DIVISIONS AND POWER IN THE INDONESIAN NATIONAL PARTY, 1965-1966

Angus McIntyre

The principal division which split the PNI into two sharply opposed factions in 1965-1966 had its origins as far back as 1957, when the PKI made spectacular advances in large part at PNI expense in the 1957 regional elections in Java and South Sumatra. In Central Java, where the PKI supplanted the PNI as the region's strongest party (based on the 1955 general elections results), the PNI reaction at the time was most outspoken. Hadisubeno, the regional party chairman, blamed the party's poor showing on its past association with the PKI and accordingly urged the party's central executive council to review this relationship. He suggested that the party consider forming an alliance with the Masjumi (the modernist Islamic party) and the Nahdatul Ulama (NU, the traditional Islamic party). A conference of the Central Java PNI passed a resolution forbidding cooperation with the PKI.

These acts were interpreted by many as a slap at President Sukarno, who had made it increasingly clear in the preceding months that to oppose the PKI was to oppose him as well; however, the party's central leadership, no less hostile to the PKI, was unwilling to risk such an interpretation and thereby further impair its relations with Sukarno. Indeed, only a few months before, Sukarno had indicated strong displeasure with the PNI in his address to the party on the occasion of its thirtieth anniversary celebrations. He implied that PNI members had lost their commitment to the goal of a socialist or marhaenist society, the realization of which had been his very reason

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2. Ibid., p. 106.
3. Ibid., p. 108.
5. For Sukarno, a socialist or marhaenist society was one which advanced the social and economic well being of small farmers, farm laborers, and others who had been impoverished by imperialism--people for whom he had coined the phrase "Marhaen." Soekarno, Marhaen and Proletarian (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1960), pp. 3 and 5.
for establishing the PNI in the first place in 1927: 6 "Look at your face today. Is it the same, or not, as the portrait of 1927? If it is the same, thanks to God who be praised, I say. If it is not the same, then--self-correction." 7 Accordingly, the central leadership issued no public rejection of the PKI. 8

As it turned out, however, improvement of relations with the President involved far more than merely forfeiting the opportunity to oppose the PKI openly. It also involved a commitment to a Marhaenist society and to whatever means Sukarno chose to adopt for its realization. Between 1957 and 1959, a commitment to the President's concept of Guided Democracy had been required, and on this matter party leaders such as general chairman Suwirjo and central leadership council member Hardi, dedicated as they were to the preservation of the parliamentary system, were unable to satisfy Sukarno. They thereby left themselves open to challenge from the younger leaders of the PNI mass organizations who were attracted to Sukarno's brand of radical nationalism and supported his concept of Guided Democracy.

Immediately prior to the 1960 party congress the younger leaders distributed a brochure to the delegates entitled Appeal Djuli 1960 (July 1960 Appeal). 9 Invoking the authority of Mentjapai Indonesia Merdeka (To Achieve an Independent Indonesia), a pamphlet written by Sukarno in 1933, and its Leninist prescriptions for party composition and organization, 10 the appeal deplored the "embourgeoisement" and "liberalization" of the PNI and its leaders since 1946. 11 In order to remedy this situation and to restore the PNI to its proper role as vanguard party of a marhaen mass movement, it called on the

6. In fact, the Indonesian National Party, founded in January-February 1946, is organizationally distinct from the party of the same name founded by Sukarno in July 1927 and was dissolved by party members in April 1931. The post-independence party, however, has not recognized such a distinction and therefore dates its founding from July 1927.


9. Appeal Djuli 1960 Organisasi-Organisasi Karya Front Marhaenis kepada Kongres PNI ke-IX (1960) was compiled and signed by the leaders of the following PNI mass organizations: Pemuda Demokrat Indonesia (Democratic Youth of Indonesia), Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Student Movement), Kesatuan Buruh Kerakjatan Indonesia (Indonesian People's Labor Front), and Persatuan Tani Indonesia (Indonesian Peasants' Front).

10. In this document Sukarno had written that the vanguard party of the marhaen mass movement must have a highly centralized organization of radical orientation whose leadership would have far reaching power and authority. Mentjapai Indonesia Merdeka (1933), p. 61. Borrowing the term as well as the idea from Lenin, Sukarno referred to this arrangement of power within the party as democratic centralism. Ibid., p. 62.

11. Appeal Djuli, passim.
It blamed the PNI's estrangement from Sukarno on those party leaders, such as Hardi, who had opposed the President's plan "to do away with the liberal form of parliament." This proposal called for the introduction of functional group representation into Indonesia's next parliament and the inclusion of such groups as peasants, students, and youth. As prospective beneficiaries of this plan, the PNI mass organizations had given it their full support.

The leaders of the mass organizations argued that the restoration of the party to its vanguard role could only be achieved within the context of Guided Democracy and that the preservation of the parliamentary system was associated with the malaise of liberalization which had afflicted the party since 1946.

In light of these statements, the mass organization leaders must have regarded the party election results of the 1960 Congress with mixed feelings. Ali Sastroamidjojo, who had been complimented in the Appeal Djuli for his organization of the Bandung Conference, replaced Suwirjo as general chairman, but the latter was elected first chairman and Hardi was elected secretary general.

The growing prominence of these young leaders in the affairs of the party greatly enhanced the President's influence over the central leadership, for now there was an emerging group with leadership aspirations and an ideological persuasion similar to Sukarno's whom he could threaten to support, should the central party leadership fail to accede to his various demands. Indeed, he offered a clear challenge along these lines to the incumbent party leadership in his address to the PNI Congress in Purwokerto in 1963:

> Without being personal, I say that Pak Ali [Sastroamidjojo] is already old. This morning I said to Pak Abikusno: "Bung Abi, why, you're looking old." Bung Hardi is old, Pak Sartono is old. They are all old. Don't tell me there are no young people, brothers and sisters, whose spirit is like Hatta's was when he was still

12. Ibid.
13. Appeal Djuli, p. 12; see also p. 13.
15. Appeal Djuli, passim.
16. There were other reasons why these leaders supported Ali at the 1960 party Congress. Firstly, he enjoyed considerable prestige within the party as a former prime minister. Secondly, as ambassador to the United States between 1957 and 1960, he was immune to the charges of vacillation, "embourgeoisement," and the like which they levelled at the Suwirjo leadership.
17. The other offices were filled by Dr. Moh. Isa (second chairman) and S. Hadikusumo (treasurer). Antara, July 30, 1960 (morning edition).
young, whose spirit is like Tjokroaminoto's was when he was still young, like Muljadi Djjomartono's was when he was still young and working as a postal clerk, brothers and sisters. Rejuvenate, rejuvenate, rejuvenate, rejuvenate!  

Although Ali was able to survive this challenge and was elected general chairman, he was nonetheless aware of his vulnerability to the "politicking" of Sukarno on the one hand and to a challenge from the young leaders of the mass organizations to whom Sukarno had given the nod in his address, on the other. Indeed, one of these leaders, Ir. Surachman, the secretary general of *Pereatuan Tani Indonesia* (Petani) and one of the signatories of the July 1960 Appeal, was elected party secretary general.  

Accordingly, Ali cast off such associates as Hardi, who had been elected first chairman at Purwokerto, and second chairman Osa Maliki and began to work more closely with Surachman and like-minded radicals in following the course which Sukarno was mapping out for the party. Clearly, Ali had given priority to improving relations with the President in order to secure his own position as party leader. Thus, the following year, Sukarno was successful in having his conception of Marhaenism, as Marxism adapted to Indonesian conditions, enshrined by the Congress Working Committee (Badan Pekerdja Kongres) of the PNI in its *Deklarasi Marhaenis* or Marhaenist Declaration. Sukarno first formulated this notion in 1958 and had been urging it on the party ever since.  

Some participants at the meeting of this organization, such as Hardi, viewed the outcome with alarm. Believing that the distinction between Marhaenism and the ideology of the PKI had been all but obliterated, they assumed that this definition could only work to the PKI's advantage. Consequently, they began to entertain deep suspicions regarding Sukarno's intentions towards the PNI.

Why did Ali Sastroamidjojo not share these suspicions? Unlike most other members of the central leadership council he cherished a...
long political relationship with the President. This relationship dated back to the time Sukarno had been leader and Ali a prominent member of the first Indonesian National Party founded in 1927. Born of this long association was a belief on Ali's part that Sukarno would never sacrifice his former party, and his longtime political associates within it, to the interests of another political party. It was this historical factor peculiar to Ali which facilitated his adoption of Sukarno-inspired radical policies for the PNI.

After the Congress Working Committee session of November, Ali's former friends in the central leadership began to establish more systematic contact with like-minded regional party leaders such as Hadisubeno in Central Java. In this province the party and its front organizations, particularly Petani, which was made up of both landlords and landless peasants, had been engaged in a number of physical clashes with the PKI's peasant union, BTI (Barisan Tani Indonesia or Indonesian Peasant Front), which consisted largely of landless peasants. These clashes had occurred after BTI had taken the law, namely the Basic Agrarian and Sharecropping Acts of 1960, into its own hands in March 1964 and attempted to implement it in a number of so-called "unilateral" actions against landlords who were in many cases PNI members or supporters.

Despite the class-based appeals of the PKI, there were few, if any, defections by landless peasant members of Petani. This loyalty was largely a consequence of the skillful appeal by provincial and local PNI leaders to traditional patron-client relations between richer and poorer villagers. Thus, the PNI was able to maintain its peasant support and Hadisubeno was able to mobilize Petani in vigorous support of these landlords.

It was not only Hadisubeno who was concerned about these actions; so, too, was Ali Sastroamidjojo. Yet, under the constraints he had imposed upon himself by the choice to maintain close relations with the President, he confined his criticism of the PKI to saying that the PNI "cannot agree to those unilateral actions." He attempted to wield the President's most favored symbols of political unity to the PNI's advantage by calling on those involved in the land disputes "to overcome the problem together by consultation [musjawarah], and cooperation [gotong-rojong] based on NASAKOM [i.e., the unity of

23. Ibid.
24. For an account of these acts see ibid., passim and Selo Soemardjan, "Land Reform in Indonesia," Asian Survey, 1, No. 12 (February 1962).
nationalist (NAS), religious (A) and communist (KOM) political forces.

Eventually, on December 12, 1964, following joint consultations at the Bogor palace presided over by President Sukarno, Indonesia's ten political parties produced a statement calling for the peaceful resolution of land disputes.

On March 7, 1965, Hadisubeno convened a "Lightning Conference" of the Central Java branch of the PNI which, at his instigation, condemned the party's secretary general, Ir. Surachman, for implying that the police had been at fault in the handling of a land clash in the kabupaten of Bojolali. This clash had occurred on November 18, 1964 in the village of Ketaon where three peasants, presumably BTI members or supporters, were shot dead by the local police during a dispute with a landlord, presumably a PNI supporter. According to one source, Ir. Surachman actually paid a special visit to the graves of the dead peasants, much to the amazement and confusion of local PNI members.

In a commentary attached to the announcement of the conference decisions, both of which were published under the same cover as Buku Putih Adjakan PNI-Front Marhaenis Djawa-Tengah (The White Book: An Invitation of the Central Java PNI-Front Marhaenis), it was strongly suggested that some members of the PNI's central leadership council were being manipulated by the PKI.

Just as Surachman's enthusiastic brand of NASAKOM-style politics appeared incongruous, to say the least, to the more conservative PNI members in Central Java, so Hadisubeno's insinuation that some members of the central leadership council were PKI instruments appeared very heavy-handed even to such like-minded men as Hardi and Osa Maliki, who had felt it necessary to phrase their opposition to the PKI in pro-Sukarno terms in the hope of avoiding a head-on clash with him. No such constraint, however, acted on the outspoken Hadisubeno. Accordingly, he became the frankest proponent of the anti-PKI side of the issue in the party, even to the extent of occasionally embarrassing his political allies.

On March 24, 1965, President Sukarno joined the fray in a speech to the "Marhaenist Vanguard Cadres": "I say to the Marhaenists that

28. Ibid.
29. The text of the statement, commonly referred to as the Bogor Declaration, may be found in Amankan dan Amalkan Deklarasi Bogor (DPP-PNI, pamphlet), pp. 5-6.
30. DPD-PNI Djawa Tengah, Buku Putih Adjakan PNI-Front Marhaenis Djawa Tengah, pp. 4-5.
32. Interview, Semarang, December 18, 1966.
33. Buku Putih, p. 11.
if there are false Marhaenists among them, expel them from the Marhaenist group. Why do they hang on to people who are like that? Yes, if they are false, expel them, expel them from your circle."  

Later in the speech, the President gave some indication as to what he meant by the phrase "false Marhaenist": "I say that if there is a person who calls himself a Marhaenist and he is anti-NASAKOM, or if he balks at the policy of Nasakomization, he is a false Marhaenist who ought to be expelled from the Marhaen group."  

Hedging his bets in public at least, Sukarno mentioned no names. Yet, his association in this speech, which he delivered only two weeks after the "Lightning Conference" of the Central Java PNI, of "false Marhaenists" with those opposed to his NASAKOM policy, strongly suggests that it was Hadisubeno, for one, whom the President had in mind.

Whatever the case, a plenary session of the central party leadership, held on May 12-13, 1965, ordered Hadisubeno to retire from his position as first chairman of the Central Java party council and suspended Oemar Said (third chairman, Central Java), Soetopo Koesoemodirdjo (first chairman, Kudus branch), and Soegeng Tirtosiswojo (first chairman, Tjilatjap branch) from party membership on the grounds that their compilation and propagation of the Buku Putih had damaged party unity. By all accounts, this meeting was conducted in an extremely tense and acrimonious atmosphere.

President Sukarno, apparently unsatisfied with the May 14 decision, returned to the fray in another address to the party on the occasion of its thirty-eighth anniversary in July:

Once again I say, quickly kick these false Marhaenists out of our ranks! The Sundanese say, iraha deui [when again]. Ngadagoan naon deui. It means what else are you waiting for? It is already obvious that they are false Marhaenists. Kick them out, don't let them remain in our ranks!

The President's use of Sundanese in this speech perhaps suggests that he believed that many of the "false Marhaenists" were in the West Java


35. Ibid., p. 4.

36. It has been suggested that he did mention privately whom he considered to be "false Marhaenists."


(Sundanese) branch of the party. At the very least, it must have been apparent to Ali that he had not yet gone far enough to satisfy the President.

At the Kesatuan Buruh Marhaenis (Marhaenist Labor Front) Congress convened from July 25 to August 1, 1965, Bachtiar Salim Haloho, who was reelected general chairman, put forward a resolution which he claimed had the full approval of the President. Essentially, it stated that if the PNI central leadership did not expel the "false Marhaenists" then KBM would refuse to recognize them either as members or leaders of the party.40 This resolution was followed in the next few days by a number of similar ones issued by the leadership councils of other PNI front organizations such as GMNI (Indonesian National Student Movement), GPM (Marhaenist Youth Movement), and Petani. Whether the front organizations, in collaboration with the President, were endeavoring to force Ali's hand on this matter or whether Ali himself had mobilized them to clear the way for a final showdown with the "false Marhaenists" in a further attempt to appease the President is unclear. It is clear, however, that it was Sukarno who was calling the tune.

On August 3, Hardi, Mh. Isnaeni, Osa Maliki, Karim M. Duriat, Sabilal Rasjad, and Moh. Achmad sent a letter to members of the PNI leadership stating that they saw no use in attending the plenary meeting of the central party leadership on August 4 on the grounds that they believed it, like the preceding plenary session of May 12-13, would not provide a forum for free discussion.41 They wrote, however, that they would attend a session of the central leadership which would specifically discuss the matter of holding an extraordinary congress "where it is hoped the Father of Marhaenism, Bung Karno, will agree to issue an order for the restoration of unity in the PNI Front Marhaenis."42

It was this event which proved the occasion of their suspension from the party. The following day the central leadership, in a letter of decision signed by general chairman Ali Sastroamidjojo and secretary general Ir. Surachman, suspended the above six as well as Hadisubeno from party membership.43 This action was greeted favorably

40. Suluh Indonesia, August 2, 1965.
42. Ibid.
43. Surat Keputusan Tentang Pemetjatan Sementara Sdr. Hardi Cs. (Mimeographed, DPP-PNI), pp. 1-2. It is of course true that changes in the party leadership at all levels were foreshadowed in the Deklarasi Marhaenis of 1964. See J. Eliseo Rocamora, "The Partai Nasional Indonesia," pp. 174-175. Whether these particular suspensions and the ones that followed were also foreshadowed in the declaration cannot, in the writer's view, be established on the available evidence. Cf. ibid., p. 176.
by Partindo and the PKI and with alarm by the NU. The "false Marhaenists," as their opponents characterized them, or the "Ten Friends," as they initially styled themselves, did not drop their demand for an extraordinary congress. Indeed, they immediately tried to enlist sufficient branch support to call such a congress.

A dispute among the party's leaders over whether to support the President or oppose the PKI had thereby been transformed by the Osa Maliki faction into a contest for the party leadership as the best means of most forcefully presenting their side of the argument without at the same time relegating themselves to the ineffectual status of a splinter group. And, having flouted the authority of the central leadership council, this would almost certainly have been the consequence of failing to appeal to the highest policy-making body within the party, namely, congress, to vindicate their actions. Although the prospects for such vindication may have appeared dim at that time, there was, in fact, no other course open to them.

The position of the Osa Maliki faction was most precarious. All they could point to in terms of tangible support was a radiogram dated August 21 from Brigadier General Sutjipto, the chairman of the fifth (political) section of the Supreme Operations Command (KOTI), to all the military commanders of Indonesia, instructing them not to interfere in the internal affairs of the PNI/Front Marhaenis. This instruction did not deter the minister/commander of the police force, Sutjipto Judodihardjo, from issuing an order on September 6 to all local police commanders to prohibit the activities of the "false Marhaenists." The police force, in addition to the President, PKI, and Partindo, had to be counted among their enemies.

The situation within the PNI changed dramatically and suddenly after the central leadership council severely compromised itself in the eyes of the army and other anticommunist political groups as a result of its statements of apparent support for the short-lived

47. This term refers to the seven members suspended on August 4 in addition to Oemar Said and Sugeng Tirtosiswojo suspended on May 14, and Drs. F. Surtrisno. See Kepada Kawanku I, pp. 7-8.
48. Ibid., pp. 6-7.
49. Sinar Harapan, October 21, 1965. In terms of intangible support, a prominent member of the Osa Maliki faction informed the writer that they received "moral support" from General Nasution. Interview, June 26, 1967.
50. J. Eliseo Rocamora, "The Partai Nasional Indonesia," p. 180. A copy of the Supreme Operations Command radiogram of August 21 was attached to a letter, dated September 8, which Osa Maliki and Isnaeni sent to Sutjipto Judodihardjo to protest his order. Ibid., p. 180, n. 97. However, this was to no avail as the commanders of the Djakarta and West Java police districts issued similar instructions to those of the minister/commander for their areas of jurisdiction on September 20 and 24. Warta Bhakti, September 21, 25, 1965.
Gerakan Tiga Puluh September (September 30th Movement), or Gestapu, as it became known. In fact, two PNI statements were published in the ensuing days—one in Suluh Indonesia on October 2, which reappeared in Patriot (Medan) on October 6, and one in Antara on October 2. While both may be interpreted as statements of support for the September 30th Movement, the Antara one lends itself more easily to such an interpretation.

In a subsequent "clarification" issued by the central leadership of the events surrounding the emergence of the PNI statement of October 1, 1965, a list of fifteen men allegedly responsible for its formulation was provided. Strikingly, the vast majority—twelve of the fifteen—were current or ex-leaders of the party's mass organizations including such people as Bachtier Salim Haloho of KBM, former GMNI leader John Lumingkewas, and Ir. Surachman. Karna Radjasa (first chairman, Djakarta branch), Satyagraha (managing editor of Suluh Indonesia), and Selamat Ginting (acting chairman of the organization department since Hardi's suspension) were the three who had not been leaders of the mass organizations.

As for the other party leaders, general chairman Ali Sastroamidjojo was in Peking, third chairman Dr. Moh. Isa was outside Djakarta, fifth chairman Subamia was overseas, and Dr. Ruslan Abdulgani "had duties...

51. Cf. "Continuity and Change," Indonesia, No. 2 (April 1966), pp. 198-201 which points out that the Antara version is different from the Patriot version but fails to mention that the Patriot version is identical to the statement which appeared in Suluh Indonesia on October 2.

52. The "clarification" does not account for the fact that two different statements of the PNI central leadership appeared in the press in the days following the abortive September 30th Movement. It also leaves the question open as to whether the statement which the "clarification" asserts was completed at about 11:30 a.m. on October 1 (i.e., when the Gerakan was still in control of Djakarta) was the same as either one of the two which was subsequently published. It does, however, state that the PNI statement was handed over to the Antara press agency at 8:00 p.m. or three-quarters of an hour before the first army broadcast announcing the suppression of the September 30th Movement in Djakarta. It is feasible, therefore, that the statement formulated by the leadership council on the morning of October 1 was the same as the one delivered to the Antara office before the city had changed hands again and published in Antara's morning edition of October 2. On the other hand, the version published in Suluh Indonesia (and Patriot) probably did not go to press until after 8:45 leaving time for its modification in an attempt to take account of the dramatic new power shift which took place in the capital after 8:00 p.m.

53. For the text of the "clarification" see Harian Nasional (Jogjakarta), November 5, 1965.

54. Warta Bhakti, August 11, 1965.

55. Ibid.

56. The complete list may be found in Harian Nasional, November 5, 1965.
elsewhere. Unrestrained by the elder and more experienced party members, who presumably would have cautioned restraint in such a fluid situation, the leaders of the mass organizations overreached themselves on that day.

On October 2, Brigadier General Sutjipto called a meeting of representatives of political parties at KOTI headquarters. The PNI leadership did not attend, although the Osa Maliki faction was present. Suluh Indonesia was promptly banned on the grounds that it had sided with the September 30th Movement which was now being generally interpreted as inspired and controlled by the PKI. A few days later, the first of the army-sponsored demonstrations against the PKI was held in Djakarta.

Encouraged by these events, the Osa Maliki faction publicly set its sights on the party leadership in a somewhat cavalier declaration which it made on October 6. It "banned the PNI central leadership council led by Ali-Surachman on the grounds of "the involvement of several members of the DPP-PNI in the counter-revolutionary September 30th Movement..." and established a new leadership under the general chairmanship of Osa Maliki. The remaining leadership positions were filled by Hardi (first chairman), Sabilal Rasjad (second chairman), Isnaeni (third chairman), Moh. Achmad (fourth chairman), Usep Ranawidjaja (secretary general), Abadi (first deputy secretary general, I.G.N.), Gde Djaksa (second deputy secretary general), and Karim M. Doeriat (treasurer).

The Osa Maliki faction, by forming themselves into a rival central leadership council on October 6, had clearly violated party conventions. There was no precedent, let alone provision in the party constitution, for such a step. Moreover, Osa Maliki supporters subsequently conceded this fact by attributing de jure status to the leadership council of Ali Sastromidjojo and only de facto status to their own faction: "There were those who hesitated faced with the 'legality' of the DPP-PNI Ali-Surachman' on the one hand and the 'reality' and purity of the 'DPP-PNI Osa-Usep' on the other." Thus, if a divided party may be defined as one in which at least one group

57. Ibid.
61. Ibid., p. 3.
62. Ibid.
by-passes or exceeds the limits imposed by party convention for the resolution of differences of opinion or rival ambitions for party office, then by early October the PNI fit such a definition.

The Contestants

A closer examination of the Ali and Osa Maliki factions and their supporters reveals that ethnic and regional differences underlay the conflict between the two factions. If the 140 members who were suspended from the PNI between August 4 and October 1 for lending support to the Osa Maliki faction64 may be regarded as representative of the faction as a whole, then, as the following table makes clear, it consisted largely of non-Javanese, among whom the Sundanese (West Java) were predominant.

Table 1. Ethnic and Regional Composition of Members Suspended from the PNI and its Mass Organizations between May 12 and October 1, 1965, for supporting the Osa Maliki faction.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atjeh</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Sumatra</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Sumatra</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banten/West Java</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djakarta</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>24.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Java</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>30.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Java</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Java</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>18.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulawesi/Makasar</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>140</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
</tr>
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In the 1955 general elections the PNI gained only 37.5 percent of its vote in non-Javanese areas.65 If this distribution of the PNI vote in 1955 can be taken as a rough guide to the proportion of Javanese and non-Javanese members in the party in 1965, then, clearly,

64. For details of the suspension of these members from the party, see Warta Bhakti, August 28, September 1, 3, 1965 and Suluh Indonesia, August 20, 28, 1965; see also J. Eliseo Rocamora, "The Partai Nasional Indonesia," p. 179.

65. This percentage was calculated from figures to be found in Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955 (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1957), pp. 58, 85.
the non-Javanese, or more precisely, people resident in non-Javanese areas, were overrepresented in the ranks of the Osa Maliki faction.

The other side of this coin, of course, is that non-Javanese must have been underrepresented among the supporters of the Ali leadership. Indeed, according to its own assessment, this appeared to be the case. Immediately prior to the Extraordinary Congress, the Ali leadership calculated that it would command a majority of congress votes in Central Java (including the Special Region of Jogjakarta), East Java, and North Sumatra, whereas it estimated that the Osa Maliki faction would command a majority in West Java, Atjeh, and South Sulawesi.66

If this characterization of the ethnic bases of the two groupings is correct, the question arises: What factor did the non-Javanese PNI members hold in common which set them sufficiently apart from the Javanese members to be able to explain, in part at least, the division which occurred in the party in September? Nominally Islamic non-Javanese PNI members do not share the antipathy of their Javanese counterparts67 for devout Moslems.68 Relatively tolerant of Islam, they are much more inclined to perceive a threat in communism or, more precisely, the PKI. Javanese PNI members, on the other hand, have been more susceptible to the appeals of communism69 and highly distrustful of Islam, especially in its modernist political form, as represented by such organizations as Masjumi and the Islamic Student Association (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam or HMI). They feared that such organizations wished to turn the Indonesian state into an Islamic theocracy.

Thus the Ali leadership chose to support Sukarno, rather than oppose the PKI, not only because of Sukarno's considerable influence within the PNI and his standing as the trusted founder of the Indonesian National Party, but also because he had, since 1945, stood clearly and unequivocally for a secular, that is non-Islamic, Indonesian


67. The statement that PNI members are nominally Islamic is based on the assumption that devout Moslems join the specifically Islamic parties, such as Masjumi (until its banning in 1960), Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII), and NU.

68. Daniel Lev (The Transition to Guided Democracy, p. 95) has stated that "West Javanese PNI leaders did not perceive in Islam the threat feared by PNI supporters in the ethnic Javanese areas of the island." In a similar vein, Feith (The Indonesian Elections, p. 82) has pointed out that outside the Islands of Java and Bali "a self-conscious group of anti-Moslem Moslems, the equivalent of the Javanese abangan" do not exist. The fact that these two writers disagree on the religious orientation of the Sundanese should be borne in mind in assessing the worth of the argument. For a discussion of the Javanese abangan, see C. Geertz, The Religion of Java (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 11-112.

Although the Islamic state issue lost most of its urgency when Masjumi was banned in 1960, it regained it, as shall be seen, after October 1, 1965.

Members of the Osa Maliki faction attached less importance to Sukarno's role as guardian of the non-Islamic state, as they were less inclined to attribute such political designs to the Islamic organizations in the first place. They were far more concerned about the Ali leadership's seemingly uncritical acceptance of Sukarno's policies at a time when he appeared to them to be falling increasingly under the influence of the PKI. Thus they chose to oppose the PKI, rather than support Sukarno, by building up anti-communist opinion in the party.

Obviously, the difference between the two groups should not be cast solely in cultural terms. The antipathy of the Osa Maliki faction for the PKI was bound to attract the more politically conservative members of the party—at least so long as they regarded communism as a greater threat to their positions than the political aspirations of Indonesian Islam, and, indeed, it is in these terms that the support of the Javanese Hadisubeno for the Osa Maliki faction is to be explained. Likewise, the Ali leadership's close identification with and support of the President attracted those younger party members for whom Sukarno's radical nationalism had appeal, and it is for this reason that the predomately non-Javanese leaders of the mass organizations supported the Ali group. Just as the different political orientations of the Javanese and non-Javanese members of the PNI contribute to an explanation of the division within the party, they also help explain why the rival groupings sought the outside allies they did in the struggle for control of the party.

The Alliances

The preparedness of various political forces to intervene actively in the PNI leadership struggle suggests that the PNI was too important a political factor to ignore in the struggle that was taking shape between army and Sukarno-led forces. The reasons for its importance lay principally in its large mass base, the influence it enjoyed in the state bureaucracy, and the fact that it had the largest parliamentary representation of any political party.

Army support for the Osa Maliki faction, which was forthcoming as early as August 21, assumed a more concrete form in mid-October when Brigadier General Sutjipto of KOTI instructed all the regional military commanders of Indonesia to allow the Osa faction a free hand.

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70. "Belief in the One Deity," and not an Islamic confession of faith, was one of the five principles which Sukarno advocated in June 1945 as a basis for an independent Indonesia. Subsequently, these five principles, or Pantja Sila, were adopted as the official ideology of the Republic.

in ridding the PNI of Gestapu elements. Moreover, General Sutjipto informed the PNI of this move in a letter addressed to "The Chairman of the Central Leadership Council of the Indonesian National Party.”

Clearly, KOTI had extended recognition to the Osa Maliki faction as the leaders of the PNI.

In line with the political orientation of its predominately non-Javanese members, the Osa Maliki faction was quick to cooperate with Islamic organizations such as PSII, NU, and Muhammadijah, in addition to the two Christian parties and various functional groups. These organizations subsequently joined to form the Kesatuan Aksi Pengganjangan Gestapu (Crush Gestapu Action Front) or KAP/Gestapu, which demanded the dissolution of the PKI. The Ali leadership continued to offer its undivided support to Sukarno. It even committed itself in advance to support whatever decision the President might reach regarding the PKI. The fact remains, however, that the physical elimination of the PKI by the army and its civilian supporters proceeded apace from mid-October until January 1966. Under such circumstances, who else could the President turn to apart from the PNI? Did not this change of circumstances provide the PNI with an opportunity to reestablish a close relationship with Bung Karno—to approximate that ideal (and idealized) state of affairs that had existed in 1927 when Sukarno had been chairman and people such as Ali active members of the Indonesian National Party. Such a relationship, however, would obviously be of little consequence if the President were to lose out in his power struggle with the army, and the task the Ali leadership set itself was to lend such support as it could to the President. The inevitable price of such a policy was that it incurred the further anger of the army high command.

The Ali leadership's fears concerning the designs of the Islamic political groups assumed renewed urgency after October 1 and provided it with additional incentive to rally to the President. Pointing suspiciously to the prominence of such Islamic organizations as PSII, Muhammadijah, and NU in KAP/Gestapu, it argued that their aim was not merely the dissolution of the PKI but also the overthrow of Sukarno and the PNI in order to facilitate the establishment of an Islamic state. An epigramatic statement of this point of view was published in bold type in the pro-Sukarno newspaper Genta: "ANTI BUNG KARNO = ANTI PANTJASILA = PENGCHIANAT [TRAITOR].”

74. See Api Pantjasila, October 22, 1965.
75. Sokoguru Revolusi, November 5, 1965.
76. Genta, February 4, 1966. A similar although considerably more subtle statement of this point of view is to be found in an editorial in the Catholic newspaper, Kompas, as early as October 22, 1965. In the same month Major General Tbrahim Adjie declared in a speech to members of West Java branches of the PNI that the counter-revolutionaries will not cease in their efforts to replace the state ideology (Pantja Sila) and to seize power. The full text of his speech may be found in Angkatan Bersendjata, October 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 1965.
The Ali leadership's choice of allies among the various student organizations was also largely determined by its concern both to support the President and to stem any resurgence of Islamic political aspirations. Thus, it instructed GMNI not to join KAMI. It obviously believed that GMNI's participation in an overtly anti-PKI organization would jeopardize its relations with the President. The prominence in KAMI of modernist Islamic political organizations such as HMI, which had enjoyed a close association with Masjumi prior to its banning in 1960, and Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadijah, the student association of Muhammadijah, a former constituent organization of Masjumi, not to mention Persatuan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (PMII) and Serikat Mahasiswa Muslimin Indonesia (SEMMI), the ancillary student organizations of NU and PSII respectively, aroused the Ali leadership's suspicions of its intentions as had the presence of Muhammadijah, NU and PSII in KAP/Gestapu. For example, GMNI attempted to clarify its position with respect to KAMI in a statement of early November in which it warned of the need "to oppose the efforts of the right wing reactionaries [i.e., members of the banned Masjumi party] who wish to rehabilitate themselves in the wave of destruction of the September 30th Movement and divert our left wing Pantjasila revolution to the right. ..." The Osa Maliki faction, as noted above, did not perceive such a threat from the Islamic organizations, and so the recently established GMNI (Osa Maliki faction) joined KAMI.

The Iskaq Committee

On May 29, 1965, Iskaq Tjokrohadisurjo, a prominent and long standing member of the PNI, wrote a letter to the central leadership council requesting that a meeting of the consultative body of the party be called to examine the council's decision to remove Hadisubeno from the Central Java branch leadership and suspend Oemar Said, Soetopo Koesoemodirdjo, and Soegeng Tirtosiswojo from the party membership. The meeting did not eventuate.

After the leadership council suspended Osa Maliki, Hardi, and their associates from the party on August 4, Iskaq, Sumaneng, and a number of other like-minded party men, at a meeting in Djakarta on August 13, called on the party leadership to convene an emergency congress in order to resolve the dispute within the party. This


79. Letter, Kartomo to Kombes Sumirat, n.d.


appeal was almost identical to the one contained in the letter sent by Osa Maliki and his associates to members of the central leadership on August 3.

After the open establishment of the DPP-PNI (Osa Maliki faction) on October 6 and its recognition by KOTI on October 15, Iskaq argued that such a congress, if it was not to prejudice the aspirations of one faction in advance, could now only be convened by a "third party." In an attempt to assume this role, Iskaq and his colleagues formed themselves into the Panitia Penegak Persatuan dan Kesatuan PNI-FM (Committee for the Maintenance of the Unity of the PNI-FM).

Not only had Iskaq and his committee pleaded the cases of the suspended party members and echoed their call for a congress, but they had also elevated the Osa Maliki faction, following the KOTI letter, to the position of one of two equal disputants within the PNI. As this directly contradicted the position of the Ali leadership, which did not even recognize the existence of a split within the party, doubt was cast on the veracity of Iskaq's claim to impartiality by Ali's son, Karna Radjasa, amongst others. He alleged that the Iskaq committee was not a "third party" but a front organization of the "Hardi-Isnaeni clique." It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the Ali leadership declared in a letter distributed to the party's branches that it neither supported nor had any contact with Iskaq's committee. Moreover, it announced its intention of holding a session of the Congress Working Committee in Lembang, West Java, between December 18 and 20.

The Osa Maliki faction immediately declared that it would not attend such a session at that time. This move was apparently inspired by the belief that the committee offered even fewer opportunities than a congress to press its leadership claims upon the party,

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and that it would therefore be better to hold out in hope of the lat­
ter rather than accepting the former. After all, Osa Maliki's sup­
porters could expect little from a party organization made up of
plenary members of the central leadership council that had suspended
them and their regional and mass organization appointees from party
membership.88 The prospects for a party congress convened under favor­
able circumstances would be greatly enhanced if their allies should
prove victorious in the national power struggle. But as its outcome
was still uncertain in December 1965, it was clearly in the interests
of the Osa Maliki faction to play for time by refusing to attend
the conference of the Congress Working Committee.

Immediately prior to the Committee session, Iskaq gained addi­
tional support for his proposal for party unity. On December 17,
24 out of a total of 43 PNI members of parliament89 called for the
convening of an extraordinary congress in the shortest possible time
to be administered by a body or committee acceptable to both sides.90
The national leadership of the Djamiatul Muslimin Indonesia issued a
statement signed by Hadji Moh. Djambek, who had replaced Osa Maliki
as chairman after the latter was suspended from party membership,
and eight other members calling for an extraordinary congress to be
organized by "a Body/Committee acceptable to all sides which truly
desire to maintain the PNI/Front Marhaenis intact."91

The Congress Working Committee meeting which was finally held
on December 22 in Jogjakarta92 met these demands half-way. It decided
to hold a congress, but not an extraordinary one. Instead, it agreed
to call together the eleventh Congress ahead of schedule in March
1966. This decision meant, of course, that it would be held under
the auspices of the incumbent leadership and not a group or committee
acceptable to both sides.93 The Osa Maliki faction promptly declared
that if the Iskaq committee proved unable to hold a party congress,

88. For details of the composition of the Badan Pekerdja Kongres, see

89. This number is based on the number of PNI members listed in Daftar
Alamat Anggota Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Gotong Rojong (Sekretariat
DPR-GR, Djakarta, August 15, 1965); cf. the figure of 44 given by

90. Pernjataan (Mimeographed, Djakarta, December 17, 1965). For a
press account (which erroneously attributes the statement to
28 members), see Kompas, December 24, 1965. Of the 24, at least
3 (Rh. Koesnan, B. J. Rambitan, and Soebagio Reksodipoero) were
closely associated with Iskaq's Committee.


92. Berita Republik, December 16, 1965. The fact that the meeting was
not held in Lembang as originally intended has been attributed to
the action of the West Java Military Commander, Major General
Ibrahim Adjie, who allegedly refused permission for it to be held
in his area of jurisdiction. Ibid.

then it would call one of its own. If Thus, by year's end, these various attempts to resolve the division in the PNI by means of a conventional congress had come to nothing. The party remained divided.

**Political Change, 1965-1966**

It has been pointed out that the Osa Maliki faction had gained the active support of the army high command, KAP/Gestapu, and KAMI. In the other camp, there had been some signs of rapprochement with President Sukarno who, without the PKI to lean on, had become more susceptible to the blandishments of the Ali leadership. This group also enjoyed considerable support in the bureaucracy and sections of the armed forces. Indeed, as we have seen, in the case of the police force this support extended, at least for a period, to its commander-in-chief. The point about these alliances and associations was that they had been made with the rival contenders for national power. Therefore, the national conflict, provided it was resolved first, would obviously have considerable bearing on the outcome of the PNI leadership struggle. Just how much bearing it would have would depend on the extent to which the victor, or victors, chose to become involved in PNI affairs. Given this partial interdependence at least between the national power struggle and the PNI leadership struggle, we shall now pay attention to the former in the hope of subsequently clarifying the latter.

Only days after General Suharto had defeated the September 30th Movement in Djakarta, the city was engulfed by anti-PKI demonstrations organized by student organizations and political parties, which subsequently formed the constituent bodies of KAMI and KAP/Gestapu, with the support of the army. The government gave these demonstrations an inadvertent boost with its harsh anti-inflationary measures of November and December. In late November it raised the official price of petrol from Rp. 4 per litre to Rp. 250 per litre. The following month it raised the price again to Rp. 1,000 per litre. A commensurate price increase was also ordered for, among other things, bus fares.

These measures provided KAMI with a genuinely popular issue—the demand that these price increases should be revoked—and a scapegoat, namely, the minister responsible for the increases, Dr. Chairul Saleh. And to this goal the students attached their long standing demand for

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the banning of the PKI and a more recent one calling for a "retooling" of the cabinet.100

It was with this last demand that Sukarno took issue in a speech before his cabinet, students, and journalists on January 15, 1966. The real target of those who demanded a "retooling" of the cabinet, he asserted, was not the cabinet ministers themselves, but the President: "... it is not you, Chairel Saleh. ... In effect everything points at Sukarno."101 By choosing to interpret a criticism of his ministers as criticism of himself, Sukarno forfeited considerable area for maneuver. He could not now allow his ministers to bear the brunt of criticism, let alone sacrifice them, in the name of political expediency. Yet, such actions would have been quite consistent with the view of many members of KAMI and KAP/Gestapu that it was not President Sukarno but his ministers who were at fault. Sukarno's "January 9, 1905"102 had not yet come, but by taking such a stand he had only hastened its arrival.

One can only assume that he still placed very considerable store by his own political resources. And such an assumption appears to be borne out by the remarkable contents of the remainder of the speech. Declaring himself responsible to the nation, Almighty God, and the Prophet Muhammad and likening his stance to that of Martin Luther in the Württemberg Cathedral,103 he continued:

Come on, whoever like Sukarno, agrees with Sukarno, as Great Leader of the Revolution, join forces, form your ranks, maintain Sukarno! Because I see that other people wish to overthrow Sukarno. Only I say to my followers, don't take wild steps! Wait for my command!104

Cognizant of the President's still widespread support, most political groupings moved hastily to declare their loyalty for Sukarno. General Suharto issued a statement which declared that the army "stands behind the President/Great Leader of the Revolution waiting for his command."105 In an apparent attempt to establish military control over the Sukarno Front, Suharto, in a KOTI announcement, ordered all mass organizations, political parties, and persons who were willing to carry out the President's command...
to submit their names either to the KOTI office in Djakarta or to the office of the Regional Military Commanders.  

Of course, the Ali leadership needed no prompting. Delighted by Sukarno's fighting speech, it declared "... that it stands fully and without reserve behind Bung Karno and is prepared to implement the command of the President/Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces/Great Leader of the Revolution/Father of Marhaenism." The enthusiasm of the party leadership was more than matched by GMNI and other PNI mass organization members who gathered in front of the Presidential palace on January 20 to listen to an address by the President. They carried signs, one of which stated: "The People--ABRI [Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia] love Bung Karno." Another declared that its bearer was "prepared to die for Bung Karno." After the rally was over, they became involved in a fight with KAMI members. An armed forces unit moved in amidst a hail of stones to separate the warring sides.

Then, on February 21, President Sukarno announced that he had, as he put it, "perfected" the composition of the cabinet. He did not, however, demote Chairul Saleh or Dr. Subandrio as KAMI and KAP/Gestapu had demanded, but instead he demoted three people who had been closely associated with the anti-PKI movement and who enjoyed high prestige in military, KAP/Gestapu, and KAMI circles, namely General Nasution, Arudji Kartawinata, and Vice-Admiral Martadinata. Furthermore, he promoted Sumardjo and Asmara Hadi, regarded by many as crypto-communists, to ministerial rank. The former was given the important and, in light of student unrest, sensitive portfolio of Basic Education and Culture. Piling insult upon injury, he even appointed the well-known Djakarta gang leader, Lieutenant Colonel Imam Sjafe'i, to the position of minister seconded to the President for Special Security Affairs.

What had prompted the President to take such a provocative step? Above all, it appears he believed that the time had come to make a stand in order to stop the various efforts to "divert the Indonesian revolution to the right." Sukarno was desperately anxious to con-

109. Ibid.
111. For President Sukarno's announcement and a list of members of the perfected cabinet, see Pengumuman PJM Presiden Sukarno Mengenai Susunan Kabinet Dwikora Jang Disempurnakan, Istana Merdeka Djakarta, 21 Pebruari 1966 (Mimeographed, Sekretariat Negara Kabinet Presiden Republik Indonesia). Further details about the cabinet may be found in Indonesia, No. 2 (October 1966), p. 185 f.
112. Ibid.
tinue ruling, and if he could not rule, then he did not want to reign either.

Outraged by the President's action, KAMI blocked all access roads to the Presidential palace on the morning of February 24 in a determined bid to prevent the swearing in of the new cabinet ministers. Although they managed to delay the ceremony for three hours, they were unsuccessful in preventing it from taking place as most of the ministers were eventually able to reach the palace either in the President's helicopter, or in the case of the less fortunate ones, on foot. Consequently, the students gathered in front of the palace to show their disapproval of the new cabinet's composition. The Presidential guard tried to disperse the demonstrators first by firing into the air and then into the crowd itself. One student, Arief Rachman Hakim, a member of GMNI (Osa Maliki faction), was shot dead.  

Suharto continued, however, to move cautiously. He was willing to mouth support for the President, thereby depriving military commanders of a choice between the President and himself. He also worked quietly to prevent Sukarno from developing any organized support of his own by coopting any initiative he took in this area. An example of this was his order, mentioned above, that all Sukarno Front supporters must register with KOTI or their regional military commanders.

In addition to containing the President's influence in this way, Suharto was also intent upon whittling it away. Thus he did nothing to prevent KAMI with the support and protection of Colonel Sarwo Edhie, the energetic and single-minded commander of the Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat (Army Commando Regiment or RPKAD), from constantly agitating for the dissolution of the PKI and a further retooling of the cabinet. Indeed, he was quite prepared to let Sarwo Edhie and the students "ride shotgun" in this way for him even though from Suharto's point of view it was premature to take decisive action against the President. It was they who incurred the hostility of the pro-Sukarno forces for the chaos which they wrought, involving as it did an open flouting of the President's will, whereas Suharto was the ultimate beneficiary of their actions insofar as they brought about a decline in Sukarno's authority.

114. Kompas, February 26, 1966. If he really were a member of the GMNI (Osa Maliki faction) it is difficult to explain why it did not claim him as one of its own in a message of condolence published two days later in the same paper. See Kompas, February 28, 1966. It is possible that he was a member of another KAMI affiliated organization who joined GMNI (Osa Maliki faction) to help swell its ranks and thereby give the impression that it commanded greater support than was the case.


In early February, President Sukarno accepted an invitation from the Ali leadership to address a rally of the Gerakan Siswa Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Pupils' Movement or GSNI), the PNI high school student front, on February 28 in Djakarta. This was the day after Iskaq's congress was scheduled to begin in Bandung. This acceptance provided further evidence, if any was needed, of Sukarno's preference for the Ali leadership in the PNI leadership struggle.

On February 28, Sukarno delivered a low-key speech stating that he interpreted the rally as a demonstration of GSNI's loyalty to Bung Karno as Great Leader of the Revolution, however, the presence at the rally of his two top aides, Chairul Saleh and Dr. Subandrio, as well as Sumardjo suggests that Sukarno attached great importance to it. Dr. Subandrio, in a sensational speech which he had presumably cleared with the President beforehand, called on GSNI to confront the terror of those who wish to divert the revolution to the right with "counter-terror." Presumably, he looked to GSNI support in particular and PNI mass support in general to counter the militant anti-government activities of the student organizations affiliated with KAMI, which had been officially banned by the President two days earlier.

No sooner had the rally ended than Ali leadership supporters attacked KAMI students at the University of Indonesia, inflicting one casualty before being driven off by a unit of the armed forces. And on March 4, Djakarta citizens were treated to the spectacle of thousands of high school students organized less than a month before into the Kesatuan Aksi Pemuda Peladjar Indonesia (Indonesian Youth and Student Action Front or KAPPI) over-running and occupying the Department of Basic Education and Culture to protest Sumardjo's appointment.

On March 8, PNI (Ali leadership) mass organization members demonstrated in front of the United States Embassy shouting: "Green is anti-Bung Karno." Many succeeded in gaining access to the embassy grounds where they set fire to a number of diplomatic cars. Eventually, they were driven away by a small detachment of soldiers. A little earlier, KAPPI students invaded the Department of Foreign Affairs, situated only half a mile from the US Embassy, upturning furniture, tearing up documents, and painting anti-Subandrio slogans on the walls. Finally, they withdrew from the building only to run into

120. Dwikora, February 26, 1966.
122. Kompas, March 5, 1966.
123. Marshall Green was the US Ambassador to Indonesia at that time. Dwikora, March 9, 1966.
124. Ibid.
the PNI demonstrators. A sharp clash ensued which armed forces units were only able to break up after firing warning shots above the heads of the feuding students.

On March 11, President Sukarno hurriedly left a cabinet session in Djakarta for Bogor on the basis of a report from the Presidential guard that armed forces without insignia had surrounded the palace. On March 12 it was announced over the radio that President Sukarno had entrusted General Suharto "to take all necessary steps to guarantee peace, calm, and stability as well as the personal safety and authority of the President ... for the sake of the integrity of the Nation and the State of the Republic of Indonesia." From this new position of authority, Suharto was able to pursue more effectively his skillful policy of whittling away the power of the President while maintaining a credible public posture of loyalty to him. For example, on March 12, he banned the PKI "in the name of his Excellency [President Sukarno]," a step which Sukarno had refused to take because he had desired to maintain this base of his own power as well as his concept of a NASAKOM state. He did not reshuffle the President's "perfected" cabinet announced on February 21; rather, he "perfected it again."

Most people were surprised by the announcement of March 12. The member organizations of KAP/Gestapu, including the Osa Maliki faction of the PNI, were, of course, happily surprised. The Ali leadership was surprised too, bitterly surprised. Just as a new period of close PNI-Presidential cooperation appeared to be emerging out of the political upheaval of the last six months, Sukarno had abandoned them. The outcome of the national leadership struggle had clearly worked to the advantage of the Osa Maliki faction. Just how much advantage it would reap, however, would depend on the degree to which the victor, General Suharto, chose to involve himself in the PNI leadership struggle.

The PNI Extraordinary Congress

Little progress had been made since December 1965 in attempts to resolve this struggle by means of a congress. Despite vigorous

127. Ibid.
128. For Brigadier General Sutjipto's account of these events, see Kompas, April 9 and 11, 1966. According to all interview accounts, the unmarked forces were army commandos (RPKAD) acting under the orders of Colonel Sarwo Edhie. It is not known to this writer whether he had gained General Suharto's approval for this action or not.
130. Ibid.
131. Several prominent members of the Ali faction expressed this view to the writer. In fairness to Sukarno it ought to be stated that during those critical days he was quite literally fighting for his political life and, therefore, in no position to come to the assistance of the PNI.
action by Iskaq on behalf of the committee's planned congress, to be held in Bandung, his efforts in this direction ultimately came to naught. After postponing the congress till February 27, it was again postponed to a date to be decided, despite the arrival of some branch delegates in Bandung. These were made up exclusively, or so it would appear from their statements, of supporters of the Osa Maliki faction. Presumably, the number of these delegates was insufficient to be able to convene a congress. In addition, the military commander of Central Java, Brigadier General Surjosumpeno, denied the Ali leadership permission to convene the eleventh PNI congress in Jogjakarta.

General Suharto rapidly put an end to this stalemate. Only five days after receiving the President's order, he succeeded where Iskaq had failed, by bringing the Ali leadership and the Osa Maliki faction together at a meeting. At the third such meeting, on March 24, he extracted a joint statement from the two sides. It declared that both groups agreed to hold an extraordinary congress, something which both the Iskaq committee and the Osa Maliki faction had been demanding for several months. The Ali leadership, however, had refused to countenance such demands while declaring its intention to hold the eleventh party congress ahead of schedule in March. The statement also laid down the composition of the committee to run the congress. Osa Maliki supporters, if we include Iskaq, as the Ali leadership certainly would, were placed in three out of the five positions, including the chairmanship. They were Iskaq Tjokrohadisurjo (chairman), Sunawar Sukowati, and S. Rifa'i. The Ali supporters appointed to the committee were Bachtiar Salim Haloho and Soediro. Obviously, the statement favored the Osa Maliki faction.

In view of the very cordial relationship existing between the army high command and the Osa Maliki faction, based on a similar political viewpoint, past cooperation, and, in the case of Hadisubeno, a long standing friendship with Suharto, it was only to be expected that once General Suharto decided to intervene in the PNI leadership...
struggle, he would do so on the side of the Osa Maliki faction. But why did he decide to intervene in the first place? If he could succeed in imposing the leaders of the Osa Maliki faction upon the party, then clearly he would gain considerable control over the PNI which would reduce his dependence on those political organizations with large Islamic components such as KAMI and KAP/Gestapu, which had helped elevate him to power.

He would also be able to restore the balance between the Islamic and non-Islamic parties which had tipped drastically in favor of the former as a result of the internecine conflict in the PNI and the physical elimination and formal dissolution of the PKI. It is important to note that not all the leaders of the Osa Maliki faction supported General Suharto's initiative. Osa Maliki, Usep Ranawidjaja, and Sabilal Rasjad were among those opposed. When they had been only able to indicate a preference between an extraordinary congress and a session of the Ali leadership-dominated Congress Working Committee, they naturally opted for the former. But now that their hand had been strengthened within the party by the favorable outcome of the national leadership struggle, they looked forward to a continuation of the struggle with the Ali leadership for the allegiance of the branches in the belief that they would eventually prevail.139

On the other hand, Hadisubeno supported Suharto on this matter. As a result of his association with the Osa Maliki faction, he found himself isolated in the Central Java branch of the PNI, which had remained overwhelmingly loyal to the Ali leadership. Moreover, the Ali leadership in Central Java enjoyed the almost unanimous support of the region's district military commanders. By means of a unitary congress, Hadisubeno hoped to shed this politically invidious association and to rebuild his basis of support within the Central Java branch of the party.140

Despite this difference of opinion, General Suharto pushed ahead with his plans to ensure the victory of the Osa Maliki faction at the party congress. For example, local military commanders were empowered to deny delegates authority to attend the congress if they regarded them as being in any way associated with or sympathetic to "Gestapu/ PKI."141 This order represented another victory for the Osa Maliki faction, as it had pressed for the exclusion of such people from a unitary congress since October 1965. It realized that such an order could only reduce the representation of the Ali leadership at such a congress, for it was this group which had compromised itself with its statement of apparent support for Colonel Untung on October 1, 1965.

A large number of Ali faction delegates who had actually gained the requisite authority to attend the congress experienced difficulty in gaining access to the congress hall, and in some cases they were

139. Interview, April 28, 1967.
140. Ibid.
141. Tata Tertib Kongres Persatuan & Kesatuan PNI/Front Marhaenis (Pansitya Kongres Persatuan & Kesatuan PNI/Front Marhaenis, Djakarta, April 6, 1966).
turned away at the door.142 Indeed, Ali delegates from branches in Djakarta and West Java were only permitted to attend the opening ceremony on April 24 and the first plenary session.143 Others, such as Lucien Pahala Hutagaol and Kartjono, were actually arrested by the West Java military authorities upon their arrival in Bandung.144

The Ali faction delegates who were able to attend the congress were subjected to a constant stream of heckling and abuse from KAMI members who were allowed to occupy the balcony of the congress hall.145 Certainly, Iskaq, in his own account of the congress proceedings admitted that he, as chairman, "very nearly lost control of the situation"146 when Ali was addressing the congress.147 On the other hand, "speeches from delegates of branches under the leadership of the DPP-PNI Osa-Usep received," he states, "an extraordinary and tumultuous response as a sign of agreement."148

Between plenary sessions, private negotiations were held between the leaders of the two sides. The Osa Maliki faction demanded that Ali surrender the PNI leadership to the DPP-PNI Osa-Usep.149 Ali responded with the proposal that members elected to the PNI leadership council at the Purwokerto Congress should be ineligible to stand again for leadership positions.150 Although this proposal would have excluded Ali himself from the running, it would also have excluded Osa Maliki, Hardi, and Isnaeni. It is not surprising that the Osa Maliki faction flatly rejected it.

Eventually, both groups agreed to the appointment of Osa Maliki as General Chairman with full authority to choose a new central leadership council,151 with the assistance of S. Hadikusumo, an Ali leadership supporter. This agreement, which was approved by a plenary session, reflected the dominant position the Osa Maliki faction enjoyed at the congress. So too did the composition of the new...
Central Leadership Council. Only the sixth chairman, Abdul Madjid, and the second and third treasurers, Hardjantho S. and Notosukardjo, were supporters of the former Ali leadership. The others were all either members of the DPP-PNI Osa-Usep as constituted on October 6, 1965 or close supporters of it.

The Osa Maliki faction's close alliance with General Suharto, who had won out in the national power struggle, was an important factor in explaining its capture of the PNI leadership. The decisive factor in this regard was General Suharto's preparedness to promote actively the cause of this faction within the party. The fact that Ali probably had the support of the majority of PNI members was of no immediate account, for it was the Osa Maliki faction which had the backing of the new national leader. Thus, for the period of this study at least, the source of power within the PNI was related to the influence possessed by non-party elite figures with whom a person or group in the party were associated, and whether they were prepared to wield that influence to the advantage of that person or group in the internal affairs of the organization. This situation was likely to continue so long as the party remained divided.

152. The members of the Council were: general chairman, Osa Maliki; first chairman, Hardi S.H.; second chairman, Sabilal Rasjad; third chairman, Mh. Isnaeni; fourth chairman, Hadisubeno; fifth chairman, Dr. Sunawar Sukowati; sixth chairman, Abdul Madjid; first secretary general, Usep Ranawidjaja; second secretary general, I.G.N. Gde Djaksa; third Secretary general, Abadi; first treasurer, Budi Dipojuwono; second treasurer, Hardjantho S.; and third treasurer, Notosukardjo. Sinar Harapan, April 28, 1966.