

WHY PARTICIPATE?
A POLICY FEEDBACK APPROACH TO POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN ZAMBIA

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In democratic regime, why do different people choose to participate in politics in different ways? After taking into account the explanatory power of various demographic characteristics, scholars of American politics have presented convincing evidence that people's experiences with public policy influence the way that they participate in politics. These works have demonstrated that public policy can "feed back" through either material or interpretive pathways to condition citizens' relationships to their government, influencing mass patterns of participation. However, this body of work has two limitations: first, in order to achieve causal inference, many works of policy feedback focus on the effects of only one or a few policies. While such a focus allows more precise causal analysis, it does not reflect the broad and varied experiences people actually have with public policy. Second, most policy feedback scholarship takes place in the context of advanced industrial democracies with high capacity for policy implementation. Assuming that policies have the capability to "feed back" in any democratic context, it is essential to understand how policy feedback loops may operate differently in the low-capacity context that characterizes most contemporary democracies.

In order to address these limitations, this study examines how policy has influenced various forms of political participation in the developing democracy of Zambia. Situating the study in Zambia allows explicit examination of policy feedback outside the context of high-capacity democracies. To address the issue of narrow policy focus, this dissertation advances a novel survey instrument to measure respondents' broad experiences across policies they themselves deemed salient. To make respondents' reports comparable, this study proposes a typology of policy experiences, making it possible to compare respondents' described

experiences across an array of possible policies. This strategy was implemented in an original 1,500 person survey across three provinces in Zambia. Because this broad approach to policy experience sacrifices causal inference, the dissertation also entails archival research and process tracing to establish the reasonable expectation that individuals' experiences with public policy are at least partially independent of their existing patterns of political participation.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Erin Accampo Hern completed a Bachelors of Arts in International Relations with honors, Summa cum Laude, at the University of Southern California in 2009. She began her doctoral work at Cornell's Department of Government in 2010, gaining a Masters of Arts in 2012. The research for this dissertation was funded by a Fulbright scholarship and grants from the Graduate School at Cornell and Cornell's Department of Government. Primary research was carried out between 2012 and 2014 in Zambia.

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Chapter One

Constructing Citizens: Broad Policy Experiences and Political Participation in Developing Democracies

Abstract

This chapter describes the motivation for this dissertation, which concerns how to apply theories of policy feedback that more accurately reflect peoples' lived policy experiences, and how to do so in developing democracies. It briefly reviews the relevant literature regarding policy feedback with an emphasis on the challenges the body of work faces, namely: persistent inferential problems and related design choices that focus on only one or a few policies and the concentration of policy feedback studies in advanced industrial democracies (particularly the United States). It describes how this dissertation takes steps towards addressing these issues by generating a typology of policy experiences and their predicted effects on political participation and giving explicit attention to how policies may "feed back" differently in developing democracies. The chapter then describes how this study deals with the assumption of reciprocal causality, outlines the research design, and presents the chapter plan for the remainder of the dissertation.

1.0 Introduction

In democratic countries, why do groups of people choose to participate in politics in different ways? In its ideal form, democracy is predicated on the concept that the government should express the aggregated preferences of the population. It relies on popular participation to ensure that people communicate these preferences and hold politicians accountable for pursuing them. Yet, within reasonably "free" democracies, citizens vary an enormous amount in their proclivity to participate in—or even pay attention to—politics. While some variation in political participation can be attributed to individual level of interest, participation often varies systematically across social groups within society, such as gender, class, race, or ethnicity. In recent years, a growing body of work contends that public policy exerts an important influence on political participation, sometimes creating or reinforcing patterns of participation that may help explain systemic participation gaps. This body of work convincingly argues that interactions with the government through public policy shape individuals' citizenship experiences, molding

their relationship to the government and influencing the way they choose to participate in politics (or not). This concept, known as policy feedback, predicts that when the government differentiates between groups of citizens through administration of policy, these groups will subsequently exhibit different forms of political participation.

While policy feedback works have become increasingly precise and better able to identify the effects of different policies, the evolution of this body of literature has opened a new set of questions. The vast majority of policy feedback studies are empirically based in the United States or other advanced industrial democracies—countries with strong institutions and high governmental capacity to implement policies. Yet, there is no theoretical reason to believe that policies only influence participation in this context. The dearth of systematic policy feedback studies in developing democracies begs the question: do the same types of policies have the same types of effects under different political and economic circumstances? What little evidence exists from examination of policies in non-western democracies suggests that the political and economic contexts probably condition the effects of policies in important ways. Because policy feedback has an interpretive dimension, one would expect respondents' interpretations of various types of policies to change with the broader political environment.

Beyond the limited scope of existing policy feedback works, the field also faces an enduring inferential problem. Because policy feedback assumes some degree of reciprocal causality between policy outcomes and participation, it is difficult to identify the precise effect of policy on participation. Nevertheless, most policy feedback studies attempt to isolate the causal effect of policy on participation. In general, such a feat is possible through the study of a single policy, which might have arbitrary guidelines for inclusion or a strict cutoff point, allowing the researcher to treat the policy as an “as-if random” treatment. However, the problem with such

research designs—beyond the difficulty of finding policy treatments that approximate the quasi-experimental ideal—is that individuals do not experience just one policy; they encounter a suite of policies, with varying levels of salience, all of which may or may not affect their perception of the government and their subsequent political participation.

With these problems in mind, this study seeks expand the scope of policy feedback work by explicitly considering policy feedback effects in the developing democracy of Zambia. Rather than focus on the effects of a single policy, it advances a framework for conceptualizing individuals' experiences with government policy in a more holistic manner, taking into account a variety of policy experiences. This chapter advances a typology of public policy experiences that allows a standardized assessment of individuals' experiences across the few policies that each person deems most salient in his or her life. This approach reflects a more realistic approximation of how individuals experience and interpret their experiences with the government: not through a single program, but through numerous policies. Using the developing democracy of Zambia as a case study, this dissertation then examines the relationship between different experiences with policy and various forms of political participation. It explores this process both through historical examination of policy creation and a contemporary survey matching respondents' policy experiences with their reported political behavior. By focusing on a developing democracy, it introduces explicit considerations of how such an environment influences respondents' reactions to policies in ways that might be different from advanced industrial democracies.

This chapter proceeds as follows: the next section briefly discusses the broad framework of policy feedback and the inferential problems it faces. Section Three describes the case of Zambia, elaborating how the case both expands the breadth of policy feedback studies and

exhibits variation particularly useful for the research design. Section Four advances a typology of policy experiences, and Section Five describes the study's main hypotheses regarding how these policy experiences may influence different forms of political behavior given Zambia's political and economic environment. Section Six returns to the inferential problems introduced by the assumptions of reciprocal causality and discusses how this study uses historical analysis to establish the reasonable expectation that policy has an independent effect on political participation. Section Seven details the research design that this study employs, and a final section describes the structure of the rest of the dissertation.

2.0 Contextualizing the Theory: The Policy Feedback Approach

While most approaches to political science emphasize how politics affect policy outcomes, this study's point of departure is Lowi's observation that public policies affect politics. Specifically, he notes that "the most significant political fact about government is that government coerces. Different ways of coercing provide a set of parameters, a context, within which politics takes place."¹ This idea has been systematized further in the policy feedback literature in American politics, which posits that social policy can affect the political behavior of target populations by defining the boundaries of citizenship and educating citizens about their relationship to the state.² Schneider and Ingram posit that different types of social policy, which target specific groups within the polity, define parameters of appropriate political behavior for target groups.³ When the state targets different types of policies at different groups of citizens, each group will have a different type of relationship with the state, translating to different forms of political participation.⁴ For example, Mettler demonstrates how the GI Bill, which targets veterans for

¹ Lowi 1972, p.299

² Mettler and Soss, 2004

³ Schneider and Ingram, 1993

⁴ Soss, 1999; Soss, 2007; Schram et al., 2009

services, actually increased political participation amongst this group.⁵ Similarly, Campbell shows that seniors who rely on state benefits like Social Security and Medicaid are more likely to vote, even though their relative poverty would predict lower rates of participation.⁶ While the majority of work on policy feedback effects has occurred in the context of advanced industrial democracies, an emerging body of work examines the non-western context broadly, and African politics specifically. MacLean⁷ and Bleck⁸ each demonstrate that African citizens' experiences with public schools and health facilities increase political participation, presumably because interaction with the government through exposure to public services increased political engagement and a sense of accountability among service consumers.

Two primary pathways of policy feedback are of theoretical interest to this study: resource effects and interpretive effects. Social policies can influence both the amount of resources to which certain groups have access as well as that group's sense of political engagement.⁹ These pathways affect both an individual's *ability* to participate, and his or her *desire* to participate. This first pathway is material: distributive or redistributive policies that direct material goods towards certain groups will increase their capacity to participate in politics by providing them with more time or money resources.¹⁰ Because income is known to be an important predictor of political participation, social policy that increases the income of a group should also increase the probability that members of the group participate in politics. Interpretive effects are psychological, altering attitudes: social policy can influence the extent to which a group feels included in the polity. At the most basic level, this proposition suggests that the

⁵ Mettler, 2007

⁶ Campbell, 2002

⁷ MacLean, 2010

⁸ Bleck, 2013

⁹ Campbell, 2012

¹⁰ Pierson, 1993 p.598

targets of social policy should feel more “included” in the polity, and therefore more politically engaged. However, the manner in which policy “includes” a group matters as well: social policy has the ability to differentiate target populations in such a way as to make them feel alienated rather than engaged.¹¹ This body of research thus demonstrates that public policies can alter political participation through objective processes that influence the material goods to which citizens have access, as well as through subjective processes concerning the way citizens interpret their experiences with policies.

2.1 Inferential Challenges of Policy Feedback Designs

Through material and interpretive pathways, social policy can affect political participation both in the *amount* and *type* of resources that it directs at certain groups. These resources may affect the ability of different groups in the population to attain education, work force experience, and income (important material predictors of participation), and they may also influence relative levels of political engagement. While the number of scholars using policy feedback approaches has expanded in recent years, and policy feedback studies have grown increasingly sophisticated, two major problems persist.

First, policy feedback approaches almost by definition face an endogeneity problem: by assuming that policies affect political participation, but political participation influences policy creation, it is difficult to establish the exogeneity of policy as a causal variable. Using the example of gender and political participation, feminist institutionalists have argued that states with more “gender inclusive” policies foster more participation among women.¹² However, it is possible that the states that have more gender-inclusive policies may simply be states that were already predisposed to women’s participation due to some other underlying variable. While

¹¹ Schneider and Ingram 1993

¹² Beckwith 2010

gender-inclusive policies coincide with a smaller gender-based participation gap, it is impossible to know from existing studies whether such policies caused higher women’s participation or vice versa. For example, one study shows that the states that enact “maternalist” policies have a higher proportion of elected female representatives.¹³ However, another study demonstrates that female representatives are also more likely to enact maternalist policies.¹⁴ Furthermore, we do not know why some states enacted maternalist policies while others did not—perhaps the states with maternalist policies already had a large number of politically active women. Because most models of policy feedback rest on assumptions of reciprocal causality—policies influence participation, but participation also influences what policies governments enact—it is unnecessary to assert that causality runs only one direction. However, it is essential to demonstrate the plausibility of policy having a causal effect on participation.

Because this problem is pervasive in policy feedback works, most studies overcome it by focusing on the effects of one specific policy. Using case-specific knowledge about policy, researchers have been able to convincingly isolate the effects of a single policy on recipients. For example, Bruch et al. examine the different rates of political participation for recipients of Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), a welfare program in the United States.¹⁵ Although TANF is a national program, it is implemented by states, and each state has latitude in establishing the specific rules of implementation. By comparing recipients of TANF—who should be similar across all other observable characteristics—across states, which vary in the degree to which they are punitive, the researchers are able to convincingly demonstrate that different ways of implementing the program create distinct effects on political participation:

¹³ McDonagh, 2010

¹⁴ Bratton 2005

¹⁵ Bruch et al. 2010

states with more punitive bureaucratic agencies diminish the level of political participation for TANF recipients as compared to TANF recipients in other states.

Methodological approaches like the one above provide convincing evidence of the precise causal effect of specific program experiences. However, these research designs are unable to capture the way that people actually experience government policy. People have experiences with multiple government policies, some more salient than others. They may have similar experiences with each policy they encounter, or they may have dramatically different experiences with different bureaucratic agencies, different sectors, or different levels of government. As such, what these studies are able to test—experiences with one or a few policies—do not match the scale of the theoretical underpinnings of policy feedback—that experiences with public policy condition citizens’ relationships to their state, influencing their level of political participation. Some works have attempted to overcome this problem: Mettler surveys Americans about their experiences with a broad array of American policies, Bruch et al. include several policies with which the poor are likely to have experience, other macro-level studies seek to characterize the overall nature of government policy.¹⁶ Nevertheless, the theory of policy feedback demands measurement of individual policy experiences across a broad swath of salient policies in order to understand how encounters with policy writ large ultimately affect political participation.

2.2 Challenges of Extending Policy Feedback beyond Western Democracies

The second enduring conceptual issue is that most of the work on policy feedback has occurred in the context of the United States or other advanced industrial democracies. Yet, policy feedback rests heavily on interpretive effects, which are likely to be contingent on the environment in which governments execute policies. As such, the concentration of policy

¹⁶ Mettler 2011, Bruch et al. 2010, and Holzner 2010, respectively

feedback work in the United States and other advanced industrial democracies presents a narrow view of how policies influence participation. For example, the study by Bruch et al. cited above argued that the reason TANF dampened political participation was because means-tested benefits can be deeply stigmatizing, and that attaching conditions (like minimum employment requirements) to benefits creates a paternalistic, demoralizing experience for recipients—particularly when the program is implemented in a punitive manner (revoking benefits for failure to meet conditions). However, Hunter and Sugiyama’s recent examination of Bolsa Familia, a means-tested conditional poverty reduction program in Brazil, indicates that recipients do not experience means testing or the conditions involved as stigmatizing.¹⁷ While Hunter and Sugiyama suggest that the lack of stigmatization is in part due to framing and careful policy design, it is also plausible that the very different political, economic, and institutional environment of Brazil influences how recipients interpret welfare programs.

Given different rates of poverty and different levels of government capacity, residents likely have different expectations about what the government can reasonably accomplish, which would alter the way they interpret policy and their access to government resources. Indeed, while policy feedback works examining the United States focus heavily on program rules, methods of implementation, and boundaries of inclusion to explain why access to public resources might demobilize some groups, policy feedback studies in countries with lower government capacity tend to focus on how access to public services in general, like education, increase political participation.¹⁸ These differences indicate that both material and interpretive effects may operate differently outside of advanced industrial democracies: increased access to material goods may have a different connotation under conditions of widespread rural poverty than in an urban

¹⁷ Hunter and Sugiyama 2014

¹⁸ For example, Soss 1999 and Soss 2007 in the United States, MacLean 2010 and Bleck 2013 in West Africa

neighborhood where issues of relative deprivation come into play; interpretations of policy outcomes are likely to be contingent on expectations of what the government has the capacity to accomplish and rooted in historical legacies of service provision. At the very least, this discrepancy demands examination of how the broader environment—including factors such as institutional capacity, the form of political linkages between citizens and the government, and the nature of benefits (meeting basic needs or addressing post-material concerns)—may alter how recipients interpret their experiences with policies.

Furthermore, using a policy feedback framework outside the context of high-capacity advanced industrialized democracies raises questions of the effects of variable government presence. While most states harbor areas of low government presence (for example, Appalachia in the United States, the Northwestern Territory of Canada, and geographically remote areas generally¹⁹), developing countries like Zambia tend to have high levels of government presence in only a few select areas, while government presence outside these areas is low. Speaking about Latin America, O'Donnell refers to such areas as “brown spaces,” where the arm of the government is limited.²⁰ Herbst notes that the development of pre-colonial polities across most of the African continent was marked by the constant struggle of asserting control over a low-density population, making it relatively easy to avoid the reach of governing bodies.²¹ Similarly, in the post-independence period, Jackson and Rosberg observed that many African governments “do not effectively control all of the important public activities within their jurisdictions.”²² This problem occurs for many post-colonial states, which achieved juridical statehood without necessarily being capable of administering their entire territory—and without being the only

¹⁹ Scott 1998

²⁰ O'Donnell 1993

²¹ Herbst 2000

²² Jackson and Rosberg 1982, p.3

game in town. In fact, as King and Lieberman note, “states increasingly share political primacy with non-state entities that are bereft of territorial sovereignty but nevertheless perform some combination of governance functions, from social services to armed force, that often enjoy substantial popular support and civil-society penetration.”²³ The ability of non-state actors, like chiefs, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or other types of local elites to carry out state-like functions may interfere with the links between policy and participation in low-capacity governments.

With these issues in mind, this study seeks to understand how public policy experiences affect political participation in the developing democracy of Zambia. Rather than measure experiences with one specific policy, I developed a typology of policy experiences and surveyed Zambians about their experiences with multiple policies that they themselves deemed salient, categorizing their responses according to the typology. This approach allowed me to create a multi-dimensional measure of “policy experience” for each respondent, capturing the dimensions of policy that was the most important to each individual. Second, using empirics from the developing democracy of Zambia increases the breadth of policy feedback studies by focusing explicitly on a developing democracy, but also allows for important within-country institutional variation. Zambia’s institutional capacity to provide public goods and implement policies varies in predictable ways due to colonial legacies along the highly developed and economically integrated line-of-rail, which allows comparison of how similar policy experiences create different political responses across different institutional contexts. Because this research design (and examination of a broad array of policy experiences) does not allow precise causal identification, I address issues of reverse causality through historical process tracing, establishing the expectation that the Zambian has government historically implemented policies in ways that

²³ King and Lieberman 2009, p.550

are at least partially independent from existing patterns of political participation, and that the contemporary government faces similar pressures.

This chapter proceeds by examining the case of Zambia, then continues to describe the policy typology and elucidate the hypotheses this study tests, taking into account the ways in which Zambia's institutional environment may result in different interpretations of policy as compared to the United States.

3.0 The Case of Zambia

Zambia presents an excellent case in which to examine the effect of public policy on political participation. As a non-western developing democracy, it expands the breadth of existing policy feedback studies, allowing explicit examination of policy feedback in an institutional environment very different from that of the United States. In many ways, Zambia might be considered a “typical” African country—it has adhered to many trends on the continent both economically and politically, and may therefore illuminate patterns in the relationship between public policy and political participation that are applicable across other developing democracies in Africa, or developing democracies in other regions that share some of the same institutional characteristics that Zambia has. It is these institutional characteristics—and the important ways in which they differ from advanced industrial democracies—that make it a particularly interesting case. Specifically, these characteristics include a limited government capacity to provide broad-based public services, multi-party democracy with limited programmatic differences between parties, and the combined challenges of simultaneous political and economic liberalization.²⁴

Yet, Zambia is unique in a number of ways that make it a particularly good case for contemporary examination. Zambia stands out from other countries in sub-Saharan Africa for its

²⁴ See Rakner 2001, Larmer and Fraser 2007, Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2009

relatively untroubled social and political history. While it had to contend with the fallout from violent political struggles occurring across many of its neighbors, Zambia's independence movement was achieved relatively peacefully, and incidents of political and social violence never erupted into large-scale social unrest as it did elsewhere (which is not to say that Zambia's political history is uncontentious²⁵). While Zambia had its fair share of economic woes and political controversy, the country's stability since independence means that its political system has important continuities that allow for meaningful comparisons between past and present. However, like other African countries, while Zambia has had uninterrupted democratic rule since 1991, it continues to deal with allegations of corruption, press freedom, political malfeasance, clientelist political linkages that mark many developing democracies.²⁶ As such, it shares many important features with developing democracies—all of which may influence the way citizens interpret their experiences with policy—that do not exist to the same extent in the advanced industrial democracies that host most policy feedback studies.

Additionally, Zambia's political geography yields a sharp distinction between the state's capacity on and off the line-of-rail. As Chapter Two will describe in more detail, Zambia (then Northern Rhodesia) began attracting more attention from British colonial administrators after they discovered massive copper deposits in the center of the territory, in an area that would come to be known as the Copperbelt. Because the British colonial economy was oriented to the south (through Southern Rhodesia and South Africa), initial infrastructural investments funded a rail line connecting the Copperbelt to colonial possessions in the south (see Figure 1 below). The line of rail rendered the Copperbelt, Central Province, Lusaka Province (where the capital is), and

²⁵ Larmer 2011 provides a detailed historical account of opposition politics in Zambia

²⁶ Rakner 2013, p.201

Southern Province most economically developed, with the highest concentration of government presence and services, and a privileged role in economic production.




Figure 1. Infrastructural Map of Zambia c. 1966²⁷

The Zambian economy has been tied to copper since the colonial period, and every Zambian government has taken a special interest in this sector’s performance.²⁸ Because of fertile land and the extension of the rail line to the south, Southern Province had the highest concentration of white farmers during the colonial period, and thus was the first area to develop large-scale

²⁷ Image source: Automobile Association of Rhodesia, c.1966

²⁸ Tordoff 1979, p.3; Beveridge and Obserschall 1979, p.22

commercial agriculture.²⁹ This historical development led it to have better infrastructure and better access to the capital (and export routes), despite being rural. Although the small farmers in the region are still impoverished, there is a concentrated presence of services (and especially non-state services), in part because the infrastructure makes it relatively easy to access.

The rest of the country comprises a neglected hinterland, dominated by small-scale subsistence farmers and far removed from the infrastructure and services that characterize other parts of the country.³⁰

Zambia's development trajectory has two important implications for the research design of this study. First, because the different regions across Zambia continue to play such different roles in the national political economy, the types of policies directed towards each region differ, yielding important variation in policy experience within the sample (Chapter Two). Second, the country's political-economic development along the line of the rail creates essential institutional variation across different parts of the country. Areas along the line of the rail are better economically integrated, experience more consistent service provision, and experience higher levels of government presence than those areas off-rail. This dramatic difference in institutional capacity creates interesting variation for the study at hand, but is also representative of many developing countries in which the government has variable presence across different parts of its territory.³¹

4.0 A Typology of the Political Effects of Policy Differentiation

As described above, one conceptual problem that many policy feedback works face is the tendency to focus on the specific effects of one or a few policies. Such focus does not reflect the way individuals actually experience policy; they encounter a suite of policies, with varying levels

²⁹ Vickery 1986, Fry 1979, p.45

³⁰ Bates 1976, p.5

³¹ O'Donnell 1993

of salience, all of which may or may not affect their perception of the government and their subsequent political participation. Of course, considering the entire array of policies to which governments expose individuals is even more causally complex, particularly since the same individual might have dramatically different experiences with various policies. Returning to the example of American welfare policy discussed earlier, one individual might have a negative experience with TANF, but a positive experience with the public school system or public works department. In order to understand how the balance of an individual's policy experiences influence their relationship to the government and their proclivity for political participation, it is necessary to theorize how and why different policies affect people in different ways.

The following typology conceptualizes public policies along two dimensions that are theoretically likely to influence how individuals experience various forms of policy. The first dimension concerns whether policies are *inclusionary* or *exclusionary*. Policies may be inclusionary through either material or interpretive pathways. From the material perspective, inclusionary policies are those that confer objective benefits to a group. However, policies may also be inclusionary in the interpretive sense when they provide formal recognition for a group, either by explicitly granting this group a role in the political arena, recognizing its role in the economic or social world, or taking steps to incorporate this group into the polity. Through either material or interpretive pathways, inclusionary policies give the group in question a stake in the existing system. A sense of inclusion generates a sense of belonging in the polity, which may increase the likelihood that citizens believe that the government is making an effort to address their needs.³² On the other hand, exclusionary policies either prevent certain groups from accessing material resources, or otherwise prevent full participation in political, social, or economic life. Those subject to exclusionary policies do not have a stake in the existing system:

³² Hunter and Sugiyama (2014) include the same dimension in their analysis of Brazil's *Bolsa Familia*

they have little sense that the government is interested in responding to their needs or incorporating them into the polity.

The second dimension concerns whether policies reflect *cognizance* of the target population’s needs. Again, this dimension may operate through both material or interpretive pathways. Some policies reflect a precise understanding of the specific needs and desires of the group it targets, as well as an understanding of the likely effects of the policy on that group. Such understanding might come from polls, studies, or other flows of political information. Cognizant policies reflect the governments’ explicit attempts to understand population needs that can be influenced through policy, and the likely effects thereof. Other kinds of policies, however, reflect misunderstanding of the specific needs and desires of the target group, either due to misperception or lack of interest. Such misunderstanding may stem from lack of awareness of what certain communities need, misunderstanding of the context in which the policy must be executed, or a complete lack of interest in certain segments of the population. Policies that lack cognizance may be well-meaning but uninformed, or they may reflect a lack of attention and care on the part of policymakers.

		Inclusionary	Exclusionary
Policy cognizant of group needs?	Yes	Empowering	Burdensome
	No	Marginalizing	Neglectful

Figure 2: Policy Experience Typology

Taken together, these two dimensions create the two-by-two typology above, yielding four “policy experiences.” Cognizant, inclusionary policies generate **empowering** experiences; policy-makers both know what the target group wants or needs and take explicit steps to meet those needs through policy. These policies explicitly address a known need of a target

population, and are likely to be popular. Empowering policies confer material benefits to a population and also have positive interpretive effects, making recipients feel both engaged and visible to the government (see Figure 2 below). Inclusionary policies lacking cognizance generate **marginalizing** experiences; policymakers might not understand precisely what the target population needs, or how to deliver the appropriate services in a way that actually facilitates meeting these needs. The result is a policy that misses the mark; it may confer some material benefits to the target population, but will likely generate mixed interpretations, making recipients feel invisible, although engaged.

	Engaged	Unengaged
Visible	Empowering	Burdensome
Invisible	Marginalizing	Neglectful

Figure 3: Interpretive Dimensions of Policy Experiences

Cognizant, exclusionary policies create a **burdensome** experience. Policymakers are well aware that the target population does not want a certain policy, and enact it anyway—despite the knowledge that it will make life harder for the group in question. Such policies explicitly make it more difficult for group members to pursue their interests or meet their needs, and are likely to be controversial. These policies may reduce the material resources to which a group has access, and result in an interpretation that makes recipients feel visible to the government, but also unengaged by it—individuals experiencing burdensome policies understand that the government is not there to serve them. Finally, exclusionary policies lacking cognizance generate a **neglectful** policy experience. Policymakers do not understand what a certain population wants or needs, make little or no effort to improve understanding, and make little or no effort to target this

group with any kind of policy. Neglectful policy experiences denote a lack of material resources, and an interpretation that tends towards a sense of invisibility as well as disengagement.

Two individuals may experience the same policy in different ways. For example, the American policy of relying primarily on local tax revenue to fund public schools creates a very different experience for citizens living in different areas: access to public schools might be empowering for families in areas where high property taxes ensure a well-funded local district, but marginalizing for families in poor areas with a failing public education system. The public education system is inclusionary for both individuals, but is designed in such a way that it only functions properly in one context (that in which local revenues are sufficient for high-quality education).

Similarly, a common agricultural policy in many developing countries is the use of a national marketing board to set agricultural prices and purchase surplus crops from farmers with smallholdings. Such a policy might be empowering for a small farmer in an area with good infrastructure and reliable collection, as it guarantees annual income and allows the farmer to plan crops in advance. However, the same policy may be marginalizing for a similar farmer in an area with poor infrastructure, where unreliable collection leaves the harvest to rot. While still an inclusionary policy, it lacks cognizance of how variable road conditions affect its implementation for more remote recipients. This same policy would be neglectful for a farmer who lives too far away from the road network and does not qualify for the program—the policy fails to acknowledge the existence or needs of farmers too far away from the grid.

This typology provides a tool to compare individuals' policy experiences across a broad array of policies. Different policies will be salient to different people (as a function of their needs) and for different reasons (as a function of their experience with that policy). Individuals

may have dramatically different experiences across different salient policies—some empowering, some marginalizing, some neglectful—all of which contribute to their relationship to the government and the extent to which they pursue their interests through politics. With this tool, it is possible to understand how different types of experiences influence different forms of political participation. As such, the following sections assert a series of hypotheses regarding how various policy experiences will influence four different categories of political participation: collective behavior, political engagement, formal participation, and alternative forms of political behavior. In addition to hypothesizing the connections between various forms of policy experience and political participation, I suggest how these relationships are likely to be different in Zambia as opposed to an advanced industrial democracy, and how they may differ within Zambia according to state capacity.

5.0 Policy Experience and Political Behavior in Zambia

This study examines the relationship between the material and interpretive dimensions of various public policy experiences, categorized according to the typology above, and different types of political participation. The forms of participation of interest in this study are collective behavior, political engagement, formal political participation, and alternative forms of political behavior. While the policy feedback literature in the context of advanced industrial democracies provides some expectations regarding the effects of various types of policies on political participation, some evidence from non-western countries suggests that the way people interpret their policy experiences is likely to depend on the context. Of particular importance is the capacity a government has to implement policy, as capacity will affect people's reasonable expectations of what the government can and should be doing. The following sections provide a preliminary

rationale for the hypotheses that this study tests, each of which is explored in more depth in its dedicated chapter.

5.1 Policy Experience and Collective Behavior

The first dimension of political participation that this study examines is collective behavior, especially in the form of civic associationalism: the likelihood that members of a community gather together to solve problems, make local improvements, or achieve collective goals. It is distinct from formal political participation in that it relies on local social capital and organization as the first step for achieving change, rather than elected officials or formal political channels. Political scientists have long considered civic associationalism to be an important indicator of social capital, which is widely believed to improve civil society and promote positive outcomes in democratic governance.³³ However, other scholars have reversed the causal relationship, emphasizing the effect of government institutions and policy on fostering civic behavior.³⁴ Following this second line of thought, collective behavior should be more likely where government institutions specifically invoke or encourage it. Such studies suggest that policies might influence collective behavior through interpretive pathways; following the typology above, one would therefore expect inclusionary policy experiences to precipitate collective behavior.

In the context of low-capacity governments, however, scholars observe the opposite trend: communities engage in collective behavior to meet basic needs when the government cannot do so.³⁵ These findings suggest that collective behavior functions differently across different contexts: in an environment with strong state capacity to meet the basic needs of most people most of the time, collective behavior may be something that inclusive policies can

³³ For example, Verba and Nie 1972, Putnam 1993, Putnam 1995, Krishna 2002, Tsai 2007

³⁴ For example, Brehm and Rahn 1997, Tarrow 1996, Skocpol et al. 2000

³⁵ Bratton 2005, MacLean 2010, Cammett and MacLean 2014

stimulate. In an environment with low state capacity to meet basic needs, however, residents may engage in collective behavior out of necessity. If this is the case, then policy would stimulate collective behavior through material pathways, and it would be more common where the government is unwilling or unable to meet basic needs. Chapter Five examines the plausibility of these two competing (but not mutually exclusive) hypotheses:

H_{3a}: Collective behavior is more likely for individuals with lower objective access to government services.

H_{3b}: Collective behavior is more likely for individuals with *inclusive* policy experiences.

5.2 Policy Experience and Political Engagement

The second dimension of political behavior that this study examines is political engagement. Scholars generally measure political engagement through levels of political interest, willingness to talk about politics or answer politically-oriented survey questions, and sometimes through political knowledge. Scholars sometimes treat political engagement as a cause of other behaviors,³⁶ and sometimes as something that other political behaviors produce.³⁷ Like collective behavior, political engagement is one of the most consistently important predictors of formal political participation. However, while I expect that policy might influence collective behavior through either material or interpretive pathways, I expect the link between policy and political engagement to be primarily interpretive. Furthermore, I expect a wide array of policy experiences to stimulate political engagement, with one important caveat: expressing interest in politics is not the same as believing one has recourse through political channels. Therefore, I expect that political engagement will correspond with the “inclusionary” dimension of the typology, but also with “cognition,” leading to the following hypothesis:

³⁶ Burns et al. 2001

³⁷ for example, Bowler et al. 2003, Verba et al 1995

H_{4a}: Levels of political engagement will increase with *empowering*, *marginalizing*, or *burdensome* policy experiences.

The expectations regarding empowering and marginalizing policy experiences follow directly from the policy typology. I expect individuals experiencing these types of policies to be more politically engaged by typological definition: I postulated that one result of inclusionary policies was to stimulate a sense of engagement with the political sphere. Those who are subject to inclusive policy types should have the psychological sense that the government is making an attempt to meet their needs, even if the government is not ultimately successful at doing so. I assume that political engagement should increase with the sense that the government is open or responsive, a sense that should be more prevalent to those subject to inclusive policies.³⁸

However, I also expect political engagement to increase along the dimension of cognition. I stated that being on the receiving end of policies that reflect a high level of cognition would make recipients feel highly visible. The sense that the government “sees” you should make individuals more attuned to politics, whether out of interest in capturing more resources (in the case of those experiences empowering policies) or out of fear or anger (in the case of those experiencing burdensome policies). I expect that being subject to policies that make your life more difficult would make a person more interested in politics, even if systemic exposure to burdensome policies makes a person less likely to channel that interest into formal measures of participation, like voting or contacting officials.

5.3 Policy Experience and Formal Political Participation

Formal political participation includes activities such as voting, party affiliation, and contacting officials. While most studies about political participation consider collective behavior, political engagement, and formal political participation to be tightly linked, political participation has a

³⁸ Reingold and Harrell 2010

uniquely negative cost-benefit structure: political participation generally entails some sort of cost (related to time, material resources, or both) and has a remote, intangible benefit. As such, I hypothesize that only empowering policy experiences are strong enough to stimulate political participation. Empowering experiences might do this because they are able to alter the cost-benefit structure by communicating to recipients that governing officials are likely to hear and be responsive to their needs, increasing the possible benefit of participation.

H_{5a}: Formal political participation is more likely for those with *empowering* policy experiences.

By typological definition, recipients of inclusionary policies are more likely to feel that the government has at least a nominal interest in them, and should feel more engaged with politics. But inclusion on any terms is not enough to precipitate political participation; those subject to inclusive but non-cognizant policies are likely to have less political efficacy as a function of sensing that the government does not really understand what they need. Furthermore, those subject to exclusionary policies have no reason to believe that the government is interested in their needs. If citizens feel that the government is using policy to actively exclude them, or that the government does not care enough about them to even consider their needs through policy, then they would have no reason to believe that participation in politics-as-usual will have much benefit.

In examining the relationship between policy experience and participation, however, it is also essential to take into account how policies might *indirectly* influence participation through their relationship with the other response variables mentioned above: collective behavior and political engagement. Because both collective behavior and political engagement have been shown to be positively related to participation, these variables may mediate the relationship

between policies and participation as well. Regarding the possible influence of the relationship between collective behavior and lower rates of service provision, the following is possible:

H_{5b}: Mediated by collective behavior, lower levels of objective service provision will be associated with higher rates of political participation.

Similarly, if political engagement is higher for all forms of policy experience except for neglect, it may also confound the relationship between policy and participation:

H_{5c}: Mediated by political engagement, *marginalizing* or *burdensome* policy experiences will increase political participation.

Finally, in order for policies to precipitate political participation, recipients must connect their experiences with policies to the political sphere. I expect that respondents will be more likely to make this connection in areas of high government presence: living in an area of high government presence may influence respondents' sense of political efficacy as well as making more obvious the connections between policies and politics.

H_{5b}: The link between policy experience and political participation will be stronger for those respondents living on-rail.

In areas of greater government presence, government bodies are more likely to deliver services regularly and better able to claim credit for those services, making it more likely that recipients connect their policy experiences directly to the government. Chapter Seven tests these hypotheses and further explores the underlying logic.

5.4 Policy Experience and Alternative Political Behavior

Finally, the last category diverges from the standard set of political behaviors. "Alternative forms of participation" refers to two distinct categories of behavior: relying on non-state actors to perform state roles as an *alternative* to the state, and explicit attempts to *subvert* state authority. While these concepts may take multiple forms, I examine the former through reliance on traditional authorities and non-governmental organizations as alternatives to the state in the

provision of some goods, and the latter through attitudes towards tax and customs noncompliance. This chapter also considers protest behavior as a form of political participation that departs from politics-as-usual. These three types of political behavior yield three sets of hypotheses. Regarding reliance on non-state actors, I expect two possibilities. If respondents view NGOs or traditional authorities as the government's partners in service provision, then:

H_{6a}: Reliance on chiefs or NGOs for service provision is more likely when respondents have *empowering* policy experiences.

However, if respondents view NGOs or traditional authorities as actual alternatives to the government, then I would expect a very different result:

H_{6b}: Reliance on chiefs or NGOs for service provision is more likely when respondents have *marginalizing, neglectful, or burdensome* policy experiences.

These relationships may work through either material or interpretive pathways. If respondents actually view state and non-state service providers as distinct, then one would expect greater reliance on non-state providers when their needs are not being met through government policy, either because they do not have access to the services they need (along either the exclusionary or non-cognitive dimension) or they do not believe that the government is likely to respond to their needs.

Subversion of the state is another matter. This study focuses explicitly on attitudes toward revenue collection. One would expect a noncompliant attitude when the respondent feels excluded from the benefits of revenues:

H_{6c}: Evasion of taxes or customs duties is more likely when respondents have *neglectful* or *burdensome* policy experiences.

While those who experience marginalizing policies are also unlikely to be satisfied with service provision, their inclusionary experience should make them feel as though they have a stake in the

government's continuing ability to collect revenues, which may lead to a greater sense of civic duty than for those who experience exclusionary policies.³⁹

The final hypothesis associated with alternative political behavior is counterintuitive. I expect that protest behavior should be more likely for those experiencing inclusionary policies.

H_{6d}: Protest is more likely for those who have *marginalizing* or *empowering* experiences.

This prediction emerges from understanding protest in Zambia as a way to make claims on the existing government, as opposed to revolutionary behavior or social movements concerned with more dramatic structural change. Understanding protest in this way, it is more likely for those who believe that the government would pay attention to their protest behavior: those along the inclusionary dimension. However, it is reasonable to expect that the opposite might be true, congruent with the expectation that protest is a reflection of contentious politics, more common for those who are fundamentally excluded from the polity. As such, I also consider the alternative:

H_{6e}: Protest is more likely for those who have *neglectful* or *burdensome* experiences.

Chapter Eight takes up these hypotheses and their associated arguments.

6.0 Reasonable Expectation of Reciprocal Causality

By conceptualizing policy experience so as to capture respondents' general experiences over a broad swath of policies, this study is unable to use specific features of policy design to plausibly identify the causal effect of policy experience on political participation. However, the theory underlying this study demands the reasonable expectation of reciprocal causality: that policy has an effect on participation, even while participation has an effect on policy outcomes. As such, in demonstrating a relationship between policy and participation outcomes, it is essential to

³⁹ Lago-Penas and Lago-Penas 2010

establish that the direction of causality is not exclusively from participation to policy. If political participation completely determined policy outcomes and the distribution of public goods and services, then it would be implausible to argue that the relationship between patterns of policy distribution and patterns of political participation are at least in part due to the influence of policy on participation. Such an expectation is particularly important in the context of a country like Zambia, which has a long history of patronage-based politics and allegations that governments use policy instruments to reward active supporters. As such, it is necessary to establish that the government's distribution of resources through policy is not *only* a response to the political behavior of groups.

In order to establish the reasonable expectation of reciprocal causality, I identify two other plausible motivations for governments to design and implement policies that would differentiate between groups. The goal of this exercise is twofold: first, by exploring motivations for policy creation that are independent of existing patterns of political participation, it is possible to generate alternative hypotheses about public policy and public resource distribution, and examine whether patterns of resource distribution and public service provision seem commensurate with motivations based on patterns of participation or other factors. Second, understanding alternative motivations for policy creation allows me to identify likely patterns of variation in policy experience. If I were examining experience with one policy, the variation is simple: either the respondent has experienced the policy or not. By exploring experience across a swath of policies, however, the variation of interest is across different types of experience: whether a respondent's interactions with government through policy were predominately empowering, marginalizing, neglectful, or burdensome. Understanding how governments might target policies differently across various groups provides allows me to make predictions about

how policy experiences might vary across different segments of the population, which allows case selection to include important variation.

One plausible motivation for how governments might target public resources is the pattern of economic production, as one fundamental function of states is to extract revenue. Tilly's famous assertion that "war makes the state, and the state makes war" hinges on the concept that the institutions of the state emerged as a way to efficiently raise and allocate revenue in a sustainable manner.⁴⁰ Similarly, Levi's *Of Rule and Revenue* argues that the primary goal of rulers is to "maximize revenue to the state," though perhaps not as they would please.⁴¹ The primacy of extraction is prevalent in the Africanist literature as well. For example, Albaugh theorizes the centrality of revenue sources for African leaders' calculations regarding public spending, and Bates' examination of African politics hinges definitively on economic extraction.⁴²

These observations about the goals of government policy provide one way to test the plausibility that patterns of political participation do not drive policy outcomes. If participation were the fundamental driver of policy outcomes, then one would expect to find support for any number of hypotheses related to the political landscape of the country:

H_{1a}: The Zambian government allocated public resources to reward political supporters.

H_{1b}: The Zambian government allocated public resources to non-supporters to undermine political opponents.

H_{1c}: The Zambian government allocated public resources to the most politically active areas.

⁴⁰ Tilly, 1992

⁴¹ Levi, 1988 p.10

⁴² Albaugh, 2014; Bates, 1981

However, if the government's economic concerns also play a significant role in the creation of public policy, then one would expect something different:

H_{1d}: The Zambian government allocated public resources to the most economically productive areas, *regardless pre-existing political support in those areas.*

If this final hypothesis is true, then at least part of public policy and public resource distribution is independent of existing patterns of political participation, making it possible to treat policy as an independent variable that is at least partially exogenous to the outcome of political participation. Geographic variation in both economic production capacity (based on the location of the line of the rail and its influence on industrial development and commercial farms) and political affiliation during Zambia's early years make it possible to examine the extent to which the government allocated resources for economic or political motivations, providing some insight into which segments of the population benefitted most from public service provision during the First Republic.

However, policy feedback is not only concerned with the distribution of public services—such an examination provides important information about the distribution of material benefits, but says little of the overall nature of policy. Existing policy feedback studies provide reason to believe that interpretation of government policies influences participation in ways that can either reinforce or counteract the effects of material benefits; therefore, it is important to understand in what ways governments might design different types of policies (punitive, conditional, coercive, means-tested) for different segments of the population. Drawing from Schneider and Ingram's work on the social construction of target groups, an additional influence

on government policy creation is government officials' perceptions of the social roles that various groups in society play.⁴³

Government officials may consider people to be particularly suited for different social roles as a function of ethnicity, class, or gender. These beliefs may be implicitly or explicitly part of policy creation; either way, scholars often call this concept a “logic of appropriateness” that encourages certain kinds of behavior while limiting others.⁴⁴ Feminist institutionalists argue that subjective belief systems, based on social norms surrounding the appropriate social roles for men and women, shape both institutional and policy outcomes in gendered ways. Beckwith notes that, despite women's increasing *de jure* political equality with men worldwide, “gender is [still] a major and primary constitutive element of political power,” and that gender retains its power as a principle of social organization based on “normative assumptions about the appropriate behaviors of men and women.”⁴⁵ Chappell and Waylen state that these normative assumptions both influence institutional design choices and persist in an “informal guise...so where formal rules have been reformed, informal ones can continue to operate and contradict them.”⁴⁶

These normative beliefs also influence policy choices: Mettler notes that, during the New Deal, welfare policies tended to provide broad-based entitlements to men, based on the concept of replacing the wages of unemployed male breadwinners, while mothers' pensions required women to “adapt to restrictive cultural norms of child rearing and housekeeping that were measured through ‘fit mother’ and ‘suitable home’ criteria.”⁴⁷ She argues that these policies—constructed on the basis of social norms about the appropriate roles of men and women—had the additional effect restricting women to the private sphere while encouraging men's activity in the

⁴³ Schneider and Ingram 1993

⁴⁴ March and Olsen 1989

⁴⁵ Beckwith, 2010 p. 160

⁴⁶ Chappell and Waylen, 2013 p. 607

⁴⁷ Mettler, 1998 p. 13

public sphere. As a result, “welfare state develop[ment]...[was] imbued by particular ideas regarding the proper social organization of sexual difference.”⁴⁸ These observations are borne out in discussions of social policy outside of the United States as well.⁴⁹

As such, government officials’ beliefs about the appropriate social roles of various groups may exert a strong pressure on policy creation, independent of either economic potential or existing patterns of political behavior for these groups. Examining how beliefs about gender may influence policy creation in Zambia, this intuition yields that idea that the government may create policy as a result of their beliefs about women’s appropriate social roles, rather than as response to their political participation or their economic potential. If true, this idea provides another source of policy variation that is independent of variation in political participation: specifically, variation in the *types* of programs directed at certain groups. Regarding the case of Zambia, Chapter Three explores the extent to which any of the following are true:

H_{2a}: The Zambian government implemented policy that treated men and women differently.

H_{2b}: The gendered differences in policy did not reflect differences in past political participation.

H_{2c}: Women in different economic roles will have different experiences with public policy, despite sharing the same gender.

While intuitive, these hypotheses contribute to the reasonable belief that resource distribution and the nature of policies vary due to non-political reasons. These two additional motivations for policy design—economic production capacity and governmental perceptions of appropriate social roles—provide two avenues for examining the extent to which Zambian policy creation is politically motivated. If the Zambian government designed policy and allocated resources for economic motivations or social beliefs instead of (or in addition to) political considerations, then

⁴⁸ Mettler, 1998 p. 16

⁴⁹ Esping-Anderson 1990

it is reasonable to treat policy as an independent variable, and assume some degree of reciprocal causality between policy and participation. In order to test these ideas, I use historical data to examine resource distribution during Zambia's First Republic, showing that government decisions about resource distribution resulted from a combination of political, social, and economic considerations—but that the pattern of policy implementation was different than if past political participation were the only concern. This approach generates the reasonable assumption that the way the government distributes public goods is at least partially exogenous to political considerations. In addition, by understanding how geographical economic patterns and gender generate variation in policy experiences, it is possible to design the contemporary survey to capture expected variation in policy experience along these dimensions.

7.0 Research Design

Commensurate with the two methodological concerns presented above, this study uses a two-part research design to establish the expectation of reciprocal causality between political participation and policy outcomes, and then to systematically examine how policy experiences corresponding with the typology described above vary with different forms of political participation.

7.1 Part 1: Historical Case Analysis and the Targeting of Public Goods

In order to establish the likelihood that the Zambian government allocates public resources for a combination of economic, social, and political concerns (as opposed to political concerns alone), this study examines the creation and execution of public policy during Zambia's First Republic (1964-1972).⁵⁰ Examining government documents and official publications, it assesses the government's rationale for its very explicit approach to public policy during the period, particularly through the First National Development Plan (FNDP), the cornerstone of domestic

⁵⁰Selection of this time period as opposed to one closer to the present is due to data availability; the national and party documentation of public policy available in the National Archives and the United National Independence Party Archives are richest during the First Republic, and thin out considerably after the mid-1970s.

policy during the time. These primary sources allow the reconstruction of the thought process behind the policy creation, matching the rationale of government officials with the actual distribution of resources across different parts of the country. The historical data employed in this section enable a qualitative case analysis to evaluate the hypotheses listed above regarding resource allocation: did the Zambian government distribute resources purely in response to existing patterns of political participation, as a way to shore up political survival? Or was resource allocation in part due to other concerns, like economic production? Furthermore, did social considerations alter the content of public policy to create additional variation in policy experiences?

Two chapters, based on this historical evidence, generate an explanation for the pattern of public resource distribution during Zambia's First Republic. The first examines geographical distribution of public goods across three different Zambian provinces with distinct economic characteristics: Central, Southern, and Northwestern. Because each region played a different role in the national vision of economic production, each had a dramatically different experience with public policy during the First Republic. These regions also held distinct patterns of political participation at the advent of the First Republic, allowing comparison of actual resources allocation to what one would expect if the government were allocating resources for purely political or economic reasons.

The second of these chapters focuses on the influence of social considerations in policy formation, tracing the gendered differences in policy experience during the First Republic and into the Second Republic. It demonstrates how, in addition to economic considerations, the government's social beliefs about gender roles influenced the creation and implementation of public policy, creating different policy experiences for men and women. This additional form of

variation lends weight to the idea that the government allocates resources for reasons independent of existing patterns of political variation. In addition, these two chapters contribute to understanding in what ways policy experiences might differ systematically across a population (as a function of geography, job, or gender).

7.2 Part Two: Quantitative Analysis of Survey Data

The second component of this study addresses hypotheses three through six, which predict the relationship between various policy experiences and the likelihood of collective behavior, political engagement, formal political participation, and alternative or subversive forms of participation. It does so through an original survey of 1,500 Zambians across three provinces—Southern, Central, and Northwestern—selected based on historical variation in public policy experience (field sites indicated by stars in Figure 3 below).




Figure 4. Field Sites

The survey establishes the public policy experience of each respondent through an analysis of three policies each respondent finds salient, and proceeds with a suite of questions regarding various dimensions of their political participation. Using three measures of policy experience to

capture both objective and subjective dimensions of policy experience, the survey data allow analysis of the relationship between various types of policy experience and political participation, controlling for other factors known to affect participation. Using policy experience as an independent variable, this component of the study allows a more systematic evaluation of how experience with public policy corresponds with reported political participation.

8.0 Chapter Outline

The remainder of this dissertation is organized into seven empirical chapters and a conclusion. Chapters Two and Three explore the governmental logic behind public policy creation and the implementation thereof during Zambia's First Republic in order to assess the claim that the government targeted public policies according to economic and social concerns in ways that were at least partially exogenous to existing patterns of political participation. Chapter Two examines regional differentiation in policy design and execution based on regionally different economic capacities, while Chapter Three assesses gendered differences in public policy experiences during the 1960s and 1970s. Chapters Four – Eight concern the results of the large-N survey. Chapter Four describes the survey methods and operationalization of variables, while also detailing the contemporary political-economic context of Zambia. Chapters Five – Eight contain a more detailed statistical analysis of the survey data, organized by “type of political participation.” Chapter Five explores the findings with regards to collective behavior, Chapter Six examines political engagement, Chapter Seven looks at formal political participation, and Chapter Eight describes alternative and subversive forms of political participation. These chapters provide a more detailed presentation of the relevant hypotheses based on the typological logic and existing literature, and use logistical regression analysis to identify the relationships between variables of interest. A final chapter concludes.

Chapter 2

The Political Economy of Resource Allocation during Zambia's First Republic

Abstract

This chapter assesses the extent to which public policy can be treated as an independent variable that might influence political participation. It does so through an examination of public resource distribution during Zambia's First Republic, analyzing predicted patterns of resource distribution as a function of existing patterns of political participation or as a response to the different economic exigencies in different parts of the country. Using archival data, this chapter examines how actual resource distribution compares to predictions based on political or economic rationales. While there is some evidence that the distribution of public resources reflected political calculations on the part of UNIP officials, it is most consistent with a model of resource allocation based on economic differences between different regions in the country. This evidence provides validity to the idea that public policy is at least partially exogenous to political participation.

1.0 Introduction

Do public policies have an independent effect on patterns of political participation, or do existing patterns of participation dictate how governments allocate public resources? The premise of policy feedback relies on reciprocal causality between policy and participation. In order to create the reasonable expectation that policies have an independent effect on participation, therefore, it is necessary to establish that governments create public policy and allocate public resources in ways that are at least partially independent of existing patterns of participation. This chapter seeks to do so by examining both the political and economic pressures on President Kaunda's UNIP government during Zambia's First Republic, assessing the extent to which patterns of resource allocation match predictions based on political or economic exigencies.

During Zambia's First Republic, from 1964-1972, the political and economic pressures on the new government at times demanded contradictory policy responses. The country's pattern of economic development during the colonial period left the national economy perilously dependent on copper revenues, and unpredictable trade with regional neighbors due to raging independence struggles and civil wars rendered national self-sufficiency in food production

essential. Economic development necessitated increasing investments along the already developed line-of-rail, which connected the mines of the Copperbelt to the capital of Lusaka and the southern export route. Industrialization occurred predominantly in towns along the line of the rail, and commercial agriculture was limited almost exclusively to white farmers settled around the line of the rail.⁵¹ Beyond the rail, the undeveloped hinterland hosted subsistence farming and dire poverty.⁵² While long-term development plans emphasized the need to address uneven development, meeting immediate economic needs demanded rapid returns on investment only available along the line-of-rail.

In addition to these economic concerns, President Kaunda and his ruling UNIP party faced additional challenges of political consolidation. While Kaunda had won a decisive victory over his African National Congress (ANC) opponent Harry Nkumbula, the ANC had won several seats in Parliament. Pockets of fierce ANC supporters provided loud critiques of the new government, sometimes clashing violently with UNIP supporters. ANC supporters were concentrated primarily in Southern Province, along the line of rail, in the economically important industrial and commercial farming corridor. While the new government enjoyed support in the urban areas of Lusaka and the Copperbelt, its most ardent supporters could be found in the more remote hinterlands of Northern, Luapula, and Northwestern Provinces. The distribution of the most ardent supporters of UNIP and its opposition thus created some tension between economic and political goals: economic pressures demanded investment along the line-of-rail provinces, which included the (sometimes violent) opposition, while political demands from core supporters insisted that the government direct the “fruits of independence” to the remote rural areas that had rallied behind UNIP during the independence movement.

⁵¹ Tordoff 1977, p. 3

⁵² NAZ MCI 1/1/6 “Economic Commission for Africa ECA Missions: Seers Mission”

Furthermore, President Kaunda's firm stance as a frontline state in the battle for majority rule across Southern Africa created additional constraints on policy creation, both by creating the political exigency to nationalize the economy and limiting the amount of regional trade in which the new country could feasibly engage. Given these constraints, this chapter argues that the pattern of resource allocation during Zambia's First Republic was a response to economic exigency as much as—if not more so—than political considerations. While government policy almost certainly responded in part to existing patterns of political participation, the pattern of resource allocation during the First Republic suggests that economic necessity was an important motivator for policy design, allowing the reasonable conclusion that the government allocated public resources in ways that were at least partially independent of existing patterns of political participation.

This chapter proceeds by delineating the competing hypotheses about the motivations behind political resource allocation, discussing the observable implications of each, and describing the case comparison research design employed to test them. Four cases—Southern Province, Central Province, Luapula Province, and Northwestern Province, selected for variation across both political and economic variables—provide the data for case comparison. Section Three describes resource allocation across these three provinces during Zambia's First Republic, comparing observed allocation against what one would expect given the competing hypotheses. A final section concludes.

2.0 Motivations for Resource Allocation in Zambia's First Republic

2.1 Background and Context

Northern Rhodesia gained its independence in 1964 in an era of great optimism. While the independence struggle was emotionally and politically charged, Zambia was born with

comparatively little bloodshed. Despite being comprised of 72 different tribal groups, Kenneth Kaunda and his United National Independence Party (UNIP) managed to pull the country together under the nationalist banner of “One Zambia, One Nation.” Kaunda ascended to the presidency with great popular support, international legal recognition, and a budget surplus. Though the economy was nearly entirely dependent on the nation’s copper mines, rising copper prices promised ongoing economic security, and gave the new government flexibility to pursue an ambitious policy agenda for development and economic growth.⁵³ This agenda was embodied in the First National Development Plan (FNDP), the cornerstone of Zambian public policy during the First Republic.

In order to implement this development agenda, the government had to contend with a few key problems facing the new country. Possibly the most pernicious issue was that of uneven development. The colonial administration regarded Northern Rhodesia as an enclave economy, neglecting the rural areas and treating the countryside as a labor reserve for the lucrative copper mines in the center of the colony.⁵⁴ The underdeveloped rural areas posed both economic and political challenges: achieving shared national development would require massive investments in the agricultural sector, particularly in remote regions, to help smallholder farmers cultivate beyond a subsistence level and bring their goods to market.⁵⁵ Furthermore, many of UNIP’s most ardent supporters during the independence struggle were from remote areas of Northern and Luapula Provinces, and they levied additional pressure on the government for urban-rural redistribution.⁵⁶ The pressures to redistribute national resources to rural areas are captured in the influential 1963 Seers Report, the result of a joint UN/ECA/FAO Economic Mission to Zambia

⁵³ Bratton 1980, p.31

⁵⁴ Bates 1974, Bates 1976, Tordoff 1977, Beveridge and Oberschall 1979, Craig 1999

⁵⁵ NAZ MCI 1/1/6 “Economic Commission for Africa ECA Missions: Seers Mission,” p 3

⁵⁶ Rasmussen 1974, p. 56-57; Tordoff 1974, p. 15

immediately preceding its independence. The report cautions that: “To maintain national will, especially after the first flush of enthusiasm over Independence, is a task for political leadership, not economic advice...It means that there must be visible returns to the development effort, if popular support is to be maintained.”⁵⁷ This observation was particularly true in the remote regions that had been excluded from economic development during the colonial period.

The economic and political pressure to direct government investment towards neglected rural areas existed in tension with the need to invest heavily in the most economically productive sectors of the economy: the urban centers of mining and secondary industry along the line of the rail. Government officials noted that the existing dual structure of the economy—the developed, urban line-of-rail and the underdeveloped, rural hinterland—was ultimately unsustainable, and the FNDP emphasized the need to “redress urban/rural imbalances.”⁵⁸ Minister of Finance A.L. Wina noted that the impulse to concentrate national investment into the (already more economically productive) urban areas was short-sighted, declaring that “unless we are careful we will continue this process of imbalance which we have inherited from previous governments...This would be disastrous.”⁵⁹ Nevertheless, given the need to grow the economy in order to create capital to invest in rural areas, “it proved impossible to reconcile fully the concept of regional balance with that of investment in the growth areas of the economy.”⁶⁰ Ultimately, the Ministry of Finance and the national development planners had to decide between the economic pressures toward concentrating investment along the line-of-rail and the political pressures towards regional redistribution.

⁵⁷ NAZ MCI 1/1/6 “Economic Commission for Africa ECA Missions: Seers Mission,” p 26

⁵⁸ Republic of Zambia 1966, p.2

⁵⁹ NAZ location C04/4/1, Memo to all Ministers, February 19, 1965

⁶⁰ Tordoff 1974, pgs. 17-18

These tensions were compounded by the material constraints imposed by Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965 and the political pressures brought by increasing political factionalism over the course of the First Republic. When Rhodesia's Ian Smith rejected Britain's call for transition to majority rule in its remaining colonies and issued his UDI, he created a rebel white-led regime that was hostile towards Zambia.⁶¹ Suddenly, Zambia's geographic position as a land-locked, resource rich, labor-poor country became a much bigger problem: The colonial administration in Southern Africa had designed the infrastructure in its territories to channel all things from Zambia out via the southern route, through Southern Rhodesia and South Africa.⁶² With Southern Rhodesia claimed by a hostile white regime, Zambia was suddenly cut off from its main supply route. In addition, the country's primary source of electricity was the hydropower plant on Lake Kariba—which was on the border (and shared) with Southern Rhodesia. Civil wars against the Portuguese in Mozambique and Angola and chaos in Zaire eliminated those bordering states as possible routes to ports, leaving only Tanzania to the north as a possibility for extending the country's export infrastructure.⁶³

The full impact of UDI became manifest by 1966: it caused the collapse of the tourist industry, dramatic materials shortages (particularly oil and construction materials), rising costs, and expensive and hurried attempts to expand export routes to the north.⁶⁴ The limited economic resources created more intense competition for resources between geographic regions and economic sectors, which contributed both to inter- and intra-party factionalism. While Kaunda initially responded to such political threats with a combination of “exhortation, diversionary tactics, generous patronage, and sectoral balancing,” diminishing material resources in concert

⁶¹ Callaghy 1990, p. 289

⁶² Beveridge and Obserschall 1979, pgs. 44-45

⁶³ Bates and Collier 1993, p. 395

⁶⁴ Tordoff 1974, p. 21

with rising factional competition ultimately made such politicking ineffective, resulting in increasingly coercive responses to political threats.⁶⁵ The political crisis came to a head by the end of 1971, when the declaration of the one-party state brought an end to Zambia's initial experiment with multi-party democracy.

The end of the FNDP implementation period coincided with the advent of the Second Republic, which was characterized by political consolidation under UNIP's one-party state, ongoing nationalization of industry and the creation of a sprawling parastatal sector, and widespread corruption and economic mismanagement. However, while the Second Republic was characterized by economic and political centralization, the First Republic offers an opportunity to assess government policymaking during a period of relative political and economic openness. Given the tensions between economic and political motivations for public resource allocation during Zambia's First Republic, and the candid explanations in official documents for the rationale behind the government's policy choices, resource allocation during the FNDP provides an opportunity to examine which motivations proved the most influential.

2.2 Political Motivations

Given the context described above, there are a number of possible political motivations that may have influenced allocation of public resources. One likely scenario is that the UNIP government would target goods to reward their most ardent supporters:

H_{1a}: The Zambian government allocated public resources to reward political supporters.

This hypothesis reflects the logic of the "core supporter" model, in which political parties or government agents attract and sustain support by rewarding those who have demonstrated

⁶⁵ Tordoff 1974, p.31

political loyalty.⁶⁶ Most critiques of the UNIP government that point to resource misallocation allege that government officials used state resources like access to credit to unduly reward supporters.⁶⁷ Indeed, material payoff was implied in the party's slogan: "It pays to belong to UNIP."⁶⁸ Such allegations of patronage politics continue to plague Zambian politics through the present: recent studies suggest that the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) government, which held power from 1991-2011, also directed resources towards the districts where it found the highest levels of support.⁶⁹

However, it is also conceivable that the government might allocate resources in order to sway opposition voters.⁷⁰ The UNIP leadership's preoccupation with the creation of a single-party state from the early days of independence often resulted in a strategy of opposition co-optation, as they considered threats to the party's dominance to be threats to the stability of the state.⁷¹ As such, another possible political motivation for resource allocation could be attempts to woo voters away from the opposition:

H_{1b}: The Zambian government allocated public resources to non-supporters to undermine political opponents.

While this charge is less frequently levied against Zambian politicians, there is some evidence that the UNIP government preferred to co-opt potential adversaries at the elite level, indicating an overall strategy of cooptation.⁷² In regions where competition between UNIP and ANC was

⁶⁶ Weinstein 2011

⁶⁷ Gertzel 1984, p.12

⁶⁸ And some party cadres took this slogan very literally, calling explicitly for patronage through government credit and subsidies. UNIP 5/8/1/2/31 UNIP Regional HQ Broken Hill Correspondence 1967 Mbala Resolutions: The Resolution Passed at the Provincial Regional Conference of the United National Independence Party, by JM Chapoloko for National Secretary 3-4 September 1966

⁶⁹ Mason et al. 2013

⁷⁰ Banful 2010

⁷¹ Gertzel 1984, p.4

⁷² Larmer 2011

fierce, some observers alleged that the new government allocated more agricultural inputs towards ANC-supporting districts, presumably to sway public opinion in their favor.⁷³

A final possibility is that the Zambian government simply allocated resources to the most politically active areas in order to palliate those who were already most likely to pursue their grievances in the political realm. Many analyses of UNIP politics during the period suggest that intra-party factionalism was just as large a threat to UNIP dominance as opposition party pressures, which suggests that the ruling party was likely concerned with ensuring that any signs of political activity were channeled safely into support for UNIP:⁷⁴

H_{1c}: The Zambian government allocated public resources to the most politically active areas.

This possibility is the most threatening to the concept of policy feedback, particularly because of the positive relationship between access to material resources and likelihood of political participation. Each of these three patterns of political allocation of resources is plausible in the context of Zambia's First Republic, and must therefore be considered alongside the final hypothesis regarding economic motivations for resource allocation.

2.3 Economic Motivations

As noted above, UNIP during the First Republic faced an economic quandary. The country's short-term economic viability (especially after the UDI) depended on rapid expansion of industry and national self-sufficiency in agricultural production. The most effective way to achieve these goals quickly was through investment in already economically productive areas along the line of the rail, where infrastructure was already in place to support economic growth. However, the fledgling government also had the long-term goal of rectifying the colonial legacy of uneven development, which required the diversion of resources to less productive areas away from the

⁷³ Bates 1974; Johns 1979, p.105

⁷⁴ Tordoff 1974, p.15; Rasmussen 1974

line of the rail. This second goal was also political in nature; UNIP freedom fighters (many from the remote off-rail Northern and Luapula provinces) welcomed independence with very high expectations regarding government wealth redistribution. Therefore, a key hypothesis competing with those regarding the politics of resource allocation is whether the government ultimately prioritized short-term economic gains over the political impetus for long-term shared development:

H_{1d}: The Zambian government allocated public resources to the most economically productive areas, *regardless pre-existing political support in those areas.*

If the fourth hypothesis finds support, then it is plausible that at least some element of public resource allocation is independent of existing patterns of political participation, meaning that it is feasible to use it as an independent variable predicting rates of political participation. However, if any combination of the first three hypotheses appear more likely than the last, then it is not possible to claim that public resource allocation is partially independent of existing patterns of participation.

3.0 Case Selection and Research Design

To adjudicate between the competing hypotheses described above, this chapter uses planning and reporting documents from the First and Second National Development Plans to analyze resource allocation across several provinces during the First Republic. By examining resource allocation across a diverse set of cases, it is possible to rule out the plausibility of some of the above hypotheses. However, examining outcomes provides little in the way of understanding process. Therefore, the second stage of the research design is to use government documents from the National Archives of Zambia and the UNIP Archives, as well as newspaper articles from the *Times of Zambia*⁷⁵ to analyze the government logic behind the policy design and implementation

⁷⁵ entitled *Northern News* until 1966

of Zambia’s FNDP. These government documents—including internal memos, correspondence, and official reports—provide insight into the logic behind policy design and official decisions regarding how to target state resources. As such, the methods employed in this chapter include both case comparison and causal process tracing.

3.1 Case Selection

The hypotheses above suggest that the government may attempt to direct political resources according to political or economic needs, requiring case selection that allows differentiation across all possible combinations: high levels of political activity (both opposition and ruling party strongholds) versus areas with low levels of political activity, and areas of high economic potential versus those of low economic potential. During Zambia’s First Republic, the country was divided into eight provinces.⁷⁶

		Economic Potential	
		<i>High</i>	<i>Low</i>
Level of Political Activity	<i>High</i>	Central (Ruling) Copperbelt (Ruling) Southern Province (Opposition)	Luapula Province Northern Province Barotse Province
	<i>Low</i>	<i>Null Category</i>	Northwestern Province Eastern Province

Figure 5. Economic and Political Activity in Zambian Provinces c.1964

Of these eight provinces, three fell along the line of the rail and had a privileged economic position at the time of independence: the Copperbelt, which housed the vast majority of mining operations; Central Province, which had the infrastructure connecting the mines of the Copperbelt to the capital and the southern export route, and contained most of the country’s

⁷⁶ Lusaka Province was not separated from Central Province until during the Second Republic, and the tenth, Muchinga Province, was delineated in 2011.

secondary industry; and Southern Province, which held the southern border posts and boasted most of the country's large commercial (predominately white-run) farms. All of these line-of-rail districts had high levels of political activity; Central and Copperbelt predominately held UNIP supporters, while Southern Province was an ANC stronghold.

The remaining five provinces were off-rail, and had been generally economically neglected during the period of colonial rule. Northwestern and Eastern Provinces, while generally supportive of UNIP, had lower levels of political activity initially, in large part due to their remoteness.⁷⁷ Luapula and Northern Provinces, on the other hand, responded most actively to the nationalist call for independence, contributing great manpower to the nationalist struggle.⁷⁸ Barotse Province (later Western Province) is a special case: while less active in the nationalist movement, it became politicized during the independence process as a result of its demands for special autonomous status (in part due to the existing tribally-based centralized political structures in the region). While Kaunda later reneged on the Bartose Agreement, the question of Barotseland's special status remains hotly politically contested.

The diversity of these provinces along the indicators of interest allows case comparison to determine how various combinations of political activity and economic potential influenced resource allocation during the First Republic. I used a purposive strategy to select cases based on variation along the dimensions of theoretical interest identified above: political affiliation, levels of political activity, and economic potential.⁷⁹ Based on these indicators at the time of independence, it is possible to determine which hypotheses are supported by distribution of public goods in each area. To include variation across all the available categories, the analysis continues with Central, Southern, Luapula, and Northwestern Provinces.

⁷⁷ Tordoff 1974, p. 10

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ per Gerring 2008, Chapter 28

		Economic Potential	
		<i>High</i>	<i>Low</i>
Level of Political Activity	<i>High</i>	Central (Ruling) Southern (Opposition)	Luapula
	<i>Low</i>	<i>Null Category</i>	Northwestern

Figure 6. Case Selection

I ruled out the Copperbelt Province because the influence of the foreign-owned mines and their service provision in the mining compounds complicates questions of national resource allocation. For the on-rail provinces, this leaves Central Province as an example of a politically active region (predominately) supporting UNIP, while Southern Province was a hotbed of ANC activity. For the off-rail, politically active provinces, I eliminated Barotseland because of its special relationship to the independent government, leaving Luapula and Northern, both of which demonstrated high levels of UNIP support at independence. There was no reason to select one over the other, so I chose Luapula. Similarly, in the category of low political activity off-rail, there was little reason to prefer either Eastern or Northwestern Province, so I selected Northwestern.

3.2 Research Design and Methods

Using the information about each of the cases delineated above, the first step of the research design is to determine where the government allocated resources. Leveraging the variation between these different provinces, it is possible to compare observed resource allocation against what each of the hypotheses would predict:

If the government allocates resources:	Then one should observe disproportionate resource allocation in:
To reward political supporters (H _{1a})	Central, Northwestern, and Luapula Provinces
To sway the opposition (H _{1b})	Southern Province
To politically active regions (H _{1c})	Central, Southern, and Luapula Provinces
To economically productive areas (H _{1d})	Central and Southern Provinces

Figure 7. Competing Hypotheses and Predicted Provincial Resource Allocation

In order to determine whether resource allocation is “disproportionate,” I examine the difference between planned and actual resource allocation. The FNDP was an exceedingly careful (albeit optimistic and ambitious) document, designed to take into account both the short and long-term economic necessities of the country, as well as the need to counter the under-development of rural areas.⁸⁰ This document was not designed to allocate patronage; it was designed explicitly to counter the prevailing economic patterns of rural underdevelopment, and was technocratic to the point that ANC leader Harry Nkumbula described it (derisively) as “purely academic and professional.”⁸¹ In fact, some analyses posit that the policies of the First Republic were sound, alleging that economic problems emerged (and compounded) not due to policy design, but due to the government’s inability to implement them.⁸² Therefore, I consider resource allocation to be “disproportionate” in the extent to which it deviates from the original plan, under the assumption that deviation implies political or economic pressures that would shift investment away from (what technocrats presumed was) optimal allocation.

The Second National Development Plan (SNDP), published in 1972, includes reports and assessments of public investment and resource allocation during the period of the FNDP. While the document is candid about the shortcomings of the FNDP, it is possible that (for political

⁸⁰ Tordoff and Molteno 1974

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p.275

⁸² Tordoff 1974, p.36

reasons) the government overestimated its progress. However, the analysis below relies on comparison of relative expenditures in each province, rather than absolute numbers. Therefore, if the government inflated its progress everywhere, it would not distort comparison of relative expenditures. The other possibility is that the government inflated the numbers for the worst-served regions. If this were the case, then this comparison would *underestimate* the differences between the provinces. As such, I assume that if the numbers in the SNDP are distorted, they are most likely to diminish differences between the provinces in a way that biases the research design *against* finding a result.

The use of these statistics allows me to identify which provinces received more or less than they were promised, but little more. Therefore, the second part of the research design is to undertake causal process tracing to understand the political and economic conditions in each of the four provinces, and how these conditions influenced resource allocation. This analysis relies on government documents and official reports, corroborated where possible with secondary historical accounts. Together, analysis of actual resource distribution and justification of these patterns allows me to weigh the plausibility of the hypotheses above.

4.0 Resource Allocation by Province

As is evident in Figure 4 below, resource allocation in general during the First National Development Plan prioritized investment in already economically productive regions. Both Southern and Central Provinces were targeted for relatively large per capita public investments, while the more remote regions of Luapula and Northwestern Province were allocated much smaller per capita investments.




Figure 8. Planned Per Capita FNDP Expenditure, by Province⁸³

Breaking down planned provincial expenditures by sector, the funding priorities become clearer. Despite the importance of national food self-sufficiency, a relatively small portion of the budget was allocated towards agriculture, though it was spread relatively evenly across the four provinces in question. Health expenditures, also a small portion of the total budget, are also relatively evenly allocated. The sectoral statistics demonstrate that the areas of highest priority are manufacturing, transport, and electricity/water generation. Central Province is favored again in manufacturing and transport, while Southern Province was scheduled for a comparatively large electricity/water allocation. The high level of “general services” reserved for Central Province again demonstrates its relatively favored position in planning, suggesting emphasis on the industrial activities that were concentrated along the line of the rail in that province.

⁸³ Republic of Zambia 1971




Figure 9. Per Capita Planned Sectoral FNDP Expenditures, by Province⁸⁴

The planned allocation of funds in the FNDP indicate that the government had an economic preference towards industrial development during the planning period, concentrated in Central Province and, to a certain extent, Southern Province.

Over the course of the FNDP period (1966-1972), the country's economic situation worsened, the problems of political disunity were exacerbated, and the deterioration of regional politics made it all the more important for the country to both have a functioning economy and disciplined political system. As such, the divergence between planned and actual expenditures is telling of which problems were more influential for resource allocation. Figure 10 displays the percent difference between planned and actual per capita expenditures in each province.

⁸⁴ Republic of Zambia, 1971. Currency denoted in 1964 £s. The Zambian government changed its currency to the kwacha in DATE, at which time it was 1:1 with the British £.




Figure 10. Percent Difference in Planned versus Actual FNDP Expenditures, by Province⁸⁵

Central Province received 57% more than it was promised, while Southern Province received nearly its exact allocation (just 3% less). Neither Northwestern nor Luapula Provinces fared particularly well during the plan period—Northwestern received 31% less than it was promised, while Luapula received 41% less. The divergence between planned and actual expenditures is striking, though not terribly surprising. However, the patterns of expenditure call into question the plausibility of some of the competing hypotheses.

The most obvious hypothesis to dispense with is H_{1c} , the idea that the government would allocate resources according to higher levels of political activity. If this were true, one would expect Luapula Province, which had higher aggregate levels of political activity (and a large number of former freedom fighters making claims on the government), to have received a greater allocation than Northwestern Province, which predominately supported UNIP but was relatively inactive. That Luapula actually fared worse than Northwestern in terms of overall allocation suggests that the government was not using rates of political activity to determine allocation in the less economically productive provinces. In addition, the pattern of resource allocation to

⁸⁵ Republic of Zambia, 1971

Southern Province, an opposition stronghold, undermines H_{1b} : that the government allocated resources to sway opposition voters. The amount of resources that the Province received was almost exactly what it was promised, and far less than Central Province (which generally supported UNIP).

This leaves H_{1a} (the government disproportionately targets supporters) and H_{1d} (that the government targets areas of greater economic potential). The relatively higher proportion of funds that Central Province received as compared to Southern Province indicates the possibility that the UNIP government was targeting supporters over the opposition. The comparison between allocation to the provinces on-rail versus the provinces off-rail demonstrates clearly that the government disproportionately favored economically productive areas, even though some of its most ardent supporters were in the remote hinterlands. Taken together, this pattern of allocation suggests that the government disproportionately favored areas based on their economic potential, particularly when the area of potential supported the ruling party. However, these patterns alone cannot illuminate actual government logic underlying resource allocation. Therefore, the following section turns to process tracing to examine the discussions around and justifications of resource allocation in each province.

5.0 Justifications

The patterns of resource allocation presented above suggest that the government directed disproportionate resources towards areas that were both more economically productive and more actively supportive of UNIP. This section turns to accounts of policy design and implementation in each of these provinces during the FNDP period in order to examine whether official accounts and secondary analysis of FNDP resource allocation are commensurate with this interpretation.

5.1 Central Province

Housing the country's capital, situated along the line of the rail, and hosting mining and industrial activities in its urban centers, it is no surprise that the FNDP directed a large amount of government investment towards Central Province. In the planning document, it was specifically singled out as an “area[] of prosperity which will...contribute directly or indirectly to raising the prosperity of neighboring provinces.”⁸⁶ It was targeted for a large amount of agricultural inputs, “both because of its high potential and, more important, because it house[d] many of the central institutions required for the agricultural industry.”⁸⁷ These “central institutions,” and its location on the line of the rail, also made it the obvious choice for the expansion of industrial activities such as iron and steel manufacturing, agricultural processing, and textile production.⁸⁸ Already essential to Zambia's economic development, the impact of the UDI made Central Province's economic production all the more important. Facing shortages of building materials due to a limited ability to import anything, the extant copper industry became even more central to the Province's—and the country's—economy. While the insecure borders made agricultural self-sufficiency more important as well, this challenge also reduced the materials available for agricultural extension, such as petrol and spare parts for tractors.⁸⁹

The material constraints brought on by the UDI can help explain why Central Province ultimately received such a disproportionate amount of resources. One of the biggest challenges posed by resource constraints during the UDI was road construction, meaning that the government was much better able to serve areas that already had infrastructure developed, and that additional infrastructure development was concentrated in areas where the highest returns on

86 Republic of Zambia 1966, p.2

87 Republic of Zambia 1966, p.135

88 Ibid.

89 NAZ C04/1/2 Meeting of the Provincial Development Committee 26 September 1967

investment were expected.⁹⁰ Indeed, resource distribution within Central Province was a microcosm of this national problem: larger towns faced few problems gaining access to the financing and materials to complete their projects—areas with existing roads won road extension projects, and these road extensions brought additional construction. The areas that struggled to receive access to the funds promised them were those that started with less road access.⁹¹ While the rural areas in Central Province still received some goods and services through the FNDP, the amount diminished with distance from the rail, creating a microcosm of the broader pattern in the country.⁹² Although the rural areas of Central Province undoubtedly fared better than more remote provinces, most rural reports from Central reported insufficient access to resources:⁹³ The government-issue tractors were sent for harvests too early or too late, and frequently broke down,⁹⁴ and farming loans issued by the Credit Organization of Zambia (COZ) were directed only to the places where there were “markets and roads.”⁹⁵

These observations regarding sub-Provincial resource allocation suggest that the underlying motivations for resource distribution were economic, but political motivations probably influenced the distribution of some goods, particularly in the agricultural sector. Multiple reports from the time allege that local civil servants used rural loans distributed through the COZ as a form of patronage to reward UNIP supporters.⁹⁶ In Mumbwa District, where ANC support remained strong throughout the First Republic and political violence was a regular

⁹⁰ Tordoff and Molteno 1974, p.277

⁹¹ NAZ C04/1/6 Minutes of a Special Meeting of the Provincial Development Committee, 28 September 1967

⁹² Notes from the Provincial Development Committee during this period of time note the centralization of mechanization schemes, removing materials from more remote areas with lower productive potential: NAZ C04/1/2 Meeting of the Provincial Development Committee 26 September 1967

⁹³ For example: NAZ CNP 1/1/148 Provincial and Local Government Division of Central Province Annual Report for the Year 1969

⁹⁴ UNIP 5/8/1/3/11, Serenje-Mkushi Correspondence 1964-66; Tour Report by Parliamentary Secretary P.M. Kapika, undated. See also Bowen 2011.

⁹⁵ NAZ C04/1/6 Minutes of the Central Province Development Committee, 21 July 1967

⁹⁶ Tordoff and Molteno 1974, p. 282; Johns 1979

problem, the local government struggled to attract resources.⁹⁷ However, it is difficult to tell if the lack of resources in this area was due to opposition support or geographical remoteness; as one civil servant in Mumbwa District lamented that “It is a plain fact that without good roads and a pontoon connecting these two areas with the line of the rail we cannot expect any development in these areas.”⁹⁸

In sum, it appears that both economic and political considerations contributed to Central Province’s disproportionate share of resources during the First Republic. However, most reports suggest that political considerations were most pronounced in the provision of agricultural loans and other forms of agricultural support, which comprised a relatively small amount of the total budget (see Figure 5). Most of the investment in Central Province appears to be related to its economic advantages in generating secondary industries, its geographical advantage as a centrally-located Province with relatively extensive infrastructural development at the time of the FNDP (and UDI), and its ready access to markets.

5.2 Southern Province

Like Central Province, Southern Province held an advantageous position at the beginning of the FNDP period because of its location along the line of the rail. However, two key differences exist: while Central Province held a comparative advantage in the development of secondary industry, Southern Province’s advantage fell predominately in commercial agriculture. It also had important hydroelectric potential, housing both the Zambian side of the Kariba Dam and potentially productive portions of the Zambezi River. These priorities are reflected in the two sectors in which Southern Province’s allocation was larger than Central’s: agriculture and electricity/water provision (see Figure 9). The other important difference is that Southern

⁹⁷ NAZ CNP 1/1/148 Annual Report for 1969, Provincial and Local Government, Mumbwa District

⁹⁸ UNIP 5/8/2/1/2 Political Assistant’s Marathon Tour Report by E.M. Lubasi, November 1967

Province was an ANC stronghold throughout the First Republic and until opposition parties were banned in 1971, constituting a strong regionally-based threat to UNIP's political dominance.⁹⁹

The economic importance of Southern Province is evident from its prominent role in the FNDP. Because of a combination of fertile soil and access to markets through the line of rail, Southern Province at independence was home to the few expatriate farmers who decided to settle in Zambia, creating large commercial farms on the most productive land. By the 1930s, most of the African population had been forcibly removed from the fertile "Crown Land" along the line of the rail, and resettled into overcrowded Native Reserves further away from the infrastructure.¹⁰⁰ As such, development planning in Southern Province focused on re-settling African farmers back onto more fertile land, setting up large state-run farming schemes, encouraging cooperatives, agricultural extension, and farm mechanization, and promoting the growth of food crops to preserve Southern Province as "the granary of Zambia."¹⁰¹ This ambitious plan included the re-settlement of 5,000 families from the over-populated African reserves to 250 "emergent commercial farms" on state land.¹⁰²

This focus on resettlement of farmers in the rural areas was matched with a second set of development goals concerning Livingstone: developing it as a major tourist center, and constructing dams at the 3rd and 5th gorges on Victoria Falls to create additional hydroelectric schemes. Most of the industrial investments were for secondary manufacturing and agricultural processing, such as the creation of a fertilizer factory and a sugar mill at Mazabuka.¹⁰³ Furthermore, due to the country's growing need for electricity and irrigation, Southern

⁹⁹ Tordoff 1979, p. 8; Gertzel 1984, p. 9.

¹⁰⁰ Vickery 1986, pgs. 204-208

¹⁰¹ UNIP 5/4/2/4/1 Appendix A of the Provincial Development Committee Report: "Speech by the Minister of State for Economic Development, Honorable U.G. Mwila, to the Provincial Development Committee at Livingstone, 31 October 1966

¹⁰² Republic of Zambia 1966, p.157

¹⁰³ Republic of Zambia 1966, p.158

Province's allocation included provisions for multiple hydroelectric and water supply schemes in the commercial agricultural areas along the rail.¹⁰⁴

Once it became clear that the Rhodesian UDI was not going to become resolved quickly, Southern Province became essential for both food and energy security. Because Zambia was a net importer of food at independence, and its overland trade routes were compromised by the UDI to the south and civil wars to the south, north, and west, Southern Province's potential to close the gap in food production gained grave national importance. In addition, Zambia drew its electricity from the Kariba Dam, which had been a joint project with Southern Rhodesia during the years in which the two countries belonged to the short-lived Central African Federation. The electricity scheme was on the Rhodesian side of the border, and given frosty relations with Ian Smith's regime, Zambia's access to electricity suddenly became uncomfortably tenuous.¹⁰⁵

That Southern Province received almost exactly the resource allocation it had been promised suggests that its economic importance outweighed political considerations regarding ANC dominance in the area. While some civil servants complained that the ANC interfered with FNDP projects,¹⁰⁶ Southern Province's record of good project implementation suggests that these complaints were probably not serious.¹⁰⁷ Furthermore, while agricultural disbursements through the COZ are the most common target for those alleging clientelism and patronage, Southern Province was the largest beneficiary of this program, indicating that politics was unlikely to be the only consideration in the distribution of agricultural projects.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁴ Republic of Zambia 1966, p.158

¹⁰⁵ Beveridge and Obserschall 1979, p.43

¹⁰⁶ UNIP 5/4/2/1/16 District Secretary of Sinezongwe 1973. "District Monthly Security Report, January 1973, for Gwemebe District to the Permanent Secretary."

¹⁰⁷ Tordoff and Molteno 1974, p. 280-281

¹⁰⁸ Johns 1979, p. 105

Government reports and internal memos from Southern Province regarding implementation of the FNDP tend to focus on administrative bottlenecks as the biggest challenge (aside from material shortages),¹⁰⁹ which is commensurate with Tordoff and Molteno's assessment of the primary obstacles to implementing the FNDP.¹¹⁰ The challenges to project implementation highlighted in government documents are generally apolitical, referencing the same challenges associated with the UDI and inefficient bureaucracy that were endemic at the time. Nothing in these documents suggests that the region suffered a bias in resource allocation as a result of the ANC. Internal party documents, on the other hand, were preoccupied with the challenges of having to contend with the ANC.¹¹¹ However, these memos and circulars focused on the challenges of swaying voters away from the ANC and the perennial problem of inter-party violence rather than threats to the implementation of government policy. The balance of the evidence therefore suggests that Southern Province received a proportional allocation of resources because of its extant infrastructure (along the line of the rail) and economic potential. The reasons it did not receive a disproportionate amount like Central Province might be in part because of the nature of its economic potential (agricultural rather than industrial). The lack of UNIP supporters may also explain why it received proportionally less than Central Province, though this is unlikely; as mentioned above, agricultural spending was the most common vehicle for patronage, and given the large amount of agricultural credit issued in Southern Province, it is unlikely that the difference between Southern and Central Provinces came from uneven amounts of patronage.

¹⁰⁹ For example, UNIP SP4/2/173 J.K. Mulwand, Development Officer for Resident Secretary, First National Development Plan Southern Province Progress Report to 30th September, 1967

¹¹⁰ Tordoff and Molteno 1974

¹¹¹ For example, UNIP 5/8/1/2/41 Regional HQ Kabwe 1969 Letter to All Regional Secretaries from National Secretary MM Chona 7 June 1967

5.3 Northwestern and Luapula Provinces

Given their similar profiles and experiences throughout the course of the FNDP, it is useful to examine Northwestern and Luapula Provinces in concert. At independence, both provinces were remote and economically under-developed. In 1964, Northwestern Province had no paved roads, no commercial agriculture, and no industry to speak of. Having served for years as a labor reserve for the mines in Copperbelt and Central Provinces, the rate of subsistence agriculture was so low that Northwestern Province was still importing staple foods. The economic development of Northwestern Province constituted a long-term economic goal rather than a short-term necessity; it was part of the broader goal to narrow the economic gap between the line-of-rail and the hinterland and create a rural base for shared development. The first steps toward this long-term vision were to eliminate dependency on food imports, extend the national infrastructure to make the province more accessible, and increase access to education and healthcare. According to the FNDP, “first priority will be given to achieving self-sufficiency in maize and to encouraging the production of ground nuts...Settlement schemes will be undertaken to aggregate sparse population under co-operative forms of settlement.”¹¹² Unlike Southern and Central Provinces, which were integral to UNIP’s national plans, Northwestern’s role in the FNDP was simply to gain self-sufficiency.

Luapula Province also served as a labor reserve for the mines of the Copperbelt. More densely populated than Northwestern, its economy revolved around the local fishing industry in addition to migratory labor. Despite an earlier period of economic productivity, the region experienced a steep economic decline in the 1950s, and was one of most economically disadvantaged provinces at the time of independence.¹¹³ As in Northwestern Province, the

¹¹² Republic of Zambia 1966, p.207

¹¹³ Maccola 2006, p. 47, Baylies 1984 p. 163

government's goals for Luapula Province during the FNDP were modest, and focused on reviving the fishing and forestry industries in the region.¹¹⁴

The primary difference between the two provinces at the time of the FNDP was their relative levels of political activity; residents of Luapula Province had been particularly active during the independence movement, contributing a large amount of “freedom fighters” and party activists.¹¹⁵ While Northwestern Province was generally supportive of UNIP, it was late to receive the nationalist message, and generally demonstrated lower levels of political activity.¹¹⁶ Because the participants in the independence struggle—particularly the freedom fighters and rural cadres—exerted a substantial pressure on the government to distribute patronage in the form of credit, access to government projects, and civil service jobs, one would expect UNIP to have directed more resources towards Luapula than Northwestern Province.¹¹⁷ However, they received approximately the same amount of consideration in FNDP planning, and Luapula Province actually received proportionately less.

Actual allocation of resources was disappointing for both Northwestern and Luapula Provinces. The economic projects in both provinces were of low national priority, and the constraints on resources caused by the UDI exacerbated the shortages in these relatively remote areas. In particular, the diversion of road-building materials to the more economically productive parts of the country made Northwestern almost entirely unable to build any all-weather roads at all, rendering most of the province completely inaccessible during the annual December-May rainy season. This state of affairs stymied all other development plans in the region. A civil

¹¹⁴ Baylies 1984, p. 179

¹¹⁵ Rasmussen 1979, p.56; Baylies 1984, p.163-4

¹¹⁶ Tordoff 1974, p.9

¹¹⁷ Dresang and Young 1979, p.73.

servant's tour report at the end of the 1965 Transitional Development Plan in Mwinilunga illustrates the depth of the problem:

In Mwinilunga we have twelve projects under the Transitional Development Plan. Of these, unfortunately only three are under way, i.e. the Mwinilunga main hospital, the Mwinilunga secondary school, the Mwinilunga police station. These three will be completed on schedule, but it must also be noted that ...there is some slackening, due to transport difficulties in the construction of certain education projects...Government Policy is in serious jeopardy in this province.¹¹⁸

Similarly, Luapula Province was left with a high number of projects never completed.¹¹⁹

Luapulans found this particularly insulting, as they presumed that their high levels of activity in the independence struggle would yield fruits through fast economic development and high levels of government investment after independence.¹²⁰ That these two remote provinces had such different experiences despite such different levels of political activity suggests that government resource allocation was influenced by economic viability more so than extant political support.

6.0 Conclusion

This chapter has examined resource allocation during Zambia's First Republic, assessing the extent to which resource allocation across different provinces could be best explained by political or economic motivations. The evidence suggests that resource allocation during this period of time was likely influenced by a combination of economic and political motivations: economically productive regions received the lion's share of public resource allocations in the FNDP planning document, but only Central Province—both economically productive and a UNIP stronghold—received a disproportionate amount of resources. Analysis of government documents and civil servants' reports along with secondary materials suggests that the political motivations for allocating patronage to UNIP supporters during this period of time was probably

¹¹⁸ C04/1/3 "My Tour Report of the North Western Province, 1st November to 9th November, 1965, by M. Sipalo, Parliamentary Secretary of the Office of National Development Planning

¹¹⁹ Baylies 1984, p. 179

¹²⁰ Macola 2006.

concentrated in agricultural expenditures, which were a relatively small portion of the budget. By examining overall allocations alongside reports of actual project implementation, it becomes apparent that projects tended to be concentrated in economically productive areas (for both reasons of infrastructural access and economic necessity). The disproportionately low level of resource distribution in both Northwestern and Luapula Provinces undermines the claim that resource distribution was strongly linked to UNIP support or high levels of political activity. Furthermore, the uneven distribution of public projects across the urban and rural areas of Central Province indicate that, even in UNIP strongholds, the government distributed resources to shore up industrial economic performance.

While admittedly circumstantial, the evidence presented in this chapter contains important information about the motivation of public resource distribution. Given the importance of economic considerations in resource distribution, it is plausible to claim that public policy was not only the result of existing patterns of political participation. Rather, public resource distribution is at least partially independent of existing patterns of participation, making it possible to treat public policy as an independent variable with the potential to influence political participation. Most importantly, this chapter has presented evidence that undermines the claim that the government simply directs resources towards the most politically active areas. Such an observation would have been particularly devastating to the policy feedback argument. However, while the evidence suggests that political considerations did play a role in resource distribution, it appears that the most “lucrative” combination was to be in an economically productive UNIP stronghold. If levels of political activity alone were enough to merit disproportionate public resource distribution, then one would have expected to observe much higher levels of public spending in Luapula Province.

As Chapter Four will demonstrate, there are many political and economic continuities linking Zambia's First Republic to the contemporary Third Republic. Without discounting the impact of twenty years of one-party rule, the country's economic and political structure currently exhibit many of the same problems that were evident during the 1960s. Importantly, the content of public policy is in many ways the same as well. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that, if economic considerations influenced policy creation during the 1960s, they should during the contemporary period as well. Chapter Four takes up the task of linking the context of the 1960s to the contemporary period in greater detail, but the logic of the argument presented in this chapter indicates that some variation in public resource allocation is a function of economic potential, which (in Zambia) varies by region. This chapter has primarily examined objective rates of material resource distribution. However, the theory presented in the previous chapter emphasizes how subjective interpretations of different types of policies can also influence political participation. Therefore, the next chapter examines how the government targeted different *types* of policies at men and women based on social considerations, arguing that (like economic pressures), this variation occurred independently of existing patterns of political participation.

Chapter 3

Training Housewives and Taming She-Devils: The Salience of Gender for Policy Creation during Zambia's First Republic

Abstract

This chapter examines the salience of gender as a social category for the creation of public policy during Zambia's First Republic. Using gender as an example of a salient social cleavage, it examines how government officials' social assumptions about the roles of men and women differed, resulting in different patterns of public policy directed at men and women. It further demonstrates that gender identity intersects with other forms of identity, such as those based on occupational categories, to generate variety in public policy based on officials' social assumptions. The underlying argument is that government officials use social heuristics to create different types of policies for different groups of people, and that these social heuristics are at least partially independent of pre-existing patterns of political participation. According to the policy feedback framework, the different nature of policies directed at different groups should generate different interpretive effects. Thus, salient social identities provide another source of independent variation in policy creation.

1.0 Introduction

In the last chapter, regional patterns of resource allocation provided some information about the relative amounts of public goods and services to which residents had access during Zambia's First Republic. Economic pressures on aggregate resource allocation are helpful for understanding distribution of material benefits, which are essential for exploring the material element of policy feedback. However, the amount of resources to which certain regions have access tells only part of the story; many policy feedback studies emphasize the importance of interpretive effects, which requires information about the *nature* of policies, and how that nature might vary for different sub-populations. In fact, a fundamental focus of many policy feedback studies is how the form or delivery of various material resources affects citizens' understanding of their relationship to the government. It is not enough, then, to know where the government targets resources: one must also consider what kinds of policies different groups of people are likely to experience.

This line of inquiry assumes that governments design different kinds of policies for different kinds of people. One source of such variation is government officials' social assumptions about various groups, which may color the types of policies directed at such groups. During Zambia's First Republic, the government carried all manner of social assumptions that influenced policy towards groups, for example: Asian wholesalers are exploitative and their activities must be contained; the rural masses are enervated and must be compelled to work; urban black-marketeers are trouble-makers who cause social problems. These assumptions about group behavior then influence policy outcomes: expropriating foreign-held stores, providing incentive schemes for rural cooperatives, razing informal markets.

The interpretive framework for policy feedback would then posit that a rural farmer who was the beneficiary of an incentive program would have a very different relationship with the government than the urban black-marketeer who was harassed by state agents. The farmer may be more likely to participate in politics, the black-marketeer more likely to protest or withdraw. This line of argumentation, however, generates the same problem of endogeneity as in the previous chapter: it obscures whether the farmer received the incentive program because he was already more likely to vote, or the black-marketeer's stand was razed because she was already more likely to agitate against the government. It is therefore essential to establish that government officials use social heuristics to design different types of policies across different groups *regardless of existing patterns of political participation*.

Where salient social identities remain static, the divisions between social groups may be entrenched in society and in policy, leading to persistent cleavages. However, social identities and the assumptions that accompany them can be dynamic, and the extent to which they are salient to policymakers may change over time. The essential insight for this analysis, however, is

simply that policymakers design different types of policies for different social groups based on their assumptions, leading to different types of policy experiences across groups. An additional insight is that each individual holds a multitude of social identities, representing different social cleavages that may be cross-cutting or reinforcing. Therefore, the ultimate balance of policies that an individual experiences will be a function of intersectionality: the specific combination of identities that carry salience for policymaking at any moment.¹²¹ As a result, members of the same social group may have dramatically different policy experiences if they have a different combination of other salient characteristics.

Therefore, this chapter must perform two tasks: first, to demonstrate that the government uses social heuristics to create different types of policy for different groups of people, independent of existing patterns of participation, that create different policy experiences *between* groups; second, that policy experiences can differ *within* a group based on the effects of other salient elements of social identity. Many elements of social identity may be salient, including race, class, ethnicity, gender, or religion. In reality, an individual's identity is made up of multiple layers, different combinations of which may be more salient at different times (or made salient through policy). To engage in the tasks above, I focus specifically on gender as one salient element of social identity during Zambia's First Republic and into the 1970s. Using this example, I illuminate how gender as a salient social category influenced policy creation independently of political participation, resulting in different policy experiences for men and women. I then discuss how other elements of social identity intersect with gender to create a variety of experiences of women depending on (in this example) their occupation.

¹²¹ Discussions of intersectionality are a central part of feminist political science literature, for example Crenshaw 1989

This chapter proceeds as follows: Section Two discusses the hypotheses, explaining how they relate to the broader argument of the dissertation and describing the research design employed to examine their validity. Section Three proceeds with the first case study, which examines the difference in the government's treatment of male and female UNIP activists, demonstrating that the differences in the content of the policy directed towards men and women was a function of social assumptions based on gender difference rather than differences in existing patterns of participation. Section Four presents two cases to examine how gender identity intersects with occupation to generate variation *within* gender categories, highlighting how intersectionality generates a large amount of variation in salient social identities and policy experiences. Section Five summarizes how the evidence presented in this chapter (and the last) provide support for the plausibility of treating public policy as partially independent of political participation.

2.0 Hypotheses and Research Design

2.1 The Saliency of Social Difference

The first argument this chapter advances is that the government uses assumptions about the social roles of various groups within society as heuristics in policy creation, resulting in policies that are qualitatively different for different social groups. The insights behind this argument are informed by Schneider and Ingram's observations about the relationship between the "social construction" of various groups within society and the relationship thereof to different types of policies.¹²² If policymakers view a group's social role as fundamentally productive, they are likely to design policies that empower that group to continue their activities, such as providing credit. Alternatively, if policymakers view a group as destructive or problematic, they are likely to implement policies designed to restrain the activity of the group in question, such as razing

¹²² Schneider and Ingram 1993

informal settlements or cracking down on informal market activities. Being on the receiving end of one or the other of these policies should theoretically generate a very different effect on political participation for the different target population. While these different policies also confer different material benefits, they are likely to generate different *interpretive* effects. Policy feedback scholars argue that, in addition to conferring material benefits (or deprivation), policies also send distinct messages to target groups about their role as citizens, their relationship to the government, and the likelihood that government officials would be responsive to their needs.¹²³ Recipients of credit may interpret such a program as evidence that government officials value them and their work, and that the political sphere is responsive to their needs. Those who have their settlements razed, on the other hand, may interpret such a policy as evidence that the government does not value them and is unlikely to be responsive to their needs.

The illustration above is an extreme example of “different policy experiences,” but the underlying intuition is that government officials and policy makers are likely to design policy based on heuristics about the social roles of different target populations, resulting in qualitatively different policies across different social groups within the polity. If the nature of these policies is different enough to trigger different interpretive effects, then these qualitatively different policies should correspond with different patterns of political participation across social groups. In order to test this argument, this chapter focuses on gender as a salient social division during Zambia’s First Republic. While this chapter could have focused on tribal distinctions, race, or class, gender has certain advantages as a category of examination. First, tribal and class distinctions during Zambia’s First Republic tended to coincide with geographic variation, making it difficult to differentiate social from economic motivations for policy creation, as described in Chapter Two. While race was highly salient during the First Republic, only a very small percentage of

¹²³ Campbell 2012

Zambia's small white and Asian population elected to adopt Zambian citizenship, making it difficult to compare across categories (black citizens versus white or Asian non-citizens).

Gender, then, constitutes a salient social category that cross-cut economic categories and allows meaningful comparisons across the total population.

As such, the first argument this chapter advances is that, during Zambia's First Republic, policymakers created policies that treated men and women differently:

H_{2a}: The Zambian government implemented policy that treated men and women differently.

While this may seem an obvious argument to make, it illustrates an additional source of variation in policy experience. Gender differences are a low-hanging fruit for analysis, but the insights behind this argument should theoretically apply to other social cleavages as well. This chapter seeks to establish that policy differentiated between men and women precisely due to government assumptions about their different social roles. In the policy feedback framework, one would then expect these differences in policy experience to generate different patterns of political participation. Therefore, it is also essential to establish that the gendered policy differences are not a result of different past patterns of political participation:

H_{2b}: The gendered differences in policy did not reflect differences in past political participation.

In order to provide evidence for this first set of hypotheses, I use a case analysis to examine the gendered differences in policy, based explicitly on a gendered rationale, between the most politically active men and women in Zambia's First Republic: those who were actively involved in UNIP. This case study traces the different experiences for men and women within the population of those most politically active. If the case demonstrates and male and female party activists were subject to different policies based explicitly on a gendered rationale, then it would

support both hypotheses: that the government differentiated between men and women for explicitly gendered reasons, and that this gender differentiation was independent of past levels of political participation.

2.2 Intersectionality and the Effects of Social Difference

This chapter seeks to establish how social identity may influence the nature of the policies that an individual experiences, while the previous chapter sought to demonstrate that geographical variation in economic potential influenced the amount of public resources that different regions receive. Together, these observations comprise at least two sources of variation in the amount and type of resources an individual might hope to receive from the government. In reality, there are multiple sources of variation, based on the salience of any number of social characteristics in concert with the relative economic prominence of an individual's geographic location. The second empirical task this chapter undertakes is to demonstrate that assumptions based on one element of social identity—gender—intersect with other variables to create distinct policy experiences for different types of women. While the first section seeks to demonstrate differences in policy experience *between* groups, this second section seeks to demonstrate how the influence of different elements of social identity and geographic location combine to create variety of experiences *within* groups. The second part of this chapter focuses specifically on how women in different economic roles have distinct policy experiences as a result of interaction between social and economic variables:

H_{2c}: Women in different economic roles will have different experiences with public policy, despite sharing the same gender.

The substantive implication of this argument is that one should expect a large amount of variation in policy experience within a national population as a result of the different possible combinations of economic roles and salient social identities. For example, one would expect an

urban white collar woman to have an experience distinct from a peri-urban male shop-owner, which would be distinct from a female farmer in a rural hinterland, or a male farmer in a rural hinterland, or a male commercial farmer along the line of the rail. Ultimately, it is unimportant *which* social or economic cleavages are the most important for policy creation; what is important is the implication that policy experiences should differ across these dimensions in ways that are plausibly distinct from existing patterns of political participation.

To demonstrate this level of variation, I undertake a pair of comparative cases along two dimensions: gender and occupation. The first case examines the gendered difference in policy experience for male and female rural subsistence farmers; the second illustrates the specific policies to which female urban white collar workers experienced. In concert, this pair of case comparisons illustrates not only the salience of gender difference, but how gender interacts with other salient variables (like occupation) to create different overall experiences for different segments of the population. If governments create distinct sets of policies for individuals based on a combination of variables that are plausibly independent of existing political participation—gender and an indicator of economic production capacity like occupation—then it is reasonable to assume that variation in policy experience across the polity is at least partially independent of existing patterns of political participation, justifying the treatment of policy as an independent variable that could reasonably influence subsequent political participation.

3.0 The Salience of Gender in Policy Creation: The Case of UNIP Activists

UNIP began as a nationalist movement in late colonial Northern Rhodesia, gaining enough support to become the ruling party of newly independent Zambia. This case examines men's and women's participation in the nationalist movement leading up to independence and proceeds to illustrate the very different ways that UNIP incorporated men and women into the party once it

transitioned from nationalist movement to ruling party. The first part of the case examines women's experiences with the colonial regime and UNIP during the later years of independence, noting that both men and women played an active role in the movement. The second part of the case examines what occurred post-independence, as UNIP moved from a nationalist movement to a governing party and institutionalized women's political participation through the Women's Brigade. In particular, it illustrates the social logic behind the government's different treatment of male and female party activists.

3.1 Gender, Labor, and Nationalism in Colonial Northern Rhodesia, 1924-1964

Northern Rhodesia became an official protectorate of Great Britain in 1924. Initially a labor reserve for mines in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, prospectors found exploitable copper deposits in the territory shortly after it became a protectorate. To maximize production in domestic mines, the colonial administration needed to convince laborers to work locally in newly opened mines rather than migrating south to work for well-established companies in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa.¹²⁴ To attract local labor, the new mines allowed workers to bring their wives to the mining compounds and even advanced wages for workers to pay bride prices.¹²⁵ Initially a recruitment tactic, these companies quickly discovered that married miners with longer contracts were more productive, not least because women performed unpaid domestic labor that lowered the mining company's operating costs: for example, it freed companies to provide workers with raw foods that women could cook in the home rather than prepared meals.¹²⁶

The colonial economy relied heavily on women's unremunerated labor, both as wives in mining compounds and in maintaining agricultural production in the countryside. In much of

¹²⁴ Schuster 1979, p.18

¹²⁵ Berger 1974, p.32

¹²⁶ Chauncey 1981, p.140

Northern Rhodesia, the sex division of labor demanded men's agricultural work only periodically. Demand for women's labor, however, was constant: they weeded, harvested, and processed staple crops, so their migration to urban centers threatened subsistence production.¹²⁷ Therefore, the increasing migration of unmarried women to mining towns, where they had more freedom and economic opportunities, threatened an economic system that depended on their unremunerated subsistence production.¹²⁸

Because colonial officials had different economic requirements of men and women, public policy under colonial administration was highly gendered. Policy towards women focused on restricting their movement and activities. Officials made formal employment illegal for women, and made it illegal for unmarried women to migrate to towns.¹²⁹ By 1939, officials set up checkpoints along all major routes to the Copperbelt to repatriate women without proper documentation. If unmarried women were caught in town, mine police could seize them, fine them, and send them back to the countryside.¹³⁰ Targeting women's primary income-generating activities, they made beer brewing illegal, shut down black markets, and cracked down on "prostitution," loosely defined.¹³¹

On the other hand, the colonial government relied heavily on local men for copper production. After a series of strikes in the 1950s, they recognized the need to channel dissent, and allowed union organization. These unions gave men an opportunity to negotiate formally with both the mining companies and the colonial administration and provided them a formal arena for politics. Colonial fears about men generating instability derived from concern that they would be too "tribal" for self-rule, so they slowly incorporated men into formal political

¹²⁷ Moore and Vaughan 1994

¹²⁸ Parpart 1994, p.18

¹²⁹ Schuster 1979, p.19-20

¹³⁰ Parpart 1994, p.143-4

¹³¹ Ibid.

processes, granting them low-level roles in political administration.¹³² The colonists' different treatment of men and women created very different political opportunity spaces for each, which began to manifest in nationalist organization.

Political participation during this period fell into two categories: the formal negotiations for independence, and grassroots nationalist organization through the nascent UNIP. While the former was institutionalized and male-dominated, the latter demonstrated striking gender parity. Formal negotiations for independence began among the unionized miners. Because formal employment (and therefore labor unions) were exclusively male, women could not take part in the official strikes or negotiations.¹³³ The strikes of the 1950s leading up to the independence struggle were thus male activities, while women assumed a supportive role behind the scenes. When nationalist struggles came to a head, men were able to make inroads in the formal political sphere through their knowledge of colonial administration.¹³⁴

However, both women and men were highly politically active in grassroots nationalist organizing. In the lead-up to independence, women had considerable autonomy in the operations of the Women's Brigade, the women's wing of UNIP. They elected their own members, organized tirelessly, and were occasionally sent to "the prison of imperialists" for their political activities.¹³⁵ Female UNIP organizers encouraged women to "act like men;" Regional Secretary Rosemary Lungu instructed "We are now at a hard time that even women should turn [i]nto men. Let us show the world that women of Zambia want freedom in January...never sit down doing nothing."¹³⁶ Membership rolls in 1962 from Broken Hill, an economically important mining

¹³² Herbert 2002, Grant 2009

¹³³ Cooper 1996, p.3

¹³⁴ Sardanis 2003

¹³⁵ UNIP 5/8/1/2/3 Letter from M. Chona, National Secretary, to the Broken Hill Regional Secretary, 6 November 1962

¹³⁶ UNIP 5/8/1/2/15 Letter to Mama Secretary of the Shamputa Women Constituency from Women Regional Secretary Rosemary Lungu 16 December 1963

town, show near balance between men (10,645) and women (9,941).¹³⁷ Women were active even in remote rural areas: they helped to organize underground meetings of unionists, they hid prominent nationalist Kenneth Kaunda during his cross-country tour of political mobilization, and they brewed and sold beer illicitly to fund the nationalist movement.¹³⁸

In the late colonial period, both men and women felt the injustice of the system of minority rule, and the both reacted against that repression through nationalist organizing. The nature of their organizing was gendered because of men's ability to better engage in the formal political sphere, but both men and women across both urban and rural settings poured energy into the campaign.¹³⁹ If the government designed policies in such a way that reflected past political participation, one would expect little difference between the policies that targeted male and female party activists; while high-level party posts would still likely be reserved for men (as a function of their greater experience with formal administration), one would expect the lower level party activists to be folded into the party in similar ways and be tasked with similar roles in the project of national development. However, as the following section describes, such parity did not occur: women were relegated to their own branch, and tasked with gender-specific projects that differed dramatically from the general civil service roles that male party activists received.

3.2 The UNIP Women's Brigade in Zambia's First Republic

After independence, UNIP began to discipline the party machinery, integrating the different groups and factions into the government to embark on the political task of consolidating power and the economic task of development. Larmer argues that UNIP as a nationalist movement was an amalgamation of various anti-colonial forces that ultimately had to be integrated into the party

¹³⁷ UNIP 5/8/1/2/3 Monthly Return Ending 30th May 1962 Mumbwa-Broken Hill Regional Report 30 June 1962 from Regional Secretary B. Kapupi

¹³⁸ Poewe 1981, p.206

¹³⁹ Tripp et al. 2009, p.30

upon independence.¹⁴⁰ As a nationalist movement, UNIP had little need for programmatic coherence beyond campaigning for independence, and could afford to recruit supporters with disparate visions of what “independence” would actually mean. Geisler notes that, across Southern Africa, “Liberation movements tended to be more inclusive, allowing women political spaces in order to claim their energies for struggle...Political parties developed more particularistic goals, which did not represent the aspirations of all citizens and often no longer included the concerns of women.”¹⁴¹ As a ruling party, UNIP no longer had the luxury of accommodating such incoherence, and instead had to coordinate members’ energies into a workable plan for national development and governance. Through this process of incorporation, it became clear that party elites had a very specific idea of the role that women should play in the party and in national development, one distinct from men.

While the pre-independence Women’s Brigade comprised a disparate group of women, some with progressive views, the post-independence Brigade adjusted to reflect the specific vision that UNIP had for women. As far as membership, the Brigade became ever more socially conservative, squeezing out more progressive members for those that towed the socially conservative party line.¹⁴² Early on, some astute members of the Brigade recognized that the party would likely sideline them after independence. For some women, this realization triggered an abrupt about-face: the Feira Constituency Women’s Brigade Secretary received the following stern letter in July 1963:

According to the facts collected by the Regional Cabinet, it became clear that you were involved directly in the affairs of the whole Women Brigade [sic] in Lusaka. It is found out that: You went around all the branches to tell the Women to sit down and stop organizing and since May no organization has been done. You condoned with these words—Women to be used by the party as tools—women

¹⁴⁰ Larmer 2011

¹⁴¹ Geisler 2004, p.88

¹⁴² Schuster 1993, p. 22-23

not educated and therefore they will not be recognized after independence... This is a serious matter... I must warn you very strongly that such conduct would lead you to suspension and later expulsion from the party.¹⁴³

As more progressive women grew disaffected and left the Brigade, the remaining membership reflected an increasingly conservative ideology.¹⁴⁴

Indeed, one purpose of the Women's Brigade was to funnel women's political energy through appropriate channels. Where women established their own non-partisan groups outside the auspices of UNIP, Women's Brigade Director Dorothy Kapantha instructed all the Women's Regional Secretaries to incorporate "and if possible, control" these organizations within UNIP, so as to limit women's autonomous organization.¹⁴⁵ In a 1972 document elucidating the "Role of the Women's Brigade in Relation to the Main Body," it is clear that the primary function of the Brigade was to incorporate women into UNIP; their activities were limited to vague goals such as "to help their less fortunate sisters to improve their well-being by teaching them some little things," or "promotions of Zambia identity," or "take part in the affairs of the Labour Movement...so as to introduce more Party Influence and control in the Labour Movement."¹⁴⁶ In a draft of this document, one loftier political goal—increasing women's representation in Parliament—was deleted in a hand-written edit.¹⁴⁷

In addition to the political incentives to exercise tight control over party branches, the purpose of channeling women's political energy into the conservative Brigade was to execute a vision of national development that characterized women's role as mothers and homemakers. Official proclamations regarding women's role in development emphasized their importance in

¹⁴³ UNIP 5/8/1/1/10 Letter to Feira Constituency Women's Brigade Secretary from Regional Secretary H. Shamabanse, 26 July 1963

¹⁴⁴ Geisler 2004, p.89-92

¹⁴⁵ UNIP 5/8/1/3/16 Memo to All Women Regional Secretaries, "The National Women's Organization of Zambia." From Director of Women's Brigade D. Kapantha, 31 August 1968

¹⁴⁶ UNIP 5/8/1/2/44 Letter to the Chairman of the Political Committee from Secretary for Women Affairs B.C. Kankasa 5 January 1972

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

“look[ing] after the children and homes,”¹⁴⁸ and to “cook and prepare good food, keep their houses in good order and be able to look after their menfolk and children.”¹⁴⁹ Exhortations of this vision were repeated by the conservative Women’s Brigade under the leadership of Director Princess Nakatindi and Undersecretary Dorothy Kapantha, who encouraged women’s participation along the same terms. In one representative speech, Princess Nakatindi emphasized that “We, as women, have been assigned with very great responsibility by nature. Citizenship starts in the family, which is the natural and fundamental group unit of society. It is here that the citizens of the future receive their first training, and our influence as women, therefore, becomes of particular importance.”¹⁵⁰ Commensurate with this vision, government calls to action for women often entailed duties such as monitoring the prices of controlled goods while they conducted their household shopping.¹⁵¹

Contrary to the conservative nature of the women’s body and the gender-specific tasks it was allocated, the incorporation of male activists into UNIP was far more gender-neutral: young men were folded into the Youth Brigade, largely tasked with recruiting new members (though, in practice, this often meant intimidation and political clashes with opposition members), while other male UNIP activists received a variety of civil service posts across various sectors.¹⁵² Their ongoing participation in party organization did not face the same narrow categorization that women’s did, despite their similar roles as activists during the independence movement.

¹⁴⁸ National Guidance Minister of State Mishek Banda, quoted in *Times of Zambia*, 14 April 1970, “No development without your help.”

¹⁴⁹ UNIP 5/9/6 1970-1971 Tour Reports, “Minutes of the Central Province Political Committee held in Serenje 4-5 January 1971

¹⁵⁰ UNIP 5/8/1/3/16 UNIP Regional HQ Mkushi 1965-1971, “Appeal to Women” by Princess Nakatindi, 19 November 1965.

¹⁵¹ For example, 18 March 1966, “Government wants housewife vigilantes,” *Times of Zambia*

¹⁵² To the extent that some viewed civil service positions as a specific form of patronage. See Gertzel 1984, Bates 1976.

3.3 Social Identity and Policy Creation

The experience of women in the transition from UNIP as a nationalist movement to a ruling political party provides evidence in support of H_{2a} and H_{2b}: during Zambia's First Republic, the government designed policies that differentiated between men and women on the basis of social assumptions about their appropriate roles, independent of their previous patterns of political participation. While both men and women were active agitators during the nationalist movement, the government's treatment of them after independence was very different. Activist men were recruited into a broad array of civil service jobs, while women's only avenue for continued political activism was through the conservative Women's Brigade, promoting policies that emphasized women's role in the home. This emphasis on women's role in the private sphere is not simply a function of existing patterns of women's participation; women's role in protests and nationalist activities during the independence movement undermine the plausibility of such a claim. Furthermore, the government's rhetorical explanation of women's policies emphasizes the social elements of gender difference. As such, the different treatment of men and women after independence must be independent of their existing patterns of political participation, instead likely a function of different assumptions about the social roles that men and women play. However, while gender was clearly a salient social identity that influenced policy creation, not all women experienced the same types of policies. The following section considers how gender intersects with other elements of social identity and demography to generate a variety of policy experiences.

4.0 Intersectionality and Within-Group Variation in Policy Experience

As the previous section demonstrated, gender was a salient social category that influenced policy formation during Zambia's First Republic, particularly in the extent to which it emphasized

women's role in the private sphere. However, the nature of the policies that women encountered was not uniform; it varied across intersections with various other salient elements of identity, creating policy variation along multiple combinations of salient individual- or regional-level characteristics. This section examines how one additional element of identity—occupation—intersects with gender to create very different policy experiences for different groups of women. This section proceeds to compare the policies targeted at two different types of women: rural members of subsistence or small-holder farming families, and urban white-collar workers. Despite their shared identity as women, the intersection of their gender with salient divisions across occupation created distinct policy experiences for each.

4.1 Gender and Agricultural Policy in Rural Areas

In rural areas, UNIP and the Women's Brigade targeted women specifically with extension programs intended to stabilize smallholder production and promote "traditional" rural family structures. One pressing development problem that newly independent Zambia faced was unsustainable rural-to-urban migration (as a result of the copper mines and disproportionate economic growth in industrial areas) and an agricultural sector dominated by small subsistence farmers who were unable to achieve national self-sufficiency in agricultural production. To create a viable rural agricultural sector, the government focused on organizing (male) rural producers into co-operatives; to stabilize the rural population, the government attempted both the expansion of service provision and re-establishment of "traditional" rural family life.

The policy expressions of these goals were based on gender difference: opportunities for economic advancement targeted men through co-operative formation, loans, and access to tractors and other machinery.¹⁵³ The government offered rural women only a narrow subset of programs designed to make them more efficient as homemakers, the most prominent being

¹⁵³ NAZ, Office of National Development and Planning, "First National Development Plan", 1966, page 24

cooperatives for sewing, knitting, and handicrafts.¹⁵⁴ The Women's Brigade instructed its members that they should be "busy bees," encouraging other women to support the party and form clubs "where women will learn to cook, sewing, and how to keep their children."¹⁵⁵ On the whole, these approaches incorporated women into the state only insofar as they embodied the highly gendered state vision of development, which emphasized women's role in the private realm of the household and limited interaction in the public or political sphere. This rationale was explicit in instructions to Women's Brigade extension workers, who were instructed "to assist women to improve family life and to learn and understand better health, food, and nutrition habits, as in her role as a mother she has the main responsibility for the fitness and happiness of all members of the family."¹⁵⁶

One prominent exception to this general rule was the widespread establishment of poultry co-operatives for women. Unlike the other projects slated for rural women, this one was unique in that it both contributed to household self-sufficiency and created income-generating opportunities. However, directing this project at women was an afterthought—originally a men's project, it was re-oriented towards women in 1968. The reasoning behind this switch indicates the content of the policy that the government typically directed at women, and is worth quoting at length:

Experience has shown that there is a great potential for this women's poultry farming movement...it must be emphasized that the first objective is to improve family nutrition and important as direct financial gain is, it must, I am afraid, be rated of secondary importance...women's poultry farming movement must be dedicated to building a strong, healthy, and vigorous generation of young Zambians...Although in the past we have encouraged our menfolk to run co-operative poultry farming this must now change. Able-bodied men should not be

¹⁵⁴ UNIP (no location number) Mumbwa Women Regional Secretary 1971-73: "Mumbwa Women's Activities Report to the Director of Women from A.R. Sinachize, Women Regional Secretary.; See also Schuster 22

¹⁵⁵ Letter to the Regional Woman Secretary of Kasempa from Undersecretary to the Director of the Women's Brigade Dorothy Kapantha, 2 February 1966

¹⁵⁶ CNP 2/6/23 Department of Community Development Four Year Development Plan, undated, probably 1965

involved anymore in co-operative poultry farming. You will all agree it will be far healthier for the country in general if these able-bodied men devoted their time to building co-operatives, ranching enterprises, mechanical cultivations and other more rigorous activities leaving the poultry farming to our womenfolk...I cannot, however, think of a better way that it would plant into the minds of our little ones the importance of farm work than our mothers working on their co-operative farms, because as they do that they will naturally take their young ones with them and I believe that this will give a type of nursery school agricultural education to these young ones.¹⁵⁷

Despite emphasizing family health and de-emphasizing income generating potential, the poultry cooperatives were one of the only projects that rural women were actually enthusiastic about.

While Women's Brigade field reports often showed that knitting and handicraft clubs had limited memberships or were completely defunct, the poultry cooperatives tended to maintain high levels of membership and perform well.¹⁵⁸

While these projects were commensurate with the broader goals of state-building in the First Republic, the government accorded them a much lower priority than other development projects. UNIP's vision of a broad grassroots network of women's homecraft clubs required a large number of female extension officers, but they invested little in training them. Women expressed frustration at the lack of help, particularly with regard to the establishment of cooperatives. One woman complained that:

We have tried to work hard just as our [male] counterparts, but the snag is that the Government has not helped us much...[t]his has been spoken by many women because they were at first informed that it was going to give aid to groups that will first help themselves...that is to say that if they themselves could raise the sum of K25 in their groups, Government too would give them another K25...surprisingly enough only very few clubs had been given the said 25, and the rest received no help at all in spite of their effort in getting this sum; and this has badly discouraged most of the clubs.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁷ UNIP 5/8/1/3/16 Memo from the Honorable Minister of Co-Operatives, Youth and Social Development, 18 March 1968

¹⁵⁸ UNIP 5/9/6 Report of the Tour of the Eastern Province by Under-Secretary to the Women Brigade (1970 or 1971)

¹⁵⁹ UNIP 11/1/35 Letter to the Undersecretary to the Director of the Women's Brigade from Women Regional Secretary Kwambwa Ellena Chilulwe 5 May 1968

Rural women faced the double blow of being offered only clubs they had limited interest in joining, and then, in the end, receiving no money for those clubs anyway. In Mumbwa, the Women Regional Secretary reported that they had “few women who were interested in s[e]wing,” and that they would prefer poultry clubs.¹⁶⁰ The following year, however, a list of Women’s Co-operatives from the same district reveals that every single one was a knitting and sewing co-operative, and only 8 of the 29 groups ever received any funding whatsoever.¹⁶¹ The only clubs that were able to maintain interest and membership were the poultry co-operatives—the only clubs that reflected a widely held need and interest for women. After initial enthusiasm in the years after independence, according to UNIP records, women’s political activity in rural areas “faded.”¹⁶²

4.2 White Collar Women and the Urban Policy Experience

The policy experience for rural women was dramatically different than that of urban women, particularly urban white collar women. In urban areas, women were exposed both to Women’s Brigade projects extolling the virtues of the modern housewife, but also to policies from the national government encouraging them to contribute to national development through education and white collar work. UNIP’s vision of economic development created an enormous demand for bureaucrats, civil servants, and office workers, which the under-educated Zambian population was ill-prepared to supply.¹⁶³ During the colonial period, many of these positions—secretaries, typists, phone operators—had been filled by the “white wives” of colonial administrators and

¹⁶⁰ UNIP (no index number) Mumbwa Women Regional Secretary 1971-1973. “Letter to the Secretary of the Women’s Brigade from Women Regional Secretary A.R. Shinachize, 7 July 1971

¹⁶¹ UNIP (no index number) Mumbwa Women Regional Secretary 1971-1973. “Mumbwa Women’s Activities Report to the Director of Women, to the Director of the Women’s Brigade, from Women Regional Secretary A.R. Shinachize, 9 November 1972

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Jolly 1971, p.212-215

European businessmen, the majority of whom left the country at independence.¹⁶⁴ An initial stop-gap measure to fill these positions included importing “Sunshine Girls” from Ireland, but the strong political need to fill coveted urban positions with Zambians ensured that this strategy was short-term.¹⁶⁵

Initially, the government recruited Zambian men for secretarial positions, but only temporarily, because (as one official noted) “I do not think it is basically a satisfying occupation for a well-educat[ed] African man whose hopes will [be] in the direction of a promotion to the executive and administrative grades and not in such field as that of, say, shorthand and typing.”¹⁶⁶ To fill this gap, the government began heavy recruitment of young women for typing and clerical coursework.¹⁶⁷ Shortly after independence, the massive demand for the small pool of women who could fill these positions led one *Times* reporter to declare that “The shorthand typist is the most popular girl in Zambia—because she is hard to get... Whether she is beautiful or plain, young or in her forties makes little difference to her attraction. She is one of a diminishing group with essential skills.” The growth of the economy depended, in part, on young women with clerical skills.

While recruiting young women was an economic imperative, encouraging them to move to urban areas and work outside the home contradicted government messaging about women’s primary role as mothers and homemakers, particularly since these women tended to be unmarried.¹⁶⁸ Secretarial work could be deeply empowering for women, who were for the first time living independently and earning their own income, but it also exposed them to state-

¹⁶⁴ Tordoff 1979, p. 5

¹⁶⁵ Sardanis 2001, p.152

¹⁶⁶ MCD 1/4/8 Ministry of Labour and Mines, Memo dated 21 March 1963

¹⁶⁷ UNIP 5/8/1/3/7 Letter to Regional Secretaries from Roger Kitava for the Education Secretary, 26 November 1963; see also Z C04/1/1 Memo by JB Zulu, Permanent Secretary for National Development and Planning, “Principles of Training Establishments,” 21 January 1966

¹⁶⁸ UNIP 5/8/1/2/41 Letter to All Regional Secretaries from Administrative Secretary JCC Peterson Ngoma 21 April 1965

sanctioned harassment for their autonomous behavior. Schuster highlights the deeply confusing relationship that urban women had with the government, which promoted women as agents of development while simultaneously claiming that “The [urban] she-devil’s influence would ultimately destroy not only the institution of the family, but also the economy.”¹⁶⁹ Concern about the moral implications of unmarried, economically independent women in urban areas manifested in preoccupation with women’s chastity and sobriety, and culminated with a slew of inhibiting policies regarding their dress, their ability to move freely at night, and their ability to be alone in public places. By the late 1960s, the government banned women in many urban areas (particularly in Lusaka, but also elsewhere) from entering bars without their husbands.¹⁷⁰ UNIP officials dubbed this campaign a “war” on “single girls” who “roam the streets unaccompanied.”¹⁷¹ By 1972, the urban campaign against “unaccompanied women” meant that any adult woman who appeared outside her home without a man at night was subject to arrest, and “assailed and harassed by the government, the ruling party, the media, and ordinary male citizens posing as plainclothes police.”¹⁷²

In addition to women’s decisions to go to bars or nightclubs—or even outside—by themselves, their adoption of western-style dress alarmed public officials. Outrage about Western styles of dress was so strong that it even triggered legislative action; in Ndola (Copperbelt Province), the Regional Council found it necessary to pass a resolution in protest of immodest clothing, declaring that

we are not prepared to see our women black or white to be demoralized with some of these international fashions, which encourage prostitution. We stand firmly that, the Party and our people cannot stand the so-called civilization of

¹⁶⁹ Schuster 1979, p. 149

¹⁷⁰ For example, UNIP 5/8/1/2/13 Circular to the Officer in Charge of the Zambia Police from Women Regional Secretary Mrs. S.J. Tembo, 26 February 1968

¹⁷¹ Ministry of Home Affairs, quoted in *Times of Zambia*, 5 April 1972, “War declared on single girls.”

¹⁷² Schuster 1979, p.148

France, therefore we are going to fight tooth and nail to see that the diabolic dresses are not entertained here...we are not a dumping ground for all the satanic ideas, which brings the moral[s] of our women from bad to worse.¹⁷³

Youth members of UNIP took it upon themselves to harass or attack women who did not adhere to acceptably modest standards of dress. These attacks were more or less officially sanctioned.¹⁷⁴

By 1969, the National Council considered banning “miniskirts and tight pants,”¹⁷⁵ state-owned companies were banning miniskirts, cosmetics, and wigs,¹⁷⁶ and UNIP Youth tried to bully women into adherence to conservative standards of dress.¹⁷⁷ Because of the increasingly conservative composition of the UNIP Women’s Brigade, this body also participated in the social sanctioning of young professional women.¹⁷⁸

4.3 Intersectionality and Within-Group Difference

As evidenced by the cases above, women living on rural smallholdings or as urban white collar workers had dramatically different experiences with public policy, despite sharing the same gender. While the point may seem obvious—all women are not alike—this observation holds essential implications for understanding national variety in policy creation. If government officials hold sets of assumptions regarding a few salient social identities—for example, gender, occupation, and tribal affiliation—these three identities hold numerous possible permutations, all of which may have different policy implications. The difference between rural and urban women is just one example of how an assumption that women’s primary role should be in the private sphere interacts in dramatically different ways with other elements of identity to create very different policy outcomes: for rural women living on smallholdings, government projects aimed

¹⁷³ UNIP 11/1/36 Letter to Honorable Secretary, Ndola from Regional Public Secretary James Phiri 15 July 1964

¹⁷⁴ For example, UNIP 58/1/3/11 Letter to the National Secretary from Regional R.N. Mborona 15 January 1966

¹⁷⁵ UNIP 5/8/1/3/16 Record of the National Council, Matero Welfare Hall, Lusaka, 21 March 1969

¹⁷⁶ February 14, 1969, “Mini-skirted girls banned from ZBS [Zambia Broadcasting Services].” *Times of Zambia*

¹⁷⁷ For example, February 21, 1972, “Wig snatchers spark terror in bars,” *Times of Zambia*

¹⁷⁸ Geisler 2004, p.90

at enhancing their roles as mothers and homemakers resulted in a series of cooperative projects in which women demonstrated little interest. Such an experience may be disappointing—especially alongside men’s ability to attract credit and recruitment into other income-generating cooperatives—but otherwise un-intrusive. Urban women, on the other hand, had to contend with a series of contradictory policies. As subjects of enhanced education and heavy recruitment into desirable positions in both the government and private industry, urban white collar women occupied a place of economic privilege in the years after Zambia’s independence. However, this place of economic privilege was marred by the experience of aggressive social sanctioning, as young, single, economically independent women tended to violate their proscribed social role of mother/homemaker.

While comprehensive data on patterns of participation is unavailable, there is some circumstantial evidence that these different policy experiences had different implications for the way that women engaged in politics. Most reports from rural areas report women’s interest in government projects “fading,” presumably because these projects embodied a very limited vision of the role that rural women should play. Such reports are striking, given the active role that rural women are purported to have played during the independence movement.¹⁷⁹ Urban women, however, maintained high levels of political activity, especially in response to government sanctioning. They ignored restrictions on dress, such as proposed bans on miniskirts,¹⁸⁰ and defied the government’s interdictions against women in bars.¹⁸¹ Urban women during the 1960s and 70s in Lusaka and the urban areas of Central Province and the Copperbelt regularly engaged in protests and demonstrations against the government, staging political events over everything

¹⁷⁹ Poewe 1981

¹⁸⁰ February 11, 1969, “Hands off our mini skirts, warn girls,” *Times of Zambia*

¹⁸¹ June 2, 1964, “Ndola African women defy UNIP plea,” *Times of Zambia*

from food prices¹⁸² to public service provision¹⁸³ to women's empowerment.¹⁸⁴ To be clear, it was not only the white collar urban women engaging in such contentious behavior—women marketeers, housewives, and illegal beer brewers all regularly engaged in contentious actions against the government.¹⁸⁵ However, the pattern of women critically engaging the government in urban areas indicates a level of engagement with the formal political sphere and a willingness to make claims on a government with which they were dissatisfied. While rural and urban women's different policy experiences is not the only plausible explanation for this divergence in political behavior, it is clear that gender intersected with other elements of identity in policy formation, yielding a variety of policy experiences (and, possibly, variation in political participation).

5.0 Conclusion

This chapter has proposed the salience of social categories in policy creation, arguing that policy-makers' assumptions about the social roles that various groups play generate variation in policy experience independent of existing patterns of policy experience. Using the example of gender as a salient social category, the chapter demonstrated that male and female UNIP party activists were treated in very different ways in the post-independence period, despite similarly high levels of political activity during the nationalist movement. Furthermore, the government's justification of treating male and female party activists differently was based explicitly on gender difference. By examining the government's different treatment of men and women who had similar profiles of political activity previously, it is possible establish the plausibility that social categories have an effect on policy creation that is independent of existing patterns of political participation. The implication is that policymakers' assumptions about the social roles of various

¹⁸² For example, 20 September 1971, "Women accuse price control office," *Times of Zambia*

¹⁸³ For example, 27 April 1967, "Women March on Ministry," *Times of Zambia*

¹⁸⁴ For example, 20 November 1969, "Varsity reels as girl power demo accuses boys," *Times of Zambia*

¹⁸⁵ Based on 114 articles from the *Times of Zambia* between 1964 and 1972 discussing women's political acts

groups have a tangible impact on policy creation, generating variation in policy experience that is at least partially exogenous to existing patterns of participation.

The second task this chapter undertook was to argue that salient social categories interact with other salient elements of identity to generate distinct policy experiences even within a category like “women.” The implication is that a large amount of policy variation could derive from policymakers’ social assumptions across a number of intersecting social categories. Such a process could explain a large amount of variation in the nature of policies that exist independent of existing patterns of political participation. Over time, the relationship between such policies and the political participation across groups likely becomes reciprocal: rural women who feel marginalized by recruitment into knitting cooperatives may disengage from political participation, which may increase the likelihood that they are the target of marginalizing policies in the future (as their lack of participation means that policymakers would have little information about what type of policies they *would* appreciate). Similarly, in urban areas, cycles of empowerment and repression may increase women’s proclivity for political activity, in part because of the confidence they gain in the public sphere through work and in part due to anger at repressive policies. Their relatively high level of political activity may make them the future targets of policies that either try to remedy their grievances (empowering policies) or restrict their ability to protest (repressive policies).

This study expects a degree of reciprocal causality between public policy experience and political participation, but as in this chapter (and the last), maintains that certain features of policy creation are exogenous to existing patterns of political participation. In particular, as Chapter 2 argued, national patterns of economic production may influence the distribution of public resources, creating different material effects based on the availability of public resources.

Material effects, however, are only one element of policy feedback: this chapter has argued that assumptions about social identity lead policymakers to create policies with different qualitative characteristics for different categories of people, leading to different interpretive effects. Taken together, the combination of different *amounts* of resources with different *types* of policies leads to the expectation of variation in policy experiences across multiple possible dimensions: geography, gender, and occupation are only a few possible salient categories. This study does not seek to establish which categories are likely to become the most salient, nor does it hazard any guesses about the specific outcomes of different combinations of social identities. The crux is that the combination of geography and demographic characteristics should lead to variation in policy experiences independent of existing patterns of political participation, allowing the reasonable assumption of reciprocal causality.

The following chapter takes up this set of assumptions to discuss the design of the contemporary survey. It traces Zambia's history from the end of the First Republic through the contemporary period, using historical trends to generate expectations about which features of the country's economic geography and social history are likely to yield salient social categories in the contemporary period, allowing survey site selection to include expected variation across policy experience.

Chapter Four

Variation in Public Policy and Political Participation in Zambia: Contemporary Context and Survey Methodology

1.0 Introduction

The previous three chapters were dedicated to elaborating the policy feedback framework, discussing the methodological problems introduced by assumptions of reciprocal causality, and introducing two sources of policy variation that are plausibly exogenous to existing patterns of political participation. I've argued that, during Zambia's First Republic, policy varied along at least two dimensions, each partially independent of existing patterns of political participation: economic production capacity across different regions influenced the amount of material resources each region was afforded, and policymakers' assumptions about the social roles of recipients influenced the nature of the policies they designed for different groups. I've argued that these different policy experiences should generate variation in both material and interpretive effects, yielding different forms of political participation as a function of different experiences with policy. Unfortunately, as noted in previous chapters, the historical data is not fine-grained enough to make specific arguments about the causal effects of policies on political participation beyond the presentation of some circumstantial evidence delineated in earlier chapters. As such, the remainder of this study seeks to systematically measure individuals' policy experiences and the relationship thereof to various forms of political participation.

The site selection and survey design are intended to maximize variation across a few key dimensions. First, I expect geographical variation to be related to relative levels of service provision, generating variation in the possibility of material feedback effects. Second, the division of the sample between those on- and off-rail should yield additional variation in level of

service provision, but also in the way citizens interpret government projects; as explained in Chapter One, government projects may carry different meaning in areas where the government is rarely present than in areas where it is omnipresent, as different levels of government presence likely generate different expectations regarding government service provision. Furthermore, if non-state service providers such as NGOs, local elites, or social networks are more active in performing state-like functions in areas of low government presence, such a dynamic likely affects citizens' interpretations of government projects. Finally, I expect variation across the nature of policies directed at different demographic groups, generating additional variation in interpretive effects. Together, these sources of variation—geography, government presence, and demography—should yield an array of both material and interpretive feedback effects.

In this chapter, I connect the theoretical concepts developed across the first three chapters to the empirical project of the survey. First, to set the stage for the contemporary study, I trace Zambian political and economic history from the end of the First Republic to the contemporary period. I use contemporary patterns of resource distribution and politically salient issues to generate expectations of likely policy variation along both material and interpretive dimensions, and discuss purposive survey site selection to include variation along these dimensions. Next, I explain further how the survey operationalizes “policy experience,” measuring both objective access to resources (material effects) and subjective assessments of policies (interpretive effects). Finally, based on Zambia's contemporary political-economic configuration, I outline the survey methodology employed to gather the data analyzed in the remainder of the dissertation, which examines variation in political participation across Zambia based on different experiences with public policy. Finally, I end by previewing the arguments made in the remaining empirical

chapters, outlining the differences between various measures of policy and the different forms of political participation.

2.0 Contemporary Zambia

While Zambia has changed in many ways since the 1970s, some important historical trends persist. The political system, while having returned to multi-party democracy, still exhibits centralized consolidation of power in the presidency. Despite two decades of IMF-style austerity and explicit attempts to diversify the economy, Zambia's GDP still rises and falls with copper prices, and debates about copper windfalls and the responsibilities of foreign countries (particularly China) still loom large in the public debate. While some improvements have been made in the way of infrastructure and electrification, the country is still divided into areas “on the rail” and “off the rail,” the former with far better access to government services, the latter still remote and poorly served.

The increased political openness in Zambia—particularly in the most recent 2011 elections—provides an opportunity to examine political participation in the country during a period in which individual participation perhaps feels more meaningful. At the same time, the continuities in regional economic and political development also allow careful comparison between different parts of the country that continue to have very different experiences with service provision. This chapter proceeds to discuss the contemporary political and economic landscape of Zambia in more detail, describe the logic of the survey design and methodology, and introduce the data that the following four chapters will explore in more depth.

2.1 Zambian Political History

Zambia was constitutionally a multi-party democracy during the period of its First Republic (1964-1972), but despite the legal context of political openness, President Kaunda and UNIP

party leaders make no secret of their preference for a one-party state. After eight years of increasing political consolidation and rhetoric about the dangers of party competition, President Kaunda officially banned all other parties, realizing the one-party state. While the country still remained a “participatory democracy,” ballot choice was limited to UNIP candidates, and all political associational life was registered and incorporated into UNIP. Where opposition did exist, it was concentrated within the trade unions, which remained a strong interest group (even after mandatory affiliation to a central union body) due to the economy’s heavy dependence on copper production.¹⁸⁶ The Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) accounted for about 70% of formally employed workers in 1991, lending the organization strong bargaining power vis-à-vis the government.¹⁸⁷ UNIP politics during this period was characterized by increasing levels of corruption, particularly regarding the management of the myriad nationalized industries. Union leadership became increasingly political over the course of the 1980s, and disagreements with UNIP’s policies ultimately spawned the first viable opposition party in 20 years: the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), led by ZCTU Chairman-General Frederick Chiluba.¹⁸⁸ Responding to widespread urban discontent with UNIP policies—particularly its on-again off-again approach to structural adjustment—the MMD was initially a pressure group organized around the reinstatement of multi-party democracy.¹⁸⁹ The movement culminated in a referendum that overwhelmingly demonstrated the desire for a multi-party system, and UNIP acquiesced with elections in 1991. MMD won this contest with a decisive margin, and ushered in a new era of multi-party democracy in Zambia.

¹⁸⁶ Rakner 2001, pgs. 513-514; Larmer 2005

¹⁸⁷ Rakner 2001, p.514

¹⁸⁸ Larmer 2006

¹⁸⁹ Larmer and Fraser 2007, p.615

While the 1991 transition occurred in an atmosphere of celebration, the fruits of the multi-party system were disappointing.¹⁹⁰ Larmer and Fraser note that “there was an almost total lack of substantive political choice...each [party was] backed by different regional supporters and offer[ed] different styles of leadership, but with essentially similar policies.”¹⁹¹ In addition to the lack of programmatic political options, the initial political openness marking the transition quickly disintegrated into a familiar landscape of corruption, electoral rigging, and centralization of power in the presidency.¹⁹² MMD support diminished after the first few years, and the next elections in 1996 are widely recognized to have been manipulated in MMD’s favor.¹⁹³ Suspicions about MMD’s waning commitment to political liberalization were confirmed in 2001, when Chiluba attempted to secure an unconstitutional third presidential term. While a popular backlash halted Chiluba’s bid, the lack of a viable alternative resulted in MMD’s Levy Mwanawasa ascending to the presidency in his stead.¹⁹⁴ Mwanawasa’s tenure marked the beginning a brief period of renewed faith in MMD leadership: he launched an anti-corruption campaign, presided over the beginnings of an economic recovery, and was re-elected in what were generally considered to be free and fair elections in 2006.¹⁹⁵ Mwanawasa suffered a stroke and died in office in 2008, and his successor, Rupiah Banda, proved much less successful at coalescing support around MMD.

In 2011, MMD’s 20-year period in office came to an end with the election of Michael Sata of the Patriotic Front (PF). Sata had campaigned since 2006 on a populist platform, characterized by appeals to the urban labor force, criticism of foreign companies (particularly the

¹⁹⁰ Resnick (2013) notes that disappointment with the MMD almost immediately resulted in defections and the creations of new parties.

¹⁹¹ Larmer and Fraser 2007, p.620

¹⁹² Burnell 2001, p. 240

¹⁹³ Rakner 2001, p. 508; Rakner et al 2001, p.659

¹⁹⁴ Resnick 2013, p.67

¹⁹⁵ Resnick 2013, p.68

Chinese) draining revenue from the country, and the need to increase the copper windfalls remaining in Zambia.¹⁹⁶ His populist mobilization of the urban poor was successful in large part because many urban Zambians blamed MMD's policies of economic liberalization (discussed below) for increasing urban poverty.¹⁹⁷ While Sata's ability to mobilize the urban poor across ethnic lines is evidence that Zambian politics cannot be defined as a purely ethnic phenomenon, the support from his "ethno-regional heartland" in the Bemba-speaking areas of the Copperbelt, Luapula, and Northern Provinces highlights the ongoing importance of ethno-regional electoral dynamics.¹⁹⁸ The elections from the mid-2000s to the present thus have a strongly regional flavor and a distinct urban/rural divide: the urban poor have been mobilized along populist lines, contributing increasing levels of support to the PF over the elections in 2006 and 2008 until Sata's victory in 2011.¹⁹⁹ Meanwhile, the MMD maintained rural support in part by re-introducing rural subsidies, and in part by (alleged) vote-buying in rural areas.²⁰⁰

While the transition of power from MMD to the PF in 2011 was peaceful, marking the first alternation of political parties since the re-instatement of multi-party democracy 20 years earlier (and thereby qualifying Zambia as a "consolidated" democracy²⁰¹), Sata's tenure became plagued by allegations of corruption, attempts to stifle the press and civil society organizations, tampering with the judiciary, and increasing centralization of power in the presidency.²⁰² Sata died in office in October 2014, leaving no clear successor. By-elections took place in early 2015, and PF's Edgar Lungu (Minister of Defense under Sata) won a narrow victory against opposition

¹⁹⁶ Larmer and Fraser 2007, p. 627

¹⁹⁷ Rakner 2001, p.213-214

¹⁹⁸ Cheeseman and Hinfelaar 2009, p.53

¹⁹⁹ Resnick 2013, p.146

²⁰⁰ Rakner 2001, 213-214

²⁰¹ Rakner 2001, p.200

²⁰² "NGO Group Complains of Crackdown on Rights." *Zambia Reports* February 9, 2013.

candidate Hakainde Hichilema²⁰³ in a hotly contested election. All reports suggest a peaceful, competitive election, though the problem of competing parties with few substantive or programmatic differences persists.²⁰⁴

Generally speaking, while Zambia has undergone a process of political liberalization over the past 23 years, significant problems remain in its democratic system. While elections are, for the most part, free and fair, the incumbent parties have a troubling tendency towards corruption, silencing of opposition voices, and centralization of power.²⁰⁵ Nevertheless, as Larmer and Fraser describe, while Zambia's democracy remains "partial, 'disciplined,' and intolerant of dissent...Zambia's democratic culture—in the form of public expression of popular social attitudes towards political, economic and social change—is, at least in urban areas, healthily undisciplined."²⁰⁶ Indeed, despite problems with elite expression of political opposition, the general public is willing and able to speak about their political opinions, misgivings, and disappointments. Unfortunately, as the optimism surrounding Sata's initial election transforms into disappointment, more Zambians are questioning whether or not the alternation of political parties will actually produce better social or economic outcomes.

2.2 Zambian Economic History

Like Zambia's political system, its economic system has also undergone substantial liberalization since 1972, though many of its underlying structures have remained the same since independence. Starting with the Mulungushi Accords in 1968, President Kaunda began to nationalize major sectors of the economy, beginning with the mines. Over the next several years,

²⁰³ From the opposition United Party for National Development, which has regionally-based support in the south.

²⁰⁴ While rumors of Sata's ill health had been circulating for a while, his death occurred six months after the end of data collection. Based on the content of the survey interviews, I do not believe that anticipation of his death entered the public political consciousness until several months after data collection was complete.

²⁰⁵ Rakner 2001, p. 201

²⁰⁶ 2007, p. 613-614

this nationalization project continued in conjunction with the establishment of parastatal industries across most sectors of the economy. In the late 1960s, the expansion of state-owned enterprise largely comprised the take-over of expatriate or foreign-owned businesses, including manufacturing, brewing, transport, and retail.²⁰⁷ By 1970, 61.2% of industrial output took place through government-run programs.²⁰⁸ Initially, in the boom years of the late 1960s, the state-owned enterprise performed well compared to the (often foreign) private-owned companies with no commitment to developing the domestic economic of the new country.²⁰⁹ However, by the mid-1970s, declining copper prices, global recession, and increased corruption in state-owned enterprise (under the auspices of the one-party state) all contributed to major economic decline.

For the first ten years of nationhood, fueled by high global copper prices, Zambia's economy expanded steadily, and the UNIP government invested heavily in social programs and infrastructure. This boom period ended in 1974 with the global crash of copper prices, sudden increase in oil prices, and the declining performance of state-owned industries. By some estimates, per capita growth between 1975 and 1990 decreased by 30%.²¹⁰ While the government engaged in some austerity agreements with the IMF during the late 1970s and 1980s, it failed to commit fully to these reforms, and the reforms failed to address underlying problems in Zambia's economy, specifically the wasteful public sector, inefficient agricultural production, and ongoing dependence on copper as the mainstay of the economy.²¹¹ Parastatal industries became a mechanism for distributing patronage, and government revenues declined precipitously.²¹² While President Kaunda made several attempts to implement structural

²⁰⁷ Craig 1999, p.26

²⁰⁸ Baylies and Szetfel 1982, p.191

²⁰⁹ Craig 1999, p.34

²¹⁰ Rakner et al. 2001, pgs. 521-522

²¹¹ Rakner 2001, p.516-517

²¹² Baylies and Szetfel 1982, p.191

adjustment reforms recommended by the IMF, these reforms caused severe economic hardship in urban areas, and the subsequent “bread riots” convinced Kaunda to abandon the reforms.²¹³

MMD’s ascendance to power in 1991 marked a dramatic change in economic policy. President Chiluba managed to attract large amounts of debt relief and foreign aid to assist in stabilizing the economy by promising widespread economic liberalization.²¹⁴ This liberalization included the privatization of 250 parastatals, cuts to tariffs, withdrawal of food and agricultural subsidies, and removal of exchange controls.²¹⁵ However, despite rhetorical commitment to structural adjustment, partial implementation of adjustment policies and political manipulation of major financial institutions contributed to further contraction of the already weak economy. As Larmer and Fraser explain, these reforms led to “the collapse of manufacturing, a significant contraction of the economy, soaring unemployment, and a severe pension crisis. Once privatized, companies established to provide essential goods in a closed economy were typically unable to compete against multinational corporations... Formal sector employment fell by 24 percent between 1992 and 2004.”²¹⁶ Resnick notes that ending currency controls caused rapid inflation, while austerity reduced funds available for public spending, resulting in an increase in unemployment and poverty across the country (and particularly in urban areas).²¹⁷ At the same time as the MMD government was aggressively pursuing privatization, it became apparent that the agricultural sector—the majority of which was made up of smallholder farmers—could not survive without state intervention, resulting in the re-introduction first of agricultural credit then of subsidized agricultural inputs.²¹⁸ Even though MMD found its initial support in urban unions,

²¹³ Rakner et al 2001, p.535

²¹⁴ Rakner 2001, p.518, Rakner 2001

²¹⁵ Larmer and Fraser 2007, p.616

²¹⁶ Ibid., p. 616

²¹⁷ 2013, p. 63

²¹⁸ Mason, Jayne, and Mofya-Mukuka 2013

many perceived its policy over the course of the 1990s and 2000s as biased towards the rural areas: leaving the urban poor to contend with the consequences of economic liberalization while continuing to support the rural population through government subsidies and patronage.²¹⁹

The Zambian economy has made a modest recovery since the mid-2000s. During his tenure, Mwanawasa created a more friendly investment climate, resulting in reduced inflation and positive economic growth.²²⁰ However, the recovery has largely been driven by the increase in global copper prices, making the copper industry profitable for the first time since the 1970s.²²¹ This economic expansion is unlikely to persist absent major changes in the underlying structure of the economy. Zambia still relies excessively on copper revenues; agricultural output and tourism have grown only modestly in recent years, and domestic industry and manufacturing still account for only a small portion of national GDP. As of 2011, metals comprised nearly 80% of Zambia's exports, and nearly all its exports are raw or intermediate goods—only 8% of total exports can be categorized as “consumer” or “capital” products.²²² Furthermore, concerns still exist about the influence of foreign-owned enterprises, particularly the role of Chinese companies importing their own labor and remitting profits from the domestic economy.²²³ Despite Sata's populist campaign rhetoric, PF's economic policy has still erred on the side of attracting foreign investment, though recent discussions about increasing the windfall tax for foreign mining companies suggests ongoing ambivalence about the extent of economic liberalism and the role of the state in developing the industrial economy.

²¹⁹ Rakner 2001, p.202

²²⁰ Resnick 2013, p.68

²²¹ Larmer and Fraser 2007, p. 618

²²² World Integrated Trade Solution Report,

<http://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/Country/ZMB/Year/2011/Summary>, accessed June 13 2014

²²³ Larmer and Fraser 2007, p.619. Others, notably Gould (2010), argue the opposite: that Zambian economic policy continues to exhibit an urban bias at the expense of rural areas.

In sum, while Zambia has undergone ostensible economic and political liberalization since the 1970s, it maintains striking continuity in both political and economic trends. Politically, while Zambia has a multi-party democracy with reasonably free elections, ongoing concerns about centralization of power in the presidency and the difficulty of elite expression of opposition mar the political landscape. Nevertheless, public expression of political attitudes remains robust. Economically, partial adjustment has not addressed the underlying structural problems in the Zambian economy; while the mining sector has performed well in the past decade, buoying the national economy, it is hypersensitive to volatile global copper prices. Economic development remains concentrated in mining areas and in the capital, and despite ongoing government transfers to the agricultural sector, rural poverty has remained unchanged, hovering at about 80%.²²⁴ Zambia's political economy thus continues to yield very different circumstances across different regions and economic sectors, resulting in different policy approaches across these different dimensions. This chapter now moves to a contemporary comparison of the three provinces that served as field sites for data collection in this study.

3.0 Field Sites in Comparison

Given the political and economic developments—and consistencies—in Zambia since the early 1970s, I selected field sites for variation across key dimensions that one would expect to influence policy experience. The first consideration was to include regions with varying levels of service provision to ensure variation across material feedback effects. Based on the analysis in Chapter 2, the key division was between those regions on- and off-rail: off-rail provinces received similarly low levels of material support regardless of the political circumstances, while on-rail provinces received relatively more—particularly in the case of Central Province, which was both on-rail and a ruling party stronghold. As such, the field sites for the survey reflect three

²²⁴ Burke, Jayne, and Sitko 2012

different anticipated levels of service provision: Central Province, as an on-rail province that supported the ruling party during the 2011 elections, should have the highest levels of service provision. Southern Province, as an on-rail province an opposition stronghold, should have a relatively moderate level of service provision. Finally, Northwestern Province, as an off-rail province, should have the lowest levels of service provision.²²⁵

The second consideration is to ensure variation in the sample along salient demographic characteristics to capture expected differences in interpretive feedback effects. One highly salient division remains that between urban and rural residents; Sata's populist platform was built around supporting the urban poor, in stark contrast to MMD's emphasis on the rural population (though the efficacy of each set of policies is unremarkable). This rhetorical shift may be accompanied by policy changes that alter the nature of policies those in urban and rural areas experience. Finally, while gender does not have nearly the same salience that it did during the 1960s and 1970s, women's political and economic prospects are still limited (particularly in rural areas), and women's lower economic status influences which policies they experience; for example, the agricultural policy of providing subsidized inputs to viable smallholders predominately targets men, while female-headed households are more likely to receive "food security packs," a government hand-out to vulnerable rural households.²²⁶ To ensure variation across demographic categories likely to experience different types of policies, I stratified the survey sample to include 50% rural and 50% urban populations in each province, and ensured that the sample was evenly split between men and women. Other demographic divisions, such as occupation and income level, are likely to be salient as well. However, it is unfeasible to

²²⁵ Northwestern Province voted for the outgoing MMD during the 2011 elections, so during the survey period, they had recently become an opposition region. Because all off-rail regions receive relatively little in the way of government service provision, including an off-rail province that supported the ruling party would not have added much in the way of variation in level of service provision.

²²⁶ Burke, Jayne, and Sitko 2012

introduce too many levels of stratification across a survey of this size, and variation across these dimensions occurred without explicit stratification.

In addition to the key differences between on- and off-rail areas in terms of service provision, there is reason to believe that interpretive effects may operate differently as a function of varied government presence in each area. As discussed in Chapter One, interpretive effects are in part a function of citizens' expectations of what the government can accomplish; two individuals might interpret the same policy very differently in a context of consistent service provision versus one of erratic service provision. Therefore, ensuring a reasonable sample of respondents both on- and off-rail allows analysis of the extent to which feedback processes operate differently as a function of government presence.

The following sections discuss the contemporary context of each field site, demonstrating that the political-economic configuration of each should lead us to expect different public policy experiences for respondents across (and within) each province.

3.1 Southern Province: Livingstone and Kazangula Districts

Of the three provinces examined in this study, Southern Province has maintained the most consistent place in the national political economy since the 1960s. Along the “line of the rail,” and along a major southern import/export route, some parts of Southern Province have received significant infrastructural development and house commercial activity related to the trade routes. Furthermore, the border town of Livingstone, along the shores of the Zambezi River and near Victoria Falls, is the country's major tourist destination. As such, towns along the road south from Lusaka to the border posts with Botswana (in Kazangula District) and Zimbabwe (in Livingstone District) accommodate a large volume of traffic. The roads are comparatively well maintained, transport to the capital is regular and easy to access, and government presence (in

terms of service provision) is relatively high. In Livingstone itself, infrastructure has recently been greatly improved in preparation for hosting the World Tourism Organization's major international conference in August 2013. Zambia's Sixth National Development Plan (NDP-6) notes that the province has a comparative advantage across multiple sectors: agriculture, energy generation, mineral deposits, and tourism, similar to assessments of the region's potential in the FNDP.²²⁷

However, many residents of Southern Province live beyond the reach of the main road and the rail. While there are some major commercial farming enterprises in Southern Province, most rural residents are engaged in small-scale or subsistence farming. Villages close to the main trade routes have a comparatively easy time getting their products to market, but those in more remote areas face persistent marketing problems. NDP-6 notes that the primary challenge that the province faces is decline in agricultural productivity due to poor infrastructure, which becomes problematic further away from the main road north to Lusaka.²²⁸

As such, experience with government presence and service provision is starkly different based on proximity to the main road, the border posts, and the tourist destination of Livingstone. The two districts selected for the survey—Livingstone and Kazangula—include both. Livingstone is an entirely urban district that reaps the benefits of being on the rail. Kazangula, which surrounds urban Livingstone, is predominately rural and has variable access to the amenities of the rail. Some of Kazangula's rural villages are remote, while its peri-urban wards near Livingstone have much better access to government services.

²²⁷ Republic of Zambia 2011, p.201

²²⁸ Republic of Zambia 2011, p.201

3.2 Central Province: Kabwe District

Since the economic boom period of the 1960s, Central Province (and specifically Kabwe District) has experienced a reversal of fortune. During Zambia's First Republic, Central Province held the capital of Lusaka, the north-south rail infrastructure connecting the northern Copperbelt to southern export routes, and productive lead and zinc mines in Kabwe/Broken Hill. In 1976, Lusaka and surrounding productive agricultural area became its own province, separating from Central Province. Kabwe became Central Province's new capital, and remained both economically and politically active through the 1980s, providing strong support for the emerging MMD.²²⁹ However, most of Kabwe's mines were decommissioned by the 1990s, and secondary industrial activity also declined. While Kabwe District still holds the advantage of being on-rail and hosting large-scale commercial agriculture, it is no longer an industrial powerhouse. This new reality is reflected in NDP-6's goals for Central Province, which emphasize its "potential as a transport hub" and "huge agricultural potential," rather than possibilities for revitalizing its industry.²³⁰

Nevertheless, Kabwe District maintains some of the advantages of being closely located and well-connected to Lusaka and holding urban infrastructure (even if it is not as well-maintained as it once was.). The local economy is bolstered by the nearby National Service Camp, a major prison, a prominent teaching college, and a large nursing school. While the urban area lacks road maintenance, most urban residents have reasonable access to services like education and health care, and proximity to the capital makes it easy to access most urban amenities. The residents in the rural areas around Kabwe are engaged in both subsistence and commercial agriculture; while most farm their own plots, many also work as contract laborers on

²²⁹ Larmer 2006

²³⁰ Republic of Zambia 2011, p.187-8

nearby commercial farms. While some of the rural areas in Kabwe District are difficult to reach—particularly in the rainy season—they are still relatively well-integrated to the national infrastructure. Located in the country’s maize belt, this Province receives a large allocation of public agricultural expenditures.²³¹ While service provision is not what it was during Kabwe’s economic peak, government presence is still strong, and the region is closely integrated into Zambia’s core economy.

3.3 Northwestern Province: Solwezi District

The final field site of this study is Solwezi District in Northwestern Province. Like Kabwe District, it is on the brink of a reversal of fortune. Historically speaking, Northwestern Province has always been a remote, neglected region. While the reach of the state extended to the neighboring (economically important) Copperbelt Province, initial prospecting for minerals and metals in Northwestern Province was not fruitful, so neither the colonial nor the independent governments had much interest in it. As such, the province has a long history of expressing a sense of disconnect and neglect. This relationship began to change in 2005 with the re-opening of the Kansanshi Mine in Solwezi. Massive discoveries of copper reserves in the formerly defunct mine launched a series of production expansions, including the establishment of the Kansanshi Mine Estate, which houses thousands of (mostly expatriate) mine employees. NDP-6 notes that, while the province is still largely agricultural, it “has been earmarked for the development of one Multi-Facility Economic Zone to promote value addition. The opening up of mining ventures in the Provinces requires more investments in infrastructure, including energy, to match with the high level of economic activities.”²³² At the time of field work, these

²³¹ Govereh et. al, p.35

²³² Republic of Zambia 2011, p.199

investments had not yet materialized, but it was clear that the region was on the brink of major economic expansion.

The report also notes the lack of human capital required to maintain the new industrial activity in Solwezi. Indeed, the re-opening of the mine has spawned a massive population increase as skilled and semi-skilled Copperbelt workers have migrated to rapidly expanding settlements in Solwezi town's outlying areas. While the government has planned infrastructural improvements, at the time of field work in January-February 2014 government investment in infrastructure and services had not kept up with population expansion. In the urban areas, the roads are dismal, there are not nearly enough schools or health care facilities to cater to the population, and import traffic is so bad that retail stores cannot keep enough inventory on the shelves to serve the growing population. While First Quantum, the company running the Kansanshi mine, has invested in some social services in the area, the population's general impression is that neither the government nor the mine is doing near enough to provide basic services to the population.

In rural areas, little (if anything) has changed since the re-opening of the mine. The rural areas of Solwezi District are remote, located far away from the poorly-maintained main road. Rural residents are nearly all subsistence farmers, and most report a total lack of government provision of agricultural resources. Rural villages have a difficult time maintaining schools and health clinics because government-appointed teachers and nurses are reluctant to keep posts in such remote areas. While popular sentiment in Solwezi Urban runs towards frustration with the government's lack of service provision, those in rural areas have low expectations, as their experience has always been one of remoteness and government neglect.

3.4 Districts in Comparison

The logic of selecting these sites for the survey was that there should be variation in the service provision both within and across each district. Preliminary examination of some services support this expectation. Figure 1 below illustrates public service provision across some basic indicators. These figures were drawn from reports of various Zambian government ministries, and standardized by the number of agricultural households (for 2006 agriculture expenditures), territorial area (for road works) and population (education and health).²³³




Figure 11. Comparative Service Delivery by Province, 2006-2009²³⁴

The same pattern obtains for all spending indicators (aside from health): Southern Province receives the lion’s share of all resources (standardized by population and Province size),

²³³ While government ministries may have the tendency to inflate numbers, the relative provision to each province is demonstrative of relative levels of actual provision, even if the precise amounts are inaccurate.

²³⁴ Agricultural spending measured in 100,000 (2006) kwacha per agricultural household (sourced from Govereh et. al, pg. 34). Roads in number of kilometers “rehabilitated or graded” in 2009 (from NDP-6) per square km (x1,000). Education in number of basic schools and teacher houses built from 2006-2009 (NDP-6) , by 2010 population (x100,000). Health in number of rural health centers and health posts built 2006-2009 (NDP-6), by 2010 population (x100,000). PDI is the Provincial Development Index, an index of life expectancy, household income, and education, multiplied by 10.

followed by Central Province, and trailed by Northwestern Province. Health is the only category that breaks the pattern, due to the low expenditure in Southern Province in this area. The Provincial Development Index (PDI) is an index constructed by the Zambian government based on measures of life expectancy, education, and average household income. According to the NDP-6, “Southern and Central were just above the average index at 0.43 and 0.41, respectively,” while Northwestern scored below average at 0.35.²³⁵

The continuing positive performance of Southern Province, the ongoing resource distribution to Central Province despite its relative decline, and the lack of resources directed towards Northwestern Province despite its ascendance indicate the ongoing importance of the line-of-rail in dictating national resource distribution. As noted in Chapter Two, the development of the line of rail had an enormous impact on patterns of industrialization, economic development, and government presence from the colonial period through Zambia’s economic development as an independent nation. However, the relatively larger amount of resources allocated towards Southern Province differs from initial expectations: as an opposition stronghold, one would expect Southern Province to receive less in the way of government spending, especially considering the received wisdom that the government targets resources towards supporters. At least as far as planning is concerned, it would appear that economic concerns trump political ones for resource allocation.

In Southern Province, urban and peri-urban wards sampled near the town of Livingstone and the Kazangula border post have reaped the benefits of being “on-rail,” while the more remote rural areas in Kazangula district are beyond easy reach of the main road (which runs alongside the rail). In the 500-person sample covering Livingstone and Kazangula areas, 350 of the respondents were urban or peri-urban with access to the benefits of the rail, while 150 of the

²³⁵ Republic of Zambia 2011, pgs. 185-186

rural respondents so remote as to be off-rail, despite their relative proximity to commercial areas. In Central Province, both the urban and rural areas of Kabwe District are on-rail. The line of the rail and the major north-south road run through the urban center, and the rural areas are reasonably well economically integrated through the large amount of commercial agriculture in the area. All 500 respondents from Kabwe District are on-rail, which may explain its ongoing ability to attract government funding despite its economic decline.

In contrast, both the urban and rural areas of Solwezi are well beyond the line of the rail. Even after the re-opening of the Kansanshi Mine, the urban center of Solwezi is poorly connected to the national infrastructure (the straight, flat road connecting Solwezi to the mines of the Copperbelt is so riddled with potholes that driving faster than about 30mph becomes exceedingly dangerous). The rural areas of Solwezi are well beyond the reach of the rail, and therefore the 500 respondents from Solwezi District are off-rail. Its unfortunate geographical location may explain its relatively low levels of public funding, despite its potential for an economic renaissance.

In total, the 1500-person sample in this study is split between 850 on-rail and 650 off-rail. The combination of different Provincial economies and historical levels of integration based on proximity to the line of the rail validate the diverse case selection, and the assumption that citizen experiences with service delivery differ within and across each province.

4.0 Survey Design and Methodology

In order to examine how varied experiences with public policy (through service delivery) correspond with forms of political participation, I undertook a 1,500 person survey across the three *Zambian* provinces described above. As previously elucidated, this site selection was purposive to ensure variation in the level of service provision, and the sample was stratified to

ensure variation across demographic categories that I anticipated would experience policies of different natures. The survey is *not* nationally representative, but rather represents a portion of the Zambian population with supposed variation across the key explanatory variable: policy experience. The primary goal of the survey was to ascertain respondents' overall experience with government policy and service provision, and to assess their level of political participation. This section describes the operationalization of the independent variables (public policy experience), provides an overview of the various forms of political participation examined, and describes the survey methodology employed.

4.1.0 Independent Variables

Many policy feedback studies in the past have focused specifically on a single policy, or closed set of policies, to understand specifically how a specific interaction with a government body affects political participation. The goal of this study, however, is to uncover how people understand their relationship with the government broadly, through multiple policies and citizen-state interactions. Therefore, the survey was designed to uncover the balance of respondents' experiences with the government through service provision. Because this study seeks to understand the relative impact of material and interpretive feedback effects, the survey operationalizes "policy experience" in three ways to delineate the difference between the two. One measure, therefore, is of the objective level of key public services to which respondents have access. The second measure is more subjective, asking respondents to assess their experiences with specific policies that they identified as being personally important to them. The last measure is completely subjective, asking respondents to assess their general overall experience with government service provision. The intuition behind including all three measures in the analysis is that some forms of political behavior may be more closely related to material

effects, others to interpretive effects. The following section describes the operationalization of each measure in detail.

4.1.1 Material Effects and the Objective Provision of Services

The first measure reflects the presence of various basic government services. At each of the 65 field sites, I recorded whether or not each of the following services was present and accessible to respondents: a secondary school, access to a main (paved) road, a functioning health clinic (rather than an empty building), and a police post. These four services were chosen for two reasons: first, there was real variation in their presence, particularly in rural areas; second, the presence of these services served as a proxy for government presence generally. As far as frequency, 73% of respondents had access to a secondary school, 71% had access to a “main road,” 78% had access to a functioning clinic, and 50% had access to a police post. Urban areas generally had all four services present, while real variation occurred across rural areas.

Remote rural areas with easy access to a paved road were far more likely to have access to other government services like farm input delivery or visits from agricultural extension officers. While nearly every field site at least had a primary school, access to secondary schools was much less common and a better indicator of “remoteness” from government presence. While nearly every site at least had a clinic built, the worst-served areas were unlikely to have any nurses or clinic staff. Finally, the presence or absence of a police post serves as a crude indicator of whether or not the arm of the government extends to certain parts of the country.

Based on the presence or absence of these four services, the count variable “Government Projects” runs from 0 to 4.

4.1.2 Interpretive Effects and Reported Project Experience

The measure of policy experiences seeks to determine how respondents' experiences map onto the typology advanced in Chapter One, (replicated in Figure 12 below).

		Inclusionary	Exclusionary
Policy cognizant of group needs?	Yes	Empowering	Burdensome
	No	Marginalizing	Neglectful

Figure 12: Policy Experience Typology

Understanding respondents' overall experience with government policy and service provision is potentially unwieldy, given the broad array of government policies and projects that each respondent encounters. Attempting to ascertain respondents' experience with a list of all major government policies and projects is not feasible, but it is also not necessary; from a theoretical standpoint, all respondent interactions with the government are not equal. Only the most salient policies and projects are likely to influence the way respondents perceive the government, and therefore affect their political behavior. However, which projects are "salient" is unavoidably different for different people, and different from region to region. It was therefore essential to design a survey instrument that was sufficiently flexible, but not so open-ended as to overwhelm respondents.

To generate such an instrument, I used a funnel approach to narrow down respondents' answers from broad policy areas to specific important policies. At the beginning of each interview, the respondent was presented with a list of seven "issue areas," with several examples of each, and asked to select up to three issue areas that were important to them (respondents also had the option of saying that no government policies or projects were important): agriculture, education, water & electricity, health, transport, public safety, or "something else." Once

respondents had narrowed down the issue areas of importance to them, they were asked which service, project, or policy specifically was important to them. While this strategy could theoretically produce hundreds of answers, certain policies consistently came up: respondents citing “agriculture” were likely to talk about subsidized seeds and fertilizer; those citing “education” were likely to talk about quality of or access to public schools; “health” usually meant inadequate staff or supplies at local clinics; “water/electricity” usually referred to boreholes (rural) and load shedding (urban); transport almost always meant “road construction or maintenance”; public safety usually meant access to a police post. While significant variation in specific policies was evident, the majority of responses clustered around these salient examples. A few respondents spoke about broader policy issues like fiscal policy and women’s rights, but such responses were few and far between; the vast majority of respondents were more concerned with service provision.

Table 1: Project Experience Categories

If respondent spoke about the service:	It was coded as:	Frequency (Rate)
Positively	“Empowering”	465 (11%)
As though it did not meet their needs	“Marginalizing”	1936 (47%)
As something they did not receive/have access to	“Neglectful”	1651 (40%)
As something that makes their life more difficult	“Burdensome”	104 (2.5%)

Finally, once respondents had identified a specific service, project, or policy, they were asked to describe their experience with it. Commensurate with the typology, their qualitative responses were then coded into the categories using the coding scheme described in Table 1 (above). To

operationalize the concept, each respondent receives a score from 0 – 3 on each of these dimensions, indicating the number of projects each respondent listed corresponding to that “type” of experience. This strategy generates four experience variables that, when included together in regression analysis, captures the respondent’s total reported experience. For example, a respondent describing two marginalizing projects and one burdensome project would have the following variable specification: Empowering=0; Marginalizing=2; Neglectful=0; Burdensome=1. Including all measures together allows the analysis to take stock of the effect of higher scores along one dimension while controlling for other possible experiences.

4.1.3 Subjective Assessment of Government Services

One final assessment of respondents’ overall experience with government services is completely subjective, in that it is not anchored to a description of an actual policy experience like the previous indicator. This measure comes from a question at the very end of the survey, asking them explicitly what they think about government service provision. Their answers were coded into the following four categories, again based on the policy experience typology:

Table 2: Subjective Government Assessment Categories

If respondent spoke about government services as though:	It was coded as:	Frequency (Rate)
The government usually tries to help	“Empowering”	349 (23%)
The government might try, but does not understand the people’s needs	“Marginalizing”	524 (35%)
The government ignores the people	“Neglectful”	449 (30%)
The government makes things harder for people	“Burdensome”	105 (7%)

The final 5% of the sample stated that they could not assess government services because they never thought about government services. The four categories above correspond to four binary variables, each estimated separately,²³⁶ indicating whether or not the respondent expressed the corresponding viewpoint.

These three independent variables allow a careful analysis of how political participation varies according to three different measures of policy experience: objective measures of government presence, actual description of salient policies, and the subjective interpretation of respondents' experiences with the government. As will become apparent in the analysis in subsequent chapters, these three ways of operationalizing "policy experience" hold different levels of importance for predicting different forms of political participation. These differences have important implications for conceptualizing policy feedback with regard to various forms of political participation.

4.2.0 Dependent Variables

The primary dependent variables of interest in this study concern various forms of political participation. As the precise specification of each form of political participation will be examined more fully in subsequent chapters, this section provides only a brief overview of the different forms of political participation and their operationalization.

The first form of political behavior that this study examines is collective behavior. It includes survey questions that measure the respondent's proclivity to participate in various forms of community organizing, including attendance at community meetings, joining together with neighbors to solve local problems, group membership, and forming self-help groups to initiate

²³⁶ Because there is no obvious base category, the dummy variables for each assessment cannot be included in the same regression. Instead, each regression compares one category against all the rest. For example: estimating "Empowering Assessment" as the independent variable estimates the effect of having an empowering experience as compared to all other experiences.

development projects. The next two categories are political engagement and formal political participation. Political engagement includes respondents' proclivities to talk about politics, express interest in politics, and follow the news. Formal participation includes a broad swath of formal behaviors, including contacting politicians (local and national), support for political parties, and prospective voting in the future. Finally, the last category—"alternative forms of political behavior"—attempts to capture engagement in non-national political spheres and in behaviors that undermine the authority of the national government. The first set of questions assesses the likelihood that respondents turn to non-state agents (NGOs or traditional authorities) for development projects. The second set of questions determines respondents' attitudes towards taxation and customs. Finally, it examines protest behavior as an exceptional form of political voice.

The following chapters are each organized around one group of these dependent variables. Because both "collective behavior" and "political engagement" are predictors of political participation (in addition to being political behaviors in their own right), they appear as independent variables in Chapter 7 (which examines formal political participation) in order to ensure that the relationship between various policy experiences and formal participation is not epiphenomenal. For example, if an "empowering" policy experience is associated with higher levels of political engagement and political participation, it is important to ensure that that the relationship between the policy experience and participation is not mediated by the relationship between the policy experience and engagement.

4.3.0 Control Variables

A standard series of control variables is also included in each of the regression analyses. To control for other factors known to influence political participation, demographic controls

included sex, age, level of education, religiosity²³⁷ (measured as frequency of church attendance), tribe,²³⁸ marital status, and number of children.²³⁹ Income is also an important predictor of political participation. But, as self-reporting of income in African countries is notoriously unreliable, several other proxies were used, including urban/rural residence, and formal versus informal employment.²⁴⁰ Additional indicators for major groups of employment were also included, to indicate whether respondents worked in the mining industry, as farmers, were students or housewives, were unemployed, or worked as a civil servant (as civil servants are not supposed to express any political attitudes). For political engagement and political participation, “on-rail” is included as a control variable, due to the expectation that government presence may influence the extent to which respondents actively think about and interact with the political sphere.

Some additional controls help to correct for biases inherent in the structure of the survey and its execution: fixed effects were included to control for unobservable differences across the three provinces, the standard errors were clustered by ward (urban) or village (rural), the unit of stratification.²⁴¹ In addition, fixed effects for the 12 survey enumerators were included to account for biases caused by interviewer effects. Full coding information regarding all the variables in the analysis is available in Appendix A.

²³⁷ Due to extremely high levels of reported religious participation, designating whether or not respondents “belong to any religion” is not terribly meaningful, while frequency of church attendance better captures the importance of religious practice in the life of the respondent.

²³⁸ Due to problems with degrees of freedom and dropped cases, distinct tribes were only included if the category included at least 10 observations. Respondents belonging to tribes appearing fewer than 10 times in the sample were grouped into an “other” category, used as a reference group to determine the effect of specific tribal identifications as compared to a “catch-all” category reflecting many tribal identities.

²³⁹ Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) find these variables to have a consistent effect on various forms of political participation in the American context.

²⁴⁰ MacLean (2010) and Bratton (2006) also note the unreliability of “income” and promote the use of “lived experiences” of poverty. In this context, education, formal versus informal employment, and rural residence were the strongest indicators of poverty.

²⁴¹ According to Cameron and Miller (2011), clustering the standard errors for survey data relaxes the assumption that observations within a cluster are independent from one another, but is less rigid than a random effects models (which would assign a different intercept for each cluster).

4.4.0 Sampling Strategy and Biases

This survey was executed using a random walk strategy, stratified by sex and local government ward. In each province, I obtained a map of local government ward boundaries, and stratified the provincial sample based on the number of constituencies in urban and rural areas. Constituency selection entailed covering as many constituencies as possible, taking into account safety and travel time. A small number of urban constituencies were ruled out due to safety concerns, as were all rural constituencies further than a 2.5 hour drive from town center (to ensure completion of enumeration by sunset). All other constituencies were included in the sample. At each constituency, enumerators each started at a different, randomly selected spot, and sampled every seventh household.²⁴² Enumerators were instructed to achieve a gender balance by the end of the day, and instructed to skip households if a respondent of the necessary sex was not present. Following this strategy, the survey overall had an 83% response rate (82% in Southern Province, 84% in Central Province, and 83% in Northwestern Province).²⁴³ Most of the “nonresponse” category was due to households in which nobody (or nobody of the correct sex) was home; very few individuals elected not to take the survey when asked (particularly in rural areas).

Because it was not feasible to work from a list of residents, or to return to houses to sample absent residents, some bias is inherent in this sampling strategy. In urban areas, those formally employed in office-type jobs are less likely to be a part of the sample. However, because of the low level of this type of formal employment, it is unlikely to introduce too much bias into the sample. Many of those who are formally employed work irregular hours, and are often home at random hours during the day. In fact, 23% of the sample reported formal

²⁴² This strategy was more flexible in rural areas, depending on housing density. In moderately dense rural areas, enumerators were instructed to sample every 3rd household, while in sparsely populated areas they walked one direction and sampled every household. Daily strategy in rural areas was established upon arrival on site.

²⁴³ This response rate is for 1205 of the 1500 respondents. In the remaining sites, research assistants failed to record response rates.

employment compared to 11% of the total 2010 population in Zambia.²⁴⁴ In rural areas, women were more likely to be out of the household during a portion of the survey because of the planting season (women tend to carry out most of the planting). However, we adjusted for this by scheduling part of the enumeration during the period when women typically return from the fields to prepare lunch.

Because of the apparent randomness with which people were in fact home during the day, there does not appear to be too much of a bias in the sample. Unemployed youth are overrepresented, while the middle-aged working are underrepresented. However, there is no reason to believe that the link between policy experience and participation differs due to age. Finally, because this study is not attempting to extrapolate from the sample to the total population of Zambia, controlling for demographic traits should be sufficient to account for sampling biases.

5.0 Preview of Argument

The following four chapters each examine the relationship between public service provisions and one set of dependent variables: collective behavior, political engagement, formal political participation, and alternative forms of interactions with the state. The literature regarding public policy and collective behavior yields competing predictions: in advanced industrial democracies, the expectation is that policies stimulate collective behavior through inclusionary policies. These studies tend to rely on interpretive feedback pathways. On the other hand, studies from developing countries emphasize the material influence of policy on collective behavior: when the government is unable to meet basic needs, collective behavior arises to fill the gaps left by objectively low rates of service provision. Chapter Five examines each possibility, and finds some support for both. However, in Zambia, the results more consistently indicate that collective

²⁴⁴ Republic of Zambia 2010

behavior arises in response to lower rates of objective service provision, indicating that (in this case) public policy and collective behavior are linked through a material pathway.

Chapter Six proceeds to examine the relationship between policy and political engagement. Unlike collective behavior, I argue that the link between public policy and political engagement likely occurs through interpretive pathways, as political engagement is primarily a psychological phenomenon. In the context of a low-capacity state like Zambia, I suggest that political engagement is likely to be higher with any type of policy experience save neglect, as any form of contact with the government through service provision should increase the extent to which individuals think and talk about politics. Indeed, I find that any form of policy experience except for neglect increases measures of political engagement, and that the experience of marginalization most consistently increases political engagement. Furthermore, I find that political engagement is higher for those residing on-rail, indicating that the level of government presence generally is important for precipitating political interest.

Chapter Seven establishes links between policy and formal political participation. Because of the results regarding collective behavior and political engagement presented in Chapters Five and Six, this is a complicated prospect. The primary hypothesis that the chapter tests is that, because of the high costs and low pay-off of political participation, one would only expect empowering encounters with policy to be strong enough to stimulate political participation. This hypothesis is a bit more complicated to test empirically, however, because of the relationship between low levels of service provision and collective behavior (Chapter Five), and marginalizing policy experiences and political engagement (Chapter Six). The data presented in this chapter indicate that low levels of service provision indeed correspond with some increases in political participation, but that this relationship is mediated by collective behavior.

Similarly, the data show a positive relationship between marginalizing assessments and political participation, but again, this relationship is mediated by political engagement. Taking into account these mediation models, the chapter demonstrates that empowering assessments have the strongest direct relationship with higher levels of political participation. While I expected this relationship to occur through either material or interpretive pathways, the results indicate a primarily interpretive relationship. Chapter Seven further explores how living on-rail might influence the relationship between policy and participation, with unexpected results.

Finally, Chapter Eight engages in analysis of the relationship between policy and various forms of alternative modes of political interaction. Unlike the previous three chapters, the arguments contained in this chapter are for the most part unrelated to the earlier analysis. The chapter examines three categories of behavior measured through five variables. First, it examines reliance on NGOs and traditional authorities as non-state service providers. While I hypothesize that reliance on non-state service providers should be associated with both lower objective rates of service provision and more negative interpretations of government services, the results are less straightforward and indicate a nuanced distinction between NGOs and chiefs. In short, the results indicate that respondents tend to rely on NGOs when rates of service provision are lower and when they are unhappy with government service provision, but the same is not true of chiefs. Rather, reliance on chiefs is more likely when respondents are relatively satisfied with service provision, suggesting they may view chiefs as brokers of government services. Next, the chapter examines attitudes towards revenue collection. Arguing that the links between these attitudes and policy should occur through interpretive pathways, I hypothesize that evasive attitudes should be more likely along the exclusionary dimension of policy experiences. This argument, as well as its inverse, finds some support in the data. Finally, the chapter examines protest behavior,

hypothesizing that it should be more likely for those with inclusionary experiences. While counterintuitive, this hypothesis grows out of Zambia's specific history with protest activity, and is based on the logic that these respondents are the most likely to believe that the government would take note of their protest activity.

Taken together, these four chapters explore a wide array of political behaviors and their relationship to the three measures of public policy described above. While certain threads run through each chapter, each set of dependent variables has a unique set of puzzles to be explained, and thus each chapter takes on a distinct character.

Chapter 5

Filling the Gaps the State Left: Service Delivery and Collective Behavior

Abstract

This chapter examines the relationship between respondents' reported experiences with government service provision and their likelihood of engaging in various forms of collective behavior. It uses logistic and ordinal logistic regression to demonstrate that collective behavior is more likely in the absence of government service provision, and is more sensitive to the objective presence of services than to subjective assessments of government provision. However, when the sample is split by sex, it becomes clear that women are more sensitive to their reported experiences with government projects than men are, while men's behavior is better predicted by demographic characteristics. Taken together, the results support the idea that collective behavior in the Zambian context arises as a function of need.

1.0 Introduction

Communities that are able to organize themselves effectively are better able to ensure beneficial political outcomes. This argument appears in many forms throughout political science literature, which treats collective behavior as a measurable indicator of many characteristics, including social capital, civic skills, and civic engagement.²⁴⁵ These characteristics help individuals and communities to engage more effectively with political systems: social capital enables communities to overcome collective action problems and achieve optimal outcomes in spite of the myriad difficulties of organizing;²⁴⁶ individuals can apply the civic skills that they learn through group organizing to participation in the formal political sphere; and joiners may develop higher levels of civic engagement by virtue of being involved regularly with the broader community.²⁴⁷

Because of these links, political scientists often treat collective behavior as an essential component of understanding broader patterns of political participation. A growing body of literature also considers the ways in which public policy may influence an individual's or community's proclivity to engage in collective behavior. While the findings in Western

²⁴⁵ Putnam 1993, Verba et al 1995

²⁴⁶ Ostrom 1990

²⁴⁷ Brady et al. 1995

democracies tend to focus on the positive relationship between inclusive policies, participatory institutions, and collective behavior, observers of African politics have noted that collective behavior often emerges to fill the gaps left by the state, rather than in response to inclusive policies.²⁴⁸ I argue that these divergent findings are the result of differences between the *material* and *interpretive* effects of policies on collective behavior: Studies of high-capacity democracies have tended to focus on the interpretive effect of policies on participation, while studies in low-capacity states tend to examine material effects. In high capacity states, studies suggest that inclusive public policies encourage collective organizing to lobby for and protect post-material interests or higher-level goods. In low-capacity states like Zambia, without broad-based basic service provision, studies have focused on collective behavior arising in the material absence of services, as communities are compelled to organize themselves to fill the gap left by the state. These outcomes are not mutually exclusive: inclusive policies may still generate interpretive effects that promote collective behavior in a low-capacity country, and citizens in high-capacity countries may galvanize around inadequate provision of basic services. This chapter examines the relationship between both material and interpretive dimensions of service provision to describe the relationship between public policy and collective behavior in the Zambian context.

Using the survey data collected over the course of field work in Zambia, this chapter demonstrates that measures of collective behavior are higher when objective rates of state service provision are lower. These results are consistent with the idea that the material effects of inadequate service provision stimulate collective behavior. While some measures of collective behavior increase in association with inclusive policy experiences as well, indicating an interpretive policy effect, these results are much less consistent than those associated with objective rates of service provision. The patterns in the data indicate that, in the Zambian

²⁴⁸ For example, MacLean 2010

context, collective behavior emerges as a strategy to provide for basic needs when the state is unable to do so. However, this effect is not consistent across sex: women are far more sensitive than men both to low levels of service provision and to their reported experiences with services, suggesting that more vulnerable populations, who may be more reliant on state provision, are particularly affected by the state's inability to provide basic services broadly.

This chapter proceeds as follows: Section Two explores the political science literature regarding collective behavior, discussing the different predictions arising from material versus interpretive effects of policies. Section Three describes the data and variable specifications relevant to this chapter, and Section Four presents the results of statistical analysis of the survey data. Section Five discusses the primary results, and Section Six examines the gender disparity evident in the primary results. A final section concludes.

2.0 Collective Behavior in Developing Democracies

Political scientists have long considered civic associationalism to be an important indicator of social capital, which is widely believed to improve the quality of civil society and promote positive outcomes in democratic governance. One can measure social capital, which Putnam defines as “features of social organizations...that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit,” through the presence of various collective behaviors, including civic or social groups, neighborhood organizing, or spontaneous self-help collectives.²⁴⁹ Scholars of Western democracies have argued that civic behavior improves the quality of democratic institutions, possibly by increasing citizens' civic skills and enabling them to participate effectively in politics.²⁵⁰ Others have posited that inclusive political institutions and public policies themselves

²⁴⁹ Putnam 1995, p.67

²⁵⁰ Putnam 1993; Verba et al. 1995

encourage civic behavior, intentionally cultivating civic skills.²⁵¹ These studies suggest an interpretive effect of inclusive policies on collective behavior: when citizens experience inclusive policies, such policies may promote collective behavior by encouraging citizens to organize around their interests.

For scholars of African politics, the mutually reinforcing relationship between civic associationalism and strong political institutions can be puzzling and perhaps irrelevant. Given Africa's "poor policies and weak institutions," one would expect measures of associational life to be similarly low; however "associative life and 'networks of civic engagement' are...well-developed, despite Africa's image of traditional atavism."²⁵² Afrobarometer data has confirmed that "associational life is alive and well in Africa, and high by world standards."²⁵³ The simultaneous existence of collective behavior, poor policies, and weak institutions suggests a different dynamic between the two than has been described in the context of advanced industrial democracies: despite the frequent and regularly documented pursuit of collective goals, African associational life has had limited impact on the political sphere.²⁵⁴

Some explorations of the different nature of collective behavior in Africa and in other developing countries suggest that this divergence is not due to some sort of "African exceptionalism" or "cultural barrier," but is instead related the different dynamics that obtain in the context of the low capacity of weak states with a limited ability to meet the needs of their citizens. In Yemen, Wedeen emphasizes that civic behavior emerges in spaces where the state has a lack of control, suggesting that "civic engagement [is not] an instrumental good leading to formal democratic institutions...but [is] the very activity of energetic political participation in its

²⁵¹ Tarrow 1996; Skocpol et al. 2000; Brehm and Rahn 1997; Pierson 2000

²⁵² Englebert 2000, p.63

²⁵³ Bratton 2005, p.251

²⁵⁴ Bratton 2005, p.256

own right.”²⁵⁵ In Africa specifically, MacLean has noted that informal collective behavior emerges “to address unmet social needs,”²⁵⁶ and Bratton proposed that Africans create their own civic institutions “when faced with falling economies and failing states.”²⁵⁷

These studies highlight the material effects of policies on collective behavior, indicating that collective behavior emerges not only in response to inclusive policies, but also as a way to compensate for inadequate state service provision. For example, MacLean notes that in West Africa, the way that communities engaged in social reciprocity was strongly influenced by the relative ability of the state to mediate risk: more state intervention reduced the extent of the structures of informal reciprocity.²⁵⁸ Berman observes a rise in associational activity in Washington, D.C. after growing weakness in the local government’s ability to provide public goods, but questions whether or not it will bolster failing institutions: “When associationism and communitarian activities flourish in such a context, it would seem that there is cause, not for celebration, but rather for deep concern about the failure of the community’s political institutions.”²⁵⁹ Referring to India, Krishna has argued that “citizens’ capacities for mutually beneficial collective action can be enhanced through purposive action. The state can retreat gracefully in this manner.”²⁶⁰ However, the above examples indicate that the state’s retreat is not always graceful.

These accounts of the relationship between collective behavior and state absence run counter to much of the literature focused on advanced industrial democracies, which emphasize the extent to which collective behavior, inclusive state institutions, and democratic processes are

²⁵⁵ Wedeen 2009, p.100

²⁵⁶ in Cammett and MacLean 2014, p.157

²⁵⁷ Bratton 2005, p. 251

²⁵⁸ MacLean 2010

²⁵⁹ Berman 1997, p.428

²⁶⁰ Krishna 2002

mutually reinforcing.²⁶¹ In general, studies from advanced industrial democracies indicate a positive, virtuous cycle in which civic associationalism helps to cultivate civic skills that joiners can apply to the political sphere, ensuring that institutions remain accountable to active citizens, and these inclusive and accountable institutions further stimulate civic associationalism. Studies from developing countries tend to emphasize a different pattern, in which collective behavior serves to fill the gaps left by the state. These different empirical patterns may reflect an emphasis on different types of effects: interpretive policy effects in high-capacity countries and material policy effects on low-capacity countries.

Studies of low-capacity countries likely focus more on material effects because, in this context, collective behavior arises in response to “depressingly low expectations” regarding state intervention, and the fundamental need for basic services.²⁶² In a case like Zambia, which has generally exhibited a low capacity to provide basic services, collective behavior is one strategy that citizens might employ to obtain basic needs. If this were true, then one would expect collective behavior to be more closely related to the objective absence of government projects than to the subjective measures of policy experience. In other words, one would expect a *material* effect rather than an *interpretive* effect:

H_{3a}: Collective behavior is more likely for individuals with lower objective access to government services.

However, there are many people living in Zambia (as in other developing countries) who *do* have their basic needs met. Therefore, one might also expect interpretive effects like those described in Western democracies. If this were also true, then one would expect a positive relationship between subjective experiences along the “inclusive” dimension of policy interpretations:

H_{3b}: Collective behavior is more likely for individuals with *inclusive* policy experiences.

²⁶¹ Tarrow 1996, Skocpol et al 2000, Brehm and Rahn 1997, Pierson 2000

²⁶² Krishna (in Cammett and MacLean 2014) p.208

These ideas yield competing (though not mutually exclusive) hypotheses. If, in a low-capacity democracy like Zambia, collective behavior emerges as a way to protect against material deprivation, then one would expect it when state provision is relatively low. However, if the same dynamics are at play as in advanced industrial democracies, then one would expect more collective behavior for those exposed to policies along the inclusive dimension: those reporting either marginalizing or empowering policy experiences. This chapter examines the evidence in support of each of these hypotheses by considering how respondents' reports of collective behavior relate to both objective and subjective measures of service provision.

3.0 Variable Specification

The survey includes four questions intended to measure the respondent's proclivity for collective behavior and community organization: attending community meetings, joining together with neighbors to solve problems, group membership, and forming self-help groups to initiate local projects. The distribution of each variable is in Table Three below. "Community Meeting" is a binary variable that takes the value of "0" if the respondent reported never attending community meetings, and "1" if s/he reported attending these meetings sometimes, usually, or always. "Join to Solve Problems" is an ordinal variable measuring the frequency with which respondents state that they organize with their neighbors to help solve community problems.²⁶³ "Group Membership" is a binary variable that takes a value of "0" if the respondent is not a member of a group, and "1" if s/he is. Finally, "Group Development" is a binary variable that takes the value

²⁶³ This variable is ordinal rather than binary because the strong regional trends caused collinearity in the models with a binary specification.

of “1” if the respondent states that s/he would organize together with neighbors to try to implement a development project, “0” otherwise.²⁶⁴

Table Three: Distribution of Dependent Variables

Variable	Distribution
Attend community Meetings	51.46% report some attendance
Join together with others to solve local problems	Never: 31.3% Rarely: 3.7% Sometimes: 11.6% Frequently: 53.2%
Group member	41.6% are members
Form self-help group	11.7% would try
Collective Behavior Index	None: 24% One: 17% Two: 26% Three: 30% Four: 4%

In addition to the indicators for specific behaviors, the analysis includes the “Collective Behavior Index,” which is an additive index of the other four variables.²⁶⁵ Ranging from 0-4, this index indicates the number of collective behaviors in which each respondent reported participating. The index is included due to the expectation that respondents’ precise form of collective behavior may vary according to necessity and social context, but that there may be a substantive difference between those who never participate, those who report one instance of collective behavior, and those who report multiple forms of collective behavior.

²⁶⁴ Respondents were presented with a list of actors, including local government officials, members of parliament, NGOs, the chief/headman, “other,” or “no one”, and instructed to select as many actors as they would go to if they were trying to implement a development project.

²⁶⁵ “Join to Solve Problems” collapsed into a binary variable for this Index, for which any reports of “joining” were coded “1,” none at all coded “0.”

The models include the suite of control variables and are specified as described in Chapter Four.

Full tables of result are available in Appendix B.

4.0 Results

Table Four: Government Projects and Collective Behavior

	Collective Behavior Index	Self-Help	Group Member	Community Meetings	Join to Solve Problems
Government Projects	0.81** (0.05)	0.97 (0.10)	0.86** (0.05)	0.83** (0.06)	0.75** (0.06)
Northwestern	0.69 (0.22)	0.88 (0.38)	0.81 (0.27)	0.91 (0.36)	0.53* (0.18)
Southern	3.69** (1.01)	1.98** (1.06)	0.90 (0.26)	1.53 (0.51)	9.47** (2.95)
Urban	0.56** (0.08)	1.02 (0.29)	0.93 (0.17)	0.29** (0.06)	0.85 (0.16)
Male	1.41** (0.16)	1.61** (0.32)	1.31** (0.17)	1.12 (0.17)	1.17 (0.15)
Age	1.31** (0.09)	1.08 (0.14)	1.35** (0.11)	1.40** (0.13)	1.20** (0.11)
Ed	1.03* (0.02)	1.17** (0.08)	1.07** (0.03)	1.01 (0.02)	0.99** (0.02)
Religiosity	1.16 (0.13)	1.01 (0.04)	1.10 (0.12)	1.09 (0.15)	1.24** (0.07)
Children	1.09** (0.03)	0.98 (0.04)	1.09** (0.03)	1.10** (0.03)	1.06* (0.03)
Married	1.29** (0.17)	0.94 (0.22)	0.96 (0.14)	1.91** (0.32)	1.24 (0.20)
Formally Employed	0.90 (0.16)	0.84 (0.24)	0.80 (0.17)	1.08 (0.24)	0.85 (0.19)
Unemployed	0.71** (0.12)	0.74 (0.25)	0.77 (0.16)	0.82 (0.18)	0.73 (0.13)
N	1475	1303	1478	1489	1488
F	14.34	3.78	4.75	8.05	11.28
Prob >F	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Notes: Odds ratios for ordinal logistic or logistic regressions reported. Standard errors reported below. Significance denoted by ** if $p < 0.05$; * if $p < 0.10$. Additional control variables included but not reported; full results table available in Appendix B. Standard errors clustered by ward, the level of survey stratification.

The results indicate that objective presence of government projects (Table Four) has a consistent and substantively large effect on collective behavior: the fewer government services to which respondents have access, the more likely they are to engage in nearly every form of collective behavior measured. With each additional government project, the likelihood of group membership decreases by 16%, of attending community meetings by 20% and of joining together with others to solve problems by 33%. Furthermore, access to additional government projects decreases the number of collective behaviors in which respondents report engaging: each additional government project decreases the likelihood of engaging in an additional behavior by 23%. In addition to having a close relationship with government projects, other demographic variables suggest that collective behavior is more likely for those in more mature life stages: being in an older age cohort, married, and having children all increase the likelihood of collective behaviors. Furthermore, location is important: urban residence decreases the overall number of activities that respondents report, as well as the likelihood of attending community meetings specifically. While tribal identity has little relationship to the propensity for collective behavior, province matters quite a bit: being in Southern Province is associated with a much greater likelihood of engaging in most behaviors as compared to Central Province (the reference group), while being in Northwestern Province is not statistically different from being in Central.

The measure of objective service provision has a consistent and substantive relationship with the likelihood of collective behavior, lending support to the hypothesis that collective behavior may be a response to material deprivation. The links between the interpretive dimensions of policies and collective behavior in Tables Five and Six below, however, are much weaker. Of all the experiential and subjective measures of policy experience, only reporting

“marginalizing” or “neglectful” policy experiences had an effect, and only on reported likelihood of forming a self-help group, increasing the likelihood thereof by 56% and 51%, respectively.

Table Five: Project Experience and Collective Behavior

	CB Index	Self-Help Group	Group Member	Community Meetings	Join to Solve Problems
Project Experience: Empowering	1.09 (0.13)	1.12 (0.24)	1.04 (0.15)	1.13 (0.18)	1.09 (0.17)
Project Experience: Marginalizing	1.06 (0.10)	1.56** (0.30)	0.97 (0.12)	1.07 (0.14)	1.00 (0.13)
Project Experience: Neglectful	1.14 (0.11)	1.51** (0.31)	1.03 (0.78)	1.18 (0.17)	0.92 (0.53)
Project Experience: Burdensome	1.01 (0.21)	0.68 (0.28)	1.13 (0.61)	1.02 (0.29)	0.85 (0.21)
N	1475	1303	1478	1489	1488
F	13.37	3.98	4.30	7.68	11.06
Prob>F	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Notes: Odds ratios for ordinal logistic or logistic regressions reported. Standard errors reported below. Significance denoted by ** if $p < 0.05$; * if $p < 0.10$. Coefficients reported only for variables of interest, full table of results available in Appendix B. Standard errors clustered by ward, the level of survey stratification.

The experiential measures in Table Five above have a very limited relationship with measures of collective behavior, only statistically significant for forming self-help groups. This semi-subjective measure captures some elements of actual service provision (by asking respondents to describe actual projects with which they have had experience) as well as the interpretive dimension (asking about their experiences with these projects). That both neglectful policy experiences, indicating a dearth of service provision, and marginalizing project experiences, indicating a dimension of inclusion, are associated with increased collective behavior lends a modicum of support to both the material and interpretive hypotheses. Clearly, however, the support is limited and only applies to only one dimension of collective behavior.

Table Six: Subjective Assessment of Service Provision and Collective Behavior

	CB Index	Self-Help Group	Group Member	Community Meetings	Join to Solve Problems
Subjective Assessment: Empowering	1.17 (0.15)	0.73 (0.17)	1.08 (0.16)	1.40** (0.24)	1.55** (0.26)
Subjective Assessment: Marginalizing	1.15 (0.13)	1.13 (0.24)	1.09 (0.14)	1.18 (0.17)	0.85 (0.11)
Subjective Assessment: Neglectful	0.92 (0.11)	0.91 (0.19)	0.90 (0.12)	0.98 (0.15)	0.92 (0.14)
Subjective Assessment: Burdensome	0.84 (0.16)	1.54 (0.56)	1.05 (0.84)	0.59* (0.18)	0.90 (0.22)

Notes: Each independent variable run in a separate model. Odds ratios for ordinal logistic or logistic regressions reported. Standard errors reported below. Significance denoted by ** if $p < 0.05$; * if $p < 0.10$. Coefficients reported only for variables of interest, full table of results available in Appendix B. Standard errors clustered by ward, the level of survey stratification.

The relationship between fully subjective assessments of government service provision and collective behavior diverge from the other results. Providing the assessment that the government “usually tries to help people like you” increases the likelihood that respondents report attending community meetings and joining together with others to solve problems by 40% and 55%, respectively. Similarly, stating that the government “makes things harder for you” reduces the likelihood that the respondent attends community meetings by 69%, though this result only attains marginal significance. These results indicate that when respondents interpret their experiences with government policy in a positive way, they are more likely to engage in collective behavior. Together, the results from the objective and subjective measures of service provision provide tentative support for both of the hypotheses.

5.0 Discussion

The series of results presented above indicate that, with regards to collective behavior, the physical presence or absence of government projects is much more strongly related to measures of collective behavior than are respondents’ reported experiences with those projects, or with

subjective assessments of the government. These results are consistent with H_{3a}, and suggest the possibility that collective behavior in the Zambian context responds specifically to need: the fewer government projects, the more communal behavior respondents engage in. There is some evidence that when respondents interpret government policies to fall along the inclusive dimension—reporting marginalizing policy experiences or empowering subjective assessments of the government as a whole—they are also more likely to participate in certain collective behaviors. These results lend some tentative support to H_{3b}—that inclusive policies foster collective behavior—but are not as consistent as the evidence connecting material service provision to collective behavior. Taken together, the data support the idea that in a low-capacity state like Zambia without broad, consistent service delivery, collective behavior more often emerges specifically to meet basic needs in a way that is supplemental to basic service delivery. These results indicate that material and interpretive effects of policies can work in opposite directions. Such a result is not terribly surprising given the evidence from the United States, which demonstrates the power of interpretation to dampen various forms of political participation despite the fact that they also confer material benefits, which “should” increase political participation.²⁶⁶ However, these results do suggest the need to differentiate carefully between material and interpretive effects to understand better the relationship between various types of policies and forms of political participation.

The balance of the data suggest strong support for H_{3a}, that collective behavior emerges in the absence of government service provision, and some tentative support for H_{3b}, that collective behavior emerges in response to experiences with inclusive policies. However, despite some tentative support for the interpretive relationship between policies and collective behavior, the evidence regarding the material relationship between low service provision and higher levels

²⁶⁶ Bruch et al.2010, Verba et al. 1995

of collective behavior is much more consistent. Such an interpretation is commensurate with observations of collective behavior in a number of the sites in which survey enumeration occurred. Two cases in particular stand out in the way that villagers themselves described how they had to collectivize to meet basic needs: New Israel²⁶⁷ in Solwezi District, and Sikaunzwe²⁶⁸ in Kazangula District. .

New Israel is one of the least-served villages in rural Solwezi. The village was relocated in 2006 by First Quantum Minerals to make way for expanding mining operations just outside Solwezi. As part of the relocation, the mine promised the residents a number of basic amenities: a well-maintained road, a primary school, a clinic, and houses. These services were supposed to be provided by the mine and maintained by the government, but during the time of field work eight years later, they were in abysmal condition. The road to New Israel was only passable with a 4x4 vehicle, both the primary school and the clinic had been built but never staffed, and many respondents complained that “mine houses” were low quality.

In order to compensate for the complete lack of service provision, the residents of New Israel organized to provide the most basic of these services for themselves. Four volunteers from the community ran classes out of the school building that the mine had erected, even though few of the villagers could afford to pay school fees and only one of the teachers (the acting headmaster) even had a high school diploma himself. The village headman organized monthly travel to a national army service camp to negotiate for medical supplies, which were distributed collectively through the otherwise empty health clinic. Respondents in the village recounted how, initially, they had tried to solicit their local government representative for service improvements, but became discouraged after he failed to respond. They reported one visit from

²⁶⁷ Based on interview with volunteer teachers conducted in New Israel on February 3, 2014.

²⁶⁸ Based on respondent interview conducted in Sikaunzwe on November 10, 2013.

an NGO, and were optimistic that other NGOs may be able to assist them to gain more basic resources, but nothing had yet materialized. While the villagers' ability to organize themselves is promising, they acknowledged that the quality of services they were able to provide for themselves was not terribly high—particularly since the school had no supplies and the volunteer teachers had little training, and medication at the clinic arrived only intermittently and there was no nurse or doctor to provide any medical care. Other problems, such as the poorly maintained road, were beyond the scope of what the villagers could reasonably organize for themselves.

While New Israel presented a perhaps an extreme example of collective behavior emerging in response to inadequate service provision, the same pattern occurred under less extreme circumstances. Sikaunzwe is a rural ward of Kazangula District in Southern Province. While I was in Sikaunzwe, a project was underway to build a new primary school to serve the population. One of the builders on the project explained that the community had been asking for an additional school for years, as the current primary school was overcrowded. The government had finally agreed, but only to provide the building materials. The builder I interviewed was a local volunteer, part of an all-volunteer crew that had taken it upon themselves to construct the school with the building materials the government had provided. Under these circumstances, it was clear that the villagers' organization of the building crew was a direct outgrowth of the government's incapacity to build the school for them.

Such observational data lends weight to the causal direction of the argument. The logic of my model assumes an independent causal effect of government service provision on patterns of collective behavior and civic associationalism, but it is also plausible that the government intentionally diverts services away from places that are better able to provide for themselves through community organizing. Yet, villagers consistently explained the emergence of collective

behavior in rural areas as the result of the lack of government intervention. Rather than speaking of their history of success with self-help projects, they spoke of their desire for government intervention—and their lack of faith that it would arrive. This qualitative interpretation cannot provide definitive causal evidence in support of the notion that policy has an independent effect on participation. However, without knowing explicitly whether or not governments target services away from communities that seem to be able to provide for themselves, the narratives that villagers tell indicate that they see causality running the other direction: they organized self-help projects because the government would not do it for them.

It is also possible that this interpretation of the data is incorrect. Rather, it could be that the *presence* of government service provision dampens collective behavior that would otherwise occur, resulting in a net loss to society. However, given the low quality of the services that villagers are able to provide for themselves (as compared to provision by trained professionals), it is unclear that the civic gains from collective organizing outweigh the costs of inadequate service provision, particularly in the areas of health and education.

Other variables included in the analysis indicate that place matters for collective action, as likelihood of engaging in collective behavior is far more likely in Southern than in Central or Northwestern Provinces. While these regional differences likely reflect local cultures around collective behavior, they are unrelated to tribe. Unsurprisingly, rural residence is a strong predictor of increased collective behavior, as rural areas are more likely to have the social structures that sustain ongoing collective behavior. This result reflects the importance of regular social contact, social sanctioning mechanisms, and face-to-face accountability in sustaining collective behaviors. Furthermore, rural areas are more likely to require collective behavior to solve social problems, since government presence is markedly lower in remote settings. Even

beyond the government projects explicitly measured by this survey, rural areas are more likely to have to cope with a chronic shortage of civil servants to fill government posts (because civil servants often refuse to take or abandon rural posts), are more likely to have uneven access to markets due to seasonal challenges with road access, and are more likely to have to come up with local solutions for supply shortages because of limited transport.

The importance of various demographic variables indicate the importance of considering how an individual's social standing influences collective behavior. Increasing age, increasing number of children, and marriage all increase the likelihood of collective behavior. These trends suggest that such behaviors are more likely amongst those later in the life cycle, perhaps more mature and more settled. These individuals are also possibly those most likely to be successful in organizing collective activities. One interesting and unexpected result is the gender difference in behavior. Men are more likely than women to report group membership and proclivity to form self-help groups, and are more likely than women to engage in more collective behaviors (as measured by the index). This finding is surprising, given the literature that lauds rural Southern African women's communal behaviors.²⁶⁹ The following section explores this phenomenon in more depth.

6.0 Gender and Collective Behavior

Repeating the above analysis by sex indicates a large gender gap both in collective behavior generally and as a function of government service provision. Men's and women's patterns of collective behavior are not terribly different from each other, except for men's increased participation: women's reported rates of involvement are consistently 3-5% lower than men's (See Table Seven below). However, while the overall patterns do not differ by sex, the factors

²⁶⁹ For example, Moore and Vaughan (1994 p. 217-220) detail Zambian women collectivizing household labor, particularly in response to men's circular migration to work in mines. See also Steady 2006.

influencing men’s and women’s proclivities to participate in collective behaviors are quite different. This is particularly true regarding the variables of interest: women’s behavior is sensitive to government service provision, while men’s is not. The following section highlights and discusses some of the numerical difference between men’s and women’s patterns of aggregate collective behavior.

Table Seven: Collective Behavior by Sex

	% Men reporting “Yes”	% Women reporting “Yes”
Attending Community Meetings	53%	50%
Joining with neighbors to solve problems	71%	67%
Being a group member	44%	39%
Forming a self-help group for a development project	14%	10%

In order to better understand the gendered dimensions of collective behavior I repeated the above analysis, first including interaction terms between sex and the explanatory variables of interest, then splitting the samples between men and women. Both approaches yielded evidence that the relationship between service provision and collective behavior is different for each sex; however, because so many key predictors behaved differently for men and women, the split sample is more appropriate to analyze the differences than the interaction term.²⁷⁰ Table Eight below displays odds ratios of the interaction terms that attained statistical significance: those between marginalizing project experiences and sex, and neglectful project experiences and sex. These results highlight the explanatory variables that (a) demonstrated a relationship with collective

²⁷⁰ Interaction terms only examine how a single variable operates differently across different groups, but splitting the sample illuminates how all independent variables perform differently across different groups.

behavior in the above analysis, and (b) operate differently between men and women.

“Empowering subjective assessment of government service provision” was the only primary explanatory variable that did not work differently for men and women. While the relationship between government projects and collective behavior also appears to be stronger for women, the difference between the coefficients for the split model is not statistically different from zero.²⁷¹

Table Eight: Interaction Effects between Project Experience and Sex

	Collective Behavior Index
Project Experience: Marginalizing	1.39** (0.15)
Project Experience: Neglectful	1.44** (0.17)
Male	5.20** (1.61)
Male*Project Experience: Marginalizing	0.56** 0.07)
Male*Project Experience: Neglectful	0.60** (0.08)
<i>Notes:</i> Numbers reported are odds ratios for ordinal logistic regressions, standard errors parenthesized below. Statistical significance denoted by ** if P<0.05. Odds Ratios reported for selected variables, results for full model available in Appendix B.	

For the two project experience variables displayed above, the results are unambiguous: the negative coefficient for the interaction term between sex and each project experience variable indicates that the relationship between project experience and collective behavior is much weaker for men than for women. While these interaction terms present evidence of a real difference between men and women, they are difficult to interpret. Furthermore, splitting the

²⁷¹ When the sample is split between men and women, the coefficient for “Government Presence” is 0.77 for women, 0.85 for men. However, the interaction term between “Male” and “Government Presence” is insignificant, and a Wald test of the two coefficients failed to reject the null hypothesis that they are equal to each other.

sample between men and women indicates enough differences in the behavior of other independent variables to justify running the models separately to facilitate interpretation. Table Nine below presents the results from the split sample, highlighting the variables that differ between men and women. For each additional marginalizing project a woman reports, her likelihood of engaging in one additional collective activity increases by 34%. For each additional neglectful activity, it increases by 37%. There is no relationship between men’s reported experiences and collective behavior.

Table Nine: Predictors of the Collective Behavior Index, by Sex

	Collective Behavior Index (Men)	Collective Behavior Index (Women)
Project Experience: Marginalizing	0.82 (0.14)	1.34** (0.18)
Project Experience: Neglectful	0.95 (0.17)	1.37** (0.19)
Age	1.14 (0.11)	1.58** (0.18)
Ed	1.16** (0.06)	1.02 (0.01)
Religiosity	1.32** (0.10)	1.05 (0.17)
Children	1.15** (0.04)	1.05 (0.04)
Married	1.52** (0.30)	1.28 (0.25)
N	731	744

Notes: Statistical significance denoted by ** if $P < 0.05$. Odds Ratios reported for selected variables, results for full model available in Appendix B.

These results indicate that women’s collective behavior is associated with interpretations of policy, while men’s is not. Women are more likely to engage in collective behavior when they

report lack of access to projects or that the projects they have access to do not meet their needs, while the same is not true of men.

Why would women's behavior be more sensitive to these interpretive measures of government service provision? The data limitations of this study make it impossible to state definitively, but circumstantial evidence allows informed speculation. One possibility is that women may rely more heavily on government service provision than men, implying a greater necessity to fill gaps through collective behavior than men may feel. Similarly, they may be more reliant on certain types of service provision that are more amenable to replacement through collective action. Scholars have noted that women bear a disproportionate burden of providing unpaid care to others.²⁷² For example, with an inadequate local health clinic, women are more likely than men to provide home care; in the absence of a nearby school, women are more likely than men to be responsible for truant children during the day.

Because of women's role in food preparation, laundry, and other housework duties, an erratic electricity supply dramatically increases the amount of time that each of these tasks might take. These observations are borne out in the results of Afrobarometer's second round of surveys, which included a portion estimating time spent on various non-remunerated activities. While the categorical coding of the data makes it difficult to estimate the precise difference in time use across sex, it is clear that women report more time spent than men on all manner of unremunerated activities, including housework (around one hour for men, around 3 hours for women), caring for the sick (around 1 hour for men, around 2 hours for women), caring for children (around 2 hours for men, around 4 hours for women), and caring for orphans (around 1 hour for men, around 2 hours for women). This is not to say that men are insensitive to government service provision; however, in the absence of basic government service provision,

²⁷² Elson 2009, p.42

women are more often responsible for filling the gaps with unremunerated labor. This interpretation is supported by Steady's examination of African women's associations, in which she notes that women's associations tend to be communally oriented and can act as "shadow development agencies" given inadequate state provision.²⁷³

Because women tend to be responsible for the care of their children, food preparation, and family health, it is not surprising that the lack of or insufficient government provision of services such as health clinics and schools would be associated with more women's increased collective behavior. If the analysis in the preceding section is accurate, and collective behavior arises in response to gaps in government provision, then it follows that men and women may rely more heavily on different kinds of government services. In this survey, it is clear that men and women prioritize different elements of government service provision: women are more likely than men to select education and health as their highest priority areas: 27% of women selected education first, as opposed to 22% of men, while 14% selected healthcare first, as opposed to 10% of men. Men were much more likely to prioritize agricultural inputs (40% of men selected agriculture as the first priority, as opposed to 33% of women).

These preferences reflect the gendered differences in the way that individuals experience government service provision: women perform more childcare and sick care, and prioritize education and health services more than men. Male heads of household receive a disproportionate amount of agricultural inputs,²⁷⁴ and thus prioritize agricultural projects. In the absence of access to schools and clinics, women may organize themselves to collectivize labor, a practice that has been documented elsewhere.²⁷⁵ However, men's access to agricultural inputs is contingent on cooperative membership; in the absence of agricultural inputs, there are few other

²⁷³ Steady 2006, p.9

²⁷⁴ Mason et al. 2013

²⁷⁵ Moore and Vaughn 1998, Steady 2006

incentives to collectivize agricultural labor, particularly since families generally tend their own plots. These divergent priorities and the nature of the projects that men and women rely on the most may explain the gendered pattern of the relationship between government services and collective behavior.

While measures of government service provision and project experience have a more pronounced relationship with women's collective behavior than with men's, the pattern reverses for other demographic characteristics. Table Nine above displays the coefficients for demographic variables in the split model that differ between men and women. To begin with, while age has a large impact on women's collective behavior, it has none on men's. In fact, age is the only demographic indicator that is significant for women but not men. On the other hand, increasing education, religiosity, more children, and marriage all increase the likelihood that men participate in more collective behaviors, while having no effect on women.

The differences in these patterns indicate that very different circumstances lead men and women to engage in collective behavior. The data show that women are more likely to engage in collective behavior when they are older and their experience with government projects is either marginalizing or neglectful; men, on the other hand, are more likely to engage in collective behavior when they are married, educated, religious, and have children. In the analysis of the aggregate data, I proposed that the positive relationship between marriage and children and collective behaviors related to social stability and maturity. That these "social stability" variables are only associated with increased collective behavior in men says something about the gendered social dynamics of family relations. One interpretation is that, while marriage and children may be an indication of men's increased social stability and maturity, they may be an indication of women's increased domestic workload. Married fathers may be more community-minded, but

married mothers may find the positive relationship between social stability and collective behavior to be outweighed by the time constraints of domestic responsibilities. While the precise mechanisms underlying these trends are difficult to identify without additional qualitative evidence, the gendered patterns of behavior indicate the need to carefully consider the social dynamics around sex in understanding the predictors of political behavior.

7.0 Conclusion

This chapter opened with the idea that material and interpretive effects of policies may work in opposite directions with regard to collective behavior. Emphasis on interpretive effects in high-capacity democracies suggests that inclusive policies foster collective behavior, while emphasis on material effects in low-capacity democracies indicate that collective behavior arises to meet basic needs when government service provision fails to do so. While such analyses are not mutually exclusive, they point to two different processes connecting public policies to collective behavior. The evidence presented in this chapter provides some support for each hypothesis: Zambians engage in more collective behavior in the absence of government service provision, but are also more likely to engage in some collective behaviors when they report inclusive experiences with government policies. While the data displayed some support for each hypothesis, the results connecting collective behavior to lower levels of objective service provision were much stronger. This pattern in the data reinforces the idea that respondents organize themselves out of necessity, which is commensurate with other studies across African countries and in other developing regions. While inclusive policies also relate to increases in collective behavior, the weak relationship lends support to the idea that, in Zambia, the relationship between public service provision and collective behavior is more strongly related to material as opposed to interpretive pathways. Such a result is consistent with the interpretation

that state capacity is an essential variable to consider in order to understand the relationship between collective behavior and the political sphere.

Political scientists have tended to treat collective behavior as a fixed category: an indication of civic skills or social trust and a variable associated with other forms of political participation. Many examinations of the relationship between collective behavior, social capital, and the political sphere indicate that social capital has an outward orientation, facilitating the links between individuals and the political sphere. Studies from high-capacity democracies, which tend to highlight the interpretive effects of inclusive policies on collective behavior, invoke such analysis. On the other hand, findings from developing countries and low-capacity democracies complicate this claim, demonstrating that high levels of social capital and collective behavior can exist in communities without any outward orientation towards the formal political arena. These studies tend to emphasize the material effects of inadequate basic service provision on collective behavior. However, the distinction between material and interpretive policy effects on collective behavior begs the question: is social capital always outward oriented? In facilitating connections between citizens and the political realm, does the origin of social capital matter?

The data employed in this study do not hold the answers to these questions, but they beg further comparison across levels of state capacity, as there are theoretical reasons to believe that not all forms of collective organizing are equal. Berman has suggested that associationism may be “a politically neutral multiplier—neither inherently good nor inherently bad, but rather dependent for its effects on the wider political context.”²⁷⁶ While Berman’s study focused on the role of civil society in the rise of Nazism in Germany, her insight has implications for less extreme regimes as well. If associationism is a “neutral multiplier,” in the context of a country

²⁷⁶ Berman 1997, p. 427

like Zambia, could collective organizing contribute to re-creating a state or regime unable to provide basic services? At the very least, the results presented in this chapter indicate that states do not only cultivate collective behavior through inclusive policies; they can also cultivate it through neglect.

Furthermore, this chapter has highlighted the gendered differences in the relationship between public policy and collective behavior, demonstrating that women's collective behavior is more closely associated with neglectful or marginalizing interpretations of policy experiences than is men's. These results lend some credence to the idea that the relationship between policy and participation is (at least in part) a function of salient features of identity. I suggested that women's collective behavior was more sensitive to neglectful and marginalizing policy experience because they tend to be more reliant than men on government service provision, due to the social roles women are more likely to play as caregivers. If this interpretation is correct, then it is a double-edged sword. Steady has noted that when women organize to take on functions that would otherwise be performed by the government, it can both allow women to "enhance their potential" as well as encourage the government to become less accountable and "leave it all to the women."²⁷⁷ The data in this study do not allow me to speculate about the extent to which the government intentionally leans on the collective behavior of women; however, the data do indicate that women are more likely than men to organize collectively due to their interpretations of policy experience.

Regardless of whether men or women shoulder most of the burden of inadequate service provision, the data overall indicate that collective behavior in Zambia is more likely when government service provision is lower, a result that is consistent with descriptions of other developing democracies. Given the empirical trends discussed at the beginning of this chapter—

²⁷⁷ Steady 2006, p.9

that (in Africa) high levels of collective behavior appear unrelated to good public policies or stronger governmental institutions—the next question is whether collective behavior emerging out of government neglect generates civic skills that individuals still channel towards the formal political sphere. This is a question that will, in part, be taken up in Chapter Seven. However, the results presented in this chapter indicate that, at the very least, collective organizing in Zambia is not a political variable that should be unequivocally applauded, as it—in part—indicates the inability or unwillingness of the government to provide communities with basic services. In the case of Zambia, the state does not “retreat gracefully;” rather, it leaves a gap that communities do their best to fill. Yet, despite their best efforts, volunteer teachers without training are a poor replacement for trained educators, a community clinic cannot run without medication, and farming cooperatives cannot grow a surplus without promised government agricultural inputs. While the communities described above explained their collective organizing as an answer to inadequate government service provision, they also acknowledged that they did not have the capacity to provide for themselves the same quality of goods that the government should be able to. However, it is possible that there are still positive spillover effects into the realm of political participation, if collective behavior in this context generates civic skills in the same way it has been shown to do elsewhere. This possibility is taken up in Chapter Seven.

Chapter Six

Peaking Interest: Policy Experience and Political Engagement

Abstract

This chapter examines the relationship between service provision and various measures of political engagement. While studies from advanced industrial democracies predict a link between positive experiences with government bodies and political engagement, this chapter demonstrates that, in a low-capacity democracy, any experience with government services save neglect is enough to precipitate political engagement. The relationship between policy and political engagement only exists for the subjective measures, not the objective measures, indicating that the link between policy experience and political engagement is likely to occur through interpretive pathways. Finally, the chapter discusses the findings that political engagement is higher for residents on-rail (in areas of higher government presence) and much lower for women.

1.0 Introduction

This study now turns to political engagement: the extent to which individuals express an interest in the political realm. Like collective behavior, political engagement is consistently one of the most important predictors of political participation. In addition to being an important predictor, it is also an interesting variable in its own right; democratic governance depends not only on participation, but on citizens' willingness to express an interest in the political system. Public policy has great potential to influence political engagement; when citizens connect their experiences with policy to the political realm, such experiences may peak or dampen interest in public affairs.

Though both collective behavior and political engagement tend to be closely associated with other forms of political participation, they operate through different mechanisms and their relationship with policy experiences differs as well. The last chapter demonstrated that collective behavior in the sample was closely related to an objective lack of services, consistent with a *material* effect of public services (or the lack thereof). However, as political engagement is a psychological expression rather than an action, it is more likely to be subject to *interpretive*

policy effects. Unlike collective behavior (or the other response variables discussed in this study), political engagement entails no action or costly activities; it simply measures the extent to which respondents express an interest in politics. While material factors certainly influence the extent to which people allocate mental and emotional energy to politics, it is plausible that substantial variation in political engagement may be the result of individuals' subjective interpretations of their experiences with the government. Indeed, the results in this chapter demonstrate a close relationship between subjective measures of policy experience and political engagement, but no relationship at all with objective measures.

Furthermore, the results differ from what one might expect in the context of an advanced industrial democracy. In the American context, numerous policy feedback studies have found that policies influence respondents' sense of interest and efficacy in politics in a straightforward manner: positive experiences increase engagement, negative experiences decrease it.²⁷⁸ However, the extent to which citizens connect public policy to the political realm is likely to be influenced by *expectations* of what the government can do, as well as actual government presence. In developing democracies like Zambia, public expectations about what the government can reasonably accomplish vis-à-vis service provision are lower than they are in democracies with more advanced economies, and there is a great deal of variability in the extent of public service provision across different parts of the country.

Based on these observations, this chapter argues that, in Zambia, encounters with *any* form of services should increase political engagement relative to experiences of neglect. This argument hinges on the idea that, in a developing country like Zambia, any level of contact with government projects should increase the extent to which individuals are interested in politics, *regardless of whether they translate such interest into action*. This argument reflects

²⁷⁸ For example, Campbell 2002 and Soss 1999

expectations about the Zambian polity that differ from the context of a more advanced industrial democracy. If policy feedback effects on political engagement tend to be interpretive rather than material, then one would expect the relationship between policies and engagement to vary across different political contexts. In the Zambian context, expectations about what the government can reasonably provide are low, which will influence the way that respondents interpret their experiences with policy.

This chapter continues in Section Two with a brief survey of the literature regarding political engagement and development of the hypothesis that the chapter considers. Section Three describes the variables employed in the quantitative analysis and specification of the models. Sections Four presents and Section Five discusses the relationship between public policy and political engagement across the full sample. Section Six briefly outlines the gendered dimension of political engagement evident in the data, and a final section concludes.

2.0 Literature and Hypothesis

Generally speaking, scholars measure political engagement through expressed interest in political activities, political knowledge, or the number of times that respondents answer “don’t know” to politically-oriented survey questions. Political scientists sometimes treat political engagement as a cause of other behaviors,²⁷⁹ and sometimes as something that other political behaviors produce.²⁸⁰ Scholars most regularly invoke political engagement to explain gaps in political participation that persist after controlling for individual-level traits. As a theoretical concept, it appears most often with regards to gendered gaps in political participation, particularly in the United States. For example, gendered gaps in political participation in the United States that persist (statistically) after controlling for education, income, employment, and

²⁷⁹ Burns et al. 2001, Verba et al. 1995

²⁸⁰ For example, Bowler et al. 2003

other standard individual-level traits finally disappear after including political engagement variables like “political interest.”²⁸¹ However, while political engagement is one of the most consistently important predictors of formal political participation, it also shares many of the same individual-level predictors as political participation, making it difficult to isolate as its own independent (or dependent) variable. If the same slew of usual suspects—income, education, sex—predict both political participation and political engagement, then political engagement is not particularly meaningful as an explanatory variable or particularly interesting as a response variable.

The literature treats political engagement as either a function of political resources²⁸² or of psychological disposition.²⁸³ The political resource explanation emphasizes the same resources that predict political participation and is therefore not especially explanatory. Accordingly, one might not expect material effects of public policy to have much of an independent effect on political engagement as a dependent variable. On the other hand, the psychological approach considers that some members of a polity may feel systematically alienated from politics, resulting in low levels of engagement in the political system. For example, Verba et al. demonstrate that political interest is lower for Latinos and women in the American context, even controlling for education and wealth.²⁸⁴ Rather than assuming something inherent about levels of political interest of the poor, the less educated, Latinos, and women, it is useful to understand how structural characteristics of the polity may dampen the level of interest of these groups: the political system may contain barriers for the poor or less educated, Latinos may feel alienated from the government because of immigration policing, and women may be

²⁸¹ Burns et al. 2001

²⁸² Bowler et al. 2003

²⁸³ Atkeson 2003

²⁸⁴ Verba et al. 1995, p. 349

less interested because the upper echelons of politics continue to be dominated by men. Many studies look to factors like descriptive representation to understand why marginalized or minority groups are less politically engaged, suggesting that the dearth of “candidates or elected officials who look like me” creates a psychological barrier to political participation.²⁸⁵ One interpretation of this work is that certain groups become politically marginalized when they feel that the government is not open or responsive to them.²⁸⁶

Such findings suggest an interpretive effect of public policies or other structural characteristics in a political system that influences political attitudes in a way that is distinct from material effects. Such an understanding is commensurate with studies from the United States that highlight lower levels of participation among groups that are subject to stigmatizing public welfare programs, despite the fact that these programs presumably improve their material standing (and should, based on political resource explanations, increase political engagement and/or political participation).²⁸⁷ Therefore, one should expect those who have had positive experiences with public policy to have higher levels of political engagement, presumably due to the sense of being included in rather than alienated from the public arena. This expectation, drawn from studies in high-capacity democracies, presupposes that individuals will interpret empowering policies in a positive way and marginalizing, neglectful, or burdensome policies in a negative way. Such an interpretation rests on the assumption that a high-capacity government plays an active role in deciding which benefits to confer onto which groups: design of empowering policies is an intentional action meant to appease certain groups; marginalizing policies may be stigmatizing or miss the mark in a way that suggests the government cares little

²⁸⁵ Atkeson and Carrillo 2007, Wolbrecht and Campbell 2007, Reingold and Harrell 2010

²⁸⁶ Reingold and Harrell 2010

²⁸⁷ Bruch et al. 2010

about certain groups; neglectful policies may indicate explicit exclusion; finally, burdensome policies may denote active repression.²⁸⁸

One cannot make the same assumption of a low-capacity government. While empowering policy experiences are still likely to be pleasing to the groups that receive them, one might not necessarily interpret an experience falling in another category in the same way. Those on the receiving end of marginalizing policies may feel that the government simply lacks the resources to accommodate their needs more carefully; those subject to neglect may understand that they are simply beyond the reach of government projects; those experiencing burdensome policies may attribute the policy to the myriad hardships associated with financial austerity or crises of development. Indeed, these differences are reflected in the way that scholars study policies in high- and low-capacity countries: in high-capacity countries, studies examine the nature of programs in order to understand the extent to which they are stigmatizing or inclusionary, empowering or paternalistic.²⁸⁹ In low-capacity countries, scholars tend to focus more simply on whether or not certain services exist at all.²⁹⁰

In brief, policy experiences across various categories in a low-capacity state may feel less intentional than those in a high-capacity state. Therefore, while analyses of high-capacity states tend to emphasize the ways in which predominately positive policy experiences increase political engagement, I predict a different pattern for a low-capacity state like Zambia. I hypothesize that *any* interaction with government policies—that is, any experience save neglect—should increase political engagement:

H_{4a}: Levels of political engagement will increase with *empowering, marginalizing, or burdensome* policy experiences

²⁸⁸ see Schneider and Ingram 1993

²⁸⁹ for example, Soss 1999, Soss 2007, Bruch et al. 2010

²⁹⁰ MacLean 2010, Bleck 2013

As I will explain further in the following chapter, I do not expect that political engagement arising from all forms of government contact will necessarily translate into increased political participation; one can easily be interested in politics without undertaking any political action. The following chapter will examine the relationship between public policy experiences and political participation more closely. With respect to political engagement, I argue that political interest may emerge from either positive or negative interactions with the government. Interest could increase as a result of empowering experiences, eliciting satisfaction or gratitude. It could result from marginalizing experiences, growing out of frustration or dissatisfaction. It could also emerge from burdensome experiences, causing anger or resentment. These experiences are unlikely to contribute to a sense of political efficacy or desire for political participation, but they may still result in higher levels of interest in the political system.

Returning to the policy experience typology elucidated in Chapter One, I suggest that political engagement should increase for those experiencing policies along both dimensions: those that are inclusionary (empowering and marginalizing), and those that reflect cognition of certain groups (empowering and burdensome). Along the inclusionary dimension, I predict that political engagement should increase as a function of receiving some form of services that give recipients a stake in the political system (even if what they receive is not precisely what they need). Those who are subject to inclusive policy types should have the psychological sense that the government is making an attempt to meet their needs, even if the government is not ultimately successful at doing so. The psychological sense of inclusion should translate to greater interest in the political realm.

In addition to expecting political engagement to increase along the dimension of “inclusion,” I also expect it to increase in the extent to which government policy reflects

cognition of the needs of various groups. In elaborating the typology, I suggested that this dimension translates to a sense of visibility for policy recipients. For those receiving empowering policies, higher levels of political engagement would therefore emerge from a positive experience of having one's needs recognized and addressed. For those subject to burdensome policies, I suspect that higher levels of political engagement would emerge from anger or fear as a result of having one's needs recognized and explicitly denied. Each type of encounter with the government through public policy should peak interest in the political realm, even if that interest does not translate to political efficacy or other forms of political participation.

3.0 Variable Specification

In order to assess the relationship between various experiences with public policy and political engagement, this chapter focuses on analysis of the survey questions concerning measures of political engagement. All binary variables, "Talk About Politics" takes the value of one if the respondent reports talking about politics frequently, sometimes, or rarely, and the value of zero if the respondents state s/he never talks about politics. "Interested in Politics" takes the value of one if the respondent reports being very interested, interested, or somewhat interested in politics, zero if the respondent reports lack of interest in politics. Finally, the variable "Interested in News" takes a value of one if the respondent reports attempts to gain access to the news via newspapers, radio, or television, zero otherwise.²⁹¹ The "Political Engagement Index" is an additive index of the other three variables, ranging from zero to three. The index allows analysis of the degree of political engagement reported, based on the assumption that those more engaged

²⁹¹ The binary coding of these variables reflects nature of responses to these survey questions: respondents tended to downplay the extent to which they talked about or were interested in politics, often claiming "I am not a politician." When probed further ("I am not asking if you are a politician, I am asking if you ever talk about politics"), respondents would admit to discussing politics or a general interest in politics; however, respondents' hesitance to report high levels of interest or regular discussion distorts the ordinal coding; therefore, the meaningful distinction for these responses was between those claiming no interest or discussion, and those claiming at least some.

would report more activities. Table Ten reports the distribution of each variable. The models employed and the independent variables are the same as described in Chapter Four.

Table Ten: Distribution of Dependent Variables

Variable	Distribution
Talk About Politics	49.3% report talking about politics at least rarely
Interested in Politics	40.7% report at least some interest in politics
Interested in News	75.3% report attempts to access news
Political Engagement Index	None: 14.3% One: 34% Two: 24% Three: 28%

The models use the same set of control variables described in Chapter Four, with one addition. Due to the expectation that more regular contact with the government may also influence citizens’ political engagement, these models also include a dummy variable indicating whether or not the respondent resides on-rail. Used as a proxy for rough levels of government presence, “On-Rail” is specified as follows: all respondents in Solwezi District (urban and rural) are off-rail and all respondents in Kabwe District (urban and rural) are “on-rail.” Urban and peri-urban residents of Livingstone/Kazangula are on-rail, while rural residents of Kazangula are off-rail. This coding scheme results in 650 respondents off-rail and 850 respondents on-rail, with both urban and rural-dwellers represented in each cut of the sample (as Solwezi urban is still off-rail, and Kabwe rural is on-rail).

4.0 Results

As expected, the number of government projects to which respondents have access has no relationship to any of the measures of political engagement (Table 11 below).

Table 11: Government Projects and Political Engagement

	Talk About Politics	Interested in Politics	Interest in News	Political Engagement Index
Government Projects	1.04 (0.08)	1.04 (0.07)	0.99 (0.08)	1.03 (0.06)
On-Rail	1.53 (0.45)	1.42 (0.40)	1.87* (0.63)	1.71** (0.42)
Northwestern Province	2.07 (0.93)	1.43 (0.62)	0.68 (0.39)	1.61 (0.69)
Southern Province	1.66 (0.33)	0.85 (0.23)	1.77 (0.70)	1.07 (0.27)
Urban	0.78 (0.14)	0.71* (0.12)	3.63** (0.81)	1.07 (0.18)
Male	1.87** (0.24)	1.78** (0.22)	2.21** (0.37)	2.08** (0.23)
Age	0.91 (0.07)	0.99 (0.07)	0.85 (0.08)	0.91 (0.06)
Education	1.25** (0.05)	1.11** (0.05)	1.41** (0.08)	1.24** (0.04)
Religiosity	0.94 (0.05)	1.00 (0.05)	1.25** (0.09)	1.02 (0.02)
Children	0.98 (0.02)	1.02 (0.02)	1.01 (0.03)	1.00 (0.02)
Married	1.10 (0.16)	0.91 (0.13)	1.56** (0.29)	1.15 (0.14)
Unemployed	0.67** (0.13)	0.93 (0.18)	0.70 (0.19)	0.77* (0.12)
Housewife	1.28 (0.35)	0.73 (0.20)	0.56** (0.17)	0.77 (0.17)
Civil Servant	0.57* (0.07)	0.50** (0.15)	0.67 (0.28)	0.48** (0.12)
N	1489	1489	1477	1489
F	5.66	4.17	6.15	8.42
Prob>F	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Notes: Odds ratios for logistic or ordinal logistic regressions, standard errors parenthesized below. Statistical significance denoted by ** if P<0.05, * if P<0.10. Some covariates unreported; full results table available in Appendix B.

Sex and education have the most consistent relationship with the measures of political engagement: men and those with higher levels of education are significantly more likely to report all forms of political engagement measured. These results are commensurate with findings from advanced industrial democracies.²⁹² While the relationship between education and political engagement is well-theorized, the source of men's higher levels of political engagement will be addressed in Section Five. Of the other individual-level characteristics, being a civil servant stands out for reducing levels of political engagement; civil servants in Zambia are instructed to be non-partisan, which most civil servants interpret as meaning they should stay out of politics altogether (including expressing interest in politics).²⁹³ Interestingly, being on-rail is associated with higher scores on the political engagement index. This result will also be examined more closely in the discussion.

Moving to the more subjective measure of policy experience (Table 12 below), a relationship between policy experience and measures of engagement emerges: both empowering and marginalizing project experiences correlate with increases in multiple indicators of political engagement, while experience with burdensome policies is associated with a greater likelihood of expressing interest in politics. For each additional "Empowering" experience a respondent reports, his or her likelihood of talking about politics or interest in politics increases by 43% and 47%, respectively; the likelihood that the respondent reports one additional measure of political engagement increases by 41%. Similarly, additional "Marginalizing" experiences increase the likelihood of talking about and interest in politics by 40% and 43%, respectively, and increases the likelihood of additional measures of engagement by 29%.

²⁹² Verba et al. 1995, Burns et al. 2001

²⁹³ Based on multiple interviews with survey respondents who were employed as teachers, nurses, and clerks, all of whom are publicly employed and considered "civil servants."

Meanwhile, experiencing an additional “Burdensome” policy increases the likelihood of interest in politics by 75%. These demonstrate that experience with any kind of policy—any experience aside from neglect—is associated with higher levels of political engagement. In sum, political engagement seems closely related to perceived contact with government services, regardless of the quality of those services. These results indicate initial support for H_{5a} : respondents exposed to empowering, marginalizing, or burdensome policies report higher levels of political engagement.

Table 12: Policy Experience and Political Engagement

	Talk About Politics (I)	Interested in Politics (II)	Interest in News (III)	Political Engagement Index (IV)
Project Experience: Empowering	1.43** (0.22)	1.47** (0.22)	1.02 (0.22)	1.41** (0.18)
Project Experience: Marginalizing	1.40** (0.18)	1.43** (0.18)	0.87 (0.15)	1.29** (0.23)
Project Experience: Neglectful	1.27 (0.18)	1.28 (0.17)	0.89 (0.17)	1.19 (0.12)
Project Experience: Burdensome	1.57 (0.39)	1.75** (0.44)	0.77 (0.26)	1.40 (0.29)
N	1489	1489	1477	1489
F	5.54	4.12	6.02	8.04
Prob>F	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Notes: Odds ratios for logistic or ordinal logistic regressions, standard errors parenthesized below. Statistical significance denoted by ** if P<0.05. Full results available in Appendix B.

The fully subjective assessments of government service provision, reported in Table 13 below, are also consistent with the possibility of interpretive effects. Respondents’ reports of marginalization are most consistently related to increased measures of political engagement relative to other assessments, increasing the likelihood of talking about politics by 31%, interest in politics by 31%, interest in the news by 57%, and additional measures of engagement by 42%. These results lend partial support to H_{5a}. Finally, a neglectful subjective assessment of

government projects is associated with a lower likelihood of additional measures of political engagement by 27%, indicating some support for the inverse of H_{5a}: neglect may decrease political engagement.

Table 13: Subjective Assessments and Political Engagement

	Talk About Politics	Interested in Politics	Interest in News	Political Engagement Index
Subjective Assessment: Empowering	1.16 (0.17)	1.03 (0.15)	0.80 (0.15)	1.05 (0.14)
Subjective Assessment: Marginalizing	1.31** (0.18)	1.31** (0.17)	1.57** (0.28)	1.42** (0.15)
Subjective Assessment: Neglect	0.82 (0.12)	0.82 (0.11)	0.86 (0.14)	0.79** (0.10)
Subjective Assessment: Burdensome	1.57 (0.39)	1.07 (0.25)	1.02 (0.27)	1.21 (0.25)

Notes: Odds ratios for logistic or ordinal logistic regressions, standard errors parenthesized below. Statistical significance denoted by ** if P<0.05. Results for separate regressions with full suite of control variables, unreported. Full results tables available in Appendix B.

Considered in concert, these results indicate a very different pattern than those regarding collective behavior. While respondent reports of collective behavior increased with the objective lack of service provision, political engagement is far more sensitive to the more subjective measures of policy experience and assessments of government provision. These results are consistent with the idea that the relationship between public service provision and political engagement may be the result of interpretive rather than material effects of policies.

5.0 Discussion

As presented above, the data indicate a large difference between the material and interpretive measures of public service provision. The purely objective measure material measure of government projects has no relationship at all to measures of political engagement. The two

interpretive measures are related to political engagement, but are consistent with the hypothesis to various degrees. The semi-subjective measure—descriptions of policy experience—corresponds strongly to measures of political engagement along the lines predicted by H_{5a}. The most subjective measure—subjective assessments of policy experience—only partially confirms the hypothesis. These divergent results indicate two different processes at play regarding the differences between policy experiences and the way that respondents translate those experiences into their subjective assessments of government service provision.

The semi-subjective experiential measures presented in Table Three indicate that any experience with government projects aside from neglect is associated with higher levels of engagement in politics, an outcome commensurate with the initial hypothesis that political engagement should increase with policy types that are inclusionary or reflect cognition of a target group's needs. Following this logic, one would expect that respondents with different policy experiences would report different reasons for their political interest. While I do not have systematic data regarding respondents' reasons for high or low levels of political engagement, certain tropes emerged from the survey interviews that lend anecdotal support to the mechanisms underlying the connection between each type of policy experience and political engagement.

One would expect empowering experiences to increase measures of political engagement because receipt of desirable services may create interest-group type behavior around maintaining those resources, or may simply generate an interest in maintaining the status quo. This type of attitude was evident amongst those living in higher-income areas, or those who had recently received desirable services (farming inputs, in particular). For example, a taxi driver living in a middle-income neighborhood in Livingstone that had recently seen some significant infrastructural improvements enthusiastically lauded the government's policies of universal

primary education, the expansion of tarred roads, and improvements to the electricity supply, and expressed a keen interest in politics and support for the incumbent government.²⁹⁴ He was clearly aware of the improvements in the area, which were in part due to Livingstone's hosting the World Tourism Organization's annual meeting several months earlier. He credited the government with improving service provision, and accordingly indicated his desire to maintain the political status quo.

Another pattern was evident for those who reported marginalizing experiences alongside high levels of political engagement. I suggested that the receipt of marginalizing projects indicates to target groups that the government is considering them in resource distribution, despite not understanding (or, perhaps, without wanting to understand) their specific needs. Such an experience could understandably generate all manner of opinions about what the government could or should be doing. However, as noted previously, lower expectations of government service provision in a low-capacity context may temper the negative psychological effects of receiving marginalizing services as compared to similar experiences in a high-capacity context. A frequent response, recorded repeatedly over the course of the survey, was that people were frustrated by the late delivery and inadequate package sizes of government subsidized seeds and fertilizer. Many respondents would report this frustration, shrug, and explain "we are too many, the government struggles to bring enough for us all."²⁹⁵ Their frustration with inadequate service provision was moderated by gratitude that the government was trying to do anything at all, and belief that they had been marginalized because the government simply did not have the capacity to deliver enough inputs in a timely manner to all in need. For the respondents in this category,

²⁹⁴ Respondent 403 interview conducted November 21, 2013 in Livingstone, Zambia

²⁹⁵ For example, respondent 664, interview conducted December 28, 2013 in Kabwe, Zambia

high levels of political engagement were connected to a sense that the government was trying, even if it was not succeeding, to meet their needs.

Finally, I suggested that being on the receiving end of burdensome policies is likely to make respondents upset with the government, which could similarly result in higher levels of interest or conversation (albeit likely unflattering). A student interviewed in an urban constituency of Solwezi illustrates how a burdensome interpretation may spark interest: he complained that targeted load shedding (regular cuts to the electricity supply) and water disruptions were damaging his family's business, actively making their life more difficult. He reported the highest levels of interest in politics and frequency of talking about politics, because he was angry about the government's mismanagement of Solwezi's urban development.²⁹⁶ This type of attitude was particularly prevalent amongst the unemployed youth, either those who had recently graduated and were unable to find work, or those who were still in school and knew they would have trouble gaining employment when they finished. Some of these respondents energetically channeled their anger into support for opposition parties, while others seemed already disillusioned with the political system.

Given this logic, why would subjective assessments of government policy behave differently? The difference between these two measures of policy experience is the degree of subjectivity, which may explain the divergent results. People who report positive experiences with projects are not necessarily the same type of people who provide an empowering subjective assessment of government service provision (the measures correlate at 25%). Those on the receiving end of marginalizing or even neglectful policies may still believe that the government is trying to help them, but is constrained by material factors. As such, the "empowering" subjective assessment may include respondents who actually had exposure to empowering

²⁹⁶ Respondent 1158, interview conducted January 20, 2014 in Solwezi, Zambia

projects as well as those who are simply less critical of government service provision. If this category includes respondents who are less critical of the government, such respondents may also be less inclined to pay close attention or talk much about politics. The existence of both types of people in the “empowering subjective assessment” category could explain why it does not correlate with levels of engagement. By a similar logic, those who report experiencing burdensome policies differ from those who explicitly state that the government actively tries to make things harder for them; coming to the subjective conclusion that the government actively tries to make things difficult for you reflects a level of cynicism that may be more closely associated with disengagement than the experience of a few burdensome policies.

Therefore, those who report marginalizing experiences—nearly 35% of the total sample—likely include those who actually predominately experience marginalizing policies as well as those who are not satisfied with their empowering policy experience (and are perhaps therefore more critical of government processes) and those who interpret neglectful or burdensome policies as not explicitly directed at them (and therefore hold a more generous view of government policies). The types of respondents who report a marginalizing subjective assessment are therefore more likely to include respondents who are actually marginalized as well as those who are critical, but not those who are expressly cynical. This group---the unsatisfied but not yet disillusioned—has the highest level of political engagement.

The different results associated with respondents’ reported experiences and subjective assessments indicate the importance of understanding both how people experience and interpret policies. Policy experience does not exist in a vacuum, and clearly policy experience alone does not determine how publics interpret government policies. This observation leads to an interesting question in the Zambian context (and in the context of developing countries, generally): if

citizens' translations of policy experiences into subjective assessments of the government depends on variable interpretations of the government, does the relationship between policy experience and political engagement change based on levels of government presence? In general, levels of political engagement in the sample were higher for those living on-rail. This result suggests that living in an area with more regular contact with the government increases the extent to which people think and talk about politics. As to whether living on-rail actually moderates the relationship between policy and political engagement, the results are inconclusive. Splitting the sample between those on- and off-rail indicates that the patterns in the data are stronger for those on-rail, but the difference between the estimates does not attain statistical significance, and the interaction between policy experience variables and the "on-rail" indicator similarly lacks statistical significance (see Appendix B for results tables). Therefore, from the data here, it is evident that those living in areas with higher levels of government presence on average have higher levels of political engagement, but there is no robust statistical evidence to suggest that government presence moderates the relationship between policy and political engagement.

6.0 Gender and Political Engagement

Just as with collective behavior, political engagement is consistently higher for men than women. As demonstrated in Table 14 below, men are 15% more likely each to talk about politics, express interest in politics, and express interest in the news. This gap is striking and concerning, as political engagement is such a consistently important predictor of other forms of political participation. As discussed above, "political interest" and "political engagement" are often included in models predicting political participation to "erase" the gender gap. However, the large gendered gap in political engagement remains to be explained.

Table 14: Rates of Political Engagement, by Sex

	% Men reporting “Yes”	% Women reporting “Yes”
Talk about politics	57%	42%
Interested in politics	48%	33%
Interested in the news	83%	68%

The first essential observation is that demographic characteristics do not account for the gender gap between men and women in Zambia: including measures of education, employment, and age in the models do not eliminate the persistent importance of gender. Nor do the policy variables diminish the gender gap, indicating that (despite expectations to the contrary), men’s and women’s different experiences with policy do not account for the political engagement gap. Furthermore, splitting the sample by sex to examine the different variables contributing to political engagement for men and women yields no result—for both sexes, education is the most important indicator.

Unfortunately, lacking additional qualitative information or other survey measures of the different ways men and women interact with the political sphere, it is not possible to come to a conclusion about this gap in this analysis. Based on the feminist literature regarding political participation, one possibility is that social and political conceptions of women’s role in motherhood may result in a political and cultural orientation that locates women in the private rather than public sphere. While women’s status has changed progressively since the 1960s, described in Chapter Three, there are still large gaps between Zambian men and women in terms of educational attainment and formal employment. Income-generating projects like agricultural

inputs still tend to target male heads of households, and (particularly in rural areas) men still dominate the economic and political realm. As illustrated in Chapter Five, women still disproportionately perform the majority of unremunerated care work, perhaps explaining why they had a greater tendency to prioritize care-based project areas like health. However, in order to understand whether or not such a national orientation affects women's political engagement, it is necessary to have a point of comparison. As a single-country study, this analysis does not have the ability to examine across national political contexts. However, these results do highlight the importance of understanding the gendered dynamics propelling such a stark difference between men's and women's interest in politics.

7.0 Conclusion

The results presented in this chapter suggest that political engagement in Zambia increases with exposure to any experience with public service delivery other than that of neglect. I proposed that this relationship differed from observations in countries with a higher capacity because of different expectations of what government could reasonably provide. Furthermore, political engagement is more sensitive to reported experiences with services and subjective assessments of the government rather than to objective measures of government provision. This finding suggests that the process of translating policy experiences to political engagement relies heavily on interpretation. Furthermore, this chapter demonstrated the importance of government presence in precipitating political engagement: measures of political engagement were much higher for those living on-rail, in areas with more consistent government contact, *ceteris paribus*.

Furthermore, this chapter confirmed that women are less politically engaged than men, a result that none of the demographic or policy-related variables included in the analysis could explain. However, given how integral political engagement is for other forms of participation, this finding

reaffirms the importance of understanding better what contributes to persistent gaps in political engagement.

In sum, this chapter demonstrated that respondents' *interpretations* of services are much more important for generating political engagement than the objective presence or absence of such services. There are two major implications to these findings: first, political engagement is most consistently associated with marginalizing policy experiences, indicating that political engagement is most likely when respondents are dissatisfied but not yet disillusioned with service provision. This category is substantively different from neglect in that respondents feel that the government is at least trying to provide basic services, even if such services leave something to be desired. As such, for low-capacity governments, making any attempt at service provision may have the effect of increasing respondents' degree of political engagement.

Second, this chapter demonstrated that political engagement arises from just about any experience with government services save neglect. If political engagement is closely correlated with political participation in the Zambian context (as in the American context), this finding indicates that empowering, marginalizing, or burdensome policies may all increase the likelihood of political participation as compared to neglectful policy experiences. However, the finding that political engagement increases with exposure to any kind of policy has a different implication for the relationship between political engagement and political participation in Zambia than in an advanced democracy like the United States. While empowering policies may increase engagement by stimulating interest groups, marginalizing policies through simple exposure, and burdensome policies through the creation of anger, these experiences should not all necessarily result in the political interest that translates to political participation. As such, some of these

policy experiences may be associated with higher levels of political engagement without being related to higher levels of political participation.

Furthermore, it is essential to note that the level of government presence has such a strong relationship with political engagement. It is perhaps unsurprising that the link between policy experiences and political participation is stronger for those living in areas of high government presence, but such a finding has important implications for political development in democracies like Zambia. Zambia is not unique in its pattern of uneven government presence; many governments have variable capacity across different parts of their territory. However, if political engagement is consistently higher in the better integrated areas, it is likely that the uneven pattern of economic and political development will intensify.

In closing, the finding that all forms of government contact increased measures of political engagement raises another question: if marginalizing and burdensome policy experiences increase political engagement, do they also increase political participation? In other words, are all sources of political engagement “equal” in precipitating political action? The following section takes up this question through an examination of policy experience on formal forms of political participation.

Chapter Seven

From Interest to Action: Policy Experience and Formal Political Participation

Abstract

This chapter explores the relationship between various experiences with service provision and formal participation in politics. Unlike political engagement, it demonstrates that political participation is only associated with empowering and (sometimes) marginalizing experiences with service provision, indicating that the motivation for translating political engagement into political participation is closely tied to material incentives. While the predictors of collective behavior and political engagement also predict political participation, these relationships are mediated, indicating that only empowering experiences have a direct relationship with political participation. In addition, the chapter demonstrates that Zambia's gender gap in political participation is attributable almost entirely to the large gender gap in political engagement.

1.0 Introduction

Formal political participation is often the primary variable of interest for political scientists, but it is a relatively rare and costly activity. Opportunities to vote come only once every few years, few people take the time to directly contact their representatives, and only the most committed become involved with political parties or campaigns beyond the act of voting. As compared to other forms of political involvement, such as community organizing around local problems or generalized interest in political issues, engaging in political action is costly (in terms of time, money, or both) and the payoff is remote and often nontangible. Because of the intermittent nature of political participation for most people, and because of its disadvantageous cost/benefit structure, experiences with public policy must be exceptional to sway the extent to which people participate in the formal political system.

This chapter argues that people are more likely to participate in politics when they have had empowering experiences with public policies, because positive policy experiences are unique in generating a sense of efficacy and the notion that the government is likely to be responsive. This expectation contrasts with the findings of Chapters Five and Six, which demonstrated that collective behavior was linked to lower rates of objective service provision,

and that political engagement was related to empowering, marginalizing, and burdensome interpretations of services. These contrasting predictions are important because, typically, collective behavior and political engagement positively correlate with political participation. In order to reconcile this argument with the previous chapters, it is therefore necessary to distinguish between direct and indirect effects of public policy on political participation: public policy experiences may be directly and independently related to political participation, or they may be indirectly related to political participation as a result of their relationships with collective behavior or political engagement. This chapter therefore considers both the direct relationship between policy and participation, and the indirect relationship precipitated by policy's relationship with collective behavior and political engagement.

This chapter proceeds as follows: Section Two reviews some relevant literature regarding political participation and policy feedback and advances the hypotheses that this chapter tests. Section Three reviews the data and model specifications, while Section Four presents and discusses the results associated with the primary hypotheses. Section Five considers the gendered element of political participation evident in the data, focusing on the extent to which political engagement mediates the relationship between sex and political participation. A final section concludes.

2.0 Literature and Hypotheses

Formal political participation includes forms of participation most commonly associated with political behavior: voting, contacting officials, and supporting political parties. This dimension of political behavior is the most commonly theorized in the democratic context where participation is meaningful, particularly in advanced industrial democracies like the United States. In predicting rates of political participation, numerous studies by political scientists repeatedly

demonstrate that three different demographic characteristics influence behavior: education, gender, and age.²⁹⁷ These studies show that education is generally the most important determinant of political participation, that women consistently participate less than men, and that young people are less likely to participate in politics.²⁹⁸ In addition, income is a fairly consistent predictor of political participation, though researchers are unclear whether income itself or its correlates (education, civic skills, etc.) are actually important.²⁹⁹

Formal political participation differs from other categories of independent variables considered in this study in that it has a disadvantageous cost-benefit structure. One fundamental characteristic of political participation is that it is a costly act. Voting requires time and travel; contacting officials requires time and energy; involvement in political parties or interest groups often requires both time and monetary resources.³⁰⁰ Furthermore, for such a costly activity, political participation has a relatively low and often intangible payoff. Early political science literature about voting puzzles over why individuals would bother exercising their right to vote, given the time associated with the activity and the low likelihood that an individual vote would have any effect on electoral outcomes.³⁰¹ Some political scientists therefore posited that political participation reflects both material interests as well as the norms of civic duty.³⁰² Regardless of the extent to which political participation reflects the rational pursuit of benefits or the personal pursuit of a principle, it stands to reason that individuals should be more likely to participate in politics if they have reason to believe that the government is likely to be responsive to their

²⁹⁷ Verba, et al. 1995

²⁹⁸ Marien et al 2010 provides a good review of many such studies.

²⁹⁹ Pacheco and Plutzer 2008

³⁰⁰ Verba et al. 1995

³⁰¹ Downs 1957

³⁰² Riker and Ordeshook 1968, Schram and van Winden 1991

demands. This belief would alter the cost-benefit structure of political participation in such a way that would make participation more likely to pay off.

Unlike collective behavior (which was most closely related to material elements of service provision) and political engagement (which correlated most closely with interpretive dimensions), formal political participation is likely to be closely related to both. Assuming that income (rather than its correlates) is an important predictor of political participation, policies that distribute material benefits may influence rates of participation by conferring material resources to certain members of the polity. Those who receive more desirable resources through public service provision should theoretically be better able to undertake the costs of political participation. Such resource effects are the subject of common study in policy feedback literature.³⁰³ Based on this assessment, citizens on the receiving end of inclusive policies—either empowering or marginalizing—should be better equipped to participate in politics than otherwise due to a theoretical increase in resources. Both empowering and marginalizing experiences indicate a transfer of government resources to recipients. Given the resulting increase in material resources, respondents who report policy experiences along this dimension should be better able to undertake the costs of political participation than those who report neglectful or burdensome policies, *ceteris paribus*.

However, material effects are not the only pathway through which policies influence political participation. The ability to undertake the costs of political participation is essential, but is unlikely to increase political participation absent motivation.³⁰⁴ Interpretive effects have the capacity to alter the extent to which citizens believe that their participation will pay off; this dimension of policy feedback is why, in the United States, certain welfare policies depress

³⁰³ Campbell 2012

³⁰⁴ Verba, et al 1995, Chapter 12

political participation, despite conferring material resources to the impoverished.³⁰⁵ If a citizen's policy experiences suggest that the government does not precisely understand what s/he needs, or designs policies in a way that do not meet his or her needs, it may result in the sense that the government is not terribly responsive. In this case, the interpretive effects of a policy (a sense of the lack of responsiveness of government) may counteract the material effects of policy (boosting participation by conferring more resources on a group). On the other hand, if a citizen believes that the government is likely to be responsive to his or her requests, then the possible payoff of political participation increases. Therefore, political participation should become more likely when citizens receive resources that reflect cognizance of their needs: empowering policies. This expectation is captured by Hypothesis 6_a below:

H_{6a}: Formal political participation is more likely for those with *empowering* policy experiences.

Because empowering policies alter both the ability of individuals to undertake the cost of political participation (through material pathways) and suggest the utility of such participation (through interpretive pathways), those subject to empowering policies should be more likely to engage in formal participation relative to those who have marginalizing, neglectful, or burdensome experiences.

This hypothesis concerns the direct relationship between public policy and political participation, but indirect relationships may also exist. For these indirect relationships, I expect different processes underlying material effects (related to objective service provision) and interpretive effects (related to the subjective measures of policy experience and assessment). In Chapter Five, the data demonstrated that lower levels of objective service provision were associated with higher levels of collective behavior. As the political science literature regularly

³⁰⁵ Soss 1999, Soss 2007, Bruch et al. 2010

demonstrates the positive relationship between collective behavior and political participation, it is possible that lower levels of objective service provision are also associated with higher levels of political participation. Such a result would be counterintuitive, as lower levels of service provision indicate fewer material resources, and should therefore be associated with lower levels of service provision. However, such a result is still possible if the link between low levels of objective service provision and higher levels of political participation are mediated by collective behavior:

H_{6b}: Mediated by collective behavior, lower levels of objective service provision will be associated with higher rates of political participation.

Similarly, with regard to subjective assessments, the results from Chapter Six regarding the relationship between marginalizing or burdensome policy experience or subjective assessments and political engagement generate contradictory predictions for this chapter. On the one hand, one would expect marginalizing or burdensome experiences or assessments to dampen political participation because they suggest the interpretation that the government is unresponsive. However, as they are also associated with political engagement, and political engagement is positively associated with participation, the opposite may also be true: it is possible that marginalizing or neglectful policy experiences or subjective assessments could precipitate an indirect relationship with political participation through political engagement. If this is the case, such a relationship is likely to disappear once the relationship between policy and political engagement is accounted for:

H_{6c}: Mediated by political engagement, marginalizing or burdensome policy experiences will increase political participation.

Finally, this chapter considers how variable levels of government presence may influence political participation. In order for policy experiences to translate into political action, citizens

must connect those policy experiences to politics. In general, policy feedback assumes that policy has an effect on political participation precisely because the recipients of various policies or services are able to attribute responsibility for those services to the government. I argue that this condition is more likely to occur on-rail, where government presence is higher (as is political engagement). As described earlier, the historical development of the line of the rail connecting the mines of the Copperbelt to Britain's colonial possessions further south resulted in uneven development: areas along the line of the rail enjoyed better infrastructure, better service provision, and better market access. In these areas, government presence continues to be much stronger and services more consistently rendered.

Indeed, when asked who was responsible for providing the services that they had deemed salient, residents of sites on-rail indicated that "the government" was responsible 81% of the time, while residents of sites off-rail only stated that the government was responsible 68% of the time. In areas off-rail, respondents are more likely to report that other service providers are responsible for various projects. Instead, communities report more project completion by a combination of traditional authorities, community organizations, or other non-state service providers. Given this environment, one might expect that respondents off-rail may be less likely to connect their experiences with service provision to the government. Furthermore, it is telling that (as demonstrated by Chapter Six) respondents on average report higher levels of political engagement on-rail, suggesting that those living along the line of the rail have more inclination to connect their experiences with politics in general.

Based on these observations, I expect that the degree to which recipients connect their policy experiences to politics will be stronger on-rail, where government presence is higher and respondents may be more likely to connect their experience with service provision to politics:

H_{6b}: The link between policy experience and political participation will be stronger for those respondents living on-rail.

Because the links between service provision and the political realm are stronger and more consistent in areas of high government presence, the relationship between service provision and political participation should be stronger in these areas. The following section elaborates the variables used in this chapter.

3.0 Variable Specification

3.1 Dependent Variables

The survey uses a suite of variables to measure various elements of formal political behavior.

Table 15: Distribution of Dependent Variables

Variable	Distribution
Contact Local Official	36.2% report contacting local officials at least occasionally
Contact MP	18.8% report contacting their MP at least occasionally
Support Party	61.1% report supporting a political party
Vote 2016	81.5% report planning to vote in 2016
Political Participation Index	None: 9.5% One: 21.6% Two: 40.1% Three: 18.2% Four: 10.5%

“Contact Local Official” and “Contact MP” are each binary variables that take the value of “1” if the respondent reports contacting a local government official or their member of parliament with any frequency, and “0” if they report never contacting these officials. The variable “Support

Party” is a binary variable that captures whether or not respondents support any political party. “Vote 2016” is a binary variable that takes a value of “1” if the respondent reports planning to vote in 2016, and “0” otherwise.³⁰⁶ Finally, the Formal Participation Index is an additive index of the other four variables.

3.2 Independent and Control Variables

This chapter examines the relationship between political participation and all three specifications of policy experience described in Chapter Four, as well as the standard suite of control variables included in Chapters Five and Six. It utilizes the same model specification, but includes some additional independent variables. Like in Chapter Six, it includes a dummy variable to indicate whether or not respondents live on-rail, due to the expectation that more regular contact with the government on-rail may influence respondents’ proclivity for political participation. Because of the regularly reported relationship between collective behavior, political engagement, and political participation,³⁰⁷ and because of the relationship between policy and these two outcome variables in Chapters Five and Six, it is possible that any relationship between policy experiences and political participation are due to the relationship between policy experience and collective behavior or political engagement. In order to ensure that policy experience has an independent relationship with political participation, the collective behavior and political engagement indices are also added into the objective and subjective models (respectively) in this chapter as independent variables.

³⁰⁶ At the time of the survey, the next regularly scheduled presidential election was in 2016. However, in October 2014, President Michael Sata died in office (from illness). Zambian law dictates that, upon the president’s death in office, the Vice President serves as interim president for a period not exceeding 90 days, at which point an election must be held. As such, the a by-election was held in January 2015 to elect the next president. Edgar Lungu, of the ruling Patriotic Front, was elected to succeed President Sata in a hotly contested but (by most accounts) free and fair election.

³⁰⁷ Verba et al.1995

4.0 Results and Discussion

Because of the different hypotheses generated with respect to the objective and subjective measures of policy experience, the results sections are organized to first examine the relationship between objective services, political participation, and collective behavior (H_{6b}), then to the more subjective measures, political participation, and political engagement (H_{6c}). After accounting for the indirect relationships between policy and participation, I assess the extent to which the balance of the evidence supports the direct relationship between empowering policy experiences and political participation (H_{6a}).

4.1 Objective Service Provision, Collective Behavior, and Political Participation

The first set of regressions examines the relationship between objective measures of service provision and political participation, presented in Table Four below. The data indicate that respondents are less likely to contact local officials and participate in additional forms of participation as the number of projects to which they have access increases. This result is counterintuitive, given the expectation that increases in material resources should also increase respondents' ability (and proclivity) to participate in politics. However, Chapter Five demonstrated that lower levels of government service provision were associated with higher levels of collective behavior. As collective behavior generally has a positive relationship to political participation, it is possible the relationship presented above between government service provision and political participation is due to the relationship between government projects and collective behavior. This relationship is explored further below.

Table 16: Government Projects and Political Participation

	Contact Local Official	Contact MP	Support Party	Vote 2016	Participation Index
Government Projects	0.87** (0.06)	0.98 (0.08)	1.05 (0.07)	0.90 (0.09)	0.88** (0.05)
On-Rail	0.65 (0.18)	0.45** (0.16)	1.21 (0.34)	0.77 (0.36)	0.57** (0.13)
Northwestern Province	0.54 (0.24)	0.26** (0.15)	1.38 (0.60)	0.27* (0.19)	0.35** (0.13)
Southern Province	0.77 (0.21)	0.65 (0.25)	0.98 (0.30)	0.96 (0.51)	1.33 (0.34)
Urban	1.30 (0.23)	1.09 (0.24)	0.67** (0.13)	0.82 (0.22)	1.53** (0.22)
Male	1.20 (0.15)	1.48** (0.22)	1.49** (0.18)	1.25 (0.23)	1.52** (0.16)
Age	1.37** (0.11)	1.11 (0.10)	1.06 (0.09)	1.16 (0.15)	1.21** (0.08)
Education	1.02 (0.02)	1.02 (0.02)	1.06* (0.03)	1.13** (0.07)	1.04 (0.04)
Religiosity	1.02 (0.04)	1.06 (0.04)	1.05 (0.04)	1.03 (0.07)	1.04 (0.03)
Children	1.08** (0.03)	1.05* (0.02)	1.00 (0.02)	1.04 (0.04)	1.05** (0.02)
Married	1.13 (0.17)	0.95 (0.17)	1.55** (0.22)	1.25 (0.26)	1.30* (0.14)
Formally Employed	1.62** (0.34)	1.14 (0.30)	1.00 (0.22)	0.67 (0.22)	1.19 (0.22)
Farmer	1.05 (0.22)	1.14 (0.30)	0.96 (0.21)	0.45** (0.15)	0.77 (0.15)
Miner	1.88 (0.77)	1.42 (0.62)	0.68 (0.30)	1.06 (0.64)	2.50** (0.85)
Unemployed	0.98 (0.19)	0.88 (0.22)	0.63** (0.12)	0.90 (0.26)	1.03 (0.16)
Civil Servant	0.94 (0.26)	1.60 (0.50)	0.43** (0.12)	0.89 (0.41)	1.21 (0.32)
N	1489	1479	1427	1487	1486
F	3.03	1.75	2.78	2.80	4.89
Prob >F	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Notes: Odds ratios for ordinal logistic or logistic regressions reported. Standard errors reported below. Significance denoted by ** if $p < 0.05$; * if $p < 0.10$. Standard errors clustered by ward, the level of survey stratification. Full results table available in Appendix B.

Interestingly, residence on-rail is associated with a dramatic reduction in contacting officials and in participating in multiple political activities. This result particularly curious given that Chapter Six demonstrated that living on-rail was associated with higher levels of political engagement. Such divergence between these response variables indicate that political engagement does not automatically translate into political participation. This result will be addressed further in the discussion. Respondents in Northwestern Province are less likely to participate in politics as compared to Central Province, even after controlling for residence on-rail. As expected given previous studies, men and those in older age cohorts are more likely to participate in various political activities.

Returning to the negative relationship between government service provision and political participation, I suggested that this outcome may be due to the relationship between service provision and collective behavior. The results presented in Table 17 below lend support to this idea: repeating the analysis above and including the collective behavior index as an independent variable completely eliminates the relationship between government projects and political participation.

Table 17: Government Projects, Collective Behavior, and Political Participation

	Contact Local Official	Participation Index
Government Projects	0.95 (0.07)	0.92 (0.05)
Collective Behavior Index	2.67** (0.21)	1.85** (0.10)
N	1475	1475
F	5.63	7.52
Prob >F	0.00	0.00

Notes: Odds ratios for ordinal logistic or logistic regressions reported. Standard errors reported below. Significance denoted by ** if $p < 0.05$; * if $p < 0.10$. Standard errors clustered by ward, the level of survey stratification. Full results table available in Appendix B.

Given these results, it is possible that collective behavior mediates the negative relationship between government projects and political participation. Using Hicks and Tingley's method of causal mediation analysis, I examined the extent to which each respondent's level of collective behavior mediates the relationship between lower levels of service provision and higher levels of political participation.³⁰⁸ This package fits models based on the observed values of the outcome and mediator variables, simulates model parameters based on their distribution, and runs simulations based on a quasi-Bayesian Monte Carlo approach in order to estimate the direct, indirect, and average causal mediation effects of the mediating variable.³⁰⁹ This analysis indicates that collective behavior does in fact mediate the relationship between low levels of service provision and higher levels of political participation, at a mean rate of 27% (the 95% confidence interval indicates that collective behavior mediates between 17 and 69% of this relationship).³¹⁰ Because Hicks and Tingley's analysis assumes a causal relationship between the variables, and the models specified above are not causally identified, it is also necessary to examine how sensitive the results are to correlation in the error terms of the equations in the mediated model. Using their method of sensitivity analysis,³¹¹ the results are robust for up to 30% correlation between the error terms in each model, after which the actual mediation effect is statistically zero. These results are consistent with the idea that objective measures of service provision have little direct effect on political participation, but have an indirect effect through collective behavior, supporting H_{6b}.

³⁰⁸ This method requires an assumption of linearity of the dependent variable. Fortunately, because the formal participation index has five categories, it can reasonably be treated as a continuous variable, and the results are indeed robust to OLS specification. Hicks and Tingley's mediation analysis was thus performed with OLS.

³⁰⁹ Hicks and Tingley 2011, p. 5

³¹⁰ full table of result available in Appendix B

³¹¹ see Hicks and Tingley 2011

4.2 Experiences and Subjective Assessments, Political Engagement, and Political Participation

Turning to the more subjective measures of policy experience, the results presented in Table 18 below indicate that project experience has a limited effect on political participation, with the exception of party support. Each additional empowering project that respondents experience is associated with a 66% increase in the likelihood that s/he supports a political party, while each additional marginalizing project is associated with a 43% increase in the same.

Table 18: Policy Experience and Political Participation

	Contact Local Official	Contact MP	Support Party	Vote 2016	Participation Index
Project Experience: Empowering	1.07 (0.16)	1.29 (0.28)	1.66** (0.26)	0.77 (0.16)	1.07 (0.12)
Project Experience: Marginalizing	1.04 (0.13)	1.21 (0.23)	1.43** (0.18)	0.87 (0.17)	0.98 (0.10)
Project Experience: Neglectful	1.01 (0.13)	1.24 (0.24)	1.17 (0.15)	0.95 (0.18)	1.00 (0.10)
Project Experience: Burdensome	1.11 (0.28)	1.53 (0.48)	1.40 (0.37)	1.04 (0.43)	1.08 (0.27)
N	1489	1479	1427	1487	1486
F	2.81	1.74	2.88	2.75	4.49
Prob >F	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Notes: Odds ratios for ordinal logistic or logistic regressions reported. Standard errors reported below. Significance denoted by ** if $p < 0.05$; * if $p < 0.10$. Standard errors clustered by ward, the level of survey stratification. Full results available in Appendix B.

Because of the close relationship between political engagement and political participation demonstrated in much of the political participation literature, and because of the relationship between policy experience and political engagement demonstrated in Chapter Six, it is possible that political engagement accounts for part of the relationship between policy experience and political participation. In order to test whether empowering or marginalizing policy experiences have an independent relationship with party support, I repeated the analysis, including the political engagement index as an independent variable. The results, reported in Table 19 below,

demonstrate that even with the inclusion of the political engagement index, empowering policy experiences maintain an independent relationship with party support. However, the inclusion of political engagement reduces coefficient size for marginalizing policy experiences, and reduces its level of statistical significance.³¹² Such results indicate that, while empowering experiences have an independent relationship with party support, the relationship between marginalizing experiences and party support does not (at conventional levels of statistical significance). Unfortunately, because “support party” is a binary variable, it is not possible to use Hicks and Tingley’s method of mediation analysis to determine whether political engagement actually mediates the relationship between marginalizing project experiences and increased party support. However, that the inclusion of the political engagement index weakens the relationship between the two variables is suggestive (Table 19). Such evidence lends initial support to both H_{6a} and H_{6c}.

Table 19: Policy Experience, Political Engagement, and Party Support

	Support Party
Project Experience: Empowering	1.55** (0.26)
Project Experience: Marginalizing	1.31* (0.18)
Political Engagement Index	2.45** (0.18)
N	1413
F	4.90
Prob >F	0.00
<i>Notes:</i> Odds ratios for logistic regressions reported. Standard errors reported below. Significance denoted by ** if p<0.05; * if p<0.10. Standard errors clustered by ward, the level of survey stratification.	

³¹² Because mediation analysis requires an assumption of linearity, it is not possible to conduct mediation analysis with a binary outcome variable like Support Party.

Subjective assessments have a stronger and more consistent relationship to political participation, though many of the relationships attain only marginal statistical significance (Table 20).

Empowering subjective assessments are associated with increased likelihood of participating in additional activities by 50%. Marginalizing assessments are associated with an increased likelihood of voting in 2016 by 54% and of additional political activities by 29%. Neglectful subjective assessments are correlated with a 28% decrease in likelihood of participating in additional forms of participation, while burdensome assessments correspond with an 85% reduction in the same.

Table 20: Subjective Assessments and Political Participation

	Contact Local Official (I)	Contact MP (II)	Support Party (III)	Vote 2016 (IV)	Participation Index (V)
Subjective Assessment: Empowering	1.28* (0.19)	1.31 (0.24)	1.33* (0.20)	1.34 (0.24)	1.50** (0.18)
Subjective Assessment: Marginalizing	1.15 (0.15)	1.12 (0.17)	1.19 (0.15)	1.54** (0.25)	1.29** (0.13)
Subjective Assessment: Neglectful	0.89 (0.12)	0.87 (0.14)	0.80* (0.11)	0.78 (0.12)	0.78** (0.09)
Subjective Assessment: Burdensome	0.72 (0.20)	0.72 (0.23)	1.24 (0.33)	0.68 (0.20)	0.54** (0.12)

Notes: Odds ratios for ordinal logistic or logistic regressions reported. Standard errors reported below. Significance denoted by ** if $p < 0.05$; * if $p < 0.10$. Standard errors clustered by ward, the level of survey stratification. Full results tables available in Appendix B.

The relationship between the subjective assessments and the participation index appears strong, and suggests that subjective assessments along the inclusionary dimension (empowering and marginalizing) lead to higher levels of political participation, while assessments along the exclusionary dimension (neglectful and burdensome) are associated with lower levels of participation. However, these results are subject to the same concerns as above about the

relationship between subjective assessments and political engagement presented in Chapter Six.

As such, Table 21 below presents results of repeated analysis of variables with significant results above, with the inclusion of the political engagement index as an independent variable.

Table 21: Subjective Assessments, Political Engagement, and Political Participation

	Participation Index	Participation Index	Participation Index	Participation Index	Vote 2016
Subjective Assessment: Empowering	1.51** (0.18)				
Subjective Assessment: Marginalizing		1.21* (0.13)			1.36* (0.23)
Subjective Assessment: Neglectful			0.82* (0.10)		
Subjective Assessment: Burdensome				0.50** (0.11)	
Political Engagement Index	1.58** (0.09)	1.58** (0.09)	1.58** (0.09)	1.60** (0.09)	2.10** (0.18)
N	1486	1486	1486	1486	1489
F	6.47	6.23	6.23	6.47	3.42
Prob>F	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Notes: Odds ratios for ordinal logistic or logistic regressions reported. Standard errors reported below. Significance denoted by ** if $p < 0.05$; * if $p < 0.10$. Standard errors clustered by ward, the level of survey stratification. Full results tables available in Appendix B

With the inclusion of the political engagement index, only the empowering and burdensome subjective assessments maintain both their magnitude and level of statistical significance, indicating that empowering and burdensome assessments of government service provision have an independent relationship with increased and decreased (respectively) rates of political participation. Repeating the mediation analysis for marginalizing and neglectful assessments lends some support to H_{6c} : political engagement mediates about 20% of the relationship between marginalizing subjective assessments and political participation, and about 30% of the negative

relationship between neglectful subjective assessments and political engagement.³¹³ However, at least in the case of marginalizing assessments, the analysis indicates that the subjective indicator still has a direct and positive relationship with political participation (the confidence interval for the direct effect of neglectful assessments overlaps with zero). Again, because Hicks and Tingley's analysis assumes a causal relationship between the variables, and the models specified above are not causally identified, it is also necessary to examine how sensitive the results are to correlation in the error terms of mediated model. Using their method of sensitivity analysis,³¹⁴ the results are robust for up to 24% correlation between the error terms in each model.

That empowering subjective assessments continue to have a statistically significant relationship with political participation is unsurprising, given the theoretical priors advanced in this chapter. However, it is surprising that burdensome assessments continue to have a negative relationship with political participation, considering that burdensome assessments are associated with *increases* in political engagement. I repeated the mediation analysis again to understand better how political engagement influences this relationship; the results indicate that burdensome assessments have a strongly negative direct relationship with political participation, which is slightly reduced in the mediated model due to the positive relationship between burdensome assessments, political engagement, and political participation.³¹⁵ However, the effect is small: the estimates indicate that the positive effect of burdensome assessments on political engagement only reduces its negative effect on political participation by about 9%. Confidence intervals for the average mediation effect overlap with zero, indicating that the mediation effect is not statistically significant.

³¹³ Results tables available in Appendix B

³¹⁴ see Hicks and Tingley 2011

³¹⁵ full results available in Appendix B

That a burdensome policy makes an individual simultaneously more interested in politics and less likely to participate indicates that political engagement does not automatically translate to participation. This interpretation is supported by the results indicating that political engagement has a very low level of mediation between burdensome assessments and political participation. On the other hand, the relationship between marginalizing assessments and higher rates of participation and neglectful assessments and lower rates of participation do support a mediated model, in which the relationship between subjective assessments of service provision and political participation are due in large part to the relationship between those subjective assessments and political engagement. These results lend some additional support to both H_{6a} and H_{6b} : that empowering experiences have a positive direct relationship with political participation, but that the relationship between marginalization and neglect and participation are accounted for by political engagement. These results also indicate, however, that burdensome assessments have a direct and negative relationship with participation, despite having a positive relationship with political engagement.

4.3 Government Presence and Political Participation

Finally, I suggested that the relationship between policy and political participation should be stronger along the line of the rail, where government presence is stronger, and should help precipitate respondents' connections between public policy and politics. Theoretically, one would expect policy experiences to be most closely related to political participation when people make stronger connections between public goods and politics. I argued that this condition is more likely to occur along the line of the rail, where the links between politicians, politics, and public goods are more apparent.

In order to test this assessment, I start with the models above that yielded the strongest results: subjective assessments of government provision and political participation. I then interact the primary independent variable of interest (policy assessment) with respondents' location on or off rail to ascertain whether the strength of the relationship between assessment and participation depends at all on level of government presence (as measured by the on-rail proxy). The results below include the control for political engagement, to ensure the estimates capture the direct relationship between assessments and participation. The results (in Table 22 below) are weak, only attaining marginal significance at best, the pattern is worth discussing.

Table 22: Subjective Assessment and Political Participation, On and Off-Rail

	Participation Index	Participation Index	Participation Index	Participation Index
Subjective Assessment: Empowering	1.64** (0.34)			
Subjective Assessment: Marginalizing		1.53** (0.45)		
Subjective Assessment: Neglectful			0.85 (0.15)	
Subjective Assessment: Burdensome				0.41** (0.10)
On-Rail	0.41** (0.09)	0.45** (0.10)	0.40** (0.09)	0.40** (0.08)
Assessment*On- Rail	0.88 (0.23)	0.70* (0.15)	0.94 (0.22)	2.65* (1.57)
N	1486	1486	1486	1486
F	6.34	6.10	6.10	6.43
Prob>F	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Notes: Odds ratios for ordinal logistic or logistic regressions reported. Standard errors reported below. Significance denoted by ** if $p < 0.05$; * if $p < 0.10$. Standard errors clustered by ward, the level of survey stratification. Full results table available in Appendix B.

First, it is worthwhile to note that despite the inclusion of the interaction term, the main effects for the policy assessments and location on-rail maintain their magnitude and statistical significance (except in the case of neglectful assessments). The interaction term between policy assessment and location on-rail only attains marginal levels of significance for marginalizing and burdensome assessments, suggesting that the relationship between empowering assessments and political participation is insensitive to location on- or off-rail. However, contrary to expectations, the two interaction terms that do indicate a weak relationship work in opposite directions: the interaction terms suggest that the relationship between marginalizing assessments and political participation is weaker on-rail, while the relationship between burdensome assessments and participation is much stronger on-rail. The interaction between residence on-rail and policy assessments is not uni-directional; rather, being on-rail makes one relationship stronger, the other weaker.

In other words, if respondents believe that the government may be trying, but is not meeting their needs through public service provision, that belief is more strongly associated with higher levels of political participation off-rail, when government presence is lower. As indicated above, the relationship between marginalizing assessments and political participation is partially mediated by political engagement; however, the interaction model controlled for political engagement, indicating that the direct relationship between marginalizing assessments and political participation varies in strength on- versus off-rail. This result runs contrary to my expectations, making it difficult to interpret. However, it may indicate the role of differing expectations. Off-rail, respondents tended to express lower expectations about what the government could reasonably provide, suggesting that the problem was that “there are too many of us poor people,” or “we are all so far apart” as explanations for why government service

provision could not meet their basic needs. Given lower expectations, one might expect that marginalizing assessments confer less disappointment, and therefore do not dissuade individuals from political participation. This interpretation is commensurate with the theory underlying rates of political engagement described in Chapter Six, but it is speculative.

On the other hand, the results regarding the interaction between burdensome assessments and location on-rail do adhere to the initial prediction: respondents' assessments that the government makes things harder for them are associated with reduced political participation, and this relationship is stronger on-rail. In areas of high government presence, if respondents do indeed make sharper connections between their policy experiences and politics, it follows that burdensome experiences would have a stronger negative relationship with political participation, as respondents may be more likely to attribute blame for negative experiences to the government.

4.4 Discussion of Primary Results

Considered in concert, the results presented above lead to some tentative conclusions. First, the negative relationship between objective service provision and some forms of political participation is primarily due to the influence of collective behavior: lower rates of objective service provision are associated with higher rates of collective behavior, and higher rates of collective behavior are associated with higher rates of political participation. This relationship accounts for the puzzling negative relationship between objective rates of service provision and political participation; once the model accounts for collective behavior, the relationship disappears. Mediation analysis lends additional support to the idea that collective behavior indeed mediates the relationship between objective rates of service provision and political participation, at least partially. This analysis is commensurate with H_{6c}, which predicted that the negative relationship between objective services and participation would be mediated by

collective behavior. However, contrary to expectations, there was no direct relationship between objective services and participation. I predicted that, because material resources are associated with higher rates of participation, greater access to objective services should increase rates of participation. However, the results do not support this material pathway.

Second, the results regarding more subjective measures of service provision do support the idea that there is a stronger relationship between policy and participation through interpretive pathways. These results indicate much stronger support for H_{6a}: that empowering policy experiences should be associated with higher levels of participation. Indeed, the data support the existence of a direct and positive relationship between (a) empowering policy experiences and party support, and (b) empowering subjective assessments and higher rates of participation. The only other policy variable with a direct connection is the burdensome assessment, which has a direct and negative relationship with political participation. In general, the results were stronger for the fully subjective policy assessments, indicating that the relationship between policy and participation is highly interpretive.

While marginalizing and neglectful assessments were associated with higher and lower rates of participation, respectively, these relationships were (at least partially) mediated by political engagement. These results are consistent with the predictions of H_{6c}. Interestingly, burdensome subjective assessments had a strong negative relationship with participation, despite being positively related to political engagement. This result supports the idea that political engagement does not necessarily lead to political participation, particularly when the source of the political engagement is a negative set of experiences. Though sparse, these results provide some support for H_{6a}: that formal political participation will be more likely for those who have empowering policy experiences than those who have marginalizing, neglectful, or burdensome

ones. That the pattern becomes stronger as the measures of policy experience become more subjective suggests that, like political engagement, the translation of public policy into experiential fodder for political behavior depends to a large degree on interpretation.

Finally, it is striking that levels of political participation tend to be lower for respondents on-rail, particularly since political engagement is higher for those on-rail. Such results indicate that higher levels of government presence increase the degree to which people talk about politics or express an interest in politics, but that living in an area with a relatively high degree of government presence may reduce the extent to which such interests translate into political participation. Testing the interaction between subjective assessments and location on- or off-rail proved inconclusive, however. Being on-rail increased the magnitude of the negative relationship between burdensome assessments and participation, and reduced the magnitude of the positive relationship between marginalizing assessments and participation. Contrary to expectations, being on-rail seems to dampen participation by magnifying negative and diminishing positive links between policy and participation. However, empowering assessments retain their positive relationship to participation regardless of location on- or off-rail, indicating that this relationship is more robust.

While it is hard to know precisely why being on-rail has such a negative relationship to political participation, there are two plausible possibilities. First, while higher levels of government presence may sharpen the connections that respondents make between service provision and the government, it may also sharpen the sense of disillusionment with the political system that respondents experience when they have anything less than an empowering experience with public policy. The other possibility is that respondents off-rail may be easier to mobilize for political participation based on short-term gains, commensurate with the research on

vote-buying in more remote areas. If this is true, and political participation in remote areas is both higher and less elastic, then it could explain why being off-rail ameliorates the negative relationship between burdensome assessments and participation. However, this interpretation is speculative, and indicates the need for a more nuanced examination of the different political processes at work on- and off-rail.

5.0 Gender, Political Engagement, and Political Participation

As with the collective behavior and political engagement variables measured thus far, women are report lower rates of political participation than men. For formal political participation, the gap ranges from 5-10%.

Table 23: Gender and Political Participation

	% Men reporting “Yes”	% Women reporting “Yes”
Contact Local Official	40%	33%
Contact MP	21%	16%
Support Political Party	66%	56%
Plan to vote in 2016	84%	79%

It is troubling that this participation gap persists after controlling for variables such as education and employment, which tend to eliminate the participation gap in more advanced democracies. However, given the strongly gendered element of political engagement, and the strong relationship between political engagement and political participation, it is possible that the source of the gap is women’s lower level of political engagement. In order to test this possibility, I examine the explanatory power of sex on all the measures of political participation with and

without political engagement as a control variable (Table 24). In nearly every case, the substantively large, positive, and statistically significant effect of being male on political participation disappears with the inclusion of political engagement as a control variable. The exceptions are contacting local officials, for which sex has no predictive power, and the participation index, for which the coefficient reduces in size but retains a marginal level of statistical significance. These results indicate the possibility that, while sex does have an effect on political participation, the effect is mediated by political engagement: gender only influences political participation in the extent to which it affects a person's level of political engagement.

Table 24: Gender, Political Engagement, and Political Participation

	Contact Local Official	Contact Local Official	Contact MP	Contact MP	Support Party	Support Party	Vote 2016	Vote 2016	Particip ation Index	Particip ation Index
Male	1.08 (0.15)	1.03 (0.15)	1.38** (0.22)	1.28 (0.21)	1.41** (0.18)	1.05 (0.14)	1.31* (0.20)	1.06 (0.17)	1.39** (0.14)	1.19* (0.13)
Pol. Eng. Index		1.13* (0.08)		1.27** (0.11)		2.40** (0.18)		2.06** (0.18)		1.47** (0.09)
N	1475	1475	1466	1466	1413	1413	1475	1475	1475	1475
F	5.73	5.66	3.64	3.65	3.04	5.24	2.54	3.45	7.60	8.38
Prob>F	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Notes: Odds ratios for ordinal logistic or logistic regressions reported. Standard errors reported below. Significance denoted by ** if $p < 0.05$; * if $p < 0.10$. Standard errors clustered by ward, the level of survey stratification. Full results table available in Appendix B.

In order to test the extent to which the relationship between sex and political participation is mediated by political engagement, I apply Hicks and Tingley's method of causal mediation analysis.³¹⁶ Unfortunately, because the technique requires the assumption of linearity, I can only use it with the participation index.³¹⁷ Their estimation technique confirms a partial mediation

³¹⁶ Hicks and Tingley 2011

³¹⁷ As described above, this 5-category count variable can reasonably be treated as continuous.

effect: political engagement accounts for an estimated 42% of the difference in political participation between men and women.³¹⁸

This analysis supports the idea that the gender difference in political participation in the survey sample is attributable to gendered differences in political engagement, a finding that confirms some analysis from advanced industrial democracies, but does not match some more recent findings from other African countries.³¹⁹ Given the persistent importance of political engagement and other “motivation” factors in explaining political participation, the significant gap between men’s and women’s political engagement in Zambia and its effect on other forms of political participation are deeply worrying. The gaps in political participation that are attributable to demographic characteristics such as education and income might be expected to diminish with processes of modernization and national economic development.³²⁰ However, the fact that the gender gap in participation is largely mediated by political engagement suggests larger, systemic forces that dampen women’s political engagement.

6.0 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the effect of respondents’ various public policy experiences on the likelihood that they engage in formal political participation through contacting officials, voting, or supporting national political parties. The results demonstrate that only empowering experiences with service provision or empowering subjective assessments of government provision result in higher levels of political participation; in addition, burdensome subjective assessments are associated with lower levels participation. These results were straightforward;

³¹⁸ This finding depends on the assumption that no omitted variables confound the relationship between the mediation model and the full model. Hicks and Tingley’s package includes a sensitivity analysis to determine the extent to which correlation between the error terms of the two models would undermine the mediation estimate; performing this sensitivity analysis reveals that the error terms of the two models would need to be correlated at approximately 20% to negate the causal mediation effect.

³¹⁹ E.g. Coffe and Bolzendahl 2011 show that, even including measures of political engagement, the gender participation gap across many African countries persists for all activities save voting.

³²⁰ Inglehart and Norris 2003

the rest of the analysis suggested more complicated processes of mediation in the relationship between policies, collective behavior or political engagement, and political participation. These results indicate that policy experiences can simultaneously have countervailing relationships with political participation as a result of their relationships with other predictors of political participation. Because of this possibility, it is essential to consider carefully the pathways through which policies might theoretically influence political participation; without considering the relationship between policies and collective behavior or political behavior, the results linking policy to formal political participation appear to be erratic, not adhering to any particular pattern. However, once the models take account of the theoretical pathways connecting various measures of policy to participation, the mediated models allowed for a much more logical interpretation of the data.

While the results presented in this chapter were (in general) supportive of the initial hypotheses, some of the results require further explanation. First, the consistently lower levels of political participation along the line-of-rail were surprising, particularly because (as mentioned previously), Chapter Six demonstrated that political engagement was higher for respondents on-rail. This pattern—relatively low engagement and high participation off-rail, alongside relatively high engagement and low participation on-rail—begs additional analysis. Due to the data limitations of this study, it is not possible to present a definitive explanation of this pattern. However, it aligns with previous interpretations of African politics that emphasize the quiescence of remote rural communities and the disillusionment of urban residents. Nevertheless, additional research is required in order to properly understand what accounts for this pattern in the data.

Similarly, analysis of the gendered differences in political participation yields more questions than answers. In all cases except for the index of participation, the suite of control variables accounts for the gender differences—upon the addition of political engagement to the list of covariates. As was discussed in Chapter Six, this study cannot account for the substantively large gap between men’s and women’s engagement. Contrary to expectations, it is unrelated to policy experience. Similarly, in this analysis, gender does not interact with policy experience to yield different rates of political participation. The gendered gap in political engagement and in political participation is substantively large, and it is worrying that neither demographic variables nor policy experiences can account for it.

In sum, this chapter has attempted to navigate the complex relationship between public policy and political participation, and has come to some surprising conclusions. First, the relationship between policy and participation is complex in large part due to the relationship between policy and other predictors of political participation. Despite this complexity, the data indicate a consistently positive relationship between empowering policy assessments and political participation. Surprisingly, the most robust findings in this chapter were for the subjective rather than the objective measures of policy, indicating that the relationship between policy and participation for this sample in Zambia runs through interpretive rather than material pathways. Second, I expected the relationship between policy experiences and participation to be moderated by government presence (proxied by residence on-rail) and by sex. While there was some evidence that government presence moderates the relationship between policy and participation, the precise nature of the moderating effect is unclear. Furthermore, the gender gap in participation proved resistant to explanation and remains opaque.

Chapter Eight

Exit and Voice: Policy Experience and Alternative Modes of Interaction with the State

Abstract

This chapter discusses the relationship between public policy experiences and the likelihood that people engage in politics outside the realm of the state by relying on non-state actors to perform state-like functions, subverting the state by evading revenue collection, or voicing contention through protest. In the context of a developing democracy like Zambia, where the state has limited capacity, citizens' decision to avoid the state or government agents has implications for the process of state-building. This chapter demonstrates that respondents are more likely to rely on certain non-state service providers and less likely to express attitudes of tax or customs compliance when they are dissatisfied with service provision. These results indicate that service provision has an important effect on the extent to which citizens decide to engage with the state at all.

1.0 Introduction

Some forms of political participation exist explicitly outside the realm of politics-as-usual.

Generally speaking, participating in politics denotes a certain level of “buy-in” to the political system: belief that one’s problems may possibly be solved by working through political channels. However, political actions are not confined to official channels; some may direct their political energy outside of the “official” political realm. These alternative modes of political interaction may denote lack of belief in the efficacy of the state, lack of belief in the legitimacy of the state or governing body, or may be a practical response to the state’s lack of a monopoly over territorial administration. This chapter examines a few ways that citizens may seek alternatives to the state or alternative ways of engaging with the state, and the relationship thereof to experiences with public policy.

A citizen seeking alternatives to the state or alternative ways of engaging the state might choose to pursue a wide array of possible behaviors, but this chapter focuses on three: reliance on non-state providers for ostensibly state-related services, compliance with state-mandated

revenue collection, and protest. These three forms of alternative politics each entail a different motivation, and may be considered “alternative” for different reasons. Reliance on non-state service providers literally entails reliance on an alternative to the state. If respondents view non-state providers as distinct from state-run services, then reliance on non-state providers indicates either a lack of faith in the government’s ability to carry out its primary functions, or its actual inability to carry out those functions. Evasion of state-mandated revenue collection through taxation or customs duties may be construed as an act of subversion, undermining government authority to extract revenue to administer the polity. Finally, as an especially dramatic form of political participation, protest is distinct from “everyday politics” in its level of intensity and in the attention it draws. However, unlike the other alternatives discussed above, it still requires working *within* existing political structures.

This chapter proceeds to examine these three forms of alternative politics and the relationship of each to policy experience. Because each category of behaviors entails a different set of motivations, the chapter examines each of them separately. Section Two draws on the literature for these alternatives to elucidate hypotheses for each. Section Three examines the relationship between policy experience and reliance on non-state actors, Section Four focuses on policy experience and attitudes toward revenue compliance, and Section Five examines policy experience and protest behavior. A final section concludes.

2.0 Literature and Hypotheses

The forms of political participation taken up in this chapter fall under two forms of behavior: alternative and subversive forms of political participation. In Chapter One, I defined *alternative* political behavior as the reliance on non-state actors to perform state roles, and *subversive* behavior as explicit attempts to subvert state authority. In theory, those who are unhappy with

the government have two primary options through which to express their discontent: voice and exit. In his examination of dissatisfaction in organizations, Hirschman posited that disgruntled members of organizations (or citizens of states) have the option of either voicing their displeasure in the hope of initiating reform or of leaving altogether.³²¹ This chapter uses his concepts of “exit” and “voice” to understand alternative and subversive political behaviors. Alternative and subversive acts may both be a form of exit, but they reflect different motivations, and it is therefore useful to theorize them separately. Furthermore, while “protest behavior” is one of the response categories in this chapter, it falls better under the category of “voice” than “exit,” and will be analyzed separately as such.

2.1 Alternative Political Behavior

Hirschman posits that those dissatisfied with an organization (including a state) might choose to exit the system altogether. However, in the case of many developing countries (in Africa and elsewhere), exit can occur without change of citizenship. In Zambia, as in much of the developing world, government reach is limited. Herbst notes that the development of pre-colonial polities across most of the African continent was marked by the constant struggle of asserting control over a low-density population, making it relatively easy to avoid the reach of governing bodies.³²² Similarly, in the post-independence period, Jackson and Rosberg observed that many African governments “do not effectively control all of the important public activities within their jurisdictions.”³²³ This problem occurs for many post-colonial states, which achieved juridical statehood without necessarily being capable of administering their entire territory—and without being the only game in town. In fact, as King and Lieberman note, “states increasingly share political primacy with non-state entities that are bereft of territorial sovereignty but

³²¹ Hirschman 1970

³²² Herbst 2000

³²³ Jackson and Rosberg 1982, p.3

nevertheless perform some combination of governance functions, from social services to armed force, that often enjoy substantial popular support and civil-society penetration.”³²⁴ As such, for many basic functions of governance, the state is not the only option—in this case, “exit” might include turning to non-state entities for goods generally provided by the state.

With regards to service provision, two sets of actors are the primary alternative to the state: NGOs and chiefs (or local elites³²⁵). Dissatisfied with the government’s ability to provide basic services, people may turn to NGOs or chiefs to either provide or broker delivery of basic services. The extent to which turning to non-state providers constitutes “exit” depends on the relationship between the non-state provider and the government. Cammett and MacLean convincingly argue that the political implications of reliance on non-state service providers depend on whether or not the state and non-state providers have a cooperative or conflictual relationship.³²⁶

NGOs may enhance the government’s ability to provide services, bolstering the relationship between citizens and their state, or they may position themselves as antithetical to the state, creating a non-state alternative and undermining citizenship.³²⁷ Anecdotally, when asked who they turn to for service provision, many respondents in this study explained reliance on NGOs due to the fact that “the government doesn’t do anything,” suggesting that they draw a distinction between government and NGO projects. On the other hand, NGOs and the government often work hand in hand, and Zambian politicians have a habit of claiming credit for delivering NGO projects: interview subjects from Caritas, World Vision, and Common Markets

³²⁴ King and Lieberman 2009, p.550

³²⁵ The survey asked about chiefs as a source for public goods, but a number of respondents stated that they would go to their village headman first, who would act as an intermediary for the chief or perhaps be able to solve some smaller service provision problems himself.

³²⁶ Cammett and MacLean 2014, p. 32

³²⁷ Brass 2012, Jennings in Cammett and MacLean 2014

for Conservation all reported that local government officials or members of parliament publicly take credit for projects they have performed.³²⁸

Similarly, reliance on chiefs as service providers may reflect exit from the national political system if traditional authorities operate as an alternative to national governance, but it may also reflect simply another mode of national politics if traditional authorities are embedded in the national political system. Logan argues that in many African countries (including Zambia), the continuing political importance of traditional authorities exists alongside modern democratic institutions, not in conflict with it.³²⁹ Gould has noted that chiefs have become increasingly active in the formal political arena over the course of the Third Republic.³³⁰ Similarly, Baldwin's examination of chief-state relations in Zambia indicates that chiefs broker relationships between their constituents and their members of Parliament, facilitating political contact between rural dwellers with the national political system.³³¹ Therefore, chiefs may either represent a parallel system of government, or simply an avenue of access to government services.

Given the ambiguity surrounding respondents' views of the relationship between the government, NGOs, and chiefs, one might expect two possible outcomes. If respondents view NGOs or chiefs as part of the government system of service provision, then one might expect them to rely on these non-state sources even when satisfaction with government service provision is high:

H_{7a}: Reliance on chiefs or NGOs for service provision is more likely when respondents have *empowering* policy experiences.

³²⁸ Interviews conducted between May 28 and June 15, 2012, in Lusaka and outside Serenje, Zambia

³²⁹ Logan 2009

³³⁰ Gould 2010, Chapter 5

³³¹ Baldwin 2013

On the other hand, if respondents view NGOs or chiefs as actual alternatives to government service provision, then one would expect respondents to rely on NGOs or chiefs if they are unable to obtain sufficient service provision through the government:

H_{7b}: Reliance on chiefs or NGOs for service provision is more likely when respondents have *marginalizing, neglectful, or burdensome* policy experiences.

Such a relationship may be the result of either material or interpretive policy effects: reliance on NGOs or chiefs may be a pragmatic reaction to limited service provision, leading to the expectation that it is more likely when objective rates of service provision are low. On the other hand, the decision to turn to alternative service providers may also be related to interpretation: if respondents interpret their experiences with policies as demonstrating that the government does not know enough or care enough to provide appropriate services, then they may be more likely to turn to locally embedded actors like traditional authorities or NGOs.

2.2 *Subversive Political Behavior*

Another form of “exit” is the active evasion of government bodies and subversion of governmental authority. As Guyer (among others) has noted, many postcolonial African nations gained independence with a conundrum regarding public revenues.³³² While taxation in Europe evolved alongside expanding state capacity to collect revenues and provide services,³³³ newly independent African states had to rely on taxation as a basis of public revenue generation without necessarily having the means—or the legitimacy—to collect them effectively. This problem is closely related to the problem of low state capacity to measure or monitor individuals’ economic activity. Scott notes how one of the major projects of statehood is to make populations “legible” to governments, while certain portions of the population develop tactics to evade legibility, such

³³² Guyer 1992. See also Centeno 1997 regarding Latin America

³³³ Eg. Tilly 1992

as living in remote hard-to-reach areas, moving frequently, or otherwise evading state agents.³³⁴ Such behavior is possible when the capacity of the state is so low as to undermine enforcement of activities such as census-taking or tax collection. As in other parts of the postcolonial world, state reach in Zambia after independence was variable: some urban centers were “legible” to the government, while parts of the rural hinterland comprised “brown spaces” in which residents could elect to avoid state control.³³⁵

Because revenue collection is such an essential function of government, and because the government has a limited capacity to monitor and enforce payment of such duties, citizens of Zambia who live in “brown spaces”—to some degree—have the ability to determine the extent to which they will adhere to or evade tax collection. Zambia’s system of taxation relies on both direct taxes on corporations and wage-earners, as well as indirect value-added (VAT) and trade taxes. However, income taxes only effectively apply to the 11% of the population employed in the formal sector, while the informal sector remains difficult to tax due to the challenge of enforcing business registration.³³⁶ Similarly, VAT and customs duties are difficult to collect due to inaccurate record keeping and outright corruption. The vast majority of Zambian citizens, therefore, are able to make decisions about the extent to which they will comply with taxation efforts. Revenue collection is a basic function of government, and evasion of revenue collection is a basic subversive act: if a critical mass of citizens evaded taxes, the government would be unable to function. In other work, Scott has posited that evasive behavior towards state agents comprises a “weapon of the weak,” which conveys implicit rejection of the governance system.³³⁷

³³⁴ Scott 1998

³³⁵ Scott 1998, O’Donnell 1993

³³⁶ Mwansa and Chileshe 2010 , p.2

³³⁷ Scott 1987, p. 33

In order to assess individuals' sentiments around subverting the government, this study examines respondents' attitudes towards evading income taxes and customs duties. While not a major act of government subversion, evasion of taxes comprises an everyday act that defies the authority and legitimacy of the government to extract revenue.³³⁸ Evading taxation is an illegal act, but it is also a statement about whether or not the individual trusts the government to invest in public goods or act as a responsible custodian of public revenues.³³⁹

According to most social science treatments of state revenue collection, people pay taxes for either of two reasons: either they fear the consequences of breaking the law, or they believe that taxation is a fair and important part of citizenship because of what the government provides in exchange for those tax dollars.³⁴⁰ Most studies suggest that people overweight the probability of being discovered were they to evade taxes, but even so, the decision to pay taxes not only a matter of rational utility. Most studies suggest that paying taxes is a combination of utility and "tax morale": the decision to pay constitutes a combination of legal, moral, practical, and intellectual reasons.³⁴¹ These rationales in favor of tax compliance denote a relatively capacious government: either the government has a reasonable capacity to audit, or citizens are generally satisfied with basic public goods provision. If attitudes towards tax compliance are related to policy experiences, the relationship most likely occurs through interpretive pathways: existing studies suggest little relationship between relative material wealth and attitudes towards taxation, instead emphasizing the role of tax morale.

³³⁸ Fjeldstat and Semboja 2001

³³⁹ For example, Kelsall (2000) writes that the Arumeru Tax Revolt in 1998 in Tanzania grew directly out of dissatisfaction with service provision and the sense that the government did not have the authority or capacity to spend tax money in a way that benefitted the community.

³⁴⁰ Alm et al 1992, Torgler 2005, Dhimi and al-Nowaihi 2007, Luttmer and Singhal 2014

³⁴¹ Lago-Penas and Lago-Penas 2010

In Zambia, which has a limited capacity to audit, one would expect the decision to pay to hinge on individuals' tax morale. As such, in the case of Zambia, one would expect tax or customs evasion to be more likely when people are dissatisfied with service provision. This may be the case with marginalizing policies, but would theoretically be more pronounced with policy experiences along the exclusionary dimension of the policy typology:

H_{7c}: Evasion of taxes or customs duties is more likely when respondents have *neglectful* or *burdensome* policy experiences.

While those with marginalizing experiences may still be dissatisfied with service provision, they are still subject to an inclusionary dimension of policies that indicates some utility in continuing to participate in the system of governance and revenue collection. Those subject to exclusionary policies, however, are less likely to have a strong tax morale. Like Kelsall's observations in Tanzania, Besley and Persson note that developing countries in general have difficulty cultivating a norm of tax compliance because of issues with corruption, unfairness, and lack of perceived public return on tax payments.³⁴²

2.3 *Protest and Voice*

Unlike the forms of "exit" described in previous section, protest may be construed less as a subversive or alternative approach to politics, and more as a dramatic expression of politics-as-usual.³⁴³ Lipsky theorizes protest as a political resource for those who are relatively powerless in politics, particularly as a method for involving more powerful third parties in various issues. In this conceptualization, the group with few political resources uses protest as a way to operate within the state, in spite of limited access to more formal avenues of political expression.³⁴⁴ In

³⁴² Kelsall 2000, Besley and Persson 2014

³⁴³ I would like to emphasize that my use of "protest" denotes peaceful demonstrations, marches, sit-ins, and other such forms of political expression. Such forms of protest are distinct from revolutionary behavior, or actions intended to precipitate regime change.

³⁴⁴ Lipsky 1968, p.1145

the context of South Africa, Harris has posited that protest behavior is actually a compliment to other forms of political participation, arguing that protestors in South Africa take to the streets “in order to change *what is done* by those in power rather than changing *who* is in power.”³⁴⁵ As such, one might construe protest as a form of “voice,” a way for marginalized groups to express their dissatisfaction while still operating within the existing governance structures.

Based on this conceptualization of protest behavior, one might expect protest to be a more common form of voice for those with inclusionary experiences—either marginalizing or empowering. This expectation reflects the observation that protest, while more dramatic than everyday politics, is still a way of operating *within* the political system; it is a form of voice rather than exit. In the Zambian context, frustrated segments of the population have a long history of protest and strike behavior to air economic or political grievances.³⁴⁶ In most cases, these protests were aimed at gaining the attention of governing bodies, not undermining or operating outside of the political system. Therefore, unlike the other variables examined in this chapter, protest should be more likely along inclusionary dimensions:

H_{7d}: Protest is more likely for those who have *marginalizing* or *empowering* experiences.

It is also possible that the opposite is true: that protest is a form of voice for those who are the most excluded from the political system, particularly for those who feel that they have no other political recourse. If this were the case, then one would expect the competing hypothesis:

H_{7e}: Protest is more likely for those who have *neglectful* or *burdensome* experiences.

³⁴⁵ Harris 2015, p.3. Emphasis in original.

³⁴⁶ Buroway 1976, Larmer 2011

The distinction between the two comes down to the motivations of protestors: do they protest because they believe that the government will listen (H_{7d}), or because the government has failed to do so in the past (H_{7e})?

3.0 Policy Experience and Alternative Service Providers

This section examines the relationship between respondents' policy experiences and the extent to which they report relying on non-state actors for service provision. *NGO Reliance* and *Chief Reliance* derive from a survey question that asks who respondents would go to for help if they wanted to bring a development project to their area. These binary variables each take the value of "1" if the respondent listed "NGO" or "Chief" as an actor to whom they would go to ask for a development project, and "0" if not. In the sample, 19.1% of respondents reported relying on NGOs for development projects, while 16.4% report relying on chiefs. The following models include the same range of control variables used in Chapters Five and Six, and the models are specified in the same way.

3.1 Objective Service Delivery and Non-State Reliance

I hypothesized that, based on material pathways theoretically linking public policy and political behavior, reliance on non-state service providers should be higher when objective rates of state service provision are lower, provided that respondents view non-state service provision as actually distinct from the government. Table 25 below illustrates that this is indeed the case—but only for NGOs. In fact, contrary to expectations, respondents tend to report reliance on chiefs and NGOs under very different circumstances. Indeed, the data demonstrate a very low rate of respondents reporting reliance on both: of the 498 respondents reporting reliance on chiefs or NGOs, only 34 (6.8%) report reliance on both.

Table 25: Service Provision and Non-State Reliance

	NGO Reliance	Chief Reliance
Government Projects	0.78** (0.07)	0.95 (0.08)
On-Rail	1.34 (0.45)	1.12 (0.37)
Northwestern	1.18 (0.60)	4.37** (3.10)
Southern	1.92** (0.57)	5.05** (2.75)
Urban	2.46** (0.00)	0.08** (0.02)
Male	1.16 (0.19)	1.10 (0.20)
Age	0.98 (0.10)	0.83* (0.09)
Ed	1.03 (0.02)	0.95 (0.06)
Religiosity	0.99 (0.04)	1.06 (0.04)
Children	1.00 (0.03)	1.00 (0.03)
Married	1.08 (0.19)	0.83 (0.18)
N	1486	1384
F	4.09	6.02
Prob >F	0.00	0.00

Notes: Odds ratios for logistic regressions reported. Standard errors reported below. Significance denoted by ** if $p < 0.05$; * if $p < 0.10$. Standard errors clustered by ward, the level of survey stratification. Full results table available in Appendix B.

First, low rates of objective government provision only increase the likelihood of reliance on NGOs for projects: if a respondent has access to one less government project, the likelihood of reported reliance on NGOs increases by 28%. Surprisingly, objective presence of services has no relationship to reported reliance on chiefs. Also striking is the influence of urban residence: urban residence increases the likelihood of NGO reliance by 146%, and decreases the likelihood

of chief reliance by a factor of 12.5. While such a difference is not terribly surprising—rural residents have much stronger ties to their chiefs than do urban residents—it *is* surprising that reliance on NGOs is relatively more likely in urban than in rural areas. This finding may be a function of NGO presence; NGOs tend to allocate projects to jointly maximize community need and ease of access.³⁴⁷ As NGOs have their head offices in urban areas and offer uneven project coverage of rural areas, it stands to reason that urban residents may be more likely to see NGOs as a viable alternative to state provision. The sharp divide between urban and rural responses may also explain the insignificance of the on/off-rail distinction, if urban residence is a better predictor of NGO presence than being on- or off-rail.

For example, in the peri-urban Mines compound just outside of Kabwe (Central Province), the government contracted with a private organization to install a number of water kiosks.³⁴⁸ This project was essential, as access to safe water had previously been a big problem in this compound. Of the 20 Mines residents interviewed, 12 mentioned the kiosks, reporting that they had greatly alleviated the problems with access to clean water. Respondents were not completely sure who was responsible for the project, but stated that either a private utility company or an NGO had implemented it (it was actually implemented by the local semi-public utility company, funded by a private trust³⁴⁹). Because NGOs tend to be visible and have more concentrated activity near urban areas—they have offices, vehicles with their logos plastered on the side, post signs advertising their projects—respondents may be more likely to see evidence of NGO projects, attribute credit to NGOs, and view them as viable alternatives to state provision. This may also explain the relatively high rates of NGO reliance in Southern Province, which hosts a large number of NGOs in Livingstone.

³⁴⁷ Brass 2012

³⁴⁸ Interviews conducted January 9, 2014

³⁴⁹ “Lukanda Water Sublet Water Projects,” *Lusaka Voice* 4/24/2013

3.2 Policy Experience, Subjective Assessments, and Non-State Reliance

Counter to expectations, the divergent relationships between government projects and reliance on NGOs and chiefs suggests that perhaps respondents view NGOs and chiefs as playing different roles vis-à-vis state service provision. If this is the case, then one would expect that the interpretive dimension of policy feedback may also function differently between these two outcomes.

Table 26: Project Experience and Non-State Reliance

	NGO Reliance	Chief Reliance
Project Experience: Empowering	0.97 (0.16)	1.66 (0.52)
Project Experience: Marginalizing	1.10 (0.16)	1.89** (0.55)
Project Experience: Neglectful	1.06 (0.16)	1.64* (0.48)
Project Experience: Burdensome	0.84 (0.25)	1.24 (0.58)
N	1486	1384
F	3.54	5.64
Prob >F	0.00	0.00

Notes: Odds ratios logistic regressions reported. Standard errors reported below. Significance denoted by ** if $p < 0.05$; * if $p < 0.10$. Standard errors clustered by ward, the level of survey stratification. Full results table available in Appendix B.

Indeed, the results in Table 26 above present additional evidence regarding the differences between chief and NGO reliance. There is no relationship between reported project experience and reported reliance on NGOs, but reporting marginalizing policy experiences is associated with an 88% increase in the likelihood that the respondent relies on the chief, and neglectful experiences are associated with a 64% increase in the same (though of marginal significance).

Table 27: Subjective Assessments and Non-State Reliance

	NGO Reliance	Chief Reliance
Subjective Assessment: Empowering	0.60** (0.11)	1.50* (0.33)
Subjective Assessment: Marginalizing	1.51** (0.25)	0.82 (0.16)
Subjective Assessment: Neglectful	1.04 (0.18)	0.81 (0.16)
Subjective Assessment: Burdensome	1.07 (0.36)	1.58 (0.46)

Notes: Odds ratios for logistic regressions reported. Standard errors reported below. Significance denoted by ** if $p < 0.05$; * if $p < 0.10$. Standard errors clustered by ward, the level of survey stratification. Full results table available in Appendix B.

The discrepancy between reported reliance on NGOs and chiefs sharpens for subjective assessments of government service provision. For those who report an empowering assessment, reported reliance on NGOs drops by 67%, while reported reliance on chiefs increases by 50% (though this result is only of marginal significance). Alternatively, for those who assess their experience with service provision as marginalizing, reported reliance on NGOs increases by 51%. What accounts for this pattern?

The results for reliance on NGOs is consistent with the results regarding objective measures of service provision: reliance on NGOs decreases with more government projects and with empowering assessments of government service provision, but increase with marginalizing assessments of government service provision. Such a result indicates that respondents may consider NGOs as a supplemental or complementary source of goods and services in the absence of government provision. The majority of respondents who report reliance on NGOs – 62%--are urban, indicating that (on average) those who report reliance on NGOs may have access to government services, but elect to pursue resources through NGOs instead when those services do

not meet their needs. For example, in Mukuni village, a (technically) rural area very close to urban Livingstone in Southern Province, the NGO Butterfly Tree has a long-standing project improving education, particularly health education. Many respondents in that area indicated that they prefer the trainings conducted by the volunteers because they appear better educated and have more resources than the local government clinic.³⁵⁰ NGOs thereby provide an alternative to state provision, explaining the patterns in the aggregate data.

The results regarding chief reliance are more puzzling. Respondents are more likely to report reliance on chiefs when they report marginalizing experiences with projects, and weaker results link increased reliance on chiefs with neglectful project experiences and empowering assessments. In other words, reported reliance on chiefs correlates with reports of insufficient service provision, but also with the assessment that the government service provision is helpful. Unfortunately, I do not have the qualitative material to shed light on this pattern. However, given some of the realities of chief-state relations in Zambia, I can speculate. Ninety percent of the respondents who reported reliance on the chief reside in rural areas, where chiefs and headmen are likely to play a much larger role in brokering access to services.³⁵¹ Therefore, it is possible that rural respondents view chiefs as their pathway to government service provision, a liaison with the state. In Zambia, politicians and political parties have a history of courting chiefs to deliver the votes of their subjects.³⁵² Given this close relationship, rural respondents may rely on chiefs when they are unsatisfied with service provision (marginalizing or neglectful policy experiences), but still believe that the government has their best interest in mind (empowering subjective assessment). With the current data, it is not possible to move beyond such speculation;

³⁵⁰ I did not pursue a comparison of the NGO vs. government provision in practice, but respondents' impressions are telling.

³⁵¹ Baldwin 2013

³⁵² Baldwin 2013, Logan 2013

however, the patterns in the data do suggest that respondents view NGOs and chiefs very differently as service providers vis-à-vis the state.

4.0 Policy Experience and Attitudes towards Revenue Collection

The next category of alternative modes of interaction with the state concerns attitudes towards revenue collection compliance, specifically taxation and customs compliance. *Tax Compliance* and *Customs Compliance* assess respondents' attitudes towards taxation and customs duties. To measure attitudes towards these issues, each respondent was presented with two vignettes about otherwise sympathetic characters: one who evades taxes by failing to register his informal business, and one who skirts customs procedures. As noted above, these are very common practices in Zambia, which has limited ability to monitor taxation in the informal sector. The vignettes are designed as follows:

I am going to read you a short story about a man named Isaac, and ask you a question about him: Isaac is an active member of the community. He sells furniture by the roadside. He works very hard, and barely makes enough money to support his family. He knows he is supposed to pay taxes on the money he makes, but because his business is not registered, it is easy for him to avoid paying taxes. He decides to skip paying taxes to buy more household goods instead. Some people say that Isaac is doing the right thing to provide for his family, while other people say that he it is his duty to pay taxes no matter what. What do you think about Isaac's behavior?

Respondents are asked to provide their reactions to these characters' choices, which are then coded to reflect attitudes of compliance or noncompliance. Both variables are binary, coded "1" to reflect attitudes of compliance and "0" to reflect noncompliance. In the sample, 65% demonstrated tax compliant attitudes, while 80% demonstrated customs compliant attitudes. Respondents were then asked why they responded the way they did.

Unlike reliance on non-state service providers, there is little reason to expect a material relationship between service provision and something like tax compliance.³⁵³ Attitudes towards taxation are generally unrelated to material resources, and so there is no reason to expect objective rates of service provision to alter attitudes. Rather, the existing research reviewed above indicates that it is more likely to be related to policy through interpretation: the extent to which you believe the government is using tax money in a way that ultimately benefits you (directly or indirectly) or not. Nevertheless, this section will examine both objective and subjective measures of policy.

4.1 Objective Service Delivery and Attitudes towards Revenue Collection

As expected, objective presence of government projects has no relationship with attitudes towards taxation or customs duties (Table 28). In fact, the only consistent predictor of attitudes towards revenue collection in these models is education. In order to understand why, it is useful to examine the reasoning respondents gave for their compliant or non-compliant attitudes.

Respondent explanations were coded as follows: if they expressed attitudes of tax compliance, their explanations were categorized into legal/moral reasons (“you have to pay because it is the law/ it is right”) or practical reasons (“if people don’t pay taxes, the country will never develop”). This distinction reflects the extent to which the respondent simply responds to legal or moral instruction, or has a deeper understanding of the role of taxes. Alternatively, if respondents expressed attitudes of non-compliance, their explanations were categorized into individual reasons (“Isaac is poor”) or institutional reasons (“the government is corrupt”). This distinction captures the extent to which respondents believe in individual exceptions based on circumstance, or have distrust of the broader institutional environment.

³⁵³Lago-Penas and Lago-Penas 2010

Table 28: Government Projects and Attitudes toward Revenue Collection

	Tax Complaint Attitude	Customs Compliant Attitude
Government Projects	1.06 (0.08)	0.93 (0.09)
On-Rail	0.97 (0.28)	0.75 (0.28)
Northwestern	1.26 (0.60)	1.21 (0.72)
Southern	1.40 (0.42)	1.60 (0.58)
Urban	1.19 (0.24)	0.73 (0.18)
Male	1.03 (0.15)	0.81 (0.14)
Age	1.04 (0.09)	1.23** (0.13)
Ed	1.23** (0.06)	1.35** (0.00)
Religiosity	0.99 (0.07)	0.92 (0.05)
Children	1.00 (0.03)	0.98 (0.03)
Married	1.33* (0.21)	1.05 (0.20)
N	1299	1240
F	4.50	4.47
Prob >F	0.00	0.00

Notes: Odds ratios for ordinal logistic or logistic regressions reported. Standard errors reported below. Significance denoted by ** if $p < 0.05$; * if $p < 0.10$. Standard errors clustered by ward, the level of survey stratification. Full results table available in Appendix B.

A series of simple bivariate logistic regressions indicates that higher educational attainment is closely correlated with expressions of practical reasoning for tax compliance, but not legal/moral reasons. With a primary school education, the predicted probability that a respondent states a practical affirmation of taxation is 11%. With a high school diploma, the predicted probability

increases to 24%, 46% with a college degree, and 55% with post-graduate education. Similarly, for those who expressed non-compliant attitudes toward taxation, justification on the grounds of personal reasons is negatively correlated with education. With primary school education, a respondent's predicted probability of justifying tax evasion for personal reasons is 34%; this predicted probability drops to 25% with a high school diploma, 14% with a college degree, and 9% with a post-graduate degree.

These results indicate that the more educated tend to promote tax compliance based on a conceptual understanding that taxation is necessary to increase public revenue and generate service provision. Many conceded that the man in the vignette was so poor that he probably would not owe any money, but that he should still at least register his business to be compliant. On the other hand, less-educated respondents tended to justify tax evasion for personal reasons, like "Isaac's" poverty. This response indicates both lack of understanding of the tax code (that Isaac is unlikely to owe any money if he is truly not making much of an income) as well as little in the way of tax morale.

Such an interpretation is commensurate with the political rhetoric around tax collection as well, which tends to discount the potential contributions of the informal sector and instead focus on increasing corporate windfall taxes, particularly for mining companies and other foreign-owned enterprises. Indeed, former President Sata's campaign platform was dedicated to the idea of increasing corporate windfall taxes, a stance which has high levels of popular support.³⁵⁴ Actual changes to corporate taxes and mining royalties are more difficult to implement, as the economy is still dependent on foreign mining companies for the majority of its GDP.³⁵⁵

³⁵⁴ Larmer and Fraser 2007

³⁵⁵ see "Zambia Said to Revert to 30% Profit Tax for Mining Companies," *Bloomberg News* 4/14/2015 for discussion of attempted changes to the tax code.

Nevertheless, as exemplified by the political cartoon below, popular discussion about taxation tends towards corporate rather than individual responsibility.



Figure 13. Popular Views on Taxation in Zambia³⁵⁶

4.2 Policy Experience, Subjective Assessments, and Attitudes towards Revenue Collection

Given that attitudes towards revenue collection are more closely related to education than objective service delivery, and given the expectation that these attitudes should be related to policy through interpretive pathways (if at all), Tables 29 and 30 below present the regression results for the relationship between these attitudes and policy experiences and subjective assessments, respectively.

The policy experience results show definitively that policies along the inclusive dimension correspond with a higher likelihood of expressing tax compliant attitudes: additional empowering policies are associated with a 40% increase and marginalizing policies with a 35% increase thereof. Curiously, neglectful policies are also associated with a 33% increase in the

³⁵⁶ Source: Mwansa and Chileshe 2010 Report Cover

likelihood of expressing tax compliant attitudes, though this result only attains marginal significance

Table 28: Policy Experience and Attitudes toward Revenue Collection

	Tax Compliant Attitude	Customs Compliant Attitude
Project Experience: Empowering	1.40** (0.23)	1.17 (0.22)
Project Experience: Marginalizing	1.35** (0.18)	1.29 (0.13)
Project Experience: Neglectful	1.33* (0.19)	1.10 (0.18)
Project Experience: Burdensome	1.16 (0.34)	1.19 (0.39)
N	1299	1240
F	4.28	4.23
Prob >F	0.00	0.00

Notes: Odds ratios for logistic regressions reported. Standard errors reported below. Significance denoted by ** if $p < 0.05$; * if $p < 0.10$. Standard errors clustered by ward, the level of survey stratification. Full results available in Appendix B.

This result is puzzling, given the expectation that only inclusionary policies should stimulate more positive attitudes about taxation. Attitudes towards customs remain unrelated to policy experiences; these null results may be because most respondents do not personally deal with customs duties, making it a more abstract concept (this interpretation would also explain the relatively higher rate of customs-compliant attitudes).

Turning to fully subjective assessments of government service provision, the pattern becomes more clear: belief that the government aids you through service provision is associated with a 65% increase in the likelihood of tax compliant attitudes, while belief that the government ignores you is associated with a 43% decrease in the same. With regards to customs, marginalizing assessments are associated with a 44% increase, and neglectful assessments with a

27% decrease in the likelihood of expressing compliant attitudes. Again, however, these estimates only attain a marginal level of significance.

Table 29: Subjective Assessments and Attitudes towards Revenue Collection

	Tax Compliant Attitudes	Customs Compliant Attitudes
Subjective Assessment: Empowering	1.65** (0.29)	1.29 (0.28)
Subjective Assessment: Marginalizing	1.12 (0.17)	1.44* (0.29)
Subjective Assessment: Neglectful	0.70** (0.11)	0.79* (0.13)
Subjective Assessment: Burdensome	1.02 (0.34)	0.64 (0.28)

Notes: Odds ratios for logistic regressions reported. Standard errors reported below. Significance denoted by ** if $p < 0.05$; * if $p < 0.10$. Standard errors clustered by ward, the level of survey stratification. Full results available in Appendix B.

Taking into account both the subjective and semi-subjective measures of policy experience, the most consistent result is that empowering experiences or assessments are associated with an increased likelihood of expressing tax compliant attitudes. The sense of marginalization—receiving some service provision, but not enough or not exactly what you need—may also be positively associated with tax and customs compliant attitudes, though this result is inconsistent across measures. Finally, neglect is associated with a lower likelihood of expressing both tax and customs compliance for the fully subjective measure, but the positive coefficient in the semi-subjective measure is puzzling. In concert, these results provide some tentative evidence for a relationship between policy and tax compliant attitudes through an interpretive pathway, particularly with regard to positive experiences with service provision. These results lend partial support to the inverse of H_{7b}: tax compliant attitudes are more likely for those who report satisfaction with service provision, and possibly for those who have marginalizing experiences

with services. Neglect may be associated with attitudes supporting tax evasion, but the evidence is mixed.

5.0 Public Policy and Protest

The final category of behavior this chapter considers is protest, which I conceptualize as a particularly dramatic expression of political voice. As such, I hypothesized that it should be more likely for those who experience policies along the inclusionary dimension of the policy typology, but that a competing hypothesis would predict protest for those who experience policies along the exclusionary dimension. It is worth noting at this point that this hypothesis (and understanding of protest) may be specific to the Zambian case. Historically associated with union activity on the Copperbelt, protest activity has long been a relatively mainstream form of political expression in Zambia.³⁵⁷ Dissatisfaction with President Kaunda's attempts at structural adjustment manifested in urban bread riots,³⁵⁸ and protests occurred multiple times at the University of Zambia over the course of my fieldwork to express opposition to various government policies. However, some new work in South Africa suggests that Zambia may not be so unique: protest may be a complement to other forms of political behavior, particularly for ardent party supports who wish to communicate their preferences without voting "their" party out of office.³⁵⁹ Anecdotally, in this study, those respondents who reported participating in protests tended to be those who were *most* politically engaged. Such individuals are a small minority: *Protest* is a binary variable that takes the value of "1" if the respondent reports having participated in a protest or demonstration in the past year, and "0" otherwise. Only 8.5% of the sample reported that they had.

³⁵⁷ Larmer 2011

³⁵⁸ Rakner 2001

³⁵⁹ Harris 2015

5.1 Objective Service Provision and Protest

As with tax compliance, there is little reason to believe that the relationship between policy and protest would run through material pathways. The results below confirm this suspicion.

Table 31: Objective Service Provision and Protest

	Protest
Government Projects	1.02 (0.13)
On-Rail	0.54 (0.22)
Northwestern	0.96 (0.61)
Southern	1.00 (0.50)
Urban	1.58 (0.53)
Male	1.28 (0.27)
Age	0.94 (0.13)
Ed	1.12 (0.09)
Religiosity	0.93 (0.09)
Children	1.05 (0.04)
Married	1.15 (0.28)
Student	2.50** (1.06)
N	1334
F	2.22
Prob >F	0.00

Notes: Odds ratios for logistic regressions reported. Standard errors reported below. Significance denoted by ** if $p < 0.05$; * if $p < 0.10$. Standard errors clustered by ward, the level of survey stratification. Full results table available in Appendix B.

In fact, the only variable included in the model with any demonstrable relationship to protest behavior is being a student, which is associated with a 150% increase in the likelihood of reporting protest behavior.

5.2 Policy Experience, Subjective Assessments, and Protest

If policy is related to protest, it is more likely to be related through interpretive pathways. Table 32 below presents the policy experience results, which are all null.

Table 32: Policy Experience and Protest

	Protest
Project Experience: Empowering	1.27 (0.30)
Project Experience: Marginalizing	1.23 (0.27)
Project Experience: Neglectful	1.05 (0.24)
Project Experience: Burdensome	1.07 (0.43)
N	1334
F	2.17
Prob >F	0.00

Notes: Odds ratios for logistic regressions reported. Standard errors reported below. Significance denoted by ** if $p < 0.05$; * if $p < 0.10$. Standard errors clustered by ward, the level of survey stratification. Full results available in Appendix B.

Table 33 below presents the results for subjective assessments of government provision and protest, which indicate that empowering subjective assessments are associated with a 64% increase in the likelihood of protest behavior. As the only variable to attain any level of statistical significance, this result is far from a definitive explanation of the relationship between policy and protest.

Table 33: Subjective Assessments and Protest

	Protest
Subjective Assessment: Empowering	1.64** (0.40)
Subjective Assessment: Marginalizing	0.96 (0.23)
Subjective Assessment: Neglectful	0.68 (0.17)
Subjective Assessment: Burdensome	1.33 (0.53)

Notes: Odds ratios for logistic regressions reported. Standard errors reported below. Significance denoted by ** if $p < 0.05$; * if $p < 0.10$. Standard errors clustered by ward, the level of survey stratification. Full results available in Appendix B.

This result provides some minimal support for the H_{7d} , which suggested that protest should be more likely for those with experiences along the inclusionary dimension of policy types. While somewhat counterintuitive, this result reflects the expectation that only those with the reasonable assumption that the government will listen engage in dramatic expressions of political voice. Such a result may be specific to the political tenor of protest in Zambia. While protest is, to some extent, a “weapon of the weak,” Lipsky notes that for protest to have any effect, it must be conducted by those who have a reasonable belief that the government will respond to the protest (that is what makes protestors different from revolutionaries).³⁶⁰ In Zambia, it appears that those with the strongest sense of government responsiveness are the most likely to protest—a sign that protest may be a sign of lively civil society rather than a truly alternative form of political participation. However, as the model in general failed to demonstrate much of a relationship with

³⁶⁰ Lipsky 1968, p. 1150

protest to any of the variables (save being a student), it is not possible to draw firm conclusions from this data.

6.0 Conclusion

The data presented in this chapter suggest a broad spectrum of alternative forms of political participation, with very different motivations leading to each. These alternative forms of political participation should be of particular concern to Zambia and other developing countries because of the implications they hold for expanding state capacity, governmental stability, and state legitimacy.

Individuals' decisions to rely on non-state service providers, like NGOs or traditional authorities, are potentially but not necessarily problematic for developing states. Indeed, as indicated by the evidence presented in this chapter, not all non-state service providers are alike, and they do not hold the same implications for citizenship or state development. Non-state service providers may in some cases act as an extension of the state, expanding access to services and improving recipients' opinions of state capacity to deliver effective services.³⁶¹ In fact, the data presented in this chapter indicates that, in Zambia, respondents are more likely to report reliance on chiefs when they assess their experiences with government service provision as empowering. Such a relationship is suggestive of a positive link between traditional authorities and the government, an interpretation that finds support in secondary literature. However, non-state provision can also act as a persistent reminder that the state is either unable or unwilling to provide services to certain sectors of the population. Other work as suggested that, under certain circumstances, such a situation may erode state legitimacy, sense of citizenship, and the possibility of generating a national civic culture.³⁶² That respondents in this sample tended to

³⁶¹ Brass 2012

³⁶² Cammett and MacLean 2014, p.45

rely on NGOs in the absence of state service provision and when they felt expressly neglected by the government is worrying, and suggests the need to understand better precisely how non-state service providers influence citizens' relationship to their state.

The results regarding tax compliance presented in this chapter are unsurprising, but also of concern for countries like Zambia. As Besley and Persson note, developing countries face an uphill battle to establish a reliable tax base.³⁶³ Large informal sectors of the economy make income taxes difficult to enforce, and low norms of compliance diminish the “tax morale” that is evident in countries with a longer history of taxation. A large body of literature in political science links taxation to democratic representation and governmental accountability, suggesting that (through a number of possible mechanisms) taxation makes governments more accountable to citizens, and makes citizens more engaged in politics.³⁶⁴ In developing countries like Zambia, a number of economic, social, and cultural issues make taxation a complicated prospect. However, the finding that respondents are less likely to hold tax compliant attitudes if they feel the government has neglected them is cause for concern. Given the low levels of government service provision in the more remote areas of Zambia and other developing countries, inability to extract taxes and low levels of government service provision may be mutually reinforcing. In Zambia, such a prospect is particularly discouraging, given the economy's current reliance on volatile copper prices and unpredictably corporate windfall taxes. Without the ability to grow the formal sectors of the economy and create a reliable tax base, the government may continue to be unable to provide widespread basic services, thereby undermining individuals' likelihood of supporting tax-based government revenue.

³⁶³ Besley and Persson 2014

³⁶⁴ Guyer 1992, Herb 2003, Ross 2004, Brautigam et al. 2008

One positive result emerging from this chapter, however, is the willingness of those who are comparatively happier with government service provision to continue to express their political opinions dramatically through protest. In previous decades, meaningful political change in Zambia has been precipitated by civil society.³⁶⁵ In 2001, for example, President Chiluba's bid for an unconstitutional third term was stopped cold in part due to the efforts of the Oasis Forum, a collection of civil society associations that took to the streets, launching numerous demonstrations demanding that the president respect the legal term limits. While the ability of Africa's emerging middle class to support democratic transition is an open question, the results presented here suggest that at least some of those with better access to government service provision are actively engaged in politics through protest—particularly students.³⁶⁶ However, the models included in this chapter were unable to uncover many correlates of protest behavior, suggesting the need for a different approach to understand who takes to the street, when, and for what reasons in a developing democracy like Zambia.

In sum, the findings in this chapter suggest that individuals' experiences with public policy not only influence their participation in conventional politics, but also their decisions to engage in alternative modes of interaction with state bodies through exit and voice. Experiences with public policy educate individuals about the likelihood that their participation in national political systems will be meaningful, but they also send signals regarding the utility of engaging with the government at all. In developing countries with large "brown spaces," where exit from the state is a possibility, signals that the government sends through service provision can have a meaningful relationship with the extent to which people engage with the state at all. Given the struggles of postcolonial states to generate a sense of national identity and legitimacy, the ability

³⁶⁵ Larmer and Fraser 2007, p.617

³⁶⁶ van de Walle 2012, Cheeseman 2014

of governments to perform the basic duties of statehood will prove essential for cultivating some of the key measures of democratic citizenship.

Chapter Nine

Conclusion

The way that people experience public policy has profound implications for their political behavior. While existing works falling under the auspices of “policy feedback” have demonstrated the links between specific policies their effects on political participation, this dissertation has contributed to expanding the empirical scope of the policy feedback literature in two ways: first, by measuring policy in a way that captures individuals’ varied experiences with and perceptions of multiple projects, and second by explicitly examining the how the relationship between policy experience and political participation may differ in the context of a developing country. This concluding chapter starts by highlighting in broad terms the original contributions that this research makes. It then continues with a summary of the study’s primary findings, organized thematically to draw connections between different outcomes that the various chapters examined. It then addresses issues of causality, discussing the limitations of my identification strategy and exploring some of the relationships for which causal direction is particularly ambiguous. Finally, given the study’s findings, it returns to some unanswered questions and proposes avenues for future research.

1.0 Contributions to Policy Feedback

This project was designed with the explicit aim of developing a novel approach to the study of policy feedback. The theoretical underpinnings of policy feedback create inherent challenges for research design: assuming reciprocal causality between public policy and political participation, the precise effects of policy on participation are exceedingly difficult to identify. In recent years, policy feedback as a body of work has become increasingly sophisticated, and numerous scholars have developed innovative research strategies aimed at establishing the causal pathways leading

from individuals' experiences with public policy to specific patterns of political participation.³⁶⁷ This research has made major contributions to the larger project of policy feedback, but causal specificity comes at a cost: focusing on specific effects of particular policies allows for much greater analytical precision, but it does not reflect how people actually experience public policies.

For most people, experience with public policy cannot be reduced to a single program or category of programs. Individuals interact with the government through a multitude of possible public programs. Some may be more salient than others, and different programs may become salient at different times. Policy feedback works tend to focus on the nature of the experience that individuals have with a particularly salient policy, but the same individual may have experiences of a dramatically different nature with a number of different government programs at the same time. In this case, these different policy experiences may operate in different directions, influencing political participation in a countervailing manner.

Because the empirical reality that individuals face inevitably entails multiple policy experiences, and the specific combination of salient policies varies from person to person, this study's research design made an explicit attempt to design a measure of policy experience that was sufficiently flexible to take into account a few of the most salient policies that each individual deemed most important without losing so much analytical precision as to make the resulting variable non-comparable across cases. Existing work in policy feedback has demonstrated that the nature of an individuals' experience with various policies is what has the potential to condition his or her resulting political participation, so I designed a typology of policy experiences that could categorize features of policy experience shown to be important in

³⁶⁷ Bruch et al. 2010 in particular develop an excellent strategy for identifying the causal effects of policy

past studies.³⁶⁸ This typology allowed me to design a survey instrument that was flexible enough to allow each respondent to discuss a unique set of personally important policies, but to code their responses in a way that was comparable across the sample.

While other scholars may disagree with the components of the typology or my operationalization of policy experience, the underlying theoretical motivation is that, in order to make accurate inferences about the effects of policies on political participation, it is important to approximate as closely as possible the ways that people actually experience policies. The obvious trade-off is that it is much more difficult to make precise measurements when taking into account such a messy reality. However, if executed well, the gain is a more holistic representation of the broad relationship between the policy environment and larger patterns of political behavior.

The second contribution that this dissertation has made to the policy feedback literature is continuing to expand its breadth. The vast majority of policy feedback work to date has occurred in advanced industrial democracies, in countries that have a relatively high capacity to design and implement all manner of policies and projects. From a theoretical perspective, there is every reason to believe that policy feedback loops should exist in all manner of democracies: if citizens can participate in politics, and citizens' relationship to the government is conditioned by their policy experiences, then policy feedback loops should theoretically occur everywhere that political participation is meaningful. However, because of the interpretive nature of policy feedback, it is reasonable to expect that the way individuals understand their policy experiences differs from place to place. Specifically, this study has highlighted the importance of understanding how the government's capacity to provide basic services conditions expectations about what the government can achieve through public policy.

³⁶⁸ For example, Schneider and Ingram 1993, Soss 2007, Bruch et al. 2010, Hunter and Sugiyama 2014

To highlight one example, government capacity becomes particularly important in policy feedback examinations because of the way that material neglect by the government may lead to a sense of political alienation. Depending on the context, “material neglect” may take on many different forms. In a wealthy democracy like the United States, material neglect may manifest through overcrowded public schools, long lines and surly bureaucrats at benefits offices, or inadequate public housing. In a poor democracy like Zambia, it may manifest through a complete lack of services altogether. This illustration does not just mean that there is a different bar for what constitutes neglect. In a wealthy democracy, where many or most citizens have reasonable access to public services, explicit neglect may feel more intentional and convey much stronger signals about the status of would-be recipients in the polity. In a poor democracy, material neglect may not carry the same interpretation. Many of my respondents reported frustration with inadequate service provision, but expressed understanding that there were limits to what the government could accomplish given the economic circumstances in the country.

This example highlights the importance of increasing the breadth of policy feedback work to gain a greater understanding of how these feedback loops may operate differently under different contexts. Indeed, some of the findings in this study were quite different than what one would expect given policy feedback findings in more developed contexts. As will be discussed further below, as a single-country study, this dissertation was unable to say anything definitive about the differences between a high- and low-capacity context for policy feedback. In this regard, it produced more questions than answers. However, it underlined the importance of explicitly considering the environment in which policies operate to understand what effects they may have.

2.0 Thematic Summary of Main Findings

The main findings of this study fall under two broad categories. First, the primary empirical work of this dissertation was to explore the relationships between broad experiences of public policy and different forms of political participation. In analyzing the patterns in the data, the secondary consideration was the extent to which the results differed from what one might expect in a country with more developed economy and a higher capacity to provide services. This consideration applies to both comparing the results for Zambia to what one would expect in, for example, the United States, as well as comparing between regions of Zambia that have relatively higher or lower levels of government presence. This section summarizes these findings, drawing connections between the main results.

2.1 Broad Experiences of Public Policy and Political Participation

This study found that, in Zambia, an individual's likelihood of engaging in collective behaviors was negatively correlated with the number of basic government services available to him or her. When respondents had less access to public services, they were much more likely to report attendance at community meetings, being group members, and joining together with neighbors to solve local problems. They were also more likely to report participating in multiple forms of collective behavior. I suggested that the link between services and collective behavior was material: lacking access to basic services, communities had to organize themselves to ensure service provision. This interpretation is supported by qualitative observations from field work, as well as secondary accounts of community organizing in developing countries.³⁶⁹ However, it implies a peculiar relationship between low levels of access to services and other forms of political participation: because collective behavior is usually positively correlated with various measures of political participation, this result implies that lower levels of service provision

³⁶⁹ Including Steady 2006, Bratton 2005, and MacLean 2010

should also be correlated with higher levels of political participation.³⁷⁰ Such a result would be peculiar because theories of political participation would predict the opposite: that low levels of access to material goods should be associated with *lower* levels of political participation.³⁷¹

Indeed, upon further analysis, the data *do* show that lower levels of service provision correlate with a higher likelihood of some forms of political participation. However, this correlation is mediated by the relationship between service provision and collective behavior: once controlling for this relationship, the statistical link between lower levels of service provision and political participation disappears. This set of relationships indicates that when individuals in poorly-served communities must organize to compensate for low levels of service provision, the process of organizing can still generate civic skills that they may channel towards political participation. While the link between low levels of service provision and collective behavior is concerning (because, as noted in Chapter Five, communities have a lower capacity for producing quality services than the government should theoretically be able to), it is encouraging that it may also stimulate some forms of political participation.

The study then turned to the relationship between public policies and political engagement, arguing that any form of interaction with government services should stimulate higher levels of political engagement. I argued that the link between policies and political engagement would be more likely through interpretive pathways, as political engagement is a psychological disposition. Indeed, the study found that *any* type of experience with government policies other than neglect was associated with higher levels of political engagement. This relationship was particularly consistent for respondents reporting marginalizing experiences, suggesting that the combination of receiving government services but being dissatisfied by them

³⁷⁰ Following Putnam 1993

³⁷¹ Brady et al. 1995, Marien et al. 2010

was most closely linked to the likelihood of talking about or being interested in politics. Again, these findings suggest a peculiar relationship between policy experiences and political participation: since political engagement and political participation are positively correlated, and all manner of policy experiences are positively linked to political engagement, one would then expect each of these policy experiences to increase political participation as well.³⁷²

However, I argued that not all political engagement translates to actual political participation. Even if negative experiences with policies stimulate interest in politics and conversation about politics, it does not necessarily mean that those individuals will also feel politically efficacious. In some cases, political engagement arising from more negative experiences does translate into participation: Chapter Seven demonstrated that marginalizing policy experiences are associated with higher levels of political participation, and that this relationship is partially mediated by the relationship between marginalizing experiences and political engagement. However, such mediation does not always occur. Even without accounting for political engagement, burdensome assessments of the government are *negatively* associated with political participation, despite being positively associated with political engagement. This additional analysis suggested that, at times, political engagement can mediate the relationship between public policy and political participation in unexpected ways. However, it also demonstrates that political engagement does not automatically result in political participation: in fact, the experience of burdensome policies was associated with both higher levels of political engagement and lower levels of political participation.

After considering how collective behavior and political engagement mediated the relationship between public policy and political participation, the direct relationship between public policy and participation was straightforward: empowering assessments of the government

³⁷² Verba et al. 1995

were associated with higher levels of participation, while burdensome assessments were associated with lower levels of participation. Those who expressed some degree of satisfaction with government service provision were more likely to engage in more political behaviors, even after controlling for political engagement. This result suggests a strong, direct relationship between satisfaction with service provision and political participation. The opposite is true of burdensome assessments: those who feel that the government is making things harder for them are far less likely to engage in political participation, despite the fact that they are more likely to be politically engaged. In fact, the positive relationship between burdensome policy assessments and political engagement only slightly decreases the magnitude of the negative relationship between burdensome assessments and political participation, similarly indicating that this relationship is strong, direct, and negative.

Finally, this dissertation examined the relationship between public policy and some other forms of political behavior. It focused on reliance on non-state service providers and attitudes towards revenue collection, as the role of non-state service providers and capacity for taxation are important issues for state-building in developing countries. I had anticipated that all non-state service provision would operate in the same way, but the data demonstrated very different patterns: respondents were much more likely to report reliance on NGOs when objective rates of service provision were low and when they were dissatisfied with government service provision. These results indicate that respondents view NGOs as alternatives to the government with regards to service provision. The implications of this relationship for state-society relations likely depends on the extent to which respondents believe that NGOs and the government are cooperating or competing with regards to service provision.³⁷³ On the other hand, respondents reported relying more on chiefs for service provision when they were relatively happy with state

³⁷³ Cammett and MacLean 2014

service provision. While my own data cannot illuminate this relationship, other examinations of the role of traditional authorities in Zambia suggest that this may be because respondents see traditional authorities as brokers of state goods; if this is the case, then respondents may see chiefs as intermediaries between themselves and public service provision.³⁷⁴

With regards to attitudes towards revenue collection, the study examined opinions regarding both tax and customs duties. Attitudes towards taxes were much more closely related to service provision, probably due to the fact that people have more personal experience with taxation than with customs duties. The results of this analysis demonstrated that attitudes towards tax compliance become more strongly positive as respondents' assessments of government service provision become more positive. Specifically, those who report policy experiences along the inclusive dimension of the policy typology are much more likely to report tax compliant attitudes. On the other hand, those who believe that the government ignores them are less likely to hold tax compliant attitudes. These results demonstrate a strong relationship between individuals' perceptions of government service delivery and the extent to which they (conceptually) support taxation. Given the difficulty that many developing countries have creating a strong national tax morale and cultivating a domestic tax base alongside persistent struggles with service delivery, this result is particularly concerning.

Finally, the study considered protest behavior. Protest was not well predicted by any of the variables in any of the models, save student status. The only relationship to policy was counterintuitive: those who have empowering assessments of state service provision are more likely to engage in protest behavior. I proposed that this could be due to the fact that the utility of protest behavior increases if one has a greater sense of political efficacy and believes that the government is likely to care about their demands. The idea that protest in Zambia may be less

³⁷⁴ e.g. Baldwin 2013

about contentious politics and more about political voice finds some support in other research from Southern Africa, but any conclusions on this topic are tentative.³⁷⁵

2.2 Policy Feedback in the Low-Capacity Context

The second broad theme that this study examined concerns the extent to which the policy feedback results in the Zambian sample differed from what one would expect given existing studies in advanced industrial democracies like the United States. I suggested that the key difference for the theoretical framework of policy feedback was relative levels of government capacity to provide basic goods and services, which might alter policy feedback pathways in two ways. First, with regards to material pathways of policy feedback, the *types* of goods that government provides has theoretical implications for the sort of effects one might expect to be associated with their receipt (or not). Second, with regards to interpretive pathways, government capacity has the potential to influence individuals' *expectations* about what the government can or should do. I suggested that these differences might result in different relationships between policies and participation between low- and high-capacity countries, but may also generate some within-country variation. Developing countries like Zambia generally have an uneven capacity for implementing public policy and services provision, as better integrated urban areas or regions with better infrastructure have higher levels of government presence than the more remote hinterlands.

The most evident difference (between the low- and high-capacity context) for material feedback pathways was in the case of service provision and collective behavior. In the Zambian context, and in the context of developing countries more generally, it is logical that a lack of service provision from the government requires that communities turn to other sources. In many cases, local collective organizing is a potential source of these public goods. This interpretation

³⁷⁵ Harris 2015

is supported by qualitative evidence from this study, and finds support in other accounts of collective organizing for public goods provision across the developing world.³⁷⁶

However, these findings run contrary to what one would expect in the context of a high-capacity country, in which studies have found that collective behavior is stimulated by *inclusionary* local political institutions—not exclusion from basic resources. I posited that this divergence may be due to the type of material goods provided in each place: in the low-capacity context, lack of service provision entails lack of basic services that fulfill basic needs. In a high-capacity context, where most of the population has access to at least the most basic services, the more salient division comes from the quality of those services. As such, one might expect collective organizing in the low-capacity context as an urgent response to meeting basic needs, a reaction which may not be triggered in a high-capacity context where it is the quality of the goods that is at stake rather than access.

Further, one might expect that interpretive feedback pathways may yield different relationships in a low-capacity context because of different expectations about what the government can reasonably accomplish. I argued that this is true for a low-capacity country like Zambia, broadly speaking, but should also generate within-country variation due to varying levels of government presence within the country. These expectations manifested in some of the results regarding political engagement and political participation. To start, I suggested that lower expectations about government service provision expand the types of policy experiences that would be associated with higher levels of political participation. In the high-capacity context, studies have demonstrated that marginalizing experiences can decrease political engagement. I suggested that, in a high-capacity context, this is in part because types of programs a government directs at certain groups within a population may feel more intentional. Alternatively, in a low-

³⁷⁶ Bratton 2005, Steady 2006, MacLean 2010

capacity context, citizens may be more willing to attribute poor service provision or marginalizing policy experiences to an overall lack of capacity rather than intentional targeting. This idea manifested in the data through the positive correlation between a wide range of policy experiences and higher rates of political engagement.

Varying levels of government presence within Zambia also influenced political engagement, but not through interpretive feedback pathways (as expected). Rather, the data demonstrated that people living in areas with higher government presence on average report higher levels of political engagement. Interestingly, however, those living in an area of high government presence also report lower overall levels of political participation. Examining the relationship between policy and participation did yield some evidence that interpretive feedback pathways work differently on- and off-rail, though the statistical relationship was weak. To put it simply, living off-rail enhanced the positive links between policy experience and participation, while living on-rail enhanced the negative links. One interpretation of these results is that living in areas of high government presence makes respondents less forgiving of negative policy experiences, which are more likely to result in political drop-out. These results are suggestive, indicating that different interpretive processes link policy to participation in areas of relatively high or low government presence.

While the findings in this study are suggestive of differences between high- and low-capacity states and across levels of government presence within low-capacity states, the research design does not allow definitive conclusions. However, it does indicate that direct comparison between various material and interpretive feedback effects between high- and low-capacity states would be a fruitful area of study. Furthermore, it suggests that the role of expectations creates different interpretations of the same types of experiences in parts of Zambia with different levels

of government presence. The psychological processes underlying these differences also warrant further examination.

3.0 Causality and the Challenges of Identification

As discussed in the introductory chapter of this dissertation, the research design for this study sacrificed causal precision in order to design a survey instrument that would more accurately represent the way that people experience public policy. To achieve this accuracy, it was necessary to design an independent variable that was flexible enough to capture respondents reported experiences with a wide array of policies. As described in Chapter Four, this study relied on three independent variables: one count measure of government projects available in each enumeration area, one straightforward subjective assessment of government service provision, and one measure of policy experience constructed by asking respondents to identify the government policies and projects that were the most important to them, and then describing their experiences with those policies or projects. The result was a set of highly individualized independent variables that, I argue, presents a realistic snapshot of the way that each individual thinks about his or her experiences with government policy. However, because this design required a high level of flexibility and includes references to a large number of projects, it was not possible to determine definitively that the policy treatment for each respondent was exogenous to his or her political participation.

Fortunately, because the theoretical framework of policy feedback assumes reciprocal causality, it is only necessary to establish the partial independence of policy from participation, to ensure the possibility that causality might run in both directions. This is a much less onerous task, but one that still presents difficulty given the construction of the independent variables in the study. The strategy I undertook was to propose additional plausible explanations accounting

for variation in policy that were unrelated to political participation. Using archival data and secondary sources, I undertook two examinations of the possible determinants of variation in both material and interpretive pathways related to policy: First, to identify exogenous variation in the amount of public resources (material pathway), I examined of how relative levels of economic activity influenced patterns of public resource distribution during Zambia's First Republic. Chapter Two focused explicitly on the differences between possible political and economic motivations for public resource distribution, demonstrating that the actual patterns of resource distribution were at least in part influenced by economic considerations. Second, to account for variation in the types of policies directed at different subnational groups (interpretive pathway), Chapter Three demonstrated the ways in which government officials' assumptions about gender influenced the nature of policies, regardless of women's previous levels of political participation.

These chapters cannot definitively establish the direction of causality between public policy and political participation in the contemporary survey, particularly since they focus on patterns of public policy in the 1960s. However, they do provide evidence for the reasonable assumption that policy is at least partially independent of existing patterns of participation, making it plausible to discuss an independent effect of policy on participation. Nevertheless, even assuming some degree of reciprocal causality, the causal direction of the relationship between policy and participation is a bigger problem for some of the correlations established in this study than others.

First, the study demonstrated that rates of collective behavior are higher when service provision is lower. I accounted for this relationship with the argument that, when the government fails to provide basic services, collective organizing is one avenue through which communities

might make up for this shortfall. I argued further that collective behavior arises *in response* to low levels of service provision. However, it is plausible that the government targets fewer resources at communities it knows to be better at collective organizing for self-help. While possible, if this were a systematic policy, it would require a large amount of village-level information on collective behavior, and it seems unlikely that such a strategy would determine public resource distribution in a systematic fashion. Furthermore, as described in Chapter Five, it belies the way that villagers themselves described the origins of their collective projects.

Moving to political engagement, it is entirely possible that the government directs more resources towards those who have high levels of political engagement. Since empowering project experiences are positively correlated with both political engagement and political participation, it is easy to imagine that the government is the most responsive to the communities that are the most engaged and the most politically active. However, this interpretation would not account for the positive relationship between marginalizing and burdensome policies and political engagement: why would the government intentionally direct such policies towards politically engaged groups? The larger inferential problem, then, is the relationship between empowering project experiences and political participation. Hopefully, however, the historical case demonstrated that high levels of political activity are not the *only* reason for concentrating state resources in certain areas. Indeed, recent research regarding the targeting of agricultural inputs in Zambia suggests that the government gives preference to areas where it had greater support in the last election; however, this research also demonstrated that economic factors like relative farm size and distance from paved roads and town centers also contributed significantly to resource distribution.³⁷⁷ Therefore, while it is plausible that pre-existing demonstrations of government support influence resource distribution, it is unlikely that these political factors are

³⁷⁷ Mason et al. 2013

the *only* source of variation, meaning that policy is still at least partially independent of participation.

Regarding respondents' reliance on non-state service providers, it is also possible that the government directs fewer resources to areas where it knows NGOs to be active. However, NGOs are more likely to establish operations in areas that already demonstrate a need for greater service provision.³⁷⁸ It is therefore unlikely that NGOs establish operations randomly, causing the government to withdraw from those areas; it is far more likely that NGOs establish projects in areas that demonstrate greater need already. The government may then withdraw, but based on what we know about NGO distribution, it makes more sense that the relationship between government service provision and the role of NGOs is one of reciprocal causality. Similarly, with regard to taxation, it is possible that the government directs fewer resources to areas with lower rates of tax compliance rather than the other way around. However, given the universally low rates of tax compliance outside of the formal sector economy, it is unlikely that relative rates of tax compliance exclusively influence service provision. Otherwise, one would expect universally depressed service provision outside of urban centers. As was evident in the data, there was wide variation in service provision across rural areas with little formal sector activity. Again, the more likely account is one of reciprocal causation. Finally, with regards to protest activity, it is possible that the government targets better resources towards communities that have a tendency to protest. However, given the low levels of protest activity in the sample, it is also highly unlikely that protest is the only source of variation in service provision.

Indeed, for nearly every variable examined in this study, reverse causation is possible. However, unidirectional causality in the reverse direction is also highly unlikely. Thinking through each case, the far more likely possibility is a relationship of reciprocal causality, as the

³⁷⁸ Brass 2012b

policy feedback framework proposes. However, if the relationships established in this study prove to be robust, it would be appropriate to follow up with an identified research design to examine more closely the causal pathways proposed here.

4.0 Unanswered Questions and Future Research

In addition to the uncertainties presented above regarding some of the intricacies of the relationships between policies and forms of participation and the ultimate nature of causality in these relationships, some additional themes examined in this study resulted in more questions than answers. Specifically, this study was unable to reach conclusions regarding the influence of gender on political participation, the precise nature of government presence in conditioning policy feedback relationships, and the role of levels of government capacity and expectations in conditioning feedback effects.

To start with, this study found a gender gap in nearly every independent variable measured across collective behavior, political engagement, and political participation. This finding is unsurprising, given existing literature on women's political participation. Nevertheless, these results are concerning. In particular, the substantively large effect of gender on political engagement is worrying, particularly given the influence of political engagement on measures of political participation. After accounting for other known predictors of political participation, political engagement is what "closes the gap" between men's and women's levels of political participation. However, this result underscores the need to better understand what accounts for the gender gap in political engagement. I had initially expected that experiences with public policy might account for these differing levels of political engagement, but policy did not actually influence men's and women's behavior in different ways. If sub-national variation in policy cannot account for women's lower rates of political engagement, it is possible that an un-

varying national-level variable depresses women's engagement. Other studies have posited that overall levels of female representation in government or the degree of "maternalism" in the national policy framework may influence women's political engagement.³⁷⁹ However, it is not possible to examine these possibilities with a single-country study.

Second, while this study provided some theoretical underpinnings for the expectation that policy may "feed back" in different ways depending on the level of government presence—using the line-of-rail as a proxy—the results of this distinction were inconsistent. My initial expectation was that government presence would be a simple moderator of any relationship between policies and participation: I expected that higher levels of government presence would intensify the policy-participation relationship, and that lower levels of government presence would diminish it. The empirical reality reflected in the data, however, does not support this claim. Rather, being on-rail seemed to magnify the negative relationships between policy experiences and participation, while being off-rail magnified the positive relationships. I speculated about why this might be the case, but given the limitations of the data, it raised a number of questions.

To begin with, on/off-rail proved a crude proxy of government presence. While it was useful in some respects—particularly as a predictor of political engagement and political participation—its behavior as a potential moderator was weak (if suggestive), and its unpredictable behavior begs a more specific operationalization. Following this point, it is necessary to theorize more specifically how government presence affects interpretations of policies and political behavior. Does the role of government presence work through gradients, or is there a threshold effect? Which divisions are salient? While the results presented in this study are suggestive, they shed little light on the actual relationships at play. Given variable levels of

³⁷⁹ for example, McDonagh 2010

government presence across most developing countries, a more precise understanding of how this variable influences possible policy feedback effects will prove important to understanding how to understand policy feedback in the low-capacity context.

This observation leads to the final open question, which is how and why the low-capacity context differs from the high-capacity context. I suggested that capacity has the potential to influence citizens expectations about what the government can and should do, and that these expectations will condition the way that individuals may interpret their experiences with policy. However, another limitation of the single-country study is the inability to examine these differences directly. The results presented in this study indicate that some processes of policy feedback lead to different outcomes than what one would have expected given results from advanced industrial democracy. However, the precise nature of these differences is at this point a matter of speculation. If the key difference is the role of expectations, how exactly do expectations matter? Are there certain types of policy feedback effects that are more or less likely given various levels of government capacity? Reprising some of the conceptual issues above, does government capacity operate along gradients, or does it have threshold effects? Furthermore, exactly what *type* of capacity matters? While the divergent results presented in this study are suggestive, they beg more careful theorizing and comparative examination.

5.0 Final Thoughts

At the risk of belaboring the point, the major claim underlying this study bears repeating: The way that people experience public policy has profound implications for their political behavior. The importance of public policy experiences in generating political behavior—and systematic differences in patterns of political behavior across groups—has been established in the context of advanced industrial democracies. This study joins a small but growing number of works that

examine policy feedback in the context of developing democracies. In doing so, it has presented evidence that public policies—specifically experiences with service provision—indeed have a relationship with political behavior in Zambia. However, these relationships do not look exactly the same as they do in the context of the advanced industrial democracy, where most studies to date have taken place.

While the findings of this study have raised a (perhaps frustratingly) large number of questions, these questions reflect the need for a better base of knowledge regarding the conditions under which policies influence participation in what ways. My hope is that this study has presented results suggesting (1) that policies influence many forms of political participation in developing democracies like Zambia, and (2) that the relationship between policies and participation is highly dependent on context. I believe that the unanswered questions discussed above hold important implications for understanding how policy can influence the development of political behavior in low-capacity democracies, a topic that has a wide range of practical applications for understanding political participation and governance outcomes in developing countries. Accordingly, I hope that these questions provide fodder for a fruitful area of future research.

APPENDIX A: VARIABLE OPERATIONALIZATION AND CODING

Variable Name	Question Wording	Variable Coding
<i>Independent Variables</i>		
Government Projects	Number of government projects that residents of the survey site could access, from the following list: tarred road, secondary school, health clinic, police post	Count variable ranging 0 - 4
Project Experience: Burdensome	Number of government projects the respondent discussed that “make life harder”	Ordinal variable ranging from 0 – 3
Project Experience: Empowering	Number of government projects the respondent discussed that “help”	Ordinal variable ranging from 0 – 3
Project Experience: Marginalizing	Number of government projects the respondent discussed that “are insufficient”	Ordinal variable ranging from 0 – 3
Project Experience: Neglectful	Number of government projects the respondent discussed that “are unavailable”	Ordinal variable ranging from 0 – 3
Subjective Assessment: Burdensome	Respondent agrees with the statement: Government projects and services “make things harder for me”	1 = Yes 0 = No
Subjective Assessment: Empowering	Respondent agrees with the statement: Government “usually tries to help” with projects and services	1 = Yes 0 = No
Subjective Assessment: Marginalizing	Respondent agrees with the statement: Government “tries, but does not understand what I need” when it comes to services and projects	1 = Yes 0 = No
Subjective Assessment: Neglectful	Respondent agrees with the statement: Government “usually ignores people like me” when it comes to services and projects	1 = Yes 0 = No

Variable Name	Question Wording	Variable Coding
<i>Dependent Variables</i>		
Chief Reliance	“If you wanted to get a development project in your community, are you likely to go to: the chief or headman?”	1 = Yes 0 = No
Collective Behavior Index	Additive index of collective behaviors, including: community meetings, form self-help group, join to solve problems, and group member.	Count variable ranging 0-4
Community Meetings	“Do you ever go to community meetings?”	1 = Yes (with any frequency) 0 = No
Contact Local Official	“Do you contact local government officials about problems in the community?”	1 = Yes (with any frequency) 0 = Never
Contact MP	“Do you contact the MP to report problems?”	1 = Yes (with any frequency) 0 = No
Customs Compliance	Respondents were told a vignette about an otherwise sympathetic woman who avoids customs when importing goods to sell for her small shop, then asked what they thought about his behavior.	1 = Supports customs compliance 0 = Supports customs avoidance
Form Self-Help Group	“If you wanted to get a development project in your community, are you likely to: organize your neighbors to provide for yourself?”	1 = Yes 0 = No
Formal Participation Index	Additive index of political participation variables, including: contact local official, contact MP, support party, and vote 2016.	Count variable ranging 0-4
Group Member	“Are you a member of any groups?”	1 = Yes 0 = No or Inactive Member
Interested in News	“Do you try to look at the news?”	1 = Yes 0 = No
Interested in Politics	“Are you interested at all in politics?”	1 = Yes 0 = No

Variable Name	Question Wording	Variable Coding
Join to Solve Problems	“How often do you join together with others to solve problems in your community?”	0=Never 1=Once every few years 2=Once per year 3=Several times per year
NGO Reliance	“If you wanted to get a development project in your community, are you likely to go to: an NGO?”	1 = Yes 0 = No
Political Engagement Index	Additive index of political engagement variables, including: interested in politics, talk about politics, and interest in news.	Count variable ranging 0-3
Protest	“In the past year, have you attended any protests or demonstrations (riots or strikes)?”	1 = Yes (with any frequency) 0 = No
Support Party	“Do you support any political party?”	1 = Yes 0 = No
Talk about Politics	“Do you talk about politics with other people?”	1 = Yes 0 = No
Tax Compliance	Respondents were told a vignette about an otherwise sympathetic man who runs an un-registered business and avoids taxes, then asked what they thought about his behavior.	1 = Supports tax compliance 0 = Supports tax avoidance
Vote 2016	“Do you plan to vote in the next election in 2016?”	1 = Yes 0 = No
<i>Control Variables</i>		
Children	“How many children are there that stay at home with you?”	Number
Civil Servant	Respondent reports occupation as a civil servant	1 = Yes 0 = No

Variable Name	Question Wording	Variable Coding
Education	“What level of education have you completed?”	1 = no school 2 = some primary 3 = completed primary 4 = some secondary 5 = completed secondary 6 = post-secondary vocational training 7 = some college 8 = college degree 9 = graduate degree
Enumerator	Enumerator responsible for interview	1 = Erin 2 = Yvonne 3 = Jacob 4 = Gift 5 = Chimwemwe 6 = Loveness 7 = Irene 8 = Robert 9 = Lewis 10 = Mackenzie 11 = Precious 12 = Holmes
Farmer	Respondent reports occupation as a farmer	1 = Yes 0 = No
Formal Employment	Respondent reports being formally employed	1 = Yes 0 = No
Male	Completed by interviewer	1 = Male 0 = Female
Married	“Are you married?”	1 = Yes 0 = No
Miner	Respondent reports occupation as a miner	1 = Yes 0 = No
On-Rail	Denotes whether respondents live along the line of rail. On-rail includes Livingstone District, parts of Kazangula District, Kabwe District.	1 = Yes 0 = No

Variable Name	Question Wording	Variable Coding
Religiosity	“How often do you attend religious events?”	0 = Never 1 = Rarely 2 = Every few weeks 3 = Once per week 4 = Multiple times per week
Student	Respondent reports occupation as student	1 = Yes 0 = No
Tribe	“What is your tribe?”	0= Ndebele, Bisa, Nyanja, Nkoya, Tswana, Shona, Nanzwa, Luchaza, Tswaka, Lungu, Kusi, Nyika, Chikunda, Zulu, Lama, Chipata, Chokwe, White/European, Indian/South Asian ³⁸⁰ 1=Bemba 2=Tonga 3=Tokal-Leya 4=Lozi 5=Ngoni 6=Luvale 7=Ila 8=Kaonde 9=Mambwe 10=Lunda 11=Chewa 12=Namwanga 14=Tumbuka 15=Lamba 16=Lenje 18=Nsenga 20=Lala 25=Soli
Urban	Completed by interviewer	1 = Urban 0 = Rural

³⁸⁰ Base category, includes all reported tribal categories with fewer than 10 respondents.

**APPENDIX B:
FULL TABLES OF REGRESSION RESULTS**

Available online:

<https://www.dropbox.com/s/vcrmc857rnfsxb8/Appendix%20B.pdf?dl=0>

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