

**ENGENDERING THE LAND GRAB:
DEVELOPMENT, INVOLUNTARY RESETTLEMENT, AND THE
STRUGGLES FOR SOCIAL REPRODUCTION IN COASTAL TANZANIA**

A Thesis

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by

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ABSRTACT

This thesis engages with the feminist concept of 'social reproduction' to arrive at a richer understanding of the gendered processes and outcomes of land grabbing. It focuses on a case of a contemporary land deal for sugarcane production in the Coast Region of Tanzania and the resultant process of involuntary resettlement. It critically examines the technical ways in which involuntary resettlement is planned and managed, and the multi-faceted ways in which rural women and men experience the disruption of their pre-existing modes of social reproduction. It argues that land grabbing, or the enclosure of rural landscapes more generally, does more than strip peasants and pastoralists of their means of production and turns them into wage labourers. It uproots them from the cultural practices, socio-ecological knowledges, and historical memory that are deeply rooted on the land, and dislocates them from complex webs of gender relations of power, which must be renegotiated.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Youjin Chung is a Ph.D. student in the Department of Development Sociology at Cornell University. She received her joint B.A. in International Studies and Journalism and Mass Communications at Korea University, and her M.Phil. in Development Studies at Jesus College, University of Cambridge.

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INTRODUCTION

Tanzania is among the top African countries targeted by foreign investors in the contemporary global land rush (Anseeuw et al. 2012). While obtaining precise data on transnational land transfers remains a challenge, it is estimated that over 30 deals amounting to one million hectares have been announced, negotiated, or signed in Tanzania within the last decade (c.f. Locher and Sulle 2014).¹ The so-called “land grabbing” in Tanzania has not only been accelerated by the convergence of the global food, fuel, finance, and climate crises (Borras et al. 2011; McMichael 2012), but also by the state’s committed push to “bring about a *green revolution*” (URT 2013a, v, original emphasis) by transforming agriculture into a “modernised, commercial, highly productive and profitable sector” (OECD 2013, 29).² Over the past several years, a wide range of civil society activists, researchers, journalists, and politicians have challenged the lack of transparency in recent large-scale land deals, and raised concerns about the impact of state-sponsored land grabbing on rural livelihoods. However, the Minister for Lands, Housing, and Human Settlements Development has dismissed such critical voices as unconstructive “sensations” (AgroEcoEnergy Tanzania 2014a), and is currently championing a new policy framework for stimulating foreign direct investments in land for agriculture.

This so-called ‘Land for Equity’ policy seeks to promote partnerships between the Tanzanian government and foreign investors in which the former provides land free of

¹ Locher and Sulle (2014, 583) suggest that only ten deals amounting to 145,000 hectares are considered “legally concluded”. On the other hand, the Land Matrix data as of October 2014 indicates that 28 deals covering approximately 276,000 hectares have been concluded, either through oral agreement or written contract. Other organisations, such as the Oakland Institute (2011) and GRAIN (2012, cited in Locher and Sulle 2014) provide entirely different figures, attesting to the challenges of collecting quantitative data on land deals in Tanzania.

² This goal is supported by high-profile national, regional, and international agricultural initiatives, such as Kilimo Kwanza (Agriculture First), the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania, Big Results Now, the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme, the Alliance for Green Revolution in Africa, Grow Africa, and the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition.

encumbrance for up to 99 years, in exchange for at least 25 per cent equity share in the investment (URT 2012a). While the policy is yet to be drafted, it is being piloted regardless through a commercial sugarcane development project in Bagamoyo District in the Coast Region – also known as the Bagamoyo EcoEnergy (BEE) Sugar Project. This public-private partnership between the Tanzanian government and a Swedish company, EcoEnergy, involves 20,374 hectares of land, and over half a billion dollars in total investment costs. While the title deed was issued to EcoEnergy in mid-2013, the actual project implementation remains at a standstill as of this writing. I argue this is because the land deal requires the eviction of over 1,400 peasants and pastoralists, who have been subsisting and residing on the land for many years, even generations. These individuals, their families, and communities are not just awaiting physical displacement from their homes and dispossession from their means of production. They are experiencing gradual dislocation from their everyday cultural practices, socio-ecological knowledge, and historical memory, which are deeply rooted on the land, and which are strongly articulated through gender.

To explain the dispossessions associated with contemporary land deals, many authors have turned to the Marxist concepts of ‘primitive accumulation’ and ‘accumulation by dispossession (ABD)’ (see e.g. Baird 2011; Ballvé 2012; Levien 2012, 2013; Moyo et al. 2012; Adnan 2013). These concepts are indeed useful for historicising the current bout of transnational land deals as an expression of, and as responses to, the crisis of neoliberal capitalism, and for explaining how displacement and dispossession are inherent to capitalist development. However, I argue that they are insufficient for explaining the gendered processes and outcomes of contemporary land deals, let alone other means through which capital continues to encroach upon rural landscapes. This is because primitive accumulation and ABD are constrained by their androcentric and capitalocentric approaches to understanding land and labour, and hence fail to fully account for the complex gender dynamics and realities of social life on the land for

agrarian households.

The overarching aim of this paper is to embed gender, or to correct the “overwhelming gender-blindness” (Daley 2011, 14), in the global land grab debate. I start by sketching in broad strokes what I am calling a ‘feminist ontology of the land grab’. Central to this approach is the concept of ‘social reproduction’. This concept is more explicitly gendered, nuanced, and humanistic than the notion of ‘reproduction’, which is invoked by orthodox Marxists and laden in the ideas of primitive accumulation and ABD. Against the dominant land grab ontology that abstracts land as a commodity and a factor of production, the feminist ontology conceptualises land as a broader site and source of social reproduction. I argue that social reproduction allows us to see the multiple uses and values of land and labour that give significance to life for rural women and men. In addition, it allows us to examine gender as a constitutive element in defining and mediating peoples’ relationships to and lived experiences on the land, and as a signifier of power within households. From Section 2 onwards, I focus on the case study of the BEE Sugar Project. I elaborate on the processes of land acquisition and involuntary resettlement associated with this project, particularly focusing on how compensation for displacement is being valued, and how the local populations are being “prepared” for imminent displacement. I argue that the technical ways in which involuntary resettlement is planned and managed leads to the fragmentation of pre-existing modes of social reproduction; it leads to the systematic devaluation of the polyvalence of land and labour, and glosses over the unequal gender relations of power that operate within Tanzanian society. Nonetheless, the ways in which rural women and men experience and respond to involuntary resettlement are deeply gendered – i.e. they are shaped and constrained by the patriarchal ideologies that are entrenched and reproduced within households.

The empirical findings presented in this paper are based on fieldwork conducted in August 2013 and July-August 2014. I draw upon in-depth interviews with 47 people

from 40 households (22 women, 25 men), and three focus groups involving 34 people – all of whom are facing involuntary resettlement induced by the BEE Sugar Project. I also build on data collected from semi-structured and unstructured interviews with 35 key informants – including village leaders, district and ministerial government officials, EcoEnergy executive and consultants, local researchers, activists, and lawyers working on issues of land, gender, and development.

1. TOWARDS A FEMINIST ONTOLOGY OF THE LAND GRAB

In order to engender our understandings of the land grab, we cannot simply “add women and stir” (Harding 1995). Engendering is about taking gender seriously as a relational and analytical category and an ideological process, which defines what it means to be women and men, female and male, and feminine and masculine in a given society (Barrett 1980; Scott 1988; Fraad et al. 1989). It also is about being keenly aware of how gender intersects with class, race, ethnicity, marital status, sex, age, and other identity categories to mediate the relations of power and inequality. As Joan Scott emphasises, feminist scholarship is less about highlighting the important role and deeds of women than exposing the “silent and hidden operations of gender that are nonetheless present and defining forces in the organisation of most societies” (1988, 25). Before elaborating on the concept of ‘social reproduction’, which lies at the heart of the feminist ontology, I highlight the limits of primitive accumulation and ABD for engendering the land grab.

Limits of primitive accumulation and ABD

Primitive accumulation refers to the violent process through which capitalism emerges from pre-capitalist agrarian social formations: the enclosure of the commons, the expulsion of peasants from their land, and their forcible transformation into wage

labourers (Marx [1884] 1976]). Harvey's (2003) updated concept of ABD signifies the ongoing nature of primitive accumulation in the contemporary era; it is the central mechanism through which capitalism 'reproduces' itself over time. Reproduction à la orthodox Marxism consists of: a) the daily maintenance of the workers' labour power; b) the continued extraction of surplus value through the exploitation of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie; and c) the biological reproduction of human beings or future labour power. As Marx ([1884] 1976, 711) puts it, the "process of production is at the same time a process of reproduction". This inter-connected process, however, is distinctly *class-based* in orthodox Marxist theory, and has significance in so far as it expands the 'public' sphere of the commodified market economy.

However, as Marxist and socialist feminists have long critiqued, privileging the 'public' sphere and silencing the 'private' sphere of the unwaged domesticity has far-reaching consequences. It eclipses the fact that capitalism has thrived on the co-existence of waged and unwaged labour, and especially the exploitation of the latter (Martin and Beittel 1987; Fraad et al. 1989). It also degrades women's social status to a mere biological "machine for the production of new workers" (Federici 2004, 12), and devalues women's housework and care work, which are unwaged, but still socially necessary for ensuring the well-being of all human beings, regardless of their position vis-à-vis the capitalist labour market (c.f. Dalla Costa and James 1972; Federici 1975, 2004; Malos 1980; Mies 1986; Picchio 1992). Furthermore, it naturalises and trivialises patriarchy that predates capitalism for over five millennia, and conceals the fact that capitalism, as we know it, depends on it for its continuity (Connell 1987; von Werlhof 2007). As Derek Sayer (1991,19) argues, patriarchy is "not just a feudal 'survival'; it has been an axial principle of *bürgerliche Gesellschaft*, produced and reproduced as surely as the relation of capitalist and worker itself".

Even the classical writers on the agrarian question who were concerned about primitive accumulation recognised the importance of women's labour, but disregarded

its analytical significance. For instance, Kautsky argued that the survival of the proletarian household depended on the “drudgery and squandered energies of the housewife” ([1899] 1988, 172), and referred to women as “the most willing and unremitting beast of burden”, on which “the proletarian can therefore cling to” ([1899] 198, 449). Similarly, Teodor Shanin, in his political sociology of the peasantry in the early twentieth century Russia, notes that “women, in spite of their heavy burden of labour (both housework and fieldwork) and their functional importance in a peasant household, were considered second-class members of the community, and nearly always placed under the authority of a male” (1972, 29). None of these gender-charged statements are substantiated with explanations of the historical, cultural, political, and ideological processes that consign women to inferior social position vis-à-vis men, and how capital interacts with patriarchy in transforming peasant economies. While the works of these authors are without doubt invaluable, a gender-informed analysis that pays attention to multiple uses and values of labour that lie beyond the ‘public’ sphere would have rendered more complex understandings of peasant dispossession and differentiation.

Not only in relation to labour, but primitive accumulation and ABD are also limited by their androcentric and capitalocentric approaches to land. The questions of who has land, who gets land, what do they do with it, how and why cannot be answered without an analysis of the interlocking hierarchies of class, gender, ethnicity, age, and other forms of inequalities. However, because primitive accumulation and ABD tend to assume that land is a commodity, private property, or physical resource to be dominated by humans for ‘productive’ use, they pre-empt the exploration of the polyvalence of land (c.f. McMichael 2014; Li 2014). By this I mean the multiple and overlapping ways in which land is accessed, used, controlled, and valued by rural women and men (Rocheleau et al. 1996; Tsikata and Golah 2010), and how property, inclusive of private, public, and communal, exists in a complex web of social

relationships and institutions (Berry 1989; Bates 1987; Alexander and Penalver 2010). For instance, as Radcliffe (2013) demonstrates in the case of Ecuador, indigenous women articulate their historical land claims not necessarily based on their class identities, but on their ethnicity and gender, while rejecting a stark division between collective and individual property rights. Federici (2004) and Linebaugh (2008) further argue that women have been more dependent on land and the commons than men throughout history, and have been the most penalised by their privatization and commodification. In addition to their materiality, Federici (2004) highlights that the commons were, for women in Medieval Europe, the centre of social life, the place where they convened to exchange news, to carry out cultural activities, and to form their own viewpoints autonomously from men. There is a strong parallel between her idea of gendered commons and what Rocheleau and Edmunds (1997, 1355) refer to as “micro-frontiers” in contemporary rural Africa. In these niche spaces – e.g. kitchen gardens, scattered patches of uncultivated land, or bushes along the roadside – women exercise greater control than what they normally would in their family plots (which are often controlled by their husbands or male elder kin), and are able to access valuable resources, such as fuelwood and medicinal plants, to meet their personal, household, and communal responsibilities.

The key point is that land enclosures, or land grabbing, does more than immediately strip peasants and pastoralists of their means of production and turns them into wage labourers. It uproots them from the cultural practices, situated knowledges, and historical memory that shape their individual and collective identities, and dislocates them from complex webs of gender relations of power, which must be renegotiated. These combined processes of displacement, dispossession, and dislocation can be as rapid as they can be slow, as visible as they can be invisible. As Feldman and Geisler (2012, 974) argue, “*in situ* displacement” – i.e. a situation in which people are displaced *in place* through the loss of entitlements, social exclusion, and alienation of

rights and identities – can be as traumatising as physical eviction itself. They emphasise that this type of unseen displacement silently accumulates human insecurity and results in the failure of peoples' capacity to “socially reproduce everyday lives and livelihoods” (ibid.). But what does it mean to be socially reproducing? And what does impaired social reproduction look like?

Bringing the 'social' back in reproduction

At the crux of the feminist ontology of the land grab is the concept of 'social reproduction', which has been used widely by feminist scholars across the disciplines. Laslett and Brenner (1989, 382-3) refer to social reproduction as the “activities and attitudes, behaviours and emotions, responsibilities and relationships directly involved in the maintenance of life on a daily basis, and intergenerationally”. Cameron (2006, 45) also includes the transmission of a “historical legacy of skills, knowledge, and moral values” as well as the “individual and collective identities” from one generation to the next. Katz (2001, 711) defines it as the “fleshy, messy and the indeterminate stuff of everyday life”, and O'Brien (1989, 8) calls it a “pregnant term”, alluding to the difficulty of defining something that is so integral to life (c.f. Silvey 2009). Picchio (1992, 98) suggests that social reproduction is something that allows “people to feel like human beings in a system that treats them like commodities”. Notwithstanding the subtle variations, I believe feminist scholars are consciously using the term to distinguish it from, and to rescue the humanism that is lost in, the orthodox Marxist notion of 'reproduction'.

Social reproduction occurs at multiple levels (e.g. household, market, state) and can be associated with various social formations. However, for the purpose of this paper, I focus on the level of the household in agrarian societies undergoing capitalist transformation. I define social reproduction as an amalgamation of diverse labour processes – both paid and unpaid, material and immaterial, individual and communal –

which are necessary for the sustenance and resilience of human life. What is unique about agrarian households is that their labour processes (i.e. the transformation of their labour power into labour) occurs on, with, and through land. To illustrate, in addition to using their farmland for producing food according to the seasons, rural Tanzanians depend daily on forests for gathering fuelwood, timber, medicinal plants, and other tree resources required for cultural rituals; grasses for thatching and weaving; meadows and pastures for grazing livestock; and rivers, ponds, and dams for fetching water, catching fish, watering livestock, and collecting clay and sand for making cooking pots. In other words, there is a strong unity between what are often separated as 'productive' and 'reproductive' activities for agrarian households (c.f. Katz 1991).

The labour processes that constitute social reproduction are primarily mediated by gender. Moreover, the repetition of these gendered labour processes on a daily and intergenerational basis has the effect of reifying the dominant identities of women as mothers, housewives, caretakers, and agricultural labours. Bryceson (1995) argues that such ideological construction of womanhood in Tanzania stems from the historical legacy of slavery and servitude, as well as the patriarchal norms that are produced and reproduced most intimately within households. Agrarian households, however, are hardly natural, isomorphic or altruistic units. Rather, they are a "battleground over patriarchy" (Friedmann 1986: 192), in which daughters, sons, wives, and junior kin do not automatically acquiesce in the authority of the male head of the household, but constantly bargain, negotiate, resist, and/or adapt to unequal relations of power (c.f. Whitehead 1981; Guyer and Peters 1987; Watts 1989; Carney and Watts 1990; Schroeder 1999).

The definition of social reproduction I provided above is intentionally broader than the approach taken by some contemporary feminist political economists, who pit the "unpaid care economy" against the "commodity economy", and attempt to calculate its value within national income statistics (c.f. Razavi 2007; Folbre 2006). While


such distinctions help politicise the invisible work of the women carried out in the home, they still operate within the public-private dualism that have characterised both mainstream and Marxist analyses of capitalism. As Dorothy Smith stresses: “It is only in capitalism that we find an economic process constituted independently of the daily and generational production of the lives of particular individuals and *in which therefore we can think economy apart from gender*” (1983, 2, original emphasis). My aim is to move beyond these rigid boundaries and to demonstrate that production and reproduction are in fact mutually constituted, and nested within a broader field of social reproduction.

To recapitulate, social reproduction is analytically important as it lends the following two key insights for engendering the land grab. First, it allows us to see the multiple uses and values of land and labour, and how the intimate mixing of the two ensures the sustenance and resilience of agrarian lives and livelihoods. Second, it allows us to examine gender as a constitutive element in shaping people’s relationships to and experiences on the land, and as a signifier of power within households. Hence, land grabbing, or the enclosure of rural landscapes more generally, will likely result in the fragmentation of the polyvalence of land and labour, and force rural women and men to renegotiate their intra-household gender relations. These are not consequences specific to contemporary land grabs per se, but of agrarian capitalism more broadly. For example, Carney and Watts (1990) and Schroeder (1999) have shown that commercial agriculture and agroforestry schemes that were introduced in the 1980s in rural Gambia have resulted in the intensification of intra-household conflicts and the renegotiation of the conjugal contract regarding gender roles, divisions of labour, and property rights. Such gendered responses to agrarian capitalism can be understood as ‘struggles for social reproduction’. While clearly being material processes, these are at the same time “struggles over socially-constructed meanings, definitions, and identities” (Hart 1991, 95). In the remainder of the paper, I extend the theoretical discussion thus far to the case

of the BEE Sugar Project. I focus on the process of involuntary resettlement induced by the project, and the ways in which it erodes pre-existing modes of social reproduction.

2. A CASE STUDY: BEE SUGAR PROJECT

Acquiring 'land for equity'



Map 1. Coast Region, Tanzania

The BEE Sugar Project is a 99-year public-private partnership between the Tanzanian government and a Swedish company, EcoEnergy. The project is located in Bagamoyo District in the Coast Region of Tanzania (Map 1), approximately 80 kilometres northwest of Dar es Salaam, about 8 kilometres inland from the Indian Ocean, directly south of Saadani National Park, and situated within the Wami/Ruvu

River Basin, one of nine river basins draining mainland Tanzania.

This vast project, requiring over half a billion dollars, is being financed through a combination of loans, grants, and guarantees from international financial institutions (IFIs) and development agencies – mainly the African Development Bank (AfDB), the International Fund for Agriculture and Development (IFAD), and the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida). While the project was conceptualised in 2006, initially with the aim of producing ethanol for export to Europe, its current rationale is to produce sugar, electricity, and ethanol for the Tanzanian domestic

market, thereby contributing to national economic development (AfDB 2012a).³ The specific goals of the project are to: a) transfer technology and know-how to the Tanzanian sugar industry; b) create over 2,000 direct and up to 15,000 indirect new job opportunities; c) produce 130,000 tonnes of sugar, 10 million litre of ethanol, and 100,000 MWh/year of electricity to supply 100,000 rural households within the first three years of operation; and d) promote community development through an outgrower scheme involving 1,500 smallholder farmers around the main sugar estate (ibid.).

In May 2013, EcoEnergy was issued a title deed to a large portion of an “abandoned” state cattle ranch, known as Razaba.⁴ In line with the ‘land for equity’ model, the Tanzanian government granted EcoEnergy the right to occupy 20,374 hectares of general land (a category of public land⁵), free of encumbrance for 99 years, in exchange for a 10 per cent non-dilutable equity share at the financial close, and an additional 15 per cent after 18 years of project operation (Agro EcoEnergy 2014b). In the absence of freehold title in Tanzania, foreign investors can only obtain rights of occupancy or derivative rights to general land, granted by the President and issued by

³ The project was originally initiated in 2006 by SEKAB, one of the largest ethanol players Europe. Since the project inception, however, the company faced considerable challenges – legal, political, social, and financial – which have been documented extensively elsewhere (Chachage 2010; Havnevik and Haaland 2011; Havnevik et al. 2011).

⁴ Razaba (*Ranchi ya Zanzibar*) is known to have operated between 1974 to 1994, housing about 7,000 cattle and 300 employees (AfDB 2012b). The Environmental and Social Impact Assessment for the BEE Sugar Project indicates that the ranch shut down due to the challenge of keeping cattle year-round in an area infested with tsetse flies and the predation of livestock by lions and leopards from the Sadaani National Park, which lies north of the Wami River (Ibid).

⁵ According to the National Land Policy, all land in Tanzania is “public land vested in the President as trustee on behalf of all citizens” (URT 1997a, 9). Public land is divided into three categories: a) village land, b) reserved land, and c) general land (URT 1999a, Section 4). Village land, which comprises 70 per cent of all land in the country, is under the jurisdiction of the Village Council, and is governed by customary rules and practices, which have equal legal status as statutory law (URT 2013b). Reserved land is used for special purposes, such as national parks, forest and game reserves, and currently makes up about 28 per cent of all land in Tanzania (ibid.). Finally, general land refers to all other remaining land (currently two per cent), including “unoccupied or unused village land” (URT 1999a, Section 2). The land for the BEE Sugar Project is assumed to fall under this two per cent of general land, although this is contested by the local communities.

the Tanzanian Investment Centre (TIC) – the nation’s “one-stop” shop for foreign investors (URT 1997b). The TIC is mandated to maintain a “land bank”, an inventory of all land available for investment in the country. However, this database is incomplete and ineffectual, because the land parcels available in it are too few, small, and scattered, and therefore, unsuitable for large-scale investments (OECD 2013, Interview with a Ministry of Lands official, 21 August 2014). In the case of the BEE Sugar Project, while EcoEnergy initially contacted the TIC, the actual negotiation over the land is reported to have directly involved the Ministry of Lands, Ministry of Planning, Economy, and Empowerment, the Prime Minister’s Office, and the State House of President Jakaya Kikwete (Chachage 2010).⁶

Despite the *de jure* transfer of land in 2013, years of inactivity on the ground since the initial announcement of the project in 2006 have meant that the site had already become an epicentre of speculative and illegal property transactions. In November 2011, the District Commissioner’s Office resorted to erecting a notice board at the entrance of the project site that read: “Warning! Do not agree to buy land/farm in this area. This area, which used to be Razaba ranch... is public land, and the government is in the final stages of transferring the land to the investment company, EcoEnergy. Do not be deceived”. In early 2014, additional notice boards were erected to delineate the boundaries of the project site, and rangers were deployed to patrol the area. As of this writing, however, there is little project implementation on the ground. No bulk infrastructure or on-farm development is under way, such as the construction of haulage roads, bridges, power lines, water storage, processing plant, and the installation of irrigation systems. While EcoEnergy attributes this impasse to issues such as the uncertainty over the stability of the Tanzanian sugar industry and the pending

⁶ President Kikwete is a Bagamoyo native; in various parliamentary sessions, the Minister of Lands refers to the BEE Sugar Project as taking place in “our President’s backyard (*backyard ya Rais mwenyewe*)” (URT 2012b).

closure of the financial agreement with donors (The Guardian, 5 December 2014), there is a more fundamental reason for the delay. I argue that it is because the Tanzanian state and the Swedish company have not been able to resolve the issue of how to remove over 1,400 people who are currently occupying and subsisting on the land.

Land, livelihoods, people, and power

There are four main farming settlements whose residents are facing involuntary resettlement induced by the BEE Sugar Project: Bozi, Gama-Makaani, Kaloleni Biga, and Gobole. In addition to these farming communities, there are other populations, such as pastoralists, charcoal producers, seasonal fishermen, and food traders, who have set up semi-permanent residence throughout the project site over the past two decades. The exact size of population of the project area is difficult to estimate due to large numbers of transient populations and lack of census data at the village and sub-village levels. But triangulating from various sources, there are estimated to be over 1,400 people currently living and working on the land (AfDB 2012a; Interview with District Land Valuer, 31 July 2014). The local populations are ethnically diverse, representing a wide range of tribes, such as Zaramo, Doe, Kwere, Zigua, Nyamwezi, Gogo, Sukuma, Nyekyusa, Luguru, Hehe, Bondei, Dengereko, Kaguru, Fipa, Ha, Barabaig, among others. The Coast Region has historically been characterised by high levels of migration from the inland, and Bagamoyo was once the centre and terminus for the East African ivory and slave trade in the early nineteenth century.⁷

In terms of livelihoods, farming communities within the BEE project site cultivate subsistence food crops, such as maize, paddy rice, cassava, sweet potatoes, beans, cowpeas, pigeon peas, and sesame. Many households, particularly those in the northern

⁷ The name Bagamoyo (originally “Bwaga moyo”, with *bwaga* meaning “to throw down” and *moyo* meaning “heart”) initially meant a happy place where the caravanserai could rest or offload their heavy burdens after travelling long distances (“*tua mzigo unaoelemea moyo wako*”). Later, it took on a negative connotation: a place of despair, where the slaves lost all hope (“*kata tamaa*”) and became broken hearted (“*vunja moyo*”) as they were shipped off to the slave markets in Zanzibar.

part of the project site near the flood plains of the Wami River, intercrop food crops with fruits and nuts such as banana, mango, coconut, papaya, watermelon, and cashew, most of which are sold for supplementary income. Back gardens are often considered autonomous spaces for women, where they grow vegetables, such as tomatoes, okra, onions, green peppers, amaranth and sweet potato leaves. Women use these vegetables along with other legumes, meat, or fish to prepare side dishes or relishes (*mboga*) to serve with staple grain foods, or to sell at small kiosks or local markets. Few households grow sugarcane; for those who do, it is mostly for household consumption or for occasional sales to neighbours.

While systems of land tenure vary across tribe, lineage, religion, and etc., gender inequality in land inheritance remains a serious obstacle for women in Bagamoyo, as it is the case for most women in rural Tanzania. A woman's right to land is often determined by her marital status. When a woman marries a man, or when she is "wedded to (*-kuolewa*)" a man, as in Swahili language, she usually receives the right to access and use her husband's land. Unmarried women (e.g. daughters, divorcées, or widows) are systematically disadvantaged from land inheritance, according to both customary practices and Islamic law (Tsikata 2003; Ezer 2006). For pastoralists, the concept of private property or individual ownership of land is irrelevant, as pasture, grazing land, and water dams are used in common. For the Barabaig pastoralists in particular, the experience of enclosures and evictions is not new. They had already been dispossessed from their homelands, the Hanang Plains of Northern Tanzania, due to a large-scale wheat mechanisation project in the 1970s (see Tenga and Kakoti 1993; Lane 1994). Since then, they have been moving eastwards in search of grazing land for their large herds of livestock.⁸

⁸ In Barabaig culture, a person "who is successful in raising a large herd of cattle is socially recognised as being more knowledgeable and powerful than a person with a small herd" (Klima 1970, 32). Within the BEE Project Site, the average herd size per Barabaig household is about 350, although this number varies widely with some owning close to a thousand (AfDB 2012a).

As abovementioned, the land acquired by EcoEnergy was a former state cattle ranch, Razaba. Since its closure in the early 1990s, some of the ranch workers and their families settled in an area now known as *Bozi*, which is situated at the southern end of the BEE project site. All government officials I interviewed (at both district and ministerial levels) consider Bozi people as “invaders (*wanaovamia*)”, squatting on government land. Most, if not all, of Bozi residents are aware of the fact that they are living and working on land that is not legally theirs, and recognise the precarious nature of their land rights. However, their sense of belonging arises not from private ownership of land, but from the years of labour they have expended to clear, occupy, and use the land to socially reproduce their lives and livelihoods.

Stretching across the northeastern part of the BEE project site, immediately past the two remnant dams from the Razaba era, is a settlement known as *Gama-Makaani*. While the official position of the government is that the people of Gama-Makaani are unrecognised squatters, the residents insist otherwise. Both claims have some merit, but are clearly contradictory. When I first visited the project area in August 2013 and returned in July 2014, I was astonished by the proliferation of people, houses, and businesses (e.g. kiosks, fruit stands, butcher shops, hair salons), all of which had not existed a year beforehand. Some of the “new” Gama-Makaani residents I interviewed decided to settle there despite being aware of the planned BEE project and involuntary resettlement, due to the hardships of eking out a living and finding land for farming in urban areas. While some are ardently claiming the land as theirs, based on the physical effort and time they put in to clear and use the land before EcoEnergy, others are more passive, with higher willingness to migrate elsewhere if and when the project were to become operational. On the other hand, the elders of Gama-Makaani argue that they have historical claims to the land that they are occupying. They contend that the formal border of Razaba never exceeded beyond the two dams that mark the southern boundary of Gama-Makaani, and that even during Razaba’s operative years, people

farmed their land without any interference. In 2012, three male elders from Gama-Makaani filed two court cases against Bagamoyo District and EcoEnergy to claim their historical rights to the land and to counter the plans for involuntary resettlement; the lawsuits are still pending.⁹

Finally, at the northern border of the project site along the south bank of the Wami River are two sub-villages – *Kaloleni Biga and Gobole* – which are part of a larger village called Matipwili. This village overlaps with and stretches further north of the project site. Matipwili is a village that was established during the socialist era of the 1970s under the villagisation programme. During the time of villagisation, the southern border of Matipwili well extended into the current Gama-Makaani area. Whilst much of the current village activities (e.g. politics, schools, social services) take place north of the river, the southern sub-villages are considered to be the historical breadbasket of the village, due to high fertility of the floodplain soil. Just like the elders of Gama-Makaani, Matipwili elders argue that the former cattle ranch never encroached the village lands past the two Razaba dams. As one male elder who lived through the opening and the closure of the ranch laments: “It is not true that the government just gave Razaba land to EcoEnergy. They also decided to give away our land without telling us!” (Interview, 25 July 2014).

The grievance of Matipwili villagers has further intensified in recent months, with the issuance of the new village map by the District Land Office, which has arbitrarily reassigned the village borders and erased all of the southern sub-villages from existence. As of September 2014, the village leaders have not signed-off on this new map. A Ministry of Lands official, with whom I spoke about this matter, stated authoritatively: “The government has fixed the problem of overlapping land claims.

⁹ The elders are adamant that the BEE Sugar Project and involuntary resettlement will not move forward unless the court cases have been resolved, and until their historical land claims have been recognised. However, a recent draft report commissioned by the Ministry of Lands states that the position of Gama-Makaani residents is *not* sustained (URT 2013b: xx).

The land was granted to EcoEnergy, so the village borders needed to be redrawn. You know all land in Tanzania is public land, so there is nothing wrong with the government doing its job” (Interview, 20 August 2014). This statement reflects the dominant ontology of viewing land as an arena of state activity and a factor of production. The local populations fully understand that all land is legally owned by the state and that the President has the prerogative in how the land is to be used and developed. However, they resist the purely productivist notion of land by embodying a much larger vision of land as their site and source of social reproduction. As I will soon demonstrate, this disjuncture between different meanings of land becomes salient during the interstitial stage of imminent involuntary resettlement, particularly through the process of compensation valuation.



Photo 1. A notice board erected in early 2014 within the BEE Project Site. N.B. Gama-Makaani is not recognised on the map due to the pending court case.



Photo 2. Wami River and the agricultural landscape in Matipwili Village

3. UNSETTLING INVOLUNTARY RESETTLEMENT

As a condition attached to IFI loans, EcoEnergy is required to follow what is known as ‘international best practice’ on involuntary resettlement in addition to complying with Tanzanian national laws. The international guidelines here refer to the World Bank’s (2001) Operational Policy/Bank Procedures 4.12, the International Finance Corporation’s (2012) Performance Standard 5, and the AfDB’s (2003) Involuntary Resettlement Policy. These mechanisms are intended to help planners of development projects avoid or minimize involuntary resettlement wherever possible; but when unavoidable, conceive and execute resettlement as “sustainable development programs” (World Bank 2001, 1); and consult with and assist displaced persons to improve, or at least to restore, their livelihoods and living standards. In Tanzania, there

are no direct laws or policies on involuntary resettlement, apart from legal requirements for ensuring compensation for compulsory land acquisitions, as stipulated in the national Constitution, Land Acquisition Act of 1967, the National Land Policy of 1995, and the Land Act and the Village Land Act of 1999.

There are some major discrepancies between what is required by Tanzanian law versus what is recommended as international best practice. First, while the latter recommends that compensation be provided for *all* populations requiring resettlement regardless of whether or not they have legal rights to the land they are occupying, the former stipulates otherwise. Hence, because it is international best practice to provide resettlement assistance to even “invaders” (i.e. people of Bozi and Gama-Makaani), the Tanzanian state has reluctantly agreed to provide what the Bagamoyo District Commissioner calls “compensation of compassion” (The Citizen 2014, 2). Second, while Tanzanian law requires one-off payment of compensation (usually cash, unless the government decides otherwise), it is considered international best practice to provide people with the option between cash or in-kind compensation. IFIs also recommend ongoing monitoring and evaluation so as to ensure that there will be a “demonstrable improvement in people’s lives” before and after resettlement (AfDB 2012a, 144). Notwithstanding the differences, I argue that there are two shared assumptions, both of which have far-reaching consequences for rural social reproduction.

First, involuntary resettlement is assumed to be a problem best solved through the knowledge of “experts”. Tanzanian law stipulates that the assessment of all compensation for displacement induced by compulsory land acquisitions “shall be prepared by qualified valuer... and verified by the Chief Valuer of the Government or his [*sic*] representative” (URT 2001, Sections 11-12). The IFIs similarly recommend that the project proponents use “a panel of independent, reputed resettlement experts...[to] help capture international best practice” (World Bank 2004, 325). The IFIs further conceptualise involuntary resettlement as a technical ‘project within a project’ (Cernea

2008) such that the solution to the problem created by development (i.e. involuntary resettlement) is more development! Consider the following from the World Bank (2004, xvii): “Implementing resettlement as a development program not only helps the people who are adversely affected but also promotes easier, less-troubled implementation of development projects”. In order for this logic to make sense, however, development must be cast as a transparent, ethical, and power-neutral object, or what Ferguson (1990) calls an ‘anti-politics machine’. When depoliticised as such, agrarian displacement and dispossession become problems to be fixed by technical “experts”, and no longer intrinsic and abiding features of capitalism.

Second, both the Tanzanian law and international guidelines assume that the costs of displacement and dispossession can be measured and compensated for whether in cash or in kind.¹⁰ Tanzanian law states that replacement land for displaced populations should be of “comparable quality, extent and productive potential to the land lost” (URT 2001, Section 25). The IFIs similarly recommend that it should be of “equal productive value” (AfDB 2012a, 39). For crops, it is considered international best practice to value them according to their “earning capacity” (ibid., 147); the Tanzanian Ministry of Lands also publishes an annual ‘Crop Compensation Schedule’ to indicate the market value of each crop that is considered compensable (Interview with District Land Valuer, 31 July 2014).

In the context of the BEE Sugar Project, only cash crops, such as fruit and nut trees (e.g. banana, mango, cashew, papaya), were considered worthy of compensation, since it was assumed that subsistence food crops have no exchange value and that they would be harvested, consumed, or stored before relocation. It was further assumed that

¹⁰ In terms of cash compensation, it is considered international best practice to base the calculations on *replacement cost* of land and other unexhausted at the time of resettlement. On the other hand, Tanzanian law specifies that the rate of compensation be based on the *market value* of land and unexhausted improvements at the time of valuation, minus depreciation, plus allowances for accommodation, transport, and loss of profit on businesses, if applicable (URT 2001, Part III).

there would be “a seamless transition for the next planting season on the replacement land” (ibid.). However, decades of research on development-induced displacement and resettlement tell us precisely that there is hardly ever any “seamless” transition after forced migration (c.f. Colson 1971; Cernea 1997; Scutter 2005; World Bank 2014). This is because people often tend to be compensated with smaller plots of land with poorer quality soil compared to the ones they have been dispossessed from, and because it takes time for people to experiment with and get accustomed to farming on new land. More importantly, it is because people lose access to common resources, which are indispensable (particularly for women) for ensuring food security and overall well-being of their families and communities – i.e. for ensuring the continuity of social reproduction.

Indeed, my in-depth interviews with people living in the BEE project site revealed a wide variety of common resources, particularly indigenous tree species, on which they depend for their social reproduction. Some of these are compiled in Table 1. In addition to their materiality as sources of food, fuel, fibre, medicine, and building material, some of these resources carry symbolic and gendered meanings. For instance, *mkole*, a tree that bears small edible fruits and has pliant branches, symbolises female fertility and matriliney for the Zaramo – one of the original peoples of the Swahili coast (c.f. Swantz 1995; James 2006).¹¹ In Zaramo mythology, female elephants are believed to hide in the *mkole* woods during menstruation and gestation, by enclosing the area with the branches tied together. This timing coincides with the season when the *mkole* fruits reach maturity and turn colours from white to green to red to black. While elephants are no longer part of the daily lives of the Zaramo, this symbolism of *mkole* is still present in the initiation rites to womanhood for pubertal girls. As James (2006, 188) notes, “[by] living longer than a single human life-time, a *mkole* tree literally binds

¹¹ The Zaramo word for clan is *lukolo*, and *mkolo* translates as “the one with the clan” (Swantz 1995, 71).

generations together as one site of repeated ritual practices; it is the site of stories about the origin of life; and it gives its name to the process of connecting lives”.

In addition, people of the Bondei tribe, living within the BEE Project Site, embody particular knowledge about motherhood linked to a small tree, called *kikulagembe*. In Bondei culture, a woman, who becomes pregnant again while still exclusively breastfeeding her first child, may decide to bathe him/her in the water in which the *kikulagembe* root was boiled. This symbolic and immaterial labour helps to ensure that the child will receive adequate nutrition and affection he/she needs to develop, despite the changes in the quantity and quality of breast milk that comes with the mother’s pregnancy.

While these local resources are not commodities with exchange value, and hence not compensable under Tanzanian law and international best practice, they embody immaterial cultural values and knowledges that are passed on intergenerationally as significant part of rural social reproduction. As Lassailly-Jacob (1996) argues, the reason why most involuntary resettlement operations have failed in Africa is precisely because resettlement planners and local populations have different visions about what land is and how it is valued. Whilst the former are fixated on “productivity and profitability”, the latter are more concerned about “a wide range of social, cultural, and religious elements, as well as the productive factor” (ibid., 196). The problem is not so much that there are differences in perspectives, but that certain visions become valorised while others are devalued and delegitimised. As one widow poignantly remarks:

“You know, there is a difference between the way you see things, and the way I see things. Poor people like me – we haven’t been educated, but it doesn’t mean that we don’t know what is valuable to us on our land. Yet, to those educated people, some things we have on our land do not seem to have value. Mangoes, cashews, and bananas – we plant them nearby; they are easily seen on our farms and in markets in town. But there are trees in the bush and in the wild, which outsiders cannot see, but we know where they are and still depend on them for our lives... We have been ignored. Our culture has been erased” (Interview, 25 July 2014).

Table 1. Indigenous tree species found in the BEE project site

Local Name	Botanical Name	Uses
Muarubaini, Mwarobaini	<i>Azadirachta indica</i>	Medicine (fever, malaria, insect bites, skin infections, muscle aches and pains, dental diseases, respiratory diseases), other household uses (soap, toothpaste)
Mkunju, Mkuyu	<i>Ficus sycamorus</i>	Fuelwood, edible fruit, medicine (abdominal pains and stomach disorders, etc.)
Mzigunga	<i>Acacia zanzibarica</i>	Fuelwood, medicine (stomach disorders)
Mcheji	<i>Manilkara sulcata</i>	Medicine (snake bites, measles, skin rash, etc.)
Muangaa, Mwangaa	<i>Terminalia spinosa</i>	Fuelwood, medicine (cough, chest problems, etc.), building material
Mchaaka, Mchalaka	<i>Spirostachys africana</i>	Fuelwood, building material
Mkwaju	<i>Tamaraindus Indica</i>	Fuelwood, charcoal, edible fruit, fibre, medicine (measles, abdominal pain, stomach disorders, wound healing, etc.)
Kikulagembe, Mkulagembe,	<i>Dichrostachys cinerea</i>	Fuelwood, charcoal, medicine (stomach and menstrual disorders, arthritis, toothache etc.), building material
Mkwamaba	<i>Flueggea virosa</i>	Fuelwood, edible fruit, medicine (liver, bile, kidney, urinary diseases, reproductive disorders, wound healing, lactation disorders)
Mkole	<i>Grewia bicolor</i>	Fuelwood, edible fruit, medicine (common cold, stomach disorders, wound healing, snake bite, syphilis, etc.), building material
Mkoko	<i>Rhizophora mucronata</i>	Fuelwood, medicine (wound healing), construction material
Mkwingwina	<i>Sorindeia madagascariensis</i>	Edible fruit, medicine (malaria, tuberculosis, menstrual disorders, etc.)
Mzambarau	<i>Syzygium cumini</i>	Fuelwood, edible fruit, medicinal (soar throat, bronchitis, asthma, etc.), building material
Mpera	<i>Psidium guajava</i>	Edible fruits, fuelwood, medicine (stomach disorders)

Source: Author's Fieldwork; Hines and Eckman (1993); Quattrocchi (2012)

4. STRUGGLES FOR SOCIAL REPRODUCTION

Becoming eligible for compensation

In 2011, EcoEnergy hired a consultancy firm to design a Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) in accordance with the international best practice. In preparation for the RAP, a census, also known as the People and Property Count (PPC), was conducted from October to November 2011 to determine the total number of people that are eligible for compensation and to value their land and unexhausted improvements. The PPC was conducted in teams consisting of government land valuers, surveyors, and employees of the resettlement consultancy firm, who participated as observers (AfDB 2012a).

Eligibility for compensation was based on the “cut-off” date, the first day of PPC for each community, after which no new residents and no additional permanent improvements on the land would be compensated (AfDB 2012a, 65). That is, if people decided to plant new mango trees, or build new houses after the cut-off date, they would not be provided with additional compensation beyond what had already been valued. However, apart from this eligibility criterion, the government authorities employed their own standards, where they decided to count only those households whose adult members were present at the time of the census. As one woman notes: “[The PPC team] visited my home multiple times, and I had to be there at all times. I didn’t know when exactly they were planning to come. I couldn’t leave the house, because I was afraid that my family and I won’t be able to receive any compensation.” (Interview, 21 August 2013). Single mothers, divorcées, and widows who were the only adults in their households felt these constraints even more severely. They worried that the PPC teams would come visit when they were taking their children to school, when they went to fetch water and to cut firewood, and when they went to work in their fields away from their homes. Moreover, since the census took place in the beginning of the short rainy season, they worried about being robbed of their time for doing farm

work, especially when they were already facing labour shortages compared to married households.

As the PPC started, each eligible person was given an official form, called 'Land Form 69a'. This document specifies that the recipient of the form has the right to have his or her assets valued, and to claim compensation in accordance with the land laws. The PPC teams would return on another day with another document, called 'Valuation Form 1', to record all necessary details, such as the identification number of the individual, his/her name, date and location of the census, a sketch map and measurement of houses and other structures built on the land, the types, numbers, and the approximate maturity rates of different crops and trees. While government authorities are generally recommended to leave a copy of Valuation Form 1 upon completion of the PPC (so that people know what they can claim once compensation is scheduled), few households I interviewed possessed a copy. If they had a copy, it was under the name of the male head of the household (unless the households were female-headed). In addition, the PPC teams, with the assumption that men would be the ones collecting compensation, took photographic records of only the male heads of households; the photographs would later be used as a cross-referencing tool so that the compensation is adequately matched to the correct household (AfDB 2012a).

During my household interviews with both husbands and wives, none of the women expressed misgivings about the PPC teams' preferred practice of dealing with men. Even when wives were interviewed separately, they noted how such practice was considered "normal (*kwa kawaida*)" because their husbands, and men in general, are the "clever ones (*wajanja*)" with more "authority and ability (*nguvu na uwezo*)" than/over women. Even though they saw this as "normal", they cautiously admitted, upon further probing, that they were apprehensive about what was happening. They knew that their husbands would ultimately be the ones collecting and controlling the cash compensation, and they feared that it would be misappropriated. Nearly all women

interviewed speculated that their husbands would use the money or and run away with it to pay bridewealth for younger and more beautiful women, while leaving them and their children destitute. In particular, women of the Barabaig tribe, in which polygyny is actively encouraged as a sign of wealth, noted that some husbands have already taken on more wives or mistresses, using the prospect of cash compensation as credit. They despaired the emotional stress they felt when forced to accept new wives, and the fact that they cannot but keep quiet about their grievances for the fear of being beaten by their husbands. As one Barabaig woman shares: "If I question my husband's authority, he will get angry, he will shout, he will beat me, even in front of children" (Interview, 17 August 2013). Some women believed that perhaps their husbands were strategically trying to increase their household size with the hopes of getting a bigger house as part of in-kind compensation. However, husbands have were not the only ones who tried to take advantage of the prospective compensation and the vulnerable social position of women. For instance, some widows were threatened by their deceased husbands' male relatives to take cash rather than in-kind compensation. They claimed that the land (and the cash that will eventually flow from it) belongs to the husband's family according to their interpretation of customary and Islamic law. All in all, what were considered strategic moves by men were in fact experienced as torment for women.

Soon after the completion of the PPC in 2011, it became evident that the census data was not comprehensive and accurate. In fact, there was an undercounting of populations that were eligible for compensation, and an overcounting of non-eligible outsiders who opportunistically showed up in the project area in hopes of reaping cash benefits. In early 2014, a second PPC was conducted, not to re-assess the valuations done three years ago, but to include those households that were omitted in the first round. However, the PPC teams were liable to similar (if not more considerable) inconsistencies as in 2011. For instance, those who were not eligible for compensation (i.e. those who moved into the project site well after cut-off date) were given Land

Forms 69a, raising false expectations for cash rewards, while those that were actually eligible were not given any forms and again excluded from the census. Several households that had already been included in the initial PPC were counted again by mistake, and were given re-valuations of the improvements they had made on their land since 2011.

This made other households extremely anxious; they were baffled as to why some households were selectively (or accidentally) re-assessed, while others were not. Some households that had decided to plant additional permanent crops since the cut-off date, but were not included in the second PPC, were uncertain as to whether they, too, would be eligible for additional compensation. What confused them even further was the conflicting information they received from the government valuers and the resettlement consultants. While the government authorities were adamant that additional permanent crops would not be compensated whatsoever, the consultants were more ambiguous, telling some households that they would be “paid double” for whatever was recorded in 2011 (Interview, 23 July 2014), while informing others that an “average rate” of compensation will be applied to all households (Interview, 1 August 2014).

Overall, the uncertainty surrounding involuntary resettlement has been a major stranglehold on the continuity of social reproduction for many households. Living in limbo – i.e. waiting for something, anything, to happen – has been psychologically debilitating for people whose lives and livelihoods are dependent on the land, and many women and men referred to how they were tired of being treated like children (*watoto*), herd animals (*wanyama*), or imbeciles (*wabumbumbu*), who were unable to take control of the direction of their own lives and livelihoods. Consider the following two testimonies from a man and a woman, suggesting the extent to which their social reproduction has been arrested, and how they are unsure of how to reimagine their life trajectories:

“You see, we are being tricked. It’s a mind game. We are told that compensation will be paid in three months. Then they [resettlement consultants] come back just shy of the third month to tell us that we will have to wait another three months. If they tell us that compensation will be delayed for a year, they know that farmers will riot... Many people are giving up hope in farming. I mean, which farmer in his/her right mind would want to make an effort to plough and sow cassava, which takes anywhere from six months to a year to grow, when they are being promised that they will be resettled in three months’ time?” (Interview, 1 August 2014).

“Had I known that resettlement would be delayed so much, and had I known that we would be evaluated again, I would have added more permanent crops to my land. But whom do I ask these things? They [government authorities and the resettlement consultants] drive past in their big cars, but I rarely get to stop them and ask questions. So sister, tell me, should I just start growing permanent crops now? I cannot live on maize and tomatoes alone” (Interview, 28 July 2014).

Becoming prepped for resettlement

In order to “prepare” the local populations for resettlement, or to foster their “mind-set changes” (AfDB 2012a, 24), the resettlement consultants have been providing a series of livelihood and skills training programmes with financial support from EcoEnergy. Known as the “Early Measures”, the training modules include basic literacy, entrepreneurship, driving, carpentry, catering, baking, tailoring, hairdressing, horticulture, poultry keeping, among others. These trainings are designed so that people can “seamlessly begin to support their families following resettlement and work towards a more productive future” (ibid., 160).

Most of my interviewees had taken part in some kind of training since 2012, but they had mixed feelings about their overall experience. Since many training courses required participants to take up temporary residence in Bagamoyo Town and commute to training venues for anywhere between two weeks to eight weeks, it meant that participants and/or their families needed to have sufficient income or social ties in urban areas to arrange for food, accommodation, and transport. In addition to wealth and social network as determining factors of participation, gender, age, ethnicity, and

education levels, also played a critical role. Mothers with young children often could not participate without the permission or agreement of their spouses. Not only did most women not have the financial means to hire someone to look after housework and care work, but societal gender norms also limited their mobility outside the domestic sphere. It was common to find wives whose husbands' had taken part in trainings, but they themselves could not because of their housework and care responsibilities. One man explained nonchalantly: "Whether the husband or the wife takes part [in training] is a household decision. And men are heads of households, so what we decide is ultimately the family decision. Women have to cook, clean, wash dishes, fetch water, cut firewood, take care of children, so men have more time to go out and do things like to get training" (Interview, 22 Aug 2013). Ethnic minorities, namely the Barabaig pastoralists, majority of whom do not speak Swahili and whose levels of education attainment are low, were often excluded from participation beyond literacy training. None of the elderly people I interviewed (65 and above) took part in any type of training. As a disabled elderly woman deploras: "I am like a child. I am not told anything about resettlement, what the trainings are for, and what kind of training is available in the first place. I am just waiting to be packed away like a piece of luggage. My soul is crying inside" (Interview, 25 Aug 2014).

However, even for those who participated, the purpose of the trainings remained elusive. One woman, who was able to take part in a two-month tailoring course after intense negotiation and bargaining with her husband, explains how she was disillusioned by the promise of skills training:

"There were five people in my course: two men and three women. During the two months, we learned how to use the sewing machines and to cut fabric. There was one man in my group, who used to be a tailor, but he lacked practical experience. After being trained for two months, he is now working as a tailor in Matipwili earning a small income. There was another girl – I think her parents took her to another place after the training so she can continue to learn more skills. But the rest of us, including myself, we are doing nothing with what we learned. Our teacher said in order for us

to become a proper tailor, we need to be trained for at least a year. She said some people are still not good even after being trained for a year.... On the day we received our certificates of completion, there was a big ceremony. Many people came, including the District Commissioner. There was a lot of commotion and many pictures were taken of us. I felt confused and uncomfortable. I think the trainings are conducted not to help us, but to show that the company is doing something nice for poor people" (Interview, 23 July 2014).

Ultimately, the Early Measures are intended to help displaced populations to take advantage of various employment and contractor opportunities that may arise with the implementation of the sugarcane project – i.e. once the local populations have been dispossessed from their land and have nothing but their “free” labour to sell. Put differently, the trainings are promoted as preliminary mechanisms for inducing people to branch out as “entrepreneurs” into the unregulated or ‘informal’ sector. There are, in fact, over 30 references to “entrepreneurs”, “entrepreneurial”, or “entrepreneurship” in the RAP. This enthusiasm, however, obscures the precarious nature of informal labour, which is likely to exacerbate in situations of uncertainty and vulnerability associated with involuntary resettlement. It further depoliticises the fact that farmers and pastoralists are being deliberately deskilled of their subsistence skills, and being dislodged from their site of social reproduction, where their socio-cultural identities, ecological knowledges, and historical memories have taken root for generations. Regardless, abstract notions of “entrepreneurship”, “skills development”, and “job creation” are being proselytized as beacon of development.

CONCLUSION

The BEE Sugar Project is a prime example of how similar large-scale public-private agricultural projects will take shape in Tanzania in the coming decades under the banner of green revolution. Given that such endeavours require the enclosure of large tracts of contiguous land, which are often occupied and/or accessed by peasants and

pastoralists to varying extents, the extent of forced population displacements are bound to become more ubiquitous. As aptly put by Geisler and Makki (2013, 3), what is at stake with increasing capitalist pressures on rural landscapes is the loss of “cultural practices, collective memories, and social ecologies that for centuries connected social reproduction to seasons, natural cycles, and the organic rhythms of human existence”.

Through the case of the BEE Sugar Project, I attempted to make three inter-related arguments in this paper. First, engaging with the concept of social reproduction allows us to gain a richer understanding of the gendered processes and outcomes of land grabbing. Social reproduction is key to understanding the multiple uses and values of land and labour (and the intricate mixing of the two into diverse labour processes) that give meaning to life for agrarian households. It also highlights the constitutive role of gender in shaping and defining peoples’ relationships to and experiences on the land, and in signifying relations of power within households.

Second, land grabbing (more precisely, land grab-induced involuntary resettlement) fragments pre-existing modes of rural social reproduction by systematically devaluing and delegitimising the polyvalence of land and labour. In the case of the BEE Sugar Project, this was made possible through the technical “expertise” of government land valuers, surveyors, and third-party resettlement consultants, who determined the value of land and other unexhausted improvements solely according to the rules of the market. I emphasised that such technical and productivist approach obscures the socio-ecological knowledges, cultural practices, and historical memories, which are deeply rooted on the land, strongly articulated through gender, and passed on intergenerationally as significant part of rural social reproduction.

Third, the highly uncertain nature of imminent involuntary resettlement forces rural women and men to renegotiate their intra-household gender relations. Households within the BEE Project Site find it extremely difficult to carry on socially reproducing their lives and livelihoods, while having to come to terms with land use

restrictions, inconsistent information about compensation, inappropriate skills trainings, and other processes that shape their everyday experiences of the land deal. Yet, the ways in which rural women and men respond to living in limbo are simultaneously informed and constrained by, and perpetuate the patriarchal ideologies that are entrenched within households.

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