, for example, the Bedoyo Ketawang, a magico-religious dance of great refinement and complex symbolism, was performed.¹² By contrast, the dances of the wong cilik in the villages, such as the Tari Tayub, Ande2 Lumut and so forth, were marked by their spontaneity. Among the wong cilik wayang was and is extremely important: it is *the* popular art-form for ceremonial purposes (births, marriages, village purifications, harvest celebrations, etc.). Feudal culture as a cultural whole thus consisted of a sub-culture created by the priyayi and a contra-culture created by the wong cilik.¹³

We can see then that the class division between the priyayi and the wong cilik gave rise to a cultural dualism between priyayi culture and wong cilik culture. During the Revolution, however, priyayi culture, carried along by the flow of the national revolution, became democratized, so that in the end there was no great difference left between it and wong cilik culture.

To give power to the ruler and to ensure the security and well-being of his government, ceremonies and offerings were continually made within the palace. One ceremony which was very popular in Solonese society was the Kirab Pusoko Kraton on the first of the Javanese month Suro.¹⁴ People believed that the Kirab Pusoko could protect them from sickness and social disorder and could ensure that their lives would be *tata tentrem kartoraharjo*.¹⁵

10. Ibid.

11. Koentjaraningrat uses the terms "elite art" and "popular art" and suggests that although there was a wide gulf between the two, they nonetheless influenced one another. See his "Saranan Perkembangan Kesenian," paper given to the Art Seminar in Surakarta, October 2-4, 1972, p. 4.

12. For full details, see K. G. P. H. Hadiwidjojo, Bedoyo Ketawang (Surakarta: Radyo Pustoko, 1971).

13. The terms contra-culture and sub-culture are borrowed from J. Milton Yinger; see Rose, Study, pp. 827-38. Here contra-culture means cultural elements in contradiction with dominant cultural values.

14. According to Kirab Pusoko Karaton Surakarta (Surakarta: Radyo Pustoko, 1972), the main kraton pusoko are: (a) spears (Kanjeng Kyai Kebo Mas, Kanjeng Kyai Panatas, Kyai Slamet, Kyai Baru); (b) kris (Kanjeng Kyai Balabar, Kanjeng Kyai Baruwang, etc.); (c) various pennons; (d) kraton pet animals such as the white water-buffalo Kyai Slamet.

15. Anderson links tata tentrem kartoraharjo with the manifestation of "power." See Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture," in Holt, Culture and Politics, p. 19.

The Formation of Laskar2 Rakyat in Surakarta

The months September to December 1945 were the period when the laskar were formed by the pemuda of Surakarta. They were initially subsumed in the Badan Keamanan Rakyat (BKR). In October 1945 the BKR, the military and the police occupied the Kempeitai (Japanese military police) headquarters in Timuran. After this event, a variety of different laskar organizations sprang up both in the towns and in the villages. Each laskar organization had its own peculiar form and style. Some of the more important popular movements were: the Barisan Laskar Banteng (BLB) with green uniforms, under Dr. Muwardi; the Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia (Pesindo); the Barisan Pemberontak Republik Indonesia (BPRI), which was made up of pemuda from all social strata; and the Laskar Rakyat, which used yellow uniforms.

According to my informants, the most important role in Surakarta itself was taken by student laskar. Prior to the formation of the Student Army (TP), students had been mobilized into various organizations, including the Pasukan Satria (PS), the Laskar Kere (KR), the Barisan Polisi Istimewa Sekolah Menengah Tinggi (BPISMT), the Barisan Pemuda Jelata (BPJ), and the BPRI. The Student Army itself was only formed in September 1946. According to the same informants, the leaders were Prakosa, Soebroto and Achmadi.¹⁶ The members of the TP got their education on the battlefield, especially during the Independence Wars--their teachers were known as *guru2 perjuangan* [resistance teachers].¹⁷

In mid-1947 the Gabungan Laskar Perjuangan Surakarta was set up in which the Student Army played a key military, political and social role. The Gabungan had the responsibility of collecting foodstuffs and sending pejuang up to the front lines. The Student Army and the military established a City Military Command, which included three Student Army people as leaders--Achmadi, Prakosa and A. Latief. On March 27, 1948, the Student Army began a purge of people from the BPRI and the Banteng laskar who were involved in corruption, blackmarketeering and robbery.¹⁸ They regarded these acts as deviations from the Revolution.

At the beginning of 1946 local defense organizations were also formed in the rural areas. They were composed of village youths, political leaders and religious notables. The names of these organizations varied from area to area: among them may be mentioned the Laskar Rakyat Surakarta (LRS) in the village of Plupuh (Sragèn), the Pemuda Laskar Rakyat (PLR), the Pemuda Penjaga Desa (PPD), the Pelopor Laskar Rakyat (PLR), and the Markas Pertahanan Rakyat (MPR). Frequently more than one laskar organization could be found in a single village. For example, in Plupuh there was a Pemuda Laskar Rakyat (PLR) and a Gerakan Sabillillah (Islamic). The latter was led by Musaban, who aroused the local Islamic youth with the *jihād* spirit.

16. Interview with Soepardi, Soepeno and Soedarmo on April 20, 1973 and May 1973. According to Soepardi, Prakosa led the Student Army very ably; his outstanding qualities were simplicity, honesty, courage and an ability to look properly after his subordinates.

17. Interview with Soedarmono in May 1973.

18. Sartono links actions of this type with "social unrest." See his Peasants' Revolt, p. 134.

The pemuda organization for the kabupaten of Sragèn was the Angkatan Muda Sukowati (AMS), among whose leaders were Panudi, Indardjo and Soemodarmodjo. According to the statements of the AMS itself, it wanted the formation of an autonomous government in the kabupaten of Sragèn no longer linked to the royal government. The AMS subsequently played an important political role. It later changed its name to Badan Perjuangan Angkatan Muda Sukowati (BPAMS). According to Totosiswanto, one of its later leaders, the BPAMS was extremely active in support of the military during the Independence War of 1948.

All the village defense organizations arose spontaneously and elected their own leaderships. They collected materiel, primarily foodstuffs, from the local peasantry. In this context the role of the village headmen in collecting materiel and mobilizing manpower was very important.

During the War of Independence all members of the village defense units participated in the guerrilla fighting. The villagers formed Pasukan Gerilya Desa (Village Guerrilla Units) or Pager Desa.¹⁹ Peasants who sold their produce in the towns often provided information on concentrations of Dutch military strength to the Pager Desa or to other military units. Members of the Pager Desa used *granggang* [pointed bamboo staves], bamboo spears, machetes and *bandil* (a weapon used by kraton soldiers for hurling stones). They also used *jimat* [amulets]²⁰ such as Tanjungsari and Kulbuntet to ward off danger from the enemy. Some of them also used to perform *tapa* or *semadi* [ascetic meditation] in solitary places such as Mt. Lawu. For according to popular belief the Sunan Lawu would give strength [power] to those who meditated on this mountain. Meditation on Mt. Lawu is still practiced today by the Javanese in general, and in particular by the people of Central Java. Tapa and semadi on this mountain are done to achieve security and prosperity, kasektèn [magical power], and good fortune.²¹ Still other members of the Pager Desa visited *guru2 ngèlmu* [teachers of esoteric knowledge] and *dukun* to obtain invulnerability, safety or military prowess. They called themselves *tunggal-guru* or *tunggal-banyu*, meaning that here were elements loyal to their guru. Some examples of these phenomena were: the pilgrimage of some laskar rakyat elements to the village of Cokrotulung to obtain invulnerability from Kyai Mangunhartono.²² Some members of the Student Army also went to the home of Kyai Jurumartani to obtain invulnerability, according to Saryono, Sunardi

19. [The acronym Pager also means "fence."--Translator.]

20. *Jimat* can give protection from danger, sickness, and death, and can increase vulnerability. See Sartono Kartodirdjo, "Agrarian Radicalism," p. 79.

21. Tapa and semadi are an important element in Javanese cultural life, occurring not only in Surakarta but also in the other regions of Java. Smail has already pointed to this phenomenon in his study of the history of the Revolution in Bandung. See John R. W. Smail, Bandung in the Early Revolution, 1945-1946. A Study in the Social History of the Indonesian Revolution (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1964), p. 77.

22. According to Sunardi, a member of the Laskar Rakyat/BKR who once visited Kyai Mangunhartono in 1947, all his pupils were forbidden to eat for seven or even sometimes up to 40 days (the ban was on food with salt in it). After his pupils had completed their assigned tasks, the guru tested their invulnerability. Interview, May 17, 1973.

and Soedarmo; all who came to the kyai were given charms for invulnerability, but they also had to go without food or drink for a week. Some people from other laskar units went to the village of Parakan in Kedu to get invulnerability from sharpened bamboo spears. It is certainly true that the Gerakan Bambu Runcing from Parakan was famous at that time among the members of the laskar organizations and the military: they believed that sharpened spears from Parakan had real kasektèn, and were full of magic. In this respect the Gerakan Bambu Runcing of Parakan can be compared with the Gerakan Tebu Ireng from Jombang.

Social Conflicts and Social Unrest

The Indonesian Revolution of 1945-50 can well be described as "multi-complex."²³ It was not merely decolonization, but a revolution full of social tensions and political conflicts between social classes.²⁴ In the realm of politics and ideology, there was a struggle to the death between Masyumi and the communists which culminated in the communist rebellion at Madiun.²⁵ The Linggardjati and Renville agreements sharpened antagonisms between the "communist group" and the "socialist group" led by Sutan Sjahrir. The People's Democratic Front (FDR),²⁶ a political instrument of the communists, publicly denounced the Renville Agreement and began to purge itself of Sjahrir's followers. In the early months of 1948, the FDR began to gather its forces to confront the government.

Political antagonisms at the national level exerted a powerful influence on political antagonisms and social tensions in Surakarta. On

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23. Taufik Abdullah has stated that the Indonesian Revolution was a "multi-complex revolution in one generation," full of energy, romanticism, etc. See his review of Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance 1944-1946 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972), in Prisma, II, No. 2 (April 1973), p. 71.
 24. Some examples of social tensions in 1946 are: (1) The Social Revolution in North Sumatra. See W. F. Wertheim, Indonesian Society in Transition (Bandung and The Hague: van Hoeve, 1956), p. 278; and George McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1952), pp. 179-82. (2) In Bali social tensions developed between the kaum ningrat [aristocracy] and the masses who were led by the civilian nationalist elite. The kaum ningrat came together in the Dewan Raja² (Council of Rulers). See Njoman S. Pendit, Bali Berdjuang (Den Pasar: Jajasan Kebaktian Pedjuang, 1954), p. 158. Cf. A. Schiller, The Formation of Federal Indonesia 1945-1949 (Bandung: van Hoeve, 1955), p. 118. The Balinese Council of Rulers clearly supported the 1946 federative government of Bali [linking together the eight principalities of Bali] conceived by Dr. H. J. van Mook. (3) In Surakarta from 1946 on social tensions arose between the kaum ningrat and the mass of the population. See my paper "Perubahan² Sosial Politik di Surakarta sesudah 1945," discussed in the Fakultas Sastra, University of Gajah Mada, Yogyakarta, in 1970.
 25. See Wertheim, Indonesian Society, p. 222, n. 1, citing C. A. O. van Nieuwenhuijze, Mens en Vrijheid in Indonesië (The Hague: van Hoeve, 1949), pp. 203-5.
 26. The strength of the FDR rested on: (1) the loyalty of the military to Sjarifuddin who was then Minister of Defense; (2) SOBSI. But at the time of the 1948 Madiun coup, it did not in fact get full support from these groups. See Mintz, Mohammed, p. 92.

June 27, 1946 Prime Minister Sjahrir was kidnapped in Surakarta by an "unknown" gang. But it could be assumed that the group behind the kidnapping came from Sjahrir's political opposition. It was socialists versus communists, with the communist leaders taking a strong opposition line against the government, which was pursuing a policy of negotiations with the Dutch.²⁷ At the same time domestic political factors caused civil wars and political conflicts in various regions.

The central government's policy of appointing Iskak as Resident of Surakarta and R. Soediro as Vice-Resident caused several badan perjuangan to react with a [joint] resolution. On October 8, 1946 they conveyed their resolution to the government. On November 9, Resident Iskak and Soediro were kidnapped by an unidentified political organization. R. Soetardjo Kartohadikoesoemo took over the position of Resident but as he was in favor of the feudal group, the Sunanate and the Mangkunegaran, the political parties and the members of the DPRD refused to accept him. One can see in all this conflict a small segment of the "government elite" trying to help the kaum ningrat to restore their authority. Reactions came swiftly from those political parties who called themselves the *kaum revolusioner*. Yet among the ningrat or priyayi there were people who were regarded as "revolutionary priyayi," among them K.P.H. Mr. Sumodiningrat, K.G.P.M. Surjohamidjojo (both members of the Surakarta KNI) and B.R.M.P. Mlojosunardjo, whose houses were used for political gatherings and meetings of guerrilla leaders.

In August and September 1948 serious social and political conflicts arose between the badan perjuangan, the laskar, the military and the political parties. The communists certainly regarded the Hatta government's policy of rationalization and demobilization as a deviation from the Revolution.²⁸ Demonstrations against rationalization took place in Surakarta and Blitar. Under the influence of the communist leader Musso, the Fourth Division (Senopati) in Surakarta refused to accept either demobilization or rationalization.²⁹ Instead it demanded that the government withdraw the Third Division (Siliwangi) from Surakarta. (The Siliwangi Division, known as the Hijrah Army or the Pocket Army, had arrived in Surakarta in February 1948.)³⁰ On September 13, 1948

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27. Strong communist opposition to the Sjahrir government developed from January 1946 on. In June 1946, Tan Malaka's communist group attempted a coup d'etat, kidnapping Sjahrir and some of his colleagues. Through his Persatuan Perjuangan Tan Malaka consistently tried to overthrow the government. See D. G. E. Hall, A History of Southeast Asia (London and New York: Macmillan, 1960), pp. 720-21; Mintz, Mohammed, p. 97.
28. Bernhard Dahm, History of Indonesia in the Twentieth Century (New York: Praeger, 1971), p. 134. Certain anti-rationalization groups regarded rationalization as "preparation for the formation of a federal army." See Moela Marboen, Peristiwa Madiun (Jakarta: Pusat Sejarah Angkatan Bersenjata, n.d.), p. 2.
29. Dahm, History, p. 134.
30. [By the terms of the Renville Agreement, Republican troops were moved out of pockets behind Dutch lines (the so-called Van Mook line), and into the diminished territory of the Republic. General Sudirman, the Panglima of the Republican Armed Forces, called this movement a hijrah, after the Prophet's flight to Medina before his triumphant return to Mecca, as a sign that the retreat in the face of the Dutch was only temporary.--Translator.]

there occurred the Srambatan Affair.³¹ The barracks of the Hijrah Army were attacked by a group from the ALRI (Navy), which supported the communists under the leadership of Mr. Amir Sjarifuddin.

It was clear then that the political conflicts in Surakarta had turned into a civil war. This war then spread out into neighboring regions,³² including Purwodadi, Ponorogo and Madiun.³³ According to documents found in Amir Sjarifuddin's house, the FDR had planned to turn Surakarta into a "Wild West" or zone of chaos.³⁴

Before the Madiun Affair itself broke out on September 18, 1948, the communists in Surakarta had been strengthening their Red Army. Its membership was composed of Pesindo, FDR, part of ALRI and part of the Laskar Rakyat. In the rural areas around Surakarta, the Red Army was known as Musso's Army. As for the military in Surakarta itself, at one meeting they were asked by their leaders: "Melu Musso apa melu Bung Karno? (Do you go along with Muso or with Bung Karno?)"³⁵

In rural areas, as for example in Sragèn, Klatèn and Karanganyar, the communists tried to get support from peasants who had joined Pokoso (Perkumpulan Kawulo Surokarto). It is clear that the communists looked for their backing among the wong abangan³⁶ of the peasantry. And in Pokoso they urged the wong cilik to oppose the wong priyayi.

The influence of the communists in the rural areas meant a politicization of the peasantry and a mobilization of the villagers. Political conflicts arose between the pro-communist wong tani and the anti-communist wong tani, especially the kaum santri. When the Madiun Affair erupted, these political conflicts reached their culmination in killings, which among the rural communities of Surakarta were known as "belèhan PKI Musso [slaughter of Musso's PKI]."

Social-political conflicts also arose between the feudalists (or priyayi) and the santri. When on December 20, 1948, the Dutch entered the city of Surakarta in order to establish their authority, they received help from a portion of the priyayi. Bad economic conditions since the beginning of 1946 had caused the spread of corruption, embezzlement of the assets of state enterprises, and anarchosyndicalism in the region controlled by the Republic of Indonesia.³⁷ Economic conditions of this type also spawned an increase in banditry and robbery.³⁸

31. For more detail, see Kenang-Kenangan Kota Besar Surakarta 1945-1953 (Surakarta: Djawatan Penerangan Surakarta, 1953), pp. 12-13.

32. Dahm, History, p. 134.

33. Kenang-Kenangan, pp. 12-13.

34. Moela Marboen, Peristiwa Madiun, p. 4.

35. Interview with Soedarmo, member of the Student Army. He stated that those who were pro-Musso left the meeting at that point, saying "we'll meet again on the battlefield." Interview, May 1973.

36. Thus the Communist Party in Surakarta pushed for the political mobilization of the wong abangan. See Lyon, Bases, p. 35.

37. Soekarno, Dibawah Bendera Revolusi (Jakarta: Panitia Penerbit Dibawah Bendera Revolusi, 1965), II, pp. 11-12.

38. According also to Wertheim, Indonesian Society, p. 144, the chaos caused by war and revolution brought with it a rise in robberies.

This can be shown to have occurred in various regions including Surakarta. In 1947 some members of the Barisan Pemberontak Republik Indonesia (BPRI) under Mardjuki committed robberies in the countryside especially in the village of Cokrotulung (kabupatèn Boyolali) and various places in Salatiga and Ungaran.³⁹ Some members of the ALRI in Surakarta did likewise, for example Ahmad Jadau.⁴⁰ It is clear that the actions of pejuang very frequently resembled banditry.⁴¹

In 1948 we in Surakarta got to know the names of well-known robbers who were much feared by the people. Prawiroadidjojo committed robberies in the city itself.⁴² In the kabupatèn of Sragèn a prominent robber named Dul Latif did likewise in the towns. And in the village of Sidoharjo (kabupatèn of Sragèn), the villagers were thrown into great confusion by criminals and robbers. In Sragèn the kabupatèn government established a court of summary justice, known by the name *snellrechten*,⁴³ to sentence these criminals.

It is clear that social unrest helped to cause these robberies, banditries, and chaos. Social protests accompanied by vandalism occurred when the local people attacked foreign asiatics, especially Chinese and Arabs, who were classed as bourgeoisie. In 1949 the people burned shops belonging to Chinese, for example Toko Obral and Toko Eng Bo. The people also burned Kampung Arab, a batik-manufacturing center near the Pasar Kliwon. This incident came to be known as the Anwar Sungkar incident. Some Arabs under the leadership of Anwar Sungkar helped the Dutch by pointing out guerrilla centers of the laskar organizations.

In December 1948 the Chinese in the kabupatèn of Sragèn formed a committee to welcome the Dutch troops which was called the Ontvangst Committee. The mass of the local people protested against these Chinese and so social conflicts arose between the people and the Chinese. In the area of Kedawung and Gondang there were some Chinese killed.

Social protests resulting from low wages of teachers in the Mangkunegaran came from the Teachers' Association of the kabupatèn of Karanganyar, especially from the Kapanéwon of Tawangmangu. This Teachers' Association under Tjiptosuwignjo had sent a formal resolution of protest to the Mangkunegoro. The main point of the resolution was that they wanted to be freed from the control of the Mangkunegoro's administration.

In the tide of the Revolution the traditional bureaucratic elite, which consisted of the aristocrats and princes, tried to get help from

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39. Interview with Soedarmono, May 15, 1973. He knew a good deal about the BPRI, and was in 1948 a teacher in a Christian school in Surakarta. Also interviews with Soedarmono, Soepeno and Soepardi on April 20, 1973. As former members of the Student Army, they told me how they had helped put down the BPRI robberies.
40. Soedarmo said that both Mardjuki and Ahmad Jadau were killed by members of the Student Army.
41. Cf. Wertheim, Indonesian Society, p. 144.
42. Interview with Saryono, a member of the BKR during the Revolution, on May 17, 1973.
43. Interview with R. Soemodarmodjo, member of the summary court, May 18, 1973.

the lower classes which were still loyal.⁴⁴ Some princes such as Gusti Surjomidjojo, Gusti Djojokusumo and Pangéran Mangkubumi tried to get assistance from the peasants who supported the Perkumpulan Kawulo Surokarto (Pokoso). In 1950 Djojokusumo organized a meeting of Pokoso peasants in the Sasonomulyo (name of a place in the kraton). The aim of the meeting was to reestablish a Swapraja [autonomous royal] government. All the Pokoso members, who came from rural areas in the kabupatèn of Sragèn and Klatèn, supported these plans of the priyayi. We know of course that the abangan peasantry with traditionalist ideas and traditional social types were glad to support the feudal system of administration. But, as a result, the mass of the people who called themselves kaum revolusioner formed an Anti-Swapraja Committee. Political protests came from the parties against the priyayi, and these parties publicized the slogan of antifeudalism among the masses of the local people.

Administrative Changes

Dutch colonialism had a great impact in Surakarta after 1847.⁴⁵ The changes introduced into the system of royal administration went right down to the village level. The structure of royal government now had at its apex the Office of the Kapatihan under the Patih, who was assisted in his functions by four Bupati Nayoko.⁴⁶ The entire corps of officials in the Kapatihan were known as the Rèh Kapatihan. The second level of government was the kabupatèn, under a Bupati assisted by a Bupati Anom; the third was the District under a Panéwu; the fourth was the Subdistrict under an Assistant Wedono or Mantri Onderdistrik; and fifth was the Kalurahan Desa under a Kepala Desa [Village Headman].

After the Proclamation of Independence, the governance of the Territory of Surakarta was regulated by laws promulgated by the central government.⁴⁷ In September 1945, a Komite Nasional Daerah (KND) was formed, headed by K.P.H. Mr. Sumodiningrat, assisted by nine others. On October 1, 1945 a Governing Council was formed under Soeprapto, Soetopo Adisapoetro and Soemantri. The formation of this council can be seen as the beginning of the democratization of the traditional bureaucracy. That same month, the central government appointed R.P. Soeroso as High Commissioner in Surakarta. The Working Committee of the KND urged the formation of a Directorate system of government. This meant the development of a collegial administration shared between the Sunanate, the Mangkunegaran and the Republic's territorial administration. But the Sunanate and the Mangkunegaran refused to send representatives to participate in this new structure. It was the Mangkune-

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44. In forming a new political order, the ruling class generally tries to enlist the help of the lower classes. See Mosca, The Ruling Class, p. 117.
 45. How great the changes were can be seen from the reorganization of the territories of Surakarta by the Dutch government in Staatsblad (1847) and (1848). The changes were proposed by Van Nes, the Adviser to the Principalities. See Soepomo, De Reorganisatie, p. 20.
 46. These Bupati Nayoko were: the Bupati Keparak Kiwo, the Bupati Keparak Tengen, the Bupati Gedong Kiwo and the Bupati Gedong Tengen.
 47. On the development of local government in Surakarta, see The Liang Gie, Pertumbuhan Pemerintahan Daerah Dinegara Republik Indonesia (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1967), I, pp. 90-95.

garan which was most strongly opposed. It seems clear that this instance demonstrates how in the process of changing the nature of local government in Surakarta the aristocrats acted as an obstructionist social force.

The central government proposed the formation of a special committee, to draw up legal provisions regulating the governments of the Sunanate and the Mangkunegaran. Membership of this committee consisted of those members of the kaum ningrat who could be termed revolutionary aristocrats--including Mr. Atmodiningrat and G.P.H. Hadiwidjojo--and intellectuals, political elites, religious leaders, for example, I. J. Kasimo, Singgih, Soeprapto, Sindu Sawarno, Sindiredjo and Sarsadi. This committee decided to reject the formation of a Special Region and, on the contrary, to support the formation of a normal residency. However, the Ministry of the Interior, then under Dr. Sudarsono, wanted to form a Special Region as was done in Yogyakarta.

Very rapidly there sprang up groups which were pro and anti the formation of a Special Region. And among the officials employed in the Sunanate and Mangkunegaran administrations serious political conflicts developed. The main reasons for the great difficulty that the central government experienced in forming a regional government in Surakarta were: (a) the psychology of the aristocrats; (b) political mobilization in this area; (c) the popular will to change the feudal system and make Surakarta an integral part of the national state. In this context it was widely felt that the kaum ningrat group would have to change their attitude and support the national revolution.

At the beginning of June 1946 a People's and Army Territorial Government of Surakarta was formed. This new structure of local government was run by a Working Committee made up of military men, party leaders and religious notables.⁴⁸ Governor Surjo was appointed by the center to act as adviser to this government. Shortly thereafter a Surakarta Regional Defense Council was established. In August 1946 these bodies were replaced by a Badan Legislatif and Badan Eksekutif [Legislative and Executive Body]. In the end the Residency of Surakarta was ruled by the Resident together with the Executive Body, which was composed of party representatives (e.g., from the PNI, the PS, Mas-yumi, the PBI) and youth. It is understandable, therefore, that in August 1946 the structure of government in Surakarta consisted of Residency, Kabupatèn, Kawedanan and Kalurahan, and that in the city itself a special administrative unit was created, known later as the Haminte.⁴⁹ Governance was carried on by the Executive Body and the Badan Perwakilan Rakyat.⁵⁰ The Residency of Surakarta now consisted of the kabupatèn of Boyolali, Klatèn and Sragèn (from the old Sunanate) and of Wonogiri and Karanganyar (from the old Mangkunegaran). With the formation of the municipal government known as the Haminte, Surakarta became the first autonomous city formed by the central government. The establishment of the Haminte meant the unification of the zones of the city formerly under Sunan Pakubuwono XII and Mangkunegoro VIII.

48. Among the leaders of the political parties at that time, the more noteworthy names included: Soemodihardjo, Soejono, Soediro, Soetarto. This government had the following sections in it: general affairs, social affairs, economic affairs, security, and civil service.

49. See The Liang Gie, Pertumbuhan, pp. 93-94.

50. Ibid., pp. 91-92.

In December 1949 the government of the Military Governor of the Second Special Region formed a military administration. Two days later it was announced that there would be only one government in the Residency--the government of the Republic of Indonesia--and that the city would be governed by a mayor. In March 1950 the Sunanate and the Mangkunegaran were "frozen" and their administrative authority was reduced to the internal affairs of their kraton.⁵¹ Most of their officials transferred to the Republic's administrative structure. Only a very small fraction stayed loyal to the Sunan and the Mangkunegoro.

An important development in the rural areas was the formation there of autonomous local governments, a process which began at the start of 1946. In the villages there developed what was called *daulat*:⁵² village heads who had held their posts from before 1945 were elected again by the people.⁵³ The revolutionary process in the countryside thus resulted in defeudalization and democratization. For the duration of the Independence Wars of 1947 and 1948 military governments were established at the kecamatan and village levels. This also meant growing political mobilization in the villages as a result of the Revolution. And in the rural areas, new political groups succeeded in taking power in various localities.⁵⁴

Conclusions

Research on the history of the Revolution in a region of Indonesia reveals that it was influenced by socio-cultural factors. Here the ecological and microsociological aspects must be studied to be able to develop a detailed microhistory.⁵⁵

The Indonesian Revolution was not simply a process of decolonization. It was a total revolution which involved the spontaneous struggle of the people. We know well the role of the people in the villages and in the towns in the guerrilla fighting.⁵⁶ The Indonesian Revolution was not merely a struggle between the diplomats in the elite and the Dutch, but involved the formation of ideas for transforming the system of government from a colonial to a national structure. In this

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51. This "freezing" was done on the basis of the Decision of the Minister of the Interior of March 3, 1950, No. F.X. 3/1/13.
 52. Smail explains the word *daulat* as: "an old word meaning 'homage,' which is the root of the modern word *kedaulatan* (sovereignty)." See Smail, *Bandung*, p. 122, n. 54.
 53. My research in the kabupaten of Sragèn indicates that of the 100 or so village headmen who held office from before 1945, about 80 were directly re-elected by their villagers in 1946.
 54. "Political group" is one whose administrative staff enforces order within a given territorial area by application and threat of physical force. See Timasheff, *Sociological Theory*, p. 180.
 55. On the concept of microhistory, see Sartono Kartodirdjo, "Beberapa Masalah Teori dan Metodologi Sedjarah Indonesia," *Lembaran Sedjarah*, No. 6 (1970).
 56. See, for example, T. B. Simatupang, *Laporan Dari Banaran* (Jakarta: Pembangunan, 1960), and Smail's analysis of this work in *Sinar Harapan*, April 3 and 5, 1973.

transitional period there arose new social classes which tried to push forward the current of the Revolution both at the national and the regional levels. The popular struggle was accompanied by social and political conflicts between different groups in society. The popular organizations in principle accepted the general values of the Revolution. The political process during the Revolution can be viewed as social interaction between different groups in society. This political process gave rise to political tension between the political parties and the governmental elite which was very evident in the frequency with which cabinets fell.

Closer contact between villagers and government officials and the military caused a political mobilization in the rural areas. New social classes arose in the villages which led the rural revolution as part of the national revolution. They formed semi-military, political and religious organizations to defend the Revolution. They led their areas by selecting their own leaders.

Conservative elements in the feudal group sharpened the antagonisms between them and the revolutionaries. The revolutionaries had many progressive elements, idealism (especially among the youth), with the fullest hopes for the future.

So it can no longer be doubted that the Indonesian Revolution was a revolution full of social and political crises. In strongly feudal regions there occurred a cultural disintegration as a result of the process of democratization and other general values of the Revolution. It is clear that the Indonesian Revolution was "multicomplex" in the social transformations that it brought about.