

THE PETA AND MY RELATIONS WITH THE JAPANESE:  
A CORRECTION OF SUKARNO'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY\*

Raden Gatot Mangkupradja

I was lying in bed feeling the effects of the medicine recently injected into my body by Dr. Sie Wie Boo. Suddenly there was the voice of a guest, and after knocking at the door Brother Rasiban came into my room.

He took a seat near my bed, and after inquiring as to my health he said, holding up a volume, "Well, Pak Gatot, I've just received this book--Bung Karno's autobiography--from my son Supena. Please read it, Pak Gatot, and see if what Mrs. Cindy Adams has written is correct. And . . . above all see if what Bung Karno has told her is true. Your name is often mentioned in the book."

"Brother Rasiban," I said. "I've heard of this book before and of my name often being mentioned in it. But I've never seen a copy, let alone read it. How could I possibly afford a book which costs two hundred and twenty-five rupiah? Thank you for it anyway," I added, "I'll read it."

On that day, however, I did not feel at all like reading; only on the next did I begin. As usual, I skimmed through the book, skipping the pages which did not catch my attention, before I settled down to a more careful reading. From this superficial glance I was able to see that Bung Karno had not told the entire truth. He had put forward as facts things he had only made up, and he had exaggerated in places. Indeed, he had gone so far as to distort facts, one of which deeply disturbed me.

In Chapter 22, "What Price Freedom," Bung Karno unashamedly stated that he completed his working program by setting up the PETA;<sup>1</sup> and elsewhere he said that he had proposed me, Gatot Mangkupradja, to the Japanese to start the PETA. Frankly speaking, I was deeply hurt by this unreasonable claim. I had regarded Bung Karno as a great man, and it was unbelievable to me

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\* As readers may be unfamiliar with the period of Indonesia's history described in this account, the editors have supplied footnotes explaining some of the terms used and incidents referred to.

1. Sukarno actually says that the setting up of the PETA completed the second part of his working program, i.e., the arming of the people (p. 186).

that he should have been so extraordinarily selfish as to claim for his own what others had done. I do not mean to boast. Far from it. Nor do I want praise and honor. I do not want to be called a leader or a hero; I would rather have had no mention whatever of my name and of PETA in Indonesia's history. But I do not want anyone else to claim as his own work what I myself did, not even if that person were a general or a commander-in-chief or a president or a king. The proposal to set up a volunteer "Fatherland Defence Corps" and a "Hizbullah Corps" was one I made to the Japanese military regime through its general staff, the Sambō Beppan,<sup>2</sup> and I staked my life on its success. I did this because I did not wish to see *conscription* introduced into Indonesia, as had been proposed by the Djawa Hōkōkai,<sup>3</sup> which, under the leadership of Bung Karno and Bung Hatta, had sent in a petition to that effect to General Harada.<sup>4</sup>

It is only in order to counter the distortion of historical fact regarding the Fatherland Defence Corps that I resolved to write this *correction*. I write it not to degrade Bung Karno, but to place the historical facts in their proper perspective.

My humble greetings to the Reader,

Gatot Mangkupradja

Bandung, 20 April 1967.

### The Independence Movement

I was born in Sumedang on December 15, 1898. My father was a very well-known doctor in the Priangan, Raden Mohamad Saleh Mangkupradja. At the time of my birth he was fulfilling his contract as government doctor for the civilian and military population; after completing his service in 1910 he practiced medicine in Bandung. He became famous because, in addition to using pharmaceutical medicines and drugs in his practice, he also employed materials derived from herbs growing in Indonesia.

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2. Sambo Beppan, better known as the Beppan, was the Special Task Unit within the 16th Army HQ which was responsible for counter-intelligence and special operations. It was headed until July 1945 by Lieutenant-Colonel Masugi.
  3. Djawa Hokokai was the last and most effective of the mass organizations instituted by the Japanese for the mobilization of the population of Java behind the war effort. It was set up in March 1944.
  4. Lieutenant-General Harada commanded the 16th Army occupying Java from November 1942 to April 1945.

He made experiments and left behind a good many recipes, which I have kept until now. He earned so much money as a doctor that he was able to buy houses, ricefields, and other real estate; he even ran a long-distance taxi service which established connections with the railway line that ran between Tandjung Sari, Tjirebon, and Kadipaten. On his death, my father left a large estate, which was divided among his six children.

In 1905 I began a Dutch-style primary education (Europeesche Lagere School) in Bandung. I finished in 1913, and the same year I began my studies at the school for Indonesian doctors (STOVIA) at Weltevreden, now a part of Djakarta. Once there I became a leader in the Langen Siswa Weltevreden and also joined in setting up the Pagujuban Pasundan, together with other Sundanese STOVIA students, among them Kusumah Sudjana, Djundjunan, Slamet, Hidajat, Kusma, Daeng Ardiwinata, and E. Purawinata.

I left the STOVIA at the third form, and in 1917 began to study at the senior high school (HBS) in Bandung. There I was active in the Bond Inheemsche Studeerenden, under the leadership of Brother Wiwoho. This group united student organizations of the OSVIA (school for Indonesian administrators), Kweekschools (teacher training schools), and the HBS; it fused into Jong Java in 1920. I pursued my HBS studies also to the third form, and in 1922 I began to work in the railway service under the administration of Ir. F. Querin den Hollander, a very kind and prudent engineer, who was extremely nice to me.

I might point out here that the picture Bung Karno gives in his autobiography of relations between the Dutch and Indonesians seems to me much exaggerated. He said, for example, that Dutch children liked to spit at him. This is unlikely: the Europeans disapproved very much of spitting, and when any of us school-children spat, the others would say "Foei" (Fie!). Moreover, he is not right in saying that Dutch pupils did not have to pay school fees; all school-children did, both Indonesians and Dutch, unless they were considered "badly off."

Bung Karno also claimed that he had once proposed to marry the daughter of a Dutchman, Mr. Hessels, who not only dismissed him rudely but also insulted him. I think this story was made up by Bung Karno to indulge his hatred of the nation which once dominated Indonesia. How could a boy still studying at HBS ask for a lady's hand? If he did so, as he described, one would not blame Mr. Hessels for being angry. A young woman is not merchandise; the parents should first be well acquainted with their future son-in-law. Especially among the Europeans or Eurasians there must first be a period of engagement, and this only after the parents of the two parties have approved of it. The proposal of marriage should be preceded by the parents' agreement and then should be made in a formal way and not like buying something from a store. Bung Karno's statement only shows he did not know etiquette, and Mr. Hessels' response most probably

was: "Zeg, jongeman, wie ben je?" Wie zijn je ouders? Ken je geen manieren? Er uit--ga uit mijn oogen, voor er wat gebeurt--onbeschofte kerel." (I say, young man, who are you? Who are your parents? Don't you know your manners? Get out--out of my sight, before something happens--impudent rascal.")

Bung Karno also said that Dutch youngsters did not pay the least attention to their Indonesian classmates, and when they did it was only to speak rudely to them. This is not true. I myself associated with boys and girls of both Dutch-Indonesian and full Dutch blood, and we all got along well together. I remember that around 1921, after I had left the HBS in Bandung, several Dutch friends of mine who had continued their studies at the Technical School (now the Bandung Institute of Technology) wanted to visit the sugar factory in Kadipaten together with their professors. Some students came to my house and asked me to join them, as they knew that I had my own car; and of course I went with these future engineers to Kadipaten. In 1927 I met a former classmate, Haga, who had sat at the same desk in school with me; he had become head of a Residency in Central Java. I also met up again with an old friend, Frits James, who had become the manager of a sugar factory at Djatipiring. I'll mention, too, Ir. Bosman, president-director of BPM, who warmly received me at his house at Gambir 64 in 1953, eight years after the proclamation of Indonesian independence; he still regarded me in the same friendly way he used to. I had the same cordial relations with Dalmeyer from the BPM, who is now living in The Hague. There were many among the Dutch who gave support to the Indonesian struggle for independence: I could name Meyer, Sleebos, Chateline, Ir. Wiedenhoff, De la Fosse, Everts, Jhr. van der Goest, and Koperberg, all of whom held important positions.

In the railway service, I worked as a senior clerk. I belonged to the railroad workers' union, VSTP, which the Communist leader Semaun headed. The trouble in 1923 which Bung Karno mentions as receiving so much attention in the newspapers was not, incidentally, Hadji Hassan's incident in Garut as he says, but the VSTP strike that took place that year. The police were busy searching for Semaun in Garut, as he had been living in that town, namely on Djalan Pangampaan in the house of my uncle, who worked as a teacher of signals in the railway service in Bandung at that time. After the strike I was moved to Djakarta, where I worked for the railroad inspectorate.

In 1926 family matters compelled me to ask for my resignation from the railway. I did not have to work to earn my living, my means of subsistence being more than sufficient because of the income from ricefields, real estate, and taxis. On my return to Bandung I became involved in the Study Club that had been established there by Indonesian nationalists. In 1927 I became a member of the Perserikatan (later Partai) Nasional Indonesia, which at that time had Mr. Usman Sastroamidjojo as

its chairman, and Ribut at its secretary; the other executive members were Ir. Sukarno, Dr. Samsi, Ir. Anwari, Mr. Sartono, and Apandi Widadibrata. The following year I became secretary of the party, Ir. Sukarno was made chairman, Mr. Iskaq first secretary, and Mr. Sartono first treasurer. After that my personal relations with Bung Karno were close and I knew very well the state of his affairs.

There are a number of things which Bung Karno has claimed regarding the development of the nationalist movement which I believe are not true. For example, he says that one day in 1922, when he was still a student at the Bandung Technical School, he cut his classes and went south of Bandung, where he met with a peasant. The peasant's name was Marhaen, and it was from his conversation with this man that Bung Karno got the idea of "Marhaenism." This is not so. The term "Marhaen" was coined by Sukarno in 1928 after the establishment of the PNI. At first the term Kromo had been much in vogue to refer to the common man; for women the term was Kasinem. Marhaenism was used specifically to distinguish between proletarianism, which is based on class struggle as taught by Marx, and the union of people of different classes fighting against colonialism, as this was experienced in Indonesia. It meant the union of the whole nation, which is broader than just the union of the proletariat. The term "Marhaenism" only became popular, then, after 1928.

Bung Karno is also wrong in saying that one could not mention the name "Indonesia" or encourage others to do so. There was no penalty attached to the use of that name. However, after the establishment of the Indonesian Party (Partindo), when Amir Sjarifuddin struck up the slogan "Indonesia Merdeka--Sekarang" (Indonesia Free, Now!) the word "merdeka," free, was prohibited. That was after the 1932 Partindo congress at Gang Kenari in Djakarta. Again, Bung Karno said that he used the term "Guided Nationalism" in 1926. Actually, up to 1929, he used the term "Positive Nationalism," and after the establishment of the Partindo he used "Socio-Nationalism and Socio-Democracy," the term "socio-" having been taken from the ideas expressed by Ki Hadjar Dewantoro at the Taman Siswa congress in Jogjakarta.

Bung Karno also said that he had suggested uniforms for the nationalists. This, too, is not so. Indeed, he denounced the wearing of uniforms as resembling the practice of the Balilla troops of fascist Italy and the Hitler Jugend of Nazi Germany. Uniforms were worn by the Surya Wirawan formation of the Parindra, the JOP of Pasundan, and by the youth of the Al Itihadiatul Islamiah in Sukabumi.

On October 29, 1928, Bung Karno said, he officially instituted the slogan "One Nation, One Country, One Language." In fact, the slogan was struck up by representatives at the

congress of Indonesia Muda that year, led by Mohamad Yamin, Amir Sjarifuddin, Asaat Datuk Muda, Anta Permana, Yusuf Adi, Sukiman, A. K. Gani, and others. We of the adult group merely witnessed this and endorsed the slogan. The national anthem, "Indonesia Raya," was also introduced then, with some last-minute alterations. Just before the congress Rudolf Wage Supratman, the composer, and Mr. Sujudi (an enthusiastic piano-player; Supratman, like Sartono, played the violin) changed the 4/4 measure into 3/4 and later into 1/2. They also used the words "Indonesia Raja Merdeka Merdeka" instead of the original "Indonesia Raja--Indoja, Indoja."

Bung Karno says that he was the popularizer of the petji. Well, well!--hadn't there been such a cap before Bung Karno wore it? The black velvet caps had been brought over by Malays via Padang and Palembang. First they became popular in the area of Djakarta and later in the interior, especially West Java, where by 1905 men had begun to have their hair cut and to wear the petji, which was also called the koptjah or kopiah. In Bandung, as far as I can remember, the wearing of this Malay cap was pioneered by the families of Tjik Hadji Abdul Sjukur, Tjik Hadji Adjis, and Hadji Anang Tajib, all wealthy jewel merchants. Afterwards the cap became popular among young men who were earning their living as traders and among the hadjis in the town of Bandung.

Some corrections should also be made in the description of the PNI organization by Bung Karno. He said, for one thing, that Bandung was divided into several organizational sectors. That is not correct: the city and regency of Bandung formed one branch (tjabang). Below this were the sector (sektor), on the ketjamaton level, the local (ressort), equivalent to the village (desa), and finally the block (blok) or segment of the local.

Bung Karno claimed, in describing his activities in the PNI, that he often had to hold important secret talks in the back of an automobile. This is a fiction; although each of us was continually followed by two detectives and our houses were watched by police agents, there was no reason to hold conversations in the back of cars; it was perfectly possible to meet at home or in the office. It is also certainly not true, as Bung Karno claimed, that the PNI used a brothel for meetings and that in Bandung it had 670 members who were whores. The fact is that one or two reformed prostitutes who had married joined the PNI together with their husbands. We were most cautious about admitting prostitutes and gamblers, who might endanger the organization by giving it a bad name. Every member, man or woman, was screened, and as PNI secretary I always gave orders to the party commissioners to be very careful in their acceptance of candidate members. Before admitting a person as a full member, he had to be a candidate for three months. Then he would be voted on after

being checked by a committee consisting of the leaders of the branch, local, and block involved, and after being vouched for by two full members. Anyway, how could one unite and coordinate 670 prostitutes without one's fellow party members and other political rivals knowing?

As the party had not enough money to pay for its printing, meeting-hall, and propaganda expenses, I gladly gave it financial support; and since I did not have other sources of income I gradually sold the wealth left behind by my father in the form of ricefields, real estate, and cars in Sumedang. From 1929 to 1931 I was imprisoned, having been arrested with Ir. Sukarno in Jogjakarta in December 1929. I was amnestied in October 1931. When I got out of Sukamiskin jail I joined the Partindo and was appointed secretary of its central executive and commissioner for the province of West Java. In order to meet household and party expenses, I finally sold my favorite cars. In 1933, after Bung Karno had published his book Mentjapai Indonesia Merdeka, and the party had succeeded in acquiring many young cadres, I asked to resign, and, as the needs of my household were urgent, I opened a pharmacy at Djalan Raya 22 in Bandung.

Regarding his period of exile Bung Karno said, "Don't let anyone dare say that he gave me financial support when I was at Endeh." Everything, he claimed, was a result of his personal effort. Why did Bung Karno say this? His friends who contributed to his support in the form of money or medicine sent to Mrs. Inggit Garnasih would not ask Bung Karno to pay back what they had given him. His statement implies that Bung Karno has abandoned his sense of gratitude towards his friends, country, and people for the sake of his personal fame and ambition.

After I opened the pharmacy, I began to have business relations with importers from Holland, Germany, and Japan, as I needed chemicals for medicine, wrapping materials, bottles, boxes, and so on. Among others I had to do with Isamij (one of the Borsumij affiliates), Fa. Steinmetz (the agency for Bayer), Hirai, and Wakamoto Takeda. In October 1933 I went to Japan, together with a group led by Mr. Parada Harahap, in order to establish relations with Japanese industrialists. And as things would have it, in early December that year the first Pan-Asiatic Congress was held in Tokyo, and I attended it by telling the committee that I was an Indonesian representative. At the congress I got acquainted with a number of leaders, among them Dr. Suzuki, the chairman of the congress, Genji Motsizuki of Kokumin Dōmei, Mr. Iwata of Minseito, and Mr. Ishihara, Marquis Tokugawa, and several generals, among them General Araki and General Itagaki. I also visited the home of Mr. Ras Behari Bose and the home of Mr. Sahai; and I met with Mr.

Aguinaldo from the Philippines. I got the impression that the Japanese were seriously determined to see that *Asia is for the Asians*, and after my return to Indonesia I immediately made contact with the Japanese running shops in Bandung, Jogja, and Solo, and managing plantations in Garut and Tjiandjur.

The prospect of a Pacific War had always been used by the PNI as something to excite people at mass meetings; it was taken from an English magazine--if I am not mistaken the London News--which contained a book review of a work by an English admiral. In his book, the English admiral had guessed there would be an outbreak of war in the Pacific because of the struggle for power between Japan and the USA. In 1932 the Japanese had made a motion picture which showed the progress of their armed forces; it was preceded by a cartoon which showed an arm stretching out to grip Asia and this arm being shot away by a cannon from a warship flying the Japanese flag, the flag of the rising sun.

Although I did not take an active part in political organizations when I returned, I was often seen visiting Japanese shops, and I therefore did not escape from the eyes of the political police. Often enough the police agents, among others Mr. Djanakum, Mr. Rachmat, and Mr. Sambas, would come to my store not only to buy medicine but to ask for my personal views on Japan.

In order to avoid unnecessary trouble I made up my mind to move to some other town, and my choice fell on Tjiandjur, where I opened a pharmacy, the Indische Kruidenhandel "De Erven van Dr. Saleh" (Indies Herb Shop "The Heirs of Dr. Saleh"). I also established branches in Sukabumi, Purwakarta, and Bandung. In 1935 I moved my family to Tjiandjur. We lived there at Bihbul in the desa of Nagrak, which was located in the middle of the ricefields about three kilometers from town. I had to live in the country, for the medicinal ingredients I dealt in had to be dried in the sun and then pounded. In town there was no yard large enough for drying the herbs while in the countryside, among the ricefields, there was ample room for this.

I became chairman of the Tjiandjur branch of the Pagujuban Pasundan and concurrently served as vice chairman of the Tjiandjur Muhammadiyah. I also made the acquaintance in this period of Mr. Takeomi Togashi, a Japanese storekeeper whose shop was situated next to mine on Djalan Raya, Tjiandjur. I was to have many acquaintances among the Japanese military, for a good deal of the Japanese who opened shops in Java were actually military personnel.

In 1942 the Pacific War broke out, and in March of that year the Japanese army landed in Java. One day we learned that the Japanese forces had entered Tjibeureum; the Dutch troops

stationed at Tjirandjang and the British under General Shilling had retreated as far as Bandung. All of a sudden, several friends of mine came round and asked me to go to the Regent of Tjiandjur, as some Japanese officers disguised in Indonesian clothes had arrived at his place, among them my neighbor Mr. Togashi. On my arrival at the Regent's residence I met Mr. Togashi, who introduced me to Lieutenant Yanagawa and to Captain Nagata, who was leading the Japanese troops together with Captain Shigeno. Then and there, in front of many people, Mr. Togashi said, "Well, Mr. Gatot, before very long Indonesia will surely be free. Now, however, we are still at war; I hope you are prepared to help us." All who heard this became excited and cried, "Hidup, hidup! Merdeka, merdeka!" (Hooray, hooray! Liberty, liberty!), and shortly after that the people brought out Red-and-White flags, which they hung everywhere.

Mr. Togashi told me that he was going to Bandung straight away and that if I wanted to see him again I must come to the Concordia building in that city. Several days later, Brother Winoto came to me from Sukabumi and asked me to accompany him to Bandung. As I had been given a surat djalan (a letter or document issued to a person by the local military authority giving him permission to travel), by Captain Nagata, I went to Bandung by car together with Brother Winoto and several young men in order to meet Mr. Togashi and Mr. Yanagawa at the Concordia.

That afternoon Mr. Togashi invited me to his home on Djalan Wastukentjana (the mansion later occupied by the Siliwangi Division commander Ibrahim Adjie). In that house I was introduced to several more Japanese officers. In the evening after dinner I was brought in a car to Djalan Embong 17. This had been my home before I moved to Tjiandjur, and it was now occupied by my younger brother, Raden Gunawan, who worked for the radio, post, and telegraph service.

The next day I returned to Tjiandjur. All of us had gotten surat djalan from Mr. Yanagawa, and at Tjiandjur I asked a Chinese to tell me what mine said, as it was written in Kanji. The man, whose name was Wong Yun Kong, told me that it was a very important paper, for with it I could go anywhere without being anxious about being detained by Japanese soldiers. From its seal it was evident that the officer who signed it was from the Sambō Beppan, a body which was more authoritative than the Kempeitai.<sup>5</sup>

I maintained my connections with the Sambō Beppan officers. Occasionally I spent the night in Bandung, if not on Djalan Wastukentjana then at Djalan Merdeka 28, the huge former residence

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5. Military Police.

of Dr. Weycherheld Bisdom, and Japanese officers often came to Tjiandjur. During the Japanese occupation my association was, therefore, not with Japanese civilians but with military personnel. I was frequently invited to go with them to such places as Ujung Genteng, Pelabuhan Ratu, Tjisolok, Mira-Maree, and Djampang; I accompanied Lieutenant N. Narusawa particularly often.

Running a drugstore was now getting more and more difficult because it was hard to get pharmaceutical ingredients. The result was that my drugstores in Purwakarta, Sukabumi, and Bogor had to be closed down, while in Bandung only the one on Djalan Dalam Kaum remained open. Those that remained in business sold mainly traditional remedies (djamu). I began to earn my living instead by dealing in sheet rubber together with Brother A. A. Achsien. We shipped the rubber to Djakarta and Surabaja. It became harder and harder for people to survive as the Japanese military administration bought up the rice. The enthusiasm which had prevailed on the arrival of the Japanese army began to fade, especially when the Japanese civilians and private entrepreneurs joined in the administration and dominated the economy.

In 1942 I became local chairman of the AAA, which was led by Mr. Sjamsuddin; but it was soon dissolved by the Japanese.<sup>6</sup> About the middle of 1942 there was news that Bung Karno had been brought to Djakarta from Bengkulu by way of Padang and Palembang; he was asked to lead the Putera (Pusat Tenaga Rakjat, or Center of People's Strength). In Tjiandjur, however, the Putera could not get under way, for after the dispersal of the AAA no one there would join any movement at all. I had already asked Mr. Yanagawa for information about the Putera, and he advised me not to join it. This seems odd, as it had been inspired by Beppan officers. However, the Shimizu group from the Gunseikanbu (Civil Administration) supported it and many from the Gunsireikanbu (Military Administration) group did not.<sup>7</sup> On

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6. The AAA or Triple-A was the first of the "mass" organizations set up by the Japanese on the island of Java. It was formed in April 1942 under the young Parindra leader Mr. Sjamsuddin, with the backing of the Japanese propaganda expert Shimizu. It was replaced by the Putera organization in March 1943, though it had become defunct by October 1942. The name derived from the three capital letters "A" in the well-known slogan of the movement: "Japan, the Leader of Asia, Japan, the Protector of Asia, Japan, the Light of Asia."
  7. The Gunseikanbu was actually the office of the Military Administrator of Java, who was, throughout the occupation, the Chief-of-Staff of the 16th Army. It became the general term for the military administration of the island; many Japanese civilians, including Shimizu, served within it. The Gunsireikanbu was the 16th Army Headquarters, concerned with strictly military affairs. The Gunseikan served within the Gunsireikanbu in his capacity as Chief-of-Staff.

hearing this advice, I contacted my friends in Sukabumi and Bogor and advised them not to join the Putera; and the result was that no Putera units were established in the regions of Bogor, Sukabumi, and Tjiandjur. Even after the Putera was changed into the Djawa Hōhōkai (also called the Pusat Kobaktian Rakjat, or Center of People's Service) under the leadership of Bung Karno, Bung Hatta, Kiai H. Mansur, and K. H. Dewantoro, the Bogor Shū (Residency) remained without it.

News About the Proposal for  
Conscription in Indonesia

Owing to the hard times, many young men joined the Heihō, or auxiliary troops directly under the Keibitai (Japanese army).<sup>8</sup> From the village of Nagrak several young men did this. After some time their families grew anxious, hearing nothing of them or their whereabouts. Their fears spread throughout the village. I often asked Sergeant Hoshino, who was stationed in Tjiandjur, for an explanation, but he knew nothing about it.

About the beginning of September 1943, the Bandung newspaper Tjahaja published the news that while in Tokyo one of the Indonesian dignitaries then visiting Japan, Mr. Raden Sutardjo Kartohadikusumo, had asked the Japanese government to institute compulsory military service in Indonesia in order to support Dai Nippon in its effort to win the Greater East Asia War. A copy of the paper was brought to my house in Bihbul by Brother R. Kuswaja Hardjakusumah and Brother Junus (Supervisor of Public Works). We could only regret Mr. Sutardjo's proposal, which had been welcomed warmly in Bandung by the Regent, R. A. A. Wiranatakusumah, who even declared himself ready to send two of his sons into the conscript army. I found the plan in conflict with the teachings and views of the Indonesian Nationalist Party on conscription. In the colonial period Bung Karno himself, while leading the PNI in Bandung, had argued against conscription on the grounds that: (1) conscription is something forced upon a subject people; (2) for an independent state, conscription is obviously beneficial, as it provides forces which can fight for the sake of the country; (3) for a subject people, military service means supporting and reinforcing the position of the colonialists; (4) even though the young man is unwilling and his father forbids it, a conscript must join the army, and if he refuses he may be sentenced to two long years; and (5) conscript soldiers are under the regular army and may be sent abroad, away from their native land.

We discussed the matter among ourselves, and finally I decided that it would be much better to suggest a system of voluntary military service, even though the fate of the young men who

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8. The Keibitai were actually Garrison Guards.

entered it might be no better than if they had been conscripted. At least those who did not wish to enter would not be compelled to do so, and likewise, if parents were unwilling, their sons would not be taken away. For this reason I wrote a letter the next day to Mr. Raden Bratanata, the editor of Tjahaja, asking him to print my views objecting to the introduction of conscription in the light of the fact that volunteer forces would be much more suitable for Indonesia. I wrote only briefly, without elaboration.

The very next day after my letter was published, a soldier from the Sukabumi Kempeitai came to my house and asked me to accompany him to Sukabumi; there I was brought to the Kempeitai office and detained. As the Kempeitaichō<sup>9</sup> and some of his subordinate officers knew that I had had much to do with Sambō Beppan officers, I was not treated rudely. On the contrary, I was even quartered in the house of Sergeant Kobayashi. After several days I was interrogated by the Kempeitaichō, Mr. Ichizaki, with Mrs. Milbraadt Miller acting as interpreter. Among other things, he asked if I had written anything in the Tjahaja and whether I was unwilling to support Nippon or perhaps was even opposed to Nippon. I told him that I wanted to support Nippon and was not in the least *against* Nippon. I only preferred a volunteer corps, since during a war only very brave young men joined armies of their own free will.

I then told him that after the war in Europe had broken out in 1939, the Netherlands East Indies administration had set up various forces in Java: (1) a territorial militia (Landwacht); (2) a city militia (Stadswacht); (3) a volunteer training corps (Vrijwilliger Oefencorps, VOC); (4) a corps of reserve officers (Korps Reserve-Officieren, KORO); (5) an emergency military academy; (6) an air raid alert service (Luchtbeschermingsdienst); (7) air raid protection organizations for rural areas, run by the civil administration and police; and (8) a system of conscription (militieplicht). I myself, I said, had been appointed deputy head of the air raid protection organization in the town of Tjiandjur under the leadership of Mr. Lodens. Its central office had been headed by Mr. van der Wetering. I said that all of this had been forced on the Indonesians by the Dutch. Thus, when the Japanese soldiers landed on Java our people had everywhere thrown away their guns and uniforms and headed back to their villages. Together with the assistant wedana of Tjugenang and Tjikalong, I had collected the carbines which they had thrown away in the tea plantations at Kiarapajung, Tjimatis, and Tjugenang. That was the reason why I had asked for volunteers and not for conscripts. The Kempeitaichō nodded

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9. Kempeitaichō--chief of the local branch of the Kempeitai. It should be noted that the Kempeitai and the Beppan formed separate hierarchies within the military, often in rivalry with one another.

musingly and then made a telephone call, to whom I do not know.

Early in the afternoon I was taken back home to Tjiandjur. There I was surrounded by many friends and neighbors, who asked me how I felt. They all thought I had been tortured. I also learned that after I had been taken away to Sukabumi my wife had immediately gone to Bandung and visited Mr. Togashi to ask his help. The next day I received a telephone call from Regent R. A. Abbas Surianata Atmadja, saying that I was asked to go to Djakarta to meet Mr. M. Yanagawa at his office.

That very day I said goodbye to my wife and set off for Djakarta. I went to stay at the house of Mr. R. Mohammad Jasin, chief of the Djakarta police, who lived at Djalan Kramat 11. The following day I went to the Beppan office at Gambir 64, where I found Mr. Yanagawa and other Japanese officers already waiting for me. They brought me to Major-General Sato, the chief of staff, who was meeting with some of his officers. Major-General Sato asked me the same questions that had been posed by the Kempeitaichō at Sukabumi, and I gave the same answers. He then asked me whether I would be prepared to receive my punishment, if no one was willing to join the volunteer forces.

On leaving home I had determined to bear all the consequences of my stand, as I wanted to see Indonesian youths saved from compulsory induction into the army. If they became victims of their own free will it was a different matter. At that time I only wanted to prevent coercion. After a lengthy interrogation, I was finally allowed to return to the home of Mr. Mohammad Jasin, but was told to present myself again at the office the next day. I was taken home in a car by Mr. Nagashima, a junior officer who was already very good at Indonesian. On the way he confided to me that Lieutenant Yanagawa was very much in agreement with the formation of a volunteer force as I proposed, but that several officers were still doubtful.

The next morning, having arrived at the Beppan office again, I was asked to call on Major-General Sato. He told me that he understood my intentions, and asked me to write letters of request which would be sent to the Gunseikan Kaka and the Gun-sireikan Kaka. I was then taken to the office of Captain Maruzaki, where pen and ink had been prepared for me. In front of Lieutenant Yanagawa and Captain Maruzaki, I once more stated the seriousness of my proposal and my personal dedication to the establishment of the volunteer corps.<sup>10</sup> And in order to prove to them my personal dedication I pricked my left arm with the pen until it bled and then *with this blood* I wrote a letter of request to the Government of Dai Nippon in Tokyo.

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10. Maruzaki and Yanagawa were both original members of the Beppan.

Who Was M. Yanagawa?

Mr. M. Yanagawa was a Japanese officer who, when he came to Java, was a first lieutenant. He belonged to the members of the General Staff who were first landed on Java via Merak, together with Mr. T. Togashi, my Japanese friend who had lived in Tjiandjur, and Captain Nagata. It was he and his staff who cleared the way for the Nipponese forces via Leuwiliang, Patjet, Tjibeureum, and Tjiandjur up to Bandung. I first got to know him during the invasion of Tjiandjur. Thereafter I often came to his residence on Djalan Wastukentjana in Bandung; Mr. Togashi, too, often invited me to his office at the Sambō Beppan headquarters on Djalan Wastukentjana.

I did not concern myself then with Mr. Yanagawa's official position or function, but came to his house in order to pay him a social visit or to have a meal. One day he told me that he was moving to Djalan Merdeka where Mr. Tjusumi and Mr. Narusawa were also staying. So I became well acquainted with these gentlemen, who often called on me at home in the hamlet of Bihbul on their way to Djakarta.

On a later visit to Bandung, I saw Indonesian youths in the spacious backyard of the house where Mr. Yanagawa was staying. According to Mr. Narusawa, he had started to give these young men military training. I did not attach importance to this at the time. However, one day Mr. Yanagawa elaborately explained to me that he was seriously interested in the Indonesians' desire for national independence and that he was prepared to lend his support to it. We then began to talk about the Indonesian independence movement. I told him that I had once been to Japan and had joined in the Pan-Asiatic Congress in Tokyo. I also told him that I had acquaintances among the circles of the Pan-Asiatic movement.

Mr. Yanagawa frankly and openly explained that not all Japanese were of one opinion on the matter, but he himself wanted very much to help. He said that in order to achieve their desire for national independence, the Indonesian people had first of all to be made strong and possess a great, flaming spirit. Since Mr. Yanagawa could not speak Indonesian well, it was very difficult for him to explain what he felt; but I was able to see that he greatly regretted the fact that among the Indonesians there were many who were weak and poor-spirited with little "seizin." They had to be aroused.

Mr. Yanagawa also explained that Indonesia had to possess a strong army of her own. For me, this statement of his was most unclear. How could Indonesia acquire her own army, when she had been under the domination of a foreign power so long? Those who did become soldiers had always served as subordinates, and power remained in the hands of those who ruled.

One day Mr. Narusawa came to Tjiandjur and asked me to help him look for some young men who were willing and able to undergo military instruction in Bandung. I promised to do so, and from several ketjamatan I sent a number of young men to Bandung for basic training at Djalan Merdeka. I had no further interest in this training effort; sometimes when in Bandung I joined in and sometimes I simply looked on. Each of us went his own way. I devoted myself to small business, until one day Tjahaja published the news of Mr. Sutardjo Kartohadikusumo's proposal for *conscription* and I responded as I have related above.

Thus, when I proposed the formation of the Volunteer Army for the Defense of the Fatherland (Tentara Sukarelawan Pembela Tanah Air, PETA) at the Beppan office at Gambir 64, Djakarta, two ideas met. I proposed the formation of the PETA because my conscience could not approve of compulsory military service for Indonesia; and Mr. Yanagawa saw in my proposal a way to bring about his ideal of an army that would enable Indonesia to defend herself. This was why Mr. Yanagawa immediately gave his full support to my petition to form the PETA.

After my proposal had been accepted by the Japanese government and its execution authorized, Mr. Yanagawa and his staff arranged all matters of administration, organization, tactics, and strategy, including the formation of the three Igokimutai and even the setting up of the Hizbullah force. All important roles were wholly in the hands of Mr. Yanagawa (he was by then a Captain) and his staff; I merely served as proposer, promotor, and sometimes as assistant.

Frankly, I must confess that as a soldier, Mr. Yanagawa was more far-seeing than I was in welcoming and later in serving the cause of Indonesian independence and nationhood. I gave too much emphasis to the strength of masses, relying on their flaming spirit and zeal to carry out the independence struggle, while Yanagawa, in addition to the strength of the masses, relied on creating a core force of steeled discipline and skill in matters of war, which could produce, maintain, and develop Independence. This core force was to be the "pushing power" which would bring forth leadership and undying zeal. This idea became a reality during our struggle against the Dutch. Without this core force, Leader and Provider of a Steeleed Spirit, the civilians could not have prevailed against the Dutch. It was thanks to the endurance of the Armed Forces that the Dutch were finally forced to transfer sovereignty to the Indonesian people. And this has to be recognized by the Indonesian politicians.

After the formation of the PETA, which was called *Bōei Giyugun* in Japanese, Mr. Yanagawa and I continued our cooperation on a basis of mutual understanding. After the Japanese surrendered, we met again at the internment camp at Benda, and again at the Glodok prison. Whenever anyone mentions the PETA, he should remember the name of Captain M. Yanagawa, who was its

guiding spirit. He is still alive, and, as one who never forgets a friend, has been to my house in Bandung several times.

#### Something Quite Unknown to Many People

When I submitted my proposal for setting up the PETA and received full support from Sambō Beppan officers, especially Mr. Yanagawa, Captain Maruzaki said he still had doubts as to whether many people would join the volunteer army. His personal experience on landing at Merak and passing through Leuwiliang, Djasinga, Bogor, and the Puntjak had been that the Netherlands Indies soldiers retreated, many of them taking off their uniforms and throwing away their weapons. A bet was therefore made between Mr. Maruzaki and Mr. Yanagawa, which was:

If the Bōei Giyūgun proved to be a success,  
Mr. Maruzaki would cut off one of his own  
fingers and vice versa.

When the PETA proved indeed to be a success, Mr. Maruzaki, witnessed by his fellow officers, cut off his little finger with his own Samurai sword.

#### The Status of the Volunteer Troops

After I handed over my petition to the Japanese government in Djakarta, I went to the editor of Indonesia Raya, Raden Sukardjo Wirjopranoto, who published the petition in his newspaper. Local newspapers in other cities took it over from Indonesia Raya.

As I did not yet know anything about military matters, I went to the Djawa Hōkōkai office on Djalan Geredja Theresia in order to ask for further advice on my project from its leaders. But they all kept silent. Indeed, Sartono said to me, "Dat is jow eigen zaak" (That's your business!). As for Bung Karno, I could not get in touch with him at all. So I made up my mind to see Hadji Agus Salim, an intellectual who might possibly know something about military affairs. He promised to help, and asked me to go and see Mr. Supangkat, a lawyer, who lived on Djalan Tanah Abang.

Whereas I felt like crying on leaving the Djawa Hōkōkai office I now felt very much elated, and went straight to the house of Mr. Supangkat, who happened to be at home. I told him of my proposal to form a corps of volunteers and asked him what I should do next. I told him that I had received various letters and postcards from people who were ready and willing to join the corps. Mr. Supangkat, who said he had already read all about it in Indonesia Raya, suggested that I submit another

proposal urging that the volunteer troops later become an Army of National Defense that would fight within the borders of Indonesia. I therefore asked him to prepare that supplementary letter of petition, which he wrote in English. In the letter we pleaded that the volunteer corps should be a Volunteer Army for the Defense of the Fatherland, which could later become Indonesia's National Army.

Carrying this supplementary letter of petition, I went to the Beppan office at Gambir 64 to find Mr. Yanagawa, who happened to be there with Captain I-ie, and I handed him the letter. From the Beppan office I went to the Karuhun pharmacy at Kramat to meet my friend Johan Diponegoro, who warmly welcomed me. With Johan was another friend of mine, Surjadi, the commander of the Djakarta branch of the Indonesian National Scout movement (Kepanduan Bangsa Indonesia, KBI) and the head of the KORA advertising bureau. The three of us agreed to agitate for the volunteer army. The next day I introduced these two friends of mine to Mr. Yanagawa, and for the purpose of our campaign we asked for a letter of testimonial, which Mr. Yanagawa immediately prepared for us.

Through the newspapers we informed people that those who wished to enlist in the Volunteer Army should send in their letters of application to Djalan Kramat 11, Djakarta. Letters of support came from all over. Every week these letters were collected and brought to the Beppan office as "proof" that my proposal had received the enthusiastic support of many people.

About the beginning of October 1943 I received a summons, brought by Mr. Nagashima and Mr. Abdulhamid Ono, which said that my proposal on the formation of the volunteer defense army had been accepted and that I was to present myself at the Beppan office in order to meet General Harada and the Gunseikan, General Yamamoto, to be congratulated. At the General Staff office I heard that Bung Karno would automatically agree and that he would be summoned for this purpose by General Harada. Several days afterwards, I saw in the newspapers the picture of Bung Karno before General Harada, and a report that Bung Karno had agreed to the proposal and would give his support.

At the Beppan office I listened to a discussion to decide on the location of the training units (Kyōikutai and Renseitai), and learned that Bogor had been decided on as the center for this training. Then and there Mr. Yanagawa advised me to move to Bogor once they had found a house in that city for me and my family. In the meantime I had been travelling back and forth between Tjiandjur and Bogor. I joined in organizing the Kyōikutai department of the Renseitai (Training Unit), and was told that Hadji Agus Salim and Mr. Sutan Prang Bustomi had been appointed to help in this. I took part in the first Daidanchō

training course, which began in October.<sup>11</sup> Most of the trainees were religious scholars, teachers, and members of the civil service. Our training was climaxed by a march through Tjibadak-Sukabumi to Tjiandjur and then from Tjiandjur back to Bogor. In all, 81 Daidan were organized, the last of them at Bomo, in the kawedanaan of Rogodjampi, Banjuwangi.

At the end of 1943, Sergeant Koba of the Bogor Kempeitai came to me and told me that a house had been found for me at Djalan Bioskop 15A in that city. I was appointed by the Bogor Shūchōkan (Resident) to give training to Suishintai, Keibōdan, and other officials who were quartered from time to time in Sukasari, Tjampaka, or Tjilendek (Bogor).<sup>12</sup> Very often I asked for Mr. Togashi's assistance in training the Suishintai, Keibōdan, etc. The Suishintai troops later became Barisan Pelopor and Barisan Banteng; they were sponsored by the Djawa Hōkōkai and led by Supeno, Wikana, Sudiro, and others. At first I gave training to Barisan Pelopor people in the Bogor Shū, together with several middle-ranking PETA officers (Chūdanchō, Sjirifin, O. Mochtan, Kosasih, Sukendro, Sabirin, etc.), and later Pelopor forces were trained in every Residency by PETA officers, so that there was a connection between the PETA and the Barisan Pelopor.<sup>13</sup> Once the Saikōsikikan, General Harada, personally witnessed the training at the Seinendōjō camp at Sukasari.<sup>14</sup>

The Bogor Shūchōkan also asked me to organize Rōmusha forces. At first I accepted the position of Rōmukyokuchō (Head of the Office of Labor Affairs), but subsequently my feelings led me to hand this position over to Mr. Sasemita and his friends.<sup>15</sup> I remained as instructor in military affairs, and

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11. Daidanchō was the term for a battalion commander with a rank somewhere between major and lieutenant-colonel. A Daidan was a battalion.
  12. Suishintai (Promotion Corps) was an activist auxiliary of the Hōkōkai, whose members were given elementary training in drill with wooden rifles and assigned various propaganda and civil defense tasks. Keibōdan (Vigilance Corps) was an auxiliary police unit.
  13. Chudanchō was the term for a company commander, next in the hierarchy below the Daidanchō, with a rank roughly equivalent to captain.
  14. Saikōsikikan--Supreme Commander. Seinendōjō (Youth Training School) was a special school to train the select cadres for the inner core of PETA.
  15. The Rōmusha program was notorious as a system of recruiting labor for defense construction projects in Indonesia and mainland Southeast Asia. The recruited laborers were often treated with appalling callousness and inhumanity.

after the Hizbullah and Igokimmu forces were formed at Lembang (Bandung), I concurrently served as assistant instructor for them. I myself held the rank of Tokubetsu Daidanchō, but did not belong to any Daidan.<sup>16</sup> Because I was assigned to training Suishintai troops as well as teaching at the Renseitai, I often travelled outside Bogor.

I also helped form the Igokimmutai forces.<sup>17</sup> They were led by PETA officers who had been trained in Lembang, Salatiga, and Malang to carry out a system of guerrilla warfare as in China, the idea being to form three Kidōbutai (mobile forces) for West, Central, and East Java.<sup>18</sup> In the hills near Tjiater, Salatiga, and Malang, places were prepared for storing equipment and food-stuffs. Instructors were taken from the Kyōikutai and included Lt. Yabe, Abdullah Ono, Lt. Katsura, and Lt. Nagano; assistants, taken from several Daidan, included Chudanchō Sutjipto, the late Sjirifin, Shōdanchō Otje Mochtan, Sukendro, Kosasih, Sabirin, and Moh. Saleh. Most of them are still active in the army, and their ranks are, at the lowest, Colonel or Brigadier-General.<sup>19</sup>

#### The PETA's Name

When the volunteer army was formed it was not called PETA but just Tentara Sukarela. It was only after the middle of 1944 that the change of name occurred, as the result of an initiative by Mr. Oto Iskandardinata and Jusuf Jahja to form a group to support the families of the volunteers (Badan Pembantu Keluarga Pradjurit Pembela Tanah Air). At that time Mr. Oto Iskandardinata began to popularize the name PETA for the volunteer defense army.

Thanks to the constant cultivation of the National Spirit in the PETA barracks by the Daidanchō, Chudanchō, and Shōdanchō,

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16. Hizbullah--Army of Allah--units of Islamic youth given paramilitary training (see below). Tokubetsu Daidanchō--Special Daidanchō.
  17. Igokimmutai--Special Task Force. It appears to have been formed as the result of a split in the Beppan between Lieutenant-Colonel Masugi and Captain Yanagawa, his subordinate. Yanagawa was successful in having the Igokimmutai established under his own command, outside the Beppan hierarchy. The two units were not reunited till Masugi was replaced by Colonel Obana in July 1945. The purpose of the Igokimmutai is explained in the text.
  18. Kidōbutai--shock troops (usually armored).
  19. Shōdanchō--section commander, next in rank below the Chudanchō in the PETA hierarchy, with a rank roughly equivalent to lieutenant.

the PETA could not be Nipponized. Fights between PETA soldiers and Sakura people, and even between PETA and Keibitai troops often took place, e.g., at Tjirandjang, Tjikampek, and Depok, where the Sidōkan received a bad mauling.<sup>20</sup> PETA soldiers' fights with the Keibōdan, who were fond of robbing the common folk of their rice, caused the people to regard them as their defenders. When we returned to our barracks after leave in the country, the villagers brought us all kinds of foodstuffs; they even supplied us with rice, although they themselves were running short. For confirmation of this, just ask Arudji Kartawinata, Muljadi Djojomartono, Kasman Singodimedjo, A. Latief Hendraningrat, Satalaksana, Ibrahim Adjie, General Suharto himself, and others who were PETA soldiers in the Japanese time.

Bung Karno said in his autobiography that he knew beforehand of the intention of the late Shōdanchō Suprijadi from the Blitar PETA to start an uprising against the Japanese. Although it is true that Bung Karno kept his house and family in Blitar, I consider this claim incredible. In fact, at the session of the Chūō Sangi-in of June 18, 1945, Bung Karno condemned the Blitar PETA's revolt.<sup>21</sup> The person who did know of the plans beforehand was Sujono Rahardjo, who was assigned by Suprijadi and Muradi to contact the Daidans in East Java as far West as Madiun and Ponorogo. (He is still in the army and lives in Djakarta.) Suprijadi was very angry at various people from the Blitar Sakura and Sidōkan, as well as the Kempeitai. He originally planned to begin the uprising while a large-scale war exercise was going on at Tuban; but the Japanese, sensing something, suddenly cancelled the exercise just when everything was ready. Up to now no one knows where Suprijadi was killed, because after the uprising at Blitar he headed for Kependjen with his troops in order to make contact with the PETA in Malang. Suprijadi's younger brother Supriatno, who lived for a long time with me when I was in Jogja during the revolution, went back and forth between Jogja and Blitar while organizing guerrilla forces among the people at Ngebruk and Ngoro; but he was unable to find where his elder brother was buried or where he had been killed.

A second clash with the Japanese was set off at the PETA barracks in Njomplon, Sukabumi, by Tjetje Subrata, a schoolteacher

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20. Sidōkan--trainer.

21. Chūō Sangi-in--Central Advisory Council--was the Japanese version of the pre-war Volksraad, a largely impotent pseudo-representative body instituted to give an air of popular participation in an essentially colonial government. The uprising of sections of the Blitar Daidan took place under the leadership of Suprijadi in mid-February 1945. It was mercilessly crushed by the Japanese with the aid of various PETA units.

of Djampang Kulon, just after he had returned from training under the leadership of myself and Shōdancho O. Mochtan. It is most regrettable that Tjetje Subrata afterward became a leader of the Bambu Runtjing and opposed the Indonesian army.

Such, in brief, is the account of the setting up the PETA during the Japanese occupation, for the sake of which I risked my personal wellbeing and life.

I Had No Intention to Sabotage  
or to Revolt

Truly, I had not the slightest idea of launching sabotage efforts or creating an uprising, or undertaking those other endeavors which are called underground activities. Once, when the Japanese army was already in possession of Java, I went to the house of Assistant Resident van der Kamp, who was then about to move to Tjipanas, as his house was to be occupied by Captain Shigeno. Mr. van der Kamp asked me, "Are you going to continue to press your claim for the independence of Indonesia?" "Yes, sir," I answered, "I'll keep on demanding the independence of my country and my people, since that's a matter of principle for me. But, of course, I'll take the legal road."

I doubt that during the period of Japanese rule in Indonesia a real underground organization existed. If such a movement had actually taken place, surely in twenty years of our independence someone would have written its history, and he would certainly have mentioned the names of its prime movers and the results of their efforts. But the fact is that until now no one at all has written about such an organization. There was the uprising led by the late Suprijadi, Dr. Ismangil, Muradi, Suparjono, Halir, Sunanto, Sudarmo, and others; but this occurred after the PETA had been formed and arose from developments within it rather than from some group operating outside. The same was true of the rebellions of PETA officers at Purwakarta, Dengklok, Segalaheerang, Pegaden, and Pangkalan.

This holds also for the organization supposedly established by the late Sutan Sjahrir, who is described in Bung Karno's autobiography as having made an agreement with the collaborating Indonesian leaders to set up an "underground movement." In my opinion this is doubtful. Sutan Sjahrir was not in the least willing to work with Indonesian government leaders any more than he was willing to work with the Japanese. He lived in extremely straitened circumstances. Sometimes he put up at a friend's house at Kepuh, sometimes at Krukut, and once in a while he came to Tjiandjur or to Garut to Mr. Sastra's house. He had very strong objections to working with the Japanese, but does it follow that he was therefore capable of carrying on underground activities other than airing his views? I never heard of any, even after we gained our freedom. Who undertook an underground movement at that time and how, nobody knows.

### Hizbullah Troops

About the second half of 1944, when the rainy season had set in, a conference of leaders of the Djawa Hōkōkai from all over Java was held in the movie theater of the Zoological Garden at Kebon Sirih. Via Mr. Raden Suradiredja, who at that time was the head of the economic bureau at the Bogor Shūchōkan's office, I received an invitation to attend the meeting, which I accepted. I had no idea what would be talked about at the conference, as I did not belong to the Board of the Djawa Hōkōkai. I was present only at the general meeting at Taman Kebon Sirih, and there I learned that the Djawa Hōkōkai intended to send a petition to the Saikōsikikan, General Harada, asking that a conscriptive militia be introduced. Bung Karno, who made a fiery speech in support of Dai Nippon, ended by asking the audience to stand up if they agreed with the proposal. I did not agree, so I remained in my seat. I felt that everyone's eyes were upon me, but I did not pay attention to it.

Finally a procession was formed, with Bung Karno at the head of the line, accompanied by Mr. Shimizu and carrying a letter of petition. It began to rain. As time wore on, the rain grew heavier and heavier, and I was forced to seek shelter in front of the building, waiting for the downpour to stop so that I could go back to the house where I was spending the night with Mr. Suradiredja. Mr. Suradiredja had joined in the procession, which headed for the residence of General Harada, which is now Merdeka Palace.

The following day, Sidik Djojokusarto and Sudiro (who was usually called "Mbah") came to see me on behalf of Bung Karno and asked for a written explanation as to why I did not agree with the conscription proposal. I immediately sat down to compose a statement of my reasons. In the letter I expressed my deep regret that Bung Karno had altered his earlier principles on conscription; he had changed and was no longer the same as in the time of the Indonesian Nationalist Party under the Dutch.

A few days later, back in Bogor, I met with Mr. Yanagawa at his home, located just opposite the PETA barracks (which had housed Battalion 14 in the time of the Dutch), and I told him about the conscription proposal. At the end of our talk, which was witnessed by Lieutenant Yabe, it occurred to me that many Indonesian youths, especially those of the Islamic religious schools (pesantren and madrasah), were still hesitant about the Suishintai or Seinendan; if they could be mobilized by giving them training of their own, this might substitute for a conscripted militia.<sup>22</sup> So I proposed, if they agreed, to form a force

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22. Seinendan--Youth Corps--was a paramilitary "boy-scout" type of organization limited to youths between the ages of 18 and 25. Many of its members were subsequently drawn into the ranks of the PETA.

of Islamic youth (I was a member of the Muhammadjah and in Tjiandjur I occupied the vice-chairmanship of the local branch). Mr. Yanagawa and Mr. Yabe promptly accepted, and promised to talk it over with the General.

Thus, at the beginning of September 1944, the first battalion of Islamic troops was formed. Kiai Hadji Achmad Sanusi, who occupied the post of the Bogor Vice-Resident at that time, suggested that this battalion be called the "Barisan Hizbullah Sabilillah." Kiai Hadji Achmad Sanusi also asked Captain Yanagawa that if the Hizbullah were formed it should not be required, if at all possible, that the Saikeirei be performed on the occasion of raising the Nipponese flag, and that instead it would be sufficient to cry out "Allahu Akbar" three times.<sup>23</sup>

We did not get any approval for our project whatsoever from the Djawa Hokokai, only from the All-Indonesia Islamic Council (MIAI) and the Masjumi.<sup>24</sup> But the first battalion was formed, at the village of Tjisalak, in the ketjamatan Tjibarusa, Bogor. At the ceremony officially inaugurating its military training various Djakarta leaders were present, among them Kiai Wachid Hasjim, Kiai Achmad Surkati, and Kiai Faturrachman. From Bogor came Kiai Hadji Achmad Sanusi, Raden Hadji Hasbullah, Kiai Fallak, and Raden Hadji Mahmud (the penghulu of Tjibarusa). Muslim youth came from all the regencies of West Java, the largest number being some sixty young men brought from Tasikmalaja by Hadji Djunaedi and his friends.<sup>25</sup>

At first the military training periods were planned to last four months, but this proved insufficient, and the first one had to be extended for another three, that is until the beginning of April 1945. Among the officers leading this program were Messrs. Yanagawa, Ono, Katsura, and Yabe.

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23. The Saikeirei was the bow of obeisance in honor of the Japanese Emperor which was obligatory on all public occasions. It aroused deep resentment, particularly on the part of devout Moslems, who felt it approximated too closely the religious bow in the direction of Mecca.
24. M.I.A.I. (Madjlisul Islamil a'laa Indonesia) was set up in Surabaya in September 1937 as a kind of Islamic unity front. It was sponsored both by the urban, entrepreneurial Muhammadiyah and the rural, landowning Nahdatul Ulama. When the Japanese replaced the M.I.A.I. by a more centralized organization, the Masjumi (Madjlis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia), in November 1943, the Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama continued as the new federation's most important constituent elements.
25. Wachid Hasjim and Faturrachman were prominent Nahdatul Ulama leaders, while Sanusi and Djunaedi were wellknown figures in the Muhammadiyah.

At a farewell party held at the end of the training for the young soldiers from Tasikmalaja at the Bogor Shuchokan office, I, as the sole speaker, called on the youths to remain devoted to their religious teachings in addition to strengthening their spirit of nationalism as Hizbullah troops. I told them they must hold firmly to the path of justice, and, without realizing what I was saying, I added that, "We shall attack even the Japanese if they behave unjustly." What I said seemed to startle the Indonesians among the audience, but the Japanese present did not pay the least attention to it, and the leave-taking party continued smoothly and safely.

A second Hizbullah battalion was formed at Kediri, and I remember having spent the night there at the house of a young man by the name of Mohamad Saleh, who also took part in the military training. After that a Hizbullah battalion was formed in every kabupaten, its leadership later being taken over by the MIAI (Masjumi) command.

This, in brief, is my account of the formation of the Hizbullah troops during the Japanese time. It was also one of my contributions, in the sense that the proposal occurred to me and that both the Hizbullah and PETA troops were the result of my reaction to the proposal for conscription, which I believed would be a disaster for a people still under colonial rule. Many of the PETA and Hizbullah instructors are still alive, and some have visited Indonesia since. Among these are Mr. Yanagawa, Mr. Abdulhamid Ono, Mr. N. Narusawa, Mr. Taguchi, and Mr. Maruzaki, the captain who cut off his little finger for losing his bet. Mr. Togashi, Mr. Rokugawa, Mr. Katsura, Mr. Yabe, and Mr. Nagano are also still living; they reside in Japan and have mostly become businessmen.

#### Expression of Thanks

On this occasion I do not forget to express my heartfelt gratitude to all the religious leaders, teachers, physicians, civil service officials, and young students who enlisted as volunteers in the PETA, because their spontaneous willingness to join the army saved me from the personal disaster which might have befallen me if my proposal to set up the PETA had not been successful. Also to the instructors, among them Messrs. M. Yanagawa, Abdulhamid Ono, Yabe, Katsura, Narusawa, Nagano, Togashi, and Nagashima. I extend my sincere thanks, because only by their perseverance, strict discipline, and correct conduct could a Volunteer Army for the Defense of the Fatherland be forged and welded together, an army which, together with the people, fought bravely for Indonesian independence. My boundless thanks are also due to the young men of the Hizbullah units and to the Muslim leaders of the All-Indonesia Islamic Council (M.I.A.I.) and the Masjumi in Djakarta, as well as to Hadji Djunaedi of Tasikmalaja, who painstakingly helped in the formation of the Hizbullah corps.

The personal dedication and conviction which I had expressed before the Japanese officers from the Sambō Beppan at Gambir 64 in Djakarta, at the risk of my life, is the *first reason* why I do not wish someone else to claim that the PETA was his work or creation and that I merely served as someone who had been given orders to set it up. Secondly, I was determined to save young Indonesians from joining an army which might be sent beyond the borders of their homeland as cannon fodder for the Allied Forces. And this applied not only to the young men of Indonesian blood, who were called Genjūmin in Japanese, but also to the youth of mixed parentage, like the Eurasians, Indonesian-Arabs, or Indonesian-Chinese, whom the Japanese also labelled Genjūmin.<sup>26</sup>

#### Indonesian National Army Succeeded

After Independence was declared, the desire to form an Indonesian National Army from the PETA became a reality.<sup>27</sup> I had first expressed this hope in the session of the Chūo Sangi-in at Pedjambon, Djakarta, if I am not mistaken on June 18, 1945, about two weeks after Bung Karno made a speech on the Pantja Dharma.<sup>28</sup> How did this come about?

One day late in May 1945, Mr. Ichibangase, the head of the Study Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence, accompanied by Dr. Toha and Kiai Hadji Abdul Halim, members of the Chūo Sangi-in, came to see me.<sup>29</sup> They were on their way to

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26. Genjūmin--natives--had definitely derogatory connotations. In May 1945, when the Japanese authorities had decided to move towards creating an independent Indonesia, official instructions were issued that the use of this term should henceforth be avoided.
  27. This should not be interpreted as indicating that there was any organizational continuity between the PETA (which was disbanded in the first week after the Proclamation of Independence) and the Indonesian National Army. But many ex-officers and soldiers from the PETA did join the National Army and formed an important nucleus within it.
  28. The Pantja Dharma--The Five Duties--was a rather vague declaration of nationalist aspirations and devotion to the Japanese cause drawn up at the Chūo Sangi-in's sixth plenary session (November 12-18, 1944). Never very popular, the Pantja Dharma was explicitly disavowed by Sukarno in favor of the Pantja Sila in his famous speech of June 1, 1945 to the Study Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence.
  29. Ichibangase was the Japanese Resident of Tjirebon and Vice-Chairman of the Study Committee mentioned above.

Tjirebon. Ichibangase handed me a message from the Gunseikan asking me to come to the Chūo Sangi-in session on June 18, 1945, which would celebrate Dai Nippon Teikoku's promise to give independence to Indonesia. The message also requested me to deliver a speech about the PETA, because at the session there would be messages from the Saikōsikikan and the Gunseikan about how to win the Greater East Asia War, how to liberate the Asian countries, and how we were all resolved and determined to be independent.

I remember that it was only possible for me to speak in the supplementary session, after the messages of the Saikōsikikan, General Harada, and the Gunseikan, General Yamamoto. In my speech I expressed full determination to win the war and to prepare for Indonesian independence, and I declared my fervent hope that the Bōei Giyūgun would later grow into an Indonesian National Army. I explained that we had been busy organizing military training of the Suishintai, Seinendan, Keibōdan, government officials, and village people, I still remember that two new members of the Chūo Sangi-in attended that session, namely Ir. Darmawan Mangunkusumo and Mr. Suprodjo. Also, two new deputy Gichō (chairmen) were appointed to succeed Mr. R. M. Kusumo Utojo, who had resigned--Drs. Mohamad Hatta and Raden Oto Iskandardinata.

Several days after that session, the members of the Chūo Sangi-in were housed at the Daidan barracks in Petodjo for two days' training. They were drilled in marching, taught how to use a rifle, and so on. Bung Karno and Bung Hatta also joined in this basic military training. Those who did not were Dr. Radjiman, Mr. Singgih, and several aged and sick persons.

Following the Chūo Sangi-in session I was called to the office of the Gunseikan, and there I learned that I would be included in a delegation of Chuo Sangi-in members who were to leave for Tokyo. The group was to be headed by Mr. Abdurachman Saleh and Mr. Masuda from the Study Committee, whose office was situated near the present KPM building. In the end the delegation did not go, as the journey to Japan had become more and more hazardous.

In his autobiography, Bung Karno described the events concerning the Proclamation of Independence, which had been forced on him at Rengasdengklok by the pressure of the young revolutionaries Sukarni, Chaerul Saleh, Malik, Noor, and others. The validity of his account can be checked not only with Sukarni and Adam Malik but also by various former PETA officers who are now still serving in the army, among them Mustafa Kemal, Marwoto, Samirahardjo, Satari, Dachjar, Darwis, Tjetjep Prawira, Suharjana, and Oja Somantri and K. H. Iljas, all of whom played an important role in the struggle at Purwakarta and Krawang.

The first real battle of the revolution occurred at Bogor, in the neighborhood of Depok, on the night of October 11, 1945. I was then commander of the Bogor BKR. Together with Duleh Abdullah, Affandi, Sofjan, Otje Mochtan, Saptadji, and Sjirifin (all former PETA officers), and assisted by Pelopor troops and local people, we attacked Gurkha forces coming from the direction of Parungpandjang through Tjiseeng. The incident was witnessed by Raden Enoch Danubrata, the police chief of Bogor, and also by a number of officers still serving in the army, but who at that time were assigned to other territories, namely, Abu Kahar, Abu Umar, Djunaedi, Dahlan, Mufraeni, Djaelani, Sabirin, Adjen, Abd. Salam, and other former PETA people. We gained the victory, but three of our men were killed, among them Sumardja from the Tjiomas Pelopor, the youth Margonda (missing in action), a policeman and a member of the local population. They were all buried on October 12, 1945, at Taman Bunga Cemetery in front of the Bogor railway station. The Gurkha troops escaped to Djakarta via Tjisalak because their path was not blocked in time. This occurred because of the carelessness of the troops of Bapak Matjem and Hadji Daud, who came from Tjileungsi through Tjibinong. They arrived late because they had been very much tempted to commit robbery at Gunung Puteri.

### I Was Seized

As a result of the Depok clash and the murder of several Dutch leaders in Bogor by young revolutionaries, I was summoned to Djakarta together with four friends--Duleh Abdullah, Basuki (a judge), Kustio, and Ambijah--in order, we heard, to talk with Colonel Harding, who wanted to arrange for the Allied Forces to have the Bogor Palace for their headquarters and the Battalion 14 camp for their Gurkha troops. We were fetched for the trip by a Colonel Greenway, who brought us first to the Hotel des Indes. We were not called in for discussions, however, but were thrown instead into Glodok prison and later, in January 1946, were moved to Onrust Island in the bay of Djakarta.

At Onrust I was tried as a war criminal and collaborator and was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment. Indeed, I had given aid to the Japanese, but in a positive Indonesian nationalist spirit, defending Justice and Humanitarianism, and *not* in the spirit of a "servant of Japan," not in the spirit of "Inggris kita linggis, Amerika kita setrika."<sup>30</sup> Hence it is my view, *down to this day*, that the judgment against me as a collaborator was completely unwarranted and that they did not understand my whole life's purpose. I was tried by Mr. Beer,

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30. This was a famous slogan of Sukarno's in his radio broadcasts during the war years. It meant "Let's use a crowbar on the English, and crush the Americans with a flat-iron."

Mr. Dendam, and Mr. Pieters. A Dutch judge advocate was also present. After the trial, those who had interrogated me shook my hand and thanked me for having rejected conscription, for by this act Eurasian youths had been saved from possible recruitment into the Japanese forces. They all wished me well.

One day in June 1947 I was called to the prison administration office and learned that I was completely free again but was not allowed to remain in the Dutch-occupied area. If members of my family wanted to follow me to the Republic, priority would be given so that all our baggage could be brought along. I chose to move to Jogja.

In Jogja, I was employed at the Ministry of Defense, which Mr. Amir Sjarifuddin headed at that time, and was appointed to assist Major-General Ir. Sakirman, the head of the Ministry's political education bureau (Pepolit), with the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. Together with Major-General Djoko Sungkono and Major-General Djoko Sujono, I attempted to re-establish the system of defense territories (Wehrkreise) according to the Daidan system of the Japanese period. I had difficulty, however, with my eyes, having become afflicted with cataracts during my imprisonment. I was treated frequently in the Panti Rapih hospital and then in the eye hospital of Dr. Yap. I was forced to have an operation, and when I returned to duty it was after Hatta had become Prime Minister. He appointed me chairman of the Badan Koordinasi Gabungan Perdjuangan Rakjat di Djawa dan Madura (Joint Coordinating Body for People's Struggle in Java and Madura), which was to supervise and coordinate the efforts of about 48 lasjkar--organizations of irregular guerrilla troops--including sailors, in order to make their struggle more efficient.

When the Indonesian Communist Party attempted its coup, I was sent to Madiun, Ponorogo, Magetan, and Plaosan to give guidance to the people; I was joined in this by Resident Sanusi Hardjadinata and the Military Police Corps under Major Rusli.

At the time of the second Dutch attack, I myself saw General Sudirman come out of the Palace and pass through Djalan Panggurakan. At Ngabean he called out, "Follow me." It was a Sunday. I was together with Captain Marjono and Sabilal Rasjad at Ngabean, near the post office, while the stronghold in front of the Jogjakarta palace was being bombed.<sup>31</sup> Bung Karno did not leave with General Sudirman but let himself be captured by the Dutch. If the Indonesian people had followed Bung Karno's footsteps, there would not have been a Republic of Indonesia. His love for country and people stayed only on his lips. In his

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31. The reference is to the airborne attack on Jogjakarta by Dutch troops at dawn on December 19, 1948, which opened the Second Military Action. The "stronghold" referred to is the old Beteng or Fortress, where Dutch troops had been stationed during the colonial period.

heart of hearts, he did not hesitate to sacrifice them for his personal interests. The country headed toward bankruptcy, and lo! Bung Karno became a millionaire. Where did all those riches come from???

During the second clash I was in Gunung Kidul, the defense territory of General Suharto (he was a Captain at the time). The regular army was under his command; I myself coordinated the irregulars, which were under the direct command of Komaruddin, who led the Hizbullah troops stationed at Djederan, and Captain Martono and Basuki, GPI commanders stationed at Imogiri. I took up my headquarters in Terong and had contact chiefly with these two forces, as well as the Military Police under the command of Captain Herman and Lieutenant Sukirno, and the PPPRI forces under the late Suparno. I also worked with Lt. Colonel Hasanuddin Pasopati of the PI, who was killed when attacking NICA troops at Barongan, and D. Suparta of the Department of Information.

When the army ran out of money, I helped with the printing of Rp. 25 and Rp. 75 banknotes at Panggang/Plosok, where Brother Mustopha, also called Lengkong, had made available his printery to Captain Trisno Sudomo. We were able to steal a hand press from Jogja with the help of youths from Wiloso Prodjo and village officials of Muntuk and Imogiri. Printing materials were first collected by Ibu Gatot and kept at Djalan Purwanggan 7 at the place of a maidservant named Ijem, from which they could easily be brought past the Dutch military outposts in Sentul and Kotagede to the hills. Printing was done with the assistance of Harun, Miss Sri, and Miss Garmini (who is now a Lieutenant in the COWAD in Djakarta).<sup>32</sup> In the first month we printed about 38,000 notes and in the second about 40,000. The money circulated as far as Tjirebon. We were able to get authorization for printing the notes from Kasimo, the Minister of Economics for the Republic, who happened to have been brought in by the guerrilla army from the Magelang area.

When Colonel Nasution ordered the irregular troops to join or hand over their arms to the Indonesian National Army, I helped advise the irregulars to turn in their weapons to Lieutenant Darsono, who was under the command of Captain Suharto at that time. I myself never met Captain Suharto, though we were both in Gunung Kidul. We received material support in this guerrilla period from Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono, who furnished us with paper to print the banknotes, and from Pangeran Honggowongso. R. M. Darsono and Supardjo acted as our liaison with them. We also had contact with Pangeran Surjaningprang of the Pakualaman. Indeed, his house became a headquarters for the guerrillas who slipped into Jogja city.

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32. COWAD--Corps Wanita Angkatan Darat--is the Women's Corps in the present-day Indonesian Army.

While in Gunung Kidul I fell ill of the bubonic plague and was nursed by Dr. R. Irsan until I had completely recovered. Thereafter I lived in Muntuk until January 1950, when the war ended and I returned to Jogja. I had been made a member of the KNIP, and as such joined in the ratification of the Round Table Conference agreement at Siti Inggil, Jogja, and in naming Sukarno President of the RIS (Republic of the United States of Indonesia).<sup>33</sup>

After the negotiations with the Dutch were completed, I was employed in Jogjakarta at the Secretariat of the Indonesian Nationalist Party. In 1952 I moved to Djakarta in order to take up the post of General Secretary of the PNI. The following year I left the party, moved to Bandung, and established the Gerakan Pembela Pantjasila (Pantjasila Defense Movement) in response to the increasing terrorist activities of the Tentara Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Army) in West Java. I was a member of Parliam from 1954 until 1959, when it was dissolved by Presidential decree, and was then pensioned off.

In September 1958 I proposed the formation of a "Staatspartei," a single state political organization, directly under the leadership of the President with the Pantjasila as its principle, in order to reduce the numerous parties in Indonesia. President Sukarno, thinking the time had not come for such a drastic reduction, rejected this concept and instead formed the National Front, which, having no political base of its own, was sterile. After 1959 I had no further contact with my former comrades in the struggle, who continued to hold high positions, nor did I meet with President Sukarno again. I did not have the courage to approach them, for I felt myself only an unimportant person. I was appointed a member of the MPRS (Provisional People's Consultative Assembly) in 1960, but left it in 1967 at the time of the rejuvenation of the MPRS membership by the West Java representative assembly.

This is the sum of my correction of Bung Karno's story as it was written down by Mrs. Cindy Adams. I should like to point out once again that I do not intend by this to sabotage Bung Karno, but only to show that history must not be distorted. I greatly regret that Bung Karno who, at the time his autobiography was written, still had authority and influence and was respected, could go so far as to tell things that were not true, only because he liked so much to boast.

Translated by Harumi Wanasita Evans  
and Ruth McVey

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33. The KNIP (Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat--Central Indonesian National Committee) was the functional equivalent of a parliament in the Republican governmental system up to the formal transfer of sovereignty.