


MAP OF ATJEH BESAR



HABIB ABDUR-RAHMAN AZ-ZAHIR (1833-1896)

Anthony Reid

Despite his undoubted services to Atjeh, Habib Abdur-Rahman has never been a candidate for the honor of *pahlawan nasional* (national hero), the title given to leaders of the later stages of Atjeh's long war against the Dutch (1873-1912). Habib had submitted to the Dutch, and when the struggle was revived a few years later, he was branded as a traitor who had abandoned the anti-colonial cause too soon.

There is a more fundamental reason, however, why it would be inappropriate to regard Abdur-Rahman as a hero of nationalism. His whole life was a testimony to Islamic internationalism. Not only was he responsible for reviving the historical claim of Turkish suzerainty over Atjeh; he also made clear time and again that he acknowledged no loyalty to any particular country or people but only to the house of Islam, of which he was an aristocrat.

Abdur-Rahman was brought up among the emigrant Hadhramaut Arabs, who had settled in all the ports of the Indian Ocean during the nineteenth century. They were primarily a trading people, whose commercial and shipping links were tightest between the Red Sea, South India, and Singapore. From mid-century, however, European steamships began to destroy most of their shipping business,¹ probably including that of Habib's father. The Hadhramaut Arabs became small traders, retailers, religious teachers, and financiers. They married into the local aristocracy, with some of them becoming rulers and founding dynasties. Others became advisers and ministers.

In spite of their local ties, they retained their solidarity as an international community, comprising one important strand in the broad and multicolored belt of Islam, stretching from Constantinople to the Moluccas. Yet few reflected this mobility and freedom as well as Habib Abdur-Rahman. According to his own account Atjeh appeared to be the first country in which he began to establish real roots. Yet even his stay there was broken by two extensive foreign journeys and was punctuated by constant restless movement within the country. He needed to be honored. His visits were privileges bestowed on the local Muslim communities. If they failed to be appreciative, he invariably served notice that he would depart. His pride could not tolerate a setback or a slight to his honor.

His movements in the most difficult period of his life--the two years following his return from Turkey--are a good illustration of this trait. He never had any illusions that Atjeh could win a war with the Dutch. If the great powers proved unwilling to intervene on Atjeh's behalf, the only solution would be to seek an honorable peace with the Dutch. Arriving in Singapore in March 1874, he set

1. L.W.C. van den Berg, Le Hadhramaut et les Colonies Arabes dans L'Archipel Indien (Batavia: Government Printer, 1886), pp. 148-149.

about opening negotiations, both directly and by invoking the mediation of the British governor. When the Dutch refused to have anything to do with him and his lack of success began to be painfully apparent, his recourse was to leave in November 1874 for his former haunts on the Malabar coast. Returning to Penang in May 1875, he immediately faced the same dilemma. He again found his creditors and benefactors losing faith as he failed to obtain satisfactory terms from the Dutch. After much talk of returning to India, Mecca, or Constantinople, Abdur-Rahman went to Kedah as a royal guest at the end of November 1875. When he finally returned to Penang three months later, he was clearly at the end of his tether. Reluctant as he was to return to fight a losing war, it seemed the only remaining way to restore his credibility and his bargaining power.²

One of the elements in Habib's mobility was the frequency of his marriages. Besides the five mentioned in his biography, he contracted at least one more in Singapore in August 1874--to a Pahang Arab woman related to Sayyid Junied.³ The daughters of *sayyid*⁴ could not marry below their station, which created a considerable demand for spouses of the correct lineage. Most of Habib's marriages were undoubtedly of this type, making allies and hosts of one family of Hadhrami sayyid in the new town he was visiting. Only his marriage to Potjut in Atjeh appears certain to have been part of a different tradition, that of the Arab marrying into the ruling family of an Indonesian state to strengthen his bid for power.

None of these six wives appears ever to have travelled with him. While in Penang and Kedah his retinue included a concubine and two servants or slaves, of whom one was a Turkish Circassian.⁵ Habib brought two young Circassians back with him from Constantinople,⁶ and, according to Snouck Hurgronje, had earlier brought Hindu slaves to Atjeh from India.⁷

2. These moves are described more fully in Anthony Reid, The Contest for North Sumatra: Atjeh, the Netherlands, and Britain, 1858-1898 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 158-180. Reference should be made to this work wherever no specific source is given below. The ultimate sources for most of Habib's moves in the Straits Settlements are the full reports of the Dutch representatives in Penang and Singapore, both of which are filed in Algemeen Rijksarchief (hereafter ARA) Consulaats-archief, Penang, 46 and 99-102.
3. Maier to Governor-General, August 23, 1874, ARA Consulaats-archief, Penang, 46.
4. The term *sayyid* is generally used for descendants of Muhammad through his grandson Husain. Habib is an honorific applied to sayyid in Malabar and elsewhere and apparently was introduced to Atjeh by Abdur-Rahman himself.
5. Laviño to Governor-General, May 27, 1875 and March 16, 1876, ARA Consulaats-archief, Penang, 101-102.
6. Helderwier to Gericke, December 20, 1874, ARA Kabinets-archief (hereafter Kol. Kab.), N¹⁶, dossier 6044.
7. A.W.S. O'Sullivan (trans.), C. Snouck Hurgronje's The Achehnese (Leyden: E.J. Brill, 1906), I, 23n.

Unlike the majority of his compatriots, Habib believed in style. His dress, his horse, his entourage, his bearing, all had to show he was a man to be respected. For solemn occasions he wore a splendid Turkish sword of honor. To greet the Dutch *Djambi* mission of 1871 he wore the Turkish Medjidie decoration which had been bestowed on Sultan Ibrahim twenty years earlier. In May 1875 he created a spectacle in Penang by the magnificent costume and richly-attired horse with which he paid his first visit to Lieutenant Governor Anson in the government house on Penang Hill.⁸ He believed, with apparent justification, that only by such a display of grandness could he ensure that Indonesians and colonial authorities alike would pay him the respect due someone of his station and office.

But this style could only be maintained by constant subventions from his supporters. Undoubtedly the wealth of Atjehese pepper growers with their willingness to support religious causes was one of the attractions of Atjeh for Habib. In 1875 he told Lavino that he had received about \$36,000 a year while in Atjeh.⁹ Though this figure is undoubtedly exaggerated, it should be compared with the sums he claims to have gathered to build the Great Mosque--if indeed he made a clear distinction between the two causes. His considerable expenses as envoy in Constantinople were provided mainly by Teuku Paja, whom the Dutch knew to have sent at least two telegraphic credits to Constantinople totalling \$6,000. In the Straits Settlements Abdur-Rahman was frequently forced to appeal to the leading Arab merchants or to T. Muda Njak Malim of Simpang Ulim for further support for his diplomatic efforts.

It is disappointing, but scarcely surprising, to find that, when the righteous cause of promoting Atjeh was abandoned as hopeless, the need for money remained. In 1875 Abdur-Rahman asked the Dutch for a reward of \$50,000, or \$500 a month for life, if he successfully negotiated a Dutch-Atjeh peace. This was refused. After leading the war effort for a time he successfully demanded twice the amount--\$1,000 per month for life. On this princely pension he lived extravagantly at Mecca. He maintained three houses and a well-provided harem there, and strove to maintain his standing by giving frequent lavish feasts.¹⁰

Abdur-Rahman's two essential assets were the sacredness of his descent from the Prophet and his religious learning. Sayyid were honored throughout the Muslim world but nowhere more than in Atjeh where a position of respect and comfort was assured even the most unimpressive members of the sacred lineage. The fact that Abdur-Rahman also had a good knowledge of Muslim law immediately established him as a religious leader. During his early years in Atjeh he became

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8. Lavino to Governor-General, May 27, 1875, ARA Consulaats-archief, Penang, 101.
 9. Lavino to Governor-General, June 24, 1875, ARA Consulaats-archief, Penang, 101. Throughout this introduction and the translation which follows, the currency referred to is the Mexican silver dollar, valued in this period at 4s. 3d. sterling.
 10. De Vicq (Jidda) to Karnebeek, November 12, 1886, ARA Kol. Kab. C13, dossier 6169.

particularly influential as an upholder of a relatively strict line opposing such sins against Islam as gambling, opium smoking, and pederasty. Most Atjehnese were ready to admit the scandalousness of these common practices and to support, in principle, movements of reform and religious revival as long as they were pursued with the high degree of common sense and flexibility which Habib displayed.

As Snouck Hurgronje and James Siegel have both pointed out,¹¹ Habib Abdur-Rahman formed part of a recurring pattern of religious reformers who were able to bring direction to the divided Atjehnese. Even for the strong Sultan Ibrahim, traditional alignments and suspicions among the *ulëëbalang* (district chief) placed severe limits on the ability of the sovereign to lead his people effectively. After 1870 the Sultanate was a minimal force. But a religious leader could appeal on the basis of a higher loyalty, by portraying the work to be done as a religious duty rather than a secular command. Habib's ability to exhort the Atjehnese to common effort in this way "was nothing short of prodigious."¹² He raised enormous sums for mosque construction and other public works, for his elaborate diplomatic ventures, and for the war. He settled feuds which had endured for decades and he brought a larger force of Atjehnese into the field against the Dutch than any of the military leaders after 1878.

Even though traditional respect for his birth and his learning were among Habib's greatest assets, he himself was a man of the modern world. When the Sultan of Serdang consulted him about the credentials of a certain sayyid, Abdur-Rahman's immediate response was an offer to telegraph Mecca.¹³ He appeared to be as much at home with European statesmen as with Atjehnese *ulama* (Islamic teachers and scholars).

Nothing could be further from the truth than van den Berg's claim¹⁴ that most Europeans who met him gained the impression of "un énorme fanfaron." Time and again skeptical Dutch and British officials, to say nothing of highly-placed Turks,¹⁵ were forced

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11. Snouck Hurgronje, The Achehese, I, pp. 158-164; James Siegel, The Rope of God (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), pp. 49-51 and 60-67.
 12. Snouck Hurgronje, The Achehese, I, p. 164.
 13. Lavino to Assistant Resident of Deli, August 6, 1875, and reply August 19, 1875, ARA Consulaats-archief, Penang, 101.
 14. L.W.C. van den Berg, Le Hadhramaut, p. 200.
 15. A grudging acknowledgement by the Russian Ambassador Ignatiev, the strongest opponent of Habib's cause in Turkey, is indicative of the way in which the Atjehnese envoy impressed Turkish leaders: "They say he is of Arab origin and very intelligent. He possesses, moreover, an education which strikes the Turkish ministers quite as much as his diplomatic cast of mind." A. Guber, G. Levinson, and V. Mazaev, eds., Politika Kapitalisticheskikh Derzhav i Natsional'no-Osvoboditel'noe Dvizhenie v Iugo-Vostochnoi Azii, (1870-1917). Dokumenty i Materialy (Moscow: The Science Publishing House, 1965), I, p. 53.

after meeting him to acknowledge his acute intelligence, political insight, and understanding of the Western world.

Habib's greatest success was in Constantinople, where he was lionized by the pan-Islamic press and created real concern in European capitals that Turkey would intervene forcefully in the war. It is significant, however, that his strongest supporters in Turkey were not the courtiers seeking to flatter the Sultan's vanity but liberal reformers like Midhat Pasha who were to overthrow Abdul Aziz in favor of a parliamentary constitution three years later. Despite the consistent pragmatism with which he had greeted Western advances before 1873, Abdur-Rahman had to overcome a reputation in Dutch circles as a fanatic troublemaker after his Constantinople mission. Dutch consuls who met him successively in Jidda, Singapore, and Penang were nevertheless all won over by him. Maier in Singapore and Lavino in Penang, in particular, became converts to his moderate peace plans once they had given him a hearing.

Similarly, Habib was able to persuade one British official after another that British mediation was the only way to peace in Atjeh. After meeting him, successive Governors of the Straits Settlements, Sir Andrew Clarke (1873-1875) and Sir William Jervois (1875-1877), alarmed the Dutch with their confident insistence that Atjeh was prepared for peace only on the basis of British guarantees. In the case of Jervois, at least, there is little doubt that his meeting with Abdur-Rahman in Penang on June 23, 1875 changed his position fundamentally on the Atjeh question. Anson, the Lieutenant Governor of Penang, was particularly anxious to assist Habib's efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement, even though he had not been notably sympathetic to Atjeh before the envoy's arrival.

Habib's success with both Atjehnese and Westerners was in large measure due to the direct and forceful methods he frequently used, in contrast to the traditional politeness of Indonesian court circles. Snouck Hurgronje relates¹⁶ that if Atjehnese displeased him by arriving very late for a meeting or addressing him in an improper fashion, "he would smite, kick, or even spit upon them by way of correction." He made use of the favorite Atjehnese *mupakat* (public discussion), whereby "his weaker opponents are terrorized, while the stronger are flattered, and finally many are won over and even persuaded that they themselves were the originators of the proposed plan."¹⁷ While the forceful, aggressive style which Habib adopted at such meetings would have been highly dangerous for most Atjehnese, in a foreigner as revered as Habib it was a sign of strength and authority.

To Europeans likewise he spoke forcefully and directly, in a manner which always commanded respect. His reply to Kraijenhoff's¹⁸ mission of "friendship" in 1871, when Habib was at the height of

16. Snouck Hurgronje, The Achehnese, I, p. 163.

17. Ibid., p. 76.

18. Controleur Kraijenhoff represented the Governor of Sumatra's West Coast, through whom relations between Atjeh and Batavia were to be conducted according to the 1857 Treaty. He came on successive Dutch missions to Atjeh in September 1871, May 1872, and October 1872.

his power in Atjeh, is a fair example:¹⁹

Atjeh lives in friendship with England, France, Turkey, and other countries, because it is not injured by these powers. On the other hand, Holland, which now wanted to tighten the bonds of friendship, had not refrained from periodically seizing states from the Atjehnese kingdom, as had happened only recently. What sort of friendship was that! He knew only one sort, namely:

Salah di larang,
Benar di ikut,
Di undju lepaskan,
Kasu karau di talong.²⁰

If Holland sincerely meant well, she should give back what she had taken, namely Singkel, Baros, Sibolga, and Nias, with the neighboring islands, as well as the petty states of the East Coast, while she must support the Sultan against the princes on those borders who wish to break away.

A later quotation, recorded by Anson's secretary in 1875,²¹ shows Habib's style at a much more desperate moment for both himself and Atjeh, when he was struggling to persuade the Dutch, through Lavino, to accept his ultimate concession to them.

The Syed said he had now come to state for the last time what he was ready to do, and if the Dutch would not trust him he would then leave Penang. He could easily get to Achin [the coast of Achin was blockaded by eleven Dutch men-of-war], and if the Dutch Government would not have anything to do with him, he could go to Achin, and bid them fight on. The war could be continued for three years more. He knew in the end the Achinese would be beaten, but what would the Dutch get? a desert, all the pepper destroyed, and the country desolate. If peace were brought about, 1000 Dutch soldiers would suffice to hold Achin, and two or three hundred the other places. He desired peace more than any one, and prayed that there might be an end to the slaughter. He would prefer to see the country under the Dutch, as he would profit greatly by it. The Dutch would make roads and improve the country. In every way it was to his interest to bring about a settlement. He was not an Achinese. What was Achin to him? If he brought about a settlement would not he be a great man.

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19. As summarized in E. S. de Klerck, De Atjeh-oorlog (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1912), p. 347.
20. The first two lines of the quatrain might be translated "falsehood is forbidden; truth is upheld." The following two lines appear to have been wrongly copied.
21. A. E. H. Anson, About Others and Myself, 1745 to 1920 (London: John Murray, 1920), pp. 326-328.

The Dutch would highly honor him, and he would get stars and medals. If he wished he could go to Europe and entirely give up Achin. He was well known to distinguished statesmen. It was clear what his interests were, and yet the Dutch would not trust him.

As for his intentions, he had shown on several occasions that he intended well towards the Dutch, and was anxious to bring about peace. The first occasion was when General Kaupmann,²² just before the war began, consulted with him. He then fully explained his views and advised the General the best way to bring about terms. Instead of listening to him, they had taken up Panglima Tibang, his enemy, a man of no position; and then this war had begun. He had told the General how they should proceed: at first offering favourable conditions, and by degrees establishing their supremacy as the English have always done in India. In that way they could have got Achin without any bloodshed. He had proposed the terms for a treaty, but the Dutch, instead of following his advice, or trusting him, had at once made war, thinking to conquer the place directly. Then he had gone to Constantinople to try to get the Turkish Government to intervene to stop the war, but they would not. He had seen the Dutch Consul at Jedda, and again he had shown to him how anxious he was to bring about terms. Failing at Constantinople, he had returned to Singapore, and from there had addressed the Governor-General, so the Dutch had plenty of opportunity of knowing his good intentions. It was true he had encouraged the Achinese to fight when the war had once begun, and since then, of course, he had assisted them, but he was none the less anxious for peace and an end of the slaughter.

What he now proposed was this: he would go on board a Dutch man-of-war, and not land at all. They would anchor off Kloewang, and he would send for the leader of the Achinese. Then in the presence of a number of Dutch officers and surrounded by a guard, he would, in Malay, openly give advice to the chiefs. In the first place, after explaining the situation, he would get them by word of mouth to engage to agree to terms. To make this more binding, he would then get them to agree in writing and lastly would have them solemnly to swear on the Koran. After that they could not go back, and terms could be arranged. Meanwhile there would be a suspension of hostilities. This was what he would do. He was the key by which the Dutch could alone enter Achin. If they threw away the key they could not get into the box without smashing it. They had thrown away the key, and had battered the box with a crowbar. It had made a great noise, but the box was not broken by it. The key was there, and they would not try it.

22. Colonel Koopman, of the 1871 Djambi mission.

About the Text

This autobiography is unfortunately only second hand. It was written by Captain I. D. I. van der Hegge Spies, the commander of the Dutch warship *Curacao*, which carried Abdur-Rahman and his party from Atjeh to Jidda. During the voyage, lasting from November 24, 1878 to January 28, 1879, the captain appears to have taken down the story of Habib's life as it was told to him. Although the manuscript he left is in third-person Dutch, it reads as though very little altered from notes taken directly from Habib. A copy of the manuscript of van der Hegge Spies was made available to me by James Siegel, to whom I am extremely grateful. The original is in the Instituut voor de Tropen, Amsterdam.

In 1880 this manuscript was used as the basis for an article in *De Indische Gids*.^{2 3} The author, Alexander, in fact made only minor rewording from the manuscript, most of which takes the meaning still further from what Habib appears to have intended. I have commented in footnotes on the very few points at which Alexander added something to the manuscript, possibly as a result of further information from van der Hegge Spies.

THE TEXT IN TRANSLATION

Born in Hadhramaut (Temir) in the year 1249 [1833-1834],¹ Habib went to Malabar at the age of two with his father, Muhammad Az-Zahir, who remarried there.² Habid had no brothers or sisters. At the age of five (1837) his father sent him to Egypt to learn reading and writing, and at the same time to study the Koran. His education was later continued in Mecca.

In 1842 he returned to Malabar; next he was sent to Calicut to study further there. When, at the age of sixteen (1848), he had sufficient learning and was at home with the Koran, his father let him travel with one of his ships called the *Yeddul Manan*, not as master but rather as supercargo, principally to learn about trade.

23. Alexander, "Korte Levensschets van den Arabier Habib Abdoe 'Rahman Alzahir, naar zijne eigen opgaven saamgesteld," *De Indische Gids*, 2, Part II (1880), pp. 1008-1020.

1. Spies gives the Muslim year 1249 and the Christian year 1832, which do not correspond. I have assumed it is the Muslim date which derives from Habib and have omitted what I take to be Spies' miscalculation. The Christian years mentioned in the following two paragraphs appear to be derived by Spies from his original miscalculation. I cannot locate Temir. Anson (*About Others and Myself*, p. 328) claims that Abdur-Rahman was born "in the British territory of Aden."
2. Alexander ("Korte Levensschets," p. 1009) adds that Habib's mother died shortly after his birth.

After having made various voyages with this ship, visiting the coasts of India, Ceylon, and Arabia, Habib came to Mocha. At that time a daughter of the deceased ruler was living there, whose possessions had been taken by others after the death of her father. Habib, although not knowing her personally, took her cause to heart, spoke and dealt in her interest, and succeeded in getting these possessions returned to the girl. Out of gratitude she asked him to marry her, having previously rejected various other claimants to her hand. Later, when Habib was staying in Atjeh, he received news of her death.

After having lived at Mocha for a year and a half, he went to Mecca; from there to Constantinople; and then back to Malabar. After marrying again in Malabar and staying there some months, he went to Calicut, where he also took a wife by whom he had a daughter named Sjarifa Fatima, who is still alive.

After having lived in Calicut for a couple of years he moved to Hyderabad, where the Hindu religion was professed.³ As the ruler of this region had no children, although he greatly desired them, Habib gave him a potion with the result that he saw his desire for children fulfilled. Habib was now able to persuade the ruler to go over to Islam, while the ruler, out of gratitude, appointed him Djamidar, or commander of 1,000 soldiers.

After having filled this position for eleven months he asked to be released and proceeded to Calcutta. There he appears to have established himself as a goldsmith, or rather as a worker in gold, a gilder, while at the same time he purified the raw gold or ore which came to the market. Whatever the real basis of this occupation was, it appears to have yielded great profits. Habib related that he earned \$100 a day at it, while he lived in a villa called Golkat which cost \$600 a month in rent.

After staying there for some years, earning and putting away a lot of money, the lure of travel overcame him, and particularly the desire to see Europe. On this journey he visited Italy, Germany, and France, and then returned to Mecca via Constantinople.⁴ Next he travelled through British India and visited Bombay, where he stayed for three months; Hyderabad, where he spent seven months; and Calicut, where he remained only three months.

Then he went to Singapore, where he stayed eleven months and got to know the Maharadja of Johor, whose service he entered for a salary of \$2,000 a year. Habib says of Johor that there was much to

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3. This probably refers to Hyderabad in the Deccan, which had a thriving Hadhramaut colony. Its ruler, the Nizam, had for over a century been a firmly Muslim as his counterpart in the other Hyderabad (Sind). Habib may have served in one of the Hindu samasthans, semi-autonomous princely domains tributary to the Nizam, or with one of the Hindu or Shi'ite noble families.
 4. Alexander ("Korte Levensschets," p. 1010) adds that Habib was received with great honor in Constantinople because of his learning and birth, and then digresses to dwell upon Habib's broad-mindedness which extended to drinking wine.

be done at the time of his arrival. Many buildings and roads needed to be constructed, and the internal government also needed to be organized; the responsibility for all this belonged to Habib.⁵

After having been there about one and a half years, he asked the Maharadja for his release and obtained it with a written testimony of satisfaction over the services he had performed. Thereupon he proceeded to Atjeh. On his way there he stopped at Pulau Penang where he stayed about a month, going from there to Pidië as a passenger on a schooner belonging to Teuku Main of Ajer Labu [Ië Labeuë] and on to Atjeh in a sampan.

On arrival there he remained for three days in Kampung Djawa, and then moved to the house of Habib Mohammad Mahaldi in Kampung Langsepong. This took place in Djumadil Awal 1281⁶ [October 1864]. The above person brought him to the Sultan, Ibrahim Mansur Shah, to whom he showed the testimony of the Maharadja of Johor. He was well received by the Sultan on the strength of this. Here, too, Habib married again. Meanwhile the Sultan appointed him head of the Great Mosque.⁷

At this time in Atjeh there was great confusion in the government and much discord among the chiefs, while the authority of the

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5. Habib arrived soon after the accession to the Johor throne of Abu Bakar (1862-1895), a modernizing ruler who introduced a number of educated Singapore Malays into the Johor administration. Early in his reign Abu Bakar also brought some prominent Singapore Arabs into key positions in the state. Some public works did take place at Johor Baru during these years (1862-1864), but Habib's claim to control "internal government" is certainly exaggerated. C.H.H. Wake, "Nineteenth Century Johor: Ruler and Realm in Transition" (Ph.D. thesis, Australian National University, 1966), pp. 241-247, and additional information kindly supplied by Dr. Wake.
 6. The Spies text gives the Muslim year 1261 (which Alexander renders 1221) and the Christian year 1864. Since the former cannot be correct, I assume it is a slip of the pen for 1281. An anonymous Dutch source states the less likely possibility that Habib arrived in Atjeh from Malabar about 1283H (1866). "Aanteekeningen over Atjehneesche aangelengheden," Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch-Indië, nieuwe serie, No. 3, II (1874), p. 405. This source is primarily based on an undated memorandum on Abdur-Rahman in ARA Kol. Kab. E24, dossier 6052. Langsepong was about a mile upriver from the dalam, on the left bank in the territory of Panglima Meuseugit Raja. The wife Habib took here was an Arab, presumably a relation of Mahaldi, and she continued to live in Langsepong. "Aanteekeningen," p. 409.
 7. This position was probably a purely religious office such as the imam of the mosque and should not be confused with the hereditary Atjehnese offices of Panglima Meuseugit Raja or Kali Malik'ul Adil, both of which had become secular ulëëbalangships with jurisdiction in the neighborhood of the palace and Great Mosque, and had lost their original religious significance. Snouck Hurgronje, The Achehese, I, p. 121.

Sultan was greatly weakened. The Sultan consulted Habib frequently, as a result of which the state of affairs improved very much and more order was introduced to the government.

The Sultan, already having the intention to bring the succession back into the legitimate line after his death, wished to have Tuanku Mohamad [Mahmud], son of the deceased Sultan Suleiman Iskandar, near him in the Kraton. Mahmud was then in the hands of Teuku Muda Ba'et in Lamtengah.⁸ On a certain day the Sultan consulted Habib about how he might bring this about. Habib requested, and immediately received from the Sultan, authority to deal with this matter as circumstances demanded. The Sultan also put 2,000 men at his disposal. With these he went straight to the III Mukim Tjot Putu and raised still more men and chiefs there. His force having grown to 12,000 men, he proceeded to Kampung Lamtengah. Close to the Kampung, on the near side of the river he called a halt and sent an envoy named Sjeich Abdul Rachman to the house of Teuku Muda Ba'et to try to bring Tuanku Mahmud to him.

On arrival the envoy found that Teuku Muda Ba'et was not at home, and it was no trouble for him to get Tuanku Mahmud to flee with him to Habib. Thereupon Habib went via Tjot Putu to Pagar Ajer, whence he sent a messenger to the Sultan in Kota Radja to inform him of the satisfactory outcome of the mission. The Sultan had several ulèëbalang collect Tuanku Mahmud and from then onwards kept him close at hand.

Teuku Muda Ba'et, who was incensed that Tuanku Mahmud had been brought to Kota Radja refused to follow the commands of the Sultan as did various chiefs and ulèëbalang of the three Sagi.⁹ Once again Habib requested the Sultan to give him authority to bring them to obedience. Having obtained this, he campaigned through the three Sagi with an evergrowing force, persuading the recalcitrant chiefs to follow him to Kota Dalam (Kraton)¹⁰ partly by force and partly

8. Both by tradition and in terms of the men he could command, the ulèëbalang of the VII Mukim, Ba'et was second only to Panglima Polem in the Sagi of the XXII Mukim, and one of the most powerful men in Atjeh. In the major succession dispute of 1850-1857 between the young heir Suleiman and his uncle and erstwhile guardian Ibrahim (Mansur), Teuku Muda Ba'et took the side of Suleiman. This alliance was cemented by Suleiman's marrying Ba'et's sister, who was then still a child. Suleiman never succeeded, however, in recovering his capital, and the conflict ended with his death in 1857. Ba'et remained unreconciled to the Sultan and continued to protect Suleiman's wife and infant son Mahmud, born about 1854. K.F.H. Van Langen, "De Inrichting van het Atjehsche Staatsbestuur onder het Sultanaat," Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, 34 (1888), pp. 397-398; Reid, Contest, pp. 16 and 80.
9. The three Sagi (corners) into which all of Atjeh Besar outside the capital and environs was divided. They were known by the conventionalized number of Mukim they once held, i.e., XXV Mukim (west of Atjeh river), XXVI Mukim (east of Atjeh river), XXII Mukim (upriver).
10. Atjehnese called the royal enclosure the dalam, whereas the Dutch wrongly referred to it as the kraton, the term used on Java.

by means of his fluency. He then proceeded to Lamtengah, took Teuku Muda Ba'et captive, and thereupon marched to the territory of Teuku Nanta,¹¹ the only ulèëbalang who had still refused to go with Habib to the Sultan. Becoming fearful, this chief then joined the others who were coming to offer their submission to the Sultan, whereupon Habib returned to Kota Dalam.

In eight days time Habib had through cunning and force brought all ulèëbalang both to the Sultan's presence and to obedience to their ruler. As a reward for services rendered, Habib was appointed by the Sultan head of religion¹² and of the Great Mosque, as well as chief of Tjot Putu in the III Mukim.¹³

In order to strengthen his position in Atjeh, Habib, who was a foreigner, now contemplated establishing kinship ties with an influential chief through marriage. As Teuku Muda Ba'et was now with the

Kota Dalam and Kota Radja were expressions sometimes used by Atjehnese to refer to their capital, although Banda Atjeh Daru's-Salam was historically a more correct name. The Dutch adopted the usage Kota Radja.

11. Teuku Nanta Setia succeeded about 1848 in wresting control of VI Mukim near the capital which had formerly been part of the domain of Teuku Nek of Meura'sa. These two families remained bitter rivals thereafter. In the succession dispute of 1850-1857, Nek sided with Ibrahim while Nanta provided Suleiman with his principal base. Van Langen, "De Inrichting," pp. 406-408; Snouck Hurgronje, The Achehese, pp. 126-127.
12. Snouck Hurgronje (The Achehese, I, pp. 161-163) states that Habib was put in charge of a new court, the balè meuhakamah, created to enable him to try all cases according to Islamic law. Although such courts appear to have been instituted on earlier occasions in Atjeh's history, their religious significance had seldom outlasted the ruler concerned, and most disputes were settled by ulèëbalang according to adat. Because of his consummate political skill as well as his religious prestige, Habib was able to use his office to settle a wide range of disputes and to attack such acknowledged abuses as opium and gambling. Ali Bahanan, who reported to the Dutch on a visit to Atjeh in 1867, noted that Abdur-Rahman had already made powerful enemies in his new position because of the stiff fines he imposed and his levies for mosque construction, not to mention the other ulama resentful of this newcomer. "Aanteekeningen" (pp. 405-406) suggests that the Sultan accepted Habib's offer to resign sometime in 1866-1867.
13. The III Mukim Keureukon was a territory on the border between the Sagi of the XXVI and XXII Mukim, though belonging directly to the Sultan rather than to either Sagi. Snouck Hurgronje, (The Achehese, I, p. 124) refers to a famous ulama in Tjot Putu in a slightly earlier period, and it may be that Habib took over the déah (religious school) which this teacher had built. The III Mukim Keureukon and parts of the adjoining XXVI Mukim remained the basis of Habib's most direct support in Atjeh Besar, although he was obliged to march against Tjot Putu in late 1871, when one of Tuanku Husein's supporters settled there. "Aanteekeningen," p. 411.

Sultan in Kota Radja, after Habib's armed expedition described above, Habib asked and obtained from him, for a payment of \$400, his sister Potjut as a wife. By this marriage Habib became a considerable person within the Atjehnese state, for Potjut was not only the sister of one of the foremost chiefs but at the same time the widow of Sultan Suleiman Iskandar.

However, after returning to his own domain, Teuku Muda Ba'et refused to allow Potjut to go to Tjot Putu. At first he promised to let Habib have her after three months but in the end declared that Habib would not get her except by force. Habib, therefore, decided to go to Tjot Bada with a great force and compelled Teuku Muda Ba'et to let him have Potjut, whom he now brought to Tjot Putu. From this point dates the friendship between Habib and Teuku Muda Ba'et which has continued until today.

The Sultan was exceedingly surprised at this war Habib had carried on with results so favorable to himself, while Habib's enemies, among whom Teuku Kali¹⁴ was foremost, slandered him and attempted to make him suspect in the eyes of the Sultan. They said that Habib only waged war in order to have ever more men at his command and intended to make war on the Sultan himself. At this time, however, the Sultan placed no trust in these accusations.

On the contrary, Habib's proposal to build another large mosque was accepted by the Sultan, who gave him authority to requisition the various ulëëbalang and other chiefs to deliver the necessary wood, which was collected and sent to Penajung by Habib. Having accumulated a sufficient stock of timber there, Habib gave a great feast in which almost the whole population of Atjeh Besar, chiefs and commoners, took part. Thereafter a start was made on building the *missigît*,¹⁵

14. His full title was Teuku Kali Malikon Adé, from the Arabic Kadhi Maliku'l adil, meaning "judge of the righteous king." Although in the seventeenth century the official with this title appears to have administered both Islamic and adat law, his hereditary successors became entirely secularized, and more learned men were appointed to judge religious questions. In the nineteenth century the Kali Malikon Adé managed to acquire a fief of twelve villages near the capital, and thus became in almost every respect an ulëëbalang, as symbolized by his use of the title Teuku. The last title holder, Teuku Kali Njak Tjut (d. 1885) could neither read nor write, yet he was still a very important adviser to the ruler and presided over a council of "court ulëëbalang" who judged some secular questions. Van Langen, "De Inrichting," pp. 42-43; Snouck Hurgronje, The Achehese, I, pp. 97-101.
15. Atjehnese meuseugit (cf. Arabic, Masdjid), mosque. The mosque in question was the meuseugit raja Beit ur-Rahman, the great mosque of the capital, said to have been founded by Sultan Iskandar Muda (1607-1637). It was burned down in the reign of Nuru'l Alam (1675-1678) and was in very bad repair again in Habib's time. The mosque reconstructed by Habib was destroyed by the Dutch in 1873, but a painting purportedly of it, as recollected by Tgk. Sjeich Ibrahim (b. Sjeich Maraban), now hangs in the balai of the Governor of Atjeh. Its inscription states that it was built on Habib's initiative in 1867, at a cost of \$13,000. In reality, however, the work does not appear to have been complete until 1870.

for which \$3,000 was given by the Sultan himself.

Habib went in person to visit the various petty states on the West Coast of Atjeh to collect money. He succeeded in getting \$33,000 and reported this success to the Sultan.

Meanwhile, each of Habib's absences was used to slander him with the Sultan. During his stay on the West Coast, for example, it was said that he had gone there to buy weapons, etc. Although the Sultan initially paid no attention to these suggestions, they were repeated so often that he finally began to waver in his good opinion of Habib--perhaps it could be true that this foreigner was a bad man. Habib's enemies, jealous of his wealth, also grew in number. In this way his position in Atjeh became untenable.

He successfully asked for his dismissal and left from Pulau Penang for Mecca,¹⁶ where he received letters of recommendation from: (1) the Great Sherif Abdullah Basjah;¹⁷ (2) the Sherif of Jidda, Mohamar Basja;¹⁸ and (3) his former teacher Habib Tadjak.

16. According to "Aanteekeningen," pp. 406-408, Abdur-Rahman had attempted to leave for Jidda when he first fell into the Sultan's disfavor, but found the port barred to him. He therefore went to Keureukon for about six months, before returning to the capital where he was seized by Teuku Kali. He was saved from execution by the Sultan, who made arrangements for him to leave Atjeh. Two days after embarking for Jidda, however, he was taken off the vessel in the roads by people from Keureukon. For two years more, the "Aanteekeningen" asserts, Habib agitated against the Sultan from Keureukon. He departed for Jidda via Simpang Ulim only when it became clear that Panglima Polem would not support a march against the dalam, probably in 1868.
17. Grand Sharif Abdullah Pasha (1858-1877) of the Devi or Abadila family, which was relatively open to western ideas. Abdullah appears to have been unusually interested in the Djawah, as Indonesians were known in Mecca, especially for the support they might give to his anti-Turkish maneuvers. Zohrab (Jidda) to the Foreign Office, London, March 17, 1880 and February 8, 1881, FO 78/3130 and 3314 respectively; Snouck Hurgronje, Mekka (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1888), I, pp. 168-173; G. de Gaury, Rulers of Mecca (London: Harrap, 1951), pp. 249-253. According to Turkish government sources, Habib was "blood relation" of Sharif Abdullah and always visited him when in Mecca. Heldewier to Gericke, May 25, 1874, Buitenlandse Zaken (hereafter B.Z.), dossier Atjeh.
18. Mouhamar Pasha was the Turkish wali (Governor General) of the Hejaz, resident in Jidda. He exercised limited powers in this period. Late in 1868, the Porte received a petition addressed to Mouhamar Pasha and signed by 65 Atjehnese "notables," which declared that the Atjehnese considered themselves Turkish subjects and begged for military protection against the Dutch. It appears likely that this petition was inspired by Habib's visit to the Hejaz. The signatories may have been his leading supporters in Atjeh. Translations of the petition are in E.S. de Klerck, De Atjeh-oorlog, pp. 461-462, and Anthony Reid, "Indonesian Diplomacy: A Documentary Study of Atjehnese Foreign Policy in the Reign of Sultan Mahmud, 1870-1874," Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Malayan Branch, 42, No. 2 (1969), pp. 75-76.

With these letters of recommendation, Habib boarded a sailing vessel and departed for Atjeh directly.

After anchoring in the Atjeh roadstead, he informed the Sultan of his return by letter, adding that the only reason he had come was to get his wife Potjut and that he would return thereafter to Mecca. At this time the Sultan sent two envoys on board to talk to Habib. Habib repeated to them what he had written to the Sultan, but he also gave them the three letters of recommendation so that the Sultan could examine them. As soon as the Sultan realized the contents of these three letters, he sent his envoys back on board with instructions to invite Habib to come to the Kraton. The Sultan personally stood on the beach to await him and brought him to the Kraton out of fear that Habib's many enemies would kill him.

The Sultan gave him back his former positions as head of religion and of the Great Mosque and chief of Tjot Putu. Habib continued to grow in the favor of the Sultan and was eventually appointed his *Wazir* (minister). In this role Habib succeeded in bringing more peace and order to Atjeh, while the Sultan's revenues increased because Habib was energetic in raising the *hasil* (tax). The *ulèëbalang*, on the other hand, became increasingly hostile toward Habib. They could no longer get to see the Sultan because he always referred them to Habib.

Meanwhile, Habib proposed to the Sultan that he allow the Dutch into Atjeh to trade and thereby establish a good relationship with them. Habib believed such relations were in the interests of the Atjehnese kingdom. Before taking a decision, the Sultan wanted to know the opinions of some leading chiefs, namely Teuku Kali, Teuku Imam Longbata, and Teuku Nek Mara'sa.¹⁹

In the discussions the Sultan had with chiefs in Habib's presence about this proposal, they fully agreed with Habib, and it was concluded that Habib would go to Batavia with Teuku Kali and Teuku Nek Mara'sa as envoys from the Sultan to the Governor-General of Netherlands India. The steamship *Patty*, and Captain Roura²⁰ were to be hired for this purpose. After the chiefs left the Kraton, however, they openly said that Habib intended to sell Atjeh to the Dutch.

While these discussions and deliberations were taking place, His [Netherlands'] Majesty's steamship *Djambi* arrived at Atjeh roads, bringing a letter from the Governor-General of Netherlands India and some presents. Habib was deputed to go to the *Djambi* with Teuku Kali

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19. As *ulèëbalang* of territories close to the capital, T. Imam Longbata (Luëng Bata) and T. Nek Mara'sa and T. Kali Malikon Adé were frequently consulted "court *ulèëbalang*." Van Langen, ("De Inrichting," p. 421) names these three and two others as members of a sort of judicial council for Sultan Ibrahim.
 20. Captain Edouard Roura, of Marseilles, had been trading in pepper between Penang and the West Coast of Atjeh since the 1850's. He was particularly friendly with Abdur-Rahman, who corresponded with him and used his ship the Patty to travel to Penang in 1872.

and Teuku Nek Mara'sa.²¹ When he left the shore, and also later when he left the *Djambi*, he was given a thirteen-gun salute.

The Commander of the *Djambi* spoke to Habib in detail about his mission, with the result that the two other envoys muttered that Habib was busy selling Atjeh. When later the Commander came ashore at Kota Dalam he held discussions with Panglima Tibang (Habib's enemy).²² On hearing this, Habib was very disturbed.

After the *Djambi's* departure the following events occurred. Tuanku Zainal Abidin,²³ son of Sultan Ibrahim Mansursjah, learning that his father intended to designate Tuanku Mahmud as his successor, resolved to murder his father. In fact, he tried to do so by firing at his father with a pistol but did not hit him. This conflict between the Sultan and his son was patched up by Habib.

Shortly thereafter Tuanku Zainal Abidin died of a short-lived but serious illness. Sultan Ibrahim followed his son soon after.²⁴ Before his death, however, he made a written will in which Tuanku Mahmud was designated his successor and Habib Abdur-Rahman was named regent during his minority.

Meanwhile there was disagreement among the ulèëbalang about the succession. While some wanted Tuanku Mahmud as Sultan, there was another party which wanted to see Tuanku Husein,²⁵ the son of

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21. Habib's chronology is confused here. The *Djambi* was in Atjeh roads during September 19-30, 1871, after the death of Sultan Ibrahim. The *Djambi* carried a letter from the Governor of Sumatra's West Coast, not from the Governor-General. The basic task of Controleur Kraijenhoff, who led the Dutch mission, was to establish whether Dutch objectives in Atjeh might be obtained peacefully. The mission achieved nothing initially, being constantly put off by the Shahbandar, Panglima Tibang, until Habib arrived from a six-month sojourn on the West Coast on September 24. Two days later a five-man Atjehnese delegation was received by the *Djambi* with thirteen guns. It was composed of Habib and Teuku Kali as the joint regents of Atjeh, and three "court ulèëbalang"-- T. Aga Imam, T. Luëng Bata, and T. Meura'sa. De Klerck, De Atjeh-oorlog, pp. 344-349.
 22. Panglima Muhammad Tibang had come to Atjeh as a child performer from South India, but stayed and became a Muslim. He became a confidant of Sultan Ibrahim, who appointed him Shahbandar (port-officer), a post he continued to hold under Mahmud. Dutch accounts of the *Djambi* visit, however, emphasize how completely Habib dominated the negotiations and how competently he put the Atjehnese case. Only later did the Dutch take Tibang more seriously.
 23. Sultan Ibrahim had two sons: Pangeran Hussein, who died in 1869, and Tuanku Zainal Abidin, who died in 1870. Tuanku Mohammad Daud, who succeeded to the throne as a minor in 1874, was the son of Zainal Abidin.
 24. Sultan Ibrahim died in 1870. His tomb within the dalam is undated.
 25. Tuanku Husein was the second son of Tuanku Abas, who in turn was the younger brother of Sultan Ibrahim and the son of Sultan Jauhar al-Alam (1795-1823). Because of the death of both Ibrahim's sons,

Tuanku Abas and grandson of Sultan Mohamadshah, appointed successor to the dead Sultan Ibrahim. In the meantime Habib carried on the government during the minority of Tuanku Mahmud (one year) as guardian of the minor and regent of the state.

At the end of this year Tuanku Mahmud was elevated to the position of Sultan²⁶ with the forceful help of Panglima Polem,²⁷ who came to Kota Dalam personally for that reason. Habib governed the kingdom as Grand Vezir²⁸ for and in the name of the Sultan.

After another year, when he judged the authority of the new Sultan sufficiently established, Habib made a voyage to the West Coast states with an authorization or *tjap* (seal) of the Sultan to levy the hasil. He succeeded in collecting a sum of \$12,000 hasil plus \$9,000 which was provided by the people for the expenses of the missigit.

Meanwhile the chiefs and people of the XXVI Mukim were still disinclined to follow the commands of Sultan Mahmud. They were encouraged in this behavior by Panglima Tibang, who bore a great hatred for Habib since, having formerly been the adviser of the late Sultan Ibrahim, he had lost all his influence on the ruler after Habib's arrival. The Panglima even tried to do him to death with poison.

On his return from the West Coast, Habib made use of the money he had raised there to force the XXVI Mukim into obedience to the Sultan by force of arms. He succeeded in this after marching on Tjadé with a large army.²⁹

Meanwhile Panglima Tibang continued to make trouble within the Atjehnese polity and tried to ingratiate himself with Sultan Mahmud. To this end he made particular use of Habib's absence when he went yet again to the West Coast.

and the youth of Suleiman's son Mahmud, the sons of Abas were the closest adult males in the line of succession. The older son, Tuanku Abdul Medjid, was without support as he was an opium addict who had fallen foul of Habib.

26. "Aanteekeningen," p. 409, states that Mahmud was declared Sultan about November 1870, Ibrahim having died in July of the same year.
27. Panglima Polem was the Panglima Sagi of the XXII Mukim, and as such had more men at his command than any other ulèëbalang.
28. Habib's title was Mangkubumi (administrator). Teuku Kali Maliku'l Adil appears to have been designated to share the office, though in a distinctly secondary capacity.
29. According to "Aanteekeningen," pp. 410-412, this expedition was directed against those in the XXVI Mukim who continued to support Tuanku Husein's candidature for the Sultanate. Husein himself was living with the ulèëbalang of Tjadé but fled before Abdur-Rahman's advance. This expedition took place after Habib's return from the West Coast and the Djambi visit at the end of 1871.

During this absence His [Netherlands] Majesty's Steamer *Maas en Waal* arrived in Atjeh roads.³⁰ The negotiations which then took place were conducted by Panglima Tibang without Habib's knowledge, since Tibang had won the Sultan's favor. Such was the state of affairs when Habib returned to Kota Radja from the West Coast. Habib already realized that war with the Dutch was unavoidable.

Unwilling to share the government of Atjeh with Panglima Tibang and unable to exercise any constructive influence over the course of events, Habib left Atjeh to return to Arabia.³¹ He took ship for Penang on the steamer *Patty*, and left from there for Mecca by the mail.³² Having stayed there for some time with the Sjarif, Abdullah Basjah, he travelled on to Constantinople. There he was given an audience with the Sultan, who received him very well and bestowed on him the Commander's Cross of the Osmanie Order. Then he returned to Mecca.³³

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30. Habib was absent on the West Coast during a second visit by the Djambi in May 1872 and also during the visit of the Maas en Waal in late October 1872. Panglima Tibang was also absent during both visits, attempting to elicit British support in the Straits Settlements. Kraijenhoff, who conducted both these Dutch missions, found the Atjehnese very reluctant to undertake any discussions in Habib's absence. De Klerck, De Atjeh-oorlog, pp. 364-370.
 31. Habib and Tibang appear to have returned to the capital in November 1872 to learn that Kraijenhoff had announced an impending high-level Dutch mission to Atjeh. Tibang had already contacted Schiff, the Resident of Riau, who was to lead this Dutch mission during his visit to the Straits Settlements. Without consulting Habib the Sultan was persuaded to send Tibang back to plead with Schiff for a delay in the mission. Tibang, supported by Teuku Kali and the few other "court ulèëbalang" who shared his jealousy of Habib, was no match for Abdur-Rahman in terms of support in the country. The Arab may have felt, nevertheless, that he had lost control of Atjehnese relations with the Dutch at the very moment these were becoming critical. His departure was dignified by a royal commission to appeal to Turkey and other European powers for help against the Dutch.
 32. A report of January 6, 1873 from Penang stated that Habib had left there "on the last mail" for Europe. His intention was thought to be an appeal to the French government, which had been suggested to him by Roura. Van de Putte to Gericke, March 14, 1873, B.Z., dossier Atjeh.
 33. It seems unlikely that Habib could have visited Constantinople in February or March 1873 without this being noticed by the Dutch at the time or mentioned in the extensive coverage of his moves after April. Habib had a private audience with Sultan Abdul Aziz to present his papers on May 15, 1873. In December 1873, at the end of his Constantinople mission, he was given the the Osmanie Order of the second class. According to Dutch sources the higher honor of Grand Cross of the Osmanie Order was denied him, as was a formal interview with the Sultan, because of pressure from the Western powers, especially Russia.

On arrival there he received news that war had already broken out between the Netherlands and Atjeh and that Sultan Mahmud had died.³⁴ At the same time he received a joint letter from the chiefs of the three Sagi, in which they gave him authority for a seven-year period to negotiate on their behalf with other countries for help in the war in which Atjeh had become involved.

Habib accepted this commission, travelled again to Europe, and visited Constantinople and Paris,³⁵ where he made fruitless attempts to persuade these governments to offer assistance to Atjeh. The Turkish government promised moral support by sending a letter to the King of Holland, though he was later informed by a letter from Murad Effendi that Atjehese affairs were governed by written agreements among European governments, so that Turkey did not feel entitled to interfere in the war.³⁶

Habib also appealed indirectly for the intervention of England by making use of an earlier acquaintance in Singapore with Sir Rutherford Alcock,³⁷ who at that time had been Ambassador to China and Japan, and now a member of the Upper House.

Because Habib travelled in very great style, the costs were considerable; however, the necessary funds were regularly forwarded by Teuku Paja of Pulau Penang.³⁸

After making all these attempts in vain, Habib returned to Singapore.³⁹ There he addressed a letter to the Governor-General of Netherlands India, in which he offered His Excellency his services

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34. Holland declared war on Atjeh on March 26, 1873. Sultan Mahmud died in January 1874, and it was at his plenipotentiary that Habib acted in Turkey.
 35. Habib arrived in Constantinople from Suez on April 27, 1873 and remained there lobbying very effectively for Atjeh until December 18, when he sailed for Suez and Jidda. He had intended to visit France but did not do so, presumably because his overtures were flatly rejected by the French.
 36. For the diplomatic outcome of Habib's mission, see Reid, Contest, pp. 119-129 and 145-153.
 37. Sir Rutherford Alcock (1809-1897) was Britain's first Consul-General in Japan (1858-1865), and Minister-Plenipotentiary in China (1865-1871). He took an extended home leave in 1862-1864, and probably met Abdur-Rahman in the suite of the Maharadja of Johor while passing through Singapore. If Habib wrote to Alcock in 1873, however, this appeal does not seem to have reached Whitehall.
 38. A wealthy pepper trader and ulèëbalang of Tandjung Samuntoh in eastern Atjeh, Teuku Paja was in Penang on business at the outbreak of the Atjeh war. His nephew accompanied Habib to Constantinople. T. Paja fell into debt to the extent of \$70,000 by 1874, largely because of his constant support of Habib's extravagant mission. He returned to Atjeh soon after Habib and took a prominent part in the war.
 39. He arrived by the S. S. Jeddah on March 13, 1874.

of mediation to restore peace in Atjeh. Habib said that he never received any answer to this letter.⁴⁰

Habib left Singapore for Pulau Penang⁴¹ with the intention of embarking from there for Atjeh. He stayed in Penang about three months, dined many times during his stay with the Lieutenant Governor, Colonel Anson,⁴² and repeated to the [Dutch] Consul⁴³ the written offer he had made to the Governor-General.

However, because the government was evidently not then willing to negotiate with him, he decided to return to Atjeh and offer his help to the Atjehnese in the war against the Dutch. Meanwhile the Consul, Mr. Lavino, tried in all possible ways to prevent his going there. He had him trailed by a spy wherever he went.

One day he managed to elude the vigilance of this spy. After he had cut his hair, shaved his beard, and dressed entirely as a Kling [South Indian], he took an unnumbered vehicle in which he rode to the beach. There he met the Atjehnese Njak Barun, went with him in a sampan to a small steamer preparing to sail to Atjeh, gave himself out as a Kling, and booked for Idi without revealing himself to anyone on board. Throughout the voyage he pretended to be a lunatic.⁴⁴

When it anchored at Idi the steamer was ordered by a warship in the roadstead to avoid any communication with the shore until the ship was inspected. At this Habib managed to hail a small Atjehnese sampan which was nearby, had himself lowered into it, and put ashore at Padawa Pantong. Njak Barun, who had stayed on board, also reached Padawa at night and procured for Habib an escort of 50 men, with which he set off for Atjeh Besar. In every place he came to--Idi Ketjil, Tandjung Samuntoh, Simpang Ulim--honor was paid to him. He

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40. Habib's extensive activity in Singapore to promote a Dutch-Atjehnese settlement is described in Reid, Contest, pp. 158-175.
 41. Habib left Singapore secretly in late November 1874 for Ceylon and South India. He resided mainly in Calicut, but appears also to have visited Madras and Bombay in the hope of influencing British officials. He arrived in Penang from India on May 14, 1875. Maier to Loudon, December 1, 27, 1874; January 11, February 9, 23, March 8, 1875; ARA Consulaats-archief, Penang, 99.
 42. Colonel A.E.H. Anson (1826-1925) was Lieutenant Governor of Penang since 1867. Anson (About Others and Myself, pp. 324-329), recalls his discussions with Habib with delightful vividness.
 43. George Lavino had the full-time post of Agent of the Netherlands Indian Government for Acheen affairs at Penang, though he became Consul in 1881. Anson brought him and Habib together for negotiations against strong resistance from Batavia.
 44. On March 7, 1876 Lavino's spies lost track of Abdur-Rahman, who boarded the Penang Chinese steamer Batara Bayoo Sree the same day. Lavino's account of his movements confirms Habib's precisely, except that his companion becomes Njak Harun. Lavino to Van Lansberge, March 16 and 22, 1876, ARA Consulaats-archief, Penang, 102.

stayed in Simpang Ulim several days. Radja Teuku Muda Njak Malim⁴⁵ gave him \$5,000 for the costs of the war as well as 500 barrels of gunpowder. His force was augmented to 2,000 men. From there he went to Kerti [Keureutoë] where his force was again increased considerably and he was given \$5,000 by the various ulëëbalang. In Peusangan he received \$1,000, in Pidië, \$5,000, in Gigiëng from Bintara Kambangan [Keumangan]⁴⁶ \$1,000. By the time he reached Pidië his force comprised about 10,000 men.

From there, he addressed a letter to the chiefs of the three Sagi, notifying them of his arrival and asking whether they wanted him in Atjeh with the force he had assembled, and if so in what capacity. He received the reply that they were anxiously looking forward to his coming. Then he went to Indrapuri, summoned all the ulëëbalang of the three Sagi, and put the same question to them in person that he had put in writing. They unanimously told him they would elect him their commander and war leader. Next he went to Missigit Mon Tasiëk, called the chiefs together once again, and put the same question to them, to which he received the same reply. Habib then told them he was prepared to accept this commission if each one promised obedience to him and if he received an appointment in writing signed jointly by the chiefs.

After receiving this commission Habib assumed the leadership of the war; however, he still had to contend with the disunity of the ulëëbalang, of whom only one section obeyed his orders while another section acted entirely according to their own lights without any considered plan.

When Habib assumed the conduct of affairs, Kajulah, Bilul, and Lambaru were already under the control of the [Netherlands Indies] government. As commander he led the Atjehnese against the government four times: three times in the XXVI Mukim⁴⁷ and once, the last time, in IV Mukim [Lhok Nga]. Before the attack on the [IV] Mukim took place Habib tried to persuade the various ulëëbalang to submit to the government because he was well aware that Atjeh was bound to lose out in the war, not only because it was no match for the government, but more importantly because there was no unity and his commands

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45. Radja Teuku Muda Njak Malim was the most energetic and successful ulëëbalang of the East Coast before the war, with the largest pepper exports in the country, a small fleet of schooners, and considerable investments in Penang. Together with Teuku Paja, he was the staunchest financial supporter of Habib.
46. Teuku Bintara Keumangan was the leader of the federation of six ulëëbalang of Keumangan (or Gigiëng) in the Pidië district. He followed Habib to the war front and seconded his attempts to unite the Atjehnese.
48. Kajulah, Bilul, and Lambaru were among the points taken in February 1876, during the first serious Dutch attempt to extend their occupation eastwards of the Atjeh river into the XXVI Mukim. Habib reached Atjeh Besar by July 1876, but he devoted his efforts to strengthening his own position and supervising fortifications in the XXII Mukim rather than initiating attacks. A renewed Dutch offensive in late 1876 ended in March 1877 after the occupation of most of the XXV and XXVI Mukim. Atjeh Besar then remained curiously peaceful until April 1878, when Abdur-Rahman began the attacks here mentioned.

were so badly carried out. Panglima Polem had entirely withdrawn from the war out of enmity for Habib,⁴⁸ and even refused to give financial assistance from the money collected from the people for that purpose. He let Habib have only a very small proportion--\$500.

Nevertheless, the majority of the chiefs were still in favor of the war. Habib therefore decided to try to bring the conflict to a decision by attacking the IV Mukim and threatening Kota Radja and Uleëlheue.⁴⁹ But now again the (Radja's) troops which he called up presented themselves in very deficient numbers.

When General Van der Heijden then attacked him from various sides he fled to Missigit Mon Tasiëk. At this he again assembled the various chiefs and urged them to submit; however, they still wanted to continue the war. There followed the taking of Sinalob. The whole Atjehnese army retreated to Missigit Mon Tasiëk, and although Habib considered this fortress was strong enough to make resistance possible, this was not to be the case.

Once Missigit Mon Tasiëk had fallen into our [Dutch] hands,⁵⁰ Habib once more convened a gathering of the chiefs, where he bluntly told them that their cause was completely lost and that they would be wise to submit with him to the government. As for himself, he wanted to be released from the task with which they had entrusted him, because he intended to take leave of them and offer his submission. Of the twelve chiefs who participated in this meeting,⁵¹ seven were inclined towards submission, whereas five chiefs still desired to continue the war.

48. Polem had in fact withdrawn from the war in 1874 in despair at Atjehnese disunity but rejoined it as one of Habib's leading supporters in 1876. The quarrel mentioned here must have arisen in 1877-1878.

49. This major operation began immediately after the Dutch commander Van der Heijden had sailed for Geudong with a large part of his force on June 15, 1878. The Dutch post at Kruëng Raba in the IV Mukim Lhok Nga (West Coast of Atjeh Besar) was cut off and seriously threatened until it was relieved on June 25. Habib twice offered to allow the 100-man garrison to leave if they destroyed their fort. Meanwhile he mobilized some thousands of men who put Kota Radja itself in danger until Van der Heijden's return with his men on June 23-24. Habib's offensive brought an end to Dutch passivity. Van der Heijden was reinforced and allowed to conquer the whole of the Atjeh valley. E. B. Kielstra, Beschrijving van den Atjeh-oorlog (The Hague: Van Cleef, 1885), III, pp. 219-247.

50. July 28, 1878.

51. This is probably a reference to the ulèëbalang jang duabelas--the twelve ulèëbalang, composed of four from each of the three Sagi of Atjeh Besar, who traditionally had the power of election to the throne. Abdur-Rahman made a similar statement to Lavino in 1875, saying that five out of twelve chiefs of Atjeh Besar were on his side. Lavino to Van Lansberge, May 27, 1875, ARA Consulaats-archief, Penang 101. These references are among the most striking evidence for the strength of the institution which Snouck Hurgronje (The Achehese, I, p. 138) plays down.

In this state of affairs a letter fell into Habib's hands addressed to Teuku Muda Ba'et by the Governor of Atjeh and dependencies, in reply to a previous letter sent by the chief to the governor. In Teuku Muda Ba'et's absence, this letter was answered by Habib, and once the reply was sent Habib wrote himself to the Governor. The correspondence which ensued resulted in the submission of Habib, which took place in Kota Radja on October 13, 1878, after the conditions he advanced were accepted.

While negotiations were being conducted between Habib and the government he still saw to it that the building of new fortifications continued day and night. He did this in the first place so as not to be unprepared if the negotiations with the government failed, but also to avoid arousing the suspicion of the population. For although Habib had informed the ulëëbalang of his intentions, he had done this in such general terms that the submission itself, as well as its timing, was unknown to them. Indeed, many perhaps regarded his statement as intimidation.

His journey to Aneuk Galong, where he was awaited on the above date by Chief of Staff Major Gey van Pittius and Assistant Resident Sol, always took place at night, for fear of being hindered by hostile elements.⁵²

The above was noted down and put into writing by me as a result of various conversations I held with Habib and questions I asked him. The native writer Mohamud Arif has assisted me by giving information. As far as possible I have taken note of facts which I believed were not generally known, but above all I have envisaged providing a contribution to the knowledge of the character of a man who has played an important role in the Atjeh war.

52. Alexander ("Korte Levensschets," pp. 1019-1020) closes his narrative with details of Habib's journey to Jidda aboard the Curacao in November and December 1878. Abdur-Rahman lived on his pension in Mecca until his death in 1896. Although he was avoided by most Atjehnese because of what they regarded as his betrayal, he still believed in 1884 that he could restore peace if the Dutch would allow him to do so. Snouck Hurgronje knew him in Mecca (1884-1885), and was obviously impressed (The Achehnese, I, pp. 76 and 158-164). In 1886 he was appointed Sheikh es-Sadat (superior of the sayyid of Mecca) by the Turkish wali Osman Pasha. A month later, when Osman was replaced, he was relieved of this office by the Grand Sharif Aun al-Rafiq. Typically, Habib responded to this humiliation by withdrawing to Malabar for some months. De Vicq to Karnebeek, November 12 and December 23, 1886, copies respectively in ARA Kol. Kab.C13, dossier 6169, and dossier 6170.

