

THE HISTORIC ORIGINS OF PUBLIC GOODS:  
LOCAL DISTRIBUTIONAL POLITICS IN RURAL WEST AFRICA,  
1880-PRESENT

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**Abstract**

This dissertation examines why some local governments deliver social services more broadly to citizens than others under democratic decentralization, arguing that the divergent politics of local service delivery are explained by variation in pre-colonial statehood. Specifically, differences in pre-colonial political geography left distinct socio-political legacies in the network relations of local elites: local elites are tied together through mutually-reinforcing claims to authority in areas that were home to pre-colonial states, but they are fragmented and contentious in areas that were acephalous. Following widespread decentralization reforms, it is the relative congruence of newly created local government boundaries with local elite networks that drives distributional politics. Greater overlap between these formal and informal institutions widens the webs of obligations that local elites have to citizens in areas of high network congruence while its absence facilitates the emergence of exclusive identities and incentivizes narrow targeting in the rest of the country.

This study demonstrates that distinct distributional patterns are emerging by looking at two locally delivered public goods, primary schools and basic health facilities, in Senegal, a West African nation that was home to a dynamic pre-colonial state system. The project blends quantitative and qualitative data collected during a year of fieldwork to illustrate the link

between pre-colonial geography and different forms of local distributional politics. These differences, which only emerged following the 1996 decentralization reforms, were a critical juncture for local elites, who gained control over substantial patronage to redistribute locally. The project therefore contributes to the recent ‘historical renaissance’ among students of political economy of development by making an important distinction between historical antecedents that are path dependent but not persistent when we ‘decompress’ history. It further contributes to the literature by emphasizing the social incentives facing local elites over the narrow materialist goals often ascribed to them in the clientelism literature and, finally, it calls attention to the vivid political debates that take place within rural communities, posing a series of implicit questions for the current agendas of decentralized governance and bottom-up development.

## **BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH**

Martha Wilfahrt received her B.A. from the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 2005, double majoring in Political Science and Geography with a minor in African Studies. Prior to beginning her PhD at Cornell, she completed a Masters degree at Indiana University-Bloomington in Political Science. From Fall 2015, she will be a Post-Doctoral Fellow at Northwestern University where she will pursue her research interests in the political economy of development, state-society relations and African Politics more generally.

To A.C.W.

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## Table of Contents

Biographical Sketch	v
Acknowledgements	vii
List of Figures	xii
List of Tables	xiii
Introduction	1
1. Theory	18
The Argument	22
‘Decompressing’ History: Plausible and Implausible Explanations	57
2. Political Organization in Senegal, 1500-present	71
Pre-Colonial Senegal, 1500-1880	72
The French Advance Inland, 1860-	83
Independence: Centralization and Decentralization	102
Chapter 2 Appendix	116
3. “They should build us a school too”: The Local Politics of Primary School Delivery in Rural Senegal	117
Primary Health and Basic Education in Senegal in the 2000s	119
Data and Measurement	125
The Delivery of Primary Schools, 2002-12, and Basic Health, 2009-12	134
Robustness Checks	140
Chapter 3 Appendix	153
4. ‘Decompressing’ Village Public Goods Investments in Senegal, 1880-2012	161
Institutions in History	163
Social Service Access in Rural Senegal, 1880-2012	173
Multivariate Analysis	188
Discussion: Taking Time Seriously	200
Chapter 4 Appendix	204
5. Local logics of public goods distribution: Evidence from Rural Senegal	205
Data Sources: Original Survey of Local Elites	207
Political Landscapes Across Rural Senegal: Continuity and Transformations	212

6. From Social Ties to Social Services: Networks in Political Employment	254
Evaluations of Local Governance in Rural Senegal	256
Assessments of Public Goods Delivery: Perceived and Actual	266
Assessing Alternative Explanations	274
Conclusion	292
General Appendix	308
Bibliography	336
List of Interviews	360

## List of Figures

Fig I.1 Two Contrasting Paths	8
Fig 1.1 Historical Paths to Different Outcomes in Local Cleavages	67
Fig 1.2 Different Network Structures in Action	69
Fig 2.1 Pre-Colonial States and Uncentralized Regions	73
Fig 2.2 Ethnic Groups	83
Fig 2.3 Early French Presence, pre-1880	86
Fig 2.4 Early Religious Movements	102
Fig 2.5 Alternative Ethnicity Measures	116
Fig 3.1 Predicted Probability of Centralization on Public Goods Access, 2009	124
Fig 3.2 Pre-Colonial Centralization Measure, 20km	153
Fig 3.3 Maximize Attendance Problem	159
Fig 3.4 Maximize Coverage Problem	160
Fig 4.1 Marginal Effects of Pre-Colonial Centralization on Service Access Over Time	169
Fig 4.2 Average Primary Schools per Department per Year and Pre-Colonial Status	170
Fig 4.3 Average Health Posts per Department per Year and Pre-Colonial Status	170
Fig 4.4 Average Boreholes per Department per Year and Pre-Colonial Status	172
Fig 4.5 Marginal Effects of Centralization on Educational Attainment, DHS Data	173
Fig 4.6 Linear Fit between Early Colonial and Subsequent Access to Health by Year	195
Fig 4.7 Linear Fit between Early Colonial and Subsequent Access to Education by Year	196
Fig 5.1 Department Case Selection	209
Fig 5.2 Difference of Means in Elite Affective Ties, by Pre-Colonial Centralization	211
Fig 5.3 Difference of Means in Other Elite Ties, by Pre-Colonial Centralization	212
Fig 6.1 Coded Local Government Responsibilities, by Network Type	262
Fig 6.2 Evaluations of CR by Network Type	263
Fig 6.3 Evaluations of CR by Network Type and Family Relation	265
Fig C.1 Generalizability of Centralization's Influence, AfroBarometer rd. 4	298
Fig A.1 Colonial <i>Cercles</i> Over Time	317
Fig A.2 Post Colonial Regions	318
Fig A.3 Colonial Cantons to Rural Communities	319
Fig A.4 Villages Over Time	320

## **List of Tables**

2.1 Administrative Hierarchies Over Time	111
3.1 Pre-Colonial Centralization and New Social Service Infrastructure, 2002-12	136
3.2 Alternative Explanations for Social Service Delivery	139
3.3 % Pre-Colonial Villages and New Social Service Infrastructure	142
3.4 Location Allocation Models	144
3.5 Placebo Test: Central State Provided Services	146
3.6 Fixed Effects, Table 3.1 Replication	147
3.7 Assessment of Bias from Unobservables (Coefficient Stability Approach)	150
3.8 Effects of Pre-Colonial Centralization on Social Service Presence in Village, 2009	153
3.9 Alternative Measures of Pre-Colonial Centralization, Table 3.1 Replication	154
3.10 Expanded Buffer Measures of Pre-Colonial Centralization	155
3.11 Reduced Radius of New Social Service Access, Table 3.1 Replication	156
3.12 Alternative Explanations for New Classroom Construction	157
3.13: Location-Allocation Alternative Explanations	158
4.1 Impact of Administrative Proximity on Social Service Delivery	186
4.2 Alternative Explanations for Historical Social Service Delivery	190
4.3 Selection Factors into French Settlement	194
4.4 Do Early Investments Drive Subsequent Ones?	197
4.5 Effect of Colonial Investments on % Student Attendance, by Rural Community 2002	199
4.6 When Does Centralization Matter?	204
5.1 Different Local Political Configurations	218
6.1 Is Democratic Decentralization (1996) an Improvement?	257
6.2 Why Ran For Office?	260
6.3 Odds Ratios of Perceived Inequality in the Rural Council	267
6.4 Odds Ratios of Receiving a Public Good in Village, 2009-12	270
6.5 Odds Ratios of Structural Factors on New Public Goods Delivery, 2009-12	272
6.6 Trust and the Slave Trade	283
C.1: Generalizability of Patterns, AfroBarometer rd. 4	308

# Introduction

Between 2002 and 2009, approximately 1,500 schools were built in rural Senegal, reflecting the expansion of basic social services across sub-Saharan Africa spurred on by an influx of funds and attention from the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). But while the MDGs were designed with the idea of reaching the most needy and under-served, this dissertation, like many others, starts with a puzzle about why local governments in decentralized countries have chosen to distribute these services to their constituents in different ways. For example, Orkadiere, in northern Senegal, built five new schools during this time period. Ida Mouride, to the south, built six. In absolute numbers, these local governments look relatively proximate in how many schools they delivered to villages and students.<sup>1</sup> But looking at which villages actually received a school suggests otherwise. If we think that the goal of the MDGs was to maximize the number of students who could attend a school in proximity to their homes, Orkadiere could have provided new schools for roughly 1,100 students and Ida Mouride 1,300, quite similar.<sup>2</sup> With the schools that were actually constructed however, Orkadiere covered eighty percent of these potential students while Ida Mouride covered only sixty-one percent. Perhaps, we might think, Ida Mouride covered a broader geographic region with their extra school: if the goal was to bring as many students within three kilometers, Senegal's definition of access, both local communities were in a position to cover almost their entire

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<sup>1</sup> These governments are similar in other ways. Orkadiere has a population of just under 27,000 and Ida Mouride 30,500. Both are home to both settled villages and pastoral populations that live in sparsely inhabited scrubland. Both also are dominantly Peulh, though Ida Mouride, as discussed below, is home to substantial minorities.

<sup>2</sup> These numbers and those following come from location allocation models. See Chapter 3.

populations within this distance if they placed their new schools carefully. In Orkadiere, all but 114 students remained without school coverage in 2009, while Ida Mouride failed to cover over 2,200 potential students.

What explains why some local governments distribute goods more broadly to their population while others engage in more targeted distribution, minimizing the developmental benefits of their investments? This is the central variation that this dissertation seeks to explain. The argument it advances suggests that these differences are driven by old causes: the local politics of public goods delivery in rural Senegal is structured by pre-colonial political geography. This project will show that local governments that fall within the borders of long-dissolved, pre-colonial states spread public goods across more villages. This is all but missing in areas that were home to acephalous or loosely organized chieftaincies prior to the arrival of French colonial rule, where goods are more narrowly targeted along ethnic or partisan lines.

In arguing that pre-colonial centralization shapes the contemporary politics of public goods delivery, this dissertation identifies a commonly invoked argument by local elites (referring here to village chiefs, local elected officials, notables and religious leaders) in rural West Africa: their network ties to an organic community. In areas home to pre-colonial states, the broader webs of obligation for local elites engendered by these perceived ties drive more developmental behavior. Despite their prominence today however, these factors only became politically consequential following democratic decentralization in 1996. In the wake of these reforms, public goods delivery hinges on the congruence of local government boundaries and the dominant network of local elites. When more elites within a local government share overlapping

claims to the same network, often rooted in ascriptive allegiance to a pre-colonial, autochthonous community, they face incentives to distribute broadly because their collective network ties generate sub-national identities that disincentivize narrow targeting. In areas that lack these pre-colonial experiences however, more exclusive identities are locally salient and easier to mobilize. Social networks are fragmented and elites use power, when they have it, as means to channel goods to their own in-network members. Pre-colonial kingdoms matter, in brief, via their social legacies.

That local politics are historically embedded can be seen clearly in Orkadiere, which is located in the heartland of the former Fouta Toro Empire that stretched along the Senegal River from the 1400 to late 1800s, and Ida Mouride, which falls in an area that was politically un-organized, or acephalous, prior to French colonization.<sup>3</sup> Finding only a few small-scale chieftaincies in the area now home to Ida Mouride, the French colonial state struggled to find intermediaries or political traction in the area, resorting to outright creation of new political hierarchies for each of the region's dominant ethnic groups - Wolofs areas were 'attributed' to one artificial ruler, Peulhs another and Mandinges to a third. This same area subsequently saw the arrival of peanut farmers following the Mouride religious brotherhood resettled by the colonial government in the 1930s and 40s in an ever expanding attempt to increase groundnut

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<sup>3</sup> In an 1896 report on their new West African territories, a colonial administrator described the region of Coungheul, where modern-day Ida Mouride exists (part of Kaffrine region), defining its extent by what it was not rather than what it was: "For the commodity of language, I designate under the generic name of "Coungheul" the group of heterogeneous cantons ... is bordered to the west by the Saloum, to the north by Djoloff, to the east by Kalonkadougou, to the southwest by Niani and to the south by British Gambia" (Orbessier, 1896).

harvests.<sup>4</sup> Not surprisingly, local governments in this area display marked social divisions today. This is not purely ethnic; original Wolof inhabitants of the region are not automatically allies with Wolof, Mouride, peanut-farmers in-migrants for example and salient social divisions more often take other forms, such as those between farmers and herders or original inhabitants and in-migrants (Thieba, 1997).

In Orkadiere, by contrast, community pride is palpable. The local government's five-year planning document from 2006 (*plan de développement locale* or PLD) is unusual in its length, describing the territory's history in great detail, dating it back to Denniyankobé, a micro-state that was absorbed by Fouta Toro in the 1500s. Orkadiere-village is one of the oldest in the region and the document suggests that 'all' of the villages in the community were founded by individuals originating in Orkadiere-village, moving out only as the village became too large, the fields too over-farmed.<sup>5</sup> As a result, "the populations of these different villages retain an umbilical cord with their 'home' village, which makes Orkadiere [village] a place of meetings, convergence, and services whose legitimacy is tied to history" (28).<sup>6</sup> The community, the planning document concludes, is among the few in Senegal that meets the government's original criteria of creating rural communities with a shared history. This is related to the local

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<sup>4</sup> These peanut farmers were largely Wolof and followers of the Mouride brotherhood based in Touba that encouraged work, most often manifested in the expansion of peanut production, as a sign of religious devotion (see discussion in Chapter 2).

<sup>5</sup> An exception should be noted here. Though it receives only scant attention, 'all' of the villages did not come from Orkadiere village. Approximately five villages were founded by refugees from the 1989 conflicts with Mauritania, on the other side of the river. Despite being co-ethnics and residents for over twenty years, these villages can be assumed to be an out-group in the community.

<sup>6</sup> In general, the document glorifies this past, from the specifics of each village's founding to the region's resistance to the arrival of French colonists, though French reports from the late 1800s note that the area was tranquil and well run (for example, *Gouvernement Général de l'AOF*, 1898).

government's performance: due to these community ties, "political divergences are not very visible in the council, which is a considerable assets," the report concludes (2006: 102). Local social relations in Orkadiere still resemble the form they took in the centuries prior to French rule. Apart from the elimination of the king following French colonization, this region of the country proved relatively unchallenging for the French and has seen remarkable persistence in social structure.

Ida Mouride's own PLD states that Wolof in-migrants (the 'Saloum-Saloum') inhabiting the south of the rural community had dominated the local council at the expense of the autochthons (original inhabitants) whose claims to community land long pre-date those of peanut farmers. The autochthons felt that their status of the original clearers of the land gave them more authority over local matters. The community's PLD went so far as to comment on these divisions, revealing not only the bias of the authors, but the deep emotion behind this division: "cohabitation has not always been easy because of these deep rivalries," but 'luckily' the original settlers of the land had won power in 2002, based on a 'sacred coalition' (PLD Ida Mouride, 2002: 20).<sup>7</sup>

In both PLDs, normally dry planning documents, the functioning of the rural community (*le communauté rurale*), Senegal's lowest level of government, is explicitly linked to the historical ties among different villages and factions. Likewise, in both documents the structure of *who* has the right to rule is explicitly linked to historical settlement patterns in the

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<sup>7</sup> Over the next five years conflicts over who should be able to speak and act for the 'community' in Ida Mouride proved sufficiently intense that appeals to the government on the part of in-migrants led to a slicing of the rural community in two halves in Senegal's 2009 administrative reforms.

area. In Orkadiere, these claims to authority are encompassing and invoked as a legitimating factor for the local government, but in Ida Mouride they are splintered, formed along disparate groups forced to co-exist by the French only to see the number of divisions amplified with later waves of in-migration. This has created disputes among different groups, sometimes politicized as differences in livelihood patterns, at others religion and yet again ethnicity. The rural community is a prize to be fought over in communities like Ida Mouride, but a cake to be shared collectively in Orkadiere.

Such claims and disputes are not new and are well studied by anthropologists in the region. The force of their weight on local development decisions however has largely gone unstudied. Following the 1996 reforms to Senegal's decentralization laws, new decision-making authority over local development was transferred to local governments, giving local elites significant patronage to distribute to clients and supporters. As the opening example of school construction reveals, this opened up opportunities for local network ties to serve as conduits of public goods provision. At the local level, Blundo (1998) has observed, politics in decentralized Senegal is less about national political parties, though they do occupy formal political space, and more about local factions emerging from long-standing and on-going disputes.<sup>8</sup>

Figure I.1 below illustrates the temporal process behind this argument for the cases of Orkadiere and Ida Mouride. Here, two different starting points lead to different interactions with the early colonial state and different forms of local politics in decentralized Senegal today.


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<sup>8</sup> Similar claims are made by Olivier de Sardan, who demonstrates that politics within the Niger's local governments are rarely constructed around the public interest but tied to various local solidarities. "The canton chief is first and foremost the representative of a lineage ... The president of the cereal bank management committee is first and foremost a man of the neighborhood ...." he writes (2009: 45).

In clearer terms, this argument suggests that the political options that contemporary local elites face, as well as the distributional outcomes their choices produce, are relatively constrained by organic social structures formed in the distant past.

As a result, this project argues that allocative decision-making follows distinctly local logics, but that these logics are quite consistent and tractable once we look at historical patterns

**Figure I.1** Two Contrasting Paths



of organization and settlement. If local elites act towards their networks, then network structure will shape how locally distributed public goods are targeted and, in the aggregate, local development outcomes.<sup>9</sup> Thus, while the argument that local elite network ties matter for development outcomes resembles common expectations that ethnic or partisan ties channel goods downwards from elite patrons to clients, this project departs from this work by returning to the largely abandoned insights of the first wave of research on clientelism, which highlighted the diffuse, personal and asymmetrical power relations that lie at the heart of rural clientelism (Lemarchand, 1981; Piattoni, 2001; Hicken, 2011; Hilger, 2011). When politicians in rural Senegal talk about being a good *homme de confiance* (a good representative), they are rarely narrowly speaking of their electoral base, but as a representative for their ‘community.’ This word has fluid meanings and actors use it to refer to their extended family, their ethnic group, their caste or their entire rural community just as they use it to refer to more common expectations of their co-partisans.

Consequently, this project asserts that local actors should not be expected to neatly follow the expectations derived from existing work on the central state. Local elites in rural West Africa are engaged in embedded social relations and the degree of congruence between their local elite networks and their local government boundaries profoundly shapes how they think of the local government: something that they are part of and want to improve or something that they must fight for control over, carefully mobilizing support to maintain their

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<sup>9</sup> This is not to reduce the incentives of elites to reputation or status pay-offs alone; rather this project simply leaves room open for local elites to be concerned about the social welfare of their clients, echoing recent work by Auyero (2000) and Paller (2014), because it can reinforce their own social position.

political dominance. If their network is based along ethnic divisions, then goods will disproportionately go to the co-ethnics of whoever dominates local politics at a given moment. If it's based upon a shared identity rooted in the pre-colonial past however, then goods will be targeted for the benefit of the community as a whole. These differences have important implications for how citizens are treated by their local state, often their most frequent site of contact with government, and their likelihood of having access to the most basic of social services. In brief, this matters crucially for how inequalities in development outcomes are produced, and reproduced, across space.

This project therefore returns to old insights into the relationship between social forces and the state. Specifically, it challenges the material focus in the recent clientelism literature, articulating a theory of local public goods delivery that turns attention to the socio-political drivers of elite behavior. Local actors live in the communities they serve rendering local elected officials stationary bandits, to borrow Olson's (1993) term, in a way that central state politicians, who come in with promises and packets of *maggi* bouillon, only to leave and never to be heard of again, are not. Local actors are just that - *locals* - and their own interests, political, economic and social, demand serious theorization by scholars of African politics.<sup>10</sup>

In recent years, it has become near gospel that 'history matters' for the marked variation in development outcomes found both across and within developing countries today (see for example Akeampong et al., 2014). This project advances this research agenda by uncoupling path dependence and persistence to call attention to how configurations of informal institutions

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<sup>10</sup> This has, of course, been studied in some depth by political anthropologists, particularly in the French tradition, though their findings are case and region specific.

can be path dependent without producing persistent effects. Despite the tendency to conflate path dependent processes with persistent ones, here they are shown to be distinct concepts: the social legacies of pre-colonial centralization are path dependent but to have an effect depends on changes in the formal institutional environment. In the chapters that follow, this dissertation will highlight how, at least for the case of Senegal, the long shadow of pre-colonial centralization is at best a story of intermittent effects. This is in many ways a response to the tendency to pretermit decades, if not centuries, of history by proponents of the historical renaissance that has swept development economics and, to a lesser degree, political scientists in recent years.

Neither politics nor economic development took a hiatus during the colonial and post-colonial era and to suggest otherwise is to ignore both the ambitious policies and projects of individual administrators, missionaries and citizens that improved - though certainly sometimes also harmed - the lives of colonized populations. In rural West Africa, historical antecedents matter, but without understanding when and for how long risks blatantly assuming improbable causes that do not advance empirical or theoretical understandings of how and why history matters for development. Work in the 'historical renaissance' should follow suit.

A clear, broad implication of this study is therefore that scholars reconsider the impact of history on African politics. Surprisingly little work in African politics, or even African historiography, has linked pre-colonial political life to post-colonial performance (see Markowitz, 1970; Englebert, 2000; to a lesser degree Bayart, 2009 for exceptions). Rather, the tendency has been to see the colonial state as so great a rupture that almost everything following is inextricably linked to the sixty year span of colonial rule (for example, Young 1994; Cooper,

1994 also observes this tendency). Still, early work by historians chronicled an enormously diverse set of social and political organization across the continent (for example, Fage, 1969; Hargreaves, 1969) and more recent scholarship has called attention to the uneven texture of colonial rule (Colombi, 1991; Klein, 2006). Colonialism was certainly a critical juncture, but it neither met a blank slate upon arrival nor did it (fully) erase what it found.

## **A Note on the Case: Senegal**

This project makes use of a sub-national study of Senegal, which was home to a dynamic microstate system prior to French colonization. This state system, which spread across Sahelian West Africa, formed in the wake of the collapse of the Malian Empire in the 1300s. On the eve of the final French push to conquer Senegal in the early 1880s, slightly under half of Senegal's territory was under the control of a centralized political organization. Indeed, as Warner (1999) notes, many states in West Africa were far more state-like than is often assumed, capable of enforcing property rights and of adapting to the changing whims of capitalist markets. A discussion of the areas that were centralized prior to colonization as well as a map can be found in Chapter Two (see also General Appendix on sources and measurements for each state).

The choice to look sub-nationally within one country allows for a systematic evaluation of differences in the independent variable, the degree to which an area experienced pre-colonial political centralization, without having to worry about any number of unobservable characteristics that are expected to differ across countries. Senegal's significant within-country variation on the independent variable of pre-colonial centralization makes it an unusually well suited case for testing arguments about the effects of pre-colonial centralization. In this way,

this dissertation follows a recent trend toward sub-national studies, which prioritize developing theoretical understandings of processes over generalizability, although thoughts on the latter will be presented in the conclusion. This approach has been praised for its ability to uncover the uneven texture of political and economic reforms and processes; many of our most studied questions, the effect of economic liberalization or why some countries develop faster than others, for example, fail to unfold uniformly within any given country (see here Snyder, 2001).

Senegal is also well fitted for looking at patterns of public goods delivery over time. The country's variation in pre-colonial political organization is paired with a process of decentralization that began in the 1970s and continued with the introduction of competitive elections following in 1996.<sup>11</sup> This allows the project to isolate the introduction of local-level choice over social service delivery that came with the 1996 reforms, which transferred decision-making over the placement of primary education and health facilities to local governments, from the political logics emanating from the central state that had run service delivery prior to this. The 1996 reforms serve as a form of exogenous institutional shock, revealing how local political dynamics are conditioned on antecedent conditions rooted in the pre-colonial past because, as will be shown, the effect of pre-colonial centralization only emerges when local actors make distributional decisions.

The village-level dataset built for and employed by this dissertation allows for a disaggregation across space that focuses attention on the spread of micro-level distributional

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<sup>11</sup> Though the broader decentralization process started in 1972 with Senegal an early mover in the region, it was only in 1996 that local councils became fully elected by the popular vote and gained the right to both tax and make independent decisions with the domains of transferred authority (Ouedraogo, 2003).

patterns rather than aggregate levels or counts that dominate the literature. To do so, local public goods are studied where they are actually targeted: rural villages. This move is facilitated by data access and joins only a handful, though growing in number, of studies that are able to make similarly precise estimates of service delivery (see Edjemyr et al., 2015 for an excellent example). Measuring public goods delivery where it actually takes place opens up a range of analytical techniques, many of which are employed here, such as GIS analysis, that enable analyses of patterns as they unfold in space. Most importantly, this means that the following chapters can evaluate the spatial spread of service delivery across administrative units and populations. This improves upon the tendency to look at absolute levels of delivery or aggregate, group-level outcomes. Such data makes up the vast majority of studies on public goods delivery, but risks obscuring as much as it illuminates. This project argues that what differs across areas that were home to pre-colonial states and those that were not is not a story about absolute numbers of service delivery but how this delivery is targeted and spread across constituents. It is only by taking location seriously, or engaging in ‘spatial thinking’ as Logan (2012) suggests, that this project is able to identify these patterns of geographic placement as well as their consequences.

## **Overview of the Dissertation**

The remainder of this dissertation elaborates the theoretical and empirical claims made in brief above. Chapter One develops the theoretical argument, building on recent work on informal institutions and institutional persistence to conceptualize network congruence between local elites and local governments. It subsequently moves on to examine why, at the micro-level,

individual elites invest in networks ties that reinforce their claims to local authority, identifying three mutually-reinforcing pathways: informal mechanisms of accountability generated by vertical patron-client ties wherein patrons seek to maintain their prestige and status, horizontal mechanisms of accountability among elites driven by reputational concerns and, finally, the ability of networks to produce collectively mobilizing identities that, in the aggregate can help link social network structure to development outcomes. Chapter Two offers a brief background to the case under study, describing the kingdoms that once populated pre-colonial Senegal, the colonial encounter and the institutional restructuring that came with independence and the country's two waves of decentralization.

Chapters Three through Six provide empirical evidence to support the core argument. Chapter Three uses an original dataset of the approximately 14,300 villages in rural Senegal today to test the effect of pre-colonial centralization on a village's likelihood of receiving a public goods investment between 2002-12. The central finding is that an area's political organization on the eve of colonization is a significant predictor of a village's propensity to receive these infrastructural investments. In areas that were home to centralized polities when the French began constructing a colonial state in 1880, there is consistent evidence that local governments are ensuring access to new clinics, primary schools and additional classrooms for more villages than their counterparts in areas that were acephalous or which lacked hierarchical governance when the French moved inland. This finding is robust to a number of alternative explanations and model specifications, affirming the argument that there is something different

about how local governments respond to demands for and deliver these public goods in formerly centralized areas even when taking into account similar objective need.

One of the central claims of this study is that the impact of informal institutions, such as pre-colonial centralization, is contingent on the formal institutional environment they operate within. This argument is explored in Chapter Four, which looks at the historical trajectory of basic public goods investments in Senegal from the onset of colonial rule in 1880 to the present. This allows for a ‘decompression’ of history by taking both spatial and temporal processes seriously and, in so doing, finds that the impact of pre-colonial centralization only appears in force following the 1996 decentralization reforms that transferred authority over public goods placement to local governments. Chapter Four makes two contributions to the broader project: first, it isolates the 1996 decentralization reforms as an exogenous shock that facilitated informal institutions, rooted in historical settlement patterns, to emerge as a key driver of sub-national distributional politics. Secondly, the chapter seeks to understand what factors matter in the interim and for how long. In a series of empirical tests, it suggests that proximity to the French colonial state, its own presence largely determined by geographic accessibility, was the most important factor for service access in the early colonial period, with social services only expanding outward into the periphery following a post-war push for colonial.

While Chapters Three and Four establish the large-scale empirical finding behind the argument, Chapters Five and Six turn to an original survey of over 330 local elites across rural Senegal, as well as interviews with a large number of development agents and central government officials working in rural areas, to investigate what drives these patterns. Chapter

Five draws on open-ended interview questions to develop a typology of how historically structured social ties both constrain and create opportunities for local political mobilization today. The central point of divergence is, as illustrated in early chapters, experiences with pre-colonial centralization. Areas that were home to cohesive, political entities prior to the arrival of the French colonial state continue to have communities with denser social ties. This is expected to be a positive relationship: the more local elites in a community that share affective network ties - brothers, cousins, friends - the more congruence between their social network and local government borders. As a result, the government is expected to act more cohesively and be, on average, more developmental. Conversely, in areas that were acephalous prior to colonization, social networks remain splintered, creating a number of divided sets of local elites that increase competition for control over the local government and the resources that come with it. The typology further integrates patterns of population migration over the past-century: in communities that experienced an exogenous shock, such as religious conversion, the basis of social networks may have been altered, transforming how individuals conceive of their network ties. Alternatively, many areas have seen significant in-migration, which proliferates social networks as newcomers create new network layers upon old ones. These are often conflicting, though in a minority of cases newcomers have been successfully integrated. The qualitative evidence marshaled in this chapter suggests that the structure of social relations is strongly associated with how local politics are perceived, with particular emphasis on how differences in social ties shape individual assessments of equality of treatment and the perceived development efforts of local government.

The final empirical chapter, Chapter Six, uses quantitative components of the surveys described above to see if quantifiable responses are consistent with qualitative assessments of local government. The chapter both presents descriptive statistics, that confirm that there are substantial differences in how local actors think about and evaluate their local governments as well as a series of statistical models that examine what factors predict a respondent's impressions of equality in the local government as well as whether or not their village received a public goods investment over the past year. These findings confirm the insights offered in open-ended interviews: network ties matter for respondent assessments of equality and distinct forms of local politics exist across the four-part typology developed in Chapter 5. Finally, the chapter evaluates a series of potential alternative mechanisms and explanations, providing evidence that there are not substantial differences in outside assistance (via donors or the central government), the experience or education of local elected officials, information flows or local government activity, associational life, reported levels of trust or any lingering impact from the slave trade (as argued by Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011). The chapter wraps up with thoughts on why this is distinct from arguments that reduce African politics to ethnicity. A conclusion to the dissertation in its entirety follows.

# 1. Theory

This dissertation seeks to explain why some local governments distribute goods more broadly to their population while others engage in more targeted and inefficient distribution under democratic decentralization. Though hardly a new question in comparative politics, the argument put forth to answer this puzzle here is more novel: differences in how governments are distributing public goods are driven by variation in pre-colonial political geography.<sup>12</sup> The project thus links two common narratives about local politics heard in rural West Africa to a very remote cause: in one version, most frequently heard in areas that were home to pre-colonial states, local elites all know each other, they share a common understanding of their community and they seek to act for the good of that community even when this prevents some individuals from obtaining short-term gains for their villages. In the second, featuring prominently in areas that were acephalous prior to French colonization and which reflect the dominant assumptions in existing work, groups of local elites engage in zero-sum competition with benefits that go to members of one group - ethnic, partisan or otherwise - a clear loss for all others.

In tracing these narratives of local political cleavages, heard around the country, to the pre-colonial past this dissertation articulates a theory of *network congruence* whereby all local

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<sup>12</sup> This project is not the first to identify pre-colonial characteristics as the cause of contemporary differences. In a series of cross-national studies, Bockstette, Chanda and Puttermann (2002), Bardhan (2005) and Hariri (2012) have demonstrated that early experiences with state formation correlate with greater economic growth, rule of law and tendencies towards authoritarianism respectively. Historical experience with political centralization has also been shown to improve development outcomes today in Latin America (Mahoney, 2010), Russia (Foa, 2014) and sub-Saharan Africa (Robinson and Parsons, 2006; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2012; Gennaioli and Rainer, 2007; Bandyopadhyay and Green, 2012). Yet while these studies have identified robust relationships both within and across countries, the mechanisms driving these outcomes remain contested and, almost exclusively, unobserved.

elites make similar claims to elite status, be them rooted in shared ethnicity, autochthony or descent from a pre-colonial kingdom, collectively forming a network. The degree of congruence between these local elite networks, as informal institutions and the formal institutional space created by decentralization aggregates sub-community interests differently, thereby producing distinct forms of local distributional politics.<sup>13</sup>

Like most recent work in contemporary political economy therefore, this project begins with the assumption that informal institutions matter for development.<sup>14</sup> While much of the literature views institutions as coordination devices or as a means for individuals to reach mutual gains, institutions at their heart are distributional. The rules institutions engender create relative winners and losers even when they fall short of resolving collective action dilemmas - and when institutions do enable coordination, it is by virtue of how they structure distributional effects (Mahoney, 2010: 15-17). Institutions can only be understood therefore when we place them within the ‘prevailing power structures and relations’ that they exist within (Hyden, 2008: 3). This dissertation identifies one informal institution, network ties among local elites, that generates shared understandings of socio-political standards and rules that, in turn,

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<sup>13</sup> No clear answer can be found on how the central government in Dakar decided on local government boundaries. What is known is that it was not a consultative process like in Mali and by comparing maps of the *arrondissement* in the 1960s and the 1972 creation of local governments, most rural communities appear to be a simple split of *arrondissements*. To the extent that the *arrondissement* often followed colonial cantons, it can be assumed that they are not highly endogenous to local political processes because a) the colonial government sought to create neutral administrative units of homogenous size and b) in many areas of the country social networks proliferated after the initial division of these colonial territories. This remains, however, an area of future inquiry.

<sup>14</sup> Definitions vary widely, but scholars generally agree that institutions - formal or otherwise - are means of guiding individual behavior. Formal institutions are then rules ‘created, communicated and enforced’ officially while informal institutions are “socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels” for Helmke and Levitsky (2004: 727).

shape distributional decisions. Whether this leads to targeted or generalized strategies by elites however, depends on the degree of overlap between informal institutions and formal institutional space. This is a markedly different institutional ‘channel’ than what is found in much of the literature, but one that can explain why local communities make different distributional decisions despite similar formal rules.

If local governments inherit various configurations of elite networks from the past and if such networks prioritize distribution along some dimensions rather than others, then a systematic explanation for differences in network composition can help explain the variation in public goods outcomes observed at the local level today. To the extent that local elites - traditional and elected - share network ties, they share an understanding of who belongs to their community, be it common kinship, settlement patterns, ethnicity, religion, etc. When this closely overlaps with formal institutional boundaries, who should benefit from their decisions is quite similar to who actually can benefit from local government policies. On the other hand, if an area has splintered networks, then the local politics of redistribution are expected to create fractured patterns of service delivery, with favoritism taking ethnic, partisan or religious dimensions depending on the particulars of any given community.<sup>15</sup>

This argument could extend to many dimensions of local politics, but the focus in this dissertation is placed on public goods delivery. While ‘public goods’ is used for the sake of (relative) brevity, this is a liberal usage given the subject under study. Collective goods such as

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<sup>15</sup> This second equilibrium may also produce local communities that are simply not very active at all, unable to forge any type of effective local governance. In this situation, distribution may be reduced because of corruption or relative inactivity on the part of the local government.

public schools, health clinics, and clean water infrastructure are best thought of as local public goods in that they are non-excludable and non-rivalrous, but their accessibility is limited to a given geographical area, as opposed to pure public goods such as national defense (Cernes and Sandler, 1996).<sup>16</sup> Following Stokes et al. (2013: 12), local public goods of this nature can be thought of as akin to pork-barrel goods in that they are non-programmatic and community, rather than individually, targeted.<sup>17</sup> More diffuse in nature, local public goods are less direct transfers than the goods-for-votes exchanges that are often the focus in the literature on clientelism.<sup>18</sup>

Voters in developing countries are principally concerned with the ability of politicians to bring goods and services, weighing a candidate's relative ability to provide for their community more than programmatic appeal (Kitschelt, 2000; Wantchekon, 2003). In Africa, these goods and services often take the form of community-specific investments rather than the vote-buying

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<sup>16</sup> Non-rivalrous, local public goods could suffer from crowding out if too many individuals access the good; thus a public school granted to a community could become over-crowded if there is undersupply. These types of investments are sometimes suggested as more closely resembling club goods to the extent that they are non-rivalrous but in practice excludable. The delivery of a primary school to one village excludes villagers from elsewhere in the community, both by virtue of distance and practicality of access but also by the fact that schools are often considered the property of a village and its nearest neighbors. A key distinction however is that individuals actively pay for the service of club goods, cable television for example. They are excludable because they are subscription based. This is categorically different from a public good that is excludable because of under-supply.

<sup>17</sup> A useful distinction is made by Golden and Min (2013: 77) who argue that local public goods are used as patronage to “create interests and obligations that reinforce or compel partisan loyalty on the part of recipients,” whereas patronage or clientelistic goods are individually-targeted in order to create long-term party loyalists.

<sup>18</sup> The term ‘local public goods’ is increasingly a double entendre now that local, elected governments deliver a set of basic public goods following democratic decentralization. These range from infrastructural investments, primary school construction and maintenance for instance, to local municipal planning (such as the construction of drainage ditches) to more diffuse social programming that is better characterized as club goods such as youth football organizations.

or one-to-one exchanges that dominate the literature on Latin America.<sup>19</sup> The assumption is therefore that support for a ‘good’ patron or representative (electoral or otherwise), will be reciprocated with the delivery of local public goods to the community (Schatzberg, 2000; Baldwin, 2013). Yet, as Nugent challenges the literature “there are precious few attempts to show exactly how leaders channel resources to service their power bases ...” (2010: 42). This project sheds light on two central aspects of this process in decentralized West Africa: it highlights the micro-distributional patterns of public goods delivery and it employs qualitative data to illustrate the ways in which local network ties shape narratives about local politics, at the same time constraining and mobilizing the strategies employed by local elites.

## The Argument

This dissertation argues that variation in the performance of local governments under democratic decentralization can be explained by historical causes. The result of a series of reforms over the past twenty years across the developing world, democratic decentralization was expected to improve local accountability, better suited to local citizen preferences than the bloated, unresponsive governments that characterized the African state in the 1970s and 1980s (Olowu, 2001). Still, detailed studies of decentralization in Africa remain rare (Olowu and Wunsch, 2004; Robinson, 2007) and most work has focused on central-local state relations (Crook, 2003; Boone, 2003b; Lambright, 2011) leaving only a handful of studies, largely conducted by political anthropologists, to describe the political dynamics interior to newly

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<sup>19</sup> Indeed there is relatively little evidence of vote buying or monitoring in the region (van de Walle, 2007).

created local governments (see, for example, the edited volume by Blundo and Le Meur, 2009).

What work has been produced has largely indicated that decentralization schemes have fallen short of their goals, citing factors such as elite capture (Platteau, 2004; Bardhan and Mookerjee, 2006) or exclusionary practices as definitions of local community, highly tied to local economic and political interests, change or are made to exclude the poor or under-represented (Mohan and Stokke, 2000; Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007).

Existing work highlights two crucial elements of the argument advanced here: the relative successes and failures of democratic decentralization can largely be explained by the local elites that power fell to and, in the same turn, decentralization only “favored the exacerbation and hardened certain traits” within local politics (Blundo, 1998: 6)<sup>20</sup>. Structural endowments, such as resources and capacity (see Romeo, 2003), only weakly explain differences in outcomes relative to the role played by pre-existing socio-political dynamics. Any attempt to explain variation in local government performance following such reforms, therefore, has to address the reality of the local politics.

## **Local Elite Networks**

The argument begins from the premise that, within local communities, elites reciprocally recognize and validate others who share similar status-claims, such as shared descent from the first-founders of an area or members of the same ethnicity, religion or caste. The term *local elite networks* is used to refer to such relational ties among elites within any given area. These ties

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<sup>20</sup> Similar claims are made by Olivier de Sardan who demonstrates that politics within Niger’s local governments are rarely constructed around the public interest, but rather tied to various local solidarities. “The canton chief is first and foremost the representative of a lineage ... The president of the cereal bank management committee is first and foremost a man of the neighborhood ....” he writes (2009: 45).

have social dimensions, encompassing both ‘strong’ ties to family and friends à la Granovetter (1973) at the same time they encompass weak ties - a cousin’s cousin one sees rarely, for example, or two village chiefs whose villages have co-existed two kilometers apart for centuries. What creates a network is not necessarily immediate, frequent and intimate social relations therefore but the similarity of claims to local authority made by elites.

Take for example the most common network form: autochthony, whereby certain communities or groups of individuals invoke greater rights to land or autochthony because they are *originaires* or ‘sons of the soil’. Village chiefs in a community who all claim descent to pre-colonial ancestors who first cleared and farmed the land (see Galvan, 2004; Hilgers, 2011) form a network because their continued authority equally depends on their mutual reinforcement that descending from the first inhabitants bestows a higher social status.<sup>21</sup> If such an area sees growing in-migration, new migrants are unlikely to be integrated into these networks, instead forming new social networks. An extended family who moves into an area and founds a handful of villages will share not only social and economic ties, but a local elite network because they mutually recognize and reinforce the validity of their own claims to the land they farm or herd on. Claims of elite status will likely be limited to their own intra-network ties however because their assertion of authority is not co-terminus with those of autochthons or other groups.

Consequently, not all local elites will be integrated into any given network in their area. Rather, the ability of a village chief, imam, notable, etc. to be part of a network depends on

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<sup>21</sup> Making land habitable is most concretely thought of clearing brush land and farming it. Other activities, such as digging a well or wrestling with the supernatural powers in a given area factor into some understandings.

their possession of the shared basis to membership, itself determined by attributes they are almost exclusively born with: claims to settlement patterns and/or other ascriptive characteristics.<sup>22</sup> At base, any two individuals who share a similar claim to local elite status, such as descent from a pre-colonial kingdom, will recognize their mutual rights to local authority even if they have no immediate relation because of the perceived similarity in position between them (though, of course, in many cases centuries of co-habitation have created social and economic ties across villages that further reinforce these relations).<sup>23</sup> This theory, whereby individuals inherit relations and network ties by virtue of their lineage, relies on an understanding of the “historical and structural embeddedness of relations” described by Granovetter (1985: 486). In brief, local elite networks are not something that local or national actors can create or (re)form at will, but rather emerge organically over time.

In the aggregate, local elite networks form informal institutions because they both engender and reproduce socially generated understandings of rules and standards in a community at the same time that they inform distributional decisions. Put otherwise, they produce hierarchical claims to community resources that are founded in a social status conferred by the network-as-institution. Because elite networks are relatively sticky in the short-run, they circumscribe local elites’ choice sets, incentivizing elites to affirm the network’s value because their own claims to authority depend on reinforcing the network as a whole. A local politician

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<sup>22</sup> The most notable exception to this is situations of religious conversion, where individuals who convert may more easily obtain in-network status.

<sup>23</sup> This logic extends to cases where the ‘source’ claim is more diffuse. For example, two village chiefs whose grand-fathers migrated from Guinea to found their villages might have no family or social ties but because both of them make similar claims to local status (a non-autochthonous claim based on usufruct land usage).

who is elected because he is from the dominant ethnicity, for instance, is likely to bolster his local, ethnically based network ties because his own authority derives from ethnicity-cum-network.

In this way, networks create webs of obligation for local elites. At base, local elites seek to deliver patronage for the same reasons that we expect any leader to do so: to (re)win election, to re-affirm their value as an intermediary for the community or, more simply, because their own families and friends benefit from infrastructure improvements. Elites prioritize aiding their families, friends and followers as defined by their networks ties because it is rational for them to do so.<sup>24</sup> Because elites rely on mutually reinforcing claims to authority within networks they are willing to engage in reciprocal, long-term exchanges of benefits across villages, such that all elites invest in the network even when it does not immediately benefit their own ‘constituents’ under the assumption that, over the long-run, they too will ‘eat’ (to invoke a long-standing metaphor in African politics).<sup>25</sup> Networks allow elites to pool resources along local understanding of community identity while investing in maintaining these ties as a way to restrict the benefits of membership. The argument is not therefore that pre-colonial

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<sup>24</sup> Take for example a village chief. While he may want to obtain services for his own village, a central component of this is to interface with and invest in broader social relations that can help his village in the future. This may entail sacrificing immediate short-term gains while other network members accrue benefits. Investing in the benefit of the broader network establishes a chief’s commitment to network members under the assumption that he too will gain over the long-term. Over time, this process of investment generates mutually recognized understandings about a network’s identity, defining localized understandings of who is and is not a network member and shaping how local elites pursue social, economic and political goals.

<sup>25</sup> The specific nature of this will vary; co-ethnics in an area they believe is rightfully theirs, for example, will claim status as the descendants of the first-founders of villages of ethnicity X. Villages that claim founding in a certain historical era (i.e. the state of Cayor) will make similar claims of historical origin that mutually-reinforce the primacy of these claims.

centralization always produces better development outcome or produce more benevolent leaders, but that because history left different social legacies embodied in elite networks, local social dynamics constrain the political strategies that elites adopt when distributing public goods.

## **Network Congruence**

If local elite networks help prioritize distributional decisions, they are only able to meaningfully do so for things that are firmly within the jurisdiction of local elites. The central moving part of this dissertation's argument revolves around local elite network ties, but it is the overlap between these informal institutions and their formal institutional boundaries that generates the variation in local political dynamics that are established in the empirical material presented in the following chapters.

With the advent of decentralization and the creation of local governments, local elite networks found themselves in new, formal institutional environments that sometimes were, but sometimes were not, congruent with their perceptions of their natural socio-political boundaries.<sup>26</sup> Because networks generate an understanding of who is and is not deserving of goods, it is only when formal institutional boundaries cover a (nearly) cohesive network of elites that they are able to territorially delimit pre-existing sub-national identities and thereby encourage elites to act towards the development of the broader community.<sup>27</sup> This is the

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<sup>26</sup> This should not be read as indicating that elite networks stop neatly at the boundaries of local governments, merely that within one single administrative unit the elite networks is largely cohesive. Elite networks often spread across local governments. What is understood by the term congruence here, however, is that an administrative boundary does not encapsulate numerous, splintered networks.

<sup>27</sup> Local elite networks rarely stop at the rural community border, rather extending over larger swaths of territory in many cases. Elites can maintain broader social connections in these cases, while still being able to focus political and redistributive choices within their own, newly delimited rural community.

dominant outcome in areas home to pre-colonial states, where local elite networks remain largely intact from the pre-colonial era on. This can prove to be a problem however in communities that host multiple elite networks, now expected to run a local government and redistribute local public goods in unison, but with few incentives for elites to do so. In areas that lack unifying network ties, the presence of multiple elite networks generates locally exclusive identities. These identities are salient and easy to mobilize within the community and elites use these as means to channel goods to their own in-network members. Networks may emerge from and reinforce claims about ethnicity, autochthony, etc., but no matter what their basis, actual decisions over where public goods are distributed are refracted through them.

In identifying an informal institution, local elite networks, as the key driver of contemporary distributional politics, this dissertation joins the increasingly widespread study of informal institutions (see Helmke and Levitsky, 2004 for a review). Indeed, a large part of this literature has sought to explain how informal institutions shape development outcomes and practices of service delivery, at times capable of improving outcomes (Putnam, 1993; Helmke and Levitsky, 2006; Tsai, 2007) while at others impeding or perverting them (Hyden, 1980; Collins, 2004; see Boone, 2003a for a mixed case). What this dissertation advances is that it is not just the role of informal institutions that matters for explaining variation in outcomes however, but that it is the relationship between formal and informal institutions that merits further scholarly attention.

This focus has been noticeably lacking in the literature bar a few exceptions.<sup>28</sup> A handful of authors have found that greater overlap between formal and informal institutions increases government legitimacy (Englebert, 2000) and can create the basis for better self-government (Cornell and Kalt, 1995). Cornell and Kalt refer to this as 'constitutional match,' whereby formal political institutions are more effective when they rest on 'extra constitutional' capital that ties individuals together (1995: 403). A similar empirical claim is made by Dippel (2014), whose finds that Native American reservations on which multiple bands without a history of shared governance were grouped together have worse economic outcomes today despite ethnic homogeneity. "This is important," he writes, "because it suggests that historical social divisions can persist and have long-run effects, even when they are not tied to easily observable characteristics like ethnicity" (2014: 2131).<sup>29</sup> Together, these arguments suggest that it is not simply attributes of society that matter, but the overlap of social groups, as informal institutions, and the geographic bounds of decision-making.

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<sup>28</sup> Of course, the role of formal institutions in shaping or being shaped by informal institutions has been recognized in the literature on African politics. For example, work has paid particular attention to colonial rule, whose policies altered and reshaped the role of traditional institutions, creating divergent legacies for democratic quality and regime legitimacy because of their structuring of political space and political identities (Ekeh, 1975; Mamdani, 1996; Ndegwa, 1997). What is missing in this work however, is any recognition of over-time or across-space variation in these various formal-informal configurations. Room for adaptation among informal institutions is present in Maclean (2010), who evaluates how informal norms of reciprocity are affected by the colonial and post-colonial state differently across borders, but such studies are exceptions; most work takes informal institutions as given, their origins irrelevant or unknowable.

<sup>29</sup> Such arguments are reminiscent of Laitin (1986), whose work on ancestral cities among the Yoruba attempts to reconcile how membership to informal, cultural institutions orders individuals' political priorities by facilitating collective action around these identities rather than other political dimensions. For Laitin, informal cultural institutions or 'sub-systems' create 'common-sense notions' about political and social life and hence structure individual preferences and strategies. When these beliefs overlap with a broader community they become hegemonic (1986: 180).

Such interplay between formal institutional dynamics and society has long been studied; scholars continue to actively debate the merits of varying configurations between state and social institutions. The concern that one must understand the state's relation with society and treat the state as one of a multitude of sources of authority has been particularly prevalent in the African context (Bratton, 1989; Migdal, 2001). Scholarship emphasizing the dynamic nature of African societies, assumed to be strong enough to challenge state policy implementation, reached an apex in the late 1980s, when a number of scholars glorified African society as a solution to the state's chronic problems (notably Chazan and Rothschild, 1988; Azarya and Chazan, 1989).<sup>30</sup> The implications of the state, or formal sphere, embedded in informal, socially rooted institutions are mixed however. For both Evans (1995) and Tsai (2007), governments perform better when they have close ties to society, particularly in societies with high degrees of coherence and norms of solidarity.<sup>31</sup>

A large body of work in African politics, emerging out of a culturalist tradition, has emphasized the negative effects of cultural attributes inherited from pre-colonial society on contemporary politics, frequently described as leading to sub-par political dynamics today. In one well known work, Bayart (1993) highlights the 'historicity' of the African state, whereby traditions of governance rooted in the pre-colonial period continue to dominate the logic of power today (the colonial encounter a mere 'shuffling of cards'). Chabal and Daloz (1999)

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<sup>30</sup> The recognition that societies throughout the region are home to a plethora of social organizations - formal and informal - has led some, like Migdal (1988) to argue that the state is but one of many competing source of authority in such societies.

<sup>31</sup> This conclusion is not without opposing evidence however; Collins (2006) finds that individuals with network ties to clans in Central Asia are less likely to hold elites accountable with negative impacts for government output, as clans function in the region to usurp state power and create an informal regime that follows clan logic.

explain the relative ‘disorder’ of the African state as a function of the state’s embeddedness in society. A more nuanced account can be found in Schatzberg, who argues that cultural transcripts of appropriate behavior for leaders as ‘father of the nation’ has led officials to redistribute downwards through their respective patronage networks as they fulfill their obligations to their ‘children,’ thus benefiting some at the expense of others because of cultural repertoires (2000: 24). This project indicates that no-such uniform effect of ‘culture’ exists - at least as pertains to local politics - but rather that we must nuance how informal social practices matter by taking seriously the interaction of informal and formal institutions.

### **Micro-Mechanisms: Explaining Local Elite Behavior**

Clearly, the ability of local elite networks to explain how distributional decisions are made in local communities hinges on the question of how network ties sufficiently motivate elites to act towards their networks rather than colluding to create a minimum winning coalitions or to collectively prey upon resources. Realistically of course, there are likely many factors that drive local actor behavior, but three which find extensive support in qualitative interviews are highlighted here: the role of status and prestige in, first, motivating elites to seek to maintain their status as a patron vertically with clients, who can hold them accountable through informal mechanisms of accountability and, secondly, to worry about their reputations horizontally amongst their network members. Thirdly, network ties generate collectively mobilizing identities that facilitate coordinated action among elites. All three of these mechanisms, which are expected to overlap and work in tandem - though the relative weight of any one may vary from situation to situation - are consistent with the argument that local

elites' decisions to act towards network members is part of a rational decision that maximizes their social as well as material gains.<sup>32</sup>

### *Prestige and Status*

Weber was one of the first to theoretically formalize status as a type of political power, defining it as "an effective claim to social esteem in terms of negative or positive privileges" (1978 (1922): 3051).<sup>33</sup> Individuals with high status positions are often treated differently, obtaining material and social benefits during market and non-market (such as marriage prospects) transactions and are more likely to be deferred to and treated with symbolic displays of respect (Goode, 1978; Hawkes, 1993: Weiss and Fehrstrom, 1998: 802). Social status is not unlike norms in this way, regulating social life because of the associated pressure for and approval of certain behaviors more than others. When a desire for social status induces behavior change among individuals, the aggregate effect can lead to 'quite determinant patterns of behavior' that are the result of decentralized control, with no active or targeted demands on behavior. "All those who regulate in this mode will be regulated in turn by others. There are no regulators who are in a position to escape the sort of regulation they practice when they police others by the opinions they form of them," Brennan and Pettit write (2004: 260).

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<sup>32</sup> This logic holds no matter how we wish to conceive of what drives rational individual behavior in a network. For actors to maintain their social status, 'social capital', identity, etc., they must be engaged in iterated play that induces them to act in a forward-thinking manner to preserve these attributes (Barr, Ensminger and Johnson, 2010: 69-70).

<sup>33</sup> Status' social value depends, of course, on a generalized agreement about who has status and is in this way inherently positional. Status is not easily obtained, as many forms are hereditary or otherwise restricted while others, such as membership to a prestigious club, are easier to acquire (Frank and Heffetz, 2008).

Such an argument has received minimal attention in recent political science research (for exceptions see Cowen and Sutter, 1995; Tsai, 2007; McClendon, 2012; Paller, 2014), though the suggestion that elites are motivated by status or reputational boosts follows insights from a number of disciplines that have revived the social dimensions of decision-making (Akerlof, 1997), recognizing that “local status has a price and can be traded for material things that have value” (Franck, 1985: 10). Social scientists increasingly recognize status, or the desire for the esteem of others, as a motivating factor in individual decision-making (Ternheim, 1994, Brennan and Pettit, 2004). Indeed individuals seem “willing to sacrifice consumption to obtain it” (Ball et al., 2001: 162) and to act to reinforce or establish their own status, engaging in more pro-social behavior when their actions are public or their identity revealed (Weiss and Fehrstrom, 1998; Frank and Heffetz, 2008).<sup>34</sup> Individuals have been shown to act out of concern for their status relative to others (Fleissback et al, 2007), see increases in economic benefits when they have higher status (Ball and Eckel, 1998), to seek status rewards as an end in and of itself (Huberman, Loch and Ocular, 2004) and, in general, seek to preserve or improve their status position (Loch et al, 2001; Bessley and Ghatak, 2008).

### *Status and Informal Norms of Accountability*

Recognizing the desire of local elites to maintain their reputations and status offers the first mechanism through which local elite networks translates into local elite decision-making about public goods delivery. Local actors of any kind have, to varying degrees, shared ascriptive

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<sup>34</sup> From a different perspective, Kahan (2003: 71) suggests a *logic of reciprocity*, whereby individuals contribute to public goods provisions when they feel others are helping because they are also motivated by honor, altruism, etc. But when they feel others are not helping, they are likely to not help out of hurt pride or anger even when their own material interest is held constant.

ties via kinship, ethnicity or history that impose reputational costs on poorly regarded behavior. Combined with the weak (at best nominal) role of political parties and the lack of local fiscal resources during normal times (let alone campaigns), individual elites have few resources to deploy other than those they obtain via their social status and network ties. The social pressure associated with the ability to gain or lose status is especially acute when individuals live within their communities, in essence making them ‘stationary bandits,’ willing to invest in the community’s long-run success and aware of the long-term consequences for themselves if they err (Olson, 1993). Because local elites rarely have exit options should their reputation suffer, their willingness to sacrifice future, reputation-based material and social payouts for short-term banditry is circumscribed.

This logic has been employed most notably by Tsai’s work on solidary groups in China, whereby citizens can grant or withhold ‘moral standing’ to local officials, incentivizing the latter to provide public goods and work for the community where they otherwise may not.<sup>35</sup> In this way, citizens have a bottom-up capacity to hold officials accountable in a way that they do not in communities that lack these encompassing and embedding institutions (2007: 4, 16). Likewise, Dippel (2014), who finds that parochial behavior of leaders on Native American reservations is lower in reservations populated by a single, autonomous social group, suggests that this might be the result of informal social norms that can hold local leaders accountable in the absence of

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<sup>35</sup> Specifically, she defines these informal mechanisms as “rules or norms that were not officially authorized or intended to enable citizens to hold officials accountable for providing public services but which do so nonetheless” (2007: 4). Moral standing is, in many ways, similar to the idea of prestige and status discussed in the previous section.

strong formal institutions. This is similar as well to Bates' (1974) argument that kinship groups provide an informal means of redistribution.

Central to these arguments is a conceptualization of informal institutions, based on vertical relations between patrons and clients (in one form or another) to fill a gap that is left by formal institutions. It is via these informal institutions that clients can hold patrons accountable because the ability to reward or withhold reputational pay-offs on the part of the former is a meaningful threat to the latter to the degree that they share, broadly speaking, a social network. This is not to reduce the incentives of elites to reputational pay-offs alone; this argument leaves open room for local elites to be concerned about the social welfare of their clients, echoing recent work by Auyero (2000) and Paller (2014), because this fulfills desires to reinforce power and status. Indeed, clientelism rooted in social networks, where brokers and politicians live in the same community, are often interpreted by citizens 'in terms of solidary relations' rather than as instrumental exchanges (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007b).<sup>36</sup>

The specific form that the incentives to maintain status takes among local elites varies. Senegal's village chiefs, for example, who had their power over land distribution curtailed following the 1964 land act, recognize that their continued status and role in the village depends on their ability to be a 'good chief' by acting as a liaison between villagers and the state, settling disputes within the village fairly and helping to advance their villagers' interests.

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<sup>36</sup> These ideas are taken up by Lawson and Green (2012), who articulate a micro-foundational approach wherein clientelism can become self-reinforcing when voters develop a sense of obligation to support patrons (such as through shows of allegiance or solidarity or willingly going so far as to vote retrospectively as an 'act of repayment'). Patrons and brokers, in turn, may genuinely seek to repay clients, which can further strengthen the clientelistic equilibrium as politicians and elites are seen as more credible (2012: 6-11, 25).

Although the chieftaincy remains firmly within the family in the vast majority of villages, many chiefs are quick to note that ‘we are in democracy now’ and that challengers may come from within their family or their role may diminish in importance altogether if they do not act as a good steward. As is explored further in Chapter Five, chiefs are anxious to maintain to do their job well because they value the prestige of their position and understand that it is based, in part, on their performance.

True to dominant expectations, elected officials want to stay in power and recognize that they must deliver public goods to do so, but they are also quick to state that above all, voters seek a ‘man of confidence’ or someone that is trusted by the community. This trust or a reputation as a ‘good representative’ is not only expressed along electoral dimensions. In the event of losing (re)election, they still want to retain their role as a respected member of the community and to continue to be consulted and deferred to when decisions need to be made. Their actions in office will therefore reflect both of these objectives - retention of power and retention of their reputation and status. These goals may overlap neatly in some circumstances, but in others the latter will lead elites to act counter to dominant expectations: public goods may not target core or swing voters in identifiable ways as seen here because this may not be the logic of distribution within the community.

### *Status and Reputations in Horizontal Peer Groups*

Local elites are also concerned, however, about maintaining their reputations horizontally amongst each other. The creation of local governments created a new venue within which local elites had invested interests. Because local development projects, the collection of

local taxes, the resolution of particularly sticky land disputes, etc. all gained a new institutional forum, close to home and close to friends and family, the costs of a negative reputation amongst other elites took on new dimensions that would have been less consequential before these same peers were charged with making important community decisions.

Though similar in many ways to the vertical relations described above, horizontally local elites are less likely to value being seen as a good patron or chief to their village, favoring instead developing a reputation as acting for the broader network, someone who can be trusted to not defect, minimizing their own short-term gains for the good of the network as a whole. Following Granovetter (1985), therefore, this conceptualizes actors as socially embedded, whereby actors' behavior is sharply influenced by their social relations. In developing a game theoretic model of Granovetter's emphasis on reputations, Raub and Weesie (2000) find that pareto-superior outcomes are reached when actors are modeled as embedded in networks that circulate information about their reputations. In short, reputations extend time horizons, leading actors away from exploiting partners because the short-run gains cannot compensate from the long-run costs that a damaged reputation incurs. They observe, "... these long-run costs become greater the faster an actor's reputation spread in his interaction network. In this way, mutual abstention from attempts to exploit partners, based on conditional cooperation, can become individually profitable" (647).

This will remind many of the reputational incentives that lie at the heart of Greif's (2006) influential case on the Maghrebi Traders' Coalition in the late medieval era that also relied on future-oriented actors discounting short-term gains for long-term ones. Such effects are

especially likely in cases where actors have limited mobility, such as those found in much of rural West Africa. As Hardin argues, an individuals' desire to preserve their reputation for future interactions can lead them to factor the interests of others into their own. Hardin calls this 'encapsulated interest' and, even when an actor does not maintain close social ties with the other player, when the reputational cost of violating the other's trust has clear reputational costs - be them economic, political, or social - further down the line, the actor is more likely to so 'encapsulate' the other's interest into their own decision making (2002: 22).

This work emerging out of economics reinforces the findings of other social science disciplines. The literature on social distance has shown that individuals are more generous and pro-social to members of their social networks in anticipation of reciprocal exchanges (Leider et al., 2009; Apicella et al., 2012). In the absence of political parties, Munshi and Rosenzweig (2008) find that strong social institutions in rural India can discipline leaders to maintain good behavior. When local elites engage in 'mutual abstention' from predation, as argued by Raub and Weesie (2000), they are manifesting this sanctioning effect of their networks-cum-informal institutions. By valuing long-term interactions over short-term gains, they reflect the understanding that as members of a local community, there are substantial reputational costs to going against the interests of the group.

Together, this work suggests that the more densely embedded local elites are in social relations, the more they will factor in the interests of others networks members when calculating their own. This will lead them to forgo defection that might produce short-term rents, such as embezzling funds from a local development project, if they think that their reputation will suffer

and that this will prevent them from benefiting in future interactions with network members.

By extension, a village chief that might gain from mobilizing his villagers to vote for a non-co-ethnic may get an immediate pay-off from the candidate, but if he thinks that this will undermine his ability to obtain social, political and economic favors from co-ethnic elites for the foreseeable future, he is unlikely to do so.<sup>37</sup>

### *Networks and Group Identities*

Finally, the group identities affirmed by local elite networks help explain why individual elites act towards the benefit of their networks. Shared group membership has been found to foster a sense of common goals (Brewer, 1979; Tajfel and Turner, 1986), act in the interest of the groups (Transue, 2007; Shayo, 2009; Singh, 2014) and increase sharing among in-group members (Baldassarri and Grossman, 2013). At base, these findings reflect the broader tendency of individuals to identify themselves with groups, deriving value from holding the identity in and of itself. As Akerlof and Kranton (2000) observe, individual's attachment to their group identities can explain otherwise ‘irrational’ behavior by altering their preferences.

Work on social identity theory can therefore help explain why local elites would work for the interest of their peer-elites as a group. Lab experiments reveal that individuals strongly prefer in-group members (Fowler and Kam, 2007) and not only are more likely to opt for social-welfare enhancing choices when paired with fellow in-group members, but they are more charitable to fellow group members who receive lower pay-offs (Chen and Li, 2009). Even randomly assigned group membership has been found to increase cooperation and enforce group

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<sup>37</sup> This is further incentivized because his vertical status depends on his ability to continue to serve as a valuable intermediary to villagers.

norms (Goette, Huffman and Meier, 2006). Outside of behavioral economics and social psychology, political scientists have repeatedly shown that within-group members are better able to overcome collective action dilemmas, be it via shared norms, rules or preferences (Bates, 1983; Ostrom, 1990; Miguel and Guegerty, 2005; Habyarimana et al, 2007) to reach better outcomes. In India, Singh (2014) finds that a collective sense of ‘we-ness’ enable groups to overcome collective action dilemmas.

The question of how group identities can motivate behavior is also much studied among sociologists. Gould (1991) argues that collective identities can motivate behavior when they establish both who has similar social relations (potential group members) and who actually has lived social connections. This means that group identities are mobilizing at a particularly local level; “networks founded on spatial proximity provide fertile ground for the emergence of plausible collective identities: individuals with ties to neighbors can readily observe numerous others whose patterns of social interaction match their own” (205).<sup>38</sup> Central to Gould’s argument is the idea that the creation of new formal institutions can create or emphasize social ties because they demonstrate to individuals their shared commonalities. In this way, democratic decentralization and other similar reforms are capable of “rais[ing] the ceiling of participant identity” by facilitating collective action at a higher level than would previously have been possible based on informal, daily interactions alone (1991: 21-22).

On the ground, individuals are much more likely to invoke group identities without problematizing or questioning them. Identities such as being a descendent of the pre-colonial

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<sup>38</sup> This is not, however, explicitly linked to only direct social ties, but includes friends of friends or similar degrees of separation.

Sine Empire in western Senegal, to take one example, have certainly long been relevant to individuals, but it was the creation of rural communities that allowed local elites to articulate these commonalities within a defined institutional space and, as a result, to mobilize (consciously or not) around them. Identities exist, of course, in historically acephalous areas as well, but these identities are almost always sub-nationally exclusive, delimiting group boundaries at the sub-rural community level. Elite claims to networks mobilized around the identity of a Wolof, a Christian or an allochthon, are likewise rooted in individual, ascriptive characteristics, but are amplified because they are locally exclusive and rival those of others in the community. In contrast, in communities with near encompassing elite network ties, territorially inclusive identities predominate: most local elites (and, by extension, most of their clients) lay claim to the same elite network and, in the process, mobilize around an identity that extends to the bounds of the rural community.<sup>39</sup>

### *What Prevents Predation?*

Studies have suggested that in areas where power is concentrated in the hands of a few, elites are likely to collude, producing poor development outcomes even if social capital is higher (Anderson, Francois and Kotwol, 2011; Acemoglu, Reed and Robinson, 2012). The position that local elites have as intermediaries between the population and the state or donors uniquely

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<sup>39</sup> This latter argument resembles in many ways Brubaker's (1990) work on citizenship rights in France and Germany. In-migrants into the territory of pre-colonial states might feel culturally distant, like North African immigrants in France, but they still benefit from falling within a territorial expanse that is congruent with the dominant elite network in the area. By virtue of spillover effects or their 'adoption' into the community, they still benefit from developmental actions of the local community as a result. In acephalous areas however, community membership is frequently defined along the dimensions of different elite networks, mirroring Germany's membership by descent, with numerous such groups sharing an officially decreed territorial delimitation with little to unite them.

enables them to advance their own interests and, similarly, unfairly divert resources to themselves (Platteau, 2009). This raises the question: why don't local elites in areas of dense networks ties collude, opting to act in their own interests at the expense of the average citizens?

How a positive equilibrium of public goods delivery is reached, wherein densely networked elites seek to deliver to their clients *and* do not collectively defect from delivery can be explained by a combination of three, perhaps deceptively simple, realities. First, all local elites seek to maintain their positions vis-à-vis their clients and the risks of not doing so are amplified in the era democratic decentralization. Although close ties with other elites can lead to collusion in non-electoral settings, Grossman (2012) finds that democratically elected leaders are more responsive to the welfare needs of constituents. Similar effects of elections have been found in Liberia (Baldwin and Mvukiyehe, 2011) and China (Luo et al., 2007). Elected officials across rural Senegal recognize that they could easily be voted out of office.<sup>40</sup> Even for village chiefs, aware that they could legally be replaced, even if only by brothers or uncles, there is growing pressure to do their best to represent their villages because 'we are in democracy now.'

Secondly, elites themselves benefit from public goods investments. The opinion that following democratic decentralization there is much to gain at the local government level is voiced around the country and the benefits accrue to the families of chiefs and elected officials as much as any other villager. Indeed, one key difference among West African local elites and those in studies that find high amounts of inter-elite predation is the absence of a consistent class divisions - while some village chiefs or councilors are wealthier than their villagers, most

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<sup>40</sup> As discussed in Chapter Six, the average elected officials has served 1.8 mandates, with no meaningful variation in thus number across the country.

are only marginally so at best.<sup>41</sup> They are not necessarily more likely to be able to send their children to school in other villages or to travel long distances to receive medical care. Nor are they necessarily of a different caste and, in many situations, they share extended family ties with most of their fellow villagers. Simply put, just like their clients they almost always are direct beneficiaries of public goods investments.

This self-interest extends to the reported desire of many local chiefs to develop their communities.<sup>42</sup> One common manifestation of this sentiment, heard around the country, was the lament that too many youth left their families and communities to seek a future in Dakar or, worse, took dangerous boat journeys to try to reach Europe. “If there was water here,” one village chief in Linguere Department observed, “there would be almost no street peddlers (*marchand ambulant*) in Dakar.”<sup>43</sup> Few have missed the link between health care, education and water and market access and the broader quality of life for their communities. The pride that many elites have in their region’s history further encourages them to want to see their community develop, not only so that their sons do not leave, but also because they care about and are proud of the community that remains.

Finally, the fact that elite collusion does not appear in the data under study here likely reflects the reality of the outcome under study. Central government transfers are often

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<sup>41</sup> The only clear difference is found in the rural council president, who is often elected in no small part due to some ‘extra’ form of capital, such as commanding an unusual amount of local respect, having worked in Dakar or being very affluent.

<sup>42</sup> Tsai recognizes a similar mechanism, noting that such informal institutions can prevent communities from defaulting to this expected outcome by “... strengthening group sanctions, promoting social trust, improving skills of cooperation, and encouraging attitudes and habits of cooperation or shifting tastes from particularistic interests ... to more community-oriented concerns” (2007: 15).

<sup>43</sup> Interview, village chief #2, rural community #21, 1 March 2013.

earmarked by sector and, while corruption certainly happens across the country, building no local public goods with the funds would result in central state sanction. Elite collusion is plausible, and indeed likely, in less-easily monitored areas of local state action, but large, visible infrastructure projects are harder to skirt. Still, even if they are colluding the difference between uncentralized and centralized areas is not the number of public goods constructed in absolute or per capita numbers, but their *placement*, as shown in Chapter Three. Even if local elites build fewer public goods in centralized areas, collectively profiting from diverted funds, compared to uncentralized areas that build the same number of schools, they are still placing them more broadly and efficiently across the country.

## **From Pre-Colonial States to Contemporary Distributional Politics**

The suggestion that the relationship between historical causes - like pre-colonial centralization - and contemporary outcomes is driven by socio-political dynamics departs from the relative under-theorization of *local* allocative decision-making as a historically informed political process. Two decades after large waves of decentralization reforms, scholars have yet to seriously interrogate how well theories of high-politics developed at the national level play out in local communities and the implicit assumption of almost all political science work is that decision-makers exist in ahistorical vacuum. These assumptions finds little support among anthropological and case-study evidence, which suggests that local politics is shaped by locally driven factions and disagreements (recall Blundo, 1998). As Nugent notes of The Gambia, ethnicity is a key political cleavage nationally, “but its salience remains weak in the internal politics of most rural communities” (2010: 50). Consequently, the following discussion clarifies

the link between contemporary local elites and pre-colonial statehood by showing the remarkable persistence of local elite status across time, explaining why local elites continue to invest in network-based socio-political relations when making decisions and, finally, why together with the creation of local governments these factors create sub-national differences in local public goods delivery.

### *Persistence in Local Elite Status*

Local elites in rural West Africa fall into a predictable set of categories for the region: local elected officials, village chiefs, notables and religious leaders. In Senegal, individuals who win seats on the local rural council, at the head of which is a President, akin to a mayor, command substantial respect and deference, in part due to the power they wield as well as the fact that they often descend from locally powerful families (see Chapter Two for a full discussion of Senegal's local elected governments). Village chiefs also fill an official place in the administrative hierarchy, but despite laws stipulating that chiefs be elected, village chieftaincies are almost exclusively passed in the male lineage in West Africa, a title transmitted either father to son or to the oldest male in the family. Villages often have a second lineage from which the village Imam is chosen, frequently a family that was an early inhabitant of the village (see discussion in Juul, 2006 for example). In Senegal, where most major ethnic groups had castes, this effect was amplified by the persistence of these social categories, further reinforcing elite status. Although caste effects have faded over time, Gellar et al. (1980: 2) note that social status remains largely rooted in caste and social norms in rural areas; "village chiefs continue to be chosen on the basis of their ancestral ties to the village founders, and political leaders are

still expected to distribute their largesse generously to their following to fulfill traditional obligations.”

In general, social status in rural West Africa has proven quite durable over time.<sup>44</sup>

Writing shortly after independence, Colson (1969: 53) observes at tendency towards continuity in local institutions despite substantial political upheaval, with people’s identity linked to their corporate lineages. The village remains the “fundamental social unit of the region” with an enduring internal socio-political hierarchy (Searing, 2002: 6). This hierarchy, Searing continues, is structured around early occupants that served as an interface between pre-colonial states (and subsequently the colonial and post-colonial state) and the population; the “village hierarchy assumed responsibility for protecting the community through diplomacy, the payment of tribute and the organizing of self-defense” (2002: 7). Of course, the colonial encounter and a half-century later independence dramatically altered the formal institutional environment within which pre-colonial elites operated. But historians generally agree that this did relatively little to alter power relations in the countryside, leaving rural social relations intact. The village chieftaincy has persisted unchanged to the present day, though, unlike in other colonial settings, the upper echelons of the pre-colonial hierarchies found in place by the French were almost exclusively dismantled.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> This is not to imply that status is immutable in rural areas, but social mobility is much more strongly associated with urban environments.

<sup>45</sup> Although some royal descendants continued to serve as the *chef de canton* (abolished at independence), the French did not have a policy to preserve tradition-based hierarchies past the first full decade of colonization.

More often than not therefore, individuals obtain local elite status because of the families they are born into, which they can parlay into other forms of prestige later in life. Patterson (2003) cites the case of the village of Ndoulo where the president of the women's cooperative is also the wife of the village chief. The accumulation of different forms of elite status or prestige like this is common in the region because such multi-dimensional forms of social status rest on local community recognition and hence the plasticity of locally-defined symbolic resources.

Additionally, recent development trends have opened up alternative paths for individuals to gain the esteem of their community members. The head of a women's cooperative or the matron of the health post are commonly cited ways for women to gain local influence. Any individual with a tie to a potentially useful outside connection - a donor, a migrant to Europe, etc. - can leverage this contact into a position of local prestige. These are one-dimensional claims to authority, however, and are more ephemeral; the departure of a donor can quickly undermine an individual's status, for example, when that tie disappears. Similarly, a councilor in the local government who loses re-election is unlikely to maintain the same level of status unless it is buttressed by other forms of influence (economic capital or being from a 'good' family, for example).<sup>46</sup>

The argument that local government performance is shaped by network ties among local elites is consistent with a general view that the dual reforms of decentralization and democratization created a 'resurgence' of African traditional authorities (for example, Englebert,

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<sup>46</sup> Of course, some means of claiming one-dimensional status are stickier, such as that which comes with sunk investments like education. Many villages have one or two educated individuals (even if this is only a high school diploma) whose informational advantages help the community interface with outsiders.

2002<sup>47</sup>; Lund, 2006; Kyed and Buur, 2007).<sup>48</sup> For local traditional elites, accustomed to serving as power brokers and intermediaries between local communities and a distant, central state, decentralization reforms produced new challenges (von Trotha, 1996; van Dijk and van Rouveroy van Nieuwall, 1999). Despite initial confusion over new roles, extant case studies indicate that traditional authorities continue to play the role of intermediary to the present day, with an array of evidence suggesting that the local governments created by decentralization in West Africa regularly delegate central tasks to informal agents (for example, Glenzer, 2005; Juul, 2006; Mohamadou, 2007; Pes, 2011).<sup>49</sup> The influence of informal institutions on local political dynamics, where most African citizens have their primary interactions with the state, is also highlighted in recent work on the ‘anthropology of the state’ (for example, Blundo and Olivier de Sardan, 2006).<sup>50</sup> Elected and traditional elites thus play dual roles: one vis-à-vis the

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<sup>47</sup> These observations have led to opposing interpretations: traditional authorities either offered a legitimate source of social capital on which new, democratic regimes could be built (for example, ECA 2007) or they hindered democratization because the ‘bonding’ social capital they represented encouraged ‘consensus politics,’ marginalized the voices of minorities and ‘splintered local power’ (Mamdani 1996; Ribot and Oyono 2005; Ribot, Chhatre and Lankina 2008). In many respects, one’s adjudication of this debate depends on where one sits. Strong traditional authorities might improve overall community outcomes while isolating individuals who hold local minority status, for example.

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<sup>49</sup> Such confusion over roles happened for elected officials and village chiefs in Senegal, the former not understanding the continued authority of the chiefs *within* villages and the latter not understanding the role of councilors as a new form of intermediary between chiefs and the *local* state (Interviews by author with various Sous-Prefets in Kedougou (3 April 2013), Kolda (12 April 2013), Louga (12 March 2013) and Tambacounda (27 March 2013) regions).

<sup>50</sup> Critically, there is no evidence that villagers see a disjunction between traditional and elected elites. Using public opinion data across the continent, Logan finds that assessments of leaders - traditional and

state, which remains an important referent for action and power in rural Africa at the same time that they act towards more localized elite networks, reinforcing their ties to extended families or historically based reciprocal relations with neighbors.<sup>51</sup>

Although individual claims to local status are often inherited, the bases of elite networks are grounded in ascriptive characteristics. Some of these are more familiar, such as ethnic networks or caste relations, while others are more specific to West Africa. Most prominently for the latter is the increasing prominent of autochthony claims in West African political discourse following the tandem processes of decentralization and democratization (Geschiere, 2009<sup>52</sup>; Hilgers, 2011).<sup>53</sup> Autochthony's influence is due in part to its plasticity as a concept, employed strategically and with significant flexibility given the ever-changing boundaries of its application

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democratic alike - are tightly linked. Chiefs and elected leaders can be thought of, she suggests "as common players in a single, integrated political system" (2009: 103).

<sup>51</sup> Despite expectations otherwise, the state remains an important reference in the lives of citizens and elites alike. Village chiefs in the region are by and large proud of their status and quick to invoke that their status as the lowest level of the deconcentrated state apparatus in Senegal is stated prior to that of the once all-powerful Sous-Prefet. Communities actively seek out official recognition for their hamlets and settlements because of both material and *symbolic* implications of having a village chief. Obtaining official status entitles a village and its residents to various distributional goods from the central and local state, such as fertilizer and other agricultural inputs or food packages (Juul 1999: 213). More theoretical explanations of this have been offered, notably by Englebert (2009: 6-7), who argues that despite its many weaknesses, the African state continues to induce compliance by citizens and to be the central locus of power struggles because it offers 'legal command', the capacity to order people around, to actors. The exchange value of this command is high at the same time that its arbitrary nature creates a host of mediated, informal arrangements. Elites across the region have incentives to maintain claims to the state and the various resources it offers them in their daily social and political interactions.

<sup>52</sup> The study of such claims has focused on its role in land disputes (Bertrand, 1994) and violent conflict, such as that witnessed in the Ivory Coast or Rwanda (Bayart, Geschiere and Nyamnjoh, 2002; Boas and Dunn, 2013).

<sup>53</sup> The study of such claims has focused on its role in land disputes (Bertrand, 1994) and violent conflict, such as that witnessed in the Ivory Coast or Rwanda (Bayart, Geschiere and Nyamnjoh, 2002; Boas and Dunn, 2013).

(Geschiere and Jackson, 2006; Geschiere, 2009; Hilgers, 2011).<sup>54</sup> To the extent that ‘first-comers’ are those who rendered a locality habitable, subsequent waves of migration add layers of ‘late-comers’ or even ‘latest-comers’ with differential degrees of rights to a community or land.<sup>55</sup> Thus even co-ethnics might compete over who has more authority in a community if they represent unrelated waves of settlement and even the poorest are both able to invest in and reap benefits from such claims (Hilgers, 2011).<sup>56</sup> Claims to autochthony should not be thought of then as absolute or unquestioned. Nor should they be assumed to over-ride all other claims to authority in a community. As Hilgers and Jacob (2008) observe in BurkinaFaso local elections, to a large degree party candidate-choice is driven by the claims that aspiring politicians can make on the region’s pre-colonial history, akin to the ‘retour du pouvoir à la maison’ as noted by Faye et al. (2006) in Mali. But the ability to translate this capital into political or material gain is

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<sup>54</sup> Thus the resurgence of such claims is in stark contrast to the historically flexible integration of migrants by Africa’s pre-colonial states, where the logic of ‘wealth in people’ as opposed to wealth in land led to the emergence of a range of flexible institutional practices, such as cousinage, adoption or clientelism, to integrated valuable labor into the polity (Bayart, Geschiere and Nyamnjoh, 2002).

<sup>55</sup> Consider, for example, a series of studies conducted by Juul (1999, 2006) in Barkedji, a large rural community in the Ferlo desert that has traditionally been inhabited by pastoralists and which falls between the pre-colonial kingdoms of Djoloff and Fouta Toro. Juul’s work chronicles the competing claims to access to pasture, boreholes and other political power among the region’s traditional inhabitants and ‘newcomers’, largely comprised of Futanke herders who moved south following the droughts of the 1970s. Attempts to exclude the Futanke take many forms, most centrally denying village claims for official recognition even when these areas had been inhabited for over twenty years, and resisting the efforts of these populations to pay local taxes (1999: 211). Ece (2008) observes how villages founded by populations evicted from Niokolo-Koba National Park in the southeast of the country in the 1970s continue to be considered ‘foreigners’ within their local government (though their original villages still largely fell within the confines of the rural community) and that such disputes increased following the 1996 decentralization reforms.

<sup>56</sup> This should not be read as a sufficient condition, as voters assess the relative morality of a candidate as well as their access to resources, thus that individuals who are not first-comers in a region may still win election (Hilgers and Jacobs, 2006: 187-8). In this sense, Hilgers argues that autochthony claims are best conceived of as a form of social capital by providing individuals access to networks and a ‘certain legitimacy’ within their communities.

context specific, dependent on other financial, political and social ties and resources; “autochthony can increase the value of other kinds of capital and make a final difference between competitors” they conclude (2011: 42).

### *Why do individuals invest in network ties?*

The status of local elites also persists because of their broader social relations. The ability of local elite status to create social and political pay-offs means that all individuals benefiting in some way from this status have an interest in maintaining their ties to the networks that bestow these benefits. This includes not only elites, but their clients as well. Thus, for instance, a casted individual’s desire to keep farming land he receives access to by virtue of his relationship with his family’s former ‘master’ creates an incentive for even the relatively disadvantaged in a community to reinforce status hierarchies.

Although not the focus of this research, most work on network ties in rural societies has focused on similar patron-client relations, whereby individuals invest in vertical relations to maintain access to resources. For example, Bates’ early articulation of why individuals participate in ethnic networks focuses on transfers among ‘big men’ and their clients. For Bates, actors with access to the state seek defend their social positions by channeling benefits to co-ethnics in order to ‘gain their support and achieve their loyalty.’<sup>57</sup> In turn, these clients know they can make significant demands on their co-ethnic ‘big men’ (1974: 471; see also Rothschild and Olorunsola, 1983). Indeed, throughout rural Africa local politics are defined by the diffuse,

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<sup>57</sup> As Fearon (1999: 5) argues, co-ethnicity is particularly amenable to pork-barrel politics because it is difficult identity to change in the short-run, unlike partisanship, thereby preventing a rapid expansion of network insiders that dilutes the rewards of being within the winning coalition. But by this logic any identity that is sticky in the short-run is a viable basis for the delivery of pork.

personal and asymmetrical power relations that lie at the heart of prominent definitions of clientelism (Lemarchand, 1981; Piattoni, 2001; Hicken, 2011; Hilger, 2011).

Beyond specific exchanges of goods, we should not forget that clientelism is classically thought about as constituting “mutual, relatively long-term compromises based on commitments and some kind of solidarity” (Roniger, 1994: 4),<sup>58</sup> reinforced through norms of reciprocity and cultural ties (Gouldner, 1960; Scott, 1972; Schmidt et al., 1977; Hyden, 1980). These early studies emphasized the face-to-face nature of patron-client relationships, that despite being based on power asymmetries granted substantial room for the social welfare concerns of patrons for their clients (Hilgers, 2011). The intimacy of such relationships, which Scott (1972: 92) defines as ‘largely instrumental friendship,’ should not be underestimated.

While this early work can be faulted for its assumption that patron-clientelism was an attribute of ‘traditional’ societies that would fade away with modernization, many of the underlying conceptualizations of the mechanism through which such ties are maintained have been unfairly dismissed or ignored in recent work (see Auyero, 2000 for an exception). Indeed, the current trend in the literature towards emphasizing instrumental, vote-maximizing politicians (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Stokes et al., 2013) and instrumentally rational voters, seeking access to goods (Baldwin, 2013) has led to a narrow focus on how politicians use public goods as a means to secure and retain power; patron-client relationships are now seen as a form of representation in its own right (see Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2006; Remmer, 2007;

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<sup>58</sup> Even when patrons, representatives and clients are linked in kinship or social networks, this does not remove potential threats to the status positions of the former types. Control, Roniger notes, “is never fully legitimized,” but could always be undermined by other patrons, bureaucratization of social organization or excluded social forces (1994: 4).

Stokes et al., 2013).<sup>59</sup> In its application to the African context, the introduction of electoral competition introduced patronage politics in full force (van de Walle, 2007) with recent literature focusing on how service delivery is motivated by the political calculi of politicians who target supporters along partisan or ethnic lines (Burgess, Morjaria and Miquel, 2011; Franck and Rainer, 2013) and that such motivations are the root cause of sub-national inequalities (Posner, 2005; Green, 2011). More recent work has been able to push this literature farther using better data and disaggregating among localities (Edjymer et al., 2015) and across goods (Posner and Kramon, 2014).<sup>60</sup>

Local politics in decentralized contexts continue to be defined by clientelism, but the local and personal nature of ties among individuals within communities means that theories

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<sup>59</sup> This literature has successfully integrated a motivating debate in American politics, over whether politicians target core voters, whereby risk-adverse politicians prefer to maintain existing political coalitions (Cox and McCubbins, 1986) or to deliver goods and policies to constituents that are most likely to respond to small improvements in their material well-being rather than to programmatic or partisan appeals, often swing voters (Dixit and Londregran, 1995; Tavits, 2009). Recent work has shifted focus to concrete variation in these dynamics, such as turnout buying (Nichter 2008), the role of brokers and intermediaries (Krishna, 2007; Kotter, 2013a; Stokes et al., 2013) and the specific forms that such relationships take in different settings (Roniger, 2004).

<sup>60</sup> The innovative use of data in this literature deserves praise. Yet a number of problems remain in our understandings of the political logics that public goods delivery follows. As pointed out by Golden and Min (2013), the assumption of favoritism on the part of many authors is made with no measure of a neutral or objective, need-based outcome as a baseline for comparison. This project corrects for this by employing location-allocation models to establish the relative degree of deviation from such a baseline (Chapter 3). Additionally, literature has only recently examined changes in service provision over time, mostly by using Demographic and Health Survey data (Kudamatsu, 2007; Posner and Kramon, 2013; Franck and Rainer, 2014), but while this data allows an estimation of flows of goods through individuals, it does not allow us to measure, which communities governments are actually targeting with local public goods. By disaggregating public goods provision to the village level and by looking at changes in access between 2000 and 2012 as well as throughout the colonial and immediate post-colonial era, this project looks at which communities are targeted by the local and central government respectively. Additionally, although not within the scope of this study, attempts to understand the demand-side of this equation by looking at voter preferences and responses to the attempts of politicians to woo them through ethnic or partisan appeals have received scant attention (see Wenghorst and Lindberg, 2013, Lindberg, 2012 for exceptions).

formed by looking at national-level political dynamics tell an incomplete story, ascribing more agency to decision makers than is realistically found in rural communities. The devolution of meaningful distributional decisions has not resolved the nation-state level problems that often led to such administrative reforms: decision-making about where and to whom goods should be distributed continue to be part and parcel of exchanges or expectations of mutual benefit among elites and citizens, merely at a new and smaller scale (Lemarchand, 1981; Piattoni, 2001). The reality of local politics in the developing world is that all relevant actors - representatives, patrons, brokers and voters - engage in daily interactions with one other, live within the same communities and all stand to benefit from local improvements.<sup>61</sup> This demands that we acknowledge the iterative nature of local social interactions because individuals themselves take into account the fact that their relationships with their patrons/clients will continue into the near future (Hickens, 2011: 292-3).

Recognizing the insights of early work on clientelism sheds light on why actors maintain such vertical connections, but at the same time it helps explain why local elites invest in horizontal networks ties. One of the most prominent studies of why individuals invest in networks comes from Berry's (1993) study of resource access and use in African agrarian economies. Because an individual's access to land depends on their membership in social networks, rural producers invest in maintaining network ties, advancing their status within

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<sup>61</sup> Given the more intimate scale of decentralized governance in rural settings, elites may be double winners: the delivery of public goods helps their own families and friends obtain access to primary schooling or reduce long-distances to water points and it reinforces their prestige and status in the community.

these networks and accessing new ones.<sup>62</sup> In earlier work, Berry observes that by making such investments, individuals show their commitment to their social networks and strengthen their own authority and prestige in the network (1985: 82). Likewise, under Hyden's (2006) 'economy of affection' individuals share wealth and assets in the short-term as an investment in social relations that, in the long-term, may generate returns.<sup>63</sup> In both cases, investing in maintaining access to a network is seen as rational investments for actors.

This latter assertion finds broad support in the social sciences with the revival of interest in networks pioneered by Granovetter (1973). Recent work has brought these debates into the realm of development studies, where individuals and households have been found to be better off when they are more connected to outside markets (Shami, 2012), when network ties facilitate the adoption of high-return technology (Chantarat and Barret, 2008), and where they improve employment opportunities (Burns et al., 2010) to cite but a handful of findings. An array of experimental (Glaeser et al., 2002; Anderson et al., 2004; Dionne, 2014) and survey (Leonard et al., 2010) evidence indicates that individuals are more likely to trust and cooperate with individuals with whom they share social connections and that such ties can help them overcome ethnic or other demographic divisions. The economic benefits of the many things that we think network ties bestow to individuals - social capital, information flows or trust - have been well documented throughout sub-Saharan Africa (Lyon, 2000; Fafchamps, 2001; Fafchamps, 2006)

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<sup>62</sup> Such investments take the form of participating in community organizations, ceremonies or financing the careers of family members or dependents.

<sup>63</sup> For Hyden such social networks form the primary redistributive mechanism in society rather than the state (2006: 72).

and beyond (Grief, 2006; Krishna, 2006), where they are thought particularly useful in compensating or substituting for weak formal institutions.

Crucially, it is only by understanding both why individual elites invest in their networks and the overlap between the informal institutions generated by this behavior with formal institutional boundaries that we can explain sub-national variation in distributional politics.

This is precisely because, as Piattoni (2001: 3) writes, it illuminates the different ways in which interests are “presented, promoted, and aggregated” across rural communities. In brief, local elite status is by and large quite durable over time because elites want to maintain their status and the various benefits that accrue with it. This often takes the form of reinforcing the value of the network that bestows elite status in the first place. For a descendant of the original inhabitants of an area, this means buttressing the value of autochthony as a guarantee of local authority and respect. Because the specific composition of local elite networks is historically determined and because these networks are sticky in the short-run, local government boundaries, created from on high in Dakar, at times map neatly and at others quite messily onto pre-existing local cleavages. It is the relative harmony of this overlap that generates the differences shown in the empirical analyses of this dissertation.

Pre-colonial centralization is therefore, not itself explicitly causal in the story, but rather matters because of the effect it had on unifying the social composition of local communities and providing a coherent network to which elites have been able to tether their claims to authority over time. As a result, and unforeseen, local governments in these areas tend to overlap with well-understood communities with local elite networks that tie most, if not all, villages in any

given rural community together. In such situations, local elected officials face high penalties if they attempt to distribute to co-ethnics, co-partisans, etc., because such an action violates the rules that the informal institution of local elite networks generate. In communities with more divided networks, in contrast, this is often the political strategy employed because they can be pursued within-networks and without violating locally powerful informal institutions.

## **‘Decompressing’ History: Plausible and Implausible Explanations**

The argument for network congruence put forth here seeks to explain why areas that were home to pre-colonial states are delivering public goods differently today than their counterparts in acephalous areas. Any alternative explanation must not only explain this geographic pattern, but also a temporal one. Why was there no effect of pre-colonial statehood prior to the 1996 decentralization reforms on public goods access, as is shown in Chapter Four?

This question challenges the most common form of argument in recent research on long-term institutional persistence.<sup>64</sup> Take, for example, the causal structure of the most path-setting article in this literature: for Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) the property rights regimes associated with different colonial state structures continue to the present day - the

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<sup>64</sup> The recognition that historical effects persist and intimately shape contemporary outcomes is not, of course, new. Comparative historical analysis, emerging in force during the 1980s, re-introduced a serious consideration of history in the field. This research agenda was unified by its focus on big questions and macro outcomes, seeking to identify causal configurations behind large-scale changes, placing them both within historical sequence and in comparative context (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003: 11-13). Explicit theorization of how we should study or model these causal processes has recently become subject of intense debate however (Bates et al., 1998; Lieberman, 2001; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003; Pierson, 2004; see Stinchcombe, 1968 for an early exception).

institution is continuous despite substantial formal institutional ruptures.<sup>65</sup> The implication in Gennaioli and Rainer (2007), in another example, is that pre-colonial states facilitated more accountability between chiefs and local populations from the colonial era to the present, with no attention paid to variation in the strengths or desires of colonial or post-colonial states and the elites that came and went with them.<sup>66</sup> Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2012) conversely argue that these differences result from ‘ethnic attributes’, whereby centralized ethnic groups experience on average better outcomes today because of unchanged cultural practices.

In all of this work, differences are assumed to persist over time. But as Nunn notes (2009: 31), while economists have successfully demonstrated that history matters, it remains to be understood through which ‘channels of causality’ historical factors course. By estimating an effect and a cause with decades, if not centuries, in between, scholars risk ‘compressing’ history and ignoring important variation in both the independent and dependent variable (see Austen,

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<sup>65</sup> More recent work has highlighted how past institutions engender a distinct set of informal institutions then do the causal lifting in shaping contemporary outcomes. For example, in Berger’s (2009) study of the differential tax policies instituted by the British above and below the tenth parallel, the tax policies themselves no longer exist and have no causal weight. The differences in development outcomes identified emerge from how these tax policies fostered varying levels of bureaucratic capacity. It is these sub-national differences in capacity on either side of the tenth parallel that then persist throughout time and create the differences observed today. For example, in Berger’s (2009) study of the differential tax policies instituted by the British above and below the tenth parallel, the tax policies themselves no longer exist and have no causal weight. The differences in development outcomes identified emerge from how these tax policies fostered varying levels of bureaucratic capacity. It is these sub-national differences in capacity on either side of the tenth parallel that then persist throughout time and create the differences observed today.

<sup>66</sup> In a rare study addressing this intersection, Huillery (2009, 2011) finds that the French were more likely to settle, and hence invest, in areas of French West Africa that were prosperous in the pre-colonial era, suggesting that French colonial efforts were shaped by the political realities they found on the ground. Across French West Africa, these initial locational decisions shaped investments, which correlate with development outcomes in the 1990s (2011: 5). Like many such studies, Huillery admits that she has no idea how this might have varied in the sixty-year interim between her two data points.

2008; Hopkins 2011a; or Jerven 2011 for concerns about such compression of history).<sup>67</sup> This leaves open the question of whether causes persist unchanged over time, when the effect actually emerges or whether the central concepts under study are actually comparable. “... If X and Y have changed in the course of the centuries, as I suggested might well be the case, no wand can give them the constancy that the comparison requires,” Hopkins critiques (2011b: 110). Taking seriously the temporal evolution of the outcome under study, can, as Gryzmala-Brusse (2010) suggests, indicate more and less plausible hypotheses.

Wary of mistakenly assuming that a robust correlation implies continuity, this project makes a methodological move by ‘decompressing’ history, looking at the evolution of service provision throughout rural Senegal between 1880, when the French began consolidating colonial rule and the early 1970s and, subsequently, 2000-2012, in Chapter Four.<sup>68</sup> The turn to history by development economists raises important questions, but by ignoring how historical causes unfold over time, the mechanisms identified risk being inconsistent with actual, over-time empirical patterns. By sacrificing causal processes in order to obtain causal identification, these scholars, at least as it pertains to the case under study here, assume a durable effect, but as will be shown for Senegal at least, that effect only appears following the exogenous institutional shock of the 1996 decentralization reforms. The evidence presented in this project demands a theory that is both rooted in pre-colonial geography but that is also logically consistent with only having an impact at the local level and only under certain formal institutional configurations.

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<sup>67</sup> Dell (2010) offers one of the few efforts to estimate the effect in history by looking at district-level education outcomes at three points in history, though with mixed support for her central argument.

<sup>68</sup> Due to data unavailability, this project is unable to evaluate changes in the 1980s and 1990s.

This project therefore departs in its conceptualization of how history matters for contemporary variation in development outcomes by identifying a path-dependent trajectory for the informal institutional ties among local elites, rooted in pre-colonial political differences, that cause the effects observed today without assuming that the latter themselves have consistently been present. Put otherwise, the argument reaffirms the path dependence of the cause without insisting on the persistence of the effect. Often conflated, these are two conceptually distinct phenomena that, while frequently going hand-in-hand, do not necessarily do so. Theoretically therefore, this argument draws on many of the concepts employed by mainstream work within comparative historical analysis at the same time that it illustrates a novel form of institutional path dependence: one which has no observable impact on the dependent variable for most of history, but which reappears in force following changes in the formal institutional environment.

The argument that different levels of pre-colonial centralization conditioned the colonial encounter in many ways resembles Slater and Simmons' (2010) concept of critical antecedents, even if colonialism was not itself a critical juncture.<sup>69</sup> It is only with the 1996 decentralization reforms, acting as an exogenous shock, that a clear punctuated equilibrium can be identified. The devolution of meaningful distributive authority to local authorities that came with the

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<sup>69</sup> Colonization is not conceptualized here as a critical juncture. Although the existence of pre-colonial states facilitated early French efforts to colonize in some ways, there is no evidence that variation in pre-colonial political organization systematically structured the colonial state just as the 1996 reforms are applied uniformly across the country. While colonization and independence were periods of significant change, the analysis presented in this dissertation fails to show that either of these reforms produced the spatial or temporal differences necessary to meet most definitions of a critical juncture (for example Collier and Collier, 1992: 29). Roberts' (2014: 14) offers a revised definition of critical junctures as "decisive periods of institutional generation, transformation, or decomposition with enduring political effects." This more closely resembles colonization, yet still lacks what Roberts' argues makes such junctures "truly critical": different outcomes that fail to emerge as a result of colonization in and of itself (2014: 49).

reforms presented local elites with a widened political space that they could employ for their collective or narrower benefit. Here, the outcomes of formal institutional changes are directly predicated on antecedent conditions, whereby local elites networks, social legacies with circumscribed activity in the interim, were only ‘activated’ following the 1996 reforms, which opened up the possibility of long-standing local socio-political cleavages to shape local distributional decisions. The ‘resurgence’ of traditional authorities in African communities following decentralization that has been much observed is not necessarily ‘new’ therefore, but rather suggests that scholars re-visit the possibility that history matters in obscure and unforeseen ways.

To date, only a handful of studies have looked at historically rooted causes whose effects only emerge decades, if not centuries, later. For Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002) or Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), the effects of formal and informal institutions respectively only emerged centuries following the root cause. Most similar to the claims made in this project, Dippel (2014) finds that the impacts of forced centralization of different Native American tribes on reservations only negatively impacts a reservation’s economic development following the shift to block grants by the United States’ Federal government in the early 1990s. Similarly, Foa (2014) argues that experiences with centralized rule prior to Tsarist consolidation positively benefits the ability of Russian districts capacity, in particular to negotiate with the central state, but only after the fall of communism. Collins (2004) could be construed as making similar claims with resurgence of clans following the end of the Soviet era, though it is unclear how

latent clans were prior to political liberalization.<sup>70</sup> These studies provide helpful, but sparse precedent for the claim that institutional differences emerged in the distant past but persisted unobserved until an exogenous institutional shock created the institutional space for them to affect observable outcomes.

Of course, the premise of this study, where strikingly different development outcomes are found in two regions of the same country, brings to the mind of most political scientists Putnam's (1993) monumental study of civic traditions in Italy. *Making Democracy Work* identified two sub-national trajectories in Italy: the North's 'civic' public versus the South's 'clientelist' one. In the former, norms of reciprocity and horizontal networks of civic engagement enabled communities to overcome collective action dilemmas, producing better governance and economic development, while vertical political and economic ties inhibited collective action, encouraged clientelism and produced sub-optimal governance and development outcomes in the South. Why are the differences between centralized and uncentralized areas of Senegal not explained by differential stocks of local social capital?<sup>71</sup>

Although civil society organizations are present in many parts of rural Senegal, such organizations remain weak democracy-promoters and are often quickly imbricated in local social

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<sup>70</sup> In all of these studies, informal institutions emerge organically out of society. A cautionary tale for artificially created informal institutions can be found in Acemoglu, Reed and Robinson (2012) who chronicle the ability of colonially constructed chieftaincies in Sierra Leone to consolidate power. Even in this case, however, these informal institutions remain somewhat checked by broader elite networks.

<sup>71</sup> A host of subsequent studies have linked how communities' histories can endow them with greater 'stocks' of social capital that, in turn, improve government performance (i.e. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2008; Tabellini, 2010).

hierarchies and power relations (Patterson, 1998).<sup>72</sup> Rural Senegal remains uniformly more similar to the vertical relations of southern Italy than the North, leaving unexplained striking differences in government performance. Much like the arguments of Evans (1995) or Tsai (2007), the state seems to perform better when it is more fully embedded in a (coherent) society, reflecting in many ways Boix and Posner's (1996) comment that Putnam leaves unanswered the important question of how a network's relative overlap with the formal institutional environment either facilitates or impedes collaboration and, in the aggregate, development.

Beyond social capital, others have argued that other, group-specific attributes, such as ethnic norms, can explain why some social groups outperform others on a range of indicators (for example, Hjort, 2010; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2012). Scholars like Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2012: 24), for example, conclude that the robust correlation between pre-colonial centralization and better public goods access today is the result of 'ethnic-specific attributes,' raising the question of how "ethnic institutional and cultural traits shape economic performance." This logic could plausibly be consistent with the temporal dynamics observed here.<sup>73</sup> But a number of concerns about this line of argumentation call into question its ability to explain the distributional patterns identified.<sup>74</sup> Most notably, this type of argument is quite

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<sup>72</sup> Furthermore, as is shown in Chapters Three, Five and Six, there is no systematic evidence that horizontal associational activity correlates with either pre-colonial centralization or the outcomes under study. The other manifestation of this argument, that civic cultures generate social trust also finds little empirical support.

<sup>73</sup> Such arguments about group attributes must be kept distinct from the social identity theory outlined earlier as a potential mechanism. An individual who acts towards their group because they identify with it is categorically different from arguments that groups as a collective whole possess attributes that facilitate their collective goods delivery relative to other groups.

<sup>74</sup> Proponents of this line of reasoning in the case of pre-colonial centralization have largely advanced this argument by using Murdock's (1981) data, which measures the hierarchy within ethnic groups. Pre-

imprecise and to date none of these studies have explicitly measured the mechanisms under question. It remains quite unclear what these attributes might be or, conversely, what scholars are really measuring. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006) use ethnic background as a variable, for example, assuming that this captures a constant set of ‘cultural attributes,’ though these themselves remain largely un-specified. Similarly, Tabellini (2010) measures ‘culture’ by looking at differences in reported trust and respect of others among other variables, with no clear theorization of what the underlying concept of culture is that is being proxied.

These concerns aside, cultural attributes could plausibly persist with no effect until decentralization. Many of the most prominent explanations in the literature on pre-colonial centralization, such as higher accountability among chiefs in areas that were home to centralized states (Gennaioli and Rainer, 2007; Michalopoulos and Papanniaou, 2012) still need more work, however, to explain why this relatively powerful factor doesn’t manifest itself until democratic decentralization. More problematically, arguments for group attributes rely on the assumption of an equal and homogenous spread or internalization of the norms under question and, in turn, that the experiences that engendered them within ethnic groups is felt by all members. If the shared culture among co-ethnics produces norms that facilitate collective action (for example, Habyarimana et al., 2007), we would expect that lower ethnic fractionalization within local governments would be a significant predictor of public goods delivery, since higher homogeneity would imply a greater ease of coordination, anywhere that centralized ethnic groups live. Yet

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colonial statehood, however, did not always map neatly onto ethnic group boundaries however nor did such hierarchies exert a constant effect across space, though it is almost exclusively measured this way (see Bandyopadhyay and Green, 2013 for an exception).

there is no evidence of this in Senegal, as will be shown in Chapter Three. Communities dominated by the same ethnic groups seem to perform differently in areas that were home to pre-colonial states versus those that were not, for example, even at similar levels of ethnic heterogeneity.<sup>75</sup>

Together, these concerns arise the deeper questions of why cultural arguments in the study of African economic development are best thought of and measured as properties of ethnic groups without seriously interrogating the nature of ethnicity in the region's history. Its not clear why ethnic groups are the sole or, at least preferred, carriers of many of these traits other than the strong bias towards ethnicity as the explanation of all things in African political life.

Critically, little of this work has sufficiently responded to the question of just how pre-colonial these attributes are given the wealth of evidence that the colonial encounter altered and created ethnic categories and identities as is well-established in African historiography (see Chanock, 1991 for an iconic example). Moreover, there is ample evidence that understanding ethnic categories as having clear, demarcated boundaries is fundamentally at odds with the fact that most pre-colonial states (in particular those in West Africa) were multi-ethnic; this argument lies at the heart of many early, influential studies on African political systems (Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, 1940, Colson, 1969).<sup>76</sup> And within these multi-ethnic states, individuals

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<sup>75</sup> One possible response could be that there were sub-group induced changes induced by differential treatment by colonial and post-colonial governments between areas that were and were not home to pre-colonial states. Little evidence suggests, however, that this is the case or that the French treated the same ethnic groups differently in other parts of the country. And this further begs the question of why late- or post-colonial migration patterns have not undermined these effects or, conversely, brought with them the pre-colonial attributes that ensure success.

<sup>76</sup> As Colson writes, "political and ethnic boundaries rarely coincided in pre-colonial Africa. Human ambitions were too pressing to allow people to remain static over long periods. States expanded when

have long switched to other ethnic groups (Amselle, 1990, McGovern 2013) or jumped within-group categories (Bruijn and van Dijk, 1997) with some fluidity. These insights from anthropology and history put otherwise the same concerns about what arguments invoking group attributes are actually measuring and whether these ascribed, ethnic traits can truly link the pre-colonial era to the present.

## Summary

To summarize, Figure 1.1 presents the general schematic form of the causal process that has been described so far. The relative cohesiveness of any community's local elite network is expected to be a function of (a) the initial, pre-colonial presence of a unifying socio-political identity and, subsequently, (b) whether or not the area saw a diversification of social networks due to in-migration in the colonial or post-colonial period. When formal institutional boundaries were created, the propensity for congruence (versus incongruence) was highly structured by pre-colonial centralization.


Figure 1.1 identifies four outcomes, shaped initially by a region's starting, pre-colonial network stock and subsequent migration patterns. At one extreme is the case exemplified by Orkadiere in the introduction, that of *network congruence*. Here, pre-colonial states facilitated the emergence of strong social and political ties among villages that persist to the present day.<sup>77</sup>

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they were sufficiently powerful to do so. Communities competed with one another to attract settlers and thereby gain supporters ... Men moved to find better land or more favorable opportunities in their craft ..." (1969: 31). If African political and social institutions have a history of adoption and integration, as evidenced in the range of informal institutions like joking cousins or 'adoption', it remains up to the colonial encounter to render these boundaries firmer and more rigid.

<sup>77</sup> Nothing about this argument should then be taken to indicate that communities with more encompassing social networks are conflict free; the role of clans in Senegalese local politics is too well

Figure 1.1 Historical Paths to Different Outcomes in Local Cleavages



In areas that never had cohesive socio-political networks, social life is expected to continue largely unchanged with continued *network fragmentation*. Despite French efforts to create overarching authorities, the case under study, this largely failed to penetrate or alter local networks,


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documented for such an assertion (Coulons, 1975; Gellar et al, 1980; Blundo 1998). But political conflict is particularly difficult when it spills out onto the social relations that make up one's everyday life. Citing Hahonou (2006) in particular, Olivier de Sardan notes the tendency for local decisions to be presented publicly as the result of consensus is a means to avoid the public humiliation of opponents who are neighbors or relatives (2009: 42). This echoes Schaeffer's argument that the construction of democracy as a consensual process among Senegalese is a means to reinforce community ties, which can, in turn, be accessed in time of crisis (1998). This suggests that networks create incentives for individuals to invest in preserving ties through a public display of 'consensus' as a means to continue access to the benefits that accrue from network membership. Goode notes a micro-level explanation for this tendency when he observes that most social rules restrict the scope and publicity of criticism to preserve social harmony. Many societies rather have a set group of individuals who can criticize elites (1978: 301). This finds support in many West African cultural traditions where specific family members can play this role, such as the quite important role often accorded to mothers in pre-colonial royal courts or the intra-household systems of joking relations in many West African societies.


which remained disjointed. Politics in such areas continues to be defined by marked differences between local elite networks, though this situation may open up space for other forms of political mobilization, such as along partisanship lines where network ties are weak altogether.

It is possible that additional elite networks have emerged or arrived in these areas, such as through in-migration. In sufficient numbers, in-migration creates *network proliferation*. While in Ida Mouride, for example, social divisions emerged along lines between farmer-herder and autochthons-allochthons, in other areas this situation is likely to produce ethnic or partisan divisions. In the final case, *network transformation*, an exogenous shock occurred, such as the arrival of missionaries or, particular to the case of Senegal, the spread of Mouridism, an extremely influential Muslim brotherhood in the country (see Chapter Two for a discussion). The rapid spread of Mouridism created an alternative elite network that soon integrated existing social and political networks. While this resulted in relatively complete transformation in some communities, creating a new basis on which local elites could stake their status, it remains incomplete elsewhere, where political tension continues to the present day between Mourides and other elites. In either of these two latter outcomes, network proliferation or characteristics, such as partisanship, ethnicity or autochthony. The details of these different processes and outcomes are detailed throughout the remaining chapters of this dissertation. To make these sub-types tractable in terms of how they generate redistributive pressures on local elites, take the examples presented in Figure 1.2 below. Here, different shading of villages (represented by circles) indicate different bases of ties to elite networks with villages with bolded outlines representing those that are chosen for the construction of one of the three new


**Figure 1.2** Stylized display of how different network structures produce different expectations for goods delivery. In this example, each box represents one of ten villages within a rural community. Only one village has a school in the baseline year and throughout the five-year local council term, the community constructs three new primary schools. Chosen locations are in bold.




Example 1: Network Congruence Despite the arrival of one new village, the local community is highly continuous over time. Distribution is expected to be quite developmental, favoring villages of a larger size or with the worse access. Exceptions would include favoring villages with a particular status in the community (for example, a former province capital of the pre-colonial state)



Example 2: Network Fragmentation In these areas, politics has always been fragmented among different groups. This fragmentation may have been exacerbated over time with moderate in-migration or partial network transformation. Distributional politics here may form along partisan lines (displayed here by black lines), or other expected contours (ethnicity, caste, autochthony claims).



Example 3: Network Transformation/Proliferation Many communities have seen waves of migration or transformation of the basis of network ties within the community from exogenous shocks such as religious transformation. In such cases, politics will be defined by whoever wins power in the local council. In the example of transformation, pictured here, the light grey network holds power and is expected to favor co-network members, so much so that one village receives two schools.



Caveat: None of these examples is intended to be deterministic to the extent that out-network member will never receive services. Out-network villages should still be expected to receive goods when they are quite large (as displayed to the right in a reprise of Example 3) or if they hold some special significance (for example a religious site or leader).

schools built by a hypothetical local council. Because different network structures aggregate interests differently, these stylized examples illustrate how choices are predicated on network structures despite similar conditions.

Although the above is specific to the case under study here, the contours of the theoretical argument presented in this chapter are broader. This argument takes seriously the very local nature of politics under democratic decentralization, placing the social and political incentives facing elites at its heart, while rendering it tractable by identifying the consistent, structural effects of historical settlement patterns. Though local elites under democratic decentralization act towards their networks for many reasons, it is how their socio-political relations have been structured throughout history that is consequential for local politics.

For the local council President who ran for office to defend and advance the interests of his ethnic community, this would suggest that distributive politics will be biased along ethnic lines, as he seeks to maintain his role as a valuable asset for his co-ethnics and channel goods to them because local politics is understood as a game between exclusive identities. For his compatriot across the country who down-plays any idea of partisan or ethnic tension because ‘we are all family here’ and proudly lays claims to the community’s descent from the great Djoloff Empire, we should expect services to pool more broadly because the idea of the Djoloff offers a cohesive political identity that ties villages together into a well-understood, sub-national territorial entity. His motives are the same, but their consequences are developmentally quite different and their actions are historically structured in a far more systematic fashion than they themselves likely realize.

## **2. Political Organization in Senegal, 1500-present**

Although largely unrecognized apart from historians, Senegal was part of a dynamic, microstate system prior to the arrival of French rule. The complexity of its constituent kingdoms should not be underestimated: throughout the Savannah belt states had learned to adapt to a range of challenges, including collecting revenue, managing far-flung intermediaries, and establishing clear rules for succession while maintaining checks on any given leader's power (Colson, 1969: 37). These states remain important historical referents today. Many regions of Senegal are still colloquially referred to by the name of these kingdoms; it is as common to hear that someone is traveling to 'Fouta' as it is to hear that they are going to Kanel or Podor Department, for example. Lat Dior, the last king of the Cayor Kingdom, bestows his name to high schools, a busy bus station in Dakar, restaurants and hotels. Yang-Yang, the capital of the Djoloff Empire, remains a mythic location in the heart of the country for primary school students, who all learn about the rise and fall of the Bourba (king) Djoloff.

This chapter provides a concise review of the political organization of the territory that composes modern-day Senegal from 1500 to the present. It begins by distinguishing between areas that were home to pre-colonial states and those that were not, and the ways in which these differences conditioned the colonial encounter. The chapter then gives an overview of the colonial encounter and French efforts at constructing a colonial state before explaining how the nature of colonial and post-colonial rule failed to eliminate the varying inheritances of the pre-colonial past that now, over a century later, are shaping local politics dynamics following the 1996 decentralization reforms.

## **Pre-Colonial Senegal, 1500-1880**

Sahelian West Africa's State system formed in the wake of the collapse of the Malian Empire in the 1300s. On the eve of the final French push to conquer Senegal in the early 1880s, slightly under half of Senegal's territory was under the control of a centralized political organization and the sub-region of Senegambia formed a relatively cohesive historical entity, bordered on the west by the Atlantic, the north by the sharp cultural and livelihood differences between the populations south of the Senegal River and the Maure and Berber pastoralists to the north, and the east by the current boundary of the Senegalese State (Curtin, 1975: 7).<sup>78</sup> Large parts of the region had been incorporated in the kingdoms of Ancient Ghana (~300-1200) and Mali (~1200-1400s), but Curtin highlights bottom-up pressures to centralize as well. States that formed along the Senegal River, for example, were based on fertile floodplains, in close proximity to the Saharan trade and were early adapters of Islam (1975: 7-8). As Warner (1999) notes, many states in West Africa were far more state-like than is often assumed, capable of enforcing property rights, adapting to the changing whims of capitalist markets and constructed around central governments with national identities.


Some states were, of course, stronger than others and in the half-millennium preceding French colonization the fates of states waxed and waned. This project defines statehood as the fulfillment of two criteria: a hierachal political system must have had i) have some expression of central authority at the village level and ii) collect taxes. The former could be someone

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<sup>78</sup> The eastern most states, Gajaaga and Boundou were more closely oriented to the West according to Curtin, while states slightly further to the East, such as Khasso and Kaarta were more culturally similar and historically oriented to the Mandingue state system in present-day Mali.

appointed directly from the royal court or, more commonly, a system whereby a local chief or religious figure was delegated to enforce the king's orders and laws. The latter was often a yearly tribute and took specific forms in each state, such as a payment for the right to farm land that, though administered locally, was all claimed by the royal court in Boundou (Clark, 1996: 8). In Saloum, the Buur received the following: each village farmed a field for the royal household, with one animal per herd and one-tenth of the millet crop going to the Buur as well. The royal family had a monopoly on the area's lucrative salt works, customs officials collected trade taxes and criminal activities required offenders to pay indemnities that supported local judges and the Buur (Klein, 1968: 20). A map of pre-colonial states in Senegal, calculated for fifty-year increments between 1500 and 1880, can be found in Figure 2.1 below, which also listed

Figure 2.1 Pre-Colonial States and Uncentralized Areas



uncentralized territories that had commonly used names. Detailed notes on coding of the cases of pre-colonial statehood can be found in the General Appendix at the end of this dissertation.

### *Senegal's Pre-Colonial States*

When Portuguese ships first began exploring the West African coast in the late fifteenth century, Senegambia was home to over a dozen small states, many of whom had long been integrated into the Saharan slave trade and who quickly oriented themselves towards the European coastal market. In the following centuries, the Senegambia became one of the most active slave markets in the sub-region. The consequences of early European contact provided political opportunities at the same time that it imposed costs. The Djoloff Empire, run by a Wolof aristocracy for most of the thirteenth through fifteenth centuries, was located in the inner plains of central Senegal that had long dominated the Saharan trade. The lure of the new coastal and river-based trade with Europeans prompted considerable unrest within the Empire's constituent kingdoms, eventually provoking its collapse around 1566 as ambitious political leaders, led by kingdom of Cayor, sought independence and, crucially, the lucrative ability to control their own profits from the growing demand for slaves (Monteil, 1966: 122). Among the most powerful successor Wolof states to the Djoloff Empire were Cayor and Baol, both of which were able to capitalize on their sea ports to enrich themselves (Searing, 1993: 14). The Djoloff State continued to exist, but slowly lost economic clout and territorial influence as smaller states, such as Oualo, Sine and Saloum stopped paying tribute between the late 1500s to mid-1600s (Suret-Canale and Barry, 1976).

The fates of these newly independent states varied. As previously mentioned, Caylor - with its on and off again dependent Baol - became an economic powerhouse, a strong military enabling raids on neighbors for slaves to sell along the coasts. Others, such as Oualo in the northwest, faced continual pressure. Conflict among the three Wolof lineages that were eligible to rule greatly weakened the state's ability to resist pressure from neighbors, particularly from Maure raids from the North. Although the kingdom received some support following the establishment of the French trading post at Saint-Louis, this largely reflected the near collapse of the state following endemic civil war in the eighteenth century, and the state had virtually ceased to exist as a political entity by the start of the nineteenth century (Barry, 1972: 64; Suret-Canale and Barry, 1976). To the south of Baol lay the Sereer kingdoms of Sine and Saloum. The former dates to the mid-fourteenth century and the latter gained independence from the Djoloff Empire in the late sixteenth (Sarr, 1986/7). These states also engaged in the Atlantic trade, using their coastal locations and their military aristocracy to consolidate power.<sup>79</sup>

Another set of states were dominated by the Peuhl (Fulani) ethnic groups. Many of these states were early converts to Islam and were run as religious states, headed by an almamy (king). The strongest was Fouta Toro, stretching along the northern arc of the Senegal River and dating to the ancient state of Tekrur, which was subsumed to the Malian empire in the mid-thirteenth century. Fouta was a regional 'breadbasket,' due to its fertile floodplains and was an early site of French commercial interest, exporting salt, gum arabic, slaves and gold from

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<sup>79</sup> The Kingdom of Sine is notable for its resistance to Islamic movements, retaining indigenous religions much longer than others states in the region.

Bambuk to the south from the late fifteenth century onwards (Clark and Phillips, 1994: 142-3).

A second Peulh state, Boundou, was founded by Malick Sy, originally from Fouta Toro, in the 1690s. Sy and his descendants maintained a ruling dynasty that rapidly expanded outward from their initial settlements, consolidating power around its role as an economic link between the Gambian and Senegal River basins, and establishing authority across the heterogeneous population of Mandingues, Soninke and Wolofs (Gomez, 1992; Clark, 1996). Boundou was largely decimated by the jihad of Umar Tall in the mid-nineteenth century and further depopulated following the uprising of Muslim cleric Mamadou Lamine in the 1880s, despite French efforts at maintaining the stability of the area. Finally, Fouladou was a state-in-formation in the second half of the nineteenth century. Located in the upper Casamance, the polity was founded by Molo Egue Bande, a Peulh who, with the help of Fouta Djallon, overthrew the Mandingue aristocracy in the region in 1867 (Girard, 1964; Ngaide, 2012). His son, Moussa Molo, expanded the extent of the territory following his death in 1881, though its debated how consolidated his authority truly was (for example see Fanchette, 1999).

Pre-Colonial Senegal was home to a number of minor kingdoms as well. Between Fouta Toro and Boundou were the small, Soninke trading states of Gajaaga (Galam) and, weaker and less organized, Guidimakha, located at the confluence of the Senegal and Faleme Rivers (Gomez, 1992: 19). A series of Mandinge-dominated states rose (and fell) in the Gambian River basin, many of which were based in the present-day Gambia. These included Niumi, Baddibu, Pakala, Niani and Ouli. Having reached the peak of their power in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, many of these states were in a period of collapse by the nineteenth century

(if not earlier) due to internal rivalries, pressure from neighbors and Islamic jihads and the decline of the slave trade (Quinn, 1972; van Hoven, 1995). The jihad of Ma Ba, eventually defeated by the Buur Sine, led to the collapse of the tributary states of Baddibu, Rip, Sabakh and Sandial. More strongly motivated by the desire to spread Islam than to found a new state, Ma Ba's crusade had established political order by the mid-1800s, but it was not able to withstand the combination of pressures in the following years from the British to the South, the French from the north and west and indigenous rivalries between traditional elites and Ma Ba's religious followers (Klein, 1968; Clark and Phillip, 1994). Additionally, parts of the upper Casamance fell under the rule of the federated state of Kaabu (Gabu) empire that was located in present day Guinea-Bissau from the fall of the Malian empire until the late 1700s (Innes, 1976).

In all of these pre-colonial states, social castes structured social life. With the exception of the acephalous Diola in Casamance, individuals across the broader sub-region were divided into three groups: the aristocracy, freemen and slaves.<sup>80</sup> Under this system, the details of which vary slightly by ethnic groups, an individual's profession, marriage choice and place of residence were circumscribed by the caste they inherited from their parents.<sup>81</sup> Slaves were owned by the aristocracy and casted individuals alike, but while many worked domestically, across the Wolof and Sereer kingdoms powerful warrior slave castes developed (*ceddo* or *tyeddo*), that protected

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<sup>80</sup> The Sereer had a less rigid caste system than other states north of the Gambia (Searing, 2003: 8).

<sup>81</sup> As Clark and Phillips (1994: 85-7) clarify, while these societies had castes, only artisans and griots (praise-singers) are referred to as 'casted' though slaves are also often referred to this way. These groups were so casted due to their professions, such as blacksmiths, weavers, carvers, etc., which were considered to involve the handling of unclean materials (in the case of griots, words were the perceived danger). Unlike slaves, many casted groups retained some esteemed position in the community; griots attached to aristocratic families, for example, kept the oral history of the lineage.

the royal court, collected taxes and served as a standing army in many parts of the country (Diouf, 1990; Getz, 2004).

Although the political elite was assured by the dominant ethnic group, in all cases significant ethnic minorities existed. Peuhl herders in Cayor paid a specific tax collected by the fourth minister, a well-organized system that took into account the specific nature of their economic specialization in livestock herding (Ba, 1976: 173). Similarly, the Wolof state of Baol traditionally had a number of Sereer provinces in the West while Saloum was ‘pluriethnic’ with important Sereer, Wolof and Peuhl groups (Becker et al., 1999: 49). Even Fouta Toro, strongly associated with the Peuhl ethnicity, is estimated as being populated by a ten percent minority of Wolof, Soninke and Maures in the middle valley in the mid-nineteenth century (Robinson, 1975: 5).

In general, the structure of the most influential pre-colonial states were more similar than not. All were based on an elective monarchy and had hierachal systems of rule from the king downwards to the village. The Sine Kingdom was less reliant on intermediary, provincial authorities, being represented directly in each village by a *sakh-sakh* who acted as judge and tax collector. Conversely, only in central Saloum did the Bour Saloum have direct connections to villages, with his power mediated elsewhere by regional titleholders (Klein, 1968: 16). Fouta Toro was largely run as a federated system, composed of a series of provinces that retained substantial autonomy and served as electors for the Almamy. Consequently, the state was less concentrated than its Wolof counterparts to the south, as electors acted out of their own

localized interests to stop any given province or Almamy (king) from consolidating power in a single lineage or region (Robinson, 1975: 19, 27).

These checks on power all reflect broader trends across the region for pre-colonial leadership to be constrained by institutional checks (Beattie, 1959). The Bourba Djoloff, for example, consulted with a council of seven titleholders on questions of great importance for the kingdom, including the declaration of war (Monteil, 1966: 604). Similarly, the fact that many kings were elected among a set of eligible families, such as was the case with the Damel of Cayor or the Buur Saloum made the position inherently insecure “with the need to conciliate different groups within the society meant that power was in effect collegial” (Klein, 1968: 21).

### *Acephalous Histories*

Roughly half of current-day Senegal’s territory was administered by a centralized political unit prior to colonization; what was happening elsewhere? Most work on non-centralized Senegal has focused on the Casamance, home to the acephalous Diola, with the historical record much quieter in remaining areas of the country, often further inland and less-well studied. The Casamance aside, most politically unorganized areas of the country contained the same ethnic groups as were found under the authority of kingdoms described above. What other purely acephalous groups existed are found in Southeastern Senegal, historically a politically unorganized area with a multitude of ethnic groups. Bambuk, for example, was a Mandingue area (the majority of which falls within western Mali today) with villages grouped under a loose confederation as protection against raids from neighboring states (Clark and Phillips, 1994: 72). Niokholo, home to five different ethnic groups, was similar. The Bassari,

Konigui and Bedik peoples of Southeastern Senegal, also acephalous groups, developed strategies for self-protection, such as settling into isolated, hilltop villages that facilitated hiding from slave raiders (Kywels and Ferry, 2006). All these groups are quite small today, numerically because of slave raiding and a trend to inter-marry with other groups and territorial because of the influx of Mandingue and, in particular, Peulhs from Boundou to the North and Fouta Djallon (present-day Guinea) to the South.

The region's considerable unrest in the years leading up until colonization, as summarized in Aubert (1923), highlight the substantial instability that populations not under the protection of a centralized state experienced. While villages in centralized states still risked raids and predatory taxation, these regions saw less of a dramatic change in day-to-day stability with the establishment of French authority than their future co-citizens did elsewhere. Following his review of the waves of armies, slave raids and massacres in Kedougou, Aubert still concludes by asking, "for twenty years [following colonization] the Mandingue and Peulh populations have lived peacefully. What is the moral effect of this peace?" Continuing, he observes that this is a question of great dispute, reporting that some local informants continue to lament the end of slavery and the dramatic changes that French-imposed peace had brought to social relations (1923: 424).

Even in areas that were home to loosely federated defense systems, the types of inter-village ties and political hierarchy seen in kingdoms were absent. Take, for example, Pakao in current day Sedhiou region, a group of twenty-four villages unified around a powerful marabout (religious guide). Despite some cohesion the principle of independence across villages is "central

to the social ethic” with villages rarely inter-marrying and high levels of suspicion between them (Schaeffer, 1980: 45). Quoting the French explorer Hecquard in 1855, “each village forms a sort of republic, governed by an imam, directing religion, and by a chief in charge of dispensing justice” (1980: 44). This is a similar history to that recounted by Balans (1975) of the Niominka, a territory located between the state of Sine and the Atlantic oceans, crossing over into The Gambia. Balans describes an egalitarian society with autonomous villages that, despite occasional attempts at domination or taxation by the Buur Sine, were never fully incorporated into the state. This is the general history of the Saloum Islands and other surrounding areas on the fringe of Sine - communities that lacked the caste and hierarchical structures found in states with villages functioning as atomistic social units (1975: 83; 89).

The Diola in Casamance (present-day Ziguinchor Region) remain the most-invoked example of an uncentralized region of the country (see, for example, the accounts of Pelissier, 1966; Boone, 2003a; Beck, 2006). Villages lacked a unifying hierarchy, though they would band together for protection, taking the eldest among them as the leader. Village chiefs were nominated via election, choosing the bravest and most respected in a village. Chiefs were above all religious authorities and, citing again Hecquard (1850), “the chiefs have very little influence and cannot take any important deliberation without assembling the village elders; they have however a justice system and impose fines ...” (Meguelle, 2012: 80). Though the Diola lacked an organized political apparatus, the region was still home to a dynamic economy in the centuries preceding colonization, trading in wax and slaves with Portuguese and, subsequently, French traders (Mark, 1985).


While Kedougou region and the lower Casamance have received some historical attention, largely due to unique minority populations that captured the attention of early French historians and ethnographers, other areas of the country were likewise uncentralized. The Ferlo desert, between the Djoloff Empire and Fouta Toro, was home to Peulh pastoralists that, while loosely grouped into clans, were not politically unified. Much of present-day Kaffrine region and western Tambacounda region, home to the *Terres Neuves* in the colonial era, were sparsely inhabited by Peulh pastoralists and Mandingue and Wolof farmers. And many parts of the upper Casamance lacked consistent, centralized rule in the century or two prior to colonization.

As discussed briefly above, few areas of the country were dominated by a single ethnic group. Figure 2.2 presents a map of approximate locations of Senegal's multitude of ethnic groups from an Atlas produced in the 1970s. An alternative rendering of this can be found in Figure 2.5 in the Appendix. As is immediately apparent, ethnic borders frequently overlap. As Diouf observes in his monograph on ethnicity in the country, while many regions of Senegal are associated with certain ethnic groups, these regions are never homogenous (1994: 17). The Wolof, the most populous ethnic group in the country whose language has become the lingua franca, has become 'de-ethnicized,' Diouf continues, the use of the language across the country emerging organically rather than being imposed from above. Commonalities across ethnic groups, such as the caste system described earlier and traditions of inter-marriage have prevented the perceived 'wolofisation' of the country from becoming a political or ethnic affront to other groups. This is further facilitated by the fact that Dakar, the national capital, is not

located in any given ethnicity's homeland, making it neutral territory of sorts (1994: 69, 183).

Another oft-invoked factor is *cousinage*, or joking cousin relations that have been claimed to act as a social mediator (Galvan, 2004, Dunning and Harrison, 2011). *Cousinage* covers all ethnic groups in the country - incorporating even the acephalous Diola.

Figure 2.2 Ethnic Groups



Source: *Atlas d'Aménagement Territoire*, 1972

## The French Advance Inland, 1860-

The French had maintained posts along the coast of Senegal since the early 1600s, but chose not to push inland for three hundred years after early explorers came back with reports of strong states and Muslim merchants, long entrenched in Sahelian trade routes, that dominated trade along the interior river ways (Fage, 1969: 161). Despite the development of an

influential trading elite in the coastal trading post of Saint Louis, French traders remained relatively conservative compared to their counterparts in other colonies, not pushing for expansion for fear of upsetting established relations with in-land neighbors and the reliable profits they brought (Robinson, 1975: 169). Prior to the mid-1800s therefore, the only impact the French had on the interior was via its traders, who were themselves largely confined to a series of established trading posts along the coast and Senegal River, and through the economic demand they created in slaves, gum arabic and, later, peanuts. Compared to the British in particular, the French interest in sub-Saharan Africa in general, and the interior in particular, was quite minimal (Crowder, 1968: 55). A map of French locations prior to 1880 can be found in Figure 2.3.

The move from this ‘water’ to ‘land’ based strategy was led by Faidherbe under the rule of Napoleon III in the late 1850s (Robinson, 1975: 168). Although Faidherbe’s move up the Senegal River established posts at Matam and Bakel as well as beginning the conquest of Cayor by placing it under Protectorate in a move that would set a precedent for later French annexation of centralized states, the French had little experience with managing large swaths of territory. Previous military efforts had been confined to securing the coastline. Faidherbe was partially driven by the myth of great wealth in the Bambuk gold fields, which could, the French speculated, support the cost of their new colonial endeavor. When this proved untrue and the advance inward too costly in the wake of metropolitan France’s own political and economic struggles, the French retreated by 1865 and left the interior largely untouched for another twenty years (Fage, 1969: 163-76; Getz, 2007: 137). The French were increasingly wary of


‘another Algeria’ and preferred to keep their involvement limited to their commercial interests (Searing, 2002: 35).

But if securing the coast was driven by the relatively circumscribed desires of traders to maximize profit, the move inward that began anew in the early 1880s is harder to explain. “Whatever economic motives there may have been in the beginning were soon thrust into the background and did not reappear until the conquest was effected,” writes Roberts (1963: 304). The French had no need for colonies in the way that Britain did and it was in part due to domestic political pressures to restore the country’s reputation following its defeat from Germany in 1870 that the country turned again to moving inland into Sahelian Africa. It was well known by this point that the interior of contemporary Senegal, Mali and Niger had little economic value, but, as Crowder (1968) argues, it was largely the French Navy that drove inland expansion in the latter part of the nineteenth century.

The Navy served to rouse domestic interest in conquering the interior and the French occupation of the Sahel was by and large a military one. As they moved inland, the Navy encountered a series of jihadist movements that rendered existing state structures more vulnerable than they had been in the preceding centuries. The stories of French officers chasing ‘Umar Tall or Samori Touré provided good fodder for Metropolitan newspapers, but historians agree that there was no overarching plan for this conquest, but a series of ‘deepening entanglements’ with Sahelian states led the French onward. Existing states still retained widely recognized control over their territory and actively negotiated with the French up until the moment of capitulation (Ajayi, 1998: 3, 271). For example, as late as 1880, the French were

forced to make a series of concessions to Abdoul Bokar, the king of Fouta Toro, in order to complete a telegraph line linking Saint Louis, a long-standing French trading city on the coast to Kayes in present-day Mali. The king's refusal to allow the French to complete a section between the forts of Salde and Bakel resulted in a five year series of diplomatic negotiations that, when militarized, resulted in a French retreat in 1881 (Robinson, 1975: 126-38). For the most part, much of the rapid French advance east was counter the desires of the government. Numerous commanders explicitly ignored their marching orders, making conquests and establishing forts - including one at Bamako, thereby founding the Malian capital - against

Figure 2.3 Early French Presence, pre-1880



orders, but for which officers were frequently rewarded (Crowder, 1968: 75; Quinn, 2000: 158).<sup>82</sup>

In 1880, much of rural Senegal had yet to have any direct interaction with the French. The French found themselves facing a series of interior states with whom they had tumultuous diplomatic relations and over whom they wished to, but did not yet, fully exert power. Beginning with the re-establishment of the protectorate of Cayor in 1883, the French pursued this model of annexation thus that by 1890 most of Senegal north of the British Gambian territories was under nominal French control (Getz, 2004: 137, 147).<sup>83</sup> The protectorate model functioned, in essence, like the indirect rule model adopted by the British - the French allowed royal kings and chiefs to administer as long as they followed French directives.

The French advance did, of course, produce resistance by the existing royal elites. The most infamous was by Lat Dior, the Damel of Cayor who had formed an early alliance with the French. Only a few years after initially acquiescing to the construction of the railroad linking Saint Louis to Dakar however, he took up arms against them. The railroad was motivated by both economic and political objectives: the French wanted to open the Wolof countryside for peanut production at the same time that they wanted to consolidate their control over Cayor, the strongest state in the region (Pheffer, 1985: 33). Lat Dior was forcibly replaced by the French, but even the head of the Military Column led against him recognized the validity of his

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<sup>82</sup> Politicians in the Metropole were hesitant to critique this inward progression, however, given its popularity with the domestic colonial lobby (Quinn, 2000: 157).

<sup>83</sup> Motives for this varied, but the protectorate strategy was particularly attractive for the French as it allowed them to not address the question of slavery. While it was largely a desire to control territory, in some instances, such as with Oualo and Dimar provinces outside of Saint Louis the French placed the regions under protectorate as a response to the indigenous, slave-owning elite who complained to the French about the out-migration of domestic slaves which was depleting the area's population and, by extension, agricultural production (Getz, 2004: 145).

motives: “all the chiefs understand that the decisive moment has come when the railway will make us absolute masters of them and when the commerce of Europe will be open to all instead of being, as it is today, the monopoly of a small number” (quoted in Crowder, 1968: 79).<sup>84</sup> Over the next few years, the French made their final conquests in the area: in 1888 they replaced the Almamy of Boundou, a sign that they no longer depended on alliances with autonomous rulers, and in 1890 French troops entered and quickly occupied Djoloff and Fouta Toro, bringing the last two semi-autonomous areas under direct control (Robinson, 1975: 149-51). While many pre-colonial rulers retained their official status for another decade or so, they were to be short lived. Boundou’s Alamamate, for example, was officially dismantled in 1905, the territory split in two with *chefs de canton* put in charge of each (Gomez, 1992: 173).<sup>85</sup>

### **Allies and Fund-Raisers: Locating early intermediaries**

The French found themselves with two needs and one central problem. They needed intermediaries and they needed them to collect taxes to finance their new colonial project, yet the rapidity of the French advance left the early colonial state with insufficient administrators. What few men were on the ground were forced to rely extensively on indigenous leaders. These pre-colonial structures intimately shaped the early colonial experience, despite the fact that what administers the French had were quite often hostile to the idea of chiefs and traditional

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<sup>84</sup> Another notable resistance was led by Mamadou Lamine, a Soninke Marabout living in the Boundou area, who seized upon a succession struggle among the Boundou aristocracy to wage a jihad in the area, seeking to fight for his co-ethnic Soninke and resist French rule. Lamine presented one of the last military challenges to French rule in Senegalese territory and was killed in battle in 1887, one year following the death of Lat Dior (Crowder, 1968; Robinson, 1988).

<sup>85</sup> In Boundou, like many areas where the French were able to locate easily identifiable aristocracies, the *chefs de canton* were from the ruling dynasty.

authority. Consequently, early French administrators carved up pre-colonial administrative boundaries and challenged traditional authorities in some areas, while relying extensively on them in others (Cohen, 1971: 75-7). Early challenges were not uniform however: the French faced considerable difficulties across the rural countryside, but this took on distinct forms between areas where they had to manage the personalities of pre-colonial political authorities and areas where they had to try to create meaningful political authority altogether. As Crowder (1968: 165) summarizes, “different techniques had to be employed to govern the large centralized state, the small independent village and the desert nomadic tribe.”

The states that proved such a challenge to the expansion of French West Africa inward from the handful of coastal enclaves that had long-represented the limits of French activity in the sub-region did offer compensation once finally conquered. The political and economic organizations that the French found in place were available for French mobilization and co-optation in a period when the French needed it most (Roberts 1963: 304-6). The French strategic need to locate intermediaries led to near whole-sale co-optation of the existing political structures of centralized states, which offered reliable and readily available intermediaries (Klein 1968: 290). Indeed, although soon dismantled, early colonial canton borders in centralized areas often mapped neatly onto the outlines of royal provinces across French West Africa (Boone 2003a: 50).<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> The French both played with and outright dismantled traditional understandings of geographic space, though this was more or less explicitly recognized. Fournier, citing the French military commander Archinard on his march East to the Sudan (present-day Mali), quotes, “I have changed nothing about the political organization of Sudan. I only extended what existed. We are looking to group the populations under a direct authority to their liking, that they will accept voluntarily and that will safeguard us” (1955

The hierarchies that had existed below the royal courts largely went unchanged. In Saloum, Klein describes the early decades of colonization as a lone administrator with an interpreter working with the existing, indigenous political hierarchy. “All information on which to make decisions came from chiefs and all decisions were carried out by them,” he writes (1968: 151). In Sine, for example, the Buur was able to gain leverage with the local French administrator because he represented an intact political organization. By the turn of the century, the royalty of pre-colonial states understood the reality of the French arrival and had busied themselves re-positioning their interests vis-à-vis the French. The traditional political elite was ‘effectively combined’ with the new French administration.<sup>87</sup>

In the last decades of the nineteenth century, the French carefully monitored and intervened in the dynastic disputes and rivalries of pre-colonial royalties, seeking to promote leaders whom they considered the most favorable to French interests. The French needed, as Searing (2002: 66) describes, “a cheap, efficient administration” and they thought they could obtain this through opportunistic alliances with existing monarchies. In the case of Baol, France’s failure to understand the rules of succession, whereby they assumed that the sons of recent kings were the natural heirs, ignored the true nature of hereditary claims. The French assumption that power was transmitted father-to-son or, more generally within a lineage, led them to put in place the son of a King and concubine, for example, a maternal line that would

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(1891): 154). In reality, few canton chiefs ruled over meaningful territorial divisions, the French administration actively seeking to create uniformly sized political units (Crowder, 1968: 191).

<sup>87</sup> This is not to imply that the French obtained immediate pacification; even in the 1902 annual political report, it is noted that there remains ‘political agitation’ along the Senegalese river and that the political situation in the rural countryside remained largely as they had found it (*Rapport d’Ensemble*, 1902 (ANS 2G2:20)).

perhaps have earned him the title of a provincial chief and nothing more (Searing, 2002: 114). In the end, these early attempts at ruling via indigenous leaders were abandoned and early policies such as these bore little resemblance to the colonial territorial administration that was to follow (Searing, 1993: 107).

Conversely, in non-centralized areas, the French struggled to find intermediaries, often creating or promoting narrowly recognized elites with little historical claim to power only to later find themselves needing to shore-up what little authority these individuals and families were able to exert over local populations. In many regions, traditional authorities did not exist beyond a given extended family or weak alliances among a few neighboring villages, making it hard for the French to easily identify intermediaries (Pelissier, 1966: 678). The French found that villages would refuse to pay taxes and resist when an outside ruler was put in their place. This happened, for example, when the French tried compensating two royal chiefs who had lost most of their territory when the French and British finalized the Senegal-Gambian border. To make up for this, they put each king in charge of newly pacified territory: one received Koungheul and the other the western parts of the former Niani region (Klein, 1968:154-5). Both of these territories were loosely organized and had been adversely impacted by the Soninke-Marabout wars that originated in The Gambia and lasted, intermittently, from 1850 until French pacification. As a result, some affected areas remained stable, such a Rip where “chiefs ... were ruling areas their families had long inhabited and ruled for generations with traditional ties of loyalty and traditional obligations.” But in Niani and Koungheul, kings were ruling strangers with no cohesive political identity and who were especially resistant to yet another new and

imposed political organization following decades of pillage and political upheaval (Klein, 1968: 154).<sup>88</sup>

In many areas, traditional authorities had been destroyed or severely dislocated by the social upheaval of the nineteenth century and there was no clear claim to power in a given village or area, often creating competing political claims that undermined the ability of village chiefs and lineage heads to solidify power and assert the advantages that come with having established ‘first comer’ status. This problem was particularly amplified as the French colonial state began making its force felt in the first decade of the twentieth century, a large component of which involved abolishing domestic slavery, many of whom flooded back to their native homelands, by and large regions that were home to acephalous communities or small chieftaincies. In Bougouni region in the western-most part of contemporary Mali, recent devastation posed significant problems for the colonial administration, with Peterson (2005: 124) noting that the French faced a chronic authority problem in the region, as they were unable to find reliable intermediaries. So much was this a problem for the French, Peterson continues, that in 1926, a local administrator reported that over one-third of villages in the region had no designated chiefs and fights between local lineages were pervasive in trying to settle the matter (2005: 124).

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<sup>88</sup> In Koungheul, which was briefly a loosely organized Mandingue polity, Klein argues that in such areas rule was especially challenging because there had been substantial in-migration by Wolofs, undermining traditional relations and making it hard to even appoint even a leader from the majority ethnicity because ethnic diversity was high. On top of this was the animosity between groups living in the area as a result of the Soninke-Marabout wars, which had created deep divisions among the Mandingue population and created problems even in more homogenous zones (Klein, 1968: 211).

In Senegal, this description most closely resembles southeastern and southern Senegal. Liberated populations met newly arriving populations, such as Peuhl in-migrants (largely from current-day Guinea) as they all sought to settle (or resettle) in areas that had recently been uninhabited. Parts of Kedougou region that had been heavily populated by Bassari as documented by one explorer in 1891, was largely depopulated in the following years as raids from Fouta Djallon to the South drove the population into the hills, largely dismantling existing social ties among villages (Gessain, 1981).

In other areas, power vacuums of collapsed political order facilitated significant population movement. The vicissitudes of the Bundunke State meant that significant out-migration in the late 1880s towards Kaarta rendered the effective control of the Almamy null in many areas. This allowed in-migrants to settle in the region with little to no difficulty at the same time that remaining populations moved southward. Clark (1994: 207) notes a ‘marked’ movement south between 1890 and 1920 as entire villages re-settled in new areas. As the railroad was extended towards Bamako to the East in the first decade of the 20th century, opening up new lands in present-day Kaffrine and eastern Tambacounda region for peanut production, many newly freed slaves as well as followers of the Mouride religious movement (see discussion below) settled along the rail lines, similarly producing new claims to land and the introduction of additional waves of population movement (Klein, 1972: 439).<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>89</sup> The effect of the railway was not universally felt however, but rather appears to be contingent on the political and economic realities it passed through. In Eastern Senegal, the arrival of the train did little to develop commercial towns along the tracks in the area home to the Boundou state, as it had in the West. In large part, this was the result of Boundou’s rapid political decline in the late 1800s and early 1900s,

When the French attempted to create new administrative units in the early years of colonization, they not only dismantled pre-existing territories, but also largely failed to create the stable social units it was intended to produce, leading to ‘considerable social dislocation’ (Klein, 1968: 175). This process has been best documented in the Casamance, which mounted the longest resistance to the consolidation of the French colonial state. As a 1902 Colonial Political Report documents, the people “are refractory to all progress and in a social state neighboring on anarchy.” Villages refused to pay taxes despite repeated French attempts at strong-arming them. “The Casamance remains the only dark spot on our political horizon,” the report concludes (*Rapport d’ensemble*, 1902 (ANS 2G: 20)). Here, where village chiefs were religious rather than political or administrative figures, the French signed treaties with arbitrary figureheads who commanded no real authority within the village.<sup>90</sup> French frustration with trying to rule the area was the source of considerable attention and reflection, producing one of the best historical records of any non-centralized area of the country. The French resorted to putting Wolof and Sereer intermediaries in place or, in one province a Mandingue jihadist, Fode Kaba, in an attempt to pacify the area and collect taxes. Yet even this violent attempt at controlling the Diola through a leader from a neighboring area was successfully repelled within two years (Meguelle, 2012: 315).

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which was amplified by economic stagnation and famine in the years immediately preceding the train’s arrival (Clark, 1996: 19).

<sup>90</sup> The Diola ‘village’ “did not exist as a collectivity,” Meguelle writes. “Social life as mostly limited to clans and family concessions,” and while the French designation of ‘villages’ met an administrative objective, it never mapped onto any real political community (2012: 117, 119).

Of course, there were some similarities of experience across the entire country. Colonial rule introduced a common currency and shifted agricultural production in many parts of the country towards cash crops.<sup>91</sup> While states bordering the Senegal River, long the central axis of French commercial influence in the region, had profited from the gum and slave trades prior to colonization, the introduction of groundnut crops and the finalization of the Saint-Louis-Dakar railroad shifted the economic weight of the colony southwards.<sup>92</sup> By 1902 the French were planning on augmenting taxes accordingly. The “*cercles* of the line,” those most exposed to early peanut crops, were considered among the richest at the time because groundnut cash cropping introduced money into the economy, as were parts of the Saloum and Nioro. But in the North, no such tax increases were planned in the previously prosperous areas of Fouta (*Rapport d'ensemble*, 1902 (ANS 2G: 20). The French arrival did bring with it a general improvement in prosperity via the peanut crop as a new source of circulating currency, but more fundamentally by virtue of the peace the French ensured, facilitating investment by peasants and population growth (though the early 1900s did experience some notable droughts that briefly set-back these advances) (Robinson, 1975: 140, Gomez, 1992).

Beyond such economic shifts many historians doubt how much impact the early colonial encounter had on the social and political lives of average citizens. In general, rural social relations were unchanged. Gellar writes, “despite destruction of the old political order, common

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<sup>91</sup> Head taxes, for example, forced peasants to grow some peanuts in order to make yearly payments, and the proximity of the railroad in many communities facilitated the ability of peasants to easily sell their harvests and, as a result, these areas produced increasing groundnut crops (Klein, 1968: 183-6).

<sup>92</sup> Economic rational was not the only factor in French decisions to build the initial Saint-Louis-Dakar trunk, to expand it eastward to Kayes or, later, to build feeder lines to Diourbel and Linguere.

social patterns continued: noble families continued to support retainers and show largess to social inferiors, though on a more limited scale" (2005: 31). The daily life of most rural inhabitants were largely unchanged (Crowder, 1968: 7). Village chiefs, Gellar continues, continued to be chosen based on their lineal descent from the first-founders of the village and their traditional roles, allocating land, settling disputes and interfacing with higher-ups, continued unchanged from the pre-colonial era (2005: 37).

That the French relied so heavily on intermediaries counters the dominant narrative of French colonial direct rule. While recent studies have increasingly recognized the patchier nature of the French colonial experience (for example Peterson, 2005), the default assumption is still that the French irrevocably diminished the power of chiefs while the British cemented it (for example, Mamdani's (1996) discussion is heavily informed by the British colonial legacy). Certainly, in the case of acephalous areas, the French often did engage in direct rule in the sense that they 'imported' intermediaries from other parts of the country to areas where they could not find suitable agents. Former soldiers or interpreters were posted around uncentralized areas of the country where they had no link to the local population. As Boone notes, this was only a choice the French took when they had to: "it is in this sense that France's institutional choices were determined endogenously, by political realities at the local level" (2003a: 107). In contrast to the common distinction drawn between French direct and British indirect rule therefore, France's early experiences in French West Africa reveals frequent reliance on the political structures it found on the ground as a means to administer the vast swaths of territory it lacked the manpower and finances to control (Crowder, 1968: 171).

## **Colonial Intermediaries Onwards**

The ultimate symbol of the French colonial administration in rural areas was the *commandant du cercle* and his indigenous counterpart, the chef de canton. The concentration of authority in the canton chiefs and French administrators “was, of course, nothing new to Africans, whose chiefs were at once leaders and guarantors of public order,” writes Coquery-Viditch. But while taxes and tribute had been collected in some form or another across most of pre-colonial West Africa, the French administration seemed to be interested in tax collection at the expense of almost all else (Coquery-Viditch, 1969: 170). Canton chiefs were in charge of collecting taxes from village chiefs, the latter being left untouched by the arrival of French rule except in cases of egregious malfeasance (Cohen, 1971: 76).<sup>93</sup> The *chef de canton* was also charged with organizing forced labor and acting as a relay for the administration.

Over time, Crowder and others note, the canton chief shifted from “the symbol of traditional unity to the most hated member of the community” (1968: 187). As canton chiefs became more autocratic, buffered from traditional checks on authority by French backing, religious leaders (see discussion below) and village chiefs gained influence at a local level. The French themselves realized the dangers of appointing canton chiefs who had no ties to the region they were about to rule though, Klein does note, “outsider [canton] chiefs did best in stateless areas and in areas where the community was new” (Klein, 1968: 196, 209). Indeed, thinking shifted fast in the early years of colonization. By 1909, General De Ponty’s *Politique de Race* was built around the idea of creating cantons of homogenous size with coherent

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<sup>93</sup> The exception to this is when village chiefs did not exist in an administrative sense prior to the arrival of the colonial state. See discussion below as to the Casamance.

backgrounds and/or ethnic mixes so as to facilitate the colonial administration's need to locate viable intermediaries.

In practice, Bayart notes that the colonial state in Senegal tended to reinforce the power of local elites (2009: 120). As the French administrator Delavignette wrote in 1946, "after fifty years of colonization, it seems that the spirit of indigenous power has left the big chiefs [chef de canton] and sought refuge in the lower chiefs [village chiefs], who are less touched by our actions" (p. 125). One hundred years later, this group remains tied together via historical ties as 'first-founders' of the regions and through the status they obtained in the pre-colonial era (often as notables) (see Galvan, 2004 for a discussion of this among the Sereer).<sup>94</sup>

### **Three Peculiarities of Senegalese Colonial History: The Quatre Communes, Missions and Mourides**

The colonial period saw three historical contingencies in Senegal that have proved to have important consequences for subsequent political dynamics in the country. The first is the French relationship with the residents of the four communes of Saint-Louis, Dakar, Gorée Island and Rufisque (a suburb of Dakar). Residents of these cities, the first major urban areas in the country, were granted French citizenship rights in 1848. At the time, the population was largely French traders and a sizable *métis* population that was also active in trade. Descendants of this population obtained voting rights in 1916 and were the basis of much of Senegal's political elite

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<sup>94</sup> As described in the previous chapter, village chieftaincy is almost exclusively passed in the male lineage in West Africa, a title transmitted either father to son or to the oldest male in the family. In a similar vein, villages often have a second lineage from which the village Imam is chosen, often a family that was an early inhabitant of the village (see discussion in Juul, 2006 for example). This cultural pattern - whereby village chiefs and imams are the descendants of the first inhabitants of an area - means that local level elites of this nature are quite durable over time.

in the late colonial and post-colonial period. The state has long been felt strongest in these areas and the disjuncture between political life in the four communes and the countryside has long been acute, though Diouf does suggest that this is one reason for the relative depoliticization of ethnicity in the country as the four communes provided a unifying focal point for rural residents to rally around when making claims of unequal treatment (1994: 183). As these areas have had an urban statute since well before the start point of the empirical analyses in this dissertation, these areas are set aside given their unique history.

Secondly, missions played a relatively circumscribed role, congregating along the coast south of Dakar. In British Africa, the meager education offered by the colonial state was supplemented by missionaries, who often provided the bulk of free education accessible to the masses (Frankema, 2012). In comparison, French West Africa had relatively few missionaries, in large part because of the separation of Church and state in France in 1905 which restricted access and the existence of Islam in many pre-colonial royal courts (Crowder, 1968: 283). Yet even compared to Equatorial Africa where the majority of students were enrolled in mission schools in 1935, across all of French West Africa less than twenty percent of students were in private, mission-run schools (Gardiniere, 1985: 338). The only areas where missions were truly active in Senegal was on the *Petit Cote* south of Dakar, home to the pre-colonial kingdom of Sine, and in the Casamance, where the Catholic church had made early inroads, strategically focusing on these two areas because their populations, majority animist, which were seen as

being easier converts than the Muslim populations that dominated the coasts to the north of Dakar.<sup>95</sup>

Religion played an alternative role in other areas of the country. As the pre-colonial state system buckled under the pressure of French advance, a series of religious leaders, at their extreme in the form of religious jihads, sought to fill the leadership void that was emerging across the rural countryside (Searing, 2002). These uprisings and movements in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century were concentrated in areas with relatively weak states - such as Baol, Rip and Boundou - allowing them easier inroads with local peasants. Following the defeat of the Wolof states, the downfall off Rip and Pakala, the uprising of Mamadou Lamine in Boundou or Umar Tall's march from Fouta to Nioro (in present-day Mali), many peasants turned to charismatic religious leaders during this time. As Boone writes, "everyone was seeking protection, land, and new opportunity, and this is precisely what the Sufi clerics offered" (2003a: 52).

The most significant of these is Amadou Bemba, a Muslim religious leader whose influence is still extensive across Senegal. The third, and most well studied characteristic of Senegalese politics, is the Mouride brotherhood that Bemba founded (for example, Cruise O'Brien, 1971). Although he was seen early on as a threat to early French interests in eastern Baol, Bemba's ability to organize his followers in large-scale farming schemes led the French to

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<sup>95</sup> Indeed, missionaries were often hostile to the French colonial reliance on Muslim elite, preferring instead that the regime support their efforts to convert animist Sereer and Diola populations, who they believed could form a Catholic base on which to prevent the further spread of Islam (Foster, 2013: 15, 46). This posed a problem for the French, who could not find suitable intermediaries in the acephalous local population, and whose only alternative was the missionaries themselves and the missionaries, often siding with the Diola against the French, were not seen as acting in the state's interest (Boone, 2003: 106).


attempt to ‘manage’ him as a means to improve groundnut production in the region (Boone, 2003: 52). The Mourides encouraged and actively assisted followers to settle new villages and devote themselves not only to their religion, but peanut farming. This meant that their influence quickly spread outward from Touba as Bemba’s followers expanded into new zones; today, many of these early sites of settlement are among the most sacred in the religion (Searing, 2002: 242). Socially, Mouridism became a means for casted individuals and slaves to shed (in part) their social positions in their traditional villages and start again (Bayart, 2009: 119).

As the state became increasingly dependent on the Mouride Brotherhood as brokers for political support, the resistance of Mouride leaders to French education resulted in notable depressions in primary school expansion in areas long-dominated by the Mourides, notably Diourbel region and Kebemer Department in Louga. Generally, early presence of Koranic schools is associated with lowered social service access.<sup>96</sup> In 1975, for example, Diourbel’s primary school enrollment rate was thirteen percent, a full twenty two percent below the national average (Le Brun, 1979: 191). Today, administrators complain that these regions pose particular problems for primary education because parents still prefer to give their children an Islamic, religious education rather than French-based primary schools.

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<sup>96</sup> This is a statistically significant difference, for example, in primary school access 1912, 1952 and 2002.

Figure 2.4 Early Religious Spread



## Independence: Centralization and Decentralization (in Two Acts)

Along with France's other colonies in West Africa, Senegal gained independence in 1960.

The transition was a remarkably smooth one, with traditional rulers - marabouts and chiefs alike - helping ensure a continuity in the transition. The state retained and, in some ways increased, the centralized structure of the colonial states, turning *cercles* into regions, cantons into sub-prefectures (Diouf, 1993: 235-7). The state and political elite embraced socialism. The first President, Leopold Senghor and the Prime Minister, Mamadou Dia, engaged in a massive campaign to educate the peasantry, bring them into the modern economy and improve their

access to social services. Although Dia was removed from power after three years as Senghor centralized power in the presidency, Senghor continued this expansion in rural areas, through the establishment of cooperatives and the program of *animation rurale*, based on rural outreach. Over the following decade, Senghor consolidated power, repressing opposition parties and challengers under an ‘amalgam’ political apparatus built on relations of convenience rather than around the socialist ideology that the regime officially promoted (Boone, 1992: 94-5).

As numerous studies of decentralized Africa have already noted, the creation of new administrative units post-independence just created additional layers of “institutional sedimentation” (Blundo, 1998: 3). There is scant evidence that either independence significantly challenged the power of local elites, but rather, the central-state often preferred to continue to co-opt them much as the French had. As Boone writes, “power relations in the rural areas that were rooted in long established social hierarchies and relations of production constituted the regime’s [the early post-colonial state] most solid and reliable bases of political power” (1992: 98). This fits the typical pattern whereby the challenge of ‘broadcasting’ state authority across rural regions led colonial and post-colonial African regimes alike to rely on traditional authorities, particularly customary and village chiefs, to carry out administrative tasks at the local level, including tax collection, monitoring citizen compliance with various regulations and policies, and conveying information to citizens (Herbst, 2000).

By the early 1970s, the Senegalese State was facing a crisis: the political elite had reinforced the country’s singular economic focus on the groundnut trade, yet the peasantry remained weakly integrated into the state, having used the cooperatives and services of

animation rurale opportunistically at best (Diouf, 1993: 240). Economic investments and programs were not producing tangible results and the state faced increasing pressure to distribute patronage (Boone, 1992: 169-70). The ruling party's tight control over the state made party membership a vehicle for patronage distribution, placing substantial strains on the elite (Diouf, 1993: 238). As a solution, in 1972 the state announced the creation of a new administrative unit below the sous-prefecture, the rural community (*le communauté rurale*).

Diouf quotes the Ministry of the Interior, Jean Collins, on the rationale:

"over the past several years it has become clear that the rural population has not really been involved in our administrative structures ... That means that only a tiny minority of the population participates. It is just as clear that if administrative activities are to be carried out with genuine efficiency, they have to be based on the active, responsible involvement of the population. After all, they are in the best position to assess their own needs" (1993, 237).

This attempt to respond to the *malaise paysan* affecting the countryside sought to

increase local resources and the ability of local officials to respond to local needs and sources of unrest (Boone, 1992: 180).

This early move to decentralization made Senegal an unintentional trailblazer. The government gradually rolled out the creation of local governments over a ten-year period between 1974 and 1984, starting in the peanut basin where the rural citizenry was most vocally unhappy. The 1972 reform established 320 rural communities run by a locally elected rural council (*le conseil rural*), composed at the time of approximately ten members, but today of between 32 and 46 councilors depending on population size. While elections were held from 1972 onward, local state agents, largely in association with rural cooperatives, appointed one-third of council seats and party competition was nonexistent. It was not until 1996, at the same time that all council seats became subject to popular vote, that opposition parties first won any local

elections, though the country was at best quasi-democratic at the time and still run by the *Parti Socialiste*, which had ruled since independence (Vengroff and Ndiaye, 1998). It was only in 2000, with the election of Abdoulaye Wade of the *Parti Democratique Senegalais* (PDS), that the country saw a true liberalization of political space nationally and locally and, as a result, a number of parties contested and were elected in the 2002 local elections.

At the head of the rural community is the rural community President, referred to throughout the country as the PCR (*le président du conseil rural*). With two adjoints, these three offices are elected within the council following elections. In practice, at the first meeting of the rural council following the popular vote, the elected councilors vote internally to select the PCR and two vice-PCRs. The PCR is almost always the most active member of the council and has substantial authority in the community.<sup>97</sup>

The boundaries established by the 1972 reform by and large left the previously lowest-level administrative unit, the *arrondissement*, intact, simply dividing it into two to seven (though most often three to four) rural communities (Vengroff and Magala, 2001). Most rural communities consist of around forty to fifty villages, though at the extremes this number ranges from six to 130. Since their creation, some rural communities have experienced significant changes, often when a large village obtains urban status, or, more rarely, when large rural communities have been divided up to create multiple local governments. This was most

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<sup>97</sup> This is widely agreed upon by interviewees as one of the foremost aspects of Senegal's decentralization laws that should be changed. Critics argue that it leads to a distortion between who citizens want to lead them and who actually does. Moreover, many respondents suggested that this would resolve the problem of elected councilors 'buying' the office. The most common version of this story is that affluent councilors buy the position by promising a certain number of cattle to each councilor who votes for them. They are illiterate, noted one regional development actor, "but they think their personal fortune gives them the right to rule" (Interview, Regional Development Agency, Tambacounda Region, 17 April 2013).

prominently the case in the 2009 administrative redistricting, which created fifty new local governments, and, in subsequent reforms in 2011-12, thirteen more. This leads to a total of 384 local governments in 2013 with the addition of 126 urban communes (including Dakar).<sup>98</sup>

The country's initial decentralization scheme in 1972 gave local governments authority over land allocation and prioritizing investments. Land had first been taken out of the customary domain with the 1964 *Loi sur le domaine national* and transferred to the central state. Although village chiefs continue to informally distribute parcels of land within villages, the 1972 law gave uninhabited or land not in use by citizens for farming or herding, to local governments, a substantial power in rural Africa. Aside from this, little meaningful power was actually transferred until further reforms in 1996, at which point local governments gained authority over nine competences, including primary education, health and urban planning in addition to an enlarged set of local tax handles.<sup>99</sup> Prior to these reforms, the development programs voted on by rural councils and their budgets were exercised and implemented by the Sous-Prefet, thereby ensuring a large degree of central government control. Consequently, there was much to

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<sup>98</sup> Numerous explanations have been put forward for the administrative redistricting of 2009-12, with the Wade regime claiming it was meant to bring the administration closer to the citizenry. But many argue that there were also clear political motivations on the part of the Wade regime in anticipation of the 2009 local elections. In reality, rural communities that were divided had, on average, more villages (73 versus 57) and larger surface areas (124,067 hectares versus 61,673), although there were certainly political motives at play as well. Uncentralized areas were more likely to have an administrative division, with only 10.4% of rural communities in formerly centralized regions having a boundary change as opposed to 20.1% in uncentralized regions ( $p < 0.05$ ).

<sup>99</sup> The full list of competences devolved to local governments is: (i) management of land usage (private and public), (ii) natural resource management, (iii) health and social action, (iv) youth, sports and leisure, (v) culture, (vi) education and professional formation, (vii) urban planning, (viii) urbanism and housing and (ix) planning/development strategy.

potentially gain from the reforms of 1996 for local governments, including access to non-negligible fiscal resources through local taxes and central government transfers.

Today, most local governments are not active in all nine of the domains transferred to them by the central government, though all rural councils run activities in health and education and many implement programs in the areas of youth and culture in addition to distributing and adjudicating issues surrounding land access.<sup>100</sup> None of this is to over-estimate the capacity of local governments, who suffer from weak tax receipts, poor training and meager transfers from the central government in proportion to their devolved areas of authority. Officials and local government actors across the country like to quip that the central state transferred ‘the nine biggest problems in the country, with none of the means.’ Nonetheless, some governments are able to engage in yearly activities, such as providing school supplies to children at the start of each school year or buying medicine for health facilities and to make modest investments by constructing new health clinics, primary schools or new classrooms each year. Combined with resources that may enter a community through donors, this can result in a number of ‘small’ improvements over a five-year term.

The central financial means available to local governments are their ability to raise their own revenues and central government transfers. Local governments have the capacity to collect a set of taxes, but they almost exclusively only collect the rural tax (*la taxe rurale*, often

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<sup>100</sup> Local governments may also run projects in non-devolved areas, such as hydrology, by digging wells for citizens. Many elected officials noted the contradiction between the demands of local populations on rural councils to provide clean water access for citizens and livestock and their lack of funds and discretion in this domain. Regardless of their lack of official capacity in this area however, most elected officials reported putting emphasis on ensuring clean water for local residents, claiming that there is no way anyone can be elected in rural Senegal without addressing the issue of water first and foremost (Interview, Director, *Union des Associations d'Elus Locaux*, 15 November 2012).

referred to as *l'impôt*) and, less frequently, taxes on local market stalls or parking.<sup>101</sup> Many rural communities collect almost nothing in a given year, but even those who do collect it rely on other sources to actually implement projects. As one Adjoint Sous-Prefet in Kaolack region observed, even though local governments in the region collected most of the rural tax, it was far from enough for them to function on.<sup>102</sup> The key revenue source of local governments is then by default central government transfers, which cover operating costs and a few small investments. The central transfer, the *Fonds de Dotation de la Décentralisation* (FDD) averages between 22,000\$ to 28,000\$ in 2013 for example, which includes the salaries of the PCR and vice-PCRs (8,400\$ per year combined).<sup>103</sup> To assist with work, all governments have a community secretary (*l'assistant communitaire*) who must have, at a minimum, the level of a high school diploma (*le baccalauréat*) and who does administrative paperwork for the government. All local governments were provided a car, largely kept in the possession of the PCR, by President Wade in 2006 to alleviate the burden of having to travel to far-flung villages.<sup>104</sup> A local city hall (*le maison communitaire*) was also constructed for each rural community in the mid-2000s, although their construction is still underway in newly created local governments.<sup>105</sup>

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<sup>101</sup> Rural communities also receive a portion of fines collected by central state agents in their area, part of receipts from the *état civil* (birth, death and marriage certificates) and any taxes paid during the delimitation of fields or village parcels). Other taxes, such as taxes for public lighting, garbage collection, spectacles and advertising (i.e. posting a poster on a public building), are almost never collected by rural councils, though they are often collected in urban communes.

<sup>102</sup> Interview, Nioro Department, 30 April 2013.

<sup>103</sup> Some communities get significantly more than this, such as Touba Mosquee, the seat of the influential Mouride Brotherhood whose population hovers around 560,000 inhabitants, far above the average of 28,000. Touba received 120,000\$ in FDD transfers in 2013.

<sup>104</sup> Or to provide patronage to local elected officials, depending on interpretation.

<sup>105</sup> The city hall has an office for the PCR, the community secretary, a meeting room and a few other rooms that employed variously by local governments. Most have at least one room dedicated the *état*

Local governments are run parallel to the deconcentrated central state, represented at the village level by the village chief and, more powerfully, by the Sous-Prefet in each *arrondissement*. Village chiefs are charged with working with both the rural council and the local Sous-Prefet and, at least in principle, collect the rural tax, serving (though without voting powers) on the local land committee and acting as an intermediary between their villages and the local government. The Sous-Prefet, once all powerful for local governments via *la tutelle*, or the right to approve, deny or correct any local government decisions, now plays a largely advisory role, though they retain the right to send back an unbalanced budget or notify the central state of illegal activity.<sup>106</sup> Table 2.1 shows the current administrative system in Senegal, distinguishing between decentralized and deconcentrated hierarchies, in comparison with its historical predecessors.

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*civil*. The state of maintenance and activity varies widely. In some communities they serve as a meeting point for citizens and local civil society organizations. In others they are borderline abandoned, with only the secretary (occasionally) working there.

<sup>106</sup> How different the current ‘controle de légalité’ is from *la tutelle* is up for debate. While Sous-Prefets certainly take a back seat today in comparison to their pre-1996 role in local governments, the power to ‘refuse to approve’ should not be under-estimated (Interview, Director in the Direction of Territorial Administration, Ministry of Interior, 30 October 2012). Most respondents however indicated that the Sous-Prefet was quite helpful for the local government, helping with paperwork and indicating where potential problems might arise. Local governments have their own checks on abuses of power by Sous-Prefet, such as the right to appeal decisions to the Prefet (at the level of the *département*) or to take them to court. Although rare, such cases do occur.

**Table 2.1: Administrative Hierarchies Over Time, with relevant officials in italics**

pre-1880		1900-1959	1960	1972	1972	1996
Indigenous	Colonial State	Central State	Central State	Decentralization, Phase 1	Central State	Democratic Decentralization, (phase II)
Pre-colonial States ( <i>Kings</i> )	Uncentralized Areas	Colony of Senegal ( <i>Governor</i> )	State of Senegal ( <i>President</i> )	State of Senegal ( <i>President</i> )	State of Senegal ( <i>President</i> )	State of Senegal ( <i>President</i> )
Provinces ( <i>Sub Kings, Provincial Chiefs</i> )	Cercle ( <i>Commandant</i> )	Region ( <i>governor</i> )	Region ( <i>governor</i> )	Region ( <i>governor</i> )	Region ( <i>governor</i> )	Region ( <i>governor</i> )
Village ( <i>Chief</i> )	Village ( <i>Chief</i> )	Department ( <i>Prefet</i> )	Department ( <i>Prefet</i> )	Department ( <i>Prefet</i> )	Arrondissement ( <i>Sous-Prefet; Chef d'arrondissement</i> )	Arrondissement ( <i>Sous-Prefet</i> )
	[Small-Scale Chiefs]	Canton ( <i>Chef de Canton</i> )	Canton ( <i>Chef de Canton</i> )	Canton ( <i>Chef de Canton</i> )	Rural Community ( <i>PCR and Councilors</i> )	Rural Community ( <i>PCR and Councilors</i> )
		Village ( <i>Chief</i> )	Village ( <i>Chief</i> )			

### *Political Parties under Decentralization*

In addition to the devolution of authority, 1996 was also an important year for local governments due to changes in electoral rules. While local elections had been based on proportionality up until that point, from 1996 onward the state enacted a mixed proportionality-plurality model with half of the seats allocated proportionally and half to the winner of the most votes. Even if the second party obtains forty-nine percent of the votes, they hold at most twenty-four percent of seats. Consequently, the winning party gains a distorted seat advantage relative to local seat share. Councilors are elected via party list, and though many villagers consider having a councilor from their village prestigious, councilors do not represent their own village. Rather the entire rural community can be thought of as a multi-member district. Given the extreme nature of seat-allocation in rural councils, considerable premium is placed on obtaining a majority and, once had, the ruling party has substantial say in decision-making.

Local elected officials report knowing which villages are most likely to vote for them and that, in general, this does not change much from one election to another; “if they vote for you once, they usually stay with you,” said one PCR.<sup>107</sup> Campaigns last for three weeks and general reported campaigning strategies involve going to all villages (‘even the very small one with only five huts’), setting up tables and listening to the concerns and worries of citizens before the candidate will then give a speech. Generally, the candidate provides some money to local women to make a meal for all in attendance. If a party is invested in an election, often only the purview

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<sup>107</sup> Interview, rural community #21, 20 June 2013.

of the President's party (i.e. the PDS in the 2009 locals), they will spend upwards of one hundred dollars on organizing an event in larger villages, but for smaller parties or those in less interesting races, this usually amounts to around twenty dollars per village.<sup>108</sup> Approximately half of elected officials interviewed had received help developing an electoral platform or some form of training from their party.<sup>109</sup>

National political parties compete in local elections therefore, but overwhelmingly respondents argued that it is local political cleavages - mapping at times neatly while at others quite disjunct from - partisan dynamics. Still, 76.5% of respondents interviewed (and ninety-seven percent of elected officials) for this project across rural Senegal reported feeling close to a political party.<sup>110</sup> This should not obscure however one of the most pervasive features of Senegalese politics: transhumance, or the tendency for elites to switch political parties frequently. Of those with a reported party identification in 2013, only 30.6% reported having always belonging to that party and approximately sixty-five percent of those who had switched parties had done so most recently right before, during or after the 2012 Presidential and Legislative elections.<sup>111</sup> Local councils had an average of 2.37 parties with seats on their councils during both the 2002-09 and 2009-14 cycles; an average of 3.44 parties had presented themselves for election in the former compared to 2.45 in the latter. Competition seemed to have likewise

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<sup>108</sup> Interview, PCR, rural community #4, 28 May 2013.

<sup>109</sup> This is balanced across the country.

<sup>110</sup> Some village chiefs reported that they had previously held a party identification, but that given their official statute in the Senegalese administration they no longer did so. Local elected officials and Sous-Prefets quickly dismissed this as nonsense.

<sup>111</sup> Roughly forty-five percent of respondents with a party identification reported having been in contact with their party hierarchy over the past year, but given that this included the 2012 elections it is hard to assess contact levels in a non-national election year. Over ninety percent of those who reported contact, for example, said it was to discuss the elections.

declined nationally by 2009, when nearly sixty-six percent of rural councils were aligned with the government in Dakar, up from 57.5% in 2002.<sup>112</sup> Although widely reported as a common practice, only twenty-four percent of village chiefs reported giving *consignes de vote*, or telling villagers who they should vote for.<sup>113</sup> A few interviewees reported a broader process of this, such as one village chief who said that during elections he and other village chiefs near him would meet, find a consensus on the person they felt was best suited for the job and able to solve their problems and then collectively give their recommendations to their villagers.<sup>114</sup>

None of this should obscure, however, the relative insignificance of party identification as an actual cue in local elections. Local political entrepreneurs may follow national political coalitions, one Sous-Prefet noted, but electoral lists are made within each community. It is “ultimately local dynamics” that shape who runs, who votes for whom and how local political cleavages are understood in any given community.<sup>115</sup> This idea was reported throughout the country, though it took different forms. In areas that were home to pre-colonial states, this manifested itself in the tendency of respondents to argue that while different parties were elected, this did not undermine community cohesiveness which offered cross-cutting links that were more important than what party any given individual belonged to.<sup>116</sup> “Locally, it’s the

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<sup>112</sup> Again, these numbers are similar in areas that were and areas that were not home to pre-colonial states.

<sup>113</sup> This was evenly balanced between areas that were and were not centralized prior to colonization.

<sup>114</sup> Interview, village chief #1, rural community #31, 15 February 2013.

<sup>115</sup> Interview, Kaolack region, 3 May 2013.

Given the more intimate scale of decentralized governance in rural settings, elites may be double winners: the delivery of public goods helps their own families and friends obtain access to primary schooling or reduce long-distances to water points and it reinforces their prestige and status in the community.

<sup>116</sup> For example, this was argued by the councilor of rural community #e (11 May 2013) and the PCR of rural community #2 (6 May 2013).

person that counts" not the party, observed on PCR in the North. People want a candidate that they have confidence in or with whom they have connections (be it family or perceived common, local social or economic interests).<sup>117</sup>

More variety in experience was found in acephalous areas. While local politics was still described as about mobilizing followers, here party identification became one means of doing so. In communities lacking a unifying history or identity, such as is almost always found in areas that were home to pre-colonial states, shared partisanship can become a means of forming a local coalition.<sup>118</sup> This is still rarely presented as being about the party, however; interviewees were just as likely to report having recently changed party identification, for example. In one rural community in the Casamance, the local government had almost ceased to function since the 2012 presidential elections because most of the councilors had switched from the PDS to the *Alliance Pour la Republique* (APR), the newly-elected President Macky Sall's party. The PCR, who had been elected under the PDS and remained loyal to it, had therefore lost his majority. This was not, the community secretary clarified, remotely related to anything about the parties themselves but reflected a growing dissatisfaction with the PCR, so much so that councilors preferred blocking all work rather than continuing to cooperate with him.<sup>119</sup> Still, it should be noted that in a small number of rural communities, the fact that one party had swept local elections was cited as a reason for a functioning local council despite deep, local divisions.<sup>120</sup>

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<sup>117</sup> Interview, rural community #31, 21 July 2013.

<sup>118</sup> This is reported heavily in Ziguinchor region, for example, as well as the southeast of the country.

<sup>119</sup> Interview, rural community #36, 5 July 2013.


<sup>120</sup> For example, this was the case in rural communities #13 and #56.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter has presented an overview (and admittedly only that) of the changing political organization of the territory of contemporary Senegal from the 1500s to the present. The critical antecedents identified in the preceding chapter - varying levels of pre-colonial political organization - have been described here in more historical depth and linked to variation in the ability of the early colonial state to find intermediaries and consolidate power. In turn, the relative ease of co-opting existing hierarchies in areas home to pre-colonial kingdoms helped preserve existing social ties among villages, even as the pre-colonial polities themselves were dismantled and, at times, replaced with new over-arching systems of legitimation, such as the Mouride Brotherhood. Areas that were uncentralized were more vulnerable to competing claims to authority at the village level and above and saw high rates of in-migration that was less successfully integrated into existing social structures.

## Chapter 2 Appendix

Figure 2.5 Alternative Ethnicity Measures



Source: *Atlas National du Sénégal*, 1976

### **3. “They should build us a school too”: The Local Politics of Primary School Delivery in Rural Senegal**

Research on social service delivery in sub-Saharan Africa overwhelmingly focuses on how public goods are deviated from the most deserving to those who are connected to leaders, be it via political or social ties. This chapter assesses the ways in which public goods are being delivered within Senegal’s local governments today, finding that such common expectations from the literature, such as central-state ties, ethnic favoritism or the interaction between such ‘deviant’ patterns of political exchange and electoral politics, cannot explain village-level public goods delivery; at best, the effect of these factors is partial and inconsistent.

Rather, the evidence presented below provides support for the central argument of this dissertation: the politics of public goods delivery in rural Senegal take *different forms* across local governments and these differences are driven by pre-colonial political geography. The political distribution of public goods by Senegal’s rural councils are spatially contingent therefore on deeply historical structures. The central finding is that an area’s political organization on the eve of colonization is a significant predictor of a village’s likelihood of receiving infrastructural investments. In areas that were home to centralized polities when the French began constructing a colonial state in 1880, there is consistent evidence that local governments are delivering new clinics, primary schools and additional classrooms to more villages than their counterparts in areas that were acephalous or which lacked hierarchical governance when the French moved inland. While most villages believe that they deserve their own clinic or primary school – echoed in the comments heard across rural Senegal that ‘they

should build us a school too' - this chapter provides evidence, robust to a number of alternative explanations and model specifications, that there is something different about how local governments deliver these public goods in formerly centralized areas even when taking into account similar objective need.

In making this claim, this chapter builds on current findings in the literature that areas that were home to pre-colonial states have, on average, better development outcomes today. However, this chapter specifically examines current patterns of goods delivery, suggesting that observed correlations between pre-colonial statehood and development outcomes are not representative of a static effect but rather created differences in on-going political dynamics. The actual politics of public goods delivery, measured here by looking at new investments in two time periods, have received scant attention up until this point, with most work looking at one, cross-sectional point in time alone.

In order to test the expectation that areas that were home to pre-colonial states are delivering public goods *differently* than other parts of the country, this chapter makes use of an original, georeferenced data set of village-level basic health and primary education infrastructure between 2002 and 2012 and of basic health infrastructure between 2009-12. This dataset covers all of Senegal's approximately 14,300 rural villages and, by looking at three time points (2002, 2009 and 2012), is able to examine where local government's physically invest new clinics schools and classrooms with relative precision while controlling for a range of local political and structural factors.

The analysis begins with a brief elaboration on the previous chapter's discussion of the role of Senegal's local governments in the distribution of basic local public goods. After establishing that formerly centralized areas are indeed more likely to have access to primary schools and basic health in 2009, the midpoint of the sample under study here, a series of empirical tests demonstrate that historical patterns of pre-colonial statehood offer the strongest leverage in explaining patterns of local public goods placement at the village level in Senegal between 2002 and 2012. Further robustness checks include employing Location-Allocation models to evaluate the comparative efficiency of school placement as well as estimations of the degree of omitted variable bias by unobservables in order to demonstrate the durability of this finding.

## **Primary Health and Education in Senegal in the 2000s**

This chapter tests the expectation that the contemporary politics of public goods delivery will vary sub-nationally, following the contours of pre-colonial political geography, by looking at the construction of primary school and basic health infrastructure in the 2000s. These two types of goods are ideal for such an analysis because they are both highly valued by local populations and relatively easy to deliver, making the ability to target villages, or a cluster of neighboring villages, with a school or clinic an unparalleled source of patronage for local politicians. While research on the delivery of public goods in developing states is dominated by work on the Latin American experience, where governments have moved to distributing mobile benefits, such as cash transfer programs (Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez and Magaloni 2012, Stokes 2005), such programs find few parallels in sub-Saharan Africa, where governments still struggle

to deliver a set of basic social services to citizens. As a result, most government investment in rural areas still takes the form of physical infrastructure, such as primary schools, that are community-targeted and community-specific.

This chapter joins a series of recent studies on how and where African citizens gain access to primary education and, to a lesser extent, basic health. Central to most of this work is the frequency with which primary education becomes a means to obtain votes (for example Stasavage, 2005). Harding and Stasavage (2014) argue that certain government actions vis-à-vis primary education are easier for citizens to verify and hence better able to create an electoral payoff, such as abolishing school fees. While Senegal's local governments have no control over popular educational reforms, such as school fee abolition, the 1996 decentralization reform shifted decisions over the placement of primary schools and basic health facilities as well as their upkeep and additional investments, such as building new classrooms or constructing a wall around a facility to local elites who can distribute them with minimal central state oversight. As a result, inputs such as classroom quality and which village receives a school is attributable to the local government.

Although only a portion of funding for basic infrastructure investments comes from local budgets, Senegal's decentralization laws task local governments with deciding where to build these public goods.<sup>121</sup> Although occasionally village-NGO partnerships or migrants bypass the local government by constructing schools on their own, most consult the local government and the vast majority of school and clinic choice lies with the local government. This chapter follows

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<sup>121</sup> The central government still determines the allocation of personnel however, meaning that there is sometimes a delay between finishing construction on a new school and the arrival of a teacher.

Banerjee and Iyer (2005) and Lee and Schultz (2012), to argue that any infrastructure improvement in the realms of basic health or primary education is influenced by local initiative even when funding originates outside of the local government since most donor or partner-funded improvements (be them negotiated by the central or local state or individual villages) require local contributions (or *contrepartie*, a fiscal or in-kind contribution to any given project) and often are the result of lobbying by rural councils, local elites or both.

Once funds arrive, they are subject to local deliberation within the rural community over how to use them (unless donors earmarked them for a specific sector, i.e. health, though the choice of location still falls to the rural council in this case). Although experiences vary greatly, all decisions made by the local rural council are in principle made in open, public meetings. While many elected officials and community secretaries complain about low public interest, meetings are attended by elected councilors (with a quorum required for all decisions), relevant members of the deconcentrated state apparatus (such as local development agents, the Sous-Prefet and representatives of relevant ministries, such as teachers or health workers), as well as village chiefs who report frequent attendance for the yearly budget meeting, though attendance is mixed for other meetings.

While village chiefs often complain that they do not have the right to speak at such meetings other than when invited to do so, many report seeking recourse by talking to their village's councilor before hand if they have one. In some zones of the country, chiefs are unofficially given the right to speak in budget meetings.<sup>122</sup> Village chiefs and local officials are

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<sup>122</sup> Interview, community secretary, rural community #21, 1 March 2013

also heavily involved in consultations to produce five-year local planning documents and are consulted for the annual investment plans that derive from these. An Adjoint Sous-Prefet in an area formerly home to the Djoloff Empire noted that village chiefs remained better respected in the zone than elected officials, but that they both worked together in consultation to make decisions about projects in the area.<sup>123</sup> Conversely, in Tambacounda, which has a largely acephalous history, a Sous-Prefet made the opposite comment: village chiefs did not interact much with the state - deconcentrated or decentralized - a fact he found in stark contrast to his previous post in Fouta Toro, another pre-colonial kingdom.<sup>124</sup>

Although the Senegalese state has established norms for social service placement, three kilometers for primary schools and five kilometers for basic health, that should inform recommended placements in planning documents, numerous respondents noted that the PLDs (along with a much shorter version for each year, the *plan annuel d'investissements* (PAI)) are not enacted ‘as they should be.’ That actual placement deviates is not surprising as opportunities abound for politicians and elites to secure projects. A councilor working to bring goods to their village is a familiar example, but at a deeper level the planning and placement process of projects is full of opportunities for local actors to assert who is more deserving of goods on grounds not strictly based on need or efficiency. That historical claims to an area are powerful factors in this was frequently mentioned during interviews throughout the country; as one Sous-Prefet noted in an area home to the pre-colonial state of Boundou, which had almost collapsed within itself by the time the French established a protectorate in the area, leaders of

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<sup>123</sup> Interview, Linguere Department, 1 March 2013.

<sup>124</sup> Interview, 22 March 2013


villages dating back to the Bundunke era had repeatedly been upset when projects went to newer villages of Guinean immigrants (many of whom had migrated in the 1940s through 1960s). Even though these villages were often much larger or had clearer objective need, older villages think they deserve priority by virtue of their claim to first-comer status in the region (Interview, 28 March 2013). The idea that some villages ‘deserve’ goods, such as schools, could work itself into the planning process at two points: in the planning process where priorities in the PLD and other planning documents could be informed by a sense of who is most deserving and, later, in the implementation process when funds have arrived and an actual decision needs to be made about where a good should be placed.

While complete data throughout the 2000s is only available for primary schools, following the justified warnings of some that studying a single public good could bias results since communities may value different public goods differently (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly, 1999) or that politicians may deliver some goods to certain types of communities and other goods elsewhere (Posner and Kramon, 2013), an analysis of basic health investments between 2009-12 allows for a verification of the validity of the effect of pre-colonial statehood across different types of local public goods. In total, 2,331 primary schools were added in rural Senegal between 2002 and 2012.<sup>125</sup> Similarly, between 2009 and 2012, 417 health huts (*case de santé*) and 173 health posts (*poste de santé*) were constructed in rural areas across the country.

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<sup>125</sup> While the Education Ministry occasionally closes schools due to lack of attendance or temporary shutdowns (caused by factors such as damage to the building, a teacher leaving their post, etc.), in this paper the sample is truncated to only look at newly constructed schools.<sup>1</sup> Throughout the total sample, 257 schools are closed, most of them (196) during the second time period under analysis, with 89 of the 196 being schools that were built during the first time period. There is much less evidence of closed

Figure 3.1 Predicted Probability of Centralization on PG Access 2009



In 2009, the first-year of the sample used in this chapter for which both public goods have data, areas that had been home to a pre-colonial state were significantly more likely to have access to a local public good in their village, as illustrated by the predicted probabilities in Figure 3.1.<sup>126</sup> This model suggests that villages in areas that were home to pre-colonial states are roughly ten percent more likely to have a primary school or basic health facility in their village, even controlling for village population (logged) and the population density within a five-kilometer buffer of the village.

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infrastructure in the case of primary health. This is lamented by local officials, who note the efforts some local governments have gone to provide pastoralists' with schools, only to have to close the facilities when the population abandons a given location if water or pasture becomes scarce. As one Sous-Prefet noted, it is hard to balance the rights that pastoralists populations have and the particularly challenging set of needs that their lifestyle poses to state actors (Interview, Linguere Region, 26 February 2013).

<sup>126</sup> The model that these predicted probabilities are drawn from can be found in Table 3.8 in the appendix.

## Data and Measurement

One of the central contentions of this project is that within Senegal's local government we can discern distinct patterns of local distributional politics that are, in large part, structured by pre-colonial political geography. To test this empirically, this chapter draws on an original dataset covering all 14,502 of localities in Senegal, including 14,360 rural villages, between 2002 and 2012. This dataset was built upon GIS data provided by the *Centre de Suivi Ecologique* in Dakar with data provided by the Senegalese Ministry of Education, the Senegalese Ministry of Health and data from the 2000 and 2009 rounds of the *Enquête villages sur l'accès aux services sociaux de base*, conducted by the Senegalese National Agency for Statistics and Demography. A range of control variables draw from other sources, a description of which can be found in the Data Appendix, are also included.

To merge these numerous sources of information, this dataset matches basic infrastructure to their respective villages using Blasnik's method for matching fuzzy text (2010).<sup>127</sup> This was done by matching village names between data sets, restricted by their rural community. All matches that are not an exact match were reviewed by hand for each merge. Because many local public goods are built with the intention that they will serve a set of villages (it is common, for example, to hear that two villages in close proximity share a primary school), this chapter uses the Senegalese national standards for 'access' to construct dependent variables of goods delivery. These norms are three kilometers for primary schools and five

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<sup>127</sup> Fifty-four schools could not be matched to a village because the village does not exist in the GIS dataset and there is no trace of it in local planning documents or other official data sources. These schools, which do not spatially cluster, are dropped from the analysis.

kilometers for basic health facilities. Consequently, distance measures are constructed between the locations of social service and all villages in a community. Any village that falls within three kilometers of a new primary school, for example, is coded as having been delivered a good and likewise for health infrastructure. Of course, this means that villages that are within one kilometer of a school and have a new school built three kilometers away are hardly receiving a meaningful delivery. All results presented below are robust to restricting the measurement of goods delivery to only those that actually improve any given village's access. Because Senegal's government underwent administrative reform in 2009 - creating three new regions and fifty-one new rural governments, models are run for two separate time periods: 2002-2009 and 2009-2012 with all relevant variables calculated to the adjusted boundaries pre- and post-2009.<sup>128</sup>

This approach requires a few assumptions. First, it assumes that the populations of all villages will share a similar proportion of school-aged children since a breakdown of demographic data at the village level is not available. The 2002 census indicates that 27.3% of Senegalese are between the ages of six and fourteen, the age of most primary school students. Hence student-aged population is calculated accordingly.<sup>129</sup> Second, the chapter works off of the assumption that rural Senegalese citizens have similar preferences for basic goods across space. This is a less demanding assumption in the case of primary health than public education. In reality, some families may prefer to send their children to Islamic schools, *daahras*, or to not send their children at all. With the exception of the area around the holy city of Touba however, there is

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<sup>128</sup> See Footnote 98 (Chapter 2) for a discussion of the various explanations put forward for these redistricting.

<sup>129</sup> This is quite similar to the initial results of the 2012 census - not yet released in full - which puts this percentage at 28.1%.

no evidence that this spatially clusters.<sup>130</sup> Fixed effects models, presented below, indicate that any such community-specific unobservables do not appear to drive the results for primary schools.

This and following chapters use multiple measures of pre-colonial centralization. All measures are based on a list of the capitals and important cities of pre-colonial states that are drawn from a wide-array of historical sources. Given the rotating nature of power among families in Senegambian pre-colonial states, any village that was the capital of a province or that was headed by a family that had a stake in the running of the state is included. This includes families that were eligible to produce kings as well as families that were electors to this system. Villages that were the ceremonial place of election are also added to this measure. This coding is done for eight points of time to account for the rise and fall of some states over time. These time periods correspond to the first and second half of each century between 1500 and 1880, when the French begin fully moving into the interior of the country. While a number of pre-colonial and colonial maps offer approximate borders of these states in the nineteenth century, given prominent theories of the difficulty of projecting power across terrain (notably

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<sup>130</sup> Accordingly, it is assumed that the exceptional role of Touba as the seat of the Mouride Brotherhood in Senegalese political life merits its exclusion from the analysis. With a population of approximately 530,000 people, Touba, the chef-lieu of the rural community of Touba Mosquee has a population more proximate to Senegal's largest secondary cities than the small urban centers that are scattered throughout the country and whose populations average around 3-4,000 people. By all standards Touba should be an urban center itself, but given the special status of Mouride leaders in Senegal, the locality retains the status of 'village'. The area's piety - with only nine percent of primary school student enrolled in public schools as opposed to the national average of 50.6% for 2012 - extends throughout the rural community. Given the exceptionalism of Touba as a rural community, it is excluded from all following analyses. Although most results hold if Touba is included, Touba is an outlier on almost every variable and tests for model fit are universally improved when it is excluded.

Herbst, 2000), the more appropriate approach is to measure pre-colonial statehood as emanating outwards from central villages.<sup>131</sup>

To do so, twenty kilometers buffers around these villages are constructed in ArcGIS. These are used to build three different measures of centralization: because the elite networks that are key to the theory may survive at the local level if a state had declined by 1880, two indexes that account for an area's past experience with political centralization are created. The first locates all villages that fall within the buffer of a pre-colonial kingdom's capital or key village at eight time periods from 1500-1900, applying a discount rate that penalizes more distant experiences with centralization. This is done under the assumption that longer intervals between the onset of colonial rule and centralization are likely to have done more to undermine local elite networks from long-dissolved states than shorter ones. This is the default variable used in subsequent models. The second index follows Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman's (2002) measure of state antiquity, which constructs a measure of an area's 'statehood' by looking at three variables: a) whether a form of government existed beyond a tribal level; b) whether the government was locally based or whether a region was a colony of another state; and c) the amount of territory controlled by the state as a percent of the current state area.<sup>132</sup>

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<sup>131</sup> While many studies measure pre-colonial centralization following Murdock (1981) as a property of ethnic groups, Murdock's measure does not neatly captures *political* centralization, but rather gets at cultural attributes that do not inherently equate with polities. This is particularly relevant in the Senegambian context because many ethnic groups fall within both centralized and uncentralized zones. Coding centralization as an ethnic attribute would overly inflate or deflate the extent of exposure to a pre-colonial polity. Moreover, all of the pre-colonial states that fell within the boundaries of contemporary Senegal had explicit provisions for minority-ethnic subjects, such as the Cayor's specific system of representation for Peuhl herders.

<sup>132</sup> In their original conceptualization, Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman have cut-off points for territorial coverage that are all too large for the amount of territory covered by any of Senegal's pre-

This measure is similarly subject to a discount decay function in order to weigh more heavily the scores of a respective area in 1880 - the eve of French arrival. Finally, a dummy variable is constructed whereby all villages that fall within the twenty kilometer buffer of any of these key cities in 1880 are assigned a value of one (in a pre-centralized state) or zero (uncentralized). Results for all measures are constant when the size of buffers is increased to twenty-five kilometers and, less robustly, to thirty kilometers. See Table 3.9 in the Appendix for a presentation of the differences in the effect of pre-colonial centralization across these measures and see Figure 3.2 for a map of this measure.

Finally, models include a series of control variables at each level of analysis. The first set of controls captures *local need*. This is a series of village-level measures, including logged population (time-invariant) and the square root of the distance to nearest school or clinic in the baseline year. Certain model specifications include the student-to-teacher ratio for villages with a primary school in 2002 and/or 2009. Because some areas were better off in the first time period of analysis, the percent of villages that had their own school or clinic in the baseline year of the sample is also included to capture the level of access to education or health in 2002/2009. Finally, population density calculated as the sum of population falling within five kilometer grid squares is included to account for the relative ease of providing services to more villages in denser versus more sparsely populated communities.<sup>133</sup>

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colonial states. Because following their original measurements this would artificially compress what is otherwise meaningful variation, here their original cut-off points are scaled down to whether or not a state controlled over five percent, two to five percent or under two percent of the current state's territory.

<sup>133</sup> Results are robust to more conservative measures of proximity where population density is calculated using four, three and two kilometer grid squares.

Two other sets of controls are included in certain models. The second set of controls features three variables meant to capture *local capacity* or *demand*. Included here is a measure of local economic activity in the baseline year, which is an additive measure of the presence of the following economic structures in any given village (data from the ANSD's *Enquête villages...*): a boutique or small store, a market, any type of artists' workshop (such as metalworking or artists making goods for tourists) and any facility for the transformation or valorization of each of the following: forest products (e.g. charcoal), seafood (i.e. fish drying), animal husbandry, fruit or agricultural products. It is also possible that public goods construction is endogenous to an area's relative wealth, but given the absence of sub-national income data, this concept is proxies by drawing on data from the 2010 and 1997 Demographic and Health Surveys to construct *arrondissement*-level indices of household belongings to account for relative differences in wealth.<sup>134</sup> Out of concern for variation in local demand for primary education, 'demand' is measured in models analyzing primary school and classroom placement by looking at the percent of primary-school-aged population attending school in the rural community. Higher rates of attendance likely indicate more local value being placed on education, which may be endogenous to past availability of schools.

Thirdly, some models include a set of *geographical* controls. These include: a village's elevation, latitude and longitude and logged distance to the nearest navigable waterway (river

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<sup>134</sup> This measure is comparable to the DHS surveys own 'rural wealth index', but it removes any possessions that are dependent on social services, notably electricity. The index is then composed of house material quality and a basket of possessions, such as a bicycle, cell phone, etc.

or coastline).<sup>135</sup> Additionally, dummy variables for ecological zones are included. Omitting the dominant category of Sudanian Woodland, these include dummies for whether or not a village falls within mangroves, lowland rainforest/grassland or Sahelian grassland/bush.

In order to test the robustness of the argument, a series of models for each dependent variable also test competing explanations. These include measures of electoral competition that draw on the results from the 2002 and 2009 local elections. For these, a similar matching procedure for voting booths was done as with social service infrastructure, matching villages to their GIS coordinates and then to the nearest voting booth within their local government, assigning the value of that bureau's results.<sup>136</sup> Because a central assumption is that proportional systems are most likely to target goods to core voters since all votes count towards a party's seat share (McGillivray, 2004), the percent of votes for the winning party at the nearest voting bureau as well as a measure of the gap between the first and second place party as a measure of swing votes is calculated.<sup>137</sup> Since we might think of the effects of political competition accruing at the rural community level rather than between villages, models are also run with a dummy

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<sup>135</sup> Results are consistent when an interaction term between latitude and longitude are included as a measure of spatial dependence (Becker and Woessmann, 2009).

<sup>136</sup> In 2002, 38 villages from five rural communities are dropped due to missing electoral data. In 2009, this number is approximately 600 villages in eleven rural communities.

<sup>137</sup> Most of the literature on core versus swing voters is based on either formal modeling or on cases of data-rich countries with longer-histories of democratic competition than the case of Senegal (or, indeed, most of sub-Saharan Africa). It was only in 2000, with the election of Abdoulaye Wade of the *Parti Democratique Senegalais*, that the country saw a true liberalization of political space and, as a result, a number of parties contested and were elected in the 2002 local elections. To speak of 'core voters' in a country with a short history of competitive elections is thus tricky since in an absolute sense, politicians cannot draw on a history of voting behavior to make such insights nor is a longer-time series of vote-bureau data available with which to attempt to make such estimations. Consequently, looking at which voting booths and their surrounding villages are voting more or less strongly for the winning party approximates this concept.

variable that takes the value of one if the ruling local council is aligned with the incumbent, national political party.

Because this argument may be conflated with the concept of social capital, a set of models controls for horizontal social capital, or associational density, within a given village. Again drawing on ANSD's *Enquête village* in the baseline year for each village, this is an additive measure of whether a village has a village development association, a women' 'promotion' group, a local sports and cultural group (often a youth group), a village-level political party or an economic interest group, such as those that form around a local, co-managed garden. This measure carefully avoids including any local associations whose existence depends on the availability of a public good, such as a group that overseas a local borehole or the local primary school. Given the prevalence of claims about ethnic fractionalization's dampening effect on public goods access, a measure of ethnolinguistic fractionalization is also included, although given significant gaps in data on local ethnic composition, this is created by averaging rural community level data across *arrondissement*, the next highest administrative level, and assigning the average value to all rural communities within the *arrondissement*. Additional models are run with dummies for the three largest ethnic groups in the country, Wolofs, Sereers and Peulhs, when they are the dominant ethnic group in a community.

Focusing on local governments as the key actors in providing services risks ignoring the possibility that the central government is shaping differential outcomes through unequal targeting of resources since it is plausible that some regions may be funneled more schools as a result of regional favoritism even though placement is technically a local government issue. To

account for this, a set of models that includes a random effect at the regional level and two measures to capture potential favoritism by the central government are presented below.<sup>138</sup> First, for both time periods, a measure of the number of new teachers assigned to a region per capita (student-aged) is included. Because the allocation of teachers remains the purview of the state Ministry of Education, looking at inequalities in teacher assignment proxies for unequal transfer of resources from the central state. Between 2009 and 2012, the models presented in this chapter also include a second measure, the average value of central government transfers to local governments (between 2009-12), in order to capture more directly any potential inequalities; this is a rural community level variable. On its own, these transfers do not appear to be biased towards formally centralized areas, in fact difference of means tests indicate that per capita transfers are, on average, larger for un-centralized areas.<sup>139</sup>

While building a new school or clinic can be thought of as an either-or decision, this dataset takes into account two types of infrastructure investments that local governments can invest in: they can build an entirely new school or clinic (0-1) or add new classrooms to an existing school (a count measure). This data is analyzed with multi-level models that cluster at the local government level (a few models include region-level random effects). Multi-level logit models are chosen in order to capture variation in infrastructure provision between villages as well as between rural communities. Moreover, since placement decisions are made at the

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<sup>138</sup> A random effect at the regional level is not included in the default model set-up as the inter-class correlation at the regional level is quite small (less than one percent of variation is between regions in all models) suggesting a random effect is not appropriate at this level.

<sup>139</sup> The mean value per capita is 898 CFA for uncentralized areas and 725 CFA for centralized areas (approximately \$1.86 versus \$1.50 respectively).

community level there is substantial reason to expect efficiency gains in the standard errors because village-level observations within any given community are not independent of one another; a local government that has the resources to build two health clinics, for example, faces a choice between villages that violates assumptions of conditional independence. Additionally, significant variation in the number of villages within rural communities, ranging from three to 195 problematizes the common approach of clustering standard errors by rural community.

Given the over-dispersed nature of classroom count data, estimations of new classroom placement are done with mixed-level negative binomial models.

Finally, following Bell and Jones (2015) and Gelman and Hill (2008), all multi-level models include a centered mean score of pre-colonial centralization at the rural community level (as well as the regional level in three-level models). This is done in order to remove unobservable characteristics at higher levels that may correlate with level one predictors and the dependent variable, thereby violating the assumption that the random intercept is uncorrelated with other variables. This approach directly models this potential source of bias as a response.<sup>140</sup>

## **The Delivery of Primary Schools, 2002-12, and Basic Health, 2009-12**

The central statistical analyses of this chapter are presented below in Table 3.1, which shows the effect of pre-colonial centralization on a village's propensity to receive a new primary school, additional classrooms to existing primary schools or a new health post or hut during the 2000s. Panel A shows that villages that fall within the boundaries of a pre-colonial state are

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<sup>140</sup> All results are consistent with the exclusion of the centered mean as well.

more likely to receive schools in both time periods. Depending on model specification, the marginal effect of centralization on new schools suggests that villages in areas that were consistently centralized in the five hundred years prior to colonization are eleven to twelve percent more likely to receive a school, holding other variables at their means, in the first time period and approximately eight percent in the second. Across models, the addition of controls puts the odds of a village within a centralized area receiving access to a new primary school at approximately 1.5 to two times more likely than areas that were always acephalous. Most importantly, this is despite the fact that rural communities with largely uncentralized histories were building more schools per capita in both time periods. Difference of means test show that uncentralized rural communities built an average of 0.00035 schools per capita versus 0.00023 in centralized areas between 2002 and 2009 and 0.00021 versus 0.00018 between 2009-12 (both significant at  $p < 0.001$ ). In absolute numbers there is only a significant difference in the first time period (7.7 versus 4.9 schools on average per rural community) with a reverse finding in the second (three versus 3.4 schools on average). This suggests that this is not a question of volition or ability to provide social services, but a question of placement and distributional choice.

Panel B presents results of negative binomial models of classroom construction in existing schools, again divided into the two time periods discussed above. Results for classrooms are, in general, less robust. Although there is a positive and consistent effect of centralization in the first time period, the effect is only loosely and intermittently significant in the second, though still pointing towards a positive bias for centralized areas. Panel C again suggests robust

and positive effects of pre-colonial centralization on the construction of new health facilities in centralized areas, where villages in centralized areas are more likely to receive access to a health facility. Again, this does not immediately appear to be driven by absolute numbers of constructed equipment: centralized rural communities built an average of 0.054 health facilities

**TABLE 3.1: Pre-Colonial Centralization and New Social Service Infrastructure**

<b>PANEL A: Odds Ratios of New School Access within 3km</b>								
	2002-09				2009-12			
Centralization Discount 20km	1.51*** (0.12)	1.83*** (0.12)	1.82*** (0.13)	1.85*** (0.13)	1.47** (0.15)	1.93*** (0.15)	2.04*** (0.17)	2.03*** (0.17)
Local Need Controls	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Local Capacity Controls	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Geographic Controls	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y
N	14321	14280	13009	12832	14273	14271	12182	12004
# Level 2	318	318	318	316	370	370	369	367
<b>PANEL B: New Classroom Placements, Incident Rates Ratios</b>								
	2002-09				2009-12			
Centralization Discount 20km	1.20** (0.10)	1.19** (0.10)	1.19** (0.10)	1.17* (0.10)	1.49* (0.32)	1.39* (0.25)	1.28 (0.23)	1.15 (0.20)
Local Need Controls	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Local Capacity Controls	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Geographic Controls	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y
N	4287	4245	4091	4000	5531	5518	5049	4936
# Level 2	318	318	318	316	367	367	367	365
<b>PANEL C: Odds Ratios of New Health Access within 5km</b>								
	2009-12							
Centralization Discount 20km		1.22 (0.12)	1.79*** (0.14)	1.61** (0.17)	1.59** (0.17)			
Local Need Controls		N	Y	Y	Y			
Local Capacity Controls		N	N	Y	Y			
Geographic Controls		N	N	N	Y			
N		10182	10180	8584	8440			
# Level 2		260	260	257	255			

\*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.05, \*p < 0.1. All models include a centered mean of pre-colonial centralization at the local government level (level 2). Panels A & C: Odds Ratios from two-tailed, mixed-level logit models. Because Stata only calculates approximate standard errors for odds ratios in binomial mixed level models, p-values and standard errors (in parentheses) reported here are from the model estimated parameters. Panel B: Incident Rate Ratios from two-tailed, mixed-level negative binomial models. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.

during this time period compared to 0.055 in uncentralized areas.<sup>141</sup> Together the results in Table 3.1 suggest that local governments in centralized areas are improving access to basic public goods for their villages more than in areas of the country that were never or had mixed histories of political centralization.

Of course, this raises questions about how the impact of pre-colonial centralization may or may not change with the inclusion of more commonly invoked variables in the study of public goods delivery. Table 3.2 presents the results of models that include common alternative explanations.<sup>142</sup> Results of these tests are either insignificant or mixed. Take for example Panel A, which includes common measures of local political competition. While there is some evidence that local governments disproportionately reward swing voters, seen in the negative coefficient on the gap between the first and second winning party in new health facilities, for primary schools this is only significant at the ten-percent in the first time period and is not significant in the second and never with classrooms (see Table 3.11 in Appendix). There is no effect of being aligned with the national government coalition or being a core voter for new schools or health access.

Ethnicity measures, found in Panel B, also have mixed findings. Ethnic fractionalization is never significant, and although being in a rural community dominated by Peulhs or Sereers is strongly positive in 2002-09, none of the dummies for country's dominant ethnic groups are

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<sup>141</sup> While there is a significant difference in favor of uncentralized areas in per capita calculations, at 4.65e-6 versus 3.08e-6, this difference is negligible in meaningful numbers.

<sup>142</sup> The models in Table 3.2 include a measure of pre-colonial centralization. When this is excluded from the models the coefficients remain the same with two exceptions. First, the effect of associational life on health facility delivery becomes insignificant in Panel C and, secondly, the effects of Wolof and Sereer become significant in Panel B, health facilities.

significant in any other model.<sup>143</sup> These dummies do not impact the coefficient on pre-colonial centralization however and take a negative coefficient for additional classroom construction in the second time period (see Table 3.11). Measures of horizontal associational life in Panel C are significant in the second time period, but again with little substantive impact on the key independent variable. Finally, in Panel D we see that there is no evidence of favoritism on the part of the central government; there appears to be no difference in the number of new teachers assigned to each region per capita (student-aged) in either time period and fiscal transfers have no, if not a negative, effect in the second. Together, these findings suggest that while more commonly posited factors may matter sometimes, their effects are not consistently driving variation across time or type of public good. Most importantly, none of these factors, when significant, impact the positive and significant coefficient on pre-colonial centralization.

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<sup>143</sup> Results are robust to restricting the sample to communities that are highly homogeneous, with an ELF of greater than seventy.

TABLE 3.2: Alternative Explanations for Social Service Delivery, Odds Ratios

PANEL A: Electoral Variables										
	Primary Schools, 3km					Health Centers, 5km				
	2002-09			2009-12		2009-12				
Core Voters	0.99 (0.07)			0.85 (0.1)			1.01 (0.09)			
Gap Btw. Parties		0.83* (0.10)			0.92 (0.13)			0.73** (0.12)		
Nat'l Aligned			0.80 (0.16)			0.91 (0.18)			1.19 (0.14)	
Centralization Discount 20km	1.87*** (0.14)	1.86*** (0.14)	1.82*** (0.13)	2.04*** (0.18)	2.04*** (0.18)	2.04*** (0.18)	1.52** (0.17)	1.51** (0.17)	1.61** (0.17)	
Village Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Local Gov. Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
N	12410	12410	13009	11481	11481	12182	8052	8052	8584	
# Level 2	313	313	318	358	358	369	247	247	257	
PANEL B: Ethnicity										
	Primary Schools, 3km				Health, 5km			Primary Schools, 3km		
	2002-09		2009-12		2009-12		2009-12		2009-12	2009-12
Ethnic Fractionalization	1.00 (0.00)		1.00 (0.01)		1.00 (0.00)					
Wolof		1.59 (0.31)		0.91 (0.31)		1.11 (0.25)				
Peuhl		1.77** (0.28)		0.85 (0.28)		0.84 (0.23)				
Serer		2.78** (0.35)		1.00 (0.39)		1.08 (0.32)				
Density of Civic Associations							1.02 (0.02)	1.06** (0.02)	1.04* (0.02)	
Centralization Discount 20km	1.82*** (0.13)	1.83*** (0.13)	2.04*** (0.17)	2.04*** (0.17)	1.61** (0.17)	1.71*** (0.17)	1.82*** (0.13)	2.01*** (0.17)	1.60** (0.17)	
Local Need Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Local Capacity Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
N	13009	13009	12182	12182	8584	8585	13009	12182	8584	
# Level 2	318	318	369	369	257	258	318	369	257	
PANEL D: Central Government Relations										
	Primary Schools, 3km					Health, 5km				
	2002-09		2009-12		2009-12			2009-12		
New Teachers per capita		0.71 (0.64)		1.24 (0.36)						
Avg FDD (transfers in \$)					0.99*** (0.00)			0.99 (0.00)		
Centralization Discount 20km	1.79*** (0.12)		1.93*** (0.15)	1.93*** (0.15)			1.78*** (0.25)			
Local Need Controls	Y		Y	Y			Y			
Local Capacity Controls	Y		Y	Y			Y			
N	14280		14271	14271			10180			
# Level 2	324		372	372			261			
# Level 3	10		14	14			14			

Results of two-tailed, mixed-level logit models. \*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.05, \* p < 0.1. Because Stata only calculates approximate standard errors for odds ratios in binomial mixed level models, p-values and standard errors (in parentheses) reported here are from the model estimated parameters. All models include a centered mean of pre-colonial centralization at the local government level (level 2). Models are robust to excluding outliers in two-level models.

## **Robustness Checks**

A series of additional tests demonstrate the robustness of the central findings in Table 3.1. The findings are robust to alternative specifications of the central independent variable (Table 3.8 in the appendix) and they are generally robust to increasing the size of the buffer used to measure the independent variable (Table 3.9 in the appendix). In general, they also hold when the definition of ‘access’ is reduced downwards to two and one kilometers for schools and three and one kilometers for health centers (Table 3.10 in the Appendix).<sup>144</sup>

### *Alternative Measure: Percent Villages Founded Prior to 1900*

The theoretical argument of this dissertation is that pre-colonial centralization impacts contemporary patterns of public goods delivery because it proxies for on average greater congruence between social networks and local government boundaries. The historical base of this argument is that pre-colonial states eased the transition to colonial rule, therefore preserving the claims of elites to local authority and associated network ties among them. Today, these same ties, based in their shared autochthonous status, create denser elite networks. Consequently, an alternative measure for this concept is the percent of villages that were founded prior to the arrival or colonial rule. Because only incomplete data exists from the first French censuses, this measure is best understood as an approximation of any given village’s existence at the turn of the last century.<sup>145</sup> It is further supplemented with a complete inventory of villages that existed in

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<sup>144</sup> Significance is lost however for new schools in 2009-12 at a one-kilometers access rate and for new health facilities at a one-kilometer access rate as well.

<sup>145</sup> Of the roughly three hundred villages surveyed by the author for this project (see Chapters Five and Six) the reported date of foundation by village chiefs was always consistent with the 1900 data with the

1956. Pre-colonial centralization has relatively strong correlations with the percent of villages founded by 1900 (0.43) and 1956 (0.52). A map of villages founded by both time periods can be found in the general appendix as well as an indication of areas with insufficient data to be included in the 1900 sample.

Table 3.3 suggests that the findings of Table 3.1 are generally consistent with the alternative measures of whether or not villages existed in the pre-colonial era (1900), the percent of villages in the rural community that existed in 1900 or, less rigorously, the percentage founded by the late colonial period (1956). The results across each of these measures are less consistent than the centralization measure, but the pattern is by and large the same. Panel A indicates that villages are more likely to receive schools the greater the percent of villages in the rural community that were founded in 1900. In Panel B actually being a village that is listed in the first colonial censuses increases the likelihood of receiving new classroom investments in the second time period. While the percent of villages founded by 1900 is only intermittently significant in these models, there is also a strong, positive effect for communities with more villages being founded by the late colonial period. Finally, Panel C again finds that villages founded by 1900 are more likely to gain access to new health infrastructure, though the percent of villages founded by 1900 is insignificant. There is a consistent and very strong positive effect of areas with more villages founded by 1956.

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exception of one village which was not listed in turn-of-the-century censuses but which was founded in the late 1800s.

**TABLE 3.3: % Pre-Colonial Villages and New Social Service Infrastructure**

<b>PANEL A: Odds Ratios of New School Access within 3km</b>								
	<b>2002-09</b>				<b>2009-12</b>			
Village 1900	0.90*	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.96	1.06	1.10	1.10
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.78)
% Villages 1900	1.74	2.95**	4.12**	5.61**	0.93	3.91**	2.85*	2.60
	(0.46)	(0.52)	(0.55)	(0.58)	(0.55)	(0.61)	(0.63)	(0.66)
% Villages 1956	1.34	1.63	1.37	1.33	1.02	1.19	2.33	1.56
	(0.60)	(0.59)	(0.62)	(0.67)	(0.62)	(0.62)	(0.67)	(0.73)
Local Need Controls	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Local Capacity Controls	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Geographic Controls	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y
N	11085	11050	10050	9895	10011	10010	8616	8466
# Level 2	257	257	257	255	275	275	275	366
<b>PANEL B: New Classroom Placements, Incident Rates Ratios</b>								
	<b>2002-09</b>				<b>2009-12</b>			
Village 1900	0.98	0.99	0.98	0.99	1.68***	1.32***	1.37***	1.38***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)
% Villages 1900	1.51**	1.37**	1.29	1.03	1.04	0.62*	0.50**	0.43**
	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.18)	(0.26)	(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.12)
% Villages 1956	1.74**	1.58**	1.49**	1.46*	2.89***	2.05**	2.83***	2.02**
	(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.83)	(0.56)	(0.87)	(0.60)
Local Need Controls	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Local Capacity Controls	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Geographic Controls	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y
N	3580	3542	3406	3324	4235	4225	3850	3752
# Level 2	257	257	257	255	273	273	273	271
<b>PANEL C: Odds Ratios of New Health Access within 5km</b>								
	<b>2009-12</b>							
Village 1900		0.93	1.25**	1.28***	1.29***			
		(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)			
% Villages 1900		1.27	1.16	0.78	0.85			
		(0.27)	(0.45)	(0.41)	(0.39)			
% Villages 1956		1.69*	7.56***	16.4***	4.47**			
		(0.31)	(0.39)	(0.50)	(0.49)			
Local Need Controls		N	Y	Y	Y			
Local Capacity Controls		N	N	Y	Y			
Geographic Controls		N	N	N	Y			
N		6802	6801	5768	5644			
# Level 2		190	189	188	186			

\*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.05, \*p < 0.1. Panels A & C: Odds Ratios from two-tailed, mixed-level logit models. Because Stata only calculates approximate standard errors for odds ratios in binomial mixed level models, p-values and standard errors (in parentheses) reported here are from the model estimated parameters. Panel B: Incident Rate Ratios from two-tailed, mixed-level negative binomial models. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses.

### *Relative Placement Efficiency*

These results support the expectation that areas that were home to pre-colonial states should be delivering primary school infrastructure to more villages on average given broader obligations of local elites to deliver local patronage. While the models presented above estimate the relative provisioning of schools at the village level, they do not allow for an estimation of how efficiently a community is targeting citizens. The existing literature indicates that such deviations in efficiency likely reflect local political pressures. Demand for this form of patronage should not be underestimated. Comments such as those of a chief in Kaolack region are common: the rural community “should build us a school so we have our own and so that our children do not have to walk two kilometers to the school in [village].”<sup>146</sup>

Yet to the extent that studies of public goods delivery are interested in making inferences about how public goods are politically deviated, they rely on the idea that a set of ideal locations exist that are never actually modeled. To get around this problem and to develop a metric for the relative efficiency of placement, this chapter make use of Location-Allocation models in ArcGIS, which are designed for business and public agencies to help identify ideal locations for public services, warehouses, stores, etc., take into account the spatial placement of existing facilities, demand for these facilities, potential locations for new facilities and a number of other parameters as necessary. The central empirical strategy behind these models is to make predictions about where the most efficient locations would be if a local government wanted to build a school so as to maximize the percent of the population covered by a primary school or,

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<sup>146</sup> Interview, rural community #55, 1 May 2013.

alternatively, to maximize overall student attendance and compare them to the actual locations chosen by any given local government.

In brief, maximize attendance models, which take into account the capacity of existing schools, predict where the best location is if the goal is to increase the total number of students attending. Alternatively, models seeking to maximize coverage calculate an ideal location for building a school thus that the percent of the local government's population that lives within three kilometers of a school is maximized, taking into account existing facilities. For each rural community, the model identifies as many locations as there were schools actually built during a time period, which allows a comparison between the 'ideal' locations identified by the model with the actual placement of schools by a rural community in that time period. A full description of both model forms, as well as an illustration, can be found at the end of the

**TABLE 3.4: Results of Location-Allocation Modeling**

<b>PANEL A: Maximize Attendance Models</b>				
	<b>2002-09</b>		<b>2009-12</b>	
Centralization	-85.8 (58.6)	-131.6* (65.4)	22.5 (134.6)	-66.1 (90.4)
Discount 20km				
Controls	N	Y	N	Y
R <sup>2</sup>	0.15	0.26	0.52	0.62
N	316	316	369	369
<b>PANEL B: Maximize Coverage Models</b>				
	<b>2002-09</b>		<b>2009-12</b>	
Centralization	-742.8** (181.2)	-747.7** (181)	-222.4* (108.2)	-214* (118.7)
Discount 20km				
Controls	N	Y	N	Y
R <sup>2</sup>	0.16	0.29	0.11	0.16
N	318	318	369	369

\*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.05, \*p < 0.1. Results of OLS regressions with fixed effects at the regional level. Robust, clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Controls include: the number of villages in the rural community, population density and the percent of the population that was covered with a primary school in the baseline year. All models include the number of new schools built by the local government during the time period.

## Chapter Appendix.

Table 3.4 presents the results of these analyses, using the difference in students who could have been covered by new schools under either model and those that actually are covered by the chosen locations of the local government as the dependent variable. A score of zero on the dependent variable would then indicate that a local government chose the ideal location for each school they built; negative coefficients therefore indicate more efficient choices. The models in Table 3.4 indicate that there is no real difference between centralized and uncentralized areas in building schools that maximize attendance. But pre-colonial centralization is associated with building schools in locations that increase the number of covered students in both time periods. In other words, these areas are providing schools more broadly so that more villages gain access. These findings are robust to a series of alternative explanations; see Table 3.13 in the appendix.<sup>147</sup> These models offer a novel test of the argument that there are sub-national differences in the politics of local public goods delivery in rural Senegal at the same time that they confirm the argument that pre-colonial centralization is associated with broader redistributive patterns in the current era.

### *Placebo Tests*

To further demonstrate that these patterns are explained by local-level rather than central-state dynamics, Table 3.5 shows the results of a series of placebo tests, using the placement of secondary schools and hospitals/health centers over the full period and the

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<sup>147</sup> Table 3.13 indicates that areas that were home to centralized states are actually building more schools that maximize attendance in the first time period as well at the ten percent level. Panel B in the second time period often obtains significance at the five percent level in Table 3.13 as well.

**TABLE 3.5: Placebo Test: Central State Provided Services, Odds Ratios**

	<b>High Schools, 2002-12</b>			<b>Hospitals/Centers, 2002-12</b>			<b>Improved Roads, 2002-09</b>		
Centralization	1.15	1.32	1.07	2.21	2.69	2.93	1.08	1.02	1.13
Discount 20km	(0.77)	(1.23)	(1.42)	(0.78)	(1.43)	(1.46)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Local Need Controls	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Dept. Controls	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
N	1504	1405	1405	1504	1405	1405	14469	13054	13054
# Level 2	42	42	41	42	41	41	42	42	42

\*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.05, \*p < 0.1. Results of two-tailed, mixed-level logit models. Because Stata only calculates approximate standard errors for odds ratios in binomial mixed level models, p-values and standard errors (in parentheses) reported here are from the model estimated parameters. Models for High Schools and Hospitals are run with a restricted sample to villages with a population of 1,000 or more due to a small number of positive values in the dependent variable. All models include a centered mean of pre-colonial centralization at the *département* level (level 2).

delivery of improved roads in the first. These investments are all exclusively provided by the central state and are far beyond the means, financial or technical, of local governments. They therefore make for useful placebo tests because many unmeasurable factors that we may think drive placement, such as local demand and interest in Western education, should be similar for both primary and secondary schools or for local health services as well as hospitals/health centers. The results indicate that pre-colonial centralization has no significant explanatory power over a village's likelihood of receiving any of these investments. This confirms the insights from the above analysis that pre-colonial centralization only influences public goods placement at the local level and is not a factor in decisions made in Dakar.

#### *Omitted Variable Bias*

A central concern with the argument put forward in this paper is that the results could be driven by an omitted variable. The models presented so far have already demonstrated that models are robust to a number of enduring geographical features, but could another, unmeasured factor be producing these results?

**TABLE 3.6: Fixed Effects, Table 3.1 Replication**

<b>PANEL A: New School Access within 3km, Odds Ratios</b>						
	<b>2002-09</b>			<b>2009-12</b>		
Centralization	1.29*	1.49**	1.47**	1.56*	1.89**	1.78**
Discount 20km	(0.17)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.43)	(0.55)	(0.55)
Local Need Controls	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Geographic Controls	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y
Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	0.002	0.02	0.02	0.002	2	0.03
N	14326	13014	14113	14273	14273	13998
<b>PANEL B: New Classrooms, Incident Rates Ratios</b>						
	<b>2002-09</b>			<b>2009-12</b>		
Centralization	1.17***	1.16**	1.13**	1.18	1.16	1.08
Discount 20km	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.19)	(0.15)	(0.13)
Local Need Controls	N	Y	Y	N	Y	Y
Geographic Controls	N	N	Y	N	N	Y
N	4287	4280	4175	5531	5519	5375
<b>PANEL C: New Health Facilities in 5km, Odds Ratios</b>						
	<b>2009-12</b>					
Centralization		1.36**	1.80**	1.73**		
Discount 20km		(0.19)	(0.38)	(0.34)		
Local Need Controls	N	Y	Y			
Geographic Controls	N	N	Y			
Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>		0.01	0.11	0.11		
N		10181	10181	9968		

\*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.05, \*p < 0.1. Panel A & C: Odds Ratios from fixed effects logit models, clustered at the *département* level. Robust standard errors are clustered by *département* and are reported in parentheses.  
Panel B: Results of fixed effects models at local governments. Standard errors are clustered by local government and are reported in parentheses.

The first response to this concern is found in Table 3.6, which replicates the models in Table 3.1 with fixed effects at the 2002 *département*. An obvious approach would be to run these models with fixed effects at the local government level. While results are consistent for schools in both time periods, because many local governments have no variation in pre-colonial centralization, these models do not estimate an effect for a large number of observations (7,303

villages, for example, fall into rural communities with no variation in the key independent variable. The coefficient on the independent variable thus essentially represents the effect of pre-colonial centralization within local governments that have a diverse history within their borders. Given the approximation of these borders in the measure constructed here, this is problematic.<sup>148</sup> Fixed effects at the level of the *département* still capture a localized effect with less restriction of the sample. As seen below, results are generally consistent with those found in Table 3.1 though in most cases the value on the coefficient of interest is slightly lower.

An alternative approach is to assess coefficient sensitivity by examining selection into the treatment with observable controls to estimate potential bias from unobservables. The logic behind this approach is to estimate how much stronger the effect of unobserved factors must be on selection into ‘treatment’ relative to observed ones for the former to nullify the estimated effect of the independent variable. Table 3.7 presents the results from a series of models that estimate the likelihood that unobserved variation is biasing estimates on the independent variable. Models 1-3 re-estimate the coefficient of pre-colonial centralization on the five central outcome variables presented earlier in this chapter. Due to restrictions in the estimation techniques used in subsequent models, all coefficients represent the outcomes of linear models with region fixed effects.<sup>149</sup> Region fixed effects are chosen over rural community effects due to

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<sup>148</sup> When run with local government fixed effects, the results are as follows: pre-colonial centralization retains significance at the five or ten percent level in the first time period and at the five percent level in a full model in the second time period (otherwise insignificant). Health facilities are significant at the ten or five percent level and classroom construction is significant at the ten percent level in full models only during both time periods.

<sup>149</sup> Oster’s (2013) *psacalc* will not run following logit or mixed-level models nor will it accept clustered standard errors.

the potential that local government boundaries could themselves be plausibly endogenous to treatment.

Oster (2015), building on Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005), argues that estimating omitted variable bias through coefficient sensitivity should be scaled to changes in the  $R^2$  because of assumptions of shared co-variance between the two sets of variables. Oster's approach relies on  $R_{max}$ , or the idea that any given dependent variable can obtain at a maximum  $R^2$  of one; the researcher therefore seeks to bound estimates of a plausible  $R_{max}$  for any given model. The method attempts to establish an 'identified set' of possible  $\beta$ s on the key independent variable that is bounded by potential values of  $R_{max}$  (whereby  $c$  denotes a model with controls and  $nc$  represents a naive, 'no controls' model). The lower bound is found in the coefficient of the model with controls. The upper bound is, in the most conservative approach, set at one (though this assumes that there is no measurement bias in the dependent variable). Following extensive replications of published papers, Oster suggests the more realistic strategy of estimating  $R_{max}$  as 2.2 times the  $R^2$  of the estimated model with controls. Similarly, Gonzalez and Miguel (2014) suggest estimating  $R_{max}$  as  $R^2_c + (R^2_c - R^2_{nc})$ . The identified sets for each dependent variable following the Gonzalez and Miguel approach can be found in M6-7. Models 6-7 show the results following Oster's 2.2 times  $R^2_c$  while M8-9 show the most conservative model where  $R_{max}$  is estimated at one.

To evaluate these results, the upper bound (listed first) estimated using the coefficient stability approach should be compared to the lower bound (listed second), which is the model-reported coefficient. For Models 4-5, these are generally quite consistent and across Models 4-7

there is a consistently positive impact of pre-colonial centralization on public goods delivery.

However, as greater values of  $R_{\max}$  are estimated in Models 6-7, the gap between the upper and lower bounds increases. The gap in the estimated and observed coefficient in schools and new

**TABLE 3.7: Assessment of Bias in estimated effect of pre-colonial centralization from unobservables; coefficient stability approach**

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9
Naive: $\beta^{nc}$	0.08*** (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.12*** (0.01)	[0.10, 0.09]	[0.14, 0.12]	[0.13, 0.09]	[0.18, 0.12]	[0.82, 0.09]	[1.13, 0.12]
$R^2$	0.033	0.044	0.0578	0.054	0.082	0.097	0.116	1	1
$R_{\max}$	0.06*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)	[0.04, 0.05]	[0.06, 0.07]	[0.02, 0.05]	[0.06, 0.07]	[-0.88, 0.05]	[-0.04, 0.07]
Naive Schools, 02-09									
$R^2$	0.018	0.029	0.043	0.0388	0.068	0.063	0.087	1	1
$R_{\max}$	0.09*** (0.02)	0.12*** (0.02)	0.15*** (0.02)	[0.12, 0.12]	[0.21, 0.15]	[0.16, 0.12]	[0.22, 0.15]	[1.31, 0.12]	[0.54, 0.15]
New Health, 09-12									
$R^2$	0.02	0.031	0.15	0.0372	0.273	0.068	0.298	1	1
$R_{\max}$	0.38*** (0.08)	0.31*** (0.09)	0.31*** (0.09)	[0.30, 0.31]	[0.21, 0.31]	[0.07, 0.31]	[0.07, 0.31]	[-5.95, 0.31]	[-3.13, 0.31]
New Classrooms, 02-09									
$R^2$	0.036	0.038	0.065	0.039	0.085	0.076	0.131	1	1
$R_{\max}$	0.64*** (0.12)	0.35** (0.13)	0.24** (0.11)	[0.33, 0.35]	[0.10, 0.24]	[0.29, 0.35]	[0.08, 0.24]	[-0.74, 0.35]	[-0.18, 0.24]
New Classrooms, 09-12									
$R^2$	0.038	0.049	0.278	0.62	0.517	0.099	0.555	1	1
$R_{\max}$	Region FEs	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

\*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.05, \* p < 0.1. Results of models estimating coefficient sensitivity to unobserved variables for pre-colonial centralization. Models 1-3 report coefficients from OLS models for new schools, and health facilities for the full sample of villages and classrooms for villages with a school in the baseline year. Models 4-9 are calculated using Oster's (2013) *psacalc* command in Stata; binary dependent variables are estimated using an OLS framework given limitations of this command. Following González and Miguel (2014),  $R_{\max}$  is estimated as  $R^2 + (R^2 - R^{**})$  in M4-5. Similarly, following Oster (2015),  $R_{\max}$  is estimated as 2.2 times the  $R^2$  from M2-3 in Models 6-7. M8-9 show results when  $R_{\max}$  is set at one. Geographic controls include village latitude, longitude, elevation, logged distance from the nearest navigable waterway and ecological zone dummies. Full controls include all geographic variables with the addition of logged village population and the square root of the distance to the nearest infrastructure in the baseline year for schools and health and students per classroom for new classroom estimates.

health infrastructure suggests that even if an unobservable variable explains as much variation as the entire fitted model, it would not overturn the positive coefficient of pre-colonial centralization. This is less the case in the estimates of classroom delivery, again suggesting that pre-colonial centralization is only a weak predictor of classroom choice in the second period.

Models 8-9 reflect the unrealistic demands of setting  $R_{max}$  at one, where the gap between estimated coefficients dramatically increases and many intervals cross zero.

## **Conclusion**


The findings presented in this chapter suggest not only that there are emerging differences in how public goods are delivered, but also that this is increasing sub-national inequality in public goods access in rural Senegal. This chapter and the broader project argue that these differences can be explained by the social legacies of pre-colonial states, departing from dominant explanations for variation in social service delivery in Africa. This chapter is unable to make causal claims about the relationship between pre-colonial centralization and current public goods provision, but the evidence presented here is suggestive of such a relationship. Centralized areas serve more villages in such a way as to maximize delivery to villages, whether measured as maximizing coverage or the percent of the population having access to schools. Conversely, uncentralized areas serve fewer villages than they could otherwise be doing. This difference is all the more puzzling given that there is not great difference in the absolute number or per-capita rate of schools or health centers being constructed one area versus another during this same time period.

By locating the precise site of investments, this chapter has tested numerous theories of public goods delivery at a much more fine-grained level than has previously been done in the literature. Many authors have attempted to get around questions of data availability by using individual-level measures, notably via the *Demographic and Health Survey* data, aggregated to ethnic groups or administrative divisions. There are many attributes of measuring how service access is translated into human capital stocks, but looking at education attainment and measures of health-attainments, such as vaccinations or home-versus-maternity birth makes it harder to isolate public versus private provision and is unable to resolve questions about *where* goods were accessed. This matters to the extent that we think that such local public goods are community targeted in politically motivated ways. By using village-level data here, this work examines specific placement patterns of primary schools and primary health facilities in order to make service delivery empirically tractable at the village level.

To address the concern that the results identified in this chapter may be the result of long-run, accumulating inequalities, the next chapter traces the evolution of public goods delivery from the onset of colonial rule to the present, finding that the effects identified here only emerged following the 1996 decentralization reforms that devolved meaningful authority over local public goods delivery to the local level.

# Chapter 3 Appendix

Figure 3.2 Pre-Colonial Centralization Measure, 20km Buffers



**TABLE 3.8: Effects  
of Pre-Colonial  
Centralization on  
Social Service  
Presence in Village,  
2009**

Centralization	1.48***
Discount 20km	(0.18)
ln Pop 2012	3.33***
	(0.09)
Pop. Density, 3km	0.99
	(0.00)
Constant	0.00
	(0.00)
N	14271
# Level 2	370

\*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.05, \*p < 0.1. Model includes a centered mean of pre-colonial centralization at the local government level (level 2). Odds Ratios from two-tailed, mixed-level logit models.

**TABLE 3.9: Alternative Measures of Pre-Colonial Centralization, Table 3.1 Replication**

PANEL A: New Schools with Bockstette et al. Index								
	2002-09				2009-12			
Bockstette et al. Index, 20km	1.58*** (0.13)	1.95*** (0.13)	1.85*** (0.15)	1.88*** (0.15)	1.59** (0.16)	2.15*** (0.17)	2.75*** (0.19)	2.65*** (0.19)
Local Need Controls	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Local Capacity Controls	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Geographic Controls	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y
N	14324	14283	12832	12832	14276	14259	12168	12004
# Level 2	318	318	318	316	370	269	368	367
PANEL B: New Schools with 1880 Dummy								
	2002-09				2009-12			
1880 Dummy, 20km	1.57*** (0.10)	1.83*** (0.11)	1.83*** (0.12)	1.81*** (0.12)	1.86*** (0.13)	2.34*** (0.13)	2.56*** (0.15)	2.49*** (0.15)
Local Need Controls	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Local Capacity Controls	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Geographic Controls	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y
N	14324	14283	12832	12832	14276	14259	12168	12004
# Level 2	318	318	318	316	370	369	368	367
PANEL C: New Health Access within 5km, 2009-12								
	Bockstette et al. Index				1880 Dummy			
Pre-C Centralization	1.42** (0.13)	2.47*** (0.15)	2.24*** (0.18)	2.22*** (0.19)	1.14 (0.11)	1.50*** (0.12)	1.39** (0.15)	1.41** (0.15)
Local Need Controls	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Local Capacity Controls	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Geographic Controls	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y
N	10184	10182	8584	8440	10184	10182	8584	8440
# Level 2	261	260	257	255	260	260	257	255

\*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.05, \*p < 0.1. All models include a centered mean of pre-colonial centralization at the local government level (level 2). Odds Ratios from two-tailed, mixed-level logit models. Because Stata only calculates approximate standard errors for odds ratios in binomial mixed level models, p-values and standard errors (in parentheses) reported here are from the model estimated parameters.

**TABLE 3.10: Expanded Buffer Measures of Pre-Colonial Centralization**

<b>Panel A: Discount Rate</b>							
	Primary School Access, 3km				Health Access, 5km		
	2002-09		2009-12		2009-12		
	25km	30km	25km	30km	25km	30km	
Centralization	1.19	1.18	2.09***	1.99***	1.61**	1.52**	
Discount	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.18)	
Local Need Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Local Capacity Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Geographic Controls	N	N	N	N	N	N	
N	13009	13009	12168	12168	8584	8584	
# Level 2	318	318	368	368	257	257	
<b>PANEL B: Bockstette et al. Index</b>							
	Primary School Access, 3km				Health Access, 5km		
	2002-09		2009-12		2009-12		
	25km	30km	25km	30km	25km	30km	
Centralization	1.32*	1.35*	2.12***	2.09***	2.04***	1.84**	
Discount	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.19)	(0.19)	
Local Need Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Local Capacity Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Geographic Controls	N	N	N	N	N	N	
N	13009	13009	12168	12182	8584	8584	
# Level 2	318	318	368	369	257	257	
<b>PANEL C: 1880 Buffer</b>							
	Primary School Access, 3km				Health Access, 5km		
	2002-09		2009-12		2009-12		
	25km	30km	25km	30km	25km	30km	
Centralization	1.46**	1.27*	2.26***	2.23***	1.18	1.47**	
Discount	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.17)	(0.17)	
Local Need Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Local Capacity Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Geographic Controls	N	N	N	N	N	N	
N	13009	13009	12168	12168	8584	8584	
# Level 2	318	318	368	368	257	257	

\*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.05, \*p < 0.1. All models include a centered mean of pre-colonial centralization at the local government level (level 2). Odds Ratios from two-tailed, mixed-level logit models. Because Stata only calculates approximate standard errors for odds ratios in binomial mixed level models, p-values and standard errors (in parentheses) reported here are from the model estimated parameters. Models are robust to excluding outliers in two-level models.

**TABLE 3.11: Reduced Radius of New Social Service Access:**  
**Table 3.1 Replication**

PANEL A: New School Access within 2km, Odds Ratios								
	2002-09				2009-12			
Centralization Discount	0.97	2.27***	2.21***	2.17***	0.84	2.21**	2.23**	2.13**
20km	(0.16)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)
Local Need Controls	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Local Capacity Controls	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Geographic Controls	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y
N	14321	12976	13009	12832	14273	12182	12167	12004
# Level 2	318	318	318	316	370	369	368	367
PANEL B: New School Access within 1km, Odds Ratios								
	2002-09				2009-12			
Centralization Discount	1.09	2.24***	2.23***	2.14***	0.87	1.55	1.57*	1.53
20km	(0.16)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.28)
Local Need Controls	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Local Capacity Controls	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Geographic Controls	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y
N	14321	12976	13009	12832	14273	12182	12167	12004
# Level 2	318	318	318	316	370	369	368	367
PANEL C: New Health Facility Access, Odds Ratios								
	3km, 2009-12				1km, 2009-12			
Centralization Discount	1.27*	1.56**	1.42**	1.41*	1.13	1.21	0.99	0.89
20km	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.24)	(0.24)
Local Need Controls	N	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y
Local Capacity Controls	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Geographic Controls	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y
N	10182	10180	8584	8440	10182	10180	8584	8440
# Level 2	261	260	257	255	261	260	257	255

\*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.05, \*p < 0.1. All models include a centered mean of pre-colonial centralization at the local government level (level 2). Results of two-tailed, mixed-level logit models. Because Stata only calculates approximate standard errors for odds ratios in binomial mixed level models, p-values and standard errors (in parentheses) reported here are from the model estimated parameters.

**TABLE 3.12: Alternative Explanations for New Classroom Construction**

<b>PANEL A: Electoral Variables</b>						
	<b>2002-09</b>			<b>2009-12</b>		
Core Voters	0.95 (0.05)			0.99 (0.09)		
Gap Btw. Parties		1.00 (0.07)			0.96 (0.10)	
Nat'l Aligned			0.99 (0.05)			1.24** (0.11)
Centralization Discount 20km	1.16* (0.11)	1.16* (0.11)	1.19** (0.10)	1.31 (0.24)	1.31 (0.24)	1.28 (0.22)
Local Need Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Local Capacity Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	3928	3928	4091	4833	4833	5049
# Level 2	312	312	318	356	356	367
<b>PANEL B: Ethnicity</b>				<b>Panel C: Associational Life</b>		
	<b>2002-09</b>		<b>2009-12</b>		<b>2002-09</b>	<b>2009-12</b>
Ethnic Fractionalization	1.00 (0.00)		1.00* (0.00)			
Wolof		1.14 (0.10)		0.66** (0.10)		
Peulh		1.18* (0.10)		0.72** (0.09)		
Serer		1.04 (0.11)		0.73* (0.13)		
Density of Civic Associations					0.99 (0.01)	1.12** (0.02)
Centralization Discount 20km	1.28*** (0.07)	1.16* (0.10)	1.27 (0.22)	1.29 (0.23)	1.19** (0.10)	1.27 (0.22)
Local Need Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Local Capacity Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	4091	4091	5049	5049	4091	5049
# Level 2	318	318	367	367	318	367
<b>PANEL D: Central Government Relations</b>						
	<b>2002-09</b>			<b>2009-12</b>		
New Teachers per capita		1.11 (0.08)		0.69** (0.08)		
Avg FDD (transfers in \$)					0.99 (0.00)	
Centralization Discount 20km		1.19** (0.10)		1.27 (0.22)	1.28 (0.23)	
Local Need Controls		Y		Y	Y	
Local Capacity Controls		Y		Y	Y	
N		4098		5049	5059	
# Level 2		321		367	367	

\*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.05, \* p < 0.1. Results of two-tailed, mixed-level negative binomial models. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. All models include a centered mean of pre-colonial centralization at the local government (level 2) level.

**TABLE 3.13: Location-Allocation Modeling, Alternative Explanations**

PANEL A: Maximize Attendance Models											
	2002-09					2009-12					
Centralization	-131.6*	-137.3*	-131.4*	-126.9*	-131.6*	-66.1	-37.8	-65.8	-73.9	-65.1	-66.6
Discount 20km	(65.4)	(63.6)	(65.2)	(68.5)	(61.3)	(90.4)	(85.9)	(77.4)	(78.1)	(75.9)	(77)
Gap Parties		-94.5					-68.8				
		(100.2)					(77.3)				
Nat'l Coalition			-7.57					-23.9			
			(39.2)					(56.9)			
ELF				-1.19					1.19		
				(1.06)					(1.18)		
Avg # Civic Associations					-0.22					7.08	
					(23.9)					(25.7)	
Avg FDD											0.00
											(0.01)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.62	0.61	0.62	0.61	0.62	0.62
N	316	311	316	316	316	369	358	369	369	368	369
PANEL B: Maximize Coverage Models											
	2002-09					2009-12					
Centralization	-747.7**	-775.1**	-746.6**	-746.5**	-721.4**	-214*	-193.9*	-214.7**	-238.9**	-198.6**	-217**
Discount 20km	(181)	(180.9)	(181.1)	(185.4)	(187.9)	(118.7)	(100.1)	(97.8)	(103.2)	(98.9)	(99.7)
Gap Parties		-219					203.9				
		(318.7)					(195.9)				
Nat'l Coalition			-35.3					78.8			
			(157.7)					(73)			
ELF				-0.32					3.73		
				(4.37)					(2.78)		
Avg # Civic Associations					-83.7					-82.8*	
					(86.8)					(46.6)	
Avg FDD											0.01
											(0.02)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.29	0.30	0.29	0.29	0.30	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.17	0.17	0.16
N	318	313	318	318	318	368	358	369	369	368	369

\*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.05, \*p < 0.1. Results of OLS regressions with fixed effects at the regional level. Robust, clustered standard errors are in parentheses. All models include a minimal set of controls that include: the number of villages in the rural community, population density, the number of new schools built by the local government during the time period and the percent of the population that was covered with a primary school in the baseline year.


## Location Allocation Models

Figure 3.3 shows an example of a chosen location that will maximize attendance. In this model, locations are chosen so as to maximize the total number of users ('demand weight') within an assigned distance. In this case, the model maximizes the percent of the population estimated to be primary aged students (27.3%) within three kilometers, discounting the weight of a village's population as it gets further away from the chosen location. For example, Ida's student population is estimated at approximately 337 students, all of which are assigned to Ida itself, the chosen location. At 2.8 kilometers away, Sylvabe is only estimated to be willing to send roughly ten of its 238 students to school in Ida, for a total weighted population of 347 students at the chosen site. Weighting is linear and is assigned as follows:


$$\text{Demand Weight} = \text{student population} - ((\text{distance} \times .3333) \times \text{student population})$$

Thus for Ida:

$$347 \text{ (demand weight)} = [(1235 \times 0.273) - ((0 \times .3333) \times (1235 \times 0.273))] + [(872 \times .273) - ((2.8 \times 0.3333) \times (872 \times 0.273))]$$



The second form of location allocation models is simpler and seeks only to assign schools to locations that will maximize the total percent of the population that is covered by a given radius - in this case the three kilometer standard set by the Senegalese State. Existing schools are added into the model along with all villages as candidate locations and their populations (weight is determined by percent of the population that is primary student aged). The model then gives locations that will maximize the percent of the population that falls within the assigned impedance range, here three kilometers. Because some of the three-kilometer buffers that are chosen will overlap with areas that are already covered, the population that falls within a chosen location and an existing school because they were already covered in the baseline time period is subtracted. Using again the examples of Ida and Sylvabe, here all of Sylvabe's population is added to the demand weight because it would now fall within three kilometers of a school and this population was not covered in 2002. In these examples, both models choose Ida and both Ida and Sylvabe receive schools by 2009.



## **4. When and Where Does History Matter? ‘Decompressing’ Village Public Goods Investments in Senegal, 1880-2012**

Over the past ten years, it has become increasingly popular to study the path-dependency of historical institutions on contemporary development outcomes. These findings reinforce the central claim of this project: history is a powerful driver of development politics today. Yet to the extent that recent work has identified sub-national spatial patterns, much like those highlighted in Chapter 3, they have glossed over temporal dynamics, including what are among the most notable formal institutional ruptures that developing regions have ever experienced.

This chapter pushes back at the default assumption that patterns such as those observed in the previous chapter are driven by a persistent and constant institutional cause. Rather, it argues that we must take both spatial and temporal processes seriously, highlighting the interactions between formal and informal institutions as they evolve over time. By ‘decompressing’ history to look at when and where public goods investments were made in rural Senegal over the past century, the central empirical argument advanced in this chapter is that the impact of pre-colonial centralization is not consistent over time, but only appears in force following the 1996 decentralization reforms that transferred authority over public goods placement to local governments. Understanding this temporal variation is valuable to recognize in its own right, but, more importantly for our understanding of how informal institutions impact political and economic life, it questions the assumption behind the majority of mechanisms that have been put forth by scholars over the past twenty years: that the

geography of sub-national inequalities have not dramatically changed and that the inequalities between regions are growing over time. Without taking time seriously, we risk misrepresenting why we think distributional politics are historically embedded.

This chapter thus makes two contributions to the broader project: first, it helps isolate the 1996 decentralization reforms as an exogenous shock that, by transferring decision-making authority to the local level, facilitated the re-emergence of informal institutions of social networks as a key driver of sub-national distributional politics. Were this analysis to limit itself to the political geography of Senegal in 1880 and outcomes in 2012, the general message would be one of institutional persistence with the expectation that areas that were home to pre-colonial states are doing better today because they have *always* done better. Yet the empirical record gives no support to this argument. The historical evidence marshaled here calls attention to a particular class of phenomena where a past cause creates persistent, informal institutions that are only capable of affecting the dependent variable following exogenous shocks to the formal institutional environment.

If pre-colonial centralization cannot explain access to social services for much of Senegal's history, this chapter secondly seeks to understand what factors matter in the interim and for how long. In a series of empirical tests, this chapter suggests that proximity to the French colonial state, its own presence largely determined by geographic accessibility, was an important determinant in the early colonial period, social service access only expanding outward into the rural countryside following post-war investments in the 1950s. A final set of analyses suggest that despite the suggestions by some (Huillery, 2009, Frankema, 2011) that investments

in the early colonial period are sticky, whereby early areas of investment continue to be better off today, that the effects of proximity to social services in the first thirty years of colonization largely fade by the early 2000s. It is only proximity to late colonial investments, following a significant expansion of colonial efforts to ‘modernize’ their colonies that seem to matter for contemporary performance.

## **Institutions in History: Sticky, Persistent and Path Dependent**

The literature on institutional persistence can be characterized as taking two broad forms: institutions, often formal, that persist with a constant and continuous effect throughout time, for example legal structures (La Porta et al, 1997) or property rights institutions (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001), or institutions that engender a cause, often via an informal institution, that persists even after the generating institution ceases to exist. For an example of the latter, in Berger’s (2009) study of the differential tax policies instituted by the British above and below the tenth parallel, the tax policies themselves no longer exist and have no causal weight. The difference in development outcomes Berger identifies these policies as having is via the differences in bureaucratic capacity it fostered. It is subnational differences in bureaucratic capacity on either side of the tenth parallel that are theorized to persist throughout time and create the differences observed today.

This argument resembles the latter such approach: pre-colonial institutions left different forms of social ties across rural Senegal which today are creating the different forms of distributional politics identified in Chapter 3. Yet unlike the story told by Berger and others,

this effect, while persisting throughout time, is not expected to always matter for development because the ability of social networks to drive public goods delivery is dependent on their ability to control local decision-making. Put more bluntly, the impact of informal institutions depends on the formal institutional configuration that they operate within.

This chapter not only serves an empirical objective, but also a methodological one by arguing that when we take seriously the temporal variation in the dependent variable, we find substantial differences in the effect of informal institutions over time. This omission in existing work is notable given the significant reconfigurations of formal institutions in the developing world over the time period under study. The full consolidation of the colonial state, with its many associated economic, political and social changes, decolonization and neoliberal economic reform and decentralization are just a handful of such major changes in the formal rules of the game that have striking distributional consequences for citizens. It is quite logical therefore, to assume that these factors matter for development outcomes across space and that they should not be relegated to background conditions that can be ignored.

The empirical analysis proceeds in three parts: the first section seeks to assess the ability of pre-colonial centralization to explain access to public goods across time in rural Senegal, suggesting that this only becomes a significant factor following the 1996 decentralization reforms. Consequently, this paper secondly turns to look at what factors drive public goods investments at different periods of Senegal's history in lieu of a constant factor driven by pre-colonial centralization. Using secondary literature in combination with the dataset described in the preceding paragraph to identify four 'periods' of investments: an early period where access is

largely a function of proximity to the weak colonial administration, a second period marked by French efforts to modernize their economies that sees expansion outwards, the socialist, post-independence era and, finally, the era of decentralization. The final part of this chapter examines to what extent early colonial investments drive subsequent investment, arguing that while there is evidence that locales of early colonial investments are strongly correlated (mirroring the finding of Huillery, 2009), that the ability of early investments to explain subsequent patterns falls off dramatically from the late colonial period onward, while there is some evidence that late-colonial investments influence subsequent patterns of access.

## **Data and Measurement**

To trace the impact of pre-colonial political centralization on development outcomes, this chapter combines the dataset used in the preceding chapter with archival data to look at the construction of primary schools and basic health facilities in Senegalese villages between 1882 and 2012 at roughly ten year intervals, with the exception of 1960-2000 for which village-level data is only available in 1972 (though data is present for village-level health investments in 1965). The dependent variable in most models is a dummy variable of whether or not a village has either a primary school or a health facility, which may include a health center, or *dispensarie* ('poste' post-1975), in a given year. Health huts, basic health facilities administered under the health posts, which were pioneered in the early 1980s, are regrettably not currently included in this dataset due to a lack of information about their locations in 2000.

It bears brief note that in an effort to control for the fact that many villages have been settled following the onset of colonial rule, early French census data is used to identify which

villages did and did not exist at the start and the end of the colonial era. Consequently, results for 1902-1912 are restricted to a small set of villages ( $n=3,301$ ) that are listed in the first censuses conducted by the French between 1890-1904.<sup>150</sup> Because early census data could not be located for some parts of the country during this time period, notably present day Kolda region, parts of Kedougou, many parts of the country that fall within the Ferlo Desert and Tivouane *département*, these areas are not included in the sample. Results from 1922-1972 use data from the 1956 *repertoire de villages*, which identifies 10,877 villages as existing at that time period. These are approximations, but start to address the risk of estimating effects with villages that simply did not exist and were not viable options for placement in the sample. Due to a lack of digitalization, all data was hand-matched.

The models presented below include a series of control variables that cluster into four groups. First, a series of variables measure *French exposure* during the pre-colonial and colonial period. More detailed descriptions of these variables can be found in the Data Appendix, but include at the village level: whether the locality was home to a trading post, fort or administrative center in the pre-colonial period, the European population in 1912, and whether or not a locality was an administrative center or had a railway station in 1912, 1932, 1953, 1972 or 2002. Also included are distance to the nearest mission and the nearest major roads over the same years with data in 1922, 1952, 1972 and 2012 (road distance is not calculated before 1922

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<sup>150</sup> The primary source for early colonial census is Becker, et al. (1983), which compiles a number of archival documents with early census data. This is combined with a series of report commissioned by the French in 1904 (dates of completion vary between 1904-1906) of all *cercles* under their administration (though some are not available in archives) that frequently list villages and their chiefs (ANS 1G:251, 1G:289-96).

as no meaningfully road system existed). Whether a village was home to a capital or key city of a pre-colonial state is also included in some models. Population density in 1900, an indicator of relative wealth of an area, is calculated at the level of the 2002 rural community, digitized from the 1972 *Atlas National du Sénegal*.


In order to control for *geographic factors* that may have both encouraged early French settlement while impeding or facilitating subsequent investments, a series of structural variables are also added. These include: logged distance to the nearest waterway as well as two dummy variables measuring whether or not a village is five kilometers from the coast or a navigable river way. Village elevation, latitude and longitude are also included. To control for variation in hospitality of climate, a series of dummy variables measure a village's ecological zone: whether or not a village is located in mangroves, Sahelian grassland or lowlands rainforest/grassland mix. The reference category is Sudanian woodland, the dominant landscape in the country. Finally, an ordinal variable measures a village's presence in the *ferlo*, a vast area of scrubland that varies from zero to three, with higher values indicating that the village falls deep within the desert. These areas, which at its maximum extent stretches over a third of the country's territory, was of great interest to the early French State who was particularly focused on settling its pastoral populations at the same time that the landscape posed difficulties for the French in enforcing control.

The third set of controls measure various elements of *favoritization* that have been put forth in the literature on Senegalese politics and include a count measure of the number of Mourides living in each *canton* in 1917 as reported by Marty and whether or not the village falls

within the peanut basin, the key colonial export crop, as it existed in 1900. Lastly, a variable of whether or not any given local community is predominantly Wolof is included to account for any possible ethnic favoritism, given claims of ‘wolofization’ of Senegalese society and, similarly, if predominantly Sereer. These ethnic groups were closest to Dakar and are considered to have gained the most from the colonial state. Finally, Tables 4.4 and 4.5 evaluate the *impact of early investments* on subsequent outcomes. Here, models include measures of the number of teachers and students in any given school during the colonial era as well as the existence of as well as distances from social services in each time period.

This data is analyzed using logit models with fixed effects at the *cercle*, an early administrative unit that is pegged here to its 1915 boundaries, the first year for which complete maps are available. While choosing a geographical boundary that was created post-colonization is not ideal, no meaningful pre-colonial boundaries existed that still allow for evaluating the impact of centralization and these boundaries are arguably less politically informed than subsequent political divisions. These early boundaries set by the French, prior to the extensive restructuring that came in the 1920s, were often amalgamated into large swaths of meaningless territorial division created as the French first moved inland. All models include robust, clustered standard errors at this level as well.

Figure 4.1: Marginal Effects of Centralization on Social Service Access over Time



## When Does Centralization Matter?

The claim that pre-colonial centralization has not always mattered for service access is supported in Figure 4.1, which shows the marginal effects from a series of naive models estimating the effect of pre-colonial centralization on whether a village has social service access (a primary school or health clinic) from 1902 through 2012. Full results of these models, which include fixed effects at the administrative division of the 1915 *cercle*, the first complete French administrative boundary, can be found in Table 4.5 in the Appendix.<sup>151</sup> As is abundantly clear, the effect of pre-colonial centralization on social service access in any given village is only

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<sup>151</sup> It should be noted that given to the extremely small numbers of social services prior to 1900 that models often fail to converge. Still, these areas did disproportionately fall in areas that had been exposed to centralized states. Even in 1902, for example, a full seventy-seven percent of primary schools were in centralized areas as opposed to eighteen percent in areas with mixed political histories and only one school in an acephalous region. By 1922 these inequalities have begun their decline, with fifty-nine percent of schools in centralized areas and twenty-six percent in uncentralized parts of the country, continuing its decline to forty-seven and thirty-six percent respectively by 1952.

statistically significant from 2002 onwards, with no effect in the colonial or immediately post-colonial period.

Data limitations prevent Figure 4.1 from identifying when the effect becomes significant. More complete time-series can be found at a higher-level of aggregation for both health and primary education. Figure 4.2 shows the average number of schools by the post-colonial division

Figure 4.2 Average Schools per Département by Year and Pre-Colonial Status






Figure 4.3 Average Health Posts per Département by Year and Pre-Colonial Status



of the *département*, squared points mark years where post-colonial data is available. This figure illustrates a marked flip between the average number of schools in *départements* that were largely centralized prior to colonization and those that were not following the 1996 administrative reforms. While areas that were not centralized had more schools on average from the 1940s through the early years of independence, this effect switches dramatically following the devolution of authority over primary school construction to local governments. Between 1998 and 2002 for example, centralized areas out build uncentralized ones by 2.7 schools to one, though this ratio declines to 1.8 to one between 2002 to 2012.

These effects are also apparent in Figure 4.3, which shows the average number of health posts for the same administrative division. Here areas that were home to centralized states in the pre-colonial era have slightly more health posts on average beginning in the 1940s (though the difference is often under one post per *département* until 1976). The growth rate indicated between 1976 and 2000 should be interpreted cautiously since no data is available in this time period. While there is no switch between the two regions as is seen with primary schools, the growth rate in average health posts following 1998 is higher in *départements* that were centralized than those that were not by roughly two to one in new construction respectively.


To further clarify that these changes in building-patterns is something unique to public goods that become locally-provided following 1996, Figure 4.4 shows comparable data for borehole construction, major waterworks that are not a devolved competence and are far beyond the capacity of even the most well-financed local governments. Borehole construction has always been in the control of the central government and, as Figure 4.4 illustrates, has been biased



towards centralized areas from the post-colonial period on (most of this is driven by a central state bias towards peanut producing zones). If anything, there has been a reduction in this bias towards centralized areas in the 2000s, likely reflecting MDG-related efforts on the part of the central government to reach the under-served. In brief, central-state provided goods seem to behave more in line with previous patterns following 1996 than locally provided goods.

As an additional check of this finding, Figure 4.4 shows the marginal effect of centralization on educational outcomes as reported by respondents in the 1992 and 2010 *Demographic and Health Surveys* in rural Senegal. The sample is truncated to those who would have been primary school aged in 1996 and onward; hence in 2010 data is limited to this between the ages of fourteen and twenty-one. To ensure comparability, the 1992 data is truncated in the same way. This data tells a similar story: young rural Senegalese were less likely to be educated if they lived in areas that were home to centralized states in 1992, but this

Figure 4.5 Marginal Effect of Centralization on Educational Attainment, DHS Data



gap has largely closed by 2010, reflecting the gains in primary school investments made over this period. Unfortunately, similar data is unavailable for healthcare.

That pre-colonial centralization has not explained social service delivery since colonization onward is immediately visible in the preceding figures. This preliminary evidence indicates that while pre-colonial centralization may help explain differential rates of investments following decentralization, its earlier insignificance leaves open the question of what factors account for investment patterns in the colonial and post-colonial period. This paper turns to a historical review of development efforts in Senegal from the late 1800s to the present in an effort to explain how these changes relate to formal institutions, notably central state capacity.

## **Social Service Access in Rural Senegal, 1880-2012**

If pre-colonial centralization only explains public goods delivery in some time periods, but not others, what drove early investments and do these have an impact on outcomes today? The following analysis subdivides Senegal's history with development initiatives into four

periods: the early colonial period (1900-1938), the late, post-war colonial period (1939-1960), the Socialist era following independence (1960-1996) and the post-1996 era of democratic decentralization. Blending secondary, historical sources and a series of statistical analyses, the following sections conclude that distributional patterns are most clearly driven by the nature of *where* decisions are being made; the central government has different objectives and capabilities than an early colonial administration than a locally elected council.

### **The Early Colonial Period: “Buccaneers” in an ad hoc administration**

Prior to French expansion inland, the first schools and health facilities were founded in the ports and *escales* dominated by trader communities (principally in Saint-Louis and, later, Dakar). It was only when the countryside was opened up to the colonial state and traders alike following the French Navy’s advance inland in the last two decades of the nineteenth century that education and, at a slower pace, health care, moved inwards. For education, the key axes of this opening were along the Senegal River - long a dominant means of transportation for French interests in the region but now fully under their control - and along the railway that was begun in 1882, running from Saint-Louis, the economic hub of the colony, to Dakar which offered the most viable port.<sup>152</sup> Administrative sites set up by the French, often in the capital villages of the fallen empires or in close enough proximity that the French could carefully monitor their puppet chiefs, became early sites of investments. Health facilities were slower to expand beyond key

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<sup>152</sup> Despite the setback that the plan suffered when Lat Dior, the Damel of Cayor going back on an his earlier agreement to let the French build the railroad through his territory, fueled in large part by his recognition that this would forever undermine his claim to authority in the state, long one of the most powerful in the region, the railway was completed by 1885 (Crowder, 1968: 75-9).

administrative centers and much of the country remained drastically under-served, including areas that had seen relative advances in education. Neither Diourbel nor Fleuve (Saint Louis) regions had rural doctors prior to 1910, for example. With the exception of French interests in the Casamance, all pre-1900 development activity fell within the bounds of pre-colonial states.

In general, the developmental policies of the early colonial state were next to nonexistent. Much like its counterpart in the metropole (and much of Europe at the time), the dominant belief was that economic and social activities were the responsibility of the private realm; the state was only obliged to provide internal and external protection. Yet it was soon clear to administrators that the colonies would never attract private investment without some development of infrastructure, such as railroads and basic social services. Given the constraints of colonial budgeting, which required colonies to be economically self-sufficient however, early revenue raised in French West Africa went largely to the financing of the state's own administrative functioning (Fage, 1969a: 201-2).

What developments did take place were largely targeted towards areas of economic interest and with European populations, which effectively meant that most colonial subjects received nothing in terms of investment from the state in the first decades of colonization. What impact was felt in outlying areas was, as Crowder notes, the expansion of transportation and communication networks, the introduction of a uniform currency and the alienation of peasants from traditional land-holding practices (1968: 275). This is not to say that there was no recognition of the need to invest and many colonial administrators bemoaned the lack of effort on the part of the state. Yet despite calls for greater work in the domains of health and

education, for example by the Gouverneur General Ponty in 1908, efforts remained weak. Of the 190 primary schools in French West Africa in 1909, there was no meaningful increase by the outbreak of WWI (Crowder, 1968: 284).

This is not to say that early investments were exclusively targeted in this manner. What public goods were built for local populations depended almost entirely on the whims of the colonial administrators appointed in these areas, who had absolute authority in their *cercles*, so far from the colonial capitals that there was almost no oversight (Cohen, 1971; Colombi, 1996). While this certainly led to abuses of power, this also led to not-inconsequential projects, as colonial functionaries, eager for promotion undertook ‘ambitious projects’ on their own initiative rather than wait for central administration’s approval or, more likely, veto. While the French colonial administration is often portrayed as a centralized, homogenous entity therefore, in reality during early years of colonization “the decentralized administrative structure virtually gave a free hand to the man who wanted to build a bridge, establish a schoolhouse, or help increase local peanut production ...” (Cohen, 1971: 61, 79).

As the administration spread outward in early years, so did the ad hoc process by which decisions were made about investments. Citing a 1911 complaint by functionaries in the Colonial Ministry, Cohen observes that the lack of “long-range direction” was obvious to everyone involved; “... colonial affairs were being handled on a day-to-day basis,” he writes (Cohen, 1971: 60). That the French had no real plan for their massive territorial acquisitions

meant that the under-staffed administration relied on their one man in any given district, whose own efforts were largely circumscribed to the most accessible areas around his post.<sup>153</sup>

With administrators limited in mobility and tied down with paperwork, access to education was still extremely limited. This took on not only geographic dimensions, but also social ones as primary education was targeted in the early years of colonialism. Students were explicitly recruited from among the local elites, sons of notables and chiefs as well as the children of ex-soldiers, colonial functionaries and merchants. Gouverneur General Rome wrote in 1924:

“because our current means do not allow us to yet reach the masses and restrict our efforts to a minority, choose judiciously among this minority .... consider the instruction as a precious item ... Chose our students first from among the sons of village chiefs and notables, the indigenous society is very hierarchical. Social classes are clearly determined by hereditary factors and custom. It is on this that our authority relies in the administration of the country” (quoted in Moumani 1967: 56).

Early education policy in French West Africa was thus explicitly targeted at creating and reproducing a stratum of Africans able to perform vital functions for the colonial economy: government clerks, technicians, shop keeps, veterinarians, teachers, and doctors.<sup>154</sup>

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<sup>153</sup> In reality, most administrators felt as Delavignette, who sums up his early years as a finance officer in Zinder (present day Niger): “I dreamed that the cercle might ‘give me the road’ of the great highways which crossed the territory ... or simply that it might show me the paths to the villages where things were grown, and to the walled towns, or perhaps take me with the flocks moving to new pastures, the peddlers on they make rounds or the pilgrims in their tribulations. Shut in as I was with the Dahomean copying clerics, I tried through them to traffic in African life in a small way since I was barred from the large-scale activities of the cercle” (1946: 3).

<sup>154</sup> Compared to the British, the French made significant advances in expanding access to health care, in part because the French found the cost of training doctors in France far too expensive and the need too high, thereby creating a training center in Dakar that results in far more African doctors than in other colonies (Crowder, 1968: 327). Although the population was initially hesitant to approach Western-trained doctors, there were clinics in all five of Sine-Saloum’s residences by as early as 1913 that offered free consultations and, although access was limited, populations did make use of these facilities more readily than French schools (Klein, 1968: 192).

Early health intervention was simultaneously geared towards meeting colonial needs and structured along racial and class lines (Keita, 2007). Most efforts focused on containing potential epidemics (for example see Echenberg, 2002) and by 1912 there were only 20 health posts in rural areas throughout the AOF, despite significant gains in urban health access (Kusiak, 2004: 63). Nonetheless, the French had institute the *Assistance Medicale Indiegene* (AMI) program in 1906, which sought to provide rural health care and was instituted under Gouverneur General Roume who allocated substantial funds to rural heath care during his tenure. Despite this, French doctors were reluctant to serve in rural areas and most of the AMI's impact was felt around Thies and the Petit Cote, south of Dakar (Echenberg, 2002: 27). The AMI remained a critical component of French policy through 1960 however, and the *Ecole African de Medicine* trained nearly 600 African 'doctors' between its foundation in 1918 and closure in 1953 (Keita, 2007: 107).

While the first schools in the colony were provided by missionaries or local Catholic churches, with financial assistance from the French State up until 1880, it was only in 1903, when the colonial government made its first attempt to regulate primary education, that they replaced religious teachers with lay teachers in state schools and cut off all support to missions (Gardiniere, 1985: 336).<sup>155</sup> In 1912, the French West Africa government issued another ruling, which attempted to homogenize the quality of access available in state schools across the colonies, and asked each colony to create its own Education Department (Senegal's was created in 1913). Schools were consequently organized in a pyramid-fashion with village schools

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<sup>155</sup> In response, the Brothers of Ploermel, the most active order in Senegal, left in mass, though many nuns remained, providing the majoring of instructors in Catholic mission schools (Foster, 2013: 79).

representing the base, regional schools as a middle layer and a few elite schools at the top, based in Dakar and Saint Louis and intended for the training of future elites. Unlike in British colonies, which relied on school fees as a means to supplement the costs of government run schools, schooling was free in French West Africa, with many students receiving free lodging as well (Mumford, 1970 (1935): 63).

### **The Late Colonial Era: Its ‘Fifty Years Too Late’**

Despite reforms to the admission process of the *Ecole Coloniale*, where colonial administrators were trained post-World War One, the inter-war period had seen no improvement or initiative in the colonial effort. Rather, as Cohen writes, by the 1930s administrators were largely loosing touch with the ‘native populations’ following the arrival of the automobile and the increased tendency of administrators to bring their families with them to their postings. Both of these factors decreased the type and quantity of time that administrators spent with the populations they administered (1971: 108, 139).

It was not until the end of WWII that the French developed more ambitious plans for their colonies. At the 1944 Brazzaville Conference, convoked by de Gaulle to outline a plan for the African colonies following France’s liberation from the Germans, a massive expansion of education and health services was proposed, though long from foreseeing independence, these reforms were undertaken with the assumption that the colonial state was ‘building Frenchmen’ (Kusiak, 2004: 104). During that same year, the Gouverneur General of the AOF asked for a fifty year plan to ensure mass education leading to primary education reform in August of 1945,

thus that schools began followed the standards of metropolitan France and, in 1948, primary schools enrollment was opened to all students (De Benoist, 1982: 142-3).

The ten year plan for the Modernization of Overseas Territories adopted in 1946 suggested adapting education to the economic activity of each territory and aimed to double school enrollment in five years and triple it by 1956, with the overall goal of fifty percent enrollment in West Africa. Although the region fell well short of these goals, over 1,000 schools were built in French West Africa between 1949 and 1950 through the *Fonds d'Investissement pour le Developpement Economique et Social des Territoires d'outre mer* (FIDES) (Gardinier, 1985: 339). FIDES brought not only money, but technicians as well, restricting the influence of any given administrator on the types or locations of projects being undertaken in their *cercle* (Cohen, 1971: 173). Although administrators could propose a number of projects, the rapid proliferation of actors during this time period meant that all projects went through a series of meetings, discussions and reviews improving quality at the same time that it bureaucratized the process (Colombi, 1991: 129). While the money financed a large number of projects, as Colombi notes, it “arrived fifty years too late” (1991: 19).

As a result, the budget for primary education tripled from 1,595,000 CFA to 5,311,000 between 1950 and 1955, but the impact on student enrollment remained low: with four out of one thousand students educated in 1947, this number had only increased to ten in one thousand by 1957 (Moumani, 1967: 126).<sup>156</sup> Despite weak enrollment, this period saw a massive expansion

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<sup>156</sup> The value of an education should be neither over- nor under-estimated. Outside of a few elite schools, a basic primary education was unlikely to give students more beyond literacy in French and basic arithmetic. Hapgood notes that in 1960 only 320 students out of each 1000 entering primary schools

of basic services into the countryside and, in particular, into areas that had previously seen little involvement by the colonial regime as the colonial state, now more secure and entrenched, had a more comprehensive reach across the countryside.

At independence in 1960, Senegal counted 106,911 primary school students, a number that rose by over 20,000 to 127,000 in 1962 (Moumani, 1967). Significant gains had been made in last few years of colonialism, though the tendency to see the French as preparing their colonies for independence by increasing access to social services should be taken cautiously. Cooper (1994: 178) denies that the French had any truly strategic plan for decolonization, seeing their efforts as reactive and “a tenacious holding operation.” There was almost no discussion of preparing colonies for self-government, but rather the dialogue remained one of ‘modernizing’ the link between France and her colonies, for example the French began allowing local elected assemblies to make decisions about health and education investments from the mid-1950s on (1994: 171-2).

Already, significant subnational variation had appeared. In 1960, two in one thousand rural Senegalese had their *certificate d'études primaire* (CEP), which certifies primary school competition, as opposed to six to eight per thousand in the lower Casamance (Ziguinchor region today). Colonial administrators often ascribed these differences to cultural differences among ethnic groups; the Diola, Sarakole and Sereer were seen as being more open to French education

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received their *Certificat d'Etudes Primaire* (CEP) and, among those that do finish primary school and receive their CEP, only twenty percent went on to further education. A CEP however could make a huge difference in the lives of young men. One study cited by Hapgood notes that of the approximately 1000 individuals who received their CEP in 1954, only two percent were farming five years later, with the vast majority living in urban areas rather than their native villages (1965: 124). Primary education could be a means of advancement therefore, but many students never completed their studies and lacked the skills necessary to transfer successfully into the urban economy.

as opposed to the Peuhl or Kedougou region as a whole (Colin, 1980: 499). In reality, and following the above discussion, that the region of Cap-Vert (home to Dakar) and the lower Casamance were better educated was largely the legacy of the early and intense efforts of Catholic missions, which encouraged families to send their children to school (Colin, 1980: 503). Such patterns were not seen with health, where the Casamance was noticeably under-served, as were Louga and Senegal Oriental up until the early 1980s, when substantial improvements were made (Keita, 2007: 137).

### **Independence: Socialist Expansion and the Politics of Structural Adjustment**

With the transfer of authority at independence in 1960, the French *cercle* commanders handed power over the Senegalese officials that had long worked under them. Unlike in Mali and Guinea where many *chef de canton*, the indigenous authorities at the sub-*cercle* level, were dismissed, in Senegal most *chef de canton* stayed on as the *chef d'arrondissement*, following the official elimination of the former post. But by 1965, the state had begun centralizing control in Dakar, eliminating substantially the autonomy previously enjoyed by the local officials (Cohen, 1971: 194-8). The centralizing tendencies of the early post-colonial state were largely justified as falling in line with the Socialist mission of the Senghor administration.

The country's first four-year plan for education sought to expand the access to primary education rapidly across the countryside, oriented around encouraging a common language and culture for the new country, with the goal of obtaining fifty percent of students in primary school by 1964. At the end of the first year of the plan's implementation (July 1962), Senegal

was ahead of schedule, having built 445 classes, forty-five more than the goal of four hundred, and increasing primary education rates to eighteen percent rather than twelve (Colin, 1980: 512-3). For health, the first four-year plan sought to restructure the country's medical training system to emphasize preventative, rural health though these goals were not met and French medical training and practices continue to dominate. By 1974, the country had only 281 doctors (Menes, 1976: 96).

In large part, the efforts to expand rural access to primary education were informed by *animation rurale*, the key policy of the first Prime Minister Mamadou Dia and President Senghor. Among the three pillars of the first four-year plan was 'political integration,' which sought to reduce inequalities in access to social services and to bring areas that had been largely isolated during the colonial era more fully into the country's economy (Gellar et al., 1980: 52). Dia's efforts to transform the lives of the peasantry resulted in over fifty percent of the state's annual budget going to the 'social budget' in the first years of independence (Colin 1980: 597). By and large, primary school construction and the construction of rural dispensaries were among the most popular services provided by *animation rurale* (Gellar et al., 1980: 70). Although Dia was pushed out of government as Senghor consolidated power around a less radical path in 1962 (Boone, 1992: 92), the government continued to place great emphasis on primary education for the rural peasantry, with its second four year plan seeking to bring the primary education rate from seventeen (1964) to forty-one percent at the end of the third four-year plan. This trend slowed in the late 1960s, however, when Senghor's government recognized that it could not support the costs associated with such rapid expansion, notably paying teacher salaries and

maintaining facilities (Gellar et al., 1980: 86). Consequently, in the second half of the first decade of independence, primary school construction slowed considerably as did growth in enrollment rates, which went from an 11.2% annual increase in 1964 to a mere 2.7% in 1971 (Colin, 1980: 605; Le Brun, 1979: 185). Although reaching complete primary school enrollment remained a goal in subsequent four-year plans, the expected date of this achievement was pushed further back to 2000, with short-term objectives hovering around forty percent.

Although health spending averaged eight to nine percent of the national budget in the early years of independence (Menes, 1976: 86), this number had dropped to 5.4% in 1985, evidence of the drastic cuts that took place during debt restructuring during that decade. Nonetheless, salaries remained sixty to seventy percent of the total health budget from the 1970s through the 1980s (Vogel, 1988). In response to the fiscal constraints of the country's free health care, Senegal implemented cost recovery programs in the late 1980s, urged on by the World Bank. An attempt to buffer the effects of structural adjustment came with the 1990 Bamako Conference, which sought to ensure rural medical care under Structural Adjustment across the continent. While substantial changes took place during the 1980s and early 1990s with the cost structure of the health system however, neoliberalism did little to alter the actual structure of health care access or to restrict physical access (Foley, 2010: 59).

Indeed the 1970s saw a marked by a slow-down in goods provision. This did not go unnoticed by citizens, among whom the schools and dispensaries were among the most popular tenets of *animation rurale*. Such was the dissatisfaction with the state of Senegal's education system that calling a national conference on education as the first act of Abdou Diouf, the

country's second President who took power in 1980, though little that came out of the meeting actually resulted in policy changes and strayed far from the technical skills that most citizens, working mainly as farmers, needed (Berthelemy et al., 1996: 69). Notable failures emerged during the postcolonial experience with primary education. Senegal had not reformed the education system it inherited at independence; primary education "led to nothing except secondary education," which was almost completely unaccessible to rural citizens (Berthelemy et al., 1996: 72). Associated with early efforts at *animation rurale* to expand groundnut production in particular and rural economic 'modernization' in general, rural citizens increasingly became indifferent to primary schooling, in particular since it often resulted in out-migration of children to urban areas (Le Brun, 1979: 186).

Another failure came with imbalances in investment. Secondary education had always been favored by the post-colonial state, with resources disproportionately going to secondary and tertiary education, despite the much more limited impact they had on the population and the urban bias it reflected. This was slightly mediated in the late 1980s, when primary school spending increased ten percent in the decade following 1980, when it accounted for thirty-six percent of education expenditure; secondary education declined nine percent from a starting point of twenty-eight percent in the same time period (Berthelemy et al., 1996: 70-71).

TABLE 4.1: Impact of Administrative Proximity on Social Service Delivery

	1912	1932	1952	1972	2002
D Nearest Admin Center in Year (km)	-0.03* (0.02)	-0.03** (0.02)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01* (0.01)
Admin Center in Year	4.72*** (0.70)	31.77*** (1.73)	-	4.79*** (0.39)	4.07*** (0.29)
Rail Station (in year)	6.29*** (0.96)	6.26*** (0.91)	6.33*** (0.66)	6.56*** (0.54)	6.24*** (1.07)
D Mir Rd in Year (km)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
D Mission 1912 (km)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01** (0.01)	0.01** (0.01)
Constant	12.9 (17.1)	8.94 (14.8)	0.78 (20.9)	-18.5 (13.7)	-5.22 (21.1)
Geog. Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
R <sup>2</sup>	0.09	0.27	0.25	0.08	0.26
N	3031	3031	3031	10760	10760

\*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.05, \* p < 0.1. Results of logit models with fixed effects at the 1915 cencle. Standard errors, clustered at the 1915 cencle, are in parentheses. Dependent variable is a 0-1 measure of whether a village has a school and/or clinic in the year of measurement. All models include the following geographic controls: a village's elevation, its latitude and longitude and the logged distance to the nearest navigable waterway.

Similarly, health care was heavily biased toward urban areas. In 1974, for example, over sixty percent of the health budget went to the three largest urban areas of the country, which accounted for only a quarter of the country's population (Keita, 2007: 133). Still, by the mid-1990s, Senegal was far below the regional averages: primary school attendance was only at fifty-eight percent of the eligible student population as compared to the seventy-nine percent regional average. Only twenty-seven percent of adults were literate as opposed to nearly fifty percent continent-wide (World Bank, 1995).

## **1996 Decentralization Reforms**

The biggest change to primary education and health policy in post-colonial Senegal came therefore with the 1996 reforms that devolved authority over the construction of primary school and basic health facilities, notably health posts and health huts, and their maintenance to local governments. Foley notes that for local officials in the field in the late 1990s these reforms were seen as being much more significant than the impact of the previous decades' neoliberal adjustment because of the significant administrative restructuring of responsibility that took place (2010: 58).

The sudden significance of pre-colonial centralization seen in Figures 4.1-4.3 earlier, is not easily explained here by anything other than Senegal's decentralization reforms. While structural adjustment cut back on salaries and personal, there was no other change in the process of allocation of schools or health clinics at the time. This is particularly interesting given the influx of development funds from the 1990s onwards. If there was no significant difference sub-nationally prior to increases in development funding, it is hard to imagine why an increased

availability of money would dramatically change established patterns of central government favoritism. If some regions of the country were being favored by the central state, for example, the lack of significant regime change during this time period calls into question why a new sub-national inequality would emerge.

## Multivariate Analysis

In order to asses how well the broad-stroke patterns described above map onto actual delivery patterns, Table 4.1 presents the result of a series of logistic regressions that estimate the impact of proximity and access to the governing administration at five points in time, 1912 and 1932 representing the early colonial period, 1952 the late colonial era, 1972 early independence and, finally, 2002 decentralization, on village-level access to social services.

Three things are immediately obvious. First, proximity to the colonial administration is almost always significant in the early colonial period. The exception is closer distances in 1912, which is only significant at the ten percent level and is not robust to a complete model. Administrative centers themselves are always positively associated with greater social service access (note that the variable is omitted in 1952 because it perfectly predicts success). Secondly, access has mixed findings. While rail stations, which often became important commercial centers are more likely to receive social services (again, in 2002 this variable is omitted as it perfectly predicts success), there is no effect of road access until 2002 and even then the effect is extremely small in substantive terms.<sup>157</sup> This may suggest that while early points of accessibility into the rural countryside was able to catalyze economic development and population growth

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<sup>157</sup> This finding is consistent even when the variable is run separately.

that brought with it demands for services, the later expansion of the road network has not done similarly.

Together, these support the general contention that early proximity to the colonial state increased the likelihood of receiving social services, with the significance of these factors fading overtime as the state sought to expand coverage. Of course, access to administrative centers, measured in distance to the nearest administrative point does regain significance in 2002, following the proliferation of administrative centers in rural communities from the late 1970s onwards.<sup>158</sup> This likely reflects an effort of the state to deliver services to the *chef-lieu* of every local government. Finally, proximity to missionary influence seems to play no role in social service delivery in rural Senegal, not surprising given the relatively circumscribed areas of missionary influence, confined largely to Ziguinchor region and the Petite-Côte south of Dakar.

While Table 4.1 established the role of evolving proximity in social service access, the models presented in Table 4.2 estimate the durability of the effect of early colonial proximity as well as measures of ‘favoritism’ on a village’s likelihood to have social services at different points in time. Panel A shows results of the former. These models suggest a diminishing effect of early European population and pre-colonial French presence as these variables are strong, significant predictors of service access in the early colonial period while only pre-colonial French presence retains any significance throughout time, though lessening dramatically in effect. For comparison, Panel A includes the dummy variable from Table 4.1 of whether or not a village is

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<sup>158</sup> There were around thirty-three administrative centers during the colonial period compared to 117 by 1972 and 438 by 2002.

TABLE 4.2: Alternative Explanations for Social Service Delivery

PANEL A: Impact of Early French Exposure on Social Service Delivery

	1912	1932	1952	1972	2002
European Pop	0.29*** (0.08)	0.27*** (0.07)	0.56** (0.22)	0.46** (0.18)	1.01 (0.65)
1912				0.84 (0.57)	0.72 (0.49)
Pre-C French	2.03*** (0.33)	1.80*** (0.41)	2.03*** (0.28)	1.49*** (0.31)	1.68*** (0.26)
Presence				1.20*** (0.34)	1.09*** (0.31)
Admin Center			27.4*** (2.26)	-	0.96** (0.41)
in Year					4.62*** (0.42)
Constant	12.08 (20.4)	8.67 (12.7)	15.3 (18.2)	-3.27 (12.3)	-3.11 (11.6)
Geog.	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Controls	0.43 N	0.18 3030	0.47 3030	0.25 10632	0.11 10632
R <sup>2</sup>				0.45 10632	0.14 10632
N				10632 10632	0.14 10632

PANEL B: Effect of 'Favoritism' on Social Service Delivery

	1912	1932	1952	1972	2002
Mourides	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)
1917					-0.00* (0.00)
Peanut Basin	0.06 (0.33)	0.20 (0.34)	0.28 (0.27)	0.31 (0.29)	0.03 (0.17)
1900					-0.22*** (0.03)
Wolf	0.05 (1.36)	-0.03 (1.38)	-0.17 (0.34)	-0.32 (0.44)	-0.19 (0.20)
					-0.21 (0.24)
					-0.42** (0.18)
Serer	-1.67 (1.33)	-0.185 (1.38)	-0.83** (0.34)	-0.98* (0.54)	-0.22 (0.22)
					-0.24 (0.34)
					-0.21* (0.13)
Constant	2.15 (16.2)	2.67 (18.4)	-9.39 (14.64)	-6.62 (17.2)	-2.31 (10.5)
Geog.	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Controls	0.08 N	0.08 3030	0.09 3030	0.10 3030	0.07 10640
R <sup>2</sup>				0.06 10640	0.06 10640
N				10640 10640	10632 10632

\*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.05, \* p < 0.1. Results of logit models with fixed effects at the 1915 cercle. Standard errors, clustered at the 1915 cercle, are in parentheses. Dependent variable is a 0-1 measure of whether a village has a school and/or clinic in the year of measurement. All models include the following geographic controls: a village's elevation, its latitude and longitude and the logged distance to the nearest waterway.

an administrative center in a given year. In all cases this remains significant, though it is not included in the model for 1912 given high collinearity with pre-colonial presence (the correlation is 0.79) and again, perfectly predicts success in 1952. The benefits of early French presence were strong early on, these models suggest, but are no longer important predictors in access.

Panel B estimates another set of logistic regressions, this time looking at the impact of measures of ‘favoritism’ alleged in the literature on Senegalese politics. This is largely a story of null effects or, when significant, in the opposite direction of the claims suggested in the literature. The peanut basin, for example, never takes a significant, positive coefficient and, when it is significant in 1972, it is in a negative direction, likely reflecting efforts by the government to target less-developed parts of the country. Similarly, Wolof and Sereers, two ethnic groups that are considered among the most educated and influential during in the colonial administration do not appear to have been favored with goods delivery. Finally, the number of Mourides in a *canton* in 1917 is always negatively associated with goods delivery in the colonial era, perhaps reflecting French struggles with how to handle the rapidly proliferating movement.

Of course, this is not meant to deny the powerful role played by the Mouride brotherhoods in the late colonial and post-independence era or to deny that favoritism did not take place, merely that there is no evidence that favoritism took the form of primary schools or health clinics. The former is not necessarily surprising given a strong preference for Arabic education among Mourides. But the negative coefficient on Wolof is surprising in this respect, as is the lack of effect of the early peanut basin, which was the site of much French concern as

peanut production was intimately tied to the Metropole's economic interest in the region. Again, favoritism may have taken other forms, such as the distribution of agricultural inputs or the digging of wells.

## **What Drove Early Settlement Patterns?**

One potential concern with Tables 4.1 and 4.2 is that something unobserved drove early French settlement patterns that are unmeasured in these models. In order to better understand why the French established their administration where they did, Table 4.3 regresses a series of variables capturing geographic attributes of villages, many of which are included as controls in other models presented in this chapter, as well as their pre-colonial characteristics on subsequent French settlement.

Models 1 and 2 estimate the impact of geographic location, finding in both models with and without fixed effects that being within five kilometers of the coast increased the likelihood of French exposure. These coefficients suggest that being within five kilometers to the coastline increases the odds of pre-colonial French settlement by a factor of around two. Latitude is significant in Model 1, suggesting bias towards Western parts of the country, which is entirely unsurprisingly since the opposite would imply an advance from the East, or present day Mali. This effect disappears, again unsurprisingly, with the inclusion of fixed effects. Village elevation is not significant.

Models 3 and 4 estimate the impact of ecological zone to assess whether some areas were considered more habitable or desirable by early colonizers. The omitted category here is again Sudanian Forest, the dominant ecological zone of the country. These initial models suggest that

there is a positive effect to being located in the coastal mangrove areas or in Sahelian grassland, but their significance disappears in models with full geographical controls (M5-6) and the full models in M11-12 with the exception of mangroves, which remain significant in models without *cercle* fixed effects. There is a consistent, negative coefficient in these models on being located more deeply within the Ferlo desert, though this effect disappears in the full models in M5-6 and M11-12. In sum, the only constant effects of geographic variables are found in proximity to the coast and, less robustly and at the ten percent level, proximity to rivers. Being located in the west of the country or in mangrove areas located along the coast south of Dakar, is also consistently positive and significant in models without *cercle* fixed effects.

One of the central arguments of Huillery (2011) is that the French preferred to settle in more prosperous areas, which she measures using early estimates of population density. This set-up is mirrored in Models 7-8, but finds no effect. Models 9-10 estimate whether the French were more likely to settle in areas that were home to pre-colonial states, finding that they were less likely to do so in M9, though this effect disappears with the inclusion of fixed effects in M10. Conversely, the coefficient on whether a village was a capital or other key city in a pre-colonial state consistently takes on a positive and significant value in M9-12, reflecting the tendency of the French to establish forts and trading posts or appoint colonial officials as residents to these villages to monitor early intermediaries over whom the French were anxious to maintain a diplomatic and economic upper hand.

Together these models suggest that sites of early French settlement were largely driven by relative ease. Arriving by the coast, the French initially saw their colony as nothing more than “convenient bases for French naval power” (recall that the colony fell under the Ministry of the Navy until the creation of the Ministry of Colonies in the mid-1890s) (Cohen, 1971: 8). Where the French saw valuable intermediaries, such as those offered by leaders of the states

**TABLE 4.3: Selection Factors into French Settlement**

	<i>Geog. Location</i>		<i>Ecological zone</i>		<i>All Geog.</i>		<i>Pre-C Wealth</i>		<i>Pre-C Statehood</i>		<i>Full</i>	
	<b>M1</b>	<b>M2</b>	<b>M3</b>	<b>M4</b>	<b>M5</b>	<b>M6</b>	<b>M7</b>	<b>M8</b>	<b>M9</b>	<b>M10</b>	<b>M11</b>	<b>M12</b>
Coast 5km	2.34*** (0.69)	1.73*** (0.53)			2.09** (0.88)	1.63** (0.66)					1.84** (0.78)	1.38** (0.59)
River 5km	1.29* (0.67)	1.03 (0.63)			1.12* (0.60)	1.06* (0.63)					1.17** (0.54)	1.01 (0.66)
Latitude	0.53** (0.25)	0.87 (0.97)			0.64** (0.31)	0.50 (1.13)					0.79** (0.26)	0.57 (1.18)
Longitude	0.05 (0.39)	-0.16 (0.49)			0.02 (0.44)	0.18 (0.42)					-0.11 (0.42)	-0.23 (0.65)
Village	-0.03	-0.05			-0.03	-0.05					-0.03	-0.05
Elevation	(0.04)	(0.04)			(0.04)	(0.05)					(0.04)	(0.05)
Ferlo Desert		-0.97*** (0.29)	-0.75** (0.24)	-0.16 (0.45)	-0.09 (0.39)						-0.35 (0.43)	-0.09 (0.35)
Mangrove		3.09*** (0.43)	2.78*** (0.18)	1.66* (0.88)	0.51 (1.16)						1.62** (0.68)	0.47 (1.21)
Sahel		1.66** (0.55)	2.04*** (0.40)	0.03 (0.79)	0.41 (0.40)						-0.47 (0.92)	0.24 (0.53)
Grassland												
Rainforest/ Grassland		-0.01 (0.35)	-0.65** (0.21)	-0.63 (0.54)	-1.63** (0.63)						-0.66 (0.53)	-1.62** (0.65)
Pop Density 1900						-0.04 (0.04)	-0.3 (0.07)				-0.05 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.08)
Pre-C Capital								1.50** (0.63)	1.48** (0.65)	1.57** (0.61)	1.49** (0.64)	
Pre-C Centr. 20km								-0.91** (0.37)	0.18 (1.23)	-0.29 (0.78)	0.22 (1.53)	
Constant	-14.8 (7.39)	-16.8 (19.7)	-5.24 (0.43)	-4.36 (0.16)	-13.6 (9.81)	-7.02 (20.4)	-18.4 (8.84)	-17.6 (13.7)	-13.2 (9.13)	-20.6 (20.5)	-17.1 (8.11)	-13.3 (18.8)
Geog. Controls	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N
Cercle 1915 Fixed Effects	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Pseudo -R <sup>2</sup>	0.16	0.19	0.08	0.12	0.17	0.21	0.17	0.19	0.18	0.21	0.20	0.23
N	3278	2593	3283	2598	3278	2593	3278	2593	3278	2593	3278	2593

\*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.05, \*p < 0.1. Results of logit models with standard errors, clustered at the 1915 cercle, in parentheses. Models with geographic controls include: a village's elevation, its latitude and longitude and the logged distance to the nearest navigable waterway.

they found inhabiting their new territory, they employed them to better help them exercise economic and, subsequently, political control. There is no evidence in Table 4.3 to suggest however that the French actively favored certain conditions (such as a low-disease environment), or areas with greater economic potential. Mangroves, for example, are not lucrative for any of the key agricultural outputs that dominated French trade with the colony, such as gum arabic or groundnuts, but they are always located along the coastline.

## **Does Early Favoritism Shape Subsequent Investments?**

In her 2009 article, Huillery argues that because infrastructural investments, such as clinics and schools, are sticky, early colonial investments tend to produce persistent patterns of access over time. To evaluate whether early investments drive subsequent access, the last set of empirical analyses in this chapter evaluate the relationship between new teacher assignments, logged distances to services and the impact of early investments on student attendance in 2002. The central finding of this section is that there is evidence in favor of early ‘stickiness’ of

Figure 4.6 Linear Fit between Early Colonial and Subsequent Access to Health





Figure 4.7 Linear Fit between Early Colonial and Subsequent Access to Education



institutional investments, but that these have largely faded by the post-colonial era. Starting points may matter in the short-run, this suggests, but in the long-run only more proximate factors influence social service access.

To begin, this data is presented graphically in Figures 4.5 and 4.6 that show the line of fit between distances to the nearest health center and school, respectively in 1912 and the four other time points used this chapter. The relationship between early and later investments is strongest in health where a linear relationship is always suggested; Figure 4.5 showing a positive correlation across years. This opposite is seen with primary education in Figure 4.6, where there is a clear positive correlation in 1932, with a subsequent flattening of effect by 1952 in early and later access to schools.

A more robust estimation of this relationship is found in Table 4.4 Panel A, which estimates the impact on logged distance to the nearest social service in 1902 on the equivalent measure in following decades. This reveals a fading ability for early access to explain subsequent

**TABLE 4.4: Do Early Investments Drive Subsequent Ones?**

Panel A: Distances to Service Access					
	In Dist. Services 1912 (km)	In Dist. Services 1932 (km)	In Dist. Services 1952 (km)	In Dist. Services 1972 (km)	In Dist. Services 2002 (km)
ln D Social Services 1902	0.41*** (0.06)	0.25*** (0.03)	0.09** (0.03)	-0.06* (0.03)	-0.03 (0.02)
Constant	9.99 (1.92)	9.99 (1.92)	9.94 (4.69)	4.34 (10.6)	1.48 (7.06)
Geog. Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Pseudo -R <sup>2</sup>	0.11	0.03	0.04	0.08	0.07
N	3180	10761	10743	10627	14015
Panel B: New Teachers during the Colonial Era					
	New Teachers 1908-1928	New Teachers 1928-38	New Teachers 1938-48		
# Teachers	0.88*** (0.17)	0.15	0.55*** (0.06)	-0.96* (0.47)	0.66*** (0.13)
Baseline Yr					(0.57)
# Students		0.01** (0.00)		0.03** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Baseline Yr					
Constant	-0.17 (0.13)	-0.18 (0.11)	0.00 (0.06)	0.00 (0.08)	-0.09 (0.11) -0.15 (0.12)
Geog. Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
R <sup>2</sup>	0.35	0.42	0.67	0.76	0.85
N	3180	3180	10655	10655	10655

\*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.05, \*p < 0.1. Panel A: results of logit models with fixed effects at the 1915 cercle. Panel B: results of OLS regressions with fixed effects at the 1915 cercle. Standard errors, clustered at the 1915 cercle, are in parentheses. All models include the following geographic controls: a village's elevation, its latitude and longitude and the logged distance to the nearest navigable waterway.

distances to social services over time. Following Huillery (2009), Panel B estimates whether teachers were sent to the same schools rather than outwards to new areas during the colonial era. These models suggest that the number of teachers in a school in the baseline year is a positive predictor of new teacher assignment in the following decade(s), but once the number of students in the baseline year is controlled for, this effect all but disappears. These models certainly indicate that the French administration was reinforcing the quality of existing

infrastructure rather, perhaps, than investing in new ones, but it is not clear that this is not driven by the relative demand generated versus the ease of not having to build a new school versus favoritism of certain regions.

Finally, Table 4.5 evaluates how well these factors can explain the percent of the student-aged population enrolled in primary schools in 2002 at the rural community level. Both Panels A and B indicate a similar trend: early investment patterns have no meaningful relationship with subsequent levels of student attendance, while late-colonial and early post-colonial investments do. Models 4 and 5, for example, suggest that the addition of one school in a rural community in 1952 and 1972 increases current rates of student attendance by two and one percent respectively. Similarly, Models 8 indicates that the addition of teachers per school is positively correlated with contemporary student attendance; a one hundred percent increase in the number of teachers over this decade increases student attendance today by an average of three percent. Model 11 suggests that this might, in part, be driven by local interest - areas with greater increases in student attendance between 1938 and 1952, for example, have higher attendance today.

Together, these models reveal both what historical factors are important and which are not in Senegal's history. Early colonial agents and administrators were circumscribed in their ability to deliver services far beyond their own postings and it is in these first decades of French colonial rule that geography and pre-colonial characteristics seem to matter most in explaining where colonists and, by extension, services were directed. To the extent that this argument could suggest a story of long-term path dependencies from these early investments onwards

**TABLE 4.5: Effect of Colonial  
Investment on % Student Attendance, by  
Rural Community 2002**

Panel A: Presence of Historical Schools						
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	
Schools 1902	0.02 (0.03)					
Schools 1912		0.01 (0.02)				
Schools 1932			0.01 (0.01)			
Schools 1952				0.02** (0.01)		
Schools 1972					0.01** (0.00)	
Constant	-0.04 (0.43)	-0.04 (0.43)	-0.03 (0.43)	-0.03 (0.41)	-0.01 (0.46)	
Geog. Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	
Pseudo -R <sup>2</sup>	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.37	0.37	
N	316	316	316	316	316	
Panel B: Teachers and Student Enrollement						
	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11
% New Teachers 1908-28	-0.00 (0.02)					
% New Teachers 1928-38		-0.02 (0.03)				
% New Teachers 1938-52			0.03** (0.01)			
% New Students 1908-28				0.01 (0.03)		
% New Students 1928-38					-0.02 (0.02)	
% New Students 1938-52						0.08*** (0.01)
Constant	-0.05 (0.43)	-0.05 (0.44)	-0.03 (0.43)	-0.03 (0.44)	-0.04 (0.44)	-0.00 (0.42)
Geog. Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Pseudo -R <sup>2</sup>	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.37
N	316	316	316	316	316	316

\*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.05, \*p < 0.1. Results of logit models with fixed effects at the 1915 cercle. Standard errors, clustered at the 1915 cercle, are in parentheses. Models with geographic controls include: a village's elevation, its latitude and longitude and the logged distance to the nearest navigable waterway.

however, remarkably little evidence is found that early patterns of investment matter for long-term outcomes in rural communities (urban areas, of course, remain an exception). When

colonial investments do correlate with contemporary outcomes, it is only those that came in the late colonial era when the administration was firmly bureaucratized and capable of making more rational choices about where to best allocate services. This suggests that colonial exposure, particularly to schools, does improve outcomes but that this is neither driven by early French decisions nor the characteristics of the societies they found in place in the late eighteen hundreds.

## **Discussion: Taking Time Seriously**

Why have centralized areas been correlated with increased access to social services at some time points but not at others? And why are some factors stickier over time than others? This project can only partially respond to these questions. At base, the first contention of this chapter, that the local elite networks engendered by pre-colonial centralization matter sometimes but not always, nonetheless serves as a reminder that many of the political ‘consequences’ that we are interested in studying may have historical roots even if they are not immediately visible. Pre-colonial centralization has path dependent effects therefore, but its effects are not persistent over time. To date, only a handful of studies have looked at historically rooted causes whose effects only emerge decades, if not centuries, later. For Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) or Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), the full effects of formal and informal institutions respectively only appear much later than the root cause. Two recent studies have findings quite similar to those made by this project, though in dramatically different settings. Dippel (2014) finds that the impacts of forced centralization of different Native American tribes on reservations only negatively impacts a reservation’s economic

development following the shift to block grants by the United States' Federal government in the early 1990s. Similarly, Foa (2014) argues that experiences with centralized rule prior to Tsarist consolidation in Russia positively benefits the capacity of Russian districts, in particular to negotiate with the central state, but that this is only true *after* the fall of communism. These studies provide helpful, but sparse precedent for the claim that institutional differences emerged in the distant past but persisted unobserved until an exogenous institutional shock created the institutional space for them to exert an effect on the observable outcomes that we are interested in understanding.

What is suggested in the second set of contentions made with the data presented above is that we cannot clearly reduce this story to French investments or differential 'human capital' levels put forth by Huillery (2009) and others. There is no evidence that the French strategically targeted certain areas of the country over others in their early colonial efforts, but rather settled according to convenience. Once faced with the need to actually govern vast swaths of territory, early investments were largely driven by the various attitudes of local administrators, choosing to invest in areas over which they had the most oversight: their own settlements and areas in close proximity. When the French government was finally willing to commit to its colonies, social services expanded outward in an attempt to equalize services across the country, a project largely continued in the post-colonial period. This is not to deny the political aspirations that the late colonial and post-colonial state had vis-à-vis the countryside, but there is no evidence that this favoritism was systematically correlated with pre-colonial centralization or even early

French investments.<sup>159</sup> Past investments are sticky therefore, but in rural Senegal, they do not appear to be ‘stuck’. To suggest otherwise would be to ignore the efforts (at times perverse, at others valiant) of colonial and post-colonial governments to equalize access across the rural countryside.

## Conclusion

This chapter provides confirmation for the fundamental insight in recent studies that pre-colonial statehood correlates with improved contemporary development outcomes. At the same time, it has challenged the dominant understandings of how these subnational inequalities emerged and persisted over time. Centrally, it suggests that the informal institutions that lie at the heart of why scholars believe pre-colonial institutions shape development outcomes are critically dependent on the formal institutional arrangements they exist within. More concretely, by unpacking social service delivery over the one hundred and thirty years since the arrival of colonial rule, two distinct influences of pre-colonial centralization are observed: first it facilitated early French administrative needs for a short-time at the turn of the century and secondly, in decentralized Senegal by allowing local elites to decide on the placement of basic social services. This functionally results in a notable outcome in the present day, but that it is not the result of a uniform or uninterrupted process. These temporal differences call into question recent research that, by virtue of compressing history, makes theoretical claims that seem to bear little resemblance to what actually unfolded in Francophone West Africa.

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<sup>159</sup> Of course, in cases where early French settlements facilitated rapid economic growth thus that a village obtained ‘urban’ status, there is a strong correlation between French investments and post-colonial favoritism. This is not within the scope of this project however, which only focuses on rural areas.

Even if the mechanism proposed in this dissertation is to be contested, this chapter has demonstrated the value of taking temporal process seriously as emphasized by comparative historical analysis. Moreover, in the face of mounting evidence that important sub-national trajectories exist in developing countries and can be explained by the legacies of institutions, it is imperative that we take seriously how these processes actually worked themselves out over time. Scholars have been quick to highlight the need to disaggregate by type of public good (e.g. Posner and Kramon, 2013) or across countries (i.e. Franck and Rainer, 2012). This chapter suggests that we must also take seriously *who* is making these decisions and how these sights of decision-making change over time.

## Chapter 4 Appendix

TABLE 4.6: When Does Centralization Matter?

(Odds Ratios)

	1902	1912	1922	1932	1942	1952	1972	2002	2012
Pre-C Centr (20km)	4.57 (1.05)	2.41 (0.98)	3.83** (0.66)	1.85 (0.44)	1.04 (0.35)	1.53 (0.29)	1.03 (0.12)	1.22*** (0.06)	1.15** (0.05)
Pseudo -R <sup>2</sup>	0.05	0.03	0.07	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.03	0.04
N	3056	3252	3252	10921	10921	10921	10887	14362	14297

\*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.05, \*p < 0.1. Results of logit models with fixed effects at the 1915 cercle. Standard errors, clustered at the 1915 cercle, are in parentheses.

## **5. Local logics of public goods distribution: Evidence from Rural Senegal**

In Dakar, it is not uncommon to be told that politics are put aside for the sake of local development in rural areas of the country. This apolitical, ‘guise of local development’ in current discourse ignores these inherently interrelated questions, noted one development consultant, and no amount of inclusive participatory planning, he continued, could remove local politics from shaping development decisions.<sup>160</sup> The following two chapters support this contention: local development efforts are highly political and community interests are understood and aggregated in different ways even within a single community. This chapter argues that local government performance is driven by local political factors, developing understandings of the empirical patterns identified in Chapters Three and Four. The findings presented in this chapter help push forward the literature on democratic decentralization and the shift to local or ‘bottom-up’ development in sub-Saharan Africa, among the biggest institutional reforms implemented in the region since the third wave of democratization in the region, to focus attention away from the heretofore dominant focus on variation in ties to the central government (for example, Lambright, 2011) or the relative political weight of regional elites (Boone, 2003b) to theorize purely local dynamics in their own right.

By comparing the dynamics of local politics across rural Senegal, this chapter precises on the earlier assertion that pre-colonial political organization matters by developing a typology of how historically structured social ties both constrain and create opportunities for local political

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<sup>160</sup> Interview, Dakar, 19 January 2013.

mobilization today based on qualitative data that reveals stark differences in local political discourse. To do so, this chapter draws on qualitative and quantitative data from original, highly structured interview data of approximately 330 local elected officials and village chiefs from fifty-six local governments in rural Senegal conducted in 2013. This data confirm that social relations are understood differently across the country and that network ties are denser in areas that were home to pre-colonial states. It further suggests that the structure of social relations are strongly associated with how local politics are perceived, with particular emphasis on how differences in social ties shape individual assessments of equality of treatment and the development efforts of local governments. To the extent that historical settlement patterns shape how actors conceive of their local political loyalties, network composition is consequential because local elites act *towards* their networks and, by extension, distribute locally delivered public goods accordingly.

Pre-colonial centralization remains the central point of divergence in how local elites see their ties and allegiances to other elites. Areas that were home to cohesive, political entities prior to the arrival of the French colonial state continue to have communities with denser ties among elites.<sup>161</sup> This is expected to be a positive relationship: the more local elites in a community that share affective network ties - brothers, cousins, friends - increase the congruence between a set of influential and connected actors and local government borders. As a result, the government is expected to act more cohesively and be more developmental, on average. Conversely, in areas that were acephalous prior to colonization, elite networks remain

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<sup>161</sup> Here, density refers to more over-lapping ties with other local elites, such has the greater propensity to have family relations with other elites or being more likely to report having councilors or chiefs as friends.

splintered: a number of divided sets of local elites that increase competition for control over the local government and the resources that come with it.

So as not to ignore the significant population changes that parts of the country have experienced since the onset of colonial rule, this chapter further identifies two circumstances under which network ties inherited from the pre-colonial era have been destabilized: first, in many communities an exogenous shock, notably religious conversion, has radically transforming how individuals conceive of their network ties by changing the basis upon which individuals lay claim to the network. In the second, significant in-migration has created a proliferation of elite networks, with newcomers to the area creating new network layers upon old ones. These are often conflictual, though in a minority of cases newcomers have been successfully integrated.

## **Data Sources: Original Survey of Local Elites**

This chapter, as well as the next, employ qualitative and quantitate data drawn from an original survey conducted between February and July of 2013 with local elected officials and village chiefs across rural Senegal. In total, the survey covers fifty-six rural communities, spread out over fourteen *départements* in ten of Senegal's thirteen regions.<sup>162</sup> Survey sampling was conducted as follows: Senegal's forty-two *départements* were coded as having been largely centralized, non-centralized or a mix of both in the pre-colonial period. Following this, a set of fourteen zones was purposively chosen so as to obtain variation in type of pre-colonial political

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<sup>162</sup> Excluding the region of Dakar. The three local communities in the Region of Dakar were not treated as eligible in the sample because four rural communities were sought in each Department. Senegal's administrative hierarchy is structures as follows, from lowest to highest: rural community, *arrondissement*, *département*, region, central state. See Table 2.1.

order and to ensure spread across the country. Within each of these fourteen zones, one *département* was randomly selected. Subsequently, two *arrondissement* were chosen in each department and, in turn, two rural communities in each *arrondissement*, again randomly both times. Within each rural community, the Rural Council President (PCR) or, in two cases when the PCR was unavailable, his adjoint (the vice-PCR), was interviewed. In one community neither was available for interview. In many communities, the PCR and his two vice-PCRs control the vast majority of decision-making power and command substantial majorities within the rural council. In addition, an interview was conducted with one randomly chosen rural councilor.<sup>163</sup> Finally, in each community four randomly selected village chiefs were interviewed.<sup>164</sup> Either the author or a research assistant conducted all interviews.

The interview questionnaire asked respondents a range of questions about the history of their village and rural community, how they perceived their ties to it, the level of social service access, their evaluations of the economy and the local and central government and a range of personal details. Because the questions ranged from standardized to open-ended formats, the

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<sup>163</sup> A few communities sampled are currently under 'special delegations' as the result of administrative changes to the boundaries. Being under a special delegation is not correlated with pre-colonial levels of centralization, but does mean that the rural council is dissolved and a special committee of three individuals - appointed by the state - is put in place until the next cycle of local elections (due in Spring 2014). In this situation, only the President of the Special Delegation was interviewed as no councilors are in place. In four of the five communities where this is the case, the current President of the Special Delegation was the elected PCR in the 2009 elections. In general, councilors were chosen along the same randomization criteria as village chiefs, though in a few cases the community secretary identified councilors.

<sup>164</sup> Random sampling was done by assigning a number to each official village and randomly drawing four numbers. In the event that the chief was unavailable (due to illness, voyage or, at times, age), the next closest village was chosen. An exception to this was if a village had a 'delegated' chief, for example, a chief who works in Dakar may delegate a brother or nephew to fulfill duties while he is away. Research Assistants conducted all surveys in the language of the respondent's choice.

data is amenable to a qualitative and quantitative analysis. All relevant coding procedures are discussed when relevant. Material coming from the survey is supplemented with interview data with local development agents and the Sous-Prefets of almost all *arrondissements* of the sample. Interviews with academics, researchers and government officials in Dakar are also included when relevant. Because some interviewees expressed interest in remaining anonymous, all respondents are only identified by their position, geographical region and subject area of work and the date of the interview.

A map of *départements* where interviews were conducted can be found in Figure 5.1.

Figure 5.1 Department Case Selection



## **Local Elites**

This dissertation argues that local distributional politics are shaped by the relative congruence of local elite networks, a concept captured in the interview data presented here as local elected officials and village chiefs.<sup>165</sup> A few points discussed in Chapter One deserve re-emphasis here. First, most individuals obtain local elite status because of the families they are born into, which they can parlay into other forms of prestige later in life. Nearly eighty-eight percent of village chiefs, for example, were related to their predecessors. Such accumulation of different forms of elite status or prestige is common in the region because such multi-dimensional forms of social status rest on local community recognition and hence the plasticity of locally defined symbolic resources. Secondly, social status is by and large durable over time both within families and over an individual's lifespan. Finally, the proliferation of administrative units post-independence has rarely eliminated elite status, if anything such changes created new layers and opportunities for individuals to claim or reinforce their elite status (such as the creation of local elected positions). Although the position of *chef de canton* was abolished at independence (as was its successor *chef d'arrondissement* with decentralization), village chieftaincies persist to the current day largely untouched by history.<sup>166</sup> As the lowest level of the deconcentrated state, Senegal's decentralized governance structure gives an important, official


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<sup>165</sup> In many communities, the local imam or religious leaders (marabouts, or religious guides, for example) and notables would constitute the elites in any given community. Because these groups are less consistently involved in decisions about local goods placements and are harder to identify from afar, this project focuses on village chiefs and elected officials. In some cases, these roles overlap (a village chief is occasionally the village imam for example, and councilors are often notables). It is quite rare, however, to see imams engaged in local politics and many respondents dismiss their role ('he is only at home praying') in local government decisions or cleavages. Villages often have a second lineage from which the village Imam is chosen, often a family that was an early inhabitant of the village (see discussion in Juul, 2006).

<sup>166</sup> The same is true of other lineage-based elite status, such as caste or the village imam.


administrative role to village chiefs.<sup>167</sup> In principle, village chiefs should not serve as councilors though in some cases they do run and are elected. Seventeen respondents in this paper's sample serve both roles, for example. As mentioned earlier, chiefs serve on the rural community land commissions and legally need to be consulted in any and all land transactions (though they themselves have no voting power).

To illustrate the contention in this chapter that there are sub-national differences in the density of elite ties, Figures 5.2 and 5.3 show difference of means tests for all respondents in their reported affective ties to other elites between areas that were home to a pre-colonial state versus uncentralized areas. Respondents in centralized areas are significantly more likely to report at least one family tie to other elites, have a village chief in their immediate family and,



<sup>167</sup> Though village chiefs, an official position in the administrative hierarchy, are by law stipulated to be elected, village chieftaincies are almost exclusively passed in the male lineage in West Africa, a title transmitted either father to son or to the oldest male in the family.

Figure 5.3 Difference of Means in Elite Ties by Pre-Colonial Centralization



at the ninety percent confidence level have an elected official in their immediate family.<sup>168</sup>

Likewise, Figure 5.2 further shows that pre-colonial centralization increases the likelihood that a respondent reports having a local elected official as a friend. There is no difference in extended family ties or in ties to possible channels for central-state resources with central state functionaries or deputies in the national assembly as seen in Figure 5.3.

## Political Landscapes Across Rural Senegal: Continuity and Transformations

This chapter argues that social networks matter for local distributional politics because they orient local political action in three ways: (i) they define who is listened to and who is elected, (ii) they influence the discourse around and conceptualization of local political cleavages and (iii) in combination, they shape whose demands before the local government are prioritized.

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<sup>168</sup> Immediate family is defined here to include direct cousins, uncles, or compound members. Extended family codes respondents who refer vaguely to 'relatives' on the council or who make the explicit clarification that these are distant ties.

First, they shape who is listened to. Across the country, respondents noted that a person's origins determined how much influence a person had. "If you are from a respected family, then each time you speak you are listened to," one village chief summed up.<sup>169</sup> Many respondents who made the claim that 'voices are heard equally' also noted that most people in their rural communities shared extended family ties.<sup>170</sup> This reflects a tendency for voice to depend on autochthony claims or other forms of in-network claims to social status. "We try to respect everyone in the rural community, but in each village some people have more say than others," one councilor confided, specifying that the social status of some local elites gave them priority.<sup>171</sup> Many elected officials cited their origins in the community as the reason they had run in the first place, frequently referring vaguely to 'having the qualities to run,' which in many cases was subtext for coming from an elite family or a high social caste, which implied that they were worthy of being heard.<sup>172</sup>

Relatedly, elite networks influence who is elected. People vote *en bloc* because a candidate is locally popular or from a 'good family.'<sup>173</sup> This can have detrimental effects. Rather

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<sup>169</sup> Interview, village chief #3, rural community #10, 23 April 2013.

Of course, this almost exclusively applies to males, although in many cases women from respected families gain influential positions in their communities as well (such as heading a local women's organization).

<sup>170</sup> The PCR of rural community #3, for example, stated that he ran for office because the population asked him to and that the reason behind their choice was that he was born in the area and people had confidence in him because of his ties to the community (Interview, 11 May 2013).

<sup>171</sup> Interview, councilor, rural community #45, 14 May 2013.

<sup>172</sup> To quote the PCR of rural community #20, "if you know that you have the qualities to be elected in the locality, you should not let others rule everything if you know that they cannot do better than you," referencing both his caste (his family were notables) and historical ties to the community (Interview, 7 March 2013).

<sup>173</sup> Interview, Law Professor, UCAD, 19 October 2012.

Support for this idea is also found in the frequent invocation among local elected officials that they ran for office because of who their family was. "I saw the needs of my village and not just anyone can be

than choosing the best-educated councilors to represent them, people vote based on personal ties, noted one Sous-Prefet in the southeast of the country. Specifically, people feel obligated to vote for people with whom they have a personal relationship, a relative or an acquaintance who has lent them money or helped them resolve a personal matter in the past. There are no ‘politics of conviction’ in rural Senegal, he concluded.<sup>174</sup> One rural development agent with years of experience working with local councils, observed that many elites he had met did not even seem interested in local policies, but ran because they thought they, as holders of elite social positions, ought to. They think they are the local authorities’ and hence should run because they deserve it, he observed. They are “elected by default.”<sup>175</sup> Indeed, interviewees in both Dakar and in the regions repeatedly observed that local elections are not about policies or parties, but about purely local sensibilities.

Secondly, social ties matter because they structure the local political discourse and how political cleavages are conceptualized. When local elites repeatedly mention that local politics are harmonious because ‘everyone is family’ or ‘unfortunately here we have [only] party politics,’ they not only offer their reflection on the nature of local political life but also reinforce the value of these categories at the same time. Comments such as those by one village chief in the east of the country, “here politics takes a single form: it’s the interest of the elected officials and their party,” both reflect and reinforce alienation from political life.<sup>176</sup> Such alienation is most

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councilor and it was my father who created our village,” said one councilor, asserting his right via his father to represent the village (Interview, rural community #13, 1 April 2013).

<sup>174</sup> Interview, Sous-Prefet, Kedougou Department, 16 April 2013

<sup>175</sup> Interview, Chef de CADL, Goudiry Department 27 March 2013

<sup>176</sup> Interview, village chief #1, Rural Community #38, 22 March 2013.

profound when the respondent is not part of the network on which political cleavages are structured (party identification in the above example). Conversely, when respondents invoked a sense of shared identity or cohesion across the local government, they did so with pride and recognition that this was helping their communities develop. “We have different political parties, but we live in conviviality. We are almost all related,” explained one councilor.<sup>177</sup> Relative congruence between formal, government boundaries and informal networks is consistently noted as a positive attribute for local political harmony and a well-functioning rural community.<sup>178</sup>

Finally, social networks matter because they change whom local elites see as deserving of goods. This is well illustrated in the example of rural community #29, where interviews with councilors, the PCR and some village chiefs presented the image of a well-connected and inclusive local government. One village chief proudly asserted that every village has a councilor who represents them in local government and the PCR claimed that all local elites, village chiefs included, worked together to make decisions in the community explicitly because everyone knew each other and shared descent from the region’s founders.<sup>179</sup> Yet chiefs of villages founded more recently, hence ‘outsiders’ to the community, repeatedly called attention to favoritism towards autochthons and lamented their lack of representation. In the eyes of the local, autochthonous elites, the rural community was representative of ‘everyone’ as understood as descendants of founding members of the community. Their understanding of community was not defined by

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<sup>177</sup> Interview, rural community #3, 11 May 2013.

<sup>178</sup> For example, in a region of Kebemer with heavy Mouride influence one Adjoint Sous-Prefet noted that ‘there are no problems between groups here’, referring to ethnic or partisan competition, because the population was eighty to ninety percent Mouride. The existence of such crosscutting cleavages attenuated conflict and provided a unifying network (Interview, 4 March 2013).

<sup>179</sup> Interview, village chief #3 (14 February 2013) and PCR (13 February 2013).

who actually fell within their borders, but by more diffuse understandings of social relations and historical claims to the land.

Of course, this is often quite undemocratic. At a fundamental level, this frequently takes the form of who even obtains the status of an official village. The value for a new settlement or hamlet in obtaining official status is both material and symbolic: this status offers residents of hamlets ‘their part’ of projects and aid, which is otherwise biased towards official villages (see also Juul, 1999).<sup>180</sup> On the symbolic side, only villages have chiefs and “this role of traditional head of a lineage reproduces a social, not individual identity, with obligations and rights attached” writes Juul in reference to the seeking of official village status among Futanke immigrants in central Senegal (1999: 211-12). The ease of obtaining official village status for a hamlet varies, though in principle any hamlet could appeal a denial by the part of the rural community to the central state. In eastern and southern Senegal, historically acephalous or weakly centralized areas, many bemoaned the tendency of intra-village feuds and in-migration to lead to a rapid proliferation of villages, which obtained official status with ease.<sup>181</sup> “Oh just anyone can create a village here,” said one local development agent in Tambacounda Region, citing a lack of ties between village chiefs and ethnic groups that had led to a rapid growth of small villages that were hard to serve.<sup>182</sup> Notably less village creation has taken place in areas

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<sup>180</sup> Interview, community secretary, rural community #15, 2 April 2013.

<sup>181</sup> One Adjoint Sous-Prefet noted that disagreements that led to new villages in the region would never escalate the same way elsewhere, recalling an example from time he had spent in Podor department, home of the Fouta Toro state, where a serious disagreement between two descendants of a family over who should be chief provoked such ire that the Sous-Prefet was removed. Yet at no point was creating two villages seen as a solution the way it does in Tambacounda (interview, Tambacounda Department, 22 March 2013).

<sup>182</sup> Interview, CADL agent, Goudiry Department, 27 March 2013.

that were home to centralized states, were in-migrants tend to be integrated into specific quarters of existing villages or to settle in hamlets on the periphery.<sup>183</sup> This can be quite contentious; with some community secretaries suggesting that appeals for official recognition and their subsequent denial by local elites had created tense political situations in the past.<sup>184</sup> Indeed, approximately eighty-three percent of villages in areas that were home to pre-colonial states are listed in the 1958 village repertoire produced by the French colonial state versus only sixty-five percent in areas that were uncentralized.

If local governments are home to various configurations of elite networks and if these networks prioritize distribution along some dimensions more than others by virtue of who they see as ‘community’ members, then a systematic explanation for differences in network composition should help explain variation in individual experiences with their local governments and public goods outcomes. These three factors, voice, understandings of local social cleavages and perceptions of who is deserving of community goods and recognition, form the basis of the typology developed here. Rooted in pre-colonial political organization and the historical settlement patterns this engendered, these three factors are both created and reinforced by social structure in rural communities. If a dominant elite network exists and is, broadly speaking, congruent with the local government boundaries, then communities generate sub-

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<sup>183</sup> Two exceptions to this within the sample are the present day areas of Saloum (Kaolack region) and the Djoloff (Linguere Department), which have seen substantial in-migration. These are discussed as specific cases below.

<sup>184</sup> For example, Interview, community secretary, rural communities #28 (12 February 2013) and #21 (1 March 2013).

national identities that induce local elites to behave developmentally for the community as a whole.

Specifically, demands for goods on the part of villages are hard for local leaders to ignore because the overlap of political and elite ties creates powerful incentives to provide goods fairly and broadly to network members *and* their incentives line up with the population of the rural community as a whole. If, conversely, at the local level elite networks are fragmented, creating numerous social networks based on ethnic, caste or partisan lines, then elites will favor their

**TABLE 5.1: Different Local Political Configurations**

	<b>Unchallenged</b>	<b>Challenged</b>
<b>Centralized</b>	<p>1) Network Congruence; a dominant network, based on pre-colonial membership, creates a territorially extended, inclusive identity that the majority of elites can lay claim to  <i>Examples:</i> Cayor, Sine, Fouta Toro</p>	<p>3) Networks Proliferation; In migration multiplies social networks  3a: Centralized Areas: may amplify divisions but less likely to create deep cleavages if immigrant's do not dominate because pre-existing networks 'adopted' or incorporated them.  <i>Examples:</i> Saloum and the peanut basin, Peuhl Migrants in Djoloff</p>
<b>Acephalous</b>	<p>2) Continued Network  <u>Fragmentation</u>; pre-colonial fragmentation leads to weak community cohesion today, exclusive identities may form around partisanship, clans, or ethnicity and, for the most part, these divisions are expected to be durable over time.  <i>Examples:</i> Casamance, Kedougou, parts of Dagana.</p>	<p>3b: Acephalous Areas: amplifies divisions within the local community; such areas are often home to the most entrenched divisions and conflicts.  <i>Examples:</i> ethnicity, caste or newcomer status (Tambacounda, Kolda regions); religion and ethnicity (<i>terres neuves</i>)</p>

own clients when in power and development outcomes will be worse in the aggregate because exclusive identities predominate.

The relative cohesiveness of a communities' social network is expected to be a function of (a) the initial, pre-colonial presence of a unifying socio-political identity and, subsequently, (b) whether or not the area saw a diversification of social networks due to in-migration in the colonial or post-colonial period. As Table 5.1 illustrates, four outcomes are identified, shaped initially by a region's starting, pre-colonial network stock. These four, stylized outcomes are elaborated in depth below, drawing on qualitative data from in-depth interviews with local elites and relevant local authorities across rural Senegal.

Three mechanisms, introduced in Chapter One, emerge from the qualitative data as candidate mechanisms. Though not expected to be an exclusive list, these three factors, mutually-reinforcing and overlapping, can help explain why network ties induce elites to forgo short-term predatory behavior and work for the development of their communities. First, throughout the country, local elites make reference to their vertical ties to their communities and their role as a 'representative' or patron. Voicing a common complaint that the central state did not transfer the necessary means for rural communities to meet all citizen demands, a PCR in Kolda region wryly commented: "of course the state doesn't care because they are far from the population. At the local level we are always seen - at baptisms, at weddings, at the market ..."<sup>185</sup> Throughout interviews, local elites commented similarly, linking their desire to maintain their social status and reputation by meeting, as best they could, the many

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<sup>185</sup> Interview, rural community #42, 11 April 2013.

solicitations for help, in all their material and non-material dimensions, that citizens made on a daily basis.

Though rural Senegalese may be skeptical of the ability of their rural council to meaningfully transform their lives, they certainly understand that their local representatives were patrons that they held sway over by virtue of their electoral approval or disapproval. This was not lost on politicians, whose most frequent response, when asked if they were going to run for re-election in the 2014 local elections, was that it depended on ‘the will of the people.’ A revealing comment to this effect was made by a councilor in Louga region: “there are three kinds of politicians in the locality: those who are there for their own interests, those who are there for their population [i.e. village], and those who are there for the love of the community. The citizens know how to make the distinction.”<sup>186</sup>

The frequency with which local elites relied on the argument that “we are in democracy now” reflects the perceived need to appeal to villagers by elected officials and village chiefs alike. Not everyone pays taxes in the village, one chief in Fatick region explained, “but we don’t enforce it because we are in democracy now.”<sup>187</sup> Forcing citizens to pay was unpopular not only for elected officials, but for village chiefs tasked with the job as well. Almost all village chiefs included in their list of responsibilities the need to represent their village before the administration and help them resolve problems and the sense that their behavior was closely monitored was apparent. Village chiefs also highlighted that they needed to be fair and honest so as not to lose the villagers’ respect. Elected and state officials consider chiefs to be quite

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<sup>186</sup> Interview, rural community #20, 8 March 2013.

<sup>187</sup> Interview, village chief #2, rural community #2, 6 May 2013.

interested in the development of their villages and valuable allies for the state. The confidence that villagers place in them may be in part informed by their hereditary claim to authority, one community secretary observed, but they want to be perceived as smart and well-respected because they want a good legacy.<sup>188</sup>

Elites are not only concerned about maintaining their vertical status with clients however, but also want to preserve their reputations before each other.<sup>189</sup> The same PCR in Kolda, cited above, stated that he had to be careful with critiquing other elected councilors out of fear of making enemies with economically and politically powerful individuals.<sup>190</sup> When asked about how local electoral lists were made, another PCR was quick to clarify that a person in his position (as a local party leader) had to be careful to put individuals from a large number of families on the list or risk being seen as biased or unfair.<sup>191</sup> The political strategy of one PCR was to “keep the interests of the local leaders first,” assuring him their support in future elections at the same time that it spread goods and favors throughout the community.<sup>192</sup> By so redistributing to network members, the PCR clearly understood that this fulfilled local expectations and ensured his own reputation as a good ally for other elites.

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<sup>188</sup> Interview, rural community #40, 18 March 2013.

<sup>189</sup> The desire among elites not to violate local social norms with other elites does not mean that there is no political disagreement within rural communities. Across the country numerous stories were told about fights within council meetings. What is crucial however is the perceived distinction between normal political disagreement and breaching local social protocol. When serious problems arise, many reported addressing them privately. If a village chief is not playing his role correctly, a PCR in the South commented, it is discussed privately because of the costs of a public sanction to both parties (Interview, rural community #35, 2 July 2013).

<sup>190</sup> Interview, rural community #42, 11 April 2013. ‘Some of them are politically very strong and can mobilize money and people well’

<sup>191</sup> Interview, rural community #27, 20 June 2013.

<sup>192</sup> Interview, rural community #52, 1 May 2013.

The desire to maintain good, horizontal relations is also cited as directly shaping elite behavior. Take, for example, the eagerness of PCRs to point out, often following a lament about a lack of interest on the part of some councilors, that they can reprimand any councilor who misses three meetings in a row. “We don’t do it,” said a PCR in the former Saloum, “because it’s not good for social cohesion.”<sup>193</sup> Another said that he spoke privately to councilors whose actions he deemed unacceptable, telling them that their behavior was not good for their reputation and future.<sup>194</sup> Many local councils had started rewarding village chiefs who collected all (or most) of their local taxes, presenting them with medals and certificates at council meetings out of an attempt to associate the prestige of being a ‘good chief’ with fulfilling this function; “we positively sanction,” said a PCR of this strategy, noting its success in his community.<sup>195</sup> Others were more forthright about the balance. “You can sanction the act, but not the person,” observed one PCR, continuing that if a chief tried to build something, such as a school or granary, without passing by the rural council, the council could reject their request to grant the land parcel. “So we sanction indirectly,” he concluded.<sup>196</sup> Though strongest within network, the interplay of elites’ need to maintain vertical and horizontal reputations can lead them to value maintaining their status across elite networks as well. In one community with tense relations between the chef-lieu and the other villages, the PCR noted that he had not sanctioned the councilors from the chef-lieu who had stopped attending because he prioritized social peace. He

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<sup>193</sup> The same PCR extended this logic to village chiefs, noting that in principle they could report chiefs that do not fairly distribute central government provided seeds and fertilizer to the Sous-Prefet, but that they do not dare to do so. Interview, rural community #11, 24 April 2013.

<sup>194</sup> Interview, rural community #13, 16 April 2013.

<sup>195</sup> Interview, rural community #49, 29 April 2013.

<sup>196</sup> Interview, rural community #23, 5 March 2013.

then quickly added that the chef-lieu was very important in the area, intimating the cost he himself would incur if he grossly violated the delicate balance he was trying to establish with them.<sup>197</sup>

Finally, elites may be motivated by the mobilizing effects of the group identities generated by their participation in their networks. Research has highlighted the tendency of individuals to identify with groups and the ability of group membership to alter preferences. Throughout interviews individuals did just this - laying claim to varying configurations of group identities as important reason for their political actions. Respondents in areas home to centralized states most frequently invoked broad identities that were presented as coterminous with rural community boundaries. When asked about relations with other villages, one councilor simply responded dismissively “we are all *ceddos*,” referring to the warrior slave caste that was influential in pre-colonial Wolof and Sereer kingdoms in the region.<sup>198</sup> Another said that there was no conflict in the community because here “we are a single family.” Even though he had not reported family relations within the local government, he was the chief of a village that dated (proudly) to the pre-colonial era.<sup>199</sup> “The collective work is better” under democratic decentralization, one chief observed, directly calling on a sense of a common mission that he took as a given, despite its absence in many other parts of the country.<sup>200</sup>

This is not to say that no sense of collective identity emerged during interviews in acephalous areas of the country, merely that in these areas, collective identities were exclusive,

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<sup>197</sup> Interview, rural community #15, 5 April 2013.

<sup>198</sup> Interview, councilor, rural community #45, 14 May 2013.

<sup>199</sup> Interview, village chief, rural community #47, 15 May 2013.

<sup>200</sup> Interview, village chief, rural community #4, 7 May 2013.

encompassing only part of the rural community's population. Respondents could clarify in great depth these lines of demarcation: one village chief provided a long-list of all of the villages that he perceived as particularly advantaged in the rural community by virtue of their shared past and ability to mobilize and dominate local politics.<sup>201</sup> Alternatively, minority ethnicities spoke of themselves as victims by virtue of their collective minority status (for example, one Peulh councilor noted 'the Wolofs [are more powerful] because the notables are from that ethnicity').<sup>202</sup> In some areas strong network ties among local elites in a handful of villages that were key economic and political centers for pre-colonial states that had collapsed in the century before the French arrival dominated local politics. In such areas, it was quickly noted (by in and out-group members alike) that these villages were quick to exert their perceived, superior legitimacy that they felt their collective identities gave them. This created conflict as they thought that this should give them more say in their rural communities than other villages, relying on their shared identity to create a locally-defined and highly motivated coalition for demanding representation and goods.<sup>203</sup>

### Network congruence

Numerous scholars have identified positive developmental impacts in sub-national regions that were home to pre-colonial states around the world. The evidence presented in this section suggests that one unappreciated feature of areas that fit this criteria is that pre-colonial

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<sup>201</sup> Interview, village chief #2, rural community #41, 6 March 2013.

<sup>202</sup> Interview, rural community #39, 19 March 2013.

<sup>203</sup> For example, community secretaries in rural communities #32 and #40 spoke at length about this (20 February 2013, 18 March 2013).

statehood created more cohesive political, economic and social ties among local elites, the vast majority of which are rooted in their shared past in the pre-colonial era. Because French authorities were quick to identify intermediaries in these areas, the continuation of pre-existing bureaucratic structures provided a buffer for these socio-political structures during the early years of colonial upheaval. Consequently, the coherence between local government boundaries and an elite network based in autochthonous elites have allowed elites to fend off challenges to their dominance over local social and political space since French colonization. Today, these areas almost always invoke a territorially extensive identity as a result - speaking of their community as a naturally cohesive whole, rooted in a pre-colonial identity, strong kinship bonds or other unifying ties.

#### *Local Political Discourse: Political Cleavages & Local Power-holders*

The dominant discourse surrounding local politics in these regions of the country is one of social harmony and a shared commitment to development. Reflective of the increased likelihood of respondents having an immediate family or other affective tie to village chiefs and elected officials in their communities, respondents in regions that were home to pre-colonial states were much more likely to make claims of social cohesion and, more crucially, to explicitly cite these relations as a reason behind various features of local government performance. Many respondents in Podor Department scoffed when asked to enumerate other local elites they were related to, responding simply that ‘we are all family here.’ In Fatick region, home to the Sereer state of Sine, respondents were particularly proud of these family ties, noting that these relations prevented political conflict or divisions between Muslims and Christians. “For us in

[rural community #3] our politics is limited to trying to solve our problems ... we all know each other and that is why nobody dares create political conflicts," explained one village chief.<sup>204</sup> This idea was reinforced by many local elites, political 'colorings' or divisions were repeatedly suggested to be at odds with the historical ties that bound villages together. As a result, "we put the common interest before politics here".<sup>205</sup>

Crucially, these areas were also more likely to make autochthony claims to belonging in the community. Local elites get along despite partisan, religious or even ethnic divisions because most people are from the same family or are 'in their ancestral villages,' observed one elected official.<sup>206</sup> Throughout areas that had been home to the Cayor Empire the PCR was frequently referred to as the *bour*, the pre-colonial title for 'king.' More concretely, over seventy percent of villages in the sample from such areas date to the pre-colonial era and only four village chiefs had not inherited their position from their family line, equivalent to 0.04% of respondents in such areas.<sup>207</sup>

This is not to ignore, of course, political disagreements, which certainly exist throughout the country. "Everyone wants to be chief," one Sous-Prefet observed in the north of the country, but unlike as will be shown elsewhere, what was unique about such areas is that no one ever observed that these conflicts were capable of reaching a point where they impeded the work of

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<sup>204</sup> Interview, village chief #1, rural community #3, 10 May 2013

<sup>205</sup> Interview, councilor, rural community #48, 16 May 2013.

<sup>206</sup> Interview, PCR, rural community #54, 4 May 2013.

<sup>207</sup> Compare this with 57.2% of villages in fragmented areas and thirty-six percent of villages in areas with network proliferation dating to the pre-colonial era. Thirty-six percent of village chiefs in fragmented areas had no family relationship with their predecessor as did ten percent in areas with network proliferation.

the local government.<sup>208</sup> Elected officials in historically centralized areas spoke of this as a balancing act rather than a battle: we have to gain party militants to win, said one PCR in Thies region, but this cannot be allowed to escalate because we ‘are all kin.’<sup>209</sup> In Fouta, in the North, where social hierarchies are among the most rigid in the country, the recognition that historical alliances and factions among the various clans and sub-clans populating the region for centuries was a point of concern for local administrators. This is the only region where village chiefs were consistently not allowed to run for councilor, which, though technically illegal, was a not uncommon practice elsewhere in the country.<sup>210</sup> Political conflict in Fouta, one councilor informed us, “was [previously] always linked to [family/clan] alliances” because people wanted to control the political sphere and politicians were ultimately only faithful to their family or clan. But, he added later, while traditional authorities, like chiefs, could keep all the grudges they wanted, this was simply not viable for elected officials who have to work for everyone because they represent *all* villages. And, after all, he continued “here we are all related.”<sup>211</sup>

### *Local Politics of Redistribution*

What consequences did respondents see these denser social ties as having for local politics? Centrally, they were cited as helping prevent deadlock from local political competition and by enabling the local council to find agreement.<sup>212</sup> These patterns were not only evoked by local

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<sup>208</sup> Interview, Podor Department, 12 February 2013.

<sup>209</sup> Interview, rural community #47, 31 May 2015.

<sup>210</sup> Interview, community secretary, rural community #29, 3 March 2013.

<sup>211</sup> Interview, rural community #28, 12 February 2013.

<sup>212</sup> For example, this prevents ‘squabbles’ with opposition party members from escalating (Interview, community secretary, rural community #3, 10 May 2013), and keeps politicians from conflating personal and political desires (Interview, PCR, rural community #19, 6 March 2013).

elites, even central state officials posted in these areas noted that social ties led these communities to find ‘amiable solutions’ more often than not. As one Sous-Prefet observed, “no one wants to send their relatives to the Sous-Prefet or the police.”<sup>213</sup> Of course, politicians desire to stay in power and to do so, as elsewhere in the country, cited delivering goods as the way to do this. Yet this is the only region where politicians proudly claimed to help those who had not voted for them. One PCR in Fatick region reported that the first thing he did once elected was to help a village that did not vote for him because local politics is not about parties but about the ability to form alliances (‘there are too many personalities in these villages’) and these do not always manifest electorally.<sup>214</sup>

These connections also seem to improve the flow of information between local elites. Many village chiefs in these areas could clearly explain how things did or should work in the local government; this is especially the case for chiefs of larger villages who are often the most involved. When asked what he would do if his villagers demanded improved access to health care, one village chief smartly replied: “the villages do not do that. During the [rural council] meetings they discuss where they should build a new health hut.”<sup>215</sup> Some political leaders in these areas happily reported that they made electoral lists thus that representation should be

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<sup>213</sup> Interview, Sous-Prefet Kaolack Region, 3 May 2013.

<sup>214</sup> Interview, PCR, rural community #4, 28 May 2013.

PCRs reported that they generally knew who would vote for them and that this did not change much. This helps them target villages to visit, implying that they are more likely to target swing voters. “If they vote for you once,” one PCR stated quite firmly, “they usually stay with you” (Interview, PCR, rural community #21, 20 June 2013).

<sup>215</sup> Interview, village chief #4, rural community #21, 1 March 2013.

geographically balanced across the community, weighting, of course, by population.<sup>216</sup> More generally, village chiefs reported frequent contact with councilors in the area, to discuss both personal and political issues. Many village chiefs pointed out how close the councilor from their village lived to them (“there is he is!” shouted one mid-interview, waving his neighbor over for an introduction) and reported that councilors from their village (or immediately neighboring ones) informed them of what happened in the rural council.<sup>217</sup> Together, these factors led village chiefs to report strong relations with their local governments (“they are very accessible and they help us all the time”), often speaking of them with pride.<sup>218</sup>

This is not, of course, meant to skate over the complaints of some village chiefs about perceived inequality in these communities. What sets these areas apart however is that inequality claims are predominately made on an ad-hoc basis, rather than being rooted in perceptions of systematic favoritism to co-ethnics, co-partisans, etc. Take the example of two village chiefs in Podor department who argued that their rural community took sides and did not treat them fairly. In the first case, the village had been founded sixty years prior by Peulhs (the dominant ethnic group in the region) from the other side of the Senegal River in

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<sup>216</sup> Interview, PCR, rural community #31, 22 July 2013. This or similar practices were also reported in rural communities #45, #48. Of course, smaller villages were quick to note that they did not have a councilor and to claim that this led them to be less well represented. But such complaints were often said with full recognition that it was their size that mattered in this, not any political or social bias. One community secretary noted that while villages with councilors were more likely to be favored, it was hard to tell what the true cause was because these were also just much larger villages. Nonetheless, he concluded, the council works hard to ensure that all villages receive something (Interview, community secretary, rural community #10, 23 April 2013).

<sup>217</sup> Interview, village chief #1, rural community #45, 14 May 2013).

<sup>218</sup> Interview, village chief #2, rural community #20, 7 March 2013; Interview, village chief #1, rural community #20, 7 March 2013.

Mauritania. The chief argued that they had never received anything from the local government, and indicated that they never would because they would always be considered outsiders.<sup>219</sup> Similarly, another village chief, whose family was Wolof and had migrated to the area in the late 1880s, cited discrimination by their autochthonous neighbors. His village, which had only become officially recognized fifty year prior, had been doted with a health hut and a primary school, but an on-going dispute over land within the community led him to conclude that while the idea of local governance was good, his local government “took sides too often.”<sup>220</sup> Once again, the sense of exclusion came from being an ‘outsider,’ whose claims were taken less seriously because of this status (although, of course, both villages had been founded prior to Senegal even becoming an independent state). “Decentralization is a bad system,” another village chief with no social ties to his community said, “because it favors the politics or the strongest of those with family relations in the council.” Once again, this village had a primary school and water spigots in the village provided by the local government, but the sense of exclusion was strong because the chief was an out-group member.<sup>221</sup> These villages could not fairly claim that they never received goods from the rural council, but they felt less included in an abstract, representative sense because they lacked ties to dominant factions.

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<sup>219</sup> Interview, village chief # 1, rural community #29, 13 February 2013).

In this case, the village was casted which most likely amplifies their exclusion. Yet Podor Department is filled with casted populations, most of who live within larger villages. While much criticism has been fairly made about the caste system in Fouta, respondents in these areas were quick to note the redistribute system within the community that ensured land and public goods access to casted community members (Interview, PCR, rural community #31, 22 July 2013). The key difference with the village chief mention above seem stop be whether or not one is considered an ‘original’ inhabitant.

<sup>220</sup> Interview, village chief #2, rural community # 20, 7 March 2013.

<sup>221</sup> Interview, village chief #4, rural community #4, 7 May 2013.

In villages with ties to dominant elite networks but who had not received much from their local government, respondents were much more likely to justify this inaction. Noting that his local government didn't do anything for him or anyone else really, one village chief was quick to defend that "they don't interfere either. If I go there with a problem they are patient towards me and are very attentive."<sup>222</sup> Other chiefs speculated that they might get more if they had a councilor in their village, but that they never get one because their villages are too small to get someone a place on the party lists<sup>223</sup> or, more simply, that their villages have been diminished in size and statute and hence 'we aren't considered much anymore.'<sup>224</sup> Excuse making such as this is a sharp contrast to chiefs in equally small villages elsewhere, who never made such justifications for why they were relatively (at least in their view) underserved.

### Network Fragmentation

In areas that never had cohesive socio-political networks to begin with, social and political life largely continues unchanged with *continued network fragmentation*. Despite French efforts to create over-arching authorities during the colonial era, primarily via the *chef de canton*, this largely failed to penetrate or alter local social networks. The classic example of a fragmented, acephalous area in Senegal is the Lower Casamance (modern day Ziguinchor region), cited by numerous studies as an area with no indigenous political hierarchy (Beck, 2008;

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<sup>222</sup> Interview, village chief #3, rural community #20, 7 March 2013.

<sup>223</sup> Interview, village chief #4, rural community #48, 16 May 2013.

<sup>224</sup> Interview, village chief #3, rural community #47, 15 May 2013.

In this case the village chief claimed that the village had been much respected in the past and that it dated back to the time of the Cayor Empire. But population out-migration meant that the village had become very small over the past half-century though they desired the esteem afforded larger villages.

Boone, 2003a).<sup>225</sup> But other examples of fragmented regions can be found. The cases of

Kedougou Department and, to a lesser degree, Dagana meet this description.

To illustrate the former, in a 1923 article, Kedougou is characterized as having been in complete upheaval with various social groups fighting, fleeing and re-settling throughout the countryside until the arrival of the French. The peace ensured by the relatively late arriving French (circa 1900) revealed that the area, once home to Bedik, Bassari and Diahanké minorities, was now joined by large Mandingues, and Peuhl populations who had arrived in the decades prior (Aubert, 1923). The latter two groups are dominant in the area today. Dagana, the latter case, is arguably a contentious labeling, since the Oualo Empire was based in part of this area, but their early contact with the French colonial trading post in nearby Saint Louis and constant pressure from neighboring states had all but undermined their authority by the second half of the eighteenth century, bringing with it an influx of Maures and Peulhs in addition to indigenous Wolofs. In 1880 therefore, the area is best coded as fragmented: the state had largely collapsed in on itself and no central power exerted authority over their former territory beyond a handful of key villages.

It is worth briefly noting that these are the only regions of the country where the chieftaincy is increasingly contested among all villagers and is no longer assured by a single

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<sup>225</sup> Interview data confirms this. One councilor in the region lamented that villagers in this area were not ‘solidary.’ “Normally,” he noted, “people go behind someone from the area and support them. If you are not behind someone, who will bring you goods?” Yet in this area, he continued, people refused to support anyone *en masse*, not working together to elevate or promote anyone as a valuable intermediary with the state (Interview, councilor, rural community #34, 7 July 2013). The PCR of a neighboring community proudly proclaimed that anyone could run for office here (implicitly contrasting the region with other parts of Senegal where lineage or autochthony dominate social status). “We are all equal, there are no real autochthons so anyone who is competent can rule here,” he stated (Interview, PCR, rural community #36, 8 July 2013).

family. Only sixty-four percent of village chiefs interviewed in these areas took over the role from a relative compared to ninety percent in areas of network proliferation and ninety-six percent in areas of network congruence. Following former President Abdoulaye Wade's brief granting of a salary to village chiefs, all holders of the position who wanted a salary had to regularize their paperwork to update their files. Communities marked by network fragmentation were the only areas where Sous-Prefets reported numerous village chiefs resigned from the position during this process, preferring to cede power to the young (as was the case in Ziguinchor region) or following contestation from villagers who wanted more say in the matter.<sup>226</sup>

#### *Local Political Discourse: Political Cleavages & Local Power Holders*

Today, politics in these regions largely follows the cleavages inherited from the pre-colonial era. In Dagana department, this line tends to fall between sedentary Wolof farmers and the pastoralist Peulhs and Maures, all of who inhabited the area in the pre-colonial era.<sup>227</sup> Ethnic inequalities were a much-commented on issue in the area, although this friction was mostly referred to as an issue between farmers and herders.<sup>228</sup> These same divisions are lamented at length in early colonial documents. In the heart of the state of Oualo, which collapsed in the late 1700s under pressure from Maure invasions, Wolof village chiefs and

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<sup>226</sup> Interviews, Sous-Prefets in Ziguinchor department (5 July 2013) and Kedougou department (3 April 2013).

<sup>227</sup> In all four rural communities that interviews were conducted in, the population was between fifty to sixty percent Wolof with the remaining population being dominated by Peulhs and, to a lesser degree, Maures. In all four communities these communities lived largely apart: Wolof farmers often dominated commercial and administrative centers along tracks of arable land while Peulhs and Maures lived in dry shrub land where they herded animals.

<sup>228</sup> Interview, Sous-Prefet, Dagana Department, 13 March 2013.

councilors quite openly spoke of ethnic tension. Wolof villages complained there were not enough Wolof councilors in the local government to represent their interests while one Peulh chief revealingly asked the interviewer, who had called to verify that he was home prior to traveling to the village, whether he had called on the phone of a Wolof resident of the chef-lieu (who had in fact provided the phone number). When the interviewer responded no, the Peulh chief nodded knowingly, “of course not,” he said, “because he would never call me. We are from different ethnic groups.”<sup>229</sup>

In many communities that fall within this categorization, a noticeable source of tension was between the chef-lieu, or the ‘capital’ village of the local government, and the other villages. In these cases, residents of the chef-lieu were perceived as having unequal say and influence (often via a disproportionate number of councilors) and as dominating local politics.<sup>230</sup> In Kedougou region, one rural community was facing an entrenched battle between the chef-lieu and the PCR, from another village. Things were ‘hot’ here last year, the community secretary reported, and councilors from the *chef-lieu* stopped coming to meetings thus the council failed to

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<sup>229</sup> Interview, village chief #4, rural community #32, 20 February 2013.

In rural community #14, ethnic tensions are also palpable, with even the PLD (2003) noting that villages have often split along ethnic lines as this has created disagreements over power (i.e. which ethnicity should have the chieftaincy) and equity. A rare example of a solution to this is found in nearby rural community #16, where the PCR is elected from one ethnicity and the village chief of the chef-lieu from another. This is not to say that ethnicity is always the defining line in fragmented areas. In Ziguinchor region, many villages are proudly inter-ethnic and minimal ethnic tension is reported. Interestingly, this is the most ethnically mixed of the three departments under discussion here. In these regions, political divisions are often described as being partisan or between the chef-lieu and other villages.

<sup>230</sup> This was cited by at least two respondents in the following rural communities: #15, #25, #30, #33, #35. This is in some circumstances linked to ethnicity, thus in rural community #30 it was observed that the accepted wisdom in the area is that if a politician can win the chef-lieu they can win all of the Wolof villages (Interview, PCR, rural community #30, 3 March 2013).

meet the required quorum to hold a meeting and was unable to work. Why the tension? Councilors they were irritated with the PCR whom they did not consider one of the village's own. This is despite having made an explicit agreement prior to the first council meeting that the PCR should not come from the chef-lieu in order to be more inclusive of the many other villages in the community. Councilors from the chef-lieu, numerically dominant, were immediately dissatisfied about their own decision to cede this power. Nevertheless, most things in the rural community continued to go to the chef-lieu, the secretary continued; "it is not very equitable."<sup>231</sup>

General discussions of local politics in areas of network fragmentation centered on exactly these types of discourses - ethnic tension, favoritism of the capital over other villages - that we have come to expect in African political life. Areas marked by fragmented social networks provide the most fertile ground for partisanship as a means of targeting goods, in large part because it offered the most effective means of obtaining a majority or forming a sufficiently large voting block across otherwise disconnected social networks. In general, such divisions that were presented were quite stable over time and, notably, they were rarely spoken of as being associated with outright hostility between groups. The comments of two community secretaries in such regions illustrate this: for one secretary in the north of the country, "politics is all about who has the people behind him" and for his counterpart in the far South "politicians are only

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<sup>231</sup> A member of the community himself, he reported that he and his family had been harassed because he was perceived as working 'too closely' with the PCR, even though this is explicitly his job (Interview, community secretary, rural community #15, 2 April 2013).

politicians ... the interest of the party dominates.”<sup>232</sup> Both of these views reflect a common understanding of political life and one that would not necessarily be disagreed with by elites in formerly centralized areas. What differs however is that in these communities there are no crosscutting social ties or relations among elites that enable communities to find solutions to partisan fighting or to avoid perverse favoritism.

### *Local Politics of Redistribution*

These divisions manifest themselves in many ways. First, many rural communities with ‘fragmented’ social networks report troubles meeting the quorum because of political divisions, whereby councilors knowingly choose not to attend.<sup>233</sup> One rural community, which was under the rule of a special delegation following an administrative redistricting, was so internally divided along ethnic lines that even the special delegation was ‘blocked’ and had been unable to execute any development project for over seven months. The community secretary upset that projects, some of which the funding had already been delivered for, were stalled because of the political dysfunction.<sup>234</sup> “I am afraid,” the Sous-Prefet in the region confessed, “that the 2014 [local] election will be explosive.”<sup>235</sup> Complete blockage such at this is, of course, rare, but the perception dominates in these regions of the country that the only way to get something from or

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<sup>232</sup> Interview, rural community #26, 11 March 2013; Interview, rural community #35, 1 July 2013.

<sup>233</sup> This was noted as a problem in eight out of the twelve rural communities that fall within this category. In one of the four that did not report having a problem with the quorum however, it was noted that the PCR would send a car to villages with large number of councilors who supported him to ensure that the had the quorum every time, therefore ensuring that the quorum was supportive of him and would follow his wishes (Interview, community secretary, rural community #30, 21 February 2013.)

<sup>234</sup> Interview, community secretary, rural community #30, 21 February 2013.

<sup>235</sup> Interview, Sous-Prefet, Dagana Region, 13 March 2013.

'have a say' in the local council was to have family ties or ethnic ties to the local council<sup>236</sup> or, alternatively, be a political ally of the ruling party.<sup>237</sup> "It is not a good political life here, because if you are not in power you are not represented at all," one village chief noted.<sup>238</sup>

How effective this is at channeling public goods is another question altogether. In Ziguinchor region many respondents lamented that the population could not overcome minor arguments to unite around anything. Even before the 1996 reforms, Darbon chronicles the dysfunction within some of the rural communities in the region. In Oussouye, for example, villages that were traditional enemies had weakened the ability of the newly formed local government to function properly. Similar accounts are offered of Oukout and Mlomp where three and two historically rivalrous villages respectively were united under one local government and stalled work as a result (1988: 173).

The most frequently cited manifestation of this was the inability to rally around a leader, be it the PCR or a deputy. "In the North," one councilor commented, people know that they "have to stick with their leader" in order to receive goods. In Ziguinchor, he continued, this meant that PCRs and deputies feel no need to deliver goods or have no sense of obligation to citizens.<sup>239</sup> General detachment between elected officials and other elites was noted in many interviews in this area, reminiscent of long-standing assumptions about the area's acephalous history (see for example O'Brien, 1975 or Beck, 2008). One Sous-Prefet in the region complained

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<sup>236</sup> Interview, village chief #4, rural community #32, 20 February 2013.

<sup>237</sup> Interestingly, despite many individuals invoking partisanship as an important political cleavage, respondents in this region were less likely to report having a party identification (67.1% compared to 77.7% in areas marked by network congruence or 80.3% in areas of proliferation).

<sup>238</sup> Interview, village chief #2, rural community #30, 21 February 2013.

<sup>239</sup> Interview, councilor, rural community #36, 8 July 2013.

that village chiefs often came to him with questions rather than their elected officials. This was because, he proudly reported, he called the village chiefs often to see what was new in their villages and to maintain contact. “The PCRs and other elected officials have to act similarly [communicate with the chiefs]” if they want to accomplish anything in this region, he concluded, arguing that the near complete lack of communication between these two forms of local elites was hindering local government activity.<sup>240</sup>

### Network Proliferation

If network congruence is associated with more developmental outcomes and areas that have always experienced network fragmentation are characterized by long-standing cleavages that can produce blockage or, more commonly, simple inaction, then what happens in areas that may have had persistent ties that but today are fragmented due to significant in-migration? In this situation, *elite network proliferation*, waves of in-migration generated new elite networks that layered on top of existing ones. In areas with strong pre-existing networks, migrants rarely destabilize existing elite networks (such as those found in the peanut basin in Kaolack), but the vast majority of cases meeting this description are found in areas with weak or weakened networks among autochthons. This most often amplifies perceived competition between groups as the autochthonous group cannot ‘out-weigh’ newcomers and has failed to integrate them into existing village or socio-political structures.<sup>241</sup> In general, these regions have some of the most

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<sup>240</sup> Interview, Ziguinchor region, 5 July 2013.

<sup>241</sup> Recall here the earlier discussion of obtaining village status; in many areas that were home to centralized states prior to French colonial rule, in-comers have been integrated into existing villages rather than being granted the land with which to found their own.

intense political battles, with a bimodal distribution of attitudes towards the local government: the rural council is representative and redistributive if you have ties to the current power-holders or it is biased and negligent if you do not. Local politics here, one Sous-Prefet in such a region commented, is a ‘continual battle. Everyone is involved in the political terrain and they all want to occupy it.’<sup>242</sup>

This case is observed most clearly in parts of Senegal that had been home to pre-colonial states that had largely disintegrated or imploded by the time the French arrived, such as the area formerly inhabited by the states of Boundou, Kaabu, Niani and Ouli, which have seen large waves of migration from Guinea as well as with Peanut farmers from Western Senegal. Alternatively, areas such as Kaffrine, where migrant peanut farmers settled land long dominated by Peulh herders, have seen similar processes of network proliferation. In some cases, this migration was voluntary, such as Guineans fleeing persecution at home during the regime of Sekou Toure, but in others it was state-managed, such as the French forced relocation of Sereer peasants into Kaffrine and western Tambacounda regions in the 1930s. Subsequent internal population movements followed in the 1960s and via the allocation of vast tracts of land to Mouride religious leaders.

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<sup>242</sup> Interview, Kaffrine region, 26 April 2013.

## *Local Political Discourse: Political Cleavages & Local Power Holders*

Network cleavages in these regions are variously organized along ethnicity, caste, autochthony or partisanship.<sup>243</sup> As with areas marked by fragmented networks, in some rural communities politics is dominated by the chef-lieu or one or two large villages that have long held the most political clout the area.<sup>244</sup> In one local government (#37), the family of the PCR has historically run local politics, with a number of family members serving as councilors. The descendants of the former *chef de canton*, the family was described by a local central government official as a ‘fortress.’ He recounted that he had recently had to intervene to ensure that all councilors were allowed to speak in meetings; one representative from the ‘ruling’ family having tried to stop non-family councilors from speaking. They ‘reign there,’ he concluded, and there wasn’t much the administration could do.<sup>245</sup>

While other regions of the country reported occasional political battles, a remarkable number of interviewees in regions marked by substantial in-migration and population change

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<sup>243</sup> In a few communities, such deep divisions were rarely mentioned, if at all. In general, this appears to be the case in communities that are very homogenous, for example in rural communities #41 and #42 most villages were founded by the same wave of in-migration in the late 1800s. These communities share more in common with the case of ‘transformation’ as described below.

<sup>244</sup> This describes, for example, rural communities #40 and 38. In both cases, the chef-lieu are by far the largest village and are home to dense social ties between families, many of whom have lived in the area for centuries. This had led villagers to complain to the Sous-Prefet in rural community #38, who intervened to ensure a more equitable distribution of goods. Similarly, in rural community #5 twenty out of thirty-six councilors were elected from the chef-lieu, with the accusation made that the PCR had changed the party list after party officials decided on it, submitted it to the Sous-Prefet where his alterations went unnoticed until it was too late. Consequently, the chef-lieu was over-represented while another larger village only had four councilors. This exacerbated a pre-existing rivalry between the villages.

<sup>245</sup> Interview, Adjoint Sous-Préfet, Tambacounda Department, 22 March 2013. This is despite the fact that the family and their ethnic group only represent approximately forty percent of the population.

noted severe political blockage in the rural council, preventing projects from being administered, taxes from being raised and allowing PCRs to flagrantly embezzle local funds.<sup>246</sup> Villages that are not politically favorable to the PCR get nothing, a Sous-Prefet in Goudiry stated, bemoaning the strong political implications in all local development initiatives in the *département*. Politically, favoritism is not limited here to partisanship. Rather caste is also often a significant factor in these regions. One PCR, the same Sous-Prefet continued, was casted and if he wanted to meet the quorum for rural council meetings, he had to pay for a car to go pick up all councilors of a higher caste who would not otherwise attend a meeting led by a casted individual.<sup>247</sup> Many rural communities were reported to be deadlocked over in fighting, preventing the council from executing projects or finishing meetings.<sup>248</sup>

#### *Local Politics of Redistribution*

Not surprisingly, evaluations of local government performance by village chiefs in these areas are highly contingent on whether they have ties to the ruling cleavage or not. A village chief connected to the same ruling family cited above (rural community #37) was quite positive about his local government, noting that decentralization had done much to improve his own as well as the lives of his villagers.<sup>249</sup> Nearby village chiefs with no such ties however were much less positive. “For all that arrives in the community, the villages are left to themselves. We have

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<sup>246</sup> Allegations about corruption were made in nine out of fourteen rural communities that meet this description. These include #5-9, #11, #38, #41, #44.

<sup>247</sup> Interview, Goudiry Department, 28 March 2013.

The influence of caste was noted extensively in these areas, with some villages refusing to vote or send their children to school because their assigned voting booth or the nearest school were in casted villages.

<sup>248</sup> Community secretaries in rural community #5, 6, 8, 9, 38, 39, and 44 noted these concerns.

<sup>249</sup> Interview, village chief #2, rural community #37, 21 March 2013.

seen nothing from the rural council,” said the chief of a sizable village with no water access and over eight kilometers between himself and the nearest health facility.<sup>250</sup> Chiefs with no ties to councilors were often simply disengaged, “the rural community is useless for us,” one concluded, with many others stating that they relied on themselves or villagers who had migrated to Dakar or beyond to help them.<sup>251</sup>

Notably, while elsewhere in the country many chiefs complained that all they had received from their local government was ‘one pen and one notebook’ per child prior to the start of the school year or the occasional sack of rice, in these regions of the country numerous village chiefs reported having been cut out of even these most basic deliveries.<sup>252</sup> At the extreme, there are simply no real ties or lines of communication at all between some villages and the government, local or central. During the second tour of the 2012 Presidential elections, an Adjoint Sous-Prefet reported having arrived in some villages that thought the election were already over so disconnected they were from the state and the surrounding community.<sup>253</sup> Areas of network proliferation were home to the only communities where multiple village chiefs stated that they had never met their PCR: ‘we only know the name’ said one chief in Goudiry, while another said he had not seen the PCR for over two years.<sup>254</sup>

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<sup>250</sup> Interview, village chief #1, rural community #37, 20 March 2013.

<sup>251</sup> Interview, village chief # 3, rural community #8, 28 March 2013.

<sup>252</sup> For example, decentralization hasn’t improved anything “because the rural community has the power now and if you are not on their side, you will not receive anything, even rice” (Interview, village chief #4, rural community#43, 10 April 2013).

<sup>253</sup> Interview, Adjoint Sous-Prefet, Tambacounda Department, 22 March 2013.

<sup>254</sup> Interview, village chief #4, rural community #5, 26 March 2013; Interview, village chief #3, rural community #41, 10 April 2013.

The reasons for such differences in perceptions among respondents were not lost on them.

Respondents frequently noted that councilors in these regions only think of their own village, seeing the village as a more important entity than the rural community, with other members of which they do not necessarily share extensive ties, and try to orient projects towards their own villages as a result.<sup>255</sup> Others were open about issues of caste or ethnicity. The PCR of rural community #39 explicitly explained how he had run for office in order to defend his ethnic group.<sup>256</sup> In another community the PCR was casted and numerous respondents claimed that he actively favored his fellow casted co-ethnics. In this community, the PCR chose the councilors for each village. “So how could things go well?” one village chief asked rhetorically.<sup>257</sup>

#### *Proliferation in Centralized Areas*

In-migration did not just occur in acephalous areas. This section discusses two regions of the country that were both home to a pre-colonial state and which witnessed substantial in-migration during the colonial and post-colonial era: the Saloum, current day Kaolack region, and Linguere Department, home of the former Djoloff Empire. These represent two different degrees of hybrid cases: in Djoloff, for example, the traditional Wolof aristocracy now finds itself outnumbered by Peuhl herders who have settled in the area, largely under the influence of colonial-era policies to settle pastoral populations in permanent villages. While the Djoloff

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<sup>255</sup> All interviewed community secretaries in Goudiry department made this claim as did many village chiefs. These concerns were all mentioned by chiefs and elected officials alike in Kolda and Tambacounda regions.

<sup>256</sup> Interview, 19 March 2013.

<sup>257</sup> He continued: ‘He [the PCR] is casted and he always takes the site of the casted, wrong or right.’ According to this village chief this had cost the community a valuable partner who pulled out given the dysfunction (Interview, village chief #2, rural community #44, 8 April 2013).

empire always had Peuhl minorities, conflict between the two groups are recent and reflect a flip in demographic and political weight between the two populations.<sup>258</sup>

In the case of Kaolack region, the area formerly home to the Saloum Kingdom saw a rapid influx of migrants in the first decades of colonialism via the *nawetanes*, or seasonal migrant workers coming from the east of Senegal and Mali and, to a lesser extent, Mossi districts of Burkina Faso. Migrants settled in this area, as opposed to others, largely as a function of the availability of land and its fertility in peanut production. Baol, to the North, was already heavily populated, and the soils in Cayor and Djoloff were quickly exhausted from peanut production. While originally arriving as temporary migrant workers, many migrants eventually settled in the largely empty territory on the edges of the Saloum as well as under-exploited areas in the heart of the former empire.<sup>259</sup> Pelissier wrote at length about the social organization of the Senegalese peasantry in this area in the mid-twentieth century and highlights that this immigration did not undermine or challenge the land rights or social status of autochthonous elites.<sup>260</sup> Rather, he describes the area as 'cosmopolitan,' observing that in Langham canton not a single village was ethnically homogenous mid-century. Pelissier offers an explanation for this and, perhaps for the findings described below as well, arguing that the need for seasonal workers and in-migrants to quickly learn the Wolof language in order to work, the unifying effects of Islam and the fact that everyone - autochthon and allochthon - were deeply implicated in the

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<sup>258</sup> Interview, community secretaries #17 and #24, 26 February and 24 February 2013 respectively.

<sup>259</sup> David, 1980: 34, 59-61, 108.

<sup>260</sup> While autochthonous villages had retained caste relations and traditional hierarchies, new villages often did not. For example, a (former) slave would not traditionally be eligible to serve as village chief in most of the country, but this was not the case in most newly settled villages. These systems co-existed peacefully (Pelissier, 1966: 452).

peanut economy together integrated migrants into existing social networks and undermined potential sources of conflict (1966: 452-6). With the exception of Islam, few parallels exist elsewhere in the country where all three of these factors were present.

As with the cases of proliferation described above, interviewees in these regions of the country noted more disharmony in local political life than was typical of areas of network congruence. This almost exclusively took the dimensions of party competition, though some mild ethnic disagreements were cited in Djoloff/Linguere.<sup>261</sup> Numerous respondents noted that inter-party conflict had ‘spoiled relations’ among local residents or commented that without a councilor your village is less likely to receive resources.<sup>262</sup> Additionally, apart from one other case, these were the only regions that had been home to a pre-colonial state that had allegations of corruption made by respondents.<sup>263</sup>

Though tensions are noted with much more frequently in these areas, there is not a single case where such divisions are cited as stopping work or which are systematically cited

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<sup>261</sup> Despite the significant ethnic fragmentation in Saloum, ethnicity was only mentioned by one village chief as a dividing cleavage in the region despite the fact that the herfandahl indexes of ethnic fractionalization in the region range between 40 to the low 60s, consistently below the national average of 63.8. (Interview, village chief #3, rural community #54, 2 May 2013). One other did make the comment that no one in the community had the economic riches to help out in times of need: “the Wolofs, they don’t help anyone” he concluded (Interview, village chief #3, rural community #49, 29 April 2013.) The tradition, a Sous-Prefet in the region observed, is that the village chief only takes care of his village. The region lacks an encompassing hierarchy that allows chiefs to mobilize ethnic or clan tensions (Interview, Kaoack Region, 3 May 2013.)

<sup>262</sup> Interview, village chief #2, rural community #21, 1 march 2013; Interview, village chief #2, rural community #22, 28 February 2013. On the latter point, except for seeds and fertilizers, this village chief noted where there was equality. Interview, village chief #1, rural community #12, 22 April 2013.

<sup>263</sup> This was true of six out of eleven possible cases compared to one out of seventeen ‘pure’ cases of persistence. This should not be read as saying that there is no corruption in areas of network congruence, merely that it is done in a way thus that other elites think it is inappropriate or opportunistic on the part of elected officials.

across respondents within a community. In the eastern Saloum, one community secretary explained that while the area was traditionally Wolof, a large number of Peulh and Sarakhole immigrants had settled during the colonial era. Regardless, relations among villages are good he commented. The current PCR, who had bought his election as *Président* with 50,000 CFA (approximately one hundred dollars) per councilor, was unlikely to be re-elected because he hadn't done enough, the secretary continued. "He is not *our* PCR, not the PCR of [rural community]," he explained, "but the PCR of his own village only."<sup>264</sup> What is interesting about this comment was not that the PCR should not be re-elected because of his alleged corruption, but because he did not represent the *community*, which was considered to exist as a cohesive whole despite its inter-ethnic and cross-partisan dimensions.

Network proliferation in areas that were home to pre-colonial states appears to exacerbate tensions therefore, but does not necessarily eliminate the underlying concept of an organic community within the local government. Even in the Djoloff, many Peulh respondents were quick to note with respect that this was *the Djoloff*, which was, after all, a very powerful pre-colonial empire at one point in time, and the descendants of whom were still very respected in the region. Conflicts exist and are noted, but they do not overwhelm local public space. "They can have a big fight," one village chief observed of the local councilors in his rural community in the Saloum, "but two days later you see them together again."<sup>265</sup> Partisan divisions exist in these

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<sup>264</sup> Interview, rural community #12, 22 April 2013.

The secretary further elaborated that really buying votes for that amount was a 'good investment' since there is so much to gain from the position via corruption or the ability to do favors for allies and family.

<sup>265</sup> Interview, village chief #1, rural community # 51, 30 April 2013.

areas, but much like in areas of network congruence they were almost always qualified by respondents as being resolved in the end and not severely escalating tensions among villages.<sup>266</sup>

### Network Transformation

In this section, the case of *network transformation* is explored. In these situations, the defining basis of dominant social networks are transformed by an exogenous shock, such as the arrival of missionaries, or, particular to the case of Senegal, the spread of the Mouride brotherhood, a Muslim (Sufi) order that has long been a dominant feature of Senegalese cultural and political life in addition to its religious influence. The spread of Mouridism in the early 1900s was particularly rapid in Diourbel region and Kebemer Department in neighboring Louga region, though today the influence of Mouridism spreads throughout much of Western Senegal. So substantial was the impact of the Mouride influence that it functionally incorporated the social and political elite of the pre-colonial state of Baol that had long-dominated the region presently associated with Diourbel region into the brotherhood (Searing, 2002). Today, politics - national and local - in eastern Diourbel Region are almost exclusively dictated by the Mouride brotherhood, based in the holy city of Touba.

#### *Local Political Discourse: Political Cleavages & Local Power Holders*

In Kebemer department, part of Louga region to the immediate north of Diourbel, four out of seven rural communities in one *arrondissement* are run by powerful maraboutic families who claim descent from Amadou Bemba, the founder and spiritual leader of the brotherhood.

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<sup>266</sup> For example, this was mentioned by all elected officials interviewed in Linguere and Kaolack and roughly half of interviewed chiefs.

Since the chef-lieu of all of these communities were founded by these families during the colonial era, one Sous-Prefet noted, they think they should run the rural community today. This is facilitated by the fact that the area is eighty to ninety percent Mouride.<sup>267</sup> This is the situation in rural community #23, where the local Marabout (a religious leader) ran for and was elected PCR in 2002. Given his experience in management and his deep knowledge of the community, he decided to run for office. “As PCR, I am more respected before the Senegalese administration than if I was just a marabout” he continued, “so I decided that things would go better here if I was PCR as well.”<sup>268</sup> He went on to described his *talibe*, or followers, who comprise ninety-eight percent of the rural community’s population, as his base; they ‘sweep the way for me’ at the same time that his dual statutes allow him to provide things to the community.<sup>269</sup> To a large degree, his statement is correct, the rural community had seen significant improvements in the time since he took office.<sup>270</sup> While only two villages had potable water in 2002, for example, ninety-five percent had it by 2013.

The case illustrated in rural community #23 is representative of communities where some shock has transformed the basis of ties among elites. But in other areas, the arrival of Mouride leaders or other religious orders had not obtained similar near-total network transformation,

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<sup>267</sup> Interview, Adjoint Sous-Prefet, Kebemer Region 4 March 2013.

<sup>268</sup> As noted by a fellow PCR in the area, the rural community was one of the few cases in the region where a PCR with strong religious ties was elected in a truly democratic fashion, rather than being nominated and then running largely for show by a Marabout (Interview, 4 March 2013.).

<sup>269</sup> Interview, PCR, rural community #23, 5 March 2013.

<sup>270</sup> The ability of the PCR to extract projects from the central government is not surprising given the long-standing relationship between the central state and the brotherhood. The region had long been favored: despite the chef-lieu only being founded in 1948, the village received a borehole in 1960 and a school in 1962, though it only received a health post in 1999. All three of Senegal’s presidents had visited the village as of 2003 (PLD, 2003).

resulting in patchier ties, which more clearly resemble network proliferation. Take for example the case of rural community #50, where the chef-lieu is home to an influential marabout. The chef-lieu was only founded around the Second World War by a descendent of the Mbacke family in Touba, in sharp contrast to the rest of the villages in the area who largely date their founding to the pre-colonial era when the state of Rip dominated the area. While other villages have some Mourides, approximately sixty percent are Tidjane, meaning that the majority of adherents to the Marabout reside in the chef-lieu.

#### *Local Politics of Redistribution*

In cases of near-complete network transformation, outcomes are expected to be similar to those of network congruence. But this is not to say that everyone in these rural communities is happy. The only village chief interviewed in rural community #23 who was not a *talibe* of the Marabout, for example, claimed that Peulh villages such as his were left on their own even though they had inhabited the area long before the arrival of the Mourides.<sup>271</sup> For followers however, the rural community was doing good work. One councilor defined himself as a ‘councilor of the Marabout,’ having not even desired to run for local office but having been signed up unknowingly on the electoral roles by the Marabout.<sup>272</sup> Indeed thirty-eight percent of the rural councilors in the 2002-9 council and twenty-two percent in the 2009-14 council were from the chef-lieu, which, with approximately eleven percent of the population, was populated entirely by followers of the Marabout. This was not lost on village chiefs, who largely noted that

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<sup>271</sup> Interview, village chief #2, rural community #23, 4 March 2013

<sup>272</sup> Interview, councilor, rural community #23, 4 March 2013.

they could do little to express disapproval to councilors as the latter were simply ‘*talibe* of the Marabout’ and above their power (despite being democratically elected). But as *talibe* themselves, they accepted that the Marabout was ‘stronger than us’ and gave consistently positive evaluations of how things were run in the rural community.<sup>273</sup>

Despite ‘incomplete transformation’ in rural community #50, the Marabout’s influence on local politics was striking. According to a 2003 planning document for the rural community, the Marabout regularly makes the political lists prior to elections, resulting in the chef-lieu receiving a disproportionate number of council seats. “The autonomy of the [council’s] decisions is not always assured, especially in the management of community goods,” the report notes, and the PCR “fails to make the distinction between himself as *talibe* [religious followers] and President” (PLD, 2003: 68-9, 71). This was no longer the case in 2013, when the previous PCR, who had served two terms, had been replaced with a more dynamic President with a background in local development. The new PCR, who did not hesitate to refer to his predecessor as a ‘dictator,’ claimed a good working relationship with the Marabout, but was not personally a follower, and he cited his independence as a positive feature in his ability to make improvements in the community.<sup>274</sup> Yet the chef-lieu retained a disproportionate number of councilors (thirty-five percent of the total for a population share of eighteen percent) and it remained unusually well-

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<sup>273</sup> Interviews, village chiefs #1, #3 and #4, rural community 23, 4 March 2013.

<sup>274</sup> Interview, PCR, rural community #50, 30 April 2013

doted in public goods, being only one of two villages with a middle school, a health post and having one out of two boreholes in the entire community.<sup>275</sup>

This ‘notable favoritism’ was commented on by village chiefs interviewed in the community, only one of whom came from a cluster of villages in the southwest that were well-served by services in another large village.<sup>276</sup> One chief concluded that they could not appreciate decentralization in this area because “we have the power of the marabout and this is a defeat for the President.” Noting a problem villagers were having getting land titles delivered by the rural council, he continued that if the Marabout were asking, it would go fast, but for regular villagers it went painfully slow.<sup>277</sup> These same facts were evoked positively by those with ties to the Marabout, one village chief who was a *talibe* and extended family member noted that “it is the Marabout who matters here,” before adding negatively “even if the PCR is trying to change that.”<sup>278</sup>

## Conclusion

This chapter identifies four distinct, ideal-types of local politics in rural West Africa. All of these represent different trajectories of settlement and rule over the past century and are associated with different cleavages, patterns of political discourse, and views surrounding redistribution. How individuals talk about and conceptualize their local governments is consequential in three ways. First, this chapter, in combination with the following, provides

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<sup>275</sup> The marabout, the 2011 planning document notes, ‘retains a stranglehold’ on the management of the chef-lieu’s borehole, unlike the other two which are managed by a users’ association (PLD, 2011: 61).

<sup>276</sup> Interview, village chief #2, rural community #50, 29 April 2013.

<sup>277</sup> Interview, village chief #4, rural community #50. 29 April 2013

<sup>278</sup> Interview, village chief #3, rural community #50, 29 April 2013.

qualitative evidence for the argument that local government outcomes, both perceived and actual results, are constrained by the past. In any given rural council, the form of local politics are distinctly *local*, but the patterns outlined here suggest that what forms this takes largely result from shared histories of rule and historical settlement patterns. A comparative lens can help identify clear types therefore despite the inherent localisms at play in each individual rural community.

Secondly, the typology developed here suggests that scholars proceed with caution when applying expectations derived from high-politics when looking at rural political relations, where actors remain embedded social settings that produce a myriad form of expectations and obligations for local elites. Certainly, this chapter has confirmed the expectations of many that distributional politics in rural Africa are informed by ethnic, partisan and other ascriptive political identities, but at best this explains *some* cases. In others the structural overlap between formal and informal institutions aligns thus that communities seems capable of reaching more developmental outcomes by virtue of the territorially inclusive identities engendered by such network congruence. At base, debates about autochthony and who has the right to speak for the community (and *what* community) remain a key defining feature in rural political dynamics, the ramifications this truism holds for who receives not only representation but access to basic social services, is contingent, however, on how these claims structurally manifests themselves among local elites.

Finally, in the worst of cases some local elites are completely disengaged from their local government, which has implications not only for democratic consolidation but also for their

ability to demand and receive goods and social services from the state. If one of the cautionary warnings about decentralization embedded in this dissertation's findings is that we are seeing the development of subnational inequalities in local development, this suggests that these problems are all the more exacerbated in cases of low-equilibrium performance. Decentralization gives an unforeseen advantage to some communities, those with high degrees of network congruence with local borders, while potentially exacerbating inter-village inequality in others. How these four types of local politics map onto actual delivery of public goods is explored in the next chapter.

## **6. From Social Ties to Social Services: Networks in Political Employment**

The preceding chapter drew on interview data to articulate four generalized forms that local political dynamics take in rural West Africa, all driven by historical settlement patterns. This chapter explores whether the patterns identified by the qualitative components of interviews are consistent with standardized assessments of local government performance by respondents by looking at how respondents answered standardized questions about their communities and local governments. This chapter further tests whether the patterns identified by survey respondents map onto the actual public goods delivered to their villages, drawing on objective measures of delivery from the dataset used in Chapter Three. Finally, a series of potential alternative explanations to the findings of this chapter as well as the broader theoretical and empirical claims made in this dissertation are explored.

As suggested in the previous chapter, local elites understand and invoke the broad contours of the argument put forward in this dissertation. Most village chiefs, for example, were proud to tell the history of their village's founding, but this does not always include an encompassing sense of the broader history of the area. Over seventy-nine percent of respondents in areas of network congruence could correctly identify who had ruled the area prior to the arrival of the French, and frequently gave a brief history of the pre-colonial ruler to give to elaborate on the history. They also often had family ties to the pre-colonial state.<sup>279</sup> Compare

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<sup>279</sup> As an example, one village chief in Fatick region told the story of his maternal ancestor who was a respected hunter and had more than ten lineages under his authority. He had served the King of Ndoffene

this to the sixty-four percent of respondents in areas of proliferation and forty-six percent in areas of network fragmentation that could correctly identify who had ruled the area prior to colonization.<sup>280</sup> Even among those who were correct in these areas, respondents answered with hesitancy much more frequently; “It was the Diola Confederacy,” one respondent in Ziguinchor answered tentatively, “but I never really knew what that was.”<sup>281</sup> Almost sixteen percent of respondents in areas of network fragmentation and thirteen percent in areas of network proliferation responded to this question of pre-colonial authority with the *chef de canton*, an explicitly colonial construct.<sup>282</sup>

Local elites in areas that were home to pre-colonial states thus seem to share a stronger sense of history, but is this enough to explain the differences in local political life detailed in previous chapters? This project theorizes that in areas where local elites’ ancestors settled under a pre-colonial state, stronger network ties among elites, often generating a sub-national identity that is territorial inclusive, leads elites today to seek to deliver goods more broadly. This should decrease inequality and improve perceived development. In areas where villages make claims to different communities, largely in uncentralized areas, exclusive identities predominate and both perceived and actual inequality should increase.<sup>283</sup> This chapter provides evidence consistent

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who was himself a delegate of the Bour Sine (Sine being the kingdom under which his village fell). (Interview, cdv #3, rural community #4, 7 May 2013).

<sup>280</sup> There is a statically significant difference as well between areas that were centralized prior to colonization and those that were not more generally at eighty-one versus fifty-four percent respectively.

<sup>281</sup> Interview, councilor, rural community #36, 9 July 2013.

<sup>282</sup> Compare this with under three percent of respondents in areas of network congruence.

<sup>283</sup> It remains plausible however that the precise nature of the mechanism varies from community to community. In large part, this because it is easier to establish the variety of ways that things go wrong, as individuals are quicker and more precise in pointing out the reasons their local governments perform

with the argument advanced so far and provides evidence against a number of alternative explanations.

The following analyses draw on quantitative components of the interview data of approximately 330 local elected officials and village chiefs from fifty-six local governments in rural Senegal described in Chapter Five. While much of the data presented below is categorical or dichotomous, when data required coding the details are described in the text. The central objective of this chapter is to illustrate the ability of the typology developed in Chapter Five from open-ended questions of the interviews to map onto patterns found in the more systematic data collected. At the same time it evaluates a series of alternative explanations. This is not, therefore, theory testing, but rather is limited to seeing if there are meaningful differences along the lines of these categories in the quantitative data. Unfortunately, due to a small number of respondents, this chapter cannot consider the case of network transformation in much depth.

## **Evaluations of Local Governance in Rural Senegal**

The advent of democratic decentralization was heralded as a great step forward for bloated African governments, intended to make the state more effective and responsive (for example, Olowu, 2001). Yet as Table 6.1 shows, only fifty-eight percent of village chiefs think that the 1996 reforms have improved things in their communities, though these attitudes vary sub-nationally. In areas of network fragmentation or proliferation, approval rates hover around forty-six percent, but they reach upwards of seventy-two percent in areas of network

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less satisfactory. It is harder to know what exactly individuals mean when they say that their local government works well together because ‘we all know each other here.’

congruence. Interesting differences also emerge in the open-ended answers chiefs gave when asked *why* they so evaluated the introduction of democratic decentralization. Their answers were coded into four broad categories: the local government was more responsive, it improved contact and proximity to officials, it facilitated paperwork, such as the *état civil* or, more generally, it had brought progress.<sup>284</sup> The majority of respondents in areas of network congruence made comments that they approved of democratic decentralization because it had increased responsiveness to their needs or improved contact and proximity to their elected officials, while areas of network proliferation and fragmentation had less clear patterns. Respondents in fragmented areas were less likely to report responsiveness than the rest of interviewees and were more likely to claim that they appreciated the ease of obtaining paperwork it had brought.

One of the most common complaints of village chiefs was a perceived erosion of their

**Table 6.1: Is Democratic Decentralization (1996) an Improvement?**

	% Yes	Why?			
		Responsiveness	Contact/ Proximity	Estat Civile	General Progress/ Unspecified
<b>Fragmented</b>	45.8**	7.1*	18.6	8.6**	7.1
<b>Proliferation</b>	46.4**	12.2	19.8*	1.9	8.5
<b>Transformation</b>	71.4	8.3	33.3	8.3	8.3
<b>Congruence</b>	72.2***	18.75**	32.6**	3.5	11.8
<b>Average</b>	58.3	13.9	25.6	4.2	9.3
<b>Centralized</b>	69.2**	18.2**	32.1**	3.8	11.3
<b>Uncentralized</b>	48.3	9.8	19.7	4.6	8.1

Responses of village chiefs only. Stars indicate a significant difference from the null category. Interpretations of the Transformation category should be treated with caution given the small N of respondents.

<sup>284</sup> The latter category most often takes the form of generic statements such as “our lives have improved” though there are more specific claims, such as one chief who observed that with democratic decentralization “we know many things now that were unknown earlier, especially about the role of women in local development. That is an improvement because we see the female councilors and that pleases me” (Interview, village chief #2, rural community #13, 5 April 2013).

authority following the reforms. The initial decentralization program of the country implemented the 1964 *Domaine Nationale*, which nationalized all land. With the arrival of local councils to enforce these rules, village chiefs' previously extensive control over land was greatly circumscribed, leaving them with informal control over land allocation within the village and its associated fields that could always be challenged by the rural council. The 1996 reforms were, to some, seen as a further assault on their traditional domains of authority. Indeed across the country stories were told about village chiefs and councilors fighting for greater prestige in the village.

For example, a Sous-Prefet in Tambacounda region recounted a recent story from a nearby rural community where he had had to intervene between a councilor and the village chief in one village because both were lodging so many complaints with him about the other. In his version of events, the councilor had been asserting that he had a superior administrative role to the village chief and hence held more authority in the village. The Sous-Prefet had to inform the councilor that the village chief had a specific statute and that in the village the councilor was just one of many citizens. The councilor, the Sous-Prefet continued, then threw his hands in the air and announced that meant he was 'nothing at all' in the village. "I had to explain to him that he had a role that the village chief did not have and that he, as the councilor, represented local development in the village" which pleased the councilor, the Sous-Prefet concluded, bemused. "They all lack proper training about what their roles are."<sup>285</sup> Some chiefs did note that they had gained new roles, even as they lost some prior powers. Though it may seem intuitive

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<sup>285</sup> Interview, Tambacounda Department, 27 March 2013.

from the argument that centralized areas, with a shared sense of history, would less aggressively undermine the role of the village chief, this is not born out in the data. Approximately sixty percent of respondents who vocalized concerns about the diminishing role of village chiefs came from centralized areas.

The initial decentralization reforms in Senegal created local governments with largely undemocratic elections. Following 1996 however, local officials were elected via full suffrage and with party competition. Up until this point, this project has simply referenced local elected officials without discussing, in depth, who runs for office and the reported logic behind individuals' vote choices. Elected officials are more likely to have family members who also hold elite positions in the community in areas that were home to a centralized state (seventy-four versus fifty-five percent), but as Table 6.2a indicates, there are not substantial differences in the reasons that elected officials give for why they ran for office, with the majority citing their desire to serve their communities or their relative experience as their primary reason. While the former is a relatively general category, many elected officials were quite proud to explain their trajectories that brought them to power under the 'experience' category. Many respondents had worked as local development agents or were involved in local civil life, such as a *département*-level youth association, or had simply been helpful to their communities in resolving problems in the past and so felt they had the necessary skills to govern well and the reputation needed to be elected. A handful of officials, primarily PCRs, had extensive management experience with large businesses or had retired from the civil service and returned to their native villages. One other factor in Table 6.2a deserves mention: while twenty-one percent of respondents in areas of

network proliferation report running for office to defend the interest of a narrow population, such as their own village or ethnic group, this number is only 8.5 percent in areas of network congruence, roughly a six point increase or decrease from the average respectively.

Table 6.2b presents answers to the question ‘what factors do you consider when choosing who to vote for?’ Answers were coded into one of six categories: i) individuals vote based on a candidates proposed program, ii) their past performance or experience, iii) their party identification, iv) for the incumbent or the party in power, v) out of affinity or hope for the future (quite often this was vocalized exactly along these lines, i.e. ‘the one I fell most hopeful

**TABLE 6.2a: Why Ran For Office?**  
(% Responses, elected officials only)

	Develop Community	Experience	Population Chose	Party	Defend Interests of Pop	Family Background	N
<b>Fragmented</b>	30.4	21.7	21.7	8.7	13.1	4.4	23
<b>Proliferation</b>	30.3	21.2	9.1	12.1	21.2	6.1	33
<b>Transformation</b>	50	0	0	0	50	0	4
<b>Congruence</b>	25.5	29.8	17	14.9	8.5	4.3	47
<b>Total</b>	29.97	24.3	15	12.2	14.9	4.7	107
<b>Uncentralized</b>	29	22	17.5	10.5	14	7	57
<b>Centralized</b>	28	26	14	14	12	6	50

**b: What Factors Considered When Choosing Who To Vote For?**  
(% Responses, full sample)

	Proposed Program	Past Performance /Experience	Political Party	Incumbent, Party in Power	Affinity, Hope	Ascriptive Chars.	N
<b>Fragmented</b>	37	16.6	14.8	4.6	21.3	5.5	68
<b>Proliferation</b>	32.9	13.9	13.3	10	29	0.6	100
<b>Transformation</b>	13.3	6.7	26.7	13.3	26.7	13.3	11
<b>Congruence</b>	33.2	21	19.6	4.2	20.6	1.4	136
<b>Total</b>	33.3	17.4	16.8	6.5	23.6	2.4	100
<b>Uncentralized</b>	33	15.4	16.5	8.4	24	2.7	167
<b>Centralized</b>	33.8	19.7	17	4.3	23.1	2.1	148

Panel A responses of elected officials only. Interpretations of the Transformation category should be treated with caution given the small N of respondents.

about') or vi) ascriptive characteristics such as religion or ethnicity. Once again there is not drastic variation in the percentage of respondents answering in a certain way, although respondents in uncentralized areas are twice as likely to report voting for the party in power and respondents in areas of network proliferation report voting out of affinity or hope at a rate of roughly eight percentage points higher.


## **What Should Local Governments Do and How Well Do They Do It?**

How do respondents understand the obligations of the local state vis-à-vis the citizenry? Figure 6.1 presents the answers of respondents as to what the three central responsibilities of the local government were. All three of each individual's answers were coded into one of five categories. An answer is *universalistic* if individuals believe that the local government should provide universalistic benefits or policies for the community, for example 'expand the healthcare network in the community' or 'provide security' fall into this category because they are indicative of an obligation to provide broad coverage. Conversely, an answer is *particularistic* if the answer implies that the local government should do something for that particular village; 'build a health hut in the village' is a much more specific demand than the examples above for universalistic responses. Similarly, statements that the local government should provide seeds, fertilizer, food relief or other targeted benefits are coded into this category. Thirdly, some respondents indicated that the local government should solve problems between community members or otherwise act as a *social regulator*. It was also often suggested that local governments had a responsibility of *representation*. These answers suggested that the rural

council should represent the population's interests to the central state and/or donors and to respond to their desires in a general sense (i.e. 'listen to the population'). Finally, some respondents listed *administrative* responsibilities, such as provided *état-civil* papers and collect local taxes.

It is immediately obvious that most respondents tend towards universalistic answers to this question, representing fifty percent of total answers across all three questions. Universalistic obligations are over sixty percent of answers in areas of network congruence however, compared to roughly forty percent in areas of network fragmentation or proliferation, a twenty percent


Figure 6.1 Coded Local Government Responsibilities, by Network Response (% Response)



difference. In the latter two areas, respondents were more likely to note particularistic benefits though the difference is less sharp at only five to ten percentage points. Interestingly, ten percent of answers in fragmented areas indicated that local governments should play a role as a social regulator, double the rate at which respondents indicated this category in either areas of network congruence or proliferation.

Open-ended questions suggest that individual evaluations of local government performance vary substantially across the country. Figure 6.2 shows the distribution of responses to two sets of questions designed to capture evaluations of the performance of the current local council (once again regions characterized by network transformation are omitted due to a low number of respondents in communities fitting this description). The histogram represents responses to the question, “in your opinion, is the local government here in [rural community] going in the right or the wrong direction?” The kernel density line reflects an

**Figure 6.2 Evaluations of CR Performance by Network Type**




aggregated score of responses to a series of questions asking respondents to evaluate their local government's efforts in a set of issues areas, including primary education, health, clean water, bringing new projects, finding financing, responding to citizen demands, facilitating participation in local government issues and being equitable. For both, responses are more favorable as one moves to the left and they are broadly consistent across questions, though respondents in areas marked by network congruence were more likely to be negative about the local government when asked about specific issue areas.<sup>286</sup>

Collectively, respondents are cautiously encouraging of their local governments, very few respondents report that the government is doing 'very good' or going 'completely in the right direction.' What is immediately apparent however is the bimodal distribution in areas marked by network proliferation, following the patterns in the qualitative data. Fragmented areas are less bimodal and more closely resemble the distribution of areas of network congruence, though more respondents do report that the local government is going in the wrong direction.

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<sup>286</sup> Respondents in Fatick region, for example, were quite critical of their local government's efforts in the area of water. While most villages had been provided some form of water infrastructure, the water table in the region was salty, rendering most of these wells and spigots unusable.

**Figure 6.3 Evaluations of CR by Network Type and Family Relation**



Of course, social desirability bias or respondents who are hesitant to critique friends and family members could drive the positive direction of evaluations in Figure 6.2. Yet this appears to not be the case, the upward bias in positive evaluations by family members is much stronger in areas of network proliferation or fragmentation, where the correlation between having a family member in elected office and a positive evaluation is 0.11 and 0.22 respectively, compared to 0.002 for areas of network congruence. This is shown in Figure 6.3, which reproduces the bar charts in Figure 6.2, but distinguishes between responses of those with elected family members and those without. A white gap indicates ‘bias’ of family members (i.e. a family member-only sample increases the percent of outcomes in the category) while bars where there is a negative deficit represent a more frequent response rate by those without family ties. This reveals that the most substantial bias from family members comes in areas of network fragmentation and proliferation where they are not only more likely to positively evaluate the government but less

likely to be critical. Conversely, in areas of network congruence there is a smaller increase in positive evaluations for the category of ‘the right direction,’ with family members actually less likely to report that the rural community was going ‘completely in the right direction’ than those without relations. Similarly, areas of network fragmentation and proliferation have more negative evaluations by non-family members. This suggests that to the extent that the histograms in Figure 6.2 are driven, at least in part, by a desire to positively evaluate personal relatives or friends this bias is primarily coming from areas with weak histories of political centralization. This further reinforces the story emerging out of qualitative data that suggests strong in and out-group dynamics.

## **Assessments of Perceived and Actual Public Goods Delivery**

This section evaluates whether these attitudes translate into perceptions of equality in treatment and whether the factors noted by respondents actually explain patterns of public goods delivery objectively measured. Table 6.3 reports odds ratios for a series of logit models examining whether or not a respondent made a reference in inequality to treatment across villages during the course the interview. This is coded zero (no allegations of unequal treatment by the rural community) or one (one or more comments that there is targeted inequality in the local government). Simply stating that the respondent’s village had not received anything was not sufficient to be coded as a one, rather there had to be a specific statement that the local council played favorites, either generically or naming which villages or communities were treated better or worse by the local government. The models include controls for the logged population

**Table 6.3: Odds Ratios of Perceived Inequality in the Rural Council**

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7
Elite Family Ties	0.77** (0.07)						0.81** (0.08)
Co-Ethnic		0.52** (0.12)					0.68 (0.16)
Co-Partisan			0.51** (0.15)				0.44** (0.15)
# Councilors				0.93* (0.04)			0.94 (0.04)
Outsider Status					1.52** (0.22)		
Pre-C Centralization						0.53** (0.15)	0.47** (0.15)
Constant	8.48 (10.0)	8.75 (10.8)	13.2 (17.1)	3.16 (4.17)	3.01 (3.79)	7.70 (8.91)	17.6 (26.2)
Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	0.17	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.17	0.16	0.21
N	331	331	331	301	331	331	301

\* p<0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. Results from logit models with robust, clustered standard errors by local government in parentheses. Control variables include logged population of respondent village, reported rural council meeting attendance in previous year, whether or not the respondent reported having received any training sessions about their role in the rural council and/or local development, their age, and dummy variables for councilors and village chiefs.

size of the respondent's village, whether the respondent reported having received any training about local governance or development, their age, their reported meeting attendance for 2012, and dummy variables if a respondent was a village chief or, similarly, a councilor.

These models support the general contention that perceptions of inequality are driven by network ties, measured in different models here as being a co-partisan, a co-ethnic, family ties to other elites, or the number of councilors from a respondent's village. Models 1 through 4 illustrate that all of these measures are significant at conventional levels (with the exception of the number of councilors from a respondent's village, which is only significant at the ten percent level): having network ties therefore decreases the probability that a respondent views the rural community as treating citizens unequally. Because we might think that outsider status has a

compounding influence, Model 5 reports an aggregated measure of ‘outsiderness,’ ranging from zero to four, where a respondent receiving a score of four has no family ties to the community, is not a co-ethnic of the dominant ethnicity on the council nor a co-partisan of the PCR and from a village with no councilors. This variable is significant, with a one-unit increase in outsider-status increasing the likelihood of reported inequality or favoritism in the rural community by a log odds of forty-four percent. A measure of pre-colonial centralization suggests that respondents in areas home to a pre-colonial state are less likely to find their local governments unequal in Model 6. Model 7 combines all variables. Here, co-ethnicity and the number of councilors from a respondent’s village loose significance.

It is possible that there is a disjuncture between perceived inequality and actual treatment by the local government. To test whether this is the case, two additional sets of models look at actual infrastructure delivery to respondent’s villages since the election for the current council (effectively making the years of delivery between 2009-12).<sup>287</sup> The basket of goods included in this measure are primary schools, health centers and clean water infrastructure, the latter restricted to cases where the respondent indicated that the water infrastructure was provided by the local government. To do so, an ordinal variable is created whereby respondents receive a score of zero if their village received none of these investments, a one if they received one and a two if they received two or three (because only four villages in

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<sup>287</sup> Because some respondents came from the same village, for example a village chief was chosen randomly and this happened to be the same village the PCR was from, the models in Table 2 drop respondents who are ‘doubles,’ keeping the village chief as the respondent (results hold if the characteristics of the councilor or PCR are used).

the sample received all three, this category is combined).<sup>288</sup> Due to violations of the parallel odds assumption, the models in Table 6.4 are the results of partial proportional odds models, run with the *gologit2* command in Stata. These models can be counterintuitive to interpret. Because the model effectively runs two separate logistic regressions, results from the first cut ('Panel 1') are the results of a logit model where receiving any public good is collapsed into a single category while those of the second ('Panel 2') represent the difference between receiving zero or one public good versus the two/three category. Positive coefficients indicate that a higher score on that variable are associated with a higher score on the outcome variable.

Because the central convention of this paper is that one should expect to see different patterns sub-nationally, the sample in Table 6.4 is split to reflect the three dominant forms of social networks in the sample (again, network transformation is dropped due to a low N). Only 70 respondents fall in the 'fragmented' category, meaning that the additional constraints imposed by the partial proportional odds model, which consume degrees of freedom, should be interpreted with caution. A model with all respondents is run in M19.

The models in Table 6.4 support many of the reported perceptions about how varying local political cleavages create different forms of favoritism. They also reinforce the claim that there are sub-national differences in the politics of public goods delivery. In areas of network fragmentation, the most noticeable finding is that there is substantial bias against co-partisans,

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<sup>288</sup> Data on public goods are taken from central government sources, to correct for any mis-reporting by respondents by using a consistent source.

**Table 6.4: Odds Ratios of Receiving a Public Good in Village, 2009-12**

		Elite Family Ties	Co-Ethnic	Co-Partisan	# Councilors	Newcomer (village < 1900)	Outsider	Constant	Elite Family Ties	Co-Ethnic	Co-Partisan	# Councilors	Newcomer (village < 1900)	Outsider	Constant	Pseudo- N R <sup>2</sup>
		Panel 1							Panel 2							
Network Fragmentation	M1	1.02 (0.19)						17.7 (10.4)	1.02 (0.19)						0.58 (0.19)	70 0.1
	M2		1.33 (0.76)					17.7 (8.46)		1.89 (1.35)					0.55 (0.20)	70 0.12
	M3			0.00*** (0.00)				7900 (4854)			0.65 (0.53)				0.56 (0.20)	70 0.17
	M4				1.34 (0.38)			20.2 (12.4)				1.21 (0.21)			0.55 (0.23)	64 0.17
	M5					3.38 (5.59)		16.7 (7.34)				0.75 (0.64)			0.57 (0.19)	70 0.13
	M6						2.19 (1.99)	17.8 (8.57)					1.06 (0.38)	0.56 (0.19)	70 0.13	
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Network Proliferation	M7	0.77** (0.10)						6.30 (2.84)	0.77** (0.10)						0.15 (0.05)	104 0.22
	M8		1.49 (1.19)					7.02 (4.62)		0.97 (0.74)					0.15 (0.06)	104 0.22
	M9			1.39 (0.69)				6.88 (4.12)			1.04 (0.64)				0.15 (0.06)	104 0.22
	M10				1.09 (0.13)			6.79 (4.14)				0.96 (0.07)			0.12 (0.05)	97 0.22
	M11					0.11** (0.09)		9.06 (5.19)				1.28 (0.85)			0.15 (0.06)	105 0.26
	M12						0.48** (0.15)	7.67 (4.73)					1.31 (0.42)	0.14 (0.06)	104 0.25	
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Network Congruence	M13	0.99 (0.13)						5.74 (1.79)	0.99 (0.13)						0.40 (0.11)	144 0.05
	M14		1.51 (1.07)					6.84 (2.55)		1.92 (1.33)					0.39 (0.09)	144 0.07
	M15			1.05 (0.49)				6.79 (2.54)			1.21 (0.41)				0.40 (0.10)	144 0.07
	M16				0.83** (0.07)			6.56 (2.36)				1.04 (0.05)			0.43 (0.12)	133 0.09
	M17					6.75** (5.63)		8.75 (3.63)					0.85 (0.50)		0.41 (0.10)	144 0.1
	M18						1.45 (0.43)	7.13 (2.75)					0.83 (0.19)	0.41 (0.10)	144 0.08	
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Total	M19	0.92 (0.08)	1.38 (0.24)	1.07 (0.24)	0.99 (0.04)	1.06 (0.38)		0.58 (0.58)	0.92 (0.08)	1.38 (0.47)	1.07 (0.24)	0.99 (0.04)	1.06 (0.38)		0.02 (0.03)	301 0.07

\* p<0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. Results from partial proportional odds models with robust, clustered standard errors by local government in parentheses. Control variables include the equivalent basket of goods present in the village in the baseline year, the logged village population, the population density measured with a 3km buffer, distance to the nearest road and a count measure of civic associations present in the village. Variables are mean centered by sub-sample.

which may suggest that politicians are targeting swing voters.<sup>289</sup> The negative coefficient on newcomer villages and outsider status in Panel 1 for network proliferation can be interpreted as meaning that villages settled after 1900 or individuals with multiple indicators of ‘outsiderness’ are more likely to not receive a public good during this time. The same is true for individuals who report family ties to other local elites.<sup>290</sup>

Conversely, areas of network congruence appear to deliver goods quite broadly, with ascriptive categories such as family ties, ethnicity and partisanship insignificant. Rather, villages that were founded post-1900 take a positive coefficient in Panel 1, suggesting that these characteristics are likely to push respondents into higher categories (or more likely to receive locally delivered public goods during the time period). Villages with higher numbers of councilors are less likely to receive goods. This suggests that while qualitative data indicates that outsiders feel excluded, these perceptions may not be based on actual bias in distribution. ‘Outsiders’ may very likely to be less integrated into local decision-making, but in areas of network congruence there is still evidence of broad-based distribution of public goods as opposed to narrower, targeted delivery.

A final set of models estimates the impact of structural attributes of local governments on new goods delivery during this time period. The results can be found in Table 6.5. Much like Table 6.4, clear differences emerge across network type that are not always present in a model

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<sup>289</sup> This is counter to the prediction of McGillivray (2004: 19) who argues that electoral systems such as Senegal’s local electoral rules are ideal conditions for targeting core voters; since all votes count toward the total seat share of any given party, parties are likely to target benefits towards core supporters in order to ensure their turnout and maximize vote share.

<sup>290</sup> This may be taken as evidence against the central argument. The finding is however indeterminate since an individual could have network ties but simply not to the actual network in power.

with the complete sample. Findings on the effect of fiscal attributes are inconclusive across network type. Tax recovery is never significant and average FDD transfers only for areas of network persistence. NGO presence has a suppressing effect in areas of network fragmentation while bilateral partners appear to increase delivery. Yet, bilateral partners have a negative effect in areas of network proliferation, suggesting an inconclusive effect to the role of foreign partners.

**Table 6.5: Odds Ratios of Structural Factors on New Public Goods Delivery, 2009-12**

	Fragmented				Proliferation				Congruence				Total	
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6	M7	M8	M9	M10	M11	M12		
Panel 1	# Mtgs 2012	0.99 (0.14)			1.07 (0.13)				1.22** (0.12)				1.07 (0.06)	
	Quorom	4.53 (9.21)			0.00** (0.00)				0.19 (0.101)				0.51 (0.73)	
	% Tax Recovery	6.67 (20.3)			0.37 (0.58)				2.64 (2.20)				1.18 (0.69)	
	Avg Transfers pc	1.49 (0.45)			1.15 (0.17)				0.84 (0.32)				1.02 (0.18)	
	# NGOs	0.52** (0.13)			1.07 (0.19)				1.11 (0.18)				1.16 (0.11)	
	# Bilateral Partners	10.4** (7.78)			0.48* (0.19)				1.21 (0.39)				0.85 (0.15)	
	# Parties in CR		0.18** (0.10)			0.64 (0.24)				0.41** (0.13)			0.56** (0.13)	
	Ethnic Fract.			1.02 (0.03)			1.05*** (0.01)				1.01 (0.01)		1.01 (0.01)	
	Constant	38.7 (23.2)	44.2 (29.5)	41.0 (20.6)	32.9 (17.5)	9.88 (5.04)	7.11 (3.23)	6.23 (2.66)	6.67 (2.51)	6.29 (1.84)	6.18 (1.96)	6.30 (2.04)	5.94 (1.92)	1.49 (2.43)
	# Mtgs 2012	0.99 (0.14)			1.07 (0.13)				1.22** (0.12)				1.07 (0.06)	
Panel 2	Quorom	4.53 (9.21)			30.8 (160.5)				0.19 (1.01)				0.51 (0.73)	
	% Tax Recovery	6.67 (20.3)			0.37 (0.58)				2.64 (2.20)				1.18 (0.69)	
	Avg Transfers pc	1.49 (0.43)			1.15 (0.17)				1.69* (0.52)				1.02 (0.16)	
	# NGOs	0.52** (0.13)			1.07 (0.19)				1.11 (0.18)				1.16 (0.11)	
	# Bilateral Partners	10.4** (7.78)			0.48* (0.19)				1.21 (0.39)				0.85 (0.15)	
	# Parties in CR		0.18** (0.10)			0.64 (0.24)				0.41** (0.13)			0.56** (0.13)	
	Ethnic Fract.			1.07** (0.03)			1.05*** (0.01)				1.01 (0.01)		1.01 (0.01)	
	Constant	0.58 (0.19)	0.54 (0.17)	0.52 (0.18)	0.50 (0.19)	0.16 (0.05)	0.18 (0.05)	0.15 (0.05)	0.13 (0.05)	0.39 (0.10)	0.38 (0.09)	0.37 (0.09)	0.39 (0.11)	0.04 (0.07)
	N	69	69	69	69	104	104	104	104	144	144	144	144	329
	Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	0.13	0.21	0.22	0.21	0.26	0.21	0.22	0.26	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.06	0.12

\* p < 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. Results from partial proportional odds models with robust, clustered standard errors by local government in parentheses. Variables in models 1-12 are mean centered. Control variables include the equivalent basket of goods present in the village in the baseline year, the logged village population, the population density measured with a 3km buffer, the kilometers to the nearest road and a count measure of the number of local civic associations present in the village.

One of the most robust findings, significant even in the full model, is that the more parties with seats on the rural council, the less likely a respondent's village received a good. Ethnic fractionalization is significant in areas of network proliferation and fragmentation, though not cases of congruence or the full model (M13). This is in line with existing findings: in these areas, increase homogeneity increases the likelihood that a village received a new delivery over the past three years.

Together, Tables 6.4 and 6.5 support that argument that exclusive identity factors matter more in areas that have a diversity of social networks than those of network congruence. In areas that were home to pre-colonial states, these tables suggest that local governments are delivering public goods even to outsiders. Furthermore, as Table 6.5 indicates, these areas are performing best under the conditions we might expect: more active councils, with fewer parties and greater fiscal resources all appear to increase the likelihood that a respondent's village in areas of network congruence benefited from a public good delivery. The analysis thus far has suggested that respondents in areas defined by network congruence are, on average, more positive about their local governments and their experiences with democratic decentralization. In general, respondent perceptions of equality are shaped by their network ties to the local government and there is suggestive evidence that patterns of goods delivery are driven by these same factors. Throughout all of these models, historical settlement patterns seem to structure and help explain variation in responses across the country.

## **Assessing Alternative Explanations**

Of course, it is possible that something else drives these patterns. Indeed, interviewees never held back in offering explanations for why some local governments performed better than others. Almost none of these, however, actually vary meaningfully across communities. The average level of education for elected officials is not significantly different across network types, nor are respondents more or less likely to report having received any kind of training.<sup>291</sup> There is also no difference in the average number of mandates councilors have served (mean of 1.8). Local governments across the country reported a similar average of five to six rural council meetings in the previous year.<sup>292</sup>

### *Information*

One potential mechanism is that denser network ties improve information flows, something that is repeatedly suggested in open-ended answers when respondents who mention being in frequently contact with one another other (village chiefs to councilors, councilors to village chiefs). Yet, it's not clear in measurable data that there are real differences here.

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<sup>291</sup> There is a significant difference for councilors, with more councilors in areas that were home to pre-colonial states. Respondents were more likely to have received training in areas characterized as network proliferation. Such training sessions are often given by the PCR or rural community on the role of a village chief or by donors for local elites about local development, various human rights issues and, most commonly, about the role and obligations of the rural council. The average respondent has only received a Coranic education.

<sup>292</sup> It is also popular to suggest that areas of the country where decentralization began earliest, starting in Thies region in 1974 onwards, local elites and populations alike are simply more adapted to the institution. It is hard to imagine however that six or eight extra years with local government, during which time the authority of local elected officials was largely limited to land distribution, was meaningful enough to radically change either the quality of elected officials or the expectations of citizens. More profoundly, the entire country had experienced at least twelve years of local governance prior to the 1996 reforms that transferred meaningful authority.

Reported meeting attendance by village chiefs, which should capture a key means to convey or receive information is comparable across the country. Village chiefs are also equally likely to correctly report the date of the last meeting (at roughly forty-four percent).

There is little meaningful difference in village chief's knowledge about the functioning of their local governments. Respondents can almost all correctly identify who is in charge of *état-civil* paperwork (ninety-seven percent can do so across the country) and ninety-five percent of respondents correctly identify the rural council as being in charge of land allocation. There is no difference in their ability to identify the local government as being responsible for bringing in funds for local development projects, although respondents in areas of network fragmentation are more likely to attribute this role to NGOs.<sup>293</sup> They are equally likely to correctly identify the local government as being in charge of primary education (approximately forty-five percent, with twenty-six to thirty-three percent reporting that this is the responsibility of civil society) and similarly that the rural council is in charge of basic health (approximately sixty-five percent with twelve to sixteen percent reporting this is the job of civil society). Another way to measure this is in the degree of shared opinions about local problems. If individuals are in more frequent conversation, it is likely that they will all share similar opinions about local issues. Measuring the degree of overlap among respondents in each local government in their perception of what the three biggest issues facing their rural community are, coded into twelve categories, there is

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<sup>293</sup> Sixteen percent of village chiefs in these zones identified NGOs or donors as being responsible for bringing money for local development as opposed to three percent elsewhere. This is likely driven by the high-NGO presence in Ziguinchor.

no substantive difference in how much agreement exists on these issues, hovering around twenty-one to twenty-three percent agreement.<sup>294</sup>

#### *Fiscal Resources*

Another plausible explanation is that differences in local government performance - and hence a driver of respondent evaluations - might arise from unequal access to financial resources. Rural communities are actually more likely to report donor activity in areas that were not home to a centralized state (3.2 versus 2.4 NGOs on average in uncentralized versus centralized areas) though bilateral partners (such USAID, German GIZ or the French ADF) are approximate.<sup>295</sup> There is also no difference in a respondents' history of migration outside the country or in the reported existence of any migrant associations from the village, such as those formed by some residents in Dakar or abroad that could provide assistance to their home village or community.

Local governments in areas that were home to centralized states do not, on average, receive greater per capita transfers from the central state (uncentralized region receive slightly more with \$1.70 versus \$1.30 though this is not a significant difference). Areas that are characterized as having high network congruence are more likely to collect local taxes, however. Eighty-seven percent of chiefs in these areas report collecting the local tax as opposed to only forty-seven percent elsewhere in the country. The local tax, or *taxe rurale*, about two dollars per head for residents (with exemptions for the elderly, children under fourteen, women with more

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<sup>294</sup> There are, in fact, statistically significant differences here. The average overlap in centralized areas is 23.4% versus 22.4% in uncentralized areas but this holds little substantive meaning.

<sup>295</sup> While a significant part of the higher NGO activity in uncentralized areas is driven by the unusually high donor presence in the Casamance, mostly conflict related, there remains a significant difference if Ziguinchor is excluded, bringing the average number of NGOs in uncentralized areas to 2.9.

than 8 children, active military service or disability) may, if fully collected, facilitate government functioning. But in many communities, even one hundred percent collection rates only amount to \$4,000 or so dollars in a medium sized community. This is certainly enough for a small project, such as the construction of a classroom, some basic medical supplies and sponsoring a few youth events, but it is far from enough to undertake the large and visible projects demanded by citizens (such as health huts or developing a system of assigned pathways for herders, etc.).

Cumulatively, this means that rural communities with congruent elite networks collect, on average, 56.3% of their total tax rolls while only sixteen percent is recuperated in the rest of the communities in the sample. While the latter is not a negligible difference, there is no association between whether or not a village chief reports raising taxes and receiving goods, nor is there an association between rural communities that have higher tax collection rates and those that do not in terms of goods delivery (as is seen in Table 6.3). This is the one area however where there does appear to be a significant gap in information flows. Forty-two percent of chiefs in areas of network congruence reported discussing collecting taxes with an elected official in the past year as opposed to an average of twenty-two percent in the rest of the country. Similarly, thirty-six percent knew of the FDD and FECL, the central government transfers, compared to twenty-three percent elsewhere; both significantly different at the 0.05 level.<sup>296</sup> Furthermore, this is reflected in the ability of village chiefs to correctly identify who is

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<sup>296</sup> There is no difference among those with family members and those without for FDD and FECL, but there is a weak relationship for taxes. At a 0.1 significance level, thirty-six percent of chiefs with

responsible for collecting taxes (themselves along with the local government, with any combination of these two answers coded as correct). While there is a significant difference between areas that were centralized prior to colonization and those that were not (ninety-five versus 81.5% respectively), there is no significant difference once Ziguinchor Region, where taxes have not been collected since the start of the Casamance conflict, is removed from the sample (here ninety-one percent of respondents in uncentralized areas correctly answer the question).

### *Monitoring Effects*

One of the tenants of democratic decentralization was to create local governments that was responsive to local needs and would be monitored by local populations (for example, this is the argument made by Keefer et al., 2006). There is no evidence that the positive effects associated with local governments in areas of network congruence are being driven by such a dynamic, however.<sup>297</sup> In addition to the fact that there is no difference in reported meeting attendance, among elites there is no difference in village chiefs' claims about their ability to monitor and sanction or reprimand elected officials across centralized and uncentralized areas or different network types. That being said, respondents are significantly more likely to report being able to monitor (fifty versus thirty-five percent) or to sanction or reprimand elected officials when they disagreed with them (sixty-two versus fifty-one percent) when they have

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relations to elected officials had discussed tax collection compared to twenty-six percent without such family ties.

<sup>297</sup> Looking at AfroBarometer data fails to suggest a difference in reported bottom-up monitoring or ability to communicate with councilors. Forty-eight percent of respondents in acephalous areas versus forty-five percent in centralized areas correctly identify 'voters' as being responsible for making sure the local council does their job, an insignificant difference.

family ties to elected officials than not. Similarly, there is no difference in a village chief or councilor's claim to be able to influence the PCR except when disaggregating by relationship type. Thus, friends and family members are significantly more likely to think that they can persuade the PCR to help them with something or see things their way than those with no affective ties.<sup>298</sup> There is no such difference for being a relative of a councilor, though being friends with a councilor has a similar, significant effect.<sup>299</sup>

### *Central State Ties*

This project has already established that there is no evidence of central state favoritism to regions that were home to pre-colonial states versus acephalous regions in terms of measurable resource transfers. Bias could, however, take other forms. This is the argument articulated by Boone (2003a), who contends that sub-national differences in the ability of the central state to locate rural allies has endogenously determined power relations between the center and periphery in West Africa. A systematic difference in the propensity of local elites to have ties to the central state could offer an alternative driver of the patterns shown in the preceding analyses. Elites who spend more time in Dakar or have more ties to others in the capital might have an easier time pulling in other, unmeasured resources, such as advice from development agents or favors from friends than elsewhere, for example.

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<sup>298</sup> This is a categorical variable, which means that the difference puts those without affective ties as reporting on average as 'rarely' being able to influence the PCR while those with such ties are halfway between "sometimes" and "often" able to do so.

<sup>299</sup> Those who report being friends with councilors are closest to the 'often' able to influence category while those who are not are between 'rarely' and 'sometimes'

Interview data fails to support the argument that respondents in centralized areas systematically have stronger ties to Dakar than elites in other areas of the country. To the extent that elites in areas that were home to centralized areas do, sometimes, appear to have denser connections, such as reporting more regular travel to Dakar or living part-time in the capital, this difference is driven entirely by respondents in Thies region, immediately outside of Dakar. Once Thies' unparalleled proximity to the capital is controlled for, there is no statistical difference in the likelihood that respondents live part-time in Dakar or in elites who live outside of their rural community reporting that they use political ties to obtain projects or favors for their communities.

PCRs report traveling to Dakar three to four times a year on average throughout the country. Respondents in centralized and uncentralized areas are equally likely to report having a meaningful tie to a central government functionary. Likewise, there is no difference in a respondent's likelihood of having been educated in Dakar, Saint Louis or Europe, another possible source of valuable contacts. One possible manifestation of stronger ties between rural elites and the central state could be more positive evaluations of central state officials on the part of local elites, but again there is no evidence that respondents, restricted to elected officials or in the entire sample, think functionaries, deputies or the President are more engaged or more trustworthy. They also do not more favorably evaluate the central government's performance or more frequently identify the central government as being the responsible party for bringing funds to the local government. None of this implies that Boone's argument is incorrect of course,

merely that the center-local relationships identified do not manifest themselves in local governance today, even if they were consequential in Senegal's trajectory of state-building.

### *Trust*

Another potential explanation to the findings of this dissertation relates to potential differences in levels of trust. The most prominent expectation for such differences comes from Nunn and Wantchekon (2001), who find that historical exposure to the slave trade makes individuals less trusting today. The impact of the Atlantic slave trade on West Africa is widely debated. Certainly, the slave trade strengthened existing states and weakened segmentary societies (Fage, 1969; Wheatley, 2014). As Hubbel (2001: 38) highlights, the slave trade increased social insecurity by undermining the 'social glue' that had held communities together. The slave trade was, however, different in West Africa than elsewhere in certain ways. West Africa did not see the population depletion that was experienced in Cameroon and Ghana, for example, and the region had participated in the slave trade, domestically and internationally, for much longer (Fage, 1969: 400). Moreover, domestic slavery pre-dated the Atlantic trade in West Africa, having developed as a means to mobilize labor. Fage (1969b) argues that the slave trade was epiphenomenal to the growth in domestic slavery as a means to meet the economic demands of increasing foreign trade by states. Cooper (1979) nuances this point in suggesting that the slave economy allowed emerging aristocracies to increase economic production without alienating the village-based economy that these states depended on. Over time, domestic slaves saw numerous outcomes: in some societies, such as the *ceddo* of the Wolof states, the warrior slave caste took on important state duties and became significant political actors. In others,

slaves were absorbed into lineages as ‘adopted’ kinsman while in others, such as Fouta Toro, domestic slaves were a subordinate class, sharing reciprocal social obligations with their owners.

Nonetheless, if areas that were acephalous prior to colonization were more likely to be raided for slaves and if this systematically reduces trust within communities today, it could explain poor performance as well as the weaker social ties observed in earlier chapters. Table 6.6 presents the results of three empirical tests of this argument. First, 6.6a reports the differences in means of reported trust in a series of local figures by survey respondents. Pre-colonial centralization does not appear to systematically explain differences in reported trust. It is only significant in one model where respondents in uncentralized areas report higher levels of trust in ‘other Senegalese’. This effect disappears, however, if respondents in the Casamance, historically acephalous and home to a low-level conflict and an endemic sense of regional marginalization, are removed from the sample. The most notable results in Table 6.6a is the negative coefficient on trust in other citizens of the rural community, trust in other Senegalese and trust in the rural council in areas of network fragmentation. Respondents in these areas are less trusting of those with whom they do not have a close connection with, such as family or their village chief. This could reflect long-standing assessments of such areas as autonomous villages with few social ties and, in the worst cases long-standing disputes and suspicions (see discussion of Ziguinchor region, for example, in Chapter 2).

These negative coefficients in acephalous areas prior to colonization do not appear to have broader traction however, either as measured by exposure to the slave trade or to pre-colonial centralization more broadly. Table 6.6b replicates the models of Nunn and Wantchekon

**Table 6.6a: Difference of Means Tests, Reported Trust**

	(source: Local Elite Survey)				
	Trust Relatives	Trust Citizens in CR	Trust Other Senegalese	Trust Rural Council	Trust Village Chiefs
Pre-C Centralization (dummy)	0.03	0.11	0.22*	0.21	0.09
Fragmented	-0.07	-0.26**	-0.37**	-0.37**	0.00
Proliferation	0.06	0.08	0.04	-0.05	0.02
Congruence	-0.04	0.04	0.21*	0.25	-0.03

**Table 6.6b: OLS estimates of Reported Trust Measures**

	Panel A: Slave Exports per Area				
	(source: AfroBarometer)				
	Trust in Relatives	Trust Acquaint- ances	Trust Rural Council	Trust Neighbors (rd 5)	Trust Other Senegalese (rd 4)
ln (1+exports/area)	0.00 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.08)	0.04 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.05)	0.04 (0.11)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Department FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	1180	1036	1166	585	562
R <sup>2</sup>	0.13	0.13	0.25	0.17	0.14

	Panel B: Pre-Colonial Centralization				
	(source: AfroBarometer)				
	Trust in Relatives	Trust Acquaint- ances	Trust Rural Council	Trust Neighbors (rd 5)	Trust Other Senegalese (rd 4)
Pre-C Centr., 20km Discount	0.02 (0.02)	-0.12 (0.10)	-0.25 (0.23)	-0.09** (0.05)	0.07 (0.24)
Individual Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Department FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
N	1183	1169	1039	587	563
R <sup>2</sup>	0.13	0.25	0.14	0.16	0.14

\* p<0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. Table 6.6a reports difference of means tests across categories. Panels A and B in Table 6.6b: Results from OLS models with fixed effects at the departmental level. Control variables follow those used in Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) and include: age, age squared, gender, fixed effects for five measures of living conditions, fixed effects of ten levels of education, fixed effects for eleven religious identifiers, a measure of ethnic fractionalization and the share of the departmental level population that is the same ethnicity as respondent. Sample is restricted to rural respondents. Results do not change if the key independent variables in Panels B and C are run together, though the significance of trust in neighbors in Panel C slips to the 10% significance level. Results are likewise consistent if respondents in areas that were home to a centralized state are recoded to zero for the independent variable in Panel B, thereby restricting the measured effect of the slave trade to those most exposed in uncentralized areas.

(2011) using AfroBarometer data from Rounds Four and Five. If Nunn and Wantchekon are correct, then the positive effects of areas that were home to pre-colonial state could be driven by higher levels of intra-community trust because they were less exposed to the slave trade. As is clear, Table 6.6b is a story of null findings.

Panels A and B show that respondents to the AfroBarometer surveys are not more trusting using Nunn and Wantchekon's preferred measure of exposure to the slave trade ( $\ln(1 + \text{ethnic group exports}/\text{area of ethnic group})$ ) nor does it vary across this dissertation's own measure of pre-colonial centralization. The only significant finding is in Panel B where respondents in areas home to pre-colonial states are less trusting of neighbors, the inverse of the expected finding. Despite the fact that some local elites report lower trust in areas of network fragmentation, there is no difference in broader popular opinion across regions of the country. Neither exposure to the slave trade nor pre-colonial centralization seems to affect trust in local actors or other citizens.

### *Social Capital*

Finally, a brief revision of why the argument made here is not equivalent to the concept of social capital is merited. For theorists of social capital, pioneered by Putnam (1993), communities perform better when they have high provision of horizontal associations that create crosscutting cleavages and facilitate collective action. There is little variation in associational life sub-nationally in Senegal and the coefficient on this variable when included in models in Tables 6.1-6.3 is never significant. It is only significant at a few points in Chapter 3 and with no impact on the coefficient on pre-colonial centralization. Throughout the country, regions do not vary

substantially in the number of reported associations in any given village in survey or in official government data. In articulating a pattern that is explained by social ties among elites, this paper is focused on vertical ties between villagers and the elites who rule them (elected, traditionally appointed or a mix of the two) wherein how elites deliver goods to citizens varies based on the relative breadth of such vertical networks across the community. Despite a push to create social capital via civil society, the evidence presented here does not indicate that it systematically improves the ability of any given community or group to extract goods from their local governments.

## **A Final Comment on Ethnicity**

Why is this not reducible to co-ethnicity? Local governments in areas that were home to centralized states are, on average, more homogenous and areas that saw significant in-migration are often more ethnically diverse.<sup>300</sup> Even in areas that were home to pre-colonial states, many communities are quite ethnically diverse, yet there were almost no complaints of ethnic tension.<sup>301</sup> There is no difference in whether or not villages in the survey sample report minority

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<sup>300</sup> In areas of network congruence the average level of ethnic fractionalization (measured as a Herfindahl index) is seventy with a range of thirty-two to ninety-six. In regions of network proliferation the average is fifty-seven with a range of twenty-nine through 90.5. For areas of network fragmentation these figures are 50.5 and seventeen to seventy-one respectively. Network transformation has an average of fifty-eight with a range of fifty-five through sixty-one.

<sup>301</sup> In total, only one respondent in an area defined here as network congruence made a claim about discrimination, which was explicitly ethnic in nature.

ethnicities in their village; an average of sixty-six percent of villages report at least one minority.<sup>302</sup>

Noting that there were many ethnic groups in the region, a Sous-Prefet in Kaolack commented that this didn't create many problems since there was no single group dominating local politics, rather other structures 'rule' in this area, such as religious authorities or family relations.<sup>303</sup> Moreover, while individuals make claims about the role of family ties in facilitating governance; this does not actually mean that everyone is related or that those who are not are discriminated against. One village chief claimed that the local government worked well because everyone was family, even though he himself reported no family ties to other chiefs or elected officials in the community.<sup>304</sup> Similarly, a community secretary who explained the relative cohesion and efficacy of the local government as a function of the fact that 'almost everyone is related,' further qualified "there are many Sow, Mbaye, Ndoye in the rural community." While Mbaye and Ndoye are Wolof names (the dominant ethnicity in the area), Sow is a Peuhl name. Her explanation reflects a historical inclusion of the Peuhl minority in the area.<sup>305</sup> Many communities also report long-standing ties between non-co-ethnics, "I almost have no

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<sup>302</sup> There is a difference in means at the ten percent level in the absolute number of minority ethnic groups however, with an average of 1.21 minority groups in uncentralized areas and 1.03 in centralized areas.

<sup>303</sup> Specifically, he contrasted the region with Fouta Toro (Podor Department and Matam Region) where chiefs have a 'stranglehold' on the populations and hence co-ethnic ties among chiefs were extremely important. By contrast, here each village chief 'just takes care of their own village' without making political claims based on ethnic identity (Interview, Kaolack Region, 3 May 2013).

<sup>304</sup> Interview, cdv #2, rural community #47, 15 May 2013

<sup>305</sup> Interview, rural community #19, 6 March 2013.

boundaries, they are all my family except for the Peulhs and they are my friends," said one councilor in the Saloum.<sup>306</sup>

Yet the dominant assumption is that ethnicity is the central conduit of public goods distribution in post-colonial African politics (for example, Barkan and Chege 1989; Azam, 2001; Miguel, 2004; Habyarimana et al., 2007). Since Easterly and Levine's (1997) influential finding that increases in ethnic diversity are associated with slower economic growth, a number of explanations for the relationship between increased ethnic fractionalization in a region or country and lowered public goods delivery have been put forth (see the review in Kimenyi 2006), for example focusing on how ethnic diversity might undermine consensus building (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly 1999) or how a common collective identity might facilitate mobilization in the context of collective action dilemmas (Habyarimana et al. 2007) or induce strategic voter behavior (Posner, 2005; Ichino and Nathan, 2013). At a more macro-level, scholars have argued that ethnic diversity allowed weak regimes to construct networks of support by distributing limited resources strategically along ethnic lines (Azam, 2001), with studies finding evidence that leaders target public goods and foreign aid to co-ethnics (Kramon and Posner, 2011; Jablonski, 2014; Briggs, 2014), though most such evidence is strongest in Anglophone cases (Nugent, 2010).

The findings of this paper should not be read as suggesting that ethnicity does not matter in African politics; this would be too bold a claim in the face of the numerous findings reviewed above and Table 6.2 and 6.3 do suggest that ethnic homogeneity improves public

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<sup>306</sup> Interview, councilor, rural community #11, 22 April 2013.

goods delivery in some cases. Merely, it seeks to nuance the assumption that ethnicity is the most important political cleavage in African political life, at least as it pertains to local politics in rural West Africa (an admittedly specific category). Of course, the relatively low importance for an ethnic effect is in part driven by the relative lack of ethnic politicization in Senegal and other Sahelian states, such as Mali (see Diouf, 1994 on Senegal). Ethnicity in Francophone West Africa is a weaker prediction of favoritism in public goods delivery relative to other countries in a study by Franck and Rainer (2012), who suggest that this may be due to the unifying effect of Islam. This is not to claim that ethnicity is not a relevant social category for Senegalese; rather individuals describe themselves along ethnic lines and often invoke ethnic stereotypes and categories (Diouf, 1994), but ethnicity has never become a national-level political cleavage (Koter, 2013a) and the sub-region is known for the relative fluidity of ethnic categories as individuals adopt and discard ethnic categories, be it part of religious conversion, migration, inter-marriage, etc. (Amselle, 1990).

As the cases discussed in the previous chapter illustrate, in many communities local political cleavages actually emerge within ethnic groups, such as between different castes or between long-time residents and newcomer co-ethnics. In Tambacounda region, one Sous-Prefet recounted numerous examples of long-existing villages in the region becoming upset when services went to newer villages, claiming that as the ‘original inhabitants’ they should be served first, invoking a legitimacy intimately tied to their historical status despite a shared ethnic identity. In areas that have seen large in-migrations of Guinean Peulhs, there was notable discrimination against migrants by what are ostensibly co-ethnics even after over a half-century

of cohabitation. In Kolda Region, a handful of chiefs claimed that it was the ‘Peulh Fulani’ who are favored over the ‘Peulh Firdu,’<sup>307</sup> again reflecting sub-ethnic disagreements based on migration patterns. In all of these examples, political differences are based on a relative degree of social ties that are more directly shaped by family or historical relations than by ethnic identity.

The stickiness of assumptions about the role of ethnicity, disproportionately based on experiences in a handful of Anglophone countries, should not lead us to overlook recent research suggesting that co-ethnicity may not yield the benefits it has long been assumed to (Kasara, 2007; van de Walle, 2007; Franck and Rainer, 2012; Jackson, 2013; Kramon and Posner, 2013; Gisselquist, 2014), that its effects depend on micro-level spatial patterns (Ejdemyr et al, 2015) and that ethnicity may not provide the most lucrative basis for clientelism as was long thought (Koter, 2013a).<sup>308</sup> Similarly, numerous studies have found that ethnicity is not a good predictor of party affiliation or vote choice in the country (Dowd and Driessen, 2008; Koter, 2013b).

Others have suggested that *cousinage* or joking cousin relations might create crosscutting cleavages (Galvan, 2006; Dunning and Harrison, 2012). The fact that this does seem to matter more in some communities has implications for expectations about the role of *cousinage*, or joking cousin relations, in preventing the escalation of ethnic conflict. The

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<sup>307</sup> When asked whether he knew any councilors, one chief in this area shook his head before saying it was the “Peulh Fulani that rule here, not us” (Interview, cdv #2, rural community #41, 10 April 2013.

<sup>308</sup> Politicians’ choice to engage in ethnically motivated politics may be a function of social structure. For Koter (2013a), elites will use intermediaries if they are available and only resort to direct reliance on co-ethnics when such intermediaries, who reduce transaction costs, are not available. Huber (2014) argues in another vein that class based voting is less prevalent in highly unequal societies than ethnic-based voting because co-ethnics form a smaller minimum winning coalition, thereby enlarging each individual’s redistributive share.

existence of such crosscutting cleavages is undeniable in most of Senegalese society, so obvious perhaps that it was rarely mentioned by respondents.<sup>309</sup> The rules of *cousinage* are consistent across the country however, which leaves open the question of why it is cited as a moderate of ethnic or caste tension in some regions of the country while apparently failing to do so in others (despite the presence of the same ethnic groups and caste categories which form the basis for joking relationships). This is an interesting question for future research.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter has explored how well the four types of social networks elaborated in Chapter Five can explain differences in quantitative data from interviews with local elites. This chapter has established that respondent evaluations of their rural council are influenced by their network ties to elected officials; co-partisans, co-ethnic and family members are all more likely to view their local governments as equitable. Yet, areas of network congruence remain distinct: respondents in these regions view democratic decentralization more favorably and are disproportionately more likely to cite the responsiveness and benefits of contact with their local governments as the reasons they appreciate the reforms. They are also evaluate the work of their rural councils more positively, view their rural community as being responsible for delivering universalistic benefits and are less likely to upwardly bias their evaluations when they are related to elected officials. When it comes to actual public goods delivery between 2009-12, this chapter has further established that different factors matter in different parts of the

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<sup>309</sup> One exception was the PCR of rural community #49 who explained to me that this helped alleviate tensions in his multi-ethnic community (Interview, 29 April 2013).

country. While increased ethnic homogeneity of the community is a positive predictor in areas of network fragmentation and proliferation, it is insignificant in areas of network congruence despite substantial ethnic diversity in these communities as well. While newcomers are biased against in areas of network proliferation, they may be favored in areas of congruence.

This chapter has also sought to examine potential alternative explanations. It has qualified expectations of ethnicity as a key explanatory variable; while ethnic homogenization appears to be beneficial, being a non-co-ethnic is not necessarily a reason that a village does not receive a good. There do not appear to be significant differences in the education of elected officials, the training local elites have received or the activity of the local council across the country. Moreover, there is little evidence of central government favoritism and, if anything, donors are more likely to go to uncentralized areas than elsewhere. Local political differences in rural Senegal today does not appear to be consistent with differences in bottom-up accountability, information flows, trust, center-local relations or horizontal social capital. All of these findings reinforce the central argument this dissertation that differences in key axes of historical settlement patterns are creating different forms of local politics in rural West Africa today.

## **Conclusion**

The past fifteen years have seen a rapid proliferation of social service delivery across the developing world. In Senegal alone, work spurred on by the Millennium Development Goals halved the population living under \$1.25 a day, achieved gender parity in primary education and made great strides towards reducing child mortality. But by 2015, the target date of the MDGs, West Africa is a patchwork of progress: Mali, The Gambia and Burkina Faso are considered on track, Senegal and Guinea lag and Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone are woefully behind. At their expiration, many suggestions as to why some domestic governments did better than others can be made and, as the international community moves forward to the MDG's presumed successor, the Sustainable Development Goals, the comparative politics literate could likewise offer a range of predictions about their likely fate. To this list of common arguments – how much aid money stays in capitals through corruption or is spent on air-conditioning units for NGO offices, whether projects are targeted to key political or ethnic supporters, etc. – this study has suggested a novel addition: progress may be made unevenly within single countries as a function of historically inherited and spatially uneven attributes.

This dissertation has made this argument by looking across time and space, identifying a historically contingent and unforeseen legacy that drives differences in development politics at the local level today. It has centrally suggested that pre-colonial statehood matters by virtue of how it structures local socio-political relations and by the relative congruence of these social networks with formal political space. By way of conclusion, the following sections review the key

contours of the argument, provides brief commentary on the generalizability of the findings

before offering a discussion of the implications that this study hold for comparative politics.

## **Summary of the Argument**

This dissertation has sought to explain why local governments engage in different patterns of redistribution despite similar formal institutional environments. The study finds that areas that were home to pre-colonial states are delivering social services to more villages than their counterparts in uncentralized areas, echoing renewed recognition of the role of history in the contemporary dynamics of political economy of development. In so doing, this project revisits an old question in African politics as to how pre-colonial institutions impact contemporary politics in the region, but pushes forward current understandings of the pre-colonial influence by arguing that this is not reducible to long-run structural differences. Rather, it only emerges when decision-making takes place at the local level. The explanation hinges therefore on the idea that patterns of allocational choices among local governments vary sub-nationally following democratic decentralization.

Three arguments have been advanced in this dissertation to explain this empirical pattern. Most centrally, this project identifies the uneven social legacies that pre-colonial statehood left in the rural countryside. Villages (and the local elites who live in them) that fell under a pre-colonial state make mutually reinforcing claims to local authority rooted in their shared history. Following democratic decentralization, these claims extend to community resources as well. Because these same areas are more likely to have a high degree of overlap between newly-created local government boundaries and local elite networks and because local

elites are enmeshed in broad webs of reciprocal obligation that encompass the community, resources that come into the local community are distributed accordingly. The socio-political legacies of the pre-colonial era are markedly different in areas that were acephalous on the eve of French arrival. Network ties among elites in these regions of the country are fractured and often contentious as different villages or groups of villages make rival claims to authority and voice in the community. Here, local politics follows more common expectations of African politics: elite networks splinter along ethnic, caste, in-migrant or partisan lines. Not surprisingly, local distributional politics follow suit.

Consequently, it is these informal institutional ties among local elites that drives the sub-national divergence illustrated in Chapter Three. These patterns are only identifiable by disaggregating across space, looking at micro-level distributional patterns rather than aggregating to a regional or district level. Of course, this is facilitated by data access, which allows for a study of local public goods where they are actually targeted: rural villages. Nonetheless, it improves dramatically upon the tendency to look at absolute levels of delivery or aggregate, group-level outcomes. Such data makes up the vast majority of studies on public goods delivery, but risks obscuring as much as it illuminates; as this project finds, what differs across areas that were home to pre-colonial states and those that were not is not a story about absolute numbers of service delivery but how this delivery is targeted and spread across constituents.

This study also makes a key distinction between the realities of *local* public goods delivery and theories of clientelism and distribution developed at the nation-state level. Local

elites in rural Africa are stationary bandits, their lives intertwined with voters and clients who are often their neighbors, friends and family, with few options to exit if they make an unpopular decision. The second argument advanced identifies the unique motivation behind the decision-making of local or community-specific actors. Local elites have social as well as material incentives; this is all the more important given the intertwined nature of social, economic and political relations in rural communities. Though leaving room open as to the specific mechanism(s), this dissertation has highlighted how elite networks not only shape who is listened to and elected, they also shape who can reinforce and validate their social status and reputation of local elites. Elites understand clearly the potential sanctions - economic, social and political - if they fail to deliver and these are only amplified under democratic decentralization. To reduce their motivations to pure power-maximization risks ignoring how local elites themselves conceptualize their choices and the reasons they make them.

Implicit in this argument is the idea that political actors have less agency than we often ascribe. Commonly theorized as utility-maximizing, with a full range of strategies and options available to obtain material gains, the recent literature on clientelism has largely failed to conceive of politicians as *social* as well as political actors, ignoring the diverse insights into the social dimensions of human motivation emerging from behavior economics and psychology. This assumption is particularly problematic at the local level, as described above and as illustrated in recent work by Auyera (2004) or Paller (2014) that highlight the social ties between patrons and clients that continue to the present day. This study joins this work in suggesting that politicians are constrained in the appeals they can make and the networks they can target.

Theirs is not a world of infinite choice but one of social, economic and political trade-offs in communities imbued with long-standing disagreements, arrangements and compromises.

Finally, the third argument made in the preceding chapters concerns the role of historical process. Most centrally, this project departs from the dominant approach to historical causes by identifying a path-dependent cause, informal institutional ties among local elites, with no persistent effect. To examine whether a robust correlation implies continuity, this dissertation ‘decompresses’ history and, as Chapter Four shows, it is only following the 1996 decentralization reforms that the distributional effects of pre-colonial statehood emerges. This critical juncture was conditioned by historical antecedents, but they themselves had had no effect on service delivery up until that point. This dissertation has shown that ‘decompressing’ history reveals the implausibility of many explanations while reinforcing the validity of the central claim that the informal institutional vestiges of the pre-colonial era that matter for service delivery today are a purely local phenomena.

## **A Commentary on Generalizability**

A key feature of the approach of this dissertation is that place-specific processes deserve further attention by scholars of comparative politics. This does not limit the implications this study to Senegal alone, however. Following are two points about the generalizability of these findings, the first pertaining the specific empirical case of pre-colonial centralization and the second to its theoretical portability.

The robust effects of pre-colonial centralization identified here parallels the findings of others (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2012; Gennaioli and Rainer, 2007; Bandyopadhyay and

Green, 2012), who have found similar patterns across sub-Saharan Africa. Together, this work indicates that there is something about areas that were home to pre-colonial states that is different and, as such, this question merits further research into what drives these effects. This project has argued that, at least in the case of the microstate system of the Sahel, this effect is intimately related to network ties among local elites. Empirically, this dissertation's argument is expected to travel through rural West Africa in all areas that were part of the vast West African State system, which includes present-day Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast and Guinea. These countries share distinct similarities: all French colonies, these countries did not experience the meddling with indigenous hierarchy the way that British colonies often did, leaving local, village-level elites more intact.<sup>310</sup>

The plausibility of the general pattern can be found in Figure C.1, which uses Round 4 AfroBarometer data to compare how rural citizens evaluate traditional leaders in Burkina Faso, Mali and Senegal, the only three Sahelian countries surveyed in this round.<sup>311</sup> Due to data limitations, centralization is measured as a dummy at the district level. Figure C.1 presented predicted probabilities from a series of simple models, the results of which can be found in Table C.1 in the General Appendix. Although the AfroBarometer does not allow for a precise estimation of the theory presented here, the fourth round asks a series of useful questions concerning traditional leaders ('TL') and local government ('LG'). In all three countries,

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
<sup>310</sup> Still, local elites in Northern Nigeria and elsewhere frequently have historically-derived status, suggesting that despite marked differences between French and British handling of indigenous authority structures, there may be more similarity than not across these often over-construed colonial differences.

<sup>311</sup> In all three countries, decentralization schemes have transferred meaningful authority to local governments, though historical evidence is not available to estimate the switch observed in Senegal.

respondents in centralized areas are more likely to report that traditional leaders influence the governing of their local community and are more likely to be in favor of increasing the amount of influence traditional leaders have with the exception of Mali where support is universally high. In turn, individuals who think that traditional leaders have more influence in governing the local community are more likely in all three countries to approve of their local council's work, to think that the local council is doing a good job making their work known and to trust their local councilor.

These findings are only suggestive, but nonetheless support the contention that there is something systematically different about areas home to pre-colonial states and to the positive evaluations of local governments where traditional authorities are perceived to be more influential across Francophone West Africa. The fact that pre-colonial centralization matters across the continent may or may not reflect a similar mechanism; this dissertation leaves that

**Figure C.1 Generalizability of Centralization's Influence, AfroBarometer Rd 4**



question open. At the most basic level, however, there is wide support for the idea that these pre-colonial characteristics matter for development outcomes and this project has attempted to explain this finding in one of the most politically organized regions of pre-colonial Africa.

Of course, pre-colonial centralization may be the origin of what drives the effects found here, but it only matters because of the relative intactness of network ties among local elites in these areas. In this sense, the general contours of the typology developed in Chapter Five are expected to be quite portable. One manifestation of this argument, of course, can be found in highly homogenous areas where individuals largely share a common claim to the community. Network congruence as a concept, therefore, is not explicitly tied to the pre-colonial origins identified here nor are the specifics of the elite networks ties described here, which are admittedly specific to West Africa.

Indeed, the broader argument of congruence between formal and informal institutions echoes a small number of recent studies. Cornell and Kalt (1994) and Dippel (2014) make comparable arguments in the case of Native American reservations, where reservations with tribes that have histories of shared governance perform better today. Tsai (2007) work on solidary groups in Chinese villages hinges on the informal institution being encompassing and embedding within the village, or, put otherwise, having a high degree of overlap with formal institutional space. Similarly in India, Pur (2007) argues that informal, local government institutions, which have existed in villages for centuries, have redefined their roles following democratization and when they overlap neatly with formal institutional settings can play a positive, synergistic role with the state. To a lesser extent, Foa (2014) argues that Russian

districts with a history of centralized rule prior to Tsarist consolidation have higher capacity and are better able to negotiate with the central state following 1989. Although a small group, together these disparate works suggest that there is a broader class of phenomena whereby informal institutions become important conduits for distributional politics when they overlap neatly with formal institutional boundaries. In tying this disparate body of work together, this study highlights the utility of the concept for comparative politics more generally.

There remains an obvious question of scale. This has been a story of sub-national differences and, at its heart, about the particular realities of the *local* political sphere. The preceding paragraphs indicate that the argument is generalizable geographically to other small-scale or sub-national settings, but can the argument of network congruence scale up the regional or national level? Some evidence exists that the relative congruence between borders and social forces matters at the state level. Most prominently, Englebert (2000) argues that the degree of ‘violence’ that post-colonial borders did to pre-colonial authority structured the incentives that national leaders faced at independence. Englebert argues that the result is developmental policies in cases of high congruence versus neo-patrimonialism, due to insufficient loyalty to the state on the part of bureaucrats, in cases of low congruence.<sup>312</sup> In addition to Englebert, one of the few arguments in this vein is made by Robinson and Parsons (2006) about Botswana (an

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<sup>312</sup> For Englebert this is a question of state developmental capacity, which differs from the argument made here (this project finding no difference in objective capacity measures), but at the most basic level, central state elites redistribute broadly in his argument because there is a well-understood community on whom their status and reputation depend.

unusual case for a region where few states meets Englebert's otherwise rigorous criteria).<sup>313</sup> In both cases, the authors focus on situations where the central state distributes goods; in these cases we might reasonably expect significant path dependence and persistence absent their own, formal institutional ruptures.

Still, a profoundly local element drives the specific form of this dissertation's discussion of network congruence. At the national level, the social incentives that help explain why elites don't predate on their co-citizens and co-elites at the local level are quite implausible.<sup>314</sup> At the same time, in tandem both national and sub-national studies suggest the value of a high degree of overlap between informal institutions and formal, administrative boundaries. It is likely that the mechanisms behind Englebert's findings are substantially different than those found for Senegal's rural councils, but that the concept of formal and informal institutional overlap retains broader utility. This is an area for future development.

## Implications for Comparative Politics

The story behind the diverging fates of rural Senegalese communities presented here holds a series of implications for the literature on comparative politics. First, it highlights the value of taking temporal process seriously. Decompressing history in this manner serves as a

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<sup>313</sup> If network congruence finds limited evidence at the national level, what are we to make of the many post-colonial states that were not home to micro-state systems but whose territory was largely, but not completely, unified prior to colonization. What, in other words, is happening in countries like Ghana where the Akan state dominated a large part, though certainly not the majority, of the contemporary state's territory? In these cases it is entirely possible that the history of social service delivery is more path-dependent than the findings for Senegal's microstate system if local, regional elites have meaningfully had authority over redistribution through time.

<sup>314</sup> Tsai similarly notes that the limitation of solidary groups is their failure to scale up beyond an extremely local level (2007: 263).

reminder that without understanding temporal process we risk identifying causes that have little historical plausibility. The turn to history in the political economy of development literature has raised important questions, but by showing little interest in how history unfolded over time, the mechanisms identified risk being inconsistent with actual empirical patterns. This dissertation's argument explains why pre-colonial statehood matters for local development today therefore, but its logic does not explain why some villages are more likely to receive a primary school or clinic in the era of structural adjustment, on the eve of independence, the inter-war period, etc. The same question could be raised for a host of other studies; the question does not negate the finding, but it does ask us to seriously interrogate the plausibility of our proposed theoretical stories. This echoes the concerns voiced by Pomeranz (2012: S140), Jerven (2011: 120), and others that the institutional persistence literature provides no evaluation of if or how institutions are modified, stopped or even reversed in the one hundred plus years between the eve of colonization and the development outcomes under study.

From another perspective, this project articulates a bolder role for history in African political life than is usually assigned. A visitor to many rural communities in Senegal would happily report that local distributional politics is driven by partisanship or ethnicity if they were to spatially and temporally stop there, but this would be an incomplete story at best. At its core, this dissertation makes a powerful claim that students of African politics ought to re-conceptualize how we think history matters and to be cautious of accepting proximate causes without deeper investigation. More precisely, it is has suggested that the historical inheritance of villages and communities across the continent are not reducible to the colonial encounter or,

more commonly, to decolonization and the process of state-building that followed. To the contrary, this dissertation articulates a clear channel by which pre-colonial characteristics act as critical antecedents that lay the groundwork for the local-level divergence that we see emerging today, over a century later.

Secondly, by virtue of its recognition of the social dimensions of elite decision-making, the project returns to an older debate about the interaction between state and social forces. This suggests that the recent turn in the clientelism literature to narrowly conceptualize incentive structures along material dimensions alone may be misdirected. The adherence to the assumption that local elites only care about maximizing power and their own utility in recent work would obscure more than it illuminates in this study and, it can be imagined, in many others. Throughout rural Africa, local politics are defined by the diffuse, personal and asymmetrical power relations that lie at the heart of classic definitions of clientelism, but the richness of these relations has either been obscured or forgotten in most recent work. To the extent that the disciplinary badge of political science is its focus on power, there is certainly value in thinking through the many dimensions of power that actors hold and to recognize that these may be best served by different means.

Countering the materialist focus, this study articulates a theory of local public goods delivery that turns attention to the socio-political drivers of elite behavior that have long been identified by behavioral economists and psychologists. Local actors are *locals* and their own interests, political, economic and social, demand serious theorization by scholars of African politics. The local and personal nature of ties among individuals within communities means that

theories formed by looking at national-level political dynamics tell an incomplete story, ascribing more agency to decision makers than is realistically found in rural communities. The reality of local politics in the developing world is that all relevant actors - representatives, patrons, brokers and voters - engage in daily interactions with one other, live within the same communities and all stand to benefit from local improvements.

The resurgence in work on informal institutions that this study builds on has by now well established their role in shaping political outcomes (for example Collins, 2004; Galvan, 2004; Helmke and Levitsky, 2004, Tsai, 2007). Still, the dominant assumption in this work continues to be that informal institutions compensate for or seize upon formal institutional weaknesses. Tsai (2007) suggests that solidary groups may only be important in authoritarian regimes where they offer citizens a means to hold local officials accountable, but the similarity of findings to this project's indicate that this is not simply a gap-filling institution in authoritarian regimes, but part of a broader set of questions about formal and informal institutional overlap.

As the literature on informal institutions matures, the findings of this dissertation suggest that informal institutions should be studied in their own right, with explicit attention to how they change (or not) in response to shifts in the formal institutional environment, rather than explaining their mere existence or perseverance.<sup>315</sup> Rather than 'filling a gap' or substituting for formal institutions, elite network ties in rural Senegal influence all aspects of local political life, at times reinforcing while at others challenging the formal rules of democratic decentralization. For local citizens, there is little perceived incongruence between these authority

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<sup>315</sup> This point is particularly salient for developing countries, where formal institutional changes have been abundant and recognition of the role of informal institutions is growing.

structures, as highlighted by Logan (2011). The suggestion that informal institutions compensate therefore seems far from the dynamics of network congruence. Scholars could learn much by examining how informal institutions fare across formal institutional settings or how they are shaped by formal institutions over time (see Maclean, 2010 for a rare example of a study that does similarly). Institutions are always - and have always - been overlapping and, as such, a host of questions about them remain that would be a more fruitful avenue of research.

Finally, the most important contemporary discussion that this study speaks to is our understanding of the dual reforms of democratization and decentralization around the continent. While initially dismissed as window-dressing, evidence increasingly suggests that decentralization matters for how individuals encounter the state; much of the anthropology of the state literature reminds us that local manifestations of the state, decentralized or devolved, are the only site of contact for most rural Africans (Blundo et al., 2006). Consequently, the findings presented here hold significant implications for how we study and approach the unfolding and concurrent agendas of decentralization and bottom-up development in the developing world. Scholars have done relatively little work on understanding variation in local political life and how this interacts with the shift to a participatory focus in development circles. As noted at numerous points, the empirical and theoretical arguments of this project caution against the assumption that local state elites are mirrors of their central state counterparts and, as the scope of what local agents control expands, it becomes even more important that we interrogate the ways in which we expect local state actors to pursue their interests and, more importantly, when we think their interests dovetail with those of the broader community.

As a cautionary note, centralized areas of the country may deliver goods more broadly, but there are profoundly anti-democratic aspects hidden within this narrative. The findings suggest that local elite networks are efficient conduits for public goods delivery in situations of high network congruence, but it remains likely that these same network ties among elites do not systematically undermine the voices of women, the young and migrants. Although there is no evidence that local elites in these communities more actively interfere in the electoral arena, the presence of a well entrenched and mutually reinforcing elite structure raises concerns about elite capture of the local public sphere. Even if this retains positive, distributional elements in the domains of the locally delivered and highly visible public goods under analysis here, the possibility remains that local elites are equally likely to use their positions of power to divert resources to their own ends in situations where they face less pressure from clients.

The suggestion that some local governments are providing more accessible and broad-based social services to their citizens than others holds serious implications for how we think about sub-national inequalities. If decentralization was designed as a means to improve transparency, representation and aid participatory development and if some areas are structurally better situated to do that better than others, then we are likely to see a new widening of development outcomes across the region. In the worst of cases, some local elites and the villages they represent are completely disengaged from their local governments, which not only holds implications for their ability to demand and receive goods and services, but for the broader process of democratic consolidation. If one of the cautionary warnings about decentralization embedded in this dissertation's findings is that we are seeing the development

of subnational inequalities in local development, this suggests that these problems are all the more exacerbated in cases of low-equilibrium performance. Decentralization gives an unforeseen advantage to some communities, those with high degrees of network congruence, while exacerbating inter-village inequality in others.

This concern is all the more profound because of the explicitly structural nature of the argument. The long-run historical processes that create different configurations of local elite network were not the intention of anyone and, as a result, network congruence is hardly something that can be created from above. In areas of low congruence, the disjointed spatial spread of different elite networks only amplifies the difficulty of engineering local administrative boundaries around different groups. Ample concern already exists as to whether or not the current boundary configurations in West Africa are producing viable economic units and, more generally, we might wonder whether such segregation is advisable. None of this is to suggest that democratic decentralization be abandoned, merely that we are well-served in recognizing that deeper structures drive outcomes than the particular, institutional contours of such administrative reforms themselves.

# GENERAL APPENDIX

## 1. Results of Generalizability Tests

Table C.1: Generalizability of Patterns, AfroBarometer rd 4

		Trad Leaders Influence LG			Should Increase Trad Leaders Influence in LG					
		Burkina Faso	Mali	Senegal	Burkina Faso	Mali	Senegal			
Centralized		0.46*** (0.11)	0.18** (0.07)	0.31*** (0.09)	0.22*** (0.02)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.15*** (0.04)			
	N	698	1061	757	679	1051	733			
	R <sup>2</sup>	0.04	0.02	0.03	0.17	0.11	0.14			
		Approve Work Councilor			Council Makes Work Known		Trust Local Council			
		Burkina Faso	Mali	Senegal	Burkina Faso	Mali	Senegal	Burkina Faso	Mali	Senegal
Trad Leaders Influence LG		0.12*** (0.03)	0.12*** (0.03)	0.12*** (0.03)	0.14*** (0.04)	0.22*** (0.03)	0.16*** (0.03)	0.08** (0.03)	0.14*** (0.03)	0.18*** (0.04)
	N	643	1020	703	571	1000	597	653	1045	689
	R <sup>2</sup>	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.06	0.06	0.03	0.03	0.04

\* p< 0.1, \*\* p < 0.05, \*\*\* p < 0.01. Results from OLS models; effects are similar in ordered logit. Control variables include age, education level, a poverty index and a dummy variable that takes a one if a respondent is a female. Sample is restricted to rural respondents..

## 2. Senegal's Pre-Colonial Kingdoms

underlined names indicate capitals

Light grey is maximum extent, dark grey is approximate territory in 1880


### BAOL (Bawol) (1689 - late 1800s)

Historically a vassal state of the Djoloff empire until the latter's collapse in the 1550s, Baol became an independent state following its succession from Cayor in 1689. Like Cayor, it was a Wolof kingdom although a large Sereer minority had long lived in the area. The state was ruled by a system of electors. Following French annexation, much of the aristocracy became followers of the Mouride brotherhood which became the dominant political force in the area formerly home to Baol (largely mapping onto today's Diourbel region) ever since.

Key Villages: Kaba, Lambaye, Sessene, Nianing, Sambaye, Seo, Mbeye, Tock Ngol, Ngoudiane, Gallo Ngoye, Poleck, Sambe

Guinte, Thiakhar, Tengue Ouolof, Mbour, Nghaye, Saly


Sources: Davidson, 1966; Martin and Becker, 1974; Searing, 2002



### BOUNDOU (Bundu) (early 1690s - late 1800s)

A state run by a Peul aristocracy descending from the founder, Malick Sy, a migrant from Fouta Toro. The area had long been home to substantial Soninke, Mandingue and Wolof

populations, many of whom submitted to the Sissibe dynasty following the state's foundation. The state expanded westward and to the south, conquering new territories that formed provinces ruled by the Sissibe family, but by late 1700s the state turned to consolidating its authority over existing territory and its role as a liaison between the Senegal and Gambian river states. By early 1800s Boundou's economy began to stagnate following a series of unsuccessful wars with Kaarta (present day Mali) and from increased pressure by growing trade with France and England to the northeast and west. The combination of a cholera outbreak



in the 1860s, the effects of the Umarian jihads and significant out-migration following increased political unrest in the region, left the state significantly depopulated and geographically reduced in size in the latter half of the 1800s thus that Mamadou Lamine's uprising in the 1880s forced the state's hand to ally permanently with the French.

Key Villages: Senedebou, Wouro Kaba, Koussan, Bubuya, Bani, Sansading, Soutouta, Diamweli, Diana, Fissa Darou, Dide Gassama, Dieylani, Aynoumadi

Sources: Rancon, 1895; Curtin, 1975; Gomez, 1992; Clark, 1994, 1996, 1998


### CAYOR (mid-1500s— ~1886)

Founded when Amary Fal's led Cayor and Baol to succeed from the Djoloff empire in the mid-1500s, Cayor became the most powerful Wolof states in the period leading up to French conquest. Given its long coastline, Cayor was able to trade in slaves and a variety of commercial and food goods with European and Moorish traders.

Nominally Muslim, the royal court was dominated by a Wolof aristocracy that had clear rules of succession and elections, though the monarchy was prone to substantial infighting. Military authority was maintained via the crown-slave caste of ceddo and administered via provinces. A Peul minority existed throughout the territory and were subject to specific tax codes. Cayor's last king, Lat Dior, resisted French annexation for over twenty years before the French finally constructed the Saint-Louis-Dakar railroad through the heart of the Cayor empire, effectively ending the region's independence.

Key Villages: Coky, Ndiakhar, Palene, Maka Fall, Kab Gaye, Battal, Ndiambor, Ndiarer Diop, Khattre, Mballene, Nguiguis, Mbediene, Ndiol, Loro, Pout, Mbidieum, Dieuleuck, Pire, Merina Diop, Ndiol Gандiole, Maka, Mboul, Gueoul, Ngourane, Niomre, Diamatyl, Ngol Ngol, Lampsar, Ndio

Sources: Rousseau, 1933; Fall, 1974; Ba, 1976; Suret-Canel and Barry, 1976; Diouf, 1990



### DJOLOFF (late 12th-14th century - late 1800s)

At its height in the 15th century, the Djoloff empire covered much of western Senegal. The state grew around its role in the trans-


Saharan trade, but following the arrival of European traders on the coast and along the Senegal river, the state was unable to

reorient its economy with its vassels, notably Caylor, breaking off and dominating these new economic activities. Following the succession of Baol, Caylor, Oualo and Sine, the empire collapsed, leaving the Djoloff state as a relatively impoverished and isolated kingdom in Senegal's sparse interior. Dominated by a Wolof aristocracy, the area was traditionally home to Fulbe herders and Maure traders.

Key Villages: Warrox, Khol Khol, Mbethio Diaobe, Mouye, Doundodji, Kilim, Linguere, Ndiayene Thotto, Ngourou, Thilla Ouarkhokh, Sagatta, Dahra, Deck Wotte,

Ndama Ouolof, Ngapp, Yang Yang, Affe, Porom, Linde, Ndiayene Sambour, Barkedji

Sources: Monteil, 1966; Leyti, 1981; Clark and Phillips, 1994




### FOULADOU (Firdu) (1867-early 1900s)

Founded by Alfa Molo Balde and ruled subsequently by his son, Mousa Molo, Fouladou formed in the wake of Kaabu's collapse by Peul herders unhappy with the long-time domination of Mandingues in the area. For much of its existence, Fouladou was a tributary of Fouta Jallon (present day Guinea). The state was at a disputed level of consolidation upon the arrival of the French with Fanchette arguing that it was little more than a large chieftaincy (resulting in a conservative measure of state expansion here, though all results hold with a more liberal estimation).

Key Villages: Ndorna, Ham dallaye, Boguel, Sare Dembayel, Sare Kediang

Sources: Girard, 1964; Quinn, 1971; Fanchette, 1999; Ngaide, 2012



### FOUTA TORO (mid-1400s - 1891)


Peul state stretching along the middle to upper Senegal river, the state was composed of a set of highly independent provinces that shared deep cultural and ethnic ties and which together elected a council that ruled in

conjuncture with an elected king. The state was an early converter to Islam and home to many famous clerics. The state was weakened in the 1800s as the French began to exert more control and became less willing to meet

Futanke demands. Economically, the state was hurt when as the pre-colonial economy shifted to groundnuts, moving away from the river-based commerce Fouta Toro had dominated.

**Key Villages:** Aere, Dabia, Kobia, Thilogne, Ndiakir, Orefonde, Orndolde, Ouaounde, Kanel, Dialmathie, Fanaye Diery, Demette, Diaba, Sangayel Cas-Cas, Mboumba, Gaol, Nguidjilone, Ndioum, Guede Village, Pete, Salde, Mbolo, Ogo, Tiguere, Sinthiou Bamambe, Semme, Adabere, Nenette, Bode Lao, Diendiouba, Ouro Madihou, Nabadjji Civol, Thiancone Hiraye, Aoure

Sources: Davidson, 1966; Wane, 1969; Robinson, 1975




### GAJAAGA (Goy, Galam) (foundation disputed, between late 8th through 14th century - 1890s)

A long-established Soninke state centered around a handful of large commercial cities that controlled commerce (principally gold, gum arabic and slaves) along the southern bank of the upper Senegal (centered around present day Bakel). Ruled by the Bathily family, the territory was divided into an upper provide, Kamera north of the Faleme river and Goy to the south.

**Key Villages:** Diawara, Tiyabu, Yafera

Sources: Curtin, 1975; Bathily, 1989; Gomez, 1992; Clark and Phillips, 1994



### KAABU (Gabu) (1200s - late-1700s)


Mandingue empire, founded in the era of the Malian empire, whose capital (Kansala) fell in present-day Guinea-Bissau and whose borders crossed into Senegal and Guinea. The empire, which reached its peak in the 1500s, was based upon a set of provinces whose increased calls for autonomy coupled

with growing pressure from Fouta Djallon to the East led to its decline from the mid-seventeenth century onwards.

**Key Villages:** Soumacounda, Coumbacara, Sare Pathe Kamako, Boguel, Kankelefa, Kerevane Pakao, Mampatim, Same Kanta

Peulh, Soulabaly, Diabicounda, Dandou  
Sadio, Diacounda

Sources: Girard, 1964; Niane, 1989; Clark and Phillips, 1994




### NIANI (mid-1600s - turn of the 19th century)

Mandingue kingdom located along the Gambian river that, at its peak in the 18th century, was quite powerful in the area, growing around the Atlantic slave trade. The state had declined by the 19th century into a series of small chieftaincies with substantial in-fighting among them.

Key Villages: Kataba (located in present-day Gambia) Koussalan, Maka Cisse

Sources: Quinn, 1972




### NIUMI (~1500 - mid-1700s)

A small Mandinka state on the coast and border with Gambia. For much of its history, a tributary state to Saloum. The state declines in the 1700s.

Key Villages: Missirah, Djinack Bara

Sources: Wright, 1977; Suret-Canale and Barry, 1976




## OUALO (Walo) (1630 - mid-1800s)

A Wolof kingdom in the Senegal River delta area that was originally part of the Djoloff empire and which became independent in the early 1600s. Ouala was a weaker state than the other Wolof kingdoms and the aristocracy had recurrent fights between three royal lineages. Moreover, the kingdom's location made it particularly vulnerable to raids from Maures to the north, pressure from neighboring kingdoms and to the growing trader community in Saint Louis, at the base of the Senegal river. As the aristocracy became dependent on the slave trade, the kingdom suffered a series of religious jihads and had dramatically declined when it finally fell under French annexation in the mid-1800s.

Key Villages: Bokhol, Merina Guewel, Nder, Ndiangue, Ndombo, Ross-Bethio

Sources: Rousseau, 1929; Barry, 1972; Suret-Canale and Barry, 1976




## OLI (Wuli) (mid-1600s - turn of the 19th century)

Mandingue kingdom located along the Gambian river that grew around the Atlantic slave trade and its ability to control communication between sea ports and the Sudan interior. Capital in Madina (present day Gambia) and ruled by the Wali family. Although the royal family was Mandingue, the area was always home to substantial Sarakhole, Wolof and Peul minorities. A series of succession crises, provoked in part by the decline of the slave trade and increased political tensions in the region (notably pressure from Boundou to the east) undermined the. By the early 1800s was largely considered a province of Boundou and by Rancon's mission in 1891-2 he reports the royal family was reported as impoverished and with no meaningful authority in the region.

Key Villages: Koulear, Licounda, Kerewane, Netteboulou, Douta Bassy, Guirigara, Boucaricounda

Sources: Rancon, 1895; Quinn, 1972; van Hoven, 1995




## RIP-PAKALA (1600s - 1860s)

First known as Badibu, Rip was a Wolof (though with Mandingue-dominated provinces and Soninke and Peul minorities) state that had intimate relations with but was always independent of Saloum. Rip was where Ma Ba staged his jihad in the 1860s and although he conquered the area, he died shortly after and the area was not clearly controlled until the French took over in the late 1800s.

Key Villages: Keur Maba, Nioro du Rip, Pakala, Sabach

Sources: Ba, 1957; Sarr, 1986



## SALOUM (late 1400s - late 1880s)

Sereer kingdom originally a tributary of the Djoloff empire and gaining independence in the 1600s, the state was founded by a matrilineage migrating from Kaabu. As trade with the coast grew, the state became quite powerful, with a well-developed military bureaucracy, supported by a royal slave-caste (*tyeddo*), the state became a commercial force. Power was centered in the Buur, or king, who was elected between eligible families, but his power rested on an extended aristocracy across a large number of provinces, many of which were Wolof. The French tried to establish a protectorate in Saloum in 1862, but this was largely unsuccessful and, shortly after, Ma Ba's jihad further challenged the state. Nonetheless, the state remained autonomous until 1898 when the French officially annexed it and, unlike everywhere but Sine, a nominal king stayed in place until 1969.

Key Villages: Nguer Mandakh, Djilor, Diokoul, Boffi, Katakel, Kathiotte, Ndioudiene, Kayemore, Mbamb Langhem, Kahone, Barkedji, Paffa, Baytite

Sources: Klein, 1968; Venema, 1978; Suret-Canale and Barry, 1976



## SINE (Siin) (14th century - late 1880s)

Serer Kingdom that gained independence from the Djoloff empire in mid-sixteenth century. Like Saloum, Sine was based on a matrilineal aristocracy though there were more direct ties between the Buur (king) and villages. Unlike the other states in the region, the Sine aristocracy never converted to Islam, retaining animist beliefs up until the early colonial period when a combination of Catholic missions and Islamization converted much of the population. Like Saloum, the Buur Sine retained a nominal title until 1969.

Key Villages: Marouth, Diourop, Mbissel, Ndiob, Ngayokheme, Ngohe Mbadatte, Diakhao, Ndoffane

Sources: Klein, 1968; Sarr, 1986




Figure A.1 Colonial *Cercles* Over Time




Figure A.2 Post Colonial Regions




Figure A.3 Colonial *Cantons* to Rural Communities





























Figure A.4 Villages Over Time












## 4. Data Appendix

NAME	DESC	SOURCE	N	$\bar{X}$	SD	DISTRIBUTION	Chpt
<b>DEPENDENT VARIABLES</b>							
New School Access (3km), 2002-09	A 0-1 measure of whether or not a village received access to a new school in a given time period	Senegalese Ministry of Education	14468	0.33	0.47		3
New School Access (3km), 2009-12	A 0-1 measure of whether or not a village received access to a new school in a given time period	Senegalese Ministry of Education	14468	0.21	0.4		3
New Classrooms, 2002-09	A count measure of the number of new classrooms a school received in a given time period	Senegalese Ministry of Education	4303	1.62	4.62		3
New Classrooms, 2009-12	A count measure of the number of new classrooms a school received in a given time period	Senegalese Ministry of Education	5594	1.48	2.82		3
New Health Facilities (5km), 2009-12	A 0-1 measure of whether or not a village received access to a new health post or health hut in a given time period	Senegalese Ministry of Health	10335	0.43	0.49		3
Maximize Attendance, 2002-09	The difference between the number of students who would have been covered under the ideal-point locations for the maximize attendance model and those that were actually covered by the built facility (zero means the ideal point was chosen)	Author Coded	319	296.5	7339		3
Maximize Coverage, 2002-09	The difference between the number of students who would have been covered under the ideal-point locations for the maximize coverage model and those that were actually covered by the built facility (zero means the ideal point was chosen)	Author Coded	319	744.4	1348		3
Maximize Attendance, 2009-12	The difference between the number of students who would have been covered under the ideal-point locations for the maximize attendance model and those that were actually covered by the built facility (zero means the ideal point was chosen)	Author Coded	370	549.6	1112		3
Maximize Coverage, 2009-12	The difference between the number of students who would have been covered under the ideal-point locations for the maximize coverage model and those that were actually covered by the built facility (zero means the ideal point was chosen)	Author Coded	370	416.7	1130		3

NAME	DESC	SOURCE	N	$\bar{X}$	SD	DISTRIBUTION	Chpt
<b>DEPENDENT VARIABLES</b>							
New School Access (3km), 2002-09	A 0-1 measure of whether or not a village received access to a new school in a given time period	Senegalese Ministry of Education	14468	0.33	0.47		3
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New Health Facilities (5km), 2009-12	A 0-1 measure of whether or not a village received access to a new health post or health hut in a given time period	Senegalese Ministry of Health	10335	0.43	0.49		3
Maximize Attendance, 2002-09	The difference between the number of students who would have been covered under the ideal-point locations for the maximize attendance model and those that were actually covered by the built facility (zero means the ideal point was chosen)	Author Coded	319	296.5	7339		3
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








NAME	DESC	SOURCE	N	$\bar{X}$	SD	DISTRIBUTION	Chpt
Ln Dist Services, 1912	Logged distance to the nearest social service in 1912	Author Coded	14497	8.49	1.31		4
Ln Dist Services, 1932	Logged distance to the nearest social service in 1932	Author Coded	14497	8.34	1.67		4
Ln Dist Services, 1952	Logged distance to the nearest social service in 1952	Author Coded	14497	7.71	2.68		4
Ln Dist Services, 1972	Logged distance to the nearest social service in 1972	Author Coded	14497	6.27	3.79		4
Ln Dist Services, 2002	Logged distance to the nearest social service in 2002	Author Coded	14497	5.35	3.58		4
New Teachers, 1908-28	Number of new teachers assigned to a school between 1908-28	<i>Rapports Statistique Annuel d'Enseignement</i>	14497	0.005	0.09		4
New Teachers, 1928-38	Number of new teachers assigned to a school between 1928-38	<i>Rapports Statistique Annuel d'Enseignement</i>	14497	0.009	0.22		4
New Teachers, 1938-48	Number of new teachers assigned to a school between 1938-48	<i>Rapports Statistique Annuel d'Enseignement</i>	14497	0.008	0.34		4
% Student Attendance by CR, 2002	Percent of school aged children attending school in a rural community in 2002	Author coded; Senegalese Ministry of Education	14468	0.23	0.12		4

NAME	DESC	SOURCE	N	$\bar{X}$	SD	DISTRIBUTION	Chpt
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New Teachers, 1908-28	Number of new teachers assigned to a school between 1908-28	<i>Rapports Statistique Annuel d'Enseignement</i>	14497	0.005	0.09		4
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% Student Attendance by CR, 2002	Percent of school aged children attending school in a rural community in 2002	Author coded; Senegalese Ministry of Education	14468	0.23	0.12		4










NAME	DESC	SOURCE	N	$\bar{X}$	SD	DISTRIBUTION	Chpt
Trust: Rural Council	A 0-3 response to the question "how much do you trust each of the following types of people"; 0 = 'not at all' and 3 = 'a lot'	Afrobarometer, rd 4 & 5	2117	1.56	1.24		6
Trust: Neighbors	A 0-3 response to the question "how much do you trust each of the following types of people"; 0 = 'not at all' and 3 = 'a lot'	Afrobarometer, rd 4 & 5	1197	2.53	0.75		6
Trust Senegalese	A 0-3 response to the question "how much do you trust each of the following types of people"; 0 = 'not at all' and 3 = 'a lot'	Afrobarometer, rd 4 & 5	1151	1.72	1.11		6










### INDEPENDENT VARIABLES










Centralization Discount, 20km	A discount-decay function of an area's level of centralization at 8 time periods between 1500-1880 Areas are coded as centralized 0-1 for each time period based on whether or not they fall within a 20km buffer of a pre-colonial capital or key city	Author coded, misc historical sources	14468	0.61	0.44		3, 4
Bockstette et al. Discount, 20km	Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman's (2002) state antiquity index with a discount-decay function All variables within 20kms of pre-colonial capitals are assigned the score for the level of 'statehood' of a kingdom at 8 time periods between 1500-1880	Author coded, misc historical sources	14468	0.55	0.39		3
1880 Centralization Dummy, 20km	A 0-1 measure where villages take a value of 1 if they fall within the buffer of an area that was centralized in 1880	Author coded, misc historical sources	14468	0.51	0.49		3, 6
Village 1900	A 0-1 measure of whether or not a village appears in the first French censuses, circa 1900	Becker, et al (1983) ; Misc Historical Sources (ANS 1G:251; 1G:289-96)	14508	0.23	0.42		3
% Villages 1900	The percent of villages in a rural community that are listed in the first French censuses	Becker, et al (1983) ; Misc Historical Sources (ANS 1G:251; 1G:289-96)	11264	0.29	0.19		3
% Villages 1958	The percent of villages in a rural community that are listed in the 1958 village repertoire	1958 Repertoire des villages	14508	0.75	0.19		3










NAME	DESC	SOURCE	N	$\bar{X}$	SD	DISTRIBUTION	Chpt
Core Voters, 2002-09	% of votes going to the winning party at a voting booth in 2002 local elections	Author coded; <i>Direction Générale des Elections</i>	13762	0.47	0.33		3
Core Voters, 2009-12	% of votes going to the winning party at a voting booth in 2009 local elections	Author coded; <i>Direction Générale des Elections</i>	13600	0.46	0.34		3
Gap Btw Parties, 2002-09	The % gap between the winning and second place party at a voting booth in the 2002 local elections	Author coded; <i>Direction Générale des Elections</i>	13762	0.36	0.36		3
Gap Btw Parties, 2009-12	The % gap between the winning and second place party at a voting booth in the 2009 local elections	Author coded; <i>Direction Générale des Elections</i>	13600	0.38	0.29		3
Nat'l Aligned, 2002-09	A 0-1 measure of whether or not the majority party in the rural council is aligned with the central state	Author coded; <i>Direction Générale des Elections</i>	14468	0.6	0.49		3
Nat'l Aligned, 2009-12	A 0-1 measure of whether or not the majority party in the rural council is aligned with the central state	Author coded; <i>Direction Générale des Elections</i>	14468	0.67	0.47		3
Civic Associations, 2002-09	An additive measure of whether or not a village has the following civic associations: a village development association, a women's 'promotion' group, a local sports/cultural group, a village-level political party branch or an economic interest group This creates a 0-5 measure	ANSD <i>Enquête Villages 2002</i>	13145	1.84	1.66		3
Civic Associations, 2009-12	An additive measure of whether or not a village has the following civic associations: a village development association, a women's 'promotion' group, a local sports/cultural group, a village-level political party branch or an economic interest group This creates a 0-5 measure	ANSD <i>Enquête Villages 2009</i>	12274	2.45	1.57		3
Ethnic Fractionalization, 2002-09	A Herfondahl Index of Ethnic Fragmentation Based on ethnic information of approximately 200 rural communities and averaged at the <i>arrondissement</i> level	Author coding based on secondary documents and local planning materials	14466	63.8	16.8		3


NAME	DESC	SOURCE	N	$\bar{X}$	SD	DISTRIBUTION	Chpt
Ethnic Fractionalization, 2009-12	A Herfondahl Index of Ethnic Fragmentation Based on ethnic information of approximately 200 rural communities and averaged at the <i>arrondissement</i> level	Author coding based on secondary documents and local planning materials	14466	63.8	16.9		3, 6
Wolof	A 0-1 measure that takes a 1 when the dominant ethnicity in a rural community is Wolof	Author coding based on secondary documents and local planning materials	14470	0.49	0.5		3, 4
Peuhl	A 0-1 measure that takes a 1 when the dominant ethnicity in a rural community is Peuhl	Author coding based on secondary documents and local planning materials	14470	0.29	0.46		3, 4
Sereer	A 0-1 measure that takes a 1 when the dominant ethnicity in a rural community is Sereer	Author coding based on secondary documents and local planning materials	14470	0.08	0.27		3
New Teachers per capita, 2002-09	The number of new, central-state appointed teachers assigned to a region per student-aged capita between 2002-09; measure is standardized to a 0-1 scale	Author coded; Senegalese Ministry of Education	14468	0.35	0.33		3
New Teachers per capita, 2009-12	The number of new, central-state appointed teachers assigned to a region per student-aged capita between 2009-12; measure is standardized to a 0-1 scale	Author coded; Senegalese Ministry of Education	14468	0.46	0.31		3
Avg. FDD	Average yearly fiscal transfers ( <i>Fonds de Dotation de la Décentralisation</i> ) in dollars from the central government to a rural community, 2009-12	Direction des Collectivités Locales	14466	23494	5776		3, 6
European Pop., 1912	Number of Europeans living in a <i>cercle</i> , 1912	Annuaire du Sénégal et Dépendances, 1912	14497	0.32	21.6		4
Admin Center 1912	A 0-1 measure that takes a 1 if a village was an administrative center in 1912	National Archives, Journal Officiel du Sénégal	14497	0.04	0.19		4

NAME	DESC	SOURCE	N	$\bar{X}$	SD	DISTRIBUTION	Chpt
Admin Center 1932	A 0-1 measure that takes a 1 if a village was an administrative center in 1932	National Archives, <i>Journal Officiel du Sénégal</i>	14497	0.002	0.05		4
Admin Center 1952	A 0-1 measure that takes a 1 if a village was an administrative center in 1952	National Archives, <i>Journal Officiel du Sénégal</i>	14497	0.002	0.05		4
Admin Center 1972	A 0-1 measure that takes a 1 if a village was an administrative center in 1972	National Archives, <i>Journal Officiel du Sénégal</i>	14497	0.008	0.09		4
Admin Center 2002	A 0-1 measure that takes a 1 if a village was an administrative center in 2002	National Archives, <i>Journal Officiel du Sénégal</i>	14497	0.03	0.17		4
Mourides 1917	The estimated number of Mourides per departement circa 1917	Marty (1917)	14497	815.8	2452		4
Peanut Basin 1900	A 0-2 measure that takes a 0 if a village falls outside of the 1900 extent of the peanut basin, a 1 if it is an area of light to average production and a 2 if it is an area of high production	Atlas National du Sénégal (1972)	14497	0.52	0.74		4
Pre-Colonial Capital	A 0-1 measure that takes a 1 if a village was a capital or key administrative center for a pre-colonial state	Author coded, misc historical sources	14468	0.008	0.09		4
Ln Dist. Services, 1902	Logged distance to the nearest social service in 1902	Author Coded	14497	8.58	1.02		4
School, 1902	A count measure of the number of schools that fell within a 2002 rural community in 1902	Rapport Statistique Annuel d'enseignement, 1902	318	0.03	0.16		4









NAME	DESC	SOURCE	N	$\bar{X}$	SD	DISTRIBUTION	Chpt
School, 1912	A count measure of the number of schools that fell within a 2002 rural community in 1912	<i>Rapport Statistique Annuel d'enseignement, 1912</i>	318	0.04	0.19		4
School, 1932	A count measure of the number of schools that fell within a 2002 rural community in 1932	<i>Rapport Statistique Annuel d'enseignement, 1932</i>	318	0.14	0.42		4
School, 1952	A count measure of the number of schools that fell within a 2002 rural community in 1952	<i>Rapport Statistique Annuel d'enseignement, 1952</i>	318	0.36	1.6		4
School, 1972	A count measure of the number of schools that fell within a 2002 rural community in 1972	<i>Atlas National du Sénégal (1972)</i>	318	2.64	7.18		4
% New Teachers, 1908-28	% increase in teachers per school between 1908-28 by rural community	<i>Rapports Statistique Annuel d'enseignement</i>	318	0.08	0.29		4
% New Teachers, 1928-38	% increase in teachers per school between 1928-38 by rural community	<i>Rapports Statistique Annuel d'enseignement</i>	318	0.08	0.26		4
% New Teachers, 1938-52	% increase in teachers per school between 1938-52 by rural community	<i>Rapports Statistique Annuel d'enseignement</i>	318	0.06	0.23		4
% New Students, 1908-28	% increase in students per school between 1908-28 by rural community	<i>Rapports Statistique Annuel d'enseignement</i>	318	0.07	0.24		4
% New Students, 1928-38	% increase in students per school between 1928-38 by rural community	<i>Rapports Statistique Annuel d'enseignement</i>	318	0.1	0.33		4










NAME	DESC	SOURCE	N	$\bar{X}$	SD	DISTRIBUTION	Chpt
% New Students, 1938-52	% increase in students per school between 1938-52 by rural community	<i>Rapports Statistique Annuel d'enseignement</i>	318	0.05	0.2		4
Elite Family Ties	A 0-4 measure for which respondents get one point for reporting each of the following: a village chief in immediate family, in extended family, an elected official in immediate family, in extended family	survey	332	1.99	1.45		6
Co-Ethnic	A 0-1 measure that takes a 1 if the respondent is the same ethnicity as the dominant ethnicity in the rural community	survey	332	0.77	0.42		6
Co-Partisan	A 0-1 measure that takes a 1 if the respondent reports being a member or supporter of the same political party as the PCR in the rural community	survey	332	0.51	0.5		6
# Councilors	A count measure of the number of councilors from the respondent's village	survey	302	3.44	5.37		6
Outsider Status	A 0-4 measure whereby higher numbers indicate a greater degree of 'outsiderness' of a respondent. Included variables are: co-ethnicity, co-partisanship, family ties, councilors from the village and newcomer status	survey	332	1.26	0.99		6
Network Type	A 0-3 measure of the network type a local government is classified as having, ranging from 0, network fragmentation, to 3, network persistence	survey	332	1.69	1.23		6
Newcomer Village	A 0-1 measure that takes a 1 if a village is a newcomer (founded after 1900)	survey	332	0.44	0.49		6
Fragmented	A 0-1 measure that takes a 1 if a village falls in an area characterized as having network fragmentation	survey	332	0.21	0.41		6









NAME	DESC	SOURCE	N	$\bar{X}$	SD	DISTRIBUTION	Chpt
Proliferation	A 0-1 measure that takes a 1 if a village falls in an area characterized as having network proliferation	survey	332	0.32	0.47		6
Transformation	A 0-1 measure that takes a 1 if a village falls in an area characterized as having network transformation	survey	332	0.04	0.19		6
Persistence	A 0-1 measure that takes a 1 if a village falls in an area characterized as having network persistence	survey	332	0.43	0.49		6
# Mtgs 2012	A count measure of the number of meetings the rural council held in the previous year	survey	332	5.82	2.24		6
Quorum	An ordinal measure of the frequency with which the rural council does not meet the quorum (1 = never, 5 = with some frequency)	survey	332	0.95	0.09		6
% Tax Recovery	The percent of the rural tax recovered in the previous year in the rural community	survey	332	0.34	0.36		6
# NGOs	A count measure of the number of NGOs active in the rural community over the past two years	survey	332	2.81	1.89		6
# Bilateral Partners	A count measure of the number of Bilateral Aid Partners active in the rural community over the past two years	survey	332	1.18	0.82		6
# Parties in CR	A count measure of the number of political parties elected into the 2009-14 rural council	survey	332	2.39	0.89		6








NAME	DESC	SOURCE	N	$\bar{X}$	SD	DISTRIBUTION	Chpt
Slave Exports (Nunn)	A replicated measure of slave exports per ethnic group, measured as the log of 1+ the total exports per ethnic group divided by the area of the ethnic group's 'homeland'	Nunn and Wantchenkon (2011)	2345	0.87	0.66		6

## CONTROL VARIABLES

Ln Village Population, 2012	Log of village population, 2011	<i>Repertoire officiale du villages 2011, Gouvernement du Senegal</i>	14467	5.47	1.23		3
Sqrt D School, 2002-09	Square root of the minimum distance to the nearest school from a given village in 2002	Author coded; Senegalese Ministry of Education	14412	35.7	31.3		3
Sqrt D School, 2009-12	Square root of the minimum distance to the nearest school from a given village in 2009	Author coded; Senegalese Ministry of Education	14415	28.6	29.5		3
Sqrt D Health, 2009-12	Square root of the minimum distance to the nearest clinic from a given village in 2009	Author coded; Senegalese Ministry of Education	10335	48.3	29.5		3
% Villages School, 2002-09	% villages in a rural community that have a primary school in 2002	Author coded; Senegalese Ministry of Education	14497	0.3	0.16		3
% Villages School, 2009-12	% villages in a rural community that have a primary school in 2009	Author coded; Senegalese Ministry of Education	14497	0.39	0.19		3
Students per Classroom, 2002	Number of students per classroom in 2002	Author coded; Senegalese Ministry of Education	4334	37.1	19.7		3
Students per Classroom, 2009	Number of students per classroom in 2009	Author coded; Senegalese Ministry of Education	5595	28.3	19.5		3

NAME	DESC	SOURCE	N	$\bar{X}$	SD	DISTRIBUTION	Chpt
% Villages Health, 2009-12	% villages in a rural community that have a health facility in 2009	Author coded; Senegalese Ministry of Health	10335	0.16	0.12		3
Pop Density, 5km	Population density in 5km radius of village	Author Coded	14365	2621	10509		3
Economic Activity, 2002	An additive index of economic activity in a village. This includes: a boutique/small store, a market, an artisanal workshop, and facilities for the valorization of the following: forest products, seafood, animal husbandry, fruit or agricultural products for a full range of 0-8	ANSD Enquête Villages 2002	13145	1.86	1.65		3
Economic Activity, 2009	An additive index of economic activity in a village. This includes: a boutique/small store, a market, an artisanal workshop, and facilities for the valorization of the following: forest products, seafood, animal husbandry, fruit or agricultural products for a full range of 0-8	ANSD Enquête Villages 2009	12274	2.59	2.02		3
Wealth, 1997	An index of average household wealth, calculated at the arrondissement level in 1997	Demographic and Health Survey, 1997	14468	0.09	0.65		3
Wealth, 2010	An index of average household wealth, calculated at the arrondissement level in 2010	Demographic and Health Survey, 2010	14468	-0.08	0.74		3
% Student Attendance, 2009	Percent of school aged children attending school in a rural community in 2009	Author coded; Senegalese Ministry of Education	14466	0.38	0.18		3
Ln D Waterway	Logged distance between a village and the nearest navigable waterway	Author Coded, GIS Shapefiles	14283	10.3	1.29		3,4
Latitude	A village's latitude	GIS Shapefiles	14497	-15.4	1.17		3, 4

NAME	DESC	SOURCE	N	$\bar{X}$	SD	DISTRIBUTION	Chpt
Longitude	A village's longitude	GIS Shapefiles	14497	14.3	1.04		3, 4
Village Elevation	Village elevation in meters	USGS Global Elevation Grids (Systematic Subsample 75 arc-seconds)	14369	35.9	27.5		3, 4
Mangrove	A 0-1 measure that takes a 1 when a village falls within a Mangrove	White (1983)	14470	0.004	0.06		3, 4
Sahel Grassland	A 0-1 measure that takes a 1 when a village falls within Sahel Grassland	White (1983)	14470	0.17	0.38		3, 4
Rainforest/Gassland	A 0-1 measure that takes a 1 when a village falls within Lowland Rainforest/Grassland	White (1983)	14470	0.16	0.37		3, 4
Sudanian Forest	A 0-1 measure that takes a 1 when a village falls within Sudanian Forest	White (1983)	14470	0.66	0.47		3, 4
Coast, 5km	A 0-1 measure that takes a 1 when a village falls within 5km of the coastline	Author Coded, GIS shapefiles	14497	0.01	0.12		4
River, 5km	A 0-1 measure that takes a 1 when a village falls within 5km of a navigable river	Author Coded, GIS shapefiles	14497	0.09	0.28		4
Ferlo Desert	A 0-3 measure of how deep within the Ferlo desert a village is; 0 indicate not within the Ferlo, 3 indicating deep desert	Author Coded, GIS shapefiles	14497	0.22	0.68		4

NAME	DESC	SOURCE	N	$\bar{X}$	SD	DISTRIBUTION	Chpt
Population Density, 1900	Population density in 1900	Author Coded, <i>Atlas National du Senegal</i>	14508	41.8	183.4		4
Meeting Attendance	A respondent's reported meeting attendance, ranging from 1 'rarely' to 4 'always'	survey	332	2.71	1.43		6
Formation	A 0-1 measure of whether a respondent reports having received some type of training or instruction about local governance or their administrative role	survey	332	0.56	0.49		6
Age	Age of respondent	survey	332	59.9	13.1		6
Ln Pop Village (Sample)	Logged village population (2011) for villages in sample	<i>Repetoire officiale du villages 2011, Gouvernement du Senegal</i>	331	6.19	1.2		6
Village Chief	A 0-1 measure that takes a 1 if a respondent is a village chief	survey	332	0.69	0.46		6
Councilor	A 0-1 measure that takes a 1 if a respondent is a councilor	survey	332	0.19	0.39		6

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## **List of Interviews**

All interviews of village chiefs and elected officials are identified in-text by their rural community, date of interview and, in the case of village chiefs, the identifying number assigned to their village.

### **Sous-Prefets:**

Podor Department, 12 February 2013  
Dagana Department, 13 March 2013  
Goudiry Department, 28 March 2013  
Kaffrine Department, 26 April 2013  
Kaolack Department, 3 May 2013  
(Adjoint) Kebemer Department, 4 March 2013  
(Adjoint) Kedougou Department, 3 April 2013  
Kedougou Department, 16 April 2013  
(Adjoint) Linguere Department, 1 March 2013.  
(Adjoint) Tambacounda Department, 22 March 2013  
Ziguinchor Department, 5 July 2013.

### **Others:**

Law Professor, UCAD, Dakar, 19 October 2012.  
Law Professor, UCAD, Dakar, 24 October 2012.  
Economist, Union des Associations d'Elus Locaux, Dakar, 29 October, 2012.  
Director, Dir. of Territorial Admin., Ministry of the Interior, Dakar, 30 October 2012.  
Director, Union des Associations d'Elus Locaux, Dakar, 15 November 2012.  
Director, Ministry of Territory and Local Authorities, Dakar, 16 November 2012.  
Director, Local Authorities Directive, Dakar, 10 December 2012.  
Researcher, Development Consulting Agency, Dakar, 19 January 2013.  
Communication Director, National Local Development Program, Dakar, 21 January 2013.  
Decentralization and Finance Specialist, Local Authorities Directive, Dakar, 5 January 2013.  
Agent, Regional Development Agency, Saint Louis Region, 14 March 2013  
Development Agent, Goudiry Department, 27 March 2013  
President, local village chiefs association, Kolda Department, 9 April 2013  
Agent, Regional Development Agency, Kolda Region, 12 April 2013  
Agent, Regional Development Agency, Tambacounda Region, 17 April 2013  
Planning Director, Regional Development Agency, Ziguinchor Region, 10 July 2013