CONSTRUCTING ORDER AMID VIOLENCE:
COMPARATIVE MILITARY INTERVENTIONS IN THE ERA OF
PEACEKEEPING AND COUNTER-TERRORISM

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This study is motivated by two questions: To what extent are countries engaged in military interventions willing to use force to promote democracy? And what are the likely consequences of such actions? Interveners face a dilemma in seeking to impose democracy through military interventions: They can either accommodate armed factions in the target state by bringing them into a powersharing government with little democratic accountability, or they can seek to impose higher-order democracy at the risk of violent confrontation. The course of action chosen depends on the interveners’ regime types, strategic cultures, and resource constraints. Coalitions dominated by committed democracies with militarized strategic cultures have proven vastly more successful in promoting democratic change through interventions than coalitions dominated by less militarized, less committed, or less democratic states. They do so, however, at the risk of provoking international crises and unsustainable escalations of violence. These claims are investigated through both a medium-N, fuzzy-set analysis of all military interventions in the post-Cold War era and a series of controlled, focused comparisons between the policies of the United States, Germany, and Russia in interventions in the Balkans and Central Asia. This study has implications for both theory and policy. It advances the argument that both rationalist and constructivist theories of international relations, taken separately, fail to predict either state behavior or the outcomes of states’ policy choices; rather, only by integrating these perspectives can we understand patterns of military interventions. These patterns reveal that policy-
makers must commit to one of three basic models of intervention; pursuing the goals of one while providing the means appropriate to another typically yields disastrous outcomes.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Stephen Watts completed his dissertation while in residence first as a Research Fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC and subsequently as a Research Fellow at the Belfer Center of Harvard University. He received his Master’s degree in German and European Studies from the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and his Bachelor’s degree from the College of William and Mary. Prior to beginning his doctoral studies at Cornell University, he served as a Foreign Affairs Officer in the Office of International Security and Peacekeeping, United States Department of State, and as a Legislative Assistant at the Balkan Institute. He will join the faculty of the Department of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts Amherst as an Assistant Professor in 2007.
above all, for Anne
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Introduction

In March 2003 the United States invaded Iraq in what has proven to be a disastrous military intervention – the first and very possibly the last “preventive war” carried out under the Bush Doctrine in the wake of the September 11 attacks. The invasion of Iraq appears peculiar in many respects. It was a preventive war, launched without any clear intelligence to suggest that Iraq had the capabilities or imminent intent to harm the United States. The Bush administration’s unilateralism was not a recourse of last resort but almost a badge of honor proudly displayed as a signal of American resolve. It was audacious in its ambition: to remake a large country with a substantial military, decrepit public infrastructure, legacy of severe inter-ethnic violence, and history of passionate anti-colonialism. Even more peculiar was the manner in which the intervention was conducted, without apparent agreement among senior decision-makers about the precise ends being pursued or the precise means that would be used to obtain them. That the intervention has turned out so disastrously should surprise no one.

The invasion of Iraq and the United States’ subsequent flailing efforts to remake the country are indeed peculiar, but more as an extreme instance of a much broader trend than as a singular event. Throughout the post-Cold War era both states and international organizations have sought to reorganize the domestic politics of states in order to produce an international order more to their liking. While the Bush administration is well-known for the zeal of its commitment (rhetorically, at least) to democracy promotion, it was not the U.S. National Security Strategy but the European one that declared, “The quality of international society depends on the quality of the governments that are its foundation. The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states” (European Security Strategy 2003, 10). Nor is the United States alone in its resort to unilateralism or its willingness to use force to
restructure other governments according to its preferences, although it is certainly unique in the frequency and audacity with which it has abandoned multilateralism and resorted to force. The European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) joined with the United States in using military force to impose a settlement on the Serbian territory of Kosovo, despite lacking a United Nations mandate for their action. Australia spurned near-certain UN approval for its intervention in the Solomon Islands, preferring to act unfettered by any UN mandate (Bellamy and Williams 2005, 186).

What is unusual about Iraq is the preventive nature of the intervention and the scale of commitments and risks entailed. Interventions are typically so difficult, dangerous, and expensive that they are undertaken only as a last resort; the invasion of Iraq was an option of first resort. The decision to invade is puzzling in many respects, and scholars may never fully understand the reasons behind American decision-makers’ choice. Once the decision to intervene had been made, however, the dynamics that unfolded in Iraq bear a remarkable similarity to other interventions of the post-Cold War era, and many who initially opposed the war were placed in the uncomfortable position of seeking ways to make it succeed (see for instance Diamond 2005).

Nor is Iraq likely to be the last time the United States and other world actors intervene militarily to restructure the politics of other states. As both the U.S. National Security Strategy and the European Security Strategy acknowledge, failed states are a – if not the – leading security threat in the world today. Not only may they harbor transnational terrorists, as in the case of Afghanistan, but they also frequently fuel regional conflict, transnational crime, destabilizing population movements, and other threats to broader peace and stability. Even in the wake of the invasion of Iraq, the European Security Strategy did not abandon the concept of using military force to
advance state-building. Previous problematic interventions (and non-interventions) have also touched off flurries of criticisms and responses, none of which led to either the abandonment of intervention as a tool of international politics or to solutions to the enduring dilemmas of intervention.

This study does not seek to explain why or when countries choose to intervene. Rather, it examines their choice of strategies once the decision to intervene has already been made. In particular, the study is motivated by two questions: To what extent are countries engaged in military interventions willing to use force to promote democracy? And what are the likely consequences of such actions? Interveners face a dilemma in seeking to impose democracy through military interventions: They can either accommodate armed factions in the target state by bringing them into a powersharing government with little democratic accountability, or they can seek to impose higher-order democracy at the risk of violent confrontation. The course of action chosen depends on the interveners’ regime types, strategic cultures, and resource constraints. Coalitions dominated by committed, militarized democracies have proven vastly more successful in promoting democratic change through interventions than coalitions dominated by less militarized, less committed, or less democratic states. They do so, however, at the risk of provoking international crises and unsustainable escalations of violence. Committed, militarized democracies tend to pursue high-risk, high-reward strategies. Thus countries such as the United States and United Kingdom have been critical to establishing the requisite security environment for state-building efforts in missions ranging from the Balkans to Central Asia to West Africa. They have also been responsible for fiascoes such as Somalia. Broader coalitions, such as those participating in UN-led operations without a lead nation, have been less likely to spark international rows or violent opposition to their presence by local militias. They have also seldom promoted substantial democratic change.
Intervening states seek to influence the regime type of the target state for a complex variety of reasons. Often the decision-maker responsible for approving an intervention acts on the basis of multiple and potentially conflicting motivations. When we examine not simply the decision to intervene but also the manner in which an intervention is conducted, a great many more actors with diverse perspectives and goals come into play. Regime change may be sought primarily as an end in itself, but more often it is a means to some other goal, such as regional stability, alleviation of a humanitarian disaster, or promotion of security interests. It may be simply a device used to legitimate an intervention to a broader domestic or international audience. Thus to argue that democracies generally promote democracy is not to claim that they do so all the time or do so whole-heartedly. They often doubt that democracy can be effectively promoted in weak and failed states, and they frequently privilege other goals before democracy rather than pursuing democracy as an ultimate good in itself. But more often than not they return to democracy promotion as at least an element of a broader policy because none of the alternatives looks any more attractive than the arduous and risky process of building governments that are inclusive and more or less responsive to their populations. Democracies are not “good guys” intent on exporting “good” institutions to the victims of tyranny. Rather, they are actors that seek to secure their own interests under conditions of high uncertainty, and they frequently resort to an externalization of their own systems of governance as what they perceive to be the least bad option when confronting the dilemmas inherent in stabilizing unstable or threatening regions of the world. Thus democracies tend to create conditions more favorable to democratic change even if this is not their primary goal.

These claims challenge much of the political science literature on interventions. Other scholars have claimed alternatively that no one truly seeks to promote democracy through armed intervention, or that all do, or that the United
States uniquely does so.¹ Yet others argue that, regardless of the intentions of interveners, democracy promotion in the course of intervention is practically impossible in all but the most narrowly defined circumstances (Etzioni 2004; Marten 2004). Still others have argued that the use of force in higher-intensity enforcement missions is typically either ineffective or counter-productive, failing to impose peace in states beset by civil wars and unable to foster an inclusive, more democratic political order even in those cases where peace is achieved (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2004).² For very legitimate reasons, much of the literature on interventions has focused on the circumstances prevalent in the target state rather than on the politics of interveners. In doing so, however, large-N studies of the phenomenon have generally failed to distinguish among interveners except in the broadest of terms, often lumping together interveners as disparate as Syria in Lebanon and Australia in East Timor.

Obviously no single study can examine an issue from every possible dimension, and the existing literature has contributed immeasurably to our understanding of interventions. This study shall argue, however, that the attitudes and politics of intervening countries are critical to understanding what can and cannot be achieved in the course of an intervention. In particular, interveners differ in what they believe can or should be achieved through intervention and in their attitudes towards the acceptability and efficacy of force. By focusing on this variation in the goals

¹ Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2006) claim that democracy promotion in the course of interventions is at best “window dressing.” Paris (2003) claims that a “global culture shapes the character of peacekeeping in fundamental ways – peacekeeping agencies and their member states are predisposed to develop and implement strategies that conform with the norms of global culture,” meaning above all liberal democracy and sovereign statehood (442-3). Huntington (1982), Judis (2005), Monten (2005), Pickering and Peceny (2006), and others have claimed that the United States is uniquely committed to democracy promotion through military interventions.

² Note, however, that Doyle and Sambanis later (2006) offered a more equivocal assessment of the consequences of UN enforcement actions, claiming that enforcement actions may be necessary, but that they alone cannot promote democracy.
intervening states pursue and the means they adopt, this study makes three contributions to the literature on intervention and state-building.

First, in many recent assessments of state-building, scholars have focused on UN missions or on the combination of governmental, inter-governmental, and non-governmental organizations operating in “post-modern imperialist” enterprises (Fearon and Laitin 2004). These studies have made an important contribution to our understanding of these missions. But many of them obscure the underlying conditions that make political progress possible. Except in the most benign implementation environments, violence or the threat of violence remains the single most important arbiter of political outcomes. States, not the UN or NGOs, ultimately control how their militaries are deployed and thus the extent to which they can be used to demilitarize politics and create opportunities for more inclusive and participatory politics to emerge. “Bringing the state back in” thus offers the opportunity to recapture these underlying dynamics.

Second, many analyses originating from comparative politics have assessed the ideal institutional designs for regulating domestic conflict or the conditions under which transformations to democracy are most likely. Both are clearly worthy enterprises. When the lessons of these studies are applied to military interventions, however, analysts often forget that institutional design and democracy promotion are as much about the domestic political needs and constraints of the intervening states’ decision-makers as they are about advancing policies that are most optimal for the target state.

Finally, this study demonstrates the importance of integrating constructivist and rationalist variables to develop a more complete picture of international relations. Without examining different conjunctions of these variables, theories of military interventions commonly are limited in their predictive utility. Realist theories, for
instance, generally see the pursuit of ideological ends as a frivolous activity undertaken only when national interests are not at stake. The analytical framework presented here suggests the opposite is the case, at least in post-Cold War interventions: Ideological variation among interveners is more acute precisely when national interests are more directly engaged.

This study consciously makes two intellectual gambles. First, it integrates the analysis of military interventions as a whole, from intrusive peace operations to counter-insurgencies. One of the fundamental themes underlying this study is that interveners face a nearly universal trade-off between inclusion and coercion. They can exclude so-called “spoilers” – armed groups who threaten to weaken or undermine the preferred political order of the intervener – but they do so at the risk of sparking violent confrontation with these groups. Or they can include these groups in governance structures, but only at the risk of making political authority structures hostage to the preferences of competing armed militias. Such dynamics challenge interveners ranging from blue-helmeted peacekeepers to forces of military occupation. When former U.S. Deputy National Security Advisor James Steinberg, for instance, was asked why the United States was not more aggressive in marginalizing criminalized paramilitaries in the Kosovo peace operation, he argued that the situation was analogous to Iraq: “If intervening states rule out dealing with local armed groups, they risk turning them into committed antagonists” (author interview, October 28, 2005).

Second, this study focuses on the security dynamics of military interventions at the expense of neglecting other important processes, such as economic reconstruction, civil society and grassroots politics, or reconciliation and justice issues. Scholars studying efforts at democracy promotion have long recognized that the use of military force permits an intrusive restructuring of domestic politics that is impossible through
less direct means (Whitehead 1986, 3). More fundamentally, however, in the weak and failed states in which interventions typically occur, where the state has lost much (or all) of its ability to regulate violence, the influence of violent coercion is pervasive, whether it takes the form of acts or threats, made by the interveners themselves or the armed factions who dominate both the institutions of the state and the “shadow institutions” formed by paramilitaries and illicit economies. It provides the context in which non-military instruments such as aid and negotiations operate. The restoration of the monopoly on the use of force to the state is the necessary prerequisite for achieving political stability (Stedman 2001). Outside military forces cannot by themselves compel specific political outcomes, much less democracy itself, but they can help to provide an environment either more or less conducive to inclusive, representative politics.

By focusing on how intervening states fuse military force with political goals, we can correct two opposite but equally misleading understandings of armed state-building. One strand of the literature ignores the military dynamics of such operations altogether, discussing them instead in terms of police and law enforcement – the arrest of war criminals, the enforcement of the rule of law, the imposition of liberal institutions. Analysts in this camp point out – quite rightly – that, if physical coercion is to be exercised at all, it should be used by indigenous police forces whenever possible and by international police when necessary. Soldiers tend to be ill-equipped for law-and-order missions. While this observation is true, it does not go far enough, for the simple reason that the arrest of war criminals, the enforcement of the rule of law, and the imposition of liberal institutions all directly threaten large and well-armed factions in the target state. We will not be able to understand political outcomes without reference to the full spectrum of possible interactions between intervening forces and local actors.
The opposite tendency is to give too much credit to military forces, blithely assuming that they can impose their will if they simply have adequate numbers and equipment. In fact, interveners must perform a delicate balancing act between confronting indigenous armed actors, thereby risking an explosive backlash, and co-opting them, thereby strengthening their position and freezing in place political dynamics antithetical to the projects pursued by the intervener. Unfortunately, it is seldom if ever clear to interveners ex ante where the line between productive and counter-productive uses of force lies, and this uncertainty lies at the center of much of the analytical framework that is advanced in this study.

The theory presented here yields two implications for policy. First, the results of this study show that military interventions can indeed potentially promote more democratic governance, particularly if the intervening country or coalition is committed and willing to both accommodate and in some cases confront armed indigenous actors. Such efforts, however, will inevitably be lengthy, expensive, risky, and uncertain to succeed in any given case. Second, all good things do not necessarily go together, as the liberal model would suggest. Because different states possess very different preferences in cases of military interventions, effectiveness in promoting democracy may frequently conflict with multilateralism. Ideally, coalitions can be constructed that combine effectiveness, international comity, and burdensharing. But in more difficult intervention environments, the obstacles to realizing this ideal are profound.

The analytical framework provided in this study does not yield an easy prescription for interveners. It certainly does not indicate that all interventions should become highly militarized in order to overcome the resistance of local factions to

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3 John Mueller (2004, 22), for instance, argues that “When a criminal army comes into direct armed confrontation with a competent disciplined one, the disciplined one, essentially by definition, will prevail.”
democratic change. Interventions take place in a myriad of contexts. The extent to which local armed factions possess broad bases of popular support should certainly influence how an intervener responds to them, as should the level of an intervener’s own commitment. This study does indicate that democratic change is possible, that it usually requires the sustained commitment of militarized interveners willing to endure high risks and costs, and that multilateral comity is often difficult to sustain through such an effort. Recognizing the challenges that an intervener will face both on the ground and in diplomatic circles is the first step towards designing better models of intervention – and refraining from interventions where the costs are too great and the chances of success too poor.

The study proceeds in six chapters. The first chapter provides a theory of comparative military interventions, examining how the regime type, strategic culture, and interests of the intervening countries shape their intentions and the probable outcomes of interventions. The next chapter provides a medium-N overview of the empirical record, assessing the outcomes of all 27 interventions of the post-Cold War era. The following three chapters are devoted one each to three cases of intervention: Tajikistan, Bosnia, and Afghanistan. The empirical chapters confirm the utility of the analytical framework proposed here. The medium-N analysis reveals that 22 of the 27 cases of intervention in the post-Cold War era produce levels of democratic change as predicted by the theory of this study. When we assess levels of democratic achievement (that is, whether the target state becomes at least an illiberal democracy during the course of an intervention), the correlation still holds, albeit more weakly. The case studies confirm that these outcomes occur for the reasons specified. The case studies focus on the intervention behavior of extreme examples of the major types of intervening states: militarized democracies (the United States), non-militarized democracies (Germany), and militarized non-democracies (Russia). Not only do these
interveners behave almost precisely as predicted, but lesser included cases also
conform to expectations. Thus, for example, not only the United States but also Great
Britain exhibit tendencies to militarize their efforts to secure relatively more inclusive
and participatory governance in interventions, while both Germany and Italy display
much greater reluctance to utilize military force. Finally, the last chapter concludes
with a discussion of the implications of the analysis for Iraq and future interventions.
Part I: Overview
Chapter 1:  
A Theory of Comparative Military Interventions

This study seeks to explain how interventions are conducted once the decision to intervene has already been made. More specifically, it examines how the cultures and domestic politics of intervening states shape the strategies that they pursue and the resources that they commit, and it examines the likely consequences of interveners’ divergent approaches to intervention. The theoretical framework is presented in five steps, beginning with an overview of the argument. I then map the conceptual landscape by reviewing the definitions central to an understanding of democracy promotion through intervention. Next, I examine the existing literature on how the regime type, strategic culture, and national interests of intervening states influence the objectives that they pursue and the means that they are willing to use. In a fourth section, I demonstrate how these three variables interact with the intervention environment to shape the political authority structures of the target state. Finally, I outline the study’s research design and preview the empirical results to be presented in the following chapters.

Overview of the Argument

In the post-Cold War era one of the primary threats to international security is the existence of extremely weak and failed states (Eizenstat, Porter, and Weinstein 2005; National Security Strategy 2002). Such states typically produce numerous negative “security externalities” such as refugee flows, conduits for illegal trafficking (e.g., of arms, narcotics, and people), ethnic conflict with spillover or contagion effects that endanger regional security, and havens for transnational terrorism. Other states affected by these security externalities or spurred to action by the humanitarian
consequences of internal chaos have commonly intervened or sought to recruit others to intervene to restore stability.

High levels of uncertainty exist, however, concerning how best to promote stability. Although there appears to be considerable evidence that mature democracies are the most stable form of government (Hegre et al. 2001), scholars are divided although often skeptical that democracy can be effectively promoted through armed intervention – if indeed it can be promoted from the outside at all.4 Such uncertainty is echoed by policy elites throughout the world, who have stridently debated the proper ends of intervention throughout the post-Cold War era. When faced with such high levels of uncertainty, decision-makers cannot choose a single, “optimal” strategy but instead rely on cognitive short-cuts to guide their decisions. Typically such cognitive “short cuts” reflect the culture or personal experiences of the decision-maker, leading to divergent strategies among different actors (Goldstein and Keohane 1993). When confronted with the uncertainties inherent in attempting to impose political order in unstable societies, if intervening states are highly committed to an intervention, then they typically seek to externalize their own domestic norms of governance – that is, democracies commonly seek to export democracy while autocracies export autocracy. In some cases such projects are ideologically driven – that is, they reflect the values or beliefs of top decision-makers. More commonly, however, such approaches to state-building reflect less a coherent strategy than the precarious, internally incoherent outcome of numerous bargains struck between different domestic actors in the intervening state.

While interveners usually prefer to externalize their own forms of governance, a substantial distance typically separates aspiration and reality. In the post-Cold War era military interventions almost without exception take place in environments in

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4 This point will be addressed at greater length below.
which the major contenders for political power are armed groups. In such circumstances interveners can either confront these actors, imposing the intervener’s preferred political order to the detriment of the indigenous armed groups’ control over political and economic resources, or the intervener can accommodate these local actors, constructing a political order that largely reinforces the existing distribution of military power. The choice between relatively more accommodating or coercive strategies is determined by the intervener’s willingness to risk violent confrontation with armed groups in the target state.

This risk propensity, in turn, is determined by two factors: the intervener’s strategic culture and the national interests of the intervener that are engaged by the target state. In a world of scarcity, interveners must necessarily accept less desirable outcomes when their preferred end-states are too costly. Where an intervener’s direct security interests are at stake, its resource constraints tend to be lower, and it can commit considerable resources – both soldiers’ lives and financial assets – to realize its preferred outcome. Where no significant security interests exist, interveners are unlikely to commit to costly state-building projects. Thus security interests are one major determinant of whether an intervener will confront local actors in order to impose its preferred political order. Yet a second factor is equally significant: the strategic culture of the intervener. Countries that have come to believe through past experience that the projection of military force can achieve important political outcomes – what I term countries with “militarized” strategic cultures – are more likely to adopt confrontational as opposed to accommodating strategies vis-à-vis local armed groups. Other states have adopted much more circumscribed notions of what military force can accomplish (“non-militarized” strategic cultures) and are more likely to choose to accommodate indigenous parties rather than risk armed confrontation.
Taken together, the regime type, strategic culture, and security interests of intervening states determine the end-states that they pursue (democracy or autocracy) and the strategies that they are willing to use (accommodating or coercive). The conjunction of the three variables yields three approaches to military interventions. Democracies with militarized strategic cultures and high security interests at stake in an intervention tend to pursue a *transformation* approach in which they seek to impose relatively more participatory and inclusive political orders (that is, relatively more democratic orders) at the risk of confrontation with armed groups in the target state. Non-democracies with militarized strategic cultures and significant security interests generally adopt a *proxy* approach in which they seek to buttress the autocratic control of a favored faction in the target state to the exclusion of all others. All other interveners – those with non-militarized strategic cultures or with low security interests engaged by the target state – typically implement a *mediation* approach, where the interests of all armed groups are accommodated in a power-sharing structure which is broadly inclusive but that does not permit effective participation by unarmed elements of civil society (that is, lower-order democracy).

The approaches adopted by interveners do not alone determine the political outcomes of a military intervention. In particular, in the most benign implementation environments, where violence or the threat of violence is no longer central to political contestation, the coercive capacity of intervening forces may be irrelevant, allowing even uncommitted or non-militarized interveners to facilitate a relatively inclusive and participatory political order. Empirically, in the post-Cold War era, military interventions (as defined here) seldom take place in such benign circumstances. Indeed, nearly the only instances of such environments are cases in which Cold War-era civil wars were brought to an end by the withdrawal of the superpowers’ military

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5 Doyle and Sambanis (2000 and 2006) emphasize the importance of implementation environments.
and financial support and no indigenous source of readily plunderable resources existed. Outside of these fortunate circumstances, however, the ability of intervening forces to present a credible military deterrent has proven critical to fostering relatively more democratic political orders. Moreover, even in a number of apparently benign implementation environments, such as Panama, the security umbrella of the intervener has proven critical for the new regime’s endurance in the face of armed challenges.

**Defining the Conceptual Landscape**

Studies of forcible democracy promotion frequently stumble on the central but elusive concepts of military intervention and democracy, as well as on standards for what constitutes “success.” Before outlining my own theory of interventions, therefore, I will define each of these terms.6

*Military Interventions.* Two different conceptions of military interventions are present in political science: a broader definition in which interventions are characterized as any “use of troops or forces to cross borders or the employment of forces already based in a foreign country in pursuit of political or economic objectives in the context of a dispute,” and a more circumscribed concept referring to “the deployment of military personnel across recognized boundaries for the purpose of determining the political authority structure in the target state.”7 The two concepts frequently differ in scale: the former encompasses even small-scale cross-border incursions, while the latter is usually reserved for relatively sizeable and enduring military operations. What truly distinguishes them, however, is their object: the former definition can refer to uses of military force designed to effect changes in specific

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6 More precise operationalizations of each concept will be provided in Chapter 2 below.

7 The former definition is drawn from Pearson, Baumann, and Pickering (1994, 209). The latter definition is borrowed from Finnemore (2003, 9), but it is important to note that Finnemore does not accept this or any other single definition for the concept of interventions across historical eras.
policies of the target state, but the latter denotes only cases in which outside forces seek to change the entire political authority structure of the target.

It is the objective of uses of force which also distinguishes military interventions from war. Whereas wars are traditionally understood as interstate uses of force typically waged for territorial acquisition, interventions are usually undertaken to determine how a territory is governed rather than to whom it belongs (Jentleson and Levite 1992).

At the lowest intensity such missions as the delivery of humanitarian aid, the observation of a ceasefire, or the protection of so-called “safe areas” do not qualify as interventions, at least as the term is understood here. At the high end of the coercive spectrum, interstate wars such as World War II do not count as interventions, although the ensuing occupations of Germany and Japan do. Even with these restrictions, the concept still encompasses a wide variety of operations. Indeed, many scholars seek to erect a sharp distinction between operations undertaken with the consent or even the “induced consent” of the target state – particularly UN-mandated peace operations – from aggressive actions such as the American occupation of Iraq. While there are certainly a number of compelling reasons to delineate these two sub-categories for a variety of research agendas, it is the contention of this study that these two varieties of intervention can usefully be understood as extreme ends of a continuum. On the bottom end lie relatively robust instances of so-called “Chapter VI-½” UN operations in which international forces are mandated to facilitate the creation of elected governments in the target state and are authorized to use military force for some purposes other than strict self-defense. On the opposite end lie counterinsurgency campaigns such as the current ones in Afghanistan and Iraq. By examining the entire

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8 And others – see for instance Findlay (2002), Cable (1993), and Cooper and Berdal (1993).
spectrum of interventions we can better understand the relationship between force and the political orders likely to result.

Democracy. If the definition of military interventions is contentious, it is not nearly so disputed as the definition of democracy. This study draws upon the classic conceptualization of Robert Dahl in which democracy (“polyarchy,” in Dahl’s rather more precise terminology) is understood as the institutionalization of both competition for power among elites and participation by non-elites in the determination of which elites shall rule (Dahl 1971). In a contemporary context these two axes of political inclusion can be understood to refer to (i) the extent to which all major organized political groupings are afforded opportunities to compete for office and (ii) the extent to which ordinary citizens are provided channels for effective participation in the regular determination of the holders of public office (e.g., not only through exercising the right to vote, but also through freedom of press, freedom of assembly, and so on).

At the heart of many controversies lies the question of whether to understand democracy as a dichotomous or continuous variable – that is, is a country with many but not all characteristics of democracy better considered a non-democracy or an intermediate case somewhere between democracy and autocracy? If we adopt a dichotomous conception, then it is clearly absurd to speak of military interventions designed to promote democracy. The targets of military interventions will not look

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9 This conceptualization has achieved widespread acceptance. In one recent, widely cited definition, democracy is understood as “a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives” (Schmitter and Karl 1991, 76).

10 Many scholars include a third dimension of democracy, often labeled “rule of law” (see for instance Munck and Verkuilen 2002). While for many purposes it is important to distinguish this third dimension, in this study it is incorporated into the other two components for two reasons: first, for the sake of simplicity, and second, because incorporating all (or most) organized political factions into political competition and creating political space for the participation of unarmed civil society elements and voters is typically a prerequisite of establishing the rule of law in a democratic polity.
anything like Switzerland anytime soon, and anyone seeking to create new Switzerland from the rubble of failed states may be justly pilloried. If we adopt a continuous conception of democracy (more or less, rather than either-or), however, it is less clear that military interventions designed to promote democracy are inevitably errant idealism (although they may well be in specific cases). This latter conception of democracy is almost certainly the one adopted by Western policymakers launching military interventions, who often speak of “inclusive and representative” political orders so as not to confuse partial democratization with the creation of mature democracies. This study adopts the pragmatic approach recommended by Collier and Adcock (1999): The research question should determine the proper conceptualization of democracy. Since most policymakers appear to think of democracy promotion in terms of more or less rather than either/or, the former framework is adopted here.

Success. Success in promoting democracy can be understood both in terms of the quality of democracy (that is, the extent of democratic change fostered by intervention and the level of democracy eventually achieved) and its durability (i.e., how long it is able to survive). Ideally, we would examine the targets of military interventions ten or even 30 years after an intervention was concluded to assess how successfully a new regime had taken root. Unfortunately, since over half of the military interventions of the post-Cold War era are ongoing, studies assessing the long-term success of interventions have had to draw on military interventions conducted over the past half-century or more (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2006; Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Edelstein 2004; Pei and Kasper 2003; Pickering and Peceny 2006).

Many of these studies provide a valuable warning about the inherent difficulty of fostering enduring political change in a foreign country. There are at least four
reasons, however, why we should treat these findings with some skepticism. First, with some possible exceptions, the motives of current interventions are considerably different from those of a century ago, when protection of business investments and loans were dominant goals (Finnemore 2003). Second, the contemporary environment, in which a majority of countries on the planet are at least illiberal democracies and democracy as a goal for all humanity has been incorporated into UN documents, is much more favorable to democratic transitions than it was in previous eras (Huntington 1991). Third, superpowers are no longer funding and arming insurgencies and providing them safe havens and diplomatic support. Considering the significance that state backing frequently has for insurgencies (Byman et al 2001, especially 104-106), current nation-building efforts should generally be less threatened by external subversion than was the case during the Cold War. Finally, the methods of democracy promotion practiced now are in most cases substantially different than in previous eras, when interveners tended to rely either on hand-picking a narrow elite without broader efforts to make them accountable to their citizenry, or (as was common in American practice during the Cold War) half-heartedly promoting economic and social policies such as land-reform without broader engagement in civil society and political institutionalization (Smith 1994; Carothers 1999, Chapter 2). Concluding that military interventions cannot produce enduring, positive changes in the target regime on the basis of interventions conducted over the past century may be like concluding that foreign assistance can never promote development on the basis of the outcomes of the World Bank’s highway- and dam-building projects of decades past.

The only honest answer to the question of whether current military interventions can promote enduring political change in the post-Cold War era is simply that we cannot be certain (Paris 2004, 57). Instead of seeking definitive answers to this question, we should establish a more modest standard: What are the
likely consequences of interventions in the short-term, and are there indications that short-term progress made during interventions can be built upon through less intrusive instruments (such as aid, diplomacy, and possibly over-the-horizon military support) to effect lasting change after external forces have been removed? Military interventions almost always take place in highly parlous environments, where central authority has lost or loses its monopoly on violence and must begin once more to provide public goods while fending off armed challengers. Under such circumstances, external interveners will not create new Switzerlandes, nor should they try. They may hope, however, to create relatively stable quasi-democracies that show strong potential to improve gradually, according to an indigenous logic of democracy, once the intervening troops have withdrawn. Weak and failed states are some of the most complex challenges facing the international community today. We should approach these challenges with a healthy dose of pragmatism, recognizing that the least bad policy is the best available.

In this study “success” is defined according to three standards: the extent to which democratic change was fostered during an intervention, the level of democracy achieved by the last year of an intervention (democratic achievement), and indications that this level of democratic achievement may be sustained for the long-term after the departure of international troops (democratic sustainability). The first two of these standards of success will be assessed through a medium-N analysis based on Freedom House data, while all three will be assessed through a series of structured, focused comparisons between interventions in Bosnia, Tajikistan, and Afghanistan.

**Literature Review**

With an overview of the argument and definitions in place, we can turn to a review of the existing literature on military interventions and the promotion of
democracy, the use of force, and the stakes involved in an intervention. These three literatures bear on the three variables at the center of this study: the regime, type, strategic culture, and interests of intervening states. The literature on each of these will be reviewed in two steps, first by examining the probable intentions of intervening states and second by examining the likely effect of the specified variable on intervention outcomes.

\textit{Democracy}

\textit{Intentions}. Most of the existing literature on democracy promotion through armed intervention claims that no one does it, or that everyone does it, or that the United States uniquely does it. Relatively ignored is the simple thesis that all countries tend to externalize their own domestic forms of governance – that is, that democracies typically prefer to promote democracy while autocracies generally foster autocracy.

In a recent article Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2006) claim that no states truly seek to create democracies through their interventions. The authors argue that, while autocracies have no interest whatsoever in doing so, democratic leaders have an incentive to pursue “window-dressing” democratization – that is, democracy-building projects that give the appearance of promoting democracy while in fact allowing autocrats loyal to the interveners to retain power. In so doing they can costlessly assuage their public’s preference for building “nice” regimes while at the same time fulfilling the narrower demands of the “winning coalition” that backs the decision-makers – demands such as the exploitation of foreign countries’ natural resources. As evidence of their assertions, the authors provide a large-N analysis of the regime type of the targets of intervention long after the interveners withdraw. From these outcomes they infer intentions. That is, rather than beginning from the assumption that democracy promotion is an extraordinarily difficult enterprise, they
assume that interveners are capable of creating whatever regime they choose. Thus, if
the target states do not become and remain high-functioning democracies, then it is
because interveners had no intention of creating such.

Many observers advance a second hypothesis – that the United States is unique
in its attempts to impose its own political institutions on others and in particular in its
pursuit of democracy promotion through military interventions. This hypothesis –
commonly known as “American exceptionalism” – has a lengthy history, going back
at least as far as Louis Hartz’s (1955) seminal *The Liberal Tradition in America*. The
theme was revisited by Samuel Huntington (1982) in the 1980s, and it has seen a
renaissance under the administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush (Judis
2005; Monten 2005; Pickering and Peceny 2006).¹¹ Most of its proponents ground the
argument in the peculiar religious and political foundations of the early American
state: The lack of a cohesive ethnic basis for American nationalism forced the
adoption of a civic nationalist creed based on the Puritanical religious beliefs of
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century America. As a result American foreign policy is
premised on the notion that the United States must combat the forces of “evil” in the
world by promoting its own, superior political institutions.¹²

A third perspective contends that democracy promotion is the result of a
“global culture” that makes the promotion of democratic, Westphalian states appear to
be the only appropriate end of military intervention while making the imposition of
other forms of governance unthinkable (Paris 2003).

This study takes issue with all three of these perspectives: Democracy
promotion is neither “window dressing” nor a uniquely American enterprise, but

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¹¹ Pickering and Peceny, however, find little quantitative evidence to support their hypothesis of
American exceptionalism, and they admit that there may be indications that other liberal democracies in
recent years have also sought to promote democracy through interventions). For a closely related
argument that the United States tends to view its wars in Manichean terms, see Lipset (1996, 20).
¹² Such a view has often found expression in popular European commentary on the United States,
particularly since the invasion of Iraq (see for instance Bahners 2004).
neither is it universal. It is the result of a general tendency to externalize one’s own domestic norms of governance where possible at an acceptable price. Indeed, as will be seen in detail below, attempts to externalize one’s own political norms are remarkably common in interstate relations over both space and time. Nonetheless, given the inherent difficulties of creating a functioning state, let alone a higher-order democracy, in the circumstances that typically prevail where interventions occur, the real puzzle is to explain the precise conditions under which interveners will invest in such an ambitious enterprise.

**Outcomes.** According to many studies of democracy promotion through intervention, the historical record is hardly inspiring. With the notable exceptions of the Allied occupations of the defeated advanced industrialized Axis powers after the Second World War, these studies have found few success stories (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2006; Etzioni 2004; Marten 2004; Pei and Kasper 2003). Successes, these authors argue, are generally explained by local circumstances (Carothers 1999, 70; Etzioni 2004; Fukuyama 2004), and partial successes can prove most disastrous of all in that partial democracies are highly unstable and prone to violence (Hegre et al. 2001; Mansfield and Snyder 2002). Given these challenges and the risks of premature efforts at democracy promotion, many observers have recently argued for democracy only as a long-term goal to be pursued after a long period of more-or-less autocratic state-building.13

Other scholars dispute these findings. Some have found evidence that the United States has succeeded in promoting democratization through interventions over

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13 Some authors propose that the state-building should take place under international trusteeships (Paris 1997, 2004; Barnett 2006). Others propose that indigenous actors must themselves create a strong state – potentially through a bloody process of state-building on the model of early European state formation – before they can be nudged towards greater democracy by the international community (Weinstein 2005).
the decades (Hermann and Kegley 1998; Meernik 1996; Peceny 1999; Smith 1994).

Doyle and Sambanis argue that, while non-UN interventions do not have a good record at democracy promotion, UN interventions – particularly the so-called “Chapter VI½,” multi-dimensional peace operations that have been prevalent in the post-Cold War era – have proven successful (Doyle and Sambanis 2000 and 2006; see also Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 2005).

Much of the reason for these widely divergent assessments stems from different standards and time frames for assessing the dependent variable. Doyle and Sambanis, for instance, set a very low threshold for success in promoting what they term “participatory peace” – i.e., peace with elements of democratic participation. They require only that target states two years after an intervention score a 3 out of a possible score of 20 (again, using Polity data) in order to qualify as a democracy. By this standard, the Soviet Union and nearly all of the countries of Eastern Europe consistently counted as “participatory” polities after the death of Stalin, as have the large majority of African states.

Beyond the problems of differing standards, however, their work suffers from overly broad conceptual categories for their independent variables and units of analysis. Doyle and Sambanis’ work, for instance, disputes the contribution of non-UN interventions to the construction of participatory (relatively more democratic) peace. But within this category they include numerous operations such as Russia’s support for secessionist regions in Georgia – interventions that were never intended to

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14 Others have disputed the underlying theoretical and methodological choices made by the authors. See for instance the Sambanis and Doyle’s (2006) response to the criticism of King and Zeng.
15 The former Yugoslavia (after the Second World War) and all of its successor republics, as well as Soviet successor republics such as Azerbaijan, have all consistently met or exceeded Doyle and Sambanis’ cut-off value of 3. Such countries as Angola, Burkina Faso, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Togo, Uganda, and Zimbabwe have never fallen below a value of 3.
promote democracy in any way.\textsuperscript{16} Bueno de Mesquita and Downs’ work differentiates between the actions of democratic and non-democratic interveners, but within their unit of analysis they include interventions ranging from the provision of a handful of unarmed military observers to the U.S. war in Vietnam.\textsuperscript{17}

Many of the analyses discussed above have contributed substantially to our understanding of interventions and peace operations; Doyle and Sambanis’ empirical work in particular is an impressive achievement. In general, however, they fail to examine empirically both the motivations of intervening states and the tools through which these states pursue their objectives. Thus, when interveners fail to promote democracy or promote only an extremely low level of democracy, we often do not know whether democracy promotion was even attempted or how the major actors involved pursued such a goal. This study seeks to combine an analysis of the intentions of interveners with the means they have at their disposal.

\textit{Military Enforcement}

\textit{Intentions}. The existing literature on military interventions generally treats interveners as indistinguishable from one another, at least as regards the use of force. This is particularly true of quantitative examinations of the effectiveness of intervention forces, which typically measure overall numbers of deployed troops or the ratio of troops to population or territory (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Quinlivan 2003). Some works have distinguished between highly capable military forces (usually those of the advanced industrialized countries) and less capable ones (typically from developing countries) (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Howe 1996/97; Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 2005). Even in this latter literature,

\textsuperscript{16} On Russia’s intentions in Georgia, see for instance the work of Felgenhauer (2004), King (2001), Malashenko (2000), Shenfield (1995).

\textsuperscript{17} The work of Hermann and Kegley (1998) and Meernik (1996) distinguishes between different intensities of intervention.
however, interveners differ from one another in terms of their material capabilities and
troop discipline rather than in terms of their intentions and perceptions. Although these
latter studies have found that the militaries of more developed countries correlate with
higher levels of success, there remains considerable empirical variation within this
category. As will be seen in the empirical sections to follow, while Britain and France,
for example, possess similar levels of military capabilities, they tend to approach
military interventions differently. Although Germany has a very high level of overall
military capacity, it has a force structure and follows rules of engagement that tend to
limit its effectiveness in interventions.

Outcomes. Some are skeptical that military enforcement actions can contribute
to promoting even peace and order in a target state (Fortna 2004), others are skeptical
only that enforcement can promote more democratic political orders (Marten 2004),
while still others believe that UN enforcement actions can be successful in promoting
more inclusive politics but that non-UN enforcement operations have failed in this
regard (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 2005). On the
other end of the spectrum, some observers believe that enforcement actions against the
criminalized paramilitary bands that have predominated in cases of post-Cold War
state failure are almost certain to be successful at low cost, at least if conducted by
competent militaries. Still others have argued for much more intrusive state-building
missions in which local actors are subordinated to an international protectorate,

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18 Doyle and Sambanis (2000) argued that enforcement operations failed to promote more participatory
peace, but they later qualified this argument (2006) to claim that enforcement without broader, civilian
capacity-building operations failed.
19 For the purposes of this study, it is important to note that both of these studies adopt a narrow
operationalization of non-UN operations.
confrontation with a competent disciplined one, the disciplined one, essentially by definition, will
prevail.”
without ever directly addressing how armed groups who are removed from positions of power are likely to react (Paris 1997; Paris 2004).

Four issues lie at the heart of these differing assessments concerning the importance and likelihood of success of military enforcement: the nature of target state actors, the nature of the interveners, the high levels of uncertainty inherent in any use of force, and the likelihood that positive (non-coercive) inducements can bring about decisive political change.

One line of argumentation contends that military enforcement may be appropriate and even necessary in certain environments while counter-productive in others. Stephen Stedman’s well-known concept of “spoilers,” for instance, distinguishes between “limited” spoilers (to whom positive incentives for cooperation should be offered), “total” spoilers (who must be coerced), and “greedy” spoilers (with whom interveners should adopt a combination of positive and negative inducements) (Stedman 1997). Doyle and Sambanis distinguish between interventions into “coordination games,” where interveners need only provide the coordination point and transparency local actors need to realize mutually beneficial political arrangements, and “cooperation games,” where interveners must alter the relative costs of cooperation and conflict for local parties, potentially through the use of military force (Doyle and Sambanis 2006). Such clear distinctions tend to break down in practice, however, as these authors themselves recognize (Doyle and Sambanis 2006, 51), suggesting that they are often better understood as poles of a continuum. When these concepts are used to explain the conditions under which outside interveners can bring peace to war-stricken countries, there may well be numerous empirical instances of pure coordination games (or limited spoilers), because war exhaustion may induce the local parties to seek peace, so long as their basic interests are accommodated in a post-
When these concepts are applied to external attempts to bring about regime change, however, there are likely to be few empirical instances of pure coordination games, for the simple reason that regime change by definition directly threatens the political interests of some local actors. Armed actors who expect to lose free and fair elections are likely to oppose such elections, and no positive inducements – short of a guarantee of political prerogatives proportionate to the party’s armed strength – are likely to sway these parties towards cooperation. Thus the use or threat of armed force is likely to exercise a pervasive influence on the outcomes of interventions designed to promote substantial change towards either autocracy or democracy. This is not to say that military enforcement actions will necessarily be successful, but they will at the least be highly relevant in the vast majority of cases.

Much of the literature also fails to make sufficiently clear a second important distinction – that between UN and non-UN interventions. The UN, many scholars argue, has a comparative advantage in interventions derived from its perceived legitimacy, its administrative capacities, and its institutional checks that aim to prevent any single intervener from realizing narrowly self-interested goals at the expense of the target state (Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl 2005). Often there is considerable overlap between missions initiated by the UN and those initiated by particular powers, and quantitative analyses have difficulty in disentangling the effects that may be attributed to the UN. Indeed, often the coding decisions used in quantitative analyses obscure more than they elucidate. Studies by Doyle and Sambanis (2006) and by Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2005), for instance, code as a UN operation any intervention that “took place in the context of a UN mandate.” Thus the post-Dayton intervention in Bosnia is coded as a UN intervention, not one undertaken by the

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21 The classic statement on war exhaustion and “ripeness” for war termination is Zartman’s (1985).
22 A point acknowledged by Pickering and Peceny (2006, 553), who call for in-depth qualitative studies of these cases.
United States and its allies. This coding choice was made despite the fact that the
drafters of the Dayton accords sought to keep the UN at arms-distance from any
significant role in Bosnia, leaving the world body with only highly circumscribed
duties in unarmed police monitoring and assistance in refugee resettlement, while the
use of military force, the provision of reconstruction assistance, and the exercise of
quasi-trusteeship political powers were all authorities retained by coalitions of states
outside of the UN system.

More fundamentally, if the use or threat of force is as omnipresent in efforts to
promote regime change as was suggested in the discussion above, then a focus on the
UN misses much of the underlying dynamics even within UN-flagged operations.
When it comes to using force, troop-contributing countries (TCCs) in UN missions
overwhelmingly operate on a national basis, retaining the right to interpret a mission’s
mandate and rules of engagement and the right to refuse participation in any activities
deemed unacceptable. Moreover, it is states that vote on a UN mission’s mandate in
the first place, and it is states that determine the troop and funding levels available to
pursue that mandate. This basic point was highlighted by the single most authoritative
study on the subject of UN peace operations, conducted by the UN itself – the so-
2000). Thus, studies may be technically correct in ascribing failures of UN peace
operations to “inappropriate mandates” or inadequate levels of material support. But
these failures themselves are usually best understood through an examination of states’
policies.

This study therefore focuses on the motives, perceptions, and interests of
states. Such a perspective not only sheds light on the outcomes of missions led by
states outside of a UN framework, it also reveals much about the variation in outcomes
among UN operations as well.
The role of uncertainty in the use of force is yet a third point concerning the likely success of military enforcement actions that is obscured by much of the existing literature. Some scholars within a single work criticize both the use of force and the non-use of force, without ever specifying ex ante the conditions under which force is appropriate or the manner in which it should be exercised. Other scholars dismiss the utility of force altogether, but for certain exceptions – which, again, remain unspecified. Thus Bellamy and Williams (2004, 200) for instance write that “there are always ‘better’ (more efficient in terms of financial and human resources and more effective in addressing the causes of violence and human suffering) ways of promoting order, human rights and welfare, preventing war and resolving violent conflict than resorting to military force. That said, force may be necessary in exceptional circumstances.” The reader is often left with the impression that uses of force that succeed are good, while those that fail are bad.

Undoubtedly there is much to be said about ways in which military enforcement actions could be performed better and about the circumstances in which they are appropriate at all. At the same time, the ambiguity of many authors may derive less from the weaknesses of their specific analyses and more from the nature of the subject itself. Carl von Clausewitz, one of the founders of modern strategic thought, is famous for his argument that even discrete uses of force tend to have unpredictable consequences (Clausewitz [1832] 1976). More recent academic studies of military operations in general and interventions in particular have commonly made the same point (Betts 2000, Brown 2003, Kupchan 1992, Garofano 2002). While the likely outcomes of uses of force may be predictable at some level, this study begins from the empirical fact that there is a high level of uncertainty associated with military instruments. Higher-intensity uses of force may be an inherently risky proposition, associated with both inspiring successes and spectacular failures. Given this level of
uncertainty, different interveners are likely to reach divergent assessments of the utility of force.

Finally, much of the existing literature fails to make clear that both coercive and non-coercive instruments have their inherent risks. The obvious risk of military enforcement is that it will spark spirals of violence that exceed an intervener’s commitment to the intervention. Yet relying on positive inducements risks political stagnation and even the strengthening of predatory elites. Proponents of less coercive tactics commonly argue that the cooperation of warlords must be secured in the early phases of state-building in order to restore peace and order, but over time politics will evolve (nudged forward by international actors) towards greater representativeness and accountability as all parties become more secure and the benefits of cooperation more visible. While such an outcome is certainly possible, two powerful dynamics work against it. First, much of the literature on democratic transitions stresses the path dependence of democratization and the tendency of the institutions in place at the time of “founding elections” to become highly resistant to change (especially O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986). Consequently, paramilitarized factions are frequently able to “lock in” their initial advantages, preserving institutions that favor powersharing among an elect oligarchy over efficiency in producing public goods (Rothchild and Roeder 2005; Bunce 2005, especially 22-23). Second, to the extent that armed factions retain both their paramilitary capabilities and control over illicit economies, they are able to maintain powerful patronage networks and extragovernmental enforcement of their oligarchic privileges. This combination of dysfunctional governmental institutions and over-functioning illicit networks may endure indefinitely (King 2001). In the meantime, the paralysis of government encourages both economic stagnation and a culture of corruption, while those young and able typically flee for better opportunities overseas. Both democracy and democrats are discredited by their failure
to produce public goods (Diamond 1999, Chapter 5). And the balance of power among the dominant factions remains highly fragile and susceptible to relapse into violent conflict (Rothchild and Roeder 2005), subject as it is to disruption by exogenous shocks such as a decisive shift in the population ratios of different ethnic groups, a change in leadership of one of the parties, or a change of government in a potentially meddlesome neighboring country.

This review of the literature on military enforcement suggests four important conclusions for understanding the role of force in interventions. First, there is an intimate relationship between force and political authority in the circumstances in which military interventions occur, and thus the use or threat of force is likely to exercise a pervasive effect on political outcomes in the course of an intervention. Second, while the UN and NGOs are effective administrators of capacity-building programs, states are still the actors that deploy the military forces necessary to shape the underlying political dynamics of target states. Thus we must understand the motives, perceptions, and commitment of intervening states to understand the range of political outcomes likely to result from an intervention. Third, there is a high degree of uncertainty inherent in the use of force, and this uncertainty means that various states will behave differently when facing the decision to confront or co-opt target-state actors. Finally, both the use of force and the non-use of force exercise a profound impact on the outcome of interventions. Focusing on catastrophic uses of force, such as UNOSOM II in Somalia, without recognizing the risks inherent in the non-use of force skews our overall understanding of interventions.

National Interests

Intentions. Quantitative studies of democracy promotion through intervention have generally assumed that intervening states pursue identical strategies regardless of
the circumstances in which they are intervening. Failure to promote democracy in any instance has been read as evidence against the intention of ever doing so (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2006). Such an assumption flies in the face of both the empirical literature on interventions and the theoretical literature on democracy promotion. The empirical literature on peace operations, for instance, has repeatedly made the point that Africa receives vastly less diplomatic attention and fewer material resources than such regions as the Balkans that are of particular interest to wealthy great powers (for instance Bellamy and Williams 2004b, 196-7). The theoretical literature makes clear why intervening states are likely to pursue different strategies at different levels of commitment. First, democracy promotion is both a difficult and hazardous enterprise. While relatively consolidated democracies appear to be more stable than autocracies, transitional states tend to be highly unstable (Hegre et al 2001; for a contrasting view, see Ghandi and Vreeland 2004). Consequently, even if an intervening state’s first preference might be the promotion of democracy, if it is unwilling to dedicate substantial resources to the enterprise, it may choose to abandon the democratic project altogether. Second, as discussed above, intrusive efforts to reorient the politics of other states are likely to provoke violent confrontations with parties in the target state who benefit from the status quo. Without some substantial degree of national interest at stake, decision-makers in the intervening country may be highly reluctant to risk escalating a conflict, even though doing so will prevent the realization of the decision-makers’ first-order preferences.

Outcomes. Just as recent quantitative analyses have ignored the relative importance of the target state to the intervening power when assessing the motives of interveners, they have also ignored them in assessing outcomes. This choice is a peculiar one for a number of reasons. First, as discussed immediately above, the stakes
influence the approach that an intervener adopts and the resources an intervener brings to bear, both of which should influence the outcomes of an intervention. Moreover, these resources cannot be understood simply in terms of soldiers deployed or dollars spent on aid. More important than such numbers is what is done with them. Do soldiers aggressively pursue their mandate, or are they primarily engaged in self-protection? Is aid spent to bolster a faltering autocratic regime, or is it disbursed with stringent conditionality requirements incorporating good governance principles? Beyond the question of how an intervener acts, there is also the question of how it is perceived to act. In previous studies of extended deterrence, scholars contended that third parties were more likely to deter an attack on an ally when such an attack would threaten significant interests of the deterring state (Huth and Russett 1984). Similarly, in interventions armed factions in the target state are more likely to be deterred from attacking an intervener if they believe that the intervener has significant interests at stake in the mission. Otherwise, target-state actors are more likely to calculate that the intervener is a paper tiger, unwilling to absorb significant costs – measured particularly in soldiers’ lives – to impose its preferred political institutions.

Existing studies of military interventions have provided a wealth of theoretical concepts and empirical information from which we can better understand military interventions. Relatively few, however, have looked at how the perceptions, motives, and domestic political constraints of intervening powers interact to shape the strategies that they adopt and thus the outcomes that are relatively more likely to emerge. With an understanding of the prior literature and its limitations, we can now turn to an integrated theory of comparative military interventions.
A Theory of Interventions

High levels of uncertainty lie at the heart of military interventions. It is easy to be skeptical of ambitious attempts to impose democracy in foreign states. Yet the two other major regime types, anocracy and autocracy, are equally problematic: As numerous scholarly studies make clear, anocracy may well be the least stable of all regime types, while autocracies are likely more stable than anocracies but less stable than democracies and more prone to bloody repression of politically excluded groups (Hegre et al 2001). Outside powers may instead adopt less ambitious goals that do not seek to shape the political authority structures of the target state – goals such as the amelioration of human suffering or the containment of a conflict within the borders of a single state. Yet such goals also often prove to be highly problematic (Betts 1994). If the decision is made to intervene at all, then an intervener faces a dilemma in the true sense of the word, where all alternatives are unattractive and the least bad option is the best available. When confronting this dilemma, different intervening states adopt different approaches to intervention based on three variables: the regime type, strategic culture, and interests of the intervening state or states. Various conjunctions of these three variables determine which of three broad approaches interveners choose: the transformation, mediation, and proxy models of intervention. These approaches, in turn, profoundly influence the outcomes of intervention. The remainder of this section will proceed in three steps, examining first the preferences of interveners, then the structure of intervention strategies and their ramifications for the politics of the target state, and finally predictions about the approaches chosen by interveners and the concomitant range of intervention outcomes that is more or less likely as a result.
Independent Variables: The Sources of Intervener Strategies

Given the dilemmas posed by interventions, how do different interveners respond? In general countries tend to externalize their own political and military cultures. Democracies commonly think that democracy is both feasible and the best long-term means of stabilizing unstable regions. Countries that have come to believe through past experience that the projection of military force can achieve important political outcomes are more likely to use force to secure their preferred outcome. Thus democracies with militarized strategic cultures are more likely to use force to marginalize “spoilers” and attempt to promote higher-order democracy. Actors in autocracies and quasi-democracies, on the other hand, tend to view democracy promotion with extreme skepticism, seeing it either as misguided idealism or as cover for the pursuit of geopolitical and economic interests (for instance Kosachev 2004). Similarly, those in non-militarist states often perceive the use of force to promote democracy as a form of irrationality inspired by domestic political psychoses or Manichean worldviews (for instance Bahners 2004).

Regime Type. The notion that countries tend to externalize their own domestic norms of governance is a common one, appearing in the normative strain of the democratic peace literature (Doyle 1983a and 1983b; Russett 1993; Owen 1997; Weart 1998), in studies of foreign aid and international law (Lumsdaine 1993; Nadelmann 1990; Reus-Smit 1999), and in theories of alliance formation and armed intervention (Lang 2002; Owen 2002; Walt 1987). More recently a broad empirical study has found that democracy assistance (both technical and diplomatic support) is strongly correlated with the regime type of the state providing assistance (Herman and Piccone 2002). Thus it should come as no surprise that democracies tend to promote
democracy while autocracies generally undermine the potential for democratic change abroad.

At the same time, the relationship is not so simple. Many leaders are skeptical that targets of intervention have the social prerequisites for democratic change, or they may believe that democracy is highly vulnerable to foreign subversion (for instance Kirkpatrick 1979). Institutions and bureaucracies may be highly averse to taking on the risks of regime change (Western 2002). And populations may shy away from the costs of democracy promotion or regime change (Holsti 2000; Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998). Rather than seeing democracy promotion as a monolithic strategy invariably pursued from the highest levels of the state, it is better to understand it as a contingent but probable outcome, one emerging from the interaction of top policy-makers, institutions and bureaucracies, and general populations (Peceny 1995). In some cases decision-makers may strongly believe in democracy promotion. In other instances top leaders may not believe that democracy is a realistic goal but may be pushed towards promoting more representative government as a condition for gaining domestic support for a foreign policy, such as occurred during the Reagan Administration’s domestic battles over its Central American strategy (Carothers 1991; Karl 1996). In yet other cases policymakers may find themselves dependent on organizations with pro-democracy mandates – such as the UN or NGOs – to implement their plans. Thus a “concatenation” of causal pathways and mechanisms (Gambetta 1998) is responsible for the pro-democracy tendencies of interventions undertaken by democratic states.

This is not to say that democracies always seek to promote democracy. In many instances they are daunted by the challenges of democracy-building in underdeveloped regions of the world, or they are unable to marshal the resources necessary for such an enormous task, or they have built cooperative relationships with
unpalatable regimes for security reasons. Where the available resources for promoting
democratic transitions are low, the challenges are great, and the risks of alienating
existing elites are high, democracies commonly jettison any qualms they may have
about cooperation with autocratic regimes. Where democracies intervene in small-
scale or covert operations, where public scrutiny is minimal and the resources to
manage a dangerous transition are limited, democratic interveners also act in very
undemocratic ways. But where the resources expended are great, offering substantial
sources of leverage over the target state’s politics and requiring public justification for
the risks and costs endured, democracies tend to externalize their own systems of
governance.

The tendency of non-democracies to undermine the opportunities for
democracy abroad is an equally complex and probabilistic phenomenon. In some cases
non-democracies such as the Soviet Union actively seek to propagate non-democratic
political institutions for ideological reasons. More often, however, and particularly in
the post-Cold War era, non-democratic elites simply do not value democracy (a
principled belief, to borrow again from Goldstein and Keohane), or they do not believe
that it is achievable except in certain narrowly defined circumstances (a causal belief).
The latter view is particularly common among transitional or “hyphenated” states –
that is, those that cannot be considered mature democracies but that also are not closed
autocracies. Such states may value democracy and may aspire to become democracies
themselves, but precisely because they occupy an intermediate position, they
recognize the enormous difficulties inherent in democratic transitions. Moreover, the
same mechanisms that constrain decision-makers’ latitude for action in mature
democracies do not operate in non-democracies. In particular, while elites in
democracies may not favor democracy promotion, they are typically constrained by
checks and balances within the system. Although public opinion and legislatures only
imperfectly constrain executive action, there is a political price to be paid in
democracies for militarily supporting repressive dictatorships (Peceny 1995). As will
be seen in the case study of Russian interventionism in the following chapter, such
mechanisms do not operate in non-democracies. Thus, when non-democratic elites
confront the daunting challenges of restructuring another state’s political authority
structures, they are less likely to believe that promoting a relatively more democratic
system is possible, and they are highly unlikely to be constrained from supporting
less-than-democratic regimes abroad.

_Strategic Culture._ Different countries clearly think about military force in
different ways. This is not to say that opinion is unified within a country; obviously,
decisions about when and how to use force are commonly the subject of bitter
domestic debate between political parties and between different branches of the
government (Avant 1993; Katzenstein 1996; Rathbun 2004). But numerous scholars
have found relatively consistent patterns of divergent beliefs about the efficacy of
force among states in the contemporary era, whether judging by behavior or public
opinion. By a variety of metrics such countries as the United States, United Kingdom,
Israel, India, Pakistan, and Russia typically rank among the most prone to use force,
while postwar Germany, postwar Japan, Belgium, and New Zealand are among those
least likely (Asmus, Everts, and Isernia 2004; Maoz 2004; Müller 2004).
Beginning with the work of Jack Snyder (1979), scholars have explored the concept of “strategic culture” to explain why states adopt such divergent patterns of behavior. While the concept has evolved considerably over the years, the term is perhaps best understood to indicate “an integrated system of symbols (i.e., argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors, etc.) that acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting grand strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious” (Johnston 1995, 36, emphasis added).

Although useful, such a definition may still encompass a wide range of approaches to the subject. In this study I adopt a broad and empirical understanding of strategic culture, without seeking to make a definitive statement about its origins or nature. Strategic cultures are doubtless influenced by such factors as a country’s level of development, the timing of its development (i.e., early or late), regime type, prior experience with war, military bureaucracies, and the contingent outcomes of domestic political debates (Merom 2003; Snyder 1991; Cederman 2001; Kier 1997; Katzenstein 1996). Here, however, it is sufficient to know that various states have internalized

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23 It is important to note that Snyder subsequently came to express considerable reservations about the utility of the concept, arguing that, “[a]s a rule, culture is an explanation of last resort,” and that “culture,” as he used the term, was simply an expression of the phenomenon in which rational solutions to a given set of material circumstances become “locked in” and resistant to change even after those initial material circumstances change (1990, 4). Snyder’s later misgivings notwithstanding, the concept of strategic culture remains a valuable one for the purposes of this study. First, many others have developed the concept and found it useful in explaining a variety of otherwise puzzling political phenomena, ranging from European warfighting doctrine in the World Wars to continuities in Chinese strategic thought over several centuries. Second, although this study does not seek to provide an account of the origins of divergent strategic cultures, it may well be that these cultures evolved very much in the terms that Snyder describes – that is, as rational adaptations to a given set of material circumstances that over time become resistant to change. It is notable that the least militarized countries in this study – Germany and Italy (and Japan, although it has not deployed enough combat troops to qualify as an “intervener”) suffered traumatic defeats in World War II, while the most militarized countries – the United States and Britain – have never in recent memory suffered military defeat on their home soil. France, an intermediate case, was both a victor and victim of World War II, and it suffered the traumatic loss of part of its “home” territory in Algeria. Thus the strategic cultures of interest here may indeed have evolved much as Snyder might expect – originally as rational adaptations to traumatic defeats in war.
patterns of thinking – both at the level of policy elites and in the public as a whole – that make the use of force seem relatively more or less efficacious and acceptable as a policy instrument for shaping international politics. In reality, of course, strategic cultures are vastly more nuanced than can be expressed by a simple more-or-less dichotomy. States may be relatively more prone to use force in certain contexts, such as within a UN-mandated, multilateral peace operation, while being vehemently opposed to the use of force in other contexts, such as a unilateralist invasion. Strongly pacifist groups and militarists may (and in fact often do) co-exist within a single polity, with institutions or triggering events playing key roles in determining the relative influence of each on policy outcomes. Finally, strategic cultures are not fixed, but evolve over time in response to both historical events and the manner in which the lessons of those events are internalized (Katzenstein 1996). This study makes a conscious gamble, sacrificing intention for the sake of extension (Sartori 1970, 1044). By simplifying strategic cultures into a single axis of comparison (more or less militarized), we can understand many disparate intervening states’ broad orientations towards the use of force while acknowledging more subtle variations in the case studies to follow. Such orientations do not determine how a country will act in any given instance, but they make the resort to force more or less likely.

The extent to which an intervener’s strategic culture is militarized influences the conduct and outcomes of interventions in two ways: through what it does and through what target-country populations expect it will (or might) do. Wherever possible it is preferable to maintain order during an intervention through indigenous police. When they are unable or unwilling to enforce the laws, international police with executive authority may be necessary. But in cases of state failure, indigenous

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24 Once internalized, however, these strategic cultures tend to be relatively resistant to change, at least in the medium-term (one or more generations) and absent a traumatic national event that precipitates public reflection, and they exercise powerful effects beyond the context in which they initially evolved.
groups frequently possess vastly more numbers and firepower than the police. In such
cases the police operate only to the extent that they are tolerated (or co-opted) by these
local militias – unless an external intervening military has made it clear that they will
respond to any attacks on the police and will enforce those laws so threatening to
various paramilitary groupings that the police do not dare to do so. Militarized
interveners are more likely to use their forces so as to maintain order against
paramilitaries, at least in those interventions which are a priority for the intervener.
They are also more likely to be perceived as able and willing to do so, thus deterring
many indigenous armed groupings from directly challenging the intervening state or
coalition. In such cases a militarized intervener’s greatest contributions to maintaining
order may be invisible – but no less effective (indeed, perhaps more so) for operating
only in the background.

The measurement of strategic culture will be discussed at length in the next
chapter. Here, however, it is important to note that strategic culture and military
capabilities are distinct concepts. In some countries such as the United States powerful
capabilities and a highly militarized strategic culture coincide. In numerous other
cases they sharply diverge. Germany, for instance, has substantial military capabilities
but a strategic culture generally opposed to force projection, while Nigeria has
relatively meager capabilities but a heavily militarized strategic culture, as may be
seen in its leadership of regional peacekeeping missions in the 1990s. While
capabilities certainly matter, they are less significant than strategic culture. Australia,
for instance, led an aggressive and highly successful military intervention in East
Timor, despite possessing modest military means. Britain and France possess
comparable capabilities, but Britain ultimately proved willing to lead an international
military response to the provocations of the warlord Foday Sankoh in Sierra Leone,
while France has typically adopted a more laissez faire approach. As will be seen below, these differences in national style are highly consequential; outcomes are influenced more strongly by strategic cultures than by capabilities.

*National Interests and Resource Constraints.* While the regime type and strategic culture of an intervener reveal much about its preferences for constructing order through military interventions, states are not always able to act upon their first-order preferences for lack of resources. Military interventions are costly. They require the investment of considerable money, political capital, and frequently soldiers’ lives. As a result decision-makers must prioritize where they will expend scarce resources, and they typically use their rough estimates of “the national interest” as a guide. Indeed, the American academic literature over the past two decades has been replete with warnings of “imperial overstretch” and the need to limit American involvement in peripheral conflicts so as to preserve resources for critical priorities, be they the domestic economy or rising potential competitors (Art 2003, 232-3; Carter and Perry 1999; Clarke and Halper 2004; Gaddis 1982; Gilpin 1981; Kennedy 1987; Kupchan 1994). In general, resource constraints will force interveners to adopt less costly forms of intervention in cases where their national interests are not engaged, while more costly alternatives will be feasible in target countries of higher priority. Such an assumption underpinned a number of studies on extended deterrence during the Cold War, with would-be deterrers significantly more likely to intervene on behalf of their

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25 France is a rather peculiar case. According to the measurements described in detail in the next chapter, France is an intermediate case – much less militarized than the United States or United Kingdom, but much more militarized than Germany, France, or Belgium. Rather than having “intermediate” preferences, however, France seems to have conflicting preferences. In general French society has rejected high-intensity uses of force in all but the most exceptional circumstances. The French military, chastened by its experiences in Algeria and Indochina, is typically skeptical of intrusive interventions, although it is willing to undertake more limited uses of force. The president and the offices reporting directly to him (potentially “her” in the near future) have typically been more interventionist, particularly in Francophone Africa, but the executive is usually constrained from undertaking large-scale, high-risk operations by other French political actors (Moisi 1984).
client states when tangible and intangible interests were at stake (Huth and Russett 1984, especially 503).

Specifying the “national interest” ex ante is of course difficult (Wolfers 1962, especially 147). Yet scholars have nonetheless found that the willingness to bear the costs associated with force projection can be predicted. Huth and Russett’s (1984) analysis of extended deterrence, for instance, was premised on the notion that deterrent threats would be more credible when the would-be deterrer had significant interests at stake in the target state; otherwise the threatening country would be unconvinced of the deterrer’s willingness to pay the price for defending the target. Although more precise operationalizations of interests will follow in the next chapter and in the appendices, it is worth noting that Huth and Russett (1984) use as proxies such variables as military bases, formal alliances, and volume of trade. In the post-Cold War era, similar interests – such as maintaining the vitality of the NATO alliance and preventing an exodus of costly refugees – frequently influenced the willingness of intervening states to commit substantial resources to an intervention. Specifying these interests ex ante rather than inferring them from behavior in the course of an intervention is of course necessary to avoid logical circularity.

The correlation of interests and committed resources is imperfect. There are some instances, such as Somalia in the early Clinton administration, where intervening states have been much more aggressive than might have been expected given the limited interests at stake. In other cases, such as Afghanistan in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks, interveners have committed far fewer resources than observers expected. In general, however, such divergences from the predicted level of commitment tend to be self-correcting over time, at least in part. Following an aggressive pursuit of the Somali warlord Mohammed Farah Aideed, the United States suffered 18 fatalities in a single firefight in Mogadishu and rapidly recalibrated its
intervention, hunkering down in bunkers for a few months before a planned withdrawal. In Afghanistan, on the other hand, the Bush administration ramped up its commitment to the country after two years of a minimalist intervention, more than doubling the soldiers and money committed to the Central Asian state and making it one of the largest interventions in the post-Cold War era. Thus, although the correlation of interests and resource commitments is imperfect, the exceptions suggest that the overall relation is quite strong.

The conjunction of these three factors – the regime type, strategic culture, and resource constraints of the intervening state or coalition – determine the broad outlines of the strategies pursued and the outcomes that are more probable in the course of the intervention.

Dependent Variables: The Structure of Political Authority in Target States

Three Models of Intervention. Interventions in the post-Cold War era have almost uniformly been undertaken to restore order to weak and failed states (Bunce 2005). In the case of the one major exception, Iraq, the intervention quickly created an extremely weak or failed state. In such cases, where the state has lost its former

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26 Even after doubling the resources committed to Afghanistan, the Bush administration was faulted by many observers for what was perceived as its inadequate support, particularly in comparison to the Iraq war and on a per capita basis to the interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor. As will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5, the resources committed to Afghanistan were indeed much less than the need. But when one compares, for instance, absolute numbers of soldiers deployed or fatalities endured, the only intervention that clearly exceeded the commitment to Afghanistan was Iraq, while only Bosnia received comparable numbers of soldiers or claimed a similar magnitude of intervening soldiers’ lives.

27 Other possible exceptions include the American invasion of Panama, the ongoing Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus and the Russian interventions in the break-away republics of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transdniestr. Panama was also not a weak or failed state before the American invasion, and the United States was successful in imposing a new political order relatively quickly. The Turkish intervention in Cyprus was undertaken not so much to restore order as to protect ethnic Turkish Cypriots and secure strategic advantage against Greece. The Russian interventions were undertaken with mixed motives. For some powerful actors in Moscow the interventions were motivated by the desire to keep Georgia and Moldova weak and subject to Moscow’s control, although others acted on the basis of more positive motives (Lynch 2000; Shenfield 1995).
monopoly on violence and anarchy predominates, armed factions quickly become the dominant actors. Unarmed actors for the most part are either cowed into irrelevance by the threat of violence, or they develop their own paramilitary capabilities. Meanwhile, throughout the course of fighting, armed groups strengthen their position by intensifying intra-group loyalties and by developing their control of illicit economies in order to purchase both the materiel with which to fight and the loyalty of the cadres to do the fighting (Kaldor 1999). Even when armed factions come to favor an end to fighting – whether because of a hurting stalemate, war exhaustion, or some other mechanism – they are unlikely to relinquish the privileged political status that they have acquired during the period of anarchy. Thus international interventions designed to promote political stability must reckon with the dominant position of these factions.

Intervening powers may hypothetically pursue one of four strategies, depending on the extent to which both armed and unarmed actors in the target state are included in political authority structures. On the one hand interveners can accept the predominance of paramilitarized factions as a given and do relatively little to strengthen the position of unarmed groups in the politics of the target state. In such a case the intervener can adopt one of two strategies, either strengthening a single faction so that it can impose its rule against all challengers (the proxy model of intervention), or the intervener can incorporate all armed factions into a single powersharing arrangement or “government of national reconciliation” (the mediation model of intervention). On the other hand interveners can attempt to weaken the position of these armed factions. They can do so, in the words of William Zartman, either by making the powerful legitimate (that is, by making armed factions into political parties accountable to unarmed elements of civil society and the electorate as a whole) or by making the legitimate powerful (that is, by marginalizing paramilitarized groups and ensuring that political groups drawn from civil society
become the custodians of a democratic state wielding a monopoly over violence) (Zartman 1995, 270). The strategy of making the powerful legitimate may be termed the transformation model of intervention in that it transforms the nature of the dominant political actors. While it is also hypothetically possible to make the legitimate powerful, in practice intervening states in the post-Cold War era have almost uniformly avoided such an approach. Each of these approaches to intervention has implications for both the level of democracy promoted within the target state and the likelihood of violent confrontation between local factions and intervening forces, as may be seen in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inclusion of Armed Actors</th>
<th>Less Inclusive</th>
<th>More Inclusive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inclusion of Unarmed Actors</td>
<td>More Inclusive</td>
<td>Transformation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Democracy: High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Violence: High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less Inclusive</td>
<td>Proxy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Democracy: Low</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Violence: High</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Mediation</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Democracy: Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Violence: Low</td>
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</tbody>
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**Democracy.** Democracy ultimately involves the demilitarization of politics. Thus, ideally interveners would marginalize armed actors while incorporating broadly representative unarmed groups in political authority structures. Again, however,

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28 The major possible exception might be the American invasion of Iraq. The Bush administration attempted to marginalize nearly all armed actors in Iraq in the early stages of the intervention, most notably by decommissioning the entire Iraqi military. According to public statements, at least, the Bush administration was also committed to empowering unarmed actors through the creation of democracy in Iraq. Indeed, the singular approach of the Bush administration in the early days of the intervention might in part explain the horrific outcomes of the ambitious enterprise. In practice, however, the United States relatively quickly came to an accommodation with the various Shiite and Kurdish paramilitaries and sought to reach accommodation with many of the Sunni factions as well, making the intervention a case of (thus-far failed) transformation.
interveners in the post-Cold War era have almost universally shunned such an approach—usually for very practical reasons. In the circumstances which prevail during interventions, when the state has temporarily lost its monopoly on violence, armed groups are typically too well entrenched in social and political structures to be marginalized easily. Beyond their military potential, they commonly have come to dominate illicit economies and may garner substantial popular loyalty through the patronage networks funded by such economies and through their role as armed protectors of constituent sub-populations. Thus interveners seeking to promote democracy have typically opted for a second-best option, including the existing armed factions whenever possible, but attempting to make them accountable to the population at large through the development of effective means of political participation, including the organization of civil society groups and the empowerment of the electorate through meaningful elections. In time such a strategy may transform the armed groups themselves through electoral competition and opportunities for sharing in legitimate political power (Manning 2004).

The mediation approach may facilitate some degree of democratization, but it subordinates the goal of democracy to the creation of structures fostering peaceful co-existence among existing armed factions. The precise content of such arrangements will differ somewhat depending on the context, although they have typically taken the form of consociationalism in multiethnic contexts or “reserved powers” for ancien régime military forces in transitions from authoritarian regimes. The fundamental bargain in either of these situations is the same: the sacrifice of some degree of external control over government in order to accommodate all political elites with the potential to militarily threaten the stability of the state.29

29 The literatures on both forms of elite accommodation are enormous. The classical statement on consociationalism is Lijphart’s (1977); for a recent criticism of consociationalism, see Roeder and Rothchild (2005). The foundational work for much of the literature on transitions from military dictatorship is O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; see also Yashar 1997.
Finally, the proxy model of intervention almost uniformly causes the autocratization of a state. Not only are unarmed elements of civil society excluded from participation in governance, but so are most armed groups. The intervening state seeks to buttress a single armed party (or coalition of parties) at the expense of others, thus creating a government with a narrow base of support that depends for its continued survival on the forcible repression of all challengers.

Violence. Each of these models also has implications for the level of violence targeted at intervening forces. Rationalist theories of politics almost universally begin from the assumption that office-holders seek to retain office (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Whatever the limitations of such an assumption in the context of relatively stable, democratic polities, it proves a highly accurate description of the vast majority of elites in extremely weak and failed states, where loss of political power very commonly means not only loss of prestige and economic opportunities, but also potentially physical elimination by hostile factions (Walter 1999; Walter 2002) or arrest and trial by international war crimes tribunals. We should thus expect to see armed factions resist direct threats to their continued hold on political power. Such threats may originate from either armed or unarmed sources: either from defeat by other armed factions or from removal from office through loss of democratic elections. An intervener may minimize violence directed at its own forces by guaranteeing political power to armed factions in proportion to their relative military capabilities.\(^{30}\) The mediation model follows such a logic, accommodating armed elites so as not to trigger a violent backlash. The other two models of intervention, however, threaten armed factions’ continued political preeminence: the proxy model, by threatening non-favored factions with military defeat by the intervener’s preferred faction, and the

\(^{30}\) This is the baseline assumption of Fearon’s (1995) work on rationalist explanations of war.
transformation model, by threatening armed factions which cannot transform themselves with defeat at the polls. Consequently, all else being equal, interveners adopting the proxy and transformation models should face higher levels of violent confrontation with armed target-state actors than interveners adopting the mediation model.

It is important to note that none of these models is inherently superior. Many observers have advocated the proxy model, believing that it offers the swiftest and surest route to political stability, with the potential for gradual evolution towards a more inclusive and representative polity in the longer term (Regan 1996; Regan 2000; Weinstein 2005). Among the risks inherent in this model, however, is the violent subjugation – even genocide – of defeated sub-populations. The transformation model promises the inclusion of all major political groupings in the target state. If democracy promotion is successful, it may well form the most promising foundation for political stability and economic growth. On the other hand, such an approach is the most ambitious and may easily provoke escalations of violence beyond what an intervener is willing to endure. Finally, the mediation model offers the possibility of promoting a more modest level of political stability and improvement without triggering a violent backlash by target-state actors. By accommodating armed factions with anti-democratic preferences in a fragile power-sharing arrangement, however, it also risks consolidating political and economic stagnation.

Predictions: Divergent Strategies and Multilateral Tensions

Faced with these dilemmas of intervention, where all policy options are problematic, interveners’ approaches to intervention can be explained through the conjunction of the interveners’ regime types, strategic cultures, and national interests.
Interveners’ first preference is to externalize their own domestic norms of governance. Countries with non-militarized strategic cultures or with few national interests at stake in the target state, however, are unlikely to be willing to accept the costs inherent in imposing political change on armed parties in the target. Thus, the conjunction of the three independent variables yields the following predictions: (i) Militarized democracies with significant interests at stake in an intervention (and thus lower resource constraints) are likely to pursue higher-order democracy through the transformation model of intervention; (ii) militarized non-democracies with significant interests at stake in an intervention are likely to support a preferred proxy in the target state, thus helping to consolidate its autocratic control of the target; and (iii) all other types of interveners are likely to pursue the mediation model of intervention in order to minimize the likelihood of violent confrontation, thereby promoting at most a very modest amount of democratic change. The predicted pattern of outcomes is illustrated in Table 2.

Table 2: Predicted Approaches of Intervening States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inclusion of Armed Actors</th>
<th>More Inclusive</th>
<th>Less Inclusive</th>
<th>Transformation</th>
<th>Proxy</th>
<th>Mediation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inclusion of Unarmed Actors</td>
<td>Committed, Militarized Democracies</td>
<td>Committed, Militarized Non-Democracies</td>
<td>All Others</td>
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*Militarized democracies* such as the United States and the United Kingdom are more likely to pursue high-risk, high-reward strategies in which higher levels of political participation by unarmed elements of civil society and the electorate are
likely, but at the risk of higher levels of violence. The policies of such countries sometimes also display greater inconsistency than non-militarized democracies because militarized democracies may alternate between two different models of intervention, the transformation and mediation models, based on perceptions of how much risk can be accepted given the national interests at stake.

*Non-militarized democracies*, in contrast, typically maintain greater consistency in their approach, with a consistent preference for the mediation model. They are also less likely to touch off escalating spirals of violence such as were seen in Somalia. They may make substantial contributions to peace and stability, particularly in less challenging intervention environments. Such states, however, risk being all but irrelevant in more difficult environments, and their dependence on mechanisms such as persuasion and inducement risks strengthening armed, autocratic elements in the targets of intervention by legitimizing them and helping them to maintain patronage networks as international aid is disbursed to purchase their cooperation.

In weak and failed states where democracies have refused to intervene, *militarized non-democracies* have made significant but problematic contributions to peace and order in what may be termed a “regional sheriff” approach to policing unstable regions of the globe. Strong arguments can be made that Russia and Syria each were critical to the brokering and implementation of the Moscow Agreement and Ta’if Accords that ended the civil wars in Tajikistan and Lebanon respectively (Akiner 2001; Barak 2003; Zahar 2005); a weaker argument can be made on behalf of Nigeria’s contribution to stability in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Adebajo 2002; Howe 1996/97). In each of these cases non-democratic or quasi-democratic interveners brokered powersharing agreements and elections to help end fighting in neighboring countries. Unfortunately, the two instances in which the peace deals proved successful
– Tajikistan and Lebanon – may be examples of an “obsolescing bargain.”31 In both of these cases the intervener initially sought to support a particular faction’s efforts to gain undisputed control over the government and exclude other factions (the proxy model). Only when the costs of supporting a single faction in an interminable war exceeded the intervener’s resource constraints did the intervening state adopt a more inclusive approach (the mediation model). But as the situation stabilized in the target countries, both Russia and Syria gradually began to backslide on their commitments and continued to support their favored faction over other contenders. After initial movement towards greater political inclusion in the wake of the peace agreements, both Tajikistan and Lebanon slid back towards autocracy while Moscow and Damascus still retained sizable military presences.32

The divergent preferences of different types of intervening state pose substantial challenges to multilateral cooperation in high-stakes interventions taking place in challenging circumstances. Multilateralism is unproblematic for non-militarized states or those facing high resource constraints. In such cases interveners seek to minimize the risk of confrontation with armed factions in the target country by relying on their cooperation as much as possible, even if this weakens the prospects for promoting the intervener’s preferred form of government.

Multilateralism is more problematic for committed, militarized interveners, whether democratic or undemocratic. In some cases there may be multilateral agreement to legitimize the intervention of a regionally powerful non-democracy – the “regional sheriff” approach described above – particularly in regions of little interest to other major powers. Such regional sheriffs are problematic, however. When they possess the resources to be most effective, they typically seek to impose autocratic

31 The term is used by David Lake (1991, 61), following Raymond Vernon (1971).
32 Under strong international pressure Syria was eventually forced to recognize the “Cedar Revolution” in 2005 and withdraw its military and security forces from Lebanon. It remains unclear in which direction Tajikistan will head.
solutions to local instability, while they are more likely to accept more inclusive conflict regulation strategies in precisely those cases where resource constraints limit their commitment to the intervention. Militarized democracies, on the other hand, more commonly seek to use military force to marginalize “spoilers” who threaten democratic transitions, but the risks and costs of such an approach often prove unacceptable to broader coalitions, leading to considerable international tensions. In the NATO airstrikes over Kosovo, for instance, Germany placed a higher premium on seeking a negotiated solution to the crisis than did the United States. Consequently, Berlin was much more forward-leaning in seeking Russia’s collaboration in efforts to secure Serbian President Milosevic’s acquiescence to the stationing of an international peacekeeping force in Kosovo. Washington, on the other hand, was more skeptical of including Russia in diplomatic efforts at an early stage in the airstrikes, fearing that Russia would demand so many concessions on behalf of its client Serbia that either the resulting governmental structures for Kosovo would be completely stalemated and dysfunctional, or the province would be de facto partitioned. Thus, while always desirable, multilateral cooperation may be most achievable in precisely those interventions that are least likely to promote substantial democratic change.

**Research Design**

The following chapters provide the empirical substantiation for the analytical framework presented above. Recognizing that various research methods each have characteristic strengths and weaknesses, I rely on a combination of methods (Tarrow 2004).

In the next chapter I assess all instances of military intervention in the post-Cold War era using fuzzy-set logic. Pioneered for the social sciences by Charles Ragin, fuzzy-set logic relies on set-theoretic relationships to make probabilistic claims
about the necessity and sufficiency of causal arguments (Ragin 2000; also Goertz 2006). It is ideally suited for analyzing patterns of complex causation, including conjunctural causality and equifinality, among an intermediate number (medium-N) of cases where traditional statistical methods would lack sufficient data points to make statistically significant claims. By studying the entire universe of cases in the post-Cold War era, I can avoid selection bias. By using a medium-N research design, I can make probabilistic and generalizable claims with clear and uniform standards.

Fuzzy-set methods alone, however, are inadequate to substantiate causal arguments; they must be combined with case studies. In Chapters 3 through 6 I investigate the behavior of three intervening states – the United States, Germany, and Russia – in three cases of military intervention: Tajikistan, Bosnia, and Afghanistan. In order to avoid bias and observe the widest possible range of behavior, I chose cases with extreme values on the independent variables: The United States is a highly militarized democracy, Germany a highly non-militarized democracy, and Russia a highly militarized non-democracy. The fourth potential type of intervener, a non-militarized non-democracy, exists, but in practice such states play only very modest roles in military interventions.

By examining the behavior of the same three intervening states in two very different circumstances – peace enforcement missions in the Balkans and counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency missions in Central Asia – we can combine what Przeworski and Teune (1970) term “most similar” and “most different” research designs. The Balkan and Central Asian interventions differ in almost every respect except the identities of the intervening states: the two regions are characterized by vastly different levels of development, cultures, political histories, and strategic stakes in the contemporary era. Thus, by studying the behavior of the same intervening state

33 On selecting cases based on extreme values for the independent variables, see King, Keohane, and Verba 1994 and Gerring 2007. The measurement of variables will be addressed in the next chapter.
in the radically different circumstances of the two regions, we can determine whether a particular intervener adopts a characteristic orientation towards interventions undertaken in highly dissimilar contexts. At the same time, in looking at the behavior of three very different outside powers in the same intervention, we can hold constant the effect of most exogenous variables – such as the level of development and ethnic heterogeneity of the target state or the strategic context – to observe how different actors behave in the same (or highly similar) conditions.\textsuperscript{34}

These cases also prove useful in assessing the importance of the independent variables specified in the theory above relative to the many exogenous variables that might be said to account for observed outcomes. A variety of factors, such as levels of development, hostile neighbors, prior experience with democracy, ethnic heterogeneity, and others have been found to exercise significant effects on the likelihood that a state will democratize. Nearly all of these factors would suggest that both Bosnia and Afghanistan are “least likely cases” (George and Bennett 2005, 121-122) for democratic change, so if we observe democracy promotion in these two instances, we should have relatively more confidence in these qualitative results.\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{34} Of course, we cannot “control” for all variables besides the regime type and strategic culture of the interveners. Perhaps most importantly, the United States and Germany could intervene in regions such as the former Yugoslavia without worrying that their behavior set a precedent for other countries to intervene militarily in their own affairs. Nor did they fear that Russia’s intervention in Tajikistan would provide Russia a base from which to extend its military influence up to their own borders. Russia, on the other hand, was very much concerned about the implications of American and NATO interventions for its own domestic security. These and other dissimilarities in strategic context will be noted and incorporated into the analysis of the case studies to follow.

\textsuperscript{35} According to George and Bennett, “least likely” cases are those in which the independent variables of the theory being tested are only weakly present, or the independent variables of rival theories are strongly present. Bosnia and Afghanistan are least likely cases in this latter sense. The United States is an extreme example of a militarized democracy and thus would be expected to promote democracy, particularly in the post-Cold War era. The chances of successfully promoting democracy in Bosnia and Afghanistan, however, were not considered high prior to intervention, and thus even an actor biased towards democracy promotion might well decide that discretion is the better part of valor when confronting such a daunting task. Doyle and Sambanis (2006) characterize Bosnia as an extremely difficult implementation environment, and it receives Stephen Stedman’s (2001) highest difficulty score. More colloquially, Warren Christopher famously described Bosnia as “a problem from hell.” Even more daunting than Bosnia, Afghanistan represents as great a challenge to would-be democracy-promoters as anywhere in the world.
Given the context of Bosnia – an intervention into a state on the European periphery in the post-Cold War era – it is perhaps not surprising that Western actors sought to promote democracy. According to existing theories, however, it would be surprising to see evidence of substantial democratization in such a difficult implementation environment – one characterized by high levels of economic devastation and inter-ethnic tensions resulting from the war. While Bosnia represents a hard case for the successful promotion of democracy, Afghanistan represents perhaps the least likely case that could be imagined in the post-Cold War era, both for the success of the democracy-promotion enterprise and even for the intention to do so. By nearly every measure Afghanistan is one of the poorest and least-developed countries in the world. It is extremely ethnically heterogeneous, is burdened by more than two decades of devastating warfare, suffers from hostile neighbors and an ecology uniquely suited to narcotics production and trafficking, and faces daunting geographical challenges to the creation of a physical infrastructure linking the country both internally and to the rest of the world. Moreover, the American-led intervention into Afghanistan was not motivated by humanitarianism but by the goal of destroying terrorist networks, and it occurred under a president who had explicitly campaigned against “nation-building.” In short, even modest evidence of democracy promotion in Afghanistan would count as evidence in favor of the theoretical framework presented here.

In order to make the similarities and differences between the cases as clear as possible, I adopt the method of “structured, focused comparison” in the studies to follow (George 1979; George and Bennett 2005). More specifically, I will interrogate each case with a uniform set of questions that draw out the different approaches of the three intervening states and their consequences. The questions may be grouped according to four categories: (i) attitudes, (ii) policy alternatives, (iii) structure of the intervention, and (iv) outcomes. The full list of questions is provided in Table 3.
Before becoming immersed in the details of individual cases, however, it is useful to understand the broad patterns apparent in the military interventions of the past 15 years. The following chapter examines all 27 cases of military intervention in the post-Cold War era. It reveals that intervening coalitions dominated by democracies with militarized strategic cultures and low resource constraints have typically been able to promote significant democratic change in targets of intervention, while coalitions of states with substantial resource constraints or non-militarized strategic cultures tend to produce relatively little change, and committed autocracies usually contribute to the further autocratization of the countries in which they intervene.
Table 3: Questions for Structured, Focused Comparison

- **Attitudes**
  - **Democracy**
    - *Population*: What are popular attitudes towards democracy and its promotion abroad? Is public opinion on these issues a significant factor in influencing policy in interventions?
    - *Elite*: What are elite attitudes towards democracy and its promotion abroad? What policies (if any) have been enacted to influence the regime type of states abroad?
  - **Military**
    - *Population*: What are popular attitudes towards the use of force abroad? Does the population believe military force can achieve important political objectives besides self-defense? Is the population willing to endure and/or inflict casualties in military operations? Is public opinion on these issues a significant factor in influencing policy in interventions?
    - *Elite*: What are elite attitudes towards the use of force abroad? Do “veto players” exist who can effectively prevent the use or escalation of force? Do players exist who can militarize the state’s foreign policy even without a broader consensus behind the use of force?

- **Structure of Intervention**
  - **Military**
    - *Scope*: How many troops (and with what equipment) were deployed?
    - *Deployment*: Where were troops deployed? Were deployments dispersed so as to maximize overall coverage, or were they concentrated in particular areas (e.g., in the capital, at particular borders) and, if so, for what purposes?
    - *Mode*: How did military units actually function? Did they actively patrol or remain in barracks? What were their rules of engagement? Did they aggressively target “spoilers”?
  - **Civilian**
    - *Aid*: Was aid disbursed broadly among competing sub-populations in the target country, or was it concentrated among actors within a single faction? Was aid distributed to civil society actors (bottom-up approach), or was it concentrated among elites (top-down)? Was aid conditioned on certain performance objectives related to democracy-promotion?
    - *Diplomacy*: What institutional design for the target state government did the intervening country advocate (if any)? If a powersharing arrangement was brokered, did the intervening state publicly urge all parties in the target state to meet their obligations under the agreement? What other diplomatic actions were taken to encourage compliance?

- **Policy Options and Counterfactuals**
  - **Democracy**: Was the promotion or acceptance of autocracy (democracy) a reasonable alternative to the policy the intervening country actually chose? What specifically would such an alternative have looked like? What would have been the likely outcome of such an alternative? Did policymakers actively consider such an alternative, and if so, why was it rejected?
  - **Military**: Was a non-military (military) approach a reasonable alternative to what the intervening country actually chose? What specifically would such an alternative have looked like? What would have been the likely outcome of such an alternative? Did policymakers actively consider such an alternative, and if so, why was it rejected?
### Table 3 (Continued)

- **Outcome of Intervention**
  - To what extent did political authority structures become more inclusive – that is, exhibit higher degrees of competition and participation – during the course of the military intervention?
  - How significant were coercive instruments – both police and military – in disrupting informal political authority structures and concentrating power in inclusive state institutions?
  - For those interventions that have concluded, are there indications that the political authority structures promoted by interveners proved durable? For those interventions that have not concluded, what indications, if any, exist that suggest these imposed structures may prove durable?
Chapter 2:
Fuzzy-Set Analysis of Interventions

This chapter applies fuzzy-set logic to the study of interventions. Fuzzy-set logic is an empirical method which applies set theory to the analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions. The first section of this chapter will explicate the logic of fuzzy-set analysis, while the second section explains the measurement of the relevant variables, and the third discusses the empirical results of the investigation.

Before explaining fuzzy-set logic in detail, it is perhaps worth clarifying why this method provides the best tool for assessing interventions in the post-Cold War era. Fuzzy-set analysis combines the strengths of qualitative and quantitative methods when assessing medium-N phenomena. Case studies and the comparative method provide nuance, context, and a close fit of data to theory, but they are nonetheless subject to a number of criticisms. They provide an uncertain basis for generalizability, they commonly lack clear standards of interpretation or comparison with cases outside of the analysis, and they provide no estimates of the probability that a given cause (or conjunction of causes) will produce the hypothesized effect nor an estimate of the reliability of an investigator’s findings. Statistical analyses offer a useful tool for addressing precisely those areas – generalizability, standards of evidence, and probability and error estimates – where qualitative methods are weak. But besides lacking the strengths of qualitative methods – nuance, context, and close fit of data to theory – they also have difficulty coping with complex patterns of conjunctive causation (interaction effects) in universes of only an intermediate number of cases (medium-N).

By combining fuzzy-set logic with the comparative method, we can derive many of the advantages of both qualitative and quantitative methods. Such a tool is perfectly suited to the study of military interventions in the post-Cold War era, where
the number of cases (27) presents considerable challenges for traditional statistical analysis. More specifically, we can assess interaction effects that would rapidly exceed the degrees of freedom that traditional statistical analysis would permit with such a universe of cases. The intermediate number of cases also allows us to make qualitative comparisons across the entire universe, using the fuzzy-set findings to structure brief assessments of the divergent outcomes of the 27 cases.

**Fuzzy-Set Methods**

Necessary and sufficient conditions are well known to those who use qualitative methods, even if arguments are not necessarily formulated in precisely this language. Necessary conditions are those in which a given cause must always be present in order for an outcome to occur. Robert Pape (2003), for instance, has recently argued that military occupations are a necessary cause of substantial suicide terrorism campaigns, although they are not by themselves sufficient – else we would expect to see Serbs ramming truck bombs into NATO targets in Kosovo. Sufficient conditions are those in which the outcome must always be present whenever the cause is present. Proponents of the democratic peace, for instance, argue that whenever we see two democratic countries, we also will see peace (the hypothesized outcome) between them. These relationships can be expressed in terms of set theory: In relationships of necessity, the set of cases in which a particular outcome is present is a subset of instances in which the hypothesized cause is present, while in relationships of sufficiency, the set of instances of a particular cause is a subset of the set of instances in which the hypothesized outcome is present. These relationships are represented graphically in Figure 1.

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36 Such scholars as Pickering and Peceny (2006) acknowledge the difficulties of using traditional statistical methods to examine democracy promotion in military interventions. They have a total of three positive cases for the United States, for instance, and five for the United Nations, making statistical inference problematic.
Necessity and sufficiency have thus far been described in dichotomous terms: a given cause or effect is present or absent. Fuzzy-set logic simply makes these concepts scalable, with 1.0 representing complete membership within a set, 0 representing complete absence of membership in a set, and .5 representing the dividing line between cases more “out” than “in.” Przeworski and Limongi, for instance, argue that a high level of development is a sufficient condition for the long-term survival of democracy. While they find that no countries with per capita income above $6055 have slid back into autocracy after becoming democracies (i.e., perfect sufficiency), they also find that very few countries with incomes near $6055 have experienced democratic reversals (Przeworski and Limongi 1997). Thus we could scale both the cause and the outcome: Survival rates for democracy (the hypothesized outcome) are very high where income levels are very high (i.e., possessing fuzzy-set membership scores closer to 1.0), while survival rates are low where income levels are low (i.e., possessing fuzzy-set membership scores closer to 0). The United States and other advanced industrialized countries would score 1.0 for both the cause (national income) and the effect (democratic survivability), while most desperately poor countries would score close to 0 on both.
In fuzzy-set terms relationships of necessity and sufficiency can thus be expressed succinctly: The value for an outcome variable should always (or at least usually) be less than or equal to the value for the causal variable in instances of necessity (that is, the cause should be “at least as present” as the effect), while the value for an outcome variable should always (or usually) be greater than or equal to the value of the causal variable in instances of sufficiency (that is, the outcome should be “at least as present” as the cause). In a standard scatterplot with the dependent variable represented by the y-axis and the independent variable represented by the x-axis, all data points for necessary relationships should fall on or below the identity line, while all data points for sufficient relationships should fall on or above the identity line. With an intermediate number of cases, we can make probabilistic assessments about the likelihood that a given cause or conjunction of causes is either necessary or sufficient depending on the proportion of cases that fall to the hypothesized side of the identity line.

Social phenomena are seldom so accommodating, however, as to present social scientists with monocausal relationships. Fuzzy-set logic uses fuzzy algebra similar to Boolean algebra – particularly the functions of logical “and” (Boolean multiplication) and logical “or” (Boolean addition) – to describe relationships among numerous causal variables. Fuzzy multiplication represents the intersection of various sets and is mathematically expressed by the minimum value for a particular case across all of the variables included in the multiplication function, while fuzzy addition represents the union of various sets and is mathematically expressed as the maximum value for a particular case across all of the variables included in the addition function. In the example of the democratic peace, for instance, the hypothesized outcome (peace) will only occur if both countries in a given dyad are relatively democratic. If one country is perfectly democratic (scoring 1.0 on the scale of membership in the set of democratic
countries) while the other is highly autocratic (perhaps scoring a 0.2), we would expect their membership in the set of peaceful dyads to be as low as 0.2 because in fuzzy terms $1.0 \times 0.2 = 0.2$. Their membership in the set of peaceful dyads might be higher – for instance, if the two countries are minor powers on different continents and have never had the opportunity to come into conflict – but we would not expect their membership in the set of peaceful dyads to be 1.0 just because one of the countries receives a 1.0 democracy score.37

Using these methods we can make probabilistic assessments of necessity and sufficiency across an intermediate number of cases – assessments that would be impossible using either traditional qualitative or quantitative methods. It is important to note, however, that the results of fuzzy-set analysis are sensitive to the scaling of membership scores in a given set as well as to the operationalization of variables. While membership scores are grounded in both theory and the investigator’s substantive knowledge, different analysts can derive different scales and operationalizations, yielding substantially different results. Fuzzy-set logic should therefore be understood as a tool for interpretation in conjunction with case studies rather than as an instrument of “proof” for causal inference (Ragin 2000, Chapter 11).

**Operationalizing Military Interventions**

This section provides a brief overview of the manner in which the theories of the preceding chapter were translated into measurable variables and the sources of data used for each. More in-depth explications of the fuzzy-set scoring system may be found in Appendix 1.

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37 Adding additional variables such as these can be easily accommodated by fuzzy-set logic, and indeed Ragin (2005) recommends a procedure that often entails using additional variables to minimize the distance between data points and the identity line.
The Universe of Cases

As discussed in the previous chapter, military interventions are defined here as the deployment of troops across international borders for the purpose of shaping the political authority structures of the target state. On the basis of this definition, five more precise criteria guided the determination of what counts as a case of intervention. First, only instances in which the troops of a sovereign state are deployed on the territory of another recognized sovereign state may be included as cases. Second, covert deployments of forces are not eligible to be included as cases. Third, at least 1000 armed troops must be deployed. Fourth, troops must have been deployed for at least three months during the post-Cold War era (for convenience, this period is assumed to have begun in January 1990) and the intervention must have begun by the first of January 2004. Fifth, troops must have authorization to use force to ensure the success of the mission (thus distinguishing military interventions from observer missions). And finally, the mission must include a substantial governance component that encompasses the target country as a whole (thus distinguishing military interventions from humanitarian missions such as the provision of relief supplies or the protection of safe havens for civilians). 38 Twenty-seven cases meet all of the criteria, including a handful of cases in which the purpose or means of an intervention changed substantially, in which case it has been coded as two or more successive interventions. The complete list is provided in Appendix 2.

Rules of Aggregation

The framework for analysis presented in this study claims that the characteristics of intervening states determine much about how an intervention is

38 Note that Kosovo is included as a case despite the fact that the NATO-led mission does not encompass the entire country of Serbia-Montenegero. It is included, while other regional missions such as UNTAET in Croatia were not, because the independence of Kosovo has been the issue at stake and because it has been governed de facto as a sovereign entity.
structured and its likely consequences. Obviously, however, in cases of multilateral interventions – the norm in the post-Cold War era – some formula must be derived by which the characteristics of individual member states can be aggregated into a composite “intervener.” This task is complicated by the fact that there are numerous models of multilateral intervention, and each participant state is likely to exercise different degrees of influence on how the intervention is conducted. The United States, for instance, will inevitably carry much more weight in determining how an intervention is run than Burkina Faso. At the same time, no matter how powerful the state participating in an intervention, the provision of soldiers offers considerable opportunities to shape a mission, both at the diplomatic level (e.g., by threatening to withdraw troops) and at the level of execution (e.g., how patrols are conducted, the rules of engagement followed by soldiers, how a mandate is interpreted and how aggressively military forces seek to pursue that mandate, etc.). For the purposes of simplicity I follow four rules of selection and aggregation. First, in cases of multilateral interventions, for a country to be considered as one of the interveners it must provide at least a light battalion (roughly 400 troops) and be among the top five troop contributing countries (TCCs) in an intervention.\footnote{There are two exceptions. First, in MINURCA in the Central African Republic the entire mission was comprised of company-sized contingents (100-150 soldiers) from numerous countries. In this case all of those countries providing at least a company were included. Second, in IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia, the United States, United Kingdom, and France divided the country into three political-military administrative units (multi-national divisions, or MNDs); in this case, only these three “lead nations” were included as interveners.} Second, where a single country provided more than half of all troops (the “lead nation” framework), the characteristics of that lead nation are taken as representative of the intervention as a whole. Third, where no single country provided more than half of all troops (the “broad multilateralism” framework typical of UN missions), each TCC is given equal weight and the characteristics of all TCCs are averaged to determine the characteristics of the “intervener.” Finally, where two missions share a common
purpose and run simultaneously or consecutively but are integrated (so that one mission “hands off” responsibilities to a follow-on operation), each operation counts for half of the characteristics of the “intervener.” These rules of aggregation are somewhat mechanistic, but they provide an objective approximation of different intervening coalitions and take account of different frameworks for multilateral cooperation.

**Dependent Variables**

The dependent variable can be understood in three ways: as the amount of democratic *change* promoted during intervention, the level of democratic *achievement* to take place during the intervention, and the *durability* of the democratic change promoted. I assess the first two using Freedom House’s *Freedom in the World* scores, measuring *change* as the difference in Freedom House scores from the last year before an intervention took place to the last year of the intervention and *achievement* as the absolute level of democracy achieved in the target state by the last year of the intervention. Since competitive oligarchy is the expected outcome in most interventions due to resource constraints or domestic limitations on the use of force, I expect that small increases in democratization are common regardless of the

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40 The Freedom House dataset is not without flaws (Munck and Verkuilen 2002). Unfortunately, no other database provides a superior alternative for the analysis being conducted here. The principle alternative, the Polity IV dataset, has a number of drawbacks. First and most importantly, it does not provide democracy ratings for years in which countries are experiencing intrusive military interventions, undergoing major transitions, or experiencing substantial internal disorder, thus eliminating a large proportion of the cases of interest in this analysis. Second, it only extends to 2002 and thus provides no information on recent interventions (such as those in Iraq or Cote d’Ivoire) and excludes two years out of the fifteen in the post-Cold War era. Third, its data is based on formal democratic institutions and not on actual democratic performance – a particular problem for assessing “success” in military interventions. The World Bank’s Governance Indicators provide another possible dataset on which to test the hypotheses presented here. The indicators only begin in 1996, however, thus eliminating interventions in the first years after the end of the Cold War from consideration. Moreover, they are only compiled every two years, leaving odd-numbered years out. Consequently, it is difficult to determine how much change in the indicators occurred in the year prior or subsequent to an intervention in those cases where an intervention began in an even-numbered year or concluded in an odd-numbered year. Thus, despite the limitations of Freedom House data, it provides the best possible dataset with which to assess the consequences of interventions.
characteristics of the intervener. Substantial movement towards autocracy or democracy, on the other hand, should only occur in the exceptional cases described above – when militarized interveners face low resource constraints. Because such a large percentage of post-Cold War interventions are either ongoing or only recently concluded, broad assessments of democratic durability cannot be made reliably using quantitative data. Instead, I assess interventions’ ability to promote durable change qualitatively and on a case-by-case basis, with brief references in the qualitative overview of results in this chapter and more extended discussions in the case study chapters to follow.

**Independent Variables**

*Regime Type.* The regime type of each intervening state was determined by taking the average of all of its Freedom House scores in the post-Cold War era, 1990-2004.

*Militarization.* The degree of militarization of each intervening state’s strategic culture is more difficult to operationalize. As discussed in the preceding chapter, I define the concept simply as the extent to which the foreign policy elite and general population of a country believe that military force can be used to achieve politically desirable ends in foreign affairs. Nearly all people accept the use of force for territorial defense; the citizens of more militarized countries believe that force can be projected to secure a variety of foreign policy goals. I use two indicators to measure the extent to which a country’s strategic culture is militarized: defense spending as a proportion of gross domestic product and national responses to World Values Survey questions regarding the priority that should be accorded national defense and the willingness of citizens to fight for their country (see Appendix 1 for more detailed information). The
intersection of the intervener democracy and militarization variables produces a typology of interveners as shown in Table 4.

Table 4: Typology of Intervening States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highly Militarized</th>
<th>Democracies</th>
<th>Quasi-Democracies and Autocracies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt, Syria</td>
<td>Egypt, Syria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia, Turkey</td>
<td>Ethiopia, Turkey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan, Zimbabwe</td>
<td>Pakistan, Zimbabwe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Militarized</th>
<th>India, Korea (Republic of), United Kingdom, United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Australia, France, Poland, Portugal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh, Ghana, Kenya</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anti-Militarized</th>
<th>Brazil, Canada, Finland, Italy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands, Uruguay</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand, Zambia</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highly Anti-Militarized</th>
<th>Belgium, Germany, New Zealand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia, Nepal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The measures used to assess “militarization” are only rough proxies for the underlying concept, much as the Correlates of War Project’s Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) provides only a rough proxy for the concept of national “power.” A handful of countries – most obviously Indonesia – are doubtlessly

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41 For inclusion a state must have been among the top five largest contributors to at least one of the 27 military interventions selected in this study and must have provided a total of at least 1000 armed troops. Degrees of militarization are based on the quintile into which a country’s militarization score falls; see Appendix 2 for a more detailed explanation. To be included as a democracy a state must receive a Freedom House score of at least 3.5.

42 Note that the United States is on the borderline between “militarized” and “highly militarized.”
misplaced according to the measures of militarization used here. A comparison of the militarization scores presented here with the results of other scholars, however, suggests that the measures used in this study more or less accurately capture the concept of a militarized strategic culture. In their study of Cold War-era interventions, for instance, Pearson, Baumann, and Pickering (1994) find that the United States, Britain, France, the then-Soviet Union, Syria, Egypt, and India were the leading intervening states of the Cold War. On the basis of Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data, Maoz (2004) labels Pakistan, India, Syria, the United States, South Korea, Russia, France and the United Kingdom “fightaholics.” And Asmus, Everts, and Isernia (2004) find in their study of North Atlantic community public opinion that the United States and Britain have substantially more “hawks” than most continental European countries, while Germany and Italy have the fewest. Despite using very different metrics, all of these studies yield results which correspond quite closely to the militarization rankings provided here. This correlation suggests that we can have relative confidence in the overall index, even though some individual countries’ strategic cultures are not accurately captured by the proxies and the proxies themselves are dictated in part by the availability of data rather than by achieving the most precise correspondence between empirical proxies and underlying concepts.

*National Interests and Resource Constraints.* The resource constraints of intervening states are based on the realist assumption that available resources depend on the degree of threat posed by a given crisis. Thus intervening states’ resource

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43 The most common source of error in a country’s militarization score was a lack of World Values Survey (WVS) data. Many countries which participated in post-Cold War military interventions were not included in the WVS. In such instances the country’s militarization score was based entirely on its defense budget as a proportion of GDP. In practice the consequences of this missing data were minimized by the fact that nearly all of the major troop contributing countries for interventions also participated in the WVS.

44 Along with China and Israel, two states not included in the analysis here, and South Africa, although obviously the end of apartheid would account for its rapid demilitarization.
constraints are scored on a five-point scale, where the highest value was given to cases of total war and their aftermath (such as the military occupations of Germany and Japan in the wake of the Second World War) and the lowest given to cases in which the outside state had no interest whatsoever. In the post-Cold War era, in reality scores ranged among the three intermediate values, with responses to direct threats (such as terrorism) gaining the second highest score; responses to indirect threats (such as massive refugee flows, alliance credibility, etc.) receiving an intermediate value; and no or almost no threats (such as in the typical UN peacekeeping mission) receiving the next-to-lowest score. Such a scoring system avoids circularity by calculating interests independently of interveners’ behavior in interventions, and the use of a simple ordinal scale reflects the imprecision of the underlying concept. The indicators of national interest are ones that appear commonly in the literature on interventions and extended deterrence. Although this variable cannot predict when an intervention will be launched, it does help us to understand how an intervention is conducted after the decision to intervene has already been made.

45 Of course, the independent variable of national interests can be in part endogenous to the dependent variable of intervener behavior if intervener behavior creates threats that did not exist before. Such endogeneity is obviously at play in the Iraq intervention. More generally, by the very act of intervention an intervener places a certain amount of its prestige or reputation at stake, thus creating interests where none existed previously. Such feedback mechanisms clearly exist, so it is impossible to separate these variables entirely. So long as the interests created by states’ interventionist behavior remain less significant than the interests that exist independent of interventionist behavior, however, this element of endogeneity does not compromise the validity of this study’s findings. Of the 27 cases included in the empirical analysis here, only the case of Iraq has substantial elements of a feedback effect – that is, American interventionist policies significantly contributed to threats against the United States (a positive value on the dependent variable contributed to a more positive value on the independent variable). And even in the case of Iraq the United States had substantial interests in the country before the intervention. Thus, while these elements of endogeneity cannot be dismissed, they also are not responsible for the broad causal patterns identified in this study.

Exogenous Variables

To assess alternate theories and complex patterns of conjunctive causation, a number of control variables were included in the fuzzy-set analysis. Realist theories emphasizing military capabilities were tested using variables to estimate intervening countries’ military potential (soldiers in uniform, military expenditures, and level of development) and forces deployed (total troop deployments into the target country, the ratio of intervening forces to the target state’s population, and the duration of the intervention). Liberal and critical theories emphasizing legitimacy, persuasion, and inducement were tested using such proxies as whether an intervention had a UN mandate, the number of countries in the intervening coalition, and the amount of aid disbursed to the target country. Finally, characteristics of the target countries themselves were included in the analysis: the target’s level of development, ethnic heterogeneity, and prior experience with democracy. Many of these variables play a role in shaping the ultimate outcomes of an intervention. In a few cases variables related to the intervention environment can be so conducive to successful democracy promotion that relatively high levels of democratic change and achievement occur even when an intervention is not anchored by committed, militarized, democratic interveners (Namibia stands out as such a case). For the most part, however, these other variables play a significant role, if at all, in conjunction with the characteristics of the interveners.

Military Expenditures. Realist perspectives on military interventions would expect outcomes to be correlated with differential military capabilities among the intervening states. Military expenditures (annual military budgets) are one of the standard measures of states’ military capabilities, included in the widely used National Material Capabilities (NMC v. 3.02) dataset (Singer 1987). In this study the variable
was measured using the average annual military expenditures for each intervening country in the period 1990-2003 (the most recent year for which data was available), using data from the NMC 3.02 dataset.

Military Personnel. The number of soldiers a state keeps in uniform is another measure of capabilities included in the National Material Capabilities database. Like military expenditures, this variable was measured using the average annual soldiers in uniform for each intervening country in the period 1990-2003.  

Intervener Level of Development. Fearon and Laitin argue that level of development may serve as a proxy for military discipline; less developed countries, these authors argue, are less likely to possess troops who follow orders and are held accountable for indiscriminate uses of force. Fearon and Laitin (2003) further argue that it is lack of disciplined troops that prevents countries from conducting effective counter-insurgency operations. Thus interveners’ level of development was also included in this analysis, using World Bank data from the World Development Indicators (WDI) Online dataset.

Composite Military Capability Score. Since each of the above variables capture an aspect of military capability, a composite score (similar to the Composite Index of National Capability of the NMC dataset) was also used, based on the average values of the three above variables.

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47 Other indicators of national material capabilities included in the NMC dataset such as urban population and energy consumption were not included here because they represented military potential rather than deployable military assets.
Troops Deployed. Troop deployments provide yet another measure of the military capabilities brought to bear in an intervention. Unfortunately, the number of troops deployed in a military intervention are in constant flux depending on strategic requirements and rotation schedules, making it difficult to assess accurately the number of troops deployed at any one time, even with the best of information. Complicating matters further, in many instances intervening states have incentives to disguise the number of troops they have deployed, such as was the case for Syria in Lebanon. This variable was based on the maximum number of troops deployed during an intervention, but all figures are rough estimates. Data were drawn from official sources (such as the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations’ database) wherever possible.

Force Ratios. James Quinlivan (2003) argues that the appropriate metric for assessing troop requirements for an intervention is neither absolute numbers of troops (per the variable above) nor other ratios such as the number of troops per unit of territory or per potentially hostile combatant. Since the objective of interventions is to secure the loyalty of the population at large to the target regime, Quinlivan argues that the proper yardstick is the ratio of intervening troops to the population of the target state, using the ratio of police officers to populations in advanced, stable countries as a minimum baseline. In this study the data for the variable was drawn from troop deployments (above) and the WDI Online dataset’s population figures.

Duration. Many scholars have argued that interventions must last longer to have a hope of accomplishing more ambitious goals such as the promotion of democracy (Paris 1997). This variable was operationalized as the number of years for which an intervention was conducted (or until the end of 2004 in the case of ongoing
interventions). The median duration for interventions in the post-Cold War era, however, was a mere 2.3 years, and two-thirds of interventions did not last as much as four years.

_Civilian Aid._ Those theories emphasizing cooptation over coercion typically argue that aid provides a critical source of leverage in interventions. Unfortunately, there is no database that documents all aid transfers. This variable thus refers to average annual non-military aid per capita for target states from OECD countries, with data drawn from WDI Online. Ideally we would want the variable to reflect aid payments from non-OECD countries as well, such as transfers from Moscow to the Rakhmonov regime in Tajikistan. Unfortunately, the amount of many such transfers are simply unavailable to the public – and often perhaps even to government officials in the countries concerned. Using only figures for OECD transfers, however, actually biases the data against the argument made in this study because it makes it easier to ascribe any correlation between an intervener’s regime type and democratic change in the target country to differential capabilities (i.e., democracies’ relatively greater wealth and thus ability to “purchase” preferred outcomes with aid) rather than to different worldviews, as argued in the previous chapter.

_UN Mandate._ Theories which emphasize non-coercive instruments for use in military intervention typically emphasize the importance of international legitimacy and especially an explicit mandate for intervention from the United Nations Security Council. A UN mandate signifies greater transparency in the motives of the interveners, greater moral weight for efforts at persuasion, and international consensus for diplomatic and economic carrots and sticks aimed at securing local parties’ cooperation in initiatives for peace and democratization. This variable was coded on
an interval scale, with UN-led missions receiving the highest score, UN-mandated missions the next highest, those with mandates from regional organizations but not the UN lower still, and unilateral missions lowest of all.

**Number of Coalition Members.** Another proxy for international legitimacy is the number of states participating in the intervening coalition. Global coalitions with large numbers of troop contributing countries (TCCs) were ranked highest, while unilateral interventions were ranked lowest.

**Ethnic Heterogeneity.** Numerous authors have argued that high levels of ethnic heterogeneity is deleterious to democratic development in general (an argument made most forcefully by Rabushka and Shepsle 1972) and efforts to promote democracy through military interventions in particular (Kaufmann 1996; Pei and Kasper 2003). This variable was operationalized using the “ethnic fractionalization” index (Alesina et al. 2002).

**Target State Level of Development and Prior Experience with Democracy.** The membership scores for nearly every target state were so low on both of these variables that they were essentially irrelevant. Only six target states received a non-zero score for level of development (i.e., only six were not defined as “low income” by the World Bank, with average annual incomes per capita less than $736), while only one (Panama) had more than ten years of prior experience with democracy (defined extremely generously as a Polity IV score of at least 5). Consequently, these variables were omitted from the analysis.49

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48 The invasion of Iraq, of course, demonstrates the weaknesses of coalition size as a proxy for international legitimacy.

49 Variables for which nearly all scores lie extremely close to either 1 or 0 produce distorted results in fuzzy-set logic. Inclusion of these variables, for instance, would have led to the conclusion that poverty
Analysis of Results

All of the above variables\(^{50}\) were analyzed for conditions of necessity and sufficiency. Necessary conditions, again, are those in which a particular cause is present whenever a given outcome is present. Relationships of necessity can be represented mathematically as those in which the membership score for the outcome is less than or equal to the membership score for the cause in every (or nearly every) case in a given universe. Graphically, the data points in a scatterplot will fall below the identity line where the causal condition is plotted on the x-axis and the outcome on the y-axis. Sufficient conditions are the mirror image of necessary ones: They express relationships in which the outcome is present when a given causal conjunction is present (that is, when the outcome membership score exceeds the causal membership score), and they are represented graphically as a scatterplot in which the data points fall above the identity line. Arguments that fulfill both of these relationships – where a given variable is both necessary and a central component of sufficient conjunctions – are relatively rare, and they are powerful explanations of social phenomena.

Analysis of cases of autocratic change is complicated by the fact that there were only four instances in which an intervention led to greater autocracy: the Syrian intervention in Lebanon and the Russian interventions in Abkhazia (a province of Georgia which won its de facto independence with Russian military assistance), Transdniestra (a province of Moldova which, like Abkhazia, secured de facto independence with the support of the Russian military), and Tajikistan. All four

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\(^{50}\) As explained above, target state level of development and prior experience with democracy were omitted due to the extremely large percentage of scores falling on or near 0. In the summary data to follow, the three components of military capability – military expenditure, military personnel, and level of development of the intervener – were consolidated into the composite military capability score. When included as separate variables, none of them came close to achieving statistical significance as a necessary condition. Some were elements of statistically significant sufficient conjunctions, although combining them into the “higher-order construct” of military capability greatly simplifies analysis without loss of important information. On higher-order constructs, see Ragin 2000 (321).
instances of autocratic change were cases in which highly militarized, non-democratic interveners propped up loyal factions in nearby countries experiencing civil wars. Unfortunately, four cases are too few to exclude the null hypothesis as an explanation.

Two different models were utilized to assess necessary and sufficient conditions for democratic change, both of which incorporate a .05 fuzzy adjustment factor (equivalent to shifting the identity line up .05 for necessity analyses and down .05 for sufficiency analyses). In the first model only the variables were used for which complete data was available, so that no cases were eliminated. As can be seen in Table 5, in this specification only two of the variables described above qualify as “usually necessary” conditions for substantial democratic change in the course of an intervention: the extent to which an intervener is democratic and possesses a militarized strategic culture. In more mathematically precise language, these are the only two variables for which we can predict with relative confidence (p < .05) that the score for the outcome will be less than or equal to the causal score in 65 percent of cases of intervention. In this specification of the fuzzy-set analysis no conjunctions of variables proved sufficient for democratic change.
Table 5: Analysis of Necessity and Sufficiency, Model 1

Model: DC = D + M + R + B + S + W + C + T + F + P + U + N

Cases Read: 27  
Valid: 27 100.0%  
Missing: 0 0.0%

*** NECESSARY CAUSE ANALYSIS ***

Number of Cases Tested (Outcome > 0): 19 (70.4% of Total)  
Method: Probabilistic  
Test Proportion: 0.65  
*p < 0.05

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2 Necessary Cause(s) Included in the Analysis

*** SUFFICIENT CAUSE ANALYSIS ***

Method: Probabilistic  
Test Proportion: 0.65  
*p < 0.05

*** FUZZY-SET SOLUTION ***

No sufficient causes found satisfying necessary conditions

Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of the effects of the regime type and strategic culture of the intervener. Very few data points fall above the identity
line, representing the fact that the membership score of the cause (democracy and militarization) almost always exceeds that of the effect – that is, the cause is almost always present in at least as great a proportion as the effect.

**Figure 2: Necessity of Intervener Democracy and Militarization**

The analysis of democratic change was run a second time, using all variables, including those for which only incomplete data was available (see Table 6). Unfortunately, by doing so, we exclude five cases from analysis: Abkhazia, Afghanistan, Northern Cyprus, Kosovo, and Transdniestr. Consequently, assessment of causal necessity is not as reliable as with the first model. Analysis of causal sufficiency, however, is greatly improved by the inclusion of the two highly relevant variables of aid and ethnic heterogeneity.
Table 6: Analysis of Necessity and Sufficiency, Model 2

Model: DC = D + M + R + C + T + F + P + A + U + N + E

Cases Read: 27
Valid: 22 81.5%
Missing: 5 18.5%

*** NECESSARY CAUSE ANALYSIS ***

Number of Cases Tested (Outcome > 0): 16 (72.7% of Total)
Method: Probabilistic
Test Proportion: 0.65
*p < 0.05
Fuzzy Adjustment: 0.05

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</table>

*** SUFFICIENT CAUSE ANALYSIS ***

Method: Probabilistic
Test Proportion: 0.65
p < 0.05
Fuzzy Adjustment: 0.05
3 Necessary Cause(s) Included in the Analysis

*** Sufficient combinations satisfying necessary conditions:

D*M*T*P*A*N*e
+
D*M*R*C*T*P*A*N

DC = Democratic Change
D = Democracy
M = Militarization
R = Resources
C = Composite Capabilities
T = Troops Deployed
F = Force Ratios
P = Period (Duration)
A = Aid
U = UN Mandate
N = Number of Coalition Members
E = Ethnic Heterogeneity

Lower case letters indicate negation (e.g., d = 1 – D)
The two conjunctions identified as sufficient to produce democratic change in at least 65 percent of cases are both long (D·M·T·P·A·N·e + D·M·R·C·T·P·A·N), but interpreting them is not difficult. The first conjunction refers to interventions in target states characterized by low ethnic heterogeneity (e). In such circumstances militarized democracies must deploy substantial numbers of troops (T) for an extended period of time (P) and should maximize their co-optive power through the disbursement of large amounts of aid (A) and their persuasive power by rallying large coalitions (N) to contribute both troops and diplomatic clout. Where militarized, democratic interveners structure their interventions in this way, their chances of producing substantial democratic change in relatively homogenous states are relatively good, at least based on the record of the last fifteen years. In more ethnically diverse targets of intervention, the intervening states must meet all of the above conditions, but they must also possess substantial military capabilities (C) and face relatively low resource constraints (R).

It is worth noting that although a large intervening coalition becomes a statistically significant necessary condition in the second model, a United Nations mandate is neither necessary nor an element of a sufficient causal conjunction in either model.

Adding these additional elements of explanation creates a more robust and more nuanced account of success in military interventions than the parsimonious causal conjunction described in the previous chapter. Although the conjunction of intervener democracy, militarization, and resource availability (D·M·R) is not identified as sufficient by itself to produce democratic change, there are strong indications that this conjunction lies at the heart of success in interventions – or, at a minimum, in interventions which take place in challenging environments where spoilers contest the creation of a new, more inclusive political order.
Standard fuzzy-set procedures in fact under-represent the causal strength of the D·M·R combination because they assume a linear relationship between causal conjunctions and outcomes. Causal conjunctions with high membership scores on the causal conjunction (e.g., .8) are expected to produce outcomes with high membership scores (.8 or higher), while causal conjunctions with low membership scores (e.g., .3) are expected to produce outcomes with low membership scores (.3 or higher).

Applying fuzzy-set logic to democratic peace theory helps to show why this assumption is problematic. While it may be true that two imperfect democracies, each of which has a .8 membership score in the set of democracies, may experience high but not complete levels of peace (.8) with each other, it does not follow that two electoral autocracies (with .3 membership scores in the set of democracies) should experience partial peace (.3) with one another; indeed, they may well experience total war (0). Causal conjunctions with membership scores beneath the breakpoint (that is, less than .5) may behave radically differently from those above, generating a bimodal distribution of outcomes.

Interventions are also characterized by such a bimodal distribution of outcomes. While relatively democratic countries (those with membership scores in the set of democracies above .5) are expected to prefer democratic outcomes, relatively more autocratic countries (those with scores below .5) are expected to prefer autocratic regimes in the targets of their intervention. Thus an electoral autocracy with a democracy score of .3 is not necessarily expected to produce some democratic change (.3 or higher) in the targets of its interventions; in fact, whenever the autocratic intervener is committed and possesses a militarized strategic culture, we would expect to see autocratic change in the target (a “democratic change” score of 0). According to standard fuzzy-set procedures, such a case would provide disconfirming evidence of the sufficiency of the D·M·R combination because its causal score exceeds that of its
outcome. Similarly, anti-militaristic intervening states may privilege peace over democracy, so that they would not be expected to pursue democratic change if doing so threatened to unravel a peace among armed factions. Consequently, a highly anti-militaristic intervener (with a membership score of .2 in the set of militarized countries) may well produce no democratic change at all – again, a case that would be considered disconfirming for the sufficiency of the proposed D·M·R conjunction.

Instead of interpreting the D·M·R conjunction by assessing the number of cases that fall on or above the identity line, it is more useful to dichotomize the concept space, creating four quadrants that correspond to high and low membership scores on both the causal and outcome variables, as pictured in Figure 3. Because fuzzy algebra models causal conjunctions using the minimum score for each variable in the conjunction, the x-axis represents the minimum value of an intervener for democracy (D), militarization (M), and resource availability (R). The y-axis represents democratic change achieved by the last year of an intervention (or 2004 in the case of ongoing interventions), with all instances of negative change coded as zero. As can be seen in the figure, more than 80 percent of all cases fall within the two quadrants that we would expect based on the theory presented here: Where the scores for the conjunction of D·M·R are high, scores for the outcome (democratic change, DC) are also high, and where scores on the causal conjunction are low (d·m·r), outcome scores are also low (dc). Six of the nine cases of substantial democratic change (change of at least .5 in fuzzy-set terms or at least 1.5 on the Freedom House scale) occurred in the presence of the D·M·R conjunction, and all three cases of extremely high democratic change (change of at least .67 in fuzzy-set terms or 2.5 on the Freedom House index) occurred

51 As with the analysis of necessary conditions, a .05 adjustment factor has been incorporated to compensate for imprecise measurement, so that breakpoints occur at .45 instead of .50. On adjustment factors, see Ragin 2000 (223-6).
52 Negative democratic change – that is, autocratization – is assessed separately. Detailed coding rules are available in Appendix 1.
where the D·M·R conjunction was high. In the eight cases where D·M·R was high (seven if the highly questionable case of Cyprus is excluded), six evidenced high levels of democratic change. In contrast, in the 19 cases where at least one element of the D·M·R conjunction was low, only three evidenced significant democratic change.

In Figure 3, all of the data points that fall within the upper right-hand quadrant and the lower left-hand quadrant – 22 out of 27 cases – correspond to the predictions of the theory presented here. Each of the quadrants will be reviewed in turn, beginning with the two quadrants which correspond to the predictions of the theory, followed by an assessment of those cases which do not behave as predicted.

The Upper-Right Quadrant (D·M·R = DC). The six cases in this quadrant represent those instances in which committed, relatively militarized, democratic interveners succeeded in producing substantial democratic change (an improvement in Freedom House scores of at least 1.5 – 2.0 points). The cases of Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan will be treated at length in the chapters to follow. The remaining cases of intervention – in East Timor, Haiti, and Panama – are all notable for having been led by two countries, the United States and Australia, with relatively militarized strategic cultures and a relative willingness to commit to stabilizing neighboring states. The American commitment to Haiti was obviously highly qualified, and the country descended once again into chaos within years of the departure of American and UN (UNMIH) troops. Both East Timor and Panama, however, have been able to sustain the democratic changes initiated under foreign intervention, and both now score relatively highly on Freedom House’s index of democracy, with scores of 3.0 and 1.5 respectively. These scores place East Timor on a par with Turkey today and nearly as high as such relatively democratic countries as Romania and Thailand, while Panama scores substantially better than all of them.
Figure 3: Sufficiency of Democracy, Militarization, and Resources for Promoting Democratic Change

ABK: Abkhazia  
AFG: Afghanistan  
ALB: Albania  
ANG: Angola  
BIH: Bosnia  
CAM: Cambodia  
CAR: Central African Republic  
DRC: Congo (Dem. Republic)  
IVR: Cote d’Ivoire  
CYP: Cyprus  
ETM: East Timor  
HAI: Haiti  
IRQ: Iraq  
KOS: Kosovo  
LEB: Lebanon  
LIB: Liberia  
MOZ: Mozambique  
NAM: Namibia  
PAN: Panama  
SLE: Sierra Leone  
SOL: Solomon Islands  
SOM: Somalia  
TJK: Tajikistan  
TRD: Transdniestr
The Lower-Left Quadrant (d·m·r = dc). Because a case’s score for a causal conjunction is its lowest score for any one of the variables included, this quadrant actually represents seven different causal conjunctions, where one or more of the causal variables receives a score below the breakpoint (represented by a lower-case letter): D·M·r, D·m·R, D·m·r, d·M·R, d·M·r, d·m·R, and d·m·r. These cases can be placed into three groups, depending on which of the three variables is lowest.

Cases of non-democratic interveners (d) are notable for almost uniformly producing autocratic change, such as Syria in Lebanon and Russia in Abkhazia, Tajikistan, and Transdniestr. Nigeria during the days of its military dictatorship is an exception, having produced modest but notable democratic change in Liberia and Sierra Leone. It is important to note, however, that democratic solutions were usually not Nigeria’s first preference (or first strategy attempted), and even where Nigeria did back elections and a negotiated solution among warring factions, its desire to make itself an indispensable partner to such powerful democracies as the United States played an important role (Adebajo 2002).

Cases of low resource availability (r) are generally UN peacekeeping missions in which no country or coalition had a substantial national stake in the outcome, including Angola (UNAVEM III), the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), Mozambique (ONUMOZ), Sierra Leone 2 (UNAMSIL), and Somalia (UNOSOM II). In relatively more challenging environments these missions frequently collapse unless supported by a significant, militarized power, as was the case with Britain in Sierra Leone (ICG 2004a). In relatively beneficent intervention environments (e.g., Mozambique at the end of the Cold War) they commonly facilitate modest democratic change.

Cases of low intervener militarization (m) are more difficult to evaluate. Interestingly, although non-militarized countries are roughly as common as militarized
countries among the most significant interveners in this study (Table 3), there are few cases of intervention in which anti-militarized countries dominate. This fact in itself suggests that anti-militarized countries tend to play a supporting role in interventions, leaving the leadership to more militarized states. The two interventions in which relatively anti-militarized states dominated – the Italian-led intervention in Albania (Operation Alba) and the French intervention (Operation Licorne) alongside UN forces (UNOCI) in Côte d’Ivoire – are both marginal cases. In Albania the Italians and other members of the multinational force did not have a mandate to pursue longer-term, more intrusive political change, nor did Rome pursue such a mandate (Greco 1998; Kostakos and Bourantonis 1998). In Côte d’Ivoire, France’s role is complicated by its colonial and post-colonial history in the country, making a more aggressive French effort potentially counter-productive (International Crisis Group 2004b). A more extensive assessment of the consequences of non-militarized strategic culture will be pursued in-depth in discussions of Germany in the chapters to follow.

The Upper-Left Quadrant ($d\cdot m\cdot r = DC$). The five outlying cases are as revealing as those which fall within the predicted quadrants. Three cases fall within the upper-left quadrant, where democratic change exceeded expectations: Cambodia, Liberia 2, and Namibia. Cambodia and Namibia were both UN peacekeeping missions (UNTAC and UNTAG respectively) in conflicts that were grinding to a close with the end of the Cold War and apartheid in South Africa. While the UN played a valuable role in both cases, the UN’s work was considerably simplified by the fact that the end of the Cold War and apartheid removed the causes of conflict or the sources of support

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53 With a fuzzy-set militarization score of .43, France falls within the middle one-fifth of the range of militarization scores, although it is slightly below the break point of .50. France’s strategic culture thus scores within the intermediate band (countries with scores between .41 and .60), although it is towards the bottom end of this band.

54 France is also close to the borderline between militarized and anti-militaristic states, scoring a .43.
for the warring parties (or both). Liberia 2 was also a peacekeeping mission (UNMIL), although it operated in a considerably more challenging environment. The fact that it has endured and contributed to the stabilization of Liberia is encouraging, although it is important to note that Nigeria and the United States played important roles in preparing the country for the arrival of UNMIL, with Nigeria leading an ECOWAS vanguard force and the U.S. positioning an amphibious group of 2000 marines offshore in support of the ECOWAS mission.

*The Lower-Right Quadrant (D·M·R = dc).* Finally, two cases fall in the lower-right quadrant: Turkey’s occupation of Northern Cyprus and the American invasion of Iraq. Northern Cyprus tells us very little. Turkey itself lies on the exact dividing line between relatively more democratic and more autocratic countries (with a Freedom House average score of 4.0 for the period 1990-2004), making predictions indeterminate. Moreover, Cyprus in the early 1970s, before the attempted coup by Greek loyalists and the Turkish invasion that followed, was already a relatively democratic country (a 2.5 Freedom House score), making it nearly impossible for Northern Cyprus to make substantial democratic progress under Turkish control.

Iraq, on the other hand, is a much more important case, both substantively and theoretically. In the final chapter Iraq will be treated at greater length, but a brief discussion of the case is warranted here. As a highly militarized democracy facing relatively low resource constraints, the United States should have been able to impose considerably more democratic change, according to the theory proposed here. The theory presented in this study, however, is probabilistic. There are two major reasons why a few cases – and Iraq in particular – do not behave as predicted: (i) the difficulty of the target environment and (ii) the manner in which an intervention is conducted. It is hard to imagine a case in which both of these factors could exercise a more
intensely negative influence on the outcome of an intervention than Iraq. Although a number of control variables were introduced to account for difficult intervention environments (level of development, ethnic heterogeneity, prior experience with democracy), none of these comes close to capturing the hubris required to believe that invading Iraq was anything less than an extraordinary gamble. Iraq is an enormous country. Its civil society had been crushed by decades of brutal dictatorship, leaving nothing but clerical hierarchies upon which to base a new political order. Its three major ethnic groups were divided by memories of near-genocidal acts perpetrated by the former regime. Its citizens’ expectations of the wealth that should flow from its oil reserves in no way reflected the realities of the country’s antiquated infrastructure and explosive population growth rate. These expectations combined with colonial legacies to fuel enormous suspicions of neo-colonial expropriation of the country’s oil wealth. And finally, the United States faced considerable suspicion and hostility as the country which, more than any other, had insisted on an economic sanctions regime which had contributed to a devastating economic decline over the 15 years before the invasion (Cordesman 2003). The United States exponentially increased the difficulties of an already daunting task by failing to plan properly for the occupation of Iraq. The U.S. failed to provide for public order in the weeks and months after the invasion, failed to identify legitimate representatives of the major Iraqi political communities, and – perhaps most important of all – failed to heed one of the clearest lessons of post-conflict interventions over the past 15 years, the need to incorporate former combatants (in this case, former Baathists) into the new political order. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a worse handling of nation-building (Bunce 2005; Phillips 2005).


Democratice Change and Achievement

Ultimately, what is of interest to interveners is not simply the ability to promote democratic change, but the ability to promote sufficient change to create at least an “electoral democracy” – a country which includes all major political interests in institutionalized political contestation, even if political liberties and the rule of law are not as strong as in a liberal democracy. The strongest test of the conjunction of intervener democracy, militarization, and resource availability is the extent to which it can promote both democratic change and achievement.

The outcomes of interventions are summarized in Table 7 using the minimum membership score an intervention achieved on both the dependent variables of democratic change and democratic achievement.55 “High change and achievement” are those cases in which substantial democratic change was promoted (a gain of at least 1.5 points out of a possible improvement of 6.0 on the Freedom House democracy scale) and at least electoral democracy (a score of 3.5 or better on the Freedom House scale) was achieved, so that a .5 or higher membership score was achieved on both the scales of democratic change and democratic achievement.

“Moderate change and achievement” are those cases in which the minimum membership score for the two dependent variables was .33 (a change of at least 1.0 points and the attainment of a score of at least 5.5 – that is, at least competitive oligarchy). The category “low or no change and achievement” represents cases in which the minimum was either 0 or .17 (no more than a 0.5 point improvement in democracy scores or no higher than a 6.0 rating on the Freedom House scale – that is,

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55 As with all previous analyses, a .05 adjustment factor was used to determine which cases counted as “high” or “low” presence of a given independent variable, so that .45 is the breakpoint. Northern Cyprus was excluded from the table because, as discussed before, it is essentially irrelevant to the discussion here.
closed autocracy) but where no negative change (autocratization) took place. Finally, “Autocratization” designates those cases in which the targets became more autocratic during the course of an intervention.

Table 7: Democratic Achievements in Military Interventions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democracy (Interveners)</th>
<th>Militarization ∩ Resources</th>
<th>Democratic Change ∩ Achievement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High High</td>
<td>Bosnia East Timor Panama</td>
<td>Afghanistan Haiti Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Low</td>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>Cambodia Liberia 2 Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Low</td>
<td></td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low High</td>
<td>Liberia 1</td>
<td>Sierra Leone 1 Tajikistan 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Abkhazia Lebanon Tajikistan 1 Transdniestr</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table demonstrates a clear trend: Where an intervening state or coalition combines both high resource commitments and a militarized strategic culture (“Militarization ∩ Resources”), it is vastly more likely to externalize its regime type successfully. Where either militarization or resource commitments are low, target states are likely to remain “warlord democracies.” All four cases of autocratization involved militarized, committed, non-democratic interveners. Three of the four cases of substantial democratic change and achievement were instances in which committed,

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56 Note that the term “failure” applies to the extent to which an intervener promoted democratic change and achievement. Interventions that rank as failures on this count may well be successes by other standards, such as the restoration of public order.

57 As discussed above, there are unfortunately no alternative indices for the dependent variable that are suitable for “robustness checks” of the analysis performed here. It is noteworthy, however, that the four cases of intervention identified above as “successes” also register as among the best performers on the World Bank’s Governance Indicators of Voice and Accountability, Government Effectiveness, and Rule of Law (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2005). On all three of these indices, the four cases identified here as “successes” were among the top six highest scoring countries in 2004 from among all of the targets of intervention included in this study.
militarized, democratic interveners led the intervention. Thus, seven of the eight extreme outcomes correspond precisely to the predictions of the theory presented here. Certainly, committed, militarized democracies often do not succeed in helping target countries to become at least illiberal democracies; indeed, they succeeded in just under half of all attempts. But there is only one instance (Iraq) in which committed, militarized democracies did not promote at least moderate levels of change and achievement, whereas in the 19 interventions conducted by other types of interveners, only four resulted in moderate change and achievement, and only one yielded high levels of change and achievement.

Conclusion

The pattern highlighted in Table 7 is repeatedly visible in interventions over the past 15 years. Before any militarily capable state was willing to intervene in Sierra Leone, the international community invited the warlord Foday Sankoh (best known for his troops’ practice of amputating the limbs of civilian victims) into the government of the country. He subsequently repudiated the peace deal, took hundreds of UN peacekeepers hostage, and marched on Freetown to seize power. When Great Britain inserted several hundred elite troops into the country, with considerable offshore firepower available to support them, Foday Sankoh’s forces were repulsed and Sierra Leone today is more stable (albeit tentatively so) than it has been in years. Similarly, Australia’s willingness to confront paramilitaries in East Timor was an essential prerequisite for the success of the UN mission in that fledgling country. Without the presence of American airpower, observers agree, warlords in Afghanistan would quickly return to fighting, whereas the present government of Hamid Karzai has brought greater opportunities to consolidate a central state than Afghans have known in decades. In short, militarization carries substantial risks – as can be seen in Iraq and
Somalia – but also is usually an important element of successful democracy promotion in interventions. Anti-militarism also carries risks: the likelihood not that violence will be avoided but rather that its power will be ceded to warlords intent on shaping political authority structures in ways destined to promote continued violence and instability.

Three caveats, however, should substantially temper anyone’s enthusiasm for promoting democracy through military interventions. First, militarized interveners can provide a sense of security to the general population of a target country, and they can challenge paramilitaries for control of state and shadow institutions. They can also, however, overly militarize an intervention – that is, they can place too much emphasis on military as opposed to other instruments (probably the case with the current American presence in Afghanistan), or they can militarize an intervention beyond the level of their commitment (for instance, the American performance in UNOSOM II in Somalia), provoking unnecessary bloodshed in either case. Second, promoting substantial democratic change is not the same as successfully promoting democracy. Few of the target states of interventions in the past 15 years achieved even the level of illiberal democracy (if they did not begin there already). Nor have enough interventions concluded for us to know in what percentage of cases positive democratic change can be sustained after the intervener withdraws. Finally, there are some cases in which a variety of factors – including the size of the target state, its ethnic heterogeneity, its lack of suitable civil society “partners” for the intervener, a history of hostile relations with the intervener, and an overwhelmingly hostile international environment, among others – makes intervention ill-advised no matter how it is structured. Iraq is almost certainly such a case.

Recommending that would-be interveners be aware of these caveats, however, is not the same as recommending against interventions in general or against the
promotion of democracy as a goal of interventions. The record remains clear that
democratic change can be promoted. As discussed above, six of the eight cases in
which coalitions were dominated by committed democracies with militarized strategic
cultures produced substantial democratic change in the target country. If democracy
promotion is difficult, or if there have been relapses towards authoritarianism, these
outcomes may well suggest not that doing “less is more” for interventions, as Etzioni
claimed, but rather that interveners must commit to the long haul, to challenging
spoilers, and to strengthening civil society, and observers must compare the targets of
intervention not against Switzerland but against what would have happened in the
absence of intervention.

58 Again, the record is even better – six of seven – if the highly questionable case of the Turkish
intervention in Cyprus is excluded.
Part II: Cases
Chapter 3: Tajikistan

In June 1997 an alliance of Tajik Islamist parties signed a peace accord with the government of Tajikistan, ending a civil war that had lasted five years and killed up to 100,000 people. The agreement between the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) and President Emomali Rakhmonov is considered by many a triumph of Russian diplomacy. Indeed, Russia played a critical role in brokering the settlement in which the various opposition parties were guaranteed a proportion of Cabinet positions and the chance to participate in democratic elections. For several years previously, however, Moscow had one-sidedly supported the government of Rakhmonov against the opposition. How then are we to understand Russia’s championing of the 1997 peace accords for Tajikistan – an agreement which corresponds to the dominant post-Cold War norm of peaceful conflict resolution through inclusive, democratic government – despite Russia’s radically different behavior in other times and places?

A complete explanation, of course, would require considerable attention to differences in the context of the conflicts in the two regions. A more parsimonious explanation, however, may be found in the framework presented in the previous two chapters. After an initial period of internal decision-making chaos, Russia ultimately adopted a policy consistent with its norms of governance, its strategic culture, and its resource constraints. Although quasi-democratic at home in the 1990s, Russia’s own tumultuous experience with its democratic transition had discredited many Russian democrats and convinced many Russians that democratic transitions were difficult enough in Russia, let alone in a war-torn, impoverished Central Asian republic. Moreover, for much of the 1990s Russian foreign policy towards other states of the former Soviet Union was controlled by some of the least democratic forces in Moscow, the Ministry of Defense and the military. Political inclusion in military
interventions, therefore, was not a policy adopted by conviction but rather by the force of circumstances.

Russian political elites and, to a lesser extent, the Russian people were willing to use force where necessary to protect Russian interests. Given the magnitude of Russia’s domestic problems, however, very few were willing to devote substantial resources to policing the conflicts that had erupted along Russia’s southern rim in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse. In Tajikistan Russia faced a situation with some parallels to the West’s experience with both the Balkans and Afghanistan. Similar to Western interests in the wars in the former Yugoslavia, Russia feared refugee flows and a loss of its own credibility and that of the alliance it had painstakingly created, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Similar to Western stakes in Afghanistan, Russia feared that Central Asia would become a conduit into Russia for both radical Islam and criminality (especially trafficking in drugs, but also in people and weapons). At the same time, Moscow decision-makers confronted similar constraints as those faced by Western leaders in the Balkans: Order was to be restored, but without enduring significant casualties.

The result was a profoundly ambivalent policy. After an initial period of policy disarray, Moscow decided to back the faction in the Tajik civil war that seemed to best protect Russian interests: the former communists friendly to Moscow, rather than the alliance of opposition parties which were taking an increasingly Islamist direction as the conflict escalated. When it became clear that limited Russian support could not guarantee the victory of its clients, and indeed that Tajikistan was becoming an increasingly dangerous failed state, Moscow played a key role in brokering a peace agreement premised on a government of national reconciliation that brought the opposition into government and that conformed with global norms of conflict resolution. The Moscow-backed, incumbent government of Emomali Rakhmonov,
however, quickly failed to live up to its democratic commitments, but with the civil war over and the immediate crisis past, Moscow did very little to ensure the agreement it had brokered was honored by its client. Thus, the democratic provisions of the peace accords turned out to be largely hollow. Russia contributed to peace in Tajikistan in the short term while doing nothing to lay the groundwork for an inclusive political order that will be sustainable over time. In the terms of this study, Russian policy migrated from the proxy model in the first several years of its intervention to an uncommitted mediation model, as shown in Table 8.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inclusion Of Unarmed Actors</th>
<th>Less Inclusive</th>
<th>More Inclusive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inclusion of Armed Actors</td>
<td>Less Inclusive</td>
<td>Proxy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The rest of this chapter will proceed in four steps. First I provide a brief narrative of the war in Tajikistan and Russian efforts to stabilize the failing state. Next, I examine the conflict through the framework for structured, focused comparison that was presented in the first chapter. I then briefly review alternative explanations for the outcome in Tajikistan, and I conclude with a discussion of the relevance of the case of Tajikistan to the broader phenomenon of military interventions by non-democratic regional powers.
An Overview of the War and Peace in Tajikistan

Descent into Conflict

As with all cases of state failure and civil war, the causes of the bloody conflict in Tajikistan are complex. The proximate cause of the country’s disintegration was the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the loss of central Soviet subsidies, which had constituted roughly half of Tajikistan’s economy (Dadmehr 2003, 250). The roots of the conflict, however, lay much deeper, in the artificiality of the Tajik state and its boundaries, the weakness of a cohesive Tajik identity vis-à-vis the much more localized identities prevalent in the mountainous republic, and the structural weaknesses of its economy. When social tensions mounted in the 1970s and 1980s as a result of a rapidly declining economy and burgeoning birth rate, they were frequently expressed in terms of regional or “clan” grievances (Akiner 2001; Dadmehr 2003; Rubin 1998). Because the Soviet state never deeply penetrated into Tajik society, Communism in the republic became grafted onto traditional social relations. The patronage networks common to the Soviet economy were often cemented through intermarriage and similar practices, so that alliances within the Communist Party took on many aspects of extended kinship structures. The Communist party elites from the province of Leninabad – known both as the Leninabadi and Khojandi “clan” – dominated Tajikistan’s politics throughout most of the Soviet era. When social discontent turned violent in the 1990s, therefore, it adopted both ideological forms (as a conflict between privileged former Communists and an alliance of democrats and Islamists) and regional forms (as a struggle between the formerly dominant Leninabadis and the Pamiris, Gharmis, Hissaris, and Kulyabis, as well as between groups within each region vying for dominance) (Akiner 2001; Rubin 1998).

Following the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the tensions that had been smoldering in Tajikistan erupted in May 1992 into armed violence.
between the (mostly Leninabadi and Kulyabi) supporters of Tajikistan’s Communist President Rakhman Nabiev and those of the democratic and Islamist opposition.

By far the largest and most capable fighting force in Tajikistan at the time was the 201st Motorized Rifle Division (MRD) – a formerly Soviet unit that now belonged to Russia but was filled with large numbers of Tajikistani recruits, particularly in the enlisted ranks. Russia’s initial involvement in Tajikistan’s civil war was thus entirely unintentional and, indeed, unwilling. In 1992 Russia was a newborn state, still without effective diplomatic representation in the other states of the former Soviet Union and with vastly more pressing matters requiring the attention of Moscow than an internal conflict in a Central Asian backwater. To the extent that they paid any attention at all to events in Central Asia, much of Russia’s foreign policy establishment – then dominated by Western-oriented, liberal “Atlanticists” under Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev – sought to distance Russia from the autocratic, economically backward region (Dubnov 1996; Gretzky 1997; Jonson 1998; Lynch 2000, Chapters 2 and 3; Malcolm et al 1996; Orr 1998; Polikanov 2003; Raevsky and Vorob’ev 1994; Sagromoso 2003; Stepanova 2003b; Trenin and Malashenko 2004, 7-8; Wilhelm 1998). Consequently, in the initial months of the war Russian policy towards Tajikistan was incoherent, made de facto by officers in the field. In some cases that policy was highly constructive. In other cases particular Russian units probably contributed to the fighting by providing weapons and support to allies among the Tajikistani combatants, while in yet other cases the Russian officers simply lost control of their units entirely (Gretzky 1997, 14; Orr 1998, 152-3; Schoeberlein 2002, 476; Serrano 2003, 166; Stepanova 2003; Wilhelm 1998).

By the fall of 1992, however, some in Moscow were becoming increasingly concerned by developments in Tajikistan. The Islamist elements in the coalition government formed in May 1992 gained the upper hand in the Tajikistani capital of
Dushanbe, supported by paramilitary gangs. At the same time criminalized paramilitaries loyal to the government were responsible for massacres in opposition strongholds. With violence rapidly escalating, those Russian officials paying attention to events in Central Asia saw numerous threats emerging from the chaos in Tajikistan: the rise of radical Islam, the spread of criminalized economies throughout the region, the spillover of ethnic violence into the rest of Central Asia and potentially into Russia itself, and a power vacuum that would invite intervention by a range of outside powers into Russia’s strategic southern rim (Beissinger 1997; Jonson 1998; Kasenov 1998).

The war took a critical turn in November-December 1992, when the head of the coalition government and Islamist-democratic alliance, Akbarsho Iskanderov, was displaced by an armed alliance of Leninabads and Kulyabs, militarily backed by Uzbekistan. Various accounts differ concerning the role that Russia and the 201st MRD played during this period, ranging from benign neglect to acquiescence to active support. What is clear is that the Kulyabi leader Emomali Rakhmonov and his paramilitarized political party, the Popular Front, won control of the government of Tajikistan by December 1992. With the Islamists out of power and a government of former communists friendly to Moscow in power, Russia quickly lent its support to the new regime and attempted to marginalize the Islamist armed opposition, even while calling its military presence a “peacekeeping” mission and sponsoring diplomatic talks between the warring parties (Dubnov 1996; Gretzky 1997; Lynch 2000; Serrano 2003).

Russian support to the Kulyabi regime of Rakhmonov took a number of forms – military, economic, and diplomatic. The Russian military presence consisted of both the 201st MRD and the Border Forces. The Border Forces were in fact comprised of Tajik recruits with a Russian officer corps. While these forces were to be funded by both Dushanbe and Moscow, in fact Rakhmonov’s cash-strapped government
consistently failed to provide its share of the funding, making them almost exclusively Russian-funded. The Border Forces were deployed along the border between Afghanistan and Tajikistan, while the 201st MRD was headquartered in Dushanbe, with regiments in the Kulyab and Kurgan-Tyube regions near the Afghan border. The deployment locations for the Russian forces reflect their missions: to deter any direct attacks on the Rakhmonov regime in Dushanbe and to interdict not only drugs but also all forms of support for the Tajik Islamist forces that seeped across the Tajik-Afghan border. Although the Russian forces in Tajikistan generally suffered from low morale, corruption, and inadequate support from Russia, they were nonetheless the clearly predominant military force in Tajikistan. Whenever possible they sought to achieve their ends through mere deterrent presence, although at times they participated in direct combat operations, including aerial and artillery bombardment of the opposition’s military bases in Afghanistan (Panfilov 1996a). They clearly were not designed for what is understood traditionally as peacekeeping: Rather than being deployed throughout the territory of Tajikistan, they were based in government strongholds and as an interdiction force along the border that provided the opposition’s main sources of supply (Jonson 1998, 13-14; Orr 1998, 155-9; Sagromoso 2003, 14-15, 23-27; Serrano 2003, 174-5; Trenin and Malashenko 2004, 11).

Financially, there was relatively little that Moscow could do to support the Rakhmonov regime, given Russia’s own economic problems. Nonetheless, given the absolute destitution of Tajikistan after the collapse of the Soviet Union, relatively small amounts of assistance yielded considerable influence. The government of Tajikistan owed Russia over $600 million. Moscow also provided a substantial part of the government’s (admittedly miniscule) annual budget, with many reports claiming that Russian funds accounted for up to two-thirds of the Central Asian state’s annual
budget (Rubin 1998). Finally, Russia provided the lion’s share of funding for the Border Forces which were ostensibly an entity jointly funded by the two governments. While there are some accounts of humanitarian assistance being provided by Russian forces, all indications are that nearly all Russian aid\(^{59}\) was directed towards the support of the Rakhmonov regime in Dushanbe, which in turn used the aid to perpetuate its patronage networks (Atkin 2002, 109-110; Atovullo 1996; Gafarly 1996; Georgiev 1997; Mlechin 1995; Nazarov 1996).

At the same time Russia used its diplomatic weight one-sidedly on behalf of the Rakhmonov regime, helping it to legitimize itself and to place the opposition at a disadvantage in peace negotiations. In 1994, for instance, Rakhmonov sought to bolster his regime’s domestic support by orchestrating a referendum on a new constitution and holding presidential elections – thus violating a Joint Declaration that he had signed with opposition leaders in which he promised not to organize elections without opposition participation. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Albert Chernyshev reportedly stated that Russian President Boris Yeltsin had ordered the elections (Jonson 1998, 10), and the Russian commanders of the “peacekeeping” force in Tajikistan openly endorsed Rakhmonov during the campaign (Atkin 1997, 303).

Although the United Nations flatly stated that the elections lacked even “the semblance of democracy,” Chernyshev proclaimed the elections to be legitimate, and the Russian government welcomed the elections as a milestone in Tajikistan’s progress towards democracy (Atkin 1997, 303; Lynch 2000, 165). These elections were then used as a tool to delegitimate the opposition in peace negotiations (Abarinov 1996a; Jonson 1998, 19).

\(^{59}\) Unfortunately, there do not appear to be any published numbers on the amount of assistance provided to Tajikistan by Moscow. Given the extremely high levels of both inflation and corrupt diversion of official funds in these years, any figures on assistance that did exist would be largely meaningless. I am grateful to Eugene Rumer for a discussion on this point.
The Turn to Power-Sharing

Throughout the period from 1993-1996, Moscow’s support for Rakhmonov and the Kulyabi faction was far from absolute. Moscow foreign policy-makers recognized that the president was a flawed leader with a narrow support base and a regime held together through the distribution of state spoils. Russian political elites also had much more pressing issues than Central Asia on their agenda, and they primarily sought to keep Tajikistan from disintegrating while minimizing Russian resource commitments to the country. As a result, Moscow’s policy was always somewhat equivocal, combining elements of peacekeeping and mediation between the Kulyabi faction of Rakhmonov and the increasingly Islamist United Tajik Opposition (UTO): Russia “organized a dialogue between both parties, while providing support to only one of them. Russia’s military commitment [was] not sufficient to resolve the conflict by force, and yet [was] too one-sided to act as an impartial ‘peacekeeper’” (Lynch 2000, 160).

By 1996 Russia came to resolve these contradictions in its policy in favor of a more even-handed approach towards the warring factions. The reasons for this shift in policy are many, and analysts disagree about the relative priority of these various factors. Rakhmonov’s hold on power was becoming increasingly tenuous. The economic situation in Tajikistan was declining, sparking food riots and mutinies. Meanwhile, the Kulyabis increasingly concentrated all political power and wealth in their own hands, thus narrowing their base of support and antagonizing other clans and warlords (Atovullo 1996; Jonson 1998, 11-12; Lynch 2000, 163-6; Serrano 2003, 174). Many in Moscow thus came to doubt the wisdom of continuing one-sided support for a besieged regime. At the same time as Rakhmonov’s position was weakening, the risks posed by a complete collapse of order in Tajikistan grew exponentially with the Taliban’s seizure of Kabul in 1996. With a radical Islamic
government in power in Afghanistan, many in Moscow felt the need to shore up Central Asian governments – and especially Tajikistan – as a bulwark against the spread of Islamic radicalism and instability (Abarinov 1996a and 1996b; Atkin 2002, 110; Gafarly 2000).

Thus, while Russian policy-makers did not believe in democracy as a formula for conflict resolution, they ultimately played a critical role in brokering a peace agreement for Tajikistan that included provisions for democratic elections and a power-sharing formula which guaranteed the opposition 30 percent of cabinet seats in a transitional government in exchange for opposition forces’ disarmament and demobilization. The final two rounds of negotiations were held in the capitals of the two states that were most influential in brokering the peace deal: The penultimate round was held in Tehran, while the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan was signed in the presence of Russian President Boris Yeltsin in Moscow on June 27, 1997. Until elections could be held for the presidency and parliament, a Commission on National Reconciliation, with equal representation from parties loyal to Rakhmonov and the United Tajik Opposition, was responsible for overseeing the safe return and reintegration of refugees; developing laws regulating political parties and the media; and working with the president to develop amendments to the constitution, a new election law, and a Central Election Commission (Akiner 2001, 55-6; Smith 1999, 244; Zoir and Newton 2001, 3-4).

After the signing of the Moscow Agreement and considerable back-and-forth over the details of the transition, the United Tajik Opposition forces ultimately disarmed in exchange for governmental positions and new elections. Both sides of this exchange, however, were flawed: Disarmament and demobilization have been more nominal than real, while formal political inclusion of the opposition has been highly partial and offered on terms extremely favorable to Rakhmonov. Participation in
presidential elections, held in 1999, was effectively limited to a single candidate, President Rakhmonov, who won 97 percent of the vote. Rakhmonov’s party also won the vast majority of seats in the parliamentary elections held several months later, while the opposition won only a token number in elections which the UN and OSCE declared had failed to meet even minimum international standards. Murders of journalists and official censorship have declined since the war, although independent media outlets remain limited. Opposition parties are now legal, and indeed in many ways there is more political pluralism in Tajikistan now than in the rest of the former Soviet Central Asian republics. Because opportunities for formal political participation have been so limited, however, much political inclusion occurs at the informal level, with Rakhmonov offering rival warlords or faction leaders positions in government and access to patronage resources in exchange for some degree of loyalty. And numerous opposition leaders who did hold formal political authority were later removed from office or have been found dead (Akiner 2001, 59-65; Atkin 2002, 106-110; Dadmehr 2003; Schoeberlein 2002, 476-7; Zoir and Newton 2001).

A Focused Examination of Russian Policies in Tajikistan

With the broad outlines of Russian involvement in Tajikistan established, we can turn to an evaluation of Russia’s policy choices using the same questions by which we will evaluate American and German behavior in the Balkans and Afghanistan. By using a uniform framework to evaluate the three countries’ intervention policies, we can better determine the causes and consequences of the choices they made. In this section I will review what was at stake for Russia, its attitudes towards democracy and the use of force, the policy alternatives available to Moscow, the structure of the Russian intervention, and the consequences of Russian policies. In subsequent sections
I will examine alternative explanations for Russia’s behavior and the implications of the Tajikistan case for a broader understanding of military interventions.

**National Interests and Attitudes**

National interests (and concomitant resource constraints), regime type, and strategic culture form the framework proposed by this study for understanding the conduct and much of the outcomes of interventions. Russia is clearly willing to use substantial force to ensure its preferred form of order prevails in regions of critical strategic concern (e.g., Chechnya), but it is highly skeptical that democracy is the form of political order that can or should be promoted. In the case of Tajikistan the absence of critical national interests explains the ambiguities and reversals that characterized Russian policy – in particular, the shift from one-sided (albeit qualified) Russian support for Rakhmonov to instrumental (and half-hearted) support for powersharing and “democratic” elections.

**Democracy.** Russia is neither a liberal democracy nor a closed autocracy. Rather it is a transitional regime which for many years during the 1990s possessed many of the attributes of a democracy before slipping once again towards autocracy under the administration of Vladimir Putin. Both the country’s political culture and its institutions played a role in shaping its policy towards Tajikistan. As citizens of a country that was only beginning the transition towards democracy, Russians in the 1990s had not fully internalized the norms of democracy. Moreover, democratic governmental institutions in Russia were still highly tentative in the 1990s. In particular, much of the security and defense apparatus operated without strong civilian oversight. Because these were the institutions most responsible for Russian foreign policy in the so-called “near abroad,” the institutional checks on foreign policy that we
might expect to operate in democracies functioned poorly or not at all. The result was initially a preference for the proxy model of intervention, although Russia turned to a mediation approach when it found that it could not successfully implement the proxy model within existing resource constraints.

Russians’ attitude towards democracy is highly conflicted, in large part because of their own experience with a turbulent and economically devastating period of transition from Soviet rule. Russians have observed first-hand the many difficulties of democratic transitions. If a country with Russia’s relatively developed economy, state institutions, and educational system has struggled to establish a stable and prosperous democratic order, then, most Russians assume, there is very little hope for regions such as Central Asia. While Russians generally support democracy in principle, they are vastly more likely than citizens in mature democracies to believe that “democracy is not very good for the maintenance of order” (Zimmerman 2002, 49). Opinion among Russia’s foreign policy elites is highly skeptical of democracy promotion as a goal of foreign policy, commonly seeing it as errant sentimentality or empty rhetorical cover for policies driven by geopolitical imperatives (Bordachev 1998; Dorenko 2003; Lo 2003, 100-101). Interestingly, even in the writings of relatively liberal academics, references to democracy as an instrument of conflict resolution are almost non-existent (for instance Kremeniuk 2001; Lebedeva 2000; Stepanova 2003).

The actual makers of Russian policy towards the former Soviet Union are even less inclined to experiment with democracy as a means of stabilizing Russia’s periphery. Particularly for the first several years after the fall of the Soviet Union (the period of Tajikistan’s civil war), Russian policy towards its “near abroad” was dominated by the military and Ministry of Defense – the most illiberal bastions of the Russian foreign policy establishment (Lo 2003, 21-22, 34-5; Lynch 2000, 10;
These elements of the foreign policy establishment were dominated by personnel who demonstrated considerable continuities with the Soviet era, and they frequently operated without any transparency or effective civilian oversight.

The limits of Russia’s own democratic transition thus tended to be externalized in its relations with its neighbors. Russian public opinion was ambivalent about democracy when it was confronted with challenges to public order. Russian siloviki (Defense, Interior, military, and intelligence elites) were even more skeptical, and they were often able to exercise their illiberal preferences without effective check by civilian leaders or the public more generally. Consequently, Russia tended to support loyal autocrats over unstable or hostile leaders who came to power by democratic means (Gretzky 1997, 40; Malashenko 2000).

*Strategic Culture*. Russian foreign policy was characterized by other continuities as well. The same militarized strategic culture seen in the Soviet approach to Afghanistan was evident as well in Tajikistan, which the Russian military generally approached through the lens of counter-insurgency (Lynch 2000, 9, 98-100; Raevsky and Vorob’ev 1994, 5; Sagromoso 2003, 15). Russian peacekeeping doctrine in general emphasizes many strategies, tactics, and forms of military organization more appropriate to counter-insurgency, and Russian “peacekeeping” forces operate without effective rules of engagement or other systematic restrictions on the use of force (Jonson 1998; Lynch 2000, 98-102; Polikanov 2003; Raevsky and Vorob’ev 1994; Sagromoso 2003). This militarized strategic culture was evident during Tajikistan’s civil war in Russia’s sporadic artillery and aerial bombardment of opposition forces.
National Interests. Russia’s involvement in the conflict in Tajikistan – and, indeed, throughout the former Soviet Union – is highly “overdetermined” (Evangelista 1996, Roeder 1997). Russia had a large number of national interests at stake in Tajikistan and Central Asia: stemming the flood of narcotics (and other contraband) from Central Asia into Russia, preventing the spread of radical Islam and inter-ethnic conflict further northwards, checking the encroachment of outside powers’ influence in the region, and maintaining Russia’s great power status in the lands it once ruled. Analysts disagree about the relative priority of these various factors, but they all obviously played some role in spurring Russia’s involvement in the conflict.

Tajikistan was a key transit route for a torrent of drugs (opium and heroin) flowing out of Afghanistan, with state seizures of thousands of kilos of opium and heroin and a total volume of traffic probably ten times that amount, worth billions of dollars annually (Akiner 2001, 74-5; Olcott 2001, 42-3). Although Russian units in Tajikistan to some extent became “captured” by the drug trade, profiting from it themselves (Gretzky 1997, 25; Rubin 1998), one of the reasons for their deployment was nonetheless to reduce the flow of narcotics entering Russia. Fear of radical Islam and the spread of ethnic and sectarian violence also played an important role, particularly given Russian fears of state disintegration on the Yugoslav model in the early 1990s (Abarinov 1996a and 1996b; Gafarly 2000; Kasenov 1998; Rashid 2002). A geopolitical worldview and notions of a new “Great Game” in Central Asia also fueled interventionist tendencies among elements of the Russian foreign policy establishment, who desired to deny the region to potentially hostile foreign powers such as the United States, Turkey, Iran, and China (Bushkov et al 2002; Cummings 2001; Kasenov 1998; Lo 2003, 83; Polikanov 2003, 190-191). Finally, Russian desire to maintain its great power status and its international reputation played some role as
well (Legvold 1999, Mlechin 1995, Dadmehr 2003), although Central Asia was hardly the ideal stage for recapturing lost international prestige (Kahler 1997).

All of these interests were more than sufficient to guarantee some level of Russian commitment to Tajikistan, but none of them constituted such a clear strategic imperative as to justify the expenditure of substantial resources, either in terms of scarce money or Russian lives. Russia desired to stabilize its southern neighbor, but it was imperative that the effort to do so be accomplished with limited resources (Cummings 2001; Jonson 1998; Sagromoso 2003, 23; Serrano 2003). When Russia committed to the Rakhmonov regime it was originally convinced that its military forces could be used to secure Russian interests at a manageable cost (Polikanov 2003, 188). When events in Tajikistan and Afghanistan demonstrated the risks of less than full commitment to the Rakhmonov regime, Russia was forced to reconsider its original policy of support for its proxy (Jonson 1998; Lynch 2000).

*The Structure of Intervention*

From 1993 to 1996 Russia adopted the “proxy” approach to intervention, attempting to ensure that its preferred faction won in Tajikistan’s civil war. When this policy proved unsustainable at a moderate level of resource commitments, Russia shifted to the “mediation” model, helping to orchestrate the peace deal that brought the Islamists of the UTO into office. Both of these models of intervention were apparent in the ways Russia structured both the military and civilian aspects of its intervention.

*Military Forces.* Russia’s military presence took three forms: the 201st Motorized Rifle Division, the Border Forces, and a variety of Russian military officers who held official positions in the government of Tajikistan. Up to 25,000 soldiers were authorized to the 201st MRD, although its true strength was between 6,000 and
10,000 (Orr 1998, 155; Lynch 2000). Despite its budget shortfalls, low morale, and problems with corruption, the 201st MRD was the overwhelmingly dominant military force in the country, with a monopoly on heavy artillery, heavy armored vehicles, and aerial support.\textsuperscript{60} The Border Guards were comprised almost entirely of Tajik recruits with predominantly Russian officers. Although officially the governments of both Russia and Tajikistan were supposed to contribute equally to their budget, the Border Guards were financed almost entirely by Russia. They numbered approximately 10,000-14,000 (Lynch 2000, 154; Orr 1998, 156). Finally, Russians held a variety of key “power ministry” positions and advisory roles in the government of Rakhmonov, including minister of defense from 1992 to 1995 (Atkin 2002, 109-110). In contrast, the government of Tajikistan (under Rakhmonov) had approximately 3000 soldiers by 1996, mostly armed and trained by the Russians, while opposition forces had a total of approximately 10,000-12,000 fighters scattered among a variety of small, regionally based, and poorly trained paramilitaries (Lynch 2000, 154). Despite all of their problems, therefore, Russian forces were clearly capable of playing a decisive role in the conflict.

Two of the 201st MRD’s regiments and its headquarters element were deployed near the capital of Dushanbe, while the other two regiments were deployed near the Afghan border (Orr 1998, 155). The Border Guards were deployed primarily along the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border. The spatial deployment of these forces was significant. They were not deployed as a typical peacekeeping mission, either interposed between the warring factions or distributed throughout the country in order to build confidence and security among all parties. They instead were concentrated around the capital, thus deterring any attacks on their ally Rakhmonov, and along the southern border of Tajikistan, thus interdicting the opposition forces’ main supply lines from Afghanistan.

\textsuperscript{60} Despite its problems, in 1998 the 201st was rated Russia’s top military division (Akiner 2001, 44, 46; Polikanov 2003, 195).
Due to Russia’s resource limitations, Russian forces relatively seldom played an activist role during the civil war in Tajikistan. Most of the time they served simply as a deterrent and as “echelon support” to the Border Guards, the ranks of which were filled with Tajikistani recruits. When they did take direct part in combat, however, they typically did so using warfighting tactics on behalf of the government of Rakhmonov (Jonson 1998; Lynch 2000; Sagromoso 2003, 27). Since the end of the war, Russian troops have had relatively little influence on politics in Tajikistan.

Civilian Aid and Diplomacy. It is impossible to assess with any precision the amount of aid Russia gave to Tajikistan. With periods of hyperinflation and rampant corruption, all figures cited are largely notional. Various reports have estimated that Tajikistan borrowed over $600 million from Russia during the course of the war (Nazarov 1996), while Duma deputies claimed that Russia was providing assistance worth roughly 25 billion rubles per year during the war (Gafarly 1996). Given the enormity of Russia’s own economic troubles, Russia certainly did not infuse anywhere near the money into Tajikistan that Western powers donated to Bosnia, for example. In a country as impoverished as Tajikistan, however, when no other donors are providing substantial assistance, infusions of $100 or more million per year represent a significant source of political leverage. At various points in the conflict this aid was reported to have played critical roles – for instance, weeks before the 1994 presidential elections in Tajikistan, when a reported Russian transfer of 15 billion rubles allowed Rakhmonov to pay months of wage arrears (Atkin 1997, 303).

Russian diplomacy throughout much of the conflict was equally lopsided. As discussed above, Russia typically attempted to fuse the roles of mediator and partisan,
sponsoring peace talks and then pressing the opposition to accede to Rakhmonov’s terms – the integration of the opposition into purely advisory bodies with no representation in government itself and no guarantees of a level playing field in future elections. Opposition leaders frequently decried Russian pressure and threats and demanded substantive powersharing arrangements (Misin 1996, Pel’ts 1995, Rotar’ 1996). After the shift in Russian policy in 1996, the opposition publicly noted the more even-handed role that Russian diplomats played in the negotiations and publicly praised top Russian officials for extracting meaningful concessions from Rakhmonov (Rotar’ 1996, Sytaia 1997).

Since the end of the war, Russia has possessed fewer sources of leverage over the Rakhmonov regime and thus has had less of an influence over specific political outcomes in Tajikistan (Smith 1999). Most of Russia’s efforts have focused on ensuring the continued presence of Russian forces in the country. Russia retains a number of important tools with which to influence Tajikistan, however. The continued Russian military presence was an important counterbalance to threats from Afghanistan before September 11 and remains important vis-à-vis Uzbekistan (Dadmehr 2003, 257). Moreover, alongside opium and heroin trafficking, remittances from Tajikistani workers in Russia are one of the most important source of revenues for Tajikistan, and Russia remains one of the very few potential investors in the impoverished country (Panfilova 2002; Rashid 2002, 107). Had Russia chosen, therefore, it could have exerted some amount of influence on Rakhmonov to live up to the powersharing and democratic commitments he undertook in the Moscow Agreement that ended the civil war. There are no indications that Moscow did so.
Policy Options

Although resource constraints induced a shift in Russian policy from a proxy model of intervention to a mediation strategy, neither of these choices was foreordained by the circumstances of the region or conflict. Other countries in Russia’s strategic position could have made different choices – and indeed, others have adopted a more politically inclusive approach.

Powersharing was a fully viable alternative from the beginning of the conflict. Indeed, in the earliest months of the crisis, before Tajikistan captured the attention of at least some policymakers in Moscow, the commander of Russia’s 201st MRD, General Zabolotnyi, brokered a powersharing arrangement among the primary antagonists. This agreement endured several months before disintegrating amid mutual suspicions and escalating violence. Rather than taking steps to buttress the powersharing government and increase transparency among the factions, Russia at a minimum acceded to and very possibly actively participated in the Kulyabis’ seizure of power under Rakhmonov in late 1992 – a move that was initially resisted by the Atlanticists in Moscow.

Over the ensuing years Russia could have pressured Rakhmonov to make concessions to the opposition. In the end the United Tajik Opposition accepted a peace deal very similar to demands that it had voiced in the early years of the war (Mlechin 1995; Rotar’ 1996; Smith 1999). Had Rakhmonov made such an offer in 1993, the war might have ended years earlier. Analysts broadly agree, however, that Russian military and financial support to Rakhmonov removed any incentive for him to compromise (Atavullo 2000; Atkin 1997, 303; Atkin 2002, 109-110; Jonson 1998, 9-10; Lynch 2000, 164-6). Similarly, while a number of other factors and actors contributed to the peace accords in the end, Russian pressure on Rakhmonov was, if not the critical condition, certainly one of the key prerequisites for the peace deal (Dadmehr 2003,
Thus a powersharing formula was a viable policy option throughout the years of the civil war. Moscow simply preferred to ensure the outright victory of its proxy.

In the aftermath of the civil war Rakhmonov has reneged on many of the powersharing and democratic commitments he undertook in the peace negotiations. Russia has not held him to any of these promises. Certainly Tajikistan offers relatively infertile soil for democracy, but it is not unreasonable to believe that a political system could institutionalize access to political power for all major political groupings in Tajikistan and provide the public at least some minimal ability to sanction abuses of power. Nearby Mongolia, for instance, scores a “2” on the Freedom House democracy index – a score equal to Mexico’s and Romania’s. While Russian academics and think tank experts generally dismiss any talk of democracy in relation to Central Asia, many Central Asia specialists in the United States vigorously defend democracy as the appropriate prescription for the region’s downward spiral (Olcott 2005; Schoeberlein 2002). International organizations have sought to instill democratic processes: The UN and OSCE have sought to uphold the integrity of the electoral process in Tajikistan, while the IMF and World Bank placed pressure on Rakhmonov to withdraw a legislative proposal that would have banned Islamist parties from participating in elections. In all of these cases Russia was either silent or actively supported the legitimacy of elections tilted overwhelmingly in Rakhmonov’s favor. Furthermore, the United States and numerous international NGOs have sought to nurture civil society in Tajikistan as a means of both checking and bolstering state power (Babus 2004; Slim and Hodizoda 2002).\(^6\) Other actors, in short, have sought to encourage both

\(^6\) There has been some U.S. ambivalence concerning the promotion of democracy in Tajikistan. A number of reports suggest that the United States subordinated democracy to concerns over Islamic radicalism (Mesbahi 1997; Rashid 2002). At the same time, USAID has funded programs to promote civil society, and the U.S. government has emphasized democracy-promotion in its public pronouncements. Inconsistencies in the U.S. approach are not particularly surprising. Tajikistan has always been peripheral to American national interests, and thus the United States has never committed
horizontal and vertical political inclusion – that is, political competition among all major organized political groupings and participation by unarmed elements of civil society. Russia, on the other hand, initially opposed inclusion of the opposition in political competition and since the end of the war has done nothing to uphold either competition or participation.

None of this discussion indicates that Russia should have pursued a higher-order democracy-promotion strategy in Tajikistan. Given Russia’s resource constraints and the difficulty of the environment – with Tajikistan’s Soviet-era economy having collapsed and the opium economy booming – such an approach would have been highly challenging. Yet a powersharing formula combined with some efforts to constrain the worst abuses of warlords and to foster unarmed elements of civil society was a perfectly plausible alternative to that adopted by Russia. Indeed, this blueprint formed the basis of international organizations’, transnational NGOs’, and the United States’ approach to both Tajikistan and neighboring Afghanistan after September 11th. As a result of the U.S.-led intervention, Afghanistan has demonstrated greater political liberalization (as measured by Freedom House) in four years than Tajikistan has in the nine years since a peace deal was brokered. Had Russia – likely in conjunction with international organizations and other international actors – adopted such an approach, it may have helped to alleviate some of the problems that have plagued postwar Tajikistan.

Outcomes

Russia’s turn to a mediation strategy in 1996-1997 had the advantage of shoring up the Tajikistani state and maintaining Russian influence while significant resources to pursuing its policies in the country. Without substantial sources of leverage, Washington was unlikely to pursue in earnest an ambitious democracy agenda resisted by existing power-holders, although indications are that it has done so to the extent its resource commitments permit (Babus 2004).
simultaneously limiting Russian resource commitments. This change of strategy enabled Russia to play a critical role in bringing Tajikistan’s civil war to an end – a triumph for Russian diplomacy, even if its client Rakhmonov is hardly the Abraham Lincoln of Central Asia that the Russian military’s newspaper, Krasnaia Zvezda, claimed (Ramazanov 2001). Given Russia’s resource constraints and the lack of commitment from other international actors, a mediation strategy designed to bring the primary warring factions into a powersharing arrangement was probably the strategy best-suited for bringing stability to Tajikistan. Such an approach, however, still has significant drawbacks, and Russia’s lack of follow-through with its client has further exacerbated these failings.

The postwar political order in Tajikistan has been characterized by three flaws: the gutting of the formal powersharing provisions of the peace agreement, the concentration of power among warlords, and the prevalence of violence and assassinations among Tajikistan’s various factions. Postwar Tajikistan has tolerated substantially more political pluralism than any of the other former Soviet Central Asian republics save Kyrgyzstan. Unfortunately, this tolerance is born of necessity – the inability of either side to triumph militarily in the civil war – rather than conviction. Rakhmonov has used his domination of state organs to craft political institutions and electoral laws that have rapidly eviscerated the formal powersharing provisions of the Moscow Agreement. As discussed above, the president won re-election in 1999 with 97 percent of the vote. Rakhmonov has engineered the removal of many opposition figures from the governmental positions they won as a result of the peace accords, often replacing them with the Kulyabis who held the positions before the peace deal. A number of prominent opposition politicians have been assassinated. Meanwhile, Rakhmonov has sought to co-opt various faction leaders by offering them lucrative positions within the Kulyabi-dominated patronage network.
While this informal powersharing is pluralism of a sort, it is pluralism offered primarily on Rakhmonov’s terms (Schoeberlein 2002; Smith 1999 and 2002; Zoir and Newton 2001).

In part as a consequence, much political power has remained concentrated in “shadow institutions” outside of the state. The various warlords of the civil war period almost universally retained the loyalty and capabilities of their paramilitaries. They are the de facto political authorities of large swathes of territory in Tajikistan, and they effectively control much of the economy. Without greater institutionalization of powersharing within the government, and without the empowerment of unarmed elements of civil society, these power-brokers have no incentive to sacrifice their prerogatives to the state. Thus Rakhmonov has concentrated much of Tajikistan’s formal political power in his own hands only by eviscerating the scope of the state’s effective authority (Dadmehr 2003; Slim and Hodizoda 2002).

Such a political system rewards the use of violence as a routine instrument of politics. Assassinations and gunfights have been common in Tajikistan since the end of the war, and even larger-scale insurrections have taken place from time to time. The level of violence is obviously much lower than it was during the civil war, but its continued prevalence at low intensities has troubling implications for the future of the country (Dadmehr 2003).

Russia’s incomplete efforts to broker a powersharing agreement, in other words, have purchased peace and relative stability in the short-term for Tajikistan – a worthy accomplishment. But the failure of Russia and other outside powers to reinforce the institutionalization of powersharing and to develop broader constituencies committed to peace risks the stagnation or even reversal of Tajikistan’s precarious political order.
Contending Explanations

While the framework presented here provides an explanation for the strategic choices made by Russia and the consequences that they had for the political authority structures of Tajikistan, others have advanced alternative explanations, including Russia’s strategic position, its internal weaknesses, and the role of international actors and global discourses.

Perhaps the most fundamental challenge to the account provided in this chapter is that Russia was not the critical actor involved in brokering the peace deal for Tajikistan. In a number of narratives of the war, either internal factors (in particular, war exhaustion and a number of battlefield reverses suffered by forces loyal to Rakhmonov) (Hay 2001; Smith 1999) or the United Nations and other international actors (Goryayev 2001) played decisive roles in bringing about the powersharing compromise that ended the conflict. Certainly both of these elements contributed to the shape of the postwar political authority structures of Tajikistan. There are clear reasons for believing that Russia’s role, however, was ultimately decisive. While forces loyal to Rakhmonov did suffer several defeats in the months prior to the Moscow Agreement, numerous reports suggest that Russian troops’ new-found commitment to neutrality (following Russia’s shift of strategy in 1996) were responsible for a number of these military setbacks (Panfilov 1996d). And while the UN played an invaluable role in promoting dialogue between the parties and drafting the specific arrangements of the peace accords, without taking into account Russia’s role, it is impossible to explain why Rakhmonov became willing to compromise in 1996 and 1997 but had not been willing in the four years previous.

A second potential line of argumentation claims that the Russian approach to Tajikistan differed from the United States’ and NATO’s approach to Bosnia or Kosovo because the two actors’ strategic motivations were different. In the case of the
former Yugoslavia, the primary threats to NATO were posed by state failure – waves of immigration and the potential of the slaughters to undermine the alliance’s credibility at home and abroad. Consequently, NATO sought only to stabilize the former Yugoslav republics and help to build new states. Russia, on the other hand, sought to prevent incursions into Central Asia by outside rivals to Russian hegemony, and consequently Moscow aimed to ensure an ally held office in Tajikistan. Thus, according to this argument, Russia’s strategic situation, not regime type, explains why it sought to create a loyal autocracy in Tajikistan.

It is indeed true that many Russians think in geopolitical terms and understood the stakes of Central Asia in general or Tajikistan in particular in terms of great power rivalry (Bushkov et al. 2002; Dubnov 1996). The chaotic decision-making of the Yeltsin government and the opaque decision-making of the Putin government make it impossible to provide a truly definitive judgment on the relative significance of the various threats Russian decision-makers perceived to be emanating from Tajikistan. All publicly available information nonetheless points to greater Russian concern for the consequences of state failure in Tajikistan than for an alignment of Tajikistan with a foreign power. Certainly top Russian officials frequently stressed radical Islam, narcotics trafficking, and generalized instability as the greatest threats posed by Tajikistan and Central Asia more broadly, and the 1993, 1997, and 2000 National Security Concepts all de-emphasized state-based threats relative to non-state threats (Abarinov 1996b; Gafarly 1996; Ivanov 2004; Lo 2003, 83). Moreover, unlike the Caucasus, Tajikistan evoked only very limited interest among any external powers, with the partial exception of Iran. Although Iran provided some support for Tajikistan’s Islamist opposition, such support was limited, and in any case, due to a variety of ethnic, religious, and economic factors, Iran’s involvement posed little threat to the rest of Central Asia (Mesbahi 1997). Finally, Russian behavior
throughout the crisis indicates it prioritized these threats over those posed by external powers. As discussed above, in the initial months of the conflict Russian officers sought to broker a powersharing agreement among the Tajikistani factions, and Foreign Minister Remake did so again in 1996-97. Moreover, after the September 11th attacks, President Putin was quick to accept the American military presence in the region in order to alleviate the threats posed by Afghanistan. All of these actions are more consistent with a prioritization of state failure threats over those of geopolitics. Thus Moscow’s strategic situation was not substantially different from that of NATO relative to Yugoslavia or the United States in Afghanistan. Russia nonetheless chose to adopt a different strategy, and this choice has had significant implications for Tajikistan’s political development.

A third argument might explain the difference in outcomes between Russia’s intervention and Western interventions in terms of aid commitments: Russia’s economic collapse precluded it from spending the sums of money committed by rich, Western states in successful instances of peace building. Certainly Russia’s parlous economic situation restricted the amount of aid it could commit to Tajikistan, and more economic assistance for Tajikistan may well have helped to secure more inclusive political authority structures. Yet there are at least three reasons for believing the lack of aid did not determine political outcomes in Tajikistan. First, as discussed in previous chapters, the “carrot” of aid can often have perverse consequences when offered in the absence of any “stick” with which to keep under control the predations of paramilitarized factions. Thus additional aid without an external military presence designed to ensure a more inclusive political system may well have simply reinforced the position of Rakhmonov, who would have had more patronage resources to disburse. Second, although little external assistance would have been forthcoming in any case, given Tajikistan’s utter irrelevance to most states prior to September 11,
international reluctance to become involved in Tajikistan was in part motivated by concern for the role that Russian “peacekeeping” troops were playing in the internal conflict (Neumann and Solodovnik 1995). Had Russia committed to a more even-handed policing of the civil war and welcomed a more substantial political role for the United Nations, additional aid may have been available. Thus the lack of aid for Tajikistan was in part a consequence rather than a cause of the country’s continued authoritarianism. Third, Russia did possess considerable leverage over Rakhmonov through those economic assets which were at its disposal: The economy of Tajikistan was largely dependent on the remittances of Tajikistani workers in Russia; Russia was the single most realistic potential economic partner for Tajikistan; and that aid which Russia did commit was employed to maximum political effect – such as the disbursement of billions of rubles directly to Rakhmonov’s government immediately before the 1994 elections. While Russia could not afford to donate billions of dollars annually for the reconstruction of Tajikistan, Russia did have the tools to help foster a more inclusive political solution for Tajikistan. Moscow chose not to use these tools for that purpose.

Finally, Russia’s championing of a powersharing arrangement and elections in the 1997 peace accords might be attributable to the influence of a global norm of peacebuilding pervasive in the post-Cold War era. According to Roland Paris (2003, 442-3), for instance, “peacekeeping agencies and their member states are predisposed to develop and implement strategies that conform with the norms of global culture” – specifically by promoting democratic, sovereign states. This argument may not

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62 The relationship between Russia, the West, and various international organizations in Tajikistan was a complex one. On the one hand, many Western powers – particularly the US – were content to let Russia play a stabilizing role along Afghanistan’s northern border, seeing in this an opportunity to limit the expansion of instability and Islamic radicalism without direct Western involvement. On the other hand, many of these same countries had substantial concerns about the manner in which Russia used its influence in Tajikistan. Consequently, Russia was able to get some recognition of its special role in Tajikistan through the UN and OSCE, but it was not able to obtain the financial support for its “peacekeeping” activities that it desperately sought. Moreover, Russia was often reluctant to grant the UN or OSCE too large a role in Tajikistan. (See also Lynch 2000, 163; Sagramoso 2003, 19, 29).
originally have been meant to apply to cases such as Russian “peacekeeping” along its southern rim. The consistency of the Russian-brokered peace accords with these global norms is nonetheless striking. Does Russia’s conformity with these global norms mean that these norms drove Russian decision-making? To the contrary, Russian behavior suggests that we should treat such correlational arguments about the relationship of norms and behavior with some caution. Russia followed a strategic logic in which such global norms were an afterthought for most of the actors who dominated Russian policy towards Tajikistan. So long as policy-makers in Moscow believed Rakhmonov could win the civil war with modest Russian support, they whole-heartedly backed him. Only when the costs of outright victory came to appear prohibitive and the risks of failure increasingly serious did Russia champion a meaningful powersharing formula in peace negotiations. Russian behavior, in short, followed a path determined by its own regime type, strategic culture, and resource constraints, not by global norms, which were followed when convenient and ignored otherwise.

**Theoretical and Policy Implications**

Two important implications follow from this analysis. First, logics of consequence and logics of appropriateness can yield similar or even identical outcomes, making it imperative to consider equifinality in social science explanations. Many observers have noted a global norm of democracy in the post-Cold War era (Fox 2000; Franck 2000), and Paris has even claimed that agencies structuring peacekeeping missions have uncritically adopted this norm (Paris 2003). Russia’s actions in 1996-97 and the peace agreement it brokered appear to lend support to the notion that this global norm has shaped conflict resolution efforts since the end of the

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63 Such an approach also characterized Russian behavior in Chechnya and in the southern Caucasus, where Russian military activities bolstered their preferred proxies (Shenfield 1995).
Cold War. A closer look at Russian behavior – particularly its actions from 1993-96 in Tajikistan and its activities in the Caucasus – suggests that it was driven by a strategic logic emphasizing resource constraints and discounting democracy. Obviously Russian “peacekeeping” in the former Soviet Union is not a typical example of peacebuilding operations. Yet the fact that it adopted a similar form with very different motivations should lead us to question the extent to which normative convergence is possible in part because it is compatible with more strategic logics.

Russia’s behavior in Tajikistan also carries implications for policy, not simply for the former Soviet Union but also for other instances in which non-democratic states have intervened to restore order in neighboring states, such as Syria’s intervention in Lebanon or Nigeria’s in Liberia. The fact that Russia played a critical role in bringing peace to Tajikistan suggests that non-democratic regional powers can be a positive force for promoting stability in unstable regions of the world. This positive potential comes with a caveat, however. Russia’s policy was most inclusive when it felt its resource constraints most keenly, and its policy was least inclusive precisely when it believed it could devote the resources necessary to achieve its first-order preferences. Thus, when non-democratic “regional sheriffs” such as Russia are most able to promote an inclusive peace, they may well be least willing.

Such a conclusion does not indicate that cooperation between democracies and non-democracies in flashpoints such as Tajikistan is impossible, however. As discussed in the chapters above, when facing high resource constraints, all states’ preferences concerning interventions are remarkably similar, converging on the “mediation” model of intervention. In cases such as Chechnya, where an unstable region directly threatens core national interests of a non-democracy, non-democracies are likely to adopt very different strategies from those of democracies. But where national interests are less directly engaged and resource constraints concomitantly
higher, non-democracies may be persuaded to cooperate with democracies to implement the mediation model. In cases such as Tajikistan, Western states may be able to offer financial assistance to a non-democratic intervener in return for a verifiable commitment to broad political inclusion in a powersharing formula. Such international cooperation will be difficult, given the very different ways that democracies and non-democracies tend to approach such interventions, but it should nonetheless be possible. Where successful, it offers the potential for Western states to enlist regional actors in securing acceptable outcomes without becoming militarily committed to an intervention in a region of peripheral interest.
Chapter 4: Bosnia

Although the general outlines of the war and NATO intervention in Bosnia are well known, the case remains an important source of lessons for scholars interested in the relationship between state-building and military force. Given the richness of previous accounts, this chapter does not seek to “tell the story” of international involvement in Bosnia, and it certainly does not do justice to the subtleties of the case. The chapter aims instead to answer the two questions motivating the broader study: What approaches did the various intervening powers adopt in the course of the military interventions in Bosnia, and what were the consequences of those approaches?

The conjunction of regime type, strategic culture, and national interest again provides a useful, parsimonious framework for understanding the policies of the major intervening powers. From the beginning of the crisis, before violence erupted, the democracies of western Europe and the United States were all committed to democracy in the Balkans both as an ideal end-state and as the preferred means of conflict regulation – although many were skeptical that democracy could brake the building momentum toward war. Significant differences, however, quickly arose between the Western powers concerning the relative significance they accorded the Balkans and the perceived relationship between force and diplomacy. The United States consistently believed that force was the ultima ratio that would likely decide the outcome of the various Yugoslav republics’ and autonomous regions’ relationships with Belgrade. While diplomacy would inevitably play an important role, Washington decision-makers tended to view diplomacy initially as a hope-beyond-hope that violence could be avoided and later as either a palliative to the dreadful consequences of violence or a means of marshalling support for military suasion. European
statesmen and women, on the other hand, commonly placed greater confidence in persuasion and diplomatic leverage. The United States thus tended to favor maximalist solutions to the war in Bosnia – ones that emphasized justice over peace (to borrow a trope in common use throughout the crisis), but that would require substantial military force to implement. While certainly sensitive to the cause of justice, European powers typically were willing to make greater concessions to the militarily stronger parties – the Serbs of Bosnia and Serbia proper – in order to avoid military escalation.

The catastrophic disconnect in American foreign policy, as many observers have noted, is that its preference for a relatively more inclusive political order for Bosnia (and later for Kosovo) was unmatched by its interests in the region. It was not until the survival of the Atlantic alliance itself was threatened that the United States directly engaged in Bosnia. Despite the spasmodic quality of American intervention in the former Yugoslavia, it was eventual American commitment to the region that made possible a relatively inclusive peace settlement for Bosnia. In the absence of American intervention, had a peace agreement been brokered, it almost certainly would have come at the expense of the militarily weakest party, the Bosnian Muslims. While in many respects flawed both in their initial formulation and in their implementation, the Dayton accords and subsequent implementation operations have created space for an inclusive and participatory postwar order gradually to take hold.

In terms of the theory undergirding this analysis, only the United States and eventually the United Kingdom combined a commitment to democracy promotion, a militarized strategic culture, and eventually sufficient commitment to act on their preferences. The differences between the United States and European actors are illustrated in Table 9.

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64 Following the British Labour Party’s electoral victory in 1997 and Tony Blair’s assumption of the position of Prime Minister, the UK also adopted a transformational approach to both Bosnia and later Kosovo. The reasons for and implications of this variation in British policy will be discussed in greater detail below.
Table 9: Major Powers’ Intervention Policies toward Bosnia

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<th>Inclusion of Armed Actors</th>
<th>Less Inclusive</th>
<th>More Inclusive</th>
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<td>Inclusion Of Unarmed Actors</td>
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Bosnia cannot currently be called a democracy; it is a significantly flawed quasi-democracy in which “shadow institutions” formed by criminal networks, paramilitary organizations, and extremist political parties remain the most powerful indigenous political actors. But considerable progress has been made towards a sustainable, inclusive political order. Participation in political processes has induced many nationalists to moderate their political demands in order to satisfy voter discontent. The prospect of renewed wide-scale violence in Bosnia has diminished substantially, as testified by the fact that NATO withdrew its combat forces in 2004, replaced by a small European Union force (EUFOR). While many factors are responsible for the gradual progress of Bosnia towards more democratic politics, the strong military presence anchored by the United States was a key prerequisite.

The remainder of this chapter proceeds using the same framework as the previous one. A short narrative of the international interventions in Bosnia introduces the most relevant facts of the case. A focused, controlled comparison of the major powers’ approaches to Bosnia follows, with primary emphasis on the United States, Germany, and Russia, but with attention devoted to the roles of Britain, France, and
Italy as well. The next section then reviews contending explanations, and a final one examines the implications of this analysis for military interventions more generally.

**An Overview of International Intervention in Bosnia**

The broad outlines of the war in Bosnia are well known to most students of international relations. Rather than reconstructing the conflict in detail – scholarship that has been ably conducted by other authors (especially Burg and Shoup 1999) and that would in any case be impossible in the space available – this section provides a brief overview of both the two major attempts to impose a peace settlement on Bosnia and two important implementation episodes in post-war Bosnia. These episodes were chosen because each represents a critical juncture in the evolution of the war and subsequent peace in Bosnia, and each reveals one of the causal pathways linking the independent variables with the hypothesized outcomes. A comparison of the two peace proposals – the Vance-Owen plan and the Dayton accords – reveals the relationship between the intervening power and the nature of the political institutions that are likely to be created through intervention. The analysis of Dayton implementation through an examination of the attempted coup against President Biljana Plavšić and the Herzegovacka Banka raid demonstrates the importance of committed, militarized, democratic interveners for the deterrence of would-be spoilers and the enforcement of democratic provisions of peace accords.

**Peace Plans that Failed and the One that Worked**

By the late 1980s the economic and political forces that had encouraged Yugoslav unity had begun to dissipate. Various political elites in Yugoslavia’s constituent republics seized on the opportunities available to press their own agendas and promote their own political fortunes. Due to the particular ethnofederal structure
of the Yugoslav state, competitive politics quickly led to demands for sovereignty among the federation’s constituent republics (Bunce 1999). As the federation dissolved into five successor states over the period from 1990-1992, however, power relations among Yugoslavia’s nationalities shifted dramatically. The dangers inherent in such a rapid transition propelled both Croatia and Bosnia into full-scale wars – between the Serb minority and Croat majority in Croatia and between Serbs, Croats, and Muslims (or Bosniacs) in Bosnia. While the conflict in Croatia quickly settled into a stalemate, with UN forces interposed between the hostile parties in a de facto partition of the country, the war in Bosnia rapidly escalated into the worst violence Europe had seen since the Second World War. Eventually the war would claim 200,000 lives and would displace over half of the pre-war population of approximately 4.5 million – a horrific conflict by any standards.

In the final days of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the major external powers were remarkably united in their vision for how the crisis could ideally be defused, although they were bitterly divided by the realities of the situation. All sought to reconcile the secessionist preferences of Slovenia and Croatia on the one hand and the centralizing preferences of Serbia on the other by balancing support for a unified Yugoslavia with demands for the democratization of Yugoslavia as a whole and the devolution of considerable autonomy to the constituent republics.65 When events on the ground called into question the viability of this balancing act, however, the countries of the West reacted differently. Germany pressed for the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in hopes that the internationalization of the conflict would provide the international legal instruments with which to deter further escalation of

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65 For the accounts of former government officials concerning their countries’ policies at the time, see for instance those of Libal (1997) on Germany and Gompert (1996) and Zimmermann (1996) on the United States.
violence (Caplan 2002). The United States was reluctant to recognize Croatia, believing that recognition would imply a responsibility to protect not only the sovereign state thus created, but Bosnia as well. While symbolic uses of force might have been adequate to deter Serbia from continued military and paramilitary activities, Washington was concerned that such uses of force would cause Serbia to escalate rather than de-escalate (an option that was, in fact, to be pursued by Serbia in the Kosovo crisis in 1999). Ambassador Zimmerman recounted a discussion he had with Brent Scowcroft, then National Security Advisor to President Bush, about the possibility of using force during the early days of the war in Bosnia: “The prevailing view in the Bush administration was that, for the sake of credibility, we would have to do what was necessary to prevail, even to the point of using ground troops. Since no senior official was prepared to wage a ground war, the line had to be drawn short of the use of force in general” (Zimmermann 1996, 215). From the beginning the United States believed that decisive military force would be necessary to resolve the crisis should central authority in Belgrade collapse, while Germany was relatively more optimistic about the possibilities for conflict resolution provided by international law.

After Bosnia descended into war, the diplomatic efforts to defuse the crisis did not taper off. Indeed, the next three and a half years were a flurry of diplomatic activity, with a variety of negotiators and peace plans entering and then exiting the international stage. Before the Dayton peace accords that finally brought an end to the war, three major peace initiatives stand out: the Lisbon or Cutileiro accords of spring 1992, the Vance-Owen proposal of 1993, and the Owen-Stoltenberg or Contact Group...
plan of 1994. Of these the Vance-Owen plan was by far the most developed and is believed to have come the closest to bringing an end to the conflict before the direct intercession of the United States and the brokering of the Dayton agreement (more formally known as the General Framework Agreement for Peace) (Burg and Shoup 1999; Gow 1997; Silber and Little 1995, 287). The following pages will therefore compare the Vance-Owen plan with the Dayton accords. The fundamental dilemma facing all peace negotiators was that the costs and risks involved in imposing a peace on Bosnia were incommensurate with the national interests at stake for the states who would have to intervene. Interestingly, however, the major states involved resolved this dilemma in different ways. The argument advanced here is that the involvement of the United States as a militarized democracy was a necessary condition for brokering an inclusive peace deal to end the war in Bosnia and for enforcing a political order that has gradually moved towards greater democracy. Such an interpretation is at odds with a number of major works of scholarship (especially Gow 1997) and with the interpretations of many senior officials involved in the crisis, including the international negotiator David Owen and the foreign (later prime) minister of France, Alain Juppé (Holbrooke 1998, 318; Owen 1995). The argument will proceed in three steps, beginning with a comparison of the two plans’ provisions, followed by an analysis of their enforceability, and concluding with an examination of why the Vance-Owen plan failed while the Dayton accords succeeded in bringing an end to the violence.

**Provisions of the Two Plans.** Lord David Owen and Cyrus Vance were international negotiators appointed to represent respectively the European Union and the United Nations in efforts to broker a peace deal for Bosnia. Although Vance was a former American Secretary of State, the duo worked most closely with the European
powers, Britain and France, who had troops deployed in UNPROFOR, the wartime UN peace mission in Bosnia, and who would be primarily responsible for enforcing the provisions of a peace accord. Their efforts began in earnest in the fall of 1992, following the collapse of the Lisbon agreement in the spring of that year, and yielded a publicly presentable draft plan by January 1993. The plan called for the radical decentralization of governmental power to ten provinces, each of which (with the exception of the capital province of Sarajevo) would be dominated by a particular ethnic group, with seats in the Interim Provisional Governments of the provinces roughly determined by the ethnic distribution according to the pre-war 1991 census. Nearly all governmental functions – crucially including policing – would be performed at the province level, with the central government retaining some limited economic powers and the right to represent the country in foreign affairs (at Serb insistence, defense functions were eliminated from the original drafts). Moreover, each of the three major ethnic groups would wield a veto over all substantive issues at the level of the central government. The proposal also called for the separation of all military forces, cantonment of heavy weapons (to be supervised by the UN force present in Bosnia, UNPROFOR), and the demilitarization of Sarajevo. The plan also called for a civilian official to oversee implementation of the agreement in the transitional period (Gow 1997, 239-241; Malcolm 1994, 247-248).

The Dayton accords (officially the General Framework Agreement on Peace, with accompanying annexes) were negotiated by an American negotiating team led by American Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke and – in sharp contrast to the Vance-Owen plan – had the backing, both political and military, of the United States. In many ways its provisions were similar to those of Vance-Owen, particularly in the radical decentralization of political power. The critical differences concerned the territorial division of the country, multi-ethnic representation in local governments,
and the agent of external military enforcement. The Dayton accords, unlike Vance-Owen, divided the country into two “entities” along a 51-49 percent territorial split, with the Muslim-Croat Federation receiving the marginally larger share of territory and the Republika Srpska the smaller. While the Dayton accords permitted multi-ethnic representation in the legislatures of both entities – and indeed, hoped to promote such representation by guaranteeing displaced voters the right to vote in their pre-war district of residence – the peace agreement did not designate seat set-asides for all three ethnic minorities in each unit of government, as did Vance-Owen. Finally, the Dayton agreement was to be enforced by NATO, whereas the Vance-Owen plan was to be enforced by UNPROFOR (with the addition of American troops, in contrast to the wartime UNPROFOR).

Critics of the Dayton accords argue that they represented a significant set-back from the Vance-Owen plan for the creation of a multiethnic, inclusive post-war order (especially Gow 1997). The decentralized governmental units of the Vance-Owen plan explicitly preserved the principle of multi-ethnic inclusion by explicitly setting aside seats for all three ethnic groups in each unit, and they denied each ethnic group control of contiguous territories through which they could attempt to create ethnically pure “states within a state.” Under the provisions of the Dayton accords, on the other hand, the Serbs were allocated contiguous territory with a separate legal identity (the Republika Srpska), and ethnic Serbs were clearly allocated a dominant political position within their entity, while the Muslims and Croats shared a dominant position in the other entity, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Minority political representation in each of the entities would depend on citizens voting in the districts corresponding to their pre-war places of residence (although under both Vance-Owen and Dayton, effective political participation would depend on enforceable guarantees of safety for minority politicians operating in regions controlled by the forces of other
ethnic groups). Thus, on paper – and contrary to the predictions of the analytical framework offered here – the plan proposed by the European powers provided for institutions that were more politically inclusive than the peace deal pushed by the more militarized United States. The apparent anomaly can be explained by the enforceability of the two agreements.

Enforceability of the Two Plans. Two closely inter-related issues lie at the core of comparisons between the two plans: first, the ability of the international community to secure the agreement of all of the warring parties, and second, the ability of the international community to compel compliance with the provisions of the plans once the parties had – in theory, at least – agreed to a peace deal.

Both the Croats and Muslims agreed to support the Vance-Owen plan. The Muslims, however, did so in the calculated expectation that the Serbs would refuse the deal, thus engendering more international sympathy for the Muslims. The Muslim-dominated Sarajevo government was highly skeptical of the willingness of the Serbs to honor the commitments undertaken in the framework of Vance-Owen and the willingness of the international community to enforce their compliance. These concerns were, in fact, well-founded.

According to the journalists Laura Silber and Allan Little, Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic demanded a number of “clarifications” of the peace proposal from David Owen. The first of these concerned the Posavina Corridor – the narrow and militarily vulnerable strip of land that connected the eastern and western halves of Serbian territory. The negotiators assured him that neither Croat nor Muslim forces would be allowed into this territory but that it would instead be controlled by UN forces – and, in a side-deal, they even specified that Russian forces would be assigned to this sensitive region (Silber and Little 1995, 278). Thus, unless Russian forces were
willing to conduct highly aggressive operations to root out the Serb paramilitaries operating in the corridor, these lands would remain within the de facto control of Serb ultranationalists. Given the partial behavior of Russian troops in the “near abroad,” such a prospect was always highly unlikely. A second and related “clarification” demanded by Milosevic concerned all other territory which had been conquered by the Serbs, cleansed of their Muslim and Croat populations, but which would have to be surrendered to Croat or Bosnian Government (Muslim) sovereignty under the Plan: this amounted to more than a third of the territory the Serbs controlled. According to Milosevic, Owen gave an assurance that Croat and Bosnian Government forces would not be allowed to police those territories; ‘only UN forces which will guarantee personal safety, the safety of property, and the security of the citizens can be deployed in those areas,’ he said. Milosevic was thus convinced that the Vance-Owen Plan provided him with a way of achieving his central war aim – the creation of a viable Serbian state on Bosnian territory. It even appeared to hold out the prospect that that state would, in practice if not on paper, consist of a single unbroken territorial entity – even though, in theory, the Vance-Owen map gave the Serbs three distinct chunks of territory linked only by UN-protected through-routes. Milosevic’s calculation was that the Serbs could sign the Plan, and then obstruct its implementation, much as they had done in Croatia the year before (Silber and Little 1995, 278-279).

The ultimate goal of Milosevic and other Serb elites was the eventual creation of an independent Bosnian Serb state:

The only way in which the Vance-Owen plan could gain even token acceptance among the Serbs was on the clear assumption that it would be a temporary resting-place on the way to the full secession of the Serb-conquered territories. On that basis Radovan Karadzic was encouraged by Slobodan Milosevic to sign the plan at a special meeting convened in Athens on 2 May 1993. The basis of the Serbian approach was explained by Dragoslav Rancic, the confidant and spokesman of the nationalist ideologue Dobrica Cosic (who was now President of the Serbian-Montenegrin rump Yugoslavia). ‘It is just the first stage,’ he said. ‘It is not going to last long. Not even Lord Owen believes in it.’ He added that the Muslims would eventually be left with ‘a Balkan Lesotho,’ and that the Serbs would get everything they wanted (Malcolm 1994, 250).
Certainly the behavior of UNPROFOR up until this point had given the Serbs no reason to believe that the contingents involved would aggressively enforce the provisions of Vance-Owen. As will be seen below, only the most militarized contingents in IFOR and SFOR were later willing to undertake relatively riskier enforcement actions in post-Dayton Bosnia, and even these actions were more limited than those implied by Vance-Owen. Thus, the primary strength of the Vance-Owen plan – its denial of contiguous territories to ultranationalists intent on creating “states within a state” – was a strength in theory only, contradicted by the realities of the informal agreements made by the EU’s chief negotiator, David Owen, and the limitations of what external interveners were willing to do to enforce the provisions of the plan.

Even with these evident limitations on the potential enforcement of Vance-Owen, the international community was unable to induce the Bosnian Serbs to sign the agreement. Although Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic signed the plan under pressure from Milosevic, he made Bosnian Serb acceptance of Vance-Owen contingent on ratification by the Bosnian Serb “parliament.” The body held a debate on ratification on May 8, 1993. During this session, Yugoslav President Cosic argued in favor of ratifying Vance-Owen and subverting its implementation, proclaiming, “The entire project of provinces and Bosnia-Herzegovina is historically temporary…. A federation will exist, which is not yet equitable but it will be. In the places where a Serbian house and Serbian land exist and where the Serbian language is spoken, there will be a Serbian state” (Silber and Little 1995, 285-6). The Bosnian Serb deputies, however, refused to endorse the plan, instead putting it to a referendum which they were sure would fail. While Vance-Owen was almost certainly unenforceable, many Bosnian Serb leaders were confident “they could get what they wanted without even bothering to pass through the diversion of the Vance-Owen plan. Opposition was
especially strong among those Serb politicians who had become in effect the personal rulers of larger territorial fiefdoms, and did not want their powers to be clipped by any administrative interference” (Malcolm 1994, 250). The plan was ultimately rejected by the Bosnian Serbs following the failure of the referendum on May 16.

The international community could have sought to compel Bosnian Serb acceptance of the Vance-Owen plan in one of three ways: an intensification of the economic pressure on Serbia designed to cut off Belgrade’s continuing military and financial support for the Bosnian Serbs; a sustained, high-intensity air campaign (potentially including targets in Serbia as well as Bosnia); or “rolling implementation,” in which the international community inserted ground troops into regions controlled by the parties who had signed the agreement (the Croats and Muslims) and slowly expanded the area under its control by moving forces into Serb-held regions. The economic sanctions option will be considered in-depth further below. The air strike option was definitively rejected by the European powers – principally Britain and France – who had troops on the ground with UNPROFOR and feared that they would be targeted in retaliation by the Serbs. The only option left was “rolling implementation” with ground forces.

Such an alternative was proposed by Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev and was defended by the British scholar James Gow (1997). There are two possible scenarios according to which “rolling implementation” might have unfolded. In the first scenario, international ground troops would first deploy to regions held by the Croats and Muslims before seeking to break the back of Serb resistance by splitting Serb-controlled territory in half by seizing the Posavina corridor. Such a scenario, while favored by some observers (Gow 1997, 198-9, 248-52), was never politically realistic. None of the UNPROFOR-contributing states had shown a willingness at any point to undertake such dangerous enforcement actions, and their potential willingness
to do so was flatly contradicted by public statements made by their top leaders (Gow 1997, 305). Nor did these states (with the exception of Britain, Europe’s most militarized state) prove willing to undertake high-risk enforcement actions in Bosnia even after the Dayton accords were imposed. Nor are there any other examples in the post-Cold War era of states risking large-scale casualties in open-ended ground combat where no vital national interests are perceived to be at risk, as Chapter 2 demonstrated. In other words, such a scenario was never truly plausible. The other possible scenario according to which “rolling implementation” might have proceeded is one in which international peacekeeping troops deployed to the Croat- and Muslim-controlled regions of Bosnia and continued to press for Serb consent to deploy to the other 70 percent of the country’s territory held by the Serbs. As will become clear in the paragraphs below, Serb consent to the deployment on their territory of a credible military force with an enforcement mandate was eventually achieved only through considerable military pressure.

Thus, in the absence of an aggressive international military campaign, Vance-Owen could only have meant the partition of Bosnia, with the Serbs retaining 70 percent of the country’s territory and the Muslims relegated to a “Balkan Lesotho,” in Yugoslav President Cosic’s own words. It is hard to imagine a relatively inclusive, participatory political order emerging in either a “Muslim Lesotho” or in a Bosnian Serb statelet controlled by paramilitaries and war profiteers, founded on the principle of ethnic exclusion and governed without an armed international presence to enforce the democratic provisions of a peace accord. The Vance-Owen plan, in short, was superior to the Dayton accords only had the international community committed to a dangerous and costly enforcement campaign which none of the European powers were willing to seriously contemplate. European diplomacy, in short, had reached a dead end: the Europeans could, perhaps, have brought peace to Bosnia, but only at the
expense of disenfranchising the Muslims and hamstringing a civilian peace implementation effort.

The Dayton accords, in contrast, contained more formal concessions to the Bosnian ultranationalists, concessions that limited democratic self-expression by ensuring ethnic domination of different territorial units. They did, however, have the great advantage of being implementable while still preserving various instruments designed to inject democratic accountability and inter-ethnic cooperation. The militaries of the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska were to be strictly separated, and NATO forces (three reinforced heavy divisions, amounting to 60,000 troops) were to be deployed throughout the country. The real achievement of Dayton – and the vital difference between it and Vance-Owen – was to craft a relatively equitable agreement in which the enforcement measures required for implementation corresponded to the level of commitment of the militarized democracies necessary to compel the local parties’ compliance.

*Why Dayton Ended the War.* There are numerous explanations for why the Bosnian Serbs did not thwart the Dayton accords as they had Vance-Owen. The three primary explanations concern the international economic embargo against Serbia, the sweeping Croatian military offensive of summer 1995, and the NATO airstrikes of August-September 1995.

The UN Security Council imposed economic sanctions against Serbia-Montenegro for the republics’ role in the war in Bosnia in May of 1992. In the wake of the sanctions’ imposition, the Serbian economy collapsed, with devastating consequences for the population of Serbia and Montenegro, although it is unclear the extent to which sanctions were responsible for this outcome and the extent to which other factors – including the collapse of trading relations with other Yugoslav
republics, the inflationary financing of the wars in Bosnia and Croatia, and the kleptocratic nature of the Milosevic regime – contributed. Although there is considerable debate about the effect of the sanctions on Milosevic’s eventual decision to compel the Bosnian Serbs’ acquiescence to Dayton, it seems clear that they played a critical role. In the absence of sanctions, it is unclear what other factor could have induced Milosevic to reverse himself and abandon the Greater Serbia project that he had pursued for years (Stedman 1998; see also Stremlau 1996) – particularly given that such a decision was a costly one insofar as it weakened his nationalist credentials and strengthened the position of many of his domestic political opponents (Thomas 1999). More controversial is the argument made by a number of observers and officials that economic sanctions alone, without the reinforcing effects of the massive military reversals suffered by the Bosnian Serbs in 1995 – could have brought about a peace agreement.

There is significant reason to doubt that sanctions alone produced the Bosnian Serbs’ acquiescence to Dayton. Long after sanctions had been imposed on Serbia, Belgrade continued to arm and supply Bosnian Serb paramilitaries. Even after Pale’s rejection of the Vance-Owen plan, when Milosevic loudly announced that he would impose a sweeping embargo against the Bosnian Serbs, cross-border traffic was resumed within days (Silber and Little 1995, 335). Belgrade does appear to have imposed significant restrictions on cross-border traffic in the wake of the Bosnian Serbs’ rejection of the Contact Group plan in 1994 in order to get international sanctions on Serbia lifted. Milosevic even accepted the placement of international monitors on the Serbian-Bosnian border to report on his compliance with international demands that he stop aiding the Bosnian Serbs. Milosevic’s acceptance of these border monitors is often uncritically accepted by observers as an indication that economic sanctions had compelled him to isolate the Bosnian Serbs. In reality, however, the
monitoring mission was much less than it appeared. There were a total of 135 observers, dispatched to monitor a 375 mile-long, mountainous border, and they were only allowed to observe the actions of the Serbian border police rather than being able to conduct searches themselves (Lewis 1994; Reuters 1994). European negotiators were unable to broker a more intrusive mandate. Silber and Little report that the blockade of the Bosnian Serbs was “real only in the sense that [Milosevic] was sending a message to the politicians and, as importantly, to the West. There is strong evidence that the border remained porous. The Bosnian Serbs still received essential military supplies from the Yugoslav Army as well as their salaries from Belgrade. The central point was that Milosevic wanted to see a political and not a military defeat” of the Bosnian Serbs (Silber and Little 1995, 343). The sanctions were thus partially effective. They led Milosevic to place increased pressure on the Bosnian Serbs. But even after three years of sanctions, Milosevic was unwilling to withdraw critical military support from his proxies in Bosnia, a point acknowledged by Owen himself (1995, 352). And without significant military defeats, Pale would not have accepted the major concessions made at Dayton and the stationing of a militarily credible foreign force throughout its territory (Stedman 1998, 178).

The Bosnian Serbs’ military defeats were the result of the spectacular military advances of the combined forces of the Croatian regular army and Bosnian Croat and Bosnian government units, aided by a sustained NATO air campaign aimed at the Bosnian Serbs. It is impossible to determine the relative significance of the air and ground campaigns. Although primary responsibility for the altered military balance may well belong to the Croatian and Federation ground forces, NATO airstrikes played a highly significant role in disrupting Bosnian Serb communications and logistics, as well as in deterring overt assistance from Serbia and demonstrating to the Bosnian Serbs that the West – including the United States – had finally committed to
altering fundamentally the military balance in Bosnia (Daalder 2000, 120-124; Johnson 2006, 53-6; Pape 2004).

In the end a shift in battlefield fortunes was necessary to broker a relatively inclusive peace for Bosnia. Although the UNPROFOR Rapid Reaction Force – dominated by Britain and France – played a role in bringing about this altered strategic landscape, it is a stretch to claim that the RRF was the critical change on the path to Dayton, as some British and French officials have (for instance Neville-Jones 1996-97). The RRF’s primary contribution was to protect UNPROFOR peacekeepers while a more aggressive policy was implemented; it did relatively little to implement that policy itself. And even after the RRF was deployed and the United States had begun using the ongoing NATO airstrikes as leverage to impose a peace settlement, many European governments pressed for the early termination of the air operations (Holbrooke 1998, Chapter 7). Thus the main determinants of the Bosnian Serbs’ military reversals were the result of policies that the United States had long supported and the Europeans had opposed: making Croatian and Bosnian military forces more combat-effective and conducting airstrikes in support of a more equitable military balance.67

The Dayton accords were purchased at a terrible price. American equivocation and lack of resolve between 1992 and early 1995 contributed to prolonging the war unnecessarily, thus indirectly costing thousands of lives. Perhaps a more foresighted and resolute American presidency could have brought about a peace in Bosnia years before – either by washing its hands of the Bosnian war entirely and allowing the Europeans to impose the Vance-Owen plan on the unwilling Bosniaks, or by

67 Echoing a theme found throughout this study, the American approach was not nearly so coherent as to be a “strategy.” American policy in summer 1995 was highly reactive. Elements of the foreign policy establishment, led by Richard Holbrooke and Tony Lake, seized on events in Bosnia to press for an aggressive military response, in contrast to the Europeans. The success of these policy entrepreneurs in using the air strikes as leverage over the Serbs in the run-up to Dayton was, however, a highly contingent outcome (Holbrooke 1998, Chapter 7).
committing to doing what was necessary to secure a peace settlement on terms acceptable to the United States. In the end, however, it was the commitment of the United States as a highly militarized democracy that made a relatively inclusive settlement possible.

**Implementation**

Once the Dayton accords were agreed, the fundamental problem became one of implementing its provisions in the face of strong resistance by the same “shadow institutions” – networks of paramilitaries, organized criminal enterprises, and ultranationalist political parties – that had come to dominate the country during the course of the war. These networks quickly assumed the guise of peace-time legitimacy, transforming from paramilitary bands into police and “special police” units, from war profiteers into government officials. They used patronage networks, bribery, and the implicit threat of violence to maintain voter loyalty, deter political rivals from challenging their dominant positions, and perpetuate their hold on both political and economic power (Andreas 2004, Corpora 2004, Festič and Rausche 2004, Manning and Antic 2003, Perito 2004, Woodward 1999).

International actors recognized the danger these shadow institutions posed to the creation of a self-sustaining inclusive and participatory political order, yet the same ambivalence that had characterized the international response to the war also defined the international response to the peace (Clark 2001; Dziedzic and Hawley 2005, 21; Festič and Rausche 2004; Meyer zum Felde 2002; Woodward 1998). It was clear to the policy-makers directly involved that democracy was more than just elections, but direct actions to “create a safe and secure environment” for the conduct of elections by marginalizing the leaders of the shadow institutions was a risky proposition. The dangers inherent in highly intrusive, law-enforcement operations
were a principle reason for strident European opposition during the Dayton negotiations to the creation of an armed international police force with executive authority (i.e., the authority to make arrests), despite American urging for such an institution to avoid an “enforcement gap” (Holbrooke 1998, 251-2; Neville-Jones 1996, 52; Perito 2004, 113-116). Yet the United States as well demonstrated a reluctance at first to confront these paramilitarized shadow institutions, paralyzed by bitter infighting between the Departments of State and Defense and between the Democratic president and a Republican-controlled Congress.

For just over a year after the introduction of NATO troops in the IFOR (Implementation Force) mission, little direct action was attempted. Following presidential elections in the United States and the election of Tony Blair to the post of prime minister in Britain, however, the United States and Great Britain – the two most militarized democracies in the IFOR (later SFOR) coalition – led efforts to weaken these shadow institutions, in part through the aggressive use of their military contingents (Holbrooke 1998, Chapter 20; Woodward 1998). While the military contribution to peace implementation in Bosnia is only one part of a much larger story, NATO nonetheless provided the skeleton on which civilian implementation efforts depended.

The following pages detail two incidents chosen because they represent critical turning points in Bosnia’s post-war political development where military force played a key role. In these episodes NATO troops – led by the British and American contingents – prevented an armed attempt by Serb ultranationalists to overthrow relatively more moderate forces and thwarted an effort by Herzegovinian extremists to forcibly alter the fundamental structures of the Dayton accords. Critics commonly argue that such efforts were too little too late. While such criticisms may be true, it is also the case that the military deterrence and enforcement actions that were carried out
made a critical difference to the post-war political order, and such actions were overwhelmingly advocated and conducted by the United States and Britain, often against the opposition of other troop-contributing countries.

*The Coup Attempt against Plavšić.* In the year after Dayton was signed, a split emerged among Bosnian Serb political forces between somewhat more moderate politicians based in the Republika Srpska town of Banja Luka and those in the wartime “capital” of Pale. Many of the Banja Luka politicians were themselves ultranationalists implicated in wartime atrocities; indeed, Biljana Plavšić, the leader with whom the international community came to work very closely, had been one of Radovan Karadžić’s closest wartime allies and was later herself indicted for war crimes. Plavšić and many of the other Banja Luka politicians were, however, willing to abide by the Dayton accords, work with the international community, and limit the criminalization of the Republika Srpska economy. They were opposed by the Pale hardliners, who controlled much of the police and “special police” apparatus filled with members of the wartime paramilitaries. Tensions between these two groups came to a head in July through September 1997. Deputies in the RS loyal to Pale called for Plavšić’s dismissal; Plavšić responded by dissolving the parliament and calling for new elections. Pale supporters in the parliament later voted to strip her of control of the RS military, turning its command over to an ad hoc body dominated by Pale loyalists.

The dispute quickly escalated into threats of violence. In August 350 British and Czech troops, supported by tanks, armored personnel carriers, and U.S. Apache attack helicopters, seized a 12-ton arms cache in Banja Luka with enough weapons to arm a 2000-person army. The operation was widely believed to have thwarted a coup attempt against Plavšić. It was also considered an extremely dangerous operation,
Canadian and Dutch units reportedly refused to participate (Erlanger 1997; Maclean’s 1997; Associated Press 1997). A second suspected coup attempt was prevented on the night of September 8-9, when American and British SFOR units intercepted over 100 busses carrying several thousand “demonstrators” – most of them out-of-uniform police loyal to Pale – bound for a demonstration in Banja Luka. The OSCE had given orders permitting the planned demonstration to take place, despite the fact that firearms and hand grenades had been found in demonstrators’ vehicles in the days leading up to the crisis. A senior American official working in the Office of the High Representative, Jacques Klein, counter-manded the order and worked with British General Angus Ramsay throughout the night of September 8-9 to intercept the busloads of hired “demonstrators” converging on Banja Luka (Steele 1997; Walker 1997; Woodard 1997).

British and American policy-makers proved the strongest advocates of the more confrontational approach, despite the fact that the operations were perceived as highly dangerous, with the potential to escalate into large-scale confrontations with Pale militias (Erlanger 1997; Steele 1997), and British and American military forces were at the forefront of the operations to marginalize the Serb paramilitaries. Jacques Klein, a former American general serving as the High Representative’s administrator for the pivotal town of Brcko, played a critical role on the ground in the September crisis, threatening Serb forces loyal to Pale with SFOR enforcement actions if they did not back down (anonymous author interview with a senior American government official, March 2, 2006; Steele 1997; Woodard 1997). Meanwhile, the United States also took the lead in advocating a conceptual shift at NATO headquarters. Jock Covey, the Senior Deputy High Representative of Bosnia at the time, recalls that as Serb hard-liners were attempting to muscle Biljana Plavsic, president of the Republic of Srpska from 1996 to 1998, out of power … Washington proposed to NATO headquarters in Brussels that it adopt a more rigorous standard [of
implementation]: support the peace process and oppose those who seek to obstruct it. Within hours, this simple rule of thumb was translated into the SFOR commander’s intent and passed down to subordinate units. This new concept immediately legitimated the role of SFOR in preventing Krajisnik’s coup against Plavsic. Thereafter, it was clear to all concerned – would-be spoilers as well as risk-averse commanders – that the international military would no longer be neutral about the peace process. The importance of this seemingly small conceptual adjustment cannot be overestimated (Covey 2005, 78).

Agreement in Brussels was facilitated by the fact that the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), American General Wesley Clark, had recently taken office with a mandate to press for a more activist implementation agenda in Bosnia and particularly to neutralize the “Ministerial Special Police” (militarized police units loyal to Pale) (Holbrooke 1998, 349; Clark 2001, 84-5). In contrast to these actions by American and British actors, as mentioned above, Canadian and Dutch units were reported to have refused to take part in the August raids on the Serb weapons cache in Banja Luka.68 Moreover, as will be discussed below, the actions of the British and American contingents stand in sharp contrast to those of French and Italian regular army units in the Herzegovacka Banka crisis in 2001.

The attempted coup against Plavsic and subsequent NATO actions were believed by the actors involved to represent a major crossroads in international policy, with Richard Holbrooke comparing SFOR’s actions to the NATO decision to launch sustained airstrikes in 1995 (Erlanger 1997). Subsequent analyses suggest that the 1997 crisis did represent a significant juncture in the post-Dayton political development of Bosnia. Carrie Manning, for instance, argues that electoral competition among Bosnian Serb parties was a critical factor in inducing the single largest Bosnian Serb party, the SDS, to moderate its political platform (Manning

68 This refusal is particularly noteworthy because Dutch and Canadian units were often relatively more aggressive in their pursuit of their mandate in other circumstances, and these nations were among the few willing to deploy to the dangerous southern regions of Afghanistan, as the next chapter will discuss.
Yet such competition would have been impossible had the Pale hardliners successfully used force to topple their opponents. Military force obviously cannot impose democratic outcomes. It is, however, critical to create the political space necessary for democratic competition.69

The Herzegovacka Banka Crisis. A second crisis erupted four years later when Bosnian Croat hardliners in the HDZ party sought to use force as part of an effort to create their own “state within a state.” Croatian ultranationalists had long resisted any efforts to weaken their de facto autonomy within the Herzegovinian heartland of the Federation. In October 2000, however, in accordance with a judgment of the Bosnian Constitutional Court, OSCE officials re-wrote Bosnian Federation election laws in ways that negatively affected Croatian ultranationalists’ hold on the upper chamber of the legislature. In elections in the following month, the HDZ (as well as hardline Serb and Bosnian Muslim nationalist parties) lost both share of the popular vote and seats in the parliament, despite the party’s enormous advantages in patronage spoils deriving from its monopolization of all economic assets during the war (Economist 2001; Festić and Rausche 2004; Peterson 2001). In a bid to retain their stranglehold on power – and to prevent their being investigated for “war crimes, corruption, illegal trafficking and other nasty things” (Economist 2001) – Ante Jelavić, the Bosnian Croat member of Bosnia’s presidency, and the rest of the HDZ leadership sought to prevent more moderate Croat parties from entering a coalition government with more moderate

69 It is highly instructive to compare NATO’s response to the attempted coup against Plavšić with UNTAC’s response to the “creeping state coup” conducted by the GOC in Cambodia. The results of the first post-war elections in Cambodia were largely negated by the GOC’s threatening violence if it was not made a co-equal partner in a new coalition government, despite having lost the elections. UNTAC was in no position to forcibly deny the GOC’s demands and, rather than face renewed violence or a confrontation with the GOC, it agreed to the GOC’s demands. Subsequent to this decision, the GOC retained control of the administrative and coercive apparatus of the Cambodian state and undermined any substantive efforts at powersharing. Within years of UNTAC’s departure, the GOC seized de jure, as well as de facto, control of the government. Critics charge that the UN essentially legitimated a state coup; supporters argue that UNTAC oversaw a difficult transition to peace, if not democracy.
Bosnian Muslim parties. After a three-month stand-off, Wolfgang Petritsch, then High Representative of Bosnia, ordered the installation of the new coalition government and the removal of Jelavić and other key HDZ hardliners from their governmental posts. Jelavić and his allies quickly struck back, creating a new “constitutive assembly” – the Croatian Sabor – as a precursor to creating a third, autonomous “entity” within Bosnia. They also called on all ethnic Croats in the police and military to cease cooperation with Federation authorities. Reportedly some 8000 Croat soldiers deserted the Federation army (Economist 2001).

Interlocking networks of paramilitaries and patronage systems fueled by criminal activities were critical in determining the outcome of this confrontation between the international community and the HDZ. Croat hardliners reportedly offered payments of $250 to $25,000 to each member of the military who deserted their posts (Peterson 2001). Threats of violence were used by the HDZ both to secure the funding necessary to create the new state-within-a-state and to enforce the loyalties of soldiers who otherwise would have remained loyal to the Federation (International Crisis Group 2001, 4). One media report told of a number of incidents of intimidation, such as that of a senior Croat military commander [who] told members of the 18,000-strong SFOR that he would remain neutral and not walk out. He disappeared for several days, then emerged on television … looking roughed up and sweating. He avoided eye contact with the camera as he professed allegiance to the HDZ. In another incident, two prominent Croat officials and businessmen – who until recently were HDZ supporters, and employ hundreds of Croats in their meat business – issued a statement last Tuesday rejecting HDZ methods. Early the next morning, a bomb blast ripped through one of their cars (Peterson 2001).

The Federation’s defense minister, a moderate Croat named Mijo Anić, warned of a possible armed revolt by HDZ hardliners (Gutman 2001).

The international community responded through both political and military means. As a preliminary step, the American commander of SFOR, Lieutenant General
Michael Dodson, ordered SFOR forces to round up all heavy weaponry from Croat military units. The British deputy commander of SFOR, Major General Robert Connatt, announced that SFOR would prevent the withdrawal of Croat military units from the Federation’s integrated military structures (Perito 2004). Different SFOR contingents responded to these orders in different ways, however. American forces worked five days and nights straight to round up all heavy weapons in the U.S.-run northeastern sector…. In the French-controlled zone near Mostar, Spanish troops posted a lackadaisical guard carrying no weapons at one consolidated arms depot in the town of Caplina. Croats appeared to be completely in charge – despite the absence of Federation patches from their uniforms. “We make sure that the weapons are completely and professionally guarded,” the French sector’s commander, Major General Robert Meille, told reporters last week. Meille seemed unconcerned about the renegades. “They are rebels,” he said. “But this is the problem of the government. It is not my problem” (Gutman 2001).

A second and much more ambitious step, however, targeted the sources of the HDZ’s patronage network with which it was attempting to build a new state. The center of the nexus of paramilitaries, criminalized economies, and patronage-driven nationalist political parties was the Herzegovacka Banka, a bank controlled by HDZ hardliners. Amra Festić and Adrian Rausche, two former OHR officials, describe the significance of the bank for the HDZ’s efforts to construct a state-within-a-state under the guise of a third “entity” within Bosnia:

The third entity offered them a haven from the uncertainties of lost power and position. To guarantee this continued control, a political economy designed to underpin the HDZ’s leading role for Bosnian Croats – independent of the international oversight of public institutions and based in the private sector – had been gradually built up. This political economy was focused on a leading bank, Herzegovacka Banka, and its network of related companies in key sectors of the economy: insurance, oil, investment funds, telecommunications. This group of firms was collectively known as ‘Herzegovina Holding.’ Although nominally designed to support a Croat economy in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the HDZ maintained its control by carefully selecting the management of these firms…. The complex interlocking of financial and economic interests through Herzegovina Holding suggested that the [HDZ
hardliners] had achieved a level of sophistication that made their political power difficult to criminally investigate along traditional lines (Festić and Rausche 2004, 30-32).

The High Representative ordered that the bank come under temporary international administration in order to facilitate a criminal investigation of its activities. OHR officials worked with SFOR in an operation to seize bank records and begin an audit conducted by international investigators. While the High Representative ordered the operation, Adrian Rausche, the Deputy Head of OHR’s Anti-Fraud Department, recalls that it was three American officials – Robert Barry (then chief of the OSCE mission in Bosnia), Tom Miller (U.S. ambassador to Bosnia), and especially Ralph Johnson (Senior Deputy High Representative for Bosnia) – who strongly advocated the policy against the initial reluctance of many other international officials involved (author interview with Rausche, April 21, 2006).

Operation Athena was launched on April 6, 2001. The concept involved sending international auditors and Bosnian policemen into several branches of the bank, protected first by Italian Carabinieri (paramilitary units specializing in crowd control and organized crime) in the so-called “Blue Box,” with SFOR regular army contingents providing support (the “Green Box”) should the operation go awry (Perito 2004, 173-5). In the event, HDZ hardliners rapidly organized large-scale riots to prevent the seizure of incriminating records. These riots combined large mobs of men, women, and children hurling insults and rocks with smaller groups of armed paramilitary HDZ loyalists. Despite the brave efforts of Carabinieri and other “Blue Box” defenders, these armed groups quickly overcame the “Blue Box” at numerous branches of the bank, seizing auditors, translators, and Bosnian police. Twenty-nine of the personnel involved in the operation were injured, many of them severely, and the identities of masked Bosnian personnel were compromised, thus subjecting them to fear of violent reprisals. Moreover, the personnel involved were forced to return the
seized documentation necessary to indict high-ranking members of the “third-entity” movement.

Despite the danger both to personnel and mission, the national contingents comprising the “Green Box” reacted in very different ways to the crisis:

In Orasje, Vitez and Tomislavgrad, American, Danish and Canadian units provided full security for the auditors of the bank's branch offices. Although these operations were met by groups of angry protestors, a review of documents in the banks was successfully completed without major incident. In these areas SFOR provided a significant show of force, as well as an outer perimeter of security, known as a 'green box', around the banks. However, at the main office in Mostar, as well as at a number of branches in Herzegovina (including offices in Mostar, Grude, Medjugorje and Posusje), the auditors were confronted by well-organized mobs that beat international officials and Federation authorities. In the worst case, in Grude, hostages were taken and threatened with execution, unless and until materials taken from the bank were returned. This blackmail worked. All the towns in which the mobs were successful in frustrating the auditors' access to bank documentation are located in that part of Bosnia under the control of SFOR's French-led division. Participants in OHR's operation, both expatriates and Bosnians, expressed bitterness over SFOR's failure, despite its previous assurances, to extend adequate security cover to civilians from the start of the operation. However, having assessed the security risk as low, French SFOR in these areas did not provide the 'green box' of wider protection, sending only a few Italian Carabinieri to each building, including even the headquarters of the bank…. SFOR then also failed to send in forces to rescue the international and local civilians trapped in the banks, who reportedly called for help as the crisis unfolded over the course of several hours. On the other hand, security at the French base in Ortijes, miles away from the trouble, was beefed up markedly during these events (International Crisis Group 2001, 4-5).  

Having failed to secure control of the bank or its records during the April 6 operation, the international community returned twelve days later. In this second operation SFOR took no chances, deploying nearly 5,000 troops and 400 armored vehicles (Festić and Rausche 2004). This second operation was led by the British. According to Rausche, the decision to give the British the lead – despite the fact that the main targets of the

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70. This account broadly accords with those of two international officials directly involved in the incident (author interview with Adrian Rausche, April 21, 2006, and anonymous author interview with a junior OHR official participating in the operation at one of the bank branches, May 2004).
operation were in the operational zone controlled by France – was a political one. Although the French general in charge of the sector wanted to take the lead, he was reportedly over-ruled by authorities in Paris (author interview with Adrian Rausche, April 21, 2006).

Much like the attempted coup against Plavsić, many observers considered the Herzegovacka Banka incident to be a crucial turning point in Bosnia’s political development. James Lyons, the Balkans director of the well-respected International Crisis Group, was quoted at the time as saying, “If [the West] backs down – this is the scary part – then Dayton literally falls apart” (Peterson 2001). Much like the Plavsić coup incident, the ultranationalists’ capacity for violence only became visible when their hold on power was threatened by relatively more moderate political parties. Had the HDZ been successful in its “third entity” project, then not only would more moderate Croat political parties have been marginalized by the HDZ’s capacity for violence, but the governmental machinery of Bosnia would have been further paralyzed by yet another veto-wielding sub-state political unit. Instead, the international community’s Herzegovacka Banka raids yielded three key successes:

First, the third-entity project collapsed. After one year, the HDZ was forced to indefinitely ‘postpone’ its plans…. Second … the Herzegovacka Holding system is being broken up and liquidated, including sales of companies and assets to non- or less political owners. This means that the clandestine political-economic framework that had maintained a third entity has been broken and the ability to create a shadow authority has been substantially impaired…. Third, the focus on prosecutions has prevented hardline HDZ figures from credibly arguing that the Croats have been unfairly targeted. The criminal investigation has managed to more or less deflect any accusations of bias, allowed the federation authorities to be integrated into the process, and perhaps even deepened the fissures between the ‘criminal’ and ‘non-criminal’ elements of the HDZ…. The arrest of Ante Jelavić and two other Herzegovacka Banka conspirators for corruption and fraud charges in early 2004 attested to not only the success of the strategy but also the significantly improved capabilities of the Bosnia law enforcement, prosecutors, and courts to deal with such critical matters. Finally, Herzegovacka Banka’s assets have been depoliticized. The effective prosecution of the persons responsible should
help to reshape the political economy into one more conducive to democratic standards and market-economy principles (Festić and Rausche 2004, 31-32).

The capacity to deter violent escalation of crises and to enforce the rule of law against the actions of “shadow institutions” wielding violence to secure their hold on power, in other words, proved essential to creating the space necessary for a relatively more participatory and inclusive political order. The mere presence of a sizable and capable military force was not enough, however, to prevent the Croat ultranationalists from seeking to create “facts on the ground” backed up by an ethnically “pure” Croat army. Many officials involved in the crisis were reluctant to challenge the HDZ directly, and many national contingents refused at various points to participate in operations designed to thwart the third-entity project. Throughout this crisis, American and British officials and military units were more aggressive in responding to the HDZ’s confrontational tactics.

There are many possible reasons for an intervening state’s reluctance to engage in a particular crisis. At various other points and in other missions, the United States and United Kingdom have been less willing to challenge local “spoilers.” The Herzegovacka Banka incident, as well as the Plavsić coup incident before it, however, do fit into a broader pattern. During various high-intensity crises, the U.S. and Britain have been more willing to use military force to marginalize “spoilers” and create space for non-militarized elements of the political spectrum to participate in post-war orders. While the American and British instincts for relatively more militarized tactics and strategies have sometimes proven disastrous in other contexts, they proved critical in fostering the slow progress of post-war Bosnia towards something resembling a democratic order.
A Focused Examination of Interveners’ Policies in Bosnia

Throughout the periods of peacemaking and peace implementation in Bosnia – and again later in Kosovo – the major powers for the most part exhibited remarkably stable orientations towards the conflict. Some variation occurred among the preferences of the interveners. Most notably, Britain became much more aggressive under the Blair government, Germany slowly became more willing to participate directly in “out-of-area” military operations, and the liberal, pro-Western period of Russian foreign policy in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet collapse proved short-lived. For the most part, however, the behavior of the major powers conforms with the predictions of the theoretical framework advanced in this study. Britain and the United States, as militarized democracies, proved the most willing to use force to enforce a more democratic political order for Bosnia (and later Kosovo). Although Germany adapted to the circumstances of the post-Cold War era, Germany along with Italy remained among the NATO countries least willing to advocate or engage in high-intensity military activities in the Balkans. France occupied a middle ground. Russia, on the other hand, tended to regard democracy promotion with considerable skepticism, often seeing it as nothing more than rhetorical cover for the expansion of NATO’s military sphere of influence. In conjunction with national interests, these orientations determined the broad outlines of the intervening powers’ policies and the likely outcomes of their interventionist actions. Although American interests were not sufficiently engaged for the United States to commit wholeheartedly to the implementation of the Dayton accords that it had brokered, ultimately it was the United States and Britain that provided the de-militarized space in Bosnia in which relatively more moderate political forces could begin to shift the balance towards a more democratic postwar political order.
**Attitudes of the Major Powers**

**Germany.** Surprisingly, Germany played the initial pivotal role in the Yugoslav crisis by forcing an early decision on the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. Germany strongly advocated for the recognition of these two republics as independent states, seeing in their struggles with Belgrade a parallel with Germany’s own recent overthrow of autocratic communist rule and struggle for self-determination. Its recognition policy was thus an expression of its own norms of democratic governance. Unlike many of the other Western democracies, however, Germany placed relatively greater faith in the efficacy of international law, believing that Serbia would not dare to militarily assault a sovereign state. When that assumption proved mistaken, German foreign policy suffered a traumatic defeat, and Germany retreated behind the

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71 Michael Libal, the director of the Southeast Europe Department of the German Foreign Office at the time of the recognition debates, explained Germany’s position succinctly, writing that “all that the talk about ‘self-determination’ amounted to in reality were two things: first, as in the case of German unification, to respect democratic decisions in the framework of existing political institutions, in this case the individual Yugoslav republics; second, to defend the right of these republics to survive the process of dissolution of the larger state by safeguarding their own integrity and protecting themselves against the threat of ethnically motivated violence coming from other republics, or supported by them” (Libal 1997, 110-111, italics added). See also Axt 1993; Crawford 1996; Gow 1997, 167-171; Libal 1997; Müller 1994; Schmidt 2002; and Wagner 1992. Some have argued that German economic interests motivated the recognition decision. Arguing against this view, see Axt 1993.

72 Richard Caplan (2002, 164-165) summarizes a position paper written by the German Foreign Office in 1993 to explain the logic of its recognition decision: “[B]ecause the Yugoslav conflict was not a civil war but a war of conquest by Serbia, the international community had only two choices: it could either respond with a military containment of Serbia or it could pursue ‘internationalization of the conflict by political means through formal recognition of the threatened republics in order to thwart any hopes Belgrade might have of faits accomplis achieved through the use of force being tolerated’…. Recognition, by this reasoning, would deter Belgrade from the further prosecution of its military campaign and even effect a withdrawal of its forces because the Yugoslav army’s control of Croatian territory would then be in violation of Croatia’s sovereign rights.” The precise mechanisms by which Serbia would be deterred remained ambiguous in Germany’s advocacy (Axt 1993, 354). Clearly Germany was itself unwilling to participate directly in any enforcement actions. Thus, either Germany was expecting to force its allies into high-intensity enforcement actions in which it was unwilling to participate itself – a rather cynical reading of German foreign policy – or it believed that international law would be substantially more efficacious than it turned out to be in this instance. The latter interpretation accords with Germany’s broader foreign policy tradition: “When the Cold War ended and Germany was united, the strategic vision for keeping peace in Europe, as prevailing in Bonn, was through a multilateral network of institutions…. It was a vision basically based on the rule of law rather than on any thought about the use of force. It was, in other words, a typical expression of the German aversion to thinking seriously about war” (Müller 1994, 125). See also Wagner 1992, 33-34; Woodward 1995, 185-6.
lead of the other major powers of the EU and NATO. Constrained by its own non-militarized strategic culture, Germany was unable to offer any military contribution beyond participation in AWACS reconnaissance overflights and Sharp Guard maritime sanctions enforcement (Gow 1997, 173). More than a year after the signing of the Dayton accords, Germany finally deployed ground forces as part of SFOR in Bosnia itself.

Defenders of Germany’s policies argue that it was unrealistic for Germany to adopt a more aggressive military posture so soon after the end of the Cold War and Germany’s semi-sovereign status. They argue that Germany moved towards greater “normalization” throughout the 1990s and that it was a reliable partner by the time of the Kosovo crisis, when it launched combat air sorties during Operation Allied Force and assumed control of one of the five military zones (MNBs) of KFOR. Although German strategic culture undeniably evolved in the decade after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, perhaps more startling than the changes are the continuities. Germany did “normalize,” but it became normal in much the same way that Italy or Belgium are “normal” countries.73 Public opinion in Germany lagged behind that of Britain or France in support of military options throughout the crises in Bosnia and Kosovo (Auerswald 2004; Sobel 1996). While it participated in military actions in Bosnia and Kosovo, it continued to do so under enormous political constraints, and it continued to favor diplomacy over force to a much greater extent than Britain or the United States.

*The United States.* Up until the summer of 1991, American and German (and other European states’) foreign policies towards Yugoslavia were in agreement on the desirability of restructuring the federal republic as a much more decentralized, democratic confederation (Libal 1997, Chapter 2; Woodward 1995; Zimmermann

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Where they diverged were in their assessments of the efficacy of internationalizing the conflict between the secessionist republics and Serbia. While German commonly decision-makers believed that recognition of Slovenia and Croatia as sovereign states would make the conflict amenable to the same instruments of interstate conflict resolution and international law that had proved successful in reducing Cold War tensions, top officials in the Bush administration tended to believe that recognition would create a crisis resolvable only through military force, and it did not see American interests as sufficiently engaged by Yugoslavia to warrant the decisive application of American military capabilities (Gompert 1996, 122-123; Zimmermann 1996, 215). When Germany nonetheless pressed for recognition, Washington was more than content to allow the Europeans to take the lead in attempting to cobble together a policy that would accomplish what American policymakers saw as a nearly impossible goal: a viable peace achieved without decisive force.

The Europeans in fact proved unable to square this circle. The American foreign policy community, however, neither re-calibrated its conception of what an acceptable peace would entail, nor did it alter its judgment that the stakes in the former Yugoslavia could not justify the diversion of American military resources from what were perceived as their more pressing deterrent roles in Southwest and Northeast Asia. Instead Washington opposed European diplomacy, which it saw as imposing an unjust peace on the Bosniaks, while simultaneously failing to devise a workable plan to secure a more inclusive, equitable postwar political order.

Consistent with its strategic culture, when faced with the utter collapse of its policy and the severe ramifications of inaction, the United States proved more willing to escalate to higher levels of force than any of its European allies but Britain under Blair. The militarization of American strategic culture was evident in both the foreign
policy and elite and in the public. As the narrative above described, American officials were consistently associated with the advocacy of the most confrontational policies in both the pre-Dayton period (e.g., arming the Bosniaks and widespread airstrikes against the Serbs – the so-called “lift and strike” policy) and the post-Dayton period (e.g., intervention to thwart the attempted coup against Plavšić and striking the Herzegovacka Banka to disrupt the “third entity” movement). Public opinion polls do not demonstrate a particularly high level of support for forceful action in pre-Dayton Bosnia, although the Clinton administration did not commit to selling such a policy to the American public until the fall of 1995. In Kosovo, however, where the Clinton administration did publicly commit, polls show that the American and British publics were much more acceptant of higher-intensity uses of force than were German or Italian publics.74 This broader acceptance of high-intensity uses of force in the United States – both among policy elites and among the public – allowed for more aggressive actions to restructure Bosnian political authority structures.

Russia. Moscow played a less pro-active role in the Balkans than the Western powers, but it nonetheless remained a significant player in multilateral efforts to bring peace to the former Yugoslavia. Preoccupied with its own transition and dependent on external financial credits, Russia’s contributions were primarily diplomatic, but at various points it sought to use troops deployed to the theater as diplomatic leverage.75 As discussed in the previous chapter, most Russians simply do not believe that

74 For polls related to Bosnia during the war, see Sobel 1996; for Kosovo, see Auerswald 2004. After the Clinton administration committed to Bosnia and American forces were deployed, public support for the operation was very high even though most Americans believed that U.S. military forces had sustained significant casualties in the operation (Kull and Ramsay 2001, 218-223). The polls during the Kosovo crisis show a surprisingly high level of French support for force, although the Chirac government proved much less willing than Clinton or Blair to support high-intensity military operations such as a ground assault.

75 Most notably, Russia sought to defuse NATO’s threats of airstrikes against the Bosnian Serbs in 1994, and it sought to effect a de facto partition of Kosovo in 1999 by unilaterally claiming its own military district in the northern, predominantly Serb area of Kosovo (Pape 2004; Talbot 2002).
democracy is possible or preferable under conditions of high instability (see also Lo 2003, 100-1, 108). In both Bosnia and Kosovo Russia generally advocated variants of a “soft partition” policy, where ethnic groups would be separated into distinct geographic and political units, comprising a single state in name only.76 Relatively liberal observers in Russia generally viewed Western interventions in the former Yugoslavia as serving the same end; less sympathetic Russian observers saw in NATO policies efforts to assert military control over Eastern Europe, to humiliate Russia, and ultimately to intervene in Russia itself (Alexandrova-Arbatova 1997; Danilov 1999; Davydov 1999). Western claims to be pursuing multi-ethnic democracy were generally dismissed as either rhetorical cover for a policy of ethnic favoritism or military expansionism, or as errant idealism (Bordachev 1998; Danilov 1999). Russia, in short, may have preferred the proxy model, but given its own very limited interests in the former Yugoslavia and its resource constraints, it adopted a mediation model for its foreign policy.

Britain, France, and Italy. As explained in the discussion of research design in the first chapter, this study concentrates on the policies of Germany, the United States, and Russia as exemplars of the three major types of interveners. Britain, France and Italy may be seen as lesser included cases, with the United Kingdom representing a militarized democracy, Italy a non-militarized democracy, and France occupying a middle ground. Each of these countries behaved largely according to the model presented here. All three in principle supported democratic principles of conflict.

76 For a revealing look at Russian skepticism concerning Western policy in the Balkans, see former Russian Foreign and later Prime Minister Evgenii Primakov’s memoirs (1999, 339-355). Concerning Primakov’s advocacy of political autonomy as a solution for Kosovo, see Krasnaia Zvezda 1998, Petrovskaya 1998, Sysoev 1998. Of course, in practice the lines Russia chose to draw disproportionately benefited the Serbs. It is difficult to say whether this was a result of ethnic favoritism or of a realism reflecting Serbia’s military preponderance. The discussion of alternative hypotheses below will seek to parse between these explanations.
resolution for the Balkans, but they diverged in their assessments of the practicality of such an option given the military actions that would be entailed.

Under the government of John Major, Britain adopted a restrained policy towards the conflict in Bosnia that closely resembled the approach taken by France. Both his predecessor, Margaret Thatcher, and his successor, Tony Blair, however, advocated much more hawkish policies. Under Blair Britain undertook actions in the former Yugoslavia that would simply have been inconceivable in the German or even Italian context. The UK was the principle advocate of a ground campaign to impose a peace in Kosovo, and it took the operational lead in many of the highest-intensity SFOR enforcement actions in Bosnia. British public opinion was highly supportive of such an aggressive role.\(^\text{77}\)

Italy, like Germany, suffered defeat in the Second World War and has adopted very restrained military roles ever since. Rome frequently shied away from higher-intensity military operations, such as the airstrikes over Kosovo. In marked contrast to Germany, however, Italian paramilitary troops – the Carabinieri – have proven highly adept at lower-intensity peace operations (Perito 2004).

France occupies an intermediate position between the less militarized states like Germany and Italy and the more militarized ones like the United States and Britain. Since its defeat in Algeria, France has been reluctant to participate in large-scale expeditionary operations. While France has been active in providing military assistance to Francophone Africa, these operations almost always involve very small numbers of French troops supporting the government in power, with very little parliamentary or public oversight (Moisi 1984). Where France has taken the lead in large-scale, widely visible missions such as Operation Turquoise after the Rwandan

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\(^{77}\) For public opinion poll data, see Auerswald 2004. For a discussion of the relationship between Britain’s imperial past and the British public’s reflexive support for military options in the Balkan context, see Towle 1994.
genocide or Operation Licorne in Côte d’Ivoire, it has generally preferred interpositional peacekeeping duties to more intrusive (and thus confrontational) mandates (International Crisis Group 2004b; Vaccaro 1996). At times France has advocated aggressive military actions in the former Yugoslavia – most notably under President Chirac in 1995 in Bosnia and again during the Kosovo crisis, where it was one of the primary European contributors to combat air sorties flown in Operation Allied Force in 1999. More often, however, it has sought accommodation with the parties to the conflict, seeking to exercise the minimal amount of force necessary to stabilize the situation at hand. France has interpreted its mandate in Bosnia similarly to many of its African peacekeeping missions, adopting a minimalist approach that seeks to separate the parties without fundamentally transforming power relationships.

All of the major Western countries involved sought to promote a democratic resolution of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The nature of the conflict, however, tended to marginalize parties with a vested interest in the de-militarization of the conflict. Consequently, states with less militarized strategic cultures were left without effective tools for implementing their first-order preferences and instead were forced to adopt a mediation model for resolving the war and subsequent tenuous peace. As will be seen in the following section, even the militarized democracies had to balance their orientation towards aggressive enforcement measures with the limited national interests at stake in the Balkans.

*Interests of the Major Powers*

The only American interests at stake in the former Yugoslavia were its desire to retain a strong transatlantic military alliance (with American leadership) and to build a “new world order” predicated on peaceful resolution of international disputes and democratic governance. Even these interests were limited by resource constraints;
for many years the United States was more interested in deferring a greater proportion of the defense burden to its European allies than to maintaining undisputed leadership of the NATO alliance or to building a rather nebulous – and potentially extraordinarily expensive – world order. Unlike Europe, the United States was a global power with defense commitments around the globe. At the time much of the American defense community was preoccupied with containing Iraq and preparing for the contingency that the former Soviet Union might itself descend into violent chaos (Baker 1995, 636; Gompert 1996; Halverson 1996). 78

The Europeans also had no vital interests in the former Yugoslavia, although they were somewhat more directly affected by the conflict. Parallel to the American interest in retaining a vital NATO under American leadership, most Europeans were enthusiastic about the opportunities for Europe to act as a major, unified diplomatic player in the post-Cold War era – first as the European Community (EC) and later as the European Union (EU). The Europeans also had an interest in developing a world order based on Helsinki principles of peaceful dispute resolution and democratic governance. But beyond these diplomatic goals, the Europeans sought to minimize many of the direct “security externalities” of the conflict. The most important of these was the massive refugee crisis provoked by the violence. Europeans also feared the potential for the conflict to widen geographically, threatening the stability of many of Europe’s eastern neighbors (Calic 1996, 68-9).

The great challenge on both sides of the Atlantic was to reconcile the major powers’ first-order preferences for how the war should be resolved with their fairly limited interests in the conflict. It was a balancing act that both sides juggled poorly, although the United States did far the worse, refusing to commit to either providing the necessary resources for the realization of its ambitious first-order preferences

78 On the reluctance of the U.S. military in particular to become involved in what it saw as a peripheral region, see Western 2002.
while simultaneously refusing to accept a peace that reflected the military, rather than moral, balance of forces. When the Clinton administration ultimately decided to intervene, it was not a decision that was made lightly. The president expected to take casualties in the operation, which was a politically perilous decision in the aftermath of the Mogadishu debacle in Somalia (Chollet 2005; Daalder 2000, 63-4, 106-7; Holbrooke 1998, Chapter 15). Even after the decision to intervene, American commitment was much less than total, reflecting the intermediate level of the American interests at stake in Bosnia. Only after the 1996 mid-term elections did the administration replace many key personnel in Bosnia, Brussels, and Washington with officials dedicated to more aggressive implementation of the Dayton accords (Holbrooke 1998, Chapter 20), leading to the sorts of enforcement actions seen in the attempted coup against Plavšić and the Herzegovacka Banka incident.

Structure of the Intervention

Prior to 1995, all of the powers involved had adopted a mediation model to structure peace negotiations and the eventual deployment of a peace enforcement coalition force. As discussed in the narrative above, while various countries and negotiators had pressed for democratic mechanisms in the various peace plans, in practice most of the enforceable provisions for democracy institutions were offered as concessions to secure the agreement of the warring parties. Only the combined ground and air campaign in 1995 provided the necessary military leverage to impose a peace agreement with realistically enforceable provisions that more resembled the transformation model. Even then, however, many of the countries participating in the IFOR and SFOR peace enforcement missions preferred to avoid confrontation with the paramilitaries that thwarted Dayton implementation, leading to the divergent policies and complex bargaining arrangements described in the narrative above.
Military Structure. The troop-contributing countries of IFOR – above all the United States – sought to ensure that the NATO-led force would have the military credibility that UNPROFOR had lacked. To this end they deployed 60,000 troops, including substantial armor and air support, within NATO command and control structures. They were deployed throughout the territory of Bosnia, and they were given extremely broad powers of enforcement through the so-called “silver bullet clause” of the Dayton accords, which permitted international forces “to do all the Commander judges necessary and proper” (“General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” quoted in Holbrooke 1998, 223).

These forces were divided between three reinforced multinational divisions (MNDs), one each under the control of the United States, Britain, and France. Although all forces operated ostensibly under the same robust NATO rules of engagement, the distinct approaches of these three “lead nations” led many international personnel in Bosnia to refer to the MNDs as “the Three Kingdoms.” Besides the conflicts over the conduct of enforcement operations described in the narrative above, the three MNDs had differential rates of refugee returns and the apprehension of war criminals. Refugees were repatriated at the highest rate within the British MND (after the Blair government took power), reflecting Britain’s highly proactive approach to guaranteeing the security of ethnic minorities (Bassuener 2005, 109), while for years after the initial introduction of IFOR (later SFOR) troops, there was scarcely a single arrest of a war criminal within the French sector (Sudetic 2000).

79 Unified NATO command and control arrangements were in distinct contrast to the so-called “dual key” arrangements (in which both the UN and NATO had to agree to combat operations) that had frequently hamstrung NATO air operations during the war.
80 Initially the U.S. military opposed such a provision, preferring simply to deploy to the Federation in order to deter a resumption of fighting without risking clashes with Bosnian Serb forces. American civilian officials insisted that IFOR be deployed throughout the territory of Bosnia in order to prevent the “soft partition” of the country and to enforce compliance with Dayton throughout the country’s borders (Holbrooke 1998, 220-221).
81 The United States military did not distinguish itself by facilitating refugee repatriation.
Civilian Structure. The civilian structure of the Dayton accords and subsequent implementation efforts was largely decided by a continuing clash between so-called “minimalists” and “maximalists,” both within the United States government and between the United States and European powers. During the fall of 1995, proponents of a transformational model of intervention, led principally by U.S. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, fought with those who adopted a mediation approach, which would have sought merely to police a durable ceasefire and separation of the warring parties. The mediation approach found many champions within the U.S. government, particularly among the military, who favored its less demanding implementation requirements. The institutions created by Dayton incorporate both models of intervention, reflecting the intermediate interests at stake in Bosnia and the reluctance of the European countries to pursue more ambitious political goals with a concomitantly higher risk of confrontation with the local parties. The division of Bosnia into two “entities,” the Republika Srpska and the Federation, with a clear separation of indigenous military forces along the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL), reflects the logic of the mediation model. But Dayton also incorporated a variety of instruments designed to undermine the rigid division of the country, including provisions for state-level political institutions, refugee returns, the apprehension of war criminals, and various human rights mechanisms (Cousens and Cater 2001; Holbrooke 1998; Woodward 1998 and 1999).

One of the most controversial provisions mandated the holding of elections within one year of the accords’ signing. With an eye towards the U.S. Congress, the Clinton administration initially insisted that the IFOR mission last only a single year, despite the ambitious goals that Holbrooke and the other American negotiators had pursued at Dayton. When Washington consented to an extension of the IFOR mandate (now renamed SFOR), it agreed to only an 18-month extension. Not until more than
two years into the mission did the Clinton administration commit to keeping American troops deployed indefinitely – that is, replacing an “end date” with an “end state.” As a direct consequence of the initial one-year mandate, the United States advocated holding elections within one year of the peace accords’ signing. Officials responsible for Bosnia policy at the time recognized the contradiction between the lofty goals of Dayton and the extremely short time horizons. The explanations provided by these officials do not reflect a blind faith in either democracy or in elections, as some critics have maintained, but rather a delicate balancing act between ambitious political goals and a Congress skeptical of deploying large numbers of troops for extended periods of time where no vital national interests were at stake (Holbrooke 1998).

Outcomes: Democratic Change, Achievement, and Durability in Bosnia

Bosnia, of course, looks nothing like Switzerland or any other mature multiethnic democracy, but neither is it any longer dominated by paramilitarized actors operating outside of formal democratic institutions. In fact, it is a unique creation, combining the semi-trusteeship of the Office of the High Representative with both the shadow institutions inherited from the war and more legitimate domestic political actors willing to play by democratic rules of the game. Although there remain many troubling aspects of Bosnian politics, there has been substantial political progress since the signing of the Dayton accords.

At least three sources of change lie behind this progress: the weakening of popular support for nationalist parties, the moderation of nationalist parties’ political platforms, and the rise of numerous less-nationalist parties. Popular support for nationalist parties has charted a steady decline, falling below the 50 percent level in the 2000 and 2002 elections (Caspersen 2004, 675-6; see also Pugh and Cobble 2001 for an analysis that disputes the most negative interpretations of the nationalists’
electoral strength). Accompanying this decline has been the emergence of a number of viable parties less tied to the criminalized economy and paramilitaries of the wartime era; several of these parties united (admittedly under the tutelage of the international community) to form a coalition government for the Federation following the 2000 elections. This increased electoral competition has forced many of the nationalist parties to respond (at least in part) to voter discontent, particularly on the issue of corruption, and has led to a general moderation of the more nationalist parties’ platforms (Manning 2004).

According to Andreas Schedler’s (2002) quadripartite division of regime type based on Freedom House rankings, it has progressed from “closed autocracy” (a score of 6 on the Freedom House scale) to “illiberal democracy” (a score of 3).82 One comprehensive study of peacebuilding efforts in Bosnia published in 2001 pointed out that “some observers with experience have stated that Bosnia compares favorably to other post-communist states, including Russia and Ukraine, where the level of mafia involvement in politics in both countries is much higher (Cousens and Cater 2001, 122). Since that time Bosnia has made further progress. This progress does not mean that all is well with Bosnia. Widespread voter alienation and depoliticization, for instance, is a severe constraint on developing mechanisms of accountability for political elites who continue to stall economic and political reforms (Søberg 2006). Its current level of political achievement is nonetheless far beyond what many skeptics in 1995 deemed possible.

**Policy Options and Counterfactuals**

Could the major powers have adopted different policies than they did and, if so, what would have been the likely outcomes of these alternative approaches?

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82 As a point of comparison, Turkey also scored a 3; see Freedom House 2007.
Answering this question is important for theoretical as well as policy purposes: The accomplishments of intervention are best understood in terms of the counterfactual of what would have happened in the absence of intervention. As the narrative above makes clear, there were indeed alternatives to using military force and to promoting democracy in order to realize an inclusive, durable political order: first, advocating the continued unity of socialist Yugoslavia and turning a blind eye as Belgrade and the Yugoslav National Army forcibly repressed secessionist movements in the other republics; second, recognizing the “hard partition” of Bosnia between Croatia and Serbia; and third, supporting a “soft partition” of Bosnia, with each national group awarded territory according to its military victories. Each of these was problematic for different reasons.

The first alternative was considered by the Bush administration in 1991 but ultimately abandoned as infeasible or unacceptable. With an eye towards the disintegrating Soviet Union, the administration of George H. W. Bush strongly supported the principle of territorial integrity, and it sought to promote a solution in which Yugoslavia remained united but less centralized. Events on the ground quickly outpaced American efforts to broker such a compromise, however. With Yugoslav defense forces divided between a centrally controlled military and territorial defense forces controlled by each republic, the institutions of unified Yugoslavia had distributed military capabilities in such a way as to make any weakening of central authority likely to be an extraordinarily bloody affair (Bunce 1999). The U.S. and Europe could have continued to support a unified Yugoslavia, but doing so would not likely have made the outcome any less bloody. Nor was either side of the Atlantic anxious to condone a large-scale campaign of violent repression by Belgrade, particularly when there were no guarantees that such a campaign would have succeeded in preventing the broader civil wars that all feared.
Once the fighting had spread from Croatia to Bosnia, a second alternative policy would have accepted the vast military superiority of Serbian and Croatian forces and recognized the partition of Bosnia between them. The presidents of Croatia and Serbia, Franjo Tudjman and Slobodan Milosević, met together early in the war and reportedly drew up lines for the division of Bosnia between them (Burg and Shoup 1999, 104). Those who argued that humanitarian intervention was too costly or too unlikely to succeed either implicitly or explicitly advocated such a policy, as did many of those in Russia who decried Western favoritism towards the Bosniaks. Military victory in civil wars, such observers argued, provides the basis for the construction of politically stable states, which in turn are the necessary prerequisite for enduring peace (Licklider 1995; Luttwak 1999). These states might subsequently be induced through aid conditionality and other means to obey international norms of governance, including those pertaining to the treatment of the populations defeated in war (Weinstein 2005). In the context of the former Yugoslavia, a hard partition of Bosnia between Croatia and Serbia might have ended the war more rapidly and thus saved lives. In the best-case scenario, the Bosniaks might have held the same position in the newly expanded states as, for instance, the Sandjak Muslims of Serbia – that is, they would have been denied political rights and economic opportunities but might have improved their lot over time. This, however, is the best case scenario. As previous research has made clear, military victories not only increase the likelihood of enduring peace, they also increase the likelihood of genocide (Licklider 1995). Given the behavior of paramilitaries operating in Bosnia during the early months of the war, there is little reason to believe the Muslims of Bosnia would have remained a viable sub-population in a Greater Serbia or a Greater Croatia analogous to the Sandjak Muslims; the Palestinians or the Tutsi living in Uganda after the violence of the 1950s and 1960s in Rwanda are perhaps more apt analogies.
The final and most likely alternative scenario was the “soft partition” of Bosnia into distinct ethno-national territorial units, with no effective provisions for integrative political mechanisms – in other words, de facto partition within a single de jure state. As discussed in the narrative above, soft partition was the most likely outcome of European efforts prior to 1995 to broker a peace deal.83

The narrative raised considerable doubts about whether such a deal was possible at all unless outside powers were to compel the parties to accept the arrangements, and such enforcement actions were highly unlikely without the participation of the United States. Nonetheless, because such peace plans met more of the demands of the militarily dominant parties, particularly the Bosnian Serbs, it is possible that they might have been successfully imposed without the benefit of the Croatian military offensive and NATO airstrikes of 1995. Such plans, however, would have gained the uncoerced consent of these militarily dominant parties by offering these parties a relatively more advantageous position – at the expense of the militarily weakest faction, the Bosniaks. So long as they were winning the war, the paramilitaries and war profiteers that dominated the government of the Bosnian Serb wartime government would not have voluntarily consented to any measures that sought to limit the territory they controlled, the “rents” they reaped through their control of a predatory proto-state, or their hold on political power. As the narrative demonstrated, only substantial military setbacks and the risk of outright military defeat compelled the Pale leadership to make substantive concessions.

Thus, the soft partition option would have created three microstates, none of which would have been economically viable without integration into (or subsidies from) neighboring, much larger economies. Such an arrangement would have

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83 Daalder (1997) argued for a hard partition of Bosnia two years after the signing of the Dayton accords. The issues associated with soft partition (discussed below) generally apply to Daalder’s version of hard partition as well.
accorded well with the aims of the wartime political parties of the Bosnian Serbs and Croats. They would have maintained their hold on power, without any effective mechanisms for the international community to enforce elections or compliance with the rule of law, they would have retained the vast economic fortunes the wartime leadership had acquired during the war, and they would have been the beneficiaries of continued subsidies from the nationalist parties in Serbia and Croatia proper. The Bosniaks, on the other hand, would have inhabited a tiny proportion of the territory of Bosnia as a whole, with massive refugee populations that had no realistic hope of return. Moreover, the Bosniak-controlled territory would have been cut off from many of the economic assets and trade routes of pre-war Bosnia.

Proponents of soft partition argue that the Dayton accords accomplished little, if anything, more than earlier plans for soft partition, and they did so after the loss of many more thousands of lives in the war. There is substantial truth to these criticisms. The Dayton accords were an uneasy compromise between soft partition and a transformational blueprint for a relatively more democratic, integrated, and multiethnic Bosnia. In the initial year and a half of implementation, Dayton yielded almost exclusively a soft partition of the country.

By the summer of 1997, however, both the United States and Britain had committed to more aggressive enforcement of the transformational elements of the Dayton accords. In 1997 these countries ensured that the Pale hardliners could not use their paramilitaries to marginalize other Serb political parties. Beginning in the same year, a steadily increasing number of war criminals were apprehended. By 1999 freedom of movement across the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) dividing the Federation and Republika Srpska had improved substantially, and meaningful refugee returns began to become possible. In 2001 NATO forces, with Britain playing the dominant role, foiled an attempt by the hardline HDZ to create by fiat a “third entity.”
In successive elections hardline nationalist parties gained fewer and fewer votes, and the content of their political platforms generally moderated. By 2005 the situation in Bosnia had stabilized to the point where SFOR was replaced by an EU-led force (EUFOR). Freedom House scores continued to chart a slow but steady trend towards greater democracy in the country, reaching the same level of democracy as Turkey by 2006. By 2006 many in the conflict resolution and development communities had begun to become relatively optimistic about Bosnia.

The country is by no means a consolidated democracy. It is a hybrid creation of the international community, fusing Western-imposed institutions to an underlying political dynamic born out of a vicious civil war. The resultant political system combines elements of autocracy and division with democracy and integration. While it is too early to judge the ultimate outcome, there are strong indications that this hybrid creation can not only be sustained but also improved over time as Bosnians adapt to the new opportunities available to them.

Clearly there were viable policy alternatives to the transformation model of intervention – indeed, the European powers pursued the mediation model for years, and many within the Clinton administration pressed for such an approach. Equally clearly, there are differences between the political authority structures that Dayton created and the soft partition that an intervention without American participation would have produced. Military interventions can produce a relatively more inclusive and participatory political order, so long as the intervening countries are committed to undertaking the military enforcement actions necessary to create and sustain more democratic institutions. It is an open ethical question whether these political orders are a substantial enough improvement over those produced by the mediation model so as to justify the military force and loss of life necessary in challenging environments to achieve them.
Contending Explanations

Numerous observers have contested the argument made here. Many advance alternative explanations for the sources of interveners’ preferences, including explanations based on partisanship, domestic institutions, ethnic ties, and leadership. Others question the causes of the outcomes in Bosnia, arguing that capabilities rather than strategic cultures account for variation in states’ willingness to use force, or that military force was not the primary determinant of outcomes. Finally, some have questioned whether the politics of post-war Bosnia can be considered even minimally democratic. Most of these alternative explanations are not direct competitors with the one advanced in this study; rather, they capture different elements of the complex processes at work. Thus the goal of this section is less to “disprove” alternative explanations as to assess the relative explanatory power of the various theories.

Preferences

Perhaps the most basic challenge to the argument adopted here is that democracies do not truly intend to promote democracy through their interventions. Instead, they are motivated to provide public goods (such as security) or other services that broadly benefit their own populations (such as inexpensive access to energy resources), while erecting only the “trappings” of democracy abroad to disguise their true goal, which is to prevent full democratization in the target state (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2006). Perhaps such a description of democracies’ preferences fits some other cases; it does not remotely describe the case of Bosnia. The democracies of Western Europe and the United States demonstrated a consistent commitment to democratic mechanisms of conflict regulation when such were deemed to be viable, such as before the war began and after the insertion of IFOR. Had democracy not been the goal of the post-Dayton intervention, the intervening powers
could have saved themselves billions of dollars in civilian aid expenses alone, not to speak of the cost of keeping tens of thousands of highly expensive troops deployed for years. Indeed, as detailed above, the Clinton administration took considerable political risks to support aspects of the so-called maximalists’ schemes for Bosnia, rather than the minimalist, balance-of-power approach favored by the U.S. military and the Congress. Perhaps most telling is the fact that the intervention occurred despite the fact that no vital national interests, such as direct security concerns or access to cheap energy resources, were at stake.

More plausible as an alternative explanation is the contention that factors other than regime type and strategic culture best explain the interventionist impulses of the major powers. Stephen Saideman (2001), for instance, argues that ethnic ties motivate patterns of one-sided support or opposition to the parties in a civil conflict. His argument relatively accurately explains patterns of support among third-party actors that shared borders with the former Yugoslavia or were former imperial overlords in the region – countries such as Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey. It does much less well in explaining the actions of the major powers such as the French (who acted against their co-religionists, the Croats), the British, or the Americans. Even the behavior of the Germans, who are commonly accused of bowing to Catholic pressures to support the Croats, is poorly explained by the ethnic ties argument. While Germany did support Croatian independence, it also was one of the primary proponents of intervention on behalf of the Muslims in Bosnia. In their special role in the administration of the divided city of Mostar, many Germans were highly critical of the Herzogivinian “mafias” and worked to weaken these Croats’ hold on power (Seidt 2002). Such actions are more consistent with an overall commitment to democracy as an instrument of conflict resolution than to a narrowly one-sided intervention on behalf of co-religionists.
Brian Rathbun (2004) contends that partisanship more reliably predicts the occurrence of humanitarian intervention than any state-level variable, with left-wing parties more likely to initiate humanitarian interventions than right-wing parties.\(^{84}\) Certainly, as a general rule left-oriented parties are more disposed to state-directed efforts to improve the human condition than are right-oriented parties, and incorporating partisanship as a variable can help to explain when humanitarian interventions are more likely to occur. But there are considerable anomalies within this explanation, and even where it accurately predicts \textit{when} interventions will occur, the theory cannot account for differences in the \textit{manner} in which different governments with similar partisan leadership implement humanitarian interventions. While it is true that the Tory government of John Major sought to minimize its commitments in Bosnia, both his Tory predecessor, Margaret Thatcher, as well as his Labor successor, Tony Blair, were outspoken advocates of intervention. Although many American Republicans opposed humanitarian intervention in Bosnia, so did many Democrats. On the other hand, one of the primary proponents of intervention was Bob Dole, the 1996 Republican challenger for the presidency.\(^ {85}\) Perhaps more fundamentally, partisanship does not explain the manner in which interventions are conducted.

Whether the German Chancellor was a Social Democrat or a Christian Democrat, it is inconceivable that she or he could have advocated a ground invasion of Kosovo in the manner of Tony Blair. Germany has had troops deployed to Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan under governments of both the right and left, yet never have they taken an aggressive role in enforcement actions.

\(^{84}\) Rathbun’s theory explains intervention \textit{initiation} and does not directly address the argument of this study, which concerns the \textit{manner} in which interventions are conducted. By implication, however, Rathbun’s theory speaks to the likelihood that an intervening state will commit to more ambitious goals in cases of humanitarian intervention, and thus it is relevant to the discussion of Bosnia.

\(^{85}\) Not only was Dole the sponsor of legislation designed to promote greater American activism on Bosnia during the war, he also ceased to challenge Clinton on Bosnia policy after Dayton, admitting that there was little difference between Clinton’s policy and the one he himself would have adopted (Holbrooke 1998, 345, 355-6).
A fourth alternative explanation concerns the leadership of the intervening state (Saunders 2007, Shafer and Walker 2006). Militarized, democratic interveners do not exhibit consistent patterns of behavior even in cases that are of significant interest to them. British behavior in Bosnia provides a prime example, where John Major responded to the war in Bosnia in a much different manner than Tony Blair. Again, such an explanation is not so much an alternative explanation to the one offered here as an additional variable that can help to explain within-intervener variation. While not all democratic leaders will be equally disposed to pursue ambitious policies of democracy promotion during interventions, democratic leaders are much more prone to export democracy than are the leaders of non-democracies, and militarized democracies are more likely to be willing to confront armed groups in the target state, thus making them relatively more disposed to ambitious efforts to reorganize the political structures of the target. These broad tendencies, however, do not ensure that a given leader will act according to his or her state’s type.

**Outcomes**

Three lines of argumentation contest that the actions of committed, militarized democracies led to a more democratic political order in Bosnia. The first claims that American military capabilities, not its strategic culture, were the deciding factor. A second argues that military force did no more than stabilize or secure outcomes that were achieved through other means. Specifically, some claim that economic sanctions on Serbia rather than the air and ground campaigns of 1995 made possible a peace settlement for Bosnia, while economic and political mechanisms were the primary drivers of change in the post-Dayton period. A third criticism disputes the notion that politics in Bosnia can be considered even a hybrid or lesser form of democratic
politics. All of these arguments are partially correct; disagreements concern the weighting or interaction of the variables at work.

Many believe that the intercession of the United States was a necessary condition for imposing a relatively more inclusive peace on Bosnia, but they argue that military capabilities, not culture, were the key issue: The European powers alone did not have adequate numbers of troops to engage in peace enforcement (Gow 1997, 306). While capabilities are certainly an important component of interventions and cannot be excluded from any serious analysis, strategic culture generally provides more leverage. At one level the distinction between strategic culture and military capabilities is a misleading one: Culture is a significant influence on the extent to which countries develop material capabilities. Although there is little difference between the level of military threat faced by the Europeans and Americans, Europeans have chosen to invest much less in their defense capabilities than the United States. Analyses arguing that the Europeans would seek to acquire actual military capabilities in line with their potential capabilities (Mearsheimer 1990) have proven wide of the mark. But even if we accept a rigid distinction between capabilities and culture, culture provides a better indicator of the goals that intervening states will in fact pursue. The Europeans have proven capable of sustaining the deployment of more than 30,000 well-equipped troops around the world for years on end, simultaneously operating in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and elsewhere. Such totals rival those of IFOR and SFOR. The issue is not overall numbers or equipment; the issue is whether militaries have the necessary training, organization, and domestic political support to potentially engage in high-intensity military operations abroad. Without such an orientation, peace enforcers are unlikely to deter well-armed spoilers, and a peace enforcement operation will prove
unsustainable. Again, an examination of the broader empirical record suggests that this interpretation is correct. Of the European powers, only Britain has committed to higher-intensity peace enforcement operations. France is the only other power to have provided leadership of sizable of interventions in the post-Cold War era, and it has consistently pursued less-ambitious goals.

A second line of criticism contends that military force was at best a contributing factor, while the economic sanctions against Serbia were the critical element for bringing the war to an end by inducing Milosevic to pressure the Bosnian Serbs into a deal. As discussed in the narrative above, the sanctions were indeed an important factor in securing peace for Bosnia. But the sanctions induced Milosevic only to limit the amount of support he provided to the Bosnian Serbs. He twice continued to provide financial and military aid to Pale, albeit at reduced levels, despite publicly having committed to end all support. The combined air and ground campaigns of 1995 changed the situation fundamentally. Without a substantial – and highly visible – infusion of military support from Serbia, the Bosnian Serbs risked outright military defeat. Milosevic was unwilling to endure continued international isolation and economic decline in order to head off a Bosnian Serb defeat, so he committed to brokering a negotiated end to the conflict. Economic sanctions are thus an important part of the story, but without military reversals, they proved unable in four years of implementation to secure an end to the conflict.

Similarly, military enforcement actions and deterrence were not alone capable of fostering political progress in post-Dayton Bosnia, but they were a necessary

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86 Of course, even with a militarized strategic culture, an intervener may be unwilling to commit to higher-intensity peace enforcement operations; the example of Somalia readily comes to mind. But direct confrontation with a militarized intervener is a risky proposition for a potential spoiler, particularly where the intervener has significant national interests at stake and where the intervener is offering the target-state party the opportunity to be included in the post-intervention political order.

87 The distinction between capabilities and culture is an important one for a number of minor powers such as Canada and the Nordics. Many of these countries’ militaries have proven relatively aggressive in the implementation of their mandates. Their overall capabilities, however, have prevented them from playing other than a secondary leadership role in peace enforcement operations.
condition and an element of the combination of factors that proved sufficient to induce positive political change. Without NATO’s intercession in the attempted coup against Biljana Plavsic, Pale hardliners would have retained a monopoly on political power, anchored in their monopoly on paramilitary violence (or the threat thereof). Similarly, NATO support for the operation against the Herzegovacka Banka was a precondition for preventing the HDZ’s attempt to use armed force to secure its continued hold on power in the Croat regions of Bosnia. Observers are certainly correct to contend that interventions cannot produce democracy through armed force alone. They are also correct in arguing that democracy arises out of grassroots support for democratic processes and from the dynamics generated by political competition among elites who have committed to observing the “rules of the game.” But too often they ignore the preconditions that are necessary for such political dynamics to evolve. Outside military force is often necessary to open a de-militarized political space in which unarmed elements of civil society can find their voice and to enforce the agreement of political elites to obey at least minimalist “rules of the game” regulating political competition. Such an intrusive role for intervening forces risks confrontation with those local parties who benefit from the paramilitarization of politics. Relatively few interveners are willing to take on such a role.

The final, most fundamental criticism of the argument advanced here challenges the notion that the politics of Bosnia can be described as being democratic in any meaningful way (Chandler 2000). This perspective contends that all meaningful political initiatives originate with the international community and are imposed on elected Bosnian officials, either de jure through the High Representative’s Bonn Powers, or de facto, through the threat of withholding the aid on which Bosnia depends. Again, there is considerable truth to these criticisms. They are, however, too blunt and sweeping to describe accurately the complexity of Bosnian politics. The
many indications of political progress in Bosnia were detailed in the section above on the outcomes of the Western intervention. Currently Bosnia remains a hybrid polity, with elements of an international protectorate uneasily co-mingled with nationalist political parties, a criminalized postwar political-economy, and a political culture with little historical experience of democracy. Within this environment of cross-cutting incentive structures, there is visible a gradual moderation of nationalist political parties’ platforms and behavior, relatively pragmatic preferences among voters, and the rise of enough new political actors to ensure some degree of electoral competition (Søberg 2006). This is not democracy, but it is a hybrid regime with substantial democratic aspects and the foundations for continued progress.

Conclusion and Implications

The project to build a durable peace in Bosnia through the promotion of a multiethnic democracy was not the project of everyone, or no one, or the United States alone, as various theorists of democracy promotion through military interventions have contended. The various democracies of Europe and North America all sought to promote democratic mechanisms for ethnic conflict regulation before, during, and after the war. The less militarized states, however, were unable to decisively alter the dynamics that favored the armed parties in Bosnia. Consequently, they turned to their second-order preference, the mediation model of intervention, in which the warring factions were offered a postwar political order that ratified the military balance of power and consolidated the position of the predominant armed groups. The United States maintained its first-order preference for the transformation model throughout the conflict, but for years it was unable to reconcile its ambitious preferences with its lack of a vital national interest in the region. The result was a vacillating foreign policy that infuriated its allies and stymied efforts to impose a peace that, while unfair
to the primary victims of the war, would have at least saved lives. In the end, however, the threat that this impasse posed to the transatlantic alliance itself became a significant enough impetus to action that the Clinton administration accepted the political risks inherent in undertaking a hazardous intervention in the absence of a vital interest. Even then the United States did not wholeheartedly commit to a transformational model of intervention. Instead, consistent with the intermediate stakes involved in the crisis, American policymakers balanced the transformational preferences of the “maximalist” camp with the mediation preferences of those who sought to husband American military resources for direct threats to American security. The resultant Dayton accords were an incoherent blend of the two models. Only in 1997, more than a year into Dayton implementation and after the American midterm elections in 1996, did the United States, along with Tony Blair’s Britain, commit to many of the enforcement actions necessary to undermine the paramilitary-backed shadow institutions in Bosnia that posed a significant brake on political development.

American vacillations have rightfully been criticized by many observers. In the end, however, American commitment to intervention was a necessary condition for the achievement of a peace that could yield a relatively inclusive, participatory political order. Unlike the peace plans negotiated by the Europeans before American intercession, the Dayton accords provided a realistic, enforceable blueprint for a postwar Bosnia in which democratic mechanisms of ethnic conflict regulation could be used to weaken the control of the paramilitarized factions that dominated Bosnian political life. After the Dayton accords were in place, it was the United States and Britain that provided the backbone of the higher-intensity enforcement actions necessary to break the monopolies on power held by the Pale hardliners in the Republika Srpska and the Herzogivinian extremists of the Federation. Progress towards a relatively more democratic postwar political order in Bosnia, in short, was
contingent upon the commitment of militarized democracies such as the United States and Britain.
Chapter 5:
Afghanistan

On September 11, 2001 four airplanes crashed into the two towers of the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a field in Pennsylvania, killing more than 3,000 people and provoking an American military response that would profoundly alter world affairs. In the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks, the North Atlantic alliance for the first time in its history invoked the self-defense provisions of Article V of its charter, committing its European members to come to the defense of the alliance’s leading member. Russian President Vladimir Putin was among the first to call the American president, offering him Russia’s sympathy and support. German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder declared “unlimited solidarity” with the United States—a phrase that would return to haunt him as America widened its “global war on terror.”

The September 11 attacks posed a difficult strategic challenge. Formerly the ability to kill large numbers of people in a foreign country had been a capability possessed only by states. States, in turn, could be deterred from launching such attacks for fear of devastating reprisals. Non-state actors such as al Qaeda, on the other hand, are difficult to locate and therefore difficult to deter. The Bush administration responded to this challenge by making the states that harbored terrorists accountable alongside the terrorists themselves for any attack made against the United States. Such a policy, however, immediately posed another challenge: What to do with the states themselves? For a president who had come into office vehemently opposed to the “nation-building” enterprises of his predecessor, this challenge was a difficult one indeed.

In part for this reason, Afghanistan represents a “hard” case for the theory presented here—in fact, it would be difficult to find ones much harder. The military intervention into Afghanistan was not launched for humanitarian purposes, as were the
large majority of those in Europe and Africa. It was initiated by a president who did not believe in nation-building, and the execution of the policy was entrusted to a bureaucracy – the U.S. Department of Defense – that has been similarly disdainful of using military forces to help shape the political authority structures of target states. Moreover, Afghanistan itself is as inhospitable to democratic development as any country on the planet, with extraordinarily low levels of development, high levels of illiteracy, an almost non-existent middle class, high ethnic heterogeneity, an unforgiving physical environment that inhibits nearly any form of economic development besides opium production and trafficking, and a legacy of civil war that has destroyed the entire physical and human infrastructure of the country. Beyond these factors inimical to democratic political development, Afghanistan also suffers from a variety of factors that inhibit even the achievement of peace and stability: in particular, a variety of hostile neighbors locked in rivalry with one another over the control of Afghanistan and easily transportable and highly lucrative primary commodity exports (i.e., opium and its derivatives). Given these circumstances, any evidence that intervening states did, in fact, seek to promote democracy and that they were at all successful should count as important testimony to the validity of the theoretical framework advanced in this study.

The invasion of Afghanistan and subsequent events in fact provide a fascinating illustration of the causal pathways linking the regime type and strategic culture of intervening states with political outcomes in the targets of intervention. Unlike much of the Clinton administration, the Bush administration did not believe in nation-building. Its initial priorities in Afghanistan were to “decapitate” al Qaeda by capturing or killing its leadership, to punish (in a highly visible way) the Taliban regime that had harbored the terrorists, and to create an Afghan government of national reconciliation capable of fostering sufficient political stability in Afghanistan
for American forces to operate in pursuit of the first two goals. Yet within two years the Bush administration had come a substantial distance (if not nearly as far as its critics would have liked) towards attempting to create the democratic regime in Afghanistan that had been part of its declaratory strategy all along. There was nothing inherent in the strategic situation in Afghanistan that pre-determined such a strategy: From the beginning many critics of American policy (albeit almost exclusively critics outside of the United States) had insisted that the United States either could have worked with the Taliban to apprehend al Qaeda operatives or could have staged special operations against al Qaeda figures without toppling the Taliban itself (for instance Dorronsoro 2005, 320-1). If the policy adopted by the Bush administration seemed inevitable, it was because the political culture of the United States made such a course of action appear to be the only reasonable one.

Germany, Russia, and other actors involved in the intervention do not present puzzles as interesting as those posed by the Bush administration, but they nonetheless conform to the predictions of the analytical framework advanced in the first chapter. Although Russia had supported the Tajik and Uzbek members of the Northern Alliance against the Pashtun-based Taliban, Moscow was more than willing to support the American-led efforts to broker a government of national reconciliation in hopes of defusing the Islamic threat to its Central Asian neighbors. Germany had worked alongside the United States in the 1990s to foster a government of national reconciliation to replace the Taliban, and many in Germany hoped to use the post-9/11 invasion to promote a more liberal, more democratic regime in Afghanistan. Unable to provide military forces capable of challenging Afghan warlords, however, Germany remained a minor player in state-building efforts in Afghanistan, restricting its activities to restrained peacekeeping operations in the safest part of the country. Other states behaved much as predicted, with the British playing a major role in counter-
insurgency and counter-narcotics operations, while the less-militarized states such as Italy made contributions more similar to Germany’s. These patterns of behavior are summarized in Table 10.

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<th>Inclusion Of Unarmed Actors</th>
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Afghanistan is nothing approaching a democracy. Indeed, the most that outsiders can realistically hope to achieve is a broad-based, representative and accountable government – that is, one that includes all major groups in Afghanistan and that has some relatively effective means for sanctioning predatory state elites. Although significant progress towards this goal had been achieved in the first four years of the intervention, currently many observers are pessimistic that these achievements can be sustained and improved upon. The two most intractable – and closely inter-related – challenges facing Afghanistan are its opium economy and the existence of Pakistan as a haven for insurgents. It is almost certainly true that in the most hostile implementation environments outside interveners cannot bring about sustainable change towards representative and inclusive governance. While Iraq was clearly (at least to this author) a case of hubris, where a successful transformational
intervention was doomed from the beginning, it is not yet clear that Afghanistan is also condemned to failure.

The remainder of this chapter, like the case studies before it, will proceed in four steps, beginning with a narrative of the intervention, followed by a focused, controlled application of this study’s variables to the case of Afghanistan, and concluding with an examination of alternative explanations and the implications of this case for interventions more broadly.

An Overview of the Intervention in Afghanistan

Even more so than Bosnia, Afghanistan is an unfinished intervention, the end of which is difficult to foresee. Many, perhaps most, expert observers in the past few years have shifted from an attitude of guarded optimism about Afghanistan to one of deep concern deriving from the inter-related challenges of a burgeoning opium economy and an insurgency with considerable foreign backing. It is important, however, to maintain perspective. Even in the face of such challenges, Barnett Rubin, one of the foremost experts on Afghanistan, noted that, “[b]efore the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and all that followed, Afghans and the handful of internationals working on Afghanistan could hardly have imagined being fortunate enough to confront today’s problems” (2006, 1). The following narrative briefly summarizes the American response to the terror attacks of September 11 and the United States’ efforts to construct a new Afghan regime through the Bonn process. The discussion then turns to the American efforts to displace the burden of implementing the Bonn process to the Europeans in 2002, before a significant (although still only partial) shift in Bush administration policy towards formerly disdained “nation-building” missions. The narrative concludes with a summary of Afghanistan’s status after the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2004-5 and
the potential for the progress of the first few years to be sustained in the face of a thriving opium economy and an increasingly effective insurgency.

*The Invasion of Afghanistan and the Bonn Process*

Following the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, the Bush administration rapidly identified al Qaeda as the organization responsible for the attacks. While it was clear that the United States would seek to degrade al Qaeda’s capabilities and destroy the organization if it could, the manner in which these objectives were to be accomplished was a matter potentially open for debate. Many outside observers, particularly on the European left, believed that this task was best pursued through diplomacy and a “law enforcement” mentality, using both persuasion and aid incentives to induce the Taliban to deliver top al Qaeda leaders to the United States for prosecution.88 A “decapitation” strategy might have been pursued that would have used military and covert instruments to kill or capture al Qaeda without targeting the Taliban and pursuing regime change or state-building objectives. There was nothing inherent in the strategic situation, in other words, that pre-determined a state-building military intervention as the appropriate strategy.

The Bush administration, as is well known, came to office on a political platform that included a harsh condemnation of the “nation-building” adventures of the Clinton administration. Its preference was to use military and covert means to eliminate the leadership of al Qaeda and to punish the Taliban regime in a way that would be visible to all the world as a deterrent against other regimes’ harboring known terrorists. American decision-makers sought to construct a new government for Afghanistan that would provide the minimal levels of stability necessary for the United States to accomplish its military objectives. To this end they desired to build a

88 Gilles Dorronsoro, for instance, argues that “the only effective stratagem for the elimination of the radical networks would be to make an alliance with the Taliban” (Dorronsoro 2005, 320).
broad-based government of national reconciliation, including representatives from all
ethnic groups and all armed militias excepting the Taliban. Building liberal democracy
in Afghanistan was in no way part of the agenda. The reasons for such limited goals
were many, although two were foremost. First, the Bush administration feared that a
large international presence in Afghanistan (a “large footprint,” in the terminology
broadly used among internationals involved in Afghanistan) would engender hostility
towards non-Muslim foreigners and provoke the same intractable insurgencies that
had defeated the Soviets and the British long before. Second, top decision-makers in
the administration were rapidly coming to the conclusion that Iraq should also be
included in the “war on terror,” and the administration wanted to husband resources
for the march on Baghdad.\(^89\) Thus, rather than pursue the riskier and more resource-
intensive transformation model, the Bush administration initially adopted a mediation
approach.

American military operations against Afghanistan commenced on October 7,
an offensive combining air strikes and covert operations designed to bring various
Afghan militias into the war against the Taliban on the side of the United States.
Initially the United States sought to mobilize a broad-based coalition of Afghan
warlords against the Taliban, working not only with the ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks of
the Northern Alliance (a force that had battled the Taliban for years) but also with
ethnic Pashtun groups which were willing to break with the Taliban. American
decision-makers feared that a narrow government dominated by the Northern Alliance
would not be stable. Unfortunately, no “southern alliance” ever emerged to balance
the Northern Alliance; Taliban forces quickly killed Abdul Haq, one of the few
Pashtun leaders in the country who was willing to work with the United States. With
their initial strategy thwarted, American decision-makers decided to commit to much

\(^{89}\) Weinbaum (2006) points out that the proposition that Iraq diverted resources from Afghanistan in the
longer term is debateable, a point to which the analysis will return in the next section.
more intensive support of the Northern Alliance and greatly expanded airstrikes (Cottey 2003, 175). Soon thereafter Taliban forces were quickly routed, and Northern Alliance forces seized Kabul, despite calls by the American president and secretary of state to stop their advance short of the capital. Firmly in control on the ground, Northern Alliance commanders seized all of the significant ministries of the Afghan government (Starr 2006, 111).

From November 27 to December 5, American and other world leaders convened a conference in Petersberg, outside the German city of Bonn, summoning together all of the major Afghan political and military leaders outside of the Taliban in what was intended to be a continuation of the international community’s efforts in the late 1990s to broker a government of national reconciliation. With the Northern Alliance’s dominance on the ground, however, and with its militias continuing to assist the United States in hunting down the remnants of al Qaeda, its leaders – particularly the so-called Panjshiri faction of ethnic Tajiks – were in a strong position to claim most of the leadership positions in the new transitional government, including all of the so-called power ministries. Eventually they were persuaded to yield the presidency to the Pashtuns, but only on the condition that it go to Hamid Karzai, who had neither the widespread legitimacy of the former king of Afghanistan nor any significant militia supporting him.

Had this division of governmental offices been the full extent of the Bonn conference’s achievements, it would have represented nothing more than a highly skewed powersharing arrangement little different than the numerous ones that had been brokered since the final days of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. This

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90 Interestingly, Germany and the United States had cooperated closely before September 11 in an attempt to broker a successor regime to the Taliban. Both countries saw the Taliban as a weak and ultimately doomed regime and sought to use the traditional institution of the Loya Jirga as a means of promoting an alternative, more broad-based government. (Author interview with a mid-ranking German official with direct knowledge of Germany’s relations with Afghanistan in the late 1990s; May 24, 2006).
distribution of power, however, was to be only an interim arrangement. The Bonn conference set out a years-long evolutionary process in which an emergency Loya Jirga or “great council” would choose a transitional government and delegates to a constitutional Loya Jirga, which in turn would draft a constitution providing for a liberal democratic government. It is unclear from where the impetus came to tie a liberal democratic project to the original, more limited goal of a multi-ethnic government of national reconciliation. Mark Peceny claims that it originated with a number of the Afghan factions themselves, in part from a sincere belief (at least among some factions) in democracy and in part from the desire to win favor with the United States and other aid donors and troop-contributing countries by playing to their democratic biases (Peceny 2004, 15-21). Yet another explanation is possible: By enfranchising the population as a whole, the Bonn process implied a more equitable re-distribution of governmental offices, weakening the domination of the Panjshiri warlords and bringing more Pashtuns into power. Such an approach may have had relatively little to do with democracy promotion itself but was instead an effort to co-opt the Pashtun population and draw them away from the Taliban. In either case the transitional process laid out in the Bonn Agreement was democratic in form, but it was not at all clear that international decision-makers at the highest levels were committed to implementing democracy in practice.

The first two years of the Bonn Agreement’s implementation fell well short of many observers’ expectations while also avoiding the catastrophes that many had feared. The international presence did not provoke a widespread public backlash, although Pashtuns were often resentful both of their near-exclusion from the government in Kabul and the manner in which the United States prosecuted its counter-insurgency campaign against the Taliban. A humanitarian crisis was avoided even as refugees in large numbers were repatriated to the country, but economic
development remained elusive outside of the opium economy and the few cities where international aid was doled out in substantial amounts. The process of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) under the Afghan “New Beginnings” program moved forward at a snail’s pace, ensuring warlords and militias remained the dominant actors in the country (International Crisis Group 2003a, 2004). Afghanistan soon began to harvest record crops of opium poppy, threatening to turn the country into a narcostate (UNODC 2003).

Throughout these highly uncertain beginnings, the Bonn process went forward according to schedule, although warlords retained their dominant position in the process. UN and other international personnel coordinated the selection by 390 district assemblies of over 1000 delegates to the Emergency Loya Jirga, held in June 2002. Assessments of this process vary, with some observers claiming that it involved a “significant amount of public participation” (Cottey 2003, 185), while others weighed in much more skeptically: “Few people deluded themselves into thinking that the Loya Jirga was a meaningful popular consultation – the aim was to encourage those who wield power in Afghanistan to exercise it through politics rather than through the barrel of a gun” (Chesterman 2002, 40). Assessments of the Emergency Loya Jirga itself are similarly divided. It did successfully choose a Transitional Administration (headed once again by Hamid Karzai) to govern Afghanistan until presidential elections could be held. On the other hand, the determination of office-holders was subject to considerable violent intimidation and many of those selected were themselves warlords (Cottey 2003, 185). Finally, a Constitutional Commission began the work of drafting a new constitution for Afghanistan, but it did so amid criticisms that its public consultations failed to provide meaningful public input into the document that was to become the foundation of a new political order (International Crisis Group 2003b). The Constitutional Loya Jirga nonetheless “went better than
many had dared to hope it would,” producing a constitution that was, despite flaws, a relatively progressive document (Rubin 2004, 10).\footnote{Rubin went on to explain that the “UN had more time and experience in making the meeting secure, and the president and his supporters were better organized. Hence warlords and jihadi leaders had lost some of the capacity to intimidate that they had exercised at the ELJ. The result was a constitution that reflected to a considerable extent the agenda shared by Karzai and those of cabinet members who considered themselves ‘reformers’” (2004, 10).}

For the first two years following the introduction of foreign troops into Afghanistan, outright disaster was averted, but the country’s political trajectory was deeply worrying to many. By 2003 American and other world leaders faced a decision: to allow the continued political disintegration of the country or to invest in a sustained effort to promote a new political order. Contrary to his stated preferences as a presidential candidate, Bush opted to commit more than double the number of troops and money committed to Afghanistan, despite already being over-burdened in Iraq.

The Decision to Commit to State-Building

Given the ethnic diversity and topography of Afghanistan, its ideal environment for the production and distribution of opium poppy and its derivates, and the competitive geostrategic agendas of its neighbors, the creation of an effective central authority now requires considerable assistance from outside actors. The weakness of the Kabul government in the first two years after September 11 was attributable to the minimal commitment of the United States and other outside powers to the state-building project. Similarly, the significant achievements of the Karzai government beginning in late 2003 owed much to the reengagement of the United States and other powers. Whether this reengagement can be sustained and will be sufficient to overcome Afghanistan’s many centripetal forces remains to be seen.

Washington’s initial ambivalence towards state-building in Afghanistan had a number of negative consequences. The United States did not want to divert large
numbers of troops to Afghanistan or take high numbers of casualties there while simultaneously preparing for then launching an intervention into Iraq. Consequently, it sought to minimize the number of deployed troops not directly prosecuting the war on terror and to avoid antagonizing Afghan warlords. For this reason the Bush administration opposed the expansion of the peacekeeping component of the international military presence, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), beyond the Kabul region. American forces also neither pressed the implementation of the DDR campaign on Afghan militias, nor did they engage in counternarcotics efforts in the initial stages of the Afghan intervention. Indeed, rather than seeking to marginalize the warlords, the United States often strengthened them, providing them with both cash and military aid in exchange for their assistance in hunting down members of al Qaeda and conducting counter-insurgency campaigns against Taliban and other forces (Buchsteiner 2004; Goodhand 2004, 53; Johnson and Leslie 2005, 16; Rubin 2004b).

The American opposition to a broader state-building mission attracted considerable international criticism, but in fact there was very little appetite anywhere for undertaking such a dangerous and potentially open-ended mission (Oakley and Hammes 2004, 4; Rubin 2004b). The NATO Secretary-General reportedly had to “bludgeon” NATO member states to make even minor contributions to the ISAF mission (Cordesman 2004, 141). Even after the United States abandoned its reluctance to expand ISAF in 2003, finding troop-contributing states to volunteer additional units was nearly impossible. In the year following the change in American policy, NATO increased its commitment by a mere 1,250 troops, from 5,000 to 6,250 (Goodson.

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92 Initially the Bush administration opposed ISAF’s expansion even if European and other troop-contributing countries provided all of the necessary forces: “Recalling the agonizing dilemmas of the UN and NATO in Bosnia, the USA feared the peacekeepers would be taken as hostages by enemy forces to hamper the US campaign, or require a US rescue operation that would divert resources from the war” (Suhrke et al 2004, 83).
2005a, 90). At issue was much more than simple numbers and capabilities. Expanding the ISAF mission beyond Kabul would involve other NATO members in precisely the dangerous and morally ambiguous operations that many troop-contributing countries feared: “In the capital, the Northern Alliance forces had reluctantly agreed to cantonment [of their forces] outside the city limits in return for political dominance in the national interim authority. There was no similar political reward in the provinces. Cantonment here would court serious military confrontation with the local commanders. Alternatively, ISAF would simply legitimize the power and presence of warlord forces by operating alongside them” (Suhrke et al. 2004, 83-4). Few countries either within or outside of NATO relished either of those choices.

The shift in American policy began in 2003, originating both from front-line troops and from top policy circles. As early as the summer of 2002 U.S. troops in the field came to the conclusion that reconstruction and governance programs were necessary to consolidate military gains, although top levels of the Pentagon were not committed to such a course until mid-2003 (Rubin 2006, 6). Around the same time that such opinions were seeping upwards through the military ranks, political levels in Washington were also turning to a reinvigoration of American policy in Afghanistan. Beginning by the fall of 2003, and certainly by 2004, it was clear that the U.S. invasion of Iraq was not turning out as Bush administration officials had hoped. To maintain public support for the deployment of nearly 200,000 troops and the expenditure of tens and then hundreds of billions of dollars, the administration required a “success story,” an example of how armed intervention could indeed promote democracy in the greater Middle East. Since Iraq appeared unlikely to yield dividends along these lines in the near future, Bush administration officials turned to Afghanistan, where many trends were worrying but the political process had advanced relatively well at the national level (Hersh 2004). Thus, despite not believing in
“nation-building” at an ideological level, the Bush administration came to support it, due to both pressures from within the military bureaucracy and from the necessity of winning over American public opinion.

Originally the United States sought to garner the resources necessary to implement its expanded vision for Afghanistan by drawing on its European allies. It quickly became clear, however, that the Europeans would not substitute for American commitment but would at best be induced to contribute troops and increased aid alongside an increased American presence. The United States ultimately doubled its military forces in Afghanistan, from 10,000 to more than 22,000, and it quadrupled its annual economic aid expenditures from the previous year, to two billion dollars (Goodson 2006, 151; Hersh 2004). At least as important as overall numbers was the change in approach. The United States moved from a seek-and-destroy military orientation to one more oriented towards providing security and development assistance through Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The U.S. had previously deployed four of these PRTs, but following Lieutenant General David Barno’s assumption of command in Afghanistan in late 2003, the U.S. increased the number of these units to 16. President Bush also signaled his personal commitment to the country by making his special advisor for Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, U.S. ambassador to the country.

In the wake of the renewed American commitment to Afghanistan, other NATO countries also expanded their contributions to the country. Non-American forces eventually increased in number from the initial 5,000 in ISAF to nearly 20,000, reaching a total of 31,000 (including U.S. troops), and they increased their geographical coverage from the Kabul region alone to cover the entire country. Germany took over the leadership of the northern sector, Italy the western, and Canada the southern (NATO 2006). Donor countries also increased their commitments, with
more than $8 billion pledged at the Berlin Conference held in April 2004 (Goodson 2006, 164).

At least four major changes ensued as a result of the American shift in approach. First, with an eye to strengthening the Kabul government, the United States began to limit (although not eliminate) the aid it gave to Afghan militias in pursuit of the war on terror (Cordesman 2004, 145). Second, American forces began to provide support to units engaged in counter-narcotics operations, including both eradication and interdiction efforts. Third, the United States increasingly supported Afghan President Karzai’s efforts to marginalize powerful warlords who undermined Kabul’s authority (Goodson 2005b). In September 2004, for instance, Karzai replaced Ismail Khan, the warlord who formerly served as governor of Herat, by deploying several thousand Afghan National Army (ANA) troops, backed up by American Special Operations forces and air power. More generally, the American military presence made possible the slow, incremental efforts of Kabul to extend its authority and rein in the worst abuses of the warlords:

The presence of B-52s in the skies was a visible reminder of their superior firepower. Some Afghans took to calling the air patrols ‘the new Vice and Virtue’ (a reference to the all-powerful Ministry for the Prevention of Vice and the Promotion of Virtue)…. The metaphor brought out the important point that the presence of international forces, and the resources they provided to the local military organizations, not only enabled rival groupings to revitalize their organization [in the aftermath of the fall of the Taliban]. They functioned as a lid on intra-Afghan conflict as well (Suhrke et al 2004, 83-4).

At the same time, renewed international attention reinvigorated both the formation of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the disarmament of official militias through the Afghan New Beginnings Program (ANBP), which had languished in the years since

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93 American support generally took the form of direct financial and military assistance to Afghan government counter-narcotics units, funding for private military contractors who undertook such operations, logistical support for both of these types of units, and in extremis direct military support for these units.
the Taliban’s overthrow. The ANBP collected large amounts of heavy weaponry from militias, while the ANA made major strides in recruiting a more ethnically balanced cadre of soldiers, retaining them once they were recruited, and training them to become effective fighting units (Ghufran 2006, 89-90; International Crisis Group 2005).

In the context of Afghanistan’s daunting implementation environment, many observers interpreted these improvements as substantial accomplishments. They were all nonetheless very partial accomplishments. The improvements in the ANA were not matched by similar gains in the Afghan police and judiciary system. Reducing official militias and cantoning their heavy weapons did nothing to weaken the proliferating unofficial militias, armed not with tanks but with weaponry more than sufficient to intimidate the population and run illicit economies in opium and other contraband. The Karzai government scored a number of very visible victories against major warlords such as Ismail Khan in Herat, but lesser warlords remained the dominant actors outside of Kabul. And even Karzai’s government itself, although increasingly filled with competent technocrats at the top levels, was riddled with corruption and incompetence at lower levels. As Afghanistan moved towards the presidential and parliamentary elections prescribed in the Bonn Agreement, its politics showed signs of improvement but remained very far indeed from the liberal democratic model.

After the Elections

Presidential elections were held in Afghanistan on October 9, 2004; parliamentary elections followed on September 18, 2005. Hamid Karzai won the presidential elections with 55.4 percent of the vote, becoming Afghanistan’s first-ever democratically elected president. Some irregularities marred the presidential polling, and voting split largely along ethnic lines. Besides the Pashtun areas, however, Karzai
also polled well in the multiethnic west and multiethnic urban areas (International Crisis Group 2004, ii), which is likely the best that could be expected in the first post-conflict elections. Parliamentary elections the subsequent year were more problematic. Voter turnout fell from the 70 percent mark established by the presidential elections to a mere 53 percent of registered voters, likely because of confusion caused by a complex voting system, resentment of the ubiquitous presence of warlords among the parliamentary candidates, and popular dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of the Karzai government (Ghufran 2006). More significant than the low voter turnout was the electoral system used: a single non-transferable vote (SNTV) formula that inhibited the formation of parties and greatly increased the difficulties of building parliamentary majorities with anything other than patronage politics (International Crisis Group 2006; Maass 2006; Reynolds 2006; Wilder 2005).

The Karzai administration thus faces challenges both within the formal structures of the government and without. Internally, Karzai now confronts a parliament which he helped to make less governable by adopting the SNTV voting system. While the overall quality of executive officials has improved, with nearly all of the top ranks being filled with capable technocrats, Karzai must still confront high levels of incompetence and corruption at the middle and lower levels of his administration. Indeed, his strategy of co-opting warlords by removing them from their regional base and appointing them to positions in Kabul has been effective at one level but has also ensured that the central administration remains difficult to harness to a progressive political agenda. Finally, the court system remains in abysmal condition, filled with judges who are not qualified to run a modern judiciary, who are beholden to the religious establishment in Afghanistan, and who are subject both to bribery and intimidation (Rubin 2004a). Of course, all of these challenges are common throughout
post-conflict governments, and, while daunting, they are a vast improvement over the situation in 2001.

The more significant threats lie outside of government, in the continued power of lesser warlords, the gathering strength of the Pashtun- (and Pakistan-) based insurgency, and in the opium economy – all three of which are closely inter-related. Even with substantial international aid, the Kabul government cannot co-opt all of the middle-ranking and lesser warlords, most of whom profit vastly more from opium and other illicit economies than they could possibly earn from governmental positions. Nor would a universal strategy of co-optation be a sustainable strategy for state-building; more likely, it would simply purchase an interregnum before international aid began to decline. On the other hand, particularly as the insurgency intensifies, neither the Kabul government nor NATO can afford a broad coercive campaign to enforce the demilitarization of minor warlords and their militias.

The opium economy poses a similar challenge. As Larry Goodson (2005, 92-3) describes, none of the three major approaches to counter-narcotics are attractive: They are “poppy eradication, which threatens the fragile livelihood of poor Afghans; crop substitution, problematic because of the high unit price received for opium; and destruction of processing laboratories and interdiction of smugglers, both easily thwarted through protection schemes by senior government officials.” Experts in counter-narcotics operations in other parts of the world have recommended embedding a counter-narcotics campaign in Afghanistan within a broader agenda emphasizing governance (Mansfield and Pain 2005). Such an approach potentially offers to increase returns from the non-poppy sectors of the economy and to release an interdiction campaign from the stranglehold of corrupt office-holders. Unfortunately, a “good governance” campaign is extremely difficult to implement while simultaneously trying to build a state from scratch in an ethnically heterogeneous
society and prosecuting a counter-insurgency against well-funded, well-armed, and motivated groups with safe havens in a neighboring country and transnational financial and logistics networks.

This insurgency represents the third, inter-locking element of the extra-governmental challenge to the state-building project in Afghanistan. It receives funding from both the opium economy and transnational Islamic radical networks. It recruits predominantly from politically marginalized and religiously conservative Pashtuns in Afghanistan and in the largely autonomous border regions of northwestern Pakistan. And it is able to organize and regroup in Pakistan, safe from U.S. military forces and recently from those of the government of Pakistan as well (Karzai 2007). Counter-insurgency doctrine typically prescribes a strategy in which the support networks of an insurgency are targeted while the government provides public goods to the general population in an effort to secure their loyalty (O’Neill 1990, Chapter 8). Both elements of such an approach, however, are thwarted by the current realities of Afghanistan. With transnational financial and logistical networks and safe havens in Pakistan, it is extremely difficult for either the United States or the Kabul government to target the insurgency’s infrastructure. And with the opium economy providing incentives for Afghans at all levels to subvert the authority of the Kabul government, it is difficult for Afghanistan to develop a powerful, autonomous central authority capable of providing public goods. Thus, the absence of central state authority, the opium economy, and the insurgency all reinforce one another and confront state-builders with a daunting challenge.

Assessments of contemporary Afghanistan typically emphasize that there has indeed been some movement towards greater political competition and participation – “democratic stirrings” – in Afghanistan, but that this movement is likely to be rapidly reversed unless the United States and its allies commit to providing greater security,
economic opportunities, and public services to ordinary Afghans (Newberg 2007; Rotberg 2007). As casualties mount among the NATO member states deploying troops to the southern regions where the insurgency is active, and as opinion in the United States turns against the war in Iraq and thus possibly, by extension, against state-building in Afghanistan, it is unclear whether the intervening states will have the necessary “staying power” to accept the costs of a long-term, intrusive intervention. On the other hand, the intervention in Afghanistan has considerably more legitimacy among Europeans than Iraq ever did, and two different NATO secretaries general have declared Afghanistan the single most important test of the alliance. While the stakes in Iraq are vastly higher than those in Afghanistan, the future of Afghanistan may well tell us more about the future of interventions in the age of counter-terrorism.

A Focused Examination of Interveners’ Policies in Afghanistan

The United States clearly played the dominant role among foreign actors in restructuring Afghan politics subsequent to the attacks of September 11. Given that the attacks were made against American targets on American soil, it is unsurprising that other outside actors did not exercise the same level of influence that they did in the Balkans. The discussion that follows will therefore focus on the United States. It will also, however, compare American actions to those of Germany and Great Britain. Although the Europeans did not have the same level of national interests at stake in Afghanistan as the United States, most shared very similar interests with one another: the desire to be seen as a loyal ally of the United States and the goal of denying transnational terrorists a safe haven. Variation between Britain and less militarized

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94 Many foreign nationals of course also lost their lives in the attacks on the World Trade Center.
95 These interests were neither uncontested nor universally held among all European states. Such differences will be discussed in greater detail below.
states such as Germany or Italy thus sheds light on the nature of multilateral action in such contexts.

The discussion will begin with an analysis of the attitudes and interests of the United States and the other major members of the international coalitions operating in Afghanistan, the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). It will proceed by examining the military and civilian structures of the missions and the outcomes (to this point) of the intervention. In the following section the discussion will turn to policy alternatives to the ones the United States pursued and a counter-factual examination of the probable outcomes of such policies. The analysis will then consider alternative explanations for the outcomes achieved before turning finally to the conclusions that can be drawn from Afghanistan and their implications for the future of intervention.

Interests of the United States and other Coalition Members

The September 11 attacks clearly rocked the United States as a whole – decision-makers, members of the media, and the general public. Journalistic accounts of the Bush administration’s reaction make clear that the administration responded both “from the gut” but also from concern that the attacks were but the first of a campaign of mass-casualty terrorist attacks targeting the American homeland (Woodward 2002). Moreover, the American public registered astronomically high levels of support both for the president and for the use of military force, even if high levels of casualties were involved – a “rally round the flag” effect familiar from other contexts. Action was not only possible; in many ways it was demanded.\footnote{Levels of popular American support for the war in Afghanistan were astronomically high in the first year of the campaign. In several dozen public opinion polls collected by the Polling the Nations database, general support for the war in Afghanistan never fell below 80 percent during the high-intensity phase of the war (through spring 2002; no data were available for later periods). Levels of support remained high even when questions posited that large numbers of American ground troops would be involved, that they would remain deployed for extended periods, and/or that high levels of casualties were involved.} Relatively
soon after the collapse of the Taliban, however, American resources began to be redirected towards the looming conflict in Iraq (Chesterman 2002, 39; Oakley and Hammes 2004, 1). American commitment, therefore, was significant but much less than total.

Interestingly, although Germany was not directly targeted, German elites generally accepted that Afghanistan represented a significant security interest, both because of Germany’s alliance with the United States and the potential for transnational terrorist networks to target Germany itself. In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder declared Germany’s “unlimited solidarity” with the United States. German Defense Minister Peter Struck announced that Germany’s defense interests began at the Hindu Kush. Walther Stützle, a former State Secretary in the Ministry of Defense at the time of the September 11 attacks and the subsequent invasion of Afghanistan, remarked that even more surprising than Struck’s comment was the minimal dissent it elicited from among German policy circles (author interview with Stützle, May 8, 2006). Even in personal discussions and in remarks made not for attribution in numerous interviews with the author in May 2006, German policy elites emphasized the importance of the intervention to Germany. One senior civilian official commented on his surprise at the breadth of support he found among German parliamentarians for the Afghanistan mission (anonymous author interview, May 11, 2006). Moreover, most members of casualties among American soldiers would result. In a November 15, 2001 Los Angeles Times poll, for instance, 73 percent of respondents registered support for the war in Afghanistan – with 55 percent registering “strong support” – even if “a substantial number of casualties among American troops” resulted. The only formulations that received less than majority support were those which specified that the U.S. would endure at least 10,000 fatalities (although opinion was nearly evenly split when 1,000 fatalities were specified) and that “a large scale invasion … would station thousands of troops in Afghanistan indefinitely” (Time/CNN poll, October 13, 2001). Beyond immediate public support for military action, members of the administration also feared that there would be terrible recriminations if another mass-casualty terrorist attack occurred in the wake of the September 11 attacks, one that military action could potentially have thwarted. See for instance Woodward 2002, 60.

97 Both interests are widely discussed in the press. They were also given in anonymous author interviews conducted with senior and mid-level German officials in May 2006.
the German foreign policy and defense elite did not accept the argument that German interests would be better served by avoiding contact with Afghanistan altogether. Indeed, Hans-Ulrich Klose, a Social Democrat who served as chairman and deputy chairman of the Bundestag foreign affairs committee during the period of the Afghanistan intervention, dismissed as “absurd” the notion that Germany would be spared from Islamic extremist attacks simply because it dissociated itself from American military actions (author interview with Klose, May 15, 2006). In short, although many Germans have reservations about the manner in which the United States is prosecuting the intervention, at least among the policy elite there is broad agreement that participation in the intervention is in the interest of Germany.

The same two interests of Germany that were at stake in Afghanistan – the elimination of safe havens for transnational terrorism and the desire to demonstrate solidarity with the United States – also bore on other NATO members, although with somewhat different implications for each. Top officials of the transatlantic alliance, including Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and SACEUR James Jones, all repeatedly emphasized in public statements that Afghanistan was a “defining moment” for the alliance and that its future would likely be determined by its performance there (Graham 2004a and 2004b; Schmitt 2004). France, for whom the strength of the NATO alliance was less important, felt relatively little need to contribute to operations in Afghanistan. Lesser NATO members were often not expected to shoulder the same level of burden in Afghanistan as did larger powers like Germany. Britain, on the other hand, much like Germany found its interests significantly engaged by the distant country.
Attitudes of the United States and Other Coalition Members

**Militarization.** The Bush administration’s reaction to the September 11 attacks was militarized from the beginning, as Bob Woodward’s account makes clear. On the day of the attacks, President Bush reportedly told Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that soon “the ball will be in your court and [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff] Dick Myers’ court” (Woodward 2002, 19). The American public was similarly supportive of military action. Polls showed that 88 percent of Americans favored the American military campaign in Afghanistan, and a majority believed that the military operations would be likely to achieve the goals set forth by their country’s leaders (CBS News/New York Times Poll, January 6, 2002; CBS News/New York Times Poll, February 28, 2002; and Market and Opinion Research International, November 1-2, 2001; all accessed via the Polling the Nations database).

In contrast not only to the Bush administration but also to governments such as Tony Blair’s in Britain, Germany’s leadership found it extremely difficult to commit to participating in operations in Afghanistan. Two-thirds of Germans opposed German combat forces’ participation in anti-terror operations (Becher 2004, 402). In November 2001 German Chancellor Schröder was forced to tie a parliamentary vote over the deployment of 3,900 German troops to Afghanistan to a vote of confidence in his government. Even after having placed his government and his personal prestige on the line, he received a narrow majority of votes from within his own coalition. This ambivalence among German policy-makers and the public would shape the nature of Germany’s military contribution in Afghanistan.

**Democracy.** At the level of public opinion and public rhetoric, the United States, Germany, and other coalition members were broadly committed to democracy promotion abroad. According to polling figures from the German Marshall Fund’s
“Transatlantic Trends” survey, in 2005 majorities in all of the countries polled (with the exception of Turkey) believed that it should be the role of either the United States (in the case of American respondents) or the European Union (European respondents) to promote democracy abroad. Germans were among the most supportive (at 80 percent) and Americans among the least supportive (52 percent). Moreover, support for democracy echoes throughout the rhetoric not only of the United States but also of many European countries. Records of German parliamentary debates, for instance, reveal repeated references to the Germany’s contribution to democracy promotion in Afghanistan.

Assessing genuine support among key decision-makers for democracy promotion in Afghanistan, however, is more difficult. Decision-makers in both the United States and Germany are divided on the question of whether some form of democracy, adapted to the characteristics of Afghanistan, is a realistic long-term end state for Afghanistan. Given the extraordinary challenges facing Afghanistan’s transition, it is not hard to believe, as one senior German official put it, that at the end of the day, “Afghanistan will remain Afghanistan” (anonymous interview with author, May 11, 2006). Yet others are committed to the democratization project. One senior German official intimately involved in the country’s Afghanistan policy said that it would be “cynical” to believe that democracy was not one of the long-term goals being pursued by the international community, even though the more immediate goal was simply to form “a self-sustaining political order in accordance with the basic

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98 American support for democracy promotion fell to 45 percent in 2006, while German support remained essentially unchanged at 78 percent. Given the close association in the Bush administration’s rhetoric between the Iraq war and democracy promotion, it is likely that this drop in American support is associated with the plummeting popularity of the Iraq war. All data is from the German Marshall Fund 2005, 2006.

99 In arguing for an extension of the Bundestag mandate for the German ISAF deployment, for instance, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer declared that “it is precisely now [before the Afghan presidential elections of 2004] that terrorism will seek to hinder democratic legitimation. The fact that over 10 million Afghans have registered [for the elections] is an impressive vote for the democratic renewal of this land” (author’s translation, Plenarprotokoll 15/129, 30 September 2004, 11753).
aspirations of the Afghan people while at the same time (and we hope there is no contradiction here) in accordance with basic, globally accepted human rights standards” (anonymous interview with author, May 11, 2006).

As discussed in the narrative above, during the Taliban era both Germany and the United States worked towards the creation of a government of national reconciliation that would include Northern Alliance members, elements of what a German official involved in the process termed (very loosely) the “democratic opposition,” and more moderate elements of the Taliban. Although such efforts were thwarted before the September 11 attacks, they became the basis for the Bonn process after the fall of the Taliban. Thus, in one sense, both American and German approaches to Afghanistan (as well as the other Western European countries involved, Britain and Italy) demonstrate considerable continuity in their support for a broad-based powersharing government. The largest change occurred in the willingness of the Bush administration to dedicate the resources necessary to move beyond a mediation strategy towards the transformation model of intervention. This movement, induced by both feedback from uniformed military deployed to Afghanistan and by the need to produce a “success story” of democracy promotion in the context of the “war on terror,” was always very partial. The Bush administration never committed the resources that many critics insisted were necessary to consolidate the regime in Kabul. It did, however, greatly expand the resources available for this mission, helping to ensure a relatively successful presidential election in 2004 and the more problematic accomplishment of parliamentary elections in 2005.

Structure of the Intervention

Military Structure. Within a month of the September 11 attacks American military operations against Afghanistan commenced. By the end of December more
than 12,000 bombs had been dropped on Afghanistan (Dorronsoro 2005, 325). These air strikes, combined with the offensives of the Northern Alliance, ultimately led to the defeat of the Taliban, with an Interim Authority officially taking power on December 22.

As the Taliban collapsed, foreign troops in large numbers began to deploy to Afghanistan in two missions, a counter-insurgency campaign under the broader Operation Enduring Freedom (often designated either OEF or OEF-A to indicate forces operating specifically in Afghanistan) and a peacekeeping operation mandated by the United Nations, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). OEF was concentrated in the southern and south-eastern regions of Afghanistan where the Taliban and other insurgent forces were concentrated, and its mission was specifically focused on combating insurgents and transnational terrorists. In contrast, ISAF initially deployed only to Kabul and its immediate environs before slowly expanding into the more stable regions of the north. Prior to 2006 its mission had been more similar to a traditional peacekeeping operation: training forces of the new Afghan National Army (ANA), assisting with the voluntary disarmament and demobilization of militias, and similar tasks. In 2006 ISAF expanded into the more dangerous South and Southeast and took on peace enforcement and counter-insurgency roles. Just as ISAF expanded both in geographical scope and in mission, it also expanded throughout this period in numbers. In 2002 and 2003 ISAF stood at approximately 5,000 soldiers, while OEF-A operated at slightly more than 10,000. By 2004 ISAF had expanded to more than 8,000 and OEF-A to approximately 18,000, and by 2006, after a majority of American forces operating in Afghanistan had been folded into ISAF, its overall numbers increased to more than 31,000 (Ghufran 2006, 88; ISAF 2006). At the same time OEF-A numbers dropped from just under 20,000 in 2005 to 8,000 in 2006. Both operations were multinational, although Americans overwhelmingly dominated
the ranks and leadership of OEF, while the Germans for much of the first several years were the single largest contributor to ISAF and provided a number of its commanding generals.

The international military presence in Afghanistan came under considerable criticism in its early years for being under-resourced: too few troops in too few areas providing too little security. It has changed substantially over the past five years, although critics contend that these changes are too little too late. The United States originally opposed an expansion of ISAF beyond Kabul, fearing that these troops would interfere with its highest priority of hunting down al Qaeda and senior Taliban figures and that they would be vulnerable to assaults in much the same way that European troops in UNPROFOR had been kidnapped to prevent NATO airstrikes during the war in Bosnia. During 2002 and 2003 the United States dropped its opposition to ISAF’s expansion and began pressing Europeans to provide more troops for a geographically expanded ISAF mission. At this point it became clear that no other potential troop-contributing countries were eager to provide an expanded security presence in Afghanistan either. As detailed in the narrative above, both senior American officials and the NATO secretary general complained of allies’ reluctance to make even minor commitments to ISAF. By 2004 the United States committed to expanding its own presence in Afghanistan beyond a narrow counter-terror and counter-insurgency mandate. American military forces initiated the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) concept, where small groups of soldiers (in the American case, usually 50-100) deployed to combine development and security assistance. The United States initially provided the majority of these teams, deployed in many of the most dangerous parts of Afghanistan. By 2006 ISAF numbers had expanded to the
level that many observers had been recommending from the beginning of the intervention.\footnote{William Durch (2003) provides one of the most detailed initial assessments of force requirements for Afghanistan, outlining three possible force packages – the light, medium, and heavy options. He himself favored the light option of approximately 18,000 ISAF soldiers, although he also recognized the medium option of approximately 34,000 troops to be a viable option. He was more critical of the heavy option, based on the model of such operations as Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor, which advocates of a more robust, intrusive intervention in Afghanistan commonly used as their baseline. The heavy option would have required between 100,000 – 600,000 troops deployed over an extended period – an option that was logistically daunting and risked sparking broad Afghan opposition by looking like an occupation force.}

The United States clearly adopted a highly militarized approach towards Afghanistan. As many have pointed out, the U.S. was spending more than ten times as much on military operations in Afghanistan as on development assistance (for instance Vaishnav 2004, 245). Its PRTs tended to emphasize counter-insurgency functions rather than the peacekeeping functions adopted by the Germans, for instance, and American PRTs were co-located with OEF combat units (Hett 2005; Perito 2005; Schmunk 2005). American forces in some cases assisted the Karzai government in removing troublesome warlords from their local fiefdoms, such as the case of Ismail Khan in Herat. Although the American military presence made political stabilization possible by generally deterring direct armed challenges to the Karzai government, the United States also came under frequent criticism for overly militarizing its approach – that is, for emphasizing military instruments while contributing grossly inadequate amounts to civilian reconstruction and for adopting heavy-handed military tactics, including aggressive house searches and devastating bombing campaigns that alienated much of the Pashtun population.

In contrast Germany accepted a much more limited role. With the exception of the special forces dedicated to OEF (fewer than 100 in all), the Bundeswehr deployed to the safest regions in Afghanistan: Kabul, its immediate environs, and the north of
the country. German officials repeated as a mantra that Germany emphasizes the “A” of the International Security Assistance Force. In practice this means an avoidance of any direct enforcement role, whether in disarmament or counter-narcotics. German Foreign Minister Fischer explicitly announced that German forces would take no part in counter-narcotics missions, even the destruction of drug laboratories (Kurbjuweit 2005b). Although a variety of other countries established Provincial Reconstruction Teams under the aegis of the American-led OEF, Germany insisted that its PRTs come under ISAF command. Moreover, as other nations took on PRTs in much more dangerous parts of Afghanistan, not only did the Bundeswehr remain resolutely in the safest regions of Afghanistan, but there was not even any discussion in Germany of the possibility of deploying to other regions. Such discussions, in the words of one senior German official, might have “over-charged the system” (anonymous author interview, May 11, 2006). Even within its area of operations, there were reportedly numerous zones where German forces simply did not patrol; ISAF dispatched British units to patrol these problematic areas (anonymous author interview with a mid-ranking ISAF military officer, September 27, 2005). The

101 For data on the stability of these regions relative to the rest of Afghanistan, see CSIS Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project 2005. It is important to note that the rest of this discussion refers to the German units other than the small contingent of special forces (KSK). The KSK was active in counter-terrorist operations in the southern and southeastern parts of Afghanistan, but little is known about their role in these operations. Most accounts suggest that they primarily participated in intelligence and reconnaissance missions. Much as with German participation in combat missions in Kosovo, however, German decision-makers attempted to keep Germany’s combat role in Afghanistan as “invisible” as possible. With so few troops involved, for the most part Germany succeeded in keeping these forces invisible.

102 A German journalist observed of the Bundeswehr, “Not only are they the world’s ‘best equipped’ army, they are also the friendliest. ‘Waving is protection,’ explained Commander Vogler-Wandler. Wherever the soldiers go, they pass the message that they do not want to harm anybody. We leave you alone, you leave us alone is the silent pact they seem to make” (Kurbjuweit 2005a).

103 The militarization of counter-narcotics policy is of course a highly controversial subject, although such well-respected organizations as the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the International Crisis Group (ICG) have called for international military participation in a narcotics interdiction campaign in Afghanistan. This study takes no stand on the relationship between counter-narcotics policy and the promotion of a representative and inclusive government in Afghanistan. It is important nonetheless to note that Germany’s refusal to become involved in counter-narcotics operations is consistent with a broader pattern of non-militarized behavior.
Bundeswehr has lost only six soldiers to hostilities in Afghanistan, in contrast to the more than 300 combat fatalities among American forces. Four of those six German soldiers were killed in a single suicide attack on a bus carrying German troops – an event that was “hell” for German officials trying to maintain German support for a continued military presence in Afghanistan (anonymous author interview with a senior German official, April 15, 2005).104

No one disputes that the Bundeswehr is a highly trained, well-disciplined, motivated, and capable military force – one of the best in Europe. At various points since the end of the Cold War Germany has been the second largest contributor to multilateral military missions behind the United States and the single largest contributor to operations such as KFOR and ISAF. Clearly Germany is playing an important role in military missions all around the world, a contribution that few would have anticipated in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall. Yet the nature of the Bundeswehr’s participation remains highly distinct from that of many other contingents from more militarized countries. Recounting an exchange between German Defense Minister Peter Struck and the press, one German journalist perfectly captured Germany’s ambivalence about its participation in such missions:

During a flight to Afghanistan, Struck invited journalists on board to join him in his cabin. After a few harmless questions, a female journalist spoke up. ‘The Bundeswehr has been active overseas for a good ten years,’ she said. ‘In this time, only two people have been shot by German soldiers. Does that not suggest that they are lacking the fighting spirit?’ The question was followed by gaping silence, and red-faced embarrassment as the crowd looked down at the floor…. The German Defense minister twice began to speak, before stopping himself. Then he managed to form a sentence. ‘No, I don’t think that German soldiers are softies.’ Struck’s press spokesman was quick to end the conversation (Kurbjuweit 2005a).

104 The same official noted that it would be “completely impossible” for Germany to endure the levels of casualties that either the Americans or British are taking in Afghanistan.
German forces in Afghanistan clearly avoided the overly militarized approach that the United States sometimes adopted. In doing so, however, they also provided only a very limited contribution to the creation of a secure environment in Afghanistan.

Other national contingents in Afghanistan fell between the extremes of the United States and Germany. Much like the Americans, the British were willing to deploy in substantial numbers to the most dangerous regions of Afghanistan and to confront anti-regime militias in the South and Southeast of the country. They tended, however, to adopt a rather less militarized approach emphasizing small units and close contact with the local population. The Italians, on the other hand, were more reminiscent of the Germans, deploying to the relatively safer western regions of Afghanistan and adopting a less aggressive approach to patrolling.

Assessing the relationship between the military structure of the intervention and political outcomes in Afghanistan is difficult. Many have criticized the American military role in Afghanistan for doing both too little and too much – too little to provide security for ordinary Afghans and to marginalize the warlords undermining Kabul’s authority, while at the same time too much to prosecute its war on terror, alienating many Pashtuns through intrusive house searches and the civilian casualties resulting from American air strikes. On the one hand the American role has been the unambiguous necessary condition for progress towards a more representative and inclusive political order. The American invasion of Afghanistan opened opportunities for a more broad-based regime that nearly all experts believe was all but impossible before the September 11 attacks. Once in Afghanistan American forces and those from other more militarized states (particularly Britain) have prevented the Taliban from recapturing the country, they have at various points helped to remove troublesome

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105 Even some American military officers expressed serious concern about the aggressiveness of American military actions in southern and southeastern Afghanistan (anonymous author interview with a mid-ranking ISAF official, September 27, 2005).
warlords from their local fiefdoms, and they have protected Karzai as he has purged many of the biggest warlords from their senior positions in the ministries. While American forces in particular have been criticized for an overly aggressive prosecution of the counter-insurgency, it is also true that they are the essential precondition without which the very existence of ISAF would not be possible, as German officials readily admit (anonymous interview with a senior German official, May 11, 2006).

The true debate is not about whether the presence of militarized interveners was a necessary condition for change towards a more inclusive political order; clearly, it was. Rather, the debate is one about the sufficiency of the American strategy for Afghanistan. Could an earlier commitment of 30,000 or more troops have substantially changed the current complexion of Afghan politics? Would even more have been necessary – a number in the hundreds of thousands that more closely would have approximated the troop to population ratios in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor? Should OEF and ISAF troops have been more aggressive in disarming and demobilizing illegal militias? Should they have committed more strongly to a narcotics interdiction campaign? Or would any of these more aggressive approaches have sparked much broader resistance to the presence of international troops – something akin to the American decision in Iraq to dissolve the Sunni-dominated military of the Saddam Hussein-era? Clearly the strategy initially adopted by the Bush administration was inadequate, as American decision-makers themselves implicitly admitted in their change of course in 2003-4. What is not clear is whether a substantially heavier footprint would have significantly improved the situation in Afghanistan.

_Civilian Structure._ The American and international approaches to the civil implementation aspects of the intervention parallel the military effort. The general
thrust of the policy accords with the predictions of the theory outlined in this study, but the policy was pursued much less resolutely than might have been expected.

From the beginning American and international diplomacy sought to broker a broad-based government that excluded only the Taliban while incorporating all other political and ethnic groups. Over time the United States relented on the issue of participation by former Taliban members, and the Karzai government reached out to all but a narrow circle of top Taliban leadership (International Crisis Group 2004, 25-6). At the same time, the international community attempted to slowly weaken the warlords who undermined the authority of the central government, visibly supporting Karzai’s efforts to remove a number of high-profile regional governors and to put in place a cabinet of experienced professionals rather than militia commanders (Sedra and Middlebrook 2005, 7-8; although these authors, like many critics, observe that these efforts were only a partial success, leaving in place many regional commanders, particularly and mid- and low-levels of governance).

Rather than using explicit aid conditionalities to press for more inclusive and participatory governance, the international community worked with Afghan officials to produce collaborative blueprints for Afghanistan’s development, one aspect of which was “good governance.” The most recent of these initiatives emerged out of the London Conference in early 2006. Named the Afghanistan Compact, this document laid out principles to govern cooperation between donors and the Afghan government and benchmarks and timelines to which both donors and the Afghan government committed themselves. The document is replete with references to democracy, good governance, transparency, rule of law, and respect for pluralism and human rights.

Some critics charged that the United States acted as kingmaker, installing its preferred candidate, Hamid Karzai, as president rather than encouraging a truly representative process of selection. Certainly the United States made clear its
preference for Karzai, but charges of his being installed by fiat are overstated. With Pashtuns forming a majority of the country, any broadly acceptable candidate would necessarily have been Pashtun. While the former king of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah, was popular among many Afghans, he was entirely unacceptable to the Northern Alliance, who threatened to “roll out their tanks” for Kabul if he were appointed interim president of the country (Strmecki 2003, 40). Karzai emerged as an ideal compromise candidate, with substantial support among Pashtuns while simultaneously being acceptable to the Northern Alliance. The fact that he secured a majority of popular votes in the presidential elections of 2004, with support not only from Pashtuns but also from some multiethnic urban areas, suggests that Karzai indeed represented something as close to a consensus candidate as Afghanistan was likely to produce.

A closely related criticism concerns American acceptance of a strong presidential system and a voting system (the Single Non-Transferable Vote method, SNTV) that inhibits the formation of strong political parties (Maass 2006; Reynolds 2006). Opinions differ among experts about the desirability of creating a strong presidency in the Afghan context, but there is certainly no consensus that a presidential system was an undemocratic choice for Afghanistan. Opinion is much more unified in condemning the choice for an SNTV electoral system, although the decision appears to be one that was made out of ignorance rather than design, and there is hope that the negative consequences of the choice can be reversed in the near future without long-term damage.

More telling are charges that the United States and other members of the international community were overly accommodating to warlords, privileging basic stability and the “war on terror” over the construction of a strong and representative central state (Barakat 2004; Bhatia et al 2004; Jalali 2007). Central to such criticisms

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106 Wilder (2005, 18), however, claims that political parties played a more important role in the parliamentary elections of 2005 than is generally understood.
is the contention that regional warlords were “paper tigers” whom the international community could intimidate into compliance without major bloodshed (Sedra and Middlebrook 2005, 8). It may well be that the United States and other troop-contributing countries could have been more aggressive in attempting to marginalize warlords. On the other hand, it may well be that more aggressive efforts to disarm illegal militias would have caused the violent backlash of Afghan warlords, replicating the United States’ oft-criticized decision to disband the Sunni-dominated Iraqi military of the Saddam Hussein era. Either decision was a gamble. According to the theory advanced in this study, the United States might have been expected to commit more resources and take more risks in pursuit of a transformational agenda, and Afghanistan may have made much more progress towards building a viable, representative and inclusive government as a result. At the same time, the theory presented here highlights the high degree of uncertainty associated with the use of force, and, while the United States was not as aggressive as many of its critics would have liked, it certainly was much more so than less militarized states such as Germany and Italy operating within the same context.

**Outcomes**

Most observers agree that Afghanistan has experienced remarkable political changes in the past five years. Questions and doubts concern the ability of the Kabul government, with the assistance of the international community, to translate these initial gains into a more effective, more rule-bound and transparent, and more representative regime that can eventually overcome the enormous challenges posed by the opium economy, lesser warlords, and the resurgent insurgency.

The changes of the past several years represent a remarkable if stillunfinished achievement:
Circumspect observers of the December 2001 Bonn Conference would have scarcely believed that within four years the country would have held a largely peaceful presidential election that would see one candidate prevail with a clear majority of the vote; a constitution promulgated, one of the most progressive in the Muslim world; and a complex legislative electoral process undertaken without major security incidents…. Through the implementation of the Bonn process and complex bargaining that reaches down to the district and village level, the Karzai government has been able to extend its authority to most areas of the country and to curtail the overbearing influence of warlords in national politics. The de facto veto that prominent warlords seemingly held over national policy from 2001-03 has largely been removed. This is not to say that the threat of warlordism has receded. Politics at the local level are still highly militarized and factionalized, and regional commanders remain the dominant presence in the political and economic life of villages and districts across the country. But the Bonn process, buttressed by international military and development assistance, has positioned the government to challenge these local power dynamics (Sedra and Middlebrook 2005, 3-4).

Seen in light of Afghanistan’s history, these changes are even more remarkable. Even in Afghanistan’s “golden days,” in the period before the wars of the 1980s and 1990s, previous Afghan constitutions had been “more myths than operational codes” (Norchi 2004). Never before had Afghanistan had such a meaningful election campaign as the ones held in 2004-5 (Wilder 2005).

Yet, for all of Afghanistan’s accomplishments, it would be misleading to suggest that these changes have been more than the initial steps towards a sustainable participatory and representative government. Afghanistan remains one of the weakest states in the world (Rubin 2006, 26). Most of its population remains bitterly disappointed in the Kabul government’s inability to deliver public goods, including adequate security, health care, and education (Wilder 2005, 35). Despite its weakness, it is being called upon to fight both a burgeoning opium economy and an insurgency strengthened by safe havens in Pakistan and transnational sources of support. Certainly Afghanistan’s situation remains precarious. Massive international intervention with the military capabilities of the United States was a necessary
condition for significant political change towards a representative and inclusive government; it remains to be seen whether the intervention will also be sufficient.

**Policy Options and Counterfactuals**

Even once the United States committed to intervening in Afghanistan and attempting to install a new regime in Kabul, it possessed alternative policy options to the ones chosen. In the very broad terms of this study, the United States need not have pursued either democracy, nor, according to many of its critics, need it have militarized its campaign in Afghanistan to the extent that it did. A third and more nuanced alternative is the one most commonly advocated by critics of American policy: adopting a less militarized approach to the Taliban in the initial years of the intervention while adopting a much more aggressive stance vis-à-vis warlords and the provision of public security. Each of these options is problematic in its own way, but the very fact that these alternatives could have been chosen – and, indeed, the first was chosen for the first two years of the United States’ intervention – reveals that there was nothing inherent about the strategic situation in Afghanistan that determined the strategy adopted by the United States. Other actors facing an identical situation might have chosen other strategies, which suggests that the perceptions and politics of intervening states are critical for understanding outcomes.

The first set of counter-factual policies that the United States could have chosen concerns the promotion of democracy: Washington could have chosen not to pursue a democratic agenda in Afghanistan by not intervening against the regime at all, by supporting a single faction (the “proxy” model of intervention), or by supporting only a weak powersharing structure (the “mediation” model). In fact, for the first two years of its intervention, the United States did choose the last option – and earned considerable international criticism for not pursuing more ambitious goals. The
American intervention could also have followed the same path as the Russian intervention in Tajikistan from 1993-1997 (the mediation model), providing economic and military support to one faction at the expense of others. In doing so, however, the United States would have risked creating a pliable but fragile regime with a narrow support base – a less-ambitious but highly problematic alternative. Or the United States could have acted against al Qaeda alone, either in cooperation with the Taliban or through focused covert operations that left intact the Taliban government. Given the dependence of the Mullah Mohammed Omar’s regime on the financial and military assistance of al Qaeda and the weak leverage available to the international community through non-military instruments (Barfield 2004, 289; Goodhand 2004; Newberg 2007), however, neither variant of the non-intervention strategy stood a high probability of success, and both would have left in place an environment in which transnational terrorism had flourished. Democracy promotion, in other words, is a daunting challenge in the Afghan context, but the alternatives were at least as unattractive.

A second alternative set of strategies would have eliminated or greatly reduced the role of military enforcement in promoting a new regime for Afghanistan. The heavy-handed American counter-insurgency campaign against the Taliban earned considerable criticism from many observers. Rather than militarizing the attempt to bring stability to Afghanistan, the cooperation of local power-brokers and the Afghan population could have been pursued through cooptation – for instance, by radically decentralizing power in an effort to minimize center-periphery conflict and by seeking to expand regional trade so as to maximize opportunities outside of any “political-economy of violence” (von Erffa 2002). Although some forms of federalism might make sense in the Afghan context, decentralization by itself offers no means of improving the quality of governance nor constrains local power-holders from seeking
to expand their fiefdoms at others’ expense. It is also difficult to imagine profitable trading in licit goods without a central authority to prevent ruinous “taxation” of trade by local warlords. It is thus difficult to imagine a sustainable political-economic order that could meet its citizens’ basic needs without creating a central authority, and the creation of a central authority inevitably involves conflict with armed regional power-brokers. A non-military approach to Afghanistan, in short, would have had little likelihood of curbing the predatory behavior of multiple warlords or building workable state institutions, much less of routing out the terrorist organizations that were the original target of the American intervention.

A final, more nuanced alternative strategy rejects neither the goal of producing a more representative and inclusive government, nor the use of military means, but rather would have reoriented the ways in which the United States and its coalition partners pursued their policies. In particular, more emphasis would have been placed on the disbursement of aid, the provision of security for ordinary Afghans, and the marginalization of warlords. There is nothing inherently wrong with any of these goals, and indeed the disbursement of additional aid would almost certainly have had positive effects in Afghanistan.107 Whether troop-contributing countries could have deployed sufficient soldiers to provide greater security throughout Afghanistan without appearing to be an occupation force is less certain, although the relative success of the Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the expansion of ISAF beyond Kabul suggests that most observers were correct in believing that a larger security presence would have been advisable from the start. Most contentious of all is the notion that warlords were nothing more than “paper tigers” and that foreign troops could have enforced their political and economic marginalization without provoking wide scale resistance. There simply is not enough evidence to judge the merits of this

107 Few experts involved with Afghanistan believed that the country had come anywhere close to reaching its “absorption capacity” for foreign aid (Weinbaum 2006, 131).
argument, although the American debacle in Mogadishu stands as a warning not to underestimate the risks involved in confronting even relatively small and apparently weak militias.

Other options were thus available to the United States and other coalition members than the ones they chose. The United States behaved according to predictions by seeking to promote some level of democracy and by adopting a highly militarized approach. Critics suggest that the U.S. could have done much more to promote democracy in Afghanistan, if that was indeed its aim. While this criticism is almost certainly true, it is mitigated by two factors: first, the United States in the end did more than any of the other coalition members (with the possible exception of Great Britain) to pursue a more participatory and inclusive political order in Afghanistan, and second, critics might perhaps be too quick to dismiss the risks inherent in a more intrusive approach to re-ordering Afghan politics than the one the U.S. adopted. Thus, none of the obvious counter-factual policy alternatives invalidates the primary conclusions of this study – namely, that the choice of intervention strategy derives from the perceptions and politics of intervening states rather than from any logic inherent to a given strategic situation, and that only committed, militarized, democratic interveners will pursue the policies necessary for promoting substantial change towards more representative and inclusive political orders.

Contending Explanations and Criticisms

Unlike in the cases of Bosnia and Tajikistan, there are few who believe that the political changes that have occurred in Afghanistan are attributable to anything other than the armed intervention of the United States and its coalition partners. Rather, critics generally contend that what democratization has occurred is largely illusory (Barakat 2004, 2-3) and that, if the United States and its allies had truly sought to
promote a more inclusive and representative government in Afghanistan, then they would have dedicated more resources to the project (Rubin 2004b).

There is obviously a considerable degree of truth to both criticisms. As detailed in the narrative, the Bush administration clearly did not enter into Afghanistan with the intent of promoting strong, representative and inclusive political authority structures. It did, however, move in this direction, albeit less resolutely than most critics of the administration had hoped. The aid-to-population and intervening-soldier-to-population ratios in Afghanistan never reached anywhere near the levels reached in small and tiny countries such as Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor. Troop levels did, however, eventually grow to roughly the size of the UN’s largest current operation, MONUC in the Congo (a country of similar size, ethnic heterogeneity, and underdevelopment as Afghanistan). Aid levels similarly never came close to those requested by the Afghan government or development workers, but they did reach into the billions of dollars per year. When viewed in terms of the absolute numbers eventually reached rather than ratios to Afghanistan’s (large) population, the only intervention that has been substantially larger is the American invasion of Iraq. Certainly the United States’ initial level of effort indicated a deep ambivalence about the more expansive project of promoting sustainable political change in Afghanistan, but by 2004 the situation had begun to change significantly in terms of soldiers deployed and military missions adopted, albeit less so in terms of civilian aid dispensed.

Similarly, although Afghanistan did not make as much progress towards a sustainable, representative and inclusive political order as many critics would have liked, clearly it took several significant steps towards this end. It remains to be seen whether the level of international effort will be sufficient to continue assisting Afghanistan along this path, and whether the initial successes achieved can be
sustained in the face of the burgeoning opium economy and an insurgency that possesses safe havens and other forms of support abroad.

**Conclusion**

The theory presented in this study predicts the general direction of interveners’ policies and the overall trend in outcomes of interventions throughout the world. Afghanistan lies “off the curve” – that is, the United States committed much less strongly than might have been expected to promoting a strong, representative and inclusive government for Afghanistan, and Afghan political authority structures have thus far made only limited progress towards becoming a sustainable, relatively more democratic regime. Understanding the reasons for these outcomes are important for understanding interventions as a whole.

Afghanistan is a “hard case” in nearly every way. The country itself is nearly as daunting an implementation environment as can be imagined: highly underdeveloped, ethnically heterogeneous, filled with a multitude of competing armed factions, ideally suited to the production and trafficking of narcotics, surrounded by hostile neighbors, possessing no history of democracy, and burdened by a legacy of decades-long civil war. The American invasion was not a humanitarian operation but a response to a devastating act of terrorism, it was launched by a president who had publicly and repeatedly voiced his opposition to nation-building, and it had to compete for resources with the much higher-stakes intervention in Iraq. In only one way can the resort to democracy-promotion be considered a likely outcome: The intervention occurred in the post-Cold War era, when the ostensible American “victory” over communism remained fresh in the minds of many American decision-makers and democracy has been enshrined as a global norm in any number of UN documents. Yet these factors had been inadequate to secure the commitment of the Bush
administration to democracy-promotion until after the September 11th attacks, and even then it took two years before the administration shifted towards such a strategy in Afghanistan. Thus, from nearly every perspective, it appears surprising that the intervening coalition would adopt – albeit half-heartedly – such ambitious goals.

In this sense Afghanistan provides powerful testimony to the tendency of intervening states to externalize their own norms of governance, even when nearly every possible argument suggests that they would not. Two factors led to the Bush administration’s shift towards providing more money and forces for “nation-building” in Afghanistan. First, the administration needed to show the American public a “success story” in order to garner support for its broader democracy-promotion agenda (specifically in Iraq). Second, American soldiers deployed to the country (and much of the American military more generally) “learned” a specific set of lessons from their failures in the first two years of the American intervention. Yet the American military’s reaction was not “learning” in the rationalist sense. When looking for solutions to the difficulties encountered in Afghanistan, the U.S. military returned to the American counter-insurgency thinking of the 1960s. Such thinking emphasized enhancing the legitimacy of the regime through elections and the provision of public services. The United States could instead have opted for alternative strategies more akin to Russia’s in Tajikistan.

Despite the American turn towards greater nation-building, Afghanistan’s progress towards sustainable representative and inclusive political institutions remains both very partial and highly tenuous at this point. It is impossible to say whether this outcome is the result of Afghanistan’s unpromising environment for democracy promotion or whether it is because the American-led coalition in Afghanistan did much too little to achieve its goal. Most Western critics of U.S. policy in the country lambaste the Bush administration’s failure to provide human security throughout the
country by deploying more troops and dispensing more development aid. In all likelihood greater resources would have yielded more positive results. It is impossible, however, to exclude the alternative hypothetical outcome: A larger “footprint” might have presented the appearance of an occupying army, produced large distortions in the Afghan economy, and introduced large numbers of well-paid foreign workers advancing Western, liberal agendas antithetical to the traditional lifestyles of most Afghans. Given the past experience of foreign interveners in Afghanistan, concerns about these issues – which were hardly unique to the Bush administration – are certainly understandable.

The “mediation” approach to intervention generally yields very partial results: Peace and some progress towards greater political inclusion are achieved, but often without the institutionalization of the mechanisms that would make such achievements self-sustaining. When resource constraints are low, militarized democracies tend to press for the more substantial results potentially achievable through the “transformation” approach. The American intervention in Afghanistan fits this general prediction, with the Bush administration having initially launched a minimalist state-building project that approximated the mediation model before gravitating closer to the transformation model. Whether either model of intervention can yield a sustainable political order in Afghanistan remains to be seen.
Part III: Conclusion
Conclusion: Iraq and Beyond

State-building military interventions are tremendously complex. Their dynamics are simultaneously shaped in three arenas: the domestic politics of the intervening state or states, the domestic politics of the target state, and the international politics that occur between members of an intervening coalition, neutral third parties, and neighbors of the target state. Within each of these arenas complex bargaining dynamics take place among myriad actors, and the preferences and capabilities of these actors differ from one context to another. Understanding interventions in all of their complexity is a daunting challenge.

To simplify this task, this study has focused on the characteristics and constraints of intervening states and their concomitant ability to foster political change in the target state. Such simplification has its rewards. As the fuzzy-set analysis of Chapter 2 demonstrated, we can correctly predict the outcomes of more than 80 percent of post-Cold War military interventions by focusing only on the conjunction of an intervener’s regime type, strategic culture, and national interests. Such a parsimonious framework, however, does not explain every case, including most importantly the invasion of Iraq. In order to make the complex analytical terrain more tractable, this study has largely bracketed two important issues that together do much to explain Iraq and other deviant cases: (i) the characteristics of the target state and their influence on rates of success in promoting political change, and (ii) the quality of intervention planning and implementation.

This concluding chapter, therefore, seeks to explain not only what we have learned but also why Iraq appears to be such a peculiar case. The chapter will proceed in three parts. It begins with a review of the study’s findings, then examines the catastrophic invasion of Iraq, and finally assesses this study’s implications for the future of intervention after Iraq.
A Broad Brush-Stroke Review of Military Interventions

When launching an intervention, interveners face a central dilemma. They can seek to promote their preferred form of governance, but only at the risk of violent confrontation with target-state actors who are adversely affected by the change. Alternatively, they can minimize the likelihood of confrontation, but in so doing they risk creating a fragile and ineffective powersharing government. Three models of intervention emerge from this dilemma: a proxy model in which an autocratic faction loyal to the intervener is supported, a mediation model in which all armed actors are brought into a government of national reconciliation, or a transformation model in which existing elites are subjected to some form (albeit imperfect) of democratic accountability.

The conjunction of the intervener’s regime type, strategic culture, and resource constraints usually determines the strategy adopted and the extent of political change that is therefore likely to result. The analytical framework presented here accurately predicts political change in more than 80 percent of the cases of post-Cold War military intervention. Where democratic interveners possess a militarized strategic culture and intervene in situations where their national interests are directly engaged, they typically promote substantial democratic change. Moreover, in roughly half of these instances they have succeeded in assisting the target country to become at least an “illiberal democracy.” In contrast, in interventions which are not dominated by committed, militarized democracies, substantial democratic change almost never results (three cases out of 19). Finally, all four cases of autocratization resulted from the intervention of a committed, militarized autocracy.

These results yield three important findings about military interventions. First, assuming one or more militarized democracies commits to anchoring an intervention, democracy promotion does indeed appear to be possible, although it is a dangerous
and expensive undertaking that should be attempted rarely. Second, the goal of promoting democracy through intervention is not the result of Manichean worldviews held by peculiar world powers but is rather a part of a much broader pattern of countries’ seeking to externalize their own domestic norms of governance in their relations with the wider world. Third, while externalizing domestic norms is common, resort to high-intensity uses of force is rare. There is likely to be much less international consensus in favor of strategies such as the proxy and transformation models that pursue more ambitious ends with concomitantly higher risks of military confrontation. Thus, although the mediation model commonly promotes fragile and relatively less effective governance, it is the one most likely to engender broad multilateral support, while the other models of intervention are more likely to spark international crises.

Such findings are at odds with much of the extant literature on intervention, which has claimed that democracy promotion through armed intervention is impossible or nearly so, that no states – or only those with messianic tendencies – truly seek to promote democracy, or that military enforcement measures do not play an important role in promoting democracy. Much of this literature can be situated in one of the major schools of international relations thought – realism, liberalism, or constructivism. At some risk of oversimplification, these schools’ perspectives can be succinctly summarized. Realists commonly maintain that there is no advantage to be obtained by transforming the regime type of target states, but also that interveners seldom truly pursue such ends, adopting democracy promotion (if at all) only as a rhetorical ploy to disguise more realpolitik motivations. Liberals frequently argue that democracy promotion is a worthy end, but that it is best accomplished through multilateral cooperation and the minimal use of force (relying instead on economic cooptation and institutions to promote transparency). Constructivists often argue that
the liberal project of democratic state-building almost inevitably founders on the resilience of local cultures opposed to the imposition of alien institutions. Interveners’ attempts to export these institutions cannot therefore be explained by rational strategic calculations, but must instead be understood as the product of messianic identities or Manichean worldviews that are ignorant of or do not accept cultural differences. All of these schools of thought share the great advantage of internal consistency: If democracy promotion is desirable as a foreign policy goal, then it is also achievable without great risk or indefensible costs. If democracy promotion is not possible, then it is also not desirable – either because it does nothing to advance an intervener’s interests or because it is a contemporary form of colonial subjugation.

The analytical perspective adopted in this study insists that reality is much “messier.” The promotion of democracy may well advance the interests of outside actors who desire to stabilize fragile regions of the world, but it is an inherently risky and costly activity because it gravely threatens the interests of some of the best organized, most heavily armed, and most highly motivated actors in the target states. In the face of such high levels of uncertainty, different actors in identical situations, all attempting to act rationally, will inevitably reach divergent conclusions about what the optimal policy is. Thus the analytical framework advanced here is “messy” in another way as well: It insists that state behavior can only be predicted by integrating rationalist and constructivist perspectives on international politics.

Each of the three models of intervention has characteristic strengths and flaws, and both policymakers and academics have made arguments in favor of each. The greatest peril lies in not committing to one of these models – that is, in adopting the goals of one of the more ambitious and dangerous approaches (proxy or transformation) while only committing the resources sufficient for the less ambitious mediation model. Of the cases examined in depth in this study, the Russian
intervention in Tajikistan from 1993-1997 and at various points the Western intervention in Bosnia illustrate such dysfunctional mismatches of means and ends. In both cases the intervening states recalibrated either their resource commitments or their ambitions. More disastrous examples of ends-means mismatches include the UNOSOM II mission in Somalia, where the United States’ ambitions clearly exceeded its interests in the country, and, most catastrophically of all, the invasion of Iraq.

**Iraq**

The catastrophic failure of the American intervention in Iraq cannot be explained through the analytical framework presented here. As a highly militarized democracy facing relatively low resource constraints, the United States should have been able to impose considerably more democratic change. There are two major reasons why a few cases – and Iraq in particular – do not behave as predicted: (i) the difficulty of the target environment and (ii) the quality of intervention planning and implementation. It is hard to imagine a case in which both of these factors could exercise a more intensely negative influence on the outcome of an intervention than Iraq. Although a number of control variables were introduced in the fuzzy-set analysis to account for difficult intervention environments (level of development, ethnic heterogeneity, prior experience with democracy), none of these comes close to capturing the hubris required to believe that invading Iraq was anything less than an extraordinary gamble. Iraq is an enormous country. Its civil society had been crushed by decades of brutal dictatorship, leaving nothing but clerical hierarchies, the remnants of the Baathist party, and increasingly the newly created militias upon which to base a new political order. Its three major ethnic groups were divided by memories of near-genocidal acts perpetrated by the former regime. Its citizens’ expectations of the wealth that should flow from its oil reserves in no way reflected the realities of the
country’s antiquated infrastructure and explosive population growth rate. These expectations combined with colonial legacies to fuel enormous suspicions of neo-colonial expropriation of the country’s oil wealth. The United States faced considerable suspicion and hostility as the country which, more than any other, had insisted on economic sanctions which had contributed to a devastating economic decline over the 15 years before the invasion (Cordesman 2003; on Iraqi suspicions of U.S. motives, see Diamond 2005, 25-6). Moreover, the United States exponentially increased the difficulties of an already daunting task by failing to plan properly for the occupation of Iraq. The U.S. failed to provide for public order in the weeks and months after the invasion, failed to identify legitimate representatives of the major Iraqi political communities, and – perhaps most important of all – failed to heed one of the clearest lessons of post-conflict interventions, the need to incorporate former combatants (in this case, former Baathists) into the new political order. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a worse handling of nation-building (Bunce 2005; Diamond 2005; Phillips 2005).

It is impossible to assess the relative weighting of these two factors, the implementation environment and the conduct of the occupation. Was the intervention doomed from the moment the invasion was launched? Or could a well-devised occupation strategy have produced a workable government? While it is impossible to answer these questions, the framework adopted in this study does offer some insights into the Iraq war.

The Bush administration’s policy – or lack thereof – is deeply puzzling. At various points aspects of the intervention resembled the proxy, mediation, and transformation models. Indeed, this confusion may help to explain why the invasion has turned out so disastrously. Had the United States truly sought to promote democracy in Iraq, previous experience from the post-Cold War era clearly
demonstrated that violent resistance to this project would be almost certain and that a costly and highly intrusive intervention would be necessary to realize the desired ends. In adopting this model the administration should have also committed to the provision of public order, detailed plans for reconstruction (made in advance and accepted throughout the U.S. government), and larger numbers of deployed troops.\textsuperscript{108} Alternatively, the United States could have adopted the mediation model, in which case it would have needed to dedicate itself from the beginning to providing credible assurances that the interests of all armed actors – particularly Sunnis loyal to the prior regime but also newly emerging Shia militias – would be accommodated and protected in a new political order. The United States did neither, but neither did it commit itself to building a credible proxy force in the country. The analytical framework adopted for this study cannot explain why the Bush administration produced such an incoherent muddle, although it clearly suggests that failing to commit to one or another approach is likely to produce dysfunctional policies and disastrous outcomes.

\textbf{Beyond Iraq}

The invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq has thus far been a catastrophe, and there are few if any signs that it will improve in the foreseeable future. It has cost tens if not hundreds of thousands of lives, and it gives every indication of leaving the United States less secure than when it began. The Iraq debacle is likely to spark a backlash against ambitious attempts to promote democracy through interventions, at least in the near to medium term. Two alternatives are possible: non-intervention and proxy interventions.

\textsuperscript{108} Of course, it is not at all clear that the United States could have sustained the deployment of such large numbers of troops for an extended period of time, which should have cautioned policy-makers against the invasion in the first place.
State-building interventions have had a stormy history in the post-Cold War era. Various observers declared in turn that Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, then East Timor represented the “high water mark” of interventions and that the tide had turned away from intrusive efforts to remake foreign societies (for instance Chesterman 2002). Yet each time a new crisis arose and states again found themselves drawn into ambitious efforts to impose new political authority structures far from their own shores. High-level international panels have grappled with the failures of past interventions, but for all their efforts they have neither produced a “silver bullet” solution nor have they ruled out the use of interventions. Rather, they have acknowledged that interventions are inherently difficult but that some circumstances may indeed demand them (“Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations” 2000, International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001).

If the United States and other states do not abandon interventions entirely, what are the alternatives to democracy promotion? It is instructive to look the parallels between post-Iraq American foreign policy and the war in Vietnam and its aftermath. In response to the United States’ failed efforts at nation-building in Vietnam, President Nixon decreed what became known as the “Nixon Doctrine,” in which the United States would provide support to threatened allied governments but would insist that the manpower for any war come from the threatened state itself. Since such a policy depended on cooperating with the government in place at the time, and since the vast majority of developing countries (especially those facing insurgent threats) were not democracies, essentially the Nixon Doctrine was a public commitment to a policy resembling the proxy model of interventions. The United States might return to such an approach in the post-Cold War era. Three factors, however, suggest a high degree of caution is warranted. First, although the proxy model avoids many of the pitfalls of the transformation model, it has its own drawbacks. As the Russian intervention in
Tajikistan suggests, the proxy model in many ways makes the intervener hostage to the proxy. Because the proxy regime is autocratic rather than a broad-based, more democratic one, the intervener cannot abandon its partner without abandoning the regime to its enemies. When pursuing a more broad-based, democratic strategy, on the other hand, the intervener can abandon a troublesome partner and work more closely with another one without abandoning the intervention altogether. Thus, for instance, in Bosnia the United States worked closely with Biljana Plavsic when she was helpful in broadening the arena for intra-Serb political competition, but Washington was also willing to abandon her when she was indicted for war crimes. Moscow, in contrast, found it difficult to direct its proxy Rakhmonov towards greater cooperation with the United Tajik Opposition. The proxy model suffers from a second potential pitfall: In the proxy model the intervener often contributes enough to prevent its proxy from failing completely but is unable to secure its faction’s ultimate victory, thereby fueling perennial war. Such was Russia’s experience in Tajikistan until it invited the opposition into a government of national reconciliation. Finally, democracies often find it difficult to support in highly visible ways autocratic regimes engaged in bloody repression. Democracies often engage in less-visible activities that help keep autocrats in power: covert operations, the provision of military aid, diplomatic legitimation of repressive practices, and so on. But the Reagan administration’s experience in Central America in the 1980s, among other examples, suggests that domestic opposition frequently forms when such practices become large-scale and thus highly visible (Peceny 1995). In the immediate aftermath of September 11, the American president was able to transgress norms of traditionally accepted conduct with impunity. There are already signs, however, that such latitude of action will not be possible indefinitely. Thus, a renewed “Nixon Doctrine” and the proxy interventions it would entail is neither advisable nor sustainable.
If intervening states do continue to launch interventions which aim to promote more democratic governance, they should heed the lessons of past interventions. First, if the realization of their goals depends on the democratization of the target state, then they must be prepared to marginalize spoilers, which in turn requires a willingness to use force decisively. If interveners are unwilling to confront spoilers, then they should adopt much more minimalist goals for an intervention. Problems arise when would-be democracy-promoters adopt the goals of the transformation model while providing means sufficient only for implementing the mediation model.

Second, choosing to promote democracy is a long-term commitment. If interveners commit only to short-term interventions, such as the European Union’s intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo or the Pentagon’s initial vision of a short American presence in Iraq, then they must be aware that violent challenges to the new regime’s authority are likely to emerge in the immediate aftermath of the withdrawal of intervening troops. Such short-term interventions are less likely to provoke violence against the intervener, but it is extremely difficult to build an effective new regime capable of withstanding violent challengers in such a short period of time. Even once interveners withdraw their forces, they typically cannot end their commitments. The most successful interventions have been ones in which the intervening state or states not only established a functioning new regime but also provided both economic incentives and security guarantees to the fledgling government. In Bosnia the prospect of EU membership is a tremendous incentive to maintain progress towards democracy, while in East Timor Australian troops were forced to return to prevent a coup, and in Sierra Leone British over-the-horizon security guarantees have played an important role in stabilizing the new government.

Finally, international comity is highly desirable for a great many reasons, but it is often extremely difficult to sustain when an intervention involves higher-intensity
uses of force. Multilateralism is not by itself sufficient to ensure that the non-use or minimal uses of force prevail, as the case of Bosnia demonstrates. Nor is it sufficient to ensure the protection of intervening agents, as has been demonstrated in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Iraq, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and elsewhere. When interveners believe that only the escalation of force will achieve their ends, as in Kosovo, frequently multilateral consensus must be abandoned. Interventions thus may force intervening states to choose between multilateral comity and the ends that they would pursue.

Recognizing the dilemmas posed by interventions is the first step towards designing more coherent strategies for intervention and avoiding many potential interventions altogether. Interventions are tremendously daunting and should be seldom undertaken and then only with a healthy appreciation of the difficulties involved. Seldom, however, is not never. The empires and bipolar structures that formerly buttressed political authority structures in much of the world have both collapsed, leaving in their wake weak, failing, and failed states. Such states sometimes give rise to genocide, massive population displacements, transnational terrorism, or other activities that members of the international community will find either threatening or unacceptable. The past fifteen years of the post-Cold War era have demonstrated not only that interventions are difficult and dangerous, but also that members of the international community sometimes consider the consequences of non-intervention worse. In such instances would-be interveners are faced with strategic decisions, none of which are attractive. They can support a single faction in the target state to the exclusion of all others, but in so doing may produce an autocratic regime with a narrow base and propensity to violent repression of all potential challengers. They can promote a government of national reconciliation, bringing all armed factions into a powersharing structure that defuses violence but that tends to
promote political stagnation and often ultimately fragmentation. Or they can seek to compel the armed factions in the target state to act as democrats, hoping that such actions, however insincere, may over time create enough space for peaceful political pluralism and accountable government to emerge. While none of these alternatives is attractive, failing to commit to one or the other is typically disastrous. Decision-makers must therefore understand the limitations and potential of each model, as well as the limitations imposed by their own domestic politics, before embarking on interventions in which so many lives are at stake.
Appendix 1: 
Rules for Inclusion, Scoring, and Aggregation

Rules for Inclusion

A use of force is included as a case if it meets the following five criteria:

- **Sovereignty**: Only instances in which the troops of a sovereign state are deployed on the territory of another recognized sovereign state may be included as cases.
- **Overt Presence**: Covert deployments of forces, such as those of Serbia-Montenegro in Bosnia or Pakistan in Afghanistan, are not eligible to be included as cases.
- **Personnel**: At least 1000 armed troops must be deployed.
- **Duration**: Troops must have been deployed for at least two months; at least two months of the intervention must have taken place in the post-Cold War era (for convenience, this period is assumed to have begun on 1 January 1990); and the intervention must have begun no later than 1 January 2004.
- **Mandate**: Troops must have had a mandate to use force to ensure the success of the mission, and the mission must include a substantial governance (as opposed to purely humanitarian or military) component. For instance, a mission in which armed troops are used solely to deliver humanitarian aid or protect pockets of civilians, such as UNITAF or UNPROFOR, would not count, but a mission in which troops were authorized to use force to arrest any who seek to disrupt elections would count as a case.

Rules for Scoring Democracy of Intervener

The level of democracy of an intervening state was determined using the average of all Freedom House scores in the post-Cold War era (the years 1990 – 2004). These Freedom House scores were converted to fuzzy-set values based on the breakpoints provided below. As a check on robustness, all scores were also computed using Polity IV data and different fuzzy-set intervals (e.g., 4-, 5-, and 7-point intervals rather than the 11-point interval provided below); none of these variations significantly influenced the results.
Rules for Scoring Militarization of Intervener

The extent to which an intervener’s strategic culture is militarized was determined using both defense expenditures as a percentage of GDP (as a proxy for the strength of the military and defense establishment in foreign-policy decisionmaking) and public responses to the World Values Survey (WVS) questions on defense issues. The fuzzy-set scores for each WVS question were averaged to determine the public opinion component of an intervener’s militarization score, and the public opinion and defense expenditure components together were averaged to determine the overall militarization score. By combining these two measures we may hope to account for differences between public opinion and the strategic culture of the foreign policy elite. In those intervening countries in which the WVS was not conducted, only defense expenditures as a percentage of GDP were used. In these cases there likely are some misleading scores. Fortunately, most of the important intervening states participated in the WVS, and when less important states participate in multilateral interventions, the aggregation of the interveners’ scores renders the effect of absent public opinion data negligible.

WVS Question 1: “People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. On this card are listed some of the goals which different people would give top priority. Would you please say which one of these you, yourself, consider the most important?” (Data refer to the proportion of the population who agreed with the response, “Making sure this country has strong defence forces.”)

WVS Question 2: “Of course, we all hope that there will not be another war, but if it were to come to that, would you be willing to fight for your country?” (Data refer to the proportion of the population who answered “yes.”)

Defense Spending as a Percentage of GDP: Figures were used from the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ (IISS) *The Military Balance*, years 1991 – 2004. These figures vary from year to year as more data becomes available. Whenever there was a discrepancy, the most recent estimate was used.

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Freedom House Scores</th>
<th>Fuzzy-Set Scores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 – 1.55</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.56 – 2.10</td>
<td>.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.11 – 2.65</td>
<td>.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.66 – 3.20</td>
<td>.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.21 – 3.75</td>
<td>.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.76 – 4.30</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.31 – 4.85</td>
<td>.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.86 – 5.40</td>
<td>.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.41 – 5.95</td>
<td>.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.96 - 6.50</td>
<td>.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.51 – 7.00</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Rules for Scoring Resource Availability of Interveners

Resources are understood as the political capital, financial commitments, troop deployments, and potential casualties that must be endured by an intervener in the course of an intervention. Available resources were scored on the basis of the realist assumption that countries will sacrifice resources in proportion to the importance of a given issue to the national interest. An intervener’s interest in a given intervention was scored on the five-point scale below. In practice, in the post-Cold War era whenever a country committed troops to an intervention, its resource availability score ranged among the three intermediate values.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Importance of Intervention</th>
<th>Fuzzy-Set Scores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Existential threat (e.g., total war)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct threat (e.g., high-casualty terrorism)</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significant interest (e.g., potential refugee influx, alliance credibility, significant post-colonial relations)</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor interest (e.g., pure humanitarianism, UN subsidies for troop contributions)</td>
<td>.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No interest</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Rules for Scoring Democratic Change in Target States

Democratic change was measured using Freedom House data. (Because the Polity IV dataset does not score countries undergoing rapid transitions or interventions, a large percentage of target states did not have usable Polity IV scores.) Change was
measured as the difference in Freedom House scores from the last year before an intervention began to the last year an intervention took place (or the most recent year, 2004, in cases of ongoing interventions).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change in Freedom House Scores</th>
<th>Fuzzy-Set Scores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>≥ 3.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 – 2.0</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>≤ 0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Rules for Scoring Autocratic Change in Target States**

Rules for scoring autocratic change are the same as those used for democratic change, except that negative movement on the Freedom House scale is measured.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change in Freedom House Scores</th>
<th>Fuzzy-Set Scores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt; -1.0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>≥ 0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Rules for Scoring Level of Absolute Democracy in Target States**

Following the suggestion of Schedler (2002), I use a four-point scale to measure the absolute level of democracy in a target state, reflecting (from most to least democratic) the levels of liberal democracy, electoral democracy, electoral authoritarianism, and closed authoritarianism. Again, Freedom House data is used.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Freedom House Scores</th>
<th>Fuzzy-Set Scores</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 – 2.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.0 – 4.0</td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5 – 5.5</td>
<td>.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.0 – 7.0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Rules for Aggregation**

In most cases in the post-Cold War era interventions are not conducted by a single intervening country but by a coalition of states. In such cases it is necessary to score the characteristics of the intervening coalition as a whole. I have adopted the conventions below for converting the characteristics of intervening states into those of the coalition. Again, as with all measures, these are simply approximations. In actuality, of course, different intervening states are likely to have varying degrees of influence on the intervention as a whole. Nonetheless, there are two reasons for
believing that the conventions of aggregation adopted here are reasonable approximations of the intervening coalitions. First, every troop contributing country (TCC) exercises influence on the manner in which an intervention is conducted in at least two ways: (i) national contingents on the ground are the ones actually implementing an intervention, and differences in training, rules of engagement, and aggressiveness in implementing a mandate can be highly consequential; and (ii) policymakers in a TCC’s capital may threaten to withdraw scarce troops unless their policy conditions are met. Second, usually the most powerful members of an intervening country formalize their position in command and control arrangements that are reflected in the rules of aggregation below.

- **Lead-Nation Model**: A multilateral intervention in which at least half of the troops are provided by a single troop contributing country (TCC) (lead-nation model) is assumed to reflect the characteristics (regime type, militarization, resource constraints) of the dominant TCC.

- **Broad-Multilateralism Model**: A multilateral intervention in which no one state contributes at least half of the troops (broad-multilateralism model) is assumed to reflect the average characteristics of the top five TCCs, with a minimum contribution of 400 armed soldiers\(^ {109}\) – roughly one minimum-strength battalion – necessary for inclusion.

- ** Concurrent and Consecutive Interventions**: For those cases in which two operations are running concurrently (e.g., ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, Operation Licorne and UNOCI in Cote d’Ivoire) or consecutively in an integrated hand-off of responsibilities (e.g., the hand-off from U.S. forces to UNMIH in Haiti), the characteristics of the interveners are derived by averaging the characteristics of the two operations.

\(^{109}\) Whenever possible the number of intervening troops reflects the maximum deployment. These numbers are in constant flux as units are rotated, and frequently accurate data is unavailable. Thus all figures are approximate.
## Appendix 2:
### Interventions of the Post-Cold War Era

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Intervention Name(s)</th>
<th>Interveners</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Abkhazia</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td></td>
<td>9/93 –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Afghanistan</td>
<td>OEF, ISAF, UNAMA</td>
<td>US, Coalition, ISAF</td>
<td>10/01 –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Albania</td>
<td>Operation Alba; Multinational Protection Force (MPF)</td>
<td>Italy, Coalition</td>
<td>4/97 – 8/97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Angola</td>
<td>UNAVEM III</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>2/95 – 6/97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Bosnia</td>
<td>IFOR/SFOR/EUFOR</td>
<td>NATO, EU</td>
<td>12/95 –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Cambodia</td>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>UN, Australia</td>
<td>2/92 – 9/93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Central African Republic</td>
<td>MINURCA</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>4/98 – 2/00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Congo (Democratic Republic of)</td>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>11/00 –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Cote d’Ivoire</td>
<td>ECOMICI, Operation Licorne, MINUCI, UNOCI!110</td>
<td>Ecowas, France, UN</td>
<td>2/03 –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Cyprus (Northern)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>7/74 –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 East Timor111</td>
<td>INTERFET, UNAMET, UNTAET, UNMISET</td>
<td>Australia, UN</td>
<td>9/99 –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Haiti</td>
<td>UNMIH, UNSMIH</td>
<td>UN, US</td>
<td>9/94 – 7/97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Iraq</td>
<td>Iraq War</td>
<td>US, Coalition</td>
<td>3/03 –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Kosov (Serbia)</td>
<td>KFOR, UNMIK</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>7/99 –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Lebanon</td>
<td>Post-Taif Lebanon</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>10/89 –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Liberia 2112</td>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>9/03 –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Mozambique</td>
<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>12/92 – 12/94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Namibia</td>
<td>UNTAG</td>
<td>UN</td>
<td>4/89 – 3/90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Panama</td>
<td>“Operation Just Cause”</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>12/90 – 1/91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Sierra Leone 1</td>
<td>ECOMOG, UNOMSIL</td>
<td>Ecowas, Nigeria; UN</td>
<td>7/97 – 11/99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 Sierra Leone 2</td>
<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>UN, UK</td>
<td>11/99 –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Solomon Islands</td>
<td>RAMSI; HELPEM FREN</td>
<td>Australia, Pacific Islands Forum</td>
<td>7/03 –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Somalia</td>
<td>UNOSOM II</td>
<td>UN, US</td>
<td>3/93 – 3/95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Tajikistan 1</td>
<td>CPKF, UNMOT</td>
<td>Russia, CIS</td>
<td>5/92 – 6/97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Tajikistan 2</td>
<td>CPKF, UNMOT</td>
<td>Russia, CIS</td>
<td>6/97 –</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Transdniestr</td>
<td></td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>7/92 –</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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110 ECOWAS’ ECOMICI first deployed on 26 October 2002 to observe a cease-fire agreement. France’s Operation Licorne first deployed on 6 February 2003 to police the Linas-Marcoussis Accord. The UN cooperated with the ECOWAS mission through its small political mission, MINUCI. The UN did not deploy its own peacekeeping operation, UNOCI, until 4 April 2004. The mission is taken to begin in February 2003 with the signing of the Linas-Marcoussis Accord.

111 The international intervention in East Timor was actually a string of missions: first, INTERFET, an initial transition force dominated by Australia but with international participation and a UN mandate (September 1999 – February 2000); second, the primary nationbuilding mission, UNTAET (February 2000 – May 2002); and third, a UN follow-on mission, UNMISET (May 2002 – present).

112 Note that ECOWAS provided a transition force, ECOMIL, for the subsequent UN force, UNMIL. ECOMIL’s responsibilities were limited to stabilizing the cease-fire until the UN mission was ready to deploy.
### Appendix 3:
#### Characteristics of Intervening States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervener</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
<th>World Values Survey – Q1</th>
<th>World Values Survey – Q2</th>
<th>Defense Spending</th>
<th>Aggregate Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Freedom House</td>
<td>Fuzzy Set</td>
<td>WVS Fuzzy Set</td>
<td>WVS Fuzzy Set</td>
<td>% GDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7.0 .5</td>
<td>74.8 .6</td>
<td>2.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>10.4 .6</td>
<td>78.8 .7</td>
<td>1.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.8 .1</td>
<td>38.3 0</td>
<td>1.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>13.1 .8</td>
<td>53.1 2</td>
<td>1.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.0 .1</td>
<td>66.4 .5</td>
<td>1.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>5.60</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d’Ivoire</td>
<td>5.73</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>5.70</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>5.07</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.14</td>
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<td>Finland</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.6 .4</td>
<td>82.7 .8</td>
<td>1.67</td>
</tr>
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<td>3.3 .2</td>
<td>56.9 .3</td>
<td>3.00</td>
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<td>.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.35</td>
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<td>Germany</td>
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<td>43.1 0</td>
<td>1.86</td>
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<td>Ghana</td>
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<td>10.9 .7</td>
<td>92.6 1</td>
<td>1.13</td>
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<td>1.80</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
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<td>21.2 1</td>
<td>84.0 .8</td>
<td>2.94</td>
</tr>
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Bibliography


Huntington, Samuel P. 1982. “American Ideals versus American Institutions.” *Political Science Quarterly* 97 (Spring); 1-37.


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