

**REAPING THE BENEFITS OF DIVERSITY WITH INDIVIDUALISM:
THE CONTINGENT EFFECTS OF INDIVIDUALISM-COLLECTIVISM ON
THE WORK TEAM COHESION**

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The current study examines the interplay of individualism-collectivism and team composition in team cohesion. I propose that individualism generates greater cohesion in diverse teams than does collectivism, whereas collectivism generates greater cohesion in homogeneous teams than does individualism. The underlying reasoning is that team composition is a cue that provides verification of one's self-construal, ingroup-construal, and diversity beliefs, and that such verification fosters cohesion in work teams. Two experimental studies that manipulate psychological states representing individualism-collectivism provide evidence for the proposition. Study 1 manipulated self-construal, with results showing that individualistic self-construal generates greater energetic feeling in diverse teams than does collectivistic self-construal, which in turn promotes cohesion. Study 2 manipulated ingroup-construal, with results showing that individuated ingroup-construal promotes greater cohesion in diverse teams than does depersonalized ingroup-construal. The results of Study 2 also reveal a mediating effect of diversity beliefs linking individuated ingroup-construal and cohesion in diverse teams. Theoretical and practical implications of such findings for teams and organizations are discussed.

Keywords: Diversity, individualism-collectivism, cohesion, energetic affective tone, diversity beliefs

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Na Yoon Kim is a candidate for Doctor of Philosophy degree in Organizational Behavior at Cornell University's School of Industrial and Labor Relations. She earned a Master of Science Degree in Management at Yonsei University and a Bachelor of Arts in Psychology at Yonsei University. Her primary research interests include diversity and culture.

This dissertation is dedicated to my amazing daughter, Dana Kim Jung, who has shared every single day of my journey at Cornell

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: Introduction	1
CHAPTER 2: Theory and Research Background	6
CHAPTER 3: Study 1- Individualism that excites and solidifies diverse teams: Individualism- collectivism, energetic affective tone, and the emergence of cohesion in task Teams	26
CHAPTER 4: Study 2- When diversity verifies who we are and my beliefs: Positive relationship between individuated ingroup-construal and diverse team cohesion.....	44
CHAPTER 5: General Discussion	63
CONCLUSION	72
REFERENCES	73
APPENDIX	87

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE 1: Energetic tone by condition (Study 1)	39
FIGURE 2: Cohesion by condition (Study 2)... ..	58

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1: Means and Standard deviations per condition (Study 1)	39
TABLE 2: Regression results for antecedents variables of energetic tone and the mediation effect of energetic tone leading to cohesion, perception of groupness, and collective self-esteem (Study 1)	41
TABLE 3: Means and Standard deviations per condition (Study 2)	58
TABLE 4: Mediation Test in Diverse Teams: Linking Ingroup-construal and Cohesion via Diversity beliefs (Study 2)	61
TABLE 5: Mediation Test in Homogeneous Teams: Linking Ingroup-construal and Cohesion via Similarity beliefs (Study 2)	61

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Organizations have become team-based (Ilgen, 1999; McGrath, 1997) with increasingly diverse workforces not only at demographic and surface levels but also at deeper psychological levels (Mannix & Neale, 2005). As a result, understanding the processes that underlie the effects of diversity in work teams and how to manage these processes is critical for team effectiveness (Van Knippenberg et al., 2004). However, as literature on diversity suggests, diversity is a double-edged sword and there is a tension between the promise and the reality of diversity in team process and performance (Mannix & Neale, 2005). One of the dilemmas diversity poses to organizational theory and practice concerns the issue of social integration, that is, the degree to which group members are attracted to the group, feel satisfied with other members, interact socially with them, and feel psychologically linked to one another (Harrison et al., 1998; O'Reilly et al., 1989; Smith et al., 1994). The issue of social integration in teams is important because members of socially integrated teams are able to coordinate their efforts and integrate their perspectives not only more effectively but also efficiently to produce high-quality team outcomes (Polzer et al., 2002; Shaw, 1981). However, as reflected in two main streams in the research of work team diversity (Van Knippenberg et al., 2004; Williams & O'Reilly, 1998), diverse teams are likely to encounter difficulties with regard to social integration.

From a social categorization perspective, diversity gives rise to social divisions, and a resulting distinction of “us and them” undermines the performance of the team. This is the pessimistic view of diversity. Indeed, research has provided evidence that diverse teams have lower member commitment (Riordan & Shore, 1997; Tsui et al., 1992) and group cohesion (O'Reilly et al., 1989), and more relational conflicts (Jehn et al., 1999; Pelled et al., 1999) than

homogeneous teams. As such, research drawing from social categorization theory emphasizes that diversity may undermine social integration. Yet, social integration is particularly important in diverse teams because social integration may facilitate the processes by which a larger pool of resources is integrated and elaborated in diverse teams (Bourdieu, 1986).

An information/decision-making perspective offers an optimistic view of diversity that highlights the potential benefits of diversity that lead to greater team performance and creativity. For example, diversity increases a variety of task-relevant knowledge, skills, abilities, and perspectives on the task at hand that will serve to foster team performance. Nevertheless, the potential benefits of diverse resources within diverse task teams will only be reaped when diverse members cooperate with each other by sharing and synthesizing the knowledge each member brings to the team (Bacharach et al., 2005; Podsakoff et al., 2000). In other words, social integration may facilitate such processes. Considered together, these two streams suggest that potential resources in diverse teams may not be maximally realized due to the social integration problems pointed out by the social categorization perspective. As we have witnessed in scholarly efforts to integrate pros and cons of diversity in organizational contexts (Bell, 2007; Joshi & Roh, 2009; Van Knippenberg et al., 2004), it is important to understand the conditions in which diverse teams achieve social integration, that is, to focus on contingencies. Such an examination reveals under what conditions diverse teams realize benefits of diversity and thus, promote team success.

Social integration broadly refers to positive social relationships present in teams and can be decomposed into four aspects: affective, behavioral, environmental, and cognitive (Ashmore et al., 2004; Moreland, 1987; Williams, 2010). Among these multiple dimensions, the current study highlights the affective dimension of social integration, emphasizing the central

role of emotion in the social exchange process and in the emergence of solidarity (Collins, 1990; Lawler & Yoon, 1993). In this context, I refer to the affective dimension of social integration as cohesion (Harrison et al., 1998) and define it as the extent to which members of the team feel positive and are attached to their team. Consistent with the notion of affective commitment (Kanter, 1968), cohesion in this paper indicates the extent to which members of the team become affectively attached to the group. Therefore, in response to the question of whether and when diversity and cohesion coexist in work teams, I examine the circumstances in which cohesion in diverse teams can be enhanced.

Because cohesion taps the types of positive relationships individuals develop toward their teams, I particularly illuminate the effects of individualism-collectivism, which denotes the fundamental differences in how people construe themselves in relation to collectives. Regarding the relationship between individualism-collectivism and diverse team functioning, there exists contrasting views. In one stream, benefits of collectivism in diverse teams have been proposed such that a salient overarching social category reduces the detrimental effect of social categorizations (Chatman et al., 1998). In another stream, positive effects of individuation in diverse teams have been demonstrated such that verification of one's uniqueness fosters diverse team effectiveness (e.g., Polzer et al., 2002). In an attempt to reconcile these contrasting views on diverse team functioning, the current study examines the joint effects of individualism-collectivism and composition of the team on the emergence of cohesion. To this end, I extend a tenet of a self-verification theory that people want to be known for who they believe they are (Swann, 1990) by shedding light on the verification, or the perception of self-verification, that occurs between individuals and the collective. The underlying reasoning is that people strive to

affirm their self-views using contextual cues, and cues in social situations that verify their self-views should lead people to form positive relationships to the social context.

Given that information on the task environment constitutes cues that set the standards for one's attitudes and behaviors (Burke, 1991; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978), I propose that team composition serves as a contextual cue that engenders a sense of verification, or the lack thereof, for team members. The degree of such verification may vary as a function of the fit between individualism-collectivism and team composition. Because individualism-collectivism triggers different self-definitions (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Nisbett, 2003; Oyserman et al., 2002), compositional cues that affirm or verify certain self-definitions should facilitate cohesion in teams. If a match occurs, individuals will not only feel right and excited about the self-verifying situation but will also find the situation predictable. Such positive responses in turn lay foundations for cohesion in teams.

This reasoning is consistent with person-situation congruence theories (e.g., Edwards, 1994) that consider how the combination of individual and situational characteristics influences a person's behavioral response in a given situation. Research relying on congruence theory suggests the importance of fit, or the match between two conceptually distinct but comparable person and situation constructs. Specifically, it has been reported that people exhibit more positive responses and behaviors in situations that provide validation or confirm who they are. For example, greater fit between a person's values and his or her organization's culture is associated with behavioral and affective outcomes such as better job performance, longer tenure, and greater commitment to the organization (O'Reilly et al., 1991). Therefore, I contend that psychological states triggered by individualism match with diversity, thereby fostering the sense of verification that leads to cohesion in diverse teams. In contrast, psychological states triggered

by collectivism match with homogeneity, fostering the sense of verification that leads to cohesion in homogeneous teams.

Thus, using self-verification theory as a framework, the goal of this research is to theoretically justify and empirically test whether and in what ways individualism contributes to cohesion in diverse teams. Specifically, I predict that cohesion in diverse teams will be promoted with individualism, while cohesion in homogeneous teams will be promoted with collectivism. Two experimental studies that manipulate specific elements of individualism-collectivism, including self-construal and ingroup-construal, are conducted to demonstrate how elements of individualism fit diversity while those of collectivism fit homogeneity, thereby increasing cohesion in teams. In doing so, I demonstrate that individualism-collectivism entails different views of self, ingroup, and beliefs about diversity, and that the match between such views and contextual cues delivered from the composition of teams determines the level of cohesion in teams.

CHAPTER 2

THEORY AND RESEARCH BACKGROUND

This chapter is composed of three parts. First, the relationship between diversity and cohesion is discussed. Second, I review and discuss the influence of individualism-collectivism on cohesion in work teams. Finally, by reinterpreting the extant research on such topics from a self-verification perspective, I propose a cultural contingency model of cohesion.

Diversity and Cohesion

Positive relationships in the organization are valuable assets for organizational performance (Fredrickson, 2001). Theories and research have stressed the role of cohesion in fostering cooperation and performance (Coleman, 1988; Kuwabara, 2011), with researchers cautioning that problematic intragroup relations and low group cohesiveness are detrimental to performance (De Dreu & Weingart, 2003; Jehn, 1995; Mullen & Copper, 1994). In line with this view, a premise of the current project is that cohesion generally enhances team effectiveness. Despite the benefits of cohesion in facilitating the processing and the realization of substantial resources in diverse teams, it has been reported that achieving cohesion is a challenge for diverse teams (Harrison et al., 1998; Van Knippenberg et al., 2004). Two distinct types of social relationships at different levels are involved in this challenge: interpersonal or person-to-person level relationships and person-to-group level relationships.

Regarding interpersonal relationships, a similarity-attraction paradigm has guided research on diversity to posit that team members are more attracted to others who are similar rather than dissimilar to the self (Byrne, 1971; Williams & O'Reilly, 1998). This is because they anticipate that their own values, attitudes, and beliefs will be reinforced in interactions with similar others. Therefore, because attraction at this interpersonal level is a function of the

individuals' similarity (Hogg, 1992; 1993), diverse teams are likely to suffer cohesion problems. In comparison, at a person-to-group level or collective level, a social categorization perspective maintains that people tend to like and trust members of their ingroup more than those of an outgroup, and thus tend to favor ingroups over outgroups (Brewer, 1979; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner et al., 1987). As a consequence, subgroups can be produced within diverse work teams, eliciting negative intergroup relations. This in turn will disrupt the formation of positive relationships to the overarching group. The implication of social categorization theory is consistent with the thesis of similarity-attraction theory such that the more homogeneous the work team, the higher members' attraction to other members will be. However, social categorization theory is distinguishable from similarity-attraction theory in that social categorization theory maintains that liking and positive evaluations of others are a result of the simple knowledge that they share a common membership or a social category, even in the absence of interpersonal attraction or even social interactions (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Taken together, those mechanisms at the interpersonal and collective level illustrate the difficulties that diverse teams face in achieving cohesion.

Such a distinction between interpersonal and person-to-group relationships relates to three-levels of self-definition (Brewer & Gardner, 1996): personal, relational, and collective. Per this distinction, self-representation varies from self as a unique individual (personal self), to self as part of an interpersonal relationship (relational self), to self as an interchangeable part of a larger social entity (collective self). From this theoretical framework, it can be reasoned that diversity threatens not only the emergence of the positive relational self at an interpersonal level as suggested by similarity-attraction theory, but also the collective self at a person-to-group level as postulated by social categorization theory. Social integration is defined as the degree to which

group members are attracted to the group, feel satisfied with other members, interact socially with them, and feel psychologically linked to one another (Harrison et al., 1998; O'Reilly et al., 1989; Smith et al., 1994). This notion of social integration involves complex mechanisms at multiple levels—interpersonal and person-to-group relationships. Thus, although shifts and transformation among different levels of self are possible (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Sedikides & Brewer, 2001), I emphasize the positive person-to-group ties that form the basis for cohesion in teams.

If positive person-to-group relationships are established, group welfare becomes an end in itself (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Brewer & Kramer, 1986), making person-to-group relationships important to distinguish both conceptually and empirically (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Prentice et al., 1994; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Importantly, how an individual forms a relationship with a particular social entity is captured by social identity theory. Social identity has three dimensions—cognitive, affective, and evaluative. That is, social identity refers to the individual's knowledge that one belongs to certain social groups (cognitive), together with some emotional (affective) and value significance (evaluative) to the group membership (Tajfel, 1972). Among multiple dimensions of social identity, a specific dimension of import in this study concerns the affective dimension of social identity that captures the extent to which members feel positive about their membership in the team and feel attached to the team. Positive affect is one of the features of positive relationships (Collins, 1990; Lawler, 2001; Lawler & Yoon, 1993), and research suggests how relationships that are affective in nature produce stable social structures. For example, strong person-to-group affective ties generate more resilient social orders than instrumental ties (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Parsons, 1951), and members are more inclined to remain in the group and exert more efforts on behalf of group goals (Lawler et al.,

2009). Although past research suggested that imposing cross-cutting social categories reduces the detrimental effects of intergroup biases due to recategorization (Gaertner et al, 1989), I consider individuals as active meaning-seekers who develop positive ties to the collective according to the subjective meaning the collective provides to them. In this vein, I maintain from an inductive perspective that cohesion in work teams emerges as a consequence of psychological mechanisms operating in task interactions. Put differently, I conceptualize that cohesion is an emergent state in teams (Jans et al., 2011; Jans et al., 2012; Lawler et al., 2009), that indicates the extent to which members of the team come to develop affective attachment to their team. Thus, the “positivity” that individual members developed toward the team should make the team cohesive.

For the experimental studies discussed in this paper I created teams of two, or dyads, to represent a basic type of social interaction in which actors engage in a joint activity to produce a collective product. There are controversies over whether dyads are groups or not (Moreland, 2010; Williams, 2010). On one hand, some scholars argue that dyads are not groups because dyads form and dissolve more quickly and because some group phenomena cannot occur in dyads (e.g., Moreland, 2010). On the other hand, some scholars argue that dyads are groups because fundamental aspects of group behaviors such as social facilitation and social loafing occur in dyads (e.g., Williams, 2010). Individuals' motivation and performance are influenced by the presence of other individual in dyads as well as larger groups. Despite the controversy, I suggest that dyads align with the definition of the work team — a “group” of individuals working interdependently to solve problems or to accomplish tasks (Hackman, 1987; Kirkman & Shapiro, 1997; Manz & Sims, 1993; Sundstrom, De Meuse, & Futrell, 1990).

To be sure, there are complicated dynamics in groups of three or more that cannot be captured in dyad. Yet, dyad-level studies seem valuable for examining in a fundamental way how diversity promotes or hinders cohesion. Teams are likely to be diverse in a variety of ways, making it hard to capture a specific effect of a given dimension of diversity. Although conceptualizing and measuring diversity involves complexity (Harrison & Klein, 2007), my purpose is to nail down the effects of specific types of diversity by making a single category of homogeneity and heterogeneity most salient in a given situation (Ragins, 1997; Thomas & Higgins, 1996). In dyads, the formation of minority/majority relations and subgroups is eliminated and a clear comparison is possible between homogeneous or heterogeneous “groups” in terms of a given social category. For these sorts of reasons, I conduct dyad-level studies in order to disentangle the essential effects of diversity or homogeneity with other potential factors controlled as much as possible. Practically, dyadic interactions are prevalent in organizations in the form of various interpersonal work relationships such as leader-member relationships and mentoring relationships, forming a basis of broader social networks within organizations. In sum, the current project intends to reveal circumstances under which a dyad as a unique social unit becomes cohesive.

With regard to diversity in teams, team composition is the configuration of member attributes in a team (Levine & Moreland, 1990). According to one of the widely used typologies of diversity, there are two types of diversity: surface-level and deep-level diversity (Bell, 2007; Jackson et al., 1995; Harrison et al., 1998). Surface-level diversity is defined as differences among group members in overt characteristics typically reflected in physical features such as age, sex, and race, whereas deep-level diversity refers to differences in members' psychological characteristics such as personalities, perspectives, and values. In addition to the distinction

between surface- and deep-level diversity, another dimension that is particularly useful in organizational contexts concerns job relatedness, which refers to the degree to which a type of diversity is directly related to the task at hand. For example, diversity in distinct experiences, skills, or perspectives relevant to cognitive tasks at work is an important property that constitutes an increase in a group's potential for better performance (Milliken & Martins, 1996; Pelled, 1996). Given the importance of job-related diversity on cognitive tasks, I highlight the effects of deep-level (cognitive) diversity that is highly related to the team task in a given context. The experimental studies conducted in this research parsimoniously disentangle the complex effects of both individualism-collectivism and diversity through experimental manipulations.

In this conceptual context, I aim to explicitly theorize how and when work teams, particularly diverse teams, become cohesive by revisiting the relationship between individualism-collectivism and team composition. In terms of social identity theory, the current study addresses the inductive emergence of positive collective identity that is affective in nature. Therefore, the following sections will discuss the joint effects of individualism-collectivism and team composition on work team cohesion and the theoretical reasoning that leads to a proposition that individualism will generate greater cohesion in diverse teams, whereas collectivism will generate greater cohesion in homogeneous teams. Two experimental studies that provide evidence for this overarching framework will be presented. Utilizing teams of two that were either diverse or homogeneous, I examined indirect as well as direct paths by which cohesion emerges at the team level.

Individualism-Collectivism and Cohesion in Work Teams

Individualism-collectivism, as a broad multi-construct, influences self, values, world view, and behaviors (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1989; 1995). Specifically, individualism entails a self-concept that is defined in individual or trait terms, whereas collectivism defines self with reference to a societal and cultural context (Earley & Gibson, 1998). Likewise, individualism-collectivism demonstrates fundamental differences in the nature of the relationship between the individual and the collective (Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz, 1994), such as how people make sense of themselves and the social world (Oyserman et al., 2009), and how they maintain distance between self and both others and collectives (Brewer & Chen, 2007; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Nisbett, 2003; Oyserman et al., 2002; Triandis, 1995). In general, contrasts have been noted in the extent to which people are autonomous individuals or embedded in their groups (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Schwartz, 1994). Those in individualistic contexts act as if they define self as an entity consisting of a unique person, while those in collectivistic contexts act as if they define self as an entity that includes a particular group of others beyond the individual (Wagner, 1995).

An assumption shared in many organizational studies as well as in conventional wisdom is that collectivism is more likely to generate behaviors conducive to organizational functioning, such as cooperation, than is individualism (Chen et al., 2002; Cox et al., 1991; Mead, 1976; Triandis, 1990; Wagner, 1995). Thus, one might suggest that collectivism is a key in enhancing cohesion in work teams. Consistent with the stream of research supporting the value of collectivism, Chatman et al. (1998) found that potential benefits of demographic diversity are more likely to be realized in collectivistic organizations. The underlying reasoning, drawing on self-categorization theory, is that collectivism makes the common organizational identity salient,

making categorical differences among diverse group members less obvious. In support of this prediction, they found that compared with an individualistic organizational culture, a collectivistic culture enhances social interactions and creative performance to a greater degree in demographically diverse groups.

Although the benefit of collectivism in diverse teams was convincingly argued and discovered by a prior study, the downsides of collectivism in diverse team functioning has also been pointed out by researchers. For instance, collectivism may discourage individuals from thinking and acting in ways associated with their uniqueness, thus leading individuals to behave in a uniform way (Polzer et al., 2002). In other words, collectivism may, in the long run, homogenize members and impede the process of preserving and continuously capitalizing on diversity. Importantly, subgroup formation and the resulting fragmentation in work teams is more likely to occur under collectivism due to a tendency to make ingroup-outgroup distinctions, which is found to be more active in collectivistic contexts. Research has shown that collectivism is more subject to intergroup biases and ingroup favoritism because of the importance of maintaining ingroup boundaries in collectivistic contexts (Brewer, 1999; Huff & Kelly, 2003; Triandis et al., 1988; Yamagishi, 1994). Thus, if those under collectivism make sharp distinctions between their ingroup and the outgroup and tend to develop intense emotional attachments to the ingroup, as found by research (Earley, 1989; Wheeler et al., 1989), imposing collectivism may not be ideal for diverse teams. However, such a tendency toward ingroup favoritism or the preference for similar others is attenuated in individualistic cultures, with those in individualistic contexts more comfortable at meeting outsiders, forming new ingroups, and getting along with new or different people than those under collectivism (Oyserman et al., 2002; Triandis et al., 1988). This line of research suggests that collectivism may facilitate social

categorization processes in diverse teams that generate ingroup-outgroup fragmentation within the team, thereby decreasing the level of cohesion at the team level.

Then the question arises as to whether and how individualism is more conducive to diverse team functioning than collectivism. In general team contexts, research has shown the benefits of individualism in work teams. For instance, individualism facilitates group creativity to a greater degree than collectivism does because collectivism heightens pressure for conformity (Goncalo & Staw, 2003). Moreover, although not explicitly stated as an effect of individualism, indirect evidence suggests that individualism may enhance individuals' orientation to groups. Cable et al. (2013) found that the expression of an authentic self, which presumably is more likely in an individualistic context, fosters effective employment relationships such as greater customer satisfaction and employee retention. Particularly related to the topic of the current study is the positive role of individuation in diverse teams, which has been emphasized by research drawing on self-verification theory.

Self-verification theory contends that people want to be known for who they believe they are (Swann, 1983, 1996; Swann et al., 1994), and that self-verification has positive consequences such as connection, intimacy, and satisfaction. Consistent with self-verification theory, positive processes and outcomes in diverse teams were found to be facilitated when group members see others in the group as others see themselves—interpersonal congruence (Polzer et al., 2002). Specifically, Polzer and associates demonstrated that diverse teams with higher interpersonal congruence show not only improved creative task performance, but also improved social integration, identification, and less relationship conflict than diverse teams with low interpersonal congruence. They demonstrated how some teams serve as a self-verification context where each person is seen by others as they see themselves. Furthermore, another study,

although not taking a self-verification perspective, illustrated the inductive formation of social identity in heterogeneous teams (Jans et al., 2012). In support of their reasoning based on different routes of social identity formation, inductive or deductive, they found that the expression of individuality which represents an inductive route facilitates the formation of positive social identity in heterogeneous teams more than does the deductive route represented by the expression of shared similarities. This research suggests the possibility that heterogeneity in a team provides a sense of verification to those who express their individuality, thereby enhancing the formation of social identity. Taken together, one can infer from this line of research, emphasizing the role of individuation and individuality, that individualism may uniquely contribute to diverse team functioning because diversity may provide a sense of self-verification to those under individualism.

As delineated above, two distinct views in the diversity research show contrasting theoretical perspectives on the effects of individualism and collectivism on diverse team effectiveness. On one hand, research from self-categorization theory highlights the value of collectivism in diverse teams by suggesting that collectivism would prompt members to view themselves and different others as members of an overarching organization. On the other hand, research from self-verification theory signifies the value of individualism in diverse teams, accentuating the positive effects of individuation processes in diverse teams.

Taking a broader idea from social identity theory, depersonalization and individuation are at the heart of this implied contrast. According to Turner et al. (1987), depersonalization refers to "a shift towards the perception of self as an interchangeable exemplar of some social category and away from the perception of self as a unique person" (p. 50). In contrast to depersonalization, by which people are perceived as embodiments of a common shared social

category, individuation emphasizes the individuality or the uniqueness of individuals such that people are distinct and unique entities (Hogg & Terry, 2000; Swann et al., 2003; Turner et al., 1987). I propose that the difference between the two perspectives of diversity may be rooted in the different assumptions each perspective holds about how people define themselves, others, and the situation to which they belong. Research emphasizing collectivism in diverse teams, which draws from self-categorization theory, has suggested people would positively respond to and accept a depersonalized view based on a shared category and take on the self-view as an interchangeable exemplar of the organization (i.e., social self). Only when such an assumption or portrayal of people is met, can one reason that collectivism that endorses depersonalization would lead to positive processes and outcomes in diverse teams. In contrast, research drawing on self-verification theory, which maintains that the perception of individuality through individuation in diverse teams facilitates diverse team functioning, would be valid only under the assumption that people strive to verify their uniqueness (i.e., personal self). Such distinct assumptions that underlie the two contrasting views can be integrated by taking into account two issues: 1) the prominence of self-views—either personal or social self is subject to situational influence, and 2) that people have different self-verification motivation depending on the self-view made salient in the situation.

A situated cognition view of culture explains that differences in individualistic or collectivistic mindsets are malleable rather than fixed, and easily cued by contextual influence (Oyserman et al., 2002; Oyserman et al., 2009; Oyserman & Lee, 2008). From this perspective, the situational influence of individualism-collectivism may change self-views into either individualistic or collectivistic. Finally, because changes in self-definition are associated with significant changes in salient values, beliefs, and cognitive representations of the social world

(Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Swann et al., 2007), how individuals define themselves in a specific context may determine how they respond to depersonalization and individuation manifest in the context. Provided it is the context that influences both what comes to mind and how it is made sense of, the aforementioned contrast in diversity research can be reconciled into the following idea: collectivism elicits the mindset (depersonalization) that causes the perception of homogeneity in the face of diversity, while individualism elicits the mindset (individuation) that facilitates the acknowledgment of actual diversity in work teams. Thus, the key question guiding the current research is whether positive team processes and outcomes such as cohesion in diverse teams are more likely with individualism than with collectivism. To explore the possibility, I extend the notion of self-verification theory, proposing that diversity serves as a contextual cue that provides self-verification to those under individualism, whereas homogeneity serves as a signal of self-verification for those under collectivism. Consequently, greater cohesion will occur in the matching conditions in which self-verification is anticipated and experienced. Moreover, a culture as situated cognition model (Oyserman et al., 2002) enables the examination of how specific aspects of individualism-collectivism, framed in context, influence the way people deal with homogeneity and diversity.

Contingent Effects of Individualism-Collectivism on Cohesion: Self-Verification

Framework

Although research on self-verification theory has focused on people's desire to confirm the personal selves that make them unique (Swann, 1983; Swann et al., 2007), research has recently provided empirical evidence that people are also motivated to verify their collective self-views, which refers to who one is as a member of a social group or collective (Chen et al.,

2004; Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990; Swann et al., 2004; Swann et al., 2009). Studies revealed that people strive to verify different levels of self-definition, personal (e.g., I am unique) or collective (e.g., I am a woman), depending on the context. Thus, from the situational perspective of individualism-collectivism, I propose that individualism-collectivism may engender distinct self-verification processes in teams because of the different self-views prominent under individualism-collectivism. Personal aspect of self might be dominant under individualism, and thus the verification of the uniqueness of self as a person might be appreciated by members. In contrast, collective aspect of self might become more salient under collectivism, and thus the verification of self as an embodiment of a collective might be desired by members. Furthermore, beyond the idea of self-verification occurring in interpersonal interactions, I elucidate the person-to-group mechanisms by examining how contextual cues such as team composition facilitate self-verification processes. It is important to highlight the nature of the team as a signal because, in this paper particularly, cohesion denotes the extent to which members develop positive affective ties toward the team. The following section will discuss how and when individualism-collectivism elicits distinct types of self-verification processes and leads to work team cohesion contingent on team composition.

Drawing from the findings of prior research that self-verification promotes collective orientation to the upper level unit (Burke & Stet, 1999), I contend that individualism will generate greater cohesion in diverse teams because diversity is a contextual cue that verifies the self-views and diversity beliefs those under individualism hold. In comparison, collectivism will enhance cohesion in homogeneous teams because homogeneity serves as a signal that verifies the self-views and beliefs about homogeneity those under collectivism hold. Cues in organizations, such as information on the job or task environment characteristics, serve as social

information that determines an individual's attitudes and behaviors (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978). Such cues may originate from team norms, expectations, the behavior of other team members, and importantly, compositional information in a given context (Purdie-Vaughns et al., 2008). The signs derived from such environmental cues constitute a set of meanings that will function as a standard reference point in an identity control system (Burke, 1991). In this vein, it can be reasoned that the self-verification process involves the process of matching the self-relevant meanings in a situation to the meaning derived from the standard (Burke & Reitzes, 1991). Mismatches between the meanings carried in the identity identity standard and the self-relevant meanings in a situation (i.e., error signals) will translate into negative subjective experiences such as depression and distress (Burke 1991, 1996; Higgins 1989), while the matches or the reduction of the error signals will lead to positive experiences such as esteem and pride. The current study is based on the presumption that compositional information is a saliently significant self-relevant cue that will influence how individuals construct and interpret events, further determining their evaluation of the fit or the misfit between themselves and the situation. If the composition, for example diversity, is congruent with their subjective views, they will not only think that their views are correct but also sense that the situation is predictable, resting themselves assured that they know how to behave in the situation.

Particularly, the current study revisits and challenges two assumptions on the emergence of cohesion prevalent in social psychology, one on the positive effects of homogeneity and the other on collectivism (Chen et al., 1998; Jans et al., 2012). On one hand, it has been consistently reported that diversity undermines social cohesion (Putman, 2000; Putnam, 2007) and has negative effects on affective outcomes in teams (Milliken & Martins, 1996). On the other hand, collectivism has been considered to play an important role in the emergence of cohesion (Earley

& Gibson, 1998; Dierdorff et al., 2011; Mead, 1976; Triandis, 1990). Although it is important to acknowledge the main effect of composition or individualism-collectivism on work team cohesion, I propose that it is a matter of the fit between individualism-collectivism and composition that determines the level of cohesion, not necessarily the single effects of either collectivism or homogeneity. This is a cultural contingency model of cohesion that is consistent with Chen et al.'s proposed culturally contingent model of cooperation (1998), which advanced the discussion on the relationship between culture and cooperation. Moving the discussion forward from the often-emphasized value of collectivism in promoting cooperation, the authors suggested that different mechanisms will determine the effectiveness of cooperation for different cultures. They proposed six sets of contrasting cooperation mechanisms for individualists and collectivists: 1) goal interdependence versus goal sharing, 2) personal identity versus group identity enhancement, 3) cognition-based trust versus affect-based trust, 4) individual accountability versus group accountability, 5) partial-channel communication versus full-channel communication, and 6) equity-based reward distribution versus equality-based reward distribution. By delineating the conditions under which individualism and collectivism respectively foster cooperation in unique ways, they suggest that individualism is not an oxymoron to cooperation but that the mechanisms that entail the emergence of cooperation substantially vary depending on the cultural context. For example, related to set number 4 above, individual accountability versus group accountability, Early (1993) found that individual accountability enhances cooperation for individualists, but not for collectivists because, as he argues, in a culture in which the normative values are individualistic, cooperation mechanisms that appeal to and satisfy individual rationality and individuality will be more effective. In contrast, in a culture in which the normative values are collectivistic, cooperation mechanisms

that appeal to and satisfy collective rationality and sociality will be more effective. Thus, sharing the main line of reasoning with a cultural contingency model of cooperation, I suggest that there are conditions under which individualism uniquely fosters cohesion to a greater degree than collectivism does, and that diversity may be one of those conditions where individualism promotes cohesion. Put differently, individualism or diversity may not hinder cohesion, but rather the match of those two may lead to cohesion. In this sense, I specifically propose that the match between psychological states triggered by individualism-collectivism and team composition (i.e., diversity or homogeneity) generates psychological mechanisms underpinning the cohesion in work teams. With these considerations in mind, this project is organized around the following general proposition:

Proposition: Individualism generates greater cohesion in diverse teams than does collectivism, whereas collectivism generates greater cohesion in homogeneous teams than does individualism.

To elaborate and deepen the rationale for this proposition, I consider further the specific psychological states likely to be prominent under individualism-collectivism, and the match between psychological states and team composition enhances cohesion in work teams. Individualism-collectivism is a multi-construct concept that is associated with differences in the content of self-concept, ways of engaging others, cognitive style, values, and behaviors (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Nisbett, 2003; Oyserman et al., 2002). As such, because of the multifaceted nature of individualism-collectivism, which has been described as being conceptually fuzzy (Earley & Gibson, 1998), it is important to specify a focal aspect of individualism-collectivism

most relevant in a given situation. By doing so, the effects of unique dimensions of individualism-collectivism can be separately examined and captured (Brewer & Chen, 2007; Brockner, 2003; Chen et al., 1998; Fiske, 2002; Oyserman et al., 2002).

Accordingly, the focus of this study is on three distinct constructs encompassing self-construal, ingroup-construal, and diversity beliefs that will be differently shaped under individualism and collectivism. First, self-construal refers to how people define themselves in relation to others and groups (Brewer & Chen, 2007; Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Markus & Kitayama, 1991). In an individualistic context, people tend to hold independent self-construal, viewing self as unique and distinguishable from others. Those under collectivism view self as interdependent and tightly connected with others; an interchangeable part of a larger social entity (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; 1994). Because the issue of cohesion taps the subjective uncertainty about how to define themselves in relation to the collective (Ashmore et al., 2004), mechanisms concerning self-construal may reveal how cohesion emerges in teams as a function of how members make sense of teams in terms of who they think they are. On this issue of self and the collective, Dutton et al. (1994) found that when people find continuity between their self-concept and the nature of the collective, they find the collective more attractive than in the case of discontinuity or uncertainty.

Second, the notion of ingroup-construal in this study represents how people construe their ingroup, or the members in the ingroup as a whole, including themselves and others (Turner et al., 1987). A variety of subjective uncertainty is present in work teams beyond a matter of self. For instance, uncertainty about who “we” are as a group exists in teams, raising the uncertainty about whether how I define ourselves is valid in a certain situation (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Gaertner et al., 2006). Put differently, ingroup-construal denotes a prototype of the ingroup

members that is shared in teams and thus concerns subjective uncertainty at a collective level. For example, in some work contexts, individual members in the unit may be seen as unique individuals, whereas in other contexts individuals in the unit may be seen as exemplars of the collective who embody the characteristics of the collective. As such, perception of ingroup would vary as research has found conditions where ingroup is perceived as more homogeneous than outgroups (Rubin & Badaea, 2007; Simon & Brown, 1987; Simon et al., 1995). Specifically, parallel to the notion of self-construal, I maintain that distinct ingroup-construal manifests in teams as a function of individualism-collectivism such that individualism leads to the perception of heterogeneity while collectivism leads to the perception of homogeneity (Simon et al., 1995). How members construe their ingroup as a whole will differentially shape how they further respond to diversity or the homogeneity emergent in teams. Thus, exploration of the mechanism involving the interaction between distinct ingroup-construal and composition will extend a previously discussed issue of self-construal.

Finally, beliefs denote people's convictions concerning agency, their worldview as to what makes things happen (Brewer & Chen, 2007). According to Brewer & Chen (2007), one of the beliefs that individualism and collectivism differentially shape is that individualists believe in individual agency and responsibility for achievement, whereas collectivists believe in group interdependence in achievement. The current study particularly highlights diversity beliefs defined as people's beliefs that diversity is beneficial for the functioning of the team or the organization (Homan et al. 2007; Van Dick et al., 2008; Van Knippenberg et al., 2007). Although diversity beliefs may remove barriers for diverse groups to benefit from their diversity, people differ in their beliefs about and attitudes toward diversity (Hostager & De Meuse, 2002; van Knippenberg & Haslam, 2003). Diversity beliefs may be enduring individual characteristics

contingent on prior experience (van Knippenberg et al., 2007). It may also be situationally determined; Ely & Thomas, (2001) found that when an organization emphasized diversity as a valuable resource for the organization, members reported feeling more valued and respected, reported a higher quality of intergroup relations, and felt that they were more successful than when the organization's perspective was not focused on the potential value of diversity. Extending such a situational view on diversity beliefs, I explore whether individualism-collectivism triggers differential belief structures that will drive distinct mechanisms leading to cohesion. Taken together, three constructs of individualism-collectivism are illuminated, and the underlying mechanisms by which the match between those constructs and team composition leads to cohesion are examined, drawing from self-verification theory. I argue that verification of those three constructs in specific team contexts will cultivate members' positive relationships to the team, consequentially promoting cohesion at a team level.

To summarize, I propose that the fit or match between psychological states triggered by individualism-collectivism and team composition fosters cohesion. The overarching proposition is that individualism promotes cohesion in diverse teams, whereas collectivism promotes cohesion in homogeneous teams. The underlying reasoning is that greater cohesion occurs in teams when the composition of the team provides signals to members of the team that their self-construal, ingroup-construal, and diversity beliefs are verified in the context. Such verification of subjective issues will lead individuals to feel right and alive, thus forming a positive affective relationship with the work team. This process demonstrates the inductive formation of cohesion that I define as members' affective attachment to the team. With an emphasis on the affective nature of the cohesion, I examine in two experiments the manner in which this proposition will manifest.

Overview of the Studies

This project includes two experimental studies. Experimental manipulations involved specific constructs of individualism-collectivism such as self-construal (Study 1) and ingroup-construal (Study 2) as well as the diverse or homogeneous composition of the team (both Study 1 and Study 2). The two studies tested indirect and direct paths by which the interaction of individualism-collectivism and composition of the team leads to cohesion. Because the central feature of cohesion in the current study concerns an affective dimension, Study 1 was designed to highlight the mediating role of energetic affective tone, a team-level affective state indicating the extent to which members of a team feel energized. In short, Study 1 manipulated self-construal representing individualism-collectivism along with team composition to examine how the interaction of the two gives rise to energetic affective tone that in turn contributes to cohesion. Study 2 extended the notion of self-construal, exploring how the interplay of ingroup-construal and team composition influences cohesion. It manipulated ingroup-construal, which denotes how members of the team view their ingroup as a whole (i.e., the group prototype), including themselves and others in the team, with individuated vs. depersonalized ingroup-construal representing individualism vs. collectivism respectively. In addition to the direct interaction effect of individualism-collectivism and composition on cohesion, the mediating role of diversity beliefs in the relationship between individualism-collectivism and cohesion was tested in Study 2. Both Study 1 and Study 2 focused on specific types of diversity made salient in team interactions—those that concern a deep-level diversity related to the task at hand (Harrison et al., 1998; Jehn et al., 1999; Lawrence, 1997; Milliken & Martins, 1996; Webber & Donahue, 2001). Thus, work teams either diverse or homogeneous in underlying task-related characteristics.

CHAPTER 3

In Chapter 3, theoretical reasoning, method, and the findings of Study 1 are presented.

Study 1. Individualism that excites and solidifies diverse teams: Individualism-Collectivism, energetic affective tone, and the emergence of cohesion in task teams

Study 1 examines the hypothesized interaction effect of individualism-collectivism and team composition on cohesion by focusing on the self-construal construct, that is, how people view themselves in relation to others. To explore the interplay of distinct self-construal under individualism-collectivism and team composition on cohesion, I look at the mean level of group affect (Barsade et al., 2000; George, 1990), shedding particular light on the role of energetic affective tone in work teams. Energetic affective tone refers to the affective state of feeling energized at the team level. In other words, to explicitly capture the affective foundation of cohesion, Study 1 tests the mediating role of energetic affective tone in the emergence of cohesion in work teams.

Durkheim (1915) contended that joint activities generate uplift, elation, confidence, and other emotions that objectify larger group membership. His notion of uplifted emotion relates to one of the two facets of positive emotion (Larsen & Diener, 1992). Positive emotion is often construed as having a pleasure or satisfaction dimension and an interest or excitement dimension (Izard 1977; Watson and Tellegen 1985; Larsen and Diener 1992). The two are different in terms of the level of activation each entails. Pleasure/satisfaction denotes feeling gratified (low activation), while interest/excitement denotes feeling energized (high activation). Although there are various terms used to describe energetic feeling as reviewed by Quinn et al. (2012), such as energetic arousal (Thayer, 1989), positive activation (Watson et al., 1999), vitality (Ryan & Fredrick, 1997), emotional energy (Collins, 1981), and interest/excitement

(Lawler & Yoon, 1993), I use energetic affective tone to broadly refer to an affective state of teams associated with interest and excitement, that is, feeling energized. Energetic affective tone in this study represents a distinct dimension of positive emotion defined as a motivating state of curiosity and fascination (Izard, 1977), a positive state of arousal (Watson & Tellegen, 1985), or an active state of pleasure in the two-dimensional circumplex model (Larsen & Diener, 1992). By shedding new light on the circumstances in which people feel energized in the face of diversity, I also seek to further the understanding of the relationship between diversity and emotion (Ashkanasy et al., 2002).

Theories suggest how feeling energized in the social unit facilitates the formation and the maintenance of an individual's positive relationship to the unit. For instance, Collins (1993), using the term emotional energy, argued in his interaction ritual chain theory that people derive emotional energy from positive interactions and that they strive to recreate energizing experiences by reengaging in activities that they think will increase their energetic activation. The core idea of the theory is that this repetition generates chains of repeated activities that become stable social structures. In support of this theory, but at the interpersonal level of social exchange, Lawler and Yoon (1993) found that when people feel energetic activation in negotiated exchange due to reaching agreement, they are more likely to stay in relationships and engage in gift-giving behaviors. Consistent with such research highlighting the positive role of feeling energized in the formation of person-to-group ties, I examine whether people feel more energetic when there is a match between self-construal and team composition than when there is not and how such energetic affective tone in teams mediates the relationship between self-construal and cohesion.

Energy is more likely to be experienced when people engage in certain relational activities that give them more meaning, self-worth, and personal growth (Dutton, 2003; Dutton & Heaphy, 2003). In this sense, it is reasonable to infer that individuals will feel more energized when their views of self are verified in social contexts because such contexts affirm subjective meanings about self and their sense of self-worth. For example, the person-culture hypothesis (Fulmer et al., 2010) explains that when a person's personality matches the prevalent personalities of other people in a culture, culture serves to amplify the positive effect of personality on self-esteem—that is, confidence in one's own worth or abilities. This suggests that a perceived match on self-relevant issues in a team increases self-esteem, which is a basis of energetic feelings. Thus, verification of self-conceptually important matters should trigger energetic feelings, a high-arousal emotion, more than pleasantness and calm, low-arousal positive emotions.

Along this line of reasoning, I predict that the match between the members' self-construal and team composition will increase energetic affective tone in teams. In the case of individualistic self-construal, those who view themselves as unique will feel more energized and alive when they are in a context where their uniqueness is verified, such as being in a diverse team and interacting with others who are different from themselves. Put differently, teams under individualism will exhibit higher energetic affective tone when diversity exists in the team because diversity will serve as a cue that verifies how members view themselves (i.e., self-viewed as a unique individual). Conversely, those under collectivism who view themselves as interchangeable exemplars of the organization will feel more energized in homogeneous teams because homogeneity may serve as a validation of their self-construal (i.e., self-viewed as an interchangeable exemplar who is like others in the team). Hence, team contexts that provide

members with self-view verification cues will not only reduce subjective uncertainty of how to define themselves in the team context, but also energizes members.

Further, my argument is that energetic affective tone intervenes and is a mechanism that generates cohesion. Previous studies have found that when people feel positive in the course of joint activities, they tend to attribute positive emotion to the larger interaction unit and thus become more committed to the unit (Markovsky & Lawler, 1994; Lawler & Thye, 2006; Lawler et al., 2008). Consistent with their findings and the reasoning, I anticipate that energetic feeling experienced in teams will strengthen individuals' positive relationships to the team, because members might attribute such saliently positive feeling to the larger team context. Furthermore, per the social outlook hypothesis, positive events promote positive perception of the general social community and one's favorableness to the social entity where the situation has occurred (Holloway et al., 1977); this also suggests that energetic feelings in teams will lead members to feel positive toward the team. Thus, I predict that energetic affective tone will strengthen the affective ties each member has toward his or her team.

As noted, the current paper's examination of cohesion taps the inductive route by which positive social identity in work teams, particularly collective identity, emerges as a consequence of experiences in the team rather than of a given membership. Thus, in addition to the affective dimension of social identity that is of primary interest, this paper examines cognitive and evaluative dimensions of social identity development. In brief, I predict that energetic affective tone resulting from self-view verification in teams will increase the extent to which members perceive their team as more than a collection of individuals (i.e., perception of groupness), as well as the importance of the membership to their self-concept (i.e., collective self-esteem). The broaden-and-build-perspective (Fredrickson, 2001) posits that the experience

of positive emotions broadens people's momentary thought–action repertoires, which in turn serve to build their enduring personal resources, ranging from physical and intellectual resources to social and psychological resources. I expect that energetic affective tone will lead members to see a broader range of potential resources in the team. Those experiencing energetic feeling will tend to recognize and experience synergy in teams, perceiving that their team is more than a collection of individuals. Furthermore, regarding the evaluative dimension of social identity, collective self-esteem defined by the degree to which people value their social groups (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992) reflects the importance of social identity to one's sense of self. Identities are accompanied by particular feelings, and positive feelings serve as guidelines for evaluating the identity associated with the feelings (Heise, 1977). Teams that engender energetic experiences should become more important to members. Therefore, membership in a team may become important to members if they feel alive, excited, and vital in the team. In sum, I predict that higher energetic affective tone in teams will foster cohesion through the enhanced affective, cognitive, and evaluative dimensions of social identity that members develop toward their team.

Hypothesis 1. *There will be an interaction effect between individualism-collectivism and team composition on energetic affective tone such that: Individualistic self-construal generates higher energetic affective tone in diverse teams than does collectivistic self-construal, whereas collectivistic self-construal generates higher energetic affective tone in homogeneous teams than does individualistic self-construal.*

Hypothesis 2a. *The higher the energetic affective tone in teams, the more cohesive teams will be.*

Hypothesis 2b. *Energetic affective tone will mediate the impact of the interaction between individualism-collectivism and composition on cohesion.*

Hypothesis 3a. *The higher the energetic affective tone in teams, the more likely members will perceive the team as more than a collection of individuals (i.e., perception of groupness).*

Hypothesis 3b. *Energetic affective tone will mediate the impact of the interaction between individualism-collectivism and composition on perception of groupness.*

Hypothesis 4a. *The higher the energetic affective tone in teams, the more likely members will think that membership in the team is important to who they are (i.e., collective self-esteem).*

Hypothesis 4b. *Energetic affective tone will mediate the impact of the interaction between individualism-collectivism and composition on collective self-esteem.*

Method

Participants

One hundred sixty eight students at a large American university in an introductory course on organizational behavior participated in the study in exchange for course credit. The study was a 2 x 2 factorial design (Individualism vs. Collectivism: Individualistic self-construal vs. collectivistic self-construal) x (Diversity vs. Homogeneity: Diversity in cognitive estimation tendency vs. Homogeneity in cognitive estimation tendency). Teams of two people were randomly assigned to each of the four condition resulting in 21 teams per condition and a total of 84 teams. All teams were homogeneous in terms of gender.

Procedure

Participants were told that they were taking part in a study of how group decisions are made under conditions of uncertainty. The study consisted of three phases. In Phase 1,

participants worked on a Dot-estimation task that asked them to estimate the number of dots on each of the three pages. Dot-estimation task was used to provide participants with bogus feedback both on their own cognitive estimation tendency and the composition of the team in terms of the estimation tendency. Then, in Phase II, participants were asked to complete a survey that was designed to prime them with either individualism or collectivism particularly regarding self-construal. In Phase III, participants received feedback on their own estimation tendency ostensibly drawn from their response on the Dot-estimation task. The feedback also indicated the composition of their work team, either diverse or homogeneous in estimation tendency. Then, after reading the feedback, participants proceeded to the team task which involved a decision-making task called Lost at Sea. Finally, participants filled out questionnaire about their feelings, thoughts, and opinions. The entire study took approximately 40 minutes to complete.

Phase I. Dot-estimation task

At the beginning of the study, participants were seated in an individual cubicle and worked on a task called Dot-estimation that was ostensibly to capture participants' cognitive estimation tendency. Participants received a task booklet consisting of three pages each page of which was a box of black dots that vary in the number of dots, ranging from 100 to 200 (See Appendix). Participants were instructed that they would have 20 seconds in total to estimate the number of dots on the following three pages and that they would later receive feedback about their estimation tendency—whether they are an overestimator or an underestimator. Upon the completion of this task, the experimenter collected the booklet. I adopted this task (Gerard & Hoyt, 1974) to provide participants' with bogus feedback on their estimation tendency. This dot-estimation task has been used in other research to provide participants with feedback on their

cognitive tendency (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000). In the current study, this task also served as a basis of creating teams that are diverse or homogeneous in cognitive estimation tendency.

Phase II: Manipulation of individualistic vs. collectivistic self-construal

In Phase II, participants were asked to fill out a survey that was designed to determine how they view themselves in relation to other people. This task has been used successfully in other research to prime participants with individualism-collectivism (Goncalo & Staw, 2006). All participants were asked to write at least three statements in response to each question, and they were given 10 minutes to complete the survey. To immerse participants in the experimental situation, the instruction asked them to imagine that they were a member of an organization that has an individualistic/collectivistic culture. Participants in the individualistic self-construal condition were asked to respond to the following three questions ostensibly what their organization would ask them to think about:

- A. Write three statements describing yourself.
- B. Write three statements about why you think you are not like most other people.
- C. Write three statements about why you think it might be advantageous to “stand out” from other people.

Conversely, participants in the collectivistic self-construal condition were asked to respond to the following three questions:

- A. Write three statements describing the groups to which you belong.
- B. Write three statements about why you think you are like most other people.
- C. Write three statements about why you think it might be advantageous to “blend in” with other people.

Ten statements task

After 10 minutes elapsed, the experimenter returned and administered 10 statements task asking participants to write ten answers to the simple question 'who am I?' (Kuhn & McPartland, 1954). This task was used as a manipulation check to see whether the priming of individualism-collectivism successfully framed how participants view themselves. The experimenter also mentioned to participants that they would work on this task while the experimenter examined their responses on the Dot-estimation task and that they would later receive feedback on their estimation tendency.

Feedback on their own cognitive estimation tendency

After 10 minutes elapsed, the experimenter returned and collected their responses on the Phase II task. The experimenter then handed each individual a sheet of feedback that indicated their own estimation tendency. Half the total participants read that their response on the dot-estimation task revealed that they were overestimators, while the other half read that they were found to be underestimators. Feedback that participants read was “Your response on the previous dot-estimation task indicates that you are an *overestimator (or underestimator)*.” Also, in order for participants to have a neutral sense of being underestimators or overestimators, following note was added on the feedback (Howard & Rothbart, 1980): “Past research has shown that the numbers of overestimators and underestimators in the population seem to be about even. Also, each style of estimation does not relate to the accuracy of judgments, but simply represents different patterns of responding.”

Phase III: Feedback on the composition of their team and decision-making task

The experimenter then introduced the participants to the next task. Before working on the actual decision-making task in teams, participants read the instruction that “You will work in a dyad to solve a survival problem for Chris who is lost at sea. The scenario is described in detail on the next page. Your task is to rank the importance of these 15 items to Chris’ survival. You will place the number 1 by the most important item, the number 2 by the second most important, and so on. You will have 10 minutes to complete the task.” Then, they also read on the instruction page about the cognitive estimation tendency of the other person who would work with them in a team of two for the decision-making task. Importantly, this information about the partner’s estimation tendency was designed to manipulate participants’ perception of diversity or the homogeneity in teams to which they would belong for the task. For instance, underestimators who were in diversity condition read that “The estimation tendency of the other participant you will be working with on a decision-making task is an overestimator.” To make sure that participants correctly understand the composition of the team in terms of estimation tendency, participants were asked to answer two simple questions about their own and the other participant’s estimation tendency. The questions were “What was your estimation tendency written on the feedback?” and “What is the other participant’s estimation tendency?”

After reading this instruction page and briefly reviewing the items they would talk about with the other participant in the Lost at Sea task, each teams of the two people were escorted to the discussion table for the completion of Lost at Task. When seated as a team, they were given 10 minutes to discuss and rank the importance of 15 items on a single ranking sheet. On a single ranking sheet was the detailed scenario about someone lost at sea and the 15 items that needed to be ranked in terms of the importance to survival.

Dependent variables

When the decision making task in team was completed, each participant was escorted back to individual cubicle and was asked to complete the dependent measures described below. In each case, participants responded on a 9-point scale. I averaged the response of two individuals of each team to generate team-level variables.

Energetic affective tone in team

To measure energetic affective tone in teams, four items were adopted from measures of interest/excitement (Lawler et al., 2000). Each individual responded to the question of how they felt during decision-making in teams. They indicated on the following 9-point scales:

1(*disinterested*) to 9 (*interested*) , 1(*bored*) to 9(*excited*), 1(*unenthusiastic*) to 9 (*enthusiastic*), 1 (*unmotivated*) to 9(*motivated*) ($\alpha = .863$).

Cohesion

I used the six items adopted from Lawler et al., (2008). The items asked participants to indicate how they feel about their relationship to the dyad. They responded on the following nine-point scales: 1 (*bad*) to 9 (*good*), 1 (*attached*) to 9 (*detached*), 1 (*disloyal*) to 9 (*loyal*), 1 (*disconnected*) to 9 (*connected*), 1 (*negative*) to 9 (*positive*), and 1 (*distant*) to 9 (*close*) ($\alpha = .90$).

Perception of groupness

To measure the extent participants perceived the dyad to which they belonged as a group or a mere collection of individuals, I asked participants to respond to a question “To what extent do you think of you and the other participant as a group?” on the following 9-point scale: 1 (*a collection of individuals*) to 9 (*a group*).

Collective self-esteem

Four items adopted from Luhtanen and Crocker (1992) measured collective self-esteem. Example items include “The dyad I belonged to is an important reflection of who I am.”, “The dyad I belonged to is important to my sense of what kind of a person I am.”, “In general, belonging to this dyad reflects an important part of my self-image.”, and “Membership in this dyad has very little to do with how I feel about myself (reverse-coded)” ($\alpha = .878$). They responded on a 9-point scale ranging from 1(*strongly disagree*) to 9(*strongly agree*).

Results

Manipulation checks

Individualistic vs. collectivistic self-construal

I examined each participant’s responses on a 10 statements task to see whether the statements included more personal-level self-descriptions or more social-level self-descriptions. For instance, statements describing one’s personal attributes such as name and personality were counted as personal, while statements describing social membership or relationships (e.g., affiliation, family, friendship) were counted as social statements. I then counted the number of each participant’s personal and social statements to calculate the percentage of personal-level statements out of the total statements generated, creating the ratio of personal-level statements for each individual. ANOVA results showed, consistent with the purpose of the manipulation, that individualism led to a higher ratio of personal-level statements ($M=0.64$) than did collectivism ($M=0.55$), $F(1,79)=9.4$, $p<.01$.

Diversity vs. homogeneity

Before the decision-making task in teams began, participants were asked to answer two questions designed to ensure that they correctly perceived the diversity or the homogeneity of their team. Participants were asked to indicate their own and the other team participant's estimation tendency, which they had learned from feedback. In a few cases of incorrect indication, the researcher redirected participant attention to the feedback so they could correctly perceive the composition of the task team to which they belonged.

Energetic affective tone

As hypothesized, univariate analysis of variance indicated that there was a significant interaction between individualism-collectivism and team composition on energetic affective tone, $F(1,79)=5.35, p<.05$. I further explored this interaction by conducting post hoc pairwise comparisons. I examined the effect of individualism-collectivism among diverse teams and then the effect of individualism-collectivism among homogeneous teams. As shown in Figure 1 and Table 1, energetic affective tone was higher in diverse teams under individualism ($M=6.12, SD=0.74$) than those under collectivism ($M=5.60, SD=0.94$) at a marginally significant level, $F(1,79)=3.50, p=.065$. No significant difference was found between homogeneous teams under individualism ($M=5.80, SD=0.19$) and collectivism ($M=6.19, SD=0.19$), $F(1,79)=1.96, ns$. The effect of gender was controlled, but there was a significant difference between female groups ($M=5.63, SD=0.95$) and male groups ($M=6.23, SD=0.87$), $F(1,79)=9.72, p<.01$. Teams of male participants tended to show higher energetic affective tone than female teams. Overall, hypothesis 1 predicting the interaction between individualism-collectivism and team composition on energetic affective tone was supported, after controlling for the effects of gender.

Table 1
Means and Standard deviations per condition

	Experimental Condition			
	Diverse		Homogeneous	
	Individualism	Collectivism	Individualism	Collectivism
Energetic affective tone	6.12 (0.74)	5.60(0.94)	5.80(0.19)	6.19(0.94)

Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses.




Figure 1. Energetic tone by condition

Cohesion

To examine the mediation effects of energetic affective tone linking the interaction of individualism-collectivism and composition to cohesion, I employed Rucker et al.'s (2011) approach. They suggest that Baron and Kenny's (1986) approach requiring a direct effect of the distal predictor (individualism-collectivism X composition) on the outcome (cohesion) is unnecessarily restrictive because suppression effects can conceal significant total or direct effects. Thus, I tested 1) whether the distal predictor (individualism-collectivism X composition) has a

significant relationship with the mediator (energetic affective tone), 2) whether the mediator (energetic affective tone) has a significant relationship with the outcome (cohesion) after controlling for the distal predictor (individualism-collectivism X composition), and 3) whether the relationship between the distal predictor and the outcome is not significant in the presence of the mediator (full mediation) or whether both relationships are significant (partial mediation).

The regression results showing the mediation are reported in Table 2. First, consistent with the univariate analyses of variance results in the above section, the interaction of individualism-collectivism and team composition had a significant effect on energetic affective tone (Model 1 of Table 2). That is, individualism generated higher energetic tone in diverse teams than collectivism did. Further, as shown in Model 2 of Table 2, energetic tone had a significantly positive relationship with cohesion ($B=.515, p<.000$) after controlling for the effect of the distal predictor (individualism-collectivism X composition). This provided support for hypothesis 2a that cohesion increases with energetic tone. Lastly, the effect of interaction between individualism-collectivism and composition had no significant effect on cohesion ($B=-.083, ns.$) as shown in Model 2 of Table 2. In combination of Models 1 and 2 of Table 2, the results showed a full mediation through energetic tone, supporting hypothesis 2b regarding the mediating effect of energetic tone in the emergence of cohesion. Also, a significant indirect effect of the distal predictor (individualism-collectivism X composition) on cohesion was found ($B=0.20, p<.05$). Thus, the results proved that significant interaction between individualism-collectivism and composition leads to cohesion via the mediating role of energetic tone.

Perception of groupness

The same patterns were found for the perception of groupness as shown in Model 3 in Table 2. In support of hypothesis 3a, energetic tone had a significantly positive relationship with

perception of groupness ($B=.359, p<.001$), after controlling for the effect of the distal predictor (individualism-collectivism X composition). However, the effect of interaction between individualism-collectivism and composition had no significant effect on cohesion ($B=.152, ns.$) as presented in Model 3 of Table 2. In combination of Models 1 and 3 of Table 2, the results showed a full mediation via the role of energetic tone, providing evidence for hypothesis 3b. An indirect effect of the distal predictor (individualism-collectivism X composition) on cohesion was found to be marginally significant ($B=0.12, p<.062$). Furthermore, an unexpected effect of gender was found such that female participants were more likely to perceive their work teams as more than just a collection of individuals than did male participants.

Table 2

Regression results for antecedents variables of energetic tone and the mediation effect of energetic tone leading to cohesion, perception of groupness, and collective self-esteem

	Model 1 Energetic tone	Model 2 Cohesion	Model 3 Perception of Groupness	Model 4 Collective Self-esteem
Individualism- Collectivism	-.204	.020	-.055	.111
Diversity- Homogeneity	.313	.156	.029	.069
Individualism- collectivism x Composition	.413*	-.083	.152	-.076
Gender	-.323**	.093	.235*	.055
Energetic tone	—	.515***	.359**	.389**
R ²	.40	.49	.40	.374

Notes N=84 dyads

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

Coding of individualism vs. collectivism: Individualism=1, Collectivism=0

Coding of diversity vs. homogeneity: Diversity=1, Homogeneity=0

Coding of gender: Female=1, Male=0

Collective self-esteem

As presented in Model 4 of Table 2, energetic tone had a significantly positive relationship with collective self-esteem ($B=.389, p<.001$), providing support for hypothesis 4a. The effect of interaction between individualism-collectivism and composition, however, had no significant effect on cohesion ($B=-.076, ns.$). In combination of Models 1 and 4 of Table 2, the results showed a full mediation effect of energetic tone leading to cohesion. Thus, hypothesis 4b was supported. An indirect effect of the distal predictor (individualism-collectivism X composition) on cohesion was found to be significant ($B=0.16, p<.05$).

Taken together, the results revealed that energetic tone served as a mediator through which the significant effect of the interaction between individualism-collectivism and composition carries over to indicators of positive social identity in teams—cohesion, perception of groupness, and collective self-esteem.

Summary

Study 1 yielded evidence for the positive effect of individualism on diverse team processes and outcomes. As predicted, individualism generated greater energetic tone in diverse teams. Further, it was found that energetic tone was positively associated with cohesion, serving as a mediator linking the interplay of individualism-collectivism and composition to cohesion. Thus, this study suggested that individualism contributed to cohesion in diverse teams by elevating the energetic feeling members experienced in the team context. My interpretation is that individualism leads members to feel energized when diversity exists in teams because diversity verifies their self-view that they themselves are unique individuals. Further, the energetic tone created through this path gives rise to cohesion by enhancing affective, cognitive, and evaluative

ties members have toward their teams. However, there was no significant difference between homogeneous teams primed with collectivism and those primed with individualism. Although the prediction was not supported in homogeneous teams, such a non-significant difference demonstrated that, even in homogeneous teams, collectivism is no better than individualism at generating energetic tone and furthering cohesion. In summary, by examining the joint effect of individualism-collectivism and composition on energetic tone that in turn increases cohesion, this study presented an affective mechanism by which individualism contributes to diverse team cohesion.

CHAPTER 4

In Chapter 4, theoretical reasoning, method, and the findings of Study 2 are presented.

Study 2. When diversity verifies who we are and my beliefs about diversity: Positive relationship between individuated ingroup-construal and diverse team cohesion

Study 1 yielded results in line with my central proposition that individualism sets the foundation of and facilitates cohesion in diverse teams. Although the idea that collectivism facilitates cohesion in homogeneous teams more than individualism was not supported, the results of Study 1 suggested that verification of the self as unique individual is important for those under individualism, thereby fostering cohesion in diverse teams. However, being a member of a team entails a variety of uncertainties in addition to the uncertainty about self. Extending the notion of self-construal highlighted in Study 1, Study 2 focused on two psychological states, ingroup-construal and diversity beliefs. Ingroup-construal refers to how people view members of the ingroup including self and others, and diversity beliefs refers to the degree to which members think diversity is important for the team. Consistent with the overarching proposition of this project, I predict that if ingroup-construal and diversity beliefs are verified by the contextual cues delivered in composition information, more positive relationships to the team will unfold, and this will in turn lead to greater cohesion.

Although research on self-verification theory (Swann, 1983) has focused on people's desire to confirm their individual selves that make them unique (Swann et al., 2007), recent research has extended the notion of self-verification to include self-verification processes operating at a collective level of self associated with one's membership in a group or collective (Chen et al., 2004; Gomez et al., 2009). People strive to verify views of themselves as members of a group, and there are conditions in which collective self-verification is more likely. Research

has demonstrated that people seek verification of the characteristics of their social group when the collective self is made salient (Chen et al., 2004), when the characteristics of collective is self-descriptive, and when they are highly invested in their ingroup identities (Gomez et al., 2009). For example, one who thinks that “people in my organization are extroverted” would strive to verify his or her “extrovertness” when the collective identity is made salient. In line with research suggesting conditions under which collective self-verification operates, Study 2 extends the findings of Study 1 by exploring whether such collective self-verification processes vary as a function of individualism-collectivism.

One of the central components of collective self-verification is how people perceive the characteristics of their ingroup, and it hinges on individualism-collectivism (Brewer & Chen, 2007; Coats et al., 2000). That is, parallel to the notion of self-construal, ingroup-construal can be of two types, either a view of ingroup that members are unique individuals or a view that members are interchangeable exemplars of the ingroup. Thus, Study 2 examines how ingroup-construal at a collective level differentially shaped under individualism-collectivism is verified, and what the consequences are of such verification. Drawing from the research suggesting that people want to verify their ingroup identities, I propose that people will strive to verify ingroup-construal, that is a shared view of who “we” are that involves both self and others in the ingroup. Specifically, ingroup-construal in this study denotes whether people construe members as unique individuals or as interchangeable exemplars of the organization.

It is often thought that ingroup is likely to be perceived as homogeneous. According to self-categorization and social categorization theories, categorization of people perceptually assimilates them to the relevant ingroup or outgroup prototype and thus perceptually accentuates prototypical similarities among people in the same group and prototypical differences of people

from different groups (Hogg, 2001; Tajfel, 1969; Turner et al., 1987). This process is called depersonalization because people are not viewed as unique individuals but as exemplars of the pertinent ingroup. The focus of depersonalization is on prototypicality, not individuality. However, such a demonstration that members hold a depersonalized ingroup-construal raises a question regarding the nature of the prototype. Are there circumstances in which a unique individual or the individuality serves as a prototype of the group? There are discussions that suggest the possibility that ingroup-construal may be dependent on individualism-collectivism (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Simon et al., 1995; Stapel & Koomen, 2001). With regard to the relationship between self-definition and cognitive construal of ingroups, some work argues that if salient personal self is activated, self-schematic traits become accessible dimensions for evaluating others (Higgins et al., 1982; Markus et al., 1985). In contrast, if collective identity is made salient, the ingroup-outgroup distinction becomes the most important guideline for evaluating others. This line of reasoning suggests the positive association between individualism, where personal self is emphasized, and the perception of ingroup heterogeneity. Indeed, Simon et al. (1995) found that greater emphasis on the individual self accentuates greater perception of ingroup heterogeneity.

Other evidence supporting this relationship between individualism-collectivism and ingroup-construal points to a positive link between individualism and differentiation mindset and, contrastingly, between collectivism and integration mindset (Stapel & Koomen, 2001). Considered together, this research demonstrates that individualism provokes a mindset conscious of the differences between people while collectivism provokes a mindset attentive to commonalities. As such, people under individualistic context may view others in terms of traits that make them unique and perceive that others in the ingroup, as well as themselves, are unique

individuals. In contrast, views of those under collectivism may be driven by the shared membership, leading them to perceive that members including both self and others within the ingroup are alike as interchangeable exemplars of the collective.

In light of this discussion, Study 2 illuminates the role of ingroup-construal under individualism or collectivism, based on the reasoning that prototypes of the ingroup do not necessarily project depersonalized views. Rather, collectivism may elicit a depersonalized ingroup-construal (i.e., that members are alike and embody the organization), while individualism may elicit an individuated ingroup-construal (i.e. that a unique individual is a prototype). Importantly, distinct ingroup-construals may underlie contrasting views of diversity in research. Depersonalized ingroup-construal reflects the main idea of research using self-categorization theory that proposes the value of collectivism in diverse teams (e.g., Chatman et al., 1998). Because collectivism is suggested to create a depersonalized sense that we are alike as members of the organization or the team, the notion of depersonalized ingroup-construal captures the main ideas in this research stream. In contrast, individuated ingroup-construal reflects the discussions in studies that emphasize the benefit of individuation for the functioning of diverse teams (e.g., Polzer et al., 2002), who claimed that acknowledgment of the individuality and uniqueness of individual members in the team is essential, which denotes the importance of individuated ingroup-construal.

Therefore, to explicate such a theoretical contrast reflecting differences in ingroup-construal under individualism-collectivism, Study 2 directly compares depersonalized ingroup-construal representing collectivism and individuated ingroup-construal representing individualism to examine whether the verification of ingroup-construal in the team context generates greater cohesion. Because Study 1 provided evidence of the mediation process that

showed the affective basis of cohesion, Study 2 primarily examined how the interaction effect of individualism-collectivism and composition directly leads to cohesion. I predict that diversity will serve to provide verification of individuated ingroup-construal such that those under individualism will think that diversity represents or is congruent with their sense of who “we” are. Consequently, this ingroup verification will lead to greater cohesion than in the mismatch between ingroup-construal and composition. In contrast, homogeneity will provide verification of the depersonalized ingroup-construal that those under collectivism hold, leading to greater cohesion when collectivism is prominent.

In addition to ingroup-construal, Study 2 explores whether a different belief structure can be triggered under individualism-collectivism. Specifically, focusing on diversity beliefs defined as one’s beliefs about the value of diversity to work group functioning (Homan et al., 2007; Van Dick et al., 2008; Van Knippenberg et al., 2007), I further test whether the match between beliefs that members hold about diversity and the actual composition of the team to which they belong fosters cohesion in teams. Homan et al. (2007) found that when group members see diversity as valuable to group functioning, they respond more positively to diversity and thus respond favorably to a group with diverse membership. Moreover, evidence was found for the moderating influence of diversity beliefs on the relationship between subjective diversity—perceived ethnic diversity—and group identification (Van Dick et al., 2008). The relationship between subjective diversity and identification is more positive in ethnically diverse teams when group members hold diversity beliefs. Their analyses also revealed that diversity beliefs are positively related to individuals’ desire to stay in diverse groups. These results suggest that diversity beliefs influence not only how individuals respond to the diversity of the team, but also how they think and behave in the context of work team

diversity. Diversity beliefs increase individuals' team orientation when the team is perceived to be diverse.

By highlighting the role of diversity beliefs, I adopt a situational view that diversity beliefs can be situationally triggered (Ely & Thomas, 2001). Beliefs that denote people's convictions concerning agency, their worldview as to what makes things happen (Brewer & Chen, 2007), and the schemas for what constitutes successful workgroups are found to vary across cultures (Baldwin, 1992; Sanchez-Burks et al., 2000). Thus, I anticipate that individualism-collectivism will differently shape people's diversity beliefs. Those under individualism who view every individual in the team as a unique entity may be more likely to recognize and embrace the value of diversity in work teams. In contrast, ingroup-construal under collectivism may bring about the beliefs that having members who are alike and interchangeable exemplars of the team will be more effective than having diverse members. Thus, I predict that individualism will lead to greater cohesion in diverse teams not only because it entails diversity beliefs that promote positive responses to diversity, but also because diversity affirms/validates the beliefs of members under individualism. That is, the composition of the work team may provide members with sense of verification about their beliefs—what makes things work and succeed. Collectivism, in contrast, may lead to greater cohesion in homogeneous teams as homogeneity aligns with and validates the beliefs of those under collectivism that homogeneity boosts team functioning.

In summary, Study 2 examines two mechanisms involving ingroup-construal and diversity beliefs of members. Consistent with the overarching proposition of this paper, I predict that diversity serves as a contextual cue that verifies ingroup-construal and diversity beliefs that those in individualistic contexts hold, thereby fostering cohesion in diverse teams under

individualism. In contrast, I predict that homogeneity serves as a contextual cue that verifies ingroup-construal and similarity beliefs that those in collectivistic contexts hold, and thus fosters cohesion in homogeneous teams under collectivism. A specific type of deep-level diversity made salient in Study 2 concerns opinion diversity/homogeneity.

Hypothesis 1. *There will be an interaction effect between individualism-collectivism and composition on work team cohesion such that: Individuated ingroup-construal generates greater cohesion in diverse teams than does depersonalized ingroup-construal, whereas depersonalized ingroup-construal generates greater cohesion in homogeneous teams than does individuated ingroup-construal.*

Hypothesis 2a. *Individuated ingroup-construal will trigger diversity beliefs more than depersonalized ingroup-construal.*

Hypothesis 2b. *Greater diversity beliefs will promote cohesion in diverse work teams.*

Hypothesis 2c. *Diversity beliefs will mediate the relationship between individuated ingroup-construal and cohesion in diverse teams.*

Hypothesis 3a. *Depersonalized ingroup-construal will trigger similarity beliefs more than individuated ingroup-construal.*

Hypothesis 3b. *Similarity beliefs will promote cohesion in homogeneous work teams.*

Hypothesis 3c. *Similarity beliefs will mediate the relationship between depersonalized ingroup-construal and cohesion in homogeneous teams.*

Participants

One hundred sixty students at a large American university in an introductory course on organizational behavior participated in the study in exchange for course credit. The study was a 2 x 2 factorial design (Individualism vs. Collectivism: Individuated ingroup-construal vs. Depersonalized ingroup-construal) x (Diversity vs. Homogeneity: Diversity in task opinion vs. Homogeneity in task opinion). Teams of two people were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions; there were 20 teams per condition and a total of 80 teams. All the teams were homogeneous in terms of gender.

Procedure

Participants were told that they were taking part in a study of how group decisions are made under conditions of uncertainty. The study consisted of two phases. In Phase I, participants were asked to complete a survey that was designed to prime them with either individualism or collectivism, particularly regarding ingroup-construal. Then, after reading the instruction sheet about Phase II and the composition of the task team, participants proceeded to Phase II, which involved a team decision-making task called Lost at Sea. Teams were asked to discuss and rank the importance of 15 items for the survival of someone lost at sea. Following the completion of Phase II, the participants completed questionnaires on their feeling, thoughts, and opinions. The entire study took approximately 40 minutes to complete.

Phase I: Manipulation of individuated ingroup-construal vs. depersonalized ingroup-construal

Phase I asked participants to work on a survey that was designed to manipulate their views of members of the organization, either as unique individuals (individuated ingroup-construal) or

as interchangeable exemplars of the organization who are alike as organizational members (depersonalized ingroup-construal). Depending on the experimental condition, participants were instructed to imagine that they were right now a member of a hypothetical organization where individual members are viewed *as unique individuals (or interchangeable exemplars of the organization)*. Then, participants read three questions that were ostensibly what the organization would ask its members to think about. All participants were asked to write at least three statements in response to each question, and they were given 10 minutes to complete the survey.

Participants in the individuated ingroup-construal condition were asked to respond to three questions.

For today's study, please imagine that you are right now a member of a hypothetical organization where individual members are viewed as unique individuals. Following statements are what your organization would ask you to think about. Please write at least three statements in response to each question.

Write three statements about why you think you are a unique individual.

Write three statements describing why you think others are unique individuals.

Write three statements why you think we are all unique.

Participants in the depersonalized ingroup-construal condition were also asked to respond to three questions.

For today's study, please imagine that you are right now a member of a hypothetical organization where individual members are viewed as interchangeable exemplars of the

organization. Following statements are what your organization would ask you to think about. Please write at least three statements in response to each question.

Write three statements about why you think you are like other people.

Write three statements about why you think other people are like one another.

Write three statements describing why you think we are all alike.

Instructions for decision-making task

Before participants moved on to Phase II, they received instructions for Phase II that “you will work in a team of two (hereafter referred to as team) to solve a survival problem for Chris who is lost at sea. The scenario is described in detail on the next page, and your team will rank the importance of 15 items to Chris’ survival when you get together.” To create diversity or homogeneity in task opinion in work teams, additional information on experts’ different opinions about the survival situation was provided as background, as follows:

Statistics based on actual incidents show different survival strategies and devices that were critical for the survival at sea. As such, experts suggest different strategies about increasing the chance of survival when lost at sea. There are experts suggesting that locating and landing on an island is most important for the survival, while other experts suggesting that signaling and getting rescued is most important. Some experts also suggest that food and hygiene issues are most important for the survival.

When they finished reading the background information, participants were asked to hold a specific view. Drawing from the background information, half the participants were asked to hold an opinion that locating and landing on an island is most important for survival, while the

other half were asked to hold an opinion that signaling and getting rescued is most important for survival. To immerse them in a given opinion, participants were instructed to review the items for survival in terms of the specific view they were asked to hold.

Team information and pre-survey

After participants were informed about the task in Phase II and the specific opinion they should hold for the task, they received a sheet titled “Team information and pre-survey.” This sheet, provided information about the specific opinion that the other participant in their team held. For example, a participant with a “signaling” opinion in diversity condition read that “In Phase II, you will work in a team of two composed of you and another person who holds a *different (hand-written) opinion* from you. In other words, the other person holds an opinion that *locating and landing on an island is most important for the survival (hand-written).*” Questionnaires that served as manipulation checks were also included in this page as a pre-survey. Participants were asked to indicate their own opinion, the other participant in their team’s opinion, and the perception of diversity in their team.

Phase II: Decision-making task

Following the instruction, each team was escorted to a separate discussion table to complete the Lost at Sea task. Teams were given 10 minutes to discuss and rank the importance of 15 items on a single ranking sheet, which contained the detailed scenario about someone lost at sea and the list of 15 items that needed to be ranked in terms of the importance to survival. Face-to-face interactions in each team were videotaped through a one-way mirror. These data were not coded and analyzed for dissertation.

Dependent variables

Right after the experimental manipulations in each phase and the completion of the team decision-making task, participants were asked to respond to the measures described below. In each case, participants responded on a 9-point scale, and I averaged the response of the two individuals of each team to generate team-level variables.

Manipulation checks

Ingroup-construal

After the Phase I task that manipulated participants' ingroup-construal, participants responded to the following two questions on a 9-point scale, from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 9 (*strongly agree*). The two questions were: "In the organization I am asked to imagine, we are all alike," (which captures depersonalized ingroup-construal) and "In the organization I am asked to imagine, we are all unique," (which captures individuated ingroup-construal).

Diversity perception

When they finished reading about the cognitive estimation tendency of their own and the other participant in their team, they responded to two questions asking "To what extent do you think your team is diverse in members' opinion on the Lost at Sea task?" and "How similar or different are people of your team with respect to their opinions on the task?" ($\alpha = .959$). A 9-point scale tailored to each question was presented, from 1 (*not at all diverse*) to 9 (*very diverse*) and 1 (*very similar*) to 9 (*very different*).

Cohesion

I used six items adopted from Lawler et al., (2008) to measure an individual's affective relationship to his or her team. The items asked participants to indicate how they feel about their relationship to the dyad. They responded on the following 9-point scales: 1 (*bad*) to 9 (*good*), 1 (*attached*) to 9 (*detached*), 1 (*disloyal*) to 9 (*loyal*), 1 (*disconnected*) to 9 (*connected*), 1 (*negative*) to 9 (*positive*), and 1 (*distant*) to 9 (*close*) ($\alpha = .865$).

Diversity beliefs

Five items were adopted from Homan et al. (2007): “Diversity is an asset for teams,” “I believe that diversity is good,” “I enjoy working in diverse teams,” “I feel enthusiastic about diversity,” and “To what extent do you think that diversity *or* homogeneity is beneficial for teams?” Importantly, to examine how individualism-collectivism differentially shapes diversity beliefs and the manner it affects cohesion, participants were asked to respond to these items in-between the manipulation of individualism-collectivism and the manipulation of composition. They responded on a 9-point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 9 (*strongly agree*). For the last question, 1 represented *homogeneity* and 9 represented *diversity*, ($\alpha = .941$). Higher ratings on the scale for diversity beliefs reflect pro-diversity beliefs whereas lower ratings indicate pro-similarity beliefs (Van Dick et al., 2008).

Results

Manipulation checks

The manipulation of individuated ingroup-construal vs. depersonalized ingroup-construal was successful. Individuated ingroup-construal generated a greater sense of “we are all unique” ($M=7.90$, $SD=0.90$) than did depersonalized ingroup-construal ($M=4.81$, $SD=2.64$), $F(1,$

76)=47.83, $p < .000$. In contrast, depersonalized ingroup-construal generated a greater sense of “we are all alike” ($M=6.38$, $SD=2.18$) than did individuated ingroup-construal ($M=2.95$, $SD=1.64$), $F(1,76)=62.01$, $p < .000$.

Diversity perception

Manipulation of diversity, particularly opinion diversity, was also effective as found in the univariate analysis of variance. Participants whose partner held a different opinion on the task perceived a higher level of diversity in teams ($M=7.00$, $SD=0.92$) than those whose partner shared a common task opinion with them ($M=2.35$, $SD=1.21$), $F(1, 76)=372.52$, $p < .000$. While difference and diversity are the same in dyads, these results affirm that participants’ perception of diversity/homogeneity did correspond to the experimental manipulation such that participants in diversity condition tended to perceive that their team was diverse, while those in similarity condition tended to perceive that their team was homogeneous. Although the procedures cannot distinguish similarity-difference from diversity-homogeneity, it is important to note that participants perceived the composition of their task teams in line with the experimental manipulation designed to elicit the perception of diversity/homogeneity.

Cohesion

As hypothesized, univariate analyses of variance revealed a significant interaction effect of individualism-collectivism, specifically individuated vs. depersonalized ingroup-construal and composition on cohesion, $F(1,76)=13.82$, $p < .000$. I further explored this interaction by conducting post hoc pairwise comparisons. I examined the effect of individualism-collectivism among diverse teams and then among homogeneous teams. As shown in Figure 2 and Table 3, the results showed that diverse teams who were individualistic were significantly more cohesive

($M=7.08$, $SD=0.76$) than those who were collectivistic ($M=6.46$, $SD=0.73$), $F(1,76)=7.0$, $p<.05$.

Conversely, homogeneous teams who were collectivistic were significantly more cohesive

($M=6.92$, $SD=0.76$) than those who were individualistic ($M=6.25$, $SD=0.85$), $F(1,76)=7.4$, $p<.01$.

Thus, the results showed, in support of hypothesis 1, that individualism is more conducive to team cohesion in diverse teams than collectivism is, while collectivism is more conducive to cohesion than individualism only in homogeneous teams.

Table 3
Means and Standard deviations per condition

	Experimental Condition			
	Diverse		Homogeneous	
	Individualism	Collectivism	Individualism	Collectivism
Cohesion	7.08 (0.76)	6.46(0.73)	6.25(0.85)	6.92(0.76)

Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses.




Figure 2. Cohesion by condition

Diversity beliefs

The results provided evidence for hypothesis 2a that individuated ingroup-construal may lead to greater diversity beliefs. As predicted, it was found that individuated ingroup-construal elicited a higher level of diversity beliefs ($M=7.68$, $SD=0.71$) than did depersonalized ingroup-construal ($M=6.72$, $SD=1.43$), $F(1,76)=14.60$, $p<.000$. Because a lower level of diversity beliefs denotes a higher level of similarity beliefs, this result also illustrated that depersonalized ingroup-construal triggers a higher level of similarity beliefs than individuated ingroup-construal, which is consistent with the prediction of hypothesis 3a.

Mediating role of diversity beliefs in linking individuated ingroup-construal and cohesion

To examine whether diversity beliefs that are found to increase with individuated ingroup-construal foster cohesion in diverse teams, I conducted an analysis testing the mediating effect of diversity beliefs, linking ingroup-construal and cohesion in diverse teams. For the analysis of hypotheses 2b and 2c regarding the mechanism in diverse teams and hypotheses 3b and 3c regarding the mechanism in homogeneous teams, I split the data into two sets: diverse teams vs. homogeneous teams. Specifically, hypothesis 2b and hypothesis 2c concerned a mediating effect of diversity beliefs in diverse teams under individualism, while hypothesis 3b and hypothesis 3c concerned a mediating effect of similarity beliefs in homogeneous teams under collectivism. Thus, I examined if different levels of diversity beliefs had a significant yet contrary effect on cohesion as a function of composition. First, in diverse teams, the results showed that diversity beliefs partially mediated the relationship between individuated ingroup-construal and cohesion. As previously reported in the univariate analysis of variance above, individuated ingroup-construal (distal predictor) significantly increased diversity beliefs (mediator) ($B=.316$, $p<.05$).

In further analysis, it was found that diversity beliefs (mediator) were positively associated with cohesion (outcome) after controlling for individuated ingroup-construal (distal predictor) as shown in Model 2 of Table 4 ($B=.271, p<.05$). This provides support for hypothesis 2b. The results further illustrated a partial mediation because the effect of ingroup-construal (distal predictor) on cohesion (outcome) continued to have a positive effect on cohesion as shown in Model 2 of Table 4 ($B=.306, p<.05$). Although the significance level of individuated ingroup-construal dropped when diversity beliefs were included in the model predicting cohesion, ingroup-construal continued to play a significant role in the emergence of cohesion. Together, the results provided some evidence for the mediating effect of diversity beliefs on the relationship between ingroup-construal and cohesion in diverse teams as well as the significant direct effect of individuated ingroup-construal on diverse team cohesion. Overall, hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c were supported.

Then, to test hypothesis 3b and hypothesis 3c, I conducted a mediation analysis in homogeneous teams, with the following results. Although hypothesis 3a regarding the positive relationship between depersonalized ingroup-construal and similarity beliefs was supported ($B=.48, p<.01$), no significant mediating effect of similarity beliefs was found in homogeneous teams as shown in Table 5 ($B=-.087, p>.10$). Only depersonalized ingroup-construal had a direct effect on homogeneous team cohesion both when similarity beliefs were controlled ($B=.393, p<.01$, Model 1 in Table 5) and not controlled ($B=.435, p<.01$, Model 2 in Table 5), providing no evidence for hypothesis 3b and 3c.

Table 4

Mediation Test in Diverse Teams: Linking Ingroup-construal and Cohesion via Diversity beliefs

	Diversity beliefs	Cohesion	
		Model 1	Model 2
Individuated ingroup-construal	.316*	.392**	.306*
Diversity beliefs	—	—	.271*
R ²	.32	.39	.47

Note N=40 dyads

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$ (one-tailed).

Coding of individuated ingroup-construal: Individuated ingroup-construal=1, Depersonalized ingroup-construal=0

Table 5

Mediation Test in Homogeneous Teams: Linking Ingroup-construal and Cohesion via Similarity beliefs

	Similarity beliefs	Cohesion	
		Model 1	Model 2
Depersonalized ingroup-construal	.48**	.393**	.435**
Similarity beliefs	—	—	-.087
R ²	.48	.39	.40

Note N=40 dyads

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$ (one-tailed).

Coding of depersonalized ingroup-construal: Depersonalized ingroup-construal=1, Individuated ingroup-construal=0

Summary

To extend the notion of self-construal highlighted in Study 1, Study 2 illuminated ingroup-construal defined by how people view members of the ingroup as a whole—whether members are viewed as unique individuals or interchangeable exemplars. Study 2 included a manipulation of ingroup-construal whereby either individuated or depersonalized ingroup-

construal was made salient. The central prediction concerning the interplay of individualism-collectivism and composition on cohesion was supported. This is consistent with the reasoning based on self-verification theory. Diversity may serve as a cue that verifies the individuated ingroup-construal that people under individualism hold, and such verification can then lead to cohesion in diverse teams. That is, those who viewed members of their team as unique individuals better dealt with diversity and further developed positive relationship to their diverse team, because diversity provided collective validation of who they think they are. In contrast, homogeneity provided a cue to those under collectivism that their depersonalized ingroup-construal was verified in the context, thereby promoting cohesion in homogeneous teams. Additionally, the mediating role of diversity beliefs linking individuated ingroup-construal and cohesion in diverse teams was found. Situationally induced individualism triggered beliefs that diversity is important for teams; such diversity beliefs, in turn, promoted members' affective relationship to diverse teams. Taken together, the results of Study 2 provided evidence for the positive effects of individualism on diverse team cohesion and the comparable positive effect of collectivism on homogeneous team cohesion.

CHAPTER 5

GENERAL DISCUSSION

In Chapter 5, summaries of two studies conducted for this research, theoretical and practical contributions, limitations, directions for future research are discussed.

Understanding the mechanisms underpinning the complex relationship between diversity and cohesion is important because cohesion facilitates the integration and processing of a broad range of potential resources in diverse teams. Thus, the current study examined the joint effects of individualism-collectivism and team composition on the emergence of cohesion. Highlighting the affective relationship that members have with their team, I defined cohesion as the extent to which members of the team feel positive and attached to their team. In this context, this research documented inductive routes by which work teams become more cohesive, demonstrating that individualism generates greater cohesion in diverse teams than does collectivism, whereas collectivism generates greater cohesion in homogeneous teams than does individualism.

The underlying theoretical reasoning that I propose and test as the best interpretation relies on self-verification theory. From self-verification theory, people strive to verify their self-definitions, and the verification of their self-view promotes collective orientation in the form of intimacy, identification, and commitment. Extending the theory's claim centered around interpersonal relationships, I suggest at a person-to-group level that critical contextual cues conveyed in diversity and homogeneity serve as signals that confirm or disconfirm the views that members of teams hold (i.e., self-construal, ingroup-construal, and diversity beliefs). Thus, if such team composition cues match with members' views, members will feel positive toward the team where their views are validated, thereby contributing to positive team outcomes such as

cohesion. However, in case of mismatch, members will detach themselves from the collective and thus the cohesion will decrease. Applying the issue of individualism-collectivism to such a person-to-group verification mechanism, I demonstrated joint effects for individualism-collectivism and team composition. Because individualism leads people to seek ways to affirm their personal self (i.e., individuality or uniqueness), the diversity in a team is a situational cue that affirms their prominent self-views in the situation. In contrast, because collectivism leads individuals to seek verification of their collective self (i.e., interchangeable exemplar of the collective), homogeneity in a team provides a sense of verification to those under collectivism.

Study 1 examined the role of energetic affective tone in mediating the relationship between self-construal and cohesion. As predicted, I found a significant interaction between self-construal and composition on the rise of energetic tone such that higher energetic tone emerges in diverse teams when members hold individualistic self-construal than when members hold collectivistic self-construal. Although there was no comparably significant difference between homogenous teams primed with individualistic and collectivistic self-construal, this result provides implications for the relationship between diversity and emotion (Ashkanasy et al., 2002). The results of Study 1 suggest that diversity does not necessarily cause tensions or negative reactions but that there are conditions in which diversity instead triggers energetic feelings in teams. Where individualism is pronounced, team members view themselves as unique individuals. The mediating role of energetic tone leading to cohesion was evidenced by findings that the higher the energetic tone in teams, the higher the level of cohesion, perception of groupness, and collective self-esteem. At a broader level, the results demonstrated that energetic tone promotes social integration in teams by enhancing not only the affective dimension of social identity people develop in teams, but also the cognitive and evaluative dimensions of social

identity. When people feel energized in a certain social unit, they tend to perceive that the unit is more than just a collection of individuals, be emotionally attached to the unit, and think that the unit is important to who they are. In short, Study 1 delineated how cohesion in diverse teams can be established through the positive relationships individual members have with their teams.

Study 2 was designed to obtain further evidence for this paper's general proposition. I examined the effects of ingroup-construal verification on cohesion. By manipulating ingroup-construal as individuated vs. depersonalized ingroup-construal, Study 2 attempted to directly get at distinct types of ingroup-construal under individualism-collectivism. Consistent with the prediction, a critical individualism-collectivism X composition pattern was seen, revealing that individuated ingroup-construal generated greater cohesion in diverse teams than did depersonalized ingroup-construal, while depersonalized ingroup-construal generated greater cohesion in homogeneous teams than did individuated ingroup-construal. The results suggest that how team members construe their team as a whole plays an important role when diversity or homogeneity becomes salient in teams. Specifically, individualism matches with diversity in that diversity verifies the ingroup view of those in an individualistic context. Because they view that members are all unique, diversity in the team provides a signal that they, as a group, are in the right situation that in turn will enhance members' positive relationship to the team. Conversely, those under collectivism who view ingroup members as interchangeable exemplars feel connected to homogeneous teams because homogeneity provides a cue that verifies their depersonalized ingroup view. Further extending the argument, I tested whether ingroup-construal influences diversity beliefs in teams as well as how diversity beliefs lead to cohesion. The results showed that individuated ingroup-construal triggered beliefs that diversity is important for the functioning of the teams, which in turn bred cohesion in diverse teams.

In sum, this project is in line with research revisiting prevailing assumptions in organizational studies. Given the contemporary changes in workplaces, such as increasing diversity and globalization, challenging assumptions in the organizational behavior research is critical. Such challenges not only capture mechanisms reflecting the changes that simple assumptions cannot predict, but also reduces the risk of unexpected mismatches occurring as a result of applying unquestioned assumptions. Interestingly, findings of the current research move the theoretical discussions forward from two standard assumptions that 1) homogeneity promotes cohesion and 2) collectivism fosters cohesion. Rather, I provide evidence that it is not simply the effect of individualism-collectivism or team composition alone, but instead the joint effects of the two that determine the level of cohesion in teams. In this sense, the current study nicely dovetails with Chen et al.'s (1998) cultural theory of cooperation that posits that individualism is not the antithesis of cooperation and that different mechanisms operate to promote cooperation for different cultures. In short, this study supports a cultural contingency model suggesting that individualism uniquely fosters cohesion in diverse teams.

The novel theoretical contribution of this study is the demonstration of mechanisms by which diverse teams become cohesive, reconciling theoretical contrasts in diverse team research. In a similar vein, Swann et al. (2004) has provided in their review of diverse team effectiveness a theoretical comparison between the self-verification perspective and the self-categorization perspective. They reinterpreted the work of Chatman and her colleagues (1998) from self-verification theory indicating that Chatman and her colleagues reveal a process involving the verification of "social-self" facilitated by collectivism. Swann et al. (2004) further proposed that collectivism may have fostered individuated appraisals (i.e., self-verification) because collectivism theoretically encourages "other focus," leading team members to find uniqueness

and the individuality of others. They also proposed that personal self-views and social self-views can be simultaneously verified in a given context, and they analyzed the interplay between the verification of the personal self and the social self. Although their analysis integrates the two perspectives in a meaningful way, I systematically distinguished self-verification processes in teams at two different levels (personal vs. social self-verification) by specifying the nature of the contexts in which either personal or social self is prominent. Drawing from the variability in the self-verification motive, the current research provided empirical evidence of the different verification motives shaped under individualism vs. collectivism, and how the matches or mismatches between the motive and team composition determines cohesion. In a nutshell, individualism triggers views that emphasize not only the uniqueness of personal self but also the individuality of other members in the ingroup, and thus those under individualism will feel verified when they perceive diversity in the team. In contrast, collectivism elicits views that self and others in the ingroup are interchangeable exemplars of the team, thereby leading to a sense of self-verification when homogeneity is perceived. By elaborating how positive processes and outcomes unfold in teams as a function of distinct self-verification processes, the current study offers insights into the positive work environments where diversity can be acknowledged, embraced, and maintained.

There are limitations to the current research as well as many intriguing questions that need to be addressed by future research. Among the most pressing tasks for future research is to assess cohesion at larger levels. Because this research was conducted at the dyad level, some caution should be exercised in generalizing the arguments of this research at larger levels. Remaining questions include whether the mechanisms proposed in the current research will unfold in other contexts such as teams with more than three people. In light of the results of the

Study 1 and 2 that suggested that individualism may prompt individuals to develop positive affective ties to the dyadic social unit and thus foster cohesion, it is possible that those under individualism may form such positive ties to similar others in the group instead of ties to the group itself. Thus, future research should investigate the richer stories likely in larger contexts. Within the collectives that are larger in size than dyads, more complex psychological mechanisms should influence the functioning of the team. For instance, although dyadic studies limit the formation of minority/majority in teams, how individuals perceive themselves in relation to the rest of majority others in the collective can be explored. Such an investigation would capture how the individual member who is distinct from the others, a person in the token position, establishes a connection to the team.

To capture the effects of a broader range of one's social relationships on the emergence of strong person-to-group ties, future research may examine how one's social network position in a given collective determines his or her commitment to the collective. For example, one's whole social network in a large team consists of multiple dyadic relationships that one has with other individuals in the team. Because the structural position affects the extent to which an actor interacts with others and thus acquires social information of others in the team, the level of commitment an actor develops toward the team may depend on the social network position. For instance, in diverse teams, if an individual occupies a central position that allows the person to have much interaction with others in team, the person will be more likely to discover and perceive the diversity in the team than those who are peripheral. Along the main reasoning of the current research, such an individual with a central position in a diverse team will be more likely to develop stronger positive relationship to the team under individualism than under collectivism. Overall, despite some limitations of dyad level study, future research may

considerably benefit from incorporating and extending the findings of the current research to study of diverse team functioning.

It will also be important to explore a wide range of person-to-group relationships and other types of social integration in teams. For example, moving beyond the concept of cohesion that particularly reflects affective ties that members have toward their teams, an examination of whether individualism promotes normative commitment to diverse teams will serve as a meaningful extension of the current research. In consideration of the multifaceted nature of collectivism and person-to-group ties, it is possible that positive relationships between collectivism and person-to-group ties reported by extant research might have reflected normative imperative rather than affective attachment.

In addition, findings of this research offer insight into cross-cultural studies. As noted, I adopted a situated cognition view, utilizing a priming method in experimental studies. Although experimental manipulations administered to students at an American university successfully created targeted psychological differences representing individualism-collectivism, future research is needed to explore whether the mechanisms found to be significant in this study hold true in other cultural contexts identified as more collectivistic than the United States.

Alternative accounts for the findings of this study should be addressed by future studies. Prior research has documented that people consciously strive to experience positive emotional states and to avoid negative emotional states (Carlson et al., 1988; Clark & Isen, 1982). In other words, when a person is in a positive mood, there is a tendency to try to maintain the mood. Given such a tendency to maintain positive feelings, it is possible that cohesion in teams might have resulted from members' conscious efforts to maintain positive states not only at the individual level but also at the collective level. Those under individualism may have experienced

a higher level of energy when they learned about the diversity of their team than did those under collectivism, even before the task interaction in teams. If so, they might have tried to continue experiencing such a positive affective state as they interacted in the team for the completion of a team task. Thus, future studies may explore whether and how social relationships in diverse teams can be fostered from the emotion regulation perspective.

To explore detailed information on the actual interactions between participants in teams, videotaped interactions can be further analyzed in a future paper. For instance, analysis of participants' emotional expression may enrich the suggested mechanism regarding the role of energetic affective tone in the emergence of cohesion in teams. It is plausible that a higher level of laughter that represents the affective state of high-arousal might be observed in teams with higher energetic tone than with lower energetic tone. Likewise, more detailed information can be derived from the analysis of videotaped interactions of participants.

The results of this study also provide practical implications for diversity management in organizations, raising concerns about whether collectivism is best suited for increasingly diversified contemporary organizations. Despite the values of collectivism, certain aspects of collectivism may inhibit the emergence of cohesion in teams and organizations. Particularly with regard to how members construe themselves and the team as a whole, collectivism might activate negative reactions and behaviors of members toward diversity because diversity creates a sense of mismatch for those under collectivism. Consequently, such negative chains of interaction, if repeated, will result in unstable social structures that impede organizational functioning. From this vantage point, diversity statements that emphasize depersonalized self-view and ingroup-view (e.g., we are all alike, we are not that different) might unintentionally increase members' sensitivity to diversity in a negative way.

According to the results of this study, viewing themselves and others as exemplars who are alike may lead individuals to find diversity to be an error signal and to detach themselves from diverse teams. Along the same line of reasoning, collectivism might not be the best vehicle for achieving diversity and inclusion in organizations, although that is one of the central issues in human resources practices (Nishii, 2013; Shore et al., 2010). Ironically, collectivism may hinder organizations from accomplishing diversity and inclusion not only by homogenizing the members but also by eliciting negative reactions to diversity. Furthermore, this study's findings seem related to the ideological approaches to managing diversity, meaning the implicit and explicit systems of ideas, meanings, and practices that suggest how groups should include and accommodate one another and how to best organize a diverse society (Plaut, 2010; Todd & Galinsky, 2012). There are two dominant ideological approaches to diversity and inclusion;—color-blindness and multiculturalism—that have significant influence on individuals' cognition and behaviors (Park & Judd, 2005). The current study implies that acknowledging the unique subgroup identities (i.e., multiculturalism) may be more efficacious than solely emphasizing the shared superordinate identities (i.e., color-blindness).

CONCLUSION

At a broad level, this study addresses how positive team processes and outcomes emerge in work teams. In conclusion, the present study disentangles the complex effects of diversity on group functioning by examining concepts that capture the effects of both individualism-collectivism and diversity. I began by noting the importance of cohesion in diverse teams and revisiting two assumptions shaped around this issue. In contrast to many works that emphasize the positive impact of either collectivism or homogeneity on the emergence of cohesion, the findings of this study document the interplay of individualism-collectivism and composition on cohesion. It finds that cohesion is determined by the match between individualism-collectivism and composition such that individualism contributes to cohesion as long as diversity exists in teams. Therefore, while individualism and diversity alone may at times impede cohesion, the match of the two may actually help work teams stick together.

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APPENDIX

- EXPERIMENTAL MATERIAL USED FOR STUDY 1 -

DECISION MAKING IN DYAD STUDY INSTRUCTIONS

This study is about decision making under conditions of uncertainty. You will work in a dyad to complete a task called Lost at Sea. The study has two phases.

- In Phase I, you will work on a **Dot estimation task** that asks you to estimate the number of dots on each page.
- In Phase II, the two of you will do a task called **Lost at Sea**. This involves a decision problem in which you will make judgments about and rank the potential importance of different items to the survival of someone lost at sea. For this task, there are best answers available based on the analysis of experts.

In addition to doing the tasks, we will ask you to respond to some questionnaires. We ask you to strive to do your very best at these tasks. Thank you.

We will provide you with more detailed information on these tasks shortly. If you have previously done either of these tasks, please inform the researcher now.


Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. Before we get started, please read and decide whether to sign the consent form on the next page. This procedure is required by the University to make certain students understand that their participation in this research is voluntary.

Phase I : Dot-estimation Task

You will have 20 seconds to estimate the number of dots on the following pages. There are three estimation tasks, and you will receive feedback about your estimation tendency: whether you are an overestimator or an underestimator.


PLEASE TURN TO THE NEXT PAGE

1.




Your estimation: _____

2.



Your estimation: _____

3.



Your estimation: _____

PRE-SURVEY

Please imagine that you are right now a member of an organization that has an individualistic culture. Following statements describe what organizations with individualistic culture would ask you to think about. Please write at least three statements in response to each question.

A. Write three statements describing yourself.

1.

2.

3.

B. Write three statements about why you think you are not like most other people.

1.

2.

3.

C. Write three statements about why you think it might be advantageous to stand out from other people.

1.

2.

3.

Please turn the page.

PRE-SURVEY

Please imagine that you are right now a member of an organization that has a collectivistic culture. Following statements describe what organizations with collectivistic culture would ask you to think about. Please write at least three statements in response to each question.

- A. Write three statements describing the groups to which you belong.
- 1.
 - 2.
 - 3.
- B. Write three statements about why you think you are like most other people.
- 1.
 - 2.
 - 3.
- C. Write three statements about why you think it might be advantageous to blend in with other people.
- 1.
 - 2.
 - 3.

Feedback

Your response on the previous dot-estimation task indicates that you are an
_____.

Past research has shown that the numbers of overestimators and underestimators in the population seem to be about even. Also, each style of estimation does not relate to the accuracy of judgments, but simply represents different patterns of responding.

Please answer. What is your estimation tendency written on the feedback?

: _____

PHASE II INSTRUCTIONS

In Phase II, you will work in a dyad to solve a survival problem for Chris who is lost at sea. The scenario is described in detail on the next page. Your task is to rank the importance of these 15 items to Chris' survival. You will place the number 1 by the most important item, the number 2 by the second most important, and so on. You will have 10 minutes to complete the task.

- The estimation tendency of the other participant you will be working with for Phase II task is _____.

Q. What was your estimation tendency written on the feedback?

Overestimator or Underestimator

Q. What is the other participant's estimation tendency?

Overestimator or Underestimator

PHASE II TASK - LOST AT SEA

Chris has chartered a yacht with three friends for the holiday trip across the Atlantic Ocean. Because Chris has no previous sailing experience, she has hired an experienced skipper and two-person crew. Unfortunately in mid Atlantic a fierce fire breaks out in the ships galley and the skipper and crew have been lost whilst trying to fight the blaze. Much of the yacht is destroyed and is slowly sinking. Chris' location is unclear because vital navigational and radio equipment have been damaged in the fire. Her best estimate is that she is many hundreds of miles from the nearest landfall. She has managed to save 15 items, undamaged and intact after the fire. In addition, Chris has salvaged a rubber life craft and a box of matches. Place the number 1 by the most important item, the number 2 by the second most important, and so on. You have 10 minutes for this task.

	RANK
1. A sextant (a navigational tool)	_____
2. A shaving mirror	_____
3. A quantity of mosquito netting	_____
4. A 25 liter container of water	_____
5. A case of army rations	_____
6. Maps of the Atlantic Ocean	_____
7. A floating seat cushion	_____
8. A ten liter can of oil/petro mixture	_____
9. A small transistor radio	_____
10. 20 square feet of opaque plastic sheeting	_____
11. A can of shark repellent	_____
12. One bottle of 160% proof rum	_____
13. 15 feet of nylon rope	_____
14. 2 boxes chocolate bars	_____
15. A fishing kit	_____

QUESTIONNAIRE

Consider your feelings right now. How would you describe your feelings about Phase II?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9		
disinterested	neutral	interested
1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9		
bored		excited
1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9		
unenthusiastic		enthusiastic
1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9		
unmotivated		motivated

Now think of the two of you. How do you feel about your relationship to the dyad?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9		
bad	neutral	good
1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9		
detached		attached
1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9		
disconnected		connected
1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9		
negative		positive
1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9		
disloyal		loyal
1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9		
distant		close

Think about your overall experiences in dyad and indicate the number that best represent your opinions.

1. The dyad I belonged to is an important reflection of who I am.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9		
strongly disagree	neutral	strongly agree

2. The dyad I belonged to is important to my sense of what kind of a person I am.
1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9

strongly disagree

strongly agree

3. In general, belonging to this dyad reflects an important part of my self-image.
1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9

strongly disagree

strongly agree

4. Membership in this dyad has very little to do with how I feel about myself.
1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9

strongly disagree

strongly agree

5. To what extent do you think of you and the other participant in Phase II as a group?
1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9

a collection of
individuals

a group

- EXPERIMENTAL MATERIAL USED FOR STUDY 2 -

DECISION MAKING STUDY INSTRUCTIONS

This study is about decision making under conditions of uncertainty. You will work in a dyad (team of two) to complete a task called Lost at Sea. The study has two phases.

- In Phase I, you will work on a task that is designed to assess how you view yourself and others. You will be asked to write several statements about yourself and others.
- In Phase II, you will work in a team of two to complete a task called **Lost at Sea**. This involves a decision problem in which you will make judgments about and rank the potential importance of different items to the survival of someone lost at sea. For this task, there are best answers available based on the analysis of experts.

In addition to doing the tasks, we will ask you to respond to some questionnaires.

Also, during Phase II you and the other participant will be videotaped. These video recordings and all other responses and information you provide us will be strictly confidential.

We will provide you with more detailed information on these tasks shortly. If you have previously done either of these tasks, please inform the researcher now.

Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. Before we get started, please read and decide whether to sign the consent form on the next page. This procedure is required by the University to make certain students understand that their participation in this research is voluntary.

Extra Credit Opportunities: You will earn 1 extra credit toward your final grade in ILROB 1220: Intro to Organizational Behavior for your participation in this study. We ask you to strive to do your very best at these tasks. Thank you.

PHASE I TASK

For today's study, please imagine that you are right now a member of a hypothetical organization where individual members are viewed as unique individuals. Following statements are what your organization would ask you to think about. Please write at least three statements in response to each question.

A. Write three statements about why you think you are a unique individual.

1.

2.

3.

B. Write three statements describing why you think others are unique individuals.

1.

2.

3.

C. Write three statements why you think we are all unique.

1.

2.

3.

PHASE I TASK

For today's study, please imagine that you are right now a member of a hypothetical organization where individual members are viewed as interchangeable exemplars of the organization. Following statements are what your organization would ask you to think about. Please write at least three statements in response to each question.

- A. Write three statements about why you think you are like other people.
 - 1.
 - 2.
 - 3.

- B. Write three statements about why you think other people are like one another.
 - 1.
 - 2.
 - 3.

- C. Write three statements describing why you think we are all alike.
 - 1.
 - 2.
 - 3.

QUESTIONNAIRE I

Identify and circle the number that best represents your thoughts.

1. In the organization I am asked to imagine, "we are all alike".

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9

strongly disagree

strongly agree

2. In the organization I am asked to imagine, "we are all unique".

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9

strongly disagree

strongly agree

3. To what extent do you think that diversity *or* homogeneity is beneficial for teams?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9

homogeneity

diversity

4. Diversity is an asset for teams.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9

strongly disagree

strongly agree

5. I believe that diversity is good.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9

strongly disagree

strongly agree

6. I enjoy working in diverse teams.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9

strongly disagree

strongly agree

7. I feel enthusiastic about diversity.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9

strongly disagree

strongly agree

PHASE II INSTRUCTIONS: LOST AT SEA

In Phase II, you will work in a team of two (hereafter referred to as team) to solve a survival problem for Chris who is lost at sea. The scenario is described in detail on the next page, and your team will rank the importance of 15 items to Chris' survival when you get together.

Background

Statistics based on actual incidents show different survival strategies and devices that were critical for the survival at sea. As such, experts suggest different strategies about increasing the chance of survival when lost at sea. There are experts suggesting that locating and landing on an island is most important for the survival, while other experts suggesting that signaling and getting rescued is most important. Some experts also suggest that food and hygiene issues are most important for the survival.

For the Phase II that will be done in the team of two, **we ask you to hold an opinion that locating and landing on an island is most important.** Before you rank the items with other participant, please review items on the next page in terms of increasing the chance of locating and finding a land.

Q. What is the specific opinion you are asked to hold for the task? Please circle one of the followings:

- 1) Locating and landing on an island is most important
- 2) Signaling and getting rescued is most important
- 3) Food and hygiene are most important

-----PLEASE TURN TO THE NEXT PAGE FOR A PREVIEW-----

Preview of the Items: Increasing the chance of *locating and landing on a island*

Chris has chartered a yacht with three friends for the holiday trip across the Atlantic Ocean. Because Chris has no previous sailing experience, she has hired an experienced skipper and two-person crew. Unfortunately in mid Atlantic a fierce fire breaks out in the ships galley and the skipper and crew have been lost whilst trying to fight the blaze. Much of the yacht is destroyed and is slowly sinking. Chris' location is unclear because vital navigational and radio equipment have been damaged in the fire. Her best estimate is that she is many hundreds of miles from the nearest landfall. She has managed to save 15 items, undamaged and intact after the fire. In addition, Chris has salvaged a rubber life craft and a box of matches. **Quickly look out for some items that will increase the chance of locating and landing on an island.**

1. A sextant (a navigational tool)
2. A shaving mirror
3. A quantity of mosquito netting
4. A 25 liter container of water
5. A case of army rations
6. Maps of the Atlantic Ocean
7. A floating seat cushion
8. A ten liter can of oil/petro mixture
9. A small transistor radio
10. 20 square feet of opaque plastic sheeting
11. A can of shark repellent
12. One bottle of 160% proof rum
13. 15 feet of nylon rope
14. 2 boxes chocolate bars
15. A fishing kit

TEAM INFORMATION AND PRE-SURVEY

Before moving on to actual Phase II in team shortly, please respond to the following questions.

1. What is the opinion you hold for the task? Circle only one of the followings.
 - 1) Locating and landing on an island is important.
 - 2) Signaling and getting rescued is important.
 - 3) Food and hygiene are important.

In Phase II, you will work in a team of two composed of you and another person who holds a *different opinion* than you. In other words, the other person holds an opinion that signaling and getting rescued is most important for the survival.

2. What is the opinion that the other participant in your team holds for the task?
 - 1) Locating and landing on an island is most important.
 - 2) Signaling and getting rescued is most important.
 - 3) Food and hygiene are most important.
3. To what extent do you think your team is diverse in members' opinion on the Lost at sea task?
1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9

not at all diverse

neutral

very diverse

4. How similar or different are people of your team with respect to their opinions on the task?
1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9

very similar

very different

PHASE II TASK - LOST AT SEA

Chris has chartered a yacht with three friends for the holiday trip across the Atlantic Ocean. Because Chris has no previous sailing experience, she has hired an experienced skipper and two-person crew. Unfortunately in mid Atlantic a fierce fire breaks out in the ships galley and the skipper and crew have been lost whilst trying to fight the blaze. Much of the yacht is destroyed and is slowly sinking. Chris' location is unclear because vital navigational and radio equipment have been damaged in the fire. Her best estimate is that she is many hundreds of miles from the nearest landfall. She has managed to save 15 items, undamaged and intact after the fire. In addition, Chris has salvaged a rubber life craft and a box of matches. **Your team will arrive at a single ranking of all 15 items in terms of the value for Chris' survival. Place the number 1 by the most important item, the number 2 by the second most important, and so on. You have 10 minutes for this task.**

	RANK
1. A sextant (a navigational tool)	_____
2. A shaving mirror	_____
3. A quantity of mosquito netting	_____
4. A 25 liter container of water	_____
5. A case of army rations	_____
6. Maps of the Atlantic Ocean	_____
7. A floating seat cushion	_____
8. A ten liter can of oil/petro mixture	_____
9. A small transistor radio	_____
10. 20 square feet of opaque plastic sheeting	_____
11. A can of shark repellent	_____
12. One bottle of 160% proof rum	_____
13. feet of nylon rope	_____
14. 2 boxes chocolate bars	_____
15. A fishing kit	_____

