The rebellion of 1958 marked a turning point in the development of the Indonesian army, for it provided the central military leadership with the means to establish its ascendancy over the officer corps. Had there been a compromise in the settlement of the insurrection, General Nasution might have continued for some time to inch his way toward control, in the manner in which we saw him progress during 1955-1956, and the relations between the army center and the powerful territorial commanders would have continued for some time to be roughly equal. But the central military command moved with great success against the rebel forces, whose failure was apparent within six months of their revolt. This victory both eliminated Nasution's principal rivals for army leadership and gave him great military prestige, with which he consolidated his personal position and reshaped the army's structure.

Of even greater significance for the army's ultimate role in Indonesia, the rebellion—or, to be more exact, the State of Emergency proclaimed in April 1957 in response to the regional crisis—allowed the military to expand its activities into the economic and political spheres. This expansion provided the army leadership with vital sources of finance and patronage, strengthening its position over the officer corps and enhancing the army's status in the society as a whole. The proliferation of the army's functions and of its members' contacts with civilian elements that resulted from this development increased the chances for extra-military alliances and civilian influence over individual officers, but in another and ultimately more important sense, it diminished army disunity. The military now clearly had elite status within the society. Under the Guided Democracy system of 1959-1965, territorialy officers participated down to the local level in political decision making; with civilian forces increasingly at loggerheads and government administration declining in efficiency and authority, the military representatives assumed an ever more influential role.

Increasingly, the military functioned in a socially conservative manner. The direct role assumed by the army in the economy, and particularly the control over Dutch-owned enterprises which it assumed in late 1957, gave it a stake in the economic status quo and an

* This is the second part of a two-part article. The first part appeared in the April 1971 issue.

appreciation of the problems of management confronted by labor's demands. Its position in territorial government put army officers in a close working and social relationship with civilian elites, and it also enhanced their professional military tendency to value order imposed from above rather than effervescence from below. Moreover, Sukarno's use of the Communist Party to provide a mass backing for his efforts to prevent the army's political advance underlined the rivalry between the PKI and the military as the country's two great sources of organized initiative--two structures whose ideological differences were strengthened by the tendency for civilian interests to seek their patronage and protection. This polarization, in which the army assumed the post of the Right, strained the sympathies of officers who looked to the revolutionary tradition, and it created an acute problem of military loyalty to Sukarno, who was seen as a national father-figure by officers who were by no means otherwise leftist. At the same time, however, powerful civilian opposition to the army enhanced its corporate sense, for in the post-rebellion period the army leaders' principal rivals were without rather than within the military, and they could therefore portray the contest in terms of preserving military solidarity against civilian subversion.

More concretely, army officers who, under Guided Democracy, had acquired (or aspired to) posts and perquisites far beyond those they could have imagined in the earlier period were concerned to preserve the army's expanded role, and they were correspondingly alarmed at the advance of the PKI, which threatened ultimately to put its own hierarchy in the favored position which the army now occupied. Nor does it seem probable that this concern to preserve existing privileges was limited to members of the officer corps. As we shall see, the economic decline of Guided Democracy straitened the circumstances of the soldiery in spite of the army's acquisition of new resources. Nonetheless, army men had that very important possession--a relatively secure job. They received relatively advantageous allotments and housing, and even after retirement they could be far more certain than the mass of the population that their voice would be heard.  

2. Official retirement ages were 42 for non-commissioned officers, 45 for junior officers (lieutenants and captains), 48 for middle-grade officers, and 55 for officers of general rank. Angkatan Bersenjata, September 9, 1968. However, these limits were not closely observed, for there was strong resistance to demobilization, which usually meant a significant loss of income, prestige, and security. This even proved the case with conscripts: a 1958 scheme for rejuvenating the army through the institution of a two-year draft was dropped when it proved difficult to demobilize them when their time was up. Nusantara, November 10, 1960, statement of Brigadier General Sajidiman; and see Pedoman, May 21, 1958, for the conscription plan. Demobilization and the classification and organization of veterans had been problems since the end of the revolution, the more so since it was generally expected that the army would find sources of employment for those who were sent back to civilian life. See the statement by Brigadier General Sajidiman above, and also Pikiran Rakjat, February 18, 1963, statement of Colonel Djohari; and Berita Yudha, August 14, 1965, statement of General Yani.

Because of the danger posed by discontented men with a knowledge of weapons, the army was, within its means, generous in the treatment of ex-servicemen; indeed, of 800,000 claimants to veteran
were, moreover, men who possessed the means of violence in a time when order was gradually breaking down. Particularly in the defeated rebel areas of the Outer Islands, where the army behaved like a force of occupation, soldiers experienced the psychological and material satisfactions of mastery; but everywhere common soldiers found their status to be greater than that of their civilian equivalents, the *rakjat* of which Guided Democracy spoke so much and for which it did so little.

Because of the army leadership's greater stability after 1958, the consolidation of central military authority proceeded more through reforms of the army's institutions than through the personal struggles for power characteristic of the parliamentary period. Consequently, I shall turn my discussion of the post-revolutionary military transformation from a chronological approach to a topical consideration of the changes in the army's structure and practices that took place in status only 5,860 went unrecognized (Pikiran Rakjat, March 21, 1963, statement of General Sambas, Minister for Veterans' Affairs), although many of these would have been at best intermittent members of the revolutionary lasjkar. Aside from the attention paid them in recognition of their potential for trouble-making, the veterans could express themselves in the early 1950's through the division-based solidarity groups and the officers' league (IPRI), as those included both active and non-active military men. They also had their own veterans' associations, and, reflecting the restiveness of the demobilized soldiers, the largest of these was the Communist-oriented All-Indonesia Union of Former Armed Fighters (Perbepbsi), which was founded in 1951 and claimed 300,000 members in 1957. See Dokumentasi Konggres ke-VI Serikat Buruh Kereta Api (Djakarta: Pimpinan Pusat SBKA, 1957), p. 96. It enjoyed its greatest influence in the post-1952 period of army weakness, when it pressed for the creation of People's Security Troops, composed of its members, who would supplement the army's counter-insurgency efforts. For the debate see Antara Warta Berita, July 23, August 22, September 4, 5, 8, and 16, 1953.

Perbepbsi's importance can be assessed from the fact that high army officers, including Colonels Nasution and Gatot Subroto, attended its executive session of November 1955 in order to present their views on veterans' affairs (Pikiran Rakjat, November 15, 1955). A year later, however, Nasution's position had improved to the point where he could seek to impose a single, army-controlled veterans' organization. This was formally instituted in January 1957 (Harian Rakjat, January 4, 1957), but it did not actually succeed in supplanting the independent organizations until the end of the decade. Its commandant and chairman was the Minister of Veterans' Affairs, and it served less as a veterans' lobby than as a supplement to the ministerial organization. In 1960 it joined the World Veterans Federation (PIA news bulletin, July 6, 1960). In addition, the divisional associations that began to develop in the late Guided Democracy period, beginning with the 1963 formation of the Body for the Fostering of the Siliwangi Corps (BPC Siliwangi), attempted to involve veterans and prevent their forming undesirable civilian ties (Pikiran Rakjat, June 25, 1963, statement by General Ibrahim Adjie). Nonetheless, the veterans appear to have remained a politically disaffected group; it was estimated that 80 percent of the Central Java veterans sided with the September 30th Movement in 1965 (Berita Yudha, May 31, 1966, statement of Lieutenant Colonel Sumitro, head of the Central Java Veterans' Administration).
the late 1950's and early 1960's in the fields of leadership, promotion and patronage, training, and organization. In these areas we can see the working out of longstanding ideas regarding the kind of army Indonesia ought to have as well as more general efforts to enhance the authority of the high command. This period saw the first substantial decline of some of the major problems of discipline and structure inherited from the revolution as well as the emergence of questions created by organizational proliferation, technological specialization, and social participation that were to affect the army's development in the post-Sukarno period.

Reconstituting the Army Leadership

With the defeat of the 1958 rebellion the army's top leadership, for the first time in Indonesia's post-revolutionary history, no longer consisted of broadly equal rivals quick to band together to sabotage the claims of any one of them to power. Gradually, during the course of Guided Democracy, General Nasution lost some of his claims to primacy, as his apparent inability to resist Sukarno and formulate a successful response to the PKI irritated his anti-Communist supporters, while his tacit opposition to the President disturbed officers strongly loyal to that leader. In the period with which we are concerned, however--1958 to about 1965--Nasution was able to use his stature as the military's unquestioned leader to secure a relatively free hand in determining army placement and policy, and one of his principal efforts was naturally directed toward preventing the emergence of any rivals. He did not completely succeed in this effort, but he did acquire a high command whose members were far more congenial, homogeneous, and obedient than the army had possessed before. The members of the general staff were clearly his subordinates and not his equals, as were the panglima (territorial commanders at division level), the ensuring of whose obedience we shall consider later.

Nasution's dominance did not mean that his word automatically became army policy, especially in matters concerning the military's more delicate internal and external relations. Leadership remained collegiate in the sense that important matters required the acquiescence of the major portion of the panglima and heads of central army institutions as well as the decision of the general staff; a good deal of negotiation took place in order to achieve the necessary unity, and often enough the interests and attitudes of the senior generals were so diverse as to prevent any firm decision. Nonetheless, there was general acknowledgment as to who had the right to make the less critical decisions on army policy and to gather consensus on the more weighty ones. Moreover, the top army leaders strove to increase their overall control by making the general staff, rather than broader conferences of senior generals, into the acknowledged forum of discussion on important matters of policy. They did not wholly succeed, but the overall result of their endeavor was to produce a military hierarchy whose visible decision-making process was much more like the textbook image than before.

Nasution's position as leader of the army was greatly enhanced by his accession to the post of Minister of Defense in 1959.3 The

3. This took place in July 1959 with the formation of the Kabinet Kerdja, the first cabinet following the return to the 1945
vesting of this ministerial post in military hands did not receive much attention amidst the more dramatic events surrounding the formal introduction of Guided Democracy, but it was of great importance, for it marked the army leadership's establishment of a principle for which it had struggled from the very beginning of the revolution and which had hitherto been denied by Indonesia's civilian governments. The ministry was not, henceforth, to go out of army hands, in which it remained the instrument of the paramount military chief.

In addition to the Ministry of Defense, Nasution occupied the office of Supreme War Administrator (Peperti), which was established under the State of Emergency which existed from 1957 to 1963. It headed an army hierarchy which paralleled civilian territorial administration down to the local level and which administered the martial law under which the country lay. It provided a regular means for military intervention in civilian affairs at all levels, and particularly in the early years of Guided Democracy, the decisions taken by the Supreme War Administration were often more important than the deliberations of the cabinet. The acquisition of this office not only enhanced Nasution's personal prestige and political influence but, like his possession of the Defense Ministry, it gave him a hold on the army outside that provided by his position as Army Chief of Staff. This was important for the one great defeat which Nasution suffered in his efforts to secure undisputed claim to military leadership was his removal from that post in 1962. This blow to his power was struck in the reshuffle of general staff posts that followed the death of Deputy Chief of Staff Gatot Subroto. At that time, Nasution was promoted to a newly created post, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces; his old office of Army Chief of Staff became that of Commander of the Army and was given to his erstwhile Operations deputy, General Ahmad Yani.

This transformation, the effect of which was to remove Nasution from immediate command of the army and to supply an alternative focus for military loyalties, appears to have been arranged by President Sukarno, who desired to weaken Nasution's grip on post-rebellion army loyalties, which now formed a threat to his own power. The President could not have made this move stick without the army leaders' Constitution. Initially, Sukarno tried to persuade Nasution to give up the post of Army Chief of Staff in return for the cabinet position; but Nasution, being well aware that the dual function was a vital key to power, refused to go along with this. See Daniel S. Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1966), p. 279.


5. Under the New Order, General Suharto has also held the posts of Minister of Defense and Commander of the Armed Forces (in addition to the Presidency), though he has relinquished the office of Commander of the Army. See below, pp. 179-180.

6. Normally the head of the war administration was the chief of staff of the territorial army command at the appropriate level. For a discussion of the powers and effect of the martial law administration, see Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy, pp. 59-74.
acquiescence, but there were reasons why it was attractive to them as well. In reviving the office of Armed Forces Chief of Staff, which had been abolished following the October 17, 1952 Affair in the interests of promoting inter-service rivalry, it allowed the army to reassert its hegemony over the other services, a dominance that was becoming increasingly important to possess as the air force and navy expanded and grew in confidence with the aid of their new foreign equipment. It also reinsured Nasution's position as Minister of Defense, which he continued to occupy in his new capacity as armed forces head.

As Yani received his post in preference to several more senior generals, Sukarno could hope that he might be weak enough in his new office to remain dependent on Presidential support. This calculation proved only partially correct, for Yani, who had already acquired a considerable military reputation for his direction of operations in the regional rebellion, proved sufficiently adept at army politics to overcome much of the resentment at his premature promotion. In spite of the best efforts of Sukarno and the civilian left, he maintained a lively appreciation that he would have less room for maneuver if he broke with Nasution than if he maintained a position in the middle. Thus, although he assumed a more cooperative public stance than Nasution did vis-a-vis the civilian leadership of Guided Democracy, he remained essentially a leader of the army and opposed to Sukarno's camp.7

Though Nasution and Yani had different ethnic and divisional backgrounds8 and possessed separate personal clienteles, their military and social outlooks were sufficiently alike for them to represent roughly the same style of officer. They belonged to the "metropolitan superculture"9 which developed in Indonesia's great cities towards the end of the colonial period, a mestizo mingling

7. Towards 1965, with the army increasingly on the defensive in capital politics, there was growing talk that Nasution would be removed to an exalted but powerless post, that he would be replaced as Armed Forces Chief of Staff by Yani, and that the latter would turn over his old job to a more malleable army commander. Nasution's position was by that time sufficiently weak that he probably could have been replaced had Yani agreed to cooperate with Sukarno in the effort, but in the ensuing months there was little sign that the Commander of the Army had lost his awareness that what was done to Nasution now might later also be done to him. It was General Suharto, relying on the great prestige he had won for his role in the October 1965 coup and on the demoralization of his opponents, who succeeded in kicking Nasution upstairs; having used Nasution's dismissal as Defense Minister by Sukarno following the coup as a reason to seize the Presidential powers for himself, he then did not restore Nasution but made him head of the Temporary People's Consultative Assembly (MPRS), effectively removing him from active military politics.

8. Nasution was of Mandailing Batak origin and a Siliwangi man; Yani was Javanese and of the Diponegoro Division.

of Western and Indonesian styles of life characteristic of the modern-educated, urban elite. Officers from this group were men of high education for the Indonesian army, of relatively distinguished birth, people who possessed good access to the upper levels of the civilian elite. Dutch was often their common language of informal discourse. They were the type of officer who had dominated the central leadership of the army in the early postcolonial period; most of their post-revolutionary military experience was in the capital rather than in a divisional context, and in staff rather than line duties. Yani's accession thus did not greatly alter the style of the army leadership; nor did it change the direction of military reform, for, as we shall later see, he had a principal hand in shaping this reform even before he became army commander.

As Yani's appointment showed, the army's acquisition of the Defense Ministry did not mean the final liberation of the military from civilian supervision. Sukarno, acting in his capacity as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and relying on his increasing political stature to secure the loyalty of officers, continued to exert some of the influence which previously civilian governments had wielded on the armed forces. But he was the only civilian element that could interfere at the top level. Political parties and interest groups might endeavor to infiltrate and manipulate, but they could only affect the behavior of individual officers, usually in a local context; they were not capable of influencing army policy as a whole. Moreover, even at the height of Sukarno's influence, it was not possible for him to achieve the measure of control over the military leadership which the parliamentary governments had enjoyed a decade before. The civilian politicians had made a fatal step in deciding to recall Nasution to power in 1955 and to grant him full backing in order to prevent regional disintegration, for, when the rebellion was over they found themselves faced with a military leadership too strong and too deeply entrenched for them to be able to reassert their prerogatives. Sukarno found himself engaged instead in a struggle for power with the army chiefs, a contest in which he, though nominally dominant, had in fact the weaker hand, for time and the possession of force were on their side. They needed only to preserve their unity and authority over their troops to succeed, while he needed to attack, to divide their forces, and to set them to quarrelling. This was no longer so easy to do.


11. It is perhaps not surprising that, of the seven military leaders who were targets of the coup group on October 1, 1965, three had played major roles in the October 17, 1952 coup attempt. These were Generals Nasution, Suprapto, and S. Parman. It should be noted, however, that this did not mean that they were faithful followers of Nasution on all issues. We have seen earlier that Parman, for example, engaged in conflict with Nasution at the time of the Zulkifli Lubis Affair in his capacity as IPRI secretary.
Promotions and Patronage

As we have seen in the discussion of the early efforts to impose central authority on the post-revolutionary army, the absence of adequate means to satisfy the material requirements of officers and units was a major factor in internal disaffection. In amending this condition on his return to office as Army Chief of Staff in 1955, General Nasution turned to an increase in the rate of promotions as the most immediately efficacious salve. Nasution had had little luck in handling the promotions issue earlier, for it had been his group's efforts at channeling assignments and promotions that had largely been responsible for uniting his military opponents in 1952. In the three years that had followed his downfall, discontent over ranks and placements had festered, and it was apparent that he had to take immediate and generous steps if he wished to secure cooperation and prevent the further dispersal of the high command's control in the direction of civilian and regional interests. At the same time, he was comforted by the fact that promotions were easy to make, needing only central fiat; and they were relatively cheap—a major consideration for an army leadership which disposed of very few ways of satisfying the material demands made on it.

The first major reform which Nasution undertook on his return was, therefore, that of bringing order into the arrangements for promotions. To give army men a sense of regularity and structure in their careers and to bind them to the ideas of discipline and objective bureaucratic routine, it was necessary to introduce the appearance of impersonal and earned reward into the matter of advancement, for so long as promotion was thought an affair of patronage, alliance, and the power play at the top it was not likely that officers would abandon a personalistic approach to their pursuit of their ambitions. Accordingly, at the beginning of 1956 a commission was installed to review army ranks and assignments and to advise the Chief of Staff on their revision. It was headed by the Deputy Chief of Staff, Colonel Gatot Subroto. That officer had been a Nasution ally in both the October 17 and Lubis Affairs, but he commanded independent respect both through his own strong claims to army leadership and the contrast between his flamboyant personality and the gray bureaucratic image of his chief. In addition, the Commission included Nasution's erstwhile enemy Colonel Bambang Supeno, evidently as evidence of Nasution's intention not to repeat the policies that had brought charges of favoritism in 1952. This time, too, the Nasution leadership did not repeat the mistake of coupling reorganization with the threat of unemployment. Instead, the Gatot Commission's deliberations were accompanied by assurances that the army would expand in size and that, since it appeared that Indonesian ranks were lower than those of military men doing equivalent jobs in other countries, massive promotions would take place.


13. Madjalah Angkatan Darat, I (January 1956), announcing the formation of the Gatot Commission. See also Waspada, August 9, 1956, for a communiqué by the Army Information Service on the progress of the Commission's work. The Commission consisted at that time of Colonels Gatot Subroto, Bambang Supeno, Suwondho, and S. Parman. It is interesting to note that these officers were all of East and Central Java divisional background; there was no Siliwangi or Outer Island representation. It was probably reckoned that
At the same time, the high command stressed that these pleasant prospects were tied to sacrifice. It forbade army men and veterans henceforth to have associations of their own, for too often, it declared, such groups had interfered in military matters and tried to establish "shadow hierarchies" in rivalry with the official chain of command. Once the Gatot Commission had completed its deliberations and a central system of education and training had been established, there must be no more regional efforts to establish training units and schools or otherwise interfere with central prerogatives in placement and instruction. All matters of the officer corps must go through the officers' union, the IPRI. Even this organization was reminded that it was an unofficial association which might not make public pronouncements concerning internal army affairs, but only make proposals aimed at improving the army's organization and methods of work. Coming as this proclamation did in a time of regional defiance, it was not much more than a declaration of intent; but it described an intention firmly held, and the high command applied it with an increasingly strong hand in the areas which it controlled.

The Gatot Commission's task of sorting out the multitudinous claims of officers after six years of retrenchment, confusion, and favoritism was clearly very difficult, but it was aided in its efforts both by the policy of rank increase and by the fact that the 1958 rebellion removed a great many claimants from consideration. Moreover, in the 1957-1959 period the army leadership moved rapidly from rags to relative riches: The declaration of a State of War and Siege in early 1957, the seizure of Dutch enterprises later that year, the turn from parliamentary rule to Guided Democracy, and the acquisition of substantial amounts of foreign military aid, all opened new vistas for promotion, advantageous assignment, and power. However, as the question of promotion and placement was not one that vanished with the first major sorting-out, it was decided to make the commission permanent as the Central Advisory Council on Offices and Ranks. Nasution's presence as Chief of Staff would ensure attendance to Siliwangi interests.

It is not clear why Indonesian ranks were held at a relatively low level through the early 1950's. A possible explanation is that the general reduction of ranks that accompanied the rationalization effort was intended to be succeeded by the selective promotion of the type of officers desired by the Nasution-Simatupang leadership, but that neither this group nor succeeding leaders were strong enough to promote their clients above other claimants. The first post-revolutionary general, following Simatupang's retirement, was Nasution, who advanced from colonel to major general on his return to office in 1955.

14. Waspada, March 8, 1957 (Army Information Service Communiqué) announcing the opinion of the high command. The reference to IPRI pronouncements on internal army matters was no doubt related to that association's hapless intervention in the Zulkifli Lubis Affair (see "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation," Part I, pp. 172-173).

In 1960, in response to the rapidly increasing complexity of the officer corps, it was split into the Council on Assignments and Ranks for Senior Officers (WANDJABTI) and the Advisory Council on Assignments and Ranks (DEPDJABKA), which dealt with the middle grades. The WANDJABTI, known as the Generals' Council, was to play an increasingly important role in the 1960's because it gave a say to some of the army's most senior and powerful officers who would otherwise have been unable to present to the general staff recommendations for promotions and assignments outside their official spheres of responsibility.16

Side by side with the effort to regularize promotions, the high command endeavored to secure acceptance of a two-year tour of duty as the norm for army assignments. This policy, of course, ran directly counter to the territorial commanders' interest in entrenching themselves, and indeed it was aimed particularly at destroying their independence. The principle was necessary for other reasons as well, particularly to ensure the smooth flow of promotions and assignments, which, after the early 1960's, again showed signs of becoming blocked. In the pre-1965 period the high command could never really overcome resistance to a standard length of assignment, try as it would, for it was still too weak and divided to be able to impose its will on senior officers (including its own members) who had no intention of losing advantageous positions or weakening their subordinates' support by the untimely movement of themselves or their favorites. The roughly equal age of the officer corps inherited from the revolution was incompatible with the highly pyramided hierarchy of posts, and it was only after 1965, with the massive post-coup purges of the army and the arrival of the revolutionary generation at an age indisputably close to retirement, that this major obstacle to the regularization of promotions and assignments was removed.17

Promotion and placement were important for pacifying individual officers, but to keep troop commanders loyal to the center and in control of their men, the high command had to provide supplies, equipment, and amenities on a far greater scale than it had done in the early post-revolutionary years. In the late 1950's, the high command proceeded to acquire substantial resources of its own, in a transfer to control over resources that entailed a major reorganization of the Indonesian governmental and economic system.

The first step in the direction of securing greater control over patronage sources had already been taken with the reappointment of

16. At the time of the October 1965 coup the chairman of the council was General Sudirman, head of the Army Staff and Command School, and its vice-chairman was General Suharto, head of the Army Strategic Command. The term "Generals' Council" (Dewan Djenderal) was used to refer to this group from an early date (see, for example, Kedaulatan Rakjat, June 8, 1962).

17. In the post-1965 period the tour-of-duty principle was also extended to the posts of chief of staff of the various services. Suharto declared on the installation of Soewoto Soekendar as head of the air force in January 1970 that the government intended to limit the service chiefs to a three or four-year assignment. Merdeka, January 8, 1970, reporting Suharto's speech.
Nasution as Army Chief of Staff, for, as we have seen, it reflected a
decision on the part of Sukarno and the Djakarta political leadership
to subordinate their desire to divide and rule the military to the
cause of preventing regional rebellion. Consequently, Nasution
received full governmental backing in his appointment policies and
in his handling of the Zulkifli Lubis Affair. He also seems to have
received assurances of considerably greater allocations of funds than
the army had obtained since the October 17 Affair, and he placed much
stress on this in soliciting support from within the army. Nasution
also secured government acquiescence in major arms purchases abroad,
and at an early date a mission was dispatched to Indonesia's previous
suppliers to discover what new arrangements could be made. Unfortun­
ately, the initial enquiries yielded little of promise: Indonesia's
supply of hard cash was very low, and the major country likely to
supply arms for credit, the United States, was uncertain of Djakarta's
political reliability and more than a little attracted by its regional­
ist opponents.

With foreign assistance temporarily unavailable and Indonesia's
own resources drained by economic decline and smuggling, it is very
doubtful that the army leadership could have acquired the sort of
patronage it needed short of a coup that would have placed civilian
posts and perquisites at military disposal or a radical reorganiza­
tion which would have enlarged the government's portion in the
society as a whole. There was, indeed, much talk of an impending
army takeover during 1957 and 1958, and Nasution hinted that this was
the alternative if, by one means or another, the military's require­
ments were not met.

This crisis was resolved by two means: the utilization of Cold
War competition to provide Indonesia with substantial sources of
foreign backing, and the progressive extension of governmental
authority over available domestic resources, with the army getting a
major share of the new public domain. The first of these moves involved
the decision to seek aid from the Soviet Union as well as from the
Western sources to which Indonesia had previously looked. This
decision, in spite of the officially neutralist position of the army
and governmental leaders, was not an easy one for them to take. How­
ever, when they did make the move they found an excellent reception
on the Soviet side, for the Khrushchev regime, in the ebullient
beginnings of its effort to win Asian and African friends, was more
than pleased to acquire the largest Southeast Asian country as a
potential client. The Americans, for their part, rapidly reversed
their position once it became evident that Djakarta would win out
over the regional rebels; and as relations between Indonesian and
American military representatives had never deteriorated as those between
the civilian leaderships had done, it was possible to make swift amends.
For some time, Indonesia was in the pleasant position of being able to
bid its two great suitors against each other, though in the end it was
the Soviets who supplied by far the greatest amount of aid through
their large-scale provision of heavy equipment, particularly modern
ships and airplanes.

18. See "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation," Part I, p. 152,
ftn. 26; and also Pesat, XV, No. 41 (October 11, 1958), pp. 5-6
(Nasution's Armed Forces Day speech of October 5, 1958).

This aid provided the Indonesian military with the naval and air capability it needed to enforce Djakarta's authority throughout the archipelago, for the central command's lack of means to move troops massively and rapidly from Java had been a major factor in the regional defiance of the 1950's. More generally, the acquisition of this advanced equipment was a move in the direction of the sophisticated and highly mobile cadre army to which Nasution and his military colleagues aspired. They could also reckon that regional commanders would be impressed by the possibility of acquiring advanced equipment and, insofar as they gained access to it, would bind themselves further to the center through its heavy logistical requirements. In turn, however, the central army leadership found itself bound to its foreign suppliers by the advanced nature of its new armament, particularly since the country had virtually none of the industrial base and few of the specialized armed forces needed to support a large, sophisticated armed force.

Although foreign aid was an important source of central patronage for the army, its scope and significance were far inferior to those of the domestic political and economic resources made available to the high command. The initial promises made by a government ready to give the army leadership whatever backing it could in return for support in the regional crisis were soon transformed into real power through the proclamation in March 1957 of a State of Emergency. This meant the introduction of martial law and a hierarchy of "war administrator" offices which, in effect, placed the supervision of civilian government in the hands of the military command at that territorial level. This not only gave great political power to the army at all levels but, because of the war administrators' influence on licenses, permissions, and means of communication, it provided important possibilities for economic gain as well. The State of Emergency was


21. Much of the military aid solicited by the Indonesians in connection with the rebellion arrived instead in time for the Irian campaign of 1960-1962, and it played an important role in a reorganization and upgrading of army combat units which was initiated at that time. The Soviets were quite willing to have their arms used for the seizure of West Irian, as they proved by providing further supplies. But the next major operation, the confrontation of Malaysia, was a different affair so far as Indonesia's foreign creditors were concerned. By this time the Soviets and Americans no longer responded automatically to attempts to play the one against the other, and neither of them saw much attraction in financing an Indonesian political course that seemed likely to benefit not their interests but China's. The Americans urged economic stabilization and the regularization of relations with the West; the Russians also looked for Indonesian retrenchment, for it seemed otherwise unlikely that their huge loans would be repaid. When Indonesia abandoned its economic stabilization effort of 1963 in favor of Confrontation and moved significantly closer to China in its stand on international issues, the Americans and Russians rapidly lost interest in providing substantial military aid. The effects of this decrease in aid were soon felt by the Indonesian armed forces, for the demands of Confrontation operations and the stringencies of a rapidly declining economy rapidly reduced their available materiel. By 1965, military leaders were discussing the necessity of "standing on their own feet" in the matter of maintenance and spare parts.
important for the legitimation which it gave to the massive penetration of the civilian world by the army in the first years of Guided Democracy. No one could challenge the military physically in its new role, but the army leadership was still sufficiently unsure of its further ambitions and still legally minded enough to find this provision for its presence a very important one. We can see the weight that this was accorded in the fact that the lifting of the Emergency in 1963 gave the army a marked if temporary diffidence in its intervention in the civilian political world.

During Guided Democracy, the army presence grew steadily in all fields. In some areas older ideas of social hierarchy and proper government were sufficiently strong to guarantee the dominance of the head of the civil administration but more and more local military representatives were acknowledged to possess the greatest weight by virtue of the physical resources at their command. Indeed, military men were increasingly appointed to posts in the civil service, and thus both the heads of local military and civil administrations might be army men. This began in the areas that had been under the control of regionalist rebels and in localities where the Darul Islam revolt had destroyed the regular governmental structure, but during the 1960's it spread until most governorships and a great many other civilian administrative posts were in army hands.

This extension of the army role was most valuable as a source of patronage. In the first place it gave the high command—which controlled all appointments of army officers to civilian posts—access to political and economic power at all levels of the society. In the second place, it provided an opportunity for removing officers judged too incapable or unreliable for further advancement in the mainstream of army promotion. The emoluments of the new posts would, it was hoped, preserve the loyalty of the officers concerned, and they would represent the interests of the army in the civilian world while lacking the military base that would allow them to interfere effectively in intra-army politics. In addition, the army extended its political activities by sponsoring a series of mass organizations, beginning with the National Front for the Liberation of West Irian in 1958 and continuing through the "functional organizations" of Guided Democracy.\(^{22}\) These organizations, too, had the dual purpose of controlling civilians and providing an opportunity for employing unwanted members of the armed forces.

But by far the greatest source of patronage to come into the hands of the high command in the pre-coup period was the control over enterprises seized from the Dutch late in 1957. The takeover occurred in the context of the West Irian dispute, but its domestic effect was perhaps even more important than its impact on Indonesia's foreign affairs. It brought under Indonesian control a critical area of the economy which had hitherto remained in foreign hands, and it transferred that control to a particular segment of the Indonesian state, its army.

This was the beginning of a major military presence in the economic life of the country, a presence which gave great power to the central command and to the army as a whole but which also served to settle the social role of the military in a particular fashion—to ensure that it became a conservative force.  

The extension of army activity into the economy meant, among other things, that military leaders were provided with substantial sources of funding outside the regular government budget, which itself expanded the defense allotment greatly. The direct tapping of the resources of the state enterprises was not simply a matter of providing luxuries for well-placed officers, for the Indonesian armed forces, though not large in relation to the problems of security which the country's geography and social divisions presented, were expensive in relation to the funds available to the government. Attempts at retrenchment—such as the government's stabilization effort of 1963—involved a real sacrifice of military supplies; they were felt by army members in the form of reduced rations and benefits, and this reduction in turn created a problem of internal military instability. Not surprisingly, the army leaders sought to forestall this, by opposing effective reductions of the army's share of government funds or by tapping moneys before they reached the government. This independent system of funding had considerable advantages for the central army command. For one thing, it made it even freer of civilian control than before. For another, it provided great patronage powers, not only because the appointment and removal of officers placed in charge of government enterprises or otherwise


24. The high point of military utilization of the government budget was in the final stages of the Irian campaign, when about three quarters of the budget was devoted to defense. In 1966, the armed forces were still consuming 70 percent of the budget, according to Colonel Sajidiman Surjohadiprodjo. Of this, he said one quarter was used to maintain the organization and the rest for operations; even if all operations ceased, the minimum necessary to keep the military would be 25 or 30 percent. Berita Yudha, May 30, 1966. The government's subsequent ability to reduce this percentage drastically has been aided by the practice of informal financing discussed below and by the devotion of sizeable funds earmarked for "special projects" to military purposes. The direct role of the army in enterprise management has been greatly reduced, however.

25. Thus in 1963 the Central Java panglima, General Sarbini, urged army members to understand the necessity of budget cuts which had meant the reduction of that year's standard ration and the discontinuation of refined sugar, butter, and cigarette allowances for soldiers. Kedaulatan Rakjat, June 19, 1963, speech to the Jogjakarta garrison. No doubt the common soldiers were the first to suffer under such cutbacks, but, particularly as inflationary pressures increased, a lack of funds was felt as well in the officer corps.
inserted into the economy lay in the hands of the high command, but also because the informal system of financing created a "slush fund" of sizeable proportions which the military leaders could use largely as they wished to enhance the army's and their personal power. However, the system also contained substantial drawbacks, which made themselves most evident in the general decline of the economy and which also acted to reduce the power of the army leadership.

The most visible of these disadvantages was the conflict of purpose which arose as a result of the high command's utilization of economic appointments as a means of buying off recalcitrant or incompetent officers as well as a means of obtaining funds. Aside from the fact that the officer appointed to manage or supervise a government enterprise very rarely had any relevant experience, he was also, because of this policy, unlikely to be very competent or eager in the matter of learning. Especially in the first years of Guided Democracy, many army estate supervisors used their position essentially to divest the enterprise assigned them of whatever sources of income it possessed, with the result that productivity declined disastrously and considerable reinvestment was required in order to make the concern at all viable again. In the seized export-import concerns, where the military supervisors' lack of experience quickly led to crisis, the frequent resolution was that the official administration became a front for the actual backroom running of the enterprise by businessmen from the Chinese minority, whose position as Indonesia's main commercial force was enhanced by the removal of the great Dutch firms that had hitherto dominated the country's international trade.26

These developments placed the military in a parasitical role which was not conducive to high morale and incorruptibility. The question of military corruption first became acute in 1958, as it became apparent to the army leaders that their entrance into economic and political life was not leading, as they had hoped, to efficiency and the ousting of rascals but to the bewilderment and corruption of military men faced with many temptations and armed with small sense of purpose. The army heads endeavored then and later to combat corruption in their forces, but their efforts were foiled by the ready possibilities of temptation, the pressures of inflation, and the army leaders own visible reliance on extraordinary sources of finance.

The army's direct utilization of the economy as a major source of income, and the widespread appointment of army officers as managers of already established enterprises gave the military a very considerable stake in the existing economic structure. Strikes were banned in important enterprises soon after their seizure from the Dutch and were not again allowed; military units and civil defense groups under army supervision saw to it that labor discipline was preserved and that squatters were driven off estate land. This was a principal reason why, in spite of the populist rhetoric of Sukarno and the public

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expansion of the PKI, the position of the Indonesian labor organizations declined precipitously in terms of being able to launch effective actions for wages or other improvements in their members' standard of living. The sources of social conservatism already present in the Indonesian officer corps were thus reinforced by a concrete and substantial identification with the economic status quo.

Although the army high command claimed the right to appoint army managers of enterprises and appointees to political positions, its use of these sources of patronage resulted in another sense in the weakening of its grip. The expansion of military activity into the civilian sphere led to the growth of alliances and entanglements there between individual officers and their civilian counterparts. It opened up new, local sources of patronage and support; and, because the high command itself indulged in highly informal fund raising, officers easily felt justified in making arrangements of their own. Nor, given the great power which an army officer represented, were civilians likely to refuse the chance to obtain the friendship of one that was strategically placed; on the contrary, both as individuals or representatives of parties and interest groups, civilians made considerable efforts to obtain military patrons and to take advantage of whatever army factionalism might be bent to their interests. Finally, the continued stringency of army finances meant that local commanders often felt obliged to make informal arrangements for the support of their troops; moonlighting and the commercial use of army vehicles were common, and local sources of income were tapped by officers and men. Thus, a rather sprawling system of army financing emerged, partly distributed from the center and partly locally derived or acquired from patrons elsewhere in the military structure. It was difficult for the army leaders to oversee this development, and it acted as a brake on their efforts to create an obedient and efficient military machine.

Education as a Source of Central Control

One of the principal projects which General Nasution promoted after his return to power in 1955 was upgrading the army's instruction and training system and transforming it into a means of enhancing the army's ideological unity and hierarchical discipline. The early moves in this direction, which began about 1956, went largely unnoticed amidst the more dramatic events of the Lubis coup and the subsequent regional rebellion; but when the dust of these conflicts had settled, it was apparent that the new policies were already well on the way toward creating a military force of quite different character from that of the 1950's.

We might have expected, given the orientation towards expertise which we observed in Nasution's earlier leadership of the army, that he would place considerable emphasis on instruction and training, but recognition of the key role of education did not stem from the ideas of his kind of officer alone. It flowed as well from the "red"

tradition\(^2\) of the revolution and the earlier experience of the Peta during the Japanese occupation, in which military and ideological training were seen as equally vital to the creation of the fighting man. This consideration indeed continued to be important during Nasution's term of office. In the first place, his emphasis on expertise over indoctrination was only relative, for he was of the revolutionary generation himself; moreover, the army's great role in civilian affairs in post-parliamentary Indonesia made the military leaders feel strongly the need for a doctrine which would provide them with a broader national purpose and prevent army members from being drawn toward civilian political movements. Consequently, they saw education as including not only technical training and the principles of soldierly obedience but also the shaping of a broader ideology. In the end, however, while the technical side of their program flourished, the doctrinal effort did not. It was a victim not of lack of emphasis—for it received a great deal of that—but of the army leaders' own puzzlement as to their ultimate political goals and of their inability to compete with the ideas put forward by Sukarno and other major civilian political forces.

The acute shortage of trained personnel for the revolutionary armed forces and the desire to acquire the accoutrements of full nationhood inspired Indonesia's leaders to create a system of military instruction soon after the declaration of independence. In October 1945 a National Military Academy (Akademi Militer Nasional, AMN) was formed in Jogjakarta.\(^2\) In Malang, an Army School (Sekolah Tentara) emerged to provide instruction and upgrading, particularly for the forces fighting in East Java. In July 1948 the Malang school was formally incorporated into its Jogja counterpart, which continued until 1950. At that point the Academy found itself stranded by the removal of the capital to Djakarta, the lack of educated young men attracted to a peacetime army career, and factional rivalries for control over military institutions. Only ten candidates presented themselves for admission, and these, given the chance, chose training with the Corps of Engineers in Bandung or at the Royal Netherlands Military Academy in Breda instead.\(^3\) As a result, the AMN was ordered to close its doors.

The primary focus of military instruction now shifted to Bandung, where the Chandradimuka Academy had been established to provide courses

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\(^2\) Ibid., p. 134.

\(^2\) The Academy opened on October 28, 1945, with five hundred students; in November 1948 it graduated its first class, 196 second lieutenants. Forty-five of the original group were listed as killed in action before graduating. The second and last revolutionary class was much smaller, some two hundred students. Kedaulatan Rakjat, November 21, 1957. According to Benedict Anderson, the Jogjakarta academy was preceded by a school set up in Tanggerang by Peta-trained officers including Sukanda Bratamenggala and Daan Mogot; it was dissolved when the Republican forces abandoned Djakarta. (Private communication to the author.)

\(^3\) Kedaulatan Rakjat, November 21, 1957. Military scholarships to Holland were offered as part of the Round Table Conference agreement and ceased with the 1953 expulsion of the Netherlands Military Mission; they never became an important source of post-revolutionary Indonesian military training or clique formation.
to upgrade military officers and in particular to create for them a common ideological base. Unfortunately for its survival, this institution was headed by Colonel Bambang Supeno, who, as we will remember, fell afoul of the Nasution-Simatupang army leadership. In the course of the quarrel the high command eliminated the school as a source of Supeno's support by abolishing it. Thereafter the Staff and Command School (SSKAD, later SESKOAD) was developed as the prime center of military instruction and ideological formulation. It drew its clientele, for varying periods of assignment, from officers on active duty, whom it was supposed to provide with the highest level of instruction in the military educational establishment. It did not, in other words, do what the National Military Academy was supposed to have done, that is to provide university-level instruction for young men who wished to embark on a professional army career. Nothing did so for five years: evidently Nasution and his allies lacked sufficient support to establish an academy to their liking but had enough backing after their 1952 fall from power to keep their opponents from doing so themselves.

31. "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation," Part I, pp. 145ff. The name of the academy fit well with Bambang Supeno's ideological leanings, for Chandradimuka is the name of the boiling crater into which the wajang hero Gatotkatja is dipped to make his body like steel. I am grateful to Benedict Anderson for pointing this out to me.

32. Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 250; Pelopor, May 17, 1955. The Academy accepted officers from the rank of major up, and as the highest officer was then colonel, it thus accepted the army's most senior members. Feith emphasized the close identification of the Chandradimuka leadership with President Sukarno. The academy's ideological endeavors were oriented toward the inculcation of the principles of the army oath of loyalty, Sapta Marga, which Bambang Supeno had drawn up and which was to continue as the army's fundamental pledge. The instruction was designed to contain something for the group of officers of fundamentally revolutionary bent, something for the technocrats, and something for those who wished to see the army play a more active role as an instrument of state power. Pelopor, May 17, 1955.

33. The Defense Ministry had urged reopening the National Military Academy in 1952 but had not been able to push the project far before the October 17 Affair. Subsequently army committees and commissions studied the problem of reopening the academy, but nothing was decided until 1956. The school reopened its doors in October 1957. In December 1965 it was renamed Armed Forces Academy of the Republic of Indonesia (AKABRI) and given charge over the education of cadets from all services. Sapta Marga, December 3, 1965.

General Nasution noted that candidates for the AMN, who were required to have senior high school (SMA) certificates, experienced great difficulty passing the psychological test required for entrance: on average, only 23 percent got through. Their main failings were a low state of general knowledge, insecurity and timidity, inability to distinguish real from false problems and solutions, lack of judgment and character, and lack of leadership talents. See A. H. Nasution, Menudju Tentara Rakjat (Djakarta:
With no other high-level educational or planning institutions in existence, the Staff and Command School emerged as the army's intellectual center; in later years, when challengers did exist, it was still able to maintain its primacy as the source of military doctrine and thought. Moreover, owing to the fact that the officers who attended its courses were drawn from all over the country, it afforded an opportunity for acquaintances to be made and bonds to be formed among officers of varied divisional background. For many officers in the 1950's it provided their first chance to meet colleagues outside their home territory, and the school tie soon acquired importance, especially for young and ambitious officers who saw their schooling as a key to appointment in the capital or as a means of pressing claims against uneducated superiors at home. The placement of an officer who underwent a course at the school was normally made by Djakarta; a promising student might well find himself assigned to the staff of a difficult panglima from which delicate perch he might, if he acted successfully in the interests of the high command, aspire to promotion and perhaps the panglimaship itself.

But as we have seen from the SSKAD's part in the Lubis Affair of 1956, the political role of the Staff and Command School (and for that matter of any other major military educational institution) could work against the central command as well as for it. In cutting across regional ties, it also created loyalties of its own, in which army headquarters had no necessary share. It could and did foster notions of elitism and of collective representation for the officer corps, and the school's leaders felt this opinion provided sufficient legitimation for political action so that they used it on occasion to challenge Djakarta. The army leadership could not feel this threat was over once the crisis of the Lubis Affair was past, for it recognized that the SSKAD intervention was a reflection of the broader problem created by the army leaders' effort to increase central control over a diffuse and diverse military force. Under such gathering

Jajasan Penerbit Minang, 1963), pp. 194-198. The psychological test appears to have been as much an I.Q. test as anything else, and its results may have reflected in part the declining standards of Indonesian secondary school education; in addition, it was probably very difficult for students of provincial background to respond adequately to what appears to have been a rather westernized personality test.

34. The principal one of these was the National Defense Institute (Lemhanas), which was established in 1965 as a "think tank" to study matters of defense policy in a more thorough manner than was possible at the Staff and Command School. Pikiran Rakjat, July 26, 1965, statement of Major General Sudirman, commander of the SESKOAD, concerning plans for the new institution. Its location in Djakarta placed it closer to the center of power than the Bandung-based SESKOAD and made it easier for military and civilian leaders stationed in the capital to participate in its activities, but it has remained less important than the SESKOAD as a center of army thought.

central pressure, army institutions which possessed prestige and which brought together officers of widely different background were almost bound to become sources of criticism, whether or not this was encouraged by those in charge. And yet, if the high command wished to possess a militarily qualified and doctrinally unified army, it would have to bring officers together and grant prestige to the centers of their instruction. The question in the mid-1950's was whether to put aside the development of a central educational and training structure for the short run, in the interests of economy and the preservation of diffuse opinion--much as the Military Academy had been put aside earlier--or whether to grasp the nettle firmly and strive to pass as quickly as possible to the stage where the central command possessed a reliable and effective instrument for shaping the Indonesian army man.

A prime factor in the decision to move massively in the direction of developing the educational system was the return of Colonel Ahmad Yani from the United States in 1956 and his assumption of the role of Deputy in charge of Operations on Nasution's staff. Yani had spent a year at the American army's staff and command school at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and while there he had been greatly impressed by the ability of that institution to mold effective and ideologically compatible officers in a brief period of time. In the American system of military instruction he and his colleagues on the army general staff saw a model which was modern without being Dutch, one which, moreover, had fashioned the world's paramount military force, a wealthy potential patron with a rising interest in Southeast Asia. It seemed possible, following the American example, to construct a training and instruction system that would expose army men at all levels to new ideas, skills, and central control and which would have a transforming role in the creation of a unified army. But this could not be a matter of half-measures: a great deal of the army's resources would have to go into the enterprise, so that the schools would impress their attenders instead of adding to their discontent; and the officers assigned to teach in them must be of high caliber and not, as too often in the past, those without the ability or connections to obtain posts closer to the seat of power.

The immediate ideological goal sought was, with gestures to the Indonesian revolutionary heritage, the Western ideal of the professional soldier: a nationalism deemed to be above partisan politics, a stress on hierarchy and discipline, and a sense of pride at being part of a vital and highly trained organization. By intensive indoctrination and the development of military skills, it was hoped, army men would adopt a more "modern" and professional way of looking at their role and would cease to be distracted by the anti-hierarchical ideals of the revolution, by patron-client ties, and by regional and religious loyalties.36

36. The Western ideals of professionalism, while overtly nonpartisan, do contain powerful incentives for military intervention in public affairs, as has been demonstrated by S. E. Finer, The Man on Horseback (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 25-32. However, in the Indonesian situation, where the army had both a revolutionary tradition and an immediate political role, the short-run effect was to confuse officers as to the extent of their proper participation in nonmilitary affairs.
Before July 1956 army instruction had been the theoretical prerogative of the central inspectorates and offices, which provided training in their respective fields of specialization. Much of the military's basic education in practice was not supervised from the center at all, for territorial commanders wishing to upgrade their units and to improve their cohesion and local loyalty had provided instruction and indoctrination quite independently. In mid-1956, in line with the decision to stress education as an instrument of the center, all instruction and training was placed under a single authority, from whose control only the Staff and Command School and the about-to-be-revived National Military Academy were exempted. This move was accompanied by a general upgrading and ideological weeding-out of the training institutions' teaching personnel. Greater emphasis was now placed on securing politically reliable instructors, in order to provide soldiers with the uniform outlook that would ensure their loyalty and efficient response to orders.

At first, all teaching was channeled through a general instruction center (Pusat Pendidikan), but this extreme concentration soon proved impractical and the major corps were given qualified control over their own centers of training. For the infantry, a special infantry center (Pusat Kesendjataan Infanteri) was placed in charge of both actual instruction and of planning the broader development of infantry combat capabilities. Logistically and administratively this body was directly under the office of the Army Chief of Staff, while operationally (that is, in actually giving instruction) it came under the Instruction and Training Command. Within each division-level regional command, cadre regiments (Resimen Induk) played an equivalent role. They were in charge of the instruction and training of the infantry units in their territories and were linked administratively and logistically to the office of the divisional commander and operationally to the Instruction and Training Command. These regiments had charge of the infantry cadre school (SKI) which existed in each military region, and of the one or more instruction depots (Dodik) which offered refresher courses and basic infantry training. The idea behind the whole system was that army men would periodically undergo instruction, the successful completion of which would be the stepping-stone to promotion and favorable reassignment. The educational structure was highly pyramided and culminated, for the most successful graduates of earlier phases, in courses for field-grade officers at the Staff and Command School.

As it existed in theory, this system not only fitted ideas of modern military organization and bureaucratic procedure, but it offered immediate practical advantages to the army leadership. Education was highly valued in postcolonial Indonesia, and while the officer with

37. This body was first called the General Instruction and Training Inspectorate (I. Djen. P.L.), but after a few years it assumed the title of Instruction and Training Command (KOPLAT).

38. Pikiran Rakjat, January 17, 1963, speech by the commander of the Infantry Center. From 1960 to 1962, he declared, the center had trained some 5,700 commissioned, noncommissioned, and candidate officers and specialists. When in 1962 the office of Army Chief of Staff was replaced by that of Commander of the Army, organic (administrative and logistical) control of the center was assumed by the office of the army commander.
a revolutionary reputation but few educational qualifications might
do his best to deny the need for formal learning, he could not feel
completely comfortable with his lack of it, and therefore could not
effectively resist the demand to attend a course. Officers called
to do a training course might suspect their summons was part of an
effort to remove them from the local scene, but as long as the prin-
ciple of universal retraining had been laid down and the possibility
existed that successful study would lead to a desirable new assign-
ment, it more often than not made sense for them to cooperate. Once
an officer was at a central installation, cut off from his divisional
base and dependent on the high command for his next post, army head-
quartes could shunt him aside with less chance of resistance from
himself and his associates than if the blow fell at home.39 4 0  4 1  Ultimat­
ely, the army leadership could hope that periodic instruction at
central training institutions would orient ambitious officers away
from the cultivation of a local power base and towards the pursuit
of expertise and the favor of the center--would create, in other
words, the attitudes essential to firm hierarchical control.

Needless to say, this system did not become actuality overnight.
There was a good deal of trouble securing reliable and competent
staff, and even when the army's income had begun to increase there
were severe material shortages.40 Moreover, once the new program
was under way it became evident that the highly centralized system
originally envisioned would have to be greatly modified. The rapid
upgrading of army units, the expansion of highly specialized services,
and increasing sophistication of equipment--all worked for a return
of authority over instruction to the inspectorates, directorates, and
offices in charge of specialized functions. Moreover, it became
evident that extreme vertical organization of military institutions
made for lack of coordination between local units, and at times
engendered a rivalry between them that hindered the effort to present
a solid army front in dealing with local civilian affairs.

As a result, another reorganization of the educational system
took place in mid-1963. This time the Instruction and Training Com-
mand relinquished its control of actual teaching, though it retained
general supervision and policy-making powers vis-a-vis the training
institutions.41 At the same time, full authority over the cadre

40. Thus Colonel Suharto, then commander of the Diponegoro Division,
announced in 1958 the temporary closing of the region's Infantry
Cadre School because there was no money to run it. Kedaulatan
Rakjat, July 12, 1958.
41. These training institutions were divided into three groups:
Kesendjataan (infantry, cavalry, and field and anti-aircraft
artillery); Kedinasan (adjutant general's office, finance, trans-
port, physical education, health, psychology, and justice); and
Korps (military police, quartermaster corps, engineers, signal
corps, and women's auxiliary). Nearly all the national-level
training centers were in Java, and a great many of them were in
West Java. The Bandung area, where the majority were concentrated,
boasted twenty instruction centers capable of handling fifty to
sixty thousand noncommissioned and commissioned officers a year.
Pikiran Rakjat, June 25, 1963, announcement of the Instruction and
Training Command.
regiments was returned to the divisional commanders; furthermore, these regiments were placed in charge of all army instruction provided in their territories at the divisional level and below, thus extending their scope considerably beyond their original infantry sphere. One reason for this appears to have been the great expansion in local-level army activity in the course of Guided Democracy, which meant that lower training institutions evolved new courses and included non-army members in their activities.

Not all the army's instruction and training took place in Indonesia itself. A significant portion of the officer corps received training abroad, most notably in the United States, where over four thousand Indonesian officers were trained before 1965. Lesser centers for overseas instruction were the Philippines, Pakistan, India, and Yugoslavia. Very few Indonesian army officers were trained in the USSR in spite of that country's role as Indonesia's chief arms supplier in the 1960's, although naval and air force personnel went there in rather greater quantity to learn to use Soviet-supplied equipment. Russia's absence from the list of Indonesia's military instructors appears to have been due in the first place to the army leadership's fear of the possible ideological consequences of Soviet indoctrination. In addition, the Soviets trained Indonesians (and other foreigners) in separate courses in order, they claimed, to minimize the language problem and provide instruction more suitable to the circumstances a tropical army would face; this division had its merits, but the Indonesians suspected they were getting second-class instruction. Even more important, the Soviets neglected, in the Indonesian

42. For an illustration, see Kedaulatan Rakjat, June 30, 1964, which provides a description of the competence of the Diponegoro cadre regiment.

43. The instruction depots, at least on Java, seem to have handled a great variety of training projects. The Fifth Instruction Depot Battalion in Klaten had, for example, trained the following by 1964: officers undergoing refresher courses, paramilitary "volunteers" for Irian and Malaysia, people doing compulsory military training, the "Garuda I" battalion which did UN duty in the first Suez crisis, a company of Papuans receiving training in connection with the Irian campaign, army-sponsored militia (OPR), and civil servants required to undergo part-time military training. Kedaulatan Rakjat, April 28, 1964, statement by Major Sudibjo, the depot battalion commander.

44. The great majority of these trained after the end of the regional rebellion, for between 1952 and mid-1958 only about 250 officers had received instruction in the United States. PIA news bulletin, May 15, 1958.

45. Interestingly, this stricture did not apply to Yugoslavia. The Indonesian military leadership under Nasution had excellent relations with the Yugoslav regime, which was seen as nonaligned, acceptable to respected Western opinion, and opposed by the Indonesian Communists. In the pre-coup period there does not seem to have been much alteration in the Indonesian army's attitude to Soviet Communism as a source of disruptive ideas in the light of the Sino-Soviet dispute.
participants' opinion, certain of the patronage aspects expected of such tours, and so an assignment to study in the USSR was not highly valued.

From the viewpoint of the high command, training assignments abroad were a most useful form of patronage; there was a very clear order of prestige, with a tour at Fort Leavenworth most highly valued. Foreign training was also held to increase the ideological self-confidence of officers. Particularly in the Guided Democracy period, it removed them from the Sukarno-dominated Indonesian scene and showed them that the ideals held up by their own military leaders were the international norm. The host countries were, of course, interested in winning friends and influencing opinion among the foreign students, and particularly the American programs pursued these aims effectively. It did not always work, but its general result was to temper suspicion of cooperation with the West and to reduce the impact of Guided Democracy exhortations.

In spite of their use of foreign examples and training, the Indonesian army leaders did not employ a permanent staff of foreign advisers to guide them in the construction of a modern military force following the removal of the Netherlands Military Mission in 1953. In this respect, Indonesia's experience was quite unlike that of most postcolonial states. Nonetheless, an effective military machine was created, and if the process was accompanied by many expensive mistakes it resulted in an army that was probably more capable of handling the situation at home than it would have been had its evolution been guided by outsiders. Moreover, consciousness that the army was shaping its own character counted a great deal for its internal morale and the prestige of its leaders.

This self-consciousness was not translated into a clear sense of the army's larger purpose, however. There was emphasis enough on indoctrination and ideology, for Indonesian military leaders of the Generation of '45 were too conscious of the importance of these elements in their own experience to neglect them after the revolution.

46. An attempt was made in 1958 to standardize Indonesian levels of military training with the educational opportunities available abroad: The AMN in Magelang was, according to this plan, to conform to the standard of the Royal Netherlands Military Academy; the advanced officer course was to be equated with the company grade and basic officer training in the US and with the junior officer course in India; the second level advanced officer course was to conform to the US advanced officer courses and the Indian senior officer course. The second grade of the SSKAD was to meet the standard of the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, the Higher War College in the Netherlands, and the Defense Services Staff College in Pakistan. *Kedaulatan Rakjat*, April 26, 1958, statement by General Nasution.

The normal progress of a Military Academy graduate in the infantry was supposed to be via training periods at the Basic Infantry Development School (Sarbangif), the first and second Intermediate Officers' Course and the Advanced Course (all held at the Infantry Instruction Center in Tjimahi) to instruction as a middle-rank or senior officer in the Staff and Command School. This progression was not always adhered to in practice, however.
Moreover, Indonesia's later circumstances emphasized the importance of possessing a coherent world view—first the confusion and demoralization of the parliamentary years and then the intense ideologizing of Guided Democracy. But the army's leaders found it hard to reconcile Western ideas of professionalism with a larger social role; they found it impossible to resist Sukarno's ideological presence; and above all they possessed no sure vision of Indonesia's goals themselves. They continued to think of themselves and the army as revolutionary in spite of the military's increasingly conservative social role. They saw the great hold of Sukarno's ideas on their own forces as well as on the civilians, and they saw the Communists' ability to maintain discipline and mobilize popular support in the face of adversity. They feared and envied these rivals, for though they knew they possessed the ultimate physical power, they could not before October 1965—see how this could be employed in a way which even a substantial part of their own forces would hold to be legitimate.

As a result, the military's indoctrination efforts had a curiously hollow character, a circling about a center that was not there. They appeared as a search for a formula that would somehow provide a single social meaning for the disparate traditions, experiences, and interests that went into the Indonesian army's being. Nasution argued that the army should pursue a "middle way," neither accepting direct leadership of and responsibility for the country's course nor yet abandoning its claims to participate in political and economic life, but though this allowed the army to act in its interests without being bound by formal government responsibility, it did not provide the clarity of purpose essential to giving meaning to the army's broader role. This meaning had to be total and dynamic, the first in order to seal soldiers off from unwanted outside influence and the second to provide a vision through which the army could engage the society as a whole. The line was never found, and the army's doctrine was always in the process of coming into being, its formulation debated in the SESKOAD, discussed in commissions, and weighed in seminars.

Reorganizing the Army Structure

We have already noted that Djakarta's victory in the regional rebellion eliminated Nasution's most prestigious rivals among the panglima and allowed him to emerge as the army's acknowledged head. But this was not enough to secure the continued dominance of the army center over the territorial commanders, whose strong local roots could supply a new threat should Nasution's prestige begin to fade. The

47. This formulation was developed by Nasution in defining the army's role in the emergent Guided Democracy system; he declared that the Indonesian army should neither be a political football like those of Latin America nor yet a dead instrument like those of Western Europe. See his address to the first anniversary celebration of the National Military Academy, in Pos Indonesia, November 13-14, 1958. For a general discussion of the army's political behavior in that period, see Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy; and Lev, "The Political Role of the Army in Indonesia," Pacific Affairs, XXXVI, No. 4 (Winter 1963-64), pp. 349-364.
army leadership therefore endeavored to ensure its continuing authority by three major changes in the army's structure and distribution of power—garrisoning the Outer Islands with forces from Java, reducing the authority of the regional military commanders, and creating a strike force under direct central control. These moves did indeed limit the panglima's autonomy, but they also created other pressures and sources of challenge which were eventually to prove fatal to the Nasution leadership.

The army's most public response to the defeat of its regionalist opponents, aside from the relatively mild reprisals taken against those who participated on the rebel side, was its transfer of large numbers of officers and men from the three Java divisions to the Outer Islands. In effect, the areas outside Java came under military occupation by the central island's forces. The Outer Islands were parcelled among the Siliwangi, Diponegoro, and Brawidjaja divisions; in these dependencies, they supplied the panglima, most of the key officers, and a good proportion of the combat troops. The army leadership reckoned that the infusion of Java forces would prevent the identification of military units outside Java with local civilian interests, and that in an emergency the Java troops could be relied upon to side with their home island.

The military leaders' calculation was almost certainly correct, but there were also considerations which helped to limit the extent to which the forces from Java identified with the center and against their new environment. Economic interests and a desire to preserve their freedom of action against Djakarta impelled officers who came from Java to make arrangements with regional civilian elites in spite of their initial lack of local ties. Locally popular parties and political leaders were often unable to act after the rebellion, and in any case they were allowed little influence by the occupying military authorities. Local pressure groups in the post-rebellion Outer Islands therefore tended to seek the backing of officers as much as that of civilian political leaders, with the result that civil and military factionalism often became intertwined.

A second method by which the army leaders sought to reduce regional power vis-a-vis the center was greatly to increase the number of the regional commands, a move which satisfied localist demands and created new positions for patronage as well. From an initial seven military territories, the number of divisional-level regions was raised to seventeen. The number of Java panglima was not increased (except involuntarily, by the creation of the Djaya Division in Djakarta), but their relative strength in army councils

48. These are: I, Iskandarmuda (Atjeh); II, Bukit Barisan (North Sumatra); III, 17 Agustus (West Sumatra); IV, Sriwidjaja (South Sumatra); V, Djaya (Djakarta); VI, Siliwangi (West Java); VII, Diponegoro (Central Java); VIII, Brawidjaja (East Java); IX, Mulawarman (East Kalimantan); X, Lambung Mangkurat (South Kalimantan); XI, Tambun Bungai (Central Kalimantan); XII, Tandjungpura (West Kalimantan); XIII, Merdeka (North and Central Sulawesi); XIV, Hasanuddin (South and Southeast Sulawesi); XV, Pattimura (Maluku); XVI, Udayana (Lesser Sundas); XVII, Tjendrawasih (West Irian).
was improved rather than diminished, for as the older, better manned and equipped, more stable, and more prestigious divisions, they had the weightiest voice; moreover, the fact that most of the Outer Island commanders were alumni of one or the other of the Java divisions extended Java's influence to other commands as well.

Another structural alteration undertaken by the central command in order to increase its power was the establishment of Inter-Regional Commands (KOANDA), which were introduced at the time of divisional expansion in order to link the several regional commands of Sumatra, Kalimantan, and East Indonesia. At first these were little more than liaison offices between the territorial panglima and the center. However, both the Mandala and Mandala Siaga operations—the Irian and Malaysia campaigns—were used to strengthen them, as they were to secure other structural changes desired by the center. Instead of the army leadership establishing a separate chain of command for these campaigns or working directly with the panglima, the KOANDA commanders were placed in charge in their respective areas. This gave a KOANDA head operational claims over a good portion of the best troops located in his territory, with the result that his position vis-a-vis his panglima was greatly strengthened. They were also granted the title of Deputy to the Army Chief of Staff (later Commander), which enhanced their status and emphasized their roles as representatives of the center.

In theory, it was possible for a KOANDA commander to establish himself as a sort of super-panglima challenging the central command. In practice, however, he had little possibility for doing this. Insofar as a KOANDA commander could succeed in establishing his paramount authority over an entire island he could achieve an appreciable independence of the center, but regional rivalries within any one KOANDA grouping were so great, and the existing divisional bonds so strong that Djakarta could reckon on being able to check unacceptable aggrandizement with the cooperation of the regional commands. The KOANDA commander, therefore, could act as a counterweight to the panglima without being easily able to play the same role against the center.

49. It was not considered necessary to establish this new level of command in Java, possibly because it was thought it would be unwise to unite the four Java commands in this fashion. However, under the Suharto reorganization of 1969, this was done with the creation of a KOWILHAN with jurisdiction over the central island (see below). It is possible that the development of cooperation among the Java commanders in the form of the Panglima se-Djawa faction, which had expressed itself strongly in favor of a more radical New Order stance in 1967 (see Nusantara, July 10, 1967, for its Jogja declaration of principles), Suharto concluded that it would be better after all to establish an office that would serve as a counterweight to the Java commanders.

50. The nearest approach to it appears to have been the aggrandizement of General Mokoginta, whose accumulation of power against the local panglima seems to have been one of the irritants leading to support for the September 30th Movement in that area, and whose subsequent assertions of autonomy led to his removal by Suharto.
The final major structural change which was begun by the pre-coup army leadership centered about the creation of a strike force that was under its direct control. As we have seen, one of the major problems faced by the army high command, which was reflected in its inability to deal with the regional coups in the October 17 Affair and in its later difficulties with recalcitrant panglima, was the lack of direct control over troops who would be moved quickly into an area of resistance. Expeditionary forces were sent to quell disturbances outside Java, and troops were transferred across divisional boundaries on the central island to deal with security problems beyond the control of local forces; but these troops consisted of soldiers from the Java divisions, whose participation had to be procured by negotiation with the territorial commanders. The panglima were not often eager to commit their forces to actions whose outcome was uncertain; moreover, the use of troops particularly identified with Java was bound to rouse Outer Island tempers more rapidly than those which represented the center alone. At an early date, therefore, the high command sought to obtain a substantial force under its own direction.

The first step towards this was the creation of the Army Paracordon Regiment (RPKAD). This force had originated as an elite unit within the Siliwangi Division, where it was founded as the Third Territorial Commando Force by Colonel Alex Kawilarang in 1952. When, soon after, it came under central control, it dropped all formal regional identification, though during the 1950's its personnel continued to be drawn largely from the Siliwangi Division and it retained its headquarters in Bandung. These continuing local ties, plus the often-observed inclination of elite units to engage in acts of national salvation, seems to have impelled its participation in the Zulkifli Lubis Affair, in which, as we will remember, its officers and men played vigorous if sometimes diverging roles.

If the RPKAD was not a perfect instrument of the center, it was nonetheless effective, after the purge of its members that followed the Lubis affair, in providing a show of central force in the regions. In situations where officers were eager to expand their independence but not to engage in armed conflict, the timely addition of even a small number of troops greatly added to the arguments extended by deputations from the high command. During the regional rebellion itself, RPKAD units reinforced Pakanbaru and went into Riau, established beachheads for larger forces in Bukittinggi, Menado, and Minahasa, and lent support to the local authorities in Ambon to prevent the outbreak of a rebellion brewing there. By and large, however, the RPKAD remained fairly obscure during the 1950's, carrying out the specialized smallscale operations fitted to the then still very minor capabilities of the army for mounting airborne actions.

There were other elite units attached to the principal divisional commands which passed, if less completely, under central control. These were Ranger-trained ("Green Beret") battalions which formed the top combat units in their respective regions and which came under Djakarta's jurisdiction in the early 1960's. The oldest of them were

51. *Berita Yudha*, May 15, 1965, provides a history of the RPKAD.

the Banteng Raiders of the Diponegoro Division, which originated as a tactical reserve of the Gerakan Banteng Nasional (GBN) command set up at the end of 1949 to combat the Darul Islam insurgents in Central Java. Efforts to form units which would be able to act swiftly and flexibly against the guerrillas were begun in 1951, but it was only when the command came under Ahmad Yani's leadership in 1953 that two companies of Raiders were actually set up. They were shortly expanded into two Ranger-qualified battalions, both of them stationed in the area outside Semarang. In the Siliwangi Division, the removal of its commando unit to become the RPKAD meant the creation of other elite groups; two Raiders-type "Kudjang" battalions were formed during the 1950's, and these saw extensive service against the Darul Islam and in the North Sumatra action which constituted the main effort of the Siliwangi Division against the regional revolt. Raiders units were not formed in the Brawidjaja Division until the early 1960's, and then it was evidently only to create East Java components for the emergent Army General Reserve system.

The incorporation of these units by the center took place as part of a general restructuring of the army, the implementation of which was begun in 1961. Prior to that year, divisions had consisted of battalions and, above them, regiments which were identified with a particular territorial responsibility. Now, however, a distinction was made between battalions that were to be used principally for garrison duty and local defense and those which would serve as mobile units used both within and outside the divisional boundaries. The former territorial units were to be grouped under Military Area Commands (Korem) and, below them, Military District Commands (Kodim), the latter normally being the province of one territorial battalion. The units designated as field battalions were gathered into brigades, day-to-day authority over which rested with divisional headquarters. When the brigades were called on duty beyond divisional boundaries, operational authority passed to a centrally-established command. Under normal conditions, these brigades consisted of three battalions plus auxiliary units; they had no logistical or administrative support of their own but depended for this on the territorial defense system, to which they were usually linked through a territorial battalion stationed at the same locality as brigade headquarters.

Though the brigades thus had substantial ties to the regions of their origin, they were also given strong reason to feel a qualitative difference between their own status and that of the territorial units and to value particularly their relationship with the center. They contained the better combat units; normally, field battalions and not territorial ones had the chance for Ranger qualification or absorption into the RPKAD and other elite forces. They were very conscious of this enhanced status, and the members of territorial

53. Pikiran Rakjat, November 13-15, 1965; and see Madjalah Angkatan Darat, No. 3 (March 1955); No. 7/8 (August 1956).
54. Waspada, April 7 and 16, 1959; Pikiran Rakjat, August 19, 1960.
55. Kedaulatan Rakjat, April 26 and December 6, 1963.
56. Kedaulatan Rakjat, October 27, 1961, explanation of the reorganization by General Sarbini.
units were jealous of it; they were also quite well aware that advancement as elite forces meant greater association with the center. Accordingly, brigade officers wishing to be transferred to a more desirable post or hoping for the upgrading of their units would look to the center rather than to their divisional associations. The whole system appears to have been a step towards the realization of Nasution's vision of a defense force divided into territorial units with strong local roots and a highly mobile strike force; its net effect on center-region relationships was to diffuse the power of the panglima by introducing two hierarchies into their commands, one of which was rather ambiguously tied to their authority. At the same time, it took a small but significant step toward psychologically orienting an important part of the better infantry units toward the center.

Three of the new brigades were still more definitely associated with Djakarta. These were attached operationally to a new institution, the Army General Reserve (TJADUAD), which was created in August 1961. Their component battalions were not necessarily identified with any one division—in fact, they were deliberately formed of one battalion from each of the Java regional commands. In normal day-to-day activities these components were responsible to the division in whose territory they were based (not through any divisional brigade or Korem but directly to divisional headquarters), while the TJADUAD had prior claim on their services whenever it found it necessary to call them up. Into this new category of reserve battalions went the best-qualified units, the Raiders from Central and East Java and the Kudjang battalions from the Siliwangi Division. In addition the RPKAD was placed under the authority of the TJADUAD.

The commander of the TJADUAD was Major General Suharto, who held the position from its inception. Suharto also headed the Mandala Command, which had operational control over the Irian campaign. This provided the first combat experience for the Reserve units in their new association, and it was very important for inculcating in them a consciousness of new loyalties—to each other, to Suharto as their commander, and to Djakarta as the center of the ambitions. The high heat of the political campaign for Irian, the massive preparations for the invasion of the island, and the dropping of RPKAD and Airborne (mostly Brigade III) troops into Dutch-occupied territory—all served to create a sense of identity and common experience greater than one might expect from the lack of actual major battle. In the course of the campaign Suharto firmly established his image as a key combat commander, and he subsequently worked to preserve his stature among his men by personal attention to their welfare.

57. Thus, when Lieutenant Colonel Witono witnessed the disbanding of a number of battalions in his command in 1963 he found it necessary to stress that those soldiers who had been reassigned to territorial units should not feel themselves thought inferior to colleagues who had been posted to field battalions. Pikiran Rakjat, February 11, 1963.

58. Suharto was head of the Trikora (Irian campaign) Orphans' Fund, and seems to have made various efforts at fundraising and visiting the units which had fought in Irian (see, for example, Nasional, May 22, 1963; Kedaulatan Rakjat, January 30, 1964; Pikiran Rakjat, September 23, 1964). If other central army leaders made similar efforts I have not seen it reported.
General Suharto also became head of the Army Air Defense Command (Kohanudad) at the time he was appointed commander of the TJADUAD, and both his own enthusiasm for air activities and the importance of Indonesia's new airborne capability led him to take a particular interest in the development of an airborne central strike force. The armed forces in general and the army in particular, he argued, must become "Para-minded." It was the ambition of Suharto and other air-minded army leaders to create an Airborne division for the army, but at the time the Mandala Command began military operations in January 1962 only the RPKAD and Infantry Brigade III were so qualified. Soon, however, more units were added and various Airborne units were promoted into the RPKAD, which during the early 1960's expanded from a small and highly specialized group into an important force; some were also taken up into the Tjakrabirawa (Presidential Guard) regiment, which was formed in 1963. A great deal of public fuss was made over the elite units, which were seen as a symbol of Indonesia's arrival as a world power. Their accomplishments in the Irian campaign were celebrated, and their strength and derring-do were demonstrated on public occasions. All this, together with their special training, superior equipment, and privileges, helped to create in these units a sense of separateness from the army rank and file.

In developing a powerful central strike force, the army leaders greatly reduced the territorial commanders' ability to resist them, but at the same time they created a potential source of challenge at the center. The force which in 1965-1966 served General Suharto as a vehicle to power, replacing President Sukarno in political and General Nasution in military leadership, was the Army Strategic Command (KOSTRAD), successor to the TJADUAD. The KOSTRAD, formed following the dissolution of the Mandala Command in May 1963, initially had jurisdiction over the RPKAD and the first three infantry brigades which it had inherited from the TJADUAD. However, unlike the regular army divisions, the KOSTRAD underwent no period of temporary retrenchment following the end of the Irian campaign; instead, it expanded very rapidly, adding cavalry and artillery brigades, upgrading its infantry components, and strengthening the RPKAD. In the quarrel with Malaysia, General Suharto headed the army component of the Mandala Siaga (Confrontation) Command, and this gave the KOSTRAD units


60. Pikiran Rakjat, September 22, 1964. Suharto learned to jump himself and was awarded paratrooper's wings by the air force. Pikiran Rakjat, September 28, 1964.

61. In June 1966, the KOSTRAD achieved the long-sought goal of an Airborne division (LINUD) system. Berita Yudha, June 18, 1966. In spite of the many difficulties budgetary deficiencies and lack of sufficient expertise caused this body, the achievement of the LINUD was important as a demonstration that Indonesia was continuing to aim at acquiring as sophisticated a strike force as it could.

62. Airborne units were trained at the Army Paracommando School (SEPARKOAD), which indoctrinated them with the ideals of the RPKAD--a sort of air-age version of the traditional bravo. They also worked closely with the air force paratroop force, PGT. After the October 1965 coup the training of all three groups of air-qualified troops--Airborne, RPKAD, and PGT--was placed under one institution, the Joint Airborne Instruction Command (KOGABDIK PARA). Berita Yudha, February 9, 1966.
a further opportunity for common experience and the strengthening of central ties. It also provided Suharto with new possibilities to display himself as a leading commander and to solicit the affection of his men. By the time of the October 1965 coup Suharto had headed the same key force for four years and was the only commander it had ever had. Furthermore, since 1963 he had been the most senior officer on active military duty after the Commander of the Army, and, following the practice of the Indonesian army, he therefore replaced Yani whenever the latter was absent. He thus had very powerful claims to succeed Yani as army commander at the time of the coup, but his very qualifications endeared him the less to Sukarno, who needed a pliable man in the job.

In the development of the army after 1956 we see a tendency toward greater centralization and at the same time a proliferation of function--both in the sense of greater military specialization and of expansion into the civilian sphere--that created new problems of control. The problem of containing the panglima was gradually reduced, but new rivalries appeared at the center, resulting eventually in the overthrow of the old army leadership and the establishment of one with a quite different style. But many of the same basic assumptions regarding the role of the military in society, the need for a highly sophisticated armed force, and the importance of enhancing central control remained. By the late 1960's General


64. This was probably the reason why Sukarno refused to appoint Suharto to the command of the army on the death of Yani in the October 1965 coup, arguing that Suharto was "too stubborn" and instead attempted to name the more sympathetic General Pranoto. Suharto, having used the KOSTRAD as his own vehicle to power, was naturally concerned to prevent its similar utilization by anyone else thereafter, and he devoted some thought to providing it with commanders dependent on his good will and to preventing them from becoming entrenched. But the KOSTRAD's developing activities also made for a weakening of its effectiveness as an instrument of power. Its very rapid post-coup expansion reduced its coherence; moreover, the great power which it enjoyed in the first flush of the New Order led both officers and men to assert themselves in the civilian sphere. The KOSTRAD as a whole, in fact, began to branch out into side activities, providing funds, licensing opportunities, protection, and so on for a considerable range of enterprises. Because the KOSTRAD possessed power, wealth sought it out; but with this came all kinds of attachments, interests, and rivalries which have probably weakened its ability for concerted military action on behalf of a commander.
Suharto was in a much better position to wield power than General Nasution had ever been, for the army's main civilian opponents had been destroyed and the intra-military opposition to him had been thrown into disarray by a series of purges. At the same time, the greatly increased role of the military in the country's affairs, and particularly the demands on its leader, who also held the office of President, made it urgent to make the command structure as efficient as possible and also to limit the opportunities for rival claimants to power to find bases within it. The result was the 1969 reorganization of the armed forces. Because the changes made at that time both carry forward the main lines of development we have discussed with regard to the 1956-1963 period and illustrate how different the army has become from what it was in its early post-revolutionary days, we might, by way of conclusion, consider briefly the reorganization.

In terms of power, the 1969 reorganization downgraded the top echelons of the army as well as the other services and greatly enhanced the powers of the Minister for Defense and Security and the Commander of the Armed Forces, which offices were held by Suharto. Whereas previously the commanders of the individual services had had operational charge over them, this authority was now placed, down to company level, in the hands of the Commander of the Armed Forces. Hitherto the service commanders had had ministerial rank, but this was now taken from them, and, as befitted their loss of actual command functions, they now assumed the title of service chief of staff. The size and competence of the staffs over which they presided were reduced, and the powers they lost were transferred to the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces General Staff. Coordination of the services was extended below the general staff level by the replacement of the KOANDA, together with their naval and air force counterparts, with the Regional Defense Command (KOWILHAN) system. This created six regional commands, presided over by members of the three major services, who were responsible to the armed forces commander and the Ministry of Defense and not to their own service heads.

Because Suharto was himself clearly too busy with affairs of state to devote as much time to the supervision of military operations as his new powers required, the post of Deputy Commander of the Armed Forces was created, and day-to-day charge of operations was handed over to him. The deputy commander at the same time headed the Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (KOPKAMTIB) which had been set up in the wake of the 1965 coup and was a major instrument for controlling the civilian population. Here again, transfer of operational control occurred: day-to-day command rested with the Deputy Commander of the KOPKAMTIB. This arrangement reflects a main theme of the entire reorganization, the desire to achieve maximum concentration of power and yet to provide checks and balances against the independent use of this strength by any of Suharto's high sub-

65. For details of this reorganization, see "Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite after the Reorganization of 1969-1970," Indonesia, No. 10 (October 1970), pp. 195-208. Note especially the official motivation quoted in the introduction (p. 195), which makes it clear the purpose was to eliminate any likely source of a coup.

66. These were I, Sumatra; II, Java and Madura; III, Kalimantan; IV, Sulawesi; V, Lesser Sundas; VI, Maluku and West Irian.
ordinates. General Staff control was extended into the territorial defense system by composing the KOWILHAN staffs of more than one service and counterposing their members to their service headquarters above and the single-service regional commands below. There has also been a diminishing of divisional ties and even of corps affiliation for the panglima, for in some of the Outer Island territories officers from the cavalry and artillery have been appointed to regional command.

The 1969 reorganization made the position of Commander of the Armed Forces far stronger than any Indonesian military office had been before. Simatupang, as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces in the early 1950's, had been responsible to the Minister of Defense (which Suharto now embodies in himself). Furthermore, Simatupang's formal function had been to preside over the Joint Chiefs of Staff (GKS), who were supposed to provide the major military decision-making center, even if the army had dominated in fact. Nasution had combined the functions of Defense Minister and Armed Forces Chief of Staff, but his authority was limited by Sukarno as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, who used this role to promote the fortunes of Nasution's rivals both within the army and among the other services. Under the 1969 reform, the chiefs of staff of the individual armed forces appear to have been given no joint role in theory or practice, and their individual powers were much diminished with the withdrawal of operational command over their services.

Most notably, the 1969 reorganization greatly diminished the preeminence of the army, for at the higher levels of command it now appeared as only one of three major services. That Suharto, an army man, chose to diminish that service's stature once his position as national leader was secure seems to flow from the fact that he is no longer in a position to control it closely, and he must therefore prevent its being too potent a weapon in the hands of another. This was not a path to domination which Nasution could have followed as Armed Forces Chief of Staff, for he had found himself between Sukarno and the services; his strength had rested on his continuing influence within the army, and if he had not acted as its spokesman he would soon have lost the backing he needed to maintain himself against Sukarno. Because of this, and because of Nasution's generally much weaker position, supra-military organization had remained at a minimum during his tenure, consisting of little more than the general staff offices and a series of commands and agencies linking the services for special projects and functions. Under Suharto, however, there has been a proliferation of inter-service bodies and a vast extension of the authority of the armed forces staff.

The 1969 reorganization followed the general trend of post-revolutionary military consolidation in its search for centralization and the elimination of particularistic ties. Much has been accomplished, especially in the matter of reducing the power of territorial commanders, the achievement of technical sophistication, and the general acceptance of central authority and bureaucratic procedure. At the same time, the complexity and expanded role of the military have created new problems of control for the army leadership. The military bureaucracy has proliferated to take care of the diversity of the services' activities, the increasing specialization of their forces, and the desire of leaders to ensure dominance by creating countervailing forces and layers of command. Whereas once local commanders could act independently because the lines tying
them to the center were few and weak, now they find a certain degree of autonomy because the lines of communication and command are complex and tangled. At the same time, however, the expansion of the military role in Indonesian society which began with Guided Democracy and reached undisputed dominance in the New Order has given army members a strong sense of their corporate elite status, and with the fading of revolutionary memories and the reduction of Sukarnoist ideological ties, this has become a central source of army solidarity. Whether unity can be maintained in the long run in the face of the pressures and temptations of the army's social role and whether the army can both govern and be an effective military machine are questions that the future must answer. The role of Leviathan is not an easy one, but the army has come very far from the weakness and confusion that marked it only some fifteen years ago.