

COMMUNICATING JUSTICE:
THE ROLE OF JUSTIFICATIONS IN ACCOUNTING FOR NORMATIVE DECISIONS

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By

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When authorities make decisions, they are often expected to provide an explanation for the outcome. In contrast to excuses or apologies, justifications are a particular kind of account, whereby the decision-maker accepts both responsibility and asserts that the outcome was normatively just. Quality justifications are essential to the perceived legitimacy of authorities within organizations, as well as fostering pro-organization behaviors. The present research: (a) investigates the degree to which justifications are (or are not) a distinct component of overall justice determinations, (b) investigates the effect of high (versus) low quality justifications on perceptions of the decision-maker, and (c) compares and empirically evaluates the conflicting positions of two major justice models – the value protection model and group engagement model – regarding whether the hypothesized effect of high-quality justifications occur under conditions of strong moral conviction. The study asked participants to evaluate aspects of moral and policy decisions supported by high and low quality justifications. Informational justice emerged as a construct distinct from interpersonal justice and procedural justice when evaluating decisions and the decision-maker. High quality justifications have a positive influence on perceived procedural, interpersonal and informational justice related to the decision. Moral conviction matters, but only under conditions of moral agreement. Even when decisions are inconsistent with a moral mandate, high quality justifications increase positive perceptions of justice. The group engagement model thus received more support from the data than the value protection model.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

I graduated with a degree in psychology and government from Cornell University in 1989. After graduating from Northwestern University School of Law in 1992, I practiced consumer-protection law in Chicago for 15 years. It was during this time I became fascinated with issues of justice, both abstractly and in connection with its implementation. I currently live in Chicago, Illinois.

Dedicated in fond memory of Kathy Berggren, Sr. Lecturer in Communication.

She was a friend, a mentor, and a voice for the voiceless.

And, to the champions of justice everywhere...

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I am so grateful for the opportunity to have studied at Cornell University, twice: as an undergraduate, and as a graduate student in the Department of Communication. Dr. Poppy McLeod has been an outstanding mentor and chair – she gave me the freedom to explore my ideas, yet was always there to guide and ground me. Katherine McComas, the chair of our department, who reminded me several times that this dissertation is not the end, but the beginning of an entire program of research. Tarleton Gillespie, my initial advisor, and the person who taught me never to lose perspective of the big picture. David Dunning, my favorite professor as an undergraduate, whose teaching of Psychology and Law influenced my entire legal career, including this research. Prof Robert Summers, whose health and retirement did not allow him to continue to serve on my committee, but whose scholarly fingerprints remain all over this work and whose contributions to legal scholarship will remain with me forever.

I would also like to thank my father for his motivational speeches and support during this entire process; and my former law partner, Mark Lavery, who convinced me to go to graduate school in the first instance. Thanks to Sam Nelson, who helped me gain admission to the program, and gave me the opportunity to work with, coach, and learn from the some of the best and brightest students at Cornell – those on the speech and debate team. Some of those students remain close friends to this day. Kathy Berggren, in whose memory this work is dedicated, supervised and supported by teaching of oral communication almost the entire time I was here. I am a better teacher, and person, because of her. Finally, I would like to thank all my friends for their encouragement, most especially Mike Maffie and Tony Liao for the great tennis matches I could never win, and the therapeutic trips to the Chapter House that helped keep me sane.

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PREFACE

PAUL NEWMAN (Playing lawyer Frank Galvin):

Well...You know, so much of the time we're just lost. We say, "Please, God, tell us what is right. Tell us what is true."

I mean there is no justice. The rich win; the poor are powerless. We become tired of hearing people lie. And after a time we become dead, a little dead. We think of ourselves as victims -- and we become victims. We become weak; we doubt ourselves; we doubt our beliefs; we doubt our institutions; and we doubt the law.

But today you are the law. You are the law, not some book, not the lawyers, not a marble statue, or the trappings of the court. See, those are just symbols of our desire to be just.

They are, in fact, a prayer, I mean a fervent and a frightened prayer.

In my religion, they say, "Act as if you had faith; faith will be given to you."

If we are to have faith in justice, we need only to believe in ourselves and act with justice. See, I believe there is justice in our hearts.

-- The Verdict, Screenplay by David Mamet

The above quotation constitutes the entirety of attorney Frank Galvin's closing argument in Sidney Lumet's classic David-and-Goliath courtroom drama, *The Verdict*. By the time Galvin rises to give his closing argument the biased and hostile judge had denied Galvin a much-needed continuance due to the disappearance of a witness, embarrassed his expert on the stand, and stricken the testimony of the smoking-gun whistleblower on an archaic legal technicality. Technically, Galvin did not have a legal leg to stand on, so he makes a passionate appeal to the "justice in our hearts," using power of iconic symbols, and empowering the jury to act with justice in the specific case. These three ideas – (a) the placement of justice in the domain of the morality, (b) the expression of disillusionment (i.e., the crisis of legitimacy) with processes and our legal institutions, and (c) the ultimate recognition of justice as the requirement *to act* in a specific case – motivate the present research.

When we act, we are oftentimes expected to justify our action. That is, to demonstrate that we acted with justice. The three themes that animate this research – morality, procedural justice, and reason-given – correspond to three phases of my intellectual and scholarly

development. As an undergraduate in psychology, my advisor was Dr. Frank Keil. Working with Professor Keil, whose field was developmental psychology, is when I first became interested in questions regarding the development of moral concepts in children, and its connection to levels of blame and excuse in law. Law is a second-order concept to justice. As is, for instance, “morality,” which only overlaps partially with “law”; some things may be viewed as “immoral” but not “illegal,” and some things that are “legal,” such as abortion, may be vehemently condemned as “immoral.” Nevertheless, concepts of both morality and legality interact with the more over-arching concept of justice.

When I was in law school in the 1980s, I took a course in legal sociology with Professor Jack Heinz. It was then I first learned of the work of Professor Tom Tyler. I still recall to this day being shocked at the results of the early justice research – that people seemed to care about procedural justice as much as, sometimes more than, distributive outcomes themselves. The studies have been replicated so frequently, and the theories developed and refined in the intervening three decades, that this finding does not seem as shocking today. Instead, new sets of questions have arisen about how to harness the power of procedural justice in everyday interactions, as well as to help increase the perceived legitimacy of our institutions of justice.

Finally, as a practicing lawyer, I experienced firsthand the rise of (oftentimes mandatory) arbitration, and observed the effects it had on my clients, and our society. My clients were often forced into arbitration unwillingly, based on fine print in the boilerplate of contracts, credit card agreements, and automobile installment contracts. And I remember how my clients reacted after an unfavorable decision that was given without explanation. Just, “you lose,” no reason provided. The sense of injustice in losing was far outweighed by the sense of outrage at not being given a reason as to why. This work attempts to combine the three disciplines I have

studied (psychology, law, and communication), and contribute to theorizing on the importance of communicating justice, and the role of justifications in accounting for moral decisions. As

Folger (2001) has noted:

Somewhere along the road of theory and research, those of us who study fairness made a wrong turn: We've continued the search for phenomena related to fairness, but we've lost sight of how fairness relates to morality. We're not hopelessly lost, but it's going to take us longer to get where we want to go if we continue on some of the path's we've taken so far (p. 4).

Fundamentally, this research attempts to heed that call and help bring morality back to justice research.

Chapter 1: Literature Review

Authorities make important decisions every day in a variety of contexts. Managers hire and fire, judges decide cases, professors evaluate students, and reviewers accept and reject papers. Oftentimes, authorities are expected to provide *justifications* for their decisions (Bies & Moag, 1986; Colquitt & Chertkoff, 2002; Folger & Bies, 1989; Gilliland & Beckstein, 1996; Tyler & Bies, 1989; Van Prooijen, Van den Bos, & Wilke, 2005). If justifications are not provided – or are of poor quality – the perceived *legitimacy* of the authority may be diminished (Pops & Pavlak, 1991; Tyler, 1994a; Wilbern, 1984), the decision less likely to be accepted, and overall satisfaction decreased (Colquitt, 2001; Fagan, 2008; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Moorman, 1991). As a result, affected parties are more likely to feel anger and resentment, and initiate grievance and litigation procedures. In organizational contexts, perceived injustice results in fewer pro-organizational behaviors (Colquitt & Chertkoff, 2002), poor performance, (Konovsky & Cropanzano, 1991), and negative conduct such as theft (Greenberg, 1990).

In the communication literature, the term *account* has been used to refer broadly to an explanation designed to remove an actor from a predicament (Benoit, 1995; Bobocel & Farrell, 1996, citing Schlenker, 1980). Although a significant body of academic literature exists on the issue of account-giving generally (Benoit, 1995; Bies, 1987; Bies, 2001; Bies & Shapiro, 1987, 1988; Bies, Shapiro & Cummings, 1988; Bobocel & Farrell, 1996; Conlon & Murray, 1996; Scott & Lyman, 1968), there has been little attention given to assessing the quality of a particular kind of account – the justification (Colquitt & Chertkoff, 2002). While Bies and Shapiro (1987, 1988) have certainly done some important work in this area, justification has eluded systematic empirical study. When justifications have been studied, they were generally lumped in – usually

as a single item in a multi-item measure – with other justice-related variables such as politeness, neutrality and trust (see Tyler, 1994b, study 1, for an example).

This purpose of this research is: (a) to investigate the degree to which justifications are a distinct component of *procedural justice* determinations, (b) to study the aspects of justifications that cause them to be perceived as high or low quality, (c) to test the hypothesis that high-quality justifications will increase perceptions of fairness, legitimacy, and quality of treatment, (d) to compare and empirically evaluate the conflicting positions of theoretical models regarding the effect of strong moral conviction, and (e) to examine the effects of high-quality justifications in moral and policy decision-making contexts and frames. This section will:

1. Survey three major “waves” of procedural justice research, and trace the evolving thought on the dimensionality of the justice construct. Based on Solum’s (2004) theorizing regarding the three *action-guiding functions* of procedures – the *accuracy function*, the *dignitary function*, and the *norm-specification function* – it is suggested that there are three dimensions to procedural justice, corresponding to these three action-guiding functions. These dimensions are: (a) *pure procedural justice*, (b) *interpersonal justice*, and (c) *informational justice*. When *distributive justice* (which is not an element of the present research)¹ is added, this leaves a four-dimensional view of justice, supporting the views of Colquitt (2001), and others (Blader & Tyler, 2003; Nabatchi, Bingham, & Good, 2007), on this question. Most theories of justice contend there are only three dimensions to justice: distributive justice, procedural justice, and interactional justice (which conceives interpersonal justice and informational justice as part of a single dimension). Some theorists, however, at least in applied context, are suggesting a six-

¹ Distributive justice focuses on the equity of decision outcomes, whether material, honorific, or moral. Need, equality, and equity theory (Adams, 1965; Deutsch 1975; Homans, 1961; Leventhal, 1976, 1980) are common approaches to distribute justice and have obvious analogues in Marxist, Rawlsian, and libertarian thought.

factor model, while others advocate a monistic – single factor – approach. Both the dimensionality of procedural justice, and the issue of what aspects of justifications help them be perceived as high quality, are formulated as research questions one and two (RQ1 & RQ2).

2. Describe organizational communication research into social accounts, including Folger’s (1986a, 1986b, 1987, 1996, 2001) *referent cognitions theory* and *fairness theory* (Cropanzano, Goldman, & Folger, 2003). These theories predict that a sense of injustice is experienced when observers or participants compare outcomes and/or decisions to various “would, could, and should counterfactuals” (Folger & Cropanzano, 2001).² This study focuses on justifications (sometimes called *ideological accounts*), which are relevant to Should (i.e., normative) counterfactuals. Hypothesis 1 (H1) is that high-quality justifications lessen the chance that observers will generate Should counterfactuals and thus increase favorable procedural justice perceptions in each of its three dimensions.

3. Examine a debate in the literature between Professors Skitka and Mullen (2008), and Napier and Tyler (2008) over whether strong moral conviction (called *moral mandates*) moderates the influence of procedural justice factors, including informational justice factors such as quality of justification. Skitka’s view is tested as Hypothesis 2 (H2). Finally, the potential impact of framing disputes as *moral* or *policy* will also be briefly discussed. This framing issue formed the basis of Hypothesis 3 (H3).

The Action-Guiding Functions of Procedures, and the Dimensionality of Justice

Procedural justice “refers to participants’ perceptions about the fairness of the rules and procedures that regulate a process” (Bingham, 2006, p. 147). In contrast to distributive justice, which suggests that satisfaction is a function of outcome, procedural justice suggests that

satisfaction, in part, is a function of the process. Thibaut and Walker (1975)'s groundbreaking work, *Procedural Justice*, demonstrated a main effect of procedures on overall outcome satisfaction. Indeed, in some cases procedures were found to impact overall satisfaction as much as outcome favorability (Thibaut & Walker, 1975; see also Blader & Tyler, 2003; Tyler, 1994b). As Tyler (1994b) notes, Thibaut and Walker's findings regarding the effect of procedure have been widely replicated in a variety of contexts, including legal trial procedures, non-trial procedures, such as plea-bargaining, and mediation as well as in organizational, political, and educational settings (p. 850). This section will briefly review the history of procedural justice research, which has proceeded through a series of three waves I believe roughly correspond to Solum's (2004) action-guiding functions of procedure: accuracy, dignitary, and norm specification.

The action-guiding functions of procedures. Procedures are the mechanism by which substantive rules or laws coordinate human conduct. As Solum (2004) explains, substance alone cannot discharge this function because of the problems of imperfect knowledge, incomplete specification of norms, and partiality:

Were we to assume (a) that citizens have perfect information about the state of the world and the content of the laws, (b) that the content of the laws is fully specified, and (c) that each and every citizen viewed the law and the facts impartially, then the rules of substantive law could perform their action-guiding function without the aid of a system of procedure. In the actual world, however, none of these idealizing assumptions holds true: instead, the actual world is characterized by three problems of compliance with substantive legal norms: (1)

² The literature on accounts refers to these counterfactuals differently, sometimes by enclosing the words in quotation marks, and sometimes capitalizing the word as if it were a proper noun. For clarity,

the problem of imperfect knowledge of law and fact, (2) the problem of incomplete specification of legal norms, and (3) the problem of partiality. Notice that these three problems would hold, even if citizens saw themselves as obligated by the content of substantive legal norms (pp. 3-4).

Procedures help solve the problems of imperfect knowledge, incomplete specification of norms and partiality in a variety of ways. For instance, procedures that attempt to identify witness or disputant bias, and ensure the neutrality of decision-makers, are essential for dealing with the problem of partiality. And procedures that give people “voice,” or an opportunity to be heard, not only help mitigate the problem of imperfect knowledge by enabling participants to elicit relevant facts and advance argumentatively valid reasons for particular outcomes, but also serve dignitary purposes by allowing participation. Finally, procedures that require decision-makers to justify their decisions contribute to the overall specification of norms in the society, and provide a means of transparency and accountability essential to maintaining legitimacy.

Procedures fulfill an epistemological function to the extent they communicate information, they fulfill a cultural function to the extent they specify norms and values, and they fulfill a practical function to the extent they provide legitimate and authoritative resolutions to the conflicting interests of citizens in a pluralistic society. In sum, “procedure provides the information, specificity, and impartiality that is required for citizens to conform their behavior to law” (Solum, 2004, p. 6). This is what Solum calls the “action-guiding” functions of procedures. These action-guiding functions are of crucial importance when examining the quality of a justification, and particular, and procedural justice, in general.

The quality of procedural models are generally evaluated by three criteria: (a) the extent to which they accurately determine facts and generate outcomes consistent with normative

decision rules, (b) the degree to which they create an appropriate, respectful and dignified discursive environment in which disputants can speak and be heard, and (c) the extent to which they adequately and appropriately balance competing values and prevailing norms. Indeed, in my view, these three functions seem to correspond to the “waves” of justice research. These waves are reviewed next.

Equity theory and the accuracy function of procedures. After World War II, Samuel Stouffer and his colleagues published their landmark study on the American soldier (Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Starr, & Williams, 1949). This research introduced the concept of *relative deprivation*, a core justice concept, and linked judgments of relative deprivation to social and political unrest (Tyler, 1994b). This research was followed by a large literature on equity theory (Adams, 1965; Walster, Walster & Berscheid, 1978), a theoretical offshoot from social exchange theory (Blau, 1964; Homans, 1961, 1974). Fundamentally utilitarian in nature, this view conceives humans as rationally self-interested utility maximizers, yearning for material things. As a result, this initial research program focused primarily on distributive justice concerns – that is, concerns about the fairness of allocations and outcomes (Brockner & Weisenfeld, 1996). Procedures tended to be viewed in an instrumental sense and valued primarily to the degree they help participants influence or control outcomes in order to ensure fair and accurate distribution of outcomes.

Social exchange and equity theory predict that people feel they have been treated fairly if, and only if, the ratio of inputs to outputs is relatively equal. Negative affective reactions are hypothesized to result from distributive inequities: people feel angry if there is underpayment inequality, and guilty if there is overpayment inequality. Moreover, if people feel they have not received the outcomes they (or others) deserve, they will attempt to restore equity –

psychologically, behaviorally, or in some other manner (Adams, 1965; Bies & Tyler, 1993; Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978). Equity and exchange theories posit that issues of equity and justice arise whenever two or more persons exchange valued resources, whether these resources consist of goods, services, money, or even love and affection (Skitka, 2009). Equity and exchange theorists thus focused on primarily distributive concerns, such as whether: “outcomes are consistent with implicit norms for allocation, such as equity or equality” (Colquitt, 2001, p. 386, citing Adams, 1965; Deutsch, 1975; Homans, 1961, 1974; Leventhal, 1976). Accordingly, studies in this tradition examined dependent variables such as outcome fairness, acceptance, and satisfaction, which were measured in both an absolute (favorable, unfavorable) and relative (deserved, undeserved) sense.

Strongly influenced by this tradition, the landmark Thibaut and Walker (1975) procedural justice studies viewed procedures as mechanisms for making decisions about the allocation of outcomes. Their research focused on “formal procedures that related to decision-making processes in legal settings” (Tyler & Blader, 2003, p.350). In this context, Thibaut and Walker (1975) identified three variables that mediate the degree to which a process is deemed fair: (a) the perceived neutrality of the decision-maker; (b) the degree to which trust is developed in the decision-maker and the process itself; and (c) and the extent to which the process allows participants to exercise “control over the development and selection of information that will constitute the basis of resolving the dispute” (p. 546).

A central finding that emerged was that overall satisfaction was not determined by outcomes (relative or absolute) alone, procedures mattered as well. From this central finding, an entire research program emerged. Researchers endeavored to discover the different types of procedures that would effect outcome satisfaction, and the degree to which the dependent

satisfaction measures generalized to other evaluations such as leadership quality, legitimacy, and pro-organizational behaviors. One example of this is research on so-called *process control*, or voice procedures (Thibaut & Walker, 1975; Folger, 1977).³

The procedural justice criteria proposed by Thibaut & Walker (1975) have received significant theoretical support (Barrett-Howard & Tyler, 1986; Greenberg, 1986; Sheppard & Lewicki, 1987; Tyler, 1988). A central finding that emerged was that overall satisfaction was not determined solely by outcomes (relative or absolute), procedures mattered as well. These procedures, however, were generally examined from an instrumental perspective, meaning procedures were hypothesized to be valued to the extent they facilitated equity and desert. This view reflects a concern with the first of Solum's (2004) three action-guiding functions of procedures, the *accuracy function*. Indeed, accuracy is explicitly named as one of Leventhal's (1980) six procedural justice criteria. The other six – consistency, bias suppression, accuracy, correctability, representativeness, and ethicality – generally serve Solum's (2004) first the action-guiding function. But as Solum (2004) argues, accuracy is not the only function of procedures.

The narrowest meaningful view of procedural justice would be a purely instrumental perspective, whereby the value of a procedure is only as good as the quality of the outcomes it generates. Such a view focuses exclusively on the accuracy of the procedures in bringing about

³ Voice procedures allow participants to provide inputs into the decision making process, i.e., to have an opportunity to be heard before outcomes are determined. Procedures that allow voice have consistently emerged as being perceived as fairer than non-voice (mute) procedures (Folger, 1977; Kanfer, Sawyer, Early & Lind, 1987; LaTour, 1978; Lind et al., 1980; Lind, Lissak, & Conlon, 1983; Tyler, 1987; Tyler, Rasinski, & Spodick, 1985; Greenberg & Folger, 1983), even when outcomes are unfavorable, whether relative or absolute (LaTour, 1978; Lind et al., 1980). This finding has emerged across a variety of contexts, including participatory decision-making (Greenberg & Folger, 1983), and performance appraisal and compensation (Folger & Greenberg, 1985) and conflict management (Sheppard & Lewicki, 1987).

distributively-just outcomes. But perfect accuracy can never be attained. As more procedural resources are invested in seeking equitable outcomes, the marginal utility of those additional procedures decreases relative to the increase in accuracy versus the cost of additional procedures.

As Solum (2004) explains, using Rawls' (1971) cake-slicing example:

The idea of procedural justice may be made easier by using a simple example. Consider the familiar procedure for dividing a cake: the person who slices the cake picks last. What makes this a fair procedure? One answer is that the criterion for what constitutes a fair outcome, equal slices for all, requires that the slicer pick last. The slicer-picks-last rule is fair because it guarantees accuracy in cutting equal slices. Or does it? A more reliable way to ensure perfectly equal slices would be to use a compass and principles of plane geometry. But this strikes us as an undue amount of fuss to go through when slicing a cake. Perhaps the reason we believe that the slicer-picks-last rule is fair is that it strikes a balance between the importance of the outcome and the cost of getting there; it gets us close to equal shares most of the time at a reasonable price. Thus, the slicer-picks-last rule might be considered fair because it does a good job of balancing. Or is there something even more to the idea that the slicer-picks-last rule is fair? Maybe we believe that the slicer gets a fair share because the slicer was the one who did the cutting; the slicer's participation in the cutting validates the outcome, even if the slicer ends up with a smaller slice (or among the calorie conscious, a bigger slice). The slicer-picks-last rule could be fair because of process independent of outcome (Solum, 2004, p. 238-239).

This idea of “process independent of outcome” was the central finding of Thibaut and Walker (1975), a philosophical impetus for the groundbreaking work of Tyler and colleagues regarding relational justice, and a central concept in normative theories of procedural justice. Thus, Solum (2004) argues that, in addition to accuracy, procedures serve a dignitary function, and a function relative to norm specification. These two functions are discussed in the next two sections, respectively.

Relational theory and the dignitary function of procedures. By the late 1980s and early 1990s, attention shifted, based primarily on the work of Tom Tyler, Allan Lind, and colleagues (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992) to the *relational* or *interpersonal justice*. Relational models hypothesized that because procedures are usually implemented by authorities – and because these authorities are perceived as representatives of the entire social group – then an authority, by using a fair procedure, communicates symbolic messages that recipients are respected by the larger group or society as whole (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Skitka (2009) calls this research tradition, *homo socialis*, noting its similarity to James’ (1890) conception of the social self, and explaining that it views motivation focused less on material goals and outcomes than on people’s need for status, standing and to belong (Skitka, 2009). Three significant models have emerged from this research: (a) the *group-value model*, the *authority-relations model*, and the *group-engagement model*. They will be briefly reviewed.

A central premise in social identity theory is that “people use groups, and the authorities that represent these groups, as a source of information about their self-worth” (Smith & Tyler, 1997, p. 147, citing Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Because we are cognitive misers, treatment by authorities within groups can be an important heuristically accessed barometer of social (and thus self) worth. A common hypothesis in social identity theory is that people prefer

to belong to positively valued groups or social categories because positive social identities contribute to general feelings of self-worth (Smith & Tyler, 1997, citing Tajfel & Turner, 1986). The group-value model extends this basic hypothesis and posits that “treatment by authorities communicates two symbolic messages about group membership” – respect (i.e., that the person is a valuable and respected member of the group) and pride (i.e., that the group as a whole is a worthy group to belong to)(Smith & Tyler, 1997, p. 147; Tyler, DeGoey & Smith, 1996). Tyler & Blader (2003) contend that the primary contribution of the group value model was to help us realize that non-instrumental factors influence judgments about procedural justice (p. 352). The focus of concern under this model is procedural justice judgments, *per se*, and the model focuses on the antecedents of favorable and unfavorable procedural justice determinations, such as existence or lack of voice (Tyler & Blader, 2003).

As groups get larger, and/or institutionalized, decisions are often made and/or implemented in the name of, or on behalf of, the group by various authorities. Authorities thus become representatives of the entire group. As such, an authority, by using a fair procedure, communicates that decision recipients are respected, and thus included, within the social group (Tyler & Lind, 1992). This, in turn, has implications on feelings of individual and collective self-worth and self-esteem (Van Prooijen et al., 2005). Unfair procedures, in contrast, communicate disrespect and exclusion from the relevant group (Van Prooijen et al., 2005). Tyler and Blader (2003) explain that the focus of the relational model is on “authority relations” and leadership.

In sum, the group value model contends that relational concerns (neutrality, trustworthiness, standing and status recognition) shape judgments about procedural judgments” (Tyler & Blader, 2003, p. 352), whereas the authority-relations model proposes, “procedural justice shapes reactions to authorities.” Most recently, Tyler and Blader (2003) have posited the

group engagement model. This model seeks to conceptually unite insights from the group value and authority-relations models, as well as account for their impact on behavior. The group engagement model contrasts two aspects of group behavior: social identity within the group, and resources gained or lost by group membership, in either absolute terms or by what is available in other groups (Hogg & Abrams, 1988). The group engagement model selects between these two aspects and argues that “the central reason people engage themselves in groups is because they use the feedback they receive from those groups to create and maintain their identities” (Tyler & Blader, 2003, p. 353). This identity information, in turn, is hypothesized to emanate from procedural fairness evaluations and mediate the relationship between justice judgments and group engagement.

Many insights have emerged from the interpersonal approach, including:

- People spontaneously mention issues about treatment more than specific outcomes when asked to relate instances of injustice (Skitka, 2009).
- Procedural treatment, not just outcomes, has a significant impact on the evaluation of fairness and legitimacy of authorities and institutions (Lind & Tyler, 1988).
- People become more committed to organizations when they perceive they are treated well, even in the face of adverse outcomes (Greenberg 1990; Tyler, 1989).

Ultimately, this results in increased psychological engagement and other pro-social behaviors, such as increased cooperation (Tyler & Blader, 2003).

Solum (2004) notes these concerns also animate the dignitary function of procedures:

The second interpretation of the participation model connects the independent value of process with the dignity of those who are affected by legal proceedings. One way of articulating this central notion is that everyone is entitled to his or her day in court.

This right to participation is justified by a background right of political morality, that is, the right of persons (or citizens) to be treated with dignity and respect. A procedure that ensures parties an opportunity to participate in the process of making decisions that affect them might be counted as a just procedure for this reason, independently of the correctness of the outcome that results from the procedure (pp. 262-263).

In addition to facilitating proper and accurate outcomes, and promoting dignity through participation and respectful treatment, there is third function of procedures: Procedures provide the information necessary to specify norms, and aid in the balancing of incommensurate moral values.

Deontic models and the norm specification function of procedures. As discussed above, promoting accurate outcomes is an important function of procedures. Because no procedure can “guarantee” (i.e. to 100% accuracy) a fair outcome, all procedural justice is, at best, imperfect and requires some kind of balancing. Rawls (1971) used the criminal trial as an example of this so-called “imperfect procedural justice.”

Imperfect procedural justice is exemplified by a criminal trial. The desired outcome is that the defendant should be declared guilty if and only if he has committed the offence with which he is charged. The trial procedure is framed to search for and establish the truth in this regard. But it seems impossible to design the legal rules so that they always lead to the correct result. The theory of trials examines which procedures and rules of evidence, and the like, are best calculated to achieve this purpose consistent with the other ends of law [including balancing of costs and interests other than accuracy]. Different arrangements for hearing

cases may be reasonably expected in different circumstances to yield the right results, not always but at least most of the time (Rawls, 1971, pp. 85-86).

Thus, as Solum (2004) explains, “imperfect procedural justice incorporates the notion of an independent criterion for accuracy but adds the notion of ‘other ends of the law,’ e.g., considerations of cost that may be balanced against accuracy” (p. 52).

Balancing is rendered difficult, however, because of the challenges of value incompatibility and incommensurability (Finnis, 1998; Griffin, 1977; Raz, 1998). There is not a single, objective, or universally acceptable way to compute the advantages and drawbacks of proposed human actions and weigh them up against each other. In this regard, Kock (2007) quotes Isaiah Berlin, “not all good things are compatible, still less all the ideals of mankind...neither political equality nor efficient organization nor social justice is compatible with more than a modicum of individual liberty” (p. 236). Moreover, as Kock (2007) explains, the real problem is not value incompatibility, per se, but the fact that there also exists value incommensurability. He states: “value pluralism might not be a major difficulty in deliberation (and in argumentation theory) and a form of value monism might be derived, If these values were not also *incommensurable* – meaning that no ‘common denominator’ can be found, providing ‘a common basis for determining, in given situations, the respective weights of the conflicting commitments.” Put differently, there is no single set of scales that “Lady Justice” can use to weigh competing positions. The challenge of incommensurability is taken up extensively in argumentation theory (*see* Kock, 2007 for a review) and is one of the fundamental problems addressed by Habermas (1981/1997) in his *Theory of Communicative Action*. Oftentimes, this balancing is made on moral grounds. As Solum explains, “one answer to these questions is utilitarian...another approach would emphasize rights-based constraints on both the nature of the

costs that may be imposed and the distribution of these costs” (p. 253).

Solum’s (2004) jurisprudential theorizing is consistent with recent thinking by scholars who study justice in organization communication context. Indeed, Folger (2001), Skitka (2002), and others have argued that instrumental and relational models do not provide a comprehensive set of justice motives, nor do they reflect a full set of reactions to (in)justice, because they ignore principled moral obligations and substitute personal desires as reasons for acting fairly or responding negatively to injustice (Cropanzano, Goldman, & Folger, 2003). They stress, “surely accounts of justice remain incomplete without reference to morality” (p. 1019). These models have been called “deontic” models following the obligation-based (*deon* is the Latin root for obligation) logic of deontological philosophies.

The dimensionality of procedural justice. Colquitt (2001) has stressed that the three concepts of formal procedural criteria, respectfulness, and explanations are conceptually and practically distinct (Colquitt, p. 387). Colquitt (2001) has identified *informational justice* as a potentially distinct factor to be considered in justice models, and has expressly noted the need for further research in this area. In this regard, the present research seeks to answer Colquitt’s call. Following Colquitt (2001), Greenberg (1993a, 1993b, 2002), and others I posit that overall quality of justification consists of four factors: distributive, formal procedural, interpersonal, and informational. The last three of these factors are related to procedural justice.

The formal procedural aspect includes Leventhal’s (1976, 1980) fairness criteria, such as accuracy, consistency, correctability, ethicality, lack of bias, representation, and voice (Besley & McComas, 2005; Colquitt, 2001). Quality in the procedural dimension means the justification demonstrates that stakeholders’ arguments were duly considered and the warrants offered in support of the outcome are accurate, coherent, relevant, and normatively acceptable (but not

necessarily normatively preferable).

Interpersonal justice relates to the manner in which participants are treated by the authority decision-maker (Tyler, 1994a, 1994b, 1989). Quality in the interpersonal dimension means the justification was delivered in a polite, respectful, and dignified manner and without inappropriate or inflammatory remarks, sarcasm, or needless editorial comment.

Informational justice relates to “communication about procedures, including open sharing of information, transparency of the process, or adequacy of procedural explanations” (Besley & McComas, 2005, p. 419). Quality within this dimension means the justification is delivered in a manner that is candid, thorough, reasonable, timely, and appropriately tailored to the specific context. Justifications are an important *informational* aspect of procedural justice (Bies & Moag, 1986; Greenberg, 1990; Shapiro, Buttner & Barry, 1991) that has been relatively under-studied compared to the formal, equitable, and interpersonal aspects.

I believe that there are sound theoretical reasons to believe that, independent of distributive justice, the three action-guiding functions of procedures may provide some insight into the dimensionality of the construct –specifically, that justice overall is a four-dimensional construct. But such theorizing, based on jurisprudential thought rather than communication or social scientific theories, may be too nascent to confidently formulate a sound hypothesis. This is especially so because the four-dimensional view of justice is still the minority position among researchers. Ambrose and Schminke (2009), concisely describe the state of the literature as follows:

Most justice research accepts that three distinct justice types exist: distributive, procedural, and interactional (Cropanzano, Byrne, Bobocel & Rupp, 2001; Konovsky, 2000). Further, recent research has suggested there may be four distinct justice types:

distributive, procedural, interpersonal, and informational (Colquitt, 2001; Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001). Indeed, empirical support exists for each of these conceptualizations, and it has demonstrated the relationship between each type of justice and a broad range of attitudes and behavior (p. 491).

Moreover, some scholars have argued for a six-factor conceptualization (at least in the applied context of mediation), while others argue that the research pendulum should swing back toward a more monistic view. Thus, I've opted to frame issue of dimensionality as a research question, rather than a hypothesis:

RQ1: *Is informational justice, as operationalized as quality of justification, a separate factor in justice determinations from formal procedural justice and interpersonal justice?*

The Accounts Literature and Justification Quality

Justifications as normative, or ideological, accounts. Accounts have been classified into two primary types: *excuses* and *justifications* (Benoit, 1995; Benoit & Drew, 1997; 2005; Shaw, Wild, & Colquitt, 2003; Giacalone, 1988). Excuses admit that the decision in question is unfavorable or inappropriate, but deny full responsibility by making causal attribution to an external cause or mitigating circumstance (Shaw, et al., 2003). Justifications, in contrast, accept full responsibility for the decision or outcome, but deny that anything improper or untoward occurred.⁴ Justifications have also sometimes been referred to in the literature as “ideological,” or “exonerating,” accounts (Colquitt & Chertkoff, 2002, p. 600). The law makes the same distinction in examining criminal defenses, justification assert a normative good (e.g., self-defense) whereas excuses deny causal responsibility (e.g., duress) (Chin, 2009).

⁴ There is also a body of literature that discusses apologies (Giacalone, 1988). Apologies admit responsibility, and express regret regarding outcomes. Apologies have shown to have effects on interpersonal treatment variables, but are beyond the scope of the present research.

Thus, when giving justifications people often cite relevant norms, social comparisons, and superordinate goals; when making excuses, in contrast, people typically cite unforeseen consequences or extenuating circumstances (Shaw, et al. 2003, p. 445; Chin, 2009). Most existing literature has examined the mere *provision* of explanations (both excuses and justifications) (Daley, 1995; Gilliland, 1994; Colquitt & Chertkoff, 2002), rather than their *quality*. And the literature that does focus on the content of a justification focuses on the issue of *adequacy* (i.e., sufficiency), rather than quality, *per se*. A core assumption of my research program is that justifications can be more than simply adequate; they can be good (or bad), better (or worse), or even best (or worst).

In giving justifications, the decision-maker provides feedback on what occurred. A good justification acknowledges and addresses the arguments advanced by disputants and explains how those arguments are being considered and weighed in the overall decision calculus. A failure to do this sends an implicit message that the disputant's arguments were not listened to, not understood, and/or ignored. Justifications, if sincere, also make decision-making transparent, which is an independent warrant for their in-depth and systematic study. This study explores the quality of a justification, as a communication act, and examines its direct relation to the action-guiding function of procedures in solving the problems of imperfect knowledge, incomplete specification of norms and partiality.

As Shaw et al. (2003) have explained, the explanations literature “remains unclear” with respect to inconsistent results regarding the main effects of justifications on the dependent variables of perceived fairness, as well as the fact that “research on where and when to provide adequate explanations has proven inconclusive” (Shaw et al., 2003, p. 445). Although several studies have found that explanations are more beneficial in the face of unfavorable outcomes

(e.g., Colquitt & Chertkoff, 2002; Gilliland, 1994; Langone, 2009; Ployhart, Ryan, & Bennett, 1999; Schaubroeck, May, & Brown, 1994), the results were inconsistent. Some studies have suggested the efficacy of explanations may be linked to key outcomes in intuitively important contexts, such as layoffs or evaluation procedures (e.g., Cobb, Vest, & Hills, 1997; Wanberg, Bunce, & Gavin, 1999), whereas others have shown only marginal effects in those settings (e.g., Mellor, 1992; Rousseau & Tijoriwala, 1999; Skarlicki, Ellard, & Kellin, 1998). The presence, or absence, or moral conviction may also have an effect on the efficacy of justifications. This is discussed in more detail in conjunction with hypothesis two, discussed below.

Prior work on justifications has suggested that people care about the quality of justifications when they receive unfavorable outcomes, or when their expectations are violated; but not when they receive favorable outcomes, or adverse outcomes that were expected (Langone, 2009). Colquitt and Chertkoff (2002), in the face of similar findings, argued that counterfactual thinking (Roese, 1997) – embodied in theories such as *referent cognitions theory* (Folger, 1986a, 1986b, 1987, 1996) and *fairness theory* (Cropanzano, Goldman, & Folger, 2003) – might explain these results and resolve some inconsistencies in the literature.

Justifications are an important informational aspect of procedural justice (Bies & Moag, 1986; Greenberg, 1990; Shapiro, Buttner & Barry, 1991) that has been relatively under-studied compared to the formal, equitable, and interpersonal aspects. Indeed, Bies and Shapiro (1988) noted that current theories of procedural justice “have ignored the role justification by a decision-maker.” They observe that this omission is surprising:

Since in court trials, the primary focus of procedural justice, judges frequently provided justifications for their decisions. Yet, the findings we reported suggest that examining the role of the decision-maker justification can increase our understanding of people’s

reactions to organizations procedures. Thus, the role of justification is a new an important theoretical development in organizational justice (p. 683).

The present research hopes to begin to fill that gap.

Elements of Quality of Justification. Bamforth (1997) has suggested criteria of relevance, plausibility, and acceptance in evaluating quality of a justification. But Bamforth's (1997) work is jurisprudential in nature. His criteria are not theoretically derived, or empirically tested; rather, the examination is one of *a priori* reasoning. Indeed, "acceptance," is often a dependent variable in studies involving communication accounts, not an element of the account itself.

Shaw et al. (2003) suggest that length, clarity, legitimacy,⁵ and reasonableness, are all factors that seem theoretically justified, and have some empirical support. And Kellerman and Cole (1994) refer to sufficiency, comprehensibility, and relevance. O'Keefe (1988) and others have referred to message design logics, noting a difference between "conventional" and "expressive" communicators. "Expressive communicators do not strive for coherence, and expressive messages may contain incoherent, [or] irrelevant" elements (Lambert & Gillespie, 1994, p. 313). In contrast, "coherence, relevance, and appropriateness to the present context are of the utmost importance," (p. 313), to conventional communicators. Conventional messages are theorized to be more effective.⁶

⁵ But again, legitimacy is often used as an independent variable in many studies. Skitka's model involves legitimacy both as a dependent variable (in testing the authority relations hypothesis) and as a element in the determination (litmus test hypothesis). This study examines legitimacy as a dependent measure and as a hypothesized element of quality.

⁶ There is a third type of message design (rhetorical), which under the theory is viewed as the most effective. "Rhetorical message producers attend to others' perspectives, focus on the future, and strive for consensus on goals" (Lambert & Gillespie, 1994, p. 313). The present research does not examine "rhetorical" justifications in this sense. This is beyond the scope of the present research, but as noted in the discussion section an avenue for future research.

As stressed by Shaw et al. (2003), the literature in this area is sparse and needs further inquiry. As noted by Areni (2002, 2003) and others (Areni & Lutz, 1988), the quality of an argument (which is similar to justification) was often determined operationally; an argument was found to be strong when “it elicited predominantly favorable (vs. unfavorable) cognitive responses” (Areni, 2002, p. 168). First, this approach risks confounding two distinct components, “argument strength and argument valence” (Areni & Lutz, 1988, p. 197). Second, because most persuasion research has been concerned with “identifying conditions under which persuasion [occurs],” the “argument quality construct itself has not received much attention...little or no emphasis as been given to identifying the underlying dimensions of which arguments can differ in quality” (Areni & Lutz, p. 197).

This present study hopes to contribute in this regard by seeking to identify the aspects of quality, and the underlying dimensions of which justifications can differ in quality. Thus:

RQ2: *What aspects of a justification are associated with perceiving the justification as “high,” as opposed to “low,” quality?*

Folger’s Fairness Theory

Recently, Skitka (2009), Colquitt and Chertkoff (2002), and Folger and Cropanzano (2001) have turned to referent cognitions theory, counter-factual thinking, and deonance-based reasoning to create morally-focused models such as *fairness theory* (Folger & Cropanzano, 2001) and the *contingency model of justice* (Skitka, Aramovich, Lytle, & Sargis, 2009). Colquitt and Chertkoff (2002) stress that fairness theory has been so recently introduced that demonstrating the theory “can be used to derive testable hypotheses about when explanations should, and should not, have positive effects is in and of itself a contribution” to the literature (p. 606). And Shaw et al. (2003) claim that the most promising line of theoretical research in the justice field lies in further testing Folger and Cropanzano’s (2001) fairness theory.

Fairness theory “presumes that the central topic of social justice is the assignment of blame” (Folger & Cropanzano, 2001, p. 1). Accordingly, the process of *accountability* is essential to justice determinations. Nonetheless, contend Folger & Cropanzano, most justice research has focused on the antecedents and consequences of accountability determinations, rather than the determinations themselves.

Folger’s (1986a, 1987) *referent cognitions theory* (RCT), for instance, is a theory about antecedents of blame. “RCT maintains that people are most likely to experience a sense of injustice when they are disadvantaged in relation to some point of comparison (such as another person)(Folger & Cropanzano, 2001, p. 2);” or, more relevant to the present research – one’s own normative moral standards. RCT contends that people evaluate an outcome from a frame of reference regarding “what might have been” (Cropanzano & Folger, 1989). Distributive outcomes are thus compared to “alternative, but unrealized, states of reality in an attempt to make sense of an undesirable referent outcome” (Goldman, 2003, p. 707). If the actual outcome compares unfavorably to expected or easily imagined alternative outcomes then negative emotions result. RCT suggests that the “magnitude of the discrepancy” between what actually happened and what could have, or should have, happened is “related to the emotional and motivational strength of responses” to the outcome (Goldman, 2003, p. 707).

According to fairness theory, however, poor outcomes (as compared to easily imagined alternatives) are only part of the equation. In other words, they are a necessary but not sufficient condition for overall dissatisfaction. “Whether unfavorable outcomes give rise to negative reactions depends on the decision-makers’ conduct or behavior” (Brockner & Weisenfeld, 1996, p. 193). Fair procedures, of course, are part of peoples’ thoughts about “what might have been.” Thus, fairness theory inherently “integrates justice issues that relate to both process and outcome

concerns. Fairness theory relies upon outcome justice (distributive justice) and the two process elements of justice (procedural and interactional⁷) to make its case for the importance of the combined effects when unfavorable outcomes are received” (Goldman, 2003, p. 707).

Fairness theory suggests that people who experience negative or unexpected results cognitively initiate an attributional search, querying: “why did I receive this unfavorable outcome?” Or, “I didn’t expect this, what happened?” In seeking to answer these questions, alternative counter-factual “worlds” are explored. Here, justifications can be hypothesized to play an especially significant role. Satisfactory or high-quality justifications thus are hypothesized to satisfy the conditions of the referent cognitions, or perhaps even prevent the initial attribution-seeking behavior in the first place, thus restoring or maintaining legitimacy in the decision-making system.

Fairness theory “posits that the assignment of blame or responsibility is a necessary step in reacting to decision-making events” (Shaw et al., 2003; Folger & Cropanzano, 1998; 2001). The theory suggests that individuals react to events by forming *could-should-would counterfactuals*, (i.e., mental simulations of events contrary to the facts). *Could counterfactuals* compare what the decision-maker did (in terms of outcomes and procedures) with other possible outcomes within the decision-makers’ control – i.e., were the other feasible alternatives within the discretion of the decision maker? *Should counterfactuals* compare what the decision-maker did with what “should have been done” from the normative and ethical perspective of the person(s) affected by and evaluating the decision. For instance, did the decision maker make the right decision relative to a superordinate goal or moral duty? – If not, the decision-maker can be

⁷ In this regard, note that Goldman (2003) seems to come from the perspective that justice has three dimensions, rather than four. Or at least this was his view in 2003. As noted in the discussion leading up to research question 1, the dimensionality of justice determinations is a question central to the present research.

held blameworthy. *Would counterfactuals* “compare the current state of well-being with what it would have been had another outcome been received, or another procedure followed” (Colquitt & Chertkoff, 2002, p. 594) – that is, would my well-being have been better off if the event played out differently? – If not, then explanations matter less, if at all. Fairness theory predicts that people will react negatively to decision outcomes where “the decision maker (1) could have done something differently; (2) should have done something differently; and (3) the current state of being would have been better if the event had played out differently” (Colquitt & Chertkoff, 2002, p. 594).

“It is now widely accepted in social and cognitive psychology that two processing systems are often at work when a person makes judgments or solves problems” (Haidt, 2001, p. 818, citing Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Zajonc, 1980, and others). These models have come to be referred to as *dual processing models*. A core tenet of such models is that we are cognitive misers and will not needlessly engage in high levels of cognitive involvement. An example is Eagley and Chaiken’s (1993) *sufficiency principle*, which asserts, people “will exert whatever effort is required to obtain a ‘sufficient’ degree of confidence they have accomplished their processing goals (p. 330). By default, “most people employ the principle of least effort by processing messages heuristically, judging their validity and making decisions to comply through the use of superficial cues such as the length of the message, use of a trusted spokesperson, or the use of statistical data (Griffin, Neuwirth, Giese, & Dunwoody, 2002).

It is on this basis I contend that people first process would counterfactuals.⁸ It is here motivation thresholds are met (or not). If people are harmed by adverse outcomes, a result unexpected, or a moral mandate threatened, then people will be motivated to process further and

⁸ This contention is part of my overall theory building, but this contention is not tested in the present research.

examine “could/should,” counterfactuals; if not, they do not bother. In my prior research (Langone, 2009), only “high quality” justifications moderated the effect of adverse or unexpected outcomes. Fairness theory helps explain why, “if individuals cannot imagine how their well-being would have been better, then there is no reason to focus on Could or Should issues. This makes explanations – which provide Could and Should information – less necessary in light of favorable outcomes” (Colquitt & Chertkoff, 2002, p. 595).

If Would counterfactual scenarios are invoked, then the individual is presumably under some form of moral, relational, or distributive threat. Thus, I argue they look next to Could counterfactuals. I believe Could counterfactuals are next because if the Could. counterfactuals are deactivated then there is no need to proceed to “should” evaluations. Shaw et al. (2003) suggest support for this view:

From the perspective of the theory, explanations have the potential to deactivate both the could and should counterfactuals [figure omitted]. The act of providing an excuse can demonstrate that some external cause or mitigating circumstances make the decision unnecessary or unavoidable. The more adequate the excuse is, the more the recipient will see the event in question as the only feasible option. Thus, excuse provision and adequacy can influence the could counterfactual, breaking the could-should-would chain that determines blame and accountability.

Similarly, the act of providing a justification can demonstrate that the decision was appropriate in light of some superordinate goal. The more adequate the justification is, the more the recipient will see the event in question as ethically defensible. Thus, justification provision and adequacy affect the Should counterfactual and again prevent an injustice from being perceived. The fact that

justifications and excuses affect different mechanisms illustrates the utility of fairness theory in an explanations context (p. 446).

Although the literature is conflicting, Shaw et al. (2003) argue that excuses are more effective than justifications because excuses deactivate the Could counterfactual, which is a necessary pre-condition to the Should counterfactual. “Justifications are incapable of deactivating both counterfactuals, because they admit – by definition – that other feasible options were possible (though less morally appropriate)” (Shaw et al., p. 448). Excuses are thus hypothesized to affect both the Could and Should counterfactuals, whereas justifications affect only the latter.

Hareli (no date), however, has written a compelling critique of the notion that account type (i.e. excuse or justification) plays a role in its effectiveness. Instead, Hareli argues for a focus on content quality, contending: type of account has no role in the observer’s deciding whether or not to accept it, unlike what is suggested by an entire tradition of research. Instead, we suggest shifting focus of research toward the study of the role of content. I agree in part with Hareli, but for different reasons. I believe excuses seem more effective because Could counterfactuals are processed before Should counterfactuals, but not because of anything intrinsic to being an excuse (or not).

In contrast to an excuse, mere provision of a justification may not deactivate the Should counterfactual; it must first meet a quality threshold operationalized in the literature as “adequacy.” It is on this basis that Colquitt and Chertkoff (2002) conclude: “Fairness theory does in fact provide theoretical support for the explanation provision x outcome favorability interaction sometimes demonstrated in past research” (p.595; Langone, 2009; Brockner & Weisenfeld, 1996).

I believe fairness theory should reconsider its articulation of the view that there is no order in which the counterfactuals are processed. It seems that people would first consider Would, then Could, then Should. This view, I believe, is supported both by the reasons stated by Shaw et al. (2003), as well as dual-processing research. First, the individual evaluates whether there is a material impact on one's self: this could be by an adverse result (Langone 2009), or an unexpected result (Colquitt & Cherkoff, 2002; Langone 2009), or a threat to a moral mandate (Skitka, 2009). Next, assuming an unfavorable, unexpected, or value-threatening impact to the self, an individual evaluates the causal agency of the decision-maker. Wong and Weiner (1981) have described some of these attribution processes and mechanisms. Finally, if participants perceive the outcome would have made a material difference, and conclude the decision-maker could have acted differently, then the Should phase is reached and justifications are normatively evaluated and balanced. Consistent with the call by Shaw et al. (2003) this research seeks a "better understanding of adequacy:"

One interesting, though unexpected, pattern was that explanation adequacy tended to have more beneficial justice effects than explanation provision. This suggests that an inadequate explanation may be deemed more unfair than failure to provide one at all. A better understanding of adequacy is needed to understand such a result. Although many studies assess adequacy only in vague terms, some have operationalized adequacy in terms of *length*, *clarity*, or *legitimacy* (e.g., Greenberg, 1994; Mansour-Cole & Scott, 1998; Mellor, 1992). Similarly, Shapiro et al. (1994) showed *reasonableness* to be a key dimension of adequacy (p. 451).

Indeed, Shaw et al. (2003) argue that the inconsistent findings in the literature regarding the effects of explanations suggest the existence of moderating variables. In this regard, they

stress, the “identification of such moderators is important practically and theoretically” (p. 447) because moderators answer the “who-where-when” questions critical for sound theory development (citing Whetten, 1989). One such moderating variable they identified is the type of explanation in an effort to identify “boundary conditions for explanation effects” (Shaw et al., 2003, p. 452). Another potential boundary condition, as theorized by Skitka, would be the existence of a moral mandate (see Hypothesis 2, below); another might be the favorable or expected nature of a result (Langone 2009; Colquitt & Cherkoff, 2002). The present research will investigate potential boundary effects with respect to giving of justifications. In non-morally-mandated situations, justifications will be expected to function as demonstrated elsewhere in the literature in that high-quality justifications will increase overall acceptance, satisfaction, and legitimacy measures; low-quality justifications, in contrast, will decrease those variables. Thus, the following hypothesis:

H1: *High-quality justifications will increase perceived fairness, legitimacy, propriety, and interpersonal treatment of decision outcomes.*

The Tyler-Skitka Debate

In the September 2008 issue of *Social Justice Research*, there is an interesting exchange between Tyler and Skitka. As explained above, Tyler has been studying justice effects for the past three decades (Tyler, 2006, 2004, 2003; Smith & Tyler, 1997; Tyler & Lind, 1992; Lind & Tyler 1988) and was one of the pioneers of the interpersonal and relational aspects of justice research. Tyler’s development of the group value model (Smith & Tyler, 1997), the four-component model (Blader & Tyler, 2003) and most recently the group engagement model (Tyler & Blader, 2003) has added significantly to theoretical development in the field. Skitka has also contributed extensively to thinking on distributive and procedural justice (Skitka, 2009, 2002;

Bauman & Skitka 2009a, 2009b). She developed the concept of moral mandates, (Skitka 2002; Skitka, Bauman & Lytle, 2008) and, most recently, proposed an ambitious integrative model she calls the contingency model of justice, which builds upon her value protection model, essential features of which are what Skitka called the *litmus test hypothesis* and the *authority independence hypothesis* (Skitka, 2009; Skitka, Aramovich, Lytle & Sargis, 2009). “The value protection model of justice reasoning proposes that moral convictions serve a number of important functions for people, including allowing them to classify the actions of institutions, authorities, in-group or out-group members and even themselves into categories of legitimate thought and deed versus a fundamental transgression” (Skitka & Mullen, 2008, p. 530-31). There are two fundamental predictions of the model – one regarding people’s perceptions of decision outcomes (e.g. fairness) and the other regarding people’s perceptions of the authorities that make the decisions (Skitka & Mullen, 2008, p. 531).

The value protection model predicts that when people take a moral perspective, they are more likely to reason from the moral dictates than rely on procedural rules or authority, *per se*. “When people take a moral perspective, they focus more on their ideals, and the way they believe things should or ‘ought’ to be done, than on authorities” (Skitka & Mullen, p. 531). Thus, the model’s authority independence hypothesis predicts that people’s moral beliefs are independent of authority relative to their normative expectations. Thus, contend Skitka & Mullen (2008), whether decisions are consistent or inconsistent with moral conviction is a stronger predictor of perceived fairness than perceptions of procedural justice.

Another hypothesis generated by the value protection model is the litmus test hypothesis (Skitka, 2009; Skitka & Mullen, 2008; Skitka, Bauman, & Lytle, 2009). This hypothesis predicts that people use their sense of morality as a benchmark to assess authorities and their decisions,

including their legitimacy (Skitka, 2009; Skitka, Bauman, & Lytle, 2009). Thus, when peoples' core moral convictions are perceived as threatened, they react to protect their values by rejecting the authority, legitimacy, and fairness of the threat (Skitka & Mullen, 2008).

Moral conviction is a fundamental element of Skitka's theorizing. Bauman and Skitka (2009b) note that, "moral convictions are subjective beliefs that something is fundamentally right or wrong" (p. 41). Nonetheless, not all individuals experience moral conviction in any given moral situation; nor does moral conviction necessarily exist in any particular individual across all situations. Skitka (2008) acknowledges that there are indeed individual differences regarding when people view issues as moral mandates. But she contends nonetheless that a great deal can be learned from examining the antecedents and consequences of people who have had their moral mandates activated. Skitka (2008) explains:

Our theory of moral conviction begins with one key and important assumption, that is, that people can accurately report on the degree to which a given feeling or belief reflects a moral conviction. Working from this basic assumption, the task of moral research becomes to explore the antecedents and consequences of people's self-reported degree of moral conviction (p. 4).

Skitka, Bauman, and Sargis (2005) have also proposed a theory of moral convictions to explain the difference between strongly held attitudes and strong moral convictions, which they call moral mandates. A "moral mandate is a selective self-expressive stand on a specific issue, not a generalized orientation toward the world" (Skitka, 2002, p. 589). They noted several factors that distinguish moral mandates from other types of attitudes:

- Moral mandates are perceived *sui generis*, that is they inhabit their own unique conceptual class;

- Moral mandates are experienced as absolute and universally applicable,
- Moral mandates are linked to strong affective response and
- Moral mandates are perceived as authority independent and serve as a benchmark heuristic for important determinations regarding perceived legitimacy of authorities.

The nature of the debate is the effect, if any, of moral mandates on perceptions of justice in light of procedural justice manipulations. Skitka predicts that if a particular justice issue is perceived as a moral mandate then only consistency of outcome with the mandated outcome is predictive of justice determinations – *i.e.*, moral mandates moderate and create a boundary condition to traditional fair-process effects (Skitka & Mullen, 2008; Skitka, 2009). The model suggests, “that when an outcome is related to a person’s moral values, the fairness of the procedures by which policies are made or decisions are resolved has no influence” (Napier & Tyler, 2008, p. 510).⁹

Tyler, writing with Jamie Napier, contends that Skitka (2002) has overstated the effect of moral mandates, noted potentially “troubling” implications of her findings. They write:

Skitka and colleagues argue that there is *no* influence of procedural justice in the face of issues that people view as morally important. The value protection model holds that, in the case of a morally relevant outcome, congruence between the

⁹ Indeed, Napier and Tyler (2008) disagree with the theoretical conceptualization of “moral mandates.” They wonder whether this is “the most useful conceptualization of the phenomenon of interest.” In this regard, they point to a body of research that has shown that moral values are systematically related to one another and certain belief systems are associated with specific cognitive and motivational needs.” Specifically, they point to work by Haidt & Graham (2007) and Lakoff (2002). They stress, for instance, that “political conservatives tend to have higher needs to manage uncertainty and threat than liberals, and should therefore be more affected by incongruence between their value systems and an authorities decision” (Napier & Tyler, p. 513). This issue, however, is well beyond the scope of this research.

moral values of the perceiver and the direction of the outcome is the only factor that will influence overall perceptions of procedural and outcome fairness. This leads to the troubling conclusion that there is little authorities can do to garner public acceptance of decisions in morally diverse environments (Napier & Tyler, 2008, p. 514).

My own work on justifications has suggested that people care about the quality of justifications when they receive unfavorable outcomes, or when their expectations are violated; but not when they receive favorable outcomes, or outcomes that are consistent with their expectations (Langone, 2009). Justifications are an important “informational” aspect of procedural justice that has been relatively under-studied compared to the formal, equitable, and interpersonal aspects. The study of justifications can also shed some light on the issues recently raised between Tyler and Skitka. One reason is that unlike other procedural factors, justifications are backward looking, they are provided *after* the outcome is made known; they seek to “justify” the outcome. One of the issues Tyler and Skitka found significant was the difference between pre-outcome and post-outcome perceptions of procedural fairness. But justifications are always post outcome. Thus, by examining justifications the theoretical issues can be brought into clearer focus.

Moreover, if moral mandates moderate procedural justice effects, as Skitka contends, then the perceived quality of justification will be less important than the outcome itself. But if justifications contribute to *bona fide* procedural justice effects, then justification quality will have an effect even with respect to outcomes that go against moral mandates. Skitka (2009) contends that “outcomes and procedures will be perceived as legitimate and fair if they are consistent with perceivers’ moral mandates and will be perceived as illegitimate if they are

inconsistent with perceivers' moral mandates" (Skitka, 2009, p. 589). "When people have a moral mandate about an outcome, any means justifies the mandated end. Similarly, fair procedures do not ameliorate the sense of injustice people experience when a morally-mandated outcome is threatened or rejected" (Skitka, 2009, p. 594). Napier and Tyler (2008) illustrate the results of the conflicting theoretical predictions, as in Figure 1.¹⁰




Fig. 1 The predictions of the value protection model (left) and the group engagement model (right) for the relationship between procedural justice and moral mandates

As noted by Napier and Tyler, the “model predicts that outcomes and procedures will be perceived as legitimate and fair if they are consistent with perceivers’ moral mandates and will be perceived as illegitimate and unfair if they are inconsistent with perceivers’ moral mandates” (Skitka, 2002, p. 589). Thus, conclude Napier and Tyler “Skitka predicts a meditational effect of moral outrage and suggests because people’s reactions are driven by moral outrage procedural influences become irrelevant” (p. 510).

In re-analyzing Skitka’s data, Napier and Tyler conclude that while moral values are important factors in final fairness perceptions they do not over-ride or completely moderate procedural justice factors. They describe Skitka’s claims as “extreme” and do not support the argument that procedural justice determinations are irrelevant in the fact of threats to morally

¹⁰ Reproduced from: Napier and Tyler (2008).

mandated views. They specifically call for more research into the effects of moral values on perceptions of justice and specifically to “delve more deeply into the issue of where moral mandates come from and how they function.” This study will attempt to answer this call by examining quality of justification under conditions of moral mandate (in favor of, or against, the outcome), and no moral mandate. Using Figure 1, except with quality of justification on the x-axis, and dependent measures (such as satisfaction, acceptance and perceived legitimacy) on the y-axis – if Skitka, et al. are correct the results will look like the graph in the left panel of Figure 1, but if Napier and Tyler are correct, my results will look like the graph in the right panel.

Similarly, Skitka has stated: “In short, when people have a moral mandate about an outcome, any means justifies the mandated end. Similarly, fair procedures do not ameliorate the sense of injustice people experience when a morally mandated outcome is threatened or rejected” (Skitka, 2002, p. 594; Skitka & Houston, 2001). Studying justifications is a uniquely good way to investigate the issues recently raised between Tyler and Skitka. This is because, unlike other procedural factors, justifications are backward looking: justifications are provided after the outcome is made known. If moral mandates moderate procedural justice effects, as Skitka contends, then the perceived quality of justification will be less important than the outcome itself. But if justifications contribute to bona fide procedural justice effects, then justification quality will influence outcomes that go against moral mandates. Thus:

H-2: *When people have a moral mandate about an outcome, justifications, regardless of quality, will not significantly decrease the sense of injustice, illegitimacy, and improper treatment people experience when a morally mandated outcome is threatened or rejected.*

Situational Contexts and Communication Frames.

Shaw et al. (2003) also argue that the decision-context in which the outcome occurs – in addition to its favorability or expectedness – also affects the Would counterfactual, stressing:

widely varying contexts likely have implications for the Would counterfactual in fairness theory. They state, “it is likely the perceived impact of decision events is higher in some contexts than others, thereby increasing the importance of explanation provision and adequacy. If so, the key question becomes how to differentiate contexts according to their impact” (Shaw, et. al, p. 448). Whereas outcome favorability affects the magnitude or valence of the impact, context determines the type of impact. Shaw et al. (2003) identify three main contexts: instrumental, relational, and moral. Notably, these three contexts correspond to the waves of justice research described above, James’ (1890) three conceptions of self, and Solum’s (2004) action-guiding functions of procedure.

Frames are reflexive structures that help people interpret and disambiguate information by “selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation and/or solution” (Entman, 2004, p. 5, as cited in Besley & McComas, 2005). Framing has been described as “the core element of message structure” (Terkildsen, Schnell, & Ling, 1998, p. 47), and the “central organizing idea” of the message (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989, p. 3). It has also been an influential concept in the field of conflict research generally (see Dewulf et al., 2009, for an extensive review), and is starting to be applied to procedural justice specifically (Besley & McComas, 2005).

Scholarship in framing tends to emerge from one of two research paradigms: the *cognitive* approach, or the *interactional* approach. The cognitive paradigm sees frames as relatively static “structures of expectations” (Dewulf et al., 2009; Lakoff, 2004; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Under such a view, conflict frames are cognitive representations that guide expectations about the conflict situation (Dewulf et al., 2009). The interactional paradigm in contrast, conceptualizes conflict framing as “an interactional process in which the meaning of the

conflict situation is co-constructed through the meta-communicational aspects of discourse” (Dewulf et al., 2009, p. 163).

Because the present research is on scenario studies, it will approach framing from a cognitive approach, and attempt to manipulate the cognitive task by framing it as taking place within either a moral, or policy, context. Based on Shaw et al.’s (2003) meta-analysis it appeared explanations were more powerful when the context concerned a morally charged event, or implicated relational concerns. As noted by Bauman & Skitka (2009b), “more than 25 years of domain theory research demonstrates that people act and reason differently across moral and non-moral contexts” (p. 41). Shaw et al. (2003) explicitly called for further research, as do Besley and McComas (2005).

The present research will manipulate frames as *moral*, or *policy*, and explanations provided will either be morally-based, or instrumentally (i.e. policy) based. It is hypothesized the justifications will be perceived as more high quality to the extent they assert frame-consistent reasons or warrants. Thus, in a moral frame, a morally based justification will be perceived as higher quality relative to a policy-based justification, whereas in a policy frame, a policy-based justification will be perceived as higher quality than a moral justification. More simply stated:

H3: *Frame consistent justifications will be perceived as higher quality than frame-inconsistent justifications.*

Chapter 2: Method

Participants

Two hundred and eighteen (218) individuals volunteered to participate in a questionnaire-style study that was conducted in a large mid-western city, and at a large east-coast university. Participants over the age of 18 were recruited via the “volunteers wanted” link on Craigslist, and from introductory-level communication courses, in accordance with university guidelines. All participants were paid \$10.00 for their participation in the study. Student participants were offered extra course credit in lieu of the \$10.00. The study was approved by the university’s IRB. A copy of the questionnaire, including the instructions, definitions, and items are in Appendix 1.

After 19 of the 218 participants completed the questionnaire, I realized that the original version of the questionnaire did not contain items inquiring about underlying attitudes toward the death penalty and affirmative action, thus moral mandate scores could not be properly computed. These 19 individuals were thus excluded from further analysis. Moreover, one participant inquired after the study about the meaning of the phrase “affirmative action.” Thus, a “definitions” section was added, defining relevant terms (See Appendix 1, p. 113).

The remaining 199 participants were included in all statistical analyses.¹¹ One participant did not complete one page of the instrument in the affirmative-action scenario and thus was excluded from analysis involving that scenario. Due to oversight, data relative to race and religion was not collected during the first portion of the study. That data was recorded for 122 of the 199 participants. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 89, and consisted of 97 males and 97

¹¹ *A priori* power analysis was not conducted before conducting the study, however, I now understand this to be the norm (and many IRB committees are requiring such analysis). In the future will use a utility such as G*Power to calculate the required sample size to detect effects at desired levels of power. G*Power, for instance, reports that to detect a medium effect (effect size $f = .25$), with an alpha of .05 and power of .8 with 6 groups and 5 degrees of freedom would require a total sample of 211 to have a reasonable effect of detected a medium or greater effect.

females (five individuals did not report sex). Appendix 2 more fully sets forth the demographic characteristics of the study participants.

Experimental Design and Procedure

The purpose of the study was to explore the components of a high quality justification, and examine the effect of high and low quality justifications in moral and policy frames, and under conditions of perceiver moral mandate. The study used vignettes involving an affirmative action scenario and a death-penalty scenario. The study included two manipulated independent variables (Frame consistency of justification: consistent, inconsistent; and justification quality: high, low) and one measured independent variable (moral mandate: pro-decision mandate, no mandate, anti-decision mandate) design.

Participants were told that they would participate in either a decision on “moral decision making” or “policy decision making,” depending on which experimental frame to which they were randomly assigned. After providing informed consent and signing the applicable forms, participants were provided with a nine-page packet (order of the packets having been randomized in advance). The packet contained: instructions and definitions; demographic questions; questionnaire items designed to gauge participants’ attitudes toward the death penalty and affirmative action, and whether those attitudes are moral mandates; and two decision-making scenarios (presented in a counterbalanced order) – an affirmative action vignette, and a death penalty vignette. The use of vignettes is common in organizational justice research (Bies & Shapiro, 1988; Blumstein, Carsow, Hall, J., Hawkins, Hoffman, Ishem, Maurer, Spens, Taylor, & Zimmerman, 1974; Bobocel, Agar, Meyer, & Irving, 1998; Bobocel & Farrell, 1996; Tyler & Caine, study 3, 1981; Skitka, 2002). Moreover, in their meta-analytic study, Shaw, Wild and Colquitt (2003) coded for “whether hypothetical vignettes were used” and found “neither

methodological characteristic (i.e., field or lab study, and use of vignette, or not), affected the size of the explanation correlation” (p. 450).

The affirmative-action scenario, for instance, was as follows:

Recently, there was an opening for the position of police detective, and both Amy Johnson and Eric Smith were considered for the job. Police detectives are plain-clothes investigators who gather facts and collect evidence for criminal cases. They conduct interviews, examine records, observe the activities of suspects, and participate in raids and arrests. Both Amy and Eric went through a series of interviews with their commanding officer, Lieutenant Williams. Although Amy and Eric were equally qualified and both received serious consideration for the job of police detective, Ms. Amy Johnson was ultimately promoted to that position. When asked for the reason Lieutenant Williams stated [... reason(s) given then vary based on experimental condition].

This scenario was modeled on a prompt used by Bobocel and Farrell (1996) based upon the hiring decisions of a hypothetical police chief. I chose this scenario for two reasons. First, because it involves an affirmative-action type hiring decision it can easily be framed as a moral issue (“to make up for past injustice”) or an instrumental/pragmatic issue (“to promote workforce diversity in order to gain a market advantage”). Second, several scholars have shown how workplace diversity can provide organizations with a competitive advantage (Cox, 1991; Cox & Blake, 1991). Indeed, at least one study has examined the effect of providing a diversity-based rationale on women recruits’ perceptions of the decision to hire them, their own perceived abilities, opinion of the company, and opinion of co-workers (Richard & Kirby, 1998)¹². Thus, in

¹² Some studies found that women who felt they were hired for “affirmative action” reasons perceived themselves as “tokens” and thus reported less satisfaction with work, co-workers and their

partial response Richard and Kirby's (1998) call for future research into "competitive advantage arguments," I have chosen to use the Bobocel and Farrell (1996) affirmative-action scenario.

The death penalty scenario was developed to provide a second context for evaluation. It was loosely based on the Troy Davis case, which was prominent in the news at the time the materials were being developed. This vignette involved a warden, who refused to implement a death sentence based on his strong belief that the condemned prisoner was innocent. This context was chosen because it readily lent itself to both policy (e.g. deterrence) and moral (e.g. state should not kill) rationales. The scenario was as follows:

Last year, Eric Smith was executed by the State. Before the execution, it had come to light that eight of the ten principal prosecution eyewitnesses changed all or part of their testimony. One witness, for example, stated in an affidavit that she felt under pressure from police to identify Smith as the killer because she was on parole for a shoplifting conviction. Another witness wrote, in a sworn statement, that the police had scared him into falsely testifying by threatening to charge him as an accessory to the crime, and alleged that he had not seen Smith do anything. Three other witnesses also stated in affidavits that strong-arm police tactics had coerced their earlier testimony implicating Smith. Moreover, three witnesses signed affidavits stating that another person, Cole White, had confessed to the murder to them. After a hearing, the Judge who presided over the original trial found the affidavits to not be credible, calling Smiths' case "smoke and mirrors."

The Supreme Court of the United States denied Smiths' appeal and the execution was ordered to proceed. Imagine that after the Supreme Court denied Smiths'

organization (Richard & Kirby, 1998; Chacko, 1982). Accordingly, Richard & Kirby (1998) investigated whether a diversity-based rationale tied to competitiveness, rather than past injustice, would have a more

appeal the warden refused to implement the execution order. The governor calls, and states he is duty-bound to implement the execution. In refusing, Warden Williams stated: [... reason(s) given then vary based on experimental condition].

Variables

Independent variables. There were three independent variables: frame consistency, justification quality, and moral mandate.

Frame consistency. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions, either a moral frame or a policy frame. In the moral frame, participants were told that they would be participating in a study about *moral* decision-making, whereas in the policy frame participants were told the study was about *policy* decision-making. Both words were defined, as follows:

Moral: of, pertaining to, or concerned with the principles or rules of right conduct or the distinction between right and wrong; ethical: *moral attitudes*.

Expressing or conveying truths or counsel as to right conduct, as a speaker or a literary work; moralizing: *a moral novel*.

Founded on the fundamental principles of right conduct rather than on legalities, enactment, or custom: *moral obligations*.

Policy: action or procedure conforming to or considered with reference to prudence or expediency; a definite course of action adopted for the sake of expediency, facility, etc.: *We have a new company policy*.

Participants were given the following instructions, which varied as indicated in brackets depending on whether they were assigned to the moral or policy condition:

In this study, we are going to ask you read some scenarios and answer some questions about your views on **[policy/moral]** decision-making, and to examine

and evaluate the decision makers and justifications given for policy decisions in certain decision-making scenarios. Please evaluate the decision scenarios from a **[moral/policy-making]** perspective; evaluate the decision makers and justifications based on the degree to which you think they promote sound **[policy/moral]** outcomes. [As you answer these questions, please think about the costs and benefits of the policy decision, and the degree to which the policy decision is instrumental in achieving desirable goals OR As you answer these questions, please think about the values and duties that underlie the moral decision, and the degree to which the moral decision is ethically desirable.]

As in the above excerpt, the word “moral” or “policy,” as applicable, was made more salient using a larger and emboldened font. Participants were provided with definitions of moral, or policy, as a per the assigned frame, and of “death penalty” and “affirmative action.”

In an effort to gauge attitudes toward the subject matter of the scenarios, as well as to strengthen the moral versus policy prime, participants were asked to think about the issues of affirmative action and the death penalty from the assigned frame (moral or instrumental), and respond to the following items:

- The death penalty is [bad policy/immoral] because studies have shown that it does not deter crime.
- It is [bad policy/immoral] for the State to put people to death, killing is always wrong, even when done by the State.
- Affirmative action is [bad policy/immoral].
- It is [bad policy/immoral] to preference any person on account of their race or gender.

Participants responded to all items by indicating level of agreement on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*).

Next, depending on the assigned frame, participants were provided either a moral or a policy justification, randomly assigned. Generally, a moral justification is one that is backward looking and remedial; a policy justification is one that is forward looking and instrumental (Summers, 1978). An example of a moral reason provided by the Lieutenant in the affirmative-action scenario is: “The decision was made to redress past injustices”; whereas a policy reason is: “We strive for diversity in our organization, and attempt to select a workforce that is diverse” (See, Ployhart et. al, 1999). Although both these examples are from the “low quality” condition (see below), one is remedial, the other goal oriented.

Thus, if the moral reason was provided in the moral frame, it was frame consistent; but if it was given to participants assigned a policy frame, it was frame inconsistent. And the same for the policy/instrumental reasons: they are frame consistent in a policy frame, and frame-inconsistent in a moral frame. These manipulations are similar to those used by Bobocel & Farrell (1996). One is a moral-based justification regarding redressing past discrimination (the *affirmative action rationale*), and the other is a policy-based explanation based on the tangible benefits of increasing work-place diversity (the *diversity rationale*).

Justification quality. The work of Toulmin (1958), Areni & Lutz (1988), Areni (2002), theoretically informed the manipulation of justification quality. High-quality arguments contained a claim, data, and warrant (as opposed to just a claim). So, for instance, the high-quality moral reason in the affirmative-action scenario was:

Historically, and at present, qualified women have not had the same access to jobs and promotions as have men, which has led to an underrepresentation of equally

qualified women detectives in the police force (data). As members of a fair society, we have a social and moral obligation to attempt to reduce the underrepresentation whenever it is possible to do so (warrant). This decision is necessary to ensure that our workplaces are more reflective of our population and to make up for past injustices (claim).

The low-quality moral reason, in contrast, was:

The decision was made pursuant to our affirmative action policy to redress past injustices (claim).

And the high-quality policy reason:

At present, there is an underrepresentation of qualified women detectives in the police force, and the key to a successful police force is to draw on the full potential of all its employees (data). It is in the best interests of the police force to create a more diverse workforce, which reflects the diversity in the community, in order to provide improved services to that community (warrant). I've concluded therefore, that teams of detectives that include both men and women will be better equipped to deal with the full range of problems that face our police force (claim).

The low quality policy reason was:

We strive for diversity in our organization, and attempt to select a workforce that is diverse (claim).

In the death penalty scenario the manipulated justifications were as follows:

High-quality moral: I know it's my job to order this execution. But I cannot morally (claim). I know ultimately that the execution will proceed, that the courts will order another warden to proceed with the execution (data). Living with the

nightmares is something that we know from experience (data). No one has the right to ask a public servant to take on a lifelong sentence of nagging doubt, and for some of us, shame and guilt (warrant). Should our justice system be causing so much harm to so many people when there is an alternative (warrant)?

Low-quality moral: I cannot be the trigger man; I will not have blood on my hands (claim).

High-quality instrumental: I am going to refuse to implement these orders in order to draw attention to this important public policy issue (claim). By my actions, I will not only delay the wrongful execution of Davis (data), I will draw attention to this issue and hopefully policy-makers will see that the economic and social costs imposed by the death-penalty outweigh its benefits (warrant).

Low-quality instrumental: Hopefully, by my actions, I will draw attention to this issue and prevent wrongful executions in the future” (claim).

Moral mandates. As in Skitka, Bauman & Lytle (2009), the existence of a moral mandate was operationalized by multiplying attitude direction by moral conviction.

Attitude direction. Participants were asked to identify their degree of agreement, or disagreement, with the following items: (a) I am against the death penalty (1 = *strongly disagree*; 5 = *strongly agree*); and (b) I am against affirmative action (1 = *strongly disagree*; 5 = *strongly agree*).

Moral conviction. As in Skitka, Bauman & Lytle (2009), moral conviction was assessed by averaging two items, both of which were responded to using a 5-point scale: (a) To what extent are your feelings about [affirmative action/death penalty] a reflection of your core moral values and convictions?” (1 = *not at all*, 2 = *slightly*, 3 = *moderately*, 4 = *much*, and 5 = *very*

much) and “To what extent are your feelings about [affirmative action/death penalty] deeply¹³ connected to your beliefs about ‘right’ and ‘wrong’?” (1 = *not at all*, 2 = *slightly*, 3 = *moderately*, 4 = *much*, and 5 = *very much*).

Moral mandate. I calculated a moral mandate measure by multiplying the degree of moral conviction scores with the scores indicating attitude direction, and rescaling the result to counteract the increase in measurement error associated with multiplying the items (Skitka, 2002, p. 501). Those participants with an average mandate score above 4 were coded as possessing a moral mandate on the issue.

Decision consistency with mandate. For some individuals, the decisions described in the vignettes were consistent with their mandates. For example, the Lieutenant’s decision was pro affirmative action, thus people who were in favor of affirmative action and saw the issue as a moral mandate were placed in the “consistent mandate” group ($N = 47$). Similarly, participants who reported being against the death penalty and as having a moral mandate on that issue ($N = 52$) were placed in the “consistent mandate” group for the death penalty scenario because their attitude of being against the death penalty is consistent with the hypothetical warden’s anti-death penalty decision and justification. Those individuals who saw the issue as a moral mandate, but were against affirmative action (or in favor of the death penalty) were placed in the “inconsistent mandate” group ($N = 28$ for affirmative action scenario; $N = 33$ for death penalty scenario). Those with “no mandate” were placed in a third group ($N = 123$ for affirmative action scenario; $N = 114$ for death penalty scenario).

Dependent Variables. Twenty-three items were devised and intended to be reflective indicators of the following latent constructs: perceived informational justice, perceived

¹³ The word “deeply” is omitted in Skitka, Bauman, and Sargis. (2005).

procedural justice, and perceived interpersonal justice. These constructs are the dependent variables in this study. All items were measured on 5-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*). Given some of the measurement issues that arose, some of the questionnaire items are examined in more detail than is ordinary. Questionnaire items were intended to obtain measures of participants' perceptions of three core aspects of justice determinations: procedural propriety, interpersonal treatment, and overall quality.

So, for instance, respondents in the affirmative action scenario were asked, among other things, to evaluate the degree to which the Lieutenant's justification was fair, legitimate, relevant, and specific. And respondents were asked to rate features such as the politeness of the Lieutenant, or the degree to which respect was shown. Respondents were asked to make similar evaluations regarding the Warden, and the reasons given in the death penalty scenario. Appendix 1 contains a list of all items used for both evaluations of the Warden (in the death penalty scenario) and the Lieutenant (in the affirmative action scenario). In an effort to reduce acquiescence bias, 10 items were reverse coded.¹⁴

Informational justice. Seven items [nine, prior to averaging items 9 & 16 (relevance) and 13 & 14 (adequacy/sufficiency)] were intended to tap this aspect of justice, as follows:

- The [Warden/Lieutenant] did not explain the decision thoroughly (item 5).
- The [Warden/Lieutenant]'s justification was unreasonable (item 7).
- The [Warden/Lieutenant]'s justification was specific (item 8).
- The [Warden/Lieutenant]'s justification was relevant/irrelevant (items 9 & 16, averaged).

¹⁴ The reverse-coded items were: "The [decision-maker's] justification was untruthful;" "The [decision-maker] did not explain the decision thoroughly;" "The [decision maker's] justification was unreasonable;" "The [decision-maker's] justification was not coherent;" "The [decision-maker's] decision was illegitimate;" "The reason[s] the [decision-maker] gave for the decision ...[was/were] inadequate;" "The [decision-maker's] justification was irrelevant;" "The [decision-maker's] justification was biased;" "The [decision-maker] is untrustworthy;" "The [decision-maker] was unfair.

- The [Warden/Lieutenant]’s justification not coherent (item 10).
- The [Warden/Lieutenant] advanced a sufficient number of reasons for the decision (item 11).
- The reason the [Warden/Lieutenant]’s gave for the decision [not to promote Amy/to refuse to execute] was inadequate/sufficient (items 13 & 14, averaged)

As explained in the results section below, only three of these items (specificity, item 8, thoroughness, item 5, and number of reasons, item 11) loaded as intended on this factor in a significant and stable manner in both scenarios. Coherence (item 10) did not load above .5 on any factor (using PAF, coherence loaded $>.5$ using PCA). Relevance (avg. of items 9 & 16) and reasonableness (item 7) loaded on the “procedural justice” factor and included in that measure. The three informational justice items (5, 8, & 11) were summed ($M=9.47$; $SD = 3.09$; $\alpha = .702$).

Procedural justice. Five items were included in the dependent measure of *perceived procedural justice*. Three of these items were the average of reverse-coded analogues (fair/unfair, items 3 and 23), (legitimate/illegitimate, items 6 & 12), (relevant/irrelevant, items 9 & 16). The remaining two items were: item one (nothing improper) and item seven (reasonable). The five items (1, 3/23, 6/12, 7 & 9/16) were summed ($M = 17.05$; $SD = 4.14$; $\alpha = .872$).

Interpersonal justice. The “interpersonal justice” measure was the sum of the following four items: item 15 (concern for rights), item 18 (respect), item 21 (politeness), and item 22 (kindness and consideration). ($M = 11.61$; $SD = 3.13$; $\alpha = .805$). These items were based on Colquitt (2001) and Lind, Tyler, Huo (1997). For the purposes of this study, the distinction between trust and standing are not relevant to the analysis, thus items reflecting these constructs were included in a single overall “interpersonal justice” measure. Participants rated each statement on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*).

For the affirmative action measure, alpha was .780 for all six items, but would increase to

.811 if item #4 was excluded (untruthful), or simply averaged with its positively worded antonym ($\alpha = .812$). But if the truthfulness measures are averaged, alpha can be further improved (to .833) by excluding item #19, “untrustworthy.” As for the death-penalty scenario, alpha was .709 (but would increase to .741 if item 18 was excluded). If the two “truthfulness” measures (items #4 through 20) were averaged alpha is .710 (.759, if item #18 is excluded). If only the four positively worded items are included, alpha drops to an unacceptable .504.

Because Cronbach’s alpha is a coefficient of internal consistency, it is well suited to testing the *reliability* of measurements. But in order to gain a better understanding of *validity* exploratory factor analysis is a useful analytical tool. The next section will explain how exploratory factor analysis was used to attempt to *explain* the data (in particular as to questions of convergent and discriminant validity and to gain insight into the operation of unobservable latent processes), whereas principal component analysis was used to reduce the data.

Chapter 3: Results

The data were screened for outliers. No out-of-range values were recorded. Thirty-two out of 9,552 cells contained missing data. Ten missing cells were because a single respondent neglected to complete the second page of the affirmative action scenario (items 14 to 24). This respondent was excluded from further analyses involving that scenario. The remaining 22 cells of missing data were replaced with the mean value of that item for all non-missing data.

Appendix 3 contains histograms summarizing respondents' answers to each of the items for both scenarios. Correlations among all questionnaire items are reported Appendix 4.

As noted in chapter 2, several reverse-coded items were used in the study. Research indicates, however, that reverse-coded items can interfere with factor extraction in factor analysis because reverse-coded items tend to load as an independent component/factor and otherwise interfere with the loadings (Netemeyer, Bearden & Sharma, 2003; Swain, Weathers, and Niedrich, 2008). To mitigate this effect, those items that were identical in substance, but simply phrased as antonyms (e.g., relevant/irrelevant; legitimate/illegitimate) were averaged before inclusion in further analyses. After averaging such items (2 and 17, 3 and 23, 4 and 20, 6 and 12, 9 and 16) into five composite indicators, 17 items were left – only four of which remained reverse-coded. These 17 items were subjected to dimension reduction and exploratory common factor analysis, as described in the next section.

Data Reduction and Exploratory Common Factor Analysis

Central to this study is the question regarding those factors that influence perceptions of quality of justification and under what circumstances do high-quality justifications matter. In order to examine the number and nature of the factors that influence the justification-quality aspect of the informational justice construct an exploratory factor analysis was conducted. These

results were contrasted with a principal components analysis for both exploratory reasons, as well as for data-reduction purposes. The results of the exploratory factor analysis are reported below and in Appendix 5.

Suitability for factor analysis. The final sample size in this study was 198 respondents (199 for the death-penalty scenario). Although Tabachnick and Fidell's (2007) "rule of thumb" suggests a sample size in excess of 300, other scholars have noted samples of 100-200 are sufficient for meaningful factor analysis (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1995; Comrey, 1973). Indeed, as noted by Henson and Roberts (2006), such rules of thumb can be misleading when they ignore differences such as the $p: N$ ratio, correlation matrices, and communalities (p. 402). Accordingly, the trend in factor analysis is to examine all these aspects of the data.

With 198 respondents and 17 items for analysis, the sample to item ratio ($p: N$) exceeded 11:1. Scholars who evaluate factorability based on p -to- N ratios would generally consider an 11:1 ratio acceptable (Gorsuch, 1983; Streiner, 1994). Other analyses suggest, however, that p -to- N ratio is not as important a consideration as overall sample size, and/or at least 50 respondents per factor (Guadagnoli & Velicer, 1988; Widaman, 1990). The present sample contained 66 respondents per factor. So regardless of the criterion applied, the sample size was sufficient for meaningful interpretation of what theory predicts should be either two or three factors.¹⁵

The factorability of the 17 items was also examined. With respect to both scenarios, all 17 items correlated at least .3 with at least one other item, and often at the "important" and "practically significant" loadings of .4 and .5 as categorized by Hair, Anderson, Tatham, &

¹⁵ Theory based on the action-guiding function of procedure would predict a three-factor solution: overall procedural propriety (formal quality of treatment per Tyler & Blader, (2003), interpersonal treatment (informal quality of treatment), and quality of justification (informal quality of decision). None

Black, 1995). For the affirmative action scenario, the Kaiser-Mayer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was .875, above the commonly accepted value of .5 (Hair, et. al 1995; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Bartlett's test of sphericity was significant ($\chi^2(91) = 1251.69, p < .001$). For the death penalty scenario the KMO was .899, and Bartlett's test was significant. ($\chi^2(136) = 1522.77, p < .001$). The diagonals of the anti-image correlation matrix were above .5 for all items in both scenarios. Finally, the communalities were all above .3, confirming that each items shared common variance with other items. All items were visually inspected for kurtosis and skewedness. No data was unacceptably skewed, defined as 90% or more of the responses in a single cell.

Method of Extraction. Principal components analysis (*PCA*) and exploratory common factor analysis (*ECFA*) are both commonly used data-reduction techniques. They differ, however, in both theory and statistical method. PCA is primarily a data-reduction technique, which analyzes all the variance in the indicators; ECFA, in contrast, seeks to identify underlying causal constructs and thus only analyzes shared variance. As explained by Costello and Osborne (2005):

Components analysis is only a data reduction method. It became common decades ago when computers were slow and expensive to use; it was a quicker, cheaper alternative to factor analysis (Gorsuch, 1990). It is computed without any regard to any underlying structure caused by latent variables; components are calculated using all the variance of the manifest variables, and all that variance appears in the solution. However, researchers rarely collect and analyze data without an a priori idea about how the variables are related (Floyd &

of the items were directed toward distributive justice, so this fourth factor was not expected to emerge from this data.

Widaman, 1995). The aim of factor analysis is to reveal any latent variables that cause the manifest variables to covary. During factor extraction, the shared variance of a variable is partitioned from its unique variance and error variance to reveal the underlying factor structure; only shared variance appears in the solution (p. 2).

Ultimately, Costello and Osborne argue factor analysis is superior to PCA for exploratory analyses that seek to contribute to theory development.

To maximize experimental validity with respect to manifest variables, however, PCA has its advocates. Precisely because PCA retains all variance, advocates argue for its use as a data-reduction technique (Guadagnoli & Velicer, 1988; Schonemann, 1990; Steiger, 1990; Velicer & Jackson, 1990). Thus, for the purpose of data reduction PCA was used, while ECFA was employed to attempt to gain insight into the underlying constructs and aid experimental design in future research (Floyd and Widaman, 1995). Because some doubt existed as to multivariate normality, principal-axis factoring was chosen as an extraction method rather than maximum likelihood factoring (Costello & Osborne, 2005; Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum, & Strahan, 1999).

Number of components/factors extracted. Theory predicts three theoretical components to the kind of justice evaluations examined in the study: procedural propriety, interpersonal treatment, and quality of justification. As stressed by Williams, Onsman & Brown (2010) many peer-reviewed journals now require multiple approaches be used in determining number of factors to extract, and researchers should consider Kaiser's criteria, scree test, cumulative percent of variance extracted and parallel analysis in making such decisions.

The affirmative action scenario. With respect to the affirmative action scenario, component extraction using Kaiser’s criteria (i.e., eigenvalues > 1) resulted in a clear and stable three-factor solution (Appendix 5, p. 130). The initial eigenvalues showed that the first factor explained 41% of the variance, the second factor 10% of the variance, and the third factor 9% of the variance (60% cumulative). Results were similar using principal-axis factoring (Appendix 5, p. 131).

The death penalty scenario. Component extraction for the death penalty scenario, however, was less easily resolved. Four-factor solutions consistently emerged based using Kaisers’ criteria for both PCA and PAF (Appendix 5, pp. 132-133). Accordingly, for the death penalty scenario parallel analysis was conducted using SPSS syntax developed by O’Connor (2000). As noted by Thompson, “...parallel analysis appears to be among the best methods to for deciding how many factors to extract or retain” (Thompson, 2004). Using 1000 Monte Carlo simulations using permutations of the death penalty data, three statistically significant eigenvalues were generated (Appendix 5, p. 134). These approaches supported a three-factor solution, which cumulatively explained 58.05% of the variance, and was preferred because of leveling off of eigenvalues on the scree plot after three factors (Velicer & Jackson, 1990), and insufficient and unstable four-factor loading for one of the two scenarios.¹⁶ Accordingly, three components were ultimately extracted for both scenarios.

Method of rotation. Because the dependent measures were theoretically expected to covary (Smith & Tyler, 1997, p. 153), oblique factor rotation ($\delta = 0$) was used in the reported results. (Although it should be noted, Varimax rotation did not cause materially different factor loadings, Appendix 5, pp. 135-138).

¹⁶ Factor 1 explained 38.28%, factor 2 10.24% and factor 3, 9.53%. The excluded fourth factor (with an eigenvalue of 1.064) explained 6.26%.

Interpretation and labeling. Based on the component loadings within each scenario, and the desire to keep dependent measures consistent in both scenarios, five items were discarded for one of the following reasons: (a) the item did not meet a .5 threshold of loading on a component in both scenarios, (b) the item cross-loaded on another component with a loading of more than .32, and/or, (c) the item loaded on different factors in the two scenarios (Costello and Osborne, 2005). Thus:

- The trustworthiness item (item 19) was excluded because it did not load with a factor weigh greater than $>.5$ on any component in the affirmative action scenario (Appendix Table 11)(although it loaded $>.6$ on the procedural justice component in the death penalty scenario)(Appendix 5, p. 135)
- The adequacy/sufficiency item (avg. of items 13 & 14) was excluded because it cross-loaded on both procedural justice and informational justice components in both scenarios (Appendix 5, pp. 135 & 137).
- The neutrality item (avg. of items 13 & 14) was excluded because it cross-loaded on both procedural and interpersonal justice in the death-penalty scenario (Appendix Table 13).
- The coherence item (item 10) was excluded because it loaded on informational justice in affirmative action scenario, yet loaded on procedural justice in the death penalty scenario (Appendix 5, pp. 135 & 137).
- The truthfulness item (avg. of items 4 & 20) was also excluded because it loaded on different components in the different scenarios. In the affirmative action scenario, it loaded on the interpersonal treatment component (Appendix 5, p. 135), whereas in the death penalty scenario it loaded on the procedural justice component (Appendix 5, p. 137).

The remaining 12 items left a strong and stable solution – meaning a least three items per factor, strong loadings, and no cross loadings (Bagozzi & Baumgartner, 1994; Green & Rao, 1970) – for all three factors in both scenarios using PAF. Using PCA, the results were more ambiguous, as kindness and considerateness started to cross-load. Descriptive statistics for all retained items, and Cronbach’s alpha statistics are reported in Table 1. The alphas ranged from acceptable (.662) to strong (.872) for all measures.

Table 1:

Means, Intercorrelations, and Coefficient Alphas for Perceived Justice Measures in Each Scenario

	N	M	SD	1	2	3
<i>Affirmative Action Items</i>						
1. Procedural Justice	198	17.05	4.14	[.872]		
2. Interpersonal Treatment	198	11.61	3.13	.537**	[.805]	
3. Quality of the Justification	198	9.42	3.08	.411**	.357**	[.702]
<i>Death Penalty Items</i>						
1. Procedural Justice	199	19.13	3.82	[.837]		
2. Interpersonal Treatment	199	13.45	2.71	.454**	[.662]	
3. Quality of Justification	199	9.57	2.93	.495**	.411**	[.776]

Note. Coefficient alphas are listed in brackets on the diagonal.

** p<.01

Hypothesis Testing

The three dependent variables used in statistical tests of the various hypotheses are:

1. Perceived procedural justice, consisting of the sum of: procedural propriety, fairness, legitimacy, reasonableness, and relevance.
2. Perceived interpersonal justice, which consisted of the sum of four items: politeness, considerateness, respect, and concern for rights.
3. Perceived informational justice, which consisted of the sum of thoroughness, specificity and number of reasons

Comparing Tyler and Skitka. Hypotheses 1 and 2 reflect the conflicting theoretical predictions of Tyler and Skitka regarding the effect of procedural justice, and the potential boundary effects of moral mandates. A fundamental assumption in the testing and comparison of these hypotheses is that justification operates in the same manner as other procedural justice manipulations (such as voice). If so, then Hypothesis 1 predicts that high quality justifications will have a positive effect on dependent measures across all mandate conditions, with mandate-consistent decisions being viewed most favorably and mandate-inconsistent decisions the least. Hypothesis 2 predicts that justification will have a positive effect on those with no mandate, but not those with moral mandates. For such individuals Hypothesis 2 predicted that the consistency of the mandate alone, would predict whether the decision makers were viewed favorably or not.

For the purposes of this study, justification quality was assumed an aspect of informational justice and part of the overall procedural justice construct. In other words, even though the studies at issue involved procedural justice manipulations (such as voice) it is assumed the conflicting pattern of results identified by Napier and Tyler in Figure 1 would also apply to informational justice manipulations, such as justification quality. This study assumes that the value-protection model predicts the same Z-shaped pattern of results for quality of justification as it shown in the left panel of Figure 1 regarding moral mandates. Similarly, it is assumed that the group engagement model would predict the same pattern of results for high-quality justifications as for pre-threat procedural justice perceptions (i.e., three parallel lines as shown in Figure 1's right panel; see, page 33, above).

Linear contrast analysis. In order to test Hypotheses 2, regarding the potential effects of moral mandates, and to test the different theoretical predictions made by Tyler and Skitka, I used contrast analysis procedures as described by Furr and Rosenthal (2003; Abdi & Williams, 2010).

As noted by Furr and Rosenthal (2003), when the goal is to test differences between theories, then ANOVA is a relatively inefficient procedure because it only locates significant differences in means between the groups without regard to theoretically-predicted directional differences (i.e., higher means). When theory predicts a pattern of results, as do both the group engagement theory and the value protection model, then it is more efficient to simply compare “the degree to which the observed pattern of data matches the pattern of data implied by the [competing theories]” (p. 46). As Furr and Rosenthal (2003) explain, while factorial analysis of variance, such as ANOVA, is “a typical and potentially informative way to analyze data, it is a relatively inefficient way *to evaluate theories*” (Furr & Rosenthal, 2003, p. 46, emphasis in original). A major advantage of this approach is “that it can provide relatively clear and direct evaluations of theoretically-driven predictions” (p. 48). As Abdi and Williams (2010) explain: “precise conclusions can be obtained from *contrast analysis* because a contrast expresses a specific question about the pattern of results of an ANOVA” (p. 1, emphasis in original).

In *a priori* (or planned) contrast analysis, as were conducted here, the first step is to translate the theory into numbers, and then hypothesize contrast weights before collecting and analyzing the data (Furr & Rosenthal, 2003, p. 46). Based on the competing theoretical differences predicted by the value protection model and group engagement model, the

theoretically-expected means for the two competing models are as follows:

Expected Results	<u>Value Protection Model</u>		<u>Group Engagement Model</u>	
	Low	High	Low	High
Consistent Mandate	5	5	4	5
No mandate	2	4	2	4
Anti Mandate	1	1	1	2

Subtracting these expected means from the grand mean resulted in the following hypothesized contrast weights as between the two theories:

Skitka	Moral Mandate	<u>Quality of Justification</u>	
		Low	High
Expected Results	Consistent mandate	2	2
	No mandate	-1	1
	Inconsistent mandate	<u>-2</u>	<u>-2</u>

Tyler	Moral Mandate	<u>Quality of Justification</u>	
		Low	High
Expected Results	Consistent mandate	1	2
	No mandate	-1	1
	Inconsistent mandate	<u>-2</u>	<u>-1</u>

Contrast analysis using the SPSS syntax provided by Furr and Rosenthal (2003) was conducted. In all cases, the contrasts hypothesized by group engagement model accounted for slightly more variance than the contrast coefficients predicted by the value protection model. See Table 2, lending slightly more support to the Tyler model than the Skitka model.

Table 2

Planned Contrast Analysis between Testing Value Protection versus Group Engagement Hypotheses

Factor	df	SS	L	F,	p	η^2
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION SCENARIO						
<i>Procedural Justice</i>						
Value Protection	1	302.79	17.20	20.44	<.001	.10
Group Engagement	1	382.82	15.91	25.84	<.001	.12
Diff. b/w theories	1	15.73	1.29	1.06	.304	.01
Error	192	2844.38				
<i>Interpersonal Justice</i>						
Value Protection	1	75.28	8.58	7.97	.005	.04
Group Engagement	1	68.59	6.73	7.26	.008	.04
Diff. b/w theories	1	32.24	1.84	3.42	.066	.02
Error	192	1812.59				
<i>Informational Justice</i>						
Value Protection	1	30.84	5.49	4.34	.037	.02
Group Engagement	1	8.51	15.62	15.62	.000	.08
Diff. b/w theories	1	86.78	-3.02	12.38	.001	.06
Error	192	1345.98				
DEATH PENALTY SCENARIO						
<i>Procedural Justice</i>						
Value Protection	1	221.19	13.85	16.12	.000	.08
Group Engagement	1	194.73	10.89	14.19	.000	.07
Diff. b/w theories	1	101.83	2.96	7.42	.007	.04
Error	193	2648.91				
<i>Interpersonal Justice</i>						
Value Protection	1	31.64	5.24	4.48	.036	.02
Group Engagement	1	27.13	4.06	3.84	.051	.02
Diff. b/w theories	1	16.01	1.17	2.27	.134	.01
Error	193	1362.16				
<i>Informational Justice</i>						
Value Protection	1	60.04	7.21	7.64	.006	.04
Group Engagement	1	106.23	8.04	13.53	.000	.07
Diff. b/w theories	1	7.93	-8.26	1.01	.316	.01
Error	193	1515.92				

Note. Skitka contrast coefficients were: 2, 2, -1, 1, -2, -2; Tyler coefficients were: 1, 2, -1, 1, -2, -1.

In order to gain further insight from the data, just as in Bauman and Skitka (2009), I analyzed moral mandates as a categorical variable using analysis of variance (ANOVA), as well as conducting a regression analysis. It is to those analyses that I now turn.

ANOVA. Hypothesis 2 predicts that the differences in means of perceptions of justice will not be significantly different (between high and low quality) when moral mandates exist. To test this hypothesis, perceptions of procedural justice, interpersonal justice, and informational justice were subjected to a two-way analysis of variance having two levels of quality of justification (high, low) and three levels of consistency with mandate (consistent with mandate, no mandate, inconsistent with mandate)

Prior to conducting the ANOVA, the assumption of normality was evaluated and determine to be satisfied as the all of the groups' distributions were associated with skew and kurtosis less than $|2.0|$ and $|9.0|$, respectively (Schmider, Ziegler, Danay, Beyer, Buhner, 2010). Furthermore, the assumption of homogeneity of variances was tested and satisfied based on Levene's F test, $F(5,192) = .899, p = .483$ (procedural justice), interpersonal justice, $F(5,192) = 2.054, p = .073$, and informational justice, $F(5,192) = .619, p = .685$. In the death penalty scenario the Levine's test for procedural justice was $F(5,193) = .433, p = .825$; for interpersonal justice, $F(5,193) = 1.010, p = .413$; and for informational justice $F(5, 193) = 4.707, p = .000$ (Note: this was the only significant Levene's test).

Affirmative Action Scenario. Table 3 reports the results of ANOVA in the affirmative action scenario.

Table 3

ANOVA of Manipulated Justification Quality and Level of Mandate on Perceptions of Justice Measures in Affirmative Action Scenario

	High Quality		Low Quality		Anova F		
	M	SD	M	SD	Mandate	Quality	M x Q
Procedural Justice Perceptions	18.07	4.08	15.99	3.95	10.87^{***}	12.56^{***}	.02
Mandate consistent	20.40	4.27	18.02	4.42			
No Mandate	17.67	3.84	15.47	3.54			
Mandate inconsistent	16.59	3.78	14.17	3.31			
Interpersonal Justice Perceptions	11.98	3.25	11.23	2.96	3.30[†]	.63	1.09
Mandate consistent	12.64	4.06	12.31	3.84			
No Mandate	12.16	2.90	10.84	2.60			
Mandate inconsistent	10.44	3.14	10.83	1.90			
Informational Justice Perceptions	10.99	2.46	7.78	2.80	.69	55.00^{***}	.25
Mandate consistent	11.52	2.62	7.85	3.02			
No Mandate	10.91	2.46	7.86	2.79			
Mandate inconsistent	10.63	2.28	7.25	2.49			

Note. [†] $p < .05$; ^{***} $p < .001$

Hypothesis 1 predicted that higher quality justifications would positively influence procedural justice perceptions in all three domains. Manipulation of justification quality in the affirmative-action scenario yielded a statistically-significant main effect with respect to procedural justice $F(1, 192) = 12.564, p < .001, \eta^2 = .061$, indicating that more positive procedural justice evaluations were made of the high-quality justification ($M = 18.07, SD = 4.08$) than of low-quality justification ($M = 15.99, SD = 3.95$). The quality manipulation also exhibited a main effect on informational justice, $F(1, 192) = 54.99, p < .001, \eta^2 = .223$, meaning that evaluations of informational quality were higher for the high-quality justification ($M = 10.99, SD = 2.46$) than for the low-quality justification ($M = 7.78, SD = 2.80$). As to interpersonal justice, however, the null hypothesis could not be rejected. There was not a statistically significant difference, $F(1, 192) = .630, p = .428$, between the mean interpersonal justice evaluations of those provided a high-quality justification ($M = 11.98, SD = 3.25$) relative to those provided a low-quality justification ($M = 11.23, SD = 2.96$). Hypothesis 1 thus received partial support.

Moral mandates also exhibited statistically significant main effects, as predicted by hypothesis 2. Level of moral mandate explained approximately 10% of the variance in perceived procedural justice, $F(2, 192) = 10.871, p < .001, \eta^2 = .102$. Post-hoc Fisher's LSD tests (Hayter, 1986) on the procedural justice variable showed a statistically significant difference ($p < .001$) between consistent mandate ($M = 19.21$) and both no mandate ($M = 16.57$) and inconsistent mandate, ($M = 15.38$), but not between no mandate and inconsistent mandate ($p = .188$). Although the effect of moral mandate on interpersonal treatment was also significant, the effect size was much smaller. $F(2,192) = 3.30, p = .039, \eta^2 = .033$. The effect of moral mandate on perceived informational justice was not significant. $F(2,192) = .689, p = .503$.

Figure 2 depicts the pattern of the means as to perceived procedural justice.




Figure 2 Relationship between justification quality and perceived procedural justice for each level of moral mandate in the affirmative-action scenario

The pattern in Figure 2 looks much like the pattern predicted by Tyler in the right hand panel of Figure 1. But this pattern did not hold with respect to perceptions of interpersonal treatment or informational justice, as show in Figures 3 and 4.




Figure 3 Relationship between justification quality and perceived interpersonal justice for each level of moral mandate in the affirmative-action scenario




Figure 4 Relationship between justification quality and perceived interpersonal justice for each level of moral mandate in the affirmative-action scenario

Indeed, Figure 3 resembles the left panel, as predicted by the value-protection model. And Figure 4 suggests no impact of moral mandate on perception of quality. Potential reasons for this are discussed in the next chapter.

Death Penalty Scenario. Table 4 reports the results of the ANOVA in the death-penalty scenario.

Table 4

ANOVA of Manipulated Justification Quality and Level of Mandate on Perceptions of Justice Measures in Death Penalty Scenario

	High Quality		Low Quality		Anova F		
	M	SD	M	SD	Mandate	Quality	M x Q
Procedural Justice Perceptions	19.08	3.90	19.19	3.74	8.56^{***}	.29	.95
Mandate consistent	20.23	3.64	20.87	3.20			
No Mandate	18.99	4.02	19.03	3.55			
Mandate inconsistent	17.90	3.62	16.25	3.93			
Interpersonal Justice Perceptions	13.69	2.49	13.16	2.93	4.18[†]	.37	1.12
Mandate consistent	14.42	2.21	14.27	3.24			
No Mandate	13.59	2.46	12.55	2.53			
Mandate inconsistent	13.09	2.79	13.50	3.37			
Informational Justice Perceptions	10.34	2.79	8.65	2.85	2.55	18.97^{***}	.69
Mandate consistent	10.92	2.77	9.27	3.87			
No Mandate	10.18	2.64	8.66	2.20			
Mandate inconsistent	10.10	3.24	7.25	2.53			

Note. [†] $p < .05$; ^{***} $p < .001$

Within the death penalty scenario, quality did not exhibit a statistically-significant effect on either procedural justice, $F(1, 193) = .290, p = .591$, or interpersonal justice, $F(1, 193) = .366, p = .546$. Although the effect of manipulated quality on informational justice was statistically significant, the effect size was relatively small $F(1, 193) = 18.971, p < .001, \eta^2 = .089$. Moral mandate yielded a significant main effect on perceived procedural justice, $F(2, 193) = 8.556, p < .001, \eta^2 = .081$, perceived interpersonal treatment, $F(2, 193) = 4.177, p = .017, \eta^2 = .041$, but not perceived informational justice $F(2, 193) = 2.550, p = .081$. There were no significant interactions.

Similarly, the pattern of means did not seem to resemble either panel in Figure 1. Figure 5 seems to show no effect of quality on perceived procedural fairness. And while Figure 6 looks slightly like the left panel of Figure 1, the lines intersect, which is not predicted by either the value protection model or the group engagement model.




Figure 5 Relationship between justification quality and perceived procedural justice for each level of moral mandate in the death penalty scenario




Figure 6 Relationship between justification quality and perceived procedural justice for each level of moral mandate in the death penalty scenario




Figure 7 Relationship between justification quality and perceived procedural justice for each level of moral mandate in the death penalty scenario

Figure 7 shows an effect of quality across all conditions, but strongest with respect to inconsistent mandate. Again, potential reasons for this are discussed in the next chapter.

Regression Analysis. Throughout her research program, Skitka has consistently operationalized her moral mandate variable by taking a measure of attitude strength (e.g., from -3 for an anti attitude to +3 for a pro attitude) and multiplying it by moral conviction. Napier and Tyler criticize this operationalization claiming that looking for an interaction between the continuous moral mandate scale and procedural justice perceptions could not correctly test the hypothesized predictions. Thus, they advocate breaking the moral mandate measure into two separate items, a “pro mandate” and an “anti-mandate” measure. The pro-mandate score is the same as the positive side of the Skitka scale for participants with a mandate; the anti-mandate score was calculated by using the absolute value of the negative side of the Skitka scale. Participants who report having no moral mandate are coded with a zero on both scales.

Following Napier and Tyler (2008), the dependent variables were regressed on each of manipulated quality, pro-decision mandate, anti-decision mandate, and multiplicative interaction

terms. Tables 5 and 6 report the results of the regression analysis.

Table 5

Regression of Perceptions of Justice Quality on Manipulated Quality and Mandate Consistency in the Affirmative Action Scenario

Variable	B	SE B	β	t	p
Procedural Justice [$R^2 = .23$ (N = 198, $p < .01$)]					
Quality	1.08	.42	.26	2.57	.001
Consistent Mandate	.63	.18	.25	3.52	.001
Inconsistent Mandate	-.81	.24	-.25	-3.39	.001
Quality * Consistent	.02	.18	.01	.10	.919
Quality * Inconsistent	-.18	.24	-.04	-.49	.625
Interpersonal Justice [$R^2 = .11$ (N = 198, $p < .01$)]					
Quality	.80	.34	.26	2.33	.021
Consistent Mandate	.45	.15	.23	3.04	.003
Inconsistent Mandate	-.20	.20	-.08	-1.04	.301
Quality * Consistent	-.15	.15	-.10	-1.05	.296
Quality * Inconsistent	-.33	.20	-.15	-1.70	.091
Informational Justice [$R^2 = .28$ (N = 198, $p < .01$)]					
Quality	1.75	.30	.57	5.78	.000
Consistent Mandate	.10	.13	.05	.80	.427
Inconsistent Mandate	-.14	.17	-.05	-.79	.431
Quality * Consistent	-.05	.13	-.03	-.38	.707
Quality * Inconsistent	-.13	.17	-.06	-.76	.447

As reflected in these Tables 5 and 6, manipulated quality was a statistically significant predictor of all three dependent measures in the affirmative action scenario, but did not predict any of the dependent variables in the death penalty scenario.

Table 6

Regression of Perceptions of Justice Quality on Manipulated Quality and Mandate Consistency in the Death Penalty Scenario

Variable	B	SE B	β	t	p
Procedural Justice [$R^2 = .30$ (N = 198, $p < .01$)]					
Quality	-.700	.89	-.09	-.79	.434
Consistent Mandate	.275	.18	.12	1.51	.132
Inconsistent Mandate	-.663	.25	-.21	1.51	.132
Quality * Consistent	.016	.18	.01	.09	.931
Quality * Inconsistent	.319	.25	.12	1.28	.202
Interpersonal Justice [$R^2 = .11$ (N = 198, $p < .01$)]					
Quality	1.28	.63	.24	2.03	.044
Consistent Mandate	.46	.13	.28	3.59	.000
Inconsistent Mandate	.10	.18	.04	.56	.576
Quality * Consistent	-.23	.13	-.170	-1.80	.077
Quality * Inconsistent	-.13	.18	-.073	-.75	.454
Informational Justice [$R^2 = .28$ (N = 198, $p < .01$)]					
Quality	1.55	.67	.27	2.3	.02
Consistent Mandate	.21	.14	.12	1.53	.13
Inconsistent Mandate	-.29	.19	-.09	1.21	.23
Quality * Consistent	-.03	.14	-.02	-.23	.82
Quality * Inconsistent	.12	.19	.06	.65	.51

Pro-decision mandate was a strong predictor of interpersonal justice in both scenarios, and procedural justice in the affirmative action scenario. The existence of a pro-decision mandate was not a statistically significant predictor of informational justice in either scenario, nor was anti-decision mandate. Anti-decision mandate was also a highly significant predictor of perceptions of procedural justice in both scenarios. There were no interactions among any of the predictors in any of the scenarios, although a p -value of .09 for the quality by anti-decision

mandate interaction is worth noting.

Hypothesis 2 was thus supported in the affirmative action scenario, but not in the death penalty scenario. As to the Tyler-Skitka debate, Tyler's model received support from the data, as it did not show an interaction between moral mandate and quality, as would be expected if moral mandates moderated the effect of informational justice.

These results lend support to Tyler's model, although it is consistent with Skitka's model that pro-mandate was different from both no mandate and anti-mandate, and that quality did not have a statistically significant impact on those individuals with a pro-decision mandate. Contrary to the prediction of Skitka's model, however, those with an anti-decision mandate were influenced by high-quality justifications.

The framing hypothesis was not in either the affirmative action, or the death penalty scenario (See Table 7 and Appendix 6). Potential reasons for this are discussed in the next chapter.

Table 7

ANOVA of Manipulated Quality and Frame Consistency of Justification on Perceived Justice Quality in Both Scenarios

	High Quality		Low Quality		Frame	Anova F	
	M	SD	M	SD		Quality	F x Q
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION SCENARIO							
Procedural Justice Perceptions	18.07	4.08	15.99	3.95	1.13	14.18 ^{***}	1.48
Frame consistent	18.04	4.12	16.43	4.04			
Frame Inconsistent	18.14	4.05	15.03	3.62			
Interpersonal Justice Perceptions	11.98	3.25	11.23	2.96	.02	3.32	.44
Frame consistent	11.90	3.25	11.35	3.13			
Frame inconsistent	12.15	3.30	10.97	2.58			
Informational Justice Perceptions	10.99	2.46	7.78	2.80	.66	62.58 ^{***}	.02
Frame consistent	11.12	2.31	7.87	2.78			
Frame inconsistent	10.73	2.76	7.60	2.88			
DEATH PENALTY SCENARIO							
Procedural Justice Perceptions	19.08	3.90	19.19	3.74	.08	.17	.96
Frame consistent	19.34	4.07	19.02	3.73			
Frame Inconsistent	18.64	3.61	19.41	3.80			
Interpersonal Justice Perceptions	13.69	2.49	13.16	2.93	.39	1.13	2.61
Frame consistent	13.84	2.36	12.79	2.93			
Frame inconsistent	13.45	2.71	13.67	2.90			
Informational Justice Perceptions	10.34	2.79	8.65	2.85	.41	14.81 ^{***}	1.61
Frame consistent	10.63	2.70	8.54	2.73			
Frame inconsistent	9.85	2.90	8.79	3.04			
Note. *** p < .001							

Chapter 4: Discussion

This study sought to address five major questions:

1. Are justifications, as a subset of “informational justice,” a distinct component of justice determinations?
2. What aspect(s) of justifications are involved in determining whether they are perceived as high, or low, quality?
3. Do high quality justifications increase perceptions of procedural justice, legitimacy, and quality of treatment?
4. Do “moralized outcome preferences” have an impact on how justifications, decision-makers, and/or decision-making systems are perceived?
5. Does framing a justification instrumentally (i.e., as a goal reason) versus deontologically (i.e., as a rightness reason) have an impact on perceptions of quality when participants are told to evaluate a decision from either a “policy” or “moral” perspective?

This chapter will: (a) interpret the results in light of these questions, (b) identify methodological and theoretical limitations of the research, and (c) in conjunction with examining practical and theoretical implications of the research, I will suggest lines of potentially fruitful future research.

Interpretation of Results

The results support a four-dimensional model of justice: distributive, procedural, interpersonal, and informational. Regarding this informational dimension, justifications that are perceived as specific, reasonable, and advance a sufficient number of reasons for the decision tend to reflect higher informational quality. But quality justifications can also affect perceptions

that influence other dimensions of justice, like being truthful (interpersonal justice), and legitimate (procedural justice).

In determining whether a decision-maker should have acted differently, some people interpret the situation through the lens of moral conviction. Moralized outcome preferences do have an impact on how justifications, decision-makers, and decision-making systems are perceived. This impact, however, differs depending on whether the moralized preference (called “moral mandates”) is consistent or inconsistent with the decision. Individuals with pro-decision mandates tend to view the decision-maker, and evaluate the justification, positively. And they do so regardless of the structural and argumentative quality of the justification. Individuals with anti-decision mandates tend to view the decision maker negatively, but the structural and argumentative quality of the justification does have influence: high-quality justifications increase positive perceptions of the decision-maker, legitimacy, and the process. Those individuals without moral mandates are also positively influenced by high-quality justifications, and their overall impressions are, as expected, between those with pro- and anti- decision mandates.

Finally, these results did not support the hypothesis that frame consistent justifications would be perceived as more high quality than frame-inconsistent justifications. Potential reasons for this are discussed below.

Informational justice as a fourth dimension of justice determinations. As detailed previously, justice research proceeded through a series of waves, during which various proposals were made about the dimensionality of justice. Originally, justice was associated primarily with distributive concerns, such as allocations of outcomes. With the work of Thibaut and Walker (1975), procedural justice was recognized as conceptually and empirically distinct from distributive justice. Work led by Tom Tyler and colleagues demonstrated another dimension:

interpersonal justice. The question of whether interpersonal justice encompassed account giving, or other “informational justice” concerns has also received attention in the literature (Bies & Moag, 1986; Brockner & Weisenfeld, 1996; Colquitt, 2003; Shaw, Wild, & Colquitt, 2003).

In discussing the dimensionality of justice, Bies (2001) recounted his development of the “the construct of interactional justice from [its] moment of ‘birth; to its current ‘adolescent’ stage.” In so doing, Bies (2001) explained he faced initial resistance, when first advancing the idea that interactional justice may be a separate construct: “Although the conference participants were relatively open-minded about my ideas, I found little groundswell for *another* type of justice. In fact most people tried to persuade me I was just articulating another facet of procedural justice” (p. 92). Referring generally to the work of Lind, Tyler, and Greenberg, Bies states: “Therein lie the seeds of controversy. Specifically, the controversy over whether interactional justice is a separate form of justice, or an interpersonal component of procedural justice (Bies, 2001, p. 93). A similar controversy applies to whether informational justice is a separate form of justice, or part of interactional justice.

Bies and Moag (1986) used term “interactional justice” to encompass aspects of fairness that stem from interpersonal behavior. Brockner and Weisenfeld (1996) further broke this down into two factors: informational justice, and interpersonal justice. The former “that decision makers clearly and adequately explain the reasons underlying their decisions;” and the latter that decision makers treat those affected by the decision with dignity and respect (Manger, Johnson, Sobery, & Welker, 2000, p. 801). Justifications appear to be a distinct component of procedural justice, specifically, informational justice.

Like its subsuming concept, interactional justice, informational justice is also “difficult to distinguish from [what Bies calls] structural procedural justice.” I believe that what Bies calls

“structural” procedural justice are similar to what Greenberg (1993b), has called *systemic justice*, “which addresses how the decision-making context is structured and thus encompasses ...process control, consistency, [and] accuracy.” (Manger, et al., 2000, p. 801-802, citing Greenberg, 1993b). In my opinion, these aspects of procedural justice fulfill Solum’s first action-guiding function of procedure.

Then there are those procedures that fulfill Solum’s second action-guiding function of procedures – the dignitary functions. These, I believe, are “interactional” aspects so skillfully described and researched by Bies (2001). The present research certainly supports his view that “interactional (in)justice matters to people. People are concerned about the interpersonal treatment they receive from others. Further, these interactional concerns are distinguishable from procedural concerns. (p. 100). Indeed, as stressed by Bies “people view the self a sacred...[a] sacredness [that] assumes an ‘inviolable personality and the individual’s independence, dignity, and integrity” (Bies, 2001, p. 100). As discussed in more detail below, this “sacred self” may explain some of the finding as to the warden’s reason-giving. As noted below, theories of self are only recently be applied to justice research, and are starting to yield some interesting results.

But the present research also supports the view that informational justice is distinct from interactional/interpersonal justice. Brockner and Weisenfeld (1993), Greenberg (1993b). Greenberg (1993b) also contended that dignitary concerns (such as politeness and respect) might be more properly theorized as an aspect of distributive, rather than procedural justice. Although the present results do not bear upon the question of whether dignitary concerns are part of distributive justice, they do support the four-dimensional model suggested by all the above-mentioned theorists.

Because distributive justice was not examined in the present study, the four-dimensional

model would predict three factors to emerge in the present study, which is what occurred. I believe these three factors also correspond to the functional aspects of procedures as articulated by Solum (2004). That said, as detailed in previously, the factor loadings yielded some surprising and conflicting results within and between the two scenarios as to five items: adequacy, neutrality, truthfulness, trustworthiness, and coherence. Some possible reasons for, and implications of, the manner in which these items loaded will now be addressed.

The items adequacy/sufficiency loaded on both procedural justice and information quality in both scenarios. In discussing this item, it should first be noted some researchers have referred to “adequacy” as a dependent variable related to informational quality (Bies & Shapiro, 1987, for example). I believe, however, the use of the phrase “adequacy” as a surrogate for “quality” is not ideal. Adequacy implies a threshold, not a range: A reason, or food supply, or amount of money, is either adequate, or inadequate. The dictionary definition of adequate is “enough for some need to requirement,” “good enough,” and “of a quality that is acceptable but not better than acceptable.” Much as a light-switch is on, or off, adequacy implies a binary condition. The phrase “highly (or lowly) adequate” seems more awkward than high or low “quality.” Quality, of course, is hypothesized to be a determinant of overall procedural justice perceptions, and adequacy is related to quality. So, in this sense it is not surprising that respondents see adequacy as tapping both perceived procedural justice, and perceived informational justice.

Neutrality loaded as expected (on procedural propriety) in the affirmative action scenario, but cross-loaded on interpersonal justice in the death penalty scenario. Clearly, neutrality is a requirement for a procedurally fair system; it underlies many of Leventhal’s (1976) six criteria. Yet, it also involves interpersonal treatment; it would be part of what Blader and Tyler (2003) term informal quality of treatment. And in these scenarios, neutrality seems highly relevant. For

instance, the lack of neutrality is seen as one of the traditional arguments against affirmative action: There should be no bias whatsoever in hiring. Moreover, in the death penalty scenario the warden is being so obviously non-neutral in refusing to administer the orders, that it is understandable why respondents would associate such conduct with “kindness,” a prototypical interpersonal justice variable. The warden is being biased in favor of the accused, so the lack of neutrality may also be viewed as a form of favorable interpersonal treatment, especially since the other “side” of the dispute is the state, a very impersonal entity. Nevertheless, the “shifting” nature of this item, suggests the context-dependence of these determinations.

Truthfulness and trustworthiness are closely related, with the former perhaps causing (or being a pre-requisite to) the latter. It was intended that both these items reflect aspects of interpersonal justice when giving a justification. Truthfulness seemed to tap interpersonal justice in the affirmative action scenario, but trustworthiness did not. And in the death penalty scenario, both items loaded on the procedural justice factor. This may be due to the uniqueness of the reasons, which were loosely based on the Troy Davis case from Georgia. Here, a warden – who is duty bound to proceed with an execution – refuses, because of his own personal views of innocence. The recalcitrance/civil disobedience aspect of the scenario may have had such a significant role that it shifted perceptions away from treatment to justice. Colquitt (2001) included truthfulness as a part of informational justice, although it did not load on that factor here. It is important to note, however, little information was provided upon which truthfulness could be reasonably doubted or called into question. There was nothing in either vignette suggesting dishonesty by the decision maker. (See, Colquitt and Chertkoff, p. 600, making a similar observation: “It is important to note that the explanation did not make the proctor seem biased in his judgment and implied the decision was based on accurate information, two primary

indicators of procedural justice.”)

Interestingly, coherence loaded on the procedural justice factor, rather than informational justice. This suggests *coherence* is seen more akin to *relevance* than *specificity*. Or perhaps participants did not have an accurate understanding of the meaning of the word coherent. Areni (2002, 2003) clearly uses “coherence” as a standard of argument quality regarding the manner in which the use of connectives (i.e. therefore, whereas) keeps an argument from seeming fragmented. Participants did not appear to employ the term in such a manner.

Indeed, as Ambrose and Schminke (nd) have noted, while there is benefit in understanding the dimensionality of a construct, there is also a risk of “slicing the phenomenon into smaller and smaller pieces – pieces that by themselves become less powerful in contributing to what we know about justice in organizations” (p.18).¹⁷ Writing with Schminke, Ambrose stressed that viewing justice as a monistic construct can also yield significant insights (Ambrose & Schminke, 2009).

Aspects of quality of justification. As Bies and Shapiro (1987) noted “what constitutes adequacy of justification emerges as an important question for future research on interactional fairness” (p. 215). And Austin, McGinn, and Susmilch (1979) explained, “psychologists have been interested in outcome evaluation since at least Thorndike (1913) first described the law of effect in terms of satisfaction and dissatisfaction” (p. 427). A century of research has shown us, however, that actual outcome evaluation is much more nuanced, and certainly not so binary.

Indeed, as noted earlier, an important assumption of this study was that justification

¹⁷ Oddly, this keen observation was not repeated in the published work stemming from the manuscript – perhaps because the editors thought the insight too critical of the existing research to date. Nonetheless, the applicability of this observation is echoed by the relatively moderate-to-low effect sizes seen in the present research (Cohen, 1992). Moreover, Ambrose and Schminke’s (2009) conclusion that there are benefits in viewing justice as a monistic concept is worth acknowledging.

quality is not binary: justifications are not simply adequate or inadequate, provided or not provided – they can be good, better, and best. In other words, there are degrees/gradients to quality in justification. At its core, a justification is a type of argument – it is a normative claim that something is right, good, just, or proper. Argument, of course, is the subject of extensive scholarship in the fields of rhetoric, political communication, artificial intelligence, and linguistics, among others. This study sought to contribute to a relatively understudied aspect of argument – that of justification (as opposed to, for instance, persuasion, of which ideological accounts are related, but not a necessarily a subset). Moreover, the present results support the view that justifications are more than just adequate or inadequate, but that there is a degree of quality. In both the mandate and anti-mandate condition, high quality justifications had a significant effect on important dependent variables relative to a low quality (i.e., simply “provided”).

As Areni (2002) has noted, a limitation of some prior studies is that argument quality has been defined empirically (i.e., high quality arguments were those perceived as high quality in pilot testing, and low quality arguments were those perceived as low quality):

Several arguments are pretested in pilot experiments; those that elicit consistently favorable cognitive responses are labeled strong arguments, and those that evoke consistently unfavorable cognitive responses become weak arguments (Areni, 2002, p. 184, citing Petty and Cacioppo 1986).

This approach was criticized as “lacking conceptual rigor and obscuring the question of why, exactly, some arguments are more persuasive than others” (p. 184). Heeding this admonition, this study took a theoretical approach to defining justification quality, and analyzed quality of justification with respect to theorized components.

Following Toulmin (1958), Payan and McFarland (2005), and other argumentation theorists, it was assumed, for the purposes of manipulating quality, that argument structure would provide a successful manner of so doing. Under this view, argument quality resides primarily in the structure of the argument. “Strong argument quality consists of a complete argument structure, and weak argument quality consists of incomplete argument structure” (Payan & McFarland, 2005, p. 70; Areni & Lutz 1988; Boller, Swasy, & Munch 1990). Accordingly, high quality arguments contained warrants and evidence, whereas low quality arguments contained only claims. The results supported the view that completely-structured justifications were perceived as superior to mere assertion of claims.

It is possible, however, the argument length also played a role, as the “incomplete” arguments were shorter. As noted by Bies and Shapiro (1987) future research should be directed toward the question of whether justification quality is “a reflection of sheer number of arguments ...or more closely linked to quality, not the quantity, of the argumentation.” Future research should thus compare complete and incomplete structures of comparable word length to reduce this potential confounding variable.

Consistent with structural theory *number of reasons* would be an item expected to tap perceived quality, but it is not clear whether number of reasons means number of warrants (as a rhetorician would perhaps argue), or number of assertions. A complete argument has one reason (the warrant). A claim is not a reason, it is assertion, and data or evidence is not technically a reason, it supports one. But number of reasons may simply be interpreted as number of sentences – for instance would three naked claim be perceived as higher quality than the three statements of proper syllogism?

Three items loaded stably on the hypothesized informational justice factor: specificity,

number of reasons and reasonableness. Reasonableness is an interesting component, because it suggests a range of behavior, rather than a precise threshold. But other items, which I thought would be considered aspects of quality (e.g., relevance and truthfulness), did not load stably as aspects of informational justice. This again suggests the more context-dependent approach urged by some theories may be at play.

Quality of justification matters. Higher quality justifications seemed to matter, at least with the people the proponent of the justification would presumably hope to convince – those hostile and/or neutral to their view (as opposed to those already in agreement). This result supports the RCT predictions upon which fairness theory elaborates. High quality justifications prevent or neutralize the normative should counterfactuals that RCT suggests would be generated when a moral mandate is threatened. As to individuals with no mandate, they are likely generating counterfactuals (or not) based simply on the evaluative process embedded in the task. And similarly, the high quality justification seems to prevent or neutralize the counterfactuals.

Moral conviction matters too, but only when consistent with the decision. The results show that moral conviction matters, but only when consistent with the decision. Contrary to the predictions of Skitka, quality justifications appear to have an effect on those with anti-decision moral mandates. “Morality is an important but understudied factor in justice judgments” (Skitka, 2009, p. 47, citing Cropanzano et al., 2003, Folger, 2001). And when it has been studied, studies tended to focus on “how individuals come to perceive whether or not *they themselves* are treated fairly,” rather than “how fairly individuals perceive *others* to be treated” (Rupp & Bell, 2010, p. 89, emphasis in original). As a result, non-instrumental considerations, such as moral intuition and other deontic considerations, have been somewhat neglected in the empirical moral research literature. The present research sought to advance theory and research regarding the

consequences of moral conviction in relation to the evaluation of justifications, and as suggested by Rupp and Bell (2010) studied the perceptions of the treatment of others, which thus focused evaluations on deontic considerations.

The present research sought to the empirical moral research literature by examining the potential effect of moral conviction on justice determinations in general, and the degree to which the quality of a justification can effect these determinations in the face of moral conviction. Skitka (2009) contends: “When aspects of situations activate a concern for morality, people change the way they approach questions of justice” (p. 47). The present research supports this view, but only in part.

The most important finding in this regard is that justifications do matter, and a high-quality justification can improve perceptions of the decision-maker, even when the decision is inconsistent with a moral mandate. Also important is the finding that, when a decision is aligned with a moral mandate, the decision-maker is regarded favorably regardless of the justification quality. In discussing these findings, their implications, and limitations, it is important to (1) clarify the distinction between moral conviction and moral reasoning, and (2) the benefits (and limitations) of deontic approaches to empirical research.

Differences between moral judgment and moral conviction. As Bauman and Skitka (2009b) detail in length, moral judgment and moral conviction – perhaps a form of what Haidt (2001) calls moral intuition – differ in important and significant ways. They identify four key differences as follows:

- Who defines whether a situation or decision is moral.

- The type of situations examined: moral judgment tends to focus on moral dilemmas (like Kohlberg's (1981) famous Heinz dilemma) whereas the moral conviction approach tends to focus on moral controversies, like affirmative action and the death penalty.
- The degree to which the approaches expect cross-situational constancy.
- How are counter-normative responses interpreted (i.e., the person who says they would push the “fat-man” off the bridge in a classic variation of Foot's (1978) trolley problem).

The first three of these distinctions are relevant to the interpretation of the reported results.

Who defines whether the situation or decision is moral. In contrast to the views of Areni (2003) as regards argument quality, and Skitka (2009b) contend that moral conviction must be empirically defined. A core assumption and central tenet of their theory of the moral conviction is that people can accurately report the degree to which their stand on an issue is a “moral” one. The experimenter, for instance, cannot simply proclaim an issue as a moral one, and simply proceed on that assumption. Not even trolley problems – perhaps the most classic of all moral dilemmas – are viewed as moral issues by all participants. And the present results supported that view. As claimed by Skitka, individuals who saw affirmative action as a moral mandate did not necessarily see the death penalty as one. But when moral conviction was identified, it behaved in predictable (albeit not all the predicted) ways.

People who had pro-decision mandates generally saw the process and decision-maker in a favorable light, even in the low-quality justification condition. For these individuals, the quality of the justification did not significantly influence their overall perceptions. This result lends support to dual processing and motivated reasoning theories.

The type of situations examined. In describing the social-intuitionist model of moral reasoning, Haidt (2001) discusses efforts to “justify” as part of a “reasoned persuasion” link

between an individual and others. He states: “The model proposes that moral reasoning is produced and set forth verbally to justify one’s already-made moral judgment to others. Such reasoning can sometimes affect other people, although moral discussions and arguments are notorious for the rarity with which persuasion takes place” (p. 818-819). But the present research suggests there may be an important goal short of persuasion that can be achieved with high-quality reasoned justification: increased perceptions for legitimacy, and fairness. People do not have to change their mind – they will likely still be in favor (or against), affirmative action (or the death penalty) – but they may change their perception of the decision-maker. And importantly, this seems to hold true even if individuals perceive the decision as going against their own moral mandate.

The results of this study support some core ideas advanced by the moral conviction/moral intuition perspective within moral psychology. Yet, the results also support a moral rationalist’s notion that reasons matter, even in moral circumstances. Bauman and Skitka (2009b) and Haidt (2001) have both discussed the differences between these traditions, at length.

As Rupp and Bell (2010) observed, rather than viewing justice as a means to an instrumental or relational end, contemporary justice research has viewed justice theoretically, for its own sake, as an end to itself and a universal norm of human behavior. Deontic approaches to justice research propose that individuals experience moral unease, or what Folger (2001) has called a *deontic state* (Rupp & Bell, 2010). This state creates motivations to “react against the perpetrator in order to address the injustice” (p. 90). This approach adopts an empirical perspective that is somewhat different than the rationalist models that long dominated empirical justice research (Haidt, 2001, p. 814).

Cross-Situational Consistency. The present results support the view, advanced by

Bauman and Skitka (2009b) that moral mandates are selective moral stands, rather than trait-based worldviews. An individual may have a moral mandate against the death penalty, as a reflection of their moral commitment to the sanctity of life – yet not see abortion in moral terms at all. Or, as here, a person may see affirmative action questions as moral issues, yet not the death penalty. Theoretical models such as Kohlberg's (1981) ideas on moral development, for instance, assume a cross-situational consistency in moral outlook that is not supported by the present results, which are more in line with Bauman and Skitka's outlook on this point.

The nature of moral conviction: Are moral controversies harder to resolve? Moral convictions are subjective beliefs that something is fundamentally right or wrong (Bauman & Skitka, 2009b). They comprise concerns about human welfare, justice, and rights, duty, purity. People do not experience moral conviction about everything that fits theoretical definitions of morality – philosophers argue that moral convictions are sui generis, meaning unique and in a class by themselves – “people act and reason differently across moral and non-moral situations.” In this sense, citing Guadagnoli (2001) and Turiel (1983), Bauman and Skitka (2009b) make a comparison to domain theory of social development, “which postulates that people act and reason differently as a function of whether a given situation is personal, conventional, or moral” (p. 6).

As Bauman and Skitka (2009b) have stressed, empirical investigations of moral conviction rely on the crucial assumption that people can accurately self-report the extent they feel moral conviction. Bauman and Skitka also discuss the important distinctions between moral conviction and moral reasoning – a distinction that certainly has implications for research such as that of Butterfield, Trevin, and Weaver (2000), who discuss the importance of the concept of “moral awareness.” This conception assumes that people can foresee, *ex ante*, those issues that

moral – this is a contention Bauman and Skitka interrogate.

In this sense, the research directly addressed a fundamental question posed by Skitka (2009): “are moral controversies inherently more difficult to resolve than non-moral controversies” (p. 40). Skitka has sometimes phrased the effect of moral mandates in very strong terms, such as: moral mandates are “psychologically non-negotiable” (Skitka & Mullen, 2002, p. 1420). But if this were the case, then why would high quality justifications have any effect on perceptions of fairness and legitimacy in the anti-mandate case? And while Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis (2005) contend “it would be interesting to explore whether moral mandates are more resistant than otherwise strong but non-moral attitudes to persuasive appeals” (p. 914), the present results suggest that – at least when it comes to evaluating perceived justice and legitimacy – that moral mandates are influenced by quality argumentation. Indeed, as Shaw, Wild, and Colquitt (2002), concluded: explanations may be “more powerful when the explanation concerns a morally charged event” (p. 453).

The results also help provide some insight into the cognitive processes underlying justice judgments. The results indicate that individuals with a pro-decision mandate thought equally highly of the decision maker. These individuals did not seem to be influenced by the quality of the justification. Equally-favorable judgments were formed in the consistent-mandate condition, regardless of quality of justification. These results thus support the theoretical views of motivated reasoning and dual processing (as discussed by Haidt (2001), in relation to morality).

Finally, although not part of the *ex ante* hypothesis construction, the death penalty results suggest there may also be a “moral tolerance,” effect at work. That is, even if we do not agree, we may respect the freedom of others to decline to engage in actions they view as immoral. On some issues, simply saying “I will not have blood on my hands” may be enough. People may feel

others should be able to simply refuse to engage in morally distasteful conduct, without explanation, and thus excuse the justification obligation. Review of the literature has shown that moral tolerance has received little-to-no attention, and may be a fruitful line of future research.

The framing hypothesis. The present study hypothesized that moral and policy decision-making contexts could be conceptualized as “frames,” and that frame-consistent justifications would be perceived as higher quality. For instance, as suggested by Skitka, Bauman and Sargis (2005), “Persuasive messages that appeal to moral values may also be more persuasive than those the focus on preferences or convention because they include stronger motivations and justifications for action” (p. 914). This rationale was expanded to hypothesize that, in contexts explicitly described as “moral decision making,” justifications that appeal to moral values would be perceived as higher quality than those stated in instrumental terms. Correspondingly, I hypothesized instrumental would be perceived as higher quality than moral, or rightness reasons, in “policy” contexts. Nonetheless, the present results did not support the hypothesis that framing a justification in moral terms (versus policy terms), in a decision context described as “moral,” would improve perceived quality. Correspondingly, framing a justification in instrumental terms did not increase perceived quality in contexts described as policy-making.

The potential importance of the distinction between moral and policy reasons (or, to use Summers’ nomenclature, rightness and goal reasons) was noted by Bobocel and Farrell (1996), who stated: “we added a second justification that referred to the superordinate goal of increasing the potential effectiveness of the organization through increased diversity. Finding similar effects for both justifications would provide stronger evidence about the role of justification itself (i.e., the conceptual independent variable) rather than limiting conclusions to the particular justification in experiment one (which was a moral reason: to redress past discrimination).

Nonetheless, the “framing” hypothesis was not supported. There are several possible explanations for this:

- Perhaps the frame manipulation was not sufficiently strong given the use of vignettes, and corresponding lack of psychological engagement. Perhaps participants should have been asked to think of a moral scenario first, or explicitly placed in a policy vs. moral role – i.e., a legislator versus a member of a character and fitness committee. But such manipulations would risk introducing other confounding biases, such as eliciting people’s view of the role, rather than their own beliefs.
- Maybe “policy” and “moral” are not frames at all. In other words, “moral” vs. “instrumental” frames simply do not exist – at least not outside the minds of academics (and debate team members).¹⁸
- The fact participants were sitting in “judgment” of third parties might have had an effect by creating a superseding value-oriented “judgment” frame – thus overriding the framing manipulation, and causing all vignettes to be perceived as “moral” situations.
- Skitka’s theory of moral conviction might also provide an explanation. The failure of the frame manipulation supports Skitka’s view that people do not perceive an issue as moral simply because an experimenter, an authority, or anybody else, categorizes it as “moral.”
- Another interpretation of the lack of support for the framing is that moral justifications are, in fact, accorded the same weight as policy justifications in discussions about praxis, or rightness of action. That is to say, in determining what to do (in contrast to what is true), both “goal” reasons and “rightness” reasons are evaluated on their quality, not on their categorization as goal or rightness reasons.

- Perhaps thinking about the matter in terms of “consistency” versus “relevance” was a reason the framing hypothesis was not supported. The framing literature talks in terms of increasing the salience of frame relevant information, not frame consistent information.

Limitations of the Present Research

An important theoretical assumption in testing whether the z-shaped pattern predicted by the value protection model (see Figure 1, left panel), is that justification operates in the same way as other procedural justice manipulations such as voice, or correctability. The present results, however, suggest justification fits neither pattern, or only partially fits both. Both models predict that high-quality justifications, as an informational aspect of procedural justice, will have positive effects on justice evaluations (in all dimensions) of those individuals with no moral mandate. But the value-protection model predicts that individuals with anti-decision moral mandate will not be influenced by procedure, and thus justification. This prediction was not supported. Individuals with a pro-decision mandate, however, acted in accordance with the predictions of the value protection model. But if justifications do not act like other procedures under the value-protection model, then this research says little about the validity of the model. The value-protection model does not explicitly account for justifications, so it is unclear whether the model would predict that justifications behave under the model in the same way, for example, voice would.

As noted earlier, vignettes are often used in justice research. Nonetheless, the limitations of such an approach must be acknowledged. As Austin et al. (1979) explained in connection with their study, the “relatively uninvolved role-playing methodology,” might have resulted in a “failure to find moral deser[vedness] due to weak manipulation” or lack of real outcomes (p.

¹⁸ As to the sub-group of participants that were members of the debate team, the framing hypothesis was supported. These results will be further explored in future research.

434). As Skitka (2002) observed, “when there was no threat to perceivers mandate, judgments of procedural fairness and moral mandate were uncorrelated” (p. 592). The use of vignettes could have resulted in a lack of psychological engagement, which could possibly explain both the lack of framing effects as well as underestimating the effect of moral conviction.

Several methodological considerations have also limited the interpretation of these results. First, due to experimental oversight, I did not record demographic data for approximately one-third of the data. The data available, however, do not show a significant effect for race or gender as to moral mandate. Second, as explained in the method section, the reverse coding of certain items may have interfered with the factor analysis. Third, analysis was likely limited because there was no measure of moral outrage. Fourth, interpretation of the results of this study, as to the framing hypothesis, are limited by the fact that an explicit “manipulation check” was not performed relative to the framing manipulation. Participants were not asked to state (or confirm) the nature of the study regarding “moral” or “policy” decision-making. Nonetheless, in a questionnaire study, this may not be a major a flaw. As noted by Austin, McGinn and Susmilch (1979), “no attempt to check the manipulations was made. The information necessary to answer questions regarding the two independent variables was easily obtained by glancing back through the story and it was therefore assumed that all subjects were ‘informationally aware’ of the manipulation” (p. 432-433). Similarly, in the present research, the “moral” or “policy” frame was easily obtained by glancing back at the emboldened words, and highly salient definition. Subjects were presumably informationally aware of the framing manipulation. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the mere length of the explanations (independent of quality content) may have influenced perceptions of quality. Future research should investigate differences in quality while keeping the length of the justification the same.

Generalization is also limited because the findings did not replicate across the affirmative action and death penalty contexts. The context-dependence of justice determinations has been noted before, and the present results tend to support these highly context-dependent interpretations. Possible reasons for the failure of the findings to replicate across scenarios, as well as theoretical implications of this are discussed in the next section.

Finally, and of particular importance in explaining the lack of support for hypothesis three, there is the issue of frame activation. In retrospect, it is doubtful that merely asking people if the study was about “moral” or “policy-making” would have caused the frame to activate. Nonetheless, without the manipulation check, the results are ambiguous as to whether competing frames were activated, or the null hypothesis supported.

Implications of the Present Research and Suggested Avenues of Future Research

The interaction between authority, accountability, and legitimacy is important to a variety of disciplines, including sociology, law, psychology, political science, and communication. Because justifications play an important role in the relationship between these constructs, the questions addressed by this research have significant practical and theoretical implications. This section will first discuss practical implications for organizational communication, deliberative democracy, and conflict management. Finally, theoretical implications and avenues of future research will be explored.

Organizational communication. As stressed by Shaw, Wild & Colquitt (2003), “organizational life is rife with decisions that affect the interests of employees,” from imminent layoffs, to mergers, wage freezes, implementation of an affirmative action policy, or a drug-testing policy. Although events such as this seem to demand an explanation, “many organizations are often reluctant to offer explanations because of concerns over potential

litigation or for the protection of confidential information” (p. 447). This approach, they stress, is “likely to be the most damaging” (p. 447). The failure to give an adequate explanation is associated with negative consequences, including some that affect the very motivations that seem to incentivize no explanations: blame, lawsuits and retaliation by whistleblowing or leaving the firm. As stressed by Nicklin (2013), perceived unfairness has implications for organizations (e.g., job satisfaction), consumer behavior, and increased learning in the classroom.

Shaw et al. (2003) note that explanation effects are inconsistent in the literature. Sometimes they are strong, other times they are weak or non-existent. Indeed, in this study, the same inconsistency manifested between the two scenarios: justifications had a notably more significant effect in the affirmative action scenario than the death penalty scenario. They queried: “What can explain these inconsistencies? One obvious possibility is sampling error, but it seems likely that some moderating variable could be altering the strength of explanation effects (p. 447). They suggest three: outcome favorability, type of explanation (excuses vs. justification), and the context on which the decision making event occurred. One of the contexts identified by Shaw et al. (2003) is a moral context, which was an important context examined in this study.

Apart from general implications for organizational communication, the present research also has direct implications for organizational decision-makers that plan and implement affirmative action policies. (See, Crosby, Iyer, Clayton & Downing (2003) for a detailed review of affirmative action policy, arguments pro- and con, and a summary of the psychological research). Thus, as stressed by Bobocel & Farrell (1996), “proper implementation of affirmative action policy is important in light of recent studies documenting adverse reactions exhibited by both intended beneficiaries, such as women and blacks” (p. 23, citing studies). Answering the call that “research is needed to examine what managers can do, beyond providing information

about qualifications...to mitigate negative reactions” (p. 23), this study suggests that providing high-quality justifications can help in this regard. Like in as Bobocel and Farrell (1996), the high-quality l accounts had an impact on perceptions on interactional fairness in the context of an affirmative action decision. And similar to the results reported by Bobocel and Ferrell (1995), “the difference between the two justification conditions was significant, such that participants perceived the redressing-discrimination justification as more adequate than the increasing-diversity justification” (p. 31).¹⁹ The same results occurred here, the redressing discrimination justification was perceived as more adequate than the increasing diversity justification. Reasons for this, as well as further study of the demographic factors involved is a possibility for future research.

Deliberative Democracy and Participation. The research questions and findings of the present research are also relevant to theorists and practitioners concerned with questions of deliberative democracy and public participation. Accountability and legitimacy are of central importance to political and administrative decision making and processes. As Chambers (2005) explains, “public reason involves justification and accountability directed at a public ...public reasons are reasons the public at large could accept” (p. 256). Part of the reason this is so, is accountability’s relationship with legitimacy. And legitimacy is a concept deeply embedded in theories of democratic participation. As Thompson (2008, p. 502) asserts, the fundamental problem of deliberative democracy is: “In a state of disagreement, how can citizens reach a collective decision that is legitimate?” Knowledge of the functioning of justifications can help

¹⁹ Perhaps this is due to gender effects. Saal and Moore (1993) had students read summaries of fictitious court cases using the four permutations of hiring decisions (male over male, female over male, female over female, male over female) – both men and women saw a decision to promote a member of the opposite sex instead of a member of their own sex as significantly less fair. A full exploration of the potential gender effects associated with the respective explanations is beyond the scope of the present research.

provide insight into this fundamental problem of deliberative democracy.

As Folger stresses, fairness theory is a theory about the accountability process. Accounts in general, and justifications in particular, are a key part of this process. As noted by Abelson et al. (2003), “public participants are demanding greater accountability for their participation. At minimum, they want the resulting decision communicated to the public with some demonstration of how the public’s input was used or considered in the decision-making process” (p. 247). Justifications serve this purpose, and high-quality justifications seem to do so better than low quality justifications. And even in circumstances involving strongly-held moral conviction, justifications matter. This is encouraging news for advocates of deliberation in a pluralistic society.

Another reason the study of justifications can inform the field of deliberative democracy and public participation is they openly reveal the bases for decisions. This “publicity has a Socratic effect on deliberation because in forcing interlocutors to respond to others, it forces them to give an account and offer reasons and justifications” (Chambers, p. 40). Gutmann and Thompson (2007) agree. They define deliberative democracy as a form of government in which free citizens, and/or their representatives: “justify decisions in a process in which they give one another reasons that are mutually acceptable and generally accessible.” There are two distinctions here, one related to acceptability, and the other to accessibility. They will be addressed in turn.

Acceptability. This study examined various elements that might impact the perceived acceptability of the justifications, such as relevance, coherence, reasonableness, etc. But is also relates to the public or private nature of the reason-giving. As Chambers (2006) explains:

Publically arguing for a policy on the grounds, say, that it makes you better off is not

a *public* reason and will not get very far within a modern liberal democratic dynamic makes obviously selfish, narrow, or sectarian defenses of public policy, especially public policy concerning moral disagreement or fundamental law, difficult to pursue in public. We might say that the Socratic element stresses the rationality of public *reason* while the democratic element stresses the public nature of *public* reason (p. 257, emphasis in original).

Chambers (2005) argues that private reasons (*i.e.*, reasons that appeal to religious text or authority, or the priority of an in-groups' well being) are "inappropriate sorts of *justifications* for public policy because they fail a democratic accountability test."²⁰

This distinction may help explain some of the unexpected results in the death penalty scenario. For instance, in one of the experimental manipulations the Warden said, in relevant part, "I will not have blood on my hands." This phrase invokes the biblical image of Pilate washing his hands before the crowd: "I am innocent of this man's blood. It is your responsibility" (Matthew 27:24). Explicitly religious imagery such as this may have unintentionally elicited, at least in some respondents, a public-private distinction that was not part of the present theorizing. Regardless, Chambers' (2005) assertion that these kinds of private reasons are not legitimate should be subject to future empirical scrutiny. This study evaluated the quality of reasons based on the degree to which they were "carefully articulated, well reasoned and fully examined" (Chambers, 2005, p. 257). Chambers calls this the "Socratic accountability test."

Accessibility. When authorities give justifications for decisions, they are also providing

²⁰ Here she concedes theorists "like Jon Elster and Joshua Cohen are concerned with the private reasons of individual maximizers, while John Rawls and Seyla Benhabib (albeit very differently) are concerned with the private reason of particular moral, religious or cultural worldviews" (Chambers, 2005, p. 257). Wading into this dispute, however, is well beyond the scope of this work.

important transparency (assuming the reasons are sincere). Transparency and openness increases the perceived legitimacy of the decision making (Licht, 2014). The significance of this was not lost on Abelson et al. (2003), who specifically noted the importance of:

How decisions and the public's input into these decisions were communicated to the public, and the degree to which the decision-making authority was found to respond to the public's input (i.e., what aspects of the input did they incorporate or not incorporate and why?) (p. 244)

Justifications allow the public to see if their input was, in fact, addressed. Similarly, Burkhalter, Gastil, and Kelshaw (2002) state, "in the end, deliberation requires not just a final decision but also a justification of that choice" (p. 411).

Moreover, stating justifications allow future decision-makers and stakeholders decide when a justification is no longer valid. The issue of *defeasibility* is an important one in public administration and law. As Guttman and Thompson (2008) stress, deliberative processes are aimed at reaching conclusions that are "binding for some period of time," that is, they demand immediate compliance, but remain open to challenge in the future (pp. 5 & 7). This contrasts with, for instance, mathematical or logical reasons, which are universally true so long as consistent with deductive logic. If all men are mortal, and Socrates is a man, then Socrates will always be mortal, so long as he is man. The same cannot be said for whether something is a good policy. For instance, what might have been good copyright policy in the nineteenth century may no longer be good policy today.

Indeed, and of direct relevance to one of the scenarios used in this research, is the issue of affirmative action. One of the reasons provided in the manipulations was "to redress past discrimination." In *Grutter v. Bollinger*, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), Justice O'Connor specifically

argued that this argument might entirely lose its force within 25 years, stating:

“race-conscious admissions policies must be limited in time. . . . We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will *no longer be necessary* to further the interest approved today” (p. 342, emphasis added). So, while at least in view of some, the redress past-discrimination reason might be defeasible within the next (now) 15 years, the diversity rationale would still apply.

Finally, it’s worth observing that Solum’s (2004) three action-guiding functions of procedures also bear directly the factors “essential for legitimizing public participation efforts” (p. 144). Because the three action-guiding functions of justifications play an important role in advancing both: (a) the three values articulated by Black, Leichter, and Gastil (2009), and (b) the purposes of deliberative democracy as stated by Gutmann and Thompson (2004), there are potential insights to be gained from comparing work in the field of democratic participation and deliberation and the informational justice concept of justification.

Legitimacy. Feather and Boeckmann (2013) observe, “there is an extensive multidisciplinary literature about legitimacy that spans decades and the disciplines of philosophy, sociology, political science, and psychology” (p. 194; Fagan, 2008). From a political perspective, legitimacy is “the substance that oils the machinery of democracy, reducing the friction that inevitably arises when people are not able to get everything they want from politics” (Tyler, 2008, p. 381). Legitimacy is theorized to create a “reservoir of support,” a sense of loyalty that permits institutions to deliver outcomes that may “go against what people may want at the moment without suffering debilitating consequences” (p. 381).

Legitimacy, however, is gained through a psychological process. Tyler (2006) defines legitimacy as “a psychological property of an authority, institution, or social arrangement that

leads those connected to it to believe that it is appropriate and just.” And as Fagan (2008) emphasizes, “Legitimacy is not simply an abstraction, or a sentiment, but an internalized obligation to defer” to authority (p. 139). The concept is that people internalize norms and values and thus behavior is guided independent of rewards and sanctions. Legitimate authorities create an internalized sense of “obligation” (or duty) to respect their authority (Tyler, citing Hoffman, 1977, p. 85). One way for authorities can gain legitimacy is through acting in a procedurally just manner (Tyler, 2008). Another way, as this research suggests, is by offering high-quality justifications. Failure to do so erodes legitimacy. Erosion of legitimacy has “behavioral consequences, including withdrawal of cooperation and defiance and rejection of norms” (Fagan, 2008, p. 139).

The concept of legitimacy is of particular relevance to the present work, which stands at intersection of morality and informational justice. But as Tyler stresses, it is important to distinguish between the concepts. Legitimacy is an internalized sense of obligation to defer to existing social institutions. Morals, in contrast, are a set of personal standards to which people try to align their behavior. This distinction may be implicated in the reasons why the quality justifications offered in the death penalty context did not show the same relationship with the dependent variables as in the affirmative action scenario. Respondents may have been deferring more to the Warden’s articulation of his own sense of moral duty than the structure of the communication itself.

Also, of note regarding the death-penalty scenario is a research example cited by Tyler (1988). He states:

Recent studies indicate that people’s views about appropriate sentencing decisions in criminal cases are driven by their morally based desire to give wrongdoers the

punishment they deserve, and not be the instrumental goal of preventing future criminal activity either by the criminals themselves or by others whose actions might be shaped by the punishment the criminal receives (pp. 390-391).

This may have influenced the results. The Warden was refusing to execute an accused criminal that the experimental materials defined explicitly as “innocent.” Innocent people do not deserve to be executed. Desert is a distributive justice element, and in criminal contexts people may focus disproportionately on desert (relative to other justice inputs). The criminal scenario may have overwhelmed the manipulations. This could also explain why the data suggested that a four-faction solution might be present.

Tyler calls legitimacy the “litmus test of effective leadership,” noting: “Consistent with the longstanding arguments of legitimacy theorists, recent studies suggest that having legitimacy facilitates the ability to gain decision acceptance and to promote rule-following” (p. 379). This view is in tension with Skitka’s authority independence hypothesis, which predicts “when people have a moral stake in decision outcomes, their reasoning about outcome fairness and decision acceptance will be based more strongly on internal conceptions of personal right and wrong than their established perceptions of authorities’ legitimacy” (Skitka, Bauman, & Lytle, 2009, p. 568-69). The quality of justifications is directly relevant to questions of legitimacy because, according to some theorists, the functional goal of justification is to seek to legitimize decisions and outcomes (Tyler, (2006) p. 378; Major, Feinstein, & Crocker, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). In this regard, the present research seems to support Tyler’s view –that authorities can enhance their legitimacy through procedural justice, including informational justice factors such as high-quality justifications. Skitka’s authority independence hypothesis predicts that, as for individuals with inconsistent mandates, that their views of the authority would be independent of

their mandate and thus the former could not influence the latter. Further investigation of this difference is a task for future research.

Conflict Resolution. The original focus of the Thibaut and Walker studies was the court system, and specifically whether litigants preferred adversarial systems to inquisitorial systems. The conclusion was that disputants' preferred adversarial systems because of the control such systems allowed litigants over the case outcome. As explained in the preface, the impetus for the present research also came from a legal context -- but not the court system. As the "crisis-of-legitimacy," (Bingham, 2008; Pops and Pavlak, 1991), has increasingly exacted its toll from the American judicial system and administrative law process, there emerged a movement to privatize justice through dispute resolution services such as the American Arbitration Association (AAA) (Sternlight, 2003).

Oftentimes in arbitration, the only decision that is rendered is the outcome. As Cooley and Lubet (2003) explain, "Normally, the award does not include a written opinion. . . . A written opinion is usually not required in arbitration because it slows down the process and encourages appeals by losing parties who wish to challenge the arbitrators reasoning" (p. 242). For instance, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), which arbitrates disputes within the securities industry, states: "Awards must be in writing, but arbitrators are not required to write opinions or provide explanations or reasons for their decisions." The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged this concern: "A further alleged deficiency of arbitration is that arbitrators often will not issue written opinions..." *Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.*, 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991). Regardless of one's normative position on the rise of mandatory arbitration in America, those involved in what Ury, Brett and Goldberg call *DSD* ("dispute system design"), should focus some efforts on whether ADR systems can increase their

perceived legitimacy, and overall perceptions of procedural fairness, by departing from its “no opinions” tradition.

Theoretical Contribution and Future Research Directions

These results make several theoretical contributions to the justice literature. Whetten (1989) suggests that a theoretical contribution is made by improving the “what,” “how,” “why,” and “who-where-when” ingredients of existing theory (see also, Colquitt & Chertkoff, p. 605). In conjunction with reviewing these elements, observations regarding future research questions will also be made.

What? The “what” is: informational justice, in general; accounts, more specifically; and justifications, most specifically. The dimensionality analysis suggests that there is more to justice dimensions than is fully understood. While the results provide further empirical support for the view that justice has dimensions, the inchoate emergence of a fifth dimension raises further questions about dimensionality. Nabatchi et al.’s (2007) research showed the strongest support for a six-dimensional model. This model, which was studied in the context of evaluating mediations, reached six dimensions by making a further distinction between conduct of the mediator and that of the system or process itself. Thus, the binary interactional justice construct becomes four components based on formal and informal quality of information and formal and informal quality of treatment. Blader and Tyler’s (2003) call for more research into the agent-system distinction as to the source of the (in)justice seems even more necessary now.

Moreover, as noted above, some scholars are arguing the research pendulum should swing back, toward a more unified justice construct (Ambrose & Schminke, 2009). Proponent of this view argue that focusing on distinct justice dimensions that may not accurately capture individuals justice perceptions. In different contexts, individuals may be unable to discriminate

among justice types. Thus, researchers are increasingly emphasizing the importance of overall justice and global fairness models (Ambrose & Schminke, 2009).

How? The “how” was hypothesized to be fairness theory. Folger and Cropanzano (2001) have described fairness theory as a radical reorientation of the justice literature, but necessary to attempt to achieve synthesis. The present research provides empirical support for the core theoretical predictions of fairness theory – justice determinations are about accountability.

There is a rich literature on accountability (see Tetlock and Lerner, 1999, for a review). Tetlock and Lerner (1999) stress competition among motivations, including: (a) of achieving cognitive mastery of causal structures, (i.e., intuitive scientist of classic attribution theory), (b) minimizing mental effort, (i.e., the cognitive miser view), (c) maximizing benefits and reducing costs, (i.e., intuitive economist), (d) asserting one’s autonomy and values, as well as reactance and self-affirmative. (p. 574) Any or all of these motivations could confound any particular set of experimental results. This warrants further investigation into accountability as a potentially unifying procedural justice construct. Tetlock and Lerner stress “it is difficult to escape the evaluative scrutiny of others in a complex, interdependent society....Accountability serves as a linkage construct by continually reminding people of the need to (a) act in accord with prevailing norms, and (b) advance compelling justifications or excuses for conduct that deviates from norms” (p. 573).

Why? Various motivations for attribution and generation of counterfactuals have been suggested throughout this manuscript. Fundamental among them is the drive to be certain about the world and our role in it. When making evaluations of others, or feeling judged by others, its important to investigate whether the person is stranger, or not. From a relational communication perspective, this is an important distinction. As Berger and Calabrese (1975) contend, “when

strangers are faced with each other in a particular situation, their communication behaviors are, in part, determined by a set of communications rules or norms. (p. 99). Under this view, in the entry phase of communication, a primary motivation is uncertainty reduction. Individuals attempt to reduce uncertainty by creating an expectation of how the other should act, and then “retroactively explaining the other’s behavior” in light of the referent expectation.

Within this framework, interpersonal communication behavior plays at least two different roles. First, we must attempt to develop predictions about, and explanations for, our own and others’ communication behavior; that is, communication behavior itself is something that we endeavor to predict and explain. Second, communication behavior is one vehicle through which such predictions and explanations are themselves formulated. (p. 101). In this regard, future research should more explicitly test Berger and Calabrese (19975)’s axioms. For instance, Axiom 3 is “High levels of uncertainty cause increases in information seeking behavior. As uncertainty declines, information seeking behavior decreases.” In this case, sharing a moral mandate (pro decision mandate) not only reduces uncertainty (See, Berger and Calabrese, axiom 6), it may also have the affect of affirming a moral value, thus creating self-enhancement. Many of Berger and Calabrese’s theorems involved the relationship between amount of communication, and uncertainty reduction. Although the intent of the present research was to focus on formal and qualitative aspects of justificatory messages, the “higher quality” justifications also happened to be “more communication.” This is yet another area for future research.

Who-where-when? Although the present results support the idea that justifications matter, methodological and other limitations require that the matter be investigated further. As noted by Rupp, the present results are “intended more to catalyze the emergence of new research

questions than make affirmative statements regarding the role of deonance.” (Rupp & Bell, 2010, p. 100). Some of the most interesting research questions can be generated from the who-where-when aspect of Whetten’s (1989) paradigm. That is to say, to start making theoretically-informed predictions about both boundary conditions and contextual determinants of fairness.

A somewhat obvious, but understudied (in the justice literature) example of such a distinction would be actor-observer differences. The vast majority of existing research has examined justice perceptions from the point of view of a participant (experimental, or field) in the justice manipulation or decision. Only occasionally, however, are study participants asked to cast themselves in the role of observer, as they were here. And in this “observer” role, interesting distinctions have emerged.

For instance Beier, Eib, Oehmann, Fiedler, & Fiedler (2014) recently examined perceptions of judge treatment by defendants and observer. The participant-observer distinction also suggests there may be another distinction at play. Is there a prior relationship between the parties, whether participants or observers. In organizations, for instance, the employers and employees are not strangers to each other. Who are the reasons for? Oftentimes we think the reasons are for the participants or stakeholders in the decision. But in large interconnected society, there is also the role of the observer, or the “audience.” Because trials are open, Beier et al. (2014) were able to directly compare different perceptions between defendants and audience (court observers) members’ perceptions of procedural justice in criminal bench trials in Germany. They reported:

Pattern was different when data gathered from the audience were considered. Here, there existed a relation between the judges’ behaviors measured via observation and the audience’s procedural justice rating. The more respectful the judge treated the defendant,

the fairer the trial was perceived by the audience ($r = .42, p < .01$). There was no relation between the judges' interested and empathetic listening measured via observation and the audience's procedural justice perception. ($r = .03, n.s.$; $r = .08, n.s.$). To judge the relative importance of the relation between observed respectful behavior and the audiences' procedural justice ratings, especially in comparison to the subjective assessment of procedural aspects (p. 55) that we found no correlations between the defendants' procedural justice ratings and the informal treatment in court by the judge, measured via observation of the judges' behaviors, but a significant positive correlation between the audience's procedural justice ratings and the observed respectful behavior of the judge. The more respectful the judge treated the defendant, the fairer the trial was perceived by the audience. Thus, for the audience we found evidence for the previously established connection between the informal quality of treatment and justice perception.

Moreover, as explained by De Cremer and Sedikides (2005) examine individual differences in reactions to procedural justice. One identified possible moderator of responses to procedural justice was self-uncertainty. There results found – at least as to voice manipulations – stable self-esteem emerged as a moderator. This lends further credence to the potential applicability of communication theories of uncertainty management to justice determinations.

Justice is in our hearts. But it is in our heads too. Although there is much research still to be done, it seems we can use our ability to effectively communicate accounts, such as justifications, to enhance legitimacy even in moral domains. And when we do act, we should remain cognizant of the importance of justifying that act, not only to those adversely affected by the outcome but also those who are not involved, but watching, and forming opinions as well.

APPENDIX 1
Questionnaire completed by respondents

Age: _____

Gender: Male Female

Race:

Religion:

- ___ American Indian or Alaska Native
- ___ Asian
- ___ Black or African American
- ___ Hispanic or Latino
- ___ Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander
- ___ White
- ___ Other: Please Specify

- ___ Buddhist
- ___ Christian
- ___ Hindu
- ___ Jewish
- ___ Muslim
- ___ Athiest/Agnostic
- ___ Other (Please Specify):

INSTRUCTIONS

In this study we are going to ask you read some scenarios and answer some questions about your views on **moral decision-making**, and to examine and evaluate the decision makers and justifications given for **moral decisions** in certain decision-making scenarios. Please evaluate the decision scenarios from a **moral** perspective; evaluate the decision makers and justifications based on the degree to which you think it promote sound **moral** outcomes. As you answer these questions, please think about the values and duties that underlie the **moral decision**, and the degree to which the **moral** decision is ethically desirable.

Participants assigned to the “instrumental” frame received the following instruction prompt:

In this study we are going to ask you read some scenarios and answer some questions about your views on **policy decision-making**, and to examine and evaluate the decision makers and justifications given for **policy decisions** in certain decision-making scenarios. Please evaluate the decision scenarios from a **policy-making perspective**; evaluate the decision makers and justifications based on the degree to which you think they promote sound policy outcomes. As you answer these questions, please think about the costs and benefits of the **policy decision**, and the degree to which the policy decision is instrumental in achieving desirable goals.

DEFINITIONS

Participants assigned to the moral condition received the following definitions:

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

An active effort to improve the employment or educational opportunities of members of minority groups and women; also : a similar effort to promote the rights or progress of other disadvantaged persons

DEATH PENALTY

Punishment by death for a crime; capital punishment.

MORAL

Of, pertaining to, or concerned with the principles or rules of right conduct or the distinction between right and wrong; ethical: moral attitudes.

expressing or conveying truths or counsel as to right conduct, as a speaker or a literary work; moralizing: a moral novel.

founded on the fundamental principles of right conduct rather than on legalities, enactment, or custom: moral obligations.

Those assigned to the policy frame received the following definitions:

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

An active effort to improve the employment or educational opportunities of members of minority groups and women; also : a similar effort to promote the rights or progress of other disadvantaged persons

DEATH PENALTY

Punishment by death for a crime; capital punishment.

POLICY

Action or procedure conforming to or considered with reference to prudence or expediency; a definite course of action adopted for the sake of expediency, facility, etc.: We have a new company policy.

Please read the following scenario, and then answer the questions by circling the number that best describes your feelings on each of the statements about the scenario.

Last year, Eric Smith was executed by the State. Before the execution, it had come to light that eight of the ten principal prosecution eyewitnesses changed all or part of their testimony. One witness, for example, stated in an affidavit that she felt under pressure from police to identify Smith as the killer because she was on parole for a shoplifting conviction. Another witness wrote, in a sworn statement, that the police had scared him into falsely testifying by threatening to charge him as an accessory to the crime, and alleged that he had not seen Smith do anything. Three other witnesses also stated in affidavits that strong-arm police tactics had coerced their earlier testimony implicating Smith. Moreover, three witnesses signed affidavits stating that another person, Cole White, had confessed to the murder to them. After a hearing, the Judge who presided over the original trial found the affidavits to not be credible, calling Smiths' case "smoke and mirrors." The Supreme Court of the United States denied Smiths' appeal and the execution was ordered to proceed. Imagine that after the Supreme Court denied Smiths' appeal the warden refused to implement the execution order. The governor calls, and states he is duty-bound to implement the execution. In refusing, Warden Williams stated:

Based on random assignments, participants received:

HIGH-QUALITY MORAL: "I know it's my job to order this execution. But I cannot morally. I know ultimately that the execution will proceed, that the courts will order another warden to proceed with the execution. Living with the nightmares is something that we know from experience. No one has the right to ask a public servant to take on a lifelong sentence of nagging doubt, and for some of us, shame and guilt. Should our justice system be causing so much harm to so many people when there is an alternative?"

LOW-QUALITY MORAL: "I cannot be the trigger man; I will not have blood on my hands"

HIGH-QUALITY INSTRUMENTAL: "I am going to refuse to implement these orders in order to draw attention to this important public policy issue. By my actions, I will not only delay the wrongful execution of Davis, I will draw attention to this issue and hopefully policy-makers will see that the economic and social costs imposed by the death-penalty outweigh its benefits."

LOW-QUALITY INSTRUMENTAL: "Hopefully, by my actions, I will draw attention to this issue and prevent wrongful executions in the future." "I know it's my job to order this execution. But I cannot morally. I know ultimately that the execution will proceed, that the courts will order another warden to proceed with the execution. Living with the nightmares is something that we know from experience. No one has the right to ask a public servant to take on a lifelong sentence of nagging doubt, and for some of us, shame and guilt. Should our justice system be causing so much harm to so many people when there is an alternative?"

Please read the following scenario, and then answer the questions by circling the number that best describes your feelings on each of the statements about the scenario.

Recently, there was an opening for the position of police detective, and both Amy Johnson and Eric Smith were considered for the job. Police detectives are plain-clothes investigators who gather facts and collect evidence for criminal cases. They conduct interviews, examine records, observe the activities of suspects, and participate in raids and arrests. Both Amy and Eric went through a series of interviews with their commanding officer, Lieutenant Williams. Although Amy and Eric were equally qualified and both received serious consideration for the job of police detective, Ms. Amy Johnson was ultimately promoted to that position. When asked for the reason Lieutenant Williams stated:

LOW-QUALITY INSTRUMENTAL: We strive for diversity in our organization, and attempt to select a workforce that is diverse. [Ployhart et al. (1999)].

LOW QUALITY MORAL: The decision was made pursuant to our affirmative action policy to redress past injustices.

HIGH-QUALITY MORAL: Historically, and at present, qualified women have not had the same access to jobs and promotions as have men, which has led to an underrepresentation of equally qualified women detectives in the police force. As members of a fair society, we have a social and moral obligation to attempt to reduce the underrepresentation whenever it is possible to do so. This decision is necessary to ensure that our workplaces are more reflective of our population and to make up for past injustices.

HIGH QUALITY INSTRUMENTAL: At present, there is an underrepresentation of qualified women detectives in the police force, and the key to a successful police force is to draw on the full potential of all its employees. It is in the best interests of the police force to create a more diverse workforce, which reflects the diversity in the community, in order to provide improved services to that community.





I've concluded therefore, that teams of detectives that include both men and women will be better equipped to deal with the full range of problems that face our police force.

APPENDIX 2
Demographic Characteristics of Study Participants (N=199)


Characteristic	<i>n</i>	%
Sex		
Female	97	49
Male	97	49
Unknown	5	2
Age at time of survey (years)		
<20	65	33
20-29	85	43
30-39	17	9
40-49	15	8
50-59	6	3
60-69	6	3
>70	4	2
Unknown	1	<1
Race		
Asian	18	9
Black	15	8
Hispanic	4	5
Indian	7	4
White	79	40
Unknown	76	38
Religion		
Atheist	14	7
Christian	27	14
Jewish	1	<1
Other	1	<1
Unknown	155	78
Debate Team		
Yes	61	31
No	138	69

Note. Totals of percentages are not 100 for every characteristic because of rounding.


APPENDIX 3
Histograms of responses




3. The Lieutenant did as much as possible to be fair.




3. The Warden did as much as possible to be fair.




4. The Lieutenant's justification was untruthful.




4. The Warden's justification was untruthful.















5. The Lieutenant did not explain the decision thoroughly.









5. The Warden did not explain the decision thoroughly.












15. The Lieutenant showed concern for Eric's rights during the promotion procedure.




15. The Warden showed concern for the State's rights during the procedure.




16. The Lieutenant's justification was irrelevant.




16. The Warden's justification was irrelevant.




17. The Lieutenant's justification was biased.




17. The Warden's justification was biased.




18. The Lieutenant treated Eric with respect.




18. The Warden discharged his obligations with respect for the state.




19. The Lieutenant was untrustworthy




19. The Warden is untrustworthy.




20. The Lieutenant took steps to deal with Eric in a truthful manner during the promotion procedure.




20. The Warden took steps to act in a truthful manner during the execution procedure.




21. The Lieutenant treated Eric politely during the promotion procedure.




21. The Warden discharged his duties politely during the execution procedure.




22. The Lieutenant treated Eric with kindness and consideration during the promotion procedure.




22. The Warden discharged his duties with kindness and considering during the execution procedure.





23. The Lieutenant was unfair.



23. The Warden was unfair.





APPENDIX 4
Correlations Among Items

Inter-Item Spearman Correlations for Affirmative-Action Questionnaire Items

Questionnaire Item	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1. nothing improper												
2. was free from bias	.526**											
3. as much ...to be fair	.589**	.571**										
4. was untruthful	.336**	.078	.266**									
5. not thorough	.249**	.081	.241*	.394**								
6. was legitimate	.532**	.353**	.448**	.348**	.226**							
7. was unreasonable	.573**	.411**	.479**	.314**	.271**	.533**						
8. was specific	.212**	.050	.234**	.152*	.373**	.313**	.200**					
9. was relevant	.522**	.359**	.512**	.330**	.337**	.581**	.550**	.420**				
10. was not coherent	.373**	.141*	.263**	.206**	.404**	.374**	.361**	.358**	.353**			
11. sufficient # reasons	.346**	.346**	.334**	.256**	.480**	.290**	.291**	.452**	.382**	.288**		
12. was illegitimate	.537**	.360**	.384**	.334**	.261**	.496**	.471**	.170*	.472**	.287**	.287**	
13. was inadequate	.517**	.275**	.395**	.315**	.444**	.511**	.541**	.375**	.588**	.407**	.434**	.553**
14. reasons sufficient	.512**	.324*	.442**	.311**	.450**	.507**	.480**	.435**	.576**	.357**	.580**	.437**
15. showed concern rts.	.274**	.397**	.422**	.044	.109	.184**	.201**	.108	.288**	.077	.301**	.261**
16. was irrelevant	.428**	.227**	.347**	.314**	.355**	.449**	.407**	.292**	.481**	.340**	.277**	.388**
17. was biased	.301**	.615**	.357**	.073	.024	.299**	.347**	-.001	.224**	.058	.243**	.339**
18. with respect	.403**	.392**	.412**	.229**	.259**	.300**	.339**	.236**	.381**	.251**	.342**	.371**
19. was untrustworthy	.386**	.160*	.308**	.401**	.330**	.355**	.429**	.218**	.281**	.349**	.310**	.401*
20. truthful manner	.259**	.257**	.354**	.179*	.243**	.264**	.166*	.212**	.291**	.227**	.298**	.277**
21. polite	.347**	.205**	.313**	.192**	.228**	.228**	.216**	.218**	.215**	.285**	.241**	.403**
22. kind and considerate	.313**	.203**	.316**	.212**	.238**	.291**	.182*	.250**	.308**	.228**	.309**	.352**
23. was unfair	.561**	.482**	.525**	.261**	.175*	.494**	.470**	.113	.385**	.232**	.253**	.526**
24. overall quality	.600**	.512**	.599**	.378**	.394**	.605**	.535**	.318**	.639**	.315**	.512**	.512**

	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
13. was inadequate		.725**	.253**	.424**	.312**	.395**	.430**	.234**	.276**	.280**	.512**	.608**
14. reasons sufficient			.294**	.429**	.240**	.476**	.423**	.362**	.305**	.354**	.391**	.659**
15. showed concern rts.				.188**	.308**	.507**	.203**	.385**	.292**	.312**	.345**	.346**
16. was irrelevant					.316**	.340**	.419**	.274**	.321**	.280**	.401**	.485**
17. was biased						.353**	.260**	.198**	.113	.142*	.417**	.367**
18. with respect							.418**	.537**	.520**	.544**	.433**	.526**
19. was untrustworthy								.235**	.339**	.266**	.454**	.407**
20. truthful manner									.531**	.558**	.335**	.397**

Inter-Item Spearman Correlations for Death-Penalty Questionnaire Items

Questionnaire Item	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1. nothing improper												
2. was free from bias	.385**											
3. as much ...to be fair	.455**	.472**										
4. was untruthful	.381**	.250**	.343**									
5. not thorough	.241**	.077	.289**	.325**								
6. was legitimate	.618**	.292**	.507**	.460**	.250**							
7. was unreasonable	.448**	.189**	.308**	.544**	.282**	.588**						
8. was specific	.214	.066	.207**	.244**	.546**	.365**	.302**					
9. was relevant	.397**	.208**	.381**	.459**	.389**	.519**	.518**	.492**				
10. was not coherent	.435**	.130	.378**	.399**	.463**	.437**	.469**	.261**	.472**			
11. sufficient # reasons	.180**	.110	.175*	.237**	.505**	.245**	.215**	.540**	.387**	.213**		
12. was illegitimate	.402**	.189**	.311**	.471**	.263**	.571**	.558**	.163*	.416	.367**	.217**	
13. was inadequate	.370**	.228**	.409**	.378**	.444**	.493**	.447**	.403**	.515**	.503**	.316**	.473**
14. reasons sufficient	.391**	.281**	.387**	.354**	.504**	.484**	.443**	.506**	.554**	.423**	.431**	.427**
15. showed concern rts.	.095	.313**	.188**	-.049	.185**	.120	.010	.251**	.070	.046	.291**	-.022
16. was irrelevant	.406**	.359**	.453**	.435**	.256**	.486**	.467**	.217**	.486**	.426**	.166*	.447**
17. was biased	.336**	.617**	.372**	.159*	.154*	.274**	.126	.070	.153*	.230**	.031	.122
18. with respect	-.012	.187**	.118	.020	.024	.172*	.077	.144*	.078	-.016	.154*	.050
19. was untrustworthy	.409**	.229**	.373**	.333**	.233**	.565**	.430**	.264**	.409**	.389**	.177*	.406**
20. truthful manner	.355**	.263**	.538**	.307**	.307**	.454**	.394**	.233**	.422**	.322**	.218**	.371**
21. polite	.350**	.221**	.377**	.257**	.245**	.332**	.300**	.313**	.297**	.193**	.224**	.168*
22. kind and considerate	.362**	.294**	.510**	.316**	.321**	.353*	.284**	.303**	.317**	.241**	.260**	.266**
23. was unfair	.519**	.364**	.489**	.497**	.274**	.533**	.490**	.268**	.367**	.344**	.170*	.437**
24. overall quality	.491**	.410**	.535**	.460**	.407**	.584**	.534**	.421**	.541**	.477**	.314**	.465**

	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
13. was inadequate		.704**	.150*	.442**	.284**	.099	.472**	.461**	.292**	.312**	.387**	.615**
14. reasons sufficient			.259**	.435**	.199**	.187**	.425**	.405**	.352**	.360**	.434**	.653**
15. showed concern rts.				.156*	.218**	.365**	.209**	.146*	.187**	.263**	.171*	.220**
16. was irrelevant					.347**	.104	.455**	.423**	.241**	.304**	.565**	.535**
17. was biased						.092	.249**	.300**	.249**	.289**	.346**	.318**
18. with respect							.134	.063	.194**	.245**	.216**	.248**
19. was untrustworthy								.456**	.377**	.382**	.520**	.484**
20. truthful manner									.472	.538	.514	.597
21. polite										.702	.497	.440
22. kind and considerate											.593	.468
23. was unfair												.570**
24. overall quality												

Inter-Item Pearson Correlations for Affirmative-Action Questionnaire Items

Questionnaire Item	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1. nothing improper												
2. was free from bias	.543**											
3. as much ...to be fair	.594**	.608**										
4. was untruthful	.321**	.156*	.254**									
5. not thorough	.220**	.110	.241**	.404**								
6. was legitimate	.504**	.394**	.462**	.327**	.212**							
7. was unreasonable	.554**	.436**	.484**	.302**	.256**	.521**						
8. was specific	.199**	.106	.238**	.118	.390**	.332**	.185**					
9. was relevant	.527**	.385**	.520**	.320**	.335**	.557**	.516**	.400**				
10. was not coherent	.347**	.189**	.260**	.142*	.384**	.343**	.326**	.321**	.316**			
11. sufficient # reasons	.349**	.377**	.340**	.287**	.469**	.299**	.293**	.467**	.391**	.267**		
12. was illegitimate	.521**	.376**	.383**	.306**	.238**	.466**	.420**	.166*	.482**	.245**	.291**	
13. was inadequate	.509**	.315**	.416**	.304**	.427**	.508**	.532**	.384**	.586**	.359**	.432**	.548**
14. reasons sufficient	.516**	.371**	.461**	.325**	.447**	.518**	.484**	.453**	.589**	.324**	.579**	.449**
15. showed concern rts.	.282**	.396**	.423**	.100	.120	.206**	.209**	.104	.316**	.104	.303**	.280**
16. was irrelevant	.425**	.257**	.328**	.249**	.318**	.417**	.357**	.245**	.446**	.251**	.263**	.391**
17. was biased	.293**	.622**	.377**	.091	.026	.319**	.346**	.019	.205**	.081	.255**	.332**
18. with respect	.414**	.439**	.424**	.217**	.237**	.309**	.331**	.224**	.411**	.218**	.337**	.385**
19. was untrustworthy	.380**	.215**	.319**	.412**	.319**	.322**	.390**	.205**	.253**	.293**	.311*	.364**
20. truthful manner	.243**	.303**	.346**	.155*	.247**	.276**	.139	.221**	.289**	.210**	.305**	.271**
21. polite	.341**	.290**	.329**	.140*	.216**	.238**	.183*	.208**	.226**	.277**	.258**	.390**
22. kind and considerate	.332**	.293**	.340**	.204**	.237**	.324**	.185**	.251**	.344**	.249**	.326**	.363**
23. was unfair	.570**	.513**	.544**	.233**	.154*	.473**	.457**	.120	.401**	.193**	.256**	.511**
24. overall quality	.602**	.537**	.616**	.366**	.374**	.606**	.532**	.336**	.680**	.306**	.513**	.522**

	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
13. was inadequate		.730**	.257**	.411**	.334**	.387**	.420**	.241**	.264**	.290**	.514**	.618**
14. reasons sufficient			.299**	.424**	.264**	.470**	.422**	.369**	.311**	.378**	.397**	.671**
15. showed concern rts.				.198**	.312**	.517**	.230**	.390**	.321**	.344**	.352**	.377**
16. was irrelevant					.333**	.339**	.387**	.262**	.315**	.277**	.389**	.466**
17. was biased						.359**	.264**	.216**	.161*	.179*	.413**	.360**
18. with respect							.400**	.547**	.552	.598**	.461**	.535**
19. was untrustworthy								.230**	.320**	.280**	.424**	.392**
20. truthful manner									.554**	.584**	.347**	.399**
21. polite										.773**	.472**	.428**
22. kind and considerate											.408**	.485**
23. was unfair												.625**
24. overall quality												

Inter-Item Pearson Correlation for Death-Penalty Questionnaire Items

Questionnaire Item	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1. nothing improper												
2. was free from bias	.396**											
3. as much ...to be fair	.418**	.491**										
4. was untruthful	.334**	.231**	.296**									
5. not thorough	.218**	.080	.279**	.335**								
6. was legitimate	.542**	.295**	.485**	.420**	.254**							
7. was unreasonable	.418**	.185**	.294**	.486**	.294**	.564**						
8. was specific	.173*	.062	.200**	.222**	.554**	.346**	.295**					
9. was relevant	.349**	.215**	.379**	.428**	.375**	.503**	.506**	.472**				
10. was not coherent	.432*	.121	.334**	.357**	.426**	.431**	.466**	.264**	.444**			
11. sufficient # reasons	.161*	.113	.176*	.239**	.509**	.245**	.210**	.552**	.388**	.200**		
12. was illegitimate	.343**	.174*	.257**	.403**	.188**	.559**	.528**	.103	.383**	.327**	.140*	
13. was inadequate	.323**	.207**	.386**	.321**	.452**	.467**	.420**	.364**	.458**	.480**	.292**	.429**
14. reasons sufficient	.345**	.271**	.390**	.316**	.517**	.468**	.452**	.492**	.526**	.413**	.424**	.395**
15. showed concern rts.	.118	.317**	.203**	-.056	.170*	.113	.042	.273**	.065	.066	.288**	-.049
16. was irrelevant	.380**	.350**	.444**	.375**	.244**	.472**	.437**	.180*	.466**	.340**	.159*	.397**
17. was biased	.342**	.625**	.371**	.146*	.151*	.262**	.119	.065	.130	.219**	.040	.063
18. with respect	-.011	.205**	.147*	.025	.016	.147*	.081	.137	.066	-.034	.150*	.052
19. was untrustworthy	.398**	.207**	.343**	.271**	.212**	.548**	.389**	.265**	.384**	.408**	.170*	.364**
20. truthful manner	.315**	.278**	.528**	.247*	.303**	.415**	.333**	.235**	.424**	.273**	.218**	.294**
21. polite	.346**	.236**	.376**	.249*	.242**	.341**	.291**	.313**	.284**	.182*	.234**	.128
22. kind and considerate	.346**	.304**	.514**	.314**	.330**	.351**	.310**	.300**	.331**	.227**	.251**	.226**
23. was unfair	.528**	.361**	.489**	.472**	.283**	.506**	.476**	.225**	.348**	.331**	.139**	.388**
24. overall quality	.482**	.415**	.541**	.395**	.389**	.556**	.490**	.359**	.505**	.460**	.277**	.414**
	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
13. was inadequate		.689	.149**	.404**	.263**	.112	.476**	.432**	.275**	.311**	.398**	.596**
14. reasons sufficient			.266**	.428**	.191**	.192**	.436**	.385**	.344**	.367**	.432**	.626**
15. showed concern rts.				.172*	.237**	.393**	.222**	.137	.216**	.254**	.180*	.214**
16. was irrelevant					.236**	.112	.411**	.411**	.228**	.311**	.542**	.534**
17. was biased						.113	.241**	.291**	.257**	.287**	.365**	.316**
18. with respect							.123	.031	.190**	.246**	.223**	.249**
19. was untrustworthy								.413**	.338**	.363**	.512**	.496**
20. truthful manner									.443**	.509**	.475**	.573**
21. polite										.700**	.497**	.410**
22. kind and considerate											.601**	.490**
23. was unfair												.580**
24. overall quality												

APPENDIX 5
Factor Loadings

Factor Loadings From Principal Components Analysis: Communalities, Eigenvalues, and Percentages of Variance for Items in Affirmative Action Scenario

Item	Factor Loading			Co
	1	2	3	
Propriety (item #1)	.72	-.00	-.36	
Neutrality (avg. of items #2 & #17)	.59	-.27	-.41	
Fairness (avg. of items #3 and #23)	.78	-.21	-.29	
Truthfulness (avg. of items #4 & #20)	.67	-.12	.30	
Thoroughness (item #5)	.50	.51	.35	
Legitimacy (avg. of #6 & #12)	.76	.05	-.25	
Reasonableness (item #7)	.65	.16	-.47	
Specificity (item #8)	.45	.50	.32	
Relevance (avg. of items #9 & #16)	.76	.18	-.16	
Coherence (item #10)	.48	.37	.12	
Number of reasons (item #11)	.61	.29	.19	
Adequacy (avg. of items #13 & #14)	.79	.29	-.09	
Concern for rights (item #15)	.51	-.41	.02	
Respect (item #18)	.71	-.38	.18	
Trustworthiness (item #19)	.59	.07	.00	
Politeness (item #21)	.61	-.41	.44	
Considerateness (item #22)	.64	-.38	.48	
Eigenvalue	7.05	1.62	1.51	
% of variance	41.49	9.55	8.93	

Factor Loadings From Principal Axis Factoring: Communalities, Eigenvalues, and Percentages of Variance for Items in Affirmative Action Scenario

Item	Factor Loading			Communality
	1	2	3	
Propriety (item #1)	.70	-.17	-.25	.56
Neutrality (avg. of items #2 & #17)	.56	-.03	-.39	.47
Fairness (avg. of items #3 and #23)	.77	-.00	-.35	.72
Truthfulness (avg. of items #4 & #20)	.64	.19	.14	.46
Thoroughness (item #5)	.48	-.17	.50	.52
Legitimacy (avg. of #6 & #12)	.74	-.16	-.14	.60
Reasonableness (item #7)	.63	-.33	-.22	.55
Specificity (item #8)	.43	-.16	.42	.39
Relevance (avg. of items #9 & #16)	.73	-.21	.00	.58
Coherence (item #10)	.45	-.13	.21	.26
Number of reasons (item #11)	.57	-.11	.27	.41
Adequacy (avg. of items #13 & #14)	.78	-.28	.13	.71
Concern for rights (item #15)	.47	.20	-.16	.29
Respect (item #18)	.69	.33	-.07	.58
Trustworthiness (item #19)	.55	-.05	.04	.31
Politeness (item #21)	.60	.54	.09	.66
Considerateness (item #22)	.64	.58	.14	.76
Eigenvalue	7.05	1.62	1.51	
% of variance	41.49	9.55	8.93	

Factor Loadings From Principal Components Analysis: Communalities, Eigenvalues, and Percentages of Variance for Items in Death Penalty Scenario

	Factor Loading				Communality
	1	2	3	4	
Propriety (item #1)	.63	-.31	.16	.04	.52
Neutrality (avg. of items #2 & #17)	.48	-.00	.49	.17	.50
Fairness (avg. of items #3 and #23)	.80	-.11	.33	-.09	.76
Truthfulness (avg. of items #4 & #20)	.76	-.19	.01	-.24	.67
Thoroughness (item #5)	.57	.29	-.49	-.17	.68
Legitimacy (avg. of #6 & #12)	.71	-.35	-.06	.21	.67
Reasonableness (item #7)	.67	-.30	-.16	.11	.57
Specificity (item #8)	.54	.47	-.43	-.07	.70
Relevance (avg. of items #9 & #16)	-.76	-.17	-.10	.14	.63
Coherence (item #10)	.60	-.26	-.29	.17	.55
Number of reasons (item #11)	.47	.52	-.41	-.03	.65
Adequacy (avg. of items #13 & #14)	.76	.05	-.22	.16	.66
Concern for rights (item #15)	.31	.61	.30	.39	.70
Respect (item #18)	.22	.49	.39	.39	.60
Trustworthiness (item #19)	.65	-.14	.08	.21	.49
Politeness (item #21)	.59	.20	.34	-.51	.81
Considerateness (item #22)	.69	.19	.36	.45	.76
Eigenvalue	6.51	1.74	1.62	1.06	
% of variance	38.28	10.24	9.53	6.26	

Factor Loadings From Principal Axis Factoring: Communalities, Eigenvalues, and Percentages of Variance in Death Penalty Scenario

	Factor Loading				Communality
	1	2	3	4	
Propriety (item #1)	.59	-.24	.10	.08	.43
Neutrality (avg. of items #2 & #17)	.44	-.01	.33	.19	.34
Fairness (avg. of items #3 and #23)	.79	-.13	.31	-.01	.74
Truthfulness (avg. of items #4 & #20)	.74	-.18	.01	-.17	.61
Thoroughness (item #5)	.56	.28	-.40	.16	.57
Legitimacy (avg. of #6 & #12)	.69	-.33	-.09	.13	.62
Reasonableness (item #7)	.64	-.25	-.16	.04	.49
Specificity (item #8)	.52	.43	-.36	-.08	.59
Relevance (avg. of items #9 & #16)	.73	-.16	-.11	.10	.59
Coherence (item #10)	.57	-.19	-.24	.08	.42
Number of reasons (item #11)	.45	.43	-.32	-.04	.49
Adequacy (avg. of items #13 & #14)	.74	.05	-.22	.11	.61
Concern for rights (item #15)	.31	.57	.25	.44	.67
Respect (item #18)	.20	.31	.25	.21	.24
Trustworthiness (item #19)	.61	-.12	.04	.15	.41
Politeness (item #21)	.57	.17	.33	-.31	.83
Considerateness (item #22)	.68	.19	.43	-.39	.56
Eigenvalue	6.51	1.74	1.62	1.06	
% of variance	38.28	10.24	9.53	6.26	

Parallel Analysis for Death Penalty Scenario Data

Root	Raw Data	Means	Percentile
1	6.503998	1.546570	1.643959
2	1.746364	1.435650	1.516618
3	1.623772	1.345442	1.413361
4	1.066045	1.269202	1.331346
5	.901868	1.203633	1.255599
6	.711418	1.141440	1.186663
7	.621336	1.081981	1.112881
8	.607143	1.028321	1.071109

Summary of Items and Factor Loadings From Principal Components Analysis for Affirmative Action Scenario, and Comparison between Oblimin and Varimax Rotations

Factor Loadings on Dependent Constructs using Identified Rotation

	<u>Procedural justice</u>		<u>Interpersonal Justice</u>		<u>Informational Justice</u>	
	<u>Oblimin</u>	<u>Varimax</u>	<u>Oblimin</u>	<u>Varimax</u>	<u>Oblimin</u>	<u>Varimax</u>
Reasonableness (#7)	.848	.776	-.207	-.004	.114	.251
Propriety (#1)	.773	.751	.031	.202	.049	.210
Neutrality (#2)	.746	.714	.146	.277	-.263	-.085
Fairness (#3/#23)	.730	.747	.262	.402	-.079	.112
Legitimacy (#6/#12)	.693	.699	.078	.241	.163	.315
Relevance (#9/#16)	.593	.617	.049	.207	.324	.449
Adequacy (#13/#14)	.549	.587	.022	.186	.471	.581
Trustworthiness (#17)	.337	.395	.185	.275	.257	.352
Thoroughness (#5)	-.056	.058	.068	.128	.790	.780
Specificity (#8)	-.054	.047	.032	.091	.753	.738
# of Reasons (#11)	.162	.258	.157	.239	.554	.605
Coherence (#10)	.165	.223	-.003	.084	.542	.568
Considerateness (#22)	-.126	.098	.898	.845	.112	.230
Politeness (#21)	-.110	.104	.881	.827	.064	.183
Respect (#18)	.209	.360	.706	.722	-.009	.147
Truthfulness (#4/#20)	.076	.237	.577	.596	.267	.373
Concern for rights (#15)	.261	.349	.534	.551	-.188	-.046

Note. Item number(s) in parentheses, two item number means items were averaged. Factor loadings >.50 in bold.

Summary of Items and Factor Loadings From Principal Axis Factoring for Affirmative Action Scenario, and Comparison between Oblimin and Varimax Rotations

Factor Loadings on Dependent Constructs using Identified Rotation

	<u>Procedural justice</u>		<u>Interpersonal Justice</u>		<u>Informational Justice</u>	
	<u>Oblimin</u>	<u>Varimax</u>	<u>Oblimin</u>	<u>Varimax</u>	<u>Oblimin</u>	<u>Varimax</u>
Reasonableness (#7)	.749	.688	-.173	.030	.139	.284
Fairness (#3/#23)	.747	.744	.222	.375	-.078	.144
Propriety (#1)	.718	.696	.030	.206	.066	.243
Neutrality (#2)	.684	.641	.120	.248	-.185	.006
Legitimacy (#6/#12)	.638	.649	.068	.239	.181	.342
Relevance (#9/#16)	.531	.568	.034	.205	.339	.464
Trustworthiness (#17)	.302	.364	.153	.250	.242	.336
Considerateness (#22)	-.118	.124	.892	.834	.094	.228
Politeness (#21)	-.067	.148	.829	.780	.043	.179
Respect (#18)	.248	.384	.603	.634	.015	.186
Truthfulness (#4/#20)	.116	.269	.462	.504	.265	.371
Concern for rights (#15)	.285	.345	.375	.412	-.089	.051
Thoroughness (#5)	-.078	.066	.045	.127	.732	.703
Specificity (#8)	-.047	.074	.034	.109	.628	.606
Adequacy (#13/#14)	.492	.549	-.016	.171	.509	.611
# of Reasons (#11)	.148	.257	.118	.217	.504	.548
Coherence (#10)	.139	.214	.037	.127	.419	.448

Note. Item number(s) in parentheses, two item number means items were averaged. Factor loadings . >50 in bold.

Summary of Items and Factor Loadings From Principal Axis Factoring for Death Penalty Scenario, and Comparison between Oblimin and Varimax Rotations

Factor Loadings on Dependent Constructs using Identified Rotation

	<u>Procedural justice</u>		<u>Interpersonal Justice</u>		<u>Informational Justice</u>	
	<u>Oblimin</u>	<u>Varimax</u>	<u>Oblimin</u>	<u>Varimax</u>	<u>Oblimin</u>	<u>Varimax</u>
Legitimacy (#6/#12)	.808	.784	-.126	.025	-.018	.129
Fairness (#3/#23)	.749	.724	.346	.480	.102	.034
Truthfulness (#4/#20)	.744	.736	.046	.188	-.085	.197
Propriety (#1)	.734	.695	.042	.173	.144	-.030
Reasonableness (#7)	.725	.716	-.175	-.036	-.121	.215
Relevance (#9/#16)	.716	.719	-.015	.125	-.182	.285
Coherence (#10)	.634	.640	-.260	-.133	-.227	.301
Trustworthiness (#17)	.630	.618	.107	.224	-.027	.127
Adequacy (#13/#14)	.551	.593	.043	.161	-.422	.502
Concern for rights (#15)	-.143	-.083	.694	.676	-.272	.296
Respect (#18)	-.120	-.088	.676	.655	-.079	.107
Considerateness (#22)	.440	.448	.543	.625	-.040	.142
Politeness (#21)	.375	.384	.513	.583	-.039	.129
Neutrality (#2)	.435	.402	.466	.535	.244	-.146
Specificity (#8)	.068	.176	.130	.172	-.783	.795
# of Reasons (#11)	-.019	.091	.160	.186	-.780	.780
Thoroughness (#5)	.209	.300	-.028	.039	-.728	.750

Note. Item number(s) in parentheses, two item number means items were averaged. Factor loadings . >50 in bold.

Summary of Items and Factor Loadings From Principal Axis Factoring for Death Penalty Scenario, and Comparison between Oblimin and Varimax Rotations

Factor Loadings on Dependent Constructs using Identified Rotation

	<u>Procedural justice</u>		<u>Interpersonal Justice</u>		<u>Informational Justice</u>	
	<u>Oblimin</u>	<u>Varimax</u>	<u>Oblimin</u>	<u>Varimax</u>	<u>Oblimin</u>	<u>Varimax</u>
Legitimacy (#6/#12)	.799	.762	-.102	.061	.006	.126
Reasonableness (#7)	.703	.680	-.129	.023	.099	.199
Relevance (#9/#16)	.694	.693	.007	.161	.156	.270
Truthfulness (#4/#20)	.687	.683	.117	.259	.061	.188
Fairness (#3/#23)	.682	.680	.428	.549	-.138	.027
Propriety (#1)	.641	.614	.094	.214	-.102	.017
Coherence (#10)	.610	.597	-.186	-.044	.187	.265
Trustworthiness (#17)	.564	.560	.121	.236	.033	.140
Adequacy (#13/#14)	.545	.582	.041	.184	.377	.467
Specificity (#8)	.077	.184	.112	.188	.712	.728
# of Reasons (#11)	.013	.118	.128	.187	.666	.674
Thoroughness (#5)	.224	.303	-.003	.096	.628	.656
Considerateness (#22)	.330	.379	.606	.667	.021	.145
Politeness (#21)	.275	.320	.526	.578	.037	.142
Concern for rights (#15)	-.116	-.033	.494	.484	.227	.261
Respect (#18)	-.084	-.030	.437	.422	.073	.108
Neutrality (#2)	.336	.340	.386	.437	-.153	-.050

Note. Item number(s) in parentheses, two item number means items were averaged. Factor loadings . >50 in bold.

APPENDIX 6

ANOVA of Quality and Level of Mandate on Perceptions of Justification Quality

Factor	df	SS	MS	F	P	η^2
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION SCENARIO						
<i>Procedural Justice</i>						
Quality	1	185.79	185.79	12.56	<.001	.06
Mandate	2	321.52	160.76	10.87	<.001	.10
Quality x Mandate	2	.49	.24	.02	.984	.00
Error	192	2839.15	14.79			
Total	197	3374.19				
<i>Interpersonal Justice</i>						
Quality	1	5.93	5.93	.63	.428	.00
Mandate	2	62.16	31.08	3.30	.039	.03
Quality x Mandate	2	20.57	10.29	1.09	.338	.01
Error	192	1808.21	9.42			
Total	197	1926.59				
<i>Informational Justice</i>						
Quality	1	385.27	385.27	55.00	<.001	.22
Mandate	2	9.66	4.83	.69	.503	.01
Quality x Mandate	2	3.56	1.78	.25	.776	.00
Error	192	1344.98	7.01			
Total	19	1866.21				
DEATH PENALTY SCENARIO						
<i>Procedural Justice</i>						
Quality	1	3.98	3.98	.29	.591	.00
Mandate	2	234.86	117.43	8.56	.000	.08
Quality x Mandate	2	25.95	12.98	.95	.390	.01
Error	193	2648.91	13.72			
Total	198	2891.48				
<i>Interpersonal Justice</i>						
Quality	1	2.58	2.58	.37	.546	.00
Mandate	2	58.96	29.48	4.18	.017	.04
Quality x Mandate	2	15.85	7.92	1.12	.328	.01
Error	193	1362.16	7.06			
Total	198	1451.30				
<i>Informational Justice</i>						
Quality	1	149.01	149.01	18.97	<.001	.09
Mandate	2	40.06	20.03	2.55	.081	.03
Quality x Mandate	2	10.77	5.39	.69	.505	.01
Error	193	1515.92	7.86			
Total	198	1702.83				

ANOVA of Quality and Frame Consistency on Perceptions of Justification Quality

Factor	df	SS	MS	F	P	η^2
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION SCENARIO						
<i>Procedural Justice</i>						
Frame	1	17.91	17.91	1.11	.293	.01
Quality	1	238.30	238.30	14.81	<.001	.07
Frame x Quality	1	23.86	23.86	1.48	.225	.01
Error	194	3120.88	16.08			
Total	197	3374.19				
<i>Interpersonal Justice</i>						
Frame	1	.19	.19	.02	.889	.00
Quality	1	32.41	32.41	3.32	.070	.02
Frame x Quality	1	4.27	4.27	.44	.509	.00
Error	194	1894.12	9.76			
Total	197	1926.59				
<i>Informational Justice</i>						
Frame	1	4.62	4.62	.66	.417	.00
Quality	1	436.32	436.32	62.58	.000	.24
Frame x Quality	1	.17	.17	.02	.877	.00
Error	194	1352.60	6.97			
Total	197	1866.21				
DEATH PENALTY SCENARIO						
<i>Procedural Justice</i>						
Frame	1	1.13	1.13	.08	.782	.00
Quality	1	2.43	2.43	.17	.685	.00
Frame x Quality	1	14.09	14.09	.96	.329	.01
Error	195	2875.13	14.74			
Total	198	2891.48				
<i>Interpersonal Justice</i>						
Frame	1	2.84	2.84	.39	.533	.00
Quality	1	8.21	8.21	1.13	.289	.01
Frame x Quality	1	18.96	18.96	2.61	.108	.01
Error	195	1416.46	7.26			
Total	198	1451.30				
<i>Informational Justice</i>						
Frame	1	3.27	3.27	.41	.521	.00
Quality	1	117.25	117.25	14.81	<.000	.07
Quality x Mandate	1	12.76	12.76	1.61	.206	.01
Error	195	1515.92	7.86			
Total	198	1702.83				

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