

KRUMHOLZ EARLY PAPERS

Edited by

Pierre Clavel

Abstract

When Cleveland Mayor Carl Stokes offered Norman Krumholz the directorship of the Cleveland City Planning Department in 1969, Krumholz jumped in with hopes of getting the maximum effort toward the social justice that Stokes, the first black mayor of as large U.S. city, represented.

These papers represent Krumholz' first efforts. They reflect a series of initial forays engaging parts of the city hall bureaucracy, talking to the mayor's constituents and testing the waters with city institutions like the newspapers, and other professional contacts like the Northeast Ohio Area Coordinating Agency (NOACA). These papers are short, generally written for spoken presentation rather than for publication. Some began as speeches to be given by Stokes. Some were at professional meetings or university speaking engagements, where he hoped to use the Cleveland experience to impact the practice of planning in the nation at large.

The thread that runs through these papers is the encounter between social justice ideals and the real world of city hall and local institutions: the regional planning agency, the capital budgeting process in city hall, the transportation agencies in the city. They represent the first phase of Krumholz' Cleveland career, from 1969 through 1975 – up to, but not including the Cleveland Policy Planning Report (1975).

That report and its aftermath signaled a shift in Krumholz' career and made a significant impact on the planning profession and the history of city government. The whole story is still unfolding, but it was well told by Krumholz himself. He published “The Cleveland Policy Planning Report” with Janice Cogger and John Linner (two co-authors of the plan itself) in the *Journal of the American Institute of Planners* in 1975; and “A Retrospective View of Equity Planning: Cleveland 1969-1979” in that same Journal in 1982. A full account appeared in *Making Equity Planning Work*, written with John Forester (Temple University Press, 1990) and there have been dozens, hundreds of formal and informal presentations since the 1970s during a long academic career as a leading professor at Cleveland State University's College of Urban Affairs and in such public roles as President of the American Planning Association (1987) and of the American Institute of Certified Planners (1999).

Here are ten unpublished papers presented during Krumholz' period with the City Planning Commission during 1969-75. (They were prepared for oral presentation, and with no original copy available, we present them complete with hand-written marginal notes.)

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NK1

ECONOMIC TRENDS AND PUBLIC POLICY.

Abstract

Norman Krumholz, in one of his first local speeches after arriving in Cleveland as planning director, gives local notable the bad news of decline – population, share of the region, manufacturing – everything except a modest increase in business services and office space. He saw hope for growth in office space and the airport-related business complex; and in universities and health care institutions; was short on other answers: he urged support for federal family assistance legislation that would help Cleveland families; and a metropolitan land development agency to regulate and support local development region-wide.

Author: Norman Krumholz, Professor Emeritus, Levin College of Urban Affairs, Cleveland State University

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Remarks by Norman Krumholz, Director
Cleveland City Planning Commission
to the City Club, August 21, 1970

ECONOMIC TRENDS AND PUBLIC POLICY

I must confess the Cleveland scene provides a surplus of potential topics for anyone who is asked to talk about this City, particularly anyone connected with City Hall. I originally decided on the topic "The Ghetto Must Go" which was announced as the title of my talk this afternoon. But, after some reflection, I concluded this would be like shooting fish in a barrel; surely everyone in this room would agree that the ghetto must go, and you might even be joined by certain councilmen and a local rotund lawyer or two. So I chucked the topic as being too obvious and I must apologize to any of you who came in the hope of getting your teeth into that topic. I then considered talking about the planning and development initiatives available to local decision-makers in a situation where all the significant money is locked-up and out of reach in Washington; I rejected that as being too depressing. Then I thought of contrasting the peace and accommodation of my last job as Assistant Director of the Planning Department in Pittsburgh with the conflicts of my present assignment and perhaps make some comments on the implications of this conflict so far as recruiting and holding trained personnel, but I rejected this because I didn't think anyone would believe it. So I've turned my attention to some long-term economic trends in the City of Cleveland in comparison with its metropolitan region and, in spite of the fact that others with a rather direct pipeline to the Oracle of Delphi will be addressing themselves to these and other issues, I'd like to analyze these economic trends, discuss what produced

them, and make some recommendations for local public policy. I hope in the process I don't demonstrate a new cure for insomnia, but I am encouraged in the view that ours is a serious group eager to consider serious issues.

The economic indices for which we have gathered trend data include:

- a. Population Level and Composition
- b. Retail Trade Employment and Retail Sales
- c. Wholesale Trade Employment
- d. Manufacturing Trade Employment
- e. Employment in Misc. Business Services
- f. Trends in Amounts of Office Space

Let's start at the top with population and work our way down to see where we are today, where we were yesterday and where we may be going tomorrow.

As you all may know, the U.S. Census has just reported that the population of the City of Cleveland has dropped to 739,000 in 1970. I believe this to be an undercount of about 5% but in any event, it represents a decline that has been underway since 1950 when Cleveland's population reached an all-time high of 914,000.

Table 1: Population - City of Cleveland - 1900-1970

<u>1900</u>	<u>1910</u>	<u>1920</u>	<u>1930</u>
381,768	560,663	796,841	900,429
<u>1940</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1970</u>
878,336	914,808	876,050	739,000

Although it is probably not as generally well-known, it is not surprising, given the vast improvements in transportation and access, that the City's population as a proportion of its surrounding region has been declining for a far longer period -- in fact, this decline or shift has been taking place since 1910.

Table 2: Cleveland's Population as a Proportion of its Region - 1900-1970

<u>1900</u>	<u>1910</u>	<u>1920</u>	<u>1930</u>
82.8	84.9	82.0	72.4
<u>1940</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1970</u>
69.3	62.4	46.0	36.2

In 1910, Cleveland had about 85% of the total regional population. In 1950, when the city had its largest population in history, its share had declined to 62%. Today, that share is 36%. A declining population may be seen as an opportunity to reduce densities and improve the quality of life - but other factors must be considered.

While the level of population has been changing, so too has its composition. Trends suggest an increasingly dependent population residing in the City.

Since 1940, population in the working ages (15-64) has gone from 75% of total population to less than 60%. At the same time, the young and the elderly have grown from 25% to over 40%. Not only are broadened public services needed by the young and old, but fewer workers are now supporting the City population. This is confirmed by the trend in City population per employed resident -- from 2.4 in 1950 to 2.7 in 1965.

Table 3: Population in Selected Age Groups, City of Cleveland, 1940-1965
As Percent of Total Population

	<u>1940</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1965</u>
0-14	19.9	22.7	28.9	30.1
15-64	74.7	69.5	61.2	59.9
65+	5.4	7.8	9.9	10.0

Table 4: Population Per Employed Person, City of Cleveland, 1950-65

<u>1950</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1965</u>
2.4	2.6	2.7

Between 1950 and 1965, the actual number of families in Cleveland declined from over 233,000 to less than 200,000. By our best estimates, almost 25% of these families were faced with annual incomes of less than \$4,000 and this poor population as a proportion of the total is showing remarkable resistance to change. These families are untouched by increases in the GNP because they are not in the labor market or are desperately underemployed.

So much for people. What has happened to retail trade employment and retail sales?

As the population has shifted outward, it is not surprising that neighborhood retail trade has gone along with it. As a result, dollar volumes in retail trade and retail trade employment in the City have shrunk. In 1948 (at the height of the population curve) there were over 67,000 retail employees in Cleveland, and the City had 81% of all retail employment in the region. By 1967, the actual number of employees was 46,000 and the City was down to 44% of the total regional retail employment. In just 19 years, in other words, the City lost 21,000 retail employees, 37% of the regional retail employment.

Table 5: Cleveland's Retail Employment
As a Proportion of its Region and Actual
Number of Employees - 1929-1967

	<u>1929</u>	<u>1939</u>	<u>1948</u>	<u>1954</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1967</u>
Proportion	87.7	83.4	80.6	73.5	49.7	44.3
Actual Employees	46,497	50,198	67,551	63,225	46,127	46,035

Trends in dollar volume of retail trade in the City indicate an even more radical shift outward. From 1958 to 1967, retail dollar volume was slipping even faster than retail trade employment. And this decline took place during a period when retail sales in the region were expanding dramatically. In terms of percentage, Cleveland had 60% of the total retail sales volume of the region in 1958; by 1967 it was down to 39%. Actual dollar volume between 1958 and 1967 dropped \$87 million in the City while volume in the same 9 years in the region went up over \$1 billion.

Table 6: Cleveland Retail Sales in Dollar Volume
and as a Percent of SMSA - 1958, 1963, 1967

(In Billions of Dollars)

	<u>1958</u>		<u>1963</u>		<u>1967</u>	
	<u>\$ Volume</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>\$ Volume</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>\$ Volume</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Cleveland	\$ 1,383	60%	\$ 1,250	47%	\$ 1,296	39%
SMSA	\$ 2,290		\$ 2,672		\$ 3,315	

Let us turn to wholesaling and take a look at what has been happening in this sector.

Almost from the day of its founding, Cleveland had been an important town for wholesaling activities. Its position at the mouth of a great river emptying into

a great lake meant that goods could be floated here from various directions; here to be weighed, inspected or purchased or shifted to rail or wagon for further travel inland.

So dominant has Cleveland been in this type of activity that even as late as 1954 over 93% of all wholesaling jobs in the metropolitan region were located in the City. But between 1954 and 1963, the City's share of wholesaling jobs declined by 20%. Between 1963 and 1967 another 8% drop was recorded.

Table 7: Cleveland's Wholesale Employment as a Proportion of its Region and Actual Number Employees - 1929-1967

	<u>1929</u>	<u>1939</u>	<u>1948</u>	<u>1954</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1967</u>
Proportion	97.1	97.9	96.4	93.5	73.5	65.4
Actual Employees	24,946	23,539	36,841	39,650	33,226	32,560

The forces which lie behind this shift can be traced in great part to transportation changes. The shift in the movement of goods from rail to truck operating on high-speed regional highway networks has freed wholesalers from the need to be at rail terminals and has weakened the advantages of being close to a rail junction. So long as wholesalers relied principally on the rail lines in Cleveland, the fact that the point of convergence of different lines was within the city acted as an attractive force. Once the truck began to be extensively used, however, the attraction of the City of Cleveland as the preferred distribution point for wholesalers was weakened.

Although the decline in wholesaling has been relatively recent, Cleveland has been declining in importance as a manufacturing center relative to its region since 1929. Let me make clear at once that Cleveland's position in manufacturing

far stronger than 10 other similar cities we analyzed, but, its share of manufacturing production workers has dropped from 89% in 1929 to 60% in 1963.

Table 8: Cleveland Manufacturing Employment
as a Proportion of its Region - 1929-1963

	<u>1929</u>	<u>1939</u>	<u>1949</u>	<u>1954</u>	<u>1963</u>
Proportion	89.1	86.3	83.0	69.5	60.0

To understand the forces which determine industrial locations in Cleveland a century or two ago, one has to return to the problems of transportation. When Cleveland was in its earliest development stage, the mills lay inside the City for the City sat on the natural transportation routes and the City also typically provided much of the market and almost all of the labor which the factories employed.

As time went on, rail and truck offered manufacturing plants more latitude in choice of sites while the manufacturing structures became obsolete in terms of material processing and technological developments. This technological obsolescence was accelerated by the development of the assembly line. As a result of these changes, the old mill multi-story structure became inappropriate. Pallet-loading and the use of the fork-lift truck, for example, were difficult in multi-story structures. The preferred type of structure became the one story building on large sites with the easy possibility of expansion in any direction.

If a manufacturer in Cleveland (or any city) wanted to expand his plant, his job became exceedingly difficult as time passed. Zoning regulations might limit his expansion or might classify him as a non-conforming user, unable to expand. If that was no problem, he would still have to deal with the owners of dozens of small parcels, one or two of whom might refuse to sell or attempt to

gouge an impossible price and wreck the entire project. Moreover, once the site was acquired, demolition costs would run up costs substantially. This is precisely why the assembly of central city land is often so expensive, and so difficult.

So much for down-trends. We come now to a few trends which can be classified as optimistic and hopeful: employment in the "services" sector of the economy, and the construction of office space, both of which are related to downtown development, and the rapid growth of institutions which are more randomly located in the City.

Employment in business services which include advertising, communications and business consultants is up in Cleveland from 7,000 jobs in 1954 to 15,000 in 1967, although the City accounts for a smaller proportion of the region even in this sector.

Table 9: Cleveland Misc. Business Services *Employment as a
Proportion of its Region - and Actual Number Employees
1954-1967

	<u>1954</u>	<u>1958</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1967</u>
Proportion	93	91	83	77
Actual Employees	7,032	9,839	11,245	14,755

*Advertising, Communications, Bus. Consultants

Although we do not yet have the breakdowns for the important fields of Finance, Insurance and Real Estate, I am sure these sectors will show Cleveland in a strong position, probably being strengthened over time.

Similarly, the amount of occupied office space in the Central Business District (CBD) is up. By our best estimates the amount of office space in the CBD was about 6,500,000 sq. feet in April, 1950. Today, the square footage occupied or now being leased totals 10,287,000 square feet not including space used by government offices or Bond Court and the Cleveland Trust Tower. It seems clear that the CBD is firmly maintaining its viability as an office center. Why?

From the earliest beginnings, office functions have sought out central city locations in most cities, and Cleveland is no exception. The reasons for this affinity are not altogether clear, but it appears as if information, negotiation, and the face-to-face kinds of communication which are essential to executive personnel provides the motivation. Then, too, an important reason for the concentration of office activities in downtown locations is the insensitivity of many office activities to the cost of space. Land costs in downtown areas are often higher than they are anywhere else in the region, but the cost of land and the cost of construction are incidental to the need of office headquarters for prestige and proximity to one another.

In the last three years, new office construction has made up about 25% of the total dollar volume of all new construction in Cleveland for a total of about \$62 million dollars. These 3 years have been the best construction years in Cleveland's history. In this area, again, the City shows great vitality and growth.

Similar growth is also clear in the institutional field where schools, universities, hospitals and government buildings have been growing users of land.

Let me recapitulate: long-term trends confirm that the City is not only losing total population, but retaining in the process the more dependent population groups. At the same time, the City is becoming a less viable location for all but a relatively few sectors of economic activity, with attendant loss in municipal revenues and resident incomes. The result is a failing base of support for municipal revenues in the face of increasing demands for services by City residents. The outward-moving trends are caused by age and obsolescence in the City's physical plant, in a certain hardening of the City's physical arteries, in technological changes over time, in improved family income and in vastly improved transportation, mobility and access. It is poor consolation to observe that the suburban areas of the region will fall heir to much the same problems in their season, but that is certainly indicated and there is nothing in view calculated to interrupt this cycle.

The relevant question for us at this point is: What does all this mean for local public policy? Let me make some proposals in this area which lack the sanction of Mayor, Council and Planning Commission. Indeed, I am not even confident my wife shares my views on these matters.

1. It appears definitely to be in the City's interest to strengthen the strong market demand that now exists for office space. The increased use of air travel by business executives is already a fact of life and this increased mobility will probably be exploited by gathering executives at central locations for quick dispersal into the field. Then too, air transport in the future is likely to weaken the hold on manufacturing and wholesaling now held by truck and rail,

just as rail transport loosened the hold of the barge and cart. Hence, I would strongly suggest support for the proposed Air-Port-In-The-Lake -- so long as the project does not divert local funds from needed services and housing.

The airport concept is no longer a few landing strips connected to the city by an umbilical cord. As now conceived, the Airport proposal is a New Town on a giant scale and gives us an opportunity to build on an area equal to almost one-third of Cleveland's present land area the new housing, manufacturing and transportation facilities we so badly need. Properly funded out of federal and state programs, and developed in accord with City plans and priorities, it could support and capitalize upon those sections of the economy for which a central city location remains optimum.

2. Since a great part of Cleveland's crisis is the result of a lack of money to maintain or improve services in the face of a heavily obsolete plant and a population less and less able to pay for services, the City must continue to press the federal and state levels for broad family assistance payments to help people, for bloc grants directly to the cities to spend as directed by local priorities, and for generally broadened federal funding. Mayor Stokes has been extremely active in this regard with recent testimony in support of the Ashly Bill which proposes to vastly expand federal urban aid, on the Koch Bill which proposes a Transportation Trust Fund to be allocated to any form of transportation as determined by local priorities, and on

the proposed Family Assistance Program. This thrust must not be left to the Mayor's leadership alone but be broadened to include all concerned segments of this community. In that regard, I think the Planning Commission is to be commended for its resolution on the Family Assistance Program and transmission of the staff analysis to H.E.W. Secretary Elliott Richardson.

The Mayor and the Planning Commission are supporting a series of amendments designed to improve the work incentive provisions of the Nixon Bill, to provide equitable and adequate basic allowances to those who cannot work and to accomplish this without serious drain on national resources. Successful passage of these amendments would result in an estimated additional \$100 million annually in Federal payments to the poor of Cleveland and an added \$50 million annually to the non-poor of Cleveland. This money will end up, in other words, in local cash registers. Are you listening, Growth Association?

This important legislation is now before the Senate Finance Committee. Passage of this bill, with necessary amendments, will require much more effort among concerned citizens that has been demonstrated to date. But an adequate bill will be an important first step toward resolution of some of our most serious urban problems.

In pressing for these and similar programs, the cities will become the greatest force for liberalized politics of any institution.

3. This proposal addresses itself to the quality of the future environment. Since new development takes place for historic, technological and particularly for economic reasons without any real control except for easily subverted local zoning and sub-division regulations, I would recommend that a metropolitan land development agency be established to acquire, plan, and improve land in the entire region and that this agency be given territorial jurisdiction for Cleveland and its suburbs and surrounding undeveloped areas.

This public agency would develop its land in conformance with a long-range metropolitan growth plan. It would install all street and utility improvements, retain all sites needed for parks, schools and other neighborhood facilities, and then sell off or lease without profit the remaining land to private developers who would agree to build in accordance with the metropolitan plan which would include a program to offer housing choices to the poor on a regional basis. Unless something like this is done, the future environment will look pretty much like the present.

The most important advantage of such a system would be the public control over the strategic elements of urban growth. But it would also dampen land speculation, provide a constant flow of improved building sites to the housing market, provide land on a regional basis for persons displaced by public programs and make open housing a reality.

4. Since a strong market demand exists for institutional uses, the City should encourage the expansion of universities, hospitals, government buildings, etc. At the same time, the City must end its reliance on the property tax since these are non-taxable uses. Failing in this, the City should insist that all institutional uses be placed on the tax duplicate with federal and state governments paying a full property tax. I would apply the same recommendation to all public housing. Let it pay full property taxes to local governments via a federal subsidy. In so doing we may eliminate one of the most strident complaints about public housing.

You may say that in suggesting these new governmental devices, I have raised greater problems than I sought to solve. This could be, but I must console myself with the story of the grasshopper and the ant. The grasshopper dreads the winter months to come and the ant advises him to change himself into a cockroach. The grasshopper is delighted with the advice but asks how it can be done. "I have given you the objective," says the ant, "now you work out the details."

NK 2

TRANSPORTATION PLANNING, PROBLEMS AND NEW DIRECTIONS

Abstract

Notes the federal mandate for cooperation in transportation planning, at odds with endemic conflict arising from priorities given to highways and to transit routes that allocate service geographically rather than according to transit dependent populations (families without automobiles). Argues for priority to that population in all transportation planning.

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TRANSPORTATION PLANNING, PROBLEMS AND NEW DIRECTIONS

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- A paper prepared for presentation at the AIP/DOT Conference in Cleveland -
November 16 and 17, 1970

In this country's urban and densely populated suburban areas, transportation programs are in trouble and Cleveland is no exception. Mass transit suffers from declining ridership, revenues and service. Public outcries against the highway program have become so familiar that they can be summarized in a few phrases: unresponsiveness to the varied priorities of many clients, inattention to what we planners call "externalities" or side-effects, and resistance to meaningful participation in the decision process by those other than highway engineers.

Against this backdrop, the preceding two papers by Donald C. Hyde and Albert S. Porter present an interesting study in contrast. Hyde, former general manager of Cleveland Transit System, focuses heavily on finance, changes in administration to ease financial problems, and possible methods of supplementing the inadequate revenues of the "fare-box". He describes a series of transit-related studies in the Cleveland area over the past twenty years which are mostly gathering dust for want of an adequate financing vehicle. In his paper the words "debt" and "financing" appear twenty-three times. He makes clear that new capital projects cannot be expected out of the "fare-box."

Porter, on the other hand, as long-time Cuyahoga County Engineer and former head of the Cuyahoga County Democratic Party, projects the view of the prototypical highway engineer. Most of his plans since 1928 have been translated into concrete and steel by virtue of the 1956 Federal Aid Highways Act. He has accomplished much; he is proud of his accomplishments and of his professional techniques, he is chafing at the restraints coming from his critics and he is anxious to get on with the job. The two papers provide useful summaries of the transportation planning process in this area over the past fifty years. I see no need to restate the salient points in each paper. However, I think that it is important to note that both men assume a number of normative concepts and some of these will provide the basis for my comments.

- Hyde:
1. Rapid transit extensions including a downtown Cleveland subway and transit lanes in freeways are desirable and should be built.
 2. An anti-transit bias exists among highway officials which tends to negate transit projects no matter how worthwhile.

3. Substantial revenues should be made available to mass transit to supplement the "fare-box" since mass transit serves the general public interest.

- Porter:
1. Highway improvements are desirable and should be built as quickly as possible.
 2. The location of highway projects and routes should be left to the highway engineer.
 3. Engineering criteria, i.e., traffic service and cost, should control route selection. Other criteria such as "community goals, . . . loss of tax base, relocation" are "vague and intangible", and they, along with recent review procedures, have added unnecessary cost to the highway planning process.
 4. The articulate public, i.e., newspapermen and "uninformed, unqualified and unenlightened citizens" should not be confused with the larger public which supports all proposed highway construction.

I do not propose to argue or agree with any of these propositions directly. What I shall do is comment on the papers and some of these normative views while addressing myself to two basic questions:

1. Why do highway departments in Cuyahoga County and everywhere else continue to suffer charges of unresponsiveness in spite of the laudatory "3-C" regulations of the 1962 Highway Act which called for a "cooperative, comprehensive and continuing planning process" as a basis for all federally-aided highways?
2. What steps might be taken to mute this criticism while developing a more flexible transportation policy to better fit the varied priorities of the nation's urban areas?

Let me begin with the "3-C's" of the 1962 Highway Act to which Mr. Porter has added a fourth -- "costly".

The highway planning process must be cooperative. This suggests that the highway bureaucracy -- the Bureau of Public Roads (BPR), the State Highway Departments and local highway officials -- must develop plans in concert with local and regional planning agencies so that local considerations with regard to land use, housing and other community values would be reflected in the plans as well as purely technical traffic considerations.

The guidelines to assure "cooperation" in the transportation planning process were established in a series of Policy and Procedure Memoranda (PPM)

from BPR^{1/} which required that local communities acknowledge their access to information and awareness of the transportation planning process through a memorandum of understanding. Through this memorandum, local bodies would fulfill the statutory need for cooperative planning. But the procedures and techniques of the transportation planning process were left with the highway engineers who would insure technical competence.

Under this operational format, the initiative for establishing the essential structure of the highway system has remained with highway agencies, with local or regional planning bodies being called upon only to ratify the proposed system or make marginal adjustments to it.

A local Cleveland example might be instructive. The interstate network proposed by the Northeast Ohio Areawide Coordinating Agency (NOACA) which has responsibility for transportation planning, 204 and A-95 reviews in a seven-county region, is essentially that proposed by the highway bureaucracy.^{2/} For one east-west link in this system, two alternatives were proposed -- a Northern and a Southern Heights Corridor. NOACA's technical staff recommended the Northern Corridor. The Planning Council of NOACA made up of the directors of all regional planning commissions unanimously recommended "further study" on both corridors as did the NOACA Steering Committee. The affected municipalities unanimously supported the further study proposal. But the NOACA Board overwhelmingly recommended the Southern Heights Corridor as proposed by the County Engineer.

In no case, to my knowledge, has the requirement for the cooperation of local government specified in the 1962 Highway Act been interpreted to mean that any local government's refusal to cooperate would block federal highway operations.

It is not surprising that many viewers of this process see not cooperation (collective action for common benefit) but merely the co-optation of local representatives who provide data, financial support and symbolic legitimacy for projects dominated by the needs of highway departments. Further, it is not surprising to find regional planning and review agencies such as NOACA intensely supportive of the needs of the highway bureaucracy given the fragmentation of local political jurisdictions and planning agencies compared with the long-term, well-organized, well-staffed and well-financed highway departments.

But the basic issue involving the unmet need for cooperation goes much deeper than the techno-political construct described above. There exists a fundamental difference of objectives between the highway agencies and in-

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1. See, particularly, PPM 50-9 "Urban Transportation Planning," June 21, 1967.
 2. Cleveland/Seven County Transportation/Land Use Study, A Framework for Action, 1969, pp. 10.

dividual urbanized communities, and until these objectives can be reconciled, true cooperation may be impossible. Cities like Cleveland and, many others, are concerned about displaced populations, housing, declining tax bases, and the destruction of community. They cannot "cooperate" in the support of programs which promise to deepen their problems by clearance of vast rights-of-way which are technically justified by the "need" of the region to move more cars faster. If the cities are to agree to their partial dismemberment, some large-scale value trade-offs are in order. I will suggest some possibilities along this line later, but let me turn now to another of the "3-C's" -- comprehensiveness.

The 1962 Act states that the planning process must be comprehensive. This requirement insists that the areawide highway system be planned with full consideration for all relevant factors -- population shifts and projections, economic analysis, land use patterns, and even "social and community value factors."^{1/} City planners would have no argument with this concept in spite of the debate currently raging in the profession on the possibilities and limits of comprehensiveness. But comprehensiveness, as interpreted by BPR, relates to full coverage of the technical elements of transportation planning with only an occasional nod to the rest of the world. Zoning and land use control is not the highway department's problem. As Mr. Porter states: "the best plan is good only until the next meeting of municipal Council." Transit trip demand becomes a net residual after automobile trips have been estimated. Housing need, when identified, becomes a yellow blob on a land use plan, and neighborhood and environmental factors are almost completely disregarded in establishing the criteria leading to corridor selection.

Again a local example might be illuminating. The comprehensive report of the Cleveland Seven County Transportation Land Use Study establishes twenty-six criteria to "measure the relative merits of the transportation systems" it proposes.^{2/} Of these, thirteen or half, are environmental criteria. Imposing! On closer inspection however, it develops that all "environmental factors" comprise only 30% of the total weighted criteria and that the elimination of irreplaceable historical sites or parkland is covered under "Historical/Natural/Architectural Sites" which makes up .9% of the total while something called "separation-bisection" (actually relating to the disruption of neighborhoods) makes up 4.5% of total criteria.

It is not my intention to disparage these criteria or the weighting system. Rather, I simply wish to observe that other groups with different objectives might prefer other methods to "measure the relative merits of the transportation systems." That these approaches are not represented suggests anything but the comprehensiveness implied by the "3-C's" regulation. It also suggests that Mr. Hyde's easy confidence that "environmental and social factors will be taken into consideration" by organizations such as NOACA is a trifle premature.

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1. PPM-50-9, pp. 2-8.
 2. A Framework for Action, pp. 23-24.

The "3-C's" need no further belaboring, but I believe the point has been made that the promises of the 1962 Highway Act to bring highways into harmony with the urban environment have not been fulfilled. They are not likely to be fulfilled in the future, unless highway officials truly accept the principles of local participation and coordinated land use and multi-modal transportation planning. So long as the highway bureaucracy regards the "3-C's" and similar legislation as an unnecessary and disruptive force threatening progress and their established procedures, future regulations in this area are likely to be heavily compromised.

Let me turn now to ways by which an urban transportation policy might be developed to meet a greater variety of client needs and so accommodate many of the critics of present policies.

First, it seems to me that we must improve the balance between highway and other forms of transportation investment, particularly those means of transportation which serve the needs of the elderly, the poor and the young. The reason that this point is the highest item on my agenda arises from a moral imperative. [As a society we have opted for an automotive civilization. In the process, the national majority which profits from this increased mobility has ignored those injured by it. As any place-bound resident of any city can testify, if he is too young, too old, or too poor to drive, there are fewer and fewer places he can reach by conventional transit ^{and at higher & higher prices.} This is partly the result of the increased scatteration of new development taking place at low densities impossible to achieve without the highway and the car, and partly because of declining service by public transit as a function of shrinking ridership and revenues.

It is clear that we have a major obligation to those unable to get around by car -- the worker who must reach his newly-suburbanized job via car-pool and two buses; the elderly widow who has not visited her friend in a year because she lives six miles away and can't make connections; the housewife of a poor family who must shop two or three times a week by bus.*] It is this group which must be the prime beneficiary of changes in transportation policy. It is service to this group which best justifies the name "public transit." And it is this priority which must be emphasized again and again at the highest levels, lest the transportation changes now proposed be used simply to further improve the situation of those groups now served so well by our society's present policies.

I do not believe we will be able to serve the needs of this transit-dependent population by building new rail transit systems or by extending existing ones. Rather, I suspect that the needs of this large transit-

* In the City of Cleveland this group is substantial, indeed. By our best estimates, in 1965 32% of all households did not own their own car. Of the estimated 45,000 families with annual incomes under \$4,000, 46% own no car. Of the households headed by persons over 65, 48% had no car.

dependent population can best be provided by systems that supply door-to-door service on demand. Whether this service is made available through jitneys, subsidized taxis, dial-a-bus or even subsidized car ownership, it seems fair that highway users bear part of the cost.

In addition to serving the needs of the transit-dependent population, local governments need some other real choices in transportation policy that reflect local priorities. Such choices are now rendered almost impossible by the nature of transportation funding. In a situation where inter-state highways cost Cleveland only 5% of project cost while mass transit "solutions" cost 100%, I submit that real options do not exist. How do we rectify this?

Federal aid for urban highways has been massive since 1956 and currently totals over \$2 billion each year. Federal mass transit aid however, dates only from 1964 and up to just recently, totalled only \$175 million a year. It may be assumed that the backlog of unmet transit needs is far greater than highway needs. I would therefore propose that we handle this situation by simply increasing the level of funding for mass transit out of the highway trust fund -- a proposal that already is the thrust of several Congressional bills. Perhaps a reasonable goal would be a catch-up decade during which 50% of all transportation allocations would go to mass transit.

A step in this direction would be Congressional authorization for the Secretary of DOT to approve state applications to use part of their highway allocations for public transit purposes. Logically, an application of this sort should emanate from a State Department of Transportation. (Given present views, it is unlikely that such a request would emanate from a State Highway Department.) Were mass transit funds to be made available on a large scale, local communities interested in transit rather than highways would be encouraged to develop their ideas in formal proposals, as is now taking place in response to the new Public Transportation Assistance Act of 1970.

The problem of compensation is another area of conflict in highway development. A "great leap forward" was taken with the compensation provisions of the Highway Act of 1968. If they are vigorously enforced, much needed equity will enter the relocation picture.

1. Homeowners will receive up to \$5,000 above market value for purchase of comparable property.
2. Renters will receive up to \$1,500 for comparable quarters either as rent subsidy or down payment on a purchase.
3. Displacees will receive reasonable moving expenses.
4. Displaced businesses will receive up to \$5,000 for loss of patronage or good will.

I would like to make a further suggestion using the Century Freeway experience in Watts as a guide post. The rule set out here was that no resident was to be left worse off as a result of the freeway. Homeowners would be left in the same mortgage and equity position, renters in the same rental position. To redeem this promise, the State Highway Department developed replacement housing on scattered sites using highway money for that purpose.

Perhaps this excellent precedent can be expanded further so that no city would be left worse off as a result of a freeway. Again, let us turn to a local example of what this approach might mean in practice.

The Parma Freeway is now proposed to cut through the west side of the City of Cleveland running north-south and connecting I-71, I-90 and the Memorial Shoreway. Estimates suggest the first-cut economic and social loss to the City would be in the following magnitude for the right-of-way proposed: 924 families displaced, 63 commercial businesses eliminated, 36 industrial businesses displaced, \$5.7 million loss of assessed valuations to the tax duplicate and an annual tax loss of \$391,000. In addition the City's share of the cost is expected to be 25 or 50% since the highway is not on the interstate system.

Under these circumstances, I judge that Cleveland would find accommodation impossible. But talking room exists if the State Highway Department or some other, more comprehensive transportation/development agency could (1) absorb the entire cost, and (2) rebuild the lost housing in the city on a unit-for-unit basis while also compensating the city for its loss of tax revenue. These costs would be lessened by deducting any new tax rateables developed as a result of freeway construction as well as other "in-puts" into the city economy. This formula would put the city in line with the ground-rule that it would not be left worse off than before the highway, and would almost guarantee widespread support for the highway program and continued high appropriations.

Let me make one last observation and comment on the preceding papers. Mr. Porter says that "major highways . . . streets . . . roads . . . or what have you pay for themselves through gasoline tax and license tag fees as a user tax in the classic form." There is a great body of urban economic research that suggests this is not exactly the case -- at least -- with reference to congested downtown streets where the driver pays far less than the full investment of the facilities he uses.* Here the driver does not pay taxes on land occupied by thoroughfares, nor does he pay proportionately for the parking congestion and safety problems he creates. In the urban core, Philadelphia estimates it pays \$50 a year more per auto than it takes

* Thompson, Wilbur, A Preface on Urban Economics, pp. 367-368.

in, and Milwaukee \$90.*

There is a general understanding that no feasible amount of highway investment will decongest peak hour traffic in core areas. As William Vickrey has noted, "Sometimes a facility becomes worthless precisely because it is free."

I would therefore suggest, along with many economists, that a street use pricing system be instituted in our crowded urban areas, where detailed research indicates this is appropriate.

This "surcharge" would be levied in accord with the high cost of providing service on particular streets at particular times. Motorists unwilling to pay the surcharge would use other streets and decongest critical ones. Mass transit vehicles would enjoy greatly reduced travel times which would likely increase patronage and service. Motorists sufficiently affluent to pay the surcharge would enjoy a more efficient facility, while the revenues thus generated could be used to further improve circulation within street use toll zones.

Concluding, I have tried to respond to the previous two papers constructively, with the general argument that the entire urban transportation problem could (1) be eased by accommodating, rather than scornfully rejecting, its critics, (2) be rendered more equitable by serving the needs of the transit-dependent population as the highest priority. That my suggestions may be controversial does not disturb me. What is vital is that those with policy responsibility for transportation take a fresh look at their own preconceptions in the broadest sense of the public interest. If, in company with the other panelists, I have helped accomplish that, these AIP/DOT Metropolitan Transportation Seminars will have been most worthwhile.

* Burck, Gilbert, "How to Unchoke Our Cities" Fortune, 63, (May, 1961) pp. 119-126.

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**TOWARD A WORK PROGRAM FOR AN ADVOCATE PLANNING
AGENCY
– AND SOME EXAMPLES OF WORK ACCOMPLISHED**

Abstract

Here, Krumholz and his chief planner Ernest Bonner establish their redistributive goal: maximize choice for those who have few, if any choices. They note the implications for policies: de-emphasis of some, enhancement of others: housing allowances, locations near employment.

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TOWARD A WORK PROGRAM FOR AN
ADVOCATE PLANNING AGENCY

And Some Examples of Work Accomplished

Background Paper for 54th Annual Conference
American Institute of Planners
San Francisco

Session on Advocacy Planning for Social Change
2 - 5 p. m., Monday, October 25, 1971

Norman Krumholz, Director
Ernest R. Bonner, Chief, Comprehensive Planning

City Planning Commission
City of Cleveland

A GYROSCOPE FOR THE GENERAL PLAN

The long-range planning staff will deal in information, criticism and advice. Our audience will be those who influence or make decisions.

We take upon ourselves a special role with respect to that audience. The information, criticism, and advice we offer will be informed by a vision we have for the City of Cleveland and its people. This vision is utopian in that it is admittedly normative, arising from our own conceptions of the "good life" for people. It is not utopian in that it may point to a direction the City can choose and can follow, a direction that distinguishes among desirable and undesirable actions taken yesterday, and today, and to be taken tomorrow.

Our vision (in outline) is as follows:

- Individuals choose their own goals and means to pursue those goals.
- Societal values and conditions act as constraints upon individual selection and pursuit of goals.
- Societal values are questionable insofar as they unnecessarily restrict choice and to the extent that they are inconsistent with one another.
- Institutions are established to serve individual pursuit of goals. In the process institutions, themselves, establish goals--some of which must be self-serving to assure their

survival.

- Institutional goals which are self-serving, however, must be clearly secondary and supportive of institutional goals furthering pursuit of individual goals.
- Societal values and conditions also act as constraints upon institutional selection and pursuit of goals. But, unlike individual selection and pursuit of goals, institutional selection and pursuit of goals affect societal values and conditions. Institutions are, therefore, the focus for changes in societal values and conditions.
- Both individuals and institutions pursue their respective goals through decision and action. Decisions to act must be made from among those choices of action which the individual or institution perceives.
- Individuals are better off with more choices in any decision.
- Institutions serve individual goals most when they provide wider choices in decisions made by individuals.
- The primary goal of institutions must be to provide wider choices, partly through their own decisions and actions, partly through their affect on societal values and conditions.
- In a context of limited resources, first and priority attention should be given to the task of promoting wider choices for those individuals and groups who have few, if any, choices.


A BRIDGE OVER MUDDY WATERS

- Given this goal as a direction for change, what policies should we as, a City, pursue in order to serve that goal?
- Income and power are important generators of choice. Policies dealing with changes in the level and distribution of income and power are, therefore, necessary guides in reaching our goal.
- But, any given level and distribution of income does not, automatically, lead to more choices in private and public goods and services. Prevailing political, social, and economic trends, for example, are toward a systematic narrowing of choice for all, but a very few. Policies dealing with these trends in the response of the private and public sectors are additional guides in reaching the goal of more choices for individuals who have few or none. These policies will widen choice for the majority as well as the minority.
- There are, thus, two (2) broad areas of policy:
1. Policies to promote changes in the level and distribution of income toward some more equitable allocation of the rewards of our productive system; and
 2. Policies to improve the choices in goods and services offered by the private and public sectors in response to any given level and distribution of

income and power.

--Both areas of policy must be included in an effective thrust toward the goal of promoting choices where few or none exist.

--The two (2) broad areas of policy can be further subdivided by reference to the diagram which charts the important parts of the system within which we work and the relationships among these parts.



Each arrow represents a relationship which will be a subject of policy.

--More specific areas of policy under the general area of policies dealing with the level and distribution of income and power include:

- (2) Private sector payments and transfers of income to individuals.
- (3) Public sector payments and transfers of income to individuals.
- (5) Public sector allocation of power to individuals.
- (8) Relationship between individual income and power.
- (11) Payments and transfers of income among individuals.
- (12) Transfers of power among individuals.

--More specific areas of policy under the general area of policies to improve response of the private and public sectors include:

- (1) Individual expenditures on private sector goods and services.
- (4) Individual payments to public sector institutions.
- (6) Response of the public sector to individual power.

--Each of these policy areas serves as an initial framework for a work program. The objective of each work program will be to devise alternative policies for the accomplishment of the goal before us. Priority in work programming will also be assigned in view of our goal. Thus, policy areas which clearly focus on individuals with few choices will be considered first.

THE PRIMROSE PATH FROM GOAL TO WORK PROGRAM

--In order to determine what these policy areas might be, consider the lack of choices confronting an individual who lacks income. Theoretically, he has a number of options for gaining income. He may become employed, he may acquire capital (and, thus, realize income from earnings on the investment of that capital), he may apply for public or private assistance in the form of "welfare" or charity, he may borrow or ask for money from his friends or family, or he may acquire income through some illegal activity (robbery, burglary, gambling, etc.).

--Suppose this individual cannot get a job, does not own nor can he possibly acquire capital, and is not eligible for public or private assistance. His choices remaining are not hopeful, nor does his exercise of either remaining choice contribute to our goal. Even though he was successful in borrowing or obtaining income from his friends or family, chances are good that this transfer of income will be from poor to poor, leaving his friend or family even worse off than they were. Further, though the transfer may be made, it is obviously made grudgingly and sets up a conflict among those who already suffer under conflicts sufficient to undermine their life (and society at large) in important ways. Clearly, reducing his options

to that of committing crime leaves him with no real choice at all. In fact, this is the one choice we cannot permit. The possibility of obtaining income through illegal activity must be reduced if not removed altogether.

--The policy implications of this are clear. On the one hand, policies establishing an adequate income guarantee to all individuals based on need must be devised. At the same time, policies must be devised to reduce the effective income to be gained from illegal activity.

--A minimum, but adequate, income guarantee program would include policy determinations on such matters as eligibility, work incentive, and level of basic allowance or guarantee.

--Reducing the effective income of criminal activity would require policies as to:

1. Possible changes in the definition of criminal activity--gambling can be a crime or a local industry.
2. Ways of decreasing possible revenues from criminal activity, by increasing the responsibility of victims or by reducing the opportunities for criminal activity.
3. Ways of increasing the probability of apprehension, either in fact, or as perceived by the criminal.

--Successful pursuit of these policies would provide a choice the individual did not enjoy before (eligibility for a minimum, but adequate, income guarantee) while rendering the

choice of criminal activity less preferred.

--Most individuals who lack income would prefer employment as a means to income over public assistance, transfers from friends and family or illegal activity. Those who cannot choose employment as a means to income fall somewhere in the following outline of the reasons for unemployment or underemployment--in some cases the reason for an individual not even being in the labor force.

1. Supply of labor exists, demand for labor does not
 - a. Changes in the level, composition and organizational structure of national output.
 - b. Changes in the level and composition of regional output
 - c. Discrimination in hiring on racial, sexual, religious, or other grounds
 - d. Arbitrary employment requirements based upon education level rather than ability
 - e. Underemployment
2. Supply of labor does not exist, demand does
 - a. Individual is not qualified
 1. He perceives himself as not qualified
 2. He is not qualified
 - b. Individual is qualified, but not willing to work
 1. Wages too low
 2. Job location inaccessible

3. Working conditions-safety and health
or time off
4. Family or other responsibilities
- c. Individual does not know that demand exists
- d. Individual is not physically capable
 1. Poor mental or physical health
 2. Alcoholic or addict

--In those cases where supply exists, demand does not, policies to promote choice in employment would include those designed to:

1. Encourage economic development of city and region in specific categories of economic activity.
2. Insure equal employment opportunity.
3. Encourage re-assessment of work tasks and personnel requirements by public agencies, private firms, and unions in the area.
4. Maintain the demand for labor through public service employment of those willing but out of work.
5. Encourage migration to or from the area.

--In those cases where supply does not exist but demand does, policies would include those designed to:

1. Improve the flow of information about job openings and the counseling of those searching for work.
2. Improve the working conditions of those employed.

3. Permit choice of residential accommodations in closer proximity to employment centers.
4. Equip individuals with the special skills and talents that jobs with promise require.

--Throughout our discussion of policies above, we have dealt in detail only with those encompassed in the broad area of policy directed toward a change in the level and distribution of income toward a more equitable distribution to those with little income. In the event that the chosen combination of policies is in some way successful in improving the relative income position of the poor, we still have that important set of policies remaining to insure that the increase in income does, in fact, promote wider choices in goods and services from the private and public sectors.

Housing

--Would, for instance, a change in the distribution of income as a result of the policies above, promote wider choices for the poor in housing? Specifically, would individuals and families living in substandard homes now be able to choose standard housing at rents they can afford? Or will the costs of supplying and maintaining housing at local standards ~~still place the unit out of their reach?~~ *CONTINUE TO KEEP*

--For many families, the dilemma is clear. "Standard" housing in central City locations is costly. Rents to support the construction or rehabilitation of these units is then neces-

sarily high. Incomes, from which rents must be paid, are low and burdened with other demands--food, clothing, transportation. The gap between the rents which must be paid and the rents which could be paid must be narrowed by policies to increase incomes of poor families and individuals (already discussed above) and policies to reduce the cost of "standard" units-in effect to improve the response of the private and public sectors in the provision of housing for low-income families.

--An obvious first step is the development of policies to adjust the local standards.

--Policies will also be required in those areas of cost which together promote the high cost of housing units:

1. Land Costs
2. Construction Costs
3. Financing Costs
4. Operating Costs

--If a "standard" home is to include important neighborhood service levels, policies will be necessary in the areas of:

1. The level, quality and distribution of services (schools, recreation, safety, etc.) in the City.
2. The choice of location in an area or municipality where services are "standard."

- An important, and newly-emerging area of policy, would be those directed toward improving a household's capacity to pay rent through a program of housing allowances. This kind of program, along with improvement in neighborhood service levels will be necessary to assure some demand for standard housing in many areas of the City where no effective demand now exists.
- Promoting choices in housing is only one area of concern in our consideration of the response of the private and public sector. Other areas would include certain private consumption goods as well as a host of public services including education, recreation, public safety, and sanitation.
- Further, the discussion so far has not directly concerned itself with either the distribution of power or the response of the public sector to this auxiliary form of command over goods and services.
- This paper, is admittedly, only a demonstration of the process the general planning staff is following to develop a direction for ourselves and the Planning Commission and to use that direction as a guide in the development of policies for the City of Cleveland.
- This demonstration, however, should make clear how the challenge we have set before us differs from typical planning practice.

- First, we have established a single, relatively specific goal; and this was established with reference to our vision of the way a society ought to be. It is basically, a moral stance ~~on our part, and~~ places us in a clear advocate position in favor of those who have ^{the fewest opportunities for choice,} ~~few, or no,~~ choices.
- Second, the connection between this goal and the policies developed will be explicit and ^{dominant,} ~~overriding~~. As a result, some traditional policies and programs of planning agencies may ^{be the responsibility of} ~~not appear~~. At the same time, many policies (and areas of concern) new to planning agencies will be ^{EMPHASIZED} in prominent positions.

SHORT MANUAL ON STYLE FOR ADVOCATE PLANNERS

Certain obstacles (and opportunities) are inherent in this approach to planning and obvious beforehand. Our style of operation must recognize these:

1. To promote social change is to accept social conflict. We agree to submit all conflicts to those executive, legal and legislative tribunals for resolution and to accept the resolution which is forthcoming. At the same time, ^{we present them by discussion rather} ~~we refuse to minimize~~ ^{with detail and explicit} ~~or cloud~~ those conflicts ^{boldly & realistically,} before decision-makers. ~~Conflicts in interests and ideas are not to be avoided.~~ ^{IMPORTANT PROBLEMS WILL BE} They are to be sharpened and clarified so that those who ~~must~~ ^{have an opportunity to} decide, ~~make~~ clear choices based on ~~more~~ fundamental precepts.

2. To cast our vision in ~~more~~ ^{the} fundamental terms ^{described in this paper} is to assure that ~~our~~ ^{the} breadth of ~~our~~ ^{our} concern will eventually encompass ~~all~~. ^{the full range of the factors which affect} Our limited resources will not permit a "comprehensive" analysis to match our framework for planning. We must admit that our eventual plan will not be comprehensive in the generic sense of that term. Still, each part we

accomplish of the total effort required will at least be informed and conditioned by knowledge of its place in a broader scheme. Further, the more comprehensive framework provides the same perspective to others in their various capacities throughout the City. Their work will be on our behalf in that sense.

3. There can be no "best" way for there can be no "best" goal. This or that policy or program might, in some limited sense, be the "best" way to serve some given goal. But the determination of a "best" goal will fail for lack of criteria. Selection from among alternative goals is the difficult task of political decision-makers. Their selection is not of the "best" goal, only their selection of an alternative. Our selection of a goal, and all subsequent policy design based on that selection, does not presume that decision-makers will select that goal, too. It will assure, however, that that goal will always be in front of decision-makers as an alternative during times of decision.

4. A healthy, pragmatic skepticism will be of invaluable assistance in our efforts, toward our own actions and decisions as well as others. Our framework of analysis will give this skepticism great force and direction. In every case, in all decisions, there are only a few questions:

What explicit (or more likely, implicit) goal will decision one way or the other serve in this matter?

In what way does service to that goal affect service to our goal?

In most cases these questions will not be easy to answer, but if our action (review, approval, etc.) is the one sought, the responsibility for answering the question is not entirely ours.

5. Our goal springs directly from those egalitarian ideals which are rooted in the rhetoric of our history. To fix ourselves, with professional integrity and abilities, upon that goal is to become the conscience of our society. As such, we will be

beaten back at every hard choice. To take as our measure of success the number and importance of changes made in institutions or the things which "get done" is to invite frustration. A more valid measure of our success would be those small, sometimes fleeting, changes in men's minds, those important (but invisible) succumbings by an individual to his own conscience, and the new dedication, new purpose of individuals to those ideals we hold but only haltingly strive for.

WORK ELEMENTS - THE FIRST TWO YEARS IN CLEVELAND

First, it must be understood that no city planning agency can survive with a work program ignoring its charter-delegated responsibilities. The zoning, land-use, site-selection studies and mandatory referrals continue to be processed by Commission staff, conditioned by our advocacy viewpoint. The analytical policy studies, however, which are designed to promote improved ranges of choice for those with few choices in our society were assigned to a newly-created Comprehensive Planning Section.

It was clearly impossible for the limited staff (five professionals) of the Comprehensive Planning Section of the Planning Commission to undertake a broad range of studies and analyses with the view of developing a "comprehensive plan" directed toward the broad objectives set out in earlier sections. And this strategy may not be desirable in any event. Further, some policy-directed analysis was already being pursued by other agencies in the area. The relationship of their efforts to ours was clear from the conceptual framework developed earlier. In these cases, no substantial effort was required from us. Thus, we decided to employ our limited resources in intensive analysis of those issues on which decisions were imminent or legislation was pending and little effort was being made, in the hope of exercising influence disproportionate to our numbers.

Our efforts, and accomplishments, can be separated into two groups:

1. Studies and analyses of policies designed to promote changes in the level and distribution of income and power, and
2. Studies and analyses of policies designed to improve City resident choices in goods and services offered by the private and public sectors.

Policies to promote changes in the level and distribution of
income and power -

In the first group should be included two major projects -- an early and continuing analysis of federal legislation in public assistance reform and the design and promotion of changes in that legislation to better serve our redistribution of income objective,*/ and a study**/ of the feasibility of redevelopment of a substantial vacant and vandalized industrial area for a neighborhood economic development organization with no funds nor staff.

In the former effort our long-run objective was a redistribution of income through much needed reform in our public assistance program. The short-run objective was to place information, critical analysis and alternative programs in the hands of Mayor Carl B. Stokes, and U. S. Congressmen who could, from their forum, hope to influence the decisions being made about this legislation at the national level. In the process, we were able

*/ The Proposed Federal Family Assistance Plan: A Critique, Some Suggested Modifications and Their Impact on the City of Cleveland, August 1970, General Plan Report No. 2, City Planning Commission, City of Cleveland, 45 pp.

**/ Economic Feasibility Analysis: Industrial Redevelopment of National Screw and Perfection Stove Property, March, 1971, Special General Plan Report, City Planning Commission, City of Cleveland, 23 pp.

to accomplish other objectives. Our exposition of the issues in this crucial reform and our analysis of the impact of changes in public assistance on the City impressed the Planning Commission with the importance of fundamental change at the federal level in matters of local concern. Our problem of marginal retail centers, for example, would be significantly changed with the introduction of a just and adequate income maintenance program for such a program would provide a crucial missing ingredient in our solutions to the dilemma -- a substantial growth in the demand for retail goods and services (as high as \$40 million of new expenditures annually).

In the latter case, (the economic feasibility analysis) our immediate objective was to transfer the power of planning professionals -- their access to information, their critical analytical skills and their institutional role -- to a group composed mainly of low-income blacks who had neither the resources nor the skills to deal with a complex redevelopment scheme. The ultimate objective was to promote redevelopment of land burdened by obsolete, vacant and vandalized structures into industrial use to further the availability of jobs immediately at hand to the neighborhood;

thus to accomplish some redistribution of income, too. The outcome of the study was specific and realistic. If redevelopment were to take place, clear public and private subsidies were needed and these were carefully spelled out in detail.

In this case, it became clear to us that there will be no redevelopment of land into industrial use in many areas of Cleveland until heavy private or public subsidies to support the demand for industrial land are available. No feasible amount of subsidy toward the cost of acquiring land, demolishing structures and constructing new facilities would make an industrial redevelopment project pay in that area without assurance of some adequate revenues from eventual tenants.

Policies to improve City resident choices in goods and services -

Low-Income Housing - Choices in housing - particularly choices in standard housing for low and moderate-income households -- is a clear need in Cleveland as in other major cities. The basic problem, of course, is that the poor cannot afford housing defined by ourselves as "standard," and our society is unwilling to commit the substantial funds needed to house these families in public housing units nor is it willing to provide choices -- in location or type -- among those units it does construct.

Planning Commission staff have developed a proposal for a new kind of housing subsidy -- a so-called "housing allowance" -- which the Mayor has made to the National League of Cities and will submit to Congress. The issues raised by this proposal and the questions which need answers before embarking upon such a program nation-wide are the subject of a report just released by the Commission*/ and will provide the basic design for an extended analysis of this program during the coming months. Our preliminary findings -- and some important results from other studies**/-- suggest that a subsidy, going directly to low and moderate-income households rather than to the developers and owners of low income housing units would provide much greater choice to the individual household and accomplish other important objectives as well.

SP emminent. It is important that this legislation, in its progress

*/ Housing for Low and Moderate-Income Families: The Failure of Present Programs, A Proposed New Approach and the Issues It Raises, Sept. 1971, City Planning Commission, City of Cleveland

**/ See, for example, the Rand Institute's excellent study of New York, Rental Housing in New York City, Vol. II, The Demand for Shelter, Ira S. Lowry, Joseph S. DeSalvo, and Barbara M. Woodfill, N. Y. City Rand Institute, June 1971.

through the Capitol Hill grinder, not lose sight on that fundamental purpose of improving housing choices for the poor. The City Planning Commission intends to be prepared for those hearings and will argue forcefully for such a program through the Mayor's office, Cleveland-Area U. S. Congressmen and other prospective advocates for the program.

In the interim, the Planning Commission stands forcefully in support of present programs for low and moderate-income housing and for the distribution of low-income housing in all suitable locations of the City and region.

Part of this concern was expressed in a New-Town proposal for 865-Acres of City-owned land located east of Cleveland.*/ The proposal, now pending before H.U.D., calls for the implementation of innovative programs in health, education and general services as well as the allocation of 2,800 of the 8,000 total dwelling units planned for low and moderate-income families.

Delivery of City Services -- The City Planning Commission has charter responsibility for preparation of a capital improvement

*/ Pre-Application Proposal for Warren's Ridge New Town, City Planning Commission, Cleveland, Ohio, February, 1971.

program. This year a substantial change was made in a document which had become widely known as the "wish book." Essentially, the Planning Commission admitted that the document has no real affect on allocation of capital funds, articulated the reasons for this, and directed this year's document to a discussion of this central issue as well as a number of other important issues surrounding our investment in, use of and maintenance of municipal capital facilities.*/

In addition to our charter responsibilities with respect to capital improvement programs, the staff has been importantly involved in analysis and recommendations concerning the operation and management of city line departments. This activity has two related purposes. First, we are concerned about the quality of municipal services, particularly as it affects the demand for housing and related use in the various neighborhoods of the City. Improvements in the quality of service, however, cannot at this time be expected to come about through the availability of new revenues but must be sought through changes in management and procedures given existing levels of financing.

*/ Capital Improvement Program, 1972-1977, July, 1971, City Planning Commission, City of Cleveland.

At the same time, it will greatly assist us in the long run if we are able to place, or train through example, individuals in every operating department of the City who have management or planning experience and the perspective that implies. This we hope to accomplish by analysis of, and recommendation for changes in, the operating procedures in departments along with key personnel of that department.

A good example of this is our work with the Division of Waste Collection and Disposal. As a result of an analysis completed by the Planning staff,*/ a City-wide task force was established, a federal grant was secured, and work is now underway on a management study of this division with a view to making our expenditures in that function more efficient. Four million dollars of local bond funds matched with federal funds will implement the recommendations of the study. We expect to save millions of operating dollars annually as a result of these capital expenditures while improving the services of that division considerably. The Division of Waste Collection and Disposal is now administering that study and planning staff assigned to that project are now working with the Health Department in the same kind of effort with the same expected outcome.

*/ Urban Solid Waste Collection and Disposal in the City of Cleveland, March 1971, City Planning Commission, City of Cleveland.

Transportation for the Poor -- The results of our efforts in some areas of concern are not easy to see - no report has been published,*/ no physical or administrative changes have been made, or no legislation has been introduced or passed through channels. This is a characteristic of our involvement and influence in the area of transportation. Some months ago a task force was established to complete a study of public transportation needs in the metropolitan area and develop a plan for investment in public transit facilities. The Planning Director of the City of Cleveland was on that task force.

In the deliberations of that task force about the kind of study to be accomplished, the direction of the study and the consultants to be selected for various parts of the study, the Planning Director's consistent and forceful emphasis on the needs of those among us who have no choice but public transportation has assured that attention will be paid - at least in the study phase - to that group which deserves priority in transportation subsidy.

This position has led to some conflict between the City and the Seven-County Planning and Review Agency anxious to assert

*/ Though the study has not been completed, a paper setting forth the Planning Commission's position with respect to the transportation needs of the poor has been published: "Transportation and Poverty," General Plan-Transportation Paper #2, City Planning Commission, City of Cleveland.

"regional" considerations. But, as in all things, conflict is not to be avoided. Rather, its basis must be made apparent, so that those officials who must decide can make clear choices based on fundamental issues.

NK4

TRANSPORTATION AND THE INNER CITY

Abstract

Arguments for the focus on the transit dependent population in transportation planning: make fares proportional to need through devices like charge card making possible differential rates according to need, perhaps indicated by neighborhood average incomes.

Author: Norman Krumholz, Professor Emeritus, Levin College of Urban Affairs, Cleveland State University; At the time of writing author was Director, City Planning Department, City of Cleveland.

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TRANSPORTATION AND THE INNER-CITY

by Norman Krumholz, Director
Cleveland Planning Commission

for the
American Society of Civil Engineers, Akron Section
December 9, 1971

In the beginning, the American city was compact, its form determined by the distance a man could walk to and from his home to his work. Later, the form was star-shaped, distended along trolley and railroad lines where new development took place clustered within reasonable walking distance from the stations. Finally, in the years following WW II and continuing through the present, the city virtually exploded with its components scattered to the four winds and to a multiplicity of individual jurisdictions in every metropolitan area. I do not think we can recapture the compact city.

The reasons for these changes in American urban form are not difficult to identify. They have mainly to do with rising family incomes, weak or non-existent land use controls in the developing urban fringe, FHA insurance policies and technological changes. The most significant of these technological changes have been the availability of the automobile and the high-speed highway. With

a good car and a good road, locational choices become virtually unlimited. Those of us who have been able to take advantage of our automotive civilization have enjoyed the benefits of mobility and choice unprecedented in human history.

But while most of us were enjoying this mobility, the mobility of those who lack regular access to a car was suffering both in absolute and relative terms. There is no question but that the national majority which has opted for our automotive civilization, has not only injured the minority but has tended to ignore the problems it creates for those who do not have a car or those who cannot drive. As highways and cars have proliferated, and homes and destinations have scattered, ridership on conventional transit has sharply declined, fares have been increased and service has been cut. For the transit-dependent rider, there are fewer and fewer destinations he can reach at higher and higher prices. CTS, for example, runs about 200,000 bus miles less in 1970 than it ran in 1960 for double the fare. It is ironic; at a time when the central issue of American domestic politics is equality, public programs overwhelmingly cast in favor of the automobile by our federal highway policies has opened an ever-widening "mobility gap" between those who have and those who lack a car.

Those who cannot achieve "automobility" are a substantial group indeed, especially in the central city. They include the poor, the

elderly, and those too young or infirm to drive. In the City of Cleveland, we estimate that 32 percent of all households (about 79,000 households) do not own a car; that of the 46,000 Cleveland families with annual incomes under \$5,000, 46 percent own no car; that 48 percent of all households headed by persons over 65 have no car.

It seems to me - in the name of simple justice - that it is this group which must be the prime beneficiary of improvements in transportation policy. It is no stretch of the imagination to state that those people who depend on mass transportation for their mobility have been "injured" by the national decision to opt for an automotive civilization, and deserve compensation much in the same way that those whose homes are taken by a highway are compensated.

Clearly, the broad objective of an equitable transit policy must be to ensure a decent level of mobility to those prevented by extreme poverty, old age or physical disablement from moving freely about the metropolitan area.

Just as it is clear that those who depend on transit for their only mobility demand highest priorities in transit policy, so is it clear that present transit policies serve other objectives almost exclusively. The main beneficiaries of today's transit subsidies and most subsidy programs now proposed are the more affluent riders

of transit and the mass transportation institution itself -- not the transit-dependent riders. This is true from the top - the \$3.2 billion available in the Federal Aid Mass Transit Act which has not been earmarked for people subsidies but for capital grants and advanced acquisition of rights-of-way for new or extended rail systems, to the bottom - the flat fare rates which discriminate against the poor.

In the Chicago, Boston and Philadelphia areas, the most heavily subsidized transit riders have been the affluent patrons of commuter railroads. In our own area, the flat-fare structure on the Shaker Rapid produces a cost of 50¢ from the Terminal to the E. 55th Street inner-city stop, and the same cost from the Terminal to Green Road in Shaker Heights, a ride about as far apart in distance as in economic status. The much-heralded Bay Area Rapid Transit system - which will require a projected annual subsidy roughly twice total fare box revenues - is designed to bring people from well-to-do suburban areas to the commercial cores of San Francisco and Oakland. The line has no extensions into North Beach or Chinatown - the poorest and highest density neighborhoods in San Francisco. This criticism is more-or-less applicable to the dozen or so new rapid transit systems now under consideration in metropolitan areas around the country - in Washington, Los Angeles, Pittsburgh. Each requires large subsidies and confers the lion's-share of its benefits on middle- and upper-income riders.

100

We hear proposals to expand the transit system. If our purpose is to improve the mobility of the elderly, the poor and the disabled who are concentrated in the central city, how will the extension of steel rails into low-density, wealthier suburbs accomplish this? If the answer to this question is: 'We must bring the poor close to job opportunities which are decentralizing' is it not more reasonable to move the residences of the poor close to these jobs and dispense with the expensive, new transit system?

We hear proposals from time to time to make all public transit free. How would this sort of proposal benefit the transit-dependent rider in relation to costs? A recent analysis of a free-transit proposal in Boston pegs the annual cost of the program at \$75 million. Beneficiaries however, include a large percentage of people who are neither poor nor dependent on transit, while those dependent on transit would not necessarily receive any improvement in service. On the other hand, if the program were properly directed by specific purpose, the cost of tripling transit service to and from Boston's poverty areas would cost only \$4.3 million less any fare-box revenues received.

If the primary direction of transit subsidies should be - as I obviously believe - focused specifically on the needs of the transit-dependent population, it follows that subsidies should be channeled to particular users of transit systems rather than to the systems themselves.

How can transit best serve this specific objective?

First, let me include in my definition of transit everything from buses, to taxis, to job jitneys, to car-pools to rail rapid transit.

Second, let me state that we tend to over sell the ability of transit alone to accomplish a massive diversion of commuters from their cars. I see a strong case for improving the quality of the rail transit system we already have in half a dozen cities, and for extending the lines in a few cases. But the case for new rail systems now being made in many cities strikes me as singularly weak.

Finally, let me state that urban transit has four critical needs in the current era: money, research, testing and managerial innovation. Until the first is confronted squarely, little progress is likely to be made with respect to the latter three.

It seems clear that mass transportation in the public interest cannot operate solely out of the fare box. Mass transit can make a profit if it deals only with peak-hour demand and the most heavily travelled routes, but this approach to scheduling will injure precisely that group which has the strongest claim to transit improvement. We cannot allow that to happen. Rather, we must insist that the funds needed to supplement the fare box in the interest of

the transit-dependent population come at least partially from the Highway Trust Fund which has indirectly restricted their mobility.

With this in mind, I hope that very soon we will see a transformation of the Highway Trust Fund into a combined Transportation Trust Fund as a single system of transportation finance. This would be in keeping with trends in the system of highway financing which are progressively broadening within an ever more-comprehensive framework. This change would allow local officials to budget a portion of their transportation aid apportionments for transit purposes. To control misallocation of these funds, a heavy proportion of these funds would have to be specifically earmarked for direct subsidies to the transit-dependent rider, much in the way education funds are earmarked for poverty areas under Title II of the Federal Education Act.

Now how can we deal with possible ways of administering subsidies to make fine distinctions among transit users.

One method, already wisely in use in some cities, is the use of identification cards to those eligible for reduced fares such as the elderly and school children. It would be relatively simple to issue similar identification cards subject to a means test to those qualified for special subsidized fares as a result of low income or special physical disabilities.

A less complicated method which would do away with many identification cards would be to charge reduced transit fares for trips beginning or ending in a specified poverty zone. These would have to be supplemented, however, with special cards to identify the aged and disabled living outside the poverty areas.

An alternative way of specifically subsidizing the transit-dependent population would involve putting as much fare collection as possible -- for rich and poor alike -- on a charge basis. Everybody's charge card would look the same but some users - those qualified by low income or physical disability or age - would receive a discount on their monthly bill. If the reporting of income and other data were accurate - which could be assured by computerized cross checking of income tax returns - the subsidy could be varied according to the specific characteristics of each family.

In terms of system modification, I believe the greatest potential for serving the needs of the transit-dependent population and perhaps the entire future of transit lies in new systems such as the Dial-A-Bus which utilize cars and buses and offer door-to-door pick up and delivery with fare schedules automatically adjusted by computer. Such a system is in development at M.I.T. But we should not overlook the broadened use of taxi or jitneys - with or without sophisticated scheduling and control devices. As a matter of fact,

taxi cabs could now provide much of the needed service, were it not for franchise restrictions and prohibitions on group fares.

Let me conclude, by briefly summarizing my recommendations:

1. The primary aims of transit policy should be to enhance the mobility of those who cannot drive and those who cannot afford automobile ownership. In my judgment, this is the only group that has a strong case for transit subsidization.
2. The most compelling argument for transit subsidies is that the national majority while opting for an automotive civilization has unwittingly caused a reduction in the mobility of the non-driving minority.
3. The predominant form of transit subsidy should be reduced fares to needy individuals rather than grants to support whole services.
4. The main source of subsidies should be transportation user charges -- that is, highway user tax payments plus the fares of unsubsidized transit patrons -- rather than general tax revenues.

I may have stated some ideas this evening which disagree with some of your judgments. This does not disturb me. What is vital is that those with policy responsibility begin to take fresh looks at

their own preconceptions, at the arguments of their critics and at the unconventional ideas just visible over the horizon of feasibility. If I have stimulated even a few of you to undertake this effort, my purpose is achieved.

NK5

AREAWIDE HOUSING POLICY: A VIEW FROM THE TRENCHES

Abstract

Experience with regional agencies has been disappointing – Cleveland policy is to expand housing opportunity for the poor; localities outside the central cities localities simply resist.. Krumholz holds out hope if federal and state governments will play the role of balancers among these conflicting interests: A federal housing allowance sufficient to raise capabilities of all families to a housing budget equal to 16 percent of a defined moderate income; and a state agency to police discrimination and develop jobs .

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NK 5

AREAWIDE HOUSING POLICY: A VIEW FROM THE TRENCHES

by Norman Krumholz
Director, Cleveland City Planning Commission
for the Annual Meeting
of the American Society for Public Administration
Housing and Areawide Policy Session

New York City, March 23, 1972

When I joined the Cleveland City Planning Commission in 1969, I was anxiety-ridden but optimistic about the prospects for developing an areawide housing program to which the city might make a contribution. I disagreed with those who were skeptical that areawide housing policy could have as its primary goal not merely more housing starts but the provision of many more housing choices in the entire region for the poor and near-poor. I suggested that the skeptics dismissed too lightly the egalitarian nature of American ideals, the weight of recent legislation and the increasing use of federal grant programs to induce areawide planning and development.

Now, two and one-half years later, I am still anxiety-ridden but my optimism is waning. I see a small record of achievement; one suburb contiguous to Cleveland has actually built some housing for low-income families and another is talking about the possibility of public housing for the elderly.

similar attempts in other areas. The many jurisdictions in metropolitan areas have all the legal weapons they need to "protect" themselves against any change in the status quo. They have a housing "policy" although it is unwritten: it is to resist. There is no other consensus on areawide housing objectives. This is particularly true when an essential goal of housing policy is, as it has been in our case, the expansion of regional housing opportunities for the poor and near-poor. We might have been more successful with proposals for higher housing densities in the region or planned unit developments, but it has been our insistence upon equity which has provided the focus for resistance.

This should surprise no one. Although equity as a goal has strong support in federal regulations and in political rhetoric, it has never received much attention either in the formulation of area-wide policies or in metropolitan reorganization. Our attempts to resolve the problems of our metropolitan areas have uniformly concentrated on service and the ease of administration rather than on considerations of equity.

The park districts, sewer and water districts, stadium and transportation authorities which abound on the metropolitan scene were neither conceived nor constructed in terms of equity. These entities were developed solely on the basis of the need for service

and efficiency. But the promise of efficiency says nothing about the appropriateness of policy, nor about the relevance of program, nor about the incidence of benefits and costs to different economic groups in the region. One who seeks elements of equity in such bodies will be disappointed.

Our contentment with service and efficiency answers to metropolitan problems presents us with major difficulties when we try to frame areawide housing policies based on equity.

-- By concentrating attention on functional needs and organizational efficiency, we have assiduously avoided the deeper and more controversial questions of areawide policy including low-income housing distribution, racial assimilation, economic segregation and fiscal inequalities.

-- By retaining local governmental autonomy and direct control through referendum elections at the local level, we have assured the perpetuation of "communities of limited liability" possessing a powerful inertia which supports the status quo, with its severe opportunity imbalance.

-- By supporting numerous units of local government all based on the image of the homogeneous residential

neighborhood we have divorced resources from responsibilities and rights from duties. Further, we have practically guaranteed that neither the local governments nor the consensus upon which they rest will support housing ventures based on region-wide opportunity. Moreover, as our experience in Cleveland indicates we have helped produce a situation where some local governments can and will block the efforts of others to develop equitable areawide housing policies.

It seems clear that areawide housing policies designed to increase choices for low- and moderate-income families throughout the region are unlikely to emerge from the efforts of local governments. As we have seen, local governments act with vigor to obstruct equity-based regional housing programs, and power clearly lies with those who would insulate themselves against equity.

The "urban county" approach also seems unlikely to produce equity-based policies in housing. While the county may satisfy some of the demands for "stop-gap" measures such as contractual cost-cutting services among local units, it retains the individual nuclei of resistance to equity-based schemes.

Similarly, such policies are unlikely to emerge from areawide agencies such as councils of government or regional planning agencies

which conceive their responsibilities as limited to programs of efficiency. Rural and suburban officials perceive areawide agencies as a threat to local autonomy and act defensively, while central-city officials fear that these agencies may come between them and the higher levels of government on which they count heavily for aid.

Perhaps more equity-based planning and programming activities in housing will be forthcoming from areawide agencies in the future. That, however, depends on the willingness of the federal government -- specifically HUD -- to use the fiscal inducements of its grant programs on a much broader and more-coordinated scale in behalf of equity than it has to date.

If local governments, areawide agencies and even such governmental rearrangements as metro or urban counties are unable to base planning and programming on equity considerations, are we left to presume that there is no remedy in our country for the millions of Americans who live in dilapidated, inadequate, unsafe housing? Is there no remedy for this imbalance of opportunity?

I think there is. I see the federal and state governments filling the necessary role of balancer. Local governments, which are closest to the people in theory, have not been so in fact -- at least not to the nation's wretchedly housed or racial minorities.

Those who live in our ghettos, barrios and rural poverty pockets are often closer to the federal establishment than to City Hall.

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. has put it well:

Local government is characteristically the government of the locally powerful, not of the locally powerless; and the best way the locally powerless have found to sustain their rights against the locally powerful is through resort to the national government The growth of national power, far from producing government less "responsive to the individual person," has given a majority of Americans far more dignity and freedom than they could win in a century of localism.

Equity in housing-choice opportunities has advocates -- however reluctant at times: the federal, and increasingly, the state governments. The federal government has both the necessary vision (as evident in HUD and Civil Rights regulations) and the essential money necessary to support or induce equity in housing opportunities.

I would like to endorse two specific programs which seem capable of promoting region-wide equity in housing choices. The first of these is a proposal for massive reform -- total reform in U. S. housing policy. The plan depends heavily on incentives provided by federal subsidies to the private market. The second lies in the establishment of new state entities.

First, I propose the enactment of a National Allowance Program to aid low and moderate-income households. This program would

provide large-scale money support for housing. Decent housing would then be within the financial ability of each household in the United States. Such a program might utilize a sliding-scale based on economic conditions of each region to relate the amount of the housing allowance to the living standards (and housing costs) of the region.

For example: in the City of Cleveland in 1969, the Bureau of Labor Statistics has set the moderate standard of living budget for a family of four at \$10,453, and the moderate housing cost at \$1,662 or 15.8% of the total budget. The 15.8% housing expenditure would be applied to all four-person families with incomes below the moderate standard of living level. Thus, a family with an income of \$5,000 would receive an annual housing allowance of \$362 which would represent the difference between 15.8% of their income, or \$790, and the moderate standard of living housing cost of \$1,662.

In each region, every household with less than the "moderate level of income" would be eligible. This would include poor individuals and childless couples as well as families. At long last, we will be addressing the housing needs of all Americans of low- and moderate-income, rather than just that small percentage able to take advantage of the few low-rent units available. And these

needs will not be held contingent on "cooperation agreements," political subterfuge or housing authority boards hostile to their own responsibilities.

Let me sketch some of the administrative details. An eligible household would apply for the allowance and furnish evidence of its income. An annual income report would be required. An eligible household would be issued its Housing Allowance in the form of a check.

Tenants occupying housing units in compliance with local housing codes would simply endorse the check and turn it over to the owner along with whatever cash is required to cover the rent.

In the event the tenant occupies a substandard unit, the housing allowance is not sent to the tenant but held in trust, in the tenant's name, until such time as the household occupied a unit in compliance with the codes.

The accumulation of ear-marked housing allowance in this way will be a means of capital formation for the poor and those of moderate-income. A person would be free to choose to occupy a substandard unit for a time in order to accumulate a trust fund sufficient for a down payment on the home which would otherwise have remained forever beyond reach.

Owners occupying standard units and qualified by income would receive the full amount of the allowance in the same way as tenants, but owners occupying units not in compliance with local codes would receive no allowance. A subsidiary trust would be established, however, as part of this program to guarantee the availability of credit at reasonable interest rates to the eligible owners of sub-standard housing on the condition that future allowances will be used to repay the loans necessary to bring the dwelling up to standard condition.

In all cases, the rent certificates or checks would be endorsed by the occupant of a standard unit and subsequently endorsed by the owner. Only the latter may negotiate the rent certificate for cash at offices of the local public agency or delegated banks.

Here are some of this program's anticipated benefits:

- By increasing the buying and negotiating power of all poor and moderate-income families while making subsidies conditional on residence in standard housing, we will benefit from powerful market forces in the upgrading of existing units and the construction of new homes.
- The dwelling-places of the poor will no longer be set apart from the balance of the community.

- All poor and moderate-income families (not just those for whom public housing units happen to be available) will receive help, with the poorest receiving the greatest subsidies.
- Incentives will be established to assure owner and/or tenant cooperation in maintaining decent homes at prices occupants are willing and able to pay.
- Most importantly from the standpoint of areawide housing policy, poor and moderate-income families will be able to choose housing in any jurisdiction and in any location.

✓ A federal housing allowance program as described would do much to insure that all Americans could afford standard housing. It would also provide for some increase in areawide housing choices for low- and moderate-income families. It would not, however, necessarily overcome the persistent phenomenon of racial residential segregation.

To open our communities to all races, the state government must play an important role, probably along the lines of a state development corporation based on that devised by New York State. The corporation's first objective would be housing for low and moderate-income families in a wide range of locations

with insistence on open occupancy conditions. The corporation could also develop community facilities and industrial projects. It would have broad powers of eminent domain, and would be empowered not only to plan for the property it acquires but to develop the land through all stages including management. The agency would have statewide jurisdiction and would not be governed by local land-use controls or zoning ordinances but only by the state's own building code.

The establishment of such a state agency under a clear equity mandate would weaken the power of local governments to block federally-assisted housing of all kinds through large-lot zoning and other manipulations of local ordinances. It would make clear that we cannot simultaneously enjoy the benefits of large-scale housing production based on egalitarian considerations, while allowing fragmented land-use policies by hundreds of tiny communities locked in fiscal competition and planning only to avoid - not facilitate - change.

Though New York State has already vested power in this kind of agency, I am frankly not optimistic about its chances in other states. Most state constitutions are uniformly more restrictive than facilitative, and constellations of power in the form of lobbies tend to exert more weight at the state level than at other

levels of government. Even in New York State, consistent efforts by UDC to promote housing choices for low-income families in suburban areas may undermine its freedom to act, as a rural and suburban-dominated state legislature may constrict its operations. The same, of course, is true of HUD on the national level as it attempts to impose sanctions in order to enforce its regulations in the face of political pressure. Yet, at this point in time, these seem to be our best options for equitable areawide housing policies.

The program I have proposed will be expensive and politically difficult to develop. We have estimated that an adequately-funded Housing Allowance Program will cost approximately \$15 billion a year -- not only a substantial increase in our present commitment to housing but a substantial redistribution of income in favor of the poor. The political difficulties of using governmental bodies such as state UDC's to destroy residential racial segregation argue for themselves. Yet, both are linked to an essential redistribution of income and power in this society which is overdue.

We can no longer avoid a redistribution of the resources of this society.

We can no longer accept subsidy to the richest among us
and rhetoric for the poorest among us.

We can no longer believe in an equitable society with
the evidence of inequity growing around us.

And we can no longer hope that equity will establish
itself inevitably, without sincere efforts on
our part.

I believe that state-wide and equity-based urban development
corporations and a national program of housing allowances are
steps in the right direction. Support for these programs will
involve us in conflict at all levels of government and frequent
disappointments.

Yet your group may be an important ingredient in ultimate success.

I invite you to join me in the trenches.

- end -

NK6

**PLANNING IN CLEVELAND: WORKING THE ADVOCACY-EQUITY
SIDE OF THE STREET**

Abstract

Here Krumholz raises the question to the American institute of Planners at their annual meeting: Can Advocacy Planning Survive? For he has found that traditional planning respond adequately to persistent poverty and racism. He then shows how it has been possible to generate support for redistributive policy in Cleveland and elsewhere.

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NK6

-EQUITY

PLANNING IN CLEVELAND: WORKING THE ADVOCACY SIDE OF THE STREET

by Norman Krumholz, Director
Cleveland City Planning Commission

for the

American Institute of Planners
55th Annual Conference
Boston, Massachusetts

October 11, 1972

I suppose most city planners have long since dismissed the question posed as the title of this session -- "Can City Planning Survive?" Of course, ^{city planning and} city planners can survive -- and prosper as well. For the last two decades -- at least -- this society has handsomely rewarded planners with positions of prestige and financial security in return for our land use plans, our zoning ordinances and our increasingly shrill cries of alarm at the deepening urban crisis. When the local general fund has faltered in our support, Uncle Sam has hastened to sustain our income and status with 701 or Community Renewal Program grants.

The question, then, is not whether city planners can survive. Surely this profession will endure. But can individual members of this profession survive who cast ^{before themselves} the vision of a just society ~~before~~ ^{goal?} and then work seriously and meaningfully toward that ~~end?~~ ^{goal?} In other words, can advocacy planners survive?

4.

For those interested in the answer to this question, I bring hesitant glad tidings and a glimmer of hope.

Three years ago I joined the administration of Mayor Carl B. Stokes as Planning Director, intent upon producing a general land use and public facilities plan for the City of Cleveland. ^{1960 Philadelphia General Plan} In just a few ^{and my staff} short months, it became obvious to me [^] that accomplishment of this traditional planning exercise would be irrelevant if not counter-productive. The elements of the urban crisis -- personal and municipal poverty, racism, ^{lack of mobility} ~~social alienation~~, crime, bad housing -- cannot be directly, nor meaningfully, attacked with the city planner's traditional bag of tools. ^{have}

We could have ignored this realization and plunged forward with an updated version of ^{Cleveland's} ~~our~~ 1949 Land Use Plan. Instead, we began the first halting steps toward a new vision for Cleveland, new direction for our institutions, and a role for the planning agency worthy of our efforts and resources.

This ~~is~~ vision was simple, ^{but} ~~quite~~ its ramifications were to be profound:

- that individuals choose their own goals, and the means to pursue those goals,
- that institutions derive their legitimacy only insofar as they promote individual choice of goals and means,

- that institutions serve individual goals most when they promote wider choices in decisions made by individuals, and that this must then be the primary goal of institutions, and
- that, in a context of limited resources, first and priority attention must be given to the task of promoting wider choices for those individuals and groups who have few, if any, choices.

The planning agency's role would be to offer information, criticism and policy guidance to decision-makers consistent with this ~~vision~~ ^{framework.} The goal we chose to support placed us in a clear advocate position in favor of those who have few, or no, choices.

^{We understand that} its successful pursuit will require no less than a fundamental redistribution of income and power in our society. But such a goal is not utopian, it is not radical, nor is it altruistic or benelovent. It is a familiar goal, rooted in the egalitarian ideals of our birth and growth as a nation. It is, ultimately, a just goal; one that seeks a society where equity is at least as important as efficiency.

Our own dedication to this goal is essentially ideological; it rests on our commitment to equity as an ideal and the consequent ^{It also accords w/ our perceptions of proper planning practice.} belief that any step in the direction of the ideal is desirable.

And, of course, ~~concentrated~~ attention to this goal led us away from the traditional policies and practices of planning agencies.

In particular, our ^{operational framework} ~~vision~~ and the new role we assumed to promote that ^{framework,} ~~vision~~, put the substantial capabilities of my staff in service

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to those who need planners, not in service to those who have planners.

- . not in service to local governments which employ land use controls to exclude low-income housing from our suburbs and harass development in our central cities,
- . not in service to private and public entrepreneurs who have used urban renewal to materially reduce the supply of low-cost housing in American cities at a cost of more than three billion dollars,
- . not in service to those whose "solution" to transportation problems is to propose increased mobility for those with regular access to a car at the expense of those with no car -- the poor, infirm, elderly and young,
- . and not in service to developers, banks and high-income taxpayers in search of tax-shelter who gratuitously develop and finance Section 236 housing where their financial interests are heavily served while the low-income family's interests are only tenuously served -- all at startling cost to the public treasury.
- . in short, not in service to the "haves" of our society, but to the "have-nots."

The "haves" don't need planners. They simply use planners. Those who truly need planners, and the substantial talents planners possess, are those who are truly in need of everything -- the poor and powerless of our society.

~~But those who need planners are not the ones who pay for them.~~

~~And~~ most planners believe that advocacy planning is risky business, generating conflict with those powerful institutions and individuals with vested interest in the status quo. Sooner or later one has to eat. And every planner here knows the politics of agency survival. Those who pay for you can use you. Those who need you are second in line.

I do not wish to minimize this so-called "fact of life." I do want to reconsider this part of our conventional wisdom in light of my experiences in Cleveland for the past three years -- years spanning two administrations, one led by a black Democrat (Carl B. Stokes) the present led by a white Republican (Ralph J. Perk). During this time our agency has consistently worked the advocacy side of the street and, I believe, we have acquired greater influence, prestige and possibly ^{win} success with the passage of time.

Let me note at the outset, that in advocating minority interests through agency efforts, there are two levels of engagement.


 First, reasonable discharge of ~~your~~ professional responsibilities ^{ies} ~~would surely~~ require^s that you understand the ramifications of proposals made by you or by others before your planning commissions. Be responsible to the goal of equity in your analysis of these proposals. Ask whether the clear benefits of these programs go to those most in need or those least in need. Ask whether those who are called upon to pay for these programs are those most able to pay or those least able to pay. And finally, make the results of these analyses available to the planning commission and the public at large, as well as ^{to} local decision-makers. This is surely a proper ~~function of~~ ^{function of} ~~effort by~~ planning agencies. It may be castigated as divisive, or negative (and very often will be by the media) but it can never be wrong.

The second level of engagement requires much greater technical competence in economics and cost-benefit analysis as well as a good deal of political finesse. Once you understand that given proposals lead away from equity, design alternatives where the clear benefits of the alternative programs do go to those most in need, and where those least able to pay do not pay most of the costs. Then, use your institutional and political role in the community to argue for these programs before local and federal decision-makers.

The staff of the Cleveland City Planning Commission operates on both of these levels. In so doing, we have developed the role of the planner in such a way as to be almost diametrically opposite to

that envisaged in most formal conceptions of the planner's function. Rather than serving as technicians supplying data for the pre-existing preferences of policy-makers, ~~(which are sometimes hard to perceive if they exist at all)~~, we function whenever we can as advocates for our own ^{goals.} vision. Some of our information and proposals, ^{and lobbying} are directed at the participants in political decision-making; much of it is directed through the media to the public at large. Some of it -- as in this paper -- is directed toward the profession. All of it is directed toward shaping the ends and means of others toward ^{our own view.} ~~the image of our firm.~~

My experiences in engaging at these two levels of advocacy have been sometimes exciting, sometimes frustrating, occasionally surprising. Let me touch on some examples and indicate several principles which are emerging and are of importance to our success and survival as an advocate agency.

First, decision-makers often make their decisions on the basis of appallingly limited information. In a few cases, this may be the level of information they want. In most cases, they want more information but cannot get it.

So there is a great demand for information among political decision-makers that is often unfulfilled. Those conditions give the suppliers of information considerable influence upon the decision. ^{As it is said: 'In the kingdom of the blind, the one-eyed man is king.'}

Being clear about how any proposal affects the interests you are

advocating, and placing that information in the hands of decision-makers with similar interests among their constituencies will lend great weight to your recommendation.

For example: a proposed interstate highway through the City of Cleveland promised great benefits in increased mobility for suburban residents at great cost to those in the path of that highway as well as to city taxpayers in general. An alternative, developed and advocated by the Planning Commission, is now being proposed by the City -- not only because the alternative minimizes displacement within the City, but because the devastation of the original proposal on a certain Roman Catholic parish was outlined in precise detail by our staff to an important local decision-maker. This relatively small bit of information offered to the right decision-maker at the right time was a crucial key in assuring some equity between the benefits to the suburbs and the costs to the City of the proposed highway.

In the same way, our staff analysis of Nixon's proposed Family Assistance Plan ^{which contained} ~~with~~ recommended modifications to increase Cleveland's benefits received ^{much} ~~great~~ local support. We took great pains to point out the benefits of such an income maintenance program to the non-poor; ^{that is, how many of the support-payment dollars would end up in local cash register} I am convinced this information contributed importantly to endorsement of the proposal by our Chamber of Commerce as well as the approval of some local officials ^{as well as the} ~~and their~~ consequent support of FAP via our U. S. Congressional delegation.

A second principle is of crucial importance to those who deal with large legislative bodies elected on an area basis such as wards. In Cleveland we have 33 Councilmen, all elected on a ward basis.

Your constituency as represented by such a body will not remain solid. Rather, the forces arrayed against your proposals will shift in composition and size from issue to issue. This tends to discourage consistent majority opposition to your proposals, discouraging as well coalitions of legislators in favor of your quick ~~demise~~, ^{departure from the local scene.}

Again, let me use local illustrations: the City Planning Commission has consistently advocated public housing for low-income families throughout the City and in the suburbs as well. This position has been supported, by and large, by the councilmen from black wards and generally resisted by the councilmen from the white wards.

In another study, however, a routine staff evaluation of the capital needs of our municipal light plant led to the Planning Commission proposing the condemnation and acquisition of the private electric utility and the expansion of our small municipal power system into a city-wide network promising lower electric power rates, ~~to the local consumers now on the private system~~ ^(something like condemning Con-Edison). Our antagonists and protagonists in this issue are almost exactly flip-flopped from the public housing issue. Black councilmen, by and large, want to sell the municipal light plant to the private utility, not expand it. And the white councilmen most adamantly against public housing in their wards are most decidedly in favor of our proposal to expand the municipal power plant.

A third principle relates to the incremental nature of political decision-making. Public policy moves forward slowly and carefully rather than boldly. Decision-makers who wish to change policy, move very carefully with a sharp eye to the breath of support and narrowness of opposition. Generally, they prefer to avoid committing themselves to large-scale programs, ^{promising future benefits,} preferring feasibility in operational terms to "fit" in any grand designs. But, as reluctant as decision-makers are to decide on large issues whose implications are unclear, still they must decide.

In this situation, advisors with an informed point of view can exert influence considerably out of proportion to their numbers.

Mayor Stokes felt he should do something about 800 acres of city-owned and essentially vacant land in a suburban township. His idea was to sell off the land and use the proceeds for redevelopment and rehabilitation in the various neighborhoods of the City. We persuaded him to let us plan a new town on the site. In six months, the Planning Commission completed a development plan and feasibility analysis which promised new choices in housing for low and moderate income families of the City, ^{it also promised} and the testing of new procedures for the delivery of essential public services, as well as \$750,000 annually in lease revenues to be used in the City. The Mayor supported the proposal.

When the business community came forth recently to offer a proposal for a new jetport in Cleveland, the Administration of Mayor Perk was reluctant to support it because it was unclear how City interests were affected. The City Planning Commission quickly developed a 7-point list of conditions under which the City could enter into such an agreement. Included in the list were clear benefits to the City in the form of revenue flows and jobs for its unemployed citizens. The Mayor supported the proposal.

The Cleveland City Planning Commission has convinced both the Stokes and Perk administrations that transfer of our municipal bus and transit system should not take place without assurances that services to transit-dependent riders are improved, maintained and subsidized. Both Mayors felt the need for attention to the needs of those whose mobility depends entirely on public transportation, but it was the staff of the Planning Commission which developed the conditions under which transfer of our municipal system will take place.

In the same way, we have successfully influenced the course of a study designed to produce a transit plan for our region, ~~and we will~~ ^{we have made it clear that} fight the use of federal subsidies in mass transit for extensions of existing systems into suburban areas at the expense of improvements in service to the poor, elderly and infirm of the City.

A fourth principle is one which all of you can surely appreciate. Political decision-makers rarely harbor articulate, consistent objectives. For those of you who look to political leaders for objectives, this is a very decided problem. For those of us who have objectives for which we are seeking clients this is a decided opportunity.

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Let me use another example to illustrate this point.

A state highway threatens to decimate two neighborhoods on the Cleveland's near west side -- displacing over a thousand low to middle-income families, removing millions of dollars from the assessed valuation rolls of the City, and burdening the City taxpayers with millions of dollars for their share of the construction costs. Again, the benefits of this highway would accrue largely to suburban residents in reducing the time and congestion of their journey to work.

The objectives of many political decision-makers in this matter were not articulated, but much general dissatisfaction was apparent. But the highway had been pending for ten years outlasting, in the process, several mayors and dozens of councilmen. The Planning Commission's objectives were to bring the relative costs and benefits of this highway into a more reasonable equilibrium. In so doing, the Commission provided a policy-framework which articulates the objectives and the time-frame which many political figures in two administrations both comprehend and support.

Briefly, the City Planning Commission has refused to approve this highway. Our decision rule for the approval of all future highway "improvements" is that the City and its residents are not left worse off ^{after} ~~with~~ the "improvement" than before. Specifically, three conditions must be met:

1. The city will not be responsible for any share of the construction costs,
2. Displaced families will be relocated in units they can afford which are built substantially out of highway funds, and
3. The State will make an annual payment to the City to reimburse it for all lost tax revenues as a result of clearance for the highway ^{right-of-way.} ~~roadbed.~~

Let me close by saying that I am beginning to think that all planning agencies in our older central cities should be, or will soon become, advocates for the "have-nots" of our society. Our moral commitment in Cleveland to what we have called "advocacy" is real. **B**ut striking a consistent stance in favor of the "have-nots" is becoming more and more a matter of simply providing appropriate service to a majority of the residents in our older central cities.

The city is, after all, more than a collection of buildings, power elites and land uses. It is more than rich suburbanites and expatriate corporations. As Henry Churchill wrote, the city is the people, and they have real interests which must be served.

It is relatively unimportant whether these interests are served in a planning or policy sense by people who operate out of the Mayor's office, or out of some executive agency such as an Office of Management and Budget, or, propitiously, out of a ready-made outfit that already has the appropriate title of Planning. But if these interests are not served by City Planners -- if our profession fails to adapt to these needs -- if we continue with our traditional focus on land use, zoning and design, then city planning will indeed survive, but not as a significant force in solving America's urban problems.

Tavern.

We will survive like Yale's fabled Mory's¹. The tables remain, but few can sit with ease. The glasses are raised, but not on high. And voices joined will sing a tune that only few¹ vaguely recall. We will pass and be forgotten like the rest.

- end -

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ADVOCACY PLANNING IN CLEVELAND

Abstract

Describes beginning with traditional approaches – a land use plan, zoning, downtown revitalization. But in the face of poverty and decline, the Cleveland planners devise the equity goal: maximize the support for those who had few” leading to a non-traditional analysis: there was an abundance, not scarcity of low rent housing; the city should focus on income supplementation, not housing construction the city should favor the transit-dependent population, not downtown access for peripheral neighborhoods and suburbs.

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ADVOCACY PLANNING IN CLEVELAND

Lecture by Norman Krumholz, Director
Cleveland City Planning Commission
at the Department of City and Regional Planning
University of California, Berkeley, California
October 10, 1973

Four years ago I joined the administration of Mayor Carl B. Stokes as Planning Director of the City of Cleveland. It is not clear whether Mayor Stokes had any idea of what to do with me at first, but the body to which I am officially responsible -- the City Planning Commission -- had some very clear ideas on high-priority work assignments. One Commission member (a planning professor interested in land use control) wanted a completely new zoning ordinance; another (a downtown businessman) wanted a downtown-revitalization study; a third (a banker) thought that a study aimed at straightening out the winding Cuyahoga River would help straighten out the city's problems as well. For my part, my intent was to gather up all the resources at my command and plunge forward with a new long range land use plan.

Luckily, a few newly-hired staff members and I paused to look at the City of Cleveland and its people. What we saw caused us to question the relevancy of traditional American planning practices. We saw an old industrial city whose population was declining rapidly as was its share of the regional economy. We saw neighborhoods whose housing stock had deteriorated to the point at which disinvestment and abandonment had become commonplace. We saw a blue-collar population,

white and black, whose access to income and wealth was severely limited
 - a population in which the 1969 median household income was \$7,100,¹
 a population in which 30% of all households had annual incomes of less
 than \$5,000, a population in which ^{1/3 or} 79,000 households lacked the basic
 mobility provided by an automobile. We saw an environment in which
^{partly by} crime and racial hostility and segregation were dominant facts of
 life.

Having ~~seen all~~ of that, it became obvious to us that development
 of a comprehensive long range land use plan -- even a brand-new zoning
 ordinance -- would be irrelevant if not actually counter-productive.
 The elements of the "urban crisis" in Cleveland and in other older cities
 of this nation have little to do with land use or zoning. They have
 to do with poverty, racism, social alienation, crime and bad housing
 and they cannot be directly, nor meaningfully, attacked with the city
 planner's traditional bag of tools.

We could have ignored or suppressed this realization and proceeded
 toward an updated version of Cleveland's 1949 Land Use Plan. Instead,
 we chose to address what we conceived to be the authentic needs of the
 city and its people. Our first halting steps led us toward a new
 vision for Cleveland, toward advocacy of new directions for our
 institutions, and into a role for the Cleveland Planning Commission
 worthy of our efforts and resources.

The vision, or our over-riding goal, is simple. It can be outlined quickly. The focus is not on patterns of land use but on individual opportunity and institutional responsibility:

- Individuals choose their own goals and means to pursue those goals.
- Institutions are established to serve individuals in their pursuit of their own goals. In the process institutions, themselves, establish goals -- some of which must be self-serving to assure their survival.
- Institutional goals which are self-serving, however, must be kept secondary to those which further the pursuit of individual goals.
- Both individuals and institutions pursue their respective goals through decision and action. Decisions to act must be made from among those choices of action which the individual or institution perceives.
- Individuals are better off with more choices in any decision.
- Institutions serve individual goals best when they enlarge the range of choices available to individuals.
- Therefore, the primary goal of institutions through institutional actions must be to expand the range of choices available to individuals.

- In a context of limited resources, institutions should give first and priority attention to the task of promoting wider choices for those individuals and groups who have few, if any choices.

The last point is the key. The advice, information and recommendations offered by the Cleveland City Planning Commission would be directed primarily toward the accomplishment of this single, simply-stated goal:

- Simple equity requires that locally-responsible government institutions - with limited powers and resources - should give first and priority attention to the goal of promoting wider choices (more alternatives and opportunities) for those individuals and groups in the City of Cleveland who have few, if any, choices.

We are aware that this goal places us in a clear advocate position in favor of those who have fewest choices. We understand that our position entails advocacy of a fundamental redistribution of income and power in our society. But we are convinced that such a goal is not utopian, it is not radical, nor is it altruistic, benevolent or charitable. It is a familiar goal that is thoroughly American and is rooted in the egalitarian ideals of our birth and growth as a nation. It is ultimately, a just goal; one that seeks a society where equity is at least as important as efficiency.

In these introductory remarks I have tried to establish the concern for "advocacy" or "equity" which guides the day-to-day activities of the Cleveland City Planning Commission. I would like now to relate ~~two~~ examples of our work and our operating style. Later, I will try to elicit some useful observations from ~~these~~ examples.

The first example has to do with housing one of the first issues we chose to address in Cleveland. There was general agreement among the Mayor, City Council and most city officials as to what the problem was: there was a scarcity of low- and moderate-income housing in the city. The remedy was uncomplicated and direct: it was to build more subsidized housing wherever such construction was politically feasible.

My staff was not convinced. If conventional wisdom was correct, why were rents in Cleveland so low? And why were several neighborhoods in Cleveland showing clear signs of widespread abandonment? We decided to undertake a research effort aimed at casting more light on the issue by answering three basic questions: 1) what was the nature of the housing problem in Cleveland? 2) what had been the nature and effectiveness of the public response to the problem? 3) what changes in public programs and policies would be needed to achieve a more effective response to the problem?

The analyses are now completed and are being bound and published as the Cleveland Housing Papers. The collection is, in my opinion, one of the finest series of analytical papers on housing ever done by a city planning agency.

The analyses argue forcefully that the conventional wisdom is incorrect, and that an alternative definition of the "housing problem" such as that advanced by Ira Lowry of the N.Y. Rand Institute, and Henry Aaron, of the Brookings Institution is applicable to the situation in Cleveland. No longer is there a scarcity of low income housing units. Because of sweeping population shifts and generally low income, a surplus of low income units -- many of them substandard -- has been created. The basic flaw in the conventional wisdom has been the assumption that the problem is a lack of housing when in truth it is a lack of income.

Our field survey found about 2,000 vacant and vandalized housing units in Cleveland, and we estimated that the rate of residential abandonment was averaging about three additional dwelling units a day. We found that, because of low income, large numbers of Cleveland households simply could not afford standard housing; that owners were not getting enough revenues to be able to maintain their buildings properly. We became increasingly convinced that the traditional of city housing policy on new construction was untenable. We came to believe that the attention of City officials should be focused on saving the existing stock from the growing threat of deterioration and abandonment.

On the basis of this analysis, we arrived at a series of program recommendations:

First, that a strong Housing Allowance Program be made the cornerstone of federal efforts in the area of housing.

A Housing Allowance Program, providing assistance directly to qualified families for the rental of standard housing

would address the heart of the housing problem - *poverty.*

, that improved code enforcement be undertaken in those residential areas of Cleveland which are still salvagable.

, that \$1.5 million of city funds be allocated immediately for the demolition of vacant and vandalized housing

_____, that state codes and local procedures relating to the condemnation of hazardous structures and the collection of tax-liens be substantially altered so that Cleveland might demolish abandoned structures more quickly and regain its investment in demolition.

But the publication of these recommendations and of the Cleveland Housing Papers was not the end of our efforts. Far from it. Here briefly are some of our subsequent activities: We presented these findings and recommendations to the City Planning Commission - and got a good deal of local publicity. We briefed ^{the} Mayor and other key city officials on our program recommendations, and lobbied (with essential support from our friends in the press) for their necessary *support.* ~~demolition funds.~~ We asked for - and received - the Mayor's support in lobbying for a Housing Allowance Program within the HUD Washington bureaucracy. We have pursued such lobbying efforts with substantial vigor. We contacted all of our area's U. S. Representatives and both

Ohio Senators trying to get their support for a program of housing allowances. We wrote an article describing our study and its findings for the ASPO magazine. We sent copies of the Cleveland Housing Papers to various academicians whom we hoped would support our argument, help us in further lobbying efforts with the HUD bureaucracy, and initiate lobbying efforts with their own area Congressmen. And we have armed the Mayor and members of our Planning Commission with testimony to present before Congressional Committees in support of housing allowances when hearings are held on ~~the~~ new housing bills.

The record of our efforts is ~~encouraging~~. The City Administration and City Council responded to our housing abandonment survey by accepting our recommendations and allocating the full \$1½ million we requested for demolition of vacant, vandalized buildings. The prognosis for the other recommendations is reasonably hopeful. A Housing Allowance Program apparently will be included in a federal housing bill either amended into the present bill or in the next bill. A good deal of work has already taken place locally on reform of code enforcement and condemnation procedures within the city.

But maybe more important, individuals with power and institutional responsibility are beginning to doubt the conventional wisdom in housing. People are changing their minds. Perhaps in some way we have helped change their minds.

The second example deals with transportation. A few weeks after I arrived in Cleveland, Mayor Stokes asked me to serve as his represen-

U.S. Federal Court has used our public housing fair-share as a basis for making decisions on the suburbs of the Court

tative on a City transit committee established to prepare a program and grant application for federal funds in support of the Cleveland Transit System. CTS, which is owned by the City, was (and is) suffering from the familiar ridership and revenue shortages that characterize public transit everywhere. A way had to be found simply to keep the system operating. Beyond that, no other objective was discussed in any clear way.

The Committee completed its work quickly and submitted its proposal to the Department of Transportation. The people at DOT, anxious to assure comprehensiveness, told us to go away until we had a joint City-County proposal. We returned to our labors with some County officials added to our roster and, lo, just such a joint proposal emerged which we then brought back to DOT for approval.

But the federal agency still was not satisfied that the joint City-County proposal was sufficiently comprehensive; after all, parts of the larger region were urbanizing and our transportation proposals would have an impact there. So the joint City-County committee was reconstituted as a special subcommittee of our seven-county regional agency; the scope of the study was broadened from one to five counties and the study committee itself was broadened to 21 members of which the outlying four counties appoint one representative each, the business community appoints two, the Cuyahoga County Commissioners appoint three, and the City of Cleveland appoints three.

The new committee and study area were now sufficiently "comprehensive" to satisfy federal requirements. But somehow the goal of the committee was no longer simply to keep CTS running. We were now supposed to extend rapid lines, provide an attractive alternative to the automobile, unify and coordinate the 21 public and private transit systems in the region, build a downtown distribution system and to transfer CTS to some sort of regional agency which could use general tax funds to supplement farebox revenues. Once all of this was accomplished, the system's survival would be assured, and everybody would be happy. Or would they?

My staff and I were not convinced that the prospects were quite so bright. While these re-organizations were taking place, our first transportation study entitled Transportation and Poverty was published. Let me quote briefly from its findings:

> "In the course of opting for an automotive civilization, we have provided unprecedented mobility for those who can take full advantage of it. But in the process, the national majority has chosen to ignore completely the problems this civilization creates for those who cannot drive or lack regular access to a car. As any resident of Cleveland can testify, if he is too young, too poor, too ill or too old to drive, there are fewer and fewer places he can reach by conventional transit. This is partly the result of the increased scatteration of new developments taking place at low densities impossible to achieve without the highway and the car, and partly because of service cuts by public transit brought on by decreasing ridership and revenues.

It is not the purpose of this paper to argue for an end to highway investment, but to attempt to modify and redress the impact of present regressive transportation policies on the poor, the elderly, the very young and the disadvantaged.

This group is substantial, indeed. In 1966, 32% of all households, that is, about 79,000 households, in the City of Cleveland did not own cars. Of all families with annual incomes under \$5,000 an estimated 46% owned no car. Of all households headed by persons over 65, 48% or approximately 24,000 households owned no car.

In keeping with the Cleveland City Planning Commission's goal of improving choices for people who have few, it is morally imperative that this transit-dependent group be the prime beneficiary of changes in transportation policies. The overriding goal of transportation policy in the City of Cleveland must be to ensure a decent level of mobility to those prevented by poverty or by a combination of modest income and physical disability (including old age) from moving freely about the metropolitan area."

Given the goal of providing more choices to those who have few, improved mobility for the transit dependent population had become the Cleveland City Planning Commission's prime transportation objective. Would the transfer of CTS to a regional agency automatically or necessarily serve that end? Would a downtown subway or suburban rapid extensions confer any benefits on the transit-dependent? Would improved funding be used to improve the mobility of the transit-dependent or would it provide more transportation choices to the suburban middle class? Would the 5-County Transit Committee with its business and regional political constituency, be overly concerned with the needs of a transit-dependent population which is largely confined to the City of Cleveland?

I would like to be able to answer these questions definitively, but after almost four years we are still in the process of finding out. Over that period my staff, myself and the Planning Commission have urgently and persistently stressed the plight of the transit-dependent

population. If we were the ultimate decision-makers, the issue would be resolved; the politicians and local institutions with a stake in the issue, however, have been ambiguous in their support. What have we as planners done to assure proper attention to our point-of-view at decision-time?

As a planning professional, I have lobbied for emphasis on the needs of the transit-dependent through briefings with the Mayor, City Council members and other local political figures. I have submitted papers at an AIP-DOT sponsored conference, at AIP and ASPO annual conferences and at two AIP Biennial Policy Conferences. I have been in constant touch with my opposite numbers in the DOT bureaucracy. Key members of my staff have engaged in similar efforts.

The Cleveland City Planning Commission has been supportive in passing numerous resolutions stating and re-stating its concern for the transit-dependent, and setting conditions clearly beneficial to this group in any future transfer of CTS to a regional agency.

In my role as member of the Five-County Transit Committee, its Consultant Screening Committee, its Executive Committee and on the Board of the seven-county regional planning agency, I have pressed for proper recognition of the plight of the transit-dependent.

To some extent, our efforts have been successful. In its goal statement the 5-County Transit Study has recognized the improved mobility of the transit-dependent as its highest priority. After much bargaining and committee in-fighting, we convinced the 5-County Study

to select our candidates for prime contractor, for sub-contractor in the vital transit-dependent element of the plan and for project manager. We have also fought for and won adequate funding for the transit-dependent element of the study. We supported specific consulting organizations and individuals because they seemed conscious of the human problems of the transit-dependent while other firms and individuals seemed beholden to nothing beyond the standard civil engineering approach to transportation analysis. We have had some successes.

Yet, after all this effort, I am not overly-confident that the needs of the transit-dependent will be met in the end. The seven-county planning agency has announced, as its first transit proposal, support for a \$10 million 1½-mile extension of the existing Shaker Rapid line from fashionable - and rich - Shaker Heights to fashionable - and richer - Pepper Pike. And the 5-County Transit Study has presented as its preliminary package, a series of high-priced proposals that under our analysis, appear to confer massive benefits on the rich and middle-class in the region while giving only token benefits to the transit-dependent population in the City.

But the game is not over. As professional long-term players, representing an important City agency, our point-of-view must be accommodated. If the business community is to get its downtown subway and the suburban politicians their rapid extensions, we are determined to get adequate attention to our transit-dependent clients. If we do not, we have made clear our intent to publicly and (loudly) defect and

disavow the study, an action that could jeopardize the entire program when a tax issue is presented to the region's voters. By continuing to try to influence the study, the Mayor and other key decision-makers, we may still exert enough leverage to win out after all.

These two examples are representative of many of the issues in which we are involved. What is it that they represent? What do they suggest about the operations of the Cleveland City Planning Commission which might be of some value to other planning agencies and the planning profession in general? Let me suggest a few lessons which might be derived from our experiences over the past four years in Cleveland.

First, we planners have been too timid. That criticism is pointed especially toward directors of planning agencies, who are the individuals confronted by the challenge and the opportunity to create an activist role for their organizations. It must be understood that few people in government understand just what it is that city planners are supposed to do. Beyond the narrowly defined powers and responsibilities mandated to us by the City Charter, the scope of the planning function is not specified by law nor is it uniform by practice. Thus, we have great freedom to define our own roles and responsibilities. We cannot wait for decision-makers to define our roles; or to come in search of our "wisdom." They will rarely come to us; neither the law, nor custom nor their own political instincts will suggest that they do. If we are to be used, then, we planners must seize the initiative. We must develop the kinds of work programs and ^{problem-solving} analyses which are relevant to

We are independent enough to be somewhat critical of city policies;
 " " insulated enough from daily operation to work on underlying problems;
 " " able enough to do so.

political decision-making. We must bring our work to the attention of decision makers and convince them of its worth.

Surely this course of action entails some risks, but it seems to me that the risks have been overly dramatized. As a profession, we have been too much concerned with job security and the limits of current American practice to be as useful as we might be in making things better for the people of the city.

Second, the initial - and essential - step toward developing an activist role lies in the adoption of a clearly-defined priority goal. In the absence of such a goal, planning agencies have been unable to answer the basic question of how to allocate limited agency resources. Why not re-write the zoning ordinance? Or study the straightening of the Cuyahoga River? Or design a co-ordinated container for street furniture? Why not simply replicate the replications of our predecessors? We have often resorted to focusing upon techniques; applying the well-established tools of the trade merely because the tools are familiar and safe, not because such tools provide useful insights or solutions in problem areas.

In our Cleveland case, the goal of providing more choices to those individuals and groups who have few, if any, choices, has provided the needed direction for our activities. It has enabled us to select those issues upon which we have focused primary attention -- issues involving equity considerations. The goal has given clarity and power to our

analyses, both in evaluating proposals set before us by others, and in developing policy and program recommendations of our own. Those essential questions which most planners never ask: "Who gets?" "Who pays?" have been key elements in our analytical framework. The goal has placed us in a position where we can seek out and identify clients for our work. Our allies are those who are concerned with improving the equity of a given situation or with improving the quality of the political process itself.

It will be noted that our goal is one which we virtually defined for ourselves. We had to. Those planners who, in the tradition of our profession, look to political leaders for clear statements of goals or objectives will be eternally frustrated. The political process is a decision process, not a process of goal development or analysis. Government officials persist in avoiding any close identification of goals or objectives. They must. The purposes of some programs are cynical; the objectives of many more are multiple, and the maintenance of disparate sources of support requires ambiguity. Moreover, men who run for public office know far more poignantly than we do the odds against actually achieving basic change. They know, therefore, that large promises made with specificity today may become proof of failure in two or four years. Yet large promises must be made; but prudently kept vague. Thus, while the planning process, as we conceive it, demands that goals be clearly specified, the political process as we have experienced it, demands that goals remain ambiguous. Planners committed

to adopting an activist role have little choice. The first, and perhaps the most important, initiative which they must take is that of developing a clear, goal-oriented perspective for themselves.

The third lesson derived from our experience deserves special emphasis. We have been concerned not merely with the adoption of a goal -- just any goal. Rather, we have been concerned with the adoption and pursuit of a very specific goal, a goal to which we are personally and professionally committed - the goal of trying to create a more just society. Our goal has placed us in a clear advocate position on behalf of those less favored by present social and economic conditions. It is obvious that the less favored are neither the more powerful nor, in many cases, the more numerous in our city, region or country. Yet, based upon our experience in Cleveland, it seems clear that for planners to adopt equity as their overriding goal is both a reasonable and a defensible position.

The criticism most often leveled against our approach is that our goal is too "ideological." But, being "ideological" hardly constitutes a radical departure from traditional planning practice. Behind most planning perspectives there lies some basic ideological commitment -- often to aesthetics, or beauty or efficiency or to that most grandiose of ideological icons - the value of real property. Ironically, although we in Cleveland are often faulted by fellow planners for being advocates, planners have always been advocates - for themselves, for their values, for the city's business interests and for the middle or upper classes of their communities.

But given the environment in which we work, an environment marked by deteriorating inner city neighborhoods and burgeoning suburban subdivisions, by vastly expanded mobility for those with automobiles and significantly diminished mobility for the transit-dependent -- an environment characterized by massive inequalities in the distribution of income and power, what more appropriate ideological commitment could planners make than a commitment to equity?

If our logic will not convince you of the appropriateness of our goal, perhaps our record will. In four years, under two mayors who could not be more dissimilar -- a Black, Liberal Democrat, and a White, Conservative Republican -- our agency has steadily acquired greater influence, prestige and success.

My fourth observation, is that pursuit of a goal such as equity, requires that planners focus their attentions upon the decision-making process and focus on it with hard, relevant information. Important decisions effecting society are made by politicians, administrators and private entrepreneurs, not by planners. But it has been our experience, that planners can have a significant impact upon the decisions made by others if they bring an information dimension to that decision.

In its role as an "activist" agency, the Cleveland City Planning Commission develops policies and programs and works with decision-makers to secure their implementation. This requires foresight. What are the key issues coming up? What institution is empowered to decide

whether a program will be approved? Who are the key actors? Who may influence them? When will the decision be made? What information is likely to be relevant to those who decide? How much will the program cost? How will the expenditure benefit the residents of Cleveland? What are unintended but probable side-effects? In this situation, the planning director and senior staff must make judgments concerning issues and problems which may reach legislative form in the next six or twelve months. They must predict who will decide on what issue and they must program staff time and resources for efforts designed to bring information and analysis to bear on the problem. They must develop the program that the Planning Commission will support during discussions prior to decision. They must seek support for the program among those who will ultimately decide. All of this takes time and attention; and it is not always successful. But, since influencing decisions is the only means we have for affecting our goal, all of this, and possibly more, is required.

In Cleveland we have discovered that our power to influence decisions is directly related to our professional competence. Our program analyses and recommendations are informed both by our point of view and by our technical expertise. They are not based on liberal rhetoric or our own "feel" of an issue. Political decision-makers are uninterested in hearing more of the standard rhetoric from the left or the right, and their political "feel" is lots better than ours.

The understanding of problems and the presentation of policies and programs to the Mayor, Councilmen and other key political and business figures requires staff with basic, critical skills and abilities. Ability to deal with voluminous statistical information, familiarity with both public and private financial practices and techniques; an understanding of basic economic precepts, a working knowledge of the law and an appreciation of the rules of bureaucracies are crucial characteristics of staff engaged in this work. More often than not, the successful advocacy of a desirable program or legislative change will rely entirely upon the quality of staff work involved. Certainly the only legitimate power the Commission can count on in these matters is the power of information, analysis and insight they bring to bear. But that power is considerable when harnessed to authentic conceptualizations of public need. If you are interested in affecting outcomes, then, vision, energy and expertise are essential

There is yet another ingredient which is required if ^{equity} planners are to have any substantial impact upon decision making. Planners must be prepared to stay put and use all their resources in fighting for their objectives. The transit and ^{electric power} ~~housing~~ examples related earlier cover a span of about four years. Just now the critical decisions are being made on the elements of the transit service package which will be presented to the voters for approval, and they are very large decisions indeed. If the planners involved in this issue had played their usual game of two-years here, then off to another agency, we would be in no position to influence this decision whatever. Some considerable continuity is needed.

Permit me a couple of closing observations. If we planners want to treat urban problems as simply a source of employment and institution-building, that is one matter. But if we seriously want to improve conditions in the cities, we must understand that the challenge requires much more than our traditional responses. The planner is very likely to want to address a problem only in terms of his own professional skills, and then to stop. He sketches his design, or performs his regression, or builds his simulation model; he identifies an apparent solution. He then represents it as lucidly and persuasively as he can to his client, the Planning Commission -- and then he stops.

Gentlemen -- that is not enough if we seriously intend to affect outcomes! Those who propose ends, and who care about outcomes must come to care about means. We must be prepared to spend some time and take some risks in improving city conditions and in moving toward greater equity - two points which come to almost the same thing. Planners who are serious about their work must understand more clearly that both decision-making and implementation are processes, not acts, and that both require their protracted and energetic participation.

So our work is cut out for us. We must better understand our moral and technical responsibilities as planners within a system driven by powerful economic and ideological forces. We must learn to interact with political and other public officials on their terms and accept our share of responsibility and risk in the day-to-day decision process. If we work seriously and energetically within the context I have described, our profession may play a major role in resolving many of

America's urban problems. But anything less than such a serious effort lays us open to the ultimate judgment -- "that we came and saw and passed by on the other side."

Definition of Planning - A method of decision-making which formulates the problems which the city needs to resolve; determination of the causes of the problems & formulation of policies & programs & decisions which will ameliorate or solve these problems.

in this def Comp LUP is neither Comp. or Plog. The Master Plan deals 2 to made up of pre-ordained solutions:

- 1) Sep of L.U. via zoning
- 2) neighborhood concept
- 3) parks & open spaces
- 4) max. of tax receipts, etc. & land values.

* Copies of all papers to Mike

To be concerned about the needs of the poor, and to observe how the system deals with those needs, is to be continually outraged.

NK8

**UNDER TWO FLAGS . . . PLANNING UNDER MAYORS CARL B.
STOKES (D) AND RALPH J. PERK (R)**

Abstract

Compares working for African American mayor Stokes and white neighborhood populist Ralph Perk, who had won office vowing to be different from his predecessor. The outcomes, Krumholz notes, were approximately similar. Both opposed massive highway inspired clearances. Both supported a focus on the transit dependent constituencies. And the planners had more success with, and influence on, Perk: Stokes had needed to capture white votes, and hesitated to implement the planners proposals. Perk needed the black vote, and supported them.

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UNDER TWO FLAGS . . .

PLANNING UNDER MAYORS CARL B. STOKES (D) AND RALPH J. PERK (R)

A Seminar at the University of California, Berkeley

October 11, 1973
By Norman Krumholz

A little more than two ^{months} ~~years~~ ago, after 3½ years in office as Mayor of Cleveland, Carl B. Stokes announced he would not seek re-election.

Three pretenders to the throne eventually emerged --

- a millionaire businessman and developer running on the Democratic ticket who stressed efficiency in government and Cleveland's need for unity under strong executive leadership;
- a black candidate and president of the school board running as an independent who stressed efficiency in government and Cleveland's need for unity under strong executive leadership; and
- the Republican County Auditor making his third run for the Mayor's office who stressed that Carl Stokes was ~~the~~ villain and that a vote for the other two candidates was a vote for Carl B. Stokes.

On November 2, 1971, 38% of the electorate voted against Carl B. Stokes and, in a 3-way race, this gave Ralph J. Perk a stunning and sizeable plurality. Six days later Mayor Perk was sworn into office and the City of Cleveland waited expectantly -- some waited in fear -- for the drastic changes promised by the apparently drastic change in leadership.

Much of the difference in the two as perceived by Cleveland voters was an obvious difference in personalities. Stokes has an unfailing

charisma, a cosmopolitan air; is flamboyant in his dress and manner, engaging and engrossing in his appearances. He has a national (even international) following, uses the electronic media well both locally and nationally.

Perk, on the other hand, is viewed as steady, honest and sincere -- a family man who attends church regularly. He wears \$40 suits proudly (or wore them before he became Mayor) and pays for his own travel as Mayor (or occasionally says he does). He is less than noteworthy before TV, but very much at home in church basements and in ethnic social clubs where he ate and talked for most of his adult life with those who voted for him in November 1971. He fixes his own oatmeal for breakfast every day, lives in the same neighborhood where he was born. His wife bowls regularly, he sings with a local barbershop quartet. (As Mayor, Perk's wife is said to have turned down a dinner invitation to the White House, protesting that it was her bowling night. It is probable that her husband, the Mayor, was delighted.)

Differences between Stokes and Perk seem overwhelming -- and are usually emphasized by the news media -- but there are some important similarities. Both were born and raised in Cleveland -- Stokes in one of Cleveland's first public housing projects on the near east side, Perk in an ethnic working class neighborhood in south Cleveland. Both have felt the pressing indignity and discipline of poverty. Both eventually finished higher education with financial difficulty. Both sprang into political life with poor working class constituencies and both eventually were elected to offices by a much wider constituency.

Both espouse a moral commitment to essentially the same constituency -- in Stokes' terms the "poor people," in Perk's terms the "little people."

But in the end, Stokes is black, Perk is not. When Stokes argues for attention to the needs of "poor people," voters hear him argue for black people. When Perk argues for attention to the needs of "little people," voters hear him argue for white people. This difference is fundamental and pervasive.

So, the differences between Stokes and Perk as individuals and as advocates were partly real, partly perceived; partly important, partly not. For the voters of Cleveland on November 2, 1971, the differences must have been real and important. We can safely assume that the significant minority of Clevelanders who voted for Perk wanted a drastic change in City Hall and that they felt Perk as Mayor would make those changes. This paper is a brief analysis of the possibility of such change as well as a comment on the difference the change from Stokes to Perk made to the effectiveness of the city planning staff.

You will recall that Perk's campaign was blantly against Stokes (who wasn't even running) and only superficially for anything. It is difficult therefore, to speculate and impossible to know exactly what Perk's constituency wanted or expected. Aside from Perk's constant reminder that a vote for Pinkney or Carney (the other two candidates in the race) was a vote for Stokes, his campaign promises of importance were, 5:

1. To join with other municipalities in the suburbs to cooperatively guide the destiny of the region.

2. To improve services and cut fares on the Cleveland Transit System entirely out of fare-box revenues.
3. To balance the City's budget with no increase in taxes.
4. To stop the construction of public housing in areas where residents did not want it (i.e., in white and black middle class neighborhoods) and
5. To stop the decline of Cleveland's population and industry.

These promises, in ^{the first 4} ~~all~~ cases, represented a change from Stokes' policies. How did Mayor Perk succeed in implementing these changes? Let me discuss them in turn.

City vs. Suburb -- Mayor Stokes wanted more influence in decisions made by regional entities which affected the City. He asked for this influence in decisions made by the 7-county regional agency which oversees most federal spending and A-95 reviews in the area. When his proposal was rejected, he withdrew from the regional agency, refused to pay the City's dues, and initiated a lawsuit calling for one man-one vote representation on the agency's governing board.

Mayor Perk promised in his campaign to rejoin the regional agency, pay the City's dues and terminate the lawsuit.

After Mayor Perk's inauguration he did precisely that, but not before insisting on the same numerical representation on the Board as did Stokes. Subsequent events are beginning to suggest that he ~~will~~ ^{is} ~~beginning~~ ^{beginning} to see that the interests of the people of Cleveland -- particularly the interests of the poor and lower-middle class population which predominates -- are rarely served by the rural - and suburban-dominated Board of the 7-County regional agency.

Admittedly, this view has been pressed upon Perk as it was upon Stokes by my staff and myself, and the Mayor's regional policy will wax and wane with his trust in us. But Mayor Perk has seen in the last two years how two highways -- one approved by the regional agency and one soon to be approved, would decimate ethnic areas of political interest to him. He has also seen how a \$20 million law enforcement grant which he was instrumental in getting (and which he planned to use for his police department) will accrue largely to the courts, correctional institutions and the suburbs as it works its way through the regional sieve. He will come to see more threats to City interests from projects to be proposed by the regional agency in mass transportation, and water and sewer. I predict that before too much longer, he will be fighting the suburbs with much the same vigor and maybe the same methods that Mayor Stokes used.

Improve Service and cut fares on the Cleveland Transit System: In spite of much rhetoric focused on the "incompetent" personnel of CTS - especially on the executive director who "makes more than the Governor of Ohio," Mayor Perk has been unable to reduce the annual deficit or improve service. Efforts at cost-cutting have broken over the rock of union contracts. Even the "over-paid" Executive Director remains by virtue of his long-term contract. So, in spite of his complete control of the CTS Board, and his predilections toward economy, Mayor Perk has been forced to lend the transit system \$9.3 million to bail out its deficit for another year. When that money runs out, who knows? Ultimately, the city system must go to a regional agency and, at that

time, the City Planning Commission will press upon Perk (or his successor) as we did upon Stokes, the conditions for that transfer which will be of specific benefit to the transit-dependent people of Cleveland. *But at this time, the change of Mayors has had no discernible effect on public transit in Cleveland.*

A Balanced City Budget -- Mayor Stokes sought to resolve the fiscal crisis of the City in 1970 by asking voters for an increase in taxes.

Mayor Perk was vocal and adamant in his promise to the voters that he would balance the City's books without raising taxes -- by cutting costs.

Mayor Stokes argued throughout his second term in office that the City needed new revenues to maintain minimum service levels. In November of 1970, he asked for tax reform -- a reduction in property taxes and an increase in income taxes -- to raise new revenues. He got the reduction in property taxes but not the increase in the income tax, and was forced into a first round of lay-offs a year before Perk came into office. Because Mayor Stokes would permit no cuts in public safety forces (police and fire), City services in health, recreation and waste collection were seriously curtailed.

Mayor Perk argued in his campaign that service levels could be maintained (even improved) with even more reductions in cost; he promised no tax increase if elected. When he assumed office he found that the cuts by Stokes had already undermined services and that, with no new revenues to count on, the cost reductions needed would be drastic indeed. Most important, the public safety forces would have to assume some of the burden, for this department represents 70% of the general budget.

Further, the City ended 1971 with a deficit, varying between 2.5 million and 27 million depending upon your political persuasion, which would have to be paid off the top in 1972. (Perk's story about accountants.)

In short, Perk's promise not to increase taxes led him to proposals for severe cost reductions and these reductions could only be made with massive lay-offs. He began some lay-offs in December of 1971.

Though the Mayor knew he must reduce the costs of police and fire, he did not want to lay off these, to him, crucial city employees. He privately proposed a compromise -- that all police and firemen remain on the job full-time, accept 90% of their legal wages now and 10% at some future date when the City got the money. The police and fire unions refused.

The Mayor, stung by the police and fire refusal, then proposed that all City employees -- police and fire included -- work only nine out of every ten days and receive only 90% of their current pay. The alternative, he threatened, was substantial lay-off of city workers, again, including police and fire.

The Fraternal Order of Police then sought, and obtained from the lower courts, an order prohibiting the Mayor from implementing this proposal insofar as the police and firemen are concerned. Mayor Perk appealed this order and got a temporary order from a higher court saying that his plan could be put into effect on an interim basis.

In the meantime, other City unions indicated that they would reluctantly accept a proposal similar to that originally offered to the public safety forces -- to work full time at 90% pay if the remain-

ing 10% is eventually paid. Some individual police and firemen indicated they would also prefer such a plan.

But the union leadership and higher echelons of the police and fire remained adamantly opposed to lay-offs, reductions in pay and work, or deferred payments. They cited the usual crime statistics and made the standard comparison to show that the City cannot reduce its efforts in any way in this society's struggle against crime. At the same time these leaders refused to commit themselves in support of any measure to increase revenues through tax increases.

In short, by mid-1972 Mayor Perk had come to the realization that he could not reduce costs as much as he needed to (costs were to be deferred, not reduced), that new revenues would have to be required, and that his resolution of the fiscal crisis would not vary significantly from the resolution Mayor Stokes was heading for -- costs would be cut somewhat and new revenues will have to be found in tax increases.

in the late winter of 1972

PP
out of Enter General Revenue Sharing and the Swift resolution of last year's
that revenue-sharing funds will not bail us out of anticipated increases in costs, this.
revenue-sharing funds *But*
fiscal crisis. New wage negotiations open in Jan. 1971, and we estimate
With regard to the Planning Commission's contribution, it is note- *time*

worthy that neither Mayor held any abiding interest in efficiency of City government operations. Mayor Stokes, in his appeals for new revenues was not interested in management studies which we urged upon him promising ways in which the City could do more with what it had. In the same way, Mayor Perk's cost-cutting is absolutely without discrimination -- a straight 10% cut across the board with no attention nor preference given to priorities or affect on services. We continue

to labor in this particular vineyard, proposing that "productivity" be entered into next year's wage discussions. *Whether it will or not remains to be seen, but clearly Perk was no more able to solve Cleveland's revenue crisis than Stokes, save for the Revenue*
Low Income Public Housing -- Mayor Stokes wanted low-income public *Sharing windfall.* housing in every neighborhood in the City and in the suburbs as well.

Mayor Perk has said he will fight the location of public housing in any area where the residents do not want it. He appears to include the suburbs in this, as he halted work by the planning staff on a new town because suburban neighbors were opposed to low-income residents in the proposal.

Mayor Perk revoked the building permits for two previously-approved public housing projects in white areas of the City immediately upon assuming office. In both cases, fulfillment of his campaign pledge subjected him to court action. In both cases, court action was requested by the local public housing authority and the court's decision was against him. Quietly, the revoked building permits were re-issued and construction is now complete.

Though Mayor Perk, by this action, did please his constituency immensely, he has at the same time posed himself another dilemma. On the one hand, he threatens to fight any public housing located in white areas. On the other hand, he is the chief executive officer of a City which has a contractual agreement with the local public housing authority to build or buy and operate public housing units in all parts of the City. When the federal spigot is opened again in support of public housing, I presume that the Housing Authority will bring suit against the City for breach of contract. The courts, then, may determine the future of public housing in Cleveland - at least in the short term. *Over*

Conclusions:

approximately

- Despite different styles of two Mayors, outcomes were ^{approximately} similar. Institutions and bureaucracies, civil service, unions, the FOP tend to control on relatively minor matters. On large matters such as city decline, larger economic and social forces control. Therefore, the Mayor has few critical options open to him, whoever he is. (Cite RAND Santa Clara Valley study)
- What did the changing of the guard mean to the operations and effectiveness of CPC staff?
- Expected to be fired or at least cut back in budget. Did not occur. ^{Why?}
In departure of Stokes.
- ¹ Lost ability to address the rest of the nation as well as the City and region on matters CPC staff considered vital -- FAP greater equity, re-adjusted national priorities redistribution of wealth and power. Wrote speeches, articles, Law Review paper, Congressional testimony, U. S. Civil Rights Comm. testimony, etc. for Stokes. Also, great influence on NOACA and New Town policy. ^{3 Conditions on highway policy.}
- ¹ With Perk But gained receptive audience on equity-based programs, i.e. New Health Center at Miles Ave. \$1.5 demolition allocation; improved funding for rat-control and neighborhood clean-up campaigns. ¹ Got support for cutting solid waste collectors & saving \$4 million per year. Also support for housing allowance proposals, where Stokes was more supportive of supply-side subsidies.
- Both Mayors gave planning staff great support on highway and transit policies. Perk used CPC staff in Justice Center, Stadium, Port Authority lease review. Also, supported (or didn't kill) CEI - Miami Light proposals.

also, lost ability to commit effectively.

and more successful

-- On net, we appear to be more influential with Perk than Stokes. Why?

- a) Perk less concerned with "professionalism" in appointments. Good for local politics but needs dimension of ^{information,} expertise, analysis and understanding of regional and federal bureaucracies.
- b) Stokes needed 20% white vote; Perk needs to neutralize black vote and is therefore somewhat more receptive to "black" programs.

Question of planning effectiveness re: two mayors.
-- How measure?

On Status of agency - Great. Rising. Respected by Mayor and Council - media, etc.

Impact on legislation - Improving, but estimate greater than other planning agencies. Testimony by Stokes on FAP, Housing Allowances, Senate Bill 90.

Impact on profession - AIC/MSPO speeches, papers. Stokes' speeches & law article, talks to students @ Universities, liaison w/ HUD & DOT

Impact on local, state, Fed. politics - Highway policy, Jetport, Transit, Growth Assn's fear of NK

-- Possibly improving entire political process. Possibly educating next generation

NK9

THE URBAN COMPLEX: CENTRAL CITY, SUBURBS AND REGIONALISM

Abstract

Reviews the evidence and literature of claims regional authorities will lead to better service and reduced costs. Finds they do not; and democracy suffers as well, with less voter turnout. Krumholz calls the Cleveland area version, the Northeast Ohio Area Coordinating Agency (NOACA) "the bastard offspring of a loveless dalliance between dreamers and cynics": its history of conflict, first over the unwillingness of rural and suburban counties to tolerate proportional representation to the central cities of the region, then over highway proposals that would raze 1700 Cleveland residence and cost the city \$25 million in lost property assessments, resulted in the federal government decertifying the agency. Krumholz concludes: "To really do something new in governmental reform requires some critical mass of people who perceive themselves as chronic losers under the present rules of the game. Lacking this, there is no logic strong enough

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NK9

"The Urban Complex: Central City, Suburbs, and Regionalism"

by Norman Krumholz
Director, Cleveland City Planning Commission

Keynote Speech
for the
National Meeting of the Council of University Institutes of Urban Affairs
April 25, 1974

James Thurber, in one of his most delightful stories, writes of his great aunt who, in the years following the discovery of electricity, would go around the house stuffing bits of paper into the electrical outlets. It seems she was possessed of the unshakable notion that this was the only way to keep electricity from dripping onto the carpet.

Whenever I leave the pressure cooker at Cleveland City Hall and address myself to such cosmic subjects as "City, Suburbs and Regionalism" I often get the feeling that I, like Thurber's great aunt, don't understand what's going on. Nobody else seems to see the stuff and nonsense dripping onto the regional carpet.

✓ "Regionalism," whether one means some form of metropolitan government or merely an arrangement for metropolitan planning and cooperation, conjures up such righteous connotations, such visions of piety, that one feels inhibited from discussing it with anything but reverent approval. In fact, my views on regionalism are less than reverent, less than enthusiastic and less than optimistic. And I must say that my four years

on the Board of the Northeast Ohio Areawide Coordinating Agency (NOACA), our regional planning body, has done little to temper my opinion.

Let me elaborate on this jaundiced view by dealing first with what the literature seems to be saying about the performance of various metropolitan governing arrangements including those which are permanent like Nashville-Davidson County and those which are cooperative like the Lakewood Plan in Los Angeles. I'll turn to our local situation later on.

→ Regional governmental arrangements are reform movements. They are designed to respond to the problems of political fragmentation in our metropolitan areas.

These problems include the proliferation of local and special-purpose governments with similar or overlapping responsibilities. These multitudinous governmental entities are alleged to be major obstacles to orderly administration and planned development. In Greater Cleveland, for example, there are some 105 separate governmental units each possessing independent taxing prerogatives and varying degrees of regulatory power. It is said that this leads to overlapping service responsibilities, rising taxes, lack of centralized political control, uneven and gross aspects of regional growth, fiscal disparities in the region, and the general decline of the central city. All these problems, it is said, can be resolved and rationalized by political and administrative reform.

Simply stated, the main goals sought through metropolitan governmental reform are economy and efficiency which are said to accrue as a result of centralized control and economies of scale, an improved level of public service -- both soft and hard, professionalization of governmental decision-making, weakening of "parochialism" among area-wide policy-makers and maintenance of open access by all the citizens of the region.

What has been the record of various metropolitan governmental arrangements in meeting this set of goals? I have not read too widely in the field, but my admittedly limited analysis leads me to the following general conclusions:

1. Economy and Efficiency:

There is little evidence that economies of scale in public services are being realized across the board in many reformed metropolitan institutions. Such economies of scale as are realized, appear only in hard services like electricity, water and sewerage, and are lost in such soft services as police protection. In general, moreover, the taxes which support these reformed metropolitan entities do not go down, they go up. Some of the literature does suggest that when services are transferred from a local to an areawide basis, levels of service tend to rise on the average. On that basis, it might be inferred that higher costs are justified since they are buying an improved level of service.

But in some of the cases where service levels rise for the region as a whole, there is a question as to the incidence of these improvements. Does everyone get the goodies equally? If not, who does?

Daniel Grant's work on the experience in Nashville-Davidson Co. presents evidence of an equalization of services. But the equalization of services means improved services for the suburbs, not for the City. Grant makes no claim that City services were improved at all.

Similarly, the accomplishments of Toronto Metro, as detailed by Harold Kaplan, are almost exclusively in the form of improved hard services for outlying areas, rather than improved City services or solutions to the social problems of particular concern to the central city.

The economist, Werner Hirsch who has done extensive work on quantification of units of service, seems to best sum up the question of the relationship of service area size to potential economies of scale. Hirsch points out that, for private goods, increasing the size of the population tends to be associated with declining unit costs, but this is not necessarily so for public goods. Hirsch concludes that there are some economies of scale which result from decreasing unit costs in such routine items as water and sewerage, as well as from bulk purchasing of supplies and equipment. But, says Hirsch, these savings are often outweighed by the cost of top-heavy

administration in the more labor-intensive services. Hirsch concludes that on balance, governmental size is not correlated with efficiency or economy. He concludes that governments serving from 50,000 to 100,000 urbanites might be more efficient than larger governmental units.

2. Professional Administration:

In almost all studies I have seen, the increased influence of professionals does appear throughout the entire range of reforms. Typically, regardless of whether permanent or cooperative regional units are under analysis, policy-making members of the executive board devote little of their time to "homework" between meetings, and leave the technical experts to run the various divisions. The impact of professionals appears to be greatest in "hard" service areas: capital projects, tangible and physically-oriented rather than "softer" socially-oriented functions. Although not much on homework, policy makers are active in determining the jurisdictional distribution of projects and programs. In this sense, they yield to the expertise of the professionals in agenda-setting and in project development, but they make sure that some kind of parity among participating bodies exists in sharing the goodies.

3. Weakening of "parochialism" among areawide policy-makers:

Very little of this seems to be happening. Representatives to areawide decision-making bodies apparently see themselves

as delegates of their municipalities to the regional body: they are municipal officers first, and metro councillors second. As Joan Aron makes clear in her 1969 study of the N.Y. Metropolitan Regional Council, the members tend to examine proposals in terms of costs and benefits to their own communities. This is not surprising since in most major governmental reform structures, representatives are elected on a district basis with most municipalities retaining their independent legal status. This structure contains a host of incentives which favor the delegate outlook. Although they perceive themselves as delegates from their own districts, participants do feel that metropolitan governmental institutions provide a forum for sharing state and regional information and relating to state and federal governments.

4. Citizen Interest and Participation:

P [Apparently reformed regional agencies dampen voter interest. And the quality of performance of regional institutions -- one way or the other -- has little effect on citizen interest or participation. A Nashville study indicates that increased citizen interest in Metro is related to educational achievement, and that interest decreases with the depth of rural attachment. This is exactly what might have been expected -- simply a confirmation of existing patterns of participation in local government.

Voter participation actually seems to decline with the advent of reform. The voters in Toronto Metro and Miami seem to be directing their interest toward their own municipal governments, or neighborhood arrangements, not Metro, where percentages voting in elections has declined.

Another interesting aspect of citizen participation in reform movements is the often-heard cry that metropolitan government has the effect of blunting the increasing black influence in the political affairs of the core city. In fact, this seems to be the case, although research on the issue is limited.

Observers in Nashville and Miami indicate that black influence has not decreased under reform, but they are not prepared to argue that, in the absence of metro, black influence would not have been greater in the core city. Clearly, however, according to Bollens and Schmandt, black political leaders and minority voters in reformed areas feel that their service levels have declined and that their power and influence have suffered dilution. And perhaps the perception in this case is the same thing as reality.]

Given this brief run-down, how are we to answer the question: Have regional governmental reform units worked? The answer is ambiguous. They have clearly not achieved the aspirations of their staunchest proponents. They have not reduced taxes, they have not realized any significant economies of scale in services across the board. They have dealt almost exclusively with "hard" rather than "soft" services. They appear

not to have altered the structure of local political power, mitigated parochialism or inspired their citizens to great interest and vigorous participation. Their "successes" seem mainly to exist in the field of professionalizing some aspects of regional decision-making, in providing a regional forum for political dialogue and information interchange, and in providing another governmental level between component localities and the state and federal governments. They have, in fact, not done much which is new. Not much of a track record, if I read the literature correctly.



Let me now turn to the Cleveland scene where I propose to briefly examine the short, unhappy life of NOACA, the Northeast Ohio Areawide Coordinating Agency. NOACA, formed in early 1968, is an example of a metropolitan organization established solely to satisfy federal requirements for areawide review and planning of federal grant applications. The region served by NOACA is comprised of 7 counties whose populations range in size from 1.7 million to 63,000. Two of the counties are almost entirely urbanized, two are suffering the swift growth pangs of suburbia, and the other three may be classified as rural. The region's black population is heavily centralized in its two core cities, Cleveland and Akron, and its concentrations of poverty are similarly distributed. 75% of all families with incomes over \$15,000 live in the suburbs, 75% of all people on welfare live in Cleveland. About 1/3 of all suburban families have 2 or more cars; 1/3 of the households in Cleveland have no car; Cleveland has 12,000 public housing units, its suburbs have none. It is this region

Summit & Cuyahoga

Lake & Lorain

Portage, Medina, Geauga

In Cuyahoga County, for example

which was presumed by its federal architects to have a deep commonality of interest. Obviously, it is not so! In fact, NOACA represents the bastard offspring of a loveless dalliance between dreamers and cynics, with no general government willing to proclaim any pride in paternity.

Originally,

The suburbs opposed its formation, fearful of loss of home rule and domination by the Central City, and Cleveland opposed the agency as another governmental level which might get between the City and the federal government on whom the City depends heavily for help. The City also feared -- with some justice -- that its vital interests would be given over to those who felt no responsibility to its people. Nonetheless with heavy federal inducements acting as a shot-gun, the marriage was made.

NOACA's first four years were marked with bitter controversy -- originally over representation on the Board and, then at the end of 1969, over the Board's approval of a controversial highway project through Cleveland, which in the judgment of Cleveland representatives, imposed grossly unacceptable costs upon the City of Cleveland. The conflict was resolved in 1972 with adjustments to the City's representation on the NOACA Board and the rescinding of the controversial highway proposal.

→ The Board is an executive body whose size was originally set at 43, grew to 49 in 1969 and then to 58 in 1972. It consists of members of the county ^{*of County Commissioners*} Boards of each of the 7 counties, plus some members appointed by the Mayor of Akron, the Mayor of Cleveland, the City Council of Cleveland,

Some smaller cities

the Cleveland Transit System, and the Cuyahoga County Mayors and Managers Association. Some executives *body!* (How does the staff discern the public interest from such an executive?)

But the highway dispute is even more interesting than the Board. The dispute which ostensibly centered on Interstate 290, exposed a series of issues which in Cleveland and elsewhere make up the crux of America's urban dilemma and outline the depth of the gulf separating central city from suburbs. These are not the issues of efficiency, economy, and management with which most regional agencies of all types busy themselves, but the deeper, more controversial problems of neighborhood preservation, declining tax base, race, housing and fiscal disparities among growing and declining jurisdictions.

The I-290 controversy in Cleveland laid open many of these issues. The highway, if built, along the NOACA-approved right-of-way, would have displaced 1700 City of Cleveland households (many of whom were low-income families), disrupted two of the most stable neighborhoods on Cleveland's east side, taken about \$25 million in property valuations off Cleveland's tax duplicate and cost the City about \$7 million directly as its local share of project cost. The rationale used to justify NOACA's decision was the alleged need for I-290 as part of the regional interstate highway network. It was even argued at NOACA that the members of the Board must turn their faces from parochialism and, like regional statesmen, think of the best interests of the entire region. Most Board members were able to rise to the occasion over the vociferous objections of the City. In response, the City's representatives asked the regional statesmen to help

re-settle the displaced by building public housing in their jurisdictions, by sharing in Cleveland's share of highway construction costs and by making annual payments to Cleveland to make up for the losses to its tax base. It is too painful for me to record the reaction. Of course, none of this was seriously discussed.

It was this issue which sparked two years of bitter conflict between City and Agency and led to the de-certification of NOACA by HUD. And it was not until the City and NOACA reached an accommodation on I-290 that things settled down to their present state -- one in which we all quietly and automatically approve each other's requests for grants-in-aid, and try to stay out of trouble.

None of this should be seen as reflecting badly on the quality of the NOACA staff -- it seems well led and considerably more competent professionally than that of many similar agencies. But the Agency suffers from a basic problem inherent in regional planning bodies -- it lacks the power to implement anything at all, and its proposals must be reflective of its political environment -- if it rocks the boat it may be in deep trouble. Indicative of the concern for the local political culture is the slogan of the National Association of Regional Councils, "Regionalism is Local Power." That's almost as good as "Fat is Thin." What I take this to mean is everything will be as before -- we will all continue to enjoy our communities of limited liability, only now we will satisfy the federal guidelines.

Perhaps this is not too surprising. After all, it is the "soft" social issues which vex our whole society, and simply altering a few governmental institutions means dealing with the wrong end of the causal chain. The institutions, and patterns of behavior associated with them, are consequences of more basic attitudes and social patterns. The value system, or the distribution of power and wealth, determines the impact of institutional manipulation; simply changing governmental structures cannot alter these basic elements. In that context, perhaps it is not too surprising that metropolitan institutional reform has actually changed very little.

But then, despite the wailing of the reformers, academicians and professional bureaucrats like myself, it is an observable fact that most people are not interested in changing the present governmental game; the familiar present is often preferred to some alleged future good. Most of the time people will settle for a new deck or perhaps simply a new shuffle of the cards.

To really do something new in governmental reform requires some critical mass of people who perceive themselves as chronic losers under the present rules of the game. Lacking this, there is no logic strong enough to bring about anything but a surface and illusory tinkering with the machinery.

NK10

THE CAPITAL IMPROVEMENT PROGRAMMING PROCESS IN CLEVELAND: MYTH AND REALITY

Abstract

Here two Cleveland planners describe the discrepancies between the rational planning process as devised for capital improvement budgeting, and bargaining that actually takes place among city council and city departments in Cleveland. In response, they devised ways to involve themselves in the real decision process, introducing a measure of rationality after all. They gave staff support to one department resulting in the discovery of bonding authority that made possible funding to carry out the department's program and established the planners' position in the decision process. In another case the planning commission, analysing a developer proposal, discovered cost estimates to the city an order of magnitude higher than stated, and made a case for reallocation of city priorities to other projects.

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The Capital Improvement
Programming in Process in Cleveland:

Myth and Reality

by Janice Cogger and Norman Krumholz
for ASPO Conference, 1975, Vancouver

Section 76-2 of the City of Cleveland's Charter directs the City Planning Commission to annually prepare a capital budget and capital improvements program. In discharging this responsibility the Commission supposedly obtains detailed project requests from the operating departments, reviews these requests in light of resource estimates prepared by the Finance Department and the types of land use and development considerations embodied in the General Plan, conducts public hearings, formulates priorities, and recommends a one-year budget and five-year program to the Mayor. The recommended Capital Improvements Program (CIP) then provides the foundation for the Mayor's submission of a capital budget to City Council and, ultimately, for the allocation of the City's capital resources. At least this is the way Cleveland's capital improvements programming process has been described in the Manual of Suggested Practice for the Preparation and Adoption of Capital Programs and Capital Budgets by Local Governments.^{1/} Judging from this description, one would think that capital improvements programming was an integral part of the decision making process, and that it provided the City Planning

^{1/} Prepared for the Municipal Finance Officers Association by Lennox L. Moak and Kathryn W. Killian, Chicago, 1964.

Commission with a powerful tool with which to influence the allocation of the City's capital resources.

However, shortly after my arrival in Cleveland I discovered an enormous gap between this "myth" and reality. The fact that the CIP consistently recommended a capital program which exceeded even the wildest estimates of the City's financing capabilities by several tens-of-millions of dollars provided an initial indication of the gap. Indeed, the CIP was almost universally known as the "City's wish book."

My worst suspicions were confirmed when I asked a staff member to describe the capital programming process. He launched into a detailed description of the steps involved in printing the book. Primary emphasis had clearly been placed upon the development of the CIP as a glossy publication rather than as a part of the decision making process.

I initially assumed that the gap between theory and reality was attributable to a lack of expertise and initiative on the part of the planning staff. New staff members were assigned to redesign the process.

We found that efforts to work with the operating departments were complicated by their lack of analytical ability and the crisis environment in which they functioned. Most departments found it difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of individual projects in terms of service objectives. Many of the projects which they pro-

posed seemed to be more a product of historical accident than any assessment of needs. The information which they gave about the projects was extremely sketchy and of questionable reliability. In fact, departments regularly prepared their capital improvement requests by taking the prior year's CIP, crossing out those relatively few projects which had been financed, and moving the cost figures for all other projects ahead one year.

The Finance Department's ability to play its appointed role in the process was equally limited. The City's financing and accounting procedures provide little foundation for the analysis of past, or design of future, investment policies. Bond accounts are maintained on a cash basis. Until very recently, the Division of Accounts had been generally two or more years behind in posting entries on bond accounts. Therefore, it is impossible even to determine the total capital funds available at any given point in time.

The Mayor did not propose and City Council did not adopt a capital budget. The approval of a single project required the introduction and passage of several pieces of legislation. What had been called the City's "capital budget" was a document prepared at year's end indicating projects which had received some type of approval during the preceeding year. At the time we began our efforts in 1969, two years had lapsed since the publication of the last so-call capital budget.

We concluded that a great deal of work would be required to move from the current reality toward the rational process described in the Manual. However, we continued to assume that both the Finance and operating departments could be convinced of the potential value of capital programming and, with technical assistance from our staff, could be helped to do a creditable job.

This was also found to be a myth. It was not that the City's administrators had never heard of the rationale for capital programming. Rather, the City's elected officials and department heads had found that their interests were better served by the political process than by the planning process.

Cleveland's City Council is composed of thirty-three councilpersons elected by ward for two-year terms. Since certain capital improvements have a high degree of public visibility, councilpersons have a considerable stake in the allocation of the City's capital resources. They are willing to trade votes on a wide range of issues for the construction of a recreation center or fire station, the rehabilitation of a playground or health center, the paving of several streets, or the provision of sewer improvements in their wards.

City departments are in constant search of the resources required to meet emergency capital needs, to maintain existing capital, to replace deteriorating and obsolete capital and to provide for program expansion.

Finally, both the Mayor and Council are frequently confronted by requests for City investments in support of private development efforts. Such requests may involve the provision of site improvements or the concentration of City capital in areas surrounding the proposed development. The areas are not necessarily those scheduled for urban renewal, and the improvements are not necessarily those of highest priority from a City-wide perspective but they must be given consideration.

Therefore, the allocation of Cleveland's scarce capital resources involves the Mayor and his Finance staff in a continuous bargaining process. Within this context, decision makers are unwilling to commit themselves even months, to say nothing of years, in advance to a detailed investment program.

It might be argued that Cleveland's ward system makes the City's situation if not unique, at least extreme. I doubt it. The Cleveland School Board is composed of seven members elected at large. Yet, when the Board's capital program began to generate public interest, when questions were raised regarding the Board's investment policies, the practice of preparing a capital program was dropped.

So long as capital programming is conceived as a step-by-step process resulting in the preparation of a long-range plan, it will have little impact in the City of Cleveland. Decisions on the allocation of capital are political decisions not technical decisions.

The establishment of investment priorities is a function of the political process, not the planning process. Therefore, decision makers and administrators have few incentives to cooperate in the formulation of the Planning Commission's Capital Improvements Program. In fact, their interests have been well served by discrediting it, lest it be used to discredit them -- hence the popular "wish book" title.

Does this mean that planners should abandon all efforts to influence the allocation of the City's capital resources? We think not. Recognizing that we have little chance of changing reality to fit our old models of planning practice (and, I should add, little desire to do so), we have attempted to change our method of operation to fit the reality of decision making.

We continue to publish an annual Capital Improvements Program because we are legally obligated to do so. But, we have substantially reduced the money and staff time devoted to it. More importantly, we have changed the image of the document by dropping all pretext of its being a plan. Emphasis is placed upon the discussion of investment issues rather than on the programming of individual projects. We have used the CIP as a way of drawing attention to the fact that the City regularly constructs facilities which it cannot afford to operate or maintain. Similarly, we have shown that by deferring investment in less visible types of projects (such as bridge repairs)

the City is gradually consuming its capital stock. Individual projects are presented in "shopping list" fashion as a kind of appendix to such issues analyses.

However, our efforts to influence investment decisions are not confined to, nor principally oriented toward, the preparation of the CIP. They generally take two forms: (1) providing operating departments with staff assistance in analyzing their capital needs and finding means to finance priority projects; and (2) active involvement in the highly political process by which individual projects are financed or tabled.

Staff work with the Division of Waste Collection and Disposal provides an example of the former. Based largely on a recommendation made by the Planning Commission in 1971, a Federal grant was secured for the study of waste collection and disposal procedures. As a result of considerable analysis and lengthy negotiations, the number of waste collection routes has been reduced by over 50%, a bulk-item pick up program initiated, a major capital improvement program undertaken, a detailed capital replacement scheduled formulated, and proposals for changes in disposal procedures sent on their way through the legislative process. For over two years a member of the Planning staff was assigned full time to work with the Commissioner of Solid Waste, the consultant, and City Council on this project. His initial contribution to the effort was the

"discovery" of \$6 million in voted bond authority. In order not to risk an increase in the property tax rate, the prior administration had decided not to issue waste collection and disposal bonds approved by the voters in 1967. With a change in administration and department personnel, the existence of the bond authority had apparently been forgotten. While studying old capital fund records, our man re-discovered it. With only a matter of weeks left before the authority was to lapse, he mustered the support needed to have the bonds sold. This insured the availability of the capital funds needed to carry out the Division's program, and firmly established his position as a key actor in the Division's planning process.

An example of the Planning Commission's involvement in the controversy surrounding individual projects is provided by the "Tower City debate." In the spring of 1974, a local developer sought City Council approval of legislation committing the City to an open-ended investment in the repair of bridges surrounding the site of a proposed office-commercial complex. While the developer estimated the cost to the City at \$2-3 million, independent engineering studies had indicated that the price tag might be \$15 million or more. In attempting to determine the probable benefits to the City from such an investment, the Commission concluded that the project offered no guarantee of additional property or income tax revenues to the City, no commitment of jobs for the unemployed, and in fact, might only add to the surplus of office space in downtown. Based upon the

knowledge that the bridges under consideration constitute no hazard to public safety while other bridges in the City do, and based upon a policy aimed at insuring that the City and its residents receive a reasonable return from investment in downtown redevelopment efforts, the Commission disapproved the legislation. Though the Commission's disapproval was overridden by City Council, the issue has not yet been resolved. At very least, the Commission succeeded in raising several important questions which provide the basis for current negotiations and will certainly arise again in regard to similar investment proposals.

Our experience in Cleveland indicates that we can have far greater impact upon the allocation of the City's capital resources by involving ourselves in the process by which investment decisions are actually made, than by involving ourselves in the preparation of a capital improvement program. Perhaps in some cities the two processes can be made synonymous; in Cleveland they cannot.

The description of the capital programming provided in the Manual -- reflects a certain type of rationality. It assumes that each step in the process can be specified, ordered, and assigned a time frame. It assumes that the actors in the process are always the same and that they can be assigned specific roles. The decision making process embodies a different type of rationality -- political rationality.

For decades planners have attempted to mold reality to their ideal of rationality. In Cleveland we have discovered that to influence decisions we are the ones who must adapt. We have found that the decision making process is continuous, that it follows no rigid pattern, and that power is dispersed. Abandoning the ideal of planning rationality, we seize opportunities to influence decisions whenever they arise; we seek to identify the key actors on any given issue and to influence their positions; we enlist the support of all interested in the allocation of public resources. The outcomes we seek are not defined by a General Plan, but by the goal and objectives of the Planning Commission.

If I were here today to discuss other, traditional tools of the planning process, the examples I might cite would be different but my conclusion would be substantially the same. In a session later today on planning education, I will discuss the need for planners to re-evaluate the issues to which they address themselves, to abandon long-standing professional biases, and to respond to the serious economic and social problems confronting our cities and their residents. There is a parallel need for planners to reconsider the methods which they employ, to abandon those which are merely a reflection of some abstract planning ideal, and to develop new methods more suited to the world in which we function.