Disillusionment in Action: The Origins and Outcomes of US Solidarity with Chilean Refugees

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Abstract

In March of 1976, President Gerald Ford agreed to host a reception for foreign ambassadors and their wives at the White House in celebration of the United States’ bicentennial. Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor, had recommended the reception as an alternative to a more elaborate event for foreign heads of state. In a February memo for the President, Scowcroft cautioned against “assembling leaders of widely differing political colorations,” anticipating that popular protests and demonstrations against these foreign leaders might overwhelm security officials. Scowcroft identified President Pinochet of Chile as one foreign head of state whose policies were so offensive to democratic ideals that his participation in the nation’s celebration of its bicentennial would call into question the spirit of the entire event. By this time, a domestic solidarity movement sympathetic to the victims of political repression under the Pinochet regime had not only gained visibility, but also attracted attention at the highest levels of the US government.

In a 1973 coup d’état, General Augusto Pinochet overthrew President Salvador Allende’s democratically elected government.

2 Ibid.
Consolidating his regime, Pinochet saw the supporters of Allende—a Marxist—as enemies of the state and arrested them, along with thousands of Latin Americans who had sought refuge in Chile during Allende’s presidency. Many were then tortured or executed, causing hundreds of thousands to flee Chile for other nations in the Americas and Europe.\(^3\) Acting on the orders of President Richard M. Nixon, who believed that Allende and the Popular Unity coalition posed a communist threat to US economic interests across the Western Hemisphere, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) provided material support to the Pinochet coup. Having participated in the overthrow of Allende and the installation of the Pinochet regime, the United States was reluctant to admit Allende’s leftist supporters as refugees.

Despite the government’s relations with the Pinochet regime, a popular solidarity movement in the United States achieved important successes for the Chilean refugees. The groups that contributed most to the effort to settle them in the US were activists on university campuses, religious groups, non-governmental organizations, and several key figures in Congress. These actors not only educated the American public about their country’s role in Latin America, but also turned human rights into a discussion topic within the government and among the public.

Further, this domestic solidarity movement was the driving force behind cuts in aid to Pinochet’s Chile in 1974, as well as the Special Parole Program for Chilean Refugees in 1975. Enacted two full years after the Pinochet coup, this 1975 parole program brought four hundred families into the United States, who most notably settled in California, New York, and Florida.\(^4\) Settlement in the United States, however, was unavailable to members of the Communist party, leftist revolutionaries, and those who had never been detained but anticipated future persecution from the Pinochet regime. The United States’ fear of sheltering communists and reluctance to “encumber its relations with the Santiago government” delayed establishment of the program.\(^5\) The eventual enactment of a parole program in the United States, however, is a testament to the strength of the Chilean solidarity movement and the complementary efforts of concerned citizens and politicians.

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\(^3\) Diana Childress, *Augusto Pinochet’s Chile* (Minneapolis: Lerner, 2009), 91.


Sympathy for the victims of Pinochet’s regime in Chile arose in reaction to the “realpolitik” policies of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Kissinger believed that in the United States’ best interest was the preeminence of US political and economic interests abroad, without a moral consideration of the policies’ consequences on the countries they affected. Such logic justified turning a blind eye to the human rights abuses of Pinochet’s anticommunist regime. With the Watergate scandal unfolding and a disheartening loss in Vietnam increasingly apparent, allegations of covert US involvement in the Chilean coup would have been discouraging to citizens, but hardly surprising. Americans perceived US interference in Chile in the context of Watergate and the Vietnam War, which led many to identify dishonesty and aggression as recurrent themes in their nation’s leadership. These Americans concluded that US interests would not be best served by forced economic and political dominance abroad, but by the restoration of a healthy democracy at home. Their cause found strength in its broad appeal, and thus was successful in bringing the plight of Chile’s refugees to the attention of a disinclined government.

The United States, Latin America, and the Pinochet Coup d’État of 1973

“Make the economy scream,” recorded Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms in his notebook during a September 1970 meeting with President Nixon. Referring to the Chilean economy, Helms and Nixon anticipated the elections the country was set to have in November and feared that the Marxist candidate, Salvador Allende, would win the presidency. The United States sought to inhibit Chile’s transition to socialism by crippling the country’s economy, an initiative that intensified when Allende won the close election on November 4, 1970 by a plurality of only thirty-six percent of the popular vote.

Two days later, the National Security Council met in Washington and developed what President Nixon dubbed a “correct but cool” policy towards Allende’s Chile. The United States would “maximize pressures on the Allende government” in order to “prevent its consolidation and limit its ability to implement policies contrary to US and hemisphere

7 The CIA also interfered in the 1964 Chilean elections, providing aid to Eduardo Frei Montalva, who defeated Allende.
interests.” These “pressures” were largely economic. The decision prohibited any new bilateral and multilateral aid to Chile, with the exception of aid to the rightwing military. When possible, preexisting commitments would be “reduced, delayed or terminated.” This attack on Chile’s economy politicized even “programs of a humanitarian character,” which would thereafter be considered only “on a case by case basis.”

At first, Allende’s policies were successful in expanding employment and consumption in Chile’s recessing economy, progress that benefited the poor. His moderate policies also calmed the Chilean middle class, who had feared that the Allende administration would become a communist dictatorship. In April of 1971, these successes helped the Left win a majority in municipal elections, which Allende interpreted as a signal to accelerate his socialist initiatives. In addition to nationalizing the banking sector and implementing land reforms, he nationalized Chile’s US-owned copper mines with the unanimous support of Chile’s congress. The nationalization of the mines, signed into law in July of 1971, occurred without compensation of the mines’ American owners. Concern that Allende’s initiatives might facilitate the spread of socialism and anti-American policies across the hemisphere motivated Washington’s economic pressure on the Allende government.

Allende’s path to socialism was expensive, and the Soviet Union was unwilling to finance a revolution it concluded Chile was not ready for. Prior to Allende’s presidency, Chile had been the largest recipient of aid from the Kennedy Administration’s Alliance for Progress, an aid program for Latin American countries launched in 1962 in reaction to the Cuban Revolution. Between 1964 and 1969, the initiative brought over $1 billion in direct and overt aid from the United States to Chile. The US

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9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
12 Elizabeth Quay Hutchison, Thomas Miller Klubock, and Nara B. Milanich, The Chile Reader (Durham: Duke University, 2014), 400.
14 Hadden, “Chile,” 9.
16 United States Senate, Covert Action in Chile 1963-1973, by Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence
reduced this figure to $10.1 million by 1973, contributing to the collapse of Chile’s economy and an inflation rate of 300%. By cutting off aid to Chile, the US indeed made Chile’s economy “scream.”

The repercussions of these economic pressures offset the gains the country expected to achieve through nationalizing the mining industry. Allende characterized US pressure as “an oblique, underhanded, indirect form of aggression,” though his own policies contributed to the country’s economic crisis as well. Allende’s policies created a demand that Chilean production could not meet, forcing the government to divert its resources from new investment towards supporting that demand instead. In an effort to save the failing economy, the Chilean government increased the amount of currency in circulation, which aggravated inflation.

In December of 1971, a march remembered as the “March of the Empty Pots” protested the shortages of food and basic goods caused by Allende and the Popular Unity’s economic policies. Beating on pots and pans, women of the middle and upper classes accused the party of favoring the politically connected with access to goods at lower prices. This women’s movement became the Poder Femenino (Feminine Power), whose vice-president reiterated her support of the 1973 Pinochet coup during a 1990 interview. “I have always supported democracy and I always supported the September 11th military coup,” she explained, “because Chile had no other alternative.” Her statement demonstrates the Chilean opposition’s conviction that preserving the country’s democracy required a military coup to overthrow the President’s government.

Though electoral support for Allende increased from thirty-six percent of the population to forty-four percent between 1970 and 1973, the turbulent transition to socialism gave rise to a virulent opposition, which included the military. The collapse of the economy cost Allende the support of the middle class as well. As the Chilean economy and Allende’s legitimacy suffered, the CIA supported the president’s

20 Hutchison, The Chile Reader, 406.
21 Carmen Saenz as quoted in Hutchison, The Chile Reader, 409.
22 Hadden, “Chile,” 9.
opponents. Between 1970 and 1973, the military received $8 million from the CIA.\textsuperscript{23} Aid was also directed towards maintaining the opposition’s ideological presence in Chile through the financial support of political newspapers, for example.\textsuperscript{24} US interference paired with domestic reactions to Allende’s failed economic policies permitted General Pinochet and the Chilean military, again with the support of the CIA, to overthrow the president on September 11, 1973. Over the course of the next two years, direct aid to Pinochet’s Chile from the United States would increase by $167 million.\textsuperscript{25}

Though violent, the coup itself was quick. A full year later, however, Pinochet still considered the country to be in a “state of war and a state of siege.”\textsuperscript{26} The military junta directed this “siege” at those affiliated with any political organization it considered a possible threat to the consolidation of the regime. Pinochet’s targets included both Allende’s Chilean supporters and the thousands of left-leaning Latin Americans who had been persecuted in their native countries and welcomed into Chile during Allende’s presidency. In a 1974 report on the situation in Chile, Amnesty International confirmed \textit{Le Monde’s} September 1973 assessment that 4,000 Bolivians, 3,000 Uruguayans, 2,000 Argentineans, and 1,200 Brazilians had settled in Chile “to enjoy the political freedom” of the Allende government. The majority of these individuals risked “imprisonment, torture or even death if they returned to their countries of origin.”\textsuperscript{27}

The international community immediately recognized that the coup posed a threat to the leftist Latin American refugees in Chile. The junta insisted on the refugees’ intent to instigate a civil war in Chile, and circulated pamphlets encouraging citizens to denounce all suspect foreign nationals because they had “come to kill Chileans.”\textsuperscript{28} Many of the refugees were subsequently detained by the regime and tortured. Some were executed by military officials, while others were shot by local law enforcement officers.

enforcement after revealing their foreign identity. In 1974, the junta decided to release and expel nearly all of the roughly 450 foreign detainees it held captive alongside Chileans at the National Stadium in a Santiago suburb. Most of them fled the country on their own, found protection in foreign embassies, or were resettled by the United Nations Refugee Agency.

Though forced disappearances of Chilean citizens occurred throughout Pinochet’s seventeen-year dictatorship, most were committed between 1974 and 1977. Amnesty International estimates that under Pinochet, 40,000 Chileans were detained, denounced, or arrested because of their association with the former Allende government. In 1974, the Chicago Commission of Inquiry in Santiago recorded the testimonies of several Chilean detainees, who remembered being brutally beaten and humiliated until they signed a document admitting to criminal acts against the Pinochet regime. Many were physically scarred from the torture, which the commission concluded was used systematically during interrogations. Over the course of the regime, three thousand individuals were either executed or disappeared.

The United States, prioritizing its economic and diplomatic relationship with Chile, was reluctant to condemn the abuses of the Pinochet dictatorship. Consequently, its response to these abuses differed greatly from that of its European and Latin American allies. When Allende was overthrown, many of his supporters sought protection in the embassies of other Latin American nations. As signatories to the Treaty of Caracas, these countries were committed to grant the refugees diplomatic asylum. Refugees overwhelmed the Argentinean, Venezuelan, Panamanian, Mexican, and Ecuadorian embassies, and the junta stationed officials outside who were poised to fire on anyone seeking refuge. To relieve the crowded embassies, European ambassadors agreed to shelter Chileans as well. The United States did not.

Though US Ambassador to Chile David Popper raised human rights concerns with Washington, the US continued to increase aid to Chile. In 1975, the United States offered $66.8 million in total to Latin American countries through the American Food for Peace program. Of this amount, $57.8 million went directly to Pinochet’s Chile, though many

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29 Ibid, 64-65.
30 Ibid.
33 Ibid, 57-58.
34 Ibid, 67; Loescher and Scanlan, “Congress and the Choice of Victims,” 95-96.
Latin American countries were considerably poorer. To avoid damaging its relationship with the Pinochet regime, the United States refused to support the resettlement initiatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Intergovernmental Commission for European Migration until 1976, when the majority of the Chilean refugees had already been resettled in Europe, Canada, and other Latin American countries.

As National Security Advisor under President Nixon, Henry Kissinger was the primary motivator behind CIA involvement in the 1973 coup. He instructed Ambassador Popper to “cut the political science lectures,” and ignored advisors who argued that US interference in Chile was inappropriate because Allende was neither a moral nor security threat to the United States. Under President Ford, Kissinger served as Secretary of State and continued to advance a policy of support for Pinochet, still claiming that the anticommunist dictatorship best served US national interest. A pro-American government in Chile, he insisted, would preserve foreign investment opportunities and US access to raw materials, as well as prevent other Latin American governments from adopting socialist policies. Americans in solidarity with the Chilean refugees, therefore, would be tasked with convincing the US government and people that supporting a military dictator would in fact be of no long-term benefit to the United States.

US Solidarity with Chilean Refugees

Five days after Allende’s ousting, President Nixon and then National Security Advisor Kissinger connected by telephone. After considering how the coup would be portrayed in the newspapers, Nixon expressed to Kissinger, “well we didn’t—as you know—our hand doesn’t show on this one though.” Kissinger agreed, confirming, “we only helped them.” In closing, the men concurred that because Allende’s presidency was “an anti-American government all the way,” the people “aren’t going to buy this crap from the Liberals on this one.”

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35 Loescher and Scanlan, “Congress and the Choice of Victims,” 97.
36 Ibid, 98.
37 Ibid, 97; Viron P. Vaky to Henry Kissinger, memorandum, “Chile – 40 Committee Meeting,” 14 September 1970, the National Security Archive.
39 Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, phone call transcript, 16 September 1973, 11:50AM, the National Security Archive.
of September 11, 1973, the two men assured each other that the extent of American involvement would not be revealed, and that a popular movement in response to the coup was unlikely to coalesce in the United States.

The very next day, a rally in front of Willard Straight Hall at Cornell University protested not only the ousting of Allende’s government, but also the United States’ role in the coup. An article printed in the Cornell Daily Sun on September 18 reports that at the rally, Professor James Petras of the State University of New York at Binghamton “accused the news media of trying to cover up United States involvement in internal Chilean affairs.”40 Less than one week after the Marxist government was overthrown, two Cornell students encouraged their peers to sign petitions that urged both the Senate Committee on Refugees and the United Nations Committee on Refugees to support the resettlement of the thousands of Chileans Pinochet was targeting.41

One month after the coup, San Jose State University Professor Patricia Fagen argued to an audience at Stanford University that “the US government’s ‘low-profile’ economic policies played just as important a role as CIA action in bringing down the Chilean government, which was a model for democracy.”42 These early reactions demonstrate that contrary to Nixon and Kissinger’s expectations, the American public suspected US involvement in the coup from the beginning, and quickly identified the Nixon Administration’s military and economic interference in Chilean affairs.

American universities and academics were crucial to the Chilean solidarity movement. While rallies and talks were held at colleges across the United States following the 1973 coup in Chile, campus opposition to US policies in Latin America was part of a broader academic movement in exploration of the region’s culture and history. As news of the human rights abuses of Pinochet’s dictatorship reached the United States, academics researched the most efficient methods of human rights “fact-finding,” and the number of courses on human rights at colleges and law schools across the country rose dramatically.43 In 1975, for example, the Committee on US-Latin American Relations (CUSLAR) at Cornell worked with professors to design a new class that allowed students to

41 Ibid.
direct their own research projects within the human rights field. Cindy Crowner, who would later become CUSLAR’s coordinator, said that this course and a later one called “The International Economic Disorder Seminar” made her a “true believer” in CUSLAR’s commitment to redirect US policy towards Latin America.\(^4^4\)

In 1974, the Latin American Studies Association (LASA) created the Emergency Committee to Aid Latin American Scholars (ECALAS), supported in part by a $25,000 grant from the Ford Foundation. ECALAS brought one hundred Chilean professors who had been persecuted by Pinochet to the United States as “visiting faculty.”\(^4^5\) Mario Valenzuela, one of Allende’s top ministers, was the fifteenth intellectual brought to an American university through ECALAS. He taught a course called “The Organization of American States” at Bowdoin College, after over half of the institution’s students and forty-five members of its faculty signed a petition urging the college’s administration to offer Valenzuela the temporary position.\(^4^6\)

Cornell University’s CUSLAR was another effective sponsor of Chilean refugees. In 1974, CUSLAR founder Bill Rogers agreed to sponsor Joel Gajardo, a Chilean Presbyterian minister, who at that time was still detained at the National Stadium in Santiago. In 1990, Rogers remembered that bringing Gajardo into the United States required that he and CUSLAR invent a job for the Chilean in order to fulfill State Department requirements. Consequently, Rogers appointed Gajardo as the committee’s director, without ever having met him.\(^4^7\)

CUSLAR had a close relationship with Friends of Chile, an ecumenical association that settled and supported several Chilean families in Ithaca and other towns in Upstate New York with the help of Cornell University and local churches.\(^4^8\) The organization took advantage of the refugees’ presence in Ithaca by bringing them to local elementary schools,

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\(^{44}\) Crowner, “CUSLAR in the 1970s,” 12.


where the Chileans discussed the implications of the Pinochet dictatorship with children. The refugees’ classroom visits were paired with CUSLAR presentations on Latin American history and the United States’ role in shaping it, an initiative that was so inspiring to the children that they wrote to the President, asking that military aid to the Chilean dictatorship be halted for good.49

Universities were important to the solidarity movement because they provided real opportunities for individuals to demonstrate their support of Chilean refugees, regardless of the federal government’s policy. Cornell rallies against US interference in Latin America over the course of the 1970s, for instance, were so effective that the CIA greatly reduced its recruitment presence at the university.50 Former Cornell student Bill Gasparini, a freshman in 1978, believed that the projects of organizations like CUSLAR and the demonstrations on his campus kept the reality of the refugees’ plight on his mind, and helped him translate lessons from campus lectures into action.51

Domestic support of the Chilean refugees, however, was hardly limited to university campuses. Religious groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) concerned with the protection of human rights were also important actors in pushing the solidarity movement with Chile forward. A significant development of the mid-1970s was their shift from grassroots organizing to lobbying at the highest levels of the government. Kenneth Cmiel, director of the University of Iowa’s Center for Human Rights, attributes this shift to the information age and the global circulation of images and literature it fostered.52

Amnesty International’s development into one of the world’s foremost investigators of human rights abuses was part of a broader call for political transparency. Founded in 1961, the organization expressed in its bylaws, for example, that “information is the core of the work of the movement.”53 Amnesty’s movement grew quickly; between 1970 and 1976, membership in Amnesty International USA jumped from 6,000 to 35,000 individuals. The organization, at the first ever congressional hearing on human rights in 1973, encouraged Congress to participate in “the maximum exchange of information.”54

54 Ibid.
Amnesty International started publishing and circulating reports on its investigative missions in 1973, thus supporting the rapidly growing community of US human rights NGOs with credible facts as they lobbied for a tougher congressional stance on the violations of the Pinochet dictatorship. Many smaller NGOs sent their own fact-finding missions to Chile, as well. After 1975, the Chilean exile community in the United States also supported US NGOs’ lobbying efforts by providing them with lists of political prisoners and the disappeared, which the NGOs then took to their allies in Congress.

The founding of the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) reflected the US NGO community’s new focus on Congress. WOLA was born out of the Latin American Strategy Committee (LASC), an association of North American church groups with a focus on justice and peace in Latin America. After the Pinochet coup, the coalition came together and created WOLA with an intent to “move into high gear, with primary attention now on the Congress.” WOLA lobbied Congress and provided congressmen sympathetic to the Chilean refugees with the information they needed to further their cause.

WOLA was one of several religious-based institutions that made major contributions to the Chilean solidarity movement. In reaction to the horrors committed against both Allende’s supporters and the refugees he had welcomed into Chile, nearly fifteen religious organizations criticized US policy on the basis that it was “immoral and indefensible” through a petition addressed to President Gerald Ford in 1974. In this petition, the signatories also claimed that American missionaries in Chile had observed and felt the real effects of the United States’ covert interventions, and therefore had a unique perspective on the gravity of the Pinochet regime’s abuses.

Frederick McGuire of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) traveled to Chile in 1974, and his report of the

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55 In the early 1970s, there were several human rights NGOs lobbying Congress; by 1980 there were over fifty; Cmiel, “The Emergence of Human Rights in the United States,” 1237; Amnesty International, “Chile: an Amnesty International report,” 1974.


experience reflects other religious organizations’ moral objection to US policy in Latin America. Like the petition’s signatories, he too expressed the belief that his first-hand knowledge of the conditions in Pinochet’s Chile made his account valuable to Congress.\textsuperscript{60} McGuire and the USCCB as a whole called on Congress to reduce US aid to the regime until it could demonstrate that it had put an end to systematic abuses of human rights.\textsuperscript{61}

The NGOs and religious groups who lobbied Congress for increased attention to the victims of Pinochet’s dictatorship found important allies in Senator Edward Kennedy and Representative Robert Drinan. Shortly after the coup, Kennedy called on the US government to “provide asylum and resettlement opportunities under appropriate provisions of the immigration and nationality act to a reasonable number of political refugees.”\textsuperscript{62} Similarly, Drinan suggested to the House “that the United States give the same treatment to those suffering persecution in Chile as we have given to Hungarian freedom fighters and the refugees from Fidel Castro’s Cuba.”\textsuperscript{63} Both within one week of the 1973 coup, Kennedy and Drinan introduced bills to admit Chilean refugees into the United States. Congress’s resistance to welcoming Marxists into the country, however, prevented their success. In response to Drinan’s bill, Representative John Rarick wrote that “influential Americans are assisting these Chileans by urging the US Government to provide asylum for these so-called ‘political refugees,’ who are equated with genuine escapees from Hungary and Cuba.”\textsuperscript{64} For Rarick, a ‘refugee’ was someone who had resisted communism abroad, not a committed supporter of Allende’s Marxist government.\textsuperscript{65}

Nevertheless, Drinan and Kennedy kept the plight of Chilean refugees on Congress’s agenda. In 1974, Kennedy won Congress’s approval on an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act. The Kennedy Amendment, as it would be known, set a $25 million ceiling on assistance to Chile while prohibiting the use of those funds towards security


\textsuperscript{61} Conferencia Episcopal de los EEUU, “Declaración de solidaridad de la Conferencia Nacional de Obispos Católicos de los Estados Unidos,” in \textit{Chile: Masacre de un pueblo, cristianos frente a los hechos, resistencia y solidaridad} (Lima: Centro de Estudios y Publicaciones, 1974): 194.

\textsuperscript{62} Edward Kennedy, as quoted in Power, “The US Movement in Solidarity with Chile in the 1970s,” 55.

\textsuperscript{63} Robert Drinan, as quoted in Loescher and Scanlan, “Congress and the Choice of Victims,” 97.

\textsuperscript{64} John Rarick, as quoted in Calandra, “The Good Americans,” 28.

\textsuperscript{65} Power, “The US Movement in Solidarity with Chile in the 1970s,” 55.
assistance or arms sales. Senator Kennedy in particular would be a positive force behind the eventual establishment of the 1975 parole program for Chileans.

Though his initiatives were not in explicit support of resettling Chilean refugees in the United States, Representative Tom Harkin was an important supporter of Representative Drinan and Senator Kennedy in Congress. In September 1975, he secured passage of the Harkin Amendment to the Foreign Service Act, which established that countries whose governments engaged in “gross and persistent” human rights violations would not be eligible for economic and military assistance from the United States. The following year, he and an aide traveled to Chile on a fact-finding mission. Harkin and his aide broke into Villa Grimaldi, a secret police headquarters and torture center in Santiago that the dictatorship had insisted did not exist. Harkin’s confirmation of its existence forced the Pinochet regime to publically acknowledge the center just as Pinochet, concerned about cuts to US aid to his regime, had been trying to convince Congress that Chile was “making progress” in human rights.

These actors—American universities, non-governmental organizations, religious groups, and certain congressmen—complemented each other to consolidate a broad, public condemnation of US policy into a single well-rounded solidarity movement, which ultimately brought Chilean refugees to the United States. Though each were important contributors to the movement, they depended on one another. The congressmen, for example, relied on NGOs to provide witnesses for their congressional hearings on human rights and foreign policy. The witnesses’ moving testimonies, in conjunction with other congressional initiatives, illuminated the regime’s routine violation of human rights. The accounts would help garner support for the 1975 parole program, as well as establish the regime’s ineligibility for US aid. NGOs, religious groups, and activists on university campuses depended on the congressmen in Washington to convert their demonstrations and research into legislation. Cindy Crowner of CUSLAR recalls sending Cornell University students to Washington to lobby the nation’s

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66 Loescher and Scanlan, “Congress and the Choice of Victims,” 100.
congressmen, where they “marched through the halls of Congress urging all kinds of senators and congresspersons to oppose further aid [to Chile].”

Civilian activists and congressmen thus worked together to change US policy towards Pinochet’s regime.

The Successes of US Solidarity with Chileans

The US solidarity movement had to address two principal obstacles in its effort to redirect US government policy. First, Pinochet’s targets were the supporters of Allende, a Marxist. Given the Cold War context, conservatives in Congress were reluctant to admit known leftists fleeing an anticommunist and pro-American government into the United States. Secondly, the movement had to challenge Kissinger’s presumption that keeping socialists out of power in Chile was in the United States’ national interest, as this idea was his justification for ignoring the tremendous human rights abuses that occurred in Pinochet’s Chile.

The solidarity movement could not change the Chilean refugees’ political ideology, but the discussion that surrounds the movement indicates an effort to take on Kissinger’s definition of what would most benefit the United States.

In supporting the Pinochet coup, the United States was behind the violence that tore down the oldest democracy in South America. As discussions regarding the facilitation of Allende’s ousting began in 1970, Viron Vaky of the National Security Council expressed to Kissinger that “what we propose is patently a violation of our own principles and policy tenets.” In her talk at Stanford, Professor Patricia Fagen referred to the power Kissinger and Nixon wielded in crafting US policy towards Chile, and said, “presumably only in totalitarian countries are such far-ranging decisions made in secret by one or two men.” At his inauguration in 1977, President Jimmy Carter proposed that “the best way to enhance freedom in other lands is to demonstrate here that our democratic system is worthy of emulation.”

The expressed concerns of Vaky, Fagen, and Carter over the course of the 1970s each connect the United States’

73 Falcoff, “Chile, Pinochet, the Opposition, and the United States,” 193.
involvement in Latin America to a concern for the health of the United States’ democracy. With the condition of US democracy highlighted by the celebration of its bicentennial, one could have argued that nothing was more in the best interest of the country than the restoration of the principles upon which it was founded.

In a 1974 article that acknowledged the CIA had sent $8 million to Allende’s opposition between 1970 and 1973, *Time Magazine* painted Chile as “much more a totalitarian than a democratic state.” Most of the journals and magazines of the era that discussed the Chilean military dictatorship similarly linked the CIA to Chile’s crumbled democracy. From magazine readers to government officials, Americans observed the United States’ support of a dictator’s destruction of a democracy and were disheartened. That an assertion as provocative as the purported failure of American democracy caught on, however, is indicative of the historical moment in which the 1973 coup occurred.

As the Vietnam War wound down and the Watergate scandal unfolded, by 1973 the US government’s willingness to intervene in the affairs of sovereign nations and act in a secretive, unethical manner was well known. Americans, consequently, understood the covert interference in Chilean politics within these terms. Drawing this connection between the United States’ involvement in Vietnam and in Chile, Cornell student Jack Schrager wrote to the editor of the *Cornell Daily Sun* in 1973 claiming that activists in defense of the victimized Chileans did not demand changes of Pinochet, but the attention of the US government. Schrager argued that the “anti-war agitators of the sixties’ demonstrated with the same desire to challenge their government’s interference in the affairs of a sovereign nation.

While Congress authorized the Vietnam War with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964, US covert involvement in Chile excluded Congress and involved CIA action purely on the orders of the President. Though the nature of US interference in Vietnam and Chile was different, at the heart of the popular response to both situations was the same rejection of the government’s imperialist tendencies abroad. In a publication entitled “Viet-Report,” for example, the North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) argued that “Vietnam was not an isolated case.” Even before the Pinochet coup occurred, NACLA drew parallels between US imperialism in Vietnam and in Latin America, cautioning that intervention in the Western Hemisphere would be just as

devastating to the United States as the conflict in Vietnam had been. Both NACLA and Community Action on Latin America, a research center founded in 1971, released publications titled “The Vietnamization of Latin America,” and pointed to a pivot of US imperialist tendencies from Asia to Latin America. 80

The dishonesty behind the Watergate scandal further discouraged Americans about the reality of their government’s decision-making. 81 The evidence confirming the President’s guilt in the 1972 break-in of the Democratic National Committee Headquarters mounted just months before the public would learn of the CIA’s support of the 1973 Chilean coup. Joseph Eldridge, the founder of WOLA and the aide who accompanied Representative Harkin on his 1976 fact-finding mission to Santiago, demonstrated the degree of public disillusionment with the US government after Watergate by pointing to the results of the 1974 midterm elections. In a 2004 interview, Eldridge remembered that of the ninety-two members elected to Congress, three-fourths were Democrats. He referred to them as the “Watergate babies” and explains that “they were angling for change; they were willing to take on the government, they were reformers, they were the people who were instrumental in pushing this reform along.” 82

The religious organizations that signed the aforementioned petition to President Gerald Ford in 1974, the same year as WOLA’s founding, articulated the particular reform sought in the aftermath of Watergate. The scandal, they wrote, proved that the United States’ “gangster methods” used across the Third World “[would] eventually be turned against our own citizens.” 83 Watergate highlighted the distance between the people of the United States and their government, and proved that the dishonest government itself was the biggest threat to the democracy it was supposed to protect.

The US government classified national interest as the opposition of leftist gains in the Western Hemisphere and the dominance of the US economy abroad, but the American people were alienated from their country’s leadership following the Vietnam War and the Watergate Scandal. As citizens of a country whose government exercised “gangster methods,” their perception of the United States’ foremost national priority looked inwards, and called for the restoration of democratic and

80 Ibid, 23.
principled leadership. It was this historical and social context created by the aftermath of the Vietnam War and Watergate that allowed a movement in support of Chilean refugees to take hold in the United States, even though the US government had supported the right-wing dictator that caused the outflow of refugees in the first place.

The principal success of this solidarity movement was the establishment of the Special Parole Program for Chilean Refugees in June 1975, made possible in large part by Senator Kennedy. In September 1974, the Chilean government announced that it would release the majority of its detainees if foreign governments would accept them.84 Following the Chilean government’s announcement, the Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs called on the State Department to develop a parole program for the Chileans, a proposal that took over seven months to reach the Attorney General because of resistance from the Nixon and Ford administrations as well as from much of Congress. The State Department and the proposal’s supporters in Congress, addressing the suspect political affiliations of the refugees, insisted that this program would not involve the “blanket admission” of Chileans, that very few would be admitted, and that none would be communists.85 The Special Parole Program for Chilean Refugees, nevertheless, did bring approximately one thousand individuals to the United States who brought fresh energy to the solidarity movement.86

At this time, many Americans found ways to further commit themselves to solidarity with the Chilean refugees. The parole program, for example, required that Chileans obtain private sponsors before entering the United States, though the government did not provide the refugees with the resources to identify them. Churches across the country responded to this need, and helped connect Chilean refugees with American families that would sponsor them. Seventy-five of the four hundred families that came to the United States through the 1975 parole program took advantage of the sponsoring services offered by the Lutheran Council.87 In 1976, one Lutheran refugee sponsor wrote, “The Chilean experience is sensitizing us to repression and human need in a much more personal way than could ever be known by writing out a check for charity.”88 It was through sponsoring the refugees and hearing

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their stories that many Americans grasped the effect of their government on Chile and its people.89

The successful establishment of the 1975 parole program, however, was a qualified success in three ways. First, Kissinger continued to rationalize the program in terms that adhered to his own definition of the United States’ best interest. He described the program to admit Chilean refugees as a “cosmetic operation” that was necessary because at the same time, the United States was asking the rest of the world to accept Vietnamese refugees.90 After the program was established, Senator Kennedy expressed frustration with Kissinger’s perspective, emphasizing disappointment in his discovery that “the red tape barriers suddenly were broken” once the resettlement of Vietnamese refugees was brought into the equation.91

Secondly, even after the passage of the 1975 Special Parole Program for Chilean Refugees, a reluctance to refer to the victims of Pinochet’s dictatorship as ‘refugees’ still existed in the US government. An October 1976 briefing for President Ford on a meeting between Secretaries Simon and Kissinger and several Chilean officials, written over a year after the enactment of the parole program, reported that “[t]he Chilean Government has released several hundred prisoners into exile in recent months.”92 This fact was portrayed as an accomplishment of the military government, an achievement in itself. While certainly a necessary step towards the resettlement of those several hundred prisoners, the briefing did not include that these exiled individuals would then be considered ‘refugees.’

The briefing proceeds to claim that the Chilean government had “committed itself to continue the US parole program and other similar programs,” transitioning between the creation and the resettlement of a refugee population still without once using the appropriate term to describe them.93 Routine references to Chilean ‘refugees’ would have been damaging to the Executive, as each use of the word would insult the anticommunist regime, as well as highlight the US government’s historic support of a dictatorship that had committed such abuses of human rights. Though the parole program was explicitly for Chilean refugees, this briefing’s avoidance of the word demonstrated a limit of the solidarity movement’s ability to influence the highest levels of the government.

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91 Edward Kennedy as quoted in Loescher and Scanlan, “Congress and the Choice of Victims,” 99-100.
92 “Issues Briefing Book: Box 8; Issue: Chile,” October 1976, Gerald R Ford Presidential Library.
93 Ibid.
Lastly, the parole program did relatively little to resettle the Chilean refugee population in the United States. By the time the US even agreed to welcome four hundred families through the 1975 legislation, Canada had already settled two thousand.\textsuperscript{94} The program was not open to Chileans who feared future persecution from the military dictatorship; only Chileans currently in prisons were eligible. Those who were members of the Communist party, had participated in leftist revolutionary movements, belonged to “other terrorist groups,” or had a criminal record were also barred.\textsuperscript{95} This final requirement was a real obstacle to most of the Chilean refugees, who fled their country precisely because they had supported its Marxist government. Further, Pinochet had criminalized support of Allende, a move that left many with a criminal record.\textsuperscript{96}

The 1975 parole program was one of several important successes of the solidarity movement. The allegation of US involvement in the Pinochet coup pushed Senator Frank Church to organize the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. The Church Committee, as it would be known, conducted hearings on US covert action and intelligence abuses during the 1970s.\textsuperscript{97} Like the Chilean solidarity movement’s activists, Church was concerned with the state of US democracy. On NBC’s Meet the Press in August 1975, in fact, Church came one step short of classifying American democracy as a failure by explaining that he knew “the capacity that is there to make tyranny total in America.” The potential for a dictator to take charge in the country existed, he explained, because of the “capacity that the intelligence community has given the government.”\textsuperscript{98} Church, whose committee also exposed the CIA and FBI for opening citizens’ mail, had already found the government to have abused that capacity.

The Church Committee confirmed in the very first sentence of its 1976 report that “[c]overt United States involvement in Chile in the decade between 1963 and 1973 was extensive and continuous.”\textsuperscript{99} This report, among other studies on government abuses of intelligence by the Church Committee, would cause President Ford to ban future US

\begin{footnotes}
\item[94] Power, “The US Movement in Solidarity with Chile in the 1970s,” 55.
\item[96] Ibid.
\item[97] Falcoff, “Chile, Pinochet, the Opposition, and the United States,” 186.
\item[98] Frank Church as quoted in Walter Pincus, “This NSA history has a familiar ring to it,” \textit{The Washington Post}, 19 May 2014.
\end{footnotes}
support of assassinations of foreign leaders through a 1976 executive order, as well as to legally restrict the ability of the CIA to gather intelligence in the future.\(^{100}\)

Finally, President Jimmy Carter shared the solidarity movement’s view that US foreign policy must be consistent with the country’s democratic principles. In reaction to the human rights violations ignored by the Nixon and Ford administrations, Carter ran on a campaign that championed consideration of human rights as a necessary component of US foreign policy, demonstrating a redefinition of the United States’ priorities abroad. In a debate with Ford before the election, Carter accused Ford’s administration of having “overthrown an elected government and helped to establish a dictatorship in Chile.”\(^{101}\) Carter trusted that highlighting the Republican’s involvement in the destruction of a democracy would be a familiar point to a public sensitive to the topic.

Once in office, Carter’s stance with Pinochet was firmer than that of his predecessors. Indicative of human rights’ new role in US policy, a declassified National Intelligence daily cable from July 1977 stated that Chile was still “a long way off” from reestablishing the democracy it once had. The document also suggested, however, that “if the [Chilean] government follow[ed] through on its recent proposed actions [to relax the government’s emergency powers], the most blatant aspects of repression would be eased.” Pinochet, the document continued, “expect[ed] the US to react positively to these gestures.”\(^{102}\) By 1977, Pinochet recognized that the United States was no longer prepared to tolerate his treatment of internal dissenters to his dictatorship. Pinochet’s recognition of the need to moderate his repressive regime suggested that in this regard, Carter upheld his welcomed promise to restore “the moral stature” the United States once exemplified in the world.\(^{103}\)

\(^{100}\) Power, “The US Movement in Solidarity with Chile in the 1970s,” 54; The CIA had been behind the assassination of the Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean army René Schneider in 1970 because he proved an obstacle to plans to overthrow Allende.

\(^{101}\) Jimmy Carter as quoted in Falcoff, “Chile, Pinochet, the Opposition, and the United States,” 194.

\(^{102}\) “Chile: Pinochet’s Return to Civilian Rule,” 16 July 1977, National Intelligence Daily Cable, the National Security Archive.

Conclusions

In order to protect the predominance of US political and economic interests abroad, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger advocated a realpolitik pragmatism that in practice required supporting military dictators guilty of gross human rights violations. On the heels of both the Vietnam War and Watergate, however, the American public was disillusioned with a US government that demonstrated such imperialism and dishonesty, and feared that the nation’s leadership had lost sight of its commitment to democracy. Those who rallied in support of the Chilean refugees saw the restoration of democratic government in the United States as the country’s foremost national interest, as opposed to the dominance of its economy abroad or the restriction of communism in the Western Hemisphere.

A movement primarily concerned with the health of American democracy was not composed of leftist activists seeking the re-establishment of Allende’s Marxism in Chile. Instead, the efforts of scholars on university campuses, committed lobbyists and fact-finders in religious groups and NGOs, and Representative Drinan and Senator Kennedy in Congress complemented each other and formed a single front that ultimately achieved the establishment of the 1975 Special Parole Program for Chilean Refugees, among other gains.

By 1980, CUSLAR was using its “fires of awareness and action” and financial resources to support Upstate New York chapters of the Network in Solidarity with Guatemala, the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador, and the Nicaragua Network.104 In the mid-1980s, WOLA published the first major report documenting the Nicaraguan Contras’ human rights abuses, while the office’s founder, Joseph Eldridge, promoted human rights and development in Honduras.105 Many other organizations and individuals who identified and acted upon a concern for Chile during the 1970s were similarly propelled by the solidarity movement, and committed to continued advocacy for Latin America after having been part of the powerful coalition for Chile. Perhaps the most enduring legacy of the Chilean solidarity movement is that in placing Latin America, human rights, and

US imperialism within the United States’ popular political conscience, the movement laid the groundwork for solidarity movements that in 1973 were unforeseen.
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