At the end of the revolution of 1945-1949, the Indonesian army held a place of great power. Its leaders had refused from the outset to accept the principle of civilian control over military affairs, and the course of the revolution did nothing to convince them that they had been wrong in maintaining their independence. In their eyes, the army had borne the brunt of the struggle against the Dutch, while the politicians had quarreled among themselves, negotiated concessions to the Netherlands forces, and even rebelled against the Republic itself. For the military leaders, the army embodied the spirit as well as the fighting strength of the revolution, and, if they had no specific political program for the post-independence period, their ideas of what Indonesia should be were at least as coherent and strongly held as those of the politicians in charge of the government.

There was no compelling reason for the parliamentary system, which refused the army a legitimate political role, to be sure of military obedience, and there were no forces in the civil society that could be expected to offer effective resistance if the army attempted to impose its will. Liberal democratic ideas and institutions were of very recent origin and uncertain authority; they had been chosen as the nation's governing principles because the Dutch-educated civilian elite identified them with the modernity towards which they thought independent Indonesia must strive, because liberal democratic forms were valuable assets for securing Western recognition and aid, and because the parliamentary system offered a means of negotiating differences between diverse elements of the civilian elite, no one part of which was in a position to claim the sole right to rule. This elite consisted of a quite small group of politically influential people, mostly clustered in the capital and with little claim on the loyalties of the population at large, and it is doubtful whether the frustration of its preferences would have evoked a significant mass reaction. Sukarno, who was later able to call on his popularity among the masses and within the military itself to keep the army leaders from asserting too strongly their claims to power, was in the beginning of the 1950's at the low point of his influence. His prestige among the military had been dimmed by his failure to avoid capture during the 1948 Dutch attack on the Republic, and his political lustre diminished by the active role played since 1948 by Vice-President Hatta. No other civilian leader had sufficient stature to outbid the army leaders on nationalist grounds. The Left, which had achieved significant mass support during the revolution and which at that time had stressed the need for civilian control over the military, had been shattered organizationally and morally by the 1948 clash between government and

* This is the first part of a two-part article. The second part will appear in the October 1971 issue.
Communist forces. The only other ideological force with political leadership and a mass base, Islam, was unlikely to offer effective resistance to army rule except on the basis of the already existing rebellion for an Islamic state, and it is doubtful if the insurgent forces would have been greatly augmented by an army takeover that did not declare hostility to Islam.

Nor were the civilian cadres essential to running the state so thoroughly in favor of parliamentary rule that they might have been expected to sabotage any army dominated system. The small but influential group of technocratic administrators favored Western political ideas but were also impressed by the military's emphasis on efficiency and modernization, and, from a very early point, they showed themselves to be of two minds regarding the subordination of the military to the politicians. The bureaucratic elite of the pamong pradja (civil service) could have been expected to look with distaste on the prospect of submitting to the socially upstart military, but its opinion of the civilian politicians was not much higher than its view of the soldiers. The threat posed to its position by the extension of democratic institutions to regional and local government was keenly appreciated.

As for the army leaders themselves, they had less regard for the Dutch political example than did the civilian political chiefs; younger and generally of somewhat inferior social position, they had had less exposure to Western education and political ideas. Their formative ideological experience had been acquired in the Japanese occupation and revolution rather than in colonial politics; they had thus not been involved in the struggle to secure the democratic rights recognized in principle by the Dutch, which had been the focus of most legal nationalist activity and had made those rights seem particularly important to the Indonesian politicians. Their own experience had made them suspicious of institutions derived from the West, particularly of the parliamentary system, which offered them nothing but the prospect of losing their independence from civilian control. Nonetheless, they accepted parliamentary rule at the outset and, in spite of the great tensions that marked their relationship to parliament in the 1950's and to Sukarno thereafter, they did not move forcefully to establish their own claims to rule until 1965.

As we shall see, this fifteen years' modesty was the product of accident as much as design, but it is nonetheless significant, given the great strains endured by Indonesian society in that time, that no more determined effort to establish military hegemony was made. What I should like to do here is to consider one of the reasons for this, namely the diffusion of power within the military itself. For the army was by no means united at the end of the revolution, and the effort to determine who was to lead it and how power should be divided between the high command and other, subordinate but powerful officers, was to consume much of the military leaders' energy and to restrict their ability to use the army for political ends. Because most of the changes that I wish to describe had their origin in the events of the 1950's, most of this essay will concern that period, but I shall also indicate the main lines of their continuation in later times. My emphasis will be the internal development of the army, and so I shall treat its relations with civilian affairs only in passing.
The Revolutionary Heritage

The initial force from which the Indonesian army sprang was the Peta (Pembela Tanah Air, or Fatherland Defense Corps), a paramilitary body created in 1943 in the expectation of an Allied invasion of Japanese occupied Java. Nominally, Indonesian civilians of nationalist or religious note commanded its battalions, but they had little to do with its actual working, and real control and ideological influence lay in its Japanese trainers. The Peta mobilized youth from a broad social range, but in selecting platoon and squad leaders (who were eventually to form the backbone of the revolutionary officer corps), the Japanese naturally chose those who were better educated and equipped to lead. Most of these Peta non-coms had had some secondary school education, and this meant that they came from the few families that were sufficiently wealthy and modern-minded to give their sons advanced Western schooling. Similarly, those without a Peta background who became officers during the revolution tended to have had some secondary education and sufficient organizational knowledge to enable them to assume technical, administrative, or command posts. Those revolutionary officers who had no such qualifications and whose status rested entirely on derring-do and popularity with their men were in a very vulnerable position once the fighting was over. They were usually among the first victims of the rationalization efforts, and after the revolution they were often to be found among veterans but increasingly rarely among active officers.

The officer corps was thus composed almost from the start of people drawn largely from the more privileged strata of Indonesian society. They did not, however, come from the highly advantaged group of the university-educated which served in the top nationalist leadership during the revolution; only very few came from families of aristocratic background, although a small but important group of senior officers, particularly in the Siliwangi Division of West Java, was drawn from the lesser ranks of the traditional bureaucratic elite. The tendency for officers to be of somewhat lower social


2. For a discussion of the social background of Peta members, see Anderson, "The Pemuda Revolution," pp. 26-27. The higher proportion of socially and educationally advantaged officers in the Siliwangi Division derived in good part from the fact that Bandung and Batavia were principal centers of residence and education for the Western educated Indonesian elite in the colonial period. Indonesian youths who attended Dutch-language schools in those cities were required, along with resident Europeans, to participate in the civil
status than their civilian counterparts continued into the post-revolutionary period. In the parliamentary years, it lent something of a class tone to military grumblings at the incompetence of civilian politicians. Later, when military officers had assumed many governmental functions (and were taken up by civilian elite families anxious to make an alliance with the powerful parvenus), it exacerbated tensions within the army as a result of resentment by officers who did not experience similar social advancement and who held that those of their colleagues who did had corrupted themselves.

Because of the social connotations of advanced education, and because of its scarcity and value in the army's formative period, the position of officers who came from the Western educated social elite was both powerful and delicate. Their ability to deal with administrative problems, Republic-level politics, and Dutch counterparts brought them into top positions in the course of the war for independence. They tended to occupy general staff positions in the years thereafter, where they formed a well-knit clique; their Europeanized life style made them particularly visible, and they easily became the target of anti-Western charges by their opponents within and without the army.

It was natural that leaders whose claims to primacy rested on superior education and expertise would emphasize the value of this and give advancement to subordinates of similar background. Moreover, a stress on "modernization" and technical upgrading fitted in with the style of the political leaders of the immediate post-revolutionary years, who emphasized the restoration of hierarchy and order and the limiting of social demands in the name of reconstruction. These leaders and their equivalents in the officer corps represented what Herbert Feith has called the "administrator" style of Indonesian politics, as opposed to the expressive "solidarity-maker" approach embodied above all by Sukarno. In some ways, too, the tension between professional and revolutionary military styles can be seen as a version of the dichotomy between "red" and "expert" familiar to post-revolutionary Communism, in which emphasis on the revolutionary remaking of mankind has battled against stress on technological advance.

One way in which the army leaders might have sought to increase the expertise of their forces and to reduce their own isolation as a relatively Westernized group was to allow the judicious promotion of elements from the large body of colonial army (KNIL) members that the Republic was obliged to employ under the treaty ending the war with the Dutch. However, revolutionary soldiers threatened with defensive corps established shortly before the Japanese invasion, and some of them later entered the Peta. In addition, Bandung contained an officer training school for the Netherlands Indies army established after the German occupation of Holland; some who had been studying there stayed on in West Java after the Japanese invasion and ended up in the Siliwangi Division. See also John R. W. Smail, "Revolution in Bandung: 1945-1946" (Ph.D. Thesis, Cornell University, 1963), p. 17.

demobilization keenly resented the allocation of places to the KNIL, receiving support in this from civilian politicians, who required repeated assurances that the TNI—the revolutionary army—would remain the heart of the military. Aside from this very powerful pressure, the army leaders had reasons of their own for doubting the usefulness of the former KNIL members. The Dutch had not insisted for nothing on KNIL inclusion in the Indonesian army and on the establishment of a Netherlands Military Mission; and the Indonesian military leaders, however Westernized they might appear against the mass of the army, were strong nationalists who had no desire to accommodate what might well turn out to be a Trojan horse.

Even if the KNIL soldiers did not directly serve Dutch interests, there was no guarantee they would faithfully serve their erstwhile enemies; they might follow a rebel from among their own former chiefs—as they did in the Westerling Affair of 1950—or become involved in movements of regional dissent—as they did in the same year with the Ambonese rebellion in South Maluku. Moreover, if KNIL members were allowed to rise through the officer corps by a promotional system which recognized competence alone, it could be expected that they would come to form a faction of some coherence and power, and this might well be a source of great trouble later for the existing military leadership. Finally, the revolution had given a strong corporate sense to the army, a memory of shared danger and of mission. To dilute this by granting significant roles to those who had opposed the Republic would both reduce the army leaders' own revolutionary claims to pre-eminence and damage the organic sense of unity of the military as a whole.

Consequently, no attempt was made by the army heads to preserve—much less promote—former KNIL members who had not taken the Republic's side in the revolution, and most of them were retired or worked into insignificant positions early in the post-revolutionary period. Those who had joined the Republic's forces during the revolution suffered no great disability, and indeed one of them, A. H. Nasution, became army chief of staff. But there were very few in this dual position, and they were too sensitive about the "colonialist" element in their past to make Dutch military experience the basis of factional association. The Westernized group of military leaders was composed for the most part of relatively well-educated civilians who entered into military activity under the Japanese or during the revolution and were brought together by their shared elite background, skills and

4. This formed a major theme in the parliamentary debate on army policy in September and October 1952; for the Defense Minister's major statement of assurance on the subject, see his reply to parliament of October 1, 1952, in Keng Po, October 2, 1952.

5. By the terms of the Round Table Conference agreement which ended the war with the Dutch, the Indonesians accepted a 600-man Netherlands Military Mission and received into their army all Indonesian KNIL members who wanted to enlist. See Feith, Decline, p. 15. The Mission, after heavy nationalist attack, was repatriated early in 1953.
command of Dutch and not by colonial army experience.

The refusal to give a permanent place to KNIL elements meant that the Indonesian army lacked a colonially derived conservative element. It also lacked a radical one. The shearing-off of those elements in the army which were identified with the Left came about largely as a result of the struggle for control of the armed forces by civilian governments during the revolution, a battle which ended by strengthening army claims to independence from civilian control and thus making less likely intra-army schism on the question of subordination to civil authority. Already in the Peta, future army leaders had been persuaded by their Japanese mentors of the need for military independence from civilian control. When independence was proclaimed in 1945, the Republican leaders acquiesced in the Japanese authorities' decision to disband the Peta—which subsequently reformed, largely on its own leaders' initiative. This hasty disarmament, together with later concessions to the Dutch by the civilian governments, strengthened the military's conviction that the country's salvation could not rest with the politicians.

The Republic's political leaders, on the other hand, were anxious to assert civilian control over the armed forces, in whose independence they spied the seeds of fascism. Particular efforts were directed to this end by the Sjahrir and Sjarifuddin cabinets (1945-1947), which introduced a political commissar system into the army and gave preference to officers and units that appeared, for one reason or another, more sympathetic to the government than to the high command. Lasjkar, or irregular forces, were organized by the government and the parties (as well as arising of themselves), not only to further the struggle against the Dutch but also to serve as an armed counter-weight to the recalcitrant army high command. They competed with the regular army for scarce weapons and supplies, were a source of support for local social revolutions, and were more inclined than regular troops to violate the various cease-fire arrangements negotiated with the Dutch. It was only natural that army commanders should find them a thorn in the flesh, and feel their own enthusiasm for revolutionary struggle increasingly qualified by a concern to prevent the triumph of disorder as embodied in the irregular forces. Even the government was of two minds about the lasjkar, for it too was eager to minimize internal social upheaval and to give the Dutch no excuse to

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6. For a discussion of the attitude of military and civilian leaders toward each other's roles at this time, see Anderson, "The Pemuda Revolution," pp. 355-363. The major statement of civilian fears of militarism was Prime Minister Sutan Sjahrir's Perdjuangan Kita (Our Struggle), a pamphlet issued in November 1945. Sutan Sjahrir, Our Struggle, trans. by Benedict Anderson (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1968), especially pp. 36-37.

7. This was primarily instituted through the Political Education Staff (Staf PemPoli) created by the first Sjahrir government in 1946 to indoctrinate and control the army. In addition, the Struggle Bureau (Biro Perdjuangan) of the Ministry of Defense, which was in charge of coordinating guerrilla activities, formed a center of civilian influence on military affairs. Government leaders referred to the Red Army (Soviet Union) as the inspiration for the system of political officers, as much to secure army acknowledgment that such a system was consonant with military success as much to indicate a desire to move the army more generally in a leftist direction.
attack. The army commanders pressed for control and, where possible, the disbanding of the lasjkar, and in the several "rationalizations" of the revolutionary armed forces some of them were absorbed into the regular service (from which most of their members were demobilized soon after the revolution) and others were dissolver.8

The reduction of the lasjkar and other instruments of civilian leverage gained speed with the installation of the Hatta cabinet in 1948, which sought to undo the work of the leftists who had previously controlled the Ministry of Defense. An alliance was struck between the army leaders and the new conservative regime whereby, in return for military support for the government's program, the army was freed of civilian interference, and both irregular forces and army units of dubious loyalty to the central command were dismantled in the name of retrenchment and rationalization. The ensuing armed confrontation between Right and Left in the Madiun Affair of September 1948, in which Communists and troops allied with them appeared as rebels against a government already sorely pressed by the Dutch, gave the army leaders an excellent argument to use whenever, in subsequent years, political leaders again tried to engineer devices for the civilian control of their forces.9 The army

8. Of the many politically affiliated lasjkar, the most important were the leftist Pesindo (Indonesian Socialist Youth) and the religious Hizbullah. The main officially sponsored lasjkar organization was the Lasjkar Rakjat Djawa dan Madura (Java and Madura People's Lasjkar). That the army's relationship to it was tense from the outset can be seen from the army's December 1945 statement that it hoped to clear up the existing misunderstanding between its own organization and the lasjkar, but that it must be accepted that the army was the Republic's official fighting force and that the Lasjkar Rakjat was to unite the populace for defense. Unfortunately, the statement continued, the Lasjkar Rakjat had not been organizing youth into large, manageable, and effective groupings but had allowed them to form small partisan outfits of their own. Merdeka, December 14, 1945.

The Lasjkar Rakjat of Java and Madura showed a very different character from one district to the next depending on whether it was primarily in pemuda hands or under the control of local civilian government authorities. For a description of one of the "tame" ones, see Selosoemardjan, Social Changes in Jogjakarta (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 168. It was shakily united by a central executive, chairman of which was Ir. Sakirman, then a Socialist and later a prominent Communist leader; his office gave him the title of Major General and a place in the army's executive. The ambivalence of government authorities--civilian as well as military, and Left as well as Right--can be seen in the mild goals set out for lasjkar members: 1) to fight illiteracy; 2) to improve military preparedness and catch spies; 3) to further cooperation among the people, especially within peasants' and workers' organizations. Soeara Lasjkar, 1, No. 5, (March 1, 1947), p. 3, citing the results of the first Lasjkar Rakjat conference.

9. The demand for a political officer system became a serious issue in 1965, when it formed the opening shot in a Communist campaign to reduce the power of the military leadership. Whether it was seriously intended then is open to argument--given the army's longstanding view of its revolutionary experience of the institution
leaders also endeavored to insulate their men against leftist sympathies by stressing the treasonous character and disastrous consequences of the Communist betrayal of the Republic at Madiun. In this they were largely successful with the officer corps, which, at least until the mid-1960's, remained free of apparent leftist sympathies; they fared less well, however, with the common soldiery, a third of which appears to have indicated a preference for the Communist Party in the 1955 general elections.10

Religious influence in the army was also reduced by the close of the revolution. In 1944, the Hizbullah was set up as an Islamic paramilitary group independent of the Peta. The actual amount of organization and training accomplished under the Japanese was minimal, but what was important was the fact that the Hizbullah's foundation established the principle of separate Muslim military organization. In effect, youth from the pious Muslim (santri) community was channelled separately into the revolution. The Hizbullah became a lasjkar acting in league with the Islamic parties, and it thus entered on the anti-army side into the rivalry between the regular and irregular forces.11 In 1947, when the regular army abandoned West Java in accordance with agreements negotiated with the Dutch, Hizbullah elements in the area stayed on to carry out a guerrilla war and to nurse their grievances at what they felt to be the army's abandonment of freedom and Islam. In August 1949, the Hizbullah

as a cause of friction and subversion in its ranks, the party could not have expected anything but the fierce objections which its proposal got. It is perhaps more likely that it was intended as a gambit to secure army acquiescence in a project it saw as more immediately realizable, that of securing a new armed service composed of militia (the "Fifth Force").

10. Communist Party (PKI) chairman D. N. Aidit claimed this publicly on several occasions, and as it was never denied by the army it seems probable it was so. Military men voted separately in the 1955 elections, presumably because the army leaders were interested in discovering the political leanings of their men; the results of the poll were never officially made public. One should be cautious in estimating the extent to which the Communist Party could hope to make use of this sympathy. Lower-class Javanese of abangan (syncretic Muslim) religious persuasion often felt the party was the one appropriate to their group—that is, they looked to it as a communal representative rather than a revolutionary force, and were not willing to go along with it in any challenge to authority. Also, the soldiers who looked to the PKI generally looked even more to Sukarno, and would not support any Communist actions which he opposed. The fact that following the 1965 coup the army leadership was able to portray the party as having betrayed the President was probably a major reason why there was little army indiscipline in the campaign to liquidate the Communists.

11. For accounts of the establishment of the Hizbullah, see Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun (The Hague: van Hoeve, 1958); and Gatot Mangkupraja, "The Peta." The army specifically declared that it considered the Hizbullah on the same footing as the Lasjkar Rakjat and other armed civilian groups (Merdeka, December 14, 1945).
leader S. M. Kartosuwirjo proclaimed the Islamic State of Indonesia, setting off a chain of religious revolt which was to last thirteen years. Some individual units and soldiers of strong religious convictions defected to his cause at the outset; others simply made no effort to remain in the post-revolutionary army. Later, orthodox Muslim youths who might otherwise have contemplated a military career either joined local Islamic guerrillas or chose civilian pursuits in preference to fighting champions of their own faith. There was nothing in a military career as such that was repugnant to the pious adherents of Islam, but the fact that so much of the army's post-revolutionary activity consisted of combatting Muslim guerrillas offered a strain on loyalties which few proposed to bear. Moreover, the long years of warfare against Muslim rebellion encouraged a tradition of army distrust of militant Islam, and the many Javanese officers of abangan persuasion were strengthened in their objection to Muslim aggressiveness. As a result of all this, the secularizing tendency common to the modern professional military was, in the Indonesian case, particularly marked; the santri officer became a rare bird, and, even when the army later entered into alliance with the Muslim forces in the anti-Communist campaigns surrounding the 1965 coup, it showed a notable concern to prevent its Islamic collaborators from acquiring any real access to power.

Loyalties to ideological elements outside the military were thus relatively weak, a factor which was probably of considerable importance in preserving the post-revolutionary army's coherence. There was, however, a major internal ideological challenge to the high command, and this was contained in the profoundly anti-hierarchical impulse of the revolutionary experience itself. If the Indonesian revolution

12. The Darul Islam revolt seems to have had its greatest impact on West and Central Java. It affected the military most deeply in West and Central Java. West Java was the heart of the revolt, and much of the Siliwangi Division's energies were employed fighting it. In Central Java, insecurity connected with the Darul Islam revolt existed in hill areas along the West Java-Central Java border, in Banjumas and the coastal region around Pekalongan-Tegal, which was not declared militarily secure until the early 1960's. Diponegoro battalions were also seconded to the Siliwangi Division to assist its operations against the main Darul Islam forces. Given the proximity of the insurgency, it was relatively easy for sympathizers in Diponegoro to join the guerrillas; the most famous defection was that of Battalion 426, which mutinied at the beginning of the 1950's.

In East Java there was no serious post-revolutionary insurgency in spite of the considerable religious tensions that had been exhibited in the Madiun Affair of 1948. Reflecting this calm, orthodox Muslim soldiers seem to have found a career in the Brawidjaja Division less of a problem than their co-believers in the Diponegoro and Siliwangi, and that force retained a number of santri officers. Brawidjaja Division troops participated only marginally in operations against the Darul Islam in Java; their expeditionary force in Sulawesi confronted the Kahar Muzakkar revolt, which also claimed a religious basis, but that rebellion presented itself at the military level very much as a matter of regionalism and the dissatisfaction of demobilized revolutionary partisans rather than as an Islamic affair. I am grateful to Lance Castles for drawing my attention to the greater representation of santri officers in the Brawidjaja Division.
did not bring about the overthrow of the indigenous social order, it did have strong social revolutionary overtones, and those who participated most actively in it were deeply influenced by its mood. The training provided by the Peta also worked, psychologically, in this direction. The Peta's Japanese trainers conveyed an image of the martial role which appealed to a strong Indonesian tradition, one which was particularly vivid to young men in a time of war. The style was bravura, romantic and mystic, emphasizing that victory was to be had not by calculation but by the iron exercise of will, and that the essential soldierly ingredient was the possession not of formal skills or material equipment but of a flaming spirit.

This image fitted the Indonesian idea of the bravo, or 
djago,
who in times of disorder or oppression may appear as a popular champion. More broadly, it spoke to the socially undigested group of young unmarried men usually referred to as pemuda. It contrasted sharply, in turn, with the image of rationalism, order and expertise employed by the Dutch as the legitimizing style of their colonial role. It also was opposed to the style of the traditional elites of Java--the 
prigaji
and the Sundanese equivalent mênak--which emphasized the qualities of refinement, harmony and impartial judgment; to this extent, it hinted at social revolution and was unacceptable to those in military and civilian command in the early 1950's. Equally important, it opened the possibility for penetration by civilian elements, who might urge the prior claims of the revolution and its leaders above the principle of the chain of command which the central army authorities were at pains to develop.  

The revolutionary experience might have been expected to produce a military leader of sufficient personal reputation to establish charismatic claims to dominance over the officer corps. It did

13. This discussion of the pemuda spirit and the Japanese and Dutch styles is drawn largely from Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, "The Pemuda Revolution," Chapter 1, et passim, and Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, "Japan: The Light of Asia," in Josef Silverstein (ed.), Southeast Asia in World War II: Four Essays (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1966). An interesting illustration of pemuda attitudes can be found in the description of former revolutionary soldiers transmigrated by the government to South Sumatra, in H. J. Heeren, Het Land aan de Overkant: Transmigratie van Java naar Sumatra (Meppel: J. A. Boom en Zoon, 1967). Heeren noted in the early 1950's that, "Another important characteristic of the [transmigrated ex-soldiers] was their strong dependence on the leaders of the various organizations. The leaders were deeply respected and blindly followed." At the same time, the men also displayed a marked "cowboy spirit" (djiwa keboi), manifesting itself in the assumption of striking clothes and mannerisms and a general devil-may-care attitude (p. 82). The strong dependence on personal leadership--which was initially provided by men who had led them in the revolution--also meant that, in the long run, the leaders were held completely responsible when things failed to go right. They would be accused of corruption; all or part of their following would seek a new, presumably purer leader, in a continuing process of fragmentation (p. 87). In this we can see some of the aspects of the degeneration of revolutionary ties into more manipulative and fragile "bapakist" relationships, which will be discussed below.
indeed bring forth a commander of such stature in General Sudirman; but he died at the close of the revolution, and the remaining high officers were sufficiently equal, when combat reputation, managerial expertise, ethnic background and popularity were all taken into account, for no one to shine as the obvious head. The rough equality of the army leaders' ages and of their claims to pre-eminence was to form a continuing source of strife, for it meant that a large body of people—the greater part of the revolutionary officer corps—could feel entitled to high position in the peacetime army, and certainly to preference over those who entered after the vital period of the revolution. If they found themselves neglected by the center in the process of developing the post-revolutionary hierarchical pyramid, they were more than likely to feel justified in intriguing against their superiors; and, given the weakness of central army authority at the time, they were frequently able to make their claims stick. Indeed, it was only with the expansion of the army into non-military activities, which proceeded from the takeover of Dutch property and the development of army roles in civil administration and mass organization in the late 1950's, that the high command would find a way to dispose peaceably of these unwanted but importunate colleagues, by placing them in lucrative or prestigious offices which were outside the mainstream of military promotion.

The very diversity of the revolutionary experience also provided an anti-hierarchical impulse. There was in reality very little central control over the military forces during the war for independence. The revolutionaries in the Outer Islands had minimal contact with Java, and they had not had the same experience under the Japanese—even the essential element of the Peta was missing. Where there

14. The 16th Army, headquartered in Djakarta, sponsored the formation of Peta battalions on Java and Bali. Sumatra was occupied by the 25th Army, which also ruled Malaya; its headquarters were in Singapore, which was also the Southern Region Armies' Headquarters. Kalimantan and East Indonesia came under the jurisdiction of Naval Civil Government Headquarters in Makassar. There was very little communication between these segments during the occupation, and the occupying forces pursued quite different policies with regard to relations with the local population, partly because of varying attitudes of the Japanese commanders and partly because they faced quite different susceptibilities of the populations to mobilization. For a discussion of the contrasting styles of the Japanese administrations, see Mitsuo Nakamura, "General Imamura and the Early Period of the Japanese Occupation," Indonesia, No. 10 (October 1970), pp. 11-19.

In Sumatra, a paramilitary organization was established under the Japanese equivalent name Bui-giyugun, but it was less extensive and in general had less impact than the Peta itself. It did, however, provide some of the leadership for the Republican forces in Sumatra during the revolution. The navy command provided no paramilitary training in Kalimantan and East Indonesia; revolutionary forces there either sprang up as local partisan groups, without any training, or were led by Republican army men infiltrated from Java during the course of the revolution. The extreme weakness of nationalist military strength in East Indonesia was one reason why, during the 1950's, a special expeditionary force from the Brawidjaja (East Java) Division was assigned to the area. Its relations with the regular territorial command were notoriously difficult.
was an armed struggle against the returning Dutch, it drew its impulse
and its recruits on the basis of local social pressures and alignments,
and these did not correspond faithfully to the forces at work on Java.
When, in the early post-revolutionary years, officers of Outer Island
provenance who had experienced the revolution on Java were placed in
charge of former guerrilla forces in their home area as part of the
effort to bring them into line with the center, they faced a difficult
task; and, in the end, they often found it easier and more profitable
to cultivate local allies against a high command which could back its
centralizing ambitions neither with adequate patronage nor with effec­
tive force. Similarly, officers sent from Java to areas where there
had been no effective Republican strength found themselves and the
men who came with them painfully isolated expeditionary units, if they
were not of local origin; and if they were, they soon changed from
representatives of centralism and nationalism to the protectors of
local interests against Djakarta's demands.

Even in Java, the revolutionary experience provided little basis
for a commonly acknowledged military hierarchy. In the ever-narrowing
territory of the Republic, units operated in virtual independence of
each other, or in an association with neighboring forces that was
more collegial than hierarchical. Furthermore, the units were local­
ly raised and thus reflected the ethnic and cultural complexities of
Indonesia's central island. This meant that the strongest ties pro­
vided by the revolutionary experience were narrow but intense, and
they formed the basis for cliques and alliances which endured long
after the revolution. Indeed, army politics of the post-revolutionary
period can scarcely be understood without reference to the associa­
tions of this time. Those in charge of the army after the revolution
were faced with the task of weakening these non-hierarchical ties and
preventing any one group of old associates from obtaining dominance
in any important command or service which it might well make into a
vehicle for resistance to central claims and advancement of its own
interests. In accomplishing this, the army leaders could lean on
their own revolutionary associates only at the peril of arousing
suspicion of favoritism and a desire to close the top positions to
outsiders; it was thus no easy assignment, and for some time the
army chiefs made little headway with it.

Not only the high command, but also officers in command posi­
tions at lesser levels, needed more than their formal authority to
ensure the execution of their orders. During the revolution, a com­
batt officer's effectiveness and reputation had rested largely on his
ability to attract and keep a following of soldiers; these commonly
had no military background but had been drawn into the struggle by
idealism, a desire for adventure, and the conviction that service
under a strong and protective leader offered the greatest security
available in a war-torn world. Under these conditions, a commander's
authority depended not so much on his formal office as on the strength
of his personality and his ability to appear as a father figure to
his subordinates.

This close personal relationship between officers and men also
characterized the style demonstrated by the Japanese in the Peta,
and it fitted as well with older Indonesian traditions of the relation­
ship prevailing between a superior (bapak: literally, father) and
his following (anak buah, offspring). The intensity of the experi­
ence of young men in the revolution meant that the bapak-anak buah
relationships established then were much more vivid and enduring
than were any subsequent ties between commanders and their men. The counter-insurgency and Irian campaigns also provided a special bond for those who took part, but they in no way matched the revolution as a luminous personal experience. Later, when torn between revolutionary loyalties and the authority of their current commander, soldiers were only too likely to choose for their revolutionary chief or to avoid action altogether.

In the same way, relationships established during the revolution between officers serving in the same area or under the same commander were much closer and more enduring as factional sources than the associations they entered on later; this tended to give a qualitatively different character to the responses of officers who had experienced the revolution and those who came later, and caused the former to judge their associates on the basis of their revolutionary participation, to the exclusion and annoyance of the growing number of post-revolutionary officers who did not share their experience. The criterion of being "present"--having been an active participant and on the right side--was also applied to other points of crisis in the army's history in determining an officer's standing, but never to the extent this was done for the period of the revolution.

The First Centralizing Attempt and the October 17 Affair

In the initial post-revolutionary years, a prominent role in the Indonesian government was played by what Feith has called the "administrator" group of politicians, whose brief pre-eminence rested on their superior managerial knowledge, the general desire for stability following the chaos of the revolution, the temporary eclipse of Sukarno and the post-Madiun dispersal of the Left, and the confusion of nationalist revolutionaries regarding post-independence goals. Archetypically, this style was represented by the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI), a small cadre party whose leaders had strong ties to prominent members of the military high command. During the Wilopo government, which came into power in April 1952, the chief of staff of the armed forces, Major General T. B. Simatupang, was the brother-in-law of the secretary general of the Ministry of Defense, Ali Budiardjo; both of them were supporters of the PSI. The Minister of Defense, Hamengku Buwono IX, Sultan of Jogjakarta, was the man army leaders had preferred since the outset of the revolution for that post, and though officially non-partisan he also had close informal ties to the PSI. General Simatupang, Army Chief of Staff Colonel A. H. Nasution, and West Java (Siliwangi Division) commander Colonel Alex Kawilarang had been closely associated since their participation in the KNIL officer training class of 1940.15 In this congenial environment, the army command pursued its plans for a post-revolutionary military rationalization which would greatly strengthen discipline and central control. At the

same time, it asserted its claims to freedom from unsympathetic civilian control, particularly in the sticky matter of finance and control over the placement of military personnel.\textsuperscript{16} It is possible that the mutual appreciation between the army leaders and the civilians most closely involved with them blinded them to the overall weakness of their position, for neither the army leadership nor the politicians friendly to them were in firm control of the institutions currently under their command. They soon over-reached themselves, with disastrous results for the central military chiefs.

The contest which proved the undoing of the army high command pitted it, on the one side, against soldiers who feared demobilization and regional commanders who sought to establish their autonomy, and, on the other, against civilian politicians who objected to the PSI or who were concerned to insure military subjection to civilian decision making. Either one of these was a powerful opponent; together, they reinforced each other so well that the military leaders were soon faced with a situation which, it seemed, only desperate methods could solve. They attempted to take such measures with the coup de force of October 17, 1952; and its failure spelled their downfall. I should like to take up some aspects of this affair, for its course illustrates broader problems in the struggle for control of the army.

\textsuperscript{16} One of the principal issues was the matter of the propriety of ship purchases arranged by the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense; it was charged that the arrangements were made through a PSI concern and that a high price was paid, presumably to provide rake-offs. Opponents of the army leadership and the PSI argued that there should be greater parliamentary control over military spending. At the same time, they asserted that military autonomy in placement policy was leading to a dangerous concentration of power in the hands of Nasution and his allies. Zainul Baharuddin, secretary of the Defense Section of parliament, charged that "Only those who are of the same opinion as the KSAD [Army Chief of Staff] are allowed around him. And, as much as possible, in the divisional units they are trying to gather only those who are in agreement with the army leadership. In working for this goal, methods are used by the secretary general of the Defense Ministry with which we are all too familiar." Parliamentary speech of October 3, 1952, in Disekitar Peristiwa 17 Oktober 1952 (Djakarta: Republic of Indonesia, Ministry of Information, mimeo, 1953), p. 124. Zainul Baharuddin was the principal spokesman for parliamentary opposition to the military leadership. He was a non-party man, but was a relative and friend of Lieutenant Colonel Zulkifli Lubis, then head of the armed forces' intelligence agency (Feith, Decline, p. 253); we shall hear more of Lubis later. Outlining the methods by which he claimed the army and Defense Ministry leadership were working towards elimination of unreliable officers, Zainul Baharuddin declared that they were called to serve in Djakarta, were sent to attend courses or other further training, or were assigned temporarily to duty with units other than their own and then [when they had been sufficiently separated from their original clientele and source of support] they were retired. If they entered a protest against this, they were sent through a maze of official procedures until they gave up. Zainul Baharuddin gave as examples of persecuted officers whose position was uncertain: Col. Sungkono, Col. Hidajat, Col. Djiatikusumo, Major Nazir, Major Bedjo and Lt. Col. Abimanju. (Ibid.)
The issue that brought matters to a head was the high command's dismissal of Colonel Bambang Supeno, one of the most senior army officers and the formulator of the official military code of principles, Sapta Marga. He had incurred the wrath of the high command by declaring his reservations concerning its plan for transforming the army into a small, highly equipped and mobile "cadre army." Event­ually, after heated exchanges with the military chiefs, he publicly declared his lack of confidence in them and was thereupon suspended from duty.

The army, Bambang Supeno maintained, should concentrate on people rather than equipment, remaining a mass force which possessed close ties to its civilian surroundings and was oriented toward local defense. In his argument, he summoned the populist slogans of the revolution, but sentiment was not the only basis for his stand, and we should be careful not to identify, in this or later conflicts, the argument on rationalization as necessarily being one for and against rationality. Bambang Supeno stressed that for Indonesia manpower was cheap and locally produced, while heavy equipment would cost a great deal in scarce foreign exchange and require skills and servicing which the country was by no means equipped to provide. That the proponents of a cadre army, for their part, were not unmoved by romantic considerations is evident from their monument-building assertions (in the light of the national budget) that they sought to provide Indonesia with an armed force of internationally recognized excellence--not to mention their eventual acquisition of a great deal of impressive, expensive and unnecessary materiel. To the opponents of a highly equipped army, this course promised debt and dependence on foreign powers, just as it seemed to the more Westernized army leaders with their emphasis on expertise, technologi­cal advancement and discipline, to be the natural choice. Romance and reality mingled in both arguments, and this is perhaps why they were presented with such heat.

It is also necessary to bear in mind that the contrast between these two appeals reflected not only ideological leanings but also the power position of their advocates. An officer's relation to the center of power had a good deal to do with his inclination to stress expertise and discipline as against people-mindedness and

17. The Ministry of Defense announced soon after the formation of the Wilopo cabinet that the army would reorganize itself as a kernleger--cadre army--and in the process would reduce its numbers from 200,000 to 100,000 men. The main problem, as the army saw it at that point, would be to find a livelihood for the half of its membership it was returning to civilian life. Statement of Major Bahtar Lubis, spokesman for the Ministry, Harian Rakjat, April 23, 1952. For a detailed presentation of the problem by Nasution, see A. H. Nasution, Tjatatan-Tjatatan sekitar Politik Militer Indonesia (Djakarta: Pemlimbing, 1955), pp. 262-295.

In his quarrel with the army leadership, Bambang Supeno approached Sukarno, to whom he was distantly related, and sub­sequently collected officers' signatures in various military territories for a petition to oust Nasution. Feith, Decline, p. 250. This seems to have been the earliest instance of an appeal to the President by a subordinate to remove his commanding officer.
revolutionary reputation. The "professional" approach, with its emphasis on hierarchy, discipline and order, automatically favored those at the top, and there was a natural tendency for those in the army high command to emphasize it. Officers who assumed the opposing, "revolutionary" style might do so for any one of several reasons: because they were personally attuned to the bravado manner and had few professional qualifications; or because they were of radical intellectual persuasion; or--and this was quite frequent--because in the struggle for power within the army they found themselves opposed to their superiors and hence to the claims of professional discipline. They might not persevere in this position if their power interests changed; and, in fact, if we look at the principal officers involved in the disputes over rationalization and central control in the 1950's, we find this was often the case.18 It was natural for an officer who was in the central command, or who saw his fortunes linked to it or its members, to see the virtues of professionalization, hierarchy, and discipline; and it was equally natural for one who felt his interest threatened by those in power in Djakarta to praise the revolutionary spirit and to accompany this with the cultivation of sympathy among military anak buah and local civilians. This tendency was a persistent one, even in the post-1965 period, when hitherto conservative officers who found themselves at odds with the central command were commonly accused of "Sukarnoist" tendencies and themselves in turn assumed positions to the left of those they previously were wont to hold.

The fact that many officers changed their ideological arguments to suit their power interests does not mean that they assumed their stands quite cynically. They had experienced both the revolution and life in a professional army, and for them the two styles reflected incompatible but very real ideological worlds. The preservation of both sets of values in army thinking meant that neither had unquestioned legitimacy for the military, and thus they tended to remain factional weapons rather than universally assumed elements of the military creed.

To return, however, to the events surrounding the crisis of October 1952. The culmination of the argument over Bambang Supeno's dismissal was a demand by parliament that the army leadership be reconstituted and, in particular, that Ali Budiardjo, Nasution and Simatupang be dismissed. From the viewpoint of the high command, this was the kind of civilian interference which the military could not brook if it were to preserve the autonomy essential to its role as guardian of national independence. As it became evident that parliament was approaching this unpalatable conclusion, the army heads held a series of meetings at which they sought to secure the backing of other officers for a counter-move. These included some officers with whom they had had close revolutionary associations and who might be expected to support their demands, others who were prominent by reason of their office or revolutionary reputation, and regional commanders.

18. This will, I hope, become clear in comparing the alliances in the October 17 Affair with those of the Lubis Affair four years later, as discussed below.
These last, the panglima, headed the seven territorial units into which the post-revolutionary Indonesian army was divided. Because of Indonesia's geography and the weakness of central control, these regional commanders had great independence vis-a-vis Djakarta, and the army leadership's relationship to them was more one of negotiation than of command. The territorial commanders looked on themselves as the equals of the officers on the general staff, and they considered that decisions of basic policy should be taken collegially, with them, rather than by the central authorities alone. As we shall see, the high command was later to devote no little thought to reducing the power of the panglima; and the fact that panglima conferences continue to play a major part in the legitimation if not the origination of army policy testifies to the enduring importance of regional power.

The results of the deliberations between the senior officers became apparent on the morning of October 17, 1952, when thousands of people--brought in, as it turned out, by army trucks--appeared before the presidential palace bearing placards that proclaimed a popular demand for the dissolution of parliament. To prevent this appeal from falling on deaf ears, heavy guns were dispersed around the palace, and a little later a delegation of army leaders arrived to present Sukarno with its endorsement of the people's voice.20

The seven military territories were: I, North Sumatra (headquarters at Medan); II, South Sumatra (headquarters at Palembang); III, West Java (Bandung); IV, Central Java and Jogjakarta (Semarang); V, East Java (Surabaja); VI, Kalimantan (Bandjarmasin); VII, East Indonesia (Makasar). This last division included Sulawesi, Maluku, and Bali and the Lesser Sunda islands.

According to Feith (Decline, p. 264), whose account of the affair is generally sympathetic to the army leadership, the show of armed force at the time of the arrests of parliamentary leaders that took place on October 17 was not the plan of Simatupang and Nasution, but the act of a smaller group of General Staff officers in cooperation with Lieutenant Colonel Taswin, the Djakarta city commander--militants corresponding to what we would now call "New Order radical" officers. This is not at all impossible, for, both in the revolutionary and post-revolutionary periods, we find subordinates undertaking more radical action than their superiors intended, either because they feared that their commanders would negotiate if given the opportunity or because they saw an opportunity to gain fame for themselves. At the same time, however, officers frequently found it politic to feign reluctance while quietly encouraging impatience on their subordinates' part, the better to present their demands as the result of overwhelming pressure from below and to escape full responsibility if the move failed. It seems likely this was Nasution's purpose in the confrontation with Sukarno at the palace on October 17: the chief spokesman for the officers' group was Lieutenant Colonel Sutoko, with regional commanders Colonel Simbolon and Colonel Kawilarang making supporting statements; Nasution's own formal role was only to introduce the speakers. (Pedoman, December 6, 1952, reporting a press statement by Nasution issued by the Information Bureau of the Army General Staff, in response to an unfavorable account of his role by the Information Bureau of the Armed Forces General Staff. For a detailed account of the October 17 Affair,
From the army leaders' viewpoint, they were paying parliament back in its own coin, and it is possible they would have settled for a compromise whereby an unreconstructed assembly would stay out of what an unreconstructed army staff considered to be its own territory. In any event, it seems clear the military chiefs did not intend their move as a bid for direct army rule, but sought, maximally, an arrangement whereby Sukarno would serve as the leader and legitimator of a regime which would provide a much enhanced role for the army. The army chief of staff, Colonel A. H. Nasution, had evidently been contemplating a 'coup to this effect for some months.21 He was eventually to achieve a version of his goal with the establishment of Guided Democracy, but in 1952 luck was not with him. The president, who had been heartened by his ability to sway the crowd before the palace gates, temporized with the army delegation's demands, promising satisfaction to all sides, and the military leaders made the fatal mistake of taking him at his word. Later that day, he broadcast an appeal for popular calm which implied his strong disapproval of attempts to rock the ship of state, and thereafter he and the political parties set about working the destruction of the high command.

They did this in the first place by appealing to the symbols of the revolution, claiming loyalty to the president as its particular test. Officers who had attempted to force their will upon Sukarno and the nation had, it was implied, no legitimate right to their posts, and patriotic subordinates who wished to take action against them would receive not only approbation but, perhaps, the newly vacant offices. These hints were conveyed broadly by implication and specifically by pro-government officers sent out from Djakarta, who were influential in the army units to which they repaired. These missions were accompanied by demonstrations of parties and mass organizations in key cities, which strengthened the appearance of government power and helped to provide a steamroller effect for the removal of rebellious officers. Very shortly, intra-military coups began to take place, in the course of which commanders who had favored the army leadership were removed from their posts; elsewhere, officers were able to maintain their commands only after confrontations with their subordinates in which they were forced to assure them that they would not act without their approval.22

including the debate that preceded it, see the government compilation Disekitar Peristiwa 17 Oktober 1952. The annual chronology of events, Tempo dan Peristiwa, also published by the Ministry of Information, is valuable for a synchronic presentation of the elements leading up to the affair and its denouement.

21. Feith, Decline, p. 262. According to this account, Nasution planned to use the Siliwangi Division, headed by his then ally Colonel Alex Kawilarang, to accomplish this. Both the Sultan and Major General Simatupang opposed the plan, but, according to Feith, Nasution did not give it up until he found it impossible to secure Sukarno's agreement to the arrests of military and civilian opponents that Nasution wished to carry out.

22. The major coups of panglima were in East Java, East Indonesia and South Sumatra. The first and most important was East Java, where the pro-October 17 stand of the Brawidjaja Division's acting commander, Lieutenant Colonel Suwondho, was shaky because he had only recently assumed the position following the illness of
The army high command proved quite helpless in confronting this pressure. It had lost the initiative after accepting Sukarno's assurances that morning at the palace, and the kind of backing that it had received from the senior officers' meetings was too narrow and Colonel Bambang Sugeng. He therefore did not have a strong personal grip on the division; he might be thought by other officers to have committed it on the basis of insufficient authority; and might not be able to prevent the intervention of the regular commander, who was not so very ill. At the same time, younger officers in the Brawidjaja Division were demanding a reshuffle of the general staff and regional commanders that would put their Bambang Sugeng in the post of army chief of staff and make the senior regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel Sudirman, the new East Java panglima. See Disekitar Peristiwa 17 Oktober, p. 482, for the reorganization they reportedly proposed. The Brawidjaja Division's defection would break the solid panglima support for the October 17 action, which it was critically necessary to retain. Therefore two of Nasution's closest general staff associates, Lieutenant Colonels Suprapto and S. Parman, went to East Java, taking with them Sudirman, who had been in Djakarta at the time of the affair. They arrived in Surabaja, on the evening of October 21, to find that earlier that day Suwondho, pressed by Bambang Sugeng's return and the arrival of senior pro-government divisional officers from Djakarta, had chosen to take a defiant stand and to declare he would be responsible only to his regimental and city commanders (Disekitar Peristiwa 17 Oktober, p. 429, quoting Suwondho's statement as reported by P. I. Aneta, October 22, 1952). By the time the general staff delegation had arrived, Suwondho was under arrest by pro-government colleagues, and his replacement by Sudirman was announced the next day. Sudirman trimmed his sails to a generally pro-Sukarno line, but his position remained sufficiently ambivalent and critical that negotiations with both sides continued, culminating by November in pilgrimages first by Sukarno and then by the Sultan and Nasution to East Java to secure him for their side (see Merdeka, November 12, 1952, for Sudirman's statement following the visit of the Sultan, in which he made clear his decision for Sukarno).

A few days after Sudirman's final rejection of the October 17 proponents, the commander of East Indonesia, Colonel Gatot Subroto, was ousted by his chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel Warouw, who announced that he would refuse to see Nasution or the Sultan unless they were authorized by Sukarno. Gatot Subroto, he charged, had told his fellow officers he would accept orders only from Vice-President Hatta or the Sultan (Disekitar Peristiwa 17 Oktober, pp. 459-450, text of Warouw's statement on assuming command). As Warouw was a local man—unlike Gatot Subroto, who was Javanese—and as he was sufficiently senior, the government confirmed him in the post he had seized. On November 23, Lieutenant Colonel Kosasih, the acting panglima of South Sumatra, was the victim of a coup led by Lieutenant Colonel Kretarto, commander of Brigade X, who charged that he had not acceded to his subordinate's demands that he take a strong stand against the October 17 Affair. Kretarto was not confirmed in his new position, however, the government appointing the retired Colonel Bambang Utojo to head the territory instead. (Sumber, November 20, 1952, in Disekitar Peristiwa 17 Oktober, pp. 445-447.) There was also
conditional for it to contemplate any drastic attempt to restore its position. When the government considered its position well secured, it undertook the removal of those it held most responsible. These were Ali Budiardjo and General Simatupang, of whom parliament had earlier proposed to rid itself, and also the army chief of staff, Colonel A. H. Nasution, and his closest associates on the army general staff. Moreover, Simatupang's former office of armed forces chief of staff was dissolved, the better to prevent army domination of the services and to allow the civilians to promote inter-service rivalry as an instrument of their control. The post of acting army chief of staff was given to Colonel Bambang Sugeng, who found himself helpless in the face of army factionalism and government hostility. The army now entered a period of maximum decentralization and exposure to civilian influence, the low point of its post-revolutionary estate.

The whole episode was a nightmare to the army leaders, who saw their ambitions destroyed at a blow; and as Nasution and his closest associates were not to remain out of power for long, their reaction was of some importance. The experience bore in upon them the essential frailty of a central command which, possessing no strike force of its own, was able to impose its will on outlying commands only by means of persuasion, intrigue and appeals to the scarcely sacred principle of military discipline. More important, perhaps, it pointed out the danger of taking on civilian leaders—particularly Sukarno—when these were in a position to call on the symbols of the revolution and to garner support from officers hostile to the central command. Nasution appears to have come to the conclusion that a frontal move against the president would be foolhardy and that the army's cause was best served by pursuing its goals in such a way as to avoid a direct challenge. At any rate, he did not subsequently attempt to face down the president when, as happened increasingly in the Guided Democracy of the 1960's, Sukarno took a position that was far from the army's liking.

23. Many of these changes occurred, however, not under the Wilopo government but after the July 1953 accession of the first Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet, which was strongly opposed to the military policies of its predecessor. Rather as "the army" tends to be presented as a monolithic and anonymous actor in accounts of civilian politics, "the government" has tended to be so in this one. For the play of civilian forces involved in this and other affairs recounted here, see Feith's study of the period.

24. It seems not unlikely the appointment of Bambang Sugeng was related to promises made by the government in order to secure Brawidjaja support in the critical post-coup weeks. Moreover, Bambang Sugeng's illness at the time of the affair left him conveniently with no strong record on it, so that he could be viewed as a compromise candidate.
The president himself was usually cautious in testing Nasution's complaisance, and only towards the end of his rule, encouraged by growing intra-military disunity and a sense that time was running out, did he begin to move in a way that again threatened the coherence of the army high command. When he did so, he was to employ the same levers for breaking hierarchical discipline that were utilized by the government forces at the time of the October 17 Affair, namely the appeal to nationalist and revolutionary principles against senior officers who had purportedly betrayed them. As in 1952, this was a powerful weapon, for not only did it appeal directly to patriotic emotion, but it provided legitimation for attempts by subordinates to replace their superiors—and as the channels of military promotion had become increasingly clogged this was an attraction which had gained in savour with the years.

The revolutionary appeal was not used solely by Sukarno and the civilians. In general, in the post-1952 period, regional commanders who wished to solicit the support of their troops in defiance of central pressures found it profitable to hark back to the days of the revolution and to accuse the high command of having strayed from the ideals of those times onto the paths of corruption. Their use of revolutionary slogans naturally lent a radical cast to their arguments; that this did not necessarily reflect actual leftist leanings is evident from the fact that the recalcitrant regional commanders of the mid-1950's, who used these slogans, were generally allied to civilian forces of the Right. Moreover, as the appeal to common soldiers' loyalty was possible for troop commanders more than for those in administrative posts, use of the slogans became involved in the tension between the line and staff officers, which increased as inflation made outside sources of income more necessary to an officer's livelihood and caused combat officers, with limited access to official perquisites and to unofficial opportunities for deals with civilians, to resent those in staff posts whom they felt to be taking unfair advantage of their position. Their extreme response was to call on the principles of the revolution and to denounce the worldliness and hypocrisy of the bureaucrats on the staff—again without necessarily being themselves political radicals.

These were not the only occasions for the use of the revolutionary appeal, nor was it a weapon that served only against the high command. During the late 1950's, faced with grave central weakness and regional unrest, the army high command made wide use of the theme of loyalty to the revolution and Sukarno in order to secure the support of subordinate officers against powerful and rebellious officers outside Java. Given the regional commanders' own use of revolutionary slogans, the center's stress on loyalty to Sukarno and the revolution was an attempt to trump the local card of patriotic memory with a national one. We can thus see that when, in October 1965, the coup forces of Lieutenant Colonel Untung appealed for the support of "progressive-revolutionary" officers against a corrupted army general staff—and soon thereafter General Suharto urged loyalty to the army leadership in the name of the revolution and Sukarno—the two sides, subordinates and superiors, were playing a game with which both were quite familiar. By and large, however, the army high command adopted the "revolutionary" approach only when in extremis, for from its viewpoint an appeal to non-hierarchical values was generally more dangerous than useful. It consequently sought to minimize its use and to develop other means of dealing with recalcitrant subordinates, and, under the New Order, after Sukarno himself had been declared beyond the pale, revolutionary
slogans were virtually discarded by the army high command.

After Nasution's fall in 1952, real power in the army passed out of the hands of the central command and into those of the panglima, and, indeed, of lesser territorial officers. The weakness of the center not only allowed more power to be exercised at lower levels, but it aided the consolidation of power there. It did so in two ways. In the first place, the inability of the army leadership to impose its will meant that it could not take steps to transfer officers who were striking local roots in a way that appeared dangerous to the interests of the high command. In the first post-revolutionary years, the Simatupang-Nasution leadership had been able to take advantage of the general sense of flux, the extension of Republican authority to vast new territories, and the fact that their rivals had not yet coalesced against them, to effect sweeping troop transfers and changes of officer assignment. These were aimed at breaking the ties with the local environment formed by the Indonesian fighting forces during the revolution, in the interest of maximizing central control.

The reaction to the October 17 Affair undid much of this effort, for in some places "foreign" commanders were replaced by officers of local derivation, and a stronger voice was given to the lesser ranks, who more often were local men. Those who held territorial command in the post-October 17 period were much more dependent on the support of their men and had much less to hope and fear from the central command. They attempted to make permanent the positive aspects of this situation by cultivating their subordinates and the local civilians in the hope of securing their support against future demands by Djakarta. When, after 1955, a restored Nasution attempted to reassert central control, he found himself confronted with well-entrenched regional opposition who could be removed by only the most delicate negotiations or by force of arms.

Secondly, the weakness of the army center meant that it was unable to press the military's claims effectively upon the government, particularly in the matter of the budget. The army's income dropped catastrophically after 1952, with the result that the high command lost that important source of patronage and discipline, and regional commanders began to make deals with local business interests which enabled them to support their troops and preserve the loyalties of

25. See Feith, Decline, pp. 248 and 252.

26. Nasution made this a major element in his bid for internal army support for his return to power. Thus, in his Armed Forces Day speech of 1956, he noted that whereas, in 1951-1952, the army had consumed about half a billion rupiah in foreign exchange, in 1954-1955, it had not spent more than five million and the purchase of foreign equipment had virtually ceased. In 1952, Rp. 200 million was spent on new buildings, in 1955 only one-fifth of that amount. Forgetting for the moment his earlier promotion of rationalization, he pointed out that, in 1950-1951, the army had still recruited soldiers and trained new officers, but since then there had been no renewal of personnel. Text of the speech, in Putera Sum Samudera, No. 10 (October 1956), p. 12. For a more detailed survey by Nasution, see Tjatatan, pp. 232-261.
their subordinates. This gave them a financial base independent of the center, one which sometimes was so strong that even if the military budget had been restored the commanders would have lost income by giving up their local arrangements. Moreover, it helped to identify military officers with the interests of the civilian elites at the regional and local levels. We have already remarked that officers tended to come from the more privileged parts of society. At the same time, they generally were not of the same social status as civilian officials on the level at which they operated; they had been imbued with the ideas of revolution and progress; and they saw the army as an instrument of general social improvement. But with the post-revolutionary emphasis on retrenchment and expertise, with the general sense of let-down and confusion that followed the end of the independence struggle, and with the establishment of business and later marriage ties to the privileged elements of local civilian society, both the initial reforming elan and the actual amount of social mobility in the army decreased, and it began to assume the characteristics of a conservative force. More than this, the military’s local financial dealings not only served to keep troops well-fed and loyal but padded the pockets of the commander and those who assisted him in his dealings. The fact that many of the most lucrative arrangements involved smuggling from the export-producing border areas only increased the tendency of military men to draw the conclusion that soldiers need not take the law too seriously nor provide a particular example of honesty. There thus began, at quite an early stage, the process of personal corruption and entanglement with civilian concerns that has plagued the military ever since.

The post-October 17 period also saw a rapid deterioration of the revolutionary bonds between troop commanders and their anak buah into a much more instrumental patron-client relationship. This was part of the universal degeneration of revolutionary elan, and it rested as well on the fact that rationalization and transfers separated many men from the officers they had served under in the revolutionary years, and that their ties with their subsequent commanders did not attain the same emotional level. It sometimes happened, of course, that anak buah remained in contact with their former chief, and, particularly if he served nearby or if his followers had meanwhile achieved posts of importance, he could still use them in confronting his own superiors. Over time, an extremely complex system of alliances and possible alliances was developed on the basis of patron-client relationships that existed between commanders and their (former) subordinates, and in periods of uncertainty and maximum decentralization such as the mid-1950's, when a commander's strength rested as much on his subordinates' support as on his official authority, the cultivation of these ties became a central preoccupation for the holders of office. The panglima sought to secure the personal loyalty of the regimental and city commanders below them, and these in turn tried to insure their authority and prepare their future advancement by soliciting the support of the battalion commanders and men in their service.27

27. Of some interest in this connection is the matter of the army's age. Nasution declared (Tjatatan, p. 203) that, in 1954, the average age of soldiers was 34 years. This seems extraordinarily high, for it would mean that the average soldier would have been 27 years old at the outbreak of the revolution. Possibly the figure is sharply affected by the absorption of former KNIL members into the post-revolutionary army; but, by 1954, the great number of
All this went to make up the phenomenon of "bapakism," which was a particular object of concern for the army high command in the 1950's, and which, in one form or another, was continually to interfere with the principle of the authority of the chain of command. An officer whose men were strongly loyal to him was obviously in a much better position to act independently than one who had only the general claims of army discipline behind him; it was therefore in his superiors' interest to reduce this independence by emphasizing professional discipline and/or their own personal claims for loyalty. In severe cases of recalcitrance it behooved the center to dislodge the offender, if it could, by transferring him from his power base, preferably to an administrative post, to a politically insignificant territory, or to a command whose ethnic composition was such that he would find it hard to create a strong personal bond with his men. Conversely, it was in the interest of the officer concerned to cultivate bapak-anak buah loyalties among those beneath him, to seek a command which would both maximize the number of his personal supporters (including, in the case of territorial commanders, civilians who might back him for ethnic, political or economic reasons), and best of all to obtain a command which would be strategically situated in terms of negotiations with the capital. Above all, an officer of ambition had to resist any attempts to remove him from such a post once won, unless he could exact a heavy price in terms of promotion or patronage.

Many of the most dramatic moments in the history of Indonesian military politics have hinged on maneuvers to secure the transfer of a powerful commander, though often enough, after the mid-1950's, the only public indications of the struggle were the lengthy postponement of command transfers which had been officially announced.

All things being equal, it has consistently been in the interest of an officer to cultivate personal loyalties to himself among those below him, while discouraging any similar propensity on his junior officers' part. Hence we may well find the same officer acting as a bapak in one situation and as a stickler for professional values in another. But some officers have been less able than others to capitalize on the bapak-anak buah relationship, either because they have generally held staff rather than command posts, because they have never headed units for long or under combat, or because they do not personally arouse the enthusiasm of their men--and these we naturally find supporting professional values alone.

these had been retired or otherwise left service, and one would have expected the older ones to have been among the first to be mustered out. One possibility is that younger soldiers, tending to be of lesser rank and education, were early victims of the post-revolutionary rationalization program; or that they were more optimistic about possibilities for a non-army career and so left once the revolution was over. In any event, the army seems to have been left by the mid-1950's with a corps roughly the same age from private to chief of staff, and of sufficiently advanced years that an extra-military career would be hard to come by. That this made for extreme frustration and status tension goes without saying.

Reflecting the dispersal of authority and the importance of "bapakist" relationships following the October 17 Affair was the fact that the instrument for determining army policy in the period between 1952 and 1955 was not meetings of the general staff nor yet panglima conferences, but rather the officers' union, IPRI. The congress of this organization had taken place immediately after the revolution, in January 1950, and its second had been called at the end of the same year to deal with the serious intra-military disagreements over changes of command and structure resulting from Indonesia's transformation from a federal to a unitary state. The third meeting took place in 1952 in the wake of the October 17 Affair and was devoted to stabilizing the turbulent internal army situation that those events had produced. Smaller conclaves of officers were also held in the name of conferences of the IPRI, while regional and local committees provided forums for the consolidation of junior officers' opinion on the larger affairs of the military.

The IPRI was something of a trade union and something of a representative assembly. It had arisen from the egalitarian and democratic impulses of the revolution, drawing for its tradition on the frequent revolutionary practices of electing commanders and making collective decisions on important action. One reason it had been created was to preserve solidarity within the broader "family" of those who had served in the officer corps, and so it included veterans and made no distinction between those on active and non-active duty.

These characteristics provided two, rather contradictory, reasons for the association's prominence in the 1952-1955 period. For one thing, the loss of central control and discipline which followed the October 17 Affair, and the very intense emotions and factionalism to which the affair gave rise, placed great emphasis on the opinion of regimental level commanders and of middle rank officers whose revolutionary reputation or other personal characteristics made them influential outside the chain of command. At the same time, the fact that the IPRI did not exclude non-active officers meant that those who had been removed from their posts as a result of the October 17 Affair could continue to have a voice in army policy-making if it was carried on under IPRI auspices. Nasution and his colleagues made full use of this, and as the army's position grew more difficult in relation to an unsympathetic government, opinion within the IPRI began to swing around in favor of the authors of October 17.

During 1954, as the leaderless army's authority and income continued their post-1952 decline, sentiment within the various officers' gatherings began to shift from a concern with negotiating factional

29. Ikatan Perwira Republik Indonesia, Indonesian Republic Officers' League. There was also a non-commissioned officers' union, the IBRI, Ikatan Bintara Republik Indonesia.

30. Pikiran Rakjat, August 6, 1955, contains an account of the early history of the IPRI. Reflecting the dominance of the Java divisions and the balance of power between them, the first of these gatherings was held in Jogjakarta, the second in Bandung, and the third in Tretes, outside Surabaja.
differences to the desire to achieve a more positive form of unity. A special Collegial Meeting called in February 1955 in Jogjakarta established standing committees which were to handle controversial issues involving military personnel; it also drew up the "Jogja Charter," a statement of army policy designed to end the worst of the factional quarrelling, and it resolved to press basic army demands on the government. In the last task, the IPRI failed, and, in August 1955, it held a congress again, this time to discuss the events that had flowed from the resignation of Colonel Bambang Sugeng, who had given up his post as acting army chief of staff in despair at the government's indifference to the Jogja Charter demands. The main purpose of the meeting was to present a united front regarding acceptable successors to Bambang Sugeng's post, and to prevent the government from again trying--as it had immediately following Bambang Sugeng's withdrawal--to impose on the army a leader that was not of its liking.

The meeting of February 1955, which produced the Jogja Charter, was already under the considerable influence of the October 17 group, and meetings held later to discuss Bambang Sugeng's successor indicated strongly that the weight of opinion lay with those on the October 17 side. Much of this appears to have been a reaction to the Ali Sastroamidjojo government and its defense minister, Iwa Kusumasumantri, whose determined rejection of the October 17 proponents made them temporarily into symbols of army independence in their colleagues' eyes. By the time of the IPRI congress of August 1955, the group's strength was such that the meeting's chief speakers were Nasution, Simatupang and Vice-President Hatta--the last having emerged as a civilian legitimator favored by the October 17 group following Sukarno's ruination of their hopes. Colonel Zulkifli Lubis, who


32. The government tried to appoint the South Sumatra commander, Colonel Bambang Utojo, and the resulting army boycott brought about the fall of the Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet. See Feith, Decline, pp. 399-409. According to Feith, and to Pauker ("The Role of the Military in Indonesia," p. 311), army officers contemplated a coup at this point, but decided to wait in the hopes that the general elections scheduled for a few months hence would result in a realignment of power more congenial to their interests.

The Working Committee of senior officers established by the Collegial Meeting as its main standing committee, was headed by Colonel Simbolon, who as the most senior active officer had reason to urge that considerations of hierarchy be observed in granting the post; he was able to obtain the committee's support for a declaration implying as much. Soon thereafter a meeting of panglima urged that the appointment be made according to seniority--which, so long as the possibility of restoring non-active officers was not considered, meant supporting Simbolon for the job. In considering Simbolon's role in the ensuing Lubis Affair, this should be kept in mind.

had been an opponent of October 17 and who now, as deputy chief of staff, was the army's highest (though not most senior) officer, was not allowed to give a major address, the main statement of leadership policy being made by Nasution, who outlined the way in which he hoped to deal with the problems of army disunity and of regional and religious rebellions.34

Nasution was in fact reinstated as chief of staff the following October, and thereafter the IPRI's fortunes declined. For the first year of his command, his position was so weak that the union's influence was unaffected, but—as had been the case when the October 17 group was out of power—its sympathies tended to swing to those who were not in command. At the end of 1956, when Nasution had just put down a coup that posed the gravest threat to his control, the IPRI intervened to rescue Lubis, his defeated rival,35 a gesture the victorious chief of staff found difficult to forgive. In the regional crisis the following year, the union's branches were at times useful to the central command's efforts at unseating recalcitrant territorial commanders, since they provided a forum for subordinate officers who, with Djakarta's encouragement, could rally local resentments of the defiant commander and remind their colleagues of the need for national unity and loyalty to Sukarno. But thereafter, when such extreme central weakness did not exist, the IPRI was of dubious value to the army high command. It gave too great influence to the opinion of middle level officers, and it stressed shared revolutionary experience and patron-client relationships rather than current position in the army hierarchy. Since it included non-active officers, it gave a forum to individuals whom the army leadership had taken pains to remove from circulation; moreover, it represented veterans, who as a group were a notorious source of discontent and anti-hierarchical opinion. Therefore, once Nasution's weak initial position had been overcome, he worked to replace the IPRI with other associations directed increasingly away from policy—a task which was not difficult in view of the fact that, during 1957, the regionalist crisis reached such proportions that the IPRI was unable to function effectively as a central forum, while, after the defeat of the regional rebellion, Nasution's personal authority in the military was great enough to overcome collegial demands. The final version of the IPRI-style association was Tjandra Kirana, an organization devoted to the welfare of military families, whose officials were automatically those of the regular command.

The Lubis Coup and the Restoration of Central Authority

The reinstatement of Nasution as chief of staff in 1955 had not gone without objection from prestigious officers who fancied themselves

34. Pikiran Rakjat, August 8, 1955. Zulkifli Lubis gave a short address in which he said he regretted not being able to present the major speech because the task of speaking in the name of the chief of staff had been assigned to others.

35. See below, the IPRI intervention of November-December 1956.
for the post and from territorial commanders who wished central author-
ity to remain weak. But the other potential candidates were even
more opposed to each other than to Nasution, and they may also have
reckoned at first that his position would be so precarious that they
could look forward to his speedy downfall. The government, however,
had come to see that it must have a strong army head if Djakarta's
authority was to be preserved, and Nasution was able to have his way
in the vital matter of placing personnel.36

It has been argued that, in his years of forced retirement,
Nasution underwent a change of heart regarding his relations with
Sukarno and the Nationalist Party, and that, therefore, he supported
their attitudes towards regionalism rather than those of the Masjumi
and PSI, parties to which he had earlier seemed sympathetic.37 It
seems likely, however, that civilian ideological alignments were not
for him the main consideration. Nasution was concerned first of all
with military politics; he was a strong centralist who sought to
preserve the unity of the nation (and to enhance his own power) by
strengthening the army chain of command and imposing Djakarta's will
on the outlying regions. His concern for order and control had
pitted him against what he saw as parliament's disorder and inter­
ference in 1952. He was indeed philosophically more sympathetic to
the Masjumi and PSI than to Sukarno and the Nationalists, but, by
1955, the interests of the Masjumi and PSI had become identified
with those of decentralization and regional unrest. Within the
military Nasution's strong centralizing ambitions were more immedi­
ately appreciated, and officers tended to line up for and against
him— and thus for and against the government in power—to the extent
they saw their interests threatened by a strong, Nasution-led high
command. This affected, in the first place, his rivals for office,
and, in the second place, territorial commanders whose power would be
broken by separation from their command. Some of these had been for
and some against him in 1952; the rivalries which arose out of
Nasution's reappointment in 1955 did not follow any discernable pat­
tern of ideology, style, or previous factionalism, but coalesced
above all around the officers' perceptions of their relationship to
central military power.

Of all those officers who saw their interests threatened by
Nasution's resumption of leadership, surely the most distressed was

36. Nasution returned to office under the Burhanuddin Harahap cabinet
(August 1955-March 1956). According to the army, the cabinet had
accepted a plan for a massive reshuffle of personnel which Nasution
had presented in February 1956. Feith, Decline, p. 501, citing a
statement by the deputy head of the army Information office, in
Abadi, July 11, 1956. It seems likely that the Masjumi-led Harahap
government had been proceeding on the assumption, common to civil­
ian politicians at the time, that the newly reinstated chief of
staff would be friendly to Masjumi/PSI interests and that their
position would be improved by giving Nasution a strong hand. Under
the succeeding Nationalist-led cabinet, the Defense portfolio was
concurrently held by the prime minister, Ali Sastroamidjojo, who
obtained Nasution's cooperation, with the agreement that the chief
of staff would have a free hand in army affairs. Feith, Decline,
p. 502.

37. See, for example, Feith, Decline, pp. 443-444.
Colonel Zulkifli Lubis, who made no secret of his resentment when handing over the central command to his rival. But, for the first half year of his office Nasution moved very quietly, gradually implementing a series of low-level changes designed to remove key supporters of those territorial commanders whom he wished eventually to transfer; and his opponents were not sufficiently alarmed to bury their differences. Towards the middle of 1956, the pace of these reassignments increased sharply, and it became evident that, unless something was done, the central command would soon be very powerful indeed. Those who thought they would lose by its aggrandizement now became greatly concerned, and their nervousness was communicated as a rising sense of insecurity in the officer corps. At last, Zulkifli Lubis had the necessary support to undertake a reversal of the situation, and, in August 1956, he invited some of his fellow officers to contemplate a coup. I should like to outline in some detail Lubis' effort, which spanned the next three months, because it illustrates some of the general propositions concerning army behavior which I have been discussing and also because it led directly to the military involvement in the regionalist movements of 1957. The open, protracted character of Lubis' attempt has not been otherwise characteristic of coups in Djakarta, but its equivalent can be seen often enough in the prolonged negotiations surrounding the coups against officers in the Outer Islands in the course of the regional disturbances.

There was, Lubis declared to the August 1956 gathering at his home in Djakarta, no need for the Indonesians' revolution to end in corruption, dissension and despair; they could emulate Egypt, where the military truly understood its role as national saviour. Like the leaders of the October 17 Affair (whom he had strongly opposed at the time), Lubis did not call for the removal of Sukarno, but declared that the president could be forced to accept the dissolution of political parties and the establishment of a military junta. Lieutent Colonel Abimanju, whom Nasution had recently replaced as second deputy on the general staff, illuminated Lubis' remarks by describing the progress of Egypt, which he had just visited; and the meeting ended by deciding the impending changes of territorial command must be prevented.

It was already late in the day for Nasution's opponents to gather their forces. Key changes had taken place in regimental commands, and the planned shift of major panglima-ships was to take place in the next ten days. The most important of these were the commands of Territory III (West Java), headed by Colonel Alex Kawilarang, a proponent of October 17 and purportedly a key figure in Nasution's own coup plans of 1952; Territory VII (East Indonesia), which was

38. Sin Po, December 13, 1956, text of the statement by Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo to the parliament giving the government's account of the Lubis Affair. This source is hereafter referred to as Ali-DPR. It is not clear who, besides Abimanju, was among the senior officers attending Lubis' meeting. However, the account of Lubis' subsequent maneuverings should give a general picture of his military sources of support.

39. Ali-DPR; and see Merdeka, December 12, 1956.

40. See footnote 21 above.
under Colonel J. F. Warouw, who had seized the post from his former commander in the October 17 Affair; and Territory I (North Sumatra), where Colonel M. Simbolon—who had been strongly pro-October 17 but was also one of the principal claimants for the office of chief of staff—was scheduled to be replaced by Lubis himself. The East Indonesia command was of great importance because it covered a major export area and was a center of open army involvement in smuggling; if the central government were to preserve its authority and the high command to establish its integrity, it was essential to bring the area under firmer control. Warouw's position was powerful, for, as a local man, he had strong Sulawesi support, and the regimental commanders who ran the more distant parts of his far-flung territory as their own fiefs were likely, unless delicately handled, to take his side in any attempt to impose central discipline. Nasution therefore sought to minimize the visible degree of change by appointing another local man, Lieutenant Colonel H. V. Sumual, as Warouw's chief of staff and then moving him into command, thus arriving at a panglima who, if he turned out to be an opponent, would have less local prestige and fewer claims on a military following. As for Warouw, the possibility of his making further trouble was to be reduced by sending him on assignment abroad. In the Sumatran command, which posed the same problems of illegal exporting as Territory VII, the shift in panglima was designed to kill two birds with one stone. It would remove Colonel Simbolon from his home region and the command where he had built up a following; he would be brought to Djakarta, where he would have fewer effective connections and from which, Nasution may have further calculated, he could eventually be transferred safely abroad. Lubis, on the other hand, had had most of his career in Djakarta, and his support was strongest in the central offices of the army and in the West Java division. If he were removed to Sumatra, much of his power would probably be permanently lost, and in any case he would not present so immediate a threat as he did in the capital.

Of all the seven territorial commands, the most vital to control was that of West Java, which contained both Bandung—the headquarters of most army corps and central training installations—and the national capital, whose defense was under its command. The territorial

41. Warouw was to join the presidential delegation which embarked on a world tour in August 1956 and was thereafter to become military attache in Peking.

42. It was intended that Simbolon would replace Colonel Sukanda Bratamenggala as Inspector General of Instruction and Training, the headquarters of which were in Bandung. This would remove from a key post, and probably from Bandung as well, an officer who was strongly sympathetic to Zulkifli Lubis and who had considerable influence in the Siliwangi Division. See Sin Po, September 15, 1956.

43. The Greater Djakarta city command (KMKB-DR) was formally of regimental status within the main territorial division, as was the case with other principal city commands. In addition, it was the headquarters of Regiment 7 of the Siliwangi. After the Lubis Affair, when Nasution had secured a Siliwangi Division he could count on for support, the West Java division's control over the
division, the Siliwangi, was originally Nasution's own; he retained considerable influence in it, and, when he was considering a coup of his own in 1952, this was the force on which it seems he hoped to base the move. But Kawilarang was a very popular commander and had been in charge for many years, and Lubis had his following there as well. The Siliwangi, moreover, was a grouping of great ideological complexity, and there was room in it for movements based on Sundanese localism, on a sense of cosmopolitan superiority, on progressive notions, on anti-Communism, and many permutations of these. These variegated moods were magnified by the unease of mid-1956, which was expressed in the frequent reunions of former pemuda and lasjkar groups, who asked where the revolution had gone and whether they must watch the country sink ever deeper into corruption. The impending changes of command, and the uncertainty as to what further transfers would take place, gave the sense of urgency and motion necessary to turn these generalized feelings of malaise into a readiness for action. It was to prevent his opponents from utilizing this state of mind that Nasution moved to replace Kawilarang by Lieutenant Colonel Suprajogi, who as a Siliwangi alumnus could hope for early acceptance and influence in the division but who as a man of the center (he had until then been quartermaster general) and a lesser personality was not likely to form a threat of his own.

Kawilarang was slated to become military attache in Washington, a post that should effectively prevent the utilization of his popularity on behalf of either Lubis or himself. This transfer of divisional authority, the most urgent of all the three, was to take place on August 14, four days after the meeting in Lubis' house.

The method by which Lubis and his associates endeavored to forestall Kawilarang's ouster was to engineer the arrest of the Foreign Minister and several other civilian notables on charges of corruption. This seems to have been partly a device to secure the postponement of the transfer ceremony (which was to take place the next day), partly a signal to more distant enemies of Nasution that there was a movement they could ally with, and partly to establish publicly the theme of their claim to power, the fight to restore honesty and a sense of high purpose to the state. The bid failed, for reasons which were typical of the behavior of Nasution and his opponents during the whole period of their struggle. In the first place, Nasution's enemies moved too late to be effective. Both Simbolon and Warouw sent in supporting demands, but they arrived only after the fateful transfer had taken place. Organization was poor: no agitation capital command seemed advantageous, but civilian political leaders were anxious to force a separation in order to protect themselves from the possibility of a Siliwangi-general staff decision for a coup. In 1960, Sukarno was able to take advantage of Nasution's discomfiture, following the exposure of a smuggling scandal in Djakarta in which army leaders appeared to be involved, to secure the creation of separate divisional status for the capital region. Most of the new Djaya Division's troops were transferred from the Siliwangi, and they retained their identification enough to form a Siliwangi "alumni association" within their new division. See Berita Yudha, August 9, 1965, formation of the Djakarta branch of the BPC Siliwangi. However, the civilians, and especially Sukarno, did their best, not unsuccessfully, to secure a pliable attitude on the part of the divisional leadership.
Lubis' speech at the ceremony in which he handed over his office to Gatot Subroto had the sound of a man who has lost—he stressed the unpleasantness he had had to endure, the sacrifice of himself and his position, the denial of justice—but he was in fact not yet quite willing to give up. He now turned, however, from the grand arena of panglima politics to the more easily available one of the Siliwangi Division. On September 9, he met with some of its officers in Tjipanas, a resort town halfway between Djakarta and Bandung. He called for their aid in overthrowing the government and establishing a Military Council that would supervise the workings of a new one. His appeal was well received, and the officers returned to secure the support of their subordinates.

Almost immediately, word of the plot leaked out, and both Nasution and the division's new commander moved to minimize Siliwangi support for it. On September 26, after several tours of inspection and battalion roll-calls at which Suprajogi had sounded divisional opinion and explained the center's viewpoint, the new panglima managed to get a meeting of Siliwangi regimental and city commanders formally to reject a coup as a means of improving the affairs of state. But three days later, Lubis met with Siliwangi officers who were still willing to go ahead with the affair, and they agreed on

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44. What appears to have happened is that Kawilarang, as commander of West Java, ordered the Djakarta city commander, Major Djuhro, to arrest the civilians. Accordingly, three members of Djuhro's intelligence staff arrived at the house of Foreign Minister Ruslan Abdulgani early on the morning of August 13 with a summons. Ruslan's wife telephoned the prime minister to ask the meaning of all this, and he in turn called the secretary general of the Defense Ministry, who phoned Nasution, who in turn telephoned Djuhro. Djuhro was evidently quite unprepared to confront pressure from so high a level; he ended by personally repairing to the Foreign Minister's house in order to summon back his three officers, who, themselves awed by the magnitude of their undertaking, had been patiently waiting on Ruslan's negotiations. Algemeen Indonesisch Dagblad, August 14 and 15, 1956; Merdeka, August 16, 1956; and Sin Po, September 8, 1956 (Suprajogi's account of the affair).

45. Sin Po, August 20, 1956, summary of Lubis' speech.

46. Ali-DPR.
the general outlines for a seizure of power.\textsuperscript{7}

The central command did not feel strong enough to bring matters to a head or even to interfere substantially in Lubis' activities, but it chipped away at his support, forcing the postponement of planned actions, encouraging the hesitant among his allies to believe that if they withdrew nothing would be held against them, and waiting for frustration to bring dissension and distrust. Each round of the game, Lubis' support in the Siliwangi grew narrower, more impatient to act, and more ready to despair. The center had the advantage that its very weakness encouraged its opponents to remain in the open; the high command could keep track of Lubis even if it could not arrest him, and it could be fairly confident of the direction from which a coup move would come. Moreover, although Nasution and his associates had plenty of enemies elsewhere, they seem to have been transfixed by the maneuvers between Lubis and the Siliwangi; save for the announcement by Abimanju, the Egyptian advocate of Lubis' first meeting, who had since become panglima of Territory VI (Kalimantan), that he would arrest any central government or army official who entered his territory, Nasution's non-Siliwangi opponents took no action until Lubis' defeat was certain.\textsuperscript{8}

As was common in Indonesia during periods of stress, rumors of an impending coup clustered around October 5, Armed Forces Day, when military leaders and large numbers of troops gathered in the capital. Whether because the Lubis group actually proposed action then or because Nasution wanted to take advantage of the spate of rumors to justify more drastic measures against his opponents, the chief of staff called, on October 4, for the investigation of army members suspected of political involvement, and he ordered the Siliwangi

\textsuperscript{47} Ali-DPR; Harian Rakjat, November 24, 1956; according to the latter account, the most active supporter of Lubis at the meeting was Lt. Col. Kemal Idris, commander of Regiment 9 (Tjirebon).

Suprajogi's initial meetings with the Siliwangi officers must have presented an alarming state of discontent, for he went to see the prime minister with the urgent demand that corruption and inefficiency in the central government be controlled. Pikiran Rakjat, October 5, 1956, statement by the Siliwangi information officer. Very likely, too, his ostentatious visit was designed to show his subordinates that he could represent Siliwangi interests at the highest level.

\textsuperscript{48} On November 15, Abimanju ordered Hassan Basrie, the commander of Regiment 21 (Bandjarmasin), to detain all field grade officers and ministers arriving from Djakarta and to arrest various officials in the Kalimantan capital. Basrie, a Kalimantan commander since revolutionary days, was little inclined to subordinate himself in such an extreme step to a newly arrived commander. He sought and obtained the support of his regiment against Abimanju and then solicited the backing of Regiments 20 (Pontianak) and 22 (Balikpapan), whose commanders, Lieutenant Colonel Siahaan and Lieutenant Colonel Ibnu Subroto, had assumed a wait-and-see attitude following Abimanju's move. Harian Rakjat, November 21, 1956. As a result, Abimanju was without power in his own division, a fact of critical importance in his surrender to Nasution described below.
commander to discipline members of his division suspected of engaging in such affairs. He then summoned to Djakarta Colonel Sukanda Bratamenggala, inspector general of instruction and training, and Colonel Sapari, the adjutant general, two Bandung-stationed officers who were of influence both in the Siliwangi and in West Java society; he wished to discuss with them their patronage of the Sundanese Youth Front (Front Pemuda Sunda), which had been founded the previous June.

In part this was an excuse to take the two officers out of pro-Lubis action, but the central authorities also had reasons to be disturbed about the youth group as such, as was evidenced by Nasution's stress on the problem of "youth juntas" in his Armed Forces Day speech. Like many of the pemuda groups that became active about this time, the Sundanese Youth Front reflected the desire for radical change and the resurgence of the "primordial sentiment" of ethnic identity which had become marked as national government became seen as stagnant and corrupt. "Youth" was an elastic concept, and the groups included revolutionary veterans and former lasjkar members, so that it was very easy for their activity to resonate with local military unrest. The penetration of civilian ideas could have had very serious consequences for central efforts to channel intra-military dissent, for as long as conflict in the army was primarily a struggle for personal advancement, irrevocable commitments were unlikely to be made. Indonesian officers do not seem to have been sufficiently convinced of the political potential of the military itself to see in an army takeover a cause worthy of unquestioning devotion, despite the talk of the Egyptian example and the ringing declarations of salvationist intent; participation in intrigues and even coup maneuvers were nearly always taken with an eye out to withdrawal if the adventure seemed unpromising. It was thus far better, from the high command's viewpoint, that its military opponents not acquire an ideological cause; and as the Front Pemuda Sunda and its ilk offered some possibility for forming one, Nasution was eager to isolate the military from them.

The visit of Sukanda and Sapari in fact constituted the first stage of their arrest; but because of their influence and the high command's weakness, and because Nasution wished to convey the impression that he was the soul of moderation, the matter was handled with great politeness. They were guests, it was said; Sukanda stayed at Nasution's house and Sapari at Gatot Subroto's; they were moved back and forth between Bandung and Djakarta, remaining more or less (but increasingly less) free to see whom they pleased. Unfortunately for this diplomacy, word was leaked out that orders had actually been issued for the arrest not only of Sukanda but also of several Siliwangi officers sympathetic to Lubis; this caused a new flurry of excitement in the division, and those who felt themselves threatened decided they must move quickly for a coup. They sought to do so before Sukarno returned from his current trip abroad, for the president could only be expected to throw his weight against them given the civilian alliances they had struck.

49. Sin Po, October 9, 1956; Ali-DPR.
50. Pikiran Rakjat, October 5, 1956 (text of the speech).
51. When word leaked out that arrest orders for Sukanda and Sapari had been issued, a press conference was arranged for them by the
On the evening of October 15, Lieutenant Colonel Kemal Idris, commander of the Ninth Regiment (headquartered at Tjirebon) and one of the officers purportedly slated for arrest, appealed to his officers to provide troops for a coup in Djakarta on the grounds that they could thus prevent his incarceration by Nasution. He had already led them in an attempt on the 11th, when they and troops from Major Suwarto's Eleventh Regiment (Tasikmalaja) had headed towards Djakarta, expecting a friendly reception from the city commandant there, Major Djuhro, a Lubis ally; but they had not succeeded in squaring the command of the Eighth Regiment (Bogor), whose territory lay across their route. Confronted by guards from that regiment and not wishing to embroil themselves violently with a fellow Siliwangi unit, they had returned home.\(^\text{52}\) Now, however, Kemal Idris proposed that they go via Purwakarta, thus avoiding the center of the Eighth Regiment's domain. He needed the troops for only three days, he declared, and he gave an army leadership to explain that this was not so. Sukanda used the occasion to make points of his own which were typical of the hard-pressed dissident officer: He appealed to civil authority against that of his army superior (by saying that a magistrate would have to examine the case before any arrest); he appealed to the fears of his colleagues (arguing that it should not be possible to arrest an officer without showing just cause); and he stressed the strength of his following (telling how subordinate officers and non-coms had tried to "kidnap" him at the airfield because they feared for his safety in Djakarta, and how they continued to urge him to allow them to liberate him). Sin Po, October 11, 1956, reporting Sukanda's press conferences; also Sin Po, November 15, 1956, citing a general staff source.

The putative arrestees were, in addition to the above-named, Lieutenant Colonel Taswin (who, we will remember, had been an enthusiastic proponent of the October 17 move in 1952); Major Djuhro, the Djakarta city commander; and Lieutenant Colonel Kemal Idris, commander of Regiment 9. The news was given to foreign journalists by Lieutenant Colonel Rudi Pirngadie, the official army general staff spokesman, and was published in the Straits Times on October 10. See also Merdeka, October 11, 1956. Both Pirngadie and Lieutenant Colonel Chandra Hassan, the head of army intelligence, were fired for this (Merdeka, October 17, 1956); the fact that they had evidently attempted to sabotage Nasution's maneuvers illustrates how weak the chief of staff's position was at the time, with many key central offices still not in the hands of men he could trust.

The decision to move for a coup before Sukarno's return--scheduled for October 16--was discussed in a meeting in Colonel Sapari's house in Bandung and also in a gathering between Lubis and Siliwangi officers in Lembang (outside Bandung) on October 12, according to the government's account. Ali-DPR.

52. Ali-DPR; Pedoman, October 17, 1956; Bintang Timur, November 23, 1956. These accounts give the impression that the Regiment 8 commander, Achmad Wiranatakusumah, was solidly opposed to Lubis' actions; but later there were charges that he had become involved in the movement, and Suprajogi, in discussing these, made the ambiguous statement that "as an individual" (setiara pribadi) Wiranatakusumah had not been involved. Merdeka, November 27, 1956.
impressive list of the units whose support could be expected for a move to oust Nasution.53 In addition to army help, he added, they could reckon on the participation of the village defense organization, OKD,54 whose members would be armed and some of whom would participate in the attack on Djakarta.

This proposal to involve armed civilians in a military move was not rare in Indonesian coup attempts. The reason was seldom a purely military one; indeed, the ill-trained militia was usually likely to be more of a hindrance than a help in the lightning seizure of power. However, army rebels, whether of the political Left or Right, usually called on The People for legitimation of their decisions to move, and participation by The People in one form or another was therefore considered psychologically important. Also, armed civilians could be risked in ways which army personnel could not. Most attempts to seize

53. The list of units Kemal Idris reportedly declared would back an anti-Nasution coup is interesting, though the extent of support was doubtless exaggerated. He said that Territory I (North Sumatra) would be thoroughly on their side, which was probably right; and that II (South Sumatra) was in favor except for its commanding officer (there were in fact reports of unrest in the division and an attempt to carry out a coup against the panglima, Colonel Ibnu Sutowo, about that time). Territory IV (Central Java, under Suharto), would, he declared, be passive, which should probably be read as not in favor. (About the only visible Diponegoro involvement in the whole affair was the fact that Nasution sent arrested Siliwangi officers to Jogjakarta for interrogation, evidently to avoid demonstrations or attempts to rescue them in West Java.) Kemal Idris asserted the backing of Territory V--where Sudirman, who had commanded the Brawidjaja Division since the October 1952 affair, had recently been replaced. That there may have been considerable Brawidjaja support for a move against Nasution is also indicated by the particular stress paid by Nasution on winning Brawidjaja favor at the end of the year. He went to Kediri to attend the Brawidjaja's anniversary celebration, taking with him Colonels Sungkono, Suhud and Kretarto from army headquarters--perhaps as proof that opposition in the October 17 Affair no longer counted, as these had all fought him then. Colonel Sarbini, speaking for the Brawidjaja Division, emphasized that there was a considerable difference of opinion in the Brawidjaja, and particularly among its officers, as to the means of dealing with the national situation. Sin Po, December 19, 1956.

Kemal Idris did not mention Territory VI (Kalimantan), and, indeed, only its panglima, Abimanju, appeared be on the Lubis side; Territory VII (East Indonesia) was, he assured his officers (again probably correctly), on the anti-Nasution side. Bintang Timur, November 23, 1956.

54. Organisasi Keamanan Desa, Village Security Organization. Particular attention had been paid to organizing this in West Java because of the Darul Islam revolt, but it existed elsewhere under various titles. As of 1957, there were 80,000 members in West Java; their costs were borne by their villages but their orders came from the army, which also kept generally firm control over the issue of weapons. PIA bulletin, October 26, 1957.
power or to replace a commander from below involved a barracks diplomacy that allowed almost no room for bloodshed. If there was actual fighting between troops, honor and sentiment might make it impossible for a unit to back down or reverse alliances once any of its members had been killed. Moreover, a commander could not risk humiliating his men too greatly or often and expect to keep their loyalty; hence it was wise, if possible, to use civilians for the more controversial aspects of one's activity, and particularly for guarding positions that might have to be given up. Finally, it was advisable to involve civilian groups in more controversial public activity, for if later the army commanders on both sides negotiated an agreement, the blame for breach of the public order could be placed on the civilians' getting out of hand (as they were likely to do with the least encouragement, their expectations being of a more millenial sort than the military commanders'). Armed civilians were, in short, a kind of insurance in a coup situation; they were used in this capacity by dissident officers of various ideological persuasions, without very much regard for the political affiliation of their members as long as they could be thought reliable in the immediate circumstances.55

Kemal Idris' appeal to his anak buah was received favorably, but the attempt failed, evidently for much the same reason as his earlier one had. Kemal was reportedly in something of a panic after the affair, and indeed the next day Suprajogi moved to relieve him and Suwarto of their duties. But in fact it was to be another month before they were actually replaced. Their position was bolstered not only by the opinion of their subordinates but also by the fact that Nasution's recent actions were now rather widely thought to be going too far. His October 4 order against political participation had been accompanied by the declaration that an ad hoc committee of investigation headed by a recently appointed ally of his would consider charges of corruption and political involvement throughout the army. As might be expected, this announcement created a considerable stir in army circles, and it appears to have been one of the few times in the Lubis Affair that Nasution overstepped himself.

55. For an example of the use of village guard groups for the purposes of military politics, see John Smail, "The Military Politics of North Sumatra: December 1956-October 1957," Indonesia, No. 6 (October 1968), pp. 160-165. The use of youth undergoing paramilitary training at Halim air base by Lieutenant Colonel Untung's September 30th Movement at the time of the 1965 coup seems to have been governed by some of the above considerations. A striking instance of the extent to which this civilian recruitment for coup purposes could ignore political lines is provided by the mobilization of participants for the demonstration outside the presidential palace on October 17, 1952. A large portion of those brought in by army trucks had been picked up on their way to work and asked to participate in a demonstration to support Sukarno, to which they enthusiastically agreed. A good part of them belonged to Communist-controlled unions, which led to accusations that the Communists were secretly behind the move, and to agonized denials from Communist union leaders that this was so (see Harian Rakjat, October 20 and 22, denials by Djawadi, chairman of the Serakat Buruh Bea dan Tjukai, S. Darjono, information officer of the Serikat Buruh PeKerdjaan Umum, and Njono, secretary general of the SOBSI).
On October 20, a conference of army leaders--panglima, general staff and heads of important corps--was held to discuss the situation; after a session that lasted all day, it announced that it had been agreed to dissolve the committee, as the problems it had been assigned to deal with no longer existed.\(^{56}\)

The meeting did not prevent Nasution from summoning Lubis himself, however, and, on November 7, the chief of staff called him to answer for his involvement in political affairs. There ensued two days of negotiations, in which Lubis attempted to demonstrate his superior position by a series of studied insults to Nasution's delegate, Colonel Gatot Subroto. At a general staff meeting held on the second day of Lubis' resistance, it was at last decided that he was guilty of insubordination and should be arrested. Lubis was not, of course, immediately sent off to prison; on the contrary, it was claimed that he went underground and could not be found.\(^{57}\) Meanwhile, however, various of his and Sukanda's adherents in central army installations in Bandung were summoned to Jakarta to "provide information" on the Lubis case. One of them, Major Djaelani, head of the army paratroop regiment (RPKAD), refused to obey the summons. As Djaelani was popular with his staff and had considerable firepower at his command, his obstinacy presented a serious problem, and Gatot Subroto was again assigned to procure compliance with the summons. He failed, and other officers were sent to see the major, but he still refused.\(^{58}\) He was, in fact, holding back so that he might commit his forces to a coup that was scheduled to take place in Jakarta on November 16.

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\(^{56}\) Sin Po, November 16, 1956, statement by army headquarters; see also Sin Po, October 22, 1956; and Ali-DPR. The meeting consisted of the panglima, including Colonel Sudirman, now in charge of the Brawijaya expeditionary force in East Indonesia; the members of the General Staff; Colonel Sukanda Bratamenggala in his capacity as inspector of instruction and training; Colonel Surjosularso, governor of the national military academy (AMN); Colonel Mokoginta, director of the staff and command school (SSKAD); and Colonel Bahrung quartermaster general. This was evidently considered at the time to be the senior group of army decision makers. The meeting affirmed that investigations of official misbehavior would be carried out by commanding officers and the military police and thus not directly by the high command.

\(^{57}\) See Merdeka, November 16, 1956; Sin Po, November 13, 1956. It was subsequently claimed, particularly by the Left, that Lubis could not be arrested because he enjoyed the protection of high politicians--usually the name of Burhanuddin Harahap, the Masjumi former prime minister, was mentioned. It seems unlikely that this was the main reason, whether or not succor was offered Lubis from that quarter, for Nasution would scarcely have countenanced civilian intervention in an intra-military affair of such gravity for army discipline. It is more probable that, with storm clouds already brewing in the officer corps regarding his moves against Lubis, he delayed the execution of the arrest order to avoid a coalition of army opinion against himself.

\(^{58}\) Ali-DPR; Sin Po, November 23, 1956.
On the night of November 15, Major Djuhro, head of the Djakarta city command and a partisan of Lubis' cause, held meetings with several subordinate officers to prepare for an action that was to begin at 3:30 the next morning. The essential move, so the army later claimed, was to rest on units available in the capital, but an RPKAD force that would arrive later in the day would act as a tactical reserve and ensure continuing control of the city. The plan was, in the first stage, to kidnap Nasution and members of the general staff. Later, augmented by the RPKAD force and by Kemal Idris' men from Tjirebon, they would arrest unfriendly ministers and party leaders and create a general disturbance in the capital that would force the president to dissolve the cabinet and parliament and accept their terms for a reorganization of the government. The initial phase failed, due, we are told, to poor coordination. Meanwhile, however, the RPKAD force had left its headquarters in Batudjadjar, near Bandung, on schedule, and arrived at Krandji, where it was supposed to join Kemal Idris' force and receive orders to proceed to the capital. Instead, a courier from Djakarta reported the failure of the initial move and asked them to await further instructions. By noon they began to get impatient; there was still no sign of the Tjirebon force, for that morning Kemal Idris had finally been forced to turn over his command, and the Ninth Regiment was lost to further dissident action. At 1:30 p.m. a messenger from Djakarta arrived, saying that in the evening there would be another attempt. But the RPKAD commander was by now thoroughly worried, and he replied that he intended to have his men back in Bandung by night. There obviously needed, he said, to be further planning, and he demanded full explanations from the others as to the reasons for their failure to live up to their part.

In Djakarta, fires had broken out in army warehouses at about 1:00 p.m.—the time when the RPKAD and Tjirebon forces were to arrive and the general disturbances to begin. Those involved in guarding the arms saw no way to rescue them but to spread them on the streets outside—the better, according to the original plot, to be available to civilians enlisted on the coup group side. In Bandung, the Front Pemuda Sunda was supposed, it was later claimed, to seize weapons and support a coup there, but the plan had been discovered in time by loyalist officers. There was much evidence of military activity in both cities, but a façade of business-as-usual was maintained. Nasution's first move, once it was evident that open action in the capital could not be avoided, was to meet with the heads of the government and the other services to secure

59. One suspects, particularly in view of Ali Sastroamidjojo's statement that Nasution's agents had infiltrated the Djakarta forces (see below), that a major reason for the failure was that the chief of staff and his allies knew all the plans for the affair. If that is so, it would seem likely that Nasution elected to allow the move to take place in order to be able to offer proof of the danger posed by Lubis and his allies and thus to secure intra-army support for their removal. For relevant accounts of the Djakarta coup, see Ali-DPR; Berita Minggu, November 18, 1956; Berita Indonesia, November 21, 1956; Sin Po, December 7, 1956, reporting an army statement on the affair; Harian Rakjat, November 17 and 20, 1956; Merdeka, November 20, 1956.
their acknowledgement that this was an internal army affair, and that there would be no interference from outside in its settlement.\textsuperscript{60} He then flew to Bandung, ostensibly to open the new office building of the adjutant general's directorate. Militarily, his forces were clearly on top, for as the initial coup moves failed and doubts began to arise among the more subordinate participants, they began to pay more heed to the arguments of the doubters in their own ranks--opponents who had often been primed long beforehand by agents of the central command.\textsuperscript{61} By evening, the commander of the Seventh Regiment (Djakarta) consigned all his men to barracks in obedience to Nasution's command, and Djuhro, though furious, felt himself forced to go along. The next day, there was a demonstration with heavy weapons outside army headquarters, but all real action in Djakarta had ended.

There remained the removal of Djuhro and Djaelani, but the latter proved not so easy. Djaelani retired to his headquarters in Batudjadjar, and to this redoubt Nasution sent a series of emissaries calculated to impress him: three officers who had attended the staff and command school (SSKAD) with him, then a high officer of Siliwangi origin (Colonel Sadikin, inspector general for territorial affairs), and then a comrade from revolutionary days. But Djaelani hardened his heart, and indeed received a secret visit from Lubis, with whom he developed yet another plan for action. On November 20, he met with his subordinate officers and told them of the new attempt, giving them 48 hours to make up their minds on participation and relying on their loyalty not to reveal the plot. The next morning, Djaelani appeared at the staff and command school in Bandung, followed shortly by a number of non-commissioned RPKAD officers who had the intention of arresting him. They had already captured their pro-coup officers back at Batudjadjar, having decided to take things into their own hands to prevent another attempt at a coup.

This intrusion was most embarrassing, for the SSKAD was celebrating its anniversary; Sukarno was there to speak, and he took the occasion to declare that it was not the soldiers but the officers who had behaved badly. The army hierarchy did not share his view. If officers could occasionally be encouraged to revolt against their superiors in the interests of still higher command, the ultimate loyalties of those below officer rank were too uncertain to be permitted to take similar action. Nasution immediately gave orders that everything should be done to prevent soldiers from taking action against their superiors, and a few days later all men of the RPKAD were inspected by Colonel Sadikin, representing the high command, who guided them in the proper understanding of recent events and had them reaffirm the Soldier's Oath and the Sapta Marga code of principles, which they were evidently considered to have broken.\textsuperscript{62}

\textsuperscript{60} Sin Po, November 17, 1956.

\textsuperscript{61} Ali-DPR; and see Djuhro's statement on giving up his command, in Sin Po, November 30, 1956. It might be noted in this connection that Djuhro had only served about eight months in his post as head of the Djakarta city command, and therefore had not had time to acquire reliable personal support.

\textsuperscript{62} Harian Rakjat, November 27, 1956.
But just as Lubis' coup effort was dissolving into these last frantic fragments, the whole question of the central command was reopened at the highest level. Other senior officers had suddenly come to realize that if the battle were viewed solely as a struggle between Nasution and the followers of an officer who had been declared an outcaste, a purge of all non-Nasution men in key positions might be carried out on the argument that they were Lubis' clientele and involved in his coup. Nasution might therefore emerge from the affair in a very strong position indeed, unless he could be reminded of the general equality of the officer corps and of the collective nature of army policy decisions. For this, the Jogja Charter could be appealed to, for if it had once served to unite the army against government interference, it could also be used to illustrate and sanctify the collegial principle. Moreover, senior officers considered, there were some who were in a better position to defy Nasution than others, notably the panglima in the Outer Islands, some of whom would in fact find themselves under severe pressure from their subordinates and local civilian interests if they submitted too far to domination by Djakarta. Lubis himself had told Nasution in the course of refusing to obey his summons that he could see to it that Territories I and VI would break off relations with Djakarta. The latter, Kalimantan, was not so serious, as Abimanju was a new man in the post and had already alienated regimental commanders by not consulting them in making his gestures on Lubis' behalf; but if Simbolon decided to seize power in North Sumatra he could do so, with severe consequences both for the Djakarta government and for army unity. The situation seemed too dangerous to press, and yet it seemed Nasution intended to press it. As a result, his colleagues determined to check his course.

The officers attending the anniversary meeting at the SSKAD, which Djaelani had so precipitously interrupted, took the occasion to discuss the failings of the state and the armed forces and the possible means of overcoming them. At the gathering they decided, first of all, that whatever else might happen they must achieve unity in the army. There should, furthermore, be an "integral change" in the army leadership aimed at creating the desired unity through establishing a balance of factional power. The character of the leadership change should be decided collegially, on the basis of *musjawarah* (deliberation seeking the sense of the meeting) and in accordance with the Jogja Charter. As the chief SSKAD spokesman declared, "Our army and state, which at this time are filled with disappointed and explosive forces, cannot be handled by main force, by calling on authority, and by stressing military norms alone."63 In other words, Nasution would have to back down, and perhaps he would have to go.

The declaration was particularly weighty in view of the prestige of the staff and command school, which was regarded as an intellectual and ideological center for the army. The ties that were established between officers while studying at the school were sufficiently strong that they could be used politically—we have seen Nasution  

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63. *Waspada*, December 18, 1956, quoting Lieutenant Colonel Slamet Ali Junus, official spokesman of the SSKAD. The school later was known by the initials Seskoad.
attempt to do so in sending SSKAD colleagues to Djaelani, and, during the regional troubles in Sumatra the next year, he was to encourage graduates assigned to unreliable divisional commands to act as a loyalist bloc against dissident commanders and local IPRI associations. But the SSKAD Officer Corps—the association of staff, students and alumni of the school—offered a forum of opinion outside the army hierarchy, and it was thus bound to give more voice to dissident commanders and middle-rank officers than the high command cared to hear. In short, although the SSKAD Officer Corps was more elite and "professional" in character than the IPRI, it had much the same uses and disadvantages from the viewpoint of the high command. (Its fate was to be similar: although the school itself flourished after the end of the regional rebellion, Nasution moved, once his position was strong enough, to see that the Officer Corps ceased to act as a collective spokesman.)

The members of the SSKAD, however superior they may have felt their qualifications, were not confident their voice alone would be accepted throughout the army, and so they stressed the right of the officer corps as a whole to decide the issue of army leadership. Nor was the SSKAD group the only one to appeal to broader officer opinion. On November 23, two days after the SSKAD meeting, Zulkifli Lubis sent an open letter to the Indonesian officers and the press in which he asked that the evidence for his insubordination be turned over to a representative gathering of officers, and he would be responsible to them alone. Soon thereafter, IPRI leaders met with the presidium of the SSKAD Officer Corps to work out a common plan of action. As a result of this, the IPRI wrote to both Nasution and Lubis, requesting their views on the way in which the affairs of state and the army could be improved in line with the principles of the Jogja Charter. Moreover, the IPRI secretary general, Colonel S. Parman, seems to have met with Lubis (who, we will remember, was officially in hiding) to discuss his position. The presidium of the SSKAD Officer Corps also sent a delegation to the army general staff to discuss the Corps' proposals for a settlement, demanding among other things that, by December 31 at the latest, there be a revision of the army leadership.6

Nasution seems to have been furious at this attempt to undo his work, and particularly at the effort to place Lubis and himself on the same level. He replied to the IPRI letter that he would answer only to his superiors for his policy, being willing enough to acknowledge the authority of a civilian government that gave him full backing. Parman and other IPRI leaders were called into army headquarters and interrogated, and the IPRI presidium issued a statement declaring that it had not intended to imply that Nasution was responsible to it. As for the SSKAD, it was possible to undermine its position from below: The senate of students then at the school expressed its distress at the demands of the Officer Corps and said it had not been sufficiently consulted in the matter—a viewpoint possibly connected with the fact that the chairman and secretary of the senate had just

64. Merdeka, November 26, 1956.

65. Waspada, January 3, 1957; see also Merdeka, December 15, 1956; Sin Po, December 12, 1956, for accounts of the IPRI and SSKAD moves.
been appointed by Nasution to head the Djakarta city command.\(^{66}\)

Nasution did indeed carry out a change in the army leadership, but it was by appointing a general staff of his own choice.\(^{67}\) He was in a position to do so, for the events of the Lubis Affair had left him in control of those military forces that were capable of acting effectively at the center. In the Siliwangi Division, the principal leaders of resistance had been removed and arrests and transfers were taking place at an increasing tempo, so that Nasution could look forward to the creation of a force he could rely on—as indeed he could rely on the Siliwangi for the remainder of his military career. The RPKAD had just been put under the command of one of his own men, and a "correction" was being carried out to ensure its reliability. The Djakarta city command was now also in favorable hands. Lubis' supporters in the various central corps and institutes were being rooted out, and other dissidents, as they realized Nasution's determination and their immediate helplessness, quickly decided that discretion was after all called for in such matters.

It was because the game was up at the center that the focus of action in the struggle for control of the army now began to move away from Djakarta. In the Outer Islands, powerful panglima were still capable of resisting the high command's claims, and the course of events in the Lubis Affair convinced them that Nasution would not stop short of breaking their power. Moreover, it showed them that if they were going to resist they would have to do so credibly—to threaten, and be willing to carry out, a break with Djakarta. Not all, of course, were in a position to do so. The once fiery Abimanju, having seen Lubis' effort crumble and aware of his own lack of local support, announced that Lubis' threat that Kalimantan would reject central control was nonsense. "We are not," he loyally stated, "so easily persuaded to submit to the will of Colonel Lubis."\(^{68}\) A few days later, he presented himself in Djakarta for interrogation by the chief of staff.

Simbolon, however, was in an excellent position to resist, and so were others. On November 24, the North Sumatra commander left

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66. These were Major Endang Dachjar and Captain Marsudi. Dachjar replaced Djuhro on November 29, after the collapse of the Djakarta coup effort. Other considerations influencing student opinion were their dependence on the central command for placement after their SSKAD assignment and their freedom while at the school from immediate pressures from subordinates and local civilian interests.

67. These were: Colonel Jani as Deputy I, replacing Colonel Kartakusuma and serving concurrently as Assistant II; Colonel Ibnu Sutowo as Deputy II, replacing Abimanju and serving concurrently as Assistant IV; and Colonel Dahlan Djambe as Deputy III, replacing Colonel Mursito; the change was announced on December 17, 1956. The doubling up of offices may have been in order to keep out men Nasution could not rely on until he could put in people he wanted but who were too controversial or were needed temporarily elsewhere. He hoped to use Dahlan Djambe for mediation with dissident Sumatran forces, but in the end Djambe elected to join the rebels.

68. Harian Rakjat, December 19, 1956, Abimanju statement on returning to Djakarta.
Medan for Djakarta, ostensibly to discuss his still pending replacement with Nasution. On his way he stopped at Padang in western Sumatra, to attend a reunion of officers of the former Banteng Division. This revolutionary force had been dissolved as part of the rationalization program that had preceded the October 17 Affair, and its members had been demobilized or dispersed among other units. Agitation by those assigned outside Sumatra had been one of the military issues in which parliament became involved preceding the Affair, and, in 1953, there was a mutiny by members of one battalion whose demands to return home still had not been met. In the years following, rising regional feeling combined with soldiers' and veterans' discontent to produce a movement demanding that West Sumatra again have an army division of its own. Nasution's return to office did not promise well for this ambition, for the Banteng Division's ex-members knew too well that his Sumatran origins would not keep him from pursuing a centralist line at their expense.

The military sponsors of the Banteng Division reunion were the leaders of the Fourth Regiment, headed by Lieutenant Colonel Ahmad Husein, whose aim was to withdraw their force from subordination to the North Sumatra command and set themselves up as an independent divisional leadership. Simbolon, as North Sumatra commander, stood to lose by their defection, but he evidently regarded the Fourth Regiment's withdrawal as inevitable and not injurious to his principal territorial concerns, while at the same time it offered a new and powerful possibility for military resistance to Nasution's consolidation of power. Consequently, Simbolon was not at all disturbed by the proceedings of the reunion, which formed a junta, the Banteng Council, to implement unilaterally its demands for regional autonomy and the replacement of Djakarta's political and military leadership. On the contrary, the reunion strengthened his hand for negotiating in the capital, where he presented to Nasution and the chiefs of staff of the other services his objections to the treatment of Zulkifli Lubis.

One wonders whether at that point either Simbolon or Nasution still cherished hopes that a suitable arrangement for Simbolon's transfer of command could be reached. Perhaps they had some hope

69. This was the Pagar Rujung Battalion, which had been absorbed into the Siliwangi Division as Battalion 327. In 1953, its members went, in effect, on strike, and were disarmed on command of the panglima, Colonel Kawilarang. See Trompet Masjarakat, May 18, 1953.

70. For the text of the Banteng Division statement, see Peristiwa Sumatera Barat. Kronik Dokumentasi (Djakarta: Departemen Penerangan, 1960), Djilid I, pp. 3-4. It is clear from the statement that, from the viewpoint of the meetings' participants, the primary goal was to achieve Nasution's removal. The first demand read: "Carry out as quickly as possible progressive and radical improvements in all fields, especially in the Leadership of the Army, and subsequently in the Leadership of the State, with due consideration to the unity of the Republic." (p. 3).

71. Feith (Decline, p. 525) is of the opinion that the matter seemed settled, with only the exact date of transfer undecided; and army headquarters sought to give this impression at the time. The
of persuading each other of the seriousness of their intentions and of the necessity for the other to give ground. If so, neither was successful; too much in terms of prestige and power was at stake, and too many other forces, military and civilian, were pressing against concessions. After a day, Simbolon returned to Medan, there to resume leadership of the dissident officers' movement, which had been given great impetus by the return of North Sumatra officers who had attended the SSKAD reunion and had partaken of its alarm at Nasution's march to power. Nasution, for his part, battened down for the coming storm by sending emissaries to the other military territories to persuade their officers to stay with the central command by promising the massive promotion of middle-rank officers, and by announcing the intended large-scale purchase of arms and equipment.

On December 20, the Banteng Council formally seized control over government in West Sumatra. Two days later, Simbolon followed suit with the formation of a junta and the seizure of power in North Sumatra; the central government and the high command took up the challenge, and there began the series of intricate military and civilian maneuverings that was to end in the regional rebellion of 1958. In the agitation accompanying these moves, much was made by military as well as civilian leaders of ethnic identification, religion and ideological position in an effort to rally popular support for their claims to power. However, although the military protagonists were not without views on these issues--sometimes very strong ones--most of them did not lose sight of the fact that, for them, the issue was to determine who would control the high command and how much authority he would have over his fellow officers. It was a matter worth much maneuvering, but it was not really worth a war. Threats, intramural coups and seizures of governmental control were forgivable in the long run and if alliances changed, but shedding the blood of fellow army men went strongly against the spirit of the guild, and the officer who was held to have done so unnecessarily was not likely to be rehabilitated if he lost or trusted if he won. The same ground rules that had kept Kemal Idris from trespassing on the territory of Regiment 8 on the way to his coup in Djakarta kept most rebel commanders from giving serious battle to the invading Djakarta troops and kept the high command from assuming the unforgiving line which Djakarta political leaders urged towards the rebels. Civilians were not so fortunate, either at their own or at military hands, but, within the army, violence was restricted, the decisive victories being won by successfully playing off military factions within rebel commands and by presenting a plethora of favorable rumors on the subject may, however, have been inspired to pressure Simbolon into acceding, a not unfamiliar tactic in urging the transfer of an officer unwilling to give up his post. It is also possible, however, that Simbolon did not wholly make up his mind to defy Nasution until he arrived back in Medan and found very strong local backing for a move against the center.

72. For a treatment of the intra-military maneuverings in one critical area in this period, see John Smail, "The Military Politics of North Sumatra," pp. 128-186.
prompt and credible show of central force in the dissident areas.

This mildness did not mean the high command won only half a victory in suppressing the rebellion; on the contrary, its primary goal of achieving strong central control was now at last to be realized. In part this triumph rested directly on the defeat of the most powerful Outer Island commands, the disgrace of Nasution's main rivals for leadership and the simultaneous enhancing of his own prestige. It also resulted from the working out of other projects, some of which had been initiated by Nasution soon after his reappointment in 1955 and others which were brought into being in the course of the next few years. The ensuing radical improvement of central control meant that debate on the policies and leadership of the high command became restricted to a small group of senior officers, and even these were clearly the subordinates and not the equals of those officially at the army's head. Thus able to present a monolithic face to the outside, the army was less vulnerable to manipulation by civilians even though its role in civil affairs expanded rapidly. But in the longer run, the suppression of debate within the army meant that dissatisfaction within the still heterogeneous and turbulent corps sought expression in alliances outside, with other services and with the civilian leadership, whose relations with the high command grew more tense as the army leaders grew more powerful. At the same time, the construction of a military instrument that would ensure continuing central control over the regional commanders produced a force which was to acquire a life and ambitions of its own and eventually to pose the most serious threat to the established army leadership. The following sections will deal with the means by which Nasution and his allies endeavored to institutionalize their control and by which they eventually worked their own replacement.